State: Louisiana
Volume: 263
Term: 1972-1972
Jurisdiction(s): Louisiana
Source: https://static.case.law/la/263.pdf

266 So.2d 710

Patsy McDowell COOPER
v.
Frederick D. BROUSSARD et al.
No. 52815.
Sept. 11, 1972.

Application denied. There is no allega-
tion to the effect that but for the alleged
irregularities applicant would be entitled
to enter a second primary. R.S. 18:364,
subd. B. Therefore the petition does not

state a cause of action.

BARHAM, J., concurs. The exception
of no cause of action is god but both the
trial court and the appellate court erred in
sustaining the plea of prescription and we
should so hold explicitly. The provision
for instituting an election contest “within
two days” after promulgation of the re-
turns means within the two legal days
which follow the day of the promulgation—
not within 48 hours after the hour of
promulgation. R.S. 18:364 repeatedly and
pointedly makes distinctions between days
and hours for the purpose of computing
time lapses. No case holds to the contrary
and if one did it would be erroneous and
deserving of being overruled because of the
express language of the statute,

2

3 Le 4

a
266 $0.2 710

Patsy McDowell] COOPER
ve

Frederick D. BROUSSARD et al.
No. 52826.

Sept. 15, 1972.

Writ denied. The showing made does

not warrant the exercise of this Court’s

supervisory jurisdiction,

Z
266 S0.2d 710

Joyce MARCUS
ve

Joseph Raymond BURNETT.

No. 52803.

Sept. 29, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be noti-
fied.

:
266 So.2d 711

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Noil GEORGE.

No. 52800.

Sept. 29, 1972.

The petition of the relator in the above
entitled and numbered case having been
duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari
issue herein, directing the Honorable
Baron B. Bourg, Judge of the Seventeenth
Judicial District, Court for the Parish of
Terrebonne, to transmit to the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, on or before the 15th
day of December, 1972, the record in dupli-
cate, or a certified copy of the record in

5 | 6

duplicate, of the proceedings complained
of by the relator herein, to the end that the
validity of said proceedings may be as-
certained,

It is further ordered that the aforesaid
Judge of said Court and the respondent
through counsel shall show cause, in this
court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock
AM, why the relief prayed for in the
petition of the relator should not be grant-

ed.
1!

266 So.2d 711

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Gary HIGHTOWER.
No. 52805.

Sept. 29, 1972.

The petition of the relator in the above
entitled and numbered case having been
duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari

issue herein, directing the Honorable John
S. Covington, Judge of the Nineteenth

Judicial District, Court for the Parish of
East Baton Rouge, to transmit to the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana, on or before
the 15th day of December, 1972, the record
in duplicate, or a certified copy of the
record in duplicate, of the proceedings
complained of by the relator herein, to the
end that the validity of said proceedings
may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid
Judge of said Court and the respondent
through counsel shall show cause, in this
court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock
A.M., why the relief prayed for in the peti-
tion of the relator should not be granted.

Ll
266 So.2d T12

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Willie BAKER
ve

Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52835.

Sept. 29, 1972.

7 De 8

-On considering the petition of relator
in the above numbered and entitled cause:

It is ordered that the Honorable John
C. Morris, Jr., Judge of the Fifth Judicial
District Court, Parish of Richland, with-
out undue delay, grant a full evidentiary
hearing on relator’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed in that Court and in
this Court, and make a determination of
the merits of his application after the hear-

Ll
266 So.2d 712

ing.

STATE of Louisiana ex ref. Johnny
Beamon JENNINGS

ve

Elayn HUNT, Director, Department
of Corrections.

‘No, 52810.

; Sept. 29, 1972.

Le

The petition of the relator in the above
‘entitled and numbered case having been
duly considered,

It is ordered’ that a writ of certiorari
issue herein, -‘directing the Honorable

Donovan W. Parker, Judge of the Nine-
teenth Judicial District, Court for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge, to transmit
to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, on or
before the 15th day of December, 1972,
the record in duplicate, or a certified copy
of the record in duplicate, of the proceed-
ings complained of by the relator herein,
to the end that the validity of said pro-
ceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid
Judge of said Court and the respondent
through counsel shall show cause, in this
court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock
A.M., why the relief prayed for in the peti-
tion of the relator should not be granted.

i
266 So.2d 712

STATE of Louisiana
Ww
Robert Duane BLAIR.
No. 52808.

Sept. 29, 1972.

Application denied; the showing made is
insufficient to warrant the exercise of our
jurisdiction,

9 Ln

-
266 So.2d 713

Anthony BELLARD |
ve
TRI-STATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 52847.

Sept, 29, 1972,

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that

counsel for plaintiff and defendant be noti-

fied.
L
266 So.2d 713
-“ STATE of Louisiana ex rel.

Herman TANNER
ve

Cc. Murray. HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
. ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No, 52780.
Sept. 29, 1972.

16°

Writ denied. The plea of guilty waived
non-jurisdictional defects such as the alleg-
ed unlawful search and seizure. The appli-
cant does not contest in this Court the trial
court’s finding that his plea of guilty was
voluntary and éaken only after full ex-
planation of the applicant's constitutional

rights,

|
266 So.2d 713
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. James
Edward LOWE et al.
ve
Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
ana State Penitentary.

No. 52799,
Sept. 29, 1972.

Application denied; this is a subsequent
application, and this Court has already re-
viewed applicants’ principal complaints.
(261 La. 472, 259 So.2d 918). ‘The: coni-
plaint of delay is moot. The contention

concerning court costs in the previous‘

proceeding is not properly before us.

266 $0.24 713

Homer A. BLAND
ve
CITY OF HOUMA,

No. 52791.

Sept. 29, 1972.

L
266 So.2d 714

6 STATE of Louisiana

te ve

Lawrence A. CASSANOVA, III.

No. 52806.

Sept. 29, 1972.

Writ refused. We find no error of law
in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

12

Writ denied. The ruling of the trial
judge is correct.

SUMMERS, J, is of the opinion the
writ should be granted,

'
266 So.2d T14
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Leslie
F. WALGAMOTTE
ve
. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Loulsi- :
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

~
No, 52823,

Sept. 29, 1972.

Writ denied. The showing made does
not warrant the exercise of this Court’s
supervisory jurisdiction. We cannot re-
view the action of the trial judge at the
hearing in the trial court on the application
for habeas. Applicant docs not attach
the transcript of that hearing and he makes
no showing that an effort has been made
to obtain that transcript.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ |
should be granted. . .

I
266 So.2d Ti4

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Wardell DONAHUE

ve

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52819.

Sept. 29, 1972.

Application denied—on the showing
made at the evidentiary hearing, it does

not “appear that the trial judge erred in
denying the relief sought.

Lt
266 So.2a 714

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Thomas
Leo PERRIN

ve

©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52809,

Sept. 29, 1972.

M4

Writ denied. On the basis of the con-
temporaneous recording of the applicant’s
1968 guilty pleas (pre-Boykin) and of the
evidentiary hearing held on June 13,1972,
we find no merit to the applicant’s conten-
tion that he did not voluntarily and under-
standingly waive the assistance of counsel
and other constitutional rights, after fair
explanation thereof by the trial judge.

266 S0.2d 715

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Kenneth THIBODEAUX.
No. 52820.

Sept. 29, 1972.

Writ refused. The showing made is not
sufficient to warrant the exercise of our
supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J,, is of the opinion the writ
should be granted.

a 266 $0.24 T15 266 $0.24 715
_ aSTATE of Louisiana ex rel. Kenneth W. Jack OLIVER
Joseph MILLER v.
we T & C CONTRACTORS and Bituminous

Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louist- _ Casualty Corporation.

ana State Penitentiary.

: No. 52807.
_ No, 52830.

Sept. 29, 1972.,
Sept. 29, 1972.

Application denied; the record before us .
shows the applicant is not entitled to the Writ denied. Under the facts found by
the Court of Appeal, the result is correct.

relief prayed for.

I
266 So.24 715

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Raymond
J. MOORE

ve

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52834,

Sept. 29, 1972.

Writ refused. Since the trial judge has
granted the applicant an out-of-time ap-
peal, this application is now moot.

L
266 So.2d 716

” ” STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Gary
. P. SIMPSON

ve

Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, L.ouisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52836.

Sept. 29, 1972.

“ search and seizure.

: 18*
Writ denied. The showing made does

not warrant the exercise of our original
or supervisory jurisdiction,

|
266 So.2d 716

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Robert Samuel EVERITT, Jr. |”

No. 52837.
Sept. 29, 1972.

Writ denied; we find no abuse of the
trial court’s discretion.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ

, should be granted. The revocation of pro-

bation was based solely upon the evidence
secured in an admittedly unconstitutional
Relator was not al-
lowed to offer evidence of abuse and
harassment by police and probation officers
preceding this unconstitutional search. I
would apply the exclusionary rule to this
probation revocation. I believe the harass-
ment evidence was admissible for that de-’
termination, “

19: — 20

wee - | Writ denied. The return of the trial

court shows that a trial date has been sct

266 $0.20 716°
for October 31. The motion for speedy
STATE of Louisiana ox rel. Ernest trial has been disposed of by that order.
B. GONZALES
v

©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary. 7
No. 52840.

Sopt. 29, 1972.

Pp “ 266 So.2d 914
‘Application denied. The ruling of the ‘STATE of Louisiana”
trial judge is correct. v.
Christine Mary THARP.
No. 52848.
|| - . . nis
La 7 This Court will not interfere with the
266 So.2d 914 orderly trial of- a criminal case except

where irreparable injury is shown, No
ro + STATE of Louisiana such showing having been made, the ap-
i 7 ve

* plication is denied.
Kenneth Joseph MILLER. .

McCALEB, C. J., and SANDERS, J;;
: ” . although of the ‘opinion that the judge
Oct. 8, 1972. © es . erred in curtailing’ the district attorney’s
cross-examination .of the defense witness

No. 52846.

on a matter pertaining to the veracity of
her. testimony. concerning ‘the affirmative
defense of entrapment, nevertheless. con-..

21

cur in the denial of the application as it
has long been the policy of this Court not
to interfere with the orderly progress of a
criminal trial on questions pertaining to
the admission or rejection of evidence, save
in cases where a motion to suppress has
been erroneously sustained.

I
266 So.2d 914

Gerald M. DEAN
ve :
The ELECTION CONTEST BOARD et al.

No. 52861.

Oct. 6, 1972.

‘Writ denied. The ruling of the Court
of Appeal is correct.

DIXON, J, dissents from the refusal to
grant writs, being of the opinion that the
RS. 18:365
should not prevent nomination by quali-

court of appeal is incorrect,

fication papers when the only nominee of
the party was certified, and not “nominated
cat or through a primary.”

EE 2

Ll
266 $0.24 915

STATE of Louisiana
v.

0. E. PRICE and L. H. Padgett, Jr.
No. 52849.

Oct. 9, 1972.

Application denied. The State has an
adequate remedy by appeal—in fact, it has
taken an appeal returnable im this Court
on Oct. 31st, 1972,

a. :

266 S0.2d 915

‘Florence Tye JENNISON
ve

Wade O. MARTIN, Jr., Secretary of State,
State of Louisiana, et al. °°

No. 52888.

Oct, 18, 1972.

Writ refused. ‘The judgment”is edrrect.

267 So.2d 181

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Donald HARRIS.

No, 52497.
Oct, 4, 1972.

Woodson T. Callihan, Jr., Baton Rouge,
for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry

Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

“Through habeas corpus proceedings the
‘defendant; Donald Harris, was granted an
out of time appeal from-a conviction of
aggravated, burglary, La.R.S. 14:60, for

24
which he was sentenced to serve twenty
years at hard labor in the State Penitentia-
Ty.

No Bills of Exceptions were reserved by
counsel for the defendant during the
course of the trial, The public defender
appointed to assist the defendant in put'su-
ing his out of time appeal filed one Bill of
Exceptions with the trial court.
the error alleged does not pertain to a Bill

Because

of Exceptions reserved during the course
of the trial, the trial judge refused to sign
it.

Consequently, as no Bills of Exceptions
have been perfected, we are limited on ap-
peal to a review of the pleadings and pro-
ceedings for discoverable error. La.C.Cr.
P. art. 920; State v. Ash, 257 La. 337, 242
So.2d 535 (1971). We find none.

The bill of exceptions reserved is not be-
fore us as there was no ruling by which
the defendant could reserve a bill. How-
ever, even if we were to treat the bill of
exceptions as a Motion for a New Trial,
which alleges essential eléments of the
crime of aggravated battery were not prov-
en during the defendant’s trial, we would
be forced to conclude it is without merit.

The facts developed in the testimony
show that the defendant was surprised
while he was in the dwelling of Mrs, Tol-
son, the victim, without authority, The de-
fendant threw Mrs. Tolson to the floor,
dumped the contents of her purse, out. tak-
ing, $28.00 therefrom, forced her, to, give -

‘25
him other money she had hidden in the
house, then tried to force her onto the
bed in her bedroom, and was in the act of
unzipping his pants when Mrs. Tolson’s
husband returned home. Mrs. Tolson
grabbed the defendant upon realizing her
husband had returned home, and between
herself and her husband, they were able to
subdue and hold the defendant until the
police arrived.

There is evidence of every essential ele-
mient of the crime of aggravated burglary.
There is evidence that the defendant did
make an unauthorized entry of an inhabit-
ed dwelling and did commit a battery upon
the person of Mrs. Tolson. We are for-
bidden to pass upon the weight and suffi-
ciency of the evidence. 7

For these reasons, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

267 So.2d 182

STATE of Louisiana
ve
L, C, ROBINSON.

No. 52479.

Oct, 4, 1972.

26

Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Alton T. Moran,
Asst, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was indicted for murder
and found guilty without capital punish-
ment at his trial by jury. He was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment and appeals his
conviction and sentence.

Hl 0m appeal, the defendant relies up-
on two Bills of Exceptions reserved and
perfected during his trial. In his first Bill
of Exception the defendant argues the trial
judge committed error when he excluded
certain testimonial’ evidence as being ir-

28
relevant. Upon cross-examination of the
victim’s sister, counsel for the defense

sought to elicit information concerning a
The vic-
tim’s sister indicated she believed the scar
was the result of a prior stab wound, Aft-

prior scar on the victim’s body.

er so indicating, she was asked, “Do you
recall the night he was stabbed?”. The
State objected and when the Court requir-
ed counsel for the defense to show the rel-
evancy of this line of questioning, he an-
swered, “Well, we have a case here—I’m
not saying this is my defense, but I think
the fact that he did have a stab wound,
there must be some reason for it.” In his
Per Curiam to this bill of exception, the
trial judge stated that this was an old scar
which was in no way shown to be related
to the victim’s death by gunshot wounds.

Counsel for the defense argues in his
brief that he was attempting to delve into
the dangerous character of the deceased
in order to sustain his self defense argu-
ment. See La.R.S. 14:20, 21. If this was
counsel’s purpose he should have made it
clear to the Court. Counsel for the de-
fense did not lay a proper foundation
for this line of questioning by either show-
ing evidence of hostile demonstration or
overt act on the part of the victim as re-
quired by La.R.S, 15:482. From the facts.
as they had developed at this point of the
trial, we cannot say the trial judge abused
his discretion in finding this line of ques-

tioning irrelevant, La.R.S, 15:441; State

29 De 30

v. Murphy, 234 La. 909, 102 So2d 61
(1955). We find this bill of exceptions

lacks merit,

Defendant's second Bill of Exceptions
was taken to the denial of the motion for
new trial. The motion for new trial al-
leged, “Malice after thought (sic) was not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact,
there was no showing by evidence of any
The defendant fur-
ther reiterated his specification of error
set forth in Bill of Exceptions No. 1.

malice whatsoever.”

TBE We assume that counsel for’ de-
fendant intended to contend the State did
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the offender had a specific intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm, See La.R.S.
14:30; however, we find there is ample
evidence in the record from which a jury
could-have presumed such intent, It is only
when there-is no evidence at all of an es-
sential element of the crime charged that
this Court may set aside the conviction
on appeal. When there is some evidence
to sustain the conviction this Court can-
not pass on the sufficiency thereof. State
v. Coleman, 260 La. 897, 257 So.2d 652

(1972). This second’ bill of exceptions

lacks merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed. . .

SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree.

"267 So.2d 183

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Willie EDMONSON.

No. 52378.

Oct. 4, 1972.

‘William E. Woodward, Clinton, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, War-
ren E, Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rich-
ard H. Kilbourne, Dist. Atty. Fred C.
Jackson, Asst. Dist. Atty, for plaintiff
appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Willie Edmonson appeals from his con-

viction of attempted murder. La.R.S. 14:27
and 14:30. He was sentenced to 20 years.

The defendant reserved one bill of ex-.
ception to the court’s denial of an applica-.

tion for a bill of particulars in which he
requested pre-trial discovery of, informa-
tion relating to the State’s witnesses,

It is now well settled that the iniférma-
tion sought by the.defendant is not: subject

to: pretrial discovery under our criminal’
State -v. ‘Davis, 259 La.-'33,-
249 So.2d 193 (1971); State v. Coney, 258°

procedure.

La. 369, 246 So.2d 793 (1971).

31 Le 32

There is no merit in the bill of excep-
tion and no error discoverable in our re-
view of the pleadings and proceedings.

The conviction and sentence are af-

firmed.

267 So0.2d 184

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Charles MONROE, Jr.

No, 52521.

Oct, 4, 1972.

Truly W. McDaniel, Shreveport, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, John A.
Richardson, Dist. Atty., Albert S. Lutz,
Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Charles Monroe, Jr., was
granted an out of time appeal from his ju-
ry conviction of armed robbery, La.R.S.
14:64, for which he was sentenced to serve
thirty years in the State Penitentiary, In
pursuing this appeal, he relies upon one
bill of exceptions.

This bill pertains to the denial of a mo-
tion for new trial. The motion alleged a new
trial should be granted because of the in-
competence and ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. No bills of exceptions were re-
served during the trial, and therefore the
defendant’s appellate counsel further con-
tends in his motion for new trial that an
appeal to this Court would be meaningless
under the circumstances,

The errors asserted by the defendant can-
not be reviewed by this Court on appeal
as they were not objected to during the
trial, nor were bills of exceptions reserved.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. We are therefore
limited on appeal to a review of the plead-

ings and proceedings for discoverable er-
ror. La.C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Ash,

33 be 34

257 La. 337, 242 So.2d 535 (1971). We
find none.

The appropriate remedy for contentions
such as those presented by the defendant
is through habeas corpus proceedings. See
State v. Washington, 261 La. 684, 260 So.
2a 668 (1972).*

For the above stated reasons, the convic-
tion and sentence are affirmed.

267 So.2d 185

STATE of Louisiana
v
Taylor EVANS.

No, 52394,

Oct. 4, 1972,

Norman A. Pettingill, New Orleans, for
defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison,

*In State ex rel. Monroe vy. Henderson, 259 this Court for the reason that, “The
La. 686, 251 So.2d 381 (1971), the pres- showing made is insufficient to warrant
ent defendant’s writ of habeas corpus, in the exercise of our original or supervisory
which he voiced the same objections as jurisdiction.” . .

“he alleges on this appeal, was refused by
Dn

35

Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist, Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Taylor Evans, appeals
his jury conviction of attempted simple
burglary, LaR.S. 14:62, La.R.S. 14:27, for
which he was sentenced to serve four and
a half years in the State Penitentiary at
Angola.
fendant relies upon one Bill of Exceptions

In pursuing this appeal, the de-

reserved and perfected during his trial.

Tn his Bill of Exceptions, the defendant
argues the trial judge committed error
when he denied a motion for new trial,
which motion alleges only “The verdict is
contrary to the law and evidence.” La.C.
Cr.P. Art. 851(1). Yet the defendant does
not present any evidence, with any specific-

ity, that a factual element essential to a.

lawful conviction is omitted from the proof.
State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 142 So.2d 381
(1962). Neither do we find any in the
record. A Bill of Exceptions taken to the
overruling of a motion for new trial based
upon an allegation that the verdict is con-
trary to the law and evidence, without any
direction to a specific legal error, presents
nothing for review. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 858;
State v. Grey, 257 La, 1070, 245 So.2d 178
(1971). ,

The conviction and sentence are’ af-
firmed.

267 So.2d 185

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Houston J. HAWKINS and David H, Smith.

No, 52407.

Oct. 4, 1972.

Davis A. Gueymard, Brown, McKernan,
Monsour. & Screen, J. Patrick Screen, Jr.,

Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellants.

37 [| 38

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Warren argued in brief, and find it discloses no-
E. Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent reversible error.
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Donald L. Beckner,

Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. For these reasons, the conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The defendants, Houston J. Hawkins and
David H. Smith, were tried by a jury and

convicted of the crime of armed robbery.

Each was sentenced to serve twenty-five
years in the state penitentiary at hard la-
bor. La.R.S. 14:64.

~ 267 So.2d 186
STATE of Louisiana

While the defendants reserved and per-
fected two bills of exceptions during their
trial, counsel only argues bill of exceptions
No. 2, contending that the penalty provi- No. 52344.
sion under La.R.S. 14:64 constitutes cruel Oct, 4, 1972.
and unustal punishment and denies the

v.
Emma Jewell PITTS,

defendants equal protection of the laws un-
der Art. I, Section 12, of the La.Constitu-
tion of 1921, and the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. In support of their
argument, defendants allege that there was
no showing that they were habitual crimi-
nals and that no pre-sentence investigation
was requested by the trial judge.

As these identical issues were rejected
in State v. Howard, decided June 5, 1972,
262 La. 270, 263 So.2d 32, we adopt our
previous position for the reasons assigned.

‘We have examined the defendants’ re-
maining first bill of exceptions, though not

Jack N. Rogers, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-appellant,

40

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard H.
Kilbourne, Dist. Atty., Fred C. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Emma Jewell Pitts, ap-
peals her jury conviction of attempting
to introduce contraband into a correctional
institution in violation of La.R.S. 14:402
for which she was sentenced to serve three
years in the State Penitentiary. On appeal,
the defendant relies upon three bills of ex-
ceptions reserved and perfected during her
trial.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 alleges the
trial court erred when it refused to sustain
a motion to quash and a motion to sup-
press evidence. The defendant maintains
the seizure of the CNS drugs was unlawful
in that there was no probable cause for the
search, and that the defendant had not con-
sented to be searched.

On November 21, 1970, the defendant
approached the main gate of the Louisiana
State Penitentiary at Angola for the pur-
pose of visiting her husband, an inmate.
When the defendant entered the gatehouse
to request a visitor’s pass, a security offi-
cer informed her that two female em-
ployees of the penitentiary would like to
She was then searched and
‘in her purse, inside of what appeared to

search her.

i

-be two new packs of Pall Mall cigarettes,
460 capsules of central nervous system
stimulants were found.

This Court can take notice of the unique
‘problems prison authorities have in pre-
venting contraband from reaching the
hands of the prison population. In order
to maintain prison security, certain meas-
ures must be taken to insure that visitors
to the prison do not smuggle contraband
articles to the inmates. Persons who wish
to visit prisons must therefore realize that
their persons are subject to search if they

intend to enter the prison confines,

HM We have read the transcript of
the hearing on the Motion to Quash and
Motion to Suppress Evidence, and we have
read the transcript of the trial. The two
matrons who searched the defendant both
stated that they asked the defendant if
she objected to the search before proceed-
The defendant, herself, testified she
was told by the prison matrons, “.
we would like to search you, do you have

ing.

any objections * * * They asked me if
they could and I said yes.” Under the
facts as they appear in the transcripts we
cannot disagree with the trial judge’s con-
clusion that the search was made with
the consent of the defendant, though she
may not have been told specifically that

42

she could refuse to be searched. The
factual determination of the trial court
regarding the validity of the consent should
be given great weight, and it will not be
disturbed on review unless clearly errone-
State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249
So.2d 560 (1971); State v. Hall, 257 La.
253, 242 So.2d 239 (1970).

ous.

In Bill of Exceptions No. 2 the defend-
ant argues evidence seized as a result of
the search complained of in Bill of Ex-
ceptions No. 1 was improperly admitted
into evidence. The defendant maintains
the search was conducted because she was
a suspect rather than the subject of a rou-
tine security search, Having found the de-
fendant consented to the search, this con-
This second Bill of Ex-
ceptions lacks merit,

tention must fail.

The defendant’s third Bill of Exceptions
argues the trial court incorrectly denied a
The motion for
new trial contains the same allegations of

motion for a new trial.

error made in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1
and 2, For the reasons stated in our
treatment of those bills of exceptions we
find this third and final bill of exceptions
lacks merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

43 De 44

267 So.2d 188

STATE of Louisiana
ve

David Harold FOSTER.
No. 52551.

Oct, 4, 1972.

Bernard J. Usprich, New Orleans, for
defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garrix

45

son, Dist. Atty, Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted, after a trial by
jury, of Simple Burglary. La.R.S. 14:62.
Pursuant to the provisions of LaR.S.
15:529.1 the district attorney filed an in-
formation charging defendant with being a
On March 5, 1971, de-
fendant was arraigned and pleaded guilty

multiple offender.

to being a multiple offender, and he was
sentenced to twelve years at hard labor.
Defendant appeals from his conviction for
Simple Burglary.

Police officers on patrol spotted defend-
ant while he was lying half in and half out
of an automobile parked on the street.
The officers obscrved that he was appar-
ently. putting something under the front
seat. “They stopped to question defendant
and one of the officers removed a brown
paper bag containing four tapes, a stereo
tape player, and an FM radio from under
the seat. A further search under the seat
produced a coat hanger wire.

While the officers were questioning de-
fendant, the owner of the car returned and
informed the officers the car was locked
wheh she left it and that defendant did not
havé'permission to enter the car, Where-
upon defendant was placed under arrest
and advised of his rights.

At the trial the owner of the car testi-

46

locked with the windows rolled up, that the.
stereo tape deck was mounted under the
dashboard of the car, the tapes were in the
glove compartment, and neither the FM ra-
dio, the coat hanger wire, or the brown pa-
per bag was in the car.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1

HEE Patrolman Michael Kilbride testi-
fied that he had been a police officer for
four years, and that he had seen coat hang-
ers bent in a similar fashion to the one
found in the automobile in which defend-
ant was arrested on five previous occasions
in connection with auto burglary investiga-
tions. The trial court qualified him as an
expert and allowed him to express the
opinion, over defendant’s objection, that a
coat hanger bent in the fashion of the one
introduced into evidence could be used to
gain access to a locked automobile.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to
the introduction of this opinion testimony. °

“The test of the competency of an ex-
pert is his knowledge of -the subject
about which he is called upon to express
an opinion, and before any. witness can
give evidence as an expert his competen-
cy $0 to testify must have been estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the court.”
LaRS. 15 :466.

The trial court has wide.discretion in pass-

fied.that when she left the car it wag, ing on the qualifications of a witness ten-

47

dered as an expert. State v. Richey, 258
La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971); State v.
Square, 257 La, 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971) ;
State v. Washington, 256 La. 233, 236 So.
2d 23 (1970); State v. Alexander, 252 La.
564, 211 So.2d 650 (1968). We cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in
qualifying this officer as an expert and al-
lowing him to testify as to'thé use to
which a coat hanger such as this could be
put.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2
Defendant objected to the introduction
into evidence of the brown paper bag, the
tapes, the stereo tape deck, the FM radio,
and the coat hanger, all of which were
found in the car which defendant was
charged with burglarizing. Defendant
plains that since none of these items

were found in his possession, and none of
them were identified as belonging to him,
they: should not have been admitted into
evidence,

HMM Defendant’s objection is ground-
less. ‘The fruits and physical evidence of a
crime as well as the tools used to commit
the crime are relevant to show the commis-
sion of the crime, LaR.S. 15:441, and as
such are admissible on the trial of the case.
State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d
143 (1971).

‘The conviction and sentence are af-
firmed:.

&

267 So:2d 190

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Floyd A. ST. ANDRE,

No, 51731.
Oct, 4, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1972..

©. Romaine Russell, Gay A. Modica,
Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty. Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was indicted and tried
for the crime of aggravated rape, La.R.S.
14:42, The jury returned a verdict of

- guilty without capital punishment and the
accused was sentenced to life imprisonment
at the State Penitentiary.

HMM On this appeal, the accused is
relying on thirty-nine bills of exceptions to
obtain a reversal of the conviction. Bills
of Exceptions Nos. 24, 34, 36 and 38 were
not perfected and therefore are not before

cl a

this court. La.C.CrP. art. 845. Bills of
Exceptions 28, 32 and 39 were not briefed
or argued and are therefore considered
abandoned. State v. Mills, 229 La. 758,
86 So.2d 895 (1956).

HI Bills of Exceptions 1 through 23,
reserved during voir dire examination of
the prospective jurors, pertain to defend-
ant’s allegations that the trial court ex~-
ceeded its authority by excusing the pro-
spective jurors, ex proprio motu, and not by
ruling on a challenge for cause by either
counsel for the State or the defendant.
We find these bills without merit.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 787 clearly gives the trial
judge discretion to disqualify a prospective
petit juror from service in a particular
case “when for any reason doubt exists as
to the competency of the prospective juror
As noted in the red-
actor’s comment to the article, “This arti-
cle is very broad, but it is essential to give

to serve in the case.”

the court a wide latitude to determine ju-
rors’ qualifications in the particular situa-
tion of each case.
ments to a degree Arts, 797 and 798 which
list special challenges for cause. It is
necessary to give the judge the right to

This article comple-

disqualify, a challenge being available only
to counsel.” .

HH Bills of Exceptions Nos. 25, 26 and
27 were taken by the defendant to the
court’s overruling a motion to quash the

‘52
indictment and motion for a mistrial after
it was learned that the indictment was not
read in its entirety to the jury (see La.
C.Cr.P. art. 765(2)) by virtue of omission
of reading the name of the co-defendant,
not tried with the present defendant, and
failure to grant a mistrial for the same
reason. We do not see any prejudice flow-
ing from this omission as to constitute re-
versible error, if any, or grounds for dis-
La.C.Cr.P. arts. 464 and 921. The
omission did not mislead the defendant to.

missal,

his prejudice nor is the defect, if any, in
the indictment one of substance as to him.
La.C.Cr.P, art. 487, These bills are with-
out merit.

By Bill of Exceptions No. 29, defense
counsel principally contends that the de-
fendant had not been informed of his con-
stitutional right to remain silent prior to
being interrogated pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and of his right to
counsel at a line-up.

HME Tre testimony of the two arresting
officers shows that St. Andre was advised
of his rights prior to interrogations at the
police station and that the defendant did
The defend-
ant is shown to possess at least < seventh

sign a waiver of his rights.

grade education, to be able to read, and to
be of normal intelligence. There is no evi-
dence to suggest that he was not fully able

53 |

to understand his right to remain silent and
to have a lawyer if he wished one.

After hearing all the evidence, the trial
judge determined that the Miranda warning
had been given and understood and that
the defendant’s statements were “spontanc-
ous” and were not the product of coercion
or duress, Such a factual determination
‘by the trial judge is given great weight.
‘Tt will not be disturbed on appeal unless it
is clearly erroneous. State v. Vessel, 260
La. 301, 256 So.2d 96 (1971).

THB Despite the absence of counsel, the
trial judge declined to suppress the line-
up identification, holding that the pro-
cedures for the line-up, as reconstructed,
were fair and impartial and satisfied the
Constitutional requirements. We find no
error of constitutional significance, the
line-up having been taken prior to the de-
fendant’s indictment, Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411
(1972).
tions lacks merit.

We conclude this bill of excep-

Hl Bills of Exceptioas Nos. 30 and 31
‘oth pertain to witnesses’ statements ad-
mitted into evidence over defense coun-
sel’s objections. In the first instance,
the trial judge correctly ruled the witness’
answer was part of the res gestae excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. We also find
the statement of a sccond witness was prop-

54

erly admitted into evidence as a spontane-

ous utterance, another exception to the
hearsay rule, Hearsay is clearly admissible
if it comes within the broad res gestae ex-
ception applied in Louisiana. La.R.S. 15:
447; State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.
2d 121 (1971). See also H. Alston John-
son, III, Comment, 29 La.L.Rev. 661 (1969).
The bill is without merit.

HI Bills of Exceptions Nos. 33 and 35
were both taken to the admission into evi-
dence of a copy, instead of the original
waiver of rights form, purportedly signed
by the defendant.

As the deputy who helped execute the
waiver form testified that the exhibit was a
copy of the original, the trial court was in
the best position to weigh the evidence be-
fore it and rule as it did. The record re-
veals that the proper foundation was laid
for the admissibility of the exhibit. Such
a factual determination by the trial judge
is given great weight. It will not be
disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.
State v. Hall, 257 La. 253, 242 So.2d 239
(1970). These bills lack merit. See also
Pardo v. U. S., 369 F.2d 922 (1966).

HH Defendant reserved Bill of Excep-
tion No, 37 to the court’s ruling on the
relevancy of an answer by the State’s ex-
pert medical witness, Notwithstanding the
fact that this objection came too late, after

55 |

the doctor had answered the questions,
this court has repeatedly held that it is
within the sound discretion of the trial
judge to determine whether or not there is
a rational connection between the fact
which is sought to be proved and the fact
which is an issue in the case. The ruling
of the trial judge was correct. The doc-
tor testified about the wound allegedly
caused by the force utilized by the defend-
ant in the aggravated rape of the victim.
There is no merit to this bill.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree
only.

BARHAM, J., concurs and assigns rea-
sons,

BARHAM, Justice (concurring).

I coneur in the majority opinion in order
to note a potentially fatal defect in con-
nection with Bills of Exceptions Nos. 25,
26, and 27. These bills were reserved to
the refusal to quash the indictment and the
overruling of a motion for a mistrial. The
basis of the objections was the failure to
sever the indictment which charged two
persons, the defendant and another, with
the commission of the offense.

In this case I concur rather than dissent
because this defendant had notice in ad-

56

vance of trial of the severance. Further,
the juty did not have any knowledge that
another person was also charged in the
same indictment because the court reporter
read the indictment to the jury without
mention of the other person. There was.
no prejudice to the defendant under these
circumstances.

Failure to sever could result in a finding
that there is no valid indictment as to a
defendant on trial when he has been
charged jointly with another but tried
alone. In the future I would be compelled
to conclude that an omission to file sepa-
rate indictments is inexcusable.

The majority fails to consider the Code
of Criminal Procedure articles pertinent to
the issue presented by these bills of excep-
tions:

“Art. 704. Severance

“Jointly indicted defendants shall be
tried jointly unless:

“(1) The state elects to try them sepa~
rately; or

“(2) The court, on motion of the de-
fendant, and after contradictory heating
with the district attorney, is satisfied
that justice requires a severance.”

“Art. 705. Effects of severance

“When the court has ordered sever-
"ance of an indictment, the district at~
torney shall file separate indictments.

57 |

“In the case of a grand jury indict-
ment, no further action by the grand
jury is required. Severed indictments
shall be considered as filed on the date of
the filing of the original indictment.
Proceedings under the original indict-
ment are not affected by the severance
except insofar as they may be incon-

sistent with some other provision of this
Code. The effects of a severance, as
stated it this article, apply to severances
under Articles 532(3) and 704.” (Em-
phasis. supplied.) 7

‘These articles demand the filing of sepa-
rate indictments not only when the defend-
ant moves for and is granted a severance,
but also when the State severs voluntarily.
The last sentence of Article 705 does not
limit the application of the requirements of
that article to severances obtained by the
defendant; rather, it states that all sever-
ances made under the authority of Article
704 are subject to the effects of Article
705. This includes severances made at the
election of the State. See Comment (a)
of Article 705.

A physical severance—separation of the’
indictment—is required and cannot be
achieved by the judge, or anyone else,
orally amending the indictment by deletion
of that portion concerning the other per-
son charged.

‘ For these reasons I concur.

267 So.2d 193

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Rohert DUNN.
No, 52311.
Oct. 4, 1972.

Dissenting Opinion Oct. 10, 1972.

—+——

Norman M. Magee, Ferriday, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. C. Falk-
enheiner, Dist. Atty., George F. Griffing,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Robert L. Dunn, was con-
victed of two counts of simple burglary
(LaR.S. 14:62). The premises allegedly
burglarized were the Jonesville Park and
Wash (a washateria) and the Enterprise
High School in Jonesville, Louisiana.

These premises were entered and money
was stolen from vending machines therein.
During the trial, defendant reserved and
perfected three bills of exception.

Bills of exception No. 1 and 2 are re-
lated to the same facts and will be con-
sidered together. The defendant, during
the course of the police investigation, gave
two written statements to the police. Prior
to making the first statement, defendant
was given the Miranda warnings and the

61 Le

statement shows on its face that he waived
his rights, The second statement was made
several hours after the first; however, no
Miranda warnings were given the defend-
ant immediately prior to this second state-
ment.

HH At the trial, defense counsel ob-
jected to the introduction of the first state-
ment on the grounds that it was irrelevant
and contained highly prejudicial material.
Defense reserved Bill No. 1 to the trial
judge’s overruling his objection. This first
statement contained an admission by the
defendant that he had cashed a “hot” check
on the day of the alleged burglary, but it
also contained an admission by the defend-
ant that on the day on which the burglaries
occurred he had been on the premises
(The

burglarized during the daytime.

burglary occurred during the night.)

Although the admission concerning the
“hot” check is irrelevant as far as proving
the defendant committed a burglary, the
admission that he was at the scene of the
crime some hours prior to its occurrence
is certainly relevant to prove an alleged
burglary by defendant. Therefore, the
statement is admissible in its entirety as
an admission. LSA-R.S. 15:450. The bill
is without merit.

4. This statement amounted to a confession
of guilt by the defendant.

2. The text of the charge is as follows:
“Where the offense charged has ‘unau-

62

HMM Bit of exceptions No. 2 was re-
served when the trial court overruled de-
fense counsel’s objection to the introduc-
tion into evidence of the second statement.
The ground for objection was that the
Miranda warnings were not given the de-
fendant immediately prior to his making:
this statement.

We hold that under the circumstances
here, there was no necessity to give the
Miranda warnings to the defendant prior
to his making this second statement. The
defendant was given the Miranda warnings
prior to his making the first statement;
the second statement was given on the next
morning. The purpose of the Miranda
warnings is to insure that an accused is
aware of his constitutional rights, In light
of the fact that the defendant was given
the Miranda warning on the night prior to
his making this second statement, we are
unable to say that the defendant was not.
aware of his rights,

This bill we find to be without merit.

Bill of exceptions No. 3 was reserved
when the trial court refused to give a spe-

‘cial instruction to the jury to the effect

that entering into a building open to the
public could not be an “unauthorized entry”
for purposes of the simple burglary of—
fense® (See LSA-RS. 14.62)

thorized entry’ as one of its elements,
the entry into a truck stop, or other place
of public accommodation during the busi-
ness hours is not an ‘unauthorized entry’

$3

HMM W¢ conclude that it was error for

- the trial judge to refuse to give the special
instruction requested by defendant. One
of the essential elements of a burglary is
an unauthorized entry. As we appreciate
an entry
with the consent of the owner, express or
implied, is not unauthorized. In the case
of a building which is open to the public,
the consent to enter the building at the
times which it is open to the public and

the term “unauthorized entry,”

within the confines designated is implied.
Therefore, there is no unauthorized entry
becatse consent is present.

The state contends that since the legisla-
ture abolished the requirement of a “break-
ing” which was contained in the 1942 crimi-
nal code, all that is necessary for burglary
now is an entry with intent to commit a
theft or felony, The state argues that the
entry is made unauthorized by the fact
that there was an intent to steal present.”

As we construe the burglary statute, the
entry must be unauthorized and this must
be determined as a distinct element of the
offense separate and apart from the intent
to steal. If the legislature desired that
burglary consist of only an entry with in-
tent to steal, they would have omitted the
word unauthorized. ‘

as required by law and was made in the
exercise of his right to enjoy equal ac-
cess to a place of public accommodation
under the civil rights act... .

64

We conclude that an entry into a build-
ing open to the public at the designated
hours and within the designated confines
is not an unauthorized entry, regardless of
the intent of the person so entering. See
Smith v. State of Alaska, Alaska, 362 P.
2d 1071, 93 A.L.R.2d 525.

IM The trial judge when requested by
defense counsel to give the special charge
stated that the matter of unauthorized en-
try was covered by the general charge to
the jury. We have examined the general
charge and are of the opinion that it de-
fines unauthorized entry in a general man-
ner only and did not cover the point at
Additionally, although the re-
quested charge may have been inartistically

issue here.

drawn this would not warrant a rejection
of it by the trial judge. State v. Hills, 241
La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1960).

Therefore, the instruction requested by
defendant should have been given and the
failure to do so substantially prejudiced
the rights of the defendant. This convic-
tion is to be reversed.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are reversed,

SANDERS, J., dissents and assigns writ-
ten reasons.

The entering of a building which is open
to the public in general, does not consti-
tute an authorized entry as required by
LSA-B.8. 14:60 . . .

65 Le 66

SUMMERS, J., dissents,

SANDERS, Justice (dissenting).

In my opinion, the majority erroneously
holds that the trial judge’s refusal to give
the special charge requires reversal of the
conviction.

The requested charge reads as follows:

“Where the offense charged has ‘unau-
thorized entry’ as one of its elements,
the entry into a truck stop, or other
place of public accommodation during the
business hours is not an ‘unauthorized
entry’ as required by law and was made
in the exercise of his right to enjoy equal
access to a place of public accommoda-
tion under the civil rights act .

The entering of a building which is open
to the public in general, does not consti-
tute an authorized entry as required by
LSA-R.S. 14:60...”

Article 807 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides:

. . . “A requested special charge
shall be given by the court if it does not
require qualification, limitation, or ex~
planation, and if it is wholly correct and
pertinent. It need not be given if it is in-
cluded in the general charge or in an-
other special charge to be given.”

Obviously, the charge is not wholly cor-
rect and pertinent. .

The truck stop referred to in the special
charge is completely foreign to the case.
The buildings allegedly burglarized here
‘were a washateria and a high school build-
ing. Likewise, the Civil Rights Act ap-
pears to be foreign to the subject matter
of the litigation.

‘The final paragraph of the charge con-
veys the meaning that all entries into build-
ings that are open to the public are wnau-
thorized, an incorrect statement of the
law.

The trial judge states that the matter
contained in the special charge was covered
by the general charge. The general charge
was not made a part of the bill of excep-
tions. Hence, under the established juris-
prudence, we accept the trial judge’s decla-
ration as conclusive. State v. Barnes, 257
La. 1017, 245 So2d 159 (on rehearing);
State v. Martin, 250 La. 705, 198 So.2d 897;
State v. Bickham, 236 La. 244, 107 So.2d
458; State v. Stracner, 190 La. 457, 182
So. 571; State v. Daleo, 179 La. 516, 154
So. 437.

Assuming, however, that we can con-
sider the content of the general charge, as
the majority has done, the trial judge’s
position is amply supported, for he instruct-
ed the jury as follows:

“The crime of burglary must have the
following elements. First, there must be
entry of a building. Second: This en-
try must be unauthorized, that is to say

67

if the entry is an authorized entry as op-
posed to an unauthorized one, then one
of the essential elements is lacking.
Thirdly:
commit a theft of forcible felony.

there must be the intent to
(Ital-
jes mine).

“If you entertain any reasonable doubt
as to any fact or element necessary to
constitute the defendant’s guilt, it is your
sworn duty to give him the benefit of
that doubt and return a verdict of ac-
quittal.
demonstrates a probability of guilt, yet,
if it does not establish it beyond a rea-

And, even where the evidence

sonable doubt it is your duty to acquit.”

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully

267 $0.24 197

dissent.

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Henry Charles WALKER,

No, 52430.

Oct. 4, 1972.

iti

Anthony R. Messina, New Orleans, for
defendant-appellant,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garri-
son, Dist, Atty. Louise Korns, Asst, Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Henry Charles Walker,
appeals his conviction of simple burglary,

10

La.R.S. 14:62 for which he was sentenced
to serve eight years in the State Peniten-
tiary. The defendant relies upon two bills
of exceptions in pursuing his appeal.

HH Bill of Exceptions No. 1 alleges the
trial judge erred when he permitted two
slides containing fingerprints found at the
scene of the burglary to be introduced into
evidence. Counsel for the defense main-
tains the slides are objectionable because,
“there was no positive proof of being those
(the prints) that were taken from a partic-
ular place at the scene of the burglary.”

Counsel for the defense does not attack
the testimony of Officer Daniel O’Neil, the
fingerprint expert. His objection seems to
be centered around the “chain of custody”
of the physical fingerprint evidence. He
contends the State did not sufficiently
show that the fingerprint evidence sought
to be admitted was the same as that evi-
dence taken at the scene of the burglary.
This contention is without merit. On di-
rect examination, Officer O’Neil stated he
personally “lifted” the fingerprints from
various objects at the scene of the burgla-
ry. The crucial print slides which led to
the identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator of the burglary were labeled by
Officer O’Neil and identified as to their
source at the time he took the fingerprints.
The same testimony was repeated on

val Le 72

cross-examination, re-direct examination
and re-cross examination.

HI We find that this demonstrative ev-
idence was properly identified by the testi-
mony of Officer O’Neil. For admission
into evidence, it suffices if the custodial
evidence establishes that it is more proba-
ble than not that the object is the one con-
nected with the case. State v. Dotson, 260
La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971).

HM Regarding the “chain of custody”,
Officer O’Neil explained the procedures
followed by the latent print section of the
Crime Lab, specified the location, method
of preservation, classification, and those
who had access to the prints while in po-
lice custody. He unequivocally stated the
prints offered by the State were those he
took at the scene of the burglary. Such
testimony amply lays the foundation for
admitting the slides into evidence. La.C.
Cr.P. art. 773; State v. Dotson, supra.
Thus admitted, the connexity of this physi-
cal evidence to the culpability of the de-
fendant is a factual matter for determina-
tion by the jury. State v. Dotson, supra.

Bill of Exceptions No, 2 was taken to
the denial of a motion for new trial based
on the grounds advocated in Bill No. 1.
For the reasons stated this second bill also
lacks merit.

For the reasons assigned, conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

267 So.2d 198

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Frank HUDSON.

No, 52556,

Oct, 4, 1972.

Sanders Cazedessus, Baton Rouge, for

defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent

73 [| 7.

Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty, J. David McNeill,
ILL, Asst, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee,

PER CURIAM.

The trial court sustained defense coun-
sel’s motion to quash a Bill of Information
on the ground that further prosecution was
prescribed. The State appeals.

The defendant is charged with simple
burglary, La.R.S. 14:62, a non-capital bur-
glary. In such cases, La.C.Cr.P. Art. 578
(2) provides that, unless the time limita-
tion is interrupted or suspended, no trial
shall be commenced “after two years from
the date of institution of the prosecution.”

The State relies upon the provision of
La.C.Cr.P. Art. 579 that:

“The period of limitation established
by Article 578 shall be interrupted if:
Hoke

“(2) The defendant cannot be tried
because of insanity or because his pres-
ence for trial cannot be obtained by legal

process, or for any other cause beyond
the control of the state.

“The periods of limitation established
by Article 578 shall commence to run
anew from the date the cause of inter-

1, The notations on the bill show, however,
that on May 5, 1970 (i. ¢., prior to the
June 5 motion) the fixing on June 12,
1970 had been cancelled on motion of
the assistant district attorney, subject to
later re-assignment.

ruption no longer exists.’ (Emphasis

ours.)

The State contends that a motion for
continuance by the defense counsel in
which the State concurred interrupted pre-
scription.

The facts of this case are as follows:

The Bill of Information against the ac-
cused was filed on September 11, 1969.
Nothing was ever filed on behalf of the
defendant until a motion for continuance
was filed on June 5, 1970, which had a no»
tice attached, “I agree to a continuance in
the above matter”, signed by an Assistant
District Attorney.

The continuance was granted by the
Court, apparently (the record is not clear)
on June 12, 19704 when the notation shows
that the case was passed and re-assigned

for trial on September 23, 19702 Subse-
quently, the defendant’s case was assigned
for trial on May 29, 1972.

On this date defendant, filed a motion to
quash further prosecution because more
than two years had elapsed since the date
of filing the Bill of Information. In sus-
taining this motion, the trial court relied
upon the circumstance that the State had
agreed to the continuance and that there-
2. This assignment was cancelled on July

22, 1970. The case subsequently was

set March 15, 1972 on motion of the
State for trial on May 29, 1972.

15
forc the State’s inability to try the defend-
ant did not result from “cause beyond the
control of the state’, La.C.Cr.P. Art.
579(2).

The trial court ruled correctly. Sec
State v. Benson, 254 La. 867, 227 So.2d 913
(1969).

_ For the reasons assigned we affirm the
judgment of the trial court sustaining de-
fendant’s motion.

Affirmed.

267 So.2d 200

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Nathaniel SMITH.

No, 52324,

Oct. 4, 1972.

16

vil be 8

—+—_

Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Nathaniel Smith and Alvin
Hayes, and one other were charged with
the April 10, 1970 armed robbery (R.S.
14:64) of Peter J. Miranda in Baton

Rouge. After a trial by jury, Smith and

Hayes were convicted as charged. On
September 23, 1970, Smith was sentenced to
nine and one-half years and Hayes to nine
years in the penitentiary without benefit

of parole, probation or suspension of sen-

tence. Only defendant Smith appeals his

conviction and sentence. Five bills of ex-

ceptions were perfected.

TH ill of Exceptions No. 1 was
reserved to the trial judge’s overruling a
motion for a mistrial because the State
was allegedly using its peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of the prospective ju-
rors’ race.

There is no merit to this bill, Both the
State and the defendant are each entitled
C.Cr.P.
art. 799. The court has no power by law

to twelve peremptory challenges.

to control the State’s use of its peremp-
tory challenges. The record in this case
does not support the defendant’s conten-
tion that the sole reason that the various
jurors were peremptorily challenged was
because of their racé. We cannot say that
the district attorney used his peremptory
The
trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d
143; State v. Lee, 261 La. 310, 259 So.2d
334. See also C.Cr.P. art. 799.

challenges for an improper purpose.

Hl Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2 and 3
were reserved to the admission into evi-
dence of the taped statements of Smith

79 | 80

and Hayes, and the waiver of constitution-
al rights forms signed by them. An ex-
amination of the record discloses that the
State laid a proper foundation for the ad-
mission of these items. C.Cr.P. art, 773.
The tapes start off with a statement by the
interrogating police officer that the de-
fendants were advised of their constitu-
tional rights and that they had signed
waiver of rights forms to that effect, The
statements given were clear and unequivo-
cal confessions of participation in the
robbery; they were voluntary.
‘There is no merit to these bills. State v.
Brumfield, 254 La. 999, 229 So.2d 76; State
y. Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 So. 891,
rev'd on other grounds, Alexander v. Lou-
isiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct, 1221, 31 L.Ed.
2d 536; RS, 15:451.

armed

HI Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was re-
served to the court’s denial of the defend-
ant’s motion for a directed verdict of ac-
quittal. This court has declared Article
778 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
which allows directed verdicts unconstitu-
tional insofar as trials by jury. State v.
Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484.

4. Counsel does not specify what evidence
he objects to. A revolver stolen in the
robbery, and some cartridges found with
it, wero introduced into evidence upon
testimony that a third participant (Mor-
ris), charged but not tried with the de-
fendants Smith and Hayes, had volun-
tarily turned it’ over to police officers
after they had first unsuccessfully
searched his premises pursuant to a
search warrant, ‘Tr, 399-402. When

Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved to
the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
for a new trial, which was based on the
grounds alleged in Bill of Exceptions No.
1, For the reasorls discussed in relation
to Bill of Exceptions No. 1, there is not
merit to Bill of Exception No. 5.

HM oon this appeal, in brief, the de-
fendant for the first time contends that
evidence introduced against him was the
product of an unlawful arrest or of an
unlawful search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.4 No motion’to sup-
press such evidence on such ground was

ever filed prior to or even during trial,
La.C.Cr.P, art. 703. No objection was
made to the introduction of evidence at
the time it was introduced. La.C.Cr.P.
art. 841. The objections are therefore
deemed waived. Further, there was, of
course, no bill of exception reserved, in
the absence of which on appeal this court
cannot consider these contentions of the
La.C.Cr.P, arts. 844, 920.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction

defendants.

and sentence are affirmed.

these exhibits were formally introduced
along with the statement, tapes and waiv-
er forms, defendants objected only to in-
troduction of the tapes and waivers. ‘Tr.
406-07. As previously noted, the taped
statements and waivers were taken only
after the defendants were fully informed
of their constitutional rights and are
shown to have been freely and voluntarily
made.

267 So.2d 202

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Bill SPECKS.

No. 51700.

Oct. 4, 1972.

—.-_

Charles E, McConnell, Springhill, W.
Carl Roberts, Minden, for defendant-appel-
Jant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen.,“Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles A.
Marvin, Dist. Atty. James S. Harris, Asst.,
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM. |

Bill Specks has appealed trom his cori
viction of murder (La.R.S. 14:30) and his
sentence to life imprisonment. He relies
upon three bills of exceptions. .

The main thrust of the defendant’s three
bills are all aimed at the trial court’s grant-
ing continuances on oral motions made by
the District Attorney, alleging this was
contrary to the statutory and constitutional
requirements. The defendant urges that
the judge’s rulings were reversible error,
being an unreasonable abuse of his dis-
cretion and a denial of the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. Defendant’s trial
began February 8, 1971.

We take notice of the trial court’s Per
Curiam which explains that under the cir-
cumstances, the trial court had no alterna-
tive but to continue the case. On October
26, 1970, the date on which the case was
set for trial, the criminal docket of the
trial court was already trying a case be-
fore a jury and it was not possible to try

83

more than onc jury case on that date. In
regard to October 29, 1970, another case
was still in progress necessitating upsctting
the subject case without refixing.

While it was error on the part of the
trial court to grant the State its oral mo-
tion for the continuance without a written
motion pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Article 707,
and also to upset the trial date of October
29, 1970 without fixing another date, it was
The defendant does not
show he reurged his exception nor demon-
strated any prejudice flowing from the

not reversible.

granting of the continuance. We only re-
verse for error prejudicial to the rights
of the accused. La.C.Cr. Art. 921. See
also State v. Shilow, 260 La. 23, 255 So.2d
60 (1971).

For these reasons, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

267 So.2d 203

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Charles SAMPSON,

No. 52270.

Oct. 4, 1972.

James D. Davis, Alexandria, for defend-

ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O.
Ware III, Dist. Atty., Robert P. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Charles Sampson, was
indicted and charged with murder for the
November 21, 1970 killing of one David
C. Collins in Alexandria, Louisiana. Trial
was held November 16, 1971. Defendant
was found guilty without capital punish-
ment and sentenced to life imprisonment.

“85 be 86

Two bills of exceptions were perfected,
one of which was briefed.

In Bill of Exceptions No, 2 (the briefed
Dill), the defendant contends that the trial
court should have given an instruction to
the jury to determine the question of guilt
separaicly from the penalty because coun-
sel for the defendant would have to take
an inconsistent position with respect to
both guilt and penalty. The trial judge in
his per curiam to the bill stated that there
was “no provision of law permitting this
type procedure.”

There is no merit to the bill. The trial
judge’s per curiam is correct. The de-
fendant has no right to demand such a
procedure, State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605,
257 So.2d 121; State v. Harris, 258 La.
720, 247 So.2d 847; Crampton v. Ohio,
402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d
711; McGautha y. California, 402 U.S.
183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711.*

The remaining bill of exceptions was
neither briefed nor argued. We have ex-
amined it anyway and find it to be without
merit.

For the reasons assigned, the convic-
tion and sentence are affirmed.

* We do not find the case of United States
y. Jackson, 890 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209,
20 L.Wa.2d 188, applicable. ‘That case
along with Furman y. Georgia, 408 U.S.
288, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.d.2a 346, indi-
eate that only the imposition of the death
sentence is unconstitutional, in the former
because it infringes upon a defendant's

267 So0,.2d 204

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Roland CORBELLO.

No, 51832.

Oct. 4, 1972,

right to jury trial and in the latter because
it is cruel and unusual punishment. Those
eases do not stand for the proposition
that the Louisiana system in capital cases -
is unconstitutional, especially as applied
to the defendant in the case before us
because the defendant did not receive the __
death penalty,

87 es 88
Po him that he was a drug user. Then the
prosecutor asked: “In your opinion, Mr.

Raleigh Newman, Lake Charles, for de-
fendant-appelfant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Frank T.
‘Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Charles W. Richard,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

_/ Defendant appeals his conviction and
one year jail sentence for possession of
marijuana,

The state’s first witness was a deputy
sheriff in charge of an undercover nar-
cotics operation. He had employed two
persons, a man and a woman, to investi-
gate illegal narcotics activity; the man
was to be one of the main witnesses against
the defendant. On cross examination the
deputy was asked if he had been told that
the male “undercover agent” he had em-
ployed had been a drug user. The deputy
denied it.

On redirect, the assistant district attor-
ney (because, he said, he knew the deputy
interrogated the deputy

was mistaken)
about conversations with the estranged
wife of the agent. The deputy then testi-
fied that the agent’s estranged wife told

Hebert, is she (the agent’s wife) a sane,
reasonable woman?”. The defense object-
ed, stating: “He’s not a Psychiatrist, or
anything else. If she takes the stand the
jury can make their own determination
whether she is worthy of belief. That’s
not Mr, Hebert’s province.” (The woman
in question had been summoned by the de-
fense.)

The objection was overruled, and Bill
of Exceptions #6 was perfected.

Continuing his examination concerning
the sanity of the agent’s wife, the prose-
cutor asked: “And with your conversa-
tions with her did she appear to be a rea~
sonable or sane type of individual?”. The
deputy answered: “No, sir, she was not.
She appeared to be a real bad mental case,

sir!

HM There is no authority in Louisiana
allowing the impeachment of a prospective
witness. To the contrary, such procedure
is specifically prohibited. R.S. 15.484 pro-

vides:

“Before a witness has been sworn he can
be neither corroborated nor impeached,
nor is testimony to establish the credi-
pility of a witness admissible until that
credibility has been attacked.”

89

conviction and sentence must be reversed.

In addition, error was committed in the
trial court in connection with the examina-
tion of character witnesses for the defend-
ant, Bill of Exceptions # 11 was perfected
when an objection was sustained to the
following question asked a defense witness:
“Mr. Boise, have you heard of his reputa-
tion in this community discussed for being

Dn
Bill of Exceptions #6 is good, and the

90

law abiding—for being a law abiding citi-
zen?”

HM Excluding such evidence was er-
ror. Evidence of the good character of the
accused is always admissible, and depends
on his general réputation. R.S, 15:479, 480.

The conviction and sentence are re-
versed,

91 [| 92

| The petition of relator in the above num-
267 So.2a 206 bered and entitled cause having been duly
considered,
Louis E. MOOSSY
v It is ordered that the Honorable James
HUCKABAY HOSPITAL INC. R. Alexander, Judge of the First Judicial

District Court, Parish of Caddo, without
delay act on relator’s petition for a writ

Oct. 17, 1972. of habeas corpus filed in that Court, and
make a determination of its merits.

No. 52868.

Tt is ordered that the wrt of review ise 7

sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be noti-
fied. |
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Charles HEBERT
L

ve
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-

267 $0.24 206 ana State Penitentiary, et al.
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Clinton No. 52729.
ANDERSON

v Oct. 17, 1972.

. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
aha State Penitentiary, et al.

No, 52854.

Oct. 17, 1972. . .
Writs refused. Considering the per

does not warrant the exercise of our super-

visory jurisdiction or original jurisdiction.

=
267 $o.2d 206

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
George R. TERRELL

Vv.

cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 52669.

Oct. 17, 1972.

Writ refused. Since relator has served
his sentence and has been finally dis-
charged from custody, the questions raised
by his application are now moot.

Z
267 $0.24 207

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Charles HARRIS.

ve

, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary,

No. 52798.

Oct, 17, 1972.

94

Writ denied. Based on evidentiary hear-
ing held in the trial court, we find that
the factual allegations concerning trial and
pre-trial prejudice to be without merit.
Further, the petitioner was represented by
retained counsel at the times. See also
State v. Harris, 260 La, 872, 257 So.2d 643

(1972).

|
267 So.2d 207

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Georgette HUNDLEY, Diana Hundley
et al.
No, 52893,

Oct, 17, 1972,

The petition of relators in the above
numbered and entitled cause having beet
duly considered,

‘The Juvenile Court in and for the Parish
of Jefferson Davis is ordered to hold a bail
hearing within twenty-four (24) hours and
fix bail in accordance with Code of Crimi-

95 Es 96

nal Procedure Article 317. See State v.
Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So.2d 211, and
In Re: Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18
L.Ed.2d 527 (1966).

|
267 So.2d 207
STATE of Loutsiana ex rel.
William RILEY
v.
Cc, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, LouisI-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 52842.

Oct. 17, 1972,

Writs denied. In view of the written
reasons by the trial’ judge the showing
made does not warrant the exercise of
our original or supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted. See Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.
2d 274,

TATE, J., dissents. In the absence of a
contemporaneous recording, the conclusion-

ary statement in the minutes at the time of
the plea of guilty that the Boykin interro-
gation was conducted does not justify the
denial of an evidentiary hearing on the pe-
titioner’s allegations that no such interro-
gation took place and that the minutes’
general allegations are not correct.

DIXON, J., dissents from refusal.

L
267 So.2d 207
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Welton BROWN
ve
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 52833,

Oct, 17, 1972.

Writs denied. In view of the reasons as-
signed by the trial judge, the showing made
does not warrant the exercise of our origi-
nal or supervisory jurisdiction,

97 a 98,

LI Writ denied. The petitioner has no right
267 $0.24 208 to bail pending review of a revocation of
probation. Cf, La.C.Cr.P. Art, 899, subd.
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. lon
Aubrey Leon HAYNES
v.

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louis!- BARHAM, J., concurs. There is no
ana State Penitentiary. right to bail here but upon a proper show-
No. 82888, ing of abuse which is not made here, the

Court can in the exercise of its supervisory
Oct. 17, 1972. rs . + *
jurisdiction stay execution with or without

Application denied. The application for

mandamus is moot in view of the return f |
of the district judge. As shown therein,

relator is not entitled to a writ of habeas

corpus on the merits.

7 Br AES

Michael E. CULLIGAN

vy
Py : Wade 0. MARTIN, Jr., Secretary of State,
State of Louisiana, et al.
267 $0.24 208 No. 52698.
Charlene Mary SALA Oct. 11, 1972.
ve .
Louis A. HEYD, Jr. "
No. 52874. P|
Oct. 17, 1972.

Writ refused. This Court will not exer-

cise its supervisory jurisdiction when due
to the element of time, any judgment which

99 De 100
might be rendered could not become effec- |
tive to afford relator the relief sought. 207 $0.24 209
DIXON, J., is of the opinion that the Thelma Elizaheth BILLIOT
time element does not prevent the con- v
sideration of the issues; ballots have not Joel Henry ROUSSELLE, Jr.
No, 52845.

been printed, except for absentee ballots.
Downs v. Pharis, 240 La. 580, 124 So.2d Oct, 19, 1972.

553, is probably in error, and, if so, should

Writ denied. The judgment is not final.

t
|
267 So.2d 208
267 So.2d 209
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Jesse HARVEY STATE of Louisiana ex rel,.Lee LANE
v ve
©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi- C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary. ana State Penitentiary.
No. 52856. No. 52859.
Oct. 17, 1972. Oct. 17, 1972."

Writ denied. The assignment of error | Writ refused. The showing made does
raied in this Court is without merit as a not warrant the exercise of our original
matter of law. or supervisory jurisdiction.

I
267 $0.24 209

J. ©. BAKER, d/b/a Alexandria
Welding and Press

ve
J. M. NELSON.

No. 52867.

Oct, 17, 1972.

Writ denied. Under the facts found by
the Court of Appeal, there is no error of

law.

Lt]
267 $0.24 209

George KARAM
ve

ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE
CO, and A. E. Darbonne, Jr.

No. 52882.

Oct. 19, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be no-

tified.

'
267 So.2d 210

TOYE BROS, YELLOW CAB COMPANY
v.
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al.

No, 52811.

Oct, 19, 1972.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the
Court of Appeal, the result is correct.

McCALEB, C. J., and HAMLIN and
SUMMERS, JJ., are of the opinion that a
writ should be granted.

108 — 104

267 So.2d 210

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ben Application denied. The judgment is

Frank ROBERTSON =~ correct,
vw
©, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
SUMMERS, BARHAM and DIXON,

ana State Penitentiary.
JJ. are of the opinion the result is correct.

No, 52857.

Oct. 19, 1972.

| | —
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Leo LAZART

ve

C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-

Application denied. The trial Judge was
correct in his ruling after the evidentiary
hearing.

: ana State Penitentiary, et al.
267 So.2 210 No. 52853.
Aubrey HARRIS, Sr. Oct. 19, 1972.
ve

HUVAL BAKING COMPANY, INC., et al.,
Gulf Coast Lines Employees’ Hos-
pital Association,

No. 52869.

Oct. 19, 1972. Writ denied. The showing made does

not warrant the exercise of this Court’s
supervisory jurisdiction.

a 106

267 So.2d 211

Application denied. The resul€ is correct,
Almon JOHNSON et ai.

v BARHAM, J., concurs in the denial.
B. L. SWEAT. The action is incorrectly styled one under
No. 52876. “the “Intrusion into Office Statute” R.S.
42:71-87. The suit is one in Quo Warran-
to. Code of Civil Procedure Arts. 3901-3902.
The definition of “Public Offcer” is con-
tained in R.S. 42:71 and does not apply to
this officer. “Public Officer” under the
Code provisions does include this office
holder.

Oct. 19, 1972.

Application denied; the judgment com-

plained of is not final. P|
| | 7

267 So.2d 214
1 Joseph Enos THERIOT
ve
207 So.2d 211 TRANSIT CASUALTY COMPANY and
Jim 8. Hebert.
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Paul BROUSSARD No. 52872.
ve Oct, 19, 1972,

Harold GAUTHE and Lafayette Parish
School Board, Intervenor.

No. 52877.

Oct, 19, 1972.

S| Writ denied. The result is correct.

107 — 108

BARHAM and TATE, Justices, concur-
ring in the writ denial: While the result is
correct, we are of the opinion that liability
for the damage here should be founded
upon the theory of strict liability under
Civil Code Articles 2315 and 2317. In Cart-
wright v. Firemen’s Insurance Company
of Newark, New Jersey, 254 La. 330, 223
So.2d 822, this court said that although
Article 2317 made one responsible for dam-
age occasioned by “the things which we
have in our control”, that article was modi-
fied by Articles 2315 and 2316. That case
then stated that “fault” under those articles
‘was a prerequisite to recovery in cases such
as this, but the court construed “fault” at
that time to mean only “negligence”. In
Langlois vy. Allied Chemical Corporation,
258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133, this court ex-
panded the “fault” concept and categorical-
ly held that “fault” as defined in Articles
2315 and 2316 included acts and omissions
other than those defined as negligent. The
Cartwright rationale is therefore inappli-
cable now, and the application of res ipsa
lJoquitur by the appellate court to establish
negligence in the case at hand was unneces-
sary. The owner of the vehicle from which
the tire was thrown is responsible for the
damage occasioned to the innocent third
party under the theory of strict liability.
See concurrence in Cartwright v. Firemen’s
Insurance Company of Newark, New
Jersey, 213 So.2d 154 (La.App. 3rd Cir.
1968).

L
267 $0.24 212

Gerald D. NORRIS
Y.
STATE of Louisiana et al.
No. 52878.

Oct. 19, 1972.

Application denied. The return of the:
District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans

shows that he will endeavor to secure the:
return of Applicant to Louisiana for trial.

Ld
267 So0.24 212

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
W. Heyward RESTER
v.

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No, 52878.

Oct. 19, 1972.

Writ refused. The showing made is in~

sufficient to warrant the exercise of our
original or supervisory jurisdiction,

‘109 a 10
1

267 So.2d 212

“STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPART-
MENT OF HIGHWAYS Writ refused. On the facts found by the

w Court of Appeal we find no error of law
James M. MENEFEE ot al. in its judgment.

No. 52883.

Oct. 19, 1972.

Writ denied. On the facts found by the f

Court of Appeal the judgment is correct.
267 So.2d 213

Leland F. HORTMAN et al.
} | ‘
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
State of Louisiana,
' No. 52885,

267 So.2d 212 Oct. 19, 1972.

Finis Leach CLAMPITT et al.
ve
DAVIS BROTHERS LUMBER CO. et al.

No, 52887.

Oct, 19, 1972. Application denied. On the facts found

by the court of appeal, the application fails
to demonstrate error of law.

|
267 So.24 218

TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION
CORPORATION et al.

ve
David Roy ARCENEAUX et al.

No, 52886.

Oct. 19, 1972,

Writ refysed. The result is correct.

Ll
267 80.24 218

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Earl ANDREWS
v

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Loutisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52897.

Get, 19, 1972.

Writs refused. ‘The showing made does
not warrant the exercise of our super-
visory jurisdiction or original jurisdiction.

Lt]
267 So.2d 213

Robert MATTHEWS
ve

The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
et al.

No. 52894,

Oct. 19, 1972.

Writ not considered. This is a civil pro-
ceeding, and relator has not shown that he-
has exhausted his remedy of applying for
review in the court of appeal.

L
267 So.2d 218
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Henry D., MODELIST

v.

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louls!-
ana State Penitentiary et al.

No. 52896.

Oct, 19, 1972,

Application denied. On the showing
made, relator is not entitled to the relief
sought.

113
267 So.2d 541

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Grady BREWER.

No, 51695.

Oct. 4, 1972,

i14

15

ms

116

—+—

Steven N. Cowel, Henley A. Hunter,
Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. John A.
Richardson, Dist, Atty., Fred C. Sexton,
Jr., Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-appellee..

PER CURIAM.

The defendant Grady Brewer, was tried’
by jury and found guilty of Murder, La.R.
S. 14:30. He was sentenced to life impris-
onment in the State Penitentiary. He ap-
peals this conviction and sentence, relying
on 11 bills of exceptions to obtain a rever-
sal.

HMM Bill of Exceptions No. 1, though
not argued by defense counsel in his brief
and therefore considered abandoned, is.

117

nevertheless without substance. Here, de-
fendant alleged he had the right to be ad-
vised of the list of State’s witnesses. It is
well settled in our jurisprudence that the
ruling which permits a pretrial inspection
‘of written statements by an accused does
‘not apply to such extended pre-trial discov-
very. See State v. Pesson, 256 La, 201, 235
So.2d 568 (1970); State v. Anderson, 254
“La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329 (1969).

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 6 and 7 all
relate to the introduction of the alleged
murder weapon, a knife. The defendant
-contends that prejudicial error occurred
when the trial court overruled his motion
“for suppression of the knife into evidence
based upon the grounds of, (1) lack of
probable cause for his arrest; (2) subse-
quent alleged illegal seizure of the knife;
(3) failure of the arresting officers to ad-
vise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda
y. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); and (4) because the
State allegedly failed to show conclusive
identification and proper chain of custody
-of the knife.

First, as to the contention of the lack of
“probable cause for the defendant’s arrest:

HHMI On the trial of the motion to
‘suppress under this contention, the burden
‘of proof was on the defendant. La.C.Cr.P.
art, 703(C). The defendant presented no
evidence to support this allegation, Only
the defendant and his mother took the

118

stand to testify on other issues but neither
contributed any supporting evidence that
the arresting officers did not have proba-
ble cause to make a warrantless arrest for
the murder. La.C.Cr.P. art. 213.

Hl Second, in regard to the subsequent
seizure of the alleged murder weapon: Ac-
tually no search and seizure were involved.
here when the police obtained the knife by
following specific directions of the accused
and his mother. The police, who exerted
no effort to coerce or dominate either the
accused or his mother, were not obligated
to refuse the defendant’s directions and his
request for them to take the knife from the
designated hiding place, a clothes basket.
See also, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S, 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564
(1971). We therefore, find this aspect of
the defendant’s contentions to be without
merit.

Hl Thirdly, the defendant alleges he
was not advised of his right to remain si-
lent at the time of his arrest, pursuant to
Miranda, supra. We find no merit to this
objection. Miranda expressly excludes
from its prior-warning requirements spon-
tancous volunteered statements given with-
out compelling influence or custodial inter-
rogation (ic. questioning). 384 U.S. 478,
86 S.Ct. 1630. See also State v. Hall, 257
La. 253, 242 So.2d 239 (1970). As was
confirmed by the defendant’s own testimo-
ny, he voluntarily, spontaneously asked the

119

then proceeded to tell them where to find
it,

HE Fourthly, it is contended that the
State failed to establish the chain of custo-
dy of the knife with sufficient certainty,
and the evidence should not have been ad-
mitted.
plains that the knife was admittedly mis-
placed by the State and was not available
at the outset of the trial. At the trial,
however, the State did introduce the knife
through the identification of its witness,
Dr. Stuart DeLee, who identified it, based
on the brown envelope in which it was
placed. The objection is addressed to the
weight, not to the admissibility, of the evi-
dence. State v. Isaac, 261 La. 487, 260
So.2d 302 (1972).

Specifically, the defendant com-

We find no merit to Bills of Exceptions
Nos. 2, 6 and 7.

HI Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3 and 4
both pertain to continuances granted to the
State over objections entered by the de-
fendant, We find no abuse of discretion
in, and no prejudice flowing from, the rul-
ing of the trial court. La.C.CrP, art. 712.
‘These bills of exceptions are without merit.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 5 deals with
the denial of the defendant’s objection to
the admissibility of photographic evidence
which depicts the deceased as he lay on the
floor where he died. The basis for the

officers, “dor’t you want the knife?” and

126.

objection was that the photographs were
“gory”.

As stated in State v. Hall, 256 La. 336,
236 So.2d 489 (1970), and again reiterated
in State v. Maiden, 258 La. 417, 246 So.2d
810 (1971), “[t]he fact that objects or pho-
tographs constitute or portray a repulsive
spectacle and tend to prejudice the jury
furnish no valid grounds for their exclu--
sion where they are otherwise relevant
* * * These photographs were clearly
relevant to the burden imposed upon the-
State to establish the killing beyond a.
reasonable doubt.” As in State vy. Hall, su-
pra, they were illustrative of the manner in
which the killing was accomplished. See
State v. Mehan, 262 La. 611, 264 So.2d
581 (1972) and cases cited therein.

Thus, we find no error in the ruling of
the trial judge permitting the introduction.
of the photographs in evidence.

|| Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8, 9 and
10 were taken to the trial court’s over-
ruling defense counsel’s post-trial motions
that the state had failed to identify the de-
ceased as the person named in the indict--
ment. There was some evidence as to the
identity of the victim. When there is some:
evidence to sustain the conviction, this
court cannot pass upon the sufficiency”
thereof. State v. Coleman, 260 La. 897,
257 So.2d 652 (1972). The allegations in
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8, 9 and 10 are
without merit.

121

Bill of Exceptions No, 11 takes excep-
tion to the trial court’s denial of defend-
ant’s Motion to Furnish a Full Trial Tran-
script, Defense counsel bases his argu-
ment on a U.S. Court of Appeal (Fifth
Circuit) case, Mack v. Walker, 372 F.2d
170 (1966), wherein that Court stated that
when a defendant alleges his being found
guilty is “contrary to law and the evi-
dence” or that there was “no evidence” to
sustain his conviction, he shall be supplied
a full transcript notwithstanding La.C.Cr.
P. art. 844 which refers to the ingredients
of the Bill of Exceptions as forming the
basis for appellate review by this Court.

In this case the defendant filed a motion
for a new trial on the grounds that the
verdict was “contrary to the law and evi-
dence.” This motion was followed about
two weeks later by an amended motion for
a new trial which alleged there was “no
evidence” to support the conviction. Tak-
en together, neither the original motion for
a new trial or the amended motion present
anything for this Court to review where
the motions are devoid of any proof or al-
legations of what the missing evidence is
or what elements of proof were omitted.
At best, the list of grounds on which the
accused bases his motions for a new trial
are speculative, and it was clearly within
the province of the jury to have deter-
mined to its satisfaction the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence on these
grounds in making their determination of

122

guilt or innocence. At no place does the
defendant allege that a factual element es-
sential to a lawful conviction is omitted
from the proof. Only general allegations
as to the sufficiency of the evidencé are

set forth.

HE In our state, the scope of ap-
pellate review in criminal matters covers
“questions of law alone.” Determination
of the factual questions of guilt or inno-
cence, such as whether or not the defend-
ant acted in self-defense, or in the heat of
passion upon provocation, or was under the
influence of alcohol, as he alleges inter
alia, is within the sole province of the
jury. La.Const. Art. 7, Sec. 10; Art. 19,
Sec. 9.

HE Ferther, pursuant to La.C.Cr.P.-
art. 858, this Court may not review the
granting or the refusal to grant a new
trial, except for error of law. We are not
directed to any legal error and we find
none here,

TH Neither do we find the error com-
plained of (failure to provide a full tran-
script) has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice, is prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused, or constitutes a sub-
stantial violation of a constitutional or
statutory right. La.C.Cr.P, art. 921. The
evidence attached to the bills of exceptions
in the instant case provides a full base for
appellate review on the questions of law.

123 — 124

The situation alleged by the accused does
not fit the “exception to the general rule”
advanced by the Circuit Court of Appeal in
Mack v. Walker, supra. Neither is the deci-
sion in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76
S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) also cited
by defense counsel, controlling. Under
these circumstances, we do not find the
trial court committed any error. This bill
of exceptions is without merit. State v.
Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329
(1969).

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

267 So.2d 544

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Eastland Ray ALLEN.

No. 52389.

Oct. 4, 1972.

125 Le 126

—+—_

Office of Public Defender, Murphy W.
Bell, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appel-
lant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., War-
ren E. Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sar-
gent Pitcher, Jr. Dist. Atty. J. David
McNeill, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plain-
tiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On September 28, 1971, defendant plead-
ed guilty in the district court to a charge
of theft of an automobile, valued in excess
of $100.00, and was sentenced to three
years at hard labor. LaRS. 14:67. He
was represented by appointed counsel. At
the same time another theft charge pend-
ing against defendant was nolle prossed.
He appeals this conviction.

Hl A plea of guilty waives all defects
prior to that plea except those jurisdic-
tional defects which appear on the face of
the pleadings and proceedings. State v.
Coats, 260 La. 64, 255 So2d 75 (1971).
We have reviewed the pleadings and pro-
ceedings for discoverable error, La.C.Cr.
P. Art. 920(2), and find none.

HI Defendant argues that his guilty
plea was not knowing and voluntary be~
cause he did not realize that the intention
to deprive permanently the owner of the
thing taken is an essential element of theft,
and the trial court should not have ac-
cepted the guilty plea when the defendant
did not freely admit that he intended to
permanently deprive the owner of the thing
taken. This is neither a jurisdictional de-
fect nor an error discoverable by an in-
spection of the pleadings and proceedings.
Nevertheless, having examined the tran-
script of the Boykin examination, we are
satisfied that the trial court did not err
in accepting petitioner’s guilty plea. All
of petitioner’s rights were explained to him
and expressly waived by him. The trial
court explained in detail the elements of
the charge, and the possible penalty there-
for, and defendant continued to advise
the court that he wanted to plead guilty to
the one theft charge. See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27
LEd.2d 162 (1970).

The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree
only.

BARHAM, J, dissents and assigns rea-
sons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The defendant entered a guilty plea to
the charge of theft of an automobile
valued in excess of $100.00. The trial

127

judge made a voir dire examination to de-
termine whether the defendant's plea was
knowing and voluntary. After the judge
complied with the Boykin requirements of
ascertaining that the defendant waived his
constitutional rights, the inquiry continued
to determine whether the defendant was
actually guilty of the crime with which he
was charged—that is, whether every ele-
ment of the crime was a part of the act
which brought him before the bar of jus-
tice. In this inquiry the defendant made
known to the judge that an essential in-
gredient of theft, that is, the intent to
permanently deprive'the owner of thie-thing
misappropriated, was absent. The col-
Joquy between the judge and the defend-
ant was as follows:

“BY THE COURT:

“Q All right, Mr. Eastland. Bill num-
ber 85,809 charges you with auto theft.
How do you plead?

“A Guilty.

“THE COURT: All right, swear him in

and let’s see if I can take his plea.

“EASTLAND RAY ALLEN, having been

duly sworn, testified as follows:

“BY THE COURT:

“Q Come sit down and talk to me a while.
State your full name for the record?

“A Eastland Ray Allen.
Allen.

OR Kk

Eastland Ray

De
“BY THE COURT:

“Q) Mr. Allen—
“-

128

Yes, sir.

“Q —I will probe you or ask you a series
of questions. I don’t do this for the
purpose of embarrassing you—it is
an honest effort to be sure that you
understand the consequences of your
proposed guilty plea this morning.
Because you give up very substantial
rights afforded to you as a person
accused of a crime by entering this
guilty plea. I have to be sure that

you understand the consequences, even
though you have a lawyer I have to
canvass this area for the sole purpose
of these questions, Do you wnder-
stand?

“A Yes, sir.

eK ok

“Q Yes, what do you understand you are

charged with?

“A With car theft and theft.

“Q Well, the bill says commit a theft of
a 1969 Dodge Charger, two-door hard-
top valued at in excess of One Hun-
dred Dollars, which puts it in the fel-
ony category. I want to read to you
Article 67 of the Criminal Code, and
I quote:

om Ox

“In other words, theft—if you take some-
thing of value that belongs to somebody

129

other than yourself—either by means of
fraudulent conduct or representations, and
at the time of the taking you intend not to
return the object of the theft of the crime,
these are known as the elements of the
crime—taken without the consent and with
the intent to permanently deprive and that
Now, specifically, on
the third—on the second day of August,
71, with reference to this ’69 Dodge
Charger, did you engage in the conduct
that’s prohibited by this Article?

it had some value.

“A I guess so, I don’t understand what
you are talking about.

“Q
“A

“Q

Did you take the car?
Yes, sir. °

Did you take it without the consent
of the owner?

“Kn

“Q

Yes, sir.

Did the car have any value—was it
worth anything?
“A

«Q

Yes, sir.
Was it worth more than a Hundred
dollars?

“A Yes, sir.

“Q All right, at the time you took it did

you intend not to take it back to the
owner?

CaN

“9
“A

I really couldw’t say.

You don’t know?

I don’t know,
a

“g

“A
"9

“Q

“A
“Q
“A
“9

“a
“«Q
“nw

“Q
“A

“Q
“nn

“Q

oN
“9

«A

130

Aé the time you were apprehended
were you on the way to return it from
where you had taken it?

Yes, sir.
You were?
Yes, sir, The keys were in it,

The keys were in it when you took
it. How near were you to where you
had taken it from when you were ap-
prehended?

You mean where did I get it from?
Um-hum?
On the side of Prescott Body Shop.

What were you doing at the time you
were apprehended?

What was I doing?
Um-hum?
You mean arrested?
Um-hum?

I was on my way back from New Or-
leans to Prescott Body Shop.

You were going to put it back?
Yes, sir.

What prohibited you from putting it
back? What stopped you from put-
ting it back?

I got arrested.

But for that arrest you were going
to take it back?

Yes, sir.

181

“Q Did anybody know you were going
to take it back? Did you testify to
that point?

“A No, sir.

“oe The maximum that could be
levied would be ten years and a three
thousand dollar fine. Pretty stiff. Being
apprised of what the penalty is, do you still
_want to plead guilty?

“A Yes, sir.

“Q > Are you doing this on advice of coun-
sel?

“A No, on my own.

OK Ok OR

“Q You don’t want the State to have to
prove your guilt?

“A No, sir.

“Q You admit your guilt? I didn’t hear

an answer.

“A Yes, sin

“% All right; Eastland. Ray Allen,
state for the record, how do you plead to
the charge of felony theft on the second
"day of Atigust, 1971? ues

“A Guilty. |

“THE COURT: All right, record his plea.
Pll take.his plea.” (Emphasis, supplied.) .

Pretermitting a determination ‘of ‘wheth-
er the trial judge should.be required to as-

182

certain fron the defendant himself the
facts which brought him under. charge so

.as to determine whether they would support

a plea of guilty to that charge, I am of the
opinion that when the judge attempts to
make such a determination, he is bound to
respond to the information obtained. The
plea is not a knowing one, absent other cir-
cumstances such as plea-bargaining, when
an accused pleads guilty to an offense
which, according to his statement of facts,
he did not commit.

This record is devoid of any indication
that the defendant insisted upon pleading
guilty although he was not guilty. There is
no evidence that there was a bargain for
a reduced sentence. North Carolina v. Al-
ford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Bd.2d
162, is not controlling of this situation. In
Alford the defendant, declaring that. he
was not guilty of the offense to which he

“pleaded, insisted upon entering the guilty

plea because it was to his advantage not to
risk a harsher charge and penalty. More-
over, the court pointed out in that case that
the record contained strong evidence of
actual guilt. Here the record contains a
strong indication of innocence of this par-
ticular charge. ‘What is controlling of the

‘plea’ and what distinguishes this case from

Alford is that this defendant did not know
the elements of, the crime to which he
pleaded and that the facts clicited from
him denied the existence of one eésential

element. It is firmly established Jin ‘the

133

jurisprudence that a plea of guilty shall not
‘be accepted unless made voluntarily after
proper advice and with full understanding
of the consequences. Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.
Ed. 1009; Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473;
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct.
1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Further, and more
pertinent in this case, when the trial judge
assumes the duty of ascertaining that the
plea of guilty has basis in fact, that inquiry
must reflect a complete understanding by
the defendant, and assumptions not based
upon recotded responses that defendant had
such an understanding cannot stand. Me-
Carthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89
S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418; United States
v. Cody, 438 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Sanders, 435 F.2d 1282
(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Tucker,
425 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1970); Scott v.
United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 419
F.2d 264 (1968); Schnautz v. Beto, 416 F.
2d 214 (Sth Cir. 1969); United States v.
Rushing, 456 F.2d 1294 (Sth Cir. 1972);
Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959
(3rd Cir. 1870); United States v. Monaco,
456 F.2d 254 (3rd Cir. 1972).

‘The trial judge should have refused the
plea of guilty unless the defendant ad-
mitted he intended to permanently deprive
the’ owner of the automobile. “Alternative-
ly, the judge needed to ascertain that al-

134

though the defendant: knew he was ‘not guil-*
ty, after considered advice ‘and with knowl-
edge he was desirous of pleading guilty to
a reduced charge or for a lesser sentence.
This plea is unconstitutional.

I respectfully dissent.

267 So.2d 548

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Thankful FEAZEL.

No. 52413.

Oct. 4, 1972,

a

35

Leslie D, Ligon, Jr., Clinton, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Richard H.
Kilbourne, Dist. Atty. Fred C. Jackson,
Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

‘Thankful Feazel appeals from a convic-
tion of aggravated battery (La.R.S. 14:34)
in the 20th Judicial District Court, Honor-
able William T. Bennett, Judge, for which
he was sentenced to five years to the Loui-
siana State Penitentiary. The defendant
reserved three bills of exceptions.

HB The first bill excepts to the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a
continuance. The motion was made on the
grounds that one Freddie Lee Green, a
prospective witness for the defendant,
would not be available on the date set for
trial due to the inability of the defense
counsel to locate him.

Counsel for the defendant frankly admit-
ted he had not talked to the witness and
that he could not definitely say what the
witness’s testimony would be. The trial
court pointed out that the continuance re-
quested was based on the conjectural hope
that the absent witness might testify that

1837

the defendant had acted in self-defense, as
in fact the defendant and his four witness-
es at the trial did testify. In view of the
record which indicates that the defendant
was not deprived of any testimony which
he expected to elicit from the absent wit-
ness, we are unable to say that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the
motion for continuance nor that this preju-
diced the defendant in any manner. State
v. Dennis, 250 La. 125, 194 So.2d 720
(1971); State v. Polk, 258 La. 738, 247
So.2d 853 (1971). This bill is without merit.

I The second bill excepts to the deni-
al-of the defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict. In view of the holding in State v.
Hudson, 253 La, 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969)
which held that La.C.Cr.P. art. 778 (direct~
ed verdict)
trials, this bill is equally without merit.

is tinconstitutional in jury

“(IM The third bill reserved by de-
fendant excepts to the court’s denial of a
motion for a new trial.
based on the ground that there was a preju-

The motion was

dicial error in the proceedings to wit:
“|. in the prosecution’s closing, the
prosecution appealed to prejudice against
Louisiana State Penitentiary inmates
. . 2% The defendant did not object to
this nor reserve any bill of exceptions at
the time the alleged error occurred, there-
fore the alleged irregularity is. not present-
ed to this Court for review. La.C.Cr.P.
art. 841. We find no merit to the further

138

contention that there is no evidence at all
as to the aggravated battery, as the victim
himself testified that the accused struck
him across the face with a seine. (The
defendant and his witnesses did not deny

this, but claimed the blow was struck in

self-defense.)

The bills perfected by defendant are
without merit and there are no errors dis-
coverable on the face of the pleadings and
proceedings. The conviction and sentence
are affirmed.

267 So0.2d 550

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Robert James MILLER,

No, 52425.

Oct. 4, 1972.

139

Robert A. Connell, Jackson, for defend-
ppellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
TH. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Richard H.
Kilbourne, Dist. Atty., Fred C. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty,, for plaintiff-appellee,

PER CURIAM.
The defendant Miller was found guilty
of simple escape, La.R.S. 14:110.2, and was

140

sentenced to serve ten years in the State
Penitentiary said sentence to run consect-
tively with any sentence being served.
Two bills of exceptions are the hasis of
this appeal.

By his first bill of exceptions, defense
counsel argues that the trial court erred in
overruling defendant’s motion to quash the
bill of information on the ground that the”
time limitation for commencement of trial
had expired.

The defendant was charged by bill of in-
formation filed on August 11, 1969. He
was arraigned on September 5, 1969. On
or about September 20, 1970, .counsel for
the defendant prepared and served upon
the District Attorney for West Feli
Parish, a Motion for a Bill of Particulars

ana,

.and a Motion to Quash the Bill of Infor-

mation. On this same date, counsel also
served upon the District Attorney a supple-

mental motion for a Bill of Particulars.

“None of the defense motions was actually

filed. About 10 days later, the District At-
torncy filed an answer to defense counsel's
motions for a Bill of Particulars, including
the supplemental motion. The subject mat-
ter of the Motion to Quash was decided
adversely to the defendant in another case.
The Motion to Quash, like the motions for
Bills of Particulars, were never filed and
were not pursued further.

La.C.Cr.P. Art. 578 provides a two-year
limitation after institution of prosecution .

141

for the commencement of trial of a de-
fendant for a non-capital felony. Article
580, however, hinges the suspension of
running of the time limitation on the filing
of preliminary motions.1 Further, Art. 580
includes the requirement that “in no case
shall the state have less than one year aft-
er the [court’s] ruling to commence the

trial.”
we

+ It is the State’s contention under La.C.

CrP. Art. 580, the defendant filed prelimi-

nary’ motions thus interrupting prescrip- ‘

“The-'State refers to the’ defendant's
application for a bill of particulars and a
“supplementary application and a motion to
quash the Bill of Information submitted on
September 20, 1970 to which the State an-
-swered only the Bill of Particulars ten

tion.

days later.

However, the record does not indicate
that ‘the defendant “filed” his -preliminary
motions, in the sense of the law, nor did
the court make any rulings’on them. See
State v. Brazzel, 229 La. 1091, 87 So.2d
609 (1956), wherein this Court said, “A
documient is ‘filed’ when delivered in a
public office to the custodian of the
records thereof. * * * We find only:a
stipulation by both parties that the defense
counsel mailed his motions directly to the
District Attorney.

L “Ta... Art. 580 provides : .
“When a defendant files a niotion to.
quash. or. other preliminary ‘plea, the

running of the periods of limitation es- .
‘tablished by Article 578 shall’ be sus-*

142

We will reverse on the above specifica-
tion of error. We find jt unnecessary to

consider the remaining Bill of Exceptions.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence of the defendant are annulled

and set aside. The Bill of Information
against the defendant shall be quashed and
the same sliall not hereafter be revived. . '

267 So.2d 551

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Winfield A, HAYDEN.

No.. 52334.

‘Oct. 4, 1972.

pended until. the ruling of the court,
théreon but in no case shall the state
have less'than dne year aftet’ the! ruling . .
;to commence the trial.” :

Le 144
|

—+—

Robert L. Kleinpeter, Kleinpeter & Nev-
ils, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen,, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty, Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Winfield A. Hayden; ap:
peals his jury conviction of murder, La.R.
S. 14:30, for which he was sentenced to
life imprisonment in the State Penitentia-
ry. On appeal, the defendant relies upon
three bills of exceptions reserved and per-
fected during his trial,

HH Bill of Exceptions No. 1 alleges the
trial court erred when it allowed the State
to offer into evidence a tape recording of
an interrogation of the defendant conduct-
ed by deputies of the Sheriff's Department.
Counsel for the defense maintains the in-
terrogation, which he admits was initially
proper and complied with the requirements
of Miranda, became inadmissible as evi-
dence because of the badgering and harass-

145

ing tactics employed by the Sheriff's depu-
ties during the interrogation.

In reviewing the record we find the de-
fendant was advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), on several oc-
casions, particularly just prior to the taped
interrogation. Prior to the interrogation
he had-.signed a waiver of rights form.
During the trial the presiding judge con-
ducted a hearing out of the presence of the
jury and determined that the taped interro-
gation was free and voluntary, and not
made under influence of fear, duress, in-
timidation, menaces, threats, inducements
or promises, as required by La.R.S. 15:451.
After determining the taped interrogation
was free and voluntary, the trial judge
permitted it to be introduced into evidence
in its entirety as required by LaRS.
15:450. We have read the transcript of
the taped interrogation and we find the
trial judge didnot abuse his discretion
when he allowed the tape to be introduced
into evidence and played before the jury.
The questioning officers did not employ
tactics without the scope of reasonable po-
lice interrogation, nor were their methods
in contravention of La.R.S. 15:451, This
bill of exceptions lacks merit.

In his second bill of exceptions counsel
for the defense urges that teversible error
occurred when the trial judge refused to
include in his charge the requested special

146
charge: “An admission by the district at-
torney upon the progress of the case is’
binding upon the State.”

HM The defendant had pleaded guilty
under a bill of information charging ag-
gtavated battery for the same shooting in-
cident which resulted in this murder
charge. While he was serving sentence on
the aggravated battery charge, the victim:
died three days less than one year after the
shooting, and the defendant was indicted
by the grand jury for murder. Defense
counsel argues that, the district attorney
having permitted the defendant to plead
guilty to aggravated battery which did not
require specific intent, the State was bound
to have admitted that the intent ingredient
of murder was not present.

Even if it could be considered that the
State makes an admission in such an in-
stance, while aggravated battery does not
require specific intent, intent may be
present when aggravated battery is com-
mitted. Accepting a plea to that charge in, ,

no wise admitted lack of specific intent.

Hl There was no admission by the
State through the original plea of guilty
and a subsequent murder charge hased
upon the subsequent death of the battery -
victim may be filed. State v. Poland, 255
La, 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970).

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was taken to
the denial of the motion for a new trial.

WT 148

' As this motion merely reiterates the crror
: complained of in Bills of Exceptions Nos.
i 1 and 2, we find this third Bill of Excep-
tions lacks merit.
!

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

267 So0.2d 553

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Fred Wilson BRUMFIELD.

No. 51702.

Oct. 4, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1972.

150

fet

49

Ponder & Ponder, L. B.- Pondet, Te
Amite, for plaintiff-appellanit: ~

151

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leonard E.
Yokum, Dist. Atty., Joseph H. Simpson,
Asst, Dist. Atty., for defendant-appellee.

PER CURIAM,

The defendant, Fred Wilson Brumfield,
was tried by jury and found guilty of man-
slaughter, La.R.S. 14:31. He was sen-
tenced to eighteen years in the State Peni-
tentiary. He appeals his sentence and con-
viction, relying on 21 bills of exceptions to
obtain a reversal.

The first two bills of exceptions allege
the trial court erred by refusing to grant a
continuance of the trial date. Defense
counsel contends that because he had re-
ceived an amended bill of particulars only
a week before and, secondly, because a
sanity commission report was just filed
into the record on the day of the trial
without formal notice to the defendant,
that ‘he did not have adequate time to pre-
pate hhis defense.

The trial date was set for March 1, 1971,
the amended bill of particulars was filed
February 19, 1971.
curiam states that the ten days were suffi-

The trial judge’s per

cient time for counsel to adjust his defense
to the amended bill of particulars, and the
State answers that defense counsel had
been informed earlier of the contents of
the sanity report which found the defend-
ant not insane at the time of the commis-
sion of the crime,

152

HI The Code of Criminal Procedure
article 712 vests in the trial court the dis-
cretion to grant a continuance in any case
if there is good grounds for it. We have
consistently held that the trial court’s rul-
ing granting or refusing a continuance will
not be disturbed except where the discre-
tion has been exercised arbitrarily or un-
reasonably. State v. Shilow, 260 La. 23,
255 So.2d 60 (1971), and the cases cited.
‘We find no abuse of discretion in, and no
prejudice flowing from, the ruling of the
trial court,

HM Bills of exceptions Nos. 3 and 4,
though reserved during trial were not per-
fected therefore present nothing for this
court to review. La.C.Cr.P. art, 845.

Hl The fifth bill of exceptions was
taken to the denial of a motion for mis-
trial, which motion alleged prejudicial er-
ror was committed when the Assistant
District Attorney, upon questioning a
prospective juror, asked, “You don’t take
human life cheaply, is that correct?” In
further support of his objection, defense
counsel notes that trial judge then asked
the Assistant District Attorney, “Well, do
you think his bill is any good?” to which
the District Attorney answered “No.”
We find this bill lacks merit. The juror
never answered the question. Neither do
we find any prejudice to the defendant
flowing from the exchange between the
Judge and the Assistant District Attorney.

153

See State v. Cuchinelli, 261 La. 789, 261
So.2d 217 (1972). As a further safeguard,
the trial judge properly admonished the
jury to disregard the question. Therefore
the trial judge correctly denied the motion

for mistrial, La.C.Cr.P. art. 771.

HH Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was re-
served to the trial court’s overruling a mo-
tion to suppress a letter from the Assistant
District Attorney to defense counsel stat-
ing that the State intended to use inculpa-
tory statements and confessions by the de-
fendant. This bill lacks merit, The letter
referred to was filed in compliance with
La.C.Cr.P. art. 768 and entirely proper.

Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved
‘when the trial judge overruled the defend-
ant’s objection to a remark in the opening
statement by the Assistant District Attor-
ney alleging the statement went outside the
realm of the charge for which the defend-
ant was on trial and was prejudicial.

The objectionable statement follows:

“. . . after he had shot her the first
time, and while she was fleeing, she was
already mortally wounded about to die in
a few minutes, he shot her again in
front of the house . . .”

HI We are in accord with the trial
court’s per curiam on this bill. “Although
the victim was shot only once, the testimo-
ny showed that the defendant shot at her
more than once. The remark in the open-

154

ing statement by the District Attorney that
‘he shot her again’ was inadvertent and the
later evidence and testimony removed any
prejudice which may have been created.
The error, if any, was harmless.”

* We do not find that the defendant suf-
fered any prejudice by the trial judge’s
ruling. Bill of exceptions No. 7 is without
merit. :

[HHI The purpose of Code of Criminal
Procedure article 771 is to deal with situa-
tions such as that on which Bill of excep-
tions No. 8 is based, to wit: hearsay testi-
mony of a witness given after the trial
court had ruled the testimony inadmissible.
During the examination of State’s witness,
Vadas Dangerfield, she testified that the
victim “said she was afraid.” Immediately
the trial judge commented, “Don’t state
what she said”, adding to the jury, “Gen-
tlemen, disregard the statement by the wit-
ness.” .

Generally, this Court has held that a
verdict should not be set aside on account
of an improper spontaneous, unsolicited re-
mark by a witness. The trial court proper-
jy admonished the jury to disregard the
student. This bill has no merit.

HE Bil of exceptions Nos. 9 and 12
were reserved to the ruling of the court
that defense counsel was not entitled to in-
spect certain papers, purportedly privileged
police reports, which police officers had

155

adopt the per curiam of the trial judge.
“Defense attorney has no right to see a
document a person has used to refresh his
memory prior to taking the witness stand.
The State is not required to permit the
inspection of any of its evidence in a pend-
ing criminal prosecution including police
reports, with exception of a written con-
fession of the accused. State v. Nails, 255
La, 1070, 234 So.2d 184 (1970). See also
La.R.S, 15:279, and State v. Barnes, 257
La, 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1971).

Hl In Bills of exceptions Nos. 10, 14
and 15 the defendant complains of the ad-
mission into evidence of a confession as
involuntary and coerced. We find no er-
ror in the trial court’s finding that the
confession was not the product of compul-
sion, subtle or otherwise, and that it was
freely and voluntarily given after the de-
fendant was fully advised of his constitu-
tional rights as required by Miranda v. Ar-
izona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.
Ed.2d 694 (1966). .

HMM The evidence warrants the trial
court’s finding that the accused made an
intelligent waiver of his right to remain si-
lent and of his right: to have counsel
present at’ interfogation, before voluntarily
making the statements in: question. State
v. Faitley, 260 La. 85, 255 So.2d-83 (1971).
These bills have no merit.. .

used to refresh their memories before testi-
fying. We find no merit in thesé bills and

156

A question of fact is presented in
Bills of exceptions Nos. 11 and 13. At is-
sue is the correctness of the trial judge’s
ruling permitting the admission in evidence
of the gun allegedly used by the defendant
in the perpretration of the crime. It is
contended that the State failed to establish
the chain of custody of this evidence with
sufficient certainty, and the evidence
should not have been admitted. Specifical-
ly, the defendant complains that the gun
should have been placed with the clerk of
the court or in the sheriff’s office and not
with the desk sergeant. However, there is
no showing whatever that the gun was
tampered with while in the desk sergeant’s
possession. The objection is addressed to
the weight, not the admissibility, of the ev-
idence, State v. Coleman, 254 La. 264, 223
So.2d 402 (1969), State v. Square, 257 La.
743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971), State v. Glad-
den, 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388. (1972).

Bill of exceptions No. 16 was reserved
to the denial of the defense motion for a
directed verdict. This Court has repeated-
ly held that the trial judge is without au-
thority to grant a’ motion for a directed
verdict at the close of the State’s case.
See State v. Graves, 259 La, 526, 250 So.2d
727 (1971) and the cases there cited. This
bill of exceptions is insubstantial. —

Bills of exceptions Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20
and 21 were reserved when the trial court

“denied defendant’s repeated motions for a

mistrial based on. misquoted testimony: and

157

improper inflammatory ‘and prejudicial
statements of the prosecuting attorney dur-
ing closing argument. The assailed state-

ments occurred in close sequence in the

closing remarks of the prosecutor, and
were as follows:
“BY MR. SIMPSON: . You have

two eye witnesses who looked out that
window and saw that defendant with a
gun blazing in his hand, still shooting at
the victim. That’s quite a scene if you
will imagine it in your minds, a lady
running down the street with blood-cur-
dling screams, with a huge man follow-
ing her with a gun shooting at her.
Think about that when you go back in
the jury room . .

This man sitting here . . .
look athim . . . Fred Wilson Brum-
field, he arrested her by blocking the
road, he prosecuted her in the street, he
‘became her jury, he found her guilty, he
sentenced her to death and he went one
step further, he was her executioner
+ right in the street of Hammond

working in this courtroom today to pro-”

tect him . . . he took them away
from her, but he’s getting’ that protection
here today. He shot her in the back in
cold blood and she never liad a chance

Now when he shot her-he took’
ovér all the functions’ of law that are’

158

. . . After he shot her the first time
and she was fleeing from him and as she
rounded the corner and came into the
light of the house where she could be
seen by other people, and even as her
screams.were curdling peoples’ blood in
the night, he shot at her again to finish
the job. Then he left her, he didn’t go

. And gentlemen even as he tricd
to shoot her the second time it was in
the back too as she ‘ran from him.”

Further, defense counsel objected to the
District Attorney reading the Murder-stat-
ute (La.R.S. 14:29) as part of his explana-
tion of the charge of manslaughter, for
which the defendant was on trial.

La.Code of Criminal, Procedure article
774 states:

“The argument’ shall ‘be confined to evi-'
dence adniitted to the lack of evidence,”
to conclusions of fact that the state or
defendant ‘may draw therefrom, and'to'
the law applicable to the case.”

“The argument shall not appeal to prejte
dice: ”

“The’ state’s “rebuttal shall be confined’

to ‘answering ‘the argument of the de
fendant.”

As emphasized in’ State’ v. Dennis, 250
La. 125, 194 So.2d 720 (1967), this Court’
stated; “Under! the jirisprudence of this’

159 Le 160

Court, before a verdict approved by the
judge is set aside on the ground of improp-
er argument, this Court must be thoroughly
convinced that the jury was influenced by
the remarks, and that they contributed to
the verdict. State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642,
80 So.2d 105.”

No showing has been made that the jury
was influenced by the remarks of the State
or that they contributed to the verdict. In
his Per Curiam to these bills, the trial
judge states, “It is the opinion of the
Court that the District Attorney’s closing
argument was confined to the evidence ad-
mitted and to conclusions of fact drawn
therefrom . . . * * *”

HN We find no error in the rulings.
As we said most recently in State v. Dan-
iels, 262 ‘La. 475, 263 So.2d 859 (decided
June 5, 1972), “[w]hile we do not condone
or encourage such remarks . . . we do
not think that it is sufficiently inflammato-
ry and beyond, the realm of fair comment
on the evidence as to warrant the granting
of a new trial.” These bills are without
merit,

HE ©» appeal, in brief, the defend-
ant contends that the jury venire was im-
properly constituted because women were
excluded. No motion or objection was
made raising this issue in the trial court,
nor was any bill of exceptions reserved.
Any such contention was therefore waived
and the issue is.therefore not before us for

review. La.C.Cr.P. arts, 535, 841, 844 and
920. Further, although the contention was
(after the conviction) raised in the trial
court by a motion in arrest of judgment,
this is not a proper method to attack the
venire, La.C.Cr.P. art. 859, and no bill of
exceptions was reserved including evidence
as to this contention. La.C.Cr.P. art. 920.

For these reasons, the sentence and con-
viction are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree
only.

BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns rea-

sons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting),

Fred Wilson Brumfield was charged
with and convicted of manslaughter. Un-
like the majority, I find that Bills of Ex-
ceptions Nos. 17-21 show prejudicial error
which entitles the defendant to a new trial.

These bills are hased upon repeated mo-
tions for mistrial because of statements
made by the district attorney in his closing
argument. The motions were overruled,
and the judge did not instruct the jury to
disregard the remarks. It is pertinent to
remember that the accused was charged
with manslaughter, not murder, The state-
ments considered objectionable are as fol-
lows:

“& * %* You have two eye witnesses
who looked out that window and saw that

161

defendant with a gun blazing in his hand,
still shooting at the victim. That’s quite a
scene if you will imagine it in your minds,
a lady running down the street with
blood-curdling screams, with a huge man
following her with a gun shooting at her.
Think about that when you go back in that
jury room.”

“* & * J have gone into great detail

to point out to you the steps in a criminal
Prosecution to show you the importance of
you twelve men sitting in these chairs.
Now this man sitting over here has every
protection that the law can give in the
United States of America. You have been
sitting here watching for two or three
days. Every step in his prosecution has to
be carefully watched by the State of Loui-
siana. If we make one mistake there is a
mistrial or.a Supreme Court reversal and
we have to start all over again. Now his
rights have been jealously guarded, not
only by his very able attorney, but by the
police who testified to you that they read
him his rights before he signed that state-
ment. His rights have been jealously
guarded by the Judge, and his rights have
even been guarded by me because I can’t
afford to make a mistake. But I ask you
this, and ask you to think about this when
you go in the jury room, how about the
rights of Emma Albritton. She was a
Christian girl, she worked for a living, she
lived with her mother and father, and she

was a credit to the City of Hammond.
De

162

She didn’t bother anybody. This man sit-
ting here—look at him—Fred Wilson
Brumfield, he arrested her by blocking the
road, he prosecuted her in the street, he
became her jury, he found her guilty, he
sentenced her to death and he went one
step further, he was her executioner—right
in the streets of Hammond.”

“oe + and he did all of this because
of the lack of response to his unwanted.
attention—this big man and this little wom-
an, Now when he shot her he took over
all,the functions of law that are working
in this courtroom to protect him—he took
them away from her, but he’s getting that
protection here today. He shot her in
the back in cold blood and she never-had
a chance.”

“* 4° # After he shot her the first
time and she was fleeing from him and as

she rounded the corner and came into the
light of the house where she could be seen
by other people, and even as her screams
were curdling peoples’ blood in the night,
he shot at her again to finish the job.
‘Then he left her, he didn’t go * * *”

“# * oF And gentlemen even as he
tried to shoot her the second time it was in
the back too as she ran from him.”

A review of the jurisprudence . shows
that this ‘court is reluctant to reverse be-"
cause of remarks by the district atiorney,
and it has often held that the error, if any,
is cured by the judge’s instructions to dis-

163,

The court has leaned heavily on the propo-
sition that in ofder to reverse it must be
thoroughly convinced that the jury was in-
fluenced by the remarks, and that they
contributed to the verdict. LException is
made when the remarks are considered to
be the district attorney’s interjection of his
personal opinion into the question of guilt,
which is deemed to be a usurpation of the
function of the jury and grounds for
reversal.*

It is my considered opinion that the
statements of the district attorney in the
instant case were unnecessarily mclodra-
matic and lurid, and were, and were in-
tended to be, highly prejudicial. Indeed, it

is difficult to find a reason for his making +

them except to arouse the emotions of the
jurors against the defendant. If we con-
tinue oir present course of allowing our
prosecutors to go beyond propriety in argu-
‘ment, there is no telling what the final re-

sult will be.

Article 774 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure clearly and definitely prescribes the
rules governing argument of counsel, and
it is my view that we should give a more
strict interpretation to this'article’so that
justice and fair-play will be assured the
defendant during this phase :of the trial.
If district attorneys and trial judges would

* Also considered reversible error, except in
certain circumstances, sare appeals to

regard, which were not given in this case.

164

consider non-reversible error—error in’
fact—and refrain from repetition of these
errors, we could as a reviewing court be
less severe in pronouncing error prejudicial
Here, if I believe that fu-
ture compliance with Article 774 could be
had by holding this argument to be harm-
less error, I would concur.

and reversible.

In the face of
a deluge of inflammatory closing argu-
ments in recent cases, I must dissent.

267 So.2d 559

STATE of Louisiana
v. :
Ralph JONES and Donny McMaaus.

No. 51755.

Oct, 4, 1972,

racial prejudice and references to the
cused’s failure to testify.

Ss :
=
=

fet

67

rae

Henry C, Walker, IV, Michael R. Mang-
ham, Shreveport, for defendants-appellants.

168

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst, Atty. Gen. John A.
Richardson, Dist. Atty., Dan J. Grady, III,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants were charged with theft,
with alternate counts of receiving stolen
goods, and, after a trial by jury, were
found guilty of theft, and sentenced to
three years at hard labor. Seven bills
of exceptions were reserved and perfected
to alleged erroneous rulings of the district
court, six of which form the basis of this
appeal. The seventh was expressly waived
in brief.

At about 3:00 A.M. on the morning of
August 20, 1970, Mrs. Daniels, who resided
on Frostwood Street in Shreveport, was
awakened by the barking of neighborhood
dogs. She went to the window and ob-
served a young man wearing a white shirt
run from beside the newly constructed, un-
occupied house across the street from her
residence, get into a U-Haul panel truck,

and drive slowly away.

Mrs. Daniels called the city police and
reported the prowler. An officer (Of-
ficer Turner) was dispatched to her resi-
dence to investigate, and after talking for
a short time with Mrs. Daniels, he put out
a radio alert, reporting the description of
the prowler and the truck given him by
Mrs. Daniels. A few minutes later anoth-

169

‘er Shreveport police officer (Officer Rob-
-ertson) observed a U-Haul panel truck
-drive eastward on Flournoy-Lucas Road
rand enter La, Highway #11 The officer
followed the truck until it stopped at a
“gas station. The officer then pulled into
the gas station and requested identification
from two passengers of the U-Haul van.
(The officer did not see the third occupant)
‘They produced identification, and upon be-
‘ing asked if anyone else was with them,
they told the officer that a third occupant
.of the truck had gone to the restroom.

When the officer inquired as to the con-
tents of the truck, the defendants told him
that there were air conditioners in the
‘truck. Without opening the truck, the of-
ficer peered through the back window of
‘the truck (using his flashlight) and ob-
served two air conditioner compressors par-
tially covered by blankets and observed that
the copper pipe connections had apparently
been sawed off. The defendants told the
-officer that they had purchased the air
conditioning units from an unknown in-
dividual at a Shreveport bar around mid-
night the same night and that they had

1, The prowler incident was reported in a
subdivision located in the southwestern
portion of Shreveport. The U-Haul van
was first observed leaving the southeast-
em portion of the city. Flournoy-Lucas
Road rons in an east-west direction
through the’southern portion of Shreve-
port and passes through the subdivision
where the prowler incident occurred.

Officer Robertson contends that he had
the defendants’ permission. The defend-

»

170

borrowed the U-Haul truck from their next
door neighbor. Meanwhile two other of-
ficers had arrived at the scene and had
looked in the restroom for the third mem-
ber of defendants’ group. They were un-
able to find him in the area.

Officer Robertson radioed Officer Turn-
er and requested that he attempt to deter-
mine if any air conditioning units had been
stolen from the area in which the prowler
had been reported. Shortly thereafter Of-
ficer Turner radioed Officer Robertson
and reported that he had found that two
units had apparently been removed from
residences on Bayonne St., within several
blocks of the reported prowler incident, and
that the copper pipes had apparently been
sawed off. Armed with this knowledge,
Officer Robertson entered the U-Haul
truck and obtained the serial numbers from
the air conditioning units.

The defendants were then taken to police
headquarters and the owners of the two
residences from which air conditioner com-
pressors had apparently been removed were
called. It was learned that the serial num-

ants deny this, The trial court found
that, at this point, the officer had prob-
able cause to believe that the truck con-
tained stolen air conditioners.

3. The police officers testified that the de-
fendants accompanied them voluntarily
while the defendants testified that they
were arrested and then taken to police
headquarters.

U7

jJonging to the owners of the residences on
Bayonne Street. The defendants were then
formally arrested and advised of their
rights. .

Bill of Exceptions No. 1

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved
to the trial judge’s overruling of defend-
ants’ Motion to Quash the Bill of Informa-
tion to suppress evidence allegedly illegally
seized. | i

Defendants contend that the arrest was
illegal, since no warrant had been issued
“for their arrest, the officers were outside
their jurisdiction (outside the city limits of
Shreveport), and the officers did not have
probable cause to believe that they had
committed an offense. Hence, they con-
tend that the two air conditioners and the
hacksaw found in the truck were obtained
as the-result of an illegal search, since it
_ was without a warrant and was not incident
to a lawful arrest. .

‘The’ State contends that the officers had
‘permission to enter the truck (from whence
they obtained the serial numbers of the air
conditioners), and: alternatively, that the
evidence was seized as the result of a law-
ful arrest,

‘The trial, judge held that. the police of-
ficers had probable cause to believe the
defendants had committed “a felény—pos-
session of stolen property—and hence the

bers on the units’ in defendants’ truck
matched the serial numbers of units be-

172

evidence was seized pursuant to a lawful.
arrest. .

HM tt is unnecessary {0 determine.
when the arrest occurred, whether at the-
gas station or at the police station, since
we hold that the officers had probable cause-
to believe that stolen air conditioners were-
contained in the truck and hence were en-
titled to search it even though defendants.
were not yet arrested. An automobile, un--
like a house or other building, may easily
be- spirited away if officers are required
to leave the scene and go to a judge to.
obtain a warrant before conducting a search
of the vehicle. Hence the rule has long-
been that an automobile may be searched
without a warrant where the officers have-
probable cause to believe that the automo--
bile contains articles that they are entitled
to seize. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S..
132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 453 (1925) ;.
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51
S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Scher v..
United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174,
83 L.Ed, 151 (1938); Brinegar v. United,

"States, 338 U.S. 160, 69° S.Ct. 1302, 93

L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Chambers y. Maroney,
309 US. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419
(1970).

HH White more than mere suspicion is.
required, knowledge to an absolute certain-
ty is not required. It is sufficient that the
officer have probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains articles he is en~

173

titled to seize.
agree with the trial court that at the time
‘Officer Robertson entered the truck and
conducted the search he had probable cause

In the case before us we

to believe that it contained stolen air condi-
tioners.4

TI Defendants also complain that the
‘initial act of the police officer, after having
been told by them that the truck contained
air conditioning units, of looking through
the rear window of the truck with his flash-
light constituted an unreasonable search.
We find it unnecessary to determine wheth-
ver this was an unreasonable search, since
we hold that this was not a search. The
-officer merely observed that which was in
plain view. See United States v. Lee, 274

-4. At the time that the search was con-
ducted, Officer Robertson did not know
that the air conditioners in the truck
were stolen. That was ascertained a
couple of hours later. However, he did
Imow that a prowler had been observed
in a south Shreveport subdivision driving
a U-Haul van; that defendants were
driving a U-Haul van (the officer testi-
fied that he assumed that the occurrence
sof U-Haul vans at 8:00 A.M. would be
rather low); that the theft of an air
conditioner compressor had occurred in
cthis same subdivision two days earlier;
that a fellow officer had noted that
there were two vacant concrete founda-
tions (upon which air conditioner com-
pressors of this type are customarily
placed) in ‘the same neighborliood within
-a couple of blocks of the prowler incident
and that the units had apparently beon
removed by sawing off the copper pipe;
that defendants had stated that there
-were air conditioners in the truck; that
defendants were unable to produce proof
-of ownership of the air conditioners or

174

U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202
(1927); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) ; Unit-
ed States v, Hayden, 140 F.Supp. 429 (US.
D.C. Maryland 1956). Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed.
898 (1924); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067
(1968). :

Defendants complain that they were ar- -
rested at the gas station, which is admitted-
ly outside the city limits of Shreveport,
and that the arrest is illegal since the of-
ficers who made the arrest were city police
officers. Defendants testified they were
told they were under arrest a short while
after the search of their vehicle was con-

of their right to the truck they wero
driving; that the copper pipes ‘on the air
conditioners in the truck appeared to have *
been sawed off; that defendants stated
that they had purchased the air con-
ditioners from an unknown stranger’ at
a Shreveport bar at 12:00 midnight;
and finally that the third’‘occupant’ of
the truck had, apparently fled, the. scene. -
All of these circumstances’ combin
the officers probable’ cause to-believé that’
the truck contained stolen air, «condi
tioners.

5. “But no search on the high seas is
shown. The testimony of the Boatswain
shows that he used a searchlight, It is
not shown that there was any ‘explora-
tion below decks or under hatches. 'For
aught that appears, the, cases of liquor
were on dock ‘dnd, like the defendants,
were discovered before the motorboat was
boarded. Such use ‘of a searchlight is |
comparable to the use of a ‘marine ‘glass
or a field glass. It is not prohibited:
by the Constitution.” . 274'U.S, 559, 568, «
AT S.Ct. 746, T48. : oa

175

ducted. The officers, while admitting that
they were outside their jurisdiction at the
gas station, testified that the defendants
were not arrested until they were taken
downtown and it was positively ascertained
that the air conditioning units were stolen.

HE We find it unnecessary to decide
the factual issue of when the defendants
were arrested. As we noted in Footnote
4, at the time the search of defendants’
vehicle was conducted the officers had
probable cause to believe that defendants’
truck contained stolen air conditioners.
Even if the officers were acting as private
persons, as defendants contend, “A private
person may make an arrest when the person
arrested has committed a felony, whether
in or out of his presence.” La.C.Crim.P.
Art. 2146 The officers had probable cause
to believe the defendants were in possession
of two stolen.air conditioning units, which
is a felony, La.R.S. 14:69, and it was sub-
sequently proven on the trial below that
defendants committed the theft of the air
conditioners, worth more than $100.00,
which is felony theft. La-R.S, 14:67.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to
the trial judge’s overruling of defendants’
motions for the production of evidence

6. In, Dunson v: Baker, 144 La. 167, 80
So. 288 (1919) we held that a private
person may arrest one whom he has prob-
able cause to believe has committed a
felony, but he must subsequently show

176:

and confessions; to compel disclosure of
all evidence favorable to the defendants ;
for a list of witnesses; and for production
of confessions and statements. Defendant
admits that the Motion for Production of
Confessions and Statements is moot, since:
the State did not have confessions from
any of the defendants.

