State: Arizona
Volume: 242
Term: 2017-2017
Jurisdiction(s): Arizona
Source: https://static.case.law/ariz/242.pdf

a

391 P.3d 1193
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v
Dustin GILL, Appellant.
No. CR-16-0286-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed April 18, 2017

nw

* Justice John R. Lopez IV has recused himself
from this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Rebecca

LL

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Joseph T.
Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals
Section, Jana Zinman (argued), Assistant At-
torney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State
of Arizona

Marty Lieberman, Legal Defender, Mari-
copa County Office of the Legal Defender,
Cynthia Dawn Beck (argued), Deputy Legal
Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Dustin Gill

Randy McDonald, Osborn Maledon PA,
Phoenix, and Mikel Steinfeld, Maricopa
County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attor-
neys for Criminal Justice

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the
opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES
BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLIOK, GOULD,
and BERCH (Retired) * joined.

White Berch, Justice of the Arizona Supreme

Court (Retired), was designated to sit in this
matter,

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the
Court:

411 Arizona Rule of Evidence 410(a)(4) re-
quires a court to exclude statements made by
a defendant during plea discussions with a
prosecutor if the discussions do not result in
a guilty plea, This case concerns whether
statements made in furtherance of a deferred
prosecution agreement are protected by Rule
410(a)(4). We hold that this evidentiary rule
does not apply to discussions about deferred
prosecution and that a knowing waiver of its
provisions does not require specifically refer-
encing the rule,

L

12 In 2018, a private security guard found
Dustin Gill in a restroom stall with several
grams of marijuana, The State charged Gill
with possession or use of marijuana, a class 6
felony. In June 2014, Gill rejected a plea
agreement during a comprehensive pretrial
conference. In July, the State reduced Gill’s
charge to a class 1 misdemeanor. At a Sep-
tember 8 settlement conference, Gill agreed
to participate in a drug treatment program
through the Treatment Assessment Screen-
ing Center (“TASC”) in return for the State
deferring the prosecution.

13 Immediately after accepting the de-
ferred prosecution agreement, Gill and his
attorney met with a TASC representative to
register for the diversion program. During
the meeting, Gill completed a form titled,
‘Maricopa County Attorney/TASC Drug Di-
version Program Statement of Facts.” On the
form, Gill initialed that he understood his
Miranda rights and avowed that “I fully
understand that what I have written here
may be used against me in a court of law
should I fail to satisfactorily complete the
TASC program.” When required to describe
the facts of the offense on the form, Gill
wrote the following admission: “The marijua-
na was found in the bathroom on the ground
in my possession,”

14 In December 2014, the State resumed
the prosecution because Gill had failed to
attend TASC seminars and had tested posi-
tive for alcohol and marijuana while in the
TASC program. Gill subsequently moved to

3

suppress the statements he gave to TASC on
September 8, arguing in part that they were
made during plea discussions and conse-
quently protected by Rule 410. The trial
court denied Gill’s motion.

95 After a bench trial, the trial court
found Gill guilty, suspended his sentence, and
placed him on one year of unsupervised pro-
bation. Gill appealed. Rejecting Gill’s argu-
ments that his statements to TASC were
inadmissible under Rule 410(a)(4), the court
of appeals held that the statements were not
made to a prosecutor during plea discussions
and Gill had, in any event, waived the rule’s
protections, State v. Gill, 240 Ariz. 229, 280-
81 997-9, 877 P.8d 1024, 1025-26 (App.
2016).

6 We granted review to address whether
Rule 410(a)(4) applies to deferred prosecu-
tion agreements, a legal issue of statewide
importance, We have jurisdiction under arti-
ele 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S. § 12-120.24,

IL

Hs 17 We review a trial court’s admis-
sion of evidence for an abuse of discretion,
State v, Tucker, 215 Aviz. 298, 318 146, 160
P.8d 177, 192 (2007), and we review de novo
the interpretation of the Arizona Rules of
Evidence. State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 9
111, 365 P.3d 358, 361 (2016).

18 Rule 410(a)(4) provides that “a state-
ment made during plea discussions with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority” is not
admissible against the defendant who partici-
pated in the plea discussions “if the discus-
sions did not result in a guilty plea or they
resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.”
See also Ariz, R. Crim. P. 17.4(f) (“The ad-
missibility or inadmissibility of a plea, a plea
discussion, and any related statement is gov-
erned by Arizona Rule of Evidence 410.)
Gill argues that his statements to TASC are
inadmissible because they were made in fur-
therance of plea discussions, the TASC rep-
resentative acted as the prosecutor’s agent,
and Gill did not waive Rule 410’s protections.

4 [|

A.

Hl 19 Gill first contends that his state-
ments to TASC are protected by Rule
410(a)(4) because they were made in further-
ance of a plea discussion. In rejecting this
argument, the court of appeals held that
Rule 410(a)(4) did not apply because diseus-
sions about deferred prosecution are not plea
discussions and Gill made his statements to
TASC “after he rejected a plea offer.” Gill,
240 Ariz, at 280 17, 877 P.8d at 1025, Wheth-
er statements are protected by Rule 410 first,
depends on whether plea discussions, in fact,
occurred. We look to the record to answer
this question.

110 On September 3, Gill attended a set-
tlement conference with his father, his attor-
ney, a Maricopa County prosecutor, and a
court commissioner, The commissioner noted
that the settlement conference concerned
whether Gill would proceed to trial or “par-
ticipate in [TASC] diversion.” No other op-
tion was mentioned. As the commissioner
described the benefits of TASC and the risks
of trial, Gill’s father interjected that his son
would have to “plead guilty” in order to
participate in TASC. Immediately, the com-
missioner and prosecutor both corrected
Gill’s father, emphasizing that Gill would not
be pleading guilty but agreeing to “deferred
prosecution.” After the commissioner clari-
fied the TASC program as “diversion in lieu
of prosecution,” Gill's father asked again
whether his son would have to plead guilty.
This time, both the commissioner and Gill’s
counsel emphasized that Gill would not have
to do so in order to enter TASC. The com-
missioner then concluded the conference by
giving Gill time to speak with his father
about either proceeding to trial or participat-
ing in TASC. Later that day, Gill completed
his TASC registration paperwork, including
the Statement of Facts form in which he
admitted to possessing marijuana. The State
then suspended Gill’s prosecution while he
participated in TASC.

{11 The record reflects that the Septem-
ber 3 settlement conference concerned only
the alternatives of a trial or a deferred prose-
cution agreement, and did not involve a plea
offer or agreement. Neither the September 3
transcript nor the minute entry states that

Gill was offered or rejected a plea agree-
ment, Indeed, the fact’ that the court, prose-
cutor, and Gill’s own counsel twice explained
that Gill would not have to plead guilty in
order to participate in TASC underscored
that the September 3 settlement conference
did not involve a plea agreement,

712 Moreover, as the court of appeals
correctly noted, discussions about deferred
prosecution are categorically different from
plea discussions, A plea discussion entails the
prosecutor and defendant negotiating wheth-
er the defendant will plead guilty or no con-
test to a criminal offense in exchange for
some concession by the prosecutor on any
aspect of the disposition of the ease. See Ariz.
R. Evid. 410(a)(1)-@) (noting discussions
about “a guilty plea” or “no contest plea”);
Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz, 145, 147, 894
P.2d 688, 690 (1995) (defining plea negotia-
tions on “any aspect of the disposition of the
case” pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence
17.4(a) to mean that “‘the State and the
defendant may bargain both as to the plea of
guilty and as to the sentence to be im-
posed. ”) (quoting State v, Superior Court,
125 Ariz, 575, 577, 611 P.2d 928, 980 (1980);
see also United States v. Levy, 578 F.2d 896,
901 (2d Cir.1978) (“Plea bargaining implies
an offer to plead guilty upon condition. The
offer by the defendant must, in some way,
express the hope that a concession to reduce
the punishment will come to pass”).

HH 1113 A deferred prosecution discus-
sion, on the other hand, involves a defendant
and prosecutor negotiating whether the de-
fendant will participate in “a special supervi-
sion program” in which the state “divert[s] or
defer[s], before a guilty plea or a trial, the
prosecution of a person who is accused of
committing a crime.” ARS. § 11-361. A
defendant participates in this supervision
program before “a guilty plea or a trial,” and
so it is a type of pretrial diversion. Jd, If the
defendant satisfactorily completes the pre-
trial supervision program, the court dismiss-
es the charges. Ariz, R. Crim. P. 88,3(0). A
deferred prosecution agreement can result in
a dismissal of all charges, whereas a guilty
plea will not because the defendant formally
admits committing a criminal offense. See
DeNaples v. Office of Comptroller of Curren-

cy, 706 F.8d 481, 489 (D.C. Cir.2018) (noting
that “[a] plea bargain, for instance, would not
be a pretrial diversion, no matter its similari-
ty to pretrial diversion for other purposes”),
Thus, discussions about deferred prosecu-
tions differ from plea discussions and there-
fore are not governed by Rule 410 or Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.4(f).

Hl 114 Contrary to Gill’s contention, the
September 8 settlement conference did not
begin as a plea discussion and then morph
into a discussion about deferred prosecution.
Although Rule 410 conceivably could apply if
plea negotiations also involve discussions
about deferred prosecution, no such circum-
stances existed here. Because no plea discus-
sion occurred on September 3, Rule 410 does
not apply. We add, however, that courts
should not limit Rule 410 more narrowly than
the rule’s text. Just because a defendant
makes statements ajter rejecting a plea offer
does not necessarily mean that those subse-
quent statements were not made during plea
discussions. The category of statements
made “during plea discussions” is larger than
merely statements made “before rejecting a
plea offer,” because plea discussions may in-
volve a series of offers, rejections, and coun-
ter-offers before they are successfully con-
cluded or terminated. We therefore disagree
with the court of appeals’ suggestion that
Rule 410 does not apply merely because Gill
made his statements after rejecting a plea
offer,

B

HI 115 Because the issue is recurring,
we also address Gill’s argument that, al-
though the TASC representative was not an
attorney, Rule 410 should nevertheless apply
because the representative was the prosecu-
tor’s agent. The court of appeals rejected this
argument because Rule 410 only protects
statements made to “an attorney for the
prosecuting authority” and the TASC repre-
sentative was not an attorney. Gill, 240 Ariz,
at 230 18, 877 P.8d at 1025.

HI {16 Arizona courts have implicitly
recognized that Rule 410 extends to a prose-
eutor’s agents, See State v. Campoy, 220
Ariz, 589, 548 16, 548 1 25, 207 P.8d 792, 796,

5

801 (App. 2009) (holding that Rule 410 pro-
tected statements made by defendant to two
police detectives pursuant to a free talk
agreement with no prosecutor present).
Some federal courts and state supreme
courts have expressly reached the same con-
clusion. See, e.g., United States v. McCauley,
715 F.8d 1119, 1126 (8th Cir.2013) (holding
that Rule 410’s protection extends to agents
with express or implied authority to negoti-
ate on behalf of prosecutor); Clutter v. Com-
monwealih, 864 S.W.8d 185, 188 (Ky.2012),
We agree with those decisions and therefore
reject the State’s contention that Rule 410
only applies to attorneys for the prosecuting
authority and not to agents authorized by
prosecutors to negotiate pleas,

Hl 117 Although Rule 410 extends to the
prosecutor’s agents, the TASC representa-
tive here was not an agent for purposes of
negotiating a plea, Whether a private party
acts as a state agent depends on 1) the
government’s knowledge and acquiescence
and 2) the intent of the private party. See
State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 888, 391-92 131,
212 P.8d 75, 83-84 (App. 2009), Gill maintains
that the TASC representative was a state
agent because the name of the county attor-
ney’s office appears .on the Statement of
Facts form and TASC requires an admission
of guilt on that form pursuant to the county
attorney’s mandate.

118 However, these facts do not make the
TASC representative the prosecutor’s agent
for purposes of negotiating a plea. As previ-
ously noted, Gill did not negotiate a plea
during the September 8 settlement confer-
ence, Although the prosecutor told Gill at the
conference that he had to make an admission
to TASC in order to participate in the diver-
sion program, the TASO representative ob-
tained Gill's admission on the Statement of
Facts form because the prosecution required
it as a condition for the deferred prosecution.
At most, the TASC representative acted as
the prosecutor’s agent for purposes of effect-
ing the deferred prosecution agreement, Be-
cause the TASC representative was not the
prosecutor’s agent for purposes of negotiat-
ing a plea, Rule 410 does not apply.

6 a

Cc.

HI 119 Even if Gills statements had
been subject to Rule 410(a)(4), he waived the
Rule’s protections. Gill, however, argues that
his waiver was ineffective because it was not
knowingly made. We address this issue be-
cause it too is recurring and offers an alter-
native ground for our decision, (He has not
disputed, and we do not address, the volun-
tariness of his waiver or whether it allowed
the government to use his statements in its
case-in-chief.)

HM 120 “In interpreting Arizona's evi-
dentiary rules, we look to federal law when
our rule is identical to the corresponding
federal rule[.]” Hernandez v. State, 208 Ariz.
196, 198 110, 52 P.8d 765, 767 (2002), Ari-
zona’s Rule 410(a)(4) mirrors its federal
counterpart. See Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(4). In
interpreting Federal Rule 410, the United
States Supreme Court has held that a Rule
410 waiver is enforceable “absent some affir-
mative indication that the agreement was
entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.”
United States v. Mezzanatto, 518 U.S. 196,
210, 115 S.Ct. 797, 180 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995).
Thus, a waiver of Rule 410 must be knowing
and voluntary.

Hs {21 On appeal, Gill contends that
his waiver was unknowing because his waiver
agreement did not specifically refer to Rule
410, However, a knowing waiver of Rule 410
only requires a defendant to have “a full
awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” See In re Andre M.,
207 Ariz, 482, 484 117, 88 P.3d 552, 554 (2004)
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106
S.Ct. 1185, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). A waiver
agreement need not specifically reference the
evidentiary rule being waived. See Mezzanat-
to, 518 U.S, at 197, 115 S.Ct. 797.

22 Here, Gill recognized that he was
waiving any right not to have his statements
to TASC used against him at trial. During
the September 3 settlement conference, the
prosecutor told Gill that “if you were to fail
TASC ... that TASC paperwork could be
used against you at trial.” The commissioner
also made clear that Gill could opt for trial
instead of making an admission to TASC.

When Gill completed the Statement of Facts
form in the presence of his attorney, he
initialed the notations that he made “this
statement without coercion and of [his] own
free will” and that he “fully underst[ood] that
what [he] ha{d] written here may be used
against [him] in a court of law should [he] fail
to satisfactorily complete the TASC pro-
gram.” Both he and his attorney signed the
form. These facts indicate that in choosing to
make statements to TASC, Gill recognized
that the statements could be used against
him if he failed to complete the program.
Thus, Gill knowingly gave up his right to
object to their admissibility, which would in-
clude objections based on Rule 410,

I.

123 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate
the opinion of the court of appeals and affirm
Gill’s conviction and the penalty imposed by
the trial court.

391 P.3d 1198
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.

Antajuan Stewart CARSON
Jr, Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0218

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed February 24, 2017
As Corrected March 6, 2017

ao

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Adele G. Ponce, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Phoenix, Counsel for Appellee

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public
Defender, By Erin K. Sutherland, Assistant
Public Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Appel-
lant

. One witness also saw a second person at the
party with a gun before the fight broke out and

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Vasquez
concurred and Chief Judge Eckerstrom
concurred in part and dissented in part.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

{1 A jury found Antajuan Carson Jr.
guilty of two counts of second-degree murder
and two counts of aggravated assault. He
was sentenced to concurrent terms, the long-
est of which was thirteen years. His appeal
requires us to determine whether a defen-
dant asserting a mistaken identity defense
may also obtain a justification instruction.
We conclude that although the defenses are
inconsistent, it remains within the province of
the jury to determine the facts, and if those
facts could support justification then the jury
must be instructed on it. Therefore, we af-
firm as to the aggravated assaults because
there was no evidence supporting justifica-
tion, and reverse the second-degree murder
convictions, as to which the slightest justifi-
cation evidence existed, and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the facts in the light most
favorable to Carson, the justification instruc-
tion’s proponent. State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87,
118, 285 P.8d 240, 248 (2010). Two men, J.M.
and S.B., were shot and killed, and a third,
B.C., was shot and wounded, outside a party
at a residence in October 2018. Carson was
indicted as the lone shooter.

13 B.C., the surviving victim who came to
the party to deejay, testified that he had
known Carson only from a social media web-
site and had seen him at a couple of parties.
Shortly after B.C. arrived, Carson told B.C.
that he was carrying a nine-millimeter pistol
that shot like a .22-caliber. Multiple wit-
nesses saw Carson with a black gun at some
point during the night.

14 An argument occurred inside the house
among four or five young men. The parties
stipulated that there was “animosity or bad

asked the person to leave, but she was not sure
whether the person left,

blood” between Carson and J.M. arising out
of a prior dispute between Carson and J.M.’s
brother. The men, including J.M. and S.B.,
confronted Carson and got into a shoving
match or fistfight, Multiple people saw Car-
son display a gun inside the house.

5 People began leaving and the confron-
tation moved outside. As B.C, left through a
side door and came around the side of the
house, he saw Carson on the ground, sur-
rounded by the same four men including J.M,
and S.B. B.C. was not one of the four men.
The men were hitting and kicking Carson.
B.C. pulled 8.B., whom he knew, out of the
fray and walked him across the street. B.C.
told S.B, that if he wanted to fight Carson,
he should fight him one-on-one rather than
“jumpling]” him in a group.

16 B.C. testified he then had seen the
fighting stop, but yelling and screaming con-
tinued. Then a man in the area of the fight
stood up, and B.C. heard a gun cock. Some-
one said “He has a gun,” and everyone start-
ed running. One witness testified the man
getting jumped had “[p]ull[ed] out his gun so
they could get off him” and then “[h]e start-
ed shooting.” The man shot J.M., who fell.
J.M. tried to get back up and run away, but
the man shot him again and he stayed down,
B.C, was across the street when the man
looked him in the eyes, pointed the gun at
him, and shot him in the abdomen? Finally,
the man shot and killed §.B. Based on eye-
witness interviews and the locations of shell
casings at the scene, the shooter moved his
hand or changed positions from right to left
while firing,

17 Police officers found the bodies of J.M.
and S.B. about one and a half to two blocks
apart, in opposite directions from the party
house. An autopsy later established J.M. had
been shot twice in the back, and S.B. had
been shot once in the side of his chest and
once in the bottom of his foot, The lack of
soot or stippling around the entrance wounds
on the decedents indicated either that the
shots had been fired from more than three
feet away, or that a heavy piece of fabric
might have caught all of the soot at closer

2. B.C, suffered serious injuries. He was the vic-
tim as to both aggravated assault charges—one
charge of aggravated assault causing serious

9

range. There was no testimony that the vic-
tims were shot with the same gun, but no
eyewitnesses reported seeing more than one
person shooting that night either. Officers
found ten nine-millimeter shell casings and
one nine-millimeter live round at the scene.
Police never found the murder weapon or
‘weapons,

18 Officers also found a bloody knife near
§.B.’s body. The knife was never tested for
DNA or fingerprints, Similarly, blood on a
second knife tucked inside S.B.’s belt was not
tested. A detective explained that the investi-
gation had not revealed that anyone used a
knife during the altercation, and so testing
‘was not necessary,

19 Carson became a person of interest
early in the investigation. Police obtained an
arrest warrant for him, and he was appre-
hended about ten days later in Detroit, Mich-
igan. Several eyewitnesses identified him as
the shooter, but several others did not. He
did not testify or present evidence in his
ease-in-chief,

{10 Carson unsuccessfully requested a
self-defense justification instruction. Despite
the trial court’s refusal, in closing both sides
indirectly argued self-defense as it pertained
to the knives found at S.B.’s body, although
Carson’s primary contention remained mis-
taken identity, He was convicted and sen-
tenced as described above. We have jurisdic-
tion over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S,
§§ 18-4081 and 13-4088(A)(1).

Waiver and Standard of Review

711 Carson timely requested a self-de-
fense instruction in writing, filed a written
motion in support of that request, and ar-
gued that motion to the trial court during
trial while the jury was absent. In its oral
ruling denying the instruction, the court re-
lied on State v. Gilfillan, 196 Ariz, 896, 998
P.2d 1069 (App. 2000), which had not been
cited by the parties, The court explained
“[Gilfillan] specifically holds that given the
defendant denies committing the act with
which he is charged, it follows that he could

physical injury, and another charge of aggravat-

ed assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous
instrument,

10

not argue self-defense.... So I think that
given how the defense has presented this
case in that he didn’t do it and someone else
did it ... I think the court legally cannot
give a self-defense instruction.”

Hl 112 The state first contends Carson
forfeited his objection except for fundamental
error review because the trial court, rather
than he, cited Gilfillan. It relies on State v.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 119, 115 P.8d 601,
607 (2005), which stands for the general
proposition that when a defendant fails to
object to alleged trial error fundamental er-
ror review applies. The state’s argument that
Carson should have objected specifically to
the court’s “application of Gilfillan to his
case,” would expand Henderson’s reach far
beyond its intended purpose of placing the
initial burden at trial on a party to make an
objection. Moreover, Carson specifically ar-
gued it would be “perfectly reasonable” to
argue to the jury, “‘He didn’t do it, but if
you think he did, the facts support self-
defense here,” This argument was sufficient
to give the court the opportunity to rule on
the issue, which it did. See State v. Fulmi-
nante, 198 Ariz, 485, 164, 975 P.2d 75, 98
(1999). We also conclude Carson complied
with Rule 21.3), Ariz. R. Crim, P., which
provides that a party must object to the
failure to deliver a particular instruction be-
fore the jury retires. The issue is preserved.

118 We review a court’s decision not to
give a jury instruction for an abuse of discre-
tion, State v. Vassell, 288 Ariz, 281, 18, 359
P.8d 1025, 1027-28 (App. 2015). A court abus-
es its discretion if it commits an error of law
in exercising that discretion. State v. Ly-
chwick, 222 Ariz, 604, 17, 218 P.8d 1061,
1068 (App. 2009). We review issues of statu-
tory interpretation de novo, State v. Gear,
239 Ariz. 343, 111, 872 P.8d 287, 289 (2016).

Slightest Evidence of Justification

114 Use of physical force against another
person is justified to protect oneself “when
and to the extent a reasonable person would
believe that physical force is immediately
necessary to protect himself against the oth-
er’s use or attempted use of unlawful physi-
cal force,” subject to certain inapposite ex-
ceptions, A.R.S. § 13-404(A). Justification to

use deadly force requires, inter alia, an un-
lawful use or attempted use of such force by
the victim. A.R.S, § 18-405(A). As it pertains
to this case, deadly physical force means
force whose purpose or effect “is capable of
creating a substantial risk of causing death
or serious physical injury.” A.R.S. § 18-
105(14).

HH 115 Our supreme court has clarified
that the “reasonable person” to whom § 13-
404(A) refers is “a reasonable person in the
defendant’s circumstances.” King, 225 Ariz,
87, 112, 235 P.3d at 248, Unlike the Model
Penal Code and jurisdictions adopting it, in
Arizona the defendant's own belief about
whether deadly force is necessary to protect
himself is not an element of the test. Com-
pore Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (use of
force justifiable if actor believes force imme-
diately necessary for purpose of protecting
himself), and State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440,
940 A.2d 269, 274-75 (2008) (self-defense
claim requires jury to discern whether the
defendant had subjective belief deadly force
was necessary and whether subjective belief
was objectively reasonable), with King, 225
Ariz. 87, 111, 235 P.8d at 242-48, Rather,
what a reasonable person would do in the
same situation is a “purely objective” inquiry
in the final analysis. See King, 225 Ariz. 87,
‘41 11-12, 235 P.8d at 242-48; see also Vassell,
238 Ariz, 281, n.8, 359 P.8d at 1028 n3,

TH 116 “A defendant is entitled to a self-
defense instruction if the record contains the
‘slightest evidence’ that he acted in self-de-
fense.” King, 225 Ariz. 87, 114, 235 P.8d at
248, quoting State v. Lujan, 186 Ariz. 102,
104, 664 P.2d 646, 648 (1988). It is a “low
standard.” Id, 115. “[A] hostile demonstra-
tion, which may be reasonably regarded as
placing the accused apparently in imminent
danger of losing her life or sustaining great
bodily harm,” constitutes the slightest evi-
dence of self-defense. Id., quoting Lujan, 136
Ariz, at 104, 664 P.2d at 648, Additionally,
justification is not an affirmative defense for
the defendant to prove; rather, upon the
slightest evidence of self-defense it is the
state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not
justified. Id. 16, citing A.R.S. § 18-205(A),

Slightest Evidence of Deadly Physical
Force by B.C.

Hl {17 Applying these authorities to the
facts of this case, we conclude the trial court
correctly denied a justification instruction as
to the surviving victim, B.C. At oral argu-
ment before this court, counsel listed the
evidence Carson argues was sufficient to
raise justification.$

e AL, a guest at the party, had seen

another person with a gun at the party
earlier,

B.C. had been near the area of the
fight, and eyewitness C.Y. said he had
seen “everybody” jumping Carson at
that point. C.Y. also reported he had
attempted unsuccessfully to pull J.M.
and S.B. off Carson shortly before the
shooting.

A day later, a neighbor found a partial-
ly crushed .40-caliber shell casing two
houses away from the area of the fight,
A 40-caliber gun was recovered from
the passenger-side map pocket of T.C.’s
car, in which B.C., together with his
girlfriend T.C, and two other people,
had ridden to the hospital after he had
been shot,

The .40-caliber gun was not tested to
determine whether it had been fired
that night. Testing of the DNA on the
40-caliber gun excluded B.C. as a ma-
jor contributor, but was inconclusive as
to whether B.C. could have been a mi-
nor contributor.

T.C. had lied to the police about the
gun being in the car,

A detective testified the nine-millimeter
weapon had been discharged in a
“fluid-motion shooting.”

918 Carson acknowledges that this evi-
dence does not show B.C. made a “hostile
demonstration” toward him, King, 225 Ariz.
87, 115, 235 P.3d at 248, quoting Lujan, 186
3. The list provided at oral argument was more

detailed and extensive than that cited in the

briefs. Although we generally do not consider
arguments made for the first time at oral argu-

ment, Mitchell v. Gamble, 207 Ariz. 364, 116, 86

P.3d 944, 949-50 (App. 2004), in our discretion

we address all of the evidence cited at oral argu-
ment, in order to ensure we are viewing the

11

Ariz. at 104, 664 P.2d at 648; rather, he
contends the jury could have inferred that
B.C. (1) possessed the .40-caliber gun at the
party, (2) assaulted Carson by displaying the
gun and firing it at him, (8) placed the gun in
T.C.’s car on the way to the hospital, and (4)
instructed T.C. to lie to police about the gun
to protect him.

Hl 119 Inferences that “mak[e] an argu-
ment possible” do not substitute for the
slightest evidence, and a justification instruc-
tion must rest upon something more than
“gpeculation.” Vassell, 288 Ariz, 281, 19, 859
P.8d at 1028; see also State v. Almeida, 238
Ariz, 77, 19, 856 P.8d 822, 825 (App. 2015)
Gustification instruction required only if “ree-
ord provides evidence ‘upon which the jury
could rationally sustain the defense’”), quot-
‘ing State v, Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 587-88,
911 P.2d 577, 598-94 (App. 1995); Buzard v.
Griffin, 89 Ariz, 42, 48, 858 P.2d 155, 159
(1960) (“An inference is a fact which may be
presumed from the proof of the existence or
non-existence of other facts.”), As Vassell
illustrates, if there is no evidence for a neces-
sary aspect of a prima facie case of justifica-
tion, then there is not the slightest evidence
of justification. Compare Vassell, 288 Ariz.
281, 1911-12, 17, 859 P.8d at 1028-29 (in-
struction not required where justification
theory rested on speculative inference—as
opposed to slightest evidence—that defen-
dant did not know police officers entering
home were officers and not home invaders);
with id. 1122-29 (Eckerstrom, C.J., specially
coneurring). Because we conclude Carson's
justification theory as to B.C. necessarily
relies upon speculation, a justification in-
struction was not warranted,

Hl 120 First, there is no evidence B.C.
was involved in the physical altercation with
Carson. Of the seven testifying eyewitnesses,
none suggested B.C. had punched, kicked, or
otherwise attacked Carson.t Unlike J.M.,

evidence in the light most favorable to Carson,
see King, 225 Ariz. 87, 113, 235 P.3d at 243,

4, In context it is clear that when C.Y. testified
“everybody” had been attacking Carson, he did
not mean it literally so as to include B.C. or even
himself. There were over fifty people at the party
that night, many of whom C.Y, had just explained

12

there was no evidence that there was any
bad blood between B.C. and Carson. B.C.
only knew Carson from social media and
from having seen him at a few other parties,
Nor does C.Y.’s testimony that he was at-
tempting to pull some of Carson’s assailants
out of the fray undermine or contradict
B.C’s testimony that B.C. pulled SB, off
Carson,

1.21 Second, the evidence of the .40-caliber
shell casing and gun does not make a prima
facie justification case. Carson asks us to
assume the jury would disregard the testimo-
ny of B.C, and T.C, as lies, and instead find
that B,C. possessed the gun at the party.
Even if we do so, substantial gaps remain
that can only be bridged with speculation,
None of the seven testifying eyewitnesses
reported seeing or hearing a second shooter
at any time that evening. Additionally, Car-
son’s counsel agreed at oral argument there
was “no evidence” that B.C. ever displayed
the gun to Carson. Nor is there any evidence
that Carson was aware of B.C. possessing a
40~caliber gun before shooting at him. See
Vassell, 288 Aviz. 281, n.8, 359 P.8d at 1028
n.8, citing State v. Andersen, 177 Ariz. 381,
886, 868 P.2d 964, 969 (App. 1993). The evi-
dence does not “reasonably and clearly sup-
port” justification as to B.C., and so the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
a justification instruction as to him, Id., quot-
‘ing State v, Ruggiero, 211 Ariz, 262, 110, 120
P.8d 690, 692 (App. 2005),

Slightest Evidence of Deadly Physical
Force by J.M. and 8.B,

I {22 As to J.M. and S.B,, we conclude
there was evidence from which the jury could
find that Carson acted in self-defense against.
those victims, In the light most favorable to
Carson, King, 225 Aviz, 87, 113, 285 P.8d at
248, the evidence showed that four men, in-
duding J.M. and S.B., had surrounded Car-
son and were punching and kicking him while
he was on the ground, SB, also had a knife
on his person during the assault and another
was found near his body. Such a hostile
demonstration could be reasonably regarded
as placing Carson in imminent danger of

were “standing” around outside and “[w]atch-
ing,” when he saw “everybody” attacking Car-

sustaining great bodily harm or losing his
life—even more go than in King, in which the
only hostile demonstration was the victim
hitting the defendant’s head with a water
bottle. See id, 19 15-16,

HI 123 It is certainly true that other
evidence tended to show Carson had not
acted in self-defense against J.M. and S.B.
As the state points out, J.M. was shot in the
back and S.B. was shot in the bottom of the
foot, and the two bodies were found a dis-
tance away from the scene of the fight in
opposite directions, See State v, Buggs, 167
Ariz, 388, 887, 806 P.2d 1881, 1885 (App.
1990) (aw “settled” that “after a fight has
broken off, one cannot pursue and kill merely
because he once feared for his life”), The
evidence does not resolve, however, whether
J.M. and §.B. were shot together or in sepa-
rate locations at a distance apart. Based on
the witness testimony regarding these vic-
tims, the jury could find they were shot in
relatively close proximity and ran in different
directions before dying. And it is not the
court’s role to resolve conflicts in the evi-
dence in the context of deciding whether to
give a justification instruction. See State v.
Plew, 150 Ariz, 75, 78, 722 P.2d 248, 246
(1986) Gnstruction required because defen-
dant presented slightest evidence of self-de-
fense, although record was “ambigu[ous]”
and in conflict), disapproved on other
grounds by King, 225 Ariz, 87, 119-12, 235
P.8d at 242-43; State v. Wright, 163 Ariz,
184, 185-86, 786 P.2d 1085, 1086-87 (App.
1989) (some evidence of defense of third per-
son necessitated instruction although evi-
dence was disputed and witnesses’ testimony
“varied greatly”), Rather, because the slight-
est evidence tended to show justification, the
instruction was required, and it was the
state’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Carson was not justified in shoot-
ing J.M. and 8.B, See King, 225 Ariz. 87,
118, 235 P.8d at 244; see also § 13-205.

Justification and Mistaken Identity
124 The state also contends the law pre-
cludes a defendant from arguing both justifi-
cation and mistaken identity, which it charac-

son. Additionally, C.Y, did not testify about B.C.’s
actions,

terizes as logically inconsistent of necessity.
Carson maintains, as he did below, neither
Jaw nor logie provides a reason why a defen-
dant should be forbidden from arguing “I
didn’t do it, but if you don’t believe me, then
the evidence shows I was justified.”

125 The trial court ruled a justification
instruction was barred as a matter of law by
Gilfillan, 196 Ariz, 896, 140, 998 P.2d at
1080, But Gilfillan is inapposite because the
justification claim there was directed at con-
duct not charged as an offense. Specifically,
the defendant was charged with aggravated
assault by placing a knife found at the scene
against the victim’s neck to force her submis-
sion to being bound and sexually assaulted,
Id, 118, 11. Gilfillan testified the victim had
come at him with the knife and he had struck
her in self-defense. Id. 40, But Gilfillan was
not charged with striking the victim, Id.

26 More importantly, Gilfillan denied
possessing a knife, much less ever having
threatened the victim with it. Id. Because
Gilfillan denied possessing the knife or
threatening the victim with it, this court held,
“jt followed] that he could not argue self-
defense.” Id, Unlike Gilfillan, the evidence
that Carson was being beaten by a group of
people immediately and while he drew his
gun directly relates to the murder charges,

127 Additional authorities cited by the
parties illustrate the requirements that there
must be the slightest evidence of justification
and it must relate to the offense. In State v.
Miller, the trial court correctly denied a self-
defense instruction when the defendant testi-
fied and disclaimed all assaultive behavior
and “no evidence” otherwise suggested self-
defense. 129 Ariz, 42, 43, 628 P.2d 590, 591
(App. 1981). And in State v, Ruggiero, in
which the defendant “repeatedly and directly
denied” having shot the victim and no evi-
dence suggested deadly force had been im-
mediately necessary to prevent a crime, a
crime prevention instruction was properly
denied, 211 Ariz, 262, 11 10-18, 120 P.8d 690,
692-93 (App, 2005). Similarly, in State v,
Dixon, when the defendant “completely de-
nied shooting the victim,” the court correctly
denied a self-defense instruction, finding the
record “totally devoid of any testimony which
would provide the basis for the giving of such

13

an instruction.” 15 Ariz.App. 62, 64, 485 P.2d
1179, 1181 (1971).

128 The defendants in Miller, Ruggiero,
and Diwon adopted an “all or nothing” de-
fense, flatly denying they committed the acts
giving rise to the charged offenses, The criti-
eal distinction in this case, as we have noted,
is that, Carson argued both that he did not do
it, and that if the jury believed he did the
shooting, he was justified, And in light of our
conclusion above that the record contains the
slightest evidence of justification, the record
is susceptible to not two, but three possible
interpretations: (1) Carson is guilty, (2) Car-
son shot J.M. and §.B, but was justified in
doing so, or (3) Carson was mistakenly iden-
tified as the shooter. Both parties have cited
one justification case with similar triple pos-
sibilities. In Plew, 150 Ariz, at 77-78, 722
P.2d at 245-46, our supreme court reversed
the trial court’s denial of a self-defense in-
struction when the record contained some
evidence to support any of three theories: (1)
guilt, (2) self-defense, or (8) an accident, Al-
though some parts of the defendant's testi-
mony suggested he had not fired the gun
while other parts suggested he had fired it in
self-defense, the court concluded it could not
resolve the conflict in the evidence, See id.
Instead, the court needed only to assess
whether there was the slightest evidence of
justification, which there was. Id. at 78, 722
P.2d at 246, Thus, the defendant was entitled
to a justification instruction, Id,

129 The state emphasizes the court’s
statement in Plew that “[a] defendant who
denies shooting the victim may not thereafter
claim self-defense.” Jd. But this seemingly
absolute statement narrows upon closer ex-
amination, For the quoted proposition, the
Plew court cited only Diwon, which was itself
a case devoid of evidence of justification.
Plew, 150 Ariz, at 77-78, 722 P.2d at 245-46,
Additionally, in Plew the defendant inconsis-
tently testified that he did not shoot the
victim but also he was “unsure of exactly
what transpired,” including who shot the vie-
tim, Jd. The ambiguity precluded: the appel-
late court from deciding which portion of his
testimony should be believed. Jd. Instead, the
court limited its consideration to “whether
the appellant presented the ‘slightest evi-

14

dence’ of self-defense.” Id. Accordingly, we
understand the court’s statement in Plew—
that a defendant who denies shooting the
victim cannot claim self-defense—to be limit-
ed to cases like Diaon and Gilfillan in which
no evidence supports a self-defense theory or
the defendant unambiguously testifies he did
not engage in the wrongful conduct attrib-
uted to him. Cf State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241,
196, 8, 196 P.38d 844, 845-46 (App. 2008)
(defendant received justification instructions
despite also arguing he never pointed gun at
victim).

HMM 180 As Carson points out, case
Jaw regarding instructions for lesser-included
offenses supports our conclusion. E.g., State
v, Wall, 212 Ariz, 1, 1129-81, 126 P.38d 148,
158 (2006); State v. McPhaul, 174 Aviz. 561,
561-62, 851 P.2d 860, 860-61 (App. 1992). In
McPhaul, the defendant was charged with
attempted armed robbery of a gas station.
174 Ariz, at 561-62, 851 P.2d at 860-61, He
testified and denied all involvement in the
erime, claiming mistaken identity. Id. at 562,
851 P.2d at 861, However, the trial evidence
also included a surveillance video which argu-
ably did not show a knife in the perpetrator’s
hands. Id. In other words, reasonable evi-
dence supported any of three possibilities: (1)
MecPhaul committed attempted armed rob-
bery with a knife, (2) McPhaul committed the
lesser-included offense of attempted robbery
without a knife, or (8) McPhaul was mistak-
enly identified. See id. The trial court denied
McPhaul’s request for a lesser-included in-
struction because he had denied all partic-
ipation in the crime, but this court vacated
and ordered a new trial. Id. at 562, 564, 851
P.2d at 861, 863. We reasoned there was
“nothing inconsistent, illogical or improper
about a defendant saying, ‘I was not the
person who committed the robbery, but even
if you do not believe me, the evidence shows
that whoever did commit it was not armed.’”
Id. at 562, 851 P.2d at 861. Just as a lesser-
included instruction is required when there is
reasonable evidence in the record to support
both a mistaken identity defense and a less-
er-included defense, so too a justification in-
struction is required when there is reason-
5. Our conclusions are based on the law and

should not be construed as a comment on the
tactical wisdom of this approach. As trial counsel

able evidence in the record to support both a
mistaken identity defense and a justification
defense. See Plew, 150 Ariz. at 78, 722 P.2d
at 246. A reasonable jury could have conelud-
ed Carson was in fact the shooter but that
the state had failed to prove beyond a rea~
sonable doubt that he was not acting in self-
defense,

181 We do not find persuasive the state’s
analogy to a defendant who asserts an en-
trapment defense while denying the acts un-
derlying the charge, which our supreme
court has held impermissible for fear of en-
couraging perjury or confusing the jury. See
State v. Soule, 168 Ariz, 184, 186-87, 811 P.2d
1071, 1073-74 (1991). The affirmative defense
of entrapment is distinguishable because, by
statute, in order to raise it a person “must
admit by the person’s testimony or other
evidence the substantial elements of the of-
fense charged,” A.R.S, § 13-206(A), and it is
impossible to do so while also denying those
elements. See also McPhaul, 174 Ariz, at 564,
851 P.2d at 863 (Soule is “limited to cases in
which the defendant pleads entrapment”),
Therefore, we agree with Carson that it is
not legally impermissible * for a defendant to
argue both justification and mistaken identi-
ty.

Harmless Error

32 Finally, the state argues the
trial court’s failure to provide a self-defense
instruction was harmless, maintaining Car-
son “apparently had no intention to argue
self-defense to the jurors” when he requested
the instruction before trial because he was
planning to rely on mistaken identity. Even
assuming harmless error review applies
where the court erroneously denied a justifi-
cation instruction despite the slightest evi-
dence of justification, but see State v. Taylor,
169 Ariz. 121, 128-24, 817 P.2d 488, 490-91
(1991), the record does not support the
state’s contention. Even without the benefit
of a self-defense instruction, Carson did in
fact make self-defense-based arguments in

candidly acknowledged, arguing inconsistent de-

fenses “may not be to some minds the best strate-

By.

closing related to the knives found at the
seene,

Conclusion

188 The trial court erred by denying Car-
son’s request for a justification instruction
because slight evidence supported a justifica-
tion theory as to J.M. and S.B. Carson’s
reliance on a mistaken identity defense does
not change this result and the error was not
harmless. We affirm Carson’s convictions and
sentences for aggravated assault against B.C.
because there was no evidence of justification
relating to B.C.’s conduct. But we reverse
Carson’s second-degree murder convictions
and remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge, concurring
in part and dissenting in part:

134 I concur with my colleagues’ well-
reasoned opinion in every respect but one: I
would conclude that the trial record contains
adequate evidence to support Carson’s re-
quested self-defense instruction as to the ag-

gravated assault charges against him.

185 As the majority correctly observes, a
trial court must provide a self-defense in-
struction if the record contains even the
“slightest evidence” that the defendant acted
in self-defense. State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87,
714, 285 P.8d 240, 243 (2010). In analyzing
this question as to the aggravated assault
charges, the majority has considered wheth-
er the record supports, by an objective stan-
dard, any reasonable inference that B.C., the
alleged aggravated assault victim, actually
used or threatened deadly force against Car-
son. But that analysis overlooks that we must
consider the events not from the perspective
of the alleged victim but from the perspective
of someone in the defendant’s situation.

136 A defendant may assert self-defense if
“a reasonable person in the defendant’s cir-
cumstances would have believed that physi-
eal force was ‘immediately necessary to pro-
tect himself.’ ” Id. 112, quoting A.R.S. § 18-
404(A) (emphasis added). Those beliefs need
only be reasonable, not correct. “An instruc-
tion on self-defense is required when a defen-
dant acts under a reasonable belief; actual
danger is not required.” State v. Grannis,

15

188 Ariz, 52, 60, 900 P.2d 1, 9 (1995), disap-
proved on other grounds by King, 225 Ariz,
87, 199, 12, 235 P.8d at 242, 248; accord
State v. Lamar, 144 Ariz. 490, 497, 698 P.2d
735, 742 (App. 1984) (noting justification in-
struction included possibility of mistake in
fact); of State v, Reiner, 179 Mont, 289, 587
P.2d 950, 956-57 (1978) (“Defendant must
demonstrate that his belief in the necessity
for using force is reasonable, but even a
mistaken belief may be reasonable.”); State v,
Abdulkadir, 298 Neb, 560, 878 N.W.2d 390,
396 (2016) (“A defendant’s use of deadly
force in self-defense is justified if a reason-
able ground existed under the circumstances
for the defendant’s belief that he or she was
threatened with death or serious bodily
harm, even if the defendant was actually
mistaken about the extent of the danger.”);
State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 949 A2d
197, 201 (2008) (“Self-defense exonerates a
person who kills in the reasonable belief that
such action was necessary to prevent his or
her death or serious injury, even though this
belief was later proven mistaken.”), quoting
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 373
(1984); State v. Daniels, 160 Wis.2d 85, 465
N.W.2d 638, 647 (1991) (Callow, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is not necessary that the danger
which gave rise to the belief actually existed;
it is sufficient that the person resorting to
self-defense ... reasonably believed in the
existence of such a danger, and such reason-
able belief is sufficient even where it is mis-
taken.”), quoting Crotieau v, Karlgaard, 48
‘Wis.2d 245, 179 N.W.2d 797, 800 (1970).

137 Within a record comprised of eyewit-
nesses’ testimony, often conflicting, as to a
fast-moving event that occurred, in part, out-
doors at night, two salient facts do not ap-
pear to be disputed: (1) Carson did not fire
his weapon until after he had been kicked
and punched to the ground by numerous
assailants and (2) police found two bloody
knives on and near the body of one of Car-
son’s targets. From this, a jury could reason-
ably infer that Carson had been assaulted by
numerous persons, some of whom were
armed with knives, and that the assault had
succeeded in bringing Carson to the ground,
In my view, these facts alone should allow a
jury to decide whether a reasonable person

16

under the circumstances would “believe that
deadly physical force {was] immediately nec-
essary to protect himself against the other's
use or attempted use of unlawful deadly
physical force,” A.R.S, § 18-405(A)(2), Those
events constitute the “slightest evidence”
necessary to entitle Carson to a self-defense
instruction,

188 The majority does not disagree with
the above proposition but proceeds to ana-
lyze the reasonableness of Carson’s actions
as to each of the alleged victims. And, the
majority finds no evidence in the record from
which a juror could infer without speculation
that B.C. was an actual assailant, In my view,
the evidence renders this individualized ap-
proach unnecessary. One witness testified
that “everybody just started fighting, just
started jumping [Carson]” outside, and he
“{plull[ed] out his gun so they could get off
him” and “started shooting.” Furthermore,
B,C. himself described the group attacking
Carson as “a whole bunch of people.” This
constitutes at least slight evidence support-
ing an inference that Carson could have rea-
sonably perceived all those within his imme-
diate vicinity to be assailants,

789 Even assuming that analyzing B.O.’s
actions separately would be necessary under
the “slightest evidence” standard, the record
provides more than slight evidence from
which a jury could infer that Carson reason-
ably perceived B.C, specifically to be an as-
sailant. By B.C.’s own admission, he was
inside when the fight commenced, and he
then followed the altercation outside, where
he injected himself into the fray. B.C. was
also one of three people shot, the other two
of whom were indisputably in the group as-
saulting Carson. And, according to B.C’s
own testimony, Carson “looked at [him] in
the eyes” and audibly cocked the gun before

6. Pursuant to Rule 21.1, Ariz. R. Crim. P., civil
law related to jury instructions normally applies
to criminal cases. Accord King, 225 Ariz, 87, 113,
235 P.3d at 243.

7. Although the majority cites the correct legal
standard for this case, supra 12, in application
its opinion fails to state the facts “in the manner
which provides the strongest possible support”
for the proponent of the justification instructions.
Bliss v, Treece, 134 Ariz. 516, 520, 658 P.2d 169,
173 (1983). Examples include the majority's re-
peated observations that Carson possessed a gun,

shooting him. From this last testimony, the
jury could both infer that B.C. was close
enough to Carson to perceive these details
even outdoors at night and that Carson spe-
cifically rather than randomly targeted B.C,

40 “In weighing the sufficiency of evi-
dence to justify the giving of an instruction,
the inferences which reasonably and logically
flow from the evidence are to be considered.”
Reichardt v, Albert, 89 Ariz. 322, 326, 361
P.2d 984, 986-87 (1961).6 The above evidence
allows the logical inference that Carson had
targeted and shot the people who had as-
saulted him and that he reasonably perceived
B.C, to be one of those people. The additional
facts suggesting B.C, might have possessed a
gun and might have attempted to conceal
that fact from the police provide further evi-
dentiary support for the requested instruc-
tion here. But this more debatable inference
was unnecessary for the instruction to issue.

141 That the state presented substantial
evidence countering Carson’s self-defense
theory is irrelevant to our analysis. See An-
drews v, Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz,, 160 Ariz.
93, 95, 770 P.2d 897, 399 (App. 1989) (“Tlf
there is any evidence tending to establish the
theory posed in the instruction, it should be
given even if there are contradictory facts
presented.”), And, because the jury and not
this court is the ultimate arbiter of credibili-
ty, see Correa v. Curbey, 124 Ariz, 480, 481,
605 P.2d 458, 459 (App. 1979), B.C.’s version
of events—to the extent it might contradict
the above inferences—is not relevant either.

142 Even assuming we were to credit
B.C.’s claim that he involved himself in the
fight only as a peacemaker, we must analyze
the reasonableness of the shooter’s percep-
tions with reference to the circumstances the
shooter faced.7 A defendant being beaten,

supra 13-4, as well as the majority's acceptance
of potentially self-serving and dubious testimony
from B.C. about his involvement in the melee
outside, Whereas the majority suggests B.C. was
“across the street” and away from the conflict
when the shooting began, after the fighting had
stopped, supra 115-6, a proper view of the rec-
ord suggests B.C. was neither temporally nor
spatially removed from the fight. The street in
question was a small residential street, meaning
B.C, was “pretty close by’; both witness testimo-
ny and the location of numerous shell casings

kicked, and potentially stabbed by numerous
assailants cannot reasonably be expected to
make fine distinctions about the motives and
acts of those apparently descending upon
him. As Justice Holmes observed long ago,
“(dJetached reflection cannot be demanded in
the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 385, 848, 41 S.Ct,
501, 65 L.Ed. 961 (1921), In this context, B.C.
could have reasonably been perceived by the
shooter as an assailant, regardless of wheth-
er B.C. posed an actual threat,

148 Another reason exists for reversing
the aggravated assault convictions in this
ease, As the majority acknowledges, the trial
court erred by refusing self-defense instruc-
tions on the two murder charges. Supra
‘11 22-28, And, as our supreme court estab-
lished in State v. Glissendorf, an instruction-
related error as to one count is not necessari-
ly confined to that count, but may affect
other verdicts as well, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case. 285 Ariz. 147, 1 20-
24, 829 P.8d 1049, 1054-55 (2014).

144 Here, the jury was instructed, on the
one hand, that it had to “decide each count
separately on the evidence with the law ap-
plicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision
on any other count.” On the other hand, the
jury also was instructed it could “consider
... all the ... evidence in the case” when
deciding whether the state had proved the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consistent with these instructions, the jury
therefore could have rendered verdicts on
the aggravated assault charges while consid-
ering the evidence related to the two mur-
ders, for which no law on justification was
provided,

145 An error is harmless only if a review-
ing court can determine, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that it did not contribute to or affect
the verdict, Glissendorf, 285 Ariz, 147, 124,
829 P.8d at 1055. In this case, the preclusion
of any self-defense instructions on the mur-
der charges necessarily colored and affected

suggested the fighting and shooting occurred
within the street itself} and “[p]retty much the
entire party” was “out there” when the fighting
took place. In addition, C.Y, testified that he was
unsuccessful in removing either J.M. or S.B.
from the fight and that they were still attacking
Carson when he started shooting. Thus, our stan-

17

the jury’s determinations on the aggravated
assault charges, even assuming arguendo
that Carson was not otherwise entitled to
justification instructions for those separate
counts,

146 As the case was presented below, it
logically followed that Carson had committed
aggravated assault against B,C. because Car-
son had not been justified in using deadly
physical force against the threat posed by
J.M. and §.B. If, however, the requested
instructions had been provided as to those
two victims, then a factual question would
have arisen whether Carson’s use of deadly
force was reasonable under the cireum-
stances, see §§ 18-404(A), 18-405(A), and
whether, in the course of defending himself,
Carson had acted with the mens rea neces-
sary for assaulting allegedly innocent third
parties such as B.C. See ARS. §§ 18-
105(10), 18-1203(A)(1), 18-1204(A)(1), @).
Had justification instructions been given for
the murder counts, then Carson could have
argued, for example, that he had been negli-
gent, but not reckless, in shooting B.C. See
§§ 18-105(10), 18-1203(A)(1), 18-1204(A)(1),
(2). Carson algo could have contended that he
was not “aware of and [did not] consciously
disregard[ ] a substantial and unjustifiable
risk” of injury to B.C., because his shooting
of the other two victims was justified and his
erroneous shooting of B.C., in that context,
did not represent a “gross deviation from the
standard of conduct” a reasonable person
would observe in the same situation. § 18-
105(10)(c). The majority therefore errs by
regarding the instruction-related errors as
isolated to the murder charges,

147 For these reasons, I concur with the
majority's analysis and disposition of the
murder counts but dissent from its opinion
affirming the aggravated assault convictions
and sentences,

dard of review, which requires us to view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Carson,
does not give us the liberty to disregard this
favorable testimony from C.Y. and instead accept
the conflicting account offered by B.C. But see
supra 120,

391 P.3d 1210
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Ronald Paul GULLI, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0039
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.
Filed March 2, 2017

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defend-
er, By Stephan J. McCaffery, Assistant Le-
gal Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Appellant

Judge Vasquez authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Howard and
Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

OPINION

VASQUEZ, Judge:

V1 After a jury trial, Ronald Gulli was
convicted of twenty-six counts of sexual ex-
ploitation of a minor and two counts of sexual
conduct with a minor, The trial court sen-
tenced him to consecutive prison terms total-
ing 482 years. On appeal, Gulli argues the
court erroneously instructed the jury on the
meaning of “sexual conduct” and his sen-
tences for sexual exploitation violate his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. For the following reasons, we vacate
Gull’s convictions and sentences for sexual
conduct with a minor, but we otherwise af-
firm.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favor-
able to sustaining Gulli’s convictions. See
State v. Williams, 236 Ariz. 600, 12, 348 P.38d
470, 471 (App. 2015). In June 2012, after
Gulls wife became concerned about his per-
sistent interest “in being with children” that
“didn’t seem natural,” she went “snoopfing]”
in his home office and found a video disk
containing photographs of naked young girls

who appeared to be between eight years old
and early teens. She copied the photos to a
thumb drive and took it to the police depart-
ment, Officers obtained a search warrant and
seized Gulls computer. On it, they found
twenty-four videos of female children en-
gaged in various sexual acts. They also found
two photographs of eleven-year-old M.M.,
taken on separate dates, lying down with a
wooden dowel in her anus. M.M. was friends
with Gulls nine- and twelve-year-old daugh-
ters.

13 A grand jury indicted Gulli for twenty-
six counts of sexual exploitation of a minor
under fifteen, two counts of sexual conduct
with a minor under fifteen, and one count
each of sexual abuse of a minor under fifteen
and molestation of a child. On the state’s
motion, the trial court dismissed the child-
abuse and molestation charges. The jury
found Gulli guilty of the remaining offenses,
and the court sentenced him to seventeen-
year prison terms for each of the sexual-
exploitation counts and twenty-year prison

terms for each of the sexual-conduct counts,
all to be served consecutively. This appeal
followed, We have jurisdiction pursuant to
ARS, §§ 12-120.21(A)(), 18-4081, and 13-
4083(A)(1).

Jury Instructions

Hl 14 Gulli argues the trial court erred
by instructing the jury on the definition of
“sexual conduct.” He acknowledges that, be-
cause he failed to raise this argument below,
he has forfeited review for all but fundamen-
tal, prejudicial error. See State v. Henderson,
210 Ariz. 561, 17 19-20, 115 P.8d 601, 607-08
(2005), Under this standard, Gulli must show
that error exists, that it was fundamental,
and that the error caused him prejudice. See
State v. Juaree—Orci, 236 Ariz. 520, 111, 842
P.8d 856, 859-60 (App. 2015). We review de
novo whether a jury instruction correctly
states the law. State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz.
60, 1107, 280 P.3d 604, 627 (2012).

15 Pursuant to ARS. § 13-1405(A), “[a]
person commits sexual conduct with a minor
by intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with
any person who is under eighteen years of

20

age,” “Sexual intercourse” is defined as
“penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by
any part of the body or by any object or
masturbatory contact with the penis or vul-
va.” ARS, § 18-1401(A)(4)? “Oral sexual
contact” means “oral contact with the penis,
vulva or anus.” § 18-1401(A)(1). Consistent
with these statutes, the grand jury indicted
Gulli for sexual conduct with a minor under
fifteen in amended counts 25 and 26 for
“engaging in an act of sexual intercourse
with [M.M.]” by “inserting a wooden dowel
into [her] anus,”

{6 The final jury instructions included a
description of the proof required for “sexual
conduct with a minor” consistent with § 13-
1405(A) and a definition of “sexual inter-
course” pursuant to § 18-1401(A)(4).8 How-
ever, the trial court also specifically instruct-
ed the jury, “Regarding Counts 25 [and] 26:
‘Sexual Conduct’ means any direct or indirect
touching, fondling, or manipulating of any
part of the genitals, anus or female breast by
any part of the body or by any object or

causing a person to engage in such contact.”
(@imphasis added.)

{7 Gulli points out that the jury instruc-
tions’ additional language for the meaning of
“sexual conduct” mirrors the definition for
“sexual contact” under § 18-1401(A)(8),
which is “legally irrelevant” to § 18-1405(A).
In addition, he argues the trial court commit-
ted fundamental, prejudicial error by giving
this instruction because it “amplified the defi-
nition of the crime” and “allowed the jury to
convict [him by finding] that he caused M.M.
to place the dowel in her own anus.” The
state concedes there was error here but
maintains it was neither fundamental nor
prejudicial. We disagree,

Fundamental Error

Hs 18 Fundamental error is “error go-
ing to the foundation of the case, error that

1, The offense is elevated to a class two felony if
the person is under fifteen years of age. § 13-
1405(B).

2, Section 13-1401(A) was renumbered after Gul-
li's conviction, See 2015 Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch.
209, § 2. We cite the current version of the
statute here,

takes from the defendant a right essential to
his defense, and error of such magnitude that
the defendant could not possibly have re-
ceived a fair trial.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
719, 115 P.8d at 607, quoting State v. Hunt-
er, 142 Ariz. 88, 90, 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984),
“{I]nstructing a jury on a non-existent theory
of criminal liability is fundamental error.”
State v. James, 231 Ariz. 490, 118, 297 P.38d
182, 185 (App, 2018),

19 “Sexual conduct” is not defined in
§ 13-1401(A). Instead, our legislature de-
seribed “sexual conduct with a minor” as
including “sexual intercourse” or “oral sexual
conduct,” § 18-1405(A), and both of those
terms are defined in § 18-1401(A). Thus, as
Gulli notes, the definition of “sexual contact”
in § 18-1401(A)(8) has no application to the
offense of “sexual conduct with a minor.”

Hs 10 By instructing the jury on the
definition of “sexual contact,” the trial court
effectively created a non-existent way of
committing sexual conduct with a minor. Gul-
li was indicted for sexual conduct with a
minor by “engaging in an act of sexual inter-
course with [M.M.],” specifically by “insert-
ing a wooden dowel in [her] anus.” “Sexual
intercourse” requires “penetration” or “mas-
turbatory contact,” § 18-1401(A)(4), and in-
volves “at least two persons” participating in
the act, State ew rel, Hamilton v, Superior
Court, 128 Ariz, 184, 186, 624 P,2d 862, 864
(1981); State v, Flores, 160 Ariz, 235, 240, 772
P.2d 589, 594 (App, 1989), “Sexual contact,”
on the other hand, includes “causing a person
to engage” in certain conduct, § 13-
1401(A)(8), meaning it encompasses acts
“that an adult directs a victim to perform
upon herself,” State v Marshall, 197 Ariz.
496, 129, 4 P.8d 1089, 1047 (App. 2000), By
instructing the jury that the definition of
“sexual contact” is in fact “sexual conduct,”
the court misstated the law and, in doing so,
authorized the jury to find Gulli guilty even if,

3, Although the written instructions for “sexual
intercourse” aligned with § 13-1401(A)(4), as
part of the oral instructions to the jury, the trial
court stated that “sexual intercourse” included
“masturbatory conduct,” rather than “masturba-
tory contact." Because Gulli does not raise this
issue on appeal and we find other error with the
instructions, we do not address it.

MLM, had inserted the wooden dowel herself
at Gulli’s direction. Cf State v. Dickinson,
288 Ariz, 527, 17 11-12, 814 P.8d 1282, 1285-
86 (App. 2018) (instructions allowing jury to
convict defendant of attempted second-de-
gree murder by finding he knew conduct
would cause serious physical injury consti-
tute fundamental error because no such of-
fense exists).

Hl 111 Contrary to the state’s argu-
ment, the other jury instructions and the
prosecutor's closing argument did not “clar-
iffy] the applicable law.” See State v. Tarr,
235 Ariz. 288, 114, 381 P.8d 428, 428 (App.
2014) (when determining whether jury in-
structions adequately state law, we must re-
view them in entirety and may consider clos-
ing arguments). Although the trial court
provided proper written instructions for the
offense of “sexual conduct with a minor” and
for the definition of “sexual intercourse,”
those instructions did not help to define the
elements of the offense in light of the addi-
tional definition of “sexual conduct” that ex-
pressly created another way of committing
the offense,

{12 The record also does not support the
state’s contention that its closing argument
“helped to clarify that the State had to prove
that [Gulli] had knowingly penetrated M.M.
with the dowel.” The prosecutor stated that
sexual conduct with a minor “means the
State has to prove to you that [Gulli] know-
ingly engaged in an act of sexual intercourse,
meaning penetration, however slight, into the
vagina or the anus of a person who is under
the age of 15, that person you heard about,
[M.M.].” But as we discuss below, this lan-
guage did not clearly convey to the jury that
Gulli had to do the penetrating. Accordingly,
Gulli has met his burden of showing funda-
mental error, See James, 231 Ariz, 490, 118,
297 P.3d at 185,

Prejudice

HM 113 “Prejudice is a fact-intensive in-
quiry, the outcome of which will ‘depend[ ]
upon the type of error that occurred and the
facts of a particular case’” Dickinson, 238
Ariz, 527, 118, 314 P.8d at 1286, quoting
James, 231 Ariz. 490, 115, 297 P.3d at 186,
The defendant “must show that a reasonable

21

jury, applying the appropriate [law], could
have reached a different result.” Henderson,
210 Ariz. 561, 127, 115 P.8d at 609, In con-
ducting this analysis, we consider “the par-
ties’ theories, the evidence received at trial
and the parties’ arguments to the jury.”
Dickinson, 288 Ariz, 527, 118, 814 P.8d at
1286,

114 The state’s theory of the case was that
Gulli “is a person who has an abhorrent
sexual interest in children, made his house
into a place where kids would want to come,
and when they didn’t, he would invite them.”
The defense’s theory of the case was that,
because “[M.M.] never disclosed, in any fo-
rensic interview, that the conduct which is
purported to have occurred in Counts Twen-
ty-five and Twenty-six ... ever occurred,” it
did not happen. Gulli further maintained that
the only evidence related to those two counts
were the photographs, which could have been
“altered or changed in some way.”

115 Turning to the evidence presented at
trial, the parties stipulated that, “during the
forensic interview of [M.M.], she did not dis-
close any information about the penetration
of her anus.” However, a detective testified
that it is “not unusual” for victims to fail to
disclose information “about [an] act of pen-
etration.” And the state introduced evidence
of two photographs taken on different dates
depicting M.M. with a dowel in her anus, She
was not called to testify at trial.

116 During its closing argument, the state
asserted that Gulli “committed a hands-on
offense against [M.M.], and then took photos
of [it]” The state directed most of its initial
closing argument to a discussion of the law
and evidence supporting the charges of sexu-
al exploitation of a minor. In that context, it
noted that sexual conduct “is defined as sexu-
al intercourse, it’s defined as penetration,
however slight, into the vagina or rectum, or
an act of masturbation, that would only apply
to Counts One through Twenty-four in this
case.” However, it subsequently stated that
“[t}his is the same definition that you use for
Counts Twenty-five and Twenty-six,” the
counts alleging sexual conduct with a minor.

117 In his closing argument, defense coun-
sel highlighted M.M.’s failure to report any

22

incident involving a dowel. In addition, de~
fense counsel asserted, “There is no corrobo-
ration for [the dowel pictures], none, that is
their only evidence.” He further questioned
whether the state had met its burden of
proof:

What are those pictures with the dow-
els? Are they real? ... [A]re they really
what the State purports them to be? Do
you know? Do you know beyond a reason-
able doubt? Has somebody come in here
and proven that to you? Has somebody
proven to you that that was [Gulli] that
took the picture? Has somebody even real-
ly proven to you that that was [M.M.] in
the picture? ... [O]r is it an album of
things that are photo shopped together?

In its rebuttal closing argument, the state
responded to Gulls claim that the photo-
graphs had been photoshopped as follows:

So Counts Twenty-five and Twenty-six,
the sexual conduct counts, if there is a real
possibility that it’s photo shopped, and
again, no evidence of that, but if that were
a real, if you determine that that is a real
possibility, he is not guilty of those two
counts, but he is just as guilty in Counts
‘Twenty-seven and Twenty-eight.

118 Based on the lack of evidence about
how the dowel incidents occurred, we con-
clude that a reasonable jury, properly in-
structed on the offense of sexual conduct
with a minor, could have reached a different
result, See Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561, 127,
115 P.8d at 609. We reject as speculation the
state’s assertion that Gulli must have insert-
ed the dowel into M.M.’s anus while she was
sleeping because there was another photo
taken on the same day as one of the dowel
incidents showing M.M. sleeping. Cf State v.
Trujillo, 227 Ariz, 314, 117, 257 P.8d 1194,
1198 (App, 2011) (speculation insufficient to
show prejudice),

119 Indeed, it appears that the jury strug-
gled with the precise issue presented here,
During deliberations, the jury posed the fol-
lowing question: “If [M.M.] inserted the dow-
el herself, would ... Gulli still be guilty of
engaging in an act of sexual intercourse?

4, Berger discusses A.R.S, § 13-604.01, which
was renumbered to § 13-705, See 2008 Ariz,

Regarding counts 25-26.” The trial court
sent the following reply to the jury: “Please
refer to the jury instructions regarding sexu-
al conduct with a minor. In conjunction with
all the jury instructions.” As Gulli points out,
“There can be no reasonable claim that the
jury, now redirected to the instructions for
sexual conduct, would not have focused on
the very same language and reached the
same, legally false, conclusion.” Gulli has
therefore met his burden of showing funda-
mental, prejudicial error. See Henderson, 210
Ariz, 561, 1119-20, 115 P.8d at 607-08. Ac-
cordingly, we vacate his convictions and sen-
tences for sexual conduct with a minor. See
State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz, 361, 138, 248 P.8d
209, 216 (App. 2011).

Sentencing

120 Gulli contends his prison sentences for
sexual exploitation of a minor, imposed pur-
suant to A.R.S, §§ 18-705 and 13-3553(C),
violate his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amends.
VII, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 15. Howev-
er, he “essentially seeks a ruling that this
court is not empowered to provide.” State v.
McPherson, 228 Ariz, 557, 118, 269 P.8d
1181, 1186 (App. 2012).

121 As Gulli acknowledges, our supreme
court concluded in State v. Berger, 212 Ariz.
478, 1125, 51, 184 P.8d 878, 888, 388 (2006),
that the defendant’s twenty consecutive ten-
year prison sentences, imposed pursuant to
§§ 18-705 and 13-3558(C) for the possession
of child pornography, did not violate the
Bighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and un-
usual punishment.! The court noted: “Bighth
amendment analysis focuses on the sentence
imposed for each specific crime, not on the
cumulative sentence.” Id. 128, quoting Unit-
ed States v, Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir.
1988). Because this court is bound by the
decisions of our supreme court and has no
authority to overrule or disregard them, we
must reject Gulli’s argument. See State v.
Sullivan, 205 Ariz, 285, 115, 69 P.8d 1006,
1009 (App. 2008),

Sess. Laws, ch, 301, § 17.

122 Gulli additionally contends that his
sentences violate article II, § 15 of our state
constitution, which Berger did not address.
But in McPherson, 228 Ariz. 557, 1114-16,
269 P.8d at 1186-87, this court determined
that the Berger reasoning applies equally to
“our nearly identical state constitutional pro-
vision” and that “[alny change in that ap-
proach would be in the exclusive purview” of
our supreme court. Because we do not think
that McPherson was “based upon clearly er-
roneous principles” or that “conditions have
changed so as to render [it] inapplicable,” we
decline Gulli’s invitation to reconsider our
decision in that case. State v. Patterson, 222
Ariz, 574, 119, 218 P.3d 1081, 1087 (App.
2009) (our prior decisions are “highly persua-
sive and binding”).

Disposition

28 For the above reasons, we vacate
Gulli’s two convictions and sentences for sex-
ual conduct with a minor, but we affirm his
convictions and sentences for sexual exploita-
tion of a minor.

391 P.3d 1215
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Vernon Edward PELTZ, Appellant.
No, 2 CA-CR 2016-0055

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed March 2, 2017

oc)

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Tanja K. Kelly, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Vernon E, Peltz, Tucson, In Propria Perso-
na

Judge Vasquez authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Howard and
Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

OPINION

VASQUEZ, Judy

71 After a jury trial, Vernon Peltz was
convicted of aggravated assault causing tem-
porary but substantial disfigurement—a less-
er-included offense of aggravated assault
causing serious physical injury—and as-
sault—a lesser-included offense of aggravat-
ed assault with a dangerous instrument. The
trial court suspended the imposition of sen-
tence and placed him on concurrent terms of

26

probation, the longer of which is three years.
On appeal, Peltz contends the prosecutor
committed misconduct by charging him with
aggravated assault causing serious physical
injury and the court erred by denying his
motion for a judgment of acquittal on that
charge because there was only evidence of
minor injuries. He also argues the court
erred by admitting lay witness opinion testi-
mony and by denying his motions to sup-
press. For the reasons that follow, we affirm,

Factual and Procedural Background

{2 We view the facts in the light most
favorable to sustaining Peltz’s convictions.
See State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 180, 12, 118
P.8d 1094, 1096 (App. 2005). In December
2012, Arizona Department of Public Safety
Trooper Saleem Abdullah responded to a
motor vehicle accident on Oracle Road in
Pima County, Abdullah’s investigation re-
vealed that a pickup truck “had left the
roadway going northbound, crossed through
the center line of the road across opposing
traffic,” traveled along the dirt shoulder into
and out of a ditch, and ultimately crashed
into a sign. He observed blood on the driver’s
side of the vehicle, specifically, on the inside
and outside of the door, the seat, the floor-
board, and the steering wheel. There was no
blood on the passenger’s side. He saw emer-
gency medical technicians treating Peltz and
Peltz’s mother, J.K. Peltz had a cut above his
left eye that was bleeding, and he had blood
on his hands. J.K, did not have any open cuts
or blood on her, but she “complained of
numerous pains to medical personnel.”

18 Abdullah also noticed that Peltz had
“red, watery eyes, [a] flushed face[,] ...
ptosis, which is a drooping of the eyelids,”
and “an upper body sway.” When Abdullah
asked Peltz what had happened, Peltz stated

1. Peltz contends that “[t]he record on appeal is
still incomplete or incorrect” because the origi-
nal indictment is missing. As the appellant, Peltz
bears the responsibility of ensuring that the rec-
ord is complete. See State v. Mendoza, 181 Ariz,
472, 474, 891 P.2d 939, 941 (App. 1995), In any
event, based on our review of the record, it
appears that Peltz was charged originally in
Cause No. CR20141009 for driving under the
influence of intoxicants (DUI), After the case was
remanded to the grand jury, he was indicted for
aggravated assault causing serious physical inju-

that “there was a crash and that, honestly, he
had a few drinks.”

14 Medical technicians transported Peltz
and J.K. to nearby hospitals, Abdullah fol-
lowed Peltz to continue his investigation.
Once at the hospital, a nurse informed Ab-
dullah that they would be drawing Peltz’s
blood for medical purposes, and Abdullah
requested a sample. Abdullah waited in a
common area by the nurses’ station outside
of Peltz’s room. As he did so, Abdullah over-
heard Peltz talking on his cell phone, Peltz
stated he had been leaving a restaurant,
where he consumed “a few alcoholic drinks,”
and he had been driving. Abdullah also heard
Peltz confirm to medical personnel that he
had been drinking alcohol,

15 Subsequent testing of Peltz’s blood
sample revealed a ,142 alcohol content. Offi-
cers discovered that the truck was registered
to Peltz and that J.K.’s driver license had
been suspended. J.K’s injuries included a
lacerated spleen and fractures to her spine
and eye socket,

16 A grand jury indicted Peltz for aggra-
vated assault causing serious physical injury
to J.K. and aggravated assault of J.K. using
a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
(the motor vehicle). As noted above, the jury
convicted him of lesser-included offenses for
each charge: aggravated assault causing tem-
porary but substantial disfigurement and as-
sault, This appeal followed. We have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to ARS, §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4081, and 18-4033(A)(1).

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Hl 17 Peltz first argues “the prosecutor
committed misconduct by charging aggravat-
ed assault with ‘serious physical injury’ with-
out any reasonable belief that any injuries

ry in Cause No. CR20143713, and CR20141009
was dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the case was
again remanded to the grand jury, which also
indicted Peltz for aggravated assault causing ser-
ious physical injury in CR20143713. There was
then a superseding indictment under Cause No.
CR20153351, which added the charge of aggra-
vated assault involving a deadly weapon or dan-
gerous instrument. The trial court consolidated
CR20143713 with CR20153351, which is the
case before us.

were serious.” Although Peltz alleged prose-
eutorial misconduct in charging him below, it
was for different reasons than he now raises
on appeal. Specifically, he argued the prose-
eutor “failfed] to adequately investigate the
easy to determine status of [his] driving rec-
ord” or to present to the grand jury “clearly
exculpatory evidence ... that showed a wit-
ness observed the vehicle leaving [his] house
with [J.K.] driving.” See State v. Lopez, 217
Ariz, 438, 14, 175 P.8d 682, 683 (App. 2008)
(objection on one ground does not preserve
issue on another). Accordingly, he has forfeit-
ed review for all but fundamental, prejudicial
error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561,
‘11 19-20, 115 P.8d 601, 607 (2005). However,
because Peltz has failed to argue the alleged
error was fundamental, he has waived review
of this issue, See State v. Moreno-Medrano,
218 Ariz, 349, 117, 185 P.8d 185, 140 (App.
2008); see also State v. Fernandez, 216 Ariz,
545, 132, 169 P.38d 641, 650 (App. 2007) (ap-
pellate court will not ignore fundamental er-
ror if found),

HMM S18 Even assuming the argument
had not been waived, Peltz cannot establish
fundamental error on his claim of prosecuto-
rial misconduct. See Henderson, 210 Ariz.
561, 1719-20, 115 P.3d at 607, The prosecu-
tor has broad discretion in deciding both
whether to charge and which charges to file
against a defendant. State v. Hankins, 141
Ariz, 217, 221, 686 P.2d 740, 744 (1984),
Courts will not interfere with that discretion
unless the prosecutor is acting illegally or in
excess of his or her powers. State v. Murphy,
118 Ariz, 416, 418, 555 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1976).
Here, Peltz did not argue that the prosecutor
failed to make a fair and impartial presenta-
tion in the final remand to the grand jury,
see id. and the grand jury independently
determined that there was probable cause to
indict Peltz for aggravated assault involving
serious physical injury, see State v. Coconino
Cty. Superior Court, 189 Ariz, 422, 424, 678
P.2d 1886, 1888 (1984). The prosecutor did
not engage in misconduct by seeking an in-
dictment on that charge.

2. Peltz does not contend there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for aggravated
assault causing temporary but substantial disfig-
urement. Accordingly, we do not address this

27
Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal

HH 19 In a somewhat related argument,
Peltz contends the trial court erred by deny-
ing his motion for a judgment of acquittal,
pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., on the
charge of aggravated assault causing serious
physical injury because the state presented
insufficient evidence that J.K.’s injuries were
serious. However, because Peltz was not con-
victed of this offense, the issue is moot. See
Pointe Resorts, Inc. v. Culbertson, 158 Ariz.
187, 140-41, 761 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1988)
(under mootness doctrine, court should not
address issues that no longer exist because of
change in factual circumstances). To the ex-
tent Peltz believes that, if his Rule 20 motion
on the original charge had been granted, the
trial court could not have instructed the jury
on lesser-included offenses, he is mistaken?
See State ew rel. Thomas v. Duncan, 216
Ariz, 260, n.7, 165 P.8d 288, 248 n.7 (App.
2007) (noting that, even if judgment of ac-
quitial granted on charged offense, “lesser
included offense would still be applicable”);
State v. Miranda, 198 Ariz. 426, 19, 10 P.38d
1218, 1215 (App. 2000) (instruction on lesser-
included offense proper if supported by evi-
dence),

Hs 110 The trial court did not, in any
event, err in denying Peltz’s Rule 20 motion
because there was substantial evidence that
J.K. had suffered a “serious physical injury.”
See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 11 15-16, 250
P.8d 1188, 1191 (2011). “[I]n ruling on a Rule
20 motion, ... a trial court may not re-weigh
the facts or disregard inferences that might
reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” Id.
918. “[Tyhe relevant question is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. 116, quoting State v. Mathers,
165 Ariz, 64, 66, 796 P.2d 866, 868 (1990).
“When reasonable minds may differ on infer-
ences drawn from the facts, the case must be
submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has

issue. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896

P.2d 830, 838 (1995) (‘Failure to argue a claim
on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim.”),

28

no discretion to enter a judgment of acquit-
tal.” State v, Lee, 189 Aviz, 590, 608, 944 P.2d
1204, 1217 (1997).

411 The physician who admitted J.K. to
the intensive care unit of the hospital testi-
fied that, due to the accident, J.K. had suf-
fered a laceration to her spleen, which car-
ried a risk of internal bleeding, a burst
fracture of her spine, and an orbital frac-
ture with bruising. He also explained that,
because J.K, was eighty-three years old, she
was at a greater risk for complications and
was less likely to function at the same level
of pre-injury independence, Upon her dis-
charge from the hospital several days later,
J.K. was placed in a skilled nursing facility.
A reasonable jury could have concluded that
J.Ks injuries “create[d] a reasonable risk
of death” or “cause[d] serious and perma-
nent disfigurement, serious impairment of
health or loss or protracted impairment of
the function of any bodily organ or limb.”
ARS. § 18-105(89); see State v. Mwandi-
shi, 229 Ariz, 570, 18, 278 P.3d 912, 918
(App. 2012),

Lay Witness Opinion Testimony

Hl 112 Peltz additionally asserts the tri~
al court erred by admitting lay witness testi-
mony from Abdullah “regarding who was
driving based upon the blood spatter.” We
review the admission of evidence for an
abuse of diseretion. State v. Dann, 220 Ariz.
351, 166, 207 P.3d 604, 618 (2009).

118 Before trial, Peltz sought to preclude
Abdullah from testifying “concerning any
opinion that there was blood in the vehicle or
that the blood indicates [Peltz] was driving.”
He argued that Abdullah could not give such
testimony “unless he can prove he is an
expert in blood spatter.” At a hearing, Abdul-
Jah testified that he saw blood on the driver's
side door, seat, and steering wheel but none
on the passenger’s side, Abdullah also identi-
fied blood on Peltz’s forehead and hands,
explaining that “[t]he blood [he] saw on the
vehicle ... [was] consistent with someone
exiting the vehicle from the driver’s seat.”

114 Based on that testimony, the state
argued that Abdullah would not be testifying
as to “blood spatter” but would be explaining
his observations of blood, which “he knew

... to be blood based on training[ ] and the
fact that he is a human being.” The state
further asserted that Abdullah was not giv-
ing a scientific opinion but was making a
“basic human observation,” which was prop-
er. In response, Peltz conceded that Abdullah
could “testify where he saw the blood” but
maintained that he could not “give an opinion
as to [whether] the blood pattern indicates
who was driving the vehicle.” In its under-
advisement ruling, the trial court precluded
Abdullah during direct examination from
stating his opinion that Peltz was driving the
vehicle because “it does not fall within expert
testimony and it reaches the ultimate issue to
be decided by the jury.” However, the court
ruled that the testimony could “be elicited on
redirect if [Peltz] ‘opens the door,”

915 At trial during cross-examination, de-
fense counsel confirmed that Abdullah did
not “see who was driving .., Peltz’s vehicle,”
did not “see how the blood got anywhere on
the vehicle,” and was not “a forensic expert
in blood spatter.” Defense counsel also asked
whether Abdullah knew if “the blood got
there from ... Peltz either driving the vehi-
cle or taking his mother out of the vehicle,”
to which Abdullah responded that he “did not
see the blood get on the vehicle.” The state
then informed the court that it thought de-
fense counsel had “opened the door” and that
it intended to ask Abdullah on redirect
“about his conclusions with the blood as to
who was driving.” Over defense counsel’s
objection that it “[cJalls for an expert opin-
ion,” the court permitted the questioning.
Abdullah subsequently testified that, based
on the location of the blood on the steering
wheel and the driver’s side door and given
that Peltz was “the only individual” bleeding,
“it seems logical .,. that [Peltz] was the
individual driving the vehicle.”

116 On appeal, Peltz maintains he did not
open the door and, consequently, the trial
court improperly admitted Abdullah's testi-
mony. He also argues that the testimony
could only have been elicited from an expert,
which Abdullah was not. Because Abdullah’s
testimony was proper lay witness testimony,
admissible during direct examination, we find
no error,

HM 117 Rule 701, Ariz. R. Evid. pro-
vides:
Tf a witness is not testifying as an ex-
pert, testimony in the form of an opinion is
limited to one that is;

(a) rationally based on the witness’s per-
ception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a
fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.

Thus, when a lay witness is “drawing a rea-
sonable inference from [his] firsthand knowl-
edge and perceptions of a situation,” the
witness is “competent to voice [his] opinion,”
State v, Ayala, 178 Ariz. 885, 888, 873 P.2d
1807, 1810 (App. 1994), even as to the ulti-
mate issue, State v, Doerr, 198 Ariz, 56, 126,
969 P.2d 1168, 1175 (1998).

18 Here, Abdullah’s opinion that Peltz
had been driving the vehicle was based on his
perception and not scientific, technical, or
specialized knowledge. Specifically, Abdul-
lah’s opinion stemmed from his firsthand ob-
servations that Peltz was bleeding and J.K,
was neither bleeding nor did she have any
blood on her person, and that there was
blood on the driver’s side but not on the
passenger’s side of the truck. Cf Inman v,
State, 281 P.8d 745, 120 (Wyo. 2012) (detec-
tive’s opinion of where assault occurred
based on her perception of blood trail and
location of weapon); Gavin v. State, 891 So.2d
907, 969 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (nvestiga-
tor’s opinion about blood flow “based on com-
mon sense, not on novel scientific blood-spat-
ter analysis”). Although Abdullah stated that,
his conclusion was in part “[bJased on his
training and experience,” he also stated that
his conclusion was based on “logie[ .” See
United States v. Vega, 818 F.3d 886, 394 (1st
Cir, 2016) Gay witness may provide opinion
“personally acquire[d] through experience,
often on the job,” if “the product of reasoning
processes familiar to the average person in
everyday life”), quoting United States v.
Maher, 454 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2006) &
United States v. Garcia, 418 F.8d 201, 215
(2d Cir. 2005).

29

119 In addition, Abdullah’s testimony as-
sisted the jury in determining a fact in is-
sue—who had been driving the vehicle. See
ARS, §§ 18-1208(A)(1), 18-1204(A)(1), (2).
Accordingly, the testimony was admissible
under Rule 701, see Doerr, 198 Ariz, 56, 126,
969 P.2d at 1175, and the trial court did not
err in admitting it, see Dann, 220 Ariz. 351,
166, 207 P.8d at 618,

Motions to Suppress

120 Peltz also contends the trial court
erred by denying his motions to suppress his
hospital statements and blood test results,
“In reviewing a motion to suppress, we con-
sider only the evidence presented at the sup-
pression hearing and view the facts in the
light most favorable to sustaining the trial
court's ruling.” State v. Gonzalez, 285 Ariz.
212, 12, 880 P.8d 969, 970 (App. 2014). We
review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of
discretion, State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405,
16, 267 P.3d 1197, 1199 (App. 2011), but we
review de novo its legal determinations, State
v, Zamora, 220 Ariz, 68, 17, 202 P.8d 528,
582 (App. 2009),

Hospital Statements

121 Before trial, Peltz moved to suppress
all of his statements that Abdullah overheard
at the hospital in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and article II, § 8 of the Arizona Consti-
tution, Peltz argued that he was at the hospi-
tal “for treatment of his injuries and had an
expectation of privacy concerning his commu-
nication while inside the room,” including his
conversations over his cell phone and with
medical personnel,

122 During the suppression hearing, Ab-
dullah testified that he was not “actively
trying to listen in to ... Peltz’s room”’—he
was standing by the nurses’ station in a
“public passing area,” while waiting for a
blood sample and completing his paperwork.
He also explained that the door to Peltz’s
room was “[g]enerally” open and that Peltz
was speaking “a little louder than normal
conversation.”

123 The trial court denied the motion to
suppress, reasoning:

30

With respect to [Peltz’s] statements
made to medical personnel and overheard
by [Abdullah], these statements are not
precludable. The Officer was in a common
area he and others had a right to be. The
Officer was there for a proper purpose to
obtain a blood draw, if medical personnel
were going to make a medical blood draw.
The door to [Peltz’s] treatment room was
not completely closed, which allowed
[Peltz’s] statements to be overheard.
[Peltz] was talking in a sufficient[ly] loud
voice where his statements could be over-
heard in the common area. Under these
circumstances there was no reasonable, ob-
jective expectation of privacy.

As to [Peltz’s] statement made to some-
one on the telephone and overheard by
[Abdullah], these statements are not pre-
dludable. In addition to the analysis for the
statements to medical personnel, there is
even more reason to find no subjective
expectation of privacy by [Peltz], as well as
+. no reasonable objective expectation of
privacy. [Peltz] admitted medical personnel
would go in and out of the treatment room.
As a consequence, while on the telephone
any medical person could have entered the
room and overheard the telephone conver-
sation.

HM 124 As he did below, Peltz maintains
that he had both a subjective and objective
expectation of privacy in his conversations in
the hospital room and that Abdullah violated
his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. In
addition, as to his conversation with medical
personnel, Peltz asserts that his expectation
of privacy was “even more reasonable” be-
cause of the physician-patient privilege under
ARS, § 18-4062(4),

W125 «The Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S, Const. amend. IV; State v.
Huerta, 228 Ariz, 424, 15, 224 P.8d 240, 242
(App. 2010). A “search” under the Fourth
Amendment occurs when an individual’s rea-
sonable expectation of privacy is infringed.
3. Peltz does not re-urge his argument with re-

spect to article II, § 8. We therefore deem any

such argument waived. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at

298, 896 P.2d at 838, In any event, the right of
privacy under article Il, § 8 has not been ex-

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118,
104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); State v.
Welch, 286 Ariz. 308, 18, 340 P.3d 387, 390
(App. 2014). We have a two-part test for
determining whether a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy exists. See Katz v. United
States, 889 U.S. 847, 861, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
First, an individual must “have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,”
and, second, the expectation must “be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable’” Id.; accord State v. Adams, 197
Ariz, 569, 1117, 20, 5 P.38d 903, 906-07 (App.
2000) (describing first question as subjective
and second as objective). Moreover, even if a
search is unconstitutional, we will not reverse
a conviction if the error in admitting evidence
obtained as a result of that search was harm-
less. See State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192,
729, 68 P8d 418, 424 (2008); see also
Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561, 118, 115 P.38d at
607 (“Harmless error review places the bur-
den on the state to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the error did not contribute
to or affect the verdict or sentence.”).

HH 126 As to Peltz’s cell phone conver-
sation, which included his statement that he
had been driving after drinking alcohol, Peltz
did not exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy. For this analysis, we must consider
Peltz’s conduct. See State v, Steiger, 134 Ariz.
268, 272, 655 P.2d 808, 812 (App. 1982). Ab-
dullah testified that the door to Peltz’s room
was “[glenerally” open, as medical personnel
were going in and out. And Peltz never asked
for the door to be shut while he was on the
phone. Abdullah also testified that Peltz was
talking “a little louder than normal conversa-
tion.” Cf United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d
1211, 1214 (9th Cir, 1975) (defendants defeat-
ed expectation of privacy by exposing their
activities to others),

27 Even if Peltz had a subjective expec-
tation of privacy, the trial court did not err in
finding it is not one society would recognize
as reasonable, Participants of a conversation

panded beyond that provided by the Fourth

Amendment, except in cases involving unlawful,

warrantless home entries. State v. Teagle, 217
Ariz, 17, 0.3, 170 P.3d 266, 271 n.3 (App, 2007),

that can be readily overheard by someone
standing in a public place have a lesser ex-
pectation of privacy. See United States v,
Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 980 (1st Cir. 1992); Unit-
ed States v. Muckenthaler, 584 F.2d 240, 245
(8th Cir. 1978). This is true even in the
context of the physician-patient privilege. In-
formation is privileged when acquired by a
physician or surgeon in a consultation with
the patient under circumstances in which “it
is intended that the communication be pri-
vate and confidential.” State v. Beaty, 158
Ariz, 282, 239-40, 762 P.2d 519, 526-27 (1988)
(“The presence of third parties can eliminate
the confidential character of the [communica-
tion] and destroy the privilege.”); see also
State v, Thomas, 78 Ariz, 52, 68, 275 P.2d
408, 416 (1954), overruled in part on other
grounds by State v. Pina, 94 Ariz, 248, 245,
883 P.2d 167, 168 (1963), Peltz’s reliance on
Katz is thus misplaced.

128 In Katz, federal agents had attached
an electronic listening and recording device
to the outside of a phone booth. 389 U.S, at
348, 88 S.Ct. 507. They then testified at the
defendant's trial as to the defendant’s con-
versations from that booth, which they over-
heard because of the electronic device. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that the
agents had violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment right because he “justifiably re-
lied” on his privacy in the booth and the
search did not comply with the necessary
constitutional “safeguards.” Id. at 358-54, 88
S.Ct. 507.

29 Here, unlike the federal agents in
Katz, Abdullah used no electronic device and
merely overheard Peltz’s conversation while
standing in a public area of a hospital, as
could anyone else at that location. See id. at
861, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[Clonversations in the open would not be
protected against being overheard, for the
expectation of privacy under the circum-
stances would be unreasonable.”); United
States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 664 (7th Cir,
2018) (“[Aln individual who makes a phone
call on a public phone not enclosed in a booth
and in a voice audible to a person standing
nearby ‘knowingly expose[s] [the conversa-
tion] to the public’ and is not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.”), quoting

31

United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186,
1188 (7th Cir, 1974) (alterations in Scott).
Nor does the fact that Peltz had been using
his personal cell phone during the conversa-
tion change our analysis—Peltz was still in
an open hospital room, and Abdullah was
standing in a public area. The trial court
therefore did not err by denying Peltz’s mo-
tion to suppress with respect to his cell
phone conversation. See Zamora, 220 Ariz,
63, 17, 202 P.8d at 582.

HM 130 As for Peltz’s conversation with
medical personnel, even assuming the trial
court erred in denying the motion to sup-
press, any resulting error was harmless, At
issue here is Abdullah’s testimony that he
heard Peltz tell the hospital staff that he had
been drinking alcohol. However, that evi-
dence was “otherwise established.” State v.
Bass, 198 Ariz, 571, 140, 12 P.8d 796, 806
(2000). Abdullah testified that when he ar-
rived at the scene Peltz had “red, watery
eyes, a flushed face,” and an “upper body
sway.” Both Abdullah and the criminalist
who tested Peltz’s blood sample confirmed
that those were signs of alcohol impairment,
See State v. Nelson, 146 Ariz. 246, 249, 705
P.2d 486, 489 (App. 1985) (erroneous admis-
sion of breathalyzer test results harmless
given officers’ observations and defendant’s
conduct). Perhaps most notably, Peltz told
Abdullah at the accident scene and also testi-
fied at trial that he had been drinking before
the accident. We are therefore confident be-
yond a reasonable doubt that any error did
not contribute to or affect the verdict. See
Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561, 118, 115 P.38d at
607.

Blood Test Results

HM 181 Peltz also sought to suppress
the blood test results, arguing that Abdullah
lacked probable cause or a warrant, in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article II, § 8 of the
Arizona Constitution. He also argued that,
because there were no exigent cireumstances
and “[t]here was no medical purpose for
blood testing,” the medical blood draw excep-

32

tion to the warrant requirement under A.R.S,
§ 28-1888(E) did not apply.*

82 At the suppression hearing, Abdullah
testified, “When I got to the hospital, I deter-
mined the hospital was going to be drawing
blood for medical purposes, and under stat-
ute, I requested a sample of that blood.” He
said that no one told him “the medical neces-
sity for taking blood,” apparently because it
would “violate[ ] some sort of HIPAA rule,” §
The trial court denied Peltz’s motion to sup-
press, explaining:

This issue is governed by A.R.S, § 28-

1888(E). In this case the evidence supports

the finding of probable cause by Officer

Abdullah at the time he requested a por-

tion of [Peltz’s] blood from medical person-

nel, who were already going to take a

blood draw from [Peltz] for their own use,
88 As he did below, Peltz maintains Abdul-
lah lacked probable cause or a warrant and,
therefore, violated his federal and state con-
stitutional rights. Peltz argues that, at the
time of the blood draw, Abdullah lacked
probable cause because “[t]he information
concerning [his] driving was discovered after
the draw while [Abdullah] was secretly lis-
tening to conversations,” Peltz also asserts,
“(There were no exigent circumstances,” and
“{tIhere is no evidence in the record that
shows why the blood was being drawn, much
less any evidence which established that the
blood was drawn for a medical purpose.” We
disagree.

TH 134 Section 28-1888(E) provides:

Notwithstanding any other law, if a law
enforcement officer has probable cause to

believe that a person has violated [A.R.S.]

§ 28-1881 and a sample of blood, urine or

other bodily substance is taken from that

person for any reason, a portion of that
sample sufficient for analysis shall be pro-
vided to a law enforcement officer if re-
quested for law enforcement purposes.

4, Peltz also challenged the constitutionality of

ARS, §§ 28-1388(E) and 28-1390, However, he

does not raise these arguments on appeal. We

thus do not consider them further. See Bolton,
182 Ariz. at 298, 896 P.2d at 838,

3. Abdullah was referring to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act. The act’s pri-
vacy rule requires a detailed authorization for

Thus, under § 28-1388(E), a warrantless
blood draw seizure is permissible “if (1) prob-
able cause existed to believe that the person
was driving under the influence, (2) exigent
circumstances were present, and (8) the
blood was drawn by medical personnel for a
medical reason.” State v, Nissley, 241 Ariz.
827, 110, 887 P.8d 1256, 1259 (2017), We
address each of these factors in turn,

WM 185 The trial court did not err in
finding Abdullah had probable cause to be-
lieve Peltz had been driving under the influ-
ence of an intoxicant. “A police officer has
probable cause when reasonably trustworthy
information and circumstance would lead a
person of reasonable caution to believe that a
suspect has committed an offense,” State v.
Hoslins, 199 Ariz. 127, 180, 14 P.8d 997,
1007-08 (2000). In the DUI context, an offi-
cer is only required to show the probability
that the operator was under the influence,
not that he actually was. State v. Moran, 282
Ariz. 528, 110, 807 P.8d 95, 99 (App. 2018).
When Abdullah arrived at the scene of the
single car crash, he noticed that Peltz
“smelled strongly of an intoxicating bever-
age,” and he observed that Peltz had “red,
watery eyes, a flushed face, ptosis, ... which
is droopy eyelids,” and an- “upper body
sway.” When Abdullah asked Peltz what hap-
pened, he acknowledged “there was a crash”
but did not say how it occurred, He stated,
“Honestly, I’ve had a few drinks, and I don’t
think I should talk to you.” Abdullah also
testified that he saw blood on the driver's
side door, seat, and steering wheel, as well as
Peltz’s forehead and hands, explaining that
“{t}he blood [he] saw on the vehicle ... [was]
consistent with someone exiting the vehicle
from the driver's seat.”

136 Turning next to whether exigent cir-
cumstances were present, Abdullah testified
that Peltz was transported by ambulance to
the hospital for treatment, Abdullah agreed,

uses and disclosures of protected health informa-
tion, See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c).

6, To prove DUI with an elevated blood alcohol
content pursuant to § 28-1381(A)(2), the state
must establish “the person has an alcohol con-
centration of 0.08 or more within two hours of
driving or being in actual physical control of the
vehicle.” Thus, the timing of a blood draw is an

based on his previous experience, that per-
sons can be transported to a hospital for a
“wide variety of things,” which include sur-
gery, computerized tomography (CT) scans,
x-rays, or treatment that involves isolating
the person “for whatever reason.” Abdullah
testified that, when he learned the hospital
would be drawing Peltz’s blood, he did not
know the scope or extent of any further
medical treatment. He stated that, based on
his training as a “combat life saver in the
military,” he was aware of the possibility of
the “intravenous application of fluids,” which
would “alter an individual’s blood alcohol con-
centration” and “essentially destroy whatever
evidence was available.” Thus, the state met
its burden of showing exigent circumstances.
See Nissley, 241 Ariz, 327, 115, 887 P.3d at
1260 (state bears burden of proof for medical
blood draw exception),

987 As to the final factor, we agree with
the trial court’s determination that Peltz’s
blood had been drawn by medical personnel
for a medical purpose, “The State, as the
party seeking to admit evidence seized with-
out a warrant, had the burden of establishing
the medical blood draw exception’s applica-
bility to these facts.” State v. Spencer, 235
Ariz, 496, 112, 888 P.8d 828, 826 (App. 2014),
It was sufficient for the state to show that
Abdullah neither requested the hospital to
perform the blood draw nor directed it to do
so. In other words, it was only necessary for
the state to establish the hospital made an
independent medical decision to draw Peltz’s
blood, At the suppression hearing, Abdullah
testified that, when he arrived at the hospi-
tal, he asked whether “the hospital was going
to be drawing blood for medical purposes,
and under statute, [he] requested a sample of
that blood,” Peltz has not cited any authority,
and we are aware of none, for the proposition
that the state was required to establish the
hospital’s medical reason for the blood draw.

important concern in such cases. In State v,
Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 286, 709 P.2d 1336, 1345
(1985), our supreme court concluded that exigent
circumstances existed, for purposes of the medi-
cal blood draw exception to the warrant require-
ment, given that “[t]he highly evanescent nature
of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream guar-
anteed that the alcohol would dissipate over a
relatively short period of time,” However, the
court recently “disavowled]” any suggestion in

33

Peltz also does not argue his medical treat-
ment at the hospital was involuntary, See
State v. Estrada, 209 Aviz, 287, 115, 100 P.3d
452, 456 (App. 2004) (medical blood draw
exception does not apply “when a person is
receiving medical treatment against his or
her will”), The court did not err by denying
Peltz’s motion to suppress with respect to his
blood test results. See Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63,
97, 202 P.8d at 532,

Disposition

138 For the reasons stated above, we af-
firm Peltz’s convictions and sentences.

391 P.3d 1225
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v
Jeremy David MILLIS, Appellant.
No, 2 CA-CR 2015-0368

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed March 9, 2017

Cocio that there was a “per se exigency” based
on “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream.” Nissley, 241 Ariz. 327, 111, 387
P,3d at 1259; see also Missouri v. McNeely, 569
US. 141, 155-56, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1563, 185
L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[While the natural dissipa-
tion of alcohol in the blood may support a find-
ing of exigency in a specific case, ... it does not
do so categorically.”).

ro)

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Kathryn A. Damstra, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defend-
er, By Robb P, Holmes, Assistant Legal De-
fender, Tucson, Counsel for Appellant

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the

Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and
Judge Espinosa concurred,

OPINION
MILLER, Judge:

91 A jury found Jeremy Millis guilty of
one count of intentional or knowing child
abuse under circumstances likely to result in
death or serious physical injury and one
count of first-degree murder, both committed
against a victim under age fifteen, Millis was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of release for thirty-five years for
murder, to be followed by a consecutive ten-
year prison term for child abuse, On appeal,
he contends the trial court erroneously pre~
cluded expert testimony about his autism, he
‘was prejudiced by a duplicitous charge, and
the court erred by allowing the victim’s
mother to be accompanied at trial by a facili-
ty dog. We affirm for the following reasons,

1, Although cases refer to victim/witness support
dogs using many different terms, see, e,g., People
vy, Spence, 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d
374, 400 n.4 (2012) (‘therapy dog” or “support
canine”); State v. Jacobs, 2015-Ohio-4353, 1119,
2015 WL 6180908 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct, 21, 2015)

Factual and Procedural Background

12 “We view the facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favor-
able to upholding the jury’s verdict[s].” State
v, Causbie, 241 Ariz, 178, 12, 384 P.8d 1253,
1255 (App. 2016), Millis and S.F. began dat-
ing in 2012 and after a few months they
began sharing an apartment. Not long after
that, the relationship ended and Millis moved
out, but they remained on good terms with
one another. In order to help offset the cost
of the lease that S.F. now bore on her own,
Millis agreed to watch S.F.’s two young sons
one day a week while she was at work,

93 On the morning of January 24, 2013,
S.F. changed the diaper of her eight-month-
old son, C.K. He had no bruises on him. She
later took some pictures of C.K. “having a lot
of fun .., and being very smiley” in his
bouncer, Millis arrived to babysit the boys
and she left for work at around 2:00 p.m,
Millis was the only person watching the boys
while S.F. was at work.

94 SF, arrived home around 11:00 pm.
She looked in on the boys and they appeared
to be asleep. Millis told S.F. that C.K. had
been coughing and choking earlier that night,
but S.F, was not worried because she knew
C.K. had a condition called tracheomalacia, a
“floppiness” in the cartilage of the trachea
that sometimes caused him to make choking
sounds, cough, or wheeze. Millis left and S.F,
went to bed,

115 C.K, woke up at about 2:30 or 3:00 am,
and S.F. tried to feed him a bottle. He did
not eat much, but seemed to go back to sleep
after about fifteen or twenty minutes, Then
at about 5:80 am., C.K. started crying in a
way that “didn’t sound right, It wasn’t his
normal ery.” §.F, picked him up but he would
not open his eyes or respond to his name,
and she had to hold his head up.

16 S.F, rushed C.K. to the hospital, which
was across the street from her apartment,
When they arrived at the emergency room,
the staff took him right away, but he began

(‘companion dog"); State v. Dye, 178 Wash.2d
541, 309 P.3d 1192, 91 (2013) (“comfort ani-
mal” or “facility dog”), we use the term “facility
dog” in this opinion because that is the term our
legislature elected to use in a newly enacted
statute on the subject, see A.R.S, § 13-4442.

having seizures. At 6:53 am., S.F, texted
Millis and told him something was wrong
with C.K.—he was erying “weird” and was
nonresponsive, Millis replied that C.K. had
been “a little weird when he did that
chof Jking thing” the night before, She asked
if C.K. had hit his head on anything, and
Millis replied, “I don’t think so, Just from
him sitting on the carpet and tip[p]ing over
. ++ [bJut nothing bad.” She told Millis C.K.
was “seizing” and had a “head bleed,” to
which Millis replied, “Oh my god. Maybe
that’s what he was doing last night, I didn’t
know what he was doing. I squeezed his neck
a little [because] he was having trouble
breathing. He cried a little then went back to
sleep so I thought he was fine,” In a subse-
quent recorded confrontation call, Millis told
S.F. he had found C.K. “stiff” and making
“gasping noises” at one point, and had re-
sponded by “squeez[ing] his neck” “firm[ly].”

17 C.K, had bilateral subdural hematomas,
which caused bleeding on both sides of his
brain, bruising, and swelling. Analysis of a

CT scan indicated the head trauma had oc-
curred within approximately the last twenty-
four hours, and could not have been the
result of C.K. merely falling back onto carpet
from a seated position, His fontanel was also
bulging, and in each eye he had “too many
[retinal hemorrhages] to count” across all
layers of the retina. C.K. also had bruises on
his head, ears, neck, chin, upper arms, shoul-
ders, and “wrap[ping] around” his chest and
rib cage. Numerous medical professionals
testified that C.K.’s injuries were not consis-
tent with an accidental fall, but were consis-
tent with blunt force head trauma, intention-
al choking, and violent shaking.

18 C.K. died on January 30, five days after
he was admitted to the hospital. A forensic
pathologist opined that the date of the inju-
ries was five to six days prior to death. The
pathologist ruled C.K.’s death a homicide and
determined the co-equal and interrelated
causes of death to be (1) blunt force trauma
to the head, and (2) hypoxie ischemic injury,

2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 444-45,
86 S.Ct, 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3. At another point, Millis told the detective that
he had only “squeezed” C.K.'s neck because C.K.

37

which is a lack of oxygen and blood to the
brain,

19 SF. was interviewed by investigating
detectives the day C.K, was admitted to the
hospital, She showed them her text message
exchange with Millis. They located Millis,
advised him of his Miranda? rights, and he
agreed to an interview. When they confront-
ed him with information about C.K.’s head
injuries, Millis told the detectives he had
accidentally hit C.K.’s head on the oven door
while he was taking food out of the oven,
even though he had denied any head injuries
when he was texting with S.F. while she was
at the hospital. He also told the detectives
that C.K, had been “crying a lot” and that he
had “choked [C.K.]” with his hand, In a
second Mirandized interview after C.K. died,
Millis again admitted he had been “frustrat-
ed” with C.K. “just wanted him to stop
erying,” and “chok[ed]” him to get him to
quiet down, adding that he “just couldn’t
take it anymore” and “I did what I did.”
Millis also told his ex-wife in a recorded jail
video call that “he [had] choked [S.F’s]
baby.”

110 At trial, Millis argued the blunt force
trauma alone could have caused the brain
swelling, which in turn could have choked off
oxygenated blood to the brain, causing the
hypoxie ischemic injury notwithstanding any
strangulation. However, the forensic patholo-
gist testified that the blunt force trauma
alone could not account for certain injuries
noted on an MRI. In closing, Millis argued
that his choking the baby was not what killed
him, that S.F, had inflicted the injuries that
caused C.K’s death after he had left that
night, and that “shaking plus impact explains
the [whole] universe of injuries that we
have.” In the alternative, he argued he had
choked C.K. recklessly or negligently, not
intentionally.

{il The jury convicted Millis of all
charges and he was sentenced as described.
above, We have jurisdiction pursuant to
ARS, §§ 18-4081 and 18-4088(A)(1).

was having trouble breathing and Millis was try-

ing “to see if there was something there, if he
could move [the neck] around.”

38
Preclusion of Expert Testimony

HM 112 Millis argues the trial court
erred by precluding a defense expert from
testifying Millis suffers from autism spec-
trum disorder (ASD) when it concluded that,
the proffered testimony was diminished ca-
pacity evidence as opposed to character trait
evidence. We review a ruling to admit or
preclude expert testimony for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Wright, 214 Aviz, 540, 15,
155 P.8d 1064, 1066 (App. 2007). Because
Millis opposed the state’s motion to preclude
the testimony and made an offer of proof, we
review for harmless error. See Ariz. R. Evid.
108(a); State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561,
118, 115 P.8d 601, 607 (2005).

{18 Before trial, defense counsel filed a
motion to assess Millis’s competency pursu-
ant to Rule 11.2(a), Ariz, R. Crim. P. Counsel
attached to the motion the opinion of Dr,
Pablo Stewart, who concluded in relevant
part that Millis suffers from ASD without
accompanying intellectual or language im-
pairments. Relying on the testimony of two
other experts who rejected that diagnosis,
the trial court found Millis competent to
stand trial.

114 Millis asked to continue the trial in
order to accommodate Dr. Stewart’s schedule
so that he could testify about the ASD diag-
nosis, The state moved to preclude any ASD
testimony, which it characterized as evidence
of diminished capacity. Defense counsel ar-
gued the ASD diagnosis would not be offered
to show diminished capacity, but to show
Millis had a character trait of “difficulty in
understanding how to interact appropriately
with others,” which could have made it “more
or less likely that he formed the intent re-
quired in this particular case.” After a hear-
ing at which Millis made an offer of proof,
the trial court granted the state’s motion to
preclude Stewart's testimony, finding it was
offered to support a diminished capacity de-
fense and was not character evidence. The
court also denied Millis’s motion to continue
the trial.

4. This limitation comports with due process.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 769-71, 126 S.Ct.

HE 115 Arizona does not recognize a “di-
minished capacity” defense, in which expert
psychiatric evidence about a defendant’s
mental incapacity is offered to negate mens
rea, State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 586, 540-41, 544,
981 P.2d 1046, 1050-51, 1054 (1997); see State
v Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 212-18, 408 P.2d
521, 529 (1965). Unlike insanity pursuant to
ARS. § 13-502(A)—an “affirmative defense
that excuses, mitigates, or lessens a defen-
dant’s moral culpability due to his psycholog-
ical impairment’—the diminished capacity
defense aims to rebut an element of mens
rea, Mott, 187 Ariz, at 540, 981 P.2d at 1050.
‘The court in Mott observed that our legisla-
ture declined to adopt a diminished capacity
defense when given the opportunity, id. at
640-41, 981 P.2d at 1050-51, and instead
confined “any consideration of characteristic
behavior associated with mental disease” to
its bearing on an insanity defense, Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 785, 762, 126 S.Ct, 2709,
165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006); Wright, 214 Ariz,
640, 115, 155 P.3d at 1069,

116 In Mott, our supreme court affirmed
preclusion of evidence that “battered-woman
syndrome” and low intelligence diminished
the defendant’s capacity to decide to seek
medical care for her child. 187 Ariz, at 544—
45, 981 P.2d at 1054-55, Similarly, in State v,
Buot, 282 Aviz, 482, 306 P.8d 89 (App. 2018),
the defendant sought to introduce evidence
that he had “behavior consistent with an
intermittent explosive disorder and that his
actions are reflexive and therefore impulsive
and not the result of a conscious thought
process.” Id. 111. We affirmed preclusion of
the evidence because it was offered to rebut
a knowing or reckless mens rea for a second-
degree murder charge. Id. 120; see also
§ 18-502(A) (“impulse control disorders”
cannot underpin insanity defense), And in
State v. Lopez, 234 Ariz. 465, 11 20-23, 323
P.3d 748, 752 (App. 2014), we affirmed the
preclusion of evidence of a defendant’s pur-
ported character trait of “acting impulsively
under stress without being aware of the con-
sequences of his actions,” reasoning that the
only relevance of such evidence was for an
impermissible diminished capacity defense.

2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006),

HE 117 Millis contends that Dr. Stew-
art's testimony would not have rebutted an
intentional or knowing mens rea, which he
agrees would violate Arizona law, but instead
would have established a lesser mens rea
that would allow the jury to convict on reck-
Jess or negligent child abuse. Conviction for a
lesser-included offense would also result in
an acquittal on the felony murder charge. See
ARS. § 18-1105(A)(2). The state correctly
notes the circular nature of this argument.
Evidence that a person only acted with a
mental state of recklessness or negligence
necessarily means the person did not act
knowingly or intentionally. See ARS, § 13-
105(10). Millis acknowledged this purpose
when defense counsel explained at the mo-
tion hearing the evidence would show “that,
being on the autism spectrum made Jeremy
Millis less likely to be able to form certain
intent.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Stewart’s prof-
fered testimony was inadmissible diminished
capacity evidence under Moit and its proge-
ny.

{18 Millis argues in the alternative that
Dr. Stewart should have been allowed to
present limited “observation evidence” about
Millis’s character traits without mentioning
the ASD diagnosis. See Clark, 548 U.S. at
‘757-58, 126 S.Ct, 2709 (defining “observation
evidence” as “testimony from those who ob-
served what [the defendant] did and heard
what he said,” including “testimony that an
expert witness might give about [the defen-
dant’s] tendency to think in a certain way
and his behavioral characteristics”); see gen-
erally Buot, 282 Ariz. 432, 118, 806 P.8d at
92; Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, 1118-17, 155 P.38d
at 1068-69. But he did not clearly present
this argument to the trial court, nor did he
cite Clark or its discussion of observation
evidence below. To the contrary, his offer of
proof specifically emphasized that Stewart
needed to opine that Millis suffers from ASD,
Cf. Clark, 548 U.S, at 757-60, 126 S.Ct. 2709
(distinguishing admissible “observation evi-
dence” from inadmissible “mental-disease ev-
idence,” i.e., “opinion testimony that [the de-
fendant] suffered from a mental disease with
5. Millis does not argue he faced a duplicitous

indictment. See generally State v. Klokic, 219
Ariz, 241, 1910-13, 196 P.3d 844, 846-47 (App.

39

features described by the witness”). We do
not address an argument made for the first
time on appeal. See State v. Flores, 160 Ariz.
235, 288, 772 P.2d 589, 592 (App. 1989).

119 Millis’s reliance on State v. Christen-
sen, 129 Ariz, 82, 628 P.2d 580 (1981), is
unavailing. In that case our supreme court
held that expert testimony about the defen-
dant’s purported character trait of impulsivi-
ty was admissible to rebut the premeditation
element of first-degree premeditated murder.
Id. at 34-85, 628 P.2d at 582-88, But subse-
quent cases have clarified that Christensen is
only applicable in the context of premeditat-
ed murder. See Lopez, 234 Ariz. 465, 122,
323 P.3d at 752, Here, the jury was only
instructed on felony murder, not on premedi-
tated murder.

Duplicitous Charges

HN S120 Millis next contends duplici-
tous charges deprived him of his right to a
unanimous jury verdict.® Specifically, he ar-
gues some jurors could have concluded the
child died from blunt force head trauma
while others could have concluded he died
from a lack of oxygen to the brain caused by
choking. He did not object on this basis
below; therefore, our review is limited to
fundamental error, Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561,
11 19-20, 115 P.8d at 607-08, A denial of the
right to a unanimous jury verdict constitutes
fundamental prejudicial error. See State v.
Delgado, 282 Ariz, 182, 119, 808 P.8d 76, 82
(App. 2018).

Hs 1.21 The right to a unanimous jury
verdict is established in the Arizona Consti-
tution. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23. In the con-
text of statutes describing offenses that may
be committed in multiple ways—sometimes
referred to as “alternative-means” or “single
unified offense” statutes—the jury must be
unanimous as to whether the charged crimi-
nal act has been committed. State v. West,
238 Ariz, 482, 1918, 19, 362 P.8d 1049, 1055,
1056 (App. 2015), “However, ‘the defendant is
not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the
precise manner in which the act was commit-

2008) (distinguishing between duplicitous indict-
ment and duplicitous charge).

40

ted’” as long as there is substantial evidence
to support each of the charged means of
commission, Id. 1118, 15, quoting State v.
Herrera, 176 Ariz, 9, 16, 859 P.2d 119, 126
(1993). The jury may reach a verdict “based
on a combination of alternative findings.” Id.
118, quoting State v, Dann, 220 Ariz. 351,
179, 207 P.8d 604, 620 (2009).

HS {22 First-degree murder is a single
unified offense. See, e.g,, State v. Tucker, 205
Ariz, 157, 1150-51, 68 P.8d 110, 120 (2008),
citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643-
45, 111 S.Ct, 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991);
see also State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, n8,
128 P8d 1181, 1185 n8 (2005) (affirming
conviction where six jurors found first-degree
felony murder and six found first-degree pre-
meditated murder). It is unified because the
harm the murder statutes seek to prevent is
the same—the death itself. See State v.
O'Laughlin, 239 Ariz, 398, 117-9, 872 P.8d
342, 345-46 (App. 2016) (distinction between
statutes describing single unified offense
rather than multiple offenses “often relies on
the harm resulting from the crime”), Thus,
jury unanimity is not required about the
precise mechanism of death. See Schad, 501
US. at 681-82, 111 S.Ct. 2491, citing Ander-
sen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 500, 18
S.Ct. 689, 42 L.Ed. 1116 (1898) (immaterial
whether murder victim died by shooting or
drowning; government need not charge these
alternatively); see also State v. Payne, 283
Ariz, 484, 181, 314 P.8d 1239, 1263 (2013)
(“jury need not be unanimous as to the theo-
ry of first degree murder as long as all agree
that the murder was committed”), quoting
Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, n.8, 128 P.8d at 1185
n3,

HM 123 Similarly, child abuse under cir-
cumstances likely to produce death or serious
physical injury pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-
8628(A) is also a single unified offense. West,
238 Ariz. 482, 17 19-22, 362 P.8d at 1056-57.
Although the crime can be committed in
three different ways, the statute “focuses on
a single harm to the victim.” Id. 121, quoting
State v. Paredes-Solano, 228 Ariz, 284, 114,
222 P.8d 900, 906 (App. 2009); see Payne, 233
Ariz, 484, 1180, 88, 90, 814 P.8d at 1262,

6, The instruction went on to define proximate

1268-64 (whether committed by failing to
feed or failing to provide medical care, child
abuse is “only one crime”), Thus, a child
abuse defendant does not have a right to jury
unanimity as to “the precise manner in which
the act was committed.” West, 288 Ariz. 482,
180, 862 P.8d at 1059, quoting Herrera, 176
Ariz, at 16, 859 P.2d at 126.

HH {24 Here, the trial court instructed
the jury that in order to convict Millis of
first-degree felony murder, the state was re-
quired to prove (1) the victim’s death oc-
curred in the course of and in furtherance of
the predicate felony (intentional or knowing
child abuse under circumstances likely to
produce death or serious physical injury), (2)
“the death was proximately caused by the
acts of the defendant,” ° and (8) “but for the
defendant’s conduct, the death would not
have occurred.” Millis is correct that some
jurors may have concluded he intentionally
or knowingly choked the child causing his
death, while others may have concluded he
intentionally or knowingly inflicted head
trauma to cause death. But he was not enti-
tled to a unanimous verdict as to the means
of commission of child abuse, nor of first
degree murder. Id. 146; see also Payne, 238
Ariz, 484, 1188, 90, 314 P.8d at 1263-64,
Furthermore, the state presented substantial
evidence to support all three alternative
means of child abuse. See West, 288 Ariz. 482,
130, 862 P.8d at 1059, citing State v, Forres-
ter, 184 Ariz, 444, 447, 657 P.2d 432, 485
(1982), No duplicity error occurred,

Hs 1.25 Millis argues even if child abuse
under § 18-3628(A)(1) is a single unified of-
fense, he suffered a duplicitous charge pursu-
ant State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz, 241, 196 P.8d
844 (App. 2008), because the state introduced
evidence of multiple acts to support the child
abuse charge that were not part of the same
criminal transaction. In West, a recent case
also dealing with fatal child abuse pursuant
to § 18-3623(A), we considered and rejected
this argument. 288 Ariz. 482, 1181-89, 362
P.8d at 1059-61. We held the multiple-acts
analysis in Klokic is generally inapplicable to
cases involving a single unified offense such
as child abuse under § 13-3628(A). See West,

causation.

288 Ariz, 482, 1188-39, 862 P.8d at 1061.
Here, as in West, the state had little choice
but to allege the multiple acts because “it did
not know the precise timing and nature of
the injury leading to [C.K’s] death.” Id. 145.
Moreover, as in West, even if the state al-
leged multiple acts to support the child abuse
charge, these acts “‘only caused a single
result’—[C.K.’s] death—and were part of a
‘single criminal undertaking’ ” occurring over
the course of a single afternoon and evening.
Id., quoting Klokic, 219 Ariz, 241, 128, 196
P.8d at 850; see also Payne, 283 Ariz, 484,
1788, 90, 314 P.8d at 1268-64 (child abuse
“only one crime”; jury unanimity not re-
quired as to whether offense committed by
failing to feed or failing to seek medical
attention).

Hs 1.26 Finally, even if a duplicity
error had occurred, Millis has not met his
burden of showing prejudice. Henderson, 210
Ariz, 561, 120, 115 P.8d at 607. First, as to
the child abuse charge, regardless of whether
the choking actually caused death, no reason-
able juror could have failed to find that Millis
knowingly or intentionally choked C.K.’ Cf
Payne, 283 Ariz, 484, 190, 314 P.8d at 1264
(no reasonable jury could have failed to find
defendant guilty of child abuse for failing to
seek medical care), Millis repeatedly admit-
ted choking C.K. so that he would stop cry-
ing, and the jury reasonably could have con-
cluded that the bruises wrapping around
C.K’s neck were inflicted while Millis alone
was watching him. And second, as to the
first-degree murder charge, even if some ju-
rors believed the choking Millis admitted was
a but-for cause of death, while others be-
lieved the choking was not a cause of death
but believed Millis knowingly or intentionally
inflicted the blunt force trauma and that it
caused C,K.’s death, Millis had no right to
jury unanimity as to the means of commis-

7. The knowing or intentional mens rea for child
abuse under § 13-3623(A)(1) applies only to the
defendant’s actions, not to the “under circum-
stances likely to produce death or serious physi-
cal injury” prong, See Payne, 233 Ariz, 484,
1969-71, 514 P.3d.at 1260-61.

8, Inhis motion for reconsideration, Millis argued
in the alternative that he too should be allowed
to have a dog with him during trial as a matter of

41

sion of murder. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 631-
82, 111 S.Ct. 2491.

Victim’s Use of Facility Dog at Trial

Hs 1.27 Millis argues the trial court
denied him due process and a fair trial by
allowing a facility dog and its handler to sit
beside S.F. during the trial. In keeping with
the trial court’s “broad discretion” in manag-
ing trial conduct, State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz,
814, 332, 878 P.2d 1852, 1370 (1994), this
court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling
regarding the use of a facility dog absent an
abuse of discretion, see State v. Dye, 178
Wash.2d 641, 309 P.8d 1192, {1 14-15, 19, 82
(2018) (en bane) (ruling allowing facility dog
to accompany witness reviewed for abuse of
discretion),

128 Following S8.F.’s appearance at various
pretrial hearings accompanied by a facility
dog named “Blake,” Millis brought a motion
in limine to preclude Blake’s presence at
trial. He argued Arizona crime-victim law
gives a victim a right to be accompanied by a
support person, not a support animal, and
that the dog would unfairly prejudice him by
inviting the jury to base its decision on emo-
tion or sympathy. The state argued Blake
would not prejudice Millis, and would help
S.F, testify in the midst of difficult cireum-
stances, After a hearing, the trial court found
that the dog’s presence would not unfairly
prejudice Millis, Although the judge ex-
pressed a personal preference that Blake not
be present, she saw no “legal basis” to ex-
clude the dog and denied the motion. Millis
moved for reconsideration, and the court de-
nied that motion as well.8 Blake did not
accompany SF’, while she testified, but only
while she sat in the gallery.

HM 129 The state argues we should re-
view the due process aspect of Millis’s claim
for fundamental error, citing Henderson, 210
Aviz, 561, 1919-20, 115 P.3d at 607-08, But

equal protection. The state did not oppose Mil-
lis's request, but when the trial court asked Millis
if having a dog with him at trial would actually
comfort him, he said he did not think so and he
did not need one. The court then denied Millis's
request. He does not challenge this ruling on
appeal, nor does he raise an equal protection
argument,

42

Millis objected to Blake’s presence at trial in
his motion in limine, and argued repeatedly
that the dog would unfairly prejudice the
jury against him. His motion and argument
were sufficient to present the issue of trial
fairness to the trial court, even if he never
invoked the words “due process” or “fair
trial.” See State v. Foshay, 239 Ariz, 271,
1127-28, 370 P.8d 618, 624 (App, 2016). Ac-
cordingly, we review for harmless error. See
Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 118, 115 P,38d at
607 (harmless error review places burden on
state to prove beyond reasonable doubt error
did not contribute to or affect verdict or
sentence),

HI 180 As Millis observed in his motion
in limine, Rule 39(b), Ariz, R. Crim, P., gives
a crime victim ® the right to be accompanied
at interviews, depositions, and court proceed-
ings by a parent, relative, or other “appropri-
ate support person,” Ariz, R. Crim, P.
89(b)(8)-(9) (emphasis added), but is silent
about whether the victim may be accompa-
nied by a support animal. At the time of

Millis’s trial, no Arizona statute discussed the
use of a facility dog in the courtroom. Nor is
there any Arizona case law on the subject.

181 Several other states, however, have
considered the question and at least five have
approved the use of dogs to accompany wit-
nesses under appropriate circumstances. See
People v, Chenault, 227 Cal.App.4th 1503,
175 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 9-12 (2014); People v
Spence, 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d
874, 404-06 (2012); State v. Devon D., 321
Conn. 656, 188 A.8d 849, 864-67 (2016); Peo-
ple v. Tohom, 109 A.D,.3d 258, 969 N.Y.S.2d
128, 181-87 (2018); State v, Jacobs, 2015-
Ohio-4358, 111 19-28, 2015 WL 6180908 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2015); Dye, 309 P.8d 1192,
117-8210

182 Millis first asserts that a dog accom-
panying a victim is “presumptively prejudi-

9, It is undisputed that S.F., as C.K.’s mother, is a
“victim” under Arizona law. Ariz. Const. art. IT,
§ 2.1(C); ARS. § 13-4401(19); Ariz. R. Crim, P.
39(a)(1).

10, Dye involved a developmentally disabled adult
victim with an 10 of 65 and a mental age ranging
from six to twelve years old who was “very
scared” to testify about burglaries of his home.
309 P.3d 1192, 192-6, 9-10, 26. All of the other

cial” so as to jeopardize a fair trial in every
ease, and contends it “present{s] a nonevi-
dentiary message” to the jury that the wit-
ness is an innocent victim, Other courts have
rejected these arguments, as do we. See Che-
nault, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d at 10 (support dog not
inherently prejudicial, just as support person
not inherently prejudicial); Tohom, 969
N.Y.8.2d at 184 (no prejudice from “the con-
cededly unobtrusive presence of the dog in
the courtroom”), Since the time of Millis’s
trial, our own legislature has endorsed the
use of facility dogs in certain cireumstances,
Section 18-4442, A.R.S., which came into ef-
fect after Millis filed his opening brief in this
appeal, governs the use of such dogs for
crime victims testifying in court. Among oth-
er things, it gives the court discretion to
allow an adult crime victim to be accompa-
nied by a dog, § 18-4442(B), Although
§ 18-4442 was not in effect at the time of
Millis’s trial, it shows the policy of the State
of Arizona to accommodate crime victims’ use
of a dog. See Taylor v. Graham Cty. Cham-
ber of Commerce, 201 Ariz. 184, 127, 88 P.8d
518, 525 (App. 2001) (“[Wyhen .., the legisla-
ture has clearly spoken on a matter within its
domain, its word constitutes public policy on
that subject and controls, assuming no con-
stitutional impediments exist.”). Moreover,
there is no indication that this policy contam-
inates a fair trial in every case. Cf Dye, 309
P.8d 1192, 1129-80 (no indication in record
that facility dog actually engaged in any prej-
udicial behavior; court would not “speculate
about what might have happened at trial”).

188 Millis further argues the trial court
failed to inquire into and weigh the appropri-
ate factors to determine whether a facility
dog was appropriate in this particular case
and for this particular victim, in an abdica-
tion of its role in exercising discretion. See
State v. Garza, 192 Ariz, 171, 116, 962 P.2d
898, 902 (1998) (failure to exercise discretion

cases cited involved minor victims testifying
about sexual abuse.

11. The statute also requires a jury instruction in
cases involving a facility dog, in order “[t]o en-
sure that the presence of [the] facility dog ...
does not influence the jury or is not a reflection
on the truthfulness of any testimony” the witness
offers. § 13-4442(C).

may constitute abuse of discretion). He notes
that other jurisdictions typically allow facility
dogs for children or developmentally disabled
adult witnesses whose testimony might oth-
erwise be unavailable, and argues the state
made no particularized showing of why
S.F.—an adult with no apparent disability—
needed one. However, the record indicates
that the court considered factors relevant to
its discretionary balancing of potential bene-
fits and potential prejudices from a dog. For
instance, the court was informed that Blake
would not accompany S.F. at the witness
stand, but would only sit with her in the
gallery. This supports the court’s finding that
the use of the dog would not unfairly preju-
dice Millis, because the animal would have
been less visible and prominent to the jury in
the gallery than it would have at the witness
stand. Cf, Devon D., 188 A8d at 863 (trial
court approved presence of dog at witness
12, The factors the trial court considered in exer-

cising its discretion in this case are not the only
factors a court may properly consider in deter-

43

stand but ordered that dog be placed such
that jury would not see it). The trial court
also implicitly found that Blake would help
prevent undue stress for S.F. during a diffi-
cult trial about the death of her infant son.”
See Ariz, R. Evid. 611(a)(8). The court did
not abandon its duty to exercise discretion,
nor did it abuse its discretion.

Disposition

134 We affirm Millis’s convictions and sen-
tences for the reasons stated above.

mining whether to allow witness accommoda-
tions, nor are they necessary considerations in
every case.

392 P.3d 488
STATE of Arizona, Appellant,
v
Robert FISCHER, Appellee.
No, CR-15-0380-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed April 17, 2017

>
a

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County
Attorney, Diane Meloche (argued), Deputy
County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for
State of Arizona

Steven C. Biggs (argued), Steven C, Smith,
Smith LC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Robert
Fischer

Timothy J. Eckstein (argued), Randy Mc-
Donald, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, At-
torneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys
for Criminal Justice

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Joseph T.
Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Linley Wilson, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals
Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curi-
ae Arizona Attorney General

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the
opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES
TIMMER and BOLICK joined.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the
Court:

{1A jury found Robert Fischer guilty of
second degree murder. But the trial court,
under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
(‘Bule”) 24.1(¢)(1), determined that the ver-
dict was contrary to the weight of the evi-

dence and granted a new trial. Independently
reexamining the evidence, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the trial court erred by
granting a new trial. We hold that the court
of appeals exceeded the proper scope of def-
erential appellate review by independently
reweighing the evidence rather than deter-
mining if substantial evidence supported the
trial judge’s ruling. Because substantial evi-
dence supports the trial court’s determina-
tion, we affirm the order granting a new
trial,

I, BACKGROUND

12 Defendant Robert Fischer is an attor-
ney and a former police officer. While visiting
his family in late December 2010, Fischer,
his step-daughter Belinda, and Belinda’s hus-
band, Lee, stayed up talking and drinking.
Around 10 p.m., Lee excused himself to make
a phone call and check his email. He re-
turned worried and upset and showed Fisch-
er an email about a non-compete agreement.
Belinda went to bed around 11:80 p.m., and
Fischer and Lee continued drinking heavily.

13 Fischer testified that he awoke the
next morning to a popping sound and found a
man on the kitchen floor in a pool of blood,
Confused and unaware of the man’s identity,
he called 911, and police officers arrived
shortly thereafter. Lee—the man on the
floor—had a single gunshot wound to his
head; there was a handgun in Lee’s right
hand, and his thumb was in the trigger
guard.

14 During his police interview, Fischer
seemed confused and had difficulty keeping
track of the time. Fischer admitted the gun
was his but explained that he had disassem-
bled it upon arriving at Belinda and Lee’s
house. Fischer stated that he wanted to help
the police figure out what had happened but
he was unable to remember.

15 The police obtained a search warrant to
acquire physical evidence from Fischer and
Belinda. There was blood on Fischer’s left
foot and on the left side of his left pajama
pant leg. The police swabbed Fischer’s feet,
performed a gunshot residue test, and took
fingerprints and a blood sample. Crime scene

47

specialists seized and analyzed additional evi-
dence from the house.

16 The State charged Fischer with second
degree murder and tried the case on the
theory that Fischer shot Lee and then ma-
nipulated the scene to make it appear that
the gunshot wound was self-inflicted. During
trial, the court admitted expert testimony
regarding the blood spatter, the gun and its
position in Lee’s hand, the DNA and finger-
print evidence, the gunshot residue, and the
likelihood of Fischer having blacked out from
alcohol consumption,

17 Following the guilty verdict, Fischer
moved for a new trial under Rule 24.1(¢)(1).
The trial court considered the evidence and
determined:

There was, quite simply, no physical evi-

dence that the Defendant fired the gun

that killed Lee. The physical evidence es-
tablishes only that the Defendant was
present in a chair near where Lee was
sitting at the time of [sic] the gun was
fired. Det. Acosta’s opinion that the Defen-
dant staged the scene by manipulating

Lee’s body is not supported by the physi-

eal evidence, lacks credibility, and is sheer

speculation.
In its lengthy minute entry, the court chroni-
cled the physical evidence supporting its con-
clusion that the guilty verdict was contrary
to the weight of the evidence and granted the
motion for a new trial.

18 The court of appeals reversed. State v.
Fischer, 288 Ariz. 809, 322 1 82, 860 P.8d 105,
118 (App. 2015). After independently examin-
ing the evidence, the court concluded that the
jury properly weighed the evidence and its
verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. Id.
at 821 176, 860 P.8d at 117. The court of
appeals also concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion “by making factual find-
ings that were not supported by the record,
and by failing to consider all the evidence in
reaching its conclusions.” Id. at 816 { 29, 860
P.8d at 112.

19 We granted review to consider the
proper role of the trial court in deciding
whether a verdict is contrary to the weight of
the evidence, a question of statewide impor-
tance. We also consider whether the court of

48

appeals erred in its independent examination
of the evidence and conclusion that the trial
court abused its discretion. We have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to article 6, section 5(8) of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-120.24,

IL DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

HH 1110 We review a trial court’s deci-
sion to grant a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. Smith v. Moroney, 79 Ariz. 35,
88-39, 282 P.2d 470, 472 (1955). We review
interpretation and application of court rules
de novo. Allen v, Sanders, 240 Ariz. 569, 571
19, 882 P.8d 784, 786 (2016).

B. Motion for a New Trial

HE 111 A court may grant a new trial if
“(t]he verdict is contrary to law or to the
weight of the evidence.” Ariz. R. Crim, P,
24.1(0¢)(1). Arizona courts use essentially the
same standard in civil and criminal cases,
and we therefore consider both civil and
criminal case law in our analysis, Compare
Ariz, R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(H) (authorizing the
court to grant a new trial when “the verdict
.++ is not supported by the evidence or is
contrary to law”) with Ariz. R. Crim, P.
24,1(e)(1).

112 The trial court’s authority to order a
new trial when the jury verdict is contrary to
the weight of the evidence is deeply rooted in
our law. In 1757, Lord Mansfield wrote that
“{tlrials by jury, in civil causes, could not
subsist now, without a power, somewhere, to
grant new trials.” Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz,
159, 163, 579 P,2d 1882, 1886 (1978) (quoting
Bright v. Hynon, 1 Burr, 390, 398, 97 Eng,
Rep. 365, 866 (1757)), The authority to grant
a new trial was included in Arizona’s original
territorial code, Ariz. Howell Code ch, XI

1, See Dennis v. Stukey, 37 Ariz, 299, 306-07, 294
P. 276, 279 (1930), overruled on other grounds by
Butane Corp. v, Kirby, 66 Ariz, 272, 284, 187 P.2d
325, 333 (1947); Young Mines Co. v, Citizens’ St.
Bank, 37 Ariz, 521, 525-26, 296 P. 247, 249
(1931); Brownell v. Freedman, 39 Ariz. 385, 389,
6 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1932); Richfield Oil Co. v,
Estes, 55 Ariz. 81, 84, 98 P.2d 851, 852 (1940);
Sadler v, Ariz, Flour Mills Co,, 58 Ariz, 486, 490,
121 P.2d 412, 413-14 (1942); Ruth v. Rhodes, 66
Ariz, 129, 138-39, 185 P.2d 304, 310 (1947);
Zevon v, Tennebaum, 73 Ariz, 281, 283, 240 P.2d

§ 409, 115-16 (1865) (“The court in which a
trial is had upon the issue of facts, has power
to grant a new trial where a verdict has been
rendered against the defendant, upon his ap-
plication in the following cases only: ... 6th,
When the verdict is contrary to law or evi-
dence.”), Over the past century, this Court
has consistently recognized that unjust ver-
dicts, while rare, can occur, As we noted in
Reeves, “Due to his unique position, the trial
judge has become the primary buffer against
unjust verdicts. He performs an indispens-
able function without which our system of
justice could not hold out the promise of af ]
uniform application of the law.” 119 Ariz. at
168, 579 P.2d at 1886.

1.18 In 1926, this Court delineated the trial
judge’s “duty” to grant a new trial:

The trial courts may weigh the evidence,

and, if they think injustice has been done,

should grant a new trial, It is their duty to

supervise the verdict of the jury and grant

a new trial if the verdict in the opinion of

the court is against the weight of the evi-
dence, or if it is arbitrary and manifestly
or clearly wrong, or if it appears to be the
result of passion, prejudice [or] misconduct,
of the jury,

Huntsman v. First Nat'l Bank, 29 Ariz, 574,
578, 248 P, 598, 600 (1926), The Huntsman
court held, “If after a full consideration of
the case the trial court was satisfied that the
verdict was not supported by the evidence,
and that substantial justice had not been
done between the parties, it was its duty, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, to set the
verdict aside.” Id. at 579, 248 P, at 600
(emphasis added), Subsequent cases have
consistently recognized the trial judge’s au-
thority to grant a new trial
548, 549 (1952); Smith v. Moroney, 79 Ariz, 35,
38, 282 P.2d 470, 472 (1955); Caldwell v. Trem-
per, 90 Ariz. 241, 246, 367 P.2d 266, 269 (1962);
State v. Ross, 97 Ariz, 51, 54, 396 P.2d 619, 621
(1964), overruled in part by Yoo Thun Lim v.
Crespin, 100 Ariz. 80, 83, 411 P.2d 809, 811
(1966); State v. Thomas, 104 Ariz. 408, 411-12,
454 P.2d 153, 156-57 (1969); Cano v. Neill, 12
Ariz,App. 562, 567-71, 473 P.2d 487, 492-96
(1970); Lyle v. Boyle, 16 Ariz.App. 198, 200, 492
P.2d 447, 449 (1972),

HM 1114 The duty to grant a new trial
when the verdict is against the clear weight
of the evidence has been labeled the “thir-
teenth juror rule,” or the “ninth juror rule”
in a civil case. See Walsh v. Advanced Cardi-
ac Specialists Chartered, 229 Ariz, 198, 197
98 1115-16, 278 P.38d 645, 649-50 (2012).
“The trial judge, so far as this duty is con-
cerned, sits as a thirteenth juror, and he, as
well as the jury, must be convinced that the
weight of the evidence sustains the verdict,
or it is his imperative duty to set it aside.”
Brownell v. Freedman, 89 Ariz. 885, 889, 6
P.2d 1115, 1116 (1982). More recently, this
Court has described the judge’s role in
granting a new trial as an exercise of “broad”
or “wide” discretion, rather than in terms of
duty. See City of Glendale v, Bradshaw, 114
Ariz, 236, 287-88, 560 P.2d 420, 421-22
(1977),

Hs 115 ‘rial judges are given such
broad discretion because, like the jury, they
observed the trial:

The trial judge has the same opportunity

of seeing the witnesses, learning their in-

terest, observing their manner of testify-
ing, and of judging the probability of the
truthfulness of their testimony as has the
jury, and, by reason of his experience and
training, should be better able correctly to
evaluate the testimony.... If the evidence
accredited by the jury is improbable or
palpably untrue, he should not shirk his
duty of granting a new trial. He should
exercise his power to prevent injustice as
well as to promote justice,
Dennis v, Stukey, 37 Ariz. 299, 307, 294 P,
276, 279 (1980), overruled on other grounds
by Butane Corp. v. Kirby, 66 Ariz, 272, 284,
187 P.2d 825, 888 (1947). Appellate courts, by
contrast, defer to the factual findings of the
jury and generally will not set aside the
verdict unless no evidence supports it, even if
the verdict seems unjust or the result of
prejudice, See Huntsman, 29 Ariz, at 578-79,
248 P. at 599-600, Therefore, an unjust ver-
dict that is against the weight of the evidence
will stand unless the trial judge exercises the
power to set it aside. Dennis, 87 Ariz, at 807,
294 P, at 279.

9116 The State urges us to abandon the

thirteenth juror rule and prohibit trial courts

49

from independently reweighing the evidence
or examining witness credibility. Rather, the
State argues, and the court of appeals ruled,
that a trial court should grant a new trial
only in the extraordinary case where it is
“quite clear that the jury has reached a
seriously erroneous result and it is necessary
to set aside the verdict to avoid a miscarriage
of justice,” Fischer, 238 Ariz, at 315 22, 360
P.8d at 111 Gnternal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Cano v, Neill, 12 Ariz.App. 562,
569, 478 P.2d 487, 494 (1970). In the State’s
view, a new trial is appropriate “only where
the verdict is objectively unreasonable, mani-
festly unfair, or so outrageous as to shock the
conscience.” The State finds support for this
assertion in Hutcherson v, City of Phoenix,
192 Ariz, 51, 55 128, 961 P.2d 449, 458 (1998)
(The basie question [the trial judge] must
ask is whether the jury verdict is so ‘mani-
festly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as
to shock the conscience.’ ”) (citation omitted),

Hs {17 As the court of appeals noted,
it is “not uncommon” for the standards gov-
erning an order for a new trial and a judg-
ment of acquittal to be confused. Fischer, 238
Ariz, at 818 118 n.8, 860 P,8d at 109, Com-
pare Ariz, R, Orim. P. 24.1(0)(1), with Ariz,
R. Crim. P. 20, The State proposes to ad-
dress that confusion by effectively eliminat-
ing the difference between the two motions,
Under the existing Rule 20 standard, to de-
cide a motion for acquittal based on insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, the trial judge must
review the evidence in the “light most favor-
able to the state, and all reasonable infer-
ences are to be resolved against the defen-
dant” to decide if a reasonable person could
fairly conclude the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Clifton, 184 Ariz,
845, 848, 656 P.2d 684, 687 (App. 1982); see
also State v. West, 226 Ariz, 559, 563 118,
250 P.8d 1188, 1192 (2011) (“Thus, in ruling
on a Rule 20 motion, unlike a motion for a
new trial under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 24,1(¢)(1), a trial court may not
reweigh the facts or disregard inferences
that might reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.”), By contrast, in deciding a motion
for new trial, a trial court may weigh the
evidence and make its own determination of
the credibility of the witnesses. If, after full

50

consideration of the case, the court is satis-
fied that the verdict was contrary to the
weight of the evidence, it may set the verdict
aside, even if substantial evidence supports
it. Young Mines Co. v. Citizens’ St. Bank, 37
Ariz, 521, 525, 296 P. 247, 249 (1981); see
Huntsman, 29 Ariz. at 579, 243 P. at 600.
Under the State’s theory, a trial court, un-
able to weigh evidence or determine credibili-
ty, could not set the verdict aside despite its
firm conviction that the verdict was unjust.

118 We reject the State’s argument that
we should strictly limit the judge’s role be-
cause to do so not only undermines Rule
24,1(c)(1) but also conflates the standards for
a new trial and a judgment of acquittal.
Precluding the trial court from weighing the
evidence and assessing the credibility of the
witnesses effectively abrogates the authority
vested in trial courts under Rule 24,1(¢)(1)
and overturns more than a century of Ari-
zona law. We decline to impose such a limita-
tion and disavow the language in Hutcherson
to the contrary.

HH 1119 While we reject the State’s ar-
gument, we take this opportunity to clarify
the trial judge’s role in granting a new trial
under Rule 24.1(¢)(1). We agree with the
court of appeals that a trial court considering
a motion for a new trial must respect the role
of the jury and the integrity of the jury trial
system. Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings,
L.L.C., 229 Aviz, 877, 403 188, 276 P.8d 11,
87 (App. 2012), It is primarily the province of
the jury to determine the credibility of wit-
nesses and to find the facts. State v. Boggs,
218 Ariz, 825, 885 139, 185 P.3d 111, 121
(2008) (“Determining veracity and credibility
lies within the province of the jury”); Estate
of Reinen v. N. Ariz, Orthopedics, Lid., 198
Ariz, 288, 287 112, 9 P.8d 314, 818 (2000)
(“The credibility of a witness’ testimony and
the weight it should be given are issues
particularly within the province of the jury.”)
Gnternal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). The judge does not technically sit as a
“thirteenth juror” in the sense that the judge
has a vote in deciding the case, much less a
vote equal to or greater than that of the
jurors; but given the judge’s training, experi-
ence, and unique vantage point, the judge

must have substantial latitude in overseeing
the jury verdict.

H1.20 We are mindful that a judge
considering a motion for new trial did not
have the benefit of participating in jury de-
liberations, Thus, the judge may not set aside
a jury verdict simply because “if he had
acted as trier of the fact, he would have
reached a different result.” Cano, 12 Ariz,
App. at 569, 473 P.2d at 494 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), For this
reason, we disavow our contrary character-
ization of the trial court’s discretion made in
Peak v. Acuna, 208 Ariz, 88, 85 19, 50 P.8d
838, 885 (2002) (suggesting that a trial court
may order a new trial based on a verdict that,
is contrary to the weight of the evidence
when “the trial judge simply disagrees with
the jury’s resolution of conflicting facts”), A
trial court’s discretion under Rule 24.1(e)(1)
is not unlimited, nor does the court have
unbridled “veto” power over a jury verdict
such that the court may act as a “super
juror” and overturn a verdict merely because
the court personally disagrees with it.

Hs 1.21 The trial judge has broad
discretion, however, to find the verdict incon-
sistent with the evidence and grant a new
trial, so as to guard against arbitrary ver-
dicts. Walsh, 229 Aviz, at 197-98 {1 15-16,
278 P.8d at 649-50. We defer to the discre-
tion of the trial judge who tried the case and
who personally observed the proceedings.
The judge may weigh the evidence, make
eredibility determinations, and set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial even if there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support
the verdict. Clifton, 184 Ariz. at 8348-49, 656
P.2d at 687-88. We emphasize that the court
does not usurp the role of the jury in grant-
ing a new trial because the court does not
substitute its judgment for that of the jury; it
only allows the parties a new trial before a
different jury. In that regard, the judge’s
role in granting a motion for new trial differs
from the judge’s role in granting a motion for
acquittal, When the court grants a new trial,
the jury retains the ultimate decision-making
authority. In directing a verdict of acquittal,
the jury’s role is supplanted by the court.

122 We recognize the difficult
task the trial court faces in striking a balance
between honoring the jury’s constitutional
role and ensuring that a seriously erroneous
result does not stand. The purpose of Rule
24.1 is to prevent an arbitrary or unjust
verdict from becoming an arbitrary or unjust
judgment. Ultimately, the judge must deter-
mine if substantial justice has been done
between the parties under the standard set
forth in Rule 24.1(¢)(1)—whether “[t]he ver-
dict is contrary to law or to the weight of the
evidence.” See also State v. McIver, 109 Ariz.
71, 72, 505 P.2d 242, 248 (1978); Smith, 79
Ariz, at 88, 282 P.2d at 472,

HH 1.28 Our case law provides little ad-
ditional guidance to the trial judge, and com-
mentators have noted the difficulty of formu-
lating a bright-line rule or generic test.
“Necessarily all formulations are couched in
broad and general terms that furnish no
unerring litmus for a particular case” 11
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2806, at 90-91 (8d ed.
2012). We are mindful that attempts to refine
the standard “may run the significant risk of
muddling more than they clarify.” Hunter v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 364 P.8d 489, 448
(Alaska 2015). But we note that in assessing
whether the verdict was contrary to the
weight of the evidence, the trial judge should
consider all the evidence presented in the
light of the judge’s experience and training,

Hs 24 The judge should assess the
strength of the evidence, considering the
eredibility of the witnesses and conflicting
testimony, 12-59 James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore's Federal Practice—Civil § 59.18
(2016). The court should consider the dura-
tion of the trial, the complexity of the issues
in the case, and whether the case involves
subjects outside the ordinary knowledge of
jurors, giving greater scrutiny to more diffi-
cult cases, The court should make its assess-
ment with a keen recognition of the impor-
tance of the jury's role; that the judge would
have reached a different verdict is not
enough to grant a new trial. Finally, the
court should explain with particularity the
reasons why the jury’s verdict is against the
clear weight of the evidence. See Ariz, R. Civ.
P, 593) (2017) (previously Rule 59(m)),

51

125 As the Alaska Supreme Court aptly
said, “We commit this determination to trial
courts’ sound discretion based on our trust in
their position, expertise, and humility. Histo-
ry has indicated that this trust is well de-
served.” Hunter, 364 P.8d at 448. Arizona’s
trial judges are in the best position to decide
motions for new trial and are uniquely well-
qualified to do so, Likewise, a review of our
case law reflects that there is little cause for
concern about trial courts ordering new trials
too frequently or without a substantial basis,
Such motions are rarely granted, and when.
granted (or denied), are almost never re-
versed on appeal.

C. Appellate Review

Hs 1.26 A different standard applies
to appellate review. “We have invariably held
that this court will not disturb a verdict on
the ground that it is contrary to the weight
of the evidence.” Brownell, 39 Ariz. at 389, 6
P.2d at 1116. When an appellate court re-
views an order granting a new trial for abuse
of discretion, it “look[s] to the broad scope of
the trial and do[es] not attempt to reweigh
the facts.” Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 56 127,
961 P.2d at 454, The appellate court’s role is
to oversee the granting of new trials and to
ensure that the exercise of a trial court’s
broad discretion has a legal, rather than an
arbitrary, basis. Hstabrook v J.C. Penney
Co., 105 Ariz. 302, 805, 464 P.2d 825, 328
(1970), The reviewing court must “inquire
whether substantial evidence exists to sup-
port the trial court’s determination.” Reeves,
119 Ariz. at 164, 579 P.2d at 1887. If such
evidence exists, then the order is within the
sound diseretion of the trial court and should
be affirmed. Id.

HM 127 We have repeatedly held that
an appellate court “will not disturb an order
granting a new trial unless the probative
force of the evidence clearly demonstrates
that the trial court’s action is wrong and
unjust and therefore unreasonable and a
manifest abuse of discretion.” Smith, 79 Ariz.
at 89, 282 P.2d at 472; see also McIver, 109
Ariz, at 72, 505 P.2d at 248 (quoting with
approval Smith, 79 Ariz. at 89, 282 P.2d at
472); State v. Saenz, 88 Ariz, 154, 155, 353

52

P.2d 1026, 1027 (1960) (same). The question
for the appellate court is whether the proba-
tive force of the evidence supports the order
granting a new trial, not whether the evi-
dence supports the jury verdict,

Hs1'28 The appellate court does not
sit as the “fourteenth” juror. See Baker-
Thomas Lime & Cement Co, v. Ariz. Con-
crete Pipe Co, 1 Ariz.App. 288, 287, 401 P.2d
288, 242 (1965) (“The trial judge is a 18th
juror. An Appellate Court is not a 13th juror.
We do not substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court.”) (citation omitted), The
appellate court’s role is not to weigh the
evidence, It is to determine whether, resolv-
ing every conflict in the evidence in support
of the order, substantial evidence supports
the trial judge’s order, A trial court ruling
granting a new trial “where the evidence is
equiponderant or nearly so or where there is
substantial evidence to support the verdict is
not error.” Smith, 79 Ariz, at 89, 282 P.2d at
472,

129 We see no reason to depart from this
rule, We disavow the opinions that conflict
with this appellate standard of review, such
as State v. Moya, 129 Ariz, 64, 66, 628 P.2d
947, 949 (1981) (stating, in review of a trial
court’s order granting a new trial, “It is the
duty of this court, under the circumstances,
to review all of the evidence and to deter-
mine whether the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime of murder
was committed with premeditation,”), and
State v. Chase, 78 Aviz. 240, 242, 278 P.2d
428, 424 (1954) (to same effect),

HI 180 The court of appeals in this case
exceeded the proper scope of review by inde-
pendently reweighing the evidence, In her
minute entry ordering a new trial, the trial
judge exhaustively discussed the evidence
presented at trial, Although the court of ap-
peals’ independent evaluation of the evidence
led it to disagree with the trial court’s evalu-
ation of the evidence, we are not persuaded
that the trial court disregarded or misstated
key evidence in granting Fischer’s motion,
Rather, the trial court focused on evidence
that the court of appeals discounted, evaluat-
ed witness credibility differently, and, ulti-
mately, drew different inferences from the
evidence than did the court of appeals.

181 Considering the trial court’s broad
discretionary authority to weigh the evidence
as required under Rule 24.1(c)(1), we con-
elude that substantial evidence exists to sup-
port the trial court’s determination, Thus,
unlike the court of appeals, we hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion or
clearly exceed its authority in granting a new
trial.

IM. CONCLUSION

82 We vacate paragraphs sixteen through
eighty-two of the court of appeals’ opinion
and affirm the trial court’s order granting a
new trial, This case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion,

392 P.3d 496
Steve W. BOSWELL, Plaintiff/Appellant,

ve

Robert FINTELMANN, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

No, 1 CA-CV 15-0859

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 3/9/2017

|

mi
wo

if

Steve W. Boswell, Phoenix, In propria per-
sona, Plaintiff/Appellant

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, PO,
Phoenix, By James R. Broening, Megan E.
Gailey, Kevin R. Myer, Counsel for Defen-
dants/Appellees

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Randall M, Howe and Judge
Lawrence F’, Winthrop joined,

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge:

{11 Steve W. Boswell (Boswell) appeals
from the dismissal with prejudice of his med-
ical malpractice action based on his failure to
serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit,
For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment as modified to reflect that the dis-
missal is without prejudice,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 In July 2014, Boswell filed a complaint
in superior court alleging medical malprac-
tice against Robert Fintelmann, M.D., Rob-
ert Pinkert, O.D., Thomas R. Wolf, Barnet
Dulaney Surgery Center, LLC, Barnet Dula-
ney Perkins Eye Center, PLLC and others
(appellees). Boswell certified pursuant to Ari-
zona Revised Statutes (A.R.S,.) section 12-

54

2603 (2016)! that medical expert testimony
was necessary to prove his claims. If a claim-
ant certifies that expert opinion is necessary,
ARS. § 12-2603(B) (2016) requires a claim-
ant to serve a preliminary expert opinion
affidavit at the same time as initial disclo-
sures,

13 Boswell did not provide an initial dis-
closure statement and a preliminary expert
opinion affidavit, and appellees moved for an
order compelling him to do so. The superior
court granted appellees’ motion and ordered
Boswell to serve his initial disclosure state-
ment within twenty days and his preliminary
expert opinion affidavit within thirty days.

14 Boswell did not comply with the court
order, and appellees moved for dismissal.
Boswell cross-moved for a ruling that A.R.S.
§ 12-2608 is unconstitutional, The superior
court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss,
denied Boswell’s cross-motion, and dismissed
Boswell’s claim with prejudice. We have ju-
risdiction over Boswell’s timely appeal pursu-
ant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (2016).

DISCUSSION

HN 15 We review de novo a dismissal
for failure to serve a preliminary expert opin-
ion affidavit required by A.R.S. § 12-2608,
Romero v. Hasan, 241 Ariz, 885, 888 P.8d 22,
28 (App. 2017) (citing Coleman v. City of
Mesa, 280 Ariz. 852, 355-56, 17, 284 P.8d
868, 866-67 (2012)), because a claimant’s fail-
ure to properly certify the non-frivolous na-
ture of the complaint pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 12-2608 is a pleading failure. Dismissal for
failure to serve the expert affidavit is not
tantamount to dismissal for failure to prose-
eute, which operates as an adjudication on
the merits. See Ariz. R. Civ. P, 41(b), Nor is

1, We cite the current versions of the applicable
statutes and rules unless revisions material to
this opinion have ocourred since the events in
question.

2. Appellees acknowledged in their motion to dis-
miss that Boswell had provided his initial disclo-
sure statement prior to the deadline ordered by
the court.

3, Because Boswell fails to develop and support
his conclusory arguments that A.R.S. § 12-2603
and related statutes are unconstitutional and that
the superior court improperly sealed an “investi-

it a dismissal as a sanction for a discovery
violation, because the affidavit requirement is
“meant to certify that the action ... is not
meritless,” and it is not required “that the
expert giving the preliminary affidavit serve
as the expert at trial.” Jilly v. Rayes, 221
Ariz, 40, 42-43, 16, 209 P.8d 176, 178-79
(App. 2009) (citation omitted), See also Gor-
ney v. Meaney, 214 Ariz, 226, 228, 14, 150
P.8d 799, 801 (App. 2007) (court of appeals
reviewed de novo trial court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to defendant on the basis
that plaintiff's expert opinion affidavit did not
conform with A.R.S. § 12-2603(B)).

Hl 16 Although Boswell argues the su-
perior court erred by dismissing his com-
plaint because the court erroneously conclud-
ed that he failed to serve his initial disclosure
statement, we reject this argument because
the court properly dismissed based on Bos-
well’s failure to serve the preliminary expert
affidavit required by A.R.S, § 12-2608,

Hl 7 Section 12-2608(F) requires the
superior court to dismiss without prejudice a
claim when the claimant fails to file and
serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit
after certifying an affidavit is necessary or
the court has ordered compliance. Because
Boswell failed to comply with the order to
serve the affidavit, the court appropriately
dismissed his claim,

HM 18 However, the statute does not
authorize dismissals with prejudice. Sanchez
v. Old Pueblo Anesthesia, P,C., 218 Ariz. 317,
823-24, 1120, 22, 25, 188 P.8d 1285, 1291-92
(App. 2008), Although appellees correctly as-
sert that the superior court referred to Ari-
zona Rule of Civil Procedure 87(b)(2) * in its
ruling dismissing Boswell’s claim, that rule

gative report,” he waives them, See ARCAP

13(a)(7); Polanco v. Indus, Comm'n of Ariz, 214

Ariz, 489, 491 n,2, 16, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2

(App. 2007). Additionally, to the extent Boswell

argues he cannot afford to hire an expert to

make an affidavit, he offers no evidence that any
qualified expert would have provided the infor-

mation required by A.R.S. § 12-2603, See Rome-
ro, 241 Ariz. 385, 388 P.3d at 23 n.4,

4. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(W) provides that if a party fails
to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
the court may dismiss the action.

a =

also does not authorize dismissals with prej
dice for the failure to comply with A.R.S.
§ 12-2603. Thus, the court erred by dismiss-
ing Boswell’s claim with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

99 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the judgment as modified to reflect that dis-
missal is without prejudice.

392 P.3d 499
Andy BIGGS, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,
ve
Thomas J. BETLACH,
Defendant/Appellee.

Edmundo Macias; Gary Gorham; Daniel
McCormick; and Tim Ferrell, Inter-
venor—Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0743

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 3/16/2017

Goldwater Institute, Phoenix, By Christina
Sandefur and Aditya Dynar, Counsel for
Plaintiffs/Appellants

Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix, By Doug-
las Northup, Timothy Berg, Patrick Irvine,
and Carrie Ryerson, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee

Arizona Center for Law in the Public In-
terest, Phoenix, By Timothy Hogan and Joy
Herr-Cardillo, William E. Morris Institute
for Justice, Phoenix, By Ellen Sue Katz, Co-
Counsel for Intervenor-Defendants/Appel-
lees

Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix,
By Roopali Desai and D. Andrew Gaona,
Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association,
Phoenix, By Ann-Marie Alameddin, Co-
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona Hospital
and Healthcare Association

1. We cite to the current version of applicable
statutes or rules when no revision material to
this case has occurred.

2, The superior court originally dismissed the leg-
islators’ claim for lack of standing; however, this

Statecraft PLLC, Phoenix, By Kory Lan-
ghofer, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Health
System Alliance of Arizona

Judge Paul J. MceMurdie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D, Jones and Judge Patricia
K, Norris joined,

OPINION
McMURDIE, Judge:

11 We are asked to consider whether the
hospital assessment under Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 36-2901.08 was
enacted in violation of Article 9, Section 22,
of the Arizona Constitution,

12 Appellants, a group of legislators who
voted against House Bill (“HB”) 2010 during
the 2013 legislative session, appeal the supe-
rior court’s order granting Defendant’s and
Intervenor-Defendants’ motions for sum-
mary judgment. Appellants contend HB 2010
ereated a new tax on hospitals, and therefore
required a super-majority vote under Article
9, Section 22, Because HB 2010 imposed an
assessment that is excepted under Section
22(C)(2), we find it constitutional as enacted
and affirm the superior court,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

8 In September 2018, during the Fifty-
First Arizona State Legislature, legislators
introduced HB 2010 to expand Arizona’s indi-
gent healthcare program. Included in that
expansion was an assessment on hospitals to
be set by the director of the Arizona Health
Care Cost. Containment System
(“AHCCCS”). HB 2010 passed by a simple-
majority vote, and Governor Janice K. Brew-
er signed it into law as A.R.S. § 36-2901.08.

Hl 14 Members of the Arizona Legisla-
ture who voted against HB 2010 subsequent-
ly filed suit in September 2018 to enjoin
enforcement of the expansion, arguing HB
2010 was passed in violation of Article 9,
Section 22.2 The parties filed cross-motions

court subsequently reversed that decision. Biggs
v, Cooper, 234 Ariz, 515, 522, 120, 323 P.3d 1166
(App. 2014), The supreme court affirmed this
court's ruling. Biggs v. Cooper ex rel. County of
Maricopa, 236 Ariz. 415, 420, 121, 341 P.3d 457
(2014),

58

for summary judgment in May 2015 seeking
a declaration regarding the constitutionality
of § 36-2901.08, The superior court found
the legislation came within a listed exception
to Article 9, Section 22, and thus was not
subject to the super-majority vote require-
ment. The legislators timely appealed and we
have jurisdiction pursuant to ARS, § 12-
2101(A)(1) (2016).?

DISCUSSION

HMM 15 Questions of statutory interpre-
tation and constitutional law are reviewed de
novo, State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz,
205, 207, 15, 150 P.8d 778 (App. 2007). We
presume that a statute is constitutional and
resolve any doubts in favor of constitutionali-
ty! Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 238 Ariz. 195,
197, 15, 810 P.3d 983 (App. 2018). While all
three branches of government have a role in
interpreting the Constitution, when a conflict
arises it is the courts’ constitutional responsi-
bility to be the final arbiter. See Powell v,
McCormack, 396 U.S. 486, 549, 89 S.Ct. 1944,
23 L.Hd.2d 491 (1969),

A. ARS. § 36-2901.08 Was Constitution-
ally Enacted in Accordance with Arti-
cle 9, Section 22, of the Arizona Con-
stitution.

16 AHCCCS provides health insurance
benefits to qualified persons of low income,
HB 2010 was intended to expand the pro-

3, The Health System Alliance of Arizona, in its
amicus brief, raises the “enrolled bill rule” as a
jurisdictional ground to preclude our review.
“(Tt is the rule that amici curiae are not permit-
ted to create, extend, or enlarge issues beyond
those raised and argued by the parties.” Town of
Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 84,
638 P.2d 1324 (1981) (citing City of Tempe v.
Prudential Ins. Co, of Am., 109 Ariz, 429, 510
P.2d 745 (1973). And in any event, our supreme
court has made clear that appellants have legal
standing, and that this court has jurisdiction to
review the substance of the claims. See Biggs v.
Cooper ex rel. County of Maricopa, 236 Ariz. 415,
418, 97, 341 P.3d 457 (2014) ("... giving the
legislature exclusive authority to decide whether
Section 22 applies to a particular bill would
eliminate Article 9, Section 22’s ability to act as a
limiting provision on the legislature’s power.”)
(quotation omitted),

4, Appellants’ opening brief argues against this
presumption, citing cases where statutes were
found to be unconstitutional. B.g., Dobson v.
State ex rel. Comm’n on Appellate Court Appoint-

gram’s coverage, with joint funding from the
federal and state governments. In order to
provide the funding needed from the state
government, HB 2010 created an assessment,
paid by Arizona hospitals as set forth by the
director of AHCCCS. HB 2010, 2018 Ariz.
Sess. Laws, ch, 10, § 5 (1st Spec. Sess.).

17 Article 9, Section 22 states, “[aJn act
that provides for a net increase in state
revenues ... is effective on the affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the members of each
house of the legislature.” Subsection B pro-
vides that qualifying “acts” include, inter
alia, “{tThe imposition of any new tax” and
“{tThe imposition of any new state fee or
assessment.” Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 22(B)(1),
(6). However, Subsection C states that the
two-thirds vote is not required on “[flees and
assessments that are authorized by statute,
but are not prescribed by formula, amount or
limit, and are set by a state officer or agen-
ey.” Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 22(C)(2).

1. The Hospital Assessment Is Not a
Tax.

Hl 18 Because the exception under Sec-
tion 22(C)(2) applies only to “fees and assess-
ments,” appellants first argue that the hospi-
tal assessment enacted by HB 2010 was a
new “tax” under Section 22(B), and therefore
required a two-thirds affirmative vote from
both houses of the Arizona Legislature.>

ments, 233 Ariz. 119, 309 P.3d 1289 (2013) (leg-
islature's amendment of the judicial nomination
system violated the state constitution). We take
notice that this presumption is rebuttable, but the
party challenging the validity of a statute bears
the burden of proving that the legislation is un-
constitutional, E.g., State v. Casey, 205 Ariz. 359,
362, 111, 71 P.3d 351 (2003); Chevron Chem. Co.
v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 438, 641 P.2d
1275 (1982).

5. Appellees contend that an assessment can be
defined broadly to include a tax, and therefore
the distinction between “taxes’’ and “assess-
ments” under Article 9, Section 22 is inapplica-
ble. However, such an interpretation would
render the specific omission of the word “tax”
under Section 22(C)(2) meaningless when the
language of the provision, under subsection (B),
specifically listed categories of “tax” as a sepa-
rate class from “fee[s] and assessment[s]”. See
Ariz, Const. art. 9, § 22(B)(1)-(2), (5). Because
we presume a statute does not enact “superflu-
ous or reiterative” language, we decline to in-

When deciding whether to categorize a goy-
ernment levy as an assessment or a tax, the
analysis is context-driven and examines three
factors: (1) the entity imposing the levy; (2)
the parties upon whom the levy is imposed;
and (8) whether the levy is expended for
general public purposes or used for the regu-
lation or benefit of the parties upon whom
the assessment is imposed. May v. McNally,
208 Ariz, 425, 430-81, 124, 55 P.8d 768
(2002); see also Bidart Bros. v. California
Apple Comm'n, 73 F.8d 925, 929-81 (9th Cir.
1996), All three factors support the categori-
zation of the hospital levy in the immediate
ease as an assessment,

HI 119 Appellants claim the entity impos-
ing the levy is the state legislature because
the levy was created by the legislature
through statute. This argument misses the
mark. While the legislature may have author-
ized the levy through statute, we look to the
entity with regulatory authority over the levy
for purposes of categorizing it as a tax or
assessment, See Jachimek v. State, 205 Ariz.
682, 636, 115, 74 P.38d 944 (App. 2008). Most.
levies are first authorized by statute. See,
@.g., ARS. § 32-124(A) (establishing fees to
be collected by the State Board of Technical
Registration); A.R.S, § 45-834(A) (anthoriz-
ing the director of water resources to set
Colorado river water use fees); A.R.S. § 17-
838 (mandating that the Game and Fish
Commission prescribe license fees by rule).
This does not mean that the levies are im-
posed by the legislature. Instead, the levies
are imposed by an entity with discretion to
set and administer them. Here, because the
director has authority to “establish, adminis-
ter and collect” the levy, we find AHCCCS is
the entity imposing the levy. A.R.S. § 36-
2901.08(A).

Hl 110 Analyzing the second factor, ap-
pellants argue the levy is imposed upon a
broad class of hospitals, making it more like
a tax than an assessment, Appellants miscon-

terpret assessment to include any tax under
Section 22. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.
Dep't of Corrections, 188 Ariz, 237, 244, 934
P.2d 801 (App. 1997); see also Herman v. City
of Tucson, 197 Ariz, 430, 434, 114, 4 P.3d 973
(App. 1999) ("[W]e must avoid interpreting a
statute so as to render any of its language mere
surplusage....").

59

strue the language of the statute on its face.
Section 86-2901.08(C) allows the director to
“establish modifications or exemptions to the
assessment,” In doing so, the director is al-
Jowed to consider factors including the size,
services offered, and location of the hospital.
ARS. § 36-2901.08(C). Therefore, the levy
at issue is not necessarily charged to every
hospital in the state.6 Even if it were, the
assessment is narrowly applied only to hospi-
tals, and not a broad class of citizens as is
typical of a tax. This court has previously
held that levies that are specific to a class of
business are appropriately treated as an as-
sessment, See, eg. Jachimek, 205 Ariz. at
636, 116, 74 P.8d 944 (an assessment.
charged to all licensed pawnbrokers when
reporting transactions under state law was
not a tax). Therefore, because the levy is
restricted to hospitals within the discretion of
the director, this factor weighs in favor of
treating the levy as an assessment,

111 Finally, appellants argue the levy
is expended for general public purposes, not
for the regulation or benefit of the levied
parties, and therefore, should be considered
a tax, Appellants focus in particular on the
“broad public purpose” of the statute, and
healthcare expansion as a whole. But while
the entire expansion’s purpose was to provide
healthcare to more of Arizona’s indigent pop-
ulation, the purpose of the assessment, as
evidenced by the language of HB 2010, was
to “be used for the benefit of hospitals for the
purpose of providing health care for persons
eligible for coverage funded by the hospital
assessment.” HB 2010, 2013 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 10, § 44(8) (Ist Spec. Sess.) (em-
phasis added).

HMI 112 Appellants also contend hospi-
tals only benefit “incidentally” from the as-
sessment. But, under Arizona law, a levy can
be treated as an assessment and not a tax as
long as there is “some reasonable relation to

6. The current rules set forth by the director ex-
clude several categories of hospitals, including
those operated by the state or designated as a
short-term, psychiatric, rehabilitation, children's,
or special hospital, Arizona Administrative Code
("AAC.”) § R9-22-730(D).

60

the service to be performed on the payer's
behalf.” See Jachimel, 205 Ariz. at 687, 121,
74 P.8d 944 (quoting Stewart v, Verde River
Irrigation & Power Dist, 49 Ariz, 581, 548,
68 P.2d 329 (1987); see also Kyrene Sch,
Dist. No. 28 of Maricopa County v. City of
Chandler, 150 Ariz, 240, 244, 722 P.2d 967
(App. 1986) (water system development
charges were not taxes simply because they
benefited other parties), Here, while the Ari-
zona residents who received coverage under
the expansion also benefit from the statute
and the assessment, this does not make the
levy a tax being expended for a general
public purpose.’ Because of the hospital as-
sessment fund created by the statute, hospi-
tals receive additional funding for uncompen-
sated care, which is a benefit related to the
levy

113 Weighing the factors set forth in May,
we conclude that the hospital assessment is
not a tax. The assessment is imposed by the
director of AHCCCS, on hospitals, and it is
intended to provide additional funding for
hospitals caring for qualified individuals un-
der the expansion.

2. The Hospital Assessment Fits With-

in the (C)(2) Exception.

TN 114 Because the hospital assess-
ment is not a tax, we next address whether it
fits within the specific exception under Sec-
tion 22 (C)(2), Here, the exception requires
the assessment to be: (1) authorized by stat-
ute; (2) not prescribed by formula, amount,
or limit; and (8) set by a state officer or
agency. Ariz, Const. art. 9, § 22(C)(2), Be-
cause neither party challenges that the as-
sessment is set by a state officer or agency,
we only address the first two prongs of the
exception,

i) The plain language of the exception
does not require a super majority be-
fore it can apply to a fee or assess-
ment,

115 Appellants argue that the language
under the exception requiring it to be “au-
7. In their motion for summary judgment filed on

May 14, 2015, Appellants conceded the levy ben-
efited hospitals.

8, Section 36-2901.09 creates a special fund enti-
tled the “hospital assessment fund” where the
revenues collected from the assessment set forth

thorized by statute” requires that an assess-
ment be authorized by a two-thirds affirma-
tive vote from both houses of the legislature,
after which, a state officer or agency may
then change the fee or assessment without
invoking Section 22, so long as it is not
prescribed by formula, amount, or limit, We
disagree,

916 Article 9, Section 22(C)2) simply
states the exception applies to “assessments
that are authorized by statute, but are not
prescribed by formula, amount or limit, and
are set by a state officer or agency.” Ariz,
Const, art, 9, § 22(C)(2), Nowhere in the
plain language of the exception do we find a
requirement that the initial statute authoriz-
ing the fee must be passed by a super major-
ity before the (C)(2) exception applies to fees
and assessments set by a state officer or
agency, See Simpson v. Simpson, 224 Ariz,
224, 225, 16, 229 P.8d 286 (App. 2010) (“The
best indicator of legislative intent is the plain
language of the statute.”), Furthermore, ap-
pellants’ reading ignores the initial language
of subsection (0), which states, “[t]his section
does not apply to....” Ariz. Const. art. 9,
§ 22(C) (emphasis added). In other words, all
of the listed exceptions in subsection (C) are
exempt from the entirety of Section 22 of the
Arizona Constitution, including subsections
(A) and (8), Accordingly, it would require a
contorted reading of the exception under
(C)(2) to require a statute to pass the super-
majority requirement of subsection (A), in
order to then exempt fees and assessments
falling within subsection (C) from the appli-
cation of Section 22 entirely.

{17 Appellants argue this construction of
the statute would produce “absurd results”
and render the intent of Article 9, Section 22
“ineffectual.” We disagree. A fee or assess-
ment authorized by statute does not qualify
for exemption unless it is “not prescribed by
formula, amount or limit” and is “set by a

in § 36-2901.08 are deposited. ARS. § 36~
2901.08(F), Notably, the monies collected therein
cannot revert to the state general fund to be used.
for another public purpose. ARS, § 36~
2901,09(C)(1).

state officer or agency.” Ariz, Const. art. 9,
§ 22(C)(2). Under our reading, and contrary
to appellants’ contention, not every fee or
assessment passed by a simple majority is
exempt from Section 22, Appellants charac-
terize this interpretation “absurd” because it
would allow the legislature to enact an un-
specified levy by a simple majority. However,
the voter information pamphlet regarding
Proposition 108 explained to voters that oth-
er types of fees would not be affected by the
measure, and cited university tuition as an
example of one of these assessments,

ii) The federal approval and federal medi-
cal assistance requirements do not
place a formula or limit on the assess-
ment under the exception.

Hs ‘118 Finally, appellants contend
the federal approval and federal medical as-
sistance requirements in ARS. § 86-
2901.08(B) and (BE), respectively, act as limits
on the assessment, taking it outside the Sec-
tion 22(C)(2) exception.® The appellants raise
a facial challenge, and therefore we must
consider the text of the law itself and not its
current application. See Hernandez v. Lynch,
216 Ariz. 469, 472, 18, 167 P.8d 1264 (App.
2007), The party challenging the provision
must demonstrate that no cireumstances ex-
ist under which the regulation would be valid.
Id.

{19 Appellants argue, citing 42 U.S.C,
§ 1896b(w) and 42 C.F\R. § 488.68, that fed-
eral law contains regulations on how the
hospital assessment can be imposed while
maintaining federal funding for the expan-
sion program, which creates a formula or
limit for the assessment, We do not interpret
a clause of this nature to be a limit on the
hospital assessment under Article 9, Section
22(C)(2). The language of subsection (C)(2)
plainly applies to state law and does not look
beyond the statute authorizing the fee or
assessment, in this case A.R.S. § 86-2901.08.
This is evident when reading the entirety of
subsection (C)(2), which states the exception

9, Appellants also claim the exemption factors
and joint legislative budget committee (“JLBC’’)
review requirements under § 36-2901.08(C) and
(D) act as a formula or limit, but conceded in
their original complaint that the director is not

61

applies to “(flees and assessments that are
authorized by statute, but are not prescribed
by formula, amount or limit, and are set by a
state officer or agency.” The first clause re-
fers to state statutes only, and the final
clause specifically mentions state officers or
agencies, Thus, the middle clause applies to
formulas, amounts, or limits prescribed with-
in the state statute. See Estate of Braden ex
rel. Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 823, 826,
$12, 266 P.8d 849 (2011) (“We do not ...
consider words in isolation when interpreting
statutes.”); see also Planned Parenthood
Comm. of Phoenia, Inc, v. Maricopa County,
92 Ariz, 231, 285, 875 P.2d 719 (1962) (“The
rule of statutory construction, noscitur a so-
ctis, directs our attention to the accompany-
ing words....”).

120 Appellants also claim the director
must administer the assessment “in accor-
dance with federal law,” however, that inter-
pretation is inaccurate, Section 86-2901.08(B)
states the assessment is “subject to approval
by the federal government” to ensure federal
funding continues. This does not require the
director to implement an assessment “in ac-
cordance with federal law,” it simply provides
guidelines for the director to review before
setting the assessment, The director is still
free, based upon the statute, to choose the
amount of the assessment and any exemp-
tions. Placing an assessment amount for a
statewide program that is dependent upon
federal funding under a federal approval re-
quirement for purposes of sustaining the pro-
gram’s funding is not a limit under Section
22(C)Q).

21 Nor is the federal medical assistance
requirement a limit under Article 9, Section
22(C)(2). Section 36-2901.08(E) states “[t]he
administration shall not collect an assess-
ment ... after the effective date of any
reduction of the federal medical assistance
percentage ... applicable to this state to less
than eighty [percent].” This acts as a condi-
tion on the entire statute, which would re-
move the assessment entirely if the federal

required to consider these factors or gain ap-
proval from the JLBC.

10. The appellants admitted the director “has full
discretion” in their complaint,

62

government were to change its funding of the
program in the future. This condition is not a
limit on the amount or method by which the
administrator may impose the hospital as-
sessment, but instead acts to terminate the
entire statute should federal funding fail. Ac-
cordingly, it is not a “limit” on the assess-
ment itself under Article 9, Section 22(C)(2).

B. Attorney’s Fees.

722 Appellants requested attorney’s fees
pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure Rule 21(a), citing A.R.S. §§ 12-
841, -348, 35-218, and the private attorney
general doctrine. Because Appellants have
not prevailed on appeal, we decline to award
fees.

CONCLUSION
123 ARS, § 36-2901.08 creates an assess-
ment that falls within the exception of Article
9, Section 22(C)(2) of the Arizona Constitu-
tion. Accordingly, it was constitutionally en-
acted by a majority, rather than a super-
majority, of the legislature,

392 P.3d 506
ARIZONA CANNABIS NURSES
ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellant,

ve
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SERVICES; Dr. Cara Christ, in her offi-
cial capacity as Director of ADHS, De-

fendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0638

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 8/16/2017

a
ag

Ken Sobel, San Diego, CA, Counsel for
Plaintiff/Appellant

Sherman & Howard L.L.C., Phoenix, By
Gregory W. Falls, Matthew A. Hesketh,
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maurice
Portley joined.!

OPINION

THUMMA, Judge:

11 The Arizona Cannabis Nurses Associa-
tion (AZCNA) filed a petition with the Ari-
zona Department of Health Services (DHS)
1, The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge

of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has been

authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Arti-
cle VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,

to add Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) to the list of debilitating medical
conditions under the Arizona Medical Mari-
juana Act (AMMA). See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
(A.R.S.) §§ 86-2801 through -2819 (2017)2
DHS granted the petition, subject to certain
conditions. After unsuccessfully challenging
those conditions in superior court, AZCNA
now appeals to this court. Because AZCNA
has shown no error, the decision is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2 Approved as a voter initiative in No-
vember 2010, see State v. Okun, 281 Ariz.
462, 464 14, 296 P.8d 998 (App. 2018), the
AMMA’s “ ‘purpose ... is to protect patients
with debilitating medical conditions, as well
as their physicians and providers, from ar-
rest and prosecution, criminal and other pen-
alties and property forfeiture if such patients
engage in the medical use of marijuana,”
State v, Gear, 239 Ariz. 348, 845 111, 372
P.8d 287 (2016) (citation omitted). The
AMMA allows the regulated use of “marijua-
na to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying
patient’s debilitating medical condition or
symptoms associated with” such a condition.
ARS. § 36-2801(9). Under the AMMA, “de-
bilitating medical condition” means either (1)
specifically enumerated medical conditions or
diseases or their treatment, ARS, § 36-
2801(8)(a), or (2) chronic or debilitating dis-
eases or medical conditions or their treat-
ment that produce “one or more” specified
symptoms, A,R.S, § 36-2801(08)(b), The
AMMA has a process for DHS to add “[alny
other medical condition or its treatment” as a
debilitating medical condition. A.R.S. § 36-
2801(8)(c),

18 “The public may petition” DHS “to add
debilitating medical conditions or treatments
to the list of debilitating medical conditions.”
ARS, § 36-2801.01. DHS is required to “ap-
prove or deny [such] a petition within one-
hundred-eighty days of its submission,” and
such action is a final DHS decision subject to
2, Absent material revisions after the relevant

dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current
version unless otherwise indicated.

judicial review. A.R.S. § 36-2801.01; see also
Ariz, Admin, Code (A.A.C.) R9-17-106,

14 In mid-2018, AZCNA filed a petition
with DHS to add PTSD as a debilitating
medical condition. The petition contained re-
quired information, including “the availability
of conventional medical treatments” for
PTSD and “[a] summary of the evidence that
the use of marijuana will provide therapeutic
[meaning healing] or palliative [meaning
symptom relief] benefit” for PTSD, A.A.C,
R9-17-106(A)(5 & 6); see also Carbajal v,
Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 228 Ariz, 1, 4 116
n.2, 219 P.8d 211 (2009) (noting palliative use
manages “symptoms or mitigat[es] the ef-
fects” of illness or injury), After a public
hearing and receiving public comments, DHS
denied the petition.

15 AZCNA challenged that denial admin-
istratively, That challenge was assigned to an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), designated
by the Office of Administrative Hearings, to
receive evidence and prepare a recommended
decision for DHS to consider. See ARS.
§§ 41-1092.08(A) & (B). The ALJ presided
over a several-day evidentiary hearing,
where AZCNA presented evidence largely
addressing whether marijuana use was palli-
ative but not whether it was therapeutic. The
ALd’s June 2014 recommended decision
found that “[t]he preponderance of the evi-
dence shows that marijuana use provides a
palliative benefit to those suffering from
PTSD.” The ALJ recommended that PTSD
be added as a debilitating medical condition.

16 DHS’ July 2014 final decision adopted
the ALJ’s recommended decision as amend-
ed. DHS granted AZCNA’s petition, adding
PTSD “to the list of debilitating [medical]
conditions for which marijuana may be dis-
pensed” under the AMMA. DHS conditioned
such use, however, by requiring that a physi-
cian’s written certification “for the medical
use of marijuana for” PTSD (1) “be specifi-
cally limited to palliative, non-therapeutic
3. Although AZCNA challenges the January 1,

2015 implementation date of DHS’ final deci-

sion, because that date passed long ago, the

argument is moot. See Hormel v. Maricopa Coun-
ty, 224 Ariz. 454, 460 125, 232 P.3d 768 (App.

2010),

65

use” and (2) “include an attestation that the
patient is participating in conventional treat-
ment for” PTSD (collectively, the Condi-
tions). The Conditions are the focus of this
appeal.’

17 AZCNA appealed to the superior court,
arguing DHS lacked the authority to require
the Conditions and that they violated the
constitutional rights of individuals with
PTSD. After briefing and oral argument, the
court rejected AZCNA’s arguments and af-
firmed DHS’ final decision. This court has
jurisdiction over AZCNA’s timely appeal of
the superior court’s decision pursuant to
ARS, §§ 12-9184 -2101(A)(1) and -
120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION
I. AZCNA Has Shown No Error.

A. Standard Of Review.

HMMM 18 AZONA argues the Conditions
imposed by DHS violated: (1) Arizona’s Voter
Protection Act, Article 4, Section 1, of the
Arizona Constitution (VPA) and A.R.S. § 86-
114; (2) DHS’ statutory authority and ©)
PTSD patients’ equal protection rights. This
court is asked to address whether DHS’ final
decision was “illegal, arbitrary, capricious or
involved an abuse of discretion.” Faton v.
AHCCCS, 206 Ariz, 430, 482 17, 79 P.8d 1044
(App. 2008). “An agency decision is not arbi-
trary and capricious if it is supported by
substantial evidence.” WildHarth Guardians,
Ine. v. Hickman, 238 Ariz. 50, 58 17, 808
P.8d 1201 (App. 2018), This court will not re-
weigh the evidence, St. Joseph’s Hosp. v.
AHCCCS, 185 Ariz. 809, 812, 916 P.2d 499
(App. 1996), and reviews questions of law de
novo, Webb v, State ew. rel, Arizona Bd. of
Medical Buaminers, 202 Ariz. 555, 557 97,
48 P.3d 505 (App. 2002), Although this court
determines whether DHS has properly inter-
preted the relevant law, DHS’ interpretation
of applicable statutes and regulations “‘is

4. Notwithstanding its reference to “the supreme
court,” A.R.S, § 12-913 “has been construed as
also allowing an appeal to the court of appeals,
which was created after § 12-913 was enacted.”
Svendsen v. Ariz. Dept, of Transp. Motor Vehicle
Div., 234 Ariz, 528, 533 913, 323 P.3d 1179
(App. 2014).

66

entitled to great weight.’” Scottsdale Health-
care Inc. v. AHCCCS, 206 Ariz. 1, 8 127, 75
P.8d 91 (2008) (citation omitted); accord Ariz.
Water Co. v. Ariz. Dep't Water Resources,
208 Ariz, 147, 154 130, 91 P.8d 990 (2004)
(noting, where Legislature “has not spoken”
on issue, “‘considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department’s con-
struction of a statutory scheme it is entrust-
ed to administer.’ In such cases, ‘a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statu-
tory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.’”)
(citations omitted). With these standards in
mind, the court addresses AZCNA’s argu-
ments in turn?

B. AZCNA Is Not Aggrieved By The
“Palliative, Non-Therapeutic Use”
Condition.

HM 19 AZCNA argues DHS lacked au-
thority “to distinguish between a therapeutic
or palliative benefit” of medical marijuana,
meaning the condition that a physician's writ-
ten certification “be specifically limited to
palliative, non-therapeutic use” is invalid,
AZCNA’s pre-hearing brief filed with the
ALJ admitted that no significant evidence
showed that marijuana use is therapeutic for
PTSD, arguing instead that evidence showed
that marijuana use provides palliative bene-
fits for PTSD, Consistent with AZCNA’s po-
sition and the evidence received, the ALJ’s
proposed decision found “[t]he preponder-
ance of the evidence shows that marijuana
use provides a palliative benefit to those
suffering from PTSD,” not that such use
provided a therapeutic benefit. And DHS
construed AZONA’s petition as a request to
“add palliative treatment of [PTSD] as a
debilitating medical condition” under the
AMMA. Consistent with this view, even while
challenging the limitation on appeal, AZCNA

5. For various factual propositions, AZCNA’s
opening brief improperly and extensively relies
on a March 2015 brief in an unrelated case filed
nearly a year after DHS’ final decision. See Lov-
itch v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 202 Ariz. 102, 105
915, 41 P.3d 640 (App. 2002) (“[this court] can-
not consider evidence not presented to the ALJ”).
AZCNA's opening brief also lists legal issues
without supporting authority, which this court
will not address. See Watahomigie v. Ariz, Bd. of

concedes that “[t]here is no cure” of any kind
for PTSD.

110 AZCNA has not shown that DHS
construed its petition erroneously or that the
evidence received could support a finding
that marijuana use properly could be deemed
therapeutic for PTSD, AZCNA asked DHS
to add PTSD to the list of debilitating medi-
eal conditions, claiming marijuana use has a
palliative effect for PTSD. DHS granted that
request. Thus, AZCNA has not shown how it
was aggrieved by the “palliative, non-thera-
peutic” condition. See, e.g. Kondawr Capital
Corp. v. Pinal County, 235 Ariz. 189, 192 16,
380 P.8d 879 (App. 2014) (“an appellant is
only entitled to appeal from ‘“that part of
the judgment by which [it] is aggrieved”’”)
(citation omitted); Chambers v, United Farm
Workers Org. Comm. AFL-CIO, 25 Ariz.
App. 104, 107, 541 P.2d 567 (1975) (“[a]
court’s ruling which is favorable to a party
may not be appealed by that party”).

C. The Conditions Do Not Violate The
VPA Or ARS. § 36-114.

HMM 111 AZONA baldly argues that re-
quiring a physician’s written certification to
include an “attestation that the patient is
participating in conventional treatment for”
PTSD constitutes an attempt by DHS “to
modify a statutory provision” in violation of
the VPA. This argument is unavailing. The
VPA limits the power of the Governor and
the Legislature to amend or veto initiatives
approved by Arizona voters. See Ariz, Const.
art. 4, § 1, Although AZCNA asserts DHS is
attempting to “change the requirements im-
posed by a statute,” it has done no such
thing. The AMMA does not prohibit DHS
from imposing restrictions or conditions on
the use of medical marijuana for the treat-
ment of a medical condition added to the list
of debilitating medical conditions. See A.R.S,

Water Quality Appeals, 181 Ariz. 20, 26, 887 P.2d
550 (App. 1994). Finally, AZCNA has not provid-
ed a transcript from the evidentiary hearing be-
fore the ALJ, meaning this court presumes the
testimony supports DHS’ final decision. See, e.g.,
Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz.
96, 102 121, 158 P.3d 225 (App. 2007); Baker v.
Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73, 900 P.2d 764 (App.
1995),

§ 86-2801(8)(c). AZCNA has not shown the
Conditions violate the VPA.

MM 112 AZCNA similarly argues that the
conventional treatment condition violates the
prohibition against DHS “imposfing] on any
person against his will any mode of treat-
ment.” A.R.S, § 86-114. AZCNA argues that
imposing a condition requiring traditional
treatment as a prerequisite is the same as
requiring treatment against a person’s will.
AZCNA, however, provides no authority sup-
porting this proposition. Nor has AZCNA
shown how its reliance on Anderson v. State,
185 Ariz, 578, 663 P.2d 570 (App. 1982)—
which it admits addressed “a ‘forced treat-
ment’ situation where an attempt is made to
force the patient to submit to psychotropics
in a non-emergency, voluntary committal, sit-
uation”—supports its argument. DHS is not
forcing any person to undergo any sort of
medical treatment. Accordingly, A.R.S. § 86-
114 is not implicated, Moreover, AZCNA’s
argument that the conventional treatment
condition requires a veteran to seek such
treatment through the United States Veter-
ans Administration is not supported by the
record, And AZCNA has not shown that
DHS’ actions were contrary to its statutory
mandate to “[p]rotect the health of the peo-
ple of the state.” A.R.S, § 36-182(A)(1). On
this record, AZCNA has not shown the Con-
ditions violate A.R.S. § 36-114.

D. DHS Had The Authority Te Impose
The Conditions.

HM 1118 The core of AZCNA’s appeal is
an argument that “[nJeither the statute nor
the rule anywhere provide” DHS the authori-
ty to require the Conditions, regardless of
the underlying facts, The premise of this
argument is that DHS could not grant AZC-
NA’s petition subject to any condition what-

6. Referring to prescription drugs, AZCNA assert-
ed in oral argument before this court that con-
ventional treatments were dangerous and even
deadly. However, DHS’ September 2014 Sub-
stantive Policy Statement makes it clear that
conventional treatment does not require pre-
scription drugs and could, depending on the indi-
vidual, consist solely of counseling, participation
in support groups or prescription medication,

7._AZCNA argues “the same rationale” used by a
New Mexico state trial court in an unpublished
decision should apply here. See Kieve v. New

67

soever but, instead, could only approve or
deny the petition as submitted. The statutory
authority relied upon by AZCNA for this
proposition states that DHS “shall consider
petitions in the manner required by depart-
ment rule, including public notice and hear-
ing. [DHS] shall approve or deny a petition
within one-hundred-eighty days of its sub-
mission.” A.R.S. § 36-2801.01. This, AZCNA
argues, means DHS could not grant a peti-
tion subject to any condition of any type.”

114 Contrary to AZCNA’s argument, the
focus of A.R.S. § 86~-2801.01 is a requirement
that DHS act on a petition within 180 days of
its filing, not the form that DHS’ action
should take. This focus is furthered by the
related statutory directive that “[t]he approv-
al or denial of a petition is a final decision of”
DHS subject to judicial review, A.R.S. § 36-
2801.01. Indeed, AZCNA cites no authority
supporting its view that A.R.S, § 86-2801.01
directs DHS to grant or deny a petition, but
do nothing else, Arizona law on agency action
is to the contrary.

HM s115 The Legislature is not re-
quired to expressly set forth all authority
granted to an agency, Longbridge Inv. Co, v.
Moore, 28 Aviz.App. 858, 356, 588 P.2d 564
(1975). “[I]t is the law of this state that an
agency may” take such action “which may be
reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of
the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted); see also Hospital Corp. of
Northwest, Ine. v. Ariz. Dept. of Health Ser-
vices, 195 Ariz, 888, 886 118, 988 P.2d 168
(App. 1999) (rejecting argument DHS lacked
regulatory authority over paramedics in hos-
pital setting because no statute expressly
authorized such authority; “[i]f the [Llegisla-
ture had intended to provide DHS only limit-
ed authority, it could easily have done so”), If

Mexico Dep't of Health, D 101-CV-2014-00140
(NM. Ist Dist. Ct. Apr. 29, 2015), https:/Awww.
scribd.com/doc/263778533/MedicalMarijuana
Ruling-pdf#fullscreen&from_embed. Even if
properly citable, Kieve is not precedential. See
Ariz, R, Sup. Ct. 111()(1)(C). Nor is it persua-
sive, particularly because New Mexico required
PTSD patients to exhaust ail standard treatments
before being able to use medical marijuana,
Kieve at 21, which DHS’ final decision clearly
does not require.

68

a statute is silent on a specific issue, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is whether the agency's in-
terpretation is reasonable..., ‘Statutory am-
biguities will be resolved, within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation, not by the
courts but by the administering agency.’”
Kobold v, Aetna Life Ins, Co, 239 Ariz, 259,
262 19, 370 P.8d 128 (App. 2016) (quoting
City of Arlington, Tew, v, F.C.C., 569 U.S.
290, 188 S.Ct, 1868, 1867-68, 185 L,Bd.2d 941
(2018)).

HM 116 AZCNA has not shown that
DHS lacked the authority to consider the
unique risks and potential benefits surround-
ing the use of medical marijuana to treat
PTSD as a debilitating medical condition.
This court “will indulge all rational presump-
tions in favor of the validity of the adminis-
trative action” and will “not invalidate such
action unless its provisions cannot, by any
reasonable construction, be interpreted in
harmony with the legislative mandate.” Wa-
tahomigie v. Ariz, Bd. of Water Quality Ap-
peals, 181 Ariz, 20, 25, 887 P.2d 550 (App.
1994), AZCNA failed to show the Conditions
DHS imposed are not based on substantial
evidence or not reasonable and adequately
related to the AMMA’s purpose, See Grove v.
Ariz. Criminal Intelligence Sys, Agency, 143
Ariz, 166, 169, 692 P.2d 1015 (App. 1984)
(agency action must be reasonable and ade-
quately related to purpose of applicable stat-
ute), This is particularly so given the relief
sought in AZONA’s petition and the record
presented.

IL The Conditions Do Not Violate The
Equal Protection Rights Of Individu-
als With PTSD.

s.17 AZCNA argues the Condi-
tions violate the equal protection rights of
individuals with PTSD by “transparently dis-
criminat[ing] against a PTSD patient versus
any other patient suffering from another list-
ed debilitating condition.” In pressing this
argument, AZCNA “bears the burden of ov-
ercoming” the “strong presumption support-
ing the constitutionality of ... an administra-
tive regulation.” Watahomigie, 181 Ariz, at
27, 887 P.2d 550. Moreover, equal protection
is not violated “if all persons within a class
are treated alike.” Id,

HM {18 The Conditions treat all individ-
uals with PTSD similarly, AZCNA has not
shown how requiring different treatments for
different medical conditions is an equal pro-
tection violation, Nor has AZCNA shown
that all individuals with PTSD have a right to
use medical marijuana without DHS’ regula-
tion of such use. See, ¢g., Carnohan v, Unit-
ed States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir, 1980)
(“Constitutional rights of privacy and person-
al liberty do not give individuals the right to
obtain [medication] free of the lawful exercise
of government police power.”), On this rec-
ord, AZONA has not shown the Conditions
violate PTSD patients’ equal protection
rights,

CONCLUSION

119 The decision is affirmed. Because
AZCNA is not the prevailing party, its re-
quest for attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to AR.S. § 12-848(A)(@) is denied,

392 P.3d 512
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.

Paul Patrick Wayne CLOW, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 16-0033
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 9/14/2017
As Amended March 14, 2017

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Erie Knobloch, Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Public Defender’s Office,
Prescott, By Nicole S. Murray, Michelle De-
Waelsche, John Napper, Counsel for Appel-
lant

1, The Honorable Jennifer B, Campbell, Judge of
the Arizona Superior Court, has been authorized
to sit in this matter pursuant to Article VI, Sec-
tion 3 of the Arizona Constitution,

2, Absent material revisions after the relevant
dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current
version unless otherwise indicated,

3. In a separate memorandum decision, State v.
Clow, 1 CA-~CR 16-0033, 2017 WL 976945 (Ariz.

69

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell ! delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge
Margaret H. Downie joined.

OPINION

CAMPBELL, Judge:

V1 Following a jury trial, Paul Patrick
Wayne Clow was convicted of a single count
of continuous sexual abuse of a child, On
appeal, Clow argues the court misinterpreted
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section
18-1417(A) (2010), which requires the sexu-
al conduet to span a period of three months,
This is the sole issue addressed in this opin-
ion? For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND *

12 In July 2014, Clow placed an ad to rent
out two rooms of his house, The ad specifical~
ly stated that the space would accommodate
a single-parent family, The victim’s mother
(“Mother”) was the first person to respond to
the ad, and she and her three sons, T.F, (age
10), J.F. (age 7—the victim), and AF. (age
5), moved in on August 2, 2014, Because
Mother did not have rent money at the time
of move-in, Clow agreed that Mother could
pay rent as soon as she was able.

13 Mother testified at trial that within a
“couple [of] days,” she began a sexual rela-
tionship with Clow, and Clow let the rent
“slide.” Clow also immediately became in-
volved with the children, taking them to
parks, stores, and other outings. Clow also
supervised the children while Mother inter-
viewed for jobs. By the end of August, Clow
regularly participated in the children’s bath
and bedtime routines, including lying down
with the children and “rub[bing] their back[s]
[to] help them to fall asleep.”

App. March 14, 2017), filed simultaneously with
the opinion, we reject Clow’s remaining argu-
ments. Additional factual and procedural history
is provided therein, See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111;
Ariz, R, of Crim, P, 31.26.

4, We view the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz.
484, 509, 193, 314 P.3d 1239, 1264 (2013).

70

4 On November 9, 2014, while driving in
the car with the children, Mother asked the
victim whether Clow had ever told him “to
keep secrets from mommy.” The victim an-
swered “yes.” When Mother asked what type
of secrets, the victim answered that Clow had
told him how to have sex. At that point,
Mother stopped the car and spoke with the
victim outside the presence of the other chil-
dren. Mother asked the victim whether Clow
had touched him inappropriately and the vic-
tim stated that Clow had touched his penis
both over and under his clothing.

15 Mother immediately contacted the po-
lice, The next day, Detective P.E, conducted
a forensic interview of the victim. In re-
sponse to questioning, the victim said Clow
had touched his “private part,” and pointed
to his genitals. Detective P.E. asked when
the touching started and he responded “Au-
gust 18.” When asked about the frequency of
the touching, the victim said Clow either
touched the victim’s penis or rubbed his own
erect penis against the victim “every day.”

6 The State charged Clow with one count
of continuous sexual abuse of a child, At trial,
the victim testified that Clow repeatedly
touched and rubbed his penis and did so
“faJbout 24 times.” During follow-up ques-
tioning, the victim clarified that he was un-
sure of the exact number of times, but knew
it happened “a lot,” Initially, the victim testi-
fied that he did not know when the molesta-
tion began, but, later, recalled that he had
told Detective P.E. the touching started at
the beginning of August 2014, and confirmed
that he had told her the truth. The victim
testified that Clow touched his penis every
day until Mother reported the touching to
the police. Mother testified that she reported
the touching to the police on November 9,
2014.

17 After a five-day trial, the jury convicted
Clow as charged, The court sentenced Clow
to a term of twenty-five years’ flat time in
prison, an aggravated sentence. Clow timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
ARS, § 12-12021(A)1) (2016), ARS.
§§ 18-4081 (2010), -4033(A)(1) (2010).

DISCUSSION

TH ‘8 Clow argues the State presented
insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
for continuous sexual abuse of a child. Specif-
ically, Clow contends he did not sexually
abuse the victim for “a period of three
months or more” as required under the rele-
vant statute, A.R.S, § 13-1417(A), an issue
he raised in his motion for judgment of ac-
quittal. See Ariz, R. Crim, P. 20.

19 We review a trial court’s denial of a
Rule 20 motion for a judgment of acquittal de
novo, State v. West, 226 Ariz, 559, 562, 1115,
250 P.8d 1188, 1191 (2011) (citation omitted).
“(Tyhe relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jd.
at 562, 116, 250 P.3d at 1191 (quotations and
citations omitted), Sufficient evidence upon
which a reasonable jury can convict may be
direct or circumstantial. Id. (citation omit-
ted). A judgment of acquittal is appropriate
only when “there is no substantial evidence
to warrant a conviction.” Ariz. R, Crim. P.
20(a).

110 We also interpret statutes de novo.
State v, Neese, 239 Ariz, 84, 86, 18, 366 P.3d
561, 563 (App. 2016) (citation omitted). When
the language of a statute is clear, “we need
not look further to determine the statute’s
meaning and apply its terms as written.”
State v, Lee, 236 Ariz. 377, 388, 116, 340 P.38d
1085, 1091 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). Un-
less the legislature clearly expresses an in-
tent to give a term a special meaning, we
ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to
statutory terms. State v. Divon, 216 Ariz. 18,
20, 17, 162 P.8d 657, 659 (App. 2007) (quota-
tion and citation omitted), “In determining
the ordinary meaning of a word, we may
refer to an established and widely used dic-
tionary.” State v. Mahaney, 193 Ariz. 566,
568, 112, 975 P.2d 156, 158 (App. 1999) (cita-
tion omitted),

{11 As applicable here, “[a] person who
over a period of three months or more in
duration engages in three or more acts [of
sexual conduct, sexual assault, or molesta-
tion] with a child who is under fourteen years
of age is guilty of continuous sexual abuse of

a child.” A.R.S, § 18-1417(A). Clow does not
challenge the jury’s finding that he perpe-
trated at least three qualifying acts of sexual
abuse against the victim or that the victim is
a child under fourteen years of age. Instead,
his challenge is confined to the meaning of
the phrase “over a period of three months or
more in duration.”

12 According to Clow, the term “month”
is defined “as the entirety of the month,”
such that “portions of differing months” may
not be combined to constitute a month. Ap-
plying this definition to the facts, Clow con-
tends he only had access to the victim during
two entire “months,” September and October
2014, and during the “portions” of August
and November 2014 when the victim’s family
shared his home. Clow contends that the
portions of August and November cannot be
added together to comprise an additional
“month” within the meaning of A.R.S, § 18-
1417(A).

913 Title 18 does not expressly define
“month.” Common definitions of “month” in-
elude: (1) one of the twelve divisions of a
year; (2) a period extending from a date in
one calendar month to the corresponding
date the next month; (8) four weeks; and (4)
thirty days. Webster’s II New College Dictio-
nary (8d ed. 2005). Under Clow’s interpreta-
tion of A.R.S, § 13-1417(A), “month” is de-
fined as one of the twelve divisions of a year.
Although that is a common definition for the
term, in application here, such a construction
is untenable. See State v. Barragan-Sierra,
219 Ariz. 276, 282, 117, 196 P.8d 879, 885
(App. 2008) (explaining courts “employ a
common sense approach” to interpreting a
statute, “reading the statute in terms of its
stated purpose and the system of related
statutes of which it forms a part, while taking
care to avoid absurd results”) (citations omit-
ted).

914 For example, under Clow’s interpreta-
tion, a person who commences sexual abuse
of a child on January 2nd and continues to
abuse that child daily until April 29th (118
days) would not be guilty of continuous sexu-
al abuse of a child because the duration of
the abuse included only two full “months.” In
contrast, a person who commences sexual
abuse of a child on January Ist and continues

71

to abuse the child daily until March 31st (90
days) would be guilty of continuous sexual
abuse of a child because the period of abuse
encompassed three full “months.” Thus,
Clow’s interpretation operates to exclude
sexual abuse that occurs for a duration great-
er than 90 days, but involves partial calendar
months, and such a reading is therefore in-
consistent with the intent of the legislation.

HE 15 Adopting any of the three re-
maining common definitions, see swpra 118,
on the other hand, would lead to consistent,
logical results. Therefore, to avoid an absurd
result, we conclude a “month,” for purposes
of A.R.S. § 18-1417(A), is a period extending
from a date in one calendar month to the
corresponding date the next month. See
ARS. § 1-211(C) (2016) (“Penal statutes
shall be construed according to the fair im-
port of their terms, with a view to effect their
object and to promote justice.”); A.R.S. § 1~
215, -(23) (Supp. 2016) (if not otherwise ex-
pressed, defining “‘month’” to mean calen-
dar month unless “context otherwise re-
quires”).

916 In this case, the record reflects that
the victim’s family moved in with Clow on
August 2, 2014. The victim testified that the
sexual abuse began in early August and did
not end until Mother reported the abuse to
the police, which other evidence shows oc-
curred on November 9, 2014, This trial ree-
ord provides sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that Clow began
sexually abusing the victim by August 9,
2014, and continued sexually abusing the vic-
tim until November 9, 2014. Therefore, be-
cause the trial evidence was sufficient to
support the guilty verdict, Clow has not
shown the court erred by denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal.

CONCLUSION
117 Clow’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

72 ee
392 P.3d 516
The STATE of Arizona, Respondent,
v

Juan Antonio GRIJALVA, Petitioner,
No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0176-PR,

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed March 7, 2017

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney,
By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney,
Tucson, Counsel for Respondent

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public
Defender, By Abigail Jensen, Assistant Pub-
lie Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Petitioner

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Vasquez and
Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

I 111 Petitioner Juan Grijalva seeks re-
view of the trial court’s order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursu-
ant to Rule 82, Ariz. R. Crim. P. “We will not
disturb a trial court’s ruling on a petition for
post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of
diseretion.” State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz, 390,
14, 166 P.8d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Grijalva,
has not sustained his burden of establishing
such abuse here.

2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Grijalva
was convicted of theft of a means of trans-

portation, The trial court imposed a mini-
mum, 2.5-year term of imprisonment in Oc-
tober 2012, The state requested restitution
for the victim’s insurance company in the
amount of $3,045.58. Defense counsel indicat-
ed she had not seen supporting documenta-
tion of the claim. The court suggested that.
she contact the prosecutor to work out a
stipulation and gave the parties thirty days
to file it, The court further ordered that it
“retain[ed] jurisdiction over the issue of res-
titution” and that counsel should “submit a
stipulation regarding the amount of restitu-
tion owed.”

8 In March 2014, the state filed a motion
for restitution, and the court ordered Grijal-
va to pay $8,045.58 to the insurance compa-
ny. Grijalva filed an opposition to the mo-
tion, and the court held a hearing at which it
vacated its restitution order and gave the
parties two weeks “to request a hearing or to
submit a stipulation as to the amount of
restitution.” The court filed an under-advise-
ment ruling in May affirming its earlier
grant and ordering the same amount of resti-
tution to the insurance company.

14 Later in May, Grijalva filed a notice of
post-conviction relief, arguing in his petition
that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to
enter the restitution order and, in any event,
the amount of restitution was too high. He
also argued the court had erred in entering a
criminal restitution order (CRO). The trial
court granted relief insofar as it vacated the
CRO for “fines, fees, and assessments,” but
otherwise summarily denied relief, and de-
nied Grijalva’s subsequent motion for recon-
sideration as well.

Hl 15 On review, Grijalva again con-
tends the trial court lacked jurisdiction “to
modify” his sentence by adding restitution,
He argues the court could only add restitu-
tion by means of Rule 24.8, Ariz. R. Crim. P.,
additionally contending a sentence may only
be changed if it is illegal and the correction is
made within sixty days.

1, The trial court later found that defense counsel
had not obtained a stipulation, It also noted that
to obtain a favorable plea, Grijalva had waived

the right to a restitution evidentiary hearing.
Although the court relied on these facts to dis-

73

96 In arguing the trial court lacked juris-
diction to award restitution more than sixty
days after the oral pronouncement of judg-
ment, Grijalva relies on this court’s state-
ment in State v. Serrano, that a “judgment
and sentence are ‘complete and valid’ upon
oral pronouncement, and cannot be modified
thereafter except as provided by Rule 24.3,
Aviz, R, Crim, P.” 284 Ariz, 491, 19, 823 P.8d
774, 777 (App. 2014) (citation omitted), quot-
img Ariz, R. Crim. P, 26,16(a). Rule 24.3
provides, in relevant part, that a “court may
correct any unlawful sentence or one im-
posed in an unlawful manner within 60 days
of the entry of judgment and sentence but
before the defendant’s appeal, if any, is per-
fected.”

17 Serrano holds that 2 court lacks au-
thority to later modify a defendant’s sentence
to require him to register as a sex offender,
284 Ariz, 491, 19, 828 P.8d at 777. We ex-
plained that a registration requirement was
not mandatory for Serrano’s offense, but.
could have been imposed, in the court’s dis-
cretion, had the state raised the issue at
sentencing, Id, §7, Therefore, because the
sentences originally imposed by the court
“were not unlawful, ... [nlor ... imposed
without regard for statutory and procedural
rules,” we concluded “[tJhe absence of a reg-
istration order ... did not allow the court to
modify the judgment or sentences under
Rule 24,3.” Id. 111.

18 The discretionary registration order in
Serrano, as well as the order expunging a
DNA? profile in State v. Bryant, 219 Ariz,
514, 200 P.8d 1011 (App. 2008), on which
Grijalva also relies, were modifications of the
“complete and valid” sentences imposed ear-
lier. Id. quoting Ariz. R, Crim. P, 26,16(a), In
contrast, the restitution order here did not
constitute a modification or correction of a
sentence and judgment; rather, the trial
court expressly reserved jurisdiction to later
order restitution, which it was required to
impose upon the presentation of sufficient
evidence. See State v. Holguin, 177 Ariz, 589,
591, 870 P.2d 407, 409 (App. 1993).

miss the petition, it addressed Grijalva’s jurisdic-
tion argument separately, as we do here.

2, Deoxyribonucleic acid.

74

{19 We also find Serrano inapposite be-
cause we relied on the legislature’s “clear
intent that any discretionary order that a
person register as a sex offender must occur
at the time of sentencing.” 234 Ariz. 491,
118, 323 P.38d at 778. In contrast, A.R.S.
§ 18-608(C), which requires the trial court to
impose restitution, “is silent as to when resti-
tution must be assessed,” notwithstanding
that restitution generally “is ordered at the
time of sentencing”—if the court has “suffi-
cient evidence at that time” to support a
restitution award. Holguin, 177 Aviz. at 591,
870 P.2d at 409.

Hl 110 In support of his claim that resti-
tution must be ordered at sentencing, Grijal-
va relies on language in Rule 26.16(a) provid-
ing that “[t]he judgment of conviction and
the sentence thereon are complete and valid
as of the time of their oral pronouncement in
open court.” But Rule 26,1(b), Ariz. R. Crim.
P,, limits the definition of “sentence” to “the
penalty imposed upon the defendant after a
judgment of guilty.” Although it has been
recognized as “part of the sentencing pro-
cess” in some contexts, “restitution is not a
penalty or a disability.” State v. Zaputil, 220
Ariz, 425, 111, 207 P.8d 678, 681 (App. 2008).
Rule 26.10(b), Ariz, R. Crim, P., governing
pronouncement of sentence supports this
conclusion. It lists a number of mandatory
actions by the trial court, but the rule does
not include or even mention restitution.

HM 111 A restitution order made after
sentencing does not impair appeal rights be-
cause such orders are separately appealable.
State v. Fancher, 169 Ariz, 266, 266 n.1, 818
P.2d 251, 251 nJ (App. 1991). Similarly, al-
though a pleading defendant is required to
challenge a restitution order in a timely Rule
82 proceeding, our supreme court has al-
lowed a separate challenge to a contested
post-judgment restitution order in that con-
text as well. Hoffman v. Chandler, 231 Ariz.
362, 295 P.8d 989 (2013). Grijalva relies on
the decision in Hoffman as authority for the
proposition that a restitution order is part of
a sentence, but the Hoffman court’s ruling
did not extend so far. Rather, although the
court determined for purposes of A.R.S.
§ 18-4088(B) restitution is part of a “sen-
tence,” Hoffman, 281 Ariz, 362, 19, 295 P.38d

at 941, it did not preclude separate appeals
from all orders of restitution, id. 119. It
determined that restitution orders could only
be challenged in a Rule 82 proceeding if they
had been “entered pursuant to a plea agree-
ment that contemplated payment of restitu-
tion and capped the amount.” Jd. And, Hoff-
moan itself dealt with a restitution order that
hhad been entered three months after sen-
tencing. Jd. 18.

HM 112 Finally, although a victim may
waive restitution by failing to comply with a
time limit set by the court, this rule is a
matter of procedure. See State v. Nuckols,
229 Ariz, 266, 15, 274 P.8d 536, 538 (App.
2012), A procedural rule is based on the
orderly administration of justice rather than
the court’s jurisdiction. Qf Town of S. Tuc-
son v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pima Cty., 52
Aviz, 575, 582, 84 P.2d 581, 584 (1988),

118 Grijalva also relies on In ve Alton D.,
196 Ariz, 195, 994 P.2d 402 (2000). In that
case our supreme court determined that res-
titution claims must be resolved before a
delinquency disposition is final and appeal-
able, Id. 119-14, But the court expressly
noted its decision was based on “statutes
governing juvenile proceedings” and the
“anique nature and policies underlying the
juvenile system.” Jd. n6. It distinguished
cases involving “restitution claims filed after
final judgment [in] adult criminal actions.”
Id, Grijalva notes many similarities between
the juvenile and criminal statutes, but we
cannot say criminal proceedings share the
special purpose and policies applicable to de-
linquency adjudications, Id. Thus, we decline
to extend the reasoning in Alton D. to crimi-
nal restitution orders,

114 In sum, we cannot say, under the
circumstances presented in which a timely
request for restitution was made, the trial
court erred in retaining jurisdiction over res-
titution pending the filing of a stipulation.

915 We also reject Grijalva’s alternative
arguments that the trial court erred in deem-
ing the request for restitution timely. First,
Grijalva contends the court imposed a dead-
line when it gave the parties thirty days to
file the restitution stipulation. But the trial
court determined it had not imposed a “dead-

line,” and Grijalva does not point to anything
in the record contradicting that finding. See-
ond, citing Alton D. and In re Michelle G.,
217 Ariz, 340, 178 P.8d 1041 (App. 2008), he
contends the eighteen months between sen-
tencing and the state’s subsequent request
for restitution was not within a “reasonable
time.” But, as discussed above, we do not
apply the rules set forth for juvenile proceed-
ings to criminal restitution matters,

5

116 For these reasons, we grant the peti-
tion for review but we deny relief.

393 P.3d 137
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v
Adam RETHER, Appellant.
No. 1 CA~CR 15-0650
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,
FILED 3/7/2017

1, The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired
Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has
been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to
Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,

|
ia

Phoenix City Prosecutor’s Office, Phoenix,
By Gary L. Shupe, Counsel for Appellee

Cameron A, Morgan, Scottsdale, Counsel
for Appellant

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge
Patricia A, Orozco joined.’

OPINION

THUMMA, Judge:

11 Adam Mark Reiher was convicted of
various driving while under the influence
(DUI) offenses in Phoenix Municipal Court.
Reiher unsuccessfully appealed those convic-
tions in the Superior Court. Now, he argues
this court should apply State v, Valenzuela,
239 Ariz, 299, 871 P.8d 627 (2016), and
Brown v, McClennen, 239 Ariz, 521, 373 P.38d
588 (2016), retroactively and vacate his con-
victions. Because this court lacks appellate
jurisdiction over Reiher’s challenge, the ap-
peal is dismissed,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 In November 2018, police arrested Rei-
her and charged him with DUI pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.B.S.) section 28-
1881(A)(1), 2) (2017) After advising Reiher
of his rights pursuant to Miranda v, Ari-
2, Absent material revisions after the relevant

dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current
version unless otherwise indicated.

zona, 884 U.S, 486, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), a police officer read him the
implied consent affidavit (admin per se) form.
After being asked to do so, Reiher agreed to
a blood test, signed a consent form and blood
was drawn and analyzed, resulting in addi-
tional DUI charges being filed against him,
{8 Pretrial, Reiher unsuccessfully moved
to suppress the blood test results, arguing
that the blood draw was not voluntary and
that the implied consent law was unconstitu-
tional, After Reiher submitted the matter to
the court, the court found him guilty of vari-
ous DUI offenses, including two extreme
DUI offenses, and imposed consequences.

94 Reiher unsuccessfully appealed to the
Superior Court, arguing that the blood draw
was not voluntary and that the implied con-
sent law was unconstitutional, On appeal to
this court, Reiher no longer challenges the
constitutionality of A.R.S. § 28-1821, In-
stead, he relies on Valenzuela and Brown,
which held that a driver's consent to blood
testing, obtained after a police officer advised
that “Arizona law requires you to submit” to
such testing, was not “freely and voluntarily
given.” Valeneuela, 239 Ariz. at 301 12, 871
P.8d 627; Brown, 289 Ariz. at 528 12, 378
P.8d 588 (similar for watercraft operator), In
this appeal, Reiher argues Valenzuela and
Brown should apply retroactively and, as a
result, his convictions should be vacated,

DISCUSSION

HMMM 15 This court lacks appellate ju-
risdiction to hear an appeal from “a final
judgment of the superior court in an action
appealed from a justice of the peace or mu-
nicipal court” unless, as applicable here, the
appeal “involves the validity of a ... stat-
ute.” A.R.S, § 22-875(A). The State argues
that, given Reiher is now only arguing the
retroactivity of Valenzuela and Brown, this
court Jacks appellate jurisdiction.

Hl 16 In State v. Bowser, 1 CA-CR 15-
0601, 2016 WL 7438452 (Ariz. App. Dec. 27,
3, Although Bowser is not precedential, it proper-

ly may be cited and relied upon by this court, See
Ariz, R. Sup. Ct. 111).

4, Even if special action jurisdiction could be
exercised absent appellate jurisdiction, this court

77

2016) (mem, dec,),® this court dismissed a
putative appeal in a similar case on this same
ground, After first noting this court’s limited
appellate jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 22-
875(A), Bowser observed that the defendant
“no longer challenge(d] the validity of § 28-
1821,” and that as a result, this court “lack[s]
jurisdiction over [defendant’s] appeal pursu-
ant to A.R.S, § 22-875(A).” Bowser, 2016 WL
7438452, at "2 16, Reiher is no longer chal-
lenging the constitutionality of A.R.S, § 28-
1821, Accordingly, this court lacks appellate
jurisdiction, See Bowser, 2016 WL 7488452 at
*2 14 ({t]his court has no jurisdiction over
an appeal from a judgment of the superior
court affirming a conviction entered by a
municipal court unless the action ‘involves
the validity of a ... statute’”) (quoting
ARS. § 22-875(A) (2016).

CONCLUSION

17 Because this court lacks appellate juris-
diction, Reiher’s appeal is dismissed.

393 P.3d 138
Philip BRAILSFORD, Petitioner,
v
The Honorable George H. FOSTER, Judge
of the Superior Court of the State of
Arizona, in and for the County of Mari-
copa, Respondent Judge,

State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest.
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0010

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 3/14/2017

declines to do so given that Reiher made no such
request and he can seek relief pursuant to Ariz.
R, Crim, P, 32, See Bowser, 2016 WL 7438452 at
*1-2 1916-7 (citing authority).

S

S

80

Picearreta Davis Keenan Fidel PC, Tue-
son, By Michael L. Piccarreta, Jefferson L.
Keenan, Counsel for Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoe-
nix, By Amanda M. Parker, Counsel for Real
Party in Interest

Judge Paul J. MeMurdie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D, Jones and Judge Patricia
K, Norris joined.

OPINION

McMURDIE, Judge:

11 Philip Brailsford (“Petitioner”) peti-
tions this Court for special action relief, chal-
lenging the magistrate’s finding of probable
cause, Petitioner argues the magistrate pre-
cluded him from presenting all witnesses re-
lated to his justification defenses, thereby
denying him due process and entitling him to
a new probable cause finding. We accept
jurisdiction, but because matters related to a
contested justification defense need not be
resolved at a preliminary hearing, we deny
relief,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 On January 18, 2016, Petitioner, a
Mesa police officer, and several other Mesa
officers responded to an emergency call from
a local hotel. The caller had indicated that
someone was pointing a rifle out of a fifth-
floor hotel room. Upon arrival, Petitioner was
assigned as a lethal coverage officer for the
immediate-action team of officers who re-
sponded to the call,

18 The officers found two individuals in
the hotel room—a woman and a man
(“D.S.”)—and told them to come out of the
room, The woman came out first, followed by
DS. A police sergeant, Sergeant Langley,
instructed them to lie face down on the hall-
way carpet, which they did, As instructed by
the sergeant, the woman crawled towards the
police officers, An officer grabbed her and
1, A superior court judge may properly sit as a

committing magistrate for the purpose of holding

a preliminary examination to determine probable
cause. Sheridan v, Super. Ct., 91 Ariz, 211, 213-

pulled her behind the other officers, leaving
D.S, lying face down in the hallway. The
sergeant instructed D.S, to get on his knees
and crawl toward the officers. The sergeant
warned D.S. that if he did not comply “[there
was] a very severe possibility that [he was]
going to get shot.” As D.S. crawled toward
the officers, he abruptly put his hand behind
his back and, Petitioner shot and killed D.S.

Hl 14 Petitioner was charged with sec-
ond-degree murder. A Maricopa County Su-
perior Court Judge, acting as the magistrate,
presided over a preliminary hearing! The
State offered testimony from Mesa Police
Department Detective Sipe. Detective Sipe
testified he responded to the 9-1-1 emergen-
ey call, reviewed the footage of the incident
from the body cameras worn by Petitioner
and Officer Doane, and offered his opinion
regarding the tactics employed throughout,

15 The State rested and the magistrate,
after reviewing the exhibits admitted into
evidence including the video from the body
cameras, found that there was probable
cause for the charge. Petitioner proceeded
with an offer of proof to rebut the magis-
trate’s finding of probable cause. Petitioner
offered to call as witnesses Sergeant Langley
and Officers Doane and Jacobs of the Mesa
Police Department, and Emanuel Kapelsohn,
an expert in law enforcement use of force.
The magistrate found the issue before him
was Petitioner's state of mind, and whether
Petitioner was justified in shooting DS, The
magistrate, after considering Petitioner's of-
fer of proof, allowed Sergeant Langley to
testify.

16 Sergeant Langley testified that the
woman was taken into custody and “she was
no longer in play.” The team then focused on
the man. D.S. was instructed in the same
manner as the woman and told to put his
hands in the air; D.S., instead, put his hands
behind his back.

17 Detective Sipe testified that D.S.’s ac-
tion of putting his hands behind his back
appeared to be an attempt by D.S. to be

14, 370 P.2d 949 (1962); Dunlap v. Super. Ct., In

& For County of Maricopa, 169 Ariz. 82, 84, 817
P.2d 27 (App. 1991).

handcuffed, Sergeant Langley disagreed with
Sipe and testified that it appeared D.S. was
not understanding the instructions, Langley
said he told D.S. to keep his hands in the air
and start crawling toward the officers. But as
DS. erawled towards the officers, he stopped.
and put his right hand behind his back.
Langley believed that the motion was an
indication that D.S. may have been drawing a
weapon, Langley stated that the only reason
he did not fire his weapon was because Peti-
tioner was in his line of fire.

18 After hearing Petitioner's offer of proof
and the testimony of Sergeant Langley, the
magistrate found the offer of proof and evi-
dence was insufficient to rebut the finding of
probable cause,

19 Petitioner filed a motion for a new
finding of probable cause pursuant to Ari-
zona Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.5? in the
superior court, arguing he was denied due
process when the magistrate refused to hear
all of the proffered evidence and refused to
consider his justification defenses. Further-
more, Petitioner argued no credible evidence
of guilt was adduced, The superior court
denied the motion and Petitioner filed this
petition for special action,

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW

HI 110 We have discretion to accept spe-
cial action jurisdiction and do so “when stat-
utes or procedural rules require immediate
interpretation,” Hscalanti v. Super. Ci, 165
Ariz, 385, 386, 799 P.2d 5 (App. 1990), and
when a petition “present[s] a purely legal
issue of first impression that is of statewide
importance,” State ew rel. Thomas v. Dun-
can, 216 Ariz, 260, 262, 15, 165 P.8d 288
(App. 2007). See Ariz, R.P, Spec, Act, 8(a).

HMMM 1111 This petition raises an issue
regarding the way a magistrate is to consider
justification defenses presented in a prelimi-
nary hearing, specifically self-defense by a
police officer. See A.R.S. §§ 18-409 and -410.
A challenge to procedures used to establish
probable cause “has no equally plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy by appeal.” Chronis v.

2, Unless otherwise noted in the text, we cite to
the current version of applicable statutes or rules

81

Steinle, 220 Ariz, 559, 560, 118-4, 208 P.8d
210, 211 (2009) (probable cause for aggrava-
ting circumstances in capital prosecution);
State ew rel. Berger v, Justice Ct. of Ne.
Phoenix Precinct, Maricopa County, 112
Ariz, 24, 25, 586 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1975)
(state’s challenge to magistrate order allow-
ing discovery at a preliminary hearing), Gen-
erally, errors at a preliminary hearing must
be remedied before trial; “[oJnce [the] trial is
over and properly completed, a ‘nonjurisdic-
tional’ error at a preliminary hearing is lost.”
State v. Lenaham, 12 Ariz.App. 446, 449, 471
P.2d 748 (1970), overruled on other grounds
by State v, Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 410, 489
P.2d 44, 47 (1971), disapproved of on other
grounds by Mincey v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 885,
408, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978);
State v. Neese, 126 Ariz, 499, 502, 616 P.2d
959 (App. 1980) (preliminary hearings are to
determine the existence of probable cause to
believe the individual committed an offense;
once a jury determines guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in a full-scale trial, the ques-
tion of probable cause is moot),

HI 112 Thus, in the exercise of our dis-
eretion, we accept special action jurisdiction.
“In reviewing a trial judge’s order within the
context of a special action, ordinarily we
must find the judge abused his discretion or
exceeded his jurisdiction or legal authority
before we may grant relief.” Francis v.
Sanders, 222 Ariz. 428, 426, 110, 215 P.8d
897, 400 (2009) (quotation omitted); see also
Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 8. In reviewing the
merits of a magistrate’s decision, however,
we determine de novo whether the court
committed an error of law or whether the
record lacks substantial support for the deci-
sion rendered. See Files v, Bernal, 200 Ariz.
64, 65, 12, 22 P.8d 57 (App. 2001), The
magistrate in a preliminary hearing rules
upon the admissibility of the evidence. Za-
rate v. Jennings, 17 Ariz.App. 401, 406, 498
P.2d 475 (1972), This court has jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120,21(A)(4),

DISCUSSION

Hs 1118 The purpose of the preliminary

when no revision material to this case has oc-
curred,

82

hearing® is not to conduct a trial on the
merits, but to “determine whether a public
offense has been committed and whether
there is sufficient cause to believe that the
accused committed it.” State v. Altman, 107
Ariz, 98, 95, 482 P.2d 460, 462 (1971).

A, Petitioner Was Afforded a Fair and
Complete Preliminary Hearing.

114 Petitioner argues he was denied due
process when the magistrate both refused to
allow all of his proffered witnesses to testify,
and also failed to consider his justification
defenses. As a result, Petitioner claims he
was denied a fair and complete preliminary
hearing.

W115 “A preliminary hearing is not a
trial in an ordinary sense, and although it
must comport with the requirements of due
process, not all procedures for a trial have to
be employed.” State ex rel. Berger v. Jen-
mings, 110 Ariz. 441, 442, 520 P.2d 318, 314
(1974), Unlike a trial, the purpose of the
preliminary hearing is to determine whether
probable cause exists to cause the accused to
answer for the charge and for the courts to
retain jurisdiction over the accused, Id, at
441, 520 P.2d at 313.

116 To comport with due process, by rule
a magistrate should conduct a preliminary
hearing as follows:
The preliminary hearing shall be held be-
fore a magistrate who shall admit only
such evidence as is material to the ques-
tion whether probable cause exists to hold
the defendant for trial. All parties shall
have the right to cross-examine the wit-
nesses testifying personally against them,
and to review their previous written state-
ments prior to such cross-examination. At
the close of the prosecution’s case, includ-
ing cross-examination of prosecution wit-
nesses by the defendant, the magistrate
shall determine and state for the record

3. We are mindful that a preliminary hearing is a
constitutional right in our state.

No person shall be prosecuted criminally in
any court of record for felony or misdemeanor,
otherwise than by information or indictment;
no person shall be prosecuted for felony by
information without having had a preliminary
examination before a magistrate or having
waived such preliminary examination.

whether the prosecution’s case establishes
probable cause. The defendant may then
make a specific offer of proof, including the
names of witnesses who would testify or
produce the evidence offered. The magis-
trate shall allow the defendant to present
the offered evidence, unless the magistrate
determines that it would be insufficient to
rebut the finding of probable cause.

Ariz.R.Crim.P, 5.8, Before the adoption of
Rule 5.8, the rule regarding the presentation
of evidence at a preliminary hearing mandat-
ed that a criminal defendant be allowed to
present defense witnesses,

After the defendant has made a statement
or waived his right to do so, he may, if he
desires, be sworn and testify in his own
behalf. Whether or not the defendant testi-
fies, any witnesses produced by him shall
be sworn and examined,

Ariz.R.Crim.P, 26 (1956); accord State v. Hss-
man, 98 Ariz. 228, 281-82, 408 P.2d 540
(1965) (due process requires magistrate to
allow defendant to present witnesses at a
preliminary hearing) superseded by rule,
Ariz. R. Crim, P. 5.8 emt, (1978) (“This provi-
sion overrules State v. Hssman, ... and lim-
its the 1956 Ariz. Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, Rule 26.”) (citation omitted),

WM 1117 Under Rule 5.3, once the State
has concluded its presentation of evidence,
the magistrate is then obligated to state on
the record whether the State has met its
burden of establishing probable cause that a
crime has been committed, and it is defen-
dant who has committed it. If the magistrate
finds probable cause, then the criminal de-
fendant may make an offer of proof identify-
ing witnesses and evidence the defendant
wants to present. Whether to allow such
evidence to be presented is within the discre-
tion of the magistrate, given the issues in-

Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 30.

4, Petitioner asserted justification defenses under
the following statutes: A.R.S. §§ 13-405(A)(2)
(use of deadly physical force), -406 (defense of a
third person), -410(C) (use of deadly physical
force in law enforcement), and -411(A) and (C)
(use of force in crime prevention).

volved in the case and the type of evidence
being offered.

118 In this case, at the preliminary hear-
ing, the parties did not dispute that Petition-
er shot and killed D.S. The State called
Detective Sipe to testify. Sipe testified he
reviewed the footage of the body cameras,
and concluded that portions of the video re-
veal that D,S, did not pose a threat. Sipe also
interviewed various officers present at the
incident, who stated they did not feel threat-
ened; in fact, one officer put away his hand-
gun in favor of a Taser. The video reveals
DS. did not reach in his pockets or verbally
threaten the officers. Sipe also testified the
techniques implemented during the investi-
gation were not techniques he was familiar
with, and alternative means of arrest were
available that did not include lethal force.
Petitioner’s counsel was afforded the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Sipe, and did so.

119 As noted above, after the magistrate
found probable cause, Petitioner made an
offer of proof and the magistrate allowed
Sergeant Langley to testify, but disallowed
Petitioner’s other three witnesses. The mag-
istrate, in his diseretion under Rule 5.8, limit-
ed Petitioner’s evidence, and therein lies Pe-
titioner’s argument that he was not afforded
due process, We disagree.

«1.20 According to the offer of
proof, Petitioner’s witnesses would have
testified that the incident was a high-risk
incident, that Petitioner’s lethal force was
reasonable and justified, and that training
tactics would perceive D.S.’s movement as a
deadly threat. In fact, much of the testimo-
ny Petitioner sought to offer was already
provided by Sergeant Langley, and through
the cross-examination of Detective Sipe.
Langley testified he perceived a threat
from D.S., elaborated as to D.S.’s move-
ment, and testified to officer training and
use of lethal force. Because much of this
testimony was already offered through
Langley, the magistrate did not abuse his
discretion in limiting Petitioner’s evidence
5. Arizona’s preliminary hearing provision condi-

tioning the defense presentation of witnesses

upon the approval of the magistrate is consistent

with procedures adopted in other states, See, e.g.
Cal. Penal Code § 866; Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann.