The Motion for Production of Evidence
and for the State’s list of witriesses was.
properly denied. State v. Mitchell, 258 La.
427, 246 So.2d 814 (1971); State v. Pesson,
256 La. 201, 235 So.2d 568 (1970). This
case does not involve, as in State v. Mig-
liore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972),
the possession of a substance which is.
criminal merely by virtue of its chemical
composition.

Hl Defendants complain of the trial
court's action in overruling their Motion
to compel disclosure of all evidence favor-
able to them. At the hearing on the motion,
the State admitted that it had no evidence
favorable to the defense. While we agree
with defendants that the State cannot sup-

- press evidence favorable to them, Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S, 83, 83 S.Ct, 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), there is no indication in
the record that ‘the State, suppressed any

evidence favorable to défendants.. Defend-

that the person has actually committed
a felony. In the case at bar, it was
shown on the trial below that defendants
had actually committed a felony theft,

AT

ants’ argument in brief clearly shows that
this-Motion-was an attempt to obtain a pre-
‘trial inspection of the State’s evidence,”

Bill of Exceptions No. ?

In its opening statement the prosecution
stated, “Mr. Jones stated that he had pur-
-chased the unit.” The defense objected on
the ground that La.C.Crim.P. Art. 767
prohibits the State from adverting in the
opening statement to any confession or in-
culpatory statement made by a defendant.
The objection was overruled by the trial
court.

HM LaCode of Criminal Procedure
Article 767 provides: “The state shall not,
in the opening statement, advert in any
way to a confession or inculpatory state-
‘ment made by the defendant.” There is
no proscription against the use, by the State
in its opening statement, of exculpatory
-statements made by the defendant.

The statement herein objected to is not a
It is
not an “admission of incriminating facts”.
State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So.2d 360
(1970). The statement was in fact excul-

confession or inculpatory statement.

-patory, since the defendant was attempting
to convince the police officers that he had
purchased the air conditioning units rather

<7. The evidence allegedly suppressed (ac-,.
cording to defendants’ brief) was cer-
tain photographs and the State's list of
witnesses. The photographs cannot be
considered to have been suppressed, since
-they wore introduced at the trial (see p.

178

than stealing them. There is no merit to
this Bill of Exceptions.

Bill of Exceptions No. 4

Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved
when the trial court allowed the State to
introduce a light meter found at the resi-
dence from which one of the air condition-
ers was stolen, and a handprint found on
the light meter, The objection was based
on the grounds that: ,

1) the defendants were denied access

to the evidence prior to trial;

2) the State failed’to show a complete
chain of possession; and.

3) the identification of the handprint
was improper and incompiete.

The first ground has already been dis-
cussed under Bill of Exceptions No. 2. It
is without merit,

I The police officer who found the
light meter testified that after finding the
piece of evidence at one of the residences,
he placed it on the porch of the residence
and continued his investigation, After he
completed his investigation, he retrieved the
light meter and turned it over to a fellow
officer (who testified at the trial) who
locked it up until the trial, The defense

-16 of defendants’ brief). The witnesses
called by the State were subject to cross
examination by .the defense. There is
no contention that the State failed to -

call a witness who would have testified
favorably to the defendants.

179

objected that during the time the light
meter was on the porch it could have been
tampered with, although defendants offer
no evidence that it was in fact tampered
with.

This argument is frivolous. Although
the officer did not have the light meter
in his hands, he was at the residence com-
pleting his investigation. This was during
the early morning hours, and the residence
was unoccupied.

HE With regard to the handprint, the
expert produced by the State testified that
he had found nine points of identity be-
tween the handprint found on the light
meter (which was found at the scene of one
of the thefts) and defendant McManus’s
handprint, He admitted that some years
ago the ‘FBI required twelve points of
identity in order to make a positive identi-
fication, but testified that at present the
FBI required as few as six points in order
to make a positive identification. He fur-
ther testified that he was positive that thé
print on the light meter was the palm print
of defendant McManus.
troduced no contradictory evidence.

The defense in-

We are unable to find that the statutes
or decisions of this State require a certain
number of points of identity in order for
an’ éxpeyt to testify that the fingerprint
or handprint is that of the defendant. In
the absetice of evidence that this witness
was not competent, or was using an im-

180

proper method, it was proper to allow the
expert to testify that he was positive that
the handprint was that of defendant Mc-
Manus. The factual question of whether it
was in fact the handprint of McManus was.
for the jury.

Bill of Exceptions Nos. 5 and 6

HM Bill of Pxceptions Nos. 5 and 6
were reserved to the admission of the testi-
mony of Mr. Ray Heard of the Northwest
Louisiana Crime Lab concerning the copper"
filings in a hacksaw blade found in the
U-Haul van and his opinion that the copper
pipes on ‘the air conditioning units were cut
off with the same kind of saw or a sawing
motion, ‘The objection was based on eight

grounds (as set forth in defendants’ brief) :

1) The saw was not shown to belong to
the defendants;

2) The truck was borrowed and the saw

could have been the owner's;

3) The State did not check the saw for

fingerprints ;

4

Mr. Heard could not say that the cop-
per from the pipes was the same as
the copper in the saw blade;

5) Mr. Heard could not say that the saw

at issue was used on the pipes;

6

‘The State did not keep the saw in its
possession, throughout the investiga
tion but left it for several hours in the

unlocked truck on the parking lot at
City Hall;

The State did not have the air condi-
tioners in its possession throughout
the investigation but left them for
several hours in the unlocked van on
the parking lot at City Hall; and

The State made no effort to check
the air conditioners for fingerprints
and indeed returned them to the own-
ers immediately after the alleged
crime, keeping only the copper pipes
allegedly connecting the units to the
system.

The hacksaw was found in the truck
salong with the stolen air conditioners. The
copper pipes on the air conditioners appear-
ed to have been sawed off. The evidence
was relevant as tending to prove that this
‘hacksaw, which was in the truck being
sdriven by defendants, was used to cut the
sair conditioners from the residences to
which they were formerly attached, and as
such was admissible. La.R.S. 15:441. The
fact that the saw was not shown to belong
to defendants; that the truck was borrow-
ved; that the State did not check the saw
for fingerprints; that Mr. Heard could not
say that the copper from the pipes on the
sair conditioners was identical to the copper
on the saw blade; that Mr. Heard could
not say that this particular saw was used
to cut the copper pipes; or that the air
conditioners were not checked for finger-

182

prints does not render Mr. Heard’s testi-
mony of the hacksaw inadmissible. It
merely goes to the weight of the evidence.

HME The chain of possession of the
hacksaw and air conditioners was suffi-
ciently shown. The fact that they were
left for two hours at 4:00 A.M. in the
unlocked U-Haul van in the police station
parking lot is insufficient to break the
chain of possession, in the absence of some
evidence that they were tampered with.

For the foregoing reasons, the convic-
tion and sentence of McManus and Jones
are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs in the result
only.

BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns rea-
sons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I must dissent from the majority because
I find merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1
and 2. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served to the overruling of the motion to
suppress the two air conditioners found in
the back of the U-Haul-It truck. The ma-
jority finds that the officers had probable
cause to believe that stolen air conditioners
were in the truck and, therefore, were en-
titled to search for them. Armed with this
conclusion the majority finds it unneces-.
sary to mect the issues of when the arrests

183

thority to make the arrests outside their
jurisdiction.

- The fallacy of this conclusion is that
probable cause was acquired too late under
the factual sequence to authorize the search
and seizure. The first officer on the scene,
while attempting to act in his official ca-
pacity and on less than suspicion, detained
the truck outside his jurisdiction, question-
ed the occupants, and peered into the back
portion of the truck. Only then was there
probable cause for the search. Lacking ju-
risdiction for the detention and incidental
scrutiny of the truck which established
probable cause, he could neither arrest nor
seize.

While patrolling in the early morning
hours, Officer Robertson had received a
radio alert to be on the lookout for a U-
Haul-It truck since a report had been re-
ceived of a prowler leaving a subdivision
in such a truck. Shortly thereafter on the
edge of the city limits Robertson saw such a
truck and turned in behind and followed it.
He calied the officers who were still in-
vestigating in the subdivision and confirm-
ed-the type of truck, After travelling about
one quarter of a mile out of the city limits,
the truck pulled into a gas station and
stopped near a pump. Robertson notified
headquarters that he was going to ques-
tion the occupants, and a back-up patrol car
was dispatched to the station to render as-

occurred and whether the officers had au-

184.

sistance if necessary. He then detained the
truck and the occupants and secured fronr
the driver his driver’s license. On ques--
tioning the occupants, Robertson learned.
that they were hauling air conditioners
which they said had been purchased about.
midnight, but they could not produce any-
proof of ownership, Peering in the back
of the truck Robertson saw the air condi-
tioners with sawed-off copper tubing. Or--
dinarily the air conditioners would have:
been separated from the copper tubing con--
nections by simply unscrewing the connec-
tion. The back-up patrol car arrived, and
after giving the two officers the informa-
tion he had learned, Robertson radioed the.
police in the subdivision to check vacant:
houses in the area for missing air condi--
tioners. He then called his superior and’
asked him to come to the scene. Sergeant.
Whitney arrived, and shortly afterwards a
second sergeant arrived but remained only
a brief time. It was decided that the oc~
cupants of the truck should be allowed to»
leave, but first Robertson asked their per--
mission to copy the serial numbers on the
air conditioners. As he completed copying’
the serial numbers, he received a radio
message that there were three air condi-
tioners missing in the subdivision and that:
the copper tubing had been sawed in two..
The occupants were then taken to the police:
station for questioning after having beet:
detained approximately an hour at the gas
station,

185

Under these circumstances it cannot be
said that Robertson had knowledge that a
felony had been committed or that he had
reasonable cause to believe that an offense
had been committed. (Art. 213(2) and (3),
C.Cr.P.) He was not in pursuit to arrest
when he followed the truck out of his juris-
diction. (Cf. Art. 231, C.Cr.P., and 4
Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure
(Anderson’s ed. 1957) § 1592, where en-
forcement officials from one state are rec-
ognized to have authority to pursue per-
sons reasonably believed to have committed
a felony into another state. See also, Art.
213, C.Cr.P., as amended by Act 646 of
1972 to expressly grant this right of pursuit
to officials from one jurisdiction to another
within this state.) Thus there was no legal
arrest and no basis for probable cause for
the search in connection with an arrest.
Whitely v. Warden of Wyoming Peniten-
tiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.
2d 306 (1971).

“A police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate man-
ner, stop and detain a person to investigate
possible criminal behavior even though he
does not have probable cause for an arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and ‘Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.
2d 612 (1972). Here, however, when Rob-
ertson left his jurisdictional territory, he
lost his authority to act in his capacity as a
policeman. Even if we were to hold that

186

he could still act as a private citizen (4
Wharton, supra, § 1614), the authority
granted to private citizens is restricted to

arrests based upon probable cause (Art.

214, C.Cr.P., and 4 Wharton, supra, §
1614). So Robertson could not detain the
occupants of the truck at the gas station.

Moreover, it would be unwise to let a
police officer escape his obligations as a
policeman and the apparent authority with
which his uniform clothes him by allowing
him to act in the role of private citizen.
The relationships of a citizen to a citizen
and a citizen to a policeman have too great
a disparity to expect the same results from
a confrontation between a citizen and a
citizen and a confrontation between a citi-
zen and a policeman. For example, few
if any of us would let an ordinary citizen
have our driver’s license, detain our motor
vehicle, and inspect its interior, Yet here,
because of the uniforms, unauthorized
policemen who had no greater authority
than any citizen were able to accomplish
these things.

Furthermore, a lengthy delay occurred
while the police gathered information on
the possible commission of a crime by the
occupants of the truck, but no attempt was
made to notify the proper officers with au-
thority in that jurisdiction. When Robert-
son called in to check the type of truck
described in the radio alert or when he
called in to say that the occupants had stop-
ped at the gas station, he should have asked.

187 — 188

for assistance from the proper authorities
with jurisdiction in that area, and maintain-
ed. surveillance of the truck until they ar-
rived.

Since there was no legal arrest, there
-could be no warrantless search pursuant to
arrest, and that which was seized should
‘have been suppressed.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved
when defendant was denied access to physi-
cal evidence including handprints and fin-
gerprints, which he sought in order that he
might have experts of his.own choosing
examine it in preparation for testifying.
‘The majority does not even meet the issue
raised by this bill as presented and argued
“by both the defense and the State. I am
of the opinion that State v. Migliore, 261
La. 722, 260 So.2d 682, permits examina-
tion of physical evidence under orders and
guidance of the court for protection and
preservation of that evidence. There is no
reason why Migliore should be restricted to
narcotics. Examination of physical evi-
dence is not discovery. Handwriting, bal-

listics, and fingerprint experts differ as do
most expert witnesses, and the only means

by which the defendant can defend against
expert testimony by the State is to offer
expert testimony of his own. I am of the
opinion that Bill No. 2 is good insofar as
it addresses itself to denial of access to the
defendant for examination of physical evi-
dence. :

oT respectfully dissent.

267 80.24 568

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Sylvester JOURNIGAN.

No. 52484,

Oct. 4, 1972,

189

Woodson T. Callihan, Jr., for defend-

ant-appellant. _

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., War-

ren E. Mouledoux; Asst. Atty. Gen., Sar- ”

--gent'Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
PER CURIAM.

EME Sylvester Journigan, defendant, was
the 19th Judicial Court on a

Bill of Information which read in perti- |

nent part as follows:

“Sylvester Journigan . . . did vio-
late R.S. 14:89.1 in that (he) did have

190

an unnatural carnal copulation with

Charley Ealy, a person ob (sic) the same

sex.”

The defendant was tried by a jury,
found guilty as charged, and sentenced to

ten years. Defendant then applied to the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus to have the convic-
tion vacated on the grounds that the Bill
of Information did not properly charge a
violation of La.R.S. 14:89.1, The writ was
granted by the Trial Court to the extent
that defendant's ten year sentence based.
upon a verdict of guilty of aggravated
crime against nature was vacated. How-
ever, the trial judge was of the opinion
that the Bill of Information did properly
charge simple crime against nature (La.R.
S. 14:89) and sentenced defendant to five
years without setting aside the verdict.
The defendant Trial
Court’s imposition of sentence based on the
alleged defective bill and was granted an

excepted to ‘the

appeal before this Court.

LaRS. 1438911 provides as follows:

“Aggravated -crime against nature is
crime against nature committed . under
any one or more of the following cir-
cumstances:

(1), Where the victim résists the ‘act to
the utmost, but such resistance is over-

come by force;’

(2) Where the victim is prevented from
resisting the act by threats of great and

191

immediate bodily harm accompanied by
apparent power of execution;

(3) Where through idiocy, imbecility or
any unsoundness of mind, either tempo-
rary or permanent, the victim is incapa-
ble of giving consent and the offender
knew or should have known of such in-
capacity ;

(4) Where the victim is incapable of re-
sisting or of understanding the nature of
the act, by reason of stupor or abnormal
condition of mind produced by a narcotic
or anesthetic agent, administered by or
with the privity of the offender; or
when he has such incapacity, by reason
‘of a stupor or abnormal condition .of
mind from any cause, and the offender
knew or should have known of such in-
capacity; or

(5) Where the victim is under the age
of seventeen years and the offender is at
least three years older than the victim.
Whoever commits the crime of aggravat-
ed crime against nature shall be impris-
oned at hard labor for not more than
fifteen years, Added Acts 1962, No. 60,

As no short form indictment for aggra-
~vated crime against nature is provided by
‘La.C.Cr.P. art. 465, we must consider the
Bill of Information to be cast in long

form. As a long form the Bill of Infor-

192

mation attempting to charge aggravated
crime against nature fails to specify
“which one or more of the following cir-
cumstances” by which the crime against
nature becomes the more serious aggravat-
ed crime against nature. See Subdivisions

(1) to (5) of La.R.S. 14:89.1,

i | The Bill of Information is fatally
defective in that it failed to inform the de-
fendant of an essential element of the

crime for which he was convicted. La.C.
Cr.P. art. 464. This Court has held repeat-
edly that a conviction obtained under a fa-
tally defective indictment cannot stand.
State v. Baker, 261 La. 233, 259 So.2d 306
(1972); State v. Butler, 259 La. 560, 250
So.2d 740 (1971); State v. Raby, 259 La.
909, 253 So.2d 370 (1971). The verdict of
the jury here resting on an invalid indict-
ment cannot support any sentence. See
State v. Baker, supra, in which the co-de-
fendant of this appellant had both the sen-
tence and conviction set aside by this
Court upon the same basis urged here.
‘The trial judge erred in attempting to im-
pose any sentence under a verdict obtained
on this invalid indictment.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are reversed and the defend-
ant is ordered discharged from that convic-
tion and sentence.

267 So.2d 570

STATE o7 Louisiana

ve

Gilliam MIMS, Jr.
No, 51858.

Oct. 4, 1972,

Sentell & Roberts, William C. Roberts,
“Minden, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles A.
Marvin, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals from a conviction of
manslaughter (La.R.S. 14:31) in the 26th
Judicial District Court, Hon. Enos Mc-
Clendon, J., for which he was sentenced to
twelve (12) years at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary.

Defendant perfected three bills-of excep-
tions.

195

The first bill excepts to the trial judge’s
admission over defendant’s objection into
evidence of two photographic slides and al-
lowing the jury to view them. The de-
fendant objected on the grounds that the
slides were inflammatory and prejudicial.

One slide shows the alleged deceased
victim, and the other shows the exterior of
the house where the crime allegedly took
place.

Hl It is clear that this bill of exception
is without merit. The photographs are ad-
missible as having a probative value which
outweighs their probable prejudicial effect.
‘The Coroner testified that the victim died
from loss of blood. The photographs show
the amount of blood on the victim’s bed at
the time of death. State v. Ford, 259 La.
1037, 254 So.2d 457 (1971); State v.
Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So.2d 382 (1971) ;
State v. Callihan, 257 La: 298, 242 So.2d
521 (1970).

HI Bill of exceptions No. 2 was re-
served when the trial court overruled the
motion of defendant to have the court call
Charles Kemp as the Court’s witness and
to permit the State and the defendant to
cross-examine him. The contention of de-
fendant on this point is without merit, in-
asmuch as there is no procedural rule in
Louisiana requiring the Court to call a wit-
ness so that both sides may cross-examine
him. .

196

Hl Bill No. 2 contains another ground
for complaint. That is, following the
Court’s refusal to call Charles Kemp as its
own witness, the defendant called him and
was in the process of impeaching the wit-
ness on the grounds that the defendant was
surprised. (See La.R.S. 15:487) by his
testimony. The State objected to this on
the grounds that “[nJo one can [be al-
lowed to] impeach his own witness, unless
he have been taken by surprise by the tes-
timony . . . or unless the witness
show hostility toward him.” (La.R.S.
15:487); the court sustained the objection.
From the record, it is clear that defendant
was aware of what the testimony of the
witness would be and was not taken by
surprise nor was there any hostility shown
by the witness. It was therefore improper
for defendant to attempt to impeach his
(La.R.S, 15:487). The Bill
of Exceptions perfected on this point is

own witness.

without merit.

HE Bill No. 3 excepts to the trial
court's sending the jury back into the jury
room to deliberate after the following col-
loquy took place:

“THE COURT: Very well, Gentlemen,

have you reached a verdict?

FOREMAN OF THE JURY: No, we

haven't, your Honor,

THE COURT: The Court did not state

to you earlier, but I do so now, that you

are not limited as to time in your delib-

197

eration, nor are you bound to sit in the
deliberation room without eating or oth-
erwise—if you care to eat you may do
so. As long as you are attempting to
come to some agreement there is no limit
on your time. Is it your statement to
the Court that you are hopelessly dead-
locked—Is that the situation you find
yourself in?

FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Yes, sir,
your Honor, it appears to be . .

THE COURT: What is your wish in
the matter, Gentlemen?

FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Your
Honor, I think that if we could eat and
then possibly discuss again to see what
comes of it then.

THE COURT: Very well, if that be
your thinking I suggest you do that, and
whatever time you all reach a verdict
notify the Court as a matter of course.
FOREMAN OF THE JURY: May it
please the Court, your Honor, I can’t
speak for each juror on that particular
point, but could you possibly poll the
jury box as to their belief on this?

THE COURT: I think it would be the
better plan if you either discuss it among

198

yourselves back in the deliberation room
or if you feel that you could eat and
then discuss this again, then do that. If
you want to discuss it further before you
make that decision feel free to do so.

FOREMAN OF THE JURY: Yes, sir,
I believe we'll do that.

THE COURT: All right, you may re-
tire and make that decision.

MR. KITCHENS: May it please the
Court, for the benefit of the record we
would like to object to the sending of
the jury back to the jury room and I re-
serve a bill of exception to the Court
permitting such.

THE COURT: Very well, let the bill be
noted.”

It is evident that the Court in no manner
coerced the jury and defendant has not
been prejudiced. Sanders v. United States,
5 Cir, 415 F.2d 621, cert. denied, 397 U.S.
976, 90 S.Ct, 1096, 25 L.Ed.2d 271 (1969) ;
State v. Rodman, 208 La. 523, 23 So.2d 204
(1945) ; State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84
So. 41. This bill is also without merit.

For the reasons stated, the senterice and
conviction are affirmed.

200

267 So.2d 714

Marshall LAIRD et ux. ©
. ve
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY.

Nos. 51727, 51744.
Oct, 4, 1972.
Concurring Opinion Oct. 5, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1972,

201

202
_ —_

——+———

Holt & Woodley, Edmund E. Woodley,
Lake Charles, for defendant-applicant.

Navarre & Fuselier, John P. Navarre,
Oakdale, Gist, Methvin & Trimble, David
A. Hughes, Alexandria, for plaintiffs-re-
spondents.

BARHAM, Justice.

The posture of the case before us, the ’
facts, and the legal issues presented would
appear to be acceptable with unanimity to
the courts below and this court. However,
the method of resolution of the issues as
well as the result to be obtained in that
resolution has provoked disparity of view.

This controversy, arising out of an auto-
mobile accident, is between, on the one
hand, Mr. and Mrs, Marshall Laird and”
their insurer, State Farm Mutual Automo-'*
bile Insurance Company, and, on the other,
Travelers Insurance Company, insurer of
Red River News Company. A pickup truck |
owned and operated by Laird, with his wife
a passenger, which he had stopped partly”

203

Company and driven by Ralph Hare, Jr.,
an employee of that company, in the course
of Red River's business. Laird and his
wife Gracie suffered personal injuries and
property damage, and incurred medical ex-
penses.

>

,The Lairds brought
against Travelers, Red River's liability in-

a direct action
surer. Travelers answered with a general
denial and pleaded Laird’s contributory
negligence. Alternatively, as third-party
plaintiff, Travelers made Laird’s liability
insurer, State Farm, a third-party defend-
ant,
Laird, In this third-party demand and re-
convention it was alleged that Laird’s stop-

and reconvened against Marshall

ping on the highway was “proximate negli-
gence” which made him a joint tortfeasor
with Hare, as such liable, with his insurer,
as solidary obligors for one-half of any
amount recovered by Mrs. Laird against
Travelers. Judgment was prayed for ac-
cordingly.

The trial judge found that the cause of
the accident was Hare’s failure to main-
tain a proper lookout while travelling 55
to 6 miles per hour. Damages were
awarded to Marshall Laird and Gracie
Laird in the sum of $30,000.00 and $10,-
000.00 respectively. Traveler’s third-party
demand was dismissed.

on the asphalt or travelled portion of a
highway, was struck from the rear by a
truck-trailer owned by Red River News

204

On Travelers’ appeal the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal agreed that Hare was
negligent in not keeping a proper lookout,
but also found Laird negligent for violat-
ing the statutory prohibition (RS. 32>
141(A) ) against stopping on the highway
when it was practicable to stop off the
highway. That court additionally deter-
mined that, as between Laird and Hare,
Hare had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision, and that Laird was entitled to
recover against Travelers, the insurer of
Hare’s employer. However, having found
that Laird’s negligence made him a joint
tortfeasor with Hare, liable as such in soli-
do with Hare for the injuries to Gracie
Laird, the Court of Appeal determined that
Travelers was entitled to recover from
Marshall Laird and his insurer State Farm
in contribution one-half of any amount
awarded Gracie Laird against Travelers.

‘The Court of Appeal, finding the $30,-
000.00 trial court award to Laird for pain,
suffering, and disability to be manifestly
excessive, reduced that award to $20,000.-
00. It affirmed the $10,000.00 award to
Gracie Laird, and gave judgment in favor
of Travelers against Marshall Laird and
his insurer for $5000.00, or one-half of the
$10,000.00 award to Gracie Laird. See
La.App., 251 So.2d 73,

We granted certiorari on the application
of Marshall Laird and State Farm, and
also on the application of Travelers.

205

As stated above, our finding of fact is
in substantial accord with that of the trial
court and the Court of Appeal.

Marshall Laird was driving his pickup
truck west on Louisiana Highway 112 on
a clear, dry day, with his wife Gracie as a

" passenger. The road ran through gently
rolling hills, and its 20-foot travelled por-
tion was surfaced with asphalt. Posted on
the crest of a slight hill were three large,
conspicuous highway signs (two on the
north shoulder and one on the south

shoulder) warning that men were doing
road work ahead, and Highway Depart-
ment employees were working in the
ditches along the highway 600 to 900 feet
forward from the crest and the signs.
Here Laird stopped his pickup truck as
far as he could on the righthand shoulder
with half of the truck occupying less than
three feet of the pavement, leaving free
more than seven feet of his lane and the
entire 10 feet of the other lane. He
stopped his motor but kept his foot on the
brake pedal to activate the rear brake light.

Laird asked certain directions of his
nephew, one of the workers, and N. E.
Johnson, the work crew foreman, who was
acquainted with Laird, also came over to
his truck, While Johnson stood on the
pavement at the side of the stopped truck,
at least two cars passed it without diffi-
culty, one going in cach direction. About
five minutes after Laird had stopped, John-
son, keeping a lookout up and down the

206

highway for traffic, heard and then saw
the Red River News Company’s van truck

and trailer approaching from the cast.
The driver of the van truck, travelling at
55 to 65 miles per hour, appeared not to
see Johnson or the Laird pickup truck, for
he neither changed direction nor reduced
speed. When Johnson realized this, he
moved to the south shoulder of the road,
shouting and waving in an attempt to draw
the driver’s attention to the stopped truck
ahead. The driver did not react, however,
until he was only a few feet from the pick-
up. Then he applied his brakes and turned
slightly to his left, but too late to avoid
colliding with the Laird vehicle.

The impact hurled the pickup 150 feet
across the ditch and into the woods. The
van truck and trailer were separated, the
truck coming to rest in the south ditch 74
fect from the point of collision and the
trailer in the woods north of the road.

HE Obviously Hare’s attention was not
on the road in front of him, as his own
testimony and Johnson’s make clear. Just
before he came over the crest of the hill,
Hare began looking in his rear view mir-
ror to locate a companion who ‘was fol-
lowing him in another Red River News
Company vehicle, and his attention was thus
diverted from the road ahead. His own
testimony supports the conclusion that ‘he
could have avoided the collision if he had
been keeping a proper lookout. There was
no other traffic in the vicinity. He testi-

207

the pickup truck, or Johnson hailing him.
He had an unobstructed view in front,
perhaps even before the crest of the hill
but at least at that point. He should have
seen what was directly in his path, and had
ample time to stop or make a safe passing
movement. His failure to do so was ‘gross
negligence from which liability flows.

The real problem presented by these facts

is whether Laird was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence .which continued to the
moment of thé impact so that he cannot
recover for his injuries and damage.
Moreover, the contention is raised that
Laird was negligent, a joint tortfeasor with
Hare, responsible as a solidary obligor for
one-half of the damage incurred by Gracie
Laird, his wife, the guest passenger.

Under the facts presented it is obvious
that Laird may be called criminally negli-
gent or at least liable to criminal sanctions
to the extent that he was in violation of
RS. 32:141(A), which provides:

“Upon any highway outside of a business
or residence district, no person shall stop,
park, or leave standing any vehicle, wheth-
er attended or unattended, upon the paved
or main traveled part of the highway when
it is practicable to stop, park or so leave
such vehicle off such part of said high-
way, but in every event an unobstructed
width of the highway opposite a standing
vehicle shall be left for the free passage
of other vehicles and a clear view of such

fied that he did not see the warning signs,

208
stopped vehicle shall be available from a

distance of two hundred feet in each direc-
tion upon such highway.”

Hl Laird’s “criminal negligence” con-
sisted of his violation of the first part of
this provision by stopping on the travelled
portion of the highway when it was “prac-
ticable to stop * * * off such part of
said highway”, for there was within 40
feet of his stopping place a side road where
he could have parked completely off the
highway. However, as we said in Pierre
y. Allstate Insurance Company, 257 La.
471, 242 So.2d 821 (1971), “Criminal stat-
utes are not, in and of themselves, defini-
tive of civil liability’ and do not set the
rule for civil liability; but they may be
guidelines for the court in fixing civil
liability. Thayer, Public Wrong and Pri-
vate Action, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 317 (1913);
Malone, Contrasting Images of Torts—
The Judicial Personality of Justice Tray-
nor, 13 Stanford L.Rev. 779; Malone,
Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself
Versus American Beverage Company, 30
La.L.Rey. 363; Morris, The Relation of
Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46
Harv.L.Rev. 453; Morris, The Role of
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions,
49 Col.L.Rev. 21; James, Statutory Stand-
ards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11
La.L.Rev. 95, 103-124; Prosser, Torts (4th
ed. H.B.), § 36, p. 190. In criminal prose-
cutions no harm need result from the act
which violates the statute for the actor to

209 .

be subject to criminal sanctions. More-
over, violation of a criminal statute in
combination with some resultant harm does
not, in and of itself, impose civil liability.
‘We must determine whether the prohibition
in the statute is designed to protect from
the harm or damage which ensues from its
violation. Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. 1004,
38 So. 810 (1905); Picou v. J. B. Luke’s
Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (1943);
Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Rail-
road Company, 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646
(1962); Lee v. Carwile, 168 So.2d 469 (La.
App. 3rd Cir. 1964) (cf. Alexander v.
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 140 La.
54, 72 So. 806 (1916) ); 26 La.L.Rev. 518.

HI We have repeatedly held that a
criminal violation would lead to civil re-
sponsibility only if that act is the legal
cause of damage to another. To decide
whether the violation of the criminal stat-
ute by Laird imposes civil liability upon
him and denies him civil redress from one
admittedly negligent, we must determine
whether his act was a causc-in-fact of the
accident, what was the nature of the duty
imposed upon him, what risks were en-
compassed within that duty, and whether
under the combination of these considera-
tions he should be declared negligent.

IM Every act leading up to an accident
cannot be said to be a cause-in-fact. How-
ever, when those antecedent acts bring
the court, after careful scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstances, to a conclusion

210
that more probably than not they were inec-
essary ingredients of the accident, they
constitute cause-in-fact. In resolving this
question we make no inquiry as to whether _
the act was unlawful or negligent. We de-
termine only whether it was a substantial
factor without which the accident would
not have occurred—that is, whether it had

some direct relationship to the accident. “

[HB Licd stopped his truck so that it”
encroached upon the lane of travel ordi-
narily occupied by moving vehicles like the
track which struck it, Tf his pickup had
not been stopped in this position on the
highway, the accident could not have oc
curred. Therefore it is not difficult to
conclude that the stopping of his truck part-
ly on the travelled portion of the highway
was a cause-in-fact of the collision. | |”

We must next consider what, if any,
duty was imposed upon Laird when, he
stopped his vehicle upon the highway in
violation of the statute and in the particu-
lar manner in which he did, and what risks
were within the ambit of that duty. In or-
der to make these determinations we scru-
tinize the criminal statute to find the pro-
tection which that law was intended to af-
ford. We have said of this particular stat-
ute that it is a highway safety measure
designed to keep open the traffic arteries.
It recognizes the danger inherent when
motor vehicles are parked or stopped upon
the travelled portion of the highway.
When such a stopped vehicle fully occupies

211 | 212

a lane of traffic, not only is passage im-
paired or blocked but a following driver
finds it difficult to ascertain quickly
whether such a vehicle is moving or mo-
tionless. When a vehicle not moving oc-
cupies any portion of the highway, it re-
duces the opportunity for traffic to pass
safely at that point. It makes safe
passage impossible when there is oncoming
traffic and insufficient room for the pass-
ing movement. We have held as a matter
of court policy that this statute is designed
to protect against the risk that a driver,
whether cautious or inattentive, would
collide with a stationary vehicle. Pierre
vy. Allstate Ins. Co., supra. For application
of the same policy to a similar highway
regulatory statute, see Dixie Drive It
Yourself System v. American Beverage

Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962).

The precise questions here are whether
Laird owed a duty to the driver of the
truck which struck him from the rear;
whether, under all the circumstances of the
case and our determination of the purpose
of that duty, the risk which the driver of
the other truck caused through his actions
was contemplated by or embraced within
that standard.

The facts and circumstances of this
case are not analogous to, and may be
differentiated from, those of Dixie Drive It
Yourself System v. American Beverage
Co., supra, and Pierre v. Allstate Ins, Co.,
supra. ‘The facts in this case are anal-

ogous, except for slight differences of time,
place, and such incidentals, to those of
Rowe v. Travelers Insurance Co. 253 La.
659, 219 So.2d 486 (1969). This court’s
approach in Rowe under “proximate
cause” was different from that used in
Dixie, Pierre, and the present case. The
result in Rowe, however, would have been
the same under the approach of these
cases, which we think expresses more clear-
ly, simply, and logically the rationale of
the result. This court said in Dixie:
“e * * This [case reconciliation] is
rendered difficult by the ambiguity of the
language of proximate cause. As em-
ployed by courts, proximate cause is a legal
concept without fixed content, It is used
indiscriminately to refer to cause-in-fact,
the scope of liability, and other negligence —
factors.” See Malone, Ruminations on —
Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American
Beverage Company, supra; Green, Duties,
Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex.L.Rev.
42; Cole, Windfall and Probability: A.
Study of “Cause” in Negligence Law, 52

* CaLL.Rev. 459.

Laird owed a duty to many motorists
who might have passed his way to the
extent of responding in civil damages if
his act had given rise to the damage. Nev-

ertheless, the risk of the occurrence
brought about in combination with the act

of the driver of the truck which collided
with his stopped vehicle did not fall within
the ambit of that duty. These are the

213

pertinent facts from which we make this
conclusion:

‘There was no approaching or closely fol-
lowing traffic which impeded passage on
the highway partially occupied by Laird’s
stopped vehicle. His vehicle occupied at
most two and three-fourths feet of the
20-foot paved travelled portion of the
highway. Hare’s truck was less than seven
feet wide and could have passed Laird’s
pickup without moving out of the lane of
travel assigned to it. Moreover, because
there was no other traffic it had an addi-
tional 10 feet, or in all more than 17 feet,
of clear highway upon which to travel.
While it is difficult for other traffic to de-
termine whether a vehicle using all or
nearly all of a travelled lane is moving
or stopped, the presence of a vehicle as
far off the highway as was the Laird truck
indicates that it is a non-moving, or at least
a slow-moving, vehicle, and is as obvious
a warning to other traffic as a red flag.
In ‘addition, Laird kept his brake lights
on while he was stopped. This would
certify to traffic to the rear that there
is a stopped vehicle ahead, and indeed is a
warning device created for that very pur-
pose. Laird’s vehicle on the highway was
visible for at least two-tenths of a mile,
and perhaps more, from the crest of the
hill behind the vehicle, or even before the

1, Foreseeability, which is a nebulous con-
cept, has purposely not been discussed
for it is unnecessary, although it would
support the conclusion reached. While

214

hill. The more than adequate road signs,
warning that there was highway construc-
tion or repair work in this area, should
have alerted every driver that part of the
highway ahead might be blocked so as to
require the stopping of his vehicle or at
least the maneuvering of it into another
traffic lane. .

Finally, as in Rowe, a person standing
by the stopped vehicle recognized the im-
pending danger from the vehicle which
bore down from the rear and tried to warn
the oncoming driver by shouting and wav-
ing. The very slightest correction in direc-
tion at a very late point in time by the
driver Hare, who was totally oblivious of
the highway ahead, would have avoided the
consequences which bring this case before
us. His attention had been kept on the
rear view mirror for some distance and
some time. Under other circumstances,
and to other drivers under those circum-
stances, Laird owed the duty not to stop
on stich a portion of this highway as he
occupied, and he would or should have
known that some risks were imposed upon’
those who acted in such a manner which
would result’ in civil liability if the act
caused damage. However, the duty im-
posed, when we consider the purpose of the
criminal statute, did not encompass the
particular risk here encounteredt
foreseeability may be relevant in assign-
ing risk, there are other and often more

important factors. I paraphrase Green,
Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41

215

Tt is at this point that we then deter-
mine, by analogy with that statutory pur-
pose, that under the facts and circum-
stances of this case Laird could not be
considered negligent so that he must re-
spond in civil damages, or contributorily
negligent so that he is barred from recover-
ing civil damages, Laird’s stopping of his
truck so that it encroached slightly upon
the travelled portion of the highway in this
atea of warning of highway construction
or repairs under the totality of the circum-
stances was a technical violation of the

criminal statute, However, this conduct is

excusable for civil liability and has no oper-

Tex.L.Rey. 42, 58: The fact of risk in
the particular case is what actually took
place as a result of defendant's conduct,
not necessarily what was foreseen by the
actor as likely 10 take place. Moreover,
the concept of foreseeability would be
more applicable to a case involving the
alleged negligence of a single actor rather
than that of joint or several tortfeasors.
See Hill y. Lundin, 260 La. 542, 256
. So.2d 620 (1972); Green, Foreseeability
* ‘in Negligence Law, 61 Col.L.Rev. 1401,
See Norton v. Argonaut Insurance Com-
pany, 144 So.2d 249 (La.App. Ist Cir.
1962), which states that the Dixie case
departs to some extent from foreseeability
as the test for determining whether an
intervening cause will relieve a defend-
ant of liability. See also Robertson, In-
tervening Negligence—Proximate Cause,
23 La.L.Rev. 281; Prosser, Torts (4th
ed. H.B.), § 43, p. 250, § 44, p. 270. A
discussion of intervening cause, even
culpable intervening cause, has been de-
liberately omitted in this ease although
there is some authority for culpable in-
tervention as establishing a suwperseding
cause which relieves the first negligent
actor. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, §§

216

ative effect upon recovery of damages.
See Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive
It Yourself System Versus American Bev-
erage Company, supra, at 384-385. Al-
though Laird could have been civilly neg-
ligent under other circumstances, he is not
negligent here because there was no breach
of a duty on his part which gave rise to
the harm occasioned.

HM Actually neither the combination
fact-law question of negligence nor any at-
tendant policy consideration which might
deny liability on that basis is reached?
The resolution of the duty-risk element of

440-447; Bldredge, Culpable Interven-
tion as Superseding Canse, 86 U. of Pa.
L.Rev. 121. ‘The same result would be
had here under the application of the
appronch used under that doctrine, A
great majority of the doctrinal writers in
the field of torts have rejected intervening
and saperseding cause, as did this court
in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v.
American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 187
$0.2 298.

2. In common law jurisdictions this would
present a crucial decision by the judge
in many eases of whether to direct
verdict and take the case away from the
jury. The only previous possible jury
question—cause-in-fact—was answered af-
firmatively, but such an answer is of no
consequence when the law-judge questions
of duty-risk are negative. ‘The last answer
concludes that there was not the neces-
sary legal basis—a duty-risk relationship
‘cto support the claim, See Green, The
Gausal Relation Issue in Negligence Law,
60 MichI.Rev. 543; Malone, Rumina-
tions on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stanford L.Rev.
60; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. HLB.), § 45,
p. 289.

217

tort liability adversely to the claimant pre-
termits an inquiry into ultimate negligence
or fault, for liability cannot be imposed for
negligent acts in the absence of that rela-
tionship. However, sometimes the ques-
tion of whether the harm results from a
risk embraced within a legal duty is such
a close question of law that reason and
policy determinations are brought into
play.* In Dixie after setting forth the
policy criteria the court said: “Law and
reason support a conclusion that the de-
fendants should not be relieved of liabil-
ity.” (Emphasis supplied.) We said in
Pierre: “* * * The keys for the solu-
tion of the issue of responsibility when

there is more than one cause-in-fact of
damages are (1) a determination of the
exact risk or risks anticipated by imposi-
tion of the legal duty which has been
breached and (2) the legal or policy con-
siderations which grant excuses from cer-
tain consequences which follow an act of
negligence. This requires, under the facts
and the law of each case and the attendant
exigencies, a jurisprudential determination
which will implement and make effective
our broad codal provisions concerning
those who should respond in damages for
their faults.”

3. In some cases the duty-risk relationship
and questions of policy in assignment of
negligence are somewhat blended because
of the circumstances. See Dixie Drive

It Yourself System y. American Beverage
Co., supra;” Hill v. Lundin, supra.* See

218

Here we make a legal conclusion under
a consideration of all the facts, a conclu-
sion supported by reason and policy con-
siderations, that Laird breached no duty
to the driver of the other vehicle or to
the guest passenger in his own truck.
There was no breach of duty, for the law
does not place the particular risk of harm
encountered within a legal duty.

The evidence supports the Court of Ap-
peal’s reduction of the award to Marshall
Laird from $30,000.00 to $20,000.00.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal
in favor of Travelers Insurance Company
and against Marshall Laird and State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is
reversed, and there is judgment in favor
of Marshall Laird and State Farm Mutital
Automobile Insurance Company dismissing
Travelers Insurance Company’s third-party
demand and reconvention. The judgment
against Travelers Insurance Company in
favor of Marshall Laird for $20,000.00 and
the judgment in favor of Mrs. Gracie Laitd
against Travelers Insurance Company for
$10,000.00 are affirmed. All costs in all
courts are cast against Travelers Insurance
Company.

SUMMERS, J., concurs in result only

and assigns reasons.

Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law,
supra, at 1417; Morris, The Relation of
Criminal Statutes ‘to Tort Liability, 46
Harv.L.Rev. 458; Green, Judge and
Tary (1980). :

219 Le 220

McCALEB, C. J., and HAMLIN, J., con-
cur being in agreement with the concur-
ring opinion of SUMMERS, J.

DIXON, J., dissents with written rea-
sons,

SUMMERS, Justice (concurring).

Although I arrive at the same result, I
do not agree with some of the findings or
the reasons assigned for the legal conclu-
sion expressed. In my view the law and
facts are as follows:

On November 22, 1968 Marshall Laird
and his wife, Gracie, were traveling in
their 1968 Dodge pickup truck in a westerly
direction on Louisiana Highway 112 about
10.3 miles east of DeRidder. He was driv-
ing, and when they reached a point where
highway employees were constructing baf-
fles in the roadside ditch, he pulled over
to his right, or the north side of the high-
way, and stopped. He stopped to talle with,
and seek information from, Noah Laird,
his nephew, who was one of the workmen.

While talking to Noah, and N. E. John-
son, the highway gang foreman, Laird’s
truck was struck from the rear by a van
truck and trailer driven by Ralph Hare,
Jr, an employee of Red River News Com-
pany. At the time Hare was delivering
papers and-magazines in the course and
scope of his employment. As a result of
the collision, Laird and his wife suffered

personal injuries and incurred medical ex-
pense, The truck was extensively dam-
aged,

A direct action was brought by Laird
and his wife against The Travelers Insur-
ance Company, the liability insurer of Red
River News Company. Travelers an-
swered with a general denial and pled
Laird’s contributory negligence. Alterna-
tively, as third party plaintiff, Travelers
made Marshall Laird and his liability in-
surer State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company third-party defendants
In this third-party demand, Laird’s action
in stopping on the highway was alleged to
be “proximate negligence” making him a
joint tort-feasor with Ralph Hare, Jr., li-
able as such, in solido with his insurer State
Farm, for one-half of any recovery ob-
tained by Gracie Laird against Travelers.
Judgment was prayed for accordingly.

Travelers also intervened as subrogee to
recover $1,100 paid to Red River News
Company as collision insurer of the van
truck, The intervention was dismissed,
presumably because of an intercompany
arbitration agreement between Travelers
and State Farm advanced in an exception
to this demand,

The trial judge was of the opinion that
the cause of the accident was Hare’s fail-
ure to maintain a proper lookout and see
what he should have seen while traveling
at 55 to 60 miles per hour, noting that he

221

could easily have seen and avoided the
stopped Laird vehicle. Damages were
awarded to Marshall Laird and Gracie
Laird for personal injuries and medical
expense, in the sum of $30,000 and $10,000,
respectively. Travelers’ third-party de-
mand was dismissed.

On Travelers’ appeal to the Third Cir-
cuit, that court found Laird guilty of negli-
gence for violating the statutory prohibi-
tion against stopping on the highway, when
it was practicable to stop off of the high-
way. La.R.S. 32:141(A). Hare was also
found to be negligent in not maintaining
a proper lookout.

In addition, the Court of Appeal was of .

the opinion that as between Laird and
Hare, Hare had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision. Thus, in the opinion
of the Court of Appeal, Laird was entitled
to recover against Travelers, the insurer
of Hare’s employer. Laird’s
negligence was found to make him a joint
tort-feasor with Hare, liable as such in
solido with Hare for the injuries to Gracie
Laird. Travelers was therefore entitled to

recover from Marshall Laird, in contribu-
tion, one-half of any amounts recovered by

However,

‘Gracie Laird from Travelers.

Finding the $30,000 trial court award to
Marshall Laird for pain, suffering and dis-
ability to be manifestly excessive, the
award was reduced by the Court of Appeal
to $20,000. The $10,000 award to Gracie
Laird was affirmed. Judgment was

222

awarded in favor of Travelers for $5,000

against Marshall Laird and his insurer for
one-half of the $10,000 award in favor of
Gracie Laird. 251 So.2d 73.

Certiorari was granted upon the applica-
tion of Marshall Laird and State Farm.
259 La. 873, 253 So.2d 212. Travelers also
applied for and was granted certiorari. 259
La. 873, 253 So.2d 213.

My understanding of the facts are sub-
stantially in accord with the trial court and
Court of Appeal.

Tt was about 11 a.m. on November 22,
1968. Marshall Laird was driving his
Dodge pickup truck in a westerly direc-
tion on La. Highway 112. His wife, Gracie,
was a passenger in the truck with him.
The day was clear and the road surface
was dry.

Twenty feet of the road, the traveled
portion, was surfaced with asphalt. At the
site of the collision the road ran through
rolling hills, “like a roller coaster.” When
Laird reached a point about ten miles east
of DeRidder, he saw three large highway
warning signs, two along the north
shoulder of the road, or to his right, about
40 or 50 feet apart; and one on the south
shoulder, to his left, opposite the first sign
on the right. These signs were about four
feet high and three feet wide. They read:
“MEN WORKING’, “ROAD WORK
AHEAD”, Each had a red flag flying
from its top. oo

223

The signs were posted at the crest of a
a slight hill. At least 600 feet (the trial
judge found the distance to be 900 feet)
west of the crest of this hill, Highway De-
partment employees were at work in the
ditches alongside the highway. Here
Laird stopped his pickup truck, parking as
far as he could on the right-hand side. Be-
cause of a narrow shoulder, however, half
of the truck remained on the asphalt or
traveled portion of the road.

Although the truck motor was stopped,
Laird retained his foot on the brake pedal
to activate the rear brake light. He then
engaged in conversation with his nephew,
Noah, asking: directions to Elmer Perkins’
house, ‘Noah having told him some time
before he. could pick up a hound dog pup
there. . :

N. E. Johnson, the work crew foreman
with whom Laird was acquainted, came
over from the ditch south of the road to
shake hands and chat. As Johnson stood
at the side of the truck at least two cars
went by-one going in each direction, both
without incident. Then, as he talked, glanc-

ing) up and down the highway keeping .a
fpr jtraffic, Johnson heard the Red
Company van truck and trailer

approaching from the east. The van truck
was traveling at 55 to 60 miles per hour
and the driver appeared not to observe
Johnson or the Laird pickup truck, for he
neither changed directions nor altered
speed.

224

When Johnson realized that the van
truck driver was inattentive, he moved back
to the south shoulder of the road, at the
same time hollering and waving his hands
in a vain attempt to attract the driver’s at-
tention and divert him from the northern
or westbound ane and a collision with the
Laird pickup. The driver did ‘not react,
however, until a few feet before the im-
pact, when he applied his brakes and
turned slightly to his left, too late to avoid
a violent collision with the pickup.

The impact precipitated the pickup truck
a distance of 150 feet across the ditch and
into the woods. The van truck and trailer
were separated—the truck coming to rest
in the south ditch 74 feet from the point.
of collision, the trailer in the woods north
of the road.

Although the length of time Laird was
stopped varied according to. the witnesses
who made estimates, we are satisfied he
was there for approximately five minutes.
There was ample space in the south, or .
eastbound Jane, and the unoccupied por-
tion of the north, or westbound lane, to per-
mit Hare to maneuver around the pickup .
truck safely and with ease.

Whether Hare could see the pickup truck
before he came over the crest of the hill
is not made clear. Since the hill was-not
a steep one, it is reasonable to infer that.
he could have seen the pickup even before
he reached the crest. However, this is un-
important, for there was ample distance

225

between the crest of the hill and the stopped
pickup to enable Hare to see it as he
reached the crest of the hill in sufficient
time to either stop or go around the pick-
up. And since no traffic approached from
the opposite direction at the time, going
around the pickup presented no problem,
two vehicles having previously negotiated
the maneuver without incident.

The fact is that Hare was inattentive to
the road ahead as his own testimony and
Johnson’s testimony make clear. Just prior
to and as he came over the crest of the hill,
Hare became concerned about a companion
who was following him at a distance in an-
other Red River News Company vehicle.
Hare was looking for this vehicle in the
rear view mirror of his truck and his atten-
tion to the road ahead was diverted thereby.
His own testimony supports the conclusion
that he could have avoided the collision if
he had not been looking back. He testified
that, he did not see the warning signs, the
Pickup: truck or Johnson hailing him. His
view ahead was unobstructed and he should
have seen what was obvious, clear and di-
rectly in his path. To fail to do so was
gross negligence.

The-real problem these facts present con-
cerns the charge that Laird was guilty of

contributory negligence which continued to:

the moment of the impact, and, therefore,

he cannot recover for his injuries and dam-

age. Moreover, the contention is made

that Laird’s negligence makes him a joint
De

226

tort-feasor with Hare, responsible as a
solidary obligor for one-half of the damage
incurred by Gracie Laird, the guest pas-
senger.

Laird was negligent for violating the
rules of the road as set forth in Section 141
(A) of Title 32 of the Revised Statutes
which provides:

Upon any highway outside of a busi-
ness or residence district, no person shall
stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle,
whether attended or unattended, upon the
paved or main traveled part of the high-
way when it is practicable to stop, park
or so leave such vehicle off such part of
said highway, but in every event an un-
obstructed width of the highway opposite
a standing vehicle shall be left for the
free passage of other vehicles and a clear
view of such stopped vehicle shall be
available from a distance of two hundred
feet in each direction upon such highway.
Laird’s violation consisted of stopping on

the traveled portion of the highway when .
a nearby graveled side road, forty feet
away, with no traffic, could have provided .
It was therefore
off such..

a safe stopping place.
“practicable to stop .
(traveled) part of said highway. . . .”
This statute, as we have held, was de-"
signed to protect life and property on the
highways. It is a safety measure. The -
violation of its provisions is negligence per
se, and this negligence is actionable if it is

a legal cause of the collision. Dixie Drive

227

It Yourself System v. American Beverage
Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962). At
the same time, we recognized in the Dixie
Case that there is no universal formula for
determining legal cause.

Laird’s action was in fact a cause of the
collision, in that his truck was struck from
the rear becatise it was parked in the path
of Hare’s truck on the traveled portion of
‘the highway in violation of the rules of the
road. But for this fact, it may be said, the
collision would not have occurred. Never-
theless, Laird’s negligence was not for that
reason a legal cause of the collision in the
sense that he should answer for the result-
ing injuries and damage. This is so for
several reasons.

In the first place, his negligence was pas-
sive, too far removed in point of time from
the events leading directly to the collision.
Five minutes elapsed from the time when
he stopped until the collision occurred.
Secondly, although negligent per se for
having violated the rules of the road by
stopping on the traveled portion of the
highway when it was practicable to stop on
the side road, this per se negligence is in
this case a technical status which did not
bring about a result the statute was de-
signed to protect against, The statute was
designed to prevent blocking traffic in such
a manner that it could reasonably be ex-
pected or foreseen that an accident would
result. But this reasonable expectation did
not exist here because the road. was not

228

blocked in such a manner that traffic was
obstructed. At least fifteen feet of clear-
ance on the traveled portion of the highway
remained. This was more than sufficient
to permit any reasonable driver to go
around Laird’s pickup truck without inci-
dent, the view was unimpaired and no other
vehicles were approaching to create a
maneuver problem.

Violation of the quoted statute by the
stopped motorist under these circumstances
is not a legal cause of the collision, when
the collision occurs as a result of gross in«
attention to the road by the approaching
motorist—that is, when the collision results
from rash actions no reasonable person
could be expected to foresee. Here Hare
declared that he did not see the Laird truck
until the moment of impact, did not see
Johnson waving and hollering to attract his
attention and did not see the warning signs
placed at a sufficient distance to enable him
to stop or take necessary precautions to go
around Laird’s truck. Such gross disre-
gard of the duty to keep a proper lookout
can neither be anticipated nor guarded
against. .

In such cases the technical violation of
the statute prohibiting stopping on the high-
way becomes a passive cause, too remote
in point of time or sequence of events to re-
main legally viable. Instead, the subse-
quent negligent conduct, which intervenes
between the original negligent act and the
resulting wrong, is more proximately re-

229

Jated to the injury. This later negligence
then puts in motion a new chain of events,
and becomes the independent and primary
cause of the injury flowing directly
therefrom, making the actor chargeable
with all legal responsibility for the conse-
quences,

Applying these principles to the facts of
this case, Laird’s conduct is not a legal
cause of the collision and the damage re-
sulting therefrom. Nor did his negligence
contribute in legal contemplation to the
Instead, Hare’s
speed, inattention and failure to keep a

collision and damage.

proper lookout were the immediate and pri-
mary cause of the collision. Thus, Travel-
ers must respond in damages to Marshall
Laird and his wife Gracie. Travelers’
third-party claim against Marshall Laird
for contribution is also without merit,

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.

The majority opinion finds Laird negli-
gent (guilty of “criminal negligence”) and
his negligence to be a “cause-in-fact” of the
accident, but excuses him from civil liability
because he owed no duty to Hare, the fol-
lowing motorist. Why? Is it because Hare
was more negligent than Laird? The ma-
jority only says that “under the circum-
stances” Laird did not owe Hare a duty to
clear the highway, explaining that, al-
though Hare was a member of the class
(following motorists) to whom Laird owed
the duty of clearing the highway, Laird did

230

not, at this time and at this place, owe a
duty to Hare!

What about the duty Laird owed his pas-
senger? The following motorist and
Laird’s passenger are not in the same situa~
tion, The majority does not discuss the
duty the driver owes his passenger to avoid
placing the passenger in a position of un-
necessaty peril. The majority finds that
Laird placed his truck in a dangerous posi-
tion, violating the statute which prohibits
parking on the highway and which was de-
signed, according to the majority, “to pro-
tect against the risk that a driver, whether
cautious or inattentive, would collide with a
stationary vehicle.”

Some explanation is needed for the
evaporation of the duty which Laird owed
to his passenger. The majority relieves
Laird of all responsibility for her injury.

T agree that, as between Laird and Hare,
Laird should recover. For the purposes of
workability in solving tort cases, the opin-
ion of the Court of Appeal (251 So.2d 73)
in this case is preferable: Hare had the
last clear chance; he is responsible.

But as between Laird and Mrs. Laird, it
required the concurring negligence of Laird
and Hare to cause her injury. Laird put
his passenger in a place of danger, specifi-
cally prohibited by law, and his act, con-
curring with Hare’s negligence, caused the
injury. Laird’s insurer should bear a por-
tion of the responsibility for Mrs. Laird’s
injury.

267 So.2d 726

James 1, HOYT
ve
STATE of Louisiana.

No, 52843,

Oct, 26, 1972.

The petition of the relator in the above
entitled and numbered case having been
duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari
issue herein, directing the Honorable Field
V. Gremillion, Judge of the Ninth Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Rapides,
to transmit to the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana, on or before the 19th day of January,
1973, the record in duplicate, or a certified
‘copy of the record in duplicate, of the pro-
ceedings complained of by the relator here-
in, to the end that the validity of said pro-
ceedings may be ascertained.

It is further ordered that the aforesaid
Judge of said Court and the respondent
through counsel shall show cause, in this
court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock
‘A.M., why the relief prayed for in the
petition of the relator should not be grant-
ed,

L
267 So.2d 726
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Roy P. JOSEPH
ve
C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No, 52875.

Oct. 26, 1972.

Writ denied: Contentions 3, 4, 5 were
not raised in the trial court and will not be
considered by this Court. On the basis of
the evidentiary hearing, we are unable to
say that the petitioner proved allegations of
dereliction on the part of his retained coun-
sel, nor is any necd shown for a trial tran-
script by the allegations or evidence.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the rela-
tor should be granted an out of time ap-
peal.

DIXON, J., is of the opinion relator
should be given an out-of-term appeal.
The trial judge admitted that he did not
inform relator of an indigent defendant’s
right to a free appeal. It is uncontradicted
that relator’s attorney did not so inform
him.

i]
267 So.2d 726

Mrs, Evelyn CANTER, Individually,
etc., et al.

v.
KKOEHRING COMPANY, et al.

No. 52870.

Oct. 11, 1972,

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
“sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be

-notified.

267 So.2d 727

STATE of Louisiana
ve
David JOLLY,

No. 52884,
Get, 26, 1972.

234

Application not considered: the applica-
tion was filed in this Court on October 12th,
1972, and thus was not timely, since the
extended return date fixed by the trial
court was October 10th.

BARHAM, J,, is of the opinion the writ
should be granted.

DIXON, J,, is of the opinion that we
should consider the merits of this applica-
tion, since many of the same alleged errors
are reviewable by this Court on an applica-

tion for writs of habeas corpus filed at any

time.

|
267 S0.2d 727

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
gohan FULFORD
ve
Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 52895.

Oct, 26, 1972,

Application denied; the trial judge has

issued orders for a hearing oa all motions
filed by applicant. ao

235 ee) 236

I Application denied; there is no error in
the judgment complained of.

267 So.2d 727

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. SUMMERS, BARHAM and TATE, JJ.,

Ernest E. GREEN are of the opinion the writ should be grant~

ve ed.
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
ana State Penitentiary.

No, 52008. ||

Oct. 26, 1972.
PF '

Writ refused. Considering the written 267 80.24 728
reasons of the trial judge the showing made STATE of Louisiana ex rel:
does not warrant the exercise of our origi- Saul FONSECA
nal or supervisory jurisdiction, v.

NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CGURT, PARISH OF EAST
BATON ROUGE,

| No, 52650.

Oct, 31, 1972,

7 So, ‘The application is denied. From the re~
Donald F, GUTELIUS, Jr. turn of the District Attorney it now ap-
ve pears that the transcript of the evidence
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY et al. _ has been filed, and that the lodging of the
No. 52902. appeal in this Court is awaiting the prepa-
ration of bills of exception by defense
Oct. 26, 1972.

counsel; therefore this matter is now
moot. Copies of the District Attorney’s.
return is ordered to be sent to applicant and
Richard B, Nevils, Attorney, Suite 208,
American Bank Bldg. Baton Rouge, La.

237 a 238:

Ly BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted,

267 $0.24 728
Cy D, F. COURTNEY TATE, J., concurs. The relator’s failure
ve to raise objections to the venire or the
Wade 0. MARTIN, Jr., Secretary petit jury or to the other alleged trial error
of State, et al. waived his right to raise them now many
No. 52904. years later. See opinion on his appeal
and récord. State v. Matthews, 257 La.
Oct. 26, 1972.

220, 242 So.2d 227 (1970).

Application denied; there is no error in

the judgments complained of. 7

267 S0.2d 728
] STATE of Louisiana ex rel, Lawrence
Joseph SMITH
267 $0.24 728 ve
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, LouisI-
Robert MATTHEWS ana State Penitentiary.

ve No, 52911.

©, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary. Oct, 26, 1972.
No. 52910.

Oct, 26, 1972,

Pe Application denied; applicant’s com-

Writ denied: The showing made does plaints have already been considered and
not warrant the exercise of our jurisdic- acted upon, adversely to applicant. See
ttion, State v. Smith, 259 La, 515, 250 So,2d 724,

267 So.2d 729 267 So.2d 729

LOUISIANA NATIONAL BANK OF STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
BATON ROUGE Arthur L. JOHNSON
v. v.
Alfred S, HEROMAN et al. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 52916.
No. 52907.
Oct. 81, 1972, Oct. 81, 1972.

‘Writ refused. Considering the return of
Application denied. Relator has an ade- the trial judge that he has ruled on the peti-

quate remedy by appeal, tion for habeas corpus, this application is
moot.
Lt] . |
267 $0.24 729 267 So.2d 729
STATE of Louisiana ex ret. STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Billy
Herbert WILLIAMS Wayne SINCLAIR
ve ve

C, Murray HENDERSON, Warder, Louisi-

c. Ly ‘den, -
ana State Penitentiary, et al. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louis!-

ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No, 52908.
No. 52918,
2.
Oct. 81, 1971 Oct. 81, 1972.

“Writ denied. The mandamus prayed for The showing made is insufficient to war-
is. moot, The trial court has acted upon rant the exercise of our original or super-
the application. visory jurisdiction.

241 |

BARHAM, J, concurs, The issue pre- |
“sented addresses itself to the Department 267 80.24 736
-of Corrections.

John G. DISCON e al,

wy
| | SARAY, INC. et al.

1! ‘No. 52923.

267 So.2d 730 Oct. 31, 1972.

ve

STATE of Koulstana Pe

Joyce JACKSON.

Applicant must exhaust his remedies in
No, 52920, . *
the court of appeal before applying to this

Oct, 31, 1972. court,

Writ denied. When filed the applica- a
xtion was premature.

| | “eee
a

STATE of Louisiana ex rel,
James FRYE

w

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Lo
James H. ANDERSON ana State Penitentiary, et al,

267 So.2a 730

ve No. 52921.

‘William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General Oct. 31, 1972.

No, 52922.
Oct. 81, 1972.
Writ denied. The evidentiary hearing
transcript establishes that the plea was
Writ denied: The trial court correctly knowing and voluntary. This is a pre-Boy-
stuled that this civil proceeding is moot. _ kin plea. .

243 | 244.

i
267 $0.24 906
Belle Virginia GOLDBLUM, Testamentary

Executrix of the Succession of George
J. Woolhandler

ve
Cc. Elmo BOYD et al.

No. 52863.

Oct, 17, 1972.

Writ refused. There is no error of law
in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

'
267 S0.24 906

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Ernest
FREEMAN
ve
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louis!-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 52852.

Nov. 6, 1972.

Writ refused. Considering the report of
the trial judge that this matter has been

fixed for hearing, relator’s petition for:
mandamus is now moot.

BARHAM, J., concurs. While the trial
court’s granting of an evidentiary hearing
makes moot the application for mandamus,
the 10 month delay in acting on a writ of
habeas corpus is inexcusable.

Ld
267 So.2d 906

STATE of Louisiana
ve
James Paul LUNKINS,

No, 52932.
Noy. 2, 1972.

On considering the petition of the rela-
tor in the above entitled and numbered

cause,

Tt is ordered that the trial court grant
the writ of habeas corpus and hold a hear-
ing on the issue of mental competence or
show cause to the contrary on November
15, 1972. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815.

Ld
267 So.2d 906 -

STATE of Louisiana
Pa
dames A. CLARK, dr.
No. 52940,

Nov. 8, 1972.

Writ denied. There is no error in the
ruling complained of.

BARHAM, J., dissents in part.

L
267 So.2d 907

Mrs. Margaret MeNEILL for Stephen
Charles Loeber

we

Fred M. LINDSAY, Superintendent of Loul-
siana Training Institute for State of
Louisiana,

‘No. 52931,

Nov. 6, 1972.

246

On considering the exigencies of this case
and the petition for habeas corpus, and
attachments, of the relator in the above en-
titled and numbered cause,

It is ordered that the Honorable Wallace
A. Edwards, Judge of the Twenty-Second
Judicial District Court, Parish of St, Tam-
many, hold a hearing forthwith on peti-
tioner’s application for habeas corpus.

LJ
267 So.2d 907

STATE of Louisiana ex rel, Joseph A.
BROWN and William H. Matthews
ve
C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 52929.

Nov. 6, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made
does not warrant the exercise of our orig-
inal or supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted.

247

DIXON, J., dissents from the refusal.
As long as La. law requires a hearing un-
less the application clearly shows applicant
is not entitled to it (C.Cr.P. 354), I must
dissent. This defendant alleges inadequate
appointed counsel. No bills of exceptions
were perfected by counsel, and we refused
on appeal to rule upon them, thus effec-
tively denying the defendant’s right of ap-
peal.

TATE, J., joins in Dixon, J’s dissent.

Ly
267 S0.2d 907

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Claude ALEXANDER,

No. 52924.

Nov. 6, 1972.

248
Application denied. We perceive no er-

ror in the rulings below. Relators are not.
entitled to the relief sought.

BARHAM, J, is of the opinion the writ
should be granted ordering bail under Code:
criteria, See dissents in State v, Flood,.
263 La. 700, 269 So.2d 212 and State v.
Holmes, 263 La, 685, 269 So.2d 207.

'
267 So.2d 907

BOOKS, ETC., INC.
ve
A. KRUSHEVSKI.
No, 52930,
Nov. 6, 1972.

Writ refused. Since the case has. beem
remanded, the judgment is not final.

268 So.2d 214

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Carlos TAUCEDA,

No, 52722.
Oct. 26, 1972.

Orleans Indigent Defender Program,
William H. Byrnes, III, New Orleans, for
defendant-appellant,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison,

250

Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst, Dist. Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Carlos Tauceda, was con-
victed of simple burglary (La.R.S. 14:62)
and was sentenced to six years at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary. He appeals.
his conviction and sentence.

One bill of exceptions was reserved and
perfected to the trial court’s denial of a.
motion for new trial. The grounds for
the motion were that the verdict was con--
trary to the law and evidence and that the
verdict was not unanimous.

MI We have repeatedly held that a
motion for new trial based on the general
allegation that the verdict is contrary to

the law and evidence presents nothing for |
State v. Dillon, 260 La. 215, 255°
So.2d 745 (1971).

review.

HM According to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 782
only nine of the twelve jurors must con-
cur in order to render a verdict for the
crime of simple burglary. La.R.S. 14:62.
The contention of defendant on this point
has been rejected. Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152
(1972).

The bill is without merit.

The conyiction and sentence are affirm-
ed.

251 EE 252

268 So.2d 214

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Edward GANCH and Beverly Ann Rando.

No, 52543, a

Oct. 26, 1972.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty, Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty., Cheney C. Joseph,
Jr, Baton Rouge, Sp. Counsel for State,

for plaintiff-appellant.

Fred A. Blanche, III, Baton Rouge, for
defendants-appellees.

253
PER CURIAM.

A Bill of Information was filed charging
the defendants with disturbing the peace in
that they “committed an act in such a man-
ner as would foreseeably disturb and alarm
the public.” La.R.S. 14:103(A)(7). The
information was quashed on motion of the
defendants on the grounds that the statute
under which they were charged is uncon-
stitutional on its face. The State appeals.

HMMM Although the statute punishes
conduct we take notice of the fact that
conduct is often a means of expression.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct.
1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Cox v. State
of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13
L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). Since the statute is
susceptible of application to expression it
can withstand constitutional attack only if,
as authoritatively construed by our court,
it cannot be applied to expression which is
protected by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.
2d 408 (1972). “In other words, the statute
must be carefully drawn or be authoritative-
ly construed to punish only unprotected
speech and not be susceptible of application
to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wil-
son (supra). This is deemed necessary be-
cause persons whose expression is consti-
tutionally protected may well refrain from

254.

exercising their rights for fear of criminal
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible
of application to protected expression.
Gooding, (supra).

HI The statute on its face is susceptible
of application to expression protected by the
Louisiana Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 3) and
the First Amendment of the U. S. Consti-
tution, Since we have not heretofore lim-
ited the statute in application to expression
which is not constitutionally protected, it
must fall as being overly broad and in
contravention of the Louisiana and United
States Constitutions.

The State argues that the case of State

" v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So.2d 778 (1943)

has sufficiently limited the application ‘of
the statute to the area of unprotected ex-
pression,

In the Sanford case we merely held that
the acts of the defendant there were not
of such a nature as would tend to cause a
breach of the peace. In no way does this
limit the application of the statute so as to
comply with the constitutional mandate of
the Gooding case. (supra).

Since the statute is unconstitutional, the
Bill of Information cannot stand. The
judgment of the trial judge is affirmed,

SUMMERS, J,, dissents.

255 a 256

268 So0.2d 216

STATE of Louisiana
ve
John Henry JONES,

No, 52633.

Oct. 26, 1972.

—+—_—.
. Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst, Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty. Ralph L. Roy, Asst.
Dist. Atty, for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, John Henry Jones, was
charged with the murder of David Wil-
liams and indicted by the grand jury which
returned a true bill The defendant was
found guilty without capital punishment by
a unanimous jury and sentenced to life
imprisonment. (La.R.S. 14:30) While
three bills of exceptions were reserved dur-
ing-his trial, counsel perfected only one
to present to this Court on appeal.

Defendant contends that the admission
of his taped confession into evidence at his

257

trial was prejudicial error requiring a re-
versal of his conviction and sentence by
virtue of his being in an alleged state of
intoxication at the time of the police inter-
rogation.

A thorough and careful review of the
record convinces us the proof is sufficient
to establish the fact that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in permitting
the admission of the taped confession made
by the defendant. The record does not
show that the accused was intoxicated at
the time the confession was taken, when he
voluntarily turned himself in to the police
station at 8 A.M. the morning following
the midnight stabbing. Although he him-
self stated that he had had a half pint of
whiskey during the morning hours, and had
drunk half of another half pint just before
turning himself in, the interrogation officer
specifically stated that the accused did not
speak or appear to have been drinking, and
no testimony was introduced at the trial
to show to the contrary or that the confes-
sion was not free and voluntary. .

In reviewing the record we find the de-
fendant was advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), The tape
starts off with a statement by the inter-
rogating officer that the defendant was ad-
vised of his constitutional rights and that
he had signed waiver of rights form to that
effect, During the trial the presiding judge
conducted a hearing out of the presence of

be

258

the jury and determined that “the taped
statement was freely and voluntarily giv-
en.” After determining the taped. interro-
gation was free and voluntary, the trial
judge permitted it to be introduced into
evidence in its entirety as required by La.
RS. 15:450. Neither do we find the ques-
tioning officers employed tactics outside
the scope of reasonable police interroga-
tion, nor were their methods in contraven-
tion of La.R.S. 15:451. This bill of ex-
ceptions lacks merit. State v. Alexander,
215 La, 245, 40 So.2d 232 (1949) ; 2 Whar-
ton’s Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed. Sect.
388 at 122 (1955).

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., concurs.

268 So.2d 217

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Thomas Gregory DUDEK.

No, 51907,

Oct, 26, 1972.

eS
Be)

261

i |

Jordan & Ponder, Roger W. Jordan, John
D. Ponder, Metairie, for defendant-appel-
lant,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garri-
son, Dist. Atty, Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Dudek was convicted of vio-
lation of La.R.S. 40:971, distribution of a

controlled dangerous substance, and was

262

sentenced to five years at the Louisiana
State Penitentiary. He appeals this con-
viction and sentence.

Defendant perfected eighteen bills of ex-
ceptions during the proceedings but only
the following were urged in his brief:

Defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions
No. 1 wherein the trial court denied de-
fendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress evi-
dence allegedly illegally obtained in that it
was the result of an entrapment of the de-
fendant intended to induce the defendant
to commit the crimes alleged to have taken
place.
trial court interrogated counsel for the de-
fendant to determine whether or not the

At the hearing on this motion the

sole basis for his motion to suppress was
the plea of entrapment and counsel in-
formed the court that this was the only
point that would be raised.

Under the circumstances, we find it was
not error for the trial judge to deny the
motion to suppress, The defendant has not
alleged that he was aggrieved by an uncon-
stitutional search as required by Art. 703,
La.C.Cr.P.

HH A plea of entrapment is an af-
firmative defense, similar for instance to a
plea of self-defense, available at trial un-
der a plea of not guilty, Anderson, 1
Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, §
281 (1957); Id. Volume 4, § 1902; Anno-
tation, Entrapment, 69 A.L.R.2d 1397, Sec-
tion 10 (1960). See also: Sorrells v. Unit-

263

ed States, 287 U.S, 435 at 453-454, 53 S.Ct.
210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). No authority is
cited that Louisiana criminal procedure en-
titles the accused to a determination of this
issye in advance of trial on the merits.
CE, State v. Turner, 241 La. 94, 127 So.2d.
512 (1961).

We find no merit in this bill.

HM The next bill argued in brief is Bill
of Exceptions No. 11. During the defend-
ant’s cross-examination of Officer Larry
Hendry (the State’s chief witness and un-
dercover agent to whom the defendant al-
legedly sold the controlled dangerous sub-
stance) the State objected to the question:
“What are your personal feelings about the
use of marijuana?”

The officer’s personal feelings about the
use of marijuana are irrelevant. The trial
judge was correct in sustaining the State’s
objection. La.R.S. 15:41.

Bill of Exceptions No. 17 was reserved
to the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
Motion in Arrest of Judgment which al-
leged that Act. 457 of 1970 (the Act which
contained the La.R.S. 40:971 with which
defendant was charged) is unconstitutional.
Counsel argues that the body of that act
exceeded, or went beyond, the scope of its
title and thereby contravened Art. III, Sec-
tion 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1921.

[HI Tie date of the alleged distribution
of marijuana was March 17, 1971. Our in-

264

quiry then is to determine if the body of
that act under which he was charged ex-
ceeded the scope of its title. The purpose
of the constitutional requirement that the
body of an act not exceed the scope of its
title is to give the legislature and the pub-
lic fair notice of the scope of proposed leg-
islation. State v. Welkner, 259 La. 815,
253 So.2d 192 (1971). The title of Act 457
of 1970 reads as follows:

“To amend and reenact Sub-Part A of
Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, des-
ignated as the Uniform Controlled Dan-
gerous Substances Law, providing defi-
nition of narcotic drugs; providing reg-
ulation of the manufacture transporta-
tion, sale, possession or use thereof;
providing penalties for violation; and
providing generally with respect thereto
including the administration thereof.”

HMMM The defendant argues that the title
of the act specifies that the act is to pro-
vide for a definition of “narcotic drugs”,
and to provide for the regulation of the
manufacture, transportation, sale, posses-
sion or use thereof, etc . . . Further,
that since the act itself defines what nar-
cotic drugs are, and since this definition
does not include marijuana, then the at-
tempted regulation of marijuana by the
body of the act exceeds the scope of the ti-
tle.

While this argument is persuasive we do

not find it to be correct. In 1970 when the

265

legislature was in the process of enacting
Act 457, the definition of narcotic drugs in
the Revised Statutes (Acts 1934, 2nd Ex.
Sess. No. 14) included marijuana. A legis-
lator or member of the public reading the
title of the act would, in fact, be alerted
that the use of marijuana was to be regu-
lated by Act 457 because marijuana was
defined as a narcotic drug at that time. In
this respect, the act did not exceed the
scope of its title and is constitutional,

The trial judge properly denied defend-
ant’s motion in arrest of judgment. This

bill is without merit.

Bill of Exceptions No. 18 was reserved
to the trial court’s denial of a Motion for
New Trial.
the Motion for New Trial only two require
attention, the others having been disposed

On the grounds asserted in

of in the bills of exceptions discussed
above.

Hs The Motion for New Trial alleges
that:
that the crime allegedly took place in the
Parish of Orleans in the jurisdiction of
this Court.” We have examined the
record and find that it is replete with evi-

“There was no evidence at the trial

dence that the crime was committed in Or-
Jeans Parish (R-184-192).

HM The other ground alleged in the
Motion for New Trial is that the Court
refused defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. We have repeatedly held that La.
C.Cr.P, Art, 778 is unconstitutional. (State

266
vy. Hall, 261 La. 777, 260 So.2d 913 (1972)).

Bill of Exceptions No. 18 is without
merit.

HE Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was re-
served when the trial judge allowed into
evidence two capsules of LSD purchased
from the defendant by the undercover
agent under circumstances similar to the
purchase forming the basis for the present
charge. The defendant argues that since
we held in State v. Welkner, 259 La. 813,
253 So.2d 192 (1971) that Act 457 of 1970
(the act in effect at the time of the sale of
LSD) was ineffective for purposes of
charging offenses relating to LSD, then
the state should be precluded from intro-
ducing evidence of a sale of LSD to show
system, intent, and knowledge. LaR.S.
153445, 446,

While we did hold in the Welkner case
(supra) that offenses relating to LSD
could not be punished under Act 457 of
1970, the fact remains that these offenses
were punishable under the old law. (State
v. Welkner, supra, 253 So.2d at p. 197).
Thus, evidence of defendant’s distribution
of LSD under circumstances similar to the
distribution which is the basis for the
present charge is admissible to prove guilty
knowledge, intent, and system. LaR.S.
15:45 and 446,

I The remaining bills of exceptions
were perfected but not argued by defend-
ant in his brief therefore are considered

267 - ee 268

abandoned. In any event, we have-consid-
ercd them and found none to have any
merit,

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

_ William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
“HL. Howard, Asst, Atty. Gen, Leroy A.
| Hartley, Sp. Counsel, Jim Garrison, Dist.
Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for
plaintifi-appellee.
268 So.2d 220 Elie, Strickler & Dennis, New Orleans,
STATE of Louisiana Richard B. Sobol, for defendant-appellant.

ve

Edison Arthur SINGLETON. PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Edison Arthur Singicton,
was convicted of aggravated rape and the

death sentence imposed was affirmed by

a.
: 1 this Court. 253 La. 18, 215 So.2d 838
(1968).
Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408
US. 845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed2d 744
(1972) following Furman v. Georgia, 408
US. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346
(1972), the United States Supreme Court
vacated the judgment herein insofar as it
left undisturbed the death penalty imposed
and remanded this case to this Court for
further proceedings. 408 U.S. 932, 92 S.Ct.
2852, 33 L.Ed2d 745 (1972).
a
De

No. 49153.
Oct, 26, 1972,

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
CE, State v. Shaffer, 260 La, 605, 257 So:

269

2d 121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260
La. 644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the
Mandate’ of the United States Supreme
‘Court, the death sentence imposed upon de-
fendant is annulled and set aside, and the
ease is remanded to the 17th Judicial’ Dis-
trict Court with instructions to the trial
judge to sentence the defendant to life im-
prisonment.

Case remanded.

268 So.2a 221
STATE of Louisiana
vo
John. POLAND...
No. 49971.”

Oct, 26, 1972.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry

H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Lee A, Hart:

"Jey, Sp. Counsel, Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist.
Atty. for plaintiff-appellee.

Scallan E. Walsh, Baton Rouge, for de-
.fendant-appellant, .

270
PER CURIAM.

Defendant, John Poland, was convicted
of murder (La.R.S. -14:30), and the death
sentence imposéd ‘was affirmed by this
Court. 255 La. 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, 92.S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed2d 744 (1972),
following Furman y. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct, 2726, 33 LEd.2d 346 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undis-
turbed the. death penalty ‘imposed and re-

manded this case to this Court for further
Proceedings. 408 U.S, 936, 92 S.Ct. 2862,
33 LEd.2a 754 (1972)...

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the imposi-
tion of a sentence other than death. Cf,
State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121
(1971) and State v."Duplessis, 260 La. Mag
257 So.2d 135 (1971).

© “Accordingly, in compliance with the Man
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentence imposed upon defendant
is annulled and sét"aside, and the case is
remanded to the 19th Judicial District Court
with ‘instructions to the trial judge to -sen-
tence the" defendant “to life imprisonment.

Case, remanded,

271
268 So.2d 222

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Melvin ROSS.

No. 52629,

Oct. 26, 1972.

272

me

Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty, Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Melvin Ross was jointly tried with two
co-defendants, before a jury, on the charge
of having committed simple burglary of a
1966 Mustang in violation of La.R.S.

273

14:62. All three defendants were found
guilty.

Ross appeals his conviction and sentence
to the penitentiary. He relies upon two
bills of exceptions, ‘both pertaining to
whether or not the trial judge abused his
discretion by not granting Ross a separate
trial.

TB Article 704 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that jointly indicted
defendants may be tried separately or to-
gether. The initial election rests with the
State, but the court may order a severance
on motion of the defendant if satisfied that
justice requires it. Severance is not a
matter of right; the granting or refusal of
a motion for severance is within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, whose ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal only if
there is clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971).

Here the defense counsel contends there
was a-conflict of interest among the co-
defendants because of antagonistic defens-
es.

| | This Court has repeatedly held that
it is HOt a sufficient showing to merely as-
sert that the defenses in a joint trial arc
antagonistic, Rather, it is necessary to
present the pertinent facts in this regard to
enable the trial judge to ascertain whether
the antagonism is such as to necessitate
separate trials. State v. Bonner, 252 La.

200, 210 So2d 319 (1968); State v.

274

Progue, 243 La, 337, 144 So.2d 352 (1962).
In State v. Birbiglia, 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533
(1921), this court observed: “* * * it
does not appear that the judge had any
reason to believe, when he was called upon
to pass judgment upon the motion for ‘a
severance, that such a case would develop.”
Under these circumstances, the judge did‘
not commit an error in overruling the mo-

tion for a severance.”

Hl Since there was no showing wher
the motion for severance was made and
denied immediately before trial testimony
commenced that the defenses of this de-
fendant and his co-defendants would be
antagonistic, we muSt conclude that the
tuling complained of was not erroneous.
This pretrial bill (Bill No. 1) is without
merit. :

The defendant Ross denied complicity in
the stealing of a tape from the burglarized
vehicle found in the vehicle in which he
and his two co-defendants were riding.
After he testified, his counsel once again
moved for severance, and this was denied
(Bill No. 2).

HI Counsel requested that the testimo-
ny of the other two defendants be taken out-
side the presence of the jury, so that it
could be shown that the defenses of the
other two defendants were antagonistic to
the present appellant's. We do not find ”
any abuse of discretion by the trial court
in refusing, at this late stage of the trial

275 | 276

(after the State had put on its case and
the defendant had testified), to enter a mo-
tion for severance based upon alleged an-
tagonistic defenses, especially since no ade-
quate reason is shown for the failure to
discover same and move for severance.
prior to trial. The district judge noted
that, in the event the testimony of the co-
defendants showed there to be a serious
conflict or prejudice, then the appellant
Ross could move for mistrial. No such
motion for mistrial was made during or
after the testimony of the co-defendants.

We find no error in the ruling com-
plained of.

The conviction and sentence are af-
firmed.

BARHAM, J., concurs.

268 So.2d 224

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Angelo Roma GIANGROSSO.
No. 51979.
Oct, 26, 197:

277

‘

Orleans Indigent Defender Program,
Anthony R. Messina, New Orleans, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty, Gen. Jim Garrison,
Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

In June of 1965 the defendant was found
guilty by a jury on counts 1, 2,3 and 4 of a
five count indictment in which defendant
‘was accused of armed robbery of five dif-
ferent persons, He was sentenced to serve
fifteen years (the maximum in 1965 was
thirty years) on each of four counts, the

sentences to run consecutively.

An “out of time” appeal was granted the
defendant in March of 1971,

At the time of the offense and the trial,
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928
was still in force and effect, the present
Code of Criminal Procedure having be-
come effective on January 1, 1967.

- Several bills of exceptions were taken.
Tt is necessary to discuss only one.

Bill of Exception No. 2 was reserved to
the denial of defendant’s “motion to select.”

Before trial, the attorney for the defend-
ant filed a written “motion to select” in
which the defendant requested the district
attorney be ordered to “select before the
commencement of trial which particular
count of the information filed herein he ex-

278

The bill of in-
formation, as noted above, contains five
counts,

pects to proceed under.”

In each count the defendant was
accused of armed robbery of a different
person on April 24, 1965.
the record shows that the defendant en-
tered the “Loser’s Lounge” and robbed the

The evidence in

operator and some customers. We gather
that the State purported to draw its bill
under the provisions of Article 218 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928:

“When two or more crimes result from
a single act, or from one continuous un-
Jawful transaction, only one indictment
will lie; but each of said distinct crimes,
though some of them be felonies and oth-
ers of them misdemeanors, may be ‘sep-
arately charged in distinct counts in t
same indictment.”

That article waé repealed in 1932 by Act
No. 153. The repeal left’ in full” force
Article 217 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1928, which provides that “except
as otherwise provided under this title, ‘no
indictment shall charge more than one
crime, . . .” (The same provision is
carried in Article 493 of the Code of Crimi
inal Procedure of 1966). .

In State v. Cannon, 185 La. 395, 169 So.
446, 447, 448 (1936), this court held that
when. the defendant killed two women in
one transaction, the “killing of each was
a separate ‘homicide, a separate crime, -and
since the repeal of article 218.of thé Code

of Criminal Protedure by Act No.

279

1932, it was necessary that two separate
indictments be returned if the state in-
tended to prosecute this defendant for each
homicide.”

The Cannon case cited State v, Roberts,
170 La. 727, 129 So. 144 (1930), where a de-
fendant was charged in separate indict-
‘thents with the murder of two persons in
a robbery. In the Roberts case, before the
tepeal of Article 218 of the Criminal Code,
this court held that it was essential to
charge the dual killing in a single indict-
ment, and the failure to do so prevented the
trial of the defendant on the second in-
dictment.

It is true that there is contrary juris-
prudence in this State. For example, in
State v. Morrison, 184 La, 39, 165 So. 323
(1936), this court approved an indictment
which charged the killing of two persons
during a burglary. There, however, the
count relied on State v. Batson, 108 La. 479,
32 So. 478 (1902), a case decided before the
énactient’ of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1928. It was noted that the
question arose in a motion for a new trial,
and no motion was made during the trial
or before the trial to compel the State to
elect. See also dicta in State v. Turner,
178 La, 927, 152 So. 567 (1934); State v.
Mansfield, 178 La. 393, 151 So. 631 (1933).

1. For a discussion of the problem and his-
tory of Article 218, see Slovenko, The
Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law,

, 82 TuLL.Rev. 47 at pages 70-81 (1957~

280°

The State argues that the repeal of Arti-
cle 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1928 “in no way affected the common
law rule of joinder of crimes . . .”
and relies on the dicta of State v. Turner,

supra:

“The repeal of article 218 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 153 of
1932), relating to charging two or more
offenses in distinct counts, does not have
the effect of repealing the rule at com-
mon law as to charging such offenses.”
178 La. at 939, 152 So. at 571.

The argument is not well founded The
subsequent ruling in State v. Cannon,
supra,;was to the contrary, and was neces-

sary to the decision of the case.

‘The ruling in State v, Cannon was re-
iterated with approval in State v. Carter,
206 La. 181, 19 So.2d 41 (1944).

:

HE 4s an alternative, the State further
contends that the robbery charge contained
an element of theft, and Article 225 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 al-
lowed the cumulation in one indictment
of several counts of theft. There is no
merit in this argument, for the purpose of
cumulation of theft charges in Article 225
was to aggregate the amounts to deter-
mine the grade of the offense charged.

1958) ; Litton, Joinder of Criminal Of-

fenses in Louisiana, 4 La.L.Rev. wr
(1941-1942).

_ TB We conclude that, upon the repeal
of Article 218 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1928, Article 217 of that code
remained in full force and effect, requir-
ing that an indictment shall charge no
more than one crime, except as otherwise
provided by the statutes. The joinder of
offenses in the case before us should not
have been allowed; the defendant’s mo-
tion to select, timely filed, should have
been sustained. .

For the reasons assigned, the convic-
tion and sentence are reversed and the case
is remanded for a new trial.

SUMMERS, J., dissents.

SANDERS, Justice (dissenting).

Even assuming that multiple counts were
improper, only the sentence would be af-

fected,

268 S0.2d 226

STATE of Louisiana
v
Arthur MITCHELL,

No. 52568.

Oct, 26, 1972.

Picou & Picou, Cynthia Picou, Leon A.
Picou, Jr., St. Francisville, for defendant-
appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Richard H.
Kilbourne, Dist. Atty, Fred C. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. '°

283
PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Arthur Mitchell, appeals
his jury conviction of simple escape (La.
R.S. 14:110) on the basis of two bills of
exceptions reserved and perfected during
his trial. However, we do not consider
these bills because there is an error, patent
on the face of the error, which merits at-

tention. (La.C.Cr.P. Art. 920).

HM The court minutes state: “The
jury then rendered a written verdict as fol-
State v. Arthur Mitchell,
Guilty Simple Escape, signed Jessie J.
Bordelon, Foreman.” However, in the ver-
dict itself the word “guilty” was not used,

lows

and, indeed, it does not specify its decision.
The verdict itself reads: “Verdict, simple
signed Jessie Bordelon,

escape, Fore-

man...

I This verdict is not responsive to
the indictment. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 815. “The
finding of the jury of the’ guilt of the
prisoner must be direct and positive .
the court is not authorized or justified to
‘reason’ to an inferred verdict of guilty
against the accused” where the verdict
corisists simply of a recitation of the name
of the crime, not prefixed by the words
“guilty of”. State v. Johnson, 46 La.Ann.
5, 14 So. 295 (1894); State v. Flanakin,
128 La, 455, 54 So. 940 (1911); Cf. State
c. Milam, 176 La. 879, 147 So. 22 (1933).
See also; La.C.Cr.P, art. 810; State v.
Gueringer, 209 La. 118, 24 So.2d 284 (1924) ;

284

5 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure
§ 2129 at 321 (1957).

The conviction and sentence are re-
versed, and the case is remanded for a new
trial,

SANDERS, J., dissents.

268 So.2d 227

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Earl WILLIAMS, Jr.

No. 48931.

Oct, 26, 1972.

|

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Lee A. Hart-
ley, Special Counsel, Jack E. Yelverton,
Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.

George Leppert, for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Earl Williams, Jr., was con-
victed of rape and the death sentence im-
posed was affirmed by this Court. 252 La.
1023, 215 So.2d 799 (1968).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.
S. 845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undis-
turbed the death penalty imposed and re-
manded this case to this Court for further
proceedings, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2851, 33
LEd2d 747 (1972).

286

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
Cf., State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So,2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the
Mandate of the United States Supreme

Court, the death sentence imposed upon de-
fendant is annulled and set aside, and the

case is remanded to the 18th Judicial Dis-
trict Court with instructions to the trial
judge to sentence the defendant to life im-
prisonment.

Case remanded.

268 So.2d 228

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Donald Ray ADAMS.

No. 52542.
Oct. 26, 1972.

—+—

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Warren
E. Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent ©
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Carole M. Mosely,
Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Attys. for plain-
tiff-appellant.

Fred A. Blanche, III, Baton Rouge, for.
defondant-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

A Bill of Information was filed charging
Donald Ray Adams with violation of La.
RS. 14:103(A)(2) in that he: “did use
unnecessarily loud, offensive and insult-
ing language in such a manner as would.
foreseeably disturb and alarm the public.”

The defendant moved to quash the in-
dictment on the ground that the statute
(La.RS. 14:103(A) (2) ) is unconstitution-
al‘and void on its face. The trial judge
ordered that the information be quashed,
and the State pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Art.
912(B) (1) appeals.

: [BBs La.R'S. 14:103(A) (2) punishes only -

spoken words. It can therefore withstand

289

a constitutional attack only if, as authori-
tatively construed by the courts of Louisi-
ana, it is not susceptible of application to
speech, although vulgar or offensive, that
is protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States. Gooding v. Wilson, 405
US. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1972).

“It matters not that the words appellee
‘used might have been constitutionally
prohibited under a narrowly and pre-
cisely drawn statute. At least when stat-
utes regulate or proscribe speech and
when ‘no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabili-
tating the statutes in a single prosecu-
tion,’ Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 491, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1123, 14 LEd.2d
22 (1965), the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected ex-
pression is deemed to justify allowing
‘attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with the requisite narrow specificity,’ id.,
at 486, 85 S.Ct, at 1121... .”

. The State argues that the case of State
v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So.2d 778
(1943) has sufficiently limited the appli-
cation of the statute to the area of unpro-
tected expression.

In the Sanford case we merely held
that the acts committed by the defendant

290

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct.
1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972).

This is deemed necessary because per-
sons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercis-
ing their rights for fear of criminal sanc-
tions provided by a statute susceptible of
application to protected expression. Good-
ing v. Wilson (supra).

WM La.RS. 14:103(A) (2) on its face
subjects persons exercising their consti-
tutional right of expression to fear of
ctiminal sanctions and is a curtailment of
that right.
ited the statute in application to expression
which is not protected by the Louisiana
Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 3) and the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
‘Therefore, the statute must be declared
unconstitutional as being overly broad.
(See State v. Ganch, 263 La, 251, 268 So.2d
214, decided this date).

We have not heretofore lim-

‘We agree with the trial judge that the
statute is unconstitutional on its face and
the Bill of Information cannot stand. The
judgment is affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., dissents.

were not of such a nature as would tend
to cause a breach of the peace. In no
manner does this limit the application of
the statute to unprotected expression.
See also: State v. Cox, 244 La. 1087,
156 So.2d 448 (1968), reversed 879 U.S.
536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 18 T.W.2d 471 (1965).

268 So.2d 229

STATE of Louisiana
v
George A. SQUARE.
No, 50412.

Oct. 26, 1972.
De
—
—__

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Hart-
Jey, Sp. Counsel, J. Carl Parkerson, Dist.
Atty., Gilbert T. Brown, Jr., Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

292

John G. Loftin, Monroe, for defendant-
appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, George A. Square, was con-
victed of murder (La.R.S. 14:30) and the
death sentence imposed was affirmed by
this Court. 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200
(1971).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undisturb-
ed the death penalty imposed and remanded
this case to this Court for further pro-
ceedings. 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2871, 33
L.Ed.2d 760 (1972).

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
CE, State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the Man-
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentence imposed upon defendant
is annulled and set aside, and the case is re-
manded to the 4th Judicial District Court
with instructions to the trial judge to sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.

Case remanded,

268 So.2d 230 ©

STATE of Louisiana
Vv
Andrew MOORE.

Nos. 51918-A, 51919-A,
Oct. 26, 1972.

Cunningham & Cunningham, W. Peyton
Cunningham, Jr., Natchitoches, for de-
fendant-appellant,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Ronald C.
Martin, Dist. Atty., Charles R. Whitehead,
Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

294.
PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Andrew Moore, was tried
by a jury and convicted on two counts of
simple burglary (La.R.S. 14:62) and was
sentenced to serve five years in the State
Penitentiary on each count to run consecu-
tively. No bills of exceptions were per-
fected by the defendant. We are therefore
limited on appeal to a review of the plead-
ings and proceedings for discoverable error.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Ash, 257 La.
337, 242 So.2d 535 (1971). We find none.

The convictions and sentences are affirm-
ed, and pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 880, the
defendant is given credit for time spent in:
actual custody.

268 So.2d 231

STATE of Louisiana
: ve
Clarence DOUGLAS and Robert D, Jackson.

No. 50285.

Oct. 26, 1972,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Hart~

295 a 296

ley, Sp. Counsel, Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist.
Atty., Frank J. Gremillion, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee.

Joel B. Dickinson, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Clarence Douglas and Robert
D. Jackson, were convicted of aggravated
rape and the death sentences imposed were
affirmed by this Court. 256 La. 572, 237
So.2d 382 (1970).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman y. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972),
the United States Supreme Court vacated.
the judgment herein insofar as it left un-
disturbed the death penalties imposed and

remanded this case to this Court for further
procecdings. 408 U.S. 937, 92 S.Ct. 2864,

33 L.Ed.2d 756 (1972).

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
Cf, State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the Man-
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentences imposed upon them are
annulled and set aside and the case is re-

manded to the 19th Judicial District Court
with instructions to the trial judge to sen-
tence the defendants to life imprisonment.

Case remanded.

268 So.2d 231

STATE of Louisiana
v
Bobby Milton McALLISTER.

No. 49293.
Oct, 26, 1972,

—._—

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst, Atty, Gen., Lee A. Hart-
ley, Sp. Counsel, Leonard E. Yokum, Dist.
Atty,, for plaintiff-appellee.

Autley B. Newton, Hammond, for de-
fendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Bobby Milton McAllister,
was convicted of murder, and the death sen-
tence imposed was affirmed by this Court.
253 La. 382, 218 So.2d 305 (1969).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
followng Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the
United States. Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undis-
turbed the death penalty imposed and re-
amanded this case to this Court for further

297
|

298 |

proceedings. 408 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2854,
33 L.Ed2d 748 (1972).

‘We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
CE, State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the Man-
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentence imposed upon defendant
is annulled and set aside, and the case is
remanded to the 21st Judicial District Court
with instructions to the trial judge to sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.

Case remanded.

268 So.2d 232

STATE of Louisiana
ve . '
Mose STRONG.

No. 50198.
Oct, 26, 1972.
‘William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harty
H, Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A,.Hart-

299
ley, Sp. Counsel, Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty.,
Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plain-
tiff-appellee.

E. Howard McCaleb, III, New Orleans,
for defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM,

Defendant, Mose Strong, was convicted
of aggravated rape and the death sentence
imposed was affirmed by this Court, 256 La.
455, 236 So.2d 798 (1970).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, '02' S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct, 2726, 33 LEd2d 346 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undisturb-
ed the death penalty imposed and remand-
ed this case to this Court for further pro-
ceedings. 408 U.S. 937, 92 S.Ct. 2863, 33
L.Ed.2d 755 (1972).

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of ‘a sentence other than death.
C£., State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the Man-
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentence imposed upon defendant
is annulled and set aside, and the case is
remanded to the Criminal District Court,
Section “B”, Parish of Orleans, with in-

308
structions to the trial judge to sentence the:
defendant to life imprisonment.

Case remanded,

McCALEB, C. J., recused. :

268 So.2d 233
Theodule VIDREINE, Plaintiff,

Ashy Construction Company, Intervenor-.
Appellant-Respondent,

vw

MICHIGAN MILLERS MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Defendant-
Appetiee-Relator,

No. 51435.
Feb, 21, 1972.

On Rehearing Oct. 4, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1972,

301 | 302

Champagne & Colomb, Patrick L. Col-
omb, Lafayette, for defendant-relator.

Guillory, Guillory & Guillory, Isom J.
Guillory, Jr., Eunice, for plaintiff-respon-
dent. . .

TATE, Justice.

The only issue before us concerns the
right of an employer, who has paid work-
men’s compensation benefits to an injured
employee, to be indemnified for such’ bene-
fits by a third person whose negligence has
caused or contributed to the employee's in-
juries. La.R.S. 23:1101-03. The precise
issue is whether the employer, if he is neg-
ligent himself, is entitled to recover such
benefits from a joint tortfeasor.

For reasons detailed by the court of ap-
peal opinion, 242 So.2d'249 (La.App.3d Cir.
1970), the only claim before us is that of
the intervenor, Ashy Coristructioit Compa-
ny, for reimbursement of the workmen’s
compensation benefits paid by it as, employ-
er to the original .plaintiff, its employee
Vidrine. Vidrine was injured at, work
while riding as a passenger in an Ashy
company truck driven by a co-employee,
Cormier. The Ashy, truck was involved
with a Hardy automobile in an. accident
caused by the, negligence of both. drivers.
The defendant is the liability insurer
(Michigan Millers) of the Hardy automo-
bile.

Despite the negligence of the Ashy‘driv-
er, the court of appeal allowed Ashby recov-

303

ery for'compensation benefits paid to Vi-
drine (who was himself free of negli-
gence) up to the defendant's policy limits
of $5,000. In so doing, the court of appeal
relicd on an earlier decision of this court,
which it (and some other intermediate
court decisions) construed as holding that
the negligence of the employer is immateri-
al to its claim for reimbursement.

We granted certiorari, 257 La. 855, 244
So.2d 608 (1971), because we wished to
re-examine the holding in that early deci-
sion, City of Shreveport v. Southwestern
Gas & Electric Co., 140 La, 1078, 74 So.
559 (1919).

Before doing so, it may be appropriate
to discuss the nature of the employer’s
right to reimbursement from a tortfeasor
of compensation benefits paid to an em-
ployee injured through such third person’s
negligence.

This right is provided by LaRS.
23:1101-1103 (1950). The present enact-
ment employs substantially the same lan-
guage as set forth in a 1920 amendment of
our workmen’s compensation act. See Act
247 of 1920, re-enacting section 7 of our

workmen’s compensation act. Before this

1920 amendment, and as originally enacted,

the employer was merely subrogated to the
right, if any, of the injured employee to
recover against the third person. See:
Act 20 of 1914, Section 7; Act 38 of 1918,
re-enacting Section 7.

304

However, by the 1920 amendment the:
employer was granted a right indegend-
ent of the employee’s to be indemnified
fied for compensation benefits paid to an
employee because of the third person’s
tort; the employer’s right to recover does.
not depend upon subrogation to the rights
of the employee. Board of Commissioners,
etc. v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199,
65 So.2d 313 (1953). In Marquette Cas-
ualty Co. v. Brown, 235 La, 245, 103 So.2d
269, 271 (1968), we summarized as follows
the employer's rights to indemnification by
reason of the statutory provisions here ap-
plicable:

“Considering the provisions of R.S.
23:1101, 1102 and 1103 together, it seems
plain that there is but one cause of action
recognized for the recovery of damages re-
sulting from a single tort. However, the
right of redress against the tortfeasor has
been extended by the provisions to the in-
jured workman’s employer, who is accord-
ed a preferential right to recover, out of
the judgment for damages which may be
assessed against the tortfeasor, the amount
of compensation he has paid or become ob-
ligated to pay to the injured employee.
This right is, of course, conditioned upon
the basic right of the employee to recover
damages and, according to R.S. 23:1103, if
the damages awarded are for an amount
less than the total compensation paid, the
employer’s recovery is accordingly limited
to that amount. Thus, though the compen-

305
sation paying employer is given the prefer-
ential right to reimbursement out of the
judgment, recovery is necessarily restricted
to the amount for which the tortfeasor is
‘Hable to the injured employee for the con-
sequences of his wrongful act.”

This summary correctly describes the
non-negligent employer's right to indemni-
fication arising out of tort injury to his
therefor under

employee compensated

-workmen’s compensation law.

Tf this language were literally applied to
‘the present facts, the employer Ashy, de-
“spite its own contributory negligence (im-
cputed to it because of the fault of its driv-
er-employee), can recover from the joint
tortfeasor insurer for the compensation
“benefits paid to its injured employee, Vi-
<drine. For, Vidrine, himself being free of
fault as a mere passenger, could have re-
covered (had he persisted with his suit)
‘the damages caused him by the tortfeasor,
rsubject to the preferential indemnification
‘of his employer off the top of the plaintiff
employee's award.

The quoted language, however, must be
viewed in the context of the question
there at issue. The limited question before
the court was whether the indemnification
suit by the employer’s compensation insur-
-er was prescribed as in the case of tort
suits, since filed more than one year after
4. Vidrine withdrew from the suit, since

the indemnification of the employer would
exhaust the policy limits of the defend-

306

the accident. Civil Code Article 3536.
The primary determination of this court
was that the cause of action sounded in
tort, with the prescriptive period commenc-
ing at the date of the accident and not at
some later date when a right to indemnifi-
cation accrued.

The court was not there concerned with
the question of whether an employer could
recover from the joint tortfeasor for ben-
efits paid, despite any negligence by such
employer contributing to the accident.
Neither was such issue involved in Board
of Commissioners, etc. v, City of New Or-
leans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313 (1953), per-
haps the leading case analyzing the em-
ployer’s right to indemnification as being
independent of the employee’s right to re-
cover—the issue there being whether the
employer could recover for compensation
paid to an illegitimate child of a worker
killed through a third person’s negligence,
although the illegitimate child himself was
not entitled at that time to wrongful death
benefits under Civil Code Article 315. See
also Thomas v. Matthews Lumber Co., 253
La. 1, 215 So.2d 832 (1963).

‘The precise question before us, so far as
we can find, has never been passed upon

by an opinion of this court,

Characterized relevantly to the present
issue, the cited jurisprudence holds that the

ant, ‘Michigan Millers, and thus Vidrine
himself would receive nothing.

307

employer’s right to indemnification is a
statutorily created’ right to tort recovery
against a negligent tortfeasor independent
of the employee’s.® The cited jurispru-
dence does not require us to hold that a

negligent employer may nevertheless be in-
demnified by his joint tortfeasor for bene-

fits paid to his employee.

Since the indemnification action by the
employer is in tort, we see no reason why
we should not apply the usual rule in tort
cases that a-claimant’s contributory negli-
gence bars his recovery.

‘By re son, “Of the workmen’s compensa~
tion act, thé employer’ may have paid
How-

ever, the employer is so liable for, injuries

benefits fo his injured employee.

at work whether or not the negligence of a
third person caused them, ~

2. The cited decisions of this court charac-
terize the accident as giving rise to a
single cause of action in tort, although
the employer's independent right of action
‘to secure indemnification is created by
statute. Foi parposes of prescription, our
decisions specifically hold that the employ-
er’s right to indemnification is not a
seyiarate’and distinct cause of action (see
Marquette Casualty Co. v. Brown, cited
in text), so that a suit by the employer
_. or his insurer interrupts prescription on
the cause of action and permits a past-
year ‘intervention by the employee for his
own personal injuries, National Surety
Corp. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. 247
La. 905, 175 So.2d 263 (1965). ‘The last.
cited case, however, specifically quotes the
definition: in’ Hépe v. Madison, 192 La.
598, 188 So. 711, 715 (1989) that a cause
of action -is {‘the situation or state of
facts which- entitles. a party to sustain

The legislature may have authorized:

308°

a non-negligent employer to be indemni-
fied by the tortfeasor.
find no legislative intent to permit such

Nevertheless, we:

indemnification to an employer whose neg--
ligence has itself contributed to the em-
ployee’s injuries, in contravention of the:
general tort principle that one himself at
fault cannot recover damages caused in.

whole or part by his own fault. To allow’

a windfall to a negligent employer does not
seem to be within the intent of the com--

pensation statute; if there is to be a wind-

fall, it should be in favor of the employee,.
for whose protection the compensation act
was enacted and in whose protection such.
statute should be liberally construed.

Such a conclusion is in accord with the
analysis by Proféssor Wex Malone in his.

am action”, i.e. which gives him “aright
to judicial interference in his behalf”.
In the writer's personal view, the at- ”
tempted distinction between the employ:
er’s “cause” and “right” of action is in-
consistent with such an analysis and,
moreover (see Malone, Louisiana Work-
men’s Compensation, 1951, Section 867 at
1964 pocket supp.), is confusing. In the
writer’s opinion, the better view is that
the employer is granted an independent,
tort cause of action by the statute, with
prescription commencing to run from the °
accident, and with intervention after the
year permitted by either the employer or
the employee in a timely filed suit by the
other, see National Surety Corp, cited
above. However, for present purposes,
under either this analysis or that of the
cited cases, the result would be the same
(as it would in all cases cited herein).

“309 | 310

-authoritative work, Louisiana Workmen’s
‘Compensation, Section 367, at pp. 475-476
+1951) +

“Tt would seem that if the employer him-
-self were guilty of negligence which, in
conjunction with that of the third party,
brought on the accident, the employer
:should be denied reimbursement for the
‘compensation he has paid the employee.
-Since the principle underlying Section 7
[La.R.S. 23 :1101-1103] is the notion of re-
«quiring the wrongdoer to indemnify the
blameless employer, this principle would be
‘inapplicable where the employer were as
-guilty as the party being sued. Many deci-
‘sions in other jurisdictions have so held.
It cannot be successfully contended that
“the effect here would be to permit the em-
~ployee to recover by indirection from the
-employer contrary to Section 34 [La.R.S.
1032] of the Compensation Act, since the

:8. As Professor Malone notes, the other
American jurisdictions are divided as to
whether the employer's contributory negli-
gence, either actual or imputed, bars his
recovery. See also 101 0.1.8. Workmen’s
Compensation § 1010(c); 58 AmJur.
“Workmen’s Compensation, Section 359.
It is fair to state, however, that another
national authority on workmen's compen-
sation believes that, in the interest of
avoiding double recovery (and since the
“employer's” negligence is really vicarious
Viability for the nogligence of a co-
employee), the better view should be that
tthe employer should not be barred by a
‘defense of coneurring negligence when
the negligence is that of a ce-employee.
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Com-
pensation, Sections 71.20 and 75.23
(1970). In footnote 78 to the portion of
his text quoted in our opinion, Professor

employee is insisting only that the faulty
employer should not be allowed a bite out
of the damages to which the employee is
justly entitled from the third party. How-
ever, in the one Louisiana case [Footnote
cites City of Shreveport y.’ Southwestern
Gas & Elec. Co., 145 La. 670, 82 So. 785
(1919)] in which this problem was present-
ed the court stated that the carelessness of
the employer is immaterial in his claim for
reimbursement of compensation, paid.”

In holding that the employer’s contribu-
tory negligence was immaterial to its suit
for indemnification against the tortfeasor,
the intermediate court in the present case
relied only upon the “one Louisiana case”
to this effect cited by Professor Malone:
City of Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas &
Electric Co., 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785 (1919) ;
see also earlier decision at 140 La. 1078, 74
So. 559 (1919).

Malone also admits that an employer not
personally negligent—but only vicariously
liable through the carelessness of his
workers—should perhaps not be denied
indemnity; but he adds that none of the
cases dealing with the employer’s fault
distinguish vicarious liability from per-
sonal fault. Actually only in the com-
paratively rare case of a small enterprise
operated by an individual is the “employ-
er’s” contributory negligence personal
carelessness rather than vicarious lia-
bility. As here, where the “employer” is
a corporation, most employers are liable
only vicariously because of the fault of
their agents and employees. -

4. In the intervening fifty years, this case-
has been cited only -infrequently for the
proposition in question. It has, - how-"
ever, been characterized as holding to the

311

The actual holding of that case is con-
At the time, before
the 1920 amendment, the Louisiana work-
men’s compensation act provided that the

siderably narrower.

employer's suit for indemnification was as
subrogee of the injured employee® In
fact, in the City of Shreveport case the
employer, the plaintiff city, had filed suit
by virtue of a conventional subrogation
from the widow of the accidentally-killed
employee. The sole basis for allowing the
employer to recover for compensation paid,
despite its own negligence, was stated as
follows, 145 La. 685, 82 So. 787:

“Other defenses are contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff city, and
estoppel because of the city’s electrician
not having condemned the location of this
wire, but having, on the contrary, impliedly
approved it by not objecting to it. Suffice
it to say of these defenses that the city is
not suing in her own right, but is simply
enforcing the rights of the widow and chil-
dren of the decedent.”
(The decedent employee had been held free
of fault.)

(Italics ours.)

effect noted in the few cases on the point :
Andrus v. Security Ins, Co. 161 So.2d
118 (La.App.2d Cir, 1964) ; Day v. Na-
tional—U. S. Radiator Corp. 117 So.2d
104 (La.App. Ist Cir., 1959), reversed on
other grounds, 241 La. 288, 128 So.2d
660 (1961) ; United Gas Co. v. Guillory,
206 F.2d 49 (5th Cir, 1953). It has
‘also once been cited as supporting analyti-
cally the proposition that the third-person
tortfeasor is not entitled to contribution

312

By virtue of the 1920 amendment and
the subsequent jurisprudence cited in the
earlier part of this opinion, the right of
the employer to recover compensation paid
to an injured employee is an independent
right; it no longer depends upon subroga-
tion to the rights of the employee. Thus,
the basis of our decision in the City of
Shreveport case has since been repudiated
by the legislative amendment and subse-"
quent jurisdictional interpretations that the
employer proceeds for indemnification in
his independent right and not as subrogee
of the employee.

Therefore, as in the case of any other
tort plaintiff, we see no reason why the
employer's own contributory negligence
should not bar his recovery in his indemni~
fication suit, and the City of Shreveport

holding is not to the contrary.

In the present suit, the defendant tort-
feasor’s insurer had filed a third-party de-
mand against Ashy, seeking contribution.
from Ashy as joint tortfeasor in the event
the injured employee recovered damages as.

plaintiff in the tort suit. The intermediate
from the jointly negligent employer for
damages owed to the latter's employee be-
cause of the concurring negligence of the:
third person and the employer. Hebert

v. Blankenship, 187 $0.24 798, (La.App..
8d Cir, 1966).

5. See summary of statutory history in:
Chauvin v. Louisiana Power & Light.
Co., 177 La. 198, 148 So. 23 (1983).

313

court denied contribution under the juris-
prudence developed by the courts of appeal
that a tortfeasor cannot seek contribution
from the claimant’s employer even though
the employer is also concurrently negligent,

See: Bagwell v. South Louisiana Elec-
tric Co-Op. Assn., 228 So.2d 555 (La.App.
3d Cir, 1969) and the cases cited therein;
General Electric Co. v. Cuban American
Nickel Co, 396 F.2d 89 (Sth Cir. 1968).
Contra; Moak v. Link-Belt Co. 229 So.2d
395, 414-416 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1969). See
also Comment, The Right of a Third Party
to Contribution or Indemnity from a Loui-
siana Workmen’s Compensation Employer,
38 Tul.L.Rev. 536 (1964).

This court has never spoken on this is-
sue whether the provision of La.R.S.
23:1032, granting an employee a right to a
compensation award exclusive of any tort
remedy, likewise operates so as to bar a
joint tortfeasor from securing contribution
from the employer for the tort damages
caused through the employer’s concurring
negligence.© This issue is not before us,
however, under the present pleadings. The
employee Vidrine’s own suit for damages
was dismissed, as was the defendant insur-
6. We granted certiorari to review this

issue as decided by the court of appeal in

Moak, above cited, see 255 La. 549, 550,

551, 282 So.2d 75, 76 (1970), but the

parties dismissed the countering claims

when the appeal was heard in this court.
257 La, 281, 242 So.2d 515 (1970). See

also City of Shreveport vy. Southwestern

314

er’s third-party demand against Ashy;
these dismissals are final, as no review
was sought of the trial court judgment
which dismissed them. The issue of con-
tribution is therefore not before us.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
the contributory negligence of the interve-
nor, Ashy Construction Company, bars its
recovery against the defendant(s) herein.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of
appeal awarding recovery on the interven-
tion is reversed, and the trial court judg-
ment dismissing the intervention of Ashy
The
costs in the trial court are assessed as pro-
vided by its decree; the costs of the appeal

Construction Company is affirmed.

and‘of review by this court are assessed
against the intervenor, Ashy Construction
Company.

Reversed and dismissed.

McCALEB, C. J., dissents, being of the
opinion that the decision of the Court of
See 242 So.2d 249.
The attempt of the majority to distinguish
City of Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas &
Electric Company, 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785,
is unreal for R.S, 23:1101-03 in essence

Appeal is correct.

Gas & Hlectric Co., 145 La. 680, 689-690,
82 So. 785, 780 (1919), which notes that
the exclusive limiting provision of the
workmen's compensation act “is restricted
to contracts between employers and em-
ployés and to compensation by employers
to employés”, and that the exclusive reme-
dy of the act is limited to bar an action

315:

confers simply a right of legal subrogation
(not a separate cause of action for indem-
nification) in favor of every compensa-
tion-paying employer against negligent
third persons. Not only does the decision
today effectually overrule the City of
Shreveport case (under the guise of dis-
tinction), it also overrules several cases
from our Courts of Appeal and like con-
clusions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals of the United States, sub silentio, de-
spite the fact that over these many years
the Legislature itself has not amended the
statute to effect an overruling of his juris-
prudence. In confining the right of action
granted to all compensation-paying employ-
ets to those who are “faultless”, the deci-
sion herein, adopting the views of Profes-
sor Malone, constitutes a judicial amend-
ment to the statute which presently permits

no such classification of employers.

“by an employé and his dependents

against his employer, or the in-
surer of the employer, or the employer
of an employer.”

4. The majority here has made some extend-
ed comments as to a third party tort-
feasor’s right of contribution from an em-
ployer who is a joint tortfeasor. We
should be very careful about distinguish-
ing contribution between joint tortfeasors
and contribution from a vicariously liable
employer under workmen's compensation
to @ tortfeasor. The case of Moak v.
Link-Belt Company, 257 La. 281, 242
So.2d 515, did not present for the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court a question of con-
tribution, There the trial court and the
Court of Appeal (229 So.2d 395) con-
cluded that the plaintiff employees of both

P|
BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

316

The plaintiff Vidrine sued the defendant
Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Com-
pany for damages for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident. Vidrine’s
employer, Ashy Construction Company, in-
tervened, claiming indemnification for the
workmen’s compensation benefits it had
paid to Vidrine, and the defendant recon-
vened against the intervenor for contribu-
tion. The plaintiff employee Vidrine with-
drew his suit, and the defendant’s counter-
claim against the intervenor for contribu-
tion fell4 Only the intervention of the
employer for indemnification remains.

‘The defendant pleaded the “contributory
negligence” of the intervenor as a bar to
its claim for indemnification, alleging that
Vidrine’s co-employee was concurrently
negligent with the other driver, who was
insured by defendant.

companies had established the right to
recover under a finding of negligence on
the part of both companies only under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an evi-
dentiary rule which can be invoked only
by certain parties under exceptional cir-
cumstances. Thus both the Court of Ap-
peal and the trial court concluded that,
as between the defendants Link-Belt and
American Sugar, neither had carried the
burden of proving the negligence of the
other. Tort liability as between the par-
ties was not resolved since neither car-
ried the burden of proof, and contribu-
tion of a joint tortfeasor was not a proper
issue for the appellate court, Mach was
entitled to recover from the other on the
theory of indemnity under workmen's.
compensation. .

317

The intervenor’s right to recover against
this defendant is a statutory right found in
RS. 23:1101-1103, which is a part of the
Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation Act.
That indemnification is clearly and con-

RS. 23:1101 in perti-
“Any employer having

cisely spelled out.
nent part reads:
paid or having become obligated to pay
compensation under the provisions of this
Chapter may bring suit against such third
person [one who is legally liable in dam-
ages to the employee for an injury] to re-
cover any amount which he has paid or be-
come obligated to pay as compensation to
any injured employee or his dependent.”
Under R.S. 23:1102 the employer’s right to
indemnification through intervention, here
exercised, is granted, and R.S, 23:1103
grants to the employer who has paid com-
pensation benefits a claim for compensa-
tion actually paid which takes precedence
even over the injured employee’s or his de-
pendent’s claim for recovery.

It can thus be seen that there is no
equivocation in the statutes as to the em-
‘ployer’s right of indemnification against
any third person who is liable in damages
for an injury suffered by the employee for
which the employer has paid compensation
-benefits. .

The majority cites Malone, Louisiana
Workmen’s Compensation Law and Prac-
tice § 367, for ‘the proposition that the
‘principle: underlying Section 7 of the act
(R.S!23:1101-1103) “is the notion of re-

318

quiring the wrongdoer to indemnify the
blameless employer”. (Emphasis mine.)
It is from this point of departure that the
majority finally holds that any legal con-
tributory negligence—imputed, derivative,
personal, or independent—on the part of
the employer bars his recovery in indemni-
fication for compensation benefits. The
initial departure leads to a final conclusion
which is totally invalid.

Nothing contained in these statutes qual-
ifies the employer’s right to obtain indem-
unification, Unless that statutory right is
abridged by other statute or is against pub-
The right is not

dependent on absence of negligence.

lic policy, it is absolute.

I begin with the premise, then, that an
employer has an absolute statutory right to
be indemnified by any third party who is
liable in damages for the injury to the em-
ployee for which the employer has paid
workmen’s compensation benefits. Next I
point out that although there may be rea-
sons under public policy for a departure
from the absolute right to indemnification,
that case is not before us. There is an eq-
uitable principle of common law that one
who has unclean hands or is himself a
wrongdoer should not be able to benefit
from the concurrent wrongdoing of anoth-
er. This is the principle enunciated in a
small minority of the states in order to
qualify and limit the employer’s right to
indemnification tinder their workmen’s.

compensation law. In those jurisdictions,

319

that negligence which is a bar to the em-

ployer’s recovery in indemnification is
termed “independent personal negligence”,
which is to distinguish it from derivative
or imputed negligence giving rise to vi-

carious responsibility.

Now to the instant case: No independ-
ent personal negligence on the part of the
intervenor Ashy is pleaded; only the de-
rivative or imputed negligence of its em-
ployee-servant which fixes vicarious re-
sponsibility has been urged. The majority
hhas nevertheless held that the negligence
of the co-employee is to be here imputed to
the employer under the theory of vicarious
responsibility so as to constitute concurring
contributory negligence which will bar the
employer’s right to indemnification for the
workmen’s compensation benefits it has
paid the injured employee. The employer
here was only vicariously liable to third
parties for the negligence of the co-em-
ployee. The employer was not even vicari-
ously liable in tort for the negligent acts of
the co-employee as between that co-em-
ployee and another employee.

“* * * Tt is incorrect to say that the
negligence of a co-employee is the employ-
er’s negligence, when the injured person is
also an employee; the principle of vicari-
‘ous liability simply does not apply. Thus,
if claimant C at the time of the accident
was riding in the employer’s truck driven
by co-employee D, and was: injured in a
collision caused by the combined negligence

"320

of D and a third party T, one can, of
course, say with propriety that, in an ac-
tion by T against the employer for dam-
ages to T himself, the employer is. vicari-
ously liable for the negligence of D. But
in an action by the employer against T,
based on C’s injuries, one cannot properly
say that the injuries were in part imputa-
ble to the ‘employer’s’ negligence, because,
vis-a-vis his employee C, the employer is
not vicariously liable for the negligence of
Dz

“Accordingly, the better view seems to
be that the employer should not be barred
by a defense of concurring negligence,
when the negligence is only that of a co-
employee.

“On the other hand, if the employer’s
negligence was not based on vicarious lia~
bility, but was direct and personal, the em-
ployer’s suit could be barred in those juris-
dictions which use the concept of ‘subroga-
tion,’ on the general equitable subrogation
principle that the subrogee must not him-
self be at fault or guilty of contributing to
the loss on which he sues.” 2 Larson, The
Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 75.23.

A stronger but similar view is express-
ed by Malone, supra in footnote to the
discussion quoted by the majority: “I£ the
employer is not personally negligent, but
the carelessness of one of his workers
combines with the wrongdoing of a third
party to cause the injury to the worker, it

‘821

«Seems that the employer should not be de-
nied indemnity against the third party
wrongdoer, It is familiar law in most
states that an employer who is held liable

to a third person because of the negligence

of his servant is entitled to indemnity from
the servant, and by the same token he
should be allowed indemnity against the
third party.
dealing with the effect of the employer's

However, none of the cases

faulé on his right to indemnity in compen-
Sation have distinguished vicarious liability
from personal fault.” (Fn. 73, p. 476.)
(Emphasis supplied.) 2. For additional dis-
cussion, see Larson, \Vorkmen’s Compensa-
tion: Third Party’s Action Over Against
Employer, 65 Nw.U.L.Rev. 351; McCoid,
The Third Person in the Compensation
Picture, 37 Tex.L.Rev. 389; Comment, 25
U.Chi.L.Rev. 522; Note, 36 Minn.L.Rev.
‘549; -Note, 37 Iowa L.Rev. 84; Note, 42
Ind.L.J. 430; Note, 9 Utah L.Rev. 939;
Note, 13 Vand.L.Rev. 772.

“While the majority acknowledges in
footnote 3 that Malone and Larson hold
the view of a limited bar to indemnifica~
tion, i, e, independent negligence, it con-
cludes that since only in rare cases is the
employer's contributory negligence the re-

2. Vicarious responsibility of the employer
for the employee's acts in Louisiana and
in common law stems not from the idea
of any actual negligence, moral fault, or
wrongdoing on the part of the employer,
but is -based upon the socio-economic
theory that one who controls the activi-
ties of another and receives the financial

322

sult of personal carelessness rather than
vicarious fault, that view shoild not be
given credence. Thus with the broad
brush of pen the majority has disregarded
express and unambiguous statutory lan-
guage and determined a vital question in
the field of workmen’s compensation with-
out giving full consideration to the possible
alternatives.

The North Carolina Supreme Court in a
series of cases has made the very distinc-
tion suggested by Malone and Larson.
The jurisprudence in that state is to the
effect that negligence imputable to an, em-
ployer under the common law doctrine re-
spondeat superior is not a bar to his recov-
ery for workmen’s compensation against a
third party, but that “independent negli-
gence” may be pleaded in bar of his recov-
ery against such a third party. Brown v.
Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E.
419; Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C.
200, 60 S.E.2d 106; Essick v. City.of Lex-
ington, 233 N.C. 600, 65 S.E.2d 220; Poin-
dexter v. Johnson Motor Lines, 235 N.C.
286, 69 S.E.2d 495; Lovette v. Lloyd, 236
N.C. 663, 73 S.E2d 886; Hunsucker v.
High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C.
559, 75 S.E2d 7688

benefits of those activities should be re-.

sponsible to third parties. See Blanchard

y. Ogima, 253 La. 84, 215 “So.2d 902

(1968); Barham, Liability Without
Fault, XVII No. 4 La.Bar J. art.

3. Wor the further application’ of the “inde-
-pendent negligence” ‘doctrine’ see Liberty

323

The general rule of law, however, makes
no distinction between independent and im-
puted negligence, and is to the effect that
the contributory or concurrent negligence
of the employer can never be pleaded as
bar to his recovery from a negligent third
party for workmen’s compensation paid to
an employee. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235
Minn, 491, 51 N.W.2d 566; case note, 36
Minn.L.Rey, 549; Enghusen v. H. Chris-
tiansen & Sons, Inc., 259 Minn. 442, 107
N.W.2d 843; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Iowa 1014,
174 N.W. 709; Williams Bros. Lumber Co.
v. Meisel, 85 Ga.App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384;
Houk v. Arrow Drilling Company, 201
Kan. 81, 439 P.2d 146; Liddle v. Collins
Construction Company, 283 S.W.2d 474
(Mo.1955); General Box Co. v. Missouri
Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d 442;
Standard Wholesale Phos. & A. Wks. v.
Rukert Term. Corp., 193 Md. 20, 65 A.2d
304; Bristol Telephone Co. v. Weaver, 146
Tenn, 511, 243 S.W. 299; Indemnity Insur-
ance Co, of North America v. Odom, 237
S.C. 167, 116 S.E.2d 22; Clark v. Chicago,
M,, St. P. & P. R. Co., 214 Wis, 295, 252
N.W. 685; Employers Mut. L. Ins. Co. of
Wis. v. Refined Syrups Corp., 184 Misc.
941, 53 N.Y.S.2d 835, aff'd, 269 App.Div.
931, 58 N.Y.S.2d 216; Caulfield v. Elm-
hurst Contracting Co., 268 App.Div. 661,

Mutual Insurance Company v. Adams, 91
Idaho 151, 417 P.2d 417, and the dissent,
in Brown vy. Arrington Const. Co., 74
‘Idaho 238, 262 P.2d 789. See also Ameri-

324

53 N.Y.S.2d 25, aff'd, 294 N.Y. 803, 62 N.
E2d 237; Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern
Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.
2d 358; Graham vy. City of Lincoln, 106
Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569; Utley v. Taylor
& Gaskin, 305 Mich. 561, 9 N.W.2d 842;
Johnson v. Willoughby, 183 S.W.2d 201
(Tex.Civ.App.1944); Baker v. Traders &
General Ins. Co., 199 F.2d 289 (10th Cir.
1952); Texaco, Inc, v. Pruitt, 396 F.2d
237 (10th Cir. 1968); General Electric Co.
y. Cuban American Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89
(Sth Cir. 1968); United Gas Corp. v. Guil-
lory, 206 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1953); Otis El-
evator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 F. 376
(8th Cir, 1917); Marciniak v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company, 152 F.Supp. 89
(D.Del.1957); Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112
F.Supp. 526 (D.Conn.1953). See also
Anno. 19 A.L.R. 766; supplemented 27 A.
LR. 493, 37 A.L.R. 838, 67 A.L.R. 249, 88
A.LR. 665, and 106 A.L.R. 1040.

The majority, again in footnote, recog-
nizes a division in the jurisprudence of
this country, citing 101 C.J.S. Workmen’s
Compensation § 1010(c), and 58 Am.Jur.
Workmen’s Compensation § 359, but fails
to mention that the division is such that
only the most miniscule minority supports
the view adopted here. Most of the cases
cited in these works stand for the opposite

proposition or can be distinguished. The

can Casualty Company of Reading, Pa.
y. South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F.Supp.
30 (W.D.S.0.1954).

325 ee 326

North Carolina cases are cited for support,
‘but, as shown by my previous discussion,
they are based on the “independent negli-
gence” theory and do not support the broad
theory enounced, The same theory is
adopted in a federal district court decision
from South Carolina which is cited Two
cases out of Illinois have been overruled
by statutory amendment.5 Another of the
cases decided in the federal courts which
barred recovery of compensation payments
turned on a contractual agreement to as-
sume full responsibility.6 Also cited is a
federal district court decision out of Loui-
siana which deals with liability between
employers and has nothing to do with the
issue presented in this instance.” .

4, American Casualty Company of Reading,
Pa, v. South Carolina Gas Co., supra, at
fa. 3.

5. ‘The Illinois cases, Hulke v. International
Manufacturing Company, 14 IllApp.2d 5,
142 N.E.2a 717, and Alaimo v. DuPont,
11 TlLApp.2d 288, 186 N.B.2d 542, were
decided at a time when the pertinent por-
tions of the Illinois Workmen’s Compen-
sation Law was undergoing constant revi-
sion by legislation and jurisprudential in-
terpretation. See Rylander v. Chicago
Short Line Railway Company, 17 IN.2d
618, 161 N.W.2d 812, for disenssion. How-
ever, with the 1959 amendment to the
law there is now a right for an employer
who has paid compensation benefits to
recover that amount from a negligent third
party whether the employer may have been,
negligent in causing the injuries or not.
Reeves v. Tepen, 268 N.E24 912 (IL,
4th Dist. 1971) ; Blanski v. Actna Casu-
alty & Surety Company, 287 F.2d 113
(ith Cir. 1961).

8. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United
States, 110 F.Supp. 987 (N.D.Fla.1958),

California cases are also cited for this.
While some of the cases in the jurispru-
dence of California do hold in accord-
ance with the view expressed in the major-
ity opinion here, it cannot be said categori-
cally that this is the California rule.
These California holdings are based in a
large part upon Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d
57, 17 Cal.Rptr. 369, 366 P.2d 641, which
modified prior jurisprudence after finding
the North Carolina rule of “independent
negligence” persuasive. In adopting the
North Carolina rule, however, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court applied it to a factual
situation where only vicarious liability was
present, and the “independent negligence”
theory was inapplicable. Thereafter a

aff'd, 211 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 848 U.S. 855, 75 S.Ct. 79, 99
L.Ed. 673.

7, Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Manufac-
turers Cas. Ins. Co, 140 F.Supp. 579
(W.D.La.1956).

8. Although not cited by these authorities,
Pennsylvania appears not to adhere to the
majority rule. There a third party is
allowed to secure contribution from a
negligent employer which is limited to the
amount of the payable compensation.
Maio y. Fahs, 339 Pa, 180, 14 A.2d 105;
Brown yv. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d
836; Stark v. Posh Construction Com-
pany, 192 Pa.Super. 409, 162 A.2d 9,
allocatur denied. Stahl, Workmen’s Com-
pensation, 22 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 381; 402. Of.
Jackson v. Gleason, 320 Pa. 545, 182 A.
498. No case was found holding that a
negligent employer was precluded from
seoking recovery for paid compensation
under the statutory right of subrogation,
but such a conclusion would appear. to
follow from the rationale of the juris-
prudence above.

327 ‘

number of cases in the various appellate
courts of California interpreted and ap-
plied the “Witt decision, In some cases
there existed actual independent negligence
of the employer, and in others the employ-
er was only vicariously liable.9 The Witt
y. Jackson rule with its variations in the
appellate courts has presented numerous
aid most serious problems. See Comment,
17 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 651, and Note, 21 Has-
tings LJ. 661.

Our state courts and the federal courts
have apparently believed that City of
Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric
Co,, 145 La. 680, 82 So. 785, was authority
in Louisiana for the view that concurrent
negligence imputed to the employer was
not a ‘bar to recovery from a.third party.
Day v. National-U.S. Radiator’ Corpora-

- tion, 117 So.2d 104 (La.App. ist Cir. 1960),
reversed on other grounds, 241 La. 288,
128 So.2d 660; Andrus v. Great American
Insurance Company, 161 So2d 113 (La.
App, 3rd Cir. 1964), writs refused. See
also’ International Paper Co. v. Arkansas &
Louisiana Missouri Ry. Co., 35 So.2d 769

(LaiApp. 2nd Cir, 1948); United Gas
Corp. v. Guillory, supra, and General. Elec-

9. Chick. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.App.
2a 201, 25 Cal-Rptr. 725; ‘Tate v. Superi-
or Court, 218 Cal.App.2d 288, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 548; Castro v. Fowler Equipment
Co., 288 Cal.App2d 416, 43 Cal-Rotr.
. 589; Jones v. McFarland Co-Op Gin,
Ine, 23% Cal.App.2d 94, 46 Cal.Rptr.
5i2; Souza v. Pratico, 245 Oal.App.2d

tric Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co., st2
pra. .

The author of the majority opinion here
was the author of the opinion in Andrus v.
Great American, supra. He said there un.
equivocally: “Thus, for example, in Loui-
siana it has been held that the employer’s
own independent contributory negligence
may not bar the employer’s right to reim-
bursement from the tortfeasor of compen-
sation paid to the injured employee, since
the employer is merely enforcing the in-
jured employee's cause of action.” I am
not sure whether the author used the
phrase “independent contributory negli-
gence” advisedly or inadvertently in this
statement of law; otherwise I believe the
writer of the majority opinion stated in
Andrus the correct Louisiana rule as well
as the overwhelming majority view juris-
prudentially and doctrinally.

I have pointed out that we do not have
before us a case where this court can de-
cide whether a public policy consideration
should require us to modify our indemnifi-
cation rule in workmen’s compensation,
The. right of indemnification is founded
upon, and is part and parcel of, the same

651, 54 Cal_Rptr. 159; Benwell v. Dean,

249 Cal.App.2d 345, 57 Oal.Rptr. 894;

Smith v. Trapp, 249 Cal.App.2d 929, 58

CaLRptr. 229; Holliday v. Miles, Inc.,

266 Cal.App.2d 396, 72 CalRptr. 96;

Slayton v. Wright, 271 Cal.App.2d 219, 76.
Cal.Rptr. 494,

329°

sccio-economic theory that is the basis for

workmen’s compensation’s replacing the de-
lictual remedy. Only one remedy is given,
one recovery, and the financial loss suf-
fered is so fixed that it may be passed
down to the consumers. Tt is not founded
upon the same principle as is compulsory
insurance or upon similar theories which
attempt to spread losses horizontally and
callaterally among all situated “in similar
‘The question may be posed, and
it'appears to be in the mind of the majori-

positions.

ty: Why excuse vicarious fault of a work-
men’s compensation payor when the indem-
nification he seeks will in many cases come
irédm one who is also only vicariously at
The
workmen’s compensation statute has man-
dated that difference, and the legislative
theory and purpose underlying workmen’s

fault? The answer is very simple:

compensation are different from the legis-
lative theory and purpose underlying the
assignment of vicarious fault. Moreover,
first. and. last,- regardless of -purpose or
thepry, indemnification is the law (La.Civ.
Code Art. 1). ’

“The inajority réaches without reason or
explanation beyond and even contrary to
the authorities it appears to recognize and
rely upoti--Malone and Larson, who'are in
fact the eminent authorities in this field.

if’ the majority opinion in the instant
case prevails with all of its broad implica-

tions,
pression’ and to the previous jurisprudence

“will be contrary to statutory ex-

330"

of this state, and it will be’ the antipod 6E
the view adopted by the vast majority of”
jurisdictions outside this state. Moreover,
it poses the threat of all’thie‘ complexities
that arise where the minority view exists.”

\For the reasons assigned I respectfully
dissent. :

ON REHEARING |
McCALEB, Chief Justice.

Theodule Vidrine was injured while in
the course and scope of his employment
with the Ashy Construction Company. He
was a passenger in a company truck driven
by a co-employee, Joseph Cormier, whén it,
collided with an automobile which was’
being driven by Dorothy Hardy (a.minor)
and insured by Michigan, Millers Mutual .

Insurance Company... ,

Vidrine brought a tort action against the...
minor’s father and Michigan. Ashy interz,_
vened claiming reimbursement from the.
defendants for the amounts, it had paid
Vidrine on account of workmen’s compen-
sation benefits duc to him. Vidrine ulti-
mately withdrew his suit, and the litigation

has continued only as between Ashy (for
the compensation payments) and the de-
fendants.

In the lower courts it was determined
that the accident occurred as the result of
Hardy and Ashy’s employee, Cormier;
that Vidrine was not negligent. | .

and

331

“Phe sole question for our determination
‘on the initial hearing in this Court, and
now, is whether the negligence of Cormier,
attributable to his employer (Ashy), pre-
vents the latter from recovering against
the third-party joint tortfeasor (Hardy)
and his insurer, the compensation payments
made by it to its non-negligent employce
Vidrine.
‘whether an employer may recover such

Stated another way, the issue is

compensation benefits from a third-party
tortfeasor, under the provisions of R.S.
23:1101-1103, if he himself is guilty of
negligence which contributed to the acci-
dent causing the non-negligent employce’s
injury. On the original hearing we held
that he could not.

We now reverse and hold that the negli-
gence of the employer does not bar his right
to recover such compensation payments
Our
conclusion is based on the clear and un-
equivocal language of R.S. 23:1101 and
1103 which read as follows:

from a third-party joint tortfeasor.

§ 1101. “When an injury for which
compensation is payable under this Chap-
ter has been sustained under circumstanc-
es creating in some person (in this Sec-
tion referred to as third person) other
than the employer a legal liability to pay
damages in respect thereto, the injured
employee or his dependent may claim
compensation under this Chapter and the
payment or award of compensation here-

332

under shall not affect the claim or right
of action of the injured employee or his
dependent against such third person, nor
be regarded as establishing a measure of
damages for the injury; and such in-
jured employce or his dependent may
obtain damages from or proceed at law
against such third person to recover dam-
ages for the injury.

“Any employer having paid or having
become obligated to pay compensation un-
der the provisions of this Chapter may
bring suit against such third person to
recover any amount which he has paid or
become obligated to pay as compensation
to any injured employee or his depend-

ent.” (Emphasis added)

§ 1103, “In the event that the em-
ployer or the employee or his dependent
becomes party plaintiff in a suit against
a third person, as provided in RS.
23:1102, and damages are recovered, such
damages shall be so apportioned in the
judgment that the claim of the employer
for the compensation aciually paid shall

take precedence over that of the injured *

employec or his dependent; and if the
damages are not sufficient or are suf-
ficient only to reimburse the employer
for the compensation which he has ac-
tually paid, such damages shall be as-
sessed solely in his favor; but if the dam-
ages are more than sufficient to so re-
imburse the employer, the excess shall
be assessed in favor of the injured em-

333

ployce or his dependent, and upon pay-
ment thereof to the employee or his de-
pendent, the liability of the employer for
compensation shall cease for such part
of the compensation due, computed at
six per cent per annum, and shall be satis-
fied by such payment,

“No compromise with such third per-
son by either the employer or the injured
employee or his dependent shall Le bind-
ing upon or affect the rights of the others
unless assented to by him.
Acts 1958, No. 109, § 1.”
added.)

As amended
(Emphasis

These provisions clearly permit recovery
by any employer of the compensation pay-
‘ments made or due by him, and evidence
an intent that in on case shall the employee
-be permitted dual recovery for his injuries,
that is, recovery both from the tortfeasor
in full and, in addition, from his employer
in compensation. Indeed, in the original
statute, if an employee availed himself of
his right to compensation, only the employ-
er had the right to bring action against the
tortfeasor both for the payments made by
him, and for any additional amounts due to
the employee. An amendment in 1920 per-
tnitted either to bring the. action, and al-
Jowed the other to join to urge his claim.
As shown in Chauvin v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 177 La. 193,148 So. 23, “The
only material difference between the old
Jaw and the new is that under the old law
the right to collect the damage had to be

334

exercised through the employer, the sub-
rogee of the claim, whereas, under the law
as amended, the right may be exercised by
the injured employee personally.” (Em-
phasis added.)

In neither of the above quoted sections
is there any suggestion that the right to
recover compensation actually paid or due
is limited to those employers who are blame-
less, or innocent of any action which might
have caused the injury. Furthermore, noth-
ing in the sections creates a classification of
employers into those who are at fault and
those who are not. Any attempt by this
Court to create such a classification would
amount to judicial statutory amendment.

As we said in Board of Commissioners of
Port of New Orleans v. City of New Or-
leans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313, “* * *
the compensation statute specifically grants
to the employer * * * the right to bring
suit against the third person tort-feasor to
recover any amount which he has paid or
has become obligated to pay as compensa-
tion to the dependent. The employer, in
other words, is unqualifiedly authorized to
assert, to the extent of obtaining indemn:-
fication for the compensation for which he
is obligated to pay, the cause of action that
arose originally in favor of the employee
from the third person’s actionable negli-
gence.” This language as italicized was
quoted with approval in Thomas v. Mat-
thews Lumber Company of Mansfield, 253
La, 1, 215 So.2d 832.

385

_AS heretofore shown in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Barham handed down on
the original hearing, “Our state courts and
the federal courts have apparently believed
that City of Shreveport v. Southwestern.
Gas & Electric Co. 145 La. 680, 82 So.
785, was authority in Louisiana for the view
that concui'rent negligence imputed to the
employer was not a’bar’ 0 recovery from a
third party. Day +. National-U. S. Radia-
for” Corporation, 117 ‘So.2d 104 (La.App.
ist’Cir! 1960), reversed on ther grounds,
aay ‘La. 288, 128 So.2d 660; Andrus v.
‘Gieat American Insurance Company, 161
So.2d 113 (La.App. 3rd Cir, 1964), writs
‘refused. See also International Paper Co.
v. Arkansas & Louisiana Missouri Ry. Co.,
38° So.2d 769 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1948);
United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, sixspra [206
F.2d 49 (La, Sth Cir. 1953)], and General
Electric. Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co,
supra [396 F.2d 89 (La. Sth Cir, 1968)].”
The-legislature has never amended the stat-
ute to.effect an overruling of this jurispru-
dence.

{. For example, it was suggested that un-
* “der the circumstances of this particular
v ease the right of the negligent employer
to be reimbursed for compensation pay-
ments might be considered as a “wind-
. fall” But this gives no consideration
to the fact that there are numerous other
“‘dases in which a non-negligent employer
is. prohibited from seeking reimbursement
“for compensation payments from a tort-
“*feasor because of the negligence of the -
ployee who was paid the compensation.
‘The facts of these varying circumstances
are matters that shold be and presum- -
‘ably have been weighed by the legisla-

336

As we read the original majority opinion,
that holding is not based on the language
of the statute or on our jurisprudence, but,
instead, on concepts of equity, and/or socio-
economic reasons.1 If the views expressed.
are valid, a change in the law, is essential
so as to have it comport therewith. . But
this is not a matter for the Court; it ad&
dresses itself solely to the legislative de-
partment of our government. ““ ||

From time to time the courts of this State
have referred in various ways to the right
conferred by the statute. Some of the
earlier cases call it a “right of subrog:
but in Board of Commissioners of Port of
New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, su-
pra, this Court held that it is‘not, properly
speaking, a subrogation, At other times
itt the opinions it has been called a “right

of indemnification” or “reimbursement.”

Sonte State and Federal appellate opinions
have referred to it as “a kihd of subroga-

tion” or “in the nature of a légal subroga-

tion.”® But it matters not by what name
the right is called—whether it be'a subro-

ture and, until such time as a change is :
effected by that body, regardless of our
views of equity and justice, we are obliged *
to apply the unequivocal and unambigu:
ous language of the statute as now writ

2. See American Universal Ins. Co. v.
Chauvin, 329 F.2d 174 (© Cir, 1964); .
Day v. National-U. S. Radiator Corp., 117
So.2d- 104 (La.App., 1959) ; United Gas -
Corp. v. Guilloxy, 206 F.2d 49 (5 Cir...
1958) ; ‘Lodd-Johnson Dry Docks v. City
“of New Orleans, 55 So.24 650 (La&:App., ~

, 1951) ; International Paper Co. v. Ark, &;;

337

gation, in the ‘nature of a subrogation,
a right of reimbursément, ox whatéver—

or’

the. right is an absolute one’ and “is not
limited by the statute. .

For the reasons assigned, the 0;
the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit
is reinstated and made the judgment of this
Court.

HAMLIN, Justice (dissenting).

I do not believe that a court should lend
its aid to one guilty of unlawful conduct.
Reason dictates and justicé demands that
the fault of Ashy should bar recovery in
the present suit, the same as in tort actions.

TATE, J., dissents and assigns written
reasons. .

DIXON, J., dissents.

ON REHEARING

TATE, Justice “(dissenting).

ectiully dissent.

This is a tort suit. The liability of the
defendant (“Michigan Millers”) depends
upon fault. As both the trial and inter-
mediate courts found, the driver-employee
of the plaintiff before us (“Ashy”) was
contfibutorily negligent with regard to the

La. M. RB, Co, 85 So.2d 769 (La.App,
.1948),3. and Lowe v. Morgan’s La. &T.R.
!, Co., 150 La. 29, 90 So. 429 (1921).

es 338

accident in which his’ ¢o-
ger, Vidrine, was injured. ven

Ashy, which paid compensation to Vi:
drine, seeks to recover the compensation so
paid from Michigan Millers on the grourid
of its insured’s fault. Despite the admitted’
fact that Ashy (by imputation of its driver=
employee’s actions) is contributorily negli-
gent, wé allow Ashy to recover in this’ tort.
suit. 7 fe

T suggest that, under principles of Louisi-
ana tort law, this result is wrong. Plain
tiffs who are Contributorily negligent are
denied recovery in a tort suit:

An allowing recovery, t the majority relies
upon the provisions of TaRS. 23:1101-
1103 (a redaction of a 1920 act), which, Pers
mit an injured emplo: fo recover damage;
from a third person whe the circumstances
have created in such person “a legal liabil-
ity-to pay damages in respect thereto”, “La.
RS. 23:1101.

The samé: statutory - provi-

- sions likewise permit an ‘employer to re-

cover from such third person amounts “he
has paid or become obligated to’ pay to an

injured employee as a result of the acci-
dent. a

I respectfully susp that the 1920 legis-
lature never intended to abrogate funda-_
mental tort law by permitting a negligent
employer to recover. from -a third person

‘The author of this opinion’ is committed

to the view that this is a legal ‘subroga- "
tion. : . te

339

compensation-indemnification, where the
employer’s own fault was a contributory
cause of the injuries and damages for which
recovery is sought.

Just as the statutory provision (La.R.S.
23:1101) does not authorize an employce to
recover damages from the third person
when the employee himself is at fault, so it
does not authorize an employer at fault to
profit by its own fault and be indemnified
for compensation benefits paid to an in-
jured employce because of the employer’s
fault. In neither case does the statutory
language exclude recovery when the respec-
tive plaintiff (cmployee or employer) is
céntributorily negligent; in both cases, in
my opinion, this bar to recovery is implied,
becausé in neither case does the third per-
son have a “legal liability to pay damages in
respect” tq the accident. La.R.S, 23:1101.

T should note that the 1920 provisions in-
corporated in the 1950 Revised Statutes have
at least since 1953 been interpreted by this
court as providing an independent right-
cause of action in the employer to recovery
in tort, independent of any rights of the
injured employee to recovery in tort.
Board of Commissioners, etc. v. City of
New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313
(1963).

I am thus unable to subscribe to the ma-
jority’s view that, although the basis of
the defendant’s (Michigan Millers) liability
is fault under Civil Code Article 2315, nev-

340

ertheless the fault of the present plaintiff
(Ashy) does not bar recovery in the present
suit, though it would in all other tort ac-
tions.

I respectfully dissent.

268 So.2d 247

STATE of Louisiana
ve
John W. BROUSSARD.

No, 52635.
Oct. 26, 1972,

Rehearing Denied Noy. 21, 1972,

—_—

Leroy J. Falgout, Metairie, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Ma-
moulides, Dist. Atty., Robert B. Evans, Jr.,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM,

Defendant was convicted of violation of
Jefferson Parish Ordinance #8053, Section
3-19, Paragraph 9 (allowing “B” drinking)
and appeals.

Although it appears in the transcript of
the trial that bills of exceptions were re-
served, none were perfected as required by
La,C.Cr.P. Arts. 844, 845. Therefore, we
are limited on appeal to a review of errors
discoverable on the face of the pleadings
and proceedings. State v. Ash, 257 La.
337, 242 So.2d 535 (1971). We find none.

The conviction and sentence are affirm-
ed.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

Bills of exception were reserved but by
a combination of fault by the clerk, the

court and counsel for defendant they were
not perfected. Since the fault is not alone

342
attributable to defendant we should remand
for perfection of bills. Appeals are favored
in law. An effective appeal cannot be had
here without a review of the bills of ex-
ceptions and the necessary evidence. We
have the authority to afford relief and an
adequate appeal.

268 So.2d 248

STATE of Louisiana
ve
John W. BROUSSARD.

No. 52634.
Oct. 26, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Noy. 21, 1972.

HE Although in brief in this Court ,the
accused urges the statute under which, he
is charged is unconstitutional, this issue was
not properly raised in the trial court and
is not before us on appeal. Cf, La.C.Cr.P.
arts, 532, 859; State vy. Leming, 217 La.
257, 46 So.2d 262 (1950); State v.-Kava-
naugh, 203 La. 1, 13 So.2d 366 (1943). -

The conviction and sentence are, affirm-
ed,

BARHAM, J., dissents. . See reasons as-
signed in State v. Broussard, 263 La. 340,
268 So.2d 247.

“Leroy J. Falgout, Metairie, for defend-
ant-appellant. ©

268 So.2d 249
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
HL Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. John M: STATE of Louistana
Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Robert B. Evans, ve
Jr. Asst.. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. Gary Don FRANKLIN.
: No. 51821.
. PER CURIAM. Oct, 26, 1972.

The defendant was convicted for viola-
tion of La.R.S. 26:88 (allowing “B” drink-
ing) and appeals.

. [HB Inasmuch as no bills of exceptions
were ,perfected, we are limited on appeal
to a review of errors discoverable on the
face of the pleadings and proceedings. La.
CC We find none. .

4
oo .
s
63

&

Benjamin E. Smith, William F. Wessel,
New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garri-
son, Dist, Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

7 |

348
TATE, Justice.

The defendant Franklin was convicted
of murder, La.R.S. 14:30, and sentenced
to death. In his appeal to this court, he
primarily relies upon an assignment of er-
ror that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional.

The Death Penalty

TH After this appeal was taken, the
United States Supreme Court decided Fur-
man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and related
cases. Under these decisions, concerning
statutes like Louisiana’s (La.R.S. 14:30
and La.C.Cr.P. Art. 817), where the jury
has the discretion to impose the death in-
stead of a lesser penalty for a crime, our
nation’s highest court held: “* * *
that the imposition and carrying out of
the death penalty in these cases constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The judgment in each case is
therefore reversed insofar as it leaves un-
disturbed the death sentence imposed, and
the cases are remanded for further pro-

ceedings.” 408 U.S. 239, 92 S.Ct. 2727,

In accordance with Furman, therefore,
the imposition of the death penalty here-
in must be reversed, even though we may
affirm the conviction.

‘With regard to the capital penalty, we
regard the present situation to be analo-
gous to that resulting from the decisions

349

of the United States Supreme Court in
Witherspoon y. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88
"S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed2d 776 (1968) and re-
In them, the high court in-
validated death penalties because of the

lated cases.

exclusion of prospective jurors who had
only general conscientious scruples against
the infliction of capital punishment. In
such instances, although the death penal-
ty was invalidated, the state convictions
for which the penalty was imposed were
allowed to stand,

In Louisiana, where a death penalty
was imposed by a jury selected in vio-
lation of Witherspoon, this court has af-
firmed the conviction but has remanded
the case to the trial court, with instruc-
tions to the judge to sentence the defend-
ant to life imprisonment. State v. Shaffer,
260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971); State
v. Duplessis, 260 La. 644, 257 So.2d 135
(ag71).
ilar disposition to cases such as the pres-
ent, in which the death penalty has been

Accordingly, we will afford sim-

imposed in violation of Furman, if we af-
firm the conviction.
Other Assignments of Error

The remaining assignments of error are

without merit:
1

After the State rested its case the de-
fense counsel made an oral motion pray-
1, Equivalent relief is available by way of

post-conviction proceedings in any cases
in which the conviction is final, but in

350

ing, inter alia, to suppress evidence based
upon the alleged lack of probable cause
for an arrest made by a state’s witness.
Bill of Exceptions No. 25. The basis for
this motion is the alleged failure of the
arresting police officer to testify as to the
antecedent circumstances which furnished
probable cause for the arrest. The de-
fendant thus contends that all objects
seized as a result of the allegedly illegal
arrest should be suppressed,

HM La.C.cr.P. Art. 703 provides that a
defendant aggrieved by an unconstitutional
search and seizure must file a motion to
suppress same at least three days before

‘the trial on the merits, unless the court in

its discretion allows a later filing. In the
absence of any allegation of prior inoppor-
tunity to do so, a failure to move before
the trial for suppression of physical evi-
dence, allegedly obtained unconstitutionally,
ordinarily waives the right to’object to thé”
introduction of same at the trial/"“State v."
Wallace, 254 La. 477, 224 So2d .461
(1969); State v. Davidson, 248 La. 161,
177 So2d 273 (1965). See also State v.
Royal, 255 La. 617, 232 So.2d 292 (1970).

In the present case, no attack was made
upon the legality of the defendant’s arrest
before trial or during the presentation of
the State’s case. The only objection made
to the introduction of the physical evidence

which a death penalty has been imposed by
our state courts, La.C.Cr.P, Arts, 362,
882, .

351

chain of custody, which the trial court cor-
rectly overruled (and which basis for the
ruling is not contested’ on appeal). Since
the legality of the arrest and the search
and seizure incident thereto were not ques-
tioned, thé State simply proved the arrest,
without objection, as evidence that the
physical objects were taken from the de-
fendant’s person which connected him with
the earlier murder.

IBM = arrest is presumed to be law-
ful, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. La.R.S. 15:432 (presumption that
public officers have done their duty);
State v. Green, .244 La. 80, 150 So.2d 571
(1963). See, also State v. Simien, 248 La.
323, 178 So.2d-266 (1965). -In the ab-
sence of contest as to the lawfulness of
the arrest, the: State was thus under no
obligation to, introduce irrelevant and thus
possibly -.prejudicial® evidence, as to the
circumstances thereof.

MM We: find no error in the trial
court’s denial of'this belated motion to sup-
press, made ‘at the close of the State’s case
and after the evidence seized incident to
the arrest-had already been introduced.

The-defendant also attacks the admission
of-the confessions. of the defendant into
2. When .the.defentlant took the stand, his

own, testimony indicated that, he was arr
rested as he was leaving the area where.

was based upon the lack of proof of a

evidence,
duced at the trial on the merits were those
made to Sergeant Webb early on the morn-
ing of January 16th and to Captain Polito
at 9:00 to 10:55 P.M. that evening. We
find no error in the trial court’s acceptance
of the testimony of the police officers that

The only two confessions intro-

the confessions were freely and voluntarily
made, and only after full explanation of
defendant's Miranda rights.

On appeal, the defendant contends that
he had been subject to severe psychological
pressure, chiefly in that he was allegedly
talked into seeing a Baptist minister, after
which he confessed to several murders it
Alaska and California.
were not introduced at the trial on the
merits. The defendant did not counsel
with the minister until two days after the
voluntary January 16th confessions above
referred to.
facts and the trial court’s “Per Curiam’?
indicating to be unfounded the defendant’s
contention that the minister’s religious
counselling was misused. :

3.

At the close of the State’s case, the de~
fendant moved for a directed verdict ‘of
acquittal on the ground that the indictment.
charged a murder of January 14, 1970,
whereas the -coroner’s inquest shows the
decedent died on January 15th. The de~

he had attempted a bank robbery shortly’
before, -

352°

These confessions ©

We thus need not discuss the

353°,

fondant’ notes-that the State had never
amended the indictment.

HMM The trial court correctly denied
the motion for a directed verdict, noting
that this procedural device is unavailable
in a Louisiana criminal trial before a jury.
State v. Williams, 258 La. 801, 248 So.2d
298 (1971); State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992,
221 So.2d 484 (1969). Even had objection
been timely ‘and properly raised to the var-
iance, such variance did not vitiate the in-
dictment or bar the proof of the correct
date?

THM The trial court’s refusal to allow
defense. Coimsel permission to look at the
interrogating ‘police officer’s notes, absent
a showing that such report indicated that
the statements therein were contrary to the
sworn testimony of the officer, is in ac-

5 this court’s jurisprudence, State
v. Barnes, 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159
(1971); State v. Martin, 250 La. 705, 198
So.2d 897 (1967). The somewhat contrary
ruling in Jencks v. U. S., 353 U.S. 657, 77
S.Ct. 1007, 1 LEd.2d 1103 (1957), applies
only to federal prosecutions. State v.
Gladden, 260 La. 738, 257 So2d 388
(1972).

3. Time is not of the essence in the crime

. of murder,:so even an objection to proof’

. of death at another time would have been .
properly’ overruled if made (it was not), ¢
-iti the absence of prejudice to the defend-
ant by reason of the variance. State v.
Augusta, 199 La, 896, 7 So.2d 177 (1942) ;
State v. Barnhart, 143 La. 596, 78 So.

354
1B

HE Finally, the defense objects to the
refusal of the trial court to accept its re-
quest for special instructions concerning
intent, felony/murder, and self-defense.
Having considered the comprehensive gen-
eral charge given by the trial court, we
agree with the trial court’s “Per Curiam”
that all of these issues were competently
covered by it. The trial court correctly
réfused Special Charge No. 2, as not whol-
ly pértinent under the evidence. There-
fore, we ‘find no error in the trial court’s
refusal to give these special charges. La.
C.crP. Art. 807.

Decree.

Accordingly, for the reasons assigned,
the conviction of the defendant is af-
firmed, but the death sentence’ imposed
upon him is annulled and set aside, and the
case is remanded to the Criminal District
Court, Parish of Orleans, Section “H”,
with instructions to the trial judge to sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.

Affirmed in part, remanded in part.

SUMMERS, J., dissents.

975 (1918). When the date is not essen-
«tial to the offense, the indictment is not
insufficient when it states the incorrect
‘date, although amendment to conform to
_the proof may be permitted if objection
is made, La.0.Cr.P, Art. 468 and Of
ficial Revision Comment (c) thereof; see
also State v. Bamhatt, cited above.

355 | 356

268 So.2d 253

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Terrance MARKS, Jr.

No. 48998.

Oct. 26, 1972.

—+—

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen,, Lee A. Hart-
ley, Sp. Counsel, Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Ernest C. Hunt, Jr, Lake Charles, for
defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Terrance Marks, Jr. was
convicted of aggravated rape and the death
sentence imposed was affirmed by this
Court. 252 La. 277, 211 So.2d 261 (1968).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.
S. 845, 92 S.Ct, 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct, 2726, 33 L.Ed2d 346 (1972), the
United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment herein insofar as it left undis-
turbed the death penalty imposed and re-
manded this case to this Court for further
proceedings. 408 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 2849,
33 L.Ed.2d 746 (1972).

We construe the Mandate of the United
States Supreme Court to require the im-
position of a sentence other than death.
C£., State v. Shaffer, 260 La, 605, 257 So.2d
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

357

Accordingly, in compliance with the
Mandate of the United States Supreme
Court, the death sentence imposed upon de-
fendant is annulled and set aside, and the
case is remanded to the 14th Judicial Dis-
trict Court with instructions to the trial
judge to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment.

Case remanded.

268 So.2d 254

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Arnold J. AMBEAU.

No. 52701.
Oct, 26, 1972.

358
a

Benjamin E. Smith, Smith & Scheuer-
mann, New Orleans, for defendant-appel~
lant.

William J. Guste, Jr. Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Richard H.
Kilbourne, Dist. Atty, Fred C. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals from a convic-
tion, after trial by jury, of aggravated rape
(La.R.S. 14:42), for which he was sen~
tenced to life imprisonment.

‘The defendant perfected no bills of ex-
ceptions. We are therefore limited on
appeal to a review of the pleadings and
proceedings for discoverable error. La.C.
Cr.P. Art. 920; State v. Ash, 257 La. 337,
242 So.2d 535 (1971). We find none.

The conviction and sentence are affirm-
ed,

LI
268 So.2d 255

T. Monroe SISTRUNK, et ux.
ve

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY,
COMPANY.

No. 52901.

Oct. 26, 1972.

Writ denied, On the facts found by the
Court of Appeal the judgment is correct.

:
268 $0.24 255

STATE of Lo
ve
Basil M. SMITH, Jr.

No. 52866.

Oct, 26, 1972.

360

‘Writ granted: Since the record does. not
show that bill of information or indict-
ment has been filed, La.C.Cr.P. art. 384,
the trial court is ordered to conduct a hear-
ing upon applicant's petition for habeas
corpus.

BARHAM, J., dissents from the refusal
to grant the writ and discharge the defend-
ant and assigns reasons. . ~

DIXON, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted without hearing.

BARHAM, Justice, is of the opinion that
this writ should be granted and the re-
lator ordered discharged forthwith. Re-
lator was arrested on June 1, 1972. Some
kind of proceeding, not an arraignment
proceeding, was held fifteen days later
where relator asked for counsel as an in-
digent. The court merely referred relator
to the Indigent Defender Board and ap-
parently washed its hands of any~further
responsibility for appointment of coitnsel.

Thirty days later a lawyer was notified
by the clerk of court that he was counsel
for the relator. The lawyer did not see
relator for twelve more days. Relator
was held in jail without counsel, without
preliminary hearing, without indictment.or
information and without arraignment for
fifty-seven days. After July 12, the ef-
fective date of Act 700 of 1972, the Court
was in violation of the provisions of that
act for compulsory appointment of counsel.

361
The penalty: for, failure to timely appoint
counsel is the release of the party incar-
acerated. | .

As. if this, were not .enough, relator has
now been detained in, jail for approximately
five months without the filing of an in-
dictment or bill of information charging
him with an offense, C.Cr.P. art. 384. He
was without counsel for fifty-seven days
of this time. During all of this time he has

had no preliminary examination or prob-
table cause hearing. See Pugh v. Rain-
water, 332 F.Supp. 1107 (D.C.1971), Cf.
“Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct.
2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, at pp. 496-498, Head-
note 14-20. no bail hearing
and no arraignment were ‘had. Relator is
entitled to be discharged by this Court for
-on the face of the application for writ of
habeas corpus his right to freedom is es-
tablished. A hearing cannot cure the de-

Moreover,

fect of the lack of a preliminary hearing
and arraignment and the failure to file an
indictment for five months. This relator
has been denied his civil rights.

I respectfully ‘dissent from the refusal
of this Court “to grant the writ without
delay and without hearing.

362
268 So.2d 256

Daniel DEVER:
ve
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE,
CORPORATION, LTD., et al,
No. 52933.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Application denied. On thé facts found
by the Court of ‘Appeal, there is tlo éiror
in the judgment complained of,

BARHAM, J. is of the opinion the writ
should be granted, believing there was a
statutory violation by defendants of R.S.
40 :1672 & 40:1682 which was a cause in
fact of the injury. Defendants owed a
duty to plaintiff which encompassed the
risk which gave rise to the injury. They
are liable under Civil Code Art. 2315.

TATE, J., concurs in BARHAM, J’s
reasons for granting the writ.

363 Es 364,

Writ denied. The showing made does.
not warrant the exercise of this Court’s:

268 So.2d 256

supervisory jurisdiction. The evidentiary-

STATE of Louisiana ex rel,

Herbert VAUGHN
v.

©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Loutst-

ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 52917.

Noy. 16, 1972.

hearing held reveals that applicant did not

sustain the burden of proof.

Application denied. An _ evidentiary
hearing was held. A review of it shows ry
that the application has no merit.
268 So0.2d 256

f | W. C. BRADFORD et al.
¥

1 CITY OF SHREVEPORT.

268 So.2d 256

Mo. 52871.

Nov. 16, 1972.

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Joseph MOSES

v.
G, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louls!-
ana State Penitentiary.

No, 52899.
Noy. 16, 1972.

Writ refused. The case having been re-
manded for further proceedings, the judg~
ment is not final.

365 es 366

! Application denied. We find no error of
law in the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peal.

268 So.2d 257
TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX DIS-
TRIBUTING CORP.
ve
‘LAKESIDE THEATRES, INCORPORATED.

HAMLIN, J., is of the opinion that the
application should be granted. See C.C.P.
Art. 5051.

No. 52934.

Nov. 16, 1972. SANDERS, J., is of the opinion that a
writ should be granted, being of the opin-
ion that a cause of action is stated justify-
ing a trial on the merits. ,

Application denied; the judgment of the

‘Court of Appeal is correct. P|
|| i |

268 So.2d 257

La Lucille B, DUFRENE et al.
268 So.2d 257 ve

jartin MILLE! ft al.
George A. ADROUNY et al. Mi Ret al

¥ No. 52936.
INTERNATIONAL CITY BANK AND . Nov. 16, 1072. '
TRUST COMPANY et al.
No. 52937.
Noy. 16, 1972.

Application denied. On the facts found '
by the Court of Appeal, we find no error
of law in its judgment.

268 S0.2d 257

Lucille B. DUFRENE et al.
Martin. MILLER et al.
No. 52935.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Application denied. On the facts found
by the Court of Appeal, there is no error
of law in its judgment.

Ll
268 S0.2d 258

STATE of Louisiana
ne
Charles Daniel-PITTMAN.
No, 52951.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Application denied; ‘the.order complain-
ed of is correct. : soe

268 S0.2d 258°
Mrs, Iris BOSCH, wife of and
-Raul J. VIERA *
vw
KWIK HOME SERVICES, ING., et al”

No, 52939.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Writ refused. The present’ jidgment
is not final, and we defer our ruling as to-
the correctness thereof.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ.
should be granted, There is a conflict be-
tween circuits as to whether a reconvention
based on libel contained in the main de-
mand is permitted. For that reason and.
further believing the’ ruling here is incor-
rect we should grant the writ.

DIXON, J., dissents from the refusal.
‘The judgment of the court of appeal is
wrong and the plaintiff will suffer ir-
reparable injury in defending a reconven-
tional demand which could not stand, even
if successful in the trial court,

TATE, J., joins in-reasons ‘of BARHAM
and DIXON, JJ., for granting a writ,

Ee 3m

a : a
268 So.2a 258 268 So.2a 258
STATE of Louisiana” Willie MONTGOMERY,
William L. WESTBROOK, The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS and the
No. 52943, Travelers Insurance Company,
Nov. 16, 1972. No. 52942,

oo Noy. 16, 1972,

Application denied; no error of aw in
the judgment complained. of..

: Writ denied. Under the facts fourld-by
Lt]

George G. VILLERE and the Travelers
Indemnity.Company

John MOOK et al. - a
“No. 52944. ; "268 $0.24 259
Nov. 16, 1972.

B, J. MAYLIN, owner
ve
Louis ADAMS,
No, 52964.

Nov. 16, 1972.

2 Writ -refuséd.. On'the facts found by

Fee epee He Semen cee Pe
rect.

371 — 372

Application denied. The ruling of the
Court of Appeal is gorrect.

‘Writ refused. ‘There is no error of law
in the judgment below.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted.

TATE, J., is of the opinion the writ
should be granted in order for this court to
express its views on the serious issues
presented.

DIXON; j., concurs in the denial for
the réason that the ordinances do not pur-
port to protect complaining tenants from
retaliation by the Jandlord.

i
268 So.2d 259

Bennie J, HUDGENS et ux,
ve
John H. GUNN et al.

No. 52946.

Noy, 16, 19#2.

a
268 $0.24 259
Charles STEIN et at.

Y
The TOWN OF LAFITTE et al.

Catvin A, FLEMING et al.
aa
The TOWN OF LAFITTE et al,

No. 52950.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Writ denied. No error of law.

McCALEB, C. J., and BARHAM, J.,

are of the opinion the writ should be grant~
ed.

373 EE 374

| |
268 S0.2d 259 268 So.2d 260
George G. VILLERE and the Traveters Mrs. Emma LAMBERT, wife of/and
Indemnity Company Thomas M. LITTLETON, Jr,
a ve
John MOOK et al. B & R CONSTRUCTION CO,, ING.
No. 52945, No. 52948.
Nov. 16, 1972. Noy, 16, 1972.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the Writ denied. There is no error of law
‘Court of Appeal, the judgment is correct. in the judgment complained of.

375° | - 376°

= Ll
268 S0.2d 260 268 ‘86.2 “260
EMPLOYERS OVERLOAD COMPANY Mrs, Melia Lée CARPENTER, wife of and
¥. Waldo M. JOHNS
EMPLOYERS OVERLOAD COMPANY OF “
“NEW ORLEANS, ING.,, et al. © Dr, William K. GAUTHIER, New Orleans--
Metairie Hospital Foundation (Sometimes.
No, 52947, Referred to as Metairie Hospital), et al.
Noy. 16, 1972. No. 52949.

Nov. 16,1972.

Writ refused. There is no error of law Writ denied. No error of law in the:
in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. judgment. .

268 So.2d 514

STATE of Louisiana
ve
” Billy Wayne SINCLAIR.

No. 50645,

sor cys -Oet, 26, 1972,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty, Gen., Lee A. Hart-
ley, Sp. Counsel, Sargent Pitcher, Jr., Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

378

Elie, Strickler & Dennis, Richard B.
Sobol, New Orleans, for. defendant-appel-
Jant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Billy Wayne Sinclair, was
convicted of murder, and the death sen-
tence imposed was affirmed by this Court.
258 La. 84, 245 So.2d 365 (1971).

Citing Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U..
S. 845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972),
following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972),
the United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment herein insofar as it left undis-
turbed the death penalty imposed and re-
manded this case to this Court for further
proceedings. 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2871,
33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972).

We construe the Mandate of the United.
States Supreme Court to require the impo-
sition of a sentence other than death. Ci,
State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d.
121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La.
644, 257 So.2d 135 (1971).

Accordingly, in compliance with the Man-
date of the United States Supreme Court,
the death sentence imposed upon defend-
ant is annulled and set aside, and the case-
is remanded to the 19th Judicial District
Court with instructions to the trial judge
to sentence the defendant to life imprison-
ment,

Case remanded.

268 So.2d 590

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Earnest SHEPPARD.

No, 51815.

May 1, 1972.

On Rehearing Noy. 6, 1972.

380

—+—

Kramer & Kennedy, Ralph W. Kerinedy,
Jr., Alexandria, for defendant-appellant,

384

Jack P. F, Gremillion, William J. Guste,
Jr," Attys. Gen, Harry H. Howard, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Edwin O. Ware; IIT, Dist. Atty.,
Martin L. Laird, IIT, Robert P:*Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

HAMLIN, Justice.

The defendant appeals from his convic-
tion of Armed Robbery, LSA-R.S. 14:64,
and his sentence to serve thirty years at
hard labor in the Louisiana State Peniten-
tiary. Five bills of exceptions, reserved
during the course of the proceedings are
presented for our determination,

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1,

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was: re-
served when the trial court denied defend-
ant’s motion to suppress the confession he
had given police officers on March 14,
1971.

The motion to suppress averred that the
“confession was obtained under the influ-
ence of inducement and promises calculat-
ed, under the circumstances, to induce a
confession, irrespective of its truth oi falsi-
‘ty and under treatment designed by effect
on body or mind to compel a confession of
crime as contemplated by LSA-RS: 15:-
481 and LSA-RS. 15:452.”

Herein, defense counsel argues that the
burden of proving the voluntary. nature of
a confession rests upon the State, and that

. reasonable doubt exists .as to the voluntary

385 Le 386

nature of the instant confession He sub- that Lt. Charles David Ezernack, Lt.
mits that the trial court committed manifest Thomas L. LeJeune, and Captain Jim F.
error in denying the motion to suppress. Daniels all testified that the. confession su-

A reading of the evidence given at the pra was given willingly; thété was io fear,

hearing of the motion to suppress discloses coercion, intimidation, menace, threats,

“I, Ernest Sheppard, do wish to make
the following statement of my own free
will and accord, without any threats or

* promises, after duly being advised of my

constitutional right to remain silent, at the
Alexandria Police Dept. at 10:25 A.M.

“Tuesday, I saw Peanut, I don’t know
his real name, they say he is Leonard Bell,
in front of his mother’s house on Harris
St. I stopped and was talking to him and
he asked me if I wanted to make some

“real money. I asked him how and he

told me to just don’t worry about it. ‘This
was about 2 o’clock in the afternoon. I
left and went around to the snow cone
stand and after 2 while I went home.
About 2:30 that same afternoon Peanut
came over to Lee sther’s house at 1212
‘Turregano St. and just came up in the
house. He told me let's go. I asked him
whero but he said he was going to get his

- uncle's car at 10th and Fulton Sts. Me
“and Peanut walked to the parking lot

at 10th and Fulton Sts. It was a Ford
or Chevrolet, I think it was light brown.
Peanut raised the hood to start it and
told me to put my foot on the accelorator.
Tt started and Peanut drove the car and
we went back to Lee Esther's house and
went inside. I got a 410 gauge double
barrel shot gun that I had hid at the
house. I found this shotgun about two
weeks ago under a building down Lower
Third St. Peanut took the shotgun and
wrapped it in an army blanket and put it
in the front seat of the car. Peanut was
driving and we went to his sister’s house
and Peanut went in and stayed a minute
and came out and then we went to his
mother’s house. He went in and in a few
minutes he came out and we took off.
Peanut told me he was going to Commer-
cial Securities on Lee and get the place.
I told him no, let’s wait until tomorrow
and then he said the time was right now.

‘We parked on Schnack St., I told him ,
there was too many people in there, Pea-
nut told me to wait here he was going to
check it out. In a few minutes Peanut
came out and he was walking fast. He
got in the car and Peanut drove off. He
went down Sehnack to Overton and turned
left and went thru the underpass.
While we was driving Peanut told *
me that he had got the place and it
was simple, he had been planning
it a long time. Wien we got to the
parking lot on Fulton St, at the park- -
ing lot Peanut put the money sack with
. the money in his pants by his’ belt.
He put the black hat and. the gold sweater
under the front seat and he put the shot-
gun under the back seat. I asked him if
he was going to leave all that stuff in
the car and he told me he was going to
take care of all that. We walked to the
‘Tuxedo Cab stand on Lee St, and got a
cab to bring us to Vance and Harris Sts.
Then we walked to Peanut’s house. Pea-
nut told me to go in the bathroom. I did.
In a minute he came in the bathroom and
showed me the white money bag and about
$179.00 cash. He told me he was going
to give me a little change. He gave me
$75.00 and I left and went home.. I spent
my part of the money. I don’t know what ,
he did with his. After I was arrested and
in jail I found out that there was about
$700.00 taken and I just considered the
description of the man in the robbery the
other night at the service station on
Broadway and it sounds like Peanut.
“Signed Exnest Sheppard
“Witt.
“[Sgd.] Lt, C. Ezernack
“Lt, C. Hzernack .
“[Sgd.] Thomas LeJeune
_ “Et, D. LeJeune”

387

promises, or inducements,
given the Miranda warnings, Miranda v.
State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and signed a waiver
of rights. Defendant testified in his own
behalf; his testimony is to the effect that
he did sign the waiver of rights and gave

Defendant was

the confession supra because of promises
and inducements of leniency.

‘The trial judge’s finding that a confes-
sion was given voluntarily is accorded great
weight. State v. LaCoste, 256 La. 697, 237
So.2d 871. Cf. State v. Thompson, 256
La. 1019, 240 So.2d 899. We conclude that
the following per curiam of the trial judge
is supported by the evidence adduced at the
hearing of the motion to suppress:

“The defendant moved to suppress the
confession that he had given to the police
officers. The Court held a hearing on the
motion to suppress and denied the motion.

“The evidence on the motion to suppress
clearly indicated the confession was given
freely and voluntarily by the accused and
that there were no promises, inducements,
threats or physical abuse used by the police
officers to obtain the confession,
the taking of the confession the police of-
ficers fully advised the accused, on more

Prior to

2. “I have read this statement of my rights
and I understand what my rights are.
I am willing to make a statement and
answer questions, I do not want a lawyer
at this time. “I understand and know
what I am doing. No promises or threats

388

than one occasion, of his constitutional
rights, including his right to remain silent,
of his right to counsel and that any state-
ment he made could be used in a court
against him.

“The accused stated that he gave the
confession because the police officer told
him that he wanted to get Leonard Bell
and if he did he could get a promotion be-
cause of it. This is rather ridiculous on its
face. Nevertheless I carefully weighed all
of the testimony and am convinced that
the true facts of the case are as given by
the police officers. The Court is well ac-
quainted with all of the police officers who
testified and has no hesitancy in stating
that it has the utmost confidence in the
integrity of these police officers.

“There was no doubt in the Court’s mind
that the State fully sustained their burden
in regard to the confession.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2
(PRESENTED WITHOUT
ARGUMENT)

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved
when the trial judge denied defendant’s mo-
tion for a continuance,

have been made to me, and no pressure
or coercion of any kind has been used
against me.
“Signed Ernest Sheppard
“Witness :[Sgd.] Lt. ©, Bzernack”

389

HM The granting or refusing of a
motion for continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Art. 712,
LSA-C.Cr.P.; State v. Polk, 258 La. 738,
247 So.2d 853. Cf. State v. Shilow, 260
La. 23, 255 So.2d 60. We find no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge; the following
per curiam explains his reasons for denial
of the instant motion:

“The defendant moved for a continuance
on the ground that one of the witnesses
of the defendant was out of the state. This
witness suposedly was ‘a cell-mate of this
defendant at the time that the police officer
asked the defendant if he wished to make
a statement regarding his participation in
the crime. The defendant contends that it
was at this time that the police officer stat-
ed that he wanted the defendant to impli-
cate Leonard Bell as Leonard Bell was
the only one they were after and were not
after the defendant and also this would
bring about a promotion for the police of-
ficer. The motion to suppress was schedul-
ed for hearing on May 14th. The request
for the subpoena to be issued for this wit-
ness was on May the 13th at 3:00 P.M. In
other words at 3:00 P.M. the defendant re-
quested a subpoena for a witness to appear
in court at 10:00 the next morning. This
certainly is not due diligence.

“At the time that the deputy sheriff
served the subpoena it was discovered that
this witness was not present. Someone in
the home where the witness had previously

390

lived stated that he had gone to California
about a month ago.

“There was no showing as to when this
witness would return to Louisiana, if ever.
The witness may remain in California for
the rest of his life.
whether he intended to remain in Cali-

It was not known

fornia or to return to Louisiana. It wasn’t
even known where in California the wit-
ness was residing.

“The defendant did not fulfill any of the
requirements of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure for a continuance.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3

HI Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was re-
served when the trial judge restricted de-
fense counsel’s questioning of prospective:
juror Joseph Silas Johnson, Jr. and applied
his ruling to the questioning of other pro-
spective jurors.

‘The pertinent questioning of the juror,
the ruling of the trial judge, and the col-
loquy between the trial judge and defense
counsel are as follows:

“Q. Mr. Johnson, will you follow the
Court’s instructions that were given to you
a little earlier?

“A. Yes sir.

“Q. In particular, will you follow the
instructions of the Court that the defendant
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven”
guilty? :

391
i fA. Yessir.

“Q. Do you have any opposition to the
Court’s comment that the indictment is
proof of absolutely nothing?

“BY THE COURT: Mr. Kennedy, in
reference to that, I have instructed the
‘jurors on preliminary on the law. At the
conclusion of the evidence, I will instruct
them fully and completely on the law appli-
cable to the case and to instruct them to
accept the law as I give it to them and
whatever their personal feelings about the
law is [is] of no importance because they
have got to follow the law that I give
and we are not going to go into whether
they are going to accept each phase of the
law that I give them. He has told you that
he would follow the law that was given
to him by the court and I know Mr. John-
son and I know that he will do that. We
are not going to just break it all down and
ask him each phase of the law because
really criminal procedure takes one semes-
ter of law school and we don’t have that
long to try this case.

_ “BY MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, I
understand what you mean but I feel like
we are entitled to examine the prospective
jurors on the specific charges of law, to
determine if they will follow your instruc-
tions, I'am afraid of one particular juror
—not necessarily one but some of them may
have particular opposition to one particular
charge and I think we should find it out

now so that they can be excused from ser-

392

vice.

“BY THE COURT: Well, if we did that
I would have to give my full charge fo the
juror and just go through that thing and all
we would do would be to have a nice little
course in criminal procedure, which we are
not going to permit at this time.
made my ruling and you can reserve your

I have

bill and I expect no more questions regard-
ing the law except the blanket questions of
whether or not the jurors will follow the
law given to them by the Court.

“BY MR. KENNEDY: Is, Your Honor,
instructing me then, no more questions
along this line? ,

“BY THE COURT: I certainly am.

“BY MR. KENNEDY: All right, Your
Honor, at this time, I will respectfully re-
serve a bill of exception.”

Herein, defense counsel submits that the
trial court committed manifest error in
restricting his voir dire. He argues: “The
question at issue asked of the juror was
Do you have any opposition to the court’s
comment that the indictment is proof of
absolutely nothing’. (Tr. 124) This ques-
tion presumed the juror’s understanding of
the law and directs itself to the determina~
tion or discovery of any prejudice or bias
in the mind of the juror. It was not an
inquiry into the juror’s knowledge or under-
standing of the law. The trial court then
instructed counsel to ask no further ques-*

393

tions along this line (Tr. 126). If one as-
sumes the juror understood the trial court’s
instruction of the law the defendant was
still entitled to know if there existed any
bias or prejudice concerning that legal prin-
ciple in the juror so that he could decide to
exercise a peremptory challenge. Addi-
tionally, counsel was unable to ask this of
any subsequent juror. This juror, Joseph
Silas Johnson, Jr., was among the first to
be examined.”

The per curiam of the trial judge to the
instant bill recites:

“The defendant reserved a bill of excep-
tion when the Court on its own motion pre-
vented counsel from asking questions per-
taining to the criminal law on voir dire
examination of prospective jurors,

“This is the same legal issue that was -

presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court
in State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249, So.2d
143 (1971).

“There has been a slight change of pro-
cedure by this writer in the handling of
juries and voir dire examination subsequent
to the Richey case in this court, but before
the decision in’ the Louisiana Supreme
Court, On a Monday morning the writer
asks for and acts upon all disqualifications
and exemptions from every juror on the
venire. After the jury has thus been
screcned the remainder are the ones from
which the petit jury to try the case is to be
picked. Prior to any questioning by any of

394°
the attorneys, either for the State or for the
defense, the Court instructs all of the jurors”
as to the law applicable to the trial of any
criminal case. These instructions cover
reasonable doubt, burden of proof, presump-
tion of innocence, the fact that the bill of
information is not evidence of guilt, and the
filing or finding of such’ bill of information
or bill of indictment creates no presumption
whatever and is proof of nothing, etc.
‘These instructions were given to the jurors
in this case. After I instructed the jurors
on these phases of law I asked if there
were any on the venire list that could not
fully accept the law and apply it as given
by the Court: None of the jurors responded ~
in the negative, On voir dire examination
I permit counsel to ask the prospective
juror if he will apply all of the law. and.
follow all of the law that is given by .the.
Court. He understands what the law is as,
it has been explained to him. I permit
counsel to do this even though this is
actually repetitious of what the Court has
done prior to examination by counsel. I do
not permit counsel to ask specific questions
into every particular phase of the'law which

I have covered in the preliminary instruc
tions or which I will cover in the final ”
instructions. As to this particular juror’

counsel asked the question as follows:

“Mr, Johnson, will you follow. the,
Court’s instructions that were given to you:
a little earlier? . . !

“Yes sir?

395

) “Tt would have served no purpose to
permit counsel to break down this one ques-
tion if the jurors would follow the law as
given by the Court into many questions and
get the same response. In the first place
_counsel. is not permitted to ask the jurors
of their understanding of the law. In this
case this question was actually asked of this
juror but it was a blanket question. No
prejudice whatever has been shown by this
defendant.”

fn this matter, the motion to suppress and
the motion for a continuance were heard
on Friday, May 14, 1971; trial began on
Monday, May 17, 1971. We must presume
that the petit jury which tried this case
received the trial judge’s instructions on
the day trial began, and that defense counsel
was present when such instructions were
given. Counsel was apprised of the thor-
ough instructions; he was not in the posi-
tion of an attorney who was not present in
court on Monday morning and commenced
the trial of his case during mid-week.

Article 786 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides that the scope of the voir
dire examination of prospective jurors shall
‘be within the discretion of the court. In
State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143,
151 (1971), we said: “Our holdings, supra,
with respect to voir dire, some before the
enactment of our new Code of Criminal
Procedure, have all been based on the predi-
cate that the rulings of the trial judge on

396.

voir dire will not be disturbed unless he has
committed an abuse of his discretion. Art.
786, LSA-C.Cr.P., supra, prescribes that the
scope of the examination shall be within the
discretion of the court; therefore, the voir
dire cxamination in each criminal case is
within the discretion of the judge trying
the case. The following pertinent state-
ment was made in State v. Schoonover, 252
La. 311, 211 So.2d 273, 275 (1968): ‘The
extent to which counsel may examine jurors
on their voir dire rests largely within the
discretion of the trial judge. State v.
Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So.2d 571 (1963).
A wide latitude in the exercise of the
judge’s discretion is allowed by a liberal
attitude of the appellate courts. Sec State
v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961).
In general, however, we have not approved
of lengthy statements of particular phases
of law being expounded to jurors on their
voir dire examination as a preface to inter-
rogation, for this practice tends to facilitate
attempts to commit the juror’s vote in ad-
vance of deliberation. Care should be exer-
cised by the trial court to prevent this
result. La,Code of Crim.P. art. 357 (1928).
State v. Bickham, 236 La, 244, 107 So.2d
458 (1958).’ See, State v. Newton, 241 La.
261, 128 So.2d 651; State v. Rogers, 241 La.
841, 132 So.2d 819. Cf. State v. Brazile,
229 La. 600, 86 So.2d 208.”

We have previously stated that what
might be an improper question on voir dire

397

in one case might not be an improper ques-
tion in another case; the discretion exer-
cised by the trial judge in one case might
not be the discretion exercised in another.
Our duty is to decide whether the trial
judge abused his discretion in restricting
voir dire in the particular case we are
reviewing. The discretion of the trial
judge is not unlimited; it is always subject
to our determination as to whether reversi-
ble error was committed in the rulings on
voir dire.

“* Under the instant facts and circumstanc-
es, as stated and quoted supra, we do not
find that the trial judge abused his discre-
tion in disallowing the question, supra, pro-
pounded by defense counsel. “Do you have
any opposition to the Court’s comment that
the indictment is proof of absolutely noth-
ing??'was a question which asked for a
mental feeling of the prospective juror.
Had the prospective juror answered, “yes,”
the. answer would not necessarily have
meant that he would not have rendered a
verdict in accordance with law and the
We
conclude that the trial judge’s ruling elimi-

instructions given by the trial judge.

nated unnecessary, redundant and prolonged
voir dire questioning; it did not prejudice
the defendant who has neither shown that
he had to accept an obnoxious juror nor
suffered any violation of his constitutional
rights,

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit,

398
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO, 4

(PRESENTED WITHOUT
ARGUMENT)

HM Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was re
served when the trial judge denied defense
counsel’s motion for a directed verdict.

The trial judge properly denied the mo-
tion; the following per curiam explains his
reasons for the ruling:

“At the conclusion of the case the defend-
ant moved for a directed verdict of acquit-
tal, orally, upon the reason that the State
had not proved that the defendant was
culpable, in that the State had failed to
prove that he was over 17 years of age.
The Supreme
Court has held many times that the District
Judge has no constitutional authority to
grant a directed, verdict of aquittal. I
would not in this case, had I the authority
to do so, because this would not go to the

This was a trial by jury.

guilt or innocence of the accused as to-per-
mit the granting of a directed verdict of ac-
quittal. The objection raised by the defend-
ant here was as to the jurisdiction of the
Court. If the accused was under 17 years
of age the defendant should have filed a
motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the
District Court as such could lie only in
Juvenile Court.

“The record clearly shows however that
this accused is over 17 years of age. After
announcement of sentence he gave his age

399
as 19.” See, State v. Dimopoullas, 260 La.
874, 257 So.2d 644.

Bill of Exceptions No. 4 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO, 5
(PRESENTED WITHOUT
ARGUMENT)

“TEE Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was re-
sérved when the trial judge denied defense

counsel’s motion for mistrial based on the -

ground that a question propounded by the
‘State,to a witness on cross-examination was
prejudicial,

’ The testimony connected with the reser-
vation of the instant bill is as follows:

“OQ. You say that you are Phillip John-
son?
fA. Yes sir.

“A, I don’t go to school.

‘What school do you go to, Phillip?

" «9, You don’t go to school, why not?

- “A. I.came back too late, I came from
out.of town and then it was too late for
mie to go to school here.

“-4Q, “Where had you been out of town?
"A. Monroe.
“Q, . What were you doing in Monroe?

“A, I was in the Louisiana Training
School.

«9,

“A, Louisiana Training Institution.

I didn’t hear you.

400

“BY MR. KENNEDY: Your Honor, I
am going to object to that question as being
improper.
dicial question designed to influence the

This is a clear attempt—preju-

jury. Sir, Iam going to make a motion for
a mistrial on the grounds of that question.”

Defendant has not shown that he suf-
fered any prejudice by the above question. -
The trial court admonished the State not
to pursue the questioning; see, LSA-
C.Cr.P, art. 771; no reversible error was
committed, The following per curiam of
the trial judge explains the reasons for his
ruling:

“When the State took over this witness
for cross-examination the District Attorney
sought some background information. It is
always permissible and proper cross-exam-
ination to go into some background of
the witness, Background of the witness is
necessary in order to permit the jury to
better evaluate the testimony that that wit-
ness gave. This witness was a young man
and the District Attorney merely asked him
what school he went to. He replied that
he didn’t go to school and the District
Attorney asked him why not, and he stated
that he came back too late from being
out of town, the District Attorney then
asked him where he had been out of town
and he said Monroe, then the District At-
torney asked him what he had been doing
in Monroe and he stated that he was in
the Louisiana Training Institute. At this
Point the defense counsel objected and ar-

401

gued'that it was prejudicial and designed
to influence the jury and moved for a
mistrial. The Court denied the motion for
a mistrial. The District Attorney stated
that he had no idea where the witness was
At this
point I directed both parties to not pursue
the matter any further. At this point the
defendant reserved this bill of exception,
I can not possibly see how there was any

or what school he was going to.

prejudice to this accused by this unknown
response to a question by the District
Attorney. This was not the accused stating
that he had been to LTI but a witness
stating that he had been to LTI.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 5 is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction

and sentence are affirmed.

McCALEB, C. J., concurs in the results
as to Bill No. 3 and otherwise subscribes
to the opinion.

BARHAM, J., dissents with written rea-
sons. -

TATE, J. dissents and concurs in opin-
ions of BARHAM and DIXON, JJ., as to
Bill No. 3 (voir dire examination),

DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.

‘The reasons given in my dissent in State
of Louisiana v. Bell, 263 La, 434, 268 So.2d

; 402
610, decided this day, are also applicable
to this case.

The defense lawyer here was interrupted
by the trial judge when the lawyer in-
quired, “Do you have any opposition to the
Court’s comment that the indictment is
proof of absolutely nothing?”

Contrary to the inference contained in
the majority opinion, if the juror had an-~
swered affirmatively, without further ex-
planation, he could have been challenged~
for cause under the provisions of article”
797(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedurey’
“The juror will not “accept the law as
given to him by the court...”

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

Pretermitting any inquiry into the other :
bills of exceptions, I find reversible errér °
under Bill of Exceptions No. 3, and: ‘will
address my remarks-to that bill '

The same question of law is presented “
here as is presented in State v. Crittle, 263
La, 418, 268 So.2d 604 on our docket, and ©
State vy. Bell, 263 La. 434, 268 So.2d 610, ”
both decided today. In Crittle the majority
ordered a reversal, in Bell it did not, and
here it does not, The majority of this
court, without comparing these cases or
cross-citing them, has simply found in one
case that the limitation of voir dire ex- |
amination was reversible error and in two
cases that it was not. Here, as in the
other cases cited, counsel for the accused
was trying to determine whether jurors

403

would accept certain principles of law, such
as the presumption of innocence and that
an indictment is not indicative of guilt
and is proof of nothing. In this case
defense counsel explained that he was
greatly concerned that some of the jurors
might have particular opposition to a special

rule of law applicable to the case.

In the per curiam as quoted by the
majority, the trial judge explains his new
procedure for selecting petit jurors. On
the first day of the trial week, before
any case is called for trial or any accused
brought to the bar, the court instructs all
the prospective jurors on the law. The
same general legal principles are not ap-
plicable to all cases, and some particular
principles apply only to the exceptional
The judge cannot know the applica-
ble law in all of the cases of varying

case,

criminal charges pending for that week
when he cannot know at that moment the
posture of the cases as they willbe pre-
sented for jury determination, After the
judge has instructed the jurors on what he
believes to be the pertinent law in all the
cases for the week, in every particular
case which comes on for trial he permits
counsel only “to ask the prospective juror
if he will apply all of the law and follow
all of the law that is given by the Court”.
He says further: “I do not permit counsel
to ask specific questions into every par-
ticular phase of the law which I have

covered in the preliminary instructions or

404:

which I will cover in the final instructions.”
(Emphasis supplicd.) ‘

Criminal trials in jury cases begin in
Louisiana with the selection and swearing
of the jury. C.CrP. Art. 765(1). Under
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 786
all prospective jurors must be sworn be-
fore being examined as to their qualifica-
tions to serve, and “the court, the state,
and the defendant shall have the right to
examine prospective jurors. The scope
of the examination shall be within the
discretion of the court. * * *” Article
1, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution
gives every accused the right to challenge
jurors peremptorily that is, without need
Article 1,
Section 9, says the accused shall have the
right to an impartial jury. Code of Crim-
inal Procedure Articles 797 and 798 set
forth the grounds for challenge for cause.
Under these laws I cannot believe that the
majority means to say, or in any way
indicate, that the trial court has discretion

to show any reason or cause.

to entirely eliminate questioning which
could establish one ground for challenge
for cause, that “The juror will not accept
the law as given to him by the court”.
C.Cr.P. Art. 797(4). Moreover, these laws
recognize the latitude given defense coun-
sel to manage voir dire examination so that
the right to peremptory challenges can be
effectively exercised.

In this particular case there is no indi-
cation that the prospective jurors were’

“A05

sworn before the court instructed them
and inquired of them whether they would
accept the law. Moreover, it is admitted
by the trial judge that this procedure
was followed only on the first day of a
jury week preceding any trials and not
immediately before each case. The ma-
jority of this court has somehow found that:
“We must presume that the petit jury which
tried this case received the trial judge’s
instructions on the day trial began, and that
defense counsel was present when such
I am unable to
determine what law requires it to make

instructions were given.”

such presumption, or what facts can lead
to that conclusion. In addition, this con-
clusion has no function in considering the
legal question with which we are faced,

especially under the law cited above.

Under the voir dire procedure adopted
by this district court there exists the prob-
ability, supported by this case, that another
mandatory right of the accused will not be
observed. The defendant is entitled to be
present at every important stage of the
proceedings, and the selection of the jury
is one of the stages that requires the pres-
ence of the accused, Art, 831(3), C.Cr.P.,
as well as the charging of the jury, Art.
831(5) and Comment (d). In this case
there is no showing that the defendant
‘was present while the judge “instructed”
the prospective jurors.
in trying to distinguish this case on the
basis ‘that counsel was in the courtroom

The majority errs

“406
at some pre-trial proceeding conducted by
the judge. This could hardly be considered
waiver by temporary voluntary absence of
defendant under Article 832 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.

I find that the procedure here was an
abuse of the discretion granted to the
court under Article 786, C.Cr.P., and fur-
ther was a violation of expressed law, con-
stitutional and statutory. For the reasons
here stated, and those stated in my dissents
in State v. Crittle, supra; State v. Bell,
supra; and State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094,
249 So.2d 143 (1971). I respectfully dis-

“sent.

" ON REHEARING

SANDERS, Justice.

We granted a rehearing in this case as to
Bill of Exceptions No. 3, because of defense
counsel’s forceful allegations that the de-
fondant was prejudiced by the trial judge’s
arbitrary restriction upon voir dire exam-
ination of jurors,

The defense examination of the pro-
spective juror, Joseph Silas Johnson, Jr.,
immediately preceding the contested ruling,
was as follows: :

“Mr. Johnson, will you follow the Court's

instructions that were given to you a little

earlier?

“Yes sir. |

“In particular, will you, follow. the’ in-
structions of the Court’ that the defendant

is presumed to be innocent until he is

proven guilty?
- “Yes sir.

** “Do you have any opposition to the Courts
comment that the indictment is proof of
-. absolutely nothing?

“BY THE COURT: Mr. Kennedy, in
‘reference to that, I have instructed the
_“jurors on preliminary on the law. At
“the conclusion of the evidence, I will

instruct them fully and completely on the

Jaw applicable to the case and to instruct
“them to accept the law as I give it to
, them and whatever their personal feel-
‘jngs about the law is of no importance

‘because they have got to follow the law

that I give and we are not going to go

into whether they are going to accept
- each phase of the law that I give them. He
‘has told you that he would follow the law
_ that was given to him by the court and I
know Mr. Johnson and I know that he
will do that. We are not going to just
break it all down and ask him each phase
of the law because really criminal proce-
dure takes one semester of law school
.,2nd we don’t have that long to try this
case.

“BY MR, KENNEDY: Your Honor,
L understand what you mean but I feel
Tike we are entitled to examine the pro-
spective jurors on the specific charges of
law, to determine if they will follow
“your, instructions. I am afraid of one

408

particular juror—not necessarily one but
some of them may have particular opposi-
tion to one particular charge and I think
we should find it out now so that they
can be excused from service.

“BY THE COURT: Well, if we did
that I would have to give my full charge
to the juror and just go through that
thing and all we would do would be to
have a nice little course in criminal pro-
cedure, which we are not going to permit
at this time. I have made my ruling atid
you can reserve your bill and I expéct
no more questions regarding the law ex-
cept the blanket questions of whether or
not the jurors will follow the Iaw given
to them by the Court.”

Hl The question raised is whether, after
the juror had testified that he would follow
the judge’s instructions on the law in-
cluding the presumption of innocence, the
trial judge abused his discretion in dis-
allowing further examination as to his
understanding of and reaction to the various
rules of law deemed applicable to the case.

Article 786 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides:

“The court, the state, and the defend-
ant shall have the right to examine
prospective jurors. The scope of the
examination shall be within the discretion
of the court. A prospective juror, be-
fore being examined, shall be sworn to

answer truthfully questions asked him

409
relative to his qualifications to serve
as a juror in the case.”

I Under the above article, the voir
dire examination is a joint undertaking of
the court, the district attorney, and the
defense counsel. It is designed to discover
‘bases for challenges for cause and to secure
information for an intelligent exercise of
peremptory challenges. See State v.
Harper, 260 La. 715, 257 So.2d 381 (1972) ;
State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12
(1961); State v. Brazile, 229 La. 600, 86
So.2d 208 (1956).

HM One of the grounds on which the
state or defendant may challenge a juror
for cause is his unwillingness to accept the
‘law as given to him by the court. LSA-
C.Cr.P. Art. 797. Hence, the trial judge
properly allowed defense couse! to ask the
juror whether he would follow the court’s
instructions as to the law. Quite clearly,
the additional questions were designed to
probe in detail his knowledge of the legal
rules and his reaction to them.

TH Atticle 786 provides that the scope
of examination shall be in the discretion
of the court. In the absence of a clear
abuse of that discretion, this Court will
not disturb the ruling. State v. Richey, 258
La, 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971); State v.
Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 211 So.2d 273,
cert. den. 394 U.S. 931, 89 S.Ct. 1199, 22
L.Ed.2d 460 (1969) ; State v. Williams, 230

‘La, 1059, 89 So.2d 898 (1956).

410

In the present case, the trial,judge allowed
defense counsel to conduct a lengthy
examination of the juror, relating to his im-
partiality, prior knowledge. of the. crime,
acquaintanceship with the district attorney,
law enforcement ‘officers, and witnesses.
Following this, defense counsel received
from the juror the affirmative response that
he would follow the judge’s instructions as
to the law.

In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states:

“Prior to any questioning by any of
the attorneys, either for the State or for
the defense, the Court instructs all of the
jurors as to the law applicable to the
trial of any criminal case. These instruc-
tions cover reasonable doubt, burden of
proof, presumption of innocence, the fact
that the bill of information is not evi-
dence of guilt, and the filing or finding
of such bill of information or bill of in-
dictment creates no presumption what-
ever and is proof of nothing, etc. These
instructions were given to the jurors in
After I instructed the jurors
on these phases of law I asked if there

this case.

were any on the venire list that could
not fully accept the law and apply it as
given by the Court. None of the jurors
responded in the negative. On voir dire
examination I permit counsel to ask the
prospective juror if he will apply all of
the law and follow all of the law that is
given by the Court. He tinderstands what

the law is as it has been explained tq him.

4i1

I permit counsel to do this even though
this is actually repetitious of what the
Court has done prior to examination by
counsel. I do not permit counsel to ask
specific questions into every particular
phase of the law which I have covered
in the preliminary instructions or which
I will cover in the final instructions. As
to this particular juror, counsel asked the
question as follows:

“‘Q Mr. Johnson, will you follow the
Court’s instructions that were given to
you a little earlier?

“A Yes sir!”

“It would have served no purpose to
permit counsel to break down this one
question if the jurors would follow the
law as given by the Court into many ques-
tions and get the same response. In the
first place counsel is not permitted to ask
the jurors of their understanding of the

”

law.

HM This Court has long viewed with
disfavor the extended interrogation of a
juror as to his understanding of or re-
“action to the particular phases of law on
which the trial judge has a duty to instruct
him. See State v. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249
$6.2 143 (1971): detailed inquiry about
presumption of innocence and reasonable
“doubt; State v. Schoonover, 252 La, 311,

1. This Court has occasionally upheld the
trial court’s broad discretion in permitting
interrogation of a juror about a particu-

442

211 So.2d 273 (1968): lengthy statements
of particular phases of law; State v. Oliver,
247 La. 729, 174 So.2d 509 (1965): inquiry
as to whether juror would feel the defend-
ant guilty because he was charged or be-
cause he might not testify; State v. Bick-
ham, 236 La. 244, 107 So.2d 458 (1958) :
lengthy statements of particular phases of
law; State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So.2d
601 (1955): defense counsel reading law
to jurors on voir dire; State v. Brown, 172
La, 121, 133 So. 383 (1931): trial judge
stating the law of self-defense during voir
dire to enable defense counsel to question
the juror concerning it; State v. Dreher,
166 La, 924, 118 So. 85 (1928): questions
as to the juror’s understanding of the law
relating to burden of proof, reasonable
doubt, and elements of the crime; State v.
Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924):
question as to whether juror believed in the
right of self-defense; State v. Sinigal, 138
La. 469, 70 So. 478 (1916): trial judge
stating the law of self-defense for voir dire
examination; State v. Willie, 130 La. 454,
58 So. 147 (1912): questions as to burden of
proof and reasonable doubt. See also
Marr's Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana
§ 453, p. 691 (1923) 2

In State v. Oliver, supra, the defense
sought to ask the jurors whether the de-
fendant’s failure to take the stand would

Jar rule of law. See e. g., State v. Plum-

Jee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1938):
“unusual and novel points of law”.

443

cause them to draw an adverse conclusion
as to his innocence and whether the circum-
stance that defendant was charged and
brought to trial would cause them to feel
that he was guilty. This Court affirmed
the trial judge’s exclusion of these ques-
tions, holding:

“While the jurors are the judges of the
law and the facts of a criminal case in
Louisiana, they are duty bound to accept
the law as instructed by the court and it
is always to be presumed the jurors will
comply with this duty. Indeed, they take
an oath so to do. And, albeit it is proper
on the voir dire examination of a juror
for counsel to inquire whether he is will-
ing to accept the law as instructed by the
court (see State v. Green, 244 La. 80, 150
So.2d 571), the judge exercises a sound
discretion in restricting the breadth of the
examination to this inquiry, so that coun-
sel may not unduly explore every detail
of the mental attitude of the juror in
order to commit him in advance as to his
reactions to evidence or the lack of it or
as to his application of the law to the
facts under the instructions given by the
judge. See Marr’s Criminal Juris-
prudence, 2nd Ed. Vol, 1, Secs. 456, 457
and cases cited in support of the text.”

In State v. Brown, supra, the trial court
refused to allow defense counsel to ask the
juror whether he had any ‘prejudice against
the law of self-defense. Defense counsel
conceded that the ruling was correct. The

Al4

Court then sustained an objection to the
following question:

“Elave you any prejudice against the
law of self-defense, and I couple with the
question a request that the court explain
the law of self-defense to the juror.”

This Court affirmed, holding:

“The ruling of the court is correct.
‘The answer of the juror to the questions
propounded to him shows that he under-
stood that it was his duty to take the
law as expounded by the judge. He said
he would do that. That was all defend-
ant had a right to expect and demand.
It is not the duty of the trial judge to go
into detail and explain to a prospective
juror who is being examined on his voir
dire all of the different phases of the
law which may be applicable to the case
‘The time for him to do that is
after the testimony is closed, and the case
is argued and submitted by the state and
the accused.”

on trial.

In State v. Webb, supra, the trial judge,
excluded the following question addressed
to the juror: “. . . [DJo you believe
that a man has the right to defend himself
when he is or may be suddenly or violently
attacked?”

In affirming the conviction, this Court
stated:
“It is not permissible for counsel to
question jurors as to their individual
opinion or belief as to what the law is or

415

ought to be in a given case or under
certain circumstances. It is true that the
Constitution declares that jurors are the
judges of both the law and the facts in
_a criminal case on the question of the
guilt or innocence of the accused party,
but this is true with respect to the law
only in the sense that they are to accept
the law-as given to them in the charge by
the court and apply it to the facts of the
particular casé.”

Although, the authorities are divided, the
prevailing view in this country is that
examination of jurors as to their knowledge
of or reaction to particular phases of the
law to be given, by the court is impermis-
sible. People v. Modell, 143 Cal.App2d
724, 300 P.2d 204 (1956); ,State v. Bolle,
Mo, 20] §.W.2d 158 (1947); State v.
Mosier, Mo., 102 S.W.2d 620 (1937); Com-
monwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474, 86 A.
472 (1913); Fugit v. State, 85 Miss. 86, 37
So. 587 (1904) ; Duffy v. Carroll, 137 Conn.
51,75 A.2d 33 (1950); Harrell v. Common-
wealth, Ky, 328 S.W.2d 531 (1959); 50
CJS. Juries § 275, p. 1043; Annot, 99
ALR2d7, 20-23; The State Trial Judge’s
Book (National Coriference of State Trial
Judges and’ the Joint Committee for the
Effective Administration of Justice ed.

2. Current judicial reform is moving in the
direction of expediting the voir dire ex-
amination of jurors, a procedure that has
contributed ‘substantially to court: delays

_ and, congestion. ,See State v, Manley,
54 NJ, 259, 255 ‘A.2d 198 (1969) and’
thé authorities: therein~ cited; Levit, “et

416
1965) p. 93; Kennelly and Chapman, The*
Lawyer’s Guide p. 168 (1970).#

The prevailing rule is correctly stim-
marized in Trial Lawyer’s Guide, supra,
as follows: .

“In most jurisdictions today, court rules
and statutes prohibit the discussion of
law during the selection of the jury. This
is considered the exclusive province of
the trial judge. The extent to which the
trial lawyer may now go in the selection
of the jury concerning the law is to ask if
the jurors will follow the law as given
by the court, even though they may dis-
agree with the law, or may feel that the
law should be other than as given by the
court.”

The State Trial Judge’s Book, prepared
by the National Conference of State Trial
Judges, supra, adopts the prevailing rule:

“Questions should be limited to material
and relevant matters having relation to
the qualification or disqualification of the
jurors. They should not anticipate the
instructions of the court and demand re-
action thereto.”

Defendant contends that our original
judgment in this case conflicts with that in
State v. Crittle, 263 La. 418, 268 So.2d

al., Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical
Study, 44 So.CalL.Rev. 916 (1971);
Justice in the States: Addresses and
papers of the National Conference on -the -
Tudiciary (1971), osnecially Baward Ben- -,
nett Williams at p. 37. °

ALT De 418

604. (1972), handed down the same day. - 268 $0.24 604
However, the judgment in State v. Crittle

ae STATE of Louisiana
noted the following distinction:

ve

‘Under the present facts and circum- Taylor CRITTLE.

stances surrounding defense counsel’s
questioning of prospective jurors, we find No. 52040.

that the trial judge restricted him too May 1, 1972.
severely and too narrowly. Counsel was
not present in court on the Monday prior
to the instant trial when the prospective
jury panel was instructed; there was no
requirement that he be present. The
jury panel was not reinstructed in coun-
sel’s presence. Counsel was interrupted
at the inception of these proceedings;
he was not allowed to try this case to the
best of his ability.”

Under the circumstances of the present
case, we conclude that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in disallowing the
additional questions concerning the juror’s
understanding of and reaction to the
various rules of law deemed applicable to
the case.

, For the reasons assigned, our original
judgment affirming the conviction and sen-
tence is reinstated and made the final
judgment of this Court.

BARHAM, J., dissents for reasons as-
signed in dissent on original hearing.
TATE, J., dissents for the reasons noted
by the dissents at the original hearing. *
DIXON, J, dissents.

3. The author of this opinion dissented in State-v. Crittle.
De

419

—-——

Gravel, Roy & Burnes, James J. Brady,
Alexandria, for defendant-relator.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Edwin O.
‘Ware, III, Dist. Atty., Robert P. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.

HAMLIN, Justice:

Exercising our supervisory jurisdiction,
we directed Certiorari to Honorable Guy E.
Humphries, Jr., Judge, Ninth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Rapides Parish, Louisiana, in
order that we might determine the validity
of the instant proceedings. Art. VII, Sec.

10, La.Const. of 1921,

‘Taylor Crittle was charged with violating
LSA-R.S. 40:971(3c) in that “HE DID ON
OR ABOUT THE 18th DAY OF Febru-
ary, 1971, wilfully and unlawfully violate
RS. 40:971(3c) by the unlawful possession
of a dangerous control substance, to-wit:
Marijuana.” Thereafter, defendant was
tried by jury, found guilty as charged, and
sentenced to be imprisoned in the Parish
Prison for a period of six months.

A number of bills of exceptions were
reserved during the proceedings; however,
the record and application for Certiorari
contains only two perfected bills. We find
‘them to have merit and infra will restrict

420

this review to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1
and 2.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS
NOS. 1 AND 2

The above bills will be discussed jointly ;
each was reserved when the trial judge
restricted defense counsel’s voir dire ex-
amination of prospective jurors. The ques-
tioning, colloquy, and rulings of the trial
judge in connection with the reservation
of these bills are as follows:

Prospective juror Jimmy Moorland Tay-
lor:

“Q. Under our system of procedure in
this State and in this Country, the Defend-
ant in any criminal trial, as he sits before
you now, is presumed to be innocent until
the State proves its case. Could you afford
that of this Defendant of that assumption
that he is legally entitled to?

“A. Yes, sir.

“BY THE COURT: Mr. Brady, I in-
structed the entire panel, Monday, on all
the preliminary provisions of law that [are]
And I will
not permit you to go into the provisions of
law that are applicable to a criminal case,

applicable in a criminal case.

with the prospective jurors, as I’ have al-
ready instructed them on that. They have
stated that they would follow the law, as
given to them by the Court. The Code pro-
vides that the Judge shall instruct the Jury
on the law and the voir dire examination is
for the purpose in determining a juror’s

421 | 422,

qualifications and knowledge of the law is
not one of the qualifications.

“BY MR. BRADY: Well, Your Honor,
I don’t purpose to instruct the jurors in the
law, that is certainly not in my purview.
But I do and feel that I must in this case,
in every case, question each and every juror
to the fact, whether they can give this
Defendant a presumption of innocence,
which he is entitled.

“BY THE COURT: I have instructed
the jurors on the presumption of innocence,
applicable to all criminal cases, as well as
other provisions of law. I will permit you
to ask them if they will follow the instruc-
tions that I have given them, not only to
this provision of law but to the other pro-
visions of law, which is equally important.

“BY MR. BRADY: I respect and realize
what you have done but I think it is my
duty to ask them this question and I reserve

the objection, if its going to be overruled.

“BY THE COURT: I am not going to
permit any questions regarding the law.

“BY MR. BRADY: Your Honor, to this
ruling the Defendant respectfully reserves
a bill of exception, attaching, to and making
a part thereof, the bill of information, the
motions heretofore, filed in these proceed-
ings—

Me kk

“Q. Also important and it is sacramental
in our procedure, that a Defendant in any

criminal case does not have to take the wit-
ness stand—(Interrupted)

“BY THE COURT: Mr. Brady, I have
just issued a ruling, sir, I don’t expect it to
be violated.

“BY MR. BRADY: May we approach
the bench, Your Honor.

“BY THE COURT: Yes, sir. Your
statements are in the record.

“BY MR. BRADY: I would, just to
clarify this situation, I would like to make—
read into the record that, Your Honor, has
instructed me that I am not to ask any pros-
pective jurors, whether or not he has—wilf
give my client the presumption of innocence,
to which he is entitled, also that Your
Honor has instructed me that I am not to
ask whether the fact that this Defendant
does not take the stand, in his own behalf,
would have an effect on this—or each and
every juror. And that, Your Honor has
instructed me that if I ask these questions
that I would be disobeying an order of this
Court and that there will be—(Interrupted)

“BY THE COURT: I said, if you asl
that question, you would be disobeying an
order of this Court.

“BY MR. BRADY: And then to, Your
Honor’s ruling on this, the Defendant re-
spectfully reserves a bill of exception, at-
taching thereto and making a part thereof,
the bill of information in this case, the
testimony in connection with the examina-
tion of the Juror, Mr. Taylor, prospective

423

Juror, Mr. Taylor, the Court’s ruling there-
on, the statement of Defendant’s Counsel
and in general, the entire record heretofore,
in these proceedings.

“BY THE COURT: All right, sir.”

Counsel for the defendant contends that
the trial judge so severely limited the voir
dire examination in this case, and to such an
extent as to make the examination complete-
ly useless from the defendant’s point of
view. He argues that it was impossible to
intelligently or wisely exercise any chal-
lenge for cause or to form any basis for a
peremptory challenge because of the severe
limitation of voir dire questioning. He
submits: “It is most pertinent to point out

that neither the defendant, nor his counsel,
were present in the courtroom the previous
Monday when this particular jury was em-
paneled to try an entirely different case.
The defense counsel cannot possibly ascer-
tain what a prospective juror’s beliefs on
essential areas may be when the trial judge

1, While prospective juror Abraham LL.
George was undergoing voir dire, the
following reservations were made by
counsel for the defendant:

“BY MR. BRADY: Your Honor, I
feel at this time, in order to protect
this Defendant, tell the Court that I
feel I should ask this gentleman, the
question that I asked Mr. Taylor.

“BY THE COURT: Of course, I am
going to instruct you not to ask or you
may ask him if he will follow the law
that I gave them earlier, applicable to -
criminal cases, which includes presump-
tion of innocence and not taking the wit-

_ ness stand.

424

reads some aspects of the law to the panel
of 100 jurors, three days before the trial
of the case, when the defendant or his
counsel were not even present in the court-
room.”

The State submits that all of the issues
raised herein with respect to voir dire ex-
amination by counsel have already:“been
decided by this Court in State v. Richey,
258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971). It ar-
gues that the Court's position was reaf-
firmed in State v. Harper, 260 La. 715,
257 So.2d 381.

In State v. Richey, supra, we held that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in disallowing the following questions pro-
pounded to prospective jurors:

“Do you know the meaning of the pre-
sumption of innocence, which the defend-
ant is to receive in this case?

“Mr. Guillory, can you afford this de-
fendant the presumption of innocence to
which the law gives him?

“BY MR. BRADY: I feel then, Your
Honor—t intend to reserve a bill—I feel
I should ask each and every juror those
particular questions and I assume that
Your Honor’s ruling will be the same.

“BY THE COURT: Yes, it will be
the same, you can make the objection
general and the Court’s ruling will be
made general. .

“BY MR. BRADY: We will reserve
the same bill of exception to each of
these prospective jurors.

“BY THE COURT: All right, let a
bill be reserved.”

425

“As you stand here today, sir, can you
afford this defendant the full presumption

of innocence, can you in your own mind;

right now feel that he is innocent of the
crime that he is charged with?

“Sir, in weighing the identification testi-
mony of the defendant, will you consider
the witness’s capacity for memory, for
“observation, his familiarity or unfamiliarity
with the defendant, and any bias or preju-
-dice he may have toward the accused ?”

In Richey, we said: “Under the facts and
-circumstances existing in the trial court at
the time the instant bills were reserved, we
do not find that the trial judge abused his
‘discretion in disallowing the questions de-
fense counsel propounded to the prospec-
tive jurors. The trial judge’s per curiam,
supra, explains his reasons for his rulings;
-we find them reasonable herein. Whether
the questions propounded would be im-
‘proper in every criminal case, we are not
scalled on to say. Cf. State y. Peltier, 229
La. 745, 86 So.2d 693. * * * ‘The judge’s
vexercise of sound discretion in ruling will
‘be sustained unless unwisely exercised, pro-
viding that he allows considerable latitude
in the examination of jurors. State v.
Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So.2d 819 (1961),
scert. denied, 370 U.S. 963, 82 S.Ct. 1589, 8
L.Ed.2d 830. We are satisfied these stand-
ards have been observed.’ State v. Square,
257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200, 231. See, 24A
£J.S, Criminal Law § 1900b, p. 971 et seq.;

426

State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193
(1969).” 249 So.2d at p. 152. ;

In State v. Harper, supra, we held that
defense counsel has the right to interrogate
prospective jurors, within reasonable limits
largely within the discretion of the trial
judge, to determine whether they are biased
or committed to certain views not only for
the purpose of discovering grounds for
challenge for cause but also to enable the
intelligent exercise of peremptory chal-
We concluded that questions ré-
quiring advance commitments by prospec-
tive jurors were nevertheless properly dis-

lenges.

allowed by the trial judge.

Article 799 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides that in a case such as the
instant case, each defendant shall have six
peremptory challenges, Article 797 pro-

vides:

“The state or the defendant may chal-
lenge a juror for cause on the ground
that:

“(1) The juror lacks a qualification re-
quired by law;

“(2) The juror is not impartial, what-
ever the cause of his partiality. An
opinion or impression as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant shall not of
itself be sufficient ground of challenge to
a juror, if he declares, and the court is
satisfied, that he can render an impartial
verdict according to the law and the
evidence;

ek

427

“(4) The juror will not accept the law as
given to him by the court; or

uy ok KD

Article 786 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure states:

“The court, the state, and the defendant
shall have the right to examine prospec-
tive jurors, The scope of the examina-
tion shall be within the discretion of the
court, A’ prospective juror, before being
examined, shall be sworn to answer truth-
fully questions asked him relative to his
qualifications to serve as a juror in the
case.”

In State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d
12, 31 (1961), we said: “It is a general view
as to voir dire examination that the defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution is entitled to
make reasonable and pertinent inquiries of
the prospective juror so that he may exer-
cise intelligently and wisely his right of
peremptory challenge—since each party has
the right to put questions to a juror not only
to show that there exists proper grounds for
a challenge for cause, but to elicit facts to
enable him to decide whether or not he will
make a peremptory challenge. For this
reason, a wide latitude is allowed counsel in

examining jurors on their voir dire, and the

scopé of inquiry is best governed by a liberal
discretion on the part of the Court so that
if there is any likelihood that some preju-
dice is in the juror’s mind which will even
subconsciously affect bis decision, this may

428.

be uncovered. It is by examination into the
attitudes and inclinations of jurors before:
they are sworn to try a case that litigants.
are enabled to reject those persons, by use-
of peremptory challenges where necessary,.
who are deemed to be unlikely to approach
a decision in a detached and objective man-

ner, * *

As stated in Richey supra, we feel that
each prosecution has a life of its own, and
that the trial judge exercises his discretion
as to the particular case being tried and not
as to all cases at one time. Each defendant.
who is tried is entitled to a fair trial accom-
panied by full due process of law. The-
instructions given to prospective jurors.
during one proceeding apply to the indi--
vidual prosecution.

The methods of one counsel in trying a
case might not be the same as those of
another counsel trying a different case..
The law quoted supra allows a defendant
peremptory challenges, and a defendant is.
entitled to exercise them for his own pe-
culiar reasons, What one counsel has in
mind in questioning a prospective juror is
not necessarily what another counsel has.
in mind when he questions a different pros-
pective juror.

Herein, after defense counsel made a
statement with respect to the presumption
of innocence, he asked the prospective juror,
“Could you afford that of this Defendant
of that assumption that he is legally enti-

tled to?’ Counsel was asking for an an~

429

-swer with respect to the prospective juror’s
sstate of mind. The question although simi-
Jar to one propounded to a prospective
juror in the Richey proceeding was asked
herein under different facts and circum-
‘stances; it was not similar to those pro-
pounded in Harper, supra, such as, whether
the prospective juror would be willing to
accept the accused’s testimony as the truth,
and whether the prospective juror would
be influenced in his decision if he were told
that the defendant had a criminal record.

Under the present facts and circumstanc-
es surrounding defense counsel’s question-
ing of prospective jurors, we find that the
trial judge restricted him too severely and
too narrowly. Counsel was not present in
court on the Monday prior to the instant
trial when the prospective jury panel was
instructed; there was no ‘requirement that
he be present. The jury panel was not
reinstructed in counsel’s presence. Counsel
was interrupted at the inception of these
proceedings; he was not allowed to try this
case to the best of his ability, The trial
judge misinterpreted our ruling in Richey;
he should have permitted defense counsel to
pursue the questioning quoted supra, or
questioned and/or instructed the jurors
himself.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction

.and sentence are reversed and set aside;

1, No bill of exceptions was perfected pre-
senting this question, but the issue was
fully argued by the State and the de-
fendant, and we must notice any orror

430

the case is remanded for a new ‘triat in
accordance with law and the views" herein
expressed.

SANDERS, J., dissents.

BARHAM, J, dissents with written rea-
sons.

DIXON, J., concurs.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I must dissent from the majority opinion
since it has found reversible error tequir-
ing a new trial based upon voir dire exami-
nation when in fact there is also reversible
error requiring that the bill of information
be quashed and the defendant discharged
if he is not timely recharged.

First, however, T would address myself
to the reasoning of the majority in regard,
to the trial judge's restriction of defense’
counsel’s voir dire examination of prospec-
tive jurors. This court erred in State v.
Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971),
which I believe to be contrary to State v.
Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961).
There is no reason to try to distinguish,
qualify, or support Richey. It sé a dan-
gerous precedent contrary to our Constitu-
tions, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
our jurisprudence, and it should be cate-
gorically struck down.

discoverable by a mere inspection of the

pleadings and proceedings. Art. 920(2),
O.0r.P. vee

431

- Code of Criminal Procedure Article 797
states as one of the grounds upon which the
State or the defendant may challenge a
juror for cause that “The juror will not
accept the law as given to him by the
court”. Every case presents its own special
Jegal propositions which may not be accept-
able to a juror and which he cannot follow
We
should once and for all state to the trial

in the consideration of the verdict.

courts the’ proposition that jurors may be
examined—not lectured, examined—on the
question of whether they are able to accept
pertinent principles of law, just as it must
be determined in capital cases whether
jurors .can accept the principle of law that
one charged with a capital offense may
have to forfeit his life. For further dis-
cussion, see my dissents in State v. Richey,
supra; State v. Bell, 263 La. 434, 268 So.2d
610 on our docket, and State v. Sheppard,
263 La. 379, 268 So.2d 590, the latter two
decided this day.

The majority errs in failing to quash the
bill of information since it does not charge
acrime. There is no short form indictment
for possession of controlled dangerous sub-
stances, and therefore all the elements of
this offense must be charged under the
requirements for the long form indictment
of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464.
The crime sought to be charged here is
defined in R.S. 40:971(c): “It is unlawful
2. The citation of the statute is incorrect

and should be R.S. 40:971(c). How-
ever, the information is not fatally de-

432,

for any person knowingly or intentionally

to possess a controlled dangerous substance
* * %*” (Emphasis supplied.) The bill
of information which attempts to charge
that offense reads: “* * * he did on or
about the 18th day of February, 1971, wil-
fully and urilawfully violate R.S. 40:971
(3) (c)® by the unlawful possession of a
dangerous controlled
Marijuana * * 4”

substance, to-wit:

The error in the information is the failure
to charge an essential ingredient of the
crime: Knowing or intentional possession.
It is argued that “intentional” when used
in the Criminal Code or in criminal sanc-
tions, unless modified, refers to general in-
tent, and that therefore intent is not essen-
tial to the charge here because the knowing
and intentional possession relates to general
scienter. The fallacy in the argument is
easily demonstrated. This court through a
long line of cases, for the purpose of allow-
ing the introduction of evidence of prior
and subsequent offenses in the prosecution
of possession cases, has said that knowledge
and intent are essential ingredients. State
v. Nicolosi, 228 La, 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955) ;
State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24
(1955); State v. Maney, 242 La, 223, 135
So.2d 473 (1961); State v. Oliver, 247 La.
729, 174 So.2d 509 (1965); State v. Wil-
liams, 250 La. 64, 193 So.2d 787 (1967);
State v. O’Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484

fective for that reason.” See C.Cr.P.
Art. 464, © “ .

433

(1970); State v. Kreller, 255 La, 982, 233
So.2d 906 (1970),

Urider this jurisprudence, which has de-
clared this rule too often for it to be dis-
puted, it. is apparent that in Louisiana
knowledge and intent are essential ingredi-
ents of the crime of possession of con-
trolled dangerous substances. The amend-
mhent to the statute defining this crime
incorporated this jurisprudence and now
‘specifically includes knowledge and intent
Therefore the
genefal rule of law that “intentional” un-
qualified by special language refers to gen-
eral cfiminal intent rather than specific in-

as elements of this crime.

tent and need not be charged is inapplicable
to the crime of possession under R.S. 40:
971(c). It would also follow that “knowl-
edge” under this crime is an exception to
the rule that general scienter need not be
charged. Intent and knowledge are of a
specific quality in possession charges and,
just as for that reason extrinsic evidence
of knowledge and intent may be used to

establish this specific and essential element
‘of this crime, so must knowledge and intent
‘be charged.

‘The bill of information in the instant case
is invalid. The phrase that defendant did
“wilfully and unlawfully violate R.S. 40:971
(3) (c)” does not supply the missing in-
gredient, but is merely the usual preliminary
surplusage found in almost all bills of
information, The substance of the informa-
tion following that phrase charges only “the

434

unlawful possession” and fails to supply the
necessary ingredients to validly charge this
defendant. Knowledge and intent in pos-
session cases are that specific scienter
which it is essential to charge for a: valid
indictment under Code of Criminal Proce-
dure Article 464, Louisiana Constitution
Article I, Section 10, and United States
Constitution Amendments VI and XIV.

For all these reasons I respectfully dis-
sent.

268 So.2d 610

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Leonard BELL.

No. 52118,
May 1, 1972.

On Rehearing Nov. 6, 1972.

James S. Gravel, Alexandria, for defend-
ant-appellant.

Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty, Gen., William
J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. on rehearing, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin O.
Ware, III, Dist. Atty., Robert P. Jackson,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

HAMLIN, Justice:

Defendant appeals from his conviction of
armed robbery, LSA-R.S. 14:64,’ and his”
sentence to serve thirty-five years at hard
labor in the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
Three bills of exceptions reserved during
the course of the proceedings are presented
for our consideration.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved
when the trial court sustained the State’s
objection to defense counsel’s voir dire
examination of prospective jurors with re-,
spect to principles of law.

439

“he questioning by defense counsel, the
ruling of the trial judge, and the colloquy
among counsel and the trial court are as
follows:

“Q. ,Do you [William E, Maxey] know
any reason why you could not be fair, both
tothe State of Louisiana and to Leonard
Bell?

“A, No, sir, I do not.
“Q. And that you will have the State

to prove their case beyond a reasonable
doubt?

“A. That's right.

"9, And you can afford this Defend-
ant a présumption of innocence?

“A. I beg your pardon, sir?

“Q. And you can afford this Defendant
a presumption of innocence?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. You understand that there’s no evi-
dence right now in front of this court—I
mean, you understand that don’t you?

“A, That's right.

“Q. The fact that he is here by way of

a bill of information, that’s no evidence
against him?

“A, That’s right,

““BY MR. WARE: Your Honor, just in
the interest of time the State is going to
impose an objection to inquiries along this
line, under the rule, State v. Richey. [258
La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143]

“440

“BY. THE COURT: (Indistinct) ° in~
struction being given to the prospective
jurors, before we go into this kind of stuff, -
Mr. Gravel.
objection.

“BY MR. GRAVEL: To, Your Honor’s:
ruling, the Defendant reserves a bill of

I am going to sustain the

exception attached to and made part of the:
pill of exception, the questions asked and..
the objection of the State, Your Honor’s
ruling and make the bill general.

“BY THE COURT: So ordered.”

‘The trial judge in his per curiam to the
instant. bill stated:

“This bill of exception was feserved wher.
the Court sustained an’ objection lodged by
the State to the following ‘question’ being
put to a prospective juror, William E.
Maxey: .

“Question: ‘The fact that he is here by
way of a bill of information, that’s no evi~
dence against him?

“This question was answered.

“Answer: ‘That’s right’

“The objection, while not really timely
lodged, was aimed more at the type of in~
quity being conducted by counsel for the
defendant rather than the specific question
posed. The objection was sustained,
principally because this type of questioning
on voir dire amounts to an effort to in-
struct the jury on the law as interpreted by
counsel for the defendant, It can lead on

441

and on and usually does unless stopped
either through objection by the State or by
the Court on its own motion, Fairly recent-
ly in this jurisdiction, the Court has had to
limit the scope of examination permitted to
Tt had
reached a point where each juror was given

counsel for defendant in voir dire.

a lecture and quiz on the law of the par-
ticular case being tried and general criminal
Jaw as understood by defense counsel. This
is not, in the Court’s mind, proper and for
that reason the objection was sustained.”

Herein, counsel for the defendant sub-
mits: “* * * Tt is interesting to note
the rationale of Judge Gremillion in sustain-
ing the objection of the State. This reason-
ing is two-fold: (1) The questions brought
on voir dire amount to an effort to in-
struct the jury on the law as interpreted by
counsel of the defense, and (2) It can lead
on and on and usually does unless stopped
by objection of the State or by the Court.on
its own motion.

“It seems these objections are minor when
weighed against the rights of the defendant.
The Trial Court seems to object to the jury
being instructed as to matters of law. It
should be pointed’ out that in the final
analysis it is more important for the jury
to understand the law than for the Court or
counsel for the State or Counsel for the
defendant because in the end the jury must
apply this law to the facts. As for the
opposition of interpretation of the law by
counsel for defense it suffices to state that

442

if any error is made by defense counsel,
the District Attorney or the Court can and.
does readily correct defense counsel.

“The other objection is the time these
questions may take. Any discussion of the
Jaw with a prospective juror can only take
several minutes; however, a misinterpreta-
tion of the law by a prospective juror can
cost the defendant thirty-five years im-
prisonment.”

THM Asticle 786 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that the scope
of the voir dire examination of prospective:
jurors is within the discretion of the trial
judge, and in State v. Schoonover, 252 La.
311; 211 So.2d 273 (1968), we said: “The
extent to which counsel may examine jurors
of their voir dire rests largely within the
discretion of the trial judge. State v.
Green, 244 La. 80, 150 So.2d 571 (1963). A
wide latitude in the exercise of the judge’s
discretion is allowed by a liberal attitude of
the appellate courts. See State v, Hills, 241
La. 345, 129 So.2d 12 (1961). In general,
however, we have not approved of lengthly
statements of particular phases of law being”
expounded to jurors on their voir dire exam-
ination as a preface to interrogation, for
this practice tends to facilitate attempts to
commit the juror’s vote in advance of de-
liberation, Care should be exercised by
the trial court to prevent this result. La.
Code of Crim.P. art. 357 (1928). State v.
Bickham, 236 La. 244, 107 So.2d 458 (1958).””

443,

HMMM Each prosecution has its own
facts and circumstances; the discretion
exercised by the trial judge in trying one
case might not be the same as he exercised
in another case. We have held that the
trial judge’s discretion exercised in his
rulings on voir dire is not unlimited and is
subject to our review on appeal. In order
to reverse a ruling of a trial judge, setting
aside a conviction and sentence, we study
the record for reversible error and abuse of
-discretion.

HM Herein, we find no abuse of dis-
cretion. It was not necessary for defense
counsel to ask on voir dire questions with
‘respect to pertinent phases of law; the
questioning would have unduly prolonged
the trial. The following part of the trial
judge’s charge to the jury discloses that he
‘thoroughly apprised the jury on the law
which defense counsel attempted to give and
interpret to the jury:

“* 9% Tt is your duty to follow the
laiv I now give and to apply it to the facts
as you find them from the evidence. It is
a violation of your sworn duty to base a
verdict on any other view of the law than
‘that given by me, just as it would be a viola-
tion of your sworn duty to base a verdict on
anything but the evidence in the case. It
‘belongs to you alone to determine the weight
and credibility of the evidence. Your
service as a juror obligates you to perform
your duties without bias, prejudice, sym-

444

pathy or regard to public opinion. A person.
accused of a crime is presumed to be in-
nocent until each element of the crime
necessary to constitute his guilt is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
begins the trial with a clean slate with no
evidence against him. The burden is-on the
State to so prove each and every element
of the crime necessary to constitute his guilt.
It is your duty in considering the evidence
and applying the law to give the defendant
the benefit of every reasonable doubt
arising out of the evidence, or lack of evi-
dence. If you are not convinced of his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt it is your
duty to acquit him.” Cf. State of Louisiana
y. Richey, 258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143
(ag71).

Bill of Exceptions No, 1 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved’
when the trial judge sustained the State’s
objection to the opening statement made by
defense counsel,

The objectionable statement, the colloquy
among counsel and the court, and the ruling
of the trial judge are as follows:

“BY MR. GRAVEL: Gentlemen of the
Jury, as Mr. Ware stated when he read the
statute of armed robbery to you, that
through the evidence that he outlined, he
must prove to your satisfaction to a moral
certainty, that the Defendant was involved

445

in this take, the Defendant had actual
knowledge of what Sheppard did. Now, he
must prove every element of this crime to
a moral certainty. If he leaves out any
evidence—if he leaves out any element, I
mean, that doesn’t satisfy your moral cer-
tainty, then you must acquit. Now, as 1
stressed in the Voir Dire examination, the
Defendant, Leonard Bell, in this case, does
not have to do anything. That as of this
time, each of you told me, at this time you
convened, the Defendant to be innocent and
he is to remain innocent until the State of
Louisiana can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt or moral certainty, every element of
the crime of armed robbery. Now, we
don’t ask for you to make any conclusions
now and we know that you haven't, I didn’t
any way because you told me you hadn't.
However, I do ask that when each of these
witnesses takes the stand and you are the
judge—

“BY MR. DAVIDSON: Your Honor, I
hate to interrupt Counsel, but he is arguing
his case, he is not allowed to do that, he is
to outline the evidence he is to present,
that’s the purpose of an opening statement.

“BY MR. GRAVEL: Your Honor,—
(Interrupted)

“BY MR. DAVIDSON: He is arguing
the law and asking them—(Interrupted)

“MR. GRAVEL: I don’t—(Interrupted)

“BY MR. DAVIDSON: I don’t find any
evidence that he has presented.

446

“BY MR. GRAVEL: I was just about to
say, I wanted the Jurymen to listen carefully
to the witnesses, the State’s witnesses be-
cause they have to determine the credibility
of the witnesses, whether this could have
happened any other way. Now, that is—

“BY MR. DAVIDSON: That is not out-
lining the evidence he plans to present, Your
Honor.

“BY THE COURT: That is a legal argu-
ment, sustained.

“BY MR. GRAVEL: To, Your Honor’s
ruling the Defendant objects and reserves
a bill of exception, attaching to and making
part of the bill of exception, the argument
thus far.

“BY THE COURT: So ordered.

“BY MR. GRAVEL: Well, as I simply
said, I want you to remember, the State of
Louisiana must prove everything and the

Defendant doesn’t have to prove anything.
With the ruling of the Court I am not
going to go any farther.”

Defense counsel contends that the ruling
of the trial judge supra caused the highest
degree of prejudice to the defendant, and
that said ruling was ‘erroneous, He sub-
mits:

“Though it was the opinion of the Trial
Court that defense counsel’s statement was
nothing but a legal argument it is submitted
that this was error and that defense counsel

4aT

was simply outlining the evidence or lack of
evidence of the State that would furnish the
defense.

“To determine the’ credibility of the
State's witnesses in light of the legal
principles that are applicable, noncredibility
of State witnesses, of course, is evidence in
favor of defendant.

“Considering this Bill of Exception along
with Bill of Exception No. One indicates
that the Ninth Judicial District Court re-
stricts defendant’s rights of a fair trial and,
therefore, it is submitted that reversible
error has been committed.”

We find that our ruling in the case of
State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 682, 243 So.2d
793, 797 (1971) answers the contentions
advanced by defense counsel; it recites:

“This court held under former RS.
15:333 (Article 333 of the Code: of
Criminal Procedure of 1928), which de-
fined the scope of the defendant’s opening
statement, that if counsel for defendant
elected to make an opening statement, it
was to be confined to an explanation of
the defense and the evidence which would
be used in an attempt to prove the defense.
Wide discretion was vested in the trial
judge in his control of the opening state-
ment to confine it within these limits.
State v. Shuff, 198 La. 67, 3 So.2d 278;
State v. Boone, 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d
710. Our present Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure fails to lay down rules for the de-

fendant’s opening statement. Articles 766

448

et seq. apply only to the State. We are
of the opinion that this jurisprudence
concerning the defendant’s opening state-
ment remains the law and is applicable.
We therefore hold that defense counsel
who avails himself of the opportunity to
make an opening statement under Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 765(4) must
confine his remarks to an explanation of
the nature of the defense and the evidence
by which he expects to establish it. The
trial court here properly exercised its
discretion, and its ruling was correct.”
See, State v. Dillon, 260 La, 215, 255 So.
2d 745; State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605,
287 So.2d 121; State v. Himel, 260 La.
949, 257 So.2d 670.

I We do not find that the defendant
suffered any prejudice by the trial judge's
ruling; no reversible error was committed,

Bill of Exceptions No, 2 is. without merit,

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved
when the trial judge overruled defense
counsel’s objection to the admission in evi-
dence of the following oral statement made
by the defendant to police officers:

“He had taken the car, he had picked up
a ‘Dude,’ he did not know who he was
and took him down Lower Third to a
cafe and he didn’t know the name of the
cafe and dropped this ‘Dude’ off.”

449

HEME This bill is not argued in brief.
We consider it abandoned. However, we
find that the district attorney gave notice of
the State’s intention to use in evidence all
statements made by the defendant to law
enforcement officers after his apprehension
for the crime of armed robbery. We con-
clude that the trial judge properly admitted
the above statement in evidence; his per
curiam recites:

“This bill is based on an objection made
by the defense counsel to the introduction
into evidence of an oral statement of the
defendant given to and in the presence of
police officers. It is not a confession, but
a statement that could have some in-
culpatory weight.

“An adequate showing was made outside
of the presence of the jury that the state-
ment was admissible and thus the proper
foundation was laid, the statement was not
induced or coerced, but was given freely
and voluntarily, it was material and in gen-
eral, all of the requisites were met which
would permit this statement to be intro-
duced into evidence, The significance and
weight of the statement was left, of course,
to the jury.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., dissents with written
reasons.

450

TATE, J., dissents and joins in the dis-
senting opinions of BARHAM and DIXON,
JJ., as to Bill No. 1 (voir dire examination).

DIXON, J., dissents with reasons,

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.

‘We have approached a point of holding
that the voir dire examination of the jurors
is exclusively within the unlimited discretion
of the district judge. This was not the
intent of the drafters of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal (C.Cr.P.

786).

Procedure. art.