83

to one witness and finding it to be cumula-
tive to the finding of probable cause. The
magistrate need not determine ultimate
guilt or innocence, only whether there is
probable cause to believe Petitioner is
guilty of the offense charged. See Applica-
tion of Williams, 85 Ariz. 109, 118, 388
P.2d 280 (1958),

HM 121 Upon review of the transcripts
and exhibits from the preliminary hearing
including the videos of the incident, Petition-
er was provided a fair opportunity to present
his case. See State v. Stefanik, 106 Ariz. 466,
468, 478 P.2d 90, 92 (1970). Petitioner was
represented by counsel and was permitted,
within the magistrate’s discretion, to present
Sergeant Langley’s testimony to refute the
finding of probable cause. The magistrate
found the testimony did not rebut the finding
of probable cause, and found any other testi-
mony to be offered by Officers Doane and
Jacobs, and defense expert Kapelsohn, would
be cumulative. In reviewing the record de
novo, we find that the record supports the
decision rendered.

B. The Ultimate Question of Guilt or In-
nocence Is Not Decided at a Prelimi-
nary Hearing.

122 Petitioner also argues that the magis-
trate did not give sufficient credence to his
justification defenses, thereby applying an
incorrect legal standard in determining prob-
able cause, Petitioner supports his argument
that he was denied due process of law by
citing Crimmins v. Super. Ct, In & For
Maricopa County, 187 Ariz. 89, 48, 668 P.2d
882, 886 (1988); and Korzep v, Super. Ct, In
& For County of Yuma, 172 Ariz, 584, 539,
888 P.2d 1295 (App. 1991). These cases are
inapposite here.

123 In Crimmins, our supreme court
granted special action relief and remanded
for a new determination of probable cause
because the prosecution did not adequately
inform the grand jury of the facts and law,
and did not properly instruct as to defen-

§ 54-46a; N.Y, Crim. Proc. Law § 180,60 (judi-

cial permission extends only to witnesses other

than the defendant, as the defendant may testify

“as a matter of right”),

84

dant’s possible statutory defenses, Crim-
mins, 187 Ariz. at 48, 668 P.2d at 886. In
Korzep, the court remanded for a new proba-
ble cause determination for the grand jury to
consider a more favorable interpretation of
justification in A.RS. § 18-411, 172 Ariz, at
589, 888 P.2d 1295. While a grand jury pro-~
ceeding and a preliminary hearing are simi-
lar in objective, they differ in form. See State
v, Bojorquea, 111 Ariz, 549, 558, 585 P.2d 6,
10 (1975), These cases do not inform our
resolution of whether the magistrate in this
case properly considered Petitioner’s defens-
es,

W124 “A magistrate conducting a
preliminary hearing should be mindful that
his duty is not [to] determine the ultimate
guilt or innocence of a defendant, ... but
only to determine whether there is probable
cause to believe defendant guilty of the of-
fense charged, and leave to the trial tribunal
the final determination of the application of
the law to the facts.” Williams, 85 Ariz, at
117-18, 838 P.2d 280, The State must set,
forth proof of a crime and that someone is
responsible for that crime; “the evidence
need not be of the quantum of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones ex rel.
County of Maricopa, 198 Ariz, 18, 22, 112, 6
P.8d 828 (App. 2000). “The issue of innocence
or guilt is not before the magistrate. That
function is constitutionally placed elsewhere.
The full and complete exploration of all fac-
ets of the case is reserved for trial and is not

6. The importance of the holding in Altman is
heightened by the fact that at the time of the
decision the rules of criminal procedure mandat-
ed that criminal defendants could present evi-
dence on their behalf at a preliminary hearing.
See 116, Nonetheless, the supreme court held
that the defendant was not entitled to elicit his
affirmative defense through cross examination.
107 Ariz, at 95, 482 P.2d at 462.

7. The Legislature has set the burden of proof for
affirmative defenses as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a defen-
dant shall prove any affirmative defense raised
by a preponderance of the evidence. Justifica-
tion defenses under chapter 4 of this title are
not affirmative defenses, Justification defenses
describe conduct that, if not justified, would
constitute an offense but, if justified, does not
constitute criminal or wrongful conduct. If evi-
dence of justification pursuant to chapter 4 of
this title is presented by the defendant, the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

the function of a preliminary examination.”
Altman, 107 Ariz. at 95, 482 P,2d at 462,

125 In Altman, the defendant argued he
was denied an adequate preliminary hearing
because the magistrate did not allow him to
develop his defense of entrapment during
eross-examination of the State’s witness. Our
supreme court rejected this argument, hold-
ing entrapment is an affirmative defense to
be resolved at trial. 107 Ariz. at 95, 482 P.2d
at 462. The Aléman court relied on Marcum
v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 175, 177,
451 P.2d 845 (1969), which held the affirma-
tive defense of entrapment is to be resolved
at trial, See also People v. Moore, 180 Mich,
App, 801,446 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1989) (entrap-
ment defense may not be raised at prelimi-
nary hearing).

Hs 26 Arizona’s legislature has en-
acted several affirmative defenses that re-
quire a criminal defendant to convince a
jury, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the criminal conduct was otherwise ex-
cused.” See, ag, ARS. § 18-206 (Entrap-
ment), Under Altman, a magistrate can
properly exclude evidence and argument
from a preliminary hearing regarding such
affirmative defenses as such defenses are to
be raised at trial, 107 Ariz, at 95, 482 P.2d
at 462, Petitioner argues he did not raise
any affirmative defenses in this case, and
argues non-affirmative defenses can be
raised at a preliminary hearing.’ While we

that the defendant did not act with justifica-
tion.
ARS. § 13-205,

8. The Legislature has defined what is and is not
an affirmative defense.

B. For the purposes of this section, “affirma-
tive defense” means a defense that is offered
and that attempts to excuse the criminal ac-
tions of the accused or another person for
whose aetions the accused may be deemed to
be accountable, Affirmative defense does not
include any justification defense pursuant to
chapter 4 of this title or any defense that
either denies an element of the offense
charged or denies responsibility, including ali-
bi, misidentification or lack of intent,
ARS, § 13-103(B) (emphasis added); see also
State v, Bayardi, 230 Ariz, 195, 199, 113-21,
281 P.3d 1063 (App. 2012) (discussing distinction
between affirmative defenses, justifications and
defenses that deny an element of the charge),

recognize Petitioner's defense is not an af-
firmative defense, and can be raised in a
preliminary hearing, we disagree that error
occurred in this case,

Hs 1.27 As noted above, the purpose
of the preliminary hearing is for the State to
produce competent evidence to convince the
magistrate that a trial should be held; resolu-
tion of non-affirmative defenses is premature
at the preliminary hearing stage if the evi-
dence is controverted. See State v, Fuchs, 78
Nev. 68, 368 P.2d 869, 871 (1962) (exculpato-
ry statement by criminal defendant that she
‘was justified in killing her husband in order
to protect her three-year-old son was left for
the trier of fact to consider at trial); State v,
Jones, 233 Kan. 170, 660 P.2d 965, 969-70
(1988) (magistrate does not resolve issues of
self-defense at a preliminary hearing,
“fw]here there is a conflict in testimony, a
question of facts exists for the jury, and the
magistrate must draw the inference favor-
able to the prosecution”); People v, Medley,
889 Mich, 486, 64 N.W.2d 708 (1954) (magis-
trate does not resolve self-defense claim at
preliminary hearing when evidence is in con-
flict), Therefore, a magistrate is required to
consider a defendant’s justification defense
but does not resolve the ultimate question if
the evidence is in conflict, as that resolution
is left to the jury,

HH 128 The magistrate did not err in
this case. The magistrate stated on the rec-
ord that he considered Petitioner's justifica-
tion defense but nonetheless found there was
insufficient evidence to rebut the probable
cause determination. Because the evidence
was in conflict whether Petitioner was justi-
fied, the proper place to resolve the issue is
ata jury trial,

CONCLUSION

129 Because we find Petitioner was not
denied a procedural right at his preliminary
hearing, and credible evidence of guilt with-
out justification was adduced, neither the
magistrate nor the superior court erred by
limiting Petitioner’s evidence and denying
Petitioner’s motion for a new probable cause
determination. Accordingly, we accept juris-

85
diction of the petition for special action, but.

deny relief.

393 P.3d 146

ARIZONA ELECTRIC POWER
COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, Defendant/Appellee,

No. 1 CA-TX 16-0004

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 9/28/2017

oe
a

Daniel T. Garrett, LLC, Woodruff, By
Daniel T. Garrett, Counsel for Plaintiff/Ap-
pellant.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Macaen F. Mahoney, Kenneth J.
Love, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W.
Thompson joined.

OPINION

WINTHROP, Judge:

11 Arizona Electric Power Cooperative,
Ine. (“AEPCO”) appeals the tax court’s sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Arizona De-
partment of Revenue (“the Department”).
Because AEPCO’s purchases of coal and nat-
ural gas are subject to use tax, we affirm the
judgment of the tax court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 AEPCO, a non-profit Arizona coopera-
tive corporation, owns and operates the
Apache Generating Station, an electric gen-
eration facility in Cochise County. AEPCO
sells most of the electricity it produces to
cooperative members, and sells the remain-
der to the general electricity market.

13 To generate electricity, AEPCO uses
coal and natural gas, most of which AEPCO
purchases from out-of-state suppliers, who
are not subject to Arizona’s transaction privi-
lege tax. AEPCO originally paid use tax on
those purchases, but later filed two refund
claims with the Department, requesting a
refund of use tax paid between 2008 and
2010.1 The Department denied both claims.
After an unsuccessful protest before the Of
fice of Administrative Hearings, AEPCO ap-
pealed the Depariment’s final order to the
tax court pursuant to Arizona Revised Stat-
utes (“A.R.S.”) section 42-1254(C) (2013),?

4 In the tax court, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment. The tax
court granted the Department’s motion and
denied AEPCO’s cross-motion, determining
that AEPOO’s purchases of coal and natural
gas were subject to use tax. After entry of
final judgment in favor of the Department,
AEPCO timely appealed. We have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to A.R.S, §§ 12-120,04(@)
(2016), ~-120.21(A)(1) (2016), and -170(C)
(2016).

1, The first claim sought a refund of
$4,199,440.88 for tax paid between August 2003
and July 2007. The second claim sought a refund
of $3,089,540.09 for tax paid between June 2007
and June 2010.

87

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM 15 This court reviews de navo the
tax court’s grant of summary judgment and
its interpretation of relevant statutes. See
CCI Europe, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue,
287 Ariz, 50, 52, 17, 844 P.3d 852, 354 (App.
2015). Although we liberally construe stat-
utes imposing taxes in favor of taxpayers, we
strictly construe tax exemptions, given the
general policy that all taxpayers should share
the common burden of taxation. State ew rel,
Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Capitol Castings,
Inc., 207 Aviz, 445, 447, 110, 88 P.8d 159, 161
(2004). We apply these standards to deter-
mine whether AEPCO’s purchases of coal
and natural gas from out-of-state vendors are
subject to Arizona’s use tax.

ANALYSIS

I. AEPCO’s Purchases of Coal and Natu-
ral Gas Are Within the Scope of A.R.S.
§ 42-6155

Hl 16 AEPCO first argues that its pur-
chases of coal and natural gas fall “outside
the scope of the Arizona use tax as nontaxa-
ble purchases for resale.”

HMM 17 Arizona law imposes a use tax
“on the storage, use or consumption in this
state of tangible personal property purchased
from a retailer or utility business.” A.R.S.
§ 42-5155(A) (Supp. 2015). “Tangible person-
al property” is defined as “personal property
which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt
or touched or is in any other manner percep-
tible to the senses.” ARS. § 42-5001(17)
(Supp. 2015). In contrast to the transaction
privilege tax, which is imposed on transac-
tions consummated within Arizona, a use tax
is designed to reach out-of-state sales of
tangible personal property to Arizona pur-
chasers, Qwest Dew, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of
Revenue, 210 Ariz, 228, 225, 112, 109 P.8d
148, 120 (App. 2005) (citing People of Faith
Ine. v, Ariz, Dept of Revenue, 161 Ariz, 514,
519, 779 P.2d 829, 834 (Tax Ct. 1989); Na-
thaniel T. Trelease & Andrew W. Swain, The
2. We cite the current version of all statutes be-

cause no revisions material to this decision have
occurred since the applicable time period.

88

Law’s Long Arm: The Taxation of Electronic
Commerce, Ariz. Att'y, June 2002, at 20). The
use tax statutes create a presumption that
property purchased out-of-state and brought,
into Arizona is intended for storage, use, or
consumption within the state, see A.R.S.
§ 42-5152 (2018), and the taxpayer has the
burden of rebutting that presumption,

HI 18 The Arizona Legislature has de-
fined the term “use or consumption” as “the
exercise of any right or power over tangible
personal property incidental to owning the
property except holding for sale or selling
the property im the regular course of busi-
ness.” ARS, § 42-5151(22) (Supp. 2015)
(emphasis added), Pursuant to § 42-5151(22),
tangible personal property purchased for re-
sale is not subject to use tax, See Motorola,
Ine. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 196 Aviz, 187,
188, 14, 998 P.2d 1101, 1102 (App. 1999)
(“The tax does not extend to items for sale.”).

19 Applying this definition, AEPCO ar-
gues that its purchases of coal and natural
gas are for resale and, therefore, fall outside
the scope of the use tax. In support of its
position, AEPCO offered expert testimony,
which explained as follows:

Electric generation facilities do not pro-
duce, create or make electricity out of
nothing. Electric generation facilities pur-
chase coal and natural gas for the chemical
energy that is in the coal and natural gas.
Electric generation facilities convert the
chemical energy in the coal and natural
gas into electrical energy (electricity) for
resale.

The Department’s expert disagreed, contend-
ing that “[hJeat engines in a power plant (gas
turbines and/or steam turbines) consume fuel
(natural gas or coal) by combusting that fuel

110 The parties’ experts agreed that the
generation of electricity involves a multi-step
process that begins with the combustion of
fuel, In gas turbines, the combustion pro-
duces an exhaust stream that rotates a power
turbine, which in turn causes the generator
to rotate. In steam turbines, the combustion
produces steam that rotates a steam turbine,

3. AEPCO's plant consists of four gas-fired com-
bustion turbines, one gas-fired steam boiler elec-

which in turn causes the generator to rotate.
The experts also agreed that “[iIn both cases
the rotating generators transform mechanical
energy into electromagnetic energy, then
into electrical energy, which finally drives the
flow of electric charge (i.e. electric current,
electricity).” §

711 Because the language of § 42-5155 is
plain and unambiguous, we “apply the lan-
guage used,” City of Mesa v, Killingsworth,
96 Ariz, 290, 294, 894 P.2d 410, 412 (1964).
Pursuant to § 42-5155, any person storing,
using, or consuming tangible personal prop-
erty purchased out-of-state is liable for use
tax. See A.R.S, § 42-5165(E); Qwest Dew, 210
Aviz, at 225, 112, 109 P.8d at 120, AEPCO
clearly uses and consumes coal and natural
gas to generate electricity. Accordingly, be-
cause the fuel is purchased from out-of-state
vendors, AEPCO is liable for Arizona use
tax. See Qwest Dew, 210 Ariz, at 225-26, 112,
109 P.3d at 120-21,

12 AEPCO has failed to rebut the statu-
tory presumption or otherwise demonstrate
that its fuel purchases fall outside the scope
of the tax. See A.R.S, § 42-5152, AEPCO’s
expert's testimony does not adequately ex-
plain how AEPCO “holds” coal and natural
gas for sale or for selling in the regular
course of business. See A.R.S, § 42-5151(22),
To the contrary, the evidence reflects that
AEPCO uses and consumes the fuel in the
process of generating electricity. See Far-
rvonmd Coal Co. v. Halpin, 10 Ill.2d 507, 140
N.E.2d 698, 701 (1957) (explaining that “[ilt
is difficult to perceive how there could be a
more complete use or consumption of the
coal” than by burning or combustion), AEP-
CO’s expert admitted that, at the end of the
electric generation process, the coal and nat-
ural gas no longer have the same “chemical
composition” they had at the beginning of the
process. He also agreed that no part of the
mass of coal or natural gas becomes part of
the electricity. Rather, the fuels are combust-
ed at the beginning of the generation pro-
cess,

118 Accordingly, we conclude that AEP-
CO's out-of-state purchases of coal and natu-
ral gas are subject to Arizona use tax.

tric generator, and two coal/gas-fired steam elec-
tric power generators.

II, AEPCO’s Purchases of Coal and Nat-
wral Gas Are Not Exempt Under
ARS. § 42 5159

HE 114 Alternatively, AEPCO argues
that its purchases of coal and natural gas are
exempt from use tax pursuant to A.R.S,
§ 42-5159(A)(4) (Supp. 2015), which exempts
from use tax all “{tJangible personal property
that directly enters into and becomes an
ingredient or component part of any manu-
factured, fabricated or processed article, sub-
stance or commodity for sale in the regular
course of business.” (Emphasis added.) Ap-
plying § 42-5159(A)(4), AEPCO argues that
“the coal and natural gas, or a part thereof,
.+» directly enters into and becomes an in-
gredient or component part of the electricity
generated by AEPCO.”

915 Under the Department’s use tax regu-
lations, “[t]he sale of fuel used or consumed
in a manufacturing process is taxable,” and
“(t]he fuel is not considered to be ineorporat-
ed into the manufactured product.” Ariz, Ad-
min. Code R15-5-121; see also Harris Corp.
v, Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 233 Ariz, 377, 383,
121, 812 P.8d 1148, 1149 (App. 2018) (reeog-
nizing that, “[a]lthough not binding, the De-
partment’s regulations are entitled to consid-
erable weight”). The same reasoning that
applies to fuels consumed in manufacturing
also applies to fuels consumed in electric
generation. At AEPCO’s plant, the coal and
natural gas are combusted to rotate the gas
or steam turbines, The fuels are consumed in
the process of generating electricity, They do
not directly enter into or become an ingredi-
ent or component part of the electricity as
required by § 42-6159(A)(4).

116 Our conclusion is consistent with a
decision by the California Court of Appeal in
Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization, 160 Cal.App.4th
514, 72 Cal.Rptr.38d 857 (2008). In Searles,
the court held that coal purchased out-of-
state and used in California to generate elec-
tricity was subject to use tax,! 72 Cal.Rptr.3d
at 866, The court reasoned that “the uncon-

4, The use tax statutes of Arizona and California
are similar. Compare A.RS, § 42~5155(A) (im-
posing a tax “on the storage, use or consump-
tion in this state of tangible personal property
purchased from a retailer”), and ARS. § 42-
5151(22) (defining the term “use or consump-

89

troverted evidence at trial establishes that
the coal’s physical mass is combusted, and
thus destroyed, in creating the heat neces-
sary to make the steam and that no compo-
nent of that mass becomes part of the elec-
tricity that the Taxpayers generate.” Id. at
865. The court also concluded that “none of
the coal’s physical mass ends up as a compo-
nent of the electricity.” Jd. The same is true
here.

Hl 117 Moreover, as the Department
points out, § 42-5159 reflects the Arizona
Legislature's willingness to expressly ex-
empt fuels from taxation in specific situa-
tions, See, ag, ARS, § 42-5159(A)(1) (ex-
empting coal and natural gas “directly used
or consumed in the generation or provision
of on-site power or energy solely for envi-
ronmental technology manufacturing, pro-
ducing or processing or environmental pro-
tection”); -(42) (exempting alternative fuels
purchased by a used oil fuel burner); -(45)
(exempting gas used or consumed for the
sole purpose of fueling compressor equip-
ment that pressurizes a pipeline). “The pro-
vision of one exemption in a statute implicit-
ly denies the existence of other unstated
exemptions,” State Comp. Fund v. Superior
Court (EnerGCorp, Inc.), 190 Ariz, 871, 875-
76, 948 P.2d 499, 608-04 (App. 1997) (citing
Estate of Tovrea v. Nolan, 178 Ariz. 568,
578, 845 P.2d 494, 499 (App. 1992); State v
Roscoe, 185 Ariz, 68, 72, 912 P.2d 1297, 1801
(1996)).

118 Accordingly, we determine that AEP-
CO’s purchases of coal and natural gas are
not exempt from use tax under § 42-
5159(A)(4),

CONCLUSION

119 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the judgment of the tax court, holding that
AEPCO’s purchases of coal and natural gas
from out-of-state vendors are subject to use
tax, We award the Department its costs on

tion”), with Cal. Rev. & Tax, Code § 6201 (im-
posing a tax “‘on the storage, use, or other con-
sumption in this state of tangible personal
property purchased from any retailer”), and
Cal, Rev. & Tax. Code § 6009 (defining the
word “use”).

90 —

appeal upon compliance with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 21,

393 P.3d 151
Michael WASSEF, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve

ARIZONA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS, THROUGH its Executive
Director Elaine HUGUNIN, Defen-
dant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0756

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 8/28/2017

|

Chester & Shein PC, Scottsdale, By Mark
D. Chester, Counsel for Plaintifi/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Michael Raine, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Rick A.
Williams ! joined.

OPINION

CATTANI, Judge:

1 Michael Wassef, a licensed dentist, ap-
peals the superior court’s ruling affirming
the Arizona State Board of Dental Examin-
ers (the “Board”)’s order suspending his li-

1, The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge of the
Arizona Superior Court, has been authorized to
sit in this matter under Article VI, Section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution.

2. The Board asks the court to disregard those
portions of Wassef’s opening brief that do not
contain appropriate citations to the record and
Wassef's reference to documents he filed in the

91

cense to practice dentistry in Arizona. Was-
sef asserts that he was denied due process
because he was not given a hearing before
being ordered to undergo an inpatient sub-
stance abuse evaluation, and that his failure
to comply with that order did not establish a
basis for suspending his license. For reasons
that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND *

12 Wassef has a history of opioid addic-
tion, and he participated in a monitored
treatment program from 2002 through 2007.

8 In March 2014, a pharmacist contacted
the Board with concerns about Wassef’s pre-
scription-writing practices. In response to
the pharmacist’s report, the Board reviewed
Wassef’s pharmacy management profile and
subpoenaed records from his employer. The
Board learned that from 2008 to 2014, Was-
sef had received prescriptions for controlled
substances in increasing amounts, The pre-
seriptions included hydrocodone, a controlled
substance that Wassef had abused in the
past. The Board also learned that Wassef
had prescribed large amounts of the muscle
relaxant Soma for his wife, his assistant, and
his assistant’s daughter, even though they
‘were not patients of record and even though
Soma is not typically prescribed for dental
patients. Over a two-year period, Wassef
wrote these individuals, collectively, forty-
four Soma prescriptions.

14 The Board asked Wassef to undergo a
urinalysis and meet with Dr. Michael Sucher,
the medical director of the Board’s monitored
aftercare treatment program, for a prelimi-
nary substance abuse screening assessment,
to be followed by further evaluation if
deemed necessary based on the assessment.
Wassef submitted to the urinalysis and test-
ed positive for Soma and Tramadol, medi-

superior court that are not part of the adminis-
trative record. Because Wassef did not request
an evidentiary hearing, and the superior court
did not conduct one, he was not entitled to
submit additional evidence, and we base our
review solely on the administrative record. See
Ariz, Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-904(B), -910(A),
©), ().

92

cations for which he had prescriptions. He
vefused, however, to meet with Dr, Sucher.>

15 On March 19, 2014, the Board deter-
mined that there was a “real and significant”
risk that Wassef had relapsed in his addic-
tion, and, pursuant to its authority under
ARS, § 82-1207(B)(6), issued an order (“the
Interim Order”) directing Wassef to obtain
an inpatient substance abuse evaluation
within fourteen days at one of three ap-
proved facilities that have significant experi-
ence and expertise in evaluating and treating
professionals with substance abuse/addiction
issues.4 Wassef did not comply with the In-
terim Order, declining to be admitted for in-
patient assessment and asserting that an
outpatient evaluation at an addiction treat-
ment facility should be acceptable. The
Board thus determined that emergency ac-
tion was required based on public health,
safety, and welfare concerns and suspended
Wassef’s license, stating it would lift the
suspension if Wassef complied with the In-
terim Order.

16 The Board then filed a Complaint and
Notice of Hearing alleging that Wassef’s re-
fusal to comply with the Interim Order con-
stituted unprofessional conduct that jeopar-
dized the health and safety of the public in
violation of A.R.S, § 32-1201.01(14)5 and
that Wassef’s license should be suspended.’
After an evidentiary hearing, an administra-
tive law judge (“ALJ”) ruled that the Board
had failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Wassef was unsafe to practice
and recommended that the Board reinstate
his license.

17 The Board rejected or modified several
portions of the ALJ’s recommendation and
ordered that Wassef’s license remain sus-
pended until he complied with the Interim

3. Wassef had previously been monitored by Dr.
Sucher as part of the aftercare treatment pro-
gram, and Wassef asserted in these proceedings
that Dr. Sucher’s prior involvement created a
conflict of interest. Wassef requested permission
to meet with another evaluator, and the Board
agreed to allow him to do so, But the specialist
‘Wassef proposed declined to conduct the assess-
ment.

4. Absent material revisions after the relevant
date, we cite a statute’s current version,

Order, See A.R.S, § 41~-1092.08(B) (authoriz-
ing the agency head, executive director, com-
mission, or board to “review the [ALJ’s] deci-
sion and accept, reject or modify it”). The
Board subsequently denied Wassef’s request
for a rehearing, and he filed a complaint for
judicial review in the superior court, See
ARS. § 12-904(A). The superior court af-
firmed the Board’s decision, and Wassef
timely appealed.

{8 This court stayed the Board’s suspen-
sion order pending disposition of this appeal,
We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-918,
See Svendsen v, Ariz, Dep't of Transp., 234
Ariz, 528, 588, 118, 823 P,8d 1179, 1184 (App.
2014),

DISCUSSION

19 Wassef argues the Board denied him
due process of law by not allowing him to
challenge the merits of the Interim Order or
to otherwise be heard before suspending his
license, He also contends the Board’s deter-
mination that he posed a danger to the
health, welfare, or safety of patients and the
public was not supported by substantial evi-
dence and should be vacated.

110 Arizona law grants the Board authori-
ty to discipline a licensee for “unprofessional
conduct,” which includes “[alny conduct or
practice that constitutes a danger to the
health, welfare or safety of the patient or the
public” ARS.  §§ 32-1263(A)(),  -
1201.01(14),

HM 1111 Im reviewing a judgment up-
holding the decision of an administrative
agency, we independently review the record
and will uphold the agency’s decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence and is not

5, The statute defining unprofessional conduct in
dentistry was renumbered and slightly modified
in 2015, See ARS. § 32~-1201,01; ARS. § 32-
1201(21) (2014); 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch, 196,
§§ 1-2 (1st Reg, Sess,). Because the 2015 revi-
sions were not material to the issues in this case,
we cite the current version throughout this deci-
sion,

6. The Board also alleged Wassef’s actions consti-
tuted unprofessional conduct under A.R.S. § 32-
1201.01(22), but removed that allegation from its
final decision,

contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious,
Golob v, Ariz. Med. Bd., 217 Ariz, 505, 509,
(11, 176 P.8d 708, 707 (App. 2008); see also
ARS. § 12-910(E). We review the evidence
in the light most favorable to upholding the
Board’s decision and will not substitute our
judgment for that of the agency regarding
factual questions and agency expertise, De-
Groot v. Ariz. Racing Comm’n, 141 Ariz, 381,
886, 686 P.2d 1801, 1805 (App. 1984), Sub-
stantial evidence exists if the record supports
the decision, even if the record would also
support a different conclusion, Jd, We review
constitutional issues, including an alleged vio-
lation of due process, de novo, Carlson v,
Ariz, State Pers, Bd., 214 Ariz, 426, 480, 118,
168 P.8d 1055, 1059 (App. 2007).

I. Due Process,’

HMM 112 Wassef argues the Board de-
nied him due process by suspending his li-
cense without first granting him an opportu-
nity to be heard. Although “[tlhe State is
authorized to protect the public health and
welfare by regulating those who practice a
profession,” Dahnad v, Buittrick, 201 Ariz.
894, 398, 114, 86 P.8d 742, 746 (App. 2001), a
licensee has a property interest in his or her
license, and the State must afford due pro-
cess before it can curtail that right. Comeau
v. Ariz, State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 196
Ariz, 102, 106, 118, 993 P.2d 1066, 1070 (App.
1999); Schillerstrom v. State, 180 Ariz. 468,
471, 885 P.2d 156, 159 (App. 1994); see also
ARS. § 41-1092,11(B). Due process is not a
static concept, and may vary with the setting,
but generally requires “notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time.” Gaveck v. Ariz.
Bad. of Podiatry Ewam’rs, 222 Ariz, 488, 487,
114, 215 P.8d 1114, 1118 (App. 2009) (citation
omitted),

113 The Board was not required to hold a
hearing before it entered the Interim Order.
See ARS. § 32-1207(B)(6) (granting the
Board the authority to require licensees to
submit to physical examinations); see also
Alexander D, v, State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
281 Cal.App.8d 92, 96-99, 282 Cal.Rptr. 201
7. Wassef arguably waived his due process argu-

ments by not asserting them in the administra-
tive proceedings. See DeGroot, 141 Ariz. at 340,

93

(1991) (holding that the board of dentistry
was not required to conduct a hearing before
issuing an order requiring a licensee to un-
dergo a psychiatric examination; the order
was investigatory in nature and any disci-
pline would be the result of a separate adju-
dicatory hearing accompanied by due process
protections); Humenansky v. Minn, Bd. of
Med, Ewam’rs, 525 N.W.2d 559, 566 (Minn.
Ct.App.1995) (order requiring psychiatrist to
undergo mental and physical examination did
not implicate her property interest in her
license to practice medicine, and the board
‘was not required to afford her due process),
And the Board has the authority to summari-
ly suspend a license when it concludes, as it
did in this case, that an emergency exists.
See ARS, §§ 82-1263.02(C), 41-1092.11(B).
Such a suspension satisfies due process re-
quirements if the licensee subsequently re-
ceives a prompt and adequate opportunity to
be heard. Dahnad, 201 Ariz, at 399, 11 18-19,
36 P.8d at 747,

114 Wassef does not deny that he received
a prompt hearing after the summary suspen-
sion, but he contends that no emergency
circumstances existed to support the suspen-
sion because he had “disproved” the Board’s
suspicions that he had self-prescribed medi-
cations, written inappropriate prescriptions,
and/or was engaged in substance abuse, To
the contrary, the Board considered informa-
tion that Wassef—who had a history of
opioid addiction and self-prescribing—was
improperly prescribing medications to him-
self and to family members who were not
patients, and that he refused to comply with
the Board’s order that he obtain an inpatient
evaluation to allow the Board to determine
whether his substance abuse disorder had
recurred, Under these circumstances, the
Board was not required to accept Wassef’s
explanations, and Wassef did not disprove
the Board’s suspicions. Thus, the Board had
reasonable grounds to take emergency action
to prevent harm to the public,

{15 We also reject Wassef’s contention
that the allegations against him were not
sufficiently serious to warrant emergency ac-

686 P.2d at 1310, Nevertheless, we address these
arguments.

94

tion and that the Board did not make de-
tailed factual findings about the nature of the
emergency. By statute, the Board had the
discretion to assess the risks posed by Was-
sef, given the allegations and available infor-
mation, In that regard, the Board reasonably
relied on the expertise of Dr. Sucher, its
addiction consultant, in evaluating Wassef’s
actions in response to the Board’s request for
additional information and the risks associat-
ed with his continued refusal to comply. In
such a situation, Arizona law requires only
that the Board find that an emergency situa-
tion exists, not that it set forth a detailed
description of the emergency. A.R.S, §§ 32~
1268.02(C), 41-1092.11(B). In short, the
Board’s actions were not arbitrary or capri-
cious, nor were they an abuse of its discre-
tion, See Dahnad, 201 Ariz. at 399, 120, 36
P.8d at 747.

116 Finally, we reject Wassef’s argument
that the Board failed to provide a written
justification for its modification of the ALJ’s
ruling, as required by ARS. § 41-
1092,08(B). See Ritland v. Ariz. State Bd. of
Med. Ewam’rs, 218 Aviz. 187, 191, 19 13-14,
140 P.8d 970, 974 (App. 2006) (requiring the
board to set forth factual support when it
overrules an ALJ’s credibility findings). Al-
though the Board did not alter any of the
AL4J’s credibility determinations, the Board’s
four-page detailed description and explana-
tion of its changes to the ALJ’s ruling satis-
fies the statutory requirement.

Il. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Hl 1117 Wassef contends the Board failed
to show that he was unsafe to practice den-
tistry. We disagree.

18 The Board presented evidence at the
hearing that Wassef was not safe to practice
dentistry based on a confluence of uncontest-
ed factors: (1) he had a history of substance
abuse, which is a chronic condition; (2) his
medical records indicated that he had an on-
going back pain problem for which he had
been taking prescription medications in in-
creasing doses; (8) he was prescribing drugs
in an irregular manner to persons who were
not patients of record; and (4) he refused to
participate in a screening assessment and did
not comply with the Board’s order that he

obtain a comprehensive inpatient evaluation.
The Board’s expert, Dr. Sucher, opined that
based on these circumstances, Wassef was
not safe to practice dentistry.

19 In addition, the record contains evi-
dence of Wassef’s unreasonable efforts to
avoid complying with the Interim Order. For
example, when Wassef objected to the cost of
the inpatient evaluation, the Board informed
him that it would pay for the evaluation, but
he still did not comply with the order. Rath-
er, he maintained the Board should accept
instead an outpatient evaluation he indepen-
dently obtained from a local treatment facili-
ty, but which Dr. Sucher concluded was
“wholly inadequate” for the Board’s pur-
poses. Eventually, after the deadline for com-
pliance passed and the Board summarily sus-
pended his license, Wassef indicated he
would obtain an evaluation at a facility in
California, but he instead appeared unan-
nounced at a different facility, which he then
left when the clinic would not proceed with
the evaluation on an outpatient basis. This
evidence of Wassefs unusual behavior and
continuing attempts to avoid compliance with
the Interim Order further supports the
Board’s determination that he posed a poten-
tial danger to his patients and the public.

120 Wassef also maintains that his failure
to comply with the Interim Order cannot be
the sole basis for suspending his dental li-
cense. But the Board’s suspension order was
based on the totality of the circumstances:
Wassef’s failure to comply with the Interim
Order combined with his prior history of
substance abuse, irregular prescription-writ-
ing practices, and information regarding his
use of prescription medications. And we re-
ject Wassef’s argument that the Board did
not have grounds to consider him a danger to
the public without having received complaints
from his patients or co-workers.

21 Finally, Wassef’s contention that testi-
mony from Dr. Sucher and the Board’s Exec-
utive Director, Elaine Hugunin, was “contra-
dictory at times” misstates their testimony,
and in any event does not establish that the
Board’s decision was improper. See DeGroot,
141 Ariz. at 386, 686 P.2d at 1806 (“If two
inconsistent factual conclusions could be sup-
ported by the record, then there is substan-

tial evidence to support an administrative
decision that elects either conclusion.”) (cita-
tion omitted). The Board considered substan-
tial evidence supporting its determination
that Wassef’s behavior presented a danger to
the health, safety, and welfare of his patients
or the public, Accordingly, the Board did not
act in an arbitrary or capricious manner by
finding that Wassef’s unprofessional conduct
justified suspending his license.

CONCLUSION

122 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the superior court’s decision. In addition, it is
ordered lifting the stay previously entered by
this court on January 5, 2016.

393 P.3d 156
Nancy WAGNER, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve
STATE of Arizona, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 16-0134
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/20/2017

i)
a

el
|

Jones Raczkowski, PC, Phoenix, By Mack
T. Jones, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

O'Connor & Campbell, PC, Tempe, By
Daniel J. O’Connor, J, Edward Doman, Jr.,
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Peter B, Swann and Judge Donn
Kessler joined,

1, Absent material revisions after the relevant

OPINION

CATTANI, Judge:

{1 In this appeal, we address whether an
employee of a private contractor working in a
state-owned prison is a statutory employee of
the State such that workers’ compensation,
rather than a tort action against the State, is
the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained at
work. We hold that, because the State in this
case retained the right to control or super-
vise the contractor’s work, and because the
services constitute a part or process in the
usual and regular course of the State’s busi-
ness, the employee was a statutory employee
of the State and could not pursue a tort
action against the State for her work-related
injuries. Accordingly, and for reasons that
follow, we affirm the superior court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the State.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 While working as a clinical social work-
er at a prison operated by the Arizona De-
partment of Corrections (“ADC”), Nancy
Wagner slipped and fell on an unmarked wet
floor. Wagner was working at the time as an
employee of Wexford Health Services, Inc.,
which had a contract with ADC to provide
healthcare services at state-owned prisons,

18 Wagner filed a workers’ compensation
claim against Wexford and received benefits.
She also sued the State, arguing that ADC
negligently failed to maintain the prison
where she fell.

14 After conducting discovery, the State
moved for summary judgment, arguing that
because ADC was Wagner's statutory em-
ployer under Arizona Revised Statutes
(A.B.S.”) § 23-902(B), workers’ compensa-
tion was her exclusive remedy under A.R.S.
§ 28-1022(A).! The court entered summary
judgment for the State on that basis, and
Wagner timely appealed,

DISCUSSION

WM 15 Wagner argues that summary
judgment was improper, alleging that ADC
was not her statutory employer under A.R.S.

date, we cite a statute's current version,

§ 28-902(B) because ADC did not have suffi-
cient control or supervision over her work,
and because the work provided by Wexford
‘was not a part or process of ADC’s trade or
business. We review the court’s summary
judgment ruling de novo, and view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Tilley v, Delei, 220 Ariz, 288, 286, 17,
204 P.8d 1082 (App. 2009), Summary judg-
ment is appropriate only if “the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Ariz. BR. Civ, P, 56(a); see also Orme Sch. v.
Reeves, 166 Ariz, 301, 809, 802 P.2d 1000
(1990),

Hs 16 Unless an employee specifically
rejects workers’ compensation before injury,
the workers’ compensation system is the ex-
clusive remedy for that employee to recover
damages resulting from his or her employer's
negligence, A.R.S. § 28~1022(A); Anderson v.
Indus, Comm’n, 147 Ariz, 456, 457, 711 P.2d
595 (1985). Under ARS, § 28-902(B), an
entity that hires a contractor may be the
statutory employer of the contractor’s em-
ployees for workers’ compensation purposes
if (1) the entity “retains supervision or con-
trol” over the contractor’s work and (2) the
contractor's “work is a part or process in the
trade or business of the [entity].” See also
Young v. Envtl. Air Prods, Ine, 136 Ariz.
158, 168-64, 665 P.2d 40 (1988), The statuto-
ry employer provision generally “covers all
situations in which work is accomplished
which thle] employer, or employers in a simi-
lar business, would ordinarily do through
employees.” Basurto v. Utah Constr. & Min-
ing Co., 15 Ariz.App. 85, 41, 485 P.2d 859
(App. 1971),

Wl 117 Wagner argues that a provision in
the contract between Wexford and ADC,
which provides that neither Wexford nor its
employees should be considered employees of
ADC “under any circumstances,” creates a
fact question as to whether she was a statu-
tory employee of ADC, But the label parties
give to their relationship does not end our
inquiry into whether one party is an employ-
ee of the other. Anton v. Indus, Comm’n, 141
Ariz, 566, 568, 688 P.2d 192 (App. 1984),
Rather, we look to the substance of the con-

97

tract, id. recognizing that we should strictly
construe the statute “when loss of the work-
er’s common law rights is the object for
which the statute is invoked.” Young, 186
Ariz, at 168, 665 P.2d 40,

HM 18 A hiring entity, such as ADC
here, exercises supervision or control over
the contractor if the entity retains “the right
to control or supervise the methods of obtain-
ing a specific result.” Hunt Bldg. Corp. v.
Indus, Comm'n, 148 Ariz. 102, 105, 718 P.2d
808 (1986), To determine whether an employ-
er is a statutory employer of an independent
contractor’s employee, we consider the con-
trol exercised by the employer over the con-
tractor, not the employee. Young, 186 Ariz,
at 168, 665 P.2d 40,

Hl 19 In assessing whether an entity
has such supervision or control, the court
considers the totality of the circumstances,
including the following factors:

the duration of the employment; the meth-

od of payment; who furnishes necessary

equipment; the right to hire and fire; who
bears responsibility for work[ers’] compen-
sation insurance; the extent to which the
employer may exercise control over the
details of the work[;] and whether the
work was performed in the usual and regu-
lar course of the employer's business.
Home Ins, Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 123 Ariz.
848, 350, 599 P.2d 801 (1979).

{10 Applying the Home Inswrance factors
here, we note that ADC retained the right to
control Wexford’s provision of healthcare to
inmates in the state prison system, regard-
Jess of the label used in the contract, Wex-
ford and ADC entered into an exclusive 3-
year contract under which ADC provided
and maintained facilities and fixtures for
health services. ADC retained the power to
approve Wexford’s hires, and Wexford was
required to notify and consult with ADC
officials before “discharging, removing or
failing to renew the Contracts of professional
staff.” Although Wexford carried workers’
compensation insurance for its employees, it
did so pursuant to ADC’s requirements. And
the contract required Wexford to give ADC
monitoring personnel “free access to all Con-
tract areas at any time and ... free access to

98

staff and work products, and to any corre-
spondence, records, reports, or other written
and/or electronic materials dealing with [the]
Contract.” These monitors were tasked with
reviewing Wexford’s compliance with ADC-
mandated procedures “on a random and rou-
tine basis” “to assure that correctional health
service needs of the inmate population are
adequately met.” Thus, ADC had the right to
control the methods of Wexford’s work, satis-
fying the first prong of § 23-902(B).

111 Wagner also argues that the provision
of healthcare to inmates is not a “part or
process in” ADC’s trade or business. A work
activity is part or process of an employer’s
trade if “in the context of an ongoing and
integral business process [the work activity]
is regular, ordinary or routine in the opera-
tion of the business or is routinely done
through the business’ own employees.”
ARS. § 23-902(B).

912 Wagner points to the Legislature’s
privatization of prison healthcare as evidence
that the provision of health services to in-
mates is not a part or process in ADOC’s
business, See generally 2011 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 278 (60th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess.). But
ADC has an ongoing duty to ensure that
inmates receive adequate health services.
ARS. § 81-201.01(D); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct, 285, 50
L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of pris-
oners” violates the Eighth Amendment).
ADC’s use of a contractor to provide health
services does not relieve it of this duty. See
DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent
Ctr. Inc, 144 Ariz. 6, 8, 695 P.2d 255 (1985)
(holding that when a county provided mental
health services through a contractor, it could
not delegate “the overriding duty to provide
care and treatment” to involuntary commit-
ment patients). Even after ADC hired Wex-
ford to provide healthcare to inmates, the
provision of healthcare remained a part or
process in ADC’s maintenance of the state
prison system.

118 Because both prongs of A.R.S, § 23-
902(B) are satisfied, Wagner was a statutory
employee of ADC at the time of her injury.
Accordingly, the superior court correctly en-

tered summary judgment in favor of the
State.
CONCLUSION

114 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

393 P.3d 159
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Fuller Wayne SMITH, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0357

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed March 18, 2017

S
Ss

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Kathryn A, Damstra, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

1. Deoxyribonucleic acid,

Piecarreta Davis Keenan Fidel, PC, Tuc-
son, By Michael L. Piccarreta and Jefferson
Keenan, Counsel for Appellant

Presiding Judge Howard authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge
Eckerstrom and Judge Vasquez concurred.

OPINION

HOWARD, Presiding Judge:

1 Following a jury trial, Fuller Smith
was convicted of two counts of molestation of
a child and two counts of sexual conduct with
a minor under fifteen. On appeal, Smith ar-
gues a DNA! expert’s testimony as to the
results of a saliva test violated his Confronta-
tion Clause rights, the trial court violated his
due process rights by denying his motion to
dismiss with prejudice after two previous
trials resulted in mistrials, and that insuffi-
cient evidence supported the jury’s verdicts,
Because Smith’s Confrontation Clause rights
were violated, we vacate Smith’s convictions
and sentences and remand.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the jury's verdicts.
State v, Mangum, 214 Ariz, 165, 18, 150 P.38d
252, 258 (App. 2007), N.S. is Smith’s grand-
daughter and was eight years old at the time
of these incidents. In October 2011, she was
staying at his house and, after she went to
bed, Smith removed her pants and under-
wear, rubbed her genitals with his fingers,
and licked her genitals. He then put her
pants and underwear back on and left the
room, Although N.S. was awake during this
encounter, she pretended to be asleep.

18 The following afternoon, Smith told
NS. to take a nap even though she did not
typically take naps in the afternoon, Shortly
thereafter, Smith entered N.S.’s room, re-
moved her pants and underwear, rubbed and
licked her genitals, put her pants and under-
wear back on and left the room, She again
pretended to remain asleep, Approximately
two weeks later, N.S. told her parents what
Smith had done, Smith’s DNA was found on
the inner and outer crotch areas of the un-

derwear N.S, had been wearing while she
stayed at Smith’s house.

94 The state charged Smith with two
counts each of sexual conduct with a minor
under fifteen and molestation of a child un-
der fifteen. During Smith’s first trial, the
trial court declared a mistrial after N.S’s
mother testified to other acts of sexual mis-
conduct that Smith had not been charged
with and which had been precluded. Smith’s
second trial also resulted in a mistrial after
the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The
jury in Smith’s third trial found him guilty on
all four counts as described above.

15 As to the molestation of a child
charges, the trial court sentenced Smith to
consecutive terms totaling twenty years. On
each of the sexual conduct with a minor
charges, the court sentenced Smith to a term
of life imprisonment without the possibility of
release for thirty-five years, to be run con-
secutively to each other and the molestation
charges. We have jurisdiction over Smith’s
timely appeal pursuant to ARS, §§ 12-
120,21(A)(1) and 18-4088(A)(1),

Confrontation Clause

Hl 16 Smith argues the trial court erred
by refusing to preclude a portion of the
state's DNA expert’s testimony because it
violated his Confrontation Clause rights un-
der the United States and Arizona constitu-
tions. U.S. Const. amend, VI; Ariz. Const.
art, IT, § 24, “[W]e review de novo challenges
to admissibility based on the Confrontation
Clause.” State v. Bennett, 216 Ariz, 15, 14,
162 P.8d 654, 656 (App. 2007).

117 At trial, the state introduced the testi-
mony and written reports of DNA analyst
Brianna Smalling, Smith contends the por-
tion of her report and testimony involving
the “RSID saliva test,” which her laboratory
conducted on a portion of N.S.’s underwear,
was impermissible testimonial hearsay. The
test indicates the presence of alpha amylase,
which is a protein found in certain bodily
fluids, including saliva, Kim Lang, another
technician at the same laboratory, conducted
the saliva test on the inner and outer crotch

2, Although the test shows the presence of alpha
amylase and not definitively saliva, we refer to it

101

areas of N.S,’s underwear and submitted the
results to Smalling. Smalling included those
results in her report, but did not participate
in the testing and did not conduct any inde-
pendent analysis of the results.

HMM S18 The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees that “[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.
Const, amend. VI; see also Ariz. Const. art,
TI, § 24 (“In criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall have the right ... to meet the
witnesses against him face to face....”).
“[Tlestimonial hearsay,” although not the
sole concern of the Confrontation Clause, is
nonetheless its “primary object.” Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), Testimonial hearsay
is “out-of-court statements having the pri-
mary purpose of accusing a targeted individ-
ual of engaging in criminal conduct” and
which involves “formalized statements such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.” Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S.
50, 182 S.Ct, 2221, 2242, 183 L.Hd.2d 89
(2012). Documents “created solely for an ‘evi-
dentiary purpose’ .,. made in the aid of a
police investigation, rank[] as testimonial.”
Bulicoming v. New Mewico, 564 U.S, 647,
664, 181 S.Ct, 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011),
quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 805, 811, 129 S.Ct, 2527, 174
L.Ed.2d 314 (2009),

19 In Bulleoming, the Court discussed the
type of forensic evidence that falls within the
Confrontation Clause purview. In that case,
the state had introduced a forensic report
certifying the defendant’s blood-alcohol con-
centration “through the in-court testimony of
a scientist who did not sign the certification
or perform or observe the test reported in
the certification.” 564 U.S. at 651-52, 181
S.Ct. 2705. The Court found such “surrogate
testimony” violated the Confrontation
Clause, and the defendant had a right to
confront the scientist who had conducted the
test and authored the report. Jd. at 652, 181
S.Ct, 2705.

110 We agree with Smith that this case is
analogous to Bullcoming and that Smalling

as the “saliva test” because that is how the
parties and witnesses referred to it below.

102

acted only as a “conduit for another non-
testifying expert’s opinion.” State v. Gomez,
226 Ariz, 165, 122, 244 P.8d 1163, 1168
(2010), quoting State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz.
182, 119, 236 P.8d 409, 414 (2010), Like the
testifying expert in Bullcoming, Smalling
“played no role in producing the [test re-
sults] ... did not observe any portion of
[Lang’s] conduct of the testing” and did not
offer an “independent, expert opinion about”
whether alpha amylase was found on N.S’s
underwear, 564 U.S, at 678, 181 S.Ct. 2705
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).

{11 Additionally, the Pima County Sher-
iff's office provided the underwear to the
laboratory, informed them of the factual ba-
sis of N.S’s allegations, and requested the
saliva test, The laboratory thus was aware
the testing was being used “solely for an
‘evidentiary purpose’ ... made in aid of a
police investigation.” Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at
664, 181 S.Ct, 2705, quoting Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 811, 129 8,Ct, 2527.

912 Finally, the saliva test results were
offered for the truth of the matter asserted:
that saliva had been found on N.S.’s under-
wear. But they were introduced through the
testimony of an expert who did not partici-
pate in the testing or come to any indepen-
dent conclusion about the results. Lang, as
the technician who conducted the test and
generated the result, was the witness Smith
had the right to confront at trial under the
Sixth Amendment. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S.
at 311, 129 S.Ct, 2527.

918 At oral argument, the state conceded
the saliva test was a separate process from
the ereation of the DNA profiles used by
Smalling to compare Smith’s DNA with that.
found on N.S.’s underwear.’ Smalling did not
reach any independent conclusions as to
whether saliva was found on N.S’s under-
wear. Thus, while “(t]he DNA profiles had no
evidentiary value until they were compared

3. In its opening brief, the state argued the saliva
test results fell within an exception to traditional
hearsay rules, which allow an expert to “testify
to otherwise inadmissible evidence, including the
substance of a non-testifying expert's analysis, if
such evidence forms the basis of the expert's
opinion and is reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field.” State ex rel. Montgomery v. Karp,
236 Ariz. 120, 113, 336 P.3d 753, 757 (App.

and matched by” Smalling, the saliva test
results evidentiary impact arose once the
test was completed by Lang. State v. Ortiz,
238 Ariz. 829, 159, 860 P.8d 125, 188 (App.
2015). By relying on Smalling to relay Lang’s
test results, the state violated Smith’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him.

Hl 114 Having determined that Small-
ing’s testimony violated Smith’s Confronta-
tion Clause rights, we next turn to whether
the error was harmless. State v. Bass, 198
Ariz. 571, 139, 12 P.38d 796, 805 (2000), The
state bears “the burden of convincing us that
error is harmless.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz.
649, 588, 858 P.2d 1152, 1191 (1998). We must
be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the erroneously admitted evidence “had no
influence on the jury’s judgment.” Id, “The
inquiry ... is not whether, in a trial that
oceurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but wheth-
er the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error.”
State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz, 582, 111, 208
P.8d 288, 286 (2009), quoting State v. Antho-
ny, 218 Ariz, 439, 189, 189 P.8d 366, 373
(2008).

115 The state attempts to downplay the
impact of the evidence, arguing that any
error in admitting the test results was harm-
less because the “results alone do not in any
way connect the presence of” alpha amylase
to Smith and the jury was told the result
could also indicate the presence of other
substances such as feces or urine. It points
out that “one would expect a child’s dirty
underwear to have traces of ... feces on
them, and produce a positive test result,
especially, when, as here, the pediatric foren-
sie nurse testified that [N.S.] had hygiene
problems.”

116 But the prosecution made the saliva
test results an important part of its presen-

2014); see also Williams, 567 U.S, at 56, 72, 132
S.Ct. at 2227, 2236 (no Confrontation Clause
violation where testifying analyst relies upon
DNA profile generated by third-party of which
she lacked personal knowledge of testing proce-
dures to conclude profile matched defendant);
State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz, 296, 118, 10, 283 P.3d
27, 29 (2012); State v. Gomez, 226 Ariz. 165,
9922-23, 244 P.3d 1163, 1167-68 (2010).

tation below, while minimizing the test’s
tations. The first page of Smalling’s initial
reports lists the three areas of N.S.’s under-
wear her laboratory was asked to test: the
outer crotch area, the inner crotch area, and
the waistband. The first sentence under the
headings for the inner and outer crotch ar-
eas reads, “The testing for saliva was posi-
tive.” The following page, under the “Notes”
heading, reads “[hJuman salivary a-amylase,
a constituent of human saliva, can also be
found in ... feces and breast milk ... [and
this] must be considered when interpreting
RSID@-Saliva results.”4 Notably, neither
the term “a-amylase” or “RSID@-Saliva”
appear on the first page of the report. The
report, on its own, does not clearly inform
the jury that the statement, “The testing
was positive for saliva” in fact meant the
testing was positive for alpha amylase and
not necessarily saliva,

117 Smalling’s testimony was similarly im-
precise. She continually stated the tests on
the inner and outer crotch area were positive
for “saliva,” and described the test as one for
“a protein inside your saliva that breaks
down starches.” When asked whether techni-
cians could identify the source of the DNA
profiles, she replied they could not but “[t]he
fact that we got a positive saliva result is a
good indication.” Furthermore, although she
explained that “feces and breast milk can
cause a positive result in the test,” both
Smalling and the attorneys referred to it as a
“saliva test” multiple times throughout her
testimony. Her testimony thus left the over-
whelming impression her laboratory had
found saliva on N.S.’s underwear.

118 Additionally, the state introduced, but
did not admit into evidence, a report during
its cross-examination of Smith’s DNA expert
purporting to show the saliva test showed
positive only in the presence of saliva, breast
milk, or the fecal matter of a baby who had
fed on breast milk. By actively disputing that
expert’s opinion on the interpretation of the

4, At trial, Smalling testified that after she had
written this report, her laboratory concluded the
saliva test could not, in fact, indicate the pres-
ence of urine.

5. We do not mean to suggest that Smalling inten-
tionally misled the jury on the meaning of the
saliva test results. She stated her laboratory's

103

test results, the state demonstrated it had a
strong belief as to what the test results
showed and it wished the jury to believe the
same. This also served to reinforce the im-
pression left by the report and Smalling’s
testimony that the test did, in fact, show that
saliva was found on N.S.’s underwear.

19 During closing arguments, Smith con-
tended that his DNA could have gotten onto
the victim’s underwear in any number of
innocent ways and pointed out the saliva test
“comes up positive for other things.” The
prosecutor, in his closing and rebuttal argu-
ments, referred to the test results several
times as “positive for saliva,” characterized
them as a part of “the DNA evidence,” and
asked the jury to consider the DNA evidence
along with the test results “significant cor-
roborating evidence” of N.S.’s story. Accord-
ingly, the state sought to demonstrate that
the test did, in fact, show the presence of
saliva, proving Smith had licked the victim,
and could not be interpreted in any other
reasonable way.

120 Contrary to the state’s position on
appeal that the test results were essentially
meaningless, it assigned great meaning to
the results at trial as shown through its
efforts to establish they definitively indicated
the presence of saliva. Demonstrating that
saliva was found on N.S.’s underwear directly
supported a disputed fact the state bore the
burden of proving: that Smith licked N.S.’s
genitals, as alleged in the indictment. See
Bass, 198 Ariz, 571, 140, 12 P.8d at 806,
Because Smith’s DNA could have been trans-
ferred to the victim’s underwear in innocent
ways, the DNA alone did not directly support
that inference. The state’s continued empha-
sis on the test and its results both highlight-
ed those results and exacerbated the effect of
their erroneous admission, See Anthony, 218
Ariz. 489, 140, 189 P.38d at 878 (erroneous
introduction of other act evidence not harm-
less based, in part, on state’s reliance on that

protocol was to use the term “saliva” in refer-
ence to the test results. Indeed, the test itself uses
“saliva” in the name, That testimony, however,
only further served to strengthen the state’s con-
tention that the positive test results did indicate
the presence of saliva.

104

evidence); State 1 Romero, 240 Ariz, 503,
120, 881 P.8d 297, 805 (App. 2016) (state’s
“emphasis” on improper evidence proper con-
sideration in harmless error analysis if it
“exacerbate[s] the error”). Furthermore, we
note that the prior hung jury favored acquit-
tal 9-8, which suggests the remaining evi-
dence was not sufficiently “overwhelming” to
ensure a guilty verdict. See Romero, 240
Ariz, 508, 118, 881 P.3d at 303.

Hl 121 We emphasize the state, not
Smith, bears the burden of showing the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588, 858 P.2d at 1191; see
also Anthony, 218 Ariz, 489, 141, 189 P.3d at
874 (noting difference between sufficiency-of-
the-evidence and harmless error review). In
light of the “ ‘stringent concepts’” surround-
ing our review, the state has not met its
burden of demonstrating the jury verdicts
were “surely unattributable” to its emphasis
of and reliance on the improperly admitted
saliva test results, Anthony, 218 Ariz, 439,
1189, 42, 189 P.8d at 878, quoting Bible, 175
Ariz, at 588, 858 P.2d at 1191.9

Due Process Violation

HS 22 Smith additionally argues the
trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
his prosecution violated his due process
rights.’ He contends that, relying on State v.
Huffman, 222 Ariz. 416, 215 P.8d 890 (App.
2009), the court did not consider the proper
factors in making its ruling and thus abused
its discretion. We review a court's denial of a
motion to dismiss criminal charges for an
abuse of discretion. Mangum, 214 Ariz, 165,
16, 150 P.8d at 254, A court abuses its
discretion if it “misapplies the law or exercis-

6. At oral argument, the parties discussed wheth-
er this court should vacate all of Smith’s convic-
tions, when the saliva test results were only nec-
essary to prove the two sexual conduct with a
minor charges since those were based on oral
contact, The state conceded, however, that be-
cause the acts of rubbing and licking N,S.’s geni-
tals occurred within moments of each other on
each occasion, and the presentation of the evi-
dence interwove the events below, if we vacated
the sexual conduct convictions, then vacating all
four counts was appropriate.

7, If Smith prevails on this claim, the state would
be precluded from retrying him, See Humble v.
Superior Court, 179 Ariz. 409, 416-17, 880 P.2d

es its discretion based on incorrect legal
principles.” State v, Slover, 220 Ariz. 239, 14,
204 P.8d 1088, 1091 (App. 2009).

123 Before his third trial, Smith moved to
dismiss the charges against him with preju-
dice based on due process grounds. He con-
tended the third trial would likely result in a
hung jury, and pointed to the fact that it was
the state’s witness that caused the first mis-
trial, the hung jury favored acquittal 9-3, and
the trials had put considerable emotional and
financial stress on Smith. The trial court
denied the motion, noting that “in only one of
the two previous trials was the case submit-
ted to a jury” and “[tJhe mistrial in the first
trial occurred on the second day of trial.”

HI 124 In considering a motion to dis-
miss under these circumstances, the trial
court must consider “the relevant competing
interests of the defendant and the state in
light of the particular circumstances of each
case.” Huffman, 222 Ariz, 416, 115, 215 P.3d
at 396, This balancing test “is wholly consis-
tent with and satisfies due process require-
ments,” Jd, 112, The court is granted broad
discretion in its ruling because it has a “more
immediate grasp of all the facts of the case”
and ability to observe the parties, lawyers
and witnesses, Id. 118, quoting State v
Winegar, 147 Ariz, 440, 445, 711 P.2d 579,
584 (1985). This court will presume that a
trial court considered the relevant interests
unless its decision is “manifestly unreason-
able or exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons,” Id., quoting State v. San-
doval, 175 Ariz. 848, 847, 857 P.2d 895, 399
(App. 1998),

629, 636-37 (App. 1993). Thus, we address this
issue despite already concluding the Confronta-
tion Clause violation was not harmless and va-
cating Smith's convictions and sentences on that
ground,

8. The state argues that because Smith did not file
a special action after the denial of his motion to
dismiss, he has waived the issue on appeal. For
the same reasons expressed in State v. Felix, 214
Ariz, 110, 198, 10, 149 P.3d 488, 489-90 (App.
2006), in which we found that a defendant's
failure to request special action review on a
double jeopardy claim does not preclude his abil-
ity to raise that claim on review, we reject the
state’s contention here.

25 The trial court in this case presided
over both of Smith’s previous trials. It was
thus familiar with the factual and procedural
background, the parties, lawyers, witnesses,
and evidence. As it noted, only one of Smith’s
previous trials had resulted in a hung jury
and the other was declared a mistrial on the
second day of an expected six-day trial. Con-
sidering the “seriousness and circumstances”
of Smith’s alleged offenses—sexual contact
and molestation of his eight-year-old grand-
daughter—and resulting harm, the court
could reasonably conclude the state’s interest
in the prosecution outweighed the emotional
and financial burden the successive trials
placed on Smith. Id, 114, quoting State v.
Sawve, 164 Vt. 184, 666 A2d 1164, 1168
(1995).

126 Additionally, when there has been
only one trial that reached the jury, during
which the trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal based on
sufficiency of the evidence, “there is a rea-
sonable possibility of conviction upon a sec-
ond trial.” Sawve, 666 A.2d at 1170. We can-
not say the court abused its diseretion in
denying Smith’s motion to dismiss with prej-
udice following only one hung jury. See id.
(abuse of discretion to dismiss following
“only one trial” in light of “the seriousness of
the charged offense, the absence of any pros-
ecutorial misconduct, and the lack of any
showing of prejudice that would result to
defendant from retrial”); ef Huffman, 222
Ariz, 416, 111, 18, 215 P.8d at 392, 397
(denial of motion to dismiss with prejudice
following two hung juries not abuse of discre-
tion); State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647
P.2d 705, 718 (1982) (dismissal with prejudice

9. The state did not file a response to Smith’s
motion to dismiss. Smith contends that failure
requires us to remand this case to the trial court
because the proper procedure was not followed,
relying on our statement in Huffman that we
believed the “appropriate procedure for motions
to dismiss due to successive prosecutions after
hung juries” is that “the state should file a re-
sponse detailing the circumstances it believes
establish that a successive trial is in the interests
of justice,” 222 Ariz, 416, n.6, 215 P.3d at 397
n.6, First, we note there had been only one hung
jury, unlike the situation in Huffman. Id. 11,
Second, although that may be the preferred pro-
cedure, the state is not required to file a response
under the rules of procedure and Smith has not
explained why the court in this case was unable

105

not abuse of discretion after two hung juries
following “two full, nearly identical trials”);
State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 918, 917 (Tenn,
1978) (prejudicial dismissal appropriate only
where “repeated trials, free of prejudicial
error, have resulted in genuinely deadlocked
juries ... and that probability of continued
hung juries is great”).

- [I 127 Smith also argues the trial court

was required to address explicitly certain
non-exclusive factors listed in Huffman in its
ruling and its failure to do so constitutes
legal error, 222 Ariz, 416, 114, 215 P.8d at
895-96; see also Slover, 220 Ariz, 239, 14, 204
P.8d at 1091. The court, however, is not
required to state its reasons for denying a
motion to dismiss on the record, Huffman,
222 Ariz, 416, 118, 215 P.8d at 397. Smith
presented the court with his reasons and
legal authority for seeking the dismissal ®
and we presume the court, being familiar
with “the particular circumstances of [the]
case” and, as Smith acknowledges, “intimate-
ly familiar” with the factors listed in Huff
mom, considered the necessary interests and
concluded the prosecution was not unfair, See
id. 115, We reject Smith’s argument on this
point,

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Hs«“128 Smith additionally argues
the trial court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal made pursuant to
Rule 20, Ariz, R. Crim. P., because insuffi-
cient evidence supported the jury’s verdicts.
“We review the denial of a Rule 20 motion de

to independently consider whether a successive
trial after one hung jury was in the interests of
justice, See Ariz, R. Crim. P, 16,6. We thus reject
Smith’s argument on this issue.

10. Although we have concluded the Confronta-
tion Clause violation in this case was not harm-
Tess beyond a reasonable doubt, we address
Smith’s claim that insufficient evidence sup-
ported his convictions because were we to find
the evidence was insufficient, the prohibition
against double jeopardy would bar the state from
retrying Smith. State v. Tucker, 231 Ariz, 125,
125, 290 P.3d 1248, 1260-61 (App. 2012); Burks
v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S,Ct. 2141, 57
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).

106

novo.” State v. Tucker, 281 Ariz, 125, 127,
290 P.8d 1248, 1261 (App. 2012).

{29 In our review, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to affirming the
jury’s verdicts and “will reverse only if there
is a complete absence of ‘substantial evi-
dence’ to support the conviction.” State v.
Ramsey, 211 Ariz. 529, 140, 124 P.8d 756,
769 (App. 2005), quoting State v. Sullivan,
187 Ariz, 599, 608, 981 P.2d 1109, 1118 (App.
1996). Substantial evidence is evidence that
reasonable jurors “could accept as sufficient
to support a guilty verdict beyond a reason-
able doubt.” State v. Dawolt, 207 Ariz. 191,
187, 84 P.8d 456, 477 (2004). We consider
evidence substantial if reasonable persons
could differ on whether it establishes a fact
in issue. Id.

180 In order to show Smith molested N.S.,
the state was required to show, as relevant
here, he “intentionally or knowingly” en-
gaged in “direct or indirect touching, fon-
dling or manipulat[ion] of any part of the
genitals.” A.R.S, §§ 18-1410, 18-1401(A)().
On the sexual conduct with a minor charge,
the state had to show Smith “intentionally or
knowingly engagled] in ... oral sexual con-
tact” with N.S. A.R.S. § 18-1405(A),

181 At trial, N.S. testified that while she
was pretending to sleep, on two separate
occasions, Smith removed her pants and un-
derwear, rubbed her genitals with his fingers
and licked her genitals. Smith’s DNA was
found on the inner and outer crotch areas of
the underwear N.S, was wearing at that
time. Based on this evidence, we cannot say
there was “no substantial evidence to war-
vant a conviction.” Ariz, R, Crim. P. 20(a); see
also State v. Schlenker, 26 Ariz.App. 401,
403-04, 549 P.2d 181, 183-84 (1976) (convic-
tion for child molestation may be upheld even
if based on the uncorroborated testimony of
the victim “unless her story is physically
impossible or so incredible that no reason-
able [person] could believe it”). The trial
court therefore did not err in denying
Smith’s Rule 20 motion,

32 Smith argues, however, he presented
sufficient evidence to show that “N.S.’s accu-
sations were untrue [and] that [N.S.’s moth-

11. Because we are vacating Smith's convictions

er] was overly sensitive about the possibility
of her children being molested.” This testi-
mony, however, does not render the state’s
evidence insufficient to support the jury’s
verdict, Even were the jury to believe that
N.S.’s mother was “overly sensitive,” that do
not negate N.S’s testimony as to what hap-
pened, Smith has not pointed to anything in
the record that would show N.S.’s story was
“physically impossible or so incredible that
no reasonable [person] could believe it.” See
Schlenker, 26 Ariz.App. at 408-04, 549 P.2d
at 183-84,

HI 183 Smith also points to contradic-
tions in N.S’s testimony as to the exact
times the incidents occurred and whether she
attempted to wake her brother up during the
nighttime incident. He also relies on contra-
dictions between N.S. and her parents as to
whether they had asked her about oral con-
tact before she divulged that information to
the forensic interviewer as evidence “that
N.S.’s ‘accusations’ actually stemmed from
her parents’ suggestive questioning.” Howev-
er, “inconsistencies in witness testimony go
not to the admissibility of testimony, but
rather to the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be accorded to the evidence,
which are issues for the jury to resolve,”
State v. Rivera, 210 Ariz, 188, 120, 109 P.8d
88, 87 (2006),

HI 134 Smith also argues the most rea-
sonable inference to draw from the saliva
test results is that the test detected the
presence of fecal matter and not saliva. Even
without the saliva test, however, the state
presented sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdicts. See Schlenker, 26 Ariz.App.
at 403-04, 649 P.2d at 183-84, And although
he argues there are “innocent explanations”
for why Smith’s DNA was found on N.S.’s
underwear, “the State is not required to dis-
prove ‘every conceivable hypothesis of inno-
cence when guilt has been established by
circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Fischer,
219 Ariz, 408, 148, 199 P.8d 663, 674 (App.
2008), quoting State v. Nash, 143 Ariz, 392,
404, 694 P.2d 222, 284 (1985). We cannot say
the trial court erred in denying Smith’s mo-
tion.

and sentences and remanding for a new trial, we

Disposition
135 We vacate Smith’s convictions and
sentences and remand the case for a new

trial.

do not address Smith's other claims on appeal.

108
393 P.3d 449

DOBSON BAY CLUB II DD, LLC, a Dela-
ware limited liability company; Dobson
Bay Club III KD, LLC, a Delaware lim-
ited liability company; Dobson Bay Club
IV KG, LLC, a Delaware limited liabili-
ty company; and Darby AZ Portfolio,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability com-
pany, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vw

LA SONRISA DE SIENA, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company,
Defendant/Appellee,

No. CV-16-0029-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed April 25, 2017

109

Brian J. Pollock (argued), Jared L. Sutton,
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Dobson Bay Club II DD,
LLC, et al,

Michael A. Schern, Mark A, Hanson,
Schern Richardson Finter Decker PLC,
Mesa; and Stephen ©. Biggs (argued), Smith
LO, Phoenix, Attorneys for La Sonrisa de
Siena, LLC

D. Jeffrey Craven, The Craven Firm
PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curi-
ae Arizona Private Lender Association

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICE BRUTINEL
joined. JUSTICE BOLICK dissented,

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

11 A liquidated damages contract provi-
sion is enforceable if the pre-determined
amount for damages seeks to compensate the
non-breaching party rather than penalize the
breaching party. We here hold that a nearly
$1.4 million late fee assessed on a final loan
balloon payment constitutes an unenforceable
penalty,

I. Background

12 In 2006, Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce loaned Dobson Bay Club II DD,
LLC and related entities (“Dobson Bay”)
$28.6 million for Dobson Bay's purchase of
four commercial properties. The loan was
secured by a deed of trust encumbering
those properties, Under the terms of a prom-
issory note, Dobson Bay was to tender inter-
est-only payments to Canadian Imperial
Bank until the loan matured in September
2009, when the entire principal would become
due—the “balloon” payment. In 2009, the
parties extended the loan maturity date to
September 2012,

18 Dobson Bay bore significant conse-
quences for any delay in payment. In addi-
tion to continuing to pay regular interest,
Dobson Bay was required to pay default
interest and collection costs, including rea-

110

sonable attorney fees, and a 5% late fee
assessed on the payment amount, If Canadi-
an Imperial Bank foreclosed the deed of
trust, Dobson Bay was also obligated to pay
costs, trustee’s fees, and reasonable attorney
fees.

14 As the 2012 loan maturity date ap-
proached, the parties negotiated to extend
that date but could not reach an agreement.
The maturity date passed, and Dobson Bay
failed to make the balloon payment.

15 La Sonrisa de Siena, LLC (“La Sonri-
sa”) bought the note and deed of trust from
Canadian Imperial Bank and promptly no-
ticed a trustee’s sale of the secured proper-
ties. It contended that Dobson Bay owed
more than $30 million, including a nearly $1.4
‘million late fee. Dobson Bay disputed it owed
various sums, including the late fee. Litiga-
tion ensued. Dobson Bay secured new financ-
ing and paid the outstanding principal and
undisputed interest in March 2013, (Dobson
Bay simultaneously deposited the disputed
amounts with the superior court pending the
litigation.) The parties filed cross-motions for
partial summary judgment on whether the
late fee provision in the note was an enforce-
able liquidated damages provision or, instead,
an unenforceable penalty,

916 The superior court granted partial
summary judgment for La Sonrisa, ruling
that the late fee was enforceable as liqui-
dated damages. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding “as a matter of law, that
absent unusual circumstances the imposition
of a flat 5% late-fee on a balloon payment for
a conventional, fixed-interest rate loan is not
enforceable as liquidated damages.” Dobson
Bay Club II DD, LLC v. La Sonrisa de
Siena, LLC, 239 Ariz. 182, 140 1 22, 866 P.3d.
1022, 1080 (App. 2016).

{7 We granted review because the en-
forceability of late fee provisions in commer-
cial loan agreements presents a legal issue of
statewide importance. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article 6, section 5(8) of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24,

IL Discussion
A. Enforceability of liquidated dam-
ages provisions
HM 118 Parties to a contract can agree
in advance to the amount of damages for any

breach. See Miller Cattle Co. v. Mattice, 38
Ariz, 180, 190, 298 P. 640, 648 (1981), Such
“liquidated damages” provisions serve valu-
able purposes, They provide certainty when
actual damages would be difficult to caleu-
late, and they alleviate the need for potential-
ly expensive litigation. Cf Mech. Air Eng’g
Co. v. Totem Constr. Co., 166 Ariz, 191, 198,
801 P.2d 426, 428 (App. 1989) (noting that a
liquidated damages provision “promotes en-
terprise by increasing certainty and by de-
creasing risk-exposure, proof problems, and
litigation costs”); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (“Restatement Second”) § 356
emt, a, (Am, Law Inst, 1981) (“The enforee-
ment of such provisions ... saves the time of
courts, juries, parties and witnesses and re-
duces the expense of litigation.”).

HMMM 19 Parties, however, do not have
free rein in setting liquidated damages. Be-
cause “[t]he central objective behind the sys-
tem of contract remedies is compensatory,
not punitive,” parties cannot provide a penal-
ty for a breach, Restatement Second § 356
emt. a; see also id. (“Punishment of a promi-
sor for having broken his promise has no
justification on either economic or other
grounds and a term providing such a penalty
is unenforceable on grounds of public poli-
ey”), “A [contract] term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy as a penalty.” Id.
§ 856(1), The contract remains valid, howev-
er, and the non-breaching party can still
recover actual damages. See Gary Outdoor
Advert, Co. v. Sun Lodge, Inc., 188 Ariz, 240,
248, 650 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1982); Miller Cattle,
38 Ariz. at 190, 298 P. at 643,

110 Arizona courts have used different
methods to decide whether stipulated dam-
ages provisions are enforceable as liquidated
damages or void as penalties. This Court has
considered whether the stipulated amounts
were reasonably related to actual damages.
See Marshall v. Pateman, 81 Ariz. 367, 370,
306 P.2d 287, 289 (1957); Tennent v. Leary,
81 Ariz. 248, 249, 804 P.2d 384, 888 (1956);
Weatherford v. Adams, 81 Ariz, 187, 197, 251
P. 458, 456 (1926); Armstrong v. Irwin, 26

Ariz. 1, 9, 221 P. 222, 225 (1928). We have
also examined liquidated damages provisions
prospectively, considering whether they were
yeasonable at the time the contracts were
ereated. See Gary Outdoor Advert. Co., 188
Ariz, at 242-43, 650 P.2d at 1224-25; Miller
Cattle, 38 Ariz. at 190, 298 P. at 648.

711 Our court of appeals has generally
applied a two-part test developed under the
Restatement (First) of Contracts (“Restate-
ment First”) (Am. Law Inst. 1928) § 389.
Under that test, which our dissenting col-
league implicitly relies on, see infra 150, a
stipulated damages provision is an unenforce-
able penalty unless “(1) the amount fixed is a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for
harm that is caused by the breach, and (2)
the harm caused is ‘incapable or very difficult
of accurate estimation.’” Dobson Bay Club,
289 Ariz, at 186 19, 866 P.8d at 1026 (citing
Restatement First § 889); see also Pima
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Rampello, 168 Ariz.
297, 300, 812 P.2d 1115, 1118 (App. 1991);
Mech. Air Bng’y Co., 166 Ariz, at 198, 801
P.2d at 428; Larson-Hegstrom & Assocs.
Inc. v. Jeffries, 145 Ariz, 329, 383, 701 P.2d
587, 591 (App. 1985).

{12 In this case, the court of appeals
applied Restatement Second § 856(1), which
reframed the Restatement First test in 1981
to harmonize with Uniform Commercial Code
(UCO”) § 2-718(1). See Dobson Bay Club,
239 Ariz, at 186 19 n.2, 366 P.3d at 1026 n.2;
Restatement Second § 856 reporter’s note.
Section 856(1) provides that a liquidated
damages provision is enforceable, “but only
at an amount that is reasonable in the light
of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the
breach and the difficulties of proof of logs.”
This test requires courts to consider (1) the
anticipated or actual loss caused by the
breach, and (2) the difficulty of proof of loss.
Whether a fixed amount is a penalty turns on
the relative strengths of these factors. As
explained by comment b to § 356:

If the difficulty of proof of loss is great,

considerable latitude is allowed in the ap-

proximation of anticipated or actual harm.

If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof

of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in

that approximation. If, to take an extreme
ease, it is clear that no loss at all has

111

occurred, a provision fixing a substantial

sum as damages is unenforceable.

118 La Sonrisa urges us to disavow the
Restatement Second § 356(1) test to the ex-
tent it “retrospectively” considers actual
damages. It contends that this approach un-
dermines the contracting parties’ freedom to
allocate risk and defeats the purpose of a
liquidated damages provision by requiring
the non-breaching party to establish actual
damages. Not so.

114 Section 356(1) provides two methods
for deciding whether the parties’ damages
forecast, was reasonable. The amount is rea-
sonable if it approximates either the loss
anticipated at the time of contract creation
(despite any actual loss) or the loss that
actually resulted (despite what the parties
might have anticipated in other cireum-
stances). See Restatement Second § 356 cmt.
'b. The non-breaching party is not required to
prove actual damages to enforce a liquidated
damages provision, and a court will respect
the parties’ agreement if it is “reasonable” in
relation to anticipated or actual loss. But if
the difficulty of proof of loss is slight and
either no loss occurs or the stipulated sum is
grossly disproportionate to the loss, the par-
ties’ stipulation would be unreasonable and
therefore unenforceable as a penalty. See id.
This approach is consistent with this Court’s
opinions, See Marshall, 81 Ariz, at 370, 806
P.2d at 289 (holding that stipulated damages
were “unconscionable under the cireum-
stances” and unenforceable because the non-
breaching party suffered no loss); Weather-
Jord, 31 Ariz, at 197, 251 P. at 456 (“Where
the amount retained is grossly disproportion-
ate to the actual damages ... and, especially,
when there is available a simple method for
ascertaining the exact damages, [a stipulated
damages provision] will be considered as a
penalty.”).

Hl 115 We adopt the Restatement Sec-
ond § 356(1) to test the enforceability of a
stipulated damages provision. First, § 856(1)
aligns with UCC § 2-718(1), which Arizona
has adopted, See A.R.S. § 47-2718(A). Thus,
courts can apply the same test to both UCC-
governed and non-UCC-governed contracts.
Second, the test best accommodates the goal
of compensating the non-breaching party for

112

a loss rather than penalizing the breaching
party. Under the Restatement Second test,
courts have flexibility to respect the parties’
right to stipulate to damages for a breach
but, when appropriate, prevent imposition of
a penalty.

B. Application of Restatement Second
§ 856(1) to this case

I 116 The late fee provision in the
promissory note here provides:

If any installment payable under this
Note (including the final installment due
on the Maturity Date) is not received by
Lender prior to the calendar day after the
same is due ... Borrower shall pay to
Lender upon demand an amount equal to
the lesser of (a) five percent (5%) of such
unpaid sum or (b) the maximum amount
permitted by applicable law to defray the
expenses incurred by Lender in handling
and processing such delinquent payment
and to compensate Lender for the loss of
the use of such delinquent payment... .

La Sonrisa seeks 5% of the late balloon
payment; “the maximum amount permitted
by applicable law” is not at issue,

HH 117 Dobson Bay, as the party seek-
ing to avoid enforcement of the late fee pro-
vision, has the burden of persuading this
Court that the provision imposes an unen-
forceable penalty. Cf United Behavioral
Health v. Maricopa Integrated Health Sys.,
240 Ariz, 118, 122 114, 877 P.8d 815, 319
(2016) (stating that the party claiming that a
contractual arbitration provision is preempt-
ed by federal law bears the burden of prov-
ing it); Goode v. Powers, 97 Ariz. 75, 81, 397
P.2d 56, 60 (1964) (noting that a challenger to
a contract bears the burden of showing ille-
gality); Duenas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am,
Inc, 236 Ariz, 180, 186 114, 386 P.8d 763,
769 (App. 2014) (concluding that party chal-
lenging a contract term bears the burden of
showing unconscionability); see also DJ Mfg.
Corp. v. United States, 86 F.8d 1180, 1134
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A party challenging a liqui-
dated damages clause bears the burden of
proving the clause unenforceable.”), To de-
cide the matter, we do not apply any bright-
line rules but construe the clause “according
to the circumstances of the case, and in the

light of all the facts surrounding it.” Miller
Cattle, 88 Ariz, at 190, 298 P. at 648,

THM {18 We review the grant of partial
summary judgment de novo as an issue of
law. See Cramer v, Starr, 240 Ariz. 4, 7 18,
875 P.8d 69, 72 (2016), Whether a contract
provides for liquidated damages or a penalty
is also an issue of law we review de novo, See
Rampello, 168 Ariz. at 300, 812 P.2d at 1118,

1, _ Anticipated or actual damages

119 Dobson Bay argues that the late fee
provision was neither a reasonable forecast
of anticipated damages nor reasonably relat-
ed to actual damages incurred as a result of
the untimely balloon payment because La
Sonrisa’s loss has been compensated already
by payment of default interest and collection
costs, La Sonrisa asserts that actual damages
are irrelevant. It contends that when the loan
was made, the 5% late fee was a reasonable
forecast of just compensation for harm that
could be caused by Dobson Bay’s default in
timely making the balloon payment,

a, Anticipated damages

120 The late fee did not reasonably fore-
cast anticipated damages likely to result from
an untimely balloon payment.

121 First, the 5% fee is static, payable on
demand whether the payment is one day late
or one year late. Five percent of the loan
principal is a significant sum of money, which
did not likely reflect losses from a short
delay in payment. Because the fee did not
account for the length of time Canadian Im-
perial Bank would be deprived of the balloon
payment, the fee could not reasonably pre-
dict the Bank’s loss. Cf Miller Cattle, 38
Ariz, at 190, 298 P. at 648 (stating that a
principal rule used to decide whether a con-
tract imposes a penalty or liquidated dam-
ages is whether the payment “is a fixed and
definite sum, regardless of the nature or
extent of the breach of the contract, or
whether it is based upon, and varies with, the
nature and extent of the breach”); Grand
Union Laundry Co. v. Carney, 88 Wash. 327,
158 P, 5, 7 (1915) (cited with approval in
Miller Cattle, 38 Ariz, at 190, 298 P. at 643)
(“{(Alnother feature that some times influ-

ences courts to construe a provision for liqui-
dated damages into a penalty [is that] of
fixing for any one of several different kinds
and degrees of breach an equal forfeiture of
money.”),

122 La Sonrisa asserts that the 5% late
fee did not necessarily establish a fixed sum
of approximately $1.4 million as “alt the
time the parties formed their agreement, the
exact amount of the final installment was
unknown because the loan documents provid-
ed Dobson Bay with the flexibility to pay all,
some, or none of the principal prior to the
maturity date.” But the note permits Dobson
Bay to prepay the loan principal only “in
whole” and “not in part,” except that any
condemnation or casualty insurance proceeds
would be applied to pay down the principal.
Thus, unless Dobson Bay prepaid the entire
principal amount, meaning the late fee provi-
sion would not apply, the parties contemplat-
ed that the balloon payment would approxi-
mate the entire loan principal, requiring a
late fee of roughly $1.4 million for an untime-
ly payment.

128 Second, the late fee either duplicated
other fees triggered by a default or was
grossly disproportionate to any remaining
sums needed to compensate for the anticipat-
ed losses identified in the late fee provision.
Cf United Dairymen of Ariz, v. Schugg, 212
Aviz, 188, 188 116, 128 P.8d 756, 761 (App.
2006) (“The right to recover liquidated dam-
ages is limited by the express terms of the
parties’ agreement.”); 11 Joseph M. Perillo,
Corbin on Contracts § 58.11 at 457 (rev. ed.
2005) (“The probable injury that the parties
had reason to foresee is a fact that largely
determines the question whether they made
a genuine pre-estimate of that injury....”).

124 The late fee is calculated as the lesser
of 5% of the delinquent payment or the maxi-
mum amount permitted by law “to defray the
expenses incurred by [Canadian Imperial
Bank] in handling and processing such delin-
quent payment and to compensate [Canadian
Imperial Bank] for the loss of the use of such
delinquent payment.” It is debatable whether
this quoted language qualifies each calcula-
tion method or just the latter one, But it
matters not, Requiring an “either-or” com-
parison to fix the late fee suggests that both

113

calculation methods were intended to com-
pensate for the same categories of loss: (1)
the costs in handling and processing a late
payment, and (2) the loss of use of the pay-
ment, Cf Smith v. Melson, Inc., 185 Ariz.
119, 121, 659 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1983) (“A
contract should be read in light of the par-
ties’ intentions as reflected by their language
and in view of all the circumstances.”); State
ex rel, Goddard v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 206 Ariz, 117, 122 111 28-24, 75 P.8d 1075,
1080 (App, 2008) (stating that words used in
a contract must be read in context); see also
In re Mkt. Ctr. EB. Retail Prop, Inc, 488
B.R, 335, 844, 363 (Bankr. D.N.M, 2010) (in-
terpreting almost identical language as stat-
ing the purpose for the late fee).

125 Both categories of loss identified in
the late fee provision are substantially ad-
dressed elsewhere in the promissory note
and deed of trust. Assuming that “handling
and processing” includes actions taken to
collect the late payment, those costs would be
compensated by Dobson Bay’s required pay-
ment of “all costs of collection,” including
reasonable attorney fees, and, in the event of
foreclosure, “all expenses incident to such
proceeding,” including attorney fees and
trustee’s fees and costs. The loss of use of
money would be compensated by continuing
payments of regular interest plus default in-
terest, Cf Ariz. E.R.R. Co, v. Head, 26 Ariz.
259, 262, 224 P. 1057, 1058 (1924) (“Interest
is the compensation paid for the use of mon-
ey.”).

126 What's left to compensate by payment,
of a $1.4 million late fee? La Sonrisa and the
dissent rely on an affidavit from Mitchel
Medigovich, a commercial lending expert,
who opined that a 5% late fee is a reasonable
forecast of just compensation for impairment
of a bank’s economic interests due to an
untimely balloon payment, But much of this
anticipated impairment falls outside the two
categories of loss identified by the parties in
the late fee provision. For example, Medigo-
vich states that a predetermined late fee
compensates for post-default “reputational
risks,” “regulatory risks,” and the “risk of
expense of preserving the collateral.” Medi-
govich addresses the categories of loss identi-
fied in the late fee provision by stating that

114

late fees properly subsidize a lender’s debt
collection practices and compensate for the
loss of expected funds. He does not explain,
however, what amounts, if any, are reason-
ably needed to compensate for these expect-
ed losses when, as here, the borrower is
already obligated to pay all collection costs
and interest at both the regular rate and a
default rate. Consequently, Medigovich’s affi-
davit does not persuade us that a flat $1.4
million late fee was a reasonable forecast of
Canadian Imperial Bank’s anticipated losses
from a late balloon payment that would not
have been compensated by the payment of
regular interest, default interest, and collec-
tion costs.

27 This case is distinguishable from Met-
Life Capital Financial Corp. v, Washington
Avenue Associates L.P., 159 N.J. 484, 782
A.2d 498 (1999), on which La Sonrisa and the
dissent rely. There, the court concluded that
a 5% late charge assessed against delinquent
monthly installment payments of about.
$14,000 was enforceable as liquidated dam-
ages. Id. at 495-96, 502. The reasonableness
of applying the charge against a final balloon
payment was not at issue. See id, at 495 (“We
now consider whether the five percent late
charge assessed against each delinquent pay-
ment ... constitute[s] reasonable stipulated
damages provisions.”); see also MetLife Cap-
ital Financial Corp. v. Washington Ave. As-
soc, L.P., 8138 N.J.Super, 525, 718 A.2d 527,
581 (N.J. App. 1998) (stating that application
of the late charge against a final balloon
payment of about $69,000 was not at issue),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 159 N.J. 484, 7382
A.2d 498 (1999). Assessing a $700 late fee for
an untimely installment payment may well
reflect a reasonable assessment of the inter-
nal costs of monitoring and collecting late
installment payments during the loan tenure,
But that is a far cry from assessing a nearly
$1.4 million fee for a delayed balloon pay-
ment of the loan principal, particularly given
that the lender here was otherwise entitled
to compensation for its collections costs and
loss of use of the funds.

128 In sum, a flat 5% late fee did not
reasonably predict the damages that would
be sustained by Canadian Imperial Bank for

a late balloon payment of the entire loan
principal,

b. Actual damages

29 The $1.4 million late fee did not rea-
sonably approximate either the actual costs
of handling and processing the late balloon
payment or the loss of use of that payment.

130 The summary judgment papers did
not address the actual losses incurred by
Canadian Imperial Bank and La Sonrisa af-
ter Dobson Bay’s default, Nevertheless, the
record reflects that neither lender spent sig-
nificant time handling and processing the late
payment. The only outstanding payment was
the last payment, and nothing suggests that
either lender had much to “handle and pro-
cess” before the trustee’s sale was initiated,
Of In ve Mkt. Ctr. B. Retail Prop, Inc., 483
B.R. at 864 (concluding that after default on
a balloon payment “there would be little or
no more administrative expenses in handling
and processing delinquent payments” and
“{a]ll that is left to do is have the attorneys
sue to foreclose”), The note already required
Dobson Bay to pay any collection costs, in-
cluding attorney fees. It is inconceivable that
any remaining administrative collection costs
approached $1.4 million, particularly in light
of the short time between the default and
initiation of the trustee’s sale—about three
months. Thereafter, the deed of trust applied
to require Dobson Bay to pay attorney fees
and trustee’s fees and costs.

131 La Sonrisa was also compensated for
the loss of use of money suffered by it and its
assignor, Canadian Imperial Bank, by Dob-
son Bay’s obligation to pay regular and de-
fault interest. Cf K.B. v. State Farm Fire &
Cas, Co., 189 Ariz, 268, 267, 941 P.2d 1288,
1292 (App. 1997) (“An assignee steps into the
shoes of her assignor.”). Dobson Bay was
current on the loan until the maturity date.
La Sonrisa did not dispute Dobson Bay’s
representation at oral argument before this
Court that La Sonrisa received between
$600,000 and $700,000 in default interest
alone for the six-month delay in paying the
balloon amount.

{82 In sum, nothing indicates that either
lender, separately or together, suffered an

uncompensated loss that approached $1.4
million,

2. Difficulty of proof of loss

183 We next consider the difficulty of
proving the losses actually sustained by Ca-
nadian Imperial Bank and La Sonrisa in
handling and processing the late balloon pay-
ment and by being deprived of use of that
payment, Restatement Second § 356 emt. b
& illus. 2-4. In doing so, we examine the
difficulty of either proving that a loss oc-
curred or establishing its amount with cer-
tainty. Jd. § 356 emt. b.

134 La Sonrisa would have had no difficul-
ty proving it sustained a loss in handling and
processing the late balloon payment, if a loss
occurred. (Because La Sonrisa noticed the
trustee’s sale about a week after acquiring
the loan, it may not have expended any re-
sources handling and processing the balloon
payment.) It could have produced evidence of
the tasks undertaken by it to do so. La
Sonrisa would have had slightly more diffi-
eulty precisely proving the amount of dam-
ages incurred from any such loss depending
on what activities constituted “handling and
processing” and how it allocated the costs of
these activities. Cf Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed,
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 9 Cal.38d 731, 108 Cal.
Rpt. 845, 511 P.2d 1197, 1208 (1978) (invali-
dating a late fee provision and noting that
“[t]he lender’s charges could be fairly meas-
ured by the period of time the money was
wrongfully withheld plus the administrative
costs reasonably related to collecting and
accounting for a late payment”),

185 La Sonrisa would have had no difficul-
ty proving that either lender sustained a loss
by being deprived of the use of the balloon
payment. Interest on the outstanding amount.
could have been assessed to compensate for
the loss of use of money, Cf Ariz. E.R.R. Co.,
26 Ariz, at 262, 224 P. at 1058. And La
Sonrisa would be entitled to collect interest
earned when Canadian Imperial Bank was
the note payee and the loan was in default.
Of. KB., 189 Ariz, at 267, 941 P.2d at 1292,
Indeed, the promissory note required Dob-
son Bay to pay regular interest and default
interest for that purpose.

115

136 In sum, under the circumstances here,
the difficulty of proving La Sonrisa’s loss as
identified in the late fee provision was slight,

3. Consideration of factors

187 We are persuaded that the late fee is
an unenforceable penalty. The difficulty of
proving losses attributable to handling and
processing the balloon payment was slight.
We therefore give less latitude to Canadian
Imperial Bank and Dobson Bay’s approxima-
tion of anticipated or actual harm. See Re-
statement Second § 856 emt. b.

1138 As explained, the late fee neither rea-
sonably forecasted. anticipated damages for
the losses identified in the late fee provision
nor reasonably approximated the actual loss-
es. In view of Dobson Bay’s obligation to pay
regular and default interest, collection costs,
trustee’s fees and costs, and attorney fees as
a consequence of the six-month delay in pay-
ing the balloon, an approximate $1.4 million
late fee is unreasonable and an unenforceable
penalty. La Sonrisa is not precluded, howev-
er, from seeking actual damages incurred for
handling and processing the late balloon pay-
ment and for losing use of the payment if La
Sonrisa has not already been compensated
for that loss by the other fees and costs
Dobson Bay is required to pay under the
note and deed of trust. See Gary Outdoor
Advert, Co., 183 Ariz. at 248, 650 P.2d at
1225.

C. The dissent

HH 139 Our dissenting colleague color-
fully compares our decision to a child’s ery of
“backsies” to sidestep a promise. Rather than
invoking playground rules, however, we ap-
ply long-established common law principles
that render contractual penalty provisions—
even when agreed upon by sophisticated par-
ties—unenforceable as a matter of publie pol-
icy. This is nothing unique. Courts will like-
wise disregard the parties’ intent and refuse
to enforce contract terms that are uncon-
scionable, illegal, or otherwise against public
policy. Cf Mamwell v, Fidelity Fin. Servs.,
Ine., 184 Aviz, 82, 88, 907 P.2d 51, 57 (1995)
(‘{Elven if the contract provisions are consis-
tent with the reasonable expectations of the
party they are unenforceable if they are op-

116

pressive or unconscionable,” (internal quota-
tions and alterations omitted); Goodman v.
Newzona Inv. Co, 101 Ariz. 470, 474, 421
P.2d 818, 822 (1966) (recognizing “the funda-
mental right of the individual to [have] com-
plete freedom to contract ... so long as his
contract is not illegal or against public poli-
cy”). That the dissent prefers to ignore these
principles does not affect their applicability,

HH 140 The dissent is also incorrect
that our decision runs afoul of the Arizona
Constitution’s “contract clause,” article 2,
§ 25, an argument La Sonrisa has never
made, Our colleague contends that we assign
Dobson Bay a burden of persuasion that is so
insubstantial it “impair[s] the obligation .of
contract.” See infra 146, But judicial invalida-
tion of a contract provision does not implicate
the contract clause. Cf, Tidal Oil Co, v. Flan-
agan, 268 US. 444, 451, 44 S.Ct, 197, 68
L.Ed, 882 (1924) (finding no violation of the
federal contract clause where a state su-
preme court declared a contract void and.
unenforceable because “the obligation of con-
tracts against state action[ ] is directed only
against impairment by legislation and not by
judgments of courts”); Barrows v, Jackson,
846 U.S, 249, 260, 73 S.Ct. 1081, 97 L.Ed.
1686 (1958) (citing Tidal and holding that a
state court’s refusal to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant did not violate the feder-
al contract clause); see also Fields v, lected
Officials’ Ret, Plan, 284 Ariz, 214, 218 116,
820 P.8d 1160, 1164 (2014) (noting that the
Court interprets Arizona’s contract clause us-
ing an “analysis similar to that employed by
the Supreme Court” when interpreting the
federal contract clause); Hall v, Elected Offi-
cials’ Ret. Plan, 241 Ariz, 88, 888 P.8d 1107,
1126 1.69 (2016) (Bolick J., dissenting in part
and concurring in the judgment in part) (not~
ing, with regard to the state contract clause,
that “[hlistorically, Arizona courts have ap-
plied the United States Supreme Court’s test.
for determining violations of the Contract
Clause of the Federal Constitution”).

HE 141 Even if the contract clause had
been argued here and applies, it would not
change our decision. The contract clause only
limits the state’s ability to impair existing
contract obligations; it does not curtail appli-
cation of proscriptive principles that existed

at the time of contract creation, Cf State v.
Direct Sellers Ass'n, 108 Ariz. 165, 169-70,
494 P.2d 361, 865-66 (1972) (“The [contract
clause of the federal constitution] means only
that no state may impair the obligation of an
[elxisting contract.”); Foltz v. Noon, 16 Ariz.
410, 417, 146 P, 510, 512 (1915) (noting that a
statute will not violate the Arizona Contract
Clause “when applied to contracts made sub-
sequent to its taking effect”); Samaritan
Health Sys. v. Superior Court, 194 Ariz, 284,
298 1 41, 981 P.2d 584, 598 (App. 1998) (“[Ari-
zona’s] contract impairment clause only lim-
its the legislature’s ability to impair obli-
gations under existing contracts.”). Our cases
proscribed penalty clauses long before origi-
nation of the loan here, and the note ineorpo-
rated this proscription. Cf Bhd. of Am. Yeo-
men v, Mana, 28 Ariz, 610, 615, 206 P, 403,
404 (1922) (“It is a familiar rule that the law
in force at the time a contract is executed
enters into and forms a part of the con-
tract.”); Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler, 222
Ariz, 474, 484 184, 217 P.8d 424, 434 (App.
2009) (“{Alll contracts incorporate applicable
statutes and common-law principles.”), Con-
sequently, our refusal to enforce a penalty
provision did not impair the parties’ contract
obligations here.

If. Conclusion

142 We vacate the court of appeals’ opin-
ion, reverse the trial court’s partial summary
judgment in favor of La Sonrisa on the liqui-
dated damages claim, and remand to that
court for further proceedings, including entry
of partial summary judgment for Dobson
Bay on its declaratory relief claim concerning
the late fee. We award Dobson Bay its rea-
sonable attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S,
§ 12-841.01 subject to its compliance with
ARCAP 21(¢),

BOLICK, J., dissenting,

148 As children, we learn that the rules of
the playground dictate that if someone
makes a promise, no matter how solemnly, it
is unenforceable if the person making the
promise had his fingers crossed behind his
back. As we grow up, we learn instead that
many promises are moral and legal obli-
gations, with consequences properly attached

to breaking them, Still, some grown-ups pre-
fer the playground rules.

944 The Court today invalidates a core
and unambiguous provision of a contract
freely negotiated for mutual benefit be-
tween sophisticated parties represented by
competent counsel. After Dobson Bay reap-
ed the full benefits of its bargain, it default-
ed on its repayment obligation and looked
to the courts to avoid significant agreed-
upon consequences of that default. The ma-
jority determines that the liquidated dam-
ages provision agreed to by the parties is
an unenforceable penalty, based on its thor-
ough examination of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts. Because I believe that
over the course of that journey the majority
lost the forest for the trees, I respectfully
dissent.

145 The relevant provision of the Restate-
ment (Second) is consistent with ARS.
§ 47-2718, which provides that a contract
term “fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is void as a penalty.” As with all
statutes, we must construe this provision, if
at all possible, in a constitutional manner.
State v, Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 474 110, 65
P.3d 420, 428 (2008).

146 Freedom of contract allows individuals
to order their affairs and exchange goods and.
services, without coercion, in accord with
their personal values and priorities, The Ari-
zona, Constitution so venerates contractual
freedom that it is enshrined in our Declara-
tion of Rights. Article 2, section 25 com-
mands, “No ... law impairing the obligation
of a contract, shall ever be enacted.” That
provision requires us to indulge every pre-
sumption in favor of upholding a contract
negotiated as this one was, and to assign a
substantial burden of demonstrating unen-
forceability to the party challenging the
terms to which it willingly and knowingly
agreed, The majority purports to assign the
burden of persuasion to Dobson Bay, see
117, but that “burden” is so insubstantial as
to transform § 47-2718 into “a law impairing
the obligation of a contract.”

147 “The law of liquidated damages is
unique within the common law of contracts
because it overtly affronts freedom of con-
tract.” Larry A, Dimatteo, A Theory of Effi-

7

cient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Lig-
uidated Damages, 88 Am, Bus, LJ, 688, 634
(2001). That is because it allows courts to
displace the intent of the parties by deter-
mining that a provision amounts to a penalty,
Such discretion should be exercised with
great care, for as the majority aptly notes,
liquidated damages provisions “serve impor-
tant purposes,” such as providing certainty
when actual damages would be difficult to
calculate and avoiding the costs and delays of
litigation. See 18.

148 Moreover, “a party concerned fore-
most with performance, especially a timely
performance, may use such a clause in the
hope that it will provide a further induce-
ment for performance.” Dimatteo, 88 Am.
Bus. LJ. at 684, Certainly that is the case
with the contract here. Dobson Bay sought a
considerable loan—$28.6 million—to pur-
chase four commercial properties. Under the
contract terms, it would make interest-only
payments for a prescribed period, after
which it would repay the entire principal in a
“balloon” payment. The timely return of the
principal is a critical, indeed defining, feature
of the loan. The contract underscored that
fact by requiring, in addition to other fees
described by the majority, a 5% fee for late
interest payments or principal repayment.
Absent evidence to the contrary by the party
properly bearing the burden of proof, we
may presume that the substantial loan Dob-
son Bay sought would not have been made
absent this assurance,

149 The lender was not voracious. Before
the balloon payment was originally due in
2009, the parties negotiated a three-year ex-
tension, As the new date approached, the
parties negotiated over another extension but
failed to reach agreement. Thereafter the
note was sold to La Sonrisa which then com-
menced foreclosure proceedings.

150 The majority applies two factors in
determining whether the liquidated damages
provision is “reasonable”: the anticipated or
actual loss caused by the breach, and the
difficulty of proof of loss. See 112. Proving
the provision is reasonable based on actual
damages makes little sense in most instanc-
es, given that the point of a liquidated dam-

118

ages provision is to avoid litigation that re-
quires proving actual damages. Accordingly,
the proper inquiry “is whether the stipulated
amount was, when all of the facts are consid-
ered, reasonable at the time of the contract,
and not whether it was reasonable with the
benefit of hindsight.” Rampelio, 168 Ariz. at
800, 812 P.2d at 1118, At the same time,
citing a comment to Restatement (Second)
§ 856, the majority notes that if the difficulty
of forecasting actual damages is great, con-
siderable latitude is appropriate in assigning
liquidated damages. Although the difficulty
of forecasting the amount of loss here was
great, the majority extends no such latitude.

51 The majority concludes that the lend-
er is compensated for losses owing to a dila-
tory final payment elsewhere in the contract;
specifically, through collection costs and fore-
closure expenses. See 125. Further, “[t]he
Joss of use of money would be compensated
by continuing payments of regular interest
plus default interest.” Id, Given that we have
no idea the use to which the lender would
have put the money had it been returned in a
timely manner, that conclusion is conjecture,
and illustrates precisely why liquidated dam-
ages provisions are preferable to protracted
litigation and judicial second-guessing,

152 The main cost to the lender of failing
to recover the loan corpus in a timely fash-
ion, and the most difficult to caleulate in
advance, is opportunity cost. La Sonrisa pro-
duced a declaration from Mitchel Medigo-
vich, who has extensive experience as an
Arizona trustee and real estate broker and
originator. He attests that when a borrower
unilaterally extends the due date of a balloon
payment, it imposes costs, including opportu-
nity costs, upon the lender. He likens the
situation to a car rental company with a fixed
fleet of cars. If a renter unilaterally extends
a rental even by one day, it diminishes fleet
availability and the ability to provide new
rentals, which has economic ripple effects
throughout the enterprise,

1, Here, the lender sold the note to La Sonrisa.
Amicus Arizona Private Lender Association ex-
plains the circumstances that give rise to such a
sale:

These lenders often have a significant portion
of their total available funds invested at any

153 Medigovich summarized the conse-
quences of a late final payment and the
purpose of a liquidated damages provision:

Many lenders including banks make pro-
jections for expected and scheduled repay-
ment of loans with which the lender makes
interest payments to depositors, new loan
commitments to prospective borrowers,
bond payments to investors or to replenish
capital reserves. In any event, failure of
the borrower to make any scheduled pay-
ment including a payment due upon matu-
rity of the loan, particularly in the case of
[a] large commercial loan such as in this
ease puts the lender at great risk of de-
fault of its own commitments.... Conse-
quently, in most commercial transactions,
the parties agree that if the Borrower fails
to make a final payment of principal on the
due date, (a unilateral extension), the
economic impact to the Lender is incaleula-
ble and therefore a Late Fee is necessary
as liquidated damages to the lender.

154 Such late fees are not a penalty be-
cause (1) “[a] lender with a non-performing
loan has significantly increased risk of recov-
ery,” (2), “in addition to the expense of man-
aging the non-performing asset, the lender is
denied the ability to reinvest expected ...
payments into new performing investments
at current market rates” (emphasis added),
and (8) “the lender may be at risk of default-
ing on other loan commitments wherein fund-
ing is contemplated by the loan maturing.”
Whether any or all of those factors will occur
in a particular loan context is unpredictable,
and the cost of possible lost opportunities is
inherently difficult to calculate.

155 Consequently, Medigovich observes,
customary late fees for commercial transac-
tions typically start at 4% or 5% and range
up to 10%. In Medigovich’s view, the 5% fee
here was “perhaps below what is reasonable
for the circumstances,” which involved “a
complex transaction with multiple properties
as the collateral and multiple entities as the
Borrower.” +

given time.... Therefore, it is important to
private lenders that their borrower repay on
time to free up cash for new loans to keep the
money moving and working for the busi-
ness... Thus when a borrower defaults on the
repayment of the principal, the lender may be

156 Thus, even though La Sonrisa did not
bear the burden of proving that the liqui-
dated damages provision was reasonable, it
supplied powerful evidence that the economic
damages flowing from default or delayed fi-
nal payment were potentially substantial, dif-
ficult to forecast or calculate, and not fully
encompassed by other fees in the contract.

157 In contrast, Dobson Bay, the party
that purportedly bore the burden of proof,
presented by way of contravening evidence:
absolutely nothing.”

58 Unsurprisingly, the trial court, which
weighed the evidence presented by La Sonri-
sa and the absence thereof by Dobson Bay,
concluded that the liquidated damages provi-
sion was enforceable. The court of appeals,
by contrast, held that as a matter of law,
“absent unusual circumstances,” a 5% liqui-
dated damages provision in a contract like
this is unenforceable. Dobson Bay, 289 Ariz.
at 140 122, 366 P.3d at 1080. The court cited
neither law nor precedent for such a sweep-
ing substantive pronouncement, although at
least it provided a clear rule to which con-
tracting parties could conform themselves.

159 The majority’s opinion here is more
legally grounded but also far more nebulous.
Is a default fee based on a percentage
amount per se invalid because it does not
vary with the duration of the default, even
though amount-based late fees may not fully
compensate for lost opportunity costs; or do
the parties have to litigate every time to find
out, which defeats the important purposes of
liquidated damages clauses? Hither way, the
economic consequences may be severe. As La
Sonrisa’s expert attested, again unrebutted
by the party ostensibly bearing the burden of
proof, percentage-based liquidated damages
provisions for late balloon payments are com-
mon components of commercial loan con-

forced to sell the note to a collection agency at
a discount. Late fees and default interest make
the defaulted notes more attractive to collec-
tion firms, resulting in higher purchase prices
for the notes, which helps the lender to protect
ageinst losses and keep its capital in the mar-

2. “Under a traditional common law analysis, the
burden of proof regarding the enforceability of a
liquidated damages clause rests squarely on the

119

tracts, Every single one is now in legal pur-
gatory.

160 I prefer the approach taken by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in MetLife, 782
Ad at 499, which is more faithful to the
Restatement and protective of freedom of
contract, MetLife involved a contract contain-
ing percentage-based late and default fees as
liquidated damages, in addition to collection
and various other fees. Jd. at 495-96. At trial,
MetLife’s expert testified that a 5% late fee
was the industry custom and standard, and
‘was a reasonable forecast of costs including
“lost investment opportunities.” Id, at 496,
Unlike here, the party challenging the provi-
sion actually produced contrary evidence, Id.
at 497, The trial court found both the late fee
and a 12.55% default fee represented reason-
able liquidated damages. Jd. The court of
appeals reversed for reasons similar to those
in the majority opinion here. Jd. at 497-98.

61 The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals. It began by noting that a
“need for close scrutiny arises from the pos-
sibility that stipulated damages clauses may
constitute an oppressive penalty.” Id. at 498,
But the court should assess such provisions
on a ““continuum; the more uncertain the
damages caused by a breach, the more lati-
tude courts give the parties on their estimate
of damages.” Id, The court held that “liqui-
dated damages provisions in a commercial
contract between sophisticated parties are
presumptively reasonable and the party chal-
lenging the clause bears the burden of prov-
ing its unreasonableness.” Id, at 499.

162 Applying those standards, the court
concluded that the 5% late fee was reason-
able because (1) “[i]t seems evident that late
payments on larger loans would present a
greater risk to the lender” given that they
constitute a larger portion of a lender’s port-
folio, and (2) “damages resulting from the

party seeking to set it aside.” Dimatteo, 38 Am.
Bus. LJ. at 664-65. “Although courts recognize
this traditional allocation of burden of proof, in
reality the onus seems to be upon the non-
breaching party to prove reasonableness..., In
fact, some courts remain largely influenced by
any disproportion between the stipulated amount
and actual damages.” Id. at 667-68. That is an
accurate depiction of the majority analysis,

120

loss of investment opportunity increases with
the size of the late installment payment,”
thus “a lender suffers both larger adminis-
trative and ‘opportunity cost? damages when
a borrower is late with a larger payment.”
Id. at 500. Because operational “costs are
spread over an entire loan portfolio, it is
difficult to identify specific damages attribut-
able to the late payment or default of one
specific borrower.” Id.

768 Given the difficulty in forecasting
damages from late payment or default, the
court looked to what was permitted by stat-
ute “and what constitutes common practice in
a competitive industry.” Id. The testimony
that 5% was the industry standard was (as
here) uncontradicted. Id. By contrast, cases
in which fixed-percentage liquidated damages
provisions were struck down “involved un-
usually large percentages or explicit evidence
of a coercive intent,” Jd. at 501-02 (citing
cases).

164 The court also sustained the 12.55%
default interest rate, “As with the costs of
late payments, the actual losses resulting
from a commercial loan default are difficult
to ascertain,” Jd. at 503. “The lender cannot
predict the nature or duration of a possible
default,” nor “is it possible when the loan is
made to know what market conditions might
be” at time of default or “what might be
recovered from a sale of the collateral.” Id.
“For example, a lender cannot know what its
own borrowing costs will be if a borrower
defaults ... nor accurately predict what eco-
nomic return it will lose when the borrower
fails to repay the loan on time.” Jd, Because
the 12.55% default interest rate “appears to
be a reasonable estimate of potential dam-
ages, falls well within the range demonstrat-
ed to be customary, and because a stipulated
damages clause negotiated between sophisti-
cated commercial entities is presumptively
reasonable,” the court sustained it. Id.

165 Our Court likewise should presume
that a liquidated damages provision negotiat-
ed by sophisticated parties is valid and con-
clude that the party bearing the burden of
demonstrating its unreasonableness failed to
sustain that burden in this case, Instead, we
reward the party breaching the contract by
removing a critical term to which it assented

and, as a necessary consequence adding both
insult and injury, require the non-breaching
party to pay its attorney fees. Our decision
will inevitably have a corrosive effect on the
making and enforcement of contracts in Ari-
zona, with predictable and substantial ad-
verse economic consequences, notwithstand-
ing that freedom of contract is enshrined in
our organic law. With great respect to my
colleagues, I dissent.

393 P.3d 461
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Wade Cole DICKINSON, Appellant.
No, 1 CA-CR 14-0521

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 3/16/2017
As Amended March 29, 2017

TE TE
Misi

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Eliza C. Ybarra, Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Public Defender’s Office,
Prescott, By Jared G. Keenan, Counsel for
Appellant.

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
Lawrence F. Winthrop and Chief Judge
Michael J. Brown joined.

OPINION

CATTANI, Judge:

11 Wade Cole Dickinson challenges on
double jeopardy grounds his convictions and
sentences for fraudulent schemes, forgery,
taking the identity of another, and theft, He
argues that because the convictions resulted
from a second trial following a trial in which
the superior court swa sponte ordered a mis-
trial over his objection, the second trial vio-
lated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
United States and Arizona Constitutions. We
agree because the mistrial did not result

from a “manifest necessity” and was not
essential to the ends of public justice. Ac-
cordingly, we vacate Dickinson’s convictions
and remand with instructions to enter a judg-
ment of dismissal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 The charges arose from the theft of a
high-end mountain bike from a home in
Cornville in March 2010, and its sale a few
days later by Dickinson on Craigslist. During
opening statements in the first trial (which
began in August 2018), defense counsel told
the jury that the mountain bike Dickinson
had sold on Craigslist was not the bike stolen
from Cornville, as evidenced by the differ-
ence between the serial number for the sto-
Jen bike and the serial number on the bike
Dickinson sold.

18 Later, while cross-examining the per-
son who bought the bike from Dickinson,
Dickinson’s counsel learned that the buyer's
wife had recently given Prescott police offi-
cers a scrap of paper on which she had
written two numbers that the Cornville theft
victim told her had been on his mountain
bike, one of which the buyer indicated
matched a number on the bike he purchased
from Dickinson. The buyer’s wife apparently
had the note for three years before giving it
to the police two weeks before trial, and
neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel
was aware of the contents of the note until
the buyer mentioned it during cross-exami-
nation,

94 After a lengthy discussion about possi-
ble ways to address the surprise testimony
and the lack of timely disclosure of the note,
the superior court asked the parties if they
wanted a mistrial. Dickinson’s counsel initial-
ly noted that one possible resolution was a
mistrial, which would allow him to start over
with a new opening statement and cross-
examination “fully appri[sled of the evi-
dence.” But counsel made clear that he pre-
ferred instead to proceed with the same jury,
without any further reference to the scrap of
paper.

15 The prosecutor argued that dismissal
with prejudice was not appropriate, and sug-

gested that empaneling a new jury was an
option, or that alternatively the court could
preclude further evidence of the note. The
prosecutor concluded by noting that the
State “can proceed forward with the exclu-
sion of this evidence, It’s not the State's first
priority, because all facts should go to the
jury. But, however, it’s an option for the
Court.”

16 After again indicating his preference to
go forward with trial, Dickinson’s counsel
indicated he would not move to strike the
surprise testimony, because he believed do-
ing so would emphasize it. Finally, Dickin-
son’s counsel told the court that if it deemed
a mistrial necessary, he would seek a dis-
missal with prejudice,

17 After the court declared a mistrial,
Dickinson’s counsel did not file a motion to
dismiss with prejudice, and the second trial
proceeded six months later, resulting in the
convictions detailed above,

18 The court sentenced Dickinson to a
total of 19.5 years in prison, to be served
consecutively to a 5-year term imposed on
revocation of probation in another case, Dick-
inson timely appealed, and we have jurisdic-
tion under Arizona Revised Statutes
(CA.RS.”) § 18-4038.4

DISCUSSION

I. Double Jeopardy.

HM 19 Dickinson argues that he did not
consent to the mistrial and, because the mis-
trial was not manifestly necessary, the sec-
ond trial was precluded by principles of dou-
ble jeopardy. Although Dickinson did not
move to dismiss the charges on double jeop-
ardy grounds below, “the prohibition against
double jeopardy is a fundamental right that
is not waived by the failure to raise it in the
trial court.” State v. Millanes, 180 Ariz, 418,
421, 885 P.2d 106 (App. 1994),

110 Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a
person may not “be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” U.S, Const, amend. V. The Arizona
constitution provides similar protection. See
Ariz, Const. art. II, § 10 (“No person shall

1, Absent material revisions after the relevant

123

be compelled in any criminal case to ... be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”),

HMM 1111 The Double Jeopardy Clause
not only protects a defendant’s right to be
free from multiple prosecutions, but also
“embraces the defendant’s ‘valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribu-
nal” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
508, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed2d 717 (1978)
(quoting Wade v. Hunter, 836 U.S. 684, 689,
69 S.Ct. 884, 98 L.Ed. 974 (1949)), Neverthe-
less, a defendant’s right to a single trial
“must in some instances be subordinated to
the public's interest in fair trials designed to
end in just judgments.” Wade, 336 U.S. at
689, 69 S.Ct. 834,

HM 112 “As a general rule, if the de-
fendant successfully moves for or consents to
a mistrial, retrial is not barred on double
jeopardy grounds.” State v. Minmitt, 208
Ariz. 481, 487, 128, 55 P.8d 774 (2002). But if
the court declares a mistrial over the defen-
dant’s objection, retrial is only permitted if
“taking all the circumstances into consider-
ation, there is a manifest necessity for the
act, or the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated.” Washington, 484 U.S. at
506 n,18, 98 S.Ct, 824 (quoting United States
v. Perez, 22 U.S, 579, 580, 9 Wheat. 579, 6
L.Ed, 165 (1824), We review claimed double
jeopardy violations de novo, see State v
Moody, 208 Ariz, 424, 487, 118, 94 P.8d 1119
(2004), but we review a court’s decision to
grant a mistrial and its ruling on manifest
necessity for an abuse of discretion,
McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Aviz. 274, 277,
123 P.2d 92 (1986),

A. Consent.

HI 118 The State argues that Dickinson
consented to the mistrial because he (1) ini-
tially suggested it as a possible remedy, (2)
affirmed that any other resolution would be
unfair, (8) did not move to dismiss the case
with prejudice (despite the superior court's
repeated invitations to do so), and (4) re-
quested that the trial be reset less than a
week after the mistrial had been declared.
We disagree.

date, we cite a statute’s current version.

124

14 Dickinson’s counsel initially noted that,
a mistrial would be one possible resolution of
the issue, and would allow him to start over
with a new opening statement and cross-
examination “fully apprifsled of the evi-
dence.” But he clearly indicated his prefer-
ence to proceed without further reference to
the untimely disclosed evidence, Although
Dickinson’s counsel equivocated somewhat
and at one point observed that because of the
late disclosure, “it sounds like the State of
Arizona has put me in the position of moving
for a mistrial at this point,” counsel conelud-
ed by stating:

I just hesitate to do that for numerous
reasons; one of which is we seated a jury, I
have made my presentation, I have showed
my hand, I have played my hol[e] cards
and now we are supposed to impanel a new
jury at the detriment to my client, It’s just
not fair,
Again, Judge, I’d ask that the scrap of
paper not be admitted and no one make
any reference to it any further.
The only reason, just for the record, I am.
not asking the court to strike [the wit-
ness]’s testimony in that regard is because
it simply emphasizes the error that is
made and every attorney is always in a
difficult position when they ask for a mo-
tion to strike. It just emphasizes the er-
rors. So I am not making a motion to
strike but I would request we keep this
jury, proceed with the testimony with no
reference to that serap of paper.

115 The State notes that Dickinson’s coun-
sel’s conduct after the court declared a mis-
trial—failing to move for dismissal with prej-
udice and requesting that the second trial be
reset—suggests that Dickinson implicitly
consented to the mistrial. But counsel's fail-
ure to do something after the mistrial was
granted did not revoke his prior objection to
the mistrial. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that Dickinson adequately conveyed
his objection to the mistrial.

B. Manifest Necessity.

HI 116 Because Dickinson did not con-
sent to the mistrial, principles of double jeop-
ardy bar retrial unless the mistrial resulted
from a showing of manifest necessity such

that the ends of public justice would other-
wise be defeated. There is no rigid formula
for determining whether manifest necessity
requires a mistrial, The United States Su-
preme Court has noted, however, that the
power to declare a mistrial “ought to be used
with the greatest caution, under urgent cir-
cumstances, and for very plain and obvious
causes,” Wade, 386 U.S, at 690, 69 S.Ct. 884,
In exercising discretion in deciding whether
to grant a mistrial, “the trial judge must
recognize that the defendant has a significant
interest in deciding whether to take the case
from the jury and ‘retains primary control
over the course to be followed in the event of
such error.” Jones v, Kiger, 194 Ariz, 528,
526, 19, 984 P.2d 1161 (1999) (citing United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609, 96 S.Ct,
1075, 47 L,Ed.2d 267 (1976),

IM {17 As explained by the Supreme
Court, there are varying degrees of “necessi-
ty,” and “we require a ‘high degree’ before
concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.”
Washington, 434 U.S, at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824,
“The question whether that ‘high degree’ has
been reached is answered more easily in
some kinds of cases than others.” Jd. at 507,
98 S.Ct, 824. At one extreme are cases in
which a prosecutor requests a mistrial to
allow the State to buttress weaknesses in the
State’s evidence; at the other extreme are
cases in which a mistrial is granted because a
jury has been unable to reach a verdict. Jd.
at 508-09, 98 S.Ct, 824,

HE s18 Courts apply the “strictest
serutiny ... when the basis for a mistrial is
the unavailability of critical prosecution evi-
dence, or when there is reason to believe that
the prosecutor is using the superior re-
sources of the State to harass or to achieve a
tactical advantage over the accused.” Id. at
508, 98 S.Ct. 824. In contrast, if a mistrial is
based on conduct by the defendant or de-
fense counsel, or on a jury’s inability to reach
a verdict, reviewing courts accord “great def-
erence” to the trial judge’s decision. Jd. at
509, 98 S.Ct, 824. This is because when con-
duct by the defendant or defense counsel
leads to a mistrial, the defendant should not
benefit from that conduct, and “the trial
judge’s determination is entitled to special

respect.” Id, at 510, 98 S.Ct. 824, And the
trial judge is best positioned to assess wheth-
er further deliberations would be helpful to
jurors who have been unable to reach a
verdict, and “fail[ure] to discharge a jury
which is unable to reach a verdict after pro-
tracted and exhausting deliberations” creates
“a, significant risk that a verdict may result
from pressures inherent in the situation rath-
er than the considered judgment of all the
jurors.” Id, at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824.

HM 119 Here, although the mistrial did
not result from a prosecution attempt to
buttress weaknesses in the State’s evidence
or to achieve a tactical advantage, the mistri-
al falls closer to that end of the spectrum
than to cases involving a jury’s inability to
reach a verdict or improper conduct by the
defendant or defense counsel. Neither Dick-
inson nor his counsel contributed in any way
to the alleged need for a mistrial, and even
assuming there was no malfeasance by the
prosecutor, the fact remains that favorable
evidence for the State was presented without
having been disclosed to the defendant, Ac-
cordingly, the superior court’s decision re-
garding manifest necessity for the mistrial is
not one to which we will accord great defer-
ence. See also State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz, 235,
242, 1.25, 172 P.8d 428 (App. 2007) (“[Allong
the spectrum of trial problems which may
warrant a mistrial and which vary in their
amenability to appellate scrutiny,’ the failure
of a prosecutor to discover and disclose evi-
dence requires an exacting inquiry. Under
such circumstances, we are required to strike
the balance in favor of the defendant.”) (cita-
tions omitted),

120 The superior court’s decision to grant.
a mistrial does not survive scrutiny, particu-
larly in light of Dickinson’s opposition to the
mistrial and the prosecutor's avowal that the
State could “proceed forward with the exclu-
sion of the evidence.” Most significantly, the
court failed to recognize Dickinson’s interest
in retaining primary control over the course
to be followed after the jurors learned about
information prejudicial to Dickinson but that
had not been disclosed prior to trial. See
Dimitaz, 424 US, at 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075; Kiger,
194 Ariz, at 526, 1.9, 984 P.2d 1161.

125

{21 In Kiger, this court reversed the supe-
rior court’s denial of a motion to dismiss with
prejudice after a prosecution witness dis-
closed arguably prejudicial hearsay evidence
during cross-examination, 194 Ariz, at 525,
528, 193, 16, 984 P.2d 1161. Defense counsel
asked the court to dismiss with prejudice if it
believed that fundamental error had oc-
eurred. Id, at 525, 15, 984 P.2d 1161, After
the court denied the request to dismiss with
prejudice, defense counsel “insisted that the
hearsay testimony was not prejudicial to his
ease and requested that the trial continue.”
Id, Nevertheless, the court sua sponte grant-
ed a mistrial, finding that the hearsay was of
“the type that I would never ever allow” and
that in “just watching the response of the
jurors to that testimony, that ... they all
changed their facial features and looked as it
was, as I interpreted, had [sic] a significant
impact on them.” Id.

722 This court rejected the superior
court's approach, noting the importance of
allowing the defendant to retain control un-
der such circumstances;

[The defendant] may believe that any error

in admitting improper evidence can be

cured by a motion to strike or a request

for admonition, or can be refuted by im-

peachment of the witness or contrary de-

fense evidence. Indeed, even when a palpa-

bly prejudicial error has been committed a

defendant may have valid personal reasons

to prefer going ahead with the trial rather
than beginning the entire process anew,
such as a desire to minimize the embar-
rassment, expense, and anxiety mentioned
above. These considerations are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant, not
the judge, and the latter must avoid de-
priving the defendant of his constitutional-
ly protected freedom of choice in the name
of a paternalistic concern for his welfare.
Id, at 526, 19, 984 P.2d 1161 (quoting Curry
v Superior Cowrt, 2 Cal.8d 707, 87 Cal.Rptr.
861, 470 P.2d 845, 851 (1970).

HI 128 Here, the superior court rea-
soned that prejudicial information had inad-
vertently been presented to the jurors, and
further concluded that the jurors would be
confused without more explanation, Although
juror confusion is a valid consideration in

126

determining whether to grant a mistrial, any
assessment of whether the jurors would have
been unable to reach a verdict was prema-
ture. Cf. State v. Walton, 159 Ariz, 571, 578,
769 P.2d 1017 (1989) (“First, speculation
about ‘potential confusion among jurors’ is
insufficient to establish actual jury confu-
sion.”). Moreover, the allegedly confusing in-
formation was clearly prejudicial to Dickin-
son, rather than the State. But Dickinson did
not view the information to be of such a
prejudicial nature or to be so confusing as to
deny him his right to a fair trial, and his
assessment of the need for a mistrial (or lack
thereof) carries considerable weight. See
Dinitz, 424 US. at 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075; Kiger,
194 Ariz, at 526, 19, 984 P.2d 1161. In fact,
defense counsel may have had tactical rea-
sons for wanting to go forward with trial,
including that a mistrial would simply result
in delay and an opportunity for the prosecu-
tor to further develop the reliability of the
briefly-referenced note. See Kiger, 194 Ariz.
at 527, 111, 984 P.2d 1161 (“Defense counsel
wanted to continue with the trial, not only
because he did not find the hearsay testimo-
ny prejudicial, but also because the State
would then have a second opportunity to
present potentially damaging testimony that
it had been precluded from introducing in the
first trial.”),

124 In Aguilar, this court noted a general
rule that “the state’s inability to use a piece
of evidence does not constitute manifest ne-
cessity for a mistrial.” 217 Ariz. at 240, 172
P.8d 428 (citing cases from other jurisdic-
tions). It follows, then, that the State’s inabil-
ity to further mention evidence that was
prejudicial to the defendant and that was
inadvertently presented to the jurors similar-
Jy does not constitute manifest necessity for
a mistrial. Accordingly, and because there
potentially was a tactical reason for Dickin-
son’s decision to proceed with trial notwith-
standing the damaging information disclosed
during cross-examination, the superior court
abused its discretion by finding manifest ne-
cessity for the mistrial,

CONCLUSION

125 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
Dickinson’s convictions and sentences and re-

mand with instructions to dismiss the
charges with prejudice.

393 P.3d 467
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Terry Dale JAMES, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0447

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed March 29, 2017

be
xT
mt

_

28

. We correct the sentencing minute entry by de-
leting the identical commencement date for the
consecutive sentence imposed for count two, sex-
ual conduct with a minor. Cf. State v. Ovante, 231
Ariz, 180, 139, 291 P.3d 974, 982 (2013) (cor-

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Mariette Ambri, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Dean Brault, Pima County Legal Defend-
er, By Scott A. Martin and Robb P. Holmes,
Assistant Legal Defenders, Tucson, Counsel
for Appellant

Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Howard and Judge Vasquez
concurred,

OPINION

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:

HM 11 Following a jury trial, appellant
Terry James was convicted of child molesta-
tion and sexual conduct with a minor under
the age of twelve. The trial court imposed
enhanced, consecutive sentences of twenty-
one years and life with the possibility of
release after thirty-five years, respectively.
On appeal, James primarily challenges the
admission of other-act evidence pursuant to
Rule 404(¢), Ariz. R, Evid. We affirm for the
reasons that follow.

Factual and Procedural Background

TM {2 We view the facts in the light
most favorable to sustaining the convictions,
See State v. Diwon, 226 Ariz, 545, n.2, 250
P.8d 1174, 1177 n.2 (2011), In 2014, James
was charged in Pima County with two of-
fenses arising from a single episode against
T.H., his step-granddaughter, at some point
between 2002 and 2007. T.H. was born in
1997, and she was between six and ten years
old at the time of the incident. Count one
alleged James had committed child molesta-
tion by touching her vulva with his finger;

recting similar error). “It is .,. manifestly im-

possible for consecutive sentences to both begin

on the same date.” State v. Young, 106 Ariz, 589,

591, 480 P.2d 345, 347 (1971),

count two alleged sexual conduct with a mi-
nor based on him licking her vulva.

18 Before trial, the state sought to intro-
duce evidence of other sex acts James had
committed against T.H, around the same pe-
riod of time. Those acts had been reported
to, and investigated by, police in Mesa in
2006, Because T.H. was reluctant to partici-
pate in that investigation, no charges were
brought in that jurisdiction, The state further
sought to introduce evidence of various sex
offenses James had committed against his
stepdaughter A.H., who is T.H’s mother,
when she was a child in the 1980s, Those acts
against A.H, had resulted in James pleading
guilty to attempted sexual abuse.

14 James opposed the state’s motion and
requested an evidentiary hearing in which
AH. and T.H, would testify and be subject to
cross-examination, He asserted, inter alia,
that without such testimony the trial court
could not find he had committed the other
acts by clear and convincing evidence,

15 After hearing argument on the motion,
the trial court denied James’s requested
hearing, The court then ruled the other-act
evidence admissible under Rule 404(c) and
made the findings required by that provision,
The court based its ruling on “the documents
that the State submitted as an offer of
proof.” James had referred to several of
those documents during the hearing, and he
made no objection based on a lack of disclo-
sure. With two exceptions, however, those
materials were never entered into the trial
court’s record,?

916 At trial, A.H. testified that, from the
time she was about seven years old until she
was sixteen, James “would fondle [her] ...
fondle [her] vagina ... grab [her] breast ...
try to lick [her] ... [and] take pictures of
{her].” A.H, further testified that James had
been convicted based on those acts, As to the
Mesa incidents, T.H. testified James had

2. According to the trial court's remarks at the
hearing, it had “read” T.H.’s statements in a
forensic interview regarding the present offenses,
a transcript of T.H,'s “confrontation call” with
James, an interview between AH. and a detec-
tive in this matter, police reports regarding the
crimes against A.H., documents related to his
conviction for that abuse, and police reports re-
garding the Mesa offenses against TH.

129

touched and licked her vagina, he had rubbed
his penis against her vagina on three sepa-
rate occasions, and he had taken photographs
of her vagina,

17 With regard to the charged offenses in
Pima County, T.H. testified that James had
told her parents he was taking her to a store
in his pickup truck. He then drove her to a
remote area in the desert, stopped the truck,
removed her pants, licked her vagina, and
touched it with his finger. In a recorded
telephone conversation or “confrontation
call” from 2014 admitted at trial, James apol-
ogized to T.H, for touching and licking her
vagina when she was younger. He also apolo-
gized when she stated he had done “it” to her
“every time” she had visited him,

8 When T.H, asked why he had acted
this way, James explained he was sexually
attracted to young girls and he found it
difficult to control his impulses around them,
He acknowledged he had been similarly at-
tracted to T.H.’s mother when she was a
child, and, as a result, he had been convicted
as a sex offender for “messing around” with
her, The record of conviction the state en-
tered into evidence showed that James had
pleaded guilty in 1991 to attempted sexual
abuse committed against A.H. in 1989,

19 After the jury found James guilty of
both the charges, the trial court determined
he had one predicate felony conviction. The
court imposed the enhanced sentences noted
above, and this appeal followed.

Other-Act Evidence

110 James challenges the trial court’s ad-
mission of the other-act evidence on the
ground that “contested [Rule] 404(c) evidence
must be demonstrated by clear and convinc-
ing evidence at a pretrial hearing based on
live witness testimony or former witness tes-
timony, subject to cross-examination, with a

3. The parties acknowledge that a record of
James's prior conviction was later admitted into
evidence, and the audio recording of the tele-
phone call between T.H. and James was admitted
at trial, but not the transcript of it,

130

sufficient record to permit effective appellate
review.” Our analysis begins with the text of
the rule, which provides, in relevant part:

In a criminal case in which a defendant
is charged with having committed a sexual
offense, or a civil case in which a claim is
predicated on a party’s alleged commission
of a sexual offense, evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted
by the court if relevant to show that the
defendant had a character trait giving rise
to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit
the offense charged. In such a case, evi-
dence to rebut the proof of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts, or an inference therefrom,
may also be admitted.

(1) In all such cases, the court shall
admit evidence of the other act only if it
first finds each of the following:

(A) The evidence is sufficient to permit
the trier of fact to find that the defendant
committed the other act.

(B) The commission of the other act
provides a reasonable basis to infer that
the defendant had a character trait giving
rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to
commit the crime charged.

(C) The evidentiary value of proof of the
other act is not substantially outweighed
by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or other factors mentioned in Rule

() The court shall make specific find-
ings with respect to each of (A), (B), and
(C) of Rule 404(e)(1).

Ariz, R, Evid. 404(¢).

Hs 1111 The parties essentially raise
three issues related to the other-act evidence.
First, they dispute what a trial court must
find when making its clear-and-convincing
determination under Rule 404(c)(1)(A). See-
ond, they disagree about whether an eviden-
tiary hearing with witness testimony was re-
quired in this case.! Third, they dispute what
effect, if any, resulted from the failure to
include in the record the state’s proffered
evidence. We address each issue in turn,
4, Although James contends the denial of such a

hearing violated his rights to confrontation and

due process, we find these constitutional claims

waived on appeal due to his failure to develop a
legal argument on these issues. See Ariz. R. Crim.

mindful that we generally review the admis-
sion of evidence under Rule 404(c) for an
abuse of discretion, see State v. Vega, 228
Ariz, 24, 16, 262 P.8d 628, 680 (App. 2011),
yet we review de novo the interpretation of
the rules of evidence. See State v. Steinle,
239 Ariz, 415, 16, 872 P.8d 939, 941 (2016).

Clear and Convincing Evidence

912 As a threshold matter, we must ad-
dress what a trial court is required to find
pursuant to Rule 404(c)(1)(A) when admitting
other-act evidence. James contends a court
must find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the defendant committed the other act
alleged. The state, emphasizing the language
of this subsection, maintains that the rule
merely requires a determination of the legal
sufficiency of the evidence, namely whether it
would “permit the trier of fact to find that
the defendant committed the other act.” Ariz,
R. Evid. 404(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added), The
state further reasons that, because the un-
corroborated testimony of a single victim
may suffice as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt in cases involving sexual offenses,
State v. Williams, 111 Ariz, 175, 177-78, 526
P.2d 714, 716-17 (1974), a trial court must
find the Rule 404(c) standard met when an
alleged act is supported by a victim’s state-
ment, unless the victim’s account is physical-
ly impossible or otherwise so equivocal that
reasonable persons could not accept it as
true. If a trial court were to actually weigh
the evidence under Rule 404(c), the state
contends, this would “usurp the trier of fact’s
(i.e., the jury’s) role.”

Hl 118 We reject the state’s argument
for several reasons, Our supreme court has
repeatedly stated that, as a prerequisite for
admitting evidence under Rule 404(¢), “the
court must find by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant committed the oth-
er act.” State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 159,
872 P.8d 945, 968 (2016); accord State v.
Ferrero, 229 Ariz, 239, n.1, 274 P.3d 509, 511
n1 (2012) (noting “[t]he state must prove

P. 31.13(C)(1)(vi); see also State v. Moody, 208
Ariz. 424, n.9, 94 P.3d 1119, 1147 n.9 (2004)
("Merely mentioning an argument is not
enough.”).

that the defendant committed the other act”
and citing State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580,
584, 944 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1997), as source of
heightened standard of proof); State v. Agui-
lar, 209 Ariz, 40, 1180, 84, 97 P.8d 865, 874,
875 (2004) (citing Terragas and emphasizing
trial court should focus on whether clear and
convincing evidence establishes defendant
committed other crimes). As an intermediate
appellate court, we are bound to follow our
supreme court’s construction of its own rules,
Cullen v. Auwto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz.
417, 110, 189 P.8d 844, 347 (2008); see State
v, Bejarano, 219 Ariz, 518, 16, 200 P.8d 1016,
1017 (App. 2008) (“[W]e may not disregard or
modify the law as articulated by the Arizona
Supreme Court....”),

114 However, even if the issue were an
undecided one, we would reject the state’s
contention given the great weight of authori-
ty against it, We acknowledge that the lan-
guage of Rule 404(c) does not resolve the
question presented. Indeed, the text of the
rule does not specify any standard of proof
for the admission of other-act evidence,
which has led some commentators to ques-
tion whether the clear-and-convincing stan-
dard articulated for criminal cases applies
equally to civil ones. See, ag, 1 Daniel J.
McAuliffe & Shirley J. McAuliffe, Arizona
Law of Evidence § 104:5 (4th ed. 2016). This
Jack of textual clarity in Rule 404(¢)(1)(A)
allows a court to consider the rule’s comment
as evidence of the rule-makers’ intended
meaning. See Aguilar, 209 Ariz, 40, 126, 97
P.8d at 873, That comment provides, in un-
ambiguous terms: “To be admissible in a
criminal case, the relevant prior bad act must
be shown to have been committed by the
defendant by clear and convincing evidence.”
Ariz, R, Evid. 404(c) emt. to 1997 amend.

915 Additional support for this view is
found in the purpose of the rule, which is
made manifest by its history and features,
See State v. Whitman, 284 Ariz, 565, 18, 824
P.8d 851, 852 (2014) (recognizing language,
context, background, and purpose of rule as
guides to interpretation). In Aguilar, our su-
preme court explained that it had promulgat-
ed Rule 404(c) as a compromise measure,
rejecting a broader proposal based on a fed-
eral rule “that would [have] allow[ed] a court

131

to admit evidence of other sex crimes in most
cases charging a sexual offense.” Aguilar,
209 Ariz, 40, 1719-20, 97 P.8d at 871. Our
supreme court also included procedural pro-
visions in Rule 404(c) that are designed to
reduce the extreme risk of undue prejudice a,
defendant faces when evidence of an aber-
rant sexual trait is offered. Aguilar, 209 Ariz.
40, 1130-31, 97 P.3d at 874. Those proce-
dures require a trial court to make specific
findings regarding the pertinent standard of
proof, the probative value of the evidence
offered, and the potential for unfair preju-
dice, See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(¢)(1)(D).

HM {16 Rather than being an empty for-
mality, this process is designed to be a mean-
ingful exercise. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 11 80-
31, 97 P.8d at 874. Requiring clear and con-
vineing evidence of sexually aberrant acts
provides “assurance that the other act indeed
occurred,” thereby helping to “assur[e] that
probative need over-balances the potential
for unfair prejudice.” State v. Garcia, 200
Ariz. 471, 131, 28 P.8d 827, 882 (App. 2001),
disapproved im part by Ferrero, 229 Ariz.
239, 1110-12, 274 P.3d at 511-12. Arizona
courts impose an elevated standard of proof
under Rule 404(b) in criminal cases for the
same reason: “{b]ecause of the high probabil-
ity of prejudice from the admission of prior
bad acts, the court must ensure that the
evidence against the defendant directly es-
tablishes ‘that the defendant took part in the
collateral act.’” Terrazas, 189 Ariz. at 584,
944 P.2d at 1198, quoting Vivian M. Rodri-
guez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes,
Wrongs or Acts Under the Intent Provision
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B): The
Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair
Prejudice, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 451, 457
(1998).

Hl {17 Accordingly, we hold that Rule
404(c) requires a trial court to determine, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defen-
dant committed the other act. As a purely
textual matter, the state’s contrary argument.
is a significant one. Yet the state’s construc-
tion fails to account for the interrelated pro-
visions of Rule 404(c) and the rationale be-
hind them. In essence, the state urges an
approach similar to the federal rules of evi-
dence, which assess whether the “jury could

132

yeasonably find ... that the ‘other act’ oc-
curred” under the applicable standard of
proof, United States v, Enjady, 184 F.3d
1427, 1488 (10th Cir, 1998), citing Huddle-
ston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685, 108
S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Hd.2d 771 (1988), Because
the Arizona Supreme Court has deliberately
departed from the federal rules in this re-
spect, see Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 11 19-20, 97
P.8d at 870-71; Terrazas, 189 Ariz, at 581-82,
944 P.2d at 1195-96, we cannot accept the
state’s contention,

Evidentiary Hearing

WI 118 As they did below, the parties
next dispute whether the trial court was
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing
with witness testimony concerning the al-
leged other acts. James maintains such a
hearing was necessary, relying on our su-
preme court's decision in Aguilar, The state
takes the opposite position, citing this court’s
opinion in State v. LeBrun, 222 Ariz. 188, 218
P.8d 882 (App. 2009). The resolution of this
question demands a somewhat detailed ex-
amination of both cases.

{19 In Aguilar, the trial court had found
evidence of three separate sexual assaults to
be cross-admissible under Rule 404(¢), Agui-
lar, 209 Ariz, 40, 112-4, 97 P.8d at 866. In
making this ruling, the court had based its
decision solely on the pleadings, the argu-
ments of counsel, and a transcript of the
grand jury proceeding. Id. 188. Those mate-
vials contained no testimony from the vic-
tims, only descriptions of their statements to
police, Jd. Thus, although the documents es-
tablished that the defendant had been ac-
cused of sexual assault by the victims, those
items did not resolve whether the sexual
encounters had been consensual, as the de-
fendant had claimed. Id. 184,

120 On these facts, our supreme court
held that the determination required by Rule
404(c)(1)(A) depended on the relative credi-
bility of the victims compared to the defen-
dant. Aguilar, 209 Ariz, 40, 185, 97 P.3d at
875. The court further noted that a resolution
of this credibility question was impossible
because the trial court “neither heard from
the victims nor was presented with any prior
testimony from them.” Jd, Our supreme

court therefore reversed the lower court's
ruling due to insufficient evidence in the
record “to make the necessary finding that
clear and convincing evidence established”
the other crimes, Jd,

{21 In LeBrun, this court distinguished
Aguilar and clarified that Rule 404(c) does
not require an evidentiary hearing with wit-
ness testimony in every case, LeBrum, 222
Ariz, 188; 118, 218 P.8d at 336, The state had
submitted evidence to the trial court that
included “audio and video recordings of
statements by the victims.” Id. 18, We found.
this evidence sufficient to support a clear-
and-convincing determination under Rule
404(¢)(1)(A), LeBrum, 222 Ariz, 183, 115, 218
P,8d at 886, In so holding, we noted that the
rules of evidence do not restrict the types of
evidence a court may consider, nor do they
necessarily require sworn statements. Id,
918, 18-14; see Ariz. R, Evid, 104(a) (“The
court must decide any preliminary question
about whether a witness is qualified, a privi-
lege exists, or evidence is admissible, In so
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence
rules, except those on privilege.”). Yet we
also noted that no issue of material fact
existed for the trial court to resolve in order
to determine the admissibility of the evi-
dence, LeBrun, 222 Ariz, 188, 115, 218 P.8d
at 336,

22 We conclude the present case is more
like LeBrum than Aguilar, although we ree-
ognize that it lies between the two in some
respects, Much like in Aguilar, the trial court
here relied on documentary evidence to sup-
port its ruling, The court based its decision
largely on “police reports” reciting the state-
ments of the witnesses, But the court also
considered first-person accounts by the vic-
tims, as in LeBrum, 222 Ariz, 188, 115, 213
P.8d at 886, The court read a transcript of
'T.H’s forensic interview and a transcript of
the confrontation call between T.H. and
James, Unlike the recordings at issue in
LeBrun, the transcripts in this case do not
capture a witness’s appearance and demean-
or, see State v. Sparks, 147 Ariz, 51, 54, 708
P.2d 782, 785 (1985), or the “paralinguistic
features [of speech] such as pitch, intonation,
and pauses” that assist a trier of fact in
making credibility determinations, T.W.M.

Custom Framing v. Indus, Comm’n, 198
Ariz, 41, 122, 6 P.8d 745, 752 (App. 2000).

123 Ultimately, however, we conclude the
present case is most like LeBrun with re-
spect to the paramount consideration in de-
termining a defendant’s entitlement to an
evidentiary hearing: whether a material fac-
tual dispute existed in the record that would
necessitate the presentation of additional evi-
dence, In LeBrun, no such material dispute
existed, By contrast, the defendant in Agui-
lar had contradicted the witnesses’ accounts
in a way that demanded resolution by the
court, James made no comparable claims
here. Nor did the record otherwise raise a
question of witness credibility related to the
other acts. Although James asserted in his
responsive filing that T.H. “initially denied
that events in Mesa ... [had] occurred” and
that she had refused to participate in the
Mesa investigation, his argument at the sub-
sequent hearing and references to police doc-
uments neither supported these assertions
nor raised any doubts about T.H.’s claims
regarding the other acts,

MM 124 Im fact, the record supported
both women’s allegations, In the confronta-
tion call, James admitted to licking and re-
peatedly touching TH. He likewise admitted
to criminal activity with A.H. that had result-
ed in his conviction as a sex offender. James
did not admit to all the details of the past
incidents in the call itself. But both LeBrun
and Rule 104(a) support the proposition that
an evidentiary hearing is not required simply
because a defendant demands one or because
confrontation and cross-examination are the
best tools for developing facts, exposing in-
consistencies, and determining witness credi-
bility. Given the absence of a true factual
dispute regarding the other acts, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
satisfied, even in the absence of a pretrial
hearing with live witness testimony.

Incomplete Record

H,s«1.25 Most of the documents re-
lied on by the trial court are absent from the
record before us. The defendant asserts that
this constituted error which entitles him to
relief. To the extent the state maintains that

133

it did not need to file its proffered Rule
404(c) evidence in the record below, this con-
tention is mistaken, The proponent of other-
act evidence carries the burden of proving its
admissibility in all respects. See Ferrero, 229
Ariz, 289, 124, 274 P.8d at 514 (noting propo-
nent must “satisfly] Rule 404(c)’s prerequi-
sites”); see also State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz,
1, 110, 284 P.8d 569, 576 (2010) (acknowl-
edging burden under Rule 404(b)); State v
Salazar, 181 Ariz, 87, 91, 887 P.2d 617, 621
(App, 1994) (emphasizing that proponent of
other-act evidence must show Rule 408 bal-
ance favors admission); of State v. Ives, 187
Ariz, 102, 110, 927 P.2d 762, 770 (1996)
(recognizing proponent’s burden under case
Jaw predating Rule 404(¢)); State v. Superior
Court, 129 Ariz, 860, 361-62, 681 P.2d 142,
143-44 (App. 1981) (same), And, Rule
404(e)(1)(D) requires specific findings by a
trial court in order to enable appellate review
of that court’s ruling. Agwilar, 209 Ariz. 40,
1381, 97 P.8d at 874. For such a review to
occur, the materials on which a trial court
based its findings should be made part of the
record, The failure to include such items in a
trial record therefore does not comport with
Rule 404(¢),

HI {1.26 The state suggests that the de-
fendant has a duty to ensure that the state
properly presents its evidence to support a
Rule 404(¢) finding. We reject the unsupport-
ed contention that the defendant has a duty
to assist the state in complying with its evi-
dentiary burden. However, the defendant
does have a duty to object to any procedural
irvegularities he wishes to later raise on ap-
peal, James did not specifically do so. He
objected only to the absence of witness testi-
mony and  cross-examination, Rule
108(a)(1)(A), Ariz, R. Evid., requires that an
objection be made with specificity so as “to
allow the adverse party to obviate the objec-
tion and to permit the trial court to intelli-
gently rule on the objection and avoid error.”
In ve Tiffany O,, 217 Aviz, 370, 15, 174 P.8d
282, 284 (App. 2007), quoting Thompson v.
Better-Bilt Aluminum Prods, Co., 187 Ariz.
121, 129, 927 P.2d 781, 789 (App. 1996), Be-
cause James did not properly raise the issue
below when it could have been cured, he now
carries the burden of showing any error was

134

both fundamental and prejudicial in order to
obtain appellate relief, See State wv
Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561, 11 19-20, 115 P.38d
601, 607-08 (2005).

127 The state’s omission here resulted in
no identifiable prejudice because James ap-
parently had access to all the documents
relied on by the trial court. As noted above,
he made no objection to a lack of disclosure
under Rule 404(c)(8), and he referred to nu-
merous police documents at the hearing. The
only question he raised concerning any docu-
ments was whether they were properly certi-
fied. His novel contention that the proffered
documents were “secret” thus finds no sup-
port in the record, and his suggestion that
the court might have relied on different doc-
uments than those disclosed is merely un-
founded speculation.

HI 1.28 In addition, the confrontation
call and document showing his felony convic-
tion were admitted at trial, as James ac-
knowledges, He asserts that “it is not proper
to consider trial evidence ... here.” But we
may affirm an evidentiary ruling on any basis
supported by the record. State v. Robinson,
168 Ariz. 191, 199, 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987);
see State v. Herrera, 232 Ariz, 536, 1114, 24—
25, 307 P.8d 108, 110, 118 (App. 2018) (distin-
guishing ruling under Rule 404(c) from one
on motion to suppress evidence). James
therefore has provided no reason to disturb
the trial court’s ruling admitting the other-
act evidence under Rule 404(c),

Additional Issues

29 James raises two other issues as to
which this court cannot grant appellate relief
due to controlling adverse authority. First, as
to the child molestation charge, James as-
serts the trial court failed to instruct the jury
that the state was required to prove his
touching was motivated by sexual interest.
Our supreme court recently rejected the con-
tention that such motivation is an element of
child molestation, stating instead that the
absence of sexual motivation is an affirmative
defense to be proven by a defendant. State v.
Holle, 240 Ariz, 800, 11, 879 P.8d 197, 198
(2016). We are bound to follow this decision.
See Francis v. Ariz, Dep't of Transp., 192
Ariz, 269, 1110-11, 968 P.2d 1092, 1094 (App.

1998) (recognizing that higher court’s opinion
becomes controlling upon its publication, re-
gardless of pending review).

180 Second, James preserves his objection
to the trial court, rather than the jury, find-
ing his prior conviction for the purpose of
sentence enhancement. He maintains that
this practice, which was approved by Almen-
davez-Torres v, United States, 523 U.S. 224,
246, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 850 (1998),
no longer enjoys the support of a majority of
Supreme Court justices. As we stated, how-
ever, in State v. Keith, 211 Ariz, 436, 13, 122
P.8d 229, 230 (App. 2005), we cannot antici-
pate a prospective ruling of the United
States Supreme Court on this topic.

Disposition

81 For the foregoing reasons, the convic-
tions and sentences are affirmed as correct-

ed.

393 P.3d 475
The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,
ve

Hon. Howard FELL, Judge Pro Tempore
of the Superior Court of the State of
Arizona, in and for the County of Pima,
Respondent,

and

Bryan Mitchell Lietzau, Real
Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2017-0013

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed April 4, 2017

135

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney,
By Nicolette Kneup, Deputy County Attor-
ney, Tucson, Counsel for Petitioner

Steven R. Sonenberg, Pima County Public
Defender, By Abigail Jensen, Christopher
Lynch, and Abigail Okrent, Assistant Public
Defenders, Tucson, Counsel for Real Party in
Interest,

Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Howard and Judge Vasquez
concurred,

OPINION

ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:

11 In this special action, the State of
Arizona seeks relief from the respondent
judge’s order precluding recordings of jail
telephone calls and visits involving the real
party in interest, defendant Bryan Lietzau,
and the judge’s order precluding a transcript
purportedly showing text messages between
Lietzau and the minor victim. Because the
state has not asserted it would have present-
ed any precluded recordings at trial absent
the respondent’s order, we decline to accept
jurisdiction to consider that issue. However,
because the respondent erred by concluding
the state could not present sufficient evi-
dence to authenticate the transcript pursuant
to Rule 901, Ariz. R. Evid., and the state has
no remedy by appeal, we accept jurisdiction
to address that issue and grant relief. See
Ariz, R. P. Spee. Actions 1(a), 3(c).

136
Background

12 Lietzau was charged with six counts of
sexual conduct with a minor under the age of
fifteen based on his alleged sexual relation-
ship with then thirteen-year-old S, in 2014,
The state disclosed a document purporting to
be a transcript of text messages between
Lietzau and the victim. Lietzau’s probation
officer had manually transeribed the mes-
sages from a smartphone he had taken from
Lietzau on December 10, 2014. The tran-
script consists of dozens of messages sent
over a four-day period from December 6 to
December 10, 2014, and reflects a romantic
and sexual relationship between the partici-
pants,

18 Lietzau moved to exclude the text-
message transcript, arguing inter alia that
the state could not provide sufficient proof
the messages were between him and the
victim and thus could not comply with Rule
901. Lietzau asserted both he and S, had
denied messaging each other and that a third
party, T., had used Lietzau’s phone to mes-
sage S.—which T, had corroborated during
an interview. Lietzau also pointed out that
the messages were not found in a later foren-
sic examination of the phone, that the proba-
tion officer could not recall the program he
had used to view the messages on the phone,
and that the service for the phone was regis-
tered to Lietzau’s mother.

14 The state responded that the probation
officer had claimed Lietzau told him the mes-
sages were from §, and that the messages
were consistent with other evidence. The
state noted that S, had admitted having a
sexual relationship with Lietzau and that she
would testify about exchanged text messages
between them. Additionally, according to the
state, recordings of jail calls showed Lietzau
had asked family members to contact S., had
given her a phone, and referred to the fact
he had carved “[S,] is mine” on his arm, The
state also noted that Lietzau had identified
himself in one of the messages. After hearing
argument, the respondent judge granted
Lietzau’s motion, stating the transcript was
precluded because the phone was not in Liet-
zau’s name and “other people had access to
it.” This petition for special action followed,

Discussion

HN 15 We review the respondent
judge’s authentication ruling for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Forde, 288 Ariz. 548, 174,
815 P.8d 1200, 1220 (2014). “An ‘abuse of
discretion’ is discretion manifestly unreason-
able, or exercised on untenable grounds, or
for untenable reasons.” Torres v. N. Am.
Van Lines, Inc., 185 Ariz, 85, 40, 658 P.2d
835, 840 (App. 1982), quoting Quigley v. City
Ct. of Tucson, 182 Ariz, 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738,
740 (App. 1982), A trial court abuses its
discretion if it makes an error of law in
reaching its decision or makes a discretion-
ary finding of fact that is not justified by
reason, State v. Aguilar, 224 Ariz, 299, 16,
280 P.8d 358, 359-60 (App. 2010).

Hs 16 “To authenticate an item of evi-
dence, the ‘proponent must produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is
what the proponent claims it is.’” Forde, 238
Ariz, 548, 174, 815 P.8d at 1220, quoting
Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a). The trial court “does
not determine whether the evidence is au-
thentic, but only whether evidence exists
from which the jury could reasonably con-
clude that it is authentic.” State v. Lavers,
168 Ariz, 876, 386, 814 P.2d 333, 348 (1991). If
that standard is met, any uncertainty goes to
the weight rather than the admissibility of
the evidence. State v. George, 206 Ariz. 486,
1.81, 79 P.8d 1050, 1060 (App. 2003).

Hl 117 “[A] flexible approach is appropri-
ate, allowing a trial court to consider the
unique facts and cireumstances in each
case—and the purpose for which the evi-
dence is being offered—in deciding whether
the evidence has been properly authenticat-
ed.” State v. King, 226 Ariz. 258, 19, 245
P.8d 988, 942 (App, 2011), quoting State v.
Haight-Gywro, 218 Ariz. 356, 114, 186 P.8d
38, 87 (App. 2008) (alteration in King). A
party can authenticate evidence by various
means, including “{tJestimony of a witness
with knowledge” or “{dlistinctive characteris-
tices and the like,” such as the “contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distine-
tive characteristics” of the evidence, Ariz, R.
Evid, 901(b)(1), (4). Telephone conversations,
which are analogous to text messages, may
also be authenticated by “evidence that a call

‘was made to the number assigned at the time
to ... a particular person, if circumstances,
including self-identification, show that the
person answering was the one called.” Ariz,
R. Evid. 901(b)(6)(A).

18 Two Arizona cases have addressed the
authentication of text messages. In Forde,
our supreme court found sufficient authenti-
cation evidence when the seized phone was
taken from, and registered to, the sender,
the text message was sent to a phone regis-
tered to the defendant, and that phone was
found in her possession. 238 Ariz, 548, 1f'75-
76, 315 P.8d at 1220-21. Similarly, this court
found sufficient evidence to authenticate a
text message from the victim when the recip-
ient testified she often communicated with
the victim via text, had saved the number in
her own phone denominated with a nick-
name, that nickname was displayed when she
received the text, and the victim’s phone was
found next to her body. State v, Damper, 223
Ariz, 572, 1918-19, 225 P.8d 1148, 1152-53
(App. 2010).

19 Lietzau cites numerous out-of-state
cases addressing the authentication of text
messages. Those cases generally require
some indicia of authorship before a text mes-
sage can be attributed to a particular person,
See State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 884 P.8d 280,
288 (2014) (proponent must provide “direct.
or circumstantial corroborating evidence of
authorship” to authenticate text message);
Rodriguez v. State, 273 P.8d 845, 849 (Nev.
2012); Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996,
1005 (Pa, Super. 2011) (finding authentication
insufficient in absence of “evidence tending
to substantiate that Appellant wrote the
drug-related text messages”), We find this
approach to be consistent with Arizona law.
Such indicia was present in Damper, where
the victim regularly communicated via text
with the recipient using a particular phone,
and that phone was found near the victim’s
body. 228 Ariz, 572, 1118-19, 225 P.8d at
1152-53.

{10 The issue of authorship was not ad-
dressed in Forde, Instead, the defendant

1, In its review of Koch, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court observed that the approach in Forde
was “permissive” because it did not “require at
least some corroboration of authorship.” 630 Pa.

137

there challenged whether there was evidence
the message was “one intended for [her'].”
233 Ariz, 548, 175, 815 P,8d at 1220. But
sufficient indicia of authorship was present,
given that the phone from which the mes-
sages were sent was found in the sender's
possession.! Jd. 1 '75—76. In any event, noth-
ing in the authority Lietzau cites supports a
conclusion the authentication in this case was
insufficient as a matter of law. Instead, as we
explain, there was ample evidence from
which a jury could conclude the messages
were between Lietzau and the victim.

HH 111 The respondent judge’s authenti-
eation ruling was based on his determination
that Lietzau did not have exclusive access to
the phone and the phone was not registered
in his name, But we have found no authority
requiring exclusive possession, And, although
the phone was not registered to Lietzau, that
fact does not demand the conclusion that
Lietzau could not have sent the text mes-
sages in light of other evidence linking the
phone and messages to Lietzau. There is no
suggestion that Lietzau’s mother was the
author or recipient of the messages. Nor
would a jury have to accept T.’s claim that he
had regularly used Lietzau’s phone to mes-
sage the victim. T. claimed their relationship
was platonic. The content of the messages is
not consistent with a platonic relationship.
And the messages include references to T. in
the third person,

112 Lietzau asserts that, because the state
provided “none of th[e] information” our su-
preme court detailed in Forde, it has provid-
ed insufficient evidence to authenticate the
text messages, But Forde cannot reasonably
be read to establish a minimum threshold for
authentication. Instead, what constitutes suf-
ficient authentication will vary from case to
ease. See King, 226 Ariz, 258, 19, 245 P.8d at
942, And Lietzau is incorrect that “there is
no basis to conclude the outgoing messages
were sent by [him], or that the incoming
messages were intended for and received by
him.”

374, 106 A.3d 705, 714 (2014), As we have noted,
however, authorship was not challenged in
Forde.

138

{18 The transcript contains numerous in-
dications that the messages are between
Lietzau and the victim. In one message, Liet-
zau identifies himself. Given that the phone
was found in his possession, Lietzav’s self-
identification would permit a jury to find that
he participated in the text conversation. See
Ariz, R. Evid. 901(6)(A). Other messages ad-
dress the victim by name. Several messages
are described as photographs of Lietzan—
including photographs of Lietzau’s arm with
the phrase “[S.] is mine” “cut into it.” And, a
jury could conclude all the transcribed mes-
sages constitute conversations between the
same two individuals—the nicknames, topics,
and tone of the conversations are consistent
throughout.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 901(4).

914 Additionally, extrinsic evidence con-
nects the messages to Lietzau and the victim,
For instance, in the initial messages, Lietzau
informs the victim that he had obtained a
phone for her and that he would pay for it.
The state identified jail recordings in which
Lietzau stated he had (through his mother)
provided a phone for the victim. And, consis-
tent with the transcript, Lietzau stated dur-
ing a jail call that he had the victim’s name
on his arm,

{15 Moreover, in its motion below, the
state avowed the victim would testify she and
Lietzau had discussed via text message her
possibly being pregnant and getting a preg-
nancy test. A conversation consistent with
that avowal appears in the message tran-
2, In any event, neither party suggests we should

assess the messages separately fo determine if
the state has provided sufficient authentication

seript. See Ariz. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). And the
messages are consistent with her later ad-
mission that she had a sexual relationship
with Lietzau. This evidence, taken as a
whole, would permit the jury to conclude the
messages are a conversation between Lietzau
and the victim. The evidence is sufficient to
meet the authentication requirement of Rule
901 and the respondent abused his discretion
in finding otherwise. In this context, Liet-
zau’s contention—that these messages do not.
reflect conversations between himself and
woperly address the weight, not
ity, of that evidence, See
George, 206 Ariz, 436, 131, 79 P.8d at 1060,

Disposition
916 We decline special action jurisdiction
to address whether the respondent judge
erred in precluding recordings of jail phone
calls and visits. We accept special action ju-
risdiction to address whether the respondent
erred in precluding the text-message tran-
script and, for the reasons stated, we grant
relief. We vacate the respondent judge’s or-

der precluding the transcript,

evidence to show some of the messages, but not
others, were between Lietzau and the victim.

ory
oS

393 P.3d 919
CITY OF PHOENIX, Third-Party
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v

GLENAYRE ELECTRONICS, INC. Wil-
liam Lyon Homes, Inc; KB Home Hold-
ings, Inc; Richmond American Homes,
Ine.; MDC/Wood, Inc.; UDC Homes, Inc.,
nka Shea Homes of Phoenix, Inc. (FN)
and Elliott Homes, Inc.; Swengel-Rob-
bins Contracting Co., Inc; AZTEC Con-
struction, Inc; JNC, Inc; UH Holdings,
Inc; Los Paisanos Development, Inc;
Michael Newsome; CHI Construction
Co; Continental Homes, Inc; Pulte
Home Corp. Del Webb Corp.; Wittman
Contracting Co; Jeff Blandford Invest-
ments, Inc,, Third-Party Defendants/Ap-
pellees.

No, CV-16-0126-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona,

Filed May 10, 2017

Mary O’Grady (argued), Eric M. Fraser,
Jana L, Sutton, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoe-
nix; and Brad Holm, Phoenix City Attorney,
Phoenix, Attorneys for City of Phoenix

Keyin B, O’Malley (argued), Mark A. Full-
er, Thomas A, Maraz, Gallagher & Kennedy,
P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for CHI Construe-
tion Company and Continental Homes, Inc,

Dennis I, Wilenchik, John D, Wilenchik,
Colleen C. Thomas, Wilenchik & Bartness,
P.C,, Phoenix, Attorneys for Jeff Blandford
Investments, Inc,

Hileen Dennis GilBride, Jones, Skelton &
Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Ami-
ci Curiae Apache, Cochise, Coconino, Gra-
ham, Greenlee, La Paz, Maricopa, Navajo,
Pinal, Yavapai, and Yuma Counties, the
Town of Gilbert, the League of Arizona Cit-
ies and Towns and the-Arizona Municipal
Risk Retention Pool

Thomas J. Shorall Jr., Jason J. Boblick,
Shorall McGoldrick Brinkmann, Phoenix, At-
torneys for Wittman Contracting Company

Richard K, Mahrle, Gammage & Burnham,
P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Swengel~Rob-
bins Contracting Co., Ine,

Katherine E. Baker, Green & Baker Ltd,,
Scottsdale, Attorneys for Glenayre Electron-
ies Inc.

Brad D. Bleichner, Berkes Crane Robin-
son & Seal LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Attorneys
for William Lyon Homes, Ine,

Holly P. Davies, Alexix G, Terriquez, Lor-
ber Greenfield & Polito LLP, Phoenix, Attor-
neys for KB Home Holdings, Inc., Richmond.
American Homes, Inc, and MDC/Wood, Inc,

Jill Ann Herman, Wood Smith Henning &
Berman LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for UDC

Homes Inc., nka Shea Homes of Phoenix Inc,
(FN) and Elliot Homes Ine.

Joseph A. Kula, Benjamin R, Hid, Law
Office of Amy M. Hamilton, Scottsdale, At-
torneys for Aztec Construction, Inc.

Daniel D, Maynard, Maynard Cronin Er-
ickson Curran & Reiter PLC, Phoenix, At-
torneys for JNO, Inc, and UH Holdings, Inc.

Vincent J. Montell, Michael J. Ponzo, Quin-
tairos Prieto Wood & Boyer PA, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Los Paisanos Development,
Ine,

Michael S. Rubin, Stephen E. Richman,
Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Pulte Home Corporation and Del Webb
Corporation

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER
authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE BALES and JUSTICES
BRUTINEL, BOLICK, GOULD, LOPEZ,
and BERCH (Retired) * joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER,
opinion of the Court:

11 Under ARS. § 12-510, claims by gov-
ernmental entities generally are not barred
by statutes of limitations. For actions relat-
ing to real property, however, Arizona’s stat-
ute of repose provides that, “notwithstanding
any other statute,” an action “based in con-
tract” against certain identified parties must
be filed within “eight years after substantial
completion of the improvement of real prop-
erty.” AR.S, § 12-552(A), We hold that gov-
ernmental entities’ contract-based actions
(including claims for indemnification) that fall
within § 12-552(A) are subject to that stat-
ute’s proscription, notwithstanding § 12-510
or the common law doctrine known as “nul-
lum tempus oceurit regi” (time does not run
against the king). For the contractors in this
case having the requisite contractual rela-
tionship with the City of Phoenix, we hold
that the statute of repose applies; but for the
developers whose only relationship with the
City is as permittees, the statute of repose
does not apply.

* Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer has recused herself

from this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Rebecca

141
L

412 The superior court dismissed the City
of Phoenix’s indemnity claims under Arizona
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be grant-
ed. On review, therefore, we “assume the
truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations”
in the City’s pleading and “indulge all rea-
sonable inferences from those facts.” Cole-
man v. City of Mesa, 280 Ariz. 852, 356 19,
284 P.8d 863, 867 (2012); see also Watts v,
Medicis Pharm, Corp., 289 Ariz. 19, 22 12,
365 P.3d 944, 947 (2016),

13 In 2018, Carlos Tarazon sued the City
and numerous co-defendants after he devel-
oped mesothelioma, allegedly resulting from
long-term exposure to asbestos while install-
ing and repairing water piping for the vari-
ous defendants, (After Tarazon died in 2014,
the personal injury action was converted to
one for wrongful death.) The City filed a
third-party complaint against eighty-two de-
velopers (the “Developers”) and eight con-
tractors (the “Contractors”), alleging that
they had agreed to defend and indemnify the
City against negligence claims arising from
the construction projects on which Tarazon
worked.

14 The City alleged that the Contractors
separately contracted with it to perform cer-
tain water infrastructure projects between
1960 and 2000. The contracts include a provi-
sion stating, “{t]he Contractor agrees to in-
demnify and save harmless the City of Phoe-
nix .., from all suits, including attorneys’
fees and cost of litigation ... of any charac-
ter or any nature arising out of the work
done in fulfillment of the terms of this con-
tract,”

15 The Developers undertook their own
water-system projects, but only after apply-
ing for and obtaining right-of-way permits
from the City, as required by Phoenix City
Code § 31-35. As permittees, the Developers
were subject to Phoenix City Code § 31-40,
which provides;

White Berch, Justice of the Arizona Supreme

Court (Retired), was designated to sit in this
matter.

142

The permittee agrees to indemnify and

save harmless the City of Phoenix ...

from all suits ... arising out of or in
connection with any act or omission of the
permittee, his agents and employees, and

of any subcontractor ... which results di-

rectly or indirectly in the injury to or

death of any person or persons....

16 The permits also incorporated the De-
velopers’ project plans and specifications,
which included the Maricopa Association of
Governments Specifications (the “MAGS”).
The MAGS obligated the Developers to “at
all times observe and comply with all such
laws, ordinances, regulations, codes, orders,
and decrees.” By incorporating the MAGS,
the permits memorialized the Developers’
preexisting obligation to comply with the
City’s laws, including City Code § 31-40.

17 The Developers and Contractors moved
to dismiss the City’s third-party claims under
Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that those claims were
based in contract and barred by the eight-
year statute of repose in § 12-552(A). The
City responded that the statute does not
apply to the state’s political subdivisions and
that the Developers’ indemnity obligation
was not based in contract but instead arose
under City Code § 31-40. The superior court
rejected those arguments, ruled that § 12-
552(A) applied to bar the City’s claims,
granted the motion to dismiss, and certified
its decision as final under Arizona Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b).

18 The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the City’s indemnity claims are “time-
barred” because “A.R.S. § 12-552 applies to
governmental entities and ... the City’s
claims are based in contract within the mean-
ing of A.R.S. § 12-552(F).” City of Phoenia
v Glenayre Elec, Inc., 240 Ariz. 80, 82-83
11, 875 P.38d 1189, 1191-92 (App. 2016). The
court concluded that the phrase “[nJotwith-
standing any other statute” in § 12-552(A)
plainly and “explicitly renders inapplicable
the nullum tempus doctrine reflected in
ARS. § 12-510,” Id, at 84-85 111, 875 P.3d
at 1198-94. The court also agreed with the
superior court that the Developers’ permits
contractually obligated them to indemnify the
City, and thus the City’s indemnity claims
were based in contract and subject to § 12~

552(A). Id, at 87 118, 88 122, 375 P.8d at
1196, 1197. We granted review because appli-
cation of the statute of repose to governmen-
tal entities and interpretation of § 12-552(F)
are issues of statewide importance that are
likely to recur. We have jurisdiction pursuant.
to article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona Con-
stitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

IL

HH 119 We review the superior court’s
dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) de
novo, as we do the interpretation of statutes.
Watts, 239 Ariz, at 23 19, 365 P.3d at 948.

A.

HN 110 Arizona case law has consis-
tently recognized the common law doctrine
“nullam tempus occurrit regi”’—time does
not run against the king. See, eg., Kerby v.
State ew vel. Frohmiller, 62 Ariz, 294, 307,
157 P.2d 698, 704 (1945) (noting the estab-
lished rule that statutes of limitations “do not
run or operate against the state”); City of
Bisbee v. Cochise County (Bisbee IID, 52
Ariz, 1, 9, 78 P.2d 982, 985 (1988) (finding
“ample justification for the rule, stated in the
ancient maxim and confirmed by our Legisla-
ture from time to time, that statutes of limi-
tations which govern between private individ-
uals do not apply in proceedings on behalf of
the state”). The doctrine is based on the
premise that, although time limitations apply
to private parties so as to prevent fraudulent,
stale claims, time stands still, as it were, for
the state because “[tJhe officers who are
charged with the active duty of enforcing
[the] rights [of the state] have no personal
profit to gain thereby, and therefore no in-
ducement for the bringing of false and un-
warranted actions.” Bisbee IIT, 52 Ariz, at 9,
78 P.2d at 985,

{11 In Bisbee III, this Court held, in the
last of three opinions in that case, that the
nullum tempus doctrine generally “applies
not only to the state itself when suing in its
own name, but to all of its subdivisions,”
including municipalities acting with a public
purpose to recover tax-related monies. Id. at
18, 78 P.2d at 989, In that case, Bisbee sued
Cochise County to recover certain penalties

and fees on delinquent taxes collected by the
county but allegedly owed to the city. Id, at
8, 78 P.2d at 988, In defense, the county
unsuccessfully argued that the city’s claim
was time-barred by a general statute of limi-
tations requiring actions “[u]pon a liability
created by statute” to be commenced within
one year after the cause of action accrued.
City of Bisbee v. Cochise Ciy., 44 Ariz. 238,
243, 36 P.2d 559, 563 (1934) (quoting Ariz,
Rev. Code § 2058(8) (1928), now ARS.
§ 12-541(5)). On a second appeal after the
case was remanded and tried, this Court
again rejected the county’s statute-of-limita-
tions defense against the city’s attempted
collection of tax revenues, finding the nullum
tempus doctrine applied “unless the Legisla-
ture has expressly permitted such a [de-
fense].” City of Bisbee v. Cochise Cty., 50
Ariz. 860, 369, 72 P.2d 439, 443 (1987). In
Bisbee III, on which the City here primarily
relies, we confirmed that the nullum tempus
doctrine generally applies to municipalities
and therefore denied the petition for rehear-
ing. 52 Ariz, at 18, 78 P.2d at 989,

{12 For well over a century, our state’s
common law and statutes on this subject
have overlapped. Even before statehood, Ari-
zone’s territorial legislature codified the nul-
lum tempus doctrine. See Rev. Stat. Ariz,
Territory § 44-2306 (See. 10) (1887). And as
this Court observed in Bisbee III, the doc-
trine “has been re-enacted by our Legisla-
ture every time it has recodified the law.” 52
Aviz. at 8, 78 P.2d at 985.

HM 118 Entitled “Exemption of state
from limitations,” A.R.S. § 12-510 is the
most recent codification and states: “Except
as provided in § 12-529, the state shall not
be barred by the limitations of actions pre-
scribed in [chapter 5 of Title 12].” The excep-
tion found in § 12-529, relating to actions
involving public trust lands and navigable
watercourses, is not applicable here. But di-
rectly at issue is another provision in chapter
5 of Title 12, the statute of repose, which
states in part:

Notwithstanding any other statute, no ac-

tion or arbitration based in contract may

be instituted or maintained against a per-
son who develops or develops and sells real
property, or performs or furnishes the de-

143

sign, specifications, surveying, planning,

supervision, testing, construction or obser-

vation of construction of an improvement.
to real property more than eight years

after substantial completion of the im-

provement to real property.

ARS, § 12-552(A), Added by the legislature
in 1989, this statute defines a substantive
right limiting the “indeterminable period of
liability exposure” faced by those engaged in
development and construction activities tradi-
tionally. Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship,
227 Aviz, 121, 126, 119, 127 126, 254 P.8d
360, 365, 866 (2011).

114 The subject construction projects on
which Mr, Tarazon worked were completed
more than eight years before the City filed
its third-party complaint. The statute of re-
pose in § 12-552(A) applies, then, unless the
City is exempt from that provision. Based
largely on Bisbee III, the City argues that
the statute of repose does not apply to it and
thus cannot bar its indemnity claims. In Bis-
bee IIT, this Court acknowledged the then-
applicable predecessor statute to § 12-510
(Ariz. Rev. Code § 2056 (1928)) and re-
marked that the statute “does not add to
[lor subtract from the common-law rule, but
is merely a legislative recognition and ap-
proval thereof.” 52 Ariz. at 8, 78 P.2d at 985.
We also observed that “statutes of limitations
do not and should not apply to the state, in
the absence of an express declaration to the
eontrary by the Legislature,” id. at 8-9, 78
P.2d at 985, that is, “unless the Legislature
has expressly and definitely declared that
they do.” Id, at 10, 78 P.2d at 985,

115 Relying on that language in Bisbee
III, the City argues that the legislature has
not “expressly and definitely declared” that
§ 12-552(A)’s limitation applies to govern-
mental entities and, absent such an expres-
sion, the City is not bound by that statute.
According to the City, the legislature could
have met that standard in either of two ways,
but did neither. First, the legislature could
have expressly provided in § 12-510 an ex-
ception for § 12-552, just as § 12-510 does
for § 12-529. Or second, the legislature could
have expressly declared in § 12-552 that the
state and its political subdivisions are subject
to its provisions. Cf State ex rel. Condon v.

144

City of Columbia, 389 S.C. 8, 528 S.E.2d 408,
412 (2000) (stating that “the Legislature
abandoned the nullum tempus doctrine long
ago” by statutorily providing “ ‘the limita-
tions prescribed in this chapter ... shall
apply to actions brought in the name of the
State’”); see also A.R.S. § 12-529 (stating
that “any action brought by this state ..,
based on a claim of navigability of any water-
course ... is subject to all legal and equita-
ble defenses which would be available if the
claimant were not this state”),

116 Although the legislature could have
followed one of the avenues the City identi-
fies, it was not required to do so to apply the
statute of repose to all parties, including the
state, Section 12-552(A)s introductory
phrase, “{nJotwithstanding any other stat-
ute,” makes clear that the statute of repose
controls over other, potentially conflicting
state laws, By using that phrase in § 12-
552(A), the legislature “has expressly and
definitely declared” that the statute of repose
controls over § 12-510’s general exemption
of governmental entities from statutes of lim-
itations, Bisbee IIT, 52 Ariz. at 10, 78 P.2d at
985; see State v. Jones, 232 Ariz. 448, 450
111, 806 P.8d 105, 107 (App. 2018), vacated
on other grounds by State v. Jones, 285 Ariz.
501, 884 P.8d 191 (2014) (noting that “the
legislature has often used language such as
‘notwithstanding any other statute’ ... to
indicate that a particular provision will tramp
any conflicting statutes”). We also note that
the statute of limitations at issue in Bisbee
III, unlike § 12-552, did not broadly apply
“notwithstanding any other statute,” see su-
pra til.

{17 The City, however, asserts that the
phrase “{nJotwithstanding any other statute”
“is inherently generic” and “does not ex-
pressly and specifically limit the govern-
ment’s rights.” But the word “any” is “broad-
ly inclusive.” City of Phoenix v. Tanner, 63
Ariz. 278, 280, 161 P.2d 928, 924 (1945); see
also United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5,
117 S.Ct. 1082, 187 L.Ed.2d 182 (1997)
(“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an ex-
pansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indis-
criminately of whatever kind.’”) (quoting
Webster's Third New International Dictio-
nary 97 (1976)); Mapoy v. Carroll, 185 F.3d

224, 229 (4th Cir, 1999) (interpreting the
word “any” to mean “all” when used in the
phrase “notwithstanding any other provision
of law”); United States v. Fernandez (Appeal
of U.S. by Atty. Gen,), 887 F.2d 465, 468 (4th
Cir, 1989) (explaining the provision “notwith-
standing any other provision of law ,.. natu-
rally means” the provision “should not be
limited by other statutes”).

18 In addition, the word “notwithstand-
ing” means “without prevention or obstruc-
tion from or by; in spite of.” Premier Car
Rental, Inc. v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 228
A.D.2d 629, 687 N.Y,S.2d 177, 178-79 (1996)
(quoting Notwithstanding, Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 1545 (8d ed.
1961)), Thus, the limitation in § 12-552(A)
applies broadly and inclusively to all other
statutes. Like the United States Supreme
Court, we do not require the legislature “to
employ magical passwords” to accomplish its
manifest intent, Marcello v. Bonds, 849 U.S,
802, 810, 75 S.Ct, 757, 99 L.Ed, 1107 (1955)
(concluding that a deportation statute’s “sole
and exclusive procedure” expressly supersed-
ed a different procedure under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act even though the stat-
ute did not mention the Act, which required
any modifications to its procedure to be ex-
press).

19 The history of the pertinent statutes
supports our conclusion that § 12-552 over-
rides § 12-510’s general provision exempting
the state from limitations of actions. As noted.
above, § 12-510 and its predecessor territori-
al and state statutes date to the late 1800s.
Against that longstanding backdrop, the leg-
islature enacted § 12-552, including its
“{mjotwithstanding any other statute” pref-
ace, in 1989, We presume that the legislature
‘was aware that this more recent and specific
statute, added to the same chapter in which
§ 12-510 appears, would effectively prevail
over the former statute and govern actions
and parties covered by the latter. Cf Daou v.
Harris, 189 Ariz, 358, 357, 678 P.2d 984, 988
(1984) (stating “we presume that the legisla-
ture, when it passes a statute, knows the
existing laws”),

120 In addition, the legislature amended
§ 12-552 in 1992 by adding subsection (G),
Under that amendment, subsection (A)’s

eight-year limitation period begins to run on
September 15, 1989, for any “improvement to
real property that was substantially complete
on or before” that date. A.R.S, § 12-552(G),
The history behind this amendment strongly
suggests that the legislature recognized that.
§ 12-552 otherwise time-barred the Central
Arizona Water Conservation _ District
(CAWCD) from bringing a nearly $150 mil-
lion claim against parties that, according to
the CAWCD, negligently constructed the un-
derground piping for transporting water to
central Arizona. See S, Fact Sheet (May 27,
1992), S.B. 1478, 40th Leg. 2d Reg. Sess,
(Ariz. 1992). The legislative history convine-
ingly reveals that the legislature added sub-
section (G) so that CAWCD could file its
daims against the constructors within the
eight-year time limit, See also Minutes of S.
Comm. on Judiciary at 80-82 (April 7, 1992),
40th Leg,, 2d Reg, Sess. (Ariz, 1992).

21 If, as the City asserts, § 12-552 nei-
ther applied to governmental entities such as
CAWCD nor otherwise trumped § 12-510,
the legislature (albeit the 1992 legislature,
not the 1989 legislature that passed § 12-
552) would not have needed to add subsection
(G); that is, under the City’s view, subsection
(G) would be superfluous because even with-
out any amendment, CAWCD, as a political
subdivision of the state, was already exempt
from § 12-552, We agree with the court of
appeals that this history “is particularly com-
pelling.” Glenayre, 240 Ariz, at 86 915, 375
P.8d at 1195.

922 The City alternatively argues that,
separate and apart from § 12-510, the com-
mon law nullum tempus doctrine applies to
exempt governmental entities from § 12-552.
See ARS, § 1-201 (stating that the common
law applies insofar “as it is consistent with
+, and not repugnant to or inconsistent with
the ... laws of this state”); Pleak v. Entrada
Prop, Owners’ Ass'n, 207 Ariz, 418, 422 112,
87 P.8d 881, 835 (2004) (“[I]f the common law
is to be changed or abrogated by statute, the
legislature must do so expressly or by neces-
sary implication.”); Tucson Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Schantz, 5 Aviz.App. 511, 515, 428 P.2d 686,
690-91 (1967) (concluding that a narrow stat-
ute regarding record inspections did not su-
persede the broader common law right to

145

inspect corporate records and noting that
“the mere fact that a statute partially codi-
fies the common law does not necessarily
abolish the remainder of the common law
rule”). We are not persuaded by this argu-
ment,

123 This Court has observed that § 12-
510 “is merely a partial codification” of the
nullum tempus doctrine. State ew rel, Dep’t of
Health Servs, v. Cochise Cty., 166 Ariz. 75, 77
n8, 800 P.2d 578, 580 n.8 (1990), But that
observation simply referred to “the fact that
[§ 12-510] limits its provisions to statutes of
limitations in ‘this chapter,’ referring to chap-
ter 5, title 12.” Id; see also Bisbee III, 52
Ariz, at 8, 78 P.2d at 985 (noting that § 12-
510’s predecessor statute, which likewise re-
ferred to only “the limitations of actions pre-
scribed in this chapter,” “does not add to
[Jor subtract from the common-law rule, but
is merely a legislative recognition and ap-
proval thereof”),

124 Here, unlike the situation in Tucson
Gas, the common law nullum tempus doc-
trine and the related statute (§ 12-510) do
not differ in substance or scope. With respect
to limitations in chapter 5 of title 12, the
common law and § 12-510 are coterminous.
See In re Diamond Benefits Life Ins. Co. v.
Resolute Holdings, Inc., 184 Aviz, 94, 96, 907
P.2d 68, 65 (1995) (noting that the common
law nullum tempus doctrine is codified in
§ 12-510); State ew rel. Conway v. Versiuis,
58 Ariz, 868, 880, 120 P.2d 410, 415 (1941)
(describing § 12-510’s predecessor statute as
“merely a reenactment of the old common
law”), Thus, for purposes of the limitation
provisions in that chapter, the legislature’s
“notwithstanding” clause in § 12-552(A), at
the least, overrides not only § 12-510 but
also by “necessary implication” its common
law nullum tempus counterpart. Pleak, 207
Aviz, at 422 912, 87 P.3d at 835,

125 Finally, the City cites several out of
state cases in which courts applied the nul-
lum tempus doctrine not only to statutes of
limitations but also to statutes of repose. See,
eg., State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Con-
tractors, Inc., 8307 Conn, 412, 54 A.3d 1005,
1022 (2012); Rutgers, State Univ. of NJ. v.
Grad P’ship, 269 N.J.Super. 142, 634 A.2d
1058, 1054-55, 1056 (1993); Rowan Cownty

146

Ba. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 N.C. 1,
418 S.E.2d 648, 657 (1992). But unlike § 12~
552, none of the statutes at issue in those
cases stated they applied “notwithstanding
any other statute” or contained other express
language overriding the nullum tempus doc-
trine, Therefore, we find those cases inappo-
site and in some tension with Albano’s differ-
entiation between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose. 227 Ariz. at 127 11 23-24,
254 P.8d at 366. In sum, the superior court
and court of appeals did not err in concluding
that § 12-552 applies to the City’s contract-
based indemnity claims that fall within that
statute’s scope, notwithstanding § 12-510 or
the common law nullum tempus doctrine.

B.

HI 126 The City also argues that, con-
trary to the court of appeals’ opinion, its
indemnity claims against the Developers are
not “based in contract” within the meaning of
§ 12-552(A) and (F) and thus are not barred
by that statute. We agree that dismissal of
those claims under Rule 12(b)(6) was error.

27 The eight-year limitation in § 12-
552(A) applies to an action “based in con-
tract.” Subsection (F) defines the types of
agreements that are “based in contract” and
thereby limits the statute of repose to only
those agreements. It states: “In this section
an action based in contract is an action based
on a written real estate contract, sales agree-
ment, construction agreement, conveyance or
written agreement for construction or for the
services set forth in subsection A of this
section.” The issue is whether the indemnifi-
cation provision in Phoenix Code § 31-40
creates a contract or agreement contemplat-
ed in subsection (F), That indemnification
provision under which the City’s claim
against the Developers arises is not based on
any of the agreements the legislature listed
in subsection (F). Accordingly, the statute of
repose does not bar the City from bringing

1, The allegations in the City's third-party com-
plaint arguably could also be read as asserting a
contractual indemnity claim against both the
Contractors and Developers. However, we must
accord all reasonable inferences to the City's
complaint, and in doing so, we conclude that the
City has sufficiently pleaded an indemnity claim
against the Developers arising from § 31-40 of

its indemnity claims arising from Phoenix
City Code § 81-401

128 In ruling that § 12-552 barred the
City’s claims against the Developers, the
court of appeals stated, “[t]he nature of the
instrument bearing the indemnification
agreement ... is immaterial to whether a
claim under the agreement is based in con-
tract.” Glenayre, 240 Ariz. at 87 117, 375
P.8d at 1196. The court noted the statute’s
“broad” language and said it expressed “the
legislature’s ... obvious intent to encompass
any ‘written agreement ... for the services
set forth in subsection A’” Id. It then held
that the permits required and issued by the
City created a contractual relationship from
which the City sought indemnification. Id.
Based on the statutory language and the City
Code, however, we reach a different conclu-
sion.

729 As permittees, the Developers were
subject to and governed by City Code § 31-
40, See supra 15, The indemnity provision
contained in that Code section is clearly not a
“written real estate contract,” “sales agree-
ment,” “construction agreement,” “convey-
ance,” or a “written agreement for construc-
tion.” § 12-552(F). The question, then, is
whether the Code’s indemnity provision is a
“written agreement ... for the services set
forth in subsection A.” (Emphasis added.)
Interpreted broadly, “for” could mean “in
respect to” or “concerning” the services. For,
Webster's Third New International Dictio-
nary 886 (2002). Or, more narrowly, “for”
could mean “with the purpose or object of,”
in the sense of engaging such services. Id.

180 We are not persuaded that a broad
interpretation of the word “for” applies here,
Subsection (F)’s phrase, “written agreement
... for the services set forth in subsection
A,” serves as a catch-all provision. Pursuant
to the ejusdem generis rule, the phrase must
be construed to refer to the same type of
agreement as the enumerated agreements in

the Code. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins, Co., 218
Ariz. 417, 419, 17, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008)
(explaining that courts “must assume the truth of
the well-pled factual allegations and indulge all
reasonable inferences therefrom”). If any further
questions exist regarding the source or basis of

- the City’s indemnity claims against the Develop-
ers, they can be addressed on remand,

subsection (F), See Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz.
462, 465 118, 80 P.8d 269, 272 (2008) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed, 1990),
stating ejusdem generis applies “where gen-
eral words follow the enwmeration of partic-
ular classes of things”). The transactional
nature of the other agreements listed in sub-
section (F) suggests that subsection (A)
should apply to “breach of contract and im-
plied warranty actions against developers,
builders, and certain others.” Albano, 227
Ariz, at 126 19, 254 P.3d at 865 (quoting
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations,
Inc, 216 Ariz, 237, 239 119, 159 P.8d 547, 549
(App. 2006)), In Albano, we also noted that
“{tlhe Legislature enacted § 12-552 to limit
the ‘time period during which action may be
brought against those engaged in the devel-
opment or construction of real property and
activity related to the construction of real
property.” Id. (quoting Ariz. State Senate,
Fact Sheet for 8.B, 1305, 39th Leg,, 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mar, 20, 1989); of Flagstaff Afforda-
ble Housing Ltd. P’ship v. Design Alliance,
Ine., 223 Ariz. 820, 829 144, 223 P.8d 664,
678 (2010) (stating § 12-552 applies to ac-
tions “involving the design, engineering, or
construction of improvements to real proper-
ty”).

981 The real estate contract, sales
agreement, and other listed agreements in
subsection (F) are types of transactional
agreements from which could arise the in-
determinable liability that the legislature
sought to prohibit for breach of contract
and implied warranty actions. See Albano,
227 Ariz. at 126 119, 254 P.8d at 865 (“Be-
fore § 12-552 was enacted, developers and
builders faced an indeterminable period of
liability exposure.”). Interpreting “for”
broadly to mean “concerning” would extend
the statute of repose far beyond such
claims and could, for example, preclude
most claims against a construction compa-
ny; this is so because any contract neces-
sarily used for the company’s internal or
2, In its third-party complaint, the City alleged

that it “issued right-of-way permits to the Devel-

opers and Contractors for the projects on which

Mr. Tarazon allegedly worked,” and that the City

codes “require the permittee (the Developers)

and the Contractors to indemnify Phoenix against
injury and death claims arising out of the per-

147

external operations would broadly “con-
cern” the construction of real property, but
would not be limited to “activitfies] related
to the construction of real property.” Id. So
interpreted, the word “for” would cause the
statute to thwart the legislature's manifest
intent to limit indeterminable liability for
breach of contract and implied warranty ac-
tions, Cf Fry’s Food Stores of Arizona,
Ine. v. Mather & Associates, Inc., 188 Ariz.
89, 91-92, 900 P.2d 1225, 1227-28 (App.
1995) (stating that the language of § 12-
552(F) “may reasonably be construed as in-
applicable to negligence actions among con-
tracting parties”),

182 Moreover, if we interpret “for” to
mean “concerning,” then the catch-all phrase
would incorporate each of subsection (FY’s
enumerated agreements, rendering their
enumeration superfluous. See Fields v. Hlect-
ed Officials’ Retirement Plan, 284 Ariz, 214,
218 116, 320 P.38d 1160, 1164 (2014) (noting
that the legislature generally avoids redun-
daney). The narrow interpretation of “for”
avoids redundancy and encompasses all writ-
ten agreements that have as their purpose
engaging in the types of “services set forth in
subsection (A),” such as developing, selling,
or surveying property for construction pro-
jects. The narrow interpretation of “for” in
subsection (F')’s catch-all phrase also paral-
Jels that subsection’s phrase, a “written
agreement for construction,” which uses the
word “for” to clearly mean “with the purpose
or object of.”

Hl 133 The remaining question is wheth-
er Phoenix Code § 31-40 creates a written
agreement for any of the services set forth in
subsection (A), Although the court of appeals’
analysis and the Developers’ argument focus
on the inclusion of the MAGS in the permits
issued to the Developers, the City’s third-
party complaint alleged that the Developers’
indemnity obligation arose from § 31-40 of
the Code itself.? See swpra 15. The incorpo-

formance of the permitted work.” (Emphasis
added.) But the City also alleged that, “[gleneral-
ly, for the projects on which Mr. Tarazon alleg-
edly worked, the right-of-way permits were is-
sued to the Developers as ‘permittees.’ ” Despite
the confusion, in this Court the City asserts Code-
based indemnity claims against only the Develop-

148

ration of the MAGS into the permit simply
memorialized a preexisting regulatory obli-
gation, But even if the permit created a
contractual relationship between the City
and the Developers, as the court of appeals
held, that would not preclude finding an inde-
pendent indemnity obligation under the City
Code. Cfi Unique Equip. Co, Inc. v. TRW
Vehicle Safety Sys, Inc, 197 Ariz, 50, 55
19, 8 P.8d 970, 975 (App. 1999) (recognizing
“an independent statutory obligation to in-
demnify”).

1184 Although we question whether § 31-
40 could create a written agreement in the
abstract, we need not resolve that issue in all
respects. Cf: Proksa v, Arizona State Schools
for the Deaf and the Blind, 205 Ariz, 627, 629
111-12, 74 P.8d 989, 941 (2008) (iterating
the “general principle” that “statutes do not
create contract rights” because legislative
“[plolicies, unlike contracts, are inherently
subject to revision and repeal”) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted); Smith v.
City of Phoenix, 175 Ariz, 509, 514, 858 P.2d
654, 659 (App. 1992) (declaring the same
principle with respect to a city ordinance and
concluding “the fact that both parties knew
[the judge’s] salary was established by a city
ordinance, which was naturally subject to
change by the city council” suggested the
absence of an employment contract), Rather,
we conclude that the City Code, which ap-
plies solely based on an indemnitor’s status
as a permittee, does not constitute a written
agreement for the services listed in § 12~
562(A). The City’s issuing a permit and the
corresponding, independent indemnity obli-
gation arising under Code § 81-40 do not
create an agreement between the City and
the Developers for either party to perform
any of the services listed in subsection (A).
Instead, the permit grants the Developers a
license to enter Phoenix property to under-
take their construction projects, see Phoenix
City Code § 81-85; and § 31~40 provides a
condition for the permit’s issuance. The
Code’s indemnity provision in a very broad
sense does “concern” a construction project,
But the City did not offer or accept any of
the services prescribed in subsection (A),
such as developing or selling property or

ers, not the Contractors with which the City had

furnishing specifications for construction im-
provements,

185 Nor did an agreement for the services
listed in subsection (A) arise merely because
the Developers submitted their construction
plans to the City as part of the permit appli-
cation process, By reviewing those plans and
issuing a permit, the City simply performed
its legal duty to issue a right-of-way permit
when the Developers satisfied all the rele-
vant conditions, Cf Vance v, Lassen, 82 Ariz,
188, 191, 310 P.2d 510, 512 (1957) (requiring
the issuance of a permit when “there exists
no legal excuse for non-issuance”); City of
Tempe v. Baseball Facilities, Inc, 28 Ariz,
App. 557, 561, 584 P.2d 1056, 1060 (1975)
(determining the denial of a requested busi-
ness permit may not be arbitrary and capri-
cious), Issuance of a permit in compliance
with law does not itself evidence an “agree-
ment” between the City and the Developers
“for the services set forth in subsection A [of
§ 12-552],” and neither the construction
plans nor MAGS alter that conclusion, Ac-
cordingly, the superior court erred in finding
§ 12-552 applicable to the City’s indemnity
claims against the Developers and dismissing
those claims under Rule 12(b)(6),

I.

136 We affirm the superior court’s dis-
missal of the City’s third-party, contract-
based claims against the Contractors because
neither § 12-510 nor the common Jaw nullum
tempus doctrine precludes application of
§ 12-552(A), We reverse the superior court’s
dismissal of the City’s third-party claims
against the Developers because the allega-
tions in the City’s complaint do not establish
that those claims are “based in contract” for
purposes of § 12-552(A) and (F). According-
ly, we vacate those portions of the court of
appeals’ opinion that concluded that the
City’s indemnity claims against the Develop-
ers are “based in contract” and therefore
subject to and barred by the statute of re-
pose. We also vacate the superior court and
court of appeals’ attorney fee awards to the
Developers, without prejudice to their seek-
ing fees should they ultimately prevail. We
remand the case to the superior court for

separate contracts,

further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion and express no view on the merits of the
City’s remaining indemnity claims or on the
potential recovery of attorney fees by the
ultimate prevailing party or parties. Finally,
because the City concedes that its indemnity
claims against the Contractors arise from
contract, the Contractors are awarded their
reasonable attorney fees incurred in this
Court pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-841.01, upon
compliance with ARCAP 21,

393 P.3d 929
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Donald William GULLEY, Appellant,
No. CR-16-0456-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed May 12, 2017

149

Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County At-
torney, Dennis M, McGrane (argued), Chief
Deputy County Attorney, Prescott, Attor-
neys for State of Arizona

Lourdes Todd, Yavapai County Public De-
fender, Grace M, Guisewite (argued), Mi-
chelle L. DeWaelsche (argued), Deputy Pub-
lie Defenders, Prescott, Attorneys for Donald
William Gulley

PER CURIAM;

{1 We granted review in this case to
consider whether A.R.S, § 18-707(B) re-
quires a repeat class 1 misdemeanor convic-
tion to be both classified and sentenced as a
cass 6 felony, We have jurisdiction under
article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona Constitu-
tion and A.R.S. § 12-120,24.

12 Here, Gulley pleaded guilty in 2012 to
one count of disorderly conduct in violation of
ARS, § 18-2904(A), a class 1 misdemeanor.
See ARS. § 18-2904(B). Then, in 2018, a
jury convicted Gulley of two counts of disor-
derly conduct, also class 1 misdemeanors in
violation of § 18-2904(A)(1). At sentencing,
the trial court classified each 2013 count as a
“class 6 felony” pursuant to § 18~707(B). Un-
der § 18~707(B), a person “shall be sen-
tenced for the next higher class of offense

150

than that for which the person currently is
convicted” if the person “stands convicted of
any misdemeanor” and “has been convicted
of one or more of the same misdemeanors
... within two years next preceding the date
of the present offense[.]” Because Gulley was
convicted of the same class 1 misdemeanor in
both 2012 and 2018, the trial court classified
the 2018 convictions as class 6 felonies and
imposed two concurrent and enhanced 8.75—
year prison terms,

18 On appeal, Gulley argues that the trial
court committed fundamental error when it
designated his 2018 disorderly conduct con-
victions as class 6 felonies and sentenced him
as a category three repetitive felony offend-
er. According to Gulley, § 13-707(B) only
pertains to the sentence imposed because the
phrase “stands convicted of [a] misdemean-
or” requires that the current conviction be
classified as a misdemeanor in order for
§ 18-707(B) to apply. In response, the State
counters that if a felony sentence is imposed
pursuant to § 13-707(B), then a defendant’s
current class 1 misdemeanor conviction must,
be (ve)classified as a felony conviction be-
cause an offense is classified under Arizona
law according to the type of sentence im-
posed,

14 After considering the briefs and oral
arguments, the Court vacates paragraphs
28-29 of the court of appeals’ opinion. See
State v. Gulley, 240 Ariz, 580, 586-87 11 28—
29, 882 P.8d 795, 801-02 (App. 2016). Instead,
we approve of the interpretation of § 13-
707(B) as set forth in paragraphs 4-10 of
State v. Ceasar, 241 Ariz, 66, 383 P.8d 1140
(App. 2016). As Ceasar explains, Section 13-
707(B) only concerns the imposition of sen-
tencing enhancements for repeat misdemean-
or convictions. The phrase “stands convicted
of any misdemeanor” dictates that the cur-
rent conviction must be classified as a class 1
misdemeanor in order for the trial court to
impose a class 6 felony sentence. Thus, the
trial court committed fundamental error
when it (re)classified Gulley’s 2018 disorderly
conduct convictions as class 6 felonies and
sentenced him as a category three repetitive
felony offender. See State v. Smith, 219 Ariz.
182, 186 1921-22, 194 P.8d 399, 403 (2008)
(finding fundamental error when trial court

improperly used a conviction to enhance a
prison sentence).

15 Accordingly, as requested by the Attor-
ney General and Gulley before the court of
appeals, we modify Gulley’s disorderly con-
duct convictions and designate them as class
1 misdemeanors. We vacate Gulley’s sentence
and remand to the trial court for resentenc-
ing within the range for first-time class 6
felonies.

393 P.3d 930
BRENDA D., Appellant,
v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY,
Z.D., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0277

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 3/23/2017

Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa,
By Clark Jones, Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Amber Pershon, Counsel for Appel-
lee Department of Child Safety

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D, Jones and Judge Patricia
K, Norris joined.

OPINION

McMURDIE, Judge:

{1 In this case, we are asked to determine
if a parent has “failed to appear” for a termi-
nation adjudication hearing within the mean-

1, Z.D.’s alleged Father R.N., J.F., or John Doe's
parental rights were terminated due to abandon-

153

ing of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
section 8-863(C) and Arizona Rule of Juve-
nile Procedure 66(D)(2), if the parent ap-
peared approximately 25 minutes late. We
are also asked to determine if the superior
court improperly restricted a parent’s coun-
sel’s participation at the hearing, and violated
the parent's right to be heard by refusing to
allow the parent to testify because of tardi-
ness, We hold a parent has not “failed to
appear” simply because he or she is tardy
without good cause. We further hold the
restriction placed on counsel prior to the
parent's arrival at the hearing, and refusal to
allow the parent to testify based on a tardy
arrival, violated the parent’s constitutional
rights to due process. We therefore reverse
and remand the case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

2 Brenda D. (“Mother”) is the biological
parent of Z.D,, born in July 2005. Z.D. was
born with Down Syndrome, and has perma-
nent special needs.

43 In July 2014, the Department of Child
Safety (“DCS”) filed a dependency petition
alleging Z.D. dependent due to Mother’s ne-
glect, unstable home, and mental illness. Z.D,
was adjudicated dependent as to Mother in
May 2015. In October 2015, DCS filed a
motion to terminate the parent-child relation-
ship between Z.D. and her parents! DCS
alleged three grounds for severance as to
Mother: (1) history of substance abuse; (2)
nine or more months in an out-of-home place-
ment; and (8) fifteen or more months in an
out-of-home placement.

14 The severance hearing was scheduled
for two days, beginning on June 15, 2016. On
the first day of the hearing, Mother’s counsel
informed the court that Mother was having
severe back pain. The court continued the
start of the hearing until the next day, but
warned Mother’s counsel that Mother needed
to appear in person with medical documenta-
tion supporting her assertion of back pain.
The next day, Mother was not present when
the hearing began and, given her absence

ment. None of the alleged Fathers are a party to
this appeal.

154

and the lack of an explanation, the superior
court found Mother lacked good cause for
her absence. The court then advised the par-
ties, “[s]o, the only thing that [Mother’s
counsel] has an opportunity to address is the
weight of the evidence, not the admissibility
of the evidence.” The hearing then went for-
ward.

15 DCS called a department case manager
to testify. After the direct examination, the
superior court gave Mother's counsel limited
opportunity to cross examine the case man-
ager, reminding counsel he was limited to the
“weight of the evidence.”

16 Mother arrived 25 minutes after the
hearing started, but prior to the close of
DC8’s case. Mother requested she be allowed
to testify, and told the court her late arrival
was due to a bus delay. The superior court
denied Mother’s request, and found Mother
failed to appear in court at the start of the
hearing without good cause.

97 The superior court found all three
grounds for severance proven by clear and
convincing evidence, and terminated Moth-
er’s parental rights. The court also found the
severance was in Z.D.’s best interests. Moth-
er timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pur-
suant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution, and A.R.S, §§ 8-285(A), 12-
120,21(A)(1) and -2101(A),?

DISCUSSION

HM ‘8 “A parent has a constitutional
right to raise his or her child without govern-
mental intervention.” Carolina H, v. ADES,
282 Ariz, 569, 571, 16, 307 P.3d 996 (App.
2018) (citing Trowel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)).
“The government may not interfere with that
fundamental right unless a court finds that:
(1) the parent is unable to parent the child
for any reason defined by statute; and (2) the
parent has been afforded due process.” Id.

2. We cite to the current version of applicable
statutes or rules when no revision material to
this case has occurred,

3. We accept the superior court’s discretionary
finding Mother had no good cause for her failure
to appear at the start of the termination hearing.
See Adrian BE. v. ADES, 215 Ariz, 96, 101, 115,
158 P.3d 225 (App. 2007) ("{A] finding of good

We view the facts “in the light most favor-
able to affirming the [superior] court’s find-
ings.” Manuel M. v, ADES, 218 Ariz. 205,
207, 12, 181 P.8d 1126 (App. 2008). We do
not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Jesus M.
v, ADES, 203 Ariz, 278, 282, 112, 53 P.8d 208
(App. 2002).

19 Mother asserts her due process rights
were violated. We are confronted with a situ-
ation where the superior court did not allow
Mother to testify and restricted Mother’s
counsel’s participation at the hearing because
Mother did not appear at the start of the
termination hearing? For the reasons dis-
cussed below, we agree with Mother's claim.
We reverse and remand the case to the
superior court for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

A. Waiver of Rights for Failure to Ap-
pear at a Termination Hearing.

110 Arizona Revised Statutes section 8-
863(C) provides as follows regarding when
parents waive their legal rights and are
deemed to have admitted the allegations con-
tained in a motion filed pursuant to section
8-862(D) (“Permanency hearing”):

If a parent does not appear at the hearing,
the court, after determining that the par-
ent has been served as provided in subsec-
tion A of this section, may find that the
parent has waived the parent’s legal rights
and is deemed to have admitted the allega-
tions of the petition by the failure to ap-
pear, The court may terminate the parent-
child relationship as to a parent who does
not appear based on the record and evi-
dence presented as provided in rules pre-
scribed by the supreme court,

ARS. § 8-863(C); see also § 8-587(C) (same
directive for termination proceeding initiated
by petition and analyzed in Christy A. v.
ADES, 217 Ariz, 299, 173 P.8d 463 (App.

cause for a failure to appear is largely discretion-
ary.”) (quoting John C. v. Sargeant, 208 Ariz. 44,
47, 113, 90 P.3d 781 (App. 2004); Bob H. v.
ADES, 225 Ariz. 279, 282, 1911-13, 237 P.3d
632 (App. 2010) (“The juvenile court is in the
best position to make discretionary findings such
as what constitutes good cause for failure to
appear.”).

2007)).! The Supreme Court has promulgated
Rule 66(D)() to give effect to the statutory
directives:

If the court finds the parent ... failed to

appear at the termination adjudication

hearing without good cause shown, had
notice of the hearing, was properly served
pursuant to Rule 64 and had been previ-
ously admonished regarding the conse-

quences of failure to appear, including a

warning that the hearing could go forward

in the absence of the parent ... and that
failure to appear may constitute a waiver
of rights, and an admission to the allega-
tion[s] contained in the motion or petition
for termination, the court may terminate
parental rights based upon the record and
evidence presented if the moving party or
petitioner has proven grounds upon which
to terminate parental rights.

Ariz. R.P. Juv, Ct. 66(D)(2).

{11 Courts interpreting the statutes and
rule have disagreed regarding when and how
a superior court should apply a parent’s fail-
ure to appear. See Manuel M., 218 Ariz, at
214, 131, 181 P.3d 1126 (disagreeing with
Christy A., 217 Ariz, at 306, 124, 178 P.8d
463); but of Bob H., 225 Ariz. at 288, 117,
287 P.8d 632 (agreeing with Christy A. in
part). We add our voice to the interpretation
of the statutes and rule as it applies to the
facts of this case, and as noted below, dis-
agree in part with the holding in Bob H.

{12 In this case, we hold the superior
court erred when it determined Mother
failed to appear, because she arrived after
the hearing started, but before the presenta-
tion of all evidence concluded. Further, even
though Mother was present and prepared to
proceed after DCS’s portion of the case, the
superior court erroneously found Mother
waived her right to testify and to contest
both the truth, as well as the sufficiency, of

4. Although we have recognized that Article 5 of
Title 8 is not applicable to the parental termi-
nation proceeding initiated by motion “except to
the extent prescribed in § 8-863,” ARS. § 8-
532(C); Adrian E., 215 Ariz, at 100, 113, 158
P.3d 225 (exception prescribed by § 8-863 not
applicable), we have also concluded that sections
8-863(C) and -537(C) are consistent with each
other and with Rule 66(D)(2). Manuel M., 218
Ariz. at 210, 114, n.6, 181 P.3d 1126.

155

DCS&’s factual allegations supporting the
grounds of severance, and to present evi-
dence relevant to the best interests of her
child.

Hl 118 In determining whether a parent
failed to appear for purposes of waiver of his
or her right to testify, we disagree with the
decision and reasoning stated in Bob H., 225
Ariz, at 282, 1111-18, 287 P.8d 632. In Bob
H., mother arrived 30 minutes late, but be-
fore the close of DCS’s case, and in time to
testify in her own case. See id. This court
affirmed the superior court’s finding of no
good cause for mother’s failure to appear at
the scheduled start of the hearing, and the
court's waiver of mother’s rights. See id. The
court explained, “[wJhile it might be said that
arriving late is better than not arriving at all,
‘we cannot see how arriving late can consti-
tute good cause for a failure to timely ap-
pear.” Id, at 282, 112, 237 P.8d 682 (empha-
sis added).

HI 114 The requirement to “timely ap-
pear,” however, is prescribed neither by
ARS. §§ 8-863(C), -587(C), nor by Rule
66(D).5 Neither the statutes nor the proce-
dural rule require a parent to be present
during DCS’s case, or during his or her own
counsel’s presentation of evidence outside of
the parent’s testimony. See Manuel M., 218
Ariz, at 214, 181, 181 P.3d 1126.

115 Both sections 8-863(C) and -587(C)
state: “If a parent does not appear at the
hearing, the court ... may find that the
parent has waived the parent’s legal rights
and is deemed to have admitted the allega-
tions of the petition by the failure to ap-
pear.” A.R.S, §§ 8-863(C), -587(C) (emphasis
added). The word “timely” does not appear in
either statute. See id. If the legislature in-
tended to prescribe sanctions for the failure
to timely appear, it would have included the

5. When interpreting statutes, we apply their
plain language, unless doing so would lead to an
absurd, illegal, or unconstitutional result. Bilke v.
State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464, 911, 80 P.3d 269
(2003); Merlina v. Jejna, 208 Ariz. 1, 3, 17, 90
P.3d 202 (App. 2004) (the same rules of statutory
construction apply in the interpretation of a pro-
cedural rule) (citing Devenir Assoos. v. City of
Phoenix, 169 Ariz, 500, 503, 821 P.2d 161
(1991).

156

word “timely,” as it has done in various other
sections of Title 8. See eg. ARS. § 8
106.01(G) (“timely notices of claims of pater-
nity”); A.R.S. § 8-890(A) and (D) (notice of
scheduled proceedings to be provided “in a
timely manner”); ARS, § 8-459(A)(1)
(“timely permanency for children”); A.R.S.
§ 8-515,08(6) (“timely return of children to
their natural parents”); A.R.S, § 8-580(A)(3)
(“timely responses from agency personnel”);
ARS, § 8-817(B)(4) and (5) (“timely disclo-
sure of information”); A.R.S. § 8-822(A)(2)
(“timely interview”); A.R.S, § 8-862(E) (“rea-
sonable efforts to place the child in a timely
manner in accordance with the permanency
plan”); A.R.S. § 8-882(6) (requirement to
keep a court “timely informed”),

{16 Similarly, Rule 66(D)(2) discusses the
requirements and consequences of a parent’s
“failure to appear.” Nowhere does the Rule
discuss a “timely appearance” of a parent.
Moreover, Rule 66(D) stresses the informal
presentation of evidence, as much as “the
requirements of due process and fairness
permit,” Ariz, R.P, Juy, Ct. 66(D),

I 117 Additionally, the permissive lan-
guage used in sections 8-863(C) and -587(C)
does not obligate the superior court to find a
waiver, even in the case of a parent who did
not appear at all. The statutes merely sug-
gest the court “may find” the parent who
“does not appear at the hearing ... has
waived [his or her] legal rights and is
deemed to have admitted the allegations of
the petition.” A.R.S, §§ 8-863(C) and -5387(C)
(emphasis added),

HI 1118 Therefore, we hold the superi-
or court retains full discretion to assess
“what constitutes good cause for failure to
appear,” Bob H., 225 Ariz, at 282, 112, 237
P.8d 632, and to apply that discretion at the
severance hearing as it deems proper. But

6, In her opening brief, Mother only challenges
the limitation placed on counsel. Mother does
not specifically argue that the limitation prevent
ed counsel from calling Mother as a witness once
she arrived. Generally, it is not our role to sua
sponte address issues not raised by the appellant.
Crystal BE. v. DCS, 1 CA-JV 16-0236, 241 Ariz.
576, 578, 390 P.3d 1222, 2017 WL 897343, at *2,
16 (App. Mar. 7, 2017). While this court does not
search the record for fundamental error, we will
not ignore it when we find it. Jd. at 18. In this

should a parent appear before the close of
the hearing, such parent’s due process rights
cannot be violated by restricting the parent’s
participation, See Manuel M., 218 Ariz, at
214, 1128-81, 181 P.8d 1126. We also hold
that only if a parent has failed to appear by
the time both parties have fully presented
their case, may the court treat the parent’s
absence as a waiver of the parent’s legal
rights and deem the parent to have admitted
the well-pled factual allegations of the peti-
tion. See A.R.S, §§ 8-863(C) and -587(C). We
further hold the superior court remains with-
in its discretion to consider all evidence, even
evidence presented by the parent after the
close of the moving party’s case, related to
both the statutory grounds for severance as
well as to the best interests of the child.

B. Fundamental Error Review.5

Hs‘ 19 DCS argues Mother failed to
raise her due process argument in the court
below, waiving it for our consideration on
appeal. See Dombey v. Phoenia Newspapers,
Inc., 150 Ariz. 476, 482, 724 P.2d 562 (1986)
(“{Als a general proposition an appellate
court will not consider a question not first
raised’ in the trial court.”) (quoting Town of
S. Tucson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pima
County, 52 Ariz, 575, 582, 84 P.2d 581 (1988).
At the termination hearing, however, Mother
objected to the superior court’s denial of her
right to testify, On the record, Mother her-
self repeatedly entreated the superior court
for an opportunity to be heard, over the
court’s rejections, Though Mother “did not
object: with the ‘magic words’ of due process,
[she] implicitly raised the ... argument{]
below .., and ... preserved the issue for
our review.” See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz.
462, 469, 122, n.6, 388 P.8d 789 (App. 2014)
(quoting State v. Martinez, 172 Ariz, 487,
440, 887 P.2d 1172 (App. 1992)).

case, because the issue of not allowing Mother to
testify is intertwined with the issue concerning
the restrictions placed on counsel, we chose to
address the issue without asking for additional
briefing from the parties, Id. ("[T]n the interests
of justice and because of the inherent constitu-
tional ramifications, if we discover [potential fun-
damental error] when considering a severance
appeal, we may appropriately ask for supplemen-
tal briefing from the parties and consider wheth-
er reversal is warranted,”) (emphasis added),

HM 120 Regardless of any asserted = {28 We disagree with Christy

waiver of this argument, the court’s denial of
Mother's right to testify was a fundamental
error, because it “‘goes to the very founda-
tion’ of [the] case.” Monica C. v. Arizona
Dept. of Economic Sec,, 211 Ariz. 89, 94, 124,
118 P.8d 87 (App.2005) (quoting Data Sales
Co. v. Diamond Z Mfg., 205 Ariz, 594, 601,
131, 74 P.3d 268 (App. 2003)), Mother was
prejudiced by the court denying her right to
testify because she arrived before the pres-
entation of all evidence concluded. See Moni-
ca C., 211 Ariz, at 94-95, 125, 118 P.8d 87
(prejudice must be found to justify relief
under fundamental error analysis),

C. Denial of Right to an Effective Partic-
ipation of Counsel.

MMM {21 Mother argues the superior
court erred by instructing her attorney to
address only the weight of the evidence, not
its admissibility, when she failed to timely
appear.’ Mother asserts this instruction
amounted to a denial of her right to effective
participation of counsel, We agree.

Hs 22 “(Ihe denial of the right to
effective participation of counsel constitutes a
denial of due process of law so gross as to
lack a necessary attribute of a judicial deter-
mination.” Ariz. State Dep't. of Pub. Welfare
». Barlow, 80 Ariz, 249, 258, 296 P.2d 298
(1956), A parent who has waived his or her
right to contest DCS’s factual allegations by
failing to appear, nonetheless “retains [his
or] her rights, through counsel, to attend and
participate in the termination hearing, pose
evidentiary objections, cross-examine wit-
nesses, and present evidence relevant to the
child’s best interests.” Marianne N. v. DCS,
240 Ariz, 470, 474, 118, 881 P.38d 264 (App.
2016) (emphasis added), The limitation on the
scope of parent’s rights in such a hearing
does not limit the traditional means of attor-
ney participation. Manuel M., 218 Ariz. at
214, 131, 181 P.8d 1126, Parent’s counsel,
thus, has the right, among other rights, to
call witnesses to challenge DCS in establish-
ing the legal grounds for termination of the
parent-child relationship. See id. at 214-15,
‘(7 28-82, 181 P.8d 1126,

7. Prior to the hearing, Mother had filed various

157

A, 217 Ariz, at 806, 124, 178 P.8d 468, to the
extent the holding “could be read to preclude
a parent’s counsel from ‘contest{ing] the stat-
utory bases for termination’ and from pre-
senting affirmative evidence to do so.” Man-
uel M., 218 Ariz. at 214, 181, 181 P.8d 1126
(quoting Christy A., 217 Ariz, at 306, 124,
178 P.8d 463). We agree with Manuel M. in
that, when a parent fails to appear, the par-
ent’s absence cannot be deemed as an admis-
sion of legal conclusions. 218 Ariz. at 214,
‘17 28, 80, 181 P.3d 1126 (superior court has a,
duty “to determine whether the grounds for
termination have been proven by the record
and evidence—a process that would become
unnecessary if we construed a parent’s fail-
ure to appear as a wholesale admission to the
legal grounds contained in the allegations.”).
We disagree with Manual M. to the extent it
limits counsel’s ability to present affirmative
evidence questioning the “factual allegations
++. deemed admitted,” Id, at 180.

Hs 1 24 In our opinion, a parent’s waiv-
er by his or her failure to appear does not
apply until it becomes clear, at the close of
the hearing, the parent actually failed to
appear, See A.R.S, §§ 8-863(C), -587(C);
Ariz. R.P, Juv, Ct, 66(D)(2). Only then, may
the court apply the parent’s waiver and deem
admitted the well-pled factual allegations,
whether pled in a motion pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 8-863(C), or in a petition pursuant to
ARB.S, § 8-587(C),

HM 125 Here, without being able to ob-
ject to the admission of evidence, Mother’s
counsel could not effectively participate in
the severance hearing, See Marianne N., 240
Ariz, at 474~75, 118, 881 P.8d 264. The supe-
rior court’s discretion in admitting or exclud-
ing evidence does not abridge Mother’s due
process right to present evidence, cross-exam
witnesses, or object to evidence through
counsel, “an important component of the fact-
finding process, intended to enhance the ac-
curacy of the [superior] court’s determina-
tions.” Manuel M., 218 Aviz, at 211-12, 121,
181 P.8d 1126.

26 We conclude the superior court
abused its discretion in limiting the scope of

objections to DCS's disclosure statement,

158

Mother’s counsel’s participation, and that
Mother was denied a fair trial. See Christy
A., 217 Ariz, at 308, 131, 173 P.8d 468 (the
superior court abuses its discretion when
“the exercise of such discretion result[s] in a
miscarriage of justice or deprive[s] one of the
litigants of a fair trial”) (quoting O’Rielly
Motor Co. v. Rich, 8 Aviz.App. 21, 27, 411
P.2d 194 (1966)),

D. Court’s Flexibility to Manage Its
Docket.

M127 (Nothing in this opinion
should be construed to curtail the superior
court’s flexibility in managing its dockets. See
Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Aviz, 348, 346, 8387
P.2d 145 (1992) (“A trial court has broad
discretion over the management of its docket.
Appellate courts do not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the trial court in the day-to-
day management of cases.”). But, the superi-
or court’s discretion has limits “and cannot,
be exercised unreasonably.” Volk, 235 Ariz.
at 468, 1120-21, 333 P.3d 789 (“When the
court allows ”o time to hear testimony, or
when the time available for each necessary
witness does not allow for meaningful direct
testimony and efficient but adequate cross-
examination, the court violates the parties’
due process rights.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
US. 254, 268-69, 90 S.Ct, 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d
287 (1970) (“The opportunity to be heard
must be tailored to the capacities and cireum-
stances of those who are to be heard.”);
Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co,, 194 Ariz. 85,
91, 129, 977 P.2d 807 (App. 1998) (time limits
predetermined by the court “must be reason-
able under the circumstances [and]
should be sufficiently flexible to allow adjust-
ment during [the hearing]”). Although due
process requires the court to “remain suffi-
ciently flexible in its allotment of time[,] ...
we do not suggest that the court must in-
dulge inefficient use of time by parties or
their counsel.” Volk, 285 Ariz. at 469, 122,
338 P.8d 789,

128 Here, Mother appeared within the
time allotted for her case. She did not delay
the hearing or request the regularly sched-
uled hearing time be extended to accommo-
date her late arrival. The court's calendar
was thus not offended. Similarly, DCS was

not prejudiced by Mother’s readiness to tes-
tify prior to its case closure. Mother's late
appearance caused no harm to the court, or
DCS, and could reasonably have been accom-
modated,

CONCLUSION

129 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the superior court’s severance of Mother's
rights to Z.D., and remand for a new sever-
ance adjudication hearing regarding both the
statutory grounds for termination and the
bests interests of the child determination,
consistent with this opinion.

393 P.3d 938

Gail L. PALMER, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v

CITY OF PHOENIX, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0398

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 3/80/2017

ee
nH
=)

Timothy A. LaSota PLC, Phoenix, By Tim-
othy A. LaSota, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appel-
Jants

Schern Richardson Finter Decker PLC,
Mesa, By Michael A, Schern, Adam B, Deck-
er, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Grand
Canyon University

Phoenix City Attorney's Office, Phoenix,
By Paul M. Li, Counsel for Defendant/Appel-
lee City of Phoenix

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Paul J.
McMurdie joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

11 In 2015, Grand Canyon University
(“GCU”) asked the City of Phoenix to aban-
don a roadway near its campus that had been
dedicated to the City for the public’s use in
1926 (the “1926 Dedication”). Over the ohjec-
tions of Plaintiffs/Appellants Gail L. Palmer,
Janice M. Palmer, and Gary S. Perkins-

160

Warinner (the “Landowners”), the City de-
cided to conditionally abandon the roadway.
On appeal, the Landowners argue the City’s
decision to conditionally abandon the road-
way was contrary to the terms of the 1926
Dedication, state law, and the City Code,
and, therefore, illegal. The Landowners also
argue the abandonment method the City
adopted—a public sale—violated state law
and the City Code because the City “engi-
neered” the sale to ensure that GCU would
be the only bidder. We reject the Landown-
ers’ arguments and affirm the superior
court's judgment in favor of the City and
GcuU.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 In 2015, GCU submitted an “abandon-
ment application” to the City’s Planning and
Development Department (“Department”)
and requested the City abandon part of West
Colter Street, an east-west street, and part
of a street that intersected West Colter
Street, North 80th Drive, a north-south
street (collectively, the “roadway”), GCU
owned all the property abutting the roadway
except for three parcels of property abutting
West Colter Street, one owned by a third
party not involved in this litigation,! and two
neighboring parcels owned and used as rent-
al properties by the Landowners (collective-
ly, the “private property owners”), GCU pro-
posed building two guard gates or booths,
one on the eastern end of West Colter Street
and one at the north end of North 30th Drive
which would allow GCU to control access to
all of the property abutting the roadway,
whether owned by it or the private property
owners,

18 The City received the roadway for the
publie’s use through a recorded dedication in
1926 when the “Homeland” subdivision was
platted, The 1926 Dedication recited the own-
ers had:

caused the ... property to he surveyed,

subdivided and platted as shown hereon,

which said premises so subdivided and
platted shall hereafter be known as

HOMELAND, and that the plat as shown

1, The third party did not oppose abandonment of

hereon sets for the location, gives the num-
ber and dimensions of each lot and block
and gives the name and width of roads,
which said roads so shown are hereby
dedicated to the use of the public.

(Emphasis added),

14 In July 2015, the City’s Abandonment
Hearing Officer conducted a public hearing
on GCU’s abandonment application, At the
hearing, an attorney representing GCU ex-
plaitied GCU representatives had met with
the Landowners and others to discuss the
requested abandonment and GCU had
agreed to several “stipulations” designed to
address various access concerns they had
raised. Accordingly, GCU’s attorney in-
formed the Hearing Officer, that, in addition
to building the guard gates, GCU would: (1)
build an “express/thru” lane so the private
property owners and their renters, guests,
invitees, and service providers (collectively,
“related users”) could bypass the guard
gates; (2) maintain at its expense the road-
way’s pavement and sidewalks “commensu-
rate with” public roadways in the City; (8)
grant a permanent, unrestricted, recorded
access easement to the private properties’
owners for their benefit and the benefit of
their related users; and (4) not restrict pe-
destrians from accessing or leaving Little
Canyon Trail, a City maintained trail, at
‘West Colter Street or North 30th Drive.
Although GCU’s original abandonment appli-
cation had not expressly asked the City to
convey title or fee ownership of the roadway
to GCU, given GCU’s willingness to agree to
the stipulations, GCU clearly anticipated
that, if the City approved the proposed aban-
donment, the City would convey the roadway
to it,

5 The Landowners objected to the pro-
posed abandonment at the hearing, criticiz-
ing, among other matters, GCU’s presence in
the area, GCU’s treatment of them, GCU’s
students, and GCU’s failure to obtain an
environmental impact statement. Despite the
Landowners’ opposition, the Hearing Officer
conditionally approved GCU’s abandonment

the roadway.

application, subject to GCU’s compliance
with and performance of the stipulations
within 18 months. The Landowners and a
third party appealed the Hearing Officer’s
decision to the Phoenix City Council,

16 City officials and Department staff
then met with the appealing parties and rep-
resentatives of GCU and discussed the pro-
posed abandonment and the appealing par-
ties’ objections. Based on the discussions, the
Department’s Director submitted a memo-
randum to the City Council recommending
approval of the proposed abandonment with
modified and additional stipulations. The
modified and additional stipulations con-
cerned, in part, access issues and, in part,
reflected that if the City abandoned the road-
way, it would do so through a public sale
which, under state law and the City Code,
would allow anyone, not just GCU, to buy the
roadway, subject to any stipulations imposed
by the City. Accordingly, the Director ex-
plained the stipulations had been modified to
“correctly portray that any purchaser of the
abandonment area must comply with all or
their portion of the stipulations prior to tak-
ing control of” the roadway.

17 Thus, by way of example, the modified
stipulations required “[alny purchaser ..,
[to] provide the private property owners
along Colter Street ... with a permanent,
unrestricted, recorded access easement to
their properties for the benefit of the owners
and their invitees, guests and any service
personnel to use the [express/thru] lane at all
times.” Similarly, the modified stipulations
yequired “any purchaser ... [to] maintain
the [roadway’s] existing pavement and side-
walk improvements in a condition commensu-
rate with public roadways in the City of
Phoenix, for so long as there remains any
private properties (not owned by GCU) with-
in [] the abandonment boundaries,” And, the
modified stipulations prohibited “[alny pur-
chaser of any portion of the [roadway from
restricting] movement of pedestrians utilizing
Little Canyon Trail from accessing the trail
at Colter Street or 30th Drive during hours
of operation.”

161

18 Subject to the modified and additional
stipulations in the Director’s memorandum
(“the final stipulations”), in October 2015 the
City Council unanimously, but conditionally,
approved the proposed abandonment, The
City Council’s approval was conditional be-
cause, as the Director explained in his memo-
randum,

The City will ensure compliance with all
stipulations and City Council will have final
review and approval prior to any actual
[conveyance of the roadway] to any private
entity. This requested action only lays out.
a course for the purchasing entity to com-
ply with prior to the City Council authoriz-
ing a conveyance of the [roadway] through
a separate City Council action,

19 The Landowners then filed a verified
complaint in the superior court seeking spe-
cial action relief. As relevant here, in their
complaint and in subsequent filings in the
superior court, the Landowners argued the
City's conditional abandonment (1) violated
the 1926 Dedication and state law in effect
when the roadway was dedicated to the City
because both required the City to maintain
the roadway for the public's use; (2) violated
state law and the City Code because the
roadway was still necessary for the publie’s
use; and (8) violated state law and the City
Code because the abandonment method ap-
proved by the City—a public sale—had been
“engineered” by the City to ensure GCU
would be the only bidder at the sale,

110 After full briefing and extensive oral
argument, the superior court dismissed the
Landowners’ complaint. The court ruled the
City had not proceeded or threatened to
proceed “without or in excess of jurisdiction
or legal authority” and the City’s decision to
conditionally approve the abandonment had
not been arbitrary and capricious or an abuse
of diseretion. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(b)-
(c) (special action addresses whether a “de-
fendant has proceeded or is threating to
proceed in excess of jurisdiction or legal au-
thority” or “[w]hether a determination was
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of dis-
cretion”),

162
DISCUSSION?

I. The 1926 Dedication and the City’s Au-
thority to Abandon a Roadway Dedicated.
to Public Use.

Hl {11 The Landowners argue, as they
did in the superior court, that the City was
not entitled to conditionally abandon the
roadway because it had been dedicated in
1926 “to the use of the public.”* The 1926
Dedication did not, as the Landowners argue,
prohibit the City from abandoning the road-
way.

112 When the owners dedicated the road-
way to the public’s use in 1926, the statute
that governed the 1926 Dedication required a
landowner who wished to subdivide property
into tracts of 20 acres or less to have the
property surveyed and platted and “by prop-
er dedication, dedicate the avenues, streets,
parks, plazas, public grounds and alleys to
the public for their general use.” 1913 Ari-
zona Civil Code § 5818, Section 1895 of the
1918 Civil Code provided that upon the “fil-
ing” of a map or plat, the “fee of all streets

. and other parcels of ground reserved
therein to the use of the public, shall vest in
such town, if incorporated, in trust, for the
uses therein named and expressed.” Accord-
ingly, under these statutes, the City became
the fee owner of the roadway and, consistent
with the language of the 1926 Dedication,
received the roadway in trust for the public’s
use!

2. Because the dispositive issues in this appeal
present issues of law, our review is de novo. Nat'l
Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-2 v. Rand,
241 Ariz. 169, 171, 17, 384 P.3d 1249, 1251
(App. 2016) (citation omitted).