It is basic to the law of Louisiana that
the attorneys for the State and the defense

have an unqualified right to interrogate the
jurors concerning their qualifications. (C.
Cr.P. art. 786; State v. Hills, 241 La. 345,

129 So.2d 12).

Prejudice against, opposition to, and the
inability to apply rules of law disqualify
jurors. Any restriction, statutory or juris-
prudential, which unduly restricts the exam-
ination of jurors as to their qualifications
is unwise.

Not only has the trial court unduly re-
stricted voir dire examination in this case,
but the function of the lawyer has been
further debased.,
interrupted in his opening statement when

Defense counsel was

he was apparently attempting to explain his
defense.

451

The State objected for the reason that
the defense was allowed only to “outline the

evidence he is to present...”

It is not the defense that is restricted to
outlining the evidence. The State is re-
stricted in opening statement to explaining
the nature of the charge and the nature of
evidence by which the State expects to

prove the charge. (C.Cr.P, art. 766).

C.Cr.P. art. 765 in providing the normal
order of trial in criminal cases states that
the defendant may make an opening state-
ment, There is no statutory restriction on
that right.

RS, 15:333, since repealed when the new
Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted,
“provided that in a trial, “the opening state-
ment by counsel for the defendant at his
option explaining the defense and the evi-
dence by which he expects to prove the
same” could be made.

This court, in three cases, has previously
considered restrictions placed on the open-
ing statement of defense counsel, In State
.Y. Boone, 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d 710, coun-
sel for the defendant during his opening
statement ought to read from a hospital re-
port certain statements with reference to
the mental condition of the accused. The
trial judge sustained the district attorney's
“objection to the reading of the report to
which the defense reserved a ‘bill of ex-

ceptions. We held that because such evi-

452

dence could not be introduced at trial be-
cause the defendant had not pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity, it was proper
for the trial court to sustain the objection.

In State v. Shuff, 198 La. 67, 3 So.2d
278, this court held that sustaining the
State’s objection to defense counsel’s argu-
ment in the opening statement did not prej-
udice the defendant because, “There is
nothing in the record to show that the de-
fendant was not allowed to introduce all of
the testimony available to him on the trial
of this case and as referred to in his open-
ing statement, or that he was deprived of
the right to argue therefrom the deduc-
tions sought to be brought to the attention
of the jury during the opening statement.”
(198 La. at 73, 3 So.2d at 280).

In State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.
2d 793, defense counsel during his opening
statement began to argue the law of the
case relative to burden of proof, reason-
able doubt and failure of the defendant to
take the stand. The judge informed coun-
sel that such argument on the law was
proper only at the end of the case to which
counsel objected and reserved a bill of ex-
ceptions. This court held that the de-
fense’s opening statement must be limited
to the nature of the defense and the evi-
We held that the prior
law, R.S, 15:333, must be incorporated into
C.Cr.P, art. 765.

dence relied on,

453

There is simply no basis in law or reason
for prohibiting a defense lawyer from out-
lining his defense in an opening statement.
If he intends to base his defense on the
credibility of the State’s witnesses as was
apparent when the defense lawyer was in-
terrupted in the case before us, he is en-
titled to alert the jury to that fact. We
ought not relegate the defense lawyer to
the status of an interested witness to the
proceedings.

The State has argued that economical
use of courtroom time justifies restricting
opening argument and voir dire examina-
tion by the defense. Statistics of the Judi-
cial Council, 1971, Table XII, show that
Rapides Parish, with three judges, held
ten crminal jury trials in 1971, and thirty-
seven in the last five years. Total crim-
inal cases filed in 1971 (Table XXII) de-
clined 18.1% from 1970. Total criminal
cases terminated in 1971 declined 22.2%
from 1970. Nor is this a unique situation
in Rapides Parish. In every other district
court in the State of Louisiana, except
ten, criminal cases filed declined in num-
ber in 1971.
there was a 6.8% reduction in criminal fil-

Over the State as a whole,

ings in 1971.

Tt does not appear that there is a
demonstrable need to limit the defense
function in the name of efficient judicial
administration,

454
BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The majority has tried to distinguish this
case from State v. Crittle, 262 La, 418, 268
So.2d 604, this day decided, without even
mentioning the latter case. Both cases
arose in the same jurisdiction, the juris-
diction from which State v. Richey, 258
La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143 (1971), emanated.
Here the State objected to the defense
inquiry as to whether the prospective juror
would accept certain principles of law
which are known to be contrary to the
beliefs and moral convictions of some
prospective jurors. The same trial court
here, as in Crittle, in Richey, and in State
v. Shepard, 263 La. 379, 268 So.2d 590,
also decided this day, has innovated a
method of interrogating jurors for select-
ing the jury because it found the attempt’
to discover grounds to challenge for cause
under Code of Criminal Procedure Article
797(4) unduly prolongs trials, clogs the
court’s docket, imposes upon the court, and
delays justice.

These jury cases come out of a juris-
diction which has so few criminal jury
trials that it would be unlikely, even with
unlimited voir dire examination, for all
of the criminal jury trials to consume 15.
The fol-
lowing statistics! reflect the total lack of

days in a whole calendar year.

1. Taken from the 1971 Annual Report of The Judicial Council of the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana.

455
need for this particular court to’ control
voir dire examination so severely:

—Number_of_Jury

Trials in Criminal
Year Cases
1967 . 5
1968 10
1969 6
1970 6
“1971 20

- In the present case the majority has said
that “* * + the questioning would have
unduly prolonged the trial’, (Emphasis
supplied.) It appears that the majority
justifies its holding on this basis and on the
basis that there was a good charge given to
the jury at the end of the trial. Bad rulings
on voir dire examination are not cured by
good charges at the end of the trial. The
judge’s charge is required to be correct
under any set of circumstances.

The voir dire examination is the vehicle
by which counsel discover grounds for chal-
lenge for cause and bases for peremptory
challenge. Article 1, Section 10, of our
Constitution gives the right of peremptory
challenge to the accused in criminal prose-
cutions. To properly exercise that right
great latitude must be allowed counsel in
examining jurors on voir dire with the
scope of the inquiry governed by a liberal
discretion by the court to allow discovery
of any prejudice in the mind of the juror.
State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 So.2d 12
(1961), and Art. 786, C.Cr.P., and Comment
(d). We should be careful not to write out
this constitutional guarantee by loose juris-

456

Voir dire examina-

prudential language.
tion must be legally and constitutionally fair
and correct, and error which is prejudicial
is not cured because all other parts of the
trial are fair.

In upholding this trial court ruling the
majority has changed the procedure long
recognized as valid voir dire examination
and eliminated the means to ascertain one
of the basic grounds for challenge for
cause simply for the convenience of one
district court where the reasoning for
change cannot be supported by the statistics
shown above. I am not at all persuaded
that this procedure is designed to benefit
the accused or the State or to dispense
speedy and effective justice.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons here
assigned and for the reasons assigned in my
dissents in State y. Crittle, supra, State v.
Sheppard, supra, and State y. Richey, supra.

ON REHEARING

SANDERS, Justice.

We granted a rehearing in this case as
to Bill of Exceptions No. 1 (limitation on’
voir dire examination) and Bill of Excep-
tions No, 2 (objection sustained during
defense counsel’s opening statement to the
jury).

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved
when the court sustained the State’s ob-
jection to a defense question addressed
to William E. Maxey, a prospective juror,

1
457
on his voir dire cxamination in the follow-
ing context:

“Q. You understand that there’s no evi-
dence right now in front of this
court—I mean, you understand that
don’t you?

“A. That’s right.

“Q. The fact that he is here by way of
a bill of information, that’s no evi-
dence against him?

“A. That's right.

“(District Attorney:] Your Honor, just
in the interest of time the State is
going to impose an objection to in-
quiries along this. line, under the rule,
State v. Richey. [258 La. 1094, 249
So.2d 143]

“BY THE COURT: (Indistinct) instruc-
tion being given to the prospective
jurors, before we go into this kind of
stuff, Mr. Gravel. I am going to sus-
tain the objection.

“{Defense Counsel:] To, Your Honor’s
ruling, the Defendant reserves a bill of
exception attached to and made part
of the bill of exception, the questions
asked and the objection of the State,
Your Honor’s ruling and make the bill
general.

“BY THE COURT: So ordered.”

THB The defense question pertained to
the juror’s understanding of the rule of

458

law that the Bill of Information is not evi-
dence of guilt. As noted by the trial judge,
the objection was made and ruled upon
after the juror had already answered the
question. Hence, as to that question, the
ruling was harmless. See LSA-C.Cr.P.
art. 921. The ruling, however, may be
construed as barring further questions of
similar import, that is, questions testing
the juror’s understanding of particular
phases of the law applicable to the case.

In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states:

“The objection, while not really timely
lodged, was aimed more at the type of
inquiry being conducted by counsel for
the defendant rather than the specific
question posed. The objection was sus-
tained, principally because this type of
questioning on voir dire amounts to an
effort to instruct the jury on the law as
interpreted by counsel for the defendant.
Tt can lead on and on and usually does
unless stopped cither through objection
by the State or by the Court on its own
Fairly recently in this jurisdic-
tion, the Court has had to limit the scope
of examination permitted to counsel for
It had reached
a point where each juror was given a
lecture and quiz on the Jaw of the partic-

motion.

defendant in voir dire.

ular case being tried and general criminal
law as understood by defense counsel.
This is not, in the Court's mind, proper
and for that reason the objection was
sustained,”

rior to the objection, the juror had
already stated that he would apply the law
given to.him by the judge whether he agreed
with it or, not, base his verdict solely on
the evidence, afford the defendant the pre-
sumption of innocence, and require the state
to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. As noted in our original opin-
ion, the trial judge fully instructed the
jurors at the proper time as to the law
applicable to the case.

“), For the reasons fully assigned in State
v. Shepard, 263 La. 379, 268 So.2d 590,
handed down this day, we hold that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
barring further questions as to the juror’s
understanding of particular phases of the
law on which the trial judge was to in-
struct him.

Defense counsel reserved Bill of Ex-
ceptions No. 2 when the trial judge sus-
tained the State’s objection to the following
portion of his opening statement:

“Gentlemen of the Jury, as Mr. Ware
stated when he read the statute of armed
robbery to you, that through the evidence
that he outlined, he must prove to your
satisfaction to a moral certainty, that the

Defendant was involved in this take, the

Defendant had actual knowledge of what

“Sheppard did. Now, he must prove every

element of this crime to a moral cer-

tainty, -If he leaves out any evidence—
if, he, leaves out any element, I mean,
that doesn’t satisfy your moral certainty,

460

then you must acquit. Now, as I stressed.
in the Voir Dire examination, the De-
fendant, Leonard Bell, in this case, does
not have to do anything. That as of this
time, each of you told me, at this time
you convened, the Defendant to be inno-
cent and he is to remain innocent until
the State of Louisiana can prove beyond
a reasonable doubt or moral certainty,
every element of the crime of armed rob-
bery. Now, we don’t ask for you to make
any conclusions now and we know that
you haven't, I didn’t any way because
you told me you hadn’t. However, I do
ask that when each of these witnesses
takes the stand and you are the judge—’

In the recent case of State vy. Spencer,
257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971), we set
forth the rule governing defense counsel’s
opening statement as follows:

“During his opening statement defense
counsel began to argue the law of the
case relative to burden of proof, reason-
able doubt, and failure of defendant to
take the stand. When the judge informed
counsel that he must confine his opening
statement to what he intended to prove
and should reserve his argument on the
law for the jury at the end of the case,
counsel moved for a mistrial. The mo-
tion was overruled, and Bill of Excep-

tion No. 5 was reserved. .

“This court held under former ‘R.S.
15:333 (Article 333 of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure of 1928), which defined

461

the scope of the defendant’s opening
statement that if counsel for defendant
elected to make an opening statement, it
was to be confined to an explanation of
the defense and the evidence which would
be used in an attempt to prove the de-
fense. Wide discretion was vested in
the trial judge in his control of the open-
ing statement to confine it within these
limits. State v. Shuff, 198 La. 67, 3 So.2d
278; State v. Boone, 227 La. 850, 80 So.
2d 710. Our present Code of Criminal
Procedure fails to lay down rules for the
‘“defendant’s opening ‘statement. Articles
766 ct seq. apply only to the State’ We
are of the opinion that this jurisprudence
concerning the defendant’s opening state-

ment remains the law and is applicable.

We therefore hold that defense counsel
who avails himself of the opportunity to
make an opening statement under Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 765(4)
“ must confine his remarks to an explana-
tion of the nature of the defense and
“the evidence by which he expects to estab-
lish it. The trial court here properly
exercised its discretion, and its ruling
was correct.” :

HM The foregoing holding controls the
disposition of this case.
opening statement must be confined to an
explanation of the nature of the defense
and the evidence he intends to offer.

Defense counsel’s

HMI The contested statement here in-
cluded argument relating’ to the’ State’s

462

burden of proof, the presumption of inno-
cence, and the credibility of the witnesses.

Hence, the trial judge did not abuse. his
discretion in sustaining the objection.
For the reasons assigned, our origirial
judgment affirming the conviction and sén-
tence is reinstated and made the final judg-
ment of this Court, ~

BARHAM, J., dissents for reasons as:
signed in dissent on original hearing.

TATE, J., dissents for the reasons noted

by the dissents on the original hearing.

DIXON, J., dissents.

268 So.2d 620

STATE of Louisiana
. voy
Alvin JOHNSON.

_ No, 52550.

- Oct. 26, 1972.

“Reheaving Denied Nov. 21, 1972.

465 PC 466
: Robert P. McLeod, Paul Henry Kidd,
Monroe, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty Gen, Hal R. Hen-
derson, Dist. Atty, for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM. ,

“By Bill of Information, the State,
charged Alvin Johnson with simple arson,
in violation of La.R.S. 14:51, After trial,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The
judge sentenced the defendant to a term
of eight (8) years in the Louisiana State .
Penitentiary * and to pay a fine of four
thousand dollars ($4,000).

The defendant has appealed, relying.
upon thirteen bills of exceptions reserved
in the trial court, The first two bills raise
the identical issues of whether or not the
defendant's motions to quash the petit jury,,
venire and for a change of venue were er ,
roneously overruled as was presented and |
decided in State v. Curry, 262 La, 280, 263
So.2d 36 (1972). For the reasons there set
forth, we find no error.

Though the prospective jurors are not
the same as those excluded from service
for their inability to read and write the
| English language in State v. Curry, 262
La. 616, 264 So.2d 583 (1972), the issues
presented by bills of exceptions numbers

*The trial judge sentenced defendant to an on the sentence for the 200 days in cus- .
additional 200 days, but gave him credit tody prior to trial.

AGT.

three through five (3-5) -are - identical.

For the reasons-set forth in that decision, -

we find these bills of exceptions lack mer-
i,

Bills of exceptions Nos. 6, 7 and 8 were
taken by defense counsel to the trial
court’s rulings on the challenges for cause
of three prospective jurors, Tommy J. Ed-
wards, James W. Buckner, and John M.
Bundy.

+
HE Yommy J. Edwards was challenged
for cause by virtue of “his peculiar knowl-
edge” of the case. The trial judge asked,
“T tell you, Mr, Edwards, that before you
could vote to convict this man that the
State must prove from witnesses sitting
right there in that chair that this Country
Club burned, that that is one of the things
that the State must prove, would you re-
quire the State to prove it before you
would vote to convict that man?”, to which
Mr. Edwards responded, “If they prove
that it burned and they prove that he did
it, he is guilty.” The judge then asked,
“All right. Now suppose they prove that
he had something to do with a burning, but
they don’t prove that the Country Club
burned? Suppose the State just doesn’t
prove that the Country Club burned, or
suppose that they prove that it burned a
little bit?”, to which Mr. Edwards replied,
“Somebody would have a problem on their
hands because it looks like they would have
to prove that.” This ruling was correct.

468

Hl James W. Buckner was challenged
when he testificd he would be more apt to-
give “greater credibility” to police officer
Lt. Sherrill’s testimony than to other wit-
nesses, even though he acknowledged that
other witnesses would be under oath.
When Mr. Buckner was asked by the trial
judge, “Would you necessarily believe him
(Lt. Sherrill) more than you might believe
some other witnesses?”, Buckner answer-
ed, “Like I said, sir, yes, sir, to a certain
The judge then asked, “Why?”,
to which Mr. Buckner responded, “I feel
like to hold the position he holds he has to
be honest and truthful about it.” This rul- .

extent.”

ing was correct.

WM or. Bundy was challenged for
catse by the defense counsel when he was
asked if whether or not the State proved
the defendant’s guilt, the defendant would
have to prove he was not guilty, giving the :
impression Mr. Bundy did not understand
the law that a man is presumed innocent
until he is proven guilty. Mr. Bundy dis--
closed, however, all the necessary qualifi-
cations for a sound and competent juror
when further examined by the trial judge. |

Hl This court has repeatedly held it is
within the sound discretion of the trial
judge to determine the competency of a ju-
ror and that only when the exercise of
such discretion is arbitrary or unreasona-
ble, to the prejudicial injury of the defend-
ant in obtaining a fair and impartial trial,

“469
that this Court would be warranted in set-
ting aside a verdict. La.C.Cr.P. arts. 787,
789. See State v. Square, 357 La. 743, 244
So.2d 200 (1971).
discretion here.

We find no abuse of
These bills are without
merit.

HE Bill of exceptions No. 9 appears
frivolous. Defense counsel alleged grounds
for a mistrial arose when the trial judge
allowed two witnesses to testify, albeit
out of the presence of the jury, after the
jury was sworn and the bill of informa-
tion read but before the opening state-
ments were made by the state as to the
free and voluntary nature of a confession
to be introduced. The defendant objected
on the grounds that evidence was not to be
taken until after the opening statement in
accordance with the La.C.Cr.P. art. 765
(order of trial).

The whole examination transpired at a
hearing for the trial judge to determine
the admissability of an alleged confession
and inculpatory statements, As the exami-
nation was made outside the hearing of the
jury, we find no prejudice to the defend-
ant. Neither do we find any other circum-
stances under which a mistrial should have
been granted, La.C.Cr.P. art. 775.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 794 clearly states, “* * *
The court may remove the jury from the
courtroom at any time when considered
in the best interest of justice.”

470

HEE Bill of exceptions No. 10 alleges
the State erroneously alluded to certain in-
culpatory statements made by the defend-
ant without having given notices required.
La.C.Cr.P. Art. 768. We find this conten-
tion to be without merit for two reasons.
First, these out of court utterances were
incidents of the criminal act and therefore
form part of the res gestae admissible in
evidence under the explicit provision of
La.R.S. 15:448, State v. Rutledge, 259 La.
544, 250 So.2d 734 (1971). Second, the al-
leged inculpatory statement as contemplat-
ed by Art. 768, “refers to the out-of-court
admission of incriminating facts made by a
defendant after the crime has been com-
mitted. It relates to past events.” Staté v.
Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So.2d 360.'(1970).

HH Bill of Exceptions No, 11 alleges
the trial judge erred'when he ruled irrele-
vant a question propounded by defense
counsel during cross examination of one of
We find the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in‘ruling
this question to be irrelevant. La.R.S.
15:441. The trial judge must be accorded
a wide discretion to determine whether evi-

the state’s witnesses.

dence sought to be introduced is relevant
to the case. State v. Murphy, 234 La. 909,
102 So.2d 61, (1968); State v. Square, 257
La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971).

Hl Bills of exceptions -Nos, 12 ‘and. 13
were taken when the trial judge;' stbse-

ATL a ATZ

quent to a hearing out of the jury’s pres-
ence, ruled a confession had been proven
freely and voluntarily given and therefore
admissable into evidence, and when the
trial judge allowed the confession and
waiver of rights form to be offered in evi-
dence. Upon reading the transcript con-
cerning the confession and waiver of
rights form, we find the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in ruling them admissa-
ble into evidence. The record affirmative-
ly shows that the waiver of rights form
and confession were free and voluntary,
not made under the influence of fear, du-
ress, intimidation, menaces, threats, induce-
ments or promises. La.R.S. 15:451. These

final two bills of exceptions lack merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs.

'
’ BARHAM, J., dissents with written rea-
sons.

DIXON, J., concurs in the result only as
to bills 6, 7, and 8.

1. In State v. Hills, 241 La. 345, 129 $0.2d
12 (1961), we recognized that there should
be wide latitude in voir dire examina-
tion to provide an opportunity to discover
any basis for exercising peremptory chal-
Jenges as well as challenges for cause.
Recognition of this practice was made by
the Legislature with the adoption of the
present Code of Criminal Procedure, and
more particularly Article 786. ‘That arti-
cle provides that examination shall be
within the discretion of the court, with-
out placing any limitations to the scope.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I find merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos.
2, 7, and 8, and for these reasons I must
dissent.

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 7 and 8 were
reserved to the overruling of two chal-
lenges for cause of prospective jurors by
defendant Alvin Johnson. He exhausted
his peremptory challenges during the voir
dire examination and is therefore entitled
to present his complaints on the refusal of
the trial court to excuse any prospective
jurors for cause. Art. 800, C.Cr.P.

The well-recognized purposes of voir
dire examination are to assure a fair trial
by an impartial jury and to allow for dis-
covery of any basis for exercising the con-
stitutional right (Art. I, Sec. 10) to peremp-

tory challenges. As a means to these ends

our law gives the court, the State, and the
defendant the right to examine under oath
the prospective jurors with the scope of
examination limited only by the exercise of
the discretion of the trial judge. Art, 786.4
The ground for challenge for cause by

Previously, under former R.8. 15 :857 ex-
amination was expressly limited to ascer-
taining the qualifications of the jurors.
While the guidelines for examination for
exercise of peremptory challenges have
not yet been tested before us, we have re-
cently enforced the right of counsel to full
use of voir dire examination to ascer-
tain any partiality or inability to accept
the law by a prospective juror. State v.
Crittle, 263 La. 418, 268 So.2d 604, de-
cided May 1, 1972.

473

the State or the defendant are provided in
Article 797, with additional grounds for
challenge by the State announced in Arti-
cle 798. The grounds pertinent in this
case are:

“Art, 797. Challenge for cause

“The state or the defendant may chal-
lenge a juror for cause on the ground
that:

Oe kOe

“(2) The juror is not impartial, what-
ever the cause of his partiality. An opin-
ion or impression as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant shall not of itself
be sufficient ground of challenge to a ju-
ror, if he declares, and the court is satis-
fied, that he can render an impartial ver-
dict according to the law and the evidence;

Ok kk

(4) The juror will not accept the law
‘as given to him by the court; or

eR KR”

In Bill of Exceptions No, 7 the challenge
was to James W. Buckner, who was ac-
cepted as a juror by the State and the de-
fendant after defendant’s failure to have
him removed for cause. As pointed out by
the majority opinion, this prospective juror
testified that he would give greater weight
to the testimony of Police Lt. Sherrill than
to that of any other witness because “to
hold the position he [Sherrill] holds he has

414

to be honest and truthful about it”, He
also said that he knew Lt. Sherrill and his
family well, and that Sherrill had always
been truthful with him. The majority
finds no error in allowing Buckner to sit
on this jury. I cannot agree. It is obvious
that he had already decided that he would
believe the testimony of Lt. Sherrill over
that of any other witness. And even when
the court questioned him, Buckner admitted
he would believe’Lt. Sherrill more than’ the
It is noted from the testi-
mony attached to other bills of exceptions
that Lt. Sherrill’s testimony was vital to-the
State’s case. He testified on the arrest of
the defendant and on the confession that
In light of Buckner’s
statements on voir dire examination he

other witnesses.

defendant gave.

must have believed the defendant was
guilty as soon as Lt. Sherrill had testified
and before the defendant had an opportu-
nity to present his case, It therefore can-
not be said that defendant had a fair and
impartial jury.

The rejection of the challenge of John
M. Bundy was the basis of Bill of Excep-
tions No. 8. After the trial court refused
to remove him for cause, defendant per-
emptorily challenged Bundy. As the voir
dire examination of this potential juror re-
vealed, he believed that there was a burden
on the defendant to prove that he was not
guilty, although he said that he would ap-
ply the law as instructed by the judge at

415 Le 416

the end of the trial, including the presump-
tion of innocence. The following testimo-
ny, which came after Bundy said he would
accept the instructions of the court and
vote the defendant innocent if he was not
satisfied of defendant’s guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, is pertinent:

“BY MR. KIDD [attorney for defend-
ant]:
“ck * * Let us assume that after we
get through and the jury is chosen, Mr.
Henderson [district attorney] gets up
and tells you about how this thing hap-
pened—

“A—OK,

“Q—and he says that this defendant is
guilty, and then Mr, Henderson tells the
Court ‘we rest’. No witnesses are put on
the stand.

hk OK
“A I couldn’t go for that.

“Q What would you do?

“A I have got an idea I would need
some evidence, of some kind.

“Q All right. Would you expect the
defendant to go back to jail until he
proved he is not guilty?

“A Well, he would be out on bond, I
guess.

“Q But you wouldn’t—you would just
pretermit the matter; you wouldn’t vote
not guilty?

“A I don’t believe I would. I don’t be-
lieve I could. Either way.

x ok Ok

“WITNESS: If they prove that he is
guilty to no shadow of a doubt, I would
vote guilty.

“THE COURT: All right, and if they
don’t do that, what would you do?

“WITNESS: I would vote him inno-
cent. .

“THE COURT: All right. Now if the
State doesn’t introduce any evidence and
the jury goes out here to deliberate, what
has to be your verdict?

“WITNESS: It would be not guilty.

“THE COURT: Now do you under-
stand that this is what was being asked
you while ago? Do you understand
that that was what Mr. Kidd was asking
you while ago?

“WITNESS: Okay.
“THE COURT: All right.

“MR. KIDD: I would like to ask that
question—following what the Court has
said to you—I don’t mean to confuse
you, Mr. Bundy—What the Court has
said to you, even though the State didn’t
offer you any evidence, you are not
going to turn this man loose until he has
presented some evidence that he is not
guilty, are you?

“WITNESS: That’s right. Shouldn’t.

417

“THE COURT: How are you going to
turn him loose? How are you not
going to turn him loose if you deliberate

in the case, Mr. Bundy?
“WITNESS: I don’t know.”

Bundy’s responses show that he was of
the opinion that this defendant was guilty,
Even though he
said that he could apply the presumption of

at least to some degree.

innocence and require the State to prove
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, he admitted that he would not be
able to vote for an acquittal unless there
was evidence presented that showed that
the defendant was not guilty. A challenge
for cause under such circumstances was
certainly justified. We have -recognized
such a conclusion in the past. See State v.
McCoy, 109 La. 682, 33 So. 730 (1903);
State v. Guillory, 146 La. 434, 83 So. 754
(1920); State v. Henry, 197 La, 999, 3
So.2d 104 (1941); State v. Oliphant, 220
La. 489, 56 So.2d 846 (1952).
a prospective juror who has an opinion

Only when

about the guilt or innocence of the defend-_

ant is able to put that opinion aside and
consider the merits of the case on the evi-
dence adduced and upon the law as in-
structed by the trial court can he be accept-
ed asa juror. Although this juror in general
responses stated he would accept the law
as given by the court, it is clear that he ei-

A718

ther could not understand and apply, or
would not apply, the presumption of inno-
cence.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to
a denial of a motion for change of venue.
The present prosecution of Alvin Johnson
is one of several cases arising in a small
community out of trouble between blacks
and whites which erupted in acts of vio-
lence and destruction of property. The
question of venue was presented in the
trial of one of these defendants, and we
held in that case, State vy. Curry, 262 La.

280, 263 So.2d 36 (1972), that the accused’

had not established his right to a change of
venue. The evidence in that case was
made the basis for similar attacks upon
We have fol-
lowed that ruling in all of these other re-

venue in the other trials.

lated cases. I must admit that in the Cur-
ry case I did not read the portions of the
record -pertinent to the ruling on the mo=
tion for change of venue. I have. now
read the Curry record on the hearing of
that motion, which is made a part of the
record in the present case, and I have ad-
ditionally examined the testimony attached
to the bills of exceptions in the present
case taken on the actual voir dire examina-
tion. I am now convinced that this de-
fendant could not have obtained a fair and
impartial trial in the parish where he was
convicted”

2. See also my dissent in State v. Heard, 268 La. 484, 268 So.2d 628 this day decided.

479

Our rule for determination of change of
venue is stated in Code of Criminal Proce-
dure Article 622:

“A change of venue shall be granted
when the applicant proves that by reason
of prejudice existing in the public mind or

because of undue influence, or that for any”

other reason, a fair and impartial trial can-
not be obtained in the parish where the
prosecution is pending.

“In deciding whether to grant a change
of venue the court shall consider whether
the prejudice, the influence, or the other
reasons are such that they will affect the
answers of jurors on the voir dire exami-
nation or the testimony of witnesses at the
trial.”

The difficulty of establishing the right
to a change of venue under the express
terminology of the last paragraph is imme-
diately apparent: If the jurors on voir
dire examination or the witnesses at the
trial will be under such pressure, prejudice,
or influence as to testify falsely, then there
is every reason to believe that the same
pressure and prejudice will influence the
witnesses, drawn from the same communi-
ty, who are called to state whether this
pressure or prejudice will exist at the
selection of the jury or upon the trial. It
cannot be presumed that the witnesses on
the preliminary motion for change of ven-
ue will be absolutely truthful, not testify-
ing under pressure, when the whole com-

480

munity is being tested for that very deter-
mination. It is obvious from the testimony
taken upon the hearing of the motion that
some of the witnesses did lie, at least when
they testified to knowing nothing about
happenings which had to be common
knowledge to everyone in the community
and which indeed were to some extent
common knowledge in the entire state.,
The testimony of these witnesses reveals
their total unwillingness or inability to an-
swer freely.

Moreover, we have discarded the old
rule of State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So."
2d 530 (1959), which confused the grounds
for change of venue with the grounds for
challenge for cause. The redactors of our
present Code article say that we have ex-
panded the rule, and that the change of)
venue concept “is to be superimposed upon’
the entire proceeding”. The Official Revi-
kk OA
change of venue ought to be available even
though, individually, each juror is not sus-
ceptible to a valid challenge for cause, if
the defendant can show that overriding all”
of these things and superimposed upon all'

sion Comment continues: “*

of them he still cannot get a fair trial.
The change of venue concept should oper-
ate where the state of the public mind
against the defendant is such that jurors
will not completely answer honestly upon
their voir dire, or witnesses will be so af-'
fected by the public atmosphere that they
will not testify freely and frankly.”

481

Prejudice in the community was further
inflamed by an action of the chief prosecu-
tor in the first of the cases, State v. Curry,
supra, who was a member of the staff of
the Attorney General appointed to that
staff shortly before the trials of these de-
fendants. A few weeks before the trial of
Curry, he and three other persons caused
to be published in a local newspaper an al-
most full-page ad with a picture of Willie

Curry, one of the principal defendants in’,

these cases, and with a text specifically in-
tended to plant in the minds of those who
read the advertisement that Willie Curry
and all those associated with him (includ-
ing the present defendant) were Commu-
nists.

The judge’s comments in overruling the
motion for change of venue in the Curry
case are interesting:

“I don't think that there is any question
but what there has prejudice been shown
in the matter, ‘There is prejudice certainly
in this community; there is prejudice in
every community, which is rather unfortu-
nate.

“I think unfortunately for the defend-
ants some of their primary witnesses have

testified that they either didn’t know or’

perhaps they could get a fair trial.

“Of course, this is a matter that address-

es itself not, only to the evidence which has ,

been presented here, but the Court knows
from its own knowledge that I have de-

482

fended, in my practice of law, many black
people. Frankly, I don’t know why all of
a sudden we always want black people on
juries particularly. I never wanted one
when I was defending a black person. 1

never had one convicted with a jury.

“Now whether or not there has been
enough public sentiment aroused in this
community as to whether or not these men
can get a fair trial or not, there is defi--
nitely a doubt in my mind. 1 am sure that
there is some public sentiment against
them. But I believe that under all of the
circumstances that these men can get a
fair trial and I personally am going to do
everything that I can to see that they get a
fair trial. If a jury can not be picked
from these thirty people who have been
summonsed [sic], we will summons some
more;
takes to allow the State and the defendant
to exhaust every challenge they have in or-

we will summons as many as it

der to get a jury that they think will give
this defendant and all of the other defend-
ants a fair trial.

“T trust that everybody will start having
a little more confidence in each other in
this community and in this Court, As I
stated, I will assure you I, even though 1
am white, that I will do everything within
my power to see that these men are given
fair trials. I had rather somebody else try
them, really, but unfortunately it is my
time.

A483 |

“T have no alternative in my opinion un-
der the law but to overrule the motion for
the change of venue.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

It is apparent to me that the trial court
noted exactly what I have concluded:
‘That the witnesses at the hearing on the
motion for change of venue were so influ-
enced by pressure and fear that they could
not openly and truthfully answer the ques-
tions asked them.

My findings under Bills of Exceptions
Nos. 7 and 8 do not accord with the trial
judge’s statement that he would make cer-
‘tain the 12 men chosen were fair and im-
partial, for at least one of them forced
upon this defendant should have been ex-
cused for cause and another who should
‘have been removed for cause was excluded
only upon expenditure of one of defend-
auit’s peremptory challenges. A change of
venue would be justified even under the
old standard of State v. Scott, supra. Ob-
viously, although the trial judge stated the
codal rule, he applied the old standard con-
sidering grounds for challenge for cause
sather than grounds for change of venue.
I.therefore am of the opinion that there
‘was error of law as well as error in the
evaluation of facts in determining the mer-
‘its of the motion for change of venue.

For all the reasons assigned I respectful-
Jy dissent.

3

268 So.2d 628

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Albert Ray HEARD.

No. 52549.
Oct. 26, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1972.

485

—_+—_—.

Robert P. McLeod, Paul Henry Kidd,
Monroe, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Hal R. Hen-
derson, Dist. Atty. for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Albert Ray Heard, ap-
peals his jury conviction of aggravated
criminal damage to property, La.R.S.
14:55, for which he was sentenced to serve
twelve (12) years and 197 days in the state
_Penitentiary.* On appeal, the defendant
relies upon nine (9) bills of exceptions re-
served and perfected during his prosecu-
tion.

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2 concern
a motion‘to quash the petit jury venire and
a motion for change of venue. The issues
raised by these two bills are identical to

*The trial judge sentenced defendant to an
additional 197 days, but gave him credit

486

those presented and decided in State v.
Curry, 262 La. 280, 263 So.2d 36 (1972).
For the reasons set forth in that decision,
we find these two bills of exceptions lack
merit.

Though the prospective jurors are not,
the same as those excluded from service
for their inability to read and write the
English language in State v. Curry, 262
La. 616, 264 So.2d 583 (1972), the issues
presented by bills of exceptions Nos. 3 to 7
are identical. For the reasons set forth in
that decision, we find these bills of excep--
tions lack merit.

Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was abandoned
by appellant in brief on appeal.

Bill of Exceptions No. 9 again alleges.
the trial judge erred when he refused to
excuse a prospective juror the defense had’
challenged for cause. After reading the
transcript of testimony regarding the ex-
amination of this individual we find the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
The venireman indicated during the exa

nation that though he had some opinion
concerning the case as a result of rumors.
and “shop talk” he had heard, he could be
objective in determining the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant, He stated, “I said
I would render my verdict by the evidence

that was given here. Because I don’t ac~

on the sentence for the 197 days in cus~
tody prior to trial.

487

tually know any of the facts in the case; it
is just all hearsay with me. * * * Well,
what I meant by that is the evidence that
was given here, I would render my deci-
sion by that. Not what I have heard be-
fore now or anything like that. What

comes up in court here.” (Tr. pp. 71-72).

The examination of this prospective ju-
ror as a whole reflected that the juror could
lay his opinion aside and base his decision
solely on the evidence adduced. State v.
Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So.2d 283, re-
versed 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.
Ed.2d 663, on remand 246 La. 451, 165 So.
2d 282; State v. Square, 257 La, 743, 244
So.2d 200 (1971).

For the reasons assigned, conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

SUMMERS, J., concurs.

BARHAM, J,, dissents with written rea-
sons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting),

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to

the overruling of defendant Albert Ray

_ Heard’s motion for change of venue. I

dissent from the majority’s holding on this

bill for the reasons given in my dissent on

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 in the case of

State of Louisiana v. Johnson, 263 La, 462,
268 So.2d 620, this day decided. ;

488

268 So.2d 629

The JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE
OF the LEGISLATURE of the State of
Louisiana Created By Senate Concurrent
Resolution No. 31 As Amended By Senate
Concurrent Resolution No. 76 of the Louisi-
ana Legistature of 1970

ve
dames R. STRAIN,

Nos. 51567, 51605.
May 1, 1972.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1972 in No. 51567.

On Rehearing Noy, 6, 1972 in No. 51605.

g

493

ee — 1)

—+—_
Pugh & Nelson, Robert G. Pugh, Shreve-
port, for defendant-applicant.
Sanders, Miller, Downing &. Kean, .R.
Gordon Kean, Jr., John V. Parker, Baton
Rouge, for plaintiff-respondent.

495 “ ee 496"

SUMMERS, Justice.

By Senate Concurrent Resolution No, 31,
as amended by Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion No. 76, a Joint Legislative Committee
was established to investigate organized
crime in Louisiana as it relates to state and
local government officials. The resolution
charges the committee to “undertake an
immediate comprehensive in-depth investi-
gation, inquiry and hearings into all mat-
ters relating to the question of corrupt
and/or criminal influences on the govern-
ment of this state and/or its political subdi-
visions and the officials and employees of
either.”

The resolution invested the committee
with “the power and authority to hold pub-
lié hearings, subpoena witnesses, administer
oaths, compel the production of books, docu-
ments, and records, . . . .” Further,
the resolution set forth,

1, The reference to Article III, Section 2,
of the constitution is without doubt a mis-
print. ‘That section pertains to apportion-
ment of the legislature; whereas, Sec-
tion 11 of that same article was obvious-
ly intended, for it provides :

“Bither house, during the session, may
punish by imprisonment any person not
a member who shall have been guilty of
disrespect, or disorderly or contemptuous
behavior; but such imprisonment shall
not exceed ten days for each offense.”

2. La.R.S, 24:4 provides:
“A. Whenever the legislature or ei-

ther house of the legislature, or when-
ever any committee of either house or
any joint committee of both houses or
any sub-committee of any such commit-

toe, which committee, joint committee or

. .. that failure to comply with any”
order of the committee issued in accord-
ance with or under authority of this
Resolution, refusal to testify, or any act
of disrespect of or disorderly or con-
temptuous behavior before the committee:
shall constitute contempt of the committee
and the committee, through its counsel,
shall have the power and authority to in-
stitute proceedings in any court of.
competent jurisdiction for the punishment
thereof in accordance with the penalties
fixed by Article III, Section II (sic) t of
the Louisiana Constiiition and, . .
that in addition to the power and author-
ity of the committee to punish for con~
tempt as provided in Article III, Section
II (sic) of the Constitution, the committee
also shall have the power and authority
to invoke the provisions of RS. 24:4
through R.S. 24:6? in order to subject

sub-committee has been specifically and
expressly granted the subpoena power,
has summoned any person as a witness
to give testimony or to produce papers
or other evidence upon any matter un-
der inquiry before such house, commit-
tee, joint committee or sub-committee,
such person shall be guilty of contempt
of the legislature if he or she

“(1) willfully defaults by failing to
appear or to produce papers or other evi-
dence, as ordered, or

“(2) having appeared, refuses to take
the oath or affirmation of a witness,
or .

“(8) having appeared,. refuses to an-
swer any question pertinent to the ques-
tion under inquiry.

“B, Whoever is found guilty of con-
tempt of the legislature under the pro-

AST

..persons- guilty of contempt of the com-
mittee to the penalties provided for there-
in.

The committee was required” by the
‘resolution to submit its final report and
recommendations to the legislature and the
Governor not later than thirty days prior
to the day on which the 1971 legislature
convened in regular session.

During the month of May 1970 the com-
“mittee began its investigations, holding a
series of hearings at which many witnesses
testified. At these hearings defendant
Strain, an elected Representative to the
legislature from Caddo Parish, testified be-
‘fore the committee relative to an alleged
attempt to unlawfully influence his vote
during the 1970 session of the legislature.

visions of this section shall be punished
by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars or by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both,

“C. The provisions of R.S. 24:4
through R.S. 24:6 are hereby declared
to be supplemental to the powers of the
legislature and of the senate and of the
house of representatives to punish for .
contempt, and the legislature hereby re-
serves to itself and to the senate and
to the house of representatives all in-
herent and all constitutional powers to
punish for contempt.”

“La.R.S. 24:5 provides:

“Whenever a statement of facts alleged
to constitute contempt under R.S. 24:4 is
reported to either house of the legisla-
ture while the legislature is in session,
or whenever, while the legislature is
not in session, such statement is report-
ed to and filed with the president of the
senate or the speaker of the house of
representatives, said president or speak-

498

Subsequently, Strain made public state-
ments that he possessed evidence, including
tape recordings, relating to attempts to un-
lawfully influence his vote in the legislature
not previously presented to the committee.
Accordingly, on January 28, 1971, the com-
mittee issued a subpoena directed to Repre-
sentative Strain ordering his appearance
before the committee at a hearing to be
held on February 4, 1971 in Baton Rouge
and ordering him to bring with him certain
tape recordings and transcripts or excerpts
thereof.

Strain did not appear and did not produce
the documents, papers or recordings called

for. Whereupon the committee instituted

this proceeding in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish.

er, as the case may be, shall certify the _
statement to the district attorney of a

district where venue lies, as provided
in the general laws governing venue or
as provided by R.8. 24:6 in the case of
offenses defined in R.S. 24:4(A), and
the district attorney shall institute and
prosecute a criminal proceeding against
the accused for contempt of the legisla-
ture under the provisions of B.S. 24:4.”

La.R.S. 24:6 provides:

“Any other provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, any offense
defined by the provisions of R.S. 24:4
(A) shall be deemed to have been com-
mitted (1) in the parish where the sub-
poena issued, (2) in the parish where
the offender was served with the sub-
pocna or (3) in the parish where the
subpoena ordered the offender to give
testimony or to produce papers or other
evidence, and the trial of the offender
for such offense may take placs in any
of such parishes.” -

499

It is a rule to show cause why Strain should
not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the
committee and the legislature. The com-
mittee is represented in these proceedings

by its counsel.

Strain filed a number of exceptions, all
of which were overruled, The trial judge
‘then held Strain in contempt of the com-
mittee-and the legislature, sentencing him to
jail for ten days, execution of the sentence
to await’ further orders of the Court,

‘An appeal to the First Circuit was dis-
missed. The court reasoned it had no ap-
pellate jurisdiction in the matter. La.App.,
248 So.2d 105, Strain applied for certiorari
‘to review the, judgment of the Court of
Appeal and, made separate application to
review the judgment of contempt rendered
by the trial court.

Both applications are
granted. .

A holding that the Court of Appeal has
appellate jurisdiction would ordinarily re-
sult in a remand to that court to consider
We will therefore first
of the First
Circuit’s finding that it had no appellate
jurisdiction in this contempt proceeding.

the case on appeal.
consider the correctness

The contention that the Court of Appeal
has appellate jurisdiction is based upon the
argument that Article VII, Section 29, of
the Louisiana Constitution grants to courts
of appeal ‘appellate jurisdiction over “all
civil and probate matters of which

500

the district courts throughout the state have
exclusive original jurisdiction.”

HM The fault of this argument lies in
its assumption that this contempt proceeding
is “civil” within the contemplation of
Article VII, Section 29, of the Constitu-
tion. Punishment for this offense under
Article IIT, Section 11, of the Constitution
is by imprisonment, not to exceed ten days.
Under Section 4 of Title 24 of the Revised
Statutes contempt of the legislature is.
punishable by a fine and by imprisonment
Since the
refusal to appear in answer to the subpoena
is not a direct contempt of the committee it
Ci. La.Code
Crim.Proc. art. 24. Like criminal con-
tempt of court, it is properly triable by a
rule to show cause alleging the facts con-
Cf, La.Code Crim.
Proc. art. 24, Trial for contempt is a sum-

of not more than six months.

is a constructive contempt.

stituting the contempt.

mary proceeding before the judge alone.
La.Const. art. 1 § 9; art. 7 § 41; La.Code
Crim.Proc. art. 24. These provisions re-
lating to contempt of court do not in terms
apply to tribunals other than courts. How-
ever, although the legislature is not a court,
the procedure prescribed for contempt of
court may be utilized for contempt of the
legislature when it does not contravene ex-
press statutory or constitutional provisions.
State ex rel. Milling v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 154 La. 752, 98 So.
175 (1923). Thus the legislature prescribed,
by adoption of the concurrent resolution,

‘501

that “the Committee, through its counsel,
shall have the power and authority to in-
-stitute proceedings in any court of com-
petent jurisdiction for the punishment there-
of in accordance with the penalties fixed by
Article III, Section If (sic 11) of the
Louisiana Constitution.”
legislature determined to submit all such
contempts of this the
judiciary for trial and punishment. These

In so doing the
committee to

contempt proceedings are therefore proper-
ly triable by the courts under the pro-
cedure adopted here. Section 5 of Title
24 of the Revised Statutes specifically pro-
vides that when contempt of the legislature
occurs “the district attorney shall institute
and prosecute a criminal proceeding against
the accused.”

As we pointed out in Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners v. Bates, 258
La. 1049, 249 So.2d 127 (1971), the similar-
ity between criminal contempt and civil con-
tempt is striking. We recognized there,
despite the similarity between civil and
criminal contempt, that criminal contempt
is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a
violation of law, a public wrong which is
punishable by fine and imprisonment or
both. In the words of MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES: “If such acts are not criminal,
‘we are in error as to the most fundamental
characteristic of crimes as that word has
been understood in English speech.”

Hl Among other distinctions, criminal
contempt differs from civil contempt in

502:

that criminal contempt involves a fixed
punishment for the transgression, while
civil contempt is merely a means of com-
pelling compliance with lawful orders of
the Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Bates, ibid,

court.

In the federal system contempt of
Congress is treated as a crime. By statute,
when a person is summoned to appear be-
fore a congressional committee or to pro-
duce documents and fails to do so, and the
failure is reported to either house in the
form of a statement of fact, the presiding
officer certifies the statement to the United
States attorney, who brings the matter be-
fore the grand jury. From there, assuming
a true bill is returned, it is handled like
other true bills, 2 U.S.C. § 194.

The strong the almost
implicit inference, to be gained is that con-
tempt is a criminal matter.

implication,

HM Aside from our finding that this
contempt proceeding is criminal, or at least”
criminal in nature, and, therefore, not ap-
pealable to the courts of appeal; for it is”
not a “civil” matter of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, La.Const.
art. 7 § 29, the rule has been well-founded in
our jurisprudence that a conviction’ and sen~
tence of contempt are not appealable in the ©
absence of a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision for review. Hattier v. Martinez; 197°
La. 121, 1 So.2d 51 (1941); State ex rel.
Milling vy. Louisiana Public Service’ Com-~

503

mission, 154 La. 752, 98 So. 175 (1923);
City of Gretna v. Rossner, 154 La. 117, 97
So. 335 (1923); State ex rel. Dowling v.
Ray, 150 La. 1030, 91 So. 443 (1922) and
State ex rel. Farmer v. Judge Parish Court
of Ouachita, 31 La.Ann, 116 (1879) ; Pearce
v. Dozier, 181 So.2d 432 (La.App.1965).
No statutory or constitutional provision for
review of this contempt proceeding having
been pointed out, and none having been
discovered in our research, this contempt
proceeding was not appealable and the
Court of Appeal properly dismissed the
appeal. 248 So.2d 105.

sam

Having concluded that the Court of
Appeal has no jurisdiction, the merits of
the trial court judgment must be reviewed.
under our supervisory jurisdiction.

HI Representative Strain filed an ex-
ception to the venue of the trial court,
alleging that the contempt rule was im-
properly brought in East Baton Rouge, for
he was a resident and domiciliary of Caddo
Parish, To support this contention he re-
lies upon the general rule of venue pre-
scribed in Article 42 of the Code of Civil
Procedure that an action against “an in-
dividual who is domiciled in the state shall
be brought in the parish of his domicile.”

Section 6 of Title 24 of the Revised
Statutes designates the venue for the trial
of contempt of the legislature and pro-
vides that failure to appear or to produce

504

papers or other evidence “shall be deemed to
have been committed (1) in the parish.
where the subpoena issued, (2) in the parish.
where the offender was served with the
subpoena or (3) in the parish where the:
subpoena ordered the offender to give
testimony or to produce papers or other
evidence.”

Representative Strain was served in
Caddo Parish with a subpoena issued in
East Baton Rouge Parish ordering him to
appear in East Baton Rouge Parish to give
testimony before the committee there. The
rule for contempt was therefore properly
tried in East Baton Rouge Parish under
(1) and (2) of Section 6 of Title 24 of the:
Revised Statutes as an exception to the
general rule of venue announced in Article:
42 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

It is contended, however, that Section 6
of Title 24 of the Revised Statutes may not.
serve as authority for venue in this con-
tempt proceeding, for the facts constituting
the contempt were not certified to the
district attorney as Section 5 of Title 24
requires. See footnote 2, supra.

‘The certification procedure for prose-
cution of contempt proceedings prescribed.
by Section 5 of Title 24 is not exclusive.
It is an available procedure but not a
sacramental one. Other procedure is pre--
scribed for the trial of constructive con-
tempt by Article 24 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. This latter procedure providing
for a rule to show cause was followed here..

505

Moreover, having decided that this con-
tempt proceeding was criminal in nature, the
vente under Article 611 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is “in the parish where
the offense has been committed.” In this
instance the appearance was ordered in East
Baton Rouge Parish and it was not com-
plied with, East Baton Rouge Parish is
therefore the proper venue under Article
611. This article is authority for the prose-
cution in East Baton Rouge Parish.

Assuming that the certification to the
district attorney prescribed by Section 5 was
not complied with, the prosecution is
authorized under Articles 24 and 611 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the pro-
vision of the resolution that “the Com-
mittee, through its counsel, shall have the
power and authority to institute proceedings
in any court of competent jurisdiction for
the punishment” of those in contempt of the
committee,

TIL

It is asserted that the resolution author-
ized the institution of contempt proceed-
ings under Article III, Section 11, of the
constitution which applies to persons “not
Therefore,
since Representative Strain is a member

a member” of the legislature.

of the legislature, the authorization cannot
apply to him.
constitutional provision applicable to mem-
bers of the legislature is Section 10 of
Article IIT which authorizes “each house”

Instead, it is argued, the

506

to “punish its members for disorderly con-
duct and contempt.” Then, without cit-
ing authority to support his position, Strain
argues that it can hardly be said that the
legislature intended to delegate to the com-
mittee (seven of its members—three from
the Senate and four from the House) the
power to imprison members.

Not only does the resolution’ manifest
the clear intention of the legislature to
delegate this authority to the committee,
we see no reason why it may not do so.
To the contrary, it appears to be the most’
feasible manner of carrying out the objects
and purposes of the resolution.

Hl Although the resolution authorized
institution of contempt proceeding against
persons “not a member” of the legislature
in accordance with Article III, Section 11,
of the Constitution, the resolution also au-
thorized the committee to invoke the pro-
visions of Section 4 of Title 24 of the Re-
vised Statutes. That section permits con-
tempt proceedings against “any person”
and Article III, Section 10, of the Constitu-
tion permits the legislature to punish “its
members” for contempt. Hence the com-
mittee’s authority to punish for contempt
extends to both members and nonmembers
alike.

HE Nor is it a violation of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers expressed in
Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution
for thé legislature to authorize the trial ‘of

507.

contempt of the legislature in the courts
‘of law. This is not a delegation of legis-
lative power. It is more properly a pro-
vision for asserting legislative power by
‘imposing the implementing authority upon
‘the judiciary. It is no more an improper
delegation of legislative power than it is
‘to require by legislation the trial in the
‘courts of crimes against the State.

Iv.

HM Representative Strain’s brief as-
sserts that the minutes of the committee
‘proceedings fail to reveal that the commit-
‘tee voted to institute this contempt prose-
cution and, therefore, the entire proceeding
is unauthorized and invalid. The commit-
‘tee’s brief replies that the record of the
meeting of the committee held on February
4, 1971 clearly reflects that a motion to in-
stitute contempt proceedings was made,
seconded and adopted unanimously.

The record before us does not contain a
‘copy of the committee minutes. There is,
therefore, no evidence to support Strain’s
‘contention, and we must find it unsupport-
‘ed by the record.

v.

Hl In 2 motion for summary judgment
Representative Strain alleges that on the
date (February 4, 1971) when he was
ordered to appear before the committee
jn the city of Baton Rouge, he, as chair-
‘man, was- conducting a hearing of the

508

Statewide Health Service Committee, a
committee established by House Concur-
rent Resolution No. 95 of the Extra-
ordinary Session of 1968. For this reason,
he argues, he could not be punished for
contempt. Without citing authority for his
position, he contends that members‘of the
legislature are exempt, that is, not subject
to the power of subpoena or any other ju-
dicial process, during terms of the legis-
lature or while in attendance at duly con-
stituted legislative committee hearings.

While Section 1 of Title 24 of the
Revised Statutes stays civil proceedings
against members of the legislature “dur-
ing their attendance at the sessions of
their respective houses,” it grants no such
exemption from subpoena or attendance at
a duly constituted legislative committee
hearing.

Iv.

Representative Strain contends that the
committee was without a cause of action in
this prosecution, for the resolution estab-
lishing the committee is broader than its
title. In this respect therefore the argu-
ment is that the resolution violates the con-
stitutional requirement that “Every statute
enacted by the Legislature shall embrace
but one object, and shall have, a title in-
dicative of its object.” La.Const. art. 3
§ 16.

The title of the resolution sets.forth that
the resolution is adopted “To establish a

509

organized -crime in Louisiana as it relates
to state and local government officials

. . +”, whereas the body of the act
authorizes the committee to undertake an
investigation into “corrupt and/or criminal
influences on the government . . . or
its officials.” Strain’s argument, as we un-
derstand it, is that he was subpoenaed
to appear before the committee to testify
concerning his public statements that im-
proper influence was sought to be applied
by certain persons to affect his vote on leg-
islation. Therefore, this conduct, author-
ized to be investigated by the body of the
resolution is broader than the title which
only. refers to investigation of organized

crime,

Hs This contention is without merit.
Article V, Section 17, of the Constitution
specifically declares that resolutions of the
legislature “may. empower legislative com-
mittees to administer oaths, to send for
persons and :papers, and generally make
legislative investigations effective.” We
know of no requirement that resolutions
under this authority must adhere to the
Title Body Clause of the Constitution.
The Title Body Clause deals with “every
statute” and a concurrent resolution does
not fall within the meaning of that consti-
tutional provision. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, we are of the opinion that au-
thority to investigate “organized crime” is
broad enough to include corrupt influenc-

Joint Legislative Committee to investigate

510

ing of government officials—a crime. La.
RS, 14:120. The sole question is who is
exerting the improper influence. It was.
proper for the committee to investigate to
determine whether the improper influence

was being exerted by “organized crime.”

VIL

‘The contention is made that the commit-
tee mistakenly relied upon reports of the
news media as a basis for committee in-
quiry into the public statements of Repre-
sentative Strain, without making an inde-
pendent investigation to determine whether
the facts warranted the issuance of the
subpoena, This procedure, it is claimed,
has a chilling effect upon Strain’s free-
dom of expression guaranteed to citizens
by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Reliance is placed up-
on the holding in Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22
(1965), to support this position.

In effect, the argument proceeds, the ac-
tion of the committee places all persons
on notice that they are subject to repeat-
ed subpoenas. to testify and appear and
prove all charges they make against public
officials. In substance, it is asserted the
procedure has the effect of suppressing
criticism of public officials, and, when ap-
plied to an elected official, the procedure
hinders the performance of his “constitu-
tional duty” to call to the public’s attention
all information in his possession relating
to improper conduct of public officials.

Bil

The Dombrowski Case is not authority
for Strain’s position? There a statute im-
posed criminal penalties for subversive ac-
tivities. Plaintiffs, having been indicted
under the statute, sought, in federal court,
a judgment declaring the broad sweep of
An in-
junction was also prayed for to prevent

the statute to be unconstitutional.

its enforcement. It was alleged there that
failure to enjoin the prosecution would re-
sult in a substantial loss or impairment of
freedom of expression if Dombrowski and
the others threatened with prosecution must
await the state court’s disposition and ul-
timate review by the United States Su-
preme Court of any adverse determination.
In remanding the case to the trial court,
the United States Supreme Court declared
that the statute making it a felony to par-
ticipate in the formation or management
or to contribute to the support of “any sub-
versive organization,” as defined in the
statute, was invalid on the ground of vague-
ness.

HMM Clearly this holding has no bear-
ing upon Strain’s refusal to obey the com-
mittee subpoena, We fail to see how an
order to testify before the committee con-
cerning statements Strain made publicly
imputing improper influences to govern-
ment officials is an impairment of freedom
of expression. This subpoena was not the
result of ‘an indiscriminate dragnet proce-

3. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief
Against State Court Proceedings: ‘The

512

dure. Strain, by his public statements,
furnished probable cause for the committee
to believe that he possessed information
which was pertinent to the purposes of the
investigation for which the committee was

created,

Often those who are possessed of the
most vital information relating to investi-
gations preliminary to legislation are not
always willing to testify. For this rea-
son, most states, including Louisiana, have
enacted statutes investing legislative com-
mittees with subpoena and contempt pow-
ers, These statutes are necessary to ef-
fectuate the investigative power and they
are within expressed constitutional author-
ity. La.Const. art. 5 § 17; La.R.S. 24:2-6.

HH it is unquestionably the duty of
citizens, especially public officials, to co-
operate in a legislative investigation into
organized crime and improper influencing
of government officials. In fulfilling this
duty it is their unremitting obligation to
respond to subpoenas, to promote, uphold
and respect the dignity of the legislature
and its committees and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the province of
proper investigation. This, of course, as-
sumes that the constitutional rights of wit-
nesses will be respected by the legislature
as they are in courts of justice. Witnesses
cannot be compelled to give evidence

Significance of Dombrowski,

48 TexL.
Rev. 585 (1970). .

513

against themselves. They cannot be sub-
jected to unreasonable search and seizure,
nor can First Amendment freedoms of
speech be abridged. Cf. Watkins vy. Unit-
ed States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1
LEd.2d 1273 (1957).

For the reasons assigned, the judgment
of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, is
affirmed, and the judgment of the Nine-
teenth Judicial District Court holding Rep-
resentative Strain in contempt of the Com-
mittee is likewise affirmed.

SANDERS, J,, dissents in part and con-
curs in part with written reasons.

BARHAM, J, dissents.

TATE, J., dissents and assigns written

reasons.

DIXON, J., dissents in part and concurs
in part with reasons.

SANDERS, Justice (concurring in part
and dissenting in part).

In my opinion, this case is appealable to
the Court of Appeal and, under established
procedure, should be remanded to that court
for appellate review.

‘We have long recognized that the right
of appeal is an important safeguard in the
administration of justice. Appeals are fa-
vored by the courts. The dismissal of an

514

appeal should be ordered only for a clear
and substantial cause. Kirkeby-Natus Cor-
poration v. Campbell, 250 La, 868, 199 So.
2d 904 (1967); Emmons v. Agricultural
Insurance Company, 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d
594 (1963); Wischer v. Madison Realty
Company, 242 La. 334, 136 Soi2d:62 (1961) ;
Hood, The Right of Appeal, 29 La.L.Rev.
498 (1969).

In Kirkeby-Natus Corporation v. Camp-

bell, supra, we stated:

“On many occasions in our jurisprudence
we have declared that appeals are fa-
vored by the courts; that they should
be dismissed only for substantial causes;
and that unless the grounds urged for
dismissal are free from doubt appeals
will be maintained.”

Article 2083 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure provides:

“An appeal may be taken from a final
judgment rendered in causes in which ap-
peals are given by law whether rendered
after hearing or by default, and from
an interlocutory judgment which may
cause irreparable injury.”

Since the contempt adjudication in the
present action is a final judgment, it is
appealable as a matter of right unless the
law elsewhere excludes such appeals. See
Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La, 839, 253 So.2d
200 (1971); Succession of Damico, 161
La. 725, 109 So. 402 (1925).

515

Article 7, Section 10 of the Louisiana
Constitution gives the Supreme Court ap-
pellate jurisdiction in “criminal cases.”
Article 7, Section 29 gives the Courts of
Appeal jurisdiction in “all civil matters
+ + « Of which the district courts
throughout the state have exclusive orig-
inal jurisdiction.” Hence, for appellate
jurisdiction, the case must be classified as
either a criminal case or a civil matter,

In my opinion, it is not a criminal case,
because Section 10 governing the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court refers to con-
victions for statutory crimes.

Although it has unique features, a con-
tempt adjudication of this kind should be
classified as civil for appellate purposes.
The Court of Appeal in the present case
so classified it, but found that the dis-
trict court’s jurisdiction was non-exclusive.
The Court of Appeal apparently held that
the Legislature’s contempt authority negat-
ed the district courts’ exclusive jurisdic-
tion of this type of proceeding.

As used in the constitutional provision,
turisdiction is the legal power and au-
thority of a court to hear and determine
an action or proceeding. See LSA-C.C.P.
Art. 1.
concurrent. For concurrent jurisdiction to

Exclusive, of course, means non-

exist, another court must have been grant-
ed the legal power and authority to enter-
tain the same type of action. It must have
jurisdiction over the same subject matter.

SLE

‘The obvious purpose of limiting appeals in
this category to matters within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the district courts was
to deny appeals in civil matters involving
one hundred dollars or less, of which the
Justices of the Peace have concurrent ju-
See Art. 7, Sect. 48, Louisiana
Constitution, The investiture of contempt

risdiction.

authority in the Legislature does not ren-
der the district court’s jurisdiction concur-
rent. Since the district courts are the
only courts with original jurisdiction over
the subject matter, that jurisdiction is ex-
clusive.

I am of the opinion, therefore, that the
contempt judgment is appealable, My con-
clusion in this regard is supported by sev-
eral decisions of the intermediate courts
of appeal. See, e. g., Asp, Incorporated v.
Capital Bank & Trust Company (Joint
Legislative Committee v. Broussard; Joint
Legislative Committee v. Pinell) La.App.,
174 So.2d 809; Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Heiman, La.App.,
230 So.2d 405.

In reaching this determination, I am
aware of the jurisprudential rule denying
an appeal from contempt adjudications for
direct affronts to the dignity of a court,
in which sentence is imposed to vindicate
the authority of the court and protect the
judicial process, See State ex rel. Milling
y. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
154 La. 752, 98 So. 175 (1923); State ex
rel. Dowling v. Ray, 150 La, 1030, 91 So.

S00 51s

443; (1922); White v. Louisiana & Ar-
kansas Railway Company, La.App., 94 So.
2d 95 (1957); State ex rel, Connerly v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board, La.App.,
9 So.2d 826 (1942) ; 17 Tul.L.Rev. 655, 656-
657 (1943).

In my opinion, however, the rationale of
these decisions is inapplicable here. The
present action is an independent adversary
proceeding between two litigants, The pro-
ceeding involves both the law and the facts.
The facts must be established in accordance
with regular procedures, As in other civ-
il matters, the right of appeal is an essen-
tial safeguard.

I note, however, that a majority of the
Court has concluded that the Court of Ap-
peal has no appellate jurisdiction in the
matter. Hence, it becomes necessary for
me to record my view on the merits, On
the merits, I concur with the majority
in affirming the judgment of contempt ren-
dered by the Nineteenth Judicial District

Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully
concur in part and dissent in part.

DIXON, Justice (concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

I concur in that part of the majority
opinion which holds that the Court of Ap-
peal is without jurisdiction over an appeal
from a conviction of contempt of the legis-
lature.

However, I must respectfully dissent
from affirming the conviction.

There is little doubt, in my opinion, that
the legislature could constitutionally pro-
vide for the punishment of a member in the
manner provided in the concurrent resolu-
tion here involved, under the grant of pow-
er of Article 5, § 17 and Article 3, § 10
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.

But the legislature made no such pro-
vision. Its only reference to contempt
punishment cited Article III, Section II,
which we believe means Article IIT, Sec-
tion 11, which deals only with punishment
of non-members of the legislature. This
reference, and the failure to mention the
punishment of members under Article 3,
§ 10, is convincing that the legislature did
not intend that this committee be delegated
the power to punish a member for con-
tempt. The judgment of the district court
ought to be reversed.

TATE, Justice (dissenting).

The writer concurs in that portion of
Justice SANDERS’ dissent to the effect
that, for the purposes of appellate jurisdic-
tion, the present case must be classified
as an original civil proceeding and, thus,
appealable to the court of appeal. The ma-
jority errs, in my opinion, in holding other-
wise

If, however, we reach the merits, I like-
wise cannot agree with the opinion of the

|

519

majority of this court.
overlooks the limited contempt
granted by the legislature as a whole to this
particular committee through the instant
resolution.

Our reasoning
power

As the majority opinion quotes, the reso-
lution grants the committee (1) the aw-
thority to file contempt proceedings in any
court of competent jurisdiction for punish-
ment in accordance with Article III, Sec-
tion 11 of the Constitution and (2) “in
addition to” this power, the power to in-
voke the provisions of La.R.S. 24:4 through
24:6 for punishment of contempts of the
legislature.

The latter power may be briefly dis-
posed of, as it was not used. The statute
in question, quoted in footnote 2 of the
majority opinion, authorizes the legislature
to certify instances of contempt to the
district attorney for criminal prosecution.
A criminal proceeding of this nature, to be
brought by the district attorney, is not at
all involved here—instead, the legislative
committee, through its own private counsel
(noé the district attorney), instituted a rule
to show cause why Dr. Strain should not
be held in contempt.

The legislative committee thus did not
use the La.R.S, 24:4 remedy authorized by
the resolution. (The cited statutory rem-
edy for contempt is expressly declared “to
1, (Italics the writer’s.) The present, being

a civil proceeding for procedural purposes
(since not regulated by Code of Criminal

520

be supplemental to the powers of the legis-
lature and of the senate and of the house of
representatives to punish for contempt.”
LaRS. 24:4, subd. C as quoted in foot-
note 2, majority opinion.)

Instead, the committee sought to avail
itself, in the words of the resolution cre-
ating it, of “the power and authority to in-
stitute proceedings in any court of com-

petent jurisdiction* for the punishment
thereof [i. e, of a contempt] in accordance

with the penalties fixed by Article III,
Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution”.
See resolution, quoted in majority opinion.
However, Art. III, Section 11 authorizes
the punishment only of “any person not a
member” of the legislature.

Strain, a member of the legislature, can-
not be held in contempt by reason of any
authority emanating from this constitution-
al provision, it seems to me, for the provi-
sion expressly authorizes punishment for
contempt only of persons not members of
the legislature.

In failing to agree, the majority points
out that the resolution additionally au-
thorizes punishment by criminal prosecu-
tion under La.R.S. 24:4, which permits
criminal punishment (but with the safe-
guards of criminal law) of “any” person.
Nevertheless, the present contempt pro-
ceeding was mot a criminal prosecution

Procedure), the proper venue is the de-

fendant’s domicile (Caddo Parish). La.
Code Civil Procedure Art, 42.

521

brought under the cited statute. With due
respect, I find to be a non sequitur the
conclusion that, because of this statute
(prosecution under which was tot here
utilized and which is not here involved),
the present contempt proceedings were
properly brought against a legislator by
virtue of authority derived from Article
ITI, Section 11 (which authorizes contempt
punishment only of non-legislators).

I therefore join in Justice DIXON’s dis-
The legislative intent
expressed by the resolution, especially its
reliance on Article ITI, Section 11, does not
seem to contemplate summary punishment

sent'as to this issue.

by rule of legislators.

Likewise, I should add, I cannot com-
pletely “disregard Representative Strain’s
defense that he was not required to attend
the present’ committee’s hearing becatise, on
the same date, he was required by his legis-
lative status to attend a hearing of another
legislative: committee (one which as chair-
man‘he had called for the same date at a
ditferest location in the state.)

‘This contention seeks to raise ‘the issue
that one committee of the legislature can-
not disrupt or prevent hearings of another,
by subpoenaing as witnesses the legislator-
The majority, it

seems to me, does not satisfactorily reject
~this contention by simply stating one leg-
islative committee can hold members of
another in contempt (for failing to re-

wmembers of the latter.

spond to subpoenas for’a meeting conflict-
ing with their own) because the legislature
itself was not in session. If, for instance,
Dr. Strain’s committee had subpoenaed the
present committee’s members to appear be-
fore it on the same date as the present
hearing, then they would be in contempt
of Dr. Strain’s committee, under the mia-
jority reasoning—while, at the same time,
Dr. Strain would remain in contempt of
the present committee for failing to appear ,
at its hearing of the same date.

Dr, Strain’s solemn assertion that this
(self-created) legislative duty prevented
his appearance as a witness at the present
hearing previously called for the same time
is somewhat ingenuous and jesuitical and
may possibly lack merit (for reasons not
yet discovered by the majority or me) un-~
der the facts of this case. The argument
nevertheless points out a fundamental rea~
son why our state constitution provides
differently for contempt punishment of
legislators (Art. III, Section 10) and of
non-members of the legislature (Art. III,
Section 11)—the overriding importance,
despite possible abuses, of protecting the
independence of legislators in their repre-
sentation of their people, and of protect-.
ing members of the legislature from pun-
ishment or harassment by others of the
legislature (whether the latter be the ma-
jority or minority) because of differences
of values and views in the performances
of legislative duties.

523

Vy shate the view of our majority that it
is the unquestioned duty of all citizens,
whether they be legislators or not, to co-
operate in legitimate legislative investiga-
tions such as the present. I cannot, how-
ever, simply because I disapprove of the
non-cooperative conduct in question, over-
look the provisions of our state constitu-
tion and of the present legislative resolu-
tion which, in my view, forbid our sanc-
tioning the present summary shortcuts in
procedure and logic.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

_ ON REHEARING IN NO. 51605.

HAMLIN, Justice:

Rehearing was grantcd in this case, com-
bined on original hearing with Case No.
51,567 of the docket of this Court, rehear-
ing denied, in order that we might recon-
sider some of the legal issues raised and
adjudicated on original hearing.

On February 4, 1971, the Joint Legisla-
tive Committee of the Legislature of the
State of Louisiana, created by Senate Con-
current Resolution No. 31, as amended by
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 76 of
the Louisiana Legislature of 1970 (here-
inafter referred to as the Committee),
through its chairman, instituted this con-
tempt action in the 19th Judicial District
{. “Bither house, during the session, may

punish by imprisonment any person not

a member who shall have been guilty of
disrespect, or disorderly or contemptuous

524

Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State
of Louisiana, praying that:

“(1) A rule nisi issue herein directed to
the defendant, Representative James R.
Strain, ordering him to show cause, at a |
time and date to be fixed by this Honor-
able Court, why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt of the Joint Legislative
Committee and of the Legislature for fail-
ure to appear and for failure to produce
documents, papers and records.

“(2) In due course defendant be ad-
judged guilty of contempt of the Joint
Legislative Committee and the Legislature,
and be punished according to law.”

After trial on the merits, numcrous ex-
ceptions filed hy the defendant having been
overruled, the district court on March 8,
1971, adjudged James R. Strain (Dr.) in
contempt of the Committee and of the
Louisiana Legislature by reason of failure
to respond to a subpoena and to a subpoena
duces tecum served upon him and requiring
him to appear before the Committee at a
The trial
court ordered that as punishment for such

hearing on February 4, 1971.

contempt, the defendant be confined to the
East Baton Rouge Parish Jail for a period
of ten days in accordance with Art. Il,
Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921,4 and Senate
Concurrent Resolution No, 31, as amended

behavior; but such imprisonment shall ©

not exceed ten days for cach offense.”
Art. TIT, Sec. 11, La.Const, of 1921.

525

by Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 76
of the Louisiana Legislature of 1970, said
period of confinement to commence upon
Defendant
appealed to the Court of Appeal, which

further order of the court.

court dismissed his appeal.

We granted defendant’s application to
review the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peal, First Circuit, which dismissed his
appeal, 248 So.2d 105, 259 La. 697, 252
So.2d 433, No. 51,567 of the docket of
this Court, as well as his application to
review the judgment, supra, of contempt
rendered by the trial court. 248 So.2d 105,
259 La. 698, 252 So.2d 433, No. 51,605
of the docket of this Court.

On original hearing, we affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, supra,
and as stated supra denied rehearing; we
affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
supra, finding James R. Strain guilty of
contempt.

_ Herein, defendant-applicant for rehear-
ing urges:

1. “It was an error to hold, that not-
withstanding the Declinatory Exception to
the Venue filed by Representative James R.
Strain [Representative Strain], a domicili-
ary of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, that this
matter was properly heard by the Civil
District Court in East Baton Rouge Par-

2. “It was also an error to hold that
the District Court had the authority to

526

punish Representative Strain for contempt
of the Legislature.”

3. It was error not to issue an order
for missing parts of the record.

4. “The majority opinion erred in hold-
ing that Strain was not immune from ap-
pearing at the Committce meeting just be-
cause he was conducting his own Legisla-
tive Committee Meeting of the Statewide
Health Service Committee, which was also
a joint legislative committee.”

The Committee urges that the judgment
of the district court should be affirmed.

Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 31,
signed May 21, 1970 by the Lt. Governor,
President of the Senate, and the Speaker
of the House, provided in part:

“WHEREAS, a number of unsubstanti-
ated allegations have been made of criminal
influences upon the government of this
state and its political subdivisions and that
certain elected and/or appointed officials
and employees of the state and its political
subdivisions have been and/or are being
influenced by members of organized crime;
and

“WHEREAS, the responsibilities of the
Legislature to the citizens of Louisiana de-
mand that allegations of this kind not be
allowed to stand without investigation to
determine their veracity and to present the
actual facts of the situation to the people
and, if necessary, to the proper law en-
forcement officials for action, as well as

.to provide information upon .which the

Legislature may take such steps as are re-
quired to protect the people of Louisiana
against any influences upon the govern-
‘ment which serves them which can be at-
‘tributed to organized crime or, if none
‘exist, then to make known this fact in
order to restore public confidence in gov-
ernment and in the public officials who

“serve it,

“THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by
the Senate of the Legislature of Louisiana,
the House of Representatives thereof con-
curring, that there is hereby created a joint
legislative committee which shall be com-
posed of seven members, three of whom
shall be appointed by the President of the
Senate from the membership of the Senate
and. four of whom shall be appointed by
the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives from the membership of the House,
and which shall undertake an immediate
eomprehensive, in-depth investigation, in-
-quity and hearings into all matters relating
to, the question of influences on the gov-
ernment of this state and/or its political
subdivisions and the officials and em-
ployees of either.

ee kk

. “BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that
there is hereby created an advisory com-
mittee which shall have authority to at-
tend all meetings, public and private, of
the joint legislative committee herein cre-
ated, and shall consult, advise with and

527 . Le 528

offer assistance, consultative services and
recommendations to said joint legislative
committee.

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that
the advisory committee above provided for
shall be composed of the chairman of the
Louisiana Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice; the respective deans of the Louisiana
State University Law School, Tulane Uni-
versity Law School, Southern University
Law School and Loyola University Law
School; the president of the Louisiana
AFL-CIO and the president of the Louisi-
ana State Chamber of Commerce.

oe Ok

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that
the committee shall have the power and
authority to hold hearings, subpoena wit
nesses, administer oaths, compel the pro-
duction of books, documents, and records,
papers public or private, and to do all other
things necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses of this Resolution, * * *

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that
failure to comply with any order of the
committee issued in accordance with or
under authority of this Resolution, refusal
to testify, or any act of disrespect of or
disorderly or contemptuous behavior be-
fore the committee shall constitute con-
tempt of the committee and the committee,
through its counsel, shall have the power
and authority to institute proceedings in

| 530

ariy cotirt of competent jurisdiction for the committee shall in like manner, be pun-—
punishment thereof in accordance with the ished in accordance with the laws of the”

penalties fixed by Article III, Section 11 state [Emphasis ours]

of the Louisiana Constitution, and, in addi-

tion, false swearing or perjury before the

2.° Phe’ Committee's petition for a rule to
show cause why Representative Strain
should not be punished for contempt al-

“leged in part:

“The Committee is required by the
Resolution to submit its final report and
recommendations to the Legislature and
the Governor not Jater than thirty days
prior to the day on which the 1971 Leg-
islature convenes in regular session.

“6.

“Since May, 1970. the Committee has
been conducting its investigation and has
held a’ series of hearings at which ‘many
witnesses have testified.

‘Representative James R. Strain * * *
has. previously appeared before the Com-
mittee, and. testified, under oath, relative
to an alleged attempt or attempts to un-
lawfully influence his vote during the
1970 session of the Legislature.

“8,

“Subsequent to that- appearance, the
Committee is informed and believes, and
upon such information and belief alleges,
that Representative Strain has publicly
stated that he has in his possession cor-
tain evidence, including tape recordings,
related to that matter, which he did not
previously present to the Committee.

: «9,

“On January 28, 1971, the Committee
issued a subpoena directed to Representa-
tive Strain, ordering him to appear be-
fore the Committee at two o'clock P.M.
on Thursday, February 4, 1971, at the
State Capitol Building in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana,

. “10.

“That subpoena was personally served

upon Representative Strain on January

“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that

in addition to the power and authority of

29, 1971, by an officer of the Louisiana
State Police.

“Ah

“On January 28, 1971, the Committee
issued a subpoena duces tecum directed~
to Representative Strain, ordering him to”
appear before the Committee at two *
o'clock P.M. on Thursday, February 4,-
1971, at the State Capitol Builditg,-
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and to bring”
with him and produce the following docu-
ments, papers or records :

“(a) Any and all recordings, including

tape recordings, of conversations which

may have occurred between Representa-
tive James Strain and ‘any of the fol-
lowing persons:

“Governor John J. McKeithen,

“Representative Carl Wagner,

“Mr. Victor Bussie. .

“(b) Any and all transcripts or ex-

corpts thereof of the aforesaid record-

ings.
“2,

“The subpoena duces tecum was per-
sonally served upon Representative Strain
on January 29, 1971, by an officer of
the Louisiana State Police.

“18,

“At two o'clock P.M, on ‘Thursday,
February 4, 1971, the Committee met in
public session at the State Capitol Build-
ing in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, at which
time Representative Strain did not appear
and did not produce the documents, papers
or records called for.

“14,
“Representative Strain is therefore in
contempt of the Committee and the Leg- .
islature.”

534

the committee to punish for contempt as
provided in Article III, Section 11 of the
Constitution, the committee also shall have
the power and authority to invoke the pro-
visions of R.S, 24:4 through R.S. 24:6 in
order to subject persons guilty of contempt
of the committce to the penalties provided
for therein?

Kk ORD

"Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 76,
signed June 9, 1970 by the Lt. Governor,

3. La.RS. 24:4 provides:

“A. Whenever the legislature or either
house of the legislature, or whenever any
committee of cither house or any joint
committee of both houses or any sub-com-
mittee of any such committee, which com-
mittee, joint committee or sub-committee
has been specifically and expressly grant-
ed the subpocna power, has summoned any
person as @ witness to give testimony or
to produce papers or other evidence upon
any matter under inquiry before such
house, committee, joint committee or sub-
committee, such person shall be guilty
of contempt of the legislature if he or she

“(1) willfully defaults by failing to ap-
pear or to produce papers or other evi-
dence, as ordered, or .

“(2) having appeared, refuses to take
the oath or affirmation of a witness, or

(3) having appeared, refuses to answor
any question pertinent to the question un-
der inquiry. [Emphasis ours]

“B, Whoever is found guilty of con-
tempt of the legislature under the provi-
sions of this section shall be punished by
‘a fine of not more than one thousand dol-
lars or by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both.

“0. The provisions of RS. 24:4
through RS. 24:6 are hereby declared
to be supplemental to the powers of the
legislature and of the senate and of the
house of representatives to punish for con-
tempt, and the legislature hereby reserves
to itself and to the senate and to the

President of the Senate, and Speaker of

532

the House, spelled out the powers of the
It provided: “that
the members of the advisory committee
* * % shall have the right and authority
to freely and orally propound questions

Advisory Committee.

to all witnesses appearing before the said
joint legislative committee to the same ex-
tent as other members of said committee so
long as same is conducted in an orderly

and parliamentary fashion.”

house of representatives all inherent and
all constitutional powers to punish for
contempt.” (Emphasis ours)

La.R.S. 24:5 provides:

“Whenever a statement of facts alleged
to constitute contempt under R.S. 24:4
is reported to either house of the Jegisla~
ture while the legislature is in session,
or whenever, while the legislature is not
in session, such statement is reported to
and filed with the president of the senate
or tho speaker of the house of represen-
tatives, said president or speaker, as the
case may be, shall certify the statement
to the district attorney of a district
whore venue lies, as provided in the gen-
eral laws governing venue or as provid-
ed by RS. 24:6 in the case of offenses
defined in B.S, 24:4(A), and the district
attorney shall institute and prosecute a
criminal proceeding against the accused
for contempt of the legislature under the
provisions of R.S. 24:4.”

La.R.S. 24:6 provides:

“Any other provisions of law to the con-
trary notwithstanding, any offense de-
fined by the provisions of R.S. 24:4(A)
shall be deemed to have been committed
(4) in the parish where the subpoena is-
sued, (2) in the parish where the offender
was served with the subpoena or (3) in
the parish where the subpoena ordered the
offender to give testimony or to produce
papers or other evidence, and the trial of
the offender for such offense may take
place in any of such parishes.”

533

HM Doring argument on rehearing in
this Court, the question was raised as to
whether the present matter is now moot
because of the fact that the Committee is
no longer in existence, and defendant, if
permitted and willing to do so, would no
longer be able to purge himself of contempt
by giving testimony and producing records,
tapes, etc.

We do not find that this matter is moot.
Defendant’s disobedience was committed
during the life of the Committce, and the
sentence of the district court was rendered
during March, 1971.
attempt to purge himself; at all times, he

Defendant made no

refused to comply with the Committee’s
demands. He made no attempt to purge
himself after the trial court sentenced him;
he made no attempt to purge himself be-
fore the 1971 Legislature adjourned. He
appealed his sentence to the Court of Ap-
peal; he applied to this Court for writs.
His counsel argued the case hercin on orig-
inal -hearing; his counsel applied for this
rehearing and appeared on the day of argu-
ment, urging the errors, supra, assigned to
our original opinion and decree.

Assignment of Error No. 1, supra, avers
that it was error for the Civil District
Court in East Baton Rouge Parish to hear

4. “Hach house shall be the judge of the
qualifications, election, and returns of its
own members, choose its own officers,
except the president of the Senate, de-
termine the rules of its procedure, not’ in-
consistent with the provisions of this Con-

Le = = 534

this matter. Because of findings which we
shall make
thorough manner in which this assignment

infra, and because of the
was treated in our original opinion, there
is no need for a further discussion of
The 19th Judicial District Court,
Parish of East Baton Rouge, under the
instant facts and circumstances, was vested

venue.

with jurisdiction to hear this contempt
proceeding and thereafter impose sentence.

Dr. Strain next contends (Assignment of
Error No. 2) that the 19th Judicial Dis-
trict Court did’not have authority to punish
him for contempt of the Legislature. He
argues that as a member of the Legislature,
he was exempt from the provisions of Art.
IIT, Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921; he further
argues that LSA-R.S. 24:4 through LSA-
RS. 24:6 are inapplicable here, for, by
their terms (R.S. 24:4C), the Legislature re- _
served unto itself and to the Senate and to
the House of Representatives all inherent
and all constitutional powers to punish for
contempt. This reserved power as it re-
lates to Dr. Strain as a Representative, de-
fendant asserts, is embodied within Art.
TIT, Sec. 10, La.Const. of 19214 He fur-
ther asserts:

“Since the power of the
courts to punish for contempt is limited by
Jaw [1921 Constitution of the State of

stitution, and may punish its members
for disorderly conduct and contempt, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its members elected, may expel a mem-
ber.” Art. II, See. 10, La.Const. ‘of
1921.

585 . —— Es 536

Louisiana, Article XIX, Section 17] and
‘since the power to adjudge one to be
guilty of contempt and to order his con-
finement is a power which can only be
exercised in strict conformity with the
rales of procedure which the laws of a state
provide as a prerequisite to the validity of
‘an adjudication of contempt [Ex parte
Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 P. 725, 735],
Representative Strain could not have been
guilty of contempt of the legislature for the
only reference in Senate Concurrent Reso-
lution No. 31 to contempt punishment was
‘to Article III, Section II (sic.), which deals
only with punishment of non-members of
the legislature and R.S. 24:4 through 24:6,
which, even if applicable to legislators, was
Rot used.”

Initially, we shall discuss the nature, le~
gality, and effect of legislative resolutions.

“*  *& A resolution is not a law or
an ordinance but merely the form in
-which a legislative body expresses a de-
termination or directs a particular ac-
tion. An ordinance prescribes a perma~
nent rule for conduct of government,
while a resolution is of special or tempo-
rary character. * * *” Kalamazoo
Municipal Util. Ass’n v. City of Kalama-
z00, 345 Mich. 318, 76 N.W.2d 1 (1956).

“Generally, it may be said that a legisla-
tive body uses a resolution to express an
opinion or purpose with respect to a
given matter or thing and it is tempo-

rary in nature, while a law is intended to
direct and control permanently matters
applying to persons and things in gen-
eral. This definition has been variously
expressed in: City of Cape Girardeau y.
Fougeu, 30 Mo.App. 551, 557; Ex parte
Hague, 104 N.J.Eq. 31, 144 A.,546, 559;
Chasis v. Tumulty, 8 N.J. 147, 84 Aad
445, 449[3]; Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa.
165, 200 A. 601, 604; Steward v. Rust,
221 Ark. 286, 252 S.W.2d 816; Wilder
v. American Produce Co., Tex.Civ.App.,
147 S.W.2d 936, 938.” State v. Atter-
bury, 300 S.W.2d 806 Mo. (1957).

“ Resolution’ is also defined as meaning
a suggestion or direction in writing, con-
curred in by the two houses of the as-
sembly, if there be two houses, or passed
by one house, if there be but one, and
not submitted to the executive for his
approval, * * #*

“A. resolution is variously described as
being administrative or ministerial in
character; special and temporary in
character. It deals with matters of a
special or temporary character, and has

only a temporary effect.

“A. resolution is not a law, but is ‘the
mere expression of an opinion, or mere-
ly the form in which the legislative body
expresses an opinion, and is used when-
ever the legislative body passing it wishes
merely to express an opinion concerning
some given matter or thing. It is, gen-

0538

erally, not an order, but a mere expres-
sion of view on which an order issues
to make it effective.’ 77 C.J.S. Resolu-
tion, p. 314.

“‘A resolution or order is not a law,
‘ut merely the form in which the legisla-
tive body expresses an opinion, * * *
mere ministerial acts may be in the
form of resolutions.’ Other jurisdictions
have been even more explicit in stating
that an oral motion is a form of resolu-
tion. Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis.
632, 145 N.W. 239, says: ‘An oral mo-
tion passed by the common council of a
city thereupon becomes a resolution.’ It
was likewise so stated in City of Green
Bay v. Brauns, 50 Wis. 204, 6 N.W. 503.”
Steward v. Rust, 252 $.W.2d 816 (Ark.
1952).

Art. V, Sec. 17, La.Const. of 1921, pro-
vides:

“Orders, votes and resolutions of either
or both houses of the Legislature, affect-
ing the prerogatives and duties thereof,
or relating to adjournment, to amend-
ments to the Constitution of this State
or of the United States, to the investiga-
- tion of public officers, and the like, shall
not require the signature of the Gov-
ernor; and such resolutions, orders and
votes may empower legislative commit-
tees to administer oaths, to send for per-
sons and papers, and generally make
legislative investigations effective.” Cf.

Joint Legislative Committee v. Fuselier,
174 So.2d 817 (La.App.1968); Sullins v.
City of Shreveport, 252 La. 423, 211 So.
2d 314; Sylvestre v. St. Landry Parish
School Board, 164 La. 204, 113 So. 818.

THE Defendant in essence urges that a
legislative act rather than a resolution was
necessary to give the Committee the powers
which it exercised against him.

|| We find that the Legislature had
the power under the above authorities, par-
ticularly our Constitution, and those to be
cited and quoted infra, to pass the instant
resolution. It also had the right to incorpo-
rate into the resolution the provisions
which herein affect the defendant. We
find no prohibition in our Constitution re-
stricting or forbidding the enactment of a
resolution such as Senate Concurrent Reso-
lution No. 31, as amended by Senate Con-
current Resolution No. 76. It is a familiar
doctrine, that the Legislature of a State,
unlike Congress, which cannot do anything
which the Federal Constitution does not
authorize, may do everything which the
State Constitution does not prohibit. Ricks
v. Department of State Civil Service, 200
La, 341, 8 So.2d 49 (1942). Defendant has
not proved that the present resolution is
unconstitutional, Cf. State v. Guidry, 247
La. 631, 173 So.2d 192; Hamilton v. Mc-
Keithen, 254 La. 683, 226 So.2d 494; Joint
Legislative Committee v. Fuselier, 174 So.
2d 817.

539

Having found that the Legislature had
the right to create the Committee, we now
find that the Committee was a Legislative
Committee and possessed certain powers
inherent in the Legislature; the Commit-
tee was constituted an agent of the Legis-
lature, possessing a reasonable delegation
of the authority of the Legislature to do
what the Legislature, composed of more
than 100 members, could do, It avoided
cumbersome, expensive procedure by act-
ing efficiently.

The purpose for the creation of the
Committee set forth in Senate Concurrent
Resolution No. 31 was a legitimate one.
The investigations directed by the resolu-
tion were vital to the State of Louisiana.
The following statement by the United
States Supreme Court in Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L-Ed.
2d 1273 (1957), is applicable herein:

“We start with several basic premises
on which there is general agreement.
The power of the Congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legisla-
tive process. That power is broad. It
encompasses inquiries concerning the ad-
ministration of existing laws as weil as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic or political system for the pur-
pose of enabling the Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into de-
partments of the Federal Government to
expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.

540

But, broad as is this power of inquiry,
it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs
of individuals without justification in
terms of the functions of the Congress.
This was freely conceded by the Solicitor
General in his argument of this case.
Nor is the Congress a law enforcement
or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments
of government. No inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in fur-
therance of, a legitimate task of the Con-
gress. Investigations conducted solely
for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to ‘punish’ those investi-
gated are indefensible.

“Tt is unquestionably the duty of all
citizens to cooperate with the Congress
in its efforts to obtain the fact needed
It is
their unremitting obligation to respond

for intelligent legislative action,

to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of
the Congress and its committees and to
testify fully with respect to matters with-
in the province of proper investigation.
This, of course, assumes that the consti-
tutional rights of witnesses will be re-
spected by the Congress as they are in a
court of justice.”

HMM Act. 10, Sec. 10, La.Const. of
1921, supra, recites that each house of the

Legislature may punish its members for
there are no penalties spe-

contempt ;

541

cifically provided except expulsion; it does
not provide that each house shall be the
We
find no logical reason why the Legislature
could not by the instant resolution provide

exclusive condemnor of its members.

for judicial enforcement of contempt of a
legislative committee by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. Assigned to the judi-
ciary were judicial matters of which it

could accept jurisdiction.

Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 31
authorized the institution of contempt pro-
ceedings in any court of competent juris-
diction and stated that punishment should
be in accordance with the penalties fixed
by Art. III, Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921—
not to exceed ten days for each offense.
The resolution also stated that the Com-
mittee had the additional power to invoke
the provisions of LSA-R.S. 24:4 through
LSA-R.S. 24:6. This additional power
was a supplementary grant. LSA-R.S.
24:4, supra, recites that “any person” shall
be in contempt if he willfully defaults by
failing to appear or to produce papers or
other evidence as ordered. LSA-R.S. 24:4
therefore applied to Dr. Strain, and its
provisions were and are applicable herein.
Thus, as stated in our original opinion, the
Committee’s authority to punish for con-
tempt extended to both members and non-
members alike. There is no limitation on
a legislator’s refusing to testify.

‘As found in our original opinion, LSA~
RS, 24:5, supra, is not exclusive. Pro-

Le = 512,

ceedings by petition for rule to show
cause were proper under the instant facts
and circumstances. If the Committee had
the right to subpoena, which we have found
that it did, then it had the right to insti-
tute the present proceedings. “An indi-
vidual does not move beyond the restraints
of law, common or statutory, when he ac-
He
remains subject to them except insofar as

cepts membership in the Legislature.

they preclude acceptance of legislative of-
fice by one constitutionally qualified for it
or impair performance of legislative du-
ties.” Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 NJ. 529, 166
A2d 360, 89 A.L.R.2d 612.

HH LSA-RS. 24:4, subd. C pro-
vides that the Legislature reserves to it-
self and to the Senate and to the House
of Representatives all inherent and all con-
stitutional powers to punish for contempt.
The reservation does not prohibit the Leg-

islature’s permitting the judiciary to pun-
ish.
to the Legislature, could be given up by
the Legislature in

Therefore, the reservation, peculiar

instances where it
thought it more judicious and expedient
for another branch of government to assess
punishment. It is legion that laws should
be read together in order to give them

proper and intended effect,

Defendant (Assignment of Error No. 3)
contends that certain missing parts of the
record should have been ordered to be
produced in this Court. Absent these rec-

543

ords, we have been able to decide this mat-
ter; therefore, we find defendant’s con-
tention without merit,

With respect to Assignment of Error No.
4, we correctly stated in our original opin-
jon:

“In a motion for summary judgment
Representative Strain alleges that on the
date (February 4, 1971) when he was or-
dered to appear before the committee in
the city of Baton Rouge, he, as chairman,
was conducting a hearing of the Statewide
Health Service Committee, a committee
established by House Concurrent Resolu-
tion No. 95 of the Extraordinary Session of
1968. For this reason, he argues, he could
not be punished for contempt. Without
citing authority for his position, he con-
tends that members of the legislature are
exempt, that is, not subject to the power of
subpoena or any other judicial process,
during terms of the legislature or while in
attendance at duly constituted legislative
committee hearings.

“While Section 1 of Title 24 of the Re-
vised Statutes stays civil proceedings
against members of the legislature ‘during
their attendance at the sessions of their re-
spective houses,’ it grants no such exemp-
tion from subpoena or attendance at a
duly constituted legislative committee hear-
ing.”

We do not find from an examination of
the record that Dr. Strain had subpoenaed,

544

summoned or requested any members of
the Committee to appear before his com-
mittee on February 4, 1971. We find no
interference of the prerogatives of one
committee with those of another commit-
tee. The record does not disclose that it
would have been impossible or inexpedient
for Dr. Strain to have delegated his chair-
manship duties to another member of his
committee during the time he was called
upon to testify. The record is devoid of a
showing that Dr. Strain was precluded
from having his committee meet on a date
other than February 4, 1971. The record
is also devoid of a showing of cooperation
Strain and the Committee
Un-
der these facts and circumstances, Assign-

between Dr.
with respect to the instant subpoena.

ment of Error No. 4 is without merit.

For the reasons assigned and for the
reasons assigned in our original opinion,
the judgment and decree originally ren-
dered in this matter is approved, rein-
stated, and made the final judgment of this
Court.

BARHAM, J,, dissents adhering to orig-
inal opinion.

TATE, J., dissents for reasons assigned
on original hearing.

DIXON, J., dissents.

268'So.2d 650

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Hazel KELLY.

No. 52522.
Noy. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Noy. 21, 1972.

— 548

—-_—

Charles R. Blaylock, Monroe, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Ragan D,
Madden, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Hazel Kelly, was charged
with the violation of Ordinance No. 188 of
Lincoln Parish (engaging in the business
of selling liquor containing more than
one-half of one percent of alcohol by vol-
ume). From a conviction and a sentence
of $350 plus costs and four months in jail,
and in default of paying the costs and fine
to serve an additional two months in jail,
the defendant appeals. Three bills of ex-
ceptions were perfected.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to
the trial judge’s ruling allowing the State’s
sole witness, Officer Graham Gardner, to
testify as to what he heard and saw at the
defendant’s home on March 3, 1972. It is
contended that statements elicited from the
defendant and the defendant’s conduct

549 Es 550

were prompted by the request of the offi-
cer and therefore constituted entrapment.

In his per curiam to the bill, the trial
judge noted that Officer Gardner was em-
ployed by the Monroe Police Department
and was merely on loan to the Ruston Po-
lice Department. He noted that Gardner
did not make an arrest or carry out any
duties of a police officer. He thought that
neither Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, nor Escobe-
do v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758,
12 L.Ed.2d 977, would require Gardner to
warn the defendant of her constitutional
tights prior to the commission of the
crime.

HE (We do not find that the defend-
ant was entrapped by the actions of Offi-
cer Gardner. To constitute entrapment,
the accused must be induced by the officer
to commit the crime. As this court said in
State v. Abraham, 158 La. 1021, 1023-1024,
105 So. 50, 51:

“The transaction of purchasing the 1i-
quor in this case was the ordinary one of
a person calling for a certain article and
purchasing it. The officers, in sending
two prisoners from jail into the place of
business of defendant, and in furnishing
them with money for the purchase of the
liquor, were acting within legal bounds
in’ securing evidence of guilt.

“The holdings are that it is not a defense
to a prosecution for an illegal sale of in-

toxicating liquors to show that the pur-
chase was made by a detective or a hired
informer, There is a clear distinction
between inducing a person to do an un-
lawful act for the purpose of prosecuting
him, and catching him in the execution
of a criminal design of his own concep-
tion’ Blakemore on Prohibition, 1925
Ed. p. 81; 18 A.L.R. 162 et seq.; Sauce-~
do v. U. S., 5 Cir., 268 F. 830; Rose v.
U.S. 6 Cir, 274 F. 245; State v. See,
177 Iowa, 316, 158 N.W. 667.”

Our holding in Abraham was reaffirmed in
State v. Emerson, 233 La. 885, 98 So.2d
225, and State v. Turner, 241 La. 94, 127
So.2d 512. Moreover, entrapment exists.
when the officer instigates the crime; that
is, the officer must plan and conceive the
crime and the defendant must have perpe-
trated it only because of the trickery, per-
suasion or fraud of the officer. The fact.
that the officer afforded the opportunities
for the commission of the crime does not.
defeat the prosecution. United States v.
Caracci, 446 F.2d 173 (Sth Cir. 1971);
Borne v. United States, 332 F.2d 565 (Sth
Cir, 1964) ; Kott v, United States, 163 F.2d,
984 (5th Cir. 1947). Thus it is a question
of fact for the trier of facts to determine
whether the accused had the necessary in~
tent or persuasion before the suggestion by
the officer to commit the crime. United
States v. Caracci, supra; Badon v. United
States, 269 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1959).

551

HM Under the facts presented in the
case before us, we cannot say that the trial
judge as the trier of facts abused his dis-
cretion in finding that the defendant had
the necessary intent to commit the crime
before Officer Gardner suggested same.4
The statements of the defendant to Officer
Gardner and her actions before him were
admissible. The defendant need not have
been given Miranda warnings; she was
not in the process of confessing to the
crime but rather in the process of commit-
ting the crime. Accordingly, we find Bill
of Exceptions No. 1 to be without merit.

Although defendant has apparently aban-
doned Bill of Exceptions No. 2 by her fail-
ure to argue it in brief, we have neverthe-
less considered it and found it to be with-
out merit. This second bill was reserved
when the trial judge admitted into evidence
a half-bottle of liquor bearing an “Old
Charter” label. The defendant contended
that the evidence was inadmissible (1) be-
cause it was the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” of entrapment and (2) because there
‘was no evidence that the bottle in fact con-
tained an alcoholic beverage with a greater
than one-half of one percent alcohol con-
tent.

HMI The first part of the defendant's
contention must fail because we have

1, Technically, the question of entrapment
as @ question of law has not been prop-
erly preserved by this defendant for the
purposes of this appeal. To be proper-
ly preserved, the defendant would have to

552

found that she was not entrapped by Offi-
cer Gardner. Her second contention is
that the half-pint bottle of “Old Charter”
liquor should not have been admitted into
evidence because there was no proof that
the bottle in fact contained an alcoholic
beverage with a greater than one-half of
one percent alcohol content, From our ex-
amination of the record before us, we can-
not say the bottle did not in fact contain
an alcoholic beverage in excess of the legal
maximum alcoholic content prescribed by
Ordinance No, 188.

In his Per Curiam to this bill, the trial
judge stated:

“Gardner testified that the alcoholic con-
tent of the beverage purchased from the
accused exceeded 4 of 1%.
out in case of State v. Abraham, [158
La. 1021], 105 So. 50 (Sp.Ct.1925), ‘a
chemical analysis of liquor for the pur-

As pointed

pose of proving its intoxicating charac-
ter is not an exclusive method of ascer-
taining such fact which may be estab-
lished as well by the nonexpert opinion
of those accustomed to drink liquor and

acquainted with various kinds.’ ”

MI Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was re-

served when the trial judge refused to

grant the defendant a directed verdict be-
have raised it in a bill of exceptions re-
served when the trial judge refused to

charge himself with the defendant's re-
quested charge concerning entrapment.

553
cause the evidence introduced against her
did not establish a prima facie case of
guilt, (A motion for a directed verdict is
a valid procedural device in a non-jury
case. State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 337, 129
So.2d 4 (1961)). However, the record be-
fore us does reflect, even though it is in-
complete, that there was some evidence of
the defendant’s guilt.
cannot say that the trial judge erred in de-

Accordingly, we

nying the motion for a directed verdict.
Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

268 So.2d 653

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Gracie ROBINSON,

No. 52523.
Noy. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Noy. 21, 1972.

Charles R. Blaylock, Monroe, for defend-
ant-appellant,

554

William J: Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Ragan D.
Madden, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee,

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Gracie Robinson, was charged
with the violation of Ordinance No. 188 of
Lincoln Parish (engaging in the business of
selling liquor containing more than,one-halt
of one percent of alcohol by volume).
From a conviction and a sentence of $350
plus costs and four months in jail, and in
default of paying the costs and fine to serve
an additional two months in jail, the defend-
ant appeals. Three bills of exceptions were
perfected.

For the reasons assigned in State of
Louisiana v. Hazel Kelly, No. 52,522, our
docket, 268 So.2d 650, decided this day,
the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

268 So0.2d 653

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Bobbie Jean HEARD.
No. 52524.
Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehcaring Denied Nov, 21, 1972.

555 EE 556.

Charles R. Blaylock, Monroe, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Ragan D.
Madden, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Bobbie Jean Heard, was
charged with the violation of Ordinance No.
188 of Lincoln Parish (engaging in the
business of selling liquor containing more
than one-half of one percent of alcohol by
volume). From a conviction and a sentence
of $350 plus costs and four months in jail,
and in default of paying the costs and fine
to serve an additional two months in jail,
the defendant appeals. Three bills of ex-
ceptions were perfected.

For the reasons assigned in State of
Louisiana v. Hazel Kelly, No. 52,522 on
our docket, 268 So.2d 650 decided this day,
the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

268 So0.2d 654

Petty WALKER et al.
ve

Tuily B, MILTON and Allstate Insur-
ance Company.

No, 51917.
Noy, 6, 1972.

Nesom, Mellon, Cavanaugh & Dué, Paul
H. Dué, Denham Springs, for applicants
(plaintiffs).

Horace C. Lane, Baton Rouge, for re-
spondents.

SANDERS, Justice.

Petty Walker, individually and on behalf
of his minor children, and Ernestine Le-
Blanc Walker, his wife, seek damages for
the injuries sustained by the wife and chil-
dren in a motor vehicle accident. The dis-
trict court granted recovery. The Court of
Appeal reversed in part, disallowing dam-
ages to Mrs. Walker and allowing contri-
bution against the parents for the damages

558

awarded for injuries to their minor child.
La.App. 253 So.2d 566. We granted cer-
tiorari in order to review the basic issue of
liability and the allowance of contribution
against the parents, 260 La. 16, 254 So.2d
619. We now affirm.

The accident took place on September 7,
1966, at the junction of the Old Hammond
Highway and Palmetto Road, near Walker,
Louisiana.

‘The defendant Milton was approaching
the intersection in a pickup truck, driving
west on Old Hammond Highway. Mrs.
Walker was behind him, also driving west.
She was operating her husband’s pickup

truck, accompanicd by two of her minor
children, Darrell Lynn Walker and Loretta

Gayle Walker.

When Milton reached the intersection,
he attempted a left turn into Palmetto
Road. Mrs. Walker attempted to pass as
Milton undertook his turn, and the two ve-
hicles collided in the left lane.

The accident caused only minor injuries
to the children.
suffered a broken arm, lacerations, and
damage to two teeth.

Mrs, Walker, however,

On the record, the Court of Appeal
found both drivers negligent, Mr. Milton
for failure to heed overtaking traffic in
executing a left turn and Mrs. Walker for
attempting to pass at an_ intersection,
which, though unmarked, was well known
to her. Although there is conflicting evi-

559

dence, the record provides no adequate ba-
sis for reversing these findings.

Hl We also find, as did the Court of
Appeal, that, after the drivers were com-
mitted to turning and passing, neither had
a last clear chance to avoid the collision.
To the conitrary, their maneuvers were al-
most simultaneous, placed both drivers in
peril, and left neither in a superior posi-
The doctrine

of last-clear-chance does not apply under
these circumstances, Leake v. Prudhomme
Truck Tank Service, Inc, 260 La. 1071,
258 So.2d 358(1972); Johnson v, Wilson,
239 La. 390, 118 So.2d 450 (1960); Holla-
baugh-Seale Funeral Home v. Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 215 La. 545; 41 So.2d 212
(1949); Burns v. Evans Cooperage Co.,
208 La. 406, 23 So.2d 165 (1945); Penin-
ger v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 187
So.2d 128, (La.App., 2nd Cir, 1966); Ma-
lone and Guerry, Studies in Louisiana Torts
Law, pp. 306-334 (1970).

Accordingly, we find that the Court of
Appeal correctly denied recovery to Mrs.

tion to prevent the accident.

Walker because of contributory negligence.

Hl The final question is one of law:
Is contribution allowable in favor of a
joint tort-feasor against a negligent parent
whose negligence has contributed to his
child’s injuries?

The Court of Appeal awarded Petty
Walker the sum of $200.00 for the injuries
sustained by his minor child, Darrell

Walker.
and his insurer, Allstate Insurance’ Compa-

560"
In a third-party petition; Milton

ny, sought contribution from the parents
on the finding that the mother’s negligence’
had contributed to the injuries. Pursuant
to Louisiana Civil Code Article 2103, the
Court of Appeal granted contribution
against the parents for one-half of the

award,

‘The plaintiffs contend that LSA-R.S.
9:571,
pated minor against either parent during
their marriage, also precludes an action for

prohibiting suit by an. unemanci-

contribution predicated upon a parent's”
negligence. They ~rely upon Johnson’ v.
Housing Authority of New Orleans, 163
So.2d 569 (La.App., 4th Cir. 1964), holding
that contribution against a parent is una-
vailable for a child’s damages.

In 1965, in Smith v. Southern Farm’ Bu-
rea Casualty Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174
So.2d 122, this Court allowed a joint tort-
feasor contribution against a riegligent hus-
band for one-half the damages awarded to
his injured wife. There, the interspousal
immunity created by LSA-R.S. 9:291 was
We held that the immunity stat-
ute did not destroy substantive causes of -
action arising between husband and wife.
Rather, the statute operated only as a pro-
cedural bar to an action, Hence, under
LSA-C.C. art. 2103, contribution was al-
lJowable against the husband.

at issue.

In the recent case of Deshotel v. Travel-
ers Indemnity Co., 257 La, 567, 243 So.2d

561

259 (1971), we held that a father injured
through his son’s negligence could maintain
-a direct action against the responsible in-
surer despite the parent-child immunity
-created by LSA-R.S. 9:571. The sub-
stance of the holding was that LSA-R.S.
“9:571, like LSA—R.S. 9:291, operated only
as a procedural bar to an action by a child
against his parent and did not destroy the
cause of action.

This decision places parent-child immu-
nity within the ambit of the Smith rule.
Accordingly, we reject the Court of Ap-
peal’s holding in Johnson v. Housing Au-
thority of New Orleans, supra. Applying
Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
'Co., supra, we hold. that contribution is
available in the present case.

For these reasons, the judgment of the
‘Court of Appeal is affirmed. The cost’ in
this Court are assessed against plaintiffs,

268 So.2d 656

Cyprien BROUSSARD
v.

NEEBE’S BAKERY, INC., et al.

No. 51881.
Noy. 6, 1972.

+

Plaisance & Franques, Howard L..
Franques, Jr., Lafayette, for plaintiff-appli~
cant.

Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler & Sarpy,.
Peter A, Feringa, Jr. Peter Frank Liber-

to, Bernhardt C. Heebe, New Orleans, for
defendants-respondents.

Louisiana Trial Lawyers Assn., John R.
Martzell, New Orleans, President, for
amicus curiae,

McCALEB, Chief Justice.

Cyprien Broussard, a truck driver for
Wolf’s Baking Company, Inc., of Lafay-
ette, Louisiana, filed this suit against
Heebe’s Bakery, Inc., of Gretna, Louisiana,
to recover damages for injuries resulting
from an accident allegedly due to Heebe’s
negligence. The Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, compensation insurer of Wolf,
intervened, seeking reimbursement by pri-
ority for compensation and expenses paid
to and for plaintiff, in the event his tort
suit against Heebe is successful.

After answering, Heebe moved for a
summary judgment and was successful in

565
having plaintiff’s suit dismissed on the
ground of no cause of action in tort be-
cause plaintiff's right to compensation as
an employee of Wolf, an alleged sub-con-
-tractor of Heebe, was exclusive under R.S.
-23:1061,1 barring any action in tort against
Heebe as the principal. The Court of Ap-
peal for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that
judgment (see 254 So.2d 284) and we
granted certiorari.

In this Court plaintiff contends, as he
did below, that the appellate court crred
(1) in finding the relationship between
Heebe and Wolf was that of principal-con-
tractor, instead of vendor-vendee, and that
(2) in any case, it makes no difference
whether a principal-contractor relationship
actually existed as it was not the intent of
the legislature in adopting R.S. 23:1061
“to prevent injured employees of a con-
tractor from recovering in tort against a
negligent principal.”
|. This section reads:

“Where any person (in this section re-
ferred to as principal) undertakes to ex-
ecute any work, which is a part of his
trade, business, or occupation or which
the had contracted to perform, and con-
tracts with any person (in this section
referred to as contractor) for the execu-
tion by or under the contractor of the
whole or any part of the work under-
taken by the principal, the principal shall
be liable to pay to any employee employed
in the execution of the work or to his de-
pendent, any compensation under this
Chapter which he would have beon liable
to pay if the employee had been immedi-
ately employed by him; and where com-

pensation is claimed from, or proceedings
are taken against, the principal, then,

566

HE We consider these assignments of
error in reverse order because, if the pos-
tulation of plaintiff, joined by amicus
curiae? that the injured employee of the
contractor has two causes of action against
the principal (one for compensation and
the other for tort) is sound, then the much
debated question as to legal relationship
(principal-contractor or vendor-vendee) is
immaterial and moot. However, we reject
this argument, for this Court has decided
on more than one occasion that the remedy
afforded by R.S. 23:1061 to the employee
of the sub-contractor against the principal
is exclusive and has the effect of confer-
ring tort immunity on, the principal. See,
Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49
So.2d 852 (1950); Benoit v. Hunt Tool
Co., 219 La. 380, 53 So.2d 137 (1951); and
Coal Operators Casualty Co, v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 223 La. 794, 66 So.2d 852
(1953).

in the application of this Chapter refer-

ence to the principal shall be substituted

for reference to the employer, except that
the amount of compensation shall be cal-
culated with reference to the earnings of
the employee under the employer by whom

he is immediately employed.

“Where the principal is liable to pay
compensation under this Section, he
shall be entitled to indemnity from any
person who independently of this Section
would have been liable to pay compensa:

tion to the employee or his dependent,
and shall have a cause of action therefor.”

2. Amicus Curiae in this case, Louisiana
Trial Lawyers Association, has filed a
brief in this Court and presented oral ar-
guments through one of its members.

567

Court said: “Under the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act and the jurisprudence of this
state, the exclusive remedy of the em-
ployees of the contractor against the prin-
cipal, as these two terms are used in the
act, is for workmen’s compensation, and

there is no remedy in tort against the prin-’

cipal, as the principal is not a third person
under the provisions of Section 7 of the
act. Sections 6, 7, and 34, Act 20 of 1914,
as amended, LSA-R.S. 23:1061, 23:1101,
23:1032; Thibodaux et al. v. Sun Oil Co.
et al., La.App., 40 So.2d 761, affirmed 218
La. 453, 49 So.2d 852. The effect of Sec-
tion 6 is that the principal shall be consid-
ered the employer of the employees of the
contractor, in contemplation of the statute,
so that such employees shall have the right
to demand compensation from the princi-
pal, and this is their exclusive remedy, and
the principal cannot be held liable to the
employees of the contractor in tort.”

In view of our settled jurisprudence, the
contention of plaintiff is one which ad-
dresses itself more properly to the legisla-
ture. That body has met time and time
again and is presumed to be aware of our
rulings, “Yet it has not seen fit to amend
the statute to conform to the views and
contentions advanced by the plaintiff and
amicus curiae.

3. It is because of the disagreement as to

the relationship resulting from these
facts that plaintiff contends defendants

In Benoit v. Hunt Tool Co. supra, the

568

Conversely, however, with respect to the:
first assigned error, we believe the rulings.
below are incorrect. There is no serious.
disagreement as to the facts. The contro-
versy is over the legal relationship between.
Wolf and Heebe resulting therefrom.
The courts below concluded that a princi-
pal-contractor relationship existed, bring--
ing Heebe within the purview of the com--
pensation act, and rendering it immune to:
tort action. Plaintiff’s position is that the
facts establish a vendor-vendee relation—
ship, placing Heebe without the purview of
the act, and, thus, as a third person, sub-

ject to an action in tort.

The affidavits and depositions reveal.
that Heebe’s Bakery, Inc., bakers of vari-
ous kinds of bread, rolls, and pastries in a.
shop where the equipment required expen-
sive labor for hand manufacture and pack-
aging, discovered as long ago as 1964 that
it could purchase many of the products.
from Wolf’s Baking Company, Inc., and.
supply them to its retail outlets more eco-
nomically than it could manufacture them,
because Wolf’s automated modern equip--
ment permitted large volume production.

Accordingly, it entered into an oral con~
tract under which Wolf supplied Heebe ex-
clusively with certain items. These were
baked in Wolf's Lafayette plant, packaged
there in wrappers carrying Heebe's name

were not entitled to summary judgment.

See, Cole v. Cheyron Chemical Co., 5 Cir.
427 F.2d 890.

569

or tradename, loaded there on Wollf’s
trucks by Wolf’s employees, and deliv-
ered by Wolf’s truck driver to Heebe’s
Gretna plant. They were there unloaded
by Wolf’s driver with the use of Wolf’s
ramps (made by Wolf at its plant but kept
on hand at the Heebe plant for conven-
ience) without any supervision by Heebe,
although it did furnish the driver with a
helper to assist in the unloading. Heebe
had no control whatever over the baking,
away from its plant, of these items and
their delivery, Wolf alone being responsi-
ble for procuring the ingredients, doing the
baking, and effecting delivery to Heebe.
Nor did Heebe have any control over the
manner in which Wolf operated its busi-
ness, or to whom it sold its products.
Heebe only became the owner of the items
manufactured from the time the delivery
was completed with their unloading at its
Gretna plant.

Wolf periodically billed Heebe for the
products thus manufactured and delivered,
and received payment. Heebe cancelled its
contract when it discovered, almost two
years after the incident here involved, that
some of the identical items Wolf was pur-
portedly producing exclusively for Heebe
were, in fact, being sold to Heebe’s com-
petitors in wrappers of the competitors,
contrary to the oral agreement. During
this time Heebe also secured other prod-
ucts from at least one other bakery in an-
other city, and, since the accident here, has

570

expanded this practice, with the result that,
for all intents and purposes, Heebe, a
wholesaler and baker, had gone out of the
business of manufacturing most, if not all,
of the items it originally baked, particular-
ly those it purchased from other bakeries.

In its decision, the appellate court recog-
nized that the relationship under this oral
contract contained elements of vendor-pur-
chaser, that what Heebe “purchased from
‘Wolf was essentially a personalized baking:
and wrapping service,” and that the case in
the jurisprudence most analogous is Wilson
v. Roberts, La.App., 194 So. 88 (1940),
where the relationship was found to be
that of vendor-vendee. However, in con-
cluding that Heebe’s operations vis-a-vis
Wolf came within the scope of R.S, 23:-
1061, rendering Broussard a “statutory em-
ployee” of Heebe, the court held the sta-
tus of principal-contractor existed. It rea~
soned that Heebe controlled the manufac-
ture and delivery of these items, thus
applying one of the generally accepted
tests for determining whether the relation-
ship of principal-contractor exists between
the parties, (The emphasis is supplied.)

The elements evidencing control were
found by the court to be that Wolf was re-
quired to package the products in Heebe
wrappers and could not “sell and/or deliv-
er” the products to anyone else. And after
concluding that what Heebe “purchased”
from Wolf was a specialized service, the
court sought to distinguish the case on the

BIL

price of the service includes materials re-
ceived or expended in connection there-
with, apparently implying that since Heebe
furnished the wrappers Wolf used, this
was not included in the price of the items.
(The emphasis is supplied.)

As pointed out above, we do not find
that Heebe had any control whatever over
the production of these items in a plant en-
tirely separated from its premises; nor in
their delivery. The use of Heebe wrappers
was for the accommodation of Heebe and
‘a part of the contract,t as was the agree-
ment to sell exclusively to Heebe. The ev-
idence further discloses the materials for
the wrappers were procured and handled
solely by Wolf in Lafayette and included
in the purchase price, for when the con-
tract was terminated by Heebe upon dis-
‘covery that Wolf was supplying identical
items to competitors, Wolf, by letter, ex-
pressed regret over the loss of Heebe as a
“customer” and advised it had on hand
eebe wrapping supplies amounting to
$1,029.58, for which it sought reimburse-
In the letter it is stated: “I don’t
know the arrangements Bill Wolf made,

ment,

however, it is standard practice that these

4. This is not out of the ordinary in cases
of vendor-vendee, Cognizance can be
taken of the fact that dress manufac-
turers frequently furnish special store
labels in dresses they sell to designated
retail stores. The same is true of shoe
manufacturers, who furnish specialized

ground that in pure “service” cases, the

572
supplies become the responsibility of the
bakery whose name they carry.” (The

emphasis is supplied.)

Although no mention of this is made by
the appellate court, it is argued that con-
trol by Heebe of the production of these
items is further evidenced by the fact that
Wolf used trays furnished by Heebe in
loading the baked items for delivery. But
this factor is of no importance. The evi-
dence clearly discloses that Wolf loaded
the baked items on special collapsible trays
furnished by Heebe as an accommodation.
This facilitated Heebe’s employees, for in
loading its trucks with the items after de-
livery by Wolf, Heebe’s employees were
only required to handle the trays, no re"
packing of the material being necessary.

HM it is correctly stated in 99 CJ.S.
verbo Workmen’s Compensation, § 107, p.
369, that “The compensation act does not
apply where the transaction between the
immediate employer and the person sought
to be held liable as his employer is that of
purchase and sale, or where some other re-
lation besides that of principal and con-
tractor exists between them, provided,
* -* %* the transaction is not a mere de-

inner sole markings at the request of the
purchaser.

5. This evidences the fact that such a spe-
cialized baking and wrapping service was
readily available for purchase on the
open market, and, indeed, was so preva-
Jent as to constitute “standard practice.”

573

vice or subterfuge to avoid liability under
the workmen’s compensation act.” As
pointed out in this same section, the rela-
tionship will not be considered as one of
purchase afd sale under some statutes
where the contract to sell “is accompanied
by an undertaking by either party to ren-
der substantial services in connection with
the goods sold”. 6

PME Neither of these exceptions is
present here. There is no contention that
this contract was entered into for the pur-
pose of avoiding liability under the act. In
fact, both employers carried compensation
covering their respective employees, and
Broussard, as Wolf’s, has already received
compensation from his employer. This ac-
tion against the other employer is in tort
for the alleged negligence of that employ-
er. And the mere packaging of the items
in Heebe wrappers and the use of Heebe
trays in loading is not such a substantial
service as to render the status betweeri the
parties that of principal-contractor.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment
of the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's

6. See, also, 71 C.J. 485, Section 210, par-
ticularly footnote No. 49; Bendure yv.
Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. 199 Kan.
696, 438 P.2d 558 (company procuring
steel beams held to be purchaser and lia-
ble in tort if its negligence contributed
to injury of driver delivering beams at its
plant); Hacker v. Brookover Feed Yard,
Ine., 202 Kan. 582, 451 P.2d 506 (a “con-
tract feeder” of cattle who raised some

514

suit in the district court is annulled and set.