3. The Landowners argued in the superior court
that the City did not own fee title to the roadway
but instead held only an easement for use of the
roadway because the 1926 Dedication had been a
common law and not a statutory dedication. See
generally Pleak v. Entrada Prop, Owners Ass'n,
207 Ariz. 418, 421, 18, 87 P.3d 831, 834 (2004)
(under common law, landowner may dedicate
land for a proper public use; effect of common
law dedication is that the public acquires an
easement to use the property for the specified
purpose while the fee remains with the dedica-
tor); Allied Am. Inv. Co. v. Pettit, 65 Ariz. 283,
289-90, 179 P.2d 437, 440-41, 179 P.2d 437
(1947) (when, pursuant to statute, landowner

118 But the City’s receipt of the roadway
in trust for the public’s use did not mean it
could not abandon it, Section 1897 of the 1913
Civil Code also authorized a city to “vacate,”
that is, abandon, city streets and other public
property (“[Clities and common councils in
cities shall have the [power to] lay out and
establish, open, alter, widen, extend, grade,
pave or otherwise improve streets, alleys,
avenues, sidewalks, parks and public
grounds, and vacate the same.”). Thus, the
statutes in effect in 1926 granted a city the
right to receive property in fee for the pub-
lies use and the ‘right to vacate—or aban-
don—city-owned public property.

14 From the enactment of the 1913 Civil
Code to the present, the Legislature has
continued to grant cities the right to receive
property in fee for the public’s use and the
right to vacate city-owned public property.
What is now Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) section 9-1141 (2008) and (1956),
which authorizes a landowner to dedicate
property for public use, existed as § 17-1818
in the 1989 Arizona Civil Code, § 3210 in the
1928 Arizona Civil Code, and, as discussed,
§ 5818 in the 1913 Civil Code. What is now
ALR.S, § 9-254 (2008) and (1956), which vests
the fee of platted property in trust for the
public’s use, existed as § 16-231 in the 1939
Civil Code, § 895 in the 1928 Civil Code, and,
as discussed, § 1895 in the 1918 Civil Code.
And, what is now A.R.S. § 9-276(A)(1) (2008)
and (1956), which empowers cities to vacate,
or abandon, city-owned streets, alleys, ave-
nues, and sidewalks, existed as § 16-601 in

records plat showing streets, alleys, parks, and
other property reserved for the public’s use, fee
vests in town, if incorporated). Based on this
distinction, the Landowners argued the City
could not abandon the roadway because the City
did not own it. The superior court ruled the 1926
Dedication was a statutory dedication, and the
Landowners have not challenged that ruling on
appeal.

4, The parties have agreed that the 1913 Civil
Code governs the legal effect of the 1926 Dedica-
tion. The parties have been less than clear, how-
ever, whether the 1913 Civil Code or the statutes
in effect when the City approved the conditional
abandonment control the validity of the condi-
tional abandonment, We do not need to decide
which statutory scheme controls as the dedica-
tion and abandonment statutes have remained
the same since 1913, See infra 14.

the 1939 Civil Code, § 408 in the 1928 Civil
Code, and, as discussed, § 1897 in the 1918
Civil Code.

115 Consistent with the broad authority it
granted to cities to abandon city-owned prop-
erty, in 1961 the Legislature expressly au-
thorized a municipal corporation to vacate a
roadway if it determined the roadway was no
longer necessary for public use’ See 1961
Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch, 105, § 105 (originally
codified at A.R.S, § 18-502 (1961)). Now co-
dified at A.R.S, § 28-7202 (2018), this statute
states that if “a governing body determines
that a public roadway owned by the city ...
or a portion of the roadway is not necessary
for public use as a roadway, the governing
body may dispose of ... the roadway....”
The City Code contains virtually the same
provision: “When in the discretion of the City
Council a public roadway owned by the City,
or a portion of such a roadway, is no longer
necessary for public use as roadway, the City
Council may dispose of ... the same....”
Phoenix City Code § 31-64.

116 Thus, in 1926, when the owners dedi-
cated the roadway to the City in trust for the
public’s use, they did so subject to the City’s
right to vacate city-owned property. See gen-
erally Martini v. Smith, 42 P.8d 629, 688
(Colo. 2002) (dedication of street for public
use was binding on municipality under stat-
utes in effect at the time of the dedication
but street could be vacated by municipality if
municipality complied with statutory require-
ments in effect when municipality decided to
vacate the street); City of Detroit v. Judge of
Recorder's Court of City of Detroit, 258 Mich.
6, 234 N.W. 445, 447 (1981) (city acquired
land by dedication; subject, at the time of the
dedication, to city’s right under its charter to
alter, vacate, or abolish its public places);
Belgum v. City of Kimball, 1683 Neb. 774, 81
N.W.2d 205, 218 (1957) (when street is dedi-
cated to public’s use in a recorded plat, as
authorized by statute, dedication is also sub-
ject to statute that allows a city to vacate
streets and alleys); In re Appeal from Pas-
sage of Ordinance 4354 of the City of Altoo-
na, 479 Pa, 252, 388 A.2d 818, 317 (Pa. 1978)
(dedication does not impose upon a munici-

5. A roadway “includes all or part of a platted
designated public street, highway, alley, lane,

163

pality a duty to maintain dedicated roadway
in perpetuity; when purpose for which the
roadway was dedicated no longer exists or
the public is no longer benefited by the des-
ignated use, municipality is empowered to
vacate the roadway); see also 26 C.J.S, Dedi-
cation § 88 (“The power of a municipality
... to vacate property dedicated to public
use is dependent on the statute and, where a
city is given such a power, dedications to it
are subject to this power since the accep-
tance of the dedication does not constitute a
waiver of its right.”) (emphasis added) (foot-
notes and citations omitted).

117 At its heart, the Landowners’ argu-
ment—that the 1926 Dedication and the
City’s receipt of the roadway in trust pursu-
ant to § 1895 of the 1918 Civil Code prevent-
ed the City from conditionally abandoning
the roadway—is premised on the notion that
a city may never abandon property dedicated
to the public’s use, even if the city has deter-
mined the property is no longer needed for
the public’s use. Under their argument, a city
would be required to hold in perpetuity dedi-
eated property even if the character of the
neighborhood or surrounding property
changed. The Arizona Supreme Court, how-
ever, all but rejected that argument in Reese
v. De Mund (“Reese I”), 74 Ariz, 140, 245
P.2d 284 (1952).

118 There, a plat recorded in 1880 dedicat-
ed to the public all streets and alleys that
abutted blocks of subdivided property. Id. at
141, 245 P.2d at 285. Approximately 70 years
after the City of Phoenix accepted the dedi-
eation, the City decided to abandon and con-
vey one of the alleys to a private party. Id.
‘The plaintiff sued the private party and the
City, asserting the conveyance of the alley to
the private party was void because the aban-
donment “was not done for the public good.”
Id. After noting that the City had acted in a
legislative capacity in deciding to abandon
the alley, the court concluded the City’s char-
ter—which authorized the City to both ac-
cept and vacate street dedications—allowed
the City to vacate the alley and thus: “[T]he
action of the council was within its declared
powers.” Jd. at 143, 245 P.2d at 286.

parkway, avenue, road, sidewalk or other public
way..." ARS. § 28-7201(4) (2013).

164

{19 As in Reese I, the City’s decision to
conditionally abandon the roadway was with-
in its declared powers, both under the 1913
Civil Code, current statutes, and, indeed, un-
der the City’s current charter and City Code.
See Charter of the City of Phoenix, Ch. IV,
section 49 (2016) (City may “accept dedica-
tions of streets” and “vacate such dedica-
tions”); Phoenix City Code § 31-64 (City
may vacate a roadway if that roadway is no
longer necessary for public use),

HI 1.20 The Landowners rely on several
out-of-state cases in arguing the City was
barred from conditionally abandoning the
roadway because the roadway had been dedi-
cated to the public’s use, The cases cited by
the Landowners recognize that, in general, a
governmental entity holds dedicated proper-
ty in trust for the public to be used for the
purposes specified in the dedication.’ Arizona
courts have also acknowledged that general
tule, Allied Am. Inv. Co, v, Pettit, 65 Ariz.
288, 290, 179 P.2d 487, 441 (1947); City of
Sierra Vista v, Cochise Enters, Inc, 144
Ariz, 875, 879, 697 P.2d 1125, 1129 (App.
1984), But none of these authorities ad-
dressed whether a governmental entity may,
pursuant to statutory authorization, abandon
that property if it determines the property is
no longer needed for the public's use,

21 Finally, if we were to accept the
Landowners’ argument, A,R.S, § 28~7202,
see supra 115, would become meaningless as
a municipal corporation would never be able
to abandon a roadway that had originally
been dedicated to public use. See Carbajal v,
Indus, Comm’n, 228 Aviz, 1,8, 110, 219 P.8d
211, 218 (2009) (citing Ariz. Dep't of Revenue
v, Action Marine, Inc, 218 Ariz, 141, 148,
710, 181 P.8d 188, 190 (2008)) (appellate
courts should not interpret statutes such that
statutory words or phrases are meaningless,
unnecessary, or duplicative) (quotation omit-
ted).

22 In short, under Arizona law, the City
was not precluded from conditionally aban-
doning the roadway even though, pursuant to
the 1926 Dedication, the City received the

6. City Council of Augusta v. Newsome, 211 Ga.
899, 89 S.E.2d 485 (1955); Schien v. City of
Virden, 5 l.2d 494, 126 N.B.2d 201 (1955); 2000
Baum Family Trust v. Babel, 488 Mich, 136, 793

roadway in trust for the public’s use. The
owners made the 1926 Dedication subject to
the City’s right to abandon city-owned prop-
erty—a right, we underscore, that exists to
this day.

II, The Landowners May Not Challenge
the City’s Legislative Decision to Aban-
don the Roadway without Special Dam-
ages.

HI 23 The Landowners argue the City
‘was not entitled to conditionally abandon the
roadway under A.R.S. § 28-7202 and the
City Code because the roadway is still neces-
sary for public use. In making this argument,
the Landowners point to several of the final
stipulations that, for example, require the
purchaser of the roadway to grant the pri-
vate property owners along West Colter
Street an access easement and prohibit the
purchaser from taking steps that would limit
the public’s access to Little Canyon Trail, See
supra 17, As a matter of law, however, the
Landowners are not entitled to challenge the
City’s legislative decision to conditionally
abandon the roadway because they did not
allege or otherwise present any evidence that
the conditional abandonment had caused or
would cause them special damages,

124 In Reese I and in Reese v. De Mund
(Reese II”), 75 Ariz, 66, 251 P.2d 887 (1952),
the Arizona Supreme Court addressed
whether a property owner could challenge a
municipal corporation’s legislative decision to
abandon dedicated property. As discussed,
there, the City decided to vacate and aban-
don property it had received through a dedi-
cation, See supra 118. Recognizing that in
deciding to vacate and abandon the property
the City had acted in a legislative capacity,
Reese I, 74 Aviz, at 142-48, 245 P.2d at 285-
86, the court explained it could not “question
the wisdom or discretion or advisability of
{the City’s] action except for fraud or other
illegality or absence of jurisdiction to aban-
don” unless the property owner could show
special damages from the abandonment. The
court stated: “[I]n the absence of absolute

N.W.2d 633, 637-40 (2010); Ruggieri v. City of E.

Providence, 593 A.2d 55 (R.I. 1991); Roeder Co, v.

Burlington N., Tne. 105 Wash.2d 269, 714 P.2d
1170 (1986).

illegality a property owner may not complain
of the act of a municipality in abandoning a
street unless he shows some special damage
resulting to him from such action.” Jd. at 148,
245 P.2d at 286; see also Reese I, 75 Ariz. at
67, 251 P.2d at 887 (affirming superior
court’s dismissal; damages alleged were “not
different in either degree or kind from those
suffered by the public, generally, and can
constitute no basis for the cause of action
claimed”).

125 Here, the record before us contains no
evidence the Landowners have suffered or
will suffer any special damages.

Hs 1.26 The Landowners argue, never-
theless, that GCU waived the special dam-
ages requirement because it did not raise the
requirement in a timely manner in the supe-
rior court. GCU did not, however, waive the
issue. “[A] party must timely present his
legal theories to the trial court so as to give
the trial court an opportunity to rule proper-
ly.” Payne v. Payne, 12 Ariz.App. 484, 435,
471 P,2d 819, 820 (App. 1970) (citations omit-
ted), Counsel for GCU timely raised the spe-
cial damages requirement in the superior
court during oral argument, and the court
and the parties extensively discussed the re-
quirement and Reese J during the argument.
Further, during the argument, counsel for
the Landowners acknowledged that the “rec-
ord below”—a reference to the administra-
tive record presented to the superior court—
did not contain any testimony from the Land-
owners that the conditional abandonment
would have an adverse impact on their “prop-
erties as rentals,” 7

27 Under these circumstances, the Land-
owners were not in a position to “question
the wisdom or discretion or advisability” of
the City’s decision to conditionally abandon

7. After the Landowners acknowledged the record
contained no evidence the conditional abandon-
ment would have an adverse impact on their
“properties as rentals,” the Landowners told the
superior court they could “call” Appellant Palm-
er “if that would be helpful to the court.” Citing
Robertson v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 440, 442,
666 P.2d 540, 542 (App. 1983) (in special action
filed in the superior court, that court is limited to
reviewing the administrative record), GCU ob-
jected to Palmer testifying, asserting the superior

165

the roadway. Reese I, '74 Ariz. at 142, 245
P.2d at 285.

| 28 Finally, to the extent the Landowners
are arguing the conditional abandonment is
illegal because the roadway is still necessary
for the public’s use, see swpra 128, this argu-
ment is, at its core, nothing more than a
challenge to the City’s legislative decision
making. Reese I recognized that a ‘municipal
corporation acts in its legislative capacity
when it decides to abandon a roadway, and a
property owner who fails to present evidence
of special damages cannot challenge that ac-
tion except for fraud, other illegality, or the
absence of jurisdiction to abandon. 74 Ariz, at
142, 245 P.2d at 285. Here, the Landowners
made no showing they fell within any of
these exceptions to the special damages re-
quirement.

III. The Validity of the Conditional Aban-
donment Under A.R.S. § 28-7204 and
Phoenix City Code Provision § 81-64,

HI 129 The Landowners argue the con-
ditional abandonment violates state law,
ARS. § 28-7204 (2018), and the City Code,
§ 81-64(b), because the abandonment meth-
od approved by the City—a public sale—was
engineered to ensure that GCU would be the
only bidder at the sale. As they see the
situation, through the final stipulations, the

City and Grand Canyon have engineered
an auction in which there will be only one
bidder—Grand Canyon, If someone other
than Grand Canyon buys the property,
that person has to agree, at its own ex-
pense, to do every single thing Grand Can-
yon wants done to the property..., One
does not have to go out on much of a limb
to predict that if this “sale” does go for-
ward, there will be only one bid—Grand
Canyon’s,

court was limited to reviewing the record made
before the City, as the Landowners had filed a
petition requesting special action relief, The su-
perior court did not rule on GCU’s objection to
Palmer's testimony as the Landowners then ac-
knowledged that “the crux” of their case was
that the City had acted illegally. At that point, the
Landowners did not reiterate their offer to pres-
ent testimony regarding special damages, nor did
they make any offer of proof,

166

Although the Landowners have, in convincing
fashion, argued the final stipulations will dis-
courage anyone other than GCU from pur-
chasing the roadway, neither A.R.S. § 28-
7204 nor the corresponding City Code provi-
sion, § 31-64(b), restrict or limit the stipula-
tions a city may impose when exercising its
legislative authority to abandon a roadway.

Hl 130 After a municipal corporation de-
cides a roadway is no longer necessary for
public use, it may abandon the roadway by
conveying the roadway to an abutting land-
owner, see A.R.S, § 28-7205 (2013) and City
Code § 81~64(a), or, if the roadway is in a
planned development, by conveying the road-
way to a planned development owners associ-
ation, see A.R.S. § 28-7206 (2013) and City
Code § 31-64(d), or, as discussed, to the
successful purchaser at the public sale under
ARS, § 28-7204 and City Code § 81-64(b).

181 When the City elects to proceed by
sale, A.R.S. § 28-7204 and the corresponding
City Code provision require it to provide
notice in advance of the date of the sale to
the public and abutting owners. The statute
and corresponding City Code provision re-
quire that the notice describe the roadway or
portion of the roadway to be sold, refer to
the statute and code provision, and “[s]tate
that a person may submit purchase offers
and that abutting owners have preference
rights pursuant to this article.” A.R.S. § 28-
7204(C).

182 On its face, neither A.R.S. § 28~7204
nor the corresponding City Code provision
mandate the substance or content of any
stipulation the City may impose on the pur-
chaser of the roadway. The statute and cor-
responding City Code provision concern no-
tice—notice of the sale to the public and the
abutting owners and the content of the no-
tice, The Landowners’ argument that the
final stipulations violate A.R.S. § 28-7204
and the corresponding City Code provision
requires us to read into those provisions
requirements that are not otherwise within
them and to expand those provisions to mat-
ters that simply do not fall within the statu-
tory and code language. We cannot do that.
Cicoria v. Cole, 222 Ariz. 428, 431, 115, 215
P.8d 402, 405 (App. 2009) (court “will not
read into a statute something that is not

within the manifest intent of the legislature
as indicated by the statute itself” and will not
extend a statute to matters that do not fall
within its express provisions) (citation omit-
ted).

CONCLUSION

183 We affirm the superior court’s judg-
ment dismissing the Landowners’ complaint
against GCU and the City. We deny GCU’s
request for fees on appeal fees pursuant to
ARS. § 12-849 (Supp. 2016), which author-
izes a court to assess fees as a sanction.
Although we have affirmed the superior
court's judgment dismissing the Landowners’
complaint, their appeal was not frivolous. As
the prevailing parties on appeal, we award
GCU and the City costs on appeal as author-
ized by law contingent upon their compliance
with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Proce-

dure 21.

393 P.3d 946
VARCO, INC., an Arizona corporation;
RW Warehouse Corporation, an Arizona
corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellees,
ve
UNS ELECTRIC, INC., an Arizona
corporation, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0144
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed March 23, 2017

168

1,

UNS is represented by different counsel in this

Burris & MacOmber, P.L.L.C., Tucson, By
D. Rob Burris and Karl MacOmber, Counsel
for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Tucson, By An-
drew M. Jacobs and W. Danny Green, Coun-
sel for Defendant/Appellant

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and
Judge Espinosa concurred.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

11 Defendant UNS Electric appeals from
the trial court’s grant of a motion for new
trial in favor of plaintiffs Varco and RW
Warehouse Corporation, after the jury ruled
in favor of UNS. The ruling was based on
misconduct by UNS’s counsel for examining
witnesses regarding excluded evidence, as
well as disclosure violations! For the follow-
ing reasons, we affirm,

Factual and Procedural Background

12 The lawsuit arose out of a 2018 fire
that destroyed a warehouse owned by Varco
and rented by RW Warehouse Corporation,
hereinafter collectively referred to as “Var-
co.” Varco alleged the fire originated on a
utility pole negligently installed and main-
tained by UNS in close proximity to the
warehouse. Specifically, Varco alleged UNS’s

court.

negligence resulted in electrical “arcing” that.
caused the fire,

Hs 18 Varco filed motions in limine to
preclude evidence that a cigarette butt was
found on the site near the fire origination,
that Vareo did not possess property insur-
ance, and certain opinions of UNS fire expert
Keith Paffrath. The trial court granted the
motion about the cigarette butt and lack of
insurance, but reserved ruling on the admis-
sibility of Paffrath’s testimony “pending
proof of proper foundation.” The minute en-
try does not reflect the court’s reasoning,
and UNS did not designate a transcript of
the motions hearing as part of the appellate
record.? We presume the missing transcript
would support the court’s ruling, Myrick v.
Maloney, 235 Ariz, 491, 111, 888 P.8d 818,
822 (App. 2014); further, we rely on the
court’s statements—made throughout trial—
as to the rulings, their scope, and the court’s
rationale,

14 On the second day of trial, UNS cross-
examined an employee who witnessed the
fire, asking him if he and others smoked at
the warehouse, After objection by Varco, the
trial court reminded the parties that its mo-
tion-in-limine ruling was based on the fact
that UNS was not expected to offer a witness
who could “provide a reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude that there was some other
cause of the fire, whether it was smoking or
anything else”; therefore, evidence of any
specific people smoking or of a cigarette butt
was not relevant. UNS stated it intended
instead to introduce evidence of smoking to
show a violation of the fire code, but the
court still sustained the objection.

15 Resuming cross-examination, UNS im-
mediately asked the witness about where
smoking is allowed, Varco objected, and the
trial court sustained the objection. UNS then
asked where smoking is not allowed, Varco
objected, and the court sustained the objec-
tion, At a bench conference, UNS argued
that an expert would testify that smoking in
certain areas would have been a violation of
the fire code. The court again sustained the
objection, concluding fire code violations
were irrelevant unless there was testimony

2, See Ariz, R. Civ. App. P, 11(c)(1)(A) (@ppellant
must order transcripts necessary for proper con-

169

that adherence to the fire code would have
ameliorated the fire. Later, the court further
explained its basis for precluding testimony
about smoking and the fire code as both
lacking relevance under Rule 401, Ariz. R.
Evid., and more prejudicial than probative,
confusing the issues, and confusing to the
jury pursuant to Rule 408, Ariz. R. Evid.

16 The next day during direct examina-
tion, Varco’s expert was asked, “There is no
other evidence of anything else starting the
pallets on fire other than the sparking; is
that correct?” The expert agreed. During
eross-examination, UNS asked about smok-
ing areas at the warehouse and whether
smoking is a frequent cause of fires. Varco
objected, but the trial court overruled the
objection on the ground that Varco opened
the door to questions about the methodology
the expert had used to eliminate other causes
of the fire. The court still precluded ques-
tions regarding the cigarette butt because
there was no evidence the fire began with
smoking.

117 At the start of UNS’s case in chief, it
began by introducing deposition testimony of
a Varco employee. Vareo unsuccessfully ob-
jected based on a lack of pretrial designation.
Several pages into the testimony, UNS’s
counsel read four questions and answers re-
garding who smoked at the warehouse and
what the warehouse smoking policy was. Var-
co eventually objected, arguing that UNS
had improperly introduced testimony regard-
ing smoking. The trial court sustained the
objection,

18 The absence of property insurance was
the source of continuing dispute throughout
trial, despite a pretrial ruling precluding ref-
erence to it, UNS argued in its written re-
sponse and throughout trial that a lack of
insurance showed a lack of inspection and a
general failure to follow fire codes. During
trial, the trial court sustained objections in-
volving insurance, noting testimony regard-
ing fire code violations was irrelevant and
more prejudicial than probative. The court
separately explained it had precluded UNS
from offering proof that the warehouse had

sideration on appeal if not already in official
record),

170

never been permitted or inspected, based on
lack of foundation as well as relevance.

19 Nonetheless, on the fifth day of trial,
UNS asked the owner if the building had a
certificate of occupancy, to which Varco ob-
jected. The trial court noted that it had re-
viewed the audio recording of the motions
hearing and found this issue fell under com-
pliance with local fire codes, and it was there-
fore still inadmissible. UNS argued its ex-
pert, Paffrath, would testify that had the fire
codes been followed, the fire would have
remained outside the building. The court con-
cluded UNS could try to establish relevance
and lay a foundation with Paffrath, but noted
there was still a pending issue involving late
disclosure with respect to Paffrath’s testimo-
ny about fire codes.

110 Finally, during Paffrath’s testimony,
UNS asked, “Do you understand that the
building was—was never inspected?” Varco
objected and the trial court reiterated that
fire code violations were irrelevant absent an
opinion connecting violations to causation.
The court further stated it did not “appreci-
ate [UNS] asking the question, is it your
understanding this thing has never been in-
spected, in anticipation of [Varco’s] objection
to this question.” The court reiterated the
basis of its ruling on the motion in limine,
again stating that it reviewed the audio re-
cording’ The court had the court reporter
read back the question, concluded it was
leading, and stated that it found the actions
of UNS’s counsel to be intentional. The court
inquired about whether Varco wanted a cura-
tive instruction, but Varco did not ask for one
and the court did not give one.

{11 The jury found in favor of UNS, and
Vareo filed a motion for new trial arguing
misconduct by UNS’s counsel caused them
unfair prejudice. After a hearing, the trial
court granted the motion in an unsigned
3. The trial court ultimately ruled that any evi-

dence of fire code violations was inadmissible
due to late disclosure.

4, Compliance with Rule 54(b) or (c), Ariz. R. Civ.
P,, is not required in these circumstances. See
Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, LLC. 240
Ariz. 420, 125, 380 P.3d 659, 670 (App. 2016).

5. We note at the outset that Varco frequently has
failed to cite to the record in the analysis section

minute entry. UNS moved for reconsidera-
tion of the order for a new trial, and the
court issued a detailed twenty-one page
signed order reaffirming its ruling and deny-
ing the motion for reconsideration. UNS
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120,21(A)(1) and 12-
2101(A))(a).*

Motion for New Trial

Hs 112 UNS generally argues the trial
court abused its discretion by granting the
motion for new trial because it did not com-
mit misconduct, Vareo did not suffer preju-
dice, and the court did not “consider whether
the jury’s verdict was correct.” The trial
court has broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for new trial. See Leavy v. Parsell,
188 Ariz, 69, 72, 982 P.2d 1340, 1848 (1997), A
trial court abuses its discretion when it com-
mits an error of law, or when the record
lacks substantial evidence to support the
eourt’s finding. Romer-Pollis v. Ada, 223
Ariz, 300, 112, 222 P.8d 916, 918-19 (App.
2009). Further, “[w]e review an order grant-
ing a new trial under a more liberal standard
than an order denying one.” Englert v. Car-
ondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz, 21, 15, 18
P.8d 763, 767 (App. 2000), quoting State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co, v. Brown, 1883 Ariz,
518, 521, 905 P.2d 527, 530 (App. 1995), This
is because the denial may be a final disposi-
tion of the rights of the parties, and because
“we recognize that trial judges disfavor new
trial motions and will generally grant them
only with great caution.” Liberatore v
Thompson, 157 Ariz, 612, 620, 760 P.2d 612,
620 (App. 1988).

HM 118 When ruling on a motion for
new trial based on attorney misconduct, the
trial court “must decide whether the miscon-
duct materially affected the rights of the

of its answering brief, as required by Rule
13(a)(7)(B) and (b)(1), Ariz. R. Civ, App. P, We
could find its arguments waived due to these
omissions, but in our discretion we consider
them, because the trial court's ruling included
extensive citations to the record, Cf. Delmastro &
Eells v. Taco Bell Corp,, 228 Ariz, 134, n.2, 263
P.3d 683, 686 1.2 (App, 2011) (waiver for failure
to comply with Rule 13(a) discretionary).

aggrieved party,” and reversal is only re-
quired “when it appears probable that the
misconduct ‘actually influenced the verdict.’ ”
Leavy, 188 Ariz, at 72, 982 P.2d at 1848,
quoting Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 188
Ariz, 434, 454, 652 P.2d 507, 527 (1982), Al-
though there is no presumption of prejudice
or lack thereof, “[i]f the misconduct is serious
+. the judge should resolve any doubt in
favor of the party aggrieved.” Id.

Misconduct

I 114 UNS argues the trial court
abused its discretion when it labeled several
occurrences during trial as misconduct. It
first contends it did not commit misconduct
when asking generally about smoking be-
cause the pretrial ruling was limited to testi-
mony about a single cigarette butt, Because
we presume the missing transcript of the
motions hearing supports the court’s ruling
as it pertains to smoking, Myrick, 285 Ariz.
491, 111, 888 P.8d at 822, UNS’s claim that
the ruling was limited to preclusion of a
specific cigarette butt is not supported by the
record. The court explained on the second
day of trial that the ruling regarding the
cigarette butt broadly addressed smoking,
Despite this explanation and confirmation of
the scope of its pretrial ruling, UNS asked
questions about smoking at least three more
times, including reading deposition testimony
on the same topic.

115 UNS also argues there was no mis-
conduct because the trial court permitted
questioning into smoking multiple times.
First, UNS cites the court’s rejection of Var-
co’s non-specific objection to UNS’s initial
questions about smoking before counsel ap-

6. For example, on day two, UNS asked a former
employee to use an exhibit to explain where
smoking was permitted at the warehouse. After
Varco objected as to relevance and the trial court
sustained, UNS then asked, “Is there an area
where smoking is not allowed?” On day six,
counsel for UNS read into the record excerpts of
the deposition of a warehouse employee, which
included questions and answers about if any em-
ployees smoked, who smoked, if there was a
policy about smoking in the warehouse, and if
employees were allowed to smoke outside the
warehouse,

7. UNS also argues the trial court appeared to
have granted the motion for new trial based

171

proached the bench and the court reviewed
its motion in limine ruling. UNS also cites
the court's failure to stop UNS’s counsel
from reading deposition excerpts regarding
smoking until after the fourth question had
been asked. These instances do not indicate
the court changed its ruling on its motion in
limine and intended to permit such question-
ing; rather, they indicate Vareo did not
quickly object to the precluded testimony,
which was understandable because UNS had
not provided pretrial transcript designations.
UNS also relies on the fact that it was al-
lowed to inquire into Varco’s expert’s meth-
odology in excluding smoking as a cause;
however, the court found that testimony ad-
missible only because Varco opened the door
when its expert testified that he had ruled
out other causes. Importantly, the court ex-
pressly stated Varco had not opened the door
to all questioning about smoking, Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding that
UNS repeatedly violated its motion in limine
ruling regarding smoking.

HI 116 UNS next argues that the trial
court abused its discretion to the extent it
found misconduct based on the question it
asked of Paffrath, its expert, on the seventh
day of trial: “Do you understand that the
building was—was never inspected?” UNS
contends the court ruled that UNS could ask
Paffrath about the inspection, and the ques-
tion was not asked in bad faith.”

917 As with the smoking-related ques-
tions, UNS contends the trial court ruled
that Paffrath could be asked about whether a
certificate of occupancy had been obtained.
Again, we presume the missing transcript

solely on this question, relying on “the fact that
the Court had not exhibited any particular frus-
tration or difficulty with UNS's questioning con-
cerning smoking.” That the court withheld ex-
pressing “frustration” while repeatedly restating
its reasoning for its motion in limine ruling does
not indicate that earlier incidents could not have
been part of the court’s calculus in granting the
motion for new trial. Cf. Liberatore, 157 Ariz. at
621, 760 P.2d at 621 (court's earlier denial of
mistrial did not preclude grant of new trial based
on conclusion, “informed by the verdict, that
misconduct had cumulatively colored the re-
sult”).

172

supports the court’s ruling. Myrick, 285 Ariz,
491, 111, 3883 P.8d at 822, Moreover, during a
hearing on motions in limine, the issue of a
permit and certificate of occupancy was
raised and the court precluded UNS from
addressing the issue of “permit[ing] and in-
spectfion]” because of a lack of foundation,
adding that it was also irrelevant in that it
was “remote in connection with the facts.” On.
the second day of trial, the court also ex-
plained fire code violations were not relevant
“unless someone [was] going to tie the viola-
tion of the fire code to either the cause of the
fire” or increased damages. On the fifth day
of trial, UNS asked a witness about a certifi-
cate of oceupancy, Varco objected, and the
court noted that UNS had not yet explained
how the fire codes as related to inspections
were relevant, Despite these repeated state-
ments by the court, UNS asked its question
on the seventh day of trial.

118 UNS also argues it had laid a proper
foundation for the question, and that the trial
court erred as a matter of law in finding
there was none. It is clear from the context
of the transcript, however, that the court
used the word “foundation” in a general
sense to explain the absence of a connection
between building inspection and fire causa-
tion.® Moreover, the question was improper
on its face because the court had previously
deemed the issue irrelevant until UNS could
establish a link to causation or damages.

119 Finally, UNS argues the leading ques-
tion alone could not justify the new trial
because it was “inconsequential” and permis-
sible. As noted above, the trial court had not
yet concluded the question was permissible,
Moreover, the question itself strongly indi-
cated to the jury that the building was never
inspected, Having already repeated its rea-
soning for preclusion multiple times during
the course of the trial, the court determined
experienced counsel’s actions in asking a
leading question were intentionally designed
8. As UNS notes, the question regarding a permit

also raised a hearsay issue that the trial court

referred to as “foundational,” but UNS withdrew

that line of questioning and the jury never heard
it.

9. UNS additionally claims that deficiencies or
incorrect statements in Varco’s motion for new
trial led the trial court to err in its ruling, and it

to avoid the expected objection by Varco,
Substantial evidence, based on UNS’s re-
peated course of conduct detailed above, sup-
ports this finding.?

Prejudice

Hs 1.20 UNS also contends the mis-
conduct cited by the trial court was not
prejudicial. Prejudice occurs when the mis-
conduct (1) is significant, such as knowing,
deliberate violations of court orders; (2) “in-
volves essential and important issues”; and,
@) is “apparently successful in achieving its
goals.” Leavy, 188 Ariz, at 78, 932 P.2d at
1844, The trial judge is in the best position
to assess prejudice because he has “had the
unique opportunity to hear the testimony
and argument, observe its effect on the jury,
and determine through his observations that.
the trial ha[s] been unfairly compromised,”
Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C., 229
Ariz, 877, 192, 276 P.8d 11, 89 (App. 2012),
“{IIn contrast, we have only a cold record,
which does not convey voice emphasis or
inflection, or allow us to observe the jury
and its reactions,” Id.

21 UNS generally argues the misconduct
did not rise to the level of what occurred in
Leavy, In that ease, which arose out of an
auto accident, the trial court explicitly pre-
cluded a defense witness from testifying
about the credibility of another witness and
precluded the defendant from raising the
“seatbelt defense,” Leavy, 188 Ariz. at 70-71,
982 P.2d at 1841-42, Defense counsel violated
the witness and seatbelt orders twice during
opening statements and once during ques-
tioning of a witness. Id. at 71, 982 P.2d at
1842. Counsel also mentioned alcohol at least,
eleven times throughout the trial, despite the
absence of evidence regarding alcohol use,
Id, The court denied a motion for new trial
and our supreme court reversed, concluding
defense counsel intentionally sought to imply

disputes the characterization and inclusion of
certain trial excerpts cited in the motion. The
court, however, issued its twenty-one page ruling
after reviewing ‘‘the entire transcript of the eight
trial days, as well as the court record of all prior
proceedings”; we focus only on arguments that
connect any claimed errors in the motion itself to
those in the ruling,

the plaintiff was negligent by failing to use a
seat belt and by using alcohol, and to bolster
the credibility of a key witness, which were
mowing violations of court orders. Jd, at 71-
78, 982 P.2d at 1842-44, As in Leavy, the
issues raised here were key to the case, and
UNS repeatedly raised them in front of the
jury despite their having been precluded by
the court.!° See id,

122 UNS also argues no individual in-
stance of misconduct was prejudicial, Even if
UNS is correct about some of the individual
events, the cumulative actions of counsel may
support the granting of a motion for new
trial. See Sanchez v. Stremel, 95 Ariz, 392,
895, 891 P.2d 557, 559 (1964) (single instance
of improper argument in closing plus prejudi-
cial misconduct throughout trial justified new
trial); see also Grant, 188 Ariz. at 452-58, 652
P.2d at 525-26 (reviewing cases and finding
misconduct “almost invariably ... has been
combined with other, serious error, the cu-
mulative effect of which is to compel the
conclusion that there was prejudice”). We
address the more significant instances.

923 Regarding smoking, UNS contends
the statements made were brief, peripheral,
and not argued before the jury. However, on
the second day of trial, UNS asked a witness
twice about smoking—once immediately after
having been reminded that such questions
were precluded by the ruling on the motion
in limine, On day six, UNS’s counsel read
into the record four deposition questions and
answers regarding smoking, UNS made re-
peated references before the jury to smok-
ing, suggesting it was a potential cause of the
fire,

124 UNS also argues the trial court erred
in relying on two instances of late disclosure
to support its ruling. UNS contends the re-
lated discussions cannot be considered “mis-

10. UNS argues—without any support—that the
“quick, unanimous verdict” it obtained also dem-
onstrates the case was not “close.” Even were
this argument not waived for failure to cite au-
thority, see Polanco v. Indus. Comm'n, 214 Ariz.
489, n.2, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2 (App. 2007), it
would fail because the jury determinations—
what caused the fire or what caused it to
spread—were the subjects of UNS’s misconduct.

11, UNS argues one of the disclosure rulings
could not support misconduct because the trial

173

conduct” because they occurred out of the
presence of the jury, citing Grant. But Grant
states a new trial should be granted only
when misconduct probably influenced the
verdict or materially affected the rights of
the other party and does not state that all of
the effects of misconduct must be obvious to
the jury. See 188 Ariz. at 454, 652 P.2d at
527. Here, the court concluded UNS’s late
disclosure “regularly disrupt[ed] opposing
counsels’ ability to focus on presenting their
case,” in order to gain an unfair advantage.
The trial interruptions to discuss disclosure
issues are also apparent in the record.!! Rea-
sonable evidence supports the court’s finding
the misconduct was significant, deliberate,
and directed at key issues of causation and
damages,

HE 125 Finally, UNS argues the trial
court erred by granting the new trial without
finding “that the jury verdict was wrong.” 2
To the extent UNS is arguing the court
failed to find the misconduct was successful
in achieving its goals, as required by Leavy,
188 Ariz. at 78, 982 P.2d at 1844, the court
explicitly made such a finding in its final
judgment, and it is supported by reasonable
evidence. UNS also contends the prejudice
ruling required the court to find “that the
jury has reached a seriously erroneous result
and it is necessary to set aside the verdict to
avoid a miscarriage of justice,” citing State v.
Fischer, 238 Ariz. 309, 1 22, 360 P.8d 105, 111
(App. 2015). Fischer, however, involved a mo-
tion for new trial based on the verdict being
“contrary to law or to the weight of the
evidence,” under Ariz, R, Crim. P. 24,1(¢)(1).
288 Ariz, 309, 19117, 25, 860 P.3d at 109, 111,
Although that rule is similar to a civil motion
for new trial under Rule 59(a)(1)(H), Ariz. R.
Civ. P., the motion in this case was granted
on the basis of the prevailing party’s miscon-

court should not have precluded the testimony.
But UNS does not dispute that the disclosure
was indeed after the deadline, which was the
court’s basis for finding misconduct.

12. UNS argues we may consider Varco’s failure
to specifically respond to this argument in its
answering brief a confession of error. However,
in our discretion, we choose not to do so. See
Perry v. Ronan, 225 Ariz. 49, n.1, 234 P.3d 617,
620 n.1 (App. 2010).

174

duct pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(B), Ariz. R.
Civ. P. Such misconduct does not require a
finding that the jury has reached an errone-
ous result; indeed, misconduct itself may
make it impossible to determine the effect on
the outcome. See Leavy, 188 Ariz. at 78, 932
P.2d at 1844. The disclosure issues, repeated
references to smoking, and repeated refer-
ences to fire codes all support the court’s
conclusion that Varco was prejudiced by the
actions of UNS. See id.

Disposition
126 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the trial court’s ruling. Varco seeks attorney

fees and costs pursuant to ARS. § 12-349
and Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., arguing
the appeal was frivolous and UNS engaged
in superficial analysis in its briefing. We do
not find UNS’s arguments frivolous and su-
perficial; therefore, we deny the request for
attorney fees.

394 P.3d 2

STATE of Arizona, Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

Darrel Peter PANDELI,
Defendant/Respondent,

No. CR-15-0270-PC

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed May 15, 2017

S
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S
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179

ia

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Lacy Sto-
ver Gard (argued), Chief Counsel, Capital
Litigation Section, Jason Easterday, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys
for State of Arizona

Kenneth §S. Countryman, Kenneth 8.
Countryman, P.C,, Tempe; and Julie S. Hall
(argued), Oracle, Attorneys for Darrel Peter
Pandeli

Amy P, Knight, Kuykendall & Associates,
Tucson; Amy M, Kalman, Maricopa County
Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix; David J.
Euchner (argued), Pima County Public De-
fender’s Office, Tucson; and Amy 8. Arm-
strong, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and
Arizona Capital Representation Project

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL
and TIMMER joined.

JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court:

BACKGROUND

11 Darrel Pandeli was sentenced to death
in 1998 for the murder of Holly Iler, This
Court affirmed the conviction and death sen-
tence. State v. Pandeli (Pandeli I), 200 Ariz,
365, 382-83 794, 26 Pd 1136, 1153-54
(2001). However, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded
the case for further consideration in light of

180

Ring v. Arizona, 586 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct.
2428, 158 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Pandeli v.
Arizona (Pandeli ID), 586 U.S. 958, 122 S.Ct.
2654, 158 L.Hd.2d 880 (2002) (mem.). This
Court vacated the death sentence and re-
manded to the trial court for a new sentenc-
ing hearing. State v. Pandeli (Pandeli II],
204 Ariz, 569, 572 (11, 65 P.8d 950, 953
(2008). On remand, the jury found that
Pandeli should be put to death, This Court
affirmed. State v, Pandeli (Pandeli IV), 215
Ariz, 514, 583 1.85, 161 P.8d 557, 576 (2007).

{2 In July 2011, Pandeli’s post-conviction
relief (“PCR”) attorney filed a petition alleg-
ing multiple trial court errors, prosecutorial
abuses, and fifteen claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel (“IAC”). In September 2012,
the PCR court largely denied the petition but,
set an evidentiary hearing on the IAC claims.
The PCR court subsequently granted relief
on all those claims as well as an additional
due process violation, setting aside Pandeli’s
death sentence, and ordering a new aggrava-
tion and penalty phase sentencing trial. The
State sought review from this Court. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, sec-
tion 5(8) of the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S, §§ 18-755 and 13-4031, For the rea-
sons set forth below, we reverse,

DISCUSSION

Hl 18 We examine a PCR court's find-
ings of fact to determine if they are clearly
erroneous. State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 51,
828 P.2d 778, 775 (1992). Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure 82.8(d) requires a court
to “make specific findings of fact, and .
state expressly its conclusions of law relating
to each issue presented.” See State v, Tank-
ersley, 211 Ariz, 828, 324, 121 P.3d 829, 830
(2005), Unfortunately, the PCR court made
few specific findings and failed to connect
them to its conclusions on many of the is-
sues presented, The court failed to make
findings for some claims at all. Most proble-
matic, the PCR court did not explain how
Pandeli suffered prejudice from any of the
acts or omissions it deemed to constitute
IAC or to violate due process. Cf, Strickland
2 Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct,
2052, 80 L,Ed.2d 674 (1984) (recognizing
prejudice as an element for an IAC claim),

As a result, our ordinary deference to the
POR court’s factual findings is largely inap-
plicable here, Instead, we have reviewed the
record and conclude that Pandeli did not
establish IAC or prove his due process
claim.

A. IAC Claims

HN S14 #Whether Pandeli’s lawyers
“rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed
question of fact and law.” State v. Denz, 232
Ariz. 441, 444 16, 806 P.8d 98, 101 (App.
2018). We review the court’s legal conclusions
and constitutional issues de novo. Id; see
also State v. Newell, 212 Ariz, 389, 397 127,
182 P.8d 883, 841 (2006), However, we ulti-
mately review a POR court’s ruling on a
petition for post-conviction relief for an abuse
of diseretion. State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 488,
441, 719 P.2d 1049, 1057 (1986), An abuse of
discretion occurs if the POR court makes an
error of law or fails to adequately investigate
the facts necessary to support its decision.
State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 8 912, 126 P.8d
148, 150 (2006); State v, Douglas, 87 Ariz.
182, 187, 349 P.2d 622, 625 (1960),

HI 15 The State contends the PCR court
erred in granting relief on Pandeli’s IAC
claims because it did not properly apply the
highly deferential standards for reviewing
such claims under the two-pronged test set
forth in Strickland, 466 U.S, at 687, 104 S.Ct,
2052. “Under Strickland, we first determine
whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ”
Hinton v. Alabama, — U.S. —, 184 8.Ct.
1081, 1088, 188 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014) (quoting
Padilla v, Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 180
S.Ct. 1478, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010)), This
inquiry focuses on the “practice and expecta-
tions of the legal community,” and asks, in
light of all the circumstances, whether coun-
sel’s performance was reasonable under pre-
vailing professional norms. Id.

HMM 116 Next, a defendant must “show
that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different, A reasonable probability is a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id. at 1089 (quoting Strick-

land, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct, 2052), But
“fi]t is not enough for the defendant to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding,” because
then “[vJirtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct, 2052, Although a
defendant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test, this Court is not required to
address both prongs “if the defendant makes
an insufficient showing on one,” Id, at 697,
104 S.Ct. 2052,

HS 17 Thus, “a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Id, at 689, 104 8,Ct, 2052 (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). A defendant
does so by showing that his counsel’s per-
formance fell outside the acceptable “range
of competence,” and did not meet “an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness.” Jd. at 687—
88, 104 S.Ct, 2052, In short, reviewing courts
must be very cautious in deeming trial coun-
sel’s assistance ineffective when counsel's
challenged acts or omissions might have a
reasonable explanation,

18 The PCR court did not apply this def-
erential standard of review, instead re-
peatedly second-guessing counsel’s strategy
decisions, Simply disagreeing with strategy
decisions cannot support a determination
that representation was inadequate. Id. at
689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every ef-
fort be made to eliminate the distorting ef-
fects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circum-
stances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s per-
spective at the time.”), We proceed to assess
each of the PCR court’s findings of inade-
quate assistance in turn,

1. Failure to cross-examine Dr. Bayless
HM 119 Many of the POR court's find-
ings pertain to the fact that Pandeli’s counsel
did not cross-examine the State’s key wit-

1, Neither Gary Shriver nor his co-counsel, Dawn
Sinclair, represented Pandeli at his first trial. Dr.

181

ness, Dr, Brad Bayless, a psychologist, dur-
ing the penalty phase. Pandeli argued five
general types of mitigation: he was physically
and sexually abused as a child, began abus-
ing drugs and alcohol at an early age, suf-
fered from a cognitive disorder, behaved well
while in prison, and could maintain positive
relationships, Pandeli IV, 215 Ariz. at 581-88
41 70-83, 161 P.8d at 574-76. In rebuttal, the
State called Dr. Bayless to testify about
Pandeli’s mental health and other character-
istics. Defense counsel did not cross-examine
Dr. Bayless. The PCR court observed,
Dr. Bayless is a state’s witness who rou-
tinely testified for the state in death penal-
ty cases, In most cases, Dr, Bayless testi-
fies that a defendant is psychotic and that
there’s no saving him. Dr. Bayless fre-
quently doesn’t have any scientific basis
for his opinion. He used projective tests
that are subjective and should not be used
in a death penalty case, His testing was
not appropriate and misleading,

In this vein, the PCR court engaged in sec-
ond-guessing defense counsel’s strategic de-
cision to forgo cross-examination of Dr, Bay-
less and rebut his testimony with their own
expert. Cf Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104
S.Ct. 2052 (“[Sltrategic choices made after
thorough investigation of law and facts rele-
vant to plausible options are virtually unchal-
lengeable.”), Moreover, the court made
sweeping generalizations unmoored to specif-
ic findings of IAC,

{10 The PCR court further found, based
on the testimony of attorney Michael Reeves,
Pandelli’s professional standards expert, that
defense counsel “should have cross-examined
Dr. Bayless or somehow dealt with the infor-
mation and testimony he presented. [Defense
counsel] did not counteract any information
presented by Dr. Bayless,”

{11 Pandeli’s lead counsel, Gary Shriver,
acknowledged that the failure to cross-exam-
ine Dr, Bayless was a spur-of-the-moment
decision resulting from “wrongheadedness,” !
Co-counsel Dawn Sinclair testified that they
were not fully prepared to deal with Dr.
Bayless because they did not know what

Bayless testified during the penalty phases at
both of Pandeli’s trials.

182

questions to ask about his report. Thus, the
court found that Pandeli’s attorneys were
unprepared to interview or cross-examine
Dr. Bayless or challenge the unsupportable
conclusions he made, The court further found
that “both attorneys agreed that the decision
[not to cross-examine Dr, Bayless] was not
strategic and [was] a failure of counsel to
adequately defend [Pandeli].”

112 Considering the entire record, howev-
er, we conclude that Pandeli failed to prove
IAC, and the PCR court erred by finding
otherwise. Although the decision not to inter-
view Dr, Bayless was “made on the fly,” it
was an informed and defensible one made on
the basis of extensive investigation and prep-
aration. At the PCR hearing, Shriver testi-
fied that he had “known Dr. Bayless since
[he] started practicing,” and he believed that
as an adversary witness, Dr. Bayless was
“hard to control.” He also believed that Dr.
Bayless “was known to sandbag and bring
out more ... harmful stuff during a defense
cross.” Shriver also found that when Dr.
Bayless would testify before a jury “there
was a performance” and “(i]t wasn’t simply
providing testimony as an expert,” but rather
Dr. Bayless was “waitling] [to] bring even
more, bring the real guns out in cross.”
Therefore, Shriver believed “that simply
cross-examining [Dr. Bayless] before a jury
is not necessarily the key. It doesn’t mean
that you are going to successfully examine
him at least in my opinion.”

118 Shriver explained “what was on [his]
mind” when he decided to forgo cross-exami-
nation, namely that he could prevent Dr.
Bayless from further harming Pandeli’s case
on cross-examination, as he was known to do,
Shriver believed that Dr. Bayless’s direct
examination was not nearly as harmful as the
defense anticipated. Thus, Shriver was wor-
ried that Dr. Bayless would use cross-exami-
nation as an opportunity to “thrust and parry
to get his points across.” Finally, by declin-
ing cross-examination, Shriver would deprive
the State of an opportunity for redirect,

114 The record fails to show defense coun-
sel was unprepared to cross-examine Dr,
Bayless. To prepare for the resentencing tri-
al, Shriver compiled transcripts of Dr, Bay-
less’s testimony from other cases, discussed

with other defense attorneys how to deal
with Dr, Bayless, and interviewed him sever-
al times over three days. Shriver testified
that he and Sinclair prepared an outline and
were prepared to cross-examine Dr. Bayless
when trial started. He also believed that he
had somewhat impeached Dr. Bayless’s find-
ings through the testimony of Pandeli’s ex-
pert, Dr. Mark Cunningham. Therefore,
Shriver and Sinclair, after a brief discussion,
chose to forgo cross-examination to prevent
Dr. Bayless from further damaging Pandeli’s
ease. Based on their research and experience
with Dr, Bayless, counsel reasonably con-
cluded that a cross-examination would give
the expert a chance to inflict greater damage
than he had on direct. See State v, Farni, 112
Ariz. 182, 183, 539 P.2d 889, 890 (1975) (“The
failure of defense counsel to cross-examine
one witness and question others on certain
points was also a tactical decision and is not
evidence of incompetence.”),

HMM 115 The PCR court erred by substi-
tuting its after-the-fact judgment for coun-
sel’s during trial, “Disagreements as to trial
strategy or errors in trial will not support a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as
long as the challenged conduct could have
some reasoned basis.” State v. Meeker, 148
Ariz, 256, 260, 698 P.2d 911, 915 (1984).
Counsel clearly had, at a minimum, “some
reasoned basis,” State v. Nirschel, 155 Ariz.
206, 209, 745 P.2d 958, 956 (1987), for forgo-
ing cross-examination of Dr. Bayless. Thus,
the PCR court overlooked evidence that the
decision not to cross-examine Dr. Bayless
was the product of a reasoned (even if mis-
taken) strategic judgment. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct, 2052 (“strategic
choices made after thorough investigation of
law and facts relevant to plausible options
are virtually unchallengeable”).

116 Moreover, counsel did not leave Dr.
Bayless’s testimony completely uncontested,
but rather used their own defense experts to
rebut significant portions of his testimony.
Contra United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)
({If counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights that makes the adversary

process itself presumptively unreliable.”), Al-
though defense counsel, in hindsight, may
have “dropped the ball” by not calling Dr.
Cunningham back to the stand to reinforce
his earlier testimony that contradicted Dr.
Bayless, that mistake did not constitute IAC
given the fact that counsel did impeach much
of Dr. Bayless’s testimony through other wit-
nesses,

917 For example, as Shriver testified,
counsel laid the groundwork to impeach Dr,
Bayless through Dr. Cunningham by:

[Setting] the table to show that a lot of

these concepts that Bayless would testify

in the State’s case were not sound, under
sound psychology.

Now, I didn’t feel that I had completely

done away with any harm from Bayless’

testimony by asking Dr. Cunningham cer-
tain questions, but I felt we had at least
provided a basis for the jury to understand
that Bayless should not be given as much
credibility as he would have liked or the
State would have liked.

Although counsel did not fully impeach Dr.
Bayless’s testimony through Dr. Cunning-
ham, he strategically elicited information that
put the jury on notice that Dr. Bayless’s
methods and testimony might not be accu-
rate.

118 Defense counsel anticipated that Dr.
Bayless would testify that Pandeli maling-
ered during his psychological tests. There-
fore, counsel attempted to preemptively
combat that testimony by having Dr. Mare
Walter testify that he believed Pandeli was
“putting forward good effort” in the tests.
Dr. Walter also testified that he disagreed
with Dr. Bayless’s diagnosis that Pandeli
had a mild learning disability, stating that
Pandeli had a “very serious learning disabili-
ty” and did not think things through “be-
cause of the frontal lobe dysfunction.”

119 Dr. Bayless’s use of projective tests
was called into question at the PCR hearing
by several witnesses. Michael Reeves, Dr.
Weinstein (a psychologist specializing in clini-
eal and forensic neuropsychology), and Dr.
Jones (a forensic psychologist) all criticized
Dr. Bayless’s use of projective tests because
they do not have standardized scores. At
trial, Dr. Cheryl Karp also testified that

183

some of the tests are not appropriate to
“generate ... a diagnosis,” which served to
impeach Dr, Bayless’s findings.

120 Finally, Dr. Bayless’s determination
that Pandeli has antisocial personality disor-
der was called into question at trial. Counsel
elicited testimony from Dr. Cunningham that
Pandeli “[plotentially ... would meet the
adult criteria for anti-social personality disor-
der,” but that diagnosis was “irrelevant” for
sentencing determination because it did not
inform “how [Pandeli] came to be damaged.”
In closing, counsel reiterated this point, tell-
ing the jury that “[t]he State and Dr, Bayless
missed the point entirely.... That [Pandeli]
has antisocial personality disorder doesn’t re-
but a single thing that the defense had put
on.... [T]hat diagnosis tells you nothing
with respect to this sentencing proceeding.”

121 The decision to use other expert testi-
mony to attempt to preemptively impeach
parts of Dr. Bayless’s testimony and then
forgo cross-examination was a strategic deci-
sion that defendant has not demonstrated
falls below the level expected of a reasonably
competent defense attorney. Cf State v, Go-
swick, 142 Ariz, 582, 586, 691 P.2d 673, 677
(1984) (no IAC if counsel’s decision had a
reasoned basis rather than the result of “in-
eptitude, inexperience, or lack of prepara-
tion”). No finding was made that the decision
lacked “some reasoned basis,” and the evi-
dence would not support such a finding.

2. Failure to obtain brain imaging
scans

HM 1.22 The PCR court found that de-
fense counsel's failure to present medical
documentation of brain injury and brain dys-
function constituted IAC. After the PCR
hearing, the court found that “[o]bjective
testing would have shown that [Pandeli] had
frontal lobe impairment and it was causally
connected to his childhood and development
issues.”

123 Pandeli argues that no strategic rea-
son existed to forgo a brain scan to document
Pandeli’s brain damage, especially a quanti-
tative electroencephalogram (“QEEG”) scan,
The State argues that counsel called two
experts who testified that Pandeli had a

184

brain injury, and did not need to present
additional and cumulative evidence of brain
injury. We conclude the decision not to pres-
ent further documentation of brain injury
and dysfunction was a strategic choice and
did not constitute IAC,

24 Defense counsel hired Dr. Walter to
perform a neuropsychological evaluation of
Pandeli, which included reviewing medical
records, interviewing Pandeli, and giving him
psychological and neuropsychological tests.
Dr. Walter testified at trial that Pandeli’s
frontal lobe was impaired. Dr. Walter did not,
use any documented brain scans in his test-
ing, such as magnetic resonance imaging
(“MRI”), computerized tomography (“CT
sean”), positron emission tomography (“PET
sean”), or QEEG to make his diagnosis. He
testified that he did not recommend these
types of brain scans because “there’s not
necessarily a good correlation between these
tests and actually ... what a person’s cogni-
tive abilities are. So ... there is controversy
about whether ... they are helpful in terms
of forensic cases like this one.” Dr. Walter
also testified that these scans could produce
“false positives and false negatives,” so he
must administer the same neuropsychological
tests despite whatever results come from a
brain scan, Dr. Cunningham agreed at trial,
reiterating that brain scans can produce false
positives and negatives, and that the findings
from the neuropsychological tests that were
administered could “stand on their own.”

125 At the PCR hearing, Dr. Weinstein
testified that Dr. Walter was a “very quali-
fied neuropsychologist” and used the right
neuropsychological tests to evaluate Pandeli,
He testified that brain scans were unneces-
sary because frontal lobe impairment can be
diagnosed solely on neuropsychological test-
ing, and confirmed that Dr. Walter had per-
formed such testing, He also stated that very
few psychologists used QEEG scans in their
practice in 2006 and that the sean was not
required to diagnose frontal lobe impairment
and was not a substitute for a neuropsycho-
logical evaluation.

{26 Given this record, the decision to for-
go brain scans was a reasoned, strategic
decision by Pandeli’s counsel and does not
establish IAC.

8, Failure to present sufficient mitiga-
tion and develop a nexus

HM 127 The POR court found that de-
fense counsel’s “failure to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background
and present sufficient mitigating evidence in
an attempt to establish a nexus between the
mitigation and the crime” constituted anoth-
er instance of IAC, The court found that trial
counsel “failed to have psychological or neu-
ropsychological evaluations done” and “failed
to hive a psychologist or neuropsychologist to
explore the various different aspects of how
Mr, Pandeli’s childhood was destructive of
his entire personality.” It also found that
counsel were ineffective because they failed
to establish a causal relationship “between
brain impairment and the death penalty” and
“failed to develop a nexus between the psy-
chologist’s reports and Mr. Pandeli’s crimes.”
Finally, it concluded that counsel “did an
insufficient investigation into [Pandeli’s]
background, to understand how it related to
the offense,” which “fell short of prevailing
professional norms.” Thus, the court deter-
mined that “comparing the totality of the
evidence that actually was presented to the
jury with the totality of the evidence that
might have been presented had counsel acted
differently, makes it highly probable that the
outcome of the proceedings might have been
different.”

728 The record does not support the
court’s finding. Counsel testified that they
were aware that the United States Supreme
Court held in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.,Hd.2d 884 (2004),
that establishing a causal nexus between the
mitigating evidence and the crime is not re-
quired, but that they believed the jury and
this Court would give the mitigation evidence
more weight if a nexus was established. See
State v. Roseberry, 287 Ariz, 507, 509 112,
858 P.8d 847, 849 (2015) (“[A]ll mitigation
evidence must be considered and ... its
causal relationship to the crime goes to the
weight to be given to the evidence.”). There-
fore, they attempted to prove a causal nexus
by having a neuropsychological evaluation
performed by Dr. Walter and a psychological
evaluation performed by Dr. Cunningham,

and both doctors testified at trial how Pande-
ls upbringing negatively affected his person-
ality and behavior as an adult. The three
mental health experts called by the defense
each testified about the causal nexus between
Pandeli’s traumatic childhood and mental im-
pairment and the murder he committed. Ad-
ditionally, in closing, counsel argued that
Pandeli’s childhood and mental impairments
contributed to Iler’s murder,
129 This Court acknowledged that Pande-
ls
attempted to tie his mental impairment to
the crime, Dr. Walter testified that frontal
lobe impairment makes a person act impul-
sively, can cause violence, and could have
led to the murder of Iler. Similarly, Dr.

Cunningham testified that the murders of

both Humphreys and Iler were disorga-

nized, demonstrating that Pandeli’s impair-

ment may have played a role in them.
Pandeli IV, 2165 Aviz, at 588 179, 161 P.8d at
576,

80 Pandeli has not identified any relevant
aspect of his background left uninvestigated
or unpresented. The testimony provided by
Dr, Weinstein and Dr. Jones at the PCR
hearing closely paralleled the testimony giv-
en by Dr, Cunningham and Dr, Walter at
trial. Both sets of experts concluded that
Pandeli’s childhood trauma and neurological
impairments explained his criminal conduct,
Although no additional or new investigation
‘was conducted into Pandeli’s background, Dr.
Weinstein and Dr. Jones interviewed Pandeli
and relied on the records compiled by de-
fense counsel for the 2006 resentencing pro-
ceeding. While there were minor differences
in the testimony given by the experts at trial
and the PCR hearing, the trial experts mere-
ly used different methodology to reach the
same conclusions as the PCR experts. Thus,
the PCR court’s findings related to the issue
of failure to investigate mitigation evidence
properly are also clearly wrong. Ultimately,
Pandeli did not meet his burden of proof that
counsel was deficient with regard to this
issue.

4, Failure to object to other act evi-
dence

HM 181 The PCR court found IAC be-

cause counsel failed to challenge the State’s

185

rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase of
the trial, specifically evidence that Pandeli’s
former girlfriend, L.R., alleged he had mo-
lested her daughter, This was an informed,
strategic decision that did not constitute
TAC,

182 When L.R. was unavailable to testify
at resentencing, the State read L.R.’s inter-
view statements to the jury during rebuttal.
The court granted defense counsel’s motion
to exclude L.R.’s statements regarding other
persons’ allegations of Pandeli’s prior bad
acts that she had heard about. However,
counsel did not object to the State admitting
L.R.’s statement about what Pandeli did to
her daughter.

183 At the PCR hearing, Shriver ex-
plained that he originally tried to limit the
State’s rebuttal evidence during the penalty
phase to only the evidence that rebutted the
mitigation evidence he planned to provide.
However, the trial court ruled that based on
ARS. § 18-751(C), the State could present
any relevant and reliable hearsay as rebuttal
evidence, even if unrelated to the mitigation
evidence. Shriver testified at the PCR hear-
ing that this put them “on notice ... that a
lot of this stuff is coming in.” With that in
mind, counsel believed that “since the jury is
going to hear [evidence of Pandeli’s other
acts,] ... [counsel] attempted to show ...
that’s not that unusual given the circum-
stances of Mr, Pandeli’s upbringing.” There-
fore, counsel attempted to show that the
alleged molestation was a product of damage
that Pandeli sustained early in his childhood.
Given the trial court’s ruling on relevant and
reliable hearsay, it is understandable that
counsel accepted admission of L.R.’s state-
ments and attempted to use them to bolster
his mitigation evidence. See James v. Borg,
24 F.8d 20, 27 (th Cir. 1994) (“Counsel’s
failure to make a futile motion does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

5. Failure to challenge aggravating
factors

HM 134 The PCR court did not make
specific findings of fact on the prior homicide
and the heinous and depraved aggravators,

186

but found that counsel “failed to challenge
the aggravators offered by the state. This
includes aggravators in regard to infliction of
gratuitous violence, senselessness of the
crime and the helplessness of the victim.” See
State v. Gretaler, 185 Ariz. 42, 52, 659 P.2d 1,
11 (1988) (velishing of the murder, infliction
of gratuitous violence, mutilation of victim,
senselessness of the crime, and helplessness
of victim are factors in evaluating heinous
and depraved aggravator), At resentencing,
the State sought to prove the (F)(2) aggrava-
tor—that Pandeli had been “previously con-
victed of a serious offense”—by introducing
evidence of his 1996 conviction for the sec-
ond-degree murder of Teresa Humphreys in
1992, See Pamdeli I, 200 Ariz, at 370 11 2-3,
875 138, 26 P,8d at 1141, 1146. The State
also sought to prove the (F)(6) aggravator—
that Pandeli committed the murder of Iler
“in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner’—by introducing evidence that
Pandeli mutilated her body and kept souve-
nirs from the murder. The jury found that
the State proved both aggravating factors, as
did this Court on independent review.
Pandeli IV, 215 Ariz. at 581 169, 161 P.3d at.
574,

135 Defense counsel moved to dismiss
both the (F)(2) and (F)(6) aggravators in
pretrial motions. Counsel testified at the
PCR hearing that, after the motions were
denied, they decided not to challenge the
ageravators in order to maintain credibility
with the jury. Counsel testified that “[i]t was
dead certain” that the State was going to be
able to prove the (F)@) aggravator pertain-
ing to a prior serious offense because Pandeli
had already been convicted of second-degree
murder of Humphreys. Counsel also testified
that regardless how they attempted to chal-
lenge the (F)(6) aggravator, it would be clear
that Iler’s nipples had been removed. Thus,
counsel continued, if they

were to somehow try to argue that ... if it

wasn’t done as mutilation, which would be

: post-death[,] then they would have
been done while the woman was still alive,
which would have then likely gotten into
the gratuitous violence situation, so the
way we analyzed it is if we were going to
lose on that no matter what we did, ... to
spend a lot of time having [the jury] parse

whether or not this person was ... de-

praved loses something.

86 Thus, counsel determined that “fight-
ing ... to fight the fight was to me not a
wise thing” because he would have “lost cred-
ibility” in the eyes of the jurors if he had
futilely challenged the (F)(6) aggravator. Giv-
en this record, Pandeli did not prove defi-
cient performance by counsel,

6. Failure to object to rebuttal evi-
dence

HI 187 The PCR court found that coun-
sel’s “failure to object to [the] state’s presen-
tation of violent sex and fantasies as acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court,” constituted
IAC. However, the PCR court failed to make
specific findings on this claim in its final
ruling, as required by Rule 32.8(d). Regard-
less, the record does not support a finding of
TAG.

138 During the penalty phase rebuttal, the
State read interview statements from L.R. to
the jury about Pandeli’s violent sexual fanta-
sies, including his fantasy of killing a man
who had abused him. Another former girl-
friend testified that, on two separate occa-
sions, Pandeli sexually assaulted her when he
tied her up and pressed the “flat edge” of a
knife against her throat. On appeal, this
Court concluded that admission of this evi-
dence did not constitute fundamental error.
Pandeli IV, 215 Ariz, at 528 147, 161 P.3d at
571.

139 At the PCR hearing, Shriver testified
that, at the time, he believed the testimony
was admissible because of the trial court’s
ruling that the State was permitted to intro-
duce any relevant and reliable hearsay evi-
dence to demonstrate why Pandeli should not
be shown leniency. Nevertheless, he moved
the court to limit the content of this evidence.
Shriver testified that the court denied his
motion so he was “forced then to work that
into our theory,” and that the defense pre-
pared for and cross-examined the former
girlfriend on her testimony.

140 The court also found that defense
counsel’s failure “to object to [the] state’s
rebuttal evidence of violent sex, or to defen-
dant’s fantasies of murder, opened the door

to testimony of the prior murder and the
photos of the Humphreys murder.” But coun-
sel repeatedly filed motions to preclude or
limit the testimony that the State sought to
introduce. However, the State was permitted
to introduce evidence that Humphreys’ body
was found on a sidewalk, the scene indicated
that she had been killed there, her body had
multiple stab wounds, she had cuts to her
throat and defensive wounds on her hands,
and she had died of a stab wound to the
chest, On appeal, we held that the trial court
did not abuse its diseretion by admitting this
evidence because it was relevant and not
unduly prejudicial. Pandeli IV, 215 Ariz, at
528-29 1152-58, 161 P.8d at 571-72,

141 At the PCR hearing, Shriver testified
that he believed, under the existing case law,
that the facts and evidence of Humphreys’
murder would be admitted as relevant to
leniency and his experts would be questioned
about it. He also testified he believed that
the Humphreys murder was “an integral
part of [Pandeli’s] troubled life” and it was
“part and parcel of his mitigation” to show
that it was no surprise that he killed another
woman but should nonetheless be shown le-
niency.

142 On this record, Pandeli has failed to
meet his burden of proof that counsel’s per-
formance was deficient, Counsel’s testimony
at the PCR hearing established that counsel
attempted to preclude the evidence, and
when that failed, prepared their witnesses to
be cross-examined on the facts and attempt-
ed to fit the evidence into the overall mitiga-
tion presentation. Counsel’s actions were the
product of strategic decisions given the trial
court’s ruling and did not constitute IAC.
The PCR court abused its discretion in
granting relief on this claim.

7. Failure to object to references to
serial killers

MMM 143 The PCR court found that de-
fense counsel's “failure to object to reference
of serial killers” constituted IAC. However,
the PCR court made no specific findings on
this claim in its final ruling, in violation of
Rule 82.8(4). The record demonstrates that
Pandeli did not meet his burden of proving
TAG,

187

144 Pandeli argued in his PCR petition
that the State “repeatedly asked questions
about serial killers from material relied upon
by Dr. Cunningham” and that “[mJost of
those questions had no bearing on this case.”
Pandeli claims that counsel were ineffective
because they “did not object to the questions
until well after [the State] had already asked
those questions and placed in the jurors[’]
mind that [Pandeli] was a serial killer.”

145 At the penalty phase retrial, the sub-
ject of serial killers was mentioned in a publi-
cation that Dr. Cunningham relied on. As
Pandeli acknowledges, defense counsel raised
multiple objections to the prosecutor’s gener-
al line of questioning that referenced the
publication and unsuccessfully requested a
mistrial on that basis, The record thus dem-
onstrates that counsel vigorously contested
the evidence.

8. Failure to object to Dr. Keen’s testi-
mony

HM 146 Dr. Buldoc performed the au-
topsy on Iler in 1993. During the aggravation
phase of the resentencing trial, Dr. Keen
testified that he had formed his own opinions
about Tler’s cause of death based on the
autopsy report and photograph exhibits dis-
played at trial. Dr. Buldoc’s autopsy report
‘was not admitted. The PCR court found that
counsel committed IAC by failing to object to
permitting Dr. Keen to “stand[ ] in for some-
one absent” and “provid[e] conclusions and
opinions in regard to aggravators which were
not his own.” We reject this conclusion. Dr.
Keen neither testified to any of Dr. Buldoc’s
conclusions, nor was he a mere “conduit” for
Dr. Buldoe. See State v. Lundstrom, 161
Ariz, 141, 148, 776 P.2d 1067, 1074 (1989) (“if
the testifying expert merely acts as a conduit
for another non-testifying expert's opinion,
the ‘expert opinion’ is hearsay and is inad-
missible”), Rather, he properly testified to
his own conclusions and was subjected to
eross-examination.

147 In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 59, 124 S.Ct, 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d 177
(2004), the United States Supreme Court
held that out-of-court testimonial statements
by witnesses are barred under the Confron-

188

tation Clause, unless the witnesses are un-
available and defendants had a prior oppor-
tunity to cross-examine those witnesses.
Apparently relying on Crawford and its
progeny, the PCR court determined that
defense counsel should have objected to Dr.
Keen’s testimony because he did not per-
form the autopsy himself. Although the
United States Supreme Court has declined
to create a “forensic evidence” exception to
Crawford, see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachu-
setts, 557 U.S. 305, 829, 129 8,Ct, 2527, 174
L.Ed.2d 814 (2009); Bulleoming v. New
Mewico, 564 U.S, 647, 662, 181 S.Ct. 2705,
180 L.Hd.2d 610 (2011), the autopsy report
on which Dr. Keen relied was nontestimoni-
al and therefore not subject to the stric-
tures of the Confrontation Clause. See State
v, Medina, 232 Ariz, 891, 406 1161-62, 306
P.8d 48, 63 (2018) (autopsy report created
to determine manner and cause of death is
nontestimonial). Thus, objecting to his testi-
mony would not have resulted in its preclu-
sion,

148 In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 818,
822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006),
the United States Supreme Court held state-
ments are testimonial when their primary
purpose is to “establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion.” The subsequent plurality opinion in
Williams v. Illinois reinforced this notion,
holding that testimonial statements subject
to the Confrontation Clause are “out-of-court
statements having the primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual of engaging in
criminal conduct.” 567 U.S. 50, 182 S.Ct.
2221, 2242, 188 L.d.2d 89 (2012) (emphasis
added). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas concluded the Confrontation Clause
only extends to “formalized testimonial mate-
rials such as depositions, affidavits, and prior
testimony, or statements resulting from for-
malized dialogues, such as custodial interro-
gation.” Williams, 182 8.Ct, at 2260 (quoting
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 844, 879, 181
S.Ct, 1148, 179 L.Ed.2d 98 (2011)) Gnternal
quotation marks omitted). The report here is
nontestimonial under either the “primary
purpose” test espoused by the Williams plu-
rality or the “solemnity” test of Justice
Thomas.

149 Informed by Williams, this Court has
held that an autopsy report is nontestimonial
when created to determine the manner and
cause of death to aid in apprehending a
suspect at large, rather than gathering evi-
dence for prosecution of a known suspect.
Medina, 232 Ariz, at 406 162, 306 P.8d at 63,
Because the autopsy report here was created
for the very purpose espoused in Medina, we
conclude it is nontestimonial and thus Dr,
Keen’s testimony did not violate the Confron-
tation Clause,

150 In addition to Medina’s holding re-
garding nontestimonial reports, this Court
has held that a testifying medical examiner
may offer an opinion based on the autopsy
performed by a non-testifying expert without
violating the Confrontation Clause so long as
the examiner testifies as to his or her own
conclusions, is subject. to cross-examination,
and the report is not admitted into evidence.
State v. Joseph, 230 Ariz, 296, 298 {11 8-9, 288
P.8d 27, 29 (2012); see also State v. Smith,
215 Ariz, 221, 228 128, 159 P.8d 581, 588
(2007) (“Expert testimony that discusses re-
ports and opinions of another is admissible

. if the expert reasonably relied on these
matters in reaching his own conclusion.”);
State v, Snelling, 225 Ariz, 182, 187 11 19-21,
286 P,8d 409, 414 (2010) (holding no Confron-
tation Clause violation occurred because the
medical examiner testified that she formed
her own opinions after reading the autopsy
report, was confronted and cross-examined
about her opinions, and the autopsy report
was not admitted into evidence),

151 Because the autopsy report was non-
testimonial and Dr. Keen’s testimony com-
plied with our case law, counsel had no rea-
son to object, Thus, we need not address
whether refraining from objecting to the tes-
timony prejudiced Pandeli.

9. Allowing testimony of Humphreys’
sister
HI 152 The PCR court found that “al-
lowling] family of prior victim to testify”
constituted a colorable claim of IAC, but
made no specific findings on this point. The
only member of Humphreys’ family who tes-
tified was her sister. Defense counsel object-
ed to this testimony by unsuccessfully mov-

ing to preclude it, Therefore, defense counsel
was not deficient on this point.

10. Failure to effectively cross-examine
Chris Pandeli

TM 153 During the penalty phase,
Pandeli’s half-brother, Chris, described
Pandeli’s behavior and alcohol consumption
at a bar the night of Iler’s murder and the
night after, He also testified that Pandeli
claimed to have once stabbed a black female
hitchhiker and that Pandeli called Chris after
his arrest and admitted to killing Iler and a
black woman, Although defense counsel
briefly cross-examined Chris, she did not ask
whether Chris had any bias or motive for
testifying against Pandeli. The PCR court
found that defense counsel's failure to bring
out Chris’s “extremely prejudicial” biases on
eross-examination constituted IAC.

{154 At the PCR hearing, Shriver testified
that he and Sinclair interviewed Chris before
trial and were aware that he hated Pandeli
and had no problems with a death sentence,
Shriver testified that he and Sinclair specifi-
cally discussed and determined that a
lengthy cross-examination of Chris would not
be beneficial, but also that doing so would
open the door to him letting the jury see his
real feelings about Pandeli. Shriver also stat-
ed that he did not want to give Chris the
opportunity to “vent,” because he believed
that Chris’ testimony would not be “impor-
tant to the jury based on what they'd already
heard,” and did not want to allow “another
opportunity for somebody to get up and say
bad stuff about [Pandeli].” Sinclair also re-
called being aware that Chris blamed Pandeli
for their father’s health and financial prob-
lems and remembered that he possessed
some sort of damaging information. There-
fore, because Chris was not seen as a “key
witness” and had information “that was more
damaging than any cross could fix,” defense
counsel decided not to subject him to a
lengthy cross-examination.

155 Defense counsel’s decision not to ex-
tensively cross-examine Chris Pandeli was
strategic and “reasonable considering all the
circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S, at 688,
104 S.Ct. 2052, The PCR court erred by
granting relief on this issue,

189

11. Failure to request instruction on
all mitigating factors

HH 156 Defense counsel presented
twelve categories of non-statutory mitigating
circumstances to the jury encompassing at
least eighty-three individual factors. Michael
Reeves, Pandelli’s “Strickland expert,” testi-
fied that defense counsel should have asked
for instructions on each of the individual
mitigators rather than grouping them into
twelve categories, The PCR court agreed,
finding that defense counsel was ineffective
by failing “to present individual mitigating
factors for Mr, Pandeli” and “[i]nstead ...
submitt[ing] general categories of mitigators
to the jury.”

157 Counsel testified that he intended to
present mitigating evidence as a general out-
line rather than as an exhaustive list of indi-
vidual mitigators, Additionally, the jury was
instructed that it could consider any factor as
mitigation. The decision to organize mitigat-
ing evidence in this fashion was a strategic
decision that is well within the boundaries of
reasonable representation required by
Strickland.

Hs 1158 To the extent the PCR court
suggested that counsel’s decision violated
Pandeli’s Eighth Amendment rights, we dis-
agree. The Highth Amendment does not re-
quire a capital jury to be instructed on spe-
cific mitigating factors. State v. Johnson, 212
Ariz, 425, 487-38 19 4447, 188 P.8d 735, 747-
48 (2006) (citing Buchanan v. Angelone, 522
US, 269, 270, 118 S.Ct. 757, 189 L.Ed.2d 702
(1998)). The jury was instructed that it “must.
consider and give effect to all mitigating
circumstances that have been raised by any
aspect of the evidence.” We presume that
jurors follow the court’s instructions. Newell,
212 Ariz, at 403 168, 182 P.38d at 847 (2006).
‘The instruction satisfies Buchanan and coun-
sel’s presentation neither violated Pandeli’s
Highth Amendment rights nor constitutes
TAC.

12. Ineffective mitigation presentation

HE 159 An issue that was not raised in
the PCR petition, yet was determined by the
POR court to constitute LAC, was that the

190

mitigation presentation was deficient. The
PCR court did not make any findings or
conclusions directly on this point. However,
the court did find that the mitigation special-
ist, Barb Bumpus, had never worked on a
capital case and was not qualified to do so;
the Legal Defender’s Office restricted coun-
sel’s ability to perform mitigation; and coun-
sel had no supervisory authority over mitiga-
tion personnel,

Hs 160 Although both Shriver and Sin-
clair testified that the mitigation specialist
was unqualified, defendants do not have a
stand-alone right to a mitigation specialist.
See Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 207—
08 (6th Cir. 2010) (“{Hliring a mitigation
specialist in a capital case is not a require-
ment of effective assistance of counsel.”);
State v. Herring, 142 Ohio St38d 165, 28
N.E.8d 1217, 1289 1113 (2014) (holding de-
fendant had no “constitutional right to a miti-
gation specialist or a right to an effective
one”). To determine whether counsel provid-
ed ineffective assistance in this regard, the
question is not whether the mitigation spe-
cialist was unqualified, but rather whether
counsel fully investigated the defendant's
background. See Wiggins v. Smith, 589 U.S.
510, 524-25, 128 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Bd.2d 471
(2008).

61 Indeed, Shriver testified that he was
aware of Wiggins and that he conducted a
full investigation of Pandeli’s mitigation.
Pandeli has not established that defense
counsel failed to meet their obligation to fully
investigate his background, nor does he es-
tablish that defense counsel failed to ade-
quately present mitigation to the jury. The
PCR court erred by granting relief on this
ground.

18. Inexperience of co-counsel Sinclair

HM 1162 Although not raised in the PCR
petition, the PCR court found that Sinclair’s
“inexperience ... wlas] proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.” That determination
was based on Sinclair’s testimony that she
“had never done a trial, not even a misde-
meanor.” Therefore, the court found that
“deficits in the Petitioner's defense ... were
the result of inexperienced counsel and un-
professional judgment,” which was caused

because “counsel lacked the fundamental
requisite understanding of the requirements
for conducting a capital defense.”

168 At the time of trial, Shriver was an
experienced criminal defense attorney who
had been involved in capital cases, Shriver
‘was aware of Sinclair’s relative inexperience,
but obtained this Court’s consent to appoint
Sinclair. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.8(d) Gu-
preme Court may consent to appointment if
“attorney’s experience, stature and record
enable the Court to conclude that the attor-
ney’s ability significantly exceeds the stan-
dards set forth in [Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6.8)” and “attorney associates with
himself or herself a lawyer who does meet
the standards set forth in [Rule 6.8]”). He
stated that Sinclair was not a “newbie, as far
as [her] experience in relation to capital
stuff’ because she had previously “worked
+. on a capital case PCR at length.” Shriver
believed that Sinclair’s prior experience, “in-
tellect, [and] her desire” qualified her to be a
part of the defense team under the guideline
standards at the time. At the PCR hearing,
Shriver testified that even today he “would
not try to get Ms. Sinclair taken off a case,”
and that “[s]he’s wonderful. She might de-
mean[] her abilities, but she’s a darn good
attorney.”

HH 164 ‘The relative inexperience of a
second-chair defense attorney in capital trials
does not in itself constitute LAC, especially
when the first-chair attorney, like Sinclair,
was experienced, Indeed, “[dlefendants fac-
ing the death penalty do not have a per se
constitutional right to the assistance of two
attorneys.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.8d 1, 85
(Tenn. 2010); see also Bell v. Watkins, 692
F.2d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Although
Mississippi courts may customarily appoint
two lawyers in a capital case, the Constitu-
tion dictates no such requirement”); Smith v.
State, 445 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1984) (hold-
ing that the constitution does not require the
appointment of two attorneys for indigent
capital defendants). This is reiterated in
Committee Comment to Rule 6.8; which only
recommends co-counsel in capital cases, but
does not require multiple attorneys. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 6.8 cmt. (“The committee recom-
mends that co-counsel be appointed at all

stages of capital litigation.”). Here, having a
second lawyer with criminal defense and
some capital case experience was of benefit
to Pandeli, and the court did not tie her
relative inexperience to tangible adverse con-
sequences. The court erred by granting relief
on this ground,

14. Failure to adequately conduct voir
dire

HMM 65 The PCR court found defense
counsel deficient for “fail[ing] to conduct voir
dire of the jury.” Specifically, the court found
that counsel did not “ask about the preju-
dices and to ask specific questions, such as
would you automatically give the death pen-
alty to somebody, who has been convicted of
a murder, such as in this case of a sexually
charged murder?” The record does not sup-
port the court’s conclusion.

166 Although Sinclair had no experience
selecting juries, lead counsel Shriver had ex-
perience selecting juries in non-capital cases.
Shortly after Ring v. Arizona, 586 U.S, 584,
122 S.Ct, 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Shri-
ver attended a one-day seminar on jury se-
lection for capital cases. Shriver also testified
that he positioned staff throughout the court-
room to listen to the questions presented at
voir dire, write down the jury panels’ re-
sponses, and attempt to rate prospective ju-
rors,

167 Counsel also filed motions to “life
qualify” the jury and establish the scope of
voir dire, and submitted a proposed question-
naire, In fact, the State objected to two
questions counsel proposed—whether the
listed types of murder (including “serial mur-
ders”) are appropriate for the death penalty
and one that had the proposed jurors indi-
cate from a list of circumstances which they
could consider as a basis for imposing a life
sentence instead of a death sentence. Pro-
spective jurors were also told that Pandeli
had committed a prior second-degree murder
before he murdered Iler and were asked
whether they were “going to have problems
getting past the fact that this is a second
murder.” They were also asked whether they
would consider various categories of mitiga-
tion relevant to Pandeli,

191

168 Pandeli did not carry his burden of
proving that counsel’s voir dire was deficient.
under the Strickland standard. Counsel per-
formed competent voir dire in support of
their strategy, explained by Shriver at the
PCR hearing. Counsel employed a multifac-
eted voir dire strategy that was not demon-
strably incompetent, See Hovey v. Ayers, 458
F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir, 2006) (“Although
counsel’s decision not to question prospective
jurors more extensively may seem a ques-
tionable decision in hindsight, it was guided
by a reasonable strategy and was not defi-
cient performance.”), We focus not on rela-
tive experience in this regard, but rather
actual performance, which Pandeli has not
demonstrated was ineffective. See, e.g., LaG-
rand v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 1258, 1275 (9th Cir.
1998) (“{I]t is not the experience of the attor-
ney that is evaluated, but rather, his per-
formance.”); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho
466, 816 P.2d 1028, 1026 (Idaho Ct. App.
1991) (“Mere inexperience of counsel is not a
sufficient basis for a claim of ineffective as-
sistance, such claim must succeed or fail on
counsel’s performance, not his level of experi-
ence.”),

15. Cumulative effect of IAC

HM 169 This Court has not recognized
the cumulative error doctrine for IAC claims
as it has for prosecutorial misconduct claims.
In State v. Hughes, this Court stated:

At the outset, we need to clarify Arizona’s
position regarding the cumulative error
doctrine in criminal cases. Our general rule
has been stated several times over the
years, and was recently stated in State v.
Dickens, 187 Ariz, 1, 21, 926 P.2d 468, 488
(1996), as follows: “[T]his court does not,
recognize the so-called cumulative error
doctrine,” See also State v. Roscoe, 184
Ariz, 484, 497, 910 P.2d 685, 648 (1996);
State v. White, 168 Ariz, 500, 508, 815 P.2d
869, 877 (1991). This lack of recognition is
based on the theory that “something that
is not prejudicial error in and of itself does
not become such error when coupled with
something else that is not prejudicial er-
ror.” Roscoe, 184 Ariz. at 497, 910 P.2d at

192

We reiterate the general rule that several
non-errors and harmless errors cannot add
up to one reversible error, We also clarify
the fact that this general rule does not
apply when the court is evaluating a claim
that prosecutorial misconduct deprived de-
fendant of a fair trial.

198 Ariz, 72, 78-79 125, 969 P.2d 1184, 1190-
91 (1998),

170 Ninth Circuit decisions establish that
the cumulative effect of deficiencies may sup-
port a finding of prejudice, even when no
single instance of [AC meets the prejudice
standard. See Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.8d
1159, 1176 (9th Cir, 2005) (“We must analyze
each of his claims separately to determine
whether his counsel was deficient, but preju-
dice may result from the cumulative impact
of multiple deficiencies.”); Mak v. Blodgett,
970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We do not
need to decide whether these deficiencies
alone meet the prejudice standard because
other significant errors occurred that, consid-
ered cumulatively, compel [a granting of re-
lief],”). Bat see Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.8d
885, 852 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Having just deter-
mined that none of counsel’s actions could be
considered constitutional error ... it would
be odd ... to conclude that those same ac-
tions, when considered collectively, deprived
[defendant] of a fair trial.”) Citing the Ninth
Circuit cases, Pandeli argues that, even if
this Court does not find deficient perform-
ance on any one individual issue, the multiple
instances of LAC have cumulatively preju-
diced him under Strickland.

{71 Regardless of whether the cumulative
error doctrine should be recognized in this
context, the record shows no aggregate IAC
occurred here. It may be that multiple in-
stances of non-prejudicial actions deemed in-
adequate by the defendant, viewed collective-
ly, amount to IAC. Here, however, all of the
conduct at issue was within the requisite
bounds of competence, Although in hindsight
counsel may have done certain things differ-
ently, their decisions all were grounded in
reason or strategy and were not shown to be
the product of ineptitude, inexperience, or
Jack of preparation, As a result, there is no
cumulative error.

{72 Because the actions and decisions
complained of are within the bounds of pro-
fessional competence, we do not need to de-
termine whether they prejudiced Pandeli.
State v, Salazar, 146 Ariz, 540, 541, 707 P.2d
944, 945 (1985), We reverse the POR court’s
conclusion that Pandeli received inadequate
representation, The cumulative decisions
about which Pandeli complains do not
amount to IAC.

B. Due Process Issue

HM 173 The PCR court likewise erred
in finding a due process violation based on
testimony by the State’s medical expert, Dr.
Bayless, that Pandeli malingered during his
cognitive tests and suffered only from an
antisocial disorder rather than serious men-
tal illness. Specifically, the PCR court found:

Defendant’s [sic] have a right to a fair

sentencing procedure which includes the

right to be sentenced on the basis of accu-
vate information, which basic tenet was
violated at this resentencing.

Defendant, it is clear, suffers from a seri-

ous mental illness (cerebral dysfunction

and impaired frontal lobes) but the jury
was told he had an anti-social personality
disorder and was a malingerer.

174 The PCR court implied that the jury
must be given only objectively accurate ex-
pert testimony and that the court is the
arbiter of that accuracy. It is a tall order to
establish that expert opinions are objectively
“inaccurate” and even taller to establish they
are so wrong that merely asserting them
makes a sentencing procedure so unfair as to
violate due process. See State v. Goudeau,
239 Ariz, 421, 448 150, 372 P.3d 945, 967
(2016) (“Generally a defendant’s due process
rights are sufficiently protected by the op-
portunity to cross-examine the state’s expert
regarding the validity of the testing proce-
dures,”), We note that opinion testimony of-
ten includes subjective components, and good
faith disagreements among credible experts
are not unusual and do not necessarily
amount to a due process violation. See In re
Richards, 55 Cal.4th 948, 150 Cal.Rptr.8d 84,
289 P.8d 860, 872 (2012). To the contrary,
they are the core of our adversarial process,

175 The POR court relied on United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S, 448, 446-47, 92
8.Ct, 589, 80 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), and State v.
Grier, 146 Ariz. 511, 516, 707 P.2d 309, 314
(1985) for support that Pandeli’s due process
rights were violated by Dr. Bayless’s testi-
mony, But Tucker and Grier dealt with ob-
jectively erroneous facts rather than subjec-
tive opinions given by an expert, and are not
applicable. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92
S.Ct, 589 (trial court relied on three prior
convictions in imposing sentence but two con-
victions were invalid); Grier, 146 Ariz, at
515-17, 707 P.2d at 818-15 (sentencing court
and examining doctors relied on a presen-
tence report that included an erroneous rap
sheet).

176 The circumstances here are distin-
guishable from Tucker and Grier, The PCR
court did not find that Dr, Bayless relied on
any inaccurate facts to arrive at his opinions;
the court simply disagreed with those opin-
ions. However, a defendant’s due process
rights are not violated by a good-faith “battle
of the experts.” That Pandeli’s experts disa-
greed with Dr. Bayless’s diagnosis merely
goes to the weight and credibility of Dr.
Bayless’s opinion, matters reserved for the
fact-finder’s consideration and determination,
See State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 12 127, 865
P.8d 858, 364 (2016) (“[Wle have recognized
that a trial court’s admission of disputed
expert testimony leaves to the fact-finder the
role of assessing its weight and credibility.”);
see also State v. Lajeunesse, 27 Ariz.App.
868, 368, 555 P.2d 120, 125 (1976) (finding
that disputed facts in the case “were either
not relied upon by [the expert] in reaching
his opinion, or were immaterial to his opin-
ion, or were legitimately contested facts and
evidence ... that supported [the expert’s]
version,” and that the trial court properly left
it to the jury to assign weight to that testi-
mony), An expert’s opinion is not “false”
merely because another expert—or the
court—disagrees with it. To hold otherwise
would destroy any trial process involving
conflicting expert opinions and improperly
substitute judge for jury.

177 Pandeli argues his due process rights

were violated not because there was a dis-
agreement between each party's experts but.

193

because the other experts “demonstrated
that crucial portions of Bayless’s testimony
were either significantly misleading to the
jury, based on incorrect application or inter-
pretation of established psychological princi-
ples, or were outright false.” Pandeli claims
Dr, Bayless misled the jury by testifying that
Pandeli was malingering and that Zoloft and
Prozac have no application in the treatment
of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(“ADHD”), and by conflating Antisocial Per-
sonality Disorder with psychopathy. This ar-
gument fails because Pandeli has provided no
objective evidence that Dr. Bayless’s testimo-
ny was false or misleading.

78 Dr. Bayless did not present objective-
ly false or misleading testimony that he be-
lieved Pandeli was malingering during his
evaluation. Pandeli cites Dr. Weinstein’s tes-
timony at the PCR hearing for support that
Dr. Bayless’s testimony was “anmoored from
any factual, scientific basis,” and “[s]uch un-
corrected, unscientific testimony from an ex-
pert witness created at a minimum a grave
risk that the sentencing jury was misled.”
However, Dr. Weinstein testified that Dr.
Bayless did not use any tests that directly
measured effort, which brought him to the
conclusion that “if you don’t have any objec-
tive way of finding out whether they are or
[are] not making any good effort, then it is
very difficult to say based on X-Y.Z., I think
he is or he is not malingering.” Dr. Weinstein
did not state that Dr. Bayless was objectively
wrong, but rather that it would be difficult to
determine whether Pandeli was malingering
without specific tests designed to determine
effort. This is a difference of opinion between.
two experts and does not violate Pandeli’s
due process rights.

{179 Nor did Dr. Bayless present objective-
ly false or misleading testimony when he
stated that Zoloft and Prozac have no appli-
eation for treatment of ADHD. Pandeli cites
Dr. Jones’s testimony at the PCR hearing for
support that Dr. Bayless’s conclusion that
Zoloft and Prozac have no application for
treatment of ADHD was false. However, Dr.
Jones’s only analysis on the subject was the
general conclusion “(t]hat [it] is not true”
that the medications did not have any appli-
cation for treatment for ADHD. No other

194

evidence was presented on this subject. In
short, one expert stated the medications had
no application for the treatment of ADHD
and another said they do, It was up to the
jurors to determine which expert’s testimony
they believed and chose to accept, See Lajeu-
nesse, 27 Ariz.App. at 868, 555 P.2d at 125.
This too was merely a difference of opinion
between two experts and does not constitute
a violation of Pandeli’s due process rights.

180 Finally, Dr. Bayless did not present.
objectively false or misleading testimony
when he discussed Antisocial Personality
Disorder and psychopathy. Pandeli relies on
Dr. Jones’s testimony at the PCR hearing
that Dr. Bayless incorrectly conflated the
two disorders at trial, and thus presented
false and misleading testimony to the jury.
However, this is not supported by the record.
When Pandeli’s PCR counsel asked Dr.
Jones, “So it sounds like you are saying [Dr.
Bayless’s] diagnosis of Mr, Pandeli with anti-
social personality disorder was incorrect,
based on what he did?” Dr. Jones only re-
plied, “Well, there’s an inconsistency in the
testimony and with the statement that Dr.
Bayless presented and the diagnosis that he
presented.” This again reflects a difference of
opinion between two experts and does not
constitute a violation of Pandeli’s due process
rights.

CONCLUSION

181 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the ruling of the PCR court and reinstate
Pandeli’s death sentence.

394 P.3d 21
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Andre Lee Juwaun MAESTAS, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0724

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/6/2017

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Adele Ponce, Counsel for Appellee

195

Thomas W. Dean Attorney at Law, Phoe-
nix, By Thomas W. Dean, Counsel for Appel-
Jant

Law Office of Thomas C. Holz, Bisbee, By
Thomas C, Holz, Counsel for Amicus Curiae
National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws

Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice,
Tueson, By David J. Euchner, Sarah L. May-
hew, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Arizona At-
torneys for Criminal Justice

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered
the opinion of the court, in which Judge
Patricia A. Orozco (retired) and Judge Jon
W. Thompson joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

HM 11 Andre Lee Juwaun Maestas, a
medical-marijuana cardholder (“cardholder”),
appeals his conviction for possession of mari-
juana. His appeal challenges the constitution-
ality of A.R.S. § 15-108(A), which modifies
the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(“AMMA”) by criminalizing possession of
medical marijuana by cardholders on public
college and university campuses, The AMMA
does not prevent property owners (including
the state) from prohibiting medical marijua-
na use on their property. But because A.R.S,
§ 15-108(A) criminalizes medical marijuana
use, it does not further the purpose of the
AMMA. Accordingly, § 15-108(A) violates
the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”) and we
hold it unconstitutional. We do not, however,
hold that public colleges and universities are
required to allow marijuana use, even by
cardholders, on campus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 An Arizona State University police offi-
cer arrested Maestas for obstructing a public
thoroughfare after observing him sitting in
the road in front of his dormitory on the
university campus. He searched Maestas and
found a valid Arizona medical marijuana card
in his wallet. The officer asked Maestas if he
had marijuana in his dorm room, and Maes-
tas admitted he did. The officer obtained a
search warrant, searched the dorm room,

196

and found two envelopes containing 0.4
grams of marijuana, an allowable amount for
a cardholder under A.R.S, § 86-2801(1)(a)().

18 Maestas was charged with obstructing
a highway or other public thoroughfare, a
class 8 misdemeanor, and possession or use
of marijuana, a class 6 felony. Before trial,
Maestas moved to dismiss the possession
charge, arguing that as a cardholder, his
possession of marijuana was lawful under the
AMMA. The state opposed the motion, argu-
ing that A.R.S. § 15-108(A) prohibits even
cardholders from possessing marijuana on
public college and university campuses. After
the superior court denied the motion, the
state amended the indictment to designate
the drug charge a misdemeanor.

14 At his bench trial, Maestas was convict-
ed on both counts. The superior court sus-
pended sentencing and placed Maestas on
probation for one year. The court also im-
posed a fine on the drug charge, Maestas
appeals his conviction for the drug charge.

DISCUSSION

HI 15 Maestas contends his conviction
on the drug charge should be reversed be-
cause the AMMA allows him to possess mari-
juana in his dorm room, He argues that
§ 15-108(A), which removes the criminal pro-
tections of the AMMA on public college and
university campuses, is unconstitutional. We
review questions of statutory interpretation
and constitutional issues de novo, State v
Dann, 220 Ariz, 351, 369, 196, 207 P.3d 604
(2009), Statutes are presumed to be constitu-
tional, Indus, Comm'n v, Brewer, 281 Ariz.
46, 49, 111, 290 P.8d 489 (App, 2012). Maes-
tas, as the challenging party, bears the bur-
den of overcoming that presumption. Cave
Creek Unified Sch, Dist. v. Ducey, 288 Ariz.
1, 5, 111, 808 P.8d 1152 (2018),

I, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Hl 16 In November 2010, Arizona voters
approved the AMMA, See A.R.S, §§ 86-2801
to -2819, The purpose of the AMMA is to
decriminalize possession and use of marijua-
na for medicinal purposes. Reed-Kaliher v.
Hoggatt, 237 Aviz, 119, 122-28, §11'7, 17, 847
P.8d 186 (2015); see also 2010 Proposition

208, § 2(G) (stating that “the purpose of this
act is to protect patients with debilitating
medical conditions ... from arrest and pros-
ecution, criminal and other penalties ... if
such patients engage in the medical use of
marijuana”), As relevant here, the AMMA’s
protection against criminal liability applies
everywhere within the state of Arizona ex-
cept on school busses; on any preschool, pri-
mary, or secondary school grounds; or in any
correctional facility. A.R.S, § 36-2802(B),

17 In 2012, the Arizona Legislature modi-
fied the AMMA by prohibiting marijuana
possession and use in additional places, See
2012 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 159, §§ 8, 4 (2d
Reg. Sess.) (codified at A.R.S, § 15-108),
This statute provides, in pertinent part:

[A] person, including a cardholder ...,

may not lawfully possess or use marijuana

on the campus of any public university,
college, community college or postsecond-
ary educational institution,
ARS. § 15-108(A), Absent this provision,
Maestas would not be subject to prosecution
for possession of marijuana. A.R.S. § 36-
2811(B)(1).

IL SECTION 15-108(A) VIOLATES THE
VOTER PROTECTION ACT

HM 18 The sole issue on appeal is
whether § 15-108(A) violates the Voter Pro-
tection Act, Ariz, Const, art, 4, pt. 1, § 106).
The VPA is a provision of the Arizona consti-
tution that limits the Legislature’s authority
to repeal or modify laws enacted by voters in
or after the November 1998 general election.
Cave Creek Unified Sch, Dist., 288 Ariz, at 4,
19, 808 P.8d 1152; Ariz, Const. art. 4, pt. 1,
§ 1, Historical Notes. The VPA prohibits the
Legislature from amending a voter-passed
initiative unless, inter alia, the amendment.
“furthers the purposes” of the initiative. Ariz,
Const, art, 4, pt. 1, § 1(6)(C). Maestas con-
tends that § 15-108(A) does not further the
AMMA’s purpose of protecting cardholders
from criminal and other penalties, We agree,

A. The Constitutionality of § 15-108(A)
Is a Justiciable Question.

I 19 The state first argues that the

prohibition of marijuana on public college

and university campuses is a nonjusticiable

political question because permitting mari-
juana use “would cause the school[s] ... to
lose a monetary or licensing related benefit
under federal law or regulations.” A nonjusti-
ciable political question exists “where there
is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for re-
solving it” Nison v. United States, 506 U.S.
224, 228, 118 S.Ct, 782, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998)
(citation omitted); see also Forty-Seventh
Legislature v. Napolitano, 218 Ariz, 482, 485,
{'7, 143 P.8d 1028 (2006) (applying the same
standard in Arizona courts), But the issue
presented by this case is narrow, and does
not implicate the concerns identified by the
state.

10 The AMMA expressly does not re-
quire “[a]ny person or establishment in law-
ful possession of property to allow a guest,
client, customer or other visitor to use for
possess] marijuana on or in that property.”
ALR.S. §§ 36-2814(A)(2) (describing acts not
required), -2801(9) (defining “medical use” to
include possession), The Legislature is there-
fore free to bar the use and possession of
marijuana on public college and university
campuses to protect federal funding—or for
any other reason, The question in this case is
whether the Legislature has the authority to
designate additional areas where cardhold-
ers, otherwise in compliance with the
AMMA, are subject to criminal prosecution.
for possessing marijuana,

B. The Legislature May Not Criminalize
Cardholders’ Possession of Marijuana
Except in the Places Specified in the
AMMA.

HH {11 In interpreting a voter-approved
measure, we give effect to “the intent of the
electorate that adopted it,” and in doing so,
we interpret the words according to “their
natural, obvious and ordinary meaning.”
Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 233 Ariz. at
6-7, 121, 308 P.8d 1152 (citations omitted).
When the language is clear and unambiguous
and thus subject to only one reasonable
meaning, we apply the language without re-
sort to other means of statutory construction,

197

Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498, 110,
990 P.2d 1055 (1999),

TI 112 As relevant here, the AMMA
“does not prevent the imposition of any civil,
criminal or other penalties for ... [plossess-
ing or engaging in the medical use of mari-
juana: 1. On a school bus. 2. On the grounds
of any preschool or primary or secondary
school, 8, In any correctional facility.” A.R.S,
§ 86-2802(B). “Generally, when the [Liegis-
lature expresses a list, we assume the exclu-
sion of items not listed.” State v. Ault, 157
Ariz, 516, 519, 759 P.2d 1820 (1988), By spe-
cifically exempting only pre-, primary- and
secondary-school grounds from its protec-
tions, the AMMA offers no textual support
for the notion that otherwise lawful use of
marijuana on college or university campuses
can be made criminal,

913 By enacting A.R.S, § 15-108(A), the
Legislature modified the AMMA to re-crimi-
nalize cardholders’ marijuana possession on
college and university campuses, The statute
does not further the purposes of the AMMA;
to the contrary, it eliminates some of its
protections. See Cave Creek Unified Sch.
Dist, 238 Ariz, at 7-8, 125, 808 P.8d 1152
(holding that a statute that cannot be har-
monized with a voter-approved law violates
the VPA).

114 The state argues that the anti-dis-
crimination provision’s federal-funding excep-
tion in § 86-2818(A) gives the Legislature
authority to prohibit cardholders from using
marijuana on college and university campus-
es, This provision generally prohibits schools
and landlords from penalizing a cardholder
based “solely [on] his status as a cardholder,”
ARS. § 36-2813(A), But schools and land-
lords may discriminate to protect federal
monetary or licensing benefits. Id. While this
exception is an affirmative defense to a dis-
crimination claim, nothing in the plain lan-
guage of the statute authorizes criminaliza-
tion of cardholders’ possession of marijuana
on college or university campuses,

HI 115 Like any other landowner, the
state may regulate what items or materials
may be brought onto its property. A.R.S,
§ 36~2814(A)(2), To the extent a person vio-
lates such rules or prohibitions, the state can

198 Es

have the offending party removed or charged
with trespassing. A.R.S. § 18-1502(A)(1); see
also A.R.S. § 18-2911(D) (providing for en-
forcement of rules of educational institutions
governing conduct of persons on property). If
the state finds it necessary to protect federal
funding by prohibiting medical marijuana on
public college and university campuses, then
the AMMA does not stop it from creating
such policies. Nor does the AMMA prohibit
the Legislature from enacting non-criminal ]x
statutes to ensure the absence of medical
marijuana on college and university campus-
es,

CONCLUSION

116 Because A.R.S. § 15-108(A) does not
further the purpose of the AMMA, we hold
that is unconstitutional under the VPA and
vacate Maestas’s conviction for possession of
marijuana.

394 P.3d 25

In re the Marriage of: William N.
LUNDY, Jr., Petitioner/Appellee,

v

Colleen S, LUNDY,
Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0612 FC

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/6/2017

Aspey Watkins & Diesel PLLC, Flagstaff,
By Zachary J. Markham, Staci Lynn Foulks,
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

199

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Phoenix, By
Keith Berkshire, Maxwell Mahoney, Counsel
for Respondent/Appellant

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the
opinion of the court, in which Presiding
Judge Patricia A. Orozco (retired) and Chief
Judge Michael J. Brown joined,

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

{1 Colleen S. Lundy (“Mother”) appeals
the superior court’s modification of William
N. Lundy, Jr’s (“Father[’s]”) child support
obligation. We conclude that the court erro-
neously attributed income to Mother from a
second job, and erroneously credited Father
for the full amount paid on an insurance
policy covering both the minor children and
other dependents. We therefore vacate the
modification order and remand for further
proceedings. We further hold that the court
erred by awarding attorney's fees to Father
in the absence of a written request for fees.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

"2 In 2004, Father and Mother, the par-
ents of three then-minor children, entered a
consent decree dissolving their marriage,
The decree ordered Father to pay monthly
child support and provide medical and dental
insurance for the children.

13 In 2014, Father filed a petition to modi-
fy his child support obligation. He argued
that modification was warranted because the
parties’ incomes had changed and their old-
est child had turned 18 years old.

1.4 After holding an evidentiary hearing in
July 2015, the superior court granted Fa-
ther’s petition and modified his child support
obligation from $1,854.41 per month to $500
per month. In caleulating the new amount,
the court attributed to Mother income from
two jobs, The court also credited Father for
the full amount he paid to provide health
insurance coverage for the three children and
his wife, relying on testimony that Father’s
cost to purchase dependency coverage would
remain the same regardless of the number of
dependents added to the policy. Finally, the

200

court awarded Father approximately $5,000
in attorney's fees under A.R.S, § 25-324,

15 Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

I, THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRONE-
OUSLY CALCULATED FATHER’S
NEW CHILD SUPPORT OBLI-
GATION.

Hl 16 After the consent decree was en-
tered, the parties’ oldest child reached the
age of majority and graduated high school,
That fact alone provided sufficient grounds
for the court to revisit the issue of child
support. See A.R.S, §§ 25-501(A), -503(E).
We conclude, however, that several legal er-
rors contributed to the calculation of the new
support obligation,

A. The Superior Court Erred by Consid-
ering Income that Mother Earned
from a Second Job,

HH 17 Mother first contends that the
superior court erred by including earnings
from a second job when determining her
ineome for the child-support calculation. We
agree,

HMMM 18 Section 5(A) of the Arizona
Child Support Guidelines provides that when
determining parents’ incomes for child sup-
port purposes;

Generally, the court should not attribute

income greater than what would have been

earned from full-time employment, Each
parent should have the choice of working

additional hours through overtime or at a

second job without increasing the child

support award. The court may, however,
consider income actually earned that is
greater than would have been earned by
full-time employment if that income was
historically earned from a regular schedule
and is anticipated to continue into the fu-
ture,

ARS, § 25-320 app. § 5(A). Section 5(A)’s

intent is “consistent with the concept of full-

1, Though the second and third sentences of
§ 5(A) might appear to conflict, we interpret the
Guideline as a whole, avoiding constructions that

could render any part meaningless. We read the
second sentence to prohibit inclusion of income

time employment.” McNutt v. McNutt, 203
Ariz, 28, 82, 117, 49 P.8d 300 (App. 2002).
The provision “ensure[s] that the child sup-
port award is based on both parents’ regular
incomes but leave[s] to each parent the
choice of working additional hours—whether
overtime or at a second job—without expos-
ing that parent to the ‘treadmill’ effect of an
ever-increasing child support obligation.” !
Id,

19 The court used Mother’s 2018 tax re-
turn to determine her income, reasoning that
her 2014 tax return reflected atypical earn-
ings, The 2018 return showed that Mother's
net annual income from her job as a financial
advisor was $67,057, and that her net profit
from a separate business management job
was $37,679, Her 2014 return and her testi-
mony established that she continued to work
as a financial advisor. The 2014 return did
not, however, make any mention of a busi-
ness management position (though it did re-
port approximately $3,000 in earnings from
an “insurance” job). The court was not pre-
sented with evidence from which it could
conclude that Mother’s business management
income was “historically earned from a regu-
lar schedule and is anticipated to continue
into the future.” We conclude, therefore, that
the court erred by including that income in
the child-support calculation.

HH 110 We reject Father’s argument
that Mother waived § 5(A)’s application. Nei-
ther Mother nor Father specifically ad-
dressed the business management income in
the modification proceedings—they instead
disputed whether Mother’s 2014 earnings
(which did not include business management
income) accurately represented her financial
situation and whether she correctly self-re-
ported her 2015 income (which similarly did
not include business management income).
Mother cannot be said to have waived her
right to challenge the court's sua sponte
inclusion of income from the business man-
agement work she did in 2018.

from traditional overtime or second jobs, and we
read the third sentence to permit realistic calcu-
lation of income in cases involving a parent
whose income does not arise from such discrete
sources,

B, The Superior Court Erred by Credit-
ing Father with the Full Amount of
His Insurance Premium Payments.

W111 Mother next contends that the
superior court erred by failing to prorate the
amount Father paid to provide health insur-
ance coverage for the two minor children, the
adult child, and Father’s wife. Again, we
agree with Mother.

112 Section 9(A) of the Guidelines pro-
vides that the court:

Shall add to the Basie Child Support Obli-

gation the cost of the children’s medical

dental or vision insurance coverage, if
any.... In determining the amount to be
added, only the amount of the insurance
cost attributable to the children subject of
the child support order shall be included.
If coverage is applicable to other persons,
the total cost shall be prorated by the
number of persons covered,
Section 9(A) then provides an example of a
“family option” premium payment that “pro-
vides coverage for the employee and any
‘mber of dependents.” (Emphasis added.)
The example explains that the cost attribut-
able to the dependents’ coverage should be
divided by the number of dependents, then
the quotient should be multiplied by the
number of the dependents who are the sub-
ject of child support, and then the product
should be used to calculate child support, The
example makes clear that the premium must
be prorated even if the named insured could
add any number of non-child-support depen-
dents to the policy at no additional cost,

Hi 113 In view of the foregoing, the
superior court erred by refusing to prorate
Father’s premium payments to account for
the health insurance’s coverage of the adult
child and Father's wife. Father’s contention
that Mother waived this issue is unavailing.
The transcript reveals Mother specifically ar-
gued that proration was required. Her failure
to cite § 9(A) did not constitute waiver.

Tl, THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRONE-
OUSLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS
FEES TO FATHER,

14 Mother finally contends that the supe-
rior court erred by awarding attorney’s fees

201

to Father, arguing that he did not properly
request fees under ARFLP 78(D)(1).

HMB 15 ARFLP 78(D)(1) provides that
“fa] claim for attorney’s fees, costs and ex-
penses initially shall be made in the plead-
ings, pretrial statement, or by motion filed
prior to trial or post-decree evidentiary hear-
ing.” We need not decide the temporal stric-
tures of the rule, because one thing is clear—
the rule requires a filed, written request.
There was no such request in this case. Fa-
ther did not ask for fees in the modification
petition or in any other filing. He instead
asked for fees orally in closing argument at
the evidentiary hearing, That was insufficient
under ARFLP 78(D)(1), and the fact that
Mother requested fees in the same manner
as Father does not constitute waiver—nei-
ther party would have been eligible for fees
under the rule,

CONCLUSION

116 We vacate the superior court’s orders
modifying child support, and we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this deci-
sion. On remand, the parties should apprise
the court of any new changes in cireum-
stances or income that may affect child sup-
port,

117 In exercise of our discretion, we deny
both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees on

appeal,

394 P.3d 28

In re the Matter of: Justin Tait MITTON,
Petitioner/Appellant,

v

Candice H. MITTON,
Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0769 FC

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/11/2017

8
iJ

1, The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired
Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has

Elisworth Family Law P.C., Mesa, By
Glenn D. Halterman, Counsel for Petition-
ex/Appellant

Bowman and Brooke LLP, Phoenix, By
Travis M. Wheeler, Amanda E. Heitz, Coun-
sel for Respondent/Appellee

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Patricia
A. Orozco ! joined.

OPINION

THUMMA, Judge:

{1 Justin Mitton (Father) appeals from
the superior court’s post-decree order modi-
fying child support. Because child support
was improperly calculated, the order is vacat-
ed and the issue of child support is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 Candice Mitton (Mother) and Father
divorced by consent decree entered in 2013,
The decree provided Mother and Father
equal parenting time with their children, with
Father paying Mother child support. Mother
and Father currently have three minor chil-
dren: a daughter, who is 17, and twin boys,
who are 10.

18 Father later filed a petition to modify
child support, which was addressed at an
August 2015 evidentiary hearing. Mother and
Father testified that, with their consent,
their daughter was living with Mother full
time, while the twins continued to have equal
time with each parent. Because their daugh-
ter was living with Mother full time, Mother

been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to
Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

argued that Father needed to pay more child
support. The court took the matter under
advisement and directed counsel to file child
support worksheets setting forth their posi-
tions. Mother filed two worksheets (one for
their daughter living solely with Mother and
one for the twins reflecting equal parenting
time with Mother and Father). Father timely
objected, arguing Mother's worksheets over-
stated his child support obligation, and filed
competing worksheets, including a combined
worksheet for all three children. In a subse-
quent ruling, the court set child support in an
amount calculated by adding together the
two worksheets Mother had filed,

14 This court has jurisdiction over Fa-
ther’s timely appeal from that ruling pursu-
ant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes
(AR.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -
2101(A)(1) (2017)2

DISCUSSION ®

HM 15 Father argues the superior court’s
method of combining two separate child sup-
port worksheets “was not consistent with the
Guidelines and resulted in a support award
that far exceeded what is contemplated by
the Guidelines.” This method, Father argues,
resulted in a “clearly disproportionate in-
erease” in his child support obligation. Fa-
ther argues this method ignores that the
Guidelines account for “the fact that some of
the expenses associated with supporting a
single child (such as providing housing) do
not inerease in equal proportion to the num-
ber of children in a family,”

16 Mother counters that the superior
court did not err, citing an example in section
16 of the Guidelines, titled “Multiple Chil-
dren, Divided Custody,” that uses separate
worksheets and treats each child as an only
child. See A.R.S. § 25-820 Appendix § 16.
The example, however, assumes each parent
has sole custody of at least one child—which
2, Absent material revisions after the relevant

dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current
version unless otherwise indicated.

3. Ina separate memorandum decision, Mitton v.
Mitton, 1 CA-CV 15-0769 FC, 2017 WL 1325650

203

is not the case here—making section 16 inap-
plicable,

HM s17 How the Guidelines approach
child support for unusual parenting time ar-
rangements is a matter of law subject to de
novo review. Hetherington v. Hetherington,
220 Ariz, 16, 21 121, 202 P.3d 481 (App.
2008). The Guidelines are based on an “in-
come shares model” in determining child sup-
port. Nash v. Nash, 282 Ariz. 478, 476 17,
807 P.3d 40 (App. 2018). The income shares
model “is based on two principles: (1) ‘The
total child support amount approximates the
amount that would have been spent on the
children if the parents and children were
living together} and (2) ‘Each parent contrib-
utes his/her proportionate share of the total
child support amount.” Id. (quoting Guide-
lines § 1 Background).

18 The parties have cited, and this court
has found, no Arizona case addressing the
issue presented here: how to calculate child
support when one child lives with one parent
full time, and parents share parenting time
equally with at least one other child. For
guidance, then, this court looks to cases in
other states that use the “income shares
model” upon which Arizona’s Guidelines are
based.

19 Indiana uses the income shares model,
see Indiana Child Support Guideline 1, and
has addressed a similar issue. In In re Mar-
riage of Blanford, father had no overnight
parenting time with one child, but “signifi-
cant overnight parenting time with” another
child. 987 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). In caleulating child support, the trial
court used two separate child support work-
sheets, which “led to calculations that treated
each child as though he was an only child for
the purposes of calculating [father’s] child
support obligations.” Jd. On appeal, the court
reversed, stating the method erroneously in-
flated father’s child support obligations. Id.
The court remanded for the calculation of
child support using only one worksheet and

(Ariz, App. April 11, 2017), filed simultaneously
with this opinion, this court addresses Father's
challenge to an order modifying parenting time
and the parties’ claims for attorneys’ fees and
costs on appeal.

204

using the “basic support obligation for two
children at the appropriate weekly income
level.” Id, at 862, The trial court was then to
start with the overnight parenting time cred-
it for two children, and adjust the amount
appropriately, Id,

110 Colorado also uses the income shares
model, see In re Marriage of Nimmo, 891
P,2d 1002, 1007 (Colo, 1995), and has ad-
dressed a similar issue, In In re Marriage of
Wells, the father had differing visitation
schedules with each child. 252 P.8d 1212,
1214 (Colo. App, 2011), The trial court added
together two separate child support work-
sheets to calculate child support. Jd, On ap-
peal, the court reversed, stating that method.
“is contrary to the guidelines and schedule,
which provide for incremental increases in
support for each additional child in a family.”
Id, The court remanded for the trial court to
credit “overnight visits with only one of two
children by crediting the parent for one-half
of an overnight for each visit with the one
child.” Id.

711 As a final example, Maine uses the
income shares model, see Me, Rey. Stat. tit,
19-A, §§ 2001-2012, and has addressed a
virtually identical issue. In Lawrence v, Web-
ber, the parents had three minor children:
two sons and one daughter, 894 A.2d 480, 482
2 (2006), The daughter lived with the moth-
er full time and the sons split their time
equally with the parents. Id, at 482 14, The
trial court calculated child support by adding
together two separate worksheets, using “the
number of children in each household rather
than the total number of children for whom
support was being calculated.” Id, at 482 15,
This resulted in child support being calculat-
ed as if the daughter was an only child and
then adding that amount to the worksheet
for the two sons, On appeal, the court re-
versed, stating that method was incorrect
because it overstated the costs and resulting
obligations of parenting the children. Id. at
484 14, The court remanded to the trial
court to calculate child support using “the
total number of children for whom support
was being determined when calculating the
basic support entitlement.” Id.

112 With these cases in mind, as Father
argues, the Arizona Guidelines only inere-

mentally increase the support obligation as
more children are added. A.RS. § 25-320
Appendix (“Schedule of Basie Support Obli-
gations”), At all income levels, the support
obligation is not merely multiplied by the
number of children. Jd, As with the cases in
other income shares model states, the Guide-
lines recognize that adding each child to a
household increases costs in an incremental,
but not equal, amount. Thus, treating one of
three children as an only child and then
adding those costs to a two-child household
results in an inflated child support obligation,
As a result, the child support order in this
case was erroneous and is vacated,

Hl 113 The superior court is vested with
broad discretion when determining child sup-
port, Nash, 282 Ariz, at 478 116, 307 P.3d 40,
On remand, the court should treat all the
children as one household and prepare one
worksheet, To determine the adjustment for
costs associated with parenting time, the
court must “first determine the total annual
amount of parenting time indicated in a court
order or parenting plan or by the expectation
or historical practice of the parents” for each
child, A.R.S. § 25-820 Appendix § 11, Add-
ing together the total number of parenting
time days for each parent for all children and
then dividing that total by the number of
children yields an average annual amount of
parenting time days for use in determining
child support under the Guidelines, Jd. And
after determining the child support amount
under the Guidelines, the court still retains
the discretion to deviate, provided it makes
sufficient written findings for doing so. See
A.R.S. § 25-820 Appendix § 20 (when deviat-
ing from Guidelines, court is to make written
findings considering “the best interests of
the child in determining the amount of a
deviation”),

CONCLUSION

{14 The order modifying child support is
vacated and the issue remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

394 P.3d 32
Maricruz ZULUAGA, a minor, BY AND
THROUGH her next friend, Guadalupe
ZULUAGA, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
BASHAS’, INC., an Arizona corporation
doing business as Food City,
Defendant/Appellee.

No, 2 CA-CV 2016-0104
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed February 8, 2017

no
S
a

Hollingsworth Kelly, Tucson, By Louis
Hollingsworth, Michael F. Kelly, and John F.
Kelly, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A., Phoenix, By Da-
ryl Manhart and Susie Ingold, Counsel for
Defendant/Appellee

Judge Vésquez authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Howard and
Judge Staring concurred.

OPINION

VASQUEZ, Judge:

{11 In this negligence action, Maricruz Zu-
Iuaga appeals from the trial court’s judgment
in favor of Bashas’, Inc, and the denial of her
motion for a new jury trial. On appeal, Zulua-
ga argues the court erred by unreasonably
limiting the scope of voir dire. Zuluaga also
contends the court erred by giving a curative

instruction after plaintiff's counsel referred
during opening statements to the manner
and timing of Bashas’ disclosure of certain
information. For the following reasons, we
affirm the court’s judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

HM 112 “We view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favor-
able to upholding the jury’s verdict.” Romero
v, Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz, 200, 12, 119
P.8d 467, 469 (App. 2005). On June 2, 2011,
six-year-old Zuluaga and her parents were
shopping at a Food City location, operated
by Bashas’. While in the store, Zuluaga brief-
ly separated from her mother and went to
the produce department. At the same time, a
Food City employee, Carlos Martinez, passed
through the produce department on his way
to the back of the store. The two collided,
and Zuluaga fell and sustained a skull frac-
ture and subdural hemorrhage.

13 Zuluaga’s mother brought this action
on her behalf in July 2012, claiming Zuluaga
suffered damages because of Martinez’s neg-
ligence, for which Bashas’ was vicariously
liable. During the seven-day trial, the parties
disputed whether Martinez had been running
or walking through the produce department
and whether he ran into Zuluaga or she ran
into him. The jury returned a defense verdict
in favor of Bashas’. The trial court denied
Zuluaga’s motion for a new trial, and this
appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to ARS, §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-
2101(A)(), ()(a).

Scope of Voir Dire
14 Zuluaga argues the trial court
“unreasonably limited her voir dire by refus-
ing to allow questions about grocery store
employment.” We will not overturn a trial

1, Because the pertinent rule of civil procedure
uses language that is substantially similar to that
found in the corresponding criminal rule, we rely
in part on cases reviewing the scope of voir dire
in the criminal context. Compare Ariz. R. Civ. P.
47(b)(3) (court “shall permit that party a reason-
able time to conduct a further oral examination
of the prospective jurors” and “may impose rea-
sonable limitations with respect to questions al-
lowed during a party's examination of the pro-
spective jurors”), (d) (questioning “may extend to
any legitimate inquiry which might disclose a

207

court’s ruling on the scope of voir dire absent
an abuse of discretion. State v, Burns, 237
Ariz. 1, 119, 844 P.8d 308, 314 2015). In
addition, we will not reverse a judgment
unless the error was prejudicial. See Ariz.
Const. art. VI, § 27; United Cal. Bank v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 288,
295, 681 P.2d 390, 447 (App. 1983).

15 The trial court conducted the initial
portion of voir dire in this case, asking pro-
spective jurors if they, a close family mem-
ber, or a close friend “work[ed] for Bashas or
Food City.” One juror responded affirmative-
ly and was later dismissed for cause, During
Zuluaga’s portion of voir dire, counsel asked
a similar, but broader, question: “Who here,
or a family member, or a close friend, has
ever worked in a grocery store? This could
be 80 years ago, checkout clerk; cashier man-
ager; surveillance.” Five jurors responded
affirmatively, and the first four briefly ex-
plained their connections. The court stopped
Zuluaga’s counsel before he could address
the fifth juror, however, and the following
exchange occurred:

The Court: You're getting to some areas
here that are so long and I don’t know how
helpful it is. I’m surprised you haven't
asked who hasn’t worked at a grocery
store because that’s such a common way of
kids to advance to adults. It doesn’t really
matter whether somebody has worked at a
grocery store or has a good friend that
has.

You can ask for similar specific areas,
but I’m going to ask you to be more explic-
it asking the questions and move things
along.

[Zuluaga’s counsel]: Your Honor, thank
you.

For the record, this case involves the
actions of a grocery store with [an] em-
basis for exercise of a peremptory challenge”),
with Ariz, R. Crim, P. 18.5(d) (court “shall per-
mit that party a reasonable time to conduct a
further oral examination of the prospective ju-
rors” and “may impose reasonable limitations
with respect to questions allowed during a par-
ty's examination of the prospective jurors, giving
due regard to the purpose of such examination”),
(©) (examination “limited to inquiries directed to
bases for challenge for cause or to information to
enable the parties to exercise intelligently their
peremptory challenges”).

208

ployee and a manager, and whether or not
their testimony is reasonable under the
circumstances and upon the evidence the
jury is going to hear, I believe it’s very
important to know which jurors have
worked in that environment of a grocery
store....

And I’m not going into this to each
individual person. I’m trying to get an-
swers and the jurors saying yes, and then
T'll move past that, And I’m entitled to do
that.

The Court: Well, ... you're not going to
be able to evaluate until somebody views
the witness and until that witness takes
the stand. So, really, I think you're getting
too specific here. You're going to find peo-
ple that are candid and people who are less
than candid. Ultimately, the jury is going
to use their collective common sense in
deciding what’s credible or not, so I’m
going to ask you to move on.

[Zuluaga’s counsel]: To clarify the
Court’s ruling, the Court is preventing me
[from] finishing this line of questions with
the panel in respect to which members of
the panel have worked in grocery stores or
can remember—

The Court: Right. You can ask them, is
there anything about their experience or
experiences of a family [member] or friend
that might [alffect [their] ability to fairly
weigh the credibility of the witnesses in
this case, whether they worked in a gro-
cery store or not. So that’s really the ques-
tion here.

So get on with it,
HE 16 In turn, Zuluaga’s counsel
asked the following question:

With respect to those of you who have
had experience yourself in a grocery store
or a close friend or family member, is

2. Bashas’ argues Zuluaga “abandon|ed]” this is-
sue by failing to “request further questioning”
and by passing the panel at the end of voir dire.
Generally, parties are not permitted to raise a
post-hoc challenge based on juror bias if they
failed to thoroughly question the jurors during
voir dire. See Brooks v. Zahn, 170 Ariz. 545, 550,
826 P.2d 1171, 1176 (App, 1991). But “an objec-
tion made during voir dire is sufficient to pre-
serve [a challenge to the scope of voir dire], and
the error is not waived simply by agreeing to

there anything about those associations in
your life or those people in your life, any-
thing about conversations with them or
Imowledge about their jobs that would
make it more likely, in this case, for you to
start off favoring the grocery store or its
employees in terms of credibility?

No jurors responded to the question. Of the
five jurors who initially stated they, or some-
one close to them, had some experience
working at a grocery store, two ultimately
sat for trial, including the fifth juror who
never disclosed the nature of that experi-
ence.”

97 Rule 47(b)(8), Ariz. R. Civ. P., provides
that, “fuJpon the request of any party, the
court shall permit that party a reasonable
time to conduct a further oral examination of
the prospective jurors.” * Although the court.
“may impose reasonable limitations with re-
spect to questions allowed,” id, it cannot
restrict questions “to the grounds of chal-
lenge for cause,” Ariz, R. Civ, P. 47(d). In-
stead, voir dire “may extend to any legiti-
mate inquiry which might disclose a basis for
exercise of a peremptory challenge.” Id.; see
ARS, § 21-211 (listing grounds for chal-
lenge for cause); Ariz, R. Civ. P, 47(¢) (same);
Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 46, 308 P.2d
245, 249 (1957). For parties to “intelligently
exercise these rights of challenge, they are
privileged to examine prospective jurors as
to their qualifications.” Wilson v, Wiggins, 54
Ariz, 240, 241-42, 94 P.2d 870, 871 (1989); see
also State v. McMurtrey, 186 Ariz, 98, 99,
664 P.2d 687, 648 (1988).

WI 18 In denying Zuluaga’s motion for a
new trial on this issue, the trial court ex-
plained that it had intended to “instruct [Zu-
luaga] to ask specific questions to determine
who on the panel could not be fair.” But as
explained above, voir dire is not limited to

pass the panel.” State v. Shone, 190 Ariz, 113,
116, 945 P.2d 834, 837 (App. 1997). Therefore,
Zuluaga properly preserved the issue here.

3, The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were
revised effective January 1, 2017. See Ariz. Sup.
Ct. Order No, R-16-0010 (Sept, 2, 2016). We cite
the version of the rules in effect at the time of
trial.

grounds of challenges for cause, such as “bias
for or against” a party. Ariz. R. Civ. P.
47(¢)(6), (d). And although the court may
have intended to encourage more specific
questions, it explicitly told Zuluaga’s counsel
to ask whether the jurors’ experiences would
affect their “ability to fairly weigh the credi-
bility of the witnesses” and “to move on.” But.
merely asking jurors whether they subjec-
tively believe they can be fair and impartial
is not sufficient for counsel to make an in-
formed decision about making a peremptory
strike. See State v. Naranjo, 284 Ariz, 238,
1.17, 821 P.8d 398, 405 (2014); see also Silver-
thorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639
(9th Cir, 1968) (bias “should not be adjudged
on that juror’s own assessment of self-righ-
teousness without something more”), Be-
cause Zuluaga’s line of questioning was rele-
vant to the factual issues in dispute, see
Evans, 82 Ariz, at 46, 808 P.2d at 249, the
court abused its discretion by limiting the
scope of voir dire, see Burns, 237 Ariz. 1,
119, 844 P.3d at 314,

Hs 19 We nonetheless will not reverse
the judgment unless the error was prejudi-
cial. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 295,
681 P.2d at 447, “The test is whether preju-
dice seems affirmatively probable[,] and prej-
udice will not be presumed, but must appear
probable from the record.” Catchings v. City
of Glendale, 154 Ariz, 420, 422-28, 743 P.2d
400, 402-08 (App. 1987), quoting Hallmark v.
Allied Prods. Corp., 182 Ariz. 484, 441, 646
P.2d 819, 326 (App. 1982), In other words,
Zuluaga must show “not only that the voir
dire examination was inadequate, but also
that, as a result of the inadequate question-
ing, the jury selected was not fair, unbiased,
and impartial.” Naranjo, 284 Ariz, 238, 124,
821 P.8d at 406, quoting State v. Moody, 208
Ariz, 424, 195, 94 P.8d 1119, 1146 (2004).

110 Zuluaga did not attempt to meet this
burden, She seems to argue, however, that
we should presume prejudice in this case
because of the gravity of the trial court’s
error.t We acknowledge that other jurisdic-

4, Zuluaga also asserts that in Evans our supreme
court reversed a judgment because “[tIhe line of
interrogation objected to might well have pro-
duced answers that would have induced counsel
to exercise his rights of peremptory challenge.”
82 Ariz. at 46, 308 P.2d at 249. But Zuluaga

209

tions will presume prejudice when “the trial
judge so limits the scope of voir dire that the
procedure used for testing does not create
any reasonable assurances that prejudice
would be discovered if present.” United
States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th
Cir, 1979); see also Fietzer v. Ford Motor
Co., 622 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1980). This
approach has been utilized where “the specif-
ic circumstances suggest a significant risk of
prejudice and if examination or admonition of
jurors fails to negate that inference,” United
States v, Gillis, 942 F.2d 707, 709-10 (10th
Cir, 1991); see, ag., Babcock v. Nw. Mem?
Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989) (voir
dire regarding “lawsuit crisis”),

111 But we have found no authority sug-
gesting Arizona has applied this rule, either
in the civil or criminal context. See State v.
Detrich, 188 Ariz, 57, 65, 982 P.2d 1828, 1886
(1997) (“{Slpeculation is insufficient to meet
defendant’s burden of proving that he was
not provided a fair and impartial jury.”); of
Richtmyre v, State, 175 Ariz, 489, 490-91, 858
P.2d 822, 323-24 (App. 1993) (motion for new
trial based on juror bias requires affidavit
from juror); Catchings, 154 Ariz, at 422, 748
P.2d at 402 (“party must show that a correct
response would have resulted in a valid chal-
lenge for cause”). And Zuluaga does not as-
sert that there were special circumstances
surrounding the factual issues in this case to
cause a specific concern regarding juror bias.
See Gillis, 942 F.2d at 709-10. Accordingly,
‘we cannot say that the trial court committed
reversible error by limiting the scope of voir
dire. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz, at 295,
681 P.2d at 447.

Curative Instruction

Hs‘ 12 Zuluaga argues the trial court
erred when it determined that a curative
instruction was warranted to address her
counsel’s reference, during opening state-
ment, to the manner and timing of Bashas’
production of an incident report written

misconstrues the procedural posture of that case.
In Evans, the trial court permitted the line of
questioning, and our supreme court affirmed the
lower court's ruling when challenged on appeal.
Td.

210 Le

shortly after the accident, She also argues
the instruction given to the jury was “mis-
leading.” Because the court “is invested with
great discretion in the conduct and control of
[a] trial,” we review its decision to use a
curative instruction for an abuse of discre-
tion. Higgins v. Ariz. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 90
Ariz, 55, 69, 865 P.2d 476, 486 (1961); see
Miller v. Palmer, 143 Ariz. 84, 88, 691 P.2d
1112, 1116 (App. 1984).

118 The issue presented here arose from a
discovery dispute. In September 2012, in re-
sponse to Zuluaga’s discovery requests, Ba-
shas’ asserted it had no “written or recorded
statements” from the incident, and, although
an “in-house incident report submitted to
Bashas’ Risk Management Department” ex-
isted, the report was “privileged.” Zuluaga
requested the legal and factual basis for the
privilege the following month and, in January
2018, filed a motion to compel disclosure of
the incident report. Bashas’ filed a response
to the motion, and the court scheduled oral
argument for March 2013.

14 Meanwhile, in February, Zuluaga de-
posed Bashas’ employee, Martinez, as well as
the manager on duty during the incident,
Antonio Guerra. Martinez and Guerra both
asserted that Zuluaga had run or walked into
Martinez in the produce department, causing
the accident. Guerra had not witnessed the
incident, however, and he stated he did not
recall ever speaking to Martinez about it.
Instead, Guerra testified that he spoke to
Zuluaga’s father and mother and that he
generated the in-house report afterwards us-
ing the information provided by the parents,

{115 After the initial depositions, and fol-
lowing oral argument on Zuluaga’s motion to
compel, the trial court ordered Bashas’ to
provide it with a copy of the incident report
for an in camera inspection. In a subsequent.
order, the court noted that the report con-
tained a statement by Martinez about the
incident and that it was “unclear to the Court
that th{e statement] should be protected by
the work product privilege,” Before further
oral argument on the issue, Bashas’ disclosed
the entire document, In the report, Guerra
wrote that Martinez had “called him to the
floor area to explain what happened.” He
also stated in the report that Martinez “was

walking quickly to look for an item for a
customer and walked into the young girl and
she fell backwards to the floor.” When Zulua-
ga deposed Guerra again after the disclosure,
Guerra acknowledged that the report contra-
dicted his earlier statements.

116 During opening statements, Zuluaga’s
counsel highlighted the contradictory state-
ments and the manner in which the incident,
report was produced:

[Alfter they gave these under oath state-
ments, something really important hap-
pened in this case, And what you’re going
to hear is that after they gave these under
oath statements, an incident report sur-
faced. And the incident report that was
filled out the night that this happened is a
very important piece of evidence that
you're going to be shown in this case,

And we will ask you to compare what’s
in the incident report that the Food City
manager ... filled out the night that this
happened versus what they're going to tell
you here in court,

(Emphasis added.) Bashas’ did not object to
this statement,

117 On the third day of trial, Zuluaga read
the transcript of Guerra’s first deposition to
the jury. Before she read the second deposi-
tion transcript, however, Bashas’ counsel
raised the following objection:

[Mly concern is that the jury has already

been led through opening comments and

opening statement to believe that [the re-
port] suddenly surfaced, as if to say that it
was withheld or perhaps lost or they're
being left to speculate as to why it’s not
been produced.... But the delay related

to mostly practice communication... .

..» [Wle’ve been overruled on [whether
it was privileged], obviously it’s been pro-
duced and ... admitted ..., and the ju-
rors will be led to believe that it was
withheld, perhaps, wrongfully,

Bashas’ then requested an instruction to ex-
plain that “the basis for the delay had noth-
ing to do with some wrongful actions by
Bashas.” The court ordered the parties to
confer regarding a possible curative instruc-
tion, explaining that “when you say the re-
port surfaced, it does make it sound as

though it was lost or, worse yet, that it was
withheld.” The court gave the following i
struction at the close of Zuluaga’s case-in-
chief on the fifth day of trial:

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time I’m
going to give you one special instruc-
tion...

Members of the Jury, we have received
in evidence a copy of the [incident] report.
In the opening statement reference was
made to the timing of the production of
this report. And that it was important
since the report surfaced after ... Guerra
had been deposed once, but before he was
deposed a second time.

You are instructed that the timing of the
production of the ... report was the result.
of a ruling of the Court. You are not to
draw any negative inference with respect
to any party, as a result of the timing of
the production of the ... report.

HMMM «118 Opening statements “give
[the jurors] a general picture of the facts and
the situations, so that they will be able to
understand the evidence.” State v. Burruell,
98 Ariz. 37, 40, 401 P.2d 788, 785-86 (1965),
quoting State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120
P.2d 285, 318 (1941), To that end, parties
have “considerable latitude” in crafting their
opening. Id., quoting Erwin, 120 P.2d at 313;
see Ariz, R. Civ, P. 39(b). Of course, the trial
court also has “discretion in controlling the
conduct of a trial.” Rancho Pescado, Inc. v.
Nw, Mut, Life Ins. Co., 140 Ariz, 174, 188,
680 P.2d 1285, 1249 (App. 1984), And if mis-
conduct occurs during opening statements,
the court may sustain an objection, “admon-
ish the jury to disregard improper remarks
by counsel,” Higgins, 90 Ariz. at 69, 865 P.2d
at 486, or, if appropriate, order a mistrial,

5. The trial court’s denial of Zuluaga’s motion for
a new trial incorrectly states the instruction was
given “to the jury as part of the final instruc-
tions.”

6. Bashas’ asserts incorrectly that this new argu-
ment was first raised in Zuluaga’s opening brief.
In any event, we generally will not consider an
argument raised for the first time in a motion for
a new trial, Conant v. Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290,
293, 947 P.2d 864, 867 (App. 1997), or on ap-
peal, Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300,
878 P.2d 657, 658 (1994), because the trial court
and opposing counsel were not afforded an op-

211

Porterie v. Peters, 111 Ariz, 452, 458, 582
P.2d 514, 520 (1975). If the court elects to
give a curative instruction, however, it must
not “express[] ‘an opinion as to what the
evidence proves, in a way that interferes
‘with the jury’s independent evaluation of
that evidence,” State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557,
1949-51, 74 P.8d 281, 245 (2008), quoting
State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 129, 961
P.2d 1006, 1011 (1998); see Ariz. Const. art.
VI, § 27.

HH 1:19 In denying Zuluaga’s motion for
a new trial on this issue, the trial court
explained that it “was concerned that the use
of the term ‘surfaced’ ... unfairly implied
that [the report] had been lost or concealed
by [Bashas’].” The record below and on ap-
peal supports the court’s concern, When Ba-
shas’ first raised the issue during trial, Zu-
uaga responded that the timing of the report
was “very important ... because the report
contradicts many things that [Guerra] just
testified to.” But Zuluaga further stated that
“we don’t intend to [insinuate or argue] that
there was misconduct with respect to the
timing of the disclosure.” However, in the
motion for a new trial and in her opening
brief on appeal, Zuluaga took a far different
position.’ In the motion for a new trial, she
argued Bashas’ was “wrongfully withholding
Martinez’s statement” and its claim of work
product was “disingenuous.” And in her
opening brief, Zuluaga argues she “would
have been entitled to use much stronger
language to describe the late disclosure of
the [incident] report.” She maintains Bashas’
“eoncealed” the report and “engaged in a
long course of deceptive conduct when it
repeatedly misrepresented in disclosure and
discovery that it did not possess an incident
report or witness statements.” 7

portunity to address them below. But see Parra v.
Cont’ Tire N. Am., Inc., 222 Ariz. 212, 0.2, 213
P.3d 361, 363 n.2 (App. 2009) (considering new
arguments in motion for new trial because plain-
tiffs appealed from denial of new trial motion).

7. We refer to Zuluaga’s arguments only because
they appear to validate the trial court’s concern
that Zuluaga had used the term ‘surfaced’ to
“unfairly impl[y]” that Bashas’ wrongfully with-
held the incident report. But as Bashas’ points
out, Zuluaga never sought, much less obtained, a
court order sanctioning Bashas’ concerning the

212

{20 But even though Zuluaga did not ex-
press this position during trial, the court
interpreted counsel’s use of the term “sur-
faced” consistent with that position, and it
apparently determined the jury could have as
well. The court “had the unique opportunity
to hear the [opening statement], observe its
effect on the jury, and determine through
[its] observations that the trial had been
unfairly compromised.” Cal X-Tra .
W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C., 229 Ariz, 377,
192, 276 P.8d 11, 39 (App. 2012). As this
court pointed out in Cal X-Tra, “in contrast,
we have only a cold record, which does not
convey voice emphasis or inflection, or allow
us to observe the jury and its reactions.” Id,
We therefore cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion by giving the curative
instruction to address its concern that Zulua-
ga’s “use of the term ‘surfaced’ with respect
to the report unfairly implied that it had
been lost or concealed by [Bashas’].” See
Higgins, 90 Ariz, at 69, 865 P.2d at 486,

Hs 1121 Zuluaga also argues the cu-
rative instruction violated Arizona’s constitu-
tional prohibition against judges commenting
on the evidence. Our constitution directs that,
“(judges shall not charge juries with respect
to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but
shall declare the law.” Ariz, Const. art, VI,
§ 27, It is the jury’s burden alone to weigh
the credibility of witnesses and draw infer-
ences from the evidence presented at trial,
See Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics,
Lid., 198 Aviz, 283, 112, 9 P.8d 814, 318
(2000); Dietz v. Waller, 141 Ariz, 107, 111,
685 P.2d 744, 748 (1984), Zuluaga maintains
the trial court essentially instructed the jury
not to consider the basis and significance of
Guerra’s contradictory statements, which
“were a result of the timing of the production
of the [incident] report.” We disagree,

HE 122 “To violate Arizona’s constitu-
tional prohibition against commenting on the
evidence, the court must express an opinion
as to what the evidence proves” or “interfere
with the jury’s independent evaluation of that
evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz, 58,
129, 961 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1998). Here, the
trial court did neither. Zuluaga asserts cor-

production of the report, We therefore do not

yectly that she was entitled to inform the
jury that Guerra had given two contradictory
statements about the incident—one under
oath at his deposition and the other in the
incident report prepared within days of the
accident, But, as the court implicitly conclud-
ed, Zuluaga was not entitled to imply unfairly
that Bashas’ had concealed the existence of
the report, As we stated above, the curative
instruction addressed what the court per-
ceived as Zuluaga’s improper characteriza-
tion of how the report ultimately was pro-
duced. The instruction did not express an
opinion about Guerra’s contradictory state-
ments or interfere with the jury's ability to
evaluate that evidence independently. See id,

Disposition

128 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the judgment in favor of Bashas’.

394 P.3d 39
CIENA CAPITAL FUNDING, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v
KRIEG’S, INC., an Arizona corporation;
Dean G. Krieg and Mary Louise Krieg,
individually and as husband and wife;
Krieg Family Trust u/a/d 6/21/96, by and
through its trustees, Dean G. Krieg and
Mary Louise Krieg, Defendants/Appel-
lants.
No, 2 CA-CV 2016-0130

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed April 7, 2017

otherwise address the merits of the arguments.

14

nw

a

Minkin & Harnisch, PLLC, Phoenix, By
Andrew A. Harnisch and Jaclyn Foutz,
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Mesch Clark Rothschild, Tucson, By Gary
J, Cohen and David J. Hindman, Counsel for
Defendants/Appellants

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and
Judge Wright! concurred.

1. The Hon, Timothy M. Wright, the presiding
judge of the Gila County Superior Court, is au-
thorized and assigned to sit as a judge on the
Court of Appeals, Division Two, pursuant to Ari-
zona Supreme Court order filed March 1, 2017.

2. At that time, the lender was actually called
BLX Capital, LLC, but it later changed its name

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

11 Dean and Mary Krieg (individually and
as a marital community), Krieg’s, Inc, and
the Krieg Family Trust (collectively, “Guar-
antors”) appeal the trial court’s grant of par-
tial summary judgment for Ciena Capital
Funding, LLC (“Ciena”) as to liability for
breach of contract. They argue the court
should have granted their cross-motion for
summary judgment or, alternatively, genuine
issues of material fact prevented summary
judgment for Ciena. We affirm the court's
ruling subject to one modification as ex-
plained below.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 In September 2007, DI Safford, LLC
borrowed $1,128,500 from Ciena? in connec-
tion with the purchase of a hotel in Safford,
Arizona, and executed a loan agreement and
promissory note. As part of the transaction,
the Guarantors each signed materially identi-
cal agreements to guarantee DI Safford’s
obligations.

8 By the terms of the agreements, Guar-
antors “unconditionally, absolutely and irre-
vocably” guaranteed DI Safford’s obligations
and liabilities under the loan agreement, The
agreements also stated that Guarantors’ obli-
gations and liabilities were “direct and pri-
mary and not indirect or secondary.” Hach
guaranty further provided:

Guarantor hereby expressly agrees (i) that

the liabilities and obligations of Guarantor

under this Guaranty shall not in any way
be impaired or otherwise affected by the
institution by or against any Borrower or
any other person or entity of any bank-
ruptey, reorganization, insolvency or liqui-
dation proceedings, or any other similar
proceedings for relief under any bankrupt-
cy law or similar law for the relief of

to Ciena Capital Funding, LLC. The name
change did not alter any rights or obligations
related to this case.

3, DGMLK, LLC, which is not a party to this
action, also entered into an agreement guaran-
teeing DI Safford’s obligations.

debtors; (ii) that any discharge of any of
the obligations and/or liabilities hereby
guaranteed pursuant to any such bank-
ruptcy or similar law or other law shall not
diminish, discharge or otherwise affect in
any way the obligations of Guarantor un-
der this Guaranty; and (iii) that upon the
institution of any of the above actions such
obligations shall be enforceable against

Guarantor.

Guarantors also expressly waived “any de-
fense arising by virtue of any ... insolvency,
bankruptcy, ... liquidation or dissolution of,
or any cessation or limitation of liability from
any cause (other than full and irrevocable
payment and performance), of any Borrow-
er”

14 By late 2008, DI Safford was struggling
to make payments on its loan. By written
agreement that both parties signed in March
2009, DI Safford and Ciena agreed to reduce
the monthly payment amount due for March
through December 2009, DI Safford contin-
ued making payments at the reduced rate
until at least November 2011.

15 In March 2012, DI Safford and
DGMLK jointly filed for protection under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C, §§ 1101-1146, The joint plan
of reorganization delineated thirteen classes
of claims, two of which were pertinent to this
action. Class 4 provided that Ciena would
“be paid $50,000 in full satisfaction of its
claim” of a $1,128,500 deficiency against DI
Safford on the closing date, at which point
Ciena would no longer retain a lien interest
in the hotel property or any personal proper-
ty. Class 11 provided that Ciena’s guaranty
claim against DGMLK would be “satisfied in
full by DI Safford.” Ciena submitted a ballot
approving the Class 4 claim on September
20, 2012. On September 26, 2012, Ciena’s
counsel emailed DI Safford’s counsel to con-
firm they were “in agreement about the non-
release of the non-debtor guarantors.” DI
Safford’s counsel replied, “Yes we are in
agreement—the Plan does not release or
waive potential claims against the non-debtor

4. A Chapter 11 debtor may file a proposed plan
of reorganization organizing claims and interests
into discrete classes and recommending a resolu-
tion as to each class. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1121, 1123. Creditors whose claims are it

215

guarantors.” Notably, the Guarantors did not
participate in the bankruptcy, request relief
from the guaranties, or submit themselves to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The
same day, Ciena submitted a second ballot
that accepted the Class 11 claim, subject to
counsel’s agreement that “[t]he plan and the
Class 11 treatment do not attempt to dis-
charge the debt of the non-debtor guaran-
tors.” The bankruptey court later confirmed
the reorganization plan.

16 Ciena brought this action against Guar-
antors after bankruptcy confirmation, alleg-
ing breach of contract, enforcement of guar-
antees, and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Guarantors were
represented by the same attorney who had
represented DI Safford during the bankrupt-
ey proceedings and who made the represen-
tation concerning the reorganization plan
having no effect on Guarantors’ obligations.
Ciena filed a motion for summary judgment
on its breach of contract claim, and Guaran-
tors filed a cross-motion for summary judg-
ment on all claims, Following argument, the
trial court issued an under-advisement ruling
granting Ciena’s motion for partial summary
judgment in part, and denying Guarantors’
motion for summary judgment. The court
held Guarantors were liable to Ciena for
breach of contract, but did not decide the
issues of damages or attorney fees. The court
certified its judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b),
Ariz, R. Civ. P.

Jurisdiction

HM S17 This court has an independent
duty to consider whether we have jurisdiction
over an appeal. Ghadimi v. Soraya, 280 Ariz.
621, 17, 285 P.8d 969, 970 (App. 2012). Our
jurisdiction is purely statutory. See id. Al-
though in general only final judgments are
appealable, id., A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) pro-
vides an express exception to the general
rule, permitting an appeal from “an interloc-
utory judgment that determines the rights of
the parties and directs an accounting or oth-

paired under the plan vote on the plan by ballot,
see 11 U.S.C, § 1126; Fed. R, Bankr. P. 3018(c),
and then the bankruptcy court conducts a hear-
ing to determine whether to confirm the plan, 11
U.S.C. § 1128.

216

er proceeding to determine the amount of
recovery.” A grant of summary judgment in
favor of a plaintiff as to liability is appealable
under this paragraph, provided that it is
signed, it contains express language indicat-
ing finality, it determines the rights of the
parties on liability, and it determines that the
amount of recovery is the only remaining
question to be resolved. Cook v. Cook, 26
Ariz.App. 163, 168, 547 P.2d 15, 20 (1976); see
also Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 11 23, 26-
28, 80 P.8d 269, 274, 275 (2008) (approving
Cook and adding that Rule 54(b) certification
sufficient to establish final determination of
parties’ rights), The trial court’s summary
judgment ruling in the present case meets
each of these requirements; therefore, we
have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-
120,21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(6).

Choice of Law

HM 18 As an initial matter, Ciena ar-
gues New York law governs this dispute,
while Guarantors maintain Arizona law ap-
plies. The trial court did not expressly decide
which law applied, making only a general
reference to its reliance on “the cited case
law” from the cross-motions for summary
judgment, which included cases from both
Arizona and New York, We review choice-of-
law issues de novo. Pounders v, Hnserch
E&C, Inc., 282 Ariz, 352, 16, 806 P.8d 9, 11
(2018).

19 Each guaranty agreement contains this
choice-of-law provision:

[T]his Guaranty shall be governed, at the

Lender’s option by: (A) the laws of the

state of New York, or (B) if guarantor

resides or is organized in a state other
than New York or if collateral has been
pledged to secure the obligations guaran-
teed herein, then by the laws of the state
or states where such collateral is located,
or the state of the guarantor’s residence or
organization,

It is undisputed that the collateral hotel is

located in Arizona,

110 In its amended complaint, Ciena as-
serted, “The Guarantees ... are governed by
the laws of the state of New York or, alterna-
tively, the laws of the state of Arizona,”
Ciena also cited certain Arizona attorney fees

statutes in support of its fee request in the
amended complaint. Then, in its motion for
partial summary judgment, which was the
first substantive motion filed in the case,
Ciena stated, “The GuarantfiJes are governed
by New York law.”

HM s1111 As the forum state, the law of
Arizona governs procedural matters as well
as the choice of substantive law. Jd. 18.
Arizona follows the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws (1971) (“Restatement”) to
determine which state’s law applies in an
action arising out of contract. Cardon v. Cot-
ton Lane Holdings, Inc., 178 Ariz. 208, 207,
841 P.2d 198, 202 (1992), An express choice-
of-law provision in a contract ordinarily will
be given effect, subject to certain inapposite
exceptions, See id. at 208, 841 P.2d at 203;
see also Societe Jean Nicolas Ht Fils v.
Mousseus, 128 Aviz, 59, 61, 597 P.2d 641, 548
(1979) (contractual choice-of-law clause en-
tered into without fraud or unfair bargaining
will be enforced, so long as it is reasonable at
time of litigation and does not deprive liti-
gant of day in court), Absent a “contrary
indication of intention,” a choice-of-law provi-
sion’s reference to the law of a state means
that state’s “local law,” rather than its whole
“law” including its choice-of-law rules. Re-
statement §§ 186, emt, b; 187 emt. h.

912 The parties agree that the choice-of-
Jaw clause in the guaranty agreements is
enforceable, Guarantors argue that Ciena ex-
ercised its option under the clause, selecting
Avizona law to govern this dispute in its
amended complaint, notwithstanding its clear
statement later in its motion for partial sum-
mary judgment that New York law applies.
Guarantors offer two arguments in support
of their position, but we do not find them
persuasive,

I 118 First, Guarantors maintain that
Ciena selected Arizona law by citing certain
Arizona attorney fees statutes in its amended
complaint, However, these citations are not
inconsistent with Ciena’s ultimate selection of
New York law as controlling. Assuming for
the sake of argument that Ciena selected
New York law to apply, the forum would
adopt New York law concerning whether is-
sues are classified as substantive or proce-

dural. Restatement § 7 emt. d & illus. 2 “A
concept should be classified in the way it is
classified in the body of law which the court
is applying.”); see, e.g., OLeary v. Ill, Termi-
nal R.R, Co., 299 8.W.2d 878, 877 (Mo. 1957)
(Missouri court applying Illinois law would
adopt Illinois case law determination of
whether issue of burden of proof on contribu-
tory negligence was substantive or procedur-
al). New York regards the issue of attorney
fees as procedural for choice-of-law purposes.
See, e.g., Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund ew
rel. Goldman Sachs Grp, Inc. v, Blankfein,
34 Mise.8d 456, 981 N.Y.S.2d 885, 840 (Sup.
Ct, 2011), And the local law of the forum
governs procedural matters, Pownders, 232
Ariz, 352, 18, 306 P.8d at 11, Therefore,
Ciena’s citation of Arizona attorney fees stat-
utes is consistent with its later selection of
New York law to govern the guaranties.

114 Second, Guarantors argue Ciena se-
lected Arizona law by including in its amend-
ed complaint a separate claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Citing Harris v. Provident Life &

Accident Ins. Co., 810 F.8d 78, 81 @d Cir.
2002), and Hall v. HarthLink Network, Inc.,
896 F.3d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 2005), Guarantors
assert that under New York law, this is not a
claim for which relief can be granted if there
is also a breach of contract claim with the
same factual basis, Even assuming (without
deciding) that this is a correct statement of
New York law, it would not follow that Ciena
selected Arizona law in its amended com-
plaint.> At most, it would mean that Ciena’s
claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing should be dis-
missed in light of its later selection of New
York law. Cf Kenerson v, Stevenson, 621
F.Supp. 1179, 1180-81 (D. Me. 1985) (Maine
federal district court, applying New Hamp-
8. Indeed, the amended complaint expressly left

open the question of the applicable law, stating,

“[T]he laws of the state of New York or, alterna-
tively, the laws of the state of Arizona” control.

6. At oral argument, Guarantors’ counsel argued
Guarantors were prejudiced by not knowing
which law would control during the eleven-
month period between Ciena’s complaint and its
motion for summary judgment, But Ciena’s mo-
tion for summary judgment was the first substan-
tive motion filed in the case, and Guarantors did
not file a motion seeking clarification as to the

217

shire law, determined whether plaintiff failed
to state claim for exemplary damages by
reference to New Hampshire substantive
damages law).

915 Ciena’s statement in its motion for
partial summary judgment that “(t]he Guar-
ant[iJes are governed by New York law” was
a valid and unambiguous exercise of its con-
tractual option to select the applicable law,
and did not contradict any earlier position it
had taken in the amended complaint. Ciena’s
election is reasonable and does not deny
Guarantors their day in court. We apply
New York law.

Partial Summary Judgment
as to Liability

HM {116 Guarantors contend the trial
court erred by denying their motion for sum-
mary judgment’ and instead granting in part
Ciena’s motion for partial summary judg-
ment, Summary judgment is appropriate if
“there is no genuine dispute as to any mate-
rial fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz, R, Civ. P.
56(a). Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the party against whom sum-
mary judgment was entered, we determine
de novo whether any genuine dispute of ma-
terial fact exists and whether the trial court
applied the law correctly. In re Estate of
Olson, 223 Aviz, 441, 111, 224 P.8d 988, 941
(App, 2010); see also Target Corp. v. Prestige
Maint, USA, Ltd, 851 P.8d 498, 1118-19
(Colo. App. 2018) (forum court will use its
own standards of appellate review even if
applying another jurisdiction’s substantive
law), citing Restatement § 122 emt. a,

Hs .17 “On a motion for summary
judgment to enforce a written guaranty, all

applicable law at any point. Guarantors have not
shown prejudice from Ciena’s first election of
New York law in its motion for summary judg-
ment,

7. A denial of summary judgment is generally not
an appealable order. See, e.g,, Hourani v. Benson
Hosp., 211 Ariz, 427, 14, 122 P.3d 6, 9 (App.
2005), However, we need not determine whether
we have jurisdiction over this aspect of Guaran-
tors’ appeal because, as discussed below, the trial
court properly granted partial summary judg-
ment to Ciena,

218

that the creditor need prove is an absolute
and unconditional guaranty, the underlying
debt, and the guarantor’s failure to perform
under the guaranty.” City of New York v.
Clarose Cinema Corp., 256 A.D.2d 69, 681
N.Y.S.2d 251, 258 (1998), As with other con-
tracts, the court will interpret guaranty
agreements to reflect the parties’ intentions.
CIT Group/Credit Fin, Inc. v. Weinstein,
261 AD.2d 208, 690 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36-87
(1999).

918 Guarantors argue that because the
reorganization plan described DI Safford’s
payment of $50,000 to Ciena as a “full satis-
faction” of Ciena’s Class 4 deficiency claim
against DI Safford, the payment completely
extinguished DI Safford’s debt and left noth-
ing for Guarantors to continue to guarantee
as a matter of law. They attempt to draw a
distinction between “satisfaction” of a claim
on the one hand, and mere “release,” “waiv-
er,” “modification,” or “discharge” of a claim
on the other. They cite no New York cases
supporting such a distinction. The trial court
found this argument “unpersuasive and un-
supported by law,” particularly in light of
trial counsel’s September 26, 2012 email and
the recital on the September 26, 2012 ballot
which both confirmed that the plan would not
affect the liability of any of DI Safford’s
guarantors who, unlike DGMLK, were not
parties to the bankruptcy action. The Guar-
antors in the instant appeal were not parties
to the bankruptcy action.

919 Guarantors fail to explain how they
can assert this defense when, in the guaranty
agreements, they expressly waived “any de-
fense arising by virtue of any ... bankruptcy

. or any cessation or limitation of liability
from any cause (other than full and irrevoca-
ble payment and performance), of any Bor-
rower” (emphasis added), But even if the
defense were not waived, it is firmly rejected
by New York law. See, eg., U.S, Bank Natt
Ass’n v. Perlmutter (In ve South Side House,

8, Guarantors do not address these cases in their
reply brief, instead limiting their argument to
Arizona case law they contend is controlling.

9. Guarantors argue courts generally construe
guaranty agreements to limit guarantors’ liabili-
ty, and resolve ambiguities in those agreements
against the drafter, But both of these principles

LLC), 470 B.R. 659, 678, 676 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A debtor's bankruptcy case
does not relieve a guarantor of its liability
under the guaranty.”); Union Tr. Co. of
Rochester v. Willsea, 275 N.Y. 164, 9 N.E.2d
820, 820-21 (1987) (even if creditor’s accep-
tance of stock incident to debtor’s bankrupt-
cy reorganization plan extinguished debtor's
obligation, it “did not, in any way, affect the
independent guaranty agreement” between
creditor and guarantor); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(e) (“discharge of a debt of the debtor”
under bankruptcy law “does not affect the
liability of any other entity ... for[] such
debt”)8

120 Guarantors’ argument is also at odds
with other language in the guaranty agree-
ments, The guaranties provide that Guaran-
tors’ obligations are “direct and primary and
not indirect or secondary,” and are “absolute,
independent, unconditional, and irrevocable.”
The parties expressly agreed that “any dis-
charge” of any of DI Safford’s liabilities or
obligations pursuant to bankruptey law would
“not diminish, discharge or otherwise affect
in any way the obligations of Guarantor[s],”
and that the Guarantors’ obligations would
be enforceable in full “upon the institution
of’ bankruptcy proceedings by DI Safford.
Guarantors further agreed they would not be
released until the $1,128,500 loan, specified in
the written loan agreement, was “paid in
full.” New York courts have affirmed sum-
mary judgment for a creditor against a guar-
antor where the guaranty agreement con-
tained similarly clear language contemplating
that the relevant obligations of the guarantor
would survive the debtor’s bankruptcy. See,
@g., Weinstein, 690 N.Y.8.2d at 86-37 (noting
such case was especially appropriate for sum-
mary judgment because intent of parties was
clear from face of agreement)? The trial
court correctly determined Guarantors are
liable to Ciena for breach of contract as a
matter of law.

are used to help interpret ambiguous guaranties.
See Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 499
NY,S.2d 381, 489 N.B.2d 1283, 1284 (1985);
Raven Elevator Corp. v. Finkelstein, 223 A.D.2d
378, 636 N.Y.8.2d 292, 293 (1996). The agree-
ments at issue here reflect the parties’ intent with
clear and unambiguous language.

Factual Dispute Regarding
Date of Breach

HMM 1121 In the alternative, Guarantors
argue the trial court erred in determining
there was no genuine dispute as to the date
they breached the guaranty agreements, Af-
ter granting partial summary judgment for
Ciena on the issue of liability, the court found
“for purposes of liability of all [Guarantors]
with respect to [breach of contract], the de-
fault occurred on February 1, 2010.” Guaran-
tors dispute that finding, pointing out they
attached to their motion for summary judg-
ment an affidavit from Guarantor and appel-
lant Mary Krieg, who was also formerly a
principal of DI Safford. In the affidavit, Ms.
Krieg avowed it was her understanding that
Ciena had orally agreed to accept reduced
monthly loan payments from DI Safford for
an undefined period beyond the end of 2009,
and Ciena had in fact accepted such pay-
ments through November 2011, without ob-
jection.

HM 1122 Ciena argues the affidavit was
insufficient to raise an issue of fact because
guaranty agreements fall within New York’s
statute of frauds and may not be orally modi-
fied. See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(2);
see also Joseph R. Awad & Co. v. Pillsbury
Mills, Inc, 9 A.D.2d 870, 193 N.Y.S.2d 306,
807 (1959) (per curiam) (substantial modifica-
tion of agreement required to be in writing
must itself be in writing). But Ms. Krieg did
not avow that the guaranty agreements were
orally modified, only that the lender agree-
ment between Ciena and DI Safford was.
New York’s statute of frauds does not man-
date that the contract between Ciena and DI
Safford, or modifications thereto, be in writ-
ing, See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701 (a); see
also Rosbach v, Indus. Trading Co, 81
F.Supp.2d 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ($80,-
000 loan contract not within New York stat-
ute of frauds because capable of being per-
formed within one year). Oral modifications
to that contract were not barred by law.

10, Even though the loan agreement between DI
Safford and Ciena by its terms purported to
forbid any alteration or amendment thereto with-
out a signed writing, New York law allows for
oral modification of a contract even if it contains
such a provision, See Estate of Kingston v. King-

219

HN 1.28 Furthermore, under New York
law, “[mJodifications of written contracts may
be proved circumstantially by the conduct of
the parties subsequent to the agreement.”
Chase v. Skoy, 146 A.D.2d 568, 586 N.Y.S.2d
512, 518 (1989). Ciena’s acceptance of pay-
ments from DI Safford until at least Novem-
ber 2011 without objection is arguably incon-
sistent with a default date of February 1,
2010. Cf B. Reitman Blacktop, Inc. v. Mis-
sirlian, 52 A.D.8d 752, 860 N.Y.S.2d 211,
212-13 (2008) (defendant waived right of
written modification contained in written con-
tract where parties’ conduct demonstrated
mutual departure from written agreement).
The trial court erred in determining there
‘was no genuine issue of fact as to the date
that DI Safford breached the loan agree-
ment,

124 This error, however, was irrelevant
because liability for breach of contract was
the only issue on which the trial court grant-
ed summary judgment. To prove liability,
Ciena only needed to show the fact of de-
fault, not the exact date of default. See Cla-
rose Cinema Corp., 681 N.Y.S.2d at 258, It is
undisputed that “the commencement of any
proceeding under any bankruptcy ... laws
by ... [DI Safford]” was an “Event of De-
fault” under the terms of the loan agreement.
It is also undisputed that DI Safford com-
menced bankruptcy proceedings under feder-
al bankruptcy law in March 2012. Thus, there
is no dispute that DI Safford defaulted; at
the latest, it did so when it filed a petition in
bankruptcy court. See First Nationwide
Bank v. Brookhaven Realty Assocs., 223
AD.2d 618, 687 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1996)
(bankruptcy default clause enforceable).
Summary judgment was therefore proper as
to liability.

125 The fact dispute is only material to
the issue of damages, on which the trial court
explicitly did not rule. Accordingly, we vacate
the court’s finding of a date of default,!! and

ston Farms P’ship, 13 N.Y.S.3d 748, 750, 130
A.D.3d 1464 (App. Div, 2015).

11. Our vacatur order should not be read to pre-
vent the trier of fact from determining that Feb-
ruary 1, 2010, was the date of default, if that is

220

so modified, we affirm the court's ruling. We
revest jurisdiction in the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings to resolve the issue of dam-
ages for breach of contract and any other
outstanding issues in the case.

Disposition
126 We affirm the judgment of the trial
court as modified in this decision. Both Ciena
and Guarantors request their attorney fees
and costs on appeal, citing A.R.S, § 12
841,01, but because the case is still ongoing
before the trial court, in our discretion we

what the evidence shows in further proceedings

decline the requests without prejudice for the
parties to request appellate attorney fees at
the conclusion of the case. See Chapman v.
The Westerner, 220 Ariz, 52, 115, 202 P.3d
517, 521 (App. 2008).

upon remand,

394 P.3d 646

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Anthony Benard PRIMOUS, Appellant.
No. CR-16-0205-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona,
Filed May 28, 2017

222

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Joseph T.
Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals
Section, Robert A. Walsh (argued), Assistant.
Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for
State of Arizona

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office,
Carlos Daniel Carrion (argued), Deputy Pub-
lic Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Anthony
Benard Primous

David J. Euchner, Pima County Public
Defender’s Office, Tucson, Josephine Bidwill,
The Bidwell Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix,
Kathleen E, Brody (argued), American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation of Arizona,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Arizona
Attorneys for Criminal Justice and American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Arizona

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL
and BERCH (RETIRED), and JUDGES
MILLER and MACKEY joined.

JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court:

11 We consider whether police can form a
reasonable suspicion that an individual is en-
gaged in criminal activity and is armed and
dangerous, thus justifying a pat-down search,
based merely on where they encounter the
individual (e.g., a “high-crime neighborhood”)
and a companion’s flight. Viewing the totality
of the circumstances, we hold that the police
here did not have an individualized reason-
able suspicion sufficient to justify the pat-
down search of Anthony Benard Primous;
therefore, the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence found in the
search,

* Justices Ann A. Scott Timmer, Andrew W. Gould,
and John R, Lopez IV recused themselves. Pursu-
ant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitu-

tion, the Honorable Rebecca White Berch, Jus-
tice of the Arizona Supreme Court (Retired), the

I, BACKGROUND

{2 One February morning, five Phoenix
police officers went to an apartment complex
in a high-crime neighborhood, They were
looking for a suspect with an outstanding
warrant who they believed carried and sold
‘weapons,

18 Officers Ohland and Casillas ap-
proached four men who were talking outside
the apartment complex, which had external
surveillance cameras, Two were standing and
two were seated, including Primous, who
held an infant on his lap. None of the men
were the suspect,

14 Ohland and Casillas identified them-
selves as police officers and asked the men
how they were doing. Both officers thought
one of the men appeared nervous. When that
person noticed three other officers approach-
ing, he ran and was chased by those officers.
The other men remained and made no sud-
den moves. Primous remained seated with
the infant on his lap. He did not appear
nervous or to have a weapon.

15 Ohland and Casillas announced they
were going to pat down the men for weapons.
Before the frisk commenced, one of the men
handed Ohland a baggie of marijuana. Oh-
land then patted down all three men, The
search revealed no weapons, but Ohland felt
an object in Primous’s pocket, which turned
out to also be a baggie of marijuana.

16 Primous was charged with misdemean-
or marijuana possession. He moved to sup-
press the marijuana as the product of an
unlawful search. After an evidentiary hear-
ing, the trial court concluded the “officers
had a reasonable suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity may be afoot” and “appropriately de-
cided to perform a pat-down search for offi-
cer safety.” Assessing the “totality of the
circumstances,” the court noted “the conduct
of the one individual who ran, coupled with
the reason for [the officers’] encounter with
the group, the dangerousness of the area, the
number of individuals remaining compared to
the number of officers, and the cameras.”

Honorable Michael O. Miller, Judge of the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals, Division Two, and the
Honorable David L, Mackey, Presiding Judge of
the Yavapai County Superior Court, are designat-
ed to sit in this matter.

Based on those factors, the trial court denied
the motion. Primous was convicted following
a bench trial and placed on one year of
unsupervised probation.

7 The court of appeals affirmed. The
court applied a two-step analysis to assess
the propriety of the frisk: whether officers
reasonably suspected that the person who
‘was searched (1) was committing or had com-
mitted an offense and (2) was armed and
dangerous. State v. Primous, 289 Ariz, 394,
896 19, 872 P.8d 338, 340 (App. 2016) (citing
Arizona v, Johnson, 555 U.S. 828, 826-27,
129 S.Ct, 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). As to
the second prong, the court considered
“whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in
the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)),

18 The court of appeals framed the issue
as “whether the suggestion of wrongdoing
created by Defendant’s companions justified
a frisk of Defendant, who remained seated
and gave no indication of complicity in either
the flight or the drug possession.” Jd. 111.
The court concluded that “[clompanionship
with a suspected criminal may, in view of the
totality of the cireumstances, justify a protec-
tive stop and frisk even absent a particular-
ized reasonable suspicion that the person to
be searched is committing or has committed
a crime.” Id, at 897 118, 872 P.8d at 341,
Based on the facts identified by the trial
court, the court of appeals determined that
the frisk was justified and affirmed the trial
court’s ruling, Jd. at 397-98 1114-15, 372
P.8d at 341-42,

19 We granted review because identifying
the circumstances that may justify a pat-
down search involves recurring legal issues
of statewide importance, We have jurisdiction
under article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24,

IL DISCUSSION

HMM 110 We review rulings on motions
to suppress for abuse of discretion, consider-
ing only the evidence presented at the sup-
pression hearing and viewing it in the light
most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s

223

ruling. State v, Butler, 282 Ariz. 84, 87 18,
302 P.8d 609, 612 (2018). “An error of law
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Bernstein, 287 Aviz, 226, 228 19, 349 P.8d
200, 202 (2015). We review the constitutional-
ity of the frisk de novo. See State v, Hava-
tone, 241 Ariz, 506, 509 9111, 389 P.8d 1251,
1254 (2017).

A. The Frisk

HM 111 Although a frisk is less intrusive
than a full-body search, the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits any search of an individual
unless the police have a reasonable belief
that crime is afoot and the individual is
armed and dangerous, The controlling Ari-
zona case is State v. Serna, 285 Ariz. 270, 881
P.8d 405 (2014), which neither the State nor
the court of appeals cited. There this Court
held that in the context of a consensual en-
counter, “an officer may frisk an individual
only when the officer possesses both a rea-
sonable suspicion that the person to be
searched has engaged or is about to engage
in criminal activity and a reasonable belief
that the person is armed and dangerous.” Jd.
at 276 128, 381 P.8d at 411 (emphasis add-
ed). Reasonable suspicion in turn requires “a
particularized and objective basis” for the
suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 184 L.Ed.2d 911
(1996).

112 In Serna, police were patrolling a
known gang neighborhood at night and en-
countered a man and woman standing in the
middle of the street. 285 Ariz. at 271 12, 381
P.8d at 406. As the patrol car approached,
the duo walked in opposite directions, and
the officers engaged defendant Serna in a
consensual encounter. Jd. He was polite and
cooperative, Id. at 272 18, 831 P.8d at 407.
The officers noticed a bulge in his waistband,
which Serna disclosed was a gun. Jd, The
officers removed the gun and patted him
down. Id, In response to the officers’ subse-
quent questioning, Serna admitted that he
had a felony conviction. Id. This Court re-
versed the trial court’s denial of Serna’s mo-
tion to suppress the gun in a prosecution for
prohibited possession of a firearm by a con-
vieted felon. Id. at 272 114, 277 180, 881 P.8d
at 407, 412. Because there was no reasonable

224,

suspicion that Serna was engaged in criminal
activity, we concluded that “the mere pres-
ence of a weapon does not afford officers
constitutional permission to search weapons-
carrying individuals. To conclude otherwise
would potentially subject countless law-abid-
ing citizens to pat-downs solely for exercising
their right to carry a firearm.” Id, at 275
1 23, 331 P.3d at 410,

Hl 118 The State seemingly agrees that
nothing Primous did or said gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in
criminal activity or was armed or dangerous.
He was not the suspect police were seeking.
When police approached, he was seated with
an infant on his lap, talking with three other
men, He did not react in a suspicious manner
to the police encounter or when one of the
other men ran away. He was cooperative. In
sum, Primous gave the police no justification
to search him. Any other justification could
only have arisen from the surrounding cir-
cumstances,

14 In approving the frisk, the trial court
relied on five circumstances, the “totality” of
which it considered to give rise to reasonable
suspicion that “crime was afoot”: (1) the indi-
vidual who ran, (2) the reason for the police
encounter with the group, (8) the dangerous-
ness of the area, (4) the number of individu-
als remaining at the scene compared to the
number of officers, and (5) the surveillance
cameras. From these same circumstances,
the court of appeals concluded “we cannot
say that [the officer] unreasonably suspected
that Defendant might be armed and danger-
ous.” Primous, 289 Ariz, at 897 114, 372 P.38d
at 841. We disagree,

Hl 115 What is striking about the five
factors relied upon by the courts below is
that Primous had control over none of them.
Although “[t]he officer need not be absolute-
ly certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or others was in dan-
ger.” Terry, 892 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
The ultimate inquiry is whether police have
reasonable suspicion that the person
searched was either engaged in criminal ac-
tivity or armed and dangerous, Serna, 235
Ariz, at 276 128, 881 P.8d at 411, The sur-

rounding circumstances here do not suffi-
ciently suggest that Primous was engaged in
crime or that he was armed and dangerous to
justify a pat-down for weapons.

16 The court of appeals justified the frisk
largely on Primous’s fleeing companion, hold-
ing that “[clompanionship with a suspected
criminal may, in view of the totality of the
circumstances, justify a protective stop and
frisk even absent a particularized reasonable
suspicion that the person to be searched is
committing or has committed a crime.” Pri-
mous, 239 Ariz, at 397 118, 372 P.8d at 341
(citing Trice v. United States, 849 A.2d 1002,
1004, 1008-09 (D.C.App. 2004); United States
», Flett, 806 F.2d 828, 827-28 (8th Cir.1986)).
Thus, “[dlespite Defendant’s passivity and
the absence of any objective evidence of
criminal collusion with his companions,” the
court of appeals could not “say that [Officer]
Ohland unreasonably suspected that Defen-
dant might be armed and dangerous.” Id.
114,

117 The court of appeals’ analysis under-
states the personalized and particularized
showing required by the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis of the United States Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence shows that more is
required than appears here. In Yoarra v.
Illinois, 444 US. 85, 100 S.Ct. 388, 62
L.Ed.2d 288 (1979), for example, a search
warrant was executed for a bar and bartend-
er suspected of selling heroin. The police
frisked all of the bar's patrons for weapons,
finding heroin in defendant Ybarra’s pocket.
Id, at 88-89, 100 S.Ct. 388,

Upon entering the tavern, the police did
not recognize Ybarra and had no reason to
believe that he had committed, was com-
mitting, or was about to commit any of-
fense under state or federal law. Ybarra
made no gestures indicative of criminal
conduct, made no movements that might
suggest an attempt to conceal contraband,
and said nothing of a suspicious nature to
the police officers. In short, the agents
new nothing in particular about Ybarra,
except that he was present, along with
several other customers, in a public tavern
at a time when the police had reason to

believe that the bartender would have her-

oin for sale,

Id. at 90-91, 100 S.Ct. 888, The Court con-
cluded that “a person’s mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal
activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person.” Id, at
91, 100 S.Ct, 338.

{18 Moreover, the police “neither recog-
nized [Ybarra] as a person with criminal
history nor had any particular reason to be-
lieve that he might be inclined to assault
them.” Jd. at 98, 100 S.Ct. 888. His “hands
were empty” and he “gave no indication of
possessing a weapon, made no gestures or
other actions indicative of an intent to com-
mit an assault, and acted generally in a man-
ner that was not threatening.” Id, The Court
thus concluded that the frisk “was simply not
supported by a reasonable belief that he was
armed and presently dangerous, a belief
which this Court has invariably held must
form the predicate for a pat-down of a person
for weapons,” Id, at 92-98, 100 S.Ct. 338,

719 As in Ybarra, the facts surrounding
the police encounter with Primous did not
generate the requisite personalized and par-
ticularized reasonable suspicion that he was
engaged in crime or was presently armed
and dangerous, The encounter took place in
broad daylight. None of the men were the
suspect who occasioned the police presence.
Once one of the men fled, the remaining men,
including Primous who was seated with an
infant on his lap, exhibited no hostile, furtive,
or even uncooperative behavior. Primous had
been talking with the man who ran, but that
mere proximity or companionship did not
suggest Primous was engaged in criminal
activity or dangerous. The surveillance cam-
eras could have been intended to protect
apartment dwellers against crime rather
than the police, and in any event did not
suggest Primous was dangerous. In sum,
nothing about the environment gave rise to a
reasonable suspicion that Primous was in-
volved in a crime, much less that he was
armed and dangerous to police officers.

120 Nor were Primous and his companions
acting in concert in such a way as to give rise
to a reasonable suspicion that they all were
engaged in a criminal activity and might be

225

armed and dangerous. See Flett, 806 F.2d at
828 (holding that frisk was appropriate
where subject of arrest was an “enforcer” for
a violent gang and companion was dressed in
gang attire and identified as a member); of
Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997,
1008-04 (8th Cir.2012) (arrest appropriate
where the “group was acting as a unit” and
“the group, as a whole, was committing one
or more offenses”), Here, Primous and his
companions were engaged in no apparent
concerted action other than conversation.

721 Cases relied upon by the court of
appeals or the State are either distinguish-
able or overtaken by Ybarra. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v, Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1198
(9th Cir.1971) (pre-Ybarra case allowing frisk
of a criminal’s companion at time of arrest);
United States v, Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 500-02
(6th Cir.1985) (holding search was permissi-
ble where car containing defendant was driv-
en by a person suspected of being armed and
dangerous, defendant generally matched de-
scription of criminal accomplice, defendant
‘was uncooperative, and there was risk to
bystanders in the crowded parking lot); Flett,
806 F.2d at 828 (focusing “not [on] whether
the officer had an indication that the person
armed was dangerous, but rather, whether
the officer reasonably perceived the subject
of the frisk as potentially dangerous”); Trice,
849 A.2d at 1008 (noting that defendant “ap-
peared to be the companion of a potentially
violent, fleeing criminal and not a mere by-
stander”), Reaffirming and applying the clear
two-part test set forth in Serna, we conclude
that the facts here were insufficient to sup-
port a reasonable suspicion that Primous was
involved in a crime and was armed and dan-
gerous. Thus, unsupported by reasonable
suspicion, the frisk of Primous violated the
Fourth Amendment.

122 The amici who support Primous ask
us to categorically exclude the dangerousness
of the surroundings from an officer’s calculus
“unless officers can point to a specific attrib-
ute of the neighborhood relevant to the par-
ticular person and criminal activity under
investigation,” on the grounds that such fac-
tors are a proxy for race. We decline to do
80,

226

HI 128 Although the fact that the en-
counter occurred in a dangerous neighbor-
hood does not by itself authorize police to pat
down people they encounter during an inves-
tigation, it is not irrelevant in determining
whether an individual suspect is involved in
criminal activity and armed and dangerous.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120
S.Ct. 678, 145 L.Ed,2d 570 (2000), the United
States Supreme Court sustained a frisk by
police officers who were patrolling an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking where
the defendant fled upon seeing the officers.
The Court held that “the fact that the stop
occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry
analysis,” but observed that “[a]n individual's
presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to
support a reasonable, particularized suspicion
that the person is committing a crime.” Id. at
124, 120 S.Ct. 678.

124 In Wardlow, ample suspicion that the
defendant was engaged in criminal activity
and was armed and dangerous arose not only
from his presence in a high-crime area, but
also “his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police.” Id. By contrast, here the question is
whether reasonable suspicion justified frisk-
ing Primous not because of anything he did
or said but because someone else with whom
he was conversing fled when police ap-
proached, while Primous remained seated
and cooperative, The fact that the encounter
occurred in a high-crime neighborhood was
insufficient to justify the search of an individ-
ual who gave no indication that he was in-
volved in a crime or posed an imminent
threat to the officers, The Fourth Amend-
ment shields such individuals from pat-downs
regardless of their neighborhood. This rule
amply protects law-abiding residents of high-
crime neighborhoods from being searched
solely because of their surroundings.

B. Motion to Suppress

HM 125 The State also argues that the
marijuana baggie illegally seized from Pri-
mous should not be suppressed as evidence
because there would be no deterrent value
given that police officers will take whatever
steps they deem necessary to protect their

safety. See, eg., Ybarra, 444 U.S, at 108, 100
S.Ct. 888 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observ-
ing that excluding evidence will have little
deterrent effect where frisk is based “on an
officer’s well-honed sense of self-preserva-
tion”), We find the argument unpersuasive,
Suppressing the illegally seized evidence
here helps ensure that frisks are based upon
the legitimate factors outlined above and do
not devolve into a de facto policy of frisking
all individuals with whom police have investi-
gative encounters in high-crime neighbor-
hoods. Cf Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
185, 144, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496
(2009) (exclusionary law serves to deter “re-
curring or systemic” negligence). “While we
understand the need for police officers to
protect themselves in the course of their
duties, we must balance that weighty interest
against the ‘inestimable right’ of citizens to
be free from unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures.” Serna, 285 Ariz, at
276 129, 881 P.8d at 411 (citing Terry, 392
US. at 8-9, 88 S.Ct. 1868),

Ill, CONCLUSION
126 Because the sole evidence supporting
Primous’s conviction was the product of an
illegal search, we vacate the court of appeals’
opinion and reverse Primous’s conviction and
probationary term.

394 P.3d 651

Thomas HORNE, individually and Thomas
Horne for Attorney General Committee
(SOS Filer ID 2010 00003); Kathleen
Winn, individually, and Business Lead-
ers of Arizona (SOS Filer ID 2010 00375),
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

ve.
Sheila Sullivan POLK, Yavapai County
Attorney, Defendant/Appellee.

No. CV-16-0052-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed May 25, 2017

be
nN

228

Dennis I, Wilenchik (argued), Wilenchik &
Bartness, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Thom-
as Horne and Tom Horne for Attorney Gen-
eral Committee; Timothy A, La Sota (ar-
gued), Timothy A. La Sota, PLC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Kathleen Winn and Business
Leaders of Arizona

Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County At-
torney, Benjamin D. Kreutzberg (argued),
Deputy County Attorney, Prescott, Attor-
neys for Sheila Sullivan Polk

Dominic E, Draye, Solicitor General, Jen-
nifer M. Perkins, Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Arizona Solicitor General

Paul V. Avelar, Timothy D. Keller, Keith
E, Diggs, Institute for Justice, Tempe, Attor-
neys for Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and
JUDGES ECKERSTROM, HOWARD, and
WRIGHT joined.*

Justices Ann A, Scott Timmer, Andrew W. Gould,
and John R. Lopez IV have recused themselves
from this case, Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of

the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Peter J.
Eckerstrom, Chief Judge of the Arizona Court of

JUSTICE BOLIOK, opinion of the Court:

11 In this case involving substantial conse-
quences for alleged violations of campaign
finance laws, we hold that due process does
not permit the same individual to issue the
initial decision finding violations and ordering
remedies, participate personally in the prose-
cution of the case before an administrative
Jaw judge (“ALJ”), and then make the final
agency decision that will receive only defer-
ential judicial review.

I, BACKGROUND

12 On June 27, 2018, acting pursuant to
AR.S, § 16-924(A) (2011) repealed by 2016
Aviz, Sess. Laws, ch. 79, § 10 (2d Reg. Sess.),
Arizona Secretary of State Ken Bennett de-
termined that there was reasonable cause to
believe that Attorney General Thomas
Horne, Kathleen Winn, who served as Com-
munity Outreach Director of the Attorney
General’s Office, and two campaign commit-
tees (collectively “Appellants”) had violated
Arizona campaign finance laws, specifically
ARS. §§ 16-901(14), -905, -918, -915, -917,
and ~919, The Seeretary accordingly notified
Solicitor General Robert L. Ellman, who ap-
pointed Sheila Polk as Special Arizona Attor-
ney General because the Attorney General
and one of his staffers were subjects of the
notice, and “an appearance of impropriety
would arise if the Arizona Attorney General’s
Office investigated the alleged campaign fi-
nance violation.”

13 Following investigation, pursuant to
ARS. § 16-924(A), Polk issued a twenty-
five-page order finding that Appellants had
violated Arizona campaign finance statutes
by illegally coordinating campaign expendi-
tures, exceeding contribution limits, and col-
lecting illegal contributions. Polk directed
Appellants to amend their campaign finance
reports and ordered Horne and his campaign
to refund contributions totaling approximate-
ly $397,000. The order stated that if the

Appeals, Division Two, the Honorable Joseph W.
Howard, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals,
Division Two, and the Honorable Timothy M.
Wright, Judge of the Gila County Superior Court,
were designated to sit in this matter.

Appellants failed to take the specified actions
within twenty days, “this Office will issue an
Order Assessing a Civil Penalty pursuant to
ARS. § 16-924(B). The violation of the con-
tribution limit carries a civil penalty of three
times the amount of money of the violation.
ARS. § 16-905().”

14 Appellants requested an administrative
hearing pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-924(A), Af
ter a three-day evidentiary hearing, the ALJ
issued a decision finding that Polk had failed
to prove illegal coordination and recommend-
ing that Polk vacate her compliance order.

15 Pursuant to ARS. § 41-1092.08(B)
(2000), Polk issued her final administrative
decision, which rejected the ALJ recommen-
dation and affirmed her prior compliance or-
der. Polk accepted all of the ALJ’s findings
of fact and rejected in part the ALJ’s conclu-
sions of law.

16 Appellants appealed to the Maricopa
County Superior Court, challenging Polk’s
decision and the constitutionality of Arizona’s
campaign contribution limits, Neither side
requested an evidentiary hearing. The court
affirmed Polk’s decision, finding that sub-
stantial evidence supported it and rejecting
challenges to the statutory scheme.

17 Appellants appealed to the court of
appeals, Polk’s answering brief acknowl-
edged a fact previously unknown to Appel-
lants: “Admittedly, the Yavapai County At-
torney was involved with the prosecution of
the case, by assisting with the preparation
and strategy.” Appellants argued that Polk’s
role as advocate and adjudicator violated
their due process rights.

18 The court of appeals affirmed the supe-
rior court, concluding that “[b]ecause there
was evidence in the record supporting Polk’s
finding that Horne and Winn coordinated
«++, we find no abuse of discretion.” Horne v.
Polk, 1 CA-CV 14-0887, at *5 112, 2016 WL.
706376 (Ariz. App. Feb, 28, 2016). The court
rejected Appellants’ due process claim, rely-
ing on Comeau v, Arizona State Board of
Dental Examiners, 196 Ariz, 102, 108 126,
998 P.2d 1066, 1072 (App. 1999) (“An agency
is permitted to combine some functions of
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication
unless actual bias or partiality is shown.”).

229

Horne, 1 CA-~CV 14-0887, at *5-6 118. The
court concluded, “In this case, appellants
make no showing of actual bias. Accordingly,
their due process rights were not violated.”
Id, at *6 118,

HI 119 We granted review of the due
process issue, which is of statewide impor-
tance and likely to recur, We have jurisdic-
tion under article 6, section 5(8) of the Ari-
zona Constitution and ARS. § 12-120.24,
Because we consider only the constitutionali-
ty of the procedure under which Appellants’
statutory violations were determined, our re-
view is de novo. Gallardo v, State, 236 Ariz.
84, 87 1.8, 886 P.8d 717, 720 (2014),

I. DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Scheme

$10 Arizona’s Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), title 41, chapter 6, is generally
silent about how agency charges or com-
plaints are initiated, In the context of cam-
paign finance violations, § 16-924(A) pre-
scribes that where there is “reasonable
cause to believe that a person is violating
any provision of this title” in connection with
a statewide office, the “secretary of state
shall notify the attorney general.” The Attor-
ney General, in turn, “may serve on the
person an order requiring compliance with
that provision, The order shall state with
reasonable particularity the nature of the
violation and shall require compliance within
twenty days from the date of issuance of the
order.” Id.

711 Section 16-924(A) further provides
that the alleged violator has twenty days to
request a hearing pursuant to the APA, for
which administrative adjudication procedures
are set forth in A.R.S, § 41-1092 et seg. Once
the ALJ issues a decision, “the head of the
agency, executive director, board or commis-
sion may review the decision and accept,
reject or modify it.” A.R.S. § 41~1092.08(B).
Where an agency has a board or commission
whose members are appointed by the gover-
nor, it “may review the decision of the agen-
ey head ... and make the final administra-
tive decision.” A.R.S, § 41-1092.08(C).

912 Ordinarily, nothing in the APA would
necessitate having an agency head make both

230

an initial and final legal determination. Here,
the interplay between the campaign finance
statute and the APA placed Polk in the posi-
tion of issuing the initial order and then
making the final determination. She also par-
ticipated in the prosecution of the case before
the ALJ. And under these circumstances,
there was no board or commission to review
Polk’s final decision.t

Hl 118 An aggrieved party may appeal
an adverse agency decision to the superior
court, but the court’s review is deferential.
Section 12-910(H) provides that the court
“shall affirm the agency action unless after
reviewing the administrative record and sup-
plementing evidence presented at the eviden-
tiary hearing the court concludes that the
action is not supported by substantial evi-
dence, is contrary to law, is arbitrary and
capricious or is an abuse of discretion.” The
court affirms the agency’s factual findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence,
“even if the record also supports a different
conclusion.” Gaveck v. Ariz. State Bd. of Po-
diatry Ewam’rs, 222 Ariz. 488, 436 111, 215
P.3d 1114, 1117 (App. 2009).

B. Due Process

I 114 Combining prosecutorial and ad-
judicative functions in the same agency offi-
cial gives rise to due process concerns. A
single agency may investigate, prosecute,
and adjudicate cases, and an agency head
may generally supervise agency staff who
are involved in those functions. See, eg,
Withrow v Larkin, 421 U.S, 35, 58, 95 §.Ct.
1456, 48 L.Hd.2d 712 (1975) (“administrative
agency [can] investigate facts, institute pro-
ceedings, and then make the necessary adju-

1, Polk notes that the federal APA contains an
exception allowing an agency head, unlike other
employees, to both participate in investigative
or prosecuting functions and participate or ad-
vise in the agency review or decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(d). Arizona's APA contains no such ex-
ception, Arizona's APA tacitly recognizes the po-
tential for conflict arising from agency officials
performing certain multiple roles in the admin-
istrative adjudication process. Section 41-
1092.06(B) provides that in the context of infor-
mal settlement conferences, the agency must be
represented by ‘'a person with the authority to
act on behalf of the agency,” and the “parties
participating in the settlement conference shall
waive their right to object to the participation

dications”). However, where an agency head.
makes an initial determination of a legal
violation, participates materially in prosecut-
ing the case, and makes the final agency
decision, the combination of functions in a
single official violates an individual’s Four-
teenth Amendment due process right to a
neutral adjudication in appearance and reali-
ty. That due process violation is magnified
where the agency’s final determination is
subject only to deferential review.”

115 The general parameters for due pro-
cess are set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976), There, the United States Supreme
Court held that the constitutional sufficiency
of administrative procedures is determined
by three factors:

First, the private interest that will be af-

fected by the official action; second, the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and fi-
nally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.

Id, at 835, 96 S.Ct. 893.

Hl 116 In this context, where the gov-
ernment seeks repayment of substantial cam-
paign contributions that the private parties
contend were legal (and, indeed, constitution-
ally protected), due process requires a neu-
tral decisionmaker. Although Appellants have
not alleged actual bias, once an official deter-
mines that a legal violation has occurred, that
official can be expected to develop a will to

of the agency representative in the final admin-
istrative decision.”

2. As Appellants did not raise or argue a distinct
state constitutional claim, we have no occasion.
to determine whether the due process provision
in Arizona's Declaration of Rights, Ariz. Const.
art, 2, § 4, provides greater protection in this
context than the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf.
Garris v. Governing Bd. of S.C, Reinsurance Facil-
ity, 333 S.C, 432, 511 S.B.2d 48, 54 (1998) (hold-
ing that the state constitution provides greater
procedural protections in administrative pro-
ceedings than federal due process).

win at subsequent levels of adjudication. At
minimum, in the context of a regulatory
agency adjudication, a process that involves
the same official as both an advocate and the
ultimate administrative decisionmaker cre-
ates an appearance of potential bias. See, a9.
Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Comm’n,
774 N.W.2d 841, 849 (Iowa 2009) (“[Tyhe
primary purpose of separating prosecutorial
from adjudicative functions” in an adminis-
trative agency “is to screen the decisionmak-
er from those who have a ‘will to win’ ”). On
the other hand, barring an agency head who
makes an ultimate decision from having even
general supervisory authority over agency
employees involved in the prosecution of a
case would unduly hamper agency opera-
tions. Due process will be satisfied if the
agency head who serves as the ultimate adju-
dicator does not also serve in an advocacy
role in the agency proceedings.

117 The right to a neutral adjudicator has
Jong been recognized as a component of a
fair process. One cannot both participate in a
case (for instance, as a prosecutor) and then
decide the case, Blackstone observed that a
judge must not rule in a cause in which he is
a party, “because it is unreasonable that any
man should determine his own quarrel.” Am.
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Fed, Trade Comm'n, 589
F.2d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Black-
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land, I, 91). In In ve Murchison, 349 U.S.
188, 186, 75 S.Ct. 628, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955),
the United States Supreme Court recognized
the due process principle that “no man can
be a judge in his own case and no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an inter-
est in the outcome.” Murchison entailed a
“one-man grand jury,” in which a judge act-
ing as a grand jury charged two witnesses
with perjury and then convicted them, which
the Court held violated due process. Jd. at
188-84, 75 S.Ct. 628. Because the judge was
“part of the accusatory process,” he “cannot
be, in the very nature of things, wholly disin-
terested in the conviction or acquittal of
those accused.” Id. at 187, 75 S.Ct. 623.
“Fairness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases. But our
system of law has always endeavored to pre-
vent even the probability of unfairness.” Id.
at 186, 75 S.Ct. 628; accord Marshall v.

231

Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243, 100 S.Ct.
1610, 64 L.,Ed.2d 182 (1980) (“[J]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice, and this
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by
judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales
of justice equally between contending par-
ties.” (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)). The process was impermissibly
tainted by the judge performing both prose-
cution and adjudication functions,

918 The Court in Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46,
95 S.Ct. 1456, applied those principles to the
administrative context. There, a state licens-
ing board notified a physician that it would
commence an investigative proceeding to
consider possible violations of his medical
license. Id. at 87-89, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The phy-
sician challenged the board’s combined inves-
tigatory and adjudicatory functions as a due
process violation, Id, at 89, 95 S.Ct. 1456, The
Court noted that although “situations have
been identified in which experience teaches
that the probability of actual bias on the part
of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to
be constitutionally tolerable,” the “contention
that the combination of investigative and ad-
judicative functions necessarily creates an
unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative
adjudication has a much more difficult bur-
den,” given “the presumption of honesty and
integrity.” Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.

919 The Court distinguished Murchison
on the basis that there “the judge in effect
became part of the prosecution and assumed
an adversary position,” and observed that
Murchison did not stand for the “broad rule
that the members of an administrative agen-
ey may not investigate the facts, institute
proceedings, and then make the necessary
adjudications.” Jd. at 58, 95 S.Ct, 1456. The
Court noted that an “initial charge or deter-
mination of probable cause and the ultimate
adjudication have different bases and pur-
poses,” thus the same agency may perform
both functions. Jd. at 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456, How-
ever, the Court cautioned, “[t]hat the combi-
nation of investigative and adjudicative fune-
tions does not, without more, constitute a due
process violation, does not, of course, pre-
clude a court from determining from the
special facts and circumstances present in

232

the case before it that the risk of unfairness
is intolerably high.” Id.

20 Here, the combination of prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions not just in a single
agency but in the same official presents “spe-
cial facts and circumstances” creating an in-
tolerable risk of unfairness. The initial deter-
mination of a legal violation here was not
akin to a judge finding probable cause to
proceed to trial and then reaching a final
decision after an adversarial process in which
the judge was not an advocate. Rather, under
the statutory scheme, the Secretary of State
made the probable cause finding. Polk then
commenced investigation and issued a
lengthy decision finding a legal violation and
ordering compliance, which would have been
a final determination had Appellants not ap-
pealed, In the subsequent ALJ proceeding,
Polk admittedly “was involved with the pros-
ecution of the case, by assisting with the
preparation and strategy.” Thereafter, she
issued a final administrative determination
affirming her prior order and rejecting most
of the ALJ’s conclusions of law. So we have
here not only a single agency performing
accusatory, advocacy, and adjudicatory func-
tions, but the same individual performing all
three functions. As Withrow characterized
the circumstances in Murchison, “the judge
in effect became part of the prosecution and.
assumed an adversary position.” Withrow,
421 US, at 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456. Beyond even
that, Polk was in the position to affirm the
very determination and order that she initial-
ly issued. See also id. (describing denial of
due process where judge could rely on his
own “{personal] knowledge and impression
... that could not be tested by adequate
cross-examination” (internal quotation marks
omitted).

{21 Other decisions further inform our
analysis. Concrete Pipe & Products of Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 118 S.Ct, 2264, 124
L,Ed.2d 589 (1998), pertains to pension
plans, but its reasoning applies here. The
federal statutory scheme entailed an adjudi-
cation of withdrawal liability by pension
trustees, who have a fiduciary duty to the in-
tegrity of the pension plans, but the Court
concluded that sufficient safeguards were

present to ensure due process. Jd, at 619-20,
118 8.Ct. 2264, The initial liability determi-
nation was made by the trustees, who “act
only in an enforcement capacity,” id. at 619,
118 §.Ct. 2264, and whose decision was re-
viewed by a neutral arbitrator applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Id,
at 611, 118 S.Ct, 2264, “Where an initial de-
termination is made by a party acting in an
enforcement capacity,” the Court ruled, “due
process may be satisfied by providing for a
neutral adjudicator to conduct a de novo
review of all factual and legal issues.” Jd. at
618, 118 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks
omitted). By contrast, “[ellearly, if the initial
view of the facts based on the evidence de-
rived from nonadversarial processes as a
practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and
effective consideration at a subsequent ad-
versary hearing leading to ultimate decision,
a substantial due process question would be
raised.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58, 95 S.Ct.
1456.

Wl 122 Here the initial determination
was subject to de novo review by the ALJ,
but the ALJ’s determination was not final.
Rather, the initial decisionmaker returned to
make the final decision. “Even appeal and a
trial de novo will not cure a failure to provide
a neutral and detached adjudicator.” Con-
crete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 618, 113 S.Ct, 2264.
The superior court review available from the
final agency decision here falls far short of
that.

{28 More recently, in Williams v. Penn-
sylwania, — U.S. ——, 186 S.Ct. 1899,
1908-09, 195 L.Ed.2d 182 (2016), the Court
found a defendant’s due process rights were
violated when a prosecutor who approved the
decision to seek the death penalty later
served as a supreme court justice in a habeas
petition arising from the same crime, “Of
particular relevance to the instant case, the
Court has determined that an unconstitution-
al potential for bias exists when the same
person serves as both accuser and adjudica-
tor in a case,” Id. at 1905. Where “a prosecu-
tor who participates in a major adversary
decision” or “a judge has served as an advo-
eate for the State in the very case the court
is now asked to adjudicate,” a serious ques-
tion arises concerning whether the adjudica-

tor, despite best efforts, could untether from
his or her previous position and render a fair
judgment. Id, at 1906, Here, the fact that
Polk “had a direct, personal role in the [Ap-
pellants’] prosecution,” id., likewise violates
due process.

124 The reasoning of the Williams dissen-
ters also supports our conclusion. Chief Jus-
tice Roberts distinguished the basis for the
due process violation in Murchison, where
“the judge (sitting as grand jury) accused the
witnesses of contempt, and then (sitting as
judge) presided over their trial on that
charge.” Id. at 1918 (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing). In Williams, by contrast, it was “abun-
dantly clear” that the justice “had not made
up his mind about either the contested evi-
dence or the legal issues under review,” be-
cause he had not “previously made any deci-
sion with respect to that evidence in his role
as prosecutor.” Jd, at 1914, Likewise, Justice
Thomas observed in Williams that “[b]roadly
speaking, Murchison’s rule constitutional-
izes the early American statutes requiring
disqualification when a single person acts as
both counsel and judge in a single civil or
criminal proceeding.” Jd, at 1920 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). He emphasized that a due pro-
cess violation occurs only where the “same
person ... act[s] as counsel and adjudicator
in the same case.” Id, at 1919 (highlighting
the separation between the original decision
to approve the request to seek the death
penalty and the current civil proceeding re-
garding timeliness of a stay action). In this
case, Polk made her views on the evidence
and legal issues very clear in her initial twen-
ty-five-page order, and she subsequently af-
firmed that very order in the same case after
participating in the prosecution.

125 These cases instruct that the combi-
nation of accusatory, advocacy, and adjudica~
tive roles in a single agency official violates
due process. Other courts have followed that,
instruction. Synthesizing the cases as we
have, the Iowa Supreme Court held in Bot-
sko that the conduct of the civil rights com-
mission’s director in advocating on behalf of
the complainant and then participating in
the commission’s closed adjudicatory pro-
ceeding violated due process, 774 N.W.2d at
849-50, Therein, the court articulated the

233

applicable constitutional boundaries. Apply-
ing Withrow, it concluded that “there is no
due process violation based solely upon the
overlapping investigatory and adjudicatory
roles of agency actors,” Id. at 849. “A more
serious problem, however, is posed where
the same person within an agency performs
both prosecutorial and adjudicative roles.”
Id; see also Am. Gen., 589 F.2d at 464-65
(the order “is infected with invalidity” be-
cause a commissioner participated as counsel
in earlier proceedings, even though that par-
ticipation may have been “superficial rather
than substantial”); Trans World Airlines,
Ine, v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 254 F.2d 90,
91 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental re-
quirements of fairness ... require at least
that one who participates in a case on behalf
of any party, whether actively or merely
formally by being on pleadings or briefs,
take no part in the decision of that case.”);
Nightlife Partners, Lid. v. City of Beverly
Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 183 Cal.Rptr.2d
284, 248 (2008) (observing that combination
of investigatory and adjudicatory functions is
“fraught” with problems, especially where
“these dual functions were not held by dif-
ferent sections of a single office, but by a
single individual”.

26 Arizona jurisprudence is consistent
with those authorities. In Comeau, a doctor
retained by the board investigated the com-
plaint, then made statements and asked
questions before the administrative panel,
but “was not on the panel and did not partici-
pate in the discussion that preceded the pan-
el’s findings and recommendations,” 196 Ariz.
at 108 127, 993 P.2d at 1072. In Rouse v
Scottsdale Unified School District No. 48,
156 Ariz, 869, 871, 752 P.2d 22, 24 (App.
1987), the court stated that “[t]he precise
question in this case is whether simply join-
ing investigative/prosecutorial and adjudica-
tive functions results in a partial decision
maker, We hold that it does not.” To the
extent that these functions are combined in a
single agency, we agree that the potential for
bias is not intolerable; if they are performed
by the same individual, they violate due pro-
cess. Cf Taylor v. Ariz, Law Enf. Merit
Syst. Council, 152 Ariz. 200, 206, 781 P.2d 95,
101 (App. 1986) (“A conflict of interest would
clearly arise if the same assistant attorney

234

general participated as an advocate before
the council and simultaneously served as an
advisor to the council in the same matter.”),
In Rouse, the termination decision at issue
was initiated by the staff, not the board that.
rendered the final decision; and “the board,
at the time of the hearing, had little more
than ‘mere familiarity with the facts’” 156
Ariz, at 878, 752 P.2d at 26. Under such
circumstances, the defendant still had a neu-
tral adjudicator.

HE 1127 We hold that due process does
not allow the same person to serve as an
accuser, advocate, and final decisionmaker in
an agency adjudication. This holding should
not unnecessarily impede the efficient and
effective functioning of administrative agen-
cies. As noted, in most instances, agencies
are free under Arizona law to generate their
own processes regarding initiation, investiga-
tion, and prosecution of charges or com-
plaints. The agency head may supervise per-
sonnel involved in such functions; but if she
makes the final agency decision, she must be
isolated from advocacy functions and strate-
gic prosecutorial decisionmaking and must
supervise personnel involved in those func-
tions in an arms-length fashion. See, eg.,
Lyness v, Pa, State Bd. of Med., 529 Pa, 585,
605 A.2d 1204, 1209, 1211 (1992) (“if more
than one function is reposed in a single ad-
ministrative entity, walls of division [must] be
constructed which eliminate the threat or
appearance of bias”; specifically, “placing the
prosecutorial functions in a group of individu-
als, or entity, distinct from the Board which
renders the ultimate adjudication”),

Hs 128 Although Appellants do not al-
lege actual bias, the circumstances here de-
prived them of due process. Apparently
unique in the context of Arizona administra-
tive law, Arizona’s campaign finance statute,
when joined with the APA, place a single
official in the position of making both an
initial and final determination of legal viola-
tion, with no opportunity for de novo review
by the trial court. A quasi-judicial proceeding
“must be attended, not only with every ele-
ment of fairness but with the very appear-
ance of complete fairness.” Amos Treat & Co.
v, Sec, & Hxch, Comm'n, 806 F.2d 260, 266—
67 (D.C. Cir, 1962) (holding that a similar

combination of functions violated the “basic
requirement of due process”). Specifically, we
hold that when Polk also assumed an advoca-
ey role during the ALJ proceedings, the due
process guarantee prohibited her from then
serving as the final adjudicator,

I. REMEDY

{29 Appellants argue that because there
was no “valid” decision by the agency head
within thirty days after the ALJ decision, we
should reinstate the ALJ decision as the
“final administrative decision” pursuant to
ARS, § 41-1092.08(D) (“if the head of the
agency ... does not accept, reject or modify
the administrative law judge’s decision within
thirty days,” it becomes “the final adminis-
trative decision”), We disagree. The agency
head took action within the deadline.

130 Rather, Appellants are entitled to a
determination by a neutral decisionmaker.
See Williams, 186 S.Ct. at 1910; Botsko, 774
N.W.2d at 858; Nightlife Partners, 133 Cal,
Rptr.2d at 248-49. We therefore remand the
matter to the current Attorney General’s Of-
fice, which does not have a conflict, for a final
administrative decision. We express no opin-
ion on the merits of the case.

131 After filing their petition for review,
Appellants submitted an amended request
for attorney fees under ARS, § 12-
848(A)(2), which allows an award of fees for a
party that “prevails by an adjudication on the
merits” in a “court proceeding to review a
state agency decision.” Because the case is
remanded, any fee award would be prema-
ture as no party has yet “prevail[ed] by an
adjudication on the merits,” Scottsdale
Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Syst. Admin, 206 Ariz. 1, 8
729, 75 P.8d 91, 98 (2008) (alteration in
original),

182 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate
the decisions of the superior court and court
of appeals, and remand the case to the Attor-
ney General’s Office for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

235

394 P.3d 660
Gordon ACRI, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

ve

STATE of Arizona, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

Chuck Overmyer and Nina Bill Overmyer,
both as individuals and as representa-
tives of a class consisting of all of the
residents of Yarnell, Glen Ilah, Peeples
Valley, and the surrounding geographi-
cal area who suffered damages as a re-
sult of the Yarnell Hill Fire, Plain-
tiffs/Appellants,

ve

State of Arizona, a public entity; and the
Arizona State Forestry Division, a public
entity, Defendants/Appellees,

Nos. 1 CA-CV 15-0349, 1 CA-CV 15-0350

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 3/30/2017

Knapp & Roberts, PC, Scottsdale, By
Craig A. Knapp, Dana R. Roberts, David L,
Abney, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Brock J. Heatheotte, Daniel P.
Schaack, Stinson Leonard Street, LLP,
Phoenix, By Michael L, Parrish, Brandon R.
Nagy, Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
Lawrence F, Winthrop and Judge Peter B.
Swann joined.

OPINION
CATTANI, Judge:

{1 Residents of Yarnell and surrounding
areas (the “Residents”) appeal from the su-

1, This case involves two related complaints, The
first complaint named as plaintiffs 162 individu-
als and entities from the Yarnell area who sus-
tained property damage in the fire. Two of these
plaintiffs later filed a class action complaint as-
serting essentially the same claims on behalf of
all residents of Yarnell and surrounding areas
who suffered damage in the fire. We use the term.
“Residents” to refer to all plaintiffs in both cases,
except where otherwise specified.

perior court’s ruling dismissing their negli-
gence claims against the State of Arizona and
the Arizona State Forestry Division (collec-
tively, “State”) arising from damage caused
by the Yarnell Hill Fire, Because the superi-
or court correctly concluded that the State
did not owe a duty to protect the Residents’
property against naturally caused wildfires,
we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 On the afternoon of June 80, 2018, the
Yarnell Hill Fire burned out of control, kill-
ing 19 local firefighters and destroying struc-
tures and property throughout Yarnell,
Lightning had sparked the wildfire two days
earlier in mountainous wildlands near Yar-
nell, and the State, acting through the For-
estry Division, was in charge of the firefight-
ing efforts for the first three days, including
when it hit Yarnell. This case arises only
from the property damage caused by the fire;
the tragic loss of life is not at issue here,

13 The Residents asserted civil claims
against the State, alleging that the State had
negligently managed the firefighting efforts,
negligently failed to protect Yarnell from the
fire, and negligently failed to provide a time-
ly evacuation notice, all leading to the de-
struction of their property On the State’s
motion, the superior court dismissed the
complaints on the basis that the State did not
owe the Residents a duty as required to state
a cause of action for negligence, The Resi-
dents appealed, and we now affirm?

TH {14 We hold that the State did not
owe the Residents a legal duty in connection
with its efforts to combat a wildland fire
resulting from a natural occurrence on public
Jand in natural condition. To hold otherwise

2, The State also moved to dismiss the claims
against the Forestry Division on the basis that it
is a non-jural entity and moved to dismiss the
Overmyer class action complaint as duplicative
of the Acri complaint. Because we affirm dis-
missal based on lack of duty, we need not ad-
dress these alternative bases for partial dismissal.

238

would effectively require the State to act as
an insurer against naturally-oceurring calam-
ities affecting private property throughout
the state, And imposing such a duty (with its
corresponding potential for liability) based on
the State’s undertaking to coordinate wild-
land firefighting would create a self-defeating
incentive not to engage in such important
efforts. Thus, the Residents’ claims fail as a
matter of law.

DISCUSSION

Hs 15 Dismissal under Arizona Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim is proper “only if ‘as a matter of law
[1] plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief
under any interpretation of the facts suscep-
tible of proof’” Coleman v. City of Mesa,
230 Ariz, 352, 356, 18, 284 P.3d 863 (2012)
(citation omitted and alteration in original).
We consider only the pleading itself, and we
“assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual
allegations and indulge all reasonable infer-
ences from those facts, but mere conclusory
statements are insufficient.” Id, at 19. We
review de novo the superior court’s dismissal
for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted. Id, at 855, 17, 284 P.3d 863,

HH S16 A negligence claim requires
proof of four elements: “(1) a duty requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain stan-
dard of care,” (2) breach of that standard of
care, (8) causation, and (4) actual damages,
Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz, 141, 148, 19, 150
P.8d 228 (2007). The existence of a duty is a
threshold question; “absent some duty, an
action for negligence cannot be maintained.”
Id. at 111, This threshold question of wheth-
er a duty exists is a question of law for the
court, which we consider de novo. Guerra v,
State, 287 Ariz. 188, 185, 17, 348 P.8d 423
(2015).

HE 17 A duty is an “obligation, recog-
nized by law, which requires the defendant to
conform to a particular standard of conduct
in order to protect others against unreason-
able risks of harm.” Markowitz v, Arizona
Parks Bd., 146 Aviz, 352, 854, 706 P.2d 364
(1985). A duty may arise from a variety of
sources, including a special relationship be-
tween the parties—whether contractual, fa-

milial, or based on “conduct undertaken by
the defendant”—or as an expression of public
policy. Gipson, 214 Ariz, at 145, 1118, 22-23,
150 P.3d 228.

I. Public Policy.

HMMM 8 The Residents argue that
“sound public policy imposed a duty of care
on the State to protect Yarnell and its peo-
ple.” We recognize that public policy consid-
erations may support recognition of a duty.
Id, at 128. But public policy may also mili-
tate against recognition of a tort duty, Guer-
70, 237 Aviz, at 187, 7 20, 348 P.38d 423, and it
does so here.

19 The duty the Residents seek to im-
pose—protecting private property against a
natural occurrence on public land maintained
in natural condition—is unworkably broad.
And the limitation the Residents propose—
that the State only assumed a duty by in fact
attempting to suppress the fire—would lead
to perverse incentives. See Gipson, 214 Ariz.
at 146, 129, 150 P.3d 228 (noting that “no-
duty” rules are generally based on concerns
that imposing liability would have adverse
effects). The parties agree that prevention or
suppression of wildfires—like the emergency
response to any natural disaster—is a funda-
mental public safety obligation, and that pub-
lie policy should encourage a prompt and
efficacious response from the State. But im-
posing a tort duty based on the State’s un-
dertaking to provide an emergency response
could instead encourage inaction: the State
could shield itself from liability by simply
doing nothing. Such a result is contrary to
the overriding needs of the public,

110 Moreover, the duty advanced by the
Residents would prioritize nearby private
property interests at the expense of consider-
ation of broader state interests. And here,
the governing statute expressly guides the
state forester’s discretion to provide wildfire
suppression services, absent a governing co-
operative agreement, by reference to “the
best interests of this state” and whether such
services “are immediately necessary to pro-
tect state lands.” Ariz, Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”)
§ 87-1808(A) (formerly A.R.S. § 87-628(A))

(emphasis added); ° see also Monroe v. Basis
Sch, Inc., 284 Ariz, 155, 160, 117, 818 P.8d
871 (App. 2014) (noting that a public-policy-
based duty of care is generally grounded in
statute or the common law, and “[iIn many
instances, the legislature reflects publie poli-
cy by codifying certain duties and obli-
gations”). Imposing a duty of care beyond
the legislative directive would impermissibly
replace the State’s discretion to consider the
complex mix of risks and considerations pre-
sented by a wildfire with a mandate to priori-
tize the interests of individuals whose prop-
erty might immediately be threatened.

{11 The Residents urge us to adopt the
Alaska Supreme Court’s now-abrogated hold-
ing that “when the State or a subdivision of
the State chooses to conduct firefighting op-
erations, it owes a duty of care to those
whose lives and property are threatened by
the fire to conduct those operations non-
negligently.” Angnabooguk v. State, 26 P.3d
447, 452 (Alaska 2001). The Alaska legisla-
ture, however, thereafter adopted legislation
overriding the Angnabooguk holding except
as to “intentional misconduct within the
course and scope of employment or agency
and with complete disregard for the safety
and property of others.” Brewer v, State, 341
P.8d 1107, 1119 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Alas-
ka Stat. Ann, 41.15.045(a)). And the Alaska
legislature’s statements in doing so are apro-
pos: “[dJecisions regarding forest manage-
ment related to fire control and suppression
should be prompted by sound forestry and
firefighting principles, rather than concerns
regarding possible tort liability.” Id. (altera-
tion in original) (quoting the transmittal let-
ter and sponsor statement for H.B, 245, 28rd
Leg., 1st Sess, (Alaska 2008), as found in
2008 House Journal 782-83).

112 This is not to suggest that the state
forester should ignore the fire’s potential im-

3. As relevant here, A.R.S. § 37-1303 provides
that:
A. The state forester shall have authority to
prevent suppress any wildfires on state
and private lands located outside incorporated
municipalities and, if subject to cooperative
agreements, on other lands located in this state
or in other states, Mexico or Canada. If there is
no cooperative agreement, the state forester
may furnish wildfire suppression services on
any lands in this state if the state forester

239

pact on nearby properties and communities
as part of the statutorily-directed assessment.
of what wildfire suppression services are in
the best interests of the state, See A.R.S,
§ 87-1808(A). Certainly there was a hoped-
for benefit to the Residents here as the
result of the State’s work to contain the fire.
But a hoped-for benefit that may arise inci-
dental to broader public-safety concerns and
the best interests of the state does not estab-
lish a duty. See Vasquez v. State, 220 Ariz.
304, 315, 135, 206 P.8d 758 (App. 2008) (hold-
ing that, because primary purpose of identi-
fying human remains was public safety, inci-
dental benefit to family and friends did not
establish a duty to identify); Morton v. Mari-
copa Cownty, 177 Aviz. 147, 151, 865 P.2d 808
(App. 1998) (same),

IL Possessor of Land.

18 Our conclusion that public policy sup-
ports a no-duty rule for the State’s control of
a natural occurrence on public land main-
tained in natural condition is consistent with
Arizona law regarding the parallel issue of
duties owed by a possessor of land. The
Residents assert that, as the owner or occu-
pier of the land on which the fire started, the
State owed a common law duty to prevent
the fire’s spread, But the Residents cite no
Arizona authority, and we have found none,
recognizing an owner/occupier’s duty to pre-
vent the spread of a wildfire regardless of
the cause of the fire or the natural (as op-
posed to developed or artificial) condition of
the land.

TE {114 Instead, Arizona has adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restate-
ment”) § 363 (1965), which provides that a
possessor of land is not liable “for physical
harm caused to others outside of the land by
a natural condition of the land.” See Beals v.

determines that suppression services are in the

best interests of this state and are immediately
necessary to protect state lands.

C., The state forester shall have responsibility to
prevent and suppress wildfires only on lands
covered by cooperative fire agreements.
The Residents have not alleged that the fire sup-
pression effort around Yarnell was governed by a
cooperative agreement,

240

State, 150 Ariz, 27, 80-81, 721 P.2d 1154
(App. 1986) (applying Restatement § 363 to
affirm summary judgment for the State on
the basis of no liability for damage to neigh-
boring landowners caused by water diverted
from public lands due to natural growth of
salt cedars); compare Restatement § 864
(1965) (stating that, with some limitations, a
possessor of land is liable for physical harm
outside of the land caused by an artificial
condition created by human action), “Natural
condition” is broadly defined “to indicate that
the condition of land has not been changed
by any act of a human being.” Restatement:
§ 863 emt. b, Although the cause of the
Yarnell Hill Fire—a lightning strike—per-
haps does not constitute a “condition” of the
land, the state trust land apparently re-
mained in natural condition, and the light-
ning was not an “act of a human being.”

{15 The distinction between natural and
artificial conditions and between natural and.
human causes is consistent with the early
English cases cited by the Residents and
with a substantial group of the American
authorities as well, The English cases, Beau-
leu v. Finglam, Y.B. 2 Hen, IV, fol. 18, pl. 5
(1401) and Turberville v, Stampe, 1 Ld.
Raym. 264, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1697), both
involved liability for the spread of a fire set
by the defendant in his house or on his land,
respectively, See also St. Lowis & S.F.R. Co.
v. Mathews, 165 U.S, 1, 6, 17 S.Ct, 248, 41
L.Ed, 611 (1897). Cases from other American
jurisdictions would impose a duty for harm to
a neighbor resulting from the defendant’s
use of an intentionally set fire, see eg,
McNally v. Colwell, 91 Mich. 527, 52 N.W. 70
(1892); Koos v, Roth, 298 Or. 670, 652 P.2d
1255, 1268-65 (1982), or even if the fire was
caused by another, see, eg., Arnhold v. Unit-
ed States, 284 F.2d 826, 328-29 (9th Cir.
1960) (holding the United States liable for
damage caused by a fire started by a railroad
using a right of way through U.S. land, for
which the government had entered into a
cooperative agreement to “take ‘immediate
vigorous action’ to control all fires breaking
out” in the area), Because the Yarnell Hill
Fire arose from a natural cause on land that
vemained unused and in natural condition,
these authorities do not support imposition of
a duty in this case,

TI 1116 As the Residents note, other
American jurisdictions recognize a land pos-
sessor’s duty to control the spread of a fire
without regard to its cause. See, eg., Farrell
v. Minneapolis & R. R, Ry. Co., 121 Minn.
857, 141 N.W, 491, 492 (1918) (recognizing a
land owner’s duty to prevent the spread of a
known fire started on the owner's land even
if “from any cause for which the landowner is
not responsible”); Sandberg v. Cavanaugh
Timber Co., 95 Wash. 556, 164 P, 200, 202
(1917) (recognizing a land owner’s duty to
“ase reasonable effort to prevent the spread
of a fire occurring upon his premises, apart
from his own act or neglect attending the
starting of the fire”). But this concept of duty
‘would contravene the distinction between lia-
bility for natural as opposed to artificial con-
ditions recognized under Arizona law apply-
ing the Restatement. See Restatement
§§ 863-64, And in the case of state trust
lands, it would, as described above, under-
mine the public policy evidenced by the dis-
eretion vested in the state forester under
ARS. § 37-1808(A), Accordingly, we decline
to recognize a common law duty to protect
the Residents by preventing the spread of a
naturally caused fire started on State land
maintained in natural condition.

I. Voluntary Undertaking.

HM «117 The Residents argue that
the State assumed a duty of care by under-
taking to protect Yarnell from the fire and to
provide an evacuation notice if necessary. A
defendant may assume a duty of care by
undertaking (with or without a formal rela-
tionship) to perform services for the plaintiff.
See Gipson, 214 Ariz, at 145, 118, 150 P.8d
228; Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221,
223-24, (117, 15, 92 P.3d 849 (2004). Arizona
follows Restatement § 828 in addressing this
theory of duty:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to anoth-
er which he should recognize as necessary
for the protection of the other’s person or
things, is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise such care increas-

es the risk of such harm, or

(b) the harm is suffered because of the

other’s reliance upon the undertaking.

See Stanley, 208 Ariz. at 228-24, 115, 92
P.3d 849; Barnwn v. Rural Fire Protection
Co,, 24 Ariz,App, 288, 237, 587 P.2d 618 (App.
1975).

118 By its terms, Restatement § 323 ap-
plies to an undertaking “to render services to
another.” And here, the Residents’ factual
allegations do not show an undertaking to
provide fire protection services directed to
the Residents, The factual allegations include
that the State acted to “contain” the Yarnell
Hill Fire, providing “some point protection”
around the Yarnell area as well as structure
protection group orders for some clearing for
a potential burnout and firebreak “on the
outskirts of the Yarnell area” and some aeri-
al retardant drops. But these actions are
consistent with the state forester’s discre-
tionary authority to provide wildfire suppres-
sion services in the interest of the state and
in the interest of protecting state lands as
directed by A.R.S, § 37~1808(A), rather than
an undertaking directed to the benefit and
protection of the Residents’ property. Al-
though we need not foreclose the possibility
that the State cowld assume such a duty by
an affirmative undertaking, the actions al-
leged are consistent with the public-policy-
based no-duty rule described above.

919 The Residents’ allegation that the
State undertook to provide an evacuation
notice is also unavailing, The only allegation
arguably supporting an undertaking to pro-
vide an evacuation notice is the assertion that
the State “placed,” “requested,” or “radioed”
for evacuation of Yarnell. But the Residents’
allegation was that the State waited too long
to do so; that is, that the State waited too
long to assume this duty. Because the alleged
breach of duty necessarily occurred before
the State was bound by any assumed duty,
the Residents’ claim based on an undertaking
to provide an evacuation notice fails.

IV. Abnormally Dangerous Activity.
Hs {20 Finally, the Residents argue
that the State should be held liable for their
losses because fighting wildfires is an abnor-
mally dangerous activity. Arizona recognizes
strict liability for harm resulting from an
abnormally dangerous activity. Restatement.

241

§§ 519, 520 (1977) (adopted in Arizona by
Correa v, Curbey, 124 Ariz, 480, 481, 605 P.2d
458 (App. 1979)). Strict liability extends only
to “the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.”
Restatement § 519(2); see also id, at emt. e
(strict liability “applies only to harm that is
within the scope of the abnormal risk that is
the basis of the liability”),

121 We need not decide whether fighting
wildfires is an abnormally dangerous activity,
however, because the damages alleged re-
sulted from the uncontrolled fire itself, not
from the firefighting. The Residents’ com-
plaints do not allege that the State’s fire-
fighting efforts created the risk, but rather
that the State failed to protect them from the
risk posed by the existing fire, Even if the
State’s approach to the firefighting efforts
delayed measures that could have mitigated
the damage to private property, no affirma-
tive acts by the State are alleged to have
caused the damage. Accordingly, the abnor-
mally dangerous activity doctrine does not
apply.

V. Duty Based on Precluding Local Fire-
fighter Action.

HH {22 The Residents allege that “[iIn
the exercise of its practical and legal authori-
ty, the Arizona State Forestry Division or-
dered some of the local firefighting assets
not to do anything to combat the Yarnell Hill
Fire without its specific authorization, per-
mission, and direction.” This allegation argu-
ably supports an inference, see Coleman, 280
Ariz. at 856, 19, 284 P.8d 868, that the
State’s assumption of control prevented the
Residents and local firefighters from per-
forming activities on non-state lands that
might have reduced the Residents’ damages.
But a directive not to do anything to “combat
the Yarnell Hill Fire” is not the same as a
directive not to use local efforts to protect
property within Yarnell.

CONCLUSION

123 We affirm the dismissal of the Resi-
dents’ complaints,

394 P.3d 667
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Robert NIXON, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 16-0391

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/6/2017

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Jeffrey R. Duvendack, Gerald R.
Grant, Counsel for Appellee

Carm R. Moehle, P.C., Phoenix, By Carm
R. Moehle, Counsel for Appellant

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F, Winthrop and Judge Jon
W. Thompson joined,

OPINION
HOWE, Judge:

{1 Robert Nixon appeals the trial court’s
order denying his request to restore his gun
rights. He argues that the statute suspending
his gun rights, ARS, § 18-904(A)(6)—enact-
ed in 1994—cannot be applied to him because
the law at the time his civil rights were
suspended in 1987 upon his felony conviction
did not deprive him of his gun rights. He
contends that A.R.S, § 138-904(A)(5) cannot,
retroactively apply to him. We reject this
argument and affirm the trial court’s ruling,
Applying the statute to a person convicted of
a felony before 1994 does not constitute ret-
roactive application because the statute
merely relates to circumstances at the time
the statute was enacted—the person’s status
as a convicted felon—and does not attach
new legal consequences to a pre-1994 convie-
tion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 In 1987, Nixon pled guilty to attempted
child molestation for an incident that oc-
curred with a child under 15 years old. The
trial court sentenced him to 15 years’ proba-
tion, At the time of Nixon’s conviction, a
felony conviction suspended a person’s right
to vote, right to hold public office, right to
serve as a juror, and any other rights reason-
ably necessary for security during the time
of imprisonment. A.R.S, § 18-904(A)(1)-(4).
In 1994, the Arizona Legislature amended
ARS. § 18-904 to include suspension of a
person’s right to possess a gun or firearm,
See 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 5; see
aiso A.R.S. § 18-904(A)(5). For a first-time
felony offender, civil rights are automatically
restored upon the completion of probation,
except the right to possess a gun or firearm,
which can be restored only by application to
the court. A.R.S. § 18-912(A)-(B).

13 Nixon completed probation in 2002,
Although Nixon was not required to ask a
court to restore his civil rights, he neverthe-

243

less filed a motion seeking restoration of his
civil rights in 2007. In that motion, he asked
that his gun rights be restored as well. The
trial court denied the request, noting the
seriousness of the offense and the victim’s
age. In 2016, Nixon renewed his request,
arguing that because he was a first-time
felony offender his civil rights were automati-
eally restored when he completed probation.
And just as he did in his 2007 request for
restoration of his civil rights, he also request-
ed to have his gun rights restored. The trial
eourt granted the automatic restoration of
‘Nixon’s civil rights but denied the restoration
of his gun rights,

4 In denying Nixon’s request to restore
his gun rights, the trial court determined
that its decision was discretionary. The
court’s ruling noted the victim’s age and Nix-
on’s conviction as reasons for denying the
restoration. The trial court also referenced
“Cf. 18-907(e)(4),” which is the statute that
involves setting aside judgments of guilt. The
specific subsection cited states that convic-
tions like Nixon’s cannot be set aside. Nixon
timely appealed,

DISCUSSION

1, ARS. § 18-904(A)G) Was Not Ap-
plied Retroactively

HM 15 Nixon contends that the trial
court erred by applying ARS, § 18-
904(A)(5) to him because doing so is a retro-
active application in violation of A.R.S. § 1-
244, We review de novo issues involving in-
terpretation, application, and retroactivity of
statutes, State v. Carver, 227 Ariz, 438, 441,
(17, 258 P.8d 256, 259 (App. 2011). We pre-
sume that the statute in question is constitu-
tional and Nixon has the burden to prove
otherwise. See Zuther v. State, 199 Ariz. 104,
111, 128, 14 P.8d 295, 302 (2000).

Tl {6 The parties agree that ARS.
§ 18-904’s express language does not state
that it applies retroactively, and “[nJo statute
is retroactive unless expressly declared
therein.” See A.R.S. § 1-244. The parties
disagree, however, on whether the trial court
retroactively applied A.R.S. § 18-904. A stat-
ute applies retroactively only when it “at-
taches new legal consequences to events

244

completed before its enactment.” State
Aguilar, 218 Ariz, 25, 84, 188, 178 P.8d 497,
506 (App. 2008),

Hl 117 Nixon argues that the “completed
event” here is his 1987 conviction and that
AUR.S, § 18-904(A)(6) adds a legal conse-
quence to that completed event, The statute
is not retroactive “simply because it may
relate to antecedent facts,” however, See Ar-
anda v. Indust, Comm’n of Ariz, 198 Ariz.
467, 472, 124, 11 P.8d 1006, 1011 (2000).
Contrary to Nixon’s argument, the statute
does not change the consequences of Nixon’s
past acts, Instead, the statute relates to con-
ditions that existed in 1994, That is, if a
person was a convicted felon in 1994 whose
civil rights had not yet been restored, then
the right to possess a gun or firearm also
would be suspended. Because Nixon was a
convicted felon in 1994 and had yet to have
his civil rights restored, his right to possess a
gun or firearm also was suspended.