_ aside, and the case is ordered remanded to:

the district court for trial on the merits.
All costs in this court and in the Court of
Appeal are to be borne by the defendant;
all other costs are to await the final dispo-
sition of the case,

SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and dis~
sents in part and assigns reasons.

BARHAM, J., concurs. The discussion
of RS. 23:1061 is rank dictum. I reserve
the right to pass on that issue when it is.

presented.

TATE, J., concurs and assigns additional
reasons,

SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).

“I agree with those expressions of the:
majority opinion that the injured employee:
of the contractor does not have two causes
of action against the principal, one for
compensation and the other in tort. Under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the:
jurisprudence of this State, the exclusive
remedy of the employees of the contractor

feed but secured most from farmers held
a purchaser and liable in tort if negli-
gence contributed to injury of driver de-
livering silage at “feeder’s” silo); and
Doyle v. Missouri Valley Constructors,
D.O., 288 F.Supp. 121 (contractor se-
curing ready-mix concrete held a pur-
chaser and subject to tort action by driver
of conerete company delivering mixture
to job site).

575

against the principal is for workmen’s

576

23:1061 was not intended to prevent in-

compensation, and there is no remedy in . jured employees of a contractor from re-

tort against the principal.

However, I would not disturb the find-
ings of the trial judge and the court of ap-
peal on the issue of fact involved. See
La.App., 254 So.2d 284. I would conclude
that the relationship between Heebe and
Wolf is that of principal and contractor,
and plaintiff cah only recover workmen’s
compensation. Heebe is not a “third per-
son” under the Act subject to an action in
tort. There is no intimation whatsoever
that the relationship between Heebe and
Wolf was designed solely to circumvent
tort liability. When such a case is present-
ed those facts will readily warrant the im-
position of tort liability against the “thisd
party”, Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218
La. 453, 49 So.2d 852 (1950); Guillory v.
Farrar, 182 So.2d 158 (La.App.1966) ; Cer-
ie v. Malone, 125 So.2d 254 (La.App.1960).

I respectfully dissent.

TATE, Justice (concurring).

The scholarly majority opinion correctly
finds that the relationship between Heebe
and Wolf was not that of principal-con-
tractor, so as to constitute Heebe a statuto-
ry employer liable in compensation under
La.R.S. 23:1061.

I therefore do not find it appropriate to
dispose of, as dicta, the alternative second
contention that, in any event, LaRS.

covering in tort against a negligent princi-
pal. The intent of this statutory provision
was simply to afford an injured employee
an alternative remedy in compensation
against a principal, who is entitled to in-
demnification from the true employer of
the injured workman, When in fact the
true employer is responsible in compensa-
tion and is solvent and insured, then the
principal has no compensation liability and
he is not entitled to rely upon the compen-
sation act (designed to protect the em-
ployee, not a third person tort feasor) as
exempting him from liability under the ex-
clusive-remedy provision of the compensa-
tion act, La.R.S. 23:1032. See the excel-
lent concurring opinion of Judge Lemmon
in Broussard v. Heebe’s Bakery, Inc., 254
So.2d 284, at 288 (La.App.1971).

An erroneous prior judge-made interpre-
tation of legislation is always subject to
judicial correction, Since judges made the
mistake, they can correct it. The tradi-
tional duty of the judge in a civil-law ju-
risdiction such as Louisiana is to be bound
by the legislative intent and the legislation
itself, not by any erroneous precedent
enunciated by the former or present judges
of the court. See Techniques of Judicial
Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La.L.Rev.
727, esp. 743-46 (1962).

However, since in fact Heebe is not a
principal, it is unnecessary for us to decide

BIT

this issue in the present proceeding. I
therefore concur in the majority opinion
insofar as its scholarly discussion in sup-
port of the holding that no principal-con-
tractor relationship exists under. the
present facts between Wolf and Heebe.

268 So.2d 662

CITY STORES COMPANY
ve
Quimet J, PETERSEN.
No, 52369.
Nov. 6, 1972.

+

Maurice R. Franks, New Orleans, for
defendant-relator.

Guste, Barnett & Colomb, William M.
Barnett, Sidney L. Shushan, New Orleans,
for plaintiff-respondent. .

SANDERS, Justice.

We granted supervisory writs to review
the trial judge’s instanter rescission of an
order waiving the prepayment of court
costs by defendant because of poverty.
We hold that the trial judge erred in re-
scinding the order without an evidentiary
hearing and remand the case for further

proceedings.

On November 5, 1971, City Stores Com-
pany filed suit against Quimet J. Petersen
on an open account for merchandise. Pur-
suant to LSA-C.C.P. Article 5183, the de-
fendant filed a motion for leave to proceed
without the prepayment of costs. The mo-
tion was supported by the required affida-
vits. The trial judge granted a temporary
order but assigned the matter for hearing.
After the evidentiary hearing, the court re-
confirmed its initial order.

580

Six weeks later, at a hearing relating to
pre-trial discovery and a trial continuance,
defense counsel stated to the court that
“any dislosure of the amount and wherea-
bouts of his [defendant's] assets may tend
to incriminate him” in connection with a
federal indictment pending against him.
After a colloquy between the trial judge
and counsel, during which counsel express-
ed doubt of his ability to contact his client,
the judge rescinded the previous forma
pauperis order instanter in accordance with
the following written order:

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
considering and upon the statements
made in open court by the counsel for
the defendant, that the order of this
Court heretofore rendered permitting the
defendant to proceed in this matter in
forma pauperis is herewith recalled and
rescinded and the defendant is ordered
to pay the costs of court within thirty
(30) days or have his Answers filed in
this cause stricken., all without denying
defendant’s right to bring a further rule
to have the defendant prove his right to
proceed by way of forma pauperis.”

On application of defendant under our
supervisory jurisdiction, we granted writs
to determine the validity of the instanter
rescission of the forma pauperis order.
City Stores Co. v. Petersen, 261 La. 537,
260 So.2d 321.

In this Court, defendant contends that
when a forma pauperis order has been en-

581

tered after a contradictory hearing, it can-
not be rescinded summarily by the trial
court without evidence of a change in fi-
nancial condition. Defendant further con-
tends that the Due Process and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment preclude the State of Louisi-

ana from exacting costs in advance of

judgment in a civil proceeding from any
defendant, rich or poor.

City Stores phrases its opposition in var-
ious ways, but the central contention is
that the forma pauperis order is an inter-
locutory order subject to recall by the trial
judge at any time; that defense counsel’s
statement was an adequate basis for reex-
amination of the order; and that since re-
lator has never been finally ordered to pay
the costs, he has no standing to raise the
constitutional question.

Article 5182 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure provides:

“The privilege granted by this Chapter
shall be restricted to litigants who are
clearly entitled to it, with due regard to
the nature of the proceeding, the court
costs which otherwise would have to be
paid, and the ability of the litigant to
pay them or to furnish security therefor,

+ The appellate decisions prior to the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are
conflicting on this point. In Palmer v.
‘Wyatt Lumber Co., La.App., 146 So. 494
(1983), the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peal stated: “It is always within the
power of the trial judge with or without

582

so that the fomentation of litigation by
an indiscriminate resort thereto may be
discouraged, without depriving a litigant
of its benefits if he is entitled thereto.”

HI Under this article, the trial judge
has both the authority and duty to subject
forma pauperis orders to continuing scruti-
A trial judge may,
therefore, reconsider a poverty determina-

ny to prevent abuse.

tion whenever he has cause to believe ei-
ther that circumstances have changed or
that the order was improvidently granted.1
Like all judicial authority, however, it
must be exercised in accordance with es-
tablished procedures. These procedures re-
quire an evidentiary hearing when rescis-
sion depends upon contested factual issues.
See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 5184.

TH In the present case, defense counsel
made only a general reference to assets.
His statement contained no factual admis-
sion sufficient to disqualify the defendant
for the prior cost waiver. It was suffi-
cient, however, to warrant a further hear-
ing as to defendant’s poverty, but no such
hearing was ordered. Hence, the order of
the trial judge rescinding the forma pau-
peris authorization without a hearing must

a traverse of plaintiffs’ allegations of

poverty, to prevent any abuse of this

act...” In dicta, the Fourth Cireuit

in Singleton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co.,

La.App., 157 So. 620 (1984) said that the

allegation of poverty must be taken as
true in the absence of a formal traverse.

583

be set aside and the case remanded for
further proceedings.

Because of this conclusion, we do not
reach the constitutional question posed in
defendant’s brief?

For the reasons assigned, the order of
the district court rescinding the forma pau-
peris order is now reversed and set aside
and the case is remanded to the Civil Dis-
trict Court for the Parish of Orleans for
further proceedings consistent with the
views herein expressed and according to
law. The assessment of costs shall await
the final outcome of the suit.

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).
T respectfully dissent,

The statement of defendant’s counsel in
argument was a sufficient basis, in my
opinion, for the trial judge to rescind the
forma pauperis order.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I am of the opinion that the majority
has done a grave injustice to the trial
court and has actually interfered with that
court’s attempt to proceed with order and
decorum in discharging its judicial duties.
The majority has correctly stated that un-
der Code of Civil Procedure Article 5182

2. As to the constitutional question, de-
fendant states in brief: “This issue need
be reached . . . only if each of the
arguments presented above are resolved

«* % * the trial judge has both the au-
thority and duty to subject forma pauperis
orders to continuing scrutiny to prevent
abuse”, The trial court in conversation
with the litigant’s counsel found valid rea-
son for questioning the forma pauperis or-
der. The court sought a contradictory
hearing with the litigant. Counsel in-
formed the court that it could not be had
because he could not contact or produce
the litigant. A careful reading of the fol-
lowing colloquy, I believe, demonstrates the
correctness of my position.

“THE COURT: Yes, it does. He does
not want to disclose here the man’s inabili-
ty to pay.

“MR, FRANKS: Yes, because that would
embarrass him in connection with his right
to remain silent in connection with the
Federal indictment. More particularly, he -
will again decline to answer on the
grounds that any disclosure of the amount
and whereabouts of his assets may tend to
incriminate him as he did in this Court.
“THE COURT: In what Court did he do
that?

“MR. FRANKS: Right here in the forma
pauperis rule.

“THE COURT: Before me?
“MR. FRANKS: Yes, Your Honor.
unfavorably to relator.” In effect, there-

fore, it represents an alternative con-
tention.

585

“MR. BARNETT: He just said he doesn’t
know anything about it. He claims he
didn’t know.

“THE COURT: I am going to reorder his
appearance and reopen his determination
of the right to proceed in forma pauperis.
“MR. FRANKS: Mr. Peterson is present-
ly out of town.
“THE COURT:
“MR. FRANKS: I have had difficulty in
locating him.

“THE COURT: On counsel’s statement
today the order to proceed in forma pau-

When can he be here?

peris is rescinded and Mr. Peterson is or-
dered to pay the cost in thirty days or his
answer will be stricken.

“MR. FRANKS: I believe the Court in-
terrogated him and got answers to his
questions.

“THE COURT: I got entirely satisfactory
answers, entirely contrary to your state-
ment jist now.

“MR. FRANKS: Again I fail to see why,
Your Honér., Mr. Peterson, apparently, at
thie time satisfied the Court,

“THE COURT: Yes, he did.
“MR. FRANKS: And we disclosed at that
time that he was under indictment.

“THE COURT: Yes, sir, and if he
doesn’t appear on his return and clarify

that statement that you just made—

“MR. FRANKS: How was my statement
different from his?

586

“THE COURT: The record will reflect
that.

“MR. FRANKS: My statement was any
question as to the amount of his income—

“THE COURT: Assets.

“MR. FRANKS: Well, he does not have
any large amount of assets.

“TITE COURT: The order to allow him
to proceed in forma pauperis is rescinded
and he is order[ed] to pay costs in thirty
days or suffer striking of his answer. Jf
you want relief from that, bring him back.

“MR. FRANKS: All right. May it please
the Court, Your Honor, I respectfully, at
this time notify the Court that my client
respectfully intends. to apply to the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari, prohibition and mandamus in ordef
to rescind on the grounds that there has
been no testimony to the contrary, merely
a representation that questions as to his
present income might tend to embarrass
him; that he should not be deprived of
the right to present all defenses and of
the right to litigate under forma pauperis
merely because he is under Federal indict-
ment.

“THE COURT: I take it from you that
you represent your client and I have great
respect for lawyers, and when you tell me
what you told me, to me it’s just as Mr.
Peterson would tell me that and if he were
here I would want to inquire further into

587 a 588

that. I order his appearance and you tell
me he’s out of town and you further tell
me it’s difficult to locate him. On your
presentation of the case, I order a rescis-

sion of the order allowing him to proceed
in forma pauperis. If you want to proceed
in forma pauperis, bring him back and con-
vince me again, but armed with a recollec-
tion, I hope, of your statement today, I
certainly intend to go further into the de-
tails.

;"With that statement, of course, you have
the right always to apply for remedial
writs to the Fourth Circuit.

“The motion for continuance will be de-
nied.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The trial judge correctly interpreted the
attorney’s answers to mcan that he could
not and would not voluntarily produce the
party litigant so that the court could exer-
cise the codal mandate for continuous
scrutiny of the forma pauperis order. He
used an effective but not onerous method.
for securing the party’s presence in court
to ascertain the party’s present right to
continue in forma pauperis. Since he
could not obtain a voluntary contradictory
hearing, he ordered a rescission of the for-
ma pauperis order subject to the litigant’s
right to reopen if he would appear in
court. The court acted with restraint and
good discretion under the circumstances to
maintain its authority.

For thesc reasons I respectfully dissent.

268 So.2d 666
TRUCK SERVICE, INC, Plaintiff; +
Appeliee,
v.

The LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COM-—
MISSION, Defendant-Appellant,

A-1 Equipment Rentals, Inc., Intervenor-
Appellant.

No. 52406.
Noy. 6, 1972.

5

89

590

ail

D’Amico, Curet & Bush, Bryan E. Bush,
Jr, Baton Rouge, for intervenor-appellant.

Marshall B. Brinkley, Baton Rouge, for
defendant-appellant.

591

Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, John B.
Noland, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appel-
lee. .

TATE, Justice.
The plaintiff (“Truck Service”) files ju-
dicial proceedings to question the issuance
of a éertificate of public convenience and
necessity to another carrier. La.Const.
Art, VI, Section 5. This other carrier
(“A-1 Equipment”) intervened. The inter-
venor and the Commission appeal from a
judgment of the trial court annulling the
certificate issued to A~1 Equipment.

The basic facts adduced at the Commis-
sion hearings show:

Truck Service’s predecessor corporation
was granted a certificate by the Commis-
sion in 1959 which permitted it to haul, in-
ter alia, bauxite ore between East Baton
Rouge Parish and Ascension Parish, In
1966, this permit was transferred to Truck
Service, which acquired the assets of the
predecessor corporation.

During this entire time and up to the
Commission hearings in 1971, Truck Serv-
ice had hauled bauxite ore only once, This
was in 1959 or 1960, on which occasion it
had performed its work through a hauling
subcontract executed by A-1 Equipment,
the present applicant for another certifi-
cate.

‘The evidence shows, however, that this
was the only intrastate hauling of bauxite

592,

ore during this period. A new need for
such intrastate hauling has just developed
because of the sale of large quantities of
bauxite from government stockpiles in Bat-
on Rouge.

A-1 Equipment is a holder of an inter-
state certificate to haul bauxite ore. Pur-
suant to this permit, it has engaged in ex-
tensive interstate bauxite hauling with
shippers in Baton Rouge and Ascension
Parishes. In 1971 it applied to the state’s
Commission for an additional permit to
haul bauxite ore intrastate.

At the hearings, A-1 Equipment pro-
duced substantial evidence that it is well
equipped to perform intrastate bauxite
hauling. It also produced a shipper wit-
ness who testified, generally, that A-l
Equipment could perform such intrastate

“hauling and that Truck Service could not.

‘(By stipulation, it is conceded that only
Truck Service and—if the issuance is here
sustained—A-1 Equipment have the only
common carrier certificates from the Com-
mission authorizing the intrastate hauling
of bauxite ore.)

Truck
Service opposed the issuance of a compet-
ing certificate to A-1 Equipment. Its op-

At the Commission hearings,

position and its present application for ju-
dicial review is founded upon the provision
of La.R.S. 45:164 that: “* * * No new
or additional certificate shall be granted
over a route where there is an existing

593

certificate, unless it be clearly shown that
the public convenience and necessity would
be materially promoted thereby. * * *”

‘The principles are well settled for judi-
cial review of Commission orders granting
certificates of public convenience and ne-
cessity under this provision:

HB The applicant has the burden of
clearly showing that the public convenience
and necessity would be materially promoted
by the issuance of a certificate to it.
Hearin Tank Lincs, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Commission, 247 La. 826, 174
So2d 644 (1965); Saia Motor Freight
Line v. Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion, 243 La. 787, 147 So.2d 390 (1962) ;
Herrin Transportation Co. v. Louisiana
Public Service Commission, 241 La. 174,
127 So.2d 541 (1961). A ruling-of the
Commission granting or denying a new
certificate must be supported by some fac-
tual evidence, in the absence of which the
order is deemed unreasonable, arbitrary,
and unwarranted, Louisiana Gas Service
Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion, 256 La. 536, 237 So.2d 369 (1970);
Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Louisiana Public
Service Commission, 235 La. 973, 106 So.
2d 438 (1958).

HEME ©» the other hand, when there is
some evidence upon which the Commission
could reasonably base its determination,
then the usual rule applies that the orders
of the Commission and of other adminis-

594

trative bodies exercising discretionary au-
thority are accorded great weight and will
not be overturned in the absence of a
showing that the administrative action is
Hearin Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 247 La. 826, 174 So.2d 644
(1965). As there stated, 174 So.2d 646~
647; “* * -*, Gf the applicant adduces
evidence before the commission which

arbitrary and capricious.

clearly shows that the public convenience
and necessity would be materially-promoted
by the issuance of the certificate, it is im-
material whether the evidence making this
clear showing is termed ‘adequate’ or is
termed ‘substantial’.” —- *

In annulling the order of the Commis-
sion, the district court held that no evi-~
dence was introduced at the Commission ”
hearings to prove that Truck Service was:
not’ fully capable of hauling bauxite as now
needed. Thus, the ‘trial court held,’ thére
was no proof that hauling services pro- ©
vided through an additional ‘certificate
would materially promote the public con-
venience and necessity.

In so holding, the trial court discounted
the testimony of the purchasing agent of
the shippers, who testified that Truck
Service was not equipped to perform the
total scope of the work involved in intra
state hauling of massive quantities of
bauxite per government specifications from
the Baton Rouge to the Ascension sites, a
new contract for which had just been

595

awarded. This witness was equally posi-
tive that A-1 Equipment could perform
this massive intrastate bauxite hauling, on
the basis of its past performance of exten-
sive interstate hauling.

The trial court discounted this shipper’s
testimony because, under cross-examina-
tion, he admitted that he had no facts
based on “past performance”, to judge
Truck Service’s capacity to perform the
work. The witness, however, explained
that he had no basis “on past performance”
to judge of Truck Service’s ability to per-
form intrastate bauxite services now need-
“ed, simply because Truck Service had nev-
cr engaged in any bauxite hauling-to his
knowledge. This witness also testified
that, when Truck Service had entered a
bid to perform the present massive intra-
state hauling, he had not accepted it, based.
upon his analysis of source information in
connection with the evaluation of compet-
ing bids by A-l Equipment and Truck
Service.

In our opinion, in overturning the Com-
mission order our trial brother overlooked
the totality of the shippers’ purchasing
agent’s testimony, as well as reasonable
factual inferences the Commission could
draw from other factual evidence before it.

Hl We reverse, because we are unable
to say that the Commission erred in hold-
ing that, by the evidence before it, it was
“clearly shown that the public convenience

596

and necessity would be materially promot-
ed” by the issuance of the certificate to
A-1 Equipment, La.R.S. 45:164, The fol-
lowing evidence before the Commission
supplies a reasonable factual basis for the
Commission’s holding to such effect:

1. Although Truck Service and its
predecessor had held a certificate to haul
bauxite since 1959, it had in fact only ex-
ercised its rights under the certificate once
(in about 1960), and then it had utilized
the services and equipment of the present
applicant, A-1 Equipment, through a sub-
contract. Truck Service had not engaged
in the extensive interstate bauxite hauling
which in recent years had occurred in East
Baton Rouge and Ascension Parishes.

2, The officers of Truck Service admit-
ted that, while their firm owned some 25
trucks or so, they did not presently own
the dragline, bulldozers, and front-end
loaders needed to perform the needed
bauxite hauling. Turther, in the list of
Truck Service’s equipment filed with the
Commission at the hearing, only 4 of the
25 trucks were of models later than 1967.

3. Although the Truck Service officers
testified that they would buy or lease the
additional equipment needed to perform
bauxite hauling, their balance sheet filed in
the Commission hearing showed only $150
cash on hand, with (in round figures) ac-
counts ($81,000) and notes payable
($38,000) amounting to $119,000. Truck

597

Service listed its accounts receivable at
$85,000 and other credits claimable at
$23,000, with the net value of its fixed as-
sets being valued at $56,000 (being mostly
the depreciated value of its trucks and
trailers). Although Truck Service had of-
fered to secure a performance bond, it was
open to the Commission to question Truck
Service’s ability to rent or secure economi-
cally the expensive additional equipment
needed to perform bauxite hauling.

4, A-1 Equipment has a field office lo-
cated in Ascension Parish near the point
of terminal for bauxite hauling, and in
fact A-1 Equipment has engaged and is
engaging in inferstate bauxite hauling op-
erations for the same shippers in Ascen-
sion Parish that.desire the complementary
service of the inérastate shipping by their
interstate hauler. Cf., Truck Service, Inc.
v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
256 La. 343, 236 So.2d 491 (1970).

5. The testimony as a whole of the
shippers’ purchasing agent that Truck
Service was not equipped to perform the
total contract, based also upon his check of
in connection with
bids,
deemed corroborated by reasonable factual

source information

evaluating competitive could be
inferences drawn from this other evidence

in the record.

HEME Since at the Commission hearing
some evidence was introduced by reason of
which the Commission could reasonably

598

find that “the public convenience and ne-
cessity would be materially promoted”, La.
RS. 45:164, by the issuance of the certifi-
cate to A~l Equipment, we are unable to
say that the determination of the Commis-
sion should be annulled on judicial review.
The orders and findings of the Commis-
sion are entitled to great weight; they will
not be overturned by the courts in the ab-
sence of a clear showing of abuse of pow-
er. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,
262 La. 391, 263 So.2d 333 (1972). Fur-
ther, as reiterated in Rubion Transfer and
Storage Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 240 La. 440, 123 So.2d 880,
884 (1960): “* * * Whenever the
Public Service Commission, in the issuing
of an order, has-acted within its power,
and not arbitrarily or grossly contrary to
the evidence, and when no error of law
has been committed, the court must -not
substitute its judgment for that of the
commission, or consider the expediency or
wisdom of the order, or say whether on
like evidence the court would have made a_
similar ruling.”

Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court anmulling the Commission order
granting the certificate to A-1 Equipment
Rentals, Inc. is reversed; and this suit is
dismissed at the cost of Truck Service,
Inc, plaintiff-appellee.

Reversed and dismissed.

599

268 So.2d 670

Dann SMITH et al.
ve

William E, DUNN, Louisiana Chief Parole
Officer, et al.

No. 52602.
Nov, 6, 1972.

601

George M. Leppert, New Orleans, for
plaintiffs-relators.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., for defendant-re-
spondent.

BARHAM, Justice.

Each of the five relators is a first of-
‘fender imprisoned in Louisiana State Peni-
tentiary who, after serving one-third of his
sentence, went before the Board of Parole
and was denied parole without reasons.
Reasons were requested, but in accordance
with the board’s policy were refused.
Mandamus was then sought from the Nine-
teenth Judicial District Court to compel the
chief parole officer to give reasons for the
denial of parole. On motion of this offi-
cer the mandamus proceedings were dis-
missed after a hearing, and we granted
certiorari.

It is relators’ position that the law gov-
erning this matter is RS. 49:951-966.
They argue that the Board of Parole is an
“Agency” within the definition of RS.
49:951(2), and that therefore the board is
required by R.S. 49:958 to give reasons for
its actions.

The motion to dismiss sustained by the
-district judge is predicated on the proposi-
tion that the applicable law is R.S. 15:574-

‘
602
We
agree with the respondent and the district
judge.

2-574,14, especially RS. 15:574.11.

Chapter 13 of Title 49 of the Revised
Statutes, upon which relators rely, is enti-
tled “Administrative Procedure”. It deals
generally with administrative boards and
agencies and prescribes their general pow-
ers and duties. The Board of Parole is
created and regulated by Title 15, Chapter
5 “Reprieve, Pardon, and Parole”, Part II
“Parole”. It is obvious from a reading of
this law that the Board of Parole is not
the usual administrative agency. The two
Jaws are entirely different, and indeed
their provisions are so conflicting as to be
irreconcilable. For example, administra-
tive bodies generally are required to pub-
lish a description of their organization, to
make available for public inspection all
rules and other written statements of poli-
cy and all final orders, decisions, and opin-
ions, R.S, 49:952, and to file in the office
of the Secretary of State a certified copy
of all rules, which are to be kept in a per-
manent register in that office open to pub-
lic inspection, R.S. 49:954, Moreover, oth-
er provisions of that title and chapter re-
quire notice, opportunity to answer and
present evidence, a record of all pleadings
and proceedings, and a final decision or
order in writing or stated in the record;
and judicial review of rules and their ap-
plicability and of all decisions and orders

603

is provided, R.S. 49:955, 958, 962-964. A
final decision of a board governed by the
administrative statute must be given to all
parties, accompanied by “findings of fact
and conclusions of law” including “a con-
cise and explicit statement of the underly-
ing facts supporting the findings”, R.S.
49:958. On the other hand, the Board of
Parole is required to keep confidential all
its records and information other than
“statistical information and all information
of a general nature”, R.S. 15:574.12, In
addition it is specifically provided that
there is no appeal from the board’s deci-

I, RS. 15 :574.11 and 574.12 read :

“§ D74.11. JFinality of board determina-
tions.

“Parole is an administrative device for
the rehabilitation of prisoners under su-
pervised freedom from actual restraint, and
the granting, conditions or revocation of
parole rest in the discretion of the Board
of Parole. Wo prisoner or parolee shall
have « right of appeal from @ decision of
the board regarding release or deferment
of release on parole, the imposition or
modification of authorized conditions of
parole, the termination or restoration of
parole supervision or discharge from pa-
role before the end of the parole period,
or the revocation or reconsideration of
revocation of parol, except for the denial
of a revocation hearing under R.S. 15:-
574.9.” (RS. 15:574.9 concerns the
hearing authorized upon return of a pa-
rolee to the institution from which he was
paroled.)

“§ 574.12. Information as to Paroles;
Confidential.

“The pre-sentence investigation report,
the pre-parole report, the information and
data gathered by the staff of the board,
the prison record and any other informa-

tion obtained ‘by the board in the dis-
charge of its official duty shall be con-

604

sions on the granting or refusing of parole,
RS. 15:574.114

HMM A comparison of the law on pa-
role with the law on administrative proce-
dure makes it clear that the Board of Pa-
role is not the sort of agency or board con-
templated as subject to the law on general
administrative procedure, and that the spe-
cial provisions in Title 15 creating the
Board of Parole and setting out its powers
and duties are not complementary or sup-
plementary to the general administrative
rules of procedure.®

fidentiat and shall not be subject to public
inspection nor be disclosed directly or in-
directly to anyone other than the board
of parole, the board of pardons, the gov-
emor, the sentencing judge and the per-
sonnel of the Department of Institutions.

“All statistical information and all in-
formation of a general nature which is
recovered in connection with parole serv-
ices shall be subject to public inspection at
any time.” (Hmphasis supplied.)

2. Our opinion is based upon the pleadings
below and the writ application which re-
lators filed here, They sought only the
special remedy of mandamus and urged
only that we apply the administrative
procedure statute to the granting or deny-
ing of parole because, as they alleged,
the administration of criminal justice is
made ineffective when prison inmates are
not told what are their deficiencies in re-
habilitation which prevent parole. Rela-
tors have not attacked the constitution-
ality of the statutes which grant author-
ity to the parole board, In amicus curiae
brief filed by a penitentiary inmate other
than relators, it is argued that R.S. 15:-
574.11 is an unconstitutional denial of

due process because it allows a prisoner

to be refused the privilege of parole with-

605

HMB Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, to be applied where ordinary
means fail to afford adequate relief. It
never issues except when there is a clear
and specific right to be enforced or when
there is a purely ministerial duty to be per-
formed. See C.C.P. Arts. 3861, 3862, 3863.
We find no law which gives relators a
right to have, or which makes it the duty
of the chief parole officer to furnish, rea-
This being so,
mandamus will not lie to compel the giving
of reasons.

sons for refusal of parole.

State ex rel. People’s State
Bank v. Police Jury of Red River Parish,
154 La. 389, 97 So. 584 (1923); Schmidt v.
City of New Orleans, 164 La. 1006, 115 So.
63 (1927); State ex rel. Board of Com’rs
for Lake Borgne Levee Dist. v. Trist, 234
La. 513, 100 So.2d 489 (1958).

The ruling of the district court dismiss-
ing these proceedings is affirmed.

DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.

out a disclosure of the reasons for the ac-
tion and because it denies a right of ap-
peal or review from the action of the
board in such cases, The unconstitution-
ality of a statute cannot be raised in this
manner. We can notice ex proprio motu
the issue of constitutionality only when it

606
DIXON, Justice (concurring).

I respectfully concur.

Act 191 of 1968 reorganized the parole
board, The administrative procedure act
(R.S. 49:951 et seq.) is Act 382 of 1966.

The board of parole act catalogs the du-
ties and the powers of the board of parole.
Detailed procedures are set up in the act.
Although parole is termed “an administra-
tive device” in the act, the decisions of the
board are discretionary and there is, in
general, no right of appeal from a decision
of the board, B.S, 15:574.11, The infor-
mation obtained by the board or its staff is
confidential, and not subject to public
inspection. R.S. 15:574.12:

Consequently, it is apparent that the leg-
islature, in its later enactment of provi-
sions governing the board of parole, did
not intend for the earlier administrative
procedures act to apply.

affects our jurisdiction. See State v.
Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484
(4969), majority and dissent; State v.
Gatlin, 241 La, 821, 129 So.2d 4 (1961).
Our opinion here is necessarily limited by
the nature of the action pleaded and the
issues it presents,

607
'

268 So.2d 673

Maria Haydee CORTES
: ve

Stanley E, FLEMING, a/k/a Egon
Stanley Migocky.

No. 52963.
Nov, 21, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be

notified.

Lt]
268 So.2d 673

GILL TRAILER & EQUIPMENT
RENTALS, INC.
ve

S. D’ANTONI, INC., and/or S. D’Antoni
Motor Freight Lines.

No. 52965.

Nov. 21, 1972,

608

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be
notified,

268 So.2d 673

Gordon CORKERN
ve
MAIN INSURANCE CO. et al.

Alvin GARIC et al.
ve
MAIN INSURANCE CO. et al.

No. 52941.

Nov. 16, 1972.

Writ not considezed.
no application for rehearing to the Court
of Appeal. La.R.S, 13:4450, L.C.C.P. 2167;
Art. 7, Sec. 11, La.Const.

Applicant made

609 | 610
a
268 So.2d 673

Andrew AUSTRUM

ve It is ordered that the writ of review is-
CITY OF BATON ROUGE et al. sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
Willie D. LEWIS record in duplicate of the case; and that
v. counsel for plaintiff and defendant be
Andrew AUSTRUM et al. notified.
No, 52958,
Noy. 24, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is- :
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the 268 S0.2d 674
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be
notified, ve
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Loutsi-

ana State Penitentiary, et al.
: No. 52959.

Noy. 21, 1972.

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Larry SMITH

288 Sood Ors Po

Cloedale BASS, wife of Edward C. ABREO eas .
y. Application denied; the contemporane-

Edward C, ABREO. ous record made at time of plea shows
No. 52968. applicant is not entitled to relief sought.

Noy. 21, 1972, : woe .
BARHAM, J,, is of the opinion an evi-

dentiary hearing should be granted on
competence of counsel.

I
268 So.2d 674

STATE of Louisiana ex rel, Tracy LEWIS.
ve

Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 52905.
Nov. 21, 1972.

Application denied. “he relief sought
is moot because the judge, since the filing
of the writ, has granted relator a new trial.

268 So.2d 67+

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
ve
Thomas A. JOHNSON.

No. 52954.

Nov. 21, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made

does not warrant the exercise of our super-
visory jurisdiction.

612

BARHAM, J,, is of the opinion the writ
should be granted on the motion to quash
to determine whether R.S. 14:106 super-
cedes and makes unconstitutional that por-
tion of 828 M.C.S. Sez. 42-46 which does
not exempt employees without financial in-
terest in the theater house except for the

salary received for work. This defendant
is of the excluded class under the State
law.

a:
268 S0.2d 675

Wilmer G, GATHERIGHT
ve

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUAR-
ANTY COMPANY et al.

No. 52960.

Noy. 21, 1972.

the result is cor-

Application denied;
rect,

613 | 614

I
268 S0.2d 675

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR the
LAFOURCHE BASIN LEVEE
DISTRICT

ve
m J. ELMER et al.

No. 52967.
Noy. 21, 1972.

Dr. Wi

Writ refused. Judgment not final.

L
268 So.24 675

William INABNET
ve

PAN AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY.

No. 52966.

Noy, 21, 1972.

Writ denied; as to this applicant, there
is no error of law.

L
268 So.2d 675

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Wayne MORRIS
et al,

vw
©, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 52962.

Nov. 21, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made
does not warrant the exercise of our ju-
risdiction, as letters from Clerk of Dis-
trict Court show there is no record that
relators have filed applications in the Dis-
trict Court.

L
268 So.2d 676

D. H. OVERMEYER CO., INC,
ve

BLAKELEY FLOOR COVERING, INC.
No. 52969.

Noy. 21, 1972.

Application denied; the judgment is cor-

rect,

:
268 S0.2d 676

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Charlie J. NELSON.
No, 52972.

Noy, 21, 1972.

Writ denied. No bills of exceptions
were perfected and presented to support
this writ application.

616

SANDERS, J., concurs in the denial of
the writ.

DIXON, J., concurs in the denial, but
there are no rules of this Court, and no
statutory provisions requiring perfected
bills of exceptions on applications for writs
to this Court.

Z
268 $0.24 676

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. William DOYLE
ve
C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 52973.

Noy. 21, 1972.

Writ denied. Having received informa-
tion that the relator’s application will be
heard on November 27th, the court is of
the opinion that the present application for
mandamus is moot.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion man-
damus should issue. The writ of habe-~
corpus was filed -in the trial court mor:

‘617

‘than one year ago. The trial court took

no action. In our continual holding of
‘mandamus writs in order to give trial
courts time to act we avoid our constitu-
tional obligation to act and grant legal re-
lief when warranted. These delays by us
‘while asking for returns tend to multiply
the delays below in acting on writs of

habeas corpus. Where a showing is made

absolutely entitling one to relief by man-
damus, I am of the opinion we should—we
must—act without deiay, especially wkere
‘the mandamus is leveled at delinquencies
in acting on the “Great Writ.”

I
268 So.2d 677

STATE of Louisiana
ve
John FULFORD.

No. 52979.
Nov. 21, 1972.

618

Writ refused. There is no showing that
relator has applied to the trial court for
relief and exhausted his remedies there.

a
268 So.2d 677

Hubert Joseph LeBLANC, Individually and
as Administrator of the Minors, Cornel H.
LeBiane and Natalie M. LeBiane

ve
The ESTATE of Anthony Joseph Pierre
BLANCHARD et al.
Mrs, Melina ACOSTA, Widow of Joseph
BLANCHARD
ve

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS of the
State of Louisiana and the Aetna Cas-
uaity and Surety Company.

No, 52970.
Nov. 21, 1972.

‘Writ refused. On the facts found by the
Court of Appeal we find no error of law in
its judgment. .

619 EE 620
|

268 So.2d 677

William Edward MAYES
ve

The STATE of Louisiana.
No. 52974,

Nov, 21, 1972.

Writ denied: No error of law in the rul-
ing complained of.

:
268 S0.2d 677

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Rohert AULDS
ve

C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 52975.

Noy, 21, 1972.

Application denied; the judgment of the
trial court is correct,

BARHAM, J,, is of the opinion that sev-
eral factual allegations raise competence
of counsel and due process which require
evidentiary inquiry. I would order a hear-
ing on competence of counsel and suppres-
sion of evidence favorable to  relator-
through alleged collusion,

L
268 So.2d 678

Joseph P, MESSINA eft al.
¥

KOCH INDUSTRIES, ENC. (formerly Rock,
Istand Oi! & Refining Co., Inc.,) et al.

No. 52971,

Nov. 28, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be-
notified.

621 De 622

LI |
268 So.2d 678 268 So.2d 678
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Abel HARDY, Sr., et al.
Arthur MITCHELL ve
ve Raymond K!IDDER.
‘C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi- No. 52981.
ana State Penitentiary. Nov. 28, 1972.
No. 52976.
Nov. 21, 1972.

Application denied; on the showing made. It is ordered that the writ of review is-
at the hearing below, relator is not entitled Ste; that the Court of Appeal send up
to the relief sought. the record in duplicate of the case; and

that counsel for plaintiff and defendant be
notified.
Lt]
268 So.2d 678 L
J.C. DURBIN and Gary Lee Durbin 268 So.2d 679
w

STATE of Louisiana ex rel, Samuel LANG
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY. ve

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.

Noy. 21, 1972. No. 52956.
Noy, 28, 1972.

Writ denied. Relator’s application does

No. 52978.

Application not considered. Not timely not allege a ground warranting the grant-
filed. See Art. 7, Sec. 11, La.Const1921. ing of a hearing on writ of habeas corpus.

I
268 S0.2d 679

Roy BROADWAY
ve
ALL STAR INSURANCE COMPANY.

No, 52987.

Nov. 28, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be
notified.

L
268 S0.24 679

Billy Davis COKER:
ve

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
COMPANY et al.

No, 52955.

Nov. 28, 1972.

624.

Writ refused. On the facts found by the:
Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in.
its judgment.

268 So.2d 679

Mrs. Grace Agnes CORNISH et al.
ve

KINDER CANAL COMPANY et al., David
Crow, Trustee, and Irwin T, Muslow,
Intervenors-Appellants,

No. 52980.

Nov. 28, 1972.

Writ denied.
the result is correct.

On the facts of this case

SUMMERS, J., is of the opinion the |

writ should be granted.

DIXON, J., is of the opinion the writ

should be granted. °

625 De 62

a
268 So.2d 680

Calvin L. PRICE. Application denied; the result is correct.

ve

GAS & WELL OPERATING SERVICE and HAMLIN, SUMMERS & DIXON, JJ.,

Travelers Insurance Company. are of the view that the application should
No. 52983, be granted. \
Nov. 28, 1972. ns
Writ denied: Under the facts found by Ll

te Court of Appeal, there is no error of 268 $0.2 680
aw

Mrs. Lovenia C. ROYER

ve
| | E, W. CANTRELLE, d/b/a Hub City

Laundry and Cleaners,

ry No. 52988.
268 So.2a 680 Nov. 28, 1972.

d. Minos SIMON
ve

‘SOUTHWEST LOUISIANA ELECTRIC
MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION.

No, 52986,
Nov. 28, 1972. Writ refused. On the facts found by the

court of appeal we find no error of law in
its judgment, tee

627 a 628

269 So.2d 186

W, T. GRANT COMPANY
ve
Lawrence MITCHELL.

No, 52388,
Noy. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1972.

629, De 630

——

John W. Reed, Robert J. Hobbs, New
Orleans, for defendant-relator.

Favret & Favret, Marshall J. Favret,
New Orleans, for plaintiff-respondent.

SUMMERS, Justice.

Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refriger-
ator, range, stereo and washer from W. T.
Grant Company on an installment sales
contract. When Mitchell defaulted in his
payments, Grant instituted this suit in the
First City Court of New Orleans for $574.-
19, the balance due on the contract.

Grant alleged its entitlement to “a ven-
dor’s lien and privilege” on the merchandise
and that it “fears that said defendant will
encumber or alienate same during the
pendency of the proceeding . . . .”
Accordingly, Grant alleged, the issuance
of a writ of sequestration was necessary to
protect its interest. La.Code Civ.P. arts.
3501, 3571.

In an attached affidavit Jerry Dunnegan,
Grant’s Credit Manager, verified the facts

631

“has reason to fear and beliéve that the
said defendant, Lawrence Mitchell, will
encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of
« during the pend-
ency of these proceedings, and that a writ
of sequestration is necessary . a
La.Code Civ.P. art. 3501.

the merchandise . .

The Judge of the City Court signed an
order for the issuance of a writ of seques-
tration upon plaintiff furnishing bond in
the amount of $1,125. La.Code Civ.P. art.
3574. On the same day bond was furnished,
February 2, 1972, the writ of sequestration
issued, and Mitchell was cited to answer
within five days. On February 7, 1972
Mitcheil’s stove, refrigerator and electric
wash tub were provisionally seized pursuant
to the writ of sequestration,

Thereafter, on March 3, 1972, Mitchell’s
counsel filed a motion to dissolve the writ
of sequestration, alleging that the refriger-
ator, stove and electric wash tub were
exempt from seizure by any process what-
soever under Sectio:: 3881 of Title 13 of
the Revised Statutes. The motion to dis-

1, LaR.S. 18:3881:
“Phe following income or property of

a debtor is exempt from seizure under any
writ, mandate, or process whatsoever:

4 * * 2 *

“(4) The clothing, bed, bedding, bed-
stead, linen, china, glasses, knives, forks,
spoons, dining table and chairs, cooking
stove, kitchen utensils, pressing irons,
washiubs, and refrigerator (electric or
otherwise) used by him or a member
of his family; the family portraits; his

of the petition and affirmed that petitioner

632°

solve was also based upon the assertion:
that Mitchell was denied due process of
law in that he received no notice prior to
the provisional seizure under the writ. of.
sequestration nor was he afforded an op-
portunity to defend his rights to the per--
sonal property prior to the seizure. Mitchell:
also alleged his poverty and want of means:
and sought to proceed in forma pauperis as"
authorized by Article 5181. of the Code of°
Civil Procedure.

Mitchell’s motion to dissolve and’ the
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
were denied by the judge a quo, and a sub-
sequent application for review to the Court:
of Appeal, Fourth Circuit was also denied:
We granted review on Mitchell’s applica--
tion.

L

Section 3881 of Title 13 of the Revised:
Statutes exempts from seizure the stove,.
wash tub and refrigerator “under any writ,
mandate, or process whatsoever’. This.
section was added to the Revised Statutes
by Act 32 of 1960 to replace Article 644 of
the Code of Practice ® when the latter was.

arms and military accoutrements; the
musical instruments played or practiced
on by him or a member of his family;.
and the poultry and fowl kept by him.
for the usc of his family.”

* # Fs : +

2. La.Coile of Practice, art. 644:

“The sheriff or constable can not seize
the linen and clothes belonging to the deb-
tor or his wife, nor his bed, bedding or
bedstead, nor those of his family, nor

633

repealed, having been superseded by the
Code of Civil Procedure. See Act 15 of
1960.

After its inclusion in the Revised Stat-
utes, Section 3881 was amended in 1961 to
remove all doubt that the wages, salaries,
and other compensation of public employees
and contractors were subject to garnish-
ment. The second reason was to effectuate
the recommendation of the Louisiana Sher-
iff’s Association that the refrigerator used
in a debtor’s household be exempted from
seizure. Act 25 of 1961; Comments by
Henry G. McMahon to Section 3881. In
all other respects the subject matter of
Article 644 of the Code of Practice was
unchanged by Section 3881.

This conclusion is further confirmed by
the inclusion of Section 3881 in Chapter 18
of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes dealing
with seizures in genéral, This chapter also
contains enactments pertaining to execution
of judgments under a writ.of fieri facias;
whereas a separate chapter (Chapter 20)
in the same title collects the sections per-
taining to provisional remedies (attach-

ment, sequestration, etc.). If the com-
his arms and military accoutrements,
nor the tools and instruments and books
and sewing machines, necessary for the
exercise of his or her calling, trade or
profession by which he or she makes a
living; nor shall he, in any case, seize
the rights of personal servitude, of use
and habitation, of usufruct to the estate
of a minor child, nor the income of dotal
property, . . . nor the cooking stove,
and utensils of said stove, nor the plates,

634

pilers of the Revised Statutes, and the
Legislature, intended that the exemptions
of Section 3881 should apply to provisional
remedies, it would have been more orderly
and logical to include this section with the
sections on that subject. Instead this ex-
emption provision was included with those
sections pertaining to seizures under fieri
facias.

Article 644 of the Code of Practice was
contained in Chapter 6, “Of The Proceed-
ings in Execution of Judgments.” Section
3 of that chapter dealt with “The Execu-
tion of Judgments Directing the Payment
of a Sum of Money.” Paragraph 1 of
Section 3 pertained to the Writ of Fieri
Facias. Article 644 fails under this head-
ing. It is for this reason that the courts
have held that Article 644 related to ex-
emptions from seizure under the writ of
fieri facias only, refusing to allow the
exemption against a provisional seizure to
assert a lessor’s privilege. Ross v. Rosen-
thal, 1 Orleans App. 203 (1904), cert, denied
by Supreme Court June 30, 1904; Benton
v. Jarrett, No. 2136 on the Docket of the
Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans, cert.

dishes, knives and forks, and spoons, nor

the dining table and dining chairs, nor
washtub, nor smoothing irons and iron-
ing furnaces, nor family portraits be-
longing to the debtor, nor the musical in-
struments played on or practiced on by
any member of the family, nor any poul-

try or fowls belonging to the debtor for

family use.”
* * * = *

635

denied. In Stewart v. Lacoume, 30 La.
Ann. 157 (1878), commenting upon the
effect of Article 644, this court said: “It
is evident that the exemptions of property
from seizure provided for by Art. 644 C.P.
and by the Acts of 1872 and 1874, do not
apply in favor of the lessees as against their
lessors.”

IM These results were based upon the
proposition that the lessor’s privilege es-
tablished by Article 2705 of the Civil Code
‘was not on the same subject matter as the
exemptions of Article 644 “and the Code of
Practice was framed exclusively with a
view to judicial proceedings, and its provi-
sions on the subject of general laws do
not necessarily repeal those of the Civil
Code that are contrary to, or inconsistent
with them.” Ellis v. Prevost, 13 La. 230
(1839). See also Kay v. Furlow, 178 La.
635, 152 So. 315 (1934); Kyle v. Sigur, 121
La. 888, 46 So. 910 (1908) ; Ross v. Rosen-
thal, 1 Orleans App. 203 (1904).
sence, the conclusion has been that exemp-

In es-

tions from seizure under fieri facias were
inapplicable to provisional remedies to as-
sert privileges created by the Civil Code.
On this basis we hold that the exemptions
allowed by Section 3881 cannot be allowed
against a provisional seizure by writ of
sequestration to preserve a vendor's priv-
ilege.

3. La.Code of 1808, (Digest of Civil Laws

Now in Force in the Territory of Or-
Jeans with Alterations and Amendments

636
IL.

Article 3217 of the Civil Code announces
that “The debts which are privileged on
certain movables, are the following: . .

The price due on movable effects, if they
are yet in the possession of the purchaser

Article 3227 elaborates:

He who has sold to another any movable
property, which is not paid for, has a
preference on the price of his property,
over the other creditors of the purchaser,
whether the sale is made on a credit or
without, if the property still remains in
the possession of the purchaser...

HI The vendor’s privilege on movables
exist against the property sold as a sub-
stantive right incident to the contract of
sale. Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La.Ann.
699 (1857) ; State ex rel, Landry v. Brous-
sard, 177 So. 403 (La.App.1937).

The privilege has been an integral part
of the law of Louisiana since the adoption
of the State’s first code in 1808.3 Its prac-
tical importance has diminished somewhat
since adoption of the Chattel Mortgage Act,
the latter having been enacted principally
to supply the commercial deficiency of the
vendor's privilege, which in general does
not follow the movable when it leaves the
vendee’s possession. Nevertheless, the ven-

Adopted to its Present System of Gov-

ernment.) Bk. 8, Tit. 19, Arts. T4,
subdiv. 5, and 75, subdiv. 1.

637 Ee 638

dor’s privilege remains an important and
valuable right in commerce. The formal-
ity, time and expense involved in executing
and recording chattel mortgages often pre-
vent their use, particularly on small, inex-
pensive chattels or where the vendor ne-
glects or is prevented from using the chattel
mortgage. Daggett, Louisiana Privileges
and Chattel Mortgages, p. 91 (1942); Mar-
golin, Vendor's Privilege, 4 Tul.L.Rev. 237
(1929),

As understood in our law, the vendor’s
privilege does not exist at common law.
It is distinguished from the common law
vendor’s lien, which the vendor loses when
he delivers possession of the article sold
to the vendee. Daggett, Id.

The privilege exists upon the sound
equitable principle that when the purchaser
acquires the vendor’s property, his estate
is enriched. “It would indeed be unjust
to place an unpaid vendor on a footing of
equality with other creditors of the pur-
chaser . It would be iniquitous to
permit the property sold to become the
prey of the creditors of the purchaser with-
out requiring, as a condition precedent, the
payment of its cost ” De Lilsle
v. Succ. of Moss, 34 La.Ann, 164 (1882).

As defined by Laurent, Vol. XXX, p. 6,
§ 2; p. 18, § 16, the raison etre of the
vendor’s privilege is the enrichment of the
purchaser’s estate by the acquisition of the
vendor’s property. The right to the pay-
ment of the price has, therefore, always

commended itself to the favorable consid-
eration of courts.

Planiol gives this justification of the
privilege:

As long as the price is not paid the
sale augments the patrimony of the buyer
at the expense of the vendor; the latter
has impoverished himself, he has alien-
ated his property and has not received
anything in exchange. The vendor has
thus gratuitously augmented the common
pledge of the creditors of the buyer; the
latter can be paid with the property
sold without the vendor being paid, they
enrich themselves at his expense, which
is unjust... (Planiol, Vol. 2,
No. 2608)

The privilege alone as defined by the
Civil Code is of limited value. It is es-
sentially a right without a remedy for its
implementation. ‘The machinery for its
enforcement and protection is found in our
procedural law. Louisiana has long recog-
nized a need for several types of seizure
before judgment. Today two are allowed:
attachment and sequestration. Attachment.
is based upon some act, or anticipated act,
of the debtor which would place the cred-
itor at a disadvantage in the suit and which
prompts the law to protect the creditor by
permitting him to seize the debtor’s prop~
erty pending the suit, even though the cred-
itor has no claim against the thing seized.
Sequestration involves no intent on the part
of the debtor to defraud, but it is founded

639 | 640

upon a claim to the ownership or posses-
sion or a privilege on the property seized.
La.Code Civ.P. Book VII, Special Proceed-
ings, Title I, Provisional Remedies, Chap-
ter 1, Attachment and Sequestration, Pre-
liminary Statement.

Sequestration issues only when the
grounds clearly appear by affidavit, and
security is required for the payment of
damages for wrongful issuance of the writ.
La.Code Civ.P. 3501. It issues on the claim
of ownership, right of possession or a mort-
gage, lien or privilege if it is within the
power of the defendant to conceal, dispose
of, or waste the property or the revenues
therefrom, or remove the property from the
parish during the pendency of the action.
Id. art, 3571. In certain instances the court
may on its own motion order the sequestra-
tion of property where the ownership is in
dispute. Id, art. 3572, The seizure must
not be excessive, id. art. 3505, and the de-
fendant may by contradictory motion obtain
its dissolution unless plaintiff proves the
grounds. Or defendant may obtain the
release of the property upon furnishing se-
curity. Id. art. 3507. Sequestration has
only the effect of preserving the property
pending judgment. Id, 3510. Plaintiff's
security is not released until a final judg-
ment is rendered in his favor. Id, art. 3512.

Against this background we consider
Mitchell's due process contention. It is
based upon the argument that to satisfy
the requirements of due process defendant

is entitled to prior notice and prior hearing
before seizure. The contention is prin-
cipally based upon the recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983,
32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), and its companion
case. There appellants were purchasers of
household goods under conditional sales
contracts. They challanged the prejudg-
ment replevin provisions of the Florida and
Pennsylvania law.

The Court declared these statutes worked
a deprivation of property without due proc-
ess of law insofar as they denied the right
to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from their possessor.
However, in its reasons the Court said,
“There may be cases in which a creditor
could make a showing of immediate danger
that a debtor will destroy or conceal dis-
puted goods.”

Hl This clearly announced exception to
the ruling, we feel, exists in the instant
case. Aside from the quoted allegations of
the petition and averments of attached af-
fidavits, there is the irrefutable inference
that the vendee has, by the act of buying
itself, consented to the preservation of the
vendor's privilege.

A purchaser can only be excused from the
effects of the vendor’s privilege by saying
he was ignorant of its implications. To
sanction such an excuse violates the most
fundamental of all legal principles and

641

negates law at its source. It is only one
step from the conclusion that the purchaser
is presumed to know the law to say that
when the purchaser acquires property sub-
ject to the vendor’s privilege, he is held
to be cognizant of the remedies such a
privilege affords to the vendor and the
ancillary obligations of the purchaser. One
of these remedies is the right to sequestra-
tion where the purchaser has defaulted in
his payments.

HI Under Louisiana law, therefore, the
purchaser’s possession is precarious to this
extent: He holds possession with the im-
plied-in-law knowledge that he has acquired
the ‘Tight to possession, subject to the
vendor’s paramount right to seize the prop-
erty without hearing should he default in
his payments. This seizure, the law or-
dains, must be with security in favor of the
debtor and can only continue until a final
adjudication of the rights of the parties.
In effect, when the purchaser acquires mov-
ables he consents to the privilege and its
enforcement provisionally.

Hl The vendor's privilege differs from
the common law conditional sale in that, in
the conditional sale, the vendor retains title,
and he does not lose his right to recover
the property after it leaves the possession
of the vendee. It is different with the
vendor’s privilege. The vendor’s privilege
is lost when the vendee divests himself of
possession. The prejudgment seizure is the

642
only effective device which will preserve
the vendor’s rights against’ d'reluctant deb-
tor, pending the protracted delay incident
to obtaining judgment, Sequestration is
simply a device to which the parties to
the sale have, in effect, agreed whereby
the property may be preserved for the mu-
tual benefit of the parties pending a deter-
mination of their rights. :

The law of vendor’s privilege in this state
operates to favor the vendor and the ven-
dee alike. The long history of vendor's
privilege in Louisiana demonstrates that it
enables the purchaser to acquire property
he may otherwise be unable to buy as much
Without
the benefits accorded the vendor, it may

as it induces the vendor ta sell.

well be concluded that in a substantial num-
ber of instances the possession and title to
property would not be surrendered to pro-
spective purchasers, Because of it, many
impecunious citizens are enabled to acquire
property to foster their livelihood and pro-
vide for their sustenance.

I We can discern no violation of due
process rights when the purchaser is fully
informed by law of the remedies which
may be invoked as an incident of the sale.

wr.

Hl Finally, Mitchell complains that he
has not been permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis. He maintains he is indigent and
entitled to the privilege of litigating with-

643

out the prior payment of costs (La.Code
Civ.P. art, 5181), because, according to his
He
maintains this low income, coupled with
the need to support a wife and three chil-
dren, creates such a hardship that he can-

brief, he earns only $70 per week.

not afford to pay the costs.

There is no record evidence to support
the claim other than the general statements
in his affidavits accompanying the motion
to dissolve to the effect that he is unable
to pay costs because of his poverty. This is
not sufficient to overcome the presumption
of correctness attaching to the judge’s or-
der which denied Mitchell the right to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis. Nevertheless, since
we are remanding this case to be proceeded
with on its merits, we shall afford Mitchell
an opportunity to make up a proper record
on this forma pauperis issue.

For the reasons assigned, the ruling of
the trial judge rejecting the motion to dis-
solve the writ of sequestration is affrimed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings in accordance with
law and the views herein expressed. The
assessment of costs is to await the final
outcome of the case.

DIXON, J., concurs in the result, but is
of the opinion that Young v. Geter, 185
La. 709, 170 So, 240, is contra and should be
t. The stereo simultaneously seized is not

exempt from seizure under the statute;
the washing machine may be, if it is with-

644

overruled. Young v. Geter gives too nar-
row a.construction to Article 1, Section 11
of the Louisiana Constitution.

BARHAM, J., dissents for reasons as-
signed by TATE, J.

TATE, J., dissents and assigns written
reasons.

TATE, Justice (concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

I fully concur in Parts II and III of the
excellent majority opinion. However, on
the basis of current legislative enactments
and judicial interpretations, I cannot sub-
scribe to the holding that a debtor’s cooking
stove and refrigerator are not expressly
exempt from seizure under La.R.S. 13-
3881.4

This enactment is found within Title 13
(“Courts and Judicial Procedures”) of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes. It is found in
Chapter 18 thereof, entitled “Seizures in
General”. La.R.S. 13:3881 exempts speci-
fied income or property “from seizure un-
der any writ, mandate, or process what-
soever.”,

‘There is thus no statutory warrant for
holding La.R.S. 13:3881, providing for ex-
emptions from seizure under “any writ,
mandate, or process whatsoever”, applicable

in the exemption of “washtubs”.
footnote 8 below.

See

645

only to seizures under writs of fi, fa. Nor
is there any practical reason for the dis-
tinction?

The exemption statue in question was en-
acted in 1960 in connection with the repeal
of the old 1961 Code of Practice, especially
Article 644 thereof. As did that former
Article, the 1960 statutory provision ex-
empts from seizure a major proportion of
a debtor's wages, the tools and instruments
by which he earns a living, and (pertinent-
ly) certain minimal household goods neces-
sary to save a debtor from being without
the means to eat or sleep.3 This statute
unambiguously exempts from any seizure
the present debtor’s stove and refrigerator.

The writer initially believed that, despite
this exemption from seizure, it did not
apply to debts “for the purchase price of
property or any part of such purchase

2. Here the seizure was under a writ of
sequestration, a conservatory writ per-
mitting provisional seizure of the prop-
erty “during the pendency of the action”,
La.0.Civ.P, Art. 8571, i. e, before judg-
ment. ‘The property thus temporarily
seized cannot be sold until there is final
judgment, recognizing the sequestration.
La.C.iv.P. Art. 8510, after which the
property must be seized and sold under
the writ of fi. fa. See Hancock Bank v.
Alexander, 256 La. 648, 287 So.2d 669,
678 (1970) and Official Revision Com-
ment (b) to Article 8510. Thus, under
the majority’s interpretation, a debtor
cannot claim the exemption from tem-
porary seizure but, under LaR.S. 18:-
8881, he may do so to prevent the sale
of the exempted property when a writ
of fi, fa. issues in execution of the judg-
ment, Aside from harassing the debtor

646

price”, by reason of Article 11, Section
(4), La.Constitution of 1921. See Foot-
note 4 below. However, this court express-
ly rejected a similar contention in Young v.
Geter, 185 La. 709, 170 So. 240, 107 A.L.R.
608 (1936), a lead case. See also Grayson
v. Gray, 207 So.2d 916 (La.App.2d Cir.
1968) to the same effect; cf, also, Mounger
v. Ferrell, 11 So.2d 56 (La.App.2d Cir.
1942),

In Young v. Geter a landlord sought to
enforce his lessor’s privilege against cer-
tain property used by the tenant to earn
his livelihood. Just as is the property pres-
ently seized, the tools there seized were
exempt from seizure under the predecessor
provision (Article 644, Louisiana Code of
Practice of 1870) to La.R.S. 13:3881(2).
This court expressly rejected the conten-
tion that provisions of Article KI, Section

by depriving him of the temporary use of
his beds, bedding, kitchen stove, etc., the
creditor thus is not permitted to seize
and sell the property to satisfy the claim
against it.

3, See La.R.S. 13:8881, exempting from
seizure by “any writ, mandate, or process
whatsoever: * * * 4. The clothing,
bed, bedding, bedstead, linen, china, glass-
es, knives, forks, spoons, dining table
and chairs, cooking stove, kitchen utensils,
pressing irons, washtubs, and refrigerator
(electric or otherwise) used by him or
a member of bis family; the family por-
traits; his arms and military aceoutre-
ments; the musical instruments played
or practiced on by him or a member of
his family; and the poultry and fowl
kept by him for the use of his family.”

647

emption from ‘seizure of property subject
to the landlord’s privilege. The court ex-
pressly held that the cited constitutional
provision applied only to invalidate the
claim of a right to the homestéad exemption
established by Article 11, Section 1, of
the constitution—an exemption concededly

not at issue’ here,

In refusing to hold the statutory exemp-
tion invalid against the claim of the lessor’s
privilege (a claim based like the ven-
dor’s privilege upon our Civil Code and
the valid commercial and equitable pur-
poses thereby embodied), this court ex-
pressly stated, 170 So. 242: “In order
to advance the humane purpose of pre-
serving to the unfortunate debtor and his
family the means of obtaining a liveli-
hood and thus prevent him from becom-
ing a charge upon the public, it has become
an almost universal rule that statutes creat-
ing an exemption should receive a liberal
construction in favor of the debtor.”

The ruling in Young v. Geter is con-
trolling here. The broad statutory exemp-
tion to a debtor of minimal household furni-
ture necessary for him to eat and sleep
must be respected by the courts, As there
stated, 170 So. 241, “ ‘the state has an inter-
est . . . that families shall not be de-
prived by extravagance or misfortune of
4. The constitutional article provides that

“this exemption” does not apply to debts
“1. For the purchase price of property

24 applied'so aé to nullify the statutory ex-

648
the shelter and comforts necessary to health
and activity?”

There is simply no legislative or consti-
tutional exception from this exemption now
in effect. However salutary the purposes
of the legislatively created vendor’s privi-
lege, “it is hornbook law” that the legisla-
tively created privilege may be legislatively
made subject to “such exemptions and
limitations” as the iegislature sees fit.
Young v. Geter at 170 So. 242.

Arguably, perhaps, former Code of Prac-
tice Article 845 (1870; as amended in 1924)
did provide a statutory basis for a claim
that the statutory exemption from seizure
did not apply to debts for the purchase
price. See Ferrell v. Jena Auto. Co., 16
So.2d 548 (La.App.2d Cir. 1943), However,
Article 845 of the Code of Practice was re-
pealed by the enactment of the 1960 Code
of Civil Procedure, No subsequent enact-
ment has afforded even the shadow of a
basis for claiming that the statutory exemp-
tion from seizure of minimal household
goods must not be respected by the courts.

The courts are not empowered to supply
an exception to the broad exemption pro-
vided by the legislature in La.RS. 13:3881,
however equitable or wise we may deem
such an exception. Perhaps the legisla~
ture in its discretion and wisdom may modi-
fy such exemption law, in the same manner
or any part of such purchase price.

+ + . 5. For rent which bears a privi-
lege upon said property.”

3)
as former La,Code of Practice Article 845 :
was modified (to except certain debts, such
as the purchase price, from the exemption
from any seizure); but it has not yet done
~ so. Until then, the creditor’s only remedy
is to secure a contractual waiver of the
exemption by chattel mortgage or other-
wise.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dis-
sent.

269 So.2d 194
, NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS AS-
SOCIATION LOCAL 632, et al.
ve
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al.
“NEW ORLEANS FIREFIGHTERS AS-
SOCIATION LOCAL 632, et al.
ve
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al.

Nos. 52511, 52519.

Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dee. 11, 1972.

oe

8 ai ,

2
$3

Dodd, Hirsch, Barker, Meunier, Bou-
dreaux & Lamy, C. Paul Barker, Maurice
S. Cazaubon, Jr., New Orleans, for plain-

tiffs-applicants,

Blake G. Arata, City Atty. Frank J.
Varela, Asst. City Atty., for defendants-re-
spondents.

Many, Hartman, Lococo & Dwyer,
Ralph D. Dwyer, Jr., New Orleans, for

amicus curiae.

DIXON, Justice.

In June of 1969 the plaintiffs filed three
suits against the City of New Orleans.

654

‘They were consolidated for trial, and judg-
ment was rendered on July 11, 1969 in the
trial court. Each petition prayed for a
mandamus, ordering the city to implement
the provisions of Acts 55 and 57 of the
Extra Session of 1968 (No. 494-226 is re-
ferred to as “the vacation case;” No.
494-227 is referred to as “the longevity
case;” No, 494-228 is referred to as “the
minimum salary case.”), The trial court
overruled exceptions, sustained the demands
of the plaintiffs, and ordered the city to
comply.

The city appealed and on January 12,
1970 the Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court (see New Orleans Firefighters
Association et al. v. City of New Orleans
et al., La.App., 230 So.2d 326).

On March 12, 1970 this court denied the
application of the city for writs to review
the Court of Appeal decision.

On August 12, 1970 plaintiffs filed a
motion in the consolidated cases in the dis-
trict court seeking to have the city, the
mayor and the council of New Orleans ad-
judged guilty of contempt of court for
failure to comply with the previous judg-
ment in the mandamus suit. The motion
for contempt in 494-226 (the vacation
case) was dismissed, The motion for con-
tempt in 494-227: (the longevity case) was
“maintained to the: extent of finding the
defendants, the City ‘of New Orleans, the
Council of the City of New Orleans isi

655
contempt . . ., the said contempt being,
however, not wilfully committed by said
“defendants.” In 494-228 (the minimum
salary case), the judgment was rendered
“against the city in the same words as those
“used in 494-227,

“The firemen and the city both appealed
the adverse judgments. The judgments of
the district court which found the city in
“contempt were reversed. The judgment of
the district court in the vacation case,
Which found the city was not in contempt,
was affirmed, (New Orleans Fire Fight-
ers Association Local 632 et al. v. The City
‘of New Orleans et al., La.App., 260 So.2d
779).

In the longevity and minimum salary
cases, the Court of Appeal held that “wil-
4ul disobedience is an essential ingredient
‘of the contempt itself and without such a
finding there can be no finding of con-
structive contempt.” 260 So.2d 779, 786.
This was the only ruling of the district
court with which the Court of Appeal disa-
greed. The Court of Appeal agreed with
the district court that the city’s failure to
comply with the court’s prior judgment did
not constitute “wilful” disobedience. Upon

finding, the Court of Appeal remanded
the longevity and minimum salary cases
for the trial court to set a reasonable time
within which to comply, or face contempt
proceedings “as authorized in LSA~C.CP.
art. 225 et seg.”

656

Whereupon, both plaintiffs and defend-
ants applied to this court to review the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, Be-
cause the matier was clothed with a great
public interest, and because both parties re-
quested clarification of the issues between
them, we granted writs on June 29, 1972.

The principal argument upon which the
city bases its claim for relief from the
judgments in the mandamus suits ordering
the city to comply with the provisions of
Act 55 (amending R.S. 33:1992) and Act

_57 (amending R.S, 33:1996) of the Extra

Session of 1968 and Act 132 pf 1962
(which also amended R.S. 33:1992) arises
because of an apparent conflict between a
decision of this court and the 1970 decision
of the Court of Appeal affirming: the trial
court in the mandamus suits.’ (New Orle-
ans Firefighters Association Local 632 et
al. v. City of New Orleans et al., La-App.,
230-So.2d 326).

In March of 1971 this court decided
Louisiana Civil Service League et al. v.
Forbes et al., 258 La. 390,°246 So.2d 800.
In the Forbes case the trial court had held
Act 33 of 1970 unconstitutional as violative
of Article 14, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution, Act 33 of 1970 purported to
establish certain minimum salaries for the
state police.
opinion that the salaries of all employees

The trial court was of the

who are under civil service were governed
by the civil service, amendments to the
Louisiana Constitution. -

657

Because the district court had found an
act of the legislature unconstitutional, we
We
held that “Act 33 of 1970 is not supplemen-
tary to the Civil Service Amendment; it is

were required to review the matter.

in conflict with it because it ascribes to the
Legislature a power which was taken away
from it by the electorate’s adoption of a
constitutional amendment. . . .” (246
So.2d at 808).

We also referred to New Orleans Fire-
fighters v. City of New Orleans, supra,
and found that case not controlling. We
quoted with approval from the district
court’s opinion where the cases were dis-
tinguished on the basis of the difference in
the relationships among state police, the
state civil service commission, the legisla-
ture and the governor, on one hand, and
the firemen, the city civil service commis-
sion and the city council on the other.

The great and apparent similarity between
the cases arising from legislative efforts to
increase the pay of the state police and
that of the firemen, since both are con-
trolled by the same constitutional provi-
sion, furnishes the substance of the city’s
defense. Because this court found in the
Forbes case, supra, that the legislative ef-
forts to raise state police pay conflicted with
Article 14, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution, argues the city, it must follow
that the legislative efforts to increase the
pay and benefits of firemen are also un-
constitutional,

658

Res judicata

That question, however, is not before us.
The judgment in New Orleans Firefighters
v. City of New Orleans, La.App., 230 So.
2d 326 (1970) has become final. The City
of New Orleans is now barred by “the au-
thority of the thing adjudged” (C.C. 2286)
from defending on the basis of the uncon-
stitutionality of the legislative acts in-
volved.

The 1970 Court of Appeal’ decision in.
those cases affirmed the judgments of July |
11, 1969 of the district court, and became’
final and executory upon the denial by this
court (255 La. 557, 232 So.2d 78) of appli-
cations for writs of certiorari, CCP.
2167; Article 7, Section 11, Louisidha
Constitution. The district court had ren-
dered judgments in favor of the firemen
plaintiffs and against the city defendants.

In No, 494-226 the district coyrt.ordered |
the defendants to implement R.S. 3331996
as to vacations and to appropriate a sum
sufficient to pay for the vacation periods.

The district court judgment in No. 494-
227 ordered the defendants to implement
RS. 33:1992 as to longevity pay increases
and to appropriate the necessary funds.

In No. 494-228 the defendants were or-
dered to implement the pay provisions of
RS, 33:1972 “as of January 1, 1969,” and
to make the necessary appropriation.

In spite of the finality of the 1970 Court
of Appeal judgment, when plaintiffs

659 Es 660

sought to enforce the judgments by con-
tempt proceedings the defendants again
argued the unconstitutionality of the
amendments to R.S. 33:1992 and 1996.
The constitutional issue had been raised by
defendants in the district court in the man-
damus actions and decided adversely to
them there and in the Court of Appeal.

To meet the constitutional defense,
plaintiffs rely upon the authority of the
thing adjudged. Res judicata is available
to plaintiffs. See State v. American Sugar
Refining Co, 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965
(1902); O’Quin, Res Judicata—“Matters
Which Might Have Been Pleaded,” 2 La.
Lev. 347, 360 (1939-1940).

The essential elements of res judicata
are described in C.C. 2286:

,“The authority of the thing adjudged
1. “§ IV. That it is immaterial whether
the Demand be made in the same or a
different Form of Proceeding . . .
“[50] Provided the three things, which
‘are mentioned in the preceding para-
-graphs concur, the authority of res judi
cata equally attaches, whether the de-
mand is made in the same form of action
or another,
“Several instances may be stated of this
‘principle; suppose, for example, you pro-
ceed against me by the action quanto
minoris, to obtain an abatement in the
price of 2 horse, whick you allege to have
a certain fault against which I have war-
ratited him, it is decided that the horse
has not that fault, or that the warranty
“did not extend to it, and the demand is
dismissed; if you afterwards institute
another action against me to rescind the
sale, on account of the same fault, I
-may oppose the exception rei judicatae,

takes place only with respect to what
was the object of the judgment. The
thing demanded must be the same; the
demand must be founded on the same
cause of action; the demand must be be-
tween the same parties, and formed by
them against each other in the same
quality.”

The parties before us are the same and
are here only because the district court and
Court of Appeal have found that the de-
fendants have failed to carry out, in two
cases, the judgments rendered against them
on July 11, 1969. The demand in the con-
tempt actions is “founded on the same
cause of action.” The “object of the judg-
ment,” the “thing demanded,” the “cause,”
is the same—the implementation of R.S.
33:1992 and 1996. As Pothier says, “It is
the same horse.” +

although the new demand is made in a
different form, and aims at a different
conclusion, the three requisites already
mentioned concur, it is the same horse,
eadem res, there is also eadem causa
petendi, for the question in both cases is,
whether I have warranted against the
fault which you complain of, and the
question is between the same parties,
the difference of the actions, and of the
conditions, does not prevent their having
the same object and being cadem res,
.” 1M. Pothier, Treatise on
the Law of Obligations, Part TV, Chap-
ter II, Section I, Article IV, Section
3 (1826).
Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d
14 (1954) reconciles this State's juris-
prudence regarding res judicata, firmly
establishing that it is the civilian doc-
trine, and not the common law doctrine
of res judicata that Louisiana applies.

62,

In State v. American Sugar Refining
Co., supra, the State sued to collect license
taxes for 1900 and 1901 under Act 171 of
1898. The defense raised was an exemp-
tion for “manufacturers” under the Consti-
tution. The plaintiff filed a plea of res
judicata based on a previous suit for taxes
claimed to be due for the year 1898 and
previous years. The defense in the prior
suit was that Act 150 of 1890 (virtually the
same as Act 171 of 1898) was not applica-
ble to defendant, who enjoyed the constitu-
tional exemption as a manufacturer. The
State won the carlier suit when the Su-
preme Court held that the defendant sugar
refiner was not a “manufacturer.” State

y. American Sugar Refining Co., 51 La.

2. “The thing adjudged takes place only
with respect to what forms the object of
the judgment; and where the defendant
contents himself with resisting the de-
mand of the plaintiff, no matter on what
ground, the object of the judgment con-
tinues to be the demand of the plaintiff.
That particular demand, whether allowed
or rejected, can never again be urged,
but the fact of its allowance or rejection,
no matter on what ground, cannot pre-
clude the bringing forward of another
and distinct demand, no matter how close-
ly similar. Tf I break my neighbor's
fence, and to his suit for damages I
plead the nonexistence of any law sub-
Jecting me to pecuniary lability in such
a case, and the day after being cast in
the suit I break the fence again under
circumstances exactly similar, and an-
other suit ensues, there will be as close
identity between the two suits as between
two suits for the taxes of different years ;
but we imagine no one would think of
applying the law of res judicata to the

Ann, 562, 25 So. 447, The State lost the
later suit when the court overruled the plea
of res judicata and held that the refiner
was a manufacturer,

The reason given in State v. American
Sugar Refining Co. supra, for overruling
the exception of res judicata was that the
thing demanded and the cause of action
were not the same in the two suits. Ex-
amples given by the court illustrate the
correctness of its conclusion.”

I in the case before us, the identity
of the parties, the thing demanded and-the
cause require the sustaining of plaintiffs’
plea of res judicata, As between these liti-
gants, we will not again inquire whether
RS, 33:1992 and 1996 violate Article 14,

second suit. If, however, in the first
suit, instead of confining myself to denial

of plaintiff's claim, I set up an inde-

pendent right, justifying my conduct, as

that I am owner of the fence in ques-

tion, or that I have by contract the

right to break said fence, then, as a mat-

ter of course, as to this defense, if again

set up in the second suit, there would be

ves judicata; but the reason would be

that, while urged as a defense, this claim

of right would in reality be a demand :
brought by way of veconvention, I
should, pro hae vice, have ceased to be de-
fendant and become plaintiff; and the :
necessary feature of identity of demand

in the two suits would be presented.

Exactly when and under what cireum-

stances the defense to a suit passes from

the stage of negation, and enters upon
that of affirmance, so as to constitute

a new demand injected into the suit by
way of reconvention, it is not always

easy to tell.” .

663

Ss

ection 15 of the Louisiana Constitution of

“1921.

The basic principle of res judicata is
found in the necessity that a time should
come when the litigation shall cease, in
order. that the decree of the court may
be carried out. This is what the law

-concerns itself with, that the object of

3.

the judgment shall not remain eternally
in suspense, but be delivered into the
quiet and undisturbed possession of the
successful litigant. This is what the
Code means when it says that ‘The au-

thority of the thing adjudged takes place _

In the appropriate case we might be
required to decide whether the same
“might have beon pleaded” standard will
be applied to plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiffs are not prohibited by res
judicata from bringing a second action
against the same defendants on the same
subject matter if the cause is different.
Is the application of res judicata to be
determined solely by plaintiffs’ cause?
That is, if all the juridical facts are
placed in evidence and all issues decided
on those facts, will the unsuccessful de-
fondant be allowed subsequently to raise
a legal defense not pleaded, not placed at
issue and not decided in the first suit? Or
will the defendant be allowed to raise in
subsequent litigation a defense he might |
have urged without the introduction of
new evidence?

Or, must we decide, as suggested in State
y. American Sugar Refining Co., supra,
and 2 La.L.Rev. 516, whether the defense
raised in the second suit becomes 2 cause,
which, if not identical to the defendant's
cause in the first suit, might be raised
by him in the second? Note that in
Tustice Provosty’s fence-breaking ex-
ample, the plaintiff's cause is always
different in the first and second suits;

es : 664

i A

only with respect to what was the object
of the judgment.” 32 So. 966.
Prescription

We do not now decide whether res judi-
cata prevents the consideration of defend-
ants’ plea of prescription.® Prescription
was not pleaded in the mandamus suit.
Prescription was not pleaded in the con-
tempt proceedings, until in the Court of
Appeal.

Prescription must be specially pleaded;
the court cannot supply the objections of
prescription. C.C.P. 927. It may be plead-
ed in the trial court prior to submission

there are two different torts, each based
on a different destruction of the same
fence. Yet, when the defense in the
first suit is a cause (2 contractual right
to destroy the fence) res judicata bars
the relitigation of defendant's cause in
the second suit, in which plaintiff's cause
is different. Perhaps the mistranslation
in O.C. 2286 of “cause” to “eause of ac-
tion” which occurred in 1825 (see 2 La.
LRev. 491 at 496) was not an inadvert-
ence, in which case res judicata might
apply only when there is an identity
of “causes of action,” as contrasted to
identity of cause.
Again—is liberative prescription a cause
which, if not litigated in the first suit,
may be utilized by the defendant in subse-
quent litigation? Tiles v. Texas Co.,
166 La. 298, 117 So. 229 (1928) is cited
for the proposition that a judgment sus-
taining an exception of prescription bars
any subsequent suit on the same cause
of action. But when there is no plea
of prescription in the first suit, can
the defendant in subsequent litigation.
avail himself of this defense, even though
he might have raised it successfully un-
der the facts adduced in the first suit?

665

(C.C.P. 927) and in the appellate court “if
pleaded prior to a submission of the case
for a decision . .” CCP, 2163. In
these cases the plea of prescription was not
filed by defendants until October 4, 1971,
in the Court of Appeal in the contempt
proceeding. The defendants chose not to
raise the defense of prescription until long
after the judgments in the mandamus suits
Decame final. Now it comes too late for
consideration. This contempt action is in
the same suit as the original mandamus
suit, and is merely an effort by the suc-
cessful plaintiffs to enforce their judg-
ment. The city cannot now urge a defense

which it has tacitly waived.

This conclusion is compatible with the
only analogous* case found in Louisiana.
In State v. Clinton and Port Hudson Rail-
road Co., 21 La.Ann. 156 (1869), there was
a contest between a creditor and the liqui-
dator of the defendant railroad over inter-
est on the creditor’s claim which extended
_ over a period of several years. Early in
the liquidation proceedings the railroad’s
commissioners had filed an accounting.
The creditor Hawford filed an opposition
‘because no interest had been allowed on
his claim. There was a judgment on Feb-
ruary 11, 1854 dismissing the opposition
and homologating the account.

‘When the final account of the liquidator
was filed, Hawford again opposed the ac-

4. Both res judicata ani prescription are
peremptory exceptions, may not be raised

666

count, and obtained a judgment for $500.00
with 8% interest, and privileged rank.
‘The judgment was obtained on November
26, 1858.
judgment became final.

Then on June 7, 1867 Hawford ruled in
the liquidator to show cause why Haw-

There was no appeal and the

ford’s judgment should not be paid as a
privileged claim, to which the liquidator
pleaded the judgment of February 11, 1854
(which ruled against the claim for inter-
est) as a bar. The ruling of the Supreme
Court was:
“The judgment of the eleventh of Febru-
ary, 1854, might have been used as a de-
fense against the allowance of interest
on the trial of the opposition to the
liquidator’s account in 1858. Tt cannot
be set up now. The defendant will not
be permitted to go behind that judgment
_ and urge the defense which should have

been made at the time.” 21 La.Ann, 156,

Hl Our procedural statutes prevent the
defendants, in this contempt action which
seeks to enforce a final judgment, from
pleading prescription, a defense available
to them in the mandamus suit but not
urged.

Laches

The city argues that plaintiffs are pre-

cluded by “laches” from recovery on cer-
tain of their demands.

by the court and must be specially plead-
ed. C.O.P. 927. uw

667

The first time defendants raised the de-
fense of “laches” was in the city’s “Imple-
mentation Plan” filed in the district court
September 28, 1970 in compliance with a
stipulation between plaintiffs and defend-
ants filed August 27, 1970 in the contempt
proceedings. As an alternative to defend-
ants’ plea that the city was in compliance
with RS. 33:1992 and 1996, the “Imple-
mentation Plan” concluded with a conten-
tion that it should be relieved of responsi-
bility for payment of longevity pay in-
creases prior to July 20, 1969, when these
suits were filed, because of “the failure of
plaintiffs . . . to assert their claims
prior to the filing of suit.” No
other factual allegation is made.

HM Defendants do not complain that
the contempt proceeding came too late, but
that plaintiffs made their original demands
in the mandamus actions too late. Defend-
ants cannot, in a contempt action to en-
force a final judgment, raise the defense
that plaintiffs were guilty of laches in ob-
taining that final judgment.

“Laches” is an affirmative defense®
which must be specially pleaded. C.C.P.

5. “(e) Certain common law concepts enu-
merated as affirmative defenses in Fed.
Rule 8(c), such as accord and satisfac-
tion, laches, license, and waiver, have

been recognized and adopted in varying
degrees by the jurisprudence of Louisiana.
They have not been expressly included in
the enumeration although to the extent
that these concepts are recognized in
our jurisprudence they are included with-

668
1005. See Deposit Guaranty National

Bank v, Shipp, 252 La. 745, 214 So.2d 129
(1968).

Peremptory Exceptions

Defendants contend that their perempto-
ry exceptions to the rule to show cause
should have been sustained, citing Louisi-
ana State Board of Medical Examiners v.
England, 252 La. 1000, 215 So.2d 640
(1968). In the England case it was only
alleged in the contempt rule that the de-
fendant “failed to comply with the perma-
nent injunction.” This was held to be in-
sufficient to comply with the requirements
of C.C.P. 225 that the “rule to show cause
a shall state the facts alleged to
constitute the contempt.”6

Hl There is no similarity between the
pleadings in the England case and the
pleadings before us. Plaintiffs’ motion for
the contempt rule was articulated, contain-
ing fifteen paragraphs. In the England
case, the defendant was accused of per-
forming certain acts which violated an in-
junction which prohibited his practicing
medicine or chiropractic. In the case be-
fore us, judgments had been rendered or-

in the omnibus phrase ‘any other matter
constituting an affirmative defense.”
(Emphasis added). Comment (e) to Ar-
ticle 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. The redactors’ comments state“. .
the motion for the rule to show cause
sets forth the facts alleged to constitute
the constructive contempt.”  (Smpha-
sis added).

669

dering the defendants to perform certain
administrative acts (providing for certain
vacation periods, pay certain longevity pay
increases, establish certain minimum pay
standards, and to appropriate the necessary
funds). The refusal of the defendants to
comply with the orders of the court was
specifically described in detail. The entire
motion and order were served on each de-
fendant, and adequately complies with the
requirements of C.C.P. 225. The peremp-
tory exceptions were properly overruled.

Longevity

The city argues before us that the lon-
gevity judgment of July, 1969 is “ambigu-
ous and open to good faith interpretation.”
The argument is based primarily on the
contention that the computation of longevi-
ty in RS, 33:1992 is based on “basic sala-
ry” and “base pay” of firemen. The city
agrees that “basic salary” and “base pay”
are synonymous, but argues that the city is
entitled to certain “credits” in implement-
ing the longevity pay, particularly excess
millage payments under Louisiana Consti-
tution Article 14, Section 25.

The Court of Appeal referred to the
city’s argument that it had complied with
the pay raise judgment and the longevity
judgment as follows:

“We find it unnecessary at this time to
discuss these issues in great detail except
to say that they were based both upon
the evidence in the present proceeding

670

and upon the principle of res judicata
applying to the previous judgments. An
examination of the record discloses am-
ple basis for these findings.” (260 So.2d

at 784).

The trial judge, in his reasons for judg-
ment after the trial on the rule for con-
tempt, referred to the city’s argument as

follows:

“On the trial of this matter in 1969 sub-
stantially the same contention was made
by the city, and thus, as heretofore stat-
ed, the judgment of this Court—which
rejected that argument—was affirmed
and is now res judicata.”

Our examination of the record in the
mandamus suit and in the contempt suit af-
firms the correctness of this finding of the
trial judge. The pay plans introduced in
evidence in the mandamus suit and the pay
plans introduced by the city in the con-
tempt suit are the same. The trial court
ruled in the mandamus suit that the city
‘was not in compliance with the statutes.
The city does not contend that it made any
change in the pay plans in the interim be-
tween the mandamus suits and the con-
tempt actions. Its argument now is that
the district court was wrong in the manda-
mus suit, and that the city is actually in
compliance with the statute.

HM The city’s interpretation of the
statute will not save it from conviction of
contempt of the final judgment of court.

671

The city is accused with the violation of
the judgment. Its interpretation of the
statute was adjudicated and disapproved in
The Court of Appeal

was correct in finding that the city had not

the mandamus suits.

complied with the judgment in the longevi-
ty case.

Mininuin Salary

The city filed a “motion to correct er-
rors” in the judgment in the minimum sal-
ary case, and complains that the Court of
Appeal failed to rule upon it.

II The city’s motion to correct errors
is merely an argument that the minimum
salaries in the judgment of the district
court for the various classifications were
based on the actual salary then being paid
to a “fireman” instead of the statutory
minimum monthly salary of a “fireman”
fixed in R.S. 33:1992. The minimum sala-
ry statute contained ten classifications of
firemen. It fixed the monthly minimum
salary of a “fireman” in subsection (1) of
RS. 33:1992 at $400.00 a month. For each
subsequent classification (for engineers,
lieutenants, captains, various chiefs, ete.)
the minimum monthly salary was fixed at
not less than a certain percentage above
that of a fireman. For example, subsec-
tion (3) provides “Lieutenants shall re-
ceive a minimum monthly salary of not
less than fifteen percent above that of a
fireman.” If there was ever any question
about the interpretation of a basis for the

672.

minimum monthly salaries for various clas-
sifications in the fire department, it was
put to rest by the stipulation of the city
(Placid Oil Co. v. A. M. Dupont Corp., 244
La. 1075, 156 So.2d 444 (1963)) at the trial
of the mandamus rule on July 8, 1969.
The attorney for the city stipulated that if
the court found the minimum salaries in
R.S. 33:1992 to be applicable, “that the sal-
aries fixed for engineers would be $583,
for a supervisor or superintendent of fire
alarm system it would be $742, a fire
alarm dispatcher would be $662.50 and a
fire inspector or fire prevention inspector
would be $662.50.”

The stipulation removes any possibility
that the “calculations” in the mandamus
judgment are erroneous. Res judicata pre-
vents the defendants from renewing their
argument in opposition to the judgment.
It prevents the further litigation of the
city’s interpretation of the minimum sala-
ry schedule between these plaintiffs and
these defendants.

The city advances an alternative argu-
ment that it is in compliance with the
judgment. Again, the city simply argues
that the minimum pay plan should have
been based on the minimum salary of a
fireman fixed in the statute, rather than
on the actual salary of a fireman, The
city does not pretend that it is paying the
schedule set out in the judgment of July
11, 1969, It cannot be in compliance with
the judgment.

673
Vacations
‘The firemen complain that the Court of
Appeal erred in affirming the trial court’s
finding the city in compliance with its July
11, 1969 judgment concerning vacations.

That judgment ordered the city to imple-
ment the provisions of R.S. 33:1996 to pro-
vide:

“1) A vacation period amounting to

eighteen (18) days with full pay for all.

employees of the Fire Department of the
City of New Orleans who are employed
less than ten (10) years, but more than
one year as of January 6, 1969.

“2) A vatation period of eighteen (18)
days plus one additional day for each
year of service over ten (10) years up to
a maximum of thirty (30) days with full
pay for all those employees of the Fire
Departmént of the City of New Orleans
who are employed by the City of New
Orleans for more than ten (10) years.

“3) To appropriate a sum sufficient to
pay for these vacation periods.”

The judgment is couched in the terms of
the statute itself which provides:

“Firemen . . :, after having served
one year, shall be entitled to an annual
vacation of eighteen days with full pay.
This vacation period shall be increased
one day for each year of service over
ten years, up to a maximum vacation pe-
riod of thirty days, all of which shall be
|

674

with full pay. . . .” (RS. 33:1996,
as amended by Act 57 of 1968).

The previous statute had provided for
“an annual vacation of fifteen days with

pay.
Because firemen work in shifts (which

vary from city to city) and because of var-
iations in practice in using vacation time ©
on a piecemeal basis, the firemen contend
that the city has failed to properly inter-
pret the judgment ordering compliance
with the new vacation law.

The trial court’s opinion was that the
change in the work schedules agreed upon
by the firemen and the city subsequent to
the July, 1969 judgment resulted in the ini-
tiation of a vacation plan which substan-
tially complied with the requirements of
the statute, and that the court could not
hhold the city in contempt for non-compli-
ance. The Court of Appeal affirmed and
approved the district court’s interpretation
of the word “day” in R.S. 33:1995 and in
the judgment of July, “1969.
statute was a general statute, applicable to
various fire departments throughout the
State, the.definition of “day” in the vaca-
tion statute must be understood in its
“most usual signification.” C.C. 14. The
construction approved by the Court of Ap-
peal was that vacation days in the statute

Because the

meant calendar days, and not another kind
of day (like “work day”) which might re-
sult in a variation.in the application of the
statute. .

675

city stipulated, upon the trial of the man-
damus suit on July 8, 1969 that the word
“day” in the statute meant “working day.”

An examination of the record discloses
that the attorney for the defendants, prior
to beginning the trial of the mandamus
suits, made certain stipulations, and there
-was the following reference to vacations:

“. . . We would further stipulate
that the firemen are permitted 18 days
vacation annually in accordance with
Civil Service Rule 8, and we have a doc-

ument . . . concerning the annual

leave for firemen. . ”

“Mr. Barker: Mr. McNeely, would you

‘be willing to stipulate that the days re-

ferred to in Statute means working

days?”

“Mr. McNeely: Yes. Tt says that in the

Civil Service Rule, it does refer to work-

ing days.”

The preceding colloquy is not an un-
equivocal stipulation by counsel for the
city admitting that the (RS.
33:1996) was to be interpreted in the same
way in which the attorney for the firemen

statute

sought to have the courts interpret it.
Neither the meaning nor significance of
the question is apparent from the record;
nor does the answer seem to be exactly re-
7. The statute provided, of course, that it

was not to affect any existing system of
vacation computation which would result

The firemen conterd that counsel for the

676

sponsive. Testimony adduced seems to es-
tablish that firemen were receiving in July,
1969 eighteen days vacation (the minimum
after one year’s service) but that none of
the uniformed men in the fire department
received more than eighteen days. Those
eighteen days were, according to the wit-
ness, “working days,” but no further elabo-

ration was given.

Nor is the significance of this testimony
clarified in the record. This opinion
would only be burdened with an exposition
of the possible interpretations applicable to
the shift plans of New Orleans firemen.
It is sufficient to note that the trial judge
who ordered defendants to comply with the
statute later found the city in substantial

compliance with the judgment.

HM There is no indication in the record
before us, and none from the statute itself,
that the legislature intended anything other
than calendar days in R.S. 33:1996, when
it established a minimum of eighteen days
vacation for a fireman with one year’s
service, with an increase of one day for
each year of service over ten years, to a
maximum of thirty days.”

Consequently, we find no error in the
ruling of the district court and the Court
of Appeal, holding that the defendants are
not in contempt of court for violating the

in greater benefits than those provided
in the statute.

677

judgment of July 11, 1969 in the vacation
case.

Contempt Finding

The plaintiffs specify that the Court of
Appeal erred in finding that “wilful con-
duct” is necessary before the defendants
could be held in contempt. Nevertheless,
in their application to us for writs and in
brief, the plaintiffs interpret the instruc-
tions of the Court of Appeal to the trial
court as being identical with the trial
court’s conclusion on the contempt rule.

In its reasons for judgment of Novem-
ber 27, 1970, the trial court concluded:

“The Court is of the opinion that having
held, as it has herein, that the City’s
contention that they are in compliance
with the Orders of this Court are with-
out merit, failure to comply with the
Court’s Orders, or to have such Orders
(and Judgments) modified or changed by
appeal, or through other proceedings,
within the next ninety (90) days, would
place the City in ‘wilful’ contempt of
such Orders. Upon a showing so made
hereafter, and after a Rule for Contempt
is filed, the Court would then be autho-
tized to proceed in accordance with the
provisions of C.C.P. Article 227 and La.
RS. 13:4611.”

In every respect, except actually finding
the city in contempt, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court. It reversed the

contempt decree and remanded the case to

678

the trial court “to fix a reasonable period
of time for defendants to comply with the
judgments of July 11, 1969, after which,
should they fail to comply, further con-
tempt proceedings may be invoked as au-
thorized in LSA-C.C.P. arts. 225, 226, 227,
and LSA-R.S. 13:4611.” (260 So.2d at
788).

We agree with the plaintiffs that the
judgments of the district court and the rul~
ing of the Court of Appeal are substantial-
ly the same. Consequently, the judgment:
of the Court of Appeal in each case (No.
494-226, No, 494-227 and No. 494-228) is.
affirmed. The costs in suit No. 494-226,.
the vacation case (No. 52511 in this court),
are to be borne by the plaintiffs; the costs.
in No, 494-227, the longevity case, and No.
494-228, the minimum pay case (No. 52519:
in this court), are to be borne by defend-.

ants.

269 So.2d 204

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Huey P. GAUTHIER.

No, 52427.

Noy, 6, 1972.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Cheney C. Joseph,
Jr. Sp. Counsel for the State, Baton
Rouge, for plaintiff-relator.

“681

J. St. Clair Favrot, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendant-respondent.

McCALEB, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Huey P. Gauthier, was
charged by information with violation of
RS. 14:329.6 “in that he did intentionally
oppose and resist a lawful curfew estab-
‘lished by the Mayor-President for the City
-of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East
Baton Rouge in a time of great public cri-
isis and emergency.” He moved to quash
the bill on the ground it fails to charge an
-offense punishable under a valid statute
since the Mayor-President of Baton Rouge
was without authority to issue the orders
establishing a curfew. The trial judge sus-
tained the motion and quashed the infor-
mation. The district attorney then applied
“here and we granted this remedial writ un-
der our supervisory jurisdiction?

Insofar as pertinent here, R.S, 14:329.6
-provides that “During times of great public
crisis, disaster, rioting, catastrophe or sim-
ilar public emergency within the terri-
torial limits of any municipality or parish
* * * and upon a finding that the pub-
lic safety is imperiled thereby, the chief
executive officer of any political subdivi-
sion * * * may request the governor
‘to proclaim a state of emergency within
any part or all of the territorial limits of

such local government. Following such

682

proclamation by the governor, and during
the continuance of such state of emergen-
cy, the chief law enforcement officer of
the political subdivision affected by the
proclamation may, in order to protect life
and property and to bring the emergency
situation under control, promulgate orders
affecting any part or all of the territorial
limits of municipality or parish” within
the limits specifically set out in the stat-

ute. (The emphasis is supplied.)

TM As stated in its written brief “The
State’s position is simply that Act 176 of
1969 (La.R.S. 14:329) did not explicitly de-
fine the term ‘chief law enforcement offi-

cer,’

Obviously aware of the diversified
forms of municipal government existing in
this State, the legislature recognized the
fact that the title held by the chief law en-
forcement officer within a political subdi-
vision might vary. It is submitted that the
Mayor-President of East Baton Rouge
Parish should qualify as an individual to
whom the term ‘chief law enforcement of-
ficer’ should apply.”

The contention is unimpressive. Had
the legislature intended that the Mayor-
President could promulgate the orders as
well as request issuance of the proclama-
tion, there would have been no need for it
to designate another official, i. e., the chief
law enforcement officer, as the one au-
thorized to do so.

1. Section 10 of Article VII of the Constitution.

683,

There was, further, no need to define
just who is the chief law enforcement offi-
cer in the political subdivision, for those
whose duty it is to preserve the peace and
maintain order are universally considered
to be the law enforcement officers. The
chief law enforcement officer, therefore, is
the head of the law enforcement division.
In the City-Parish Charter of Baton Rouge
and the Parish of East Baton Rouge,? the
Mayor-President is specifically designated
the “Chief Executive Officer of the Parish
and City.” And, although he is given au-
thority to appoint the chief of police, a
mere reading of the duties assigned to him
show his work is that of an administrative
executive officer only. He is given no law
enforcement authority whatsoever. (The
emphasis is supplied.)

Instead, the charter designates the chief
of police appointed by the Mayor-President
as the head of the police department, and
this department is “responsible within the
city limits for the preservation of public
peace and order, the prevention of crime,
the apprehension of criminals, the protec-
tion of the rights of persons and property,
and thé enforcement of the laws of the
state and the ordinances of the parish and
city councils.” The charter also specifical-
ly provides that the chief of police shall be
2. Although neither the state nor the de-

fendant filed a copy of the charter in evi-

dence, we find in the records of the court,
when the constitutionality of the charter

684

in direct command of the “Police Depart~

ment.” .

HI {nm an effort’ to establish that in
such situations the chief executive officer
of Baton Rouge is considered by the Par-
ish Council of East Baton Rouge Parish:
(the “governing body” of the parish) to be-
the chief law enforcement officer as well,
the state has offered in evidence an ordi--
nance adopted by the council which not
only gives the executive officer authority
to proclaim an emergency, but also the
power to promulgate all necessary orders.
in connection therewith. Whatever the in-
tent of the council in enacting this ordi-
nance, adopted in April of 1968, insofar as.
it conflicts with the provisions of R.S..
14:329.6, adopted by the legislature in 1969,
it has been superseded and rendered inef--
fective. :

HM it is hornbook law that criminal
enaciments are strictly construed; conse-
quently, since under this statute the chief
executive officer of the Parish of East
Baton Rouge is clearly not the chief law
enforcement officer, the trial judge cor-
rectly quashed the information.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment
is affirmed.

was challenged in State v. City of Baton
Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So.2i 477, a
copy thereof certified by the Secretary of
State to be true and correct,

&
R
8
a

269 So.2d 207

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Freddie HOLMES.

No. 52812,

Noy. 6, 1972.

687

Fred A, Blanche, III, Baton Rouge, for
defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty. Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

1. 408 U.S. 288, 92 S.Ot, 2726, 33 L.1d.2

846 (1972), holding that the imposition

and execution of the death penalty, where
the jury has the discretion to impose the

688:
Louise Korns, Asst, Dist, Atty., Parish.
of Orleans, for amicus curiae,

DIXON, Justice.

On the application of the defendant we
granted writs in this case to consider the
effect of Furman v. Georgia! upon Louisi~
ana procedural aw in a murder trial,

A bill of exceptions was reservéd by de-
fendant when the trial judge instructed a
prospective juror that, since capital punish-
ment can no longer be imposed in Louisi-
ana, only nine of the twelve jurors need to:
concur to reach a verdict, and the jury
would not be sequestered during the trial.

Sequestration of the jury is required by
C.Cr.P. 791 “in capital cases.”

The size of the jury and the number that.
must concur to reach a verdict are gov-
erned by C.Cr.P. 782, whose source is Arti-

cle 7, Section 41, Louisiana Constitution of
1921: .

“ Cases, in which the ‘punishment

may be at hard labor, shall be tried by a
jury of five, all of whom must concur to
render a verdict; cases, in which the
punishment is necessarily at hard labor,
by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must
concur to render a verdict; cases in
which the punishment may be capital, by
death sentence or a lesser sentence, vio-

lates provisions of the United States
Constitution. .

689

a jury of twelve, all of whom must con-
cur to render a verdict.”

HE The word “capital” in criminal law
“has to do with the death penalty.”

Defendant observes that C.Cr-P. 878 in
view of the Furman case, might seem to
require that we hold our murder statute
(RS. 14:30) unconstitutional, but argues
that the better view would recognize that
only the imposition and execution of a cap-
ital sentence has been reprobated, leaving
intact the crimes and the procedural de-
vices applicable to cases in which the death
_penalty was applicable before Furman.

The State simply argues that there are
no more capital cases, and since the only
punishment now available for the crime of
murder is life imprisonment at hard labor,
the constitutional and statutory provisions
(nine out of twelve jury verdict, no se-
questration) applicable to non-capital felo-

+2. capfi-tal (Kip'Ttil; +t’), adj. UF, fr.
L. capitalis capital (in senses 1&2),
fr, caput head. See Chief; cf. Capital,
J "
1. Of or pertaining to the head or top.
Obs.
2. Having reference to, or involving the
_ forfeiture of, the head or life; punishable
with death; as a capital trial or verdict;
specif, in Roman or Civil Law, involv
“ing, or punishable by, loss of legal per-

sonality.
Many crimes that are capital among us.
- Swift.

Do put to death a capital offender.
Milton.

.3. Mortal; of enmity or an enemy, dead-
ly; fatal. Os.

690

ny cases must now apply to what were
formerly “capital cases.”

The provisions of Article 7, Section 41,
quoted above, were taken almost verbatim
from the Louisiana Constitutions of 1898,
Article 116, and 1913, Article 116. The
less serious offenses were triable without
juries; more serious offenses were triable
with five man juries (unanimous verdict),
twelve man juries with nine concurring, or
twelve man juries with unanimous verdict.
The severity of the offense was legislative-
ly determined and depended upon the max-
imum penalty which could be imposed for
the offense charged.

For at least three-fourths of a century,
the legislature has made provisions for
procedural matters in criminal cases which
depend on the classification of crimes in
the Louisiana Constitution* If our legis-
lature eliminated capital punishment, but

Merriam-Webster’s New International
Dictionary of the English Language, Sec-
ond Bdition Unabridged (1950).

3. “A sentence shall not be set aside on the
ground that it inflicts cruel or unusual
punishment - unless the statute under
which it is imposed is found uncon-
stitutional.”

4. Compare C.Cr.P. 933: “xcept where

the context clearly indicates otherwise, as
used in this Code:
“(1) ‘Offense’ includes both a felony and
a misdemeanor. .
“(2) ‘Capital offense’ means an offense
that may be punished by death.

691

remained silent with respect to procedural
changes, we might be justified in adopting
the reasoning of the State—that all statu-
tory references to capital cases, capital of-
fenses and capital punishment should be ig-
nored, We might conclude that the legis-
lature was aware of its laws on the sub-
ject, and chose, in effect, to repeal them
tacitly.

However, it was not the legislature, but
the United States Supreme Court that has
held the imposition and execution of the
death sentence, as now applicable in our
State, to be violative of the United States
Constitution, No presumption arises that
any other provision of Louisiana law has
been affected by the United States Su-
preme Court, except those having to do
-with the imposition and execution of death
Nor, indeed, has the United
States Stipreme Court eliminated the possi-

sentences.

bility that the Louisiana legislature might
enact statutes which could constitutionally
impose the’ death sentence, when the sen-
tence is mandatory and cannot be applied
in a discriminatory manner.

HMM Although the hiatus is obvious and
the situation undesirable, we conclude that
we should (at least until the legislative
process. has reorganized the criminal law
and procedure in view of Furman) inter-

“(8) Belony’ means an offense that may

be punished by death or by imprisonment
at hard labor.

692°

pret Article 7, Section 41 of the Louisiana
Constitution as referring to classes of
crimes, and that those which the legislature
has classified as capital offenses shall be-
tried by a jury of twelve, all of whom
must concur to render a verdict.

Ts Fourther, we adopt the same in-
terpretation as to C.Cr.P. 791, and hold.
that murder is still classified as a “capital
case,” and that C.Cr.P. 791 requires the se~
questration of the jury in capital cases,

I For these reasons, Bill of Excep-
tions No. 1 has merit, Defendant's objec-
tion should have been sustained, A mis~

trial is ordered and the jury is dismissed.
(C.CrP. 775(3)).

APPENDIX

California and Colorado have adopted:
the “classification” theory. People v. An-
derson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493
P.2d 880 (1972); People v. District Court
(Nixon and McElvray), Colo.1972, 500 P.
2d 358; Contra: State v. Johnson, 1972,
61 NJ. 351, 294 A2d 245; Ex Parte Con-
tella, Tex.Cr.App.1972, 485 S.W.2d 910;
Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Fla.
1972).

Capital offenses (capital cases, capital
crimes) in Louisiana are:

14:30 —murder

14:42 —aggravated rape
14:44 —aggravated kidnapping
14:113—treason

praP
von

“(4) ‘Misdemeanor’ means any offense
other than a felony, and includes the vio-
lation of an ordinance providing a penal
sanction.”

693

Various provisions: made applicable to
capital offenses by use of the word “capi-

694

tal,” or by reference to “death,” in Louisi-
ana statutory law, are as follows:

1. capital crime Art. 1, Sec.
Art, 7, Sec.
G.CrP, 291
CrP. 315,

ClrP. 512

2. capital case

G.cr.P.
C.Cr.P.

S57
578

C.r.P. 791,
C.Cr.P. 817
RS, 15:142

3. capital offense, Art, 1, Sec.

C.Cr.P. 313
C.Cr.P. 437
C.Cr.P. 512
C.Cr.P. 780

C.Cr.P, 859

C.Cr.P. 933

RS, 15:14

9
52

12

indictment by grand jury)
Gurisdiction of juvenile courts)

(authority to conduct preliminary examinations)
(authority to fix bail)

(assigned counsel must have 5 years experience—
“capital offense” used in the same provision)
(court shall not accept unqualified guilty plea)
(commencement of trial must be within 3 years of
institution of prosecution)

(sequestration of jurors)

(qualifying verdict in capital cases)

(added by Act 616 of 1972—creates an indigent
defender board for the 8th and 23rd judicial dis-
tricts—refers to the rule that the defense coun-
sel appointed in a capital case must have 5 years
experience)

(no bait provision)

(no bail provision)

(grand jury shall inquire into capita! offenses)
(court shall appoint indigent defense counsel with

5 years experience. Also uses the phrase “capital
case”)

(person so charged cannot waive a jury and ask for
@ bench trial)

(grounds for arrest of judgment—prosecution not
instituted by a grand jury indictment—see (8) of
article)

(definition of capital offense—"offense that may
be punished by death’)

(as amended by Act 736 of 1972—statute deals
with indigent defender boards—provides that de-
fense attorney appointed in capital offense must
have 5 years experience—see subsections C and
F of statute)

4, cases in which the punishment may be capital

Art, 7, Sec.
C.Cr.P. 782

offense which may be punished by death

C.CrP. 382

41

(unanimous verdict of 12 man jury required)

(grand jury indictment needed)

crime for which the death penalty may be imposed

C.CrP. 57L
offenses punishable by death

C.Cr.P. 799
felony not punishable by death

C.Cr.P, 832

(no time limit for the institution of prosecution)
(12 peremptory challenges available)
(indicates that a person charged with a capital of-

fense may object to his temporary voluntary ab-
sence at the proceedings against him)

695

BARHAM, J., dissents with written rea-
sons.

TATE, J., concurs with BARHAM, J.’s
dissent and assigns additional reasons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent from the majority's holding in
the instant case for all the reasons stated
in my dissenting opinion in State v. Flood,
No. 52783 on our docket, 263 La. 700, 269
So.2d 212, this day decided.

We are required here to determine the
number of jurors whose concurrence is
necessary to render a verdict in what was
formerly a capital offense, and to deter-
mine whether the requirement for total se-
questration of the jury during the trial for
such an offense is still in effect.

All thé specific legal requirements ad-
dressed to “capital offenses”, separate and
apart from other felonies, were enacted
solely because of the nature of the punish-
ment prescribed for such offenses. The
possibility of receiving a death sentence
would make one on bail for a capital of-
fense less likely to appear for trial. It was
the total irrevocability of the death penalty
which led our Legislature to require in
such cases indictment by grand jury, strict
sequestration of the jury from outside in-
fluence, agreement of all jurors in order to
return a verdict, more experienced counsel,
and right of special appellate review, and

696
to make other exceptional rules. Tlie of-
fense, the nature or the class of thie of-

fense, was never the determining factor i
laying down these special guidelines. It.
was the severe and irrevocable conse--
quences which accompanied a verdict of
guilty that impelled the Legislature and the:
courts to afford additional safeguards for
the defendant.

Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Fla.
Sup.Ct.1972), has cogently and correctly
disposed of the issues here presented and
similar issues which may arise in the fu-
ture, as noted in the appendix”to the ma-
jority opitiidn. See also State v. Johnston,
83 Wash. 1, 144 P. 944 (1914).

As shown in my dissenting opinion ix
State v. Flood, supra, the authority is over-
whelmingly in support of such dispositions,
with only a single case out of Colorado
holding to the contrary. The criterion of
“classification of offenses” set forth by the
majority and by the court in the Colorado
case as justification for the result reached
does not reflect the exercise of the judicial
function within constitutional ‘limitations.

I am of the opinion that a concurrence
of nine out of twelve jurors can convict in
cases formerly denominated “capital of-
fenses”, and ‘that the usual sequestration
rules for other felonies should apply in.
such cases.

I respectfully dissent.

697

TATE, Justice (dissenting).
I must reépectfully join Mr, Justice
BARHAWM’s dissent.

Our state constitution unambiguously
provides that “cases in which the punish-
ment may be capital” “shall be tried” “by a
jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to
render a verdict.” Art. VII, Section 41,
La.Constitution of 1921 (Italics mine).
‘The unambiguous meaning of “capital pun-
ishment” is the death penalty, as my broth-
er’s scholarly dissent shows.

In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92
S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), a major-
ity of the United States Supreme Court
held that, under statutory schemes similar
to that applicable in the present case
(where the jury has unlimited discretion to
impose life or death), the death penalty ‘is
unconstitutional.
Supreme Court decision, this court has rec-
ognized that death penalties received under
our present statutes must be set aside and’
the convicted defendant be re-sentenced to
life imprisonment. State v. Franklin, 263
La. 344, 268 So.2d 249 (rendered October
26, 1972).

1. Similarly, the accused is entitled to bail
as in all other non-capital cases, Article

I, Section 12, La.Constitution, see State

-Y. Blood, 263 La. 700, 269 $0.24 212, ren-

dered this same date, in which case I

dissent also for reasons similar to those

here stated. Of course, in fixing bail,
the trial court may consider, inter alia,

“The seriousness of the offense charged”,

“The previous criminal record of the de-
fendant”, and “Any other circumstances

In compliance with the’

698

‘Therefore, under our state constitution
—since “the punishment may be capital”,
Art, VIL, Section 41, no longer by reason
of Furman—the state is entitled to try this
case on the basis that a non-unanimous (9
of 12) verdict may convict, just as in all
other non-capital major felonies.

The majority has adopted a position
which at first seems attractive and sensi-
ble. In effect, the majority says—let the
legislature move in to regulate the chaos in
our procedural law resulting from the Fur-
man decision, As much as I would person-
ally prefer to do so, we abdicate our judi-
cial function when we fail to apply present
mandatory requirements and restrictions of
our state constitution in the hope the legis-
lature may somehow resolve the crisis,

Until the state constitution is changed,
any legislative regulation contrary to the
present provisions would be invalid. Our
duty is to'enforce the state and federal
We fail in such duty when
we do not apply unambiguous provisions of

constitutions.

our state constitution and, in effect, pre-
tend that Furman was not decided invali-

affecting the probability of the defend-
ant’s appearance”, La.0.Or.P. Art. 317
(4), (8), and (5), which indicates that,
in the serious crimes of violence involv-
ing a life sentence if convicted, the trial
court may fix the amount of bail suffi-
ciently high to avoid the untoward effects
feared, such as in the case of armed rob-
beries presently—which, were it not for
our state constitution, might reasonably
be made non-bailable if quickly tried.

699

dating the death penalty under the statutes
upon which the present defendant is tried.

‘We should likewise note that Furman
did not invalidate the death penalty per se
only as applied under statutes similar to
‘those here involved. As I read the opin-
ions in Furman, a majority of the United
States Supreme Court did not invalidate a
mandatory death penalty to be applied un-
der narrowly prescribed circumstances—
such as intentionally killing a law enforce-
ment officer known to be such and in the
‘performance of his duties. If such a stat-
ute is enacted and is valid, then the present
constitutional provisions regulating capital
‘cases are applicable—they are not invali-
dated because of Furman, they simply do
not apply to offenses charged under
present statutes of our state, since under
Furman such offenses are no longer sub-
ject to capital punishment.

“Constitutions become inconvenient things
when a current generation regards as irrel-
evant considerations which induced a pre-
vious one to incorporate in the organic law
mandatory requirements or protections of
individuals and restraints on governmental
action. Conceding that some leeway to ac-
cord with contemporary notions is afforded
in the judicial interpretation of merely
gencral standards (e, g, “due process of
law”, every person shall have “adequate
remedy . administered without
we unreasonable delay”, see La.Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 6), neverthe-

700

less, faced with a flat and explicit constitu-
tional command, the courts must enforce it.
It is so in this case.

I must therefore respectfully dissent.

269 So.2d 212

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Ellen McDaniel FLOOD.

No. 52783.

Nov. 6, 1972.

701

—

Williams & Fisher, Nathan S. Fisher,
Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst, Atty, Gen., Lee A. Hart-
ley, Special Counsel, Wilmore J. Brous-
sard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Robert B. Butler, ITI,
Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

DIXON, Justice.

We granted writs in this case, as in
State v. Holmes, No, 52812, 263 La, 685,
269 So.2d 207, this day decided, to consider
the effect of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972),
upon the administration of criminal justice
in Louisiana.

The State reserved a bill of exceptions.
when, at a hearing to fix bond for defend-
ant, accused of murder, the district judge
ruled that C.Cr.P. 313 was no longer effec-
tive, due to the unconstitutionality of the
imposition and execution of the death pen-

703

‘alty. The district judge ruled that he
would hear no testimony to determine if
the “proof is evident ot the presumption
great.” Apparently considering only the
factors set out in C.Cr.P. 317, the district
judge fixed bail at $10,000.

As in State v. Holmes, supra, we are
met not only with statutory provisions (C.
Cr.P. 312, 313) but also with constitutional t
provisions which refer to “capital off-

enses.” Louisiana Constitution, Article 1,

Section 12, provides:

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted. All per-
sons shall be bailable by sufficient sure-

ties, except the following: 1. Persons

charged with a capital offense, where
the proof is evident or the presumption

great. Persons convicted of felonies,

provided that where a minimum sentence
of less than five years at hard labor is

1, We are concerned in this case only with
Louisiana constitutional requirements.
The United States Supreme Court has
never decided whether state provisions,
which provide that no bail shall be al-
lowed in certain crimes, violate the
Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Bighth
Cireuit decided, in Mastrian v. Hedmann,
326 F.2d 708 (1964), that there are of-
fenses for which the state may constitu-
tionally provide that the right to bail does
not exist. At least one federal district
court, in Arsad vy. Henry, 317 F.Supp.
162 (D.C.N.C.1970), and one state su-
preme court, in Steigler v. Superior
Court In and For New Castle County,

704

actually imposed, bail shall be allowed
pending appeal until final judgment.”

Since the Furman case has eliminated
“capital offenses” in Louisiana, argues the
defendant, she is entitled to bail pending
trial regardless of whether the proof is ev-
ident or the presumption great.

The right to bail in Louisiana is and has
Our
present constitutional provision’ for bail

always been a fundamental one.

tracks the language found in each of the
eight preceding constitutions of this State

As far as we can determine, there have
always been capital offenses in Louisiana

until Furman v. Georgia, supra. Now,

since there are no capital offenses in Loui-
siana, must we disregard part of our con-
stitutional bail provisions, and enforce an-
other part? We think not, as long as
there is an interpretation which will give
meaning and significance to the entire pro-

vision.

252 A.2d 300 (Del.1969), cert. denied
396 U.S. 880, 90 S.Ct, 160, 24 L.Ed.2a
189 “(1969), have held that a state may
constitutionally provide that there is no
right to bail in “capital cases.”

2. Art. 6, § 19, La.Const. of 1812; Art. 108

of La.Const. of 1845; Art. 104 of La.
Const. of 1852; Art. 106 of La.Const.
of 1864; Art. 7 of La.Const. of 1868;
Art. 9 of La.Const. of 1879; Art. 12 of
La.Const. of 1898; Art. 12 of La.Const.
of 1913.
‘The same language appears in the 1682
Laws of the Province of Hast Jersey.
State v. Johnson, 1972, 61 N.J. 3851, 294
A.2d 245,

705

Hl As in State v. Holmes, supra, we
conclude that Furman v. Georgia does not
destroy the system. of classification of
Murder is still a
crime, and, when our legislature last acted

crimes in Louisiana.

with respect to it, murder was, as it has
ever been, a capital crime. The crime re-
only the penalty has

been changed. True, the penalty is what

mains unchanged;

made murder a capital offense, and it is
not actually a capital offense in Louisiana
today. But the mature of the offense has
not changed—only the punishment.

HI Because the system of classifying
certain serious offenses as capital, and
then providing the procedural structure for
the administration of criminal justice based
on that classification is so fundamental in
the organization of our criminal statutes,
we find it preferable to make no change in
the interpretation of the constitutional pro-

visions concerning bail. Those offenses

classified as capital before Furman v.
Georgia are still classified as capital of-

3. The Supreme Courts of Colorado and
California have applied the “classifica-
tion” theory to uphold bail provisions
similar to those of Louisiana after the
application of the death penalty became
unconstitutional in their jurisdictions.
People v. District Court (Nixon and Me-
Elravy), Golo.1972, 500 P.2d 358 and
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 100
Cal.Rptr. 152, 498 P.24 880 (1972) (én.
45). ‘The Supreme Court of New Jersey
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
found that bail provisions similar to those
in Louisiana are no longer viable because
there are no more “capital offenses.”

706

fenses, and those charged with an offense
punishable by death before Furman v.
Georgia are not entitled to bail where the
proof is evident or the presumption great.3

For these reasons, and those expressed
in State v. Holmes, supra, we find merit in
Bill of Exceptions No. 1. Upon motion of
the State and after notice to defendant, the
district judge shall conduct a hearing pur-
suant to the provisions of C.Cr.P. 313..

BARHAM, J., dissents with written rea-
sons.

TATE, J., concurs in BARHAM, Js
dissent and additionally dissents for the
reasons stated by him in State v. Holmes,
263 La. 685, 269 So.2d 207, this date.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The precise question in this case is
whether those charged with offenses which
were formerly punishable by death are to
be admitted to bail since Furman v. Geor-

State v. Johnson, 1972, 61 N.J. 851, 294
A.2d 245 and Ex Parte Contella, Tex.
Cr.App.1972, 485 S.W.2d 910. The Su-
preme Court of Florida in Donaldson
v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Wla.1972), noted
that Furman v. Georgia did not affect
the Florida bail provisions because Art.
1, See. 14 of the Florida Constitution,
FS.A., provides that there shall be no
bail available where the defendant is
“charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by life imprisonment
and the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption is great.”. .

107

gia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d
346 (1972), declared the death penalty un-
constitutional. The majority approaches
this problem as though it were res nova, a
problem suddenly created in every state in
this country because the Supreme Court of
the United States has stricken down the
death penalty. As a matter of fact, in a
very cursory examination I find that the
question has been presented many times be-
ginning as early as 1865, and that the an-
swer has been uniform except in one re-
cent case

Our Louisiana Constitution provides that
all persons shall be  bailable
“# %* %& Persons charged with a capital
offense, where the proof is evident or the
presumption great”, La.Const. of 1921,
Art. I, Sec. 12, (Emphasis supplied.) Our
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 933
defines “capital offense” as “an offense
that may be punished by death”.
over, if we did not have a definition in our

except

More-

Code, we would be required to look for a
definition in common law and its source.
“Capital offense” apparently has had one
meaning and one meaning only in England
and in the United States. Bacon said that
capital punishment was “That which af-
fects life”. Over the years in various edi-
tions of Webster’s and The Century dic-
tionaries, quotations from Spencer, Milton,
5. People ex rel., Dunbar y. District Court,
500 P.2d 858 (Colo.Sup.Ct.1972), relied

upon the dictum in a case where a Cali-
fornia court pretermitted the question of

708

Swift, and Macaulay have been used to il-
lustrate that “capital punishment” means
the forfeiture of head or life, punishment
by death. The Random House Dictionary
of the English Language (1967) says a
capital crime is punishable by death. The
several editions of Black’s Law Dictionary
define capital crime as one punishable with
death, and give numerous citations from
jurisdictions throughout this country.
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary says a capital
crime is “one for which the punishment of
death is inflicted’. See also Words and
Phrases, “Capital Crime or Offense”.