TI 18 The State argues that this case is
indistinguishable from State v. Olvera, 191
Ariz, 75, 952 P.2d 818 (App. 1997). In Olvera,
a defendant on trial for being a prohibited
possessor of a firearm who had been convict-
ed in 1992 argued that A.R.S. § 18-904 did
not suspend his right to possess firearms in
1992, and that applying ARS. § 18-
904(A)(5) to him would be an impermissible
retroactive application of the statute. 191
Ariz, at 76, 952 P.2d at 814. We found that
AUR.S. § 18-904(A)(6) was not retroactively
applied to Olvera even though his conviction
occurred before 1994 because its application
was based on his status as a felon in 1994, Id.
at 77, 952 P.2d at 315 (“The statutory change
made him a felon whose right to possess a
firearm was suspended.”), The factual cir-
cumstances here are not distinguishable from
Olvera, Both Olvera and Nixon were convict-
ed before 1994 and had their right to possess
a gun or firearm suspended by A.R.S. § 18-
904(A)(5). Nixon counters that Olvera is dis-
tinguishable because it merely dealt with
whether A.RS. § 18-905(A)(5) was an ex
post facto law. But Olvera’s analysis was not
so limited. In Olvera, we not only held that
the statute was not an ex post facto law, we
also held that applying it to a person who
had been convicted of a felony before 1994

was not an improper retroactive application.
191 Ariz. at 76, 952 P.2d at 314. The same
analysis applies here, The only effect that the
statute had on Nixon was to change his
status as a felon to a prohibited possessor
from 1994 onward. Thus, ARS. § 18-
904(A)(5) prospectively applies to convicted
felons who had yet to have their civil rights
restored when it became effective, regardless
whether the conviction occurred before or
after its effective date.

2, The Right to Possess a Gun or Fire-
arm Is Not Automatically Restored

HM 19 Nixon next argues that the trial
court erred by denying the restoration of his
gun rights because they should have been
automatically restored when he completed
probation in 2002, For a first-time felony
offender, civil rights are automatically re-
stored when the term of probation is com-
pleted and all fines are paid. ARS, § 18-
912(A). This statute expressly states, howev-
er, that “[t]his section does not apply to a
person’s right to possess weapons ... unless
the person applies to a court pursuant to
§ 18-905 or 18-006,” A.R.S, § 18-912(B).
Here, Nixon unnecessarily applied for the
restoration of his civil rights in 2007 because
those rights—except for his gun rights—
were automatically restored in 2002. Nixon’s
right to possess a gun or firearm, however,
was suspended in 1994 when the Arizona
Legislature amended A.R.S, § 13-904 to add
the right to possess a gun or firearm, See
supra "7, Therefore, although Nixon’s other
civil rights were automatically restored in
2002, his gun rights were not, Nixon applied
to have his gun rights restored in 2007 and
2016, which the trial court denied in both
instances, Accordingly, Nixon’s argument
that his gun rights were automatically re-
stored in 2002 is without merit,

HMM 1 10 Nixon further argues that the
trial court erred by citing an incorrect stat-
ute in denying his restoration request. The
trial court’s decision to restore civil rights,
including gun rights, is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. See ARS, § 13-908 (“[T]he
restoration of civil rights and the dismissal of
the accusation or information under the pro-
visions of this chapter shall be in the disere-

tion of the superior court judge[.]”), The trial
court denied Nixon’s request to restore his
gun rights and used the abbreviation “Cf” in
citing the statute that controls setting aside
judgments of guilt, The abbreviation “Cf” is
used in a citation when “[the] authority sup-
ports a proposition different from the main
proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend
support. Literally, ‘ef? means ‘compare.’”
The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation
Rule 1.2(a), at 59 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed, 2015), The statute
the trial court compared its decision to,
ARS, § 18-907(E)(4), states that a person
convicted of an offense where the victim is a
minor under 15 years old is ineligible to have
his or her judgment of guilt set aside, That
the trial court compared the discretionary
decision to restore gun rights with a different
section that referenced Nixon’s specific con-

245

viction does not demonstrate an abuse of
discretion. The trial court apparently noted
the separate statute to show the seriousness
of Nixon’s conviction, not as authority to
deny the restoration request. Thus, the trial
court was correct in noting that it had the
diseretion to deny Nixon’s request for gun
rights and did not err by merely referencing
another statute.

CONCLUSION

{111 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm,

394 P.3d 1083

Jeanette M, SANDERS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

ve
Francis ALGER, Defendant/Appellee.
No. CV-16-0181-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed June 1, 2017

* Justice John R. Lopez, IV has recused himself
from this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Samuel

J. Patrick Butler (argued), Tretschok,
McNamara & Miller, P.C., Tucson, Attorneys
for Jeanette M, Sanders

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Daniel P.
Schaack (argued), Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Phoenix, Robert R. McCright, Assistant
Attorney General, Attorneys for Francis Al-
ger

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the
opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICES
BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLICK, and
GOULD, and JUDGE VEDERMAN joined.*

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the
Court:

{1 We hold that a patient owes a duty of
reasonable care to a caregiver allegedly in-
jured by the patient’s actions, thereby mak-
ing the patient potentially liable for negli-
gence. We further hold that the negligence
claim, which involves an in-home caregiver
hired by the Arizona Department of Econom-
ie Security (“DES”), is not barred by the
firefighter’s rule, a common law doctrine bar-
ring recovery by a rescuer for injuries in-
eurred while performing duties as a profes-
sional firefighter,

E. Vederman, Presiding Judge of the La Paz

County Superior Court, was designated to sit in
this matter.

248

L

HM 12 We review a trial court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo, Andrews v,
Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240 112, 69 P.3d 7
(2008), Because the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Defendant Fran-
cis Alger, we view the evidence and reason-
able inferences in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff Jeanette M. Sanders as the non-
moving party. See id.

138 In 2004, Sanders contracted with DES
to provide in-home care to Alger, who is
developmentally disabled and, as a “vulnera-
ble adult,” is eligible for services from the
DES Division of Developmental Disabilities.
See ARS, § 86-559(A). Alger suffers from
cerebral palsy and other conditions that limit
his mobility and place him at risk of falling.
Sanders worked for DES as an independent,
contractor rather than an employee. In 2011,
Sanders, then sixty years old, was assisting
seventy-four-year-old Alger in moving from
his wheelchair to a car, Alger attempted to
stand up and, distracted, did not respond to
Sanders’ warnings and began to fall. When
Sanders tried to prevent the fall, Alger
grabbed her, and she said “let go, you're
hurting me.” Alger nonetheless fell on Sand-
ers, seriously injuring her. Sanders subse-
quently sued Alger for negligence. Among
other things, she alleged that he had negli-
gently placed himself in jeopardy of falling,
thereby requiring her to rescue him,

94 Alger moved for summary judgment,
arguing that he did not owe a duty of care to
Sanders, that the firefighter’s rule barred
her claim, and that no reasonable jury could
find that he had acted negligently. The trial
court granted summary judgment based on
the firefighter’s rule and did not address the
other arguments,

{5 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the firefighter’s rule does not apply.
Sanders v. Alger, 240 Ariz, 90, 98 112, 875
P.8d 1199 (App. 2016), The court also held
that “Alger owed Sanders the basic duty that
all persons owe each other: the duty to use
reasonable care to avoid causing injury to
others.” Jd. at 94 119, 875 P.8d 1199 (foot-
note omitted) (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 186
Ariz, 500, 509, 667 P.2d 200 (1983)). The court
concluded that Alger was not relieved of his

duty by the fact that Sanders had contractu-
ally undertaken to care for him, including by
helping to prevent the risks of his falling. Jd.
at 98-94 17 15-16, 375 P.8d 1199,

16 We granted review to consider whether
a patient owes a caregiver a duty of reason-
able care and, if so, whether the firefighter’s
rule bars a caregiver's negligence claim, both
recurring issues of statewide importance. We
have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5)
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12~
120,24,

I

A.

WM 17 Under Arizona law, a plaintiff
must prove four elements to sustain a claim
for negligence: “(1) a duty requiring the de-
fendant to conform to a certain standard of
care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that
standard; (8) a causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury;
and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey,
214 Ariz, 141, 143 19, 150 P.8d 228 (2007).
“Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a
duty of care is a threshold issue; absent some
duty, an action for negligence cannot be
maintained.” Jd. 111 (citation omitted).

{8 We first address whether Alger, the
patient, owed any duty to Sanders, who pro-
vided caregiver services to him pursuant to
her contract with DES, The court of appeals
held that such a duty exists because all peo-
ple have a duty to use reasonable care to
avoid causing injury to others, Sanders, 240
Ariz. at 94 119; of Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liab, for Physical & Emotional Harm
§ 7a) (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (providing that
“{ajn actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct cre-
ates a risk of physical harm”), Although we
agree with the court of appeals that Alger
owed a duty of reasonable care to Sanders,
we decline to adopt that court’s rationale, as
we need not here decide whether people
generally owe a duty of reasonable care to
others, Cf Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 146 124 &
n4, 150 P.8d 228 (noting tension in Court’s
statements regarding scope of duty and de-
clining, as unnecessary, to base decision on

broad statements of duty generally owed by
all persons).

WM O19 Under Arizona common law,
duties of care may arise from, among other
things, a direct relationship between the par-
ties. Id. at 144-45 18, 150 P.8d 228; see also
Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221 17,
228 1 18, 92 P.8d 849 (2004) (recognizing duty
by examining physician even absent formal
physician-patient relationship); Ontiveros,
186 Ariz. at 508, 667 P.2d 200 (“The relation
between individuals which imposes a legal
obligation is usually a direct relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant.”); of Al-
hambra Sch, Dist. v. Superior Court, 165
Ariz, 88, 41, 796 P.2d 470 (1990) (“Duty re-
fers to the relationship between individuals;
it imposes a legal obligation on one party for
the benefit of the other party.”) (citation
omitted).

110 No one questions that caregivers who
contractually agree to provide services (such
as helping a person with mobility issues)
have a direct relationship with their patients
and owe them a duty of reasonable care in
connection with such services. Nor would
anyone dispute that, given the relationship,
the caregiver owes a duty of reasonable care
with respect to actions beyond the contractu-
ally assumed responsibilities. For example, a
caregiver hired to help with mobility issues
would undoubtedly owe a duty of care that
would be implicated if the caregiver negli-
gently spilled scalding water on the patient.

111 The question here is whether patients
owe any duty to their caregivers, Recogniz-
ing such a duty comports with our recogni-
tion of duties in other contexts. If a patient
sues a caregiver for alleged negligence, the
defendant caregiver generally will be able to
argue that the patient’s own failure to act
with reasonable care constitutes contributory
negligence. See, e9., George Washington
Univ. v. Waas, 648 A.2d 178, 184-85 (D.C.
1994) (citing case law and jury instructions
from numerous states and other legal author-
ity recognizing a patient’s contributory negli-
gence and duty to his or her physician in
medical contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Torts
§ 8.2.1, at 189 (1999) (noting that duty is an
element of contributory negligence),

249

Hl 112 Recognizing a duty of care on
the part of patients is also consistent with
the rescue doctrine recognized in Hspinoza v.
Schulenburg, 212 Ariz, 215, 129 P8d 987
(2006), Under the rescue doctrine, an actor
who negligently imperils himself or herself
may be liable to a person who is physically
harmed in attempting to aid or protect the
actor, See Espinoza, 212 Ariz, at 217 117-9,
129 P.8d 987 (adopting Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liab. For Physical & Emotional
Harms § 82); see also Cowen v. Thornton,
621 So.2d 684, 687-88 & n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding patient owed duty of care
to caregiver despite patient’s assertion that
the firefighter’s rule barred the caregiver
rescuer’s claim). “The law should encourage
people to respond to those in distress. The
rescue doctrine does so by allowing the possi-
bility of compensation to those who injure
themselves while taking risks to help others.”
Espinoza, 212 Ariz, at 217 19, 129 P.8d 987.
‘Thus, the rescue doctrine presumes a “duty”
on the part of the actor whose conduct cre-
ates the need for rescue—if the actor fails to
exercise reasonable care and imperils the
actor or another, the actor’s breach of that
duty may result in liability to a person
harmed while trying to aid or protect the
actor. See Sears v, Morrison, 76 Cal.App.4th
577, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 582-84 (1999) (com-
piling cases from various jurisdictions and
other authorities recognizing that rescuer
may seek recovery from person negligently
placing himself or herself in danger).

Hs 118 Recognizing a duty by patients
to their caregivers is not, of course, the same
as saying that patients will be liable for
injuries incurred by a caregiver in doing his
or her job or that the patient’s standard of
care is the same as that of a caregiver. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299(A)
(Am. Law Inst. 1965) (noting “one who un-
dertakes to render services in the practice of
a profession or trade is required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed
by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities”), That
a duty exists does not mean that it has been
breached in any particular case or that a
negligent act has proximately caused an inju-
ry. Similarly, recognizing the existence of a

250

duty of care does not preclude the jury's
application of doctrines such as comparative
fault, assumption of risk, or superseding
cause to limit recovery of damages. See Gip-
son, 214 Ariz, at 147 130, 150 P.38d 228
(noting that “[w]hether the plaintiff's conduct
constituted an intervening (or even a su-
perseding) cause of the harm suffered is a
question of fact and does not determine
whether a duty exists”); see also A.R.S.
§ 12-2505(A) (providing that defenses of con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk do
not bar action but reduce damages “in pro-
portion to the relative degree of the claim-
ant’s fault which is a proximate cause of the
injury or death”),

114 Alger argues that public policy factors
weigh against imposing a duty on him as a
disabled adult because doing so would dis-
courage individuals and their families from
seeking state-provided caregiving services.
Although public policy may support the adop-
tion of a no-duty rule in some circumstances,
see Guerra v. State, 237 Ariz, 188, 187 120,
348 P.8d 423 (2015), we decline to adopt a
rule that patients categorically owe no duty
of care to those who provide caregiver ser-
vices. Cf Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143-44 911,
150 P.8d 228 (noting that “a conclusion that
no duty exists is equivalent to a rule that, for
certain categories of cases, defendants may
not be held accountable for damages they
carelessly cause, no matter how unreasonable
their conduct”),

(15 Contrary to Alger’s arguments, a
blanket exemption of liability for injuries pa-
tients cause their caregivers is not “neces-
sary as a matter of public welfare.” Ontive-
ros, 186 Ariz. at 518, 667 P.2d 200. Nor can
we conclude that finding a duty here would
“chill socially desirable conduct or otherwise
have adverse effects.” Gipson, 214 Ariz. at
146 1129, 150 P.8d 228. Indeed, barring recov-
ery by caregivers might well discourage peo-
ple from providing such services.

Hs‘ 16 Apart from whether patients
generally owe any duty to their caregivers,
Alger also argues that we should find that no
duty exists here because Sanders agreed in
her contract with DES to provide services to
protect Alger, and his individual support
plan—of which she was aware—recognized

that his condition placed him at risk of fall-
ing. Thus, Alger argues, he should not have
owed any duty to Sanders to avoid the risk
that she contractually undertook to prevent,
This argument founders because, at bottom,
it asserts that Sanders assumed the risk that
caused her injury. Under Arizona law,
whether a plaintiff has contractually assumed.
a risk is an issue of fact for the jury, not an
issue of “duty” to be decided as a matter of
law. See Phelps v, Firebird Raceway, Inc.,
210 Ariz, 408, 404 12, 405 111, 111 P.8d 1008
(2005); see also Ariz. Const. art, 18, § 5;
ALR.S, § 12-2505(A).

S117 In summary, we hold that,
based on the direct relationship between car-
egiver and patient, the latter owes a duty of
reasonable care with respect to conduct cre-
ating a risk of physical harm to the caregiv-
er.

B.

HM {118 Alger argues that even if he
owed a duty of care to Sanders, her negli-
gence claim should be barred by the fire-
fighter’s rule. Like the court of appeals, we
conclude that the rule does not apply here.

HMM 119 The firefighter’s rule is an ex-
ception to the rescue doctrine, ie., “[a] res-
cuer who could otherwise recover cannot do
so if she is performing her duties as a profes-
sional firefighter.” Hspinoza, 212 Ariz. at 217
711, 129 P.38d 937. Our courts recognize the
firefighter’s rule as a matter of public policy,
noting that “the tort system is not the appro-
priate vehicle for compensating public safety
employees for injuries sustained as a result
of negligence that creates the very need for
their employment.” Jd. Rather, firefighters
are compensated as public employees. Id.

120 In urging us to apply the firefighter’s
rule, Alger notes that Sanders, although an
independent contractor and not a public em-
ployee, was paid with public funds to care for
him; Sanders may seek compensation for her
injuries through the State’s Provider Indem-
nity Program (“PIP”); and Alger’s disabilities
created the need for Sanders’ employment.

Hs {21 We construe the firefighter’s
rule narrowly, Id. at 218 117, 129 P.8d 937.

“The rule applies when a firefighter’s pres-
ence at a rescue scene results from the fire-
fighter’s on-duty obligations as a firefighter.”
Id, (footnote omitted). Thus, the rule does
not prohibit tort recovery for off-duty fire-
fighters. Id. at 218-19 1117, 129 P.8d 987.
Limiting the reach of the firefighter’s rule
“comport[s] with Arizona’s policy of protect-
ing its citizens’ right to pursue tort claims.”
Id, at 218 116, 129 P.8d 987; see also Ariz.
Const, art. 18, § 6 (“The right of action to
recover damages for injuries shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recovered shall
not be subject to any statutory limita-
tion....”); id, art, 2, § 81 (prohibiting laws
limiting damages for death and injury).

HI 1.22 Moreover, the firefighter’s rule
is an exception to the rescue doctrine rather
than a more general rule barring tort recov-
ery. Our recognition of a patient’s duty to his
or her caregiver is based on the direct, cate-
gorical relationship and is not limited to situ-
ations in which the caregiver responds to an
emergency created by the patient’s negli-
gence, Arguably, the rescue doctrine would
not apply (nor would the firefighter’s rule as
an exception to that doctrine) in this case,
inasmuch as Sanders was performing her
usual duties in assisting Alger rather than
responding to an emergency. Cf: Orth v. Cole,
191 Ariz. 291, 292 16, 955 P.2d 47 (App.
1998) (declining to apply firefighter’s rule to
routine inspections).

123 In any event, we decline to extend the
firefighter’s rule to caregivers to prohibit
their recovery when responding to an emer-
geney, Unlike firefighters, caregivers gener-
ally are not “public safety employees” who
are trained, equipped, and compensated to
professionally rescue others. See Espinoza,
212 Ariz, at 217 711, 129 P.8d 987. Even
though the caregiver's salary here was paid
with public funds, like a firefighter’s, see id.
(quoting Grable v. Varela, 115 Ariz, 222, 228,
564 P.2d 911 (App. 1977)), such compensation
does not convert a caregiver into a profes-
sional rescuer. Furthermore, the existence of
the PIP does not alter our conclusion. Cf id.
at 219 120, 129 P.8d 937 (“[TJhe availability
of workers’ compensation to a particular
worker does not control our determination of
the applicability of the firefighter’s rule.”).

251

Finally, we agree with the court of appeals
that Sanders’ job did not depend on encoun-
tering “negligence that creates the very need
for [her] employment” in the same way a
firefighter encounters mostly negligently
caused fires, See id. at 217 111, 129 P.3d 937,

c.

924 Alger argued in the trial court that no
reasonable juror could find he acted negli-
gently in the circumstances of this case, The
trial court did not decide this issue, and the
court of appeals declined to do so in the first
instance, See Sanders, 240 Ariz. at 95 121,
3875 P.8d 1199. We did not grant review on
this issue, but we note it to underscore that
our ruling does not establish liability on Al-
ger’s part. As the court of appeals recog-
nized, id. at 94 119 n.2, 875 P.8d 1199, the
duty owed by Alger is that of a reasonable
person under the circumstances, and those
circumstances include his physical disabilities
and limitations. See Alhambra Sch, Dist., 165
Aviz, at 42, 796 P.2d 470 (“The particular
facts of the case ... are the circumstances
under which the reasonableness of the [de-
fendant’s] conduct is to be judged.”) (footnote
omitted); Morris v. Ortiz, 108 Ariz. 119, 121,
487 P.2d 652 (1968); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 283(C) (Am. Law Inst. 1965). He will
be entitled to summary judgment if, as he
contends, “no reasonable juror could con-
clude that the standard of care was breach-
ed....” Gipson, 214 Ariz, at 143 19 n.1, 150
P.8d 228,

mm.

125 We vacate 116-19 of the court of
appeals’ opinion, reverse the trial court’s
summary judgment in Alger’s favor, and re-
mand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

252

394 P.3d 1089

EARLE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability, Plain-
tiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee,

ve

SOUTHERN DESERT MEDICAL CEN-
TER PARTNERS, an Arizona general
partnership, Defendant/Counterclaim-
ant/Appellant.

No, 1 CA-CYV 15-0507
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/18/2017

Combs Law Group, PC, Phoenix, By
Christopher A. Combs, Alexandra E. Fugate,
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Ap-
pellee

Dickinson Wright, PLLC, Phoenix, By Mi-
chael R. Scheurich, Maggie E. Wood, Coun-
sel for Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Jon W. Thompson and Chief Judge
Michael J. Brown joined,

OPINION

JOHNSEN, Judge:

11 We address in this case the effect of
broadly written subordination agreements a
landowner executed in support of deeds of
trust that secured loans made to the owner
of some commercial condominium units situ-
ated on the owner's land. We conclude the
subordination agreements functioned as con-
veyances of the landowner’s interest in the
encumbered property, and vacate and re-
mand the superior court’s judgment to the
extent it is inconsistent with that conclusion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
2 In January 1974, Duane P, Alleman, on
behalf of Du Paul Ltd. (“Du Paul”), conveyed.
by warranty deed a fee-simple interest in

253

land located in Tempe to Arizona Title Insur-
ance and Trust Company (“Arizona Title”).
In 1976, Arizona Title then leased a portion
of the land to Duane P. Alleman, acting on
behalf of Southern Desert Medical Center,
Ine,, “Phase II” (“SDMC Ine.”),

13 The 50-year lease stated that SDMC
Ine, could use the land “only for the purpose
of operating and maintaining offices for med-
ical and dental and related services.” SDMC
Inc. was to pay all taxes and assessments
and rent of $1,250 per month. Additionally,
the lease provided it was “UNDERSTOOD
AND AGREED that the lease-hold interest
of the Lessee may be enrolled in a Horizon-
tal property Regime” pursuant to Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 38-561
(1976). The lease specified that SDMC Ine.
could convey “Units” of its leasehold estate
under such a horizontal property regime.
Each such conveyance would include a pro-
portionate interest in the “Common Areas”
of the horizontal property regime, The lease
provided that Unit owners would be respon-
sible for their respective shares of rent, taxes
and assessments due under the lease. The
lease further set out remedies available to
Arizona Title as lessor in the event of a
breach by a Unit owner, Among other things,
Arizona Title could “terminate this Lease as
to that portion of the premises on which the
leasehold estate is owned by such [Unit own-
er.”

14 The lease also addressed respective
rights and obligations with respect to securi-
ty interests. First, SDMC Ine. agreed that
its leasehold interest would be subordinate to
any mortgage or deed of trust placed on
Arizona Title’s interest in the property, with
the proviso that the lease would remain in
full force and effect notwithstanding any de-
fault, The lease also addressed the possibility
that an owner of a Unit might want to post
its interest as security for a loan:

Lessor may, in its sole discretion, but it

shall not be obligated to, subordinate its

interest in portions of the real estate to the
lien of a mortgage or Deed of Trust grant-
ed of [sic] the grantee of the leasehold
estate in one or more Units under a Decla-
ration of Horizontal Property Regime. In
such event, however, the subordination

254

shall be only as to the property upon which
the leasehold estate is owned by such
grantee, and appurtenant interest in the
Common Areas.

15 On the same day it entered into the
lease with Arizona Title, SDMC Ine. estab-
lished a horizontal property regime on the
parcel. The Declaration that established the
regime recited that Arizona Title was the
owner of fee-simple title to the land and that,
pursuant to its lease, SDMC Inc. was “the
owner of the leasehold estate in and to the
aforedescribed property, subject to the provi-
sions of said Lease.” The Declaration further
recited that SDMC Inc. was constructing on
the parcel a professional building project that
was to be known as Southern Desert Medical
Center, Phase II, which “shall be held, sold
and conveyed” subject to the Declaration.
The regime was to last until the 50-year
lease from Arizona Title expired.

16 As provided in the Declaration, SDMC
Ine. was to divide the project into “Units”
and “Common Elements.” The Declaration
defined “Unit” to mean “a separate leasehold
estate, consisting of the space bounded by
and contained within the perimeter walls,
floors, ceilings and windows of each Unit.”
‘The Declaration specified that “Common Hle-
ments” and “Common Area” were “synony-
mous,” and meant “each multi-office struc-
ture, except for the Units, the earth upon
which the structure is located and the air
space above, the interior surface of the ceil-
ing of the structure,” and, inter alia, all bear-
ing walls, roofs, ceilings, floors, foundations,
storage spaces, patios, lobbies, carports,
parking spaces, pipes, wires. Further, owner-
ship of a “condominium” within the meaning
of the Declaration would include “the lease-
hold interest in a Unit,” along with an undi-
vided interest in the Common Areas, Finally,
the Declaration specified that each condomin-
ium was “a separate parcel of real property
which may be conveyed, transferred and en-
1. Consistent with the Declaration, ownership of a

condominium generally means ownership of a

horizontal layer of cubic content space, subject

to the owner's exclusive control, together with a

fractional interest held in common with other

unit owners in the common elements. Makeever

v, Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 386, 609 P.2d 1084 (App.
1980), citing former ARS, § 33-553(3), The

cumbered in the same manner as any other
parcel of real property, independently of all
other parts of the property, subject only to
the provisions of this Declaration and the
underlying Lease.” !

17 On June 28, 1977, Duane P, Alleman,
acting on behalf of SDMC Ine., conveyed to
Duane P. Alleman, in his personal capacity,
two suites of condominiums under the re-
gime, designated as numbers 1 through 34 of
Building “G” and numbers 40 through 59 of
Building “I.” The warranty deed described
the real property to be conveyed as the
Units, “TOGETHER with an undivided ...
interest in and to the Leasehold Estate in
and to the subject Real Property, and TO-
GETHER with [an undivided] interest in the
common areas,” all as set forth in the Decla-
ration. Two days later, to secure financing
for tenant improvements, Alleman granted a
lender a security interest in each of the two
suites through identical deeds of trust. The
same day, Arizona Title, as owner/lessor, and
SDMC Ine., as lessee, executed two identical
Subordination Agreements. The particulars
of the Subordination Agreements are set out
‘infra 11 15, 23, 25, 29.

{8 Two years later, Arizona Title con-
veyed to Du Paul by special warranty deed
its fee-simple title in and to the land that was
subject to the lease between Arizona Title
and SDMC Ine. On the same day, Du Paul
conveyed the same interest to Southern Des-
ert Medical Center Partners (“Partners”) by
warranty deed, At that point, therefore,
Partners became the owner/lessor of the par-
cel of land, subject to whatever rights, bene-
fits or obligations were imposed or granted
by the Subordination Agreements.

19 In July 1997, the lender foreclosed on
the deeds of trust securing construction of
Alleman’s two suites of Units. The condomin-
iums were sold at a trustee’s sale, and later
conveyed to a second entity, which, on No-
vember 7, 2001, conveyed the Units by war-

common elements include “the land, the founda-
tions, floors, the exterior walls of each [unit],
ceilings and roofs, and in general all that portion
of the property other than that which is subject
to the exclusive ownership and control of an
individual [unit] owner.” 125 Ariz, at 386, 609
P.2d 1084, citing former § 33-551(6).

ranty deed to appellee, Earle Investments,
LLC (“Earle”).

10 Even though it was an owner of Units
ostensibly subject to the Lease, Earle paid
no rent to Partners, the owner/lessor, until
2012, when it agreed to pay six years’ back
rent of $35,481.07 for Units 1 through 34 of
Building “G” and $20,871.21 for Units 40
through 59 of Building “I.” Thereafter, Earle
made rent payments for several months, then
stopped, asserting that, under the Subordina-
tion Agreements and as a result of the fore-
closure sales in July 1997, it held a fee simple
interest in the land occupied by the Units, It
argued that when the lender foreclosed, the
owner/lessor’s fee-simple interest in the land
on which the Units were situated was extin-
guished.

111 In November 2013, Earle filed a com-
plaint against Partners, asking the court,
among other things, to quiet title in favor of
Earle. In due course, the superior court
granted Earle’s motion for summary judg-
ment, finding Earle had “good and valid and
inclusive of full fee simple title” in “Units 1
through 34, inclusive, of Building G, and
Units 40 through 59, inclusive, of Building 1.”
The court also ruled that Earle’s title to the
Units was not subject to the Lease, and
therefore “enjoined, estopped, and barred
[Partners] from asserting any claim, estate,
right, title, or interest whatsoever in or to
the land or premises, or to any part thereof,
adverse to ... Earle.”

712 Partners timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9,
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A) (2017)?

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles.

9113 Summary judgment is appropriate
when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts and
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party against which judg-

2, Absent material revision after the relevant date,

255

ment was entered, Corbett v. Manorcare of
Am., Inc., 218 Ariz, 618, 621-22, 12, 146 P.8d
1027 (App. 2006),

HME {114 The interpretation of a con-
tract is a matter of law, which we review de
novo. Rand v. Porsche Fin. Servs, 216 Ariz.
424, 434, 187, 167 P.8d 111 (App. 2007), In
interpreting a contract, our purpose is to
determine and enforce the parties’ intent, US
W. Comme'ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n,
185 Ariz, 277, 280, 915 P.2d 1232 (App. 1996),
In determining the parties’ intent, we “look
to the plain meaning of the words as viewed
in the context of the contract as a whole.”
United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins., 140
Ariz, 238, 259, 681 P.2d 390 (App. 1983),

B. Subordination Agreement or Deed of
Trust.

MM 115 Each of the two Subordination
Agreements expressly provided that the re-
lated deed of trust “shall unconditionally be
and remain at all times a lien, charge, and
encumbrance upon the Property prior and
superior to any right, title, or interest in or
to the Property of Owner or Lessee.” Earle
argues the Subordination Agreements effec-
tively conveyed the owner/lessor’s fee-simple
interest in the Property; as the current own-
er/lessor, Partners argues the Subordination
Agreements encumbered only the leasehold
estate.

116 Our analysis is informed by a handful
of cases from other jurisdictions, the first
being Old Stone Capital Corp. v. John Hoene
Implement Corp., 647 F.Supp. 916 (D. Idaho
1986), which addressed a question very simi-
lar to the one here. As here, the lessee had
granted a lender a deed of trust on its lease
interest in some commercial property, and,
at the lessee’s request, the owner/lessor exe-
cuted a subordination agreement. After the
lessee defaulted and the lender sought fore-
closure, the question was whether the own-
er/lessor had subordinated her fee interest or
only her lease interest in the property sub-
ject to the deed of trust. Jd. at 917, The
owner/lessor argued she agreed to subor-
dinate only her leasehold interest in the
property, “as that was the only interest

we cite a statute’s current version.

256

which was the subject of the leasehold mort-
gage” that the lessee had executed, Jd, As in
this case, the owner/lessor’s argument was
that “the subordination agreement could only
prioritize the interest which [the lender] had,
and the only interest which it had was in the
leasehold.” Id.

{17 The court agreed with the owner/les-
sor. It explained that “the nature of a subor-
dination is such that the beneficiary of the
subordination must have a competing inter-
est which, after the subordination, becomes
senior to that which, before the subordina-
tion, was the senior interest.” Jd, at 919, As
applied, the only interest the security agree-
ment granted the lender in that case was in
the lessee’s leasehold, After the subordina-
tion, therefore, the lender’s interest in the
lease became superior to the owner/lessor’s
interest in the lease. Id. But “[bly its very
nature, the vehicle of subordination could not
be used to grant [the lender] an interest in
the fee.” Id, Significantly for our purposes,
however, the court observed that the lender
might have acquired an interest in the own-
ex/lessor’s fee if the owner/lessor had execut-
ed what amounted to a mortgage or a deed of
trust, Id, There was no dispute in that case
that the subordination agreement lacked the
formalities state law required for a mortgage
or deed of trust, Id.

18 Applying the same logic, the court in
Republic National Life Ins, v. Lorraine Re-
alty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn. 1979),
held that an agreement that “[tJhe interest of
the Lessors in the leased premises .,. shall
be junior and subordinate to the interest of
[the lender]” did not subordinate the own-
er/lessor’s fee interest. The court explained,
“Ground lessors manifestly intended to retain
their fee interest, and only if they themselves
mortgaged the fee would the lessee’s mort-
gagees have priority over the fee.” Id, at 355.

{19 In Matthews v. Hinton, 234 Cal.
App.2d 736, 44 Cal.Rptr, 692 (1965), the court
addressed the same issue but held for the
lender because it concluded the owner/lessor
had joined in the deed of trust. The court
began its analysis by describing the econom-
ies of the situation: “The lessees or subles-
sees might have attempted to put up their
tenancy for years as security for construction

loans. A fee simple estate would be far more
attractive security to a lender.” Jd. at 741, 44
Cal.Rptr. 692 (citation omitted). While the
relevant security agreements in Old Stone
and Lorraine did not purport to convey the
owner/lessor’s fee interest, the deed of trust
in Matthews did just that; By expressly join-
ing with the lessees as “trustor,” the own-
er/lessor “contracted directly with the lender,
exposing [its] reversionary interest to direct
liability independently of auxiliary collection
attempts against the borrowers.” Id.

120 The court in Travelers Ins, v, Holiday
Village Shopping Center Ltd. Par., 280 Mont.
217, 981 P.2d 1292 (1996), applied a similar
analytical framework in reversing summary
judgment entered in favor of the lender, The
subordination agreement in that case recited
that the lender was “unwilling to make said
joan or advance funds thereon unless it is
assured that the [mortgage granted by the
lessee] shall be a lien upon the [owner/les-
sor’s] fee simple title in the hereinbefore
described real property....” Id. at 1295, The
agreement continued:

WHEREAS, the undersigned [owner/les-

sor] is willing to subordinate its fee simple

title to said real property to said mortgage
and is willing to give such assurance,

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of

the making of said loan ... the under-

signed hereby subordinates all of its right,
title and interest in and to said real prop-
erty to the lien of said mortgage and
agrees that said mortgage shall continue to
be a first lien upon said property prior and
superior in right to any right, title and
interest of the undersigned in and to said
real property.

Id, at 1295,

721 The Montana Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the lender, holding that
the agreement was ambiguous. Id. at 1296.
In explaining the ambiguity, the court noted
that although the subordination agreement
recited that the owner/lessor’s fee interest
was to be “subordinated,” it contained no
language purporting to mortgage the proper-
ty to the lender as security. Id. The court
explained, “A subordination agreement only
dictates the priorities between existing inter-

ests, for example lien holders—it does not
mortgage an interest in the property. A
mortgage ‘is a contract by which specific
property is hypothecated for the perform-
ance of an act, without the necessity of a
change of possession.’ ” Id. (citation omitted),

22 Applying the principles of these deci-
sions to this case, the first question is wheth-
er the two Subordination Agreements func-
tioned as mortgages or deeds of trust that
conveyed the owner/lessor’s fee interest in
some property. We say “some property” be-
cause the somewhat awkward wording of the
Subordination Agreements requires our anal-
ysis to proceed in stages,

123 To begin with, the “whereas” clauses
at the beginning of each of the Subordination
Agreements broadly describe facts leading
up to execution of the document. In particu-
lar, the fourth such clause recites that “it is a
condition precedent to making said loan that
the Deed of Trust shall unconditionally be
and remain at all times a lien, charge, and
encumbrance upon the Property prior and
superior to any right, title, or interest in or
to the Property of Owner..,..” But the dis-
positive language is paragraph (2), which
states:

The Deed of Trust and the Note, and

renewals or extensions thereof, shall un-

conditionally be and remain at all times a

lien, charge, and encumbrance on the

Property prior and superior to any right,

title, or interest therein of Owner.... For

the purpose of giving effect to this subordi-
nation, Owner consent(s] to and
join[s] in the Deed of Trust and hereby
grant{s], transfer[s}, and assign[s] to the

Trustee of the Deed of Trust all right, title,

and interest of Owner ... in and to the

Property, in trust pursuant to the Deed of

Trust with the power of sale, it being

understood that such power of sale shall be

exercised only in connection with the en-
forcement of the Deed of Trust.
(Emphasis added.)

{24 Guided by the authorities discussed
above, we hold that by agreeing to this pro-
vision, the owner/lessor did more than subor-
3, Given the passage of time, neither party offers

any extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties
to the Subordination Agreements; nor does Part-

257

dinate the leasehold to the lender; it con-
veyed all of its right, title and interest,
namely its fee interest, “in and to the Prop-
erty” in trust as security for debt, That is
the effect of the owner/lessor’s joining in the
deeds of trust and expressly “grant[ing],
transfer[ring], and assignfing]” all of its
“right, title, and interest” to the trustee?

125 Partners argues this conclusion disre-
gards the provision in Exhibit A to the sub-
ordinations that the conveyances in the deeds
of trust shall be “SUBJECT TO” the lease.
Reading the body of the Subordination
Agreements together with the property de-
scription, however, the owner/lessor’s joinder
in the deeds of trust supersedes the “subject
to” provision in the property description.
That is, Exhibit A acknowledges that the
property the Unit owner is conveying as
security is subject to the lease; by joining in
the deeds of trust and conveying all of its
“yight, title, and interest” in the property,
the owner/lessor conveyed its fee-simple in-
terest in the described property,

26 Partners further argues that the Sub-
ordination Agreements cannot be construed
as deeds of trust because they lack a suffi-
cient legal description. As Earle points out,
however, Exhibit A to the Subordination
Agreements contains a legal description of
the property conveyed, Those documents de-
scribe the property by reference to the Dec-
laration of Horizontal Property Regime and
specify the docket and page number on
which the description is recorded. The Subor-
dination Agreements therefore adequately
described the property. See Wang Elec, Inc.
v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC, 280 Ariz, 314,
824, 188, 288 P.8d 45 (App. 2012),

27 For these reasons, we hold that by
executing the documents labeled “Subordina-
tion Agreement,” the owner/lessor conveyed
its fee interest “in and to the Property,” in
trust as security for the Unit-owner’s debt.

C. The “Subject Real Property.”

Hl 128 The conclusion that the Subordi-
nation Agreements effectively conveyed the

ners argue there are disputed issues of fact as to
their meaning.

258

owner/lessor’s fee interest “in and to the
Property” leaves open precisely what “Prop-
erty” was conveyed. Earle argues the superi-
or court correctly ruled that when the lender
foreclosed, it took fee title to the land be-
neath the Units that secured the debt. The
cases cited above do not answer this question
because they involved simple commercial
leases, not commercial condominiums as are
at issue here,

129 Returning to the language of the Sub-
ordination Agreements, the key provision is,
as we have said, the owner/lessor’s consent
and joinder in the deeds of trust so as to
“gvant, transfer, and assign to the Trustee of
the Deed of Trust all right, title, and interest
of Owner ... in and to the Property, in trust
pursuant to the Deed of Trust....” The
Subordination Agreements define “the Prop-
erty” to mean the property described in an
attached “Exhibit A.” In turn, Exhibit A to
each of the Subordination Agreements de-
seribes the Property as: (1) the specified
“Units” as recorded in the Declaration; (2)
“TOGETHER with an undivided [fractional]
‘interest in and to the Leasehold Estate in
and to the subject Real Property,” and (8)
“TOGETHER with a [fractional] interest in
the common areas and facilities as set forth
in said Declaration.” (Emphasis added.)

180 None of the three elements of the
described “Property” includes the ground be-
neath any particular Unit or Units. Earle
argues that the second item—the “interest in
and to the Leasehold Estate in and to the
subject Real Property” means the land be-
neath the Units it owns. But that interpreta-
tion unduly stretches the language of the
property description: The interest specified
in Exhibit A is an wndivided fractional inter-
est in “the Leasehold Estate in and to the
subject Real Property.” Thus, when the lend-
er foreclosed, it received (1) the Unit-owner’s
interest in the Units (as defined by and
subject to the Declaration), (2) an undivided
fee-simple interest in the leasehold estate “in
and to the subject Real Property,” and (8) an
undivided fee-simple interest in the Common
Areas and facilities, as set forth in the Decla-
ration,

{81 In support of the superior court’s
ruling that the lender took fee-simple title to

the land beneath the Units subject to the
deeds of trust, Earle points to the provision
in the lease, swpra {5, stating that the own-
er/lessor “may ... subordinate its interest in
portions of the real estate” to a Unit-owner’s
lender. As Harle notes, the lease continues,
“Tn such event, however, the subordination
shall be only as to the property upon which
the leasehold estate is owned by such grant-
ee, and the appurtenant interest in the Com-
mon Areas,”

182 The lease provision Earle cites re-
serves the owner/lessor’s right to subor-
dinate on certain terms, but does not pre-
clude the owner/lessor from agreeing to
subordination on terms less favorable to a
lender. Under the circumstances, we cannot,
construe the lease provision to broaden the
express terms of the Subordination Agree-
ments, If the parties had intended that the
owner/lessor would subordinate its interest
in “the property upon which the leasehold
estate is owned” by a Unit-owner, we pre-
sume they would have so stated in the Sub-
ordination Agreements. The reference in
Exhibit A to an “undivided interest,” which
is incorporated into the Subordination
Agreements by the Subordination Agree-
ments’ references to the exhibit as defining
the encumbered property, cannot be read to
refer to a fee-simple interest in the land on
which any specific Units are situated,

183 In summary, we conclude that in exe-
cuting the Subordination Agreements, the
owner/lessor conveyed to the lender, in trust
as security for repayment of the loan to the
Unit-owner, an undivided fractional fee-sim-
ple interest in the entire parcel of property
that was the subject of the Lease. In fore-
closing on the Deed of Trust, the lender
therefore succeeded to an undivided fraction-
al fee-simple interest in that property, and
after foreclosure, the lender owned the rele-
vant Units and the associated undivided frac-
tional fee-simple interests in the leasehold
and “Common Areas” and facilities. Since its
fee-simple interest was free and clear of the
owner/lessor’s interest in the leasehold, the
lender and its assigns were not subject to the
lease or any rent obligation. But they did not
gain a fee-simple interest in any particular
portion of the land subject to the Lease;

instead, their interest is an undivided frac-
tional fee-simple interest in the entire subject
property. Moreover, just as the owner/les-
sor’s interests were subject in the first in-
stance to the Declaration, the interests to
which the lender took title (and which now
are owned by Harle) remain subject to the
Declaration. Accordingly, Earle is subject to
the obligations spelled out in the Declaration
(other than the obligation to pay rent under
the lease).

D. Ratification.

HI 184 We have held that upon foreclo-
sure, the lender obtained a fee-simple inter-
est in the property, unencumbered by the
lease, Partners argues, however, that Earle
ratified the lease by making rent payments,
But the cases on which Partners relies do not
support the proposition that a lease obli-
gation may be created in the first instance by
payments denominated as rent. See All-Way
Leasing, Ine. v. Kelly, 182 Ariz, 218, 217, 895
P.2d 125 (App. 1994) (rejecting contention
that wife had ratified contract executed by
husband, so as to bind the community);
Young Mines Co. v. Citizens’ State Bank, 87
Ariz, 521, 528-29, 296 P. 247 (1981) (vatifica-
tion is “subsequent approval by a principal of
a previous unauthorized act by one claiming
to act as an agent”). Partners also cites
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 380
(1981), but that provision concerns acts by
which one may ratify a contract that is voida-
ble. See id. (“Loss of Power of Avoidance by
Affirmance”), As we have said, upon the
lender's foreclosure, the lease was not voida-
ble as to the lender and its assigns, but void.

CONCLUSION

185 For the reasons stated, we affirm the
judgment to the extent it provides that Earle
owns the Units and an undivided fractional
fee-simple interest in the property identified
in the Lease and is not subject to the obli-
gations of the Lease. We otherwise reverse
and remand the judgment to the superior
court so that it may enter a revised judgment
consistent with this opinion. Because neither
4, Our decision to address the ratification issue

on the merits renders moot Partners’ contention
that the superior court erred by declining to

259

side has substantially prevailed in this ap-
peal, we deny both sides’ requests for fees
and costs, See A.R.S. §§ 12-841.01 (2017), -

842 (2017),

394 P.3d 1096
Michele GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
v

The Honorable Dewain D. FOX, Judge of
the Superior Court of the State of Ari-
zona, in and for the County of Maricopa,
Respondent Judge,

Robert Kivlighn, II, Real
Party in Interest.
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0047

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/13/2017

consider Partners’ reply in support of its second
motion for reconsideration,

262

Horne Slaton, PLLC, Scottsdale, By San-
dra Slaton, Kristin M. Roebuck, Counsel for
Petitioner

Cantor Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix, By
Bryan Blehm, The Murray Law Offices,
Scottsdale, By Stanley D. Murray, Co-Coun-
sel for Real Party in Interest

Judge Paul J, McMurdie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Patricia
K. Norris joined,

OPINION

McMURDIE, Judge:

11 Michele Gutierrez (“Mother”) seeks
special action relief, challenging the superior
court’s temporary orders awarding joint legal
decision-making authority to both parents,
and parenting time with Robert Kivlighn II
(“Father”) to occur in Arizona. Mother ar-
gues the temporary orders are invalid be-
cause (1) Arizona is not the minor child’s

1, We cite to the current version of applicable
statutes and rules when no revision material to

home state, (2) the superior court did not
make statutory findings pursuant to Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 25-403,
and (8) as Father had not established pater-
nity by the time she moved, she did not have
to obtain Father’s consent to move with the
child to Wisconsin.*

12 We previously issued an order accept-
ing jurisdiction, denying relief, and stating a
written decision would follow. This is that
decision, We hold that (1) under A.R.S. § 25-
1002(7)(b) when a child of six months of age
or younger has lived in Arizona “from birth
with a parent,” and the proceeding is com-
menced by a parent still living in Arizona
within six months of the child leaving Ari-
zona, Arizona remains the home state of the
child; (2) statutory findings under A.R.S.
§ 25-408 are not mandatory when determin-
ing temporary orders under A.R.S § 25-404;
and (8) a voluntary acknowledgement of pa-
ternity has the same effect as a judgment,
thereby requiring Mother to obtain Father’s
consent or a court order to permanently
move the child out of Arizona.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

{13 MLK, was born outside of marriage in
Arizona on July 21, 2016. M.K’s birth was
registered with the Arizona Department of
Health Services (“Department”) on July 31,
2016, and the Department issued a “certifi-
cate of live birth” on December 5, 2016. The
certificate lists Kivlighn as the father. Al-
though Mother and Father have never mar-
ried, they and MLK. lived in Arizona together
until September 29, 2016, when Mother left
Arizona with MLK. after a disagreement with
Father. Mother arrived in Wisconsin on Oc-
tober 2, 2016,

{4 Father initially believed Mother and
MK. had left Arizona to visit Mother’s family
in Wisconsin and would return to Arizona.
However, Father received a text message
from Mother on November 23, 2016, inform-
ing him that she had decided to permanently

this case has occurred.

relocate to Wisconsin with M.K? Father
traveled to Wisconsin to try to convince
Mother to return to Arizona, but was unsuc-
cessful,

15 Immediately after he returned from
Wisconsin, on November 28, 2016, Father
petitioned to establish his paternity, legal
decision-making, parenting time and child
support (“the petition”), and moved for tem-
porary orders, M.K. was four months and
nine days old when Father filed the petition.

16 On December 2, 2016, Mother filed a
petition to establish paternity, legal decision-
making (custody) and parenting time in Wis-
consin, and verified under oath that Father
was M.K.’s biological father. The Arizona and
Wisconsin courts conferred and agreed the
Arizona court would decide which state had
jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(“UCCJEA”). After the parties briefed the
jurisdictional issue in December 2016, the
superior court issued an order in which it
determined Arizona had “exclusive home
state jurisdiction to make the initial child
custody order,” and that Arizona was “not an
inconvenient forum” pursuant to A.R.S,
§ 25-1037(B) (“the jurisdictional order”).

17 On February 10, 2017, the superior
court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
Father’s motion for temporary orders re-
garding legal decision-making, parenting
time, and child support. Father testified he
cared for M.K., held and nurtured him as
much as he could, utilizing the parenting
skills he had learned as the oldest of seven
siblings. Father sought to establish an equal
parenting plan, as he wanted to actively par-
ticipate in M.K.’s up-bringing, feed him from
a bottle, change his diapers, and teach him as
he had with his six younger siblings,

98 During the hearing, Father denied
Mother's allegation that he had a substance
abuse problem, although he admitted that he

2. Mother testified that Father knew she was mov-
ing to Wisconsin permanently when she left in
September because she “packed [her] car with
everything [she] needed” and told him she
missed her family and needed their support.

3. The test results filed with the superior court on
February 15, 2017, were negative for any illegal
substances, While the parties did not submit the

263

previously legally used alcohol and marijuana
with Mother in Colorado. Father provided
the court with drug test results, showing
negative results for alcohol and a variety of
drugs and other substances. Father further
denied he had any criminal history, and stat-
ed that he had never been cited for driving
under the influence. Father testified he had
not experienced any employment problems
or been terminated from a job because of
drug use, Father denied suffering from sui-
cidal tendencies or mental health problems.
Father also denied all of Mother's allegations
of physical abuse, although he admitted to
having “called her names” and being aggres-
sive and angry at times, Father’s sister testi-
fied and opined Mother restricted Father’s
aecess to MLK. before she left for Wisconsin.

19 Mother testified Father had a sub-
stance abuse problem because he drank daily
and smoked marijuana. Mother asserted Fa-
ther was rarely involved in caring for M.K.
Mother further testified she has extensive
family support in Wisconsin, where she grew
up, and asserted that neither Father nor his
family had helped with MLK. in any signifi- «
cant way. She denied having restricted Fa-
ther’s access to M.K,, noting she had provid-
ed Father with photos, told Father he could
“FaceTime” with M.K., and “never told him
he could not see his child.” Mother admitted,
however, she would not allow Father to be
with MK. for an extended amount of time,
and confirmed she did not consider Father a
primary caregiver.

110 At the conclusion of the temporary
orders hearing on February 10, 2017, the
superior court entered an interim order re-
quiring Father to submit to a hair follicle
test.3 The court declined to require super-
vised parenting time. The court granted Fa-
ther daily parenting time of two three-hour
inerements until February 15, at which point
Mother could return to Wisconsin with M.K.

results to this court for review, we have taken
judicial notice of them. State v. McGuire, 124
Ariz. 64, 66, 601 P.2d 1348 (App. 1978) (“An
appellate court can take judicial notice of any
matter of which the trial court may take judicial
notice, even if the trial court was never asked to
do so.”).

264

111 On February 15, 2017, the superior
court filed temporary orders, which included
a section titled “Best Interest Findings:
ARS. § 25-403.” In its order, the court
found Father’s paternity “sufficiently estab-
lished,” awarded Father parenting time to
take place in Arizona, and awarded Father
and Mother joint legal decision-making au-
thority. Mother then filed this special action
seeking review of the superior court’s tempo-
rary orders.

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION

HMM 112 Special action jurisdiction is
discretionary, but appropriate when no
“equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
by appeal” exists, Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).
Because temporary orders under A.R.S,
§ 25-404 are “merely preparatory to a later
proceeding” that might affect the judgment
or its enforcement, they are not appealable;
leaving a party with no adequate remedy by
appeal. Villares v. Pineda, 217 Ariz. 628,
624-25, 110-11, 177 P.8d 1195 (App. 2008);
see Ariz, R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a), But of ARS,
§ 25-1064 (an appeal may be taken from a
final order in a proceeding enforcing the
UCCJEA). We therefore have discretion to
accept special action jurisdiction over tempo-
rary orders. Villares, 217 Ariz. at 625, 111,
177 P.8d 1195; see DePasquale v. Super. Ct.
In and For County of Maricopa, 181 Ariz.
888, 386-87, 890 P.2d 628 (App. 1995) (the
proper challenge to a temporary order is by
special action).

Hl 1118 We also have discretion to accept
special action jurisdiction “when statutes or
procedural rules require immediate interpre-
tation,” and a petition “presents a purely
legal issue of first impression that is of state-
wide importance.” Hscalanti v. Super. Ct. In
and For County of Maricopa, 165 Ariz. 385,
986, 799 P.2d 5 (App. 1990); State ew rel,
Thomas v. Duncan, 216 Ariz, 260, 262, 15,
165 P.8d 238 (App. 2007); see Ariz, R.P. Spec.
Act. 8(a).

114 The petition for special action in this
ease raises an issue of first impression re-
garding the application of jurisdiction of
ARS. § 25-1081(A)(1) for a child under six
months of age as defined in A.R.S. § 25-
1002(7)(b). Also, there is no controlling au-

thority whether the superior court must
make statutory findings of fact pursuant to
AUR.S. § 25-408 from a § 25-404 temporary
order hearing in which parenting time and
decision-making authority are contested. Fi-
nally, whether establishment of paternity by
a voluntary acknowledgement pursuant to
ARS, § 25-812(D) has the same effect as a
judgment, is an issue which requires our
immediate interpretation.

15 Thus, in the exercise of our discretion,
‘we accept special action jurisdiction pursuant
to A.R.S, § 12-120,21(A)(4) and Arizona Rule
of Procedure for Special Action 1(a).

DISCUSSION

A, Arizona has “Home State” Jurisdic-
tion of the Child.

HI 116 Mother contends the superior
court’s temporary orders are invalid because
Arizona is not M.K.’s “home state” pursuant
to the UCCJBA, and therefore the superior
court did not have jurisdiction to enter them.
Mother argues a minor child less than six
months old, who has not lived ewclusively in
one state, has no “home state” pursuant to
UCCJEA. Consequently, Mother argues the
superior court erred by finding M.K. had a
more substantial connection to Arizona than
to Wisconsin.

HM 117 Arizona and Wisconsin have
adopted nearly identical versions of the UC-
CJEA, See A.R.S. §§ 25-1001 to -1067; Wis.
Stat. § 822.01-47. We review de novo wheth-
er a court has subject matter jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA. Mangan v. Mangan,
227 Ariz, $46, 350, 116, 258 P.8d 164 (App.
2011); see Willie G. v. ADES, 211 Ariz, 281,
238, 18, 119 P.8d 1084 (App. 2005) (this
Court reviews de novo matters of statutory
interpretation and mixed questions of fact
and law).

HM 1118 Under the UCCJEA, a state with
home state jurisdiction has a jurisdictional
priority. See A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(1-4) (para-
graphs 2, 8, or 4 apply only if a court of
another state does not have jurisdiction un-
der paragraph 1, which defines parameters of
home state jurisdiction, or if a home state
court abdicates its jurisdiction to a more

appropriate state). “[WJhen there is a statu-
tory conflict in the application of home state
jurisdiction, the conflict should be resolved to
strengthen (rather than dilute) the certainty
of home state jurisdiction.” Welch-Doden v.
Roberts, 202 Ariz, 201, 208, 182, 42 P.38d 1166
(App. 2002). The UCCJEA revised the origi-
nal Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
which was adopted in Arizona in 1978 to
establish “uniformity and the need to avoid
disputes between competing jurisdictions,”
but produced inconsistencies in interpreta-
tion among state courts. Id. at 11 24, 29. The
UCCJEA prioritized home state jurisdiction
over other bases for jurisdiction and “com-
pletely eliminate[d] a determination of ‘best.
interests’ of a child from the jurisdictional
inquiry.” Id. at 1180-31. But of In re Ra-
mirez v, Barnet, 241 Ariz, 145, 147-48, 152,
‘11 18, 27, 884 P.8d 828 (App. 2016) (if a child
has no home state, the alternative ground for
Jurisdiction will apply, and the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act, unlike the UC-
CJEA, will require the best interests of the
child be determined to give full faith and
credit to custody orders between states).

HM 119 In Arizona, the superior court
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custo-
dy determination if “[Arizona] ... was the
home state of the child within sie months
before the commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from [Arizona] but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues
to live in [Arizona].” A.R.S. § 25-1081(A)(1)
(emphasis added). For a child under the age
of six months, “home state” is “the state in
which the child lived from birth with a par-
ent or person acting as a parent, including
any period during which that person is tem-
porarily absent from that state.” A.R.S.
§ 25-1002(7)(b) (emphasis added), After an
initial legal decision-making and parenting
time determination has been made, continu-
ing jurisdiction is governed by “a separate
(but intertwined) statutory scheme” under

4, Texas has adopted the UCCJBA, See Waltenburg
v. Waltenburg, 270 $.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. App.
2008). The Texas definition of “home state”
reads: “In the case of a child less than six
months of age, the term means the state in which
the child lived from birth with a parent or a
person acting as a parent, A period of temporary
absence of a parent or a person acting as a

265

ARS, § 25-1082(A). Welch-Doden, 202 Ariz.
at 204, 114, 42 P.8d 1166,

120 The court in Welch-Doden reconciled
a conflict between § 25-1081(A)(1) and the
definition of “home state” under § 25-
1002(7)(a) (imits home state jurisdiction only
to states where a child lived for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the
proceeding was initiated) by extending the
six-consecutive-months long requirement of
§ 25-1002(7)(a) to any time “within six
months before the commencement of the
[child custody] proceeding.” Welch-Doden,
202 Ariz, at 208-09, 1188, 42 P.8d 1166 (quot-
ing A.R.S. § 25-1081(A)(1)). The court rea-
soned that “[g]iven the fundamental purpose
of the UCCJEA to establish the certainty of
home state jurisdiction, it is clear to us that
§ 25-1081(A)(1) acts to enlarge and modify
the definition of home state under § 25-
1002(7)(a).” Id. (emphasis added), The draft-
ers intended for home state jurisdiction to
have priority and this extended home state
jurisdiction promotes that intent. Id.

{21 No Arizona precedent has applied the
home state jurisdiction of § 25-1081(A)(1) to
the definition of home state of a child six
months or younger under § 25-1002(7)(b).
Although this court reconciled the extended
home state jurisdiction with § 25~-1002(7)(a),
“there is no indication the legislature intend-
ed ‘the home state ... within six months,’ to
apply only to children six months of age or
older.” In ve Burk, 252 8.W.3d 736, 741 (Tex.
App. 2008), Like the Texas Court of Appeals,
we have found nothing in the UCCJEA or
Arizona legislative history indicating any
contrary legislative intent and find the inter-
pretation from Texas persuasive.! This inter-
pretation is consistent with other UCCJEA
jurisdictions. See, eg., Meyeres v. Meyeres,
196 P.3d 604, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (de-
termining Utah was home state of a child
who was born in Utah but moved to Kansas
at six weeks of age); Baker v. Tunney, 201
So.8d 1285, 1286-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

parent is part of the period,” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann, § 152.102 (West 2015); accord A.R.S. § 25-
1002(7)(b) (for a child less than six months old,
“home state” is “the state in which the child
lived from birth with a parent or person acting
as a parent, including any period during which
that person is temporarily absent from that
state.”),

266

2016) (Florida was the home state, pursuant
to “the plain language of the statute,” be-
eause a child born in Florida lived in Florida
with both parents “until the mother relocated.
to New York when the child was less than
two weeks old”); Fleckles v. Diamond, 398
Il.Dee. 784, 85 N.E.3d 176, 188, 152 (2015)
(Colorado, not Illinois, was the child’s home
state upon birth, because the UCCJEA’s
“home state” is the birth state for a child
less than six months old); Gray v. Gray, 139
So.8d 802, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018) (Ala-
bama had jurisdiction regarding the divorce
but not custody issues as Michigan, not Ala-
bama, was child’s “home state” because child
was born in Michigan and had never lived in
Alabama.),

122 Here, the facts closely resemble the
facts in the Texas case and the other cited
cases. M.K. was born in Arizona. MLK. lived
in Arizona after his birth for approximately
two months. Then, Mother moved M.K. to
Wisconsin, where she and MK, lived for
approximately two months before Father
filed the petition in Arizona. Father lived in
Arizona when MK. was born and has contin-
ued to live in Arizona,

128 Section 25-1031(A)(1) provides that,
Arizona has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination if it was the
home state within six months before com-
mencement of the proceeding, and the child
is absent from Arizona but a parent contin-
ues to live in Arizona. Father filed the Ari-
zona proceeding on November 28, 2016, M.K,
had lived in Arizona from birth to September
29, 2016, when Mother moved with him to
Wisconsin. September 29, 2016, falls within
the six months preceding the filing on No-
vember 28, 2016. Accordingly, Arizona was
the home state within six months before the
Arizona proceeding commenced, and Arizona
has jurisdiction under ARS. § 25-
1081(A)(1). Mother’s argument that M.K. did
not live solely in the state of birth, and thus
has no home state, fails.

924 Mother further argues the superior
court erred by finding M.K. had a more

3. Both Mother and Father analyzed the factors of
§ 25-403(A) in their pretrial statements filed pri-
or to the temporary orders hearing, Although the
superior court made detailed findings of fact

substantial connection to Arizona than to
Wisconsin; she contends the court should
have declined to exercise jurisdiction as an
inconvenient forum pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-
1037(A) and (B).

125 Under the UCCJBA, once the superi-
or court determines it has jurisdiction, it may
nevertheless decline to exercise its jurisdic
tion at any time if it determines that “it is an
inconvenient forum under the circumstances
and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum.” A.R.S. § 25-1087(A).
Here, the superior court provided detailed
analysis of why Arizona is not an inconven-
ient forum, analyzing all the § 25-1037(B)(1-
8) factors. Upon review of the record de
novo, we find substantial evidence supporting
the superior court’s analysis and conclusion.
Welch-Doden, 202 Ariz. at 210-11, 11 43-44,
42 P.3d 1166.

26 The superior court did not err by
finding Arizona is M.K.’s home state and that
it has exclusive jurisdiction in compliance
with §§ 25-1081(A)(1), (B), and -1037(B).

B. Statutory Findings Under A.R.S,
§ 25-403 Are Not Mandatory When
Determining Temporary Orders Un-
der ARS. § 25-404.

127 Mother argues the superior court’s
temporary orders are invalid because the
court failed to make specific findings pursu-
ant to A.R.S, § 25-408(B).' Mother contends
the plain language of subsection (B) extends
the specific findings requirement to all con-
tested custody orders, given the best inter-
ests of the child is the primary consideration
in awarding legal decision-making and par-
enting time, See Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99,
102, 118, 67 P.8d 695 (2008); A.R.S, § 25-
403(A).

W128 We review the superior
court’s interpretation of statutes and proce-
dural rules de novo. Mara M. v, ADES, 201
Ariz. 508, 505, 115, 88 P.3d 41 (App. 2002).
We start by giving effect to the intent of the
legislature. See Pima County v. Pima Coun-

regarding many of the factors identified in § 25-
403, see infra 47, it declined “to make the type
of detailed findings that would accompany final
orders.”

ty Law Enft Merit Sys. Council, 211 Ariz.
224, 227, 118, 119 P.8d 1027 (2005). “[Wle
interpret court rules according to the princi-
ples of statutory construction.” Potter v.
Vanderpool, 225 Ariz, 495, 498, 18, 240 P.8d
1257 (App. 2010). If the language of a statute
or rule is unambiguous, “we apply it as writ-
ten.” Roberto F. v. DCS, 287 Ariz. 440, 441,
16, 352 P.8d 909 (2015). Only if the language
is unclear do “we apply secondary principles
of construction, such as examining the rule’s
context, its relationship to related rules, its
background, and the consequences of differ-
ing interpretations.” Id. “We seek to harmon-
ize and attain consistency among related
statutory provisions in the context of the
overall statutory scheme.” Andrew R. v.
ADES, 228 Ariz. 458, 458, 116, 224 P.8d 950
(App. 2010).

129 The Arizona Constitution vests our
supreme court with the “[plower to make
rules relative to all procedural matters in any
court.” Ariz. Const. art, 6, § 5(5); Seisinger
v, Siebel, 220 Ariz, 85, 88, 17, 203 P.8d 488
(2009), The Rules of Family Law Procedure
“govern the procedure in the Superior Court
of Arizona in all family law cases, including
paternity, and all other matters arising out of
Title 26, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.).”
Ariz, R, Fam. Law P, 1.

180 Rule 82 of the Arizona Rule of Family
Law Procedure reads that “[flindings of fact
and conclusions of law are wnnecessary on
decisions of motions under Rules 32 and 79
or any other motion, except as provided in
paragraph C.” Ariz, R, Fam. Law P. 82(A)
(emphasis added). The “paragraph C” excep-
tion does not apply here; therefore, the rule’s
directive that findings of fact and conclusions
of law are not necessary for motions applies
to motions for temporary orders under Rule
47,

181 Section 25-404(A) also addresses tem-
porary orders. Under that statute, once a
party has filed a motion for a temporary
order supported by “pleadings as provided in
§ 25-411,” “[t]he court may award tempo-
rary legal decision-making and parenting
time under the standards of § 25-408 after a
hearing, or, if there is no objection, solely on
the basis of the pleadings.” Section 25-404

267

does not, however, direct the superior court
to make detailed § 25-403 findings.

HMM 132 Mother argues statutory find-
ings are required because temporary orders
resolve contested issues, and § 25~408(B),
therefore, extends the requirement to make
specific findings. Mother also argues the
court's “original” determinations pursuant to
§ 25-408(A) include temporary orders. The
arguments place §§ 25-403 and -404 in con-
flict. However, “where two statutes deal with
the same subject, the more specific statute
controls.” Pima County v, Heinfeld, 184
Ariz. 133, 184-35, 654 P.2d 281 (1982), Here,
both §§ -403 and -404 concern determina-
tions of legal decision-making and parenting
time. The language “either originally or on
petition for modification” in § 25-403(A) in-
cludes a spectrum of cireumstances present-
ed by various types of petitions and is a
general statute. By contrast, § 25-404 only
applies to temporary orders, and is triggered
only after a party to an “originally” filed
petition files a motion for a temporary order.
Section 25-404 is the more specific statute,
applicable only under certain conditions, and
its discretionary provision controls the con-
tent of temporary orders over the mandatory
requirement of § 25-403 to “make specific
findings on the record about all relevant
factors.” A.R.S, § 25-403(B).

HMI 1138 Additionally, “[wJhen the legis-
lature has specifically included a term in
some places within a statute and excluded it
in other places, courts will not read that term
into the sections from which it was exclud-
ed.” State v. Gonzales, 206 Ariz. 469, 471,
11, 80 P.8d 276 (App. 2003). Here, the term
“shall” is not included in § 25-404(A), al-
though it is included in sections 25-403(A)
and (B). We will not read “shall” into § 25-
404, when its drafters omitted it.

134 Moreover, the requirement
in § 25-403(B) that the superior court make
specific findings on the record about all rele-
vant factors and the court’s reasoning “exists
not only to aid an appellant and the review-
ing court, but also for a more compelling
reason—that of aiding all parties and the
family court in determining the best interests
of the child or children both currently and in

268

the future.” Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz, 204, 209,
118, 218 P.3d 858 (App.2009). Given the tran-
sitory nature of temporary orders, requiring
detailed findings regarding all aspects of a
pending case is not warranted, The tempo-
vary order is not appealable, so it only mar-
ginally, at best, helps a “reviewing court,”
and a temporary order “[dJoes not prejudice
the rights of the parties or of any child that
are to be adjudicated at the subsequent hear-
ings in the proceeding,” ARS, § 25-
815(F)(1), and “[tlerminates when the final
decree is entered....” ARS, § 25-
815(F)(4); see Ariz. R, Fam. P, Rule 47(M)
(‘Temporary orders become ineffective and
unenforceable upon termination of an action.
either by dismissal or following entry of a
final decree....”). Given the extraordinary
number of motions for temporary orders
handled by the superior courts, and the mini-
mal utility of detailed findings in such orders,
we decline to mandate that § 25-403 findings
be made in every temporary order.

H«85 For these reasons, we hold

that superior courts are not required to make
findings addressing the A.R.S. § 25-408 fac-
tors when entering temporary orders regard-
ing legal decision-making and parenting time
pursuant to ARS. § 25-404, See Ariz. R.
Fam. P, 82 (findings are “unnecessary” in
resolving motions). Although A.R.S, § 25-404
authorizes a superior court to award legal
decision-making and parenting time under
the standards of § 25-408, it does not re-
quire the court to make findings on those
factors, Thus, the superior court did not com-
mit reversible error by not making all the
findings under § 25-408.

C. Paternity is Voluntarily Established
by a Registered Acknowledgement,
of Paternity Under A.R.S, § 25-812.

HM 186 Mother argues paternity was
not established by the time she left for Wis-
consin, and therefore she was not required to
obtain Father's “consent” to remove M.K,

6. Under A.R.S. § 36-334(C)(2), Father's name
could only be registered on the birth certificate if
Mother and Father signed a voluntary acknowi-
edgment of paternity. Mother did not address
Father's voluntary acknowledgement of paternity
when she argued that Father's fundamental right

from Arizona pursuant to ARS. § 13-
1302(B). Mother contends M.K.’s birth certif-
icate was not signed by Father and Father
did not file a petition to establish paternity
until Mother already resided in Wisconsin
with M.K, Therefore, Mother argues the
court erred by considering Father's lack of
consent to Mother’s relocation when reject-
ing a long-distance parenting plan, We dis-
agree with both the premise and conclusion
of Mother's argument,

HM 187 Parents of a child born out of
wedlock may voluntarily establish paternity
by filmg a notarized or witnessed statement,
with the Department of Economic Security
or the Department that contains the Social
Security numbers of both parents, and is
“signed by both parents acknowledging pa-
ternity or two separate substantially similar
notarized or witnessed statements acknowl-
edging paternity.” ARS, § 25-812(A)(1).
“Once signed, a purported voluntary ac-
knowledgement of paternity is presumed val-
id and binding until proven otherwise.” An-
drew R, v, ADES, 228 Ariz, 458, 457, 117,
224 P.8d 950 (App. 2010) (citing Stephenson
v. Nastro, 192 Ariz, 475, 488, 126, 967 P.2d
616 (App. 1998)),

88 “[T]he father’s name shall be stated on
a birth certificate ... [i]f a mother and fa-
ther who are not married to each other at the
time of birth and were not married to each
other in the ten months before the birth
voluntarily acknowledge paternity pursuant
to § 25-812,...” A.R.S. § 86-884(C)(2) (em-
phasis added); see A.R.S, § 86-388(B)(1-8)
(to register a birth certificate from a birth
that occurred in a hospital, a chief adminis-
trative officer of the hospital obtains informa-
tion, fills out the birth certificate, and “sub-
mit[s] the birth certificate for registration to
... the state registrar.”), “A voluntary ac-
knowledgment of paternity ... is a determi-
nation of paternity and has the same force
and effect as a superior court judgment.”
ARS, § 25-812(D) (emphasis added),

to parent M.K. did not vest before she left for
Wisconsin because Father was not married to
her and did not act to establish paternity before
her departure. See Pima County Juv. Severance
Action No. S-114487, 179 Ariz. 86, 96, 876 P.2d
1121 (1994), Mother relies on an out of state

139 Here, Mother and Father were never
married to each other. But because Father’s
name appears on the birth certificate regis-
tered with and issued by the Department,
Father's paternity was established with the
“force and effect” of a superior court judg-
ment. See A.R.S. §§ 25-812(A)(1), -812(D), -
818(A), 36-834(C)(2). Mother could have chal-
Jenged Father’s acknowledgement of paterni-
ty and rescinded it within “[slixty days after
the last signature [wals affixed to the nota-
rized acknowledgment of paternity that is
filed with the department of economic securi-
ty, [or] the department of health services” by
filing a written copy of the rescission with
the Department. A.R.S. § 25~-812(H)(1), (D.
The record, however, does not indicate Moth-
er has ever attempted to rescind or challenge
the issued birth certificate, timely or other-
wise.

140 Mother further argues that because
the actual birth certificate was not signed by
Father, his paternity was not established
pursuant to A.R.S, § 25-814(A)(8) (“A man is
presumed to be the father of the child if...
[a] birth certificate is signed by the mother
and father of a child born out of wedlock.”),
However, § 25-814 specifies mere preswmp-
tions of paternity to be used if paternity is
contested, and is thus subordinate to § 25-
812, which governs the voluntary establish-
ment of paternity for “a parent of a child
born out of wedlock.” Moreover, in 2008 the
legislature amended A.R.S. § 25-812, and
specifically deleted the requirement that a
father sign a birth certificate to voluntarily
establish paternity. 2008 Ariz. Sess, Laws,
ch, 280, § 8. Under § 25-812(A), only the
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or an
agreed upon genetic test may be used to
voluntarily establish paternity for a child
born out of wedlock,

D, Mother Needed Father’s Consent or
a Court Order to Move M.K. to Wis-
consin,

HH {141 Mother argues that as a parent
without a specific court order designating

case, in which a Massachusetts trial court was
found to have lacked authority to force an un-
married mother and minor child to return from
New York because mother was the child’s only
legal parent at the time they moved from Massa-

269

parental decision-making, she was not obli-
gated to obtain Father’s consent before mov-
ing with M.K. to Wisconsin. We disagree.

HM 142 “A father has a right to co-equal
custody of his child but not exclusive custody
absent a court order to that effect.” Marico-
pa County Juv. Action No. JD-4974, 168
Ariz. 60, 62, 785 P.2d 1248 (App. 1990). Our
legislature has declared, as Arizona public
policy, that it is in the best interests of a
child, absent evidence to the contrary, “[t]o
have substantial, frequent, meaningful and
continuing parenting time with both parents”
and “[t]o have both parents participate in
decision-making about the child.” A.R.S,
§ 25-108(B)(1), @). This policy is also re-
flected in A.R.S. § 25-808(A), when upon the
filing of a petition for legal decision-making
and parenting time with an attached birth
certificate or an acknowledgment of paterni-
ty, the court issues a preliminary injunction
which, among other orders, prohibits “remov-
ing any natural or adopted child of the par-
ties ... from the jurisdiction of the court
without the prior written consent of the [oth-
er] partly] or the permission of the court.”
ARS, § 25-808(B)(1)(b).

HM 148 Likewise, a parent commits
“custodial interference” if he or she knowing-
ly “[blefore the entry of a court order deter-
mining custodial rights, takes, entices or
withholds any child from the other parent
denying that parent access to any child.”
ARS, § 18-1302(A)(2); State v. Donahue,
140 Ariz. 55, 57, 680 P.2d 191 (App, 1984)
(father did not have the right to custody of
the child to the exclusion of mother in the
absence of a court order to that effect). Our
supreme court stated the purpose of the
custodial interference statute was “to stem
the flood of child-stealing acts often attend-
ant to domestic relations cases.” State v
McLaughlin, 125 Ariz, 505, 607, 611 P.2d 92
(1980); Donahue, 140 Ariz, at 57, 680 P.2d
191, A parent’s removal of a child from Ari-
zona to another state, without consent of the
other parent or a court order, constitutes

chusetts to New York. See Smith v. McDonald,
458 Mass. 540, 941 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2010), We do
not find Smith persuasive, Father was M,.K.’s
legal parent at the time Mother moved from
Arizona to Wisconsin.

270

withholding the child from the other parent.
State v. Wood, 198 Ariz. 275, 277-79, 11 10-
18, 8 P.8d 1189 (App. 2000) (holding that
§ 18-1302(A)(@2) applies to any parent who
interferes with the other parent’s right of
access to and custody of a child by taking or
withholding that child from the other par-
ent).” Given the public policy of this state, we
disagree with Mother that she could perma-
nently remove the child from Arizona without
either obtaining permission from Father or a
court order.

HN 144 Mother further argues this was
not a relocation case and the superior court
erred by considering relocation factors under
ARS, § 25-408, We agree that this is not a
relocation case under A.R.S, § 25-408, Buen-
camino v. Noftsinger, 228 Ariz. 162, 163, 18,
221 P.8d 41 (App. 2009) (two prerequisites
need to be met before applying § 25-408: (1)
a written agreement or court order providing
for custody or parenting time by both par-
ents, and (2) both parents residing in Ari-
zona). Although this is not a relocation case
under § 25-408, the superior court may con-
sider § 25-408 factors in resolving a long-
distance parenting issue. Buencamino, 223
Ariz, at 168, n, 8, 221 P.8d 41 (“Even when
the § 25-408 relocation provisions are not
required to be considered, family court
judges may, of course, choose in their discre-
tion to consider some or all of the factors
listed in § 25-408(I) in appropriate cases.”)

145 Father was M.K’s “legal parent” ®
from the date he signed the acknowledge-
ment of paternity. See ARS. §§ 25-
812(A)(1), (D), -818(A). Thus, Mother was
required to secure Father’s agreement or a
court order to permanently remove MLK. to
Wisconsin. State v. Wood, 198 Ariz. at 279,
718, 8 P.8d 1189 (the purpose of § 13-
1802(A)2) is to give “both parents equal
access to their child and forbidding either
parent from hiding a child from the other”);
Donahue, 140 Ariz, at 57, 680 P.2d 191. When
rendering its temporary order, the superior
‘7. Mother's reliance on the presumption of mater-

nal custody for children born out of wedlock in

ARS, § 13-1302(B) is misplaced because “the

present case does not involve criminal prosecu-

tion, [therefore, the statute] does not apply.” Juv.

Action No, JD-4974, 163 Ariz, at 63, 785 P.2d
1248.

court did not abuse its discretion by consid-
ering Mother's failure to secure consent from
Father before moving M.K. from Arizona.
See A.R.S. § 25-408(A)(6) (which parent is
more likely to allow the child frequent, mean-
ingful, and continuing contact with the other
parent),

E. The Superior Court Did Not Exr by
Issuing Temporary Orders That
May Require Mother to Return to
Arizona With MLK,

HE {46 Mother argues that because Fa-
ther did not file a petition to establish legal
decision-making until she already resided in
Wisconsin with M.K., the superior court did
not have the authority to enter an order
effectively forcing her and the child to move
back to Arizona so that Father could exercise
his parenting time in Arizona. Because we
conclude Father was M.K.’s legal parent as
of the day he signed the voluntary acknowl-
edgement of paternity, Mother’s argument
fails, as the superior court was merely follow-
ing the statutory scheme described supra,
and acted within its authority,

947 The superior court explained its rea-
soning for issuing the temporary orders as
follows:

Section 25-403(A) enumerates specific
factors for the Court to consider, among all
factors that are relevant to the children’s
physical and emotional well-being. The
best interest of a child is the primary
consideration in awarding legal decision-
making authority and parenting time.
Hays v. Gama, [citation omitted].

In making the legal decision-making and
parenting time determination, the Court is
mindful that as a matter of public policy,
absent evidence to the contrary, “it is in a
child’s best interest: (1) To have substan-
tial, frequent, meaningful and continuing
parenting time with both parents[; and] (2)
To have both parents participate in deci-

>

“ ‘Legal parent’ means a biological or adoptive
parent whose parental rights have not been ter-
minated, Legal parent does not include a person
whose paternity has not been established pursu-
ant to § 25-812 or 25-814.” ARS. § 25-401.

sion-making about the child.” A.R.S, § 25-
108(B). Subject to the results of Father’s
hair follicle test, which was ordered at the
February 10, 2017 hearing, Mother has not
presented sufficient evidence to depart
from the public policy to allow both par-
ents “substantial, frequent, meaningful and
continuing parenting time” with the child
and to participate in decision-making about
the child. Indeed, it appeared from the
evidence that Mother's relocation with the
child to Wisconsin primarily was for the
benefit of Mother and her family—not for
the child’s best interests.

The Court specifically rejects Mother's
position that (i) the child should be with
Mother “24/7”, and (i) Father should not
be permitted overnight parenting time un-
til the child is two years old, Indeed, Plan-
ning for Parenting Time: Avizona’s Guide
Sor Parents Living Apart," which Mother
introduced into evidence, provides that: (i)
“[blabies begin to respond to a range of
different (but equally valuable) types of
parenting styles that each parent pro-
vides”; and (ii) “it’s important that [babies]
have frequent contact with each of their
parents and have a stable schedule and
routine.” (Arizona’s Guide for Parents
Living Apart, p.21). Moreover, contrary to
what Mother suggests, the fact that the
child is breastfeeding is not a basis to
restrict Father’s parenting time. In this
regard, the Guide provides:

Parents who are not raising their child

together must balance the baby’s need

to nurse with its need to bond with the
father. The parents should talk often
and openly with each other about the
baby, Breast-feeding shouldn’t be used
to stop the father from spending time
with the child. Instead, mothers need to
offer the father parenting time, and fa-
thers need to be flexible regarding the
need of the baby to nurse. A father can
feed an infant with the mother’s ex-
pressed (pumped) milk, particularly af-
9. Arizona Supreme Court, Planning for Parenting
Time; Arizona’s Guide for Parents Living Apart,

(2009), available at _http:/www.azcourts.gov/
portals/3 1/parentingTime/PPWeuidelines.pdf.

10. In support of her argument, Mother cites sev-
eral out-of-state cases. See Mark T. v. Jamie Z.,

271

ter nursing routines are well estab-

lished...
(d., p.57).

Finally, it is not possible to create a
long-distance parenting plan that facili-
tates the child’s need to bond with both
parents while Mother and the child contin-
ue to live in Wisconsin and Father contin-
ues to live in Arizona. The Court is mindful
that one of the parties will be burdened
regardless of which state the Court selects
as the primary location for Father’s par-
enting time. In determining whether the
parenting time should occur primarily in
Wisconsin or Arizona, the Court consid-
ered (among other things): () Arizona is
the child’s “home state” and birth state; (ii)
Mother, Father and the child lived togeth-
er in Arizona from the child’s birth until at
least September 29, 2016, when Mother
decided to relocate with the child to Wis-
consin without Father’s consent; (iii) Fa-
ther (who Mother is asking pay child sup-
port) has an established job in Arizona,
which he would have to give up to relocate
to Wisconsin in order to have frequent
contact with the child; (iv) Mother does not
have a regular job in Wisconsin that she
would have to quit if she decided to relo-
eate to Arizona; (v) Mother testified that, if
she continued to live in Wisconsin as she
desires, she would be willing to bring the
child to Arizona for Father’s parenting
time only as her financial resources per-
mitted; and (vi) if Mother continues to live
with the child in Wisconsin, Father either
will have to miss work frequently or re-
duce the frequency of his parenting time
below the ideal level for the child to bond
with Father.

148 Mother does not cite to any Arizona
authority that restricts a superior court
from issuing a temporary order requiring
parenting time to take place in a state dif-
ferent than where the mother and child cur-
rently live.” The superior court considered

194 Cal.App.4th 1115, 124 Cal-Rptr.3d 200, 203
(2011) (a trial court must not issue a conditional
order to coerce the custodial parent into aban-
doning plans to relocate); In re Marriage of
Smith, 378 Ul.Dec, 1, 3 N.E.3d 281, 282 (2013)
(overturning a temporary order requiring mother

272

the advantages and disadvantages to both
parents when determining whether the best
parenting plan for M.K. should have Fa-
ther’s parenting occur in Arizona or Wiscon-
sin, recognizing that one of the parents
would be burdened regardless of which state
the court selected,

149 Thus, Mother has not shown that the
superior court abused its discretion by order-
ing Father’s parenting time to occur in Ari-
zona, Kay S. v. Mark S., 218 Ariz. 373, 388,
151, 142 P.3d 249 (App. 2006) (in considering
and weighing different facts, courts might
reach different conclusions without abusing
their discretion). We defer to the superior
court’s discretionary findings and exercise of
judgment regarding witness credibility and
the weighing of evidence, if the superior
court remains within the bounds of that dis-
cretion, Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 198 Ariz, 348,
846, 15, 972 P.2d 676 (App. 1998); In re
Marriage of Inboden, 228 Aviz, 542, 644, 17,
225 P.8d 599 (App. 2010); see Ariz. R. Fam.
Law P, 82(A),

CONCLUSION

150 We accept jurisdiction of the petition
for special action, but deny relief because the
superior court did not err by issuing its
temporary orders.

to either move back to Illinois or lose physical
custody of her child); Smith, 941 N.B.2d at 4
(finding Mother of child born out-of-wedlock was
free to move before paternity determination); In
ve Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wash.2d 39, 940
P.2d 1362, 1363 (1997) (finding a trial court
should make parenting plan decisions based on
the circumstances of the parents and children as
they exist at the time of trial), Given that under

394 P.3d 1109
DIGITAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING,
INC., Plaintiff/Appellee,
ve

John MORENO and Bernadette Bruce-
Moreno, Defendants/Appellants.!

No, 1 CA-CV 16-0156

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/18/2017

Arizona law Father had parental rights at the
time Mother took M.K. to Wisconsin, we do not
find these cases persuasive,

1, The caption has been modified to more accu-
rately depict the relevance of the parties to this
appeal, The caption above should be used for all
future filings in this matter.

Marko Law PLC, Phoenix, By Edward J,
Marko, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Dickinson Wright PLLO, Phoenix, By
Charles H. Oldham, Amanda E, Newman,
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge
Lawrence F, Winthrop joined.

OPINION
THOMPSON, Judge:

{1 Appellants, John Moreno (John) and
his wife Bernadette Bruce-Moreno (Berna-
dette) (collectively, the Morenos) appeal from
the trial court’s order permitting Digital Sys-
tems Engineering, Inc. (DSE) to garnish
2, The superior court originally entered judgment

in July 2009, It amended that judgment in Sep-
tember 2009 because the original judgment in-

273

John’s wages in his current marital communi-
ty with Bernadette, whom he remarried after
divorce, to fulfill his liabilities associated with
the Morenos’ prior marital community, de-
spite a contrary stipulated judgment tanta-
mount to an agreement by DSH to limit the
scope of John’s liability. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the trial court’s order and
vacate the garnishment writ.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

12 In April 2007, DSE filed a lawsuit
against Bernadette, who is its former em-
ployee, and her husband, John. In the law-
suit, DSE alleged that from 2001 to 2005
Bernadette engaged in fraudulent transac-
tions causing DSE nearly $800,000 in dam-
ages. DSE sought relief from both Berna-
dette and John in their individual capacities
and from their marital community. After a
bench trial in 2008 and 2009, the superior
court found that John was not individually
liable, and entered judgment, on September
4, 2009, only against his undivided one-half
interest in his marital property with Berna-
dette?

18 John appealed the judgment and DSE
filed a cross-appeal challenging the court’s
ruling that John was not individually liable,
On appeal, this court affirmed both the judg-
ment on the fraud claim and the determina-
tion that John was not individually liable. See
Digital Sys, Eng’g, Inc. v. Bruce-Moreno, 1
CA-CV 09-0574, 2010 WL 5080808, at * 7,
136 (Ariz, App. Nov. 16, 2010). However, we
reversed the court’s damages award and re-
manded the case for further determinations
as to the amount of DSH’s damages on the
fraud claim and directed that the judgment
granted to DSE against John for unjust en-
richment be vacated. Id.

14 Back in the trial court, in April 2011,
DSE filed a Request for Judicial Notice,
asking the court to take judicial notice of the
fact that the Morenos had entered into a
marital settlement agreement and that the
marriage was dissolved on September 8,

correctly stated that John had been found indi-
vidually liable,

274

2009. On August 8, 2011, the court took
judicial notice, as DSE requested,

15 Before the trial to determine DSE’s
damages, DSE and John entered a stipulated
judgment, on September 2, 2011, which the
court filed on September 7, 2011. As relevant
here, the Stipulated Judgment provided:

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR

OF PLAINTIFF [DSE] AND AGAINST

JOHN MORENO’S UNDIVIDED ONE-

HALF INTEREST IN HIS MARITAL

COMMUNITY WITH BERNADETTE

BRUCE-MORENO ...

THE CLAIM AGAINST JOHN MORE-
NO’S SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPER-
TY IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,

(Emphasis added.)

16 The Morenos remarried two years la-
ter. In December 2015, DSE served a Writ of
Garnishment on John’s employer. The More-
nos objected to the garnishment on the
grounds that: (1) the Stipulated Judgment is,
by its terms, limited to recovery from John’s
interest in the prior marital community; (2)
under Arizona law, the Morenos’ remarriage
after divorce did not “resume” their prior
marital community, but instead created a
new and distinct community, beyond the
reach of the Stipulated Judgment; (8) John’s
current wages are property of the new com-
munity, and not the prior; and (4) Arizona
law supports limiting an innocent spouse’s
liability to the community property that ex-
isted at the time of any tortious acts, In
response, DSE argued that the Stipulated
Judgment was a community debt that the
Morenos could not discharge in divorce and
that John’s wages are garnishable after di-
voree and remarriage.

17 A garnishment objection hearing was
held on January 26, 2016, Relying on Com-
munity Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 182 Ariz.
627, 898 P.2d 1005 (App. 1995), the superior
court denied the Morenos’ objection and af-
firmed the Writ of Garnishment, ordering
that John’s wages “are garnishable.”

3. We cite the current version of the applicable

statutes, unless revisions material to this decision
have occurred since the events in question.

18 The Morenos timely appealed the rul-
ing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona
Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21
(2016) and -2101(6)(c) (2016).

DISCUSSION

Hl 19 I relying on Hamlin in ruling
John’s wages are garnishable, the court spe-
cifically found that:

[Plursuant to Community Guardian Bank

v. Hamlin, 182 Ariz. 627, 898 P.2d 1005

(Ariz. App. 1995), separate wages of a

spouse can be garnished to satisfy the

community obligation. The fraud claim cre-
ated a community obligation for which

John Moreno is jointly liable. Id. Divorce

does not absolve spouses of community

obligations, and a judgment creditor has
the right to pursue collection from both
spouses including garnishing wages to sat-

isfy a community obligation. Id.

Because the court’s ruling raises issues of
law, we review de novo. Citibank (Arizona)
v. Bhandhusavee, 188 Ariz, 484, 435, 987 P.2d
856, 357 (App. 1996), Ultimately, we hold that
the trial court erred by relying on Hamlin in
this context, and in simultaneously disregard-
ing community property distinctions.

110 We first address certain preliminary
matters to clarify the arguments presented
on appeal. DSE mischaracterizes the More-
nos’ argument in objecting to its garnishment.
of John’s current wages. On appeal, DSE
essentially purports that the Morenos ask
this court to find that divorce and remarriage
terminated John’s obligation under the Stipu-
lated Judgment. Not only would such an
argument be unsupported by the chronologi-
cal order of the facts in this case, it would
broaden the scope of the issues the Morenos
actually present, The record clearly shows
the Morenos were divorced two years prior
to the Stipulated Judgment. Thus, contrary
to inferences that may be drawn from DSE’s
overarching argument, the evidence does not
compel the conclusion that the Morenos di-
vorced each other to avoid liability pursuant
to a not-yet-existing Stipulated Judgment.4
4. Any argument that DSE may posit suggesting

that John divorced Bernadette to avoid his liabil-

ity pursuant to the Stipulated Judgment is specu-
lative at best. In fact, John’s position on appeal is

As to the Morenos’ related request, as prop-
erly presented, they ask this court, as they
did the trial court, to limit enforcement of the
Stipulated Judgment to its terms. The Stipu-
lated Judgment was rendered specifically
against John’s “undivided one-half interest in
his marital community with [Bernadette,]”
and disclaimed any effort by DSE to execute
on John’s separate property. The paramount
issue before us is whether the superior court
erred in relying on Hamlin for its ruling,
which, as the court pronounced, stands for
the proposition that “[d]ivorce does not ab-
solve spouses of their community obli-
gations.” Hamlin, 182 Ariz. at 681, 898 P.2d
at 1009.

Hs 111 “[Sitipulation as to Sudgment’
necessarily imports a finality of determina-
tion of the controversy” between parties.
Wolf Corp. v. Lowis, 11 Ariz.App. 852, 355,
464 P.2d 672, 675 (1970), “If the trial court’s
finding is contrary to a deliberate stipulation,
it must fall.” Id, A stipulation “constitut[es]
an abandonment of any contention to the
contrary,” and is foreclosed from being repu-
diated on appeal. Jd. Accordingly, here, the
Stipulated Judgment to which both John and
DSE consented guides our analysis.

912 The trial court’s ruling improperly
deflects the focus of the Morenos’ objections
from the language of the Stipulated Judg-
ment, to an inquiry about whether divorce
discharges community liabilities. The court’s
ruling also fails to reflect this court’s 2010
ruling limiting John’s liability, See Digital
Sys. Eng’g, Inc, 1 CA-~CV 09-0574, 2010 WL
5080808, at * 7, 186 (affirming the ruling
that “only [John’s] undivided one-half inter-
est in the marital community is liable for the
judgment in this matter”), Moreover, Ham-
tin concerned a default judgment against a
community while the parties were married, in
contrast to the Stipulated Judgment here,
which occurred after the Morenos had di-
voreed, See Hamlin, 182 Ariz, at 680-81, 898

that “the Stipulated Judgment [declaring his lia-
bility] remains in effect.” It is also noteworthy
that DSE knew of the divorce prior to consenting
to the Stipulated Judgment.

5. Stating [t]he community property is liable for
the premarital separate debis or other liabilities of

275

P.2d at 1008-09, Therefore, it is irrelevant to
this appeal.

113 We agree with the Morenos that the
Stipulated Judgment limits DSEH’s recovery
from John to his “undivided one-half inter-
est” in the only marital community to which
the Stipulated Judgment could have referred.
See Reese v. Cradit, 12 Ariz.App. 288, 288,
469 P.2d 467, 472 (1970) (stating that when.
one spouse did not participate in the tort of
the other, the innocent spouse may be held
Hable only as a member of the community
and such liability is limited to the extent of
the community property “as it existed at the
time of the [tort]”), The marital community
formed by the remarriage between Berna-
dette and John in 2018 is a new and distinct
community which, by the very terms of the
Stipulated Judgment, does not fall within its
ambit. See, ag. Mejak v, Granville, 212 Ariz,
555, 557, 19, 186 P.8d 874, 876 (2006) (apply-
ing the principle of interpreting a document
“so that no provision is rendered meaning-
less, insignificant, or void[,]” to interpretation
of a statute); Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins,
Co., 228 Ariz, 468, 476, 145, 224 P.8d 960
(App. 2010) (applying similar principles to
contract interpretation).

4114 DSE argues that John remarried Ber-
nadette and now “seeks to reinstate the ‘two-
dollar bankruptcy’” which was repealed by
Arizona’s legislature in 1978. See ARS.
§ 25-216 (repealed 1978); A.R.S. § 25-215
(2007).® The “two-dollar bankruptcy” scheme
involves a situation where an individual has
separate debts that he then attempts to avoid
by pointing to the fact of his subsequent
marriage (or remarriage). Here, John has
never been determined to be individually lia-
ble to DSE—every pertinent judgment, and
most importantly, the Stipulated Judgment,
foreclosed any possibility of John (or his
separate property that had not been a part of
the community) being so liable. See supra
92, 8, 5, and 12. Of course, John’s earnings
after divorce were his separate property, and

@ spouse, incurred after September 1, 1973 but
only to the extent of the value of that spouse's
contribution to the community property which
would have been such spouse's separate property
if single.” (Emphasis added.)

276

after DSE’s own stipulation, DSE could not
have reached those earnings while John re-
mained divorced. This point is bolstered by
the fact that there is no evidence in the
record that DSE attempted to garnish John’s
wages pursuant to his liability under the
Stipulated Judgment during the time he was
unmarried. It thus appears DSE’s Writ of
Garnishment rests on some novel Jegal claim
that John’s remarriage to Bernadette reacti-
vates some foregone right to garnish his
wages, Such a “reactivation” claim would be
without legal grounding,

115 Therefore, in light of the Stipulated
Judgment, we-hold that the trial court erred
in ruling that DSE could garnish John’s
wages, which constitute community earnings
of the marital community existing as of 2013,
to satisfy the community liabilities of the
marital community that ended in 2009. Fur-
ther, given our holding, we grant the More-
nos attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to
ARS, § 12-1598.07 (2016), in an amount to
be determined upon compliance with Arizona

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, We
deny DSE’s request for attorneys’ fees, as
sought pursuant to A.R.S, §§ 12-1598,07
(awarding costs and fees only to the prevail-
ing party), -849 (2016) (allowing for fees
where a party “[b]rings or defends a claim
without substantial justification,” among oth-
er things), and 18~2814,04 (2010) (discussing
civil remedies a private person injured by
racketeering may obtain),

CONCLUSION

116 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the trial court’s order rendering John’s cur-
rent wages garnishable. We vacate the Writ
of Garnishment,

395 P.3d 286
GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY,
Appellant,
ve
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY,
Sarah H., Jeremy H., A.D.,
Appellees.

No. CV-16-0220-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed June 18, 2017

Linus Everling, Thomas L. Murphy (ar-
gued), Gila River Indian Community Office of
General Counsel, Sacaton; and April E, Ol-
son, Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom
& Schoenburg, LLP, Tempe, Attorneys for
Gila River Indian Community

James Manley, Aditya Dynar (argued),
Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Lit-
igation at the Goldwater Institute, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Sarah and Jeremy H.

Amanda Lomayesva, Tamara Walters,
Frederick Lomayesva, Office of the Attorney

General Pascua Yaqui Tribe, Tucson, Attor-
neys for Amicus Curiae Pascua Yaqui Tribe,
Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Communi-
ty, Navajo Nation, Cherokee Nation, and the
Native American Bar Association of Arizona,

Bruce F, Peterson, Maricopa County Of-
fice of the Legal Advocate, Tiffany Mastin,
Deputy Legal Advocate, Phoenix, Guardian
ad Litem for the Minor Child

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the
opinion of the Court, in which VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER and JUSTICES
BRUTINEL, TIMMER, GOULD, and
LOPEZ and JUDGE VASQUEZ joined.*

CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the
Court:

Hl 11 This case concerns the transfer of
child custody proceedings from state to tribal
court under 25 U.S.C. § 1911() of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (‘ICWA”). We hold that
§ 1911(b) addresses transfer only of foster
care placement and termination-of-parental-
rights actions. Although § 1911(b) does not
apply to state preadoptive and adoptive
placements, such as the proceeding involved
here, it also does not prohibit the transfer of
such actions to tribal court.

L

12 A.D, is a member of the Gila River
Indian Community (“Community”) and an
Indian child for purposes of ICWA. See 25
US.C. § 1908(4). Having been prenatally ex-
posed to amphetamines and opiates, A.D. was
born in August 2014 in Arizona outside the
Community’s boundaries. Five days after her
birth, the Arizona Department of Child Safe-
ty (“DCS”) removed A.D, from her mother,
who is also a Community member, and
placed her with Sarah H. and Jeremy H.
(‘foster parents”). A.D. has since resided
with her foster parents outside the Commu-
nity’s boundaries. Because the foster parents
are not members of A.D.’s extended family
or Indians, they do not qualify for a pre-
sumptive preference as an adoptive place-
ment under ICWA. See id. § 1915(a) (stating
* Justice Clint Bolick has recused himself from this

case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Garye L.

279

that, absent good cause to the contrary, pref-
erence shall be given to a placement with
members of the child’s extended family, oth-
er members of the child’s tribe, or other
Indian families).

13 Three days after her foster care place-
ment, DOS filed a dependency petition on
behalf of A.D, in the juvenile court and noti-
fied the Community. In October 2014, the
Community moved to intervene under 25
U.S.C. § 1911(c), which the court allowed. In
February 2015, the court found that the state
had made “active efforts ... to provide re-
medial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indi-
an family,” see id. § 1912(d), but that those
efforts were unsuccessful. The court also
found that the birth parents’ continued custo-
dy of A.D. was likely to result in serious
emotional or physical danger to A.D., found
A.D, dependent, and granted DCS’s request
for a case plan of severance and adoption.
The Community agreed to the new case plan.

14 In March 2015, DCS moved to termi-
nate the parental rights of A.D.’s mother and
father and notified the Community. The
Community requested that the child remain
in her current placement until a suitable
ICWA placement could be identified. In a
June 2015 order, the court terminated the
rights of A.D.’s parents and also found good
cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement.
preferences. The Community did not appeal
from that order.

15 The foster parents moved to intervene,
noting their desire to adopt A.D. The Com-
munity did not respond to the motion, and
the court allowed the foster parents to inter-
vene, On July 1, 2015, the foster parents
petitioned to adopt A.D. After the court
scheduled A.D.’s adoption for August 26,
2015, the Community successfully moved to
stay the adoption proceedings,

16 On August 18, 2015, the Community
moved to transfer the proceedings to its trib-
al court under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b), The Com-
munity noted that DCS supported the motion
to transfer, but the foster parents and A.D.’s

Vasquez, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals,

Division Two, was designated to sit in this mat-
ter,

280

guardian ad litem objected. After holding
evidentiary hearings, the juvenile court in
January 2016 denied the Community’s mo-
tion to transfer A.D’s case to tribal court,
finding the foster parents had met their bur-
den of showing that good cause existed under
§ 1911(b) to deny the motion.

{7 The Community appealed, and the
court of appeals addressed whether “25
U.S.C. § 1911(b) of ICWA allow[s] transfer
to tribal court of state preadoptive and adop-
tive placement proceedings occurring after
parental rights have terminated[.]” Gila Riv-
er Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240
Ariz, 885, 889 1 11, 879 P.8d 1016 (App. 2016).
The court ruled that § 1911(b) does not. Id.

18 We granted review to determine
whether § 1911(b) of ICWA governs the
transfer of preadoptive and adoptive place-
ment actions from state to tribal court, a
recurring issue of statewide importance. We
have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(8),
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-
120,24,

i

Hi 19 The Community first argues that
§ 1911()’s application was not properly be-
fore the court of appeals because the foster
parents did not cross-appeal the juvenile
court’s denial of the Community's transfer
motion, The foster parents, however, were
not aggrieved by the juvenile court’s order
and therefore were not required to cross-
appeal. See CNL Hotels & Resorts, Inc. v.
Maricopa Cownty, 280 Ariz, 21, 25 120, 279
P.8d 1188 (2012) (“Arizona’s long-settled rule
is that if [an] appellee in its brief seeks only
to support or defend and uphold the judg-
ment of the lower court from which the
opposing party appeals, a cross-appeal is not
necessary.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In opposing the Community’s transfer
motion, the foster parents argued that
§ 1911(6) did not apply, and they repeated
that argument in their answering appellate
brief. Thus, whether § 1911(b) applied was
an issue properly before the court of appeals,

HM 110 On the merits, the Community
argues that the court of appeals erred in
holding that § 1911(b) does not allow trans-

fer of a dependency case after parental
rights have been terminated. We review the
interpretation of statutes de novo. Valerie M.
v. Aviz. Dep't of Econ, Sec., 219 Ariz, 831, 334
110, 198 P.8d 1208 (2009),

HM 111 With respect to ICWA, “we at-
tempt to give effect to the will of Congress as
expressed in the statutory language, which
we construe liberally in favor of the interest
in preserving tribal families.” Jd. Nonethe-
less, we “will not look beyond the clear mean-
ing of express statutory terms unless a literal
interpretation would thwart the purpose of
the statutory scheme or lead to absurd re-
sults.” Steven H. v, Ariz, Dep't of Econ. Sec.,
218 Ariz. 566, 570 114, 190 P.8d 180 (2008)
(quoting Navajo Nation v, Hodel, 645
F.Supp. 825, 827 (D. Ariz. 1986)),

712 Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to
address the removal of an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian children from their In-
dian families by nontribal public and private
agencies and the placement of such children
in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and
institutions. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4). In re-
sponse to these concerns, ICWA provides a
dual jurisdictional scheme over Indian child
custody proceedings. See Miss, Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
86, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989),
ICWA delineates “child custody proceeding”
into four categories: foster care placement,
termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, and adoptive placement. 25
U.S.C. § 1903(1)G)-(v).

918 The first jurisdictional component of
ICWA, § 1911(a), concerns all four catego-
ries of actions and acknowledges exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over actions involving Indi-
an children who reside or are domiciled with-
in the tribe’s reservation and over cases in-
volving Indian children who are wards of
tribal courts regardless of residence or domi-
eile. The Community does not assert exclu-
sive jurisdiction under § 1911(a) as A.D. has
never resided or been domiciled within the
Community’s reservation, nor is she a ward
of the Community’s court.

114 The second jurisdictional component
of ICWA, § 1911(b), concerns transfer pro-
ceedings, It addresses two of the four catego-

ries of actions involving Indian children by
acknowledging concurrent but presumptively
tribal jurisdiction over foster care placement
and termination-of-parental-rights actions.
See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 86, 109 S.Ct. 1597.
Section 1911(b) states:

In any State court proceeding for the fos-

ter care placement of or termination of

parental rights to, an Indian child not
domiciled or residing within the reserva-
tion of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in
the absence of good cause to the contrary,
shall transfer such proceeding to the juris-
diction of the tribe, absent objection by
either parent, upon the petition of either
parent or the Indian custodian or the Indi-
an child’s tribe: Provided, [t]hat such
transfer shall be subject to declination by
the tribal court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C, § 1911(b) (emphasis added), Thus,
§ 1911(b) by its terms governs only foster
care placement and termination-of-parental-
rights actions.
115 ICWA defines “foster care placement”
as:
[A]ny action removing an Indian child from
its parent or Indian custodian for tempo-
rary placement in a foster home or institu-
tion or the home of a guardian or conser-
vator where the parent or Indian custodian
cannot have the child returned upon de-
mand, but where parental rights have not
been terminated.
Td. § 1903(1)@) (emphasis added), And ICWA.
defines “termination of parental rights” as
“any action resulting in the termination of
the parent-child relationship.” — Id.
§ 1908(1)(i) (emphasis added).

I 116 When the Community requested
a transfer in August 2015, the action was not.
one for foster care placement or termination
of parental rights because the court had al-
ready terminated the rights of A.D,’s parents
in June 2015 and that ruling had not been
appealed, See id. § 1908(1)()-(i). Therefore,
§ 1911(b) did not govern the Community’s
motion to transfer.

117 We are not persuaded by the Commu-
nity’s argument that our reading of § 1911(b)
will thwart ICWA’s purpose or lead to ab-
surd results. In various provisions of ICWA,

281

Congress distinguished between foster care
placement and termination-of-parental-rights
actions on the one hand and preadoptive and
adoptive placement actions on the other. See
ad. § 1908(1)@)-Gv); id. § 1911(c) (providing
right to intervene for foster care placement.
and termination of parental rights but not for
preadoptive or adoptive placement actions);
id. § 1912(a) (same regarding notice); id.
§ 1912(¢) (same regarding right to examine
reports or other documents); id. § 1914
(same regarding right to petition for invalida-
tion).

118 Congress’s differentiation
throughout ICWA indicates its desire to
place certain federal mandates on states for
foster care placement and termination-of-pa-
rental-rights actions but not preadoptive and
adoptive placements. The latter are not pre-
sumptively subject to transfer to tribal court
under § 1911(b), But even if preadoptive and
adoptive placements proceed in state court, a
tribe may continue to participate if, as here,
it has intervened under § 1911(¢). See also
In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile, 186
Ariz, 528, 583, 667 P.2d 228, 238 (App. 1988)
(finding trial judge acted within discretion in
granting tribe’s motion to intervene in adop-
tion proceeding). Moreover, in such cases a
state court must follow ICWA’s placement
preferences unless it finds good cause to
deviate from them. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)~(b).
Cf. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, — U.S.
—, 183 S.Ct, 2552, 2565, 186 L.Ed.2d 729
(2018) (holding that “§ 1915(a)’s rebuttable
adoption preferences [do not] apply when no
alternative party has formally sought to
adopt the child”),

HI 119 Although the court of appeals
correctly held that § 1911(b) did not apply
here, that court was mistaken in stating that
ICWA does not “allow” the transfer of ac-
tions “occurring after parental rights have
terminated[.]” Gila River Indian Cmty., 240
Ariz, at 389 111, 379 P.3d 1016, By its terms,
§ 1911(b) provides that a state court must
transfer foster care placement or termi-
nation-of-parental-rights cases to tribal court
unless the state court finds good cause for
retaining the case or unless either parent
objects to the transfer. Section 1911(b) is
silent as to the discretionary transfer of pre-

282

adoptive and adoptive placement actions, but
we do not interpret that silence to mean
prohibition. See Puyallup Tribe of Indians v.
State (In re M.S.), 237 P.8d 161, 165 113
(Okla. 2010) (“Reading what is contained in
the statute ... does not require us to read
into the statute what is not there, ie, that
transfers may only be granted if requested
before a termination of parental rights pro-
ceeding is concluded.”) (emphasis omitted).

120 When enacting ICWA, Congress rec-
ognized, rather than granted or created, trib-
al jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
involving Indian children. See Holyfield, 490
U.S. at 42, 109 S.Ct. 1597 (“Tribal jurisdic-
tion over Indian child custody proceedings is
not a novelty of the ICWA,”); Indian Child
Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,-
778, 88,821-22 (June 14, 2016) (codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 28) [hereinafter 2016 BIA Final
Rule] (noting that Congress, in enacting
ICWA, recognized that inherent tribal juris-
diction over domestic relations, including
child-eustody matters, is an aspect of a
“Tribe’s right to govern itself’); Cohen’s
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 840, 842
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 12th ed.
2012) (“Before the passage of ICWA, tribes
exercised jurisdictional authority over custo-
dy of their children,” and § 1911(b) “reflects
the legislative compromise made when states
and others resisted tribes’ exercise of ewclu-
sive jurisdiction over all Indian child custody
proceedings.”) (emphasis added).

121 Thus, tribes have the inherent author-
ity to hear child custody proceedings involv-
ing their own children. By enacting ICWA,
Congress recognized that authority and clari-
fied the standards for state courts in grant-
ing transfer requests of certain types of
cases. As a result, although ICWA does not
govern the transfer of preadoptive and adop-
tive placement actions, state courts may
nonetheless transfer such cases involving In-
dian children to tribal courts.

122 The 2016 Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”) Final Rule and Guidelines support
this conclusion. Both state the following:
“Parties may request transfer of preadoptive
and adoptive placement proceedings, but the
standards for addressing such motions are
not dictated by ICWA or these regulations.”

2016 BIA Final Rule, 81 Fed, Reg. at 38,822;
see also Office of the Assistant Secretary—
Indian Affairs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S,
Dep't of Interior, Guidelines for Implement-
ing the Indian Child Welfare Act 47 (2016).

28 Our interpretation also comports with
rulings by other courts that § 1911(b) only
applies to transfer requests for foster care
placement and termination-of-parental-rights
actions, see In re A.P., 289 Mont. 521, 962
P.2d 1186, 1188 110 (1998), but does not
preclude transfer of preadoptive and adop-
tive placement actions. See In re M.S., 237
P.8d at 166 114 (“[Wle cannot construe
§ 1911(), as a matter of law, as an expres-
sion of intent to preclude tribal court juris-
diction when transfer is requested after pa-
rental rights are terminated.”). But see In re
Welfare of the Child of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 44,
47 (Minn, 2011) (concluding that federal and
state law did not authorize transfer of a state
preadoptive action).

124 Similarly, other courts have held that
§ 1911(), which recognizes a tribe’s right to
intervene in foster care placement and termi-
nation proceedings, does not bar state courts
from allowing intervention in adoption pro-
ceedings. See In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty.
Juvenile, 186 Ariz, at 588, 667 P.2d 228 (“Al-
though [ICWA] explicitly provides a tribe
with the right to intervene in foster care and
termination proceedings, it does not preclude
a trial court from exercising its discretion in
allowing intervention by a tribe in an adop-
tion proceeding.”) (citation omitted); Jeffrey
A. v. Tohono O’odham Nation (In re Baby
Boy C.), 27 A.D.8d 84, 805 N.Y.S.2d 318, 329
(2005) (“Many courts have held that although
ICWA does not provide a statutory right of
intervention, neither does it prohibit inter-
vention under applicable state law.”).

125 Our holding does not preclude a tribe
from requesting the transfer to tribal court
of a preadoptive or adoptive placement, but
we have no occasion here to discuss grounds
other than § 1911(b)—such as Arizona stat-
utes or the forum non conveniens doctrine—
that might support a transfer motion. Cf
2016 BIA Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg, at 38,822
(noting “it may be appropriate to transfer
preadoptive and adoptive proceedings involy-
ing children residing outside of a reservation
to Tribal jurisdiction in particular circum-
stances” but declining to identify criteria),

The Community relied only on § 1911() in
requesting a transfer,

126 In denying the Community’s motion,
the juvenile court concluded there was “good
cause” under § 1911(b) not to order a trans-
fer pursuant to the statute. The Community
argues that the court erred in finding “good
cause.” The juvenile court reached the cor-
rect conclusion, irrespective of its “good
cause” determination, because § 1911(b) does
not apply to preadoptive and adoptive pro-
ceedings. We accordingly affirm its denial of
the motion to transfer. See State v. Perez,
141 Ariz, 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984)
(“The fact that the trial judge came to the
proper conclusion for the wrong reason is
irrelevant. We are obliged to affirm the trial
court’s ruling if the result was legally correct
for any reason.”).

I 127 Finally, contrary to the court of
appeals and the foster parents’ arguments,
we decline to rely on waiver as a basis for
affirming the denial of the Community’s
transfer motion. See Gila River Indian
Cmty., 240 Ariz, at 391 118, 879 P.8d 1016.
The Community did not expressly waive its
right to seek transfer; thus, the only waiver
here would be implied because the Communi-
ty did not seek transfer until after parental
rights were terminated. However, “[t]o imply
a waiver of jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with the ICWA objective of encouraging trib-
al control over custody decisions affecting
Indian children.” In re J.M., 718 P.2d 150,
155 (Alaska 1986) (emphasis omitted), More-
over, courts have historically been reluctant
to imply a waiver of Indian rights under
ICWA. Id; of In ve Guardianship of Q.G.M.,
808 P.2d 684, 689 (Okla. 1991) (“Because of
the ICWA objective to ensure that tribes
have an opportunity to exercise their rights
under the Act, and because of the plain lan-
guage of § 1911(c), a tribe’s waiver of the
right to intervene must be express.”).

I

128 We vacate the court of appeals’ opin-
ion and affirm the juvenile court’s denial of
the Community’s motion to transfer,

283
395 P.3d 292
Sharon DI GIACINTO, Appellant,
Vv.

ARIZONA STATE RETIREMENT
SYSTEM; Richard Hillis,
Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0722

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/4/2017

nw
fora)
<4

Robaina & Kresin, PLLO, Phoenix, By
Thomas T. Griffin, Counsel for Appellant

Arizona State Retirement System, Phoe-
nix, By Jothi Beljan, Counsel for Appellee
Arizona State Retirement System

Richard Hillis, Peoria, Appellee

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered
the opinion of the court, in which Judge Kent
E. Cattani and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

{11 In this appeal, we hold that A.R.S.
§ 88-775 requires a former spouse of an
Arizona State Retirement System (“ASRS”)
retiree to be treated as a “spouse” for pur-
poses of survivor benefits awarded under a
domestic relations order (“DRO”). Because of
this requirement, we further hold that the
age limits on non-spousal contingent annui-
tants contained in Arizona Administrative
Code R2-8-126(H) do not apply to former
spouses whose payments are ordered by
Qualified DROs (“QDROs”).

2 Sharon Di Giacinto appeals a judgment
holding that ASRS could terminate her sur-
vivorship rights in her ex-husband, Richard
Hillis’s, retirement annuity that the superior
court ordered as part of a decree of dissolu-
tion, A.A.C, R2-8-126(H) provides that “{a]
member who is ten years and one day, or
more, older than the member’s non-spousal
contingent annuitant is not eligible to partici-
pate in a 100% joint-and-survivor option.” !
The superior court ruled that the divorce
decree and final DRO were not acceptable
under A.R.S. § 88-778(B), because Di Giacin-
to, as a former spouse, is a “nonspouse”
under A.A.C, R2-8-126(H) and because she
is more than ten years younger than her
former husband. We disagree. Because the
final DRO complied with all statutory re-
quirements necessary to qualify Di Giacinto
as a spousal contingent annuitant, we reverse
and remand for an entry of judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

18 The relevant facts are undisputed? Di
Giacinto and Hillis were married in 1983, In
2008, Hillis retired after working almost 89
years with an ASRS employer. Under A.R.S.
§ 88~760(B)(1) and A.A.C. R2-8-120(A)(2),
1. We use the language of the latest version of the

regulation because there have been no material
revisions since Hillis's retirement.

2. Because we resolve this appeal as a matter of
Jaw, we need not address Di Giacinto’s factual

285

Hillis elected a 100% joint and survivor annu-
ity, which provided a reduced monthly bene-
fit amount but continued payments until Di
Giacinto’s death if she outlived him (“the
plan”).

94 In February 2006, Hillis (then age 69)
and Di Giacinto (then age 45) divorced, and
the superior court issued a decree of dissolu-
tion with orders that a third party prepare a
supplemental DRO, ASRS approved a draft
DRO. In June 2007, the court issued the final
DRO which awarded Di Giacinto 48.75% of
the monthly annuity benefit and 100% surviv-
or benefits as a contingent annuitant. ASRS
agreed to comply with the final DRO, desig-
nating it a QDRO.

15 In June 2014, Hillis requested a review
of the final DRO’s distribution allocation, in-
voking ASRS’s authority to correct errors
under A.R.S, § 88-765. ASRS nominally de-
nied his “request ... to facilitate any legal
review of the current DRO[, because] any
formal amendment to the [final] DRO must
be done in the Superior Court of Arizona,”
Nonetheless, under A.R.S. § 38-778(A),
ASRS determined that the final DRO was
“not acceptable,” because it preserved Di
Giacinto’s survivor benefits, which it conclud-
ed violated A.A.C, R2-8~126(H),

16 In July 2014, Di Giacinto requested a
hearing on the issue, After the hearing, an
ALJ issued a proposed ruling for the ASRS
Board concluding that when the decree was
entered, Di Giacinto “was automatically re-
moved as the [contingent annuitant on the
plan] by operation of law.” The ALJ recom-
mended that Di Giacinto’s appeal be dis-
missed, and the Board did so.

17 Di Giacinto appealed to the superior
court, which affirmed. The superior court did
not directly address the statutory or equita-
ble issues Di Giacinto raised except to adopt
the view that A.R.S, § 88~773(D) removed Di
Giacinto as a beneficiary by operation of law.
Di Giacinto appeals?

arguments concerning the ASRS Board’s hard-

ship findings with respect to equitable estoppel,

3. Hillis is also an appellee, He joins most of
ASRS's arguments on appeal and also argues
that the final DRO's prohibition against his

286
STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH 18 We review questions of statuto-
ry interpretation de novo. J.LF. v. Ariz.
Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 208
Aviz, 159, 161, 110, 91 P.8d 1002 (App. 2004).
Under A.R.S. § 12-910(E), we must reverse
an administrative decision if it is contrary to
law. When a statute is part of a broader
statutory scheme concerning a single subject,
we construe it in conjunction with related
statutes, giving effect to each provision.
Johnson v. Mohave Cownty, 206 Ariz, 880,
888, 111, 78 P.8d 1051 (App. 2008). In inter-
preting statutes, we “give meaning to ‘each
word, phrase, clause, and sentence ... so
that no part of the statute will be void, inert,
redundant, or trivial’” Herman v. City of
Tucson, 197 Ariz. 480, 484, 114, 4 P.8d 978
(App. 1999) (citation omitted).

HH 19 “We give great weight to ‘ain
agency's interpretation of a statute or regula-
tion it implements.” Sharpe v, Ariz, Health
Care Cost Containment Sys., 220 Ariz, 488,
494, 118, 207 P.8d 741 (App. 2009) (citation
omitted). But we make our own legal conclu-
sions to determine whether the agency prop-
erly interpreted the law. Avila v. Ariz. Dep't
of Econ, Sec., 160 Ariz. 246, 248, 772 P.2d 600
(App. 1989). An “agency's interpretation is
not infallible, and courts must remain the
final authority on critical questions of statu-
tory construction.” U.S. Parking Sys. v. City
of Phoenix, 160 Aviz, 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33
(App. 1989). Regulations may not be applied
inconsistent with or contrary to the statutes
they implement. Sharpe, 220 Ariz. at 495,
120, 207 P.8d 741.

DISCUSSION

110 ARS, § 38-778(B) provides: “[a]n ac-
ceptable [DRO] shall not require the board to
provide any type, form or time of payment of
severance, survivor or retirement benefits or
any severance, survivor or retirement benefit
option that is not provided under this arti-
cle.” ASRS argues that an acceptable DRO
cannot retain a former spouse as the contin-
gent annuitant if he or she does not conform

changing to a straight life annuity that would pay

higher monthly benefits and eliminate Di Giacin-
to's survivor benefits was improper, Because the

to the age restrictions in AAC. R2-8-
126(H). That regulation provides, in perti-
nent part, that “[a] member who is ten years
and one day, or more, older than the mem-
ber’s non-spousal contingent annuitant is not
eligible to participate in a 100% joint-and-
survivor option.” (Emphasis added.) We find
no statutory support for ASRS’s contention
that “nonspouses” include former spouses
when a QDRO recognizes the former
spouse’s community property interest in the
survivor benefits.

I. UNDER A VALID QDRO, FORMER
SPOUSES ARE NOT “NONSPOUSES”
FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
THE LIMITS ON CONTINGENT AN-
NUITANTS.

A. Controlling Federal Law Excludes
Former Spouses Whose Benefits are
Subject to a QDRO From the Defini-
tion of “Nonspouse.”

711 The term “non-spousal contingent an-
nuitant” as used in R2-8-126 is not defined
in the regulation or in statute. A.R.S. § 38-
T15(F) prescribes the distributions that
ASRS may make to “nonspouse” beneficia-
ries. Subsection (F')(1) limits benefits payable
to nonspouses in accordance with the table
contained in 26 O.F.R. § 1.401(a)(Q9)-6 at Q-
2, A-2(c)(2). The table limits the maximum
percentage of the member's benefits that
non-spousal contingent annuitants may re-
ceive based on the age difference between
the member and the contingent annuitant. In
accordance with A.R.S. § 38-760(B)(1), which
provides that “all, two-thirds or one-half of
the retirement income, as the member elects,
shall be continued during the lifetime of the
contingent annuitant designated by the retir-
ing member,” R2-8~-126(H) limits a mem-
ber’s selection based on the age difference
between the member and the nonspouse con-
tingent annuitant.

HM 112 Read in isolation, the term
“nonspouse” might be susceptible to an inter-
pretation that would include former spouses.
But the remainder of Title 38, Chapter 5,
Article 2, requires us to conclude that the
term “nonspouse” is not based on an individ-

decree is not properly before us, we presume the
DRO is valid.

ual’s status as a spouse at the time of distri-
bution.

118 AR.S. § 38-775(A)(1) provides that
“the requirements of this section take prece-
dence over any inconsistent provisions of this
article.” Section 38-775(A)(2) provides that
“fajll distributions required under this sec-
tion shall be determined and made pursuant
to § 401(a)(9) of the internal revenue code
and the regulations that are issued under
that section.” (Emphasis added.) As a matter
of Arizona law, therefore, the statutory limi-
tations on non-spousal contingent annuitants
in § 88-775—and any related regulations—
must be interpreted consistent with the rele-
vant provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code,*

{114 Section 401(a)(9) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code sets general rules governing how,
when, and to whom benefits may be distrib-
uted, including spousal survivor benefits. The
regulations under that section provide:

A former spouse to whom all or a portion

of the employee’s benefit is payable pursu-

ant to a QDRO will be treated as a spouse

(including a surviving spouse) of the em-

ployee for purposes of section 401(a)(9),

.+. regardless of whether the QDRO spe-

cifically provides that the former spouse is

treated as the spouse...
26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-8 at Q-6, A-6(a) (em-
phases added). The plain language of the
regulation that § 88-775 incorporates re-
quires ASRS to treat Di Giacinto as a spouse
if the decree or final DRO is a QDRO (“the
federal former spouse exception”). We there-
fore reject ASRS’s attempt to equate “for-
mer spouse” with “nonspouse” for these pur-
poses.>

B. Though the Decree Was Not a QDRO,

the Final DRO Was a QDRO, Effec-
tive Even When Entered After the
Decree.

915 A QDRO for purposes of the federal

former spouse exception is “a [DRO] ...

4. ASRS argues that because it is a tax-qualified
governmentally defined benefit plan, federal law
does not apply to it. While it is true that federal
law does not impose these regulations on ASRS,
the Arizona legislature has selectively invoked
certain provisions of federal law. Therefore, our
interpretation must, as a matter of state law, be
guided by the federal provisions that Arizona has

287

which creates or recognizes the existence of
an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an
alternate payee the right to, receive all or a
portion of the benefits payable with respect.
to a participant under a plan.” 26 U.S.C,
§ 414(p)(1)(A)G); see 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-
8 at Q-6 (QDRO for purposes of the federal
former spouse exception is defined by § 414),
The term “alternate payee” refers to a
spouse or former spouse “who is recognized
by a domestic relations order as having a
right to receive all, or a portion of, the
benefits payable under a plan with respect to
such participant.” 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(8).

116 A DRO is:

any judgment, decree, or order (including
approval of a property settlement) which—

@) relates to the provision of child sup-
port, alimony payments, or marital
property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a
participant, and

Gi) is made pursuant to a State domestic
relations law (including a community
property law).

26 U.S.C, § 414(p))(B). The DRO must
specify (1) the names and last known mailing
addresses of the named participant and alter-
nate payee, (2) the amount or percentage of
the benefits to be paid to the alternate payee,
(8) “the number of payments or period to
which the order applies,” and (4) “each plan
to which [the DRO] applies.” 26 U.S.C.
§ 414(p)(2). The DRO (a) cannot require
ASRS to provide “any type or form of bene-
fit, or any option, not otherwise provided
under the [member's] plan,” (b) cannot re-
quire ASRS to provide increased benefits as
determined by the actuarial value of the plan,
and (e) may not revoke the benefits owed to
another alternate payee under a different
QDRO. 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(8).

chosen to incorporate into ASRS’s governing
statutes,

5. Our interpretation does not render the term
“nonspouse” meaningless, because members en-
joy broad discretion in their choice of contingent
amnuitants, and may, for example, name their
children as “nonspouse beneficiaries.”

288

117 The decree itself is not a QDRO for
purposes of the federal former-spouse excep-
tion, because it does not list the address or
last known address of Hillis or Di Giacinto.
But the final DRO meets all of the require-
ments, as ASRS acknowledged when the fi-
nal DRO was entered.

HM {18 ASRS argues that if the decree
itself was not a QDRO, then the final DRO
could not be a QDRO. A QDRO is “any
judgment, decree, or order ... which ...
relates to the provision of ... marital prop-
erty rights to [a] spouse [or] former spouse.”
26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)G) (emphases added).
By using “any” and “former spouse,” the
statute unambiguously allows a QDRO to be
issued after a marriage is dissolved. We
therefore hold that a QDRO need not be
entered contemporaneously with the decree
of dissolution—it must simply inelude all the
elements in 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(1)-@).

Il THE ARIZONA STATUTES GOV-
ERNING ASRS DID NOT AUTOMAT-
ICALLY TERMINATE DI GIACIN-
TO’S SURVIVOR BENEFITS.

HM 1119 ASRS also argues, and the su-
perior court ruled, that A.R.S, § 88-773(D)
automatically terminated Di Giacinto’s rights
to survivor benefits upon divorce. But
ASRS’s reading ignores the first twelve
words of that provision;

Except as provided by the express terms of

a domestic relations order, the divorce or

annulment of a member’s marriage re-

vokes any revocable .., [dlisposition or

appointment of benefits made by a di-

voreed member to that member's former

spouse...
ARS. § 88-778(D) (emphasis added), A.R.S,
§ 88-773(H) provides that:

“Domestic relations order” means any

judgment, decree, order or approval of a

property setilement agreement entered in

a court of competent jurisdiction that:

(a) Relates to marital property rights of
a spouse or former spouse,

(b) Creates or recognizes in the spouse
or former spouse the existence of an
alternate payee’s right to severance, sur-
vivor or retirement benefits.

(©) Assigns the spouse or former spouse
as alternate payee the right to receive
all or part of the severance, survivor or
retirement benefits payable to the mem-
ber.

(Emphases added.)

120 Both the decree and the final DRO
satisfy the requirements of § 88-773(H), and
the dissolution therefore did not work an
automatic defeasance of Di Giacinto’s rights
to survivor benefits,

CONCLUSION

{21 For the foregoing reasons, we hold
that ASRS has no statutory authority to limit
a former spouse’s survivor benefits if a quali-
fied domestic relations order preserves them.
We therefore reverse, and remand for entry
of judgment in favor of Di Giacinto. Under
ARS. § 12-848(A)@), we grant Di Giacinto’s
request for attorney’s fees upon compliance
with ARCAP 21.

395 P.3d 297
Noreen PASSMORE and Clifford
Passmore, a married couple,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v

James W. MCCARVER, M.D., and Patricia
McCarver, a married couple; Prescott
Valley Primary and Urgent Care Clinic,
an Arizona business entity; Ellen Lor-
enz, C.F.N.P., and Rodney Lorenz, a
married couple, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0420

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/6/2017

S
2
N

290

Laurence M. Berlin, Esq., Tucson, By Lan-
rence M. Berlin, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants

Campbell, Yost, Clare & Norell, PC, Phoe-
nix, By Renee M, Coury, Jeffrey McLerran,
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix, By
Eileen Dennis GilBride, Co-Counsel for De-
fendants/Appellees James W. McCarver, Pa-
tricia McCarver, and Prescott Valley Pri-
mary and Urgent Care Clinic

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC,
Phoenix, By James R. Broening, Megan E.
Gailey, Kevin R. Myer, Counsel for Defen-
dants/Appellees Ellen Lorenz and Rodney
Lorenz

Acting Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann
delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Judge Patricia A, Orozco (retired) and Chief
Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

{1 The superior court dismissed appel-
lants’ medical malpractice action without
prejudice for failure to serve preliminary ex-
pert affidavits under A.R.S. § 12-2603, Ap-
pellants then sought to refile the action un-
der Arizona’s “savings statute,” A.R.S. § 12-
504, but the court found that relief was not

1, We take judicial notice of relevant superior-
court orders not included in the record on ap-
peal. See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425, 14,
10 P.3d 1211 (App. 2000),

available under that statute and dismissed
the claims with prejudice. We affirm. First,
we hold that appellants were not entitled to
automatic relief under § 12-504, because the
original dismissal constituted a dismissal for
failure to prosecute within the meaning of
the statute, Second, we hold that the court
did not abuse its discretion by otherwise
denying relief under § 12-504,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY !

{2 In March 2018, Noreen and Clifford
Passmore (“Plaintiffs”) filed a medical mal-
practice action against James W. McCarver,
M.D., Ellen Lorenz, C.F.N.P., and Prescott
Valley Primary and Urgent Care Clinic (col-
lectively, “Defendants”).? Concurrent with
the complaint, Plaintiffs certified under
ARS, § 12-2608(A) that “[e]xpert testimony

. may be necessary to prove Defendants
fell below the standard of care.” But they did
not thereafter serve preliminary expert affi-
davits within the time prescribed by § 12-
2603(B). And though the parties later agreed
to a March 2014 deadline for service of the
affidavits and the court eventually approved
the agreement, Plaintiffs failed to meet that
deadline as well. Defendants then moved for
dismissal.

8 By the time the court held oral argu-
ment in September 2014, Plaintiffs still had
not provided the affidavits. The court grant-
ed Defendants’ motion to dismiss and di-
rected them to submit a proposed form of
judgment, Defendants’ proposed judgment
contemplated a dismissal “with prejudice”
and cited “the failure to ... prosecute this
case,” an “intentional and willful failure to
comply with a court order and Arizona stat-
ute,” and Ariz, R. Civ. P. 41(b), which au-
thorizes presumptive “with prejudice” dis-
missals for failure to prosecute or comply
with rules or court orders. Plaintiffs object-
ed to the proposed judgment, arguing that
the motion to dismiss had not mentioned
Rule 41(b), that the court’s order had not
mentioned either Rule 41(b) or intentional

2. Yavapai Regional Medical Center was also
named as a defendant, but was later dismissed
without objection,

or willful conduct, and that § 12-2503(F) re-
quired dismissal without prejudice. In No-
vember 2014, the court held that Defen-
dants’ proposed judgment “exceed{ed] the
scope of the Court’s .., Ruling,” and or-
dered the claims “DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-2603(F).”

14 Approximately two weeks later, Plain-
tiffs refiled their claims. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations, Plaintiffs did not dispute that the
statute of limitations had expired, but argued
that the new action was automatically proper
under A.R.S. § 12-504 because the original
dismissal was not for lack of prosecution.
Plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that
even if the dismissal was for lack of prosecu-
tion, the court should exercise its discretion
under § 12-504 to permit the new action.

15 The court held that it “[would] not
make new findings concerning [the] prior
ease” but “[could] not ignore the result of the
prior case, given that the [same judge] was
also the assigned judge” in that case, The
court concluded that, “[hJaving considered all
the facts and circumstances of what went on
in that prior case, the Court does determine
that the dismissal under [A.R.S. § 12-
2608(F) ] was for lack of prosecution.” The
court further concluded that “the exercise of
discretion would not be appropriate and
Plaintiffs’[ Jrequest for discretion for the sav-
ings of this particular case is denied.” The
court dismissed the new action with preju-
dice.

16 Plaintiffs timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

HN 17 ARS. § 12-504 creates a reme-
dial procedure by which plaintiffs may, in
some circumstances, refile terminated actions
without regard to the statute of limitations,
Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 470,
472, 808 P.2d 1222 (1991), The statute in-
cludes a mandatory provision and a discre-
tionary provision. Roller Village, Inc. v. Su-
perior Court (Dow), 154 Ariz, 195, 197, 741
P.2d 828 (App. 1987), First, § 12~504(A) pro-
vides:

Tf an action is commenced within the time

limited for the action, and the action is

291

terminated in any manner other than by
abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal
for lack of prosecution or a final judgment
on the merits, the plaintiff or a successor
or personal representative, may commence
a new action for the same cause after the
expiration of the time so limited and within
six months after such termination,

(Emphases added.) Second, § 12-504(A) pro-
vides:

Tf an action timely commenced is terminat-
ed by abatement, voluntary dismissal by
order of the court or dismissal for lack of
prosecution, the cowrt in its discretion
may ‘provide a period for commencement
of a new action for the same cause, al-
though the time otherwise limited for com-
mencement has expired, Such period shall
not exceed six months from the date of
termination.

(Emphases added.) We interpret § 12-
504(A)’s mandatory- and discretionary-relief
provisions de novo, See Sedona Grand, LLC
v, City of Sedona, 229 Ariz, 37, 39, 18, 270
P.8d 864 (App. 2012). We review the grant of
a motion to dismiss and the denial of disere-
tionary relief under § 12-504(A) for abuse of
discretion. Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz.
279, 281, 111, 180 P.8d 978 (2006); Copeland
v. Ariz, Veterans Mem’l Colisewm & Euposi-
tion Ctr., 176 Ariz, 86, 91, 859 P.2d 196 (App.
1998),

I. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTI-
TLED TO AUTOMATIC RELIEF UN-
DER § 12-504(A), BECAUSE THE
DISMISSAL OF THE ORIGINAL AC-
TION UNDER § 12-2603 WAS A DIS-
MISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSE-
CUTE.

HM 118 Plaintiffs first contend that they
were entitled to refile as a matter of right
under § 12-504(A) because their initial action
was dismissed in a “manner other than by
abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal for
Jack of prosecution or a final judgment on the
merits.” Specifically, they contend that a dis-
missal without prejudice under § 12-2603(F)
is not equivalent to a dismissal for lack of
prosecution. We hold that when a case is
dismissed for failure to serve a preliminary

292

expert affidavit under § 12-2603, the dis-
missal is for lack of prosecution.

Hs 119 The superior court has discre-
tion to dismiss cases that are not diligently
prosecuted, Cooper v. Odom, 6 Ariz.App. 466,
469, 488 P.2d 646 (1967); see also Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 41(b). “Mere delay can be the basis of
dismissal.” Cooper, 6 Ariz.App. at 469, 433
P.2d 646, Failure to serve the preliminary
affidavit required by § 12-2608 is an unam-
biguous form of delay, Section 12-2603 seeks
to “curb frivolous medical malpractice law-
suits by imposing a stricter standard of
pleading and setting deadlines for the early
involvement of the plaintiff's expert wit-
nesses.” Gorney v. Meaney, 214 Ariz. 226,
229, 18, 150 P.8d 799 (App. 2007). To that
end, the statute defines specific tasks that
must be completed by specific deadlines to
prosecute claims against health care profes-
sionals, along with specific procedures where-
by plaintiffs may obtain extensions of time
and opportunities to cure deficiencies. See
ARS, § 12-2608(A)-(C), (F). Accordingly, a
dismissal for failure to comply with the stat-
ute’s directive to serve a preliminary affidavit
is a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Plain-
tiffs’ second action therefore did not fall
within the scope of § 12-504’s mandatory-
relief provision—without regard to whether
the court had firsthand knowledge of the
original action,

110 The court’s ruling did not, as Plaintiffs
contend, create “new findings re[garding] the
original case.” The court simply recognized
the legal effect of the first judgment. And
contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the fact
that the court rejected Defendants’ proposed
form of judgment in the first action does not
compel a different outeome. The procedural
history regarding the proposed form of judg-
ment in the first action reflects that the court
correctly declined to apply Rule 41(b)’s pre-
sumption of dismissals with prejudice in view
of § 12-2608(F)’s prescription of dismissals
without prejudice, See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 41(b)
(Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision ... operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.”); Sanchez v, Old Pueblo
Anesthesia, P.C., 218 Ariz, 817, 328, 120, 183
P.8d 1285 (App. 2008) (holding that § 12~

2608 “does not contemplate dismissal with
prejudice as a sanction for a deficient prelim-
inary affidavit”), The procedural history does
not suggest that the dismissal was for any
yeason other than Plaintiffs’ failure to serve
preliminary expert affidavits and thereby
prosecute their case.

Il, THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DE-
NYING DISCRETIONARY RELIEF
UNDER § 12-504(A).

Hl 111 Plaintiffs next contend that they
were entitled to relief under § 12-504(A)'s
discretionary provision. The record supports
the superior court’s denial of relief.

Hs {12 “(ihe very nature of the dis-
eretionary portion of [§ 12-504(A) ] requires
a case-by-case application and evaluation,”
Jepson v, New, 164 Ariz, 265, 271, 792 P.2d
728 (1990). The standard “must be flexible”
and “must ensure that the statute is not
misused as a safe haven for the dilatory and
a loophole through which parties may avoid
the applicable rules of practice and proce-
dure.” Id, In deciding how to exercise its
discretion under the statute, the court must
consider several factors: “whether the plain-
tiff acted reasonably and in good faith,
whether he prosecuted his case diligently and
vigorously, whether a procedural impediment
exists which affects his ability to file a second
action, and whether either party will be sub-
stantially prejudiced.” Id, at 272, 792 P.2d
728 (citation omitted), The plaintiff bears the
burden to show entitlement to relief. Id.

118 The record shows that Plaintiffs failed
to file any affidavits under § 12-2603 even
after obtaining a significant extension of
time. Plaintiffs’ primary explanation for the
delinquency was that they had difficulty de-
termining the specialty of the expert who
should opine as to McCarver’s standard of
care, and had difficulty communicating with
their chosen expert regarding Lorenz’s stan-
dard of care, first because Plaintiffs’ coun-
sel’s office flooded and later because the
expert relocated. It was within the court’s
discretion to find those explanations insuffi-
cient to justify a conclusion that Plaintiffs
acted reasonably and in good faith, especially
in view of the length of the delay and Plain-

tiffs’ failure to comply the stipulated
extension. Further, it was within the court’s
discretion to find that the prejudice caused to
Plaintiffs by denying relief under § 12-504
‘was outweighed by the prejudice that Defen-
dants would suffer were the claims allowed to
move forward in view of the extreme and
unjustified delay. See Jepson, 164 Ariz, at
274, 792 P.2d 728 (“[Allthough the case is
now barred by the statute of limitations and
in balancing the prejudice in that regard it
appears that the hardship is greatest upon
[the plaintiff], all factors must be considered
together.”). Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court reasonably conclud-
ed that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden
to show entitlement to relief under the sav-
ings statute.

CONCLUSION

114 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims with prejudice,

395 P.3d 302

GREEN CROSS MEDICAL, INC., an
Arizona non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v

John V. GALLY, Trustee of the John V.
Gally Family Protective Trust, dated
January 11, 1993, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0019

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/18/2017

py

94,

|

Aspey Watkins & Diesel PLLC, Flagstaff,
By Whitney Cunningham, John W. Carlson,
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Hunter Humphrey & Yavitz PLC, Phoe-
nix, By Isabel M, Humphrey, Randall 8.
Yavitz, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Peter
B, Swann and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

OPINION

KESSLER, Judge:

{1 Appellant Green Cross Medical
(“Green Cross”) appeals the superior court’s
summary judgment dismissing its breach of
contract complaint against John V. Gally,
Trustee of the John V. Gally Family Protec-
tive Trust (“Gally”). We hold that the lease
between Gally and Green Cross to permit
Green Cross to operate a medical marijuana
dispensary was not void from its inception,
and to the extent Green Cross is seeking
damages for the breach, the lease was en-
forceable, Accordingly, we remand for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

{2 The relevant facts are undisputed. Gal-
ly is the owner of commercial property locat-
ed in Winslow, Arizona (“Property”). In 2012,
Gally entered into a lease agreement with
Green Cross for the Property to allow Green
Cross to operate a medical marijuana dispen-
sary. The lease provided that there was an
“application first term” allowing Green Cross
to lease the property until it was issued a
dispensary operating license from the State
of Arizona, The lease did not specify how
Jong the application first term would run, but

it provided for an increase in the rent once
the first term ended.

93 Less than two weeks after entering
into the lease, Green Cross received a letter
from Gally’s attorney stating that Gally was
revoking the lease. Green Cross filed this
breach of contract complaint, a motion for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”), and a
motion for a preliminary injunction. Gally
argued that he was required to revoke the
lease because a prior month-to-month lessee
who had wanted to operate a medical mari-
juana dispensary on the Property allegedly
had a superior interest in the Property. The
superior court issued the TRO and later a
preliminary injunction, barring Gally from
revoking the lease, Gally appealed that deci-
sion and the superior court stayed further
proceedings pending the appeal. We affirmed
the superior court’s orders. Green Cross
Medical, Inc. v. Gally, 1 CA-CV 12-0610,
2018 WL 5435817 (Ariz. App. Sep. 26, 2013)
(mem. decision).

14 On remand, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment, For the first
time in the superior court, Gally argued that
he was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because the lease was illegal and there-
fore unenforceable. Green Cross did not ob-
tain the necessary permission under the Ari-
zona Medical Marijuana Act, Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 86-2801, et seq.
(AMMA”),! to operate a medical marijuana
dispensary.2 However, Green Cross sought
partial summary judgment on liability for
possible damages for Gally’s revocation of
the lease. The superior court denied Green
Cross’s motion and granted Gally’s, holding
that the lease violated both federal and state
Jaw and was therefore void for illegality.
Green Cross timely appealed. We have juris-
diction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes
§ 12-2101(A)(1) (2016).

DISCUSSION

HN 115 We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo as an issue of law. Acosta

1, We cite to the current versions of any statute
unless the statute was amended after the perti-
nent events and such amendment would affect
the result of this appeal.

295

v. Phe. Indem. Ins. Co., 214 Ariz. 880, 381,
12, 158 P.8d 401 (App. 2007) (citation omit-
ted). We will affirm if there are no disputed
issues of material fact and the prevailing
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, viewing the facts in the light most favor-
able to the party against whom summary
judgment was entered. Jd. (citations omit-
ted). Additionally, we review issues of statu-
tory construction and interpretation de novo.
Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, 201,
18, 150 P.8d 773 (App. 2007) (citation omit-
ted).

16 The issue presented is whether a con-
tract for the lease of real property to a party
applying to operate a medical marijuana dis-
pensary is void for illegality. The superior
court held that the lease was illegal under
state law for, “among other things, produc-
tion of marijuana and conspiracy to sell or
transfer marijuana.” Additionally, the superi-
or court found that the lease agreement vio-
lated the Controlled Substances Act, 21
US.C. §§ 801 et seg. (“CSA”). Specifically,
the court cited 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)-@)
(2008), which states:

[Tt shall be unlawful to—knowingly open,
lease, rent, use, or maintain any place,
whether permanently or temporarily, for
the purpose of manufacturing, distributing,
or using any controlled substance; manage
or control any place, whether permanently
or temporarily, either as an owner, lessee,
agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee,
and knowingly and intentionally rent,
lease, profit from, or make available for
use, with or without compensation, the
place for the purpose of unlawfully manu-
facturing, storing, distributing, or using a
controlled substance.

17 At the time Gally terminated the lease,
Green Cross had not received the necessary
permission to operate a dispensary. But the
lease permitted Green Cross to sublease the
Property—a valuable commercial right that
existed independent of any concerns over the

2. For a detailed explanation of how an applicant
for a medical marijuana dispensary can obtain
permission to operate under the AMMA, see
White Mountain Health Ctr, Inc. v. Maricopa
County, 241 Ariz. 230, 233-34, 193-7, 386 P.3d
416 (App. 2016).

296

legality of medical marijuana. And nothing in
the lease suggested it would be void or voida-
ble if Green Cross did not receive a license to
run a dispensary.

18 We find no statute, state or federal,
that bars leasing property to a person or
business that is applying for a license to run
a medical marijuana dispensary under the
AMMA with a right to sublease. Even as-
suming, arguendo, that the operation of a
dispensary would have violated federal law,
the right to sublease was a valuable property
right that involves no controversy over its
legality, As such, Green Cross can seek dam-
ages for the loss of the lease,

19 Gally argues that Green Cross is not
entitled to any damages, asserting that the
lease was void from the outset because it
would have violated state and federal law if
Green Cross ever used the Property for an
AMMA-compliant medical marijuana dispen-
sary. Accordingly, we will address the inter-
play between state and federal law to deter-
mine if Gally can be liable for any damages
to Green Cross. The issue is one of first
impression in Arizona, and there are conflict-
ing superior court decisions on this issue?

I. Mlegality Under State Law

HN 1:10 We conclude the lease is not
illegal under Arizona law for several reasons.
First, the AMMA protects the rights of dis-
pensaries to enter into leases and contracts if
they are in compliance with the AMMA. Sec-
tion 86-2811(E) provides that a registered
nonprofit, medical marijuana dispensary is

3. Compare Hammer v. Today's Health Care II,
Nos. CV 2011-051310 and -051311, 2012 WL
12874349 (Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct. Apr. 17,
2012) (holding dispensary contract void as ille-
gal) with Weiss v. Fortin, No. CV 2013-00278
(Maricopa Cty. Super, Ct. Sept 20, 2013) (hold-
ing dispensary contract enforceable under
AMMA),

4, Gally cites State v. Cheatham, 237 Ariz. 502,
353 P.3d 382 (App. 2015), for the conclusion that
the AMMA does not decriminalize marijuana
possession or use, but only provides immunity
for such possession or use consistent with the
AMMA. Id, at 504-05, 19, 353 P.3d 382. Thus, he
argues that since there is no express immunity
for landlords renting to dispensaries, the lease
here is still in violation of the AMMA. That reli-
ance is misplaced for several reasons, First,
Cheatham was vacated by the Arizona Supreme

not subject to prosecution ... and may
not be denied any right or privilege ... by
@ court or ... entity, for acting pursuant
to [the AMMA] and department regula-
tions to acquire, possess, cultivate, manu-
facture, deliver, transfer, ... sell or dis-
pense marijuana or related supplies ... to
.++ qualifying patients [or] ... designated
caregivers,

ARS. § 86-2811(E) (2010) (emphasis add-
ed), The ability to enforce a lease or contract
is a right or privilege under Arizona law,
subject only to reasonable regulation by the
government when a public interest is in-
volved. Schrey v, Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 75
Ariz, 282, 286-87, 255 P.2d 604 (1953), Par-
ties have the legal right to make whatever
contracts they desire, subject to liability for
their breach except when “the acts to be
performed under the contract are themselves
illegal or contrary to public policy, or if the
legislature has clearly demonstrated its in-
tent to prohibit maintenance of a cause of
action, then recovery should be denied.” # &
S Insulation Co. of Ariz, Inc. v. BL. Jones
Const. Co., 121 Ariz. 468, 470, 591 P.2d 560
(App. 1979). That limitation, however, is not
inflexible and the court must look to the
legislative intent. Ruelas v. Ruelas, 7 Ariz.
App. 98, 101, 436 P.2d 490 (1968) (citations
omitted), Given the language of the AMMA,
a court may not void or refuse to enforce a
dispensary’s lease with a landlord simply be-
cause the dispensary would be supplying
marijuana in compliance with the AMMA‘

Court after Gally’s answering brief was filed.
State v. Cheatham, 240 Ariz, 1, 375 P.3d 66
(2016). Second, as the supreme court noted, the
only issue in Cheatham was whether the smell of
marijuana supported probable cause for a search
after enactment of the AMMA. Id. at 3, 119-10,
375 P.3d at 68. Cheatham has no bearing on the
AMMA's provisions for AMMA-compliant dispen-
saries; the AMMA prohibits a court from denying
any right or privilege to an entity “acting pursu-
ant to [the AMMA] and department regulations to
acquire, possess, cultivate, manufacture, deliver,
transfer, ... sell or dispense marijuana or relat-
ed supplies ... to ... qualifying patients or ...
designated caregivers.” A.R.S. § 36-2811(E).
Third, as we explain infra, 1911-12, the State
may not prosecute landlords for renting property
compliant with the AMMA,

HM 111 Second, while Gally correctly
notes that no provision of the AMMA ex-
pressly lists landlords as entitled to immuni-
ty for leasing property to authorized dispen-
saries, we will not interpret a statute in a
manner that would lead to an absurd result,
City of Phoenix v. Superior Court In & For
Maricopa County, 101 Ariz, 265, 267, 419
P.2d 49, 51 (1966) (citations omitted), The
AMMA provides protection against arrest
and prosecution for qualifying patients, care-
givers, physicians, providers, and dispensa-
ries so long as they are in compliance with
the AMMA and administrative rules promul-
gated under the AMMA. See ARS. § 36-
2811, An interpretation that allows a dispen-
sary to lease premises for use compliant with
the AMMA, but authorizes the State to pros-
ecute a landlord leasing property to a dispen-
sary compliant with the AMMA (or a court to
void an AMMA-compliant lease) would ren-
der the statute futile and violate A.R.S, § 86-
2811(E). If the State is prohibited from act-
ing directly, it cannot circumvent the law by
acting indirectly to obtain the same result.
See Danielson v. Huans, 201 Ariz, 401, 409,
127, 86 P.8d 749 (App, 2001) (citations and
quotations omitted). Accordingly, Gally’s pro-
posed interpretation of the AMMA as not
providing immunity for landlords would lead
to an absurd result and is untenable, We
therefore reject it,

II 112 This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that to operate under the AMMA, a
dispensary must certify to the Arizona De-
partment of Health Services that it has a
secured facility and that the dispensary has
permission from the landowner to operate a
dispensary. See A.R.S, § 86-2804(B)(1)
(2010) (providing that the department shall
register a dispensary if, inter alia, the pro-
spective dispensary shows it has a physical
address for the dispensary and for cultivation
of marijuana); Ariz, Admin, Code R9-17-
804(C)(7)(a) (2012) (requiring documentation

5, Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, if a
court could void or refuse to allow a damages
action for breach of a lease to a compliant dis-
pensary based solely on the proposed use of the
property, it could also void a sale of property to a
dispensary. Similarly, such a conclusion would
allow dispensaries who wanted to get out of their
leases to simply bring an action to void the lease
ab initio, leaving the landlords at risk of loss.

297

of permission from owner of the physical
address of the proposed dispensary). When a
statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific
issue, we defer to the implementing agency’s
interpretation of the statute if the agency’s
construction is a permissible construction
even if it is not the most reasonable construc-
tion, Kobold v. Aetna Life Ins, Co,, 289 Ariz,
259, 262, 19, 870 P.8d 128 (App. 2016) (cita-
tions omitted), To ensure proper administra-
tion of the AMMA and protect the public
interest, the department is empowered to
ensure that any property to be used as a
dispensary has the landowner’s authorization
and to adopt implementing rules. A.R.S.
§ 36-2808(A) (2016), To hold that a court can
void or refuse to enforce an otherwise en-
forceable dispensary lease authorized by the
AMMA and the implementing regulations
simply because the property would be used
as a. dispensary—in compliance with the
AMMA—would violate those regulations,
lead to an absurd result, and frustrate the
purpose of the statute.>

118 Gally argues that despite the passage
of the AMMA, under Arizona law a landlord
could still be prosecuted for accomplice lia-
bility, conspiracy liability, and facilitation lia-
bility.6 The criminal statutes for conspiracy,
accomplice, and facilitation liability each re-
quire that a criminal offense be attached to
the action in some way. See A.R.S, §§ 13-
1008(A) (2016) (“A person commits conspira-
cy if, with the intent to promote or aid the
commission of an offense ...”); 18-1004(A)
(2016) (“A person commits facilitation if, act-
ing with knowledge that another person is
committing or intends to commit an offense
+++") 18-808(A)(1) (2008) (“The person is
made accountable for [another’s criminal]
conduct by the statute defining the offense
.+-”), Gally could not lawfully be prosecuted
for any of these underlying crimes because
running a medical marijuana dispensary in
6. Gally also argues that even if the lease were

legal under the AMMA, the AMMA is preempted

by the CSA. That argument was made before our
decision in White Mountain, which held that the

CSA does not preempt the AMMA. White Moun-
tain, 241 Ariz, at 237-57, 1125-56, 386 P.3d 416,

298

compliance with the AMMA is not an of-
fense. Cheatham, 240 Ariz. at 3 19, 875 P.8d
at 68 (holding the “AMMA has made the
possession and use of marijuana lawful for
medicinal purposes under the terms and con-
ditions set forth in that Act”),

114 Gally also argues that a landlord could
be prosecuted for the possession, use, or sale
of marijuana. However, nothing in the lease
even suggests that Gally would be using,
selling, or possessing marijuana simply be-
cause he leased the Property to a dispensary
compliant with the AMMA,

915 We emphasize that nothing in the
AMMA requires a landlord to rent a proper-
ty to a proposed dispensary. Gally was free
not to enter into the lease if he was uncom-
fortable with the proposed use of the Proper-
ty. But once he chose to do so, he was not.
free to rescind his contractual commitments
without facing potential monetary liability.
Accordingly, leasing property to a medical
marijuana dispensary that is in compliance
with the AMMA is not illegal under Arizona
law. Thus, the superior court erred when it
found the lease was void and dismissed the
complaint seeking damages for the breach.

Il, Federal Illegality

Hs‘ 16 Gally also argues and the su-
perior court held that the lease was illegal
under the CSA. As we explained in White
Mountain Health Ctr, Ine. v. Maricopa
County, 241 Ariz, 280, 886 P.8d 416 (App.
2016), the sale and use of marijuana for
medical purposes is illegal under federal law.
Id, at 288, 180, 886 P.38d 416; see also United
States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th
Cir.2016) (reiterating that “the CSA prohibits
what the State Medical Marijuana Laws per-
mit”). Similarly, it is illegal under the CSA to
lease property knowing it would be used for
the illegal production or distribution of con-
trolled substances. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)—
@).

HM 117 However, that does not render
the contract in this case unenforceable under
all circumstances. “[E]ven where contracts
concern illegal objects, where it is possible
for a court to enforce a contract in a way that
does not require illegal conduct, the court is

not barred from according such relief.”
Mann v. Gullickson, 2016 WL 6478215, *7
(ND, Cal. Nov, 2, 2016). Thus, just as Ari-
zona law notes that the rule of voiding illegal
contracts is flexible and we must look to the
legislative intent, Ruelas, 7 Ariz.App. at 101,
436 P.2d 490, other courts have held that
before voiding a contract on the basis that it
violates a statute, the court must consider
the policy behind the statute and whether
voiding the agreement will result in a dispro-
portionate forfeiture, unjust enrichment,
windfalls, and deterrence of illegal conduct.
Mann, 2016 WL 6478215 at “6-7 (collecting
cases). The court must also weigh the rela-
tive moral culpability of the contracting par-
ties. Id.

118 Here, in analyzing whether the lease
was void ab initio we find persuasive the
reasoning in Mann and Green Earth Well-
ness Ctr, LLC v, Atain Specialty Ins. Co.,
168 F.Supp.8d 821, 882-83 (D,Colo.2016), In
Mann, the issue was whether a contract to
sell a business that involved consulting for
medical marijuana dispensaries and related
businesses and selling plant growing equip-
ment and related information was void for
illegality under federal law. Mann, 2016 WL.
6473215 at *1-2, Even though those activities
were legal under state law, the buyer refused
to pay on the notes owed to the seller and
sought to dismiss the seller’s breach of con-
tract action on the grounds that the contracts
were void ab initio for violation of federal
law. Id, at *2, The court rejected that argu-
ment, concluding that the contract related to
lawful activity under California law, and fed-
eral policy on medical marijuana authorized
by states was in a state of flux. Jd. at *7-8,
The court also held that requiring the buyer
to pay the notes would not require her to
violate the CSA because the buyer was not
required under the note to possess or sell
marijuana in violation of federal law. Id. As
to the third factor of disproportionate forfei-
ture and unjust enrichment, the court rea-
soned that voiding the note would be con-
trary to state policy on medical marijuana
because California, like other states, had au-
thorized use, possession, and distribution of
medical marijuana for the health of their
residents. Id. at *9, The court also found that
the buyer understood upon signing the con-

tract that possession, sale, and use of mari-
juana was prohibited by the CSA so that the
moral culpability factor could equally lie with
both parties, Id. The court also weighed the
effect on the public if the contract was found
to be void. It noted that such a holding would
encourage other potentially illicit conduct
such as the nonpayment for services ren-
dered pursuant to a contract, Id.

{19 Similarly, in Green Harth, the court
rejected a claim that a commercial insurance
policy protecting a retail medical marijuana
business was unenforceable. Green Earth,
163 F.Supp.8d at 828. The plaintiff in that
case had purchased commercial insurance for
its medical marijuana business. Jd. The plain-
tiff later filed claims for smoke and ash dam-
age from a nearby wild fire and for theft of
some of its product. Jd. When the insurer
denied those claims, the plaintiff sued the
insurer on a number of grounds including
breach of contract. Id. The court rejected the
insurer’s assertion that in light of the CSA, it
would be illegal to pay for the plaintiff's
damages. The court noted that the United
States had shown an ambivalence in prose-
euting medical marijuana cases when the use
or distribution was authorized by state law,
and it was doubtful the plaintiff would be
prosecuted. Jd. at 832-38. The court conclud-
ed that the parties had entered into the
policy of their own will, knowingly and intelli-
gently, and given the lack of clear and consis-
tent federal public policy in the area, the
insurer was obligated to comply with the
contract, Id.

120 Here, balancing the federal govern-
ment’s interest in enforcing the CSA with
Arizona’s interest in effectuating the AMMA
leads us to conclude that the contract action
seeking damages is not barred simply be-
cause the lease would violate the CSA. As to
public policy, Mann explained federal policy
as to medical marijuana has been in flux for
years. Mann, 2016 WL 6478215 at *4. As

7. In response to our request for further briefing,
Gally contends that the Appropriations Act's ban
on use of federal funds to enforce prohibitions
against medical marijuana when the actions are
compliant with state medical marijuana laws
might not survive into the next Congressional
term. However, we cannot predict the future and
must apply the law as it exists at the time we

299

Green Cross pointed out, beginning in 2009,
before this lease was signed, the United
States Department of Justice had instructed
United States Attorneys not to prosecute
persons acting in compliance with state medi-
cal marijuana laws. Similarly, as we noted in
White Mountain, 241 Ariz. at 246-47, 154,
886 P.8d 416, in 2016, Congress barred the
Department of Justice from using any fund-
ing to prosecute people using or distributing
medical marijuana in compliance with state
laws. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,
Pub. L, No. 114-118, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
Pursuant to that act, the Department of Jus-
tice may not use any of its funding “with
respect to ... Arizona ... to prevent [it]
from implementing [its] own laws that au-
thorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.” Id. at
§ 542, 2332-833. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that
the Appropriations Act prohibits the Depart-
ment of Justice from interfering with the
implementation of such laws not simply by
suing states with medical marijuana laws, but
also by prosecuting private individuals under
the CSA for conduct compliant with the state
medical marijuana law in their jurisdiction.
McIntosh, 883 F.3d at 1176~78. Thus, while
the lease might technically be in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)-(2), Congress has, for
the time being, forbidden enforcement of that
section for all purposes relevant to this case.

{21 In contrast, Arizona voters passed the
AMMA to allow such use and distribution
and prevented denials of rights and privi-
leges related to compliant medical marijuana
distribution and use. Given the federal gov-
ernment’s lack of interest in prosecuting indi-
viduals in compliance with the AMMA, as
well as a public policy that favors enforce-
ment of the lease compliant with state law,
the purported illegality here does not render
the lease void as illegal, at least for purposes
of a damages action.’ Cf; Reed-Kaliher v.

render our decision barring a manifest injustice.
Bradley v. Richmond Sch, Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711,
94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974). We find no
manifest injustice in holding Gally to his contract
with Green Cross for purposes of damages. If
Congress ends the ban on such actions and the
Department of Justice decides to prosecute per-
sons operating in compliance with state medical

300

Hoggatt, 287 Aviz, 119, 124, 721, 847 P.3d
186, 141 (2015) (noting that by prohibiting
AMMA-compliant marijuana use, a trial
court would not be authorizing or sanctioning
a violation of federal law, but merely recog-
nizing the statutory limit on the court’s au-
thority to impose probation conditions),

122 Second, just as in Mann and Green
Earth, allowing a damage action for wrongful
termination of the lease would not be requir-
ing persons to violate the OSA, It would only
be enforcing Green Cross’s contract rights
under the lease at least for an award of
damages,

28 Third, voiding leases relating to prop-
erty used for medical marijuana dispensaries
could lead to unjust enrichment or an uncon-
scionable windfall for the person who breach-
es the lease. The lessee-dispensary might,
incur damages from the futile development of
the property and certainly would have relied
on the lease for its application to run a
dispensary under the AMMA. To allow a
landlord carte blanche to void the lease sim-
ply because it might violate the CSA, even
though the landlord knew the proposed use
of the land when he entered the lease, would
undermine the sanctity of contracts and leave
a dispensary without a remedy for any mone-
tary losses caused by the breach. Conversely,
it would allow lessees to breach leases when
it suited their needs to relocate.

24 Fourth, there is no question of moral
responsibility here. Both parties knew the
purpose for which the land would be used
under the lease if Green Cross obtained the
necessary approval from the Department of
Health Services, Moreover, Gally was not
surprised that the land would be put to that
use since his initial argument against en-
forcement of the lease was that another pro-

marijuana laws, such action might affect the
length of time for which damages can be sought,
but that does not support voiding the lease from
its inception,

Gally also contends in his Supplemental Brief
that the Appropriations Act limitation was passed
after he had breached the lease and should have
no bearing on his decision not to want to abide
by a lease in violation of the CSA. As we note,
prior to the lease being signed, the Department
of Justice had already decided not to bring prose-
cutions for conduct compliant with state medical

posed medical marijuana dispensary had a
superior interest in the Property.

725 Accordingly, we conclude that enfore-
ing the lease at least for purposes of a dam-
ages action is appropriate. Such an approach
is consistent with state law and the policies
behind the AMMA, would enforce the right
of contract for dispensaries or applicants for
dispensaries, would deter wrongful breaches
of leases with persons who had leased the
premises for AMMA-compliant purposes, and
would avoid unjust enrichment by a party
seeking to terminate such a lease after gain-
ing the benefit of the lease,

TIL, Restatement (Second) of Contracts

126 Our conclusion that the court erred in
dismissing a damages action for a breach of
the lease is further supported by the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 178
(1981), which sets forth factors to consider
when applying the common law doctrine of
illegality, Those factors include the parties’
justified expectations regarding the contract,
as well as the legislative and public policy
interests in enforcing or not enforcing the
terms of the contract.

27 Here, to void the lease at issue for
illegality so as to preclude a breach of con-
tract action for damages would be contrary
to the parties’ contemplated expectations and
would contradict both the legislative intent,
and public policy underlying the AMMA. The
use of medical marijuana under the AMMA
requires dispensaries, and dispensaries re-
quire contracts, including lease agreements,
To hold dispensary leases void ab initio be-
cause they involve lawful distribution of med-
ical marijuana under state law could make
the AMMA futile and undermine the policy
behind it.

marijuana laws. The Appropriations Act merely
codified that policy, Moreover, Gally was more
than willing to lease to a dispensary in violation
of the CSA when he knew that the lease violated
federal law. Indeed, he was willing to lease it on
two different occasions to two different AMMA
dispensary applicants. He cannot later escape
liability for his breach. Nor does Gally cite to us
any authority that merely by possibly being liable
for damages for breaching such a lease he would
be subject to criminal liability under 21 U.S.C.
§ 856(a)(1)-(2).

128 Finally, there is a strong public inter-
est in enforcing contracts and leases compli-
ant with state law. Otherwise, parties to a
lease of this nature could feel free to breach
the lease after gaining advantage from it.
This is especially true for dispensaries who
have to certify that the lease and property is
appropriate and authorized for dispensary
use.

129 In applying these factors, we recog-
nize there is a tension between the CSA and
the AMMA because the CSA still criminal-
izes the sale, use, or possession of medical
marijuana whereas the AMMA offers immu-
nity and protections for those persons oper-
ating in compliance with the AMMA. Never-
theless, refusing to enforce such contracts
would undermine the medical marijuana pro-
gram the voters approved, Enforcing such
contracts leaves the federal government in
the same position it has chosen with respect
to medical marijuana in Arizona. If the feder-
al government wishes to end such programs
by enforcing the CSA, it has the power to do
so provided Congress permits use of federal
funds to conduct such prosecutions and the
Department of Justice desires to bring such
actions, We conclude the lease was enforce-
able at least for purposes of a damages ac-
tion for its breach.

CONCLUSION

130 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the superior court’s judgment and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling. We grant Green Cross’s request for
taxable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred on
appeal under A.R.S, §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01
upon timely compliance with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

301

395 P,3d 310
Adam GERSTEN, an unmarried
man, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve

SUN PAIN MANAGEMENT, P.L.L.C., an
Arizona professional L.L.C.; Dr. Ronald
S. Burns and Jane Doe Burns, husband

and wife, Defendants/Appellees,

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0635

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/18/2017

oe

02

. Dr. Burns is Sun Pain's manager.

Evans, Dove & Nelson, P.L.C., Mesa, By

H. Lee Dove, Trevor J. Fish, Counsel for
Plaintiff/Appellant

Holden & Armer, P.C., Phoenix, By Caro-
lyn (DeeDee) Armer Holden, Michael J.
Ryan, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Samuel A, Thumma and Judge
Margaret H. Downie joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

{1 In 2010, Arizona voters, exercising
their power to enact legislation by initiative,
adopted the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(“the Act”). Section 8 of the Act, codified at
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section
36-2813(C) (2014), states that a registered
qualifying patient’s use of medical marijuana
“must be considered the equivalent of the use
of any other” physician directed medication
and will not “otherwise disqualify” that pa-
tient from medical care. The dispositive issue
in this appeal is whether a registered qualify-
ing patient may assert a private cause of
action against his treating physician for an
alleged violation of this provision. We hold
that that no such cause of action exists and
therefore affirm the superior court’s dismiss-
al of Plaintiff/Appellant Adam Gersten’s com-
plaint for damages and equitable relief
against Defendants/Appellees, Sun Pain
Management, P.L.L.C, and Ronald §. Burns,
M.D.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 In May 2010, Gersten became a patient
of Dr. Burns.! Gersten suffers from chronic

pain related to Crohn’s disease, a “debilitat-
ing medical condition” under the Act. A.R.S.
§ 86-2801(8)(a) (2014), After being treated
by Dr. Burns with prescription medicines,
including Demerol (“the prescription medi-
eines”), with mixed results, Gersten informed
Dr. Burns and his colleagues at Sun Pain
that he intended to obtain a certification for
medical marijuana. Subsequently, in early
October 2014, after he received his “registry
identification card” and became a “registered
qualifying patient” under the Act, Gersten
began using medical marijuana. See A.R.S.
§ 36-2801(14). Dr. Burns then discharged
Gersten as his patient.

18 Gersten sued Dr. Burns and Sun Pain
(collectively, “Dr. Burns”) and alleged Dr.
Burns had discharged him as a patient solely
because he was using medical marijuana in
violation of A.R.S. § 86-2813(C). That statute
reads as follows:

For the purposes of medical care, including

organ transplants, a registered qualifying

patient’s authorized use of marijuana must
be considered the equivalent of the use of
any other medication under the direction
of a physician and does not constitute the
use of an illicit substance or otherwise
disqualify a registered qualifying patient.
from medical care.
For the alleged violation of ARS. § 36-
2818(C), Gersten sought damages and equita-
ble relief, including an order requiring Dr.
Burns to continue treating him in “the same
manner, at the same rate, and at the same
standard of care” as before his discharge.

14 Dr. Burns moved to dismiss Gersten’s
complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,
arguing, as relevant here, that A.R.S, § 86-
2813(C) did not create a private cause of
action for its alleged violation, Without any
evidentiary support, see infra 16, Dr. Burns
also argued he had discharged Gersten be-
cause Gersten’s use of medical marijuana was

2. The superior court's decision can arguably be
read as broadly ruling that no private cause of
action may be maintained under the Act for a
violation of any of its provisions. The only issue
properly presented to the superior court and to
this court, however, is whether a registered qual-
ifying medical marijuana patient may assert a

303

against his medical advice and contracted
plan of care.

15 The superior court granted Dr, Burns’
motion? Despite a lack of supporting evi-
dence, the court found Gersten had acted
against Dr. Burns’ medical advice and plan of
care in using medical marijuana with the
prescription medicines.

DISCUSSION

I. The Procedural Posture of this Case

16 In dismissing Gersten’s complaint for
failure to state a claim, the superior court
made, over Gersten’s objection, multiple fac-
tual findings based on proposed findings of
fact submitted by Dr. Burns. While the court
could have treated Dr. Burns’ motion as
“presenting matters outside of the plead-
ings,” and thus, as a motion for summary
judgment, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(d), Dr.
Burns presented no evidence by way of affi-
davit, declaration, deposition or otherwise
substantiating any of the “facts” listed in the
proposed findings of fact he submitted.

Hl 17 Under these circumstances, the
superior court should not have made these
findings of fact The only facts properly
before it to consider were the well-pleaded
factual allegations in Gersten’s complaint,
Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 852, 356,
19, 284 P.8d 868, 867 (2012). Thus, on review,
we have disregarded the superior court’s
findings of fact, and treat this appeal as one
from a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Hills v, Salt River Project Ass’n, 144 Ariz.
421, 424-25, 698 P.2d 216, 219-20 (App. 1985)
(because defendants presented no evidence
supporting their summary judgment motions,
there was nothing for the plaintiff to contro-
vert and motions were, thus, functionally the
same as motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and, therefore, plaintiff was
entitled to rest on well-pleaded allegations of
her complaint),

private cause of action against his treating physi-
cian for allegedly violating A.R.S. § 36-2813(C).

3. At oral argument in this court, Dr. Burns’
counsel acknowledged the superior court should
not have adopted the proposed factual findings
as they were without evidentiary support.

304

IL Section 36-2813(C) Does Not Provide a
Private Cause of Action for its Alleged
Violation

HM 18 The Act does not expressly pro-
vide a private cause of action to enforce

ARS. § 86-2818(C). Nevertheless, as he did

in the superior court, Gersten argues A.R.S,

§ 86-2818(C) should be construed as provid-

ing an implied private cause of action. Ger-

sten’s argument raises an issue of law which
we review de novo. State v. Gear, 239 Ariz,

848, 845, 111, 872 P.8d 287, 289 (2016) (ap-

pellate court reviews questions of statutory

interpretation de novo) (citation omitted);

Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 856, 11 7-8, 284 P.8d at

867 (appellate court reviews dismissal for

failure to state a claim de novo).

HN 19 Wher, as here, a statute does
not expressly create a cause of action to
enforce its terms, that statutory “silence” is
not dispositive, Napier v, Bertram, 191 Ariz.
238, 240, 19, 954 P.2d 1889, 1891 (1998)
(egislative silence regarding whether statute
creates a private cause of action begins, rath-
er than ends, the inquiry), In interpreting a
voter-approved initiative, Arizona courts ap-
ply the same interpretive standards that are
applicable to statutes passed by the Legisla-
ture. Sedona Grand, LLC v. City of Sedona,
229 Ariz, 87, 40, 111, 270 P.8d 864, 867 (App.
2012), Arizona courts have implied a private
cause of action under various statutory
schemes, recognizing that “[iJn interpreting
statutes, a court will look to the intent of the
Legislature” and “consider the context of the
statute, the language used, the subject mat-
ter, the effects and consequences, and the
spirit and purpose of the law.” Sellinger v.
Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc, 110 Ariz,
578, 575, 521 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1974) (citation
omitted), quoted in Napier, 191 Ariz. at 240~
41, 19, 954 P.2d at 1891-92, And, in consider-
ing “the spirit and purpose of the law,” Ari-
zona courts have examined whether the
plaintiff is a member of “ ‘the class for whose
especial benefit’ the statutes were adopted.”
Chavez v. Brewer, 222 Ariz, 809, 318, 128,
214 P.8d 397, 406 (App. 2009) (quoting Lan-

4, The Arizona Legislative Council analysis of tho
Act contained in the publicity pamphlet for the
2010 general election distributed by the Arizona
Secretary of State's Office stated the Act ‘would

caster v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 143 Ariz, 451,
457, 694 P.2d 281, 287 (App. 1984)). Applying
these principles here, we hold A.R.S. § 36-
2818(C) does not create a private cause of
action for its alleged violation.

Hs 110 The Act is a “comprehensive
legal framework for medical marijuana”
which, in addition to establishing a regulato-
ry structure for the management of medical
marijuana licensing and production, provides
broad legal protection for patients, physi-
cians, and all who facilitate the use of medical
marijuana. Daniel G. Orenstein, Voter Mad-
ness? Voter Intent and the Arizona Medical
Marijuana Act, 47 Ariz. St. LJ. 391, 896
(2015). The Act allows registered qualifying
patients (“qualifying patients”) to claim im-
munity from state prosecution for using med-
ical marijuana consistent with the Act. Dob-
son v. McClennen, 288 Ariz, 889, 390, 11, 361
P.8d 874, 375 (2015); Reed-Kaliher v, Hog-
gatt, 237 Ariz, 119, 122, 18, 847 P.8d 136, 189
(2015); State v. Fields ex rel, Cty. of Pima,
282 Ariz, 265, 269, 1114-15, 804 P.8d 1088,
1092 (App. 2018) (“In claiming protection un-
der this statutory immunity, it is a [qualify-
ing patient’s] burden to ‘plead and prove,’ by
a preponderance of the evidence, that his or
her actions fall within the range of immune
action.”) (citation omitted), Thus, as a quali-
fying patient, Gersten is entitled to the pro-
tections afforded by the Act.

{111 Section 36-2813(C) is part of the pro-
tections extended to qualifying patients. For
purposes of medical care, this provision re-
quires qualifying patients to be treated in the
same fashion as other, nonqualifying pa-
tients. In other words, A.R.S. § 36-2818(C)
requires similar treatment between these two
groups of patients by ensuring that qualify-
ing patients will not “otherwise” be disquali-
fied from medical care solely because of their
authorized use of medical marijuana.

HM 112 That ARS. § 36-2813(C) en-
sures equal treatment does not, however,
obligate a physician to extend or continue
medical care to a qualifying patient, The
wording of A.R.S, § 86-2813(C) does not re-

prohibit certain discriminatory practices,” Prop.

203, Analysis by Legislative Council, Ariz, Sec’y
of State 2010 Publicity Pamphlet at 83.

quire a physician to treat a qualifying pa-
tient, nor does the wording attempt to regu-
late the relationship between a physician and
patient, This distinction becomes clear when
examining A.R.S. § 86-2818(C) in context
and comparing it to other provisions of the
Act that attempt to regulate the conduct of
schools, landlords, and employers.

913 For example, A.R.S. § 36-2818(A)
provides that “[nJo school or landlord may
refuse to enroll or lease to and may not
otherwise penalize a person solely for his
status as a cardholder, unless failing to do so
would cause the school or landlord to lose a
monetary or licensing related benefit under
federal law or regulations.” In a similar vein,
ARS. § 36-2813(B) provides that, with cer-
tain exceptions, an employer may not dis-
criminate against a person in hiring, termi-
nating, or imposing any term or condition of
employment, Unlike these provisions, A.R.S.
§ 86-2818(C) imposes no affirmative obli-
gation on a physician to treat or continue
treating a qualifying patient. Given this,
there is no basis for implying a private cause
of action against a physician to enforce an
affirmative obligation to treat or continue
treating a qualifying patient that does not
exist under A.R.S. § 86-2818(C).

914 Further, a private cause of action
against physicians is not needed to imple-
ment A.R.S. § 36-2818(C)’s directive. For ex-
ample, the Arizona Medical Board may inves-
tigate and discipline a physician licensed by
the Board for “unprofessional conduct.” See
ARS. § 32-1403(A)(2) (Supp. 2016) and
ARS. § 82-1451(A) (2016). And, any person
may submit a complaint to the Board alleg-
ing that a physician committed unprofession-
al conduct. See A.R.S. § 82-1451(A). “Unpro-
fessional conduct” is defined as including the
violation of any state law applicable to the
practice of medicine, A.R.S. § 32-1401(27)(a)
(Supp. 2016), and the Board is authorized to
impose a variety of sanctions for such con-
duct. Thus, a mechanism exists to enforce
ARS, § 36-2813(C) against physicians, such
as Dr, Burns.

115 Applying the relevant factors to deter-
mine whether an implied private cause of
action exists under the Act, we hold a quali-
fying patient may not assert a private cause

305

of action for an alleged violation of this provi-
sion against his treating physician. There-
fore, although we have disregarded the factu-
al findings made by the superior court, we
nevertheless agree with the superior court
that Gersten failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

CONCLUSION

{16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the superior court’s judgment in favor of Dr,
Burns, As the successful party on appeal, we
award Dr. Burns his costs on appeal, see
ARS. § 12-841 (2016), contingent upon his
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appel-
late Procedure 21,

395 P.3d 314
IN RE J.A.
No. 2 CA-JV 2016-0219

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2,

Filed April 25, 2017

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney,
By Vincent George, Deputy County Attor-
ney, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Kevin M. Burke, Interim Pima County
Public Defender, By Susan C.L. Kelly, Assis-
tant Public Defender, Tucson, Counsel for
Minor

Presiding Judge Howard authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge
Eckerstrom and Judge Vasquez concurred.

OPINION

HOWARD, Presiding Judge:

{1 Following combined probation revoca-
tion and delinquency proceedings on multiple
petitions, the juvenile court continued J.A. on
Juvenile Intensive Probation Supervision
(JIPS), and ordered him to complete a pro-
gram at Canyon State Academy (CSA) as a
condition of probation. On appeal, J.A. ar-
gues the court erred by giving the probation
department the discretion to decide whether
to require him to wear a global positioning

system (GPS) monitor upon his release from
the program, over his objection, We affirm
the court’s order in all other respects but
vacate that portion of the disposition report
relating to the GPS monitor,

Factual and Procedural Background

712 At the November 2016 disposition
hearing, the juvenile court, the probation of-
ficer, and counsel for the parties discussed
the recommended disposition of JIPS and
J.A’s participation in the program at CSA.
J.A’s counsel acknowledged the CSA pro-
gram was a good choice for him, but asked
the court not to order him to wear a monitor
upon his release; she explained that she
hoped J.A. would be successful at the pro-
gram and would be able to reintegrate into
the community without electronic monitoring.
Counsel suggested “he should be given the
incentive to get through this program and
come out without that kind of restriction on
him,” adding that if things did not “go well
. +. you can readdress it at that time.”

13 At the end of the disposition hearing,
the juvenile court continued J.A. on JIPS for
twelve months, and ordered him to partici-
pate in the CSA program as a condition of
probation. The court added that the proba-
tion department would have “discretion
whether to put the GPS on or not at any time
during probation.” Relying on In re Navajo
County Juvenile Action No. 92-J-040, 180
Ariz, 562, 885 P.2d 1127 (App. 1994), counsel
objected, arguing the court could not dele-
gate that kind of authority and could only
impose that condition in the exercise of its
discretion after a hearing, After further dis-
cussion, the court invited counsel to file a
motion on the issue and set the matter for a
review hearing on January 31, 2017. Never-
theless, in its disposition order, the court
gave the discretion to the probation officer to
determine whether to require J.A. to wear a
monitor,

14 On appeal, J.A. raises the same objec-
tion he raised below. The state responded in
its answering brief, that it “takes no issue
with Appellant’s analysis of Arizona case
law.” But, the state argued the juvenile court
never ruled on whether J.A. was to wear the
GPS monitor, setting the matter for a later

hearing and adding “there are no minute
entries or transcripts to illuminate what tran-
spired.” Consequently, this court suspended
the appeal on its own motion and ordered the
juvenile court to transmit the record that
exists after the November 2016 disposition to
determine whether the issue raised in this
appeal has been rendered moot by a subse-
quent ruling. There is no reference to the
GPS monitor in the minute entry from the
January 31, 2017 review hearing, We are
therefore left with the minute entry from the
November disposition, which plainly states
that the probation officer has the discretion
to require J.A. to wear a GPS monitor, Thus,
contrary to the state’s contention, the court
has ruled on this issue and has, as J.A.
asserts, delegated the discretion to his proba-
tion officer.

Discussion

15 The juvenile court has the statutory
authority to determine the disposition in de-
linquency and probation revocation proceed-
ings as provided in A.R.S, § 8-341. Only the
juvenile court has the authority to impose or
modify terms of probation. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
81(A), (C). Absent an abuse of discretion, we
will not disturb the court’s ruling. In re
Nickolas, 228 Ariz, 408, 14, 224 P.8d 219, 220
(App. 2010). The court abuses its discretion
when it commits an error of law. Id,

16 In Navajo County No. 92-J-040, the
juvenile court had ordered the juvenile to
spend one week in detention as a condition of
probation but gave his probation officer the
discretion to require him to serve an addi-
tional thirty days. 180 Ariz. at 563, 885 P.2d
at 1128, Vacating that portion of the disposi-
tion order, this court found the court could
not delegate its authority to determine the
appropriate disposition and to determine the
conditions of probation initially or upon modi-
fication. Id. at 568-64, 885 P.2d at 1128-29, A
probation officer has only the limited authori-
ty to “impose regulations which are consis-
1, This court's decision in In re Marie G., 189

Ariz. 632, 944 P.2d 1246 (App. 1997), is instruc-

tive here. Although we held in that case that the

juvenile court had not “abuse[d] its discretion in
ordering ten weekends of detention and in prom-
ising a no-hearing waiver of detention if that
week's urinalysis testing was negative,” we cau-

307

tent with and necessary to the implementa-
tion of the conditions imposed by the court.”
Ariz, R. P. Juv. Ct. 31(A), (C); see also
Andrew G. v. Peasley-Fimbres, 216 Ariz.
204, 112, 165 P.8d 182, 185 (App. 2007) (find-
ing extension of probationary period not
within probation officer’s limited authority).

I 17 Whether a juvenile requires the
additional restraint and structure of an elec-
tronic monitor is the kind of probationary
condition that requires the “reflective discre-
tion” of a judge exercising his or her “inde-
pendent judgment” in determining the ap-
propriate disposition. See In re Harry B., 193
Ariz, 156, 1916-17, 971 P.2d 208, 206-07
(App. 1998) (although juvenile court may con-
sider input of probation officer, it must exer-
cise its discretion in determining conditions
of probation and should not defer to proba-
tion officer)! That it is for the court to decide
is implicit in § 8-841, which provides in sub-
section (D) that the court may include elec-
tronic monitoring as a condition of mandato-
ry probation for a repetitive felony offender.
See In re Russell M., 200 Ariz. 28, 15, 21
P.8d 409, 411 (App. 2001). Similarly, A.R.S.
§ 8-352, which relates to JIPS, provides that
the court may place a juvenile on JIPS if he
or she meets the various conditions listed in
the statute as well as any other “conditions
imposed by the court, including electronic
monitoring.” § 8-352(E)(5); see Ariz. Code of
Jud. Admin, § 6-802.01 (setting forth provi-
sions relating to JIPS and referring to dispo-
sition alternatives under § 8-852, including
electronic monitoring under subsection § 8-
352(B)(6)).

Disposition

I 18 We conclude the juvenile court
erred in giving the probation department
discretion to determine whether J.A. should
be compelled to wear a GPS monitor upon
release from CSA. We therefore vacate that

tioned that this procedure would only be ade-
quate if the detention were waived, adding that
“aq more formal process is necessary before waiv-
er of detention can be denied.” Id. at 634, 944
P.2d at 1248, That process would include notice
to the juvenile and an “opportunity to contest it
and present evidence.” Id,

308 [|

portion of the court’s November 8, 2016 or-
der and affirm in all other respects.

395 P.3d 698

Marika DELGADO, Personal Representa-
tive of the Estate of Sandra Shaw, on
behalf of the Estate of Sandra Shaw,
deceased; and Marika Delgado, Personal
Representative, for and on behalf of
Sandra Shaw’s statutory beneficiaries
and/or Estate pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-
612(a), Plaintiff/Appellant,

ve

MANOR CARE OF TUCSON AZ, LLC, an
Arizona limited liability company, dba
Manor Care Health Services, Inc. aka
Manorcare Health Services, LLC; HCR
Manorcare, LLC, a Delaware limited lia-
bility company; Manor Care, Inc., a De-
laware corporation; HCR Manorcare,
Inc., a Delaware corporation; HCR IV
Healthcare, LLC, a Delaware limited li-
ability company; HCR III Healthcare,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability com-
pany; HCR II Healthcare, LLC, a Dela-
ware limited liability company; HCR
Healthcare, LLC, a Delaware limited li-
ability company; HCRMC Operations,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability com-
pany; HCR Manorcare Operations II,
LLC, a Delaware limited liability com-
pany; Heartland Employment Services,
LLG, an Ohio limited liability company;
IPC The Hospitalist Company, Inc. a
Delaware corporation; William Amour-
eux, Administrator; and Gordon J. Cuz-
ner, M.D., Defendants/Appellees,

No, CV-16-0178-PR,

Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed June 20, 2017

309

we

10

Scott E. Boehm (argued), Law Office of
Seott E. Boehm, P.C., Phoenix, Melanie L.

Bossie, Mary Ellen Spiece, Wilkes &
McHugh, P.A., Scottsdale, Attorneys for
Marika Delgado

James W. Kaucher (argued), Danielle J.K.
Constant, Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C., Tucson,
Attorneys for Manor Care

Anne M. Fulton—Cavett (argued), Cavett &
Fulton, Tucson, Attorneys for Gordon J, Cuz-
ner, M.D., and IPC The Hospitalist Compa-
ny, Ine,

David L, Abney, Knapp & Roberts, P.C.,
Scottsdale; and Stanley G. Feldman, Miller,
Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.C., Tueson, At-
torneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Associa-
tion for Justice/Arizona Trial Lawyers Asso-
ciation

JUSTICE GOULD authored the opinion of
the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
TIMMER, BOLICK and LOPEZ joined.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court:

{11 In this case we are asked to determine
what constitutes an actionable claim for
abuse of a vulnerable adult under the Adult

Protective Services Act (APSA), A.’

§§ 46-451 through -459. We hold that such a -

claim requires proof that: (1) a vulnerable
adult, (2) has suffered an injury, (8) caused
by abuse, (4) from a caregiver, A.R.S. §§ 46-
451(A)(1)(b), -455(B). In making this deter-
mination, we abolish the four-part test for an
actionable claim set forth in Hstate of McGill
ex vel. McGill v. Albrecht, 208 Ariz. 525, 580
116, 57 P.8d 884 (2002).

BACKGROUND

Hl {2 Because the superior court grant-
ed summary judgment, we review the facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Marika Delgado as the non-
moving party. See Andrews v. Blake, 205
Ariz, 236, 240 112, 69 P.8d 7 (2008).

13 This case arises from the death of
Sandra Shaw while she was a patient at
Manor Care’s skilled nursing facility in Tue-
son. Dr. Gordon J. Cuzner was Shaw’s pri-
mary treating physician at Manor Care,

14 After being treated at four different
hospitals in late 2011 and early 2012, Shaw
was discharged to Manor Care for physical
and occupational therapy, as well as skilled
nursing care. When Shaw was admitted to
Manor Care in March 2012, she was in poor
health. Shaw was suffering from several seri-
ous medical conditions, including chronic kid-
ney disease, decreased kidney function, acute
kidney failure, anemia, heart disease, and
hypertension; she also had recently under-
gone surgery to remove a brain tumor and
had a history of urinary tract infections, Ad-
ditionally, Shaw was confined to a wheelchair
and needed assistance with walking, bathing,
dressing, toileting, transfers, and bed mobili-
ty.

5 Following her admission, Shaw’s condi-
tion initially improved. However, by late
April 2012, her condition was deteriorating.
She became confused, refused to get out of
bed, and began eating and drinking less. On
April 30, Dr. Cuzner ordered lab tests and a
urinalysis; the results indicated that Shaw
had an “early” septic infection. Nonetheless,
1._ Cf. 2009 Ariz, Sess. Laws, ch. 119, §§ 4-10 (Ist

Reg. Sess.) (providing that a “vulnerable adult”
includes an “incapacitated person,” and amend-

311

Dr. Cuzner issued no new orders or treat-
ment for Shaw, On the morning of May 1,
Shaw's condition worsened. She was con-
fused, disoriented, and lethargic, and had not
eaten or taken any fluids in over two days.
The assistant director of nursing was notified
of her condition, but no further orders or
treatment were provided for Shaw. A few
hours later, she died. The cause of death was
sepsis.

16 Delgado, Shaw’s sister and the person-
al representative of her estate, filed this ac-
tion against Dr. Cuzner, Manor Care, and
several persons and entities that allegedly
owned or were related to Manor Care (collec-
tively, “Defendants”). Delgado alleged sever-
al claims, including a claim for both abuse
and neglect of a vulnerable adult under
APSA. See ARS, § 46-451(A)(1)(b) (defining
“abuse”); A.R.S. § 46-451(A)(6) (defining
“neglect”), Manor Care and Dr. Cuzner
moved for summary judgment on Delgado’s
APSA claim.

17 The superior court granted Defendants’
motion. In making its ruling, the court ap-
plied the four-part test adopted in McGill:

to be actionable abuse under APSA, the

negligent act or acts (1) must arise from
the relationship of caregiver and recipient,

(2) must be closely connected to that rela-

tionship, (8) must be linked to the service

the caregiver undertook because of the
recipient’s incapacity, and (4) must be re-
lated to the problem or problems that
caused the incapacity.!
208 Ariz, at 580 116, 57 P.8d 884. The court
concluded that, under the fourth part of the
McGill test, Shaw’s death, which was “attrib-
utable to sepsis,” was “not related [to the
condition(s) ] that [ ] caused [her'] incapacity.”

18 The court of appeals reversed. Delgado
v. Manor Care of Tucson, 240 Ariz, 298, 299
11 25-26, 378 P.3d 736 (App. 2016). The court
held that, under McGill, a triable issue exist-
ed as to whether Defendants’ alleged abuse
“was related to the problems that caused
Shaw’s incapacity.” Id. at 298-99 1919, 20,
28-25, 378 P.8d 736.

ing all references in APSA to “incapacitated or
vulnerable adult’ to “vulnerable adult”).

312

19 We granted review because the inter-
pretation and application of APSA are recur-
ring issues of statewide importance, We have
jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(8)
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-
120.24,

DISCUSSION

TI 110 We review de novo both a grant
of summary judgment, Andrews, 205 Ariz, at
240 112, 69 P.8d 7, and issues of statutory
construction, In re Estate of Wyatt, 235 Ariz.
188, 189 15, 329 P.3d 1040 (2014).

711 Defendants argue Delgado has no ac-
tionable APSA claim because she cannot sat-
isfy the third and fourth parts of the McGill
test. They contend that Shaw’s sepsis was
not “related to the problem or problems”
that made her a vulnerable adult. McGill,
208 Ariz, at 680 116, 57 P.3d 384, Rather,
her sepsis was an unrelated, acute condition
that developed several weeks after her ad-
mission to Manor Care. As a result, any
alleged negligence by Defendants in treating
Shaw's sepsis was not “linked” to the ser-
vices or treatment Defendants “undertook”
because she was a vulnerable adult, Id. To
assess these arguments, we consider the
Court’s ruling in McGill and its continuing
viability.

I, The McGill Test

112 In McGill, this Court addressed
whether A.R.S, § 46-451(A)(1)(b) permits an
APSA claim to be based on a physician’s
single act of negligence. Jd. at 526 11, 57
P.8d 384. Defendants asserted that the stat-
ute, by its terms, requires multiple acts com-
mitted over a period of time. Id. at 528-30
(78-15, 57 P.8d 384; see ARS. § 46-
451(A)(1)(b)(defining “[aJbuse” as an “[i]nju-
ry caused by negligent acts or omissions”),
The defendants also argued that negligence
claims against physicians could not be
brought under APSA because such claims
were exclusively governed by the Medical
Malpractice Act (MMA), ARS, § 12-561
through -578. Id,

118 In construing APSA, the Court held
that “we can neither automatically limit the
negligent act or omission wording of A.R.S.

§ 46-451(A)(1) to a series of negligent acts
nor say that a single act of negligence involv-
ing an incapacitated person will never give
rise to an APSA action,” Jd, at 580 116, 57
P.8d 884, However, the Court expressed con-
cern that “interpreting APSA so as to apply
to any and every single act of medical mal-
practice would [not] be consistent with” the
legislature's intent, because it would give rise
to negligence claims that “can afflict anyone,
not just the incapacitated.” Id, at 529-30
1:14, 57 P.8d 884,

114 Attempting to harmonize the statuto-
ry language and the legislature’s intent, the
Court formulated McGill's four-part test, Id.
at 526, 529-81 171, 14-16, 21-22, 57 P.38d
884, This test limits a caregiver's liability
under APSA, requiring a victim of abuse to
satisfy all four of its requirements to assert
an actionable claim. Jd. at 580, 581 1116, 22,
57 P.8d 384,

HM 115 The McGill test has proved to be
problematic. The legislature enacted APSA
to protect vulnerable adults, and to further
this purpose, it created a broad remedial
cause of action against caregivers who, by
means of abuse, neglect, or exploitation, en-
danger the life or health of a vulnerable
adult, A.R.S, §§ 46-455(B), -455(0); see also
In ve Estate of Winn, 214 Ariz. 149, 151 19,
150 P.8d 286 (2007) (APSA seeks to remedy
the “evil” of abuse and neglect of vulnerable
adults, and to “protect some of society’s most
vulnerable persons from abuse, neglect, and
exploitation.”), We generally construe such
remedial statutes broadly “to effect the legis-
lature’s purpose in enacting them.” Winn,
214 Ariz, at 150 15, 150 P.8d 236; Wyatt, 235
Ariz. at 140 16, 829 P.8d 1040 (same). How-
ever, the McGill test narrows the scope of a
caregiver's liability by adding requirements
not expressly contained in APSA.

116 The McGill test has also been difficult
to apply. As McGill recognized, “[wle are
well aware that this formulation does not
provide an easy, bright-line test for judges
and juries.” Id. at 580 117, 57 P.8d 384. The
test is particularly burdensome when a per-
son, such as Shaw, suffers from multiple
medical conditions. Identifying which specific
medical conditions render a person vulnera-
ble, and then relating subsequent treatment

and injuries to those specifie “vulnerable”
conditions, is no easy task, Courts navigating
their way through the McGill test have made
fine distinctions which, at times, seem to be
at odds with the broad protective provisions
of APSA. See, eg. Equihua v. Carondelet
Health Network, 235 Ariz, 504, 507-08 11 8-
14, 984 P.8d 194 (App. 2014) (applying the
McGill test, the court distinguished between
hospital staff's negligence in treating plain-
tiff's head and neck injuries, which it deter-
mined were not actionable under APSA, from
staff's negligence in monitoring plaintiffs
feeding tube, which it determined was action-
able under APSA),

TI, APSA’s Requirements for an Abuse
Claim

Hi 117 In identifying the elements for
an APSA claim, our principal guide is the
statute’s language. Section 46~455(B) pro-
vides that a “vulnerable adult whose life or
health is being or has been endangered or
injured by neglect, abuse or exploitation may
file an action in superior court against any
person or enterprise that has been employed
to provide care....” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, an APSA claim is premised initially on
whether a person is a “vulnerable adult.” Id.
A “vulnerable adult” is defined as “an indi-
vidual who is eighteen years of age or older
and who is unable to protect himself from
abuse, neglect or exploitation by others be-
cause of a physical or mental impairment.”
ARS § 46-451(A)(9).

118 APSA also requires a party to show
that a vulnerable adult has suffered an “inju-
ry caused by [a caregiver’s] negligent acts or
omissions.” A.R.S. §§ 46-451(A)()b), -
455(B). APSA defines a caregiver as a person
or “enterprise” employed to provide care to a
vulnerable adult, and includes care provided
at a nursing home or an acute care hospital.
ARS. § 46~455(B), -455(Q); see Wyatt, 285
Ariz. at 141 914, 829 P.8d 1040 (APSA in-
cludes care provided at nursing homes and
acute care hospitals).

HH 1119 Thus, by its terms, APSA identi-
fies four requirements for an actionable
abuse claim: (1) a vulnerable adult, (2) has
suffered an injury, (8) caused by abuse, (4)

313

from a caregiver. ARS. §§ 46-

451(A)(1)(b), -455(B),

120 The fact that APSA identifies the
requirements for an abuse claim, combined
with the difficulties accompanying the four-
part McGill test, prompts us to reconsider
the McGill test. In particular, the third and
fourth prongs of the McGill test are not
found in the statute, and, when applied, have
produced a great deal of confusion.

121 Defendants argue that if the McGill
test is not followed, then “APSA will apply to
‘virtually all medical malpractice cases arising
from care provided to adults in inpatient
healthcare institutions,” including care of
“acute conditions.” To avoid this potential
liability, Defendants urge us to continue fol-
lowing the four-part test and not expand the
“boundaries” set by MeGiil,

HI 1.22 We recognize that the broad lan-
guage of APSA creates considerable overlap
between medical malpractice claims arising
under the MMA and abuse claims under
APSA, However, we will not engage in a
“narrow construction” of APSA that
“thwart{s] the legislature’s goal of protecting
vulnerable adults.” Wyatt, 285 Aviz. at 141
718, 329 P.3d 1040. By its terms, APSA
identifies four requirements for an actionable
abuse claim, Supra, 19. If the legislature
wishes to limit the scope of APSA by adding
the requirements of the McGill test, it may
do so. It is not, however, our role to rewrite
the statute, See Ballesteros v. Am. Standard
Ins. Co. of Wis., 226 Ariz, 845, 349 117, 248
P.8d 198 (2011) (stating “[ilf the legislature
desires to add [] a requirement [to A.R.S,
§ 20-259.01], it may do so ... but it is not
our place to rewrite the statute”),

123 Additionally, Defendants claim that
based on the doctrine of legislative acquies-
cence, that the McGill test has been incorpo-
rated into APSA, Specifically, Defendants
contend that APSA has been amended sever-
al times since the McGill test was adopted
and, therefore, the legislature has tacitly ap-
proved of the test. Cf Madrigal v. Indus.
Comm'n, 69 Ariz, 188, 144, 210 P.2d 967
(1949) (discussing doctrine of legislative ac-
quiescence); Fisher v. Kaufman, 201 Ariz,
500, 502 112, 88 P.8d 88 (App. 2001) (same).

314

HM 124 We reject Defendants’ argu-
ment. The doctrine of legislative acquies-
cence “is limited to instances in which the
legislature has considered and declined to
reject the relevant judicial interpretation.”
SW Paint & Varnish Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of
Envtl Quality, 194 Ariz, 22, 25-26 121, 976
P.2d 872 (1999), Thus, we do not presume
legislative intent when a statute is amended
“in ways unrelated to the judicial construc-
tion at issue” absent “some affirmative indi-
cation the legislature considered and ap-
proved our construction.” Lowing v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 101, 106, 859 P.2d 724
(1998). Here, Defendants concede that none
of the subject amendments concern the defi-
nition of actionable abuse under APSA.

125 We therefore disapprove the McGill
test and hold that an actionable APSA abuse
claim requires proof of the four basic ele-
ments set forth in the statute. See supra,
119,

III. Delgado’s APSA Claim

126 Viewing the facts and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Del-
gado, as we must, we conclude that the supe-
rior court erred in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Defendants.

HS 127 Shaw qualifies as a vulnerable
adult. She was a frail seventy-four-year-old
woman who, at the time of her admission,
needed assistance in virtually every daily
activity of life. There is no dispute that Man-
or Care qualifies as an “enterprise” em-
ployed to provide care to Shaw, and that Dr,
Cuzner was her primary physician at Manor
Care, Additionally, in her capacity as person-
al representative of Shaw’s estate, Delgado
properly alleges damages for Shaw’s injuries.
ARS, § 46-455(P); In re Guardian-
ship/Conservatorship of Denton, 190 Ariz.
152, 157, 945 P.2d 1288 (1997) (holding that,
under APSA, representatives of vulnerable
adult abuse victims “may recover damages
for the pain and suffering endured by the
victims, notwithstanding death of the vic-
tim”).

HI 128 Delgado has also presented a
triable issue as to whether Manor Care
abused Shaw, thereby causing her death.

Delgado submitted medical records and the
preliminary expert affidavits of Nurse Kath-
leen Hill-O’Neil and physician Leonard S.
Williams showing that due to Shaw's serious
medical conditions, she could not care for
herself and required close monitoring and
medical attention to ensure her safety and
well-being. Nurse Hill-O’Neil opines that the
nursing staff at Manor Care breached the
applicable standard of care by failing to noti-
fy Dy. Cuzner about Shaw's deteriorating
condition and also by failing to provide neces-
sary treatment and care as her condition
worsened. See Cornerstone Hosp. of Se.
Ariz, LLC, v. Marner, 231 Ariz. 67, 74
121, 290 P.8d 460 (App. 2012) (holding that
plaintiff's estate alleged a viable claim for
APSA abuse based on allegations that the
decedent received inadequate “nursing and
medical services” while at defendant’s long
term acute-care facility, thereby causing the
decedent to become dehydrated, malnour-
ished, and develop pressure sores that be-
came infected).

929 The superior court also erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Cuzner. Dr. Williams opines that Dr. Cuzner
breached the standard of care by failing to
properly treat Shaw’s sepsis. Dr, Williams
also concludes that Dr. Cuzner’s breach of
the standard of care caused Shaw “unneces-
sary pain and suffering and contributed to
her death.”

730 Dr. Cuzner asks us to address his
argument that he should not be held liable
irrespective of any potential liability on the
part of Manor Care. However, throughout
this litigation, including briefing in his peti-
tion for review, Dr. Cuzner joined in Manor
Care’s argument that there was no viable
APSA claim under the McGill test because
Shaw’s death was not related to the condi-
tions causing her incapacity. Thus, our analy-
sis regarding Dr. Cuzner is limited solely to
the legal and factual arguments raised by
Manor Care, and we decline to address his
arguments not raised below.

181 Defendants argue that Delgado has
failed to present any admissible evidence
showing abuse. Specifically, Defendants claim
the superior court granted their motion to
strike the affidavits of Nurse Hill-O’Neil and

Dr. Williams because they were conclusory
and did not establish their qualifications to
testify as experts, See A.R.S. § 12-2608 (pre-
liminary expert affidavits); A.R.S. § 12-2604
(qualifications for medical experts in medical
malpractice claims). However, we can find no
order in the record striking the affidavits,
See Delgado, 240 Ariz. at 299 22, n.10, 878
P.8d 736. Thus, we leave determination of the
admissibility of these affidavits for the supe-
rior court to resolve on remand.

132 In sum, on this record, we conclude
the superior court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Defendants on
Delgado’s APSA abuse claim. In addition,
like the court of appeals, because we reverse
the superior court’s grant of summary judg-
ment based on Delgado’s abuse claim, we do
not decide whether Delgado alleged an ac-
tionable claim for neglect pursuant to APSA.
ARS. § 46-451(A) (6). Delgado, 240 Ariz, at,
299 11 25, n.11, 378 P.3d 736.

CONCLUSION

183 Accordingly, we vacate the court of
appeals’ opinion, reverse the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment, and remand
this case to the superior court for further
proceedings,

395 P.3d 704

ZB, N.A., a National Banking As-
sociation, Plaintiff/Appellee,

ve

Daniel J. HOELLER, an individual; and
Azar F. Ghafari, an individual,
Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0071

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 4/25/2017

315

wo

16

Porter Law Firm, Phoenix, By Robert S,
Porter, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Ardeo Law, PLLC, Gilbert, By Kate Mil-
ler, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F, Winthrop and Judge Jon
W. Thompson joined,

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

{11 This appeal is from a deficiency action
that lender ZB, N.A. brought against Daniel
J, Hoeller and Azar F. Ghafari (collectively,
“Borrowers”) on a loan used to finance the
purchase of commercial real estate in Mis-
souri, secured by a deed of trust on the
property. Borrowers moved for summary
judgment, arguing that because the promis-
sory note included a Utah choice-of-law pro-
vision, the action was time-barred by Utah’s
90-day statute of limitations. The trial court
denied the motion, finding that the deed of
trust’s Missouri choice-of-law provision ap-
plied and that the lawsuit was timely under
Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations. ZB
subsequently moved for summary judgment.
on the merits, and the trial court granted the
motion,

12 We hold that the promissory note’s
choice-of-law provision—not the deed of
trust’s—applies to the deficiency action be-
eause deficiency actions stem from the un-
derlying debt. We further conclude that the
deed of trust is effectively extinguished after

the security property is sold at a trustee’s
sale and therefore provides no remedies to
the lender beyond the trustee’s sale. Accord-
ingly, we reverse and remand for entry of
judgment in Borrowers’ favor,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

48 In the summer of 2004, Borrowers—
then California residents—purchased com-
mercial real estate located in Missouri, Bor-
rowers financed the purchase through a loan
from ZB—principally located in Utah—se-
cured by a deed of trust to the property, The
promissory note contained a choice-of-law
provision stating that it “will be governed by,
construed and enforced in accordance with
federal law and the laws of the State of
Utah.” The note also contained a fee provi-
sion which provided for the award of ZB’s
expenses, including attorneys’ fees, to collect
on the note if Borrowers did not pay. The
provision was silent on Borrowers’ right to
receive payment for its expenses in success-
fully defending an action by ZB on the note,

94 The deed of trust similarly required
that the laws of Utah govern it, “except and
only to the extent of procedural matters re-
lated to the perfection and enforcement of
Lender’s rights and remedies against the
Property, which matters shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Missouri.” One
remedy provided for by the deed of trust in
ease of a default on the loan was the ability
to foreclose on the property and collect any
resulting deficiency from Borrowers with in-
terest, “In the event that the enforceability
or validity of any provision of this Deed of
Trust is challenged or questioned,” the deed
continued, “such provision shall be governed
by whichever applicable state or federal law
would uphold or would enforee such chal-
Jenged or questioned provision.”

15 Borrowers made payments on the loan
for eight years. But in 2012, Borrowers could
not continue making payments and conse-
quently defaulted on the loan, ZB foreclosed
on the property and at the trustee’s sale
purchased the property for a credit bid for
$102,469—an amount less than the unpaid
balance on the debt. This left a principal
deficiency amount of $147,874.73 plus accru-
ing interest.

317

16 In September 2014, ZB initiated this
deficiency action against Borrowers—who
had since moved to and become residents of
Arizona—to recover that unpaid amount,
Representing themselves, Borrowers moved
to dismiss the action. They argued that the
action was time-barred under A.R.S. § 88~
814, which requires that a deficiency action
be filed within 90 days after the sale of trust
property. ZB opposed the motion, arguing
that under the deed of trust’s terms regard-
ing its “rights and remedies against the
property,” Missouri law and its five-year
statute of limitations applied.

{7 The trial court agreed with ZB and
denied Borrowers’ motion, In making its rul-
ing, the trial court looked to the Restatement.
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187, which
requires the application of the “laws of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights ... if a particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by
explicit provision in their agreement directed
to that issue.” The court noted the applicable
statute of limitations was “clearly ... one
such issue.” Thus, the court concluded that
because the deed of trust specified that Mis-
souri law must govern procedural matters
relating to the enforcement of ZB’s rights
and remedies against the property, the Mis-
souri statute of limitations applied and the
action was not time-barred,

18 Borrowers again moved to dismiss, ar-
guing that Utah’s laws and statute of limita-
tions applied because the promissory note’s
choice-of-law provision required that Utah’s
laws apply to it. Borrowers also argued that
the provision requiring the application of
Missouri’s laws in the deed of trust applied
only to ZB’s remedies against the property
itself, not the debt. But the trial court denied
the motion “for the same reasons set forth”
in its previous ruling.

19 Two months later, ZB moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that no genuine is-
sues of material fact existed regarding the
unpaid amount. The court denied the motion,
however, because ZB cited to Arizona and
Missouri Jaw instead of Utah law. Specifical-
ly, the court stated that although it had
previously held that the Missouri statute of

318

limitations applied “to matters regarding the
enforcement of the deficiency as directed by
the Deed of Trust,” the court did not hold
that Missouri law applied to the substantive
elements of ZB’s remedies for default. In-
stead, the trial court concluded that ZB’s
substantive rights are governed by the prom-
issory note, which established that Utah law
governed.

10 The following month, ZB again moved
for summary judgment, this time stating that
it had previously “erred in believing that
Arizona law applied to the Note itself,” and
agreeing that “Utah law applies.” ZB then
established Borrowers’ liability for the debt
pursuant to Utah law. Borrowers, too, moved
for summary judgment, arguing anew that
Utah law and its statute of limitations ap-
plied, rendering ZB’s deficiency action time-
barred, After hearing oral argument on both
motions, the trial court granted summary
judgment in ZB’s favor. The trial court af-
firmed its previous holding that Missouri’s
statute of limitations applied pursuant to the
deed of trust. The court also noted that, as
the parties agreed, Utah law governed Bor-
rowers’ liability under the promissory note.
After the trial court entered its judgment
consistent with this ruling, Borrowers timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

1, Summary Judgment

HMM 1111 Borrowers do not challenge
the finding that they defaulted on the loan
nor the amount of the deficiency. They ar-
gue, however, that the trial court erred by
concluding that Missouri’s laws—particularly
its statute of limitations—applied to ZB’s
deficiency action against them. Specifically,
the parties disagree only whether the prom-
issory note’s or the deed of trust’s choice-of-
law provision applies to establish the timeli-
ness of ZB’s deficiency action, We review
choice-of-law issues de novo as questions of
law. Garcia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 195 Ariz.
510, 516 119, 990 P.2d 1069, 1075 (App.
1999). Similarly, we review the trial court’s
ruling on motions for summary judgment de
novo. MidFirst Bank v. Chase, 280 Ariz. 366,
368 16, 284 P.8d 877, 879 (App. 2012). Sum-
mary judgment should be granted only if no

genuine issue as to any material fact exists
and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, Ariz. R, Civ. P. 56(a).
Because the promissory note’s choice-of-law
provision applies to this deficiency action, the
action is time-barred and the trial court
erred by granting summary judgment in
ZB's favor.

HM 12 Substantive matters are gov-
erned by the “law of the jurisdiction to which
the court is referred by the choice-of-law
rules of the forum.” Cardon v. Cotton Ln.
Holdings, Inc., 178 Ariz, 208, 206, 841 P.2d
198, 201 (1992). Trustee’s sales of real prop-
erty are themselves procedural matters gov-
erned by the law of the state where the
property is located. Jd, But any subsequent
deficiency action in Arizona is a substantive
matter, and therefore governed by Arizona’s
choice-of-law rules. Parkway Bank & Tr. Co,
v. Zivkovic, 232 Ariz. 286, 289 111, 304 P.3d
1109, 1112 (App. 2018). The Arizona Supreme
Court has expressly adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restate-
ment”) to resolve these issues. Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 562, 565, 447 P.2d 254,
257 (1968), abrog’d on other grounds, Fer-
nandez v, Romo, 182 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878
(1982),

118 As relevant to the foreclosure of a
mortgage on land, the Restatement directs
that the method of foreclosure of a mortgage
and the resulting interests in that land are
determined by the laws of the state where
the property is located. Restatement § 229,
Issues relating to the foreclosure but not
affecting any interest in the actual property,
however, are determined by the law govern-
ing the underlying debt. Id. at § 229 cmt. e.
In other words, the courts will apply the
choice-of-law provision in the promissory
note, The Restatement directs that a contrac-
tually agreed-upon choice-of-law provision
governs if that choice is valid and effective.
Restatement § 187(2). A choice-of-law provi-
sion is valid and effective if “the law of the
state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties ... is one
which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed
at that issue.” Restatement § 187(1); see

Cardon, 178 Ariz. at 208, 841 P.2d at 203
(stating that the parties’ choice-of-law provi-
sion was valid and effective because the par-
ties could have contractually agreed to the
relevant issue).

Hl 114 Applying these principles, ZB’s
deficiency action is time-barred by Utah's
statute of limitations, The basis of ZB’s ac-
tion against Borrowers is the deficiency Bor-
rowers owed to ZB on the promissory note
afier the foreclosure of the commercial prop-
erty. The action thus has no effect on any
interest in the actual property, See Natl
Bank of Ariz. v, Schwartz, 230 Aviz, 810, 312
17, 283 P.8d 41, 48 (App. 2012) (“The debt
arises from the promissory note. It is con-
tractual.... Rather than the deficiency flow-
ing from the foreclosure ... the debt and all
the potential recovery flow from the promis-
sory note.”). Because the action is not based
on the foreclosed property, but on the under-
lying debt, the Restatement states that the
provisions of the promissory note govern the
deficiency action. The promissory note’s
choice-of-law provision declares clearly with-
out exceptions that Utah law applies. ZB
even conceded before trial—and does not
now dispute—that “Utah law applies” to “the
Note itself.” This choice to be governed by
Utah law was valid and effective because
nothing in Utah law would have precluded
the parties from explicitly agreeing to limit
ZB’s right to pursue a deficiency action up to
90 days from the date of the sale of the
property held as security for the debt.

9115 Under Utah law, ZB had 90 days from
the date of the sale of the Missouri property
pursuant to the deed of trust to initiate a
deficiency action. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-82.
Because ZB waited almost two years to initi-
ate this action, the action is time-barred. The
trial court thus erred in granting ZB sum-
mary judgment,

Hl 1116 ZB argues, however, that regard-
less of its right to recover a deficiency
through the promissory note, the parties cre-
ated an additional remedy for ZB by adding
a deficiency remedial provision to the deed of
trust. ZB and Borrowers agreed in the deed
of trust to apply the law of whichever rele-
vant jurisdiction that would enforce and up-
hold ZB’s rights to recover through a defi-

319

ciency action. ZB further argues that because
the deed of trust includes. deficiency as a
remedial provision, the deficiency’s procedur-
al matters should be governed by the deed’s
governing law provision. But ZB’s argument
is unavailing for two reasons.

117 First, the deed of trust serves only to
secure the performance of a loan contract,
which allows trust property to be sold and
transferred after a breach or default of the
underlying loan contract. See A.R.S. §§ 33-
801(8) and -807(A); see also Hogan v. Wash.
Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz, 584, 587 110, 277
P.8d 781, 784 (2012) (“The note is a contract
that evidences the loan and the obligor’s duty
to repay. The trust deed transfers an interest
in real property, securing the repayment of
the money owed under the note,”). Once that
purpose was served through the trustee’s
sale, the deed of trust and its choice-of-law
provision no longer had effect. Cf Long v.
Corbet, 181 Ariz, 153, 157, 888 P.2d 1840,
1844 (App. 1994) (concluding that a junior
ereditor’s deed of trust was “extinguished”
when a senior creditor sold the deed of trust
property at a trustee’s sale, although the
debt secured by the junior creditor’s deed of
trust was not). The deed of trust is effective-
ly extinguished after a trustee’s sale of the
security property. Contrary to ZB’s argu-
ment, then, the remedial provisions do not
survive after the successful sale of the prop-
erty. Moreover, the remedial provision did
not create an additional right for ZB; the
provision was merely a reference to the defi-
ciency remedy that ZB had under the prom-
issory note itself. Applying Utah’s laws does
not deprive ZB of its right to recover
through a deficiency. Utah’s laws provide
lenders the right to initiate a deficiency ac-
tion. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. ZB simply
failed to invoke its right under Utah’s laws
within the statutorily allotted time. ZB did
not need a provision in the deed of trust to
initiate this action,

Hl 118 Second, even if the trustee’s sale
did not effectively extinguish the deed of
trust, the deed would not require application
of Missouri law. Contrary to ZB’s argument,
the deed’s provision requiring the application
of “whichever applicable [state law] would

320

uphold or enforce” a challenged provision
does not apply because Borrowers have not
“challenged” any of the deed’s provisions. A
challenge to a contract provision’s enforce-
ability is based on the provision’s legality or
public policy. See Landi v. Arleules, 172 Ariz,
126, 188, 885 P.2d 458, 465 (App. 1992) (“An
agreement is unenforceable if the acts to be
performed would be illegal or violate public
policy.”). The Borrowers here merely re-
sponded to a deficiency action against them
with an affirmative defense that the action is
untimely. This is a challenge to the deficiency
action’s timeliness, not the deed provision’s
legality or public policy. The trial court thus
erred by granting summary judgment in
ZB's favor.

2, Attorneys’ Fees

HN s119 Borrowers and ZB each re-
quest attorneys’ fees and costs, Although we
would ordinarily be required to award fees
under the promissory note’s fee provision,
ARS. § 12-341.01, that provision allows for
fees only for ZB, When a provision allows for
awarding fees only to one party and is silent
on awarding fees to the other parties to a
contract, fees may be awarded to the other
parties pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-841.01. See
Pioneer Roofing Co, v. Mardian Constr. Co.,
152 Ariz. 455, 471, 788 P.2d 652, 668 (App.
1986). Because Borrowers are the successful
party in a contested action arising out of the
promissory note—a contract—we grant Bor-
rowers their reasonable attorneys’ fees under
ARS. § 12-841.01 upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21
and deny fees and costs to ZB,

CONCLUSION
{20 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse

the trial court’s judgment and remand for
entry of judgment in Borrowers’ favor.

395 P.3d 709
Jimmy PARSONS, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SERVICES, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0851

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 6/2/2017

Thomas W. Dean, Esq., Phoenix, Counsel
for Plaintiff/Appellant

Sherman & Howard L.L.C., Phoenix, By
Gregory W. Falls, Matthew A. Hesketh,
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jon
W. Thompson joined.

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

11 This appeal is from the superior court’s
ruling affirming the Arizona Department of
Health Services’s (“DHS”) order revoking
Jimmy Parsons’s caregiver registration card
under the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act,
ARS, §§ 86-2801 through -2810 (“AMMA”),
because Parsons had committed an “excluded
felony offense” in 2005, making him ineligible

321

to be a designated caregiver. Parsons argued
that because his conviction had been set
aside pursuant to A.R.S, § 18-907, DHS and
the superior court erred by using it as a
ground for revocation. Specifically, he argued
that ineligibility for a caregiver registration
card is a “penalty or disability’ released
upon the setting aside of the conviction.

12 Whether a set-aside conviction may be
considered by DHS as a ground for revoking
a license pursuant to the AMMA is an issue
of fivst impression. We hold that ineligibility
for a caregiver registration card under the
AMMA is not a penalty or disability under
ARS. § 18-907 and that DHS may there-
fore consider the felony in determining
whether to grant, deny, or revoke a caregiver
registration card,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

48 In May 2005, Parsons pled guilty to
one count of possession of narcotic drugs
(cocaine) for sale, a class 2 felony. The supe-
rior court suspended the imposition of a sen-
tence, placed Parsons on five years’ proba-
tion, and required him to pay a fine. Parsons
successfully completed the terms of his pro-
bation and paid the imposed fine. According-
ly, the court discharged him from probation
in 2008,

14 After Parsons was discharged, he twice
moved to have his 2005 conviction set aside
under A.R.S. § 13-907, but the superior
court denied the motions. Parsons tried again
in February 2012. Two months later, the
superior court issued an order granting Par-
sons’s application, The order formally set
aside the judgment of guilt, “dismissing the
accusations or information and releasing
[Parsons] from all applicable penalties and
disabilities resulting from the conviction”
pursuant to A.R.S, § 13-907, The court also
ordered that Parsons’s civil rights be re-
stored, except his right to possess or carry a
firearm.

15 Two years later, Parsons applied to
DHS for a designated caregiver registration
card under the AMMA, As part of his appli-
cation, DHS required Parsons to attest that
he had not been convicted of an excluded
felony as defined in A.R.S. § 36-2801(7)—

322

which includes felony violations of state or
federal controlled substances law—and re-
quired Parsons to mail in copies of his finger-
prints, Parsons signed the attestation, repre-
senting that he had not been convicted of an
excluded felony offense. The attestation form
that, Parsons signed included a notice that his
fingerprints would be used to run a criminal
background check.

16 Upon receiving Parsons’s application,
DHS sent Parsons’s fingerprints to the Ari-
zona Department of Public Safety to obtain
his criminal history report, Generally, when
DHS receives a criminal history report, it
reviews the report for excluded felonies that
would make a person ineligible for a caregiy-
er card. This process can take up to several
months. However, because the AMMA re-
quires that DHS issue or deny caregiver
applications within 15 days, see A.R.S. § 86-
2804.08(A), DHS approved Parsons’s applica-
tion and issued him a caregiver registration
card before completing the background
check,

47 When DHS ultimately received Par-
sons’s criminal history report, it learned of
his 2005 conviction for possession of narcot-
ic drugs for sale and the superior court’s
subsequent order setting the conviction
aside. Upon consulting with its counsel,
DHS concluded that Parsons’s conviction
was an excluded felony offense under the
AMMA, disqualifying him from being a car-
egiver. Specifically, DHS concluded that set-
ting aside a conviction does not eliminate
the conviction and restores only civil rights
irrelevant to the issuance of a caregiver
identification card under the AMMA. Ac-
cordingly, DHS issued a notice of intent to
revoke Parsons’s caregiver card in Septem-
ber 2014. DHS alleged that Parsons had
been convicted of an excluded felony offense
and that Parsons knowingly violated the
AMMA by falsely attesting that he had not
been convicted of one.

18 Parsons requested an administrative
hearing to challenge DHS’s notice, At the

1, Parsons also argues that insufficient evidence
supports the conclusion that he knowingly violat-
ed the AMMA by attesting that he had not been
convicted of an excluded felony because he be-
lieved that setting it aside meant that the convic-

hearing, Parsons argued that the setting
aside of his conviction released him from all
penalties and disabilities, including ineligibili-
ty under the AMMA. He therefore argued
that he did not have an excluded felony
offense and did not knowingly falsify any
information in his application, After taking
the matter under advisement, the administra-
tive law judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision rec-
ommending that DHS revoke Parsons’s reg-
istration card. The ALJ concluded that the
AMMA does not permit granting a caregiver
registration card to a person who has been
convicted of a controlled substance felony.
The ALJ also concluded that setting aside a
conviction did not change the fact that Par-
sons was convicted of the felony. DHS’s di-
rector subsequently adopted the ALJ’s rec-
ommended decision.

{9 Parsons moved for a rehearing. The
director denied the motion and Parsons ap-
pealed to the superior court. After oral argu-
ment, the superior court affirmed the DHS
director’s final order, adopting DHS’s argu-
ments and finding that sufficient evidence
supported it. Parsons timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Hs 1110 Parsons argues that the supe-
rior court erred by affirming the DHS di-
rector’s final order upholding the revocation
of Parsons’s caregiver card.! The superior
court’s review of an agency decision is limit-
ed to whether substantial evidence supports
the agency’s decision and whether the deci-
sion is contrary to law, arbitrary and capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion. A.R.S, § 12-
910(E). In reviewing the superior court’s rul-
ing affirming an agency’s order, we “indepen-
dently examine the record to determine
whether the evidence supports the judg-
ment,” under a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Webb v. State ew rel. Ariz
Bad. of Med. Exam'rs, 202 Ariz, 555, 557 17,
48 P.8d 505, 507 (App. 2002); Ariz. Admin,
Code. (“A.A.C.”) R2-19-119(A), Although we
view the evidence in the light most favorable

tion no longer existed. However, neither the ALJ,
the Department director, nor the superior court
made findings or conclusions on this issue.
Therefore, we do not address this argument.

to upholding the agency’s decision, we are
not bound by the agency’s or the superior
court’s legal conclusions or statutory inter-
pretations. JHass Grp. L.L.C. v. Ariz. Dept
of Fin, Insts., 288 Ariz. 877, 883 120, 360
P.3d 1029, 1085 (App. 2015), Because ineligi-
bility for a caregiver registration card under
the AMMA is not a penalty or disability
released when a conviction is set aside, Par-
sons’s conviction is an excluded felony of-
fense and is grounds for revocation of his
caregiver registration card,

711 Parsons argues that DHS and the
superior court erred by concluding that
A.R.S. § 18-907 does not remove his ineligi-
bility for caregiver registration pursuant to
the AMMA, Our primary goal in interpreting
a statute is to give effect to legislative intent.
JHass Grp., 238 Ariz, at 884 127, 360 P.3d at
1086, In doing so, we look to the statute’s
plain language as the best indicator of that
intent. Azore, LLC v. Bassett, 236 Ariz. 424,
427 18, 841 P.8d 466, 469 (App. 2014). Fur-
ther, we must construe the statute in context
with other related provisions and its place in
the statutory scheme. Hosea v. City of Pha.
Five Pension Bd., 224 Ariz, 245, 250 28, 229
P.8d 257, 262 (App. 2010). When the statute’s
language is clear and unambiguous, we must.
give effect to that language without employ-
ing other rules of statutory construction. In-
dust. Comm'n of Ariz. v. Old Republic Ins.
Co., 228 Ariz, 75, 77 17, 219 P.8d 285, 287
(App. 2009).

112 In Arizona, a person convicted of
a criminal offense may apply to have the
judgment of guilt set aside upon completion
of the sentence and discharge. A.R.S. § 13-
907(A). This is a “special benefit conferred by
statute” and subject to legislative control and
limitations. State v. Hall, 284 Aviz, 874, 877
{i 11, 322 P.8d 191, 194 (App. 2014), If the
court grants the person’s application, the
court must “set aside the judgment of guilt,
dismiss the accusations or information and
order that the person be released from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the
conviction.” A.R.S. § 13-907(C), However,
the statute specifically excludes from release
enumerated penalties and disabilities im-
posed by the Arizona Department of Trans-
portation and the Arizona Department of

323

Game and Fish, Jd. The statute also clarifies
that “the conviction may be used as a convic-
tion if the conviction would be admissible had
it not been set aside and may be pleaded and
proved in any subsequent prosecution of such
person by the state or any of its subdivisions
for any offense.”- Jd, Thus, setting aside a
judgment does not eliminate all consequences
of a person’s criminal conviction under Ari-
zona law, nor does it make the conviction a
nullity, Hall, 234 Ariz. at 877 911, 322 P.3d
at 194,

HM 118 For example, setting aside a
judgment under A.R.S. § 13-907 does not
erase or remove the fact of a conviction in
Arizona. Russell v, Royal Maccabees Life
Ins, Co., 198 Ariz. 464, 467 115, 974 P.2d 443,
446 (App. 1998), A person whose felony con-
viction has been set aside under A.R.S. § 18-
907 must still disclose it when asked if the
person has ever been convicted of a felony.
Id. at 470-71 127, 974 P.2d at 449-50; see
also In ve Couser, 122 Ariz. 500, 501, 596
P.2d 26, 27 (1979) (concluding that setting
aside a judgment relieves the offender from
punishment that the law imposes for the
crime but does not remove the fact that the
offender committed the crime, meaning that
the fact that the conviction was set aside
cannot be used as a defense in a disciplinary
proceeding); of A.R.S. § 18-907.01 (allowing
a trial court to “vacate” a specific conviction,
which in turn specifically allows the person
convicted of it to “in all instances state that
the person has never been arrested for,
charged with, or convicted of the crime” in
response to questions on applications), Be-
cause setting aside a conviction does not
mean that the conviction ceases to exist, Par-
sons improperly failed to disclose the 2005
conviction in his caregiver registration appli-
cation.

114 Parsons nevertheless argues that a
requirement to disclose the conviction does
not mean that DHS can use its existence as a
reason to revoke his caregiver registration
card. But DHS indeed can. The AMMA was
enacted in 2010 as a voter initiative measure.
State v, Gear, 239 Ariz, 348, 344 12, 872 P.8d
287, 288 (2016). DHS facilitates and monitors
the AMMA’s administration, and is tasked
with governing how it considers applications

324

for registry identification cards, A.R.S.
§§ 86-2801(4), -2808(A)(8). Generally, the
AMMA authorizes medical use of marijuana
and immunizes qualified patients and desig-
nated caregivers from criminal prosecution in
certain circumstances relating to the pur-
chase and possession of marijuana, A.R.S,
§ 86-2811(B). A designated caregiver is a
person who has agreed to assist with a quali.
fied patient’s medical use of marijuana,
ARS. § 86-2801(5)(b). To be a designated
caregiver, the person must not have been
convicted of an excluded felony offense,
ARS, § 86-2801(5)(¢). As relevant here, an
“excluded felony offense” includes a violation
of a controlled substance law that was classi-
fied as a felony, A.R.S. § 86-2801(7)(b). An
offense that would otherwise be an excluded
felony offense will not make a person ineligi-
ble, however, if either of two exceptions ap-
ply: (1) the sentence or probation for that
offense was completed ten or more years
earlier or (2) the offense involved conduct
that would be immune from arrest, prosecu-
tion or penalty under the AMMA but oc-
curred before the AMMA’s effective date,
ARS. § 86-2801(7)(b)(@), (i). Regulations
governing the AMMA’s administration re-
quire that DHS revoke a caregiver's registra-
tion card if the person has been convicted of
an excluded felony offense, A.A.C. § R9-17-
205(E).

15 Particularly when considering the vot-
ers’ intent in enacting the AMMA, “our task
is to apply the law they have written.” Reed-
Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 235 Aviz, 361, 867 125,
832 P.8d 587, 593 (App. 2014), Here, the
voters have clearly written the AMMA in a
way showing their intent to require consider-
ation of the fact of a conviction for a con-
trolled substance related felony in determin-
ing whether an applicant is eligible for a
caregiver registration card. Specifically, the
voters explicitly precluded those who violated
a controlled substance law from having ac-
cess to what is otherwise a controlled sub-
stance within ten years of that conviction,
The AMMA does not treat those convictions
differently based on whether they were set
aside, Indeed, recognizing convictions for
controlled substance violations as exceptions
to the AMMA’s definition of “excluded felony
offense” would read an exception into the

definition that the voters did not make. See
id, at 868 131, 882 P8d at 594 (“[Jludges
may [not] read exceptions into the law where
none exist, thereby contravening the plain
terms of the AMMA and usurping the legis-
lative authority exercised by, and ultimately
reserved for, the people.”).

{16 Although A.R.S. § 18-907(C)’s plain
language could support Parsons’s argument
that ineligibility for receiving a caregiver
registration card under the AMMA is a “dis-
ability,” see State v. Zaputil, 220 Ariz. 425,
428 1 12, 207 P.8d 678, 681 (App. 2008) (defin-
ing “disability” as a legal incapacity or dis-
qualification), the set aside statute specifical-
ly qualifies that a convicted felon is only
released from the penalties and disabilities
“resulting from the conviction.” Ineligibility
for a license from a state agency is not a
penalty or disability, but a measure designed
to protect the public, See id, at 427 118, 207
P.8d at 681 (finding that a mandate to pay
restitution is not a “penalty or disability”
because its purpose is to make a victim whole
again); see also Loughran v. Superior Ct. of
Maricopa Cty., 145 Aviz, 66, 58, 699 P.2d
1287, 1289 (1985) (“The purpose of the revo-
cation [of a driver's license] is to protect the
public and not to punish the licensee.”); Ariz.
Op. Atty Gen, 178-181 (concluding that “pen-
alties and disabilities resulting from a convic-
tion” refers only to those “which are of kin-
dred nature to criminal proceedings” and
finding that examining the qualifications of
potential licensees is not for the punishment
of a licensee but for the public's protection),
Instead, the ineligibility under the AMMA is
merely a collateral consequence of having
been convicted of a felony related to con-
trolled substance laws, As applied here, the
fact that Parsons was convicted for posses-
sion of nareoties, which remains notwith-
standing that the conviction was set aside,
has the collateral consequence of making him
ineligible to be a caregiver under the AMMA,

117 Parsons counters that this interpreta-
tion would render the enumerated exceptions
to A.R.S, § 18-907(C) superfluous because no
determinations of eligibility for licensing
would ever be affected by A.R.S. § 13-907.
However, all of the enumerated exceptions
are direct punishments, not collateral conse-

quences, of certain types of criminal conduct.
See, ¢.g., A.R.S. §§ 28-8304 (mandating revo-
cation of a driver’s license upon conviction of
certain vehicle-related crimes), -8806 (allow-
ing discretionary suspension or revocation of
a driver’s license or requirement of traffic
survival school if a licensee commits certain
driving-related conduct), -3308 (requiring
suspension of a driver's license if a licensee
fails to appear to a traffic hearing). Thus,
DHS may consider a person’s prior felony
conviction for a controlled substance violation
as grounds to deny or revoke a caregiver’s
registration card, even if the conviction was
set aside. Accordingly, because the record
supports the finding that Parsons was con-
victed of possession of narcotic drugs for sale
and that only six years had passed between
his discharge from probation and the date of
his application for a caregiver registration
card under the AMMA, the superior court
did not err by affirming DHS’s final order.

CONCLUSION
18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

395 P.3d 714
STATE of Arizona EX REL. Attorney
General Mark BRNOYVICH, Plain-
tiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant,
v

MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT BOARD,
Defendant/Appellee,

Abel Badillo and Bibiana Vazquez,
Intervenor-Defendants/Counter-~
Plaintiffs/Appellees.

No, 1 CA-CV 15-0498
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/20/2017
As Amended 6/21/2017

oD
pS
Ot

8 |
on

|

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Kevin D. Ray, Rusty D. Crandell,
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Ap-
pellant.

Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, By Mary
R. O’Grady, Lynne C, Adams, Erie M. Fra-
ser, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Ortega Law Firm PC, Phoenix, By Daniel
R. Ortega, Jr., Co-Counsel for Intervenor-
Defendants/Counter—Plaintiffs/Appellees

Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.C,,
Phoenix, By José de Jesus Rivera, Nathan J.
Fidel, Co-Counsel for Intervenor-Defen-
dants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees

Mexican American Legal Defense and Ed-
ucational Fund, Los Angeles, CA, By Victor
Viramontes, Martha L. Gomez, Co-Counsel
for — Intervenor—Defendants/Counter-Plain-
tiffs/Appellees

Law Office of Noel Fidel, Phoenix, By
Noel Fidel, Co-Counsel for Intervenor-De-
fendants/Counter~Plaintiffs/Appellees

Presiding Judge Kenton D, Jones
delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Paul J, McMurdie joined and Judge
Patricia K. Norris specially concurred.

OPINION

JONES, Judge:

{1 In 1996, Congress enacted two federal
statutes intended to restrict welfare and pub-
lie benefits for aliens. The Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) defines which aliens qualify
for eligibility to receive state and local public

1, Unauthorized aliens are those who “enter[] a
country at the wrong time or place, elude[] an

benefits, Although PRWORA also generally
allows the states to define alien eligibility for
public benefits, part of the egal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) does not allow any state to
provide non-qualified aliens with postsecond-
ary education benefits based upon their resi-
dence within the state. Ten years later, Ari-
zona voters passed Proposition 800 (Prop
800) which, in relevant part, incorporates
TIRIRA’s prohibition on providing the quin-
tessential residence-based, postsecondary ed-
ucation benefit—in-state tuition—to non-
qualified aliens.

12 In 2012, the U.S, Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), through a lawful exer-
cise of its prosecutorial discretion, elected to
defer deportation of unauthorized aliens who
entered the country as children, a depart-
mental policy otherwise known as Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Con-
gress permits DHS to issue employment au-
thorization documents (HADs) to DACA re-
cipients but has not specified whether DACA
recipients qualify for in-state tuition or other
state and local public benefits. Thereafter,
the Maricopa County Community College
District (MCCCD) began accepting EKADs
from DACA recipients as evidence that they
qualified for residence-based, in-state tuition
benefits. The Arizona Attorney General
(AAG) objected, but the trial court upheld
MCCCD’s actions in a subsequent declarato-
ry action,

13 The AAG now appeals the trial court’s
orders denying its motion for judgment on
the pleadings and granting summary judg-
ment in favor of MCCCD and partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of Abel Badillo and
Bibiana Vazquez (the Students). In reconcil-
ing federal and Arizona law, we hold DACA
recipients are not eligible to receive in-state
tuition benefits and therefore reverse the
court’s orders and remand with instructions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

4 In June 2012, DHS initiated the DACA
policy, which allowed DHS to defer the re-
moval of certain unauthorized aliens! and

examination by officials, obtain[] entry by fraud,
or enter[] into a sham marriage to evade immi-

redirect immigration enforcement resources
away from those individuals who lacked un-
lawful intent in entering the United States
and have since demonstrated productive use
of their time. See generally Memorandum
from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, DHS, to David
V, Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs &
Border Patrol, Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir.,
US, Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Cus-
toms Enf't (Jun, 15, 2012), https:/Awww.dhs,
gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising—
prosecutorial-discretion—individuals-who-
came-to-us-as-children.pdf (Napolitano
Memo). DACA originally applied to unautho-
rized aliens who: (1) came to the United
States under the age of sixteen; (2) had
continuously resided in the United States for
at least five years preceding DACA’s institu-
tion; (8) were not older than thirty before
June 2012; (4) were currently in school, had
graduated from high school or received a
GED, or had been honorably discharged
from the U.S. military; and (5) had not been
convicted of a felony or significant or multi-
ple misdemeanors. Jd. Individuals qualifying
for deferment under DACA are required to
apply for an EAD from the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (US-
CIS). See 8 C.F.R. § 274a,12(¢)(14).

{5 Shortly after the implementation of
DACA, MCCCD began accepting EADs from
DACA recipients as evidence of residency for
purposes of receiving in-state tuition bene-
fits, In 2018, the AAG filed a declaratory
action, seeking a determination that
MCCCD’s policy violates Arizona law and an
injunction prohibiting MCCCD from allowing
DACA recipients to obtain subsidized tuition
rates. The Students, two DACA recipients
attending MCCCD colleges and benefitting
from in-state tuition benefits, successfully in-
tervened and asserted constitutional defenses
in addition to MCCCD’s statutory defenses,

16 Both MCCCD and the Students filed
motions for summary judgment. After brief-
ing and oral argument, the trial court con-
cluded that, under the relevant federal and
state law, DACA recipients are “lawfully

gration laws”; we use the term “unauthorized”

as a substitute for “illegal” because the latter

term has developed a pejorative connotation.
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014),

329

present” and therefore eligible for in-state
tuition benefits. Because it granted Appel-
lees’ motions on statutory grounds, the court.
did not decide the constitutional claims pre-
sented in the Students’ motion. The AAG
timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes
(A.B.S,) §§ 12-120,21(A)(1) ? and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The AAG’s Authority to Bring Suit

HM 17 As an initial matter, MCCCD
argues the trial court’s orders must be af-
firmed because the AAG had neither statuto-
ry nor constitutional authority to initiate its
suit. Whether a party has standing to sue
presents a question of law we review de novo,
Pawn ist, LLC. v. City of Pha, 231 Ariz,
309, 811, 111, 294 P.8d 147 , 148 (App. 2013)
(citing Cir, Boy Gardens, L.L.C. v. City of
Tempe City Cowncil, 214 Ariz, 858, 356, 115,
158 P.8d 874, 877 (App. 2007),

HM 18 The AAC’s powers derive solely
from the Arizona Constitution or Arizona
statutes. State ew rel, Woods v, Block, 189
Ariz, 269, 272, 942 P.2d 428, 481 (1997) (quot-
ing Fund Manager, Pub, Safety Pers. Ret.
Sys. v. Corbin, 161 Ariz. 348, 854, 778 P.2d
1244, 1800 (App. 1988), and citing Ariz. State
Land Dep’t v. McFate, 87 Ariz, 189, 142, 848
P.2d 912 (1960)), In asserting its authority to
pursue this litigation, the AAG relies upon
ARS, § 41-198(A)(2), which states “[alt the
direction of the governor or when deemed
necessary by the attorney general, [the AAG
shall] prosecute and defend any proceeding
in a state court ... in which the state or an
officer thereof is a party or has an interest.”
This section “does not permit the Attorney
General, in the absence of specific statutory
power, to initiate an original proceeding.”
McFote, 87 Ariz. at 140, 145, 348 P.2d 912.

HH {9 We find no law, however, pro-
hibiting the chief executive of Arizona from
directing a lesser executive officer to enforce
a statute. Indeed, Arizona’s governor is

2, Absent material changes from the relevant
date, we cite a statute's current version.

330

tasked with supervising the official conduct
of all State officers and “is obligated and
empowered to protect the interests of the
people and the State by taking care that the
laws are faithfully executed.” Yes on Prop
200 v. Napolitano, 215 Ariz, 458, 470, 185,
160 P.8d 1216, 1228 (App. 2007) (quoting
McFate, 87 Ariz. at 148, 348 P.2d 912); see
also Ariz, Const. art. 5, § 4; ARS, § 41-
101(A)(1). Therefore, “the governor’s order is
the highest executive voice within this state
and may not be ignored by a lesser officer of
the executive branch.” Id. (quoting State v.
Hooker, 128 Ariz. 479, 481, 626 P.2d 1111,
1118 (App. 1981)).

110 Here, after the AAG filed this action,
then-Governor Jan Brewer directed the AAG
to take “all legal actions” to enforce the laws
regarding aliens’ eligibility for in-state tuition
benefits, which she interpreted as proscrib-
ing students without lawful immigration sta-
tus from receiving in-state tuition benefits or
other financial aid, and to continue this litiga-
tion to its conclusion. The Governor had an.
interest in the outcome because, by virtue of
her position, she was obligated to protect the
public’s interest by ensuring the laws were
faithfully executed. With that interest in
mind, the Governor directed the AAG to
“prosecute” the current proceeding within
the meaning of A.R.S. § 41-198(A)(@).

{11 Contrary to MCCCD’s contention,
there is no evidence the Governor used the
take-care clause of the Arizona Constitution,
see Ariz. Const. art. 5, § 4 (“The governor
.-. Shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”), to create statutory standing for
the AAG, thereby making a legislative deci-
sion in violation of her executive authority,
see Litchfield Elementary Sch, Dist. No. 79
v, Babbitt, 125 Ariz. 215, 220, 608 P.2d 792,
797 (App. 1980) (citing Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co, v, Saavyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88, 72
S.Ct. 868, 96 L.Ed, 1158 (1952)), Pursuant to
her constitutional and statutory authority as
chief executive, the Governor ordered the
AAG to serve as her proxy in enforcing
Arizona’s laws. The AAG, therefore, had a
legal right, derived from the Governor’s com-
mand, to seek a judicial determination that
MCCCD acted unlawfully. We conclude the
AAG had standing to bring the underlying

declaratory and injunctive actions against
MCCCD.

Il. DACA Recipients’ Eligibility for In-
State Tuition

112 The AAG argues the trial court erred
in interpreting state and federal law in a
manner that permits DACA recipients to
qualify for in-state tuition benefits. We re-
view the interpretation and application of
statutes de novo. See John Munic Enters.,
Inc, ». Laos, 235 Ariz, 12, 15, 15, 826 P.8d
279, 282 (App, 2014) (citing First Credit Un-
ton v. Courtney, 288 Ariz, 105, 107, 19, 809
P.3d 929, 981 (App. 2018)).

A. PRWORA, IITRIRA, and Prop 300:
Defining Alien Eligibility for Welfare
and Public Benefits

118 A brief examination of the history and
content of the relevant federal and state
statutes is instructive.

914 In 1996, Congress passed PRWORA,
Pub. L. No. 104-198, tit. IV, §§ 400-51, 110
Stat, 2105, 2260-77 (1996) (partially codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to -1646),
and ITRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C,
§ 505, 110 Stat. 3009, 3681 (1996) (codified as
8 U.S.C. § 1628). PRWORA was generally
enacted “to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of
public benefits,” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(6), and spe-
cifically delineates which aliens are eligible
for state and local public benefits, see 8
U.S.C, §§ 1621(a), 1641(b)-(c). In relevant
part, PRWORA defines state and local public
benefits as:

[Alny retirement, welfare, health, disabili-
ty, public or assisted housing, postsecond-
ary education, food assistance, unemploy-
ment benefit, or any other similar benefit
for which payments or assistance are pro-
vided to an individual ... by an agency of
a State or local government or by approp-
viated funds of a State or local govern-
ment.

8 U.S.C. § 1621(¢)(1)(B).

{15 Under PRWORA, unless an alien is
“() a qualified alien ,.., (2) a nonimmigrant!

31 _.., or (8) an alien who is paroled into the
United States” for urgent humanitarian rea-
sons or significant public benefit, he or she is
not eligible for state or local public benefits,
8 USC. §§ 1621(a), 1641(o), “Qualified
aliens” are statutorily defined to include: (1)
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence; (2) aliens granted asylum; (8) refu-
gees; (4) aliens whose deportations are with-
held because removal would threaten the
alien’s life or freedom; (6) certain Cuban and
Haitian entrants; (6) certain battered aliens,
or their spouses or children; and (7) certain
victims of sex trafficking. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)-
(c). For ease of reference, we refer to these
groups, collectively, as qualified aliens. We
likewise refer to aliens who do not fit within
these specifically defined groups as non-qual-
ified aliens.

916 Although the individual states retain
the authority under PRWORA to enact a
statute that would affirmatively provide “an
alien who is not lawfully present” eligibility
for state and local public benefits “for which
such alien would otherwise be ineligible un-
der [8 USC. § l62l(@)1” 8 USC.
§ 1621(d),! this general grant of authority is
limited by ITRIRA, which provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of

law, an alien who is not lawfully present in

the United States shall not be eligible on

the basis of residence within a State (or a

political subdivision) for any postsecondary

education benefit unless a citizen or nation-

al of the United States is eligible for such a

benefit (in no less an amount, duration,

and scope) without regard to whether the

citizen or national is such a resident.
8 U.S.C. § 1628(a). ITRIRA has been inter-
preted as applying to in-state tuition bene-
fits. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ, of
Cal., 50 Cal.4th 1277, 117 Cal.Rptr.38d 859,
241 P.8d 855, 865 (2010) (“[Section 1628(a) ]
provides that illegal aliens are not eligible for
in-state tuition rates at public institutions of
higher education,”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No,
104-828, at 240 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)); see gen-

3. Nonimmigrants are legal temporary residents
of the United States, the most common of which
hold student or work visas. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(@)(15).

331

erally Day v. Bond, 500 F.8d 1127 (10th Cir.
2007) (presuming in-state tuition is a benefit
governed by IIRIRA but concluding the
plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a claim).
117 Ten years after PRWORA and IIRI-
RA were enacted, Arizona voters approved
Prop 800 to ostensibly prohibit unauthorized
aliens from receiving in-state tuition or edu-
cational financial aid derived from publicly
appropriated funds. See generally Public
Program Hligibility, 2006 Ariz, Legis. Serv.
Sen. Cone, Res. 1081 (2d Reg. Sess.). Thus,
pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-1803(B):
In accordance with [IIRIRA], a person
who [i]s not a citizen or legal resident of
the United States or who is without lawful
immigration status is not entitled to classi-
fication as an in-state student pursuant to
[A.R.S.] § 15-1802 or entitled to classifica-
tion as a county resident pursuant to
[A.R.S.] § 15-1802.01.
Section 15-1825(A) similarly prohibits a stu-
dent seeking postsecondary education in Ari-
zona “who is not a citizen of the United
States [or] is without lawful immigration sta-
tus” from receiving “tuition waivers, fee
waivers, grants, scholarship assistance, finan-
cial aid, tuition assistance or any other type
of financial assistance that is subsidized or
paid in whole or in part with state monies.”
Section 15-1825(B) further requires each
community college and university to report
the total number of students not entitled to
educational financial aid because they are
“not lawfully present.”

118 In sum: (1) PRWORA grants eligibili-
ty for state and local public benefits only to
“qualified” aliens who are “lawfully present,”
but separately permits the states, individual-
ly, to extend state and local public benefits to
non-qualified aliens; (2) IIRIRA restricts the
states’ authority to extend a specifie public
benefit—residence-based, in-state tuition—to
aliens “not lawfully present”; and (8) Arizona
statutes, adopted at the direction of Arizona
voters, affirmatively deny in-state tuition

4, Congress also permitted the states to restrict
the eligibility of qualified aliens for state public
benefits, within certain limitations. See 8 U.S.C,
§ 1622; see also Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Bd.2d 351
(2012).

332

benefits to persons “without lawful immigra-
tion status.” Whether DACA recipients are
eligible for in-state tuition benefits turns on
whether they are “lawfully present” within
the meaning of the above statutes addressing
eligibility for state and local benefits.

B. Defining “Lawful Presence”
1, A Coherent Statutory Scheme

Hs 1119 MCCCD first argues that ITR-
IRA is the more specific statute relative to
in-state tuition and thus controls over
PRWORA’s general provisions for state and
local public benefits, MCCCD therefore con-
tends we should disregard any discussion
defining “not lawfully present” found in
PRWORA, Basie principles of statutory in-
terpretation instruct that “specifie statutes
control over general statutes,” and, “when a
general and a specific statute conflict, we
treat the specific statute as an exception to
the general.” Mercy Healthcare Ariz, Inc. v.
AHCCCS, 181 Ariz, 95, 100, 887 P.2d 625, 630
(App. 1994) (citing City of Phu. v. Superior
Court (Derickson), 189 Ariz, 175, 178, 677
P.2d 1288, 1286 (1984), and Kearney v. Mid-
Century Ins., 22 Aviz.App. 190, 192, 526 P.2d
169 (1974)). But we should only disregard
PRWORA, as MCCCD asks us to do, if it
truly conflicts with IIRIRA or the two can-
not in any way be read together, See Berndt
», Ariz. Dep't of Corr, 288 Ariz, 524, 528,
V11, 868 P.8d 141, 145 (App. 2015) (citing
Baker v. Gardner, 160 Ariz, 98, 101, 770 P.2d
766, 769 (1988)). We do not find that to be
the case here, especially given our duty “to
harmonize, whenever possible, related statu-
tory and rule provisions.” Metgler v. BCT
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Ariz, 141, 145,
113, 829 P.8d 1043, 1047 (2014) (citing State
v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, 17, 160 P.8d
166, 168 (2007)).

HI 1.20 ITRIRA can be construed within
the entire statutory scheme as a restriction
on PRWORA’s general decree authorizing
states to enact statutes granting state or
local public benefits to non-qualified aliens,
See 8 U.S.C, § 1621(d). First, the parties
here do not dispute that the restriction with-
in ITRIRA applies to in-state tuition benefits.
See supra 116. And because in-state tuition is
financial assistance provided by a postsec-

ondary educational institution, such as a com-
munity college district or other local govern-
ment agency, see Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed, 2014) (defining a “local agency” as
“{a] political subdivision of a state,” including
“counties, cities, school districts, etc.”); see
also McClonahan v. Cochise Coll., 25 Ariz,
App. 18, 17, 540 P.2d 744 (1975) (“We hold
that a community college district is a political
subdivision of the state.”), in-state tuition
benefits fit within PRWORA’s definition of a
state or local public benefit, see supra 114;
see also Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.38d 359, 241
P8d at 866 (analyzing, with regard to
PRWORA, a state statute exempting certain
unauthorized aliens from paying out-of-state
tuition); Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F.Supp.2d
1821, 1880 (SD, Fla. 2012) (construing
PRWORA as encompassing IIRIRA).

HM 121 This construction is consistent
with IIRIRA’s placement within the general
statutory scheme outlining eligibility for
state and local public benefits. “When stat-
utes relate to the same subject matter, the
later enactment, in the absence of any ex-
press repeal or amendment therein, is held to
have been enacted in accord with the legisla-
tive policy embodied in [the earlier statute.”
Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91
Ariz, 168, 171, 870 P.2d 652 (1962) (citing
Fragier v, Terrill, 65 Ariz, 181, 134, 175 P.2d
438 (1947), and then United States v. Ari-
zona, 295 U.S. 174, 191, 55 S.Ct. 666, 79
L.Ed, 1871 (1985)), MCCCD has not identi-
fied any divergent legislative policy that
would justify reading IIRIRA outside of the
general context of PRWORA. To the con-
trary, both ITRIRA and PRWORA reflect a
general policy to encourage aliens to be self-
reliant and reduce their burden on the public
benefits system in accordance with national
immigration policy, See generally 8 U.S.C,
§ 1601.

122 By its subsequent enactment of ITRI-
RA, Congress was clarifying that
PRWORA’s eligibility provisions applied to
in-state tuition benefits, while at the same
time removing residence-based, in-state tu-
ition from the class of public benefits a state
may offer, under PRWORA, to non-qualified

or unlawfully present aliens. Because we
reject MCCCD’s argument that the provi-
sions of IIRIRA supplant the provisions of
PRWORA, we examine the meaning of “law-
fully present” within the statutory scheme as
a whole,

2. Chevron Step 1: Congress Has Defined
“Lawfully Present” for Purposes of
Alien Eligibility for State and Local
Public Benefits.

WM 128 Because this case involves
DH&’s policy regarding statutes it adminis-
6 we must first ask “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise questions
at issue.” See FDA v, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S, 120, 182, 120 S.Ct.
1291, 146 L.Hd.2d 121 (2000) (citing Chevron,
USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res, Def: Council, Inc.,
467 U.S, 887, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d
694 (1984)), If Congress has done so, we will
give effect to Congressional intent and do not
consider the agency’s interpretation. Id. (cit-
ing Chevron, 467 U.S, at 842, 104 S.Ct, 2778),
“In determining whether Congress has spe-
cifically addressed the question at issue, a
reviewing court should not confine itself to
examining a particular statutory provision in
isolation” because the meaning of certain
phrases “may only become evident when

5. Should a state extend residence-based, in-state
tuition benefits to non-qualified aliens, IIRIRA
requires the benefit be extended to all U.S, citi-
zens and nationals, including those residing out-
of-state, see infra 158, thereby defeating the
state's ability to distinguish between students
based upon their residency.

6. The Department of Justice, through the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), was
originally responsible for enforcing the immigra-
tion laws, but that responsibility has since been
transferred to DHS, See Clark v. Martinez, 543
US. 371, 374 nl, 125 S.Ct, 716, 160 L.Bd.2d
734 (2005).

7. DACA and other DHS deferred-action policies
are exercises of administrative discretion in
which immigration officials temporarily defer the
removal of unauthorized aliens, See Reno v. Am—
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S, 471,
483-84, 119 S.Ct, 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999);
DHS’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S. & to Defer
Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 12-13
(2014), https://www justice,gov/sites/default/files/
olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11—

333

placed in context.” Id. (citing Brown v, Gard-
ner, 518 US. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 180
L.Ed.2d 462 (1994)).

124 The phrase “lawfully pres-
ent” is only used twice within the statutory
subchapter involving state and local public
benefits and in-state tuition. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1621(d), 1623(a). “A term appearing in
several places in a statutory text is generally
read the same way each time it appears.”
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 185, 141-
48, 114 S.Ct, 655, 126 L.Ed2d 615 (1994)
(construing the term “willful” as it appears in
different sections of the same subchapter)
(citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479, 112 S.Ct, 2589, 120
L.Hd2d 879 (1992)), Although 8 U.S.C.
§ 1628(a), within ITRIRA, provides little
guidance as to the meaning of the phrase, 8
U.S.C, § 1621(d), within PRWORA, equates
aliens who are “not lawfully present” with
non-qualified aliens—or those ineligible for
benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a). See supra
(115-16, Reading the statutes together, we
conclude that only qualified aliens are “law-
fully present” for purposes of receiving state
and local public benefits,

125 Qualified aliens include alien-benefi-
ciaries of some forms of discretionary and
deferred-action relief.’ See supra 115. How-

19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (Deferred Action
Op.). Deferred action is one of multiple forms of
discretionary relief} other forms of discretionary
relief include parole, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A); asylum, see 8 U.S.C,
§ 1158(b)(1)(A); cancellation of removal, see 8
U.S.C. § 1229b; and temporary protected status,
see 8 U.S.C, § 1254a, See also Arizona, 567 U.S.
at 394, 132 S.Ct, 2492; Deferred Action Op., 38
Op. O.L.C, at 5, 12 n.5, Although deferred action
developed without express statutory authoriza-
tion, see Am.~Arab Anti-Discrimination, 525 U.S.
at 484, 119 S.Ct, 936 (citation omitted); USCIS
Adjudicator's Field Manual ch. 40.9.2(b)(3)(0)
(last updated Nov, 23, 2016), https:/www.uscis.
gow/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1,
html (USCIS Manual), some deferred action poli-
cies have been codified by Congress, see 8 U.S.C,
$§ 1101(a)(15)(1), (U), 1154(a)(1)(A), (D); De-
ferred Action Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 13, 15, More-
over, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledges de-
ferred-action policies represent a valid extension
of the federal power over immigration and an
agency's discretion to use scarce enforcement
resources in an effective manner. See Arizona,
567 U.S, at 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492; Deferred Action
Op., 38 Op. O.L.C. at 13, 20,

334

ever, not all persons benefitting from discre-
tionary and deferred-action relief are quali-
fied aliens, as defined within 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1621 and 1641; rather, discretionary and
deferred-action relief recipients who are also
defined as qualified aliens are emblematic of
statutorily recognized groups who have suf-
fered or will imminently suffer from violence
or the effects of an emergency situation. Nor
are the beneficiaries of discretionary and de-
ferred-action relief necessarily “lawfully
present.” See Deferred Action Op., 38 Op.
O.L.C. at 20 (describing deferred-action pro-
grams as “the toleration of an alien’s contin-
ued unlawful presence”).

26 DACA recipients have not been spe-
cifically recognized by legislative enactment
and do not share these same acute humani-
tarian concerns. See id. at 18 n8 (noting
DACA is “predicated on humanitarian con-
cerns ... less particularized and acute” than
those underlying other deferred-action pro-
grams). They are more aptly described as
beneficiaries of an executive branch policy
designed to forego deportation of those who
lacked unlawful intent in entering the coun-
try and have, since their arrival, led produc-
tive lives. However, even accepting DACA
recipients’ positive societal attributes, Con-
gress has not defined them, or deferred-
action recipients generally, as “qualified
aliens” who are “lawfully present” and there-
by eligible to receive in-state tuition benefits,

HE 127 Appellees nonetheless urge us
to adopt a definition of “lawfully present”
buried within an unrelated immigration stat-
ute addressing alien eligibility to receive vi-
sas, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)Gi). This section
states:

8. Appellees also rely on a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, which considered the defini-
tion of “lawfully present” found in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(), to support their position. See Ariz.
Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 855 F.3d 957, 974
(9th Cir. 2017). This case is not persuasive, how-
ever, because the Ninth Circuit was interpreting
the definition of a different phrase—“authorized
presence”—and in a different context—to deter-
mine an alien's eligibility to apply for a driver's
license. Id, at 963. Furthermore, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not adopt the definition contained within
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)Gi), but referenced the
statute only to illustrate how the state’s position
was inconsistent with the federal immigration
classification scheme, and thereby preempted.

For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is
deemed to be unlawfully present in the
United States if the alien is present in the
United States after the expiration of the
period of stay authorized by the [Secretary
of DHS] or is present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled,

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)Gi). By its own
terms, this definition is specifically limited to
the phrase “unlawfully present” as used with-
in paragraph (9). Id.; see also Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Ine. v. Nigh, 548 U.S. 50, 60-
62, 125 S.Ct, 460, 160 L.Bd.2d 389 (2004)
(explaining the hierarchical scheme used by
Congress to subdivide statutory sections),
And paragraph (9) does not address in any
manner an alien’s eligibility for state and
local public benefits, providing only that
aliens who have previously been removed
from the United States, after defined periods
of unlawful presence, are ineligible to gain
reentry for a certain period. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9); see also Hstrada v. Becker,
1:16-CV-8310-TWT, 2017 WL 2062078, at *6
(N.D, Ga. May 15, 2017) (holding the “tempo-
vary reprieve from prosecution” afforded
DACA recipients “does not change a recipi-
ent’s status and make them eligible for other-
wise unavailable benefits”) (citing Texas v.
United States, 809 F.8d 184, 167 (5th Cir.
2015), and Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights
v, Governor, 691 F.8d 1250, 1258 n.2 (11th
Cir, 2012), The definition contained within 8
U.S.C, § 1182(a)(9)(B)Gi) was proffered for a
narrowly defined immigration purpose and
does not render a DACA recipient lawfully
present for all purposes that might arise
throughout the entirety of the immigration
statutes’ particularly where a meaningful

See id. at 974-75. In the present case, the AAG
“did not create a novel immigration classifica-
tion,” but “frlather, ... permissibly borrowed
from existing federal classifications” in an at-
tempt to distinguish those aliens who have at-
tained a more concrete legal status—and are
therefore eligible to receive state and local public
benefits—from those who have not. Id. at 975
(quoting LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410 (Sth
Cir, 2005); see infra Part 11(B)(3). Moreover, the
evidence presented indicated there was no basis
to believe that DACA recipients’ ability to obtain
driver's licenses would otherwise facilitate their
access to public benefits to which they were not
entitled. Id. at 969,

and consistent definition is clear when the
relevant provisions are read as a whole.

128 Moreover, to apply a blanket defini-
tion to the phrase “lawfully present” in dispa-
rate sections of a body of law as complex and
extensive as immigration law would give
“unintended breadth to the Acts of Con-
gress.” Yates v. United States, —- U.S. —,
185 S.Ct. 1074, 1085, 191 L,Ed.2d 64 (2015)
(applying “the principle of noscitwr a soci-
is—a word is known by the company it
keeps—to ‘avoid ascribing to one word a
meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with
its accompanying words’”) (quoting Gustaf
son v, Alloyd Co., 518 U.S, 561, 575, 115 S.Ct.
1061, 181 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995), and citing United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294, 128
S.Ct, 1880, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008)). This is
particularly true where Congress has ex-
pressly granted the states authority to deter-
mine alien eligibility for state and local public
benefits, Congress would not simultaneously
delegate this policy decision to an agency,
such as DHS, where it would guarantee un-
remitting conflict between the two, See
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 188, 120
S.Ct. 1291 (“[We must be guided to a degree
by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy deci-
sion of such economic and political magnitude
to an administrative agency.”) (citing Tele-
comm. Corp. v. Am. Tel, & Tel. Co., 512 U.S.
218, 231, 114 S.Ct, 2228, 129 L.Ed.2d 182
(1994); see also Hstrada, 2017 WL 2062078
at *5 (citing Teas, 809 F.3d at 183),

29 Furthermore, two of the most recent
Congressional acts designed to repeal IIRI-
RA and institute a pathway to legal perma-
nent resident status for certain unauthorized
student-aliens have failed to pass. See Andor-
ra Bruno, Cong. Research Serv., RL88863,
Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and
“DREAM Act” Legislation 5-8 (2012); Ste-
phen L, Nelson, Jennifer L. Robinson &
Anna M. Bergevin, Administrative DREAM
Acts and Piecemeal Policymaking: Examin-
ing State Higher Education Governing
Board Policies Regarding In-State Tuition

9, The Students argue that deferred-action recipi-
ents’ eligibility to receive specific federal public
benefits is evidence that Congress intended
DACA recipients to be eligible for state and local

335

Sor Undocumented Immigrant Students, 28
Geo. Immigr. LJ. 555, 566-68 (2014), This
provides further evidence of a lack of Con-
gressional intent to extend postsecondary ed-
ucation benefits beyond those defined as
qualified aliens within 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)
and 1641(b)-(c). See Texas, 809 F.3d at 185
(citation omitted).

8. DHS Has Avoided Defining “Lawfully
Present” for the Purpose of Determining
Eligibility for State and Local Public
Benefits.

HMM 180 Congress has directly ad-
dressed the issue of alien eligibility for state
and local public benefits, and DHS has not
encroached upon that Congressional intent
through its enunciation of the DACA policy.
Congress charged DHS, at the time of its
ereation, with the administration and en-
forcement of all laws relating to the immigra-
tion and naturalization of aliens, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1). Within that enforcement au-
thority, DHS has near-absolute prosecutorial
diseretion to enforce immigration law, be-
cause it is unable to “act against each techni-
cal violation” and must be free to prioritize
the policy goals upon which the agency will
spend its limited resources. See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-82, 105 S.Ct. 1649,
84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (creating a general
presumption of unreviewability of an agen-
cy’s refusal to take enforcement action) (cita-
tions omitted). Indeed, “[a] principal feature
of the removal system” is DHS’s broad dis-
eretion with regard to admissibility and re-
moval procedures set forth by Congress. Ari-
zona, 567 U.S. at 394, 182 S.Ct. 2492,

HM 131 DHS is not free, however, “to
disregard legislative direction in the statuto-
ry scheme that the agency administers.”
Heckler, 470 U.S, at 888, 105 S.Ct. 1649,
Congress has granted DHS some discretion
to define which aliens may physically remain
within the country, but, of those aliens au-
thorized to stay, Congress has exclusively
and particularly delineated which of them
may receive specific public benefits.? And

public benefits, Although non-qualified aliens are
generally ineligible for federal public benefits, 8
U.S.C. § 1611(a), Congress created an exception
for “an alien who is lawfully present in the

336

Congress, not DHS, retains the right to de-
fine the path to citizenship and other recog-
nized forms of immigration status. See Brew-
er, 855 F.8d at 971; see also infra 1154-55. In
the context of deferred-action policies, DHS
has recognized this limitation for over a dec-
ade. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
Comm’r, INS at 3 (Noy. 17, 2000) (“Prosecu-
torial discretion does not apply to affirmative
acts of approval, or grants of benefits, under
a statute or other applicable law that pro-
vides requirements for determining when the
approval should be given.”); Napolitano
Memo at 8 (noting an exercise of prosecutori-
al discretion “confers no substantive right,
immigration status or pathway to citizenship.
Only the Congress, acting through its legisla-
tive authority, can confer these rights.”); De-
ferred Action Op., 88 Op. O.L.C. at 2; USCIS
Manual ch. 40.9.2(b)(8)) (“Deferred action
is, in no way, an entitlement, and does not
make the alien’s status lawful.”),

182 DHS has similarly acknowledged its
limited ability to deem an alien “lawfully
present” for specific immigration purposes.
DHS may exercise its discretion to forego
removal of a DACA recipient, but the effect
is only to suspend the alien’s unlawful pres-
ence for purposes of future admissibility. See
Deferred Action Op., 88 Op. O.L.C. at 2; see
also Estrada, 2017 WL 2062078 at *6, US-
CIS distinguishes between “unlawful status”
and “unlawful presence” for purposes of 8
U.S.C, § 1182(a)(9)(B), advising:

[There are situations in which an alien

who is present in an unlawful status never-

theless does not accrue unlawful presence.

As a matter of prosecutorial discretion,

DHS may permit an alien who is present

United States as determined by the [Secretary of
DHSJ" to receive Social Security benefits, 8
U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (emphasis added). Because
Congress attached additional qualifying language
to the phrase “lawfully present” in discussing
Social Security monies, we presume it intended a
different meaning than the unqualified phrase
used in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d) and 1623(a). See
DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 83, 131
S.Ct, 2225, 180 L.Bd.2d 114 (2011) (“When the
legislature uses certain language in one part of
the statute and different language in another, the
court assumes different meanings were intend-
ed.”) (quoting Sosa vy, Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 711 n,9, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718
(2004)), Moreover, the federal regulation inter-
preting 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) includes “[aJliens

in the United States unlawfully, but who
has pending an application that stops the
accrual of unlawful presence, to remain in
the United States while that application is
pending. In this sense, the alien’s remain-
ing can be said to be “authorized.” Howev-
er, the fact that the alien does not accrue
unlawful presence does not mean that the
alien’s presence in the United States is
actually lawful.

USCIS Manual ch, 40.9.2(a)(2) (emphasis
added).

83 Indeed, it would be incongruous to
communicate to DACA recipients that they
are permitted to remain in the country and
later penalize them for that same period of
residency if they attempted to admit them-
selves lawfully. DHS would similarly not be
able to effectively exercise its prosecutorial
discretion had Congress not also authorized
it to grant work authorization via EADs;
otherwise, aliens granted deferred action as
low enforcement priorities would be forced to
support themselves through illegal means,
thereby defeating the reason DHS chose to
exercise its prosecutorial discretion in the
first place.

784 Still, there is a fundamental distine-
tion between basic benefits—such as the abil-
ities to work, drive, or attend public school—
afforded to those physically present in the
United States for the sake of social order,
and those secondary benefits commensurate
with the assistance afforded citizens, legal
permanent residents, or certain alien-victims
of acute humanitarian concerns. PRWORA
itself makes this distinction, prohibiting

currently in deferred action status” as “lawfully
present” for purposes of receiving Social Securi-
ty benefits, but defines them separately from
those “qualified alien[s] as defined in 8 U.S.C.
[8] 1641(b),” thereby unequivocally limiting
those aliens’ eligibility solely to federal Social
Security benefits, See 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(1), (4)(wi).
And, although DACA recipients may be eligible
for Social Security benefits, they are specifically
precluded from receiving federal postsecondary
education assistance under 8 U.S.C. § 1611 and
20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5), See also Mashiri v. Dep't
of Bduc., 724 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2013),
‘These statutes further undermine the Students’
suggestion that Congress generally intended non-
qualified aliens to be eligible for education bene-
fits.

states from restricting any alien’s access to
public benefits related to emergency and
medical assistance. 8 U.S.C, § 1621(b), The
ability to obtain financial assistance for post-
secondary education, however, is not synony-
mous with emergency assistance; nor does
access to postsecondary education impose an
obligation upon taxpayers to offset the cost.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79, 96
S.Ct, 1888, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); see also
Plyler v, Doe, 457 U.S, 202, 221-22, 102 S.Ct.
2882, 72 L,Ed.2d 786 (1982).

135 In sum, Congress has specified those
aliens who are “lawfully present” such that
they are eligible to receive in-state tuition
and other state and local public benefits,
These “qualified aliens” include some de-
ferred action and other discretionary relief
recipients whom Congress has statutorily au-
thorized based upon acute humanitarian con-
cerns. DACA recipients are not defined as
“qualified aliens,” To effectively exercise its
prosecutorial discretion, DHS is authorized
to deem classes of aliens “lawfully present”
for specifically articulated purposes, such as
admissibility and work authorization, that do
not include eligibility for state and local pub-
lie benefits, with determinations as to those
benefits being left to the individual states,
Accordingly, we conclude that DACA recipi-
ents are not automatically eligible for in-state
tuition benefits, but rather must look to Ari-
zona’s statutory provisions regarding alien
eligibility for in-state tuition benefits.

Til. Preemption and Equal Protection

186 The Students argue the AAG’s refusal
to treat DACA recipients as “lawfully pres-

10. In discussing minor children and basic edu-
cation, Plyler afforded every alien equal protec-
tion to access public primary and secondary
schools. 457 U.S, at 230, 102 S.Ct, 2382; see also
8 U.S.C. § 1643(@)(2). Similar unfettered access
to postsecondary education, however, has not
been conferred constitutional protection. In fact,
several states prohibit unauthorized aliens from
receiving higher education. See, eg., Ala. Code
§ 31-13-8; S.C. Code Ann. § 59-101~430; see
also Estrada, 2017 WL 2062078 at *1,

11. Other states have generally construed ITRIRA
as preempting state laws that grant in-state tu-
ition rates to unlawfully present or non-qualified
aliens solely upon the basis of residence. See
Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d at 863-
64, In the context of in-state tuition benefits,
residence is most often defined as physical pres-

337

ent” for in-state tuition either violates equal
protection or is preempted. We review statu-
tory and constitutional issues de novo. Peder-
sen v. Bennett, 230 Ariz, 556, 558, 16, 288
P.8d 760, 762 (2012) (citing Ross v. Bennett,
228 Ariz, 174, 176, 16, 265 P.8d 356, 358
(2011)).

A. Preemption of A.R.S. §§ 15-1803 & -
1825

WM 1387 The Students argue Arizona’s
statutes codifying Prop 300 are preempted
by federal law. But in fact, Congress has
expressly declined to preempt states’ regula-
tion of alien eligibility for state and local
public benefits. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(d),
1622; Martinez, 117 Cal.Rptr.8d 359, 241
P.3d at 867, We thus consider whether ITRI-
RA’s “[I]imitation on eligibility for preferen-
tial treatment of aliens not lawfully present
on [the] basis of residence for higher edu-
cation benefits,” 8 U.S.C. § 1628, preempts
Arizona’s statutes,"

138 Juxtaposed against their federal coun-
terparts, the Arizona statutes relevant in this
case—A.R.S, §§ 15-1803 and ~-1825—can
only be preempted if they provide aliens who
are “not lawfully present”—those who are
non-qualified—with residence-based, postsec-
ondary education benefits. The only two
questions that remain, therefore, are: (1)
whether Arizona law, pursuant to PRWORA,
intended to provide postsecondary education
benefits to aliens who are not Congressional-
ly defined as qualified or “lawfully present”;

ence and an intention to remain, analogous to
domicile. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321,
330-31, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 75 L.Bd,2d 879 (1983);
Webster v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 363,
365, 599 P.2d 816, 818 (App. 1979) (declaring
students seeking to prove domicile must show, by
clear and convincing evidence, physical presence
and intent to remain permanently), But see 8
ULS.C. §§ 1101(a)(33), 1641(a) (defining “resi-
dence” for purposes of PRWORA and IIRIRA as
a person's “place of general abode” or “his prin-
cipal, actual dwelling place in fact, without re-
gard to intent”). To avoid preemption, some state
Jaws permit non-qualified aliens to receive in-
state tuition on the basis of high school attend-
ance and graduation, See, e,g., Cal. Educ, Code
§ 68130.5(a); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-7110; N.M.
Stat, § 21-1-4.6(B).

338

and, if so, (2) whether Arizona law, pursuant
to IIRIRA, avoids providing such aliens with
residence-based, in-state tuition.

HN 189 Because ARS. §§ 15-1803
and -1825 both derive from Prop 300, our
primary purpose in statutory interpretation
is to effectuate the intent of the state’s
electorate that adopted it. Calik v. Kongable,
195 Ariz, 496, 498, 110, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057
(1999) (quoting Jett v. City of Tucson, 180
Ariz, 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994), “The
best indicator of that intent is the statute’s
plain language, and, if that language is clear
and unambiguous, we apply it as written.”
State v, Liwski, 238 Ariz, 184, 186, 15, 358
P.3d 605, 607 (App. 2015) (citing State v.
Matlock, 237 Ariz. 331, 334, 110, 350 P.3d
885, 888 (App, 2015). If ambiguity exists,
however, “we attempt to determine legisla-
tive intent ... considerfing] ‘the statute’s
context, subject matter, historical back-
ground, effects and consequences, and spirit
and purpose.” Calik, 195 Ariz. at 500, 116,
990 P.2d 1055 (quoting Aros v, Beneficial
Ariz, Inc., 194 Ariz, 62, 66, 977 P.2d 784, 788
(1999)), Furthermore, the publicity pamphlet
for, and stated purpose of, an initiative such
as Prop 300 are indicative of legislative in-
tent, Id.

140 Together, ARS. §§ 15-1803 and -
1825 deseribe four groups that are eligible to
receive in-state tuition: (1) citizens; (2) “legal
resident[s]”; (8) those with “lawful immigra-
tion status”; and (4) those “lawfully present.”
The trial court correctly noted the two stat-
utes “use the four terms interchangeably and
without meaningful difference,” although it is
clear these terms were to be construed “in
accordance with” federal law, specifically
TIRIRA. See A.R.S, § 15-1803(B). As we
have stated, IIRIRA prohibits states from
offering residence-based, in-state tuition ben-
efits to aliens who axe “not lawfully present,”
which, in the context of a state or local public
benefit such as in-state tuition, are those
aliens deemed non-qualified under federal
law. We must now determine whether Ari-
zona intended to mirror the federal definition
of qualified aliens,

12, Indeed, as the Concurrence adroitly points

out, early drafts of Prop 300 that based eligibility
for in-state tuition benefits on other factors, such

141 No language in either statute evi-
dences an intent to stray from the provisions
of PRWORA or IIRIRA regarding alien eli-
gibility for in-state tuition or other state and
local public benefits. Furthermore, the legis-
lative history of Prop 800 is consistent with
our interpretation. The bill’s sponsor specifi-
cally stated “[i]t [wals not any change in
federal law,” see H. Comm. on K-12 Educ.,
47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 13 (Ariz. Mar,
29, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dean Martin),
and another proponent declared the “resolu-
tion does not change the [federal] law, but
enforces eligibility standards already in the
law,” see H. Comm. on Appropriations (P),
47th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., at 15 (Ariz. Mar.
29, 2006) (statement of Chairman Russell
Pearce).

HM 142 In considering the plausible in-
terpretations of a statute, we must be mind-
ful of “the effect of different interpretations,”
Bell v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 Ariz. 478, 480,
17, 841 P.8d 1149, 1151 (2015) (citing Baker
v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz.
879, 888, 18, 296 P.8d 42, 46 (2018), and “Lilt
is our duty to uphold statutes, if their lan-
guage will permit, even though the statute
may not be artfully drawn,” State v. Book~
Cellar, Inc, 189 Ariz, 525, 528, 679 P.2d 548,
551 (App. 1984) (quoting State v. Grijalva,
111 Ariz. 476, 478, 588 P.2d 588, 535 (1975).
Because A.R.S. § 15-1808(B) incorporates
the residency or domiciliary requirements of
ARS. §§ 15-1802 and -1802.01,” see Web-
ster, 123 Ariz, at 865, 599 P.2d 816 (citation
omitted), the statute would be preempted by
TIRIRA if it extended in-state tuition to
aliens who are non-qualified under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1621(a) and 1641(b)-(c). Thus, we con-
elude Avizona’s scheme incorporates the
qualified alien distinction drawn by
PRWORA and IIRIRA, and is therefore con-
sistent with, and not preempted by, federal
law.

B. Equal Protection

HM 143 The Students also assert the
AAG has singled out DACA recipients for

as high school attendance and parental tax fil-
ings, were rejected, See infra 162.

disparate treatment, as compared to other
deferred-action recipients, in violation of the
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Had
the AAG done s0, its classifications would
likely be heavily scrutinized and overturned,
See, 29, Graham v. Richardson, 408 U.S.
365, 871-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 584
(1971) (noting “[state] classifications based on
alienage ... are inherently suspect and sub-
ject to close judicial scrutiny” and holding
provisions of state welfare laws conditioning
benefits upon citizenship were violative of
equal protection), But the AAG has not clas-
sified aliens for the purpose of receipt of
state and local public benefits; Congress did,
through its plenary power to do so, See
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78-80, 96 S.Ct. 1883.
Because unauthorized aliens are not a sus-
pect class and education is not a fundamental
right, Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228-24, 102 S.Ct.
2382, Congressional classification of aliens is
subject to rational basis review, Mathews,
426 U.S, at 82-83, 96 S.Ct. 1883,

Hl 144 In addressing whether a ration-
al basis exists for the challenged classifica-
tions, the legislation is “accorded a strong
presumption of validity,” and the burden is
upon the party challenging the legislation to
show the absence of “any reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts that could provide a ration-
al basis for the classification.” Heller v. Doe
ex vel. Doe, 509 U.S. 812, 319-20, 118 S.Ct.
2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1998) (quotations and
citations omitted), And the U.S. Supreme
Court has already determined “Congress has
no constitutional duty to provide [alll aliens
with the welfare benefits provided to citi-
zens.... [I]t is unquestionably reasonable
for Congress to make an alien’s eligibility
depend on both the character and the dura-
tion of his residence [because] neither re-

13. To the extent the Students argue the AAG
treats those with EADs disparately under A.R.S,
§ 1-502, we are unconvinced. First, A.R.S, §§ 1~
501(A) and -502(A) “specifically authorize agen-
cies to accept an Arizona driver license or non-
operating identification license as acceptable
proof of lawful presence.” Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen.
110-008, at 16. Although “{tJhis identification
may establish lawful presence, ... it does not
establish whether a person is a qualified alien,
nonimmigrant, or an alien who is paroled into
the United States[,] ... which are the eligibility

339

quirement is wholly irrational.” Mathews, 426
US. at 82-88, 96 S.Ct. 1888,

145 Congress has clearly defined what
constitutes “lawful presence” for purposes of
receiving state and local public benefits, and
DACA recipients are not qualified aliens for
this purpose, Although the DACA policy pro-
tects its recipients from accruing unlawful
presence for the purpose of determining fu-
ture admissibility and permits the issuance of
EADs so recipients may lawfully sustain
themselves while in this country, these bene-
fits do not translate into the recipients’ eligi-
bility for in-state tuition or other state and
local public benefits, This legislative distine-
tion is ostensibly borne of acute humanitari-
an concern for certain classes of unautho-
rized aliens, of which DACA recipients are
not included. As stated in Part III(A), Ari-
zona law is consistent with Congressional
classifications of aliens eligible for state and
local public benefits. The Students have
therefore not met their burden of proving the
AAG subjected DACA recipients to disparate
treatment by doing nothing more than ac-
cepting those federal classifications.!3

CONCLUSION

146 Congress has not defined DACA re-
cipients as “lawfully present” for purposes of
eligibility for in-state tuition or other state or
local public benefits. Congress has, converse-
ly, authorized each state to determine wheth-
er aliens, otherwise non-qualified under fed-
eral law, should be granted state or local
public benefits. Arizona’s statutory scheme
for postsecondary education benefits does
not demonstrate an intent to create that eli-
gibility for DACA recipients. Although
DACA recipients are “lawfully present” for
the specific purpose of obtaining EADs,
these documents do not automatically confer

requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1621,” id., and, as set
forth in Part II, supra, form the prerequisite for
eligibility for postsecondary education benefits.
Section 1-502 was merely enacted to respond to
PRWORA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1625 (authorizing each
state “to require an applicant for State and local
public benefits (as defined in section 1621(c) of
this title) to provide proof of eligibility”). Second,
because the AAG is accurately enforcing federal
legislation governing alien eligibility for state and
local public benefits, there is no equal protection
violation.

340

eligibility for in-state tuition. Considered to-
gether, federal and state law therefore pro-
hibit MCCCD from granting in-state tuition
benefits to DACA recipients, As a result,
MCCCD may be enjoined from offering in-
state tuition to DACA recipients, According-
ly, we reverse the trial court’s orders grant-
ing Appellees’ motions for summary judg-
ment and remand with instructions to enter
a judgment enjoining MCCCD from granting
in-state tuition to DACA recipients.

147 MCCCD and the Students request
attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal pursuant
to ARS, §§ 12-841 and -348,01. Because
they were not successful, we deny the re-
quests. However, as the prevailing party, the
AAG is entitled to its costs incurred on ap-
peal upon compliance with ARCAP 21(b).!4

NORRIS, Judge, specially concurring:

148 The first pivotal issue in this appeal is
whether the AAG had standing to sue
MCCCD for the declaratory and injunctive
relief it requested. See supra 17, I agree with
the majority the AAG had standing to pursue
the requested declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against MCCCD. Thus, I concur in the
majority’s decision at 11 7-11.

49 The second pivotal issue in this appeal
is whether MCOCD may offer in-state tuition
to DACA recipients who otherwise meet ad-
mission requirements. Following the AAG’s
lead, the majority resolves this issue by prin-
cipally focusing on two federal statutes, 8
U.S.C. § 1621, enacted as part of the Person-
al Responsibility and Work Opportunity Ree-
oneiliation Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1628, enacted
as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform

14. The AAG did not request its attorneys’ fees
incurred on appeal. In its complaint, the AAG
requested a fee award under A.R.S, § 12~348.01.
On remand, the trial court may consider the
AAG's request for fees under this statute but only
for its work in the trial court. We express no
opinion on whether the trial court should award.
the AAG fees under this statute,

15. Section 1621(c)(1)(b) broadly defines “state or
local public benefit” as “any retirement, welfare,
health, disability, public or assisted housing,
postsecondary education, food assistance, unem~
ployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for
which payments or assistance are provided to an
individual ... by an agency of a State or local
government or by appropriated funds of a State
or local government.” Not all courts agree that

and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Subject to
specified exceptions not relevant here, see 8
U.S.C. § 1621(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) prohib-
its aliens who do not meet certain require-
ments from being eligible for a variety of
state or local public benefits, defined to argu-
ably include in-state tuition.® Section
1621(d), however, allows a state to grant
these benefits to an alien “not lawfully pres-
ent in the United States” if it affirmatively
provides for such eligibility through a state
law enacted after August 22, 1996. Section
1628(a) goes one step further, and directly
addresses when a state may provide a “post-
secondary education benefit” to “an alien not
lawfully present in the United States.” See
infra 156.

50 In my view, whether MCCCD may
offer in-state tuition to DACA recipients who
otherwise meet admission requirements is
not controlled by either 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) or
8 U.S.C. § 1628(a), but instead by two Ari-
zona statutes, A,R.S. § 15-1803(B) and
ARS, § 15-1825(A), enacted by the voters
as part of Proposition 300. Under these stat-
utes, DACA recipients are not eligible for in-
state tuition, Accordingly, although I agree
with the majority that MCCCD was not enti-
tled to offer DACA recipients in-state tuition,
I do not join in the majority’s reasoning.

151 The third pivotal issue in this appeal
is whether the AAG singled out DACA recip-
ients for disparate treatment, as compared to
other deferred action recipients, in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution and federal preemption
principles, Although I also agree with the

in-state tuition constitutes a postsecondary edu-
cation benefit under this definition. “Compare
Martinez v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 50
Cal.4th 1277, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 359, 241 P.3d 855,
866-69 (2010) (implicitly recognizing that Cali-
fornia statute exempting ‘unlawful aliens” from
paying nonresident tuition at California state col-
Jeges and universities under certain ciroum-
stances provides a postsecondary education ben-
efit under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(0)(1)(b)), with Equal
Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F.Supp.2d 585, 605
(B.D, Va, 2004) (Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act addresses
only postsecondary monetary assistance paid to
students or their households, not admission to
college or university),

majority’s rejection of the Students’ equal
protection and federal preemption argu-
ments, I do so based solely on the record
before us, Accordingly, I agree with the re-
sult reached, but not the reasoning of, the
majority on the equal protection and preemp-
tion issues,

A. Proposition 300, ARS. § 15-
1803(B), A.R.S. § 15-1825(A), and
DACA

152 In 2006, the voters approved Proposi-
tion 300. That proposition amended state
statutes that governed in-state tuition and
financial assistance to individuals enrolled in
a publicly funded state university or commu-
nity college, As approved by the voters,
A.R.S. § 15-1803(B) bars a person who is
“without lawful immigration status” from be-
ing classified as an in-state student at public-
ly funded state university and community
colleges. That section reads as follows:

In accordance with the illegal immigration

reform and immigrant responsibility act of

1996 (P.L. 104-208; 110 Stat, 3009), a per-

son who was not a citizen or legal resident.

of the United States or who is without
lawful immigration status is not entitled to
classification as an in-state student pursu-
ant to § 15-1802 or entitled to classifica-
tion as a county resident pursuant to § 15~
1802.01.
ARS, § 15-1808(B).

158 Similarly, as approved by the voters,
ARS, § 15-1825(A) bars a student at a pub-
licly funded state university or community
college “without lawful immigration status”
from receiving a tuition waiver, fee waiver,
tuition assistance, or any other type of finan-
cial assistance subsidized or paid in whole or
in part with state monies, That section reads
as follows:

A person who is not a citizen of the United

States, who is without lawful immigration

status and who is enrolled as a student at

any university under the jurisdiction of the

Arizona board of regents or at any commu-

nity college under the jurisdiction of a

community college district in this state is

not entitled to tuition waivers, fee waivers,
grants, scholarship assistance, financial
aid, tuition assistance or any other type of

341

financial assistance that is subsidized or

paid in whole or in part with state monies.
AR.S. § 15-1825(A),

154 Although the two statutes do not de-
fine “lawful immigration status,” neither
MCCCD nor the Students have argued the
DACA program confers lawful immigration
status, that is, an enforceable legal right, to
remain in the United States on DACA recipi-
ents. Nor, as a matter of law, could they
make that argument. Like other deferred
action programs, the DACA program is
based on the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion by immigration officials to defer the
removal of a person unlawfully present in the
United States. Reno v. Am.—Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Comm., 525 U.S, 471, 483-84
n8, 119 S.Ct, 936, 948-44 n.8, 142 L.Ed.2d
940 (1999); Ariz, Dream Act Coalition v.
Brewer, 757 F.8d 1058, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“Like recipients of other forms of deferred
action, DACA recipients enjoy no formal im-
migration status.”). Although deferred action
programs, like the DACA program, are an
established feature of the Unites States im-
migration removal system, acknowledged by
the Supreme Court and Congress, Reno, 525
U.S. at 484-85, 119 S.Ct. at 944-45; see, e.g.
8 U.S.C, § 1154 (a)(1)(D)@CD, (IV) (provid-
ing that certain individuals are “eligible for
deferred action”), as the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
explained in her memorandum announcing
the DACA program, the program “confers no
substantive right, immigration status or
pathway to citizenship” and “[o]nly the Con-
gress, acting through its legislative authority,
can confer these rights,” see swpra 131.

155 Although the DACA program does not
confer lawful immigration status, that is, an
enforceable legal right to remain in the Unit-
ed States, on DACA recipients, DHS consid-
ers DACA recipients, like other deferred ac-
tion recipients, “not to be unlawfully present,
in the United States because their deferred
action is a period of stay authorized by the
Attorney General.” Ariz, Dream Act Coali-
tion, 757 F.3d at 1059 (citing authority); see
also Ga, Latino All, for Human Rights v.
Governor, 691 F.8d 1250, 1258-59 (11th Cir.
2012) (deferred action recipient remains
“permissibly” in the United States), And,

342

pursuant to DHS regulations, deferred action
recipients are authorized to, and indeed
must, apply to the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services for an “employ-
ment authorization document,” known as an
“EAD,” to work in the United States. 8
C.FLR. § 274a.12(¢)(14).

156 Because deferred action programs are
well-established under federal immigration
law and DHS considers deferred action re-
cipients lawfully present in the United
States, MCCCD and the Students successful-
ly argued in the superior court that DACA
recipients are eligible for in-state tuition be-
cause A.R.S. § 15-1803(B) specifies it is to
be construed “in accordance” with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1628(a), which they argue, links or ties
eligibility for in-state tuition to a person's
lawful presence in the United States, Section
8 U.S.C. § 1628(a) reads as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of

law, an alien who is not lawfully present in

the United States shall not be eligible on

the basis of residence within a State (or a

political subdivision) for any postsecondary

education benefit unless a citizen or nation-

al of the United States is eligible for such a

benefit (in no less an amount, duration,

and scope) without regard to whether the
citizen or national is such a resident,

157 Although MCCCD and the Students
have not explicitly argued ARS, § 15-
1808(B) incorporates by reference 8 U.S.C.
§ 1628(a), that is the thrust of their argu-
ment, To quote MCCCD’s brief on appeal:
“(T]he Arizona statute expressly references
the federal statute, indicating the intention to
interpret one the same way as the other....
For that express statutory cross-reference
fin A.R.S. § 15-1803(B) ] to make any sense,
the phrase ‘awful immigration status’ in
ARS. § 15-1803(B) must mean the same
thing as ‘lawfully present? in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1628[a].” Based solely on the language of
US.C. § 1628(a) and A.R.S, § 15-1803(B), I
reject that argument. See generally State v.
Thomas, 219 Ariz, 127, 129, 16, 194 P.3d 394,
896 (2008) (when resolving questions of statu-
tory interpretation, court should first consid-
er the language of the statute as it provides
the best and most reliable index of the stat-
ute’s meaning) (citations omitted).

758 On its face, 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) does
not define “lawfully present.” Nevertheless,
even if, as MCCCD and the Students argue,
8 USC. § 1628's reference to “lawfully pres-
ent” includes a person present in the United
States under a deferred action program, the
statute does not compel a state to do any-
thing or, of importance here, grant a person
lawfully present in the United States any
postsecondary education benefit, such as in-
state tuition. Instead, the statute allows a
state to grant any postsecondary education
benefit, which would include in-state tuition,
to an “alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States” based on the alien’s residence
within the state if it grants the same benefit.
to any United States citizen or national, re-
gardless of that person’s residence, Thus, 8
US.C. § 1628(a) provides a state with a
choice: if a state wants to make aliens who
are not lawfully present in the United States
eligible for in-state tuition based on residence
within the state, then the state must make
in-state tuition available to United States
citizens or nationals, regardless of their resi-
dence.

959 Because 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) simply
allows a state to decide whether to grant in-
state tuition to an alien not lawfully present
in the United States, A.R.S. § 15-1803(B)’s
reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) amounts to
nothing more than an acknowledgement that
the federal statute authorizes Arizona to
make this decision, In other words, the
phrase “[iJn accordance with” simply means
“as authorized by” or “pursuant to.” The
reference does not place a definitional gloss
on or modify the meaning of “without lawful
immigration status” as used in A.R.S. § 15-
1803(B), as MCCCD and the Students essen-
tially argue.

60 Further, even if there was some ambi-
guity regarding the meaning of the “in accor-
dance with” reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1628(a)
contained in A.R.S. § 15-1808(B), the legisla-
tive history surrounding Proposition 300
demonstrates that neither the Legislature
that referred Proposition 300 to the voters
nor the voters who approved Proposition 300
intended the “in accordance with” reference
to give the phrase “lawful immigration sta-
tus” the same meaning as “lawful presence.”

The history of what became Proposition 800
and the situation it was designed to address
make this crystal clear. See Simpson v. Ow-
ens, 207 Ayiz. 261, 265, 112, 85 P.8d 478, 482
(App. 2004) (court must effectuate the intent
of those who framed the proposition, and in
the case of a referendum, the intent of the
electorate that adopted it; if the meaning is
not clear, the court will consider the history
and purpose of the proposition),

161 What became Proposition 800 started
out in the Forty-Seventh Legislature (First
Regular Session 2005) as House Bill 2080
(“HB 2080”). As passed by the Legislature,
HB 2030 was, in all respects, identical to
Proposition 300. Then-Governor Janet Na-
politano vetoed HB 2080, In her May 20,
2005 veto letter, Governor Napolitano ex-
plained she believed Arizona laws should not
“discourage” high school graduates who had
been brought into the United States illegally
“ag small children by their parents” from
contributing to the United States,

162 Responding to Governor Napolitano’s
veto of HB 2080, the Legislature in the next
legislative session (Forty-Seventh Legisla-
ture, Second Regular Session 2006) passed
Senate Concurrent Resolution. 1081 (“SCR
1081”), and referred SCR 1081, which was
identical to HB 2080, to the voters, Before
the Legislature gave final approval to SCR
1081, the House of Representatives rejected
a Senate amendment to SCR 1081 that would
have allowed a person without lawful immi-
gration status to be classified as an in-state
student for tuition purposes if that person
met certain residency and income tax re-
quirements.6 The Legislature’s rejection of
this proposed amendment demonstrates that
in drafting and referring SCR 1081 to the
voters, it deliberately excluded students who
did not have lawful immigration status from
receiving postsecondary education benefits,
including in-state tuition.

163 Arguments in favor of Proposition 800
contained in the Secretary of State’s publicity
pamphlet for the 2006 general election fur-
ther demonstrate Proposition 300 was in-
16. These conditions required the person to have

attended a state public school for at least six

years, to have graduated from a state public high
school, and to have a parent who had filed an

343

tended to prevent those without lawful immi-
gration status from having access to in-state
tuition or to state subsidized financial assis-
tance. The “for” arguments emphasized that
“citizens of foreign countries, who break the
law to enter Arizona illegally, are given tax-
payer subsidized tuition,” Ariz. Sec’y of
State, 2006 Publicity Pamphlet 103 (2006),
and, even more tellingly, “Last year ... Gov-
ernor Napolitano ... VETOED it (HB 2030).
Now you have a chance to override the Gov-
ernor’s veto, We have many needs in Ari-
zona; if we end taxpayer subsidies for ille-
gals, we will save millions of tax dollars that
could benefit US citizens.” Id.

164 The proponents of Proposition 300
were not alone in recognizing that Proposi-
tion 300 was intended to prevent those with-
out lawful immigration status from receiving
in-state tuition and state subsidized financial
assistance. An opponent of Proposition 300
wrote in the publicity pamphlet that Proposi-
tion 800 would “prohibit colleges and commu-
nity colleges from giving resident status,
scholarship assistance, and the like to [stu-
dents not here legally], fly in the face of our
state’s need for an educated workforce to
attract new jobs and lay the foundation of
our economic future.” Id. at 104. Similarly,
another opponent of Proposition 800 wrote:

[Slome immigrant parents bring their chil-

dren to the U.S. and the children are here

without legal documents.... The mean

spirited proponents of Proposition 300

want to end the ability of these children to

progress in Arizona’s public higher edu-
eation system. Proposition 300 will prohibit
the granting of in-state resident tuition
status to any such person at a Community

College or University. A Senate compro-

mise allowing undocumented children to be

granted in-state tuition status if the stu-
dent had been in Arizona for at least six
years and if the parents had filed income
taxes for those six years was removed in
the House.

Id.

165 Given the wording of ARS. § 15-
1808(A) and A.R.S. § 15-1825(A), the evolu-

income tax return in Arizona for the six taxable
years preceding the person's enrollment in a
State university or community college.

344

tionary history of Proposition 300, and the
“for” and “against” arguments in the publici-
ty pamphlet, the voters were explicitly in-
formed Proposition 800 would bar students
without lawful immigration status from re-
eeiving in-state tuition and financial assis-
tance subsidized with state monies. To argue
otherwise, as MCCCD and the Students
have, ignores this reality,

166 MCCCD and the students also argue
“lawful immigration status” in A.R.S. § 15-
1808(B) must mean “lawfully present” be-
cause Proposition 300 used those two phrases
interchangeably. For example, MCCCD and
the Students point out A.R.S. § 15-1825(A)
bars a person “without lawful immigration
status” enrolled as a student at any state
university or community college from receiv-
ing financial assistance subsidized or paid in
whole or in part with state monies, while
ARS. § 15-1825(B) requires community col-
leges and universities to report the number
of students “not entitled” to such assistance
because they are “not lawfully present in the
United States.” Thus, MCCCD and the Stu-
dents argue the “reporting obligation in sub-
section B must cover the same scope as the
prohibition in subsection A for the statute to
make any sense,” and, therefore, “lawful im-
migration status” as used in Proposition 300
must mean the same thing as “lawfully pres-
ent.” This argument is grounded on an inter-
pretation of Proposition 300 that is at odds
with what Proposition 300 was intended to
do, In my view, the reverse argument is
true—Proposition 800 used the phrase “law-
fully present” to refer to a person with, and
only with, “lawful immigration status.”

67 Finally, MCCCD and the Students
argue that DACA recipients are entitled to
in-state tuition because A.R.S. § 1-502(A)(7)
allows a person to submit an HAD to an
agency or political subdivision of the state to
demonstrate his or her “lawful presence in
the United States.” This argument ignores
the meaning of “legal immigration status” in
ARS. § 15-1808(B) and ARS. § 15-
1825(A) as reflected in Proposition 300’s leg-
islative history. Further, this argument ig-
nores that A.R.S, § 1-502, enacted by the
Legislature in 2009, three years after the
voters approved Proposition 300, does noth-

ing more than list various documents a per-
son may use to show “lawful presence” in the
United States, The statute does not grant a
person eligibility for any public benefit such
as in-state tuition or state subsidized finan-
cial assistance to attend a state university or
community college.

168 For the foregoing reasons, I agree
with the majority that under current state
law, specifically, A.R.S. § 15-1803(B) and
ARS, § 15-1825(A), DACA recipients are
not eligible for in-state tuition. Accordingly, I
do not need to address the AAG’s argument,
that 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) bars MCCCD from
granting in-state tuition to DACA recipients
because Arizona has not affirmatively author-
ized such a benefit.

B, Equal Protection and Federal Pre-

emption

169 The Students have asserted the AAG
singled out DACA recipients for disparate
treatment, as compared to other deferred
action recipients, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution, Given its ruling on the in-state tu-
ition issue based on its construction of A\R.S.
§ 15-1808(B), the superior court denied the
Students’ claim as moot, although it did note
the Students’ claim appeared to have merit.
On appeal, the AAG argues we should affirm
the superior court’s dismissal of the Stu-
dents’ equal protection claim because they
failed to support that claim with any evidence
of such disparate treatment.

170 I agree with the AAG the Students
did not support their equal protection claim
with evidence. Therefore, on this record—
and only on this record—I agree with the
majority the Students failed to present a
cognizable equal protection claim.

171 The Students also asserted in the
superior court that federal law preempted
the AAG’s alleged disparate treatment of
DACA recipients because by attempting to
prohibit DACA recipients, but not other de-
ferred action recipients, from receiving in-
state tuition, the AAG was treating DACA
recipients as a sub-class of aliens even
though DACA recipients, like other deferred
action recipients, are lawfully present in the
United States, Although the superior court

wo
&

did rule on this argument, the AAG asks us
to “dismiss” this claim.

172 As noted above, the Students present-
ed no evidence of disparate treatment. Fur-
ther, the Students’ preemption argument is
grounded on interpreting ARS. § 15-
1803(B) as incorporating by reference 8
U.S.C, § 1623(a) and construing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1623(a) as requiring a state to confer post-
secondary education benefits on individuals
who are lawfully present in the United
States—arguments I reject. Therefore, I
agree with the majority that the Students
failed to present a cognizable federal pre-
emption claim.

173 I acknowledge the sincerity of the
arguments of MCCCD and the Students, and
the force of the policy reasons that caused
Arizonans to speak out against Proposition
300, Nevertheless, for the foregoing reasons,
T agree with the majority that MCCCD was
not authorized by state law to offer in-state
tuition to DACA recipients. As explained
above, I also concur in 117-11 of the majori-
ty’s decision, and join in the conclusions
reached by, but not the reasoning of, the
majority on the equal protection and preemp-

tion issues.

395 P.3d 734

IN RE the MARRIAGE OF John William
PECK, Petitioner/Appellant,

and

Sabine Sybille Hansen Peck,
Respondent/Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0131-FC
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed April 20, 2017

Waterfall, Economidis, Caldwell, Hanshaw
& Villamana, P.C., Tucson, By Peter Eco-
nomidis and Corey B. Larson, Counsel for
Petitioner/Appellant

Garnice Law, PLLC, Scottsdale, By Victor
A. Garnice, Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

Judge Espinosa authored the opinion of
the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring
and Judge Miller concurred,

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Judge:

11 John Peck appeals the trial court’s
judgment dismissing his petition for dissolu-
tion on grounds of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion over his wife, Sabine Peck. He also
contends that, even if jurisdiction was lack-
ing, he was nonetheless “entitled to have an
Arizona court terminate his marriage.” For
the following reasons, we affirm the conclu-
sion that the court did not have jurisdiction
over Sabine but we remand for further
proceedings regarding the dissolution of the
matriage.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 In reviewing the trial court’s dismissal
for lack of personal jurisdiction, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to John. See
In ve Consol. Zicam Prod. Liab. Cases, 212
Ariz, 85, 1'7, 127 P.8d 908, 907 (App. 2006),?
The salient facts in this case are essentially
undisputed. John and Sabine were married in
Switzerland in 2001. Sabine is a German
citizen who resides and is employed in Spain,
and John resides in Tucson. Throughout
their marriage, the couple have lived sepa-
rately and apart in Switzerland, England,
and Spain, In June 2014, John moved to
Tucson while Sabine remained in Spain. Sa-
bine has never resided in Arizona, but she
visited John in Tucson on several occasions
throughout 2014 and 2015 “in an effort to
reconcile their marriage” and co-signed the
lease on his Tucson apartment.

1, For convenience and to avoid confusion, we
refer to the parties by their first names.

2. Although we view the facts in his favor, we
reject John’s argument that courts are “required
to accept all well pleaded facts in the Petition, as
well as all facts set forth in [his] Opposition and

347

13 In January 2016, John filed a petition
for dissolution of marriage without minor
children in the Pima County Superior Court,
alleging the trial court had personal jurisdic-
tion over the parties because he was “a resi-
dent of and domiciled in Pima County,” “Ari-
zona [wa]s the last matrimonial domicile of
the parties[,] and [Sabine] has caused numer-
ous events to occur in Arizona including exe-
eution of a Contract for Home Rental.” Sa-
bine was served with the petition in Spain
pursuant to Ariz, R. Fam. Law P, 42(A) and
in compliance with the Hague Convention.

14 Sabine filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing she had
“not established domicile in Arizona” and
Jacked sufficient minimum contacts with Ari-
zona to permit the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over her. John responded that
personal jurisdiction over Sabine was appro-
priate because her “conduct ... caus[ed]
{his] move to Arizona and her other conduct
in Arizona,” including making statements
that she intended to move to Arizona and co-
signing the lease on John’s apartment, satis-
fied jurisdictional requirements.

15 In a signed written ruling, the trial
court determined that Sabine did not have
sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona to
subject her to divorce proceedings in the
state and dismissed the petition for lack of
personal jurisdiction. John filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing he had established a
prima facie case of jurisdiction over Sabine,
and she had “not denied” the allegations in
his opposition. From this conclusion, he as-
serted the court was required to accept his
claims as true and exercise jurisdiction over
Sabine. The court denied John’s motion, he
timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
12-2101(A)(8). See Garza v. Swift Transp.
Co., 222 Ariz, 281, 1115-16, 218 P.8d 1008,
1011 (2009) (section 12-2101(A)(3) provides

Affidavit.” See Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins.

Co., 154 Ariz. 502, 506-07, 744 P.2d 29, 33-34

(App. 1987) (court may consider documentary

and testimonial evidence to resolve jurisdictional

challenges).

348

jurisdiction when non-final order precludes
party from obtaining ultimate judgment)?

Personal Jurisdiction

HH {6 In the context of proceedings for
the dissolution of marriage, A.R.S. § 25-312
authorizes the superior court to make provi-
sion for child custody, child support, the
maintenance of either spouse, and the dispo-
sition of property, “[t]o the extent it has
jurisdiction to do so.” It is against this back-
drop that we consider whether the trial court
had personal jurisdiction over Sabine, John
argues the court erred in determining it
lacked jurisdiction over Sabine because her
purposeful acts “directed at Arizona” and her
“breach of [their] contract” to relocate to
Tucson provided sufficient contacts for the
forum to assert its jurisdiction over her.
“When a defendant challenges the existence
of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must
come forward with facts establishing a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction, at which time
the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut
the showing.” Ariz, Tile, LLC. v. Berger,
228 Aviz, 491, 18, 224 P.8d 988, 990 (App.
2010).

Hs 17 A petitioner cannot establish a
prima facie showing with bare allegations
and must come forward with facts, estab-
lished by affidavit or otherwise, supporting
jurisdiction, Van Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft
Piy., Lid., 229 Aviz, 412, 16, 276 P.8d 46, 50
(App. 2012), Nonetheless, the court should
resolve any conflicts “in the affidavits and
pleadings” in the petitioner's favor. Ariz.
Tile, 228 Aviz, 491, 18, 224 P.8d at 990,
quoting Macpherson v. Taglione, 158 Ayiz.
809, 312, 762 P.2d 596, 599 (App, 1988). We
will not set aside any findings of fact made
by the trial court in reaching its jurisdiction
determination unless clearly erroneous, sce
Bonner v. Minico, Inc., 159 Ariz, 246, 253-56,
166 P,2d 598, 605-06 (1988); see also Bushel-
man v, Bushelman, 246 Wis.2d 817, 629
N.W.2d 795, 808 (Wis. Ct. App, 2001), but we
review de novo the court’s dismissal of claims
for lack of personal jurisdiction, Van Hee-
swylt, 229 Ariz, 412, 16, 276 P.8d at 50,

3. Garza refers to ARS. § 12-2101(D), which
was subsequently renumbered as § 12-

“Arizona courts may exercise personal juris-
diction to the maximum extent allowed by
the United States Constitution.” Planning
Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C, v. Lake Mathews
Mineral Props,, Ltd,, 226 Ariz, 262, 112, 246
P.8d 848, 846 (2011). For personal jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident to exist, the defen-
dant must have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,
Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz, 1, 16, 13
P.8d 280, 282 (2000); see also Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S, 810, 820, 66 S.Ct. 154,
90 L.Ed, 95 (1945),

HEM 18 Personal jurisdiction may be ei-
ther general or specific and, under both
forms, “the constitutional touchstone remains
whether the defendant purposefully estab-
lished ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum
{sltate.” Williams, 199 Aviz, 1, 16, 18 P.8d at
282, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew-
tcz, 471 US, 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85
L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A non-resident defendant
is subject to general jurisdiction when her
contacts with the state are so substantial or
continuous that she may be haled into court
in the forum, even for claims unrelated to her
contacts with the forum. Id, We consider only
specific jurisdiction here because John con-
cedes none of the traditional indicia of gener-
al jurisdiction are present,

Hs 19 Specific jurisdiction may be ex-
ercised over non-resident defendants to the
extent permitted by the Due Process’Clause
of the United States Constitution. In re Con-
sol. Zicam Prod., 212 Ariz. 85, 110, 127 P.8d
at 908, Due process is satisfied if (1) the
defendant purposefully availed herself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Arizona;
(2) the claim arises out of or results from the
defendant's activities related to Arizona; and
(8) the exercise of jurisdiction would be rea-
sonable, Jd, Although the personal jurisdic-
tion inquiry is “holistic,” it is also “case-by-
case,” and the existence of specific jurisdic-
tion depends upon only those minimum con-
tacts that are velated to the cause of action.

2101(A)(3), 2011 Ariz, Sess, Laws, ch, 304, § 1.

Planning Grp., 226 Ariz, 262, 1915-16, 25,
246 P.8d at 347, 349 (“[Clontacts by a defen-
dant with the forum state ... not directly
related to the asserted cause of action ...
eannot sustain the exercise of specific juris-
diction.”),

W110 “The requirement that a
nexus exist between a defendant's activities
in the forum state and a plaintiff's cause of
action provides the key to exercising specific
jurisdiction.” Williams, 199 Ariz, 1, 111, 18
P.8d at 283. In other words, a petitioner's
claim must result from “ ‘alleged injuries that
arise out of or relate to [the defendant’s] ...
activities’ in the forum state.” Id, quoting
Burger King, 471 US. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174;
see also Rollin v. William V. Frankel & Co,
Inc., 196 Ariz. 350, 114, 996 P.2d 1254, 1258
(App. 2000) (same), If the petitioner’s claim
and the non-resident defendant’s forum-re-
lated activities are not sufficiently connected,
dismissal is warranted. In ve Consol. Zicam
Prod., 212 Ariz, 85, 1 11, 127 P.8d at 908. The
focus of the analysis is “the relationship be-
tween the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Williams, 199 Aviz. 1, 111, 18
P.8d at 283,

HM {11 In her motion to dismiss, Sabine
asserted she was a citizen of Germany who
had never resided or been domiciled in the
United States, She further stated John left
their marital residence in Spain in June 2014
and moved to Tucson, that she did not move
with him, and that the parties had lived
separately after that time. Sabine visited
John in Tucson for brief periods in 2014 and
2015 in an effort to reconcile their marriage,
and during one of those visits, she co-signed
the lease on John’s apartment because he
told her “she was required to sign [it].” She
maintained she did not “have a copy of the
lease, did not intend to submit herself to
jurisdiction in Arizona, and did not consult
with an attorney [as to] the effect of signing
the lease.” She also asserted she did not have

4, We note John did not submit a copy of the
lease or make it part of the record.

5. John repeatedly characterizes the couple's plan
to move to Tucson as a “contract” but we are
unaware of a legally cognizable claim for breach

349

“significant minimum contacts with the
state.”

12 In response, John admitted several of
Sabine’s assertions, including that she had
“visited with [him] in Tucson ... for brief
periods in 2014 and 2015, in an effort to
reconcile their marriage,” but he disputed
some others, including Sabine’s claim that
she lacked significant minimum contacts with
Arizona, John also submitted an affidavit as-
serting the parties “began discussions re-
garding a move to the United States” and
“mutually agreed that [John] would explore
employment in ... three [U.S] cities and
ultimately permanently move to the United
States.” According to John, he immediately
sought employment in Tucson pursuant to
this agreement, and Sabine had agreed this
was an appropriate choice because “that is
where [he] ha[s] family.” John further stated
that Sabine had agreed to move to Tucson if
he was offered a job there, and that she told
his mother and a hairstylist that she planned
to move to Tucson,

118 John also reported that, during one of
Sabine’s visits, the parties “jointly selected
an apartment where [they] decided [John]
would live while [they] were seeking a home
to purchase,” and they both signed the
lease.‘ On other visits, they spent time with a
realtor looking at houses, and Sabine told the
realtor, “I know we've taken a lot of your
time but we'll be buying something soon,”
Finally, John asserted he “would never have
moved to Tucson but for the mutual agree-
ment we made to permanently relocate to
Tucson in order to be together.”

114 Even viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to John, see In re Consol.
Zicam Prod, 212 Ariz, 85, 17, 127 P.8d at
907, we disagree that Sabine’s contacts with
Arizona satisfy minimum contacts require-
ments. Sabine’s promise 5 to move to Arizona
is not dispositive because John did not allege
that Sabine unilaterally decided not to move
to Tucson, or that her failure to do so gave

of contract based on a spouse’s breaking a prom-
ise to relocate, and John has provided no on-
point authority to support such a claim. More-
over, we note that John has not asserted a breach
of contract claim against Sabine.

350

rise to him filing the petition for dissolution.®
Cf Williams, 199 Ariz, 1, 111, 18 P.3d at
288; see also Engle v. Engle, 412 Pa.Super.
425, 608 A2d 654, 658 (1992) (party’s con-
tract with out-of-state individual insufficient
to establish minimum contacts with the fo-
rum state), Further, it does not appear—nor
did John allege—that Sabine’s act of co-sign-
ing the lease on his apartment gave rise to or
related to his decision to file for dissolution.
Cf. Williams, 199 Ariz. 1, 111, 18 P.8d at
288, As the trial court noted below, while
Sabine’s entering into the lease with John
“could be a basis for finding speciffic] juris-
diction on a subsequent breach of contract
action, it is not the type of purposeful action
that would support a claim of jurisdiction in
an unrelated divorce proceeding.” Moreover,
John having never introduced a copy of the
lease and there being no information about
its terms or period, there is no evidence
relating it to the parties’ separation or John’s
filing for divorce. Indeed, John’s affidavit
indicates the lease was entered during 2014,
but he filed for dissolution in January 2016,
at least suggesting a standard 12—-month resi-
dential lease could have expired before the
divorce was contemplated. Thus, John has
not shown a nexus between Sabine’s activi-
ties in the forum state and his cause of
action, See id; see also Muckle v. Superior
Court, 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 125 Cal,Rptr.2d
308, 806, 311 (2002) (finding no personal ju-
risdiction over former resident husband
whose only “purposefully directed ... activ-
itty!’ before wife filed for divorce was to
“provide some shelter” by purchasing a mo-
bile home for her).

115 Moreover, even if the minimum con-
tacts requirement was satisfied here, we
agree with Sabine that it would not be fair or
reasonable to require her “to defend this
matter in Arizona,” See Asahi Metal Indus.
Co, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,

6. John does allege for the first time in his reply
brief that “the filing of this action results from
[Sabine]’s breach of th[e] contract” to relocate to
Arizona, but that argument comes too late and is
waived. See Romero v. Sw, Ambulance, 211 Ariz,
200, 1916-7 & n.3, 119 P.3d 467, 470-71 & n.3
(App. 2005) (argument raised for first time in
reply brief waived).

118, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)
(ultimate determination of reasonableness
depends on several factors, including burden
on defendant, interests of the forum state,
and plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief); see
also Tiscornia v. Tiscornia, 154 Ariz. 376,
877, 742 P.2d 1862, 1863 (App. 1987) (state’s
interest best served when careful inquiry
made into reasonableness of asserting juris-
diction by weighing burden on foreign party
against minimal state interests).

116 Arizona has minimal contacts with this
marriage and dissolution, and several factors
militate against the court’s exercising its ju-
risdiction over Sabine. Cf Tiscornia, 154
Ariz, at 377, 742 P.2d at 1868. The parties
never resided together in the United States,
let alone Arizona, and they spent the entire
duration of their thirteen-year marriage in
Europe until John relocated to Tucson in
2014. Sabine has never lived in the United
States, and there is no evidence that the
parties jointly own any property in Arizona,”
Moreover, they allegedly entered into a
Post-Marital Agreement’ in Europe before
John moved to Arizona, and it appears
most—if not all—of their joint property is
held in Europe. Thus, considering the heavy
burden on Sabine, a foreign defendant, the
international context of the matter, and the
slight interests of the state, we conclude
these factors militate against the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Sabine and support
the trial court’s determination. Cf Planning
Grp., 226 Ariz. at 270-71 1188-89, 246 P.8d
at 851,

Dissolution of the Marriage

HMM 117 John alternatively argues that,
even if personal jurisdiction over Sabine was
lacking, he nevertheless was entitled to a
divorce because he met the jurisdictional re-
quirements of A.R.S. § 25-312 and “[tjhe

7, At oral argument, John’s counsel asserted the
parties hold a “leasehold” property interest in
Tucson, but there is no such evidence in the
record, John’s affidavit only having generally re-
ferred to an apartment lease being jointly execut-
ed in 2014,

8 Although referred to by both parties on appeal,
this document too was not made part of the
record,

outright dismissal of this matter was, thus,
plain error.” That statute provides that the
court “shall enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage if it finds ... [t]hat one of the
parties, at the time the action was com-
menced, was domiciled in this state ... for
ninety days prior to filing the petition for
dissolution of marriage,” that certain concilia-
tion provisions do not apply, and that the
marriage is irretrievably broken. § 25-312.

HMM 118 The trial court “may exercise
this limited jurisdiction to dissolve the mar-
riage without violating due process, even
though it lacks personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident party, as long as the court does
not determine the monetary obligations of
the parties.” Taylor v. Jarrett, 191 Ariz. 550,
17, 959 P.2d 807, 809 (App. 1998). Although
it appears John satisfied at least the first
requirement of § 25-12, he did not raise
this argument below and did not request in
his petition, in his response to the motion to
dismiss, or in his motion for reconsideration,
that the trial judge make the requisite find-
ings and grant a “divisible divorce” pursuant
to § 25-312 notwithstanding personal juris-
diction over Sabine and disposition of marital
property. The issue is therefore subject to
waiver, See Englert v. Carondelet Health
Network, 199 Ariz, 21, 118, 18 P.3d 768, 768
(App. 2000) (failure to raise issue in trial
court constitutes waiver on appeal),

119 John has proffered no argument or
authority entitling him to a remand on this
issue and we are aware of none, Neverthe-
less, Sabine has not argued waiver; indeed, at
oral argument, her counsel indicated she
would not have objected to a divisible di-
voree, and the issuance of an ex parte divorce
decree entails a relatively straightforward
procedure. Thus, in our discretion under

351

these circumstances, and as a matter of con-
serving judicial resources and those of the
parties, we return this case to the trial court
to consider this issue. Cf Ritchie v. Krasner,
221 Ariz, 288, 163, 211 P.8d 1272, 1289 (App.
2009) (addressing merits of waived issue par-
tially “in the interests of judicial economy”);
State v. Steffy, 173 Ariz. 90, 98, 889 P.2d
1135, 1188 (App. 1992) (addressing merits of
issue not raised below partially because ap-
pellee had not argued waiver).

Attorney Fees

HH 120 Both parties request attorney
fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-824
and Rule 21(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Section
25-824 requires that we examine both the
financial resources of the parties and the
reasonableness of their positions. See Leath-
ers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 122, 166 P.3d
929, 984 (App. 2007). The record discloses no
recent information as to the parties’ relative
financial resources, but both sides have pre-
sented reasonable arguments on appeal, and
we therefore conclude each should bear its
own appellate attorney fees and costs.

Disposition
121 For the foregoing reasons, the trial
court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over
Sabine is affirmed, but its dismissal of John’s
petition for dissolution is reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

352 a

395 P.3d 1111
STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,
%

The Honorable Kevin B. WEIN, Commis-
sioner of the Superior Court of the State
of Arizona, in and for the County of
Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner,

Marlin Bryan Henderson, Real
Party in Interest.
State of Arizona, Petitioner,
v

The Honorable Kevin B. Wein, Commis-
sioner of the Superior Court of the State
of Avizona, in and for the County of
Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner,

Guy James Goodman, Real
Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 17-0072
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0077 (Consolidated)

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.
FILED 4/25/2017

See also 241 Ariz, 841, 387 P.8d 1270.

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Lisa Marie Martin, Counsel for Peti-
tioner

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office,
Phoenix, By Nicholaus Podsiadlik, Jamie A,
Jackson, Counsel for Real Party in Interest
Goodman

Michael L. Freeman, Scottsdale, Counsel
for Real Party in Interest Henderson

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the
Opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge
Lawrence F', Winthrop joined.

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge:

91 This consolidated special action con-
cerns bail in sexual assault cases following
Simpson v. Miller (Simpson ID), 241 Ariz,
841, 887 P.8d 1270 (2017). The state argues
that trial courts are erroneously holding bail
hearings for individual defendants charged
with sexual assault, It asserts that no hear-
ing is required for a determination of future
dangerousness. The real parties in interest
assert Simpson II requires a finding of indi-
vidualized dangerousness for each defendant
before denying bail. Because this issue is
important and the potential threat to the
community great, we have, in a previously
entered order, accepted jurisdiction and
granted the state relief. Sexual assault re-
mains a non-bailable offense.

JURISDICTION

Hl 12 Special action jurisdiction is avail-
able when there is no other equally plain,
speedy or adequate remedy by appeal. Ariz.
R. Spec. Act, 1(a). Another critical factor is
whether the case presents an issue of state-
wide importance affecting numerous cases.
Lind v, Sup. Ct, 191 Ariz, 283, 236, 110, 954
P.2d 1058, 1061 (App. 1998), The issue pre-
sented here is of statewide importance, is
likely to recur numerous times, and is an
issue of first impression following Simpson
II, There is no remedy by appeal. For these
reasons, we accepted special action jurisdic-
tion,

353

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL
BACKGROUND

13 On February 9, 2017, our supreme
court issued Simpson IJ, On February 18,
2017, the Maricopa County superior court
issued a “Protocol for Setting Simpson v.
Miller Review Hearings.” That protocol stat-
ed of Simpson IT:

In summary, the ruling held unconstitu-
tional the portion of A.R.S, 18-8961(A)
[2010] that allowed a defendant charged
with Sexual Assault, Sexual Conduct with a
Minor under 15, or Molestation of a Child
under 15 to be held without bond if the
Court has only made a “proof evident and
presumption great” finding, The ruling
held that in addition to a finding of proof
evident and presumption great, the State
must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence (at a “full blown adversary hearing”)
that no condition or combination of condi-
tions of release may be imposed that will
reasonably assure that the safety of the
other person or community (per A.R.S.
§ 13-8961(D) [2010] ).

14 Goodman and Henderson were each
charged with one count of sexual assault
under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
§ 13-1406 (2010), a class 2 felony. In both
cases, the superior court held an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the defendant
could properly be held without bail under
ARS. § 18-3961(D). In both cases, the supe-
rior court found proof evident and presump-
tion great that the defendants committed
sexual assault, However, because the court
found that the state did not prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendants
were an ongoing danger to the community or
to the victim, both defendants were held to
be bailable, Defendant Goodman was allowed
a $70,000 secured appearance bond. Defen-
dant Henderson was allowed a $50,000 se-
cured appearance bond.

DISCUSSION

HMM S15 In Segura v Cumanan, this
court provided the historical context of bail in
this state.

354

Not all defendants are entitled to bail.
Since statehood, the Arizona Constitution
has provided that all offenses are bailable,
“except for capital offenses when the proof
is evident or the presumption great.” Ariz.
Const, art, 2, § 22 (as quoted in Wiley v.
State, 18 Ariz. 239, 158 P, 135 (1916)), Over
the years, the list of nonbailable offenses
‘was expanded, and by 2006 included capital
offenses, sexual assault, certain crimes
against children, offenses committed when
the person charged is on bail on a separate
felony charge, and felony offenses if the
person charged poses a substantial danger
to any other person. Ariz. Const. art. 2,
§ 22. In each case, the standard of proof
was that the proof is evident or the pre-
sumption great as to the charge. Id.; see
also A.R.S, § 18-8961 (Supp. 2007) (statu-
tory provision supplementing constitution).

219 Ariz, 228, 284, 124, 196 P.3d 881, 837
(App. 2008) (addressing the availability of
bail to persons charged with serious felony
offenses and in the country illegally). Section
22(A)(1) of our Constitution now reads that
“All persons charged with a crime shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except: For
capital offenses, sexual assault, sexual con-
duet with a minor under fifteen years of age
or molestation of a child under fifteen years
of age when the proof is evident or the
presumption great.” This case presents ques-
tions of law, which we review de novo. US
West Comme'ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,
201 Ariz, 242, 244, 17, 84 P.8d 351, 353
(2001).

16 In Simpson I, the court examined
whether bail was potentially available to De-
fendant Martinez, who was charged with sex-
ual conduct with a minor under the age of
fifteen. The court said:

The crime charged against Martinez, how-

ever, is not in itself a proxy for dangerous-

ness. Section 18-1405(A) states, “A person
commits sexual conduct with a minor by
intentionally or knowingly engaging in
sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact
with any person who is under eighteen
years of age.” Section 18-1405(B) classifies
felonies for sexual conduct with a minor
under age fifteen but does not alter the
definition of the crime. The crime can be

committed by a person of any age, and

may be consensual. Hence, as the court of

appeals noted, Simpson [v. Miller], 240

Ariz, [208] at 215[,] 120, 877 P.8d [1003] at

1010 [ (2016) ], the offense sweeps in situa-

tions where teenagers engage in consensu-

al sex. In such instances, evident proof or
presumption great that the defendant
committed the crime would suggest little
or nothing about the defendant’s danger to
anyone, Cf, ARS. § 18-1406 (defining
sexual assault as “intentionally or know-
ingly engaging in sewual intercourse or
oral sewual contact ... without consent of
such person”).
Simpson II, 241 Ariz, at 349, 127, 887 P.3d
at 1278 (emphasis added). The court conclud-
ed, as an issue of first impression, that due to
the possibility that teenage consensual sex
might be charged under the terms of the
offense, a blanket prohibition on bail for the
crime of sexual conduct with a minor violated
due process rights. Jd. at 181. It went on to
require that before a denial of bail, in sexual
conduct with a minor cases, an individualized
determination must be made that the defen-
dant is dangerous even when proof is evident
or the presumption great that the defendant,
committed the crime. Id.

HI 17 Sexual assault is not a crime like
sexual conduct with a minor which could
potentially include consensual situations and
which, therefore, may involve a defendant
who is not a danger to the community, The
Court expressed this comparison with a “Cf.”
citation. The Bluebook explains the citation
signal “Cf.” as “Cited authority supports a
proposition different from the main proposi-
tion but sufficiently analogous to lend sup-
port. Literally, ‘cf’ means ‘compare.”’” The
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation R,
1.2(a), at 59 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et
al. eds. 20th ed. 2015); see State v, Niwon, 1
CA-CR 16-0391, 242 Ariz, 242, 248, 394 P.3d
667, 2017 WL 1278849, slip op. at *3, 110
(Ariz. App. April 6, 2017) (same).

18 Simpson II used the Cf. citation to
highlight the difference between the two of-
fenses. This citation makes sense because
ARS. § 18-1406(A) reads; “A person com-
mits sexual assault by intentionally or know-
ingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral

sexual contact with any person without con-
sent of such person[ ]” (emphasis added), Un-
like sexual conduct with a minor, lack of
consent is an element of the crime of sexual
assault, A.RS. §§ 13-1405 (2010), -1406
(2010). We are bound by our Supreme
Court’s analysis in Simpson IJ and have no
authority to overrule or disregard it. See
State v. Sullivan, 205 Ariz. 285, 289, 115, 69
P.8d 1006, 1009 (App. 2008).

TE 19 Simpson IZ held that persons
charged with sexual conduct with a minor
under fifteen years of age are entitled to a
hearing as to dangerousness, Sexual assault.
remains a non-bailable offense. Where proof
is evident or the presumption is great that a
defendant committed sexual assault, the non-
consensual nature of the crime fulfills the
requirement for finding inherent dangerous-
ness. No section 13-8961(D) hearing need be
held.

CONCLUSION

110 For the above stated reasons, the
state is granted relief,

395 P.3d 1114
Thomas Jonathan CHANTRY, Petitioner,
v.

The Honorable Bradley H. ASTROWSKY,
Visiting Judge of the Superior Court of
Arizona, in and for the County of Mari-
copa, Respondent Judge,

State of Arizona, ex rel., Sheila Sullivan
Polk, Yavapai County Attorney,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 17-0081

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 4/27/2017

355

356

if

Law Office of John M, Sears PC, Prescott,
By John M, Sears, Counsel for Petitioner

Yavapai County Attorney's Office, Pres-
ecott, By Susan L, Eazer, Counsel for Real
Party in Interest,

Presiding Judge Peter B, Swann delivered
the opinion of the court, in which Judge Kent
E, Cattani and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

Hl 11 This special action requires us to
decide the constitutionality of A.R.S, § 18-
3961(A)(4) and the corresponding portion of
Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22(A), which provide
that a person in custody must be denied bail
if he or she is charged with molestation of a
child under the age of fifteen and the proof is
evident or the presumption great that he or
she is guilty,

{2 The petitioner, Thomas Jonathan
Chantry, is being held without bail under
§ 18-8961(A)(4). He seeks special-action re-
lief from the superior court's refusal to
consider his entitlement to bail under the
standard prescribed by § 18-8961(D), which
imposes a higher burden on the state. We
accepted jurisdiction by earlier order be-
cause the issue is one of first impression
and statewide importance, and Chantry has
no adequate remedy by appeal. Inzunza-
Ortega v, Superior Court (State), 192 Ariz.
558, 560, 17, 968 P.2d 681 (App. 1998);
Costa v. Mackey, 227 Ariz, 565, 569, 16,
261 P.8d 449 (App. 2011).

HH 18 The supreme court recently held,
in Simpson v. Miller (“Stimpson II”), that
§ 18-8961(A)(8) and the corresponding por-
tion of Ariz, Const, art. II, § 22(A), are fa-
cially unconstitutional, 241 Ariz, 341, 349,
181, 887 P.Sd 1270 (2017). Section 18-
8961(A)(8) is identical to § 18-3961(A)(4) in
all respects except that the former statute
pertains to those charged with sexual con-
duct with a person under the age of fifteen,
rather than molestation of a person under
the age of fifteen, Molestation of a person
under the age of fifteen is a lesser-included
offense of sexual conduct with a person un-
der the age of fifteen. State , Ortega, 220
Ariz, 820, 828, 111 24-25, 206 P.3d 769 (App.
2008). Both the greater and the lesser of-
fense “can be committed by a person of any
age, and may be consensual.” Simpson v.
Miller, 241 Aviz, at 349, 127, 887 P.3d 1270.
Because Simpson II holds that bail cannot
be denied under the standard prescribed by
§ 18-8961(A) for the greater offense, the
statute is a fortiori invalid with respect to
the lesser offense, In view of Simpson II, we
must hold that § 18-8961(A)(4) and the cor-
responding portion of Ariz, Const. art. II,
§ 22(A), are facially unconstitutional.

Hl 14 Consistent with Simpson II,
Chantry may be held without bail under
§ 18-8961(D), which provides that a person
charged with a felony may be held without
bail if, after a hearing, the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the proof
is evident or the presumption great that the
person committed the offense, that the per-
son poses a substantial danger to another
person or the community or engaged in con-
duct constituting a violent offense, and that,
no condition or combination of conditions of
release may be imposed that will reasonably
assure the safety of the other person or the
community, 241 Ariz, at 849-51, 11 29, 31, 387
P.8d 1270.

15 Though the state contends that the
court already made the requisite findings,
our review of the record reveals otherwise.
The court, in denying Chantry’s motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his request
for a hearing under Simpson II, did indicate
at one point that the state had proved dan-
gerousness in the initial bail hearing by clear

357

and convincing evidence. But the court then
clarified that dangerousness was “still sub-
ject to litigation” because it “wasn’t on the
table at th{e] time” of the initial hearing and
Chantry therefore might have additional evi-
dence to present. Further, the court stated
that it had no evidence and therefore made
no finding regarding whether release condi-
tions could reasonably assure the safety of
others and the community.

16 For the foregoing reasons, we grant
relief. Chantry cannot be held without bail
absent compliance with the procedures and
the entry of the findings contemplated by
§ 18-8961(D).

395 P.3d 1116
WAL-MART STORES, INC., Petitioner,
v

The Honorable Kerstin LEMAIRE, Judge
of the Superior Court of the State of
Arizona, in and for the County of Mari-
copa, Respondent Judge,

Kathi Buss, Real Party in Interest.
No. 1 CA-SA 17-0003

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/11/2017

R
o

4, The superior court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing on Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss, and
we therefore review the superior court's ruling
de novo, “viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff[] but accepting as true
the uncontradicted facts put forward by the de-
fendant[}.” Planning Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v.

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie, LLP,
Phoenix, By Craig W. Phillips, Lawrence A.
Kasten, Jennifer Lee-Cota, Counsel for Peti-
tioner

The Keating Law Firm, PLC, Scottsdale,
By Kevin R. Keating, Counsel for Real Party
in Interest,

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered
the opinion of the court, in which Judge Kent
E. Cattani and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

OPINION
SWANN, Judge:

11 Kathi Buss sued Wal-Mart Stores,
Ine, a company incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place of business in Arkan-
sas, in Arizona over a slip-and-fall accident
that occurred at a store in Oregon. Wal-Mart
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion, and the superior court, relying on our
opinion in Bohreer v. Erie Insurance Ex-
change, 216 Ariz, 208, 165 P.8d 186 (App.
2007), denied it, finding Wal-Mart was sub-
ject to general jurisdiction in Arizona, Wal-
Mart then filed a petition for special action.t

112 Because the facts of the case have no
connection to Arizona, Wal-Mart can be sued
here only if the Arizona courts have general
jurisdiction over it, Buss maintains that Wal-
Mart’s pervasive presence and substantial
business activities in Arizona are sufficient to
ereate general jurisdiction, and any claim
against Wal-Mart is therefore cognizable in
Arizona. We disagree. In keeping with Good-
year Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 US. 915, 181 S.Ct. 2846, 180
L,Ed.2d 796 (2011), and Daimler AG v. Bau-

Lake Mathews Mineral Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262,
264 n.1, 12, 246 P.3d 343 (2011). Neither the
petition nor the response include the exhibits
from the motions filed in the superior court, We
therefore take judicial notice of the superior
court record, See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424,
425, 14, 10 P.3d 1211 (App. 2000).

man, — US, —, 184 S.Ct. 746, 187
L,Ed.2d 624 (2014), we hold that the magni-
tude of a corporation’s business activities in
Arizona is not sufficient to create general
jurisdiction when that corporation is neither
incorporated nor has its principal place of
business in Arizona. We further hold that
foreign corporations do not impliedly consent.
to general jurisdiction in Arizona merely by
registering as foreign corporations and ap-
pointing agents for service of process under
ALR.S. §§ 10-1501 to -1510, Wal-Mart there-
fore is subject only to specific jurisdiction in
Arizona, and actions against it in the Arizona
courts must relate to its activities in the
state,

JURISDICTION

HM {18 Special action jurisdiction is dis-
cretionary, “reserved for ‘extraordinary cir-
cumstances’ and is not available ‘where there
is an equally plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy by appeal.’” Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of
Psychologist Ewam'rs, 210 Ariz. 177, 182,
721, 108 P.8d 956 (App. 2005) (citations omit-
ted). We accept jurisdiction when, as here,
“the motion [to dismiss} reveals an absence
of jurisdiction, as an appeal inadequately
remedies a trial court’s improperly requiring
a defense in a matter where it has no juris-
diction.” Sigmund v. Rea, 226 Ariz. 378, 375,
15, 248 P.3d 703 (App. 2011) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted),

DISCUSSION

Hs 14 States may exercise two forms
of personal jurisdiction. First, specific juris-
diction exists when the defendant establishes
minimum contacts with the forum state by
purposefully directing its activities to that
state, and the litigation arises out of those
activities. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzew-
tez, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85
L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Second, general jurisdic-
tion allows a forum state to hear any claim
against the defendant, even when the facts
giving rise to it have no connection to the
forum. Goodyear, 564 U.S, at 919, 181 S.Ct.
2846, General jurisdiction exists over a corpo-
ration in several circumstances. For example,
a corporation is subject to general jurisdic-
tion in the state in which it is incorporated,

359

the state in which it has its principal place of
business, id. at 924, 181 S.Ct, 2846, a state in
which it has consented to general jurisdic-
tion, see id, at 928, 181 S.Ct, 2846, a state in
which its “affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State,” id,
at 919, 181 S.Ct. 2846 (citation omitted), and
in other states in “exceptional cases” where
circumstances make general jurisdiction ap-
propriate, see Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 n.19.

15 Because this case arises entirely out of
Wal-Mart's activities in Oregon, Arizona
courts lack specific jurisdiction. The sole is-
sue in this special action is the extent to
which Arizona may exercise general jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations. Buss suggests
two theories to support general jurisdiction
over Wal-Mart in Arizona: (1) by appointing
an agent for service of process, it has con-
sented to general jurisdiction, and (2) the
sheer magnitude of Wal-Mart’s presence in
Arizona relative to other corporations means
that Wal-Mart is “at home” here. We ad-
dress each argument in turn,

I. WAL-MART DID NOT CONSENT TO
GENERAL JURISDICTION IN ARI-
ZONA.

16 The superior court concluded under
Bohreer that Wal-Mart impliedly consented
to general jurisdiction in Arizona by register-
ing and appointing an agent to receive pro-
cess here. Bohreer held that Arizona courts
may exercise general jurisdiction over a for-
eign insurer because the insurance statutes
provide “for an irrevocable appointment of
the director of insurance for service of pro-
cess which remains in effect ‘as long as there
is in force in this state any contract made by
the insurer or obligations arising there-
from’ ” 216 Ariz, at 211, 1110-11, 165 P.8d
186 (quoting A.R.S. § 20-221(A)). The Boh-
reer court interpreted § 20-221 as creating
express (not implied) consent to general per-
sonal jurisdiction.

47 Wal-Mart argues that Bohreer was
impliedly overruled by the United States Su-
preme Court's recent opinions in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations and Daimler AG.
Those cases do not address general jurisdic-

360

tion by express consent, and we need not
decide the continuing vitality of Bohreer, be-
cause Wal-Mart is not registered under
§ 20-221,

18 No Arizona case has decided whether
foreign corporations consent to general juris-
diction by registering pursuant to A.R.S.
§§ 10-1501 to -1510, Those statutes provide
that foreign corporations authorized to con-
duct business in Arizona are “subject to the
same duties, restrictions, penalties and liabil-
ities now or later imposed on a domestic
corporation of like character.” A.R.S. § 10-
1505(B). And foreign corporations must
maintain in Arizona a known place of busi-
ness and a statutory agent for service of
process. A.R.S. § 10-1507,

HM 10 We hold that these provisions
do not create general personal jurisdiction
over foreign corporations, either by prescrip-
tion or consent, First, corporations do not
expressly consent to general jurisdiction by
registering. The equal treatment of foreign
and domestic corporations prescribed by
§ 10-1505(B) refers to substantive liabilities
and duties without any mention of general
jurisdiction. Had the Legislature intended to
endow Arizona courts with the ability to hear
all cases (including those in which Arizona
has no interest) against all registered foreign
corporations, it would have said so, We think
it is unlikely that the Legislature intended to
give Arizona courts the constitutionally dubi-
ous authority to hear any case against any
registered foreign corporation when such
cases need not involve any Arizonans.? Buss
argues that it would be “manifestly unfair to
Arizonans” to hold that we lack general juris-
diction over Wal-Mart such that Arizona res-
idents cannot sue for causes of action that
arise in other states. But, it is settled law
that the specific-jurisdiction analysis focuses
exclusively on “the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”
Walden v. Fiore, — US. —, 184 S.Ct.
1115, 1126, 188 L.Ed,2d 12 (2014) (citation
omitted), and the convenience to the plaintiff

2, Some states do assert general jurisdiction in
this manner. For example, under Pennsylvania
law, it “shall constitute a sufficient basis of juris-
diction to enable the tribunals of this Common-
wealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction”
ifa corporation “carr[ies] on [] a continuous and

has no bearing on whether a defendant’s due
process rights are violated by subjecting it to
general jurisdiction.

HI 1110 Second, we conclude that the
statutes do not create general jurisdiction by
implied consent. A corporation cannot fairly
be deemed to have consented to waive its due
process rights when, as here, the statutes
give no notice that such a waiver is the price
of registration,

{11 We acknowledge that some recent
decisions still hold that consent to service of
process is consent to general personal juris-
diction. See, e.g., Senju Pharm. Co, v. Met-
rics, Inc., 96 F.Supp.3d 428, 439-40 (D.NJ.
2015); Otsuka Pharm. Co, v. Mylan Inc., 106
F.Supp.8d 456, 467 (D.N.J. 2015). The Senju
and Otsuka courts reasoned that because the
Supreme Court has not expressly overruled
its implied-consent jurisprudence, corporate
defendants consent to jurisdiction by con-
senting to service of process in the forum
state. Senju, 96 F.Supp.8d at 486-40; Otsuka,
106 F.Supp.3d at 467. We are not persuaded
by those decisions,

712 The concept of consent implied from
registration statutes originated in response
to Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714, 24 L.Ed.
565 (1877), in which the Supreme Court held
that state courts’ jurisdiction was based on
physical presence in the forum. Implied con-
sent allowed state courts to assert jurisdic-
tion over companies that at the time were
considered “present” only within their re-
spective states of incorporation. See Brown v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 681-32
@d Cir. 2016) (citing Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 88 U.S. 18 Pet, 519, 10 L.Ed, 274
(1889). Thus, registration statutes “secure[d]
local jurisdiction in respect [to] business
transacted within the State.” Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co, v. Selden Breck Constr, Co.,
257 US. 218, 215, 42 S.Ct, 84, 66 L.Ed, 201
(1921), The Supreme Court’s personal “juris-
diction by consent” cases, such as Pennsylva-
nia Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v.

systemic part of its general business within
Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 (a)(2)(iii).
We need not opine on the constitutionality of
such a scheme to observe that it evinces a legisla-
tive purpose different from that apparent from
the text of Arizona’s statutes.

Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S.
98, 37 S.Ct. 344, 61 L.Ed. 610 (1917), and
Louisville & N.R. Co, v. Chatters, 279 U.S.
820, 328, 49 S.Ct. 829, 73 L.Ed. 711 (1929),
were decided before International Shoe Co.
v, State of Washington, Office of Unemploy-
ment Compensation & Placement, 826 U.S.
810, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed, 95 (1945), which
held that states could exercise jurisdiction
over a corporation that had “minimum con-
tacts” with the forum. This in turn led to the
doctrine of specific jurisdiction, which al-
lowed states to assert jurisdiction over cases
arising from business activities conducted by
foreign corporations in or affecting them
while preventing unfair assertion of jurisdic-
tion against those who had not voluntarily
established contact with the forum. Seg eg.,
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S, 462, 105 S.Ct.
2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, Today, specific juris-
diction accomplishes the same goal as juris-
diction by implied consent, but rather than
focusing on a corporation’s “presence” in a
forum state, specific jurisdiction is based on
the relationship between the forum, the de-
fendant, and the facts giving rise to the cause
of action, See Walden, 184 S.Ct. at 1126,

118 Because the modern doctrine of spe-
cific jurisdiction amply ensures that a state
has jurisdiction when a corporation’s conduct
allegedly causes harm in that state, there is
no need to base personal jurisdiction solely
upon a murky implication of consent to suit—
for all purposes and in all cases—from the
bare appointment of an agent for service. We
therefore agree with those decisions holding
that registration statutes do not imply con-
sent to general jurisdiction. E.g., Brown, 814
F.8d at 680-41; Display Works, LLC v. Bart-
ley, 182 F.Supp.8d 166, 175-79 (D.N.J. 2016);
State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry, Co. v. Dolan, 512
S.W.8d 41, 51-52 (Mo, 2017). To be sure,
registration and appointment may form the
basis for a finding that a corporation has
established minimum contacts with the forum
state. But minimum contacts are not enough
to create jurisdiction over cases having no
substantive connection to the forum. As the
Supreme Court observed in Daimler, cases
“decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer’s
territorial thinking ... should not attract
heavy reliance today.” 184 S.Ct. at 761 n.18,

361

I. WAL-MART IS NOT “AT HOME” IN
ARIZONA.

HM 1114 A state has general jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation when the corpo-
vation’s “affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 181 S.Ct. 2846.
But general jurisdiction requires more than
continuous and systematic activity, Id. at
927-28, 181 S.Ct. 2846; see also Daimler,
184 S.Ct. at 761 n.19 (general jurisdiction
outside the state of incorporation or forum
state may be permissible in an “exceptional
case”). Wal-Mart argues that after Daimler
and Goodyear, foreign corporations are sub-
ject to general jurisdiction only in their re-
spective principal places of business and
states of incorporation. We need not endorse
‘Wal-Mart's broad reading of those cases to
conelude that they do not support the exer-
cise of general jurisdiction in Arizona on
this record.

115 In Goodyear, the Supreme Court held
that North Carolinians could not sue Good-
year’s foreign subsidiaries in a United States
court for a tire design defect that allegedly
caused an accident in France. 564 U.S. at
920-21, 929, 181 S.Ct. 2846. The Court rea-
soned that placement of tires into the stream
of commerce, some of which may end up in
the forum, is not enough to confer general
jurisdiction in that forum. Id. at 926-29, 181
S.Ct. 2846,

{16 In Daimler, Argentinian residents
sued Daimler, a German company, in federal
court in California over its Argentinian sub-
sidiary’s alleged collaboration with Argentini-
an security forces in the perpetration of hu-
man rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s in
Argentina. 184 §.Ct, at 750-51, The plaintiffs
claimed that Daimler was subject to general
jurisdiction in California based on the con-
tacts of its subsidiary, Mercedes, Jd. at 751.
The Court reasoned that “[iJt was .,. error

.. to conclude that Daimler, even with
[Mercedes] contacts attributed to it, was at
home in California, and hence subject to suit
there on claims by foreign plaintiffs having
nothing to do with anything that occurred or

362

had its principal impact in California.” Zd. at
‘762.

{17 Daimler did not categorically reject
the possibility that a state may exercise gen-
eral jurisdiction over a corporation for other
reasons:

We do not foreclose the possibility that in
an exceptional case [such as Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
72 S.Ct, 418, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) ] a corpo-
ration’s operations in a forum other than
its formal place of incorporation or princi-
pal place of business may be so substantial
and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.

[But] the general jurisdiction inquiry does
not focus solely on the magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts.... General
jurisdiction calls for an appraisal of a
corporation’s activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide. A corporation
that operates in many places can scarcely
be deemed at home in all of them. Other-
wise, “at home” would be synonymous with
“doing business” tests framed before spe-
cific jurisdiction evolved in the United
States.

Id. at 761 n.19, 762 n.20 (internal quotation,

modification, and citation omitted) (emphasis

added).

118 Federal circuit courts have interpret-
ed Daimler to mean that states other than a
corporation’s state of incorporation and prin-
cipal place of business may exercise general
jurisdiction over that corporation only in ex-
ceptional cases. Brown, 814 F.8d at 627 ({I]n
our view Daimler established that, except in
a truly ‘exceptional’ case, a corporate defen-
dant may be treated as ‘essentially at home’
only where it is incorporated or maintains its
principal place of business—the ‘paradigm’
cases.”); Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt.
Ine., 789 F.8d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015)
(noting that general jurisdiction is appropri-
ate “only in ‘exceptional’ cases”); Kipp v. Ski
Enter. Corp. of Wis., 788 F.8d 695, 698 (7th
Cir, 2015) (holding any state other than the
states of incorporation and principal place of
business can assert general jurisdiction only
by adhering to the “stringent criteria” of
Daimler and Goodyear), Monkton Ins,

Servs. Ltd, v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 482 (th
Cir. 2014) (noting that it is “incredibly diffi-
cult to establish general jurisdiction in a
forum other than the place of incorporation
or principal place of business”); Martinez v,
Aero Caribbean, 764 F.8d 1062, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“Only in an ‘exceptional case’ will
general jurisdiction be available anywhere
else.”); In re Roman Catholic Diocese of
Albany, New York, Inc., 745 F.3d 30, 39 2d
Cir, 2014) (“Daimler AG, however, reaffirm-
ed that, under Goodyear, general jurisdiction
might, ‘in an exceptional case, extend beyond
a corporation’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business... .”).

119 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
only one exceptional case that would give rise
to general jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration, Daimler, 184 S.Ct. 746 at 761 n.19,
762 0.20 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. 487, 72
S.Ct. 418), In Perkins, the Supreme Court
held that general jurisdiction was proper in
Ohio when the defendant company’s mining
operation in the Philippines was shut down
by the Japanese occupation, and the general
manager, who was also the principal stock-
holder, relocated to and ran the company’s
“necessarily limited wartime activities” in
Ohio. 342 U.S, at 447-48, 72 S.Ct. 413.

HI 120 Buss argues that Wal-Mart is
subject to general jurisdiction based on its
exceptionally substantial business activities
in Arizona, As of January 2017, in Arizona
‘Wal-Mart operates 127 retail locations and 4
distribution centers, employs 33,910 people,
spent $1.5 billion with suppliers, collected
$270.8 million in state sales taxes, and paid
$91.5 million in state taxes. Wal-Mart was
the largest employer in Arizona in 2014 and
the second-largest in 2015. In 2015, it em-
ployed more Arizonans than the next two
largest employers combined. But while Wal-
Mart has a large economic presence in the
state, there is nothing “exceptional” about its
activities to give rise to general jurisdiction,

121 Were we to hold that Arizona, a state
that is home to just under 84,000 of Wal-
Mar't’s estimated 2.3 million global employees
(1.5 million of whom are employed in the
United States) has general jurisdiction over
‘Wal-Mart, we would effectively confer gener-

al jurisdiction over every foreign corporation
with a large commercial presence in Arizona.
Such a rule would be neither fair, rational
nor consistent with the reasoning of Daimler
and Goodyear. Neither the facts of this case
nor the nature of Wal-Mart’s activities in
Arizona give rise to the “exceptional case”
envisioned by the Supreme Court—exigent
circumstances that render traditional juris-
dictional limits unworkable.

122 Moreover, a size-based approach
would be both standardless and malleable.
There is no constitutional doctrine establish-
ing a threshold level of commereial activity
sufficient to create general jurisdiction, And
if mere size were sufficient, the fluctuating
levels of each foreign corporation’s economic
activity would have to be relitigated in every
case before jurisdiction could be determined.
We view such an approach as constitutionally
untenable,

123 Buss argues that Wal-Mart’s pres-
ence here is more like Perkins by arguing it
is a party to many suits in Arizona and is
thus not prejudiced by having to defend this
action in Arizona, and she notes that the
former chairman of Wal-Mart's board of di-
rectors resides in Arizona, We disagree.
First, Wal-Mart's contacts with the state are
easily sufficient to subject it to specific juris-
diction in cases involving its activities in, or
directed to, Arizona. The fact that such cases
arise does not create jurisdiction over cases
that have no connection to this state—as the
Supreme Court noted, “[a] corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them.” Daimler, 184
S.Ct. at 762 n.20.

724 Buss finally attempts to distinguish
the defendants in Daimler and Goodyear
from Wal-Mart by arguing that the Supreme
Court distinguished between foreign corpora-
tions (Le., corporations incorporated in other

363

states) and alien corporations (i.e., corpora-
tions incorporated in other countries). She
relies on the undecided assumptions in Da-
imler and Goodyear that the domestic enti-
ties were subject to general jurisdiction in
the forums. Daimler, 184 S.Ct. at 758; Good-
year, 564 U.S. at 918, 181 S.Ct, 2846, But due
process applies to all defendants, and person-
al jurisdiction jurisprudence makes no such
distinction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104
S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (applying
the Due Process Clause’s minimum-contacts
analysis to a Colombian corporation sued in
Texas); of Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77,
96 S.Ct, 1888, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (noting
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
protect aliens from “deprivation of life, liber-
ty, or property without due process of law”),

25 In sum, subjecting Wal-Mart to gen-
eral jurisdiction in Arizona based on the level
of its commercial activity would wrongly con-
flate general jurisdiction with specific juris-
diction and provide an unworkable standard
that would require extensive factual findings
in every case. Even without general jurisdic-
tion in Arizona, Buss has a forum readily
available to seek redress for her injuries—
Oregon.

CONCLUSION

126 For the foregoing reasons, we accept
jurisdiction and grant relief. We direct the
superior court to dismiss the action without
prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

364

396 P.3d 600
AMERICAN POWER PRODUCTS, INC,, a
California corporation; LFMG/APP,
LLC, an Arizona corporation, Plain-
tiffs/Counter~Defendants/Appel-
lants/Cross—Appellees,
v.
CSK AUTO, INC., an Arizona corpo-
ration, Defendant/Counter—Claim-
ant/Appellee/Cross~Appellant.
No. CV-16-0133-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed May 11, 2017

David B. Goldstein (argued), John L. Lohr,
dr., Evan B, Schechter, Hymson Goldstein &
Pantiliat, PLLC, Scottsdale, and Herbert Do-
dell, Dodell Law Corporation, Woodland
Hills, CA, Attorneys for American Power
Products, Ine, and LFMG/APP, LLC

Leon B, Silver (argued), Andrew 8. Jacob,
Gordon & Rees LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for
CSK Auto Ine.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER
authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE BALES and JUSTICES
BRUTINEL and BOLICK joined. JUSTICE
TIMMER dissented.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER,
opinion of the Court:

1 Under Arizona law, a court may award
reasonable attorney fees to the successful
party in a contested contract action. A.R.S,
§ 12-841.01(A). If a party makes a written
settlement offer that is rejected and the final
judgment is more favorable to the offering
party, that party “is deemed to be the suc-
cessful party from the date of the offer.” Id,

12 In this case, we address the interplay
between this statutory provision and a con-
tractual fee award provision when one party
rejected the other’s written settlement offer
and later obtained what appears to be a less
favorable judgment. Because the contract
does not itself define “prevailing party,” but
does incorporate Arizona law to determine
the parties’ rights and remedies, we hold that

366

the statute applies for the purpose of deter-
mining the successful party. That is, if the
final judgment is more favorable to the party
that made the rejected offer, that party is
the successful party from the date of the
offer,

L

{8 In 2008, American Power Products
(“American”) and CSK Auto (“CSK”) entered
into a Master Vendor Agreement (“MVA”)
under which American agreed to sell electric
scooters and other items to CSK on an open
account, The MVA provided that in the event
of any action arising out of the agreement,
“the prevailing party shall be entitled to re-
cover ... reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The
agreement did not define “prevailing party.”
But the MVA included a broad choice-of-law
provision that Arizona law would govern the
parties’ “rights and remedies” under the
agreement.

14 In 2005, American sued CSK for
breach of contract and negligent misrepre-
sentation, seeking more than $5 million in
damages. CSK asserted various affirmative
defenses and counterclaims and sought dam-
ages of approximately $950,000. In 2011, sev-
eral months before trial, CSK served Ameri-
can with an offer of judgment under Rule 68,
Ariz. R. Civ. P., in the amount of $1,000,001,
“inclusive of all damages, taxable court costs,
interest and attorneys’ fees.” American did
not accept the offer and, after trial, obtained
a jury verdict in the amount of $10,738, The
trial court later dismissed CSK’s counter-
claims with prejudice.

{5 On the parties’ post-trial claims for
attorney fees, the trial court ruled that
American was the “prevailing party” at trial
despite American having asked the jury to
award it over $10.8 million. Applying a totali-
ty-of-the-litigation test, the court reasoned
that American “must be the prevailing party”
because “after litigating all of the claims”
and counterclaims, American “obtained relief
in the form of monetary damages; [CSK] was
awarded nothing.” The trial court then
awarded American $775,000 in attorney fees
1, The court of appeals’ decision was rendered

after we remanded the case to that court “for
consideration of ... the parties’ claims for attor-

(American had requested almost $2 million),
plus costs and interest on the verdict, for a
total judgment of approximately $861,000.
The court denied CSK’s request for sanctions
under Rule 68(g), Ariz. R. Civ. P., finding
such sanctions inapplicable.

16 The court of appeals affirmed the fee
award in favor of American. Am, Power
Products, Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc, 1 CA-CV
12-0855, at *8 114, 2016 WL 2930686 (Ariz.
App. May 19, 2016) (mem. decision). The
court reasoned that the trial court did not
abuse its substantial discretion in identifying
the “prevailing party” and “had a reasonable
basis for finding that American was the pre-
vailing party under the totality of the litiga-
tion test.” Id. at *4 16, *6 19. Contending
that American obtained a judgment less fa-
vorable than CSK’s pretrial settlement offer,
CSK argued that A.R.S, § 12-341.01(A) and
Rule 68 precluded any award of fees Ameri-
can incurred after the date of the offer. In
rejecting that argument, the court of appeals
stated that “[w]hen attorneys’ fees are based
on a contract—as here—the contract controls
to the exclusion of A.R.S. § 12-841.01(A).”
Id, at *6 (11. The court, however, “re-
verse[d] the superior court’s denial of CSK’s
Bule 68 sanction request and remand[ed] to
the superior court for it to make the compar-
ison required by Rule 68.” Id. at *13 130.

17 We granted review on the attorney fee
question because the interplay between
§ 12-841.01 and contractual fee provisions
presents legal issues of statewide importance
that are likely to recur. We have jurisdiction
under article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

i

18 The parties’ MVA contained two provi-
sions that are pertinent here:
(@) Applicable Law. The MVA is made with
reference to and under the laws of the
State of Arizona which shall be deemed to
govern the validity and interpretation of
the MVA and the rights and remedies of
the parties hereunder. Any legal action
neys’ fees, court costs, and other expenses,”

American Power Products, Ine, v. CSK Auto, Inc,,
239 Ariz, 151, 157 121, 367 P.3d 55, 61 (2016).

instituted by the parties arising out of this
MVA shall be within, and the parties here-
to stipulate to the jurisdiction of, the
Courts of Maricopa County, Arizona.

() Attorneys’ Fees. In the event either
party shall commence or be required to
defend any action or proceeding against
the other party arising out of this MVA,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to
recover from the other party its reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs through all levels
of proceedings as determined by the court.

As noted above, the MVA did not define

“prevailing party.”

19 In pertinent part, ARS. § 12-341.01
provides:

A. In any contested action arising out of

a contract, express or implied, the court

may award the successful party reasonable

attorney fees. If a written settlement offer
is rejected and the judgment finally ob-
tained is equal to or more favorable to the
offeror than an offer made in writing to
settle any contested action arising out of a
contract, the offeror is deemed to be the
successful party from the date of the offer
and the court may award the successful
party reasonable attorney fees. This sec-
tion shall not be construed as altering,
prohibiting or restricting present or future
contracts or statutes that may provide for
attorney fees,
As originally enacted in 1976, § 12-341.01
contained provisions now mirrored in the
first and third sentences of subsection (A).
The second sentence of that subsection was
added in 1999,

110 CSK acknowledges that the trial court
and court of appeals correctly “equated ‘pre-
vailing party’ in the MVA with ‘successful
party’ in § 12-841.01(A).” Am. Power Prod-
ucts, Inc., 1 CA-CV 12-0855, at *8 115-6;
see Murphy Farrell Dev, LLLP v. Sowrant,
229 Ariz, 124, 182 130 & n8, 184 136, 272
P.3d 355, 364 & n.8, 365 (App. 2012) (relying
on cases decided under § 12-841.01 in deter-
mining which party was “the ‘prevailing par-
ty’ under the terms of the [parties’] Agree-
ments” when those contracts mandated an.
award of fees to the “prevailing party” but
did not define that term). Noting that “the

367

parties expressly incorporated Arizona law
into their contract” and “clearly intended to
apply Arizona law to the entire [MVAJ,” how-
ever, CSK argues that both courts below
erred in failing to apply “the definition in the
second sentence of § 12-841.01(A).” Under
that provision, CSK asserts, it is “the suc-
cessful party after the date of its rejected
settlement offer.”

11 American counters, as the court of
appeals determined, that the trial court had a
reasonable basis for deeming American the
prevailing party under the MVA and did not
abuse its discretion in awarding fees to
American, particularly considering that CSK
received nothing on its counterclaim for al-
most $1 million. Relying on the third sen-
tence of § 12-841,01(A) and Arizona case
law, American argues that the statute does
not apply when, as here, a contract mandates
an award of fees to the prevailing party.
American further asserts that CSK’s argu-
ment, by seeking a sanction not recognized
by Rule 68, effectively would amend the rule
so as to conflict with § 12-341.01.

HN 112 We review de novo issues of
statutory application and contract interpreta-
tion. See Bell v. Indus. Comm'n, 286 Ariz.
478, 480 16, 341 P.8d 1149, 1151 (2015) (stat-
utes); Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz, 236, 240
112, 69 P.3d 7, 11 (2008) (contracts). A trial
court’s determination of which party is suc-
cessful and thus entitled to a fee award gen-
erally will be upheld absent an abuse of
discretion, Murphy Farrell Dev., 229 Ariz, at
183 131, 272 P.3d at 364; Sanborn v. Brooker
& Wake Prop. Mgmt. Inc. 178 Ariz. 425,
430, 874 P.2d 982, 987 (App, 1994). An error
of law in reaching a discretionary ruling con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion. Twin City
Fire Ins, Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, 63
P.8d 282, 285 (2008).

mm.

118 As noted above, § 12~-41.01 does not
“alter[ ], prohibit{] or restrict[]” contracts
that “provide for attorney fees,” nor may the
statute “be construed” to do so. § 12~
841.01(A). Based on that statutory language,
our court of appeals has repeatedly stated
that “the statute is inapplicable ... [when]

368

the parties have provided in their contract
the conditions under which attorney’s fees
may be recovered,” Sweis v. Chatwin, 120
Ariz, 249, 252, 585 P.2d 269, 272 (App. 1978);
see also Geller v, Lesk, 280 Ariz, 624, 627
19, 285 P.8d 972, 975 (App. 2012) (stating
that parties’ contractual attorney fee provi-
sion, “not the statute,” governs an award of
fees); Lisa v. Strom, 188 Ariz, 415, 418 n,2,
904 P.2d 1289, 1242 n.2 (App. 1995) (stating
that “when a contract has an attorney’s fee
provision it controls to the exclusion of the
statute”); Connor v. Cal-Az Properties, Inc.,
187 Ariz, 58, 55, 668 P.2d 896, 898 (App.
1988) (stating that “§ 12-341.01 is not to be
considered” when parties’ contract provides
conditions under which attorney fees may be
recovered), In Sweis, the parties’ contract
entitled the successful or prevailing party to
a non-diseretionary attorney fee award for
enforcing the contract. 120 Ariz. at 251 n.2,
585 P.2d at 271 n,2. To apply § 12-841,01 in
those circumstances, the court reasoned,
would alter the agreement by “in effect can-
cel{ing] the unqualified contractual right to
recover attorney's fees given to the success-
ful party by their agreement, and substitute
in its place the purely discretionary or per-
missive right given by the statute.” Id. at
252, 585 P.2d at 272.

Hs 114 Relying on its prior case law

, and the third sentence of § 12-341.01(A), the
court of appeals here rejected CSK’s argu-
ment that, based on that subsection’s second
sentence, CSK was the prevailing party from
the date of its offer, holding instead that “the
contract controls to the exclusion of A.R.S.
§ 12-B41,01(A).” Am. Power Products, Inc.,
1 CA-CV 12-0855, at *6 111. To the extent,
prior case law broadly precludes application
of § 12-841.01 whenever the parties’ contract.
contains an attorney fee provision, regardless
of its content, scope, and other provisions in
the contract, we disagree, Rather, § 12-
841,01 “is inapplicable by its terms if it effec-
tively conflicts with an express contractual
provision governing recovery of attorney’s
fees.” Jordan v. Burgbacher, 180 Ariz, 221,
229, 888 P.2d 458, 466 (App. 1994) (disagree-
ing with Connor’s broad statement and ob-
serving that Sweis “did not hold that any
express contractual provision for attorney’s
fees, however worded, ‘preempts’ A.R.S. sec-

tion 12-841.01”); of Tucson Estates Prop.
Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. McGovern, 289 Ariz.
52, 54-56 I] 7-14, 866 P.8d 111, 118-15 (App.
2016); (stating that when parties’ contract
has a unilateral provision mandating attorney
fee recovery for only one party, § 12-841.01
applies to the other, successful party's claim
for attorney fees and affords trial court dis-
eretion to award or deny fees under the
statute); Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian
Constr, Co,, 152 Ariz. 455, 470-72, 783 P.2d
652, 667-69 (App. 1986) (same). Thus, rather
than being completely supplanted by any at-
torney fee provision in the parties’ contract,
the statute—consistent with its plain lan-
guage—applies to “any contested action aris-
ing out of contract” to the extent it does not
conflict with the contract. § 12-841.01(A).

HMM 115 Our conclusion comports with
the general rule in Arizona that contracts are
read to incorporate, applicable statutes, See
Banner Health v. Med, Sav, Ins. Co, 216
Ariz, 146, 150 115, 168 P.8d 1096, 1100 (App.
2007) (“It has long been the rule in Arizona
that a valid statute is automatically part of
any contract affected by it, even if the statute
is not specifically mentioned in the con-
tract.”) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also Yeagell v. Copins, 98
Ariz, 109, 118-14, 402 P.2d 541, 544 (19665),
Because the MVA here did not define “pre-
vailing party” and expressly provided that
Arizona law shall apply and govern “the
rights and remedies of the parties,” and be-
cause the second sentence of § 12-341.01(A)
does not directly conflict with the MVA’s
attorney fee provision, that statutory provi-
sion is “incorporated by operation of law”
into the MVA for the limited purpose of
defining “successful party” under the cireum-
stances presented here. Banner Health, 216
Aviz, at 150 115, 168 P.3d at 1100.

116 Contrary to the dissent, infra 129,
our opinion does not “alter the meaning of
‘the prevailing party’ in the MVA,” inasmuch
as the MVA does not define that phrase or
provide any other interpretative guidance.
‘The dissent also downplays the MVA’s broad,
unqualified choice-of-law provision, under
which the parties agreed that Arizona law
would govern their rights and remedies un-

der the MVA. As for there being two prevail-
ing parties—American before CSK’s offer,
and CSK after its offer—that paradigm is
implicitly contemplated and permitted by
§ 12-841.01(A)’s second sentence, which sup-
plements, but does not alter, the MVA. Cf
Hall v, Read Dev, Inc. 229 Ariz, 277, 283
919, 274 P.8d 1211, 1217 (App. 2012) (recog-
nizing that statute’s second sentence could
“potentially shift the ‘successful party’ desig-
nation for at least part of the litigation”),
And such a result is permissible even though
§ 12-841,01(A), like the MVA, limits attorney
fee awards to “the” successful party,

HM 117 American unpersuasively argues
that the MVA’s choice-of-law provision does
not apply to the attorney fee provision be-
cause they are separate and the former is
“general and all-embracing, and not specific
to the fees provision,” The choice-of-law pro-
vision is not limited, and the attorney fee
provision does not exclude the former from
applying to it. See Bradley v. Bradley, 164
P.8d 587, 542 (Wyo. 2007) (holding that
broad, general language of choice-of-law pro-
vision in parties’ agreement applied to other
provisions when the agreement contained no
specific provision indicating a different intent
and “{olther provisions of the agreement
[did] not specifically speak to choice of appli-
cable law”),

118 The courts below thus erred in failing
to apply the definition of “successful party”
under § 12-841.01(A)’s second sentence,
which by its terms will apply here if the final
judgment American obtains is less favorable
to American than CSK’s pretrial settlement
offer under Rule 68, As the court of appeals
has observed, that statutory provision, “add-
ed in 1999, seemingly narrows the trial
court’s discretion in handling fee determina-
tion issues in contract cases, obligating the
court to compare a written settlement offer
against the ‘judgment finally obtained.’”
Hall, 229 Ariz, at 279 19, 274 P.8d at 1218,
That comparison, in turn, “potentially alter[s]
the successful party designation from the
date of the offer.” Jd, at 280 110, 274 P.8d at
1214,

Hs 1 19 “Ain offeror is the successful
party, even if an offeree obtains a favorable
judgment, if the offeror previously made a

369

written offer for an amount equal to or great-
er than the final judgment.” Jd, at 279 19,
274 P.3d at 1213, That is seemingly the situa-
tion here. CSK asserts that its pretrial offer
under Rule 68 in the amount of $1,000,001,
“inclusive of all damages, taxable court costs,
interest and attorneys’ fees,” was greater
than the total judgment of approximately
$861,000 (which included fees, taxable costs,
and interest on the $10,788 verdict) that
American obtained. If so, CSK “is deemed to
be the successful party from the date of the
offer.” § 12-841.01(A), And from that point
forward CSK would be “entitled to recover
from [American] its reasonable attorneys’
fees” because the MVA expressly so pro-
vides, That is, the statute’s discretionary fea-
ture, providing that “the court may award
the successful party reasonable attorney
fees,” id., is inapplicable here because, if
applied, it would directly conflict with the
MVA’s mandatory fee provision and thereby
impermissibly “alter{]” or “restrict[ ]” the
parties’ agreement. Id.; see Murphy Farrell
Dev,, 229 Ariz, at 183 182, 272 P.8d at 364
(“Unlike discretionary fee awards made pur-
suant to A.R.S, § 12-841,01(A), the trial
court lacks discretion to deny a fee award
required by the terms of the parties’ con-
tract.”); McDowell Mountain Ranch Cmty.
Ass'n v. Simons, 216 Ariz, 266, 269 114, 165
P.8d 667, 670 (App. 2007) (same, citing
cases),

HI 1.20 Applying the second sentence of
§ 12-841.01(A) also furthers the policy of the
statute and Rule 68. As the court in Hall
pointed out, “[t]he purposes of § 12-
841.01(A) include: (1) mitigating ‘the burden
of the expense of litigation to establish a just
claim or a just defense’; (2) encouraging
‘more careful analysis prior to filing suit? by
imposing the risk of paying the opposing
party's attorneys’ fees where legitimate set-
tlement offers are rejected; and (8) promot-
ing settlement and thus reducing caseloads
involving contractual matters.” Hall, 229
Ariz, at 282 118, 274 P.8d at 1216, By reject-
ing CSK’s settlement offer and choosing to
instead pursue costly, protracted litigation,
American cannot avoid the potential legal
consequences, including attorney fee expo-
sure as determined by the parties’ agreement

370

and compatible Arizona law that is specifical-
ly made applicable under the agreement’s
choice-of-law provision.

721 American unpersuasively asserts that
imposing attorney fees against it by “incorpo-
rat[ing] only part of” § 12-841.01(A) fails to
give “the type of fair warning the law should
provide.” On the contrary, the parties had
adequate notice of their potential liability for
attorney fees, given the MVA’s broad incor-
poration of Arizona law, the clear definition
of “successful party” in § 12-841.01(A)’s sec-
ond sentence, and the lack of any inconsis-
tency between that provision and the MVA’s
attorney fee provision.

922 Nor is American correct in arguing
that CSK’s position will “alter every contract
mandating an award of attorneys’ fees by
foreing upon parties to contracts the stan-
dard established in the second sentence of
ARS. § 12-841,01.A.” Rather, we agree with
American’s assertion that parties should
“have freedom to contract whether they want
that standard to apply or not.” As long as a
contract is legal and enforceable, parties of
course may fashion all aspects of an attorney
fee provision, including a definition of “pre-
vailing party” different from the statute, in
whatever way they see fit. (Unlike the MVA,
for example, a contract could not only specifi-
cally define “prevailing party” but also either
include or exclude certain aspects of Arizona
Jaw from applying.)

23 Finally, we reject American’s argu-
ment that the result here “conflicts with and
supersedes Rule 68.” As American conceded
at oral argument in this Court, the sanctions
prescribed in Rule 68(g) are separate and
distinct from attorney fees. Cf Ariz, R. Civ.
P. 68, State Bar Committee Note (1992
Amendments) (“The term ‘costs’ in Rule 68
does not include attorneys’ fees, even if they
ave recoverable in the action.”) (citing Boltz
& Odegaard v. Hohn, 148 Ariz, 361, 714 P.2d
854 (App. 1985)). Contrary to American’s
contention, if the final judgment is more
favorable to CSK than its Rule 68 offer, an
award of fees to CSK under the MVA, based
on the statutory definition of “successful par-
ty’ in § 12-841.01(A)’s second sentence,
would not result in “de facto amendment of
the rule ... by imposing an additional sane-

tion” not authorized by the rule. Nor would
such an award run afoul of Rule 68(d)’s pro-
vision that “[elvidence of an unaccepted offer
ig not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine sanctions under this rule.” Har-
monizing the rule with the statute, we con-
clude that any such evidence is inadmissible
at trial or other merits-related proceedings,
but is not barred for purposes of identifying
the “successful party’ under § 12-341,01(A)
in separate post-trial proceedings regarding
attorney fees. See Hall, 229 Ariz, at 288
1119-20, 274 P8d at 1217 (harmonizing
§ 12-841.01(A) with Rule 68 to “conclude
that comparing the ‘judgment finally ob-
tained’ under § 12-841,01(A) to a settlement
offer should involve only those reasonable
fees and costs incurred as of the date the
offer was made”); see also State v. Hansen,
215 Ariz, 287, 289 17, 160 P.8d 166, 168
(2007) (stating that, whenever possible, we
harmonize rules and statutes and read them
in conjunction with each other).

Tv.

124 For the reasons stated above, we re-
verse the trial court’s award of attorney fees
to American and its ruling that American
was the prevailing party in the proceedings
below even after CSK’s settlement offer un-
der Rule 68, This opinion does not alter the
trial court’s determination that American was
the prevailing party up to that point, But if
the judgment finally obtained is more favor-
able to CSK than its pretrial offer, American
is not entitled to recover any fees incurred
after the offer. (CSK conceded at oral argu-
ment that American is entitled to recover its
reasonable attorney fees incurred before the
offer.)

125 We vacate paragraphs 6-14 of the
court of appeals’ decision and remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings
to apportion fees and costs between CSK and
American, consistent with this opinion and
the remaining portions of the court of ap-
peals’ decision, On remand, the trial court
must first calculate the amount of the final
judgment to determine if it is less favorable
to American than CSK’s pretrial offer that
American rejected. For purposes of that
comparison under § 12-841,01(A), American

must establish, and the trial court should
determine, what amount or percentage of the
court’s $775,000 fee award to American was
attributable to fees incurred after the June
27, 2011 offer, and the court should reduce
American’s fee award by that amount, See
Hall, 229 Ariz, at 288 120, 274 P.8d at 1217.
To that balance the court should add the
verdict amount of $10,788; American’s tax-
able costs under A.R.S. § 12-841 (totaling
$46,625.94) and reasonable non-taxable costs
(recoverable under the MVA, as both parties
concede and the court of appeals ruled) in-
curred up to the date of CSK’s offer, see id;
plus applicable prejudgment interest. If the
new sum is less than CSK’s offer of
$1,000,001, the trial court must deem CSK
the prevailing party from the date of its offer
forward, entitling it to an award of reason-
able attorney fees for that time frame as well
as applicable sanctions under Rule 68(g).

126 Finally, if CSK is determined to be
the prevailing party from the date of its
rejected offer, CSK must establish, and the
trial court should determine, what amount or
percentage of CSK’s fees (incurred after its
settlement offer) was clearly attributable to
defending against American’s claims as op-
posed to the unsuccessful prosecution of
CSK’s counterclaim, on which CSK was not
the prevailing party. Based on that determi-
nation, the trial court may then decide if, or
by how much, CSK’s fee award should be
reduced. In the end, as CSK acknowledged
at oral argument, the trial court in its discre-
tion may consider all pertinent factors in
determining the amount of reasonable fees
CSK should be awarded, Cf Associated In-
dem. Corp. v. Warner, 148 Ariz. 567, 570-71,
694 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1985) (isting non-
exclusive factors bearing on attorney fee
awards under § 12-841.01); ARS, § 12-
841.01(B) (providing that an award of reason-
able fees under the statute “should be made
to mitigate the burden of the expense of
litigation to establish a just claim or a just
defense”). American’s request for attorney
fees incurred in this Court is denied as it is
not the prevailing party in the proceeding
before us.

371

TIMMER, J., dissenting.

127 By its terms, § 12-841.01(A) cannot
“alter[], prohibitl] or restrict{] ... con-
tracts ... that may provide for attorney
fees.” By applying § 12-841.01(A) here, the
majority has done just that. I respectfully
dissent.

128 I begin with the plain language of the
MVA. Cf Smith v. Melson, Inc, 185 Ariz,
119, 121, 659 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1988) (“A
contract should be read in light of the par-
ties’ intentions as reflected by their language
and in view of all the cireumstances.”), Amer-
ican and CSK agreed that “the prevailing
party” in any lawsuit “shall be entitled to
recover” its reasonable attorney fees. The
parties did not define “the prevailing party,”
so the majority, noting the parties’ agree-
ment that Arizona law governs interpretation
of the contract, skips to § 12-341.01(A) to
supply a definition, See supra 115. In doing
so, the majority ignores Arizona’s “control-
ling rule of interpretation” that “requires
that the ordinary meaning of language be
given to words where circumstances do not
show a different meaning applicable.” Brady
v, Black Mountain Inv. Co., 105 Ariz. 87, 89,
459 P.2d 712, 714 (1969) (citing Restatement
(First), Contracts § 285(A) (Am. Law Ins.
1982)). There is nothing ambiguous about the
fee provision here. “The” indicates a particu-
lar party, and “prevailing” identifies that par-
ty as the one that wins the lawsuit. See
Smith, 185 Ariz. at 121, 659 P.2d at 1266
(noting that “the” is “a definite article used
in reference to a particular thing”); Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary
1797 (8d ed. 2002) (defining “prevail” in part
as to “win,” “triumph,” or to be “successful”);
Black's Law Dictionary 1298 (10th ed. 2009)
(defining “prevailing party” as the one “in
whose favor a judgment is rendered”),

29 The majority uses § 12-341.01(A) to
impermissibly alter the meaning of “the pre-
vailing party” in the MVA. The second sen-
tence in § 12-841.01(A) does not define the
“successful party” in a lawsuit and thus does
not shed light on the parties’ use of “the
prevailing party” in the MVA. Instead, the
second sentence “deem[s]” the unsuccessful
party in the lawsuit the “successful party,”
and thus eligible for a discretionary fee
award, if the final judgment is “equal to or
more favorable” than a previously rejected

372

settlement offer. And that party is only con-
sidered “successful” from the offer date,
meaning the other party can be “successful”
and eligible for a fee award before the offer
date, In essence, the second sentence serves
as a fee-shifting device to encourage settle-
ment; it does not apply to the party that
prevails on the merits of the lawsuit. Cf
Hall, 229 Ariz, at 282 118, 274 P.8d at 1216
(“The purposes of § 12-841.01(A) include .
promoting settlements and thus reducing
caseloads involving contractual matters.”),
Although it is appropriate to use tests devel-
oped under § 12-841.01(A) to identify the
“prevailing party” overall in light of “multiple
claims and varied success,” see Murphy Far-
rell Dev, 229 Ariz, at 134 136, 272 P.8d at
865, it is not appropriate to use § 12~-
841.01(A) to change the meaning of “the pre-
vailing party” in the MVA.

180 Rather than respect the parties’ intent
to mandate a fee award for the single, pre-
vailing party in the lawsuit, the majority uses
the second sentence from § 12-341.01(A) to
redefine “the prevailing party” and require
awards for each party, There are now two
prevailing parties—American before the set-
tlement offer and CSK thereafter—and each
must be awarded attorney fees. This inter-
pretation alters the MVA’s fee provision in
violation of the third sentence in § 12~
841.01(A). I would affirm the trial court’s
attorney fee award.

396 P,3d 608
STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,
v
The Honorable Kevin B. WEIN, Commis-
sioner of the Superior Court of the State
of Arizona, in and for the County of
Maricopa, Respondent Commissioner,

Phillip Ray Sisco, Real Party in Interest.
No, 1 CA-SA 16-0159 .
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.
FILED 4/27/2017

|

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoe-
nix, By Lisa Marie Martin, Counsel for Peti-
tioner

Curry Pearson & Wooten PLC, Phoenix,
By Kristen M. Curry, Counsel for Real Party
in Interest,

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the
Opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge
Margaret H. Downie joined.

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge:

{11 This special action arises out of the
superior court’s refusal to consider victims’
impact statements proffered by the state
during a bond release hearing, The court
ruled that, at a hearing to determine whether
a defendant was bondable, it would not con-

373

sider the impact statements without giving
the defense an opportunity to cross-examine
the victims at the hearing. The state peti-
tioned this court, For the following reasons,
‘we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

{2 In January 2016, Real Party in Inter-
est, Phillip Ray Sisco (Sisco), was charged by
indictment with three counts of sexual as-
sault, class 2 felonies; one count of child
molestation, a class 2 felony and dangerous
crime against children; seven counts of sexu-
al conduct with a minor, class 2 felonies and
dangerous crimes against children; four
counts of sexual abuse, class 8 felonies and
dangerous crimes against children; one count
of sexual abuse, a class 5 felony as well as
various misdemeanors for acts in 1987-89,
1998 and 2001-2004 involving two victims.
Sisco originally was held without bond,

18 In June 2016, the Court of Appeals in
Simpson v, Miller, 240 Ariz, 208, 209, 11 2-8,
877 P.8d 1003, 1004 (App. 2016), vacated by
241 Ariz, 841, 887 P.8d 1270 (2017) (Simpson
IT), decided that persons who had been held
without bond pursuant to Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) section 18-3961(A)(8) (2016)
(where “the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great that the person is guilty of ...
[slexual conduct with a minor who is under
fifteen years of age”) were entitled to a
further hearing under A.R.S, § 18-8961(D),
Under Miller, to hold a defendant without
bond a trial court would have to find (1) the
proof evident or presumption great that the
defendant is guilty of sexual conduct with a
minor under the age of 15, (2) clear and
convincing evidence that he poses a substan-
tial danger to the victim(s) or the community
and (8) no condition or combination of condi-
tions of release could be imposed that would
reasonably assure the safety of the victim or
the community. Id. at 218, 115, 877 P.8d at.
1008, If these findings are not made, mean-
ing the defendant is bondable, the trial court
would then need to determine release condi-
tions, Id, at 215, 122, 877 P.8d at 1010.

14 In July 2016, Sisco filed a motion for
bond hearing pursuant to the Court of Ap-
peals’s decision in Miller. During the subse-

3874

quent bond release hearing, the state in-
formed the trial court that the victims
wanted to present impact statements
through a representative. The state clarified
that it was not offering the victims’ state-
ments to meet its burden of proof for the
first two requirements mentioned above, In-
stead, the state wanted the court to consid-
er the victims’ statements as part of its de-
termination as to the third requirement:
“whether there are any reasonable .,. re-
lease conditions that would protect the vic-
tim or the community” within the contest of
the bond release hearing. The trial court
responded that it would consider the vic-
tims’ views when determining release condi-
tions, but would not consider the state-
ments in the context of whether Sisco could
be held without bond unless Sisco had the
opportunity to cross-examine the victims.
Without considering the victims’ statements,
the court found Sisco bondable. The state
subsequently filed a petition for special ac-
tion,

15 After the state filed its petition in this
court, the Arizona Supreme Court took re-
view of Miller and issued its decision in
Stmpson II. Our supreme court agreed with
relevant parts of the Court of Appeals deci-
sion (ie. unless charged with a crime that
inherently predicts future dangerousness, a
defendant is entitled to an additional bail
hearing at which the trial court must make a
separate finding of dangerousness before de-
nying bail). Simpson IT, 241 Ariz, at 348-49,
11 24-80, 887 P.8d at 1277-78, As additionally
relevant here, the Court stated that bail
hearings “require a full blown adversarial
hearing.” Id. at 846, 115, 887 P.8d at 1275.

DISCUSSION

HM 16 Special action jurisdiction is ap-
propriate for issues involving the interpreta-
tion of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and the
Victims’ Rights Implementation Act as pure
issues of law, issues of first impression, and
of public significance, likely to recur, and not
susceptible to review on appeal. See Lincoln
v, Holt, 215 Ariz. 21, 23, 18, 156 P.3d 488,
440 (App. 2007); State ex rel. Thomas v.
Klein, 214 Ariz, 205, 207, 14, 150 P.8d 778,
780 (App. 2007); State ew rel. Romley v.

Superior Court (Cunningham), 184 Ariz.
409, 410, 909 P.2d 476, 477 (App. 1995). Spe-
cial action jurisdiction is particularly appro-
priate in this case because the pretrial rights
of the victims will otherwise be lost, State ew
rel. Romley v. Dairman, 208 Ariz, 484, 486,
12, 95 P.8d 548, 550 (App. 2004), There is no
equally plain, speedy and adequate remedy
by appeal. See State ew rel, Thomas v.
Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 15, 169 P.3d 115,
117 (App. 2007), Therefore, we accept special
action jurisdiction in this matter.

HM S17 In reviewing the trial court’s
order in the context of this special action,
before granting relief we must find the trial
court abused its discretion, or exceeded its
jurisdiction or legal authority. Twin City
Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz, 251, 258-54,
10, 63 P.8d 282, 284-85 (2003). An abuse of
discretion finding is appropriate when the
record fails to provide substantial support for
the trial court’s decision. State v. Cowles, 207
Ayiz. 8, 9, 18, 82 P.38d 369, 370 (App. 2004),
‘This court reviews questions of statutory in-
terpretation and constitutional law de novo.
Holt, 215 Ariz, at 28, 14, 156 P.3d at 440. We
conclude the trial court violated the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S, § 18-4422 (2010)
when determining Sisco was bondable with-
out considering the victims’ impact state-
ments at the bond hearing.

{8 That determinations as to eligibility for
bail “require a full blown adversarial hear-
ing” does not resolve the question before us,
because victims as witnesses have constitu-
tional protections not available to others.
Stimpson v. Owens (Simpson I), which expli-
cates the quoted proposition by stating “[t]he
parties must have the right to examine/cross-
examine the witnesses and to review in ad-
vance those witnesses’ prior statements that
are written[,]” does not address victims as
witnesses in a bond release hearing. 207 Ariz,
261, 275-76, 144, 85 P.38d 478, 492-93 (App.
2004),

19 In Arizona, victims of crimes have the
right to be heard at any proceeding involving
a post-arrest release determination, such as
Sisco’s Simpson II hearing, pursuant to the
Arizona Constitution’s Article II, § 2.1 (A)
@ of the Victims’ Bill of Rights and A.R.S.

§ 13-4422! In exercising that right, A.R.S.
§ 13-4426.01 (2010) pronounces that victims
are not subject to cross-examination.? Noth-
ing in Simpson II changes this.

TI 1110 Here, the court’s ruling—refus-
ing to consider the victims’ statements in its
determination of whether Sisco was bonda-
ble, unless the victims were subjected to
cross-examination—undermines — Arizona’s
constitutional and statutory guarantees giv-
ing victims the right to be heard before, not
afier the decision to release on bond has
been made, without being forced to testify.
See e.g., Mendez v. Robertson, 202 Ariz, 128,
130, 18, 42 P.8d 14, 16 (App. 2002) (rejecting
a defendant’s “claim that a victim whose
rights are protected by the Victims’ Bill of
Rights and related statutes and procedural
rules may be required to testify at a release
hearing”). A victim’s “right to be heard” is
meaningless if it is not tantamount to a right
to have the victim’s impact statement (includ-
ing his/her safety concerns) be seriously con-
sidered and addressed before the determina-
tion of whether a defendant is bondable.

{11 Furthermore, a requirement that a
defendant be permitted to cross-examine
victims at a Simpson II bond hearing would
import into such a hearing the procedural
and evidentiary strictures typical of jury tri-
als. Our precedent indicates that the use of
hearsay is authorized at hearings in deter-
mining whether an individual is bondable.
See Simpson I, 207 Ariz, at 276, 148, 85
P.3d at 494 (noting that in that kind of
bond hearing, the record of grand-jury pro-
ceedings—which typically includes hearsay
testimony and evidence, and, which would
ordinarily be barred in a jury trial—was
permissible), Accordingly, victims’ state-
ments, despite being hearsay, are permitted
and must be considered in a Simpson IT
hearing,

1, Section 13-4422 states that “[a] victim has the
right to be heard at any proceeding in which the
court considers the post-arrest release of the
person accused of committing a criminal offense
against the victim or the conditions of that re-
lease,”

2, The section states:

In any proceeding in which the victim has the

right to be heard pursuant to article II, § 2.1,
Constitution of Arizona, or this chapter, the

375

112 To uphold the protections this state
has bestowed on crime victims, we direct the
superior court to hold a new hearing wherein
it considers the victims’ impact statements in
undertaking the determination as to whether
the state has proven Sisco is not bondable,
without subjecting the victims to compulsory
cross-examination.

CONCLUSION
1183 For the foregoing reasons, we accept
special action jurisdiction and grant relief to
the state by vacating the results of the sub-

ject bond release hearing at which the vic-
tims’ rights were impinged,

396 P.3d 611
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Erick Antonio ESCALANTE, Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CR 15-0684

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/11/2017

victim's right to be heard is exercised not as a
witness, the victim's statement is not subject to
disclosure to the state or the defendant or
submission to the court and the victim is not
subject 10 cross-examination. The state and the
defense shall be afforded the opportunity to
explain, support or deny the victim's state-
ment.
(Emphasis added.)

=
of

1, Count 4: possession of a hand-gun; count 6:
possession of a machete; count 7; possession of

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Eric Knobloch, Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Public Defender’s Office,
Prescott, By John David Napper, Michelle
DeWaelsche, Nicole S. Murray, Counsel for
Appellant

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Paul J.
McMurdie joined.

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge:

{1 Erick Antonio Escalante (Escalante)
appeals from his convictions for transporting
a dangerous drug (methamphetamine) for
sale, a class 2 felony (count 1), possession or
use of drug paraphernalia (methamphet-
amine related), a class 6 felony (count 2),
tampering with physical evidence for dispos-
ing of methamphetamine, a class 6 felony
(count 3), misconduct involving weapons dur-
ing the commission of the felony alleged in
count 1, a class 4 felony (count 5), and vari-
ous misconduct involving weapons charges
due to his status as a prohibited possessor,
all class 4 felonies (counts 4, 6, 7, and 8).! For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

12 In April 2014, an informant told Detec-
tive Sinn that Escalante was one of multiple
people suspected of selling drugs in the
Verde Valley. In November of that year,
Sergeant Braxton-Johnson contacted Detec-

an “Blk Ridge” knife; count 8 possession of
another knife,

378

tive Sinn, reporting he had received calls
from concerned citizens suggesting ongoing
illegal drug activity at Escalante’s apartment
in Cottonwood and that Escalante had in-
stalled a camera outside the apartment. De-
tective Sinn confirmed there was a camera
outside Hscalante’s apartment. Neither the
informants nor any of the concerned citizens
testified at trial.

8 The same month, the detective and the
sergeant began conducting surveillance on
Escalante’s apartment, Detective Sinn testi-
fied that during their surveillance they no-
ticed a high volume of short-duration vehicle
and foot traffic going to and from Escalante’s
residence. He also reported receiving “sever-
al” concerned citizen tips reported to various
officers—including Sergeant Braxton, Detec-
tive Scott, Officer Scarim and Detective
Dominguez—between November 2014 and
January 2015, about Escalante and his likely
drug activity. Detective Sinn used these tips
and the information gleaned from surveilling
Esealante’s home to secure a warrant on
January 18, 2015, allowing him to place a
tacking device on Escalante’s truck. Sinn
attached the device the next day and moni-
tored Hscalante’s truck for the next seven
days. On January 21, officers stopped a vehi-
cle leaving Escalante’s home for speeding.
‘The driver consented to a search of his vehi-
cle; no drugs or indicia of drugs were found,
but the driver had $940 in his wallet.

94 Later that night, the tracking device
alerted that Escalante’s truck traveled on
Interstate 17 (I-17) to Phoenix, to an address
near 85th Avenue and Indian School Road.
The vehicle stayed for about 15 to 20 minutes
before heading back in the direction of Yava-
pai County. Detectives decided to follow Es-
calante’s truck once it returned to the Camp
Verde area and then to conduct a traffic stop
if they saw any traffic violation.

{5 Yavapai County Sheriff Sergeant
Rumpf eventually observed a truck north-
bound on I-17 matching the description of
Escalante’s truck exit from the freeway to-
ward Cottonwood with an illegal blue license-
plate light. Sergeant Rumpf and another offi-
cer followed. Escalante traveled west on
Highway 260, but before reaching Cotton-

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 86 S.Ct.

wood, took a right turn onto Prairie Lane
and headed into a residential area, eventually
taking “a sharp left across both lanes of
traffic and stopping] in the middle of the
road.” At that point, officers stopped the
truck.

16 Sergeant Rumpf informed Escalante he
was stopped for having an illegal license-
plate light. He observed a firearm in Esca-
lante’s driver door, Deputy Jeff Bowers sub-
sequently arrived with a canine, The canine
alerted to the odor of narcotics near Esca-
lante’s driver door, but no narcotics were
found in the truck or on Escalante’s person.
Neither were drugs found outside the truck
after an initial search of the roadway and
surrounding area.

17 About ten or fifteen minutes later, De-
tective Sinn arrived and read Escalante his
Miranda* vights. When Detective Sinn
asked Escalante where he was coming from,
Escalante responded “Camp Verde,” but
would not respond to specific questions as to
what he was doing in Camp Verde, asserting
that had no relevance to the situation. Esca-
Jante also mentioned he knew the officers
were following him as he drove,

18 Officers arrested Escalante and his
vehicle was taken to be searched, The search
resulted in the discovery of, among other
items, a loaded magazine belonging to the
firearm in the driver’s-side door, confirmed
to be a .880 caliber semi-automatic hand-gun;
various knives, including a 8- or 4~inch pock-
et knife; a machete; and a “flip” cellphone.

19 Approximately two hours after Esca-
lante was stopped, Deputy Bowers returned
to the scene to search the roadway further.
The deputy traveled eastbound on Highway
260 and made a left onto Prairie Lane where
Escalante had been driving. Just after Depu-
ty Bowers turned left onto the lane, he “saw
what appeared to be a [bag with] white sub-
stance laying on ... the yellow double yellow
line.” The substance was later confirmed to
be roughly 47.8 grams (the equivalent of
0.105881 pounds) of methamphetamine. Po-
lice officers subsequently searched the truck

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

again and found a digital scale bearing meth-
amphetamine residue.

110 Escalante was charged with the eight
counts noted above, At his request, the court
severed the various counts into two trials—a
jury heard counts 1, 2, 3 and 5, and a bench
trial ensued on counts 4, 6, 7 and 8. Esca-
lante was found guilty on all counts. He
timely appealed to this court. We have juris-
diction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1)
(2016), 18-4031 (2010) and -4088(A) (2010).

DISCUSSION

HM 111 On appeal, Escalante argues
the trial court erred by allowing the officers
to give “drug courier profile” testimony. Be-
cause Escalante failed to object to this al-
leged error at trial, we review his claim for
fundamental error. See State v, Henderson,
210 Ariz, 561, 567, 119, 115 P.8d 601, 607
(2005). On fundamental error review, Esca-
lante “bears the burden to establish that ‘(1)
error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and
(8) the error caused him prejudice.’” State v.
James, 231 Ariz, 490, 498, 111, 297 P.8d 182,
185 (App. 2018) (citations omitted), Funda-
mental error review involves a fact-intensive
inquiry, and the showing required to estab-
lish prejudice “therefore differs from case to
case.” Henderson, 210 Ariz, at 568, 126, 115
P.8d at 608.

712 At trial, the state called multiple po-
lice officers to testify. Much of their testimo-
ny focused on drug trafficking methods, drug
traffickers and drug trafficking organizations
as informed by their experiences and drug
interdiction training. The officers testified
about “source cities,” reportedly including
metropolitan Phoenix—and identified the
area around 85th Avenue and Indian School
Road to which Escalante had traveled as a
“jmown active drug area.” The officers testi-
fied about drug corridors used for trafficking
drugs, which they said include the I-17,
which Escalante took to Phoenix. The offi-
cers stated drug traffickers sometimes use
surveillance equipment outside their resi-
dences, presumably like the camera found
outside Escalante’s apartment, They talked
about the presence of high-volume, short-

379

term traffic outside homes used for drug
dealing. They identified “heat-runs” as coun-
ter-surveillance driving techniques used by
drug traffickers and testified Escalante also
used such techniques. One officer testified
that in assisting with the initial search of
Escalante’s vehicle, based on his training and
experience, he observed “several vehicle indi-
cators as far as—or what is consistent with
drug trafficking or drug activity.” Officers
testified drug traffickers usually carry weap-
ons while transporting drugs—as one testi-
fied “there’s a direct nexus between weapons,
violence and drugs.” They stated that drug
traffickers use scales to weigh the drugs for
sale and purchase, and that the type of cell-
phone found in Escalante’s truck was com-
monly used by drug dealers.

113 Citing authority from several other
jurisdictions, the state argues this testimony
‘was not improper drug courier profile evi-
dence, but rather admissible modus operandi
evidence. We disagree with the state because
even if the officers’ testimony constituted
modus operandi evidence, it was improper
because the operation of drug trafficking or-
ganizations was largely irrelevant to the
charges against Escalante. See State v. Gon-
zalez, 229 Ariz, 550, 551, 11, 278 P.8d 328,
329 (App. 2012) (holding that “expert testi-
mony as to the modus operandi of a drug
organization may, depending upon the facts
of the case, be admitted as evidence”) (em-
phasis added).

I. Whether the officers’ testimony was
proper modus operandi evidence

914 The principles distinguishing drug
courier profile evidence from modus operan-
di evidence guide our analysis of the officers’
testimony, particularly as to Escalante’s con-
viction for transport of a dangerous drug for
sale, in violation of A.R.S. § 18-3407 (2016)
(count 1),

HI 115 Drug courier profile evidence in-
formally or abstractly describes characteris-
tics “displayed by persons trafficking in ille-
gal drugs.” State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 644,
110, 959 P.2d 799, 801 (1998) (citations omit-
ted). This evidence is “a loose assortment of
general, often contradictory, characteristics

380

and behaviors....” Id, (citing Mark J. Kad-
ish, The Drug Courier Profile: In Planes,
Trains, and Automobiles; And Now in the
Jury Bow, 46 Am. U.L. Rev. 747, 748 (1997).
‘The use of this evidence as substantive proof
of guilt has been condemned, id. at 545, 112,
959 P.2d at 802 (citing State v, Walker, 181
Ariz, 475, 481, 891 P.2d 942, 948 (App, 1995)),
even though it may be “offered in the contewt
of suppression and probable cause hearings,
where law enforcement’s justifications for a
stop, arrest, or confiscation is at issue,” id. at
545, 111, 959 P.2d 799 (emphasis added), In
agreeing that drug courier profile evidence is
impermissible as substantive proof, we have
concluded that the “use of profile evidence to
indicate guilt ... creates too high a risk that
a defendant will be convicted not for what he
did but for what others are doing.” Gonzalez,
229 Ariz, at 558, 112, 278 P.8d at 881 (quot-
ing State v. Cifuentes, 171 Ariz, 257, 257, 830
P.2d 469, 469 (App, 1991)),

116 We have previously stated that Lee
“in broad terms, prohibits the prosecution
from introducing ‘drug courier profile’ evi-
dence to prove that [a] defendant was traf-
ficking in drugs” or from presenting evidence
and tying it “to what other drug couriers do.”
Beijer v, Adams ex rel. Cty. af Coconino, 196
Ariz, 79, 82-83, 1714, 28, 998 P.2d 1048,
1046-47 (App. 1999). In Beijer, this court
found that testimony about an officer’s spe-
cialized training in drug interdiction was “ir-
relevant and went a long way toward creat-
ing an impermissible inference,” and when
coupled with testimony about why the offi-
cer’s suspicions were aroused, in effect, told
the jury that “the Defendant fit the drug
courier profile.” Id. at 88, 120, 998 P.2d at
1047, We noted that Lee expressly forbids
testimony about where drugs originate and
where drugs are distributed, Jd, at 121, 998
P.2d at 1047,

117 We also recognized circumstances in
which similar evidence may be admissible as
modus operandi evidence. See Gonzalez, 229
Ariz, at 554, 918, 278 P.8d at 882 (citing
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230
(th Cir, 1997)) (reaffirming that modus op-
erandi evidence is “properly admitted to as-
sist [a] jury in understanding the modus
operandi of a drug trafficking organization”

in a case where the defendant and another
individual were found with three plastic con-
tainers containing a total of 2.5 pounds of
methamphetamine, and defendant denied
knowing the drugs were in the car); see State
v, Salazar, 27 Ariz.App, 620, 624-25, 557 P.2d
552, 556-57 (1976) (holding admissible expert
testimony describing the common counter-
surveillance techniques used by narcotics
dealers in a case where four co-defendants
were charged with conspiracy to sell and
transport heroin).

118 In Gonzalez, where the defendant had
denied knowing drugs were in his car, this
court affirmed the trial court's admission as
modus operandi evidence of a police ser-
geant’s testimony that provided circumstan-
tial evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of
the drugs, 229 Ariz, at 551, 554, 191, 16, 278
P.8d at 329, 882, The sergeant testified “that
drug-trafficking organizations, like legitimate
businesses, have a profit motive, and do not
‘typically’ entrust $112,000 worth of their
drugs to an ‘unknown transporter” Id. at
558, 18, 278 P.8d at 381,

119 There, the sergeant’s testimony was
not offered to show the defendant “was guilty
because he fit the characteristics of a certain
drug courier profile[,!” but was instead of-
fered to establish general facts about drug
trafficking organizations that served to un-
dereut the asserted defense theory, Id at
654, 115, 278 P.8d at 882 (quoting Cordoba,
104 F.8d at 229-80), This court concluded
that, given the facts of that case and consid-
ering the asserted defense, the “testimony
was proper because it was limited to the
general practices of drug organizations,” Id.
at 116; see also State v, Garcia-~Quintana,
284 Ariz, 267, 269-70, 278, 117, 29, 821 P.3d.
482, 435-36, 488 (App. 2014) (holding that
testimony regarding common counter-sur-
veillance techniques used by drug trafficking
organizations to smuggle drugs into the
country was admissible to show “how the
actions of Defendant fit into the modus oper-
andi of a drug trafficking organization[,]”
where the defendant claimed he was not part
of a drug trafficking organization and that he
had not carried the several backpacks full of
marijuana he was found lying near in the
desert).

HI 120 As demonstrated, case law sug-
gests that modus operandi testimony typical-
ly is admissible only when a defendant was
found with large quantities of drugs and
asserts, in defense, that he had no knowledge
of the drugs? Under those circumstances,
what drug trafficking organizations do is rel-

evant.‘ This is not that kind of case,

HI 121 As Escalante points out, at no
point did the state allege he was transporting
drugs as part of a drug trafficking organiza-
tion, Further, as a factual matter, Escalante
was not found with drugs on his person, or in
his vehicle, Additionally, the amount of the
methamphetamine found on the road that led
to the charge in count 1 is small by compari-
son to the large quantities of drugs that
ordinarily may permit modus operandi drug
trafficking testimony, as shown in the cited
cases, Nor did Escalante assert a lack of
knowledge defense, as in Gonzalez and the
other cited cases, that might allow the sup-
posed modus operandi evidence offered by
the state. Moreover, unlike in Salazar, see
supra 917, Escalante was not charged with
drug conspiracy. See United States v, Vare-
la-Rivera, 279 F.8d 1174, 1179 (Oth Cir,
2002) (“[E]xpert testimony on the modus op-
erandi of drug trafficking organizations is
inadmissible in cases where, as here, the
defendant is not charged with conspiracy to
distribute drugs.”),

122 We ave not persuaded by the cases
from other jurisdictions the state cites to
support its position that the officers’ testimo-
ny constituted admissible modus operandi
evidence, Each of those cases allowed modus
operandi evidence in situations involving
drug distribution organizations, See United
States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.8d 641, 662 (Sth
Cir, 2008) Gnvolving the operation of a “drug
trafficking business” where testimony about
the use of plastic wrap and grease used to
mask odors on drugs and drug money from
K-9 units was held to be permissible modus
operandi evidence); United States v. Wash-

3. This statement should not be deemed to suggest
that modus operandi evidence would not be per-
missible in a case presenting different facts from
those present here.

4, See also Garcia-Quintana, 234 Ariz, at 271,
113, 321 P.3d at 436 (noting that modus operan-
di evidence “focuses on the usual patterns or

381

ington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1288 (6th Cir. 1995)
Gnvolving a “drug distribution ring,” and
holding, “an experienced narcotics agent may
testify about the significance of certain con-
duct or methods of operation unique to the
drug distribution business, as such testimony
often is helpful in assisting the trier of fact
understand the evidence”), We therefore hold
the officers’ testimony cannot be deemed ad-
missible modus operandi evidence in the
context of this case.

1283 Accordingly, even if we were con-
vineed by the state’s additional argument
that much of the officers’ testimony constitut-
ed foundation in support of their expert opin-
ions on drug trafficking, to the extent the
officers’ testimony, foundational or otherwise,
pertained to the operations and methods of
drug trafficking organizations not at issue in
this case, it was irrelevant and therefore not
allowed as modus operandi evidence,

124 In support of its position, the state
further relies on a decision from the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for the proposi-
tion that experts are permitted to equate
abstract patterns of conduct to specific cases
“to the point of testifying that the defendant
‘was involved in criminal conduct.” United
States v, Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C, Cir.
1992) (citing United States v. Carson, 702
F.2d 851 @d Cir, 1988)), The D.C, Cireuit’s
proposition is contrary to our precedent, See,
eg. Fuenning v. Superior Court, 189 Ariz,
590, 605, 680 P.2d 121, 196 (1983) (holding
that a witness may not testify as to whether
a defendant is innocent or guilty), We also
specifically reject, as contrary to our juris-
prudence, the state’s argument that the
statements referencing the area of Phoenix
to which Escalante traveled as a “known
drug area” did not constitute inadmissible
profile evidence. See Beijer, 196 Ariz, at 88,
121, 998 P.2d at 1047 (disallowing “testimony
about where drugs originate and where they
are distributed”).

methods used by a criminal gang or organization
to commit a crime [,]” and is ‘properly admitted
to assist the jury, [as the trier of fact,] in under-
standing the modus operandi of a drug traflick-
ing organization”) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted).

382

Il, Whether the officers’ testimony was
impermissibly used as substantive evi-
dence of guilt (ie, improper drug
courier profile evidence), and if so,
does that error amount to fundamen-
tal and prejudicial error

125 As to each relevant count, we further

consider (1) whether the state offered the
officers’ drug courier profile statements as
substantive evidence of Escalante’s guilt, and
if so, (2) whether Escalante has shown funda-
mental and prejudicial error. We conclude
that while the record suggests the state im-
permissibly used the officers’ testimony as
substantive evidence of Escalante’s guilt as
to count 1, Escalante has not met his burden
under fundamental error review as to any of
the counts at issue,

126 Escalante argues that the state’s ref-
erences to the officers’ drug courier profile
evidence, from the opening statements
through closing arguments in the trial, sub-
stantively affected the jurors’ decisions and
thus constituted fundamental prejudicial er-
ror. He contends that questions posed by the
jurors indicate he was prejudiced by the
officers’ statements and the state’s presenta-
tion of that evidence. The state argues that
even if the statements should not have been
admitted, the jury would have nonetheless
convicted Escalante due to the other “over-
wheliming” evidence,

(27 As an initial matter, we note Esca-
lante only argues that the evidence preju-
diced the jury’s consideration of the charges
it was tasked to decide; he thus offers no
viable challenge to his convictions by the
court on counts 4, 6, 7, and 8 As to the
remaining counts (counts 1 through 3 and
count 5), we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the jury’s ver-
dicts, as we are required to do on appeal. See
State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, 12, 150
P.8d 769, 769 (App. 2007).

A. Count 1
1. The officers’ testimony constituted
substantive evidence as to count
1
Hl 128 To obtain a conviction for trans-
porting a dangerous drug for sale, the state
had to prove that Escalante knowingly

“transport[ed] for sale, import[ed] into this
state, offer[ed] to transport for sale or im-
port into this state, sell, transfer or offer to
sell or transfer a narcotic drug.” A.R.S.
§ 18-8408(A)@), (7) (2010). “Knowingly”
means that a defendant acted with awareness
of or belief that his conduct is of that nature
or the circumstances of his conduct consti-
tute the offense. See A.R.S. § 138-105(10)(b)
(2016). The state had the burden to prove
each element of this crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. The reasonable doubt standard
requires evidence sufficient to satisfy each
element of the crime and to convince a fact-
finder of the defendant’s guilt “with utmost
certainty.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364,
90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

HI {29 As to count 1, viewing the trial in
its entirety, the state used the officers’ state-
ments to paint Escalante’s actions as those of
a drug trafficker. The state’s opening state-
ment and closing argument repeatedly refer-
enced the officers’ statements and forcefully
dyew parallels between the described conduct
of drug traffickers and Escalante’s behavior.
Given that we have concluded, contrary to
the only justification offered by the state for
the evidence, supra 1118, 22, that this testi-
mony is not proper modus operandi evidence
in the context of this case, the only purpose
of the testimony was to create parallels be-
tween drug traffickers and Escalante. See
Lee, 191 Ariz. at 546, 118, 959 P.2d at 803
(stating evidence “should not have been ad-
mitted in the first instance [where] its only
purpose was to suggest that because the
accuseds’ behavior was consistent with that
of known drug couriers, they likewise must
have been couriers”).

180 In its opening statement, the state
claimed that it was significant that officers
saw Escalante use purported counter-surveil-
ling techniques, which the state argued “will
show is consistent with people who are in-
volved in drug trafficking activities.” The
state continued—“he had a loaded handgun
which you will hear about evidence of drug
trafficking to protect those drugs [from] be-
ing taken by somebody else. That’s what the
evidence is going to show.”

181 During the state’s closing argument,
the prosecutor stated, “I want to talk about
drug trafficking ... drug trafficking is a
subculture ... Culture, the beliefs, the cus-
toms, the way of life, a way of thinking, a
way of behaving, a way of working that exists
in a place or organization.” The prosecutor
asserted that the Phoenix area and I-17 is a
“pipeline for narcotics distribution, and spe-
cifically meth from Mexico.” The prosecutor
recounted the testifying officers’ extensive
drug interdiction training and experience and
restated that the neighborhood Escalante al-
legedly visited in Phoenix is “a drug traffic
neighborhood.” The prosecutor argued that a
scale is carried by “[p]eople who deal drugs
and buy drugs in bulk free sales.”

132 Based on this record, given the extent
to which the officers’ drug courier profile
testimony permeated the trial, we cannot
conclude that as to count one—the charge of
“transporting a dangerous drug for sale’—
the state did not offer the officers’ drug
courier testimony as substantive evidence of
Escalante’s guilt. Such evidence should not
have been permitted; its admission was thus
error, See Gonzalez, 229 Ariz, at 558, 112,
278 P.8d at 381.

2, The state’s other evidence

133 On appeal, the state highlights several
pieces of evidence it argues would have re-
sulted in a conviction even absent the inad-
missible statements by the officers. It argues
the following evidence was relevant to count
i

(1) the testimony that another driver
pulled over for speeding shortly after leav-
ing Escalante’s apartment had $940 (two
$100 bills and the rest in $20 bills), As
noted, no drugs were found on this driver
or in his car;

3, Escalante’s opening brief references Lee in sup-
port of the proposition that admission of improp-
er drug courier profile evidence was not harm-
less error. See Lee, 191 Ariz. at 546, 119, 959
P.2d at 803. However, as established by
Henderson seven years after the Lee decision, the
standard of review in this case is fundamental,
not harmless, error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz, at
567-68, 11 17-20, 24, 115 P.3d at 607-08,

383

(2) Escalante traveled almost two hours to
Phoenix and stayed only 15 to 20 minutes
before beginning his return to Yavapai
County;

8) After Escalante was stopped, a canine

alerted to the odor of narcotics on the

driver's side of Escalante’s vehicle; the dog
alerts to four different types of drugs with-
out distinguishing among them;

(4) A scale bearing methamphetamine resi-

due was found in Escalante’s truck when it

‘was searched for the second time;

(5) As noted above, approximately two

hours after officers stopped Escalante’s ve-

hicle, they discovered the plastic bag of

478 grams of methamphetamine on the

road where Hscalante had been driving.

However, Escalante’s fingerprints were

not found on the bag and the state offered

no evidence or argument that Escalante
could have been wearing gloves. Further,

Escalante denied possessing the drugs;

and

(6) Escalante had $350 on him at the time

he was pulled over.

34 There is also evidence in the record
that Escalante’s cellphone contained mes-
sages saying “Hey bro give me a call, Need
to place an order,” and “If you got any let me
know.” The state also presented maps illus-
trating the area of Prairie Lane onto which
Escalante turned after exiting Highway 260
and Cliff View Drive where he stopped,

8. We find no reversible error.5

HM 135 Under Henderson, to establish
fundamental error, Escalante must show “the
error complained of goes to the foundation of
his case, takes away a right that is essential
to his defense, and is of such magnitude that
he could not receive a fair trial.” 210 Ariz, at
568, 124, 115 P.8d at 608.5 We find no re-
versible error as to count 1.

6. In this decision, we discuss all three elements
which Henderson indicates are required to show
fundamental error. However, we note an internal
inconsistency in Henderson as to whether a de-
fendant must prove all three elements, or wheth-
er any one of the listed elements would suffice.
While the quoted text is written in the conjune-
tive, in support of the rule, Henderson cites State
v. Hunter, 142 Ariz, 88, 90, 688 P.2d 980, 982
(1984), which suggests that each element consti-

384

Hl 186 In light of our conclusion that the
state impermissibly offered the drug courier
profile evidence as substantive evidence, such
evidence arguably went to the foundation of
the case against Escalante on count 1. See,
eg. State v. Stevens, 228 Ariz, 411, 416-17,
{7 15-16, 267 P.8d 1208, 1208-09 (App. 2012)
(concluding, on fundamental error review,
that evidence offered as substantive evidence
of guilt went to the foundation of the case).
However, viewing the trial evidence in its
totality, we find that even absent the imper-
missible inferences, the jury had substantial
evidence to convict Escalante on count 1,

187 On his return from Phoenix, Escalante
exited Highway 260 onto Prairie Lane know-
ing officers were following him, He exited the
highway far from the vicinity of his apart-
ment in Cottonwood, under circumstances
strongly suggesting that he did so to evade
the officers and ultimately to dispose of the
methamphetamine he had been carrying.
This inference, in conjunction with the scale
with methamphetamine residue found in Es-
calante’s truck, the methamphetamine found
on the road, and the messages on his cell-
phone, reasonably supports the conclusion
that Escalante was carrying the scale to
weigh the methamphetamine he had for sale,

188 Escalante has not established other
elements of fundamental error, He has not
shown he was deprived of a right essential to
his defense by the state’s use of the imper-
missible drug courier profile testimony, In-
stead, it appears his failure to object to the
evidence may have been strategic—allowing
the state to run amok with the drug courier
profile evidence. See infra 1942-44, Esca-
lante has not shown that the error was of a
magnitude such that it is unlikely that he
received a fair trial,

189 Nor has Escalante affirmatively dem-
onstrated that the drug courier profile evi-
dence caused him prejudice, Henderson, 210
Ariz, at 568, 126, 115 P.8d at 608; see also id,
at 567, 119, 115 P.8d 601, 607 (quoting State
v. Valdez, 160 Ariz, 9, 18-14, 770 P.2d 318,
817-18 (1989) (explaining that under funda-
mental error review, we place the burden to

tutes a distinct error that, standing alone, may

amount to fundamental error. Hunter, in turn,
references State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz, 132, 138,

prove prejudice on the defendant, “to dis-
courage a defendant from ‘tak{ing] his
chances on a favorable verdict, reserving the
‘hole card’ of a later appeal on [a] matter that.
was curable at trial, and then seek[ing] ap-
pellate reversal’ ”)),

HM 140 “The showing [of prejudice] a
defendant must make varies, depending upon
the type of error that occurred and the facts
of a particular case.” Id. at 568, 126, 115
P.8d at 608, Here, since the nature of the
error Escalante complains of was the state’s
dependence on the impermissible evidence,
from the opening statements through closing
arguments, Escalante had the burden to
show that absent the inadmissible evidence,
and applying the appropriate standard of
proof, the jury could have reached a different
result. See, eg. id, at 669, 127, 115 P.8d at
609 (requiring the defendant to show that “a
reasonable jury, applying the appropriate
standard of proof, could have reached a dif-
ferent result than did the trial judge” where
the nature of the error at issue deprived the
defendant of “the opportunity to require that
a jury find facts sufficient to expose him to
an aggravated sentence”),

141 Escalante argues that absent the inad-
missible evidence, the prosecution presented
“very little evidence of guilt.” He contends
the jurors’ questions demonstrate the inad-
missible evidence weighed substantially on
the jurors’ minds and therefore prejudiced
him. Escalante specifically identifies the fol-
lowing questions asked by the jury:

Was [Escalante] directly asked if he was in

Phoenix and what was his answer?

Can you verify the meth on the scale can
be matched to the meth sample?

‘Was the second phone a cell and was it on
[Escalante] when he was stopped or found
in the vehicle?
These questions do not necessarily indicate
that the jury was unduly influenced by the
improper evidence. Therefore, we conclude

685 P.2d 1284, 1290 (1984), which lists only the
first two elements in the disjunctive.

that Escalante has not shown resulting prej-
udice. Moreover, if Escalante’s failure to ob-
ject to the impermissible evidence was a
defense strategy, under that circumstance,
he cannot show prejudice and therefore
could not meet his burden under fundamen-
tal error review.

1 42 Before trial, the state moved in limine
to allow evidence of information it received
from a confidential informant and a con-
cerned citizen about Escalante’s alleged drug
trafficking. It also moved to allow evidence
that authorities had been told and verified
that Escalante had installed “surveillance
equipment often associated with drug traf-
ficking,” that Escalante “when followed by
narcotic and gang detectives engaged in driv-
ing consistent with actions of individuals sell-
ing drugs,” that surveillance revealed “high
volume and short term traffie coming and
going” from Escalante’s home consistent with
drug trafficking, that Escalante drove on the
day in question to “an area known for drugs
[sic] sales and drug use” in Phoenix, and that
authorities retrieved inculpatory text mes-
sages from Escalante’s cell phone. In re-
sponding to the motion, Escalante only ob-
jected to admission of the text messages, but
at the related evidentiary hearing his counsel
acknowledged that the officers would be “al-
lowed to testify as to their investigation ...
[and in accordance with] their training and
experience what they believe that informa-
tion means,”

148 While it may very well be that Esca-
lante’s counsel did not object to the other
evidence because he did not know he could,
the record most clearly suggests counsel did
not object because he did not consider the
officers’ testimony to be “real evidence.”
Counsel’s implicit conclusion that he did not
consider the officers’ testimony to be “real
evidence” is reflected in the record of the
motion in limine hearing, He thereafter used
his conclusion about the testimony as a talk-
ing point that informed his defense strategy
throughout the trial, arguing the evidence (or
the “real evidence”) was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of guilt,

7. While we conclude that Escalante cannot meet
his burden under fundamental error review, we

385

144 In his brief opening statement, Esca-
lante’s trial counsel referred to the “parade”
of investigating police officers the prosecutor
intended to present during the trial, and
asserted that the whole months-long investi-
gation of Escalante came about because “law
enforcement had convinced themselves that
he was selling drugs.” During his closing
argument to the jury, counsel characterized
the prosecution’s case as “three days [spent]
blowing a lot of smoke from a lot of law
enforcement officers.” He argued that the
“parade” of officers showed that law enforce-
ment had committed themselves so thorough-
ly to their belief that Escalante was selling
drugs, notwithstanding there was nothing to
show for so much investigative activity, that
the reported discovery of drugs in the street
and a scale in the truck could not be sus-
tained as legitimate—suggesting that evi-
dence was fabricated. Counsel stated: “when
they pulled over Erick on the 21st they didn’t
find any drugs and that was a problem ...
it's not looking good for them, so now you've
got to start thinking about we need more
evidence. And then the evidence appears af-
ter the fact.” Counsel argued that the jury
was given nothing more by the state than “a
parade of police officers who were convinced
that Erick Escalante is a drug dealer and no
hard evidence that he really is.” It thus
appears the defense used the state’s irrele-
vancies to establish the state’s motives as ill-
intentioned and its evidence as unworthy of
credibility. Accordingly, the possibility that
counsel may not have known he could have
objected to the drug courier evidence does
not foreclose the apparent probability that he
did not object to the evidence at trial because
he wanted to show that the state did not
proffer sufficient “real evidence” to support a.
conviction,

145 A defendant cannot show prejudice,
and thus cannot obtain reversal under funda-
mental error review, even though the state
substantively used impermissible drug couri-
er profile evidence throughout the trial,
where the record suggests the defendant did
not object to the impermissible evidence as
part of his defense strategy, and there is
otherwise substantial evidence of his guilt.”

note that this does not preclude a defendant

386

Accordingly, based on the record, we affirm
Escalante’s conviction on count one.

B. Count 2

146 To obtain a conviction of “possession
or use of drug paraphernalia,” the state had
to prove that Escalante used or “possessed
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia.”
A.RS. § 18-8415(A) (2010). Subsection (F)(2)
defines drug paraphernalia as

all equipment, products and materials of

any kind which are used, intended for

use or designed for use in planting, prop-
agating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,
manufacturing, compounding, converting,
producing, processing, preparing, testing,
analyzing, packaging, repackaging ... or
otherwise introducing into the human
body a drug in violation of this chapter.

147 In addition to logically relevant fac-
tors, “[i]In determining whether an object is
drug paraphernalia,” a fact finder shall con-
sider, among other things, “[t]he existence of
any residue of drugs on the object.” Jd. at
(6).

TI 148 The evidence that the scale
found in the vehicle Escalante was driving
was found to contain methamphetamine resi-
due, coupled with the fact that intent is typi-
cally shown by circumstantial evidence, was
sufficient to render the scale drug parapher-
nalia and to convict Escalante for possessing
it.

C. Count 3

149 To obtain a conviction for “tampering
with physical evidence,” the state had to
prove that a person—here, Escalante, “with
intent that [the evidence] be ... unavailable
in an official proceeding ... which such per-
son knows is about to be instituted, such
person: 1, Destroys, mutilates, alters, con-
ceals or removes physical evidence with the
intent to impair its verity or availability.”
ARS. § 18-2809(A)(1) (2010).

HHI 150 The record indicates that Esca-
lante knew he was being followed by the
officers on the night of his arrest, but he
continued driving. Thus, drawing the neces-

under these circumstances from claiming ineffec-

sary inference to sustain the jury’s verdict,
we find the evidence was sufficient to support
a determination by the jury, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that Escalante discarded the
methamphetamine found on the road as he
continued driving to avoid being arrested and
subsequently prosecuted,

D. Count 5

151 To obtain conviction of “misconduct
involving weapons,” the state had to prove
Escalante knowingly used or possessed a
deadly weapon during the commission of a
felony offense, while “a prohibited posses-
sor.” A.R.S. § 18-8102(A)(4), (8) (2010).

HM 152 The record demonstrates Esca-
lante is a prohibited possessor. As previously
noted, there was a .880 caliber handgun on
the driver's side inside the vehicle Escalante
was driving and the relevant offense in count
1 is a felony offense. This evidence was sutffi-
cient, separate from the impermissible drug
courier inference, to support the jury’s con-
viction on this count.

153 We thus hold Escalante has not shown
that the erroneous admission and reliance on
the officers’ drug courier profile testimony
constitute fundamental and prejudicial error
as to the convictions he challenges.

Ill, Confrontation Clause

154 Escalante argues that the officers’
statements about the information received
from the concerned citizens and informants
violated his rights under the Confrontation
Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U.S, 36, 124 S.Ct, 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d
177 (2004). Again, because Escalante failed to
assert this objection at trial, we review this
claim for fundamental error. Henderson, 210
Ariz. at 567, 119, 115 P.8d at 607. As previ-
ously noted, Escalante necessarily must
prove “both that fundamental error occurred
and that the error caused him prejudice.” Id,
at 568, 122, 115 P.8d at 608.

W155 The Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the wit-

tive assistance of counsel in a Rule 32 petition,

nesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI,
This Confrontation Clause bars the admis-
sion of “testimonial hearsay.” Crawford, 541
US, at 58, 124 S.Ct. 1854, Hearsay is defined
as a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the instant trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Ariz, R. Evid.
801(c).

56 Here, the officers testified about tips
and other information received from infor-
mants and concerned citizens, Even assum-
ing this testimony was inadmissible, as to
this issue on appeal, Escalante has again
failed to satisfy his burden to establish preju-
dice under fundamental error review. See
supra $111, 40,

CONCLUSION

157 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the verdicts on all counts.

396 P.3d 623

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD
OF REGENTS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v

ARIZONA STATE RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0239

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 5/11/2017

&

388

Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix, By Thomas
L, Hudson, Eric M, Fraser, Arizona State

University, Office of General Counsel,
Tempe, By Lisa K. Hudson, Co-counsel for
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Jothi Beljan, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appeliee

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered
the opinion of the court, in which Judge Kent
E, Cattani and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

OPINION

SWANN, Judge:

{1 In Arizona State University v. Arizona
State Retirement System, 287 Ariz, 246, 849
P.8d 220 (App. 2015) (hereinafter “ASU v,
ASRS”), we held that the Arizona State Re-
tirement System (“ASRS”) wrongly collected

$1,149,108 from Arizona State University
(the “University”). This appeal concerns the
rate of prejudgment interest that applies to
ASRS's liability for the refund. The superior
court held that the refund was in the nature
of a “judgment,” and not a “debt”—a distinc-
tion that determines the applicable interest
rate under A.R.S, § 44-1201. We disagree,
and hold that ASRS’s over-collection of mon-
ey created a debt that was not dependent on
the existence of a judgment, We therefore
reverse and remand for entry of judgment
with prejudgment interest computed at 10%,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 The underlying litigation arose from an
invoice ASRS sent to the University for a
purported actuarial unfunded liability result-
ing from 17 employees’ participation in the
University’s termination incentive program,
See generally ARS, § 38-749; ASU »,
ASRS, 287 Ariz, 246, 349 P.3d 220, ASRS
determined the unfunded liability to be
$1,149,108 and demanded payment within 90
days, ASU v. ASRS, 287 Ariz, at 249, 19, 349
P.8d 220. It also asserted under § 88-749
that ASU would owe ASRS 8% interest on
any “balance” until the $1,149,108 was paid in
full. The University paid the invoice and then
pursued an administrative appeal. Jd, at 228,
19.

18 In ASU », ASRS, we concluded that
ASRS was required to follow the Administra-
tive Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures
before enforcing the policy under which it
charged the University. 287 Ariz, at 258-54,
182, 849 P.8d 220, We remanded the case to
the superior court with instructions “to enter
an order directing ASRS to refund $1,149,103
to the University, with interest thereon if
and as authorized by law—an issue the supe-
rior court should address on remand.” Jd, at
254, 183, 349 P.8d 220.

14 The superior court entered judgment
for the original invoice—$1,149,108—togeth-
er with prejudgment interest at the rate of
4.25%, The only issue before us in this appeal
is whether the court chose the correct inter-
est rate,

DISCUSSION

15 The parties agree that the interest rate
is determined by A.R.S, § 44-1201. That
statute provides in pertinent part:

A. Interest on any loan, indebtedness or

other obligation shall be at the rate of ten

per cent per annum, unless a different rate
is contracted for in writing, in which event.
any rate of interest may be agreed to,

Interest on any judgment that is based on

a written agreement evidencing a loan,

indebtedness or obligation that bears a

rate of interest not in excess of the maxi-

mum permitted by law shall be at the rate
of interest provided in the agreement and
shall be specified in the judgment.

B, Unless specifically provided for in stat-

ute or a different rate is contracted for in

writing, interest on any judgment shall be
at the lesser of ten per cent per annum or
at a rate per annum that is equal to one
per cent plus the prime rate as published
by the board of governors of the federal

reserve system in statistical release H.15

or any publication that may supersede it

on the date that the judgment is entered.

The judgment shall state the applicable

interest rate and it shall not change after it

is entered,

F. If awarded, prejudgment interest shall

be at the rate described in subsection A or

B of this section,

(Emphases added.)

16 The University argues that once it paid
the improperly issued invoice, ASRS became
“indebted” to it in the amount of $1,149,108,
entitling it to 10% interest under subsection
(A). ASRS contends that the superior court
eorrectly decided that the University was
entitled only to the prime rate plus 1% (i.e,
4.25%)—the rate applicable to a “judgment”
under subsection (B),

HN 117 We review this issue de novo.
Hail v, Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan, 241 Ariz.
38, 46, 138, 888 P.38d 1107 (2016); Metzler v,
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles,
235 Ariz, 141, 144, 118, 329 P.8d 1048 (2014).
“If the plain language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous when considered in con-
text, we do not resort to other methods of

389

statutory construction.” Newman v, Select
Specialty Hosp.Ariz., Inc., 239 Ariz. 558, 566,
35, 374 P.8d 438 (App. 2016). We interpret.
statutes to avoid rendering “any of its lan-
guage mere ‘surplusage,’ [and instead] give
meaning to ‘each word, phrase, clause, and
sentence ... so that no part of the statute
will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial,” In
ve Estate of Zaritsky, 198 Ariz. 599, 608, 111,
12 P.3d 1208 (App. 2000) (citation omitted),

18 Until 2011, A.R.S. § 44-1201 did not
differentiate between “judgments” and
“loans, indebtedness, or other obligations,”
See Metzler, 285 Ariz. at 145, 114, 829 P.3d
1048, The Legislature then amended § 44-
1201, “uncoupling ‘judgments’ from ‘loans,
indebtedness, or other obligations’ so as to
‘limit’ the interest applicable to judgments.”
Id. at 116 (citing Arizona Senate Fact Sheet,
S.B, 1212, 50th Leg,, Ist Reg. Sess. (Apr. 18,
2011)). In Metzler, the supreme court held
under subsection (A) that prejudgment inter-
est is awarded at 10% on any loan (“money
lent at interest”), indebtedness (“something
(as an amount of money) that is owed”), or
other obligation (“things of the same nature
or class as ‘oan’ and ‘indebtedness’ ”). 235
Ariz, at 145-46, 119 18-19, 329 P.8d 1048 (cita-
tions omitted), And under subsection (B),
prejudgment interest is currently awarded at
4.25% on “any judgment,” which our su-
preme court concluded means an amount
that “depends on a judgment for its exis-
tence,” See id, at 146, 119, 829 P.8d 1043,

Hl 19 Taken alone, subsection (A) might
be read as a contractual gap-filler for debt
obligations that are paid without resort to
litigation, and subsection (B) could be read to
define the interest rate for liabilities that are
reduced to judgments, But read as a whole,
§ 44-1201 makes clear that subsection (B) is
not triggered every time a judgment is en-
tered, Subsection (F) states that “prejudg-
ment interest shall be at the rate described
in subsection A or B.” (Emphasis added.)
Were we to hold that subsection (B) applies
to all liabilities reduced to judgments, sub-
section (F) would have no meaning. There-
fore, a person who successfully obtains a
judgment to collect an “indebtedness” is enti-
tled to the 10% interest rate even though

390

litigation and a judgment was necessary to
collect the debt.

110 The University argues that “indebted-
ness” under subsection (A) includes all liqui-
dated claims once they are reduced to judg-
ments. See Viad Corp. v. MoneyGram Int'l,
Inc., 1 CA-CV 15-0053, 2016 WL 6436827, at
¥8, 9942-45 (Ariz. App. Nov. 1, 2016),
Though liquidated claims will very often
qualify for prejudgment interest under sub-
section (A), we decline to rewrite the statute
to substitute the three terms the Legislature
wrote—‘loan,” “indebtedness,” and “other
obligation”—with the single term “liquidated
sum.” Had the Legislature intended subsec-
tion (A) to apply to all “liquidated” claims, it
would have said so, See, eg., A.R.S. §§ 44-
1201(D)(1) (“A court shall not award ...
[plrejudgment interest for any unliquidated,
future, punitive or exemplary damages that
are found by the trier of fact.” (emphasis
added), 47-2718(A) (“Damages for breach by
either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment....” (emphasis added)),

{11 “Liquidated” damages can exist even
when there is not an “indebtedness.” See,
eg., Precision Heavy Haul, Inc. v, Trail
King Indus. Inc., 224 Aviz. 159, 161-62, 117,
14, 228 P.3d 895 (App. 2010). Therefore,
while the majority of cases involving liqui-
dated damages may indeed be cases involv-
ing “indebtedness,” we cannot say that the
two terms are congruent.

HM 112 Instead, consistent with Met-
aler, we hold that courts must look to the
fundamental nature of the underlying obli-
gation to determine which subsection applies.
Here, while the litigation and resulting judg-
ment may have been necessary to secure
ASRS&’s refund of the money that the Univer-
sity paid, the obligation itself does not “de-
pend on the judgment for its existence.” Met-
gler, 235 Ariz. at 145, 117, 329 P.8d 1043.

118 ASRS’s obligation has all indicia of a
“debt.” ASRS cast the original demand that
created the overpayment, giving rise to the
need for refund, as an amount “due” within
90 days. ASRS’s own letter stated: “Pay-

1, Although ASRS urges “equities” favoring an
award of interest at 4.25%, it offers no authority
for the proposition that equitable considerations
bear on the applicable interest rate. Cf, Employ-

ment is due within 90 days of the invoice,
If not paid in full within that time, the ASRS
will assess interest on the balance at a rate of
eight percent (8%) until the amount is paid in
full.” (Emphasis in original.) It is difficult to
imagine a better fit for the word “indebted-
ness” than an amount “due” within a time
certain that carries a fixed interest rate if
any “balance” remains outstanding after the
due date. And the wording of ASRS’s letter
was not merely a rhetorical characterization
of a generic demand—A.R.S, § 38-749(C) es-
tablished the deadline for payment of actuar-
ial unfunded liabilities, the default interest
rate, and the concept of an “amount due.”
Therefore, had ASRS’s demand been merito-
rious, the underlying claim would have been
one by ASRS against the University for non-
payment of an indebtedness and ASRS would
haye received the benefit of the 10% interest
rate under A.R.S. § 44-1201(A).

114 We see no reason to treat a claim for
refund of an overpayment differently from
the claim that gave rise to the overpayment,
Properly applied, A.R.S. § 38-749 creates
“indebtedness” owed by employers to ASRS.
Claims for refunds of overpayments on such
indebtedness are likewise claims for indebt-
edness governed by A.R.S, § 44-1201(A)2

CONCLUSION

115 The University was entitled to 10%
prejudgment interest on an “indebtedness”
under A.R.S, § 44-1201(A). We therefore re-
verse the superior court’s order awarding
prejudgment interest at 4.25% and remand
for modification of the interest calculation.

116 The University requests an award of
costs on appeal under A.R.S, § 12-341,
ASRS argues the University was not a “suc-
cessful party to a civil action” under § 12~
341, ASRS did not raise this argument in the
first appeal, and it is therefore waived. Car-
rillo v. State, 169 Ariz, 126, 182, 817 P.2d 493
(App. 1991) (failing to raise an issue in first
appeal waives it as to the second appeal). We

er’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. McKeon, 170 Ariz. 75, 77,
821 P.2d 766 (App. 1991) (“[PIrejudgment inter-
est on a liquidated claim is a matter of right and
not a matter of discretion.””),

award the University its costs under § 12-
341, upon its compliance with ARCAP 21.

396 P.3d 627
Diana GLAZER, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve
STATE of Arizona, Defendant/Appellee.
No, 1 CA-CV 16-0416
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,
FILED 5/16/2017
As Amended May 22, 2017

392

The Leader Law Firm, Tucson, By John P.
Leader, Aiken & Scoptur, 8.C., Milwaukee,
WI, By Timothy Aiken, Zachar Law Firm,
P.C., Phoenix, By Christopher J, Zachar, Co—
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Daniel P. Schaack, Fred Zeder,
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jon
‘W. Thompson joined,

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

11 This appeal is from a trial court order
holding that interest on a $7.8 million judg-
ment against the State shall accrue pursuant.
to ARS. § 41-622(F), which allows for ac-
crual at a lower interest rate than the statu-
tory rate during an appeal of a judgment
paid out of the Risk Management Revolving
Fund. Diana Glazer, to whom that judgment
was awarded, argued that the reduced inter-
est rate should not apply because the judg-
ment was originally paid out of the Construc-
tion Insurance Fund. The State argued that
the lower interest rate should apply because
although it initially made payment from the
Construction Insurance Fund due to an ad-
ministrative error, once the State recognized
the error, it rectified the error by reimburs-
ing the Construction Insurance Fund from
the Risk Management Revolving Fund.

{2 Because the judgment against the
State was ultimately paid out of the Risk
Management Revolving Fund, the trial court
did not err by applying the reduced interest
rate described in A.R.S, § 41-622(F) for the
duration of the appeal. However, because the
State’s insurance carrier will reimburse the
State for $800,000 of that judgment, the re-
duced interest rate applies only to $7 million
of the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's order that A.R.S, § 41-622(F)
applies, but reverse the order’s application of
the statute to the entire judgment,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

138 In 2007, Glazer was seriously injured in
a head-on, crossover collision with another
vehicle on Interstate 10 that killed her hus-
band and young daughter. Glazer sued the
State, which designed and maintained the
interstate, for negligence in failing to con-
struct a median between the westbound and
eastbound lanes to prevent crossover colli-
sions. After a nine-day jury trial, the jury
awarded Glazer a verdict of $7.8 million,

94 Glazer subsequently lodged her pro-
posed form of judgment, which provided for
“interest at the legal rate of prime plus one
percent (currently 4.25%) per annum” from
the date of the jury’s verdict until paid in
full. The State objected, arguing that the
proposed judgment did not account for the
possibility that a lower interest rate could
apply while the case was pending appeal.
Although the legal interest rate normally
applies, A.R.S. § 41-622(F) allows interest to
accrue at a reduced rate during appeal for
judgments paid from the Risk Management
Revolving Fund. Glazer agreed, responding
that the interest rate during the time of an
appeal may be at a reduced rate, “but only so
long as the Judgment is ultimately paid out
of the ‘Risk Management Revolving Fund.’ If
the Judgment is ultimately paid from else-
where, [the legal rate] remains applicable.”
However, the trial court entered the judg-
ment against the State with interest to ac-
erue at the legal rate,

15 The State then moved to amend the
court’s judgment, arguing again that it im-
properly failed to account for a reduced in-
terest rate on the judgment while the case
was appealed. Glazer objected, arguing that
the court could not issue an order on “possi-
bilities,” and that the reduced rate would
apply only after the State paid the judg-
ment and proved that the monies came from
the Risk Management Revolving Fund. The
trial court granted the State’s motion and
subsequently entered an amended judgment
providing that “ARS. § 41-622(F) may
supplant the normal statutory interest rate
during the pendency of an appeal.”

116 After the trial court entered its amend-
ed judgment, the State appealed on issues

unrelated to the interest rate. When this
Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
the State petitioned for review to the Arizona
Supreme Court, That court also affirmed the
trial court’s judgment and issued its mandate
in the summer of 2015. Accordingly, the Ari-
zona Department of Administration’s (“De-
partment”) risk management section began
to process the payment of the judgment, The
State is self-insured up to $7 million, mean-
ing that the State pays for judgments against
it out of its own funds up to that amount.
Anything over that amount is covered by an
excess insurance policy with the State's in-
surance carrier, Because amounts above $7
million are paid for through reimbursements
from the insurance carrier, the Department
generated a “risk management payment re-
quest” for each of three installments totaling
the entire $7.8 million judgment. Each of
those requests reflected that the loss type
was “GEN-CIF,” a designation made for
general liability losses that arise from claims
relating to a roadway's design. The loss type
code does not instruct which account pay-
ment should come from though, so the re-
quests must also include an account code,
Each of the three requests for the Glazer
payments reflected the payment account
number of the Risk Management Revolving
Fund.

47 A Department adjuster approved the
requests on May 14, 2015, and forwarded
them for further approval by two other au-
thorized supervisors, After receiving the ad-
ditional approvals, the requests were sent to
a financial services technician for processing,
Upon receiving the requests, the technician
noticed the “GEN-CIF” loss type. Interpret-
ing “CIF” to mean that the payment should
come from the Construction Insurance Fund,
the technician changed the payment account
number from the Risk Management Revoly-
ing Fund to that of the Construction Insur-
ance Fund. This was the last recorded
change to the requests and was made with-
out approval from any of the authorized ad-
justers or supervisors that had previously
approved the requests, Three days later, the
Department issued three checks to satisfy
the judgment. The Department realized the
payment error two months later in July 2015,
To rectify it, a Department risk manager

393

transferred $7.8 million from the Risk Man-
agement Revolving Fund to the Construction
Insurance Fund to reimburse it.

18 In August 2015, Glazer requested a
status conference to determine the applicable
interest rate on the judgment, stating that
the parties disagreed on whether the legal or
the reduced rate applied. Specifically, the
State argued that the reduced rate should
apply because it corrected its mistake and
transferred the debt to the proper account.
Glazer argued that the higher rate applied
because the State failed to prove that it paid
the judgment out of the Risk Management.
Revolving Fund. Glazer also argued that
even if A.R.S. § 41-622(F) applied, the stat-
ute’s purpose of saving the State money
would not be served because the insurance
carrier—not the State—would pay the total
interest through the excess insurance policy,
Glazer also requested an evidentiary hearing
on the issue,

19 Before the evidentiary hearing, Glazer
moved for summary judgment, arguing that
because the State issued the check to pay the
judgment from the Construction Insurance
Fund, not the Risk Management Revolving
Fund, A.R.S. § 41-622(F) did not apply. The
State cross-moved for summary judgment,
positing that because the Construction Insur-
ance Fund is not a permissible source for
paying judgments like the one awarded in
this case and the funds ultimately came from
the Risk Management Revolving Fund,
ARS, § 41-622(F) applied to the judgment,
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
issued its ruling, agreeing with the State that
ARS. § 41-622(F) applied to the $7.8 million
judgment because the funds used to pay that
judgment ultimately came from the Risk
Management Revolving Fund. The trial court
found that the original payment from the
Construction Insurance Fund was an ac-
counting mistake caused by the unauthorized
change by the technician. The court conse-
quently ordered that “the interest accruing
on Plaintiffs’ $7.8 million Judgment shall be
paid at [the reduced rate] during the course
of Defendant's appeal.” Glazer timely appeal-
ed from that order.

394

DISCUSSION

Hl 110 Glazer argues that the trial court
erred by holding that ARS. § 41-622(F)
applies because the judgment was paid from
the Construction Insurance Fund, Alterna-
tively, Glazer argues that the trial court
erred by holding that the reduced interest
rate applied to the entire $7.8 million judg-
ment because the State paid only $7 million
of that amount. We review questions of statu-
tory interpretation de novo as questions of
law. City of Tucson v, Clear Channel Out-
door, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 178 15, 181 P.38d
219, 225 (App. 2008). Because the State paid
the judgment against it out of the Risk Man-
agement Revolving Fund, the lower interest
rate prescribed by A.R.S. § 41-622(F) ap-
plies for the duration of the case’s appeal.
However, because the State’s insurance car-
rier will pay $800,000 of the judgment, the
reduced interest rate applies only to the $7
million paid by the State from the Risk Man-
agement Revolving Fund.

$11 Our primary goal in interpreting a
statute is to give effect to legislative intent.
JHass Grp. LLC. v. Ariz. Dept of Fin.
Insts., 238 Ariz, 877, 884 127, 360 P.8d 1029,
1036 (App. 2015), In doing so, we look to the
statute’s plain language as the best indicator
of that intent. Azore, LLC v. Bassett, 236
Ariz, 424, 427 18, 841 P.3d 466, 469 (App.
2014). Further, we must construe the statute
in context with other related provisions and
its place in the statutory scheme. Hosea v,
City of Pha. Fire Pension Bd., 224 Ariz. 245,
250 {1 28, 229 P.3d 257, 262 (App. 2010). When
the statute’s language is clear and unambigu-
ous, we must give effect to that language
without employing other rules of statutory
construction. Indust. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Old
Republic Ins. Co., 223 Ariz, 75, 7 17, 219
P.8d 285, 287 (App. 2009).

112 Arizona statutes govern the interest
rates applicable to judgments. For most.
judgments, A.R.S. § 44-1201(B) requires
that, unless otherwise provided for by a dif-
ferent statute or in a written agreement,
interest on any judgment be “the lesser of
ten per cent per annum or at a rate per

1, See Daily Treasury Bill Rates Data, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, available at https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/

annum that is equal to one per cent plus the
prime rate” as published by the federal re-
serve system. For certain judgments against
the State however, A.R.S, § 41-622(F) pro-
vides for a different interest rate: “Interest
on any judgment against this state paid for
out of the risk management revolving fund
shall accrue at the average yield offered by
the United States treasury bills during the
course of the appeal.” This is usually a re-
duced rate!

1183 The trial court correctly concluded
that A.R.S. § 41-622(F) applies and interest
therefore accrued at the lower interest rate
during the course of the appeal. The statute’s
language is clear: any judgment against the
State that is paid for out of the Risk Manage-
ment Revolving Fund shall accrue interest at
the reduced rate. See Minjares v. State, 223
Ariz. 54, 62-68 1137-41, 219 P.8d 264, 272-73
(App. 2009) (examining A.R.S. § 41-622’s
plain language and legislative history), The
statute does not require that the checks is-
sued to pay the judgment be issued from the
Risk Management Revolving Fund. Nor does
the statute require that the judgment be
originally paid from that fund. See id. at 68
141, 219 P.3d at 278 (stating that “the legis-
lature clearly intended that when a judgment
against the State would be paid from the
Risk Management Revolving Fund, the nor-
mal statutory rate would not apply if there
was an appeal”) (emphasis added). Instead,
ARS. § 41-622(F) plainly states that if the
Risk Management Revolving Fund pays for a
judgment against the State, that judgment
acerues interest at a lower rate pending ap-
peal.

I 114 Here, although the funds to sat-
isfy the judgment originally came out of the
Construction Insurance Fund, the judgment
against the State was ultimately paid out
from the Risk Management Revolving Fund.
The payment requests had been generated
and approved by three supervisors with the
account payment code for the Risk Manage-
ment Revolving Fund. Without authorization,
a technician changed the code to that of the
Construction Insurance Fund, This was the

interestrates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=billrates
(last visited May 10, 2017).

last documented change to the payment re-
quests before the State issued the checks to
Glazer. Approximately two months later, the
Department became aware of the error and
corrected it by transferring the debt to the
account to which it had originally been coded.
Had the Department risk manager not trans-
ferred the funds to the Construction Insur-
ance Fund and the debt to the Risk Manage-
ment Revolving Fund, the former would have
been the account that paid the judgment.
However, that was not the case here, Despite
the accounting error, the judgment against
the State was paid for out of the Risk Man-
agement Revolving Fund,

115 Glazer argues that the statute cannot
apply because the interest due is an insured
loss that will be paid by the State’s excess
insurance coverage. However, who will pay
for the accrued interest has no effect on what
rate that interest will accrue at, This is par-
ticularly so here, where A.R.S. § 41-622(F)’s
application depends only on the type of judg-
ment and source of its payment, not on the
interest due. Thus, A.R.S. § 41-622(F)’s re-
quirements are met and the trial court did
not err by applying the lower interest rate
for the duration of the appeal.

HI 116 The court erred, however, by
applying the reduced interest rate to the
entire $7.8 million judgment. The State will
ultimately pay only $7 million of the judg-
ment out of the Risk Management Revolving
Fund. The State’s insurer will reimburse the
State for the balance of its obligation. Thus,
because the judgment that the State paid out
of the Risk Management Revolving Fund
totals $7 million, only that amount accrued
interest at the rate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-
622(F), The remaining $800,000 of the judg-
ment will be paid by the State’s insurer and
does not qualify for the reduced interest rate.
The State argues that the reduced interest
rate should apply to the entire judgment
because the statute’s language does not make
exceptions for amounts covered by excess
insurance coverage. However, the limiting
language is within the statute, which allows
application only for “any judgment ... paid
for out of the risk management revolving
fund.” The insurance carrier will not pay out
of that fund, so the statute does not apply to

395

that amount. We therefore remand to the
trial court to modify its ruling consistent with
this decision and to impose the proper inter-
est rate on the balance of the judgment.

CONCLUSION

{17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the trial court’s ruling that A.R.S. § 41-
622(F) applies, but only to the $7 million paid
for by the State. We remand to the trial
court to enter a corrected order consistent
‘with this decision.

396 P.3d 631

SOLARCITY CORPORATION, et
al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

ve.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, Defendant/Appellee.
SolarCity Corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
ve

Arizona Department of Revenue,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-TX 15-0008

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 5/18/2017

S
of

Mooney, Wright & Moore, PLLC, Mesa,
By Paul J. Mooney, Bart S. Wilhoit, Rose
Law Group, PC, Scottsdale, By Court 8.
Rich, Logan V. Elia, Counsel for Plain-
tiffs/Appellants/Appellees

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Kenneth J. Love, Jerry A. Fries,
Macaen F. Mahoney, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee/Appellant

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn
Kessler joined,

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

{11 In 2018, the Arizona Department of
Revenue (“Department”) decided that it
could value for taxation purposes solar ener-

gy panels owned by companies that lease and
install the panels on their customers’ proper-
ty for the generation of electricity. The De-
partment determined that the panels could
be valued because under the relevant Ari-
zona statutes, the panels were renewable en-
ergy equipment that solar power companies
used in the operation of an electric genera-
tion facility.

12 Two solar power companies, SolarCity
Corporation and SunRun, Ine. (collectively,
“Taxpayers”) sought a declaratory judgment
in the tax court that the solar panels were
not taxable. They argued that the panels
were not renewable energy equipment used
in the operation of an electric generation
facility, but were used for the customers’
production of electricity for their own con-
sumption, They also argued that because the
panels were solar energy systems designed
to produce electricity primarily for on-site
consumption, the panels had no value for
taxation purposes,

98 After considering cross-motions for
summary judgment, the tax court issued a
declaratory judgment agreeing with Taxpay-
ers that the solar panels were not renewable
energy equipment used in the operation of an
electric generation facility and could not be
so valued under the taxation statutes. The
tax court further declared, however, that con-
sidering solar panels designed primarily for
on-site consumption to have no value or to
add no value to property for taxation pur-
poses violated the Exemptions and Uniformi-
ty Clauses of the Arizona Constitution. The
court ruled that valuing the solar panels at
zero effectively exempted them from taxa-
tion, The court also ruled that distinguishing
between solar panels that are used “primari-
ly” for on-site consumption and those that
are not did not treat similarly-situated prop-
erty uniformly. The Department and Taxpay-
ers both appeal that judgment,

14 Upon review, we affirm the judgment
in part and reverse in part. The tax court
correctly ruled that the Department had no

1. After oral argument in this case and while this
opinion was pending, the Arizona Corporation
Commission replaced net-metering with a new
methodology for determining the rates at which
the customer is credited. See Arizona Corp.
Comm'n, Commission Passes Historic Decision to

399

statutory basis to value the solar panels
leased to Taxpayers’ customers because the
panels do not constitute renewable energy
equipment used in an electric generation fa-
cility. We reverse the tax court’s declaration
of unconstitutionality, however. Legislatively
mandating that Taxpayers’ solar panels have
or add no value for tax purposes does not
exempt them from taxation, and treating so-
lar energy systems designed primarily for
on-site consumption differently from those
that are not does not violate the principle of
uniformity because the two types of systems
are not similarly-situated property.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

15 Taxpayers sell and lease rooftop solar
panel systems to owners of residential and
commercial buildings and also install, main-
tain, and operate the panels. The solar panels
take solar energy, convert it to electricity in
an inverter, and use the converted energy to
meet the building’s current electricity de-
mands. Because this process generates elec-
tricity for the residence or commercial prop-
erty without drawing electricity from a utility
company, it is referred to as being “behind
the meter.” The energy that the solar panels
produce cannot be stored, however, and must
be used as it is generated. Accordingly, what-
ever generated electricity is not used to meet
the building’s current electricity demands
travels from behind the meter to power grids
owned and maintained by traditional utility
companies. Taxpayers’ solar panels are thus
“grid-tied,” or linked to the traditional utility
power grids.

16 Most homeowners with Taxpayers’ so-
lar panels have a “net-metering” agreement
with the traditional utility companies, Net-
metering is a process through which the
utility companies track the amount of elec-
tricity that flows from behind the meter onto
the grid from the building’s solar panel, and
credit the homeowner for the retail value of
that amount.! The utility companies then ap-

Protect Solar Interests and Provide Equity for all
Customers, available at http://www.azce.govw/
Divisions/Administration/news/2016Releases/12—
21-2016% 20Value% 20and% 20Cost% 200f%
20Solar% 20decision.pdf (last visited May 16,
2017).

400

ply this credit to offset the cost of electricity
that the home or building owner must pur-
chase from the utility company during times
when the solar panels cannot produce power.

17 Because the solar panels are intended
to generate and provide electricity to meet a
building’s needs, Taxpayers design each indi-
vidual system separately, In doing so, they
rely on the customer’s consumption data to
ascertain how much energy the building typi-
eally uses, as well as data relating to the
physical characteristics of the installation lo-
cation, After obtaining this data, Taxpayers
typically create a solar panel system that
produces less than 100% of the annual con-
sumption. This standard ensures compliance
with Arizona Corporation Commission regu-
lations that prohibit rooftop solar panel sys-
tems from producing more than 125% of the
location’s annual consumption. How much
electricity is actually consumed once a solar
panel system is installed, however, depends
on the habits of the building owners and
several other variables, including weather

and the number of occupants during a given
period,

18 In 2018, the Department issued a mem-
orandum analyzing two statutes to determine
whether solar panels “owned by a solar pow-
er company and installed at a customer's site
to sell or provide power to the customer” are
taxable and subject to valuation by the De-
partment or local valuation by the counties.
The first statute, A.R.S, § 42-11054(C)(Q),
(the “solar energy systems statute”) requires
the Department to prescribe guidelines for
applying standard appraisal methods and
techniques to be used by the county asses-
sors in determining a property’s value, The
statute specifies, however, that in applying
any prescribed standard appraisal methods
and techniques, “solar energy devices, ...
grid-tied photovoltaic systems and any other
device or system designed for the production
of solar energy primarily for on-site con-
sumption are considered to have no value and
to add no value to the property on which
such device or system is installed.” A.R.S,
§ 42-11054(C)(2). The second statute, A.R.S.
§ 42-14155 (the “renewable energy equip-
ment valuation statute”), requires the De-
partment to value “renewable energy equip-

ment” for taxation purposes at 20% of the
equipment’s depreciated cost. For purposes
of this renewable energy equipment valuation
statute, “renewable energy equipment”
means “electric generation facilities .., lo-
cated in this state, that [are] used or useful
for the generation ... of electric power ...
derived from solar ... not intended for self-
consumption.” A.R.S, § 42-14155(C)(8).

19 Reading these statutes together, the
Department concluded that leased solar pan-
els should be assessed by the Department
under the renewable energy equipment valu-
ation statute as renewable energy equipment.
The Department reasoned that because solar
panel companies—which own the panels—do
not consume the electricity the leased panels
produce, the panels are not intended for self-
consumption and therefore must be renewa-
ble energy equipment. The Department stat-
ed that this specific statute applies only when
the solar panels are leased by solar panel
companies, but not when the homeowners
themselves own the panels. In the latter
situation, because the solar panel owners
would be the ones using the produced ener-
gy, the solar energy systems statute would
apply and the panels would be considered to
have no value and add no value to the prop-
erty.

10 In May 2014, Taxpayers asked the
Department to reconsider its position be-
cause it had incorrectly interpreted the solar
energy systems statute. When the Depart-
ment notified Taxpayers that it stood by its
position, Taxpayers sought a declaration in
the tax court that the Department lacked
authority to assess Taxpayers’ leased solar
panels under the renewable energy equip-
ment valuation statute because the panels
were systems designed for primarily on-site
consumption, which meant that under the
solar energy systems statute, the panels had
no value or added no value to any property
on which the panels were installed.

{11 Soon after, Taxpayers moved for sum-
mary judgment on the interpretations of the
solar energy systems statute and the renew-
able energy equipment valuation statute.
Taxpayers argued that the tax court could
enter summary judgment without a need for
discovery because the issues presented in

the complaint were purely legal and no gem
ine issues of material fact existed. The De-
partment disagreed, however, and moved for
additional time to conduct discovery before
responding to Taxpayers’ motion, The De-
partment argued that it needed to obtain dis-
covery about how the solar panels deliver
electricity, who Taxpayers’ customers are,
and generally what Taxpayers’ business
models are, The tax court granted the De-
partment’s request.

12 Disputes continued over the following
months about the necessity and sufficiency of
discovery requests. Counsel met to confer
about the disputes and ultimately resolved
many by stipulation, But they were unable to
resolve disputes about the disclosure of Tax-
payers’ strategic plans and the names of
representatives that might have other
sought-after information, so the Department
moved to compel their production. The par-
ties then agreed to stay the motion to allow
time to depose Taxpayers’ representatives.
The Department nevertheless continued to
request additional time for discovery and ad-
ditional information, and ultimately asked the
tax court to lift the stay on the motion to
compel. The tax court denied the motion, The
Department later moved to compel again, but
the tax court denied the motion, finding that
although the Department maintained that
any disclosures it received from Taxpayers
were inadequate, the Department failed to
“describe the response to each request or
how, or why, such response is inadequate.”

118 In March 2015, the Department cross-
moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Taxpayers’ solar panels must be centrally
assessed by the Department under the re-
newable energy equipment valuation statute
as a matter of law. The Department argued
alternatively that the tax court should hold
that the valuation provided by the solar ener-
gy systems statute is unconstitutional as ap-
plied to Taxpayers’ leased panels because
those panels are not entitled to a zero-value.
It further argued that application of the solar
energy systems statute to leased panels vio-
lated the Uniformity Clause of the Arizona

2, Taxpayers separately filed protective valuation
appeals for the Department's valuations for the
2015 tax year. After completing briefing on ap-
peal, Taxpayers jointly requested that this Court

401

Constitution because “the electrical genera-
tion properties of traditional electrical gener-
ators can be valued under A.R.S. § 42-14151
[ (the “electric generation statute”) ] ... but
the electrical generation properties of dis-
tributed electrical generators,” which the De-
partment argued included leased solar pan-
els, cannot. In the meantime, the Department.
mailed notices of value to Taxpayers for the
2015 tax year valuing their properties consis-
tent with the 2013 memorandum?

114 The tax court granted Taxpayers sum-
mary judgment in part, holding that Taxpay-
ers’ solar panels do not conduct the “genera-
tion of electricity” for purposes of the electric
generation statute, and that the Department
therefore lacked the authority to centrally
assess the panels under that statute and the
renewable energy equipment valuation stat-
ute, The court reasoned that the solar panels
do not deliver the electricity they produce
through a transmission and distribution sys-
tem as the statute requires. The court stated
that the panels instead transfer any surplus
energy to the meter, where the traditional
utility companies receive it and then use
their own transmission and distribution sys-
tem to deliver that energy to their own cus-
tomers, The tax court concluded that because
the Department lacks authority to assess: the
solar panels, the panels must be locally as-
sessed and valued by the individual counties
pursuant to A.R.S, § 42-18051(A).

115 The tax court denied Taxpayers’ mo-
tion for summary judgment, however, on the
issue of valuation, finding the solar energy
systems statute unconstitutional for two rea-
sons. First, the tax court held that the solar
energy systems statute violated the Exemp-
tions Clause, Article 9, Section 2 of the Ari-
zona Constitution, because it effectively ex-
empted the panels from taxation, The tax
court reasoned that by mandating that solar
panel systems have no value for assessment
purposes, “whether no tax is assessed or a
tax is assessed on a value of zero, the result
is zero tax.” The court further stated that
although the Legislature may choose to not

take judicial notice of Taxpayers’ additional ap-
peals relating to the Department's valuations of
their properties for the 2016 and 2017 tax years.
‘We grant their requests.

402

tax certain categories of property, it may not
exempt otherwise taxable property.

116 Second, the tax court held that the
solar energy systems statute violated the
Uniformity Clause, Article 1, Section 1 of the
Arizona Constitution, because the statute dis-
tinguished between solar panels “primarily”
intended for self-consumption and those that
were not. Consequently, “within [the renewa-
ble energy equipment valuation statute’s]
class of equipment producing electricity not
for self-consumption,” two tax rates existed:
“zero for equipment meeting the ‘primarily’
standard and [20%] of depreciated cost for
other equipment.”

917 The tax court held that the solar
energy systems statute violates the Unifor-
mity Clause also because the statute would
apply differently “based on the amount of
electricity used by the building on which the
device is installed.” The tax court explained
through hypothetical examples that houses
with identical solar panels would be taxed
differently depending on whether the panels’
output was more or less than 125% of the
particular house’s consumption in a given
month,

1118 Additionally, the tax court denied all
requests for attorneys’ fees and sanctions
under A.R.S, § 12-349, finding that neither
party unreasonably delayed the proceedings.
The court stated that the novel nature of the
issues was such that the law and unfamiliar
factual scenarios were important to both
sides. The court further stated that neither
party acted in bad faith, but instead simply
disagreed on the scope of discovery and
strongly advocated accordingly. The court
also denied Taxpayers’ request for attorneys’
fees under A.R.S. § 12-848(B) because they
were not the prevailing parties, Although
Taxpayers received the sought-after declara-
tion that the Department lacked the authori-
ty to centrally assess the solar panels under
the electric generation statute and the re-
newable energy equipment valuation statute,
the tax court also held that the statute that
Taxpayers argued exempted them from taxa-
tion was unconstitutional. Finally, the court
held that, like Taxpayers, the Department
did not prevail for purposes of awarding

costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-832 and -841, and
denied their requests.

119 The court entered judgment consis-
tent with these rulings. Taxpayers timely
appealed from the portions of the tax court’s
judgment holding that the solar energy sys-
tems statute is unconstitutional and declaring
that the counties have authority to assess
and value their solar panels. The Department.
also timely appealed the tax court's judgment
that the Department cannot assess Taxpay-
ers’ solar panels under the electric genera-
tion statute and the renewable energy equip-
ment valuation statute. Both parties appeal
from the tax court’s denial of the imposition
of sanctions and attorneys’ fees against ei-
ther party.

DISCUSSION

1, The Department’s Assessment Au-
thority

TE 120 The Department first argues
that the tax court erred by granting Taxpay-
ers’ motion for summary judgment regarding
its authority to centrally assess Taxpayers’
solar panels. Specifically, the Department ar-
gues that the electric generation statute
mandates that it centrally assess Taxpayers’
leased solar panels because Taxpayers are in
the business of operating “electric generation
facilities” under the statute’s definition. Sum-
mary judgment may be granted when no
genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P, 56(a). When
the material facts are undisputed, this Court
determines whether the tax court correctly
applied the substantive law to those facts.
Duke Energy Arlington Valley, LLC v. Ariz.
Dep't of Revenue, 219 Ariz. 76, 77 14, 193
P.8d 880, 831 (App. 2008). We review the tax
court's granting summary judgment de novo,
Scotisdaie/101 Assocs, LLC v. Maricopa
Cty., 288 Ariz, 291, 292 17, 859 P.8d 1086,
1086 (App. 2015). We similarly review the tax
court’s construction of applicable statutes de
novo, See Chevron U.S.A. v. Ariz, Dep’t of
Revenue, 238 Ariz, 519, 520 1 6, 868 P.8d 136,
187 (App. 2015). Because Taxpayers’ solar
panels—regardless whether sold or leased—
do not fit within the electric generation or
renewable energy equipment valuation stat-

utes, the tax court did not err by granting
summary judgment.