The jurisprudence is replete with the
definition of “capital offense”, and it is
undeviating. Therefore, under the specific
legislative definition in Louisiana as well
as under the consistent definition in stat-
utes and jurisprudence of other states, a
“capital offense” is one punishable by
death.

If there are no more offenses punishable
by death in Louisiana because of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court’s pronounce-
ments, there are no more capital offenses,
and our constitutional limitation upon the
right to bail in capital offense cases is
without effect. persons
charged with crimes are bailable, subject to
This

Therefore all

the Code criteria for fixing bail.

bail in a footnote in People v. Anderson,
6 Cal.24 628, 100 Cal-Rptr, 152, 493 P.2d
880 (1972).

709

history of jurisprudence.

In In Re Charles A. Perry, 19 Wis. 676
(1865), it was said: “The court are of
opinion that since the abolition of capital
punishment in this state, persons charged
with murder are in all cases bailable.” *

In State v. Johnston, 83 Wash. 1, 144 P.
944 (1914), it was held that since capital
punishment was abolished by that state in
1913, the 12 challenges previously afforded
in prosecutions for capital offenses were
no longer available, and that the provisions
for six peremptory challenges in non-capi-
tal offenses should be applied in a murder
prosecution.3

Ex Parte Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 188 P. 424
(1920), held that when the Constitution of
that state (like ours) made all offenses
bailable except capital offenses and the
legislature declared that murder could no
longer be punished by death, murder be-
came a bailable offense.

For other cases with similar holdings,
see In Re Welisch, 18 Ariz. 517, 163 P. 264
(1917); In Re Wood, 18 Ariz, 527, 163 P.
268 (1917); City of Sioux Falls v. Mar-
shall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925);
State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d
205 (1958); see also Taglianetti v. Fon-
taine, 105 RI. 596, 253 A.2d 609 (1969).
2. Capital punishment was abolished by ch.
103, Laws of 1853 in Wisconsin.

3. This is analogous to issues presented
in the companion case of State v. Holmes,

conclusion can be documented with a long

710

Tt can be seen from a reading of these
cases that the abolition of capital punish-
ment is not new in some jurisdictions with-
in this country. It becomes more readily
apparent that in these earlier cases where
states have abolished capital punishment,
these offenses, previously not bailable, be-
came bailable upon the abolishing of the
death penalty. :

The majority of the cases that have aris-
en recently have followed the uniform rule.
In People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 100
Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972), bail
was not an issue. However, as an after-
thought on rehearing the court said in dic-
tum “* * * Subject to our future con-
sideration of this issue in an appropriate
proceeding, we hold that they [offenses
formerly capital] remain as offenses for
which bail should be denied * * *” In
People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court,
500 P.2d 358 (Colo.Sup.Ct.1972), that
court, without looking to the vast authority
throughout this country for an answer to
this question, supported its decision with
that meager gleaning from the California
case.

Courts of all other jurisdictions which
have considered the impact of the new
United States Supreme Court declaration
hold that unless there is some saving pro-
No. 52812 on our docket, 263 La. 685,

269 So.2d 207, this day decided, in which
I dissent.

TH | 712

vision in their Constitutions, the end of the
death perialty tolls the end of the ‘denial of
bail. State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294
A2d 245 (1972); Ex Parte Contella
(Tex.Cr.App.1972) 485 S.W.2d 910. See
also Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499
(Fla.Sup.Ct.1972), which held that since
capital punishment had been abolished, the
provisions applying only to capital offenses
for manner of indictment, the number of
jurors required to constitute a jury, speedy
trial, and jurisdiction were now without
application. The Florida court held, how-
ever, that since the Florida Constitution
Article I, Section 14, states that an offense
punishable by life imprisonment is non-
bailable when the proof of guilt is evident
or the presumption great, the abolition of
capital punishment did not affect that ex-
ception to right to bail.

I cannot find any justification for the
holding of the majority in this case and in
the companion case, State v. Holmes, No.
52812 on our docket, 263 La. 685, 269 So.2d
207, this day decided, in which I also dis-
sent. The former provisions which specif-
ically pertain to capital offenses, whether
they benefit the State or the defendant, are
stricken with nullity since there are no
longer capital offenses. To reach any oth-
er conclusion usurps the function delegated
in this particular instance to the legislators
in combination with the people for legisla-
tive and constitutional reform.

I respectfully dissent.

268 So.2d 217

Eileen Reed GRIFFITH
v.
Joseph Folse ROY, Sr.
4. Folse ROY
v
Eileen REED, wife of Joseph Folse Roy, Jr.
No, 52241.

Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehearings Denied Dee. 11, 1972.

TL

er nm ES SEE ST ae eT

TT

——

Reed, Reed & Reed, Floyd’J. Reed, New
Orléans, for plaintiff-applicant,

Sydney J. Parlongue, Philip R. Riegel,
Jr, New Orleans, for defendant-respon-
dent.

BARHAM, Justice.

We are required to determine whether a
district court or a juvenile court has juris-
diction to adjudicate the status and custody
of two children under seven years of age
when a neglect complaint is made by a
grandparent and there has been no prior

718
judicial determination of custody betweén
the divorced parents.

These very young children are the issue
of a marriage between Eileen Reed and Jo-
seph Folse Roy, Jr. The mother instituted
a separation suit in July, 1969, in Orleans
Parish where she and the children were
domiciled, and she was awarded provi-
sional custody, The, children remained
with their mother until February 5, 1971,
when they were taken by their paternal
grandfather, Joseph Folse Roy, Sr., from
the domicile of the mother in Jefferson
Parish. On February 9, 1971, the paternal
grandfather filed suit in the district court
for the Parish of Jefferson alleging that
the children were neglected and that their
mother was morally unfit.to keep them,
and praying for the permanent, custody .of
the children. Personal service was, had; on
the mother, but she failed to answer, and
never appeared in the proceedings. ..Mean-
while, the father of the children, had. ob-
tained a ‘default divorce judgment on’-his
petition in Orleans Parish. The judgment
was silent as to the children of the mar-
riage. On March 10, 1971, by judgment of
default in the Jefferson Parish district
court the grandfather was given the per-
manent custody of the children.

On May 8, 1971, the mother, having re-
married, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the district court of Jefferson
Parish seeking the custody of her éhildrén.
‘The father of the childrén filed ‘an inter-

vention asking that he be given their custo-
dy if they were taken from the grandfa-
ther. At the suggestion of the district
judge the mother also filed a rule for
change of custody in the suit in which the
grandfather had obtained custody, and
these proceedings were consolidated for
trial. The district court dismissed the writ
of habeas corpus and awarded the grandfa~
ther custody of the children in conformity
with its earlier decree. The Court of Ap-
peal affirmed, 256 So.2d 705, and we
granted certiorari.

"The development of court jurisdiction
cover juveniles is pertinent to our determi-
pation of this case. Act 79 of 1894 created
a mew function for district courts of this

state. It charged the judges of those
courts, upon presentation by affidavit that
parents ot parent, tutor or other person
shaving custody of a child endangered the
physical or moral welfare of the child by
neglect or abuse, to remove the child from
that person and provide him with a home
or other place for safekeeping for his best
interest.” Juvenile courts in Louisiana had
théir origin in 1908, when by a constitu-
tional amendment such courts were estab-
lished and given the power to declare chil-
dren neglected and to commit them to in-
stitutions or to some citizen of good moral
character. The Constitution of 1913, Arti-
cle 118, retained the establishment of juve-
nile courts, but Act 201 of 1918, amending
Article 118, declared that the provisions re-

720

lating to their jurisdiction and powers shall
not be exclusive.

The Constitution of 1921, Article 7, Sec-
tion 52, in its original form and as last
amended, provides: “There shall be a Ju.
venile Court for every parish of the State.”
The judges of the district courts are
made ex officio judges of the juvenile
courts for the parishes where separate ‘ju-
venile courts have not been established,
and the juvenile courts are given jurisdic-
tion “* * * of cases of the State of
Louisiana in the interest of children under
seventeen years of age, as may be provided
by the Legislature, brought before - said
Courts as delinquent or neglected children

* & + and of “* -* * all cases of de-
sertion or monsupport of children
OR RM

Under Act 79 of 1894 (former R.S.
9:551-553) the district courts and the juve-
nile courts had concurrent jurisdiction oyer
the “trial” of neglected children. That act,
however, was repealed by Act 111 of 1956,
so that after 1956 the district courts of
Louisiana were divested of jurisdiction
over “neglected” children, and in matters

concerning children were left with juris-
Con-
versely, of course, a special juvenile court

diction of only civil proceedings.

or a district court in session as a juvenile

court could exercise the jurisdiction
matters affecting children specially accord-
ed them by the Constitution and by legisla-
tive enactment.

724

As regards ‘jurisdiction of the district
courts in matters of child custody, Code of
Civil Procedure Article 10 provides:

“A, A court which is otherwise compe-
tent under the laws of this state has juris-
diction of the following actions or proceed-
ings only under the following conditions:

ek ok

“(8) A proceeding to obtain the legal
custody of a minor if he is domiciled in, or
is in, this state;

fee oe ok

“(7) An action of divorce, or of separa-
tion from bed and board, if one or both of
the spouses are domiciled in this state and,
except as otherwise provided by law, the
grounds therefor were committed or oc-
curred in this state, or while the matrimo-
nial domicile was in this state.”

1, Civil Code Article 146 provides: “TE.
there are children of the marriage, whose
provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet
ponding and undecided, it shall be grant-
ed to the wife, whether plaintiff or de-
fendant; unless there should be strong
reasons to deprive her of it, either in
whole or in part, the decision whereof is
left to the discretion of the judge.” Arti-
cle 157 provides in part: “In all cases
of separation or of divoree the children
shalt be placed under the care of thé
party who shall have obtained the separa-
tion or divorce unless the judge shall, for
the greater advantage of the children,
order that some or all of them shall be
entrusted to the care of the other party.
* * *» (Bmphasis here and elsewhere
supplied.)

| 728,
[I The two basic provisions of the

Civil Code which set out the substantive
law for custody matters in the district

courts are Articles 146 and 1571 Their
sources are Articles 267 and 302 of the
Code Napoleon, respectively. However,
our articles depart from their source provi-
sions by deleting the right of the court to.
place the children with a third party uport
petition by the mother, a relative, or the

proper government official” Thus it may
be seen that in France it was specifically’,
provided that third parties and the govern—
ment had an interest in a proceeding for
the custody of children upon the dissolu-
tion of marriage by divorce, and that the,
care and custody of such children could be
placed in a third person. , In Louisiana,
however, under a literal reading of oyr
Code, during the pendency of litigation for .
separation from bed and board or divorce-

2. Code Napoleon Article 267 provided that

in a suit for divorce the children should ««
provisionally remain with the husband
(who was preferred not only in that Code,
but in our Codes of 1808 and 1825 and :
even in our Code of 1870 until the amend-
ment by Act 124 of 1888 placed the préf-
erence in the wife). However, “on peti-
tion of the mother, family [which means
an individual relative, 1 Pt. 1 Planiol,
Treatise on the Civil Law § 1277] or
commissaire du Gouvernement” the court
might order the children placed elsewhere.
Code Napoleon Article 802 gave the cus-
tody with the decree of divorce to the par-
ty who had obtained it “unless the court,
on the petition of the family or the com-
missaire du Gouvernement”, for the great-
er advantage of the children entrusted
them into “the care of the other party or
of @ third person”.

723. — 724

or upon judgment of separation or of di-
vorce, the court is empowered, perhaps
mandated, to determine the custody of the
minor children as between the parties, the
parents.

Our law specifically recognizes the
strong ties and the reciprocal obligations
and rights of parents and children. Civil
Code Article 227 states this principle vory
succinctly: “Fathers and mothers, by the
very act of marrying, contract together the
obligation of supporting, maintaining, and
educating their children.” Following the
Roman, the French, and the Spanish, our
law recognizes paternal or parental author-
ity and power as the bedrock of the rela~
tionship of parents and their children.
La.Civ.Code Arts. 215-245, Sec 1 Domat,
Civil" Law in Its Natural Order (Strahan’s
tr. Cushing’s ed.), Chapter III, § 3, pp.
13-15; 8 Dupin, Oeuvres de Pothier,
Traité des Personnes et des Choses, Tit.
VI, Sec. IT; 1 Pt. 2 Planiol, Treatise on
the Civil Law (LaState Law Inst. tr.
1959), §§ 1636, 1651, 1657, 1701; Las Siete
Partidas (Scott’s tr. 1931), Part IV, Titles
13, 17, 18, 19. The paternal authority ter-
minates only upon the child’s reaching ma-
jority or being emancipated (La.Civ.Code
Art. 216), upon parental incapacity (La.
Civ.Code Art. 221, C.C.P. Arts. 4501-02),
upon death (La.Civ.Code Art. 250), upon

the modification or cancellation of the

marital contract (La.Civ.Code Arts. 146,
157, 250), or upon the deposition of a par-
ent or both parents for neglect or abuse
(R-S. 13:1570, 1580).

TM it is necessary to be constantly
aware of the distinctions of paternal au-
thority, custody, and tutorship# There is
a dissolution of paternal authority in all its
aspects upon separation or divorce, just as
upon the death of one of the parents. The
primary interest on these occasions is to
provide the minor children of the marriage
with personal care and custody. The need
for the immediacy of that determination
can be contrasted with the less urgent need
for determination of where to vest all of
the attributes of paternal authority, where
to vest the attributes of tutorship other
than those involving the care of the mi-
nor’s person. Determination of custody
and care, especially in the case of the very
young, is the decision affecting personal
welfare, physical and mental wellbeing, and
even life and death,

HMM The original custody of a child
who has not been adjudicated neglected or
delinquent can be determined only in a civ-
il proceeding between parents when both
are living, in connection with an attack
upon the marital contract or after dissolu-
tion of that ‘contract, Since custody and
care of children born of the marriage is
such a vital part of the marital contract

3. See Appendix.

725

and since the marital contract is held invi-
olate from attack by anyone other than the
parties to it (husband and wife), no other
person can institute a civil proceeding for
child custody while that contract exists.
To allow such an attack would allow third
parties to perhaps induce one of the parties
to initiate a legal attack upon the marriage
itself. Moreover, it would call upon a
court to exercise paternal authority which
then exists only in the parents, Until one
of the parties attacks the marital contract,
the State, through the judicial function,
can interfere with that paternal authority
only under the special laws defining ne-
glect and delinquency; and then that func-
.tion is assigned exclusively to the juvenile
courts upon petition by the State in the in-
terest of the child and not by petition of a
third party in his own interest.

HH Our courts look
through the caption, style, and form of

consistently

pleadings to determine from the substance
of the pleadings the nature of the proceed-
ing. See State y. United Bonding Ins. Co.

4. The Family Court for the Parish of Bast
Baton Rouge has different juristictional
authority, and cases involving that court
should not be analogized on jurisdictional
questions to those in either the district
courts or the juvenile courts, ‘That court
has pre-empted the authority that the dis-
trict court and the juvenile court of that

» parish had on cases involving juvenile de-
Jinquency, criminal acts involving a ju-
venile, desertion, non-support, and crim-
Smal - neglect, adoptions, dissolutions of
marriage, paternity, alimony and custody
proceedings. La.Const. Art. VII, Sec. 53,

Le “7126

of Indianapolis, Tnd., 244 La. 716, 154 So.
2d 374; State v. Shelton, 227 La. 27, 78
So.2d 498; State v. Judges of Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, 45 La.Ann, 883, 13
So. 2; Erath Sugar Company v. Brous-
sard, 240 La. 949, 125 So.2d 776, and cases
there cited, “This grandfather’s suit here
was in fact an attempt to have the mother
declared unfit and the children declared
neglected. The manner in which ’ the
grandfather’s suit is styled is of no moment.
Here was an attempt by a third party to
declare children “neglected” under Consti-
tution Article VII, Section 52. Only the
State could exercise that right (although a

‘third party’s affidavit may motivate the

State to institute such a proceeding, R.S.
13:1574), and then in the juvenile courts
A third person cannot. by means of the
style and form of a petition deprive the. ju-
venile court of its exclusive jurisdiction
The district
court, lacking jurisdiction, was incompetent

over neglected children.

to act in the proceedings filed by ‘the
grandfather.S Therefore the adjudication

For discussion of its jurisdiction see Kel-
ly v. Kelly, 227 La. 275, 79 So.2d 307
(1955); State v. Bannister, 198 $0.20
196 (ist Cir. 1967). : a

5. In this opinion we are determining only
jurisdiction. ‘The question of “whether
a third party has a right or cause of ac- -
tion. to institute a suit which is in sub-
stance as well as style a civil proceéding ©
for custody of minor children is not before
the court. Neither do we reach, the
tion of a’ third party's rights in’ civit'eits-
tody proceedings pending between parents,

faq
“granting dustody of the children to the
grandfather is null, void, and without ef-
fect.

TH Habeas corpus was unavailable
to the grandparent for at the time he initi-
ated his action, he detained the children
and had them in his own custody, How-
ever, proceeding by writ of habeas corpus
can be had here by the mother, where
there is a claim of detention by another
without legal right. The only jurisdiction
for such a proceeding is in the district
court, and venue would be where the chil-
dren are detained or at the domicile of the
defendant, The mother’s application for
habeas corpus relief was brought in the
proper forum, and was the legal vehicle by
which she could assert her right to regain
‘the custody of the children who had been
taken by the grandparent. State vy. Re-
naud, 157 La. 776, 103 So. 101 (1925) ;
State v. Salter, 211 La. 918, 31 So.2d 163
(1947), The district court erred in dis-
missing that proceeding.
mine in the hearing on the application for
habeas corpus the custody of the children
and not the change of custody of the chil-
dren since there has never been a legal
award of custody.

It must deter-

For the reasons assigned we reverse the
judgments below. The judgment on the
rule in the proceeding styled J. Folse Roy
6. The Family Court of the Parish of

Bast Baton Rouge has jurisdiction over
habeas corpus proceedings, but juvenile

728

v. Eileen Reed, Wife of Joseph Folse Roy,
Jr, No. 132-868 on the docket of the
‘Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court for
the Parish of Jefferson, is set aside and
cancelled, and the proceeding is dismissed.
In the proceeding styled Eileen Reed
Griffith v. Joseph Folse Roy, Sr, No.
134.967 on the docket of that court, the
judgment dismissing the application for
writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the
trial court is ordered to proceed in that
matter in accordance with this opinion.

APPENDIX

In repeated writings in the Louisiana
Law Review, and more particularly in Tu-
torship After Separation of the Parents, 16
La.Bar Journal 267, Professor Robert A.
Pascal of Louisiana State University has
condemned jurisprudence which permits
suits for change of custody after an award
in a separation or divorce judgment. He
states that the parent initially awarded cus-
tody under Civil Code Article 157 is by
that fact alone constituted ¢utor and can be
deprived of custody thereafter only
through a proceeding to remove the tutor.
He is of the opinion that when in 1924
Acts 74, 72, and 196 respectively amended
Civil Code Articles 157, 246, and 250, tu-
torship became an essential ingredient of
every pronouncement of civil custody. He
believes that tutorship is at that moment de

courts are not accorded that jurisdiction
under our Constitution,

729
jure vested and complete without the ne-
cessity for any other judicial proceeding.
He therefore reasons that after the judg-
ment awarding custody in the divorce or
separation proceeding, only a civil proceed-
ing to remove a tufor can be maintained
against the person who obtained custody.

HHI While tutorship is inclusive of
custody in most instances, a custody award
in connection with separation and divorce
proceedings does not include appointment
of a tutor, nor does it institute the regime
of tutorship.

Act 74 of 1924 added the following
clause to Civil Code Article 157: “The
party under whose care a child or children
is placed, or to whose care a child or chil-
dren has been entrusted [in the separation
or divorce judgment], shall of right be-
come natural tutor or tutrix of said child
or children to the same extent and with the
same effect as if the other party had died.”
(Emphasis here and elsewhere has been
supplied.) By Act 197 of 1924 we amend-
‘ed Article 221, which had provided and
still provides that the father is, during the
marriage, administrator of the estate of his
minor children, and that his administration
ceases at the majority or emancipation of
the children. The 1924 amendment added
that the administration of the minors’ es-
tate also ceases upon judicial separation of
the mother and father. Civil Code Article
159 provides that the effects of divorce are
the same as those of separation from bed

. gal separation,

730

and board, except that divorce places the
parties with respect to each other as
though no marriage had been contracted
between them. Article 225 transfers the
usufruct of the child’s estate to the party
obtaii
suit, and it necessarily applies to a divorce

ing the judgment in a separation

proceeding which was not preceded by le-
Act 72 of 1924 amended
Article 246 to read: “The minor not eman-
cipated és placed under the authority of a
tutor after the dissolution of the marriage
of his father and mother or the separation
from bed and board of either one of them
from the other.” Article 247 provides that
there are four sorts of tutorships, and Ar-
ticle 248 says: “Tutorship by nature takes
place of right, but the natural tutor must
qualify for the office as provided by law.
In every other kind of tutorship the tutor
must be confirmed or appointed by the
court, and must qualify for the office as
provided by law.” It should be noted that
this language change came through an
amendment by Act 30, Section 1, of 1960,
and came about in connection with the
adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That article is in conflict with the articles
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to that
extent it must fall, as will be shown later.

HM Acticle 250 was amended by Act
196 of 1924 to provide that upon divorce or
judicial separation the tutorship of minor
children belongs of right to the parent to
whom custody is awarded, and that this, is

BL

tutorship by nature. The Code of Civil
Procedure, adopted in 1960, incorporated
many of the provisions concerning tutor-
ship which had previously been a part of
our Civil Code. Code of Civil Procedure
Article 4031 provides: “A petition for the
appointment of a tutor of a
* * * shall be filed * * *
the surviving parent is domiciled, * * *
or * * * where the parent or other

minor
where

person awarded custody of the minor is
domiciled, if the parents are divorced or
judicially separated.” It is obvious that
the natural tutorship does not begin with
the judicial pronouncement of custody and
without appointment, although the right to
be tutor is then in existence. See Oppen-
heim, The Basic Elements of Tutorship in
Louisiana, 44 Tul.L.Rev. 452, at 456, 465,
466. Code of Civil Procedure Article 4061
provides the obligations of a natural tutor.
Comment (a) under that article correctly
states: “Although the surviving parent [or
the parent awarded custody] has an abso-
lute right to be appointed natural tutor, he
must qualify as such before he can exer-
cise the authority conferred on tutors.”
Article 4131 provides in part that “The
person appointed tutor, except the natural
tutor, shall furnish security * * *”,
Article 4101 reads in part: “When any
person applies to be appointed as tutor, the
court shall order the taking of an invento-
ry and an appraisal of the minor’s property
* * #*” Article 4131 provides the natu-
ral tutor is not required to furnish bond

732

but must record the certificate of invento-
ry required by Article 4101 when one ap-
plies for appointment as tutor, which oper-
ates as a legal mortgage in favor of the
minor. Insofar as it is pertinent to the
discussion here, it reads: “Within thirty
days after his appointment, the natural tu-
tor shall cause the clerk’s certificate to be
recorded in * * * every other parish
in the state in which he owns immovable
property.” Article 4171 requires that ev-
ery tutor take an oath before he enters
upon the performance of his duties, and
that the natural tutor include within his
oath the list of the parishes in which he
owns immovable property. Article 4172
sets forth the requirements to be met be-
fore letters of tutorship can issue. The
Civil Code provides that every tutor must
Code of Civil Proce-
dure Article 4201 requires that an undertu-
tor be appointed “at the time judgment is
rendered appointing a tutor * * *,
Article 4204 requires the undertutor to
“cause the natural tutor to record the legal
mortgage * * , Article 4232 provides
that when a tutor fails to qualify within 10
days after his appointment, the court may
revoke the appointment, but the article
says this revocation does not apply to a
“parent of the minor [who] is appointed
Even under the provisions for

have an undertutor.

tutor”.
“small tutorships” it is anticipated that a
natural tutor becomes such only upon judi-
cial appointment. When there is an un-
emancipated minor and the parents are di-~

733

vorced or judicially separated, Code of
Civil Procedure Article 683 provides that
the proper plaintiff to sue, and Article 732
provides that the proper defendant to be
sued, is “* * * the tutor appointed by
the court of this state * * *, When
procedural capacity of a divorced or judi-
cially separated parent representing a mi-
nor is raised by exception, that parent
must cure the defect by seeking the ap-
pointment as tutor. C.C.P. Arts. 926(6)
and 933; Bogan v. Byrom, 151 So.2d 718
(3rd Cir. 1963); Jackson v. Dickens, 236
So.2d 81 (ist Cir. 1970). When the minor
has no tutor to be sued, an attorney at law
is provided. C.C.P. Art. 732.

HEM Last and most pertinent for an

evaluation of the articles of the Civil Code
and the Code of Civil Procedure for deter-
mination of when a natural tutorship be-
gins, Sections 5 and 6 of Act 15 of 1960,
which adopted the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, repealed all laws or parts of
laws in conflict or inconsistent with that
Code, and provided that in the event of
any conflict between the provisions of this
Code and those of any other act adopted at
the 1960 session, the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure will control and
prevail regardless of the date of enactment
at that session, Therefore, while the party
awarded custody in a separation or divorce
proceeding is of right the natural tutor of
the minors, that right is inchoate; it is, as
a matter of fact, exactly what Civil Code

734

Article 250 calls it, “tutorship * * * of
right”, but no more than 4 “right”. Natu-
ral tutorship has existence, as do all other
tutorships, only after appointment of the
tutor by a judicial tribunal, as provided in
the Code of Civil Procedure.

HM After custody is awarded in a sep-
aration or divorce proceeding and if the
successful party has not obtained an ap-
pointment as natural tutor, the proceeding
to be had for change of custody is a civil
proceeding for custody and not for remov-
al of a tutor.

HE Grandparents as well as other re-
lations have an interest in causing a tutor
to be appointed. See La.Civ.Code Art. 310.
In such a proceeding an attack can be
mounted upon the qualification of the par-
ty or parties preferred for the tutorship
even where a parent is preferred as a nat-
ural tutor.

McCALEB, C. J., subscribes to the opin-
ion only.

HAMLIN, J., dissents being of the opin-
ion that the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peal is correct,

DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.

As I understand the majority opinion, it
has categorized this grandfather’s petition

735

for custody of his grandchildren as a “ne-
glect” complaint and proceeds to hold that
the district court, “lacking jurisdiction, was
incompetent to act in the proceedings filed
by the grandfather.”

This cannot be correct, First, the juris-

diction of the district courts in civil mat-
ters is unlimited, and is fixed by the Con-
stitution. Second, plaintiff's petition is not
a neglect proceeding. It is an effort to ob-
tain legal custody of grandchildren already
in his actual custody.

The district courts in Louisiana are

courts of unlimited jurisdiction. Article 7,
Section 35 of the Louisiana’ Constitution of
1921 provides: “The District Courts
+o... shail have original jurisdiction in

all civil matters . . . and in all cases

where . . . civil or political rights

are involved, and in all cases where no
specific amount is in contest, except as
may be otherwise provided in this Consti-
tution .” (Emphasis added).

1. “Jurisdiction. The said Courts shall
have jurisdiction, except for capital crimes
and crimes defined by any law defining
attempted aggravated rape if committed
by children fifteen years of age or older,
of cases of the State of Louisiana in the
interest of children under seventeen years
of age, as may be provided by the Legis-
lature, brought before said Courts as de-
linquent or noglected children and of the
trial of all persons charged with the viola-
tion of any law now in existence or here-
after enacted for the protection, of the
physical, moral or mental well-being of

. children under seventeen years of age,
not punishable by death or hard labor.

Poe

736

Unless another provision of the Consti-
tution limits the jurisdiction of the district
courts, possibly by granting exclusive ju-
risdiction to another court, that jurisdic-
tion cannot be restricted by statute.

Article 7, Section 52 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921 establishes juvenile
courts, That article provides that judges
of district courts in most of the State are
ex-officio juvenile court judges. Certain
city courts were given jurisdictions concur-
rent with the district courts, and as such,
the judges of the city courts were ex-offi-
cio judges of juvenile courts. There is no
indication in the jurisdiction section of Ar-
ticle 7, Section 52 that the jurisdiction
granted to juvenile courts was to be

exclusive

RS. 13:1563 does make the effort to
grant exclusive jurisdiction to juvenile
courts, as does R.S. 13:1570.
ceptions are noted in R.S. 13:1570?

Certain ex-

Said Court shall also have jurisdiction of
all cases of desertion or nonsupport of
children under seventeen years of age, by
either parent, or nonsupport of a wife by
her husband, and also of the adoption
of childven under seventeen years of age.”

2. “Nothing contained in RS. 13:1561
through 13:1592 shall deprive other
courts of the right to determine the eus-
tody of children upon writs of habeas
corpus, or to determine the custody of
children when such custody is incidental
to the determination of cases pending in
such other courts.”

737

the constitutional grant of jurisdiction giv-
en to the district courts.

Finally, this court has reached the rath-
er surprising conclusion that the petition
filed by this plaintiff was a proceeding un-
der R.S. 13:1569 et seq. to have a juvenile
court declare the grandchildren “neglected”
children, apparently contrary to our hold-
ing in In re Sherrill, 206 La. 457, 19 So.2d
263.
be without jurisdiction in a grandparent’s

There we held the juvenile court to

“neglect” petition, when the grandparent
alleged that actual custody was in the good
home of the grandparents, and the moth-
er’s home was unfit.

In this case, plaintiff prayed for a judg-
ment awarding him “the permanent care,
custody and control of his two grandchil-

dren 2.”

The petition contained
over fifty articulated paragraphs, describ-
ing conduct of the mother which the peti-
tion alleged rendered her morally unfit to
keep the children. The petition was filed
in the district court. It was heard by the
district judge, sitting as a district judge,
who rendered written reasons for judg-
ment after consolidating the case with the
mother’s habeas corpus act. The district
court found, based on State v. Stokes, La.
App., 222 So.2d 573 and State v. Bannister,
La.App., 198 So.2d 196, such unusual cir-
cumstances had been presented, showing
that the welfare of young children was in

jeopardy, that the grandparent could seek
a

Le 738

“It is elemental that statutes cannot limit

the legal custody from the natural parent.
The district court granted the legal custody
to the grandparent, in whose actual custo-
dy the children had been for more than
four months.

In one respect, I agree with the majori-
ty; this court should pay little attention to
the label attached to pleadings. However,
I disagree with the majority when it labels
this petition a “neglect” action, and be-
cause of that label finds that the district
court did not have jurisdiction to decide
the custody of these children.

“Neglected child” is defined by R.S.
13:1569(8) as follows:

“A ‘neglected child’ means a child who
has been adjudged to be within the con-
ditions set forth in R.S, 13:1570, Sub-
section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2).”

The relevant portions of R.S. 13:1570
provide that:

“Except as otherwise provided herein,
the court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in proceedings :

“A. Concerning any child whosé domi-
cile is within the parish or who is found
within the parish:

“(1) Whose parent or other person le-
gally responsible for the care and sup-
port of such child neglects or refuses,
when able to do 0, to provide proper or
necessary support, education as required
by law, or medical, surgical or other care

739

abandoned by his parent or other cus-
todian; or who is otherwise without

proper care, custody, or support.

“(2) Whose occupation, behavior, envi-
ronment or associations are injurious to
his welfare.”

Although the requirements of a “neglect
complaint” are not clearly delineated, R.S.
13 :1574 sets out the requirements of a peti-
tion which shows that a “child is within
the purview of RS. 13:1561 through
13:1592.” This phrase encompasses both
neglected and delinquent children. RS.
13:1574 provides:

“Whenever any person informs the court
that a child is within the purview of R.
S. 13:1561 through 13:1592, the court
shall make a preliminary inquiry to de-
termine whether the interests of the pub-
lic or of the child require that further
action be taken. Thereupon the court
‘may make such informal adjustment as
‘is practicable without a petition, or may
authorize a petition to be filed by any
person. The proceeding shall be entitled
‘The State of Louisiana in the interest of

» a child under
years of age.’

seventeen

“The petition shall be verified and, if
-made by a probation officer or the dis-
trict attorney, may be upon information
and belief. It shall set forth plainly (1)
tthe facts which bring the child in the

necessary for his well-being; or who is

740

purview of RS. 13:1561 through
13:1592; (2) the name, age, and resi-
dence of the child; (3) the names and
residences of his parents; (4) of the
person or persons having custody or care
of the child and (5) of the nearest
known relative if no parent, custodian or
other person having the care of the child
can be found. If any of the facts herein
required are not known by the petitioner
the petitioner shall so state.

“In the trial of a child under RS.
13:1561 through R.S. 13:1592 it shall be
the duty of the district attorney to con-
duct the prosecution.”

The Roy petition varies from the re-
quirements of a “neglect complaint” in
that:

(1) The petition is not entitled “The
State of Louisiana in the interest of Ei-
leen Kaye Roy and Joseph Folse Roy,
II, children under the age of seventeen.”

(2) Roy’s petition is not verified.

(3) The name of the father is included,
but his residence is not included.

(4) The district attorney did not conduct
the “prosecution.”

A reading of RS. 13:1561 through
13:1592 indicates that this is not and was
not intended to be a “neglect complaint”
for the additional reason that the State is
not involved in this matter in any way.
Apparently, a “neglect complaint” is one to

TAL

which the State is either the mover or a
party.

In State v. Graham, 173 La. 469, 137 So.
855, this court held that:

“cases involving the neglect or

delinquency of children are quasi crimi-
nal in their nature, in which cases the
state is a party. In cases of neglect, the
state acts for and on behalf of the child
against either or both parents who may
have it in custody, and this creates an is-
sue between the state and the parent, of
which issue the juvenile courts have ju-
tisdiction under the express provisions
of the Constitution and the statute.
Brana v. Brana, 139 La. 305, 71 So. 519.”

It should be noted that there is no con-
test in this case between district courts and
juvenile courts for jurisdiction over the
persons involved or over the subject mat-
ter.

Tt seems to me that the majority makes
it impossible for the district court to adju-
dicate the question presented to it. We
seem to hold that the district court lacks
jurisdiction to decide whether the mother
is an unfit person: yet we reverse and re-
mand the habeas corpus suit, and order the
trial court to proceed in that matter “in ac-
cordance with this opinion.”

Have we decided that under no circum-
stances is the grandfather to obtain a de-
cree granting him the legal custody of
these children? Are we saying, by infer-

742

ence, that the district court must either
grant or deny the mother’s demands in the
habeas corpus action? Are we saying-
that the district court could find that the-
mother, by immoral conduct, had forfeited
her right to these children, but the court
was without “jurisdiction” to render a.
judgment granting the grandfather legal.
custody?

Nor should some of the other broad con-
clusions in the majority opinion be allowed”
to rest unchallenged. Such statements in
the majority opinion as: “No other person
can institute a civil proceeding for child.
custody while that (marriage) contract ex-
ists,” are not supported by authority, nor-
by reason.

We granted writs in this case to consid-.
er what the Court of Appeal said and did
about the so-called “double burden rule.”
We-
should, in my view, touch upon this matter.
The application by the Court of Appeal of
Nev-
ertheless, an examination of the record
demonstrates the probable correctness of
the conclusion of the Court of Appeal and’
the district court that the evidence adduced’
on the trial of this matter was sufficient to-
demonstrate the moral unfitness of the
mother.

Such questions, we do not reach.

this “rule” was perhaps unfortunate.

In my opinion, this court should examine
the record and determine whether the wel~
fare of these children requires that their
grandfather be granted legal custody.

743

269 So.2d 228

LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ve
Leslie B. PONDER, dr.

No. 52373.

Nov, 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1972.

TAL

Louisiana State Bar Ass’n Committee
on Professional Responsibility: James H.
Drury, New Orleans, Chairman, Pat W.

Browne, Sr, New Orleans, Leonard
Fuhrer, Alexandria, A. Leon Hebert, Baton
Rouge, Edgar H. Lancaster, Jr, Tallulah,
Henry A. Politz, Shreveport, John F.
Pugh, Thibodaux, A. Russell Roberts, Me-
tairie, John B. Scofield, Lake Charles,
Thomas O. Collins, Jr, New Orleans,
Counsel, for applicant.

J. Lynn Ponder, Amite, for' respondent.

745 — 746

DISBARMENT PROCEEDING

DIXON, Justice.

The Committee on Professional Respon-
sibility of the Louisiana State Bar Associa-
tion instituted this disbarment proceeding
against Leslie B. Ponder, Jr., a member
practicing in Tangipahoa Parish. The
committee’s petition for disbarment is
based upon respondent’s final conviction of
two counts of filing false federal income
tax returns, (26 U.S.C. 7206(1)). Re-
spondent was convicted by a jury in the
United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Louisiana December 29,
1969. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tion and the United States Supreme Court
denied respondent’s application for a writ
of certiorari February 22, 1972. Respon-
dent received a “pardon” from the Gover-
nor of Louisiana on March 6, 1972. On
April 12, 1972 the committee instituted this

disbarment proceeding.

Respondent filed an exception of prema-
turity alleging that (1) the law governing
‘this proceeding is the Articles of Incorpo-
ration of 1941, and, under that law, respon-
dent must be given a hearing by the com-
‘mittee before proceedings are instituted
against him, and (2) the conviction is not
final in that respondent plans to file mo-
tions either to set aside the sentence or to

reduce the sentence,

Respondent also filed exceptions of no
right or cause of action and a motion to
dismiss the proceeding alleging that (1)
members of the Louisiana State Bar Asso-
ciation can not be disbarred on the basis of
a federal felony conviction; (2) the par-
don by the Governor of Louisiana is a bar
to any disciplinary action; and (3) that
filing false income tax returns is not the
type of crime which requires disbarment.

Respondent also filed a motion seeking
the admission of certain facts.

We find that the exceptions and the mo-
tion for dismissal are without merit and
that respondent’s motion for the admission
of certain facts should be denied,

I. Exception of Prematurity

HI Respondent’s conviction became fi-
nal twenty-five days after the United
States Supreme Court denied respondent’s
application for a writ of certiorari, Rule
58 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Cutrer v. Humble Oil &
Refining Company, 228 F.Supp. 787 (E.D.
La.1964), aff'd Stevens v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 346 F.2d 43 (Sth Cir.1965),
cert. denied 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 546, 15
L.Ed.2d 468 (1966). The United States
Supreme Court denied respondent’s writ
application February 22, 1972. No rehear-
ing application was filed within the twen-
ty-five days. Therefore, on April 12, 1972,
when the committee instituted this proceed-
ing, respondent’s conviction was final.

TAT

HMI The current Articles of Incorpora-
tion of the Louisiana State Bar Associa-
tion became effective on September 1,
1971. Because respondent’s conviction be-
came final after this date, the committee

properly instituted this disciplinary action
pursuant to Article 15, Section 8(7) of the
Articles of Incorporation of 1971. How-
ever, under the articles of incorporation as
they formerly existed or as they presently
exist, respondent has no right to a hearing
by the committee prior to the institution of
Re-
spondent’s hearing is held before a com-

disciplinary proceedings in this court,

missioner appointed by this court after the
committee institutes the disciplinary pro-
ceeding by petitioning this court for re-
Sections 7, 12, Ar-
ticles of Incorporation of 1941; Article 15,

spondent’s disbarment.

Section 8(7), Articles of Incorporation of
1971; Louisiana State Bar Association v.
Rayl, 208 La. 531, 23 So.2d 206.

Thus, respondent’s exception of prema-
turity is without merit.

IL Exceptions of No Right or Cause of
Action and Motion to Dismiss

HI Respondent contends that a member
of the Louisiana State Bar Association can
not be disbarred on the basis of a federal
felony conviction. However, both the arti-
cles of incorporation and the jurisprudence
clearly provide that a federal felony con-

748
viction may form the basis of disbarment,
Article 13, Section 12, Articles of Incorpo-
ration of 1941; Article 15, Section 8, Arti-
cles of Incorporation of 1971; Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Leche, 201 La:
293, 9 So.2d 566 (using the United States-
mail to defraud); Louisiana State Bar As--
sociation v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So.2d°
582 (willfully attempting to evade the pay--
ment of federal income tax); Louisiana.
State Bar Association v. Steiner, 201 La.
923, 10 So.2d 703 (willfully attempting to.
evade the payment of federal income tax) ;
Louisiana State Bar Association v. Rayl,
208 La, 531, 23 So.2d 206 (making false:
statements to a federal savings and loan

insurance corporation).

HE A1c0, a pardon is not an absolute-
defense to disbarment as respondent con-
tends. People ex rel. Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation v. Burton, 39 Colo. 164, 88 P. 1063.
See, State v. Gowland, 189 La. 80, 179 So..
41; People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214
Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737; Verneco, Inc. v. Fi-
delity & Casualty Company of New York,
253 La. 721, 219 So.2d 508 (dictum).

The committee attached a certificate of
respondent’s conviction to its petition for-
disbarment and alleged in the petition that
the conviction was for a “felony and a se-
Article 15, Section 8, Arti-
cles of Incorporation of the Louisiana.
State Bar Association. Respondent was.

rious crime.”

749

convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. 7206,
which specifically provides that:

“Any person who (violates the
provisions of this statute) shall
be guilty ofa felony . . .”

Further investigation into the nature of
‘the offense as it bears upon the discipli-
mary proceedings must await the hearing
‘by the commissioner. Article 15, Section
-8(7) (d) provides:

“At the hearing based upon a respond-

ent’s conviction of a crime, the sole issue

to be determined shall be whether the

-crime warrants discipline, and if so, the
At the hearing the re-

‘sgondent may offer evidence only of

‘extent thereof.

‘mitigating circumstances not inconsistent
~with the essential elements of the crime
for which he was convicted as deter-
mined by the statute defining the crime.”

HM Therefore, respondent's allegation
‘that the committee has no right or cause of
Re-
sspondent’s exceptions and motion to dis-
“miss are denied.

saction against him is without merit.

Ill. Motion for Admissions

The admissions respondent seeks are not
admissions of fact, but a request for ad-
‘missions of certain conclusions, some legal
and most irrelevant.

The exceptions of prematurity, no right
-of action and no cause of action are over-
ruled; the motion to dismiss is denied;
rand the motion for admissions is denied.

750
269 So.2d 231
James R. GAILLARD.

vy

Alwynn CRONVICH, Sheriff of the Parish
of Jefferson and Roland Vicknair, Warden
of the Jefferson Parish Prison,

No. 52415.
Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dee. 11, 1972.

| a
ye
Fa

“Smith & Scheuermann, Benjamin E.
Smith, New Orleans, for plaintiff-relator.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst, Atty. Gen., John M. Ma-
motilides, Dist. Atty, Thomas P. McGee,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-respondent.

DIXON, Justice,

In this habeas corpus proceeding the ap-
plicant seeks release from the Jefferson
Parish prison. After a hearing, the dis-
trict court denied applicant relief.

52

On September 20, 1968 applicant was
convicted in Orleans Parish’ df four thefts.
He was sentenced to six years at hard la~
bor for each theft, the sentences to be con-
On March 6, 1969 applicant pled
guilty in Jefferson Parish to four burgla~

current.

ries. He was sentenced to seven years at
hard labor for each burglary, the sentences
The Jefferson Parish
sentences were made consecutive to the
Orleans Parish sentences.

to be concurrent.

Therefore, ap-
plicant was effectively sentenced to a thir-
teen year prison term for the four thefts
and four burglaries,

November 2, 1971 Governot John J.
McKeithen commuted applicant's Jefferson
Parish sentences from seven to five years
in length and made the Jefferson Parish
sentences concurrent with the Orleans Par-
ish sentences. Due to the commutation,
applicant Gaillard’s Jefferson Parish sen-
tences were shorter than his Orleans Par-
ish sentences, so that the Jefferson Parish
sentences would be satisfied upon the com-
pletion of the Orleans Parish sentences.

On December 3, 1971 applicant complet-
ed his Orleans Parish sentences and was
released from custody. He was immediate-
ly arrested by Jefferson Parish authorities
to begin serving the Jefferson Parish sen-
tences. Although the Jefferson Parish au-
thorities recognized the Governor’s power
to commute applicant’s sentencé from sev-
en to five years, they refused to honor that
portion of the commutatién order which

753

made the Jefferson Parish and the Orleans
Parish sentences concurrent. Jefferson
Parish authorities take the position that
‘the Governor has no authority to make
consecutive sentences run concurrently.

The executive’s power to commute is
found in Article V, Section 10 of the Loui-
siana Constitution of 1921, which provides:

“The governor shall have power to grant
reprieves for all offenses against the
state; and may, except in cases of im-
peachment, or treason, upon the recom-
mendation in writing of the lieutenant
governor, attorney general, and presiding
judge of the court before which the con-
viction was had, or any two of them,
grant pardons, commute sentences, and
remit fines and forfeitures; provided,
‘however, that each first offender who
‘has never previously been convicted of a
felony shall be eligible for pardon auto-
matically upon completion of his sen-
tence without the aforementioned recom-
In case of trea-
son he may grant reprieves until the end

mendation in writing.

of the next session of the legislature, in
which body the power of pardoning is
vested.”

“The statutory provision is identical (R.S.
15:572). °

Hl The only limitation on the Gover-
nor’s commutation power is that he act

184

pursuant to a written recomendation of
commutation signed by any two of the fol-
lowing: the lieutenant governor, the attor-
ney general and the presiding judge of the
court before which the conviction was ob-
tained. Once this recommendation is re-
ceived, the Governor has unlimited discre-
tionary power to commute an applicant’s
sentence.

In this instance, the Governor did not
choose to commute applicant’s Jefferson
Parish sentences completely, as he could
have. Rather, he choose to commute the
Jefferson Parish sentences to a term short-
er than the Orleans Parish sentences and
to make the Jefferson “Parish sentences
concurrent with the Orleans Parish sen-
tences. The result under either method of
commutation is the same: the Jefferson
Parish sentences are satisfied when appli-

cant completes the Orleans Parish sentenc-
es.

I We find that applicant’s commuta-
tion was, in all respects, a valid exercise of
the executive commutation power. Appli-
cant has satisfied his Jefferson Parish sen-
tences. Therefore, we find applicant to be
incarcerated in the Jefferson Parish prison
unlawfully,

The judgment of the district court is re-
versed, and applicant, James R. Gaillard, is
ordered discharged from custody. ,

a
ot
#

269 So.2d 232

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Archie Lee WILLIAMS,

No. 51875.
Oct, 26, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dee. 11, 1972.

"BT ;
a

TS

—_——

D’Amico, Curet & Bush, Louis D. Curet,
Bryan E. Bush, Jr, Kizer, Cangelosi, San-
ford & Mosely, Roy F. Cangelosi, Jr, Ba-
ton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty. Frank J. Gremil-
lion, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appel-
lee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals from a convic-
tion, after a trial by jury, of armed rob-
bery (La.R.S. 14:64), for which he was
sentenced to serve forty years at hard la-
bor in the State penitentiary. He relies
upon fifteen bills of exceptions to obtain a
reversal of the conviction and sentence.

Bill of exceptions No. 1 was reserved to
the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion to excuse the jury venire. The mo-
tion was made on the grounds that the dis-
trict attorney, in the presence of the jury,
moved to sever the indictment which had
charged the defendant along with two oth-
ers, and to try Archie Williams in a sepa-
rate trial.

759

HI We can find no prejudice to the
defendant from the fact that the jury
heard thé State’s motion for a severance.
The jury was retired immediately after the
motion was made, and they heard no part
of the argument thereon, This bill is with-
out merit.

Bill of exceptions No. 2 was reserved
when the trial court allowed the indictment
to be read to the jury, including the names
of the other defendants under the original
indictment. The defendant moved for a
mistrial which motion was denied by the
trial court.

HB Again, we find that no prejudice to
the defendant resulted from the fact that the
jurors heard that the defendant was indict-
ed along with two others. Testimony in-
troduced at the trial brought out the fact
that the defendant was not the only person
involved in the perpetration of the crime
charged. This bill is without merit.

Bills of exceptions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 all
relate to the defendants objection to the
trail court’s admissibility of evidence of
the alleged aggravated rape of the victim
into’ the trial. Counsel contends the injec-
tion of such testimony in the trial for arm-
ed robbery was inflammatory and denied
the defendant a fair trial. However, we
find the alleged aggravated rape was part
of the res gestae. LaRS, 15:448 pro-
vides ;

-“To constitute res gestae the circum-
stances and declarations must be neces-

760

sary incidents of the criminal. act, or im-

mediate concomitants of it, or form in
conjunction with it one continuous trans-
action.” (Emphasis mine.)

HM The general rule is that all that oc-
curs at the time and place and immediately
before and after a difficulty is admissible
as res gestae.

I oLaRs. 15:447 declares “* * *
what forms any part of the res gestae is
always admissible in evidence.” The testi-
mony reveals the alleged aggravated rape
of the victim’s date took place immediately
after the armed robbery was said to have
taken place. There is no merit to these
bills.

Bill of exceptions No. 7 was taken wher
the trial judge denied a motion for mis-
trial, which had been based on grounds a
State’s witness, Officer Gill, injected
hearsay testimony as to what an unnamed.
informer thought, specifically, that the in-
former “felt like his life was in danger.”
Immediately after the Officer made this
statement, the trial judge gave the follow-
ing admonition to the jury:

“The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you
can disregard the last answer, the last
statement made by Officer Gill as not
being relevant and not being responsive
to the question having no weight and no
bearing. You must give it no weight
and no bearing in your deliberation.”

761

TN The purpose of Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 771 is to deal with situa-
tioris such as this on which this bill is
based. Generally, this Court has held that
a verdict should not be set aside on ac-
count of an improper, spontaneous, unsolic-
ited remark by a witness. The trial court
properly admonished the jury to disregard
the statement. This bill has no merit.

HM Bill of Exceptions No. 8 has not
been briefed by the defendant and is there-
fore considered abandoned.

Bills of exceptions Nos. 9 and 10 con-
cern the admissibility of the defendant’s

taped recorded confession.* The defendant
alleges that he gave the tape recorded con-
fession so that the police would stop beat-
ing him, and that he signed the waiver of
his rights after he gave the tape recorded
confession. Herein, defense counsel then
argues that the burden of proving the vol-
untary nature of a confession rests upon
the State, and that reasonable doubt exists
as to the voluntary nature of the instant
He submits that the trial court
committed manifest error in denying the

confession,

motion to suppress.

A reading of the evidence discloses that
Detective Ronnie Alford, and Mr. Joe Sa-
lard, an investigator employed by the Dis-
trict Attorney both testified that the ac-
cused was advised of his constitutional
tights and, in fact, signed a printed rights

762

waiver form before he was asked any
questions concerning the crime. Further,
Mr. Salard also testified that he again ad-
vised the accused of his constitutional
rights at the beginning of the tage record-
ing and that this advice appeared on the
tape itself, Neither do we find anything
in the record’ that the accused made the:
tape under any type of force or coercion.

IM In light of the fact that the defend-
ant was given the Miranda warning and
there appears beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant’s confession was made
freely and voluntarily and not under the

-influence of fear, duress, intimidation or

threats, contrary to La.R.S, 15:451 we find
no reversible error. These bills of excep-
tions Nos. 9 and 10 lack merit.

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 11 and 12 were
not argued by the defendant in his brief
and are therefore considered abandoned.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No, 13 was tak-
en when the Assistant District Attorney
asked Bill Jones, a witness called for the
defense:

Q. “Is it not a fact, Bill, that after you
testified on Tuesday, somebody
called you and talked to you about
your testimony ?

A. No, sir.

Q. Who talked to you about your testi-
mony Tuesday afternoon?”

* Taped confession by defendant, Archie Lee Williams: Record, pages 1270 to 1815 inclusive,

763

Defense contends that it was error for
“the Assistant District Attorney to assume
“by his second question that the contrary
answer had been given by the witness, in
violation of La.R.S. 15:278. Earlier, Jones
“had given a taped statement which impli-
cated the defendant in the crime. When
called to testify as a defense witness, Jones
stated that everything he had reported to
‘the police was untrue. The purpose of the
State’s questioning was clearly to impeach
Jones’ testimony.

Hill of Exceptions No. 14 was re-
served to the trial court’s overruling de-
fendant’s objection to the state’s playing
the tape recording of Jones’ statement to
The State wanted
the tape played to show that, contrary to

the arresting officers.

Jones’ testimony, the tape was almost
wholly a narrative statement by Jones, and
not a programmed “leading-question-af-
firmative-reply” colloquy as alleged by
Jones.

Based on the evidence attached to these
bills before this court, we find that under
the provisions of La.R.S. 15:487, 488 and
493, the law regarding the impeachment of
the defense witness was complied with.

Bill of Exceptions No, 15 was reserved
by the defendant when the Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney, in his closing argument,
stated:

“Now, defense would have you believe
that—well the first thing is, one of the

164

most discouraging things about prosecut-
ing criminal cases is you find yourself
doing very little prosecuting and doing a
lot more defending. Every criminal I've
tried in the past four years I have found
that I have had to defend the victim and
the Police Department.
understood how, in argument, defense

I have never

counsel are always able to turn the vic-
tim into the villain, It always happens.
The victim in a rape case, for example,
some poor girl is dragged into the bushes
and raped. Defense will show you that
it is her own fault.”

La.Code of Criminal Procedure article
774 states:

“The argument shall be confined to evi-
dence admitted, to the lack of evidence,
to conclusions of fact that the state or
defendant may draw therefrom, and to
the law applicable to the case.”

“The argument shall not appeal to preju-
dice.”

“The state’s rebuttal shall be confined to
answering the argument of the defend-
ant.”

As emphasized in State v. Dennis, 250 La.
125, 194 So.2d 720 (1967), this Court stated,
“Under the jurisprudence of this Court,
before a verdict approved by the judge is
set aside on the ground of improper argu-
ment, this Court must be thoroughly con-
vinced that the jury was influenced by the
remarks, and that they contributed to the

765

verdict. State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 80
So.2d 105.”

TM No showing has been made that
the jury was influenced by the remarks of
the State or that they contributed to the
verdict. As to the defense argument that
the trial court gave its tacit approval to
the State’s comments by overruling the
objection, this Court has held that when a
defendant avails himself of the lack of the
cautionary instruction, by remaining silent
and not making a specific request to the
trial judge to cure any error that may have
been committed, it creates a trap for the

unwary judge to the prejudice of the fair’

and efficient administration of justice.
Where the defendant did not make known
to the trial judge his desire for such a cau-
tionary instruction and afford him an op-
portunity to give it, we find no error.
State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540
(1971). :

HHI As we said most recently in State
v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So.2d 859 (1972),
“while we do not condone or encourage
+ we do not think that
it is sufficiently inflammatory and beyond
the realm of fair comment on the evidence
as to warrant the granting of a new trial.”
This bill is without merit.

such remarks . .

For these reasons, the sentence and con-
viction are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., dissents with written rea-
sons.

766
BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The defendant Archie Lee Williams and.
two other persons were charged with ag-
gravated rape as well as with armed rob-
bery, the criminal charge involved in this.
case. On the morning the cases were
called for trial and in the presence of the
jury venire from which would be formed.
the juries to try the cases in that section.
of court during that week, the State “ad--

. vised the court” that it had elected to sever"

in the aggravated rape charge and try the
defendant Williams separately for that of-
fense. Counsel for this defendant moved
for a discharge of the jury venire because
this had occurred in its presence and was
prejudicial to him. However, the State
has correctly shown that the defendant was
not in fact tried under a severed indict-
ment for that charge but went to trial un-
der an indictment for armed robbery. The
bill of exceptions reserved in that other’
proceeding in the trial court cannot proper-

- ly be a part of this record.

Because the other two defendants plead-
ed guilty to the armed robbery with which
they were charged jointly with Williams in
this case, the State had to sever the indict-
ment and try Williams alone on the rob-
bery charge. However, the indictment had
not in fact been severed, and there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate a severance.
‘When the court reporter read the only in-
dictment in the record, he included the
names of all three persons charged with

167

armed robbery. The jury knew after
-opening statement that although this de-
fendant was charged with two others for
this crime, for some reason he alone would
be tried. The defendant timely objected,
moyed for a mistrial, and reserved Bill of
Exceptions No. 2.

In State v. St. Andre, 263 La. 48, 267
So.2d 190, 1972, I concurred when the
State had failed to sever—that is, to file a
separate indictment against the one of sev-
eral defendants
There, however, when the clerk read the
indictment to the jury, he omitted the
names of the other defendants, and I
found that this could, under the particular
facts of that case, constitute harmless er-

it chose to try alone,

ror although it was a violation of a sub-
stantial right. Failure to sever is not
harmless error in this case, and I am of
the opinion that the defendant is entitled to
a reversal.

The mandate of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is in clear and concise lan-
guage:

“Art. 704. Severance

“Jointly indicted defendants shall be
tried jointly unless:

“(1) The state elects to try them sepa-
rately; or

“(2) The court, on motion of the de-
fendant, and after contradictory hearing

*¥or a discussion of the court’s considera-
tion of the 15 perfected bills of excep-

with the district attorney, is satisfied

168

that justice requires a severance,”
“Art. 705. Effects of severance

“When the court has ordered sever-
ance of an indictment, the district attor-
ney shall file separate indictments.

“In the case of a grand jury. indict-
ment, no further action by the grand
jury is required. Severed indictments
shall be considered as filed on the date
of the filing of the original indictment.
Proceedings under the original indict-
ment are not affected by the severance
except insofar as they may be inconsist-
ent with some other provision of this
Code. The effects of a severance, as
stated in this article, apply to severances
under Articles 532(3) and 704." (Em-
phasis supplied.)

These articles demand the filing of sepa-
rate indictments not only when the defend-
ant moves for and is granted a severance,
but also when the State severs voluntarily.
The last sentence of Article 705 does not
limit the application of the requirements of
that article to severances obtained by the
defendant; rather, it states that all sever-
ances made under the authority of Article
704 are subject to the effects of Article
705. This includes severances made at the
election of the State. See Comment (a) of
Article 705.

tions, here, see my concurrence in State v.
Ross, 268 La, 271, 268 So.2d 222.

769

No matter by what method or on whose
part a severance is accomplished, it is in
fact accomplished only when a separate or
a severed indictment is filed. Failure to
file a severed indictment is fatal if only
one of several defendants jointly charged
is to be tried. The indictment is the basis
for the entire proceeding from arraignment
to verdict and sentence. The original in-
dictment must be in writing (C.Cr.P. Art.
464); if it is amended, the amendment
must be in writing (C.Cr.P, Arts. 487 and
488), and if it is severed, the severed in-
dictment must be in writing (C.Cr.P. Art.
705). Article 705 does not merely permit
the filing of a separate indictment; it or-
ders the filing of a separate indictment
when there is to be a severance for pur-
poses of trial. Nothing short of a separate
filed written indictment can validly support
such a proceeding.

While the error alleged in this bill of ex-
ceptions is reversible error, there is anoth-
er ground for reversal in the case.

Bill of Exceptions No. 14 was reserved
to the court’s overruling of defendant's
objection when the State, during rebuttal,
played a tape recording of a statement giv-
en before trial by a witness Bill Jones. If
this bill of exceptions is reviewed on the
restricted basis of looking only to the evi-
dence attached to and made a part of the
pill, there has been a denial of defendant’s

right to full confrontation of a witness.

710

The only testimony attached is that of a
police officer which shows that he took a
statement from a man named Bill Jones
but which does not connect Jones with the
trial as a witness or as a defendant.
There is also conversation between the
court and counsel indicating that Bill Jones
had in fact testified previously in the trial.
There is also a charge from the court to
the jury to consider the taped statement
only for the purpose of impeaching Jones’s
testimony in court “about the manner in
which the statement was given”. If we do
not look to the colloquy between the court
and the attorneys as evidence—and the
jury did not hear this colloquy—, it is ob-
vious that the State offered testimony to
the jury in rebuttal by way of a recorded
statement which denied the defendant the
On the face
of the bill this is obviously reversible error.

right to confront a witness.

If we consider the colloquy which
showed that Jones was a previous witness
and that this statement was offered to im-
peach his testimony, then it is immediately
apparent that the State failed to lay the
proper foundation for impeaching a wit-
ness by a prior inconsistent statement.
There is nothing in the bill of exceptions
to show that the State confronted the wit-
ness with a prior contradictory statement.
Since the witness was not on the stand, he
obviously was not asked whether he made
a statement, not told of the time, place, and

TL

circumstances of the statement, not given
the opportunity to explain the seemingly
contradictory statement and admit or deny
that he made such a statement. These ex-
acting requirements of R.S. 15:493 were
obviously not complied with. Considering
the bill of exceptions in the light that the
State was attempting to impeach a witness,
the taped statement must be held to be im-
proper rebuttal since the predicate for a
prior inconsistent statement to be used for
impeachment was not laid. There is no
per curiam to explain the deficiencies in
the Dill, nor has the State exercised its
- right to supplement the bill.

As I am often persuaded to do, I have
looked at the objection in the perspective
of the whole record, disregarding the tech-
nical requirements for the perfected bill of
exceptions. All the evidence is before us,
“and it is very simple to place this bill with
the limited evidence attached in its proper
perspective. The result is the same—re-

versible error.

Preliminarily; I believe that when the
State’s use of the recorded statement in re-
buttal is examined in the context of the
full record, it must be found to be improp-
er rebuttal, for the recording of this state-
ment should have been played while the
witness was on the stand. A recorded
statement is, and we have so held, in the
nature of a written statement. The proper

time for impeachment by a prior written or
recorded statement is while the witness is
on the stand. An oral statement given to a
third party may be introduced in rebuttal
for purposcs of impeachment.

TZ

However, I find the error more serious
for another reason. The State called Bill
Jones on Tuesday as its witness. He testi-
fied against the defendant and admitted
having previously given a statement to the
police and that his testimony from the wit-
ness stand was the same as the previous
recorded statement taken from him by the
police. On Friday the defense, having ap-
parently learned that the witness would
give testimony contradictory to that pre-

-viously given, called Bill Jones as its own

witness. At that time he testified that he
had lied both on Tuesday when he testified
for the State and in his recorded statement
given to the police before trial. He then
proceeded to testify to what he called the
truth. When the State could not get him
to deny making the prior inconsistent
statements, it attempted to have him say
that his taped statement recorded only his
“yes” and “no” answers to queries by the
police and that it was not in “narrative”

form. On redirect examination, counsel
for the defendant explained what “narra-
tive” meant, and then asked the witness
whether he actually had given the police in
his own words in response to questioning a

version of what had occurred on the night

CO 7

of the offense. He admitted that was the 269 So.2d 289

way the recorded statement was made. John J. RAMP, Jr, et al

The State, having failed to get the wit- ve
ness to deny the prior recorded contradic- ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSUR-
tory statement, tried to justify its right to ANCE COMPANY et al.
use the recorded statement for impeach- Nos. 51943 and 51972.
ment on the basis that he testified it was Noy. 6, 1972.

given in one form (not narrative) and that

the playing of the tape would indicate it
was in fact given in another form. The
court admitted the statement, and so
charged the jury, “solely for the purpose
of impeaching what Mr. Jones testified to
in court about the manner in which the
statement was given”. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Jones did not deny, in fact he ad-
mitted, that the recorded statement was in
narrative form, although hé may not have
understood the meaning of the word “nar-
rative”.

Moreover, whether the statement was in
narrative form or not was a totally irrele-
vant fact. R.S. 15:494 states categorically:
“Tt is not competent to impeach a witness
as to collateral facts or irrelevant matter.”

Furthermore, the predicate required by
RS, 15:493 had not been laid for impeach-
ing the witness. The witness “distinctly
admit[ted] making such statement”, and

a
|

therefore the statement could not be of-
fered for the purposes of impeachment.

Both Bills of Exceptions No. 2 and No.
14 require reversal of this conviction.

I respectfully dissent.

778
en!

William F. Wessel, New Orleans, for
plaintiffs-applicants.

117

Lemle, Kelleher, Kohlmeyer, Matthews
& Schumacher, H. Martin Hunley, Jr,
New Orleans, for defendants-respondents.

BARHAM, Justice.

Plaintiffs, four of the five children of
John J. Ramp, Sr. brought this action in
tort for damages allegedly sustained be-
cause attorneys who represented them ear-
lier in their father’s succession proceedings
were negligent. The defendants are those
two attorneys and their liability insurer for
errors and omissions, St. Paul Fire and

Marine Insurance Company. The trial

7719

the Fourth Circuit seversed, finding negli-
gence on the part of the attorneys, casting
all parties defendant for damages in the
sum of $2250.00, and casting the defendant
attorneys for return of a $200.00 legal fee.
La.App., 254 So.2d 79. We granted certi
rari,

The present litigation arose out of mat-
ters decided in Succession of Ramp, 252
La, 660, 212 So.2d 419. We there set out
the pertinent facts, as follows:

» “John J. Ramp, Sr., died testate in 1965,
survived by his third wife, Mildred Machin
Ramp, and by four children of a second
marriage and one child of a first marriage.
The decedent’s will attempted to give the
usufruct of all of his property to his third
wife, who was also named executrix, be-
queathed the disposable portion of his es-
tate to certain named legatees, and pro-
vided: % * * TI will and bequeath the
forced portion of my estate to all of my
children, share and share alike, subject to
the usufruct in favor of my wife.’

“After the succession was opened and
Mrs. Mildred Machin Ramp confirmed as
testamentary exccutrix, the four children
of decedent's second marriage filed suit
against the executrix to annul the will, pri-
marily alleging testamentary incapacity.
Following negotiations concerning this at-
tack upon the will, the executrix and these
four forced heirs entered into a compro-
mise agreement. However, the contract of

court dismissed plaintiffs’ suit. On appeal

780

compromise signed by the parties not only
sought to dismiss the nullity suit with prej-
udice but attempted to bind the four forced
heirs ‘to accept the succession of their fa-
ther in accordance with the terms and con-
ditions stated in his last will * * © and
‘to file no further opposition to or contest
of decedent’s will on any grounds what-
soever’, An inconsequential amount when
compared to the value of decedent’s estate
was paid to these heirs by the succession in
the compromise agreement. After the fil-
ing of a joint petition and advertisement,
the district court approved the compromise
insofar as it dismissed the suit to annul the

will.

“In response to a later rule filed by the
executrix asking the heirs to show cause
why they should not be put in possession
of decedent’s property in accordance with
the terms of the will, the forced heirs filed
opposition [through counsel other than the
defendants in this suit] on the ground that
the dispositions of the will impinged upon
their legitime, in contravention of Civil
Code Article 1493, Decedent's third wife
is not benefited by Article 916 of the Civil
Code, and it is apparent that any attempt
to burden the legitime of the children with
a usufruct in her favor does in fact im-
pinge upon their forced portion since the
will made a specific bequest of the disposa-
ble portion of the decedent’s estate.

“The trial court dismissed the opposition
of the four forced heirs who had been par-

73)

ties to the compromise agreement, and
placed them in possession in accordance
with the will and subject to the third
wife’s usufruct. The trial court, however
placed the child of the first marriage, who
hhad not been a party to the lawsuit or the
compromise, into full possession of her
forced portion.

“On appeal by all five children the Court
of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, reversed the
judgment of the lower court in part, hold-
ing that the four children of the second
marriage did not have to accept their
forced portion subject to the usufruct in
favor of the third wife. See [La.App.,]
205 So.2d 86. The Court of Appeal held
that the compromise agreement tended to

divide the succession and was therefore an
act of partition which was subject to re-
scission for lesion beyond one-fourth, un-
der Civil Code Articles 1398 and 1402.
We granted certiorari to determine wheth-
er these articles are applicable.”

We held in that case that the Court of
Appeal had reached the correct result, but
that it had incorrectly applied the law
since the contract or agreement could not
be a partition when one of the forced heirs
and at least two of the testamentary lega-
tees were not parties. We determined that
the contract was one of compromise limit-
ed to a dismissal of the nullity suit pending
against the succession, saying: “This, then,
is not a compromise between a legatee and
some of the heirs, but it is simply a com-

promise by the succession through its rep-
resentative of a suit and claim of some of
the forced heirs. * * *” (Emphasis
here and elsewhere supplied.)

In reforming the contract to accomplish
that which could be effectuated between
the parties to that agreement, we struck
two clauses from the contract which, if
valid, would have forced the four heirs
who executed it to accept the succession in
accordance with the terms of the will and
to file no further opposition to the will on
any grounds whatever.

Tt is argued by the defendants in the
present matter that although it was error
to include this waiver in the compromise
agreement, plaintiffs are not entitled to
damages. They urge that since these
clauses were struck from the agreement
and plaintiffs were placed in possession of
their legitime free from the usufruct of
the third wife, the plaintiffs suffered- no
damage.

For an understanding of the case now
before us, it is necessary to recount in
some detail the dealings of the plaintiffs
with the defendant attorneys, Steven R.
Plotkin and Joseph W. Nelkin. Thesé
plaintiffs consulted Plotkin concerning
their rights in the succession of their fa-
ther. After a brief discussion Plotkin re-
ferred them to his partner, Nelkin, who he
said specialized in succession work. After
several meetings Nelkin filed a suit attack-
ing the testamentary capacity of the plain-

783
tiffs’ deceased father. Nelkin testified
that he was handling the succession mat-
ters step by step, proceeding first with the
attack upon the will itself which would, if
successful, give the plaintiffs and the fifth
Ramp child the right to the entire estate,
and that if this was unsuccessful, he would
then proceed to a second step of asserting
forced heirship. According to his testimo-
ny, he informed his clients that he planned
to handle the matter by proceeding in
stages, but he never explained, in response
to their questions, the right of the usufruc-
tuary or the effect of the.usufruct. Nel-
kin, becoming convinced that the attack on
the will would be unsuccessful, proposed a
settlement, but he insists that he intended
the compromise to affect only the nullity
proceeding. The clients, to the contrary,
insist that they were told at all stages of
discussion preceding the compromise agree-
ment'that they were compromising all their
rights, and that they were informed that
only upon the death of the third wife could
they receive full ownership of their legi-
time.

Plotkin and Nelkin dissolved their part-
nership before the compromise agreement
was drafted or presented for execution.
Plotkin kept these plaintiffs as clients, and
Nelkin was, according to his testimony, to-
tally disassociated from any representation
of them at that time. The compromise
agreement was drawn by the attorney for
the executrix and forwarded to Nelkin.

784

After examining the instrument Nelkin
sent it to Plotkin with the recommendation
that the plaintiffs be advised to execute it
as written. According to Plotkin’s testimo-
ny, he merely looked at the document to
make sure it contained the amount of the
stipulated settlement and the signatures of
his clients. He testified: “* * * As to
the detailed terms of the release I did not
read them nor could I have any recollec-
tion of discussing the detailed terms which
I now later know, of course, that this law-
suit is based upon innocuous statement in
the release which led to the litigation that
I did not apparently observe or explain to
them.”

According to the plaintiffs’ repeated
statements, they were told when they
signed this agreement that they could not
get possession of their forced portion of
the estate in full ownership until the third
wife died. Plotkin did not deny telling
them this. Indeed, he excuses himself by
saying that succession law is a field in

which he did not specialize.

A letter written to all of the plaintiffs
by Plotkin shortly after the dismissal of
the nullity suit under the compromise
agreement clearly shows that Plotkin be-
lieved that the compromise (for which
each of the plaintiffs received $200.00 and
for which he received $200.00 as attorney)
was in full settlement of all of their suc-
cession rights, including the forfeiture of
their right to their legitime free from the

785

usufruct of the third wife. The letter

reads:

“Mesdames and Gentlemen:

“I have been contacted by Mr. Maurice
Burk, attorney for the Succession of
John J. Ramp, Sr., requesting that all of
the heirs or legatees join in the petition
for possession and accept service on the
final account.

“I have reviewed the pleadings and they
are in proper order.

“Therefore, it is necessary that each of
you make an appointment with Mr.
Maurice Burk, 501 Security Homestead
Building, 219 Carondelet Street, New
Orleans, Louisiana, to sign the necessary
papers which will complete this matter.

“Very truly yours,
s/d “Steven R, Plotkin
“STEVEN R. PLOTKIN”

The principal issue which we must de-
cide is whether the acts or omissions of the
attorneys Plotkinsand Nelkin damaged the
plaintiff§. This calls for determination of

causation. :

HM Although the litigation which gave
rise to the reformation of the contract of
compromise involved some collateral mat-
ters, that litigation was brought about by
the plaintiffs’ attempt to secure legal rights,
which Plotkin and Nelkin had led them to
believe they had lost. The litigation went
through the district court, the Court of

786

Appeal, and the Supreme Court, requiring
an expenditure of considerable time and
the incurring of attorney’s fees by the
plaintiffs. Obviously the errors in action
and in omission by Plotkin and Nelkin
were a catse-in-fact of the damage or
harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

This being so, we move to a considera-
tion of what duty was owed by the attor-_
neys to the plaintiffs. ,

ah

HH An attorney is obligated to “exer=
cise at least that degree of care, skill, and
diligence which is exercised by prudent
practicing attorneys in his locality, He is
not required to exercise perfect judgment
in every instance. However, the attorney’s
license to practice and his contract for em-
ployment hold out to the client that he pos-
sesses certain minimal skills, knowledge,
and abilities. The fact that an attorney’s

judgment in confecting contracts, handling ~

suits, and doing other business may result
in litigation is not, in and of itself, a
breach of a duty to the client. Risk of fi
ture litigation is often a necessary elenient
or result of legal advice and legal repre
sentation. The very fact of litigation is‘a
result of the disparity of professional judg-
ment of those in the legal profession.
However, lawyers are obligated to scruti-
nize any contract which they advise their
clients to execute, and are required to dis-
close the full import of the instrument and
the possible consequences that may arise
upon execution of it.

4

187

HE According to the cxpert testimony
in this case, every lawyer undertaking to
advise clients on succession rights must
know the basic concepts of forced heirship,
which include a child’s right to his legitime
free and uncncumbered except where the
heir’s other parent is a surviving spouse
with a legal or testamentary usufruct on
his forced portion. Moreover, even with-
out expert testimony we would necessarily
take notice that a legal duty is breached
when the attorney fails to recognize such
an obvious encroachment upon the legitime
and to properly advise clients in that re-
gard when they seek to recover all that
they can from their parent’s estate. We
therefore conclude that Plotkin and Nelkin
breached a legal duty to these plaintiffs.

Inquiring whether the duty breached in-
cluded within it the risk of the damage or
harm which the plaintiffs suffered, we an-
swer affirmatively. It was gross error for
the attorneys to allow these petitioners,
without full disclosure, to deprive them-
selves of a considerable estate upon the
payment of such a minimal sum. We are
convinced that these lawyers believed they
had effectively compromised all of these
plaintiffs’ rights. We are of the opinion
that they did not adequately and properly
advise their clients as to their legal rights.
We are of the opinion that through grave
error and omission on their part they en-
couraged the plaintiffs to execute a con-

788

tract which, but for other legal advice and
further litigation, would have deprived
them of a valuable legal right. A reasona-
bly prudent member of the profession act-
ing under accepted standards of that pro-
fession in this locality would have known
that extensive litigation would be necessary
if the plaintiffs were to recover their legal
rights once they had executed the contract
proposed by these defendant attorneys.

The risk of the expenditure of sums of
money for costs of litigation, including at-
torney’s fees, directly flowed fiom the
breach of the duty owed by the attorneys
to these plaintiffs. Therefore the defend-
ant attorneys were negligent in their acts
and omissions toward the plaintiffs, and
that negligence was the cause of the dam-
age suffered by them.

The plaintiffs eventually recovered
through employment of other counsel all
their rights in the succession—that is, their
unencumbered legitime. Therefore they
are not damaged by any loss of their suc-
cession rights. However, they were dam-
aged when they resorted to the costly liti-
gation which was the only method of ob-
taining these rights. As the appellate
court said, “* * * These included the
additional cost of resisting the judicial en-
forcement of the compromise in the trial
court, of appealing and obtaining reversal
of the adverse trial court judgment, and of
appearing and arguing before the Supreme

789

Court when certiorari was granted to the
executrix”.t

The Court of Appeal refused to award
the actual attorney’s fees which were paid
as calculated on a contingent basis. It
agreed that the contingent fee was reason-
able, but was of the opinion that the fee
for additional services rendered by present
counsel, after the successful litigation had
restored plaintiffs to their forced portions,
was included in the total fee and should
not be recovered as an item of damages.
That court attempted to determine what
would constitute reasonable advanced at-
torney’s fees and based its award of dam-
ages on that criterion.

HM Plaintiffs’ contract with present
counsel was to pay 15 per cent of “all the
property we obtain out of the said succes-
sion”, However, the attorney and his
clients have accepted this contract from its
inception as a contract for 15 per cent for
work performed in securing a judgment re-
storing their legitime unencumbered. The
bills sent to each of the plaintiffs carefully

1. Defendants’ able counsel argues force-
fully that the real error occurred when
the district court did not properly inter-
pret the compromise agreement. He ar-
gues first that this is the total causa-
tion of the damage suffered by plaintiffs
since the Court of Appeal and the Su-
preme Court determined the unencum-
bered legitime had not been compromised
under that agreement. He appears to ar-
gue alternatively that costs incurred
thereafter could be attributable only to
a correction of the trial court’s error and

790

distinguished hetween the contingent fee
for counsel’s performance in that litigation
and “Atty fees for work performed after
Supreme Court”, where success was
achieved. Each plaintiff has paid on par-
tial billing the contingent fee for that liti-
gation plus additional sums for other legal
work done in connection with the succes-
sion. We are of the opinion that the con-
tingent fee stated in the contract is reason-
able as such for successfully obtaining
what these defendants attempted to bargain
away. We are also of the opinion that the
actual amount computed and paid on the
contingent fee basis is reasonable consider-
ing the length of the litigation, the services
required, the time expended, and the other
elements of the attorney-client relationship.
The attorney’s fees incurred by the plain-
tiffs in eliminating or in mitigating the
damage caused them by the negligence of
the defendants are their total damage,
That actual fee that has been or will be
paid by the plaintiffs for the litigation
which restored their legitime unencum-
bered is $3510.84 ,

not to defendants’. We have previously
determined in this opinion that the causa-
tion factor of the defendants’ act carried
through to the final determination of
plaintiffs’ legal rights in the highest court
of this state, and we here reject the idea
that the damage which flowed therefrom
can be separated and categorized.

Counsel for plaintiffs hag miscalculated
the 15 per cent contingent fee on the
$16,312.25 collected in the partition pr
ceeding. is crror resulted from the

v

791

HM The $200.00 attorney's fees paid to
Plotkin or to Plotkin and Neikin cannot be
‘an element of damage. This was a fee
paid for services rendered in compromising
the nullity action, for which plaintiffs re-

ceived some value.

HEM Counsel for plaintiffs urges here,
as he did in the Court of Appeal, that
damages should also include the deprecia-
tion in the value of the succession property
between the time of the filing of the de-
scriptive list and the date of the ultimate
sale of the property. Plaintiffs had at one
time sued to remove the executrix, but that
matter was abandoned; and the question
of whether the estate was properly handled
is one which cannot be here collaterally
raised. The Court of Appeal correctly re-
jected the claim for depreciation allegedly
‘due to mismanagement.

HH Counsel for plaintiffs also argues
that they were deprived of the possession
of their legitime for almost three years be-
tween the proposed final account and the
judgment of possession. The final account
includes rents and fruits during the entire

clusion in the amount charged Salvador
Ramp not only 15 per cent attorney's
fees for the work done in the litigation
unencumbering that heir’s forced portion,
but also 15 per cent upon a legacy to him
which was not involved in the contract
of compromise and which, as part of the
disposable property, was properly subject
to a testamentary usufruct. This charge
is not attributable to counsel’s work in

2192

period-of administration, and these four
plaintiffs shared in those rents along with
the other heir and the legatees. They have
not shown, and they cannot show collater-
ally here, that the rents collected were not
the actual earnings due on the property
duting the delay, This claim must be re-
jected also.

For the reasons assigned the judgment
of the Court of Appeal is amended, and
judgment is rendered in favor of the plain-
tiffs, John J. Ramp, Jr., Salvador A.
Ramp, Mrs. Margaret Ramp Rossi, and
Mrs. Delphine Ramp Puderer, and against
the defendants, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company, Steven R. Plotkin,
and Joseph W. Nelkin, in the full sum of
$3510.84, with legal interest on that sum
from date of judicial demand until paid.
Defendants are cast for all costs in all
courts in these proceedings.

DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.

HAMLIN, J., dissents being of the
opinion that the judgment of the trial
judge is correct.

obtaining the forced portion unencum-
bered. here are other minor arithmeti-
cal errors in his computation. We simply
compute 15 per cent of $16,312.25 and
arrive at a figure of $2446.84. We add to
that 15 per cent of $7093.33 received by
these heirs in distribution of funds from
the expropriation of some of the prop-
erty, or $1064.00, to reach a total of
$3510.84.

798
DIXON, Justice (concurring).
I respectfully concur.

For the first time in many years, how-
ever, this court has awarded attorney’s
fees as damages for a breach of contract.
I have no objections to a compensatory
‘system which provides for complete recov-
ery of all damages from one who wrong-
fully injures another, either by virtue of
‘breach of a contractual obligation, statuto-
ry obligation, or other wrongful act. Com-
plete recovery can very well include an
award for reasonable attorney’s fees neces-
sarily incurred because of the wrongful act

of another. Certainly there is no sound

4. See, Maloney v. Oak Builders, Ine., 256
La, 85, 285 So.2d 386 (1970) ; Comment,

794

reason why a litigant can recover doctor's
fees required to repair a doctor’s bad work,
but cannot recover lawyer’s fees to repair
a lawyer’s bad work.

Nevertheless, there is substantial juris-
prudence in Louisiana holding that with
certain exceptions, attorney’s fees are not
recoverable as an item of damages in the
absence of statutory or contractual provi-

sions allowing their recovery.t

We should make it clear that attorney’s
fees are now recognized as a recoverable
item of damages, at least in professional
malpractice cases.

84 Tu.LRov. 146 (1959); Comment, 20
Ta.LRev. 889 (1960).

795
LT]
269 So.2d 247

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Melvin TEAL.

No, 52994.

Dee. 5, 1972.

SUMMERS, J., recused.

In re Melvin Teal, applying for writ of
habeas corpus.

‘The petition of the relator in the above
entitled and numbered case having been
duly considered,

It is ordered that a writ of certiorari is-
sue herein, directing the Honorable Carrol
L. Spell, Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Vermilion,
to transmit to the Supreme Court of Lou-
isiana, on or before the 23rd day of Feb-
ruary, 1973, the record in duplicate, or a
certified copy of the record in duplicate,
of the proceedings complained of by the
relator herein, to the end that the validity
of said proceedings may be ascertained,

It is further ordered that the aforesaid
Judge of said Court and the respondent

796

through counsel shall show cause, in this
court, on the date aforesaid, at 11 o’clock
A.M.,, why the relief prayed for in the peti-
tion of the relator should not be granted.

It is further ordered that, in the mean-
time and until the further orders of this
court all proceedings against the relator
in said Fifteenth Judicial District Court
shall be stayed and suspended.

SUMMERS, J., recused.

|
269 So.2d 247

STATE of Louisiana ex rel,
Carl D. MeQUILLION
ve
C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No, 52995.

Dee, 5, 1972.

Writ granted. An evidentiary
is ordered,

hearing

197 — 798

' Application denied. The evidentiary
280 $0.20 247 hearing establishes a knowledgeable and
voluntary plea with competent counsel.
Leon G. SMITH Relator has waived his right to challenge
vy the grand jury venire. See C.CrP. Art.
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY. 535 subds. B(3) and D and State v. Valen-
No. 52989. tine, 259 La. 1019, 254 So.2d 450.
Dee, 5, 1972.
‘Writ refused. On the facts found by L
the Court of Appeal, there is no error of 269 S0.2d 248

law in its judgment.
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.

William BROOKS

ve

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No, 52996.

r | Dee. 5, 1972.

269 So.2d 248
STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Roy Lee JACKSON
v Application denied; the showing made

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Lowisi- does not justify the exercise of our juris-
ana State Penitentiary.

diction.
No. 52909.
Dee. 5, 1972. BARHAM, J., is of the opinion that an

evidentiary hearing is required to inquire

into the constitutionality of the line up
identification,

799

TATE, J., concurs in Barham, J.’s opin-
jon. Aside from the lack of counsel, pe-
titioner alleges other facts which, if true,
may have led to an irreparably suggestive
pre-indictment identification.

i
269 So.2d 248

W. B. STEWART
v
C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 52997.

Dee. 5, 1972,

Application is denied; the sentence is not
illegal; the reference to Angola (if in fact
there were such reference) is mere surplus-

age and RS, 15:824 places applicant in
custody of the La. Dept. of Corrections,

BARHAM, J., concurs.
here does not warrant a finding of an il-
legal sentence, However, I am of the opin-
ion that upon a proper showing, a sentence

The showing

which commits a defendant to a patticular

800

state institution rather than to the Louisi-
ana Department of Corrections would be
illegal. A sentence must commit to that
department under R.S. 15:824. That law
should be followed.

Ll
269 So.2d 248

Grace Agnes CORNISH et al,
ve
KINDER CANAL COMPANY et al.

No. 53000,

Dee. 5, 1972.

Not considered. Not timely filed.

|
269 $0.24 249

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Roger DOUGET

ve

©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 53004,

Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dee, 5, 1972.

Writ denied. According to the judg-
ment of the trial judge, written waivers of
counsel and a written plea of guilty are en-
tered in the récord. Applicant has failed
to make these waivers part of this applica-

tion,

:
269 So.2d 249

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Joshua CARTER

ve

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
. ana State Penitentiary.
No, 53001.

Supreme Court of Louisiana,
Dee, 5, 1972,

802

Application denied; the showing made
by relator does not warrant the relief
sought.

BARHAM, J., concurs. The defendant
did not raise the question of the composi-
tion of the jury or the jury venire accord-
ing to the provisions of C.Cr.P. Art. 535,
subds. B(3) and D. He waived that right.

a
269 So.2d 249

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Clinton ANDERSON

ve

©. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary.
No. 53002.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dee. 5, 1972.

Application denied. In view of the writ-
ten per curiam of the trial judge, the show-
ing made does not warrant the exercise of
our original or supervisory jurisdiction.

BARHAM, J., is of the opinion that the
allegation of incompetent counsel and du-
ress from counsel in securing plea requires
an evidentiary hearing.

803 — 804

269 So.2d 448

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Amos W. McINTYRE.
No, 52428.

Supreme Court of Zouisiana.
Noy. 6, 1972.

——»

McCollister, Belcher, McCleary & Fazio,
Frederick Kroenke, Jr., Baton Rouge, for
defendant-respondent.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Cheney C. Joseph,
Jr. Special Counsel for the State, Baton
Route, for plaintiff-relator.

HAMLIN, Justice:

On application of the State of Louisiana,
we issued a Writ of Certiorari, Art. VII,
Sec. 10, La.Const. of 1921, to Honorable
John S. Covington, Judge of the Nine-
teenth Judicial District Court for the Par-
ish of East Baton Rouge, ordering him to
show cause why the relief prayed for by
the State of Louisiana should not be grant-
ed.

By bill of information, Amos W. Mc-
Intyre was charged as follows:

“AMOS W. McINTYRE

* * * on the Ninth (9th) day of Octo-
ber in the year * * * (1971) * * *
unlawfully attempted to commit a theft of
entertainment services, valued at Seven
and No/100 ($7.00), the property of L. S.
U. Athletic Department, by fraud and mis-
representation.”

In answer to a motion for a bill of par-
ticulars and a supplemental motion for

805

such, the State alleged that the instant of-
fense was committed at the Louisiana
State University Football Stadium, and
that the defendant attempted to commit a
violation of LSA-R.S. 14:67 The State
further alleged that the defendant was spe-
cifically charged with having attempted to
commit theft of the value of the right to
enter a Louisiana State University football
game, and that the student identification
card used by the defendant was paid for by
(De-
fendant, not an LSU student, presented a
borrowed —willingly loaned—ID card to the
attendant at the Louisiana State University
Football Stadium before a football game;
he was denied admission.) The State still
further alleged that the right to enter the
football game was non-transferable from

the student to whom it was issued.

the owner of the ID card to any other per-
son, and that defendant attempted to se-

I, LSA-R.S. 14:67 provides: “Theft is the
misappropriation or taking of anything
of value which belongs to another, either
without the consent of the other to the
misappropriation or taking, or by means
of fraudulent conduct, practices or repre-
sentations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the sub-
ject of the misappropriation or taking
is essential.

“Whoever commits the erime of theft
when the misappropriation or taking
amounts to a value of one hundved dol-
Jars or more, shall be imprisoned with
or without hard labor, for not more than
ten years or'may be fined not more than
three thousand dollars, or both.

“When the misappropriation or taking
amounts to less than a value of one hun-
dred dollars, the offender shall be fined

806

cure entry to a Louisiana State Universi-
ty football game by fraudulently represent-
ing himself as the person to whom the ID
card was issued.

After the above answer was filed, de-
fendant filed a Motion to Quash Based on
Bill of Particulars predicated on the
ground that the bill of particulars fur-
nished by the District Attorney pursuant to
the order of court showed that no crime
had been committed.

A hearing was held on April 11, 1972;
the trial court sustained the Motion to
Quash. The State reserved a bill of ex-
ceptions and thereafter applied for the
present writ.

Herein, the State argues that the trial
court erred in ruling that the State’s bill of
information as amplified by the bills of
particulars and answers thereto failed to
charge a crime.

not more than five hundred dollars, or im-
prisoned for not more than six months,
or both. If the offender in such cases
has been convicted of theft two or more
times previously, upon any subsequent
conviction he shall be fined not more than
one thousand dollars, or imprisoned with
or without hard labor for not more than
two years, or both,

“When there has been misappropria-
tion or taking by a mumber of distinct
acts of the offender, the aggregate of the
amount of the misappropriation or tak-
ings shall determine grade of the offense.”

Act 658 of 1972 amended the above
statute; its provisions, however, recite
that the Act shall not apply to any
crimes committed before the offective
date of the Act.

807

The State, relying on LSA-RS.
14:2(2)2 submits that something of value
is involved in this prosecution, It further
submits: “* * * that there was cer-
tainly an attempted misappropriation since
the card was issued not to the bearer or
The
mere possession of the card does not enti-
tle the holder to the right to enter the
football game. The State further contends
that the attempted misappropriation was

holder but to a specific individual.

effected by means of fraudulent conduct
practices and representations of the ac-
cused. The State has charged that the ac-
cused fraudulently represented himself as
the individual to whom the card was issued
and the purpose of this fraudulent repre-
sentation was to secure the thing of value,
to-wit: into the L.S.U. football

game.”

entry

The State’s contentions are without mer-
it. We find that the instant matter ad-
dresses itself to the internal discipline of
Louisiana State University. Cf. Student
Gov. Ass’n. of L. S. U., Etc. v. Board of
Sup’rs, 262 La. 849, 264 So.2d 916.

2. “Anything of value’ must be given the
broadest possible construction, including
any conceivable thing of the slightest
value, movable immovable, corporeal or
incorporeal, public or private, and includ-
ing transportation, telephone and tele-
graph services, or any other service avail-
able for hire. It must be construed in
the broad popular sense of the phrase,
and not necessarily as synonymous with
the traditional legal term ‘property.’”
LSA-R.S, 14:2(2).

808

The ID card issued by Louisiana State
University is not transferable and specifi-
cally recites that it is not; the student
owner of the instant card violated the
terms of his contract with the University
respecting the card by loaning it to the de-
fendant, but this contractual violation was
a matter to be handled by the University.
Any discipline administered the student
lender had to be imposed by the Universi-
ty; admission to the football game at
which the defendant presented himself was
denied; the University protected itself
against possible pretension. Defendant
did not see the game.

As stated supra, defendant did not steal
the instant ID card from its owner or
from the University; the price of the card
had been paid by the student lender to the
University; the space assigned to the
card’s holder was reserved and could not
be sold to another person, (We are not
concerned with a game where an ID card
is invalid). The loser was the student; he
missed seeing the game. The University
under the circumstances herein presented
lost nothing.

3. During the hearing of the Motion to
Quash, the trial judge asked counsel,
“Well, did your man, when he went
through—when he attempted to go through
the gates at L.S.U., represent himself as
a student, do you know?” Counsel re-
sponded, “No, sir, he did not, that goes
to the merits, and we will bring it out,

and we will show, of course, that he
did not represent himself as a student.”

‘809

We, conclude that the defendant has
committed no offense against the State for
which he can be prosecuted and punished
by the State; we further conclude that de-
fendant’s conduct is not included within
the provisions of LSA-R.S. 14:67 supra.

For the reasons assigned, the Writ of
is recalled; the Motion to
Quash Based on Bill of Particulars is sus-

Certiorari

tained; the ruling of the trial court is af-
firmed and the accused discharged.

269 So.2d 450

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
ve
Maillie LEWIS.

No, 51231.

Nov. 6, 1972.

810

@
¢
are

1, We do not have the record of the First
Municipal Court before us, but Justice
Lewis FP. Powell, Jr., concurring in the
remand of the United States’ Supreme

; 812:
John Wilson Reed, New Orleans, for
petitioner.

Blake G. Arata, City Atty., Servando C.
Garcia, III, Asst. City Atty., for respond-.
ent.

HAMLIN, Justice:

The United States Supreme Court, June-
26, 1972, vacated the judgment of our-
Court of March 10, 1971 in City of New
Orleans vs. Mallie Lewis, which recited:
“Writ refused. The judgment of the low-
er court is correct.” It remanded the cause
to us for reconsideration in the light
of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct.
1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). 408 U.S. 913,
92 S.Ct, 2499, 33 L-Ed.2d 321 (Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, with whom Mr. Justice
Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist

joined, dissented.)

Mallie Lewis was issued a citation for re-.
viling the police on January 3, 1970; she
was tried in the First Municipal Court, City
of New Orleans, and found guilty of violat-
ing Ordinance 828 MCS, Section 49-2, re-
sisting arrest, and Section 49-7, reviling the
police. She was thereafter sentenced to
pay a fine of $10.00 or serve ten days in jail
on each charge.t

An appeal was lodged in the Criminal’
District Court for the Parish of Orleans;.

Court stated, “* * * Here a police of-
ficer, while in the performance of his
duty, was called, ‘G- -D- -M- -F--’ police.”

813

stence? Mallie Lewis then applied to this
Court for writs, which, as stated supra,
were refused. 257 La. 993, 244 So.2d 860.
An appeal was taken to the United States
Supreme Court where defendant was grant-
‘ed the instant remand.

Herein, Mallie Lewis avers that the First
Municipal Court, City of New Orleans,
‘and the Criminal District Court for the
Parish of Orleans erred in holding the re-
viling the police ordinance, 828 M.CS.
49-7, constitational.

Counsel for Mallie Lewis submits:

“The Ordinance involved here suffers
from all the defects of the Georgia statute
and more. There are not even in the New
Orleans ordinance the requirements that the
swords be spoken ‘without provocation,’ that
the words ‘tend to cause a breach of the
‘peace,’ or that the words be spoken ‘in the
presence’ of the one spoken about. Like
the Georgia statute the New Orleans ordi-
nance sweeps within its proscription all
forms of abusive and derogatory speech.
Even more so than was the case with the

2. The judgment of the Criminal District
Court for the Parish of Orleans recites in
part:

“A review of the evidence in this case
fully convinces this court that the defend-
ant violated both Section 49-2 and 49-7
of Ordinance 828 M.0.S.

“Counsel for defendant, after the trial,
filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, on
the grounds that M.C.S. Section 49-7 was
unconstitutional because ‘it is unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad.’ Section

that court affirmed the conviction and sen-

814

Georgia statute, it is impossible to justify
the ordinance under the narrow exception
to free speech provided in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766,
86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).

“The New Orleans ordinance, 828 M.C.
S. 49-7, must be found unconstitutional un-
der Gooding v. Wilson, supra, Defendant
Lewis’ convictions for reviling the police
and for resisting arrest must be reversed
with instructions to discharge the defendant
Lewis.”

Counsel’s constitutional attack of Sec-
tion 49-7, 828 M.C.S., is based on alleged
overbroadness and vagueness; the Section
as certified by the Assistant Clerk of Coun-
cil recites:

“Section 49-7, Cursing, etc., police pro-
hibited.

“It shall be unlawful and a breach of
the peace for any person wantonly to
curse or revile or to use obscene or op-
probrious language toward or with ref-
erence to any member of the city po-
lice while in the actual performance of

49-7 defines in detail what shall consti-
tute reviling the police and, therefore,
is not vague or overbroad and the defend-
ant by said ordinance is prohibited from
cursing or using obscene language to any
member of the New Orleans Police De-
partment.

“The Motion in Arrest of Judgment was
properly overruled by the lower court.

“The conviction and sentence of the
lower court are affirmed.”

815

his duty.

1363.)”

The City of New Orleans contends that
due to prior decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and to the particularized
scope of Section 49-7, where “wanton”
cursing and reviling of a police officer must
occur while he is in the performance of his
duty, the Section is not vague and over-
broad as contended by defendant, It prays
that the judgments of the lower courts up-
holding the constitutionality of Section 49-7
be affirmed.

ool

Initially, we shall discuss the case of
Gooding v. Wilson. The defendant was
convicted in the Georgia courts on two
counts of using opprobrious words and abu-
sive language in violation of Georgia Code
Section 26-6303 which recited:

“Any person who shall, without provoca-
tion, use,to or of another, and in his pres-
ence, opprobrious words or abusive lan-
guage, tending to cause a breach of the
peace . . . shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor.”

Habeas Corpus proceedings in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of
Georgia were taken, and the District Court
held Georgia Code Section 26-6303 uncon-
stitutionally vague and broad, 303 F.Supp.
952; it set aside the defendant’s convic-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, 431 F.2d 855 (1970); the
United States Supreme Court noted prob-

a
(Flynn’s Digest 1896, art.

816

able jurisdiction of the State’s appeal; it
affirmed,

In Gooding, the Supreme Court stated:
«* * %* In other words, the statute must
be carefully drawn or be authoritatively
construed to punish only unprotected speech
and not be susceptible of application to pro-
tected expression. * * *” 92 S.Ct. at p.
1106. (Emphasis ours) The Court further
stated: “* * * Our decisions since
Chaplinsky have continued to recognize
state power constitutionally to punish
‘fighting’ words under carefully drawn
statutes not also susceptible of application
to protected expression, Cohen vy. Cali-
fornia, supra, 403 U.S. [15], at 20, 91 S.Ct.
[1780] at 1785, [29 L.Ed.2d 284]; Bachellar
v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567, 90 S.Ct.
1312, 1314, 25 LEd2d 570 (1970); see
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592, 89
S.Ct. 1354, 1365, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969).
We reaffirm that proposition today.” 92
S.Ct. at pp. 1106-1107.

In affirming the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, the United States Su-
preme Court concluded in Gooding v. Wil-
son as follows:

“We conclude that ‘[t]he separation of
legitimate from illegitimate speech calls
for more sensitive tools than [Georgia]
has supplied’ Speiser v. Randall, supra,
357 U.S. [513], at 525, 78 S.Ct. [1332],
at 1342, [2 L.Ed.2d 1460] The most
recent decision of the Georgia Supreme
Court, Wilson v. State, supra, in reject-

817

ing appellee’s attack on the constitution-
ality of § 26-6303, stated that the statute
‘conveys a definite meaning as to the
conduct forbidden, measured by common
understanding and practice’ 223 Ga.
[531], at 533, 156 S.E.2d [446], at 448.
Because earlier appellate decisions ap-
plied § 26-6303 to utterances where there
was no likelihood that the person address-
ed would make an immediate violent re-
sponse, it is clear that the standard allow-
ing juries to determine guilt ‘measured
‘by common understanding and practice’
does not limit the application of § 26-6303
to ‘fighting’ words defined by Chaplinsky.
Rather, that broad standard. effectively
‘licenses the jury to create its own stand-
ard in each case.’ Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242, 263, 57 S.Ct. 732, 741, 81
_ LiEd, 1066 (1937).
_ ‘agree with the conclusion of the District
‘Court, ‘[t]he fault of the statute is that
it leaves wide open the standard of re-

Accordingly, we

“sponsibility, so that it is easily susceptible
‘to improper application.’ 303 F.Supp.,
‘at 955-956. Unlike the construction of
‘the New Hampshire statute by the New
. Hampshire Supreme Court, the Georgia
cappellate courts have not construed §
.26-6303 ‘so as to avoid all constitutional
difficulties’ United States v. Thirty-
. In National Ass’n for Advance, of Col-
ored People v. Button, the U. 8. Supreme
Court, 871 U.S. 415, 88 S.Ct. 828, p. 888,

‘9 L.Wd.2d 405, said: “* * * Because
First Amondment freedoms need breath-

818

Seven (37) Photographs, supra, 402 U.S.
[363], at 369, 91 S.Ct. [1400] at 1405.
[28 L.Ed.2d 822].

“Affirmed.”

We do not find Georgia Code Section 26—
6303 as written and Section 49-7, 828
M.C.S. New Orleans, Louisiana, similar.
The Georgia section provided that the
prohibited language would have to tend to
cause a breach of the peace. Sec. 49-7 pro-
vides that it shall be a breach of the peace
to use the prohibited language toward or

with reference to any member of the city

police while in the actual performance of
his duty. Our section is restricted to any
member of the city police; it is narrow; it
is specific? The Georgia Section was not
specific or narrow; it pertained “to or of
another.”

TL

There is a major difference between a
member of the city police while in the actual
performance of his duty and “another.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth
Edition, 1968, defines a Police Officer'as:
“One of the staff of men employed in
cities and towns to enforce the municipal
police, i. e., the laws and ordinances for pre-
serving the peace and good order of the
community. Otherwise called ‘policemen’ ”

ing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity, Cantwell vy. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 311, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906,
84 L.Bd, 1213.”

819

See, 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 568,
p. 1090 et seq.; 47 AmJur. Sheriffs, Po-
lice, and Constables, Sec. 5, Peace Officers
as Public Officers, p. 823 et seq.

In Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S.C.
313, 15 S.E.2d 334, 336 (1941), the Supreme
Court of South Carolina stated:

““‘Policeman’ has been defined as:
‘A member of the Police.’
defined: ‘An organized civil force for

‘Police’ is

maintaining order, preventing and detect
ing crime, and enforcing the laws; the
body of men by which the municipal laws
and regulations of a city, town, or district
are enforced’ Webster’s Twentieth Cen-
tury Dictionary, Unabridged. And again
it is defined:

“That species of superintendence by
magistrates which has principally for its
object the maintenance of public tran-
quility among the citizens. The officers
who are appointed for this purpose are
also called the police. * * *

“The word police has three significa-
tions. The first relates to the measures
which are adopted to keep order, the laws
and ordinances on cleanliness, health, the
markets, etc. The second has for its ob-
ject to procure to the authorities the
means of detecting even the smallest at-
tempts to commit crime, in order that the
guilty may be arrested before their plans
are carried into execution and delivered
over to the justice of the country. The

820°
third comprehends the laws, ordinances,
and other measures which require the
citizens to exercise their rights in a par-

ticular form.” See, Wyndham v. United
States, 197 F.Supp. 856 (D.C.1961).

“Policemen of a city or town are peace:
officers and a policeman is a public of--
ficer, whose duties relate to governmental
functions of a municipality.” Klam v..
Boehm, 72 Idaho 259, 240 P.2d 484
(1952). “* * * the term ‘Policeman,”
as that term is generally used and under-
stood, means a person who is a member-
of an organized civil force for maintain-
ing peace and order, preventing and de-
tecting crime, and enforcing the law.
A policeman of a city is a person who has.
been authorized and empowered by the
city to perform duties which relate to.
its governmental function of maintain-
ing peace and order.” Tezeno v. Mary-
land Casualty Company, 166 So.2d 351,.
356 (La.App.1964).

HM The above jurisprudence affirms
that a police officer is a peace officer and
that he keeps the peace; it stands to reason
that wantonly cursing or reviling, or using
obscene or opprobrious language toward or
with reference to any police officer while
in the actual performance of his duty is a
breach of the peace. “The offense known
as breach of the peace embraces a great
variety of conduct destroying or menacing
public order and tranquility. It includes
not only violent acts but acts and words

B21

likely to produce violence in others.” Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct.
"900, 84 L.Ed, 1213, 1220.

HMMM Freedom of Speech is protected
“by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution;
-ever, the United States Supreme Court in
National Ass’n for Advance. of Colored
People v. Button, 83 S.Ct. at 341, stated:
“The decisions of this Court have con-
:sistently held that only a compelling state

how-

interest in the regulation of a subject with-
‘in the State’s constitutional power to regu-
late can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms.” The Court also stated in Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303,
95 L.Ed. 295, 300 (1950) :

“This Court respects, as it must, the in-
‘terest of the community in maintaining
peace and order on its streets.” Thus, as
ably urged by counsel for the City of New
‘Orleans, the City of New Orleans as an arm
of the State has a compelling interest in
preserving the efficient and effective op-
eration of its police department which in
‘turn provides for law and order on the
streets, Wanton interference with a police-
‘man while he is endeavoring to discharge
his duties creates a threat to the community

-at large, Here, a vital State interest is in
question, i. e., the efficient operation of an
-officer of the law while in the discharge of
“his duties. We find that protected speech
sdoes not apply to Section 49-7 supra. The
vital and compelling interest of the City of

822

New Orleans justifies the prohibition of
certain language to a member of the city
police while in the actual performance of
his duties.

TI.

In California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct.
609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court said: “It is well-
settled that First Amendment rights are not
immunized from regulation when they are
used as an integral part of conduct which
violates a valid statute.” The Court fur-
ther stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford,
(1972) 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.
2d 222, that: “The nature of a place, ‘the
pattern of its normal activities, dictates the
kinds of regulations of time, place, and
manner that are reasonable’ * * * The
crucial question is whether the manner of
expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time. Our cases make clear
that in assessing the reasonableness of
regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact
that communication is involved; the reg-
ulation must be narrowly tailored to further
the State’s legitimate interest. ‘Access to
[the streets, sidewalks, parks, and other
similar public places] for the purpose of
exercising [First Amendment rights] can-
constitutionally be denied broadly
. . . 4? Free expression ‘must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied?”

not

823

“Allowing the broadest scope to the lan-
guage and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is well understood that the
right of free speech is not absolute at all
There
are certain well-defined and narrowly

times and under all circumstances.

limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no.
essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
‘Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not
in any proper sense communication of in-

4. The statute involved in Chaplinsky, a
New Hampshire statute, recited: “No
person shall address any offensive, derisive
or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in dny street or other
publie place, nor call him by any offensive
or derisive name, nor make any noise
or exclamation in his presence and hear-
ing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
him, or to prevent him from pursuing
his lewful business or occupation.” In
upholding, the statute, the United States
Supreme Court stated :

“We are unable to say that the limited
scope of the statute as thus construed
contravenes the constitutional right of
free expression. It is a statute narrowly
drawn and limited to define and punish
specific conduct lying within the domain

824

formation or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a crim-

-inal act would raise no question under that.

instrument’ Cantwell v, Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L..
Ed. 1213, [1221] 128 ALR. 1352.” Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,,
62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942).
(Emphasis ours.)

Iv.

Our consideration of the instant matter
is made, as we have been directed by the
United States Supreme Court, in the light
of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct.
1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408. In Gooding, as
quoted supra, the Court recognized the doc-
trine of Chaplinsky as still alive and said’
that the Supreme Court’s decisions have:
recognized State power as being able to.
punish constitutionally “fighting words.” 5

of state power, the use in a public place
of words likely to cause a breach of the
peace. * * * :

“Nor can we say that the application
of the statute to the facts disclosed by
the record substantially or unreasonably
impinges upon the privilege of free
speech, Argument is unnecessary to dem-
onstrate that the appellations ‘damned
racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist’ are’
epithets likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation, and thereby cause-
a breach of the peace.”

5. See also, Cohen y. California, 408 U.S.
15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 29 L.Wd.2d 284,
wherein the Court stated: “This Court
has also held that the States are free:
to ban the simple use, without a dem-~

825

HMM Section 49-7 supra recites that:
“Tt shall be unlawful and a breach of the
peace for any person wantonly to curse or
revile or to use obscene or opprobrious
language * * *.” (Emphasis ours.) We
find and believe that it is self evident that
what is prohibited are “fighting words”
which cannot enjoy the protection of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. We find that
under the above authorities of the United
States Supreme Court it was within the
power of the City of New Orleans, an arm
of the State, to regulate the conduct of any
person towards a member of the city police
while in the actual performance of his duty
by prohibiting the use of “fighting words”
to such policeman. Permitting the cursing
or reviling of or using obscene or oppro-
brious words to a police officer while in the
actual performance of his duty would be
unreasonable and basically incompatible
with the officer’s activities and the place
such activities
Wantonly cursing, reviling, or using ob-

where are performed.

scene or opprobrious words are not pro-

onstration of additional justifying cir-
cumstances, of so-called ‘fighting words,
those personally abusive epithets which,
when addressed to the ordinary citizen,
are, as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke violent reac-
tion. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 815
U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1081
(i942), # eH”

6. In Cohen v. California, supra, the Court
said of Free Speech: “* * * Tt is
designed and intended to remove govern-
mental restraints from the arena of public

826

tected means of communication. Prohibit-
ing such is not a restraint of the area of
public discussion; such prohibition will
not render the citizenry incapable® As
found supra herein, we find that Section

49-7 is not offensive to protected speech;
it is narrowed to “fighting words” uttered
to specific persons at a specific time; it is
not overbroad and is therefore not uncon-
stitutional.

Georgia Code Section 26-6303 supra re-
cited that “Any person who shall, without
provocation, use to or of another, and in
his presence, opprobrious words or abusive
language, * * *” Section 49-7 prohibits
“any person wantonly to curse or revile or
to use obscene or opprobrious language
* * % (Emphasis ours.)

We find that the prohibitions of Section
49-7 are self explanatory; they are not

vague.
it is to wantonly curse or revile; our Sec-

Any reasonable man knows what

tion is not confined to “opprobrious words
or abusive language,” as was the Georgia
statute.’ The Section definitely does not

discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into
the hands of each of us, in the hope that
use of such freedom will ultimately pro-
duce a more capable citizenry and more
perfect polity and in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests,
* * ¥” 91 S.Ct. at p. 1788.

7. The word “wantonly” does not appear;
only the words “without provocation.”
Our ordinance provides for cursing or re-

827

sweep within its proscriptions all forms of
abusive and derogatory speech. The pro-
scriptions are narrow and specific—wanton-
ly cursing, reviling, and using obscene or
opprobrious language.

We conclude that Section 49-7 is not
it is constitutional and meets the
test of Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
US. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed2d 214
(1971), an ascertainable standard.

vague;

Having thoroughly considered this cause
in the light of Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972),
we now hold that Section 49-7, 828 M.C.S.,
New Orleans, Louisiana, is constitutional.

It is ordered and decreed for the reasons
above assigned that Mallie Lewis’ convic-
tions and sentences be affirmed; the judg-
ments of the First Municipal Court, City
of New Orleans, and the Criminal District
Court for the Parish of Orleans are af-
firmed.

BARHAM, J.,
reasons.

dissents with written

TATE, J., dissents with written reasons.

DIXON, J., dissents and subscribes to the
reasons enunciated in the dissent of TATE,

J.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).
This case was remanded to us for con-

sideration in light of Gooding v. Wilson,

viling or using obscene or opprobrious lan~
guage. ‘The Georgia statute is confined

—
405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408

828

(1972). For the reasons assigned by the
United States Supreme Court in that case
we are required to declare the municipal
ordinance, 828 M.C.S. 49-7, unconstitu-
tional. I concur in Mr. Justice Tate’s dis-

sent.

TATE, Justice (dissenting).

The defendant was here convicted of
violating a municipal ordinance which for-
bids reviling the police. She cursed the
police after they had arrested her son.

A majority of this court initially denied
supervisory review, rejecting the conten-
tion that the ordinance was unconstitution-
al on its face. 257 La. 993, 244 So.2d 860
(1971). The dissent expressed the view
that the ordinance “is clearly unconstitu-
tionally vague, overbroad and is an unlaw-
ful restriction upon freedom of speeech”.
244 So.2d 860.

The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari and reversed this court.
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S.
913, 92 S.Ct. 2499, 33 L.Ed.2d 321 (1972).
The sole issue raised was that the ordi-
nance is unconstitutional on its face. The
high court remanded the case to us “for re-
consideration in the light of Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.
2d 408 (1972)”. Despite this and the cir-
cumstance that the ordinance here in ques-

to opprobrious words or abusive lan-
guage.

829

tion is constitutionally deficient under the
standard expressed by Gooding v. Wilson,
the majority again affirms the conviction.

At issue here is the contention that an
ordinance of the City of New Orleans vio-
lates the First Amendment (freedom of
speech) protections of the United States
Constitution. See also Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1921, Article 1, Section 3,

The ordinance in question makes it “un-
lawful and a breach of the peace for any
person wantonly to curse or revile or to

use obscene or opprobrious language

toward or with reference to any member of
the City Police while in the actual perform-
ance of his duty”. Section 49-7, City of
New Orleans (Adopted by Ordinance No.
828).

‘We should at this point note the follow-
ing: Under the broad scope of the terms
of the ordinance: The punishable speech
includes (1) wantonly (recklessly) used
“opprobrious”! language “with reference

1. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
51S, 92 S.Ct. 1108 at 1107, under its
definition “opprobrious” includes greater
reach than “fighting words”. (‘This was
one reason the Georgia statute was de-
dlared unconstitutional.) The Court not-
ed that Webster’s New International Die-
tionary (1961) defines “opprobrious” as
“conveying or intended to convey dis-
grace”.

2. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 573, 62 S.Ct. 766, 770, 86 L.Ed.
1081 (1942), saving from invalidity a
statute since it did “no more than pro-
hibit the face-to-face words plainly like-

830

to” an officer engaged in the performancee
of his duty, (2) which languagee need not
be used in the presence of the officer ?,
(3) nor be of a nature tending to cause an.
immediate public disturbance nor used in
such circumstances as likely to cause such
a disturbance. Further, the punishable lan-
guage need not interfere with the officer
in the performance of his duty; it is suf-
ficient only that the words be opprobrious
with reference to the officer.

Thus, for instance, a person sitting on a
balcony overlooking the efforts of a police-
man to direct traffic in the crowded French
Quarter could, under the terms of the ordi-
nance, be prosecuted for muttering, “Look
at that stupid cop messing things up down
there’, The epithet may be used wanton-
ly, in that it recklessly and willfully reviles
the heroic efforts of the police officer.
The language is punishable under the
terms of the ordinance, even though the
muttered opprobrious comment was over-

ly to cause a breach of the peace”.
ies mine.)

(Ital-

3. As the majority notes (see its footnote
2), the Criminal District Court for the
Parish of Orleans, with primary respon-
sibility to review convictions under this
ordinance, held that the statute is not
vague or overbroad since it “defines in
detail what shall constitute veviling the
police”, for by said ordinance the de-
fendant was “prohibited from cursing or
using obscene language to any member
of the New Orleans Police Department.”
‘Under this meaning, the statute clearly
offends the United States Constitution,
see Gooding v. Wilson, cited abovo.

831

heard only by a bystander—witness up on
the balcony with the “reviler”, and though
the policeman and no one else heard the
mutter, and though the muttered criticism
did not at all interfere with the unaware
policeman’s conduct of his duties,

We should at this point note as unques-
tioned the basic American philosophy that
freedom of speech protects us against crim-
inal prosecution for criticizing or even
using abusive or opprobrious language with
regard to our public officials and our gov-
ernment. As noted in Gooding v, Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103 (1972), to which
we were referred by the United States Su-
‘preme Court when it reversed our prior af-
firmance of this same conviction, even
harsh insulting words cannot be punished
except stich as by their very utterance “tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace”.
92 S.Ct. 1107.

In Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92
S.Ct. 1103 (1972), the United States Su-
preme Court held to be unconstitutional a
Georgia statute punishing “any person who
shall, without provocation, use to or of an-
other, and in his presence ~* op-
propbrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace
.”, 92 S.Ct. 1104, (Italics mine.)
Since the Georgia statute (like the present

4. Note that the Georgia statute here inval-
idated contains, unlike the municipal or-
dinanee in question, the limitation that
the offending language be used in the
presence of the reviled person. All the

832

ordinance) punished only spoken words,
the Supreme Court noted that “It can
therefore withstand appellee’s attack upon
its facial constitutionality only if, as au-
thoritatively construed by the Georgia
courts, it is not susceptible of application to
speech, although vulgar or offensive, that
is protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments”. 92 S.Ct. 1105.

The court pointed out that “the tran-
scendent value to all society of constitu-
tionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing ‘attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the per-
son making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with the requisite narrow
specificity.” 92 S.Ct. 1105. The court ex-
plained: “This is deemed necessary be-
cause persons whose expression is consti-
tutionally protected may well refrain from
exercising their rights for fear of criminal
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible
of application to protected expression.” 92
S.Ct. 1105.

The Georgia statute was invalid because
it was not “narrowly drawn to apply only
to a constitutionally unprotected class of
words—‘fighting’ words—‘those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the

more reason that the present municipal

ordinance is unconstitutional. See Chap-

linsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).

833
peace’”, 92 S.Ct. 1106. The court spe-
cifically -pointed out that an enactment
which permits criminal punishment of the
use of “opprobrious” language overbroadly
includes within its prohi

ition merely de-
rogatory comments, not necessarily “fight-
ing words”, 92 S.Ct. 1107.

No authoritative Louisiana interpreta
tion narrows the scope of this ordinance to
include language tending to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace, “fighting
words”. In fact, quite the contrary is so.
See footnote 2 and the majority opinion.
The majority here holds that it may be
made a criminal breach of the peace “wan-
tonly” ‘to use epithets or personal abuse
with regard to a police officer while in the
performance of his duty—indeed, this may
be so, by a statute limited in application to
“those situations where the language creates
the danger of an immediate public disturb-
ance—, but it overlooks that the present
statute, under its terms, punishes not only
words used in such context, but also non
face-to-face or peaceful or even private ex-
pressions of opprobrious comments. The
mother is punishable under the ordinance
for using the disrespectful language in her
own living room as well as in the street.

The circumstance that, under the ordi-
nance, such epithets must be used “wanton-
ly”—that is, recklessly, willfully, see State
v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917 (1942),
44A Words and Phrases, “Wanton”—does

not so narrow the language criminally pun-
a

834

ishable as to save this enactment from
overbroadness. That the opprobrious lan-
guage must be used “wantonly”—reckless-
ly, willfully—does not deprive it of consti-
tutional protection, where not uttered un-
der circumstances likely to cause an im-
mediate public disturbance. As a matter
of ‘fact, as interpreted by our state courts,
the simple “cursing or using obscene lan-
guage to any member of the New Orleans
Police Department” has been regarded as
wanton reviling which is punishable under

the ordinance. See Footnote 2.

The ruling in Gooding v. Wilson is de-
cisive of this case, as the United States Su-
preme Court indicated by ordering us to
consider the present conviction in the light
of that decision,

The language there used by the defend-
ant to a Georgia police officer was “White
s-- of a b--.., I'll kill you” and “You s--
of a b-.---, Pll choke you to death”, See
92 S.Ct, 1112. In the present case, the
‘mother called the police officer a “G--
- £.--..” police. The fact that
the latter words used are shocking to the

d--- m.

sensibilities of people of our generation
does not by itself justify classifying such
critical language as not protected by the
constitution. See Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284
(1971).

‘Whatever our personal views are as to
what sort of language should or should not
be punishable, this court is bound by our

835

state and federal constitutions to enforce
constitutional protection of individuals and
their speech as interpreted by authorita-
tive decisions of the nation’s high court.
That court has reversed us in the present
case for not applying such principles an-
nounced by it, It has directed us to recon-
sider the present conviction in the light
of Gooding v. Wilson. Gooding plainly in-
dicates that the present ordinance is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad on its face, just as
was the quite similar Georgia statute in
that case, in that it subjects to punishment
constitutionally protected language as well
as language not so protected.