121 The primary goal of statutory inter-
pretation is to effectuate the Legislature’s
intent. General Motors Corp. v. Maricopa
Cty., 237 Ariz. 887, 889 18, 350 P.8d 841, 848
(App. 2015). The statute’s plain language is
the most reliable indicator of that intent.
Sempre Ltd. P’ship v. Maricopa Ciy., 225
Ariz, 106, 108 15, 235 P.8d 259, 261 (App.
2010). In interpreting a statute, we consider
it as a whole, which includes considering its
context within a broader statutory scheme.
General Motors, 287 Ariz. at 3839 18, 350
P.8d at 848.

122 The Arizona Constitution states
that all property not exempt by law is sub-
ject to taxation. Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 2(18).
Subject to constitutional limitations, the Leg-
islature enjoys plenary power over taxation,
Waddell v, 88th St. P’ship, 178 Ariz, 187, 140,
840 P.2d 318, 316 (1992). In exercising this
power, the Legislature has directed that the
Department “shall annually determine the
valuation, in the manner prescribed by this
article, of all property, owned or leased, and
used by taxpayers” that are in the business
of operating an electric generation facility.
ARS. § 42-14151(A)(4). An “electric genera-
tion facility” includes “all land, buildings and
personal property that is situated in this
state and that is used or useful for the gener-
ation of electric power.” ARS. § 42-
14156(B)(1). The “generation of electricity”
means “the process of taking a source of
energy ... or renewable sources and con-
verting the energy into electricity to be deliv-
ered to customers through a transmission
and distribution system.” A.R.S. § 42-
14151(B). Further, the Legislature has man-
dated that the Department determine the full
cash value of taxable renewable energy
equipment at 20% of its depreciated cost.
ARS, § 42-14155(A), (B). “Renewable ener-
gy equipment” for purposes of the valuation
statute means “electric generation facilities

. used or useful for the generation, stor-
age, transmission or distribution of electric
power ... derived from ... nonpetroleum
renewable sources not intended for self-con-
sumption.” A.R.S, § 42-14155(C)(8).

403

128 None of these statutes authorize the
Department to centrally assess Taxpayers’
solar panels because: first, Taxpayers are not
in the business of operating an electric gen-
eration facility, and second, the solar panels
are not renewable energy equipment. First,
the electric generation statute does not apply
to Taxpayers because they are not in the
business of operating electric generation fa-
cilities that convert energy to electricity to
be delivered to customers through a trans-
mission and distribution system. While the
grid-tied solar panel systems that Taxpayers
sell or lease to their customers do take a
source of energy (solar) and convert it into
electricity, the panels do not do so specifical-
ly “to be delivered to customers through a
transmission and distribution system” as the
electric generation statute requires. The pan-
els convert the energy into electricity to be
consumed by the building on which they are
installed. The record shows that the panels’
location “behind the meter” allows the panels
to generate energy to meet the power de-
mand of the home or business on which they
are installed. Only after this power is made
available to a home or business does the
variable amount of surplus electricity travel
from behind the meter to traditional utility
company grids. Under the net-metering mod-
el, the traditional utility company purchases
that surplus electricity in exchange for a
eredit to the building’s owner, then distrib-
utes its newly acquired electricity through its
transmission and distribution system to its
own customers who need it at that time.

924 Taxpayers do not sell electricity or
control the use of the converted energy and
do not receive any benefit from the tradition-
al utility companies for the generation of
surplus power. Taxpayers’ involvement does
not reach beyond managing the purchase or
lease agreements with their own customers
and installing and maintaining the solar pan-
els. Although electricity generated by the
solar panels, if not otherwise used, may ulti-
mately end up supplying the power needs of
traditional utility customers, this is not the
primary purpose of the conversion of energy
by the panels. Instead, this is simply a sec-
ondary function that occurs when the individ-
ual customer’s demand fluctuates but the
generation of electricity remains constant. If

404

the purpose of Taxpayers’ solar panels was
the generation of electricity to export to the
grid for sale to utility customers, Taxpayers
would essentially be the utilities’ suppliers—
not their competitors as the Department
urges.

125 The Department counters that noth-
ing in the statute’s language specifies that all
produced electricity must be delivered to the
property owner’s (here, Taxpayers’) own cus-
tomers, and that interpreting it as such im-
properly adds words to the electric genera-
tion statute’s plain language. But giving the
statute the meaning that the Department
urges—that equipment generates electricity
if it converts energy that is ultimately deliv-
ered to any customer or end-user through a
transmission and distribution system—is the
interpretation that reads words into the stat-
ute, and is inconsistent with the statute's
plain meaning. The Department’s interpreta-
tion requires adding the words “any provid-
er’s” before “customers.” This interpretation
necessarily fails for yet another reason. The
Legislature would have had no need to speci-
fy that the electricity be delivered to “cus-
tomers” if it intended to apply to any person,
place, or thing that uses electricity received
from a transmission and distribution system.
Such intent could have been achieved by
omitting the word “customers.” This inter-
pretation thus would render the word insig-
nificant and superfluous. See Corbett v. Man-
orCare of America, Inc, 218 Aviz, 618, 629
1.85, 146 P.8d 1027, 1088 (App. 2006) (provid-
ing that in interpreting a statute, “we give
meaning to each word or phrase ... so none
is rendered insignificant, contradictory, su-
perfluous, or void”),

26 The Department additionally counters
that holding that Taxpayers’ solar panels do
not “generate electricity” pursuant to the
electrie generation statute would lead to ab-
surd results because “no merchant electric
facilities, which act as electric wholesalers,
would be subject to the Department’s valua-
tion and assessment.” However, the mer-
chant electric facilities the Department re-
fers to do convert energy to electricity to be
delivered to customers through a transmis-
sion and distribution system, Unlike Taxpay-
ers’ solar panels, which convert energy to be

used primarily to meet the power needs of
the buildings on which they are installed,
merchant electric facilities convert energy to
be delivered through the grid to utility cus-
tomers. Moreover, merchant electric facilities
convert energy on a large scale for sale to
utilities, rather than on a small scale for
personal use, as solar panels on individual
buildings do, In fact, the panels are limited to
producing no more than 125% of electricity
to meet a specific building’s calculated use—a
limitation not present for electric wholesal-
ers, Thus, the electric generation statute
does not apply to Taxpayers’ solar panels,

127 Second, just as the electric generation
statute does not apply because Taxpayers
ave not in the business of operating an elec-
tric generation facility, the renewable energy
equipment valuation statute also does not
apply because Taxpayers’ solar panels are
not “renewable energy equipment.” See
ARS, § 42-14155(C)@), In exercising its
plenary taxation power, the Legislature has
mandated that the Department determine
the full cash value of taxable renewable ener-
gy equipment—which includes equipment not
intended for self-consumption—at 20% of its
depreciated cost. See A.R,S. §§ 42-14155(A),
(B), -14155(C)(8). As explained above, the
solar panels do not “generate electricity” un-
der the electric generation statute because
they do not convert energy to be delivered to
customers through a transmission and distri-
bution system, and thus are not “electric
generation facilities” under the statutes’ defi-
nitions, Moreover, the panels convert energy
into electricity intended for self-consumption
by the panel owners or lessors. Accordingly,
because Taxpayers’ solar panels do not “gen-
erate electricity” in the way described by the
electric generation statute, the panels are not
“renewable energy equipment,” and the stat-
ute does not apply to them. The Department
thus lacks authority under it to centrally
assess the panels pursuant to the renewable
energy equipment valuation statute, and the
tax court did not err by granting summary
judgment on this issue.

2 The Solar Energy Systems Statute

HM (128 Taxpayers agreed with the tax
court that the electric generation and renew-

able energy equipment valuation statutes do
not authorize the Department to centrally
assess Taxpayers’ panels. But they contend
that the tax court erred by ruling that the
solar energy systems statute—which re-
quires that Taxpayers’ panels, as solar ener-
gy systems designed for the production of
solar energy primarily for on-site consump-
tion, “are considered to have no value and to
add no value to the property on which such
device or system is installed”—violates the
Arizona Constitution’s Exemptions and Uni-
formity Clauses. Ariz, Const. art. 9, §§ 1,
2(18).3 We review a statute’s constitutionality
de novo and, if possible, construe it to uphold
its constitutionality, State v Glassel, 211
Ariz, 38, 51 165, 116 P.8d 1198, 1211 (2005).
In doing so, we presume that the statute is
constitutional, Kurti v. Maricopa Cty., 201
Ariz, 165, 168 17, 88 P.8d 499, 502 (App.
2001). The tax court erred because the solar
energy systems statute neither exempts
property from taxation, nor treats similarly-
situated property different under the tax law.

2a. The Exemptions Clause

HN 1.29 Taxpayers argue that the tax
court erred by finding that the solar energy
systems statute unlawfully exempted the so-
lar panels from taxation because the Arizona
Constitution does not provide an applicable
exemption, Although we generally liberally
construe statutes that impose taxes in favor
of taxpayers, CCI Bwrope, Inc. v, Ariz. Dept
of Revenue, 287 Ariz, 50, 52 18, 344 P.8d 352,
354 (App. 2015), we strictly construe tax de-
ductions and exemptions, Ariz, Dep’t of Reve-
nue v. Raby, 204 Ariz, 609, 511-12 116, 65
P.8d 458, 460-61 (App. 2003). Even constru-
ing the statute strictly, however, the solar
energy systems statute does not improperly
exempt Taxpayers’ solar panels from taxa-
tion; therefore, the statute is not unconstitu-
tional,

Hs 180 The Arizona Constitution's
Exemptions Clause provides that all property
not specifically exempted by the Constitution
is “subject to taxation ... as provided by
law.” Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 2(18), This means
3, The Department concedes that the tax court

“went too far in making the blanket holding”
that the statute is unconstitutional. Instead, the

405

that the Legislature may impose a tax on all
property not specifically exempted and may
establish the mechanism for doing so, Aér-
port Props. v. Maricopa Cty., 195 Ariz, 89, 99
187, 985 P.2d 574, 584 (App. 1999), But “the
limited exemption authority that the Arizona
Constitution grants to the Legislature neces-
sarily curtails the scope of any tax-exemption
statute.” Univ, Med. v, Ariz, Dept of Reve-
nue, 201 Ariz, 447, 452 121, 86 P.8d 1217,
1222 (App. 2001). Stated differently, while
the Legislature may choose to not tax certain
classes of property, it may not exempt prop-
erty from taxation that the constitution does
not exempt and is otherwise taxable. Kunes
v. Samaritan Health Serv, 121 Ariz, 418,
415, 590 P.2d 1359, 1861 (1979).

HMM {31 Nevertheless, the provision
does not require that the Legislature tax all
property not specifically exempted, Airport
Props., 195 Ariz. at 99 137, 985 P.2d at 584
(stating that when something is “subject to”
an influence or action, “it does not communi-
cate the idea that it continuously and actively
is affected by that influence or action”), The
Legislature may choose to not tax certain
classes of property which it may otherwise
tax. Id. at 101 1.44, 985 P.2d at 586 (rejecting
the argument that the Legislature has a
positive duty to tax all non-constitutionally
exempt property unless the constitution re-
quires it not to).

82 As the tax court noted, the constitu-
tion does not provide a specific exemption for
solar panels, Consequently, the Legislature is
prohibited fom exempting the panels from
taxation, But the Legislature has not done so
here, It has instead directed that the Depart-
ment set guidelines for applying standard
appraisal methods and techniques to be used
by it and county assessors in determining the
value of property, The statute further pro-
vides that in applying those standard ap-
praisal methods and techniques to ascertain
the value of the solar panels, leased or
owned, the panels should be assessed as if
they have or add no value, In other words,
the Legislature has established that when

Department supports the trial court's ruling only

as it applied to Taxpayers’ leased panels, not to
solar panels owned by homeowners.

406

assessing taxes, solar energy systems should
not be separately valued.

133 We have previously held that a legis-
lative decision to not tax property does not
exempt property from taxation, but “omits
[the property] from the state’s exercise of its
power to tax by dint of sovereign political
discretion.” See id. at 101 148, 985 P.2d at
586, A similar but more straightforward situ-
ation exists here. The solar energy systems
statute’s plain language indicates that the
Legislature chose to exercise its power of
taxation and assign a value of zero to install-
ed grid-tied photovoltaic and solar energy
systems when applying standard appraisal
methods and techniques. The solar energy
systems statute is not an exemption from
taxation; it is merely the Legislature’s di-
rective to assess and tax a specific property
class in a particular way. Cf Cutter Aviation,
Ine. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 485,
498, 958 P.2d 1, 14 (App. 1997) (“Rather than
exempting certain property from taxation,
class 12 merely provided a different assess-
ment rate for such property” when it im-
posed only a 1% tax rate instead of the 25%
tax rate imposed upon property in other
classes). Accordingly, the statute does not
violate the Exemptions Clause,

2b. The Uniformity Clause

Hs‘184 ‘Taxpayers further argue
that the tax court erred by holding that the
solar energy systems statute violates the
Uniformity Clause by creating two tax rates
for “equipment producing electricity not for
self-consumption” depending on whether the
equipment “meet[s] the ‘primarily’ standard.”
If the Legislature chooses to tax property,
the Uniformity Clause mandates that “all
taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
property within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax.” Ariz. Const. art. 9,
§ 1, A “class” of property includes “similarly-
situated properties possessing common at-
tributes ‘based on the nature of the property
or on some other real difference in its use,
utility, or productivity,” ” Adleen H. Char.
Life Interest v. Maricopa Cty., 208 Ariz. 286,
292 115, 93 P.3d 486, 492 (2004), A statutory
classification violates the Uniformity Clause
if it applies differently to businesses that (1)

are direct competitors, (2) provide similar
services, (8) have the same customer base,
and (4) use the same equipment type. Cable
One, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 282 Ariz.
275, 286 149, 304 P.8d 1098, 1109 (App.
2018). In considering these factors, courts
look at the property's physical attributes,
productivity, use, and purpose. In re Amer-
ica W., 179 Aviz. 528, 582 n.4, 880 P.2d 1074,
1078 n.4 (1994), But the paramount concern
is whether the properties and the comparison
taxpayers are functionally equivalent. Citi-
zens Telecomm. Co, of White Mountains v.
Ariz, Dept of Revenue, 206 Ariz, 38, 39 1 24;
75 P.3d 128, 129 (App. 2008).

985 Here, the tax court incorrectly held
that the solar energy systems statute violates
the Uniformity Clause. Taxpayers are not
functionally equivalent to the local utilities
and electric generation facilities taxed under
the electric generation and renewable energy
equipment valuation statutes. Taxpayers and
local utilities and other electrical generators
are not direct competitors, Large-scale utility
facilities produce large amounts of energy to
be made available to all traditional utility
customers, They sell the service of providing
this electricity through the companies’ trans-
mission and distribution systems. Converse-
ly, the solar panels Taxpayers lease and in-
stall are typically designed to meet less than
100% of the energy demand of the building
on which they are located, and are capped to
produce up to 125% of that building’s de-
mands. The solar panel companies sell the
service of designing a solar panel system
appropriate for the building and sell or lease
the product itself. The electricity produced is
intended primarily to meet the power needs
of the building on which the panels are in-
stalled, and only after it meets those needs
does surplus energy, if any, move from be-
hind the meter to the grid so that traditional
utilities can deliver it to their customers,

186 The equipment governed by the solar
energy and electric generation statutes also
provides different services to different cus-
tomer bases. The most notable difference is
the former: Taxpayers and owners of renew-
able energy equipment provide different ser-
vices. Taxpayers lease or sell individual solar
panels to be installed on roof tops. Those

panels are intended to produce electricity to
be consumed initially by the building on
which they sit. Any surplus electricity then is
transferred to the grid and the homeowner
receives a credit. In contrast, renewable en-
ergy equipment that “generates electricity”
pursuant to the electric generation statute
produces energy specifically to be delivered
to traditional electricity customers through
the utility-maintained transmission and dis-
tribution system. The energy produced is not
intended to be self-consumed or consumed on
site. Consequently, the two taxpayers and
types of property also serve different cus-
tomer bases.

187 Finally, Taxpayers and local utilities
or other electric generators do not use the
same type of property. As explained above—
and as the tax court found—the renewable
energy equipment valuation statute does not
apply to Taxpayers’ solar panels because the
panels do not fit into that statute’s definition
of “renewable energy equipment.” The re-
newable energy equipment that the renewa-
ble energy equipment valuation statute ap-
plies to are electric generation facilities not
intended for self-consumption. Taxpayers’
solar panel systems, on the other hand, are
designed to convert solar energy into elec-
tricity to be used primarily for on-site con-
sumption by the building on which they are
installed. The panels are also installed “be-
hind the meter,” while the equipment used
by electric generators is installed in front of
it. Additionally, Taxpayers’ solar panels are
limited in design to produce up to 125% of a
particular building’s power needs pursuant to
state regulations, unlike the equipment used
by large electric generation facilities that
generate sufficient energy to help meet all
current power demands of their customers.
Accordingly, the equipment described in the
solar energy systems statute that is consid-
ered to have no value and add no value is
different than the equipment described in the
electric generation and renewable energy
equipment valuation statutes that is valued at
20% of the depreciated costs. Because of
their difference, the two kinds of property
may be properly taxed differently. Thus, the
tax court erred by concluding that the solar
energy systems statute unconstitutionally vi-
olates the Uniformity Clause.

407

938 In addition, the tax court erred by
finding that the solar energy systems statute
violated the Uniformity Clause because it
would apply differently to taxpayers based
on how much electricity the customer actual-
ly used. As Taxpayers note, the tax court’s
hypothetical examples of houses with identi-
eal solar panels illustrated that the court
misread and misapplied the solar energy sys-
tems statute. The statute’s plain language
states that it applies to systems designed
primarily for on-site consumption. Whether
the buildings on which the panels are install-
ed actually consume less than 125% of the
electricity produced (consistent with the in-
dustry’s standard for when a device is for
“primarily” on-site consumption) is not a con-
sideration that the statute requires. So long
as the panels were designed to be used pri-
marily for on-site consumption and otherwise
meet the requirements set out in the solar
energy systems statute, the statute applies
regardless of actual usage. But following the
tax court's logic, the zero-value could apply
to solar panels on any one home one month if
the energy generated by the solar panels was
used by the consumer, but not the following
month if its electricity consumption declined
during that time. This would be an absurd
result. See Raby, 204 Ariz. at 511 915, 65
P.8d at 460 (stating that the courts consider
statutes as a whole and attempt to give them
a fair and sensible meaning while avoiding a
construction that produces an absurd result),
The tax court’s interpretation is therefore
incorrect.

139 Thus, because the statute applies to
all rooftop solar energy systems uniformly
and does not treat similar property different-
ly, the solar energy systems statute is not
unconstitutional, Accordingly, the tax court
erred and we reverse its judgment holding
that the solar energy systems statute violates
the Exemptions and Uniformity Clauses of
the Arizona Constitution.

8. Local Assessment.

Hs 40 Taxpayers next argue that
the tax court erred by holding that counties
must locally assess the solar panels pursuant
to A.R.S. § 42-18051(A). In Arizona, taxable

408

property is assessed at its full cash value.
ARS, § 42-11001(5). A property's “full cash
value” is the value determined by statute, or
in the absence of a statutory valuation meth-
od, the estimate of the value that is derived
annually by using standard appraisal meth-
ods and techniques. London Bridge Resort,
Ine, v. Mohave Cty., 200 Ariz, 462, 464 1 6, 27
P.8d 819, 821 (App. 2001), Here, the solar
energy systems statute mandates that “the
Department shall” prescribe the guidelines
for applying standard appraisal methods and
techniques. The statute further requires that
in applying those methods and techniques,
grid-tied photovoltaic systems, as described
in subsection (C)(2), shall be considered to
have no value and add no value. Thus, the
statute provides a method for the Depart-
ment, not the counties, to value the solar
panels, Because the solar energy systems
statute is constitutional and applies, the tax
court erred by holding that the panels should
be locally assessed.

4, Sanctions and Attorneys’ Fees

Ws‘ 41. The Department argues fi-
nally that the tax court erred by denying its
motion for sanctions against Taxpayers. Tax-
payers argue that the tax court abused its
discretion by holding that they did not pre-
vail and by declining to award their attor-
neys’ fees, We review the court’s denial of
attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.
Hormel v. Maricopa Cty., 224 Ariz. 454, 461
127, 282 P.8d 768, 775 (App. 2010). But we
review de novo the tax court’s denial of sanc-
tions pursuant to ARS. § 12-849, Id. In
doing so, we review the tax court’s findings
of fact under a clearly erroneous standard
but review its application of the statute de
novo. City of Casa Grande v. Ariz. Water
Co., 199 Ariz. 547, 555 127, 20 P.8d 590, 598
(App. 2001), The tax court did not err by
denying the Department’s motion for sanc-
tions and fees under A.R.S. § 12-349, but did
abuse its discretion by denying Taxpayers’
request for fees.

HH 142 As relevant here, A.R.S, § 12-
849 requires a court to impose reasonable
attorneys’ fees and expenses against a party
or attorney under two circumstances: first, if
the party or attorney unreasonably expands

or delays the proceeding; second, if the party
or attorney engages in abuse of discovery.
AUR.S. § 12-849(A)(8) and (4). A court may
also award fees and other expenses under
ARS, § 12-848(B)(1) to a party that prevails
in an action against the State challenging the
assessment of taxes. A party prevails for
purposes of this statute if the party prevails
by an adjudication on the merits. Corley v.
Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 160 Ariz.
611, 618, 775 P.2d 589, 541 (App. 1989).

MM 148 Here, the tax court’s factual
findings in denying the Department’s motion
for sanctions and fees under A.R.S, § 12-349
support its judgment and were not clearly
erroneous. The parties had engaged in dis-
covery disputes for nearly the entire duration
of the litigation in the tax court. In that time,
the parties had met and conferred, and large-
ly resolved most of the disputes, The tax
court intervened on matters not resolved—
including the Department’s insistence that
Taxpayers possessed unknown documents
that would be helpful to it, and setting multi-
ple depositions of many representatives. Af-
ter these depositions, the Department contin-
ued to request additional time for discovery
and additional documents, arguing that the
information received from Taxpayers was in-
adequate. The Department failed, however,
to sufficiently describe how Taxpayers’ re-
sponses to the discovery requests were inad-
equate, Further, both parties remained ada-
mant in their positions throughout regarding
whether discovery was necessary given the
nature of the suit, issues presented, and re-
lief sought. Under these facts, the parties
clearly did not act unreasonably or abusively,
but instead strongly advocated for their ad-
verse positions, None of these factual find-
ings were clearly erroneous, and the tax
court did not err by denying the Depart-
ment’s motion.

HE 144 The tax court did, however,
abuse its diseretion by failing to grant Tax-
payers’ fees and expenses pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 12-848(B)(1). Taxpayers’ complaint specifi-
cally sought a declaration that the solar en-
ergy systems statute applies to their solar
panels and therefore their property is not
subject to separate valuation or assessment
by the Department. The complaint also

sought a declaration that the renewable en-
ergy equipment valuation statute does not
apply to or authorize the Department to cen-
trally assess the solar panels, Although the
tax court correctly found that the renewable
energy equipment valuation statute did not
apply to Taxpayers’ solar panels, it incorrect-
ly held that the solar energy systems statute
is unconstitutional. Had the court correctly
found that the statute was constitutional,
Taxpayers would have prevailed on all mat-
ters by an adjudication on the merits, and
therefore would have been entitled to fees.
In addition, this lawsuit challenged the
State’s assessment of taxes, which Taxpayers
have prevailed on by adjudication of the mer-
its, Taxpayers are therefore entitled to fees
under ARS, § 12-848(B)(1) and the tax
court erred by denying Taxpayers’ request.
Accordingly, we reverse the tax court’s judg-
ment denying fees and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

5. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

145 Taxpayers request attorneys’ fees on
appeal pursuant to ARS, § 12-848(B). In
our discretion, we grant them reasonable at-
torneys’ fees in an amount to be determined
upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21,

CONCLUSION

146 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the tax court’s declaration that Taxpayers’
solar panels cannot be centrally assessed
pursuant to the electric generation statute
and the renewable energy equipment valua-
tion statute. We also affirm the tax court’s
denial of the Department’s motion for sanc-
tions against Taxpayers. However, we re-
verse the tax court’s judgment that the solar
energy systems statute is unconstitutional
and cannot apply to Taxpayers’ solar panels,
as well as the court’s mandate that the coun-
ties locally assess the panels. We also reverse
the tax court’s denial of Taxpayers’ request
for attorneys’ fees and remand for proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

409
396 P.3d 645
Pamela A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff/Appellant,
ve

ARIZONA REGISTRAR OF
CONTRACTORS, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0266

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 5/25/2017

>
ary
oS

|

Porter Law Firm, Phoenix, By Robert S.
Porter, Ryan P, Dyches, Counsel for Plain-
tiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By John R. Tellier, Thomas C, Raine,
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Paul J.
MeMurdie joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

71 Pamela A. Johnson, Plaintiff/Appellant,
appeals the superior court’s order dismissing
her “appeal” from a final administrative deci-
sion of the Arizona Registrar of Contractors,
Defendant/Appellee. Johnson argues that be-
cause Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
section 12-904(A) (2016) does not state where
an appealing party must file a notice of ap-
peal from a final administrative decision, she
was entitled to file her notice of appeal with
the Registrar, instead of with the superior
court. We reject this argument and affirm
the superior court’s order dismissing her ap-
peal as untimely.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

12 In 2010, homeowners hired Forsythe
and Sons Construction, Inc, (“Forsythe”) to
complete roofing work on their house. In
2012, the homeowners sold the house to

Johnson. After Johnson obtained possession
of the house, she discovered that the roof
leaked. Subsequently, she filed a complaint
against Forsythe with the Registrar. An in-
vestigator for the Registrar investigated her
complaint and issued a “Corrective Work
Order” giving Forsythe 15 days to correct
the deficient work. Forsythe failed to correct
the work and ultimately the Registrar issued
a finite suspension of Forsythe’s license.

18 On October 7, 2014, Johnson filed a
recovery fund claim with the Registrar! The
Registrar denied her claim and Johnson re-
quested a hearing before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) of the Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings (“OAH”) to challenge the
Registvar’s denial. After conducting a hear-
ing, the ALJ ruled the Registrar had appro-
priately denied Johnson’s claim. Pursuant to
ARS. § 41-1092.08(B) (2018) (director may
accept, reject, or modify ALJ’s decision), the
Registrar accepted the ALJ’s decision and
the Registrar’s decision became the final ad-
ministrative decision in the case on Septem-
ber 15, 2015 (“September 15 Registrar Deci-
sion”),

14 On October 14, 2015, Johnson attempt-
ed to appeal the September 15 Registrar
Decision by filing a document entitled “Com-
plainant’s Notice of Appeal” with the Regis-
trar (the “Registrar NOA”). That document
listed Forsythe, but not the Registrar, as the
“Respondent.” Johnson did not file the Reg-
istrar NOA in the superior court. On October
21, 2015, Johnson delivered to the Registrar
and the OAH a document entitled “Com-
plainant’s A.R.S. § 12-904B Notice.” John-
son did not file that document in the superior
court either. Finally, on October 27, 2015,
Johnson filed a document entitled “Notice of
Appeal from and Request for Review of Final
Administrative Decision” in the superior
1, The Residential Contractors’ Recovery Fund is

a fund that allows the Registrar to award “any

person injured by an act, representation, transac-

tion or conduct of a residential contractor” an
award not to exceed $30,000 “for damages sus-
tained by the act, representation, transaction or

conduct." A.R.S, § 32-1132(A) (2016).

2, Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here,
service under A.R.S. § 12-904(A) is complete
when the decision is personally delivered to the

“party affected” or five days after the date the
decision is mailed to the party's last known ad-

411

court, listing Maricopa County as “Appellee”
(the “Superior Court NOA”), That document
did not list the Registrar as a party, howev-
er,

15 The Registrar moved to dismiss, argu-
ing Johnson’s Superior Court NOA was un-
timely under A.R.S. § 12-904(A), a statute
that sets forth the procedure and deadlines
for filing an action to review a final adminis-
trative decision. While that motion was pend-
ing, Johnson moved to amend the caption to
substitute the Registrar and Forsythe as ap-
pellees, Although the superior court granted
that motion, the superior court nevertheless
granted the Registrar's motion to dismiss,
finding Johnson’s Superior Court NOA un-
timely under A.R.S, § 12-904(A).

DISCUSSION

HI 16 On appeal, Johnson does not dis-
pute that she did not file her Superior Court
NOA within the deadline established by
ARS. § 12-904(A).? Instead, Johnson argues
A.R.S, § 12-904(A) fails to state where an
appealing party must file a notice of appeal
from a final administrative decision and,
therefore, the superior court should not have
dismissed her appeal because she filed the
Registrar NOA with the Registrar before the
statutory appeal deadline expired. Exercising
de novo review on this issue, we disagree.
See Doty-Perez v. Doty-Perez, 241 Ariz, 872,
375, 117, 888 P.8d 9, 12 (App. 2016) (appel-
late court interprets statutes de novo) (cita-
tion omitted); M-11 Ltd. P’ ship v. Gom-
mard, 235 Ariz, 166, 168, 16, 880 P.3d 356,
858 (App. 2014) (appellate court reviews mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo).

dress, A.RS. § 12-904(A), Here, the Registrar

mailed the September 15 Registrar Decision to

Johnson on September 15, 2015. Service was

complete five days later on September 20, 2015.

Because the 35th day fell on a Sunday, Johnson

was required to file a notice of appeal from the

September 15 Registrar Decision on or before

October 26, 2015. Although Johnson filed the

Registrar NOA with the Registrar on October 15,

2015, she did not file the Superior Court NOA in

the superior court until October 27, 2015, one

day after the appeal deadline.

412

Hs 17 The process for judicial review
of final administrative decisions is set out in
title 12, chapter 7, article 6, A.R.S, §§ 12-901
to -914 (2016), Under A.R.S. § 12-904(A),
“faln action to review a final administrative
decision shall be commenced by filing a no-
tice of appeal within thirty-five days from the
date when a copy of the decision sought to be
reviewed is served upon the party affected.”
The deadline for filing an administrative ap-
peal is jurisdictional. Smith v. Ariz, Citizens
Clean Elections Comm'n, 212 Ariz, 407, 418,
125, 182 P.8d 1187, 1198 (2006) (citation
omitted), An untimely filing deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction, and the
appealing party forfeits the right to seek
judicial review. M-11 Lid. P’ship, 285 Ariz,
at 168, 12, 880 P.8d at 358; see also A.R.S,
§ 12-902(B) (“Unless review is sought of an
administrative decision within the time and in
the manner provided in this article, the par-
ties to the proceeding before the administra-
tive agency shall be barred from obtaining
judicial review of the decision.”).

18 Although Johnson argues A.R.S. § 12-
904(A) is silent on where an appealing party
must file a notice of appeal, it is not, in fact,
silent. To obtain judicial review of a final
administrative decision, A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
directs the appealing party to “commence”
an “action” by filing a notice of appeal. By
statute, an “action” is “any matter or pro-
ceeding in a court, civil or criminal.” A.R.S.
§ 1-215(1) (Supp. 2016); Semple v, Tri-City
Drywall, Inc, 172 Aviz, 608, 611, 888 P.2d
1869, 1872 (App. 1992) (proceeding before the
Registrar of Contractors was not an “action”
for purposes of A.R.S, § 12-841.01 because it
was not “a proceeding before a court of
law”); Action, Black's Law Dictionary (10th
ed, 2014) (action is “{a] civil or criminal judi-
cial proceeding”); see also Mona Baskin and
Mary DeLaat Williams, Registrar of Con-
tractors, 8 Arizona Appellate Handbook
§ 84.8.6.2.1 (4th ed. 2014) (“An action for
judicial review of a registrar’s decision must.
be commenced by the filing of a Notice of
Appeal for Judicial Review of an Administra-
tive Decision in [the] superior court.”),
Therefore, A.R.S. § 12-904(A) directs an ap-
pealing party to file his or her notice of
appeal with the superior court, which com-

mences the action to review a final adminis-
trative decision,

19 The Arizona Rules of Procedure for
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
(“JRAD”), which apply to actions under title
12, chapter 7, article 6, underscore A.R.S,
§ 12-904(A)’s directive. JRAD 1(b) incorpo-
vates the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 38, in turn,
states, “[a] civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court.” (Emphasis add-
ed.)

110 Even if A.R.S. § 12-904(A) was silent
on where an appealing party is to file a
notice of appeal, the statutory scheme for
judicial review of administrative decisions
makes clear Johnson was required to file her
notice of appeal with the superior court, not
with the Registrar. “We construe statutes to
give effect to an entire statutory scheme,”
Backus v, State, 220 Ariz. 101, 104, 1110, 203
P.8d 499, 502 (2009) (citation omitted), For
example, A.R.S. § 12~-905(B) provides “an ac-
tion to review a final administrative decision
may be commenced in the superior court of
any county” that meets certain specified con-
ditions. A.R.S, § 12-905(B) (emphasis add-
ed). Further, other provisions of title 12,
chapter 7, article 6 require the appealing
party to file certain documents with the
agency, and these provisions would be mean-
ingless if an appealing party could file his or
her notice of appeal with the agency. See
Patches v. Indus, Comm'n, 220 Ariz. 179,
182, 110, 204 P.8d 487, 440 (App. 2009)
(“{Clourts must, where possible, avoid con-
struing statutes in such a manner as to pro-
duce absurd or unconstitutional results.”),

(11 For example, A.R.S, § 12-904(B) re-
quires an appealing party to file a “notice of
the action” with the OAH or the agency that
conducted the hearing within ten days after
filing a notice of appeal, If the appealing
party could commence the action by filing the
notice of appeal with the agency, no purpose
would be served by filing the “notice of the
action” with the agency as it already would
have had notice of the action. Similarly,
ARS, § 12-906 requires the appealing party
to serve the notice of appeal on the adminis-
trative agency. This requirement would be
superfluous if an appealing party could initi-

ate an appeal by filing the notice of appeal
with the agency itself. Finally, A.R.S, § 12-
907 requires the agency responding to an
appeal to file a notice of appearance in re-
sponse to the notice of appeal. If A.R.S.
§ 12-904(A) permitted an appealing party to
file a notice of appeal with the agency, there
would be no need for the agency to then file
a notice of appearance with itself.

112 Outside the context of title 12, chapter
7, article 6, A.R.S, § 12-284(A) (2016), which
governs fees for civil proceedings, requires
an appealing party to pay the clerk of the
superior court for filing of a notice of appeal
under A.R.S. § 12-904, It would make little
sense for an appealing party to pay fees to
the superior court if that party could initiate
an appeal with the agency directly.

113 Despite the foregoing, Johnson argues
that because other appeal rights require the
appealing party to initiate the appeal in the
eourt from which the appeal is taken, we
should construe the statutory scheme as al-
lowing a party to file a notice of appeal from
a final administrative decision with the agen-
ey rather than the superior court. Johnson
points out that judgments rendered in a jus-
tice court are appealed to the superior court
by filing a notice of appeal in the justice
court, Ariz. R. Super, Ct. App. P. Civ. 3(a),
and judgments rendered in the superior
court are appealed to the court of appeals by
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
superior court, Arizona Rule of Civil Appel-
late Procedure (“ARCAP”) 8(a). Johnson also
points out a party may obtain a hearing on
an “appealable agency action or contested
case” by filing a notice of appeal or request
for a hearing with the agency, A.R.S. § 41-
1092.03(B) (2013).

114 Johnson’s argument, however, ignores
these appeal rights are grounded on statutes
or rules expressly requiring the appealing
party to initiate the appeal by filing a notice
of appeal with the entity that rendered the
decision. No such statute or rule supports
Johnson’s argument that filing a notice of
appeal with the Registrar is timely for pur-
poses of A.R.S, § 12-904(A). “Courts will not
read into a statute something that is not
within the manifest intent of the legislature
as indicated by the statute itself...” Cico-

413

ria v. Cole, 222 Aviz, 428, 481, 115, 215 P.38d
402, 405 (App. 2009) (citation omitted), And,
Johnson’s argument ignores that the Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure, which require an
appealing party to file a complaint in the
superior court, are incorporated into JRAD.
See supra 19.

115 The Legislature's 2012 amendment of
A.R.S. § 12-904(A) does not, as Johnson also
argues, evidence the Legislature’s intent to
allow an appealing party to initiate an appeal
by filing the notice of appeal with the agency
itself, Before 2012, A.R.S. § 12-904(A) re-
quired an appealing party to commence an
appeal by filing a “complaint,” tracking the
language of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
8, In contrast, the current version requires
an appealing party to file a “notice of ap-
peal.” A.R.S, § 12-904(A). The amendment,
among other things, changed certain termi-
nology, such as changing plaintiff and defen-
dant to appellant and appellee, and removed
the requirement that an appellee file an an-
swer, The amendment did not, however,
change where an appealing party is required
to file the notice of appeal. The legislative
history of the 2012 amendment, H.R. Bill
Summary (April 28, 2012), S.B. 1198, 50th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012), does not
state or suggest that an appealing party may
file the notice of appeal with the agency.

116 Finally, Johnson argues that even if
she misfiled her notice of appeal in the
“wrong forum,” it was nevertheless timely
filed in a forum and should be considered
timely. We disagree.

O17 In making this argument, John-
son relies on Wilkinson v. Fabry, 177 Ariz.
506, 869 P.2d 182 (App. 1992), and Martinez
» Indus. Comm'n, 218 Ariz, 581, 144 P.8d
1260 (App. 2006), both of which relied on the
then in effect version of ARCAP 4(a). In
Wilkinson, the appealing party filed his no-
tice of appeal with the clerk of the court of
appeals instead of the clerk of the superior
court, Wilkinson, 177 Ariz, at 506, 869 P.2d
at 182, Pursuant to ARCAP 4(a), we held the
appealing party’s notice of appeal was timely.
Id. ARCAP 4(a) then provided:

No papers received by the clerk within the

time fixed for filing which if untimely filed

414

would render the case, appeal or petition
subject to dismissal by the appellate court
for jurisdictional reasons, shall be refused
by the clerk solely for the reason that they
were not tendered for filing in the proper
court or division. Rather, such papers shall
be transmitted to the proper court or divi-
sion and shall be deemed timely filed.

Id, at 507, 869 P.2d at 188 (quoting ARCAP
A(a)). Because the rule required the clerk of
the court to transmit the notice of appeal to
the proper court, the appealing party’s notice
of appeal filed with the clerk of the court of
appeals was timely, even though it should
have been filed in the superior court, Id.

{18 Here, as discussed, see supra 19, the
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, not AR-
CAP, apply to Johnson’s claims. As discussed
above, Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 3
states, “A civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court.” Therefore, the
reasoning of Wilkinson and ARCAP 4(a) is
inapplicable.

HI 1119 In Martinez, the appealing party
filed his petition for special action from an
Industrial Commission award with the Indus-
trial Commission instead of with the court of
appeals. Martinez, 218 Ariz. at 581-32, 11,
144 P.8d at 1260-61. In addition to examining
ARCAP 4(a), the court also considered
ARS, § 12-120.22(B) (2016),3 which pro-
vides:

No case, appeal or petition for a writ
brought in the supreme court or court of
appeals shall be dismissed for the reason
only that it was not brought in the proper

3. This statute has not been amended since its

court or division, but it shall be transferred

to the proper court or division.
Id, at 582, 16, 144 P.8d at 1261.

120 Because the Arizona Rules of Proce-
dure for Special Actions incorporated AR-
CAP, and the Industrial Commission acts as
a “quasi-judicial body,” we concluded that
under ARCAP 4(a) and ARS. § 12
120.22(B), the misfiled petition for special
action was timely. Id, at 538, 18, 144 P.8d at
1262.

21 Here, as discussed, see supra 118,
former ARCAP 4(a) is inapplicable. Further,
ARS, § 12-120.22(B) addresses appeals
“brought in the supreme court or court of
appeals.” Johnson’s appeal did not involve an
appeal brought in either the supreme court
or the court of appeals. Instead, the superior
court sits as an appellate court in its review
of the Registrar's final decision. See A.R.S,
§ 12-911 (outlining powers of superior court
in reviewing agency’s final decision). Finally,
as discussed, see supra 18, on its face, A.R.S,
§ 12-904(A) requires an appealing party to
file the notice of appeal with the superior
court. Therefore, A.R.S. § 12~-120.22(B) is in-
applicable,

CONCLUSION

122 For the foregoing reasons, we agree
with the superior court that Johnson did not
timely appeal the September 15 Registrar
Decision. Therefore, we affirm the superior
court’s order dismissing her appeal.

adoption, we therefore cite the current version.

396 P.3d 1095

STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,
ve

The Honorable Hugh HEGYI, Judge of the
Superior Court of the State of Arizona,
in and for the County of Maricopa, Re-
spondent Judge,

Josh Rasmussen, Real Party in Interest.
No. CR-16-0264-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed July 7, 2017

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County
Attorney, Jeffrey R, Duvendack, Amanda M.
Parker (argued), Deputy County Attorneys,
Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Joshua M. Blumenreich, The Blumenreich
Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix; and Natalee Se-
gal (argued), Ballecer & Segal, LLP, Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Josh Rasmussen

Kevin D, Heade (argued), Mikel Steinfeld,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Ari-
zona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

JUSTICE GOULD authored the opinion of
the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
TIMMER, BOLICK and LOPEZ joined.

JUSTICE GOULD, opinion of the Court:

11 We hold that, pursuant to Arizona Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11.4(b), a defendant
who asserts an insanity defense and volun-
tarily undergoes a mental health exam must.
disclose a complete copy of the expert’s ex-
amination report, including any statements
made by the defendant concerning the
charges against him. Accordingly, we disap-
prove the holding in Austin v. Alfred, 163
Ariz, 897, 788 P.2d 180 (App. 1990) to the
extent it permits a defendant to redact such
statements under Rule 11.4(b).

BACKGROUND

12 Defendant Josh Rasmussen was indict-
ed for armed robbery and felony murder.
After the charges were filed, his attorney
consulted with several mental health experts
regarding a possible insanity defense. Based
on their opinions, defense counsel filed a
supplemental notice of defenses listing insan-
ity, or guilty except insane, as a defense.
ARS, § 18-502(A).

3 Rasmussen eventually retained a psy-
chologist to testify in support of his insanity

defense. The State and Rasmussen also
agreed to an examination by a joint expert.
Both experts prepared reports that included
statements Rasmussen made about the pend-
ing charges.

14 The State requested copies of the ex-
perts’ reports. Defense counsel produced
copies, but redacted Rasmussen’s statements,
The State moved to compel, seeking disclo-
sure of complete copies. Rasmussen objected
based on Austin, 168 Ariz. at 400, 788 P.2d
180, and the superior court denied the State’s
motion. Cf Austin, 163 Ariz. at 400, 788 P.2d
180 (stating that Rule 11.4(b) implicitly al-
lows a defendant to redact his statements
from a mental health expert’s report), The
State then petitioned the court of appeals for
special action relief,

15 The court of appeals accepted jurisdic-
tion and granted relief, reversing the superi-
or court’s order. State v. Hegyi, 240 Ariz.
251, 256-57 1121-22, 878 P.8d 428, 433-34
(App. 2016). Departing from Austin, the
court held “that a defendant who is examined
by a non-court-appointed expert cannot, after
giving notice of the guilty-except-insane de-
fense ... redact his statements from his
expert’s report under Rule 11.4(b).” Hegyi,
240 Ariz, at 256 { 18, 878 P.8d 428.

16 We granted review to resolve whether
Rule 11.4(o) requires a defendant to disclose
his statements contained in a mental health
expert’s report. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120,24,

DISCUSSION

I 17 We review de novo the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules, State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 16,
160 P.8d 166, 168 (2007),

HH 118 Rasmussen argues the statements
he made during his mental health exams are
privileged under the Fifth Amendment and,
as a result, are not subject to disclosure
under Rule 11.4(b). U.S. Const, amend, V.

HH 19 The Fifth Amendment applies
to statements made by a defendant during a
court-ordered mental health examination, Hs-

telle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 468, 101
S.Ct, 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 859 (1981); Phillips v.
Araneta, 208 Ariz, 280, 282 117, 284 114, 98
P.8d 480, 482, 484 (2004). A defendant is not
required to disclose statements made during
a court-ordered exam, and such statements
are not admissible at trial. Smith, 451 U.S. at.
462, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866; Araneta, 208 Ariz.
at 284 7 14, 98 P.8d 480.

HI 110 However, when a defendant as-
serts an insanity defense, he waives his self-
incrimination privilege, Kansas v. Cheever,
— US. —, 184 S.Ct 596, 601, 187
L.Ed.2d 519 (2018); State v, Schackart, 175
Ariz, 494, 500-01, 858 P.2d 689, 645-46
(1998); State v. Tallabas, 155 Ariz, 821, 824—
26, 746 P.2d 491, 494-96 (App. 1987). Such
waiver is analogous to the rule that a defen-
dant who chooses to testify at trial may not
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to
avoid cross-examination. Cheever, 184 S.Ct.
at 601; Schackart, 175 Ariz, at 500-01, 858
P.2d 639; Tallabas, 155 Ariz. at 824-26, 746
P.2d 491. Additionally, fairness requires the
State have access to a defendant’s statements
to “rebut the evidence [of insanity] presented
by the defendant.” State v. Druke, 148 Ariz.
314, 818, 698 P.2d 969, 973 (App. 1984); see
Cheever, 184 S.Ct. at 601 (same),

Hi 111 In contrast to a court-ordered
exam, a defendant may request a mental
health exam. In such cases, a defendant’s
statements to the examiner are not com-
pelled. Thus, because the Fifth Amendment
only applies to compelled statements, the
privilege is not implicated. See Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 402, 422-28, 107 S.Ct.
2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 886 (1987) (when a defen-
dant requests a psychiatric exam or presents
expert testimony in support of a psychiatric
defense, he has no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against the admission of statements
made during the psychiatric exam); State v.
Mauro, 159 Ariz, 186, 195, 766 P.2d 59, 68
(1988) (holding that “the [Fifth [Almend-
ment protections ... are inapplicable” when
a defendant asserts an insanity defense and
requests the court appoint an expert to ex-
amine him); State v. Smith, 181 Ariz. 29, 34,
688 P.2d 696, 700 (1981) (“Since the appellant.
was examined at his own request, the expo-

417

sure which was invited was a clear waiver of
constitutional guarantees.”).

112 Consistent with these principles, Ari-
zona’s rules and statutes governing mental
health exams preserve a defendant’s privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Cf Hansen,
215 Ariz, at 289 17, 160 P.8d 166 (stating
that when possible, rules, statutes and consti-
tutional protections should be harmonized).
Avizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.7 is
“grounded in the [Flifth [Almendment,” and
provides that, absent waiver, a defendant’s
statements to a mental health expert are not
admissible at trial. Tallabas, 155 Ariz, at 828,
746 P.2d 491. Similarly, A.R.S. § 18-4508(A)
states that “[t]he privilege against self-in-
crimination applies to any [mental health]
examination that is ordered by the court
pursuant to this chapter.”

918 Arizona’s rules and statutes also pro-
vide that a defendant may waive his self-
inerimination privilege if he asserts an insan-
ity defense, Rule 11.7(a) prohibits admission
of a defendant’s statements “unless the de-
fendant presents evidence intended to rebut
the presumption of sanity.” Similarly, Rule
11.7(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s state-
ments about the pending charges are not
admissible “without his [] consent.” See State
v. Fitzgerald, 2382 Ariz. 208, 217 144, 308
P.8d 519, 528 (2018) (stating defendant
waives privilege contained in Rule 11.7(b)(1)
by placing his mental health at issue; by
doing so “defendant consent[s] to” admission
of his statements “for purposes of [Rule
11.7)(1) 1”); Tallabas, 155 Ariz, at 325-26,
746 P.2d 491 (holding that a defendant who
hhas an expert testify regarding an insanity
defense thereby “consents” to the use of his
statements for rebuttal under Rule
11.7(b)(1)); see also A.R.S. § 18-4508(B) (de-
fendant’s statements obtained during an ex-
amination are not admissible “unless the de-
fendant presents evidence that is intended to
rebut the presumption of sanity”); A.R.S.
§ 18-8998(D) (requiring disclosure of a men-
tal health expert’s complete report “[i]f any
mental disability defense is raised”),

114 Finally, Rule 11.4 addresses disclo-
sure of a defendant's statements made dur-
ing court-ordered and noncompulsory exams.
Compare Rule 11.4(a) (referring to “Reports

418

of Appointed Experts”), with Rule 11.4(b)
(referring to “Reports of Other Experts”).
Under Rule 11.4(a), when a defendant under-
goes a court-ordered exam, his statements to
the examiner “shall be made available only to
the defendant.” In contrast, Rule 11.4(b),
which applies to noncompulsory exams, pro-
vides that each party “shall make available to
the opposite party ... all written reports or
statements made by them in connection with
the particular case.” Jd. (emphasis added).

115 Relying on Austin, Rasmussen argues
that to safeguard his privilege against self-
incrimination, the redaction provision con-
tained in Rule 11.4(a) should be read into
Rule 11.4(b), Austin, 168 Ariz. at 400, 788
P.2d 130. We reject Rasmussen’s argument,
Rule 11.4(b), by its terms, does not refer to
redacting a defendant’s statements, The fact
that such language is contained in Rule
11.4(a) but not in Rule 11.4(b) suggests the
omission was intentional. See City of Flag-
staff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz. 395, 398-99, 793
P.2d 548, 551-52 (1990) (“Where the legisla-
ture uses a term within one statute and
excludes it from another, the term usually
will not be read into the provision from which
it was excluded.”).

116 Rasmussen also contends that
Rule 11.7(b)(1) prohibits disclosure of his
statements, We disagree. Here, Rasmussen
waived the privilege contained in Rule
11.7(b)(1) by asserting an insanity defense,
See supra at 113.

117 Rasmussen also argues that, as a poli-
cy matter, compelling defendants to disclose
statements under Rule 11.4(b) will force de-
fense counsel to make an untenable choice.
On the one hand, if counsel seeks to investi-
gate whether a defendant has a viable insani-
ty defense, and retains an expert to assist in
investigating that possibility, the defendant’s
potentially incriminating statements must be
disclosed to the state, On the other hand, if
counsel foregoes investigating an insanity de-
fense in order to protect a defendant’s in-
criminating statements from the state, the
defendant may be deprived of asserting a
viable defense. Cf Austin, 168 Ariz. at 401,
788 P.2d 180 (stating that “counsel’s duty to
investigate the charges and prepare for trial
are seriously impeded as a consequence of

disclosing the names and reports of retained
experts”),

I 118 These concerns are unwarranted.
The work product privilege protects disclo-
sure of a defendant’s statements to an expert
retained solely for the purpose of trial prepa-
ration. See Ariz, R. Crim. P, 15.4(b)(1) (work
product privilege); see also Ariz. R. Civ,
Proce. 26(b)(4)(B) (“[A] party may not diseov-
er facts known or opinions held” by an expert
retained for trial preparation “and who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial.”),
However, when a defendant asserts an insan-
ity defense and lists a mental health expert
as a trial witness, the work product privilege
is waived, and his statements to the expert
must be disclosed. State ex rel. Corbin v,
Ybarra, 161 Ariz. 188, 191-98, 777 P.2d 686,
689-691 (1989); see Ariz, R. Crim. P.
15.2(c)(2) (requiring defendant to disclose the
names and examination reports of trial ex-
perts).

{19 Although we hold that disclosure is
required under Rule 11.4(), this does not,
mean that all of Rasmussen's statements are
admissible at trial. Such statements are only
admissible to rebut his insanity defense, and
are not admissible to prove his guilt. A.R.S.
§ 18-4508(B); Cheever, 184 S.Ct, at 601; Bu-
chanan, 488 U.S, at 422-28, 107 S.Ct. 2906;
Tallabas, 155 Ariz, at 823-25, 746 P.2d 491;
of. Aviz, R. Evid, 408. We recognize there
may be overlap between Rasmussen’s state-
ments about the offense and those relevant
to his insanity defense. Tallabas, 155 Ariz, at
826, 746 P.2d 491. Nonetheless, the superior
court must ensure that the State’s use of
Rasmussen’s statements is “closely tailored”
to rebutting his insanity defense. Fitegerald,
282 Ariz, at 216-17 1139, 45, 303 P.8d 519;
see Cheever, 184 S.Ct. at 608 (holding that a
defendant’s statements to an examiner are
only admissible for the limited purpose of
rebutting defendant's insanity evidence); Tal-
labas, 155 Ariz, at 825, 746 P.2d 491 (distin-
guishing between the admissibility of “state-
ments relating to the issue of insanity from
[inadmissible] statements wholly unrelated to
that issue but tending to prove guilt”),

120 We therefore hold that under Rule
11.4(b), a defendant who asserts an insanity

defense and voluntarily undergoes a mental
health exam must disclose a complete copy of
his trial expert’s report, including any state-
ments made about the pending charges. Ac-
cordingly, we disapprove of Austin to the
extent it holds that such statements must be
redacted under Rule 11.4(b),

CONCLUSION

121 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate
the opinion of the court of appeals, reverse
the superior court’s order denying the state’s
motion to compel, and remand the case to the
superior court for further proceedings.

396 P.3d 1099
Marjan H. NIA, Petitioner/Appellant,
v
Ali H. NIA, Respondent/Appellee.
State of Arizona, ex rel. the Department

of Economic Security,
Intervenor/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0380 FC

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/15/2017

421

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix, By
Marlene A. Pontrelli, Counsel for Plain-
tiff/Appellant

Tiffany & Bosco P.A,, Phoenix, By David
L, Rose, Justin P. Nelson, Counsel for Re-
spondent/Appellee

Judge Paul J, McMurdie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kent E, Cattani and Judge Jon W.
Thompson joined.

OPINION
McMURDIE, Judge:

11 Marjan H. Nia (“Mother”) appeals
from a superior court order modifying Ali H.
Nia’s (“Father”) child support obligation, By
affirming the child support order, we hold
that (1) once the superior court determines
there is a substantial and continuing change
in circumstances, the court must apply the
Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R,S.”) section 25-820
app. §§ 20, 24 (2015) (“Guidelines”), and then
decide whether to deviate from the amount
calculated pursuant to the Guidelines; (2)
there is not a presumption for deviation
based on a previously deviated order; (8) if
the court finds that the application of the
Guidelines would be inappropriate or unjust,
it must make findings as to all relevant fac-
tors, including those set forth in A.R.S. § 25-
820(D); and (4) to deviate from the amount.
calculated pursuant to the Guidelines, the
court must determine both that the deviation
is appropriate and that it is in the best
interests of the child.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
12 Mother and Father have 17-year-old
triplets in common, The parties divorced in
2009. In a consent decree, Mother and Fa-

422

ther agreed to joint legal decision-making
and equal parenting time. They further stipu-
lated to have Father pay child support in the
amount of $3880 per month, an upwardly
deviated child support amount. In 2012, Fa-
ther filed a petition to modify child support
and, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the
court modified Father's child support to
$3500, instead of the $1100 per the Guide-
lines (“2012 Order”). The Child Support
Worksheet attached to the 2012 Order
showed Father’s gross monthly income at
$54,852 and Mother's at $18,694,

13 On June 10, 2015, Father filed a Peti-
tion to Modify Child Support requesting his
obligation be reduced to $406.94 per month
as calculated per the Guidelines.! Based on
the evidence presented at a hearing, the
superior court found Father’s income was
$32,783 per month and Mother’s was $22,489
per month. Both parents testified regarding
their expenses, the Children’s lifestyle during
the parents’ marriage, the Children’s extra-
curricular activities, health insurance pay-
ments, and other needs,

14 Mother requested that her expert wit-
ness on finances be present in the courtroom
during Father's testimony, Father objected,
and the superior court denied her request.

415 After the hearing, the superior court
concluded Father had shown a substantial
and continuing change in cireumstances war-
ranting a review of the child support order.
The court found, per the Guidelines, that
Father was obligated to pay $628.84 per
month in child support. The court deter-
mined a deviation from the Guidelines was
not appropriate, and ordered Father to pay
the guideline amount starting October 1,
2015. Father subsequently filed a Motion to
Correct Mistake arguing the order should be
effective from the first of the month follow-
ing the date of service of his petition to
modify. The court issued an amended final
order with the child support modification ef-
fective on July 1, 2015, Mother timely appeal-

4, The current Guidelines were adopted for ac-
tions filed after June 30, 2015, A.R.S. § 25-320
Appendix Preamble. However, the deviation cri-
teria under the 2011 Guidelines are the same as
the current Guidelines,

ed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
AR.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and (2)?

DISCUSSION

{16 Mother argues the superior court erred
by (1) finding substantial and continuing cir-
cumstances existed justifying a modification
of the 2012 Order; (2) applying the child
support Guidelines without considering the
parties’ previous deviation; (8) determining
Mother had the burden to prove an upward
deviation was in the Children’s best interests;
(4) applying the child support modification
retroactively without ordering that Mother
be reimbursed for expenses paid pursuant to
the 2012 Order; and (5) excluding Mother's
expert witness from the courtroom during
Father's testimony.

WM S117 “The decision to modify an
award of child support rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court and, absent an
abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
on appeal.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520,
15, 975 P.2d 108 (1999). “We will accept the
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we draw our own legal conelu-
sions from facts found or implied in the
judgment.” Nash v. Nash, 282 Ariz. 478, 476,
15, 807 P.8d 40 (App. 2013). “[Wle will up-
hold the award unless it is ‘devoid of compe-
tent evidence,” Id, at 478, 116, 307 P.38d 40
(quoting Jenkins v, Jenkins, 215 Ariz. 35, 37,
18, 156 P.8d 1140 (App. 2007), and for any
reason supported by the record, Watson v.
Apache County, 218 Ariz, 512, 517, 128, 189
P.8d 1085 (App. 2008). We interpret the
Guidelines de novo. Hetherington v. Hether-
ington, 220 Ariz. 16, 21, 121, 202 P.3d 481
(App. 2008).

A. The Child Support Modification was
Based on a Substantial and Continu-
ing Change in Circumstances,

18 Mother contends the superior court
erroneously found a substantial and continu-
ing change in circumstances existed to justify
modification of the child support paid by
2, We cite to the current version of applicable

statutes or rules when no revision material to
this case has occurred,

Father, and failed “to consider the best inter-
ests of the minor children in determining a
change in circumstances.”

HN 19 A child support order can be
modified “only on a showing of changed cir-
cumstances that are substantial and continu-
ing.” A.R.S. § 25-327(A); Guidelines § 24(A)
(‘(Blither parent ... may ask the court to
modify a child support order upon a showing
of a substantial and continuing change of
cireumstances.”), Whether such a change oc-
curred is a question of fact. Schroeder v.
Schroeder, 161 Ariz. 816, 328, 778 P.2d 1212
(1989). The superior court retains “the sound
discretion” to determine “whether changed
circumstances exist to warrant modification
of an award,” Pearson v. Pearson, 190 Ariz.
281, 288, 946 P.2d 1291 (App. 1997), and the
“Guidelines do not replace the exercise of
trial court discretion; they focus it.” Id. at
234, 946 P.2d 1291. In exercising its discre-
tion, the superior court shall “consider the
nature of the changes and the reasons for the
changes.” Little, 198 Ariz, at 528, 114, 975
P.2d 108 (quoting In re Marriage of Clyatt,
267 Mont. 119, 882 P.2d 508, 505 (1994)).

i 110 Im this case, the superior court
considered several circumstances appropriate
to modify the 2012 Order, including that
Father's income had decreased while Moth-
er’s had increased.’ The evidence supports
the superior court’s determination that there
was a substantial and continuing change in
circumstances.

1. Father's decreased income.

{11 Mother contends the change in Fa-
ther’s income is not substantial and continu-
ing because Father’s income remained sub-
stantially above the $20,000 a month cap in
the Guidelines; Father decreased his working
hours voluntarily; and Father’s actual income
would be higher than reported if the court

3. To request the 2012 Order modification, Father
filed a petition titled Petition to Modify Child
Support “Simplified Process.” See Guidelines
§ 24(B) (“[Iif application of the guidelines re-
sults in an order that varies 15% or more from
the existing amount,” “{the] fifteen percent varia-
tion ... will be considered evidence of substan-
tial and continuing change of circumstances.”),
The request for a “Simplified Procedure” was,

423

were to properly account for Father's per-
sonal expenditures covered by his business,

Hs 12 “(Al court reasonably may
consider evidence of income prior to the mod-
ification petition to assist in determining the
individual’s current income and whether it
has ‘substantially’ changed since the existing
child support award was set.” Pearson, 190
Ariz, at 236, 946 P.2d 1291. Evidence regard-
ing current or reasonably projected income,
and of recent years’ income may assist the
court in determining whether an increase or
decrease in income is “continuing.” Jd.

118 Father testified, and his tax returns
demonstrated, his annual income decreased
from $441,636 in 2018 to $382,383 in 2014.
Father explained that the decrease was due
to fewer patients visiting his dental practice,
The record supported the court’s finding that
Father’s change in income was substantial
and continuing, even without Father’s recent
voluntary reduction in working hours due to
health concerns.

HM 114 Mother asserts the court
erred by concluding that Father’s personal
expenses paid by his business were de
minimus and not counting the expenses as
income. The court considered the evidence
presented and resolved the factual disputes
presented by the parties. Father testified
the business reimbursed him for such ex-
penses as uniforms, gas for a company ve-
hicle, food for networking and other busi-
ness purposes, and general office supplies,
Father further testified he employed an
accountant and bookkeeper to help him
make appropriate determinations regarding
business expenses. The court considered
the issue of whether the benefits Father
had received were “significant and re-
duce[d] personal living expenses,” Guide-
lines § 5(D), and determined Father had
not “sheltered” his income. We defer to
the superior court's “determination of wit-

however, used incorrectly in this case because
“the existing amount” of the 2012 Order was a
deviated amount and not one resulting from the
“application of the guidelines.” See id. However,
the superior court properly applied the “Stan-
dard Procedure” under Guidelines § 24(A) (sub-
stantial and continuing change in circum-
stances).

424

nesses’ credibility and the weight to give
conflicting evidence.” Gutierrez v. Gutier-
vez, 198 Ariz, 848, 847, 118, 972 P.2d 676
(App. 1998).

2, Mother’s increased income.

115 In finding modification of the 2012
Order appropriate, the court also considered
changes in Mother's annual income, which
increased from $241,421 in 2018 to $271,457
in 2014, Mother also reported $225,200 for
the first eight months of 2015, The income
gap of $41,158 between Father’s and Moth-
er’s gross monthly income in the 2012 Order
shrank to $10,294 in 2015. Mother did not
dispute her income increased during this pe-
riod. The reduction of the income gap be-
tween the parents further supported the
court's finding of substantial and continuing
change,

116 We hold the court did not abuse its
discretion by finding a substantial and con-
tinuing change warranting modification of
Father's child support payments. In exercis-
ing its discretion, the court properly consid-
ered “the nature of the changes and the
reasons for the changes.” Little, 198 Ariz. at
528, 114, 975 P.2d 108,

B. The Superior Court Appropriately Ap-
plied the Child Support Guidelines af-
ter Finding a Substantial and Con-
tinuing Change in Circumstances.

HM 1.17 Mother next argues the court
erred by ordering Father to pay an amount
based on the Guidelines because “the evi-
dence overwhelmingly demonstrated a devia-
tion was appropriate and just.” Mother also
contends the court erred by failing to consid-
er its findings underlying the 2012 Order,
which adopted the stipulated upward devia-
tion,

118 Under A.R.S. § 25-320(A), parents
may be ordered to “pay an amount reason-
able and necessary for support” of their chil-
dren. The Guidelines “establish a standard of
support for children consistent with the rea-
sonable needs of children.” Guidelines § 1(A).

HM «119 Once a court determines
that there are substantial and continuing cir-
cumstances warranting a child support modi-

fication, the court determines the amount of
child support pursuant to the Guidelines, The
Guidelines dictate that in every case “the
amount resulting from application of these
guidelines shall be the amount of child sup-
port ordered.” Guidelines § 3. If the amount
calculated under the Guidelines appears ade-
quate under the circumstances, the superior
court does not need to consider a deviation
allowed by the Guidelines. See Pearson, 190
Ariz, at 284, 946 P.2d 1291 (A.R.S. § 25-320
requires the superior court to follow the
Guidelines and consider factors of A.R.S.
§ 25-820(D) only if it intends to deviate from
the Guidelines).

HN. s'20 If, however, the case pres-
ents circumstances where it appears to the
court that the “application of the guidelines
would be inappropriate or unjust,” Guidelines
§§ 38, 20, the court is then required to make
findings as to “all relevant factors, including
those set forth” in § 25-820(D). Pearson, 190
Ariz, at 284, 946 P.2d 1291. “(T]he court may
deviate from the Guidelines only if, among
other criteria, ‘[alpplication of the guidelines
fis] inappropriate or unjust in a particular
case’ and ‘[deviation is in the best interest of
the child’” Id, (emphasis added) (quoting
ARS, § 25-820(A) (1997); ARS. § 25-
820(D); see also Guidelines § 20(A).

721 Although Mother contends the court
failed to apply the § 25-820(D) factors, the
court considered all relevant factors and
made findings of fact. See Pearson, 190 Ariz,
at 284, 946 P.2d 1291. The court found, inter
alia, that the amount calculated pursuant to
the Guidelines adequately provided for the
Children’s reasonable needs, See A.R.S.
§ 25-820(D)(1) (“The financial resources and
needs of the child.”), The court found the
ineome of each parent to be significant and
substantially similar. See § 25-320(D)()
(“The financial resources and needs of the
custodial parent.”); see also Guidelines § 20
(“In cases with significant disparity of income
between the custodial and noncustodial par-
ent, a deviation may be appropriate.”), The
court concluded “each party would be able to
meet all their living expenses quite comfort-
ably without any assistance from the other
party.”

122 The court further concluded the Chil-
dren “enjoy a very comfortable lifestyle ...
that will continue unabated” with Father's
payments based on the Guidelines. See § 25-
820(D)\(8) (“The standard of living the child
would have enjoyed if the child lived in an
intact home with both parents to the extent it
is economically feasible considering the re-
sources of each parent and each parent’s
need to maintain a home and to provide
support for the child when the child is with
that parent.”); see also Nash, 282 Ariz. at
480, 127, 807 P.8d 40 (“[A] child’s share in
the good fortune of his or her parents must
be subject to the limitation that the award be
‘consistent with an appropriate lifestyle.’ ”)
(quoting Miller v, Schou, 616 So.2d 486, 489
(Fla, 1998)),

28 The court found “no evidence of any
special needs of the [Children], no extraordi-
nary education or any extraordinary medical
expenses,” See § 25-820(D)(4) (“The physical
and emotional condition of the child, and the
child’s educational needs,”), The court or-
dered that Mother provide medical insur-
ance, and that medical, dental and orthodon-
tia expenses not covered by an insurance be
paid 59% by Father and 41% by Mother. See
§ 25-820(D)(6) (“The medical support plan
for the child.”), Mother conceded the seventh
factor was not relevant. See § 25-820(D)(7)
(Excessive or abnormal expenditures, de-
struction, concealment, or fraudulent disposi-
tion of ... property held in common.”), Last-
ly, the court found the Children spend the
same amount of time with each parent, with
Father incurring the same type of marginal
expenses as Mother, See § 25-320(D)(8)
(“The duration of parenting time and related
expenses,”),

124 In this case, the court concluded the
application of the Guidelines was appropriate
and calculated Father's child support obli-
gation to be $628.84 a month. Mother does
not dispute the amount is a correct caleula-
tion per the Guidelines. Mother, however,
contends an upward deviation from the
Guidelines was appropriate because it was
previously ordered by the court pursuant to

4. “Tn all family law proceedings tried upon the
facts, the court, if requested before trial, shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclu-

425

the parties’ agreement. We reject Mother's
argument that there is a presumption for a
deviation if it has been previously imposed.

HM 125 The Guidelines provide “[t]he
court may deviate from the guidelines based
upon an agreement of the parties only if all
of the following criteria are met: ... (4) The
court complies with the requirements of Sec-
tion 20.A.” Guidelines § 20(B)(4) (emphasis
added). Section 20(A) requires the court to
consider whether “[alpplication of the guide-
lines is inappropriate or unjust in the partic-
ular ease.” Guidelines § 20(A)(), We hold
that once a court finds there has been a
significant and continuing change in cireum-
stances from a previous child support order,
the court must review the parties’ situation
anew; no presumption from a previous order
exists,

HM 126 Mother argues the court failed
to make specific findings of fact regarding
why a deviation was not in the best interests
of the Children, For the reasons stated supra
in 1920-21, the superior court was only re-
quired to make express findings if it deter-
mined that a deviation was in the best inter-
ests of the Children, See Guidelines §§ 20,
24(A)(2); A.R.S, §§ 25-827(A), -503(E). Fur-
thermore, Mother could have asked the trial
court to make findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law regarding the sought-after devia-
tion pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law
Procedure 82.4 She did not do so, and has
thus waived the argument on appeal that the
superior court was obligated to explain why a
deviation was not warranted. See Trantor v.
Fredrikson, 179 Ariz, 299, 800, 878 P.2d 657
(1994) (“Because a trial court and opposing
counsel should be afforded the opportunity to
correct any asserted defects before error
may be raised on appeal ... errors not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised on
appeal.”).

C. Mother Had the Burden to Prove a
Deviation from the Guidelines was Ap-
propriate.

WM 1.27 Mother further argues the su-
perior court erred by finding she had the

sions of law thereon..,.” Ariz. R, Fam. Law P,
82(A) (emphasis added),

426

burden of proof to show an upward deviation
from the Guidelines was in the Children’s
best interests. Instead, Mother argues, the
burden of proof remained with Father be-
cause he filed the petition for modification.

128 “The Guidelines provide that a parent
seeking more than the presumptive child-
support amount derived from the Guidelines
and the Schedule ‘shall bear the burden of
proof to establish that a higher amount is in
the best interests of the children.” Nash,
232 Ariz, at 478, 116, 307 P.38d 40 (quoting
Guidelines § 8), Because Mother sought a
deviation from the Guidelines, she had the
burden of proof. See Guidelines § 8 (“The
party seeking a sum greater than this pre-
sumptive amount shall bear the burden of
proof to establish that a higher amount is in
the best interests of the children....”).

29 To support her argument, Mother re-
lies on an opinion in which we determined
that the party “seeking modification has the
burden of establishing changed cirewm-
stances with competent evidence.” Jenkins v,
Jenkins, 215 Ariz. 35, 39, 116, 156 P.3d 1140
(App. 2007) (emphasis added). The superior
court properly held Father to his burden to
show changed circumstances, Jenicins does
not support Mother’s argument that she did
not have the burden to establish that a devia-
tion was appropriate after Father carried his
burden of proving a significant and continu-
ing change in circumstances.

D. The Superior Court Appropriately De-
termined the Start of the Child Sup-
port Modification to Begin the First
of the Month After Notice of the Peti-
tion to Modify.

HM 130 Mother further argues the trial
court abused its discretion by modifying child
support effective July 1, 2015, without com-
pensating Mother for the expenses she had
already incurred on behalf of the Children
under the 2012 Order. Mother acknowledges
that the court has such discretion in general,
but she asserts that the court abused it in
this case considering the parties’ previous
agreements,

981 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-503(E), an
order of child support “[mJodification ... [is]
effective on the first day of the month follow-

ing notice of the petition for modification.”
Father served his petition for modification by
personal service on June 11, 2015. The supe-
rior court ordered the child support modifica-
tion to begin on July 1, 2015. We find no
error. A.R.S, § 25-508(E).

182 The court could have made an equita-
ble adjustment under the statute. See A.R.S,
§ 25-508(E) (the court may order modifica-
tion effective on a different date for good
cause shown); see also Wick v. Wick, 107
Ariz, 882, 884, 489 P.2d 19 (1971) (action for
divorce and related actions such as determi-
nation of child support are “generally consid-
ered equitable actions and are, therefore,
conducted under the rules of equity”). How-
ever, the superior court found no factual
support in Mother's contention that she paid
all the “direct” expenses for the Children.
The record supports the court’s finding that
Father purchased clothes, meals, provided
spending money, and took the Children on
vacations, The court further found that both
parties incurred similar expenses and that
Father had paid one-half of the extracurricu-
lar activities for the Children in the past.
Finally, the court noted that if Mother in-
curred unreimbursed expenses for extracur-
ricular activities, she could request that Fa-
ther’s half of the expense be taken out of the
money she owed Father due to the effective
date of the new child support order.

183 The court acted within its discretion
by establishing the date for the new child
support order on July 1, 2015. Mother has
not demonstrated how she was prejudiced by
the court’s decision, See Walsh v. Walsh, 230
Ariz. 486, 494, 1 24, 286 P.8d 1095 (App. 2012)
(quoting In re Marriage of Molloy, 181 Ariz.
146, 150, 888 P.2d 1838 (App. 1994)) (“We will
reverse only if the complaining party suffers
prejudice as a result of the error. Prejudice
must appear affirmatively from the record.”).

E. The Superior Court Appropriately Ex-
ercised its Discretion by Excluding
Mother’s Expert Witness.

HE 134 Mother contends the superior
court’s exclusion of her expert witness during
Father's testimony pursuant to Arizona Rule

of Evidence 615 prejudiced her ability to
present her case.

185 Rule 6165 states in pertinent part: “[a]t
a party’s request, [or on its own] the court
must order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony,” ex-
cept “a person whose presence a party shows
to be essential to presenting the party's
claim or defense.” Ariz. R. Evid. 615(c) (em-
phasis added),

136 Mother does not argue on appeal that
her expert witness on finances was “essen-
tial” to the presentation of her case, Mother
argues instead her expert witness’s presence
may have been helpful if the expert had the
opportunity to hear Father’s testimony so he
could provide contradictory evidence. The su-
perior court noted the expert was not neces-
sary because the parties had “ample time to
do discovery” and “there’s [not] another ex-
pert on the other side.” The court’s applica-
tion of the rule excluding the expert from the
courtroom was not an abuse of discretion.

427

See Spring v. Bradford, 241 Ariz, 455, 459-
60, 115, 888 P.38d 849 (App. 2017) (superior
court has discretion to allow essential expert
witness to listen to other testimony or review
transcribed testimony).

F, Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

187 We deny both parties’ requests for
attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal pursu-
ant to AR.S. § 25-824(A), but grant Father
his costs on appeal pursuant to Arizona Rule
of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

188 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm.

397 P.3d 361

Patricia L. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vw

Kevin J, O'BRIEN, DPM,
Defendant/Appellee,

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0159

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1, :

FILED 5/16/2017

Patricia L, Williamson, Lake Havasu City,
Plaintiff/Appellant

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, PC,
Phoenix, By James R, Broening, Michelle L.
Donovan, Kevin R, Myer, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F, Winthrop and Judge Jon
'W. Thompson joined.

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

91 Patricia L. Williamson appeals the trial
court’s order dismissing her medical mal-
practice action with prejudice for failure to
serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit
as ARS, § 12-2608 requires, For the follow-
ing reasons, we affirm the judgment as modi-
fied to reflect that the dismissal is without
prejudice,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 In October 2018, Williamson filed a
medical malpractice action against Kevin J,
O’Brien, DPM, stemming from a podiatry
surgery, Williamson did not certify whether
an expert opinion was necessary to prove her
claim as A.R.S. § 12-2608(A) requires.

913 O’Brien moved for an order compelling
Williamson to serve a preliminary expert
opinion affidavit in compliance with A.R.S,
§ 12-2608, The trial court determined that
expert testimony was necessary to prove Wil-
Kamson’s claim and ordered her to serve a
preliminary expert opinion affidavit, William-
son did not comply with the order, so O’Brien
moved for dismissal. Williamson then re-
quested additional time to comply with the
order, which the court granted. The trial
eourt told Williamson that “if you fail to
comply with the court’s order by October the
6th, 2014, and that if the defendant moves to
dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice ... you
can anticipate that the court will grant that
motion to dismiss and your case will be

”

over,

14 Before the extended deadline, William-
son filed a document titled “Order-Medical
Expert Affidavit” that contained almost 70
pages of medical records purporting to be a
medical expert affidavit by Ronald Killian,
DPM. The trial court acknowledged that Wil-
liamson filed the document but stated that it
“takes no action.” O’Brien again moved for
dismissal arguing that the document William-
son submitted did not meet ARS, § 12-
2603(B)’s requirements, The court dismissed
the complaint with prejudice and entered
judgment in favor of O’Brien for costs,

15 After the trial court entered an order
containing finality language pursuant to Ari-
zona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c),
Williamson timely appealed,

DISCUSSION

HH ‘16 We review de novo dismissal for
a failure to serve a preliminary expert opin-
ion affidavit required by A.R.S. § 12-2603.
Romero v. Hasan, 241 Ariz, 385, 386 16, 388
P.3d 22, 23 (App. 2017), We discern William-
son’s arguments as best we can and consider
only those that are adequately supported. Jn

429

re Aubuchon, 288 Ariz. 62, 64-65 16, 809
P.8d 886, 888-89 (2013). Unsupported argu-
ments are considered waived. Ritchie v.
Krasner, 221 Aviz, 288, 805 162, 211 P.8d
1272, 1289 (App. 2009),

{17 To the extent Williamson argues that
the court improperly granted dismissal be-
cause it overlooked the “affidavit” she filed,
we reject her argument. Before dismissing
the action, the court acknowledged receiving
the document titled “Order-Medical Expert
Affidavit,” but expressly stated that it took
no further action,

HH 18 Additionally, if Williamson’s argu-
ment is that the purported “affidavit” con-
taining medical records was sufficient to
comply with A.R.S. § 12-2603, we likewise
reject her argument. Section 12-2603 re-
quires that the expert affidavit contain the
expert’s qualifications, the factual basis for
each claim, the acts or omission that alleged-
ly deviated from the standard of care result-
ing in liability, and the manner in which the
deviation caused harm. ARS, § 12-
2603(B)(1)-(4). The purported “affidavit” Wil-
liamson filed is nothing more than a copy of
medical records, Section 12-2603 does not
provide for use of medical records in lieu of
serving the preliminary expert opinion affida-
vit containing the requisite information.

19 Section 12-2603(F) requires that the
trial court dismiss a claim when the claimant
fails to file and serve a preliminary expert
opinion affidavit after the court has ordered
compliance, Because Williamson failed to
comply with the order to serve the affidavit,
the court appropriately dismissed her claim.

HH 1110 However, the statute does not
authorize dismissals with prejudice. Sanchez
v. Old Pueblo Anesthesia, P.C., 218 Ariz. 317,
823-24, 1120-26, 183 P.8d 1285, 1291-92
(App. 2008). Although O’Brien correctly as-
serts that Rule 387(b)(@) authorizes dismissal
for the failure to comply with a court order,
that rule pertains to discovery sanctions and
does not authorize dismissals with prejudice
for failure to comply with A.R.S. § 12-2608.
Ariz, R. Civ. P. 37%(b)(2)(A)(v). A dismissal
under A.R.S, § 12-2608 is not a sanction for
a discovery violation, but a substantive plead-
ing failure, Boswell v, Fintelmann, 242 Ariz,

430

52, 54 15, 392 P.8d 496, 498 (App. 2017),
because the statute is “meant to certify that
the action ... is not meritless,” Jilly v.
Rayes, 221 Ariz. 40, 48 16, 209 P.38d 176, 179
(App. 2009),

{111 We acknowledge, however, that anoth-
er panel of this Court has held that a dis-
missal under A.R.S, § 12-2603 is for failure
to prosecute. See Passmore v. McCarver, 1
CA-CV 15-0420, 242 Ariz, 288, 395 P.8d 297,
800-01, 2017 WL 1279028 at *2 18 (Ariz.
App. Apr. 6, 2017), In so holding, Passmore
relies on Gorney v. Meany for the proposi-
tion that A.R.S, § 12-2608 seeks to curb
frivolous lawsuits by “setting deadlines for
the early involvement of the plaintiff's expert
witness.” 214 Aviz, 226, 229 18, 150 P.8d 799,
802 (App. 2007) (emphasis added). But inter-
preting Gorney to require the early involve-
ment of a plaintiff's expert witness for pur-
poses of A.R.S, § 12-2603—as Passmore
does—would conflict with our supreme
court’s rulemaking authority as discussed in
Jilly. See Jilly, 221 Ariz. at 42-43 16, 209
P.8d at 178-79. In Jilly, we found that A.R.S.
§ 12-2603 did not violate our supreme
court’s rulemaking authority because it re-
ferred to “preliminary” expert opinions and
not the “expert at trial.” Id, at 116-7. Gor-
ney therefore does not support Passmore’s
view.

712 Accordingly, because an A.R.S. § 12-
2608 dismissal is a substantive pleading fail-
ure, and not a sanction for a discovery viola-
tion or a failure to prosecute, the court erred
by dismissing Williamson’s claim with preju-
dice. This error does not necessitate that the
judgment be vacated, however. We may mod-
ify the judgment to reflect that it is without
prejudice to refile if Williamson can obtain
the appropriate affidavit. See Boswell, 242
Ariz, at 55 19, 392 P.3d at 499,

CONCLUSION

918 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the judgment as modified to reflect that the
dismissal is without prejudice,

397 P.3d 363
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
vy.
Darren Lee WINEGARDNER, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0110
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed May 31, 2017

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Joel Feinman, Pima County Publie De-
fender, By Erin K. Sutherland, Assistant
Public Defender, Tucson, Counsel for Appel-
lant

432

Presiding Judge Staring authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Judge Miller
and Judge Espinosa concurred,

OPINION

STARING, Presiding Judge:

{1 Darren Winegardner appeals his con-
viction for sexual conduct with his minor
stepdaughter, contending the trial court
erred by precluding him from impeaching the
victim with evidence of her prior misdemean-
or shoplifting conviction, Because we con-
clude the trial court did not err, we affirm
Winegardner’s conviction and sentence.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining Winegardner’s convic-
tion. State v. Foshay, 289 Ariz, 271, 12, 370
P.8d 618, 620 (App. 2016). One night in Octo-
ber 2012, Winegardner argued with his wife,
Rachel, whose fifteen-year-old daughter,
L.B., was present in the home. Rachel left
the house, taking L.B.’s younger siblings
with her. L.B., however, stayed behind with
Winegardner.

8 After Rachel had left, Winegardner and
LB, began drinking, and she became intoxi-
cated, Winegardner told L.B. it was “really
common for stepdads and daughters to en-
gage in sexual activities,” and asked if she
wanted to have sex with him. They then
engaged in intercourse.

14 The next day, after L.B. told her moth-
er what had occurred, Rachel contacted the
police, who had L.B, taken to the Child Ad-
vocacy Center (CAC), where she underwent.
a forensic interview and a medical examina-
tion, The examining physician obtained
swabs for a DNA? analysis, and an external
genital swab subsequently revealed sperm
matching Winegardner’s DNA profile.

45 The state indicted Winegardner on one
count of sexual conduct with a minor. He was
convicted after a jury trial, and the trial
court sentenced him to a mitigated term of
1, Deoxyribonucleic acid.

2, The record does not include evidence of the

offense or the details, but at oral argument coun-
sel agreed it could have only been a violation of

8.5 years’ imprisonment, This appeal fol-
lowed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
ARS. §§ 12-120.21(A)(D, 18-4081, and 13—
4088,

Discussion

16 Prior to L.B’s trial testimony, Wine-
gardner informed the trial court he intended
to impeach her with a 2015 shoplifting convic-
tion? because it was a “crime of moral turpi-
tude.” The court precluded him from doing
so. After her direct examination, he again
sought to introduce evidence of the prior
conviction, and, again, the court refused.

Hs 1.7 Winegardner challenges the tri-
al court’s preclusion rulings on two bases:
Rule 609, Ariz, R. Evid., required the court
to permit evidence of the prior conviction
because shoplifting involves “deceit or false
presentation”; and the court’s refusal to allow
impeachment with the conviction violated his
rights to due process and confrontation.
“When reviewing a ruling on the admissibili-
ty of prior convictions, this court will over-
turn the trial court’s determination only if it
proves to have been a clear abuse of discre-
tion.” State v, Green, 200 Ariz, 496, 17, 29
P.8d 271, 278 (2001). “An error of law consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Bern-
stein, 287 Ariz, 226, 19, 849 P.8d 200, 202
(2015). We review constitutional issues de
novo. Foshay, 289 Ariz. 271, 1384, 370 P.8d at
625,

Rule 609

18 Rule 609(a)(2) provides that a party
may impeach a witness’s character for truth-
fulness with “any crime regardless of punish-
ment ... if the court can readily determine
that establishing the elements of the crime
required proving—or the witness’s admit-
ting—a dishonest act or false statement.”
Winegardner asserts the misdemeanor of-
fense of shoplifting “necessarily involves
some sort of deceit or false presentation”
and, thus, the trial court was required to

ARS. § 13-1805 involving property, which was

not a firearm, valued at less than one thousand
dollars,

admit evidence of the conviction. We dis-
agree,

19 The parties do not cite, and we
have not located, any published Arizona opin-
ion directly addressing whether Rule
609(a)(2) permits a misdemeanor shoplifting
conviction to be used for impeachment. Our
rules of evidence, however, were adopted
from the Federal Rules of Evidence. State v.
Johnson, 132 Ariz, 5, 8, 643 P.2d 708, 711
(App. 1981). For that reason, “[wJhen inter-
preting an evidentiary rule that predomi-
nantly echoes its federal counterpart, we of-
ten look to the latter for guidance.” Green,
200 Ariz. 496, 110, 29 P.8d at 273; see also
Johnson, 182 Ariz, at 8, 648 P.2d at 711 (“in
the absence of Arizona precedent as a guide
to interpreting our [Rules of Evidence], we
will look to the federal courts”). The lan-
guage of Rule 609(a)(2), Ariz, R. Evid, fol-
lows that of Rule 609(a)(2), Fed. R. Evid,
and the historical underpinnings of the feder-
al rule, federal case law interpreting it, as
well as our own precedent, support the con-
clusion that shoplifting is not a “dishonest act
or false statement” within the meaning of
Rule 609(a)(2), Ariz, R, Evid,

10 At common law, conviction for an “in-
famous crime” rendered a person “complete-
ly incompetent as a witness.” 1 McCormick
on Evidence § 42, at 184-85 (Kenneth S.
Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). Generally, an infa-
mous crime was an offense “implying such a
dereliction of moral principle, as carries with
it a conclusion of a total disregard to the
obligation of an oath.” 2 John Henry Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§ 520, at 729 (rev. Chadbourn 1979), quoting
Simon Greenleaf, Hvidence § 878 (1842). In-
famous offenses typically included treason
and almost every felony, because they were
punishable by death, and crimes “deemed of
So grave a character as to render the offend-
er unworthy to live, [were] considered as
rendering him unworthy of belief in a Court
of Justice.” Id, at 729-80,

{11 Historically, convictions for crimes
considered crimen falsi also disqualified a

3. Rule 601, Fed. R, Evid., in part, provides that,
“Every person is competent to be a witness un-
less these rules provide otherwise.” Similarly,
Rule 601, Ariz. R. Evid., provides that, “Every

433

witness from testifying. Id. at 729, Such
crimes involved not only “the charge of false-
hood,” but also those “which may injuriously
affect the administration of justice, by the
introduction of falsehood and fraud.” Id, at
730. Crimen falsi crimes included “forgery,
perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression
of testimony by bribery, or conspiracy to
procure the absence of a witness, or other
conspiracy, to accuse one of a crime, and
barratry.” Id, footnotes omitted); accord Bu
Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428, 5 S.Ct. 985,
29 L.Ed, 89 (1885).

{12 The enactment of Rule 601, Fed. R.
Evid. ended the use of the prior common
law grounds for disqualification in federal
courts and converted issues of witness com-
petency “into questions of witness credibility
‘to be decided by the jury.” 27 Charles Alan
Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Evidence § 6002, at 17
(1990), Specifically, “[clonviction of crime as a
ground of impeachment [became] subject [to]
Rule 609,” Revised Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D, 815, 384 (1971).

113 Rule 609(a)(2), Fed. R. Evid, permits
a party to attack “a witness’s character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal convic-
tion ... if the court can readily determine
that establishing the elements of the crime
required proving—or the witness’s admit-
ting—a dishonest act or false statement.”
Since the rule’s enactment, the Advisory
Committee has maintained that offenses to
which the rule applies are:
[Clrimes such as perjury or subornation of
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement or false pretense, or any
other offense, in the nature of crimen falsi
the commission of which involves some ele-
ment of untruthfulness, deceit or falsifica-
tion bearing on the accused’s propensity to
testify truthfully.
Fed. R. Evid. 609 advisory committee notes,
1974 enactment; see also id. 1990 amends.,
2006 amends. Rule 609, Fed. R. Evid., there-
fore, did not enlarge the common law catego-

person is competent to be a witness unless these
rules or an applicable statute provides other-
wise,”

434

ry of infamous crimes. See Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the Unit-
ed States District Courts and Magistrates, 46
FR.D. 161, 297 (1969) (“common law
grounds of disqualification transposed into
grounds of impeachment”),

HE 114 In State v. Malloy, our supreme
court determined the “phrase ‘dishonesty or
false statement’ ” contained in the contempo-
raneous version of Rule 609(a)(2), Ariz. R.
Evid., “should be construed narrowly to in-
clude only those crimes involving some ele-
ment of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsifica-
tion,” 181 Ariz, 125, 127, 689 P.2d 815, 817
(1981). The rule requires a misdemeanor of-
fense to “necessarily involve” one of those
elements in order for it to be admissible; it is
irrelevant that the underlying facts of a par-
ticular conviction might have involved a dis-
honest act or false statement. Jd. at 128, 639
P.2d at 318. The court also noted that narrow
construction of the rule has “the advantage
of being in conformity with the current feder-
al practice” and that the Arizona Rules of
Evidence “were modeled after the Federal
Rules with the hope that evidence practices
would be similar in state and federal court
and that federal case law would be useful in
Arizona.” Id. at 128 & n.8, 689 P.2d at 318 &
n.8; see also State v. Hatch, 225 Ariz. 409,
111, 289 P.8d 482, 484 (App, 2010) (“Like its
federal counterpart, Rule 609(a) traces its
origins to the common law’s total prohibition
on the testimony of those previously convict-
ed of ‘crimes of infamy’: treason, felonies,
and crimen falsi.”), The Malloy court also
concluded Rule 609 did not permit impeach-

4. See also United States v. Dunson, 142 F.3d
1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998) (shoplifting does not
per se involve dishonesty or false statement);
United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374, 379 (7th
Cir. 1993) (“shoplifting does not in and of itself
qualify as a crime of dishonesty under Rule
609”); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 603
(11th Cir. 1990) (‘crimes such as theft, robbery,
or shoplifting do not involve ‘dishonesty or false
statement’ within the meaning of Rule
609(a)(2)"); McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184,
188 (6th Cir. 1990) (shoplifting not a basis for
Rule 609(a)(2) impeachment); United States v.
Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 979 (Sth Cir, 1978) (“a
conviction for shoplifting is not a conviction in-
volving dishonesty or false statement within the
meaning of Fed, R. Evid. 609(a)(2)”).

5. Winegardner relies on cases that fail to account
for the historical common law underpinning of

ment with evidence of a prior conviction for
misdemeanor attempted burglary, and that,
while “[c]riminal acts such as theft and rob-
bery commonly carry a connotation of dis-
honesty,” they do not necessarily “establish
the trait of untruthfulness,” which is the
primary concern behind Rule 609. 181 Ariz,
at 127-28, 689 P.2d at 317-18.

115 Likewise, in Johnson, 132 Ariz, at 8,
648 P.2d at 711, we concluded a “misdemean-
or conviction for conspiracy to commit bur-
glary did not involve ‘dishonesty or false
statement?” as contemplated by Rule 609,
Ariz. R. Evid. In reaching that conclusion, we
looked to the decision in United States v.
Ortega, 561 F.2d 808, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1977),
which held a conviction for misdemeanor
shoplifting did not qualify under Rule 609(a),
Fed, R. Evid. as an offense involving “dis-
honesty or false statement.” Johnson, 182
Ariz. at 8, 643 P.2d at 7114 Undoubtedly,
“[aln absence of respect for the property of
others is an undesirable character trait, but
it is not an indicium of a propensity toward
testimonial dishonesty.” Ortega, 561 F.2d at
806. Further, “[hJuman experience does not
justify an inference that a person will perjure
himself from proof that he was guilty of petty
shoplifting.” Id,

Hi 116 Thus, in light of the history and
purpose of Rule 609, Ariz. R. Evid., the
decisions in Malloy and Johnson, and per-
suasive federal precedent, we reject classify-
ing shoplifting as a “dishonest act or false
statement” within the meaning of Rule
609(a)(2).5 The trial court did not err by

Rule 609. See People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126,
1132 (Colo, 2008) (holding act of shoplifting
“probative of truthfulness” but misdemeanor
shoplifting conviction is not); Webb v. State, 663
A.2d 452, 461 (Del. 1995) (prior case law defined
“dishonesty or false statement” to include “dis-
honest conduct or stealing”); State v. Melendrez,
91 N.M. 259, 572 P.2d 1267, 1269 (N.M. Ct. App.
1977) (relying on “common human experience”),
quoting Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State v. Gallant, 307 Or.
152, 764 P.2d 920, 921-23 (1988) (interpreting
“dishonesty” after voter initiative); State v. Shaw,
328 S.C. 454, 492 S.E.2d 402, 403-04 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1997) (rejecting federal precedent); State v.
Butler, 626 8.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn, 1981) (based on
prior precedent, shoplifting involved dishonesty);
State v. Brown, 113 Wash.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013,

precluding Winegardner from impeaching
L.B. with her misdemeanor shoplifting con-
viction.

Hl 117 Winegardner also asserts we
should characterize shoplifting as an offense
involving dishonesty or false statement in
light of case law designating the offense as a
crime of moral turpitude. See State v. Superi-
or Court (Espinosa), 121 Ariz. 174, 176, 589
P.2d 48, 50 (App. 1978), Acts of moral turpi-
tude involve “actions which ‘adversely reflect
on one’s honesty, integrity, or personal val-
ues.’” Benitez v. Dunevant, 198 Ariz. 90,
115, 7 P.8d 99, 104 (2000), quoting State ex
rel, Dean v, Dolny, 161 Ariz. 297, 800 n.8, 778
P.2d 1198, 1196 n.8 (1989), overruled on other
grounds by Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz.
416, 123 & n8, 104 P.8d 147, 158-54 & n8
(2005). Winegardner asks us to consider
“moral turpitude” as a factor when determin-
ing whether a conviction is admissible under
Rule 609(a)(2). We decline to do so.

718 As noted, in construing the phrase
“dishonesty or false statement,” the court in
Malloy distinguished between those crimes
which connote dishonesty and those “which
establish a trait of untruthfulness.” 131 Ariz.
at 127, 689 P.2d at 817. Employing that
analysis here, a conviction for misdemeanor
shoplifting would “carry a connotation of dis-
honesty,” but it would not bear on a witness’s
propensity for testimonial untruthfulness.
See id.

Due Process and Confrontation Clause

HM 119 Winegardner also contends the
trial court’s refusal to permit impeachment of
L.B. using her misdemeanor shoplifting con-
viction violated his rights to due process and
confrontation. He argues “any evidence that
could impeach [L.B.’s] credibility was both
material and critical” to his defense and
“{rlefusing to allow cross-examination on [her

1027-31 (1989) (considering ordinary meaning
and state court decisions).

6. For example, rules may not be relied upon to
exclude evidence of a third party’s guilt simply
because there is strong evidence of defendant's
guilt, Holmes, 547 U.S. at 328-31, 126 S.Ct.
1727, per se prohibit the admission of a defen-
dant’s “hypnotically refreshed testimony,” Rock
v, Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56-62, 107 8.Ct. 2704,
97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), “exclude competent, reli-

435

shoplifting conviction] unconstitutionally lim-
ited [his] right to present a complete de-
fense.” Because he did not raise this argu-
ment below, however, we review only for
fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v.
Henderson, 210 Ariz, 561, 1119-20, 115 P.3d
601, 607-08 (2005).

HE {120 “The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees a criminal de-
fendant ‘a meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense.” State v. Gilfillan, 196
Ariz, 396, 119, 998 P.2d 1069, 1075 (App.
2000), quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
US, 479, 485, 104 S.Ct, 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413
(1984). “The right to conduct a complete de-
fense includes the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses.” Foshay, 289 Ariz. 271, 136, 870 P.8d.
at 626. The right to “effective cross-examina-
tion” is guaranteed by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Dawis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S, 308, 315, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105,
89 L.Eid.2d 847 (1974),

Hs 121 The right to present a com-
plete defense may be jeopardized “by evi-
dence rules that ‘infringle] upon a weighty
interest of the accused’ and ‘are arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve.’” Holmes v. South Car-
olina, 547 U.S. 819, 824, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164
L,Ed.2d 508 (2008), quoting United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 308, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261,
140 L.Hd2d 418 (1998) (alteration in
Holmes)® “Of course, the right to present
relevant testimony is not without limitation,”
and “ ‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to ac-
commodate other legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process.” Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 55, 107 S.Ct, 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37
(1987), quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
US, 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1088, 35 L.Ed.2d 297
(1978). Trial judges may “limit reasonably a

able evidence bearing on the credibility of a

confession,” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,

690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986),

prohibit impeachment of a defendant's own wit-

ness who had previously confessed to the

charged crime, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.

284, 295, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297

(1973), or bar “alleged accomplice[s] from testi-

fying on behalf of the defendant,” Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22, 87 S.Ct, 1920, 18 L.Bd.2d

1019 (1967).

436

criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a
witness ‘based on concerns about, among oth-
er things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of
the issues, the witness’ safety, or interroga-
tion that is repetitive or only marginally rele-
vant!” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149,
111 S.Ct. 1748, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991), quot-
ing Delaware v. Van Aysdall, 475 U.S. 678,
679, 106 S.Ct, 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986);
see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 241, 95 S.Ct, 2160, 45 L,Ed.2d 141 (1975)
(“The Sixth Amendment does not confer the
right to present testimony free from the
legitimate demands of the adversarial sys-
tem....”).

HM 122 Precluding Winegardner from
cross-examining L.B, about her shoplifting
conviction did not infringe on his right to
present a complete defense or cross-exami-
nation, Evidence of the conviction was not
necessary to reveal any “possible biases,
prejudices, or ulterior motives” behind her
testimony, See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94
S.Ct, 1105; State v. McDaniel, 127 Ariz, 18,
15, 617 P.2d 1129, 1181 (1980) (“if the trial
judge has excluded testimony which would
clearly show bias, interest, favor, hostility,
prejudice, promise or hope of reward, it is
error”), quoting State v. Holden, 88 Ariz. 48,
55, 852 P.2d 705, 714 (1960). And, while
“{tThe introduction of evidence of a prior
crime is ... a general attack on the credibili-
ty of a witness,” Dawis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94
S.Ct. 1105, L.B.’s conviction appears to bear
only tangentially on her credibility, if at all,
see Malloy, 181 Ariz, at 127-28, 689 P.2d at,
817-18 (“Misdemeanors which do not contain
an element of deceit or falsification are not
simply low in probative value, but more often
than not wholly lack such probative value.”),

128 Notwithstanding his failure to estab-
lish any error, fundamental or otherwise,
Winegardner has also failed to demonstrate

that any prejudice resulted from the preclu-
sion of L.B.’s conviction, See Henderson, 210
Ariz. 561, 11 26-27, 115 P.8d at 608-09 (show-
ing required to establish prejudice from fun-
damental error differs in each case depend-
ing on the alleged error; defendant must
show a reasonable jury could have reached a
different result), At trial, Winegardner did
not contest that his sperm was found on the
victim’s genital area. Rather, his defense was
that, as a result of his involuntary and un-
knowing ingestion of sleep medication, he did
not knowingly, intentionally, or voluntarily
engage in sexual intercourse with L.B. He
introduced expert testimony describing the
potential side effects of the medication, which
include amnesia and parasomnia, During
cross-examination, he elicited from L.B, her
previous admissions that she had put a sleep-
ing pill in his drink, He also elicited evidence
of several prior inconsistent statements
about the events that night—ineluding a sec-
ond interview with the CAC in which she
claimed she had fabricated the entire inci-
dent. In light of the undisputed DNA evi-
dence supporting Winegardner’s conviction,
as well as the extensive evidence impeaching
L.B’s credibility already in the record, we
cannot conclude a reasonable jury could have
reached a different result had it been ap-
prised of L,B,’s misdemeanor shoplifting con-
viction.

Disposition

124 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
Winegardner’s conviction and sentence,

397 P.3d 1037
In the MATTER OF COLTON P.
No. 1 CA-MH 16-0026

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 5/18/2017

438

Emery K. LaBarge, Attorney at Law,
Snowflake, By Emery K. LaBarge, Counsel
for Appellant

Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Hol-
brook, By Jason S. Moore, Counsel for Ap-
pellee

Chief Judge Michael J. Brown delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge
Patricia A. Orozco! joined.

OPINION

BROWN, Chief Judge:

{1 Colton P, (“Appellant”) appeals the su-
perior court’s order committing him to a
period of psychiatric treatment. For the fol-
lowing reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

12 In April 2016, the Pineview Hospital
medical director petitioned the superior court
for court-ordered evaluations, alleging that
Appellant was a danger to himself, a danger
to others, persistently and acutely disabled,
and in need of treatment. Finding reasonable
cause, the court ordered that Appellant be
evaluated,

18 Following the evaluation, the Pineview
medical director petitioned for court-ordered
treatment. The physician affidavits support-
ing the petition described Appellant as hav-
ing an impulse disorder, which caused him to
have poor judgment and insight regarding
his treatment needs.

94 The superior court scheduled an evi-
dentiary hearing on the petition and directed
that a digital recording be made of the pro-
ceeding. At the April 28 hearing, the court
heard testimony from witnesses and admit-
ted several exhibits, including the affidavits
signed by the two physician witnesses and
Appellant’s Individual Service Plan (“ISP”).
The ISP described Appellant’s history of a
suicide attempt and physical violence against
his parents, and stated he had run away from
his previous placement and into traffic. The
physician affidavits stated Appellant had two

1, The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired
Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has

reported traumatic brain injuries as a child
and that he has an impulse disorder. Follow-
ing the hearing, the court found Appellant
needed treatment as set forth in the petition.
The court ordered Appellant to undergo a
combination of inpatient and outpatient treat-
ment not to exceed one year in total dura-
tion, with the inpatient treatment not to ex-
ceed 180 days.

15 Appellant timely appealed. In attempt-
ing to prepare a transcript of the April 28
hearing, however, the Navajo County Tran-
scription Coordinator reported the digital re-
cording was inaudible because it had too
much “background and feedback” noise, Ap-
pellant then filed a motion asking us to re-
mand the case to the superior court for a
“new hearing.” We issued an order staying
the appeal and directing the superior court to
settle the record pursuant to Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 11. Af-
ter conducting a hearing, the court issued a
minute entry outlining the recollections of
counsel and the court as to the evidence
presented at the April 28 hearing. We now
consider the merits of the appeal based on
the record before us.

DISCUSSION

HI 16 Appellant’s sole argument on ap-
peal is that the superior court failed to sub-
stantively comply with the statutory re-
quirement that it hear testimony from two
acquaintance witnesses, because there is no
transcript of the witnesses’ testimony from
the commitment hearing. Appellant does not
raise any substantive argument regarding
the content of the witnesses’ testimony or
otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the
totality of the evidence presented at the
hearing,

HI 17 We review questions concerning
the application of statutes de novo. In re MH
2007-001286, 220 Ariz. 160, 165, 115, 204
P.8d 418 (App. 2008) (citations omitted). Stat-
utory requirements concerning civil commit-
ment are strictly construed to protect the
liberty interests of those involved. Id. (cita~
tion omitted), At a hearing on a petition for

been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to
Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

court-ordered treatment, Arizona law re-
quires that the evidence presented include
“the testimony of two or more witnesses
acquainted with the patient at the time of the
alleged mental disorder.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
(“AR.S.”) § 86-589(B). Regarding the tran-
scription of hearings on petitions for court-
ordered treatment, A.R.S. § 86-539(E) pro-
vides:

A verbatim record of all proceedings under
this section shall be made by stenographic
means by a court reporter if a written
request for a court reporter is made by
any party.... If stenographic means are
not requested ..., electronic means shall
be directed by the presiding judge.

18 Our supreme court has held that when
a portion of the record is destroyed or un-
available, the proper procedure “is to file in
the court in which the appeal is pending, a
motion to suspend the progress of the appeal
and to reinstate the [superior] court’s juris-
diction over the case for the limited purpose
of reconstructing the record.” Rodriquez v.
Williams, 104 Ariz. 280, 288, 451 P.2d 609
(1969) (emphasis added). The superior court
should then “assist counsel to overcome the
loss of the missing records[.]” Jd. Further,
where no transcript is available for appellate
review, “the appellant may prepare and file a
narrative statement of the evidence or pro-
ceedings from the best available source, in-
cluding the appellant’s recollection.” ARCAP
11d). The narrative statement must then be
reviewed and approved by the superior court
judge. Id.

19 On remand in this case, the superior
court held a hearing to reconstruct the rec-
ord. During this hearing, at which Appel-
lant’s trial and appellate counsel were both
present, the court noted that at the April 28
evidentiary hearing on the petition “two lay
witnesses, Devon Lawrence and Barbara
Stone ... testified regarding their observa-
tions of behavior by [Appellant].” The court
also listed the physician witnesses and refer-
enced the exhibits that had been admitted.
Nevertheless, Appellant asserts on appeal
that the parties “did not stipulate to any of
the record” and that “no evidence ... was
presented from two acquaintance witnesses,”
as required by A.R.S, § 36-539(B).

439

$10 Contrary to this contention, at the
hearing called to reconstruct the record, Ap-
pellant’s trial counsel responded to the
court’s summary of the evidence and wit-
nesses by indicating he did not have any
objection to the exhibits and he was “in
agreement with who testified.” Appellant's
trial counsel also had the opportunity to add
to the record his recollection of the testimony
and evidence presented at the original hear-
ing; but neither party discussed the content
of the lay witnesses’ testimony. Further, the
court asked multiple times whether there
was anything else the parties wished to add
to the record. Neither Appellant’s trial coun-
sel nor appellate counsel noted any deficien-
cies in the record or asked to reconstruct the
testimony of the lay witnesses. Appellant's
trial counsel could have supplemented the
record with his own recollection of the testi-
mony, but did not do so. See ARCAP 11(d).

HM 11 “It is the appellant’s burden to
ensure that the record on appeal contains all
transcripts or other documents necessary for
us to consider the issues raised.” Blair v.
Burgener, 226 Ariz, 218, 217, 19, 245 P.8d
898 (App. 2010) (internal quotations and cita-
tion omitted). This is because we are unable
to determine the validity of an appellant’s
contention when we cannot review the evi-
dence upon which the appellant relies. Cf
Adams v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz, 189
Ariz, 340, 842, 678 P.2d 525 (App. 1984)
(stating appellate courts prefer to decide
cases on their merits, rather than on proce-
dural grounds). But when portions of a trial
record are not available because they no
longer exist, the appellate court should rein-
state the superior court’s jurisdiction for re-
construction of the record and thereby pro-
vide the appellant a reasonable opportunity
to pursue the appeal. See Rodriquez, 104
Aviz, at 282-83, 451 P.2d 609. However, it is
not the superior court’s responsibility to in-
dependently reconstruct the record for the
appellant, but only to “assist” the parties in
doing so, pursuant to the appellant’s avail-
able remedies under Rule 11. See id.; see also
ARCAP 11(d).

Hl 112 Appellant suggests the superior
court failed to follow our order requiring it

440 —

to transmit its “written findings and/or the
yeconstructed materials” to this court. The
superior court, however, was not required to
make any specific findings or provide addi-
tional materials. The verbatim discussion
between the superior court and counsel is
reflected in the reconstruction hearing tran-
script and is summarized in the court’s min-
ute entry. The transcript and minute entry
constitute “reconstructed materials” as con-
templated by ARCAP 11(g).

113 We conclude that the record on appeal
in this case, as reconstructed by the parties
and the superior court, confirms that the
statutory requirement of receiving testimony
from two acquaintance witnesses under
ARS. § 86-589(B) was satisfied.

CONCLUSION
114 We affirm the superior court’s order
committing Appellant to a period of com-
bined inpatient and outpatient psychiatric
treatment.

397 P.3d 1040
Mark R. GORDON, Plaintiff/Appellant,
vw

ESTATE OF George BROOKS; Sheri
Sanborne and Maribel Maza,
Defendants/Appellees.

No, 1 CA-CV 14-0802

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/30/2017

Mark R. Gordon, Phoenix, Plaintiff/Appel-
lant

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix, By James
A. Fassold, Amy D, Sells, Counsel for Defen-
dants/Appellees

442

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D, Jones and Judge Paul J.
McMurdie joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

71 In 2007, Plaintiff/Appellant, Mark R.
Gordon, purchased a house from the Estate
of George Brooks. After the sale closed, Gor-
don sued Defendants/Appellees, the Estate
and the personal representatives of the Es-
tate, Sheri Sanborne and Maribel Maza,!
both in their representative and individual
capacities, and, as relevant here, asserted
claims against them for various alleged de-
fects and deficiencies in the house. The supe-
rior court dismissed Gordon’s complaint. On
appeal, Gordon does not take issue with the
superior court’s dismissal of his claims
against the Estate or against Sanborne and
Maza in their representative capacities. In-
stead, he argues the superior court should
not have dismissed his claims against San-
borne and Maza in their individual capacities.
We agree. Accordingly, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with our instructions,

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

HI 12 On January 31, 2007, the probate
court appointed Sanborne and Maza as per-
sonal representatives of the Estate of George
Brooks? While administering the Estate,
Sanborne and Maza listed Brooks’ house for
sale, On May 19, 2007, Gordon presented
Sanborne and Maza with a written offer to
purchase the house. Sanborne and Maza ac-
cepted Gordon’s offer the following day.

18 The purchase contract listed the seller
as “George Brooks,” and Sanborne and Maza
signed theix names under the “seller’s signa-
ture” section of the contract. The purchase

1, Maribel Maza’s name also appears in the rec-
ord as “Maribel Maza-Brooks” and “Maribel
Brooks.” Consistent with the caption of this case,
we refer to her as ‘Maribel Maza.”

2. We take judicial notice of the filings in the
Estate's probate proceeding, In re Estate of
Brooks, Maricopa County Cause No. PB2007-

contract did not state or otherwise indicate
that Sanborne and Maza were acting on be-
half of the Estate or serving as personal
representatives of the Estate.

14 On June 11, 2007, Gordon sent a letter
to the escrow agent alleging Sanborne and
Maza had breached their contractual obli-
gations to cure several alleged deficiencies in
the house, Nevertheless, Gordon submitted
the final payment required to close the sale
of the house to the escrow agent. The follow-
ing day, on June 12, 2007, Sanborne and
Maza recorded a warranty deed with the
Office of the Maricopa County Recorder con-
veying the house to Gordon. The warranty
deed, which the Recorder mailed to Gordon,
identified Sanborne and Maza as the grant-
ors acting as “Co—Personal Representatives
of the estate of George W. Brooks, deceased.
Maricopa County Superior Court Probate
No. 2007-00089.”

15 On February 27, 2012, Sanborne and
Maza filed closing statements in the probate
proceeding and represented the Estate had
been fully administered with all claims re-
solved, In June 2018, Gordon moved to re-
open the Estate, alleging he had outstanding
claims against the Estate. Specifically, Gor-
don asserted Sanborne and Maza, as person-
al representatives of the Estate, had breach-
ed express and implied warranties under the
purchase contract because warrantied items
“were not then in working condition.” The
probate court denied Gordon’s motion. Gor-
don appealed, This court affirmed the pro-
bate court’s denial of Gordon’s motion to
reopen the Estate, see In re Estate of Brooks
(“Gordon I”), 1 CA-CV 18-0592, 2015 WL
898748, at *5, 118 (Ariz. App. March 8, 2015)
(mem. decision), and held Gordon had failed
to present any cognizable claims against the
Estate pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes
(AR.S.”) section 14-8804(1) (2012) (requir-
ing claim against an estate to be presented in
writing, “indicating its basis, the name and

000389. See In re Sabino R., 198 Ariz. 424, 425,

14, 10 P.3d 1211, 1212 (App. 2000) (under

R. Evid. 201, appellate court may take ju

notice of anything superior court could take judi-

oe notice of, even if superior court did not do

80).

address of the claimant and the amount
claimed”).

16 On May 17, 2018, before Gordon moved
to reopen the Estate, Gordon filed this case.
As discussed below, in his complaint, as
amended, Gordon asserted claims against the
Estate and Sanborne and Maza, both in their
representative and individual capacities. San-
borne and Maza moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, arguing Gordon’s claims
were time-barred by the probate code be-
cause they had closed the Estate and pre-
eluded by the doctrine of claim preclusion.’
The superior court agreed with Sanborne
and Maza’s arguments and granted their mo-
tion to dismiss,

DISCUSSION
I, Gordon’s Claims

Hl 17 As relevant here, in his amended
complaint, Gordon alleged nine causes of ac-
tion against Sanborne and Maza: count 1,
failure to disclose various defects in the
home; count 2, breach of warranties in the
purchase contract regarding the condition of
the property; count 8, breach of the purchase
contract by failing to take curative action as
required under the contract and by forcing
Gordon to close the escrow; count 4, breach
of the purchase contract by failing to have
the refrigerator/freezer and irrigation sys-
tems properly repaired; count 5, breach of
the purchase contract by keeping the Estate
open to avoid having to participate in alterna-
tive dispute resolution as required by the
contract; count 6, abuse of process by failing
to comply with their statutory obligations
regarding their administration of the Estate
and in closing the Estate without paying or
settling his claims;4 count 7, estoppel by
refusing to comply with their contractual ob-
ligations and promises; count 8, breach of
their fiduciary duty to the Estate and its
creditors to pay and resolve creditor claims
against the Estate; and count 9, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed

3, We use the modern terms of claim and issue
preclusion rather than res judicata and collateral
estoppel. See Circle K Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n,
179 Ariz, 422, 425, 880 P.2d 642, 645 (App.
1993) (the terms claim preclusion and issue pre-
clusion are more descriptive, and thus less likely

443

to him under the purchase contract by failing
to disclose and repair defects to the house
and by administering the Estate in such a
manner as to avoid having to pay his creditor
claims against the Estate.

18 As reflected by the foregoing summary,
Counts 5, 6, 8, and 9 (in part) were grounded
on allegations the Estate had failed to pay
Gordon’s creditor claims or that Sanborne
and Maza had failed to properly administer
the Estate by failing to settle and pay Gor-
don’s creditor claims against the Estate (the
“Bstate Claims”). In contrast, Counts 1, 2, 8,
4,7, and 9 (in part) were grounded on allega-
tions that Sanborne and Maza were personal-
ly liable to him under the purchase contract
for alleged defects and deficiencies in the
house (the “Personal Liability Claims”),

49 On appeal, Gordon acknowledges that
this case “is not about probate administration
nor about me being a creditor with probate
claims against the Estate; that was the previ-
ously decided Probate Matter. This Civil Suit
at-bar is against the remaining defendants,
Appellees, as individuals. ...” Given this ac-
Inowledgment, we do not need to decide
whether the superior court properly dis-
missed the Estate Claims, and we deem Gor-
don to have abandoned the Estate Claims.
See DeHlena v. S. Pac. Co., 121 Ariz, 568,
572, 592 P.2d 759, 768 (1979) (issues not
argued on appeal are deemed abandoned);
see also Torrez v. Knowlton, 205 Ariz. 550,
552 nl, 13, 78 P.8d 1285, 1287 n.1 (App.
2008) (appellate court deemed appellant to
have abandoned any argument that superior
court improperly granted summary judgment
on one claim when, on appeal, appellant only
challenged summary judgment on a different
claim).

110 Gordon has not, however, abandoned
the Personal Liability Claims against San-
borne and Maza. On appeal, Gordon argues
the superior court should not have dismissed
those claims because Sanborne and Maza are
individually liable on the purchase contract

to cause confusion, than the terms res judicata
and collateral estoppel).

4, In his opening brief, Gordon acknowledged
two other causes of action, recording a false
document and slander of title, were moot,

444

and the Personal Liability claims are neither
time-barred nor barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. Reviewing the superior
court’s ruling under the applicable standards
of review, we agree with Gordon.

II. Sanborne and Maza as Parties to the
Purchase Contract

11 Gordon argues that because Sanborne
and Maza failed to identify the Estate in the
purchase contract, they cannot be shielded
from personal liability as personal represen-
tatives of the Estate pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 14-8808(A) (2012), At common law, an es-
tate was not liable on contracts entered by
its personal representative in administering
the estate even if the contracts were for the
benefit of the estate, See Vance v, Myers’
Estate, 494 P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1972). This
rule of personal liability was grounded on the
notion that an estate was not a legal entity.
14 Amy M. Hess et al., Bogert’s Trusts and
Trustees § 712 (8d ed., Sep. 2016) (similar to
personal representative of an estate, trustee
was the only legal entity who promised to
perform a contract), This rule applied even
when the personal representative disclosed to
the other contracting party that he was act-
ing on behalf of the estate in entering the
contract, In this situation, assuming the con-
tract benefited the estate, the personal rep-
vesentative could recover from the estate
based on reimbursement or indemnity theo-
ries. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 246 cmt. a (1959) (trustee personally liable
upon contracts made by him; if liability prop-
erly incurred by him, trustee entitled to in-
demnity from trust estate),

12 This was a harsh rule, Thus, begin-
ning in the last century, courts and legisla-
tures began to carve out exceptions to the
tule, See generally Durden v, Centwry 21
Compass Points, Inc,, 541 So.2d 1264 (Fla,
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), The Uniform Probate
Code (“UPC”), which Arizona has adopted,
has dispensed, in part, with the rule of per-
sonal liability, Thus, a contracting party with
a claim against an estate may bring that
claim directly against the estate by suing the
5. See Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352,

355-56, 117-8, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012)

(appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim de novo and will affirm

personal representative of the estate in his
fiduciary, that is, representational, capacity,
See A.R.S. § 14-8808(C) (claim based on con-
tract entered into by personal representative
in his or her fiduciary capacity may be as-
serted against estate by proceeding against
personal representative in his or her fiducia-
ry capacity, whether or not personal repre-
sentative is individually liable); see also Ader
v. Estate of Felger, 240 Aviz, 32, 89, 122, 875
P.8d 97, 104 (App. 2016) (estate is a collection
of decedent's assets and liabilities and does
not have capacity to bring or defend a suit; it
can only sue and be sued through its person-
al representative) (citations and quotations
omitted), Nevertheless, depending on the cir-
cumstances, a contracting party may also
assert a direct claim against the personal
representative in his or her personal or indi-
vidual capacity. A.R.S, § 14-8808(B) (person-
al representative individually liable for obli-
gations arising from control of estate in the
course of administration of estate but only if
personal representative is personally at
fault),

{18 Further, under the UPC, a personal
representative may avoid personal or individ-
ual liability on a contract entered into in his
or her fiduciary capacity if he or she makes
certain disclosures in the contract. Section
14-8808(A), which is modeled after UPC
§ 8-808, provides:

Unless otherwise provided in the contract,

a personal representative is not individual-

ly liable on a contract properly entered

into in his fiduciary capacity in the course
of administration of the estate wnless he
fails to reveal his representative capacity
and identify the estate in the contract.

(Emphasis added.) Although no reported Ari-
zona appellate decision has interpreted this
provision, the Nebraska Supreme Court in-
terpreted this provision, under facts similar
to the facts presented here, and concluded a
personal representative was not entitled to
the protections afforded by the statute when
the personal representative failed to comply
with the statutory requirements.

only if plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any facts susceptible of proof; appellate
court reviews issues of law de novo) (citations
and quotations omitted),

914 In Purbaugh v. Jurgensmeier, 240
Neb, 679, 483 N.W.2d 757 (1992), the defen-
dant, a personal representative of an estate,
sold property belonging to the estate to the
plaintiffs. The defendant signed the purchase
contract in his own name followed by the
initials “P.R.” Id. at 760, The contract did not
disclose or otherwise indicate the property
was property of the estate. Jd, The plaintiffs
subsequently sued the defendant for breach
of the purchase contract. Jd, The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defen-
dant, concluding the plaintiffs had sued the
wrong party because they had notice the
defendant was acting in his capacity as per-
sonal representative for the estate. Jd, at 761.

9115 The Nebraska Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded. Id. at 764, It held
the defendant had failed to comply with Ne-
braska’s version of UPC § 8-808, which is
identical to A.R.S, § 14-8808(A). The court
determined the initials “P.R.” after the de-
fendant’s signature, without more, failed to
put the plaintiffs on notice the defendant
was acting for a particular estate:

The initials “P.R.” which [the defendant]
added to his signature may have been suf
ficient to inform a layperson that he or she
was dealing with a personal representative,
but there was nothing in the documents or
dealings set forth in the record which
would indicate what or whom [the defen-
dant] represented....

Td, at 763

HH 116 Here, as in Purbaugh, Sanborne
and Maza did not disclose in the purchase
contract they were acting as personal repre-
sentatives of the Estate, or that the Estate
was the actual seller of the house. Thus, they
failed to comply with the disclosure require-
ments of A.R.S. § 14-8808(A), and were not

6. Gordon alleged in his amended complaint that
Sanborne and Maza had “‘indicated” to him they
“were relatives of Brooks’ and authorized to
negotiate and sign the purchase contract on his
behalf,

7. The disclosure requirements of A.R.S. § 14~
3808(A) mirror Arizona common law regarding
the liability of an agent who executes a contract
for a disclosed principal. See Cahn v. Fisher, 167
Ariz, 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (App. 1990)

445

entitled to the protections against individual
liability afforded by that statute,

9117 Nevertheless, Sanborne and Maza ar-
gue Gordon had notice they were acting in a
representative capacity because the purchase
contract listed the seller as George Brooks
and they signed their own names under the
“seller's: signature” section of the purchase
contract. But, even if we assume their signa-
tures could have put Gordon on notice they
were acting for a George Brooks,’ to trigger
the protections afforded by ARS. § 14-
8808(A), they were required to “reveal” both
their “representative capacity and identify
the estate in the contract.” ARS, § 14
8808(A) (emphasis added). The undisputed
record before us reflects they failed to com-
ply with the latter requirement.’ That the
purchase contract identified “George Brooks”
as the “seller” is insufficient, without more,
to provide notice that Sanborne and Maza
were acting on behalf of the Estate. Compare
Myers-Leiber Sign Co., 2 Ariz.App. at 586,
410 P.2d at 498 (disclosure of tradename
insufficient identification of principal), with
Empire Office Machines, Inc. v. Aspen
Trails Assocs, LLC, 874 Mont. 421, 822 P.8d
424, 426-27 (2014) (disclosure of tradename
sufficient when parties had longstanding
business relationship),

118 Sanborne and Maza also argue the
warranty deed, which they signed as the
personal representatives of the Estate and
which Gordon received after the sale closed,
see supra 14, placed Gordon on notice they
were acting in a representative capacity. We
reject this argument. Section 14-8808(A) re-
quires the personal representative to “reveal
his representative capacity and identify the
estate in the contract.” (Emphasis added.)
‘Thus, a personal representative's post-con-
tractual disclosure that he was acting for an
estate when he executed the contract is, sim-

(agent protected from personal liability on a con-
tract if agent discloses he is acting as an agent
for a third party and the third party’s identity);
Myers-Leiber Sign Co. v, Weirich, 2 Ariz.App. 534,
536, 410 P.2d 491, 493 (1966) (agent who negoti-
ates contracts on behalf of his principal may
avoid personal liability on the contract if he
discloses riot only his agency but also the identity
of his principal).

446

ply put, too little, too late.§

19 The court in Purbaugh also rejected a
similar argument. Approximately one year
after the parties had signed the contract, one
of the plaintiffs wrote a letter to the defen-
dant that referenced the existence of the
estate. Purbaugh, 488 N.W.2d at 768. And,
approximately three months later, the plain-
tiffs received a deed to the property that
identified the defendant as the grantor, act-
ing as the personal representative for the
estate. Id. at 760, 763. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court held that neither the letter nor
the deed demonstrated the plaintiffs had no-
tice of the defendant's status at the time the
parties signed the contract because both
were prepared after the parties had signed
the contract. Id, at 763.

120 Here, Sanborne and Maza failed to
comply with the disclosure requirements of
ARS. § 14-8808(A), Accordingly, they are
not entitled to the protections against indi-
vidual liability afforded by ARS, § 14~
3808(A).?

III, The Limitation Periods of the Probate
Code

121 On appeal, as they did in the superior
court, Sanborne and Maza argue Gordon’s
claims were barred by various limitation pe-
riods set out in the probate code, Specifically,
Sanborne and Maza argue ARS. § 14
8808(C) (2012), A.R.S, § 14-3983 (2012), and
ARS. § 14-8935 (2012) all barred Gordon’s
Personal Liability Claims. We address each
statute in turn.

A, ARS. § 14-8803(C)

Hl 1.22 Section 14-803(C) provides time
limits for “claims against a decedent’s estate
that arise at or after” the decedent’s death.
Under that section, all such claims are
“barred against the estate [and] the personal
representative” unless they are presented
within the specified time periods. A.R.S,

8. This requirement also mirrors Arizona com-
mon law. See Myers-Leiber Sign Co., 2 Ariz.App.
at 536, 410 P.2d at 493 (agent must disclose
identity of principal to the other party at the time
of the transaction; disclosure of identity of prin-
cipal after contract executed will not relieve
agent from liability on the contract).

§ 14-8803(C), On its face, this section only
bars claims against an estate. It does not
address claims against a personal represen-
tative in his or her individual capacity. The
comments to UPC § 3-803, which is virtually
identical to A.R.S. § 14-8808(C), make clear
that the limitation periods specified in this
provision apply only to claims against an
estate: “The time limits stated would not, of
course, affect any personal liability in con-
tract ... of the personal representative... .
Unif. Probate Code § 3-803 emt, (amended
2010), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A, (2018), The comments
continue, “Creditors of the estate and not of
the personal representative thus face a spe-
cial limitation that runs four months after
performance is due from the personal repre-
sentative.” Jd. (emphasis added). Here, Gor-
don’s Personal Liability Claims are against
Sanborne and Maza individually. Thus,
ARS. § 14-8803(C) is inapplicable.

B, ARS. § 14-3933

HI 123 Section 14-8988 addresses a per-
sonal representative’s use of a “closing state-
ment” to close an estate. Section 14-3933(B)
provides, “If no proceedings involving the
personal representative[s] are pending in the
court one year after the closing statement is
filed, the appointment of the personal repre-
sentative terminates.” Even if we assume
this provision applies to a personal represen-
tative acting in his or her individual capacity,
termination “does not discharge a personal
representative from liability for transactions
or omissions occurring before termi-
nation....” A.R.S. § 14-3608 (2012), Here,
Gordon purchased the home before Sanborne
and Maza filed the closing statements. Thus,
ARS, § 14-3988 does not bar Gordon's Per-
sonal Liability Claims,

C. ARS. § 14-8935

HE 124 Section 14-8935 establishes a
limitation period for claims against a person-

9. This appeal arises out of the grant of a Rule
12(b) motion. We express no opinion as to
whether Sanborne and Maza are entitled to pro-
tections against individual liability based on oth-
er legal principles, cluding whether Gordon
had actual notice they were acting on behalf of
the Estate.

al representative for breach of fiduciary duty.
It provides:

Unless previously barred by adjudication
... the rights of successors and of credi-
tors whose claims against the personal rep-
resentative for breach of fiduciary duty
have not otherwise been barred are barred
unless a proceeding to assert the same is
commenced within six months after the
filing of the closing statement,

ARS. § 14-8935. As we recognized in To-
vrea v. Nolan, 178 Ayviz, 485, 875 P.2d 144
(App. 1998), this six-month limitation period
applies only to individuals who are acting in
the capacity as a personal representative.

{125 In Tovrea, the defendants were the
personal representatives of a decedent’s es-
tate and served as the trustees of a residuary
trust created by the decedent’s will. Id. at
487, 875 P.2d at 146, The defendants provid-
ed an accounting to themselves in their indi-
vidual capacities and as trustees of the resid-
uary trust, Jd, They refused, however, to
provide the accounting to the trust’s remain-
der beneficiaries, the decedent’s children. Id.
Well after the six-month limitation period of
ARS. § 14-8985 expired, the children sued
the defendants and accused them of breach-
ing their fiduciary duties as the estate’s per-
sonal representatives and as trustees of the
residuary trust. Jd. The superior court grant-
ed the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling the six-month limitation period
of ARS. § 14-8985 barred all of the chil-
dren’s claims. Jd. at 488, 875 P.2d at 147, On
appeal, this court held the children’s claims
against the defendants as personal represen-
tatives were subject to A.R.S, § 14-8985 and
thus time barred. Jd, at 489, 875 P.2d at 148.
But, we concluded A.R.S. § 14-3935 was in-
applicable to the children’s claims against the
defendants as trustees. Id.

126 As Tovrea established, A.R.S. § 14-
8985 does not apply to claims against a per-
sonal representative who acts in a capacity
outside that of personal representative. Thus,
the six-month limitation period of A.R.S.
§ 14-3985 is inapplicable to Gordon’s Person-
al Liability Claims against Sanborne and
Maza.

447

IV. Claim Preclusion.

HE 1.27 Sanborne and Maza also argue
the doctrine of claim preclusion bars Gor-
don’s Personal Liability Claims because the
probate court rejected those claims when it
denied his request to reopen the Estate. See
supra 5. Under the doctrine of claim preclu-
sion, a final judgment on the merits in a
prior suit involving the same parties or the
parties’ privies bars a subsequent suit based
on the same cause of action, Pettit v. Pettit,
218 Ariz, 529, 531, 14, 189 P.8d 1102, 1104
(App. 2008) (citation omitted),

28 Assuming, without deciding, that San-
borne and Maza have established the first
two elements of claim preclusion, an identity
of claims and a final judgment on the merits,
Sanborne and Maza have failed to establish
the final element of claim preclusion, the
same parties or the parties’ privies. There-
fore, the superior court should not have dis-
missed Gordon’s Personal Liability Claims
under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

129 Under the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 86(2) (1982), “A party appear-
ing in an action in one capacity, individual or
representative, is not thereby bound by or
entitled to the benefits of the rules of [claim
preclusion] in a subsequent action in which
he appears in another capacity.” The com-
ments to § 36(2) explain this rule applies to
administrators of estates: “For [claim preclu-
sion] purposes the determination as to his
eapacity in the transaction is binding on him
only in the capacity in which he has partici-
pated in the litigation.” Zd. emt. b.

130 The court in Clark v» Amoco Prod.
Co., 794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986), applied this
Restatement provision, There, two heirs of a
decedent sued an oil company seeking rec-
ords to establish that the decedent had an
interest in real property, and, thus, mineral
rights in the property. Id, at 969. The district.
court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Id, Then, in a second suit, after being ap-
pointed as the administrators of the dece-
dent’s estate, the same individuals brought
suit against the oil company seeking an ac-
counting of minerals extracted from the
property. Jd. As with the first suit, the dis-
trict court dismissed the second suit for fail-

448

ure to state a claim, Jd. Citing the Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 86(2), the
Fifth Cireuit reversed, explaining that claim
preclusion “does not apply to a situation ...
in which a party appears in one action in an
individual capacity and in a subsequent ac-
tion in a representative capacity.” Clark, 794
F.2d at 978; see also Brooks v. Arthur, 626
F.8d 194, 195-96 (4th Cir, 2010) (corrections
officers not in privity with themselves in
their official and individual capacities for pur-
poses of claim preclusion),

781 The court in Jaramillo v. Burkhart,
999 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1993), examined a
grandmother's differing capacities under the
related doctrine of issue preclusion, There, a
grandmother filed three diversity suits
against a truck driver who had fatally injured
her daughter and injured her grandchildren
in a car accident. Id, at 1248. The grand-
mother filed one of the suits as administrator
of her daughter’s estate for wrongful death.
Id. The grandmother filed the second and
third suits as guardian of the grandchildren
for personal injury. Jd. The parties tried the
wrongful death action to a jury, which re-
turned a defense verdict. Id. The truck driv-
er then moved for summary judgment in the
personal injury suits, arguing the suits were
barred by issue preclusion, Jd. The district
court agreed and granted the truck driver's
motion. Jd.

182 On appeal, the Highth Circuit ve-
versed, holding the personal injury suits
were not barred by issue preclusion because
the grandmother appeared in the suits in
different capacities: administrator and guard-
ian, Id. at 1244, 1246. The court explained:

A person acting in a fiduciary or represen-

tative capacity who litigates to judgment,

questions relating to his or her rights,
duties, or liabilities in that capacity is not
bound by that judgment in a subsequent
proceeding with respect to his or her per-
sonal or individual rights connected with
the same subject matter.

Id, at 1244 (citation omitted).

1883 Here, Sanborne and Maza argue
“Gordon’s post hoc attempt to assert that the
Amended Complaint was filed against the

10, On appeal, Gordon has also argued the supe-
rior court violated his due process rights in dis-

Co-—Personal Representatives in their person-
al capacities is belied by a plain reading of
the Amended Complaint, which defines San-
borne and Maza as the Co-Personal Repre-
sentatives of the Estate.” Therefore, they
assert Gordon sued them only in their capaci-
ties as personal representatives of the Es-
tate. Although Gordon alleged Sanborne and
Maza had been the personal representatives
of the Estate, he also alleged, in his amended
complaint, that his claims were against San-
borne and Maza personally and they were
individually liable on the purchase contract.
Therefore, Gordon alleged causes of action
against Sanborne and Maza in their individu-
al capacities.

134 Because Sanborne and Maza have ap-
peared in this case, as related to the Person-
al Liability Claims, in a different capacity
than they appeared in Gordon I, they are
“not thereby bound by or entitled to the
benefits of the rules of [claim preclusion]” in
this case. Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 36(2) (1982),

CONCLUSION

185 For the foregoing reasons, the superi-
or court should not have dismissed Gordon’s
Personal Liability Claims against Sanborne
and Maza. Because Gordon has abandoned
the Estate Claims on appeal, we affirm the
superior court’s dismissal of the Estate
Claims and remand this case for further
proceedings on, but only on, the Personal
Liability Claims. On remand, the superior
court shall dismiss any claims Gordon at-
tempts to assert against the Estate or
against Sanborne and Maza as personal rep-
resentatives of the Estate which pertain in
any way to their administration of the Es-
tate20

186 Because Sanborne and Maza have not
prevailed on Gordon’s Personal Liability
Claims, we deny their request for attorneys’
fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-841.01 (2016).
As the prevailing party on appeal, we award
Gordon his costs on appeal pursuant to
ARS. § 12-841 (2016), contingent upon his

missing his amended complaint. That argument
is frivolous and we reject it.

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appel-
[|

late Procedure 21,

397 P.3d 1049
IN RE the Matter of the CONSER-
VATORSHIP FOR: Cathie
HARDT, an adult.

Lorrie Nevens, Special Conservator for Ca-
thie Hardt, on behalf of Cathie Hardt;
Lorrie Nevens; and Jeffrey Nevens,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

ve

AZHH, LLC, an Arizona limited liability
company formerly known as Arizona
Heart Hospital, LLC, Defendant/Appel-
lee,

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0532

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 5/80/2017

rn

Solomon & Relihan, PC, Phoenix, By Mar-
tin J. Solomon, Kevin J. McAlonan, Co-
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

The Breslo Law Firm, LLC, Scottsdale,
By John C. Breslo, Co-Counsel for Plain-
tiffs/Appellants

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP,
Phoenix, By James K. Kloss, Counsel for
Defendant/Appellee

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP,
Atlanta, GA, By Joelle C. Sharman, Pro Hae
Vice Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge John C.
Gemmill joined.

OPINION

DOWNIE, Judge:

11 Cathie Hardt and Lorrie Nevens (col-
lectively, “Appellants”) appeal a final judg-
ment entered after a jury trial that resulted
in a defense verdict.? Because we conclude
the superior court improperly precluded Ap-
pellants’ rebuttal causation expert as “dupli-
cative,” and Appellants have demonstrated
resulting prejudice, we reverse and remand
for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

12 Hardt was admitted to the Arizona
Heart Hospital (“‘AZHH”) in the early morn-
ing hours of August 25, 2008 with “complete
occlusion of the distal aorta at its bifurcation,
which presented as pulseless lower extremi-
ties.” She was deemed a “high-risk” patient
at risk of death without removal of the block-
age. Hardt underwent surgery at AZHH that
same morning.

18 On August 27, AZHH staff documented
the presence of Stage I and II ulcers on
Hardt’s back and sacral/coecyx area. By Sep-
tember 9, 2008, the ulcers had progressed to
Stage III, and upon discharge from AZHH
on September 18, 2008 to Heartstone Hospi-
tal~Mesa, LLC, dba Trillium Specialty Hos-
pital-East Valley (“Trillium”), Hardt had a
Stage IV ulcer.

1, The Honorable John C. Gemmill, Retired Judge
of the Court of Appeals, Division One, has been
authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Arti-
cle VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

451

14 Appellants sued AZHH and Trillium,
alleging Hardt was a vulnerable adult who
developed “avoidable pressure ulcers due to
substandard nursing care, negligence, abuse,
and neglect.” The court ordered the claims
against Trillium arbitrated, but the lawsuit
against AZHH proceeded.

15 After a nine-day trial, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of AZHH. Appel-
lants unsuccessfully moved for a new trial
pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
(‘Rule”) 59, After the superior court issued
its final judgment, Appellants timely appeal-
ed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
120,21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(5)(a).

DISCUSSION

I. Preclusion of Appellants’ Rebuttal Ex-
pert

Hl 16 Joseph Silva, M.D. testified as a
causation expert during Appellants’ case-in-
chief, Dr. Silva, who is Board-certified in
internal medicine and has a specialty in infec-
tious disease, opined that Hardt developed
pressure ulcers during her stay at AZHH
that were preventable through repositioning,
wound care, and adequate nutrition. Dr. Silva
did not offer opinions regarding vascular is-
sues, testifying he would defer to a vascular
surgeon on that topic.

17 During its case-in-chief, AZHH called
Gerald Treiman, M.D—a Board-certified
general and vascular surgeon—to testify as
its causation expert. Dr. Treiman opined that
Hardt’s ulcers were caused by a lack of blood
flow that pre-dated her admission to AZHH.

18 Appellants planned to call vascular sur-
geon Paul Collier, M.D. as a rebuttal witness
to refute Dr. Treiman’s opinions. After the
defense rested, however, AZHH orally
moved to preclude Dr. Collier, arguing he
would be “a repetitive causation expert” in
violation of Rule 26. The superior court
agreed, labeling Dr. Collier “a duplicative
expert” and precluding his testimony,

2, Although Jeffrey Nevens was originally named

as a plaintiff, he was dismissed as a party and is
not involved in this appeal.

452

HM 19 A ruling admitting or excluding
evidence will not be overturned on appeal
absent abuse of discretion and resulting prej-
udice. Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz,
166 Ariz. 88, 87, 800 P.2d 20, 24 (App. 1990).
If an evidentiary ruling is predicated on a
question of law, however, we review that
ruling de novo. Yauch v. S. Pac, Transp. Co.,
198 Ariz, 394, 399, 110, 10 P.Sd 1181 (App.
2000), And even when a ruling is diseretion-
ary, “[a] court abuses its discretion if it com-
mits an error of law in reaching a discretion-
ary conclusion.” Flying Diamond Airpark,
LLC v, Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 44, 50, 127, 156
P.8d 1149 (App. 2007).

HB 110 Rule 26(b)(4)(D) states that
“fulnless the parties agree or the court or-
ders otherwise for good cause, each side is
presumptively entitled to call only one re-
tained or specially employed expert to testify
on an issue.” The rule, however, contem-
plates “liberal expansion of its presumptive
limitation when ‘an issue cuts across several
professional disciplines”” Sanchez v. Old
Pueblo Anesthesia, P.C., 218 Ariz. 817, 822
118, 188 P.3d 1285 (App. 2008) (quoting Ariz,
R. Civ. P, 26(b)(4) emt, to 1991 amend.).

I 111 To the extent Dr. Collier’s rebut-
tal testimony would have focused on vascular
issues, it would not have heen duplicative of
or cumulative to Dr. Silva’s because Dr. Silva
had not addressed such matters. “[Tyhe in-
tent of Rule 26(b)(4)(D) is simply to limit the
presentation of cumulative evidence,” id.,
meaning evidence that “merely augments or
tends to establish a point already proved by
other evidence,” State v. Kennedy, 122 Ariz,
22, 26, 592 P.2d 1288, 1292 (App. 1979).

112 AZHH’s closing argument made it
abundantly clear that Dr. Silva’s opinions and
expertise were qualitatively different from
(and, in AZHH’s view, inferior to) a vascular
surgeon’s. Counsel argued:

[Dr. Silva is] a nice guy, but he ain’t the

right type of doctor for this case, he’s not a

vascular surgeon; he’s not even a sur-

geon—not a vascular surgeon. He doesn’t
have the right expertise,

3. For example, one of Dr. Collier's disclosed
opinions was that [t]he lack of pressure relief

Dr, Treiman was the only vascular surgeon
you heard from as an expert witness. You
didn’t hear any other vascular surgeon,
You didn’t hear anybody with the right
expertise,

So we put on the person with the right
expertise, We put on the person who was
best qualified, best able to talk about what
happened, why it was in this case, And
what did that one and only vascular sur-
geon when you talk about causation, what
caused this, What did that one and only
expert tell you?

Hl 118 Contrary to AZHH’s suggestion
on appeal, there is nothing untoward about
Appellants making a “strategic” decision to
wait to call Dr. Collier in rebuttal, as opposed
to during their case-in-chief. See City Trans-
fer Co, v, Johnson, 72 Ariz. 298, 297, 288 P.2d
1078 (1951) (“T]he law is well settled that
the mere fact that testimony might have
been introduced as a part of the case in chief
will not preclude its being made a part of the
rebuttal.”). “Rebuttal evidence is to counter a,
new fact or allegation made by an opponent’s
case.” Jansen v, Lichwa, 18 Ariz.App. 168,
171, 474 P.2d 1020 (1970), Appellants’ theory
of causation was, as Dr, Silva testified, that
negligence by medical professionals at
AZHH caused Hardt’s ulcers, Unless and
until AZHH placed evidence before the jury
that Hardt’s ulcers were caused by pre-exist-
ing vascular issues, Appellants had no reason.
to present testimony by a vascular expert,
Appellants presented a prima facie case of
causation during their case-in-chief through
Dr, Silva based on their theory of the case—
not AZHH’s defense. They were not required
to do otherwise.

114 In opposing the motion for new trial,
AZHH argued that Appellants “sought to
duplicate Dr. Silva by also calling Dr, Collier
to testify on causation issues.” The record
does not support this characterization, Al-
though some of Dr, Collier’s disclosed opin-
ions might have duplicated Dy. Silva’s, and
thus been properly excluded as cumulative if
Appellants had sought to offer them at trial,?

was clearly the cause of the pressure ulcer”—an
opinion that would have been cumulative.

it is clear from Appellants’ pretrial disclo-
sures that, unlike Dr, Silva, Dr, Collier would
discuss and refute Dr. Treiman’s opinion that
vascular conditions caused Hardt’s ulcers.

915 AZHH also faults Appellants for not
making a more detailed proffer to the court
about Dr. Collier's intended rebuttal testimo-
ny, But it was not until the close of day six of
trial that AZHH orally moved to preclude
Dr. Collier. Until that time, the record sug-
gests Appellants had every reason to believe
Dr. Collier would be permitted to testify in
rebuttal. They had properly disclosed and
listed both Dr. Silva and Dr. Collier as wit-
nesses in the joint pretrial statement, Al-
though AZHH objected to other witnesses
Appellants listed, it did not object to Dr.
Collier. AZHH filed pretrial motions to pre-
clude other expert witnesses, including one
motion asserting that Appellants were offer-
ing another expert in violation of Rule
26(b)(4)(D) because she would duplicate other
standard-of-care expert testimony. Yet there
‘was no indication until more than halfway
through trial that AZHH would seek to pre-
clude Dr, Collier, Moreover, the superior
court had the necessary information before
it, having heard Dr. Silva specifically testify
he was not opining about vascular issues.

HMMs 116 Rule 16(g)(2)(D) requires a
joint pretrial statement to contain
a list of witnesses each party intends to
call to testify at trial, identifying those
witnesses whose testimony will be present-
ed solely by deposition. Hach party must
list any objection to a witness and the
basis for that objection.
(Emphasis added.) “The pretrial statement
serves to narrow the scope of the legal and
factual issues to those which are truly legiti-
mate, prevents surprises and facilitates the
trial of the case. The pretrial statement con-
trols the subsequent course of the litigation.”
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dini, 169 Ariz, 555,
557, 821 P.2d 216, 218 (App. 1991) (address-
ing predecessor rule to Rule 16(g)). Issues
that are not identified in the pretrial state-
ment may be deemed waived. Carlton v
Emhardt, 188 Ariz, 358, 855, 674 P.2d 907,
909 (App. 1983), Rule 26(b)(4)(D) is not in-
tended as a vehicle to permit last-minute
objections during trial, especially when the

453

party urging preclusion has not previously
objected as required by Rule 16(g)(2)(D). Cf
Perguson v. Tamis, 188 Ariz, 425, 429, 987
P.2d 347, 351 (App. 1996) (addressing prior
rule prescribing one expert per issue and
holding that the rule should not be used as “a
weapon of destruction” in an “arsenal of
technicalities”),

HM 117 Appellants have also demon-
strated that they were prejudiced by the
preclusion of Dr. Collier's testimony,
AZHH’s closing argument alone demon-
strates the prejudice, Based on the erroneous
exclusion of Dr. Collier’s testimony, we va-
cate the judgment in favor of AZHH and
remand for a new trial.

Il. Consortium Claim

HMM 118 The superior court entered
judgment as a matter of law against Nevens
(Hardt’s daughter) on her loss of consortium
claim, finding the evidence insufficient to
submit that claim to the jury, Because we are
remanding this matter for a new trial, we
need not address Nevens’ consortium claim
in depth. We note, however, that a child
asserting loss of consortium as to a parent
need not present evidence of catastrophic
injuries. See, eg., Miller v. Westcor Ltd.
P'ship, 171 Ariz. 887, 395, 881 P.2d 386, 394
(App. 1991) (“The focus of the trial court’s
inquiry is on the interference with the nor-
mal relationship between parent and child.”).
It is unclear what standard the superior
court applied to Nevens’ loss of consortium
claim, which may be re-litigated on remand,

IIL Testimony by Former AZHH Em-
ployee

HI 119 Because the issue may arise on

remand, we address Appellants’ challenge to

the preclusion of certain testimony by Pame-

la Molyneaux—a former AZHH employee

who worked as a clinical document specialist,

20 AZHH moved in limine to preclude
Molyneaux from testifying “about liability or
billing” in the context of hospital chart en-
tries reflecting the presence of skin ulcers,
Appellants opposed the motion, arguing Mo-
lyneaux had testified at deposition that en-
tries were added to Hardt’s chart to reflect

454

the presence of pressure ulcers when she
was admitted to the hospital and that docu-
menting ulcers is a “liability issue.” AZHH
responded that it was not contending Hardt
had ulcers when admitted to its facility. The
superior court ruled:
[Tyhe plaintiff will be allowed to examine
Molyneaux as to ... her work as a clinical
document specialist in chart review and in
placing in the charts the documents that,
according to the plaintiffs’ theory, may
have induced two doctors to make a chart
entry that was incorrect, So be allowed to
establish that, and be allowed to establish
the—that that was done ... for the pur-
poses of—of making sure the hospital re-
ceived maximum reimbursement from in-
surance providers.
I do not find, based upon what has been
presented to me, that there’s adequate
foundation for Molyneaux to testify that
the reason for the query was ... for pur-
poses of limiting the hospital’s liability.
From everything that was presented to
me, that seemed to be extraordinarily
equivocal and not based on adequate foun-
dation, ... would be an improper opinion
by someone who is not being offered or
qualified as an expert.

121 “In determining relevancy and admis-
sibility of evidence, the trial judge has con-
siderable diseretion.... Evidence is relevant,
if it has any basis in reason to prove a
material fact in issue.” State v. Smith, 186
Ariz, 278, 276, 665 P.2d 995, 998 (1983); see
Ariz, R. Evid, 401 (“Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence
in determining the action.”), Had AZHH
taken the position that Hardt had pressure
ulcers upon admission, more expansive testi-
mony by Molyneaux might have been rele-
vant to challenge the veracity of that asser-
tion. But the superior court could reasonably
conclude that whether AZHH had incentive
to evade liability or recover enhanced reim-
bursement from an insurer or third-party
payor by falsely documenting the existence
of ulcers upon admission was irrelevant to
the questions before the jury—ie., whether
AZHH committed medical negligence or

abused a vulnerable adult. Additionally, the
record supports the court’s finding that Mo-
lyneaux’s testimony about liability was “ex-
traordinarily equivocal” and lacking in foun-
dation,

HI 122 To the extent Appellants also
challenge the preclusion of a July 31, 2008
letter from the Center for Medicaid and
State Operations, the record reveals no abuse
of discretion based on information before the
court at the time of its ruling. The letter at
issue addresses Medicare billing and reim-
bursement policies effective October 1, 2008
for “selected hospital-acquired conditions,”
including pressure ulcers. The policy was not
in effect during Hardt’s stay at AZHH,
Hardt was not a Medicare patient, AZHH’s
billing practices were not at issue, and the
superior court concluded the document had
“the potential for ... generating confusion.”

IV. Remaining Issues

123 Appellants identify two additional is-
sues that we do not reach: (1) the submis-
sion of Trillium’s fault to the jury; and (2)
the court’s handling of a jury question re-
ceived during deliberations. The second issue
is not likely to recur on remand. And the
first issue, as framed, relates to the court’s
decision during trial to reverse an earlier
ruling precluding a non-party at fault de-
fense. Given the defense verdict, the jury
had no occasion to consider comparative
fault, and Appellants thus suffered no preju-
dice. We express no opinion about whether
AZHH may present a non-party at fault de-
fense at the new trial.

CONCLUSION

124 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the judgment of the superior court and re-
mand for a new trial. We award Appellants
their taxable costs on appeal contingent on
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appel-
late Procedure 21,

397 P.3d 1055

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES
LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

Jonathan WOODS, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0383

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/22/2017

>
oO
Ht

Law Offices of Beth K. Findsen, PLLC,
Scottsdale, By Beth K, Findsen, Counsel for
Defendants/Appellants

The Mortgage Law Firm, PC, Phoenix, By
Christina M. Harper, Alex Schulz, Counsel
for Plaintiff/Appellee

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer
B. Campbell joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

11 Jonathan and Carrie Woods, Defen-
dants/Appellants, appeal the superior court’s
judgment in favor of Carrington Mortgage
Services LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee, in this fore-
ible entry and detainer (“FED”) action. The
principal issue in this appeal is whether Car-
rington’s FED action accrued when Carring-
ton’s predecessor in interest purchased prop-
erty owned by the Woodses at a trustee’s
sale in 2010 or when Carrington served the

456

Woodses with written demand of possession
in 2016. We hold Carrington’s FED action
aeerued when Carrington served the Woods-
es with written demand of possession in 2016.
Thus, we agree with the superior court that
Carrington’s FED action was not time
barred. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
in Carrington’s favor,

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

{2 In 2008, the Woodses executed a prom-
issory note secured by a deed of trust on real
property located in Gilbert, Arizona. On Feb-
ruary 16, 2010, BAC Home Loans Servicing,
LP FKA Country Wide Home Loans Servic-
ing LP (“BAC”) purchased the property at a
trustee’s sale, and Recontrust Company,
N.A, the duly appointed trustee, conveyed
the property to BAC through a trustee’s
deed. BAC recorded the trustee's deed in the
Office of the Maricopa County Recorder on
February 22, 2010. Subsequently, Bank of
America, N.A. (“Bank of America”) acquired
BAC and became the owner of the property.

{8 On September 9, 2014, Bank of Amer-
ica executed a limited power of attorney
(“LPOA”) appointing Carrington as its “true
and lawful attorney-in-fact.” Among other
things, the LPOA authorized Carrington to
“[elxeeute or file quitclaim deeds or, only
where necessary and appropriate, special
warranty deeds or other deeds causing the
transfer of title to [Carrington as] Servicer
or a third party, in respect of property ac-
quired through a foreclosure or deed-in-lieu
of foreclosure..,.” On February 8, 2016,
Carrington, pursuant to the LPOA and on
behalf of Bank of America, conveyed the
property to itself through a grant deed.

14 On March 2, 2016, Carrington served
the Woodses with a written “Notice to Va-
cate” the property. On April 18, 2016, Car-
rington sued the Woodses for forcible de-
tainer after a trustee’s sale, The Woodses
answered and, in separate motions argued,
first, Carrington’s action was time barred
and, second, Carrington had not established

1, After BAC purchased the property at the trus-
tee’s sale, the Woodses became tenants at suffer-
ance. See Grady v. Barth ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa,
233 Ariz, 318, 321, 912, 312 P.3d 117, 120 (App.

a superior right of possession to the proper-
ty. The superior court denied the motions,
After a bench trial, the court entered judg-
ment in favor of Carrington, finding the
Woodses guilty of forcible detainer.

DISCUSSION

I Time Bar

HH 15 The Woodses argue Carrington’s
FED action accrued when BAC recorded the
trustee’s deed in 2010 and not when Carring-
ton served them with written demand of
possession in 2016.1 Accordingly, they argue
that, under the two-year statute of limita-
tions applicable to FED actions, Arizona Re-
vised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-542(6)
(2016), Carrington’s 2016 action for forcible
detainer was time barred. Exercising de novo
review, we reject the Woodses’ argument.
See Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232
Ariz. 178, 175, 110, 808 P.8d 67, 69 (App.
2018) (appellate court reviews question of law
concerning statute of limitations, including
when a cause of action accrues, de novo)
(citation omitted),

HI 16 Sections 12-1171 to ~1188 (2016)
govern FED actions, “In Arizona, a forcible
detainer action is a summary, speedy and
adequate statutory remedy for obtaining pos-
session of premises by one entitled to actual
possession,” Casa Grande Tr. Co. v. Superior
Court ew rel. Pinal Cty., 8 Aviz.App. 163, 165,
444 P.2d 521, 528 (1968) (citations omitted).

17 The statutory scheme for FED actions
variously defines what acts constitute forcible
detainer. Applicable here, A.R.S, § 12-
1178,01(A)(2) provides:

[A] person ... who retains possession of

any land, tenements or other real property

after he [or she] receives written demand
of possession may be removed through an
action for forcible detainer ... if the prop-
erty has been sold through a trustee’s sale
under a deed of trust....

18 Under A.R.S, § 12-542(6), an action for

forcible detainer must be brought within two

2013) (although not a true landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, tenant in possession after trustee's sale
becomes tenant at sufferance) (citations omitted).

years after the cause of action accrues. Sec-
tion 12-542(6) also states a cause of action
for forcible detainer accrues “at the com-
mencement of the forcible entry or detainer.”

19 Here, on March 2, 2016, Carrington
served the Woodses with written notice de-
manding possession of the property. After
the Woodses did not surrender possession,
Carrington sued for forcible detainer on
April 18, 2016—well within the two years set
out by ARS. § 12-642(6). By the plain lan-
guage of both A.R.S. § 12~1178.01(A)(2) (per-
son can be removed through an action for
forcible detainer “after he [or she] receives
written demand of possession”) (emphasis
added), and A.R.S. § 12-542(6) (action ac-
crues “at the commencement of the forcible
entry or detainer”), Carrington’s action for
forcible detainer did not accrue until it
served written demand of possession on the
Woodses in March 2016, Therefore, Carring-
ton’s action was timely. Cf Fenter v. Home-
stead Dev. & Tr. Co., 8 Ariz.App. 248, 252,
413 P.2d 579, 583 (1966) (acknowledging, al-
though not deciding, that action for forcible
entry and detainer was timely under A.R.S,
§ 12-542(6) when plaintiff commenced action
within two years of written demand of pos-
session),

IL. Possession

HM 110 The Woodses argue Carrington
did not present the superior court with evi-
dence it had a superior right of possession to
the property because the LPOA failed to,
first, authorize Carrington to transfer the
property and, second, specify the Carrington
officers who were entitled to execute grant
deeds. Exercising de novo review, see supra
15, we reject both arguments.

{11 The “only issue” in a FED action
“shall be the right of actual possession and
the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”
ARS, § 12-1177(A); see also Curtis v. Mor-
ris, 186 Ariz, 584, 585, 925 P.2d 259, 260
(1996) (litigating title in FED action “would
convert a forcible detainer action into a quiet
title action and defeat its purpose as a sum-
mary remedy”),

112 At trial, the parties introduced into
evidence certified copies of the trustee’s deed
and grant deed from the official records of

457

the Maricopa County Recorder. A Carring-
ton representative also testified that the Car-
rington employee who executed the grant
deed on behalf of Bank of America was au-
thorized to execute deeds pursuant to the
LPOA. The Carrington representative fur-
ther testified Carrington owned the property
and had been paying taxes on and insurance
for the property. Based on this evidence,
Carrington established it had a superior
right of possession to the property.

HM 113 Further, at its core the Woodses’
argument simply challenges Carrington’s ti-
tle to the property. As discussed, see supra
711, parties may not litigate the validity of
title in a FED action. Curtis, 186 Ariz, at
535, 925 P.2d at 260,

CONCLUSION

HI 1114 For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the superior court.
Carrington requests attorneys’ fees on ap-
peal pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-841.01 (2016),
which applies to “any contested action arising
out of a contract, express or implied.” Attor-
neys’ fees are not available in FED actions
under ARS, § 12-841,01(A), however.
RREEF Mgmt. Co, v. Camex Prod, Inc., 190
Ariz, 75, 80, 945 P.2d 886, 891 (App. 1997)
(citations omitted), Therefore, we deny Car-
rington’s request for attorneys’ fees, As the
prevailing party on appeal, we nonetheless
award Carrington its costs on appeal pursu-
ant to ARS. § 12-841 (2016), contingent
upon its compliance with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

397 P.3d 1057
TAMMY M., Appellant,
ve
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY

and 0.E., Appellees,

No, 2 CA-JV 2016-0217

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed May 12, 2017

Tammy M., Ajo, In Propria Persona

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee De-
partment of Child Safety

Presiding Judge Staring authored the
opinion of the Court, in which Judge Miller
and Judge Espinosa concurred.

OPINION

STARING, Presiding Judge:

71 Tammy M. appeals from the juvenile
court’s November 2016 order terminating her
parental rights to O.E., who was born in
December 2014, after submission of the mat-
ter on the record. As grounds for termi-
nation, the court found Tammy was unable to
parent: effectively due to a history of chronic
substance abuse that was likely to continue
for a prolonged, indefinite period, see A.R.S,
§ 8-538(B)(8), and also found she had failed
to remedy the circumstances that caused
O.E, to be in court-ordered, out-of-home care
for longer than fifteen months, see § 8-
533(B)(8)(c). On appeal, Tammy argues the
Department of Child Safety (DCS) failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence
that she suffers from chronic, disabling sub-
stance abuse, She also maintains her due

1, To the extent Tammy challenges it, we lack
jurisdiction to review the juvenile court's March
2016 order approving DCS's removal of O.E.
from kinship care, That order was final and
appealable, see Lindsey M. v. Ariz, Dep't of Econ.
Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 19, 127 P.3d 59, 61-62 (App.

459

process rights were violated when the court,
having permitted her attorney to withdraw
two days before the severance trial, denied
her request for appointed counsel.

{2 Based on the submitted record, we
cannot say Tammy has shown the juvenile
court abused its discretion in finding the
evidence sufficient to terminate her parental
rights. But Tammy maintains, and the record
supports, that she consented to a “paper
trial” only after the court denied her request
for new counsel. Because we conclude the
court abused its discretion in denying that
request, we reverse the termination order
and remand the case for further proceedings,

Relevant Background

18 This dependency proceeding, originally
filed in Maricopa County, was transferred to
Pima County in April 2015, and the juvenile
court appointed Charles Lagattuta to repre-
sent Tammy. The following month, Lagattuta
moved to withdraw with Tammy’s consent,
citing her “extreme dissatisfaction” and a
resulting conflict “such that further repre-
sentation would be impossible.” Lagattuta
requested the appointment of Cynnamon Ar-
izpuru, who had indicated her availability and
willingness to represent Tammy. The court
granted Lagattuta’s request and appointed
Arizpuru as substitute counsel.

14 In July 2016, DCS filed a motion to
terminate Tammy’s parental rights. In Au-
gust, both Arizpuru and counsel for 0.E.’s
father, Larry E., filed motions to withdraw
from representation? In her motion, Arizpu-
ru informed the court that “[tJhe Attor-
ney/Client relationship has disintegrated to a
point that it is not salvageable,” that she
believed Tammy “wishes to represent herself
in further proceedings,” and that appoint-
ment of either advisory counsel or a guardian
ad litem would be appropriate,

915 According to a minute entry for the
hearing held on August 11, 2016, the next
scheduled hearing, the juvenile court noted

2006), and the time to seek appellate review has

passed. See Ariz. RP. Juv. Ct, 104(A) (appeal
must be filed within fifteen days of final order).

2. Larry E.'s parental rights to O.B. have also
been terminated. He is not a party to this appeal.

460

Avizpuru’s statement that Tammy had “in-
dicated her wish to represent herself,”
questioned both parents, and granted both
motions to withdraw, appointing Kasey
Coughlin as Tammy's new attorney.’ In
September, the juvenile court scheduled Oc-
tober 26 as the first day of a contested
severance trial, stating the set trial dates
were “firm” and would not be continued
“absent extraordinary circumstances either
unforeseen or unavoidable,”

{6 On October 18, Coughlin filed a “Mo-
tion to be Relieved as Counsel for Mother
and Possibly Serve as Advisory Counsel,”
asking that she be withdrawn as counsel of
record for Tammy, In her motion, she stated
her communication with Tammy had broken
down to the point that she could “no longer
effectively represent” her. She expressed her
belief, as had Arizpuru, that Tammy wished
to represent herself at the contested sever-
ance trial, She did not know if Tammy would.
want her to serve in an advisory role, but she
expressed her willingness to do so,

17 Tammy did not appear at the October
24 motion hearing, and the juvenile court
found no good cause for her absence and
granted Coughlin’s motion to withdraw. But
it directed that Coughlin remain as advisory
counsel, ordering her to make good faith
efforts to assist Tammy in preparing for
trial. The court further ordered Coughlin to
“make good faith efforts to continue acting as
counsel and trial counsel” if Tammy asked.
her to do so,

18 Two days later, on the first day of the
scheduled severance trial, Tammy asked the
juvenile court to appoint counsel and to con-
tinue the trial to afford her new attorney
time to prepare, When questioned about her
request, Tammy said she understood her
personality “may be strong,” but she wanted
an attorney who would “listen to [her] and
proceed the way [she] ask[ed] them to,” in
light of the serious consequences at stake,
The court sought to clarify that she was
asking for additional time because she want-
ed another attorney, and Tammy responded,
“Yes, Yes, please. And I don’t need a lot of
time, I just would like somebody to help me,

3. The transcript of this proceeding is not part of

Because I am not a lawyer, I don’t know how
to do any of this stuff.”

19 Larry E, joined Tammy's motion, and
counsel for O.E. took no position. DCS ob-
jected to a continuance, maintaining the cir-
cumstances were not “unforeseen” and re-
minding the court that in August, when
moving to withdraw, Arizpuru had stated
her belief that Tammy wished to represent.
herself. Although DCS objected to continu-
ing the trial, it took no position on Tammy's
request for appointment of counsel.

{10 The juvenile court denied Tammy’s
oral motion and request for counsel, finding
she had not presented the “extraordinary
circumstances” required for a trial continu-
ance. The court stated it had reviewed por-
tions of the record and had “listened to the
admonitions or the warnings I gave [Tammy]
about the need to be prepared for trial, the
need to cooperate with her attorneys.” The
court noted that Tammy had been appointed
three attorneys and that, although it had
granted Coughlin’s motion to withdraw, it
had “ordered [her] to stay on as advisory
counsel” and “to be prepared, as best as
possible, to step in and take over” if Tammy
so requested,

{111 After the juvenile court denied her
motion for a continuance and request for
counsel, Tammy agreed to submit the matter
based on the record and exhibits, in lieu of
live testimony. In an under advisement rul-
ing, the court found DCS had proven
grounds for termination under § 8-533(B)(8)
and (B)(8)(c), as alleged in its motion, and
had also proven that severance was in 0.E.’s
best interests,

912 We subsequently appointed Richard
Beck to represent Tammy on appeal. On
December 28, after a record review and con-
sultation with his client, Beck filed a motion
asking to be relieved of further responsibility
in this case because he could find “no non-
frivolous issue on which to base an appeal,”
He also noted Tammy “strongly disagree[d]”
with his assessment of the case and wanted
to represent herself on appeal. We permitted

the record on appeal.

Beck to withdraw and Tammy was allowed to
proceed pro se.4

Discussion

HM 1:13 We review a court’s denial of a
request for new counsel for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Moore, 222 Aviz. 1,
177, 218 P.3d 150, 164 (2009), But we review
constitutional issues and purely legal issues
de novo, Id. 151. Tammy contends she was
denied due process when the juvenile court
denied her request for appointed counsel af-
ter it had permitted Coughlin to withdraw
two days before the scheduled severance tri-
al. We agree.

Hl 114 An indigent parent in a proceed-
ing to terminate parental rights has a right
to appointed counsel afforded by statute,
ARS, § 8-221, by rule, Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct.
88(B), and as a matter of due process, Daniel
Y. v, Ariz, Dep't of Econ. Sec, 206 Ariz. 257,
114, 77 P.8d 55, 58 (App. 2008) (“constitu-
tional dimension” of right to counsel in sever-
ance). DCS does not dispute Tammy was
indigent and therefore entitled to appointed
counsel, Instead, it argues there was no deni-
al of Tammy’s right to counsel because she
was “represented” by advisory counsel—
Coughlin—“who was to assist her and be
prepared to step in if [Tammy] needed her
to.” In the alternative, DCS argues Tammy
waived her right to counsel.

115 In Daniel Y., we concluded the juve-
nile court erred in terminating a father’s
parental rights without providing appointed
counsel when the father “made no unequivo-
eal request to represent himself and did not
knowingly or voluntarily waive, or otherwise
forfeit, his right to counsel.” 206 Ariz. 257,
126, 77 P.8d at 61. As in this proceeding, the
juvenile court in Daniel Y, had already per-
mitted two attorneys to withdraw based on
allegations of “strategic” or “irreconcilable”
differences when, two weeks before the sev-
erance trial, Daniel’s most-recently appointed
attorney moved to withdraw based on irrec-
oneilable differences. Jd, (15-6. The court
granted counsel’s request to withdraw after
an ex parte, in camera hearing and declined
4, In contrast to counsel’s stated inability to iden-

tify a non-frivolous issue, Tammy filed a detailed
opening brief that accurately presented the due

461

to appoint substitute counsel. Jd, 16, It re-
ferred to an earlier minute entry in which it
had cautioned that it “would find it very
difficult to grant any other motion to with-
draw filed by an attorney or request for a
new attorney filed by” Daniel. Jd. At the
severance trial, when the court asked wheth-
er he was ready to proceed, Daniel respond-
ed that, without counsel, he did not know
how to answer the question. Id. 17, The
court nevertheless proceeded with the hear-
ing and terminated his parental rights, Jd.
917, 10.

HM 116 Drawing on criminal cases in-
volving the right to counsel, in particular
State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 968 P.2d 578
(1998), and State v, Henry, 189 Ariz, 542, 944
P.2d 57 (1997), the Daniel Y. court observed
that the waiver of the right to counsel cannot
be “easily presumed.” 206 Ariz, 257, 11 15-
21, 77 P.8d at 58-60, As in “any proceeding
involving the surrender of Constitutional
rights, it must appear from the record that
the waiver was knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made ... [and waiver] will not be
presumed from a silent record,” Id, 118,
quoting State v, Avila, 127 Aviz, 21, 25, 617
P.2d 1187, 1141 (1980). Thus, before the juve-
nile court could find Tammy had waived her
right to counsel, Arizona law required that
she be advised of “the dangers of self-repre-
sentation, and the difficulties involved in de-
fending oneself without formal legal train-
ing.” Id 915, quoting State v, Djerf, 191
Ariz, 588, 128, 959 P.2d 1274, 1282 (1998),

HH 117 Im addition, although “persis-
tent disruptive or dilatory conduct” may sup-
port a determination that the right to counsel
has been waived, “[s]uch a waiver by conduct
can occur only after a court both warns the
[party] that further disruptive conduct may
result in the loss of the right to counsel and
explains the implications of such a waiver.”
State v. Hampton, 208 Ariz. 241, 17, 92 P.3d
871, 874 (2004), citing Daniel Y., 206 Ariz.
257, 1115-17, 77 P.8d at 58-59, Thus, where
it appears a party may have an unavoidable,
recurring conflict with any attorney—for ex-

process issue and some of the supporting case
Jaw we discuss herein,

462

ample, because he insists on an impermissi-
ble defense—a trial court must make “very
clear” that if “another irreconcilable conflict
develops as a result,” he “will have to choose
between his [presently assigned] lawyer or
self-representation.” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505,
126, 968 P.2d at 582 (Martone, J., concur-
ring), cited with approval in Daniel Y., 206
Ariz, 257, 117, 7 P.8d at 59.

{18 In Daniel Y., we noted the supreme
court’s approval of the choice afforded in
Henry, requiring a defendant to “either keep
his current counsel, with whom he had no
real irreconcilable conflict, or elect to repre-
sent himself” by making “an unequivocal re-
quest to do so.” Daniel Y., 206 Ariz, 257,
121, 77 P.8d at 60, citing Henry, 189 Ariz. at
546-48, 944 P.2d at 61-63, In Henry, the
defendant had moved for substitute counsel
alleging an “irreconcilable conflict.” Henry,
189 Ariz. at 546, 944 P.2d at 61, The trial
court found no such conflict, declined to ap-
point substitute counsel and offered Henry a
choice “between keeping his attorney and
yepresenting himself.” Jd. When Henry re-
fused to make a choice between these alter-
natives, the court proceeded with the hear-
ing, with Henry represented by existing
counsel, Id.

719 The Henry court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the motion for substitute
counsel, finding “ample evidence” that the
“‘conflict’” described by Henry “amounted
to nothing more than a disagreement over
appropriate defense strategies.” Id. at 547,
944 P.2d at 62. It also rejected his alternative
claim that the court had denied his right of
self-representation, Id. at 548, 944 P.2d at 63,
The court explained, “In order to successfully
invoke this right, ... the accused must make
an unequivocal request to represent himself,”
and it found Henry had failed to do so, Id.

120 In Daniel Y., we also recognized the
Henry court “did not hold ... that the trial
court could allow existing counsel to with-
draw and require the defendant to proceed
unrepresented without providing the defen-
dant with advance warning.” Daniel Y., 206

5, The record before us, including the appoint-
ment of three attorneys in the juvenile court,
more than suggests Tammy is a challenging
client. However, the fact it may be difficult to

Ariz, 257, 121, 77 P.8d at 60. Here, as in
Daniel Y., we see no evidence in the record
that Tammy voluntarily waived her right to
counsel, was warned of the dangers of self-
representation, or was advised that, if
Coughlin moved to withdraw, she might be
required to choose between Coughlin and
self-representation,

Hs 1.21 DCS argues the juvenile court
effectively afforded Tammy the choice of con-
tinuing with Coughlin, by ordering Coughlin
to be prepared to resume her representation
at Tammy’s request, However, because the
court granted Coughlin’s motion to withdraw
based on her assertion she could “no longer
effectively represent” Tammy, Coughlin’s
further representation of Tammy would be
inconsistent with due process. It is “constitu-
tionally impermissible” to require a party
entitled to counsel to choose between self-
representation and “representation by a law-
yer with whom [s]he had a completely frac-
tured relationship, clearly an ‘irreconcilable
conflict’ ” Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 128, 968
P.2d at 582; see also State v. Cromwell, 211
Ariz, 181, 129, 119 P.8d 448, 453 (2005) (“ir-
reconcilable conflict” or “completely frac-
tured” attorney-client relationship “ordinarily
requires the appointment of new counsel”),
Thus, the court’s order permitting Coughlin
to withdraw was inconsistent with its order
that she be available to resume representa-
tion of Tammy if requested.

22 DCS next argues that even if Tammy
was not afforded counsel consistent with due
process, she had “knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently” waived that right. In support, it
maintains she “prepare[d] and file[d] plead-
ings on her own behalf and repeatedly as-
sert{ed] that she wished to represent her-
self.” But the pro se pleadings DCS identifies
were submitted to the court only after
Coughlin was permitted to withdraw, not be-
fore, Further, although the record shows two
withdrawing counsel had stated they believed
Tammy wished to represent herself, nothing
in the record suggests Tammy ever made
such a request of the court, either orally or

work with Tammy neither diminishes her right to
due process nor permits us to infer that she
would be unable to work with some other attor-
ney.

in writing, or that she persisted in that re-
quest after being advised of the dangers of
self-representation. Her request for appoint-
ment of counsel made at the severance trial
suggests otherwise. Cf State v. Russell, 175
Ariz, 529, 582-88, 858 P.2d 674, 677-78 (App.
1993) (court’s failure to expressly find know-
ing and voluntary waiver excused where rec-
ord included defendant's early, articulate pro
se motion for self-representation, signed
waiver of counsel form, and evidence of
knowledge of legal proceedings and therefore
supported implicit finding).

HI 128 DCS also maintains Tammy
waived her right to counsel by her conduct,
citing the juvenile court’s reference to its
earlier admonitions “about the need to be
prepared for trial, the need to cooperate with
her attorneys,” along with the court’s notice
that trial dates would not be continued ab-
sent extraordinary circumstances. We dis-
agree with the assertion that such general
warnings constituted “advance notice that
[Tammy’s] motion for a fourth attorney
would not be entertained at that late date
and that she would need to maintain the
relationship with her current attorney or
proceed unrepresented.” In Daniel Y., we
found more specific warnings insufficient to
effect a voluntary and intelligent waiver of
counsel. See Daniel Y., 206 Ariz, 257, 11 22-
28, 77 P.3d at 60 (court’s statement that it
would “find it very difficult to grant any
other motion to withdraw filed by an attor-
ney or request for a new attorney filed by
[Daniel}” insufficient warning that “a re-
peated instance of irreconcilable conflict
would cause him to choose between counsel
and self-representation”). And, as already ex-
plained, the court failed to offer Tammy a
constitutionally permissible alternative to
self-representation after granting Coughlin’s
motion to withdraw.’ See Moody, 192 Ariz.
505, 128, 968 P.2d at 582.

124 Likewise, Baker v. Baker, 188 Ariz.
70, 78, 900 P.2d 764, 767 (App. 1995), does
not support DCS’s contention that we must
presume the omitted transcript from the Au-

6, When these matters were heard, Rule 39, Ariz.
RP. Juv. Ct., provided courts with little guidance
with respect to motions to withdraw filed by
attorneys in termination proceedings. See 198
Ariz. CLXXV (2000). That rule has been amend-

463

gust 2016 motion to withdraw hearing sup-
ports the court’s “implicit finding” that Tam-
my had been warned about the consequences
of representing herself. Even if we presume
Tammy was warned, it would not alter our
analysis because the juvenile court did not
offer Tammy the choice between self-repre-
sentation and denying the motion to with-
draw; rather, it permitted Coughlin’s with-
drawal without permitting response. See
Damiel Y., 206 Ariz, 257, 122, 77 P.8d at 60
(noting Daniel “would have been represented
by counsel at the severance hearing” had he
been given the choice to remain with counsel
before counsel was permitted to withdraw).

Disposition

125 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the juvenile court’s termination order and
yemand the case for further proceedings.

397 P.3d 1063

IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Lisa J.
FRIEDMAN, Petitioner/Appellant,

and
David C. ROELS Jr., Respondent,

Claudia Roels and David C. Roels
Sr., Intervenors/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0029

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed June 19, 2017

ed, effective January 1, 2017, and now provides
specific requirements for motions to withdraw or
to substitute counsel filed after a trial date has
been set, Ariz, R.P, Juv. Ct. 39(C).

cy
[=r
>

Dawn Wyland, Tucson, Counsel for Peti-
tioner/Appellant

Susan M. Schauf, PLLC, Tucson, By Su-
san M, Schauf, Counsel for Intervenors/Ap-
pellees

Judge Espinosa authored the opinion of
the Court, in which Judge Miller concurred
and Presiding Judge Staring dissented.

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Judge:

{1 Lisa Friedman appeals the trial court’s
decision to grant visitation rights to the pa-
ternal grandparents of her two children. She
contends the court failed to accord sufficient
weight to the presumption that her decision
to deny visitation was in the children’s best
interests, effectively shifting the burden of
proof to require her to prove visitation was
not in their best interests. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the record in the light most
favorable to upholding the trial court’s deci-
sion, Johnson v, Johnson, 181 Ariz, 88, 44,
688 P.2d 705, 711 (1981). Lisa Friedman and
David Roels Jr, married in 2001 and have
two minor children: M., born in 2008, and R.,
born in 2005, The couple separated informal-
ly in March 2010, following an incident in
which Roels “went into a rage” and was
admitted to a psychiatric facility with suicidal
ideation. Friedman petitioned for legal sepa-
ration in September 2010, and for dissolution
of the marriage in May 2011. She and Roels
signed a consent decree of dissolution in July
2011,

13 Roels has had supervised parenting
time since the separation. He had no legal
decision making authority over the children
until August 2015, when he and Friedman
agreed that while Friedman would retain
“final decision making authority,” she would
consult with Roels on non-emergency mat-
ters. The children received counseling begin-
ning in June 2010 and participated in several
family therapy sessions with Roels in 2012,
2018, and 2015, He had been abusive at times
during the marriage, including yelling and
losing his temper, and “kicking [M.] once”
and “holding him and grabbing him once.”

94 In April 2014, paternal grandparents
David Roels Sr. and Claudia Roels (Grand-
parents) filed a petition pursuant to A.R.S,
§ 25-409 to obtain court-ordered visitation.
The trial court entered a temporary order
allowing them to participate in Roels’s super-
vised parenting time for a minimum of one
hour per month. At that time, they had not
spoken to the children in nearly four years,
at Friedman’s insistence.

15 The trial court conducted a two-day
hearing in August 2015. Grandparents testi-
fied that before the parents’ separation,
they had enjoyed a close relationship with
the children, They had attended M.’s birth
and met R. a week after hers and frequent-
ly travelled to Tucson to attend school and
sports activities and spend time with the
family. On two occasions, they had provided
1, Grandfather testified he did not know whether

the cards and gifts actually had reached the
children, but said “most of the time” previously

465

child care during the day for multiple-day
periods and were a regular presence in the
children’s lives. After the separation, Fried-
man cut off Grandparents’ access to the
children and insisted there be no contact be-
tween them. Grandparents, however, at-
tempted to maintain contact by sending the
children cards and gifts for their birthdays
and holidays.

16 The children were initially averse to
reuniting with their grandparents: Roels tes-
tified that when he first had spoken to them
about the visits, M. had stated he “dfidjn’t
want [Grandparents] to come.” After the first
visit, however, “there just wasn’t any appre-
hension or ... tension.” Delana Cota, a fami-
ly support specialist who supervised the first
visit, described the children’s initial reaction
to their grandparents as “quiet” and “awk-
ward,” but recognized that “the mood of the
visit elevated ... [and] [became more com-
fortable.”” When Grandparents left, Cota
overheard M. and R. discussing the visit and
heard R, ask M., “Do you agree with me, it
was good with grandparents,” to which M.
said, “Pretty nervous about nothing,” R, then
responded, “You would be fine if they came
again, are you with me ... I like them
coming,”

17 Bethany Aaronson, another indepen-
dent visit supervisor, testified that Grandpar-
ents planned extensively for their court-or-
dered visits and the children appeared to
enjoy them. She characterized the visits as
“very successful” and noted that when
Grandparents were around, the activities
were more structured and there was “more
laughing, more kidding around” and every-
one was “a little more involved and engaged.”
In contrast, Aaronson described visits with
only Roels as “unstructured” with “{t]he chil-
dren often spen[ding] a lot of time looking at
their devices.” But when Grandparents were
present, “the children engaged with the ac-
tivities, and as a result ... then began en-
gaging with the adults.” On one occasion,
“the children spontaneously got up and
hugged [Grandparents] a second time before
they left.”

they would receive thank-you cards, written by

Friedman or, later, drawn by the children, but
that stopped in 2010 with the separation.

466

18 Friedman and two therapists testified
the children had anxiety and PTSD? symp-
toms both during and outside the supervised
visits. Beth Winters, the children’s former
therapist who had never met or evaluated
Grandparents, opined that the children
“could have been” exhibiting behavior “indi-
cat[ivJe ... [of] trauma” due to Grandpar-
ents’ visitation, but acknowledged that the
children’s awareness of their mother’s feel-
ings toward their grandparents could have
influenced them, She also agreed that it is
“important for children to have grandparents
in their lives.” Karen Morse, the children’s
other therapist, similarly testified they had
been “traumaltized]” in the past, but were
improving as of October 2014. Morse, who
also had never met or evaluated Grandpar-
ents, concluded that news of court-ordered
grandparent visits had caused the children to
become more anxious, and opined that they
experienced trauma during Grandparents’
visits.

19 The trial court found the expert opin-
ions to be of limited usefulness, and in a
detailed under-advisement ruling, after con-
sidering all relevant evidence, “including the
demeanor and credibility of the parties,” de-
termined it was in the children’s best inter-
ests to have visitation with their grandpar-
ents. The court entered an order entitling
Grandparents to video calls with the children
every two weeks and allowing them to partic-
ipate in portions of Roels’s supervised par-
enting time.’ Friedman filed a timely motion
for new trial, which the court denied, and this
appeal of the denial of the motion for new
trial followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)().

Grandparents’ Visitation Request.

Hs 110 Friedman contends the trial
court erred in awarding Grandparents visita-
tion despite Friedman, as the children’s “only
fit parent,” having determined the visits were
contrary to the children’s best interests. We
review the decision to award grandparent
visitation for an abuse of discretion. Mc-

2. Posttraumatic stress disorder.

3, The bulk of Roels's parenting time and Grand-
parents’ visits were to occur by video because of

Govern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz, 172, 16, 33
P.8d 506, 509 (App. 2001).

T11 Section 25-409(C), A.R.S., provides “a,
person other than a legal parent may petition
the superior court for visitation with a child”
and the court “may grant visitation rights
during the child’s minority on a finding that
the visitation is in the child’s best interests
and ... [flor grandparent or great-grandpar-
ent visitation, the marriage of the parents
has been dissolved for at least three months.”
Subsection (E) further states:

In deciding whether to grant visitation to a

third party, the court shall give special

weight to the legal parents’ opinion of what,
serves their child’s best interests and con-
sider all relevant factors including:

1, The historical relationship, if any, be-

tween the child and the person seeking

visitation,

2. The motivation of the requesting party

seeking visitation.

8, The motivation of the person objecting

to visitation,

4, The quantity of visitation time request-

ed and the potential adverse impact that

visitation will have on the child’s custom-

ary activities,
§ 25-409(E). Subsection (F) adds, “If logis-
tically possible and appropriate, the court
shall order visitation by a grandparent or
great-grandparent if the child is residing or
spending time with the parent through whom
the grandparent or great-grandparent claims
a right of access to the child.” § 25-409(F).
Finally, subsection (G) directs grandparents
and great-grandparents to petition for visita-
tion in the same case in which the court
determined the parents’ legal decision-mak-
ing authority and parenting time. § 25-
409(G),

HE {12 As § 25-409(R) states, a trial
court considering a request for non-parent
visitation must give “special weight to the
legal parents’ opinion of what serves their
child’s best interests.” This aligns with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Trowel v. Gran-

Friedman's pending relocation with the children

to California, which Roels stipulated to the day
before the hearing began.

ville, 580 US. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147
L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). As
Friedman points out, the Court in that case
held that parents have a fundamental liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the “care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren,” with a “presumption that fit parents
act in the best interests of their children,”
Trowel, 580 U.S, at 65, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054; see
also McGovern, 201 Ariz, 172, 117, 88 P.8d
at 511, “However, grandparent visitation
granted within the parameters of § 25-409
‘does not substantially infringe on parents’
fundamental rights” ” Lambertus v. Porter,
285 Ariz, 882, 129, 382 P.8d 608, 614 (App.
2014) (Brown, J., dissenting), quoting Mc-
Govern, 201 Ariz. 172, 19, 88 P.8d at 509.

HH 113 In McGovern, this court set forth
“constitutionally based principles that a trial
court should ... follow in determining ...
grandparent visitation rights under § 25~
409.” 201 Ariz, 172, 117, 88 P.8d at 511.
First, the court should apply a rebuttable
presumption that “a fit parent acts in his or
her child's best interest in decisions ... con-
cerning grandparent visitation.” Id, And sec-
ond, the court must give “‘some special
weight’ to a fit parent’s determination of
whether visitation is in the child’s best inter-
ests.” Id. 118, quoting Trowel, 580 U.S, at 70,
120 S.Ct. 2054. The McGovern court conclud-
ed that “[t]he amount of weight a trial court
should place on these factors” is an issue left
“for development on a case-by-case basis.”
Id., quoting Harrington v, Dawm, 172 Or.
App. 188, 18 P.3d 456, 460 (2001). We
stressed that these principles “affect but do
not necessarily control a trial court’s deter-
minations of ‘best interests of the child’ and
‘reasonable [grandparent] visitation rights’
under [§ 25-409].” Id. 119.

114 Here, the trial court followed Mc-
Govern and applied the presumption that
Friedman was acting in the children’s best
interests in denying visitation, but ultimately
expressly determined Grandparents had re-
butted that presumption, In reaching its con-
clusion, the court made extensive findings
regarding the children’s best interests while
acknowledging it was required to “give ‘some
special weight’ to a fit parent’s determination
of whether visitation is in the child’s best

467

interest” and “consider all relevant factors,

including those ... enumerated in A.R.S.
§ 25-409.” See § 25-409(E). In doing so, the
court explicitly “glave] deference to [Fried-
manys position” and “applied the presump-
tion that [Friedman] has and shall continue
to make decisions that are in the children’s
best interests.”

{15 Specifically, the trial court found
Grandparents had a “significant relationship
[that] was very positive with the children”
until the parents separated, see § 25-
409(E)(1), and since the relationship resumed
in 2015, it had been “progressing well.” The
court noted “[GJrandparents ha[d] planned
for weeks for each visit and ha{d] provided
activities and structure to keep the children
involved,” which the children responded well
to, offering “spontaneous hugs” at the end of
some visits. It additionally considered the
testimony of Bethany Aaronson that Roels
experienced quality parenting time when
Grandparents were present; Aaronson ob-
served “a lot of laughter and joking,” but
noted “the children’s affect changed upon
seeing Mother following the visits” immedi-
ately from a happy demeanor to a subdued
one.

Hl 116 As for the therapists’ opinions,
the trial court found that Morse had only
reviewed “very limited, selected supervised
visitation reports provided by [Friedman]”;
had never observed the children with Grand-
parents or Roels; her primary input had been
from Friedman; and it was unclear how she
had ascertained Friedman was not alienating
the children from Grandparents. The court
further noted that Winters had not had much
time with the children in recent years. It is
well established that “[tJhe weight and credi-
bility to be given expert testimony are mat-
ters to be decided by the factfinder.” Stan-
dard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse,
190 Ariz, 6, 45, 945 P.2d 817, 356 (App. 1996),
quoting State v. Moyer, 151 Ariz, 258, 255,
727 P.2d 81, 38 (App. 1986); see also State v.
Pesqueira, 235 Ariz. 470, 114, 383 P.38d 797,
802 (App. 2014) (“the weight and credibility
of [expert] testimony ... are questions of
fact”), quoting Pipher v. Loo, 221 Ariz. 399,
117, 212 P.8d 91, 96 (App. 2009).

468 Es

117 The trial court also found Grandpar-
ents were “motivated by love” of the children
and a desire to influence them in a positive
way, among other factors, and expressed its
concern that Friedman was motivated in part
by a continued desire to exclude Grandpar-
ents because of her relationship with them,
See § 25-409(E)(2)-(8). The court was also
concerned that some of the children’s report-
ed behaviors and reactions to Roels and
Grandparents were “due to [Friedman's] own
reactions” to them, The court further found
that the visitation requested by Grandpar-
ents would not have “an adverse impact on
the children’s customary activities.” See
§ 25-409(E)(4). Finally, the court noted that,
Roels “wants his parents to continue to have
a relationship with the children.”

Hl 118 On the latter point, it is signifi-
cant that there are two parents here who
agreed to share decision-making, and they
have conflicting views about whether it is in
their children’s best interests to have visita-
tion with their grandparents. Roels articulat-
ed his position at trial, stating he felt it was
important for the children to have a relation-
ship with his parents because “they need to
know also where they come from” and should
“connect ] to more than just [their] mom and
dad.” Friedman, on the other hand, opposed
the few hours of grandparent visits, claiming
it caused “[the] kids” to “[go] down hill,” and
alleging increased anxiety, panic attacks, and
problems at school. Although Roels’s rights
in relation to the children bear some signifi-
cant restrictions and the parties agreed that
Friedman has “final decision making authori-
ty” in the event of a disagreement, as Grand-
parents point out, Roels was not found to be
an unfit parent and therefore his “determina-
tion” is also entitled to “special weight.” See
Trowel, 580 U.S. at 68-70, 120 S.Ct. 2054.4

119 We conclude the trial court applied
the proper standards in awarding visitation

4, The dissent suggests Roels should not be con-
sidered a fit parent due to the agreement limiting
his rights, and notes that Grandparents did not
argue otherwise below. But the trial court had a
statutory duty to consider the positions of both
parents in relation to the best interests of the
children, notwithstanding any agreements be-
tween the parties. A.R.S, § 25-409(B) (court
“shall give special weight to the legal parents’

to Grandparents. The court correctly em-
ployed the fit-parent presumption and the
factors set forth in § 25-409(H), it expressly
accorded “special weight” to Friedman’s po-
sition, and there is sufficient evidence to
support its conclusion that Grandparents had
overcome the presumption.

{20 Friedman and our dissenting col-
league rely on Goodman v. Forsen, 289 Ariz.
110, 866 P.8d 587 (App. 2016), issued after
the trial court ruled in this case. There,
Division One of this court addressed a situa-
tion in which the mother opposed her former
cohabiting girlfriend’s request for visitation
with the child. The court reversed the trial
court’s visitation order in favor of the former
girlfriend, holding that the “special weight”
accorded a parent’s visitation decision means
the party seeking visitation must prove the
denial of visitation “would substantially im-
pair the child’s best interest.” Friedman ar-
gues that Goodman should be applied retro-
actively to this case and that Grandparents
failed to meet its standard, Grandparents
respond that Goodman set new, heightened
requirements not contained in either § 25-
409 or McGovern, and should not be applied
here, We conclude, however, we need not
resolve those issues because we find Good-
mam significantly distinguishable.

{21 In Goodman, only one parent was
involved, as the father’s rights had been sev-
ered, 289 Ariz, 110, 18, 366 P.8d at 588, The
father in this case, however, has always been,
and continues to be, involved in the children’s
lives. As noted above, absent a finding that
he was an unfit parent, the trial court, pursu-
ant to § 25-409(E), properly considered
Roels’s position that maintaining a relation-
ship with their grandparents was in the chil-
dren’s best interest, Furthermore, the person
seeking visitation in Goodman was a former
cohabiting partner with no other ties to the
child. 239 Ariz, 110, 114-6, 866 P.3d at 588,
In contrast, the grandparents here have bio-

opinion”) (emphasis added). Furthermore, even
if this could properly be characterized a
“waived” argument, it is well established we are
not limited to the theories of the parties in up-
holding the trial court's correct decision. See
State v. Huez, 240 Ariz, 406, 119, 380 P.3d 103,
109 (App. 2016) (appellate court required to a&
firm trial court's ruling if legally correct for any
reason),

logical and familial ties that will be present
now and in the future. See, eg., Graville v.
Dodge, 195 Ariz, 119, 126, 985 P.2d 604, 610
(App. 1999) (noting state’s interest in pro-
moting “continuation of caring relationships
between family members, particularly among
grandchildren and their grandparents”);
Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb. 659, 715 N.W.2d
512, 525 (2006) (all states have a system for
awarding grandparent visitation because
they recognize “the importance of the grand-
parent-grandchild relationship in the lives of
children”), quoting Moriarty v. Bradt, 177
Nid, 84, 827 A.2d 208, 210 (2008). Finally,
the Goodmam court noted the mother's con-
cerns about the former girlfriend fighting
with her current girlfriend in the child’s
presence, and that she had spanked the child
and “struck her face.” 289 Ariz, 110, 114-6,
866 P.8d at 588-89, Thus, to the extent Good-
mom may establish a more stringent stan-
dard for court-ordered visitation than § 25-
409 and McGovern, we decline to extend its
holding to the very different situation pre-
sented here,

122 The trial court made detailed findings
clearly supported by the evidence,’ see In re
Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, 118, 196
P.3d 863, 868 (App. 2008), and viewing that
evidence in the light most favorable to up-
holding the court’s ruling, see Johnson, 181
Ariz, at 44, 638 P.2d at 711, we conclude
Grandparents demonstrated that Friedman’s
decision to bar them from visitation was not
in the children’s best interests, see Mc-
Govern, 201 Ariz, 172, 1117-18, 38 P.3d at
511, Accordingly, we cannot say the court’s
limited visitation award was an abuse of its
discretion. Although our dissenting colleague

5, The dissent argues “we should conclude the
legislature did not intend any distinction [be-
tween grandparents and other third-parties] be
drawn.” But this assertion discounts, if not ig-
nores, the numerous distinctions drawn in the
statute itself. For example, A.R.S, § 25-409(F)
mandates that the trial court “shall,” if logistical-
ly possible and appropriate, “order visitation by
a grandparent or great-grandparent if the child is
residing or spending time with the parent
through whom the grandparent or great-grand-
parent claims a right of access,” a benefit not
afforded to other third-parties seeking visitation.
Moreover, the trial court not only could but was
required to consider the nature of the relation-
ship between Grandparents and the children.
§ 25-409(B)(1)-(2), (4).

469

concludes “[t]he constitutional protection af-
forded to parents represents a high bar[,]” it
should not be so high that few, if any, grand-
parents could ever clear its hurdle were
there a requirement of establishing harm to
the children from denial of visitation in every
case,

Trial Court’s Denial of Attorney Fees

Hs 1.28 Friedman also appeals the trial
court’s denial of her request for attorney fees
pursuant to A.R.S, § 25-824(A), which allows
a discretionary fee award in domestic rela-
tions proceedings, including requests for non-
parent visitation pursuant to § 25-409, The
court has discretion to grant such an award
“after considering the financial resources of
both parties and the reasonableness of the
positions each party has taken throughout
the proceedings.” § 25-324(A). We review
the court's denial of fees for an abuse of
discretion. Myrick v. Maloney, 285 Ariz. 491,
16, 888 P.8d 818, 821 (App. 2014).

124 In assessing the fee request, the trial
court imputed an $80,000 annual income to
Friedman based on her earnings the previous
year, and compared Grandparents’ $122,000
annual income. It also considered that Fried-
man is “expected to be sharing expenses with
her boyfriend in California” and that their
combined income “will probably be greater
than [G]randparents[’],” despite having heard
no testimony about the boyfriend’s income.
Though it appears the court may have made
an unsupported assumption about Fried-
man’s prospective income, in light of the
reasonableness of each party’s positions and
§ 25-324(A)’s discretionary nature, we see no

6. Our dissenting colleague would find the evi-
dence insufficient to support the trial court's
ruling, but he focuses on the factors involving
Grandparents’ motivation, while ignoring or dis-
counting other evidence the court expressly and
implicitly considered, including Grandparents’
positive effects on the children’s visits with
Roels, the potential loss to the children of the
love and support of their extended family, indica-
tions that Friedman's efforts to alienate the chil-
dren from Grandparents were exacerbating the
children’s anxiety, and the negative effects of her
“setting the kids up” to be unhappy about.
Grandparents.

470

reason to disturb the court's decision to de-
cline the fee request.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

25 Both parties request an award of fees
and costs on appeal pursuant to § 25-324.
After considering the financial resources and
the reasonableness of the positions of the
parties, we find each side should bear its own
fees and costs on appeal. See Leathers v.
Leathers, 216 Ariz, 374, 122, 166 P.8d 929,
984 (App. 2007).

Disposition
126 For all of the reasons discussed above,
the trial court’s order granting visitation with
Grandparents is affirmed.

STARING, Presiding Judge, dissenting:

927 The fact that in many instances chil-
dren benefit from relationships with their
grandparents is not at issue. The issue is
whether circumstances exist that permit the
state to interfere with parental decision-mak-
ing and compel those relationships. Because
the majority impermissibly diminishes the
constitutional presumption favoring the deci-
sions of fit parents, I dissent,

128 The majority correctly observes that
parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
“care, custody, and control of their children,”
with a “presumption that fit parents act in
the best interests of their children.” Troxel,
580 U.S. at 65, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054; see also
McGovern, 201 Ariz, 172, 117, 38 P.8d at
511. The majority also recognizes a court
must give “some special weight to the par-
ent’s own determination” of the child's best
interests. Trowel, 580 U.S. at 68~70, 120 S.Ct.
2054; see also McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 118,
83 P.8d at 511. However, it stops short of
acknowledging that, even pre-Goodman, a
court could not grant non-parent visitation
“based solely on the judge’s determination

7. The majority cites § 25-409(F) and (G), which
specifically refer to grandparent visitation. But it
does not cite authority indicating either subsec-
tion diminishes the constitutional presumption
favoring the decisions of fit parents or elevates
the status of grandparents under § 25-409(E). If
anything, the specific inclusion of grandparent

of the child’s best interests’ or on the judge’s
‘mere disagreement’ with a fit parent’s
choice.” McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 119, 33
P.8d at 512, quoting Trowel, 580 U.S. at 67-
68, 120 S.Ct, 2054; see also Egan v. Frid-
lund-Horne, 221 Ariz, 229, 148, 211 P.8d
1218, 1225 (App. 2009) (trial court may not
“simply second-guess” fit parent’s decision
regarding visitation rights).

929 Further, in discussing the constitu-
tional presumption, the majority quotes lan-
guage from McGovern: “[G]randparent visi-
tation granted within the parameters of
§ 25-409 ‘does not substantially infringe on
parents’ fundamental rights”” Lambertus,
285 Ariz. 382, 129, 3382 P.3d at 614 (Brown,
J., dissenting), quoting McGovern, 201 Ariz.
172, 19, 83 P.8d at 509. However, this lan-
guage does not, as the majority seems to
suggest, state a rule that the constitutional
protection afforded to parents’ decisions is
diminished in cases where grandparent visi-
tation is at issue. It merely recognizes that
grandparent visitation granted in compliance
with the statute, which in turn requires
adherence to the presumption, does not vio-
late a parent’s fundamental rights.

130 Although § 25-409(%) codifies the
presumption, requiring a “court [to] give spe-
cial weight to the legal parents’ opinion of
what serves their child’s best interests,” it
does not distinguish between grandparents
and other third parties in the determination
of whether visitation may be granted. Thus,
in keeping with longstanding principles of
statutory interpretation, we should conclude
the legislature did not intend any distinction
be drawn in determining whether visitation is
otherwise appropriate.’ See Hayes v. Cont’
Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672
(1994) (“If a statute’s language is clear and
unambiguous, we apply it without resorting
to other methods of statutory interpreta-
tion.”); In re Casey G., 228 Ariz. 519, 12, 224
P.8d 1016, 1017 (App. 2010) (court interpret-
ing statute shall “ascertain and give effect

visitation in (F) and (G), but not (E), shows the
legislature did not intend to draw a distinction
for grandparents in (E). Egan, 221 Ariz, 229,
4137, 211 P.3d at 1223 (‘“[W]e presume that when
the legislature uses different wording within a
statutory scheme, it intends to give a different
meaning and consequence to that language.”).

to” legislature’s intent, with “language of the
statute” as “best indicator” of intent).8 As we
recognized in Egan, “[clonsistent with the
constitutional right to parent, the legislature
has provided nonparents with fewer rights
than parents.” 221 Ariz, 229, 181, 211 P.8d at
1222. Nothing in the statute, therefore, sug-
gests a parent’s decisions are any less pro-
tected merely because a grandparent is the
party seeking visitation.

131 Moreover, in Goodman, which was
decided after Friedman initiated her appeal,
we concluded the “special weight” require-
ment of § 25-409(E) requires “robust def-
erence,” and means “that the parents’ de-
termination is controlling unless a parental
decision clearly and substantially impairs a
child’s best interests.” 289 Ariz, 110, 118,
866 P.3d at 590. “Even if arbitrary, the
parents’ determination is the primary factor
in the analysis,” and a non-parent seeking
visitation must prove the “decision is harm-
ful.” Id, 1118-14. In Goodman, we also ad-
monished that “[t]he court’s role is not to
engineer what it perceives to be the opti-
mal situation for the child, but to deter-
mine whether compelling circumstances
warrant state interference with a fit par-
ent’s decisions.” Id. 914; see also Trowel,
580 U.S, at 72-78, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (rejecting
“presumption in favor of grandparent visita-
tion,” cautioning that states may not in-
fringe on fundamental right to parent “sim-
ply because a state judge believes a ‘better’
decision could be made”)? Goodman re-
flects appropriate respect for the funda-
mental nature of parental rights.

8. The legislature amended § 25-409 in 2012, at
which time the “special weight” requirement in
subsection (E) was added. See 2012 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 309, §§ 19-20; 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws,
ch, 89, § 1. In 2001, when we decided Mc-
Govern, § 25-409(A) expressly provided for
granting “reasonable visitation rights” to grand-
parents upon a finding that visitation would be in
the child's best interests. 201 Ariz. 172, 18, 33
P.3d at 509,

9. Here, the trial court appears to have focused
upon achieving what it perceived to be the opti-
mal result. For example, the court stated: “And
I've represented kids. I've worked with kids a lot.
I worry about kids that are on my caseload. And
yet I'm ever the optimist that—that things can
move forward with families.” It also stated: “I'm
very familiar with reunification efforts. I'm very

471

132 Furthermore, Goodman should apply
retroactively. “Unless otherwise specified,”
civil appellate opinions “operate both retroac-
tively and prospectively.” Law v. Superior
Court, 157 Ariz, 147, 755 P.2d 1135, supp. op.,
157 Ariz, 147, 160, 755 P.2d 1185, 1148 (1988);
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 181
Ariz. 431, 485-86, 641 P.2d 1275, 1279-80
(1982). A decision may be limited to prospec-
tive application only if it “establishes a new
legal principle by overruling clear and reli-
able precedent or by deciding an issue whose
resolution was not foreshadowed,” and retro-
active application would both frustrate “the
purpose behind the new rule” and “produce
substantially inequitable results.” Law, supp.
op., 157 Ariz, at 160, 755 P.2d at 1148.

133 Goodman was the first Arizona case
to refer to “robust deference” and to require
proof that denying visitation would “clearly
and substantially impair the child’s inter-
ests.” 289 Ariz, 110, 118, 866 P.3d at 590, But.
it is consistent with McGovern, which re-
quired a non-parent seeking visitation to re-
but the presumption a fit parent’s decision
served the child’s best interests, and also
required courts to “give ‘some special weight’
to” parents’ decisions, 201 Ariz, 172, 1117-
19, 33 P.8d at 511-12, quoting Trowel, 580
US. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Thus, Goodman
serves to clarify pre-existing law. See Good-
man, 239 Ariz, 110, M911-14, 366 P.3d at
590-91. It does not generate any “new legal
principle” sufficient to rebut the presumption
of retroactive application." Law, supp. op.,
157 Ariz. at 160, 755 P.2d at 1148.

familiar with the processes with the varying
amount of success that reunification can have.”

10. Because the constitutional presumption is not
limited to the type of third-party visitation at
issue in Goodman, as highlighted by the absence
of any such distinction in § 25-409(B), nor appli-
cable only to cases involving strong evidence of
physical abuse, I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that Goodman is distinguishable.

11. Neither are the other requirements for over-
coming the presumption of retroactivity present.
Goodman neither decided “an issue whose reso-
Tution was not foreshadowed,” nor would its
retroactive application adversely affect the pur-
pose of the clarification provided or produce
“substantially inequitable results.” Law, supp.
op., 187 Ariz, at 160, 755 P.2d at 1148.

472

184 In this instance, Grandparents pre-
sented insufficient evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption even before Goodman. Important-
ly, the trial court’s decision does not indicate
precisely how Grandparents had rebutted the
presumption. Its finding that Grandparents
“are motivated by their love of their grand-
children, their age, the fact that these are
their only grandchildren, and by a desire to
influence the children in a positive way,”
relates to Grandparents’ motivation, which is
not synonymous with the children’s best in-
terests. See Galbraith v. Galbraith, 88 Ariz.
858, 363, 856 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1960); Hoff-
man v. Hoffman, 4 Aviz.App. 88, 85, 417 P.2d
717, 719 (1966). A person could sincerely
possess such motivations and visitation could
still be harmful. Likewise, the children’s ap-
parent subjective enjoyment of portions of
visits with Grandparents also is not synony-
mous with best interests, especially in light
of the children’s lack of maturity.” Cf A.R.S.
§ 25-403(A)(4) (wishes of child with “suitable
age and maturity” relevant to determination
of parenting time); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 608-04, 99 S.Ct, 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101
(1979) (parental authority to make decisions
not diminished by child’s disagreement); Ak-
samit v. Krahn, 224 Ariz, 68, 1114-15, 227
P.8d 475, 478-79 (App. 2010) (attorney repre-
senting “child’s best interests” not bound by
child’s wishes); ..A.R. v. Superior Court, 179
Ariz, 267, 274, 877 P.2d 1828, 1830 (App.
1994) (“The wishes of the child of a sufficient
age to form an intelligent custody preference
are persuasive, although not controlling”).

185 In addition, the trial court's “con-
cern{s]” that the children’s trauma reactions
were influenced by Friedman’s “reactions to
.++ grandparents” based on an alleged moti-
vation “to exclude ... grandparents in part
because of her relationship with them” are
not supported by the record, The record
describes no instances in which Friedman
had an opportunity to “react” to Grandpar-
ents in the presence of the children, and the
ruling itself refers only to an alleged failure
to reciprocate the greetings of a visit super-
visor. See Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv, Co., 188

12, The court appeared to conclude, based on
adverse credibility determinations against Fried-
man and the therapists, that the children’s out-
ward appearance of enjoying significant portions

Ariz, 434, 456, 652 P.2d 507, 529 (1982)
(abuse of discretion if record does not contain
substantial evidence supporting finding). In
any case, an alleged motivation to alienate a
child from a non-parent, even when sup-
ported by the record, “does not warrant judi-
cial interference with [a fit parent]’s child-
rearing decisions.” Goodman, 289 Ariz. 110,
117, 866 P.8d at 591. Also, the potential for
alienation is even less relevant with respect
to Grandparents, who have never been
“treated as a parent” by the children, and
thus have neither in loco parentis rights as
defined by A.R.S. § 25-401(1) nor a history
with the children significant enough to raise
concerns that the children might be harmed
by “disruption of contact.” McGovern, 201
Ariz, 172, 118, 27, 88 P.8d at 508, 518-14; see
also Goodman, 289 Ariz, 110, 1117, 18, 366
P.8d at 589, 591-92,

136 Further, because Grandparents did
not raise it in the trial court, we should not
consider the contention Friedman is not the
only fit parent. See Payne v. Payne, 12 Ariz,
App. 484, 485, 471 P.2d 819, 820 (1970) (fail-
ure to raise argument below generally waives
it on appeal). And, we should reject any
argument the August 2015 agreement gives
Roels equal legal decision-making authority.
The agreement expressly states that, should
the parents disagree, “[Friedman] shall have
final decision making authority” on non-
emergency matters. Nothing about the par-
ents’ agreement would permit the trial court
to order or continue visitation over Fried-
man’s objection absent proof “that denial of
visitation would clearly and substantially im-
pair the child[ren]’s interests.” Goodman,
239 Ariz, 110, 118, 366 P.8d at 591; see also
ARS, § 25-410(A) (court may limit authori-
ty of sole legal decision-maker only if “the
child’s physical health would be endangered
or the child’s emotional development would
be significantly impaired”).

187 The constitutional protection afforded
to parents represents a high bar, In this

of Grandparents’ visits was indicative of actual
enjoyment rather than possible suppression of
the fight or flight instinct, as Morse had suggest-
ed,

case, the record is insufficient to overcome
the heavy presumption accorded to Fried-
man’s decisions as a fit parent, As was the
case with Trowel, “it is apparent that the
entry of the visitation order in this case

13, In light of the majority's decision to affirm the
trial court, I do not address issues of attorney

473

jolated the Constitution.” 530 U.S. at 75,
120 S.Ct. 2054,

fees in this dissent.

398 P.3d 90

Michael SOTO, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v

Anthony M. SACCO, et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-16-0136-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed July 18, 2017

Ne)
<4

rn

76

James Michael Abernethy (argued), Law
Office of James Michael Abernethy PLLC,
Phoenix, Attorney for Michael Soto

Edward G. Hochuli, Lori L. Voepel (ar-
gued), Justin M, Ackerman, Jones, Skelton &
Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for An-
thony M. Sacco, Total Transit Inc. dba Dis-
count Cab and Discount Enterprises, Inc,

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Daniel P. Schaack, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Robert R. McCright, Assistant Attorney
General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Cu-
riae State of Arizona

Joseph N, Roth, Joshua D, Bendor, Os-
born Maledon P.A., Phoenix; and Brad Holm,
Phoenix City Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Amicus Curiae City of Phoenix

Jeffrey C, Warren, Amanda Heitz, Bow-
man and Brooke LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of
Defense Counsel,

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of
the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
TIMMER, BOLICK and BERCH
(Retired) * joined.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:

11 This case concerns the standards a trial
court applies in granting a new trial or or-
dering vemittitur or additur under Arizona
Rule of Civil Procedure 59, Although a trial
court should be circumspect when modifying
a jury verdict, it nonetheless may do so if it
states the Rule 59(a) or (i) grounds for the
order and explains its ruling with sufficient
particularity to avoid speculation as to its
basis,

BACKGROUND

12 This case arises from a motor vehicle
accident, the salient facts of which are not in

ie

*Justice Andrew W. Gould has recused himself White Berch, Justice of the Arizona Supreme
from this case, Pursuant to article 6, section 3, of Court (Retired), was designated to sit in this
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Rebecca matter.

dispute. Michael Soto and his wife Julie (the
“Sotos”) were passengers in a taxi cab driven
by Anthony Saceo when it collided with an-
other vehicle, The Sotos sued Sacco, Dis-
count Enterprises Inc, and Total Transit,
Ine, doing business as Discount Cab (collec-
tively “Defendants”), Defendants admitted
Sacco’s negligence and respondeat superior
liability. A jury trial ensued to determine
damages,

18 As a result of the accident, Michael
sustained multiple fractures to his dominant
arm and underwent surgery to permanently
implant a plate and screws to stabilize it, The
Sotos testified that Michael experienced sig-
nificant pain and emotional distress since the
accident, preventing him from participating
in physical activities he previously enjoyed.
Michael’s treating physician, however, placed
no limitations on his activities and told him to
use his arm normally, using pain as a guide
when engaging in physical activity. Michael’s
medical bills totaled $40,588.40, but he made
no claim for future medical expenses or lost
wages,

14 At trial, the Sotos urged the jury to
award Michael $725,000 in damages. Defen-
dants suggested an award between $90,000
and $120,000. After deliberating, the jury
awarded $700,000 to Michael and $40,000 to
Julie. Defendants then moved for a new trial,
or to alter or amend the judgment, and for
remittitur under Arizona Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 59(a)(1), (6), (7) and (8), and Rule 59(i),
requesting that Michael’s award be reduced
to not more than $350,000. The trial court
found that the jury verdict in favor of Mi-
chael “was excessive and not supported by
the evidence,” and granted a remittitur pur-
suant to Rule 59(i), reducing Michael’s award
to $250,000.1 The Sotos rejected the court’s
remittitur and appealed from the new trial
order that became effective after they de-
clined the remittitur.

15 The court of appeals affirmed. Soto v.
Sacco, 289 Ariz, 516, 872 P.8d 1040 (App.
2016). It rejected the Sotos’ argument that
conditional grants of new trial under Rule
59) are subject to Rule 59(m), which re-

1, For purposes of this case, we refer to the 2016
version of Rule 59, which was amended in 2017.
Rule 59(i) of the 2016 version, relating to mo-

477

quires the trial court to specify with particu-
larity the ground(s) on which the new trial is
granted, The court of appeals instead con-
cluded that “Rule 59(/) does not require the
trial court to specify the particulars in rela-
tion to which the verdict was excessive” and
upheld the trial court’s remittitur, Soto, 289
Ariz, at 519 112, 372 P.8d 1040, at 1048
(quoting Hancock v, Linsenmeyer, 15 Ariz.
App. 296, 299, 488 P.2d 501 (1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), The court deter-
mined that the trial court “could reasonably
conclude that the award to Michael reflected
‘an exaggerated measurement of damages,’”
Id, at 520 114, 372 P.8d 1040, at 1044 (quot-
ing In re Estate of Hanscome, 227 Ariz, 158,
162 118, 254 Pd 397, 401 (App. 2011)).

16 We granted review because the stan-
dards for ordering remittitur or additur or
granting a new trial under Rule 59 present
recurring issues of statewide importance, We
have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(8),
of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-
120,24.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review Under Rule 59

Hs 1'7 This case implicates the proper
balance between a jury's province to deter-
mine civil damages and the trial court’s au-
thority under Rule 59 to modify a jury’s
award. Because a jury plays a vital role in
our civil justice system, a trial court may not
simply substitute its judgment for the jury's.
State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz, 44, 50 121, 392
P.8d 488, 494 (2017) (“We emphasize that the
court does not usurp the role of the jury in
granting a new trial because the court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury; it only allows the parties a new trial
before a different jury.”); of Tennant v, Peo-
ria & Pekin Union Ry, Co,, 321 U.S, 29, 35,
64 S.Ct, 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944) (“Courts
are not free to reweigh the evidence and set
aside the jury verdict merely because the
jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions or because judges feel that other
results are more reasonable.”). A trial court

tions for additur or remittitur, is now Rule 59(),

and what was Rule 59(m) is now part of Rule
59(i) in the 2017 version.

478

should be circumspect in interfering with a
jury verdict by carefully and sparingly exer-
cising its discretion to reduce or increase a
jury’s damage award, See Fischer, 242 Ariz,
44 911, 50 9119, 392 P.8d 488, at 492 (“Ari-
zona courts use essentially the same stan-
dard in civil and criminal cases,” and “[a]
trial court considering a motion for a new
trial must respect the role of the jury and the
integrity of the jury trial system.”); Creamer
v. Troiano, 108 Ariz. 578, 576, 508 P.2d 794,
797 (1972) (“Almost always when there is a
conflict in the evidence, the trial judge should
not interfere with what is peculiarly the
jury’s function.”). Such reticence preserves
the jury’s important role and protects the
right to a jury trial under article 2, section
28, of the Arizona Constitution,

Hs 18 Although we urge trial courts to
sparingly exercise discretion in modifying a
jury’s verdict, we recognize that a trial judge
plays a role akin to a “thirteenth juror” (a
ninth juror in a civil case) when ruling on a
motion for new trial, including motions based
on excessive or insufficient damages. Fischer,
242 Ariz. at 49 114, 50 119, 392 P.8d at 493;
see also Reeves v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 168,
579 P.2d 1882, 1886 (1978) (“The trial judge]
has a special perspective of the relationship
between the evidence and the verdict which
cannot be recreated by a reviewing court
from the printed record.”); Brownell v.
Freedman, 89 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115
(1982) (noting that a trial judge, as an extra
juror, “must be convinced that the weight of
the evidence sustains the verdict, or it is his
imperative duty to set it aside”), A trial
judge’s unique position is “the primary buffer
against unjust verdicts,” and the trial judge
“performs an indispensable function without
which our system of justice could not hold
out the promise of [a] uniform application of
the law.” Reeves, 119 Ariz, at 168, 579 P.2d at
1886; see also Fischer, 242 Ariz. at 48 112,

2, See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 424-25, 438, 116 S.Ct, 2211, 135
L.Hd.2d 659 (1996) (A state statute authorizing
remittitur where a jury award “deviates materi-
ally” from reasonable compensation does not
violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Colum-
bia/HealthOne, LLC, 95 P.3d 571, 582 (Colo.
2004) (‘In Colorado, a court may exercise its
power of remittitur by setting aside a verdict in
a personal injury case if the award is either

392 P.8d at 492. For this reason, we grant
significant latitude to trial courts in ruling on
new trial motions. Reeves, 119 Ariz. at 163,
579 P.2d at 1886 (“Whenever a new trial
order is justified by any of the grounds cited
in the order, an appellate court will not dis-
turb the lower court’s exercise of its discre-
tion.”), But a trial court should not disturb a
jury’s damage award unless the judge is
firmly convinced it is inadequate or excessive
and is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
See Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 576-77, 503 P.2d at
7197-98,

HME ‘9 If the trial judge finds that the
damage award is tainted by “passion or prej-
udice,” or is “shocking[ly] or flagrantly outra-
geous,” remittitur is not an appropriate rem-
edy. Hanscome, 227 Ariz. at 162 118, 254
P.8d at 401 (quoting Stallcup v. Rathbun, 76
Ariz, 68, 65, 67, 258 P.2d 821 (1953), Under
those circumstances, the court must instead
order a new trial. Jd, When, as here, the
verdict is neither the result of passion or
prejudice nor shockingly outrageous, but “in-
stead reflects an exaggerated measurement
of damages,” “the trial court may exercise its
discretion to order remittitur.” Id. (citation
omitted).

{10 In differentiating between the stan-
dard for a new trial, which requires a finding
of “passion or prejudice” or a “shockingly or
flagrantly outrageous” verdict, and the lower
standard for remittitur, which requires an
exaggerated measurement of damages not
supported by the evidence, we break no new
ground, We merely affirm our longstanding
jurisprudence and remain in the majority of
jurisdictions, including the United States Su-
preme Court, which permit remittitur of an
excessive jury award absent a finding of
“passion or prejudice” or a similarly height-
ened standard?

grossly and manifestly excessive or inade-
quate.”); Odom v. Roberts, 606 So.2d 114, 118
(Miss. 1992) (“[If a court] ‘finds that the dam-
ages are excessive or inadequate for the reason
that the jury or trier of the facts was influenced
by bias, prejudice, or passion, or that the dam-
ages awarded were contrary to the overwhelm-
ing weight of credible evidence,’ a motion for a
new trial still may be overruled upon condition
of additur or remittitur.”) (quoting Mississippi

Il. Rule 59(m)’s Application to Rule
59(i)

HI 1111 We conclude that Rule 59(m) ap-
plies to Rule 59(i), Rule 59(i) permits a trial
court to “grant the new trial conditionally,”
and if the party against whom the remittitur
is ordered refuses to accept it, a new trial is
granted without further order. Rule 59(m)
states that “[nJo order granting a new trial
shall be made and entered unless the order
specifies with particularity the ground or
grounds on which the new trial is granted.”
The trial court expressly recognized that
Rule 59(m) applies to Rule 59() by specifical-
ly referring to Rule 59(m) in its ruling. The
court of appeals, however, relying exclusively
on Hancock, 15 Ariz.App. at 299, 488 P.2d
501, held that Rule 59(m) does not apply to a
conditional new trial grant under Rule 59()
because “Rule 59(@) is express as to the
grounds.” Soto, 239 Ariz. at 519 112, 872
P.3d at 1043, Hancock held that “Rule 59()
does not require the trial court to specify the
particulars in relation to which the verdict
was excessive.” 15 Ariz.App. at 299, 488 P.2d
501.

112 We reject the court of appeals’ and
Hancock's interpretation of Rule 59(i) be-
cause it would allow the trial court to cireum-
vent the Rule 59(m) particularity require-
ment when granting remittitur under Rule
59), This is particularly so because one of
the identified grounds for a new trial under
Rule 59 is “excessive” damages. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 59(a)(5). If a trial judge conditionally
granted a new trial under Rule 59(i) without
stating the grounds with particularity, and
the party adversely affected by the reduction

statute); Drummond v. Mid-West Growers Co-op.
Corp., 91 Nev. 698, 542 P.2d 198, 207 (1975)
(“[IJhe ‘right to a jury trial’ does not mean that
an error committed by a jury may not be cor-
rected, merely because the vehicle of correcting
such error was not known or practiced at com-
mon law when Nevada’s Constitution was
adopted.”); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116
Ohio St.3d 468, 880 NE.2d 420, 431 938
(2007) (“‘[C]ourts have the inherent authority to
order remittiturs to reduce jury awards when
they deem the amount to be excessive based on
the facts found by the jury.”); Pope v. Moore,
Til S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 1986) (“Factual suf-
ficiency is the sole remittitur standard for actu-
al damages”); Powers v, Allstate Ins. Co., 10
Wis.2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393, 400 (1960)
(‘TWIhere an excessive verdict is not due to

479

declined to accept the reduction, the new
trial would be granted without the trial court
providing the requisite Rule 59(m) particular-
ity. Requiring particularity also advances
transparency and aids parties’ and appellate
courts’ review of the trial court’s decision,
The stylistic change simplifying the language
of Rule 59(), effective January 1, 2017, com-
ports with our conclusion that Rule 59(m) of
the 2016 version applies to Rule 59(i), It
requires that “any order granting a new trial
or altering or amending a judgment” must
state particularized grounds. Ariz, R. Civ. P.
59(/) (2017) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
because we find Hancock’s reasoning unper-
suasive and its conclusion inconsistent with
Rule 59 when read as a whole, we overrule
Hancock and its progeny, and now clarify
that Rule 59(m) applies to Rule 59() (and,
thus, the 2017 version of Rule 59) applies to
rulings that grant motions under revised
Rule 59(f)).

IIL Particularity Requirement Under
Rule 59(m)

18 Since shortly after Rule 59(m)’s adop-
tion in 1954, our courts have endeavored to
articulate a practical standard for determin-
ing when an order states sufficient facts and
conclusions to satisfy the rule’s particularity
requirement.’ In Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin,
100 Ariz. 80, 88, 411 P.2d 809 (1966), we
reasoned that particularity means “in a de-
tail,” and instructed that mere recitation of
the statutory grounds for a new trial in Rule
59(a) “manifestly” failed to satisfy Rule
59(m)’s particularity requirement. See also

perversity or prejudice, and is not the result of
error occurring during the course of trial, the
plaintiff should be granted the option of remit-
ting the excess over and above such sum as the
court shall determine is the reasonable amount
of plaintiff's damages, or of having a new trial
on the issue of damages.”). But see, eg., Kabel
v. Brady, 519 So.2d 912, 920 (Ala. 1987)(“A re-
mittitur or a new trial should not be ordered on
the grounds of excessiveness of the jury’s ver-
dict unless the court can determine that the
verdict was reached on account of bias, pas-
sion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper
motive.”).

3. We intend the following analysis to govern the
particularity requirement of current Rule 59().

480

Rogers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
100 Ariz, 154, 168-64, 412 P.2d 272 (1966)
(finding the trial court’s order that “the judg-
ment was not justified by the evidence”
failed to satisfy the Rule 59(m) particularity
requirement); Pima County v. Bilby, 87
Ariz, 866, 878-74, 851 P.2d 647 (1960) (ex-
plaining that Rule 59(m)’s particularity re-
quirement was not met where the specified
grounds for remittitur were that “the verdict
and judgment were contrary to the law and
evidence”). We have followed Crespin’s in-
struction that Rule 59(m) requires greater
particularity or detail than mere recitation of
Rule 59(a)’s grounds, and we see no reason
to jettison this approach. See, eg. Reeves,
119 Ariz, at 168-64, 579 P.2d at 1386-67, By
construing “particularity” as requiring the
trial judge to describe why the jury award is
too high or low, we respect the jury's deci-
sion and allow for meaningful appellate re-
view.

114 We further note that, al-
though Rule 59(m) is “designed to insure that,
both parties and the appellate courts receive
adequate notice of the grounds on which the
trial court relied,” Reeves, 119 Ariz, at 164,
579 P.2d at 1887, it does not require the trial
court “to render a written opinion setting
forth [its] rationale for granting a new trial
motion or to undertake a lengthy review of
the facts.” Heaton v. Waters, 8 Ariz, App.
256, 259-60, 445 P.2d 458 (1968). Instead,
Rule 59(m) requires only that a trial court's
order furnish sufficient detail to apprise the
parties and appellate courts of the specific
basis for the court’s ruling so that they may
avoid speculation, Crespin, 100 Ariz. at 82-
83, 411 P.2d 809 (noting that the trial court’s
new trial order did not comply with Rule
59(m) where it was based “on the grounds
set forth in [the] motion for a new trial,”
which merely was “couched in the language
of the statutory grounds for a new trial”); see
also Esplendido Apartments v, Metro. Con-
do. Ass’n of Ariz, II, 161 Ariz, 325, 330, 778
P.2d 1221, 1226 (1989) (finding Rule 59(m) is
“satisfied when ‘both parties and the appel-
late courts receive adequate notice of the
grounds on which the trial court relied’”
(quoting Reeves, 119 Ariz, at 164, 579 P.2d at
1887).

Hs“115 “The power of a judge to
grant a new trial is the same regardless of
the particularity of the language of the new
trial order....” Reeves, 119 Ariz, at 164, 579
P.2d at 1887, When a trial court’s Rule 59
order fails to satisfy the Rule 59(m) particu-
larity requirement, however, the burden
shifts to the appellee to establish that the
trial court did not err in granting a new trial,
additur, or remittitur. Jd. Thus, a trial court’s
degree of specificity in explaining its ruling
under Rule 59(m) determines the degree of
deference afforded to its judgment on appel-
late review, If the trial court provides fact-
specific reasons, sufficient to avoid specula-
tion, to support its order of a conditional new
trial or additur or remittitur on the grounds
prescribed in Rule 59(a) and (i), then appel-
late courts will afford the trial court greater
discretion and generally defer to its findings
and ruling, Jd, at 168, 579 P.2d at 1886. In
that instance, the appellant would bear the
burden of establishing that the trial court
abused its discretion; it is not enough to show
that reasonable evidence supported the jury's
verdict, Id, at 164, 579 P.2d at 1887; Santa-
nello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 264, 475 P.2d
246, 248 (1970). But if the trial court does not
provide detailed reasons to support its ruling,
our level of deference is reduced and “the
appellee has the burden on appeal ‘to con-
vince us that the trial court did not err in
ordering a new trial.’” Reeves, 119 Ariz. at
164, 579 P.2d at 1887 (quoting Crespin, 100
Ariz, at 88, 411 P.2d 809). To satisfy its
burden, the appellee must establish that the
trial court’s order was supported by substan-
tial evidence and did not constitute an abuse
of discretion, Jd. This burden-shifting para-
digm should incentivize moving parties to
seek, and trial courts to provide, particular-
ized grounds and detailed reasons for order-
ing a new trial, thus aiding appellate review.

116 In an effort to limit trial courts’ au-
thority to grant remittitur to only the most
extreme cases, the Sotos rely heavily on Ah-
mad v. State, 240 Ariz, 880, 885 117, 379
P.8d 1011, 1016 (App. 2016), a wrongful death
case in which the court of appeals overturned
a trial court’s remittitur order that was
“based solely on an unarticulated subjective
concept of ‘reasonableness,’” The trial court

in Ahmad, in granting remittitur, explained
only that its ruling was “[blased upon the
evidence presented at trial and the damages
recoverable in this action.” Id. at 883 17, 879
P.8d at 1014, The court of appeals found this
an insufficient explanation of the trial court’s
rationale, explaining that trial courts must
identify “some palpable defect in the evi-
dence or verdict” in granting a remittitur in
wrongful death cases, Jd, at 885 117, 379
P.8d at 1016,

917 The Sotos urge us to apply Ahmad's
“palpable defect” standard here. Defendants
contend that Ahmad is inapplicable because
it involved a wrongful death action rather
than a personal injury action, They reason
that Ahmad, even if correct, applies only to
special statutory considerations under the
wrongful death statute, ARS. § 12-618,
which provides that “[i]n an action for wrong-
ful death, the jury shall give such damages as
it deems fair and just with reference to the
injury resulting from the death to the surviv-
ing parties who may be entitled to recover.”
(emphasis added),

118 We find Ahmad’s reasoning unpersua-
sive for two reasons, First, the “palpable
defect” standard is novel, vague, and incon-
sistent with the language and purpose of
Rule 59. Cf; Reeves, 119 Ariz, at 164, 579 P.2d
at 1887 (“We do not believe Rule 59(m) was
intended to limit the discretion of a judge to
order a new trial.”); see also Bilby, 87 Ariz.
at 874, 861 P.2d 647 (concluding that failure
to comply with Rule 59(m) does not require
that the new trial motion be denied with
prejudice and that the verdict and judgment.
be reinstated because “[s]uch a result is en-
tively unwarranted by the terms and purpose
of the Rule”). Second, we reject the notion
that § 12-618’s “fair and just” damages pro-
vision mandates greater deference to juries
in wrongful death cases than in personal
injury actions, The standard for remittitur is
the same in wrongful death and personal
injury cases. See, eg., Alires v. S. Pac, Co.,
100 Ariz. 6, 14, 409 P.2d 714 (1966) (holding
that the trial court “did not exceed its judi-
cial discretion in finding that the damages
4. A jury may render a zero damages award un-

der the wrongful death statute if it deems such

an award “fair and just” because, unlike a com-
mon-law negligence claim, damages are not an

481

ordered by the jury were excessive” and
ordering remittitur in a wrongful death ac-
tion); of Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz.
505, 507, 715 P.2d 758, 760 (1986) (suggesting
no difference between personal injury and
wrongful death cases concerning the trial
court’s consideration of a motion for new trial
based on insufficient damages),

HE {19 We perceive no relevant dis-
tinction between a jury’s duty to render a
“fair and just” damages award in a wrongful
death action and its charge to issue an award
based upon its “good sense and unbiased
judgment” in a personal injury case! See
Meyer v. Ricklick, 99 Ariz, 855, 857-58, 409
P.2d 280 (1965) (noting that in a personal
injury action, the “law does not fix precise
rules for the measure of damages but leaves
their assessment to a jury’s good sense and
unbiased judgment”), The legislature’s codifi-
eation of the “fair and just” standard in the
wrongful death statute does not alter our
conclusion. Swmmerfield v, Superior Court,
144 Ariz, 467, 472, 698 P.2d 712, 717 (1985)
(“The phrase[ ] ‘such damages as are fair and
just’ ... (ARS. § 12-618) invite[s] the
court to participate in construing the statutes
and setting the parameters of the action.”).
To hold otherwise would imply that jurors
may act less fairly and justly in personal
injury cases or that they need not act fairly
and justly at all, an untenable proposition.
Rule 59, which does not require a “palpable
defect” in the evidence or verdict, applies
uniformly to wrongful death and personal
injury actions.

IV. Remittitur of the Jury’s Damage
Award

HM 120 In this case, the trial judge
stated in his remittitur order that the jury
verdict “was excessive and not supported by
the evidence,” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5),
(8). As explained, Rule 59(m) requires the
court to provide greater particularity than
the “ground or grounds on which the new
trial is warranted” under Rule 59(a). Al-
though the trial judge clearly provided the

essential element of a statutory wrongful death
claim. Walsh v, Advanced Cardiac Specialists
Chartered, 229 Ariz. 193, 196 19, 273 P.3d 645,
648 (2012), This distinction is not relevant here.

482

Rule 59(a) and (i) grounds upon which he
ordered remittitur, “excessive” damages and
“not supported by the evidence,” his order
failed to provide any basis for the conclusion.
Although Rule 59(m) does not require the
trial court to render a written opinion or
provide a lengthy review of the facts underly-
ing the relevant Rule 59(a) grounds, the
court must provide sufficient detail to sup-
port its ruling and to eliminate speculation on
appellate review. The trial court’s finding
that the award “was excessive and not sup-
ported by the evidence” fails to satisfy this
standard, Accordingly, the burden shifts to
Defendants to convince us that the trial court
did not err in ordering a new trial or remitti-
tur.

{21 Here, like the court of appeals, we
conclude that Defendants carried their bur-
den of establishing that the trial court’s re-
mittitur and new trial order is supported by
substantial evidence and is not an abuse of
discretion. Although Michael endured serious
injury, rehabilitation, and attendant emotion-
al distress, he did not present a claim for
future expenses or other economic loss, On
this record, the trial court could have reason-
ably concluded that the jury verdict was
excessive, and we will not disturb its ruling.

VY. Comparable Verdict Evidence

HEM 122 Defendants also presented
information regarding jury verdicts in cases
involving individuals close in age to Michael
who suffered similar fractures, These similar
cases support Defendants’ contention that
the damage award was excessive. Cf Desert
Palm Surgical Grp, P.L.C. v, Petia, 236
Ariz, 568, 588-84 11 43-4, 348 P.8d 438, 458—
54 (App. 2015) (finding that the damage
award was not supported where it could not
be reconciled with other Arizona civil jury
verdicts), Although courts may consider com-
parable verdict evidence in attempting to
establish that a particular verdict is exces-
sive, we caution that cases may be unique
and tun on fact-intensive determinations,
and juries may view similar cases differently.
Cf. Palenkas v. Beaumont Hosp., 482 Mich.
527, 443 N.W.2d 854, 358 (1989) (explaining
that while a comparison of jury awards in
analogous cases “cannot serve as an exact

indicator, it does provide an objective means
of determining the range of appropriate
awards in such cases”). Thus, while such
comparable verdict information may be pre-
sented to and considered by the trial court,
we emphasize that it is only marginally rele-
vant and the trial court should not treat
other damage awards as conclusive in assess-
ing whether the jury made a just award.
Defendants’ presentation of such information,
on this record, does not alter our conclusion
that the trial court acted within its discretion
in ordering remittitur.

VI. Constitutionality of Remittitur

Hs 123 The Sotos also argue that
the trial court’s remittitur and subsequent
new trial order violate Michael’s constitution-
al right to a jury trial under article 2, section
28, of the Arizona Constitution. We disagree.
The Arizona Constitution protects only the
right to a jury trial as it existed before
statehood. Derendal v. Griffith, 209 Ariz. 416,
419 18, 104 P.8d 147, 150 (2005). A trial
court’s discretionary authority to order addi-
tur, remittitur, or a new trial was well estab-
lished before statehood, and nothing suggests
that article 2, section 28, modified that au-
thority. See, eg., S. Pac. Co. v. Tomlinson, 4
Ariz, 126, 182, 88 P. 710 (1898) (“A trial court
has the power, where excessive damages
have been allowed by the jury, and where the
motion to set aside the verdict is based upon
this ground, to make a remission a condition
precedent to overruling the motion.”), rev'd
on other grounds, 163 U.S. 369, 16 S.Ct.
1171, 41 L.Ed, 193 (1896); see also Gila Val-
ley Globe & N. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 18 Ariz. 270,
276, 112 P. 845 (1911), Thus, although article
2, section 23, guarantees the right to a jury
trial in certain cases, it does not guarantee
the right to an undisturbed jury verdict, free
from review by trial or appellate courts. Ala-
bam Freight Lines v. Thevenot, 68 Ariz. 260,
267, 204 P.2d 1050 (1949) (rejecting argument
that remittitur violates article 2, section 23,
of the Arizona Constitution). In any event,
the trial court ordered a new trial after the
Sotos refused to accept the remittitur, thus
preserving their right to a jury trial.

DISPOSITION

124 We vacate the court of appeals’ opin-
ion, affirm the trial court’s order conditional-
ly granting a new trial, and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

398 P.3d 99
Jeffrey HAMBLEN and Barbara Youngs,
husband and wife, Petitioners,
v

Hon. Ralph HATCH, Judge of the Superior
Court of the State of Arizona, in and for
the County of Navajo, Respondent
Judge,

Winslow Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a
Little Colorado Medical Center,
Real Party in Interest.

No. CV-16-0260-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed July 21, 2017

=
ley
wo

Ss
ES

Scott W. Rodgers (argued), Thomas L.
Hudson, Joshua D, Bendor, Osborn Maledon,
P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Jeffrey Ham-
blen and Barbara Youngs

Randall Yavitz, Isabel M. Humphrey (ar-
gued), Hunter, Humphrey & Yavitz, PLO,
Phoenix; and James E. Ledbetter, Jared R,
Owens, The Ledbetter Law Firm, P.L.C.
Cottonwood, Attorneys for Winslow Memori-
al Hospital Ine,

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER
authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, JUSTICES
BRUTINEL, TIMMER, BOLICK, and
LOPEZ, and JUDGE GURTLER * joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER,
opinion of the Court:

41 In this employment dispute, the parties
submitted their respective claims to manda-
tory arbitration under their employment con-
tract’s broad arbitration provision, which nei-
ther side challenged. The arbitrator ruled in
favor of the employer, concluding that it
properly rescinded the contract based on the
employee’s underlying misrepresentations
and omissions. The final arbitration award,
which the superior court later confirmed at
the employer's request, fully settled all
claims and counterclaims submitted to arbi-
tration and denied all claims not expressly
granted in the award. Applying the “separa-
bility” doctrine, we hold that the employer,
having not specifically challenged the con-
tract’s arbitration provision, may not litigate
in this action claims against the employee
that, at the least, were permissive counter-
claims in the arbitration.

L

12 Winslow Memorial Hospital, Inc., doing
business as Little Colorado Medical Center
(LCMC”), is a nonprofit corporation that
operates a hospital in Winslow. In 2008,
LOMC hired Jeffrey Hamblen as its presi-
dent and CEO. Before he was hired, Ham-
blen misrepresented two aspects of his prior
employment with another entity with which
LCOMC had a management services agree-
ment. First, Hamblen falsely told LCMC
that he would not receive any severance pay-
ments from the other entity. And second,
Hamblen failed to disclose an amendment to
the management services agreement that re-
quired LCMC to reimburse the other entity
for the severance payments it made to Ham-
blen.

18 The 2013 Hamblen/LCMC employment.
contract included this arbitration provision:

*Justice Andrew W. Gould has recused himself
from this case, Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Charles

485

Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration ad-
ministered by the American Arbitration
Association in accordance with its Com-
mercial Arbitration Rules ... and judg-
ment on the award rendered by the arbi-
trator(s) may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof.

All counterclaims that would be compulso-
ry or permissive under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 18(a) and (b) if the claim
were filed in court shall be asserted in the
arbitration and not otherwise,

94 In early 2014, after learning that Ham-
blen was receiving severance payments for
which it was obligated to reimburse the other
entity, LOMC placed Hamblen on adminis-
trative leave, Hamblen then notified LCMC
that he was terminating the employment con-
tract, alleging “good reason” under that
agreement, LCMC in turn notified Hamblen
that it was rescinding the employment con-
tract or, alternatively, terminating him for
cause, Hamblen then filed an arbitration de-
mand with the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, claiming that LCMC owed him sever-
ance pay under the contract on the ground
that he had “good reason” to terminate it.
Shortly thereafter, LCMC filed this action in
superior court, alleging an unjust enrichment:
claim against Hamblen,

15 Hamblen moved to compel arbitration,
arguing that LCMC’s claim was subject to
the employment contract’s arbitration provi-
sion, LCMC opposed the motion on several
grounds, including its contention that it was
entitled to rescind the employment contract
because of Hamblen’s fraudulent misrepre-
sentations and omissions. Despite that argu-
ment, the superior court granted the motion
and stayed the case “until mandatory arbi-
tration under the contract is completed.” _

16 The parties then engaged in extensive
prehearing disclosures and preparation for
the arbitration, LOMC asserted various
counterclaims, including its claim for unjust

W. Gurtler, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Mohave

County Superior Court, was designated to sit in
this matter.

486

enrichment. (Although LCMC continued to
pursue its unjust enrichment counterclaim at
the arbitration hearing, it purportedly with-
drew that claim in a post-hearing memoran-
dum to the arbitrator.) LCMC also sought
rescission of the employment contract based
on Hamblen’s fraudulent misrepresentations
and omissions. LCMC did not, however, chal-
lenge the arbitration clause itself (as opposed
to the entire employment contract), The par-
ties then participated in a multi-day arbitra-
tion hearing.

17 In October 2015, the arbitrator entered
his award: (a) denying Hamblen’s claim for
severance pay because he terminated the
agreement without “good reason”; and (b)
ruling that “LCMC had grounds to rescind,
and did rescind,” the employment contract
based on Hamblen’s misrepresentations and
omissions, which “abrogates the agreement
and undoes it from the beginning.” The
award also provided that “(t]his Final Award
is in full settlement of all claims and counter-
claims submitted to this Arbitration,” and
that “[a]ll claims not expressly granted here-

in are hereby denied.”

18 Following the arbitration process,
LCMC moved in superior court to confirm
the final award. LCMC also asked the court,
to lift the stay to allow LCMC to seek dam-
ages from Hamblen for various claims
LCMC asserted, or could have asserted, in
the arbitration, including its unjust enrich-
ment claim that the court had previously
ordered LCMC to arbitrate. Hamblen did
not oppose confirmation of the award, but did
oppose the rest of LCMC’s request and
urged the court to enter a “simple judgment
in LOMC’s favor, with no monetary award
for any party,” consistent with the arbitra-
tion award’s language.

19 In February 2016, the superior court
entered judgment confirming the arbitration
award but also lifting the stay and granting
LCOMC leave to amend its complaint. The
court acknowledged Hamblen’s argument
that, based on the arbitration proceedings
and final award, LCMC should be foreclosed
from reasserting its counterclaims in this
action. But the court rejected that argument,
noting that the arbitrator found that LOMC
had “grounds to and did rescind the

LCMC/Hamblen Employment Agreement,”
which “abrogate[d] the agreement and undid
it from its very beginning.” Consequently,
the court ruled, Hamblen’s request “to deny
[LCOMC’s] right to a jury trial to prove dam-
ages” on its claims “is unreasonable as the
contract was rescinded and undid [sic] from
its very beginning.”

10 Hamblen later moved for a new trial
or, alternatively, to alter or amend the judg-
ment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
59, He argued that the arbitration award
disposed of all claims between the parties—
including LCMC’s counterclaims—and that
the court overstepped its authority under the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (““RUAA”),
ARS. § 12-8001 to -3029, by ruling that
LCMC could reassert its counterclaims in
this court action. LCMC, in turn, moved to
amend its complaint to assert various claims
against Hamblen,

{11 In April 2016, the superior court de-
nied Hamblen’s motions, ruling that (1) both
parties jointly requested the court to confirm
the arbitration award, and that “the Court
did in fact confirm the final arbitration award
by written order”; and (2) because LCMC
rescinded the employment contract, which
“undoes it from the beginning”” LCMC
was “entitled to a jury trial on its claims.” By
separate order, the court also granted
LCOMC’s motion to amend its complaint,

112 The court of appeals declined jurisdic-
tion of Hamblen’s ensuing special action. We
granted review because the case presents an
issue of statewide importance and first im-
pression before this Court—whether the sep-
arability doctrine applies to post-arbitration
confirmation proceedings and precludes court
litigation of arbitrable claims when the
agreement’s arbitration provision was not
specifically challenged, even though the arbi-
trator finds grounds for rescinding the entire
agreement. We have jurisdiction under arti-
cle 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S, § 12-120.24.

I

718 Fifty years ago, the United States
Supreme Court adopted what became known
as the “separability” doctrine in the arbitra-

tion context. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct.
1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). The issue there
was whether the federal court or an arbitra-
tor should resolve a claim of fraud in the
inducement of a contract providing for arbi-
tration. Id. at 397-98, 402, 87 S.Ct. 1801.
Applying the applicable Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, the Court held
that “if the claim is fraud in the inducement
of the arbitration clause itself—an issue
which goes to the ‘making’ of the agreement
to arbitrate—the federal court may proceed
to adjudicate it, But the statutory language
does not permit the federal court to consider
claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract generally.” Id, at 408-04, 87 S.Ct.
1801.

HM 114 More recently, the Supreme
Court affirmed and applied the Prima Paint
rule when the parties’ contract contained an
arbitration clause, but a party opposed arbi-
tration and sought to litigate in federal court
her claim of unconscionability under state
law. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
561 U.S. 68, 65-66, 180 S.Ct. 2772, 177
L.Ed.2d 403 (2010). Rejecting that position,
the Court ruled that one may prevent arbi-
tration of claims within the arbitration agree-
ment’s scope only if he or she “challenges
specifically the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate,” rather than “challengling] the
contract as a whole,” for example, based on
its having been “fraudulently induced.” Jd, at.
70, 180 S.Ct. 2772 (quoting Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444,
126 S.Ct. 1204, 168 L.Hd.2d 1088 (2006),
Accordingly, the Court held that “a party’s
challenge to another provision of the con-
tract, or to the contract as a whole, does not
prevent a court from enforcing a specific
agreement to arbitrate.” Id,

Hl 115 Although this Court has not pre-
viously addressed the separability doctrine,
our court of appeals has, Relying on Prima
Paint and applicable statutes in Arizona’s
Uniform Arbitration Act, ARS. §§ 12-
1501, -1502, the court of appeals embraced
the doctrine over thirty years ago, ruling
that “the arbitration clause is considered to
be an agreement independent and separate
from the principal contract.” U.S. Insulation,

487

Inc. v. Hitro Constr. Co., Inc., 146 Ariz. 250,
258, 705 P.2d 490 (App. 1985). As that court
observed,

except where the parties otherwise in-
tend—arbitration clauses as a matter of
federal law are “separable” from the con-
tracts in which they are embedded, and
.+. Where no claim is made that fraud was
directed to the arbitration clause itself, a
broad arbitration clause will be held to
encompass arbitration of the claim that the
contract itself was induced by fraud,

Id. (quoting Prima Paint, 888 U.S. at 402, 87
S.Ct. 1801) (second emphasis added in U.S.
Insulation); see also WB, The Building Co.,
LLC v. Bl Destino, LP (“WB”), 227 Ariz. 302,
306-07 {1 11, 257 P.8d 1182 (App. 2011) (not-
ing as “well-established that arbitration
agreements are severable from the rest of
the contract, and therefore, a court may only
stay arbitration if there is a challenge to the
arbitration clause itself”); Stevens/Leinwe-
ber/Sullens, Inc, v. Holm Dev, & Mgmt, Inc.
(“SLS”), 165 Ariz, 25, 29, 795 P.2d 1808 (App.
1990) (concluding that “the doctrine of sepa-
rability is inherent in the language of A.R.S.
§ 12-1501”).

Hl 116 We agree with the court of ap-
peals that Arizona law codifies the separabili-
ty doctrine and thus applies to all contracts
governed by RUAA and/or the Uniform Act.
“Read in conjunction, [A.R.S. §§ 12-1501 and
12-1502] embody the concept of separability
endorsed” in Prima Paint. U.S. Insulation,
146 Ariz, at 258, 705 P.2d 490; see also SLS,
165 Ariz, at 28 n.8, 795 P.2d 1308 (observing
that § 12-1502(A) tracks the FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§ 4, on which Prima Paint relied “to limit a
court’s inquiry to a determination of whether
an enforceable arbitration clause exists”);
§ 12-1501 (stating that arbitration agree-
ments are “valid, enforceable and irrevoca-
ble, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract”); § 12-1502(A) (limiting judicial inqui-
ry to whether an arbitration agreement ex-
ists),

117 In addition, in 2010 Arizona adopted
RUAA, which “governs an agreement to ar-
bitrate made on or after January 1, 2011,”
including the agreement here. A.R.S. § 12-

488

3008(A)(1).1 Section 6(c) of that uniform act
incorporates the separability doctrine, and
Arizona adopted that language verbatim in
RUAA. A.R.S. § 12-3006(C) (“An arbitrator
shall decide ... whether a contract contain-
ing a valid agreement to arbitrate is en-
forceable.”). In addition, “[ilIn applying and
construing” RUAA, Arizona courts are to
consider “the need to promote uniformity of
the law with respect to its subject matter
among states that enact it.” A.R.S, § 12-
3028. In short, RUAA further supports the
separability doctrine,

I.

118 Before addressing the parties’ posi-
tions on the doctrine’s application to this
case, we make two points. First, RUAA spe-
cifically provides that beginning in January
2011, “this chapter shall not apply to an
agreement to arbitrate any existing or subse-
quent controversy ... [bletween an employ-
er and employee.” A.R.S, § 12-8008(B)(1).
Arizona’s Uniform Arbitration Act contains a
parallel provision. See North Valley Emer-
gency Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana, 208
Ariz, 801, 302 111, 98 P.8d 501, 502 (2004)
(holding that A.R.S, § 12-1517 exempts from
the Uniform Arbitration Act “all arbitration
agreements between employers and employ-
ees,” not only such agreements contained in
collective bargaining contracts).

119 The parties did not waive those non-
applicability provisions by entering into an
employment agreement with an arbitration
clause. But both parties acknowledge they
voluntarily “opted in” to RUAA and the Uni-
form Act, and we accept the parties’ agree-
ment on this point, See A.R.S. §§ 12-8004(A)
(Except as otherwise provided in subsec-
tions B and C of this section, a party to an
agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration
proceeding may waive, or the parties may
vary the effect of, the requirements of this
chapter to the extent permitted by law.”);
12-8004(B), (C) (omitting agreements to arbi-
trate employment disputes from listing of
conditionally waivable and non-waivable mat-

1, RUAA, however, did not displace, and in some
areas overlaps with, Arizona’s Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1501 to -1518. See Bruce
E, Meyerson, Arizona Adopts the Revised Uniform

ters under RUAA), Therefore, for purposes
of this case we deem RUAA and the Uniform
Act applicable.

HHMI 120 Second, even had the parties
not waived the Arizona laws that exempt
employment agreements from RUAA and
the Uniform Act, “[t]he FAA preempts state
Jaw and governs all written arbitration agree-
ments involving interstate commerce, making
such agreements enforceable in both federal
and state courts.” S, Cal. Edison Co. v. Pea-
body W. Coal Co., 194 Ariz, 47, 51 118, 977
P.2d 769, 778 (1999). And the FAA applies to
arbitration agreements in employment con-
tracts. See Circuit City Stores, Inc v.
Adams, 582 U.S. 105, 109, 121 S.Ct, 1802, 149
L.Ed.2d 284 (2001); see also Rent-A-Center,
561 U.S. at 65-71, 180 S.Ct. 2772 (applying
separability doctrine to employment con-
tract), Nonetheless, consistent with the par-
ties’ arguments, wé limit our analysis and
conclusion to Arizona law, without consider-
ing whether the agreement here falls within
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and is
thus covered by the FAA. See generally Al-
lied-Bruce Terminix Cos, Inc. v. Dobson,
518 U.S, 265, 115 S.Ct. 884, 180 L.Ed.2d 753
(1995); Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct, 1652, 184 L.Ed.2d 902
(1996),

Iv.

I 1.21 Hamblen argues that the separa-
bility doctrine applies to not only pre-arbitra-
tion challenges to motions to compel arbitra-
tion, but also post-arbitration proceedings.
Proper application of the doctrine here,
Hamblen asserts, leads to several conclu-
sions. First, “an arbitrator’s decision to re-
seind a contract containing an arbitration
provision does not impact the validity of the
arbitration provision itself.” Second, “once a
trial court properly compels arbitration, the
parties may not later litigate claims subject.
to the governing arbitration provision.” Thus,
Hamblen contends, the doctrine “precluded
the superior court from permitting further
litigation between the parties,” particularly

Arbitration Act, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 481, 486 (2011)

(Because “RUAA does not entirely replace Ari-

zona's existing arbitration law,” “Arizona now
has two [sets of] arbitration statutes.”).

after the court confirmed the arbitration
award,

122 LCMC counters with two points, one
procedural and the other substantive. First,
it argues that Hamblen’s current attempt to
preclude superior court litigation of its vari-
ous claims is premature, inasmuch as he
never filed a motion for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment on those claims based on res
judicata, merger, or otherwise. The superior
court, therefore, had no “opportunity to con-
sider or rule upon Hamblen’s potential dis-
positive motion.” We disagree. Hamblen
clearly argued below that, as a matter of law,
the confirmed arbitration award and separa-
bility doctrine foreclose further litigation of
LCMC’s claims, and the superior court clear-
ly understood and rejected that argument,
Hamblen’s argument here, therefore, is not
premature or procedurally deficient.

WM 1283 Substantively, LCMC argues
that the parties’ dispute “is merely with re-
spect to the scope of the effect of the [arbi-
tration] award, which the parties agree is
final and enforceable.” Relying on Clarke v.
ASARCO, Inc., 123 Ariz, 587, 589, 601 P.2d
587, 589 (1979), LCMC contends that “[t]he
arbitrator’s subject-matter jurisdiction is ..,
‘limited in scope to issues raised by the arbi-
tration agreement.’” We agree with that
proposition, but it does not aid LCMC,

HE 124 In Clarke, this Court affirmed
the superior court’s order denying arbitra-
tion because the arbitration provision in the
parties’ contract was limited and governed
only certain specified disputes, and the dis-
putes involved in the case went “far beyond
the scope of issues which the parties intend-
ed to submit to arbitration under the terms
of the agreement to arbitrate.” Id. As we
observed, “[plarties are only bound to arbi-
trate those issues which by clear language
they have agreed to arbitrate,” and in Clarke
the parties’ “contract could have required
that all disputes arising out of the contract as
a whole be subject to arbitration,” but did
not so state. Id,

125 Here, in contrast, the Ham-
blen/LCMC employment contract broadly re-
quired arbitration of “[alny controversy or
claim arising out of or relating to” the em-

489

ployment contract, That language is not lim-
ited to contract claims, but also encompasses
any tort claims arising out of or related to
the parties’ employment contract. LCMC
does not dispute that the various tort claims
it seeks to litigate under its amended com-
plaint in superior court fall within that lan-
guage. Nor does LCMC contest that its
pending tort claims constitute permissive
counterclaims in the arbitration and thus are
covered by the agreement’s mandate that all
“eompulsory or permissive” counterclaims
“shall be asserted in the arbitration and not
otherwise.”

126 LCMC argues, however, that Ham-
blen’s position exhibits “a fundamental mis-
understanding of the separability doctrine.”
According to LCMC, under Hamblen’s view
“neither the court nor the arbitrator had any
authority to decide LCMC’s claim that the
entire contract, including the arbitration
clause, was invalid.” But Hamblen has never
challenged the arbitrator’s exclusive authori-
ty to rule on LCMC’s rescission claim, nor
did Hamblen contest the superior court’s
confirmation of the arbitration award, which
found LOMC’s rescission supported and ap-
propriate. Rather, Hamblen’s argument is
based on the fact that LCMC neither specifi-
cally challenged the validity of the arbitration
provision nor sought to limit the scope of the
arbitration proceeding or the arbitrable
claims submitted there. Under those circum-
stances, he asserts, “the separability doctrine
requires that once the superior court proper-
ly compelled arbitration” and later confirmed
the arbitration award, “LCMC could never
litigate any claims (permissive or compulso-
ry) against Hamblen that existed at that
time.” And that is so, Hamblen contends,
even when, as in this case, the arbitrator
finds valid grounds to rescind the contract in
which the arbitration agreement is found.

{27 Without citing any authority, LCMC
counters that “[olnce the arbitrator had de-
termined that LCMC had properly rescinded
the entire contract,” “the arbitrator no long-
er had any power to decide any other claims
that were or could have been asserted by
LCMC against Hamblen.” But this argument
is unsupported and inconsistent with the sep-
arability doctrine, the arbitration provision,

490

the arbitration award, the superior court’s
confirmation of that award, RUAA, and arbi-
tration-related policy considerations,

28 Unlike the party that opposed arbitra-
tion in WB, LCMC did not “challenge the
validity of the arbitration agreement sepa-
rately and distinctly from [its] challenge of
the underlying contract.” 227 Ariz. at 307
118 & n4, 257 P.8d 1182; see also SLS, 165
Ariz, at 29, 795 P.2d 1308 (affirming superior
eourt’s order denying motion to compel arbi-
tration when party “challeng[ed] the validity
of the arbitration provision, but not the valid-
ity of the principal contract”), Had LOMO
separately and specifically challenged, even
on identical grounds, “both [the] arbitration
agreement and the underlying [employment]
contract,” WB, 227 Ariz, at 307 118, 257 P.3d
1182, the superior court conceivably could
have found the arbitration clause to be unen-
forceable, denied Hamblen’s motion to com-
pel arbitration, retained jurisdiction, and
ruled on the merits of all claims. Cf Prima
Paint, 888 U.S. at 404, 87 S.Ct. 1801 (“{IIn
passing upon a[n] ... application for a stay
while the parties arbitrate, a federal court
may consider only issues relating to the mak-
ing and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate.”), But that is not what happened
here.

129 Under the separability doctrine,
therefore, the superior court properly com-
pelled arbitration of all claims relating to the
parties’ employment agreement, including
LCMC’s claim for rescission. Cf Buckeye
Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 44546, 126 S.Ct.
1204 (stating that “unless the challenge is to
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the
contract's validity is considered by the arbi-
trator in the first instance”); Saint Agnes
Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California,
81 Cal.4th 1187, 8 Cal.Rptr.8d 517, 82 P.3d
‘727, 785 (2008) (“[T]he central rationale of
Prima Point was that an arbitration clause
is separable from other portions of a con-
tract, such that fraud in the inducement re-
lating to other contractual terms does not
render an arbitration clause unenforceable,
even when such fraud might justify rescission
of the contract as a whole.”). Under these
circumstances, we agree with Hamblen that

the doctrine should apply here in the post-
arbitration context,

80 Once the parties’ dispute was correct-
ly referred to arbitration, LCMC was re-
quired under their agreement to present in
that proceeding all counterclaims, permissive
or otherwise, that arose out of or related to
the Hamblin/LCMC employment agreement,
Consistent with that requirement, LCMC
identified numerous claims against Hamblen
in its arbitration disclosure statement. That
LCMC chose to not present certain claims
does not justify its later asserting them in its
amended complaint in superior court. And
although the arbitrator found valid grounds
for LCMC’s rescission of the employment
contract, that ruling did not vitiate the un-
challenged arbitration clause in the parties’
contract or preclude the arbitrator from also
deciding all of the parties’ employment relat-
ed claims. Cf Verma v, Stu, 228 Ariz. 144,
158 178, 221 P,38d 28 (App. 2009) (although
“rescission is meant to restore the parties to
their pre-contract status,” “a contract may be
partially rescinded when the contract is divi-
sible or severable”). Indeed, the arbitrator
stated that the final award was “in full settle-
ment of all claims and counterclaims submit-
ted” to arbitration and denied “alll claims
not expressly granted” in the award,

781 The superior court’s confirmation of
that award was unqualified and unchal-
lenged. That confirmation was in keeping
with RUAA, which strictly limits the superior
court’s options after the arbitration process
is complete. See A.R.S, § 12-8022 (requiring
a court to confirm an arbitration award “un-
Jess the award is modified or corrected ...
or is vacated,” actions that were neither re-
quested nor appropriate here). In view of the
confirmed arbitration award, neither RUAA
nor any other authority permitted further
litigation, via LCMC’s amended complaint
that the superior court authorized, of arbitra-
ble claims that could and should have been
pursued in the arbitration. As Hamblen
points out, permitting a party to later litigate
arbitrable claims in court, after unlimited
arbitration proceedings have concluded and
the arbitration award has been confirmed,
“would result in tremendous waste and dis-

courage parties from entering into arbitra-
tion agreements,”

HM 132 Finally, our conclusion advances
the policies underlying arbitration and the
separability doctrine. See Prima Paint, 888
US. at 404, 87 S.Ct, 1801 (noting that the
separability doctrine “not only honor[s] the
plain meaning of the [FAA] but also the
unmistakably clear congressional purpose
that the arbitration procedure, when selected
by the parties to a contract, be speedy and
not subject to delay and obstruction in the
courts”), As discussed above, when parties
contractually agree to arbitrate any disputes
and the arbitration provision is not specifical-
ly and separately challenged, the applicable
United States Supreme Court and Arizona
cases require that a general challenge to the
validity of the contract be submitted to arbi-
tration. Although those cases do not squarely
address what happens “next” if the arbitra-
tor concludes that the contract as a whole—
including its arbitration clause—is unenforce-
able or rescinded, the underlying purpose
and policy of the separability doctrine sup-
port Hamblen’s position.

HM «(33 Because the separability
doctrine presumes that the arbitration clause
is separable from the overall contract, where,
as here, the parties agree to a broad arbitra-
tion clause that is not specifically challenged,
that provision will apply even if the arbitra-
tor finds that the overall contract is void or
voidable. And this is so unless (1) the parties
have provided otherwise in their contract; (2)
the parties stipulate to a bifurcated proce-
dure in which they may later litigate claims
in court if the arbitrator finds the entire
contract void or voidable; or (8) the party
opposing arbitration establishes that the
clause itself is unenforceable. Thus, the sepa-
rability doctrine operates as a presumption
that the parties intend an arbitration clause
to be severable from the rest of the agree-
ment, but—consistent with the notion that
the scope of contractual arbitration turns on
the parties’ agreement—the parties can
themselves provide otherwise.

Hs 134 This construct also aligns
with the general underlying goals of arbitra-
tion. “The primary purpose of arbitration is

491

to provide an alternative to litigation so that
the parties may ‘obtain an inexpensive and
speedy final disposition of the matter” ” Can-
on Sch, Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co.,
Inc., 180 Aviz. 148, 152, 882 P.2d 1274, 1278
(1994) (quoting Smitty’s Super-Valu, Inc. v.
Pasqualetti, 22 Aviz.App. 178, 182, 525 P.2d
309 (1974)). When parties have agreed to
submit their claims to arbitration, “the par-
ties, having chosen a different tribunal, may
not reinstate judicial tribunals to resolve the
controversy.” Id.; see also S. Cal. Edison Co.,
194 Ariz, at 52 917, 977 P.2d at 774 (recog-
nizing purpose of arbitration as affording
“prompt, efficient, and inexpensive dispute
resolution”); SLS, 165 Ariz. at 29, 795 P.2d
1808 (recognizing “the strong public policy
favoring arbitration as the preferred means
of dispute resolution”). Litigating anew
LCMC’s various claims against Hamblen, as
LOMC urges and the superior court sanc-
tioned, would undereut those fundamental
policies, result in considerable duplication of
effort, and require additional time and ex-
pense, all after costly, time-consuming arbi-
tration proceedings to which the parties
agreed and the court ordered. Accordingly,
we hold that LCMC is barred from litigating
its claims against Hamblen in superior court.

v.

185 For the reasons stated, we reverse the
superior court’s judgments granting LCMC’s
motion to amend its complaint and allowing
LCMC to litigate its various claims against
Hamblen in this action. We remand the case
to the superior court with directions to dis-
miss the amended complaint. In our disere-
tion, we deny Hamblen’s request for an
award of attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-
841.01 and RUAA, A.R.S. § 12~-8025(C).

492

398 P.3d 108
MOHAVE COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellee,
ve

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
RESOURCES, Defendant/Appellant.

No, 1 CA-CV 16-0259

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/20/2017
As Amended 6/22/2017

Arizona Department of Water Resources,
Phoenix, By Kenneth C. Slowinksi, Janet L,
Miller, Jennifer Heim, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellant

Munger Chadwick, P.L.C., Tucson, By
John F. Munger, Robert J. Metli, Co-Coun-
sel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Quarles & Brady LLP, Tucson, By Adri-
ane J, Hofmeyr, Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Ap-
pellee

Presiding Judge Samuel A, Thumma
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge
James P, Beene joined.

OPINION

THUMMA, Judge:

{1 This appeal turns on whether an award
of attorneys’ fees under Arizona Revised
Statutes (A.R.S,) section 12-848,01 (2017) 1 is
subject to the $10,000 cap in ARS, § 12-

. Absent material revisions after the relevant version unless otherwise indicated.
dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current

348(E)(4). Because that cap does not apply to
such an award, the fee award is vacated and
this matter is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2 This matter began when appellee Mo-
have County filed objections with appellant
Ayizona Department of Water Resources
(ADWR) to the transfer of certain water
rights. Mohave County challenged ADWR’s
denial of those objections in court. In the
end, the Arizona Supreme Court found
ADWR properly denied Mohave County’s ob-
jections, Ariz. Dep't. of Water Res. v
McClennen, 288 Ariz, 871, 872 12, 360 P.8d
1028, 1024 (2015). The court awarded ADWR
attorneys’ fees pursuant to ARS. § 12-
348,01, “but remand[ed] the case to the supe-
rior court for a determination of the amount,
of the award,” Id, at 877 185, 360 P.8d at
1029,

18 On remand, ADWR requested approxi-
mately $185,000 in fees. Mohave County op-
posed the request, arguing ARS, § 12-
348(E)(4) capped any award at $10,000. Tac-
itly accepting Mohave County’s argument,
the superior court awarded ADWR “attor-
neys’ fees in the amount of $10,000.00.”
ADWR’s timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Hl 14 This court reviews de novo the
interpretation of statutes, See Pima Cty. v.
Pima Cty, Law Enf't Merit Sys. Council, 211
Aviz, 224, 227 118, 119 P.8d 1027, 1080
(2005). The fee award to ADWR is made
pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-848.01, which pro-
vides that “{njotwithstanding [A.R.S.] section
12-848,” if a county “files a lawsuit against” a
state agency, “the court shall award reason-
able attorney fees to the successful party in
the action.” A.R.S. § 12-848,01. Mohave
County argues any fee award to ADWR is
capped by A.R.S. § 12-848(H)(4), which pro-
vides that “an award of fees against a city,
town or county as provided in this section
shall not exceed ten thousand dollars.” Fo-
cusing on the text of A.R.S, § 12-848.01, the

2. As Mohave County concedes, “A.R.S. § 12-348
mandates fees to private individuals in certain
suits against government entities,” meaning it is
unclear whether A.R.S, § 12-348 could authorize
a fee award in this case. Because the Arizona

493

text of AR.S, § 12-348(E)(4) and case law
construing the two statutes, Mohave Coun-
ty’s argument is not well taken,

95 First, ADWR was awarded fees pursu-
ant to ARS. § 12-848.01. Ariz, Dep't. of
Water Res., 238 Ariz, at 877 135, 360 P.38d at
1029. Section 12-348.01 contains no cap limit-
ing a fee award. Nor does the phrase “{nJot-
withstanding section 12-348” used in A.R.S.
§ 12-848.01 import such a cap. To the con-
trary, “‘{nlotwithstanding’ means ‘[iJn spite
of” and the use of that term shows A.R.S.
§ 12-348.01 is “a self-contained article” deal-
ing with the issue, Wilshire Ins. Co. v. The
Home Ins. Co., 179 Ariz, 602, 604, 880 P.2d
1148 (App. 1994) (citation omitted); see also
City of Phx. v. Glenayre Elecs, Inc, 242
Ariz, 189, 144, 398 P.3d 919, 924 (2017) (not-
ing Legislature “has often used language
such as ‘notwithstanding any other statute’
... to indicate that a particular provision will
trump any conflicting statutes”) (citations
omitted), Thus, the use of “[nlothwithstand-
ing section 12-848” in A.R.S, § 12-848,01
shows the fee award here is not subject to
the $10,000 cap in A.R.S. § 12-848(E)(4).

16 Second, the $10,000 cap in A.R.S, § 12-
848(E)(4) is limited to “an award of fees ..,
as provided in this section” (ie., A.R.S, § 12-
348)2 But fees were awarded to ADWR pur-
suant to A.R.S. § 12-848,01, not A.R.S, § 12-
348, Accordingly, this express language in
ARS. § 12-848(E)(4) (limiting the cap to
fees awarded pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-848),
and the fact that the fee award to ADWR
was pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-348,01, means
the $10,000 cap in A.R.S. § 12-848 does not
apply here,

HB S117 Third, focusing on the “[nJot-
withstanding section 12-348” clause in A.R.S.
§ 12-348.01, case law runs counter to the
argument Mohave County presses here. Ad-
dressing a somewhat different argument,
City of Tempe v. State affirmed an award of
“attorneys’ fees in the amount of $108,090
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-848,01,” negating
Mohave County’s assertion that “the fee
award cap found in” A.R.S. § 12-348(8)(4)
applies. 287 Ariz. 360, 866 1125, 27 n.8, 851

Supreme Court awarded ADWR fees pursuant to
ARS. § 12-348.01, this court need not address
whether fees could have been awarded under
ARS. § 12-348.

494

P.8d 367 (App. 2015), Although Mohave
County argues City of Tempe should be read
differently or overruled, it provides no per-
suasive argument for doing so, particularly
given the applicable statutory language.

I ‘8 For these reasons, the superior
court erred in concluding that the $10,000
cap in ARS, § 12-848(E)(4) applies to an
award of attorneys’ fees made pursuant to
ARS. § 12-848.01. Given the substantial dis-
eretion vested in the superior court in award-
ing fees, and because the Arizona Supreme
Court remanded the fee issue to the superior
court, that court should be afforded an op-
portunity to address fees using the correct
legal standard,

CONCLUSION

19 The superior court’s award of attor-
neys’ fees is vacated and this matter is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. As the successful party on
appeal, ADWR is awarded its reasonable at-
torneys’ fees incurred on appeal pursuant to
ARS. § 12-848.01, as well as its taxable
costs on appeal, contingent upon its compli-
ance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure

398 P.3d 110
Heather Lynn TURNER, Petitioner,

ve
The Honorable Ronee Korbin STEINER,
Judge of the Superior Court of the State
of Arizona, in and for the County of
Maricopa, Respondent Judge,

Liza Michelle Oakley, Real
Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 17-0028
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/22/2017

3. It does not advance ADWR’s argument to point
out that Mohave County argued a contrary posi-
tion earlier in this litigation. This court through

its analysis, not a party through its conduct,
resolves issues of statutory construction.

Berkshire Law Office, PLLC, Phoenix, By
Keith Berkshire, Erica L. Gadberry, Counsel
for Petitioner

Campbell Law Group, Chartered, Phoenix,
By Claudia D. Work, National Center for
Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA, By
Shannon Price Minter, pro hac vice, Counsel
for Real Party in Interest

Child and Family Law Clinic, The Univer-
sity of Arizona College of Law, Tucson, By
Paul D. Bennet, Barbara A. Atwood, Negar
Katirai, Amicus Curiae

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Jon W. Thompson joined and to which
Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop dissented.

OPINION

HOWE, Judge:

{1 Heather Lynn Turner seeks special
action relief from the family court’s granting
Liza Michelle Oakley’s motion for reconsider-
ation of the family court’s temporary orders,
which gives Oakley rights as a legal parent to
minor child C.T. pending the resolution of
their marriage dissolution proceedings. In

495

doing so, the family court held that Oakley is
presumed to be C.T\’s parent under A.R.S.
§ 25-814(A)(1), The court also ruled that
Turner is equitably estopped from rebutting
that presumption because her actions before
the proceedings began were “consistent with
the position that this was a child of both
parties.” Turner argues that the family court
erred because A.R.S. § 25-814 applies only
to men and cannot be applied to presume
paternity by a woman. She further argues
that if the presumption applies, the court
erred by ruling that she is estopped from
rebutting it,

Hl 12 Special action jurisdiction is ap-
propriate because Turner does not have an
“equally plain, speedy and adequate remedy
by appeal.” Ariz, R. Spec. Act. 1(a). Orders
that are merely preparatory to a later pro-
ceeding are not appealable. Villares v. Pine-
da, 217 Ariz, 628, 624-25 110, 177 P.8d 1195,
1196-97 (App. 2008). Because the family
court’s temporary orders here are merely
preparatory to a later trial on the dissolution,
we accept jurisdiction. We grant relief and
reverse the family court’s ruling because the
presumption of paternity statute, A.R.S.
§ 25-814, is gender-specific and cannot be
applied to—or rewritten by the courts to
apply to—women. In so holding, we respect-
fully disagree with a recent decision of anoth-
er panel of this Court holding that the female
spouse of a child’s mother can claim a pre-
sumption of parentage under the statute,
McLaughlin v. Jones, 240 Ariz. 560, 382 P.8d
118 (App. 2016), rev. granted, Apr. 18, 2017.
Because we conclude that the presumption is
not applicable here, we need not reach the
issue of equitable estoppel.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

13 Turner and Oakley, who were in a long-
term committed relationship, began attempt-
ing to conceive a child through artificial in-
semination in 2013. Although Turner would
carry the child, the pair entered no formal
written or oral agreements regarding parent-
ing roles or rights that either would have
over the child. The parties discussed whether
Oakley should formally adopt the child
should Turner become pregnant, but were
unsure if adoption was necessary or if “just

496

being on the birth certificate was enough.”
Turner did, however, draft a will stating that
if she gave birth, Oakley would have sole
custody of the child if Turner were to die.
Turner and Oakley married in October 2014,

14 Oakley played an active role in the
artificial insemination process, including re-
viewing sperm donor profiles, accompanying
Turner to appointments, and being with Tur-
ner during the insemination procedures, Oak-
ley did not, however, pay for any of the
services or sign any fertility clinie docu-
ments. Instead, Turner—as the recipient of
services—signed them, One of the documents
contained a provision stating that Turner
agreed that any child born from the insemi-
nation process would be the legal child of the
recipient, “which designation shall include
both recipient and recipient's husband or
partner if applicable,” and that if a child is
born “to husband and wife, such child ... is
considered their own.”

15 Turner became pregnant through an
insemination procedure and gave birth to
C.T. in September 2015, Oakley was present.
at C.T’s birth and cut the umbilical cord,
When instructing Turner on how to obtain a
birth certificate, a hospital nurse told Turner
to list Oakley on the certificate in the section
designated “father.” Turner did so, listing
both herself and Oakley on C,T.’s birth cer-
tificate. Neither Turner nor Oakley took fur-
ther action to determine whether Oakley
needed to formally adopt the child.

16 This unexplored issue became impor-
tant in May 2016, when Turner petitioned for
dissolution of her marriage to Oakley, In her
petition, Turner stated that she and Oakley
“have one minor child born of the marriage,”
explaining that Turner was impregnated
through artificial insemination and that al-
though Oakley was listed on the birth certifi.
cate, Oakley had not formally adopted O.T,
Turner asked that she be granted sole legal
and physical custody of C,T. and that Oakley
receive supervised visitation, She also asked
that Oakley be required to pay child support.
In a subsequent pleading, Turner asserted
that because Oakley is neither C.T.’s natural
nor adoptive parent, Oakley could not assert
any rights regarding temporary legal deci~
sion-making or parenting time,

17 At the temporary orders hearing, Oak-
ley asserted that she had rights as C.T.’s
legal parent, She argued that although she is
not the child’s biological or adoptive parent,
she is the presumed parent under A.R.S.
§ 25-814(A)(1), which states that “a man is
presumed to be the father of a child” if he
and the mother were married within ten
months of the child’s birth. The family court
disagreed, concluding that the presumption
of paternity statute applied only to men and
that Oakley therefore could not claim the
presumption, The court also concluded that
even if the presumption applied, the pre-
sumption would be rebutted because Oakley
is not biologically related to C.T. According-
ly, the family court entered temporary or-
ders identifying Turner as C.T,’s sole legal
parent, but granting Oakley supervised visi-
tation under A.R.S, § 25-409,

18 Oakley moved for reconsideration.
While the motion was pending, another panel
of this Court issued its decision in McLaugh-
lin, holding that A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(1) must
be read and applied gender-neutrally. 240
Ariz, at 564 114, 382 P.8d at 122, It also held
that the child’s biological mother in that case
was equitably estopped from disputing that
her wife was the legal parent in the parties’
dissolution proceedings because the parties
had entered into an agreement guaranteeing
equal parenting rights, her wife was a benefi-
cjary of her will, and her wife had been a de
facto parent of the child for two years. Id. at
565-67 {7 16-23, 382 P.3d at 128-24, Noting
that McLaughlin now guided its decision, the
family court granted Oakley’s motion for re-
consideration, The family court ruled that
Oakley was a presumed parent and set an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether ev-
idence rebutted the presumption or whether
Turner was estopped from rebutting it,

19 At the evidentiary hearing, the family
court heard testimony from Turner and Oak-
ley about Turner’s representations that Oak-
ley was C.T,’s co-parent. The court also con-
sidered evidence that they each presented,
including social media posts in which Turner
called Oakley C.T.’s mother. The family court
concluded that Turner was equitably es-
topped from rebutting the presumption be-
cause the evidence showed that the two wom-

en intended to raise the child together as co-
parents, Turner petitioned for special action
review.

DISCUSSION

Hs 1.10 Turner first argues that the
family court erred by holding that the pre-
sumption of paternity created by A.R.S.
§ 25-814(A)(1) applies to Oakley, giving her
rights as C.T’s legal parent. We review is-
sues involving statutory interpretation and
constitutionality de novo. Lincoln v, Holt, 215
Ariz, 21, 28 94, 156 P.8d 438, 440 (App,
2007). Our primary goal in interpreting a
statute is to give effect to legislative intent.
JHass Grp. L.L.C. v. Ariz. Dept of Fin.
Insis., 238 Ariz, 377, 384 127, 360 P.3d 1029,
1086 (App. 2015). In doing so, we look to the
statute’s plain language as the best indicator
of that intent. Azore, LLC v. Bassett, 236
Ariz, 424, 427 18, 841 P.8d 466, 469 (App.
2014), Further, we must construe the statute
in context with other related provisions and
its place in the statutory scheme. Hosea v,
City of Pha. Five Pension Bd,, 224 Ariz. 245,
250 128, 229 P.8d 257, 262 (App. 2010). When
the statute’s language is clear and unambigu-
ous, we must give effect to that language
without employing other rules of statutory
construction. Indust. Comm'n of Ariz. v, Old
Republic Ins. Co., 228 Ariz. 75, 77 17, 219
P.8d 285, 287 (App. 2009). Because A.R.S.
§ 25-814’s language is clearly and unambigu-
ously gender-specific to apply to men, the
family court erred by applying the presump-
tion of paternity to Oakley,

{11 In proceedings for dissolution of mar-
riage with children, the family court must
often determine who has parental rights to
the children. Arizona’s legislature has de-
fined a “legal parent” as “a biological or
adoptive parent whose parental rights have
not been terminated” and “does not include a
person whose paternity has not been estab-
lished” through voluntary acknowledgement
or the presumption of paternity statute.
ARS, §§ 25-401(4), -812, -814, The pre-
sumption of paternity statute provides that
“fa] man is presumed to the father of the
child if: (1) “{h]e and the mother of the child
were married at any time in the ten months
immediately preceding the birth” or the child

497

is born within ten months after the marriage
is terminated; (2) genetic testing confirms at
least a 95% probability of paternity; (8) the
mother and father of a child born out of
wedlock sign the birth certificate; or (4) both
parents acknowledge paternity in a notarized
or witnessed statement. A.R.S. § 25-814(A).
The presumption can be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 25-814(C),

112 Here, the statute’s language clearly
and unambiguously provides that it applies
solely to men, The statute creates a pre-
sumption of “paternity.” “Paternity” means
“the fact or condition of being a father.”
Webster’s II New College Dictionary 805
(2011), The statute further provides that a
“man is presumed to be the father of a child”
if one of the enumerated circumstances ex-
ists. Given their ordinary meanings, “man”
means “an adult male human being,” id, at
664, and “father” means “the male parent of
a child,” id. at 408, Each of these words is
gender-specific to males and not applicable to
females. See Sheldrick v. Maricopa Cty. Su-
perior Court, 186 Ariz, 829, 881, 666 P.2d 74,
76 (1988) (stating that a statute permitting a
natural mother to initiate a paternity pro-
ceeding or a father to initiate a maternity
proceeding did not allow “for the bringing of
a paternity action against the mother, nor a
maternity action against the father”),

118 The context in which those words
exist further supports this conclusion. See
Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State,
228 Ariz, 328, 826 112, 266 P.8d 349, 852
(2011) (stating that the courts do not consid-
er words in isolation when interpreting stat-
utes). The Legislature has adopted an entire
statutory scheme relating to “Maternity and
Paternity Proceedings.” See generally A.R.S.
§§ 256-801-818. To give effect to the Legisla-
ture’s delineation of different guidelines for
each, the ordinary and contrasting meanings
of “maternity” and “paternity” need to be
applied. Ignoring the gender-specific lan-
guage would disrupt this statutory scheme,

114 Notwithstanding the ordinary mean-
ing of the statute’s plain language, Oakley
urges that the presumption statute must be
construed gender-neutrally so that the pre-
sumptions may apply to women as well as
men—the conclusion reached in McLaughlin.

498

She contends that the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodg-
es, —- US. ——-, 185 S.Ct 2584, 192
L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), demands that it be read
gender-neutrally. Oakley’s—and the
McLaughlin court’s~analysis of Obergefeil
and the presumption statute is flawed in
three respects,

115 The first flaw is that Obergefell does
not extend so far as to require the courts to
modify statutory schemes relating to same-
sex parenting. Cf Doty~Perez v. Doty-Perez,
241 Ariz, 872, 875 116, 888 P.8d 9, 12 (App.
2016) (stating that Obergefell’s holding does
not require the court to retroactively modify
adoptions by individuals in same-sex mar-
rlages who would have jointly adopted if
same-sex marriage was legal at the time),
Obergefell established two points of constitu-
tional law under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. First, marriage is a fundamental right
that the government cannot deny to same-
sex couples. Obergefell, 185 S.Ct. at 2604-05.
Second, all states must give full faith and
eredit to same-sex marriages performed in
other states. Id. at 2607-08. Although the
Court cited to the importance of legitimizing
all unions for, among other reasons, the sta-
bility and safeguards it provides to families
and children, neither of the Court’s holdings
mandates that any laws dealing with mater-
nity and paternity be changed or expanded.
See id, at 2599-600; see also Smith v. Pavan,
505 S.W.8d 169, 176~77 (Ark. 2016) pet. for
cert. filed (US, Feb, 18, 2017) (concluding
that Obergefell does not require the state to
apply its law deeming a mother’s “husband”
as the child’s father for birth certificate pur-
poses in a gender-neutral manner to female
same-sex parents); In re P.L.L-R, 366

1, McLaughlin states that only one of the four
presumptions is biologically based, A.R.S. § 25-
814(A)(2) (“Genetic testing affirms at least a
ninety-five per cent probability of paternity.”),
240 Ariz. at 564115, 382 P.3d at 122. McLaugh-
lin claims that the presumption at issue here,
AR.S. § 25-814(A)(1)—a man is presumed to be
the father if he is married to the child’s mother
within ten months preceding or following the
child’s birth—is not. Although perhaps not obvi-
ous on its face, this presumption is indeed
grounded in biology. Ten months roughly corre-
sponds to the human gestation period and “the

Wis.2d 184, 876 N.W.2d 147, 158 (2015) (find-
ing that “Obergefell did not answer questions
regarding Wisconsin’s presumption of pater-
nity statute ... [or] artificial insemination
statute,” and therefore declining to read
those statutes gender-neutrally),

916 Oakley argues that Obergefell never-
theless requires that the presumption statute
be read gender-neutrally because it invali-
dates state laws “to the extent they exclude
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex
couples.” 185 §.Ct, at 2605, But the purpose
of the presumption statute is to assist in
determining whether a man is a child’s bio-
logical father, see Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz, 54,
59-60 11 18-18, 977 P.2d 776, 780-81 (1999)
(discussing the interests of the child, State,
and mother in paternity), not to broadly es-
tablish a term or condition associated with
marriage. Thus, Obergefell does not mean
that the presumption statute is unconstitu-
tional unless its language is judicially inter-
preted gender-neutrally.

117 The second flaw is that Oakley and
the McLaughlin court misunderstand the
role of biology in determining parentage in
Arizona and in serving as the basis of the
presumption statute, The McLaughlin court
believed it could interpret the statute’s obvi-
ously “male-specific terms” in a gender-neu-
tral fashion because the presumptions were
“not necessarily biologically based.”! 240
Ayviz, at 564 115, 382 P.8d at 122. According
to McLaughlin, the statute addresses more
than mere paternity, and broadly encompass-
es “the notion of parenthood” “without re-
gard to biology.” Jd. But this conclusion fails
to recognize that—with the exception of
adoption, which is not involved in this case—
parentage in Arizona is determined by biolo-
gy? See ARS. § 25-401(4) (“Legal parent’

laws of nature” suggest that the male spouse
during that period would be the child’s father.
Cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 10 Ariz.App. 496,
499, 460 P.2d 32, 35 (App. 1969) (stating that the
“presumption of legitimacy” rule requires that
“Sf a husband had access to his wife so that by
the laws of nature he could be the father of a
child born in wedlock, it must be presumed to be
his").

2. At oral argument before this Court, Oakley
contended that in addition to biology or adop-

means a biological or adoptive parent whose
parental rights have not been terminated.”);
Doty-Perez, 241 Ariz, at 377 1 28, 888 P.8d at
14 (noting that biology and adoption are “the
only legal mechanism that may establish le-
gal parenting status”), The presumption stat-
ute must be viewed in that light and not on
the basis of a non-statutory “notion of par-
enthood.” Arizona does not recognize de facto
parentage. Doty—Perez, 241 Ariz, at 375 {1 15,
388 P.8d at 12,

{18 Moreover, biology—the biological dif-
ference between men and women—és the
very reason the presumption statute exists. A
child’s mother is usually readily determined
by a woman’s biological act of giving birth.
See Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens,
598 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ind. 1992) (“Because
it is generally not difficult to determine the

tion, satisfying one of the paternity presumptions
was a third way to establish parentage in Ari-
zona. For that proposition, she relied on the
second sentence in A.R.S. § 25-401(4), which
states that a “[lJegal parent does not include a
person whose paternity has not been established
pursuant to § 25-812 [voluntary acknowledge-
ment] or 25-814 [presumption of paternity].”
But that sentence merely means that a man does
not come within the definition of “legal parent”
unless paternity has been established by (1) vol-
untarily acknowledging paternity and withstand-
ing any challenge to that acknowledgement pur-
suant to A.R,S. § 25-812, or (2) proving the
existence of a presumption of paternity and with-
standing any attempt to rebut that presumption
pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-814. It does not create a
third way to establish parentage. Moreover, ac-
cepting that argument would mean that proving
that a person satisfies a presumption proves the
fact at issue, paternity. Presumptions do not
work that way, however. See Golonka v. Gen,
Motors Corp,, 204 Ariz. 575, 590 950, 65 P.3d
956, 971 (App. 2003) (“Arizona courts generally
hold that a presumption is a procedural device
that shifts the burden of producing contrary evi-
dence to the party opposing the presumed fact
but leaves the burden of persuasion on the pro-
ponent of the evidence.”’). Even with the benefit
of the presumption, a man must still prove that
he is the child’s father.

The dissent also disputes that parentage in
Arizona is based only on biology or adoption. The
dissent argues that a man may be legally deemed
a father of a child born out of wedlock through
the voluntary acknowledgement procedure set
forth in A.R.S. § 25-812 without proving a bio-
logical relationship to the child, See infra 128.
But although the acknowledgment procedure
does not require a man to present proof that he
is the child’s biological father, in filing an ac-
knowledgement, a man declares that he is the

499

biological mother of a child, a mother’s legal
obligations to her child arise when she gives
birth.”).2 Thus, Arizona does not need, and
does not have, a “presumption of maternity”
statute. But the act of birth reveals nothing
about the identity of the child’s biological
father. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. IN.S., 588
U.S. 58, 68, 121 S.Ct. 2058, 150 L.Ed.2d 115
(2001) (noting that “fathers and mothers are
not similarly situated with regard to proof of
biological parenthood”). Consequently, to
help determine whether a particular man is a
child’s father, the Legislature enacted the
presumption of paternity statute, Given the
statute’s purpose, its limited application to
men is not remarkable or constitutionally
infirm. See id. (stating that imposing “a dif-
ferent set of rules for making [a] legal deter-
mination with respect to fathers and mothers

child's “natural father” and that he is “the only
possible father of the child.” See Ariz. Dep't of
Econ, Sec., Notice of Alternatives, the Legal Con-
sequences and Rights and Responsibilities, avail-
able at http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/
licensing/vital-records/register-acknowledge
ment-paternity.pdf (last visited June 2, 2017); see
also A.R.S, §§ 25-812(D), (F) (requiring the fil-
ing of the acknowledgement and receipt of the
notice), The man is therefore claiming that he is
the child's biological father. In addition, if the
acknowledgement is challenged, the challenge
will be resolved by genetic testing of the child,
mother, and the alleged father. See A.R.S, § 25-
812(E). The court will be required to vacate the
determination of paternity if it “finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the established fa-
ther is not the biological father of the child.” 7d.
‘Thus, even in cases of voluntary acknowledge-
ment, biology is the basis of determining paterni-
ty.

3. OF course, a woman who is using a surrogate
to give birth to her biological child cannot be
prohibited from proving that she is the child’s
biological mother. Soos v. Superior Court, 182
Ariz. 470, 475, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (App. 1994)
(holding that the statute prohibiting surrogacy
contracts, A.R.S. § 25-218, unconstitutionally vi-
olated the biological mother’s right to equal pro-
tection of the laws because it did not allow her to
prove maternity, but did allow the surrogate’s
husband to rebut the presumption of paternity).
Nevertheless, to the extent that the mother can-
not prove that she is the child’s biological moth-
er, the surrogate who gave birth to the child is
deemed the child’s “legal mother.” A.R.S. § 25-
218(B). Moreover, in a maternity action under
ARS, § 25-806(B), the petition must allege that
a woman “‘is delivered of a child’ and that the
woman is the child’s mother.

500

is neither surprising nor troublesome from a
constitutional perspective”), Because the bio-
logical difference between men and women is
the reason for the statute, and biology is
used specifically to determine paternity,
A.R.S, § 25-814(A) cannot be read gender-
neutrally as a presumption of parentage stat-
ute.

119 The third flaw in the analysis is that
replacing the male-specific language of
ARS, § 25-814(A) with gender-neutral
terms does not provide any benefit to Oakley
or to any person in a same-sex marriage
seeking to establish parentage through the
presumption statute. Arizona Revised Stat-
utes Section 25-814(C) provides that any pre-
sumption established under A.R.S, § 25-
814(A) may “be rebutted by clear and con-
vincing evidence.” Because Oakley and other
similarly-situated spouses are never biologi-
cally related to the children involved in the
dissolution proceedings, even if the statute is
read gender-neutrally, the other spouse will
always defeat the presumption by proving
that the former spouse is not biologically the
child’s parent,

120 The McLaughlin court avoided this
problem by invoking the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, holding that the child’s biological
mother could not rebut the presumption of
paternity because she and her spouse had
expressly and unequivocally agreed in writ-
ing that they would be the child’s parents
and share custody, 240 Ariz, at 566 21, 882
P.8d at 124, Whether that doctrine can apply
to determine a child’s parentage, its fortui-
tous applicability to a given case does not
help resolve this issue of statutory interpre-
tation. Not every same-sex couple will have a
written agreement clearly establishing their
intent. Here, for example—although our
holding that A.R.S, § 25-814(A) does not ap-
ply to this case obviates our need to resolve
the applicability of equitable estoppel—the
family court based its estoppel finding on the
testimony of Turner and Oakley and evidence
of their social media postings, without evi-
dence of any formal written agreement, The
applicability of clear and plain statutory lan-
guage in such a weighty matter as a child’s
parentage should not depend on the quality
of the documentation of a couple’s intent.

721 Oakley attempted to resolve the statu-
tory problem at oral argument before this
Court by contending that A.R.S, § 25-814(C)
should be interpreted in cases involving
same-sex spouses to limit rebuttal evidence
only to evidence that the biological mother
had not consented to share parental rights
with her spouse, But nothing in the language
of that subsection indicates that rebuttal evi-
dence should be so limited, Moreover, such
an interpretation would mean that the stat-
ute would apply differently depending on
whether the disputing parties are a same-sex
or an opposite-sex couple. An opposite-sex
spouse, for example, could defeat a presump-
tion of paternity by presenting clear and
convineing evidence that the presumed father
is not the child’s biological father. A same-
Sex Spouse, in contrast, could rebut the pre-
sumption only by showing he or she did not
consent to being a co-parent with the pre-
sumed parent. Nothing in A.R,S. § 25-814’s
language allows such an outcome, and such
an interpretation of the statute would raise
its own questions of equal protection of the
laws.

122 We sympathize with Oakley’s desire to
legally establish that she is C.T.’s parent
alongside Turner and recognize that this is-
sue will recur in other cases with increasing
frequency, We also understand C.T.’s need—
and the need of every child affected by this
issue—to have permanent and stable paren-
tal relationships, But the paternity statutes
as they are currently written provide no
remedy to Oakley, and we cannot rewrite the
statutes to do so, no matter how laudable
that outcome might be as a matter of public
policy, See New Sun Bus, Park, LLC
Yuma Cty., 221 Ariz, 48, 47 116, 209 P.sd
179, 183 (App. 2009) (“Our Legislature did
not choose this particular language, however,
and we are ‘not at liberty to rewrite the
statute under the guise of judicial interpreta-
tion,’”) (quoting State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz.
501, 502, 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App. 1980).
The remedy for Oakley and others similarly-
situated lies not with the courts, but with the
Legislature, See Riepe v, Riepe, 208 Ariz, 90,
94 714, 91 P.8d 812, 316 (App. 2004) (“[C]on-
cerns about the social ramifications of this
provision are more appropriately raised to

the legislature.”), The family court thus
erred by finding that Oakley was a presumed
parent under A.R.S, § 25-814(A), and we
grant relief.

CONCLUSION

123 For the foregoing reasons, we accept
jurisdiction, grant relief, and reverse the
family court’s order finding that Oakley is
the presumed parent of C.T. under A.R.S.
§ 25-B14(A)(1),

WINTHROP, J., dissenting:

124 I respectfully dissent. The majority
contends the presumption of paternity in
ARS. § 25-814(A) does not apply to Oakley
in this case, I disagree.

125 In McLaughlin v. Jones, another pan-
el of this court correctly concluded that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges requires a gender-neutral interpreta-
tion of A.R.S, § 25-814(A). See McLaughlin,
240 Ariz, at 564, 114, 882 P.8d at 122. A
gender-neutral interpretation of the statute
allows courts to apply the presumption of
paternity to females such as Oakley, who are
“married [to the mother of the child] at any
time in the ten months immediately preced-
ing the birth.” A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(1). This
interpretation is consistent with Obergefell,
which recognized that ensuring same-sex
couples have the right to marry provides
“profound benefits” to the “hundreds of thou-
sands of children [that] are presently being
raised by such couples.” Obergefell, 185 S.Ct.
at 2600,

126 The New York Court of Appeals came
to a similar conclusion last year in Brooke
SB. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y8d 1, 39
N.Y,S.38d 89, 61 N.E,3d 488, 498 (2016).
There, the court departed from its historical-
ly strict interpretation and application of the
term “parent,” and concluded that a person
who is not a biological or adoptive parent,
but who has agreed with the biological par-
ent of the child to conceive and raise the
child as co-parents, may obtain standing as a
“parent” to seek visitation and custody.
Brooke S.B., 89 N.Y.8.8d 89, 61 N.H.8d at
498-501, In so deciding, the court recognized
that the “foundational premise of heterosexu-

501

al parenting and nonrecognition of same-sex
couples is unsustainable” in light of the en-
actment of same sex marriage laws and the
Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell. Id,
39 N.Y.S.3d 89, 61 N.E.3d at 498, Further,
the court emphasized that “an overly-restric-
tive definition of ‘parent’ ... sets too high a
bar for reaching a child’s best interest and
does not take into account equitable princi-
ples,...” Id, 89 N-Y.S.3d 89, 61 N.E.8d at
500,

127 Additionally, because I believe
Obergefell mandates a gender-neutral inter-
pretation of A.R.S, § 25-814(A), I disagree
with the premise that this court should de-
cline to apply such an interpretation on the
basis that it will “disrupt the statutory
scheme” of Arizona’s paternity statutes. Af-
fording equal rights of parentage to same-sex
spouses would instead foster “the permanen-
cy and stability important to children’s best
interests” and should take priority over any
speculative fears of disrupting the statutory
scheme, Obergefell, 185 S.Ct. at 2600. See
also Brooke S.B., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89, 61 N.E.3d
at 498-99 (stating that a proper test for
determining parentage “ensures equality for
same-sex parents and provides the opportu-
nity for their children to have the love and
support of two committed parents”).

128 The majority also asserts that, under
Arizona law, biology and adoption are the
only mechanisms that establish legal parent-
ing status in Arizona. But, where a child is
born out of wedlock, legal parentage may be
established through a properly executed vol-
untary acknowledgement of paternity. See
ARS, § 25-812, Under A.R.S. § 25~812(D),
after signing a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity (and completing the other required
actions outlined in § 25-812(D)), a person
may be deemed the legal father of a child.
Although the goal of § 25-812 may be to
identify the biological father in situations
where paternity cannot be presumed under
ARS. § 25-814, in practice, an individual
who has neither biological nor adoptive ties
to a child can be deemed the legal father. See
Andrew R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Hon. Sec., 228
Ariz, 458, 455-61, 118, 224 P.8d 950, 952-58
(App. 2010). Thus, although the majority may
be correct that A.R.S. § 25-814(A) is rooted

502

in biology, interpreting the paternity statutes
as “gender specific” does not prevent a male
without a biological or adoptive connection to
a child from obtaining legal parentage rights
through other means.

129 Finally, I recognize that A.R.S. § 25-
814(C) allows for the presumption of paterni-
ty to be rebutted, Regardless of that fact,
because a male in Oakley’s position would
automatically be afforded the presumption of
parentage, I agree with my colleagues in
McLaughlin that a female in the same posi-
tion is entitled to the same presumptive
right. Refusing to interpret A.R.S. § 25-
814(A) in a gender-neutral manner denies
any meaningful remedy for an already explic-
itly acknowledged parent, which is the case
here. More importantly, such insupportable
statutory construction will force courts to
“permanently sever strongly formed bonds
between children and adults with whom they
have parental relationships,” Brooke S.B., 39
N.Y.S.8d 89, 61 N.E.3d at 498,

130 Accordingly, I would accept review
and deny relief.

398 P.3d 118
US BANK, N.A., Plaintiff/Appellee,
ve

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0253

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 6/29/2017

|

Jaburg & Wilk, PC, Phoenix, By David L.
Allen, Nichole H. Wilk, Counsel for Plain-
tiff/Appellee

Maynard, Cronin, Erickson, Curran &
Reiter, PLC, Phoenix, By Douglas C. Hrick-
son, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,

Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge
Patricia K. Norris joined.

OPINION

JOHNSEN, Judge:

{11 In this dispute between two lenders, we
address the doctrines of “replacement” and
equitable subrogation as they apply to re-
spective lien rights. We affirm the superior
court's application of the replacement doc-
trine to a claim by US Bank, N.A. for declar-
atory relief. We vacate the court’s application

504

of equitable subrogation and remand for en-
try of judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) on US Bank’s second
claim for declaratory relief. We also remand
for consideration of US Bank’s remaining
claims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

{2 In 1997, Dietrich and Susanne Loeper
obtained a $200,000 home equity line of cred-
it “(HELOC”) from Chase’s predecessor in
interest, Bank One, Arizona, N.A. (“Bank
One”), The HELOC was secured by a deed
of trust on the Loepers’ home (“HELOC
Deed of Trust”). In 2001, the HELOC was
modified to increase the available credit to
$250,000.

18 In 2004, the Loepers executed a note
and deed of trust in favor of US Bank's
predecessor in interest, First Magnus Finan-
cial Corporation (“FMF”) for $887,000 (2004
FMF Note” and “2004 FMF Deed of Trust”).
At that time, Bank One executed and record-
ed a subordination agreement waiving the
HELOC Deed of Trust’s priority in favor of
the 2004 FMF Deed of Trust.

4 In 2005, the Loepers executed a new
note and deed of trust in favor of FMF for
$682,000 (“2005 FMF Note” and “2005 FMF
Deed of Trust”), and used $384,040.34 from
the loan proceeds to pay off the 2004 FMF
Note. The 2004 FMF Deed of Trust was
released. The closing statement also allocated
$211,148.30 from the proceeds of the new
loan to pay off the HELOC, According to
Chase, which by then owned the HELOG, it
received and deposited this sum but did not
close the HELOC or release the HELOC
Deed of Trust because the payment “was
$8,452.18 short of what was required to pay
off the Loan.” Chase advised the title compa-
ny of the shortfall, but no action was taken to
correct it.! Thereafter, the Loepers continued

1. In the statement of facts it filed on summary
judgment, Chase explained that:
A check in the amount of $211,148.30 was
received by Chase on or about September 16,
2005, which was insufficient to pay off the
[HELOC]. Guaranty Title Agency was advised
that the payment was $3,452.13 short of what
was required to pay off the [HELOC], on or
about September 18, 2005, The [HELOC] was

to take advances on the HELOG, resulting in
an unpaid balance of more than $208,000 by
2013,

{5 Meanwhile, the Loepers defaulted on
the 2005 FMF Note, and the trustee began
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. The
trustee obtained a trustee sale guaranty re-
port, which showed the HELOC Deed of
Trust as superior to the 2005 FMF Deed of
Trust, Thereafter, the trustee under the HE-
LOC Deed of Trust also began foreclosure
proceedings.

16 US Bank, now holder of the 2005 FMF
Note and Deed of Trust, then filed a four-
count complaint in superior court for (1) de-
claratory relief—lien priority pursuant to the
replacement doctrine, (2) declaratory relief—
lien priority pursuant to equitable subroga-
tion, (8) unjust enrichment, and (4) estoppel.
The parties agreed to postpone any trustee’s
sale until the superior court’s final ruling on
the lien priorities,

17 Following discovery, US Bank moved
for summary judgment on counts one and
two of the complaint, and Chase cross-moved
for summary judgment on all four counts,
Following oral argument, the superior court
granted US Bank's motion and denied
Chase’s cross-motion. Applying both the re-
placement doctrine and equitable subroga-
tion, the court concluded that “equity favors
subordinating Chase’s lien to US Bank's
lien.” The court then entered judgment pur-
suant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), awarding US Bank its attorney’s fees.
Chase timely appealed, and we have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1)
(2017)?

DISCUSSION
A. General Principles.

HM 18 Previously recorded deeds of
trust normally take priority over later deeds

not paid in full and the line of credit remained
open.
US Bank did not controvert that statement.
Chase has named the title company as a non-
party at fault.

2, Absent material revision after the relevant date,
‘we cite a statute’s current version,

of trust. See BAC Home Loans Servicing,
LP v. Semper Invs, L.L,C., 280 Ariz. 587,
590, 16, 277 P.8d 784, 787 (App. 2012) Two
equitable doctrines, replacement and subro-
gation, however, may permit a later-recorded
deed of trust to assume priority over an
earlier deed of trust. See Markham Con-
tracting Co. v. Fed, Deposit Ins. Co., 240
Ariz, 360, 868, 115, 379 P.3d 257, 260 (App.
2016). Although replacement and subrogation
are similar doctrines, they apply in different
situations. Subrogation applies when there
are two different lenders “because, by defini-
tion, one cannot be subrogated to one’s own
previous deed of trust.” Cont Lighting &
Contracting, Inc. v, Premier Grading &
Utils, LLC, 227 Ariz, 882, 885, 1 10, 258 P.8d.
200, 208 (App. 2011). Conversely, replace-
ment applies to a refinancing by the same
lender. See Markham, 240 Ariz. at 863, 115,
879 P.8d 257.

HN (19 The superior court applied both
doctrines in this case. We review de novo the
application of these equitable doctrines. See
Brimet II, LLC v. Destiny Homes Mktg,
LLC, 231 Ariz. 457, 459, 110, 296 P.8d 998,
995 (App. 2018). In considering their applica-
tion, we “examine the totality of the equi-
ties.” Markham, 240 Ariz, at 864, 118, 379
P.8d 2574

B. Replacement.

HI 110 Chase argues the HELOC Deed
of Trust is superior to the 2005 FMF Deed of
Trust “under the rule of first in time, first in
right”

111 Arizona expressly has adopted
the replacement doctrine as defined by the

3. In this opinion, we use the terms “mortgage,”
“deed of trust” and “lien” interchangeably. See
Weitz Co. v. Heth, 235 Ariz. 405, 409, 912, n.2,
333 P.3d 23, 27 (2014),

4, We review de novo the superior court’s grant of
summary judgment, See Weitz, 235 Ariz. at 409,
11, 333 P.3d 23, Summary judgment is appro-
priate if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Ariz, R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also
Orme Sch. v, Reeves, 166 Ariz, 301, 305, 802 P.2d
1000, 1004 (1990). We view the facts in the light
most favorable to the party against which judg-
ment was entered, See Cont’l Lighting & Con-
tracting, Inc, v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC,

505

Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages
(“Restatement”) § 7.8 (1997):

If a senior mortgage is released of record
and, as part of the same transaction, is
replaced with a new mortgage, the latter
mortgage retains the same priority as its
predecessor, except ... to the extent that
any change in the terms of the mortgage
or the obligation it secures is materially
prejudicial to the holder of a junior inter-
est in the real estate....

Cont’ Lighting, 227 Ariz, at 888, 122, 258
P.8d 200 (citing Restatement § 7.8).5 The
rationale behind the replacement doctrine is
that “the intervening lienholder suffers no
prejudice because its lien maintains the same
position it occupied before the subsequent
lender satisfied the pre-existing obligation.”
Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp., 208 Ariz. 478, 481, 111, 95 P.8d
542, 545 (App. 2004),

112 Applying Restatement § 7.3 in Conti-
nental Lighting, this court held that:

where a senior lien is released of record
and, as part of the same transaction, is
replaced with a new lien, the latter retains
the same priority as its predecessor, ex-
cept to the extent that any change in the
terms of the security document or the
underlying debt it secures is materially
prejudicial to a junior lienholder’s interest
in the real property.
227 Ariz, at 388, 122, 258 P.38d 200. In Conti-
nental Lighting, the amount of the new loan
exceeded the balance on the original loan;
therefore, the new deed of trust assumed the
priority of the original deed of trust to the
extent of the balance on the original loan

227 Ariz, 382, 384, 12, 258 P.3d 200, 202 (App.
2011),

5. Restatement § 7.3 applies both to the replace-
ment and modification of mortgages. See Restate-
ment § 7.3. This case involves replacement,
which occurs when “a lender releases its original
lien of record, discharging it with the proceeds of
the second loan secured by a new mortgage that
is recorded either immediately or shortly after
releasing the initial loan as part of the same
replacement loan transaction.” Cont’ Lighting,
227 Ariz, at 387, 116, n.3, 258 P.3d 200 (citing
Restatement § 7.3 cmt. a).

506

paid off by the new loan, Id, at 388-89, 123,
258 P.3d 200.

918 Here, the Loepers used the 2005
FMF Note proceeds to satisfy and replace
the 2004 FMF Note and the 2004 FMF Deed
of Trust. Therefore, application of the re-
placement doctrine is appropriate. Pursuant
to the subordination agreement, the 2004
FMF Deed of Trust had priority over the
HELOC Deed of Trust, Therefore, applying
the replacement doctrine, the 2005 FMF
Deed of Trust, which replaced the 2004 FMF
Deed of Trust, retained priority over the
HELOC Deed of Trust to the extent of
$384,040.84, the amount paid on the 2004
FMF Note from the proceeds of the 2005
FMF Loan, Chase suffers no prejudice from
application of the replacement doctrine be-
cause the HELOC Deed of Trust maintains
the same position it occupied before the 2005
Deed of Trust replaced the 2004 Deed of
‘Trust.

114 Accordingly, we affirm the superior
court’s application of the replacement doc-
trine and conclude that the 2005 FMF Deed
of Trust takes priority over the HELOC
Deed of Trust to the extent of $884,040.34.

C. Equitable Subrogation.

IM 115 Chase next argues that, even if
the replacement doctrine applies, equitable
subrogation does not apply because US
Bank’s predecessor, FMF, “was aware of
Chase’s lien and failed to take proper steps
to ensure that it was satisfied and released.”

116 As with replacement, Arizona has
adopted the definition of subrogation set
forth in Restatement § 7.6: “One who fully
performs an obligation of another, secured by
a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the
owner of the obligation and the mortgage to
the extent necessary to prevent unjust en-
Yichment.” (Emphasis added); Souwrcecorp,
Ine. v. Noreuti, 229 Ariz. 270, 278, 19 10, 12,
274 P.8d 1204, 1207(2012) (adopting Restate-
ment § 7.6). This court has held that “the
doctrine of equitable subrogation allows a
subsequent lender who applies funds to a
primary and superior encumbrance to be
substituted in the priority position of the
primary lienholder.” BAC Home Loans, 280
Ariz, at 590, 16, 277 P.8d 784; see also

Mosher v. Conway, 45 Ariz. 463, 472, 46 P.2d
110 (1985) (“The general rule is that a person
having an interest in property who pays off
an encumbrance in order to protect his inter-
est is subrogated to the rights and limitations
of the person paid.”).

117 As our supreme court has explained,
however, “[elquitable subrogation is general-
ly permitted only when a person fully dis-
charges a debt secured by a mortgage.”
Weitz Co. v. Heth, 235 Ariz. 405, 411, 120,
888 P.8d 28, 29 (2014) (emphasis added). In
announcing this general rule, the court relied
on Restatement § 7.6 comment a, which
states:

Where subrogation to a mortgage is

sought, the entire obligation secured by

the mortgage must be discharged. Partial
subrogation to a mortgage is not permit-
ted. The reason is that partial subrogation
would have the effect of dividing the secu-
rity between the original obligee and the
subrogee, imposing unexpected burdens
and potential complexities of division of the
security and marshaling upon the original
mortgagee. However, if the payor can ne-
gotiate a full settlement of the obligation
for less than its face value, subrogation will
be recognized,

(Emphasis added.)

118 Weitz involved a construction loan se-
eured by a deed of trust on a high-rise
condominium project. 235 Ariz. at 408, 18,
333 P.8d 28, As the individual condominium
units were sold, the purchase monies were
applied to the construction loan and the lend-
er released the sold units from the deed of
trust. Id, at 15. After the majority of units
were sold, the general contractor recorded a
mechanics’ lien against the project. Id, at 16,
Our supreme court held that the condomini-
um purchasers and their lenders could be
equitably subrogated to the lender's deed of
trust because they fully discharged that por-
tion of the construction loan allocated to their
properties and obtained releases from the
lender. See id, at 411, 412, 17 22, 26, 333 P.3d
28,

{19 Here, FMF did not fully discharge the
obligation secured by the HELOC Deed of
Trust, negotiate a full settlement of the HE-

LOC for less than face value or obtain a
release from Chase, Accordingly, the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation does not apply
and the HELOC Deed of Trust retains prior-
ity over the 2005 FMF Deed of Trust for any
amount above and beyond $884,040.34. See
Weitz, 235 Ariz, at 411, 120, 383 P.8d 28;
Restatement § 7.6 emt, a.

920 Accordingly, we vacate that part of
the superior court’s order applying the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation and direct en-
try of judgment in favor of Chase on US
Bank’s second claim for declaratory relief.

D. Attorney’s Fees.

HM 121 After granting summary judg-
ment in favor of US Bank, the superior court
awarded US Bank $41,912 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Chase argues the award was im-
proper because the claims for declaratory
relief do not arise out of contract as required
by A.R.S. § 12-341,01 (2017).

HES" 22 Section 12-841.01(A) author-
izes an award of attorney’s fees to the suc-
cessful party “lin any contested action aris-
ing out of a contract.” “[T]his court will look
to the nature of the action and the surround-
ing cireumstances to determine whether the
claim is one ‘arising out of a contract’”
Mareus v. Fox, 150 Ariz, 338, 335, 723 P.2d
682, 684 (1986) (“[Alttorney’s fees are not
appropriate based on the mere existence of a
contract somewhere in the transaction.”).
The application of A.R.S. § 12-841.01 is a
question of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo. See Ramsey Air Meds,
LLC. v. Cutter Aviation, Inc., 198 Ariz. 10,
18, 112, 6 P.8d 815, 318 (App. 2000).

128 Although the underlying loans were
the product of contracts between the Loe-
pers and their respective lenders, US Bank’s
claims for declaratory relief, which request
application of the equitable doctrines of re-
placement and subrogation, do not arise out

6. US Bank also argues that Arizona case law is
clear that an additional advance which may be
made under loan documents loses its priority to
the interests of a subsequent creditor after the
mortgagee has actual notice of the subsequently
acquired interest in the property.” Under Ari-
zona case law, however, this rule applies only if
the advance is optional. La Cholla Grp., Inc, v.
Timm, 173 Ariz. 490, 492, 844 P.2d 657, 659

507

of contract. See Brimet IT, 281 Ariz. at 461,
922, 296 P.3d 993 (“This was a statutory
quiet title action that turned on the applica-
tion of the equitable doctrines of replacement
and subrogation; it did not arise out of con-
tract.”); see also Caruthers v. Underhill, 230
Ariz. 518, 526, 157, 287 P.38d 807, 820 (App.
2012) (‘The contract must be the essential
basis of the action and not merely a factual
predicate.”). For this reason, and because we
vacate the superior court’s ruling on US
Bank’s second claim for declaratory relief, we
also vacate the superior court’s award of
attorney’s fees and costs.

CONCLUSION

24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the entry of summary judgment on US
Bank’s claim for declaratory relief under the
replacement doctrine, We vacate the entry of
summary judgment on US Bank’s claim
seeking declaratory relief under the doctrine
of equitable subrogation. On remand, the su-
perior court is directed to enter summary
judgment in favor of Chase on the equitable
subrogation claim. We also vacate the superi-
or court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs.

25 For the reasons set forth above, we
deny US Bank’s request for an award of fees
on appeal pursuant to ARS. § 12-841.01.
Chase is entitled to costs on appeal upon
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appel-
late Procedure 21. See Henry v. Cook, 189
Ariz, 42, 48, 988 P.2d 91, 92 (App. 1996) [A]
party who succeeds on less than all claims is
sufficiently successful to recover costs under
the statute.”).

(App. 1992). “The general rule appears to be
that, as to obligatory advances where the exis-
tence of the mortgagee’s obligation to advance
funds is of record, the advances have priority
over any intervening liens.” Id. Because ad-
vances under the HELOC Deed of Trust were
obligatory and not optional, US Bank’s argument
fails,

508 |

398 P.3d 574

David STAMBAUGH, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v

Mark KILLIAN, acting in his capacity as
Director of the Arizona Department of
Agriculture; Arizona Department of
Agriculture, an agency of the State of
Arizona; Suzette Taylor, acting in her
capacity as State Brand Clerk at the
Arizona Department of Agriculture;
State of Arizona; and Eureka Springs
Cattle Co., LLC, an Arizona limited lia-
bility company and Real Party in Inter-

est, Defendants/Appellees.

No, CV-16-0217-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona,

Filed August 8, 2017

Paul R. Orme, Mark A, McGinnis (argued),
R. Jeffrey Heilman, Salmon Lewis & Wel-
don, PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for David
Stambaugh

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Kathleen P. Sweeney, Senior Appellate
Counsel, Christopher William McCormack
(argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Mark Killian, the Arizona
Department of Agriculture, Suzette Taylor,
and the State of Arizona

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the
opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICES
TIMMER, BOLICK, and GOULD, and
JUDGE PETERSON * joined. JUSTICE
BOLICK filed a concurring opinion.

“Justice John R. Lopez has recused himself from Peterson, Presiding Judge of the Graham County

this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3, of the Superior Court, was designated to sit in this
Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Michael D. matter,

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the
Court:

{11 Arizona Revised Statute § 8-1261(B)
provides that no two brands of the same
design or figure shall be adopted or record-
ed. Nonetheless, the Arizona Department of
Agriculture (“Department”) allowed Eureka
Springs to record a “bar seven” brand (—7),
even though it was identical to a previously
recorded brand owned by David Stambaugh,
because it was placed on a different location
on the animals. We hold that the plain lan-
guage of the statute precludes the Depart-
ment from recording “two brands of the
same design or figure” regardless of their
location.

I. BACKGROUND

{2 Eureka Springs planned to move its
bar-seven branded cattle from California to
Ayizona, Rather than re-brand the cattle, it
applied to the Department to use the bar
seven brand in Arizona, Stambaugh had pre-
viously recorded an identical brand in Ari-
zona, Eureka Springs’ cattle, however, are
branded on their left rib, and Stambaugh’s
cattle are branded on their left hip, Because
the brands are identical, the Department’s
brand clerk twice rejected Eureka Springs’
application but was eventually overruled by
her supervisors, Because the brands were
placed on different locations on the cattle,
the Department approved Eureka Springs’
brand.

18 When the Department publicly adver-
tised Eureka Springs’ request to record its
brand pursuant to A.R.S, § 8~1261(C), Stam-
baugh filed a protest. The Department re-
jected the protest and issued a certificate to
Eureka Springs approving and recording its
bar seven brand applied to the left rib,

14 Stambaugh sued the Department, and
both parties moved for summary judgment,
The superior court granted the Department's
motion in part, explaining that “A.R.S. § 8~
1261 and related statutes give the [Depart-
ment] and its employees discretion, as a mat-
ter of law, to consider the location of a brand
on an animal in determining whether two
brands are of the same design or figure.”
The superior court remanded the matter to

509

the Department to conduct an administrative
hearing on the brand and the protest.

15 The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that A.R.S, § 8-1261(B) is ambiguous. Stam-
baugh v, Butler, 240 Ariz, 358, 856 #111, 358
118, 379 P.8d 250 (App. 2016), Because the
brands are in separate locations, the court
reasoned they are not identical, and the De-
partment therefore did not violate § 8-1261
when it approved Eureka Springs’ brand. See
id. at 357 114, 379 P.38d 250. One judge
dissented, reasoning that the phrase “design
or figure” is unambiguous and “excludes con-
sideration of placement; both ‘design’ and
‘figure’ are defined to include only a pattern,
shape, or pictorial representation,” Id. at 858
120, 379 P.8d 250 (Jones, J., dissenting),

16 We granted review because this case
presents an issue of statewide importance
that is likely to recur. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to article 6, section 5(8), of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120,24.

IL DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Hs 17 We review the interpretation of
statutes de novo, Wade v, Ariz, St. Ret. Sys.,
241 Ariz, 559, 561 110, 390 P.8d 799, 801
(2017). “Our primary goal is to effectuate the
legislature’s intent.” Id. “If the statute is
subject to only one reasonable interpretation,
we apply it without further analysis.” Jd.
(citation omitted). Words in statutes should
be vead in context in determining their
meaning. See J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 40-
41 16, 885 P.8d 1118, 1119-20 (2014), In
construing a specific provision, we look to the
statute as a whole and we may also consider
statutes that are in part materia—of the
same subject or general purpose—for guid-
ance and to give effect to all of the provisions
involved. See Dawid C, v, Alewis S., 240 Ariz,
58, 55 19, 375 P.8d 945, 947 (2016),

B. ARS. § 3-1261(B) is unambiguous

and does not include location,

18 Section 3-1261(B) states, “No two
brands of the same design or figure shall be
adopted or recorded, but the associate di-
rector may, in his discretion, reject and re-
fuse to record a brand or mark similar to or

510

conflicting with a previously adopted and re-
corded brand or mark.”

19 The court of appeals majority deter-
mined that the statute is ambiguous and held
that it was within the Department’s discre-
tion to consider a proposed brand’s location
on an animal to decide if it was the same
“design or figure” as an already recorded
brand. Stambaugh, 240 Ariz. at 856-58
(111-17, 879 P.8d 250. We disagree. The
statutory language, when considered in con-
text and in relation to the statutory scheme,
is unambiguous and does not refer to the
location of the brand.

110 We start with the statutory language.
Because the statute does not define “design
or figure” we use the common meaning of
those words. See State v. Pena, 285 Ariz, 277,
279 16, 831 P.8d 412, 414 (2014). “Design” is
defined as “[a] drawing or sketch”; “[a]
gvaphic representation, especially a detailed
plan for construction or manufacture”; and
“{ajn ornamental pattern.” Design, American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
491 (6th ed. 2011). “Figure” is defined as “[a]
written or printed symbol representing
something other than a letter, especially a
number”; “[t]he outline, form, or silhouette of
a thing”; and “[a] pictorial or sculptural rep-
resentation, especially of the human body.”
Figure, American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 656 (6th ed. 2011), Based
on these definitions, the phrase “no two
brands of the same design or figure” does
not refer to location as part of its meaning.

{111 We next look to the statute as a whole
to determine whether the provision is subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The Department, citing State v. Sweet, 143
Ariz, 266, 269, 693 P.2d 921, 924 (1985), posits
that a statute may be found to be ambiguous
if there is uncertainty concerning the mean-
ing of its terms or its scope when all its
provisions are examined. But here, the re-
maining provisions of the statute confirm
that subsection (B) can only reasonably be
interpreted as barring the recording of two
brands of the same design or figure, even in
different locations,

12 Subsection (G) of the statute provides,
“Tt is unlawful to apply a recorded brand in
any location on an animal except as specified
on the brand registration certificate, The ap-

plication of a brand in any other location is
the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded
brand.” A.R.S. § 8-1261(G). Subsection (G)
recognizes a distinction between a brand and
its location as specified on the registration.
Reading “design or figure” to incorporate
location would conflate that distinction.

{18 The Department unconvincingly ar-
gues otherwise. The Department contends
that subsection (G) requires this Court to
interpret a brand’s design or figure as includ-
ing its proposed location. But subsections (B)
and (G) serve different functions. Subsection
(B) refers to adopting and recording a brand.
Adopting and recording a brand is the prov-
ince of the Department, and thus (B) governs
the exercise of the Department’s authority.
Subsection (G), on the other hand, refers to
applying a recorded brand. Although the De-
partment records brands, the livestock owner
applies them, and the owner, not the Depart-
ment, is subject to criminal liability for a
misapplication. Subsection (G) is a directive
to the livestock owners, not the Department.
‘The limitation on brand placement by the
owner in subsection (G) does not expand the
limitation on the Department's authority to
approve designs or figures under subsection.
@).

14 Additionally, if location were included
in “design or figure,” the second sentence of
subsection (G) would be superfluous. See City
of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.,
209 Ariz. 544, 552 131, 105 P.8d 1163, 1171
(2005) (“Whenever possible, we do not inter-
pret statutes in such a mamner as to render a
clause superfluous.”). If the Department’s in-
terpretation were correct, placing a brand in
a location other than the one specified on the
certificate would not be “the equivalent of
the use of an unrecorded brand”—it would be
an unrecorded brand. Thus, this language in
(G) would be unnecessary. Equating a misap-
plied brand to an unrecorded brand, rather,
serves the purpose of putting ranchers on
notice that placing a brand in a location other
than the one specified leads to the same
criminal consequences as using an unrecord-
ed brand. See A.R.S, § 8-1269(A) (“A person
who knowingly brands livestock with an un-
recorded ... brand is guilty of a class 3
misdemeanov.”).

915 The court of appeals reasoned that
“location” should be read into subsection (B)
because the surrounding subsections refer-
ence location. Stambaugh, 240 Ariz. at 356
112, 379 P.8d 250. But under traditional
methods of statutory interpretation, the op-
posite is true—the fact that the legislature
intentionally used the word “location” in oth-
er parts of the statute and omitted it from
subsection (B) suggests that location was not
meant to be part of subsection (B). City of
Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz, 395, 398, 798
P.2d 648, 551 (1990) (“Where the legislature
uses a term within one statute and excludes
it from another, the term usually will not be
read into the provision from which it was
excluded.”),

116 In addition to the language of § 3-
1261 itself, the statutory scheme otherwise
indicates that “design or figure” does not
encompass location, A related statute, A.R.S.
§ 8-1262(A), which regulates the recording
of brands and earmarks, reflects that a
brands location is distinct from its design or
figure. Section 3~1262(A) states in pertinent
part:

Recording shall consist of depicting a fac-

simile of the brand adopted, and a diagram

of the earmarks, together with an entry of
the name, residence, telephone number
and post office address of the person
adopting the brand and earmarks, the date
recorded, the place upon the livestock or
other animals where the brand is proposed
to be used, the kind of animals upon which
the brand and earmark are proposed to be
used, and a general designation and state-
ment of the location of the range whereon
such animals are permitted to range.
ARS. § 8-1262(A) (emphasis added). If “lo-
cation” was included in “design or figure,”
there would be no need to separate out the
depiction of “a facsimile of the brand,” which
must have a unique “design or figure,” from
“the place upon the livestock or other ani-
mals where the brand is proposed to be
used.”

HI ‘1117 Because the meaning of § 3-
1261(B) is plain, based on the statute as a
whole and its context within the statutory
scheme, we do not resort to other canons of
statutory interpretation. See State v. Chris-
tiam, 205 Ariz. 64, 66 16, 66 P.8d 1241, 1248
(2008). The statute clearly provides that a

511

brand with an identical design or figure may
not be recorded.

118 Nonetheless, we address several addi-
tional arguments asserting the ambiguity of
the statute, The Department argues that
when subsection (B) grants it “discretion to
refuse to record a brand that is similar to a
previously recorded brand, the statute neces-
sarily also gives [the Department] discretion
to record a brand that it determines is simi-
lar to, but sufficiently distinguishable from, a
previously recorded brand to fulfill” the pur-
poses of § 38-1261 in identifying livestock
ownership and preventing livestock theft.
The Department asserts that this grant of
discretion also allows it to record an identical
brand sufficiently distinguishable because of
its location. But even if we accept the De-
partment’s contention that this language al-
lows it to approve similar brands, because
neither “design” nor “figure” refers to loca-
tion, approval of an identical design in a
different location is not “similar”; it is the
same, in violation of the statute.

119 Contrary to the Department’s argu-
ment, reading “design or figure” to not
include location does not render other pro-
visions within A.R.S, § 3-1261 moot, Man-
dating the location serves other useful
functions. As Stambaugh argued, “[E]xclu-
sive brand designs serve to identify the
owner of the brand, while monitoring the
location of these brands assists the [De-
partment] with identifying problematic
brands, which may be unique in design
but lead to misidentification.”

120 Furthermore, location can also serve
as protection against theft. Requiring ranch-
ers to specify the location of their brands
makes it more difficult for a thief to modify
or replace a valid brand because the thief
must pass what effectively is a two-prong
security test: a matching design and a match-
ing location. Even if the thief is able to
modify one brand design into another, it
must still be in the required location. Addi-
tionally, specifying the location of the brand
helps the Department and other ranchers
know where to look to be able to quickly
identify an animal’s owner. In other words,
the location requirement serves valuable

512

functions without being part of the “design or
figure” of the brand itself,

C. Deference to Agency Interpretation.

721 The Department argues that we
should defer to its interpretation of the stat-
ute based on its expertise. Because the legis-
lature has directly and clearly spoken to the
question at issue, this Court owes no defer-
ence to the Department’s interpretation. See
Wade, 241 Ariz, at 563 1/21, 390 P.8d at 803
(refusing to give weight to an agency’s inter-
pretation of a statute within its expertise
when the legislature explicitly addressed the
matter at issue and this Court was “able to
ascertain legislative intent by applying inter-
pretive principles”),

22 We note, however, that contrary to
the court of appeals’ assertion, giving the
statute its plain meaning is unlikely to result
in mass confusion in the cattle industry. See
Stambaugh, 240 Ariz, at 857 116 n.5, 379
P.8d 250 (expressing concern that not read-
ing location into “design or figure” might
invalidate hundreds of brands), At oral argu~
ment, we questioned the parties at length
about the Department’s practices, Despite
the Department’s claim of its “longstanding
interpretation,” it could find only thirty-two
instances of duplicate brands out of 10,000
registered brands. Further, there was no
written policy at the time relevant here, and
during the time period when there was a
written policy, it forbade identical brands,

923 The Department’s policy manuals
from 1992 to 1998 state, “NO identical
brands are accepted for recording.” (empha-
sis in original), The manuals also read, “We
do not record a brand which conflicts with a
recorded brand. This is a brand which resem-
bles a recorded brand or could, with slight
changes, be changed into that brand, espe-
cially if on the same side of the animal.”
(emphasis added). According to its own man-
uals, the Department’s policy did not even
allow for similar looking (let alone identical)
brands on the same side of the animal, Re-
jecting identical brands in different locations
is unlikely to result in revocation of large
numbers of existing brands.

Il. CONCLUSION

24 We hold that A.R.S, § 3-1261(B) is
unambiguous and precludes the Department

from adopting or recording identical brands.
We reverse the superior court’s judgment
and vacate the court of appeals’ opinion. We
remand to the superior court with instruc-
tions to grant summary judgment in favor of
Stambaugh. Stambaugh is awarded his rea-
sonable attorney fees incurred in this Court
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2080, upon compli-
ance with ARCAP 21,

BOLICK, J., concurring:

125 I join entirely the Court’s analysis and
outcome, In addition to other arguments re-
jected by the Court, the Department urged
us to apply Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Cowncil, Inc., 467 U.S.
887, 104 S.Ct, 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984),
and defer to its administrative expertise in
construing the statute. I write separately
only to note that this Court has never ex-
pressly considered whether Chevron or its
progeny establish standards for administra-
tive deference under Arizona law, I trust
that, to the contrary, our constitutional sepa-
vation of powers remains vibrant, notwith-
standing the extent to which the United
States Supreme Court has eroded it in the
federal context. See Gutierree-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 884 F.8d 1142, 1149-58 (10th Cir,
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

398 P.3d 578

SECURITY ALARM FINANCING
ENTERPRISES, L.P.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ve

Amy FULLER, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0255

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 7/6/2017

oo
hay
=

Baskin, Richards, PLC, Phoenix, By Wil-
liam A. Richards, Nicole C. Davis, Counsel
for Plaintiff/Appellee

Limon-Wynn Law, PLLC, Tempe, By Mo-
nica A, Limon-Wynn, Counsel for Defen-
dants/Appellants

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Jennifer
B. Campbell joined.

OPINION
JOHNSEN, Judge:

11 The superior court denied a motion to
dismiss in favor of arbitration under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, holding the moving par-
ties waived their right to compel arbitration
by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense
in their answer, Exercising our discretion to
accept special action review and applying
federal law, we hold there was no waiver and
reverse the order denying the motion to dis-
miss.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

12 Security Alarm Financing Enterprises,
LP, filed a complaint alleging contract and
tort claims against several former employees
and their new employer. The complaint al-
leged breach of contract, misappropriation of
trade secrets, unfair competition and tortious
interference with business expectancies. In
answering the complaint, Amy Fuller, Molly
Griffis, and Carlee and Darryl Reeves (col-
lectively “Appellants”) did not raise any affir-
mative defense concerning arbitration.

18 Security acknowledges that 29 days
after Appellants answered the complaint,
their counsel contacted Security to raise the
existence of arbitration agreements Appel-
lants each had signed when they started
work with Security, (The arbitration agree-
ments were stand-alone contracts separate
from the confidentiality agreements on which
Security’s contract claims were based.) Each
of the identical three-page arbitration agree-
ments specified that it “is governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.,” and that it would apply “to any dispute
arising out of or related to” the employee’s
“employment with ... [Security] ... or ter-
mination of employment.” Appellants asked

whether Security would agree to arbitration;
a month later, Security responded that it
would not agree. Four days after receiving
Security’s response, Appellants moved to dis-
miss the complaint and to compel arbitration.
The superior court denied the motion, finding
Appellants waived their right to compel arbi-
tration by failing to cite the arbitration
agreement as an affirmative defense in their
answer. Appellants then appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction.

14 This court derives its jurisdiction whol-
ly from statute. See Garea v. Swift Transp.
Co., 222 Ariz, 281, 288, 112, 218 P.8d 1008,
1010 (2009), Generally speaking, an order
denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable
by appeal because it is not a final judgment.
See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare,
LL,C., 240 Ariz, 420, 426, 14, 880 P.38d 659,
665 (App. 2016),

15 Appellants, however, suggest Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-
2101.01(A)(1) (2017) grants this court juris-
diction over the denial of their motion to
dismiss and to compel arbitration.’ That stat-
ute grants the court of appeals jurisdiction to
hear an appeal from “[aln order denying an
application to compel arbitration made under
§ 12-1502 or 12-8007.” But Appellants did
not move to compel arbitration under either
ARS. § 12-1602 (2017) (adopted from the
Uniform Arbitration Act) or ARS. § 12-
8007 (2017) (adopted from the Revised Uni-
form Arbitration Act). Indeed, Arizona’s ver-
sions of the Uniform Arbitration Act and the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act expressly
do not apply to arbitration agreements, such
as the one at issue here, between an employ-
er and its employee. ARS, §§ 12-1517
(2017), -8008(B)(1) (2017). Instead, Appel-
lants moved to compel arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C,
§§ 1-16 (2017), which the arbitration agree-
ment expressly adopted. Because Appellants
did not move to compel arbitration under
ARS. §§ 12-1502 or -8007, and because no
other statute grants this court appellate ju-
risdiction, we Jack jurisdiction to consider
Appellants’ appeal from the order denying
their motion,

1, Absent material revision after the relevant date,

515

HE 16 Alternatively, Appellants ask us
to treat their appeal as a petition for special
action, In our discretion and pursuant to
ARS, § 12-120,21(A)(4) (2017), we may ex-
ercise special action jurisdiction “under ap-
propriate circumstances.” Phillips v. Garcia,
287 Ariz. 407, 410, 16, 351 P.8d 1105, 1108
(App. 2015), Special action jurisdiction is
proper when a party has no “equally plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal,”
Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Ac-
tions 1(a), and in cases “involving a matter of
first impression, statewide significance, or
pure questions of law,” State ew rel. Pennartz
v. Oleavage, 200 Ariz, 582, 585, 18, 80 P.8d
649, 652 (App. 2001).

{7 Appellants have no adequate remedy
by appeal from the order denying their mo-
tion to compel arbitration. See Yarbrough v.
Montoya-Paez, 214 Ariz. 1, 2, 147 P.8d 755,
756 (App. 2006) (accepting special action ju-
risdiction of order transferring venue). Fur-
ther, the primary issue presented here is a
question of law, namely, what a party must
show to establish that an adversary has
waived a right to arbitration under the FAA.
As presented, this dispute “require[s] neither
factual review nor interpretation.” Orme
School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 808, 802 P.2d
1000, 1002 (1990). It likewise is an issue of
first impression in this state, See State ex vel.
Thomas v. Duncan, 216 Ariz, 260, 262, 15,
165 P.8d 238, 240 (App. 2007),

18 Accordingly, we exercise our discretion
to accept special action jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the superior court erred by
denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss and to
compel arbitration.

B. Denial of the Motion to Compel Arbi-
tration.

Tl 19 We review the denial of a motion
to compel arbitration de novo. Sun Valley
Ranch 308 Ltd. P’ship v. Robson, 231 Ariz.
287, 291, 19, 294 P.8d 125, 129 (App. 2012).
Further, whether conduct amounts to waiver
of the right to arbitrate is a question of law
we review de novo. In ve Estate of Cortez,
226 Ariz, 207, 210, 18, 245 P.8d 892, 895
(App. 2010).

we cite a statute’s current version,

516

110 The parties disagree about whether
Arizona law or federal law governs waiver of
a right to arbitration under the FAA, De-
pending on the circumstances of a particular
case, which law applies may make a differ-
ence because the legal standards governing
waiver may not be precisely the same. In
arguing that Appellants waived arbitration
by failing to plead it in their answer, Securi-
ty relies on our decision in Cortez as “con-
trolling.” See 226 Ariz. at 211, 16, 245 P.8d
892 (“An assertion that arbitration is manda-
tory is an affirmative defense to a complaint.
It is well established that any defense not
set forth in an answer or pre-answer motion
to dismiss is waived.” (Citation omitted.)),
Security argues that under Arizona law, Ap-
pellants’ failure to plead arbitration was suf-
ficient by itself to constitute waiver, By con-
trast, under the FAA, conduct inconsistent
with an intent to arbitrate by itself is not
sufficient to establish waiver; at a minimum,
the court also must consider whether the
party opposing arbitration has suffered prej-
udice by the other party’s inconsistent acts,
Compare Richards v, Ernst & Young, LLP,
744 F.8d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir, 2018) (waiver
requires showing of prejudice), with Zucker-
mon Spaeder, LLP v, Auffenberg, 646 F.3d
919, 922 (D.C. Cir, 2011) (potential prejudice
is among circumstances to be considered),

Hs 1111 Two respective provisions of
the FAA guide analysis of challenges to a
party’s right to compel arbitration. First, un-
der 9 U.S.C, § 2, a written arbitration agree-
ment “shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” The cases make clear that the
inquiry under § 2 of whether an arbitration
agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able” is governed by state law, ie, the law
pertaining to “revocation of any contract.”
See, eg., Doctor's Assocs. Inc, v, Casarotto,
517 U,S. 681, 686, 116 S.Ct, 1652, 134
L,Ed,2d 902 (1996) (state law governs gener-
al issues concerning the validity, revocability
and enforceability of contracts); Perry v
Thomas, 482 U.S. 488, 492, n,9, 107 S.Ct,
2520, 96 L.Hd.2d 426 (1987); Hudson v. Citi-
bank (S.D.) NA, 387 P.8d 42, 47 (Alaska
2016), Thus, when an Arizona court deter-
mines the validity or enforceability of an
arbitration agreement under the FAA, it ap-

plies Arizona common law pertaining to con-
tracts, See, ¢9., WB, The Bldg. Co. v. Hl
Destino, LP, 227 Ariz, 302, 808, 114, 257
P.8d 1182, 1188 (App. 2011),

Hl 112 But the issue here is not whether
Arizona contract-law principles invalidate the
arbitration agreements Security asked Ap-
pellants to sign. The issue is whether Appel-
lants waived their right to enforce those
agreements, That issue is resolved not under
state-law principles pursuant to § 2 of the
FAA, but under federal-law principles dictat-
ed by the other provision in the FAA apply-
ing to challenges to arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 8,
Under § 3:

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any
of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved
in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.

Hl 118 Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 8, a state
court must order arbitration so long as the
moving party “is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.” This provision, as a
matter of federal law, governs the determina-
tion of whether a party has “defaultfed]” by
waiving the right to seek arbitration under
an otherwise enforceable agreement. See
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.8d
207, 217 (8d Cir, 2007); Marie v, Allied Home
Mortg, Corp., 402 F.8d 1, 18 (1st Cir, 2005)
(citing cases); S & H Contractors, Inc, v, A.J.
Taft Coal Co,, 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir,
1990) (‘Our determination of whether S & H
waived its right to arbitration, as opposed to
whether the contract is void under Alabama
law, is controlled solely by federal law.”);
Cornell & Co. v, Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d
612, 518 (D.C, Cir, 1966) (“Once having
waived the right to arbitrate, that party is
necessarily ‘in default in proceeding with
such arbitration, ”); Hudson, 387 P.8d at 47;
see also Barber & Ross Co, v. Cornell & Co,,

242 F.Supp. 825, 826 (D.D.C, 1965) (moving
party was “in default” because “the litigation
machinery had been substantially invoked
.+» by the time ... an intention to arbitrate
was communicated”), In the face of these
authorities, Security cites no case holding
that waiver of a right to arbitrate under the
FAA is governed by state-law principles un-
der § 2 of the FAA rather than by federal-
law principles under § 8.2

114 Accordingly, turning to the federal
law of waiver under the FAA, the Ninth
Cireuit Court of Appeals has held that waiver
of a right to arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 8
requires a showing of “(1) knowledge of an
existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts
inconsistent with that existing right; and (8)
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration
resulting from such inconsistent acts.” Rich-
ards, 744 F.8d at 1074. Many other circuit
courts impose the same requirements, See,
@g., Shy v. Nawistar Int'l Corp., 731 F.8d
820, 827-28 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Both inconsis-
tency and actual prejudice are required.”); In
ve Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 754
F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir, 2014); Wheeling
Hosp, Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio
Valley, Inc., 688 F.8d 577, 586-87 (4th Cir.
2012); Hhletter, 482 F.3d at 222 (“[P]rejudice
is the touchstone for determining whether
the right to arbitrate has been waived.”);
Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Dresch-
er, 761 F.2d 855, 862 (2d Cir, 1985). Other
courts have held that while prejudice is not
required, it is a factor to be considered in
determining whether waiver has occurred.
See, eg., Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d at
922 (potential prejudice is among circum-
stances to be considered); Si, Mary’s Med.
Ctr. of Bvansville, Inc. v. Disco Aluminum
Prods, Co. Ine., 969 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir,
1992) (“If prejudice is relevant, even if not
dispositive, the district court should consider

2. Because state law does not apply, we need not
decide whether, as Security argues, Cortez and
Arizona law require denial of a motion to compel
arbitration brought by a party that has answered
the complaint without reserving the right to arbi-
trate. We note, however, that evidence in Cortez
established far more than a mere failure to plead
arbitration as an affirmative defense; the defen-
dant there also “participated substantially in the
litigation and thereby exhibited additional con-
duct inconsistent with enforcing the [arbitration]
agreement,” 226 Ariz, at 211, 16, 245 P.3d 892;

517

it just as it should consider any other rele-
vant factor.”); Hudson, 887 P.8d at 47-48,

Hi 115 In interpreting a federal statute,
in the absence of guidance by the United
States Supreme Court, Arizona courts will
look first to a “clear rule” issued by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if that rule
appears just. Weatherford ew rel. Michael L.
v. State, 206 Ariz, 529, 582-83, 118-9, 81
P.8d 320, 323-24 (2008), When other courts
are divided on an issue of federal substantive
law, following Ninth Circuit precedent “fur-
thers federal-state court relationships” and
promotes “predictability and stability of the
law.” Id. at 588, 19, 81 P.38d 820,

Hs 116 On this question, we adopt
the Ninth Cireuit rule for the additional rea-
son that it has the benefit of clarity and
certainty. As interpreted by the Ninth Cir
cuit, waiver under 9 U.S.C. § 8 requires
proof that the party seeking arbitration knew
of an “existing right to compel arbitration,” it
nevertheless committed “acts inconsistent
with that existing right,” and those inconsis-
tent acts caused prejudice to the party op-
posing arbitration, Richards, 744 F.8d at
1074. In applying this standard, we keep in
mind that “any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract lan-
guage itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.” Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp, v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 108 S.Ct, 927, 74 L.Ed.2d
‘165 (1988),

HMM 1117 Applying 9 U.S.C. § 8 to the
facts of this case, we conclude Appellants
did not waive their right to arbitration of
Security’s claims against them, To be sure,
Appellants were aware of the arbitration

see City of Phoenix v, Fields, 219 Ariz. 568, 575,
130, n.4, 201 P,3d 529, 536 (2009) (party may
‘waive arbitration by “participat{ing] substantially
in litigation without promptly seeking an order
from the court compelling arbitration”). Further,
Security incorrectly argues that application of 9
U.S.C. § 3 to this case “illogically presumes in
the first instance” that Cortez “somehow adopted
a state waiver standard that would violate re-
quirements of the FAA.” The FAA was not at
issue in Cortez, and our decision in that case did
not mention the federal statute.

518

agreement, at least constructively, and they
undeniably did not raise arbitration as an af-
firmative defense in their answer. But they
contacted Security to commence the arbitra-
tion process within a month of answering
the complaint. Most significantly, Security
has not shown it was prejudiced by Appel-
lants’ delay.

HI 118 In support of its argument to
the contrary, Security contends it went to the
trouble of preparing its initial disclosure
statement under Arizona Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26.1 before the court ruled on Appel-
lants’ motion to dismiss. But Security’s com-
plaint against Appellants also named other
defendants with which Security has no arbi-
tration agreements, Having chosen to join all
the defendants in a single action, Security
accepted the possibility that its claims would
have to proceed on dual tracks, one through
the superior court and the other through
arbitration, Under both state and federal
principles, in these circumstances, enforce-
ment of parties’ rights “requires piecemeal
resolution when necessary to give effect to an
arbitration agreement.” Moses H. Cone, 460
US, at 20, 108 8.Ct, 927; Forest City Dillon,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz, 410, 412,
675 P.2d 297, 299 (App. 1984), Accordingly,
Appellants’ failure to cite the arbitration
agreement in their answer did not compel
Security to prepare a disclosure statement in
support of its claims; Security was obligated
to prepare that disclosure for the other de-
fendants regardless of any purported waiver
by Appellants.

{119 Nor did Appellants unfairly benefit by
receiving a copy of the disclosure statement
Security provided to the other defendants,
The arbitration agreements Appellants
signed at Security’s request expressly grant
the parties “the right to conduct adequate
civil discovery.” Security further argues it
suffered prejudice because Appellants twice
asked for extensions of time to respond to
the complaint, but it does not state how the
delay caused injury to the company. More-
over, the delay at issue here is the 29 days
after answering the complaint it took Appel-
lants to raise the arbitration agreement, not
any delay before they filed their answer. For
the same reasons, Security’s contention that
it was prejudiced by its pre-litigation efforts
to “deliver[ ] cease and desist letters” to Ap-

pellants and in “framing its litigation strate-
gy” is unfounded.

720 In sum, Security makes no showing
that it was prejudiced by Appellants’ failure
to cite the arbitration agreement in their
answer or by the subsequent 29-day delay
before Appellants first raised the issue of
arbitration, Accordingly, the superior court
erred by denying Appellants’ motion to com-
pel arbitration,

CONCLUSION

{121 Accepting special action jurisdiction,
we grant relief by reversing the superior
court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to
dismiss and to compel arbitration.

398 P.3d 584
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Francisco Miguel URREA, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0416

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed May 30, 2017

a
Rl
1

oT

20

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,

1, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S.Ct.
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (Equal Protection

By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

Gallego Law Firm, P.C., Tucson, By Rafa-
el F, Gallego, Counsel for Appellant

Judge Espinosa authored the opinion of
the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring
concurred and Judge Miller dissented.

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Judge:

{1 After a jury trial, Francisco Urrea was
convicted of transportation of a narcotic drug
for sale and sentenced to a presumptive five-
year prison term, On appeal, he renews argu-
ments rejected by the trial court that the
drugs found in his vehicle should have been
suppressed and that the court imposed an
inadequate sanction after finding a Batson?
violation, He also alleges, for the first time,
that the court erroneously admitted improper
“profile testimony” at trial. Finding no error,
we affirm,

Factual and Procedural Background

12 We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding Urrea’s conviction.
State v. Welch, 236 Ariz. 308, 12, 340 P.8d
387, 889 (App. 2014), In June 2014, a sheriff's
deputy stopped Urrea’s vehicle for a traffic
violation, After Urrea consented to a search,
the deputy found a package containing over
sixty grams of cocaine hidden in the rear
cargo area of Urrea’s vehicle.

18 Urrea was indicted on one count of
possession of a narcotic drug for sale and one
count of transportation of a narcotic drug for
sale, He sought suppression of the drugs
before trial, arguing the “stop, seizure,
search, [and] arrest” had been illegal and
sought to preclude a police detective from
testifying as an expert for the state. The trial
court denied the suppression motion after an
evidentiary hearing and heard arguments re-
garding the state’s expert immediately be-
fore Urrea’s trial began, The court ultimately
allowed the expert to testify but precluded
him from explaining the significance of a
baseball cap in Urrea’s car and a tattoo on

Clause forbids rejecting potential jurors because
of race).

Urrea’s arm allegedly depicting a “Narco
Saint.”

94 During jury selection, Urrea raised a
Batson challenge, arguing the state had im-
properly struck from the venire jurors with
“Hispanic ethnic background[s].” After di-
recting the prosecutor to identify the reasons
for its strikes, the trial court denied three
strikes for which it found the state had failed
to provide adequate race-neutral reasons and
reinstated the prospective jurors. Two of the
reinstated jurors sat on the jury, which con-
victed Urrea of both charges after a two-day
trial. The state subsequently dismissed the
possession count, and the court sentenced
Urrea as described above. We have jurisdic-
tion over this appeal pursuant to ARS.
§§ 12-120,21(A)(1), 18-4081, and 18-
4083(A)(1).

Motion to Suppress

HMMM {5 Urrea first contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the warrantless
search of his vehicle, We review the court’s
rulings on a suppression motion for an abuse
of diseretion, deferring to factual findings but
reviewing de novo constitutional and purely
legal issues. State v, Snyder, 240 Ariz. 551,
‘18, 882 P.8d 109, 112 (App. 2016). We consid-
er only evidence presented at the suppres-
sion hearing and view that evidence in the
light most favorable to upholding the court’s
ruling, State v. Caraveo, 222 Ariz. 228, n.1,
213 P.8d 877, 378 n.1 (App. 2009).

16 At a hearing in July 2015, Deputy
Nikola Zovko testified he had stopped Ur-
rea’s vehicle after he observed it “merge[ ]
over into the right-hand lane without its turn
signal, causing another vehicle to abruptly
slam on its brakes.” After obtaining Urrea’s
license, registration, and insurance docu-
ments, the deputy asked Urrea to step out
and wait at his patrol car while he conducted
a records check, “[p]rimarily [as] a safety
issue.” Urrea complied and throughout the
stop was cooperative and friendly,

17 Before completing the traffic stop, the
deputy approached Urrea’s vehicle a second
time to check the Vehicle Identification Num-
ber (VIN) against the registration documents
and a report he had received “from dis-
patch.” While doing so, he observed items in
the car that suggested to him Urrea might

521

be transporting drugs, including multiple air-
fresheners and symbols on a baseball cap
and tattooed on Urrea’s arm associated with
drug trafficking, and he asked Urrea if there
were any drugs in the car. Urrea said there
were not and told the deputy he “c[ould]
check.” Urrea then signed a “consent to
search” form and was placed in the back of
the deputy’s vehicle while the deputy and
another officer searched Urrea’s car, The
package of cocaine was found concealed be-
hind the spare tire.

18 Urrea argued to the trial court that the
initial stop was invalid, that Deputy Zovko
illegally had “extended the detention to
check federal [VIN] stickers,” and that the
search of his vehicle had exceeded the scope
of his consent. Ruling from the bench, the
court concluded the traffic stop was valid, the
subsequent “inspection of a VIN number
[wa]s within the normal discretion of an offi-
cer in a routine traffic stop,” and Urrea had
consented to a search which “encompasse[d]
all voids within the vehicle.” Although the
court found “no unreasonable detention,” it
noted it was “admitting the evidence as a
consent search and not on any other basis.”
On appeal, Urrea renews his arguments that
the deputy impermissibly “‘detour[ed) from
the mission of the underlying traffie stop”
and the subsequent search of his vehicle was
not based on “valid consent.” He does not
challenge the validity of the traffic stop,

{9 Regarding the duration of the stop,
‘Urrea contends it was illegally prolonged not
when the deputy returned to Urrea’s vehicle
to check the VIN numbers, as he argued at
the suppression hearing, but when he asked
Urrea to “step out of the car and walk back
to [the deputy’s] vehicle.” Because Urrea did
not make this argument to the trial court, we
review only for fundamental error. State v.
Brown, 2883 Ariz, 158, 112, 810 P.8d 29, 34
(App. 2018); see also State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz.
438, 14, 175 P.3d 682, 683 (App. 2008) (objec-
tion on one ground does not preserve issue
on another ground), But Urrea has not ar-
gued fundamental error, and although we
will not ignore such error if we see it, see
State v. Fernandez, 216 Ariz, 545, 182, 169
P,8d 641, 650 (App. 2007), Urrea has failed to
show error of any kind occurred here. See
also State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz,

522

849, 117, 185 P.8d 185, 140 (App. 2008) (fun-
damental error waived if not argued).

HMM 110 First, Urrea has not explained
how his being directed to exit his vehicle
while the deputy conducted a records check
illegally prolonged the stop. As we have con-
sistently held, “[llaw enforcement officers are
permitted to remove occupants from a vehi-
cle as a safety precaution.” State v. Kjolsrud,
289 Ariz. 319, 118, 871 P.8d 647, 651 (App.
2016), citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 484
US. 106, 117 n.6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed2d
831 (1977); Newell v. Town of Oro Valley, 168
Ariz, 527, 529, 789 P.2d 394, 396 (App. 1990).
And, as noted in Arizona v. Johnson, 555
U.S. 828, 888, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694
(2009), “[aJn officer’s inquiries into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic
stop ... do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so
long as the inquiries do not measurably ex-
tend the duration of the stop.” Although the
“fajuthority for the seizure ... ends when
tasks tied to the traffic stop infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed,”
Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —,
—, 185 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492
(2015), Urrea has provided nothing to sup-
port that either the records check or check of
the VIN number illegally prolonged his de-
tention. In fact, Rodriguez specifically per-
mits “ordinary inquiries incident to” traffic
stops, which include “checking the driver’s
license” and “inspecting the automobile’s reg-
istration and proof of insurance.” Id, at ——,
135 S.Ct. at 1615, quoting Illinois v. Ca-
balles, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160
L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). A check of a VIN num-
ber is a permissible inquiry sufficiently relat-
ed to a traffic stop. See New York v. Class,
475 U.S. 106, 118-19, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (upholding VIN number
checks in both windshield and doorjamb);
United States v. Ramos, 194 F.Supp.3d 1184,
1167 (D.N.M. 2016) (coneluding VIN inspec-
tion is lawful part of traffic stop).

11 Moreover, even had Deputy Zovko
illegally prolonged the traffic stop when he
asked Urrea to “step back to his patrol vehi-
cle in order to discuss the reason for the
stop,” the ensuing conversation appears to
have been entirely consensual. Kjolsrud, 239

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 86 S.Ct.

Ariz, 819, 110, 871 P.8d at 650 (“Once the
time needed to complete this mission has
passed, an officer ‘must allow a driver to
continue on his way unless ... the encounter
between the driver and the officer becomes
consensual.’”), quoting State v. Sweeney, 224
Ariz, 107, 117, 227 P.8d 868, 873 (App. 2010).
Not only did the sheriff's deputy describe
Urrea as “overly friendly” during the en-
counter and “extremely eager to answer the
questions,” but he testified Urrea had an-
swered questions even before they could be
asked.

112 Urrea nevertheless argues his consent
‘was not voluntary because he had not been
read his rights pursuant to Miranda,? he had
been told other law enforcement officers
were on their way, and there was a lack of
any sort of intervening circumstance to break
the causal connection between the illegal de-
tention and his consent. In support, Urrea
reviews considerable search and seizure law
and cites factors the Supreme Court has
identified as relevant in determining whether
the taint of illegal conduct is sufficiently at-
tenuated from evidence subsequently ob-
tained by voluntary means. See Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602-04, 95 S.Ct, 2254,
45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); see also State v. Guil-
len, 223 Aviz, 314, 114, 228 P.8d 658, 661
(2010), But Urrea has not demonstrated an
illegal or custodial detention here, and he has
failed to explain how any of the factors he
cites apply to his case. Accordingly, Urrea
has not shown the trial court committed any
error, much less fundamental error, in deny-
ing his motion to suppress.

Batson Remedies

113 Urrea next contends the trial court
should have granted his request for a mistri-
al after it found the state had struck three
Hispanic jurors without a sufficiently race-
neutral justification for doing so. He does
not, however, explain how the trial court
erred in forfeiting the state’s strikes rather
than employing the drastic remedy of a mis-
trial.

114 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Hd.2d 69 (1986), the
Court held that the use of peremptory
strikes to exclude potential jurors on the

1602, 16 L.Ed,2d 694 (1966).

basis of race violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. When a constitu-
tional violation is alleged, Batson and its
progeny require a three-step inquiry by the
trial court: first, the party challenging the
strike must make a prima facie showing of
discrimination; second, the striking party
must provide a race-neutral reason for the
strike; and third, if a race-neutral explana-
tion is provided, the trial court must deter-
mine whether the challenger has carried its
burden of proving purposeful racial discrimi-
nation. State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz, 1, 121, 226
P.8d 870, 879 (2010).

15 Here, the trial court determined Ur-
rea had made a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation when the state used five of its six
strikes on potential jurors with “Hispanic
ethnic background[s].” The state offered
race-neutral reasons for the strikes, but
failed to convince the court that three of the
five challenged strikes were constitutionally
valid.’ Over Urrea’s objection, the court de-
nied the state’s strikes it found invalid, rein-
stated the struck jurors to the venire, and
empaneled a jury that included two of the
improperly excluded jurors. Urrea asserts, as
he did below, that the only acceptable reme-
dy to the Batson violation was to strike the
entire jury panel and “start{] anew ... with
a new jury pool.” As there is no published
case law addressing this issue in Arizona, we
review Batson and its progeny among other
jurisdictions in some detail.

116 Although discriminatory uses of per-
emptory challenges were deemed unconstitu-
tional over three decades ago, courts have
taken varied approaches to remedy Batson
violations. See generally Jason Mazzone, Bat-
son Remedies, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1618 (2012)
(setting out cases adopting different respons-
es to Batson incursions), The Batson court
itself addressed remedies for the constitu-
tional violation only briefly, stating in a foot-
note:

In light of the variety of jury selection

practices followed in our state and federal
3. The state has not challenged the court’s Batson

rulings on appeal, contending only that the reme-
dy imposed was adequate,

4, Reseating improperly struck jurors was subse-
quently upheld as a permissible remedy where a

523

trial courts, we make no attempt to in-

struct these courts how best to implement

our holding today. For the same reason,

‘we express no view on whether it is more

appropriate in a particular case, upon a

finding of discrimination against [improp-

erly struck] jurors, for the trial court to
discharge the venire and select a new jury
from a panel not previously associated with
the case, or to disallow the discriminatory
challenges and resume selection with the
improperly challenged jurors reinstated on
the venire.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 106 S.Ct. 1712

(citations omitted).

{17 The appropriateness of specific reme-
dies has not been expanded upon in subse-
quent Supreme Court cases, although the
federal appellate courts have generally inter-
preted Batson as “accord[ing] significant lati-
tude” in the trial court’s ability to fashion an
appropriate remedy. Koo v. McBride, 124
F.8d 869, 878 (7th Cir. 1997); see also McCro-
ry v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1248, 1247 (2d Cir,
1996) (concluding Batson error “remediable
in any one of a number of ways”). In United
States v. Walker, for example, the Eleventh
Cireuit noted that courts are encouraged to
“take into account the practicalities of the
situation” and stated it would not reverse the
trial court’s remedy of a Batson violation
absent an abuse of discretion. 490 F.3d 1282,
1294 (11th Cir, 2007). Generally, the federal
appellate courts have upheld either of the
two remedies identified in the Supreme
Court’s Batson decision. Id. at 1294-95,

118 State courts, however, have ap-
proached remedies to Batson violations in
various ways. Trial courts in South Carolina,
for example, are required to select a new
jury de novo when Batson violations are
found. See State v, Jones, 298 S.C. 54, 358
S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302,-
454 S.H.2d 317, 819 (1995). North Carolina
has followed suit, with its supreme court
stating that recommencing the jury selection

party continues to improperly exercise perempto-
ty challenges on subsequent venires. See State v.
Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 456 S.B.2d 357, 360
(1995),

524

process with a new panel of prospective ju-
rors is the better cure. See State v. McCol-
lum, 884 N.C, 208, 488 $.H.2d 144, 159 (1993)
(noting primary goal of achieving fair trial,
and difficulty, under its procedural practices,
of asking improperly excluded juror “to re~
main unaffected by that recent discrimina~
tion, and to render an impartial verdict with-
out prejudice toward either the State or the
defendant”), In New Jersey, the single,
bright-line remedy of dismissing the already
selected jurors, quashing the venire, and
starting jury selection anew remained the
only approach for nearly thirty years until a
“broader set of remedies” was adopted in
2018. See State v, Andrews, 216 N.J. 271, 78
A8d 971, 984 (2018). The California Supreme
Court similarly modified its longstanding
precedent in 2002, to the extent the singular
remedy of a mistrial was ostensibly required.
See People v. Willis, 27 Cal.4th 811, 118
Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 48 P.8d 180, 187-89 (2002),

19 In contrast, Missouri’s courts have for
many years preferred reseating improperly
struck jurors. There, Batson challenges are
required to be made before the venire’s dis-
missal “while there remains time to correct
the error by disallowing the offending strike”
thereby maximizing “{j]udicial time and re-
sources ... because there is no need to
quash the jury and call a new venire.” State
v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 980, 986 (Mo. 1992). In
requiring reseating, the Missouri Supreme
Court has specifically noted its concern for
protecting, to the greatest extent possible,
the equal protection rights of the excluded

5, See also State v. Morales, 71 Conn.App. 790,
804 A.2d 902, 920 n.27 (2002) (concluding state
law does not require jury selection start anew
after Batson challenge sustained); Jefferson v.
State, 595 So.2d 38, 41 (Fla, 1992) (proceeding
with improperly struck juror may be appropriate
remedy in absence of prejudice); Holmes v.
State, 273 Ga, 644, 543 S,E.2d 688, 691 (2001)
(reseating improperly struck juror did not run
afoul of constitutional mandate); Haschke v. Uni-
flow Mfg. Co., 268 Il.App.3d 1045, 206 Ill.Dec.
387, 645 N.B.2d 392, 396 (1994) (vesting trial
court with discretion to fashion remedy for Bat-
son violation); Koo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 95, 100
(ind. Ct, App. 1994) (remedy for Batson viola-
tion left to trial court's discretion); Common-
wealth v. Fruchtman, 418 Mass. 8, 633 N.E.2d
369, 373 (1994) (choice of remedy for Batson
violation “the prerogative of the judge”); Ezell v.
State, 909 P.2d 68, 72 (Okla, Crim. App, 1995)
(concluding either remedy announced in Batson

venirepersons. Id, at 935; State v. Hampton,
163 S.W.8d 908, 905 (Mo, 2005) (reseating
“vindicates the equal protection rights both
of the accused and the stricken venireper-
son”), Other courts that favor reseating have
observed that commencing jury selection
anew effectively rewards the offending party
by ensuring the improperly struck juror does
not participate in that trial. See, eg., Willis,
118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 43 P.8d at 137 (observ-
ing “situations can arise in which the remedy
of mistrial and dismissal of the venire accom-
plish nothing more than to reward improper
voir dire challenges”).

120 The majority of states, however, have
allowed the trial court discretion to apply
either of the remedies contemplated by the
Batson court, See Coleman v. Hogan, 254 Va.
64, 486 8.H.2d 548, 549 (1997) (agreeing with
“majority of states that the choice of [Batson
violation] remedy should be within the dis-
eretion of the trial court”); Jones v, State, 348
‘Md. 584,688 A.2d 520, 525-26 (1996) (same).5
A few jurisdictions have fashioned additional
remedies, For example, extra peremptory
challenges to the party offended by unconsti-
tutional challenges have been upheld in New
York and Pennsylvania, People v, Chin, 8
A.D.8d 574, 771 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (2004);
Commonwealth v, Hill, 127 A2d 578, 115
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), and further penalties
for repeated violations are available in Cali-
fornia, Willis, 118 Cal,Rptr.2d 301, 48 P.8d at.
137.

{21 As a matter of first impression in
Arizona,$ we note that each of the two main

appropriate “depending on the particular cir-
cumstances at trial”); Woodson v. Porter Brown
Limestone Co., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 896, 906-07
(Tenn. 1996) (signaling that reseating juror or
striking entire venire alternate appropriate rem-
edies); Peete v. State, 180 S,W.3d 755, 759-61
(Tex. Ct, App. 2005) (trial court may fashion
remedy for Batson violation according to its dis-
cretion); State v. Valdez, 140 P.3d 1219, 1233
(Utah 2006) (requiring Batson challenge to be
raised in such a manner that trial court “is able
to fashion a remedy”).

6. The appropriateness of a Batson remedy has
been addressed in only a handful of Arizona
cases. In unpublished decisions, this court has
upheld the reinstatement of improperly struck
jurors to their original positions, State v. Mar-
tinez, No, 1 CA-CR 06-0936, Mf 9-10, 2008 WL
2447441 (Ariz, App. June 12, 2008) (mem, deci-
sion); State v. Garcia, No. 1 CA-CR 10-0033, 1 7-

approaches addresses important constitution-
al concerns. Reseating unconstitutionally
challenged jurors emphasizes the equal pro-
tection interests of the individual jurors. That
approach, however, may not be available in
all cireumstances. If struck jurors are no
longer available to serve, a mistrial may be
the only practical remedy, And although
striking an entire venire may ensure an im-
properly excluded juror will not harbor ani-
mus toward the striking party, that solution
does not promote judicial economy when al-
ternative remedies are available, Such con-
cerns may be obviated by requiring peremp-
tory challenges to be exercised outside the
presence of the jury, but there is currently
no such requirement in our procedural rules.
See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e); Ariz, R. Crim. P.
18.4, 18.5(h) (“persons remaining in the jury
box” after peremptory challenges are made).
And, as noted above, commencing the jury
selection process anew rewards the striking
party for improper actions to the extent it
ensures the excluded juror or jurors do not
sit on that jury. See Willis, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d
801, 43 P.8d at 137.

Hl 122 In view of these issues and con-
cerns, we conclude it is unnecessary to im-
pose a single, bright-line remedy for Batson
violations, The better approach, we think, is
to leave it to our trial judges’ discretion to
tailor an appropriate remedy to the particu-
Jars of the constitutional violation. We there-
fore hold that when a Batson objection has
been sustained, the trial court may impose
either of the remedies identified in that semi-
nal case, That is, it is within the court’s
discretion to either reseat an improperly
challenged venireperson, or to grant a mistri-
al, depending on the particular circum-
stances, See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 106
S.Ct. 1712.

Hs 1:23 In 50 holding, we do not fore-
close the possibility of other remedies, Al-
though the Batson court identified only two
solutions, it did not suggest they were ex-
haustive, Jd, As stated in Danforth v. Minne-
sota, 552 U.S. 264, 306, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169
L.EHd.2d 859 (2008), state courts are entitled

10, 2011 WL 283325 (Ariz. App. Jan. 27, 2011)
(mem, decision), and remanded for a new trial
when the trial court committed clear error in
denying a defendant's Batson challenge, State v.
Brown, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0608, 11 19-20, 2014 WL

525

to give broad effect to rules of constitutional
procedure. If alternative remedies are to be
employed, however, we are mindful of the
Court’s observation that any remedy for a
constitutional violation ought to take as its
touchstone that the nature of the remedy
must be determined by the character and
scope of the violation. Milliken v. Bradley,
488 U.S, 267, 280, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 58 L.Ed.2d
745 (1977). Courts should also consider the
practicalities of the situation such as the
particulars of the case, the egregiousness of
the violation, and any other factor they may
find appropriate. See Koo, 124 F.8d at 878;
see also People v, Luciano, 10 N.Y.8d 499,
860 N.Y.S.2d 452, 890 N.E.2d 214, 219 (2008)
(identifying as relevant factors “whether the
challenged juror is available to be reseated,
whether the litigant appears to be engaging
in a pattern of discrimination, and the num-
ber of peremptory challenges that remain to
be exercised”), On review, we will defer to
any factual finding unless clearly erroneous,
see State v, Gay, 214 Ariz, 214, 116, 150 P.3d
787, 798 (App. 2007), and will uphold any
remedy imposed absent a clear abuse of the
trial court’s discretion, of Walker, 490 F.8d
at 1294; State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 161,
182 P.8d 888, 846 (2006) (denial of mistrial
for prosecutorial misconduct not disturbed
absent clear abuse of discretion).

HM {24 In this case, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in reinstating the
improperly struck jurors and forfeiting the
state’s invalid challenges. The record indi-
cates that all strikes, justifications for the
strikes, and arguments regarding the appro-
priateness of the remedy were made outside
the presence of the jury; thus there was no
risk a rejected juror could be offended or
harbor animus against the state or justice
system. And, although only two of the three
reinstated venirepersons were impaneled on
Urrea’s jury, the court specifically noted it
had not found “any kind of personal miscon-
duct” attributable to the prosecutors,

2565551 (Ariz. App, June 5, 2014) (mem. deci-
sion); ef. Ariz. R. Sup, Ct, 111(c)(1)(B) (memo-
randum decisions may be cited to assist appellate
court in deciding whether to issue a published
opinion).

526 Le

HN 1.25 Urrea, however, suggested he
was concerned with the trial court’s decision
regarding the reinstated jurors and the final
composition of the jury. The court, following
standard procedure,’ empaneled the first
nine jurors who had not been struck, includ-
ing two of the three that had been reinstated,
and in response to Urrea’s complaint, noted
the “predictable” “consequences” of a suc-
cessful Batson challenge. Urrea did not indi-
cate or suggest he would have preferred that
any of the improperly struck jurors never-
theless be kept off the jury, nor did he offer
any justification for excluding additional ju-
rors. But even if he had, as our supreme
court has observed, while a defendant in a
criminal case is entitled to a fair and impar-
tial jury, he is not entitled to any particular
juror. See State v. Morris, 215 Ariz, 324, 1 40,
160 P.8d 208, 218 (2007). The nature of the
remedy here was in accord with the serious-
ness of the situation, particularly in light of
the trial court’s unchallenged finding of a
lack of any misconduct by the state, and we
conclude the court appropriately remedied
the Batson violation.

The Dissent

126 In his dissent, our colleague proposes
grounds for reversal that appear to have
little support, particularly in Arizona.’ At the
outset, the dissent quotes the reinstatement
remedy from Batson, “disallow[ing] the dis-
qriminatory challenges and resumfing] selec-
tion with the improperly challenged jurors
reinstated on the venire,” 476 U.S. at 99 n.24,

7. Ariz. R. Crim, P. 18.5(g) directs the courtroom
clerk to “‘strike the jurors on the bottom of the
list until only the number to serve, plus alter-
nates, remain” if parties fail to exercise the full
number of peremptory challenges. A similar pro-
cess has been approved in the civil context, See
Ariz. R. Civ, P, 47 cmt. to 1995 amend. (describ-
ing purpose of amendments to allow for the
“struck” juror selection method, in which for-
cause challenges are made after the jury panel
has been examined, peremptory strikes are then
made and legal issues therefrom resolved, and
“the clerk calls the first eight names remaining
on the list”),

8. The dissent cites three Arizona cases to suggest
reversal is required in this case. However, State
ex rel. Romley, 181 Ariz, 271, 274, 889 P,2d 629,
632 (App. 1995), discussed the importance of
peremptory strikes in saying that a party general-
ly need not explain its “arbitrary and capricious”

106 S.Ct. 1712, and then concludes the trial
court here “imposed only an incomplete ver-
sion of the latter remedy” because one of the
reinstated jurors did not end up on the jury.
But Batson did not say improperly struck
jurors must be placed on the jury. Rather,
they are to be reinstated on the “venire,”
which is the panel “from among whom the
jurors are to be chosen.” Black’s Law Dictio-
nary (10th ed. 2014).

127 In support of its assertion that the
trial court was “obligated” to seat all improp-
erly struck jurors on the petit jury, the dis-
sent cites a Mississippi case involving the
improper denial of a defendant’s Batson chal-
lenge. But that decision did not address the
scope of an appropriate Batson remedy, fo-
cusing only on the trial court’s failure to
grant any remedy at all. See Conerly v. State,
544 So.2d 1870, 1872-73 (Miss. 1989) (re-
manding for new trial when trial court deter-
mined state’s explanation for striking juror
was invalid but nevertheless allowed state’s
peremptory challenge). Here, the trial court
did not fail to act on the violation; it reinstat-
ed the excluded jurors on the venire, and
then “resume[d] selection” as directed by
Batson. 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
The dissent’s assertion that “resum[ing] se-
lection” under Batson “required [the court]
to redo the Rule 18.5(g) procedure” entails a
strained definition of the word “resume,”
which is in common understanding quite dis-
tinet from the word “redo.” °

reasons for striking a juror. State v. Boston, 170
Ariz, 315, 316-17, 823 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (App.
1991), is also distinguishable as the trial court
there erroneously allowed a juror to be struck in
violation of Batson. Finally, the “absolute” right
to peremptory strikes attributed to State v.
Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 390, 206 P.2d 1037,
1039 (1949), is quoted from the 1936 edition of
American Jurisprudence, The more recent sec-
ond edition notably excised this language. See 47
Am. Jur. Jury § 206.

9. As for the dissent’s suggestion the trial court
“truncat{ed] the proceeding with an inadequate
remedy” because of concerns about time, the
Supreme Court has recognized that judges’ deci-
sions in jury selection “are fast paced, made on
the spot and under pressure” and even a wrong
decision does not always require reversal. United
States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316,
120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Bd.2d 792 (2000).

128 Moreover, the dissent’s contention
that reinstating the improperly struck jurors
to the venire was inadequate to ensure their
own rights appears to contradict another Su-
preme Court case, Although the Equal Pro-
tection Clause proscribes discriminatory per-
emptory strikes that would violate the rights
of otherwise qualified and unbiased citizens
to sit on juries, it does not require that they
ultimately be seated. Powers v, Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 409, 111 S.Ct. 1864, 113 L.Ed2d
411 (1991) Gndividual juror does not have
right to sit on petit jury, only right “not to be
excluded from one on account of race”),
Here, juror C.C. ultimately did not sit on
Urrea’s jury because of his position near the
bottom of the clerk’s randomly generated list
of potential jurors, not because he was dis-
criminated against.

29 The dissent’s speculation that the trial
court “impaired Urrea’s right to peremptory
challenges under Rule 18.5(g)” because Ur-
rea may have struck different jurors knowing
that the state could not strike the three
reinstated jurors is likewise unwarranted.
First, we disagree that the trial court was
“required to vacate” Urrea’s fourth, fifth, and
sixth peremptory challenges so that he could
have another opportunity to re-exercise those
strikes, The dissent cites no authority for
that proposition, nor is there any evidence to
support the presumption that Urrea would
have used any of those strikes differently.

HE 130 Second, that the jury might
have been different had the trial court ruled
differently did not violate Urrea’s constitu-
tional rights. As the Supreme Court has not-
ed, “peremptory challenges ... are a means
to achieve the end of an impartial jury.” Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2278,
101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), In Ross, the Court
unequivocally stated that peremptory strikes
are “not of constitutional dimension.” Jd; see
also Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.8d 578, 583
(9th Cir, 1999). The Court found no constitu-
tional violation in Ross when the trial court
erroneously failed to strike a juror for cause
and the defendant used one of his perempto-
ry strikes to remove the juror from the
venire. Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2278, The Court
noted there, as the dissent does here, the
trial court’s action “may have resulted in a
jury panel different from that which would
otherwise have decided the case.” Id. at 87,

527

108 S.Ct. 2273, But if there is no error when
a defendant must use a peremptory strike to
cure what would otherwise be a violation of a
constitutional right, there can be no error
when a defendant exercised all of his per-
emptory strikes but perhaps would have ex-
ercised them differently in other circum-
stances, As our own supreme court has said,
“there is no principled basis for interpreting
a court rule governing peremptory chal-
lenges more broadly than a federal constitu-
tional right.” State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz.
192, 140, 68 P.8d 418, 427 (2003), Here, the
trial court remedied the Batson violations in
one of the ways approved of in Batson itself,
and there has been no suggestion that the
jury impaneled was anything less than im-
partial.

131 Nor did the trial court’s remedy vio-
late Urrea’s statutory right to peremptory
strikes. The Supreme Court held in United
States v. Martinez—Salazar, 528 U.S. 304,
817, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000),
that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory
strikes pursuant to [the federal rule granting
peremptory strikes] is not denied or im-
paired when the defendant chooses to use a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror who
should have been excused for cause.” As
noted above, removing jurors for cause is
necessary to make the impaneled jury impar-
tial, whereas peremptory strikes are merely
a means towards that end.

182 Lastly, the dissent’s suggestion that
“failing to remedy a Batson violation consti-
tutes structural error” appears to be based
on a misapplication of case law and the con-
flation of a non-remedied “Batson violation”
with a theoretical failure to strictly comply
with the procedural outlines of Rule 18.5(g).
The cases applying structural error review to
issues of jury selection do so either because a
juror was wrongly placed on the jury, see,
eg., United States v. McFerron, 168 F.8d
952, 954-56 (6th Cir. 1998), or because a trial
court allowed improper strikes of jurors in
violation of Batson, see, eg., Tankleff v. Sen-
kowski, 185 F.8d 285, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1998),
The situation presented here is much differ-
ent, and the cases cited by the dissent do not
compel the outcome suggested therein, par-
ticularly in view of Martinez-Salazar. See

528

Hickman, 205 Ariz, 192, 11 18-14, 68 P.3d at
421 (noting that, after Martinez-Salazar, a
number of courts adopted harmless error
review for cases in which a defendant used a
peremptory strike to remove a juror that
should have been removed for cause).

133 Our supreme court held in Hickman
that impairment of a defendant’s statutory
right to peremptory strikes only requires
reversal upon a showing of prejudice. 205
Ariz. 192, 182, 68 P.38d at 425-26, Applying
that standard here, and even accepting ar-
guendo the trial court failed to comply with
Rule 18,5(g), Urrea cannot show prejudice.
The dissent’s conclusion that Urrea was prej-
udiced because one “improperly struck juror
... did not serve on the jury” is undereut by
Ross, Martinez-Salazar, Hickman, and the
well-established principle that a defendant is
not entitled to any particular juror, but only
a fair trial. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 140, 160
P.8d at 213. Our dissenting colleague gener-
ally acknowledges the broad discretion ac-
corded trial courts in fashioning a Batson
remedy and identifies a number of potential
variants, save the reasonable and appropriate
remedy adopted by the trial court here. That
remedy was in accord with Batson and its
progeny, and well within the court’s discre-
tion.

Profile Testimony

Hs {34 Urrea lastly claims the trial
court erroneously admitted improper expert
testimony at trial.!° He alleges that, over his
objection, the state’s expert “testified to what
was essentially ‘profile’ evidence concerning
the manner in which drug[ ] transactions oc-
cur and the role of individuals in these trans-
actions, including drug couriers.” The state
counters that the challenged testimony was
not profile evidence, and even if it were, any
error was harmless, We review the trial
court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion, State v,
Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz, 590, 118, 325
P.8d 996, 1000 (2014),

HM 185 Drug courier profile evidence
has been described as “an ‘informal compila-
tion of characteristics’ ... typically displayed

10. Urrea additionally renews his claim that De-
tective Felix was untimely disclosed and should
have been precluded from testifying, His failure
to develop or support this argument, however,

by persons trafficking in illegal drugs.” State
v. Lee, 191 Ariz, 542, 110, 959 P.2d 799, 801
(1998), quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 488,
440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980).
Our supreme court has condemned the pres-
entation of such evidence as substantive
proof of guilt at trial. See id. 112. In con-
trast, generalized expert testimony about the
way drug traffickers typically operate has
been upheld. See State v. Gongalez, 229 Ariz,
550, 118, 278 P.8d 828, 882 (App. 2012), An
expert oversteps the permissible bounds
when the testimony relates not just to gener-
alized patterns of a criminal organization, but
compares the modus operandi of a specific
organization to the conduct of a defendant in
a particular case, See State v. Garcia-Quin-
tana, 284 Aviz, 267, 11 14-15, 821 P.8d 482,
436 (App. 2014).

186 Urvea broadly asserts the trial court
erred in allowing the state’s expert to testify
“concerning the manner in which drug[]
transactions occur and the role of individuals
in these transactions.” But, as noted above,
such generalized testimony has been found to
be admissible modus operandi evidence, rath-
er than inadmissible profile evidence. See
Gonzalez, 229 Ariz, 550, 118, 278 P.8d at 332.
And because Urrea has made only a vague
claim, without specifying any particular
statement he takes exception to, we are un-
able to meaningfully address the issue fur-
ther, See Ariz, R, Crim. P. 81.18(¢)(1)(vi)
(requiring citations to portions of the record
relied on); State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, n.9,
94 P.8d 1119, 1147 n.9 (2004) (undeveloped
arguments waived),

Ws«1.87 Arguments made for the
first time on appeal are reviewed for funda-
mental error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz.
561, 119, 115 P.8d 601, 607 (2005), Here,
Urrea has not argued the error was funda-
mental, nor have we found error which could
be so characterized. See State v, Torres, 233
Ariz, 479, 19, 814 P.8d 825, 827 (App. 2018);
see also Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349,
917, 185 P.8d at 140 (fundamental error
waived if not argued), And to the extent
Urrea suggests the officer’s testimony was

waives the issue and we do not address it further,
See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, n.9, 94 P.3d
1119, 1147 n.9 (2004) (merely mentioning argu-
ment insufficient).

impermissible opinion regarding whether the
drugs were for sale or for personal use, we
again reject such an argument, See, ag.,
State v, Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 1120-21, 179
P.8d 954, 959-60 (App. 2008). Urrea testified
at trial that he was on his way from Tucson
to Phoenix with the cocaine “to party” with
his cousin, The only issue for the jury was
whether the 61.8 grams of cocaine in Urrea’s
possession was for personal use or for sale,
As this court has repeatedly held, so long as
proper foundation is laid, a qualified law
enforcement officer may opine on whether a
particular defendant possessed drugs for sale
or for personal use. See State v. Carreon, 151
Ariz, 615, 616-17, 729 P.2d 969, 970-71 (App.
1986). There was no error in the trial court’s
admission of the expert testimony in this
case,

Disposition
138 For all the foregoing reasons, Urrea’s
conviction and sentence are affirmed.

MILLER, Judge, dissenting:

39 I agree with my colleagues that a trial
court has broad discretion to fashion an ap-
propriate remedy for a Batson violation, and
we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse
of discretion. I also agree that imposing ei-
ther of the two remedies the Supreme Court
mentioned in Batson is not an abuse of dis-
cretion, Those two remedies are: (1) “dise-
hargfing] the venire and select[ing] a new
jury from a panel not previously associated
with the case,” or (2) “disallow[ing] the dis-
eriminatory challenges and resum[ing] selec-
tion with the improperly challenged jurors
reinstated on the venire.” Batson, 476 U.S, at
99 n.24, 106 S.Ct. 1712. But the trial court
imposed only an incomplete version of the
latter remedy, and it impaired Urrea’s right
to peremptory challenges under Rule 18.5(g),
Ariz. R. Crim. P, A defendant who perceives

11. A non-capital criminal case in which the sen-
tence authorized by law is less than thirty years
requires a jury of eight, and typically, as here,
the court will qualify one alternate juror as well
for a total of nine. See A.R.S. § 21-102(A)-(B);
Ariz, R, Crim. P. 18,1(a), 18.2, 18.4(c)(1)Gi),
18.5(b), (h).

12, A Batson violation necessarily includes a find-
ing of discriminatory intent. Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60, 111 S.Ct, 1859, 114
L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (‘Unless a discriminatory

529

a Batson violation should not be given a
Hobson’s choice whether to assert his right
to a constitutionally valid jury or to relin-
quish his Rule 18.5 right to exercise his
peremptory challenges. For the reasons that
follow, I conclude the court abused its disere-
tion when it sustained Urrea’s Batson chal-
lenges to three jurors, but did not allow him
to exercise peremptory challenges with the
remaining members of the jury panel.

40 Each party is allowed six peremptory
challenges in a noncapital case tried in supe-
rior court, such as the present case. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.4(c)(1)Gi). The procedure for
the use of peremptory challenges is set forth
in Rule 18.5(g). After examining the jurors,
the prosecutor and the defendant take turns
exercising their peremptory challenges on
the clerk’s list, beginning with the prosecu-
tor. Id. Hither party may waive its remaining
challenges on one of its turns, but the other
party is nevertheless entitled to use all of its
remaining challenges if desired. Id. “If the
parties fail to exercise the full number of
challenges allowed them, the clerk shall
strike the jurors on the bottom of the list
until only the number to serve, plus alter-
nates, remain” (here, nine total). Id.

141 Here, the trial court found the state’s
fourth, fifth, and sixth peremptory challenges
violated Batson. The court quashed those
challenges and reinstated the three improp-
erly struck jurors on the clerk’s list. The
court then ordered that the first nine remain-
ing names on the revised list would serve as
the jurors and the alternate. The venireper-
sons the state had improperly stricken with
its fourth and fifth peremptory challenges—
EL. and FG, respectively—ultimately
served on the jury. The clerk struck from the
bottom of the list C.C., the venireperson the
state had improperly stricken with its sixth
peremptory challenge.

intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation,

the reason [for a peremptory strike] will be

deemed race neutral.”), Therefore, I cannot
agree with the majority’s conclusion that there
was a “lack of any misconduct by the state’ and
the situation was not “serious[ ]"’ enough to war-
rant a robust remedy. The arguably inconsistent
statement by the trial court regarding the prose-
cutor does not obviate the trial court's finding of

a Batson violation, which requires discriminatory

intent,

530

142 The trial court did not abuse its dis-
eretion by quashing the state’s three improp-
er strikes and reinstating the wrongfully
struck prospective jurors on the clerk’s list.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 106 S.Ct.
1712. However, the court abused its discre-
tion when it stopped there. The court was
“obligated” to seat the improperly struck
jurors on the jury, not merely reinstate them
on the clerk’s list. Conerly v. State, 544 So.2d
1870, 1871-72 (Miss. 1989); accord Ellerbee v.
State, 215 Ga.App. 812, 450 S.H.2d 443, 447—
48 (1994) (reasoning such jurors have right
not to be excluded from jury on basis of
race), overruled on other grounds by Feli« v.
State, 271 Ga. 584,523 S.H.2d 1 (1999).!8 Fur-
thermore, after reseating the improperly
struck jurors the court was required to redo
the Rule 18.5(g) procedure, at least as to
Urrea’s fourth, fifth, and sixth strikes, which
had occurred after the Batson taint had be-
gun. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24, 106
S.Ct. 1712 (court within its discretion if it
“reswme[s] selection with the improperly
challenged jurors reinstated on the venire”)
(emphasis added). At a minimum, the court
‘was required to vacate those strikes without
prejudice and give Urrea another opportuni-
ty to exercise them from among the remain-
ing venirepersons. Alternatively, in its discre-
tion, the court could have vacated all prior
valid peremptory challenges without preju-
dice and conducted the entire Rule 18.5(g)
procedure anew, The court could have re-
turned the three improperly-used perempto-
ry strikes to the prosecutor, see United
States v. Ramirez-Martinez, 278 F.8d 908,
910 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d
1186 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane), or it could

13, However, reinstatement may not always be
possible. See, e.g. Chin, 771 N.Y.S.2d at 159
(reinstatement not feasible because improperly
struck juror already released from service); State
v. Walker, 154 Wis.2d 158, 453 N.W.2d 127, 135
n.12 (1990) (in jury box system, where prospec-
tive jurors are seated, examined, and publicly
challenged or accepted one at a time, reinstate-
ment could cause juror bias against attorney who
made improper strike), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Felix, 339 Wis.2d 670, 811
N.W.2d 775 (2012).

14, The majority indicates that the nature of rem-
edy must be matched against the severity of the

have found those strikes forfeited as a conse-
quence of the Batson violation, see Luciano,
860 N.Y,S.2d 452, 890 N.H.2d at 218; Peete v.
State, 180 S.W.8d 755, 760-61 (Tex. App.
2005). If the latter, the court also could have
granted Urrea additional peremptory chal-
lenges in its discretion. Cf Chin, 771
N.Y.S.2d at 159; Hill, 727 A2d 578, 115.

148 Instead of employing any of these
permissible alternatives,“ the trial court
merely left in place the state’s three valid
peremptory challenges and Urrea’s six per-
emptory challenges, which were all made be-
fore the Batson issue had ever been raised.
The practical effect of the ruling was to deny
Urrea the full benefit and use of his peremp-
tory challenges. This was an error of law and
an abuse of diseretion. See State v. Wall, 212
Ariz, 1, 112, 126 P.8d 148, 150 (2006) (error
of law committed in reaching discretionary
conclusion may constitute abuse of discre-
tion).

944 In announcing its ruling, the trial
court stated, “we're running out of time” and
“w]e can’t just sit here and talk about it for
two days.” Although the court’s frustration
with the lack of Arizona case law guidance
was understandable, simply truncating the
proceeding with an inadequate remedy was
not sufficient, particularly where it was sim-
ple and efficient to permit another round of
peremptory challenges. The original chal-
lenges took the attorneys no more than
eighty-one minutes including their lunch
break. A second round would have taken half
that time and would not have inconvenienced
the jury panel, which was on break. See also
Andrews, 78 A.8d at 984 (“The remedy or
remedies selected to redress a Batson ...
violation must never be informed solely by
the desire to expedite a trial.”).

violation, citing Milliken, 433 U.S, at 279-80, 97
S.Ct. 2749, and Willis, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 43
P.3d at 134-35. These cases are not on point.
Milliken involved the propriety of the equitable
remedy of remedial education in the context of a
school desegregation case involving the Detroit
school system. 433 U.S. at 269, 279, 97 S.Ct.
2749. Willis concerned the offensive use of multi-
ple, continuous Batson violations to force a mis-
trial under California's then-absolute rule requir-
ing a mistrial. 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 43 P.3d at
133-37. Neither case supports the proposition
that Batson violations are weighed for severity
before deciding the appropriate remedy.

145 The question becomes whether this
court should employ structural error review
or trial error review to a court's failure to
remedy a Batson violation adequately. See
generally Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 112, 115
P.8d at 605-06 (distinguishing structural er-
vor and trial error). “[TJhe exercise of per-
emptory strikes ‘is considered one of the
accused’s most important rights,” and it is
substantial, not merely procedural or techni-
cal.5 State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court,
181 Ariz. 271, 274, 889 P.2d 629, 682 (App.
1995), quoting Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a
Delicate Balance, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 1, 11 (1988), Our supreme court has even
described the right as “absolute.” State v
Thompson, 68 Ariz, 886, 389-90, 206 P.2d
1087, 1089-40 (1949). That court has also
cautioned against overreliance on trial error
review in the Rule 185 context and has
specifically expressed its concern that appli-
cation of trial error review could “justify ...
impaneling a jury from which minorities
were excluded.” State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz.
814, 122, 4 P.8d 869, 378-79 (2000). Notably,
in Anderson the court cited Arizona v, Ful-
minante, 499 U.S, 279, 309-10, 111 S.Ct.
1246, 118 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), in which the
United States Supreme Court held that “un-
lawful exclusion of members of the defen-
dant’s race from a grand jury” is structural
error. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 814, 122, 4 P.8d
at 878-79; see also Batson, 476 U.S, at 84 n.8,
106 S.Ct. 1712 (noting basic principles pro-
hibiting racial discrimination essentially iden-
15. The practice of peremptory challenges is not

without its critics, See, eg., State v. Medina, 172

Ariz. 287, 290, 836 P.2d 997, 1000 (App. 1992)

(many based on “ugly generalizations”); Vivien

Toomey Montz & Craig Lee Montz, The Peremp-

tory Challenge: Should It Still Exist? An Exami-

nation of Federal and Florida Law, 54 U. Miami

L. Rev. 451, 481-86 (2000) (empirical evidence

suggests attorneys "generally unsuccessful in re-

liably predicting jurors’ tendencies"); Morris B.

Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abol-

ished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 809, 871 (1997) (dubious theories underly-

ing exercise of peremptory challenges are “[alt

worst ... our old friends racism, sexism, and
class hatred all dressed up in twentieth century
psychobabble” even after Batson, and “[alt best,
they are animus-free nonsense, but nonsense
nonetheless”), But unless and until our supreme
court prohibits peremptory challenges, we are

531

tical as to grand juries and petit juries), To
apply harmless error review to an unreme-
died Batson violation would effectively per-
petuate the wrongs addressed in Anderson.
For these reasons, I would hold that failure
to remedy a Batson violation in accordance
with Rule 18.5(g) constitutes structural error
requiring reversal. See, eg., Tankleff, 185
F.3d at 248; McFerron, 163 F.8d at 955-56
(collecting cases “resoundingly rejectfing]”
harmless error review of Batson errors);
Ruiz v. Comm’r of Corr., 156 Conn.App. 821,
113 A.3d 485, 493 n.6 (2015).

146 The majority’s reliance on Martinez-
Salazar, Ross, and Hickman for the proposi-
tion that harmless error review applies is
misplaced. In each of those cases, the defen-
dant used a peremptory challenge to strike a
juror whom the court should have dismissed
for cause. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at
808-09, 120 S.Ct. 774; Ross, 487 U.S. at 838,
108 S.Ct. 2278; Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 18,
68 P.8d at 419. In such a situation, only the
defendant’s rights are at stake, and as long
as the jury ultimately impaneled is fair and
impartial, the defendant is not prejudiced.
See Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 1 28, 68 P.8d at
424, But unlike those cases, Batson is about
more than just ensuring a fair trial for a
defendant. See Powers, 499 U.S, at 406-07,
111 S.Ct. 1864 (Batson serves multiple ends,
only one of which is to protect defendant
from discrimination). It is also about safe-
guarding participatory democracy and the
equal protection rights of venirepersons.!7
See JLB. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B,, 511 US.
127, 142 n.18, 114 8,Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89

required to treat them as a substantial right that
cannot be abrogated without justification.

16. The majority suggests Thompson is no longer
authoritative because it cited a treatise since
changed, but does not contend it has been abro-
gated or overruled. See also Hickman, 205 Ariz.
192, 126, 68 P.3d at 424 (distinguishing Thomp-
son rather than undermining it), “We are con-
strained by decisions of the Arizona Supreme
Court and may not overrule, modify, or disregard
them.” Craven v. Huppenthal, 236 Ariz, 217, 113,
338 P.3d 324, 327 (App. 2014).

17. Although the majority is correct that peremp-
tory challenges are not of a constitutional dimen-
sion, Batson, of course, is. Batson, 476 U.S. at
89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, citing U.S. Const, amend,
XIV, § 1.

532

(1994) (“the right to nondiscriminatory jury
selection procedures belongs to the potential
jurors, as well as to the litigants”), Uncured.
Batson violations undermine the integrity of
the judicial system by telling citizens they
ean be denied the right to sit on juries
because of the color of their skin, their eth-
nicity, or their gender. See id. at 140-42 &
n.18, 114 S.Ct, 1419 Giseriminatory jury se-
lection procedures erode public confidence in
trial fairness and send message to all in
courtroom and beyond “that certain individu-
als, for no reason other than gender [or
race], are presumed unqualified by state ac-
tors to decide important questions upon
which reasonable persons could disagree”). If
our citizens do not believe that courts and
attorneys can fairly seat them as jurors, it
will negatively affect the truth-finding pro-
cess of jurors actually seated. See id. (dis-
eriminatory use of peremptory challenges
harms litigants “by the risk that the preju-
dice that motivated the discriminatory selec-
tion of the jury will infect the entire proceed-
ings”); see also Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 1 22,
4 P.8d at 378-79, quoting Fulminante, 499
US, at 809-10, 111 8.Ct. 1246 (“[E]rrors that
create ‘defects ... in the trial mechanism’
itself affect the ‘entire conduct of the trial
from beginning to end, damage ‘the frame-
work within which the trial proceeds, and
are therefore not subject to harmless error

18, The majority is correct that Urrea had no
right to a particular jury, Morris, 215 Ariz. 324,
140, 160 P.3d at 213, but that observation does
not address or obviate the rights of citizens “not
to be excluded from [a particular petit jury] on
account of race,” Powers, 499 U.S, at 409, 111
S.Ct, 1364, as happened here,

analysis,”), The majority recognizes the equal
protection rights of jurors wrongfully exclud-
ed based on race, yet ultimately does not
afford them a means to remedy those
rights."

147 Even assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that a Batson violation constitutes tech-
nical error, which would not require reversal
in the absence of prejudice to the defendant,
the error was not harmless here. The prac-
tical result of the trial court’s incomplete
remedy was that improperly struck juror
C.C. did not serve on the jury. By merely
striking the bottom three names from a list
that included the reinstated jurors, rather
than ordering that the improperly struck ju-
rors serve on the jury and then reinitiating
the Rule 18.5(g) procedure, the court effec-
tively ratified one of the prosecutor’s uncon-
stitutional strikes,

148 Accordingly, I would reverse and re-
mand for a new trial.” Cf State v. Boston,
170 Ariz, 815, 817-18, 828 P.2d 1823, 1825-26
(App. 1991) (reversing conviction and re-
manding for new trial where jury had been
selected in violation of Batson). I respectfully
dissent,

19. Because the suppression and profile testimo-
ny issues would be likely to recur on remand, I
would address those issues and reach the same
conclusions as my colleagues. See State v. May,
210 Ariz, 452, 11, 112 P.3d 39, 40 (App. 2005).

399 P.3d 80

ARIZONA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
& INDUSTRY, an Arizona non-profit
corporation; the Greater Phoenix Cham-
ber of Commerce, an Arizona non-profit
corporation; the Tucson Hispanic Cham-
ber of Commerce, an Arizona non-profit
corporation; the Greater Flagstaff
Chamber of Commerce, an Arizona non-
profit corporation; and the Arizona Li-
censed Beverage Association, an Arizona
non-profit organization; Arizona Res-
taurant Association, an Arizona non-
profit corporation; the Yuma County
Chamber of Commerce, an Arizona non-
profit corporation; Mare Community
Resources, Inc., an Arizona non-profit
corporation; the Arizona Free Enter-
prise Club, an Arizona non-profit organ-
ization; and ABRIO Family Services and
Supports, Inc., an Arizona corporation,
Plaintiffs/Petitioners,

ve

Honorable Daniel J. KILEY, Judge of the
Superior Court of the State of Arizona,
in and for the County of Maricopa, Re-
spondent Judge,

State of Arizona; Industrial Commission
of Arizona, a public entity; Arizona
Health Care Cost Containment System,
a public entity; Thomas J. Betlach, in
his official capacity as Director of the
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment.
System; Arizona Department of Admin-
istration, a public entity; Craig C.
Brown, in his official capacity as the
Director of the Arizona Department of
Administration, Defendants/Real Parties
in Interest,

and

Arizonans for Fair Wages and Healthy
Families Supporting Prop 206, Interve-
nor-Defendant/Real Party in Interest,

No. CV-16-0314-SA
Supreme Court of Arizona,
Filed August 2, 2017

8

1S

te
l

Brett W. Johnson (argued), Sara J. Agne,
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Phoenix; Attorneys
for Arizona Chamber of Commerce & Indus-
try, the Greater Phoenix Chamber of Com-
merce, the Tucson Hispanie Chamber of
Commerce, the Greater Flagstaff Chamber
of Commerce, the Arizona Restaurant Asso-
ciation, the Yuma County Chamber of Com-
merce, Mare Community Resources, Inc., the
Arizona Free Enterprise Club, and ABRIO
Family Services and Supports, Inc.; Timothy
A, La Sota, Timothy A, La Sota, PLC, Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Arizona Licensed Bever-
age Association

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic EK. Draye, Solicitor General, Charles

535

A. Grube (argued), Senior Agency Counsel,
Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Stephen W, Tully, Hinshaw & Culbertson
LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Industrial Com-
mission of Arizona, Arizona Department of
Administration, and Craig C. Brown.

Logan T. Johnston, Johnston Law Offices,
P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona
Health Care Cost Containment System and
Thomas J. Betlach

Israel G. Torres, James E. Barton II (ar-
gued), Saman Golestan, Torres Law Group,
PLLC, Tempe, Attorneys for Arizonans for
Fair Wages and Healthy Families Support-
ing Prop 206

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County
Attorney, Joseph I. Vigil, Joseph Branco,
Deputy County Attorneys, Civil Services Di-
vision, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Maricopa County

Brian M. Bergin, Bergin, Frakes, Smalley
& Oberholtzer, PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Amici; Michael T. Liburdi, Kathryn
Hackett King, General Counsel to Governor
Douglas A. Ducey, Phoenix, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae Governor Douglas A. Ducey
and Office of Strategic Planning & Budget-
ing; Josh Kredit, Arizona House of Repre-
sentatives, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Cu-
riae House Speaker J.D, Mesnard; and Greg
Jernigan, Jeff Kros, Arizona State Senate,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Senate
President Steve Yarbrough

Rhonda L. Barnes and Jay Tomkus, Ari-
zona House of Representatives, Phoenix; and
Lisette Flores, Arizona State Senate, Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Senate Mi-
nority Leader Katie Hobbs and House Mi-
nority Leader Rebecca Rios

Stanley Lubin, Lubin & Enoch, P.C., Phoe-
nix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae National
Employment Law Project and A Better Bal-
ance

Jonathan Riches, Scharf-Norton Center
for Constitutional Litigation at the Goldwater
Institute, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Cu-
riae Goldwater Institute

David Wells, Mesa, for Amicus Curiae
David Wells, Ph.D., citizen resident of Ari-
zona

536

John R. Dacey, Christopher L. Hering,
Gammage & Burnham, P.L.C., Phoenix, At-
torneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Associa-
tion of Providers for Persons with Disabili-
ties

Jean-Jacques Cabou, Perkins Coie LLP,
Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Living
United For Change In Arizona

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
BOLICK, GOULD, and LOPHZ joined.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

11 The Arizona electorate approved Prop-
osition 206, “The Fair Wages and Healthy
Families Act,” in the November 2016 elec-
tion, thereby increasing the minimum wage
and establishing earned paid sick leave, Peti-
tioners ask us to declare that Proposition 206
violates the Arizona Constitution's Revenue
Souree Rule, Separate Amendment Rule, and
Single Subject Rule. We decline to do so,
holding instead that Proposition 206 does not
violate these provisions.

BACKGROUND

12 The Arizona Constitution, article 4,
part 1, section 1@), empowers qualified
electors to propose by initiative laws for the
voters’ approval. Proposition 206 is one such
initiative. Upon voter approval, Proposition
206 was codified as A.R.S, $$ 28-863 and 23—
871 to -881. It increases Arizona’s minimum
wage incrementally over a three-year period
and then requires annual increases tied to
the consumer price index. A.R.S, § 23-363. It
also requires employers to provide mandato-
ry sick leave of one hour for every thirty
hours worked. Id. §§ 23-872 to -873, The
State of Arizona, the United States, and cer-
tain small businesses are exempt from Prop-
osition 206’s requirements. See A.R.S. § 23~
862(B), The Proposition’s minimum wage
provisions went into effect on January 1,
2017, and the sick leave provisions went into
effect on July 1, 2017.

18 Petitioners filed suit seeking a declara-
tion that Proposition 206 violates the Reve-
nue Source Rule (Ariz, Const. art. 9, § 23),

the Separate Amendment Rule (Ariz, Const.
art. 21, § 1), and the Single Subject Rule
(Ariz, Const. art. 4, pt, 2, § 18). They also
sought to preliminarily enjoin implementa-
tion and enforeement of the Proposition, Af-
ter the superior court denied a preliminary
injunction, Petitioners sought special action
relief with this Court,

14 We previously accepted jurisdiction of
the petition for special action, rejected Peti-
tioners’ constitutional challenges, and denied
relief noting a written opinion explaining our
decision would follow. This Court has juris-
diction pursuant to article 6, section (5), of
the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

I. The Revenue Source Rule

II 15 The Revenue Source Rule was
referred to voters by the legislature and
passed in the November 2004 election. Ariz,
Const. art. 9, § 28, Historical and Statutory
Notes. It provides:

A. An initiative or referendum measure
that proposes a mandatory expenditure of
state revenues for any purpose, establishes
a fund for any specific purpose or allocates
funding for any specific purpose must also
provide for an increased source of reve-
nues sufficient to cover the entire immedi-
ate and future costs of the proposal. The
increased revenues may not be derived
from the state general fund or reduce or
cause a reduction in general fund reve-
nues.

B. If the identified revenue source provid-
ed pursuant to subsection A in any fiscal
year fails to fund the entire mandated
expenditure for that fiscal year, the legisla-
ture may reduce the expenditure of state
revenues for that purpose in that fiscal
year to the amount of funding supplied by
the identified revenue source,

Ariz, Const. art. 9, § 28, Any challenge to an
initiative or referendum under the Revenue
Source Rule must be made after the measure
passes. League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v.
Brewer, 218 Ariz. 557, 562 125, 146 P.8d 58,
63 (2006).

16 Proposition 206 does not explicitly pro-
pose a mandatory expenditure of state reve-
nues, establish a fund, or allocate funding,
And because Proposition 206 does not apply
to state employees, the state’s payroll is
unaffected. Petitioners, the Arizona Chamber
of Commerce & Industry and others, never-
theless assert that Proposition 206 “proposes
a mandatory expenditure of state revenues”
as contemplated by the Revenue Source Rule
because (1) the Industrial Commission of Ari-
zona (“ICA”) is required to implement the
sick leave provisions, and (2) other state
agencies will be forced to increase their ex-
penditures to third parties “[t]o comply with
federal law, contract provisions, and reality.”
Petitioners argue that Proposition 206 does
not provide an independent revenue source
to cover these costs, and the measure there-
fore violates the Revenue Source Rule.

17 Real-parties-in-interest, the State and
intervenor Arizonans for Fair Wages and
Healthy Families Supporting Prop 206, coun-
ter that the Revenue Source Rule applies
only to initiatives and referendums that di-
rectly require expenditures and does not ap-
ply when such measures merely cause reve-
nue expenditures or require state agencies to
act. They contend that Proposition 206 does
not explicitly require a mandatory expendi-
ture of state revenues and therefore complies
with the Revenue Source Rule.

A. Meaning of the Revenue Source
Rule

18 Resolution of this dispute turns initially
on the meaning of “proposfing] a mandatory
expenditure of state revenues” as used in the
Revenue Source Rule, § 28(A). Before decid-
ing this issue, we address real-parties-in-in-
terest’s argument, adopted by the superior
court, that even if Proposition 206 violates
§ 28(A), the provision remains valid because
§ 28(B) would relieve the state from expend-
ing revenues to fund the measure. We dis-
agree, By its terms, § 23(B) is triggered only
when an “identified revenue source [is] pro-
vided pursuant to subsection A.” If that reve-
mue source fails to fully fund a mandated
expenditure for a fiscal year, the legislature
may reduce funding in the amount equal to
the shortfall. Section 23(B) does not apply,

537

however, if § 28(A) requires an independent
funding source and one is not provided. In
that case, the initiative or referendum would
be rendered unconstitutional as a whole un-
less valid parts of the measure could be
upheld under the severability doctrine. See
Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz, 428, 427 1 18,
989 P.2d 751, 755 (1999) (discussing the sev-
erability doctrine).

HME 119 We construe § 28(A) “to ascer-
tain and give effect to the intent and purpose
of the framers and the people who adopted
it.” Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz, 284, 289 9 26,
218 P.8d 671, 676 (2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). To do so, we give
the words used “their natural, obvious and
ordinary meaning” unless the context sug-
gests otherwise, Id. We apply the provision
as written if it is subject to only one reason-
able meaning. See Ariz. Early Childhood
Dev. & Health Bd. v. Brewer, 221 Aviz, 467,
470 110, 212 P.3d 805, 808 (2009), But if the
provision is unclear, “we can consider the
history behind the provision, the purpose
sought to be accomplished by its enactment,
and the evil sought to be remedied.” Cain v.
Horne, 220 Aviz, 7, 80 110, 202 P.8d 1178,
1181 (2009) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

Hs 110 We conclude that “proposfing]
a mandatory expenditure of state revenues”
occurs whenever an initiative or referendum
explicitly requires either an expenditure of
state revenues or state actions that them-
selves inherently require expenditure of state
revenues. A mandatory expenditure of state
revenues does not occur if an initiative or
referendum only indirectly causes an expen-
diture of state revenues.

{11 First, § 28(A) by its terms provides
that the Revenue Source Rule applies when-
ever the initiative or referendum itself affir-
matively requires an expenditure of state
revenues. Cf Farris v. Advantage Capital
Corp., 217 Ariz. 1, 2 15, 170 P.8d 250, 251
(2007) (stating that courts look first to statu-
tory text as the best indicator of intent).
Specifically, the Rule calls for an indepen-
dent funding source whenever an initiative or
referendum “propose[s]” a mandatory expen-
diture of state revenues, “establishes” a fund,
or “allocates” funding. Nothing in § 23(A)

538

suggests that the Rule applies whenever the
initiative or referendum merely causes in-
creased state spending. Cf League of Ariz.
Cities & Towns, 218 Ariz, at 562 126, 146
P.8d at 68 (stating in dicta that the initiative
at issue likely does not violate the Revenue
Source Rule because “[aJny expenditure of
state general funds ... depends on the legis-
lature’s actions” rather than a mandate of
the initiative), Tellingly, § 28(A) addresses
“cause” only in the context of addressing a
sufficient independent funding source, which
suggests that the referring legislature and
voters intended “mandatory expenditure”
and “cause” to mean different things. See
Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 23(A) (providing that if
an independent funding source is required, it
“may not ... cause a reduction in general
fund revenues”),

112 Second, even if we assume § 23(A) is
ambiguous, interpreting the Revenue Source
Rule as applying whenever an initiative or
referendum indirectly causes an expenditure
of state revenues would severely hamper the
initiative process. Cf Ariz. Harly Childhood

Dev. & Health Bd., 221 Ariz, at 470 110, 212
P.8d at 808 (stating that when an initiative-
created statute is ambiguous, courts may
consider the consequences and effects of al-
ternate constructions). It is implausible that
qualified electors who seek to propose an
initiative measure could successfully scour
the state’s innumerable dealings to anticipate
and provide a funding source for any conceiv-
able expenditures of state revenues that a
ballot measure might indirectly cause. For
example, electors would have to account for
the costs to train affected employees, con-
tract for goods and services, or even to pub-
lish the new law itself. Our construction of
§ 28(A) avoids this cumbersome consequence
and preserves an initiative and referendum
practice that has been a tool of direct democ-
racy for more than a century. Gf Whitman v.
Moore, 59 Ariz, 211, 218, 125 P.2d 445, 452
(1942), overruled, in part, on other grounds
by Renck v, Superior Court, 66 Ariz, $20,
827, 187 P.2d 656, 663 (1947) (stating that
whether to include initiative and referendum
in our constitution “was a burning issue” at
statehood and both the delegates and the
voters considered its inclusion “among the
most important” provisions).

118 We reject, however, the real-parties-
in-interest’s assertion that the Revenue
Source Rule, § 28(A) applies only when an
initiative or referendum explicitly directs an
expenditure of state revenues and not when
it directs state action that itself inherently
requires such an expenditure. If we were to
adopt this construction, the Rule could be
easily circumvented. For example, rather
than directing the legislature to spend one
million dollars to establish a new agency, an
initiative could simply direct the legislature
to establish the agency. This would result in
the type of unfunded mandate the Revenue
Source Rule sought to remedy. Cf Smith v.
Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212
Ariz. 407, 410 16, 182 P.8d 1187, 1190 (2006)
(“We construe constitutional provisions in
light of the purpose of the enactment and the
evil sought to be remedied.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)), Thus,
fairly read, the Revenue Source Rule also
applies whenever an initiative or referendum
expressly requires state action that inherent-
ly requires a non-discretionary expenditure
of state revenues,

114 Our view aligns with the Nevada Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of its corollary
to the Revenue Source Rule. See Herbst
Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 122 Nev. 877, 141
P.8d 1224 (2006). The Herbst court held that
an initiative that expanded a statutory list of
public places in which smoking is banned did
not “require the expenditure of money”
merely because the measure would increase
enforcement costs. Jd. at 1282-33, Because
the measure “{did] not, for example, compel
an inerease or reallocation of police officers
to enforce its provisions,” but left enforce-
ment mechanics and budgeting discretion en-
tirely with government officials, the court
was persuaded that a revenue-generating
provision was not required. Id. at 1238; of
State ew. vel. Card v, Kaufman, 517 8.W.2d
78, 79-80 (Mo. 1974) (holding that a proposed
initiative to require University City to pay its
firefighters salaries equal to that paid by St.
Louis deprived University City officials of
budgeting discretion and was therefore “an
appropriation” that violated Missouri's ver-
sion of the Revenue Source Rule),

HI 115 We next turn to the parties’ ar-
guments concerning Proposition 206, We re-
view the constitutionality of Proposition 206
de novo. See In ve Leon G., 204 Ariz, 15, 19
19, 59 P.8d 779, 788 (2002). We also presume
it complies with the Revenue Source Rule,
Cf. Gallardo , State, 286 Ariz. 84, 87-88 19,
336 P.8d 717, 720-21 (2014) (discussing pre-
sumption of constitutionality generally af-
forded to legislative enactments).

B. The ICA

HM 116 Proposition 206 authorizes the
ICA to “coordinate implementation and en-
forcement” of earned paid sick time and re-
quires the ICA to “promulgate appropriate
guidelines or regulations for such purposes.”
ARS, § 28-876. The Proposition also pro-
vides that the ICA “shall create and make
available to employers ... model notices” for
employers’ use in providing written notice to
employees about Proposition 206’s earned
paid sick time provisions. Jd. § 28-875(D),

117 We agree with Petitioners that the
provisions requiring the ICA to promulgate
guidelines or regulations and to create model
notices constitute a “mandatory expenditure
of state revenues,” as contemplated by the
Revenue Source Rule, § 23(A), The ICA has
no discretion to ignore these provisions or to
refuse to allocate state revenues to accom-
plish the required tasks. And, unlike the case
in Herbst, Proposition 206 does not merely
expand application of an existing ICA pro-
gram but requires the ICA to take specific
actions to implement new earned paid sick
leave provisions. The Revenue Source Rule,
§ 23(A) therefore requires that Proposition
206 provide an independent funding source
for these tasks.

HH 1 18 Proposition 206 provides a fund-
ing source for the ICA tasks by amending
ARS, § 28-864(G) to permit the imposition
of civil penalties on employers that fail to pay
earned sick time to employees. Section 23~
864(G) also provides that “[clivil penalties
shall be retained by the agency that recov-
ered them and used to finance activities to
enforce this article,’ which includes the
earned paid sick time provisions. See also
ARS. § 28-864(A) (“For purposes of this
section ... ‘article’ shall mean both article 8

539

[minimum wage] and article 8.1 [earned paid
sick time] of this chapter.”). Enforcement of
the earned paid sick time provisions em-
braces the ICA’s mandate to issue guidelines
or regulations and to provide model notices
to employers. Section 28-876 plainly states
that the guidelines and regulations are to be
used to implement and enforce the sick time
provisions. And providing model notices pro-
motes enforcement by educating employers
and employees about their respective obli-
gations and rights under the statute.

919 Petitioners assert that § 23-864(G)’s
fine provisions are insufficient to fund the
ICA mandate because the ICA must act be-
fore any fines can be collected, But any
insufficiency would not invalidate Proposition
206 or the ICA mandate. The Revenue
Source Rule, § 23(B) provides the remedy
when a revenue source is provided but
proves insufficient: the legislature can reduce
the expenditure of state revenues used for
creating the ICA guidelines, regulations, or
model notices in a fiscal year to the amount
of funding supplied by the fines.

120 In sum, Proposition 206 complies with
the Revenue Source Rule, § 28(A) by provid-
ing a revenue source to fund the ICA’s man-
date to implement and enforce the earned
paid sick time provisions. If the fines collect-
ed to fund the ICA mandate are insufficient,
§ 283(B) would apply to relieve the state from
funding the shortfall.

C. Other state agencies

HMM 121 Petitioners next argue that
Proposition 206 “mandat{es] expenditure of
state revenues” without providing an inde-
pendent funding source in violation of the
Revenue Source Rule, § 28(A), because the
minimum wage and earned paid sick time
provisions caused the Arizona Health Care
Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”), the
state Medicaid program, to raise the pay-
ment rates for nursing facilities and home
and community based service providers.

122 After Proposition 206 passed, several
providers informed AHCCCS they would
have to curtail services or terminate their
contracts unless AHCCCS raised its rates.
These providers were already under financial

540

stress due to increased costs caused by fed-
eral mandates and rate reductions AHCCCS
had made during the economic downturn.
For all these reasons, AHCCCS chose to
raise certain rates effective January 2017 to
ensure it maintained a sufficiently robust
provider pool, as required by the Medicaid
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1896a(a)(80)(A) (requir-
ing state plans for medical assistance to
make provider payments that “are consistent
with efficiency, economy, and quality of care
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers
so that care and services are available under
the plan at least to the extent that such care
and services are available to the general
population in the geographic area”); A.R.S,
§ 86-2908(M) (stating that provider con-
tracts must contain terms “as necessary ...
to ensure adequate performance and compli-
ance with all applicable federal laws”). Ac-
cording to AHCCCS, nothing, including
Proposition 206, required it to increase rates
merely because a provider's labor costs in-
creased,

28 Petitioners similarly argue that Prop-

osition 206 requires the expenditure of state
revenues because the state may be required
to cover increased labor costs for contractors
that provide goods and services, Petitioners
do not point to any contract requiring the
state to increase payments under existing
contracts, Nevertheless, they assert that, “if
there is even one cost-reimbursement con-
tract that requires the State to automatically
pay a contractor the minimum wages of the
contractor’s employees due to the enactment
of the Proposition, the expenditure violates
the Revenue Source Rule and the Proposition
is unconstitutional.”

124 Proposition 206 will likely impact the
state’s coffers, despite the state’s exemption,
due to its dealings with entities that are
required to comply with the Proposition. (As
veal-parties in interest and some amici point
out, the state may also gain tax revenues and
perhaps other financial benefits from the in-
crease in the minimum wage.) But Proposi-
tion 206 itself does not require the state to
increase rates for AHCCCS providers or re-
imburse increased labor costs to other state
contractors. And increasing the minimum
‘wage and providing earned paid sick time for

non-state workers does not inherently re-
quire the state to expend revenues. Such
expenditures of state revenues, even if
prompted by Proposition 206, stem from the
state’s discretionary policies and spending
decisions or third-party contracts. Proposi-
tion 206 does not require these expenditures,
and therefore the Revenue Source Rule,
§ 28(A) does not apply.

25 The flaw in interpreting the Revenue
Source Rule as applying whenever an initia-
tive or referendum indirectly causes an ex-
penditure of state revenues is highlighted by
considering the consequences if Proposition
206 had provided an independent funding
source to cover any expenditures of state
revenues due to increasing wages and bene-
fits for non-state workers, If that source was
insufficient, the Revenue Source Rule,
§ 23(B) would have been triggered to avoid
the consequences of a partially unfunded
mandate—the increase in the minimum wage
and the provision of earned paid sick time,
But unlike applying § 28(B) to reduce fund-
ing to relieve the ICA from promulgating
guidelines, regulations, and model notices,
§ 28(B) could not relieve the state from pay-
ing the increased wages and benefits re-
quired by Proposition 206 because the state
does not pay wages and benefits to non-state
workers, And even if § 23(B) authorized the
state to reduce payments to AHCCCS pro-
viders and other state contractors, the mini-
mum wage increase and earned paid sick
time benefit for non-state workers—the sub-
ject of Proposition 206’s mandate—would be
unaffected, The remedial provisions of
§ 28(B) only make sense when applied to
mandated direct state expenditures rather
than to indirectly caused expenditures, Sec-
tion 28(B)’s inapplicability shows that the
Revenue Source Rule was not intended to
require an initiative or referendum to pro-
vide a dedicated funding source for costs
indirectly caused but not required by a meas-
ure,

126 In sum, Proposition 206’s minimum
wage increase and the provision of earned
paid sick time for certain non-state workers
does not constitute a “mandatory expendi-
ture of state revenues.” The Revenue Source
Rule, § 28(A) does not apply.

IL The Separate Amendment Rule

127 The Separate Amendment Rule pro-
vides:

Any amendment or amendments to this
Constitution may be proposed in either
House of the Legislature, or by Initiative
Petition.... If more than one proposed
amendment shall be submitted at any elec-
tion, such proposed amendments shall be
submitted in such manner that the electors
may vote for or against such proposed
amendments separately.

Ariz, Const, art, 21, § 1. The provision was
“intended to prevent the pernicious practice
of ‘log-rolling’” which bundles separate and
distinct propositions into one proposed
amendment so that voters favoring one prop-
osition must vote for all. Kerby v. Luhrs, 44
Ariz, 208, 214-15, 86 P.2d 549, 555-56 (1984);
see also Ariz, Together v. Brewer, 214 Ariz,
118, 120 18, 149 P.8d 742, 744 (2007) (stating
that the Separate Amendment Rule ensures
that voters are permitted “to express their
separate opinion as to each proposed consti-
tutional amendment” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

HM 1.28 Petitioners argue that Proposi-
tion 206 violates the Separate Amendment.
Rule by addressing two separate topics: min-
imum wage and earned paid sick time. We
disagree. By its plain terms, the Separate
Amendment Rule only applies to proposed
constitutional amendments, whereas Proposi-
tion 206 proposed statutory changes, Cf Jett
v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz, 115, 119, 882 P.2d
426, 480 (1994) (concluding that when the
language of a constitutional provision is clear
and unambiguous, “we generally must follow
the text of the provision as written”).

129 Petitioners nevertheless ask us to ex-
tend application of the Separate Amendment.
Rule to initiatives because the Voter Protec-
tion Act “put[s] statutory initiatives on par
with constitutional ones” by limiting the leg-
islature’s authority to modify laws enacted by
voters, See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1).
But erecting barriers to changing initiative-
created laws does not embed those laws in
our constitution, The Separate Amendment.
Bule does not apply.

541

III. The Single Subject Rule

130 The Single Subject Rule provides:

Every act shall embrace but one subject

and matters properly connected therewith,

which subject shall be expressed in the
title; but if any subject shall be embraced
in an act which shall not be expressed in
the title, such act shall be void only as to
so much thereof as shall not be embraced
in the title,
Ariz, Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § 18, Like the
Separate Amendment Rule applicable to pro-
posed constitutional amendments, the Single
Subject Rule was intended to prevent “log-
volling” by sparing an individual legislator
from having to vote for a disfavored proposi-
tion to secure enactment of a favored one.
See Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz, 520, 528
187, 81 P.8d 811, 819 (2008), Similarly, the
provision frees the governor from having to
veto an entire bill, including provisions he
approves, to prevent disfavored provisions
from becoming law. See id. 138 (“A governor
presented with a multi-subject bill inevitably
faces a ‘Hobson's choice.’ ”),

181 This Court has long recognized that
the Single Subject Rule applies only to acts
by the legislature; it does not apply to initia-
tives. See Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n
v. Myers, 196 Ariz, 516, 525 186, 1 P.8d 706,
715 (2000); Iman v, Bolin, 98 Ariz, 358, 365,
404 P.2d 705, 712 (1965); Barth v. White, 40
Ariz, 548, 555-56, 14 P.2d 748, 750-51 (1982).
Initiative petitions are governed by the Ari-
zona Constitution, article 4, part 1, § 1,
which, as relevant here, requires only that a
proposed measure have some title and some
text. See Ariz, Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 109);
Iman, 98 Aviz, at 865, 404 P.2d at 712; Barth,
40 Ariz, at 556, 14 P.2d at 751.

132 Petitioners ask us to reconsider our
prior decisions. They point out that Barth,
the genesis for the line of precedent, involved
an initiative-proposed constitutional amend-
ment, and other states now favor applying
provisions similar to the Single Subject Rule
to such initiatives. We decline to revisit our
decisions.

HM 138 The Barth line of cases did not
turn on the substance of the initiatives at
issue. Indeed, the initiative measures at issue

542

in Citizens Clean Elections Commission and
Iman proposed statutory amendments, not
constitutional amendments, See Citizens
Clean Elections Comm'n, 196 Ariz, at 518
12, 1 P.8d at 708; Iman, 98 Ariz. at 362, 404
P.2d at 709. This Court’s prior decisions are
farther supported by the Single Subject
Rule’s language and placement within the
constitution, The Rule applies to “act[s],”
which are enacted by the legislature, and
does not address initiative or referendum
petitions, Cf Barth, 40 Ariz, at 556, 14 P.2d
at 751 (recognizing that an initiative petition
is not an “act”), And the Single Subject Rule
is set forth in article 4, part 2 of the constitu-
tion, which addresses “The Legislature.”

184 The Single Subject Rule does not
apply.

CONCLUSION

185 We grant review of this special action
petition but deny relief. Proposition 206 does
not violate the identified provisions in the
Arizona Constitution.

399 P.3d 89

SIRRAH ENTERPRISES, LLC, an Ari-
zona limited liability company, Plain-
tiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant,

ve

Wayne and Jacqueline WUNDERLICH,
husband and wife, Defendants/Coun-
terclaimants/Appellees.

No. CV-16-0156-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed August 9, 2017

John J. Belanger (argued), Bremer Whyte
Brown & O’Meara, Tempe, Attorneys for
Sirrah Enterprises, LLC

Jeffrey R. Adams (argued), The Adams
Law Firm, PLLC, Prescott, Attorneys for
Wayne and Jacqueline Wunderlich

Stephen E. Richman (argued), Vail C.
Cloar, Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix, At-
torneys for Amicus Curiae Home Builders
Association of Central Arizona

JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion
of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
BOLICK, GOULD, and LOPEZ joined.

JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:

{11 The law implies a warranty of work-
manship and habitability into every residen-
tial construction contract. This Court has
wrestled with application of this warranty on
several occasions. We reenter the fray and
here decide whether the successful party on
a claim for breach of the warranty qualifies
for an attorney-fee award under either a
contractual fee provision or A.R.S. § 12-
341.01, Because the warranty is imputed into
the construction contract, it is a term of the
eontract, Any claim for breach of that term

544

arises from the contract, The successful par-
ty therefore qualifies for fees under a con-
trolling contractual fee provision or, barring
that, § 12-341.01,

BACKGROUND

12 Wayne and Jacqueline Wunderlich con-
tracted with Sirrah Enterprises, LLC to
build “a basement through exterior walls” at
the Wunderlichs’ home, Sirrah performed the
work, The Wunderlichs partially paid Sirrah
but refused to pay the full contract amount,
claiming construction defects,

18 Sirrah sued for the unpaid contract
amount, The Wunderlichs counterclaimed for
breach of the implied warranty of workman-
ship and habitability (the “Implied Warran-
ty” or “Warranty”) and other claims. A jury
found in Sirrah’s favor on its claim and
awarded it $31,874. The jury further found in
Sirrah’s favor on the Wunderlichs’ claims for
breach of contract and breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. But the
jury found in the Wunderlichs’ favor on their
claim for breach of the Implied Warranty
and awarded them $297,782.

{4 The trial court determined that the
Wunderlichs were the prevailing parties and
awarded them attorney fees pursuant to a
contractual fee provision and § 12-341.01.
The court of appeals affirmed the award as
authorized by the contractual fee provision.
Strrah Enters, LLC v. Wunderlich, 240 Ariz.
168, 171 125, 877 P.8d 360 (App. 2016), (The
court variously stated that § 12-841.01 did
and did not apply here, but ultimately rested
its decision on the contractual fee provision.
Id, at 168-69 1111, 15, 171 124, 377 P.8d
360.)

15 We granted review because the recov-
ery of fees under a contractual fee provision
or § 12-841.01 for an Implied Warranty
claim is a recurring legal issue of statewide
importance, This Court has jurisdiction pur-
suant to article 6, section 5(8) of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-120.24,

DISCUSSION
16 The parties’ contract provides that if
either party “is required to retain the ser-
vices of an attorney to enforce any term or

provision of this Agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to and the losing party
shall pay all expenses and costs including
reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the
prevailing party.” Sirrah argues that the Im-
plied Warranty was not a “term or provision”
of the contract but was imposed by law re-
gardless of the contract's existence, and
therefore the Wunderlichs’ success on only
their warranty claim did not trigger the fee
provision, The Wunderlichs respond, and the
trial and appellate courts agreed, that the
law imputed the Implied Warranty into the
parties’ contract, making the Warranty a
“term or provision” of the contract, and fees
were properly awarded. See Sirrah, 240 Ariz,
at 167-68 11 9, 12, 877 P.8d 860.

17 We review de novo the courts’ interpre-
tation of the parties’ contractual fee provision
as applying to Implied Warranty claims. See
Murphy Farrell Dev, LLLP v, Sowrant, 229
Ariz, 124, 183 181, 272 P.8d 855 (App. 2012),

I The Implied Warranty is a contract
term

Ns 1'8 Under the Implied Warranty, a
residential builder warrants that its work is
performed in a workmanlike manner and
that the structure is habitable. See Lofts at
Fillmore Condo. Ass’n v. Reliance Commer-
cial Constr, Inc. (Lofts), 218 Ariz. 574, 575
15, 190 P.8d 783, 784 (2008), The Warranty
“4s imposed by law” and serves “to protect,
innocent purchasers and hold builders ac-
countable for their work.” Richards v. Pow-
ercraft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz, 242, 244-45,
678 P.2d 427, 429-80 (1984) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A home-
owner is not required to have privity of
contract with the builder to sue it for breach
of the Implied Warranty. See Lofts, 218 Ariz,
at 577 115, 190 P.3d at 736; Richards, 139
Ariz. at 245, 678 P.2d at 480, Rather, the
Implied Warranty “arises from construction
of the home,” and therefore runs to subse-
quent purchasers, Lofts, 218 Ariz, at 577
1118-14, 190 P.8d at 736 (reasoning that
Richards and other cases “make clear that
an implied warranty arises from construction
of the home, without regard to the identity of
the vendor”).

Hl 19 Sirrah argues that because the
Implied Warranty “arises from construction
of the home,” it neither constitutes a contract.
term nor arises from a contract. We dis-
agree.

110 Woodward v. Chirco Construction Co.,
Ine., 141 Ariz, 514, 687 P.2d 1269 (1984),
directs our decision. The homebuilder there,
Chireo Construction, argued that the six-year
statute of limitations applicable for contract
claims, A.R.S. § 12-548(A), did not apply to
preserve the purchasing homeowners’ claim
for breach of the Implied Warranty. Id. at
515-16, 687 P.2d at 1270-71, Relying on
Richards’s pronouncement that the Implied
Warranty “is imposed by law,” Chirco Con-
struction asserted that the Warranty could
not arise from the parties’ contract and, even
if it did, breach of the Warranty only created
a tort claim. Id, at 515, 687 P.2d at 1270. This
Court disagreed. We decided that negligent,
construction of a residence can simultaneous-
ly support contract damages for breach of
the Implied Warranty and tort damages for
any personal injury or damaged personal
property caused by the contractor’s negli-
gence, Id. at 515-16, 687 P.2d at 1270-71.
The Court recognized that the Implied War-
ranty “arises from the contractual relation
between the builder and the purchaser.” Id.
at 516, 687 P.2d at 1271 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Significantly, we
also clarified Richards:

Our statement in Richards, supra, that the

implied warranty of workmanlike perform-

ance and habitability “is imposed by law”

‘was not meant to transform the duty aris-

ing out of the contract into one based on

tort principles alone; instead, it was meant
to inform buyers and sellers that the law
imputes the warranty into the contact for
the construction and sale of the residence,
We then held that the warranty runs to
subsequent purchasers of the residence. If
the warranty did not arise out of the con-
tract and provide for a cause of action in
contract, we would have had no cause to be
concerned about the absence of privity be-
tween Richards and Powercraft Homes,

Ine,

Id, The Court concluded that the court of
appeals properly applied the six-year statute

545

of limitations to the Implied Warranty claim
at issue, Id,

{11 In Lofts, the Court did not retreat
from its position in Woodward that the Im-
plied Warranty is imputed into a construction
contract and runs to subsequent purchasers.
Indeed, the Court cited Woodward for the
principle that “[a] claim for breach of the
implied warranty sounds in contract.” Lofts,
218 Aviz, at 575 15, 190 P.8d at 734, Also
consistent with Woodward, the Court held
that a subsequent homebuyer who lacked
contractual privity with a non-vendor builder
could nevertheless sue the builder for breach
of the Warranty. See id. at 577-78 17 18-19,
190 P.8d at 786-87. The only reason for
addressing privity was because the Court
treated the Implied Warranty as a contract
term.

12 Finally, since deciding Lofts, we have
reiterated Woodward's characterization of
the Implied Warranty as a contract term. See
Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp. (Sullivan I),
282 Ariz, 844, 846 118, 806 P.8d 1, 8 (2018)
(“[The] law imputes [the] warranty into [a]
construction contract and allows subsequent
purchasers a cause of action.” (citing Wood-
ward, 141 Ariz, at 516, 687 P.2d at 1271)). We
again confirm that description here.

IL. Barmat does not apply

418 Citing Barmat v. John & Jane Doe
Partners A-D, 155 Ariz, 519, 747 P.2d 1218
(1987), Sirrah argues that because the Im-
plied Warranty is imposed by law, breach of
the Warranty cannot give rise to a contract-
based fee award. We disagree.

114 Barmat addressed whether a legal
malpractice claim “arises out of a contract”
for purposes of awarding fees under § 12-
841,01(A), Id, at 520, 747 P.2d at 1219, The
clients there argued that § 12-841.01(A) ap-
plied because the law implies a contract be-
tween lawyer and client, which includes a
covenant of competent and ethical represen-
tation. Id. at 521, 747 P.2d at 1220, After
noting that the law implies contracts in sey-
eral professional relationships and some non-
professional ones, such as innkeeper-guest
and common carrier-passenger, the Court.
concluded that the legislature did not intend

546

§ 12-841,01(A) to reach tort claims arising
from these relationships. Id.

15 The Court labeled a contract implied
in law as a “legal fiction,” id. at 522, 747
P.2d at 1221, created “without regard to ex-
pressions of assent by either words or acts,”
id. at 521, 747 P.2d at 1220 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), Such con-
tracts “aris[e] from relationships between
professionals and their clients and from oth-
er special relationships” and “the law impos-
es special duties [owed] to all within the
foreseeable range of harm as a matter of
public policy.” Id. at 522, 747 P.2d at 1221.
Because “(t]he essential nature of actions to
recover for the breach of such duties” is one
arising from tort rather than contract, § 12-
341.01(A) does not apply. Jd. at 528, 747 P.2d
at 1222,

HM 116 Barmat does not apply here.
First, breach of the Implied Warranty is a
contract claim, not a tort claim. See Wood-
ward, 141 Ariz, at 515-16, 687 P.2d at 1270-
1; of ARS. § 12-552(A), (C) (providing a
statute of repose for suits “based in contract”
including “any action based on implied war-
ranty arising out of the contract or the con-
struction, including implied warranties of
habitability, fitness or workmanship”). Bar-
mat applies to determine whether a tort
claim arising from a relationship character-
ized by an implied-in-law contract can au-
thorize a fee award; it does not apply to
contract claims.

{17 Second, Barmat did not address
whether § 12-841.01(A) authorizes fees on a
claim for breach of a duty imputed by law as
a term of an express contract. Rather, the
ease concerned the proper interpretation of
“implied contract” as used in § 12-841.01(A),
Barmat, 155 Ariz, at 522, 747 P.2d at 1222
([T]he oft-used statutory phrase ‘contract
express or implied’ has no single meaning
and ‘vequires interpretation and definition.’ ”
(citation omitted)), And Barmat did not sug-
gest that fees are unavailable on claims for
breach of an implied-in-law term of an ex-
press contract, Cf id. (approving decision in
Sparks v, Republic Nat'l Life Ins, Co., 182
Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982), that claim for
breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing imputed into an insur-

ance contract “arises out of a contract” under
§ 12-841.01(A)).

HMM ‘(18 Third, the Implied Warranty
does not arise from a professional relation-
ship or other special relationship like those
discussed in Barmat. Although implied by
law, the Warranty is imputed into an express
contract for home construction, See Wood-
ward, 141 Ariz, at 516, 687 P.2d at 1271. As
with the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
also imputed by law into all express con-
tracts, the Warranty is “as much a part of a
contract as are the express terms.” See Wells
Fargo Bank v, Ariz, Laborers, Teamsters &
Cement Masons Local No, 895 Pension Tr.
Fund, 201 Ariz, 474, 490 159, 88 P.8d 12, 28
(2002).

119 The court of appeals has taken a
different standpoint on Barmat’s impact on
claims for breach of the Implied Warranty.
In Sullivan v, Pulte Home Corp. (Sullivan
1), 281 Ariz. 58, 62 148, 290 P.8d 446, 455
(App. 2012), vacated in part on other
grounds, 282 Ariz, $44, 306 P.8d 1 (2018), the
court found that because Barmat decided
that § 12-341.01(A) does not apply to im-
plied-in-law contracts, and the Implied War-
ranty is implied by law, § 12-41,01(A) does
not apply to Implied Warranty claims. See
also N. Peak Constr, LLC v, Architecture
Plus, Ltd., 227 Ariz, 165, 167, 17, 170 126,
254 P.8d 404 (App. 2011) (applying the same
analysis to deny a fee award on a claim for
breach of an implied warranty of reasonable
skill and diligence given by a design profes-
sional to a construction contractor). In the
case now before us, the court of appeals
reaffirmed the Sullivan I analysis but distin-
guished that case because, unlike the situa-
tion here, the builder and homeowners in
Sullivan I lacked privity of contract. Sirrah,
240 Ariz, at 168 11 14-15, 877 P.8d 360.

HI 1.20 The flaw in the court of appeals’
analysis is that the Implied Warranty does
not create an implied-in-law contract between.
a builder and a homeowner. See id, 114
(describing the Sullivan I homeowners’ claim
for breach of the Implied Warranty as
“based solely on a contract implied-in-law”),
The Warranty is a term imputed by law into
an express contract and can be enforced by

subsequent homeowners. See Woodward, 141
Ariz, at 516, 687 P.2d at 1271. Section 12~
841.01(A) therefore authorizes a fee award
for the successful party on a claim for breach
of the Implied Warranty because the claim
“arises out of” an express contract.

121 We disapprove Sullivan I and North
Peak Construction, LLC to the extent they
conflict with our decision.

HM s«1.22 Sirrah asserts that our
stance will result in dissimilar treatment of
attorney fee applications depending on
whether the claim for breach of the Implied
Warranty was brought by an original or sub-
sequent homeowner. Not so. Section 12-
841.01(A) does not have a privity require-
ment for claims “arising out of” a contract.
(In contrast, the parties must be in privity to
enforce a contractual fee provision.) Cf Lacer
v Navajo Cty., 141 Ariz. 892, 394, 687 P.2d
400 (App. 1984) (determining a party was
entitled to fees “if judgment in its favor is
based upon the absence of the contract sued
upon”), The Implied Warranty arises out of
the construction contract; that characteristic
does not change simply because the law ef-
fectively assigns the Warranty to subsequent.
homeowners. Just as a claim asserted by an
original homeowner in privity with a builder
can arise from contract, so too can a claim
asserted by a subsequent homeowner.

I.

128 We agree with the court of appeals
that the trial court properly awarded attor-
ney fees to the Wunderlichs. The parties’
contract requires a fee award to the success-
ful party on a claim “to enforce any term or
provision.” Section 12-841,01(A), a diseretion-
ary fee provision, does not alter the parties’
mandatory fee provision. See A.R.S. § 12-
341.01(A) (stating that the provision “shall
not be construed as altering, prohibiting or
restricting present or future contracts ...
that may provide for attorney fees”), As we
have stated, the Implied Warranty is a term
of the contract. As the successful party in the
daim to enforce the Warranty, the Wunder-
lichs were entitled to their reasonable attor-
ney fees. The trial court did not err in award-
ing them fees,

The propriety of fees on review

547
CONCLUSION

124 We vacate the court of appeals’ opin-
ion and affirm the trial court judgment. Upon
compliance with ARCAP 21(b), we award the
Wunderlichs their reasonable attorney fees

on appeal.

399 P.3d 94

PAWN 1ST, LLC, an Arizona limited li-
ability company, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PHOENIX, a political subdivi-
sion of the State of Arizona; Board of
Adjustment of the City of Phoenix; and
Bob Ford; Emilio Gaynor; Patrick Paul;
Alex Tauber; Yvonne Hunter; Bettina
Nava; and Emily Ryan, as members of
and constituting the Board of Adjust-
ment of the City of Phoenix, Defen-
dants/Appellees,

William Jachimek dba Central Pawn,
Real Party in Interest/Appellee.

No. CV-16-0107-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed August 10, 2017

Rd
wD

z=
oS

Thomas M. Baker, Baker & Baker, Phoe-
nix, Attorney for Pawn 1st, LLC

550

Brad Holm, Phoenix City Attorney, Les S.
Tuskai (argued), Paul Li, Assistant City At-
torneys, Phoenix, Attorneys for City of Phoe-
nix, Board of Adjustment of the City of
Phoenix, Bob Ford, Emilio Gaynor, Patrick
Paul, Alex Tauber, Yvonne Hunter, Bettina
Nava and Emily Ryan

Claudio E. Iannitelli, John C. Marcolini
(argued), Cheifetz Iannitelli Marcolini, P.C.,
Phoenix, Attorneys for William Jachimek dba
Central Pawn

Nicholas J. Wood, Adam E. Lang, Brianna
L. Long, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae American Plan-
ning Association, Arizona Chapter

JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the opinion of
the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE
BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE
PELANDER, and JUSTICES BRUTINEL,
TIMMER, BOLICK, and GOULD joined.

JUSTICE LOPEZ, opinion of the Court:

11 This case concerns the standards a
municipal zoning board applies in considering
an application for a zoning variance, We hold
that to obtain an area variance, an applicant.
must show that strictly applying a zoning
ordinance will cause “peculiar and exception-
al practical difficulties” that deprive a prop-
erty of privileges enjoyed by other similarly
zoned properties. We also clarify that the
applicant’s desire to use the property for
purposes allowed on other similarly zoned
properties does not in itself constitute a self-
imposed special circumstance justifying deni-
al of an area variance,

BACKGROUND

{2 The dispute here concerns the City of
Phoenix Board of Adjustment’s (the “Board”)
grant of a variance on a parcel of land (the
“Property”) at the southwest corner of
McDowell Road and 32nd Street in Phoenix.
The area in which the Property sits is zoned
as a “Commercial C-8 District—General
Commercial.” Such districts have 141 specific
permitted uses plus all uses permitted in
properties zoned C-1 and C-2, and several
residential uses. C-3 districts are designed to
provide areas for “intensive commercial

uses.” Phx, Ariz, Zoning Ordinance
§ 624(A) (hereinafter “Ordinance”),

18 The Property boasts a conspicuous his-
tory. For many decades, it was home to an
“adult theatre” operated under various
names, In 1978, the City of Phoenix complet-
ed an eminent domain action that altered the
Property’s dimensions and resulted in sever-
al unique characteristics, all of which limited
its commercial viability. First, the action re-
duced the Property to only 12,000 square
feet, smaller than any of the twelve sur-
rounding C-8-zoned corner parcels. Second,
it eliminated the frontage area around the
building on the Property, resulting in its
direct abutment of a public sidewalk. Third,
it restricted parking spaces.

14 In January 2010, the Property’s owners
evicted their tenants, discontinued the Prop-
erty’s use as an adult theatre (a non-con-
forming use), and leased the Property to
William Jachimek, doing business as Central
Pawn, with an option to purchase, When
dJachimek entered the lease, he intended to
operate a pawn shop. A pawn shop is a
permitted use in a C-2-zoned parcel, provid-
ed the building’s exterior walls are at least
500 feet from a residential district and the
owner obtains a use permit from the zoning
administrator, Jachimek applied for both a
use permit for his pawn business and, be-
cause the Property is within 500 feet of a
residential district, a variance from the 500-
foot residential setback requirement.

15 After the zoning administration hearing
officer denied his applications, Jachimek ap-
pealed to the Board. At the Board hearing,
Pawn ist, LLC (“Pawn”), a competing pawn
shop, opposed the variance. The Board condi-
tionally approved the variance, requiring Ja-
chimek to operate the pawn shop only during
specified hours, to not buy or sell guns or
pornography, and to apply for building per-
mits for a promised remodel of the building
within one year, The Board’s minutes from
its July 1, 2010 meeting memorialize its find-

[Special circumstances ... applly] to the

land, namely the unique nature of the dis-

continuance of the non-conforming use on
the property [the adult theatre use], the
fact that it was substantially impacted by

prior [eminent] domain activities in a man-
ner that was dissimilar to other properties
in a reasonably close radius, including set-
backs, and the fact that there [is] less than
12,000 total square feet available and there
[are] restrictive parking requirements, that
these special circumstances were not creat-
ed by the owner or applicant, and were
yather created in part by growth in the
city itself, that it was necessary for the
preservation and enjoyment of substantial
property rights given the restrictions and
the property and current dormancy of any
other business on the site, this particular
place on the site, that authorizing it would
not be materially detrimental to persons
residing or working in the vicinity, to adja-
cent property, the neighborhood or public
welfare in general.

16 After the Board rejected a reconsidera-
tion motion, Pawn filed a special action in
superior court challenging the Board’s vari-
ance decision. The superior court ruled in
Jachimek’s favor, finding that Pawn lacked
standing to challenge the Board’s decision.
The court of appeals reversed, finding that
Pawn had standing. Pawn ist, LLC v. City of
Phoenie, 231 Ariz. 309, 294 P.8d 147 (App.
2018) (Pawn I), On remand, the superior
court ruled in Jachimek’s favor and dis-
missed Pawn’s complaint, finding that the
variance was an area variance and not a use
variance; that the Board’s decision to grant
Jachimek’s area variance was not ultra vires
because the Board is authorized to consider
area variances; and that sufficient evidence
supported the Board’s variance decision.

17 The court of appeals again reversed.
Pawn ist, LLC v. City of Phoeniwx, 289 Ariz.
589, 545 128, 873 P.3d 556 (App. 2016)
(Pawn IT). Tt agreed with the superior court
that Jachimek sought an area variance be-
cause a pawn shop is an allowed use within a
C-8 zoning district, irrespective of the 500-
foot distance requirement. Id, at 542 711,
878 P.3d 556, But it disagreed that the Board
acted within its authority and therefore re-
manded for entry of a judgment declaring
the area variance invalid. Id. at 545 1.28, 878
P.3d 556,

18 We granted review because the
standards a municipal zoning boards of

551

adjustment must apply when considering
an application for a zoning variance pres-
ent recurring issues of statewide impor-
tance, We have jurisdiction pursuant to
article 6, section 5(8), of the Arizona Con-
stitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24,

DISCUSSION

HH 19 We review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo, Baker v. Univ. Physi-
cians Healthcare, 281 Ariz. 379, 887 1180, 296
P.8d 42, 50 (2018), and we presume the valid-
ity of the Board’s determination unless it is
“against the weight of the evidence, unrea-
sonable, erroneous, or illegal as a matter of
law.” Mueller v, City of Phoenix es vel, Phoe-
nix: Bd. of Adjustment II, 102 Ariz, 575, 581,
435 P.2d 472, 478 (1967); see also ARS.
§ 12-910(E) (“The court shall affirm the
agency action unless ... the court concludes
that the action is not supported by substan-
tial evidence, is contrary to law, is arbitrary
and capricious or is an abuse of diseretion.”).

I. Zoning Boards of Adjustment.

110 Arizona law authorizes cities and
towns to establish boards of adjustment by
ordinance. A.R.S. § 9-462.06(A), The boards
decide appeals from zoning administrators’
decisions concerning zoning ordinance en-
forcement. A.R.S. § 9-462.06(G)(1). Primari-
ly, the boards determine whether “special
circumstances” exist to relieve owners of
property with unique characteristics from
strict application of zoning laws. See A.R.S.
§ 9-462.06(G)(2).

Hl 1111 The boards’ authority to modify
zoning decisions is statutorily limited. Boards
of adjustment may not: (1) change the uses
permitted in a zoning district; or 2) “[g]rant
a variance if the special circumstances appli-
cable to the property are self-imposed by the
property owner.” A.R.S. § 9-462.06(H); of
Arkules v. Bd. of Adjustment of Paradise
Valley, 151 Ariz, 488, 440, 728 P.2d 657 (App.
1986) (holding that a board has “no powers
except those granted by the statutes creating
it,” and “its power is restricted to that grant-
ed by the zoning ordinance in accordance
with the statute”). Consequently, a board’s
grant of a variance in excess of its statutory

552

authority is ultra vires and invalid as a mat-
ter of law. Arkules, 151 Ariz, at 440, 728 P.2d
657.

Il, The Phoenix Zoning Ordinance

112 Consistent with § 9462.06, the Phoe-
nix Zoning Ordinance authorizes a zoning
administrator to issue a variance when “a
literal enforcement of any provisions of the
[O]rdinance would result in unnecessary
property hardship,” Ordinance § 807(A)(9). A
variance, however, is authorized only if the
applicant can establish that (a) special cir-
cumstances apply to the land, building, or
use referenced in the application which do
not apply to other district properties; (b) the
owner did not create the special circum-
stances; (c) the variance is necessary for the
“preservation and enjoyment of substantial
property rights”; and (d) the variance will
not be materially detrimental to the area.
Ordinance § 807(9)(a)-(d).

718 If a zoning administrator denies a
variance, an applicant may appeal to the
Board, but the Board’s authority to modify a
zoning decision is limited in that it may not.
(a) change the uses permitted in a zoning
classification or district; or (b) grant a vari-
ance if the property owner self-imposes the
special circumstances applicable to the prop-
erty, Ordinance § 303(B)(2).

Ti. Area and Use Variances

HMMs 114 Arizona Jaw distinguishes area
variances from use variances, See Ivancovich
v. City of Tucson Bd. of Adjustment, 22
Ariz.App. 580, 586, 529 P.2d 242 (1974) (not-
ing that “the distinction between ‘area’ and
‘use’ variances, and the imposition of sepa-
rate requirements for the granting of each
type, are inventions of the court”), An area
variance relieves the duty to comply with a
zoning ordinance’s technical requirements,
such as “setback line, frontage requirements,
height limitations, lot size restrictions, densi-
ty regulations and yard requirements,” while
a use variance permits a use not expressly
allowed by a zoning ordinance, Jd. The Ari-
zona Legislature prohibits boards of adjust-
ment from changing the “uses permitted,”
thus confining their authority only to area
variances. See Cardon Oil Co. v. City of

Phoeniw, 122 Ariz. 102, 108 n.1, 598 P.2d 656,
657 n.1 (1979) (“[Section] 9-462.06(H)(1) now
specifically prohibits a board of adjustment
from changing any of the uses permitted in a
zoning classification.”),

{15 In Ivancovich, the court of appeals
explained the different variance standards:
an area variance requires a showing of “pecu-
liar and exceptional practical difficulties,”
while a use variance requires a showing of
“exceptional and undue hardship.” 22 Ariz.
App. at 588, 529 P.2d 242 (noting that “[t]he
difference between exceptional and undue
hardship and peculiar and exceptional prac-
tical difficulties is one of degree”). One rea-
son for requiring a “less stringent” showing
of encumbrance for an area variance than a
use variance is because it does not affect the
character of the community. Id. at 586, 529
P.2d 242,

HMMM 1116 A use variance, however, re-
quires a more stringent showing that compli-
ance with the zoning regulations precludes
any reasonable use of the property. Id, at
588, 529 P.2d 242 (stating that “[i}t must be
shown that the zoning ordinances preclude
the use of the property in question for any
purpose to which it is reasonably adapted”),
A legislative body, rather than a zoning
board, may authorize a use variance, A,R.S,
§ 9-462.01(A)(1) (“[T]he legislative body of
any municipality by ordinance may ... [rleg-
ulate the use of buildings, structures and
Jand as between agriculture, residence, in-
dustry, business and other purposes.”);
ARS. § 9-462,06(H)(1) (A board of adjust-
ment may not “[mJake any changes in the
uses permitted in any zoning classification or
zoning district, or make any changes in the
terms of the zoning ordinance... .”); Ivanco-
vich, 22 Aviz.App. at 585, 529 P.2d 242 (“The
Board cannot amend or repeal any zoning
ordinance for this power belongs to the City
Council.”), “An inability to put the property
to a more profitable use or loss of economic
advantage is not sufficient to constitute un-
due hardship” justifying a use variance.
Ivancovich, 22 Ariz.App. at 588, 529 P.2d 242,
This “no reasonable use” standard is limited
to use variances. Id. (holding that “[sluch a
showing need not be made in the case of area
variances”),

117 The reasons for this distinction are
sound. Two examples illustrate the point,
Permitting an adult bookstore (a C-8 use) in
a residential district would require a use
variance—with its attendant higher “excep-
tional and undue hardship” standard—and
the city legislative body’s approval through
rezoning because it may fundamentally alter
the neighborhood. On the other hand, a deci-
sion regarding the number of parking spaces
for a use permitted in a particular district,
such as a restaurant, would require an area
variance because it would not produce the
type of neighborhood-altering impact that re-
quires legislative approval.

{18 The area variance provisions protect.
property owners where strict application of
the Ordinance would “deprive the property of
privileges enjoyed by other property of the
same classification in the same zoning dis-
trict,” ALR.S, § 9-462.06(G)(2), and “result in
unnecessary property hardship.” Ordinance
§ 807(A)(Q). They serve as a “safety valve
against excessive regulation.” James A,
Kushner, 2 Subdivision Law and Growth
Mgmt. § 8:18 (2d ed. 2017).

IV. Jachimek’s Variance

I 119 Here, we consider first whether
Jachimek applied for an area or use variance,
and second whether the Board acted within
its discretion in granting the variance, The
court of appeals held that Jachimek’s vari-
ance was an area variance because a pawn
shop is a permitted use in a C-8 zoning
district, irrespective of the 500-foot distance
requirement. Ponwn II, 289 Ariz, at 542 912,
878 P.8d 556, We agree.

120 The distinction between area and use
variances centers on the nature of the vari-
ance, A pawn shop is a permitted use in the
zoning classification here: the Property is
zoned as a C-8 commercial district; all C-2
commercial district uses are allowed in a 0-8
district; and a pawn shop is a permitted use
in a C-2 district, provided the exterior walls
of the building are at least 500 feet from a
residential district, Ordinance
§ 628(D)(132)(b). Contrary to Pawn’s argu-
ment, the 500-foot requirement is akin to a
setback or frontage requirement, not a use
regulation; it is a technical requirement of an

553

established commercial area. A variance al-
lowing a pawn shop in an existing commer-
cial district does not fundamentally alter the
nature of the area, The Board granted Jachi-
mek an area variance, not a use variance, and
it did not exceed its authority under A.R.S.
§ 9-462.06(H)(1),

V. Special Cireumstances

HMM 121 Boards of adjustment may
grant area variances only if, due to special
circumstances, “the strict application of the
zoning ordinance will deprive the property of
privileges enjoyed by other property of the
same classification in the same zoning dis-
trict,” ARS. § 9-462,06(G)(2), “The term
‘special circumstances’ as used in the zoning
ordinance is the functional equivalent of the
word ‘hardship,’” Burns v. SPA Auto,, Ltd.,
156 Ariz, 508, 505, 753 P.2d 198 (App, 1988).

22 We agree with the Board, superior
court, and court of appeals that special cir-
cumstances apply to the Property. The Board
reasoned, after comparing the Property to
twelve surrounding C~3-zoned corner par-
cels, that prior eminent domain activities ren-
dered the Property “dissimilar to other prop-
erties in a reasonably close radius.” The
Board explained that the special cireum-
stances arose from the Property’s physical
characteristics, The record supports the
Board’s findings that the lot size, the build-
ing’s limited setback from the public side-
walk, and the parking restrictions constitute
special circumstances justifying an area vari-
ance, because the Property’s unique charac-
teristics create exceptional practical difficul-
ties. Accordingly, the Board acted within its
discretion in finding sufficient special cireum-
stances unique to the Property to justify
Jachimek’s variance,

VI. Prohibition against Self—Imposi-
tion

Hs§'23 A finding of special cireum-
stances does not justify a variance, however,
if the circumstances are self-imposed by the
property owner. A.R.S. § 9-462.06(H)(2); Or-
dinance §§ 303(B)(2)(b), 307(A)()(a)-(b), -
(10)(b). A board of adjustment exceeds its
statutory jurisdiction and authority, and its
decision is “ultra vires and void,” if it grants

554 Ee

a variance in violation of the prohibition
against self-imposition. See Arkules, 151 Ariz.
at 440, 728 P.2d 657.

124 In this case, although it acknowledged
that special circumstances impacted the
Property, the court of appeals held that any
special circumstances “were created by Ja-
chimek and/or the Property owner by select-
ing this particular property to use as a pawn
shop, in violation of the prohibition against
self-imposition,” and, consequently, “the
Board’s decision to grant Jachimek a vari-
ance was ‘ultra vires and void.’” Pawn II,
239 Ariz, at 545 127, 373 P.3d 556, We
disagree.

125 The court of appeals relied on three
Arizona cases in concluding Jachimek creat-
ed the Property’s special circumstances: Ar-
kules, Burns, and Rivera v. City of Phoenix,
186 Ariz. 600, 925 P.2d 741 (App. 1996).
These cases are factually distinguishable.

126 In Arkules, neighbors challenged a
variance allowing a homeowner to paint his
house a color inconsistent with a zoning regu-
lation requiring it to “blend [in] with the
mountain background.” 151 Ariz. at 489, 728
P.2d 657. The court of appeals ruled in the
neighbors’ favor because, under zoning law,
“(tlhe color of a house is not a factor pertain-
ing to the real property or which would
deprive the property of uses or privileges
enjoyed by other property of the same zon-
ing classification.” Id. at 441, 728 P.2d 657.
The owner’s house color preference did not
constitute a cognizable hardship because the
statutory provisions and zoning ordinance
“specifically state that any hardship must
relate to the use of the land as opposed to
the owner” and, therefore, “(a] personal
hardship does not justify a variance.” Id. at
442, 728 P.2d 657.

127 Similarly, in Burns, a car dealership
owner created his own zoning hardship by
contracting with three car manufacturers
that required him to display the manufactur-
ers’ logos on a larger sign than the city’s
zoning rules allowed. 156 Ariz. at 504, 753
P.2d 193, The superior court reversed the
board of adjustment’s decision allowing a
yariance to display a non-compliant sign, Id.
The court of appeals upheld the superior
court, reasoning that the special circum-

stances “were self-inflicted by [the owner’s]
decision to be a three-car dealership,” and
that special circumstances may be considered
only if they arise out of “circumstances or
conditions beyond the control of the party
involved,” Id. at 505, 758 P.2d 193, Unlike
Jachimek’s decision to operate a pawn shop,
a use denied to him but permitted to other
similarly situated property owners in the
same zoning district, the owner in Burns
sought relief from signage restrictions ap-
plied uniformly to comparable properties.

128 In Rivera, a homeowner obtained a
building permit to expand his residence. 186
Ariz. at 602, 925 P.2d 741, Following inspec-
tion of the completed work, the city discover-
ed that the improvements exceeded a zoning
limitation on the square footage of residential
improvements, Id. The Board ordered the
homeowner to demolish the non-compliant
portion of his residence and he sought a
variance, Id, The court of appeals affirmed
the Board’s denial of the variance, reasoning
that the homeowner created the special cir-
cumstances because he provided the city with
an erroneous site plan, Jd, at 608, 925 P.2d
741,

129 Arkules, Burns, and Rivera are dis-
tinguishable because in each case the owner
ereated the special circumstances; they did
not arise from applying the zoning ordinance
to circumstances or conditions beyond the
owners’ control. In contrast, here the special
circumstances arose from factors beyond Ja-
chimek’s control. The City’s eminent domain
action, not Jachimek’s intended use, altered
the Property’s dimensions and created the
special circumstances, including the Proper-
ty’s comparatively small lot size, absence of
frontage area around the building, direct
abutment of a public sidewalk, and onerous
parking restrictions. These characteristics
and the strict application of the zoning regu-
lations uniquely diminish the Property’s com-
mercial viability as compared to “other prop-
erty of the same classification in the same
zoning district,” A.R.S, § 9-462.06(G)@), and
have nothing to do with Jachimek’s personal
preference.

180 We are also unpersuaded by the court
of appeals’ reliance on Minney v. City of

Azusa, 164 Cal.App.2d 12, 380 P.2d 255
(1958), for the proposition that “[olne who
purchases property in anticipation of procur-
ing a variance to enable him to use it for a
purpose forbidden at the time of sale cannot
complain of hardship ensuing from a denial
of the desired variance.” Pawn II, 289 Ariz.
at 545 126, 378 P.8d 556. In Minney, the
California Court of Appeals upheld the denial
of a variance where an owner purchased a lot
in a residential zone and sought to construct
a church, 330 P.2d at 257, Because Minney
involved a use variance, it is inapposite. See
Arden H. Rathkopf et al., 8 Rathkopf’s The
Law of Zoning and Planning § 58.22 (4th ed.
2017) (noting that classification of prior
knowledge of special circumstances as a self-
imposed hardship arose in the context of use
variances). Unlike Minney’s use variance, Ja-
chimek’s proposed use was permissible and
the area variance would not alter the charac-
ter of the neighborhood.

HEME 181 Arizona zoning statutes and
local ordinances require boards of adjust-
ment to consider special circumstances appli-
cable to the property, not the property own-
er, See, 2.9., Burns, 156 Ariz. at 504, 7538 P.2d
198 (explaining that a variance “is a legal
status granted to a certain parcel of realty
without regard to ownership,” and “[p]erson-
al hardships, regardless of how compelling or
how far beyond the control of the individual
applicant, do not provide sufficient grounds
for the granting of a variance” (citation omit-
ted)); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al.,
Land Use Planning and Development Regu-
lation Law § 5.17 (8d ed. 2017) (“Most courts
consider the transfer of title irrelevant ...
[because] the zoning, not the person, creates
the hardship.”). Thus, in the context of area
variances, we consider whether strictly ap-
plying the zoning requirements would de-
prive an owner of the same privileges owners
of other similarly zoned property enjoy. Spe-
cial circumstances are not “self-imposed”
when the owner wants to use the property in
a way permitted to other similarly situated
properties, but cannot do so because of exter-
nally imposed circumstances like those in-
volved here. Although it is fair to say that
Jachimek voluntarily acquired the Property
subject to the special circumstances, he cer-
tainly did not create them.

555

HH 182 The court of appeals’ rule would
impose an undue restraint on alienation, as
anyone purchasing a property with knowl-
edge of the restriction would have no ability
to obtain an area variance. This approach
would give purchasers fewer property rights
than sellers and, thus, would contravene our
case law and longstanding legal tradition in
favor of alienation. See, ag., Tovrea v. Um-
phress, 27 Aviz.App. 518, 517, 556 P.2d 814
(1976) (noting that “[rlestraints on alienation
are generally disfavored”); see also Lamb v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Taunton, 76 Mass.
App.Ct. 518, 928 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (2010)
(citing Arden H. Rathkopf et al, 8 Rath-
kopfs The Law of Zoning and Planning
§ 58,22 at 141-148 (1991), stating “because a
purchaser of property acquires no greater
right to a variance than his predecessor, he
should not be held to acquire less” and find-
ing that “[t]o hold otherwise would discour-
age the free alienability of real property and
the efficient use of land” (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, we reject the court of appeals’
rule and hold that an applicant or owner’s
selection of a property, even with knowledge
that an area variance is required for an
intended use allowed on other similarly zoned
properties, does not itself constitute a self-
imposed special circumstance precluding an
area variance.

CONCLUSION

183 The Board acted within its discretion
in finding that special circumstances applied
to the Property; that the variance required
‘was an area variance; that Jachimek did not
create the special circumstances; that the
variance was necessary for the preservation
and enjoyment of substantial property rights;
and that the variance would not be materially
detrimental to the surrounding area, Accord-
ingly, we vacate the court of appeals’ opinion
and affirm the superior court’s judgment up-
holding the Board’s variance and granting
summary judgment in Jachimek’s favor. We
deny Pawn’s request for attorney fees be-
cause it is not the prevailing party.

399 P.3d 103
IN RE JESSIE T.
No. 1 CA-JV 16-0253
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1.

FILED 6/8/2017

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office,
Mesa, By Jason Kinsman, Counsel for Appel-
lant

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoe-
nix, By Lisa Marie Martin, Counsel for Ap-
pellee

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Patricia A. Orozco (Retired) joined,
Judge Donn Kessler concurred in part and
dissented in part.

OPINION
BROWN, Judge:

{1 Jessie T. appeals the juvenile court’s
delinquency adjudication finding that he com-
mitted animal cruelty in violation of Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 18-
2910(A)(9) (subjecting an animal to cruel mis-
treatment), a class six felony. Because we
conclude that the State failed to present suf-
ficient evidence to support the court’s adjudi-
eation, we modify the adjudication to reflect
that Jessie committed the lesser-included of-
fense of inflicting unnecessary physical inju-
ry to any animal, a class one misdemeanor, in
violation of A.R.S, § 18-2910(A)().