The police, our front line soldiers in the
battle against crime, deserve the respect
and support of our officials and citizens.
Nevertheless, ever since this nation fought
for and obtained its freedom, it has not
been a crime to curse or use opprobrious
language about the public officers of our
democratic republic. If, for instance, the
present ordinance had made it a crime
wantonly to curse or revile members of
the United States Supreme Court of of the
state judiciary (or the Governor, or the leg-
islators or any other public officer or
servant), as well as the police, I am certain
that not one of the majority would deem

5, It is to be noted that other statutes are
available to punish conduct which ac-
tually hampers law enforcement. See,
e. g, LaR.S. 14:108 (resisting an of-
ficer), LaR.S. 14:111 (assisting an es-
cape), and La.R.S. 40:1890 (interference
with state police officers in the perform-
ance of their duties.)

836

such an enactment constitutional, The
right to criticize our public officers, be
they judges or policemen, has, since our
earliest days, been deemed a basic right of
all Americans, The harshness or unfair-
ness of language used in such critical com-
mentary does not remove it from the pro-
Freedom of
speech is protected not only for our news-

tection of our constitution.

papers and politicians, but also for our
citizens on back streets of slum areas.

Although it is immaterial to the issue be-
fore us (since the enactment is invalid on
its face), I must emphasize once again that
the sole action of the defendant hereby
punished was her use of obscene language
toward the policemen after they had arrest-
ed her son, She is not being prosecuted for
public obscenity. There is no suggestion
in the limited record in this court that such
language had any tendency to cause a fight
or public disturbance or to interfere with
the police in the performance of their du-
ties.®

To repeat, the United States Supreme
Court has reversed this court’s prior rejec-
tion of the attack on the ordinance for be-
ing overbroad in scope and violative of the
First Amendment.6 It is not our function

6. On October 24, 1972, — U.S. —, 93
S.Ct. 279, 84 LEd2d 214, the United
States Supreme Court again reversed a
majority of this court’s similar holding
in City of New Orleans vy. Martin, 260
La. 691, 257 So.2d 152 (1972) that the
ordinance was constitutional.

837

to refuse to apply the direct ruling of the
nation’s high court because we disagree
with it. Orderly processes of adjudication
and the rule of law suffer when an inferior
tribunal refuses to follow the law as enun-
ciated by a higher court.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

269 So.2d 460

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Leroy GREEN.

No. 52557.

Noy. 6, 1972,

foe)
ioc)
Ss

840

——

D’Amico, Curet & Bush, Bryan E. Bush,
Jr., Percy, Macmurdo, Gray & Eaton, Ed-
ward W. Gray, Baton Rouge, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
HL Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sargent Pitch-
er, Jr, Dist. Atty, Donald L. Becker,
Asst. Dist. Atty. for plaintiff-appellee.

SUMMERS, Justice.

Appellant Leroy Green was charged by
bill of information with armed robbery.
Trial began on January 27, 1971 and con-
tinued until February 8, 1971 at which
time Green, with consent of counsel, the
district attorney and the court, entered a
plea of guilty to “attempted armed rob-
bery.” The plea was entered without
amending the bill of information or filing
a new indictment. After a. presentence in-
vestigation, Green was sentenced to con-
finement in the penitentiary for forty
years, with credit for time served.

‘Thereafter counsel for Green filed a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, a mo-
tion in arrest of judgment and a motion
for a new trial. All three motions were
based upon the proposition that a guilty
plea of “attempted armed robbery” had been

84
entered to a charge of “armed robbery”,
and, therefore, the plea was not responsive
to the charge.
ruled, and a bill of exceptions was re-

The motions were over-

served incorporating all three motions and
rulings. Appellant then filed application
for a writ of habeas corpus, based upon
the identical contentions previously ad-
vanced by the motions. After hearing,
the application for habeas was denied. A
bill was reserved to this ruling, On the
basis of these two bills, this appeal fol-
lowed.

Appellant argues that a plea of guilty
cannot be accepted unless it is responsive
to the crime charged. To support this
argument counsel refers to Article 814
of the Code of Criminal Procedure list-
ing the only responsive verdicts which
may be entered where the indictment
charges “armed robbery”; they are, “guil-
ty”, “guilty of simple robbery” and “not
guilty’. It is urged that since the jury
is limited to these statutory, responsive
verdicts, a verdict of “guilty of attempted
armed robbery”, not being included, could
not be rendered by a jury to a charge of
“armed robbery”. On the same princi-
ple, likening a guilty plea to a “verdict”,
appellant contends, a guilty plea to “at-
tempted armed robbery” cannot be entered
to’a charge of “armed robbery”.

In reply, the State relies upon Article
487(B) of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure as amended, It reads:

gia’
Nothing contained herein shall be con-
strued to prohibit the defendant from
entering a plea of guilty to a crime
nonresponsive to the original indictment
when such a plea is acceptable to the
district attorney, and in such case, the
district attorney shall not be required to
file a new indictment to charge the crime
to which the plea is offered.

This amendment to Article 487(B) was
enacted in 1970, effective after appellant's
arrest and indictment, but before his trial.
To give the amendment retroactive effect,
it is argued, would violate the constitu-
tional prohibition against ex post facto ap-
plication of laws, La.Const. art. 4 § 15.
And the argument proceeds, if the court
should find that applying the quoted amend-
ment here does not violate the ex post facto
clause of the Constitution, and a new in-
dictment need not be filed before a guilty
plea to “attempted armed robbery” can be
entered to a charge of “armed robbery”,
Article 487(B) should, at the very least,
be construed to require an amendment to
the pending indictment in order that the
guilty plea would be responsive. Other-
wise, appellant contends, a party accused °
could plead guilty to a crime entirely dif-
ferent from that charged. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is said, the constitutional -
requirement that “the accused shall be

informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him” could not be satis-
fied. La.Const. art. 1 § 10.

843

‘THE Ax “attempt”, by the terms of Arti-
cle 27 of the Criminal Code, “is a separate
but lesser grade of the intended crime

.” And Article 558 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure permits the defendant,
with the consent of the district attorney, to
“plead guilty of a lesser offense that is
included in the offense charged in the in-
dictment.”

This latter article contemplates, in gen-
eral, that the lesser included offense must
be of the same generic class and must not
require proof of any element which is not
found in the major crime charged. Its
mandate satisfies the constitutional require-
ment that the accused be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against
La.Const, art. 1 § 10.

him,

HM Viewed in this light the article dis-
pels the apprehension expressed that a
guilty plea of attempt to commit a specific
crime would permit a plea to an unrelated
crime for which no charge exists. Clearly,
in this instance, the plea of “guilty of at-
tempted armed robbery”, a lesser offense,
is of the same generic class as the crime
of armed robbery, for, to sustain a convic-
tion of attempted armed robbery, no proof
is required of any element which is not
found in the crime of armed robbery.

Recently, in State v. Cooley, 260 La. 768,
773, 257 So.2d 400, 402 (1972), we observed:

Today, under our peculiar set of stat-
utes, a person can plead guilty to the

844.

crime of attempted murder under an in-
dictment for murder, provided such is
agreeable to the district attorney, (C.Cr.
P. art. 487(B)), even though attempted
murder is not a responsive verdict to
murder under C.Cr.P. art. 814. Prior to
the enactment of C.Cr.P. art. 487 (as
amended), one could still plead guilty to
the lesser offense of attempt under R.S.
14:27 although not a responsive verdict

Prior to the enactment of Article 814 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section
386 of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes re-
quired that the judge charge the jury on the
law applicable to all offenscs of which an
accused could be found guilty under an
indictment setting out an offense, includ-
ing other offenses of less magnitude. A
number of our decisions recognized that
a court or jury had jurisdiction to convict
a defendant of a less serious crime than
that charged, if all clements of the lesser
crime were essentially included in the defi-
nition of the crime charged. State v. Des-
selles, 150 La. 494, 90 So. 773 (1922);
State v. Comeaux, 142 La. 651, 77 So. 489
(1918); State v. Matthews, 111 La. 962,
36 So. 48 (1903); State v. Jacques, 45 La.
Ann, 1451, 14 So. 213 (1893).

Article 814, by enumerating permissible
responsive verdicts, removed the uncertain-
ty theretofore involved in determining
those offenses of less magnitude which
were included within the offense charged.

845

verdicts, the article greatly simplified the
preparation and scope of the charge. At
the same time the result was that the ac-
ensed could more definitely determine in
advance the verdicts which could result
from any given charge. State v. Stan-
ford, 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (1943).

Hl The timitation imposed by Article
814 on verdicts which may be rendered as
responsive to stated charges is applicable
to verdicts rendered upon the trial of a
cause as distinguished from pleas of guilty
knowingly and voluntarily entered by an
accused. The limitations on verdicts which
may be applicable to a trial are not entire-

ly pertinent to a guilty plea. In the latter

instance the accused actively and yolun-

tarily participates in a determination of the
plea to be entered.

Articles 487(B) and 558 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure are in keeping with
the established rationale that a guilty plea
of a lesser offense is a responsive verdict.
By its language Section 487(B) is broad
and permissive,

HI Generally, no limitation is imposed
on the guilty pleas which may be entered
to a pending charge, except the requirement
that the plea be to a lesser offense, and that
the lesser included offense be of the same
generic class, not requiring proof of any
element not found in the major crime
charged. Article 558 repeats the principle

| 86

By setting out the permissible responsive

that defendant “may plead guilty of a lesser
offense that is included in the offense
charged”. When these requirements are
satisfied, the accused is informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.

TH Acticle 487(B) serves only to clari-
fy and give statutory dignity to a principle
existing in our law prior to 1970. Jence
its application does not violate the ex post
facto clause of the constitution.

The conviction and sentence are affirm-
ed.

BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns rea-
sons,

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The majority opinion has held, relying
upon and repeating the dictum of State v.
Cooley, 260 La. 768, 257 So.2d 400, that
Subsection (B) of Article 487 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, added by amend-
ment in 1970 (Act. No. 679, Sec. 1), has
no meaning whatever. The holding of
the majority is: “Article 487(B) serves
only to clarify and give statutory dignity
to a principle existing in our law prior to
1970. Hence its application aocs not vio-
late the ex post facto clause of the con-
stitution.”

First, as interpreted by the majority,
this amendment merely provides a change
in procedure, is not a substantive change
in the penal law, and if applied in the pres-

847

of which he complains was entered there-
after.
ply to the trial and plea proceedings al-
though the offense was committed before

The procedural provision could ap-

the procedural guideline, and the conten-
tion of application of an ex post facto law
is without merit.

Second, I do not interpret the intend-
ment of the provision in question to be that
which the majority has found. That pro-
vision reads:

“B, Nothing contained herein shall be
construed to prohibit the defendant from
entering a plea of guilty to a crime non-
responsive to the original indictment when
such a plea is acceptable to the district
attorney, and in such case, the district
attorney shall not be required to file a
new indictment to charge the crime to
Which the plea is offered.”
supplied.)

(Emphasis

The majority has found that this pro-
vision permits only a plea of guilty to a
lesser offense that is included in the of-
fense charged in the original indictment.
‘The majority’s concise finding is that the
“attempted armed robbery” plea here was
a lesser included offense and a “responsive
verdict”. Yet the expr2ss language of
the statute clearly shows that the provi-

ent case, would not be ex post facto. Al-
though this defendant committed the of-
fense for which he was indicted before the
1970 amendment to Article 487, his trial be-
gan in January, 1971, and the guilty plea

848

sion intends to permit “nowresponsive”
pleas. I cannot make the express language
of the provision coincide with the interpre-
tation given to it by the majority. T am
of the opinion that the Legislature meant
exactly what is said—that is, to permit
with approval of the district attorney non-
responsive pleas to the original indictment.
As I interpret the provision, the amend-
ment of the “original indictment” will
suffice without the State’s being “required
to file a new indictment to charge the
crime to which the plea is offered”. This
being so, the question of the constitutional
validity of the provision immediately would
arise under Article I, Sections 9 and 10,

-when an accused pleads to an entirely new

and distinct crime. However, without ap-
proaching the constitutional problem and
assuming for the purpose of this dissent
the constitutionality of the provision, I am
of the opinion that Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure Article 558 is modified by Article
814, which states that the only responsive
verdicts to a charge of armed robbery are
guilty, guilty of simple robbery, and not
guilty. Attempted armed robbery, which
was the plea here, is non-responsive to an

indictment for armed robbery.

A plea of guilty and a verdict of guilty
are both convictions. They are convictions
of equal dignity. State v. Braud, 238 La.
811, 116 So.2d 676. A responsive plea
and a responsive verdict to an indictment
should have the same meaning under our

849 Le 850°

Code. Without an indictment (or at least
an amended indictment) to which attempt-
ed armed robbery would be responsive, the
plea of guilty here cannot stand.

I consider the majority’s interpretation
of the intention and effect of Subsection
(B) of Article 487 to be dispositive of a
serious legal problem. Much litigation
may be avoided if the district attorneys
and the courts below adhere to this re-
strictive interpretation of the power at-
tempted to be delegated by that provision.
However, I must respectfully dissent, be-
lieving the legislative intent to be consid-
erably broader.

269 So.2d 465

STATE of Louisiana
: v.
Charles Lee JACKSON.

No. 52660.
Noy. 6, 1972.

Le)

® iS

a
—
a

851

+

“a
Robert Glass, Ernest L. Jones, New Or-
leans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty, Gen, Harry
II, Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Jim Garri-
son, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

” MeCALEB, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Charles Lee Jackson, was
charged, tried, and convicted of possession
of heroin, in violation of R.S. 40:971.
Following imposition of sentence, he prose-
cuted this appeal, relying on two bills of
exceptions for a reversal of his conviction.

The first bill was reserved when the
trial judge overruled defense motion to
suppress evidence obtained from defend-
ant’s person, and the second when the
judge admitted the evidence during the
trial. A proper consideration of these bills
requires a detailed statement of the facts.

According to the record two police offi-
cers, patrolling in the vicinity of the St
Bernard Housing Project in the lower sec-
tion of New Orleans around 8:50 p. m,

852

saw a 1963 maroon Buick Riviera, with tail
and parking lights on, standing near a cor-
ner on a side of the street where no park-
ing was allowed, the car being the only one
parked on that side. The officers decided
to check the license number of the car, as
they had recovered several stolen Buicks in
that vicinity in the previous two weeks.
Finding that they were unable to see the
number from the side while passing in the
patrol car, the officers made a “U” turn at
the corner; but, after they had done so
and were approaching the car, they noticed
a man leave a nearby house, get in the car,
and drive toward them. Seeking to check
the license and also issue a traffic citation
for a standing violation, the officers made
another “U” turn and pursued, but were
unable to locate the car after it turned
into a cross street.

About an hour later, they saw the same
car again illegally parked in the same spot,
although headed in the opposite direction.
They sought again to maneuver to a place
that would permit a check of the license
but, as they approached, they saw the de-
fendant leave the front porch of a house at
that corner, get into the vehicle, and drive
away. This time the officers were directly
behind and turned on their blue lights as
they pursued the car, The defendant
stopped.

The officers approached the car and
asked the defendant to get out and give
them his driver’s license and registration

853

paper, the latter disclosing the car was
registered to a female. One officer was
checking these while the other, standing di-
rectly in front of the defendant, who was
fully illuminated by the spot light on the
police car, began to question him about
ownership of the car. As thus positioned,
the officer almost immediately saw a cello-
phane wrapper, with what resembled glas-
sine envelopes inside, partially protruding
from the front of defendant’s shirt, at the
bottom of the zipper opening, the whole
being bound around tightly with a rubber
band. The flat rectangular object (ap-
proximately two and a half inches long
and half an inch wide) was snagged on a
chain around defendant’s neck, from which
hung a small heart-shaped medallion.

The officer asked the defendant what
was in the package, and simultaneously
recognizing—from experience in narcotic
work and arrests made in the vicinity in
connection therewith—that the bundle was
the same length and width as the envelopes
in which heroin is usually packed, reached
for it. He was successful in removing the
package from the shirt front despite de-
fendant’s effort to grab it first. Opening
the package he found it contained three
glassine envelopes, each containing a white
powdered substance that he believed to be
1. The officers had already determined from

a check with the dispatcher that the ve-

hicle was registered to a female, and it

was later ascertained the defendant was

given permission by the owner to use the
car.

854

heroin. He immediately placed the defend-
ant under arrest? As they were walking
to the police car, the defendant endeavored
to wrest the package from the officer’s
hand, and a struggle ensued, but the de-

fendant was unsuccessful in the attempt.

Deserii

ing the manner in which he noted
the package, the officer said at the trial on
the motion to suppress: “* * * he had
a shirt on exactly like the one he has on
now, except that it was red; the zipper
and the brass ring on it. The zipper was
pulled down all the way to the bottom of
the zipper, which would be about the sec-
ond button on a shirt. The packet was
half in and half out of the shirt, as if hast-
ily stuck in, And it was snagged on a gold
chain that was around his neck with a

heart.”

As to the manner in which he obtained
the package, the officer testified: While
the defendant was “being questioned about
his possession of a car registered to some-
one else, “* * * T was looking at the
subject, I noticed a cellophane package
sticking out of his shirt’. And I reached
for the package, and as I did, he did, and
my hand got there before his did.” When
testifying during the trial he put it this
way: “It was a suspicious package and I
2. Because of his arrest on the narcotic

charge, the defendant was not issued the
two citations for illegal parking.

855
asked the defendant what it was. I asked:
What is this? And I was reaching for it;
he was reaching for it; and I grabbed it
‘before he did.”

x-The first bill of exceptions is predicated
on the. contention that the search and sei-
zure of the cellophane wrapper was illegal
because it was not incidental to a lawful
‘arrest, and argument in this Court is of
As stated in the bill, at
“the time the officer “* * * grabbed
for the cellophane-wrapped packet he no-
ticed in defendant’s shirt, he had no proba-
ble cause to arrest;
not therefore incidental to a lawful arrest;
and that an illegal search which discloses

the same tenor.

that the search was

probable cause cannot justify an anteced-

ent arrest.” (The emphasis is supplied.)

7 [EE There is no merit in this bill, or in
the second one, which is based on the same
contention. It is evident under the facts
that no search was made for the evidence.
‘There was only a seizure, for that which is
in plain view is not the subject of a search.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct
1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.
Ed.2d 1067; State v. Alexander, Or., 495
P.2d 51; Alcorn v. State, Ind., 265 N.E2d
413; and McCormick on Evidence, 2nd
Edition, at page 389. Consequently, the
3. In certain circumstances evidence has
been held admissible even though the ar-

rest was subsequent to the seizure, as, for
example, where they are integral parts of

856

law with respect to probable cause to ar-
rest in connection with alleged illegal
searches and seizures has no application
here? As stated in McCormick on Evi-
dence: “Under current interpretation the
applicability of the warrant requirement to
seizures differs significantly from its ap-
plication to searches.” :

The evidence was clearly admissible un-
der the “plain view” doctrine, which is an
exception to the warrant rule governing
searches and seizures. As stated in the
annotation at 29 L.Ed.2d 1067, where the
cases in the United States Supreme Court
on this point are collected and analyzed,
under the “plain view” doctrine “* * *
the observation of objects in ‘plain view’
has been regarded as distinct from ‘search’
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures, and it has been held that at
least under certain circumstances, objects
falling in the ‘plain view’ of a law enforce-
ment officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be introduced in evi-
dence.”

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 91 S.Ct, 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971),
the United States Supreme Court discussed
extensively the “plain view” doctrine, al-
though the case involved both a search and

a single incident. See, State v. Cobuzzi,

161 Conn. 871, 288 A.2d 439; State v.

Alexander, Or.App., 495 P.2d 51, and’ the
authorities therein cited.

857

a seizure, With respect to evidence admis-
sible under this doctrine the court said:

“It is well established that under certain
circumstances the police may seize evi-

dence in plain view without a warrant.
eRe

* * * * * *

“What the ‘plain view’ cases have in
common is that the police officer in each
of them had a prior justification for an in-
trusion in the course of which he came in-
advertently across a piece of evidence in
criminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification
—whether it be a warrant for another ob-
ject, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused—and permits
the warrantless seizure.” The court em-
phasized that even where there is no prob-
able cause to justify a warrantless search
and seizure, the evidence will, nevertheless,
be admitted if the search and seizure was

4. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91,
288 A.2d 727 (a man’s sock found to
contain jewelry seen only as a “dark
object” thrown from a car window) ;
United States v. Broomfield, D.C., 336
B.Supp. 179 (shoe box in which mari-
juana was found and a bottle in which
heroin was found); People v. Joyner,
50 Il.2d 302, 278 N.H.2d 756 (purse
in hands of passenger found to contain
revolver although the officer saw only
a “shining object” in purse); State
y. Alexander, Or.App., 495 P.2d 51. (sub-
stance in sandwich Lag found to be mari-

858

made under “exigent circumstances.”

(Italics have been supplied.)

The court further pointed out that where
the initial intrusion is bottomed on one of
the exceptions to the warrantless search
and seizure (such as “‘hot pursuit? or
search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an
extraneous valid reason for the officer's
presence”), for the evidence seized to be
admissible, its discovery “in plain view
must be inadvertent,” and it must be “con-
traband, stolen, or dangerous in itself” In
such a case, the court said: “As against the
minor peril to the Fourth Amendment pro-
tections, there is a major gain in effective
law enforcement.” (The emphasis has
been supplied.)

HE In the light of this law, it is evi-
dent that the packet seized from the de-
fendant was admissible in evidence under
the “plain view” doctrine. If not, indeed,
in “hot pursuit,” the officers had a valid
reason for the initial intrusion into defend-
ant’s privacy. He was stopped on suspi-

jana); People v. Caruso, 2 Il.App.8d
80, 276 N.W2d 112 (slips of paper in
blender in kitchen as evidence of gam-
bling) ; People v. Bombacino, 51 TIL2d
17, 280 N.E2a 697 (baseball bat seen
in car when light flashed through win-
dow); State v. Wdwards, 257 La, 707,
243 So.2d 806 (stolen property in suit-
cases); Mears v. State, 52 Wis2d 485,
190 N.W.2d 184 (brown leather case on
car seat); and United States v. Hil,
D.O., 840 F.Supp. 844 (counterfeit money
in bags).

859 De 860

cion the car he was driving had been sto-

len, and also in order to issue two traffic
citations. The officer “came inadvertently
across” the package, In the light of his
experience,® he had reasonable and proba-
ple cause to believe the packet, in its par-
ticular shape and size, and in plain view,
was contraband. Defendant’s effort to
grab the package was a factor confirming
the officer’s belief that it was contraband
and, as such, “evidence incriminating the

5. See, State v. Alexander, Or.App., 495 P.
2d 51; State v. Oltjenbruns, 187 Neb.
694, 193 N.W.2d 744.

6. See, Commonwealth y. Shaffer, 447
Pa, 91, 288 A.2d 727; People v. Joyner,
50 ML.2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756,

accused.” Jt was contraband. Further,
there were “exigent circumstances,” since
it was very likely that if the defendant
could have secured possession of the pack-
age, he would have sought to destroy it or
flee the scene with it.7

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., dissents.

7. See, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Wd.2d 419.

861 ee 862
L
269 So.2d 460

STATE of Louisiana
ve
NEW ORLEANS TERMINAL COMPANY

Writ refused. There is no error of law
under the facts found by the Court of

et al. Appeal.
No. 5307.
Dee. 11, 1972,

269 So.2d 469

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bobby HARRIS
Application denied. Relators have an v.

C, Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana
State Penitentiary.

|| ——
Dee, 11, 1972.

Not considered. The application does

adequate remedy in the event of their con-
viction.

269 So.2d 469

dunius L. HARRIS, Jr.
v.
FISK ELECTRIC COMPANY et al.

not comply with the rules of court. Ap-
plicant does not attach the motion to ap-
point counsel in lower court or the evi-

SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE CO, dence taken at hearing.
v.
FISK ELECTRIC CO. et al. McCALEB, C. J., is of the opinion that
No. 53005. the application should be denied.
Dee. 11, 1972, BARHAM AND DIXON, JJ, are of

the opinion the writ should be granted.
Applicant was not afforded counsel at

863

an evidentiary hearing had below.
of the hearing to this Court. Relator asks
us to mandamus that transcript and he is
entitled to the transcript. We should order
the transcript forwarded. The majority
force this relator who is without counsel

That
jurisdiction did not forward a transcript

864:

to comply with rules of this Court which
attorneys have difficulty understanding.
If trial court had appointed counsel for
the relator at the hearing we could now
properly dispose of this writ; if we had
the transcript we also could dispose of the
writ,

865
269 So.2d 794

" STATE of Louisiana
. ve
Evelyn BEENE.

No. 51988.

May 1, 1972.
On Rehearing Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec, 11, 1972.

867

‘R. Harmon Drew, Minden, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Jack P. F. Gremil-
lion, Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst.
Attys. Gen. Hal R. Henderson, John A.
Richardson, Ragan D. Madden, Dist. Attys.,
‘E. Rudolph McIntyre, Dist. Atty. Fifth Ju-

4d. B.S, 26:588 reads: “Prohibition of the
sale of any or all alcoholic beverages by
a Jocal option election held pursuant to
this Chapter shall not operate as a pro-
hibition of the manufacturing, producing,

868

dicial District, W. C. Falkenheiner, Dist.
Atty. Seventh Judicial Dist. Sam L. Wells,
Dist. Atty. Eighth Judicial Dist., Edwin O.
Ware, Dist. Atty. Ninth Judicial Dist., Mel-
vin P. Barre, Dist. Atty. Twenty-ninth Ju-
dicial Dist., for plaintiff-appellee.

Hamlet D. May, Baton Rouge, amicus
curiae,

BARHAM, Justice.

This defendant was convicted of selling
beer in Ward 3 of Claiborne Parish in
violation of Ordinance No. 100 of the Clai-
borne Parish Police Jury passed January 6,
1943, and sentenced to pay a fine of $400.-
00 with a suspended jail sentence of four
months. During the trial court proceed-
ings two bills of exceptions were reversed,
one to the overruling of the motion to
quash and the other to the denial of the
motion in arrest of judgment. These two
bills have been perfected for this appeal,
and both present the same legal issue for
Is the parish ordinance
which prohibits the manufacture, sale, or

consideration :

consumption of beverages of an alcoholic
content greater than one-half of one per
cent by volume unconstitutional and inval-
id, especially when the state law, RS.
26 :588,1 provides that beverages containing
more than one-half of one per cent alcohol

using, distributing, storing, or selling of
beverages containing more than one-half
of one per cent alcohol by volume but
not more than three and two-tenths per
cent aleohol by weight.”

869

by volume and not more than 3,2 per cent
alcohol by weight cannot be prohibited?

Defendant argues that to allow the
parish to enforce an ordinance which is
contrary to state statute and policy of
statewide application, and which regulates
more broadly than allowed by state statute
(actually prohibits), results in a denial of
equal protection and due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 2, of the Lou-
isiana Constitution.

The conflict between Ordinance No. 100
of Claiborne Parish and the statute is
apparent. Generally police regulations of
a subdivision of the state cannot exceed the
grant of authority from the Legislature
and must fall when they conflict with
state law. See La.Const. of 1921 Art. XIV,
Sec. 40(d). Although this rule would ap-
pear to resolve our problem, the complex-
ity of the history and evolvement of the
statutory law in this particular field makes
the resolution of the problem somewhat
more complex.

RS. 26:588 is but one of a number of
provisions in the chapter of the Revised
Statutes of 1950, RS. 26:581-96, setting
out the local option law of this state. Un-
der this chapter wards and municipalities
are given the right to determine whether
alcoholic or intoxicating liquors may be
produced, used, or sold within their geo-

870°

Approval of a local op-
tion law requires a majority vote of the
residents of the area at an election called

graphical areas.

especially for that purpose.

The predecessor of R.S, 26:581-96 was.
Act No. 372 of 1948. Section 5 of that act.
contained a provision similar to R.S.
26:588 forbidding prohibition of beverages.
containing less than 3.2 per cent alcohol.
There was, however, a saving clause in:
Act No. 372, Section 17, which provided:
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed or-
have the effect of vitiating or affecting
any ordinance or statute previously adopt-
ed or enacted by any political sub-division
declaring illegal or forbidding the manu-
facturing, producing, rectifying, blending,
using, storing, distributing and selling of
beverages containing alcohol of more than
one-half of one per cent’ (Emphasis here-
and elsewhere supplied.) Since Ordinance-
No. 100 of the Claiborne Parish Police:
Jury was passed in 1943, Section 5 of Act:
372 of 1948 forbidding the prohibition of
beverages of less than 3.2 per cent alcohol
had no effect on that ordinance.

When the Revised Statutes of 1950 were
adopted, Act No. 372 of 1948 was specifi-
cally repealed by Section 2 of Act No. 2,
and some provisions of that local option.
law were enacted as part of the Revised.
Statutes (R.S. 26:581-96). This revision
did not include the adoption of the saving
clause, Section 17, of Act No. 372. When
local option ordinances were attacked as:

871

being contrary to the state law, RS.
26 :581-96, in some respects, this court con-
cluded that the local ordinances remained
in full force and effect under R.S. 1:16?
State v. Bradford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d
145 (1951); State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990,
60 So.2d 897 (1952); State v. Dunning,
224 La. 204, 69 So.2d 16 (1953); see also
112 Grocery v. Cappel, 228 $o.2d 157 (La.
App. 3rd Cir. 1969), writs refused, 255 La.
246, 230 So.2d 94 (1970).

In State v. Bradford, supra, this court
held that the prohibition ordinance of Sa-
bine Parish, carrying a $500.00 fine which
exceeded the maximum penalty of $100.00
fine and/or 30 days provided in the Re-
vised Statutes of 1950, had not been re-
pealed with their adoptions

In State v. Wilson, supra, the court cited
Bradford for the proposition that the gen-
eral saving clause, RS. 1:16, continued in
effect any ordinance adopted pursuant to
prior local option laws. The court so held,
although the particular saving clause, Sec-
tion 17 of Act No. 372 of 1948, had been

2. RS. 1:16 provides: “The Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes of 1950 shall be construed
as continuations of and as substitutes for
the laws or parts of laws which are ro-
vised and consolidated herein. The adop-
tion of these Revised Statutes shall not
affect the continued existence and opera-
tion, subject to the provisions hereof,
of any dcpartment, agency, or office

heretofore legally established or held, nor
any acts done, any funds established, any
rights acquired or accruing, any taxes
or other charges incurred or imposed, any

872,

repealed by and was omitted from the Re-
vised Statutes of 1950.

In State v. Dunning, supra, the defend-
ant conceded that the prohibition ordinance
adopted by the Beauregard Parish Police
Jury was valid insofar as it did not con-
flict with the Revised Statutes granting lo-
cal option authority, The defendant
argued, however, that that ordinance was
subject to limitation by the contrary provi-
sions of the Revised Statutes of 1950, so
that the maximum penalty which could be
assessed for violation of the local ordi-
nance should conform to and not exceed
the penalty provision of R.S. 26:595.
Again citing and relying upon State v.
Bradford, supra, this court reasoned that
the general saving clause of the Revised
Statutes permitted these ordinances which
contradicted and exceeded the state provi-
sions now in force concerning local option
referendums. There were two dissents in
Dunning, which appear to be based upon a
finding that resultant discriminatory prac-
tices constituted a denial of equal protec-

tion. However, that constitutional issue

penalties incurred or imposed, or any judi
cial proceedings had or commenced prior
to the effective date of these Revised Stat-
utes.”

3. In State v. Reed, 220 La. 720, 57 So.2d
418 (1952), this court cited State v. Brad-
ford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d 145 (1951),
as authority for recognizing the validity

ant Parish local option ordinance

ing the sale of intoxicating liquors
of more than 6 per cent alcoholic content.

873 Le 874

had not been raised and was not before the
scourt.

On 112 Grocery v. Cappel, supra, a man-
damus proceeding was brought to obtain an
alcoholic beverages retail license in a ward
*-of Rapides Parish which was dry under lo-

cal ordinance passed in 1937 pursuant to
local option referendum, The Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal reasoned that while
local areas could not now adopt ordinances
‘prohibiting the sale of beverages of alco-
holic content under 3.2 per cent (RS.
26:588; Randolph v. Village of Turkey
Creek, 240 La. 996, 126 So.2d 341, 1961),
under the rationale of the cases of the Su-
preme Court, pre-1948 ordinances contain-
ing this prohibition must still be valid.
‘That court recognized that such a holding
“permitted the anomalous result of a

patchwork of different local prohibitory
ordinances adopted several decades ago,
providing different penalties and of differ-
ent effect than those now authorized by
law”. This Third Circuit case is the only
case considering the effect of R.S. 26:588
‘on prohibitions against the sale of bever-
ages containing less than 3.2 per cent alco-
hol under the old elections ‘and ordinances;
and this court, although refusing certiorari,
appeared to be somewhat sympathetic to
4, Possibly the comment on the refusal of the
writ by this court indicates a degree of
sympathy with the problems that result
from continuing old local laws in the face
of contrary new state Jaws. ‘This court’s

comment reads: “The showing made does
not warrant the exercise of our jurisdic-

the Court of Appeal’s view as quoted.
above

Recognizing that under our jurispruden-
tial statutory interpretation local option
Ordinance No. 100 of Claiborne Parish is
still in effect, we move to the constitution-
al issues raised by this defendant, which
have never been considered by this court
before: Does the ordinance deprive this
defendant of his constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection?

The principle that there is no in-
herent right in a citizen to deal commer-
cially in intoxicating liquors is well recog-
nized. Rather, it is a privilege subject to
control by government under its police
power for the protection of the moral, so-
cial, and economic welfare of the public.
But regulation of this activity by govern-
mental bodies is no more without its limi-
tation than is the exercise of other govern-
mental functions under the police power.
Constitutional guarantees must be ob-
served, and there can be no exercise of po-
lice power which would require the relin-
quishment of constitutional rights. State
ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans, 113
La. 371, 36 So. 999 (1904); Schwegmann
Bros. v. Louisiana Board, etc., 216 La. 148,
43 So.2d 248 (1949); City of Baton Rouge

tion for review. Relator failed to attach
the application for permit to sell ‘8.2 beer’
to his petition and failed to allege the year
or time for which he requests that permit.
Relator seeks only a writ of mandamus
which will not issue under allegations
lacking such specificity.”

875

v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So.2d 239
(1954); Reynolds v. Louisiana Board of
Alcoholic Bev. Con., 248 La. 639, 181 So.2d
377 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 8, 87 S.
Ct, 58, 17 LEd.2d 7; Reynolds v. Louisi-
ana Board of Alcoholic Bev. Con, 249 La.
127, 185 So.2d 794 (1966), cert. denied, Re-
tail Liquor Dealers Ass'n of La. Inc. v.
Reynolds, 385 U.S. 946, 87 S.Ct. 318, 17 L.
Ed.2d 225,

The method for testing the validity of a
purported exercise of the police power has
been reiterated by this court in an adoption
or paraphrase of the following statement:

“The fixed rule and basic standard by
which the validity of all exercise of the
police power is tested is that the police
power of the state extends only to such
measures as are reasonable, and that all
police regulations must be reasonable under

all circumstances. * * *

“In every case it must appear that the
means adopted are reasonably necessary
and appropriate for the accomplishment of
a legitimate object within the domain of
the police power. A statute to be within
this power must also be reasonable in its
operation. upon the persons whom it af-
fects, must not be for the annoyance of a
particular class, and must not be unduly
oppressive. * * *

“* * %* Tn order to sustain legislative
interference by virtue of the police power,
either by a statute or a municipal ordi-
nance, it is necessary that the act should

876

have some reasonable relation to such ob-
jects, or, for more specific examples, to the
public welfare or public health. Moreover,
the law must tend toward the accomplish-
ment or promotion of such purposes in a:
degree that is perceptible and clear, either
in preventing some offense or manifest evil
or in furthering some such object. The
means employed should not go beyond the:
necessities of the case. .

“ck * % The legislature has no power;.
under the guise of police regulations, arbi-
trarily to invade the personal rights and
liberty of the individual citizen, to inter-
fere with private business or impose un-
usual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations, or to invade property:
rights.” 11 Am.Jur. Constitutional Law,
§§ 302 and 303, now found at 16 Am.Jur.2d
Constitutional Law, §§ 269, 277, 279, 280,
285, and 287.

While the state can delegate its po-
lice power, its subdivisions can exercise
this authority only within the limits of that
delegation of power and can never exceed
that delegation, Louisiana has delegated
to various of its subdivisions some of its
police power for the control of alcoholic
beverages. R.S. 26:494 permits the subdi-
visions of the state to “regulate but not
prohibit” the commerce of alcoholic bever-
ages except as provided in R.S. 26:581-96
(local option chapter) and by‘ ‘zoning.
Moreover, R.S. 26:494 says that no, gov-
ernmental subdivision shall, “in the exer~

877

ness of selling such beverages more than is
necessary for the protection of the public
‘health, morals, safety, and peace”.

In a number of cases this court has dealt
with problems which arose from this dele-
‘gation of power in determining whether
the
The factual circumstances of these cases

subdivision exceeded its authority.

cover a broad range of ideas and issues
with much contradiction in the reasoning
-and in the results reached in these various
-opinions.5 They are better explained and
understood when considered in light of the
time and the circumstances in which they

were decided. Jurisprudence in other

states as well as federal jurisprudence re-

‘5. ‘The court has held that an ordinance un-
der local option cannot enact evidentiary
tules as to prima facie evidence (City of
Shreveport v. Maroun, 184 La. 490, 64
So. 888, 1914; State v. Lassiter, 198 La.
742, 4 So.2d 814, 1941); that the local
ordinances cannot be broader in terms
than the provisions of the state statute
(City of Shreveport v. Knowles, 136 Ta.
‘770, 67 So. 824, 1915, defining a blind
tiger; City of Shreveport v. Taylor, 152
La. 299, 98 So. 101, 1922, declaring any
type of possession of aleoholic beverages
illegal; City of Pineville v. Tarver, 281
La, 446, 91 So.2d 597, 1956, declaring
possession of alcoholic beverages illegal ;
Randolph v. Village of Turkey Creek,
"240 La. 996, 126 So.2d 341, 1961, mak-
ing it unlawfnl to sell beverages with
less than 8.2 per cent alcohol). Yet cer-
tain variations from the state law were
condoned (City of De Ridder v. Mangano,
186 La. 129, 171 So. 826, 1986, upholding
-ordinanee which forbade employing of
females in barrooms or the use of musical
instruments; City of Baton Rouge v. Re-
bowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So.2d 239, 1954, ree-

cise of its police power, regulate the busi-

878

flects the same variations and anomalies.
This vacillation is a reflection of the
changes in mores according to time and
place.

Before the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion in 1919, there was no federal regula-
tion or prohibition of the states’ activities
in the field of alcohol control. The Loui-
siana Constitutions of 1812, 1845, 1852,
1861, 1864, and 1868 made no provisions
relating to the control of alcoholic liquors.
Article 170 of the Constitution of 1879 per-
mitted the “regulation” of the sale and use
of alcoholic and spirituous liquors, as did
Article 181 of the Constitutions of 1898

and 1913. These provisions were inter-
ognizing as valid an ordinance which de-
fined “closed” under the Sunday closing
law to mean locked, unlighted, and unoc-
cupied; City of Lafayette v. Blias, 282
La. 700, 95 So2d 281, 1957, finding
valid an ordinance which increased the
age of persons who could lawfully pur-
chase alcoholic beverages from 18 under
state law to 21). The court in Simmons
v. City of Shreveport, 221 La. 902, 60 So.
2d 867 (1952), held a local ordinance
to be a denial of equal protection of the
law when the city, under an ariendment
to its ordinance, attempted to “zone”
the areas where packaged liquors could be
sold at drug stores, so that a drug store
which had previously carried on such trade
could no longer do so. ‘The court in State
v. Trahan, 214 La. 100, 86 $0.2d 652
(1948), however, held that the state law
which forbade the sale of intoxicants,
on Sunday but provided an exception that,
allowed hotels and boarding houses to
serve wine for table use on Sunday was
not unreasonable discrimination ‘against
restaurants,

879

preted to permit the General Assembly to
control but not to prohibit these liquors.
State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans,
113 La, 371, 36 So. 999 (1904). Section
1211 and Section 2778 of the Revised Stat-
utes of 1870 provided that prohibition as
well as control of alcoholic liquors could be
had under local option referendum. From
1919 to 1933 absolute prohibition was the
constitutional law of the entire nation, and
our 1921 Constitution omitted any refer-
ence to alcohol control because the federal
constitution had preempted that field.
After the Eighteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was repealed by
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment
in 1933, our state returned by statute to the

6. Under the prohibition against discrimi-
nation based on sex in 42 U.8.0.A. §§
2000e-2 and 2000-8 and the proposed con-
stitutional amendment to give equal rights
to. women (House Joint Resolution 208
hhas passed in the U.S. Congress and has
been ratified by 10 states), it is certainly
unlikely that any court could agree with
the reasoning of City of De Ridder v. Man-
gano, 186 La. 129, 171 So. 826 (1936),
despite its tonguein-check cleverness.
That court said:

“There is nothing arbitrary or unrea-
sonable in either of the ordinances com-
plained of, ‘he presumption is that
the city council, in adopting these ordi-
nances, spoke for a majority of the in-
habitants of the city. If the ordinance
which bans music in barrooms banned
musie anywhere and everywhere in the
city, it would be very unreasonable,
Likewise, the ordinance which forbids
the employment of women in barrooms
would be unreasonable, and would dis-
eriminate against the women unjustly,
if it forbade the employment of women
in places where no harm or mischief

880
law that the Legislature could only regu-
late alcoholic beverages, and that prohibi-
tion could be had only under local referen-
dum. We do well in considering the fluc-
tuation of our jurisprudence to place it
against this historical background.

With this in mind, we must consider the
instant case undet today’s Constitution and
Jaws and in light of what the Legislature
and the people through these legal expres-
sions have declared to be such a contraven-
tion of the moral, social, and economic
welfare of the public in this field as to
permit the exercise of the government’s

police power.6 We must determine here

whether this local subdivision’s prohibition

might be the natural consequence. But,
to forbid the playing of music or the
employment of women in barrooms is,
obviously, a reasonable regulation of
these pleasure resorts. The purpose is -
to discourage the waste of time and
money there, and to avoid the hilarity
and disturbance which the combination
—wine, women and song—is so apt to
cause, At any rate, when the members
of a city council, with their knowledge
of local conditions, and in their ma-
ture wisdom—perhaps having neither
romance nor music in their souls—have
seen fit to leave off only the women
and song, that ought to end the matter
as far as the courts are concerned.
“Barmaids in this country are an in-
novation which may require some time to
become ingratiated with the habitués of
the barrooms as the successors of the
bartenders. Only a few weeks ago there
appeared in the daily press ‘throughout
the country, a dispatch from New York,
by Universal Service, announcing, under
big headlines, that the International
Barmen’s Association had declared a

881

of beverages of less than 3,2 per cent alco-
hholic content is a reasonable restriction
which can be imposed upon the rights of
this defendant, in contravention of a statu-
tory declaration of this state’s policy when
exercising its police power in the regula~
tion of alcoholic beverages. In other
words, we must decide whether this local

prohibition is necessary, appropriate, or
permissible for the accomplishment of a le-
gitimate, object of government within this
delegated. police power, and whether it af-
fords due, process and equal protection to
the defendant.

We have previously noted that the Unit-
‘ed States Constitution, Amendment 21, per-
‘mits state prohibition and regulation of li-
quor traffic; that such regulation and pro-
hibition are permitted when they are with-
in the ambit of protecting the morals, good
order, health, and safety of the people;
that although the state may delegate this
‘constitutional power, the state authority,
vested or delegated, cannot be excessive or
unjustified, and that when it is delegated,
the authority exercised by a subdivision of
the state cannot exceed the state’s grant of
‘power.

defensive war against barmaids—of
whom there were only 25 employed in
the whole city. The slogan, adopted
by the association and proclaimed to the
world, was ‘Liquor alone causes enough
trouble. Why add women? Some very
striking—and unselfish—reasons were

given by the association for the fear
that the employing of barmaids general-

882

We said in Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisi-
ana Board, etc., supra, that when the liquor
traffic is made lawful, as it always has
been in Louisiana except between 1919 and
1933 (i. @, not prohibited by state law),
any regulation of it must be pursuant to a
legitimate and reasonable exercise of the
police power which does not encroach upon
constitutional guarantees. Our Legisla-
ture, in its enactment of R.S. 26:588 which
forbids a prohibition of beverages of less
than 3.2 per cent alcohol even wnder local
option referendwins, announced in clear and
express terms that it’no longer considered
such beverages harmful to the morals,
good order, health, and safety of the public
to a degree that the state’s police power
need be or could be exercised to outlaw
them. R.S. 26:494 also declares the state’s
policy in this regard. It says the subdivi-
sions of this state “may regulate but not
prohibit” except by referendum vote as
provided in R.S. 26:581-96 (or by zoning),
thus by reference adopting the prohibition
of R.S. 26:588 against outlawing beverages
of less than 3,2 per cent atcohol. If the
state has so clearly pronounced this limita-
tion as its public policy, has delineated the

ly in this country might become very
mischievous. It is sufficient that the
fear of such mischief is a reasonable
fear, to make a statute or an ordinance
which seeks to prevent the mischief a
constitutional statute or oréinance.”
See also Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Bd, 163 (1948),
and Anno. 172 A.L.R. 620.

883

maximum regulation necessary for the pro-
tection of its people’s welfare in the con-
trol of alcoholic beverages, and has found
it unnecessary to prohibit beverages of low
alcoholic content, it should be a natural
consequence that a local subdivision’s pro-
hibition of these beverages is unreasonable,
unnecessary, inappropriate, and impermissi-
ble under the limited delegation of the
state’s police power. When the Legislature
of a state has removed beverages of less
than 3.2 per cent alcohol from the claésifi-
cation of intoxicants categorized for possi-
ble prohibition for the protection of the

public, it is unreasonable to allow a state
subdivision to contravene its source of

power.

In State ex rel. Galle v. City of New
Orleans, supra, we said that when the state
legalizes the business of selling alcoholic
beverages, the distinctions of place and
conditions under which individuals may en-
gage in that business must be founded in
reason under its police power, for these
distinctions may deprive one citizen of the
right to earn his livelihood by a lawful
calling while they accord that right to an-
other, If legal reason does not maintain
the deny
equal protection of the law and due proc-

distinctions, such regulations

ess.

‘The constitutional right of equal pro-
tection under the law is violated when
unreasonable classification in law grants to
some what others are denied or denies to

884.

some what others are granted, To be con~
stitutional the classification must be rea~
sonable and must have a rational, reason--
able relationship to, and tend to accom--
plish, the object of the legislation which
has determined that some citizens will be
treated differently from others under the:
law. Considering the declaration of state:
policy on the limitation of -prohibition of

‘alcoholic beverages, ‘local regulations i

this field under delegated -police power can
meet the constitutional requirement of
equal protection only if. they are autho--
rized, reasonable, necessary, and appropri--
ate. 7

In the matter before us the classification’
of those who cannot sell and buy—traffic
in—alcoholic beverages under 3.2 per cent
consists of those who—or more likely,
those whose ancestors—called a local op--
tion election before 1948. The classifica
tion of those who must permit the traffic
in beverages of this low-alcohol content is.
of those in a local subdivision where the
right of local option was not exercised be-
fore 1948. What possible benefit flows to-
the state, the public, or the individual to
have these classifications determine where’
and whether beverages of less than 3.2 per’
cent alcohol can be prohibited?

Certainly these classifications have
no reasonable basis for promoting the
health and welfare of the general public,
nor can it be seriously proposed that the
persons in these two particular classifica-

885

tions need different protections for the
safeguard of their welfare. Whether to
prohibit or not to prohibit must be based
upon a determination of what the public
welfare demands, what the state’s police
‘power will permit, what will afford equal
protection to all in the same class. Here,
‘the only criterion for that determination
was the year a particular local population,
not now the same constituency, decided to
call a local option referendum. In the face
of the state’s making this commerce lawful
and its public policy statement against pro-
hibition in this particular area (under 3.2
alcoholic beverages), these classifications
founded upon that criterion alone serve no
reasonable purpose for, and have no rela-
tionship to, the protection of the general
welfare.

State policy for the exercise of its
be exceeded or
contravened by local ordinances, and the
state cannot allow local ordinances to deny

police power cannot

equal protection under the law by classify-
ing unreasonably for an unreasonable pur-
pose the citizens of this state. Although
legislation, local as well as state, is pre-
sumed constitutional, when the courts,
which are guardians against legislative in-
fringement upon constitutional rights find
such an infringement, they must act. Judi-
cial restraint in anticipation of legislative
7. The question of whether local penal pro-

visions are excessive or repugnant to state
Jaw is not before the court.

886

cure cannot be exercised when there is a
clear legislative encroachment upon consti-
tutional guarantees, nor can an unconstitu-
tional statute or ordinance be maintained
simply because it is longstanding or even
ancient.

We do not hold that all local op-
tion elections and local ordinances passed
pursuant thereto which were effectuated
before 1950 and which are not in accord
with the Revised Statutes of 1950 are null
and of no effect. We hold only that those
local option elections and those ordinances
passed thereunder cannot be repugnant to
or in contravention of R.S. 26:494 and R.
S. 26:588.7 Insofar as the Bradford, Wit-
son, Dunning, and 112 Grocery decisions
conflict with this holding, they are modi-
fied.

Insofar as Claiborné Parish Ordinance
No. 100 of 1943 prohibits the business of
producing, manufacturing,. rectifying, us-
ing, distributing, storing, or consuming of
beverages of an alcoholic content of less
than 3.2 per cent by weight, it is un-
constitutional.*

For the reasons assigned, the bill of in-
formation is quashed, the conviction and
sentence are set aside, and the defendant is
ordered discharged.

McCALEB, J., concurs in the result.

8 Soc State of Louisiana v. Willis, 263 La.
904, 269 So.2d 808, and State of Louisiana .
v. Gantt, 263 La. 907, 269 $0.24 809, both :
decided this day.

887
. SANDERS, J., dissents.

SUMMERS, J,, dissents for the reasons
aésigned by SANDERS, J.

SANDERS, Justice (dissenting).

Prior to 1948, the Claiborne Parish Po-
lice Jury enacted ordinances prohibiting

the sale of alcoholic beverages of an alco- °

holic content greater than one-half percent
in designated wards. These ordinances
were based upon elections as to the sale of
alcoholic beverages, in which the will of
the people was determined by popular vote.

In compliance with a uniform line of de-
cisions, the majority correctly holds that
these ordinances have not been repealed by
subsequent state statutes. See State v.
Bradford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d 145 (1951) ;
State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So.2d 897
(1952); State v. Dunning, 224 La, 204, 69
So.2d 16 (1953); 112 Grocery v. Cappel,
228 So.2d 157 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969),
writs refused, 255 La. 246, 230 So.2d 94
(1970).

The majority then holds that these ordi-
mances are unconstitutional, because they
deprive the defendants of due process and
equal protection. Although the opinion is
not altogether clear, the holding seems to
be based upon the notion that, because of a
1. The opinion notes that former decisions

must be considered “in light of the time

and circumstances in which they were
decided” but that the instant case must

888:
change in the attitudes of the people, the
ordinances prohibiting the sale of bever-
ages of low-alcoholic content have become:
an unreasonable restriction in the various
parishes where they have been adopted.
The majority finds no supportable distine~
tion between the subdivisions where these
ordinances apply and ‘where they do not.
Hence, it concludes that the classification
js unreasonable and denies equal protection
of the law. I disagree.

A statute or ordinance is presumed to be
The burden of establishing
unconstitutionality rests upon the party
who attacks it, Thus, one who complains

constitutional.

of the classification or territorial scope of
a statute must establish that the classifica~
tion or scope has no rational basis. To in-
validate the statute, the record must show
that no fair reason supports the legislative
judgment. State v, Rones, 223 La. 839, 67
So.2d 99; State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173°
So.2d 192; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 LEd2d 1485; Lindsley
y. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,
31 S.Ct. 337, 55 LEd. 369; 16 Am.Jur.2d,
Constitutional Law § 172, p. 390, § 174, pp-
394-399.

In the present case, the record contains
no evidence at all concerning the relevant
conditions and needs of the parish and
wards where these ordinances apply. See

be considered “under today’s Constitution

and laws” and in the light of current
conditions.

889 | 890

McGowan vy. State of Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, With-

out proof, this Court cannot assume the.

absence of differences. Fort Smith L. &
T. Co, v. Board of Imp. of Paving Dist.,
274 U.S. 387, 47 S.Ct. 595, 71 L.Ed. 1112.

The rich diversities in the people and
culture of Louisiana are matters of com-
mon knowledge. Many of these are deeply
rooted in history. The expression of these
differences in local ordinances does’ not
render the ordinances unreasonable or dis-
criminatory.

In upholding a trespass statute applicable
to only one parish in State v. Guidry, 247
La. 631, 173 So.2d 192 (1964), we set forth
the constitutional doctrine that controls the
present case:

“The equal protection clause relates to
equality between persons as such, rather
than between areas. Clearly, the guar-
anty of equal protection is not a demand
that all state laws operate from bounda-
ry to boundary. It compels no state to

adopt an iron rule of territorial uniform-—

ity for legislation. In the enactment of
Jaws, the Legislature may consider the
‘needs and desires’ of the various sec-
tions of the state without infringing
equal protection.

“In State of Missouri (Bowman) v.
Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 25 L.Ed. 989, the
Supreme Court of the United States
stated:

“The 14th Amendment does not pro-
fess to secure to all persons in the United
States the benefit of the same laws and
the same remedies. Great diversities in
these respects may exist in two States
separated only by an imaginary line.
* * % Tf diversities of laws and judi-
cial proceedings may exist in the several
States without violating the equality
clause in the 14th Amendment, there is
no solid reason why there may not be
such diversities in different parts of the
same State. A uniformity which is not
essential as regards different States can-
not be essential as regards different
parts of a State, provided that in each
and all there is no infraction of the con-
stitutional provision. Diversities which
are allowable in different States are al-
lowable in different parts of the same
State”

“In Fort Smith L. & T. Co. v. Board

.of Imp. of Paving Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 47

S.Ct. 595, 71 L.Ed. 1112, the Supreme
Court again stated:

“ex ok ok The Fourteenth Amend-

ment does not prohibit legislation mere-
ly because it is special, or limited in its
application to a particular geographical
or political subdivision of the state’ ”
“See also Ocampo v. United States, 234

US. 91, 34 S.Ct. 712, 58 L.Ed. 1231;
Gardner v. People of The State of Mich-

“gan, 199 U.S. 325, 26 S.Ct. 106, 50 L.

‘891
Ed. 212; Hayes v. State of Missouri,
120 U.S. 68, 7 S.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578;
State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Or-
‘leans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 ALL.
R. 260; and 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitution-
al Law, § 510, pp. 893-895.”

If these ordinances are obsolete, correc-
“tion lies in legislation, not in judicial fiat
-overriding both the legislative body and
Yhe will of the people as expressed in a
free election. In my opinion, the present
decision invades the province of the legis-
‘ative branch of government.

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully
sdissent.

ON REHEARING

‘SUMMERS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction for
‘violating Ordinance No. 100 of Claiborne
Parish prohibiting, inter alia, the selling
of beer of an alcoholic content greater than
one-half of one percent by volume within
‘Ward Three. The validity of the ordi-
nance was assailed by a motion to quash
and a motion in arrest of judgment, both
of which were denied. Bills of excep-
tions were reserved.

The question is whether the ordinance
denies the accused equal protection of the
laws contrary to the guarantees of Article
J, Section 2, of the Louisiana Constitution
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.

892

When the Eighteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was adopted
prohibiting the use of intoxicating liquors
throughout the Nation, all State laws on
the subject were, for all practical purposes,
nullified, the Federal Constitution having
pre-empted the field. In 1933 the Twenty-
First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment and reinvested authority in
the States to regulate intoxicating liquors.
Whereupon, Louisiana enacted laws regu-
lating alcoholic beverages. Act 17 of 1935
was part of this legislation. It is a local
option law, granting to parishes, wards, or
municipalities the right, by an election held
for the purpose, to determine that the busi-
ness of selling alcoholic or intoxicating
liquors shall not be licensed or permitted
within its territory.

Pursuant to this legislative authority, an
election was held in Claiborne Parish. The
election carried the proposition that bever-
ages containing more than one-half of one
percent alcohol should be outlawed. There-
fore, on January 6, 1943, Ordinance No.
100, a “dry law”, was adopted declaring,
in pertinent part, it to be unlawful for
any person to sell beer of an alcoholic
content containing more than one-half of
one percentum by volume.

Subsequently, Act 372 of 1948 was en-
acted providing that local ordinances
could not thereafter prohibit the sale of
beverages containing more than one-half
of one percent alcohol by volume, but not

893

more than 3.2 percent alcohol by weight.
This Act, however, contained a savings
clause which read:

Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued or have the effect of vitiating or
affecting any ordinance or statute pre-
viously adopted or enacted by any politi-
cal sub-division declaring illegal or for-
bidding the manufacturing, producing,
rectifying, blending, using, storing, dis-
tributing and selling of beverages con-
taining alcohol of more than one-half of
one per cent.

The substance of the 1948 Act, without
the quoted savings clause, ‘was thereafter
incorporated into the Revised Statutes of
1950 as Sections 581 through 596 of Title
26. Section 588 provides:

Prohibition of the sale of any or all
alcoholic beverages by a local option elec-
tion held pursuant to this Chapter shall
not operate as a prohibition of the manu-
facturing, producing, using, distributing,
storing, or selling of beverages contain-
ing more than one-half of one per cent
alcohol by volume but not more than
three and two-tenths per cent alcohol by
weight.

In a number of cases in this Court and
in our courts of appeal it has been held
that the enactment of Sections 581 through
596 into the Revised Statutes, without in-
corporating the savings clause of Act 372
of 1948, did not have the effect of vitiating

894

dry ordinances adopted under the authority
of the 1935 Act, State v. Dunning, 224 La.
204, 69 So.2d 16 (1953); State v. Wilson,
221 La. 990, 60 So.2d 897 (1952); State v.
Bradford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d 145 (1951);
112 Grocery v. Cappel, 228 So.2d 157 (La.
App.1969) cert. denied, 255 La, 246, 230:
So.2d 94; Melton y. Winn Parish Police
Jury, 228 So.2d 58 (La.App.1969) cert. de-
nied, 255 La. 153, 229 So.2d 734. These:
holdings are supported by Section 16 of
Title 1 of the Revised Statutes. That sec
tion enacts a rule of construction declaring’
that the Revised Statutes “shall be con-
strued as continuations of and as substi-
tates for the laws or parts of laws which
The.
section mandates that the adoption of the
Revised Statutes shall not affect, among

are revised or consolidated herein.”

other, any rights acquired prior to the cf-
fective date.

Notwithstanding that since the 1948 Act.
and its inclusion in Section 588 the cases
have upheld the validity of local option
ordinances previously enacted under au-
thority of the 1935 Act, it is contended that
the constitutionality of those ordinances
has never been tested against the claim
that they violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the State and Federal Consti-
tutions. The equal protection argument is
founded upon the rationale that it is an
unequal application of laws to permit some
parishes, wards or municipalities to ad-
here to local option dry laws when the

895

State’s policy enunciated in Section 588 is
that beverages containing less than 3.2 per-
cent alcohol cannot be outlawed. For one
thing, it is said, those living’ within the
geographical area affected by the ordi-
nances may not engage in the business of
selling intoxicating liquors, an avocation
permitted elsewhere in the State.

For this contention to be sustained two
propositions ‘must be established: First, a
finding must be made that the State’s policy
is expressed in Section 588 and, therefore,
it is a contravention of State ‘policy for
ordinances to outlaw beverages of less than
3.2 percent alcohol, And, secondly, it must
be shown that the dry laws result in‘an
unreasonable classification which works ‘a
denial of equal protection of the laws.*”'”

HB First, it may be true that the State’s
policy is expressed in Section 588 to the
effect that beverages of less than 3.2 per-
cent alcohol may not be outlawed. But this
is only part of the State’s policy. At the
same time Act 372 of 1948 (the predecessor
of Section 588) was enacted declaring that
beverages of less than 3.2 percent alcohol
could not be prohibited, it was emphatically
stated in the savings clause of that same
act that it did not have the effect of vitiat-
ing or affecting any ordinance or statute
previously adopted declaring illegal the

selling of beverages of more than one-half
of one percent. That is to say, the sav-
ings clause created an exception to the
general policy expressed in the Act of 1948,

896
and this exception was as much a part of
the State’s public policy as any other part
of the act. And when the 1948 Act was
continued in the Revised Statutes as Sec-
tion 588, the exception remained valid un-
der repeated decisions of this Court. The
exception remains valid today as a viable
expression of the State’s public policy,
standing with equal dignity alongside the
State’s policy of not permitting dry laws
after 1948. a

, HM As to the contention that per-
mitting isolated areas to maintain dry laws
results in a denial of equal protection, the
answer is that laws are not rendered vio-
lative of equal protection guarantees be-
cause they operate only in certain geo-
graphical areas, We answered this’ ques-
tion in State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173
So.2d 192 (1965), by saying:

‘The equal protection clause relates to
equality between persons as such, rather
than between areas, Clearly, the guar-
antee of equal protection is not a demand
that all state laws operate from boundary
to boundary. It compels ‘no state to
adopt an iron rule of territorial uniform-
ity for legislation. In the enactment of
laws, the Legislature may consider the
“needs and desires” of the various sec-
tions of the state without infringing

equal protection.

There is a rational basis for the excep-
tion to Section 588, It is found in the legis-

897

lative recognition of the differing desires
and needs of the people. These desires
and needs were encouraged and authorized
by the enactment of the local option statute
of 1935. The desires and needs were mani-
fested by those areas where local option
ordinances. were voted upon by the people.
In areas where local option was not exer-
cised, the need was not manifest. The
authority for future local ordinances pro-
hibiting beverages containing less than 3.2
percent alcohol was withdrawn by the 1948
Act and its successor, Section 588. The
local option ordinances previously adopted
have been excepted from the Section 588
restraint. The exception is further recog-
nition of the local needs and desires of a
geographical area which the public policy
of the State sanctions. .

"TE There is no constitutional require-
ment that the rich diversity of customs and
mores of our people must be abolished.
And it does not offend constitutional equal
protection rights to permit ordinances
which preserve those customs and mores.
Without evidence that these ordinances
are based upon an unreasonable classifica-
tion, there is no basis for invalidating them.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81
S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Fort
Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Paving
Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 47 S.Ct. 595, 71 L.Ed.
1112 (1927).

It would be

principles of law to declare these ordi-
a

inconsistent with sound

898

nances unreasonable and based upon an in-
vidious classification simply because they
were enacted almost thirty years ago be-
fore the majority of the presently affected
population were able to express themselves
at the polls. Those who live in Claiborne
Parish today have the power, by ordinary
legislative process, to abolish Ordinance
No. 100 if they find it incompatible with
their life style today. We will leave the
question to them. ,

For the reasons assigned, the judgment
and decree heretofore rendered is reversed
and set aside, and the judgment of the trial
court reinstated. The conviction and sen-
tence are affirmed.

DIXON, J., dissents,
ON REHEARING’

TATE, Justice (dissenting).

I do not reach the constitutional issue,
for I believe that legislation of our state
presently in effect invalidates the local pro-
hibition ordinance under which this con-
viction was had.

In 1943, Ward 3 of Claiborne Parish
voted dry by popular referendum. Pursu-
ant thereto, Ordinance # 100 was adopted
by the parish police jury. This prohibited
the sale of beer of an alcoholic content
greater than one-half of one percent by
volume.

This 1943 ordinance was adopted as au-
thorized by a 1935 state law. This 1935

898 . a 900

act was repealed by Act 372 of 1948, which
is codified as La.R.S. 26:581-595. Section
5 of the 1948 act, codified as 26:588 (1950),
provides:

“Prohibition of the sale of any or all
alcoholic beverages by a local option elec-
tion held pursuant to this Chapter shall not
operate as a prohibition of the manufactur-
ing, producing, using, distributing, storing,
or selling of beverages containing more
than one-half of one percent alcohol by
volume but not more than three and two-
tenths percent alcohol by weight.” (Italics
mine.)

Thus, the Claiborne ordinance prohibit-
ing the sale of beer of an alcoholic content
greater than 14% is contrary to (and in-
valid to that extent) the present state en-
actment, which provides that local ordi-
nances “shall not operate as a prohibition
of . . . selling of beverages contain-
ing . . . not more than three and
two-tenths percent [3.2%] weight”.

The 1948 act did contain a savings clause
expressly providing that the 1948 statute
did not invalidate local ordinances prohib-
iting the sale of beverages between 5%
and 3.2% alcoholic content. However,
Section 17 was repealed when the 1948
statute was codified into the 1950 Revised
Statutes, (Act 372 of 1948 was expressly
repealed by Section 2 of Act 2 of the Ex-
traordinary Session of 1950, which enacted
the Revised Statutes.)

Under interpretative principles generally
held applicable, where the text of a former
law was changed when it was incorporated
into, the Revised Statutes, and the present
revised provision is clear and unambigu-
ous, the unambiguous text of the Revised
Statutes should be interpreted according to
its clear meaning, without reference to the
prior law—that is, the provision is held to
be changed rather than to have merely
clarified or codified former law. Bel v.
Van Kuren, 236 La. 23, 106 So.2d 703
(1958); City of Alexandria vy. LaCombe,
220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952); Note,
15 Louisiana Law Review 472 (1955). See
also La.R.S. 1:4 (1950).

This reasoning is to some extent incon-
sistent with that of this court in State v.
Dunning, 224 La. 204, 69 So.2d 16 (1953),
State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So.2d 897
(1952), and State v. Bradford, 220 La. 176,
56 So.2d 145 (1951), where the present pre-
cise question was not at issue. To that ex-
tent, these decisions should be overruled,
insofar as not distinguishable.

In repealing the savings clause, the 1950
legislature may well have sought to void
the present anomalous situation: Over our
state is spread a patchwork of different
Jocal prohibitory ordinances adopted sev-
eral decades ago, providing different penal-
ties and of different effect than those
which are now authorized by our state law.

Further, we have held that the effect
of the local prohibition may not be re-

901

moved except by a vote of the public of
the particular land territory formerly ef-
fected, even though a portion of this dry
territory is subsequently included in a dif-
ferent territorial subdivision which has not
adopted a prohibition ordinance. Blanch-
ard v. Gauthier, 248 La. 1107, 184 So.2d
531 (1966).4 The result is that there is no
really practical method to call an election
to remove a decades-old restriction from
land territory belonging to the ancient
boundaries of former governmental units,
now dissolved, merged, or much-changed,
no longer having voting registrations or
precincts limited to include voters only of
the ancient and no longer existing unit
which voted dry between 1935 and 1948,

For these reasons, I respectfully dis-
sent.

ON REHEARING.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent and assign as my reasons the
constitutional ground set forth in the opin-
ion on original hearing. However, I also
agree with Mr. Justice Tate’s dissent on
rehearing that we could pretermit the con-
stitutional issue, and if we did, we would

1. To overcome the effect of this decision,
which applied to Baton Rougo, the legis-
lation enacted La.R.S. 25:582.1 (Act 208
of 1968), which provided when a dry por-
tion of a ward or municipality is annexed
or made part of another governmental unit
containing one hundred thousand popula-
tion or more then the annexed portion

902

be required to declare these pre-1948 local
option ordinance invalid because, as he
correctly and cogently states, the former
jurisprudence incorrectly held them valid
under an erroneous statutory interpretation
that a general saving clause in the Revised
Statutes of 1950 retained them in effect.
I purposely did not pretermit the consti-
tutional issue on original hearing, correct-
ly surmising when I penned the original
opinion, that the majority of this court
would not overrule the former jurispru-
Therefore I went directly to the
valid and basic ground urged by defend-
ant which had not been previously en-

dence.

cumbered with jurisprudential interpreta-
tion, While I am firmly convinced of the
soundness of the original opinion on the
finding of a denial of the constitutional
right of equal protection and prefer to
stand on that ground, I would lend further
support to the result which should obtain
by adding these comments to Mr. Justice
Tate’s dissenting opinion in regard to the
earlier erroneous statutory interpretation in
this area.

In my concurring opinion in Carter v.
Moore, 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813'(1971),
I stated that the jurisprudence upon the is-

should take on the legal sales character-
istic of the latter subdivision. By House
Concurrent Resolution No. 25 adopted in
Extraordinary 1968 Session, this act was
suspended in effect. Even if in effect, the
enactment does not apply to annexations
or mergers of lesser populated areas.

903

sue théré involved was “built upon a tenu-
ous and -untenablé foundation and is in-
versely pyramided’. That expresses my
opinion of the jurisprudence of State v.
Bradford, 220 La. 176, 56 So.2d 145 (1951) ;
State v. Wilson, 221 La. 990, 60 So.2d 897
(1952); State v. Dunning, 224 La. 204, 69
So.2d 16 (1953). A perusal of the Brad-
ford record in this case shows that the
conviction there was prior to the effective
date of the Revised Statutes of 1950. I
fail to understand why the court there
interpreted the 1950 Revised Statutes and
applied them to a conviction before that
legislation became effective. The cases
which follow Bradford cite and rely upon
its erroneous rationale to hold that when
the 1950 Revised Statutes were adopted,
the general saving clause of that act pre-
sérved the saving clause in Section 17 of
Act 372 of 1948 (local option law) although
Section 17 was specifically repealed in the
1950 enactment. The Revised Statutes of
1950 are the law of this state, and juris-
prudence which misinterpreted a part of
those statutes is not the law, The Civil
Code pronounces in Article 1: “Law is a
solemn expression ' of legislative will.”
(Emphasis supplied.) When the saving
clause of Section 17 of Act 372 of 1948 was
repealed by the enactment of the Revised
Statutes of 1950, all local option ordinances
forbidding the sale of 3.2 beer became null
and void under R.S. 26:588.

tate
904

For the reasons assigned on original’
hearing, those here assigned, and those as-
signed in Mr. Justice Tate’s disserit, I
respectfully dissent.

269 So.2d 808

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Mary ELLIS.
No. 51989.

May 1, 1972.
On Rehearing Nov. 6, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1972.

—+——

R. Harmon Drew, Minden, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Jack
P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen, Harry H.
Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hal R. Hender-
son, John A. Richardson, Regan D. Mad-
den, Dist. Attys, E. Rudolph McIntyre,
Dist, Atty. Fifth Judicial Dist. W. C. Falk-
enheiner, Dist. Atty. Seventh Judicial Dist.,
Sam L, Wells, Dist. Atty. Eighth Judicial

905

Dist., Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty. Ninth
Judicial Dist., Melvin P. Barre, Dist. Atty.
Twénty-ninth Judicial Dist., for plaintiff-
appellee.

Hamlet D. May, amicus curiae.

BARHAM, Justice.

Mary Ellis, charged with selling beer in
Ward 3 of Claiborne Parish in violation of
Ordinance No. 100 of that parish passed
January 6, 1943, was convicted and sen-
tenced to pay a fine of $400.00, with a
suspended jail sentence of four months.
On this appeal she relies tipon bills of ex-
ceptions taken to the overruling of her
motion to quash and motion in arrest of
judgment.

This case raises the identical issue of
unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 100 of
Claiborne Parish as was presented and de-
cided in State of Louisiana v. Beene, 263
La. 865, 269 So.2d 794, this day handed
down. Our reasoning and conclusions in
the Beene case are applicable here. See
also State of Louisiana v. Gantt, 263 La.
907, 269 So.2d 809, this day decided.

For the reasons stated, the bill of in-
formation is ordered quashed, the convic-
tion and sentence are set aside, and the
defendant is ordered discharged.

McCALEB, C. J., concurs in the result,

906
SANDERS, J., dissents for the reasons

assigned in State v, Beene, 263 La. 865,
269 So.2d 794,

SUMMERS, J., dissents for the reasons
assigned by Mr. Justice Sanders in State
vy. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794,

ON REHEARING
SUMMERS, Justice.

For the reasons assigned in State of
Louisiana v. Evelyn Beene, 263 La. 865, 269
So.2d 794 in which judgment was rendered -
this day, the judgment and decree hereto-
fore rendered is reversed and set aside,
and the judgment of the trial court is re-,
instated. The conviction and sentence are
affirmed. : ,

BARDEN, J., dissents and assigns rea-.
sons.

TATE, J., dissents for the reasons | as-.
signed in the companion Beene case.

DIXON, J., dissents.

On Rehearing

BARHAM, Justice, Dissenting.

See my dissent on rehearing in State
v. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794 this
day decided,

907

269 So.2d 809

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Mildred GANTT.
No. 51990.

May 1, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Dee. 11, 1972.

R. Harmon Drew, Minden, for defendant-
appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gon. Jack
P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen, Harry H.
Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hal R. Hen-
derson, John A. Richardson, and Regan D.
Madden, Dist. Attys. E. Rudolph MclIn-
tyre, Dist, Atty. Fifth Judicial Dist., W. C.
Fatkenheiner, Dist. Atty. Seventh Judicial
Dist., Sam L. Wells, Dist. Atty. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist Edwin O. Ware, Dist. Atty.
Ninth Judicial Dist. Melvin P. Barre, Dist.
Atty, Twenty-ninth Judicial Dist,, for plain-
tiff-appellee.

Hamlet D. MAY, amicus curiac.

BARIIAM, Justice.

The defendant Mildred Gantt
charged with selling beer in Ward 5 of
Claiborne Parish in violation of an or-
dinance of that parish of November 5,
1941, prohibiting the sale or keeping for

was

908

sale of alcoholic beverages having a con-
tent of more than one-half of one per
cent alcohol by volume. Upon conviction
she was sentenced to serve four months
in the parish jail and to pay a fine of
$400.00. She has appealed.

Bills of exceptions taken to the denial
of a motion to quash and a motion in
arrest of judgment present the same con-
stitutional issue decided by us in State of
Louisiana v. Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d
794, handed down today; and what we
have said in Beene is equally applicable to
this case. See also State of Louisiana v.
Ellis, 263 La. 904, 269 So.2d 808, this day
decided. Accordingly Claiborne Parish or-
dinance of November 5, 1941, is hereby de-
clared unconstitutional insofar as it applies
to alcoholic beverages of less than 3.2 per
cent alcohol.

For the reasons stated, the bill of in-
formation is ordered quashed, the convic-
tion and sentence are set aside, and the
defendant is ordered discharged.

McCALEB, C. J., concurs in the result.

SANDERS, J, dissents for the reasons
assigned in State v. Becnc, 263 La. 865,
269 So.2d 794.

SUMMERS, J., dissents for the rea-
sons assigned in the dissent of Mr. Justice
Sanders in State v. Becne, 263 La. 865,
269 So.2d 794,

909 |

ON REHEARING

SUMMERS, Justice.

For the reasons assigned in State of
Louisiana vy, Evelyn Beene, 263 La. 865,
269 So.2d 794, on the docket of this Court,
in which judgment was rendered this day,
the judgment and decrce heretofore ren-
dered is reversed and set aside, and the
judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
The conviction and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns rea-
sons.

TATE, J., dissents for the reasons as-
signed in the companion Beene case.
DIXON, J., dissents.
On Rehearing
BAREIAM, Justice (dissenting).

See my dissent on rehearing in State v.
Beene, 263 La. 865, 269 So.2d 794, this day

decided.

269 So.2d 810

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Franklin D. JONES.

No. 52432.
Nov. 28, 1972.

OL

E. M. Nichols, Alvin B. King, Lake
Charles, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Warren.
E. Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T.
Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Charles W. Richard,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Franklin D. Jones, appeals
from his conviction of murder without capi-
tal punishment, La.R.S. 14:30 and sentence
to life imprisonment in the State Penitenti-
ary, During his trial, defendant reserved
and perfected six bills of exceptions.

‘The defendant who had been separated
from his wife, stopped by the Shinette resi-
dence, that of his in-laws, presumably to
pick up his children who had been living
with their grandparents since the defend-

912

ant’s wife had been committed to the State
Hospital at Pineville. There he confronted
Mr. and Mrs. Norah Shinette who refused
to give up the children. Mr. Norah Shin-
ette, whom the defendant is accused of hav-
ing killed, was heatd to have told the de-
fendant to get a lawyer and come back
another day. At this point, the defendant
proceeded to his car, opened the trunk and
took out a pistol, and, against the advice
of a friend, started back to the Shinette
house with the pistol The defendant’s
friend became alarmed and drove off, testi-
fying however, that he heard a shot.

| | Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was taken
when the trial court sustained the objection
of the State which prohibited questioning
Mrs. Norah Shinette, wife of the deceased,
on cross-examination, as to whether or not
she and her husband were receiving welfare
benefits for the support of the defendant’s
children. Defense counsel argues the pur-
pose of this question was to show the state
of mind of the decedent, and his reluctance
to surrendering the children, thus, cor-
roborating the defendant’s plea of self-

defense.

The trial court’s per curiam character-
ized these questions irrelevant and immate-
rial saying he could see no connection be-
tween the receipt of welfare benefits by
the victim and his wife and the trial of the
defendant for his charge of murder.

913 Ce 914

We are in accord with the trial court’s 269 $0.24 812

ruling to Bill of Exceptions No. 1, in stop- STATE of Louisiana .

ve
Shelton RANKER.

ping the defense in its cross-examination on
this irrelevant matter. La.R.S. 15:494;
see also State v. Burch, 261 La. 3, 258 So.2d
851 (1972). Bill No. 1 is without merit. No, 52488.

Hl ®y Bill of Exceptions No. 6, the de-
fendant contends the trial court erred in

Nov. 28, 1972,

refusing to allow defense counsel to pose
questions to employees of the Louisiana
State Department of Public Welfare per-
taining to the purpose of an alleged visit
to the Department offices by the defendant.
As in Bill No, 1, defense alleges this in-
formation was important in support of the
defendant's plea of self-defense.

‘We are, however, in accord with the
trial judge’s per curiam wherein he explain-
ed the sustained prosecutor’s objection on
the grounds that the questions were irrele-
vant and immaterial. This bill is without
merit.

No assignment of error is raised by brief
on appeal as to the trial court’s rulings on
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 which
were reserved by the defendant when the
State introduced various photographs,
charts and pieces of a gun and cartridges
found at the home of the deceased; nor do
we find any error in such rulings.

For these reasons, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

DIXON, J., dissents.

Allen C. Hope, Jr., Orleans Indigent De-
fender Program, New Orleans, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garri-
son, Dist. Atty, Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Shelton Ranker, appeals his
conviction and fifteen year sentence for
armed robbery of a newspaper carrier in
the amount of twenty dollars. La.R.S, 14:
64, Defendant perfected seven bills of ex-
ceptions. However, defense counsel ex-
pressly waives Bills of Exceptions Nos, 2
and 3, and submits Bills Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7
without briefing or argument.

Hf Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is based
on the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress the identification of the defend-
ant. It was brought out at the trial that

916

the defendant was positively identified by
four newscarriers, all victims of alleged
offenses of armed robbery, after separate
and isolated views of Ranker in the lineup.
Mr. Jones, defendant’s attorney at the line-
up testified that he was satisfied the lineup
was a legal one. We do not find any viola-
tion of the defendant’s constitutional or
legal rights in this regard, This bill has no
merit.

HI Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was tak-
en to the trial court’s refusal to order the
State to furnish the defendant with both a
complete copy of the District Attorney’s
file and any supplemental information or
evidence of an inculpatory or exculpatory
nature being held by the New Orleans
At the outset, defense
counsel concedes in his brief that the State

police department.

was not obligated to furnish him with a
copy of the district attorney’s file. State
v. Hunter, 250 La, 295, 195 So.2d 273
(1967). Neither must the State furnish
the defense with information or evidence
of an inculpatory nature.
sel contends it has a right to be supplied
with information or evidence held by the
law enforcement authorities which is ex-
Specifically, defense

However, coun-

culpatory in nature.
counsel argues that the conviction should
be reversed with instructions to the trial
court to hold an in camera examination of
the District Attorney’s file to make a deter-
mination of whether there was any ex-
culpatory evidence which should have been

OT

turned over to the defense as material to
either guilt or innocence. He argues that
to have allowed the District Attorney to
make a determination, on his own as to
what was exculpatory resulted in an un-
constitutional delegation of judicial au-
thority to the State. In actuality, these
arguments greatly expanded the original
bill of exceptions No. 4 taken by the de-
fendant and are not properly before us.
Essentially, Bill No. 4 was taken to the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion,
“by Bill of Particulars, for a complete copy
of the District Attorncy’s file as well as
any supplemental information or evidence
held by the police.”

We are in ‘accord with the trial court’s
per curiam, which, in part, cites La.C.Cr.P.
art. 484, and the redactor’s notes, Comment

@,

“wThe defendant is entitled to know what
the state intends to prove; but the bill
of particulars cannot be employed in a
fishing expedition for a recital of the
details of the state’s evidence, nor used
as a device to harass the state by de-
mands for nonessential details.”

“We find the trial court properly denied
the motion for bill of particulars, ‘This
bill has no merit. See also State v. Glad-
den, 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388 (1972).

Bills of Exceptions 5 and 6 are submit-
ted on the record and are obviously with-
out merit, for the reasons noted by the
trial court’s per curiams.

918
Hl Defendant's final bill of exceptions
No. 7 is based upon the trial court’s denial
of a motion for a new trial, based on the
grounds that the verdict is contrary to the
law and evidence. It has been said in-
numerable times that a motion for a new
trial based simply on the ground that the
verdict is contrary to law and evidence pre-
sents nothing for us to review. State v.
Grey, 257 La, 1070, 245 So.2d 178 (1971).
It is only when there is no evidence at ail
of an essential element of the crime
charged that this Court may set aside the
conviction on appeal. When there is some
evidence to sustain the conviction, this
Court on appeal cannot pass upon the suf-
ficiency thereof, This bill lacks merit.

For these reasons, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

269 So.2d 818

STATE of Louisiana
vw
Wash H. MULLINS.
No. 52814,
Nov. 28, 1972.

Robert H. Hodges, Richard B. Nevils,
Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty, Ralph L. Roy,
Asst. Dist. Atty. for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Wash H. Mullins, appeals
his conviction of armed robbery (La.R.S.
14:64) and sentence of ten years at the
State Penitentiary relying on one bill of
exceptions reserved and perfected during
the proceedings.

This bill objects to the trial court’s de-
nial of a motion for new trial. The mo-
tion was made on the basis that tnere
was no evidence to sustain the convic-
tion,

920

We find this contention to be without
merit. There was direct testimony of the
victim that the defendant assaulted him
with a knife, made him stop the car, get
out, and knocked him unconscious, after
which his money was stolen. It has been
held by this Court that when, as here,
there is some evidence to sustain the
conviction, the court cannot pass upon
the sufficiency thereof. State v. Coleman,
260 La. 897, 257 So.2d 652 (1971).

For the reasons assigned, the convic-
tion and sentence are affirmed.

269 So.2d 814

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Henry A. HAYES and Ronald E. Freeman,

No. 52821.

Nov. 28, 1972.

921
a

Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for de-
fendants-appellants,

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty., Alton T. Moran,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Ronald E. Freeman and
Henry A. Hayes, were tried by a jury and
found guilty of the crime of simple bur-
glary, LaR.S, 14:62, for which they each
received the sentence of three years in the
State Penitentiary. On this appeal, the
defendants rely on a single bill of excep-
tions taken to the trial court’s overruling a
motion for a directed verdict to obtain a re-
versal of their convictions and sentences.

We have held that our State Constitu-
tion prevents consideration of such a mo-
tion for a directed verdict. La.Const.
Art, 19, Sec. 9; State v. Williams, 258 La.
801, 248 So.2d 295 (1971). We find no
error.

The convictions and sentences are af-
firmed.

922
269 So.24 815

STATE of Louisiana

we
Douglas C. SCHMIDT and Ralph G. Schmidt.
No. 52706,
Noy, 28, 1972.

a
een
—_
John J. Dolan, Peter J. Compagno, New
Orleans, for defendants-appellants.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Jim Gar-
rison, Dist. Atty. Louise Korns, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM,

The defendants were tried by a jury and
found guilty of simple burglary (LaRS.

923

14:62).
years at the Louisiana State Penitentiary.

They received sentences of nine

There were no bills of exceptions per-
fected as required by La.C.Cr.P. Art. 845.
We are therefore limited to a review of the
pleadings and proceedings for errors dis-
coverable on the face thereof. State v.

” Thomas, 260 La, 425, 256 So.2d 431 (1972) ;
State v. Sheppard, 260 La. 427, 256 So.2d
"431 (1972). We find none.

The conviction and sentence are affirm-

ed.

269 So.2d 815

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Paul G. REEVES.

No. 52755,

Noy. 28, 1972.

8

Taf

Maurice J. Wilson, Jr., Baton Rouge,
for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Sargent
Pitcher, Jr., Dist. Atty. Frank J. Gremil-
lion, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

925
PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Reeves, was convicted of
armed robbery (La.R.S. 14:64) for which
he was sentenced to fifteen years at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary. He appeals
his conviction and sentence based upon two
bills of exceptions reserved and perfected
during the proceedings.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served during the closing argument of the
State. Defense counsel objected to a state-
ment made by the district attorney on the
grounds that it was improper and preju-
dicial in that “he offered and argued” his
personal opinion concerning the credibility
of the defendant. We find no error in the
trial court’s ruling rejecting the objection.
The remark by the district attorney “was
nothing more than a denunciation of the
defendant based upon the evidence which
hhad been adduced at trial”. State v. Lem-
ing, 217 La. 257, 306, 46 So.2d 262, 279
(1959); La.C.Cr.P. Art. 774.

HH S(Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was re-
served to the trial court’s action in limiting
closing argument of defendant, after nearly
one hour, to approximately five minutes
more, although actually defense counsel was
permitted to argue about ten minutes more.
At that time, the defendant’s counsel had
fully covered his case and had spoken al-
most twice as long as the prosecutor. All
the matters pertaining to the conduct of
the trial are within the sound discretion of

926

the trial judge and rulings such as these will
not be disturbed unless we find an apparent
abuse of discretion. State v. Pierfax, 158
La. 927, 105 So. 16 (1925); La.C.Cr.P. Art.
17, We find no abuse, nor is any prejudice
shown by the record to have resulted.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM and DIXON, JJ., concur.

269 So.2d 816

STATE of Louisiana
ve
William Vernon LONIGAN.

No. 52360.

Nov. 28, 1972.

Dissenting Opinion Dec. 6, 1972.

927

Bil

Jordan & Ponder, John D. Ponder, Ro-
ger W. Jordan, Metairie, for defendant-ap-
pellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Ma-
motlides, Dist. Atty, Thomas P. McGee,
Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

-Defendant; William Vernon Lonigan, ap-
peals from the conviction of murder with-
out capital punishment for which he was

1.-“Dhe court shall not charge the jury
concerning the facts of the case and shall
not comment upon the facts of the caso,
either by commenting upon or recapitu-
lating the evidence, repeating the testi-
“mony of any witness, or giving an opin-

928

sentenced to life imprisonment in the State
Penitentiary, La.R.S. 14:30. During his
trial, the defendant reserved twenty-nine
bills of exceptions. On this appeal he ex-
pressly waived nine of the bills, and has
apparently abandoned sixteen others in
view of his failure to argue them in his
brief. Consequently, the defendant relies
upon the remaining bills of exceptions,
Nos. 26, 27, 28 and 29, to obtain a rever-
sal of his conviction and sentence.

Bill of Exceptions No. 26 was reserved
to the refusal of the trial judge to charge,
the jury with reference to self defense;
Bill of Exceptions No. 27 was reserved to
the refusal of the trial judge to grant the
requested charge relative to intoxication as.
a defense, Bill of Exceptions No. 28 was
taken to the charges given by the court “in
so far as they were in conflict with the
special charges requested by the defense.”
Bill of. Exceptions No. 29 was taken to the
refusal to grant a new trial. The motion
for new trial complained of the failure of
the trial court to grant the requests for
special charges on self defense and intoxi-
cation, and contended that the trial court
commented upon the evidence, contrary to
C.CrP, 8064 in denying the requested
charges.

ion as to what has been proved, not

proved, or refuted.”

See also C.0r.P. 772:

“The judge in the presence of the jury

shall not comment upon the facts of the
ease, either by commenting upon or re~

929 : Pe 930

Defendant's requested charges No. 9 and
No. 10 were not read aloud in the presence
of the jury. Defendant's requested
charges were considered by the trial judge
and discussed with the attorneys involved
in chambers. In the process of charging
the jury, the trial judge made his rulings
on the defendant’s requested jury instruc-
tions. The requested instructions num-
‘bered 9 and 10 were not read aloud in the
presence of the jury. The trial judge
ruled in the: following words which could
have been heard by the jury: “Request for
special charge No. 9, relative to self de-
fense, is denied on the basis that the evi-
dence does not support such a charge.” In
denying special charge No. 10, the trial
judge statéd within the hearing of the
jury: “Request for special charge No. 10,
relative ‘to intoxication, is denied on the
basis that the evidence does not support
such a charge.”

Defense attorney reserved bills “to the’

denial” of the special charges, and “the
ruling of the court, which ruling of the

capitulating the evidence, repeating the
testimony of any witness, or giving an
opinion.as to what has been proved, not
proved, or refuted.”

2, The record is not clear that the defend-
ant: objected to the statements of the *
judge ‘at the time of his ruling -on the
ground that they constituted comments
upon the facts or upon the evidence. ‘The -
formal bills of exceptions contain the de-

. fendant’s complaint that the judge's re- ,
marks constituted a prohibited comment

court is clearly a comment on the evidence
in the presence of the jury.”

Several times this court has considered
questions almost exactly like the one here
presented, In State v. Iverson, 136 La.
982, 68 So. 98, it was held to be reversible
error for the judge to say in the hearing
of the jury, “‘I find no evidence in the
case to justify such a charge’” The de-
fense counsel had requested a charge on
“accidental homicide” at the conclusion of
the judge’s instructions to the jury.

The Iverson case followed State v.
Langford, 133 La. 120, 62 So. 597. There
the judge charged the jury, then called for
any special charges the defense counsel
wished to request. The defense counsel
requested that the judge “‘charge the law
of self-defense,” whereupon the judge
stated, “‘“I do not think the request is ap-
plicable in the case.”’” The court held
that this was in effect informing the jury
that, in the judge’s opinion, the defendant
was guilty, because the defendant had not
attempted to set up any other defense.

upon the facts or the evidence. When
an objection is made, the grounds for
the objection should be stated, to give
the judge an opportunity to rule cor-
rectly and to correct any error that can
be correctetl. However, we held in State
+v. Green, 281 La, 1058, 98 So.2d 657,
that if an inference can be drawn from
a judicial comment on the facts that the
court expresses or implies an opinion as
to the ‘guilt of the accused, the error
cannot be cured by an instruction to the
jurors that the remarks be disregarded.

9381

The long-standing jurisprudence has
been codified in Louisiana. The Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1928 prohibited, in
article 384, the judge’s instructing the jury
upon the facts of the case. The Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1966, in articles 772
and 806, could hardly be more specific in
prohibiting judicial comment upon the
The holding in
State v. Green, supra, has been criticized.
See 18 La.L.Rev. 135. In spite of the crit-
icism, the official revision comment con-

facts and the evidence.

cerning Code of Criminal Procedure article

772 states:
““(a) This article was considered by the
Advisory Committee, by the Council, and
also at the 1963 general meeting of the
Louisiana State Law Institute. The Ad-
visory Committee unanimously adopted
the article, favoring a strict rule against
comment on the facts by trial judges.
At the general meeting also, there was
strong opposition to allowing judges to
comment on the facts.”

Consequently, we conclude that the

judge’s that the requested
charges were denied “on the basis that the

statement

evidence does not support such a charge”
was a prohibited comment upon the facts
or the evidence. The conviction and sen-
tence are annulled and set aside and the
case is remanded for a new trial.

SANDERS, Justice (dissenting).

I do not reach the question of whether
the trial judge’s ruling on the special

932

charges constituted a comment upon the
evidence.

The complaint that the trial judge com-
mented upon the evidence was made for
the first time in a motion for a new trial.

Subject to exceptions not pertinent here,
Article 841 of the Louisiana Code of Crim-
inal Procedure provides:

“An irregularity or error in the pro-
ceedings cannot be availed of after ver-
dict unless it is objected to at the time
of its occurrence and a bill of exceptions
is reserved to the adverse ruling of the
court on such objection. Failure to re-
serve a bill of exceptions at the time of
an adverse ruling of the court operates
as a waiver of the objection and as an
acquiescence in the irregularity or rul-
ing.”

When the defendant offered no objec-
tion and made no motion respecting the al-
leged comment on the evidence at the time
of its utterance, the matter was waived. A
defendant cannot bide his time to see if the
verdict will be favorable and, if not, then
pounce upon a language-error of the trial
judge in denying a special charge. See
State v. Reed, 252 La. 128, 209 So.2d 730
(1968); State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231
So.2d 360 (1970).

For the reasons assigned, I respectfully
dissent.

933
BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The trial court refused to charge the
jury on the laws of self-defense and intox-
ication as a defense, with the comment
“* * * the evidence does not support
such a charge’. The majority has con-
cluded that this was a comment upon the
evidence by the trial judge before the jury
and as such was reversible error. If the
majority had found that the laws of self-
defense and intoxication as a defense were
proper charges which the judge had
refused to give and the bills presented evi-
dence to support such a conclusion, I
would wholeheartedly join with the majori-
ty. But from the record before us I must
assume that self-defense and the defense
of intoxication were not as a matter of law
defenses under the evidence as presented
in the case, since the jury was not charged
to consider the evidence under these prin-
ciples of law. Because neither charge was
given to the jury, self-defense and intoxi-
cation as a defense were not before the
jury as a matter of law or as a matter of
fact.

A determination of whether the evidence
supports a charge requested by the defend-
ant is a law-finding function to be dis-

934

charged by the judge alone. That determi-
nation should ordinarily be made without
comment before the jury. But where the
comment is that the evidence will not sup-
port the charge of certain legal principles
and where in consequence those legal prin-
ciples are not before the jury, the comment
cannot be one upon evidence which the
jury is weighing.

The jury could not be weighing whether
the evidence supported a plea of self-de-
fense or the defense of intoxication, for
the judge refused to instruct them that this
law was applicable to the case before them.
They were bound to consider the evidence
under the law as given to them by the
court. Here, since the majority has not
found that self-defense and intoxication as
a defense were charges that had to be giv-
en under the evidence and since the trial
court has found that they were charges not
supported by the evidence, we are bound to
reach a conclusion that the evidence of
these two defenses was not before the
jury. Any comment, therefore, about evi-
dence affecting these two principles of law
could not be comment upon the evidence
weighed by the jury in determining this
defendant’s guilt.

I respectfully dissent.

&
ot

936
269 So.24 820
STATE of Lou

ve
Albert WOODFOX.

No. 52495.

Nov. 28, 1972,

il

Anthony R. Messina, Orleans Indigent
Defender Program, New Orleans, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison,
Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Albert Woodfox, appeals
from his conviction of aggravated escape
(La.R.S, 14:109), for which he was sen-
tenced to fourteen months imprisonment at
the Louisiana State Penitentiary, on the
basis of six bills of exceptions reserved
during trial.

Hl Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2
were reserved to the trial court's ad-
mittance of certain court records and testi-
mony of the Clerk of the Orleans Parish
Prison, which showed that the defendant
had been convicted of various felonies prior

937 . |

-to the escape. Aggravated Escape is de-
fined, in part, as “intentional departure

. » from lawful custody.” La.R.S.
Ma: 109 (emphasis supplied). Thus, it was
“necessary for the State to show the prior
convictions, and that the sentences had not
yet been completely served, in order to es-
‘tablish this essential element of the crime
charged. La.R.S. 15:271. The bills are
-without merit.

Hl Bills of Exceptions Nos. 3, 4 and 5
all relate to attempts by defense counsel to
introduce evidence of the conditions of
Orleans Parish Prison at the time of the
escape. The trial judge properly excluded
such evidence as irrelevant to the crime
charged. La.R.S. 15:435; 15:441. These
bills lack merit.

[Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was re-
served to the trial judge’s refusal of a mo-
tion for new trial on the basis that there
was not sufficient evidence to convict the
defendant of the crime charged. Four eye
witnesses to the crime testified at trial to,
and additionally, the defendant himself took
‘the stand and freely admitted, each and
every element of the crime charged. This
Court has held that it will not on appeal
review the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence if there is evidence which supports
the conviction,

“For the reasons “assigned, the conviction
.and sentence are affirmed.

938
269 So.2d 821

STATE of Louisiana
v
Lawrence E, O'BRIEN,

No. 52626.

Noy, 28, 1972.

939
een!

Bernard J. Usprich, Orleans Indigent De-
fender Program, New Orleans, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst.-Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison,
Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty.,
for plaintiff-appellee,

PER CURIAM.

‘The defendant, Lawrence O’Brien, was
convicted of simple burglary (LaRS. 14>
62), and was found guilty of violation of
the mulitple offender statute (LaR.S. 15:-
529.1). He was sentenced to fifteen years
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary. He
appeals his conviction of simple burglary,
relying on seven bills of exceptions re-

served and perfected.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served to the trial court’s denial of the de-
fendant’s motion to suppress. At the hear-
ing on the motion it was established that
the defendant was found by police officers

EE 940:

hiding in shrubbery near the premises bur-
glarized. The physical evidence (burglary
tools) sought to be suppressed was found
by the officers laying on the ground about
two to three feet from the defendant and
in plain view. Harris v. United States, 390:
U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 10677
(1968); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
US. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564:

(1971); State v. McQueen, 257 La. 684,.
243 So.2d 798 (1971). This bill is without

merit.

HMM (Bill of Exceptions No. 3. was
reserved to the trial court’s ruling that an.
inculpatory statement made by the defend-
ant subsequent to his arrest was admissible.
At a hearing conducted out of the presence
of the jury, it was found that the statement
was voluntary and that the defendant had
been given the Miranda warnings prior to
his making the statement. Such a deter-
mination by the trial court is given much
weight and we find no abuse of discretion
here. State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254
So.2d 444 (1971); State v. Cripps, 259 La.
403, 250 So.2d 382 (1971). The bill is with~
out merit.

We have examined defendant’s bills
No. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 and find they raise
no substantial question and are without
merit,

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed, ~

41 be 942

28) So.2d 822 Stephen R. Burke, Minden, for defend-

STATE of Louisiana ant-appellant,

“ William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen. Harry
Rickey LOTT. HL. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Charles A.
No, 52711. Marvin, Dist. Atty., James S, Harris, Asst.

Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM,

Through Habeas Corpus proceedings the
defendant, Rickey Lott, was granted an out
of time appeal from a conviction of simple
burglary, La.R.S. 14:62, for which he was
sentenced to serve nine years in the State
Penitentiary, On this appeal, defendant re-
Ties upon one bill of exceptions to obtain a
reversal of his conviction and sentence.

The sole bill of exceptions was reserved
after the verdict was returned, and prior
to sentencing, when the defendant’s motion
for a new trial on the grounds that the ver-
dict was contrary to the law and evidence
was denied by the trial court. The basis for
this motion was directed only to the suf-
ficiency of the proof and not to the absence
of evidence of an essential element of the
offense, The evidence consisted of finger-
prints taken from windowpanes removed
during a burglary, which fingerprints were
identified as identical with the defendant's.
This is some evidence. Upon review, we
cannot inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence of guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant. State v. Coleman, 260 La. 897, 257
So.2d 652 (1972); State v. Hochenedel,

943

253. La: 263, 217 So.2d 392 (1968). This
bill lacks merit.

_For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentenced are affirmed,

BARHAM, J, dissents. >

DIXON, J., concurs in the result.

269 So.2d 823

STATE of Louisiana
Claude BORDELON.

: No. 52715.

“ "Nov. 28, 1972.

944.

Ti

Ford & Nugent, William M. Ford, Alex~
andria, for plaintiff-appellee,

Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Richard V.
Burnes, Alexandria, for defendant-appel-
lant.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted in city court of
driving while intoxicated (La.R'S, 14:98) °
Pursuant to prosecution by the Pineville
City Attorney on a charge which arose with- *
in the city limits of Pineville, The defend-
ant was sentenced to pay a fine of four
hundred dollars and serve sixty days in the

parish prison, He appeals his conviction

945

cand sentence on the basis of one bill of
-exception reserved and perfected during the
«proceedings.

* [EB Prior to trial, defendant filed a Mo-
tion to Quash which alleged that the “Com-
-plaint-Affidavit” under which he was
charged was vague, and the prosecution of
‘this crime by the city attorney was uncon-
.stitutiorial as an infringement upon the pow-
ers of the district attorney. Defendant was
charged under a “Louisiana Uniform Traf-
fic Ticket and Complaint” in which all per-
tinent information was included. This court
“has previously held that such affidavit suf-
ficiently informs the accused of the nature
of the offense charged, and thus this
ground is without merit. City of Pineville
-y. Robinson, 260 La. 415,- 256 So.2d 427
(1972). we

[Ml The second basis of complaint is
that La.R.S. 13:1894.1 (which provides for
‘prosecution by the city attorney, in city
court, of violations of La.R.S. 14:98) is
~unconstitutional in that such prosecutions
cusurp the powers of the district attorney.
“This court has previously held that the stat-
~ute simply establishes by general statewide
‘law the functions of local government with
-regard to the prosecution of driving while
‘intoxicated offenses, City of Baton Rouge
~v. Mahnken, 260 La. 1002, 257 So.2d 690
-(1972). We find no provision in our State
‘Constitution which forbids this.+ The bill

946

of exceptions relied upon by defendant is
without merit. .

For reasons assigned, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

269 $0.24 824

STATE of Louisiana, Relator, -
vw
" James Albert BULLOCK, Respondent. ** ‘

No. 52414. :
Nov. 6, 1972.

Dissenting Opinion Nov. 20, 1972.

| |
A. Kemp v. Stanley, 204 La. 110, 15 So.2d 1 (1948) is distinguishable on it facts from the
». .present case, . ot

9:

948
P|
—+—
Robert Glass, New Orleans, for defend~
ant-appellant,
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
HL. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garri-
son, Dist. Atty. Frank Klein, Louise

Korns, Asst. Dist. Attys, for plaintiff-ap-
pellee.

TATE, Justice.

We granted certiorari, 261 La. 818, 261
So.2d 227 (1972), to review the action of
the trial judge in setting aside, sua sponte,
an order which a year earlier had granted
the defendant a new trial.

The defendant Bullock was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death in 1967.
No appeal was taken. In 1971, the Crimi-
nal District Court, in which he had been
tried, granted the defendant’s writ of ha-
beas corpus and ordered a new trial for
him, thus setting aside both the conviction
(verdict) and the sentence. ‘The State did

949

not seek supervisory review of this action
-or otherwise attempt to stay the finality of
the ruling.

The basis for this 1971 ruling was the
sdecision of the United States Supreme
Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).
‘There, the Supreme Court had invalidated
a death penalty, but not the conviction it-
self, because of the exclusion of prospec-
tive jurors with general scruples against
capital punishment. See also State v.
Turner, 253 La. 763, 220 So.2d 67 (1969).

the
present case came up for the new trial a
year later, in 1972. The defendant's
court-appointed counsel moved for a con-

Pursuant to a previous fixing,

tinuance. He noted the recent decisions of
this court} which indicated that the proper
‘disposition, where a capital penalty was
‘imposed pre-Witherspoon by a jury chosen
in violation of Witherspoon standards, was
to impose a life sentence instead of to
grant a new trial. The defense counsel did
not move to set aside the order for a new
trial; only for a continuance.

However, the trial judge then,
sponte, set aside the previously granted or-
der for a new trial and sentenced the de-
fendant to life imprisonment.

sua

We granted certiorari upon application
of the State; but the defendant’s court-ap-

950

pointed counsel likewise objected to the ac-
tion of the trial court, for the reason that
the defendant himself desired a new trial,
as well as the State.

HI Both parties correctly contend that
the trial court was without authority to re-
scind, over objection, the order which had
granted a new trial and which had set
aside the previous conviction and sentence.
In the absence of timely application for su-
pervisory review staying such ruling, it be-
came final and was no longer subject to
revision or reversal by the trial court
which had rendered it. State v. Rideau, -
262 La. 460, 263 So.2d 724 (1972); cf.
State v. Spina, 261 La. 397, 259 So.2d 891
(1972) and Ex Parte Twombly, 265 Mich.
422, 251 N.W. 538 (1933). Since not only
the sentence but also the verdict was set
aside by the now-final order granting the
new trial, the trial court was without au-
thority to impose a life sentence; for, to
be valid, a sentence must rest upon, inter
alia, a valid and sufficient verdict or plea
of guilty, La.C.Cr.P. Art. 872(3).

The State notes that it desires a new
trial with the purpose of attempting to se-
cure a more stringent life sentence, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the amend-
ment to Louisiana Code of Criminal Proce-
dure Article 817 by Act 502 of 1972, effec-
tive July 26, 1972, The effect of the 1972
amendment is to permit a jury to recom-

1. State v. Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971) and State v. Duplessis, 260 La. 644,

257 So.2d 185 (1971).

951. a 952

mend not oily the previous sentence of life
imprisonment, but in addition that such life
imprisonment be without “benefit of pa-
role, probation, commutation or suspension
of the sentence.” ®

In order to prevent error upon the
remand, we must note that, to attempt to
apply this penalty provided by the 1972 law
to those offenses committed prior thereto,
would offend the provisions of our state
and federal constitutions forbidding the en-
actment of ex-post facto laws. U.S.Const.,
Art. I, Section 8; La.Const. of 1921, Art.
4, Section 14.

[I Under long established principle,
the prohibition against ex post facto laws
includes not only those laws which make
acts criminal though done before the enact-
ment made them unlawful, but also it pro-
hibits the enforcement of any enactment
which changes the punishment so as to in-
flict a greater punishment than that autho-
rized for the crime when committed. See:
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.
Ed. 648 (1798), and the similar interpreta-
tion uniformly given by later jurispru-
dence; 1 Antieau, Modern Constitutional
Law § 5:133 (1969). “The Constitution

2. The italicized clause (2) was added to
Article 817 by the 1972 act:
: “Tn, a capital case the jury may qualify -
its verdict of guilty as follows:

“(1) With the addition of the words
‘without capital punishment’, in which
case the punishment shall be imprison-
ment at hard Jabor for life, or

forbids the application of‘any néw punitive
measure to a crime already consummated,
to the detriment or material disadvantage
of the wrongdoer.” Lindsey v. State of
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct.
797, 799, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937).

Thus, this court has held that a subse~
quent enactment which abolished a prior
right of parole was null as an ex post fac-:
to enactment insofar ‘as applied’ to persons:
convicted for offenses committed prior to
it, State ex rel. Woodward 'v. Board of
Parole, 155 La, 699, 99 So. 534 (1924).
See also, eg. Lindsey v. State of Wash-
ington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed.
1182 (1934) and In Re Medley, 134 U.S.
160, 10 S.Ct. 384, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890).

If this same prosecution for a 1966 of-
fetige had been remanded or retried prior
to enactment of the 1972 act, the defendant.
had available, if he received a life sen-
tence, the same right to apply for commu-
tation or parole then applicable to all life
sentences. “ The ex post facto prohibitions:
of our state and federal constitutions for-
bid applying the 1972 act to offenses com
mitted prior thereto so as to permit the im--
position of life sentences subject to more.
stringent conditions. Thus, in Lindsey v..

“(2) With the addition of the words
‘without capital punishment or benefit
of parole, probation, commutation, or sus-
pension of sentence’, in which case the:
punishment shall be imprisonment at hard
labor for life without benefit of parole,
probation, commutation or suspension of’
sentence.” .

958
State of Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.
Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937), the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute, as ex post facto legislation, which
had the effect of making the standard of
punishment “more onerous”, 301 U.S. 400,
57 S.Ct. 798, through its effect on, inter
alia, parole and release eligibility,

For the reasons assigned, therefore, the
sentence imposed by the trial court is an-
nulled and vacated, and this case is re-
manded to the Criminal District Court for
the Parish of Orleans, Section “H”, for a
new trial, in accordance with law.

“Remanded.

HAMLIN, J., dissents, being of the opin-
ion that the ruling of the trial judge is
correct.

SANDERS, J; concurs in the result
only.

McCALEB, Chief Justice (concurring in
part and dissenting in part). -

I subscribe to the main holding herein
which annuls and vacates the action of the
district judge in sentencing Bullock at this
time to life imprisonment. For, although
originally the judge, in compliance with
the Witherspoon case (391 U.S. 510, 88 S.
Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776) should have im-
posed a life sentence on Bullock, under
State v. Turner, 253 La. 763, 220 So.2d 67,

954 °
and the cases following that decision, as
the application was for habeas corpus, the
fact that he erroneously granted a new
trial and set aside the verdict of guilty pre-
cludes the judge, as pointed out in the ma-
jority opinion, from thereafter imposing a
sentence when there was no verdict of
guilty on which such sentence could rest.

“On the other hand, I strongly demur
from the action of the Court in giving an
advisory opinion to the judge in which it
anticipates error will be committed on the
rémand and declares that Article 817 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amend-
ed by Act 502 of 1972, cannot be constitu-
tionally applied to the defendant Bullock as
in his case it is an ex post facto law. I
make no comment whatever as to the deci-
sion of this Court on the applicability of

the 1972 amendment because the matter is
not before us at this time. It will be prop-
et only to consider the effect of that stat-
ute if or when such a question is presented
to us on appeal from an adverse ruling of
the district court.

It is well settled by this Court that it is
impermissible for it to give an advisory
opinion to a district court as to how the
judge should dispose of a particular ques-
tion of law should it come before him and,
particularly, in matters concerning the con-
stitutionality of statutes. State ex rel. Day
et al. v. Rapides Parish School Board, 158
La. 251, 103 So, 757; Graham et al., v.

955 a 956

Jones et al., 198 La. 507, 3 So.2d 761;
State v. Fant, 216 La. 58, 43 So.2d 217;
Belsome v. Southern Stevedoring, Inc., 239
La. 413, 118 So.2d 458; Aucoin v. Dunn,
255 La. 823, 233 So.2d 530; Tafaro’s In-
vestment Co. v. Division of Housing Im-
provement, 261 La. 183, 259 So.2d 57.

In disregarding this firmly established
rule of law, the majority has usurped the
constitutional right of the district court to
pass on questions coming before it at the
trial level and has actually assumed origi-
nal jurisdiction in a criminal case contrary
to Section 10 of Article VIL of our Consti-
tution.

SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).

T agree that the trial judge was without
authority to set aside his order granting a
new trial. I do believe, however, that this
court under its supervisory powers could
properly set aside the trial court order
granting a new trial, In doing so, we
might then remand the case for resentenc-

ing.

I wish to also observe that the minority
opinion of this court can have no effect in-
sofar as it purports to instruct the trial
judge in the forthcoming sentencing proce-
dure. It is an improper and gratuitous ef-
fort to deprive the trial judge of his pre-
rogative to pass upon the constitutionality
of the sentencing statute in the first in-
stance,

269 $0.24 827

James Louis FOSTER.
No. 52734,

Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 28, 1972.

957

——_

Paul Henry Kidd, Monroe, for defendant-
appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, J. Carl Park-
erson, Dist. Atty, Gilbert T. Brown, Jr,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Foster, was charged by
Bill of Information with the crime of ag-
gravated battery. (La.R.S, 14:34). He was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
During the course of the trial on motion
of the defendant, a mistrial was granted.
Thereafter, the defendant withdrew his for-
mer plea of not guilty and entered a plea
of guilty, The trial judge, after thoroughly
questioning the defendant concerning the
voluntariness of his plea, and defendant
having expressly waived his rights, accept-
ed the plea of guilty. The defendant was
sentenced to ten years at the Louisiana
State Penitentiary, and he appeals relying

958

on two bills of exceptions reserved and per-
fected.

MM (Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served to the trial court’s ruling on a mo-
tion to suppress that certain inculpatory
statements made by the defendant were
admissible at trial. We find that the de-
fendant by entering a voluntary plea of
guilty has waived any defect or error which
could have existed in the trial court’s rul-
ing on the motion to suppress. It is the law
of this state that a plea of guilty waives.
all non-jurisdictional defects. State v. Val-
entine, 259 La. 1019, 254 So.2d 450 (1971).
Bill of Exceptions No, 1 is without merit.

HI in Bill of Exceptions No. 2 the
defendant objects to the sentencing proce-
dures followed in imposing sentence. The
pill alleges that the defendant did not have
an opportunity to review the information
contained in the report in the pre-sentence
investigation as other defendant’s counsel
had been given the right to, and that he
had not been afforded an opportunity to
rebut any statements contained in the re-
port.

We are in accord with the trial court’s
per curiam that this bill is without merit.
Quoting from his per curiam:

“On April 13, 1972, the defendant was

present in court with his attorney, Paul

H. Kidd, and informed the court that he

wished to change his plea of not guilty to

guilty. After interrogation by the court,

959

the court accepted the defendant’s plea of
guilty. No objection was made by de-
fendant or his attorney. On May 12,
" 1972, defendant was present in court with
his attorney arid stated he wish-
ed to maintain his plea of guilty and was
prepared to accept sentence. The Court
sentenced the defendant to serve 10 years
in the Louisiana State Penitentiary to
“run concurrently with other sentences,
and with credit for time already served.
No objection was made by defendant or
his attorney at this time. On May 24,
1972 defendant’s attorney . . . ap-
peared in court and reserved a bill of ex-
ception to ‘the sentencing procedures em-
ployed by this court’ and asked for and
, was granted an appeal to the Supreme
Court, The attorney did not make an ob-
jection or ask for a ruling upon any ob-
jection at this time. He did not specify
to what alleged irregularity the bill of
exception related other than to ‘the sen-
tencing procedures employed by this
court’. He did not ask that the sentence
be set aside or request any other relief
from the court. The defendant’s attorney

did not make any complaint to the court .

with regard to the sentence or pre-sen-
tence procedures on this or any prior
occasion.”

It is evident from the per curiam of the
trial court that the bill of exceptions is not
properly before this court. The defendant
at no time objected to the procedures fol-

960

lowed by the trial court with regard to the
pre-sentence report. Therefore there is no
ruling of the trial court before us as re-
quired by La.C,Cr.P. Art. 841.

This bill is without merit.

For the reasons assigned herein, the
conviction and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., concurs.

269 So.2d 829

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Mrs. Lonnie B. MILLER,

No. 52813.

Nov. 28, 1972.

i)

61

Hd

Daryl Gold, Shreveport, for defendant-
appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty, Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Rich-
ardson, Dist. Atty., Dan J. Grady, III, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Mrs. Lonnie B, Miller,
entered a plea of guilty to the crime of
issuing worthless checks (La.R.S. 14:71)

962

and received a sentence of one year in the
parish prison. She appeals her conviction
and sentence relying on one bill of exception
reserved and perfected during the proceed-

The bill of exception was reserved to the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
quash the bill of information. The motion
to quash alleged that the information should
not stand because the statute under which
the charges were brought (La.R.S. 14:71) is
unconstitutional in that it inflicts cruel and
unusual punishment. The contention of
the defendant is that the felony status of
the crime of issuing worthless checks con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

HMMM The Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec.
12, La.Const. of 1921, prohibit the infliction
“Cruel
and unusual punishments are those that are

of cruel and unusual punishment.

barbarous, extraordinary, or grossly dis-
proportionate to the offense. In short, the
constitutional prohibition is directed to pun-
ishments that shock the conscience of civil-
ized men.” State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221
So.2d 473 (1969).

Tse find nothing in the penalty
provision of La.R.S. 14:71, which is bar-
barous, extraordinary, or grossly dispro-
portionate to the crime of issuing worthless
checks. The penalty provisions of La. 14:71
are neither cruel nor unusual and are not
within the constitutional prohibitions, supra.
It is a matter for the legislature to decide

963

what crimes will have felony status. The
bill of exceptions is, therefore, without
merit.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

269 So.2d 830

STATE of Louisiana
v.
Morris HARRIS and Roger L. Stevenson.

No, 52754,

Nov. 28, 1972.

* Anthony Ray Reed and Henry B. Sterling, who were also found guilty.

——_
Murphy W. Bell, Woodson T. Callihan,
Jr Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellants.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
HH. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Sargent
Pitcher, Jr, Dist. Atty. M. Stephen
Roberts, Asst. Dist, Atty., for plaintiff-
appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Morris Harris and Roger L.
Stevenson, were tried by jury, along with
two other co-defendants* for the crime
of simple burglary, La.R.S. 14:62, and were
found guilty. Morris Harris, age 19, was
sentenced to serve three years in the cus-
tody of the Director of the Department of
Corrections. Roger L. Stevenson, age 27,
was sentenced to serve nine years in the
custody of the Director of the Department

965 Le

of Corrections. Defendants reserved and
perfected only one bill of exceptions during
their trial, and rely on this to obtain a re-
versal of their convictions and sentences.

Defendants objected to the introduction
into evidence of a hat and a crow-bar, al-
legedly found near the scene of the bur-
glary, on the grounds that no proper foun-
dation had been Jaid and that there was no
connexity made between the defendants
and these items.

HE Defendant’s brief argues for a
degree of absolute connexity which the law
does not impose upon the prosecution.
Connexity is a matter for the jury to de-
cide, so long as the objects introduced are
shown to have some relevance which the
trial judge considers sufficient to warrant
their introduction into evidence, i. e., some
logical or rational connection with fact
sought to be proved. State v. Dillon, 260
La. 215, 255 So.2d 745 (1971) and cases
cited therein.

TM The only ground asserted for this
objection is that the owners of these ex-
hibits were allegedly unidentified. Never-
theless, the state has shown that the ac-
cused were arrested on the roof of the bur-
glarized restaurant, after a frustrated at-
tempt to flee, and that the items in question

were found beside the building, apparently
abandoned by the accused. State v. Dobard,
262 La. 228, 263 So.2d 16 (1972).

For these reasons, the convictions and
sentences are affirmed.

269 So.2d 831

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Johnny Lee BRADFORD.

No. 52735.
Nov. 28, 1972.

Dissenting Opinion Dee. 6, 1972.

C-)
a
| 8

James D. Sparks, Jr., Monroe, for de-
fendant-appellant.

. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Par-
kerson, Dist, Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Johnny Lee Bradford,
was tried by a jury and convicted of the
crime of theft, La.R.S. 14:67. He was
sentenced to six years at the Louisiana
State Penitentiary. He appeals his convic-
tion on the basis of one bill of exception
reserved and perfected during the proceed-
ings.

By this bill, counsel contends that it was
error for the trial court to overrule his
objection to the introduction of certain
oral inculpatory statements made by de-
fendant, on the basis that they were not
freely and voluntarily given, but rather
were the product of non-fulfilled induce-

ments and promises,

968.
VIn its “Per Curiam” attached to the Bill
of Exceptions, the trial court found,

“Defendant apparently was attempting to
contend that he made the inculpatory
statement because he hoped for assist-
ance in regard to another violation, but
if so, there was no evidence to indicate
that this state of mind resulted from any
act, inducement, promise or any other
suggestive or persuasive conduct on the
part of any police officer.”

The trial judge also found that the de-
fendant had been given the proper Miran-
da warnings prior to his making the state-
ments.

HN Such a factual determination by
the trial judge is given great weight and
will not be disturbed unless clearly erro-
neous. State v. Hall, 257 La. 253, 242 So.
2d 239 (1970). We find no such error.
Since we find the statements to be volun-
tary, they are admissible in their entirety.
LaRs, 15:451.

For this reason, the conviction and sen-
tence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J, dissents and assigns rea-
sons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I am of the opinion that defendant's bill
of exceptions leveled at the introduction of
an oral inculpatory statement made by him
is good. He attacks the introduction of

969°

the statement on the basis that the State
did not establish that it was freely and vol-
untarily given, and that the State did not
establish that the Miranda warnings were
given before the statement.

Only one of the two officers present at
the interrogation testified at the trial. His
testimony is filled with inconsistencies, but
it may be gathered without contradiction
that from the beginning until the end
Johnny Lee Bradford refused to sign the
waiver form that was available and
refused to orally waive his constitutional
rights as pronounced in Miranda v. Arizo-
na, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966). The officer’s testimony is in-
consistent as to what Miranda warnings
were given orally and when they were giv-
en. He is consistent, however, in saying
that the defendant never expressly waived
his rights and that he refused to give a
written statement. It is also certain the
defendant refused to make a confession or
admission on the electric recording device
which could have been activated by a sin-
gle switch. Although defendant admittedly
refused to give any statement at the begin-
ning of the conversation, the officers, after
talking with him for 20 minutes, finally ob-
tained an oral inculpatory statement. The
continued questioning of the defendant aft-
er he refused to waive his constitutional
rights and refused to give any statement is
a violation of the Miranda rules. More-

970
over, the simple activation of the recording
device at the beginning of the interview or
interrogation would have preserved a good
evidentiary record of whether a statement
was made and whether it was constitution-
ally obtained. Failure of the officers to
use this device and the continued question-
ing after the defendant refused to waive
his constitutional rights and to make any
statement are strong evidence that. a con-
stitutionally free and voluntary statement
was not made by this defendant.