BACKGROUND

12 Police detectives discovered a Face-
book photo of Jessie holding a pellet gun in
one hand and a black cat by its tail in the
other. The detectives also observed photos of
a subsequent mutilation of what appeared to
be the same cat, Jessie later admitted to a
police officer that he shot the cat and did so
“because it was a stray, and it was black.”
Jessie also admitted that after the shooting,
he took pictures of a female friend disembow-
eling the cat,

{8 The State filed a delinquency petition
alleging Jessie intentionally or knowingly
subjected an animal to cruel mistreatment in
violation of A.R.S, § 18-2910,

557

A person commits cruelty to animals if the
person ... [i]ntentionally or knowingly
subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment,

“Cruel mistreatment” means to torture or

otherwise inflict unnecessary serious phys-

ical injury on an animal or to kill an animal
in a manner that causes protracted suffer-
ing to the animal,

ARS, § 18-2910(A)(Q), (H)@).

14 At the adjudication hearing, after the
close of the State’s evidence, Jessie moved
for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule
of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 29(D)(2).
The State responded that it had made a
“showing beyond a reasonable doubt” be-
cause “[Jessie] did cause reasonable risk of
death or serious injury to the cat, because he
shot the cat and killed it.” The court denied
the motion,

15 In its closing argument, the State
asked the juvenile court to focus on “inflict-
ing unnecessary physical injury to an animal”
and argued that Jessie “did create a reason-
able risk of death or serious impairment,
because he actually killed the cat.” The State
highlighted the Facebook photo of Jessie
holding the cat by the tail as evidence that he
“actually did kill the cat.” Alternatively, the
State argued that if it had failed to meet its
burden of proving Jessie subjected the cat to
cruel mistreatment under ARS. § 18-
2910(A)(9), the court should adjudicate him
delinquent for violating ARS. § 18-
2910(A)(8), as a lesser-included offense that
prohibits unnecessarily inflicting “physical in-
jury” to any animal. Defense counsel coun-
tered that “killing an animal and causing
serious physical injury [are] not the same.”
Counsel also pointed to the distinct elements
of “killing” and “serious physical injury”
within the statute to support his argument.
The State responded that it was only at-
tempting to prove that Jessie inflicted seri-
ous physical injury upon the cat—an injury
that created a reasonable risk of death as
evidenced by the cat’s actual death,

16 The juvenile court found Jessie delin-
quent for subjecting the cat to cruel mis-
treatment by shooting it with a pellet gun.
The court explained that it “d[id] not know
which injury ultimately caused the death of

558

the cat, but [found] that [Jessie’s] act of
shooting the cat constituted ‘serious physical
injury’ as contemplated by ARS, § 18-
2910(H)(2) and A.R.S. § 18~105(39).” The
court placed Jessie on probation and, over
his objection, designated the offense a felony.
This timely appeal followed,

DISCUSSION

17 Jessie admits he shot the cat with a
pellet gun, but contends that the juvenile
court erred when it found him delinquent for
cruel mistreatment because there was no evi-
dence the cat suffered before it died. He
argues that “the purpose of [A.R.S, § 18-
2910(A)(9) ] is clearly to prevent the suffer-
ing of animals as each method of inflicting
cruel mistreatment ... requires suffering.”
The State does not address Jessie’s statutory
construction argument but summarily con-
tends that by shooting the cat, Jessie inflict-
ed serious physical injury because the cat
died. Although the State was not required to
prove “suffering” to support a delinquency
finding under A.R.S. § 18-2910(A)(9), the
State was required to prove that the pellet
gun shot resulted in serious physical injury
to the cat, and not merely that the cat died,

Hs 18 When reviewing a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence but review the evidence
in the light most favorable to upholding the
adjudication. In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz, 447,
448, 16, 27 P.8d 804 (App. 2001). We will
reverse for insufficient evidence only when
there is a “complete absence of probative
facts to support a judgment or when a judg-
ment is clearly contrary to any substantial
evidence.” Id. at 448-49, 16, 27 P.38d 804.

Il 119 We review de novo the interpreta-
tion of statutes. Id. at 448, 16, 27 P.3d 804.
Our primary goal is to fulfill the purpose of
the statutory provisions at issue. State v.
Cabrera, 202 Ariz. 296, 299, 1114, 44 P.8d 174
(App. 2002), If the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, we give it effect and do
not employ other rules of statutory construc-
tion to discern the legislature’s intent. State
v. Christian, 205 Ariz, 64, 66, 16, 66 P.3d
1241 (2008). We also consider the statutory
scheme as a whole and presume that the

legislature does not include statutory provi-
sions that are “redundant, void, inert, trivial,
superfluous, or contradictory.” State v. Moer-
man, 182 Ariz, 255, 260, 895 P.2d 1018 (App,
1994),

A, Cruel Mistreatment—Serious Physi-

cal Injury

HI 110 To support a delinquency finding
for cruel mistreatment of an animal, the
State was required to prove that (1) Jessie
tortured or otherwise inflicted unnecessary
serious physical injury on the cat, or (2) he
killed the cat in a manner that caused pro-
tracted suffering, A.R.S. § 18-2910(A)(9),
(H)@). Because the State did not attempt to
show that Jessie tortured the cat or killed it
in a manner causing protracted suffering, we
focus only on whether the State established
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jessie inflict-
ed unnecessary serious physical injury.

{11 “Serious physical injury includes
physical injury that creates a reasonable
risk of death, or that causes serious and
permanent disfigurement, serious impair-
ment of health or loss or protracted impair-
ment of the function of any bodily organ or
limb.” A.R.S. § 18-105(89) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted). “Serious physi-
cal injury” is an element of the offense that
must be separately established beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See State v. George, 206 Ariz,
436, 441-42, 1110-14, 79 P.3d 1050 (App.
2008).

12 According to the State, Jessie’s admis-
sion that he intentionally shot the cat was
sufficient to show he inflicted an injury on
the cat and thereby created a reasonable risk
of death. The State does not contend that
Jessie caused the cat to suffer disfigurement,
serious impairment of health, loss of limb or
bodily organ, or protracted impairment of
the function of any limb or bodily organ. For
this reason, our focus is further limited to
whether the State proved the cat suffered a
significant injury that was sufficient to create
a reasonable risk of death.

118 The plain language of the cruel mis-
treatment subsections at issue, A.R.S, § 18-
2910(A)(9), (H)@), indicates that killing an
animal without proof of protracted suffering
does not equate to causing serious physical

injury. State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100,
854 P.2d 181 (1998) (recognizing that “best
and most reliable index of a statute’s mean-
ing” is its language), Killing an animal does
not constitute cruel mistreatment unless the
killing causes protracted suffering. See State
v, Pitts, 178 Ayviz, 405, 407, 874 P.2d 962
(1994) (“When possible, we interpret statutes
to give meaning to every word.”), Accepting
the State’s argument that evidence of death
alone is sufficient to constitute “reasonable
risk of death” would stretch the scope of the
animal cruelty statute beyond its plain mean-
ing, If the legislature intended that killing an
animal without causing protracted suffering
be categorized as cruel mistreatment, it pre-
sumably could have done so, but did not.
Instead, the legislature’s drafting choice
shows that the crime of cruel mistreatment
to animals requires proof of torture, serious
physical injury, or killing with protracted
suffering.

114 Moreover, the use of “serious physical
injury” (ARS. § 18-2910(A)(9),(H)@)) and
“physical injury” (A.R.S. § 13-2910(A)(8)) to
distinguish offenses within the animal cruelty
statute is consistent with the statutory con-
struction of the assault statutes, A.R.S.
§§ 13-1208, -1204, Thus, this court’s analysis
in George, in which we considered the legal
difference between “serious physical injury”
and “physical injury” in the context of an
aggravated assault conviction and a gunshot.
wound, is instructive, 206 Ariz. 436, 79 P.8d
1050.

115 The defendant in George shot a wom-
an, causing a bullet to pass from the right
side of her neck through her right underarm.
Id, at 489, 12, 79 P.8d 1050, Evidence pre-
sented at trial showed the victim lost a signif-
icant amount of blood, some sensation,
strength and muscle control to her right arm,
and “had not regained full function of her

1. Although ARS, § 13-105 was later amended
for technical reasons, the changes are immaterial
to our analysis.

2. In George, we also recognized that because the
legislature apparently modeled its definition of
“serious physical injury” after the Model Penal
Code, the legislature intended to describe ‘‘dras-
tic harms” and injuries of “extreme gravity.” 206
Ariz. at 441, 112, 79 P.3d 1050 (‘“The distinction
between bodily injury [for simple assault] and

559

arm during her two-day hospital stay.” Id. at
440, 114, 79 P.8d 1050. Her physician, howev-
er, “refused to speculate on whether that
impairment would be temporary, protracted,
or permanent.” Id, Noting that the State
“presented no evidence that the injury itself
had exposed [the victim] to a reasonable risk
of death or had caused her to suffer serious
or permanent disfigurement,” id. at 440, 15,
79 P.3d 1050, we held it was insufficient to
support a finding of serious physical injury
because there was “no evidence that [the
victim’s] injuries had caused her to suffer a
sustained impairment of her health or a pro-
tracted impairment of the use of her arm,”
id. at 442, 118, 79 P.8d 1050. Construing
ARS. § 18-105(89), we explained that the
legislature had enacted a tiered sentencing
scheme based upon the severity of the injury,
and “that the legislature intended serious
physical injury to refer to an injury more
serious than those injuries justifying a mere
nondangerous, class four felony classifica-
tion.” George, 206 Ariz. at 441, 118, 9, 79
P.3d 1050 (citations and internal quotations
omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 220 Ariz,
56, 58, 110, 202 P.8d 521 (App. 2008) (apply-
ing George and noting the tiered structure of
punishment is based on the severity of the
injury)?

116 Similar to the statutory analysis in
George, we construe the Arizona animal eru-
elty statute to give meaning to the tiered
offenses the legislature created. The legisla~
ture has indicated that a person commits
cruel mistreatment of an animal if there is
evidence of torturing, serious physical injury,
or death with protracted suffering. If such
evidence is lacking, the legislature has im-
posed a less severe penalty, a class one mis-
demeanor, for a person who “inflicts unneces-
sary physical injury’ on an animal. See
ARS, § 18-2910(A)(8).

serious bodily injury is one of the chief determi-
nants of grading under the assault offense....
This differential [in punishment range] is appro-
priate in light of the very broad coverage
achieved under the lesser requirement and the
extreme gravity of injury punished under the
greater.” (quoting Model Penal Code and Com-
mentaries § 211.1 cmt. 3 (1980))). Those same
considerations apply to the animal cruelty stat-
ute,

560

117 The State’s presentation of evidence
and its arguments to the juvenile court, as
well as its position on appeal, focused solely
on the theory that Jessie created a reason-
able risk of death simply by shooting the cat
with a pellet gun. The juvenile court, howev-
er, was unable to determine the effect of the
pellet gunshot. Although a reasonable infer-
ence can be drawn that the cat was injured
‘im some manner by the shot from the pellet
gun, see infra 121, on this record the same
inference cannot be drawn to establish, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that Jessie created
a reasonable risk of death by shooting the
cat. See George, 206 Ariz, at 442, 114, 79
P.8d 1050 (“[Allthough a gunshot wound
may, in most circumstances, result in severe
injuries that seriously impair the victim’s
health, the mere fact that a victim has been
shot, without more, does not warrant that
finding.”), Without evidence establishing the
seriousness of the injury, the State necessari-
ly failed to prove an element of the offense.
See id. at 15 (explaining that “the state
presented no evidence that the injury itself
had exposed [the victim] to a reasonable risk
of death”) (emphasis added); see also AJ.R.
v. State, 8 N.E.8d 1000, 1006-07 (Ind, Ct.
App. 2014) (holding, in a juvenile adjudication
for animal cruelty, that the Indiana statute
“[eould] not be fairly interpreted so as to
include any injury that results in the death
of the animal,” but that “the type of injury is
a key component of and necessary condition
to making a determination of [cruelty].”) (ci-
tation omitted), Because no reasonable evi-
dence in this record establishes that Jessie
caused an unnecessary serious physical inju-
ry to the cat, the adjudication for cruel mis-
treatment of an animal cannot be sustained.

718 The dissent would sua sponte raise
accomplice liability as a basis for finding that
the State met its burden of proving that
Jessie committed cruel mistreatment. See in-
fra 129, The dissent relies on the well-recog-
nized legal principle in civil cases that we
may affirm the superior court's decision
“even if the trial judge was right for the
wrong reasons.” See infra 128. But the dis-
sent cites no authority suggesting such prin-
ciple may be applied to affirm a criminal
conviction on a theory never raised in the
juvenile court. See U.S. Const. amend. VI

(‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation.”); see
also State in Interest of D.B., 289 P.8d 459,
471, 144 (Utah 2012) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment is satisfied when a defendant (1)
receives adequate notice that the State is
pursuing accomplice liability and (2) the
State has not affirmatively misled the defen-
dant) (internal citations omitted), By inten-
tionally narrowing its theory of proof, see
supra I110, 12, the State necessarily reject-
ed a theory of accomplice liability. Applying a
new theory of criminal liability on appeal,
sua sponte, to sustain the delinquency adju-
dication would violate Jessie's constitutional
right to due process. Cfi State v. Alvarado,
178 Ariz, 589, 544, 875 P.2d 198 (App. 1994)
(deciding in the context of a bench trial
“whether the verdict was based on the right
or the wrong legal theory argued by the
State would have the appearance of giving
the State a second try at convicting Appel-
lant without giving Appellant the due process
of a second trial”),

HI 119 Moreover, we cannot affirm an
adjudication “when there is a complete ab-
sence of probative facts to support a judg-
ment.” Kyle M., 200 Ariz, at 448-49, 16, 27
P.8d 804, According to the officer, Jessie
admitted photographing the mutilation of the
cat; however, the State did nothing to sug-
gest it was relying on the admission as an
alternative theory of proof to establish ac-
complice liability. Cf State v. Woods, 168
Ariz, 548, 544, 815 P.2d 912 (App. 1991) (“In
Arizona, being an accomplice is not a sepa-
rately chargeable offense; it is merely a theo-
ry that the state may utilize to establish the
commission of a substantive criminal of-
fense.”), Nor did the State seek to prove that
Jessie’s friend committed cruel mistreatment
as a principal by mutilating the cat while it
was still alive, as there was no evidence
presented as to when the mutilation oc-
curred. See State v. Hickle, 188 Ariz. 284,
238, 650 P.2d 1216 (1982) (“[T]o prove accom-
plice liability, the State must show that [the
defendant] participated or aided the planning
or commission of the crime.... His presence
at the scene of the crime is not necessarily
enough.”). Nor did the juvenile court give

any indication it was relying on Jessie’s act.
of photographing the mutilation to find that
he was an accomplice to the cruel mistreat-
ment offense,

120 On this record, the evidence presented
by the State was insufficient to prove, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that Jessie inten-
tionally or knowingly committed eruel mis-
treatment in violation of ARS § 18-
2910(A)(9).

B. Lesser-Included Offense

HM 121 Regardless of the extent of the
injury caused, Jessie may nonetheless be
criminally liable for animal cruelty under the
lesser-included offense of ARS, § 13-
2910(A)(8), a class one misdemeanor? That
subsection prohibits intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly inflicting unnecessary physical
injury on an animal. “Whether an offense is a
lesser-included offense of another crime in-
volves a matter of statutory interpretation
which we review de novo.” In re James P.,
214 Ariz, 420, 428, 112, 158 P.8d 1049 (App.
2007),

Hs 122 A crime is a lesser-included
offense of another crime if “it is, by its very
nature, always a constituent part of the
greater offense, or whether the charging doc-
ument describes the lesser offense even
though it does not always make up a constit-
uent part of the greater offense.” State v.
Brown, 196 Ariz, 206, 207, 15, 986 P.2d 239
(App. 1999). “[FJor one offense to be included
within another, greater offense, the greater
must have all the elements of the lesser plus
at least one additional element.” James P.,
214 Ariz, at 424, 119, 158 P.8d 1049. To
sustain a conviction of a lesser-included of-
fense, “[i]t must also be shown that the lesser
cannot be committed without always satisfy-
ing the corresponding elements of the great-
ex.” Id,

123 The elements of the felony, cruel mis-
treatment, are (1) intentionally or knowingly,
(2) subjecting an animal (mammal, bird, rep-
tile or amphibian) to, (8) unnecessary serious
physical injury (including torture) or killing
3. The State does not raise this argument on

appeal; however, pursuant to Ariz, R. Crim. P.

31.17(@), we may consider whether section 13-
2910(A)(3) is a lesser-included offense of section

561

an animal in a manner that causes protracted
suffering to the animal. ARS, § 18-
2910(A)(9), (H)(@) and (2). The elements of
the class one misdemeanor, animal cruelty by
infliction of unnecessary physical injury, are
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, (2)
inflicting upon an animal (mammal, bird, rep-
tile or amphibian), (8) unnecessary “impair-
ment of physical condition.” A.R.S, §§ 18-
2910(A)(8), (H)(1), -105(83), Because inflict-
ing an unnecessary impairment of physical
condition is always a constituent part of the
greater offense of cruel mistreatment involv-
ing unnecessary serious physical injury, and
because cruel mistreatment includes all ele-
ments of subsection (A)(8) plus at least one
additional element (serious physical injury
including torture, or killing with protracted
suffering), it is a lesser-included offense of
ABS, § 18-2910(A)@Q).

124 A trier of fact could reasonably infer
that shooting the cat was unnecessary, be-
cause Jessie admitted he shot the cat for no
yeason other than it was “black” and a
“stray.” A trier of fact could also find that
shooting the cat with a pellet gun necessarily
caused some type of physical impairment,
Thus, we conclude there was sufficient evi-
dence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Jessie committed animal cruelty, in violation
of A.R.S, § 18-2910(A)(8). See Ariz, R. Crim,
P, 81.17(d) (stating that when an appellate
court finds that the evidence introduced at
trial is not legally sufficient to support a
conviction, but is legally sufficient to estab-
lish the defendant’s guilt of a lesser-included.
offense, it may modify the judgment to re-
flect a conviction for the lesser-included of-
fense and remand for resentencing); George,
206 Ariz. at 442, 114, 79 P.8d 1050 (modify-
ing judgment because evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the conviction for aggravat-
ed assault causing serious physical injury but
was sufficient to support the lesser-included
offense of assault causing temporary but sub-
stantial impairment),

CONCLUSION

125 Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that insufficient evidence exists to establish
13-2910(A)(9) and whether the evidence was le-

gally sufficient to establish that Jessie committed
the purported lesser-included offense.

562

that Jessie committed an act of cruel mis-
treatment; however, we modify the juvenile
court’s delinquency adjudication to reflect
that Jessie is delinquent for violating A.R.S.
§ 18-2910 (A)(8), as a class one misdemean-
or,

KESSLER, J., separately concurring in
part and dissenting in part:

126 I concur with the majority's construc-
tion of the statutory scheme at issue and
concur that if we concluded the superior
court erred, we could modify the adjudication
to reflect that Jessie is delinquent for violat-
ing A.R.S. § 18-2910(A)(8). However, for the
following reasons, I respectively dissent that
the superior court erred in adjudicating Jes-
sie as delinquent of a felony for cruel mis-
treatment of an animal,

127 The facts are relatively undisputed,
Jessie shot a small, stray kitten with a pellet
gun. The superior court correctly held that
the State did not prove the shot killed the
kitten because there was no evidence pre-
sented to that effect, Shortly after the shoot-
ing, another person eviscerated the kitten,
essentially cutting into its body, taking out
its organs, and cutting it into two, There is
no evidence Jessie physically participated in
the evisceration; instead he photographed the
evisceration and posted the photo record on
social media, telling the police later that he
found the evisceration nasty and interesting.

128 We view the record in the light most
favorable to affirming the trial court. State v.
Rose, 231 Ariz. 500, 515, 172, 297 P.8d 906
(2018) (citation omitted). We will affirm if, on
any reasonable view of the evidence, we can
deduce facts which on any theory of the law
would sustain the judgment. Land-Air, Inc.
v. Parker, 108 Ariz. 1, 2, 485 P.2d 838 (1967)
(citation and quotation omitted). We will af-
firm even if the trial judge was right for the
wrong reasons. City of Phoenia v, Geyler,
144 Ariz, 828, 880, 697 P.2d 1073 (1985) (cita-
tion omitted), We also presume that the
judge knows and properly applies the law.
State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 128, 871 P.2d
287 (1994) (citation omitted).

129 In light of these standards of review,
the record supports the adjudication of Jes-
sie as an accomplice to the evisceration, Giv-

en that the court found the State had not
proven the shot killed the kitten, this means
the kitten was still alive when Jessie’s friend
disemboweled it while Jessie was photo-
graphing her do it. This clearly meets the
requirements of torturing the cat, inflicting
unnecessary serious physical injury on the
cat or killing the cat in a manner that caused
protracted suffering. A.R.S, § 18-2910(A)(9),
(H)@). By filming the crime, Jessie was an
accomplice, ARS. §§ 183-301@2)-@); -
308(B)(2); Harris v, State, 790 P.2d 1879,
1888 (Alaska App, 1990).

30 In so holding, I recognize that the
State did not allege that Jessie could be
liable as an accomplice or propose a theory of
the case on the basis that the kitten was
killed in a manner that caused protracted
suffering through the evisceration, However,
there is no right to notice of how the State
will prove liability and no requirement that
charging documents allege an accomplice
theory of liability. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz,
526, 588, 633 P.2d 335 (1985) (citations omit-
ted); State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz, 161, 162-63,
704 P.2d 291 (App. 1985).

181 Accordingly, I would affirm the supe-
rior court's decision,

399 P.3d 109

FIRST-CITIZENS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, d/b/a First Citizens
Bank, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

Nayana MORARI, Renu Shah, and Vai-
shali Patel, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0201
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed June 15, 2017

May, Potenza, Baran & Gillespie, P.C.,
Phoenix, By Philip G. May, Devin Sreechara-
na, and Andrew S. Lishko, Counsel for Plain-
tiff/Appellant

Clark Hill PLC, Scottsdale, By Sean M.
Carroll, Ryan J. Lorenz, and Christopher T.
Curran, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and
Judge Espinosa concurred.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

{1 First Citizens Bank appeals the trial
eourt’s ruling dismissing its breach of con-
tract action as to the spouses of three guar-
anty signatories. It argues the court erred by

564

applying Arizona law to the guaranties rath-
er than California law, which led the court to
dismiss the action. It also argues the court
abused its discretion by denying its request
to amend the complaint. We conclude the
court correctly applied Arizona law and
amending the complaint would not have
changed the result, We affirm,

Factual and Procedural Background

12 “On appeal from a motion to dismiss,
we consider the facts alleged in the complaint
to be true, and we view them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff to determine wheth-
er the complaint states a valid claim for
relief,” Mintz v. Bell Atl, Sys. Leasing Int,
Inc, 188 Ariz, 550, 552, 905 P.2d 559, 561
(App. 1995), In 2010, Sun Sky Hospitality,
LLC, borrowed $3,787,000 from First Citi-
zens’ predecessor-in-interest, United West-
ern Bank, to purchase real property in Co-
chise County, and executed a promissory
note, loan agreement, and deed of trust. On
January $1, 2012, Dilip Shah, Chandrakant
Patel, and Bharat Morari each executed per-
sonal guaranties for one hundred percent of
all amounts owing from Sun Sky to First
Citizens, Sun Sky defaulted on its obligations
in November 2012, and First Citizens sued
Sun Sky and the personal guarantors for
breach of contract. First Citizens also sued
the personal guarantors’ spouses despite the
absence of personal guaranties by them, The
guarantors and their spouses are residents of
California, First Citizens attached guaranties
to the complaint (“the attached guaranties”)
and incorporated them by reference.

{8 The non-signatory spouses jointly
moved to dismiss First Citizens’ complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P.t
They argued First Citizens had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be
granted as to them because they had not
signed the attached guaranties as A.R.S,
§ 25-214(C)(2) requires. In its response,
First Citizens argued California law applied
instead, and asserted California law requires

1, Other defendants also joined the motion to
dismiss, but as relevant to this appeal the motion.
‘was granted only as to the non-signatory spous-
es: Renu Shah, Vaishali Patel, and Nayana Mor-
ari. (Pursuant to First Citizens’ concession be-
low, the trial court also granted the motion to

the signature of only one spouse in order to
bind a marital community, First Citizens in-
cluded in its response three additional guar-
anties not alleged in or attached to the com-
plaint (“the supplemental guaranties”). The
supplemental guaranties contained California
choice of law provisions, but like the attached
guaranties, were not signed by the spouses,

14 At the conclusion of the hearing on the
motion to dismiss, First Citizens orally re-
quested leave to amend the complaint to
include the supplemental guaranties if their
absence was a “turning point.” The trial
court issued an under-advisement ruling dis-
missing the action with prejudice as to the
spouses and denying First Citizens’ request
to amend the complaint, The court also de-
nied First Citizens’ subsequent motion for
reconsideration. The court issued a final
judgment as to the spouses pursuant to Rule
54(b), Ariz, R, Civ. P., and we have jurisdie-
tion over First Citizens’ appeal pursuant to
ARS. §§ 12-120,21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(),

Motion to Dismiss

15 We review de novo the dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Cole-
man v. City of Mesa, 280 Ariz. 852, 117-8,
284 P.8d 863, 866-67 (2012). Dismissal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted is appropriate if, as a matter of
law, the “plaintiffs would not be entitled to
relief under any interpretation of the facts
susceptible of proof.” Id, 18, quoting Fid.
Sec, Life Ins. Co. v. State Dept of Ins., 191
Ariz, 222, 14, 954 P.2d 680, 582 (1998). The
court should dismiss if the plaintiff has pled
facts revealing a legal bar to recovery. See
Moretto v. Samaritan Health Sys., 190 Aviz,
348, 346, 947 P.2d 917, 920 (App. 1997). In
our analysis we will “look only to the plead-
ing itself,’ including any exhibits thereto.
Coleman, 230 Ariz, 352, 19, 284 P.8d at 867,
quoting Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins, Co., 218
Aviz, 417, 16, 189 P,8d 844, 846 (2008); see
also Ariz, R. Civ. P, 10(¢) (copy of written.
instrument as exhibit to pleading is part of

dismiss as to Ramila Shah, the spouse of another
guarantor; First Citizens does not challenge this
ruling and thus Ramila Shah is not a party to
this appeal.) Hereinafter, any references to “the
spouses” will refer only to the non-signatory
spouses,

pleading). We will assume the truth of all
well-pleaded factual allegations and accept all
reasonable inferences from those facts, Cole-
man, 230 Ariz, 352, 19, 284 P.8d at 867.

HN 16 Here, the question of whether
the complaint reveals a legal bar to recovery
depends on which state’s law applies. Com-
pare § 25-214(C)(2) (requiring joinder of
both spouses to bind marital community to
guaranty or suretyship), and Rackmaster
Sys. Ine. v, Maderia, 219 Ariz, 60, 115, 193
P.8d 314, 317 (App. 2008) (both spouses must
actually sign guaranty), with Cal. Fam, Code
§ 910(@) (marital community liable for debt
incurred by only one spouse during marriage
unless otherwise provided by statute), and
Litke O'Farrell, LLC v, Tipton, 204 Cal.
App.4th 1178, 189 Cal.Rptr.8d 548, 550 (2012)
(same), Thus, we begin with a choice of law
analysis, We review conflict of laws issues de
novo as questions of law. Swanson v. Image
Bank, Inc., 206 Ariz, 264, 16, 77 P.8d 439,
441 (2008). Arizona courts apply the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)
(“Restatement”) to determine the applicable
law in a contract action. Cardon v, Cotton
Lane Holdings, Inc, 178 Ariz, 208, 207, 841
P.2d 198, 202 (1992); of Pounders v, Hnserch
E&O, Ine, 282 Ariz, 852, 19, 806 P.3d 9, 11
(2018) (Restatement applied in determining
choice of law for wrongful death claim),

TI 7 Section 194 of the Restatement
provides:
The validity of a contract of suretyship!!
and the rights created thereby are deter-
mined, in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties, by the law governing
the principal obligation which the contract
of suretyship was intended to secure, un-
less, with respect to the particular issue,

2, There is no relevant difference between surety-
ship and guaranty for purposes of choice of law
analysis, See Phx. Arbor Plaza, Ltd. v. Dauderman,
163 Ariz. 27, 29, 785 P.2d 1215, 1217 (App,
1989), citing Restatement § 194 cmt, a.

3, The attached guaranties include a choice of law
clause providing that federal law applies in the
event that the guaranties and promissory note
are held by the United States Department of
Agriculture's Rural Business Cooperative Service
(“RBS”), but the complaint does not allege that
RBS held the guaranties or note at any relevant

565

some other state has a more significant

relationship under the principles stated in

§ 6 to the transaction and the parties, in

which event the local law of the other state

will be applied.
See also id. emt, b (“In situations where
there are several sureties and several con-
tracts of suretyship, the convenience of hav-
ing all these contracts determined by the law
which governs the principal obligation be-
comes even more apparent.”),

Hl 18 The attached guaranties contain
no choice of law provision alleged to apply?
Given the absence of an effective choice of
Jaw by the parties in the attached guaranties,
the trial court first determined which law
governed the principal obligation between
Sun Sky and United Western/First Citizens.
See Restatement § 194. The loan agreement.
between Sun Sky and United Western pro-
vides: “This agreement shall be governed by
and construed in accordance with the laws of
the state of Arizona and the laws of the
United States applicable to transactions with-
in such state.” Parties generally have the
power to determine the terms of their con-
tractual engagements except as to issues
such as capacity, formalities, and validity. See
Swanson, 206 Ariz, 264, 12, 77 P.8d at 443,
citing Restatement § 187 cmt. d. First Citi-
zens does not dispute the enforceability of
this choice of law provision as to the principal
obligation, And indeed, even without a choice
of law clause, the principal obligation would
je governed by the law of Arizona, where the
subject real property is located, the borrower
is domiciled, and the deed of trust was re-
corded. See Restatement § 189 (governing
contracts transferring interests in land), The
court correctly determined that Arizona law
governs the principal obligation.

time. The guaranties contain no alternative

choice of law provision,

4. The trial court suggested that by citing Ari-
zona attorney fees statutes in its complaint, First
Citizens had “‘acknowledge[d] that Arizona law
applies to the cause of action alleged” therein,
including the attached guaranties. As First Citi-
zens recognizes in its reply brief, we reached
the opposite conclusion in Ciena Capital Fund-
ing, LLC v, Krieg’s, Inc., 242 Ariz. 212, 216-17,
113, 394 P.3d 39, 43-44 (App. 2017). Assuming
for the sake of argument that California law
applies, California regards the issue of attorney

566

19 Because the principal obligation is ex-
pressly governed by Arizona law, we apply
the law of another state only if it has a more
significant relationship to the transaction and
parties. See Restatement §§ 6, 194. Restate-
ment § 194, comment ec, addresses the signif-
icant relationship analysis in this situation:

On oceasion, a state which is not the state

whose local law governs the principal obli-

gation will nevertheless, with respect to
the particular issue, be the state of most
significant relationship to the suretyship
contract and the parties and hence the
state of the applicable law.... A sufficient
relationship to justify application of the
law governing the principal obligation
would, however, exist if the state whose
local law governs the obligation was (1) the
state where the creditor extended credit to
the principal or otherwise relied upon the
surety’s promise ..., or (2) the state
where the contract of suretyship was to be
performed, or (8) the state where the ne-
gotiations between the surety and creditor
were conducted or where the surety deliv-
ered the contract to the creditor, or (4) the
state of domicile of either the creditor or
the surety. Presumably, there are still oth-
er relationships which will suffice,
We have previously held that “any one” of
these four relationships “would be sufficient
to apply the law governing the underlying
obligation to the guarant[y].” Pha, Arbor
Plaza, Lid, v. Dauderman, 168 Ariz, 27, 29-
30, 785 P.2d 1215, 1217-18 (App. 1989).

{10 We agree with the trial court that the
first of these relationships is present here.
The complaint alleges that creditor United
Western extended credit to principal Sun
Sky in order to facilitate acquisition of a
hotel located in Cochise County, Arizona, The

fees as procedural for choice-of-law purposes.
See, e.g., ABF Capital Corp. v. Grove Props. Co.,
126 Cal.App.4th 204, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 815
(2005), Thus, the law of the forum would govern
that issue. Ciena Capital Funding, 242 Ariz. at
216-17, 113, 394 P.3d at 43-44. First Citizens’
citation of Arizona attorney fees statutes in the
complaint does not undermine or contradict its
contention that California law applies. Id, Nev-
ertheless, this error is not reversible because the
court’s conclusion that Arizona law applies was
correct for the other reasons discussed herein.
See Gnatkiv v, Machkur, 239 Ariz. 486, 488, 11,
372 P.3d 1010, 1012 (App. 2016) (court of ap-

promissory note attached to the complaint
was signed in Sierra Vista, Arizona. And the
deed of trust, also attached to the complaint,
was recorded in Arizona and lists Arizona
mailing addresses for both trustor Sun Sky
and trustee Fidelity National Title, This rela-
tionship is sufficient to warrant application of
Arizona law to the attached guaranties, See
id. First Citizens does not argue that the
principles of Restatement § 6 dictate a con-
trary result. In sum, the court did not err in
applying Arizona law to the attached guaran-
ties pursuant to Restatement § 194, Cf New
England Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Rosenfield,
679 F.2d 467, 471-72 (6th Cir, 1982) (under
Restatement § 194, law governing principal
obligation would also govern guaranties that
had no choice of law clause); L&L Oil Co. v.
Hugh Mac Towing Corp., 859 F.Supp. 1002,
1004-05 (E.D, La. 1994) (applying Louisiana
law to guaranty by Florida trust where guar-
anty effected “to facilitate performance of a
Louisiana transaction”),

{11 Arizona law requires joinder of both
spouses in order to bind the community in
“{alny transaction of guaranty, indemnity or
suretyship.” § 25-214(C), The complaint does
not allege, and its attachments do not reveal,
that the spouses ever signed any guaranty.
This is a legal bar to recovery against them
under Arizona law for breach of a contract of
guaranty; therefore, the trial court did not
err by granting the motion to dismiss as to
the spouses. See Moretio, 190 Ariz. at 346,
947 P.2d at 920.

Motion to Amend Complaint

HMM 1112 First Citizens argues in the
alternative that the trial court erred by deny-
ing its oral request to amend the complaint
to include the supplemental guaranties.® We

peals may affirm judgment if legally correct for
any reason); Ariz, R. Civ, P. 61 (court must
disregard error not affecting party's substantial
rights).

5. Although denial of a motion to amend a com-
plaint generally is not an appealable order, see
Dollar A Day Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Superior
Court, 107 Ariz. 87, 89, 482 P.2d 454, 456 (1971),
it is appealable in this case because a final judg-
ment has been entered, see Walls v. Ariz, Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 596-97, 826 P.2d
1217, 1222-23 (App. 1991).

review a court’s denial of a request to amend
the pleadings for an abuse of discretion. Car-
ranza v. Madrigal, 287 Aviz, 512, 118, 854
P.8d 889, 392 (2015). A court does not abuse
its diseretion by denying a request to amend
if the amendment would be futile. See Tu-
macacori Mission Land Dev, Ltd. v. Union
Pac, RR. Co., 281 Ariz. 517, 14, 297 P.8d
928, 925 (App. 2018); Bishop v, State, Dept. of
Corr,, 172 Ariz, 472, 474~75, 887 P.2d 1207,
1209-10 (App. 1992), Granting the motion to
amend would be futile if the supplemental
guaranties would not support a cause of ac-
tion against the spouses.

Hl 118 First Citizens relies on Restate-
ment § 187, which sets forth the cireum-
stances in which “[t]he law of the state cho-
sen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties” will be applied. Restate-
ment § 187(1) (emphasis added). Such reli-
ance is misplaced, As our precedents indi-
cate, Restatement § 187 does not apply to a
spouse that did not execute a guaranty con-
tract and is not party to that contract.

114 In Lorenz-Aumier Financial Group,
Inc. v. Bidewell, Leslie Bidewell, an Oregon
resident, leased certain electronic equipment
from Lorenz-Auxier and signed the lease
agreements both in his individual capacity
and as president of Infotel Arizona, Inc. 160
Ariz, 218, 219, 772 P.2d 41, 42 (App. 1989).
Leslie executed the leases in Arizona. Id.
Leslie’s wife, Sandra, also an Oregon resi-
dent, neither signed the leases nor approved
them or assumed responsibility for them in
any way. Id, When the lessees defaulted,
Lorenz-Auxier sued both Leslie and Sandra,
and the trial court granted summary judg-
ment for Lorenz-Auxier. Id. The court re-
versed summary judgment as to Sandra, ap-
plying the law of Oregon, a non-community-
property state that “protects a wife’s sepa-
rate earnings and property from subjection
to the payment of her husband’s separate
debts.” Id. at 221-22, 772 P.2d at 44~45, The

6. The spouses, invoking the principle that this
court will affirm the trial court's ruling if legally
correct for any reason, argue the court's ruling
denying the request to amend was legally sup-
portable on procedural grounds, They note First
Citizens did not proffer a copy of the proposed
amended pleading as they contend was required
by Rule 15(a)(4), Ariz. R. Civ. P,, and further

567

fact that the leases Leslie had signed con-
tained an Arizona choice of law provision did
not change the result. Jd. The court found
“this provision d[id] not bind her, as she was
not a party to the leases, made no personal
choice of law, and could not be bound by the
terms, including the choice of law terms, of
contracts she did not sign.” Jd. Even if Leslie
agreed he would be bound by Arizona law,
the court concluded, “he did not thereby bind
his wife.” Id.

115 Later that year, the court of appeals
decided Phoenix Arbor Plaza, Lid. v. Dau-
derman, which the trial court here referred
to as “[t]he controlling case.” In Dauderman,
an Arizona partnership leased space in an
Arizona shopping center. 163 Ariz. at 28, 785
P.2d at 1216. California resident Jerry Dan-
derman executed a personal guaranty of the
lessee’s performance. Jd, Following the les-
see’s default, the lessor’s successor-in-inter-
est sued Jerry and his wife, Roberta, also a
California resident. Id. Roberta moved for
summary judgment on grounds she had nev-
er signed the guaranty and Arizona law pre-
vented liability as to her and as to the Dau-
dermans’ community assets. Id; see § 25~
214(C). The trial court granted her motion.
Dauderman, 168 Ariz. at 28, 785 P.2d at
1216. On appeal, the Dauderman court first
observed that an Arizona choice of law provi-
sion in the lease agreement “[was not] bind-
ing on Roberta because she did not sign the
lease.” Id. at 29, 785 P.2d at 1217, citing
Lorenz-Auwier, 160 Ariz, at 221, 772 P.2d at
44, In addressing Roberta’s liability, the
court concluded Restatement § 194 applied
because factors set forth in comment ¢ of
that section were present. Dauderman, 168
Ariz, at 29-80, 785 P.2d at 1217-18, The court
applied Lorenz—Aucier to require an Arizona
court to refuse enforcement of “a unilateral
promise by the husband to bind his wife to a
promise which would jeopardize property
rights provided by her state of domicile.” 163

argue the motion to amend was untimely or
unduly delayed, We need not address these asser-
tions because even assuming for the sake of
argument that the request to amend was proce-
durally proper, the court correctly ruled that
amendment would have been futile, as explained
below.

568

Ariz, at 80-81, 785 P.2d at 1218-19, Because
Arizona law provided Roberta more commu-
nity property protections than California, the
court affirmed summary judgment for Ro-
berta and the marital community. Id.

116 Here, even had the trial court granted
First Citizens’ request to amend the com-
plaint to include the supplemental guaranties,
the complaint still would have been fatally
deficient, In one respect, both Lorene-Aumi-
er and Dauderman are on point: the spouses
could not be bound by guaranty contracts
they had not signed, including any choice of
law provisions therein. See Dauderman, 163
Ariz, at 29, 785 P.2d at 1217; Lorene—~Auwier,
160 Ariz, at 221, 772 P,2d at 44. In another
respect, Dauderman is on point and Lorene-
Aumier is distinguishable. Like in Dauder-
mom, and unlike in Lorene-Auwier, Arizona
law affords the spouses broader property
protections than the law of their domicile.
Dauderman, 168 Ariz, at 80-81, 785 P.2d at.
1218-19; see also Vance~Koepnick v. Koep-
nick, 197 Aviz, 162, 115-6, 3 P.8d 1082, 1088
(App. 1999) (purpose of § 25-214(C)(2) is “to
protect one spouse against obligations under-
taken by the other spouse without the first
spouse’s knowledge and consent”), Attaching
the supplemental guaranties to the complaint
would have been futile and would not have
overcome First Citizens’ legal bar to recoy-
ery. Therefore, the court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the request to amend,
Tumacacori Mission Land Dev, 281 Ariz.
517, 14, 297 P.3d at 925,

Attorney Fees

{17 We deny First Citizens’ requests for
attorney fees and costs under A.R.S, §§ 12-
841.01 and 12-842 because it is has not pre-
vailed on appeal. First Citizens also requests
attorney fees and costs under a provision of
the supplemental guaranties. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that such provision
could apply to a non-signatory spouse, by its
terms it only requires a fee award for “the
prevailing party,” and we therefore deny the
request,

718 We grant the spouses’ requests for
attorney fees and costs pursuant to §§ 12-
841 and 841.01 upon compliance with Rule 21,
Ariz, R, Civ, App. P.

Disposition
19 We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

399 P.3d 115
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Anthony Lito HERNANDEZ, Appellant.
No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0229
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 2.

Filed June 28, 2017

570

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Joseph T, Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Phoenix,
By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney
General, Tucson, Counsel for Appellee

John William Lovell, Tucson, Counsel for
Appellant

Judge Miller authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Judge Espinosa concurred
and Presiding Judge Staring dissented.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge:

{1 After a jury trial, Anthony Lito Her-
nandez was convicted of transportation of
methamphetamine for sale, possession of
marijuana, and possession of drug parapher-
nalia, and sentenced to a combined prison
term of eleven years. On appeal, he chal-
lenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. Resolving this issue re-
quires us to determine whether law enforce-
ment officers attempting to complete an in-
vestigatory stop for a civil traffic violation
were required to obtain a search warrant
before approaching the vehicle after the driv-
er pulled into a private driveway. For the
reasons that follow, we conclude Hernandez’s

1, Following oral argument in this court, we re-
quested that the Cochise County Superior Court
provide us with the exhibits from the suppression
hearing. The clerk's office subsequently informed
us that it could not locate them,

constitutional rights were not violated by the
officers approaching the vehicle stopped in
the driveway. We therefore affirm the order
denying Hernandez’s motion to suppress, and
his convictions and sentences.

Factual and Procedural Background

12 “In reviewing a motion to suppress, we
consider only the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing, viewing it in the light
most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s
ruling”! State v. Reyes, 238 Ariz, 575, 12,
364 P.8d 1184, 1185 (App. 2015). On the night
of September 11, 2014, Cochise County Sher-
iffs Deputies Villa and Gilbert, on patrol in
Willcox, observed a vehicle make an abrupt
stop and then an immediate turn. The offi-
cers followed as the vehicle made a series of
turns at various intersections in a random
zigzag pattern. When they were able to get
close enough, they ran a license plate check
on the car, which “indicated that there had
been an insurance cancellation” the previous
month,

18 The deputies had to catch up with the
car to initiate a traffic stop regarding the
insurance cancellation. When the patrol car
closed within two to three car lengths of the
vehicle, they activated their emergency
lights. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle tuned ?
onto a private driveway, not stopping, and
proceeded into the backyard area of the resi-
dence. The deputies did not know if Hernan-
dez had any connection to the property and
were not concerned about the home owner-
ship because “we were trying to make a
traffic stop of the vehicle.” Deputy Villa ex-
plained that he followed Hernandez’s car
onto the property “[bJecause that’s where the
vehicle took us when we attempted to stop
it.” He did not believe there would be any
danger to the public, to himself, or to any
other law enforcement officers if he did not
make immediate contact with the car. Nei-
ther did Deputy Villa “give any thought at all
to getting a warrant to search the vehicle.”

2, The nature of the turn was described as elon-
gated or sweeping. The angle of the turn is not
dispositive of the Fourth Amendment issue or
even a significant fact,

94 Deputy Gilbert was asked whether he
“fe[lt] that immediate contact was necessary
with the operator of the motor vehicle to
prevent any harm to the community,” and he
thought “there was.” He stated, “I fe[lt]
based on previous training and experience,
he is deciding to run, has decided to run or is
already going to and that immediate contact
needs to be made.”

15 As Deputy Villa attempted to call in
the stop on his cell phone rather than the
radio because of transmission difficulties,
Deputy Gilbert approached the vehicle. Her-
nandez had already begun to get out and was
directed to remain inside. Deputy Gilbert
walked toward the car and smelled marijua-
na. He then ordered Hernandez to step out
and place his hands behind his back, after
which Deputy Gilbert handcuffed Hernandez
and checked him for weapons. During the
pat-down, he found a large, folded stack of
paper currency and an empty plastic baggie
in one of Hernandez’s pockets. In other pock-
ets, Deputy Gilbert found a wallet and two
“stack[s] of folded United States currency of
various denominations,” Altogether, Hernan-
dez was carrying over $2,400. The search of
Hernandez’s car revealed a burned marijua-
na cigarette, a metal spoon with char marks
on the bottom and “a burned substance in it,”
and a clear plastic baggie containing suspect-
ed methamphetamine,

16 Hernandez initially denied knowing the
identity or ownership of the residence where
he stopped, It was later determined that the
residence was occupied by Hernandez’s girl-
friend,

17 Hernandez was arrested and indicted
on various drug offenses. He moved to sup-
press the evidence seized by the deputies and
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing,
also requesting supplemental memoranda. At
a pretrial conference, the court denied the
motion, stating in part:

Mr. Hernandez was within the curtilage of

his girlfriend’s home when he was detained

for a civil traffic offense, There was no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion
that he was engaged in any criminal activi-
3. In addition to the excerpted statements already

noted, the trial court stated: “And based upon
the circumstances of this case, I do find that the

571

ty, prior to his detention.... Mr. Hernan-
dez clearly was an invitee ... and he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy within
the curtilage of the home.... [Blased
upon the evidence, the Court does find that
the pursuit began in public, and then it
went into the backyard which is clearly
curtilage, but it’s not in the home. I know
there are cases that indicate, well, if it’s
curtilage, it should be viewed just like the
home, but this circumstance is a little bit
different, It’s the girlfriend’s home. It’s in
the backyard. It’s not actually through the
entryway.... If you look at the entire
thing in terms of reasonableness, is it rea-
sonable? Was it reasonable for the officers
to follow into the backyard under the cir-
cumstances? I guess my answer on that
would be that it was, and there was no
violation of the [Four]th Amendment that
would necessitate suppression.

18 Challenging only the suppression rul-
ing, Hernandez appeals and we have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 18-4081 and 13-
4083(A)(1).

Discussion

HI 19 Hernandez argues the deputies’
entry onto private property without a war-
rant to complete the investigation of a civil
infraction violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article II, § 8 of the Ari-
zona Constitution. In reviewing a ruling on a
motion to suppress for an alleged Fourth
Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, but we review de
novo mixed questions of law and fact and the
trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion.” State
v, Wyman, 197 Ariz, 10, 15, 8 P.8d 892, 395
(App. 2000), The state must prove the lawful-
ness of a search by a preponderance of the
evidence. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b).

HM «110 The Fourth Amendment as-
sures “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and _sei-

reasoning of [United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.

38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) ] does
apply to Mr. Hernandez’[s] case.”

572

zures.” 4 U.S, Const, amend, IV. Accordingly,
law enforcement officers may not enter a
person’s home to arrest him or her without
an arrest warrant, the consent of the person,
or exigent circumstances, Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 578, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 68
L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits the police from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine felony ar-
rest), “Mere incantation of the phrase ‘exi-
gent circumstances’” is not sufficient. State
v, Martin, 189 Ariz, 466, 474, 679 P.2d 489,
497 (1984), quoting People v, Barndt, 199
Colo, 51, 604 P.2d 1178, 1175 (1980). For
instance, where the state has determined
that an offense is minor and no imprisonment,
is possible, officers may not enter the per-
son’s home even when investigating an of-
fense that just occurred. Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S, 740, 758, 104 S.Ct, 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d
782 (1984) (exigent-cireumstances exception
does not apply where DUI suspect left vehi-
cle and entered his home), Rather, “an objec-
tively reasonable basis must exist for officers
to believe that the circumstances justify a
warrantless entry.” State v. Wilson, 287 Ariz.
296, 19, 850 P.8d 800, 802 (2016).

11 One such exigent circumstance
is the “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.” State v.
Love, 128 Ariz, 157, 159, 598 P.2d 976, 978
(1979), Under this exception, “a suspect may
not defeat an arrest which has been set in
motion in a public place ... by the expedient
of escaping to a private place.” United States
v, Santana, 427 U.S, 88, 48, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49
L.Ed.2d 800 (1976); see also State v, Tassler,
159 Ariz, 183, 185, 765 P,2d 1007, 1009 (App.
1988) (once officers formed intent to arrest
defendant, “[t}hat arrest could not be defeat-
ed by [a] retreat”), Hot pursuit involves
“some element of a chase,” Santana, 427
US, at 42 n.8, 96 S.Ct. 2406, and “immediate
or continuous pursuit ... from the scene of a
crime.” Welsh, 466 U.S, at 758, 104 S.Ct.
2091; United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895,

4, “The Arizona Constitution is even more explicit
in safeguarding this liberty: ‘No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home in-
vaded, without authority of law,'" State v. Mar-
tin, 139 Ariz. 466, 473, 679 P.2d 489, 496 (1984),
quoting Ariz. Const, art, II, § 8 (emphasis in
Martin). But other than in the context of a war-

907 (th Cir. 2001). However, hot pursuit
“need not be an extended hue and ery ‘in and
about (the) public streets,” and “[t]he fact
that [a] pursuit ... ended almost as soon as
it began [does] not render it any the less a
‘hot pursuit’ sufficient to justify [a] warrant-
less entry.” Santana, 427 U.S. at 48, 96 S.Ct,
2406,

HM S112 Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, curtilage—‘the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life’’—is generally considered part of the
home, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
180, 104 S.Ct. 1785, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984),
quoting Boyd v, United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), “A
driveway[, however,] is only a semiprivate
area.” State v. Cobb, 115 Ariz, 484, 489, 566
P.2d 285, 290 (1977), quoting United States v.
Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir, 1975);
see also State v. Blakley, 226 Ariz. 25, 17,
243 P.8d 628, 630 (App. 2010) (driveway,
although in curtilage, considered semipri-
vate), For the purposes of our analysis, we
accept the trial court’s finding that Hernan-
dez did not enter the house, but was within
the curtilage. This fact, however, remains
relevant in determining whether the depu-
ties’ actions in following Hernandez’s car into
the backyard were reasonable.

118 Hernandez argues the trial court erro-
neously relied on Santana when denying his
motion to suppress. There, an undercover
officer arranged a drug sale with a suspect,
who guided the officer to Santana’s house,
where the suspect took marked money from
the officer, went inside, and returned with
several envelopes of heroin, 427 U.S, at 39-
40, 96 S.Ct, 2406, The officer arrested the
suspect and took her to a police station, Id.
at 40, 96 S.Ct, 2406, Several other officers
then drove to the house and saw Santana
standing in the doorway. Jd, The officers
identified themselves and Santana retreated
into the house, prompting the officers to

rantless entry into the home itself, Arizona’s
couris have concluded that the protections of art,
IL, § 8 are coextensive with those of our federal
constitutional jurisprudence, See State v. Peltz,
242 Ariz, 23, n.3, 391 P.3d 1215, 1222 n.3(App,
2017).

follow and apprehend her inside. Id, at 40-41,
96 S.Ct, 2406. They found some of the
marked money on her person. Jd, at 41, 96
S.Ct. 2406, The Court considered “whether
[Santana’s] act of retreating into her house
could thwart an otherwise proper arrest,”
and concluded “it could not” because the
officers were engaged in “a true ‘hot pur-
suit.’” Id. at 42, 96 S.Ct, 2406,

114 While not disputing that the deputies’
pursuit of him began in public, Hernandez
argues he did not try to flee or evade the
deputies, which he contends are necessary to
find that law enforcement was in “hot pur-
suit.” Furthermore, he maintains Santana
only considered scenarios in which “the po-
lice possessed probable cause to arrest” a
defendant and where the defendant’s actions
“created an exigency whereby evidence of a
serious crime would have been destroyed had
police delayed their pursuit.” He reasons that
because the failure to have automobile insur-
ance is a civil infraction and there was no
concern evidence would be destroyed by his
actions, there was not the predicate probable
cause,

I 115 The state argues “it is irrelevant
that [Hernandez] was not subject to arrest
for the civil traffic violation because, by the
time [the] deputies followed [Hernandez] into
the backyard, they had probable cause to
arrest him for a felony offense,” citing A.R.S.
§ 28-622.01, It posits that an objective view-
ing of the failure to stop and purposeful turn
onto private property “gave the deputies
probable cause to arrest him for unlawful
flight.” Alternatively, the state suggests Her-
nandez’s “failure to stop” violated A.R.S.
§ 28-1595(A),

HHMI 1116 Section 28-622.01 provides, “A
driver of a motor vehicle who willfully flees
or attempts to elude a pursuing official law
enforcement vehicle ,.. is guilty of a class 5

5. Neither Deputy Villa nor Deputy Gilbert men-
tioned either statute as a justification for follow-
ing Hernandez onto private property. Nor did
the state raise either of these arguments below,
However, “[wle are required to affirm a trial
court's ruling if legally correct for any reason
and, in doing so, we may address the state's
arguments to uphold the court's ruling even if
those arguments otherwise could be deemed
waived by the state’s failure to argue them be-
low.” State v, Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. 551, 17,

573

felony.” We have interpreted “attempt to
elude” to connote “adroit maneuvers[,] quick
turns, driving with the lights off, driving
where the pursuing vehicle could not follow,
or attempting to hide.” State v. Fogarty, 178
Aviz, 170, 172, 871 P.2d 717, 719 (App. 1998).
“The term ‘flee’ usually, but not always, con-
notes speed.” Id, However, “any refusal to
stop on command of an officer who is in a
police car violates the felony flight statute
because of the potential for personal danger
inherent in vehicular pursuit, even if that
pursuit does not attain excessive speeds or
involve reckless driving.” Id. at 171, 871 P.2d
at 718. Section 28~-1595(A) provides, “The
operator of a motor vehicle who knowingly
fails or refuses to bring the operator’s motor
vehicle to a stop after being given a visual or
audible signal or instruction by a peace offi-
cer .., is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.” ®

HM 1:17 After the deputies had activated
their emergency lights, signaling Hernandez
that he must stop, he did not stop on the
wide shoulder of the road. He turned onto
the private driveway and continued driving
“to the back side of the residence down the
driveway,” where he began exiting the vehi-
cle, Deputy Gilbert exited the patrol car
quickly and ordered Hernandez back into his
car for officer safety and to prevent him from
leaving the area, Although it was a short
period between the activation of the lights
and Hernandez’s entry onto the driveway,
this sequence of events followed several min-
utes during which the deputies followed Her-
nandez while he made numerous random
turns in what a reasonable observer could
have interpreted as an attempt to lose the
patrol car, At the time Hernandez entered
the driveway, the deputies were unaware
that he had any connection to the property.
Under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable deputy in that situation could

288 P.3d 111, 113 (App, 2012). This holds true
even if the issue is fact-intensive, as long as “the
state is presenting an argument to uphold the
court's ruling” and “the factual record developed
at the suppression hearing is sufficient for our
review,” Id, 119-10,

6, A class 2 misdemeanor is punishable by up to
four months in jail. ARS. § 13-707(A)(2).

574

have concluded that Hernandez was attempt-
ing to elude him.’ The deputies had probable
cause to believe Hernandez was violating ei-
ther § 28-622.01 or § 28-1595(A).8

118 Hernandez and the dissent also con-
tend that there were no public safety issues,
no concern that Hernandez was attempting
to flee and, therefore, no realistic probability
of a conviction for flight from an officer.
First, Deputy Gilbert clearly stated that he
exited and approached the vehicle on his own
because he was concerned about both public
safety and flight. Second, Hernandez’s analy-
sis adopts facts about the occupants of the
home different from what he initially stated,
and the true circumstances were only discov-
ered later through investigation. If Hernan-
dez had pulled into a driveway and backyard
of a stranger, the concerns of Deputy Gilbert
would have had even greater force. Finally,
whether Hernandez could have been convict-
ed of flight from law enforcement involves
elements far beyond the reasonableness of
the deputies’ conduct here.

HM 1119 As previously noted, although in
some circumstances “the gravity of the un-
derlying offense” is an important factor in
determining whether an exigency exists,
Welsh, 466 U.S, at 758, 104 S.Ct. 2091, law
enforcement in continuous pursuit of a sus-
pect for investigation of minor offenses may
justify a warrantless intrusion into the curti-

7. Hernandez maintains he did not try to flee or
elude the deputies. But the only other plausible
explanation for his behavior is that he chose the
backyard portion of the driveway as a safe loca-
tion to pull over for the traffic stop, implicitly
consenting to the deputies’ presence on the curti-
lage, and therefore lacked a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy there. Cf. State v. Fleischman, 157
Ariz. 11, 14-15, 754 P.2d 340, 343-44 (App.
1988) (implied consent to search can arise out of
defendant's 9-1-1 call reporting crime at loca-
tion later searched). Put another way, either Her-
nandez stopped for the deputies, or he did not.
He is not entitled to both conflicting interpreta-
tions.

8. We do not hold that a driver who stops as soon
as is reasonably practicable will generate reason-
able suspicion of flight merely because he failed
to stop immediately. We hold only that under the
totality of the circumstances in this case, the
deputies reasonably could have believed that
Hernandez was attempting to elude them.

lage of a constitutionally protected area. See
Johnson, 256 F.8d at 908 n.6.9

720 In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court clar-
ified that it had never laid down “a categori-
cal rule for all cases involving minor offenses,
saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ re-
quired.” Stanton v. Sims, — U.S. —, 134
S.Ct. 8, 6, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2018) (per cu-
iam), quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750, 104
S.Ct, 2091. Noting that “neither Welsh nor
Johnson involved hot pursuit,” the Court
stated that, “despite our emphasis in Welsh
on the fact that the crime at issue was mi-
nor—indeed, a mere nonjailable civil of-
fense—nothing in the opinion establishes
that the seriousness of the crime is equally
important in cases of hot pursuit.” Stanton,
— US. —,, 184 S.Ct. at 6. The Court also
noted that California properly had refused to
limit the hot pursuit exception to felony sus-
pects in two cases: People v. Lloyd, 216
Cal.App.8d 1425, 265 Cal.Rptr. 422 (1989),
and In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal.App.3d 154,
270 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1990), Stanton, — U.S.
——, 184 S.Ct. at 7. We find these cases
persuasive.

721 In Lloyd, a police officer activated his
emergency lights to effect a stop after ob-
serving the appellant's brother Calvin run a
red light, 265 Cal.Rptr. at 428. Calvin refused
to pull over, accelerating and running a stop
sign before finally parking on the curb in
front of a house. Id, Law enforcement then
approached him and asked for his license and

9, Our dissenting colleague disagrees with this
assessment, but principally relies on inapposite
cases that do not involve hot pursuit. See Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414-17,
185 L.Bd.2d 495 (2013) (warrantless intrusion
without any exigency); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)
(plain view doctrine); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393, 98 S.Ct, 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)
(four-day warrantless search after an emergency
entry responding to gunshots); Warden, Md. Peni-
tentiary v, Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299, 87 S.Ct.
1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (police “entered the
house and began to search for a man of the
description they had been given”); United States
y, Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 745 (9th Cir. 2010)
(suspect did not attempt to run); Hopkins v. Bon-
vicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir. 2009) (entry
under the emergency exception); Johnson, 256
F.3d at 898 (attempt to locate suspect who had
last been seen thirty minutes prior).

registration. Id. He refused to comply, in-
stead retreating into the house, telling an
officer that he was not going to give him a
“damn ticket.” Id. Calvin’s brother, appellant
Willie, told the officers they could not enter
without a warrant. Id, The officers then
forced their way in and placed Calvin and
Willie under arrest. Id. The Lloyd court held
that the detention clearly began in public,
and that “Calvin’s conduct in quickly walking
away from the officer rather than complying
with the demand for identification provided
the officer with probable cause to arrest him”
for a misdemeanor under Cal. Penal Code
§ 148.1 Lloyd, 265 Cal.Rptr. at 424-25.

122 Lavoyne M. presented similar cireum-
stances, There, having observed a vehicle run
multiple stop signs, an officer activated his
lights and siren in an attempt to effectuate a
stop, but the driver refused to pull over. 270
Cal.Rptr. at 394, Eventually the car did stop
in front of a house, and the driver ran inside.
Id. at 895. An officer recognized the driver
from prior contact as a minor too young to
have a driver’s license, indicating a civil traf-
fic violation. Id. The officer immediately fol-
lowed the driver into the home, and placed
him under arrest. Jd. The Lavoyne M. court
held that the “[mlinor’s refusal to comply
with the attempts to detain him provided
probable cause for the officer to arrest him,”
citing Cal. Penal Code § 148 and Lloyd. La-
voyne M., 270 Cal.Rptr. at 396,

23 In addition to California, several juris-
dictions have held that the hot pursuit exi-
gency applies to cases involving less serious
offenses. In Middletown v. Flinchum, 95
Ohio St.8d 48, 765 N.E.2d 880, 382 (2002), a
case the trial court here relied on in denying
Hernandez’s motion, the Ohio Supreme
Court held:

Although Santana deals with the issue of

warrantless home arrests in the context of

a felony suspect, we see no reason to dif-

ferentiate appellant’s offense and give him

a free pass merely because he was not

charged with a more serious crime. The

basic fact remains that appellant fled from
police who were in lawful pursuit of him
10, Section 148(a)(1), Cal. Penal Code, makes it a

crime to “willfully resist{ ], delay[], or obstruct{]
any ... peace officer ... in the discharge or

575

and who had identified themselves as po-

lice officers.

Illinois, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin have
all adopted similar rules. People v. Wear,
871 IlApp.8d 517, 811 lDec. 41, 867
N.E.2d 1027, 1042 (2007) (“{(T'yhe doctrine of
hot pursuit does not care whether it was a
Terry stop or an arrest that the police offi-
cer set in motion before pursuing a suspect
into a private place.”), affd, 229 Ill.2d 545,
823 IlLDec. 859, 898 N.H.2d 681 (2008);
Commonwealth v. Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 81
N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (2015) (noting “such a
categorical distinction would arbitrarily per-
mit perpetrators of serious misdemeanors ‘to
avoid punishment merely because of how the
legislature had labelled an infraction’ ”),
quoting State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 267
(Minn. 1996); State v. Weber, 872 Wis.2d 202,
887 N.W.2d 554, 188 (2016) (“[T]he mere
fact that the underlying offenses at issue in
this case are misdemeanors is not a bar to
application of the hot pursuit doctrine.”),

124 A minority of jurisdictions have ap-
plied a more stringent standard in cases of
hot pursuit, In State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579,
560 A.2d 644 (1989), a case the trial court
here declined to follow, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that an officer in hot pur-
suit of a driver observed committing numer-
ous traffic infractions violated the Fourth
Amendment by following him first into his
driveway, then into his garage, and finally
into his house where the officer effected an
arrest, stating:

We reject the State’s contention that hot

pursuit alone can support a warrantless

entry into a home. Although the State

argues that citizens should not be encour-

aged to elude arrest by retreating into

their homes, the question whether hot pur-

suit by police justifies a warrantless entry

depends on the attendant circumstances,
Id. at 654,

125 Even were we to adopt the reasoning
in Bolte, this case is distinguishable on sever-
al grounds. First, the officer followed Bolte
first into his driveway, then into his garage,
then into the home itself, and finally made

attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office
or employment.”

576

the arrest upstairs in his bedroom. Jd. at
645-46, Here, Hernandez was stopped out-
side the home and the deputies never en-
tered it.!! Second, the officer in Bolte had
reason to know that the home belonged to
the defendant. See State v. Bolte, 225 N.J.Su-
per, 885, 542 A2d 494, 496 (1988) (garage
door opened automatically), Hernandez’s ve-
hicle was registered to a different address,
and the deputies were unaware of his having
any connection to the property until well
after the arrest. Finally, Deputy Gilbert tes-
tified to his belief that Hernandez may have
been attempting to flee, and that immediate
contact was necessary to prevent potential
harm to the community. In light of these
circumstances, the deputies acted reasonably
and in a constitutionally sound manner when
they pursued Hernandez onto the home’s
curtilage to effect the stop.

HI 126 To the extent Hernandez and
the dissent contend it is bad policy to author-
ize law enforcement to stop a motorist to
investigate the absence of vehicle insurance,
the criticism can only be addressed by the
legislature. It has concluded that driving
without insurance is an offense that requires
law enforcement authority to stop a vehicle
suspected of lacking insurance, A.R.S, §§ 28-
1594, 28-4033; further, refusal to stop for this
offense is punishable as a misdemeanor or a
felony, A.R.S, §§ 28-622.01, 28-1595(A), It is
within the legislature’s power to prohibit
driving without insurance without authorizing
officers to stop motorists for such a violation,
but it decided otherwise. See, eg., ARS.
§ 28-909 (failure to wear seatbelt is traffic
violation, but no authority to stop motorist
driving without a seatbelt “unless the peace
officer has reasonable cause to believe there
is another alleged violation of a motor vehicle
Jaw”); Tucson City Code § 20-160 (no law
enforcement authority to stop motorists vio-
lating hands-free cell phone ordinance).
Moreover, assessing the reasonableness of
law enforcement’s conduct under the Fourth
Amendment takes into account the decision
of the state legislature regarding the serious-
ness of the offense and the authority of offi-

11, We need not decide and do not decide wheth-
er the result would have been the same had
Hernandez entered the house before officers ar-
rived.

cers to investigate it. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at
754, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (statute is “best indication
of the State’s interest in precipitating an
arrest, and is one that can be easily identified
both by the courts and by officers faced with
a decision to arrest”).

127 In sum, Hernandez’s attempt to elude
Jaw enforcement by entering a private drive-
way constituted probable cause that he was
attempting to flee, despite the fact that the
reason for the stop was a civil traffic viola-
tion. The Fourth Amendment does not re-
quire that the deputies must “shrug [their]
shoulders and go obtain a warrant” when the
initial violation was for a minor offense.”
Wear, 811 Ill.Dee, 41, 867 N.E.2d at 60. “Law
enforcement is not a child’s game of prison-
er[’ls base, or a contest, with apprehension
and conviction depending upon whether the
officer or defendant is the fleetest of foot.”
State v, Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 558 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984), A police officer in continuous
vehicular pursuit of a person under investiga-
tion for a violation of the law cannot be
arbitrarily stopped by the person’s entry
onto private property. Any contrary rule
would encourage flight to avoid apprehen-
sion, identification, and prosecution. Id,

Disposition
128 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the trial court’s denial of Hernandez’s motion
to suppress. Accordingly, Hernandez’s con-
victions and sentences are affirmed.

STARING, Presiding Judge, dissenting:

729 The crux of the majority's analysis is
that Hernandez’s act of turning into the
driveway—making a “lengthy swooping turn”
mere seconds after the activation of the
emergency lights—provided deputies with
both probable cause to arrest him for willful,
felony flight and exigent circumstances that
permitted a physical intrusion onto constitu-
tionally protected curtilage. I disagree.

180 While reasonableness is the “touch-
stone” of Fourth Amendment analysis,

12, For the same reasons, we find no violation of
article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution.

“{rleasonableness ... depends ‘on a balance
between the public interest and the individu-
al’s right to personal security free from arbi-
trary interference by law officers.’” Pennsyl-
vania v. Mimms, 484 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct.
330, 54 L.Ed,2d 331 (1977), quoting United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 878, 878,
95 S.Ct, 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). And
“the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of
those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the
privacy of a person's home and property may
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maxi-
mum simplicity in enforcement of the crimi-
nal law.” Mincey v. Arizona, 487 U.S. 885,
393, 98 S.Ct, 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

181 “[Tyhe ‘physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Welsh
vu Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct.
2091, 80 L.Hd.2d 782 (1984), quoting United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 818,
92 S.Ct, 2125, 82 L.Wd2d 752 (1972). As
noted, curtilage, “the area to which extends
the intimate activity associated with the
‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of
life,” is considered part of the home. Oliver
v, United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct.
1785, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 680, 6 8.Ct. 524,
29 L.Ed, 746 (1886), overruled on other
grounds as recognized by Fisher v, United
States, 425 U.S. 891, 407, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48
L.Ed.2d 89 (1976); see also State v. Olm, 228
Ariz, 429, 15, 224 P.8d 245, 247 (App. 2010)
(Fourth Amendment protection extends to
curtilage).

182 The majority diminishes the constitu-
tional protection afforded to curtilage, as well
as recent developments in constitutional law.
For example, it advances the principle that a
driveway is only “semiprivate.” Ante 112. But
the deputies not only followed Hernandez up
the driveway, but also into the backyard,
which the trial court correctly determined
was curtilage. See Olm, 228 Ariz, 429, 11 11,
17, 224 P.3d at 249-50 (unenclosed front yard
where defendant parked car, abutting front
patio, constituted protected curtilage). The

13, The majority does not discuss our decision in
Otm.

14. Here, the deputies’ physical intrusion into the
curtilage of the home when they drove up the

577

court also correctiy concluded Hernandez
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the backyard. See id. 117 (officer’s inspec-
tion of automobile VIN plate in front yard
was “prohibited warrantless search”).

133 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
explained that the expectation-of-privacy test
espoused in Kate v. United States, 389 U.S.
847, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Hd.2d 576 (1967), “did
not erode the principle ‘that, when the Gov-
ernment does engage in physical intrusion of
a constitutionally protected area in order to
obtain information, that intrusion may consti-
tute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’ ”
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407, 182
S.Ct, 945, 181 L.Hd.2d 911 (2012), quoting
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286,
108 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1988) (Bren-
nan, J,, concurring). “[T]he Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, not substituted for, the common-law tres-
passory test.” Id. at 409, 182 S.Ct. 945. And,
since Florida v. Jardines, we are required to
consider two questions: (1) whether deputies
physically intruded into a constitutionally
protected area; and, if so, (2) whether their
investigation involved an unlicensed physical
intrusion, 569 U.S. 1, 188 S.Ct. 1409, 1415-17,
185 L.Hd.2d 495 (2018). If we conclude affir-
matively to both, in the absence of exigency,
then their actions violated the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 10-18, 183 S.Ct. at
1417-18,"

34 In need of an actual crime to find
exigency, the majority reaches to accept the
state’s characterization of Hernandez’s ac-
tions as illegal flight. The state argues “it is
irrelevant that [Hernandez] was not subject
to arrest for the civil traffic violation because,
by the time [the] deputies followed [Hernan-
dez] into the backyard, they had probable
cause to arrest him for a felony offense,”
citing A.R.S, § 28-622.01, or, in the alterna-
tive, a misdemeanor pursuant to A.R.S,
§ 28-1595(A). Neither statute applies here.

135 The majority overlooks several signifi-
cant facts in concluding the deputies had
driveway and into the backyard was not some-

thing subject to “customary invitation,” Id, at 9,
133 S.Ct. at 1416.

578 EE

probable cause to arrest Hernandez for felo-
ny flight! The deputies activated their
emergency lights as they were passing
through an intersection. At the time the dep-
uties activated their lights, Hernandez’s car
‘was approaching or in front of the first house
past the intersection. Hernandez, no more
than “a few ... seconds” later, made a
“lengthy swooping turn” into a driveway be-
tween the first and second houses past the
intersection and “pulled around to the back
side of the residence down the driveway,”
where the deputies followed him,

136 Section 28-622.01 provides, “A driver
of a motor vehicle who willfully flees or at-
tempts to elude a pursuing official law en-
forcement vehicle ... is guilty of a ... felo-
ny.” We have interpreted “attempt to elude”
to connote “adroit maneuvers ... [;] quick
turns, driving with the lights off, driving
where the pursuing vehicle could not follow,
or attempting to hide.” State v. Fogarty, 178
Ariz. 170, 172, 871 P.2d 717, 719 (App. 1998).
“The term ‘flee’ usually, but not always, con-
notes speed,” Jd, Here, Hernandez turned
into a close-at-hand residential driveway be-
fore “pull[ing] around to the back side of the
residence down the driveway,” where he
stopped and complied with the deputies’ or-
ders. This action describes neither a willful
flight nor an attempt to elude as we have
interpreted those terms.

187 Section 28-1595(A) provides, “The op-
erator of a motor vehicle who knowingly fails
or refuses to bring the operator’s motor vehi-
cle to a stop after being given a visual or
audible signal or instruction by a peace offi-
eer ... is guilty of a ... misdemeanor.”
Hernandez did not fail or refuse to bring his
car to a stop, however, but brought it to a
stop in the backyard shortly after the activa-
tion of the lights. When the deputies activat-
ed their lights, Hernandez was approaching
15. The majority asserts the “angle of the turn is

not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment issue,”

ante n.2, but the nature and timing of the turn
are relevant to whether the deputies had proba-

ble cause to believe Hernandez was committing
felony flight.

16, According to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), it typically takes
a person 0.75 seconds to perceive an event while
driving and an additional 0.75 seconds to react

or already in front of the first house beyond
the intersection, which is adjacent to the
driveway he entered. It was no more than “a
few ... seconds” before Hernandez was in
front of the driveway, and neither deputy
testified he increased his speed, made a
quick turn, turned off his lights, or attempted
to hide when he proceeded into the backyard.
See Fogarty, 178 Ariz. at 172, 871 P.2d at
719, It is unreasonable to conclude a person
who brings his car to a stop within seconds of
being instructed to do so gives officers prob-
able cause to believe a violation of § 28-~
1595(A) has occurred.

88 “The long-prevailing standard of prob-
able cause protects ‘citizens from rash and
unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime’ while giv-
ing ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community’s protection,’ ” Maryland v, Prin-
gle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct, 795, 157
L.Ed.2d 769 (2008), quoting Brinegar v,
United States, 888 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct.
1802, 98 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). “[Plrobable cause
is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual con-
texts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S, 218, 232, 108 S.Ct. 2817, 76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983). At the same time, “‘[t]he sub-
stance of all the definitions of probable cause
is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and
that the belief of guilt must be particularized
with respect to the person to be searched or
seized.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 871, 124 S.Ct,
795, quoting Brinegar, 388 U.S. at 175, 69
S.Ct. 1802 (citations omitted), There was no
reasonable, particularized ground to believe
Hernandez was attempting to flee simply
because he made a “lengthy swooping turn
into the driveway” seconds after the deputies
activated their lights—a conclusion that finds
support in the fact neither deputy mentioned

and move one’s foot to the brake pedal. Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin,, U.S, Dep't of
Transp., Safety in Numbers, at 1 (August 2015),
https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/Safety1nNum3ers/
auigust2015/S1N_Speeding-Angust2015_812008.
pdf, Thus, at speeds of 20, 30, 40, 55, 65, and 70
miles per hour, a car has already travelled 44,
76, 88, 121, 143, and 154 feet, respectively, be-
fore it has even begun to slow down in response
to a stimulus. Id.

the flight statute as a justification for follow-
ing Hernandez onto private property.

89 The majority also disregards the fact
that “‘[o]ne suspected of committing a minor
offense would not likely resort to desperate
measures to avoid arrest and prosecution,’ so
any inference of danger or escape from the
commission of the offense alone is not rea-
sonable.” United States v. Struckman, 603
F.3d 731, 745 (th Cir. 2010), quoting United
States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407, 1418 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1989) (alteration in Struckman). Here,
the only reason for the stop was the suspi-
cion Hernandez was driving without insur-
ance—a civil infraction. Therefore, we cannot
reasonably infer, and it would be unreason-
able for the deputies to suspect, that Hernan-
dez was attempting to flee.”

140 In addition, applying the majority's
rationale, anything other than stopping al-
most instantaneously could give officers
probable cause to believe a driver is engaged
in felony flight. Thus, for example, drivers
who do not immediately notice emergency
lights, or, concerned about their personal
safety, drive to well-lit, public places before
pulling over, could potentially face arrest for
felony flight, and also be subject to a search
incident to arrest. See A.R.S, § 18-3883(A);
see also State v. Snyder, 240 Ariz, 551, 117,
382 P.3d 109, 114 (App. 2016) (search inei-
dent to lawful arrest),1®

141 Because the officers only had reason
to suspect Hernandez of a civil infraction, the
trial court mistakenly relied on United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 88, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49

17, The majority asserts that if Hernandez was
not attempting to elude the deputies, he implicit-
ly consented to their presence on the curtilage,
citing State v. Fleischman, 157 Ariz. 11, 754 P.2d
340 (App. 1988), Ante n,7. In Fleischman, we
held:

When a crime is reported to the police by an
individual who owns or controls the premises
to which the police are summoned, and that
individual either states or suggests that it was
committed by a third person, he or she implic-
itly consents to a search of the premises rea-
sonably related to the routine investigation of
the offense and the identification of the perpe-
trator. So long as that individual is not a sus-
pect in the case or does nothing to revoke his
consent, the police may search the premises
for these purposes.

579

L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), when denying the motion
to suppress, And the majority relies on San-
tana for the immaterial observation that hot
pursuit “need not be an extended hue and
ery ‘in and about (the) public streets,” and
“[t]he fact that [a] pursuit ... ended almost.
as soon as it began [does] not render it any
the less a ‘hot pursuit’ sufficient to justify [a]
warrantless entry.” 427 U.S. at 48, 96 S.Ct.
2406. Nothing in Santana provides legal cov-
er for the state in this case.

42 Following Hernandez up the driveway
and into the backyard to investigate whether
he had automobile insurance could not rea-
sonably be considered a “hot pursuit,” sub-
ject to the holding of Santana, in which
officers had probable cause to make an ar-
rest for selling heroin, Id, at 41-42, 96 S.Ct.
2406. As noted, “hot pursuit” involves “some
element of a chase,” id. at 42 n8, 96 S.Ct.
2406, and “immediate or continuous pursuit
.++ from the scene of a crime,” Welsh, 466
US. at 758, 104 S.Ct, 2091. Nothing here
reasonably could be described as “hot pur-
suit” and there was no crime, only the possi-
bility of a civil infraction. Indeed, as the trial
eourt concluded, “[t]here was no probable
cause or reasonable suspicion that [Hernan-
dez] was engaged in any criminal activity,
prior to his detention.”

143 Further, the hot pursuit exception
envisions a situation in which “delay in the
course of an investigation ... would gravely
endanger [officers’] lives or the lives of oth-
ers,” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S, 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18
L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), or where “any delay

157 Ariz, at 15, 754 P.2d at 344 (emphasis add-
ed). I fail to understand how this principle ap-
plies to the case at hand,

18, The majority believes the deputies’ actions
were reasonable given the “totality of the cir-
cumstances,” particularly the series of turns Her-
nandez made before they activated their lights.
Ante 117. The three turns the deputies described
Hernandez making after they were behind him (a
left turn, followed by a right turn and then anoth-
er left) were not illegal and resulted in him
arriving at his girlfriend’s home. The deputies
did not observe any moving violations, and the
sole reason for the stop was the possible insur-
ance violation. On this record, what the majority
describes as the “totality of the circumstances”
would encompass many people engaged in inno-
cent behavior.

580

would result in destruction of evidence,” San-
tana, 427 U.S. at 48, 96 S.Ct. 2406, Here,
based on what the deputies knew at the time
they initiated the stop, there was no danger
to them or the public, or any possibility of
the destruction of evidence, if they had de-
layed their investigation of the civil infrac-
tion. Cf Scott v. United States, 436 U.S, 128,
187, 98 S.Ct, 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)
(evaluating alleged Fourth Amendment viola-
tion, court objectively assesses officer’s ac-
tions in light of facts and circumstances
known at time),

144 The majority also diminishes the Su-
preme Court’s view of the significance of the
“the gravity of the underlying offense” in
determining exigency. Welsh, 466 U.S. at
758, 104 S.Ct, 2091. The exception for exigent
circumstances rarely applies “in the context
of a home entry ... when there is probable
cause to believe that only a minor offense ...
has been committed.” Jd. Additionally, “an
exigency related to a misdemeanor will sel-
dom, if ever, justify a warrantless entry into
the home.” Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.8d
762, 769 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting LaLonde v.
County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 956 (9th
Cir, 2000); United States v. Johnson, 256
F.8d 895, 908 n.6 (9th Cir, 2001) (“{I]n situa-
tions where the underlying offense is only a
misdemeanor, law enforcement must yield to
the Fourth Amendment in all but the ‘rarest?
cases.”), citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104
S.Ct, 2091. In Welsh, the Supreme Court
noted “that it is difficult to conceive of a
warrantless home arrest that would not be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
when the underlying offense is extremely
minor,” 466 U.S. at 758, 104 S.Ct, 2091. Here,
of course, there was no underlying crime, not
even a misdemeanor or minor offense, but
only a possible civil infraction.

145 The majority goes on to read Johnson
expansively, stating, “while in some circum-
stances ‘the gravity of the underlying of-
fense’ is an important factor in determining
whether an exigency exists, ... law enforce-
ment in pursuit of a suspect is one of the
rare cases where even relatively minor of-
fenses may justify a warrantless intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.” Ante
19. I struggle to see how this conclusion can

originate from a footnote that concludes: “In
situations where an officer is truly in hot
pursuit and the underlying offense is a felo-
ny, the Fourth Amendment usually
yields.... However, in situations where the
underlying offense is only a misdemeanor,
law enforcement must yield to the Fourth
Amendment in all but the ‘rarest’ cases.” 256
F.3d at 908 n,6, citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753,
104 S.Ct, 2091,

146 Lastly, the majority attempts to di-
minish consideration of the gravity of the
underlying offense by discussing the Court’s
decision in Stanton v. Sims, —- U.S, —-,
184 S.Ct, 8, 187 L.Ed.2d 841 (2013). Ante 120,
There, discussing Welsh, the Court noted
“nothing in the opinion establishes that the
seriousness of the crime is equally important
im cases of hot pursuit.” Id, at ——, 184
S.Ct. at 6, The majority appears to take this
to be the end of the inquiry but does not
acknowledge what was actually at issue in
Stanton,

147 In Stanton, officers “responded to a
call about an ‘unknown disturbance’ involving
a person with a baseball bat” and upon arriv-
ing at the scene, saw a man cross the street
in front of their car and run towards a resi-
dence belonging to Sims, — U.S. ——, 134
§.Ct. at 8-4, One of the officers “decided to
detain him,” got out of his car, called out
“police,” and ordered the man to stop. Id. at
——, 184 S.Ct. at 4, He did not stop, but
instead went through the front gate of the
fence enclosing Sims's front yard. Id. Believ-
ing that the man had committed a jailable
misdemeanor “by disobeying his order to
stop” and fearing for his safety, the officer
kicked open the gate, Id, “The swinging gate
struck Sims, cutting her forehead and injur-
ing her shoulder,” Id. Sims filed suit against
the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
he had “unreasonably searched her home
without a warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.

148 The issue before the Court was
whether the officer was entitled to qualified
immunity, which “protects government offi-
cials from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have

known.” Id., quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S, 228, 281, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed2d
665 (2009). The Court concluded that “at the
time [the officer] made his split-second deci-
sion,” there was sharp division between fed-
eral and state courts “on the question wheth-
er an officer with probable cause to arrest a
suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home
without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that
suspect.” Id, at ——-, —, 184 8,Ct. at 5, 7.
Thus, the actions of the officer were not
“beyond debate,” id. at ——, 134 S.Ct. at 7,
quoting Asheroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 781,
741, 181 S.Ct, 2074, 179 L.Bd.2d 1149 2011),
and he was not “plainly incompetent,” id,
quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341,
106 S.Ct, 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), The
Court did not “express any view on whether
[the officer’s] entry into Sims’ yard in pursuit
of [the suspect] was constitutional.” Id.

149 In Arizona v. Hicks, writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia observed “there is
nothing new in the realization that the Con-
stitution sometimes insulates the criminality
of a few in order to protect the privacy of us

581

all.” 480 U.S. 821, 829, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94
L.Bd.2d 347 (1987). And “the mere fact that.
Jaw enforcement may be made more efficient
can never by itself justify disregard for the
Fourth Amendment.” Mincey, 487 U.S. at
898, 98 S.Ct, 2408, Here, deputies encroached
upon constitutionally protected curtilage to
make contact with Hernandez solely to inves-
tigate a civil infraction, This intrusion, with-
out a warrant, was per se unreasonable un-
less the state could demonstrate an exigent
circumstance, which it has failed to do. See
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 188 S.Ct, at 1414-17;
Oliver, 466 U.S, at 180, 104 $,Ct, 1785; Cool-
idge v. New Hampshire, 408 U.S. 448, 474-
75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). I
respectfully dissent.

399 P.3d 657
STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
ve
Mark HASKIE, Jr., Appellant,
No. CR-16-0327-PR
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Filed August 15, 2017

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m this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of
the Arizona Constitution, the Honorable Rebecca

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic E. Draye, Solicitor General, Joseph
T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals
Section, Robert A, Walsh (argued), Assistant
Attorney General, Capital Litigation Section,
Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Coconino County Public Defender’s Office,
Brad Bransky (argued), Deputy Public De-
fender, Flagstaff, Attorneys for Mark Ha-
skie, Jr.

David J. Huchner (argued), Assistant Pub-
lie Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus
Curiae Pima County Public Defender’s Office

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the
opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF
JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES
TIMMER, BOLICK, GOULD, and BERCH
(retired) * joined.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the
Court:

41 During Mark Haskie, Jr.’s trial on felo-
ny charges arising from an incident of do-
mestic violence, Dr. Kathleen Ferraro, testi-
fying as an expert witness, described general

White Berch, Justice of the Arizona Supreme

Court (Retired), was designated to sit in this
matter.

584

behavioral tendencies of adult victims of do-
mestic abuse, Haskie argues that Dr, Ferra-
ro’s testimony should have been excluded as
impermissible profile evidence. Because the
testimony helped the jury understand the
victim’s behavior and was more probative
than prejudicial, the trial court did not err in
admitting it.

I, BACKGROUND

2 Haskie assaulted his girlfriend, P.J., at
a Flagstaff motel after searching through
messages on her phone and threatening her,
“J told you I would kill you if you cheated on
me.” That same day, P.J. wrote a statement
for the police explaining that Haskie had
beaten and strangled her. Physical evidence
from the motel corroborated her statement,
Haskie was arrested nearly a year later,
Shortly after his arrest, P.J. wrote two let-
ters to the prosecutor recanting her earlier
statements to the police, claiming instead
that her injuries were from a bar fight she
could not remember and that Haskie was
innocent.

18 Before trial, the State filed a motion in
limine to admit testimony by Dr. Ferraro as
a “cold” expert on domestic violence to help
the jury understand why P.J, had “continued
her relationship with the defendant,” “given
conflicting statements while the case [was]
pending,” and why she was “reluctant to
testify.” The State’s motion was accompanied
by a list of questions the prosecutor intended
to ask Dr. Ferraro, Haskie objected to Dr.
Ferraro’s proposed testimony, arguing it
would not assist the jury and that it would
constitute improper profile evidence and
vouching, Following a hearing, the trial court
limited Dr. Ferraro’s testimony to the list of
questions.

14 At trial, the State presented recorded
phone calls Haskie made from jail, including
several to P.J, before she recanted. In these
conversations, Haskie dictated to P.J, an ex-
eulpatory story for her to tell police, apolo-
gized to her, and promised to marry her
when he was released. During one call, P.J.
responded, “[W]ell maybe you shouldn’t have
tried to kill me..,. You know exactly what
you did.” At trial, however, P.J, testified that
she did not remember who had beaten her

because she had been drinking, and that
although she initially blamed Haskie for her
injuries because she was jealous, she had in
fact cheated on him.

15 At trial, Dr. Ferraro testified that she
was a “cold” or “blind” expert, meaning she
had not reviewed any case-specific evidence
and was not going to testify about any of the
events in the case, The prosecutor asked her
a series of questions regarding characteris-
tics of domestic violence victims to help the
jury understand behaviors that might other-
wise seem counterintuitive to jurors unfamil-
iar with domestic violence. When asked, “[I]s
it unusual for someone who has been hurt by
an intimate partner to return to that rela-
tionship?” Dr. Ferraro responded, “It’s not
unusual, It is very common.” She continued,
“There are many reasons [why,] and they
vary by the individual, of course, and the
type of relationship.” Dr. Ferraro explained
that some victims of domestic violence return
to their abusers out of fear, retaliation, or
threats, while others do not leave their abus-
ers because of pressure from extended family
or the victim’s own shame, Dr. Ferraro fur-
ther testified that chemical dependency and
alcohol abuse complicate the decision to leave
an abusive relationship.

{6 The prosecutor then asked, “[D]o vic-
tims ever tend to blame themselves for what
happened?” Dr. Ferraro responded:

Yes. That’s a very common response of

victims of domestic violence.

[Plart of it has to do with the manipulation
of an abusive partner themselves because
that’s a very common dynamic of domestic
violence, ... the abusive partner will turn
the violence around and say that if you
hadn’t done this or you had done that as I
told you to do, this never would have hap-
pened, so it’s your fault, And if you would
just behave or comply with my wishes and
my commands, then this wouldn’t happen.
The prosecutor also asked, “Is it unusual for
victims to later change their story?” Dr. Fer-
raro answered, “No, that is very typical,”
adding that victims recant or change the
details of their account for many of the rea-
sons that might also make a victim reluctant

to leave the relationship. In addition, she
explained, the victim may be afraid of violent
repercussions; may feel pressure from the
abuser or friends and extended family; may
be intimidated to discontinue prosecution;
and may be emotionally and psychologically
manipulated.

(7 Then the following exchange took
place:

Q. [Hlave you ever seen efforts made to
assist their partner in terms of getting
them out of trouble or trying to make
something go away, avoid accountabili-
ty?

Yes, often.

A.
Q. ... Ave those factors the same in
terms of why women do that?

A. They are very often the same. I’ve
actually seen women go to jail and
take the responsibility for a crime that
their abusive partner has committed.
And in part that is related to the
psychological manipulation ... where
the abusive person will have them con-
vinced that they'll get a much lighter
sentence, that they maybe won't get a
sentence at all.

18 During closing arguments, the prosecu-
tor did not mention Dr. Ferraro or compare
any aspect of her testimony to the facts of
Haskie’s case. Before jury deliberations be-
gan, the trial court instructed the jurors that
they were not bound by any expert opinion
and should give an opinion only the weight
they believed it deserved, The jury found
Haskie guilty of two counts of aggravated
assault (domestic violence), five counts of ag-
gravated domestic violence, two counts of
influencing a witness, and one count of kid-
napping.

19 The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that Dr. Ferraro’s testimony did not consti-
tute impermissible profile evidence. State v.
Haskie, 240 Ariz. 269, 278 118, 276 134, 378
P.3d 446 (App. 2016).

1. The court of appeals held that certain portions
of Dr. Ferraro’s testimony constituted impermis-
sible vouching, State v. Haskie, 240 Ariz. 269,
274-75 9124-28, 378 P.3d 446 (App. 2016), but
concluded that admitting those statements

585

110 We granted review to consider wheth-
er Dr, Ferraro’s testimony constituted im-
permissible offender profiling! We have ju-
risdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(8) of
the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S, § 12-
120,24,

IL, DISCUSSION

HH 111 We review a trial court’s ad-
mission of evidence for an abuse of discre-
tion, which can include errors of law. State v.
Ketchner, 286 Ariz, 262, 264 118, 889 P.8d
645 (2014); see also State v. Cheatham, 240
Aviz, 1, 2 16, 875 P.3d 66 (2016). We review
interpretation of court rules de novo, State v.
Salazar—Mercado, 234 Ariz, 590, 592 14, 325
P.8d 996 (2014).

12 Initially, we note that in Salagar-
Mercado, a case involving child victims, we
held that Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 per-
mits the admission of “cold” expert testimony
that educates the fact-finder about general
principles without applying those principles
to the particular facts of the case, 234 Ariz,
at 591 11, 325 P.8d 996. Salazar—Mercado’s
rationale applies equally to cases involving
adult victims.

118 In Ketchner we precluded testimony
that “implicitly invited the jury to infer crim-
inal conduct based on the [cold expert’s de-
scriptions of] characteristics,” relying on
Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 56-57 (Wyo.
1999), 236 Ariz. at 265 1917, 19, 889 P.3d 645
(holding that the cold expert’s testimony con-
stituted impermissible profile evidence), We
now elaborate,

HN 114 “Profile evidence tends to
show that a defendant possesses one or more
of an informal compilation of characteristics
or an abstract of characteristics typically dis-
played by persons engaged in a particular
kind of activity,” Id. at 264 115, 889 P.8d 645
Gnternal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). Describing evidence as “profile” evi-
dence is a shorthand way of saying that the
evidence is offered to implicitly or explicitly
suggest that because the defendant has those

amounted to harmless error, and affirmed Ha-
skie’s convictions and sentences, Id. at 276
1133-34, 378 P.3d 446. We did not grant review
of that issue,

586 EE

characteristics, a jury should conclude that
the defendant must have committed the
erime charged.

TI 115 The state may not offer “profile”
evidence as substantive proof of the defen-
dant’s guilt. See id, at 264-65 1115-19, 339
P.8d 645, The rationale for this rule is evi-
dent: “[Plrofile evidence may not be used as
substantive proof of guilt because of the ‘risk
that a defendant will be convicted not for
what he did but for what others are doing” ”
Id. 115 (quoting State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542,
545 1112, 959 P.2d 799 (1998).

HE s«116 Conversely, expert testimony
that explains a victim’s seemingly inconsis-
tent behavior is admissible to aid jurors in
evaluating the victim’s credibility, See State
v, Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 881, 728 P.2d 248
(1986) (citing State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472,
474, 720 P.2d 78 (1986)). Although expert
testimony about victim behavior that also
describes or refers to a perpetrator’s charac-
teristics has the potential to be “profile” evi-
dence, it is not categorically inadmissible.
Rather, its admissibility is determined by the
rules of evidence, The burden of establishing
admissibility lies with the proponent of the
testimony—in this case, the State. Like all
evidence, such testimony must be relevant to
be admissible. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401 (“Evi-
dence is relevant if; (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the
action.”); Ariz. R. Evid. 402 (“Relevant evi-
dence is admissible unless any of the follow-
ing provides otherwise: the United States or
Arizona Constitution; an applicable statute;
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not
admissible.”),

Wl 117 If relevant, such evidence may
still be excluded if the prejudice created by
its admission substantially outweighs its pro-
bative value, See Ariz. R. Evid. 408 (“The
court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, mis-
leading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-

dence.”). Thus, evidence of offender charac-
teristics may be admissible, subject to a Rule
403 analysis, if it is relevant for a reason
other than to suggest that the defendant
possesses some of those characteristics and
therefore may have committed the charged
crimes. See Lee, 191 Ariz, at 546 119, 959
P.2d 799 (“[T]here may be situations in which
drug courier profile evidence has significance
beyond the mere suggestion that because an
accused’s conduct is similar to that of other
proven violators, he too must be guilty.”),

HE {18 The outcome of this analysis
will, of course, vary from case to case. “De-
ciding whether expert testimony will aid the
jury and balancing the usefulness of expert
testimony against the danger of unfair preju-
dice are generally fact-bound inquiries
uniquely within the competence of the trial
court.” Moran, 151 Ariz. at 381, 728 P.2d 248,
The more “general” the proffered testimony,
the more likely it will be admissible. See
State v. Chapple, 185 Ariz, 281, 292, 660 P.2d
1208 (1988), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State v. Goudeau, 239
Ariz, 421, 459 1154, 872 P.8d 945 (2016). In
addition, the more the testimony is tied to
the defendant’s characteristics, rather than
to those of the victim, the more likely the
admission of such testimony will be imper-
missibly prejudicial. See id.

119 The danger of “cold” evidence describ-
ing the interaction between offenders and
victims is that it may stray into prejudicial
and potentially improper profile evidence.
Ketchner provides an example of such evi-
dence, The expert witness (also Dr. Ferraro)
in Ketchner testified about “characteristics
common to domestic violence victims and
their abusers,” and “described risk factors
for ‘lethality’ in an abusive relationship.” 286
Ariz, at 264 914, 889 P.8d 645, This Court
held the testimony was inadmissible because,
in addition to explaining victim behavior that
otherwise might be misunderstood by a jury,
it described an abuser’s reaction to loss of
control in a relationship, inviting a compari-
son with the defendant’s actions. Id. at 265
19, 889 P.8d 645. Importantly, in Ketchner,
the victim’s actions were not at issue and the
expert’s testimony did not explain victim be-
havior: “There was no reason to elicit this

testimony except to invite the jury to find
that Ketchner’s character matched that of a
domestic abuser who intended to kill or oth-
erwise harm his partner in reaction to a loss
of control over the relationship.” Jd. In other
words, the expert testimony in Ketchner was
simply not relevant to explaining the victim’s
behavior.

HMM 11.20 Here, the victim’s behavior and
inconsistent statements were squarely at is-
sue. Dr, Ferraro’s testimony was limited to
questions designed to help the jury under-
stand the sometimes counterintuitive behav-
iors of domestic violence victims. Although a
few of her general statements referred to an
abuser’s characteristics, such as, “the abusive
partner will turn the violence around and say
that if you hadn’t done this or you had done
that as I told you to do, this never would
have happened, so it’s your fault,” each state-
ment primarily served the purpose of ex-
plaining victim behavior. Thus, the testimony
was relevant to help the jury understand
P.J’s behavior.

121 The trial court considered the admis-
sibility of Dr, Ferraro’s testimony at the
hearing on the State’s motion in limine. At
that hearing, Haskie neither objected to Dr.
Ferraro’s testimony on Rule 403 grounds nor
argued prejudice, The trial court found that
the testimony was relevant and granted the
motion.

HI 1.22 Based on this record, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting Dr. Ferraro’s testimony. Any prejudice
from her testimony was minimal and did not
outweigh the testimony’s probative value.
The evidence revealed some characteristics
of domestic violence abusers mentioned by
Dr. Ferraro. As the court of appeals recog-
nized, “[I]t is not surprising—indeed it is
expected—that the jury will hear evidence
that the victim has behaved to a greater or
lesser extent in accord with the testimony of
a ‘cold’ and ‘blind’ expert such as Dr. Ferra-
ro.” Haskie, 240 Ariz, at 274 128, 878 P.8d
446. Our case law has recognized that “just
because expert testimony about behavioral
characteristics is exceedingly persuasive does
not mean it is unjairly prejudicial.” Moran,
151 Ariz, at 884, 728 P.2d 248 (emphasis in
original) (holding that the trial judge did not

587

abuse his discretion in admitting such testi-
mony under Rules 403 and 702). Dr. Ferra-
ro’s testimony was not directed at establish-
ing that Haskie possessed “one or more of an
informal compilation of characteristics” typi-
cally displayed by domestic violence abusers;
rather, it was introduced to explain the impe-
tus for the victim’s counterintuitive behavior.
Ketchner, 236 Ariz. at 264 115, 889 P.3d 645.
She neither explicitly nor implicitly invited
the jury to infer criminal conduct based on
the described conduct. See id, at 265 117,
839 P.3d 645 (citing with approval Ryan, 988
P.2d at 55 (warning that even testimony that
only implicitly invites the jury to infer crimi-
nal conduct on the part of the defendant
based on described characteristics demands
close scrutiny under the character evidence
rules)). Dr, Ferraro never made comparisons
between general characteristics of an abusive
relationship and the facts of this case, During
closing arguments, the prosecutor never
mentioned Dr. Ferraro or related any aspect
of her testimony to P.J. or Haskie.

123 The State proposes a standard for
identifying when profile evidence is imper-
missibly prejudicial. It argues that to violate
the prohibition against using profile evidence
as substantive proof of guilt, the prosecution
must offer testimony (1) establishing the ex-
istence of a common profile for perpetrators
of a certain criminal activity, (2) enumerating
the profile’s component characteristics, and
(8) expressly comparing the defendant
against each component characteristic to es-
tablish guilt by showing that he “matches”
the profile in most or all respects. But re-
quiring an explicit mention of a “profile” or a
direct comparison of the defendant with the
expert’s testimony leaves too much room for
prejudice and ignores the real possibility that
an expert could create a profile without ever
explicitly describing it as such,

HM {1.24 We conclude that the trial court
should consider the prejudicial effect of the
expert’s testimony as a whole, as well as that
of each individual statement offered. See
State v. Steinle, 289 Ariz, 415, 419 114, 872
P.8d 989 (2016) (stating that Rule 408 issues
“are highly contextual—they necessarily de-
pend on assessments of not only the evidence

588 Le

in question, but also the other evidence in the
case”), But piecing together statements, none
of which make direct comparisons to the
defendant's conduct and all of which are rele-
vant to explaining a victim’s behavior, does
not necessarily establish that the evidence is
more prejudicial than probative,

HM 1.25 Although admission of Dr. Fer-
raro’s testimony in this case was not error,
we note that trial courts should exercise
great caution in screening, admitting, and
limiting this type of evidence, Evidence de-
scribing the characteristics of offenders, even
as part of a description of victim behavior,
could imply that a defendant is guilty. This
potential for undue prejudice requires that
trial courts carefully scrutinize such evi-
dence,

726 If such testimony is admit-
ted, the defendant is entitled to a limiting
instruction under Rule 105 of the Arizona
Rules of Evidence to explain to the jury the
limited purpose and scope of such testimony.
Cf Woodson v, State, 30 Ariz, 448, 455, 247
P, 1108 (1926) (“{W]hen evidence [that when
considered as a whole is highly prejudicial
and is bound to engender hostility toward the
defendant] is admitted it is the duty of the
trial court to use extraordinary care in in-
structing the jury and in seeing that no
improper matter is allowed to get before it.”).
Additionally, although testimony about of-
fender or victim characteristics from a
“cold,” “blind” expert is not categorically in-
admissible, that does not mean a trial court
should automatically admit it, Rather, trial
courts should filter such proffered evidence
through the screens of Rules 401, 402, 403,
and 702 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence.
Furthermore, we caution trial courts to limit
“cold” and “blind” testimony from expert wit-
nesses to matters within the scope of their
expertise, Such experts should not be allowed
to speak in broad, categorical terms about
supposedly “common” or “ysual” occurrences
without empirical support.

Il. CONCLUSION

127 We vacate paragraphs seventeen
through twenty-three of the court of appeals’

decision and affirm Haskie’s convictions and

sentences.

399 P.3d 663

STATE of Arizona, EX REL. Mark
BRNOVICH, Attorney General,
Petitioner,

ve
CITY OF TUCSON, Arizona, Respondent,
Jeff DeWit, in his official capacity

as State Treasurer, Nominal
Respondent.

No. CV-16-0301-SA
Supreme Court of Arizona,

Filed August 17, 2017
As Amended August 17, 2017

ot

90

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General,
Dominic Draye, Solicitor General, Paula 8.
Bickett, Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals Section,
Paul N. Watkins (argued), Brunn (Beau) W.
Roysden III, Oramel H. (0.H.) Skinner,
Evan G. Daniels, John Heyhoe-Griffiths,
Aaron M, Duell, Assistant Attorneys Gener-
al, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Richard M. Rollman (argued), Richard A.
Brown, Bossé Rollman PC, Tucson, Attor-
neys for City of Tucson

Dennis I, Wilenchik, John D. Wilenchik,
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C., Phoenix, Attor-
neys for Jeff DeWit

Paul F, Eckstein (argued), Jean-Jacques
Cabou, Perkins Coie LLP, Phoenix, Attor-
neys for Amicus Curiae League of Arizona
Cities and Towns and Carol McMillan; Brad
Holm, City Attorney, Thomas G. Stack, As-
sistant City Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for
City of Phoenix; and Richard W. Files, City
Attorney, Rodney C, Short, Assistant City
Attorney, Yuma, Attorneys for City of Yuma

Michael J. Rusing, J. William Brammer,
Jr,, Rusing, Lopez & Lizardi, PLLC, Tucson;
and David H. Thompson, Peter A. Patterson,
John D, Ohlendorf, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC,
Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Amicus Cu-
riae National Rifle Association of America,
Tne,

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER
authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE BALES and JUSTICES
BRUTINEL and TIMMER joined.
JUSTICE BOLICK concurred in part and in
the result. JUSTICE GOULD, joined by
JUSTICES BOLICK and LOPEZ,
concurred in part and in the result.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER,
opinion of the Court:

{11 The primary issue we address here is
whether the state may constitutionally pro-
hibit a city’s practice, prescribed by local
ordinance, of destroying firearms that the
city obtains through forfeiture or as un-
claimed property. We conclude that a gener-
ally applicable state statute on this subject
controls over a conflicting municipal ordi-
nance, that the legislature may require the
Attorney General to investigate and file a
special action in this Court regarding alleged
violations of the state law, and that this
Court has mandatory jurisdiction to resolve
whether the allegedly conflicting ordinance
violates state law. Applying those principles
here, we accept jurisdiction of the State’s
special action and hold, in accordance with
article 13, section 2 of the Arizona Constitu-
tion, that ARS. §§ 12-945(B) and 13-
3108(F) supersede Tucson Code § 2-142.

BACKGROUND

72 In 2000, the Arizona Legislature
passed House Bill 2095, which declared;
It is the intent of the legislature to clarify
existing law relating to the state’s preemp-
tion of firearms regulation in this state,
Firearms regulation is of statewide con-
cern. Therefore, the legislature intends to
limit the ability of any political subdivision
of this state to regulate firearms and am-
munition, This act applies to any ordinance
enacted before or after the effective date
of this act,
2000 Ariz. Sess, Laws, ch, 876, § 4 (2d Reg.
Sess.). That legislation also amended A.R.S.
§ 18-8108(A) to provide: “[A] political subdi-
vision of this state shall not enact any ordi-
nance, rule or tax relating to the transporta-
tion, possession, carrying, sale, transfer,
purchase, acquisition, gift, devise, storage, li-

591

eensing, registration, discharge or use of
firearms or ammunition ... in this state.”
Id. § 2 (codified as amended at A.R.S, § 18-
3108(A)).

13 In 2005, the City of Tucson passed
Ordinance No. 10146 (the “Ordinance”),
which enacted Tucson Code §§ 2-140 to -
142. Section 2-142 governs the “[dlisposition
of unclaimed and forfeited firearms by the
[Tucson] police department.” Tucson Code
§ 2-142, The Tucson Code permits the Tuc-
son Police Department to keep a forfeited
firearm for its own purposes or to lend or
transfer it to another law enforcement agen-
cy or museum; otherwise, the Code states
that the police “shall dispose” of unclaimed
and forfeited firearms “by destroying” them.
Id.

94 In 2018, the legislature amended two
statutes governing the destruction of fire-
arms. Section 13-3108 was revised to add
new subsection (F), which provides: “[A]ny
agency or political subdivision of this state
and any law enforcement agency in this state
shall not facilitate the destruction of a fire-
arm....” 2018 Ariz, Sess, Laws, ch. 145, § 6
(ist Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at
ARS. § 18-8108(F)). And § 12-945(B), con-
tained in an article that governs the disposal
of “unclaimed property in [the] hands of [a]
public agency,” was amended to state:

[I]f the property is a firearm, the agency

shall sell the firearm to any business that

is authorized to receive and dispose of the
firearm under federal and state law and
that shall sell the firearm to the public
according to federal and state law, unless
the firearm is otherwise prohibited from
being sold under federal and state law.

2018 Ariz, Sess, Laws, ch. 145, § 5 (Ist Reg.
Sess.) (codified as amended at A.R.S. § 12~
945(B)). Also enacted by the legislature in
2018, A.R.S, § 12-948 provides that certain
specified property, including firearms, “in the
possession of a ... city ... may only be
disposed of pursuant to this article.” 2018
Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 145, § 8 (Ist Reg.
Sess.).

15 Pursuant to the Ordinance, between

2018 and October 2016, the City of Tucson
destroyed approximately 4,800 unclaimed or

592

forfeited firearms, In March 2016, the legis-
lature passed Senate Bill 1487, codified pri-
marily in ARS, § 41-194,011 2016 Ariz,
Sess. Laws, ch. 85, § 1 @d Reg. Sess.). It
establishes a framework under which, “[a]t
the request of one or more members of the
legislature, the attorney general shall investi-
gate any ordinance, regulation, order or oth-
er official action adopted or taken by the
governing body of a county, city or town that
the member alleges violates state law or the
Constitution of Arizona.” ARS. § 41-
194,01(A). The statute gives the Attorney
General thirty days to investigate and pro-
vide a “written report of findings and conclu-
sions,” Id, § 41-194.01(B).

16 If the Attorney General concludes that
the regulation or ordinance at issue affirma-
tively “[vJiolates any provision of state law,
. ++ the attorney general shall provide notice
to the county, city or town ... of the viola-
tion, [and the local government] has thirty
days to resolve the violation.” A.R.S. § 41-
194,01(B)(1). If the Attorney General con-
cludes that the matter has not been resolved
in that time frame, he “shall ... [notify the
state treasurer who shall withhold [from the
offending entity] and redistribute state
shared monies” until the “offending ordi-
nance ... is repealed or the violation is
otherwise resolved.” ARS. § 41-
194,01(B)(1)(@)-(b).

7 If the Attorney General concludes that.
the regulation or ordinance at issue “[mlay
violate a provision of state law, ... [he] shall
file a special action in [the] supreme court to
resolve the issue, and the supreme court
shall give the action precedence over all oth-
er cases.” ARS, § 41-194.01(B)2). And
“{t]he court shall require the county, city or
town to post a bond equal to the amount of
state shared revenue paid to the county, city
or town pursuant to § [§ ] 42-5029 and 43-
206 in the preceding six months.” Id,

8 In October 2016, Representative Mark
Finchem asked the Attorney General’s Office
to investigate whether the Ordinance violates
state law. The Office investigated, and the
City provided public records and a written
1, S.B, 1487 is also codified in ARS, §§ 42~

5029(L) and 43-206(F), which direct the State
Treasurer to implement monetary penalties im-

response. The City contended that the Ordi-
nance was a valid exercise of the City’s “or-
ganic law” as a charter city, see Ariz. Const.
art, 18, § 2, and that the state’s firearms
statutes “have no application to the City.”

49 In November 2016, the Attorney Gen-
eral issued his report, concluding that the
Ordinance “may violate one or more provi-
sions of state law’ because it requires the
destruction of firearms, conflicting with
ARS, § 18-8108(F), which prohibits any
“political subdivision” from “facilitat[ing] the
destruction of a firearm.” The Attorney Gen-
eral rejected Tucson’s charter city argument.

110 After the Attorney General’s Office
sent its report to the City, the Tucson City
Council met in December and refused to
repeal or otherwise change the Ordinance,
The City did, however, “suspend the imple-
mentation of gun destruction required by
[the Ordinance] until the issue is adjudicat-
ed.” That same day the Attorney General’s
Office filed this special action pursuant to
§ 41-194.01(B)(2).

{111 Several days later, the City filed a
complaint in Pima County Superior Court,
seeking an injunction against implementation
of § 41-194.01 and a declaration that the
statute is unconstitutional. The City respond-
ed in this Court to the State’s special action
petition and also moved to dismiss it, arguing
that the State’s allegations are covered by
§ 41-194.01(B)(1), not (B)(2), that the State
sought relief not provided for in (B)(2), and
that dismissal would “allow full consideration
of the issues raised in the [City’s] superior
court action.” Earlier this year, we ordered
the parties to brief several discrete issues
raised in this special action and held oral
argument, without prejudice to the parties
continuing to litigate the superior court ac-
tion,

DISCUSSION

I Separation of Powers Challenge
to S.B. 1487
712 This litigation was prompted by a
single state legislator’s request for the Attor-

posed by A.R.S. § 41-194.01. 2016 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 35, §§ 2-3 (2d Reg. Sess.),

ney General to investigate, as required under
S.B, 1487 and codified in ARS. § 41-
194.01(A), whether the City’s Ordinance vio-
lates state law. Based on the Attorney Gen-
eral’s investigation and conclusion that the
Ordinance may violate state statutes, and the
City’s refusal to repeal or otherwise change
the Ordinance, the State filed this special
action pursuant to § 41-194.01(B)(2),

Hl 118 As it has in its pending superior
court action, the City raises a host of consti-
tutional challenges to S.B, 1487, but we ad-
dress only those portions of the law that are
directly implicated here, The City contends
that §.B. 1487 violates the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, see Ariz. Const, art. 8, § 1, by
directing the Attorney General to investigate
alleged violations upon a single legislator’s
request and, if the Attorney General con-
eludes that a local ordinance “may violate”
state law, requiring him to file a special
action in this Court “to resolve the issue.”
§ 41-194,01(A), (B)(2), These statutory pro-
cedural mandates, the City asserts, unconsti-
tutionally infringe on both executive and ju-
dicial powers. We reject these arguments.

HM {14 In determining whether a stat-
ute violates separation of powers, we exam-
ine: (1) the essential nature of the power
being exercised; (2) the legislature’s degree
of control in the exercise of that power; (8)
the legislature’s objective; and (4) the prac-
tical consequences of the action. State ew rel.
Woods v, Block, 189 Ariz. 269, 276, 942 P.2d
428, 435 (1997), As for the first factor, imple-
menting the law, disbursing appropriations,
and enforcing legislative conditions on appro-
priations are essentially executive functions.
See id. at 277, 942 P.2d at 486 (stating that
“acts necessary to carry out the legislative
policies and purposes already declared by
[the Legislature] are administrative” and,
thus, “executive function[s]”) (first alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Pioneer Trust Co. v. Pima Cty.,
168 Ariz. 61, 65, 811 P.2d 22, 26 (1991)).
Under S.B. 1487, the executive branch exer-
cises those powers.

(15 Regarding the second factor, neither
the requesting legislator(s) nor the legisla-
ture as a whole controls the “exercise” of the
executive branch’s investigative and enforce-

593

ment power under §.B, 1487. In fact, the
legislature has no role beyond initiating At-
torney General review. The Attorney Gener-
al retains his discretion to apply independent.
Jegal analysis and judgment when opining
whether a municipal action violates state
law. He also retains discretion to choose the
legal positions he will advance should he file
a special action under § 41-194.01(B)@). A
legislator does not control the investigation
itself, decision-making related to the investi-
gation, or any action taken upon a determi-
nation under § 41-194.01. Cf McDonald ».
Thomas, 202 Ariz. 85, 41 117, 40 P.8d 819,
825 (2002) (upholding legislative enactments
that increased the power of clemency board
recommendations and imposed time limita-
tions on the Governor's power to act on
those recommendations because “the gover-
nor—and the governor alone—has the final
word with regard to whether clemency is
granted”). But ef: Woods, 189 Ariz, at 276-
78, 942 P.2d at 485-87 (holding that the
legislatively created Constitutional Defense
Council, the controlling members of which
were appointed by the legislature, violated
separation of powers because it “create[d]
conflict between an executive agency and a
legislative agency performing an executive
function”).

116 Nor does the third or fourth factor
support a finding that S.B. 1487 violates sep-
aration-of-powers principles. The enactment
itself suggests that the legislature’s apparent
objective in S.B. 1487 was not to usurp exec-
utive or judicial authority but rather to re-
quire and incentivize political subdivisions to
comply with state law. Likewise, the practical
consequence of §.B. 1487 is to encourage
compliance with state law, not to coerce,
control, or interfere with executive powers or
prerogatives.

117 8.B, 1487 permits a single legislator to
initiate and require an investigation by the
Attorney General’s Office. See § 41-
194,01(A), But other statutes similarly allow
or direct the initiation of an investigation or
issuance of an opinion upon legislative re-
quest. See ARS. §$ 82-8246(D), 41-
198(A)(7). We do not view S.B. 1487 as mate-
rially different for separation-of-powers pur-

594

poses, and the City cites no anthority for
finding it unconstitutional.

{18 The Attorney General’s duties are
“prescribed by law,” Ariz, Const. art. 5, § 9,
and through S.B, 1487 the legislature has
validly established that a single legislator
may compel an Attorney General investiga-
tion and opinion (and nothing more) regard-
ing whether a local ordinance violates state
law. That this procedure may cause the At-
torney General’s Office to focus and expend
resources to identify possibly conflicting local
laws and to resolve any related issues in this
Court does not offend separation-of-powers
principles. The procedure authorized by
§ 41-194.01(A) is very different from a legis-
lative attempt to direct the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion in a criminal case or civil
enforcement action.

119 Upon the Attorney General’s determi-
nation that a local Jaw “{mlay violate a provi-
sion of state law,” S.B, 1487 also requires the
Attorney General to file a special action “to
resolve the issue” in this Court, which shall
prioritize the action “over all other cases.”
§ 41-194,01(B)(2). Those provisions do not
unconstitutionally infringe on judicial power.
The Attorney General is not exercising a
judicial function in determining whether an
action may violate state law. Rather, such
determinations are legal opinions, which the
Attorney General routinely and permissibly
issues in other contexts. See § 41-198(A)(7)
(stating that “[ulpon demand by the legisla-
ture, or either house or any member there-
of,” the Attorney General’s Office shall “ren-
der a written opinion upon any question of
Jaw relating to their offices”); of ARS,
§ 41-1481(B) (requiring, at any citizen’s re-
quest, the Attorney General’s Civil Rights
Division to investigate complaints of employ-
ment discrimination); id, § 41-1491.09 (pro-
viding the same for Fair Housing com-
plaints),

120 Moreover, as this case illustrates, ju-
dicial review is available when the Attorney
General determines that a local ordinance
“may violate” state law. And even if the

2, Because § 41-194,01(B)(1) is not at issue here
and does not directly impact the questions before
us, we express no opinion on the constitutionality
of that subsection, including its provision permit-

Attorney General were to conclude under
§ 41-194.01(B)(1) that a local law violates
state law, the offending municipality has a
cure period and (as the State concedes) may
file an action challenging the conclusion and
any withholding of funds.? See, e.g., Ariz. R.P.
Spee. Actions 1(a). In either case, the Court
must decide, or at least retains discretion to
decide, the issue. Because S.B. 1487 “leaves
the judiciary free to make its own determina-
tion based on the particular facts of a case,”
it “comports with separation of powers.”
State v. Rios, 225 Ariz, 292, 299 122, 237
P.8d 1052, 1059 (App. 2010); ef Cactus Wren
Partners v. Ariz. Dep’t of Bldg. & Fire Safe-
ty, 177 Aviz, 559, 563, 869 P.2d 1212, 1216
(App. 1998) (concluding that because a stat-
ute did not “constitute[ ] a ‘coercive influence’
upon the judiciary,” it did not unconstitution-
ally usurp judicial power).

IL, Jurisdiction

HM 121 We next address whether this
Court’s special action jurisdiction under
§ 41-194,01(B)(2) is mandatory, as the State
contends, or discretionary, as the City as-
serts. Based on the statute’s text, its under-
lying legislative intent, and the legislature’s
constitutional authority to prescribe this
Court’s jurisdiction, we conclude that our
jurisdiction in this matter is mandatory.

122 When, as here, the Attorney General
determines that a municipal ordinance or
regulation “may violate” state law and then
files a “special action” in this Court pursuant
to § 41-194.01(B)(2)’s mandate, the statute
compels us “to resolve the issue” and “give
the action precedence over all other cases.”
As long as it comports with the Arizona
Constitution, that language quite clearly
makes our jurisdiction mandatory. See Litgo
NJ. Ine. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep't of Envil.
Prot, 725 F.8d 869, 394-95 (8d Cir. 2018)
(characterizing as “a mandate” Congress’s
statement that a particular claim “shall be
brought” in a “district court”).

$23 Our state constitution identifies the
various components of this Court’s subject

ting the Attorney General to unilaterally decide
whether appropriated monies should be withheld
by the State Treasurer from the offending politi-
cal subdivision and redistributed.

matter jurisdiction and, in a catch-all provi-
sion, vests the Court with “[s]uch other juris-
diction as may be provided by law.” Ariz,
Const, art. 6, § 5(6); see also ARS, § 12-
102(A) (“The supreme court shall discharge
the duties imposed and exercise the jurisdic-
tion conferred by the constitution and by
law.”). Under that authority, the legislature
may expand, but not contract, this Court’s
original jurisdiction as long as doing so does
not otherwise violate the constitution, That is
precisely what the legislature did by enacting
§ 41-194.01(B)(2). No constitutional impedi-
ment prevents or nullifies that action,

124 Section 41-194.01(B)(2) provides
“mandatory” jurisdiction for this Court in the
sense that this is a statutory special action
rather than a “discretionary” special action,
(The latter reflects the Court’s constitutional
authority to issue extraordinary writs under
article 6, section 5(1), which historically were
a form of discretionary relief, see Dobson v.
State, 233 Ariz. 119, 121 16, 809 P.8d 1289,
1291 (2018).) “[S]tatutory special actions ‘are
not at all discretionary.’” Circle K Conven-
ience Stores, Inc. v. City of Phoenia, 178
Ariz. 102, 108, 870 P.2d 1198, 1199 (App.
1993) (quoting Ariz. R.P. Spec. Action 1 state
bar committee’s note to subsec. (b)); accord
Book Cellar, Inc, v. City of Phoenix, 189
Ariz, 332, 386, 678 P.2d 517, 521 (App. 1988).
By requiring the Attorney General to file “a
special action” in this Court if he determines
that a local ordinance “may violate” state
law, and by directing the Court “to resolve
the issue” and “give the action precedence
over all other cases,” § 41-194.01(B)(2), the
legislature clearly intended for us to have
mandatory jurisdiction,

125 The City contends that § 41-
194.01(B)(@) is inapplicable and thus cannot
support jurisdiction here because the State
asserts in its special action briefs that Tucson
Code § 2-142 “does in fact violate,” not
merely that it “may violate,” state law. “Un-
der § 41-194.01(B)(1),” the City argues, “the
Attorney General’s finding that a local ordi-
nance ‘does’ violate state law triggers a dif-
ferent path—administrative action by the At-
torney General and Treasurer—not a special
action under (B)(2).” But the City misappre-
hends the relationship between (B)(1) and

595

(B)(2). The latter recognizes that there might
be circumstances, as this case illustrates,
when a local ordinance arguably violates
state law, but the issue is not settled by
existing case law. In light of (B)(2), the most
reasonable interpretation of (B)(1) is that it
allows a “does violate” determination only
when existing law clearly and unambiguously
compels that conclusion. Otherwise, it is this
Court’s responsibility “to resolve the issue”
via a process that, as the State notes, is “akin
to a standard declaratory judgment action.”
§ 41-194.01(B)(2); see also A.R.S. § 12-1881
to -1846; of Ariz Indep. Redistricting
Comm'n v. Brewer, 229 Ariz, 847, 354-55
‘1133-34, 275 P.3d 1267, 1274-75 (2012) (stat-
ing that this Court is authorized and obligat-
ed “to interpret and apply constitutional
law,” that is, “to say what the law is”) (quot-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
187, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1808).

126 Finally, we reject the City’s conten-
tion that “§ 41-194.01(B)2)’s purported
mandatory jurisdiction unconstitutionally in-
vades the Court's rule making authority”
concerning “procedural” matters. See Ariz.
Const. art. 6, §§ 1, 5(5). Because article 6,
section 5(6) of the Arizona Constitution ex-
pressly authorizes the legislature to expand
this Court’s original jurisdiction, it arguably
does not matter whether S.B. 1487's grant of
such jurisdiction is “procedural” or “substan-
tive.” Even if that distinction were pertinent
here, however, the City’s contention is with-
out merit.

HMM 127 Although “the legislature and
this Court both have rulemaking power, ...
in the event of irreconcilable conflict between
a procedural statute and a rule, the rule
prevails.” Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz, 85, 89
18, 208 P.8d 488, 487 (2009). But because
“the legislature has plenary power to deal
with any topic unless otherwise restrained by
the Constitution,” if a “statute conflicting
with a court-promulgated rule is ‘substan-
tive,’ the statute must prevail.” Jd, at 92 26,
208 P.3d at 490 (citations omitted). “[T]he
precise dividing line between substance and
procedure” is at best elusive. Id, at 92 129,
208 P.3d at 490.

928 Even assuming that subsection
(B)Q)’s vesting of mandatory jurisdiction in

596

this Court is purely procedural, we find no
“irreconcilable conflict” between that provi-
sion and our procedural rules. Jd, at 89 18,
208 P.8d at 487, And pursuant to its plenary
constitutional and statutory authority, see
Ariz, Const, art. 6, § 5(6); ARS, $12
102(A), in other contexts the legislature has
vested this Court with mandatory jurisdiction
when doing so did not conflict with court
rules. See, ¢.9., ARS. § 16-351(A) (providing
that superior court rulings on nominating
petitions “shall be appealable only to the
supreme court”); id, § 18-4031 (providing
that criminal actions in which a death sen-
tence is imposed “may only be appealed to
the supreme court”); of Fleischman v. Pro-
tect Owr City, 214 Ariz, 406, 408-09 1112, 153
P.8d 1085, 1087-88 (2007) (identifying areas
in which the legislature has vested exclusive
jurisdiction in this Court), In addition, as it
has in § 41-194,01(B)@), the legislature has
required this Court to give precedence to
certain other actions. See ARS, § 48-
8706(C) (requiring this Court to “give[ ] pre-
cedence” to special actions from water con-
servation district orders),

129 In short, § 41-194.01(B)(2)’s mandato-
ry jurisdiction and procedural framework do
not run afoul of this Court’s rule-making
authority. And, as the State has acknowl-
edged, the “mandatory” jurisdiction under
(B)(2) would not require the Court to decide
a case that is moot or otherwise nonjusticia-
ble, Accordingly, we exercise the jurisdiction
established by subsection (B)(2) and deny the
City’s motion to dismiss the special action,

III. Bond Requirement

180 Section 41-194.01(B)(2) provides that
“{t]he court shall require the county, city or
town to post a bond equal to the amount of
state shared revenue [ (“SSR”) ] paid to the
county, city or town pursuant to § [§ ] 42~
5029 and 48-206 in the preceding six
months.” In an uneontested declaration filed
in this Court, the City states that its SSR for
the 2016-2017 fiscal year is approximately
$115 million or 23.5% of the City’s budget,
Similarly, in its pending superior court ac-
tion, the City alleged that during the six-
month period between June and November
2016, “the City received SSR under §§ 42-

5029 and 48-206 in the aggregate amount of
$55,689,999,37,” and that the City could not
post a bond at or near that amount as it
would “exceed[ ] the sum total of the City’s
available reserves by nearly $5 million.” The
State has not requested—and this Court has
not ordered—posting of a bond in this action,
Whether the statute requires the Court to
order a bond even absent any request is not
before us.

131 The State contends that S.B, 1487
makes the (B)(2) bond mandatory but that
this Court has authority to reduce or waive
the bond in certain circumstances, for exam-
ple, when requiring the bond would lead to
absurd or impossible results or cause a “se-
vere financial hardship.” The City acknowl-
edges (B)(2)'s mandatory wording (“shall”),
but argues we should interpret the bond
provision “as directory, and therefore disere-
tionary,” because otherwise it poses “an un-
constitutional financial blockade to judicial
access,” See Ariz, Downs v, Ariz, Horse-
men’s Found, 180 Ariz, 550, 554-55, 637
P.2d 1053, 1057-58 (1981) (interpreting
“shall” as permissive rather than mandatory
to preserve a statute’s constitutionality),

82 We agree with the State that the
bond provision is mandatory, but we share
the City’s concerns regarding the bond’s
purpose, basis, practical application, and con-
stitutionality. See Ariz. Const. art. 8, § 1
(Distribution of Powers”); id. art. 6, § 1
(“Judicial power; courts”), § 5(6) (vesting the
Supreme Court with “[plower to make rules
relative to all procedural matters in any
court”); of Bastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz,
576, 586, 570 P.2d 744, 754 (1977) (finding a
non-waivable cost bond requirement in medi-
cal malpractice cases unconstitutional under
article 2, section 18 of Arizona Constitution,
“by denying access to the courts”); New v.
Ariz. Bd, of Regents, 127 Ariz. 68, 70, 618
P.2d 288, 240 (App. 1980) (finding a bond
requirement in negligence actions against
the state unconstitutional as “a monetary
blockade to access to the courts”),

188 The statute does not identify the pur-
pose of a large bond, the practical application
or enforcement of the bond requirement, or
the disposition of the bond proceeds upon
the conclusion of the special action; nor does

it provide that posting the bond is, or is not,
a precondition for a political subdivision to
defend its position or for this Court to ad-
dress and rule on the merits. But even as-
suming that failure to comply with the bond
requirement would not bar a city from chal-
lenging a (B)(2) action, that requirement, if
enforced, would likely dissuade if not abso-
lutely deter a city from disputing the Attor-
ney General’s opinion of a local law’s consti-
tutional validity. Such acquiescence, in turn,
would displace this Court from its constitu-
tionally assigned role under article 6 of inter-
preting Arizona’s constitution and laws—ef-
fectively preventing final judicial resolution
of the issue on which the Attorney General
has specifically requested a ruling pursuant
to § 41-194.01(B)\(2). Gf Forty-Seventh Leg-
islature v. Napolitano, 218 Ariz, 482, 485 18,
143 P.8d 1028, 1026 (2006) (“To determine
whether a branch of state government has
exceeded the powers granted by the Arizona
Constitution requires that we construe the
language of the constitution and declare
what the constitution requires.”). In effect,
the bond requirement problematically in-
structs us to charge a substantial fee—unre-
lated to securing a monetary judgment or
costs for a non-appealing party—if a political
subdivision defends on constitutional grounds
a local ordinance the Attorney General chal-
lenges in an original action filed in our
Court.

134 In any event, although the purpose,
practical application, and ramifications of the
bond requirement are unclear, the State as-
serts that if it is meant to ensure that a city
“does not benefit from receiving SSR while
possibly violating state law, then an agree-
ment to cease the violating action (and en-
forcement thereof) is likely to fulfill that
purpose in the same way as a bond.” Because
that is the situation here (inasmuch as the
City voluntarily agreed to suspend Tucson
Code § 2-142 pending this litigation), the
State sees no reason to impose the bond
requirement against the City. In addition,
assuming the bond requirement is unconsti-
tutional, the State asserts that it can be
severed because, “[elven without the bond
provision, the statute would achieve the Leg-
islature’s purpose—incentivizing state-law
compliance and quickly resolving whether a

597

subdivision is violating state law.” See State
Comp, Fund v, Symington, 174 Ariz. 188,
195-96, 848 P.2d 278, 280-81 (1998) (setting
forth requirements for finding severability),

135 In his concurrence, Justice Gould de-
clares the bond provision “unenforceable be-
cause it is incomplete and unintelligible.” In-
fra 185 (Gould, J., concurring in part and in
the result), Neither party made this argu-
ment, And given the procedural posture of
this case, there is no reason to address the
enforceability of (B)(2)’s bond provision.
Whether the bond requirement may, as writ-
ten, be constitutionally enforced, or ignored
under the novel theory advanced by Justice
Gould, can be addressed in future cases
where that issue is specifically raised and we
have the benefit of full briefing on that par-
ticular point. Here, we instead turn to the
issue raised by the special action petition—
whether the Ordinance conflicts with and
violates state law. Cf Slayton v. Shumway,
166 Ariz. 87, 92, 800 P.2d 590, 595 (1990) (we
generally seek to avoid constitutional issues
when interpreting and applying statutes),

IV. Validity of Tucson Code
§ 2-142 under State Law

186 With certain exceptions, Tucson’s Or-
dinance provides that the City’s police de-
partment “shall dispose” of unclaimed and
forfeited firearms “by destroying” them. Tue-
son Code § 2-142, State law, in contrast,
specifically prohibits any political subdivision
or law enforcement agency from “facili-
tatling] the destruction of a firearm,” A.R.S,
§ 18-8108(F), and instead, with certain ex-
ceptions, requires public agencies to “sell the
firearm to any business that is authorized to
receive and dispose of the firearm under
federal and state law,” A.R.S, § 12-945(B);
see also id. § 12-943 (providing that certain
specified property, including firearms, “that
is in the possession of a .,, city ... may
only be disposed of pursuant to this article”),
Thus, the Tucson Code unquestionably con-
flicts with Arizona law on this subject.

HM 137 Under state law, a political sub-
division may not “enact any ordinance ...
relating to,” among other things, the posses-
sion, sale, transfer, purchase, acquisition, or

598

use of firearms in Arizona, A.R.S. § 13-
8108(A). In no uncertain terms, the Arizona
Legislature has declared that “[flirearms
regulation is of statewide concern” and has
expressed its intent to preempt “firearms
regulation in this state” and thereby “limit
the ability of any political subdivision of this
state to regulate firearms,” 2000 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 876, § 4 (2d Reg. Sess.), We of
course respect the legislature’s statements,
but “whether state law prevails over conflict-
ing charter provisions under Article 13, Sec-
tion 2 is a question of constitutional interpre-
tation.” City of Tucson v. State (Tucson IN,
229 Ariz, 172, 178 134, 278 P.8d 624, 628
(2012); of Clayton v. State, 88 Ariz. 185, 145,
297 P. 1087 (1981) (subject to judicial review,
the state legislature, not a city, determines
whether a particular subject “is of general
statewide concern or of purely municipal con-
cern”), Thus, pursuant to § 41-194.01(B)(2),
the Attorney General properly asked this
Court to resolve that legal issue.

Hl 138 Despite the legislature’s broad
pronouncements regarding firearms, the City
argues that Tucson Code § 2-142 does not
violate state law because it is authorized and
protected by article 18, section 2 of the Ari-
zona Constitution. The clear conflict between
its Code and state law, the City asserts,
“does not require the repeal of [the Ordi-
nance] because as a charter city it is author-
ized to determine matters of local concern
free from the Legislature's interference.” Ac-
cording to the City, “[dlisposition of the
City’s own property—even firearms—is sole-
ly a matter of local concern,” and therefore
Tucson Code § 2-142 “supersedes A.R.S.
§§ 12-945(B) and 18-8108(F)” under article
18, section 2. The State counters that its
applicable, firearms-related statutes impli-
cate several matters of statewide, not merely
local, concern and therefore govern over the
conflicting municipal Ordinance. We agree
with the State,

HMM 139 Our analysis begins with the
“home rule charter” provision in Arizona’s
Constitution, which from statehood has pro-
vided that any city with a population of more
than 8,500 “may frame a charter for its own
government consistent with, and subject to,
the Constitution and the laws of the state.”

Ariz, Const. art. 18, § 2. Once adopted and
approved, a city’s charter is, “effectively, a
local constitution.” Tucson IT, 229 Ariz, at
174 110, 273 P.8d at 626, By statute, the
roots of which also trace back to statehood,
see Rev. Stat. of Ariz., Civ. Code, tit. 7, ch.
16, 112088, 2036 (1918), the charter “shall
prevail” over any conflicting law relating to
charter cities in force when the charter was
adopted and approved. A.R.S. § 9-284(A)
(also stating that the charter “shall operate
as a repeal or suspension of the law to the
extent of conflict, and the law shall not there-
after be operative as to such conflict”), “The
charter,” however, “shall be consistent with
and subject to the state constitution, and not
in conflict with ... general laws of the state
not relating to cities.” A.R.S. § 9-284(B); see
City of Tucson v. Ariz, Alpha of Sigma
Alpha Epsilon (Arizona ASAE), 67 Ariz. 880,
385, 195 P.2d 562 (1948) (noting that § 9-
284’s predecessor statute “supplements” arti-
cle 18, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution).

HE {40 “The purpose of the home
rule charter provision of the Constitution was
to render the cities adopting such charter
provisions as nearly independent of state leg-
islation as was possible.” City of Tucson v.
Walker, 60 Ariz, 232, 289, 185 P,2d 228 (1943)
Gnternal quotation mark omitted) (quoting
Asxberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2
N.W.2d 618, 614 (1942)). Consistent with that
purpose, we have articulated the following
rule:

Where the legislature has enacted a law

affecting municipal affairs, but which is

also of state concern, the law takes prece-
dence over any municipal action taken un-
der the home rule charter. But where the
legislative act deals with a strictly local
municipal concern, it can have no applica-
tion to a city which has adopted a home
rule charter. Whether or not an act of the
legislature pertains to a matter of local or
state-wide concern becomes a question for
the courts when a conflict of authority
rises,
Id.; see also Tucson IT, 229 Ariz. at 174 110,
278 P.8d at 626 (“[A] home rule city deriving
its powers from the Constitution is indepen-
dent of the state Legislature as to all sub-
jects of strictly local municipal concern.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate
Club, 64 Ariz, 1, 8-9, 164 P.2d 598 (1945));
Luhrs v, City of Phoenix, 52 Aviz, 438, 442—
48, 83 P.2d 283 (1988); Clayton, 38 Ariz. at
144-45, 297 P. 1087; id. at 468, 83 P.2d 288
(on denial of motion for rehearing in Clay-
ton).

41 Tucson has been a charter city pursu-
ant to article 18, section 2 since 1929. See
Tucson II, 229 Ariz, at 178 11, 278 P.8d at
625. Its charter broadly states that the City
has the “power ... [t]o purchase, receive,
have, take, hold, lease, use and enjoy proper-
ty of every kind and description, both within
and without the limits of said city, and con-
trol and dispose of the same for the common
benefit.” Tucson City Charter, ch. 4, § 1(4).
Based on that authority, in 2005 the City
passed the Ordinance in which Tucson Code
§ 2-142 was enacted.

142 Under this state’s well-established ju-
risprudence, whether the City’s Code con-
trols over the conflicting state laws essential-
ly hinges “on whether the subject matter is
characterized as of statewide or purely local
interest.” Tucson II, 229 Ariz. at 176 120,
278 P.8d at 628 (citing Strode v. Sullivan, 72
Ariz, 360, 365, 286 P.2d 48 (1951)). We ac-
knowledge that the extensive Arizona case
law in this area is muddled. As we noted in
Tucson II, “[mJany municipal issues will be
of both local and state concern,” and thus
differentiation is “problematic in application”
because it “often involves case-specific line
drawing,” and “{t]he concepts of ‘local’ versus
‘statewide’ interest do not have self-evident
definitions.” 229 Ariz. at 176 { 20, 278 P.8d at
628; see also Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442-48, 88
P.2d 283 (to same effect); John D. Leshy,
The Arizona State Constitution 884 (2d ed.
2018) (observing that “the numerous court
decisions addressing issues of charter city
power show considerable variation in the
flexibility with which they construe char-
ters”); of Strode, 72 Ariz, at 866, 286 P.2d 48
(noting the “difference of opinion” in case law
“as to what activities of a charter city are of
local interest or concern and therefore free
from legislative interference”),

143 Our concurring colleague, Justice Bol-
ick, faults Strode as setting Arizona courts on

599

a wayward path that is untethered to article
18, section 2, asserts that Strode and similar
cases should be overruled, and disavows as
irrelevant in cases like this any distinction
between matters of statewide interest and
those of purely local concern. Infra 1176-78,
80 (Bolick, J., concurring in part and in the
result). Notably, well before Strode, this
Court in several cases (including Clayton,
which Justice Bolick applauds, infra 178-74)
recognized as significant the distinction that
he deems immaterial. See, eg., Clayton v.
State, 38 Ariz. 466, 468, 300 P. 1010 (1981)
(on motion for rehearing) (stating that where
“the subject is of state-wide concern, and the
legislature has appropriated the field and
declared the rule, its declaration is binding
throughout the state” and controls over con-
flicting local laws); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 442, 88
P.2d 288 (same, and recognizing this as “the
general rule”); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 289, 185
P.2d 228 (quoting Amberg, 2 N.W.2d at 614)
(noting that if a state statute addresses a
matter of purely local concern it does not
apply to a charter city’s law on that subject).

144 The unarticulated but obvious take
away from Justice Bolick’s concurrence is
this; assuming it is constitutional, a state
statute on any particular topic will always
trump and invalidate a political subdivision’s
conflicting ordinance, even if the topic indis-
putably is solely and purely one of local
concern. Under that view, one must wonder
what is left of charter cities’ authority under
article 18, section 2.

HE 145 While thought-provoking, Jus-
tice Bolick’s concurrence is puzzling not be-
cause of its content but rather because of its
gratuitous nature, No party or amicus has
briefed or argued that Strode was wrongly
decided, that its analysis conflicts with the
constitution, or that it or any other case
should be overruled, We generally do not
reach out to decide important constitutional
issues or to upset established precedent
when no party has raised or argued such
issues. See, @g., State v. Valenzuela, 239
Ariz, 299, 306 121, 871 P.8d 627, 634 (2016)
(declining to address issues “[tJhe parties did
not brief”); State v. Martinez, 280 Ariz. 208,
212 110 n.2, 282 P.8d 409, 418 (2012) (refus-
ing to address Arizona constitutional issues

600

“not separately argued”), But of Blonder-
Tongue Labs, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S, 818, 319-21 & 820 n.6, 849-50, 91
S.Ct, 1484, 28 L,Hd.2d 788 (1971) (overruling
a prior case when the federal government,
appearing as amicus curiae, urged that result
and the parties addressed the issue at oral
argument). Exercising judicial restraint, we
therefore decline to sua sponte address fur-
ther the points that only Justice Bolick
makes,

146 In the end, we find no need here to
overhaul our longstanding analytical ap-
proach to resolving conflicts between state
and local laws. This case does not fall within
the “doubtful or twilight zone separating
those matters that are clearly of municipal
concern from those that are not.” Clayton, 88
Ariz, at 148, 297 P. 1087; see also Ariz.
ASAE, 67 Ariz, at 886, 195 P.2d 562 (also
referring to “a twilight zone” in which it is
difficult to clearly discern whether legislation
is of general or rather merely local concern),
The State identifies several matters of al-
leged statewide concern implicated by its
statutes and on which Tucson Code § 2-142
encroaches: regulating firearms under the
state’s police powers; regulating police de-
partments (and other government agencies)
handling forfeited or unclaimed property;
protecting the constitutional right to bear
arms; and regulating city budgets and fi-
nances. To varying degrees, we are persuad-
ed that at least some of those asserted state
interests exist and prevail over the Ordi-
nance,

HEE 147 Unlike municipalities, which
have “no inherent police power,” the state
has broad police power, including “[tJhe pro-
tection of life, liberty, and property, and the
preservation of the public peace and order, in
every part, division, and subdivision of the
state,” Luhrs, 52 Aviz. at 444, 83 P.2d 283
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Kansas City v. JI, Case Threshing Mach,
Co., 887 Mo. 918, 87 S.W.2d 195, 202 (1985);
see also State v. Jaastad, 48 Ariz, 458, 468, 32
P,2d 799 (1984) (“The police power inheres in
the state and not in its municipalities.” (quot-
ing Clayton, 88 Ariz. at 145, 297 P, 1087),
Matters involving the police power generally
are of statewide concern, See Associated

Dairy Prods. v, Page, 68 Ariz. 398, 396-97,
400-01, 206 P.2d 1041 (1949) (noting “concern
of the state in the exercise of its police
powers” and holding that regulation of milk
products was within scope of statewide con-
cern for public health); see also City of
Scottsdale v, State, 237 Ariz, 467, 471 917,
852 P.8d 9836, 940 (App. 2015) (“Arizona
courts have rejected municipal ordinances
that conflict with state statutes ..., particu-
larly when such ordinances involve the police
powers of the state.”).

148 The laws at issue here implicate the
state’s police power in several respects: the
disposition of forfeited or unclaimed proper-
ty, the conduct of law enforcement officers,
including their handling of unclaimed proper-
ty, and the regulation of firearms,

{49 The Tucson Police Department’s dis-
position of property (whether forfeited or
unclaimed) is an exercise of police power
granted by the state. See A.R.S, §§ 12-940
to -945 (relating to disposition of unclaimed
property); A.R.S. §§ 13-4301 to 4316 (forfei-
ture); see also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 US.
465, 467, 47 S.Ct, 188, 71 L.Ed. 854 (1926)
(“{A] state in the exercise of its police power
may forfeit property....”), Thus, the state’s
authority validly extends over the possession
and disposition of the firearms. See McMann
v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 468, 472 19, 47
P.8d 672, 676 (App. 2002) (“In general, when
a city acts ‘as an agent of the state, the
subject upon which it acts is not of solely
local concern.” (quoting Luhrs, 52 Ariz, at
443, 83 P.2d 283),

{50 Relatedly, regulating police depart-
ments’ conduct, including their handling of
unclaimed property, is also a matter of state-
wide concern, See A.R.S, §§ 12-940 to ~945,
Arizona case law recognizes the statewide
interest in subjects even tangentially con-
nected to the work of public safety officers
and criminal justice. See Jett v. City of Tuc-
son, 180 Ariz, 115, 121, 882 P.2d 426, 432
(1994) (removal of city magistrates from of-
fice); Walker, 60 Ariz. at 287, 185 P.2d 223
(police pensions); Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 448, 83
P,2d 283 (police and firefighter minimum
wage); Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 143
Ariz, 14, 17-18, 691 P.2d 726, 729 (App. 1984)
(pay for police officers’ lunch hour), “[A]

policeman ... in the regular line of duty is
performing a governmental function....”
Luhrs, 52 Ariz. at 446, 88 P.2d 288; see also
id. at 444, 83 P.2d 288 (“Certain functions
have ... definitely been determined govern-
mental, the contol of which remains in the
state.”), And the Ordinance relates to the
day-to-day work of police as much as the
matters addressed in the above-cited cases,

51 Regulation of firearms, including their
preservation or destruction, also involves the
state’s police power and is of statewide con-
cern, See Dano v. Collins, 166 Ariz, 322, 824,
802 P.2d 1021, 1028 (App. 1990) (compiling
cases from other jurisdictions where firearm
regulations were upheld as valid exercises of
police power); State v. Beadle, 84 Ariz. 217,
221-22, 826 P.2d 844 (1958) (“The purpose of
an Act, promulgated under the State’s police
power, is to protect the public health, safety
or welfare.”), The legislature has indicated
that the disposal of firearms by government
agencies is itself a component of firearm
regulation by specifically including the dis-
posal restrictions within a comprehensive
statutory firearms regulation scheme. See
ARS. § 18-3108; of Tucson Sunshine Cli-
mate Club, 64 Ariz. at 8, 164 P.2d 598 (re-
quiring municipalities to participate in a gen-
eral advertising plan would show the matter
is of statewide concern). Because both Tuc-
son Code § 2-142 and the state laws with
which it conflicts involve the state’s police
power and matters “that the entire state is
interested in,” the matters at issue here “are
proper subjects for general laws.” Luhrs, 52
Ariz, at 448, 88 P.2d 288 (holding that “the
matter of pensioning policemen, as also the
matter of fixing a minimum wage for police-
men and firemen, is of state-wide concern”),
Accordingly, although the state laws in ques-
tion undoubtedly “affect[ ] municipal affairs,”
they are also of “state concern” and there-
fore “take[ ] precedence” over the City’s con-
flicting Ordinance. Walker, 60 Ariz. at 289,
185 P.2d 223,

52 The City points to the lack of any
evidence “of a gun shortage in Tucson, leav-
ing Tucsonans or visitors without access to
firearms in the City,” or any evidence “that
the ordinance impacts anyone or anything
outside of Tucson.” But as the State ob-

601

serves, “[t]he number of firearms affected by
[Code § 2-142] has nothing to do with the
nature of the regulated subject matter. As
this Court has explained, ‘whether general
state laws displace charter provisions de-
pends on whether the subject matter is char-
acterized as of statewide or purely local in-
terest,’” (citing Tueson II, 229 Ariz, at 176
7 20, 278 P.3d at 628),

158 The State and amicus National Rifle
Association argue that preserving the right
to bear arms under the federal and state
constitutions is also a subject of state con-
cern. See U.S. Const. amend. II; Ariz. Const.
art. 2, § 26; see also McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 180 S.Ct. 3020,
177 L,Hd.2d 894 (2010) (describing the right
to bear arms as “fundamental to our scheme
of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (first citing Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct.
1444, 20 L.Hd.2d 491 (1968); and then quot-
ing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
‘721, 117 S.Ct. 2802, 188 L.Bd.2d 772 (1997);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
635, 128 S.Ct. 2788, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008)
(noting that the people “elevate[d] above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, re-
sponsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home”), We agree with that prop-
osition, but even assuming that the Ordi-
nance somehow implicates that right, we
need not address this argument inasmuch as
the superiority of state law over the Ordi-
nance is clearly established based on the
state’s asserted police powers discussed
above.

154 The confluence of the state's broad
police powers, Arizona’s comprehensive stat-
utory and regulatory schemes regarding fire-
arms and unclaimed or forfeited property,
and the state’s interests in regulating law
enforcement agencies’ handling of such prop-
erty, all lead to one conclusion: the pertinent
state statutes, §§ 12-948, -945(B), and 13-
3108(F), embrace a topic of statewide inter-
est and concern and, conversely, the Ordi-
nance does not address a matter of purely
local concern. Therefore, the Ordinance can-
not legally coexist with the applicable and
controlling state law,

602

155 The City’s contrary arguments are not
persuasive. Relying on article 18, section 2 of
the Arizona Constitution and a handful of
Arizona cases, the City contends that it “has
charter authority to dispose of property it
owns,” including firearms. Because the state
statutes address matters of statewide inter-
est, however, whatever powers the City
seeks to exercise under its home-rule charter
authority and related ordinances must be
“consistent with, and subject to, the Consti-
tution and laws of the state.” Ariz. Const.,
art. 18, § 2; accord A.R.S. § 9-284(B), Our
cases have consistently recognized this sig-
nifieant constitutional restraint on charter
cities’ powers. See, eg., Tucson II, 229 Ariz,
at 174 19, 278 P.3d at 626; Strode, 72 Ariz, at
364, 236 P.2d 48 (observing that a charter
city does not have “carte blanche authority
or plenary power to adopt any legislation
that it might desire”); Tucson Sunshine Cli-
mate Club, 64 Ariz. at 4, 6, 164 P.2d 598 (a
charter city’s powers extend “not only in
matters of local concern, but also in matters
of state-wide concern, within its territorial
limits, unless the Legislature has appropriat-
ed the field, and directly or by necessary
implication established a rule, beyond which
the city may not go”); Luss, 52 Ariz. at 442,
88 P.2d 283 (recognizing the “general rule”
that when “the subject is of statewide con-
cern, and the Legislature has appropriated
the field and declared the rule, its declaration
is binding throughout the state” (quoting
Clayton, 88 Ariz, at 468, 800 P. 1010)).

56 This Court has narrowly limited the
concept of “purely municipal affairs,” or “lo-
cal interest or concern,” see Strode, 72 Ariz.
at 865-66, 286 P.2d 48, restricting the extent
to which charter city ordinances can prevail
over state law. In only two areas have we
upheld a municipal ordinance that directly
conflicts with state law. First, we have held
that the “method and manner of conducting
elections in the city ... is peculiarly the
subject of local interest and is not a matter of
statewide concern.” Strode, 72 Ariz, at 368,
236 P.2d 48; see also Tucson II, 229 Ariz, at
177 9980-31, 278 P.8d at 629 (concluding
that “Tucson’s manner of electing its city
council members supersedes the conflicting
provisions of [state law],” and observing that
“filf the ‘home rule’ provisions of Article 13,

Section 2 are to have effect, they must at the
least afford charter cities autonomy in choos-
ing how to elect their governing officers”),
These cases are inapposite and unhelpful to
the City, inasmuch as the conflict here does
not involve municipal elections or “the au-
thority of charter cities to structure how
their governing officers are elected.” City of
Tucson v. State (Tucson IID, 285 Ariz. 434,
435 12, 888 P.8d 761, 762 (App. 2014).

157 Second, this Court has held that “the
manner and method of disposal of real estate
of a city is not a matter of state-wide public
concern.” Arizona ASAE, 67 Ariz, at 336, 195
P.2d 562; see also McMann, 202 Ariz, at 470
V1, 472 1910-11, 474 118, 47 P.8d at 674,
676, 680 (upholding city ordinance requiring
lessees of city-owned real property to per-
form “instant background checks for pro-
spective gun purchasers during gun shows
held at the [City’s convention center]” be-
cause “the use permit” is “essentially a lease”
and thus “a disposition of property,” a city
was “engaging in business activities,” and
“the legislature did not clearly intend to
preempt the City from requiring [such] back-
ground checks”). These cases likewise do not
support the City’s position here.

158 Unlike this case, neither Arizona
ASAE nor McMann involved a clear conflict
between a municipal law or action and a state
law of general application and concern, In
Arizona ASAE, for example, this Court de-
termined that the state law at issue clearly
“ha[d] no application to charter cities” and
observed that other Arizona cities and towns
have “no interest” in what Tucson's charter
provides regarding “the manner and method
of disposal of [a city’s] real estate.” 67 Ariz,
at 385, 336, 195 P.2d 562, And in McMann,
the state had not attempted to regulate (as
an exercise of its police power) the leasing of
city property. See McMann, 202 Ariz, at 473
114, 47 P.8d at 677 (noting that “the context
of [the subject statute] in the entire [state]
legislative scheme does not establish a clear
legislative intent to preempt the City’s ordi-
nance”); of. City of Scottsdale, 287 Ariz. at
471 116, 472 128, 352 P.8d at 940 (distin-
guishing Arizona ASA and McMann be-
cause “selling and leasing property owned by
a municipality do not implicate the police

powers of the state,” and holding that a state
statute “preempts local ordinances that im-
pose a blanket prohibition on sign walkers
conducting business on public sidewalks”).
Because the statutes here involve matters of
“statewide concern” and “the legislature has
appropriated the field” regarding govern-
mental entities’ destruction or disposal of
firearms, “its declarations are binding
throughout the state, and all cities and mu-
nicipalities, including charter cities, are pre-
cluded” from directly contravening the stat-
utes through local laws. Arizona ASAE, 67
Ariz, at 336, 195 P.2d 562.

159 Other arguments presented by the
City and amicus the League of Arizona Cities
and Towns are also unpersuasive. Relying on
Luhrs, the League asserts that “whether the
property at issue is real or personal, guns or
butter, if it is owned by a charter city, its use
or disposition is a matter in which the Legis-
lature is constitutionally proscribed from in-
terfering.” See Luhrs, 52 Ariz, at 442-48, 83
P.2d 283 (noting that when the particular
activity “is exercised by the city in its pro-
prietary capacity, it is a power incident to
home rule”); see also Tucson Sunshine Cli-
mate Club, 64 Ariz, at 8, 164 P.2d 598 (ob-
serving that in advertising its advantages,
city was “acting in its proprietary rather
than its governmental capacity” and “not act-
ing as the agent of the state”); of Ariz.
Const. art, 18, § 5 (“Every municipal corpo-
ration within this State shall have the right
to engage in any business or enterprise
which may be engaged in by a person, firm,
or corporation by virtue of a franchise from
said municipal corporation,”),

160 This argument, however, skirts the
pivotal inquiry in cases like this: “whether
the subject matter is characterized as of
statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson
IT, 229 Ariz, at 176 120, 278 P.3d at 628.
Thus, even if relevant, the City’s ownership
interest or proprietary capacity is not deter-
minative. In addition, the City does not de-
stroy firearms in a proprietary capacity (and
the City does not specifically argue other-
wise). Cf City of Scotisdale v. Mun. Court,
90 Ariz, 398, 398-99, 868 P.2d 687 (1962) (a
city’s operation of a sewage plant is a gov-
ernmental function); Jones v. City of Phoe-

603

nix, 29 Ariz, 181, 181-82, 239 P. 1080 (1925)
(a city’s disposal of garbage is a governmen-
tal function). Just as a city’s wastewater
management and disposal are governmental
functions, so too is the City’s destruction of
firearms,

161 Notably, over the past seventy years
only a few of the many Arizona cases ad-
dressing city/state conflicts under article 18,
section 2 have cited, let alone based the
decision on, a proprietary/governmental dis-
tinction that originated from dicta in Luhrs,
52 Ariz. at 443, 83 P.2d 283 (stating that if a
municipality’s activity “is carried on ... as
an agent of the state[,] ... it is of general or
publie concern,” but “[i]f it is exercised by
the city in its proprietary capacity, it is a
power incidental to home rule”), See Tucson
Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. at 8, 164
P.2d 598 (same); McMann, 202 Ariz. at 472
(11, 47 P.8d at 676 (noting that Tucson’s
“folperation of a convention center is a con-
stitutionally permitted business activity”);
Shaffer v. Allt, 25 Ariz, App. 565, 569-70, 45
P.2d 76 (1976) (referring to a city’s “proprie-
tary powers” and holding that local ordinance
allowing city to purchase liquor license and
sell alcoholic beverages at city recreation fa-
cility was not inconsistent with the Arizona
Constitution or “any general law of the
state”), Because the proprietary/governmen-
tal distinction is murky and unhelpful in re-
solving disputes of this kind, we do not view
it as an appropriate factor in determining
whether a state law relates to a matter of
“statewide or purely local interest.” Tucson
IT, 229 Ariz, at 176 120, 278 P.8d at 628; of
Ryan v, State, 184 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d
597, 599 (1982) (abolishing as an unnecessary,
“speculative exercise” the “public/private
duty doctrine” in determining governmental
immunity issues).

162 The City also proposes a balancing
test, under which courts would balance the
competing state and municipal interests to
determine if the asserted statewide interest
is “sufficiently conerete and identifiable to
outweigh the local interest of home rule cities
in municipal self-government,” In support of
that concept, the City cites Johnson v. Brad-
ley, in which the California Supreme Court
stated that “as a condition of state legisia-

604

tive supremacy,” the state must show “a
dimension demonstrably transcending iden-
tifiable municipal interests,” so that the
phrase “statewide interest” does not invade
areas of intramural concern only, thereby
preserving core values of charter city govern-
ment. 4 Cal.4th 889, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 841
P.2d 990, 996 (1992). Under California law, if
a statewide concern is established, a charter
city’s contrary law is preempted only if the
state law is “reasonably related” to resolving
the state’s interest and “narrowly tailored” to
limit incursion into legitimate municipal in-
terests. Id., 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 841 P.2d at
999-1000 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Johnson was based on Cali-
fornia’s constitution, which exempts from the
control of state law “all ordinances and regu-
lations in respect to municipal affairs.” Cal.
Const, art. XI, § 5(a). Arizona has no coun-
terpart, but instead requires a city charter to
be consistent with “the laws of the state.”
Ariz, Const, art. 18, § 2,

168 We reject the California approach and
the City’s proposed balancing test. It would
not aid courts in determining if a particular
subject is of statewide interest or rather
purely local concern. We therefore decline to
follow Johnson and cases from other states
that embrace a balancing approach. See U.S.
Elevator Corp. v. City of Tulsa, 610 P.2d 791
(Okla. 1980); Madison Teachers, Inc v.
Walker, 858 Wis.2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 387 (2014).

HI 164 Im addition, a balancing test
finds only limited, marginal support in Ari-
zona. In Tucson v. State (Tucson I), without
citing any Arizona authority, the court of
appeals found “a balancing test” appropriate
in determining whether local or statewide
interests were “paramount.” 191 Ariz. 436,
489, 957 P.2d 841, 844 (1997). More recently,
however, the court of appeals correctly found
that a trial court erred in applying a balanc-
ing test to resolve a city/state dispute, aptly
noting that this Court has never used or
approved such a test in this context, Tucson
IIT, 285 Ariz, at 489 116 n.6, 338 P.8d at 766
(App, 2014), We agree and therefore disap-
prove Tucson J’s use of a balancing test in its
analysis. In short, we find such a test is
neither helpful nor appropriate, and instead
would potentially cause confusion and incon-

sistent results, in resolving issues under arti-
cle 18, section 2,

V. Conclusion

165 The state laws here, ARS. §§ 12-
945(B) and 18-8108(F), involve matters of
statewide, not purely local, interest and thus
displace the City’s inconsistent Ordinance,
Tueson Code § 2-142, regarding destruction
of firearms, Having decided the legal issue
presented under A.R.S, § 41-194.01(B)(2),
we do not address other issues pertaining to
S.B. 1487. The State is awarded its reason-
able attorney fees under A.R.S, § 12-348.01,
upon its compliance with ARCAP 21,

JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring in part
and in the result:

166 The Court does a fine job harmonizing
and applying what it aptly refers to as the
“muddled” jurisprudence governing conflicts
between city charters and state law and it
reaches the correct result. Although I join
fully in Parts I, II, and V of the Court’s
opinion, I write separately to address errone-
ous prior decisions that produced the juris-
prudential muddle, from which we can extri-
cate ourselves by aligning our case law with
constitutional text.

167 The Court describes this as a “gra-
tuitous” endeavor. Respectfully, it is not,
Although the parties may determine what
issues are placed before us, they cannot
constrain our analysis when a law’s consti-
tutionality is questioned. In every instance,
that analysis should begin with the Consti-
tution’s text. Such analysis consists not
merely of recitation but application, “We
look first to the language of the provision,
for if the constitutional language is clear,
judicial construction is neither required nor
proper.” Perini Land & Dev. Co. v. Pima
Cty., 170 Ariz, 880, 888, 825 P.2d 1, 4
(1992); Jett v, City of Tucson, 180 Ariz, 115,
119, 882 P.2d 426, 480 (1994) (“If the lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, we gener-
ally must follow the text of the provision as
written,”), Resort to the Constitution’s plain
meaning is especially essential where, as
the Court freely acknowledges, the state of
the law is disarray. See, eg, 146 (noting
that the Court has at least twice described

our jurisprudence as creating a “twilight
zone”), In such instances, our fidelity should
be to the Constitution rather than to the
disarray. See, eg., McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805-06, 180 S.Ct.
8020, 177 L,Hd.2d 894 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing that the Second
Amendment is applicable to the states, but
urging the Court to abandon a “well-set-
tled” but misguided test in favor of “a more
straightforward path to this conclusion, one
that is more faithful to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text and history”).

168 Article 18, section 2, of the Arizona
Constitution possesses the virtue of great
clarity. It provides cities that meet certain
criteria with a mechanism to secure greater
self-governance, That section includes two
provisions that squarely address the issue
presented here, An eligible city “may frame a
charter for its own government consistent
with, and subject to, the Constitution and the
laws of the state.” Ariz, Const. art. 18, § 2
(emphasis added). Upon approval, the “char-
ter shall become the organic law of such city
and supersede any charter then ewisting ...
and all ordinances inconsistent with said
new charter.” Id. (emphasis added),

69 That clear language renders simple
the dispute here. As the Court amply demon-
strates, Tucson’s charter provision conflicts
with state law regarding the disposition of
seized firearms. Tucson’s charter is subject
to that law and does not supersede it.

170 Were we construing and applying only
the constitutional text as written, we would
have no jurisprudential muddle. Charter cit-
jes and the state would understand their
respective boundaries and taxpayers could
save the cost of unnecessary litigation. But
the tendency of the law toward complexity
over clarity often seems irresistible.

{71 As the Court observes, the law gov-
erning conflicts between state and charter
cities did not end with the Constitution.
Shortly after the Constitution’s ratification,
the legislature passed an emergency statute
presently codified as A.R.S, § 9-284 (the
“charter statute”). Section 9-284(A) provides
that where charter provisions “are in conflict
with any law” relating to cities eligible for

605

charter status “in force at the time of the
adoption and approval of the charter, the
provisions of the charter shall prevail not-
withstanding the conflict.” Section 9-284(B)
provides, “The charter shall be consistent
with and subject to the state constitution,
and not in conflict with the constitution and
+» general laws of the state not relating to
cities.”

172 Two observations about the charter
statute are pertinent, First, it established
that charter provisions would prevail only as
to conflicting statutes “relating to” charter-
eligible cities “in force at the time of the
adoption and approval of the charter.” Thus,
the charter statute does not apply here be-
cause Tucson’s charter was adopted long be-
fore the conflicting statute. Second, if article
18, section 2, of the Arizona Constitution
itself established supremacy of charters over
eertain conflicting state statutes, there would
have been no need to enact that status
through legislation, much less on an emer-
gency basis, The statute’s enactment thus
implied the legislature’s recognition that arti-
ele 18, section 2 did not, by its own terms,
elevate charters over statutes,

173 Early cases harmonized the charter
statute with the Constitution. In Clayton v.
State, 38 Ariz, 135, 297 P. 1037 (1981), the
Court invalidated local highway laws that
conflicted with state statutes. The Court
posed the question of who determines wheth-
er a matter is of “general statewide concern
or of purely municipal concern? Shall the city
be permitted to determine this question, or
shall the state?” Id, at 145, 297 P. 1087.
Applying the Constitution, the Court’s an-
swer was unequivocal: the state. Jd. (quoting
State v. Thompson, 149 Wis, 488, 187 N.W.
20, 31 (1912)) (even where the Constitution
divides powers between the state and cities,
the state alone determines what is a munici-
pal concern), Quoting the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the Court observed that the Constitu-
tion “in no way limited or abridged the sv-
preme sovereign control over such municipal-
ity, but only guarantees to such municipality
the right of municipal government subject to
the Constitution and laws of the state.” Id. at
148, 297 P, 1087 (quoting City of Sapulpa v.
Land, 101 Okla. 22, 228 P. 640, 646 (1924)), If

606

charter powers were not “subject to the su-
preme powers of the Legislature[,] ... then
we have the inevitable result that the fram-
ers of the Constitution authorized the estab-
lishment of independent petty states within
this state.” Id. (quoting City of Sapulpa, 223
P, at 646),

{74 The Clayton Court continued its anal-
ysis, however, by noting that article 13, sec-
tion 2 was supplemented by statute. Id. at
146, 297 P, 1087, The Court explained that
under the statute, where a conflict exists
between preexisting state laws and charter
provisions, the latter shall prevail except as
to general laws of the state not relating to
cities. Id. The Court went on to conclude that,
the law at issue was a general law not relat-
ing to cities, thus it prevailed over the con-
flicting charter provision. Id, at 146-49, 297
P, 1087. The Court made clear that it was the
statute (which is not at issue here), not the
Constitution, that allowed charter provisions
to prevail over conflicting state laws in limit-
ed circumstances. Id.; see also 139 (acknowl-
edging that the statute, not the Constitution,
established charter cities’ primacy over state
laws in certain circumstances).

75 In Mayor & Common Council of City
of Prescott v. Randall, 67 Ariz. 369, 196 P.2d
477 (1948), the Court struck down a charter
city’s alcohol regulations that conflicted with
state law. The Court cited numerous cases to
the effect that “a charter city is sovereign in
all of its ‘municipal affairs’ where the power
attempted to be exercised has been specifi-
eally or by implication granted in its char-
ter.” Id. at 871, 196 P.2d 477. However, the
Court noted that in “practically all of the
foregoing cases the effect of section 16-303
[predecessor to § 9-284] .., has been direct-
ly or indirectly considered by this court” as
supplementing charter powers conferred by
the Constitution. Id.; see also City af Tucson
v. Ariz, Alpha of Sigma Alpha Epsilon (AA-
SAE), 67 Ariz. 330, 385, 195 P,2d 562 (1948)
(resolving conflict between state and charter
city laws pursuant to charter statute).

176 But only three years later, those stat-
utory considerations vanished from the
Court’s analysis and the charter statute was
grafted onto article 18, section 2, In Strode v.
Sullivan, 72 Ariz. 360, 286 P.2d 48 (1951), the

Court held that a charter city’s election laws
superseded conflicting state law. The Court
selectively quoted article 13, section 2, plac-
ing emphasis on a city forming a charter “for
its own government” and omitting any refer-
ence to charters superseding inconsistent lo-
cal laws but not state laws. Id. at 364, 236
P.2d 48.

{177 Without any overt indication that it
was doing so, the Court substituted the char-
ter statute language for the constitutional
text. The difference between the constitution-
al rule announced in Strode and the actual
constitutional text is so stark that it invites
direct comparison:

Article 18, section 2:

Eligible city “may frame a charter for its

own government consistent with, and sub-

ject to, the Constitution and the laws of the
state.... [Slaid charter shall become the
organic law of such city and supersede any
charter then existing ... and all ordi-
nances inconsistent with said new charter.
Ariz. Const, art. 18, § 2 (emphasis added).

Strode Rule:

[A] city charter ... becomes the organic

law of the city and the provisions of the

charter supersede all laws of the state in
conflict with such charter provisions inso-
far as such laws relate to purely municipal
affairs,
72 Ariz. at 865, 236 P.2d 48 (emphasis add-
ed).

178 The Court in Strode literally rewrote
the constitutional provision at issue, which of
course it had no power to do. It thus replaced
the Constitution’s bright line with a judicially
manufactured line of constitutional demarca-
tion between matters of statewide concern,
over which the state prevails, and matters of
purely local concern, over which charter cit-
ies have hegemony. That blurry line is en-
tirely the cause of our muddled jurispru-
dence over the past two-thirds of a century.

179 So the question presents itself: should
we hew to the Constitution or to our prior
decisions? The judicially created doctrine of
stare decisis instructs that the rule of law
requires stability and continuity, and there-
fore we should generally follow precedent.
Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256

116, 69 P.3d 28, 27 (2008), But as judges, we
take an oath to the Constitution, not to the
stare decisis doctrine. Thus, “[w]hile, under
our judicial system, all courts have a strong
respect for precedent, this respect is a rea-
sonable one which balks at the perpetuation
of error, and the doctrine of stare decisis
should not prevail when a departure there-
from is necessary to avoid the perpetuation
of pernicious error.” State ew rel. La Prade v.
Cow, 48 Aviz, 174, 188, 80 P.2d 825 (1984),
“Stare decisis is ‘at its weakest when we
interpret the Constitution because our inter-
pretation can be altered only by constitution-
al amendment or by overruling our prior
decisions.” Mitchell v. United States, 526
US, 814, 348, 119 S.Ct. 1807, 148 L.Hd2d
424 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S, 208, 285, 117
§.Ct, 1997, 188 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)); see also
Galloway, 205 Ariz. at 256 116, 69 P.8d at 27
(stare decisis “is strongest when prior deci-
sions construe a statute”), “The Court has
therefore adhered to the rule that stare deci-
sis is not rigidly applied in cases involving
constitutional issues, and has not hesitated to
overrule decisions, or even whole lines of
cases, where experience, scholarship, and re-
flection demonstrated that their fundamental
premises were not to be found in the Consti-
tution.” Thornburgh v, Am. Coll. of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 787, 106
S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted), over-
ruled on other grounds by Planned Parent-
hood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 888, 112
S.Ct, 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992); see also
id. at 787-88, 106 S.Ct. 2169,

180 Given that Strode departed so sharply
from constitutional text and has spawned
constant litigation to ascertain its contours, I
would overturn it along with other decisions
holding that charter enactments superseded
conflicting state laws. See, eg., City of Tuc-
son v, State, 229 Ariz. 172, 273 P.8d 624
(2012); City of Tucson v. State, 285 Ariz. 434,
833 P.3d 761 (App. 2014); McMann v. City of
Tucson, 202 Ariz, 468, 47 P.8d 672 (App.

3. Applying the constitutional rule would preserve
judicial analysis of whether the state’s statute
occupies the field of regulation and conflicts with
the charter city provision. If it does not, the city's
provision should stand. See, e.g,, Babe’s Cabaret

607

2002). Instead, I would adhere to the Consti-
tution’s rule that city charters do not super-
sede conflicting state laws.*

181 The City protests that such a con-
struction would render charters meaningless.
Not at all. As the Court observed in AASAB,
“Cities and towns, regardless of how orga-
nized, have only such powers as ate express-
ly or by implication conferred upon them.” 67
Ariz, at 884-85, 195 P.2d 562, “A municipality
has no inherent powers, but only such pow-
ers as are expressly conferred by statute or
are implied as necessary in aid of those
powers which are expressly conferred.” 1
McQuillan Mun. Corp. § 2:10 (6d ed.). By
contrast, “[a] presumption exists that the
exercise of power by a home rule municipal
corporation is valid if no restriction is found
in the constitution, the charter itself, or the
acts of the general assembly,” 2A McQuillan
Mun. Corp. § 10:16 (d ed.). In other words,
a non-charter municipality generally may do
only what the state expressly authorizes; a
charter city generally may do anything that
the state does not expressly forbid. That is a
significant difference in authority. At the
same time, it is unsurprising that a subdivi-
sion of the state would not have the power to
override the powers of the state itself.

182 The Court today performs a salutary
service by clarifying the law as much as the
Strode construct permits. The Court reaf-
firms, for instance, that the state retains all
police powers to the exclusion of charter
cities, Likewise, it usefully disavows the dis-
tinction between governmental and proprie-
tary functions, whose foundation is complete-
ly lacking in the relevant constitutional text.

183 The Court also observes that the sub-
ject matter at issue here is addressed by our
state’s constitutional protection of the right
to keep and bear arms in article 2, section 26
of the Arizona Constitution. In my view, that
necessarily elevates the subject matter to
statewide concern. Tucson contends that its
regulation does not limit the constitutional
right to “bear arms.” Ariz. Const. art. 2,

v. City of Scottsdale, 197 Ariz. 98, 103-04 9 18-
19, 3 P.3d 1018, 1023-24 (App. 1999); City of
Tucson v. Rineer, 193 Ariz. 160, 163 117-9, 164
11, 971 P.2d 207, 210 (App. 1998).

608

§ 26. The inquiry under current precedents
is not whether the charter enactment impli~
cates a constitutional right, but whether it
implicates a matter of statewide concern, The
state may reasonably determine that de-
stroying firearms limits the quantity of fire-
arms in the market, so that its statute ad-
dresses a matter of statewide concern not
only pursuant to the state’s police powers but
its power to enforce the right to bear arms,
Cf City of Scottsdale v. State, 287 Ariz, 467,
472 11 20-21, 852 P.3d 936, 941 (App, 2015)
(state is authorized to protect free speech
rights, which prevails over conflicting charter
enactment).

184 Although the Court draws the correct
lines here, the Constitution makes that exer-
cise unnecessary and improper. I look for-
ward to the day when we no longer have to
draw lines between such conflicting enact-
ments, because we finally accept that our
Constitution has drawn that line for us,

JUSTICE GOULD, joined by JUSTICE
BOLICK and JUSTICE LOPEZ, concurring
in part and in the result,

185 I concur in Parts I, II, IV, and V of
the majority opinion.‘ I also agree with Part
III to the extent the majority concludes we
do not have to impose a bond pursuant to
ARS, § 41-194.01(B)@). However, I dis-
agree with the majority's reasoning that im-
posing the bond “would displace this Court
from its constitutionally assigned role under
article 6.” Supra, 133, Rather, I conclude the
bond provision is unenforceable because it is
incomplete and unintelligible.

186 I also disagree with the majority's
suggestion that we should defer ruling on the
bond provision until there is a case “where
that issue is specifically raised.” Supra, 185,
The parties have had a full opportunity to
address the enforceability of the bond provi-
sion; indeed, both parties have discussed the
issue in their briefs. It is squarely before this
Court and we must address it,

187 The bond provision contains two clear
directives, First, section (B)(2) requires this
Court to impose a bond when a special action

4. My concurring colleague, Justice Bolick, does
not join Part TIT of the Court’s opinion. See

is filed by the Attorney General. The statute
states that the “court shall require the coun-
ty, eity or town to post a bond equal to the
amount of state shared revenue [ (“SSR”) ]
paid to the county, city or town pursuant to
section 42-5029 and’ 48-206 in the preceding
six months.” (emphasis added.) By using the
word “shall,” the legislature clearly intended
the bond provision to be mandatory. See Ins.
Co, of N. Am. v. Superior Court, 166 Ariz, 82,
85, 800 P.2d 585 (1990) (“The use of the word
‘shall’ indicates a mandatory intent by the
legislature.”).

1.88 Second, compliance with the bond pro-
vision is not a prerequisite for judicial re-
view. Section (B)(2) requires this Court to
determine whether a local ordinance violates
state law, The statute does not state, nor
does it imply, that our ruling is contingent on
a party posting the bond,

189 Despite these directives, the bond pro-
vision fails to provide any direction as to
how—or why—this Court should impose the
bond. Of greatest concern is the fact that
section (B)(2) does not prescribe what oceurs
if a party fails to post the bond, For example,
the statute does not authorize this Court to
enter a default in favor of the Attorney Gen-
eral, or to strike the City’s response, In
short, the text of the statute does not state,
either expressly or impliedly, that failing to
post a bond deprives the City of its right to
defend the Ordinance before this Court.

90 The bond provision is incomplete in a
number of other areas. Unlike most bond
statutes, section (B)(2) contains no provision
for reducing the amount of the bond on the
basis of economic hardship. Cf. A.R.S, § 12-
2108(C) (allowing for reduction of a superse-
deas bond upon a showing that the appellant
will suffer substantial economic harm), Addi-
tionally, section (B)(2) does not identify the
conditions for forfeiting or exonerating the
bond. Contra, eg., AR.S, § 12-1587 (stating
that a replevin bond posted by a defendant is
exonerated if the attachment is vacated or a
judgment is entered for the defendant);
A.R.S, § 14-5419(1) (a conservator’s bond is

$9.66-84, supra.

exonerated upon filing of a closing state-
ment); A.R.S, § 18-3974 (stating the condi-
tions for exonerating an appearance bond);
ARS. § 18-8858 (providing for forfeiture of
an appearance bond if a defendant fails to
appear in court).

191 Section (B)(2) also does not state the
bond’s purpose. If its purpose is to ensure
that a city or county complies with state law
during the pendency of the Attorney Gener-
al’s special action, then this is a valid reason
for imposing the bond. See Porter v. Com-
mercial Standard Ins. Co, 112 Ariz, 491,
492-98, 543 P.2d 1120, 1121-22 (1975) (stat-
ing a supersedeas bond is intended to main-
tain “the status quo [of the parties] until the
appellate process is completed”). But if this
is the purpose of the statute, we are left with
a puzzling result: under section (B)(1), when
the Attorney General determines a local ordi-
nance does violate state law, no bond is re-
quired during the thirty-day cure period.
However, under section (B)(2), when no final
determination has been made regarding a
potential violation, a party is required to post
a substantial bond while the Attorney Gener-
al’s special action is pending,

192 It is difficult to understand why sec-
tion (B)(2) requires a bond, and section (B)(1)
does not, In practice, section (B)(2) creates a
greater financial burden when the Attorney
General concludes an ordinance “may vio-
late” state law than when the Attorney Gen-
eral concludes an ordinance “does violate”
state law. Under section (B)(1), a city or
county suffers no economic penalty until
there has been a “final” determination that
its ordinance violates state law and it has
been given thirty days to cure the violation.
In contrast, under (B)(2), when the Attorney
General determines there may be a violation
of state law, the city or county is automatical-
ly required to post a bond equal to six
months of its SSR.

193 The parties recognize that the bond
provision, as written, is likely unenforceable.
The City contends that imposing a bond con-
sisting of six months’ SSR creates an insur-
mountable financial burden, The City argues
that imposing such a large bond would effec-
tively prevent it from defending its Ordi-
nance before this Court. Ariz. Const. art 2,

609

§ 18. In contrast, the State asserts that giv-
en the City’s agreement to suspend enforce-
ment of its Ordinance pending this litigation,
the purpose of the bond is satisfied, and
therefore imposing the bond is unnecessary.
In the alternative, the State argues that even
if the bond is unconstitutional, it is severable
from section (B)(2).

94 In considering these arguments, the
majority expresses concern that section
(B)(2) places an undue financial burden on
the City, Based on this concern, the majority
generally agrees with the City that the bond
provision may be unconstitutional. Specifical-
ly, the majority contends that imposing such
a large bond “would likely dissuade” the City
from defending its Ordinance, which in turn
would “displace this Court from its constitu-
tionally assigned role under article 6 of inter-
preting Arizona’s constitution and laws.” Su-
pra, 133; Ariz, Const. art 6, § 1.

95 If the majority is indeed concerned
that the bond provision may be unconstitu-
tional on this basis, I disagree. Generally, we
afford statutes a presumption of constitution-
ality. Cf Gallardo v. State, 286 Ariz. 84, 87
19, 386 P.8d 717, 720 (2014) (discussing pre-
sumption of constitutionality generally af-
forded legislative enactments). Additionally,
the record is undeveloped as to the actual
bond amount the City will have to post.
There has been no evidentiary hearing in this
case. We have no testimony from witnesses,
no exhibits or any other evidence showing
the actual financial impact on the City. All we
have are allegations by the City that it lacks
the financial means to post the bond. And
these allegations appear to be based on the
assumption that section (B)(2) requires the
City to post the full amount of the bond as a
cash bond. However, section (B)(2), by its
terms, does not prohibit the City from post-
ing a security bond to satisfy the bond re-
quirement, We have no evidence before us as
to whether the City could post such a securi-
ty bond,

996 The majority also concludes that
based on the City’s agreement to suspend
enforcement of its Ordinance, imposing the
bond is unnecessary in this case. I recognize
this is a practical approach to dealing with
the deficiencies of the statute. However, sec-

610

tion (B)(2) does not, by its terms, authorize
waiving the bond requirement based on such
an agreement, In the face of such a mandato-
ry provision, we must either impose it, or
explain why it is unenforceable.

197 At bottom, the problem with the bond
provision is not ambiguous language or unde-
fined terms, Rather, it is, in several material
respects, so incomplete as to be unintelligi-
ble. The result is a partial, unfinished legisla-
tive directive that is impossible for this Court
to enforce. Cf. Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 9,
588 P.2d 299, 802 (1978) (stating “it is the
duty of a court in construing a statute to
strive to uphold it whenever possible.”).

198 Under these circumstances, I would
declare the bond provision unintelligible and
unenforceable, and provide the Legislature
with an opportunity to fix it, The unintelligi-
bility doctrine is a well-established doctrine
that has been applied in several states, See
Board of Trustees of Judicial Form Retire-
ment System v. Attorney General of Com.,
182 S.W.3d 770, 779-81 (Ky. 2008); Yeik v.
Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d
965, 968-69 (Wyo. 1979); State ex rel. Miller
v. Brown, 167 Ohio St, 452, 150 N.E.2d 46, 48
(1958); Davidson Bldg. Co. v. Mulock, 212
Towa 780, 235 N.W. 45, 54-56 (1981); Mid-
west Hotel Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 89 Wyo. 461, 278 P, 696, 697-99 (1929);
State ex rel. Hughes v. Reusswig, 110 Minn.
478, 126 N.W. 279, 280 (1910); Ward v. Ward,
37 Tex. 389, 392 (1872); see also Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Tents 184-188
(2012) (discussing the “Unintelligibility Can-
on” of statutory construction, which holds
that an unintelligible, incomplete statute is
unenforceable).

199 A careful reading of Ethridge v. State
Bad, of Nursing, 165 Ariz. 97, 104, 796 P.2d
899, 906 (App. 1989) and State Compensation
Fund v. De La Fuente, 18 Ariz. App. 246,
251-52, 501 P.2d 422 (1972) also supports the
existence of the unintelligibility doctrine in
Arizona. In Ethridge, the court stated that
“[ajn indefinite and incomplete statute may
be held invalid on three bases: (1) the lan-
guage used may not have sufficient legal
significance to be capable of intelligent exe-
cution; (2) the statute may unduly delegate

legislative powers in violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine under article 3 of the
United States Constitution, and (8) as ap-
plied, the statute may violate due process
under the Arizona Constitution.” (emphasis
added) Id., 165 Ariz. at 104, 796 P.2d at 906,
Importantly, the first category mentioned—
“the language used may not have sufficient
legal significance to be capable of intelligent.
execution”—is identified as a separate, dis-
tinct basis from the other two grounds. Simi-
larly, De La Fuente lists “three bases upon
which a statute without the requisite definite-
ness and completeness may be held invalid,”
including “the language used may not have
sufficient legal significance to be capable of
intelligent execution.” Id., 18 Ariz. App. at
261-52, 501 P.2d 422 (emphasis added).

1100 Generally, if a statute is ambiguous,
courts apply a void-for-vagueness analysis,
The unintelligibility doctrine, however, is dis-
tinct from this doctrine. See, supra 1108. The
void-for-vagueness doctrine is typically ap-
plied to ambiguous or indefinite statutes in-
volving criminal or punitive civil laws, or laws
involving First Amendment rights, that are
applied to members of the general public.
See, eg. State v. Holle, 240 Ariz. 300, 310
146, 879 P.38d 197, 207 (2016) (holding that
statutes defining crimes for sexual abuse and
child molestation provided sufficient notice to
the public of the proscribed conduct, and are
not void for vagueness); Western Waste Serv,
Sys. v. Superior Court, 120 Ariz. 90, 584 P.2d
554 (1978) (holding that Arizona Uniform
Antitrust Act provision imposing treble dam-
ages for a “flagrant” violation of the statute
‘was not void for vagueness), In contrast, the
unintelligibility doctrine is reserved for in-
complete, non-punitive civil statutes that are
oftentimes directed at judicial procedures,
Board of Trustees, 182 S.W.3d at 778; of. De
La Fuente, 18 Aviz. App, at 251-52, 501 P.2d
422 (statute concerning authority of Industri-
al Commission to determine death benefits
lacked any standards or regulations to gov-
ern Commission’s decision; as a result, the
statute was declared unenforceable on multi-
ple grounds, including unintelligibility).

7101 For example, in Yeik a statute pro-
vided that before a person could appeal a
driver’s license suspension to the district

court, he was first required to file an appeal
with the “revenue and tax commission.” The
statute, however, provided no regulations or
directions as to how to pursue an appeal to
the commission. In holding the statute was
unenforceable as incomplete and unintelligi-
ble, the court stated:

Those wishing to seek review from the tax

commission are given no guidance by the

rules and regulations as to: 1, Within what

time frame must the appeal be effected? 2.

What notice of appeal is required? 8. Is the

decision of the hearing examiner stayed

during the pendency of the review process
or must the party seeking review specifi-
eally ask for such a stay? 4. Must the party
seeking review write a brief? 5, Does the
party seeking review have a right or obli-
gation to present oral argument to the tax
commission? There are a host of other
unanswered procedural questions that the
state tax commission must answer in the
form of Reasonable rules and regulations
before s 81-7-105(c) can have any real
meaning.
Yeik, 595 P.2d at 968, See also Ward, 87 Tex,
at 391-92 (statute was unenforceable because
the procedures for filing an appeal from an
interlocutory order were incomplete and un-
intelligible); Midwest Hotel, 273 P. at 697
(procedures for filing an appeal from the
board of equalization were incomplete, and
therefore unenforceable); Davidson, 285
N.W. at 54-56 (statute was unenforceable
because procedures for appealing from a tax
board of review decision were so indefinite
and incomplete as to be unintelligible),

7102 The unintelligibility doctrine is per-
haps the quintessential example of how a
court, acting with restraint, observes its con-
stitutional role under the separation of pow-
ers, See Board of Trustees, 182 S.W.3d at 781
(tating “the unintelligibility rule has its
foundation in the constitutional requirement
of separation of powers”); see also U.S.
Const. art. I-ITI; Ariz, Const. art, 8, When
faced with an incomplete, unintelligible stat-
ute, a court may either attempt to re-write
the statute, or declare it unenforceable. Id.
The first option is a clear violation of the
separation of powers. Courts lack the consti-
tutional authority to legislate, and this limita-

611

tion is perhaps most acute when a court
attempts to enforce a statute that, by virtue
of its incompleteness, is really no law at all.
See Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of
Wis., 226 Ariz. 345, 349 117, 248 P.8d 198,
197 (2011) (stating “[ilf the legislature de-
sires to add [] a requirement [to ARS.
§ 20-259.01], it may do so ... but it is not
our place to rewrite the statute”). In con-
trast, when a court declares an incomplete,
unfinished statute unenforceable on the
grounds of unintelligibility, it refrains from
stepping outside its judicial authority, and
provides the legislature with an opportunity
to address the infirmities in the statute.

1103 Thus, I conclude that because the
bond provision is incomplete and unintelligi-
ble, it is unenforceable.

399 P.3d 686
Mary C. BORUCH, an individual;
et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,
ve

STATE of Arizona EX REL, John HALI-
KOWSKI, Director of the Arizona De-
partment of Transportation; City of
Mesa, an Arizona municipal corpora-
tion, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0534

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 6/20/2017

|

ps
Moyes Sellers & Hendricks, Phoenix, By

Keith L, Hendricks, Louis D. Lopez, Stephen
Brower, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Ron J, Aschenbach, Joe Acosta, Jr.,
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellee State of
Avizona

Fennemore Craig PC, Phoenix, By Doug-
las C, Northup, Co-Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee State of Arizona

Mesa City Attorney's Office, Mesa, By
Mare T, Steadman, Co-Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellee City of Mesa

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix,
By Robert R. Berk, Lori L. Voepel, Jennifer
B. Anderson, Co-Counsel for Defendant/Ap-
pellee City of Mesa

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Paul J.
McMurdie joined.

OPINION

NORRIS, Judge:

11 This appeal arises out of the superior
court’s dismissal of a complaint filed by
homeowners and renters in three Mesa sub-
divisions to enjoin the City of Mesa and the
State, through the Arizona Department of
Transportation (“ADOT”), from diverting
and channeling excess storm water onto their
properties, The dispositive issue on appeal is
whether Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
section 12-1802 (2016) precludes the superior
court from granting the requested injunctive

614

relief. Because A.R.S. § 12-1802 does not
bar the injunctive relief requested in the
complaint, we reverse the superior court’s
dismissal of the complaint and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
jon.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND *

{2 The City operates a sewer drainage
system for managing storm water, which is
connected to numerous retention basins, in-
cluding a City-owned park, Emerald Park.
The State, through the ADOT, controls a
channel which it uses to collect storm water
from a portion of the U.S. Route 60 highway
(‘U.S. 60”), Combined, the City and State
(collectively, “Defendants”) use the drainage
system and channel (collectively, the “Sys-
tem”), in part, to divert, channel, and retain
storm water from the U.S. 60 and other
areas of the City into retention basins, in-
eluding Emerald Park.

13 Emerald Park is a terminal retention
basin for most of the storm water collected
from the U.S. 60 and from approximately 20
square miles of the City (the “Tributary
Area”), because it does not have an effective
emergency overflow system which would al-
low storm water to be pushed further down-
stream in the event Emerald Park overflows.
Thus, Emerald Park operates as the end-
point retention basin for most of the storm
water Defendants receive from the U.S. 60
and Tributary Area.

14 During the morning of September 8,
2014, heavy rains fell in the City. Rain con-
tinued until about ten a.m, Although Emer-
ald Park collected some water from the
storm, by the time the rain stopped Emerald.
Park was not at full capacity. Several hours
after the rain had stopped, the rainwater that
had fallen and collected in and around three
subdivisions in the City—where the Plaintiffs
owned or rented homes—had begun to re-
cede.

"5 After that, however, Defendants col-
lected, concentrated, and pumped excess
storm water from the U.S. 60 and the Tribu-

1, On review, we accept the complaint’s well-pled
factual allegations and indulge all reasonable in-

tary Area into Emerald Park. Because Em-
erald Park did not have an effective form of
emergency overflow relief, the storm water
flooded onto Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods,
homes, and properties. Even after the storm
water inundated the Plaintiffs’ neighbor-
hoods, homes, and properties, Defendants
continued to concentrate and divert storm
water into Emerald Park. Indeed, the State
rejected the City’s request to pump water
from Emerald Park back into the channel.
The flooding significantly damaged the Plain-
tiffs’ homes and properties.

16 Plaintiffs sued Defendants alleging, in
part, that Defendants had negligently oper-
ated the System and used their properties
as “ad hoc” overflow relief for Emerald
Park without just compensation in violation
of the Arizona Constitution, Plaintiffs asked
the superior court to enjoin Defendants
from operating the System in a manner that
concentrated and diverted storm water into
Emerald Park without effective overflow re-
lief. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested the su-
perior court enjoin Defendants from:

(a) using the real and personal property of
[Plaintiffs] as an ad hoc overflow relief for
Emerald Park without due process or just
compensation; (b) concentrating and di-
verting water into Emerald Park beyond
its capacity unless and until an effective
Overflow Relief is provided; (¢) operating
the [System] in such a manner as to make
Emerald Park the retention basin of last
resort in the Tributary Area; and (d) col-
lecting storm water from the U.S. 60 or
Tributary Area and pumping or otherwise
sending it to Emerald Park—whether
through the Storm Sewer Pipes or Chan-
nels—so as to exceed its capacity and over-
flow into the neighborhoods and properties
of the [Plaintiffs].

17 The State moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint arguing, in part, ARS. § 12-
1802(4) and (6) prohibited the superior court
from granting the requested injunctive relief.
Section 12-1802(4) states that an injunction
shall not be granted “[t]o prevent enforce-
ment of a public statute by officers of the law
for the public benefit,” and, ARS. § 12-

ferences, Cullen v, Auto-Owners, Ins., Co., 218
Ariz. 417, 419, 17, 189 P.3d 344, 346 (2008).

1802(6) states an injunction shall not be
granted “[t]o prevent the exercise of a public
or private office in a lawful manner by the
person in possession.” Treating both subsec-
tions as if they were identical, the State
generally argued A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) and (6)
barred injunctive relief to prevent a state
agency from performing its statutory duties.
Thus, it argued the superior court could not
grant the requested injunctive relief because
Plaintiffs were asking the court to “issue an
order telling Defendants how to design and
reconstruct the channel and retention basin
for U.S. 60”—functions not within the “prov-
ince” of the court.

18 The superior court granted the State’s
motion to dismiss, focusing exclusively on
ARS. § 12-1802(6). The court found A.R.S,
§ 12-1802(6) barred the requested injunctive
relief because Plaintiffs’ complaint had not
alleged the State had acted unlawfully. After
the City joined in the State’s motion to dis-
miss, the superior court entered a judgment
in favor of Defendants dismissing Plaintiffs’
complaint with prejudice,

DISCUSSION

19 Plaintiffs argue the superior court
should not have dismissed their complaint
pursuant to A.R.S, § 12-1802. Exercising de
novo review because this issue requires us to
construe A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) and ARS.
§ 12-1802(6), we hold the superior court
should not have dismissed the complaint un-
der either subsection. See City of Casa
Grande v. Ariz. Water Co., 199 Ariz. 547, 550,
16, 20 P.8d 590, 593 (App. 2001) (appellate
court reviews de novo interpretation of a
statute) (citation omitted); see also Coleman
v. City of Mesa, 280 Ariz, 852, 855, 17, 284
P.8d 868, 866 (2012) (dismissal of complaint
reviewed de novo) (citations omitted). As ex-
plained below, A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) did not
prohibit the requested injunctive relief, see
supra 16, because Plaintiffs were not seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of a public statute
within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-1802(4),
and A.R.S. § 12-1802(6) did not prohibit the
requested injunctive relief because that sec-
tion does not apply when public officers ex-

2. Although Arizona courts have used the term
“jurisdiction” when addressing a court's ability

615

ceed their authority or exercise discretionary
authority in an unreasonable and arbitrary
manner,

I. Section 12-1802(4)

HM 110 Although the superior court
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under
A.R.S. § 12-1802(6), Defendants also argued
ARS. § 12-1802(4) barred the injunctive re-
lief requested by Plaintiffs. Because Defen-
dants have repeated this argument on ap-
peal, we address it first, Although Arizona
courts have generally applied A.R.S. § 12-
1802(4) and (6) together, insofar as A.R.S,
§ 12-1802(4) has separate elements from
ARS. § 12-1802(6), the former statute only
bars injunctive relief when a party seeks to
enjoin conduct authorized by a valid public
statute.

{11 Hislop v. Rodgers, 54 Ariz. 101, 92
P.2d 527 (1989), is illustrative. There, a city
ordinance authorized the abatement of public
nuisances. Id. at 111, 92 P.2d at 582. Pursu-
ant to the ordinance, city police padlocked
two businesses, and left police guards at the
businesses to stop the businesses’ alleged
improper conduct. Id, at 105, 92 P.2d at 529,
The business owners sought a temporary
restraining order and permanent injunction
from the superior court to forbid the police
from interfering with their businesses, Id.
After the superior court granted the tempo-
rary restraining order, city officers peti-
tioned the Arizona Supreme Court for a writ
of prohibition to prevent the superior court
from granting the business owners’ injunc-
tive relief and from taking any further action.
Citing the predecessor to ARS, § 12-
1802(4), the officers argued the superior
court did not have “jurisdiction” to enjoin
their enforcement of the ordinance, Id. at
105-06, 92 P.2d at 529-30. The supreme
court agreed,

HM 1 12 The supreme court stated that,
under the predecessor statute to A.R.S.
§ 12-1802(4), when public officers attempt to
enforce a valid public statute, a court is
“without jurisdiction to issue a temporary
restraining order or writ of injunction,” ? Id.

to issue an injunction in light of the prohibitions
of ARS. § 12-1802, “subject matter jurisdiction

616

at 118, 92 P.2d at 588. The court then held
the business owners had sought an injunction
directed at enforcement of a valid public
statute (the city ordinance) as the injunction
sought to prevent the officers from enforcing
the ordinance. Jd. at 120, 92 P.2d at 585-36,
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded
the superior court did not have jurisdiction to
issue the temporary restraining order or en-
join the officers’ enforcement of the ordi-
nance, Id, at 121, 92 P.2d at 536,

118 Similarly, in Council of City of Phoe-
niw v. Winn, 70 Ariz, 316, 220 P.2d 222
(1950), a city ordinance declared the opera-
tion of “mechanical grabbing machines” a
public nuisance and illegal, After the chief of
police notified a business owner the city in-
tended to seize his grabbing machines pursu-
ant to the ordinance, the business owner
obtained an injunction from the superior
court enjoining the city and its officers from
doing so. Id. at 817-18, 220 P.2d at 222-23,
The city appealed, challenging the “jurisdic-
tion” of the superior court to grant injunctive
relief against enforcement of a public statute.
Id, at 818, 220 P.2d at 228,

914 Noting that the business owner had
not attacked the validity of the ordinance,
but had only asserted the grabbing machines
were not gambling devices, the Arizona Su-
preme Court concluded the city and its offi-
cers were attempting to enforce a public
statute for the public benefit, and, therefore,
the superior court had improperly issued the
injunction. Id.

115 Examining Arizona case law address-
ing a court’s power to grant injunctive relief
to prevent the enforcement of a public stat-
ute, the court explained the superior court
“was without jurisdiction” to enjoin the city
and its officers from seizing the grabbing
machines, reasoning that, when the “ ‘validity
of the law whose execution it is sought to
enjoin is not attacked or when, even though

refers to a court's statutory or constitutional
power to hear and determine a particular type of
case.” State v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, 311,
114, 223 P.3d 653, 655 (2010) (quotation and
citations omitted). As Hislop demonstrates, a
court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider
whether A.R.S. § 12-1802 bars injunctive relief,
even though it may conclude that A.R.S, § 12-
1802 precludes it from granting injunctive relief.

attacked, its validity is beyond question and
the power of an officer to enforce it, if valid,
is plain, the court has no jurisdiction to issue
an injunction restraining its enforcement,’ ”
Id. (quoting Corbin v. Rodgers, 58 Ariz, 35,
41, 85 P.2d 59, 62 (1988). Thus, under A.R.S.
§ 12-1802(4), a court cannot enjoin public
officers from engaging in conduct authorized
by a valid public statute. Winn, 70 Ariz. at
818, 220 P.2d at 228; see also Corbin, 58 Ariz,
at 41, 85 P.2d at 62 (court lacked “jurisdic
tion” to enjoin county officers from enforeing
valid penal statute).

916 Arizona appellate courts, however,
have also concluded that A.R.S, § 12-1802(4)
does not prevent a court from granting in-
junctive relief when a public officer enforces
a public statute in a manner that exceeds the
officer's power—in that case, the party is not
actually seeking to enjoin enforcement of a
public statute. For example, in McCluskey v.
Sparks, 80 Ariz. 15, 291 P.2d 791 (1955),
taxpayers sought an injunction to prevent a
county assessor and a county board of equali-
zation from “extending [their] property ...
on the tax role.” Id, at 17, 291 P.2d at 792,
The superior court dismissed their complaint,
Zd, On appeal, the assessor and board ar-
gued, in part, that the supreme court should
affirm the dismissal because the taxpayers
were attempting to enjoin enforcement of
public statutes that authorized the assessor
to assess the values of their properties and
the board to equalize the assessed values. Id,
at 20, 291 P.2d at 794,

{17 On review, the Arizona Supreme
Court explained the taxpayers had alleged
the assessor had systematically and inten-
tionally overvalued the taxpayers’ properties
as compared to other similar properties and
the board had failed to equalize the as-
sessed values, even though it knew the as-
sessor had disproportionately assessed the
taxpayers’ properties. Jd. The court conclud-

We use the term “jurisdiction” as discussed in
our case law with this limitation in mind, See
Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 223, 921
P,2d 21, 23 (1996) (noting history of imprecise
use of term “jurisdiction,” such as “authority to
do a particular thing” or “power of the court to
entertain an action of a particular subject mat-
ter”).

ed the taxpayers were not attempting to
enjoin enforcement of publie statutes—that
is, “to enjoin the assessor from assessing
their property or the board of equalization
from equalizing the same in accordance with
the [applicable] statutes”’—but, rather were
seeking an order requiring them to comply
with applicable Arizona tax statutes and
state and federal constitutional provisions.
Id. at 20-21, 291 P.2d at 794. The court
stated the taxpayers’ complaint contained
sufficient factual allegations that, if true,
stated a cause of action for injunctive relief.
Id, at 21, 291 P.2d at 794,

HMB 118 As McCluskey demonstrates,
A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) does not bar a court
from granting injunctive relief against a pub-
lie officer who has authority to act pursuant
to a valid public statute, if the requesting
party is seeking to enjoin conduct that goes
beyond the officer’s statutory power. See
Crane Co. v. Ariz. State Taw Comm’n, 63
Ariz, 426, 445, 168 P.2d 656, 664 (1945) (court
empowered to grant injunction despite statu-
tory predecessor to A.R.S. § 12~1802(4) even
though there was no question as to validity of
statute or right of public officers to enforce
it; anti-injunction statute inapplicable when
public officers exceed their authority or act
beyond their power), overruled in part on
other grounds by Valencia Energy Co. v.
Ariz, Dep't of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 959
P.2d 1256 (1998); Berry v. Foster, 180 Ariz.
288, 285, 883 P.2d 470, 472 (App. 1994) (supe-
rior court empowered to enjoin a school
board from investigating and censuring a
member of the board when neither the state
constitution nor applicable statutory scheme
expressly or impliedly authorized the board
to investigate or censure a board member),

{19 Here, Plaintiffs were not seeking to
enjoin the enforcement of any public statute.
Although Defendants cite various statutes
authorizing them to construct drainage chan-
nels, manage retention basins, and other
drainage components relating to storm water
management, Plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin
any of the activities authorized by these stat-
utes, See A.R.S, § 28-882(A), -(B)(8) (Supp.
2016) (ADOT granted exclusive control and
jurisdiction over state highways; authorized
to design and construct “transportation facili-

617

ties” and maintain and operate state high-
ways); A.R.S. § 9-276(A)(8), (8) (2008) (cities
authorized to build and repair sewers, tun-
nels, and drains); A.R.S. § 9-463.05(A), -
(T)(7)(e) (Supp. 2016) (authorizing municipali-
ties to assess fees to a development for nec-
essary public services including storm water,
drainage, and flood control facilities); A\R.S.
§ 48-572(A)(4)-(5) (Supp. 2016) (authorizing
governing body of municipality to order re-
construction or acquisition of drains, sewers,
and channels for drainage purposes or for
earrying storm water when public interest or
convenience requires). Rather, Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin Defendants from allegedly
exceeding their power by negligently manag-
ing the System, knowingly breaching Emer-
ald Park’s retention capacity, and using their
properties as “ad hoe” overflow relief for
Emerald Park without just compensation.
See supra 114-6. Accordingly, A.R.S. § 12-
1802(4) did not bar Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief as a matter of law,

IL Section 12-1802(6)

HM 120 Unlike ARS. § 12-1802(4),
which focuses on the court’s power to enjoin
a public statute, A.R.S. § 12-1802(6) focuses
on a public officer’s exercise of the powers of
the office, As relevant here, ARS. § 12-
1802(6) bars injunctive relief when it is
sought to prevent an officer from exercising
the duties of a public office “in a lawful
manner.” Accordingly, both Plaintiffs and
Defendants agree this section does not bar
injunctive relief when a public officer is act-
ing unlawfully, but they part company re-
garding what constitutes an unlawful exer-
cise of a public office.

HM 121 Plaintiffs argue ARS. § 12-
1802(6) is inapplicable when public officers
either exceed their authority or arbitrarily or
unreasonably exercise their authorized dis-
eretion, In contrast, Defendants argue A.R.S.
§ 12-1802(6) prohibits a court from enjoining
diseretionary actions that fall within a public
officer’s legal authority. Thus, according to
Defendants, because Plaintiffs never alleged
they were acting outside of their “executive
functions in designing, operating, and main-
taining the [System],” A.R.S, § 12-1802(6)
barred the requested injunctive relief. We

618

agree with Plaintiffs and conclude public offi-
cers act “unlawfully” when they exceed their
authority or exercise discretionary authority
in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.

22 As noted above, Arizona courts have
generally applied A.R.S. § 12-1802(6) and (4)
together, see supra 110, and have concluded
unlawful conduct occurs when a public officer
exceeds his or her authority by acting with-
out authority, Thus, for example, in Board of
Regents of Universities & State College v.
City of Tempe, 88 Ariz, 299, 856 P.2d 399
(1960), the Arizona Board of Regents sought
to enjoin the City of Tempe from demanding
that the Board comply with Tempe’s building
codes and regulations in constructing and
remodeling buildings on the Tempe campus
of Arizona State University. The superior
court found that, as a matter of law, Tempe
had the power to regulate the construction
and maintenance of the University’s build-
ings, and denied injunctive relief. Jd. at 301,
856 P.2d at 400. The Board appealed,

123 On appeal, our supreme court rejected
Tempe’s argument that pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 12-1802(4), the superior court did not have
“Surisdiction” to issue an injunction, Jd, at
302, 856 P.2d at 400. Although the court
focused on A.R.S. § 12-1802(4), it recognized
that it had “on several occasions held an
injunction to be a proper remedy where it is
alleged that the statute is invalid or being
applied in an unauthorized manner,” Id. (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, because the court ruled
the Board, and thus the University, was not
subject to Tempe’s codes and regulations, it
reversed the superior court’s judgment and
directed it to grant the injunctive relief re-
quested by the Board. Id. at 312, 356 P.2d at
407-08,

24 The Arizona Supreme Court has also
recognized that “unlawful” includes circum-
stances when a public officer acts unreason-
ably or arbitrarily. In Williams v. Superior
Court In and For County of Pima, 108 Ariz.

3. At oral argument and in their briefing on ap-
peal, Defendants argued that because A.R.S.
§ 12-1802 only permits injunctive relief when a
public officer's acts exceed his authority, the
Plaintiffs’ only available remedy was an action
for money damages. Defendants’ argument is
virtually identical to the dissent in Williams. See
Williams, 108 Ariz. at 161, 494 P.2d at 33 (Holo-

154, 494 P.2d 26 (1972), a school district
alleged that flights by the Arizona Air Na-
tional Guard during school hours were mak-
ing a “great deal of noise” and disturbing the
children at the district’s school. Jd. at 155,
494 P.2d at 27, Accordingly, the district
sought to enjoin the Governor, in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the National
Guard, “from permitting the National Guard
from taking off or landing within the airspace
immediately above or in close proximity” to
the school absent an emergency situation. Id.
The superior court refused to dismiss the
district’s complaint. Id,

925 The supreme court concluded that
neither A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) nor A.R.S, § 12-
1802(6) barred the district’s request for in-
junctive relief. Id. at 158, 494 P.2d at 26. Of
significance to Defendants’ argument here,
the court noted the district had not alleged
the Governor had violated any applicable
rules or regulations. Jd. at 155, 494 P.2d at
27. Nonetheless, the court concluded that
whether the Governor had acted in a lawful
manner presented a question of fact that
could only be determined after a trial. Jd. at
158, 494 P.2d at 26,

126 Of further significance to the argu-
ment made by Defendants, the district in
Williams had not challenged the Governor’s
authority to authorize the flights; thus, the
district had not alleged the Governor was
acting without authority. Therefore,
Williams implicitly recognized that a public
officer can act “unlawfully’—by acting un-
reasonably or arbitrarily—in exercising his
or her authority and that such conduct ren-
ders A.RS, § 12-1802(6) inapplicable,*

127 Wales v. Tax Commission, 100 Ariz.
181, 412 P.2d 472 (1966), explicitly recognized
that a court may enjoin acts by public offi-
cers who have authority to act, but arbitrari-
ly or unreasonably exercise their authority,
There, the State Tax Commission and the
Arizona Attorney General proposed to dis-

han, J., dissenting) (A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) and (6)
“enacted for the purpose of forbidding courts of
this state from restraining legitimate public inter-
ests even though at times these protected and
public interests may clash, The remedy in the
courts is for the so-called injured party to seek
recovery by way of damages.”).

close certain tax information to the Pima
County Attorney they had obtained from a
grand jury investigation. Id, at 182, 412 P.2d
at 473, The Attorney General argued that
because he had inspected the tax information
and concluded that certain individuals “may”
have committed tax violations, he had the
authority to direct the State Tax Commission
to disclose the tax information to the County
Attorney for the purpose of instituting an
action to enforce various Arizona tax stat-
utes, Jd. at 182-88, 412 P.2d at 478-74, In an
original proceeding before the Arizona Su-
preme Court, petitioners sought to enjoin the
Attorney General from making the disclo-
sure, arguing it would violate statutes regu-
lating secrecy of tax information, Jd. at 182,
412 P.2d at 478.

HI 128 Although the court declined to
issue the injunction and ordered the Attor-
ney General to reevaluate the appropriate-
ness of the disclosure of the information, the
court nevertheless held it could grant injune-
tive relief, Id. at 186, 412 P.2d at 476. In so
ruling, the court acknowledged the Attorney
General was entrusted with a certain amount
of discretionary power, and that generally a
court should not enjoin a public officer's ex-
ercise of discretionary power. Jd. But, the
court stated this principle did not apply when
a public officer exercises that power in an
arbitrary or unreasonable manner:

An injunction [] is an appropriate remedy

to determine whether rights have been or

will be affected by the arbitrary or unrea-
sonable action of an administrative officer
or agent. If there is an abuse of discretion-
ary power, the judiciary has the duty to
restrain the same,
Id, at 186, 412 P.2d at 476 (citation omitted),
Thus, a court can enjoin a public officer’s
arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of discre-
tion. Id.; see also Rivera v, City of Douglas,
182 Ariz. 117, 119, 122, 644 P.2d 271, 278, 276
(App. 1982) (injunction is an appropriate
remedy to determine whether rights have
been or will be affected by arbitrary or un-
reasonable action of an administrative officer;
but city manager did not act in that manner
when he asked employees to submit to poly-
graph after exhausting other investigative
tools).

619

129 In Zeigler v. Kirschner, 162 Aviz. 77,
781 P.2d 64 (App. 1989), this court recognized
that neither A.R.S. § 12-1802(4) nor A.R.S,
§ 12-1802(6) bars a court from granting in-
junctive relief against public officers who ar-
bitrarily or unreasonably exercise their dis-
cretion, There, petitioners sued the director
of the Arizona Health Care Cost Contain-
ment System (“AHCCCS”) in his official ca~
pacity and alleged AHCCCS administrators
had adopted arbitrary and unreasonable re-
quirements for verifying and documenting
eligibility for medical care, and were imple-
menting monitoring and auditing practices
over eligibility determinations in violation of
state statutes. Id. at 80-81, 84, 781 P.2d at
57-58, 61. This court held these allegations
were sufficient to render A.R.S. § 12~1802(4)
and (6) inapplicable and did not prohibit in-
junctive relief “against public officials who
exceed their statutory authority or arbitrari-
ly or unreasonably exercise their discretion.”
Id, at 84, 781 P.2d at 61.

Hl 130 To sum up: Arizona case law
demonstrates A.R.S. § 12-1802(6) does not
bar injunctive relief when public officers act.
“anlawfully” by either exceeding their au-
thority or exercising discretionary authority
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Thus, we reject
Defendants’ argument that A.R.S. § 12-
1802(6) prohibits a court from enjoining dis-
eretionary actions that fall within a public
officer's legal authority.

HM 131 Here, Plaintiffs accused De-
fendants of acting “unlawfully” by arbitrarily
and unreasonably operating the System. As
discussed, see supra 11 4-6, Plaintiffs alleged
Defendants used Plaintiffs’ properties as “ad
hoe” overflow relief for Emerald Park when
they channeled and diverted contaminated
storm water into Emerald Park even though
the storm water exceeded Emerald Park’s
capacity, while knowing Emerald Park did
not have effective emergency overflow relief.
Plaintiffs further alleged that unless en-
joined, Defendants “appear[ed] to intend to
continue to concentrate and divert water
into” Emerald Park, without providing for
appropriate emergency overflow relief. Plain-
tiffs thus alleged facts to support a claim
Defendants had and were intending to unlaw-

620

fully exercise their authority within the
meaning of A.R.S. § 12-1802(6).! Section 12~
1802(6) did not bar Plaintiffs’ request for
injunctive relief as a matter of law.

IIL Defendants’ Other Arguments

HMM 132 Defendants argue the superior
court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint
because the injunctive relief, if granted,
would have violated the doctrine of separa~
tion of powers. For example, Defendants ar-
gue the requested injunctive relief would re-
quire the superior court to micromanage
whether Defendants had complied with the
injunction and “would thrust the trial court
into the business of telling [Defendants] how
to manage storm water” irrespective of other
considerations, such as the impact on other
neighborhoods and Defendants’ traditional
executive functions.

183 This argument, however, ignores the
procedural posture of this case and conflates
access to the court with the remedy, This
appeal arises out of a motion to dismiss and
the sole issue at this juncture is whether
Plaintiffs are entitled to request injunctive
relief, See Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz,
279, 281, 111, 180 P.8d 978, 980 (2006) (ap-
pellate court will “uphold dismissal only if
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any facts susceptible of proof in the
statement of the claim”) (quotation and cita-
tion omitted), Whether the superior court
should grant injunctive relief is a separate
question, which must be addressed on a de~

4, Defendants argue the complaint failed to allege
conduct that could constitute a trespass because
it did not allege an intentional act. Specifically,
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ complaint did not
“allege that the [Defendants] intended to flood
Plaintiffs’ properties, nor did it allege any facts
demonstrating intent” because it had not alleged
the “purpose of the [Defendants’ conduct] was to
flood Plaintiffs’ properties.” Arizona law did not
require Plaintiffs to allege Defendants’ purpose
in diverting the storm water into Emerald Park
was to flood Plaintiffs’ properties, Under Arizona
law, an actor is liable for trespass if the actor
““ntentionally [] enters land in the possession of
the other, or causes a thing or third person to do
so.” Taft v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc., 169 Ariz,
173, 176, 818 P.2d 158, 161 (App. 1991) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965). An
intentional act occurs when an “actor desires to
cause consequences of his act, or [] believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to re-
sult from if.” Mein ex rel, Mein v. Cook, 219 Ariz,

veloped record in the first instance by the
superior court, not this court. See IB Prop,
Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del Mar Apart-
ments Lid. P’ship, 228 Ariz. 61, 64, 15, 263
P.8d 69, 72 (App. 2011) (“Granting or deny-
ing a preliminary injunction is within the
sound discretion of the trial court... .”) (quo-
tation and citation omitted),

134 Moreover, courts have long struggled
with how to structure injunctive relief when a
governmental entity has improperly or arbi-
twarily exercised statutory power—how to
address this issue also presents a question
the superior court should address first. Cf
Ayotte v, Planned Parenthood of N. New
England, 546 U.S, 820, 828-80, 126 S.Ct. 961,
967-69, 163 L.Ed. 2d 812 (2006) (vacating
injunction and remanding after district court
adopted “blunt remedy” of permanently en-
joining enforcement of parental notification
statute without determining whether it could
enjoin only unconstitutional applications of
statute; in formulating injunctive remedy,
courts should not nullify more of a legisla-
ture’s work than necessary, should exercise
restraint in rewriting state laws to conform
to constitutional requirements, and should
not use their remedial powers to circumvent
legislative intent); see also National Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. HPA, 966 F.2d 1292,
1800 (9th Cir. 1992) (injunctive relief may be
inappropriate if it requires constant court
supervision); Bresgal v. Brock, 848 F.2d 1168,
1171 (th Cir, 1987) (modifying district

96, 99, 116, 193 P.3d 790, 793 (App. 2008)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A
(1965)), For the reasons discussed, see supra
194-6, 31, Plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to
constitute a trespass under Arizona law: Plain-
tiffs alleged Defendants used the System to col-
lect and divert storm water into Emerald Park,
following what Defendants admitted was a “‘se-
vere” and “epic” storm even though Emerald
Park lacked effective overflow relief. Plaintiffs
further alleged the State had denied the City's
request to pump water from Emerald Park back
into the channel, These facts alleged the requisite
intent for a trespass. See Mein, 219 Ariz, at 100,
1117, 193 P.3d at 794 (‘Intent is not [] limited to
the consequences which are desired. If the actor
knows that the consequences are certain, or sub-
stantially certain, to result from his act, and still
goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had
in fact desired to produce the result.”) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A cmt, b
(1965),

court’s overbroad permanent injunction; al-
though a court may enjoin government enti-
ties from certain conduct, a court “will not
assume to control or guide the exercise of”
their authority) (quotation and citation omit-
ted),

HM 135 Finally, Defendants argue we
should affirm the superior court’s dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ complaint because Plaintiffs
have an adequate remedy at law for the
alleged taking of their property—just com-
pensation, See A Tumbling-T Ranches v.
Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty., 222
Ariz, 515, 525, 118, 217 P.8d 1220, 1280 (App.
2009) (Arizona law requires government to
pay just compensation when it takes or dam-
ages private property). Defendants did not
raise this argument in the superior court
and, accordingly, Plaintiffs did not have an
opportunity to address whether such a reme-
dy would be adequate. Thus, we agree with
Plaintiffs that Defendants failed to preserve
this argument for our review. Sierra Tucson,
Inc. v, Bergin, 239 Ariz, 507, 511, 112, 872
P.3d 1081, 1085 (App. 2016) (citation omit-
ted)

CONCLUSION

186 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the superior court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’
complaint and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

399 P.3d 696
BSI HOLDINGS, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,
ve

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-TX 16-0008
Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,

FILED 7/18/2017

5, Because we reverse the superior court's dis-
missal of Plaintiffs’ complaint we do not need to

fry
N
ad

address the other issues raised by the parties on
appeal.

o

2.2,

Ryan Rapp & Underwood, PLC, Phoenix,
By Christopher T, Rapp, Counsel for Plain-
tiff/Appellee

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoe-
nix, By Mark Ingle, Counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellant

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Judge Kenton D, Jones and Judge Donn
Kessler ! joined.

OPINION

DOWNIE, Judge:

{1 The Arizona Department of Transpor-
tation (“ADOT”) appeals the tax court’s en-
try of summary judgment in favor of BSI
Holdings, LLC (“BSI”). We hold that, in
calculating the annual license tax due for a
non-resident aircraft based in Arizona, the
word “day” in Arizona Revised Statutes

1, The Honorable Donn Kessler, Retired Judge of
the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, has

(“A.R.S.”) section 28-8336 means any calen-
dar day during which the aircraft was on the
ground in Arizona for any period of time.
Because the tax court applied a materially
different definition, we vacate its judgment.
and remand for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2 BSI is an Oregon limited liability com-
pany that was formed to purchase, operate,
and maintain a dual engine turbo-jet (the
“Jet”). During the period relevant to this
appeal, the Jet was based in Arizona and
regularly flew in and out of the Scottsdale
Airport, where BSI maintained a tie-down
arrangement/hangar agreement. For the pe-
riod of time at issue, the Jet was used exelu-
sively by Arizona resident (and BSI member)
Richard Burke for personal purposes, includ-
ing “family trips, transportation to family
events, drop-off and pick-up of family and
friends.”

18 In 2004, BSI and ADOT executed a
“Closing Agreement” that settled a dispute
between them regarding the aireraft license
tax due for 2008 and 2004, Under the terms
of the Closing Agreement, BSI paid no tax
for 2008. For 2004, it paid the non-resident
rate applicable to aircraft that are present in
Arizona for more than 90 days but fewer
than 210 days. BSI thereafter paid that same
rate for tax years 2005 through 2012.

14 ADOT conducted an audit and conelud-
ed the Jet had been based in Arizona for
more than 209 days each audited year and
that BSI should therefore have paid the resi-
dent tax rate. ADOT issued an assessment
for $161,004. ADOT also notified the Federal
Aviation Administration of the assessment,
and a lien was recorded against the Jet. See
ARS. § 28-8880(A) (“The license tax, regis-
tration fee and penalty constitute a lien on
the aircraft on which they are due from the
due date.”).

95 After an unsuccessful administrative
appeal, BSI filed a complaint in the tax court,
alleging ADOT improperly applied the tax
rates set forth in A.R.S, § 28-8336 and was

been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to
Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

estopped from imposing assessments for tax
years 2004 through 2012, BSI subsequently
moved for partial summary judgment, argu-
ing: (1) the Closing Agreement barred the
2004 assessment; (2) ADOT was equitably
estopped from imposing assessments for tax
years 2004 and 2005; and (8) the lien against
the Jet was illegal. ADOT responded to
BSI’s motion and cross-moved for summary
judgment as to the validity of the lien and
the assessment for the eight tax years at
issue. BSI responded to ADOT’s motion and
eross-moved for summary judgment, arguing
the assessment was invalid for all tax years.

16 The tax court granted BSI’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, ordering that.
the assessment be vacated and abated. The
court concluded the Jet was present in Ari-
zona “for more than 90 days, but less than
210 days, in each of the subject tax years”

623

and was thus eligible for the non-resident tax
rate BSI had previously paid. The court also
awarded BSI attorneys’ fees and costs. After
the court issued a final judgment, ADOT
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to A.R.S, §§ 12~120,21(A)(1) and -170(C).

DISCUSSION

17 An “annual license tax is imposed on all
aircraft based in this state and required to be
registered” unless an exemption applies,
A.R.S, § 28-8885; see also Ariz. Const. art.
IX, § 15. Aircraft owned by Arizona resi-
dents are taxed at .5% of the “average fair
market value” of the aircraft, See A.R.S,
§ 28-8885(B). Aircraft owned by non-resi-
dents may receive more favorable tax treat-
ment, depending on the number of days they
are based in Arizona:

BSI v. ADOT
Opinion of the Court

Based in Arizona
1-90 days
91-209 days

210-365 days

ARS, §§ 28-8822, -8836, -8835(B).

HM 18 The parties dispute whether the
Jet was based in Arizona for more than 209
days within the meaning of A.R.S. § 28-8336.
We review issues of statutory interpretation,
as well as grants of summary judgment, de
novo. See Ariz, Dept of Revenue v. Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist., 212 Ariz. 35, 38, 118, 126 P.3d 1068,
1066 (App. 2006). Ordinarily, an administra-
tive agency’s interpretation of a statute it
implements is given great weight. See Baca
v, Ariz, Dep’t of Econ. Sec, 191 Ariz, 48, 45-
46, 951 P.2d 1285, 1237-88 (App. 1998).
“However, the agency’s interpretation is not
infallible, and courts must remain the final
authority on critical questions of statutory
construction.” U.S. Parking Sys. v. City of

Tax Rate
Exempt from tax

-1% of average fair market value

.5% of average fair market value
(resident rate)

Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 88, 34
(App. 1989).

LARS. § 28-8336

19 We begin with the plain language of
the statute, which is “the most reliable indi-
cator” of its meaning, Sempre Lid. P’ship v.
Maricopa Cownty, 225 Ariz. 106, 108, 15, 285
P.8d 259, 261 (App. 2010). Section 28-8336
states:

The license tax for a nonresident whose
aircraft is based in this state for more than
ninety days but less than two hundred ten
days in a calendar year is equal to one-
tenth of one per cent of the average fair
market value of the particular make, model
and year of aircraft if the aircraft is not
engaged in any intrastate commercial ac-
tivity.

624

110 BSI concedes the Jet was based in
Arizona for more than 90 days during each of
the tax years at issue, and the parties agree
the Jet was not engaged in intrastate com-
mercial activity. The parties disagree,
though, about how to calculate the number of
days the Jet was “based in this state,”

11 BSI contends the word “day” in § 28-
8886 means a 24-hour period “beginning on

one midnight and ending on the next ensuing
midnight.” According to BSI, if the Jet land-
ed outside Arizona during that 24-hour peri-
od, it was not based in Arizona for that
particular day.? Applying that standard, BSI
ealculates the following day counts for the
Jeti

Tax Year | 2004 | 2005 | 2006

2007

2008 2010 | 2011

Day Count | 173

712 ADOT, on the other hand, argues
“day” means “any part or portion of a day or
any amount of time” the Jet spends on the

Tax Year

152 | 150 | 159 | 190

2007 | 2008 | 2009

206 | 162 | 187 | 162

ground in Arizona, Relying on that definition,
ADOT contends the Jet was based in Arizona
for more than 209 days each tax year:

Day Count
Pilot Lo:

Day Count
Flightwise®

229

228

249 | 259 | 274

718 In adopting BSI’s interpretation of
the statute, the tax court noted that the
legislature has not defined “day” and that the
parties presented nothing “to indicate wheth-
er the legislature intended for ‘day’ to mean
an entire 24—hour period or some lesser por-
tion of it.” Concluding that the statutory
ambiguity “must be construed in the taxpay-
et’s favor,” the tax court ruled that the word
“day” in § 28-8836 means “any period of
twenty four hours,”

Hl 1114 We agree with the tax court that
the statute is ambiguous. See Hayes v. Cont’l
Ins, Co,, 178 Ariz, 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672
(1994) (A statute is ambiguous if its text
“allows for more than one rational interpre-
tation.”), We disagree, however, that the am-
biguity persists after applying recognized
tools of statutory construction. See id, (if the
meaning of a statute is uncertain, courts may
employ tools of statutory interpretation). Al-
2, Although its briefing suggested that simply

leaving Arizona airspace was sufficient, BSI con-

ceded at oral argument before this Court that the

Jet is properly considered based in Arizona on a

particular day if it has not landed outside the

state during that day,

though courts “liberally construe statutes im-
posing taxes in favor of the taxpayers and
against the government,” Salt River Project,
212 Ariz. at 88, 114, 126 P.8d at 1066, that
tenet applies only if a statute remains ambig-
uous after utilizing tools of statutory inter-
pretation, See Harris Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of
Revenue, 288 Ariz. 877, 884, 128, 312 P.8d
1148, 1150 (App, 2013) (The maxim that am-
biguous statutes are construed in favor of
taxpayers applies only “after considering the
interpretive guidance provided by the legisla-
ture, and applying standard rules of con-
struction,”),

I 115 “(The law takes no notice of
fractions of a day and deems any fraction of
a day to be a ‘day.”” Maciborski v. Chase
Serv, Corp. of Ariz, 161 Ariz. 557, 562, 779
P.2d 1296, 1301 (App. 1989); see also Lagan-
daon v. Ashcroft, 888 F.3d 983, 985, 991, 998
(Oth Cir, 2004) (interpreting a statute requir-
ing aliens to be “physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not
less than 10 years” to include any portion of

a day, noting that, “[i]n the space of a day all
the twenty four hours are usually reckoned;
the law generally rejecting all fractions of a
day, in order to avoid disputes”); Talbott v.
Caudill, 248 Ky. 146, 58 S.W.2d 385, 886
(1988) (“It is the common-law rule that judi-
cially a day is the whole or any part of the
period of twenty-four hours, from midnight
to midnight.”); of State v. Carnegie, 174 Ariz.
452, 454, 850 P.2d 690, 692 (App. 1998) (re-
jecting contention a defendant must be in
custody “for a full twenty-four hours” to
receive pre-sentence incarceration credit for
a particular day), ADOT’s interpretation of
“day” is consistent with this principle, and no
legislative history suggests an intention to
deviate from this long-standing common-law
concept,

II 116 ADOT’s interpretation also fur-
thers the implicit goals of the statutory
scheme, See Hayes, 178 Ariz, at 268, 872 P.2d
at 672 (courts attempt to interpret statutes in
a manner that furthers perceived goals). In
evaluating legislative intent, we consider the
statute’s context, its language, subject matter
and historical background, its effects and
consequences, and its spirit and purpose, Id,

{17 During all of the tax years at issue
here, the statutory scheme governing aircraft
registration and taxation mandated that air-
eraft license tax assessments go directly into
the state aviation fund (“Fund”) “for use in
the construction, development and improve-
ment of airports.” A.R.S. § 28-8345, Fund
expenditures cover items such as construc-
tion and maintenance of runways, taxiways,
and aprons where aircraft park; lighting; air-
eraft guidance systems; weather observation
and reporting equipment; and signage, BSI
did not controvert ADOT employee Susan J.
Wylezik’s affidavit vegarding how aircraft
based in Arizona use airport infrastructure
and services:

Aireraft that conduct aireraft operations

use an airport's guidance signage, heli-

ports, rotating beacon, runway extension
and strengthening, Medium Intensity Run-
way Lighting and High Intensity Runway

Lighting, Visual Guidance System, taxi-

way, weather observation system, wildlife

deterrent fencing, and wind cone equip-
ment. Aircraft that fly in and out also

625

benefit from the removal of hazards that
are located within navigable airspace.

18 The graduated license tax scheme for
non-resident aircraft suggests a legislative
intent to increase the tax rate as the use of
Arizona airport facilities increases, not to
decrease the rate the more a non-resident
owner uses Arizona airports. Applying BSI’s
definition would frustrate such a purpose and
lead to anomalous (if not absurd) results. See,
0.9., State v, Bstrada, 201 Aviz, 247, 251, 117,
84 P.8d 356, 360 (2001) (Courts avoid inter-
preting statutes in a manner leading to an
absurd result, meaning one “so irrational,
unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be
supposed to have been within the intention of
persons with ordinary intelligence and dis-
eretion.”),

119 Moreover, elsewhere in the same title,
chapter, and article as § 28-8836, the legisla-
ture identifies “full” time periods when it
intends such a measure, See ag., ARS.
§ 28-8824(B)(1) (“The license tax for that
year on the aircraft shall be reduced by one-
twelfth for each full month of the calendar
year that has expired.” (emphasis added)).
The legislature also understands how to
override the common law definition discussed
supra, 115, and define a 24-hour period as a
“day” when it wishes to do so. See ag,
ARS, §§ 11-1601(9) (“ ‘Working day’ means
a twenty-four hour period....”), 48-8641(8)
(same); see also “Day,” Black’s Law Dictio-
nary (10th ed, 2014) (offering various defini-
tions for “day,” and stating that, “A statute
referring to an entire day contemplates a 24~
hour period beginning and ending at mid-
night.”),

Hl 120 We hold that an aircraft is based
in Arizona within the meaning of A.R.S,
§ 28-8836 for any day during which it is
physically present on the ground in this state
for any period of time. Applying this defini-
tion, evidence of record strongly suggests the
Jet was based in Arizona for more than 209
days during each tax year at issue, At oral
argument before this Court, however, BSI
would not concede that fact. Therefore, on
remand, the tax court must resolve that fac-
tual issue, applying the definition of “day”
adopted herein,

626 EE

121 Finally, we disagree with BSI’s
contention that ADOT impermissibly adopted
and uniformly applied a policy affecting its
substantive or procedural rights without fol-
lowing the requirements of A.R.S, §§ 41-
1091, -1091.01 or the Administrative Proce-
dures Act, A.R.S. §§ 41-1001, e¢ seg, BSI’s
reliance on Ariz, State Univ. v. Ariz State
Ret. Sys., 237 Ariz, 246, 349 P.8d 220 (App.
2015), is unavailing. In that case, the state
retirement system adopted a policy concern-
ing newly promulgated statutes regarding
employer termination incentive programs
that affected employers’ substantive rights.
Id, at 248-49, 11 5-8, 349 P.8d at 222-23, The
policy involved a “complex calculation with
subjective components,” id. at 251, 119, 349
P.8d at 225, requiring the exercise of sub-
stantial “judgment and discretion.” Id. at
252, 121, 849 P.8d at 226. No comparable
policy is at issue here. We simply have an
agency interpreting a term in a statute. Ad-
ministrative agencies need not (and indeed,
could not realistically) define, disclose, and
codify their interpretations of every Arizona
statute relevant to their duties. Furthermore,
it is the statute itself, as opposed to ADOT’s

interpretation and implementation of it, that
has affected BST’s rights.

Il. Estoppel

122 We do not reach BSI’s estoppel claims
because the tax court has not yet considered
them. On remand, the court may further
address those claims.

CONCLUSION

123 We vacate the entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of BSI, as well as the award of
attorneys’ fees and costs to BSI. We remand
to the tax court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion, ADOT is entitled to
recover its taxable costs on appeal, if any,
upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21.