Additionally, I am of the opinion that
the officers actually used the duress of ex-
posing the defendant to a federal charge to
procure the statétent. At least the State
has not established through its one witness
that this compulsion was not in fact
brought to bear on the defendant by the
police.

The State was obligated to establish as,a
predicate for the use of the statement. that,
it was given voluntarily without induce-
ment or coercion—physical or psychologi-
cal—, and that it was given after an ex-.
press waiver of the Miranda constitutional
rights. Under the circumstances attendant
upon this interrogation, I conclude that the
State has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing that this was in fact a consti-
tutionally free and voluntary statement.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

270 So.2d 116

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Charles FULMER.

No. 52569.

Noy. 28, 1972.

ait

Leon A. Picou, Jr, Picou & Picou, St.
Francisville, and William E. Woodward,
Clinton, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen, Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard Kil-
bourne, Dist. Atty., Fred C, Jackson, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appelice.

974

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Charles Fulmer, was

tried by a jury, found guilty of murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment at the Louj-
siana State Penitentiary. (La.R.S. 14:30}.
He appeals his conviction and sentence
relying on three bills of exceptions re-
served and perfected during the proceed-
ings.

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved
when the Assistant District Attorney stat-
ed during his examination of a witness, “T
believe you said you could identify the per-
son you saw beating this man over the
head with a baseball bat?” The defendant
objected to this question and asked for a
mistrial on the grounds that at this point
in the trial the witness had not testified
specifically that he could identify the per-
petrator of the beating. The defendant
argues the prosecution was assuming a fact
that wasn’t a matter of record and his
question was, therefore, improper.

Hl We find that there was no preju-
dice to the defendant resulting from the
question posed by the Assistant District
Attorney. The question did not fall within
the grounds for mistrial listed in La.C.Cr.
P. Arts. 770 and 771. Furthermore, the
trial court immediately ordered the Assist-
ant District Attorney to withdraw and re-
phrase the question thereby curing the er-
ror, if any. 1

This bill of exceptions is
without merit.

995

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved
when a state witness testified that he could
not identify the killer, to which testimony
‘the trial court upheld a plea of surprise
and allowed the prosecution to “lead” the
witriess over objection of defense counsel.

Louisiana law is clear ‘that a party may
not ask leading’ questions of his own wit-
ness unless the witness be unwilling or ex-
hibit hostility to the party calling him.
(aR. 15:277). It was shown through
testimony of events which occurred prior
to the trial; that the witness had made a
prior’ contradictory statement concerning
what took place at the time of the killing.
The Assistant District Attorney stated that
‘he had been advised by the witness on the
morning of the trial that the witness could
identify the defendant as the perpetrator
of the killing.

_ HHI Tre record demonstrates that the
witness was an unwilling witness. The
control of the examination of witnesses is
left within the sound discretion of the trial
judge, and his rulings in this respect will
not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse
of discretion. We find no such abuse.
State v. Hollingsworth, 160 La, 26, 106 So.
662 (1926). The bill of exceptions lacks
merit,

‘HEEL Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was not
briefed or argued by the defendant and is
therefore considered abandoned.

976

TM Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was re-
served when the trial court allowed the
state to call Mr. Aubrey A. Girod on re-
buttal. The defendant objected to the tes-
timony of Mr. Girod on the grounds that
he had been in the court room during the
trial, although all the witnesses were under
sequestration. Mr. Girod was a guard at
the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the
trial court allowed him to be exempt from
the rule of sequestration following our
holding in State vy. Raymond, 258 La. 1,
245 So.2d 335 (1971). In that case’ we
stated that law enforcement officers and
medical experts could be, exempted from
the rule of sequestration by the trial court
when to do so “facilitated the trial of the
case with no prejudice to the defendant.”

HH Without considering the correct-

‘ness of the trial judge’s ruling holding that
“Mr. Girod was exempt from the sequestra-

tion rule because he was a law enforce-
ment officer, we hold that under the cir-
cumstances no prejudice occurred to the
defendant. Mr. Girod testified only as to
certain procedures regarding the conces-
sion stand operation at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary, and his testimony could not
have been influenced by the testimony of
We find the bill of ex-
ceptions to be without merit.

other witnesses.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM and DIXON, JJ., concur.

270 So.2d 118

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Kenneth John AUGUSTINE.
. No. 52517.

Noy. 28, 1972.

—+—

Anthony R. Messina, Orleans Indigent
Defender Program, New Orleans, for de-
fendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen. Harry,
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Jim Garri- |
son, Dist, Atty., Louise Korns, Asst, Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM. ae

Defendant, Kenneth John Augustine, was’
tried by a jury and found guilty: of armed
robbery and sentenced to serve forty years
in the State Pententiary. On this appeal;
the defendant relies on four bills of exé
ceptions to obtain a reversal.

However, we do not consider these bills
because there is an error discoverable on
the face of the proceedings, which merits
our attention, La.C.CrP. art, 920. The
minutes show that the sentence was impos-
ed before expiration of the mandatory
statutory delay, and there is no minute en-
try or showing of a waiver of’ same—a‘’
patent error requiring remand: State’ v.""
Douglas, 250 La. 480, 196 So.2d 799 (1

La.Code of Criminal Procedure
873 provides: :

“If a defendant is convicted of a felony, |

at least three days shall clapse betwe

conviction and sentence. If a motion

979

- for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment,
is filed, sentences shall not be imposed
until at least twenty-four hours after the
motion is overruled. If the defendant
expressly waives a delay provided for in
this article or pleads guilty, sentence may
be imposed immediately.”

HM Where the record docs not dis-
close any waiver of the three-day delay in
sentencing, and it is clear from the minutes
that less than the mandatory minimum de-
lay had clapsed at the time of the sentenc-
ing, we must hold the sentence to be void.
AAs set forth in the Redactors’ Comments
to La.C.Cr.P. art. 873:

. “This provision is for the purpose of af-
fording an opportunity to an accused who
has been convicted to file, prior to sen-
tence, further pleadings, such as a mo-
tion for a new trial, a motion in arrest
of judgment, etc., and, if he is denied
the right to this delay, any sentence so
imposed is void.”

HM 12.C.crP, Art. 13 governs the com-
putation of time for delays or other acts
under this Code, Pertinently to the present
issue, this article provides that “the date of
the act, event, or default after which the
period begins to run is not to be included”
in computing a three-day delay (although,
if not a holiday, “the last day of the period”
is to be included). The date of the sen-
tencing was May 24, 1971. Since the delay
began to run on this date, it is not to be

included. Article 873 provides that “at

980

least three days shall elapse between con-
viction and sentence”. The general rule is
that the use of the word “between” in des-
ignating a period of time, bounded by two
specified dates or events, excludes both ter-
minal dates, 86 C.J.S. Time § 13(6) (citing
decisions from three states and referring to
an old footnote at 62 C.J. 897 citing deci-
sions from cleven states), although general
rule need not be followed where a statute
specifies otherwise,

HM Since the present statute (Article
873) provides that “at least three days shall
elapse between conviction and sentence” (i.
e., not providing a delay “within which”
an act must be accomplished), the statutory
intent reflected is that, after the date of
the sentence, three days, see Article 13(3)
must elapse before (i. e. following which,
see 86 CJ.S. Time § 13(4)) the sentence
may be imposed. Under this view, following
the conviction of May 24 at least three days
(May 25, 26 and 27) must “elapse” (i. e.,
“expire”, “intervene”, “pass”, 14 Words &
Phrases “Elapse”) before the date of the
sentence. Thus, the sentence imposed on
May 27th was premature by one day.

Therefore, we note, ex propio motu, that
the sentence is void, since imposed before
expiration of the three-day delay and with-
out waiver of same.

For the reasons assigned, the sentence is
annulled and set aside, and the case is re-
manded to the Criminal District Court,
Parish of Orleans, Section “j”, for re-
sentencing in conformity with law.

981
I
270 So.2a 120

Presley Carl MUSE
Y
SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 52889.

Oct. 26, 1972.

"Writ denied. On the facts found by the
Court of Appeal, we find no error of law
in the judgment complained of.

Z
270 $0.24 120

STATE of Louisiana
~ ve
Clarence J. HAMILTON, dr.

No. 53013.
Dee. 13, 1972.

982

On considering the petition of the relator
in the above numbered and entitled cause,

It is ordered that the District Attorney
and the Trial Court assign this case for
trial and make disposition of it through
trial or other means on or before January
31, 1973, or show cause to the contrary in
this Court on January 18, 1973, at 11:00
AM.

270 So.2d 120

Eileen Reed GRIFFITH
ve
Joseph Folse ROY, Sr.

J. Folse ROY
ve
Elleen REED, wife of Joseph Folse ROY, Jr.
No. 53063.

Dee. 20, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made
does not warrant the exercise of our super-
visory jurisdiction,

SUMMERS and TATE, JJ., are of ihe
opinion the writ should be granted,

270 So.2d 120

Victor A. LOMBARD
ve

. ‘SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD OF
_ NEW ORLEANS et al.

No. 53006.

Dee. 21, 1972.

It is ordered that the writ of review is-
sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the
record in duplicate of the case; and that
counsel for plaintiff and defendant be noti-

fied.

Lt]
270 $0.20 121

Ronald L. KENNEDY
v.
STATE of Louisiana.

No. 53008.

Dec. 21, 1972.

270 So.2d 121

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Bobby BAGLEY
ve

Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisl-
ana State Penitentiary.

No. 53008.

Dec. 21, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made
by relator does not warrant the relief

sought.

Lt]
270 $0.20 121

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Woodman
J. COLLINS.
v.

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

No. 53010.

Dee, 21, 1972.

Po Writ refused. Relator has previously ap-

. Writ refused. The conclusion of the trial
judge on, the evidentiary hearing is correct.

plied to this court on same grounds. See.
51,900, Collins v. Henderson.

985 | 986

a '
270 So.2d 121 270 So.2d 122
“CoE OIL SERVICE, INC. Felix J. GUILLOT, Jr.
v. v.
J.D. HAIR et al., d/b/a Hair Flying SPENCER BUSINESS COLLEGE, INC.
Service.
No. 53018.
No. 53027.
Tee. 21, 1972, Dee. 21, 1972,
It is ordered that the writ of review is- | Writ refused. On the facts found by the

sue; that the Court of Appeal send up the Court of Appeal we find no error of law in

record in duplicate of the case; and that its judgment.

counsel for plaintiff and defendant be noti-
L

fied.
270 So.2d 122

270 So.2d 122
Mrs. Constance JARREAU
ve
Succession of Paul JARREAU.

Bertha LOTT
ve
CROWN ZELLERBACH CORP.

No. 53023.
Dee. 21, 1972. Dee, 21, 1972,

No. 53015.

Writ denied, The result is correct. Writ denied. The result is correct.

270 So0.2d 122 270 So0.2d 123
Jerri! A. MUSSO Johnnie RATCLIFF
ve ve
STATE of Louisiana, Through the COL- Mrs. Addie W. GORDON et al.
LECTOR OF REVENUE.
No. 53024.
No. 53019.

Dee. 21, 1972.

Dee. 21, 1972,

Writ refused. The result is correct.

‘Writ refused. The case having been re-

manded for further proceedings, the judg- |
ment is not final. :

L
“270 $0.24 123

] Paul GEORGE et al.

270 $0.24 128 “

: Louls M. SOWERS, Director of
Harry A. WARNER Corrections, ot al.
“ No. 53035.
William C. GARRETT et al.
| Dee, 21, 1972.
No. 53033.
Dee. 21, 1972.

Writ refitsed. On the facts found by the
Court of Appeal we find no error of law
Writ refused, The result is correct. in its judgment.

Ly |

270 So.2d 123 270 So.2d 124

Arthur PEMBRICK, Jr. Lawes J. ALONZO
ve ve
CHARITY HOSPITAL OF LOUISIANA AT LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
NEW ORLEANS. HIGHWAYS.
No. 53034. No. 53041.
Dee, 21, 1972. Dee. 21, 1972.

Writ refused. The judgment of the

Writ refused; we find no error of law .
Court of Appeal is correct.

in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

| L
270 So.2a 124 270 So.2d 124
ORTLIEB PRESS, INC.
v.
Ashton J. MOUTON, Collector of Revenue.

STATE of Louisiana
ve

Jimmie STORY et al.

No. 53036.
No. 53042.
Dee. 21, 1972.

Dee. 21, 1972.

Application denied. The showing made Writ refused. The case having been re-
does not warrant the exercise of our ju- manded for further proceedings, the judg-
tisdiction. ment is not final.

991 a 992°

' L
270 So.2d 124 270 S$0.2d 125
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Michael BAZLEY Robert HARRISON
: ve ve
c. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi- Cc. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al. ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 53043. No. 53049.
Dec. 21, 1972. Dee. 21, 1972.

Writs refused. Considering the return Pe

of the trial judge that the application for © Writ denied. Since the district judge has
habeas corpus was withdrawn, application granted the relief sought, the issue present-

is moot, ed is moot.
|
270 So.2d 125 L
STATE of Louisiana ex ret. 270 So.24 125
John FULFORD
John FULFORD
ve

ve

Honorable Ear! VERON, Judge, Ad Hoc,
15th Judicial District Court, Lafay-

No. 53047. ette, Louisiana,

C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.

Dee. 21, 1972. No. 53050.

Po been
Writ denied. The showing made does
not entitle the applicant to the relief sought.

993
Writs refused. We have considered the

written return of the trial judge and

conclude that his ruling is correct.

270 So.2d 125

Benedict DAVID
. v.
The HOME INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 53051.

Dec. 21, 1972.

Not considered. The application was not
timely filed. See Art. 7, Sect. 11, La.Const,
a

Ll
270 $0.24 126

STATE of Louisiana ex rel.
Thankful FEAZEL

ve
C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary, et al.
No. 53057.

Dee. 21, 1972.

Writ refused. The relator previously ap-
pealed his case to this Court. See State v.
Feazel, 263 La. 134, 267 So.2d 548 (1972).
In this petition relator reurges matters al-
This he
cannot do. See State ex rel. Barksdale v.
Dees, 252 La, 434, 211 So.2d 318.

ready disposed of in the appeal.

995 P| 996

' Z
270 So.2d 126 270 So0.2d 126
Frank GALMICHE, Administrator of the Elsie Cecile DOBARD, wife of Anthony
Estate of Linda Galmiche L, PALAMA
ve ve
John R. SMITH, and Transportation Anthony L. PALAMA.
Vehicles, Inc.
No. 53061.
No. 53055.
Dee. 21, 1972.
Dec. 21, 1972.

Writ refused. There is no error of law Application denied; the judgment is
in the judgment. correct,

8
a

998

270 So0.2d 484

STATE of Louisiana
v.
James Charles CURRY.

No. 51690.
June 29, 1972.
Dissenting Opinion July 6, 1972.

On Rehearing Dee. 20, 1972.

—+—.

F. Pierre Livaudais, Marian M. Livau-
dais, Covington, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., War-
ren Mouledoux, Asst. Atty. Gen. LeRoy A.
Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen Wood-
row W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., Julian J. Rod-
rigue, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-ap-
pellee,

SUMMERS, Justice.

James Charles Curry was indicted by
the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish
for the murder of Mildred Acosta. He
pled not guilty, was tried, convicted and
sentenced to death, His appeal presents
three principal contentions. La.R.S. 14:-

30.
I

A bill of exceptions was reserved to the
denial of a defense motion to quash the
indictment on the allegation that the death

penalty was unconstitutional. After sen-

1. U.S.Const. amend. VIII: “Bxcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive _

fines imposed, nor eruet and unuswal pun-
ishment inflicted.”

1000

tencing, a bill of exceptions was reserved
to the imposition of the death penalty in
response to the verdict of “Guilty as
Charged” rendered by the jury. Punish-
ment by death in Louisiana is by electro-

cution as prescribed by statute. La. 15:-
569.
The attack upon the death’ sentence

is based upon the prohibition against in-
fliction of “cruel and unusual punishment”
within the contemplation of the Federal
and State Constitutions. U.S.Const. 8th
amend. and 14th amend.; La.Const. art.
1 § 12. We find no merit to the conten-
tion.

The control of crime and the fixing of
punishment is a legislative matter. Our
only inquiry can be whether, in a consti-
tutional sense, the death penalty is cruel
and unusual, The question has been an-
swered by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States and by this Court. And, since
the pertinent clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution is
identical with Section 12 of Article I of
the Louisiana Constitution, we are per-
suaded by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court interpreting the
Eighth Amendment when we consider the
meaning of Section 12 of Article I of the
Louisiana Constitution,

La.Const. art. 1 § 12: “Ixcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ment inflicted...

1001

_ Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 10 S.Ct. 930,
34 L.Ed. 519 (1880), is a case in which
the United States Supreme Court, in up-
holding the constitutionality of the death
penaliy, said:

Punishments are cruel when they in-
volve torture or lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel within
the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution, It implies there something

inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.

Again the holding in Kemmler was up-
held in State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374,
91 L.Ed, 422 (1947), the Court saying:

The cruelty against which the Con-
stitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of pun-
ishment, not the necessary suffering in-
volved in any method employed to ex-
tinguish life humanely.

The traditional humanity of modern
Anglo American law forbids the inflic-
tion of unnecessary pain in the execu-
tion of the death sentence.

These clear and succinct holdings, where
execution of the death penalty by electro-
cution was involved, leave the interpreta~
tion of the United States Constitution set-
tled. See also Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793
(1910); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
25 L.Ed, 345 (1878).

1002

In this State this Court has repeatedly
rejected the contention that the death pen-
alty is cruel and unusual punishment with-
in the meaning of Article I, Section 12
of the Louisiana Constitution. Recently
in State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So.2d
382 (1971), the settled construction of
Louisiana’s Constitution was summarized:

This contention is devoid of merit so
far as this Court is concerned. In State
v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473
(1969), we concluded, in disposing of a
similar plea involving aggravated rape,
that the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment re-
fers to those punishments that are “bar-
barous” and “extraordinary” and shock
that
electrocution is a common method of ad-
ministering the death penalty, and that
“. . . its constitutionality has been
consistently upheld.”

constitutional

the conscience of civilized man;

On the basis of these decisions and State
v. Myers, 261 La. 100, 259 So.2d 27 (1972) ;
State v. Williams, 255 La. 79, 229 So.2d
706 (1970); State v. Crook, 253 La. 961,
221 So.2d 473 (1969); State ex rel, Barks-
dale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318
(1968) ; State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69
So.2d 738 (1954); and State ex rel, Fran-
cis v. Resweber, 212 La. 143, 31 So.2d 697
(1947), we find the contention of appel-
lant to be without merit. If these long-
settled interpretations of the Constitutions
are to be upset the fundamental law or-

1008

dains that amendments are the prescribed
procedure. U.S.Const. art. V; La.Const.

art, 21 § 1.

I.

In presenting his opening statement to
the jury, the assistant district attorney
stated: “He (the defendant) then told Otis
Armstrong, he said, ‘I don’t have to kill

You're in this with me’” Previ-

you.
ously, in response to a motion for a bill
of particulars, the State’s attorney replied
that the State was not in possession of in-
culpatory statements. And, at a hearing
on a motion to suppress inculpatory state-
ments, the State’s attorney denied that the
State had inculpatory statements in its pos-
Again, the State denied the ex-
istence of inculpatory statements in re-
sponse to a prayer for oyer. Later, dur-

ing the trial, the State’s witness Otis Arm-

session,

strong testified as follows:

Question: Did Curry threaten you in
any way after you got home?

Answer: Not after we got home, he
didn’t, not right then, But I was threat-
‘ened by Curry and some of his friends,
later on.

Question: What did Curry say?

If I said anything, that I

would be taken care of.

Answer:

Defense counsel objected to the opening
statement and to the questions and answers
of Armstrong at the trial, The objections

1004.

were overruled by the trial judge. He was.
of the opinion that the statements were:
part of the res gestae.

Defense counsel argue that the prosecu~
tor’s opening statement placed an inculpa~
tory statement of the accused before the
jury contrary to express prohibitions con-
tained in Articles 767 and 768 of the Code
and the subse-
quent admission of these inculpatory state-

of Criminal Procedure;

ments in evidence was improper and fur-
nish grounds for a new trial. Those ar-

ticles provide:

Art. 767: The state shall not, in the
opening statement, advert in any way to
a confession or inculpatory statement
made by the defendant.

Art. 768: If the state intends to intro-.
duce a confession or inculpatory state-
ment in evidence, it shall so advise the
defendant in writing prior to the be-~
ginning of the state’s opening state-
ment. If it fails to do so a confession
or inculpatory statement shall not be ad~

missible in evidence.

HM Clearly, then, the issue turns upon
whether the remarks of the State’s attor-
ney in the opening statement before the
jury and the statement elicited from the
State witness Armstrong were inculpatory
statements or part of the res gestae. If
the statements are part of the res gestae
they are not subject to the restrictions-an-
nounced in Articles 767 and 768 ‘of the.

1005

Code, but, to the contrary, as res gestae they
are always admissible. La.R.S. 15:447.

This Court had occasion to consider this
question in State y. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231
So.2d 360 (1970), where a conversation
which led to the purchase of marijuana
was at issue. In holding that the conver-
sation was part of the res gestae and not
subject to the requirements of Article 768
‘of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we
said:

As used in Article 768, the term in-
culpatory statement refers to the out-of-
court admission of incriminating facts
made by a defendant after the crime
has been committed. It relates to past
Thus the article has

no application to the conversation result-

events . . .

ing in the sale of marijuana in the pres-
ent case.

Res gestae, on the other hand, is defined
as follows:

Res gestae are events speaking for
themselves under the immediate pres-
sure of the occurrence, through the in-
structive (instinctive),
spontaneous words and acts of the par-
ticipants, and not the words of the par-

impulsive and

ticipants when narrating the events.
What forms any part of the res gestae
is always admissible in evidence, (La.

RS, 15:447),

To constitute res gestae the circum-
stances and declarations must be neces-

1006

sary incidents of the criminal act, or
immediate concomitants of it, or form
in conjunction with it one continuous
transaction. (La.R.S. 15:448).

HI The facts of this case show that
the defendant raped and shot a woman and
shot her two children in an isolated wood-
ed area. The statements objected to were
uttered almost immediately after defend-
ant and Armstrong covered the bodies of
the victims with branches and twigs. The
conversation between Armstrong and the
defendant was an immediate concomitant
of the slaying and the effort to conceal
the bodies of the victims, all of which
formed one continuous transaction. In our
view these statements were clearly part of
the res gestae, And the defense conten-
tion is without merit. State v. Lacoste,
256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970); State
v. Kreller, 255 La. 982, 233 So.2d 906
(1970); State v, Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221
So.2d 484 (1969).

HMM In Louisiana the res gestae rule
has been broadened rather than restricted,
The tendency has been favorably regard-
ed by the courts because the ultimate ob-
ject of the introduction of all evidence is
the ascertainment of facts as a reasonable
means of ascertaining the truth. Conse-
quently, acts and declarations have been
brought within the doctrine if they are
connected with, and grow out of, the act
or transaction in such a way as to form

1007

one continuous transaction, provided they,
in some way illustrate, elucidate, qualify
or characterize the act, and, in a legal
sense, are a part of it. As a result, inci-
dents offered as res gestae may be sepa-
rated from the act by a lapse of time more
or less appreciable, provided they grow out
of and are in a legal sense immediately
connected with the litigated act. State v.
Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967);
State v., Raymond, 258 La, 1, 245 So.2d
335; State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199
So.2d 867 (1967).

In.

‘The next contention is based upon the
following minute entry:

On voir dire examination of the pro-
Spective juror, Rufus Alexander, Jr., the
State challenged for cause on the ground
that the juror was prejudiced and did
not believe in capital punishment and
was unable to bring back a verdict of
“Guilty as Charged” even in the event
the State proved its case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, which challenge was
granted by the Court, and objected to
by counsel for defendant, reserving a
Bill of Exception, making the entire ve-
nire, the questions to the juror, the chal-
lenge by the State, the defense objec-
tion, and the ruling of the Court basis
for said Bill. ,

Defense counsel predicate their objection
on an: alleged failure to properly apply

1608

Article 798 of the Code of Criminal’ Pro-
cedure, as recently amended to embody the
rule enunciated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct, 1770,,20 L-Ed.2d 776
(1968). ‘The pertinent part of the article
as amended reads:

It is good cause for challenge on the
part of the state, but not on the part of
the defendant, that:

(2) The juror tendered ina capital case
who has conscientious scruples against
the infliction of capital punishment and
makes it unmistakeably clear (a) that he
would automatically vote against the im-
position of capital punishment without
regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial of the case before
him, or (b) that his attitude toward the
death penalty would prevent him from
making impartial decision as to the de-
fendant’s guilt . . . . (La.Code
Crim.Proc. art, 798).

In substance the defense contention is
that this amendment places the burden of
proof on the State to show that’ the ve-
niremen so excused for cause are incapable
of impartially hearing the evidence before
them. In support of this argument it is
asserted that the quoted minute entry is
the only record of excusing the juror. The
testimony of the prospective juror and voir
dire questions were not transcribed and are.

1009

cnot in the record. Under these circum-
stances it is asserted the State has failed
“to sustain its burden so far as the record
4s concerned.

In reply the State’s attorney asserts in
its brief that he tried the case and knows
that each juror was questioned in accord-
ance with the rule of the Witherspoon Case
and Article 798 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. He states emphatically “that
each individual who was challenged for
cause by the State had categorically de-
clared that under no circumstances would
“he ever consider the death penalty in his
deliberations; that it would be excluded
automatically,

Moreover, citing Article 800 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, the State contends
the erroneous allowance to the State of
a challenge for cause does not afford the
defendant a ground for complaint, unless
‘the effect of such ruling is the exercise by
the State of more peremptory challenges
than it is entitled to by law.

HMMM Needless to say, we are unable
‘to accept the statements in brief of the
State’s attorney concerning the testimony
of the prospective juror on voir dire. And,
notwithstanding the fact that Article 798
may place the burden of proof upon the
State, a question we do not decide, the bur-
den of preserving the matters which form
the basis for a bill of exceptions and the
“burden of incorporating them into a for-
‘mal bill lies with the party making the ob-

1010
jection and reserving the bill. La.Code
Crim.Proc. arts, 843-844. Although in. a
case where the death sentence has been
imposed this Court may, to promote the
ends of justice, consider bills that have
not been timely signed by the trial judge,
this Court cannot, and will not, pass upon
a defense contention unsupported by a bill,
or at least the testimony which presents
the issue. No showing has been made that

this evidence could not be obtained, —

In any event, there is merit in the State’s
contention that there is no evidence that
the State had exhausted its peremptory
challenges, or that excusing Alexander for
cause actually gave the State another chal-
lenge after all of the peremptory challeng-
es had been exhausted. La.Code Crim.
Proc. art. 800.

The conviction and sentence are affirm-
ed. .

BARHAM, J, dissents and will assign
reasons.

DIXON, J., concurs.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

The principal contention made by able
counsel, who were appointed by this court
to perfect this out-of-time appeal, is that
the imposition of the death penalty on this
defendant
United States Constitution, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and Louisiana
Constitution Article I, Section 12. Fully

is unconstitutional under the

1011

supporting counsel’s contention is the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decision handed
down this day in Furman v. Georgia, 404
ULS. 812, 92 S.Ct. 113, 30 L-Ed.2d 42, See
also Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S.
845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 LEd.2d 744 (June
29, 1972).
expressed by all five of the majority con-

Our case falls within the views

curring opinions in Furman,

We are required under those holdings to
set aside the sentence of the defendant
James Charles Curry and remand to the
trial court for sentence in conformity with
these pronouncements. We have previous-
ly utilized this procedure of setting aside
a death sentence and remanding for im-
position of proper sentence where the
death sentence (though not the conviction)
was invalid under Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L-Ed.2d
776 (1968). Such a procedure should be
followed here. See State v. Shaffer, 260
La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971); State v.
Duplessis, 260 La. 644, 257 So.2d 135
971).

T respectfully dissent.

On Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

‘The defendant was convicted of mur-
der, La.R.S.14:30 and was given the death
sentence. We affirmed the conviction (see
the original opinion), However a rehear-
ing was granted to determine the validity
of the death sentence imposed herein,

1612

HMI After this appeal was taken, the:
United States Supreme Court decided Fur--
man y. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct, 2726,
33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which holds that the:
imposition of the death penalty under stat-
utes similar to Louisiana’s constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ac-
cordingly, we remand this case to the 22nd
Judicial District Court, with instructions to
the judge to sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment, State v, Franklin, 263 La.
344, 268 So.2d 249.

Case remanded.

270 So.2a 489

STATE of Louisiana
. ve
Donald JONES and Ronald Jones.

No. 51651.
June 29, 1972,
Dissenting Opinion July 6, 1972,

On Rehearing Dee. 20, 1972,

1017

Wayne Douglas Mancuso, Greenberg,
Cohen & Dallam, Nathan Greenberg, Gret-
na, for defendants-appellants,

1. “Aggravated rape is a rape committed
where the sexual intercourse is deemed
to be without the lawful consent of the
female because it is committed under
any one or more of the following cireum-
stances:

“(1) Where the female resists the act to
the utmost, but her resistance is overcome
by force.

O18

William J. Guste, Jr, Atty. Gen. Le-
Roy A. Hartley, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., John
M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty, Gordon K.
Konrad, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-
appellee.

HAMLIN, Justice:

Donald Jones appeals from his conviction
of aggravated rape, LSA-R.S. 14:42 and
his sentence to life imprisonment in the
Louisiana State Penitentiary; Ronald
Jones appeals from his conviction of ag-
gravated rape, LSA-R.S. 14:421 and his
sentence to death by electrocution, Thir-
teen bills of exceptions were reserved dur-
ing the proceedings; they are presented
for our consideration.

. The instant rapes were committed on one
victim. The State charged that the de-
fendants, twin brothers, each committed
rape, one offense immediately following
the commission of the other, Separate in-
dictments charging aggravated rape were
filed by the Jefferson Parish Grand Jury
against each defendant; the prosecutions,
however, were consolidated for trial. Each
defendant had and still has separate coun-

“(2) Whore she is prevented from re-
sisting the act by threats of great and im-
mediate bodily harm, accompanied by ap-
parent power of execution.

“(8) ‘Where she is under the age of
twelve years. Lack of knowledge of the

* female’s age shall not be a defense.

. “Whoever commits the crime of aggra-
vated rape shall be punished by death.”
LSA-R.S, 14:42.

1019

‘sel, and herein, in brief, counsel for Ron-
ald Jones states:

“All bills of exception concerning alleged
errors committed during the course of
the trial were reserved in behalf of both
defendants regardless of what counsel
made the objection and reserved the bill
and all issues raised in behalf of one de-
fendant were urged for the other defend-
ant.

“Mr. Nathan Greenberg, designated at-
torney for Donald Jones has previously
submitted a brief in behalf of the defend-
ant, Donald Jones, and said brief has been
answered by the State.

“The present brief is being presented in
behalf of the defendant, Ronald Jones.

“Because ali issues and objections were
urged in behalf of both defendants, coun-
sel for Ronald Jones is adopting the brief
submitted in behalf of Donald Jones by
Mr. Greenberg, and is attaching hereto,
making a part hereof a copy of said
brief and also, submitting an additional
brief in behalf of Ronald Jones urging
further written argument in his behalf
with regard to the death sentence im-
posed and the composition of the Grand
Jury that indicted the defendants and the
Petit Jury that convicted them.

“The first eleven bills of exceptions and
the argument thereto as enunciated in the
brief by Mr. Greenberg in behalf of Don-
ald Jones are incorporated herein in their

1020

entirety and presented in behalf of the
defendant, Ronald Jones.

“Additional argument will be added to
supplement Bills of Exceptions No. 10
and 11 and written argument will be sub-
mitted for Bills of Exceptions No. 12 and
13 regarding the denial of the post trial
motion to set aside the verdict on the
ground of the illegal composition of the
Grand and Petit Juries.

“Because Bill of Exception No. 10 deals
with capital punishment and Bill of Ex-
ception No. 11 concerns itself with the
denial of a motion for a new trial, one
of the grounds being various aspects of
capital punishment and its application
in the instant matter. Separate argu-
ments on each would overlap in many
areas. Therefore, in order to avoid un-
necessary duplication and to handle the
matter in a more orderly fashion, argu-
ments froms Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10
and 11 will be combined.”

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served when the trial judge overruled de-
fendants’ motion for a mis-trial and their
motion to set aside the selection of the
jury. ,

The prosecuting witness was present in
the courtroom during the selection of the
jury; counsel for defendants aver that
she was sitting directly in front of the per-

1021

sons being selected, and that she appeared
to be crying and/or wiping her eyes. They
contend that the trial judge committed
prejudicial error by not granting their mo-

_tion for a mis-trial, and that defendants
were prejudiced by the actions of the prose-
cuting witness.

In denying the motion for a mis-trial,
the trial judge stated: “I find nothing in
the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article
770 which refers to mandatory mistrials or
Article 775 which refers to mistrials in the
discretion of the Court which warrants the
maintaining of the motion, I deny it.” His
per curiam to the instant bill recites in part:
“While the record reflects defense coun-
sel’s motion, the jury had been empaneled
without objection. Further, there was no
demonstration or outburst noticeable to the
Court which would have identified the vic-
tim or in any way influenced the jurors
examined or empaneled.”

“e * * The safe-

guards relating to the integrity of the
criminal process attend every stage of a

constitutional

criminal proceeding, starting with arrest
and culminating with a trial ‘in a courtroom

presided over by a judge’ Rideau v.

2. “The second Dill of exception was reserv-
ed to an outburst of grief on the part
of the widow of the man whom the de-
fendant had killed. While a witness was
identifying the clothing worn by the de-
ceased at the time of the homicide, the
widow, with an infant on her lap, sitting
immediately in front of the jury, caused
an interruption of the trial by giving vent

1022

Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727, 83 S.Ct. 1417,
1419, 10 L-Ed.2d 663. There can be no
doubt that they embrace the fundamental
conception of a fair trial, and that they
exclude influence or domination by either
a hostile or friendly mob. * * *” Cox
v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct.
476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965). However, the
misconduct of a spectator, in open court,
during the progress of a murder trial, fur-
nishes no ground for the discharge of the
jury, unles it be of such a nature as to have
necessarily influenced the verdict of con-
viction, State v. Wimby, 119 La. 139, 43
So. 984 (1907). Cf. State v. Chinn, 229 La.
984, 87 So.2d 315.

We do not find that the defendants were
prejudiced by the conduct of the victim.
‘There is no testimony attached to the re-
served bills to the effect that there was.
any demonstration on the part of the vic~
tim, or that she gave vent to a vocal emo-
tional outburst. We conclude that there
was no need for discharging the jury; the
trial judge maintained the integrity of the
instant prosecution, and defendants suffer-
ed no violation of their constitutional rights.
See, Arts. 770 and 775, LSA-C.Cr.P.; State
vy. Williamson, 145 La. 9, 81 So. 7372

to her emotious and crying aloud in court.
‘The attorneys for defendant objected and
protested that her display of grief was cal-
culated to arouse sympathy for the widow
and child and create prejudice against
the defendant in the mind of the jury.
It is recited in the bill of exception that
the judge promptly heeded the protest of
the attorneys for defendant,. had the sher-

1023

Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was al-
legedly reserved when the trial judge over
the objection of defense counsel permitted
Mrs. Juanita Ancarrow, a neighbor of the
victim at the time of the commission of the
instant offense, to testify as follows:

Now, at that time—how long did
Mrs. Gallo and you talk, approximately, in
the back—on your back porch?

“A. Oh, approximately fifteen, twenty
minutes.

“Q. And during that time, did you see
or hear anything which may have been un-
usual?

“A. I thought I glanced someone walk
across Mrs. Gallo’s driveway.

“MR. MANCUSO:

“Wait. I’m going to object, Your Honor.
Vd like a clarification. Did she or did she
not see someone.

“THE COURT:

“You heard the objection to the question
and it is quite proper.

iff take the woman out of the courtroom,
and instructed the jury to pay no atten-
tion to her display of grief and not allow
it to influence them in any manner what-
ever. It appears, therefore, that all that
the defendant’s attorneys requested was
done to avoid any harmful effect of the
widow’s outburst of grief, and we cannot
presume that the jury did not obey the

1024
“Did you or did you not?
“THE WITNESS:

“TI thought I had a glimpse of someone,
that’s all.

“MR. MANCUSO:

“Your Honor, ’m going to object once
again. I would like—did she see someone or
did she not see someone. I think that’s a
simple question.

“MR. MAMOULIDES:

“Q. Did you see anyone you could recog-
nize?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. Is there any question that you saw
what was a person?

“A, No, sir. I couldn’t say.
“Q. Did you see more than one?
“A. Person? No, sir.

“Q. Now, when you say you saw this
person near Mrs. Gallo’s—

“MR. MANCUSO:

“Wait, I'm going to object again, Your
Honor. I’m not certain in my mind if Mrs.
Ancarrow saw anybody. That’s why I
wanted the point clarified.

judge’s instruction. ‘The attorneys did
not ask that the jury be discharged and a
mistrial entered in the case, and we do
not think the defendant would have been.
entitled to that relief if it had beon
demanded. The occurrence complained
of is not a cause for setting aside the ver-
dict.” State v. Williamson, 81 So. at
p. 738.

1025
“MR. MAMOULIDES:
“I think she answered that, Your Honor.
“THE COURT:

“She said she saw someone, I believe,
didn’t she?

“MR. MAMOULIDES:

“Q. Js your backyard or your back porch
facing the Gallo residence?

“A, No, sir; it doesn’t.

“Q. Do you have a clear view of her
- driveway, Mrs. Gallo’s driveway?

" ““A> Té Pm turned at an angle, yes.
“Q. And this was after—
“MR. MANCUSO:

“Your
object.
question.

Honor—that’s—I’m going to
That's the beginning of a leading

“MR. MAMOULIDES:

“Q. Was this before or after your chil-
‘dren had been picked up by the bus?

“A. After.

“Q. How long after this did Mrs. Gallo
leave your presence?

“A. Well fifteen or twenty minutes; I’m
not positive.

“Q. How long after you saw this per-
son?

“A. Oh, probably ten minutes,”

In later testimony, Mrs. Ancarrow testi-

fied that after the above transpired, she
De

1026

left her porch to put out her.trash. (With
respect to time, this was after the commis-
sion of the alleged rapes.) She saw two
boys standing in the driveway; she also
saw the victim and two of her children
standing in their yard. Mrs. Ancarrow
stated that she would not recognize the
boys if she saw them again.

At the time of reserving this alleged bill,
counsel for the defendants argued that since
Mrs. Ancarrow could not identify either of
the defendants, the testimony objected to
was prejudicial, speculative, and not entitled
to any weight.

Herein, counsel submit that the above tes-
timony by itself was not corroborative of
anything, and was so speculative and con-
jectural that it should not have been ad-
mitted. They argue: “This witness was
unable to say who the person was and ad-
mitted that she saw no one that she could
recognize, The inference from her testi-
mony, of course, is that someone was go-
ing across the driveway before Mrs. Gallo
returned to her home, and that someone
must have been one of the defendants.
The testimony standing alone does not prove
anything; however, the testimony in the
light of Mrs. Gallo’s testimony creates the
inference that one of the defendants was
walking across Mrs. Gallo’s driveway, and
that one of the defendants therefore laid
in wait for her in her house before she
returned to her home, The inference in
the light of the lack of knowledge of the

1027

witness is entirely too speculative and con-
jectural to even be admissible; nevertheless
the testimony was admitted over objection.
‘The testimony does not relate to any of
the defendants except by inference, and
its admissibility could only serve to cre-
ate a prejudicial inference insofar as these
defendants were concerned.”

The State submits that although defense
counsel objected to the above testimony,
they did not reserve a formal bill of ex-
ceptions; it is contended that defense
counsel should not now complain. City
of Baton Rouge v. Van Valkenburg, 259
La, 23, 249 So.2d 189; LSA-C.Cr.P. Art.
841.

The trial court felt that defense counsel
had reserved a bill because it wrote a per
curiam thereto, It stated in part: “The
testimony attached to the bill shows that
whatever apparent conflict there was be-
tween her answers was clearly before the
jury. The jury’s resolution, if any were
needed, of the issue was clearly within their
province as trier of fact.
the Court can see no prejudice to the de-
fendant.”

In any event,

Accepting the fact that a bill was re-
served, we find that the bill has no merit.
Both defendants testified during trial and
admitted that they were present on the vic-
tim’s premises on the day of the commis-
sion of the alleged crimes. Under such cir-
cumstances, defendants could not have suf-

1028

fered prejudice by the admission in evidence
of Mrs. Ancarrow’s testimony supra.

Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is without mer-
it,

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO, 3

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was re-
served when the trial court would not per-
mit Anna Lewis, a defense witness and
maid for Mrs. Constance C. Coogan, a
neighbor of the victim, to use a diagram,
previously entered in evidence, to reorient
herself and facilitate her testimony with
respect to the position of the car in which
the defendants were riding on the day of the
commission of the instant offense.

Counsel for the defendants submit that
the failure of the trial court to permit the
witness to testify from the diagram con-
stituted prejudicial error.

We find no merit in this bill and adopt
the following per curiam of the trial judge
as our reasons for such finding:

“This bill was reserved when a defense
witness, Mrs. Anna Lewis, was denied per-
mission to use, in connection with her tes-
timony, a diagram drawn by the prosecut-
ing witness. The ostensible purpose of the
requested use of the diagram was that she
might orient herself as to the position of
the defendant's car with relation to the
The denial of the use
of the diagram for this purpose could in
no way have prejudiced the defendant, there

front of the house.

1029

having remained numerous other ways in
which she might have oriented herself, if
indeed such orientation was necessary. In-
deed, the witness had previously testified
that she could not remember the direction
in which the car was pointing, and it is
extremely difficult to see how such a dia-
gram could help her. No request was made
that she be allowed to draw her own dia-
gram.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 3 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 4

TI Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was re-
served when the trial judge, June 23, 1970,
refused to continue the present trial until
the next morning.

The following colloquy transpired with
respect to the reservation of the instant
bill:

“MR. GREENBERG:

“Your Honor, please, we had planned to
call three character witnesses and we were
just informed that our other two left. So,
we are sorry. We are sort of caught short
here with reference to three character wit-
I believe that the only other wit-
nesses that we would have to put on would
be the Defendants and I’m sure that their
testimony will be quite lengthy.

“THE COURT:

nesses.

“Tt doesn’t make any difference. I’ve

got a long night ahead of me no matter

1030

what happens, Mr. Greenberg. Let’s pro-
ceed. We are going to proceed with this
case.

“MR. MANCUSO:

“Your Honor, in behalf of the Defend-
ant Ronald Jones, I would move that the
matter be continued into tomorrow. It’s
now 7:00 o'clock. We have been here all
This is the crux of the Defense’s
We know that each of them will be
on the stand at least approximately an
hour apiece and there is no telling how long
they will be subject to cross examination.

day.

case.

“THE COURT:

“That's all speculative. Let’s find out.

Let’s get started.
“MR. MANCUSO:

“I don’t know how Mr, Greenberg and
the State feels right now, and I’m some-
what tired and I don’t feel that I’m at my
best at this particular moment and I would
like to have the opportunity, since this is
such a grave matter, to at least be at my
I don’t think
I could be as competent as I would like to
be under these circumstances, after sitting
in here all day in Court. If we will be
here at least another three or four hours,
if the Defendants have to take the stand, I
respectfully request the Court continue this
matter so we can start bright and early
in the morning, and when everyone is fresh.

best on direct examination.

- 1031
“MR, MAMOULIDES:
“T object. .
“THE COURT:

“I deny the motion to continue the mat-
ter.”

Herein, counsel for the defendants sub-
mit:

“Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was taken to
the failure of the Court to allow a con-
tinuance of the matter at 7:00 o’clock p. m.,
when defendants were having trouble hav-
ing their witnesses appear to ‘testify, and
the Court insisted upon proceeding with
the trial. The Court ruled that the trial
should continue, notwithstanding request by
defense counsel for a continuance, and de-
clined to continue the case to the follow-
ing morning. Although we are aware of
the decision of State v. Skinner, 251 La.
300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967), which at first
blush may appear to be against the posi-
tion advocated by the defense, we respect-
fully. submit that the circumstances herein
warranted a continuance for the reason that
counsel for defendants were having dif-
ficulty getting their witnesses to court, and
at that time of night, the entire side of the
case-from a defense standpoint had to be
put on; as well as the argument. No harm
would: have been done by continuing the
matter to the following day. All parties
concerned including the jury had to return
the following morning anyway for the pur-
pose of rendition of the verdict, and the

1082
continuance from 7:00 o’clock p. m., that’
night to 9:00 or 10:00 a. m, on the fol:
lowing morning may well have constituted
the difference between defendants being
found guilty or not guilty herein.”

An application for a continuance shall be
by written motion, LSA-C.Cr.P., Art. 707;
the instant motion was not in writing, but
under the circumstances as presented su-
pra, defense counsel undoubtedly must have
felt that their verbal motion would suffice
since it was in the nature of a motion for

a recess.

“A motion for continuance, if timely filed,
may be granted, in the discretion of the
court, in any case if there is good groind
LSA-C.Cr.P., Art. 712. The
granting or refusing of a continuance in a
criminal case’ rests in the sound discretion
of the trial judge, and his ruling will not
be disturbed except where his discretion

therefor.

has been arbitrarily or unreasonably abused.
State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d
370; State v. Jones, 249 La. 324, 186 So.2d
608. Cf. State v. Lewis, 255 La. 623, 232
So.2d 294.” State v. Richardson, 258 La.
62, 245°So.2d 357 (1971).

We have read the defendants’ testimony
which was adduced near the end of trial.
It is lengthy and asserts their innocence;
they admitted to having relations with
the prosecuting witness but averred that
no rape was committed; they testified in
detail.with respect to her averred consent.
Nowhere in defendants’ testimony is there

1033
any reflection of fatigue or undue prolonga-
tion of trial.

Counsel for the defendants did not falter *

in presenting the defendants’ testimony;
they were alert and competent in their ques-

tioning. They did not show the materiality

of the testimony of the absent character
esses, but their representation of the

defendants was capable and efficient.

Under the circumstances presented in
this bill, we conclude that the refusal of
the trial judge to grant a continuance or a
recess was neither arbitrary nor unreason-
able. He states in his per curiam:

“This bill was reserved under thé fol-
lowing circumstances. At approximately
9:00 p. m. counsel for defendants arrived
at the point in their case where it became
necessary, to place the defendants on the
stand, the latter having agreed to testify
on behalf of themselves. Defense counsel
sought a recess until the morrow on the
grounds that the expected direct and cross-
examination would be lengthy and that de-
fense counsel would be more alert in the
morning. As pointed out by the Court-in
itsertiling at the time, any projection as to
the fength of time the defendants would be
on the stand was in the realm of specula-
tion. Even if it can be said that by the
nature of things one loses a certain amount
of mental alertness toward the end of a
considerably rigorous day, it does not fol-
low that such loss, if any, would be’ stib-

stantial to the degree necessary to preju- °

1084,
The ‘Court
knows of no constitutional mandate which
directs the recess of a criminal trial upon
the complaint of a defense attorney’s being
‘somewhat tired’. The Court, saw,
sees, no merit to the bill. State v. Skiné
ner, 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370.”

dice the cause of a defendant.

Bill of Exceptions No. 4 is without mer-,
it.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 5

| | Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was’ re=
served when the trial court refused to per-°
mit the! utilization of defendant Donald’
Jones’ entire testimony given to the Grand
Jury prior to trial, in evidence.

On cross examination, Donald Jones tes-
tified that he and his brother left the prose-
cuting witness’ house and walked to: hig
car; he said that the hood of the car res
mained raised while he was in the house
and before entering the car, he put the
hood down, The District Attorney then
asked Donald if he remembered testifying
before the Grand Jury, and he said that he
did. The District Attorney stated to the
trial court that the State intended to use
the Grand Jury testimony’ where it was in
direct conflict with the testimony of the
witness. Defense counsel then urged that
the entire Grand Jury testimony, which had
been given to thém, prior to trial, be of. |
fered in evidence, During colloquy, thg,,,
District Attorney stated: “I intend to use,
at this time, one portion, on page 63, con-

1085

“cerning the hood of the automobile. When

it was up and when it was down and when
he put it down to show the inconsistent
statements.” The trial court said that it
thought that the offering was premature,
and defense counsel stated: “I’m not de-
nying that he has a right to impeachment.
All I’m saying is that he is going to try to
“use isolated parts to impeach him, I’d like
the whole thing in.” The court ruled that
defense counsel could use any part of the
Grand Jury testimony to rehabilitate the
witness, and it would rule in defense coun-
sel’s favor, and it was willing to go through
the whole thing. Impeachment was permit-
ted, and the following testimony was ad-
duced:

“Q. Now Mr. Jones, you testified on di-
rect testimony that you voluntarily appear-
ed before the Grand Jury and testified, is
that correct?

“A, Yes, sir.

“Q. At that time you had advice of
Counsel? You knew you didn’t have to
testify, is that correct?

“A. Yes, sir.
\

“Q. Do you remember the date that this

testimony was given?

“A, No, sir.

“Q. If I told you it was October 4th,
1969, would that refresh your memory at
all?

“A. Yes, sir.

a
“Q, Would that be about right?

1036

“A. Yes, about that. It was about that
time, I think.

“Q. Pm going to refer you to page 163
[63] of the transcript of the Grand Jury
testimony in which one of the jurors of the
Grand Jury asked you the question:

“QUESTION: ‘Before you went in the
house, did you lower the hood on your
car?’

“And, your answer was:

“Ves?

“The next question was:

“You did?”

“ANSWER: ‘Yes.’

“Q. Now, I ask you again, a few min-
utes ago you testified that you left the hood
up for the entire time and you were sure
of that. Do you wish to change that tes-
timony now? You were under oath, when
you testified before the Grand Jury?

“A. Yes, I was. I can’t remember word
for word what I said.

“Q. At this time, you testified in the
Grand Jury in October, 1969, it was less
than two months after your arrest, is that
correct?

“A. Yes, sir.”

Herein, counsel for the defendant sub-
mit:

“Your Honors will note that the State
used isolated portions of the Grand Jury

1037

testimony. The defense interposed by both
of these defendants herein was consent of
the prosecutrix. Both defendants appear-
ed and testified before the Grand Jury and
in essence, confessed to the alleged crime,
although the said confession contained the
defense of consent alleged by both defend-
ants. We respectfully submit that the en-
tire Grand Jury testimony should have
been made available to the jury herein for
the reason that the utilization of isolated
portions of the testimony, considering’ the
nature of the testimony by the defendants,
was to deny the defense the provisions of
LS.A-R.S. 15:450, which provides:

“Every confession, admission or decla-
ration sought to be used against any one
must be used in its entirety, so that the
person to be affected thereby may have
the benefit of any exculpation or explana-
tion that the whole statement may afford’

“Your Honors will note that the State
herein sought to utilize a certain portion
or portions of the testimony of the defend-
ants before the Grand Jury against the de-
fendants. Whether these statements be
deemed to be a confession, admission or
declaration which the State seeks to use
against the defendants, according to the
statute, the defendants are entitled to the
benefit of the provisions of the statute,
which relate to the benefit of any exculpa-
tion or explanation that the whole state-

ment may afford. We respectfully sub-

mit that the statute in question was design-

1088

ed to cover this situation, where a portion
of the defendants’ statement or statements
is used, and where the defendants have been
denied the right to use those portions of
their statements which have reference to
exculpatory remarks, We respectfully sub-
mit that the failure to permit the utiliza-
tion of the entire testimony before the
Grand Jury was therefore prejudicial and
violative of the provisions of LSA-R.S.

15-450.”

We find that the defendants suffered no
prejudice by the trial court’s ruling. Only
a small part of the Grand Jury testimony
was used for the purpose of impeachment.
Defense counsel could have employed any
part of the Grand Jury testimony he de-
sired to use. No partiality was shown to
the State. The following per curiam of
the trial judge reflects that no reversible
error was committed:

“This bill was reserved when the Dis-
trict Attorney announced his intention to
use certain portions of ‘the testimony of
one of the defendants given to the Grand
Jury voluntarily to impeach his testimony
given at the trial. Reference to the tran-
script in connection with the bill will fairly
show that the District Attorney was per-
mitted by the Court to A) immediately at-
tempt impeachment after laying the proper
foundation, as to asserted inconsistencies
between his testimony of the trial and that
recorded at page 63 of his Grand Jury tes-
timony concerning the ‘hood of the anto-

1039

_Miobile’ ; and B) attempt further impeach-
ment, in the event it was warranted, and

after laying a proper foundation, on the
:basis of any other seeming inconsistencies
which might develop between his testimony
on cross-examination and his testimony pre-
viously given to the Grand Jury. The basis
of the objection was not (A) that all decla-
srations of the defendant made in the Grand
Jury Chamber relevant and germane to the
purportedly conflicting statements given at
the trial should be used, but rather it was
{B) that his entire testimony before the
Grand Jury should be admitted into evi-
dence. The Court therefore overruled the
objection.”

Bill of Exceptions No. § is without mer-
it.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 6

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was re-
served when the trial judge overruled de-
fense counsel’s objection to the following al-
legedly repetitious question propounded to
defendant Donald Jones on cross-examina-
tion:

* “Now, you testified earlier that after you
left the house you brought Ronald home
and you ran some other errands? What
other errands did you run?”

_..pefense counsel contends that overrul-
ing their objection to the above question
was prejudicial to the defendants.

1040

We find that the defendants suffered no
prejudice by the trial court’s ruling and
adopt its per curiam; which follows, as our
reasons:

“The objection was that the question was
repetitious, and the objection was overruled.
Perhaps as phrased the question did call
for a response which was to some extent
necessarily redundant and repetitious, but
the very phrasing of the question indicate:
that its purpose was to elicit new and addi-
tional information. If the question were

‘phrased without the perspicacity, precision,

and acuteness ideally to be contemplated,
that ‘ideal is seldom consistently obtained
in any trial. In any event, the question was
certainly within the realm of proper cross-
examination, and the defendants were not
prejudiced.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 6 is without mer-
it.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 7
AND 8

Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved
when the trial court overruled defense coun-
sel’s objection to the following question pro-
pounded to the defendant Ronald Jones on
cross-examination :

“Did your brother Donald Jones work
there too?” ,
Defense counsel contended that the in-

formation sought was not relevant evi-
dence, Herein, defense counsel states: “It

1041

would appear that LSA-R.S. 15:280 3 would
preclude this bill. However, for purposes
of the record, we respectfully reurge: this
Dill.”

Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved
when the trial court overruled defense coun-
sel’s objection to the following question
propounded to the defendant Ronald Jones
on cross-examination :

“What time did you have to get to work?”

Defense counsel contended that the in-
formation sought was not relevant and had
not been brought out on direct examination.
Herein, defense counsel states: “It would
appear that LSA-R.S. 15:280 would pre-
clude this bill. However, for purposes of
the record, we respectfully reurge this bill.”

HE During trial both defendants took
the witness stand and testified in their own
behalf.
were subject to cross-examination upon the
whole case. State v. Giles, 253 La. 533,
218 So.2d 585 (1969).

Under such circumstances, they

I The trial court committed no re-
versible error in overruling defense coun-
sel’s objections to the above questions. The

evidence sought was relevant and admissi-
dle.

3.

“When a witness has been intentionally
sworn and has testified to any single fact
in his examination in chief, he may be
cross-examined upon the whole case.”
LSA-RB.S. 15 :280

1042
Bills of Exceptions Nos, 7 and 8 are with- .
out merit,

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 9

HM Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was re-
served when the trial judge refused to
grant a continuance just prior to the argu-
ment of the State, approximately 12:00 mid-”
night, June 23, 1970.

The circumstances under which this bill
was reserved were as follows:

“THE COURT:

“We have reached a point in the trial,
gentlemen, where the next matter on the
agenda is the argument of the State, then
the Defendants and then the State and any
rebuttal it wishes to make.

“You gentlemen wish a short recess be- *
fore you begin your argument or are you
ready ?”

“MR. MANCUSO:

“No, Your Honor, I’m going to move
right for a continuance to come back in
the morning prior to closing argument.
We have had two very full days of trial |
with the witnesses and we have facts and
notes scattered all over here. It is going
to take, in order to present a logical [argu-

LSA-R.S. 15:462 provides: “When a
person accused, or a husband or wife be-
comes a witness, such witness shall be
subject to all the rules that apply to other
witnesses, and may be cross-examined ...,
upon the whole case.”

1043 a 1044

ment] to the jury, it will take some time
to accumulate these notes and put the

information together. I would like a con-
tinuance until 9:00 o’clock tomorrow
morning so we might prepare a closing
argument.”

Our reasons for finding no merit to Bill
of Exceptions No. 4 applies to the instant
bill. As stated supra, defense counsel ably
and competently represented the defendants,
and we find that they suffered no prejudice
by the late hour during which the instant
trial was conducted.

Bill of Exceptions No, 9 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 10

r Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was re-
served to the trial court’s charge to the jury
as to responsive verdicts for aggravated
rape; it was directed to the court’s instruc-
tion as to the death penalty, defense counsel
contending that the death penalty was cruel
and unusual punishment within the intend-
ment of the United States Constitution.

Herein defense counsel submit: “* *
One of the verdicts which is responsive to
the charge is guilty as charged in which
case the penalty will be death by electrocu-
tion. Objection was made on the grounds
that the charge constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment, was violative of the due
process clause of the United States Con-
stitution, and the charge was objected to.
The Court indicated that ‘it’s a good bill,

sooner or later,’ but overruled the objection -
to the charge. * * *

“Tt has been held that the death sentence
is now considered an excessive penalty for
relatively unaggravated rape. See Ralph
v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970)
decided by the U. S$. Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, which similarly holds that
execution is a cruel and unusual punishment
for all but the most aggravated types of
rape. See also Rudolph y. Alabama, 375
US. 889, 84 S.Ct. 155 [il LEd.2d 119]
(1963). Testimony of the coroner herein
clearly showed that the prosecutrix herein
was not injured by either of the defendants,
notwithstanding her tale of the alleged
knife supposedly utilized by the other de-
fendant herein, but which was never found
either at the scene or upon the person of
either of the defendants. We respectfully
submit that the conduct of the defendants
herein warrants a conclusion that the prose-
cutrix was not the subject of any beating,
laceration, cuts, bruises, etc; therefore, this
was not one of the most aggravated types
of rape.”

At the present time, there is no Louisi-
ana State Supreme Court case or a decision
by the United States Supreme Court to sup-
port defense counsel’s contentions.

In the case of State v. Crook, 253 La.
961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969), this Court stated:
“The motion to quash also attacks the con-
stitutionality of the death sentence for ag-
gravated rape. In this State, the mode of

1045

administering the death penalty is electrocu-
tion.

“About twenty states authorize a death
sentence for rape, See Rudolph v. Alabama,
375 U.S. 889, 84 S.Ct. 155, 11 L.Ed.2d 119
(Footnote 1). The Louisiana Legislature
has authorized the death penalty for ag-
gravated rape. LSA-R.S. 14:42. The jury,
however, may return a qualified verdict, and
if it does so, the sentence must be life im-
prisonment, LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 817.

“Since the Legislature is vested with the
constitutional power to define crimes and
fix punishments, this Court is concerned
only with the constitutionality of the death
penalty for aggravated rape. More spe-
cifically, we must determine whether the
death penalty for such a crime is prescribed
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.

“The Eighth Amendment provides:

“Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted’

“Cruel and unusual punishments are
those that are barbarous extraordinary, or
grossly disproportionate to the offense. In
short, the constitutional prohibition is
directed to punishments that shock the con-
science of civilized men,

“Electrocution is a common method of
Intro-
duced as an improvement over the older and

administering the death penalty.

1046

less humane methods of execution, such as
hanging, its constitutionality has been con-
sistently upheld. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 10 S.Ct. 930, 34 L.Ed, 519; State of
Louisiana ex rel, Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed, 422; State v.
Burdette, 135 W.Va. 312, 63 S.E.2d 69.

“Aggravated rape is a grave offense.
The authorization of capital punishment for
rape, as we have observed, is not unusual
in the United States. Such punishment is
neither bizarre nor extraordinary. Nor do
we appraise it as grossly disproportionate
to the crime, As late as 1963, in denying
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States declined to consider whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pro-
hibited the imposition of the death sentence
on a convicted rapist who had neither taken
endangered life. See Rudolph v.
Alabama, supra. Recently, in State ex rel.
Barksdale v, Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So.2d
318, we held the death penalty was not a
cruel and unusual punishment for ag-
gtavated rape. * * *” See State v.
Cripps, 259 La, 403, 250 So.2d 382.

nor

‘The United States Supreme Court made
the following statement in the case of Mc-
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct.
1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971): “In light of
history, experience, and the present limita-
tions of human knowledge, we find it quite
impossible to say that committing to the un-
trammeled discretion of the jury the power

to pronounce life or death in capital cases is
“offéiisive to.anything in the Constitution.2
The “States are entitled to assume that
jurors confronted with the truly awesome
tesponsibility of decreeing death for a
‘fellow human will act with due regard for
the consequences of their decision and
will’ consider a variety of factors, many of
which will have been suggested by the

evidence or by the arguments of defense
counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog
the appropriate factors in this elusive area
could inhibit rather than expand the scope
of ,consideration, for no list of circum-
stances would ever be really complete. The
infinite variety of cases and facets to each
case would make general standards either
meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ or a statement of
the obvious that no jury would need.”

* Donald Jones did not receive the death
penalty, but it was assessed against Ronald
Jones, and herein he contends that a split
verdict is discriminatory. He argues:

” «Phat the defendant, Ronald Jones, suf-
fered the ultimate discrimination in that he
along with another principal was convicted
of the same crime, yet he was sentenced to
death and the other defendant life. The
unequal application of the law in this
particular case has to be unequaled in its
unconstitutionality and its degree of cruel
and unusual punishment.

“The sentence of death imposed upon the
petitioner was determined by a jury which,
parsuant to the laws of the State of Louisi-

1048

ana, has unlimited, undirected and. un-
reviewable discretion in determining wheth-
er the death penalty shall! be imposed, No
legal, fair or uniform standards for.making
this determination are set forth by statute,
Judicial decision, administrative or execu-
tive pronouncement. Thus, the capital sen-
tencing system established under Louisiana
laws permits juries to utilize illegal and un-
constitutional factors in sentencing persons
to death, and results in the imposition of
the death penalty arbitrarily and capricious-
ly, in violation of the equal protection of
the laws and the rule of law that is the
fundamental principle of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. To sen-
tence one individual to death for com-

mitting a particular crime and another
individual for committing the same crime
at a different time and place to life would
certainly be an unequal application of the
law and would be in violation of due process
of law. But to have two defendants com-
mit the same crime upon the same victim,
and to have one sentenced to death and the
other to life is such an unequal application
of the law, that it challenges the minds of
fair men. .

“Petitioner was denied his constitutional
rights under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the
United States in that the sentence of death
under Louisiana law constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment. ‘

1049

“Juries are authorized by Louisiana law
sentence wantonly,
Such
a punishment is cruel because it is arbitrary
and irrational. The sentence of death is
unusual since its imposition is in no way
controlled or limited to circumstances which

to impose a death
whimsically, and without standards.

may reasonably be believed to justify such
a sentence.

“Louisiana is constitutionally obligated to
provide procedure whereby the particulariz-
ing circumstances which might justify im-
position of the death penalty or clearly
define and focused upon and given con-
sidered attention by the sentencing au-
thority.

“The death penalty is rarely, arbitrarily
and inequitably applied in Louisiana for the
crime of rape. If applied regularly and
even-handedly to punish the crime of rape,
it would violate public standards of decency,
dignity and humanity universally shared,
that would brand it as barbarous. It thus
avoids public condemnation only by being
unusually and arbitrarily applied. In this,
it is a cruel and unusual punishment within
the Eighth Amendment.

“If the degree of aggravation is not ma-
terial for conviction and not defined, why
should the penalty be more severe for one
individual and not the other, when that
degree of aggravation necessary for the
‘commission of the crime has been reached
by both individuals. Under such circum-

1050
stances, a more severe penalty for one
individual would not be equal application of
the law and therefore, contrary to the
principle of due process and equal protec-
tion of the law as annunciated in the Con-
stitution.

“Capital punishment is per se cruel and
unusual punishment and in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and Article 1, Section 12,
of the Constitution of the State of Louisi-

ana.

At the present time, there is no authority
to support defendant Ronald Jones’ con-
tentions. This Court, as stated supra, has
consistently rejected contentions that the
death penalty for aggravated rape consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment where
the victim’s life was neither taken nor en-
dangered. State v. Myers, 261 La. 100, 259
So.2d 27 (1972). The jury saw the de-
fendants, observed their demeanor, and
heard their testimony on direct and cross-
examination, The jury also heard the testi-
mony of the prosecuting witness as well
as that of many other witnesses. Its verdict
was that Ronald Jones should suffer death
and Donald Jones should serve life im-
prisonment. Also as stated supra, this was
the province of the jury; its prerogative
was to determine guilt and punishment. See

State v, Myers, supra. Myers v. Hender-

son, Warden of Louisiana State Penitenti-
aty, 262 La. 179, 262 So.2d 784, writ refused
June 13, 1972, Ronald Jones suffered no

1051

«violation of his constitutional rights; the
trial judge committed no reversible error.

Bill of Exceptions No. 10 is without merit.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 11

Bill of Exceptions No. 11 was reserved
when the trial court denied defense coun-
sel’s motions for a new trial.

HAs we view the motions for a new
trial, they are based chiefly on the ground
that the verdicts are contrary to the law
and the evidence, which averments, of
course, under our law present nothing for
review.

The trial judge in his per curiam to the
instant bill stated: “The Court is of the
opinion that the motion for a new trial on
the various grounds asserted therein is

without merit. Necessarily, some of the

4. “The motion for a new trial is based on
the supposition that injustice has been
done the defendant, and, unless such is
shown to have been the case the motion
shall be denied, no matter upon what
allegations it is grounded.

“Tho court, on motion of the defend-
ant, shall grant a new trial whenever:

“(1) The verdict is contrary to the law
and the evidence; .

“(2) A bill of exceptions reserved dur-
ing the proceedings shows prejudicial er-
ror}

“(8) New and material evidence that,
notwithstanding the exercise of reason-
able diligence by: the defendant, was not
discovered before or during the trial, is

1052

grounds have been discussed in connection
with the other bills, reserved during the
trial. The grounds presented for the first
time in the motion do not warrant a new
trial under the application of Article 851
C.Cr.P.”

HH This Court is without authority to
review the evidence of guilt. State v. Ford,
259 La. 1037, 254 So.2d 457 (1971) ; State v.
Jones, 251 La. 431, 204 So.2d 775 (1967);
Art. VII, Sec. 10, La.Const. of 1921.

Counsel for the defendants do not show
that the averred newly discovered evidence
if it had been presented at trial would
probably have changed the verdict of the
jury. Under the facts and circumstances
existing under this bill, we do not find
that the trial judge committed reversible
error in denying defense counsel’s motion
for a new trial.

Bill of Exceptions No. 11 is without merit.

available, and if the evidence had been
introduced at the trial it would probably
have changed the verdict or judgment of
guilty;

“(4) The defendant has discovered,
since the verdict or judgment of guilty,
a projudicial error or defect in the pro-
ceedings that, notwithstanding the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence by the de-
fendant, was not discovered before the
verdict or judgment; or

“(5) ‘The court is of the opinion that
the ends of justice would be served by
the granting of a new trial, although
the defendant may not be entitled to a new
trial as a- matter of strict legal right.”
Art, 851, LSA-C.Cr.P.

1053

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS, 12
AND 13

HH Bills of Exceptions Nos. 12 and 13
were reserved when the trial court denied
defense counsel motions to set aside the
verdicts because the Grand Jury which
indicted defendants and the petit jury
which tried defendants were unconstitu-
tionally formulated.

Herein defense counsel contend:

“Defendant's [Ronald Jones] final con-
tention of constitutional violations con-
cerns itself with the under representation
of Negros on the Grand and Petit Juries
that were involved in the indictment and
conviction of the defendants, Donald and
Ronald Jones.

“It is a constitutional imperative that the
Grand Jury must be a body truly repre-
sentative of the community. Smith v. State
of Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct. 164, 168
[85 L.Ed. 84], Brooks v. Beto, Sth Cir.
(1966) 366 F.2d 1, 11.

“At the time the defendants were in-
dicted and tried, the Parish of Jefferson
had a population of approximately 337,568
of which 12.8 percent were Negros. U. S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 1970.

“Despite the percentage of Negros com-
prised in the population of the Parish of
Jefferson, no Negros were on the Petit
Jury that convicted the defendants and the

1054

Petit Jury Venire did not comprise suffi-
cient number of Negros equal to the per-
centage represented in the General popu-
lation of the Parish of Jefferson. Nor
was there sufficient proportion of Negros
on the Grand Jury Venire and the Actual
Grand Jury that was responsible for the
indictment of the defendants. * * * The
defendants hope to prove not only their
contention of under representation of Ne-
gros on the Grand and Petit Juries involved
in their particular, but to show a trend for
the Parish of Jefferson in the selection of
Grand and Petit Juries Venires indicate
that there has always been an under repre-
sentation in that those Negros who were
submitted for the Grand and Petit Jury
Venires were done so in the manner that
constituted tokanism and systematic exclu-
sion.

kk Ok

“In the very recent case of Alexander v.
La., [404 U.S, 813] 92 S.Ct. 114, [30 L.Ed.
2d 43], the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the rape conviction of a Negro de-
fendant on the grounds that the system
used in selecting the Grand Jury and the
Grand Jury itself did not lend itself to
proper representation with regards to per-
centage of population, of Negros, on the
Grand Jury.

“Tt is therefore submitted that the indict-
ment against the defendants is invalid be-

1055

cause it was returned by a Grand Jury im-
paneled from a venire made up contrary to
the requirements of the equal protection
clause and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”

In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 LEd2d $36 (1972), the
U. S. Supreme Court stated that although a
defendant has no right to demand that
members of his race be included on the
grand jury which indicts him, he is entitled
to require that the State not deliberately
and systematically deny to members of his
race the right to participate as jurors in
The Court
also stated that once a prima facie case of
invidious discrimination is established, the
burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut
the presuinption of unconstitutional action
by showing that permissible racially neutral

the administration of justice.

selection criteria and procedures have pro-
duced the monochromatic result.

"We do not find that defense counsel made
out a prima facie case of invidious discrimi-
nation; their contentions are not supported
by sufficient’ evidence; the burden of proof
under the facts and circumstances did not
shift fo the State. The presumption thére-
fore ‘iemiains that the Grand Jury which
indictéd defendants and the petit jury which
tried them were constitutionally formulated.

Bills of Exceptions Nos, 12 and 13 are
without merit,”

1056
For the reasons assigned, the convictions
and sentences are affirmed, wee

TATE, J., concurs in the opinion, except
that he concurs in the result only as to Bills
5, 12 and 13.

BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns rea-
sons.

- BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent from the affirmation of the ver-
dicts and sentences because I believe there
is reversible error in the trial proceedings.
Moreover, I dissent from the sentence im-
posed on the defendant Ronald Jones, being
of the opinion that the case falls squarely
within the views expressed in all five of the,
concurring opinions forming a majority in
Furman y. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct.
2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). See also Stew-
art v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 92 S.Ct.
2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972). These cases
would require our setting aside the sentence,
of Ronald Jones and remanding to the trial
court for sentence in conformity with their
holding. This procedure we have utilized
in cases here the death sentence (though
not the conviction) was invalid under With-
erspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct.
1770, 20 L.Ed.24 776 (1968), and it would,
be equally applicable here. See State v.
Shaffer, 260 La. 605, 257 So.2d 121 (1971);
State v. Duplessis, 260 La. 644, 257 So.24_
135 (1971). oi

1057
+ ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM

HMM The defendants were convicted
of aggravated rape, LaRS. 14:42. De-
fendant Donald Jones was found guilty
without capital punishment and was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment at the Louisi-
ana State Penitentiary. However, defend-
ant Ronald Jones was found guilty without
any recommendation of mercy by the jury.
Accordingly, he was given the death sen-
tence. ,

. We affirmed the convictions (see the
original opinion) but granted a rehearing
with respect to appellant Ronald Jones to
determine the validity of the death sentence
imposed. :

After this appeal was taken, the United
States Supreme Court decided Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33
LEd2d 346 (1972), which holds that the
imposition of the death penalty under stat-
utes similar to Louisiana’s constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the
Ac-
cordingly, «we: remand this case to the 24th

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Judicial District Court with instructions to
the judge to sentence the defendant, Ronald
Jones, to life imprisonment, State v. Frank-
lin, 263 La. 344, 268 So.2d 249,

.Case remanded.
as

270 So.2d 506

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Dr, Paul M. CAMPBELL,

No, 52381.

Nov. 28, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1973.

1059

L, G. Campbell, Bossier City, for defend-
ant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen. Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Charles A.
Marvin, Dist. Atty., Glenn F. Armstrong,
Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant, Dr. Paul M. Campbell, was
charged, tried and convicted of the crime
of abortion, denounced by LSA-R.S. 14:87,
and sentenced to serve three years in the
State Penitentiary. During the trial, de-
fendant reserved sixteen bills of excep-
tions; however, for this appeal he has per-
fected only six bills on which he relies for
a reversal of the conviction and sentence.

1061

Defendant reserved his first bill of ex-
ceptions when the trial judge overruled his
motion to quash the Bill of Information,
predicated on the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of LSA-R.S. 14:87, the abortion
statute. The motion to quash alleged:

“Article 87 of the Criminal Code of Lou-
isiana is violative of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States of America’s
Constitution, and is an unwarranted in-
vasion of the private rights of a female
person.”

TI in his Per Curiam, the trial judge
notes that the constitutional issue in the
lower court was whether the state had a
compelling reason to impose restrictions on
a woman’s tight to have an abortion or
whether it was a fundamental freedom im-
mune from state interference. Relying
upon two recent decisions of this Court,
State v. Scott, 260 La. 190, 255 So.2d 736
(1971), and State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201,
235 So.2d 568 (1970), the trial judge over-
ruled the motion to quash. Under these
decisions, the ruling of the trial judge is
correct.

In this Court, the defense asserts that
the statute is unconstitutional because of
vagueness and overbreadth. The motion to
quash did not allege these grounds of un-
constitutionality.
them here.

Hence, we disregard

1062

TH It is well settled that the grounds.
for the unconstitutionality of a statute-
must be specially pleaded in the trial court.
to be available on appeal. See State v.
Broussard, 263 La. 342, 268 So.2d 248
(1972); State v. Kavanaugh, 203 La. 1, 13
So.2d 366 (1943). See also City of
Shreveport v. Pedro, 170 La. 351, 127 So.
865 (1930).

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4, 5 and 6 raise
a serious legal question. .

After the close of defendant’s case, the-
state called to the stand on rebuttal Mrs.
Marjorie Marsiglia, a party other than the-
alleged victim, who testified as follows:

“Q. Have you ever had an abortion,.
Mrs. Marsiglia?

“A. Yes, I have had.

“Q. Who performed the abortion, Mrs..
Marsiglia?

“A. Dr. Paul Campbell.

“Q. Please tell me when he performed.
it,

“A. December 31st, 1969.”

The trial judge states in his Per Curiam
that this testimony was permitted for the
purpose of rebutting Dr. Campbell’s state-
ment that he examined the alleged victim
on the date charged, that she had already
aborted, and that he administered medical
treatment to stop the bleeding. In effect,
Dr. Campbell denied doing the acts that:
constitute an abortion.

1063

THM In the present case, evidence of
other abortions was admissible for the pur-
pose ‘of proving intent. LSA-R.S, 15:41,
445, 446; State v. Pesson, supra, and the
cases therein cited. The State has the bur-
den of proving intent. Hence, ordinarily,
the evidence forms part of the State’s case
in chief.

In State v. Monroe, 205 La. 285, 17 So.
.2d 331 (1944), this Court defined rebutting
evidence as follows:

“Rebutting evidence is that which is
offered to explain, repel, counteract or
disprove facts given in evidence by the

adverse party.” (Italics ours).

HM ence, only when the defendant
has adduced affirmative evidence to negate
intent does evidence of other abortions be-
come proper rebuttal, Denial of the crimi-
nal act is insufficient. The trial judge er-
roneously concluded that the denial of the
criminal act, when considered with the ad-
mission of medical treatment, amounted to
evidence of intent sufficient to open the
door to this type of rebuttal.

We hold that the admission of the extra-
neous offense on rebuttal was improper.
The evidence contradicted no facts ad-
vanced by defendant. Rather, it gave the
State a second chance to prove intent
through the use of an extraneous offense.

HM We have no difficulty in also con-
cluding that the ruling prejudiced the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant. LSA-R.

1064

S. 15:282 prohibits the defendant ‘from re-
sponding to the State’s rebuttal. Hence,
the evidence stood uncontradicted for the
jury’s consideration.
tutes reversible error.
921.

The ruling consti-
LSA-C.Cr.P. Art.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.

270 So.2d 508

STATE of Louisiana
v.
John T, RODDY,

No. 52509.

Nov. 28, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1973.

Joseph B. Dupont, Sr. Plaquemine, for
defendant-appellant.

1067

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen, Aubert D.
Talbot, Dist. Atty. A. J. King, Jr., Asst.
Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, John T. Roddy, was tried by
jury and convicted of the crime of man-
slaughter and sentenced to serve 12 years
in the State Penitentiary. On this appeal,
the defendant reserved numerous bills of
exceptions during his trial, however, where
they have not been perfected or argued in
brief by defense counsel, they have been
considered abandoned. The other bills are
grouped into four categories:

HI Bill of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2
were reserved when the trial court denied
the defendant’s Motion to Quash based on
an alleged denial of the right to a speedy
trial. According to the trial judge’s per
curiam, while it is a fact that the defend-
ant was not brought to trial for a year and
nine months after the commission of the
crime, on two occasions in that period, the
trial was continued at the instance of de-
fense counsel. Once when the defense
counsel was engaged in another trial, and a
second time when he was ill. Neither of
these reasons can be attributed to the
State. As to defendant's allegation of the
loss of valuable witnesses due to the delay
in trial, we find this was not due to any
action on the part of the State or the
court, When the defendant sought a con-

1068

tinuance on the day of the trial to effect
service on these witnesses, the trial judge
offered to grant such a continuance to the
defendant at such time during the trial,
upon request if the defense counsel could:
not present his witnesses when he was
ready to do so.
tinuance was made during the trial, the de-.

No such request for con-

fense only putting on those witnesses it
had on hand. Consequently, we do not.
find any error here. These bills are with-
out merit. See State v. Gladden, 260 La.
735, 257 So.2d 388 (1972).

Bills of exceptions Nos. 3, 5 and 7 relate
to the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
Motion to Suppress which involved a state-
ment given by a defendant to the investi-
gating police officers shortly after the
commission of the crime on the grounds
that the defendant was not given proper
warning of his rights pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16,
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

In finding that the confession and the
statement was voluntary, the trial court re-
lied upon the testimony of Deputy John
Dewey Gonzales, and the fact that the de-
fendant signed the statement once it was.
reduced to writing. The trial court ‘re-
lates that,

“4 & the defendant did not, in ef-

fect, deny that the statement was freely

and voluntarily given, nor did he contend
that anv threats promises or other in-

ducements were used . Deputy

1069

Gonzales impressed the court as being a
sincere and knowledgeable officer and
the court was convinced that he did in
fact read the Miranda warning to the
defendant prior to taking his statement.
The court was further convinced that the
defendant was no stranger to the sher-
iff’s office or to the court, thoroughly
understood what was involved and was
well aware of his right to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel.”

Hl The argument that defendant makes
regarding the availability of a second
deputy, Deputy Preston Ambeau, who was
at the trial and had been allegedly pres-
ent when the inculpatory statement was
made is without merit. We are aware
‘of the rule that where a party has a ma-
terial witness within his control and fails
to call him as a witness, an inference
arises that the witness would not sup-
port that party’s case. State v. Barker,
159 La. 762, 106 So. 295 (1925). How-
ever, even if we were to allow this in-
ference to be drawn with respect to the
failure of the state to call Deputy Ambeau,
under the circumstances here we find that
there was no violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights.

HM After hearing all the evidence, the
trial judge determined that the Miranda

warnings had been given and understood
and that the defendant’s statements were

1070

not the product of coercion or duress,
Such a factual determination by the trial
judge is given great weight. It will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly er-
State v. Vessel, 260 La. 301, 256
So.2d 96 (1971). These bills of exceptions
are without merit,

roneous.

HH Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was taken
when the trial court overruled the defend-
ant’s objection to the prosecution’s ques-
tioning the defendant about previous ar-
rests. Closely related to the previous bills
of exceptions Nos. 3, 5 and 7, this bill was
taken outside the presence of the jury dur-
ing a hearing held to determine whether or
not the defendant had been given the Mi-
randa warnings. The trial court’s per cur-
iam indicates the questions pertaining to
previous arrests were posed, over defend-
ant’s objections, in an effort to determine
the defendant’s familiarity with arrest pro-
We agree with the trial judge
that inasmuch as the entire hearing on the
Miranda issue was outside the presence of

cedure.

the jury, and only after all the prospective
jurors and witnesses had been sequestered,
the accused could not have possibly been
prejudiced thereby. Bill of Exceptions No.
4 is without merit.

Hl The final bill of exceptions argued
in the defendant's brief, Bill of Exceptions
No. 6, was reserved when the trial court

1071.
denied the, defendant’s motion for a mis-
trial in response to the following remark
by the District Attorney in his opening
statement:

“The State will also introduce into evi-
dence certain inculpatory statements
made by the accused, John T. Roddy.”

Immediately following the remark, even
before the District Attorney said another
word, the trial judge admonished the jury
as follows:

“The jury is instructed to disregard the
statement of the District Attorney. You
are to remove it from your minds entire-

Thereupon, the jury was dismissed while
counsel argued defendant’s motion for a
mistrial, after which'the trial judge made
his tuling. Upon recalling the jury, the
trial judge further admonished the jury,

thus:

“Court: Gentlemen of the jury, the
State, the District Attorney is required
by law to make an opening statement.
This opening statement is required by
Jaw to contain a general statement on
the basis on which the State intends to
ask you for a conviction. Some things
are also probibited from being included
in the opening statement. One of these
is any reference to inculpatory state-
ments or to a confession of anything of
that sort. To the extent that the Dis-

1072

trict Attorney made reference to such a
statement, you are to disrégard his re-
marks altogether. Put them out of your
mind completely, just as though you had
never heard them. Do you understand
that?

Any statements which the District Attor-
ney had made in his opening remarks
relative to a statement by the defendant
in this matter is to be forgotten by you
entirely. It is to be put out of your
mind altogether. It has no part, no
Proper part in the District Attorney’s
opening statement. You are totally and
completely to disregard any reference to
any inculpatory statement by the defend-
ant. Is that perfectly clear? All right,
Mr. Talbot, does that conclude your
opening statement.”

Mr. Talbot: “Yes, Your Honor.”

While the defendant is correct in his
brief that La.C.Cr.P. Art. 767 states “em-
phatically and under no uncertain terms
that the district attorney cannot refer to an
inculpatory statement or confession prior
to introduction”, we do not find this to be
reversible error in this case. The trial
court’s admonition to the jury, under La.
C.Cr.P, Article 771, appears to have satis-
factorily cured the error. The admonition
was made immediately and emphasized re-
peatedly. Further, inasmuch as the incul-
patory statements were subsequently intro-

1073 ee “1074

«duced into -evidence, we cannot see any
. prejudice flowing from the remark,

There is no merit to this bill of excep-
‘tions. “

For these reasons, the conviction and
sentence are affirmed.

BARHAM, J., concurs. *

270 So.2d 512

Priestly VERDUN et al.

: v.
SCALLON BROTHERS CONTRACTORS,
AN rvenor: Board of Commissioners

GU
For the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District.

No. 51955,

Dee. 11, 1972.

Levy, Burleigh, Russo & Bourg, Antho-
ny J. Guarisco, Jr., Morgan City, for plain-
tiff-applicant.

1075

Samuel C. Cashio, Dist. Atty., Joseph W.
Cole, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for intervenor.

McCALEB, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, members of the Verdun fami-
ly who own in indivision a tract of land in
St. Mary Parish,! instituted this action to
enjoin Scallon Brothers Contractors, Inc.,
from moving heavy equipment onto their
property, then under sugar cane cultiva-
tion, and removing soil material therefrom.

The Board of Commissioners of the At-
chafalaya Basin Levee District, the true
party at interest,? intervened, asserting
that Scallon, as a contractor engaged by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was
authorized by the levee district to enter the
lands and secure soil for the purpose of re-
pairing and strengthening the Charenton-
Intracoastal Canal levee across the proper-
ty. This authorization is based on a reso-
lution adopted by the levee district January
11, 1934, whereby it appropriated, pursuant

1. The property is described in the petition
as “That certain tract or parcel of land
comprising the Estate of Archille and
Emma Verdun located near the commu-
nity of Verdunville being bounded on the
North by Cook, on the South by the
Bayou-‘Téche, on the West by Lake and
on the Bast by Paul.”

2. Scallon filed an answer in which it gen-
erally denied the allegations of the peti-
tion for injunction, but averred it was
acting with full authority to enter the
property in accordance with its contract
‘with the Corps of Engineers of the Unit-
ed States,

1076

to Article 665 of the Revised Civil Code,?
a right of way across this riparian

property* for levee purposes, in accord-
ance with a federal flood control project in

the West Atchafalaya Basin, paying the
Verduns the previous year’s assessed val~
uation of the property, as required by Sec~
tion 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
Alternatively, the levee board averred that
if it was without right to take this action.
until additional compensation was paid,
“the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in
damages and an injunction should not issue
herein.”

‘The trial judge, although recognizing the
levee board had a right of servitude over
plaintiffs’ lands “for purposes of obtaining
earth to repair a levee,” was not satisfied
from the evidence that the soil sought to
be used was contained within the limits of

the original levee servitude. Accordingly,

he enjoined entrance onto the property,
and the disturbance, excavation, or remov-

3. The pertinent portion of this article is
as follows: “Servitudes imposed for the
publie or common utility, relate to the
space which is to be left for the public
use by the adjacent proprietors on the
shores of navigable rivers, and for the
making and repairing of levees, roads
and other public or common works.”

4, ‘The tract, as originally appropriated con-
sisted of 7.17 acres, but only 4 acres
thereof were used in the construction
of the levee.

1077

sal of any dirt, soil, or crops therefrom un-
til such time as plaintiffs have been com-
pensated in accordance with the provisions
-of the constitution. Notwithstanding this
ruling, the judge granted the levee board a
suspensive appeal therefrom.

The Court of Appeal for the First Cir-
-cuit reversed, recalled and vacated the in-
junction, and dismissed the suit (see 255
So.2d 808, on rehearing). We granted cer-
tiorari. 260 La. 400, 256 So.2d 288.

Although counsel for plaintiffs question
the correctness of the holding of the Court
of Appeal on rehearing—that the levee
board had the legal right to use all the
land it appropriated in 1934, which includ-
ed‘ the acreage for which the injunction is
sought—we find, at the outset, that in view
sof concessions made by all counsel respect-
ing the present posture of the litigation,
this Court is unable to reach the issues
presented for review. For during oral ar-
gument here, it was admitted that, follow-
ing issuance of this injunction, the trial
judge suspended its effect by granting a
suspensive appeal, and the contractor, act-
ing under the appeal order suspending the
injunction, removed the soil from this
acreage. It was used for the repair of a
break in the levee along the intracoastal
canal, There is today, therefore, only a
deep borrow pit on the property of the
plaintiffs that forms the basis of this pro-
ceeding for an injunction,

1078

HM 1n such circumstances, the matter
is now moot, as this Court will not review
a case where only injunctive relief is
sought when the need for that relief has
ceased to be a justiciable issue. Injunction
may be used to prevent but not to correct a
wrong; it cannot be employed to redress
an alleged consummated wrong or undo
what has already been done. See, Allen v.
Commercial Nat. Bank in Shreveport, La.
App., 138 So.2d 252, affirmed 243 La, 840,
147 So.2d 865; Daigle v, Pan Am, Produc-
tion Co., 236 La. 578, 108 So.2d 516; West
Carroll Nat. Bank of Oak Grove v. West
Carroll Parish School Board, La.App., 136
So.2d 699; Forrest v. Messenger, La.App.,
20 So.2d 766; and 42 Am.Jur.2d 1116, ver-
bo, Injunctions, Section 355.

Accordingly,
Court might give at this time would be

since any opinion this

purely advisory, plaintiffs are relegated to
whatever rights they may have for recov-
ery of damages.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment
of the Court of Appeal for the First Cir-
cuit dismissing plaintiffs’ suit for an in-
junction, is affirmed, without prejudice to
the assertion by plaintiffs of whatever oth-
er legal rights they may have to claim
damages.

DIXON, Justice (dissenting).

Both parties to this suit have urged the
court to decide the issues presented. Al-

1079 |} 1080

though the majority opinion conforms to
tlie jurisprudence as it legally avoids decid-
ing the case, there seems to be neither stat-
utory prohibition nor compelling reason
against our deciding the issues, which are
still alive and which have been fully
briefed arid argued.

By perpetuating the jurisprudence which
sidesteps a decision, we merely require
these litigants to file another suit in the
same court and present the same issues in
order to settle the dispute that exists be-
tween them.

Louisiana long since abandoned the no-

tion that courts could not advise litigants.
Although “advisory opinions” will always
be hard to get, a “declaratory judgment” is
not. C.C.P. 1872, If these litigants had
only thought to couple a demand for a de-
cfaratory judgment with the suit for in-
junction, we could not have avoided decid-
ing the issues.

Since we do have a declaratory judg-
ments statute, and since appellate courts
are now urged to make any judgment
which is “just, legal and proper” upon the
record on appeal (C.C.P. 2164), and since
both parties desire an adjudication of the
single legal issue presented, we ought not
to delay a decision until the parties have
trudged once more the weary path from
the trial court to the Court of Appeal and
back to us.

270 So0.2d 514

STATE of Louisiana
ve
Roy CHAMBERS.

No. 52002.

Dee. 14, 1972.

ry
S
tera)
a

be 1086

Joseph Neves Marcal, III, New Orleans,
for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry
H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen. Jim Garri-
son, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist.
Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

McCALEB, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Roy Chambers, was
charged, tried, and convicted of armed rob-
bery, in violation of R.S. 14:64. Following
imposition of sentence, he prosecuted this

1087

appeal, relying on twenty-two bills of ex-
ceptions for a reversal of his conviction.

A rather detailed statement of the facts
and sequence of events as’reflected by the
record is necessary for a proper disposition
of these bills. They reveal that around
8:00 A.M. on July 10, 1968, a 1958 maroon
Pontiac, with license plate bent so as to ob-
scure its numbers, parked in front of
Brewer’s Food Store at 540 South Scott
Street in the City of New Orleans. Ar-
thur Ebeyer, waiting in a nearby truck
while his helper delivered soft drinks to
the food store, went into Brewer’s and
alerted John Parker, the sixteen-year-old
clerk, telling him that his suspicion had be-
come aroused as to the mission of the oc-
cupants of the parked car, particularly be-
cause of the bent license plate.
formed him he was not alarmed as the men
were known to him as customers of the
store, having been in the store only the day

Parker in-

before.

Shortly thereafter the two men entered
the store, purchased a soft drink and some
doughnuts, and stayed in the store until all
of the customers had left; whereupon one
of them, later identified as Arthur Ray-
mond Santa Cruze (or Cruz, as the name
appears in a varied spelling), left the store
and took up a “lookout” position just out-

side. The other man, Roy Chambers,

pointing a gun at Parker, demanded mon-
ey, and took with him $80 in a paper bag
as he left the store.

He and Cruze then

1088

drove away in the car. The police were
called and a description of the car and the
men -was given them by Parker, later sub-
stantiated by Ebeyer.

Three days thereafter, about 1:25 A.M.,
July 13, 1968, two officers, noting a car
fitting this description (including the bent
license plate) on Canal near South Roman,
pulled it over to the side and had the occu-
pants alight. The driver, Chambers, was
immediately placed under arrest when he
was unable to produce his operator’s li-
cense. When it was further noted that not
only the car but the occupants fitted the
description of the men involved in the July
10th robbery of Brewer's Food Store, ‘they
were both placed under arrest for the rob-
bery and were advised of their’ rights.

‘Three days later, on July 16, 1968, and
without having been shown any pictures,
mug shots, or having been permitted to
glimpse the arrested men, Parker picked
them out of a lineup which included seven
men, all of somewhat similar height,
weight, and coloring.

On July 29, 1968, Chambers and Cruze
were jointly charged by information with
the armed robbery, and, on August 23rd
following, they were arraigned and pleaded
not guilty, The court appointed the Legal
Aid Burcau to represent them and the trial
was set for September 25, 1968, being con-
tinued on that day at the request of de-
fense counsel. On October 14, 1968, there
was a joint motion for continuance as to

1089

Cruze, the court being
Chambers had escaped, and, on November
26, 1968, Cruze, represented by counsel,
withdrew his former plea of not guilty and

informed that

entered a plea of guilty, being duly sen-
tenced.

It was not until November 19, 1970, that
the court was requested to subpoena two
witnesses preparatory to the trial of Cham-
hers and, on November 24th, the case was
continued because the witnesses were not
present, On December 14, 1970, defense
counsel withdrew because of a conflict of
interest and the court appointed Joseph
Neves Marcal, III, the present attorney, to
represent Chambers. The trial was con-
ducted January 27, 1971, and resulted in a
verdict of guilty.

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was re-
served when, during voir dire examination,
the court refused defense counsel’s request
that the state be restricted in the trial to
representation by only one attorney. After
the trial and opening argument by one as-
sistant district attorney, defense counsel
renewed this request when it became ap-
parent the rebuttal would be undertaken by
the other assistant. Bill No. 17 was re-
served when this request was again denied.

There
is no law restricting and/or regulating the

There is no merit in these bills,

number of attorneys representing either
the state or the defense in criminal mat-
ters. The position of defense counsel is

1090

that it was a matter of “unfair tactics”
since being “double-teamed” by the state’s
attorneys placed him at a disadvantage.
Had he felt this way, the judge, upon re-
quest, may have appointed other counsel to
assist him, or defense counsel could have
called on the Legal Aid Bureau for addi-
tional assistance. In appointing Mr. Mar-
cal to represent the defendant, the trial
judge stated he was doing so because the
judge knew him to be highly competent,
and. Chambers had been having difficulties
with other counsel who had endeavored to
assist him. From our view of the record
the judge’s confidence was not misplaced,
for Mr. Marcal handled himself well, vig-
orously arguing every possible error on his
client’s behalf. He has also ably presented
these in brief form to this Court. .

Hl Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was also
reserved during voir dire examination of
the veniremen and is likewise without mer-
it. Defense counsel sought on this exami-
nation to determine whether the prospec-
tive juror could accept the proposition that
the defendant, at that point, was innocent.
The state objected, arguing the defendant
was not, in fact, innocent, but was pre-
sumed to be innocent as a matter of law.
The bill was reserved when the judge
maintained this objection and refused to
grant defense motion for a mistrial.

As pointed out by the trial judge in his
per curiam to this bill, “Article 770, Louisi-

1091

ana Code of Criminal Procedure, required
the Court to order a mistrial, on defend-
ant’s motion, when the District Attorney
remarks or comments: (1) prejudicially
and irrelevantly on defendant’s race, reli-
gion, color or national origin; (2) on an-
other crime committed by defendant as to
which evidence is not admissible; (3) de-
fendant’s failure to testify in his own de-
fense; (4) refusal of judge to direct a
verdict. The remark complained of by de-
fendant does not fall within any of these
four categories, and thus mistrial was not
mandatory.”

HHI Defense counsel treats Bills of Ex-
ceptions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 21 and
22 as a group. All stem directly or indi-
rectly from the trial judge’s refusal to hold
a separate hearing out of the presence of
the jury to determine the merits of a de-
fense Motion to Suppress the Arrest of
Defendant and Subsequent Identification,
which motion was filed for the first time
on the day of the trial after the jurors

were sworn and the witnesses sequestered,

contrary to the provisions of Article 703 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, requiring
that such a motion be filed “no later than
three judicial days before the trial on the
merits begins, unless opportunity therefor
did not exist or the defendant was not
aware of the grounds for the motion.”

Although counsel did not file a motion
to suppress evidence in the lower court, he
objected to the introduction of the evi-

1092

dence during the trial, and in this Court he
argues the motion as one to suppress evi-
dence and identification.

Bill No. 3 was reserved when the state
referred to the lineup identification of
Chambers during opening argument,

Bills Nos. 4 and 10 were levelled at rul-
ings permitting John Parker, the victim, to
testify—No. 4 on original about the rob-
bery and No. 10 when he was recalled and
was testifying about the lineup.

Bill No. 5 was reserved when Parker
identified Chambers in the courtroom as
one of the two men who entered the store
at the time of the robbery, allegedly be-
cause it had not been first established on
what basis this identification was being
made.

Bill No. 6 was reserved when the judge
ruled inadmissible as speculative counsel’s
effort on cross-examination to determine
the effect of the lineup two years pre-
viously on Parker’s ability to identify
Chambers in the courtroom,

Bill No, 7 was reserved when one of the
arresting officers was permitted to testify
about the circumstances surrounding the
arrest of Chambers in the Pontiac car
three days after the robbery.

Bill No. 9 was reserved when, after ex-
the
make-up of the lineup the judge curtailed
further examination of the officer who

haustive cross-examination as to

had only presided over the lineup.

1093

Bill No. 11 was reserved when Parker
was testifying about his identification of
Chambers in the lineup, defense counsel
terming such examination “repetitious”, al-
though Parker’s previous testimony per-
tained only to his identification of Cham-
ers in the courtroom.

Bill No. 21 was urged after verdict, and
is levelled at the verdict, insofar as it
might reflect the jury’s reaction to testimo-
ny about the arrest and identification
which, counsel contends, should have been
given out of the jury's presence.

Bill No, 22 was reserved when a new
trial was denied, which request was based,
in part, on these bills.

The basis for the arrest portion of this
motion is that Chambers was arrested
without probable cause: for the suppres-
sion of his identification in a subsequent
lineup, that he was not represented by
counsel; further, that the lineup infringed
his constitutional rights as enunciated in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87
S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149. The objection
to the evidence is that it was the illegal
fruit of a warrantless search and seizure.

HJ There is no substance to any of
these bills. From the facts of the case as
developed during the trial and given in de-
tail above, it is evident there was sufficient
cause to arrest Chambers and Cruze.
Their description and the description of

1094

the car in which they were riding, particu-
larly the bent license plate, were broadcast
immediately following the robbery and
when a car fitting this description, occu-
pied by two males fitting the description of
those committing the robbery, was spotted
by two officers on patrol, they were

stopped and arrested for the crime.

HM 1t is true Chambers was not rep-
resented by counsel at the lineug, but only
because, although fully advised of all of
his rights, and without pressure or coer-
cion of any kind, he at that time in writing
waived his right to counsel, Additionally,
the holding in the Wade case is not con-
trolling here from the factual standpoint.
This lineup was conducted six days after
the
brought.

crime, before any charges were
The composition of the persons
in the lineup conformed with routine prac-
tice. The men were of a similar height,
weight and coloring as Chambers and
Cruze. John Parker, the victim, picked
them out of the lineup at once without
having been shown any mug shots, photo-
graphs, or being given a glimpse of the
men, His identification was based solely
on his recognition of them as the men who
perpetrated the crime, and who were
known to him independently as customers

of the store that was robbed.

Hl in his argument counsel does not
pinpoint the exhibit or exhibits objected to
as being the fruit of a warrantless search

1095

and seizure, but apparently he referred to
the bent license plate, as this is the only
evidence taken from the car at the time of
the arrest that was introduced in evidence.
This license plate was not secured through
a warrantless search, but, instead, was only
a seizure under the “plain view” doctrine.
Consequently, the law with respect to prob-
able cause to arrest in connection with
alleged searches and seizures is not applica-
ble. See the recent decision in State v.
Jackson, No. 52,600 on the docket of this
Court, handed down November 6, 1972. 263
La, 849, 269 So.2d 465.

Defense counsel does not contend he was
entitled to file the Motion to suppress late
under the exceptions contained in Article
703 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.
e., there was no opportunity to do so soon-
er, or he was unaware sooner of the
grounds for the motion. Instead, he
argues initially that when he was appointed
to represent the defendant over a month
prior to trial, and some two years after the
robbery, the judge informed him he could
file motions, “specifically referring to mo-
tions to suppress,” on the day of the trial.
His further argument is that even though
late, once he was permitted to file the mo-
tion, the judge had no recourse but to pass
on its merits out of the jury’s presence,
with the result he was restricted in his
cross-examination of the state witnesses in
his effort to establish the illegality of the
arrest, identification, and evidence.

1096

Initially, it is important to note that al-
though counsel vigorously asserted his po-
sition in this respect throughout the trial,
at no time did he mention to the judge any
concession about thé filing of a Motion to
Suppress on the day of the trial, and from
the judge’s per curiams, it is evident he
made no such concession.

HI Counsel cites no law to sustain his
position that once the judge permitted him
to file the motion, he had no recourse but
to hear and rule on it in a separate pro-
ceeding. When such a motion is filed late,
any objection available to the defendant
with respect to a claim of unlawfulness is
waived. State v. Wallace, 254 La. 477, 224
So.2d 461.

I Furthermore, we fail to see how
the prejudiced by the
judge’s ruling, or that an unfair advantage
was taken of counsel. Instead of refusing
to permit counsel to file the late motion,
the judge, in the exercise of his discretion
under Article 703, referred it to the merits

defendant was

in order that counsel might develop his
contentions thereunder during the trial, if
possible, Despite vigorous efforts to do
so, counsel was unsuccessful, for the rea-
sons above given in disposing of the merits
of the motion.

[MM With respect to the fact that
Chambers was not represented by counsel
at the lineup, the state offered in evidence

1097 Pe

a Xerox copy of the waiver he signed
prior thereto; whereupon defense counsel
objected to it as not being the best evi-
dence, and reserved Bill of Exceptions No.
8'when his objection was overruled.

_ This bill is insubstantial, When Cham-
bers was on the stand testifying, defense
counsel did not seek to determine whether,
in fact, he had signed the document, He
did not even question him about it. In his
per curiam, the judge declares:

“Here the original could not be pro-
-duced, and the witness identified the
thoroughly legible copy marked S-4 as a
true, correct and thoroughly accurate
copy of the original Waiver Form exe-
cuted by defendant in his presence.
‘Thus the requirements of the law were
met. State v. Martin (1919) 145 La, 35,
81 So, 747; State v. Palmer (1955), 227
La. 691, 80 So.2d 374.”

HH" Bills Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 15 were
reserved in connection with various rulings
of the court admitting five exhibits ten-
dered by the state. In addition to the
waiver, which forms the basis of Bill No.
8 just disposed of, these consist of two
photographs of the car (S-1 and S-2),‘a
pliotograph of the lineup (S-S), and the
bent license plate (S-3).

“The basis for the defense objection, is
that the defendant had a right to demand.

that a predicate be iaid prior to the admis-
sion of evidence to be used against him to

1098

establish their authenticity, and, further,
that this evidence must have been “suffi-
ciently and accurately connected with the
commission of the crime.” .

We find no merit in these bills. Such
items, termed demonstrative evidence, are
“authenticated by testimony of a witness
who testified to facts showing that the ob-
ject has some connection with the case
which makes it relevant.” McCormick on
Evidence, ist Edition, 384, Section 179.
“ce * %* the theory justifying admission
of these exhibits requires only that the
items be sufficiently explanatory or illus-
trative of relevant testimony in the case to
be of potential help to the trier of fact.”
McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Edition, 528,
Section 212, Consequently, as to the pho-
tographs, “the person who lays the founda-
tion need not be the photographer nor necd
he know anything of the time, conditions,
or mechanisms of the taking. Instead he
need only know about the facts represented
or the scene or objects photographed, and
once this knowledge is shown he can say
whether the photograph correctly and ac-
curately portrays these facts.” McCormick
on Evidence, 2nd Edition, 531, Section 214.
Our law is in accord. RS. 1544L. See, ,
also, State v. Palmer (1955), 227 La. 691,
80 So.2d 374, and the authorities therein
cited,

In his excellent per curiam to these bills,
the trial judge caréfilly delineates the
manner in which the items were authenti-

1099

to the commission of the crime. For ex-
ample, the car as shown in the photographs
was identified by Arthur Ebeyer, who first
saw it outside the robbed store and alerted
the clerk, later giving the police a descrip-
tion of the car, the bent license plate, and
‘the men who occupied it. The arresting
officcr identified the car as the one he had
stopped and Chambers as the driver. Both
witnesscs supported the accuracy of the de-
piction of the ychicle in the photographs.
Ebeyer’s testimony related the car to the
crime, and the officer's testimony related
the vehicle to the defendant. The officer
identified the plate not only by the bent
portion, but also by virtue of the numerical
designation of the plate, while Ebeyer
identified the plate as one seen by him on
the car in a bent condition, which prevent-
cd him from ascertaining the numbers.
The plate was relevant to the issue of
identification in that it corroborated Par-
ker’s identification of the defendant as the
robber and connected him with the car
Ebeyer saw at the scene. It was thus rele-
vant and admissible.

HM The photograph of the lineup was
identified by Parker and the officer who
handled this phase of the case, as accurate-
ly portraying the lineup they witnessed and
conducted. It was clearly admissible.

HM (Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was re-
served when Cruze, the other man accused
with Chambers of the crime, was testifying

J
cated by the witnesses and their connexity

1100

on cross-examination, and covers a wide
range of this questioning. In addition to
objecting to the tone of voice used, defense
counsel contends the state’s attorney was
“badgering” the witness and endeavoring
to intimidate him. In particular, Cruze, on
direct examination, had testified he was
one of the men involved in the robbery,
but denicd Chambers was the other, stating
his accomplice had been a man known to
him only as “Sugar.” When the state’s at-
torney, on cross-examination, asked Cruze
what would happen when he returned to
the penitentiary if he implicated Chambers,
defense counsel objected on the ground it
called for speculation, and, further, was ir-
relevant to the guilt or innocence of Cham-
bers.

The trial judge states in his per curiam
that the conduct of the assistant district at-
torney did not offend the order and dignity
of the court, although, he may have raised
his voice “for emphasis and dramatic ef-
fect;” that the testimony was not irrele-
vant and he permitted it because the state
had a right on cross-examination to devel-
op any bias, interest, or corruption under
RS. 15:492, He denied this line of ques-
tioning on cross called for a speculative
answer, since the answer called for facts
within the peculiar knowledge of the wit-.
ness as to what “unpleasant consequences
would befall him upon his return to Ango-
ja unless he testified to aid defendant.”

We find no error in this ruling.

1101

Bill of Exceptions No. 17 raises the
same issue raised in the first bill and has
been passed on there.

HMM The next two bills (Nos. 18 and
19) were reserved during the state’s rebut-
tal argument. In an effort to prove Cham-
bers had not been the accomplice of Cruze,
defense counsel elicited from Chambers
testimony to the effect he had been with
three people during this time: first, with
his brother Ronald; from there they had
gone to the home of a cousin, Willie
Spears, and from there Chambers stated he
had gone to meet his girl friend. Defend-
ant and his brother alone testified to this
effect.t

In his per curiam the trial judge advises
that during closing argument defense coun-
sel “commented upon the necessity of a
party having to take his witnesses as he
finds them, and the inability of a party or
his counsel to select prominent citizens
such as the Mayor,” being limited to those
who had actual knowledge of facts rele-
vant to the case.

On rebuttal the assistant district attorney
adverted to this argument, stating under
the circumstances he did not feel Mayor
Landrieu would have made a good witness,
asking, “* * * what about his cousin,

1. Both Willie Spenrs and his wife, Oyntbia,
were subpoenaed, but were excused by de-

1102

Willie Spears? And what about his girl
friend?” The basis for these objections
is that such remarks exceeded the permissi-

ble scope of rebuttal argument, as defense
counsel had not alluded to the testimony or

lack of testimony by Willie or Cynthia
Spears in his argument.

We agree with the trial judge that de-
fense counsel “opened the door” to this ar-
gument by stating during his closing argu-
ment he was limited to calling only those
witnesses who had knowledge of the rele-
vant facts, According to the testimony of
Chambers, three people had knowledge of
his “alibi” during this crucial time, his girl
friend, Ronald Chambers, and Willie
Spears. Of these three, only Ronald testi-
fied but, significantly, as the judge points
out, at no time following the arrest did
Ronald come forward to furnish the “alibi”

until asked to do so at the trial.

The trial judge correctly ruled therefore,
that the
bounds on rebuttal to call the jury’s atten

state was within permissible

tion to the lack of testimony from either
Willie Spears or defendant’s anonymous
girl friend on this point. See, State v. Poe
(1948), 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359; State v.
Green (1944), 205 La. 439, 17 So.2d 620;
and State v. Taylor (1929), 167 La, 1113,
120 So, 875.

fense counsel early in the trial, and were
never called to the stand.

“1103 a 21104

- [IB The twentieth bill was reserved
during rebuttal argument when the state’s
attorney called attention to the rust marks
on the license plate, stating these showed it
“was,in fact bent.” The defense counsel
objected to this on the ground he was
bringing in matters not introduced or in
evidence.

““Phis bill is frivolous. Not only was the
plate introduced in evidence, but, during
hig closing argumient, defense counsel, as
e judge puts it in his per curiam, “ad-
dressed himself to the subject of $-3 and
the’ factual’ issue of whether or not S-3
had ‘been bent so as to obscure the num-
bers.” ,

: «Bills Nos. 21 and 22 were reserved fol-
lowing the verdict. The first is levelled at
the verdict insofar as it reflected a denial
by. the court of defendant’s Motion to Sup-
press Identification, and has been disposed
of above, as has a portion of the second
bill, The remainder of Bill No, 22, re-
served when a new trial was denied, is
based on the general assertion that the
court’s ruling on the motion to suppress

and the numerous other instances forming
the basis of the above bills were prejudi-

cial to defendant's cause, and, thus, present
nothing further for our consideration.

- For the reasons assigned, the conviction
and sentence are affirmed,

BARHAM, J, concurs in the result only.

270 So.2d 523

VERMILION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

ve
Aiphe BROUSSARD et al.

No, 52020.

Dee, 11, 1972.

1105

J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, for defend-
ants-applicants,

1106.

Charles M. Thompson, Jr., Abbeville, for
plaintiff-respondent,

BARHAM, Justice.

In this suit Vermilion Parish School.
Board seeks access to a public road across
the land of the defendants for a tract of
land owned by it which is surrounded on.
all sides by the properties of others with
no means of ingress or egress. The
School Board’s property is Section 16 of
Township 14 South, Range 1 East of Ver-.
milion Parish, Access to the property was ,
no problem as long as the defendants,
leased the School Board’s land, but when.
the School Board leased the land to a third
party, the defendants refused to allow, the
passage to the School Board or its lessee
that defendants had previously exércised
across their land to the Pine, Island Road.
This suit was then filed. |”

At the trial on the mefits-it was recog-
nized by all concerned that the School’
Board's property was indeed enclosed, and’.
that the School Board was entitled to a!
right of passage under Article 699 of the ©
Civil Code. Three alternative means of
Passage were proposed by the defendants!:
The use of the Warren Canal which cuts
through the School Board’s property; the
building of a road on the property-of Joe °
E. Broussard to the Pine Island Road,'or
the linking up with the Motty Road. The
district court rejected use of the Warren
Canal, finding that it was not the type of

1107

passage contemplated by the law. In its
first judgment the district court granted
the School Board a right of passage over
the land of the defendants under a finding
that this route was the least burdensome.
The district court recalled that judgment,
however, when a motion for a new trial
was filed by the defendants, and rendered
a second judgment dismissing the School
Board’s suit. In the reasons assigned for
that judgment the district court recognized
the Motty Road to be a public road by vir-
tuc of public maintenance for at least three
years (RS. 48:491). It held that the
School Board was not entitled to a right of
passage over the land of the defendants be-
cause the distance to the Motty Road was
less than that to the Pine Island Road.

On appeal the Court of Appeal reversed
the judgment of the district court. 254
So.2d 699. It held that Motty Road could
not be found to be a public road without
the owner of the land over which that road
travelled being a party to the suit since
such a finding would constitute a divesti-
ture of ownership without giving the own-
er an opportunity to be heard. Concluding
that the Motty Road could not be declared
public in this suit, the Court of Appeal
found that the School Board had sustained
the necessary burden of proof to show it
was entitled to a right of passage over the
defendants’ land to the Pine Island Road.
1. Article 699 was amended by Act No. 672,

§ 1, of 1970, deleting the reference to
water courses, but that amendment was

1108

Articles 699 and 700 of the Civil Code
read:

“Art, 699. The owner whose estate is
enclosed, and who has no way to a pub-
lic road, a railroad, a tramroad or a wa~
ter course may claim the right of pas-
sage on the estate of his neighbor or
neighbors to the nearest public road,
railroad, tramroad or water course and
shall have the right to construct a road,
railroad or tramway according to cir-
cumstances and as the exigencies of the
case may acquire [require], over the
land of his neighbor or neighbors for the
purpose of getting the products of his
said enclosed land to such public road,
railroad, tramroad or water course, or
for the cultivation of his estate, but he
shall be bound to indemnify his neighbor
or neighbors in proportion to the damage
he may occasion.” 4

“Art, 700, The owner of the estate,
which is surrounded by other lands, has
no right to exact the right of passage
from which of his neighbors he chooses.

“The passage shall be generally taken
on the side where the distance is the
shortest from the inclosed estate to the
public road.

“Nevertheless, it shall be fixed in the

place the least injurious to the person on
whose estate the passage is granted.”

after the trial of this case and has no
effect on the decision in this case.

1109

HMMM 1» Rockholt v, Keaty, 256 La.
629, 237 So.2d 663 (1970), we recognized
the importance of this servitude for the
benefit not only of the landowner by per-
mitting full utility of his land but also of
the public by keeping valuable property in
commerce. More important to this case,
we acknowledged in conformity with the
Code articles that the nature of the pas-
sage was to be governed according to the
circumstances and as the exigencies of the
case might require, and that the right of
passage was to be to the nearest public
road,

Article 700 clearly provides that the
owner of the landlocked estate cannot
choose from which of his neighbors’ es-
tates he will exact a right of passage, but
that it “shall be” where the distance is the
shortest-from the enclosed land to the pub-
lic road. The mandatory language of that
article is modified by the term “generally”
as an acknowledgment of certain excep-
tions, which, so far as the record shows,
have no application to the case we consid-
er. -

HM The first question for decision is
whether in a suit to establish a right of an
enclosed estate to access to a public road, a
road not’ dedicated or expropriated can be
declared public when the owner of the

2. The pertinent portion of B.S. 48:491
reads: “All roads or street in this state
* % # which have been or are here-
after kept up, maintained or worked for
a period of three years by authority of

1110

property abutting that road is not a party
to the suit. We answer “yes”.

The district court holding that the owner
of the land which the Motty Road trav-
ersed did not have to be made a party to
the suit to have the road declared public
was reversed by the Court of Appeal under
its theory that this would constitute a di-
vestiture of property without opportunity
to be heard. The error in the reasoning of
both courts was in treating this case as
though a determination here that a road
was public was a determination as to the
general public and the abutting landowner
that it was a public road for the purpose
of opening it to the. general use by the
public. This suit was not filed to decide
the question whether as to the public in
general the Motty Road was a public road
under R.S. 48:491.2 Here the defendants
attempted to show by way of a defense
that for the servitude of passage there is a
route to a public road nearer to the en-
closed land than the route sought by the
School Board over the defendants’ land.

. i
HE The second question is whether. the

plaintiff has ‘established that it is entitled
to a servitude

ff passage across defend-

_ ants’ land because it affords the nearest

route to a public road. It is conceded that
a passage from the property of’ the School

any parish governing authority in its par-
ish or by authority of any municipal gov-
ening authority in its municipality shall
be public: roads or streets as the case
may be, * * *” .

1111 a 1112

Board to the Motty Road across other land

is shorter than the route across the land of
the defendants to the Pine Island Road.

‘The evidence in this record shows that in

1959 the police juror of the ward in which
these lands‘'are located brought a dragline
‘and a foad crew onto the Motty property.
The road then in existence, known as the
Motty Road, was built up and extended
along a trail that continued from the origi-
nal roadway to’and across the Warren Ca-
nal.’ A permanent bridge was constructed
over the canal. All of this work was done
under the supervision of the police juror
with parish funds, personnel, and equip-
ment. Every year since 1959 that entire
stretch of road has been graded and main-
tained by the police juror with parish
funds and equipment. Under these circum-
stances and for the purpose of this suit we
can find no fault with the conclusion of
the district court that in light of RS,
48:491 the Motty Road is a public road.
We are also in accord with the holding of
that court that the School Board failed to
sustain the burden of proving that the
right of passage it sought over defendants’
land was the most convenient outlet to a
public road. Under the express language
of Civil Code Article 700 the School Board
3. In Rockholt v. Keaty, 256 La. 629, 287
So.2d 663 (1970), one of the reasons why
the plaintiffs’ claim for a right of passage
over the land of the defendant was re-
jected was that it was shown that there
‘were shorter routes of passage to public

roads. Yet there it was contended that
access to the publie roads by the shorter

is not entitled to a right of passage over
defendants’ land. Any rights it may have
against other adjoining landowners for ac-
cess to its enclosed property must be deter-
mined in a suit against those parties? _

‘The judgment of the Court of Appeal is
reversed, and the Vermiliom Parish School
Board’s suit against Alphe Broussard and
all other defendants is dismissed as .of
non-suit. Costs insofar as allowed by law
are assessed against the plaintiff.

SUMMERS, J., recused.

270 So0.2d 526

William B. FOSTER, Plaintiff-Appeltant,
ve

Rivers BREAUX et al., Defendants-
Appellees.

No, 51948,

Dee, 14, 1972.

routes would not be available because
subdivision building restrictions would not -
permit the construction of the access
road. We held that thaf was an issue
to be decided in another case since the
evidence and the parties before us would
not permit us to make a determination,

1117

E. Howard McCaleb, III, New Orleans,
for plaintiff-appellant.

Macy & Kemp, Duncan S. Kemp, III,
Hammond, for defendant-appellee.

TATE, Justice.

The plaintiff Foster's suit was dismissed
upon peremptory exception pleading pre-
scription, La.C.Civ.P. Art. 927(1). The
dismissal was affirmed by the intermediate
court, 253 So.2d 569 (La.App. Ist Cir,
1971). We granted certiorari to review
this holding. 260 La. 278, 255 So.2d 768
(1972). See also earlier appeal, 238 So.2d
803 (La.App. Ist Cir. 1970).

HM Foster sues for damages caused by
an alleged slander. Such an action for in-
jurious words prescribes in’ one year. La.
Civ.Code Art..3536. Prescription is inter-
rupted by mere filing of suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction! within the pre-
scriptive period, but only by the service of
citation if filed in an incompetent court,

including one of improper venue. La.R.S.
9:5801 (1960)?.
1, La.C.Civ.P. Art. 5251(4): “ ‘Competent

court’, or ‘court of competent jurisdic.
tion’, means a court which has jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of, and is the
proper venue for, the action or proceod-
ing.”

2, LaR.S. 9:5801: “All prescriptions af-
fecting the cause of action therein sued
upon are interrupted as to all defendants,
including minors or interdicts, by the com-
mencement of a civil action in a court of

1118

When a suit is filed
in a court of improper venue within the

The issue here is:

prescriptive period, but service is made aft-
er it, may the defendant urge it is pre-
scribed for this reason, if such defendant
has previously waived his right to object to
the venue as improper?

The alleged slander occurred on May 18,
1968, when the defendants Breaux and Ev-
ans made certain statements about the
plaintiff in Plaquemines Parish, The
plaintiff filed suit on May 16, 1969 (i. e,
two days before prescription accrued) in
Tangipahoa Parish, Breaux was served at
his domicile in Terrebonne Parish on May
22, 1969 (i. e, three days after the pre-
scriptive year), and Evans at his domicile
in LaFourche Parish on May 23, 1969 (i.
e., four days after the prescriptive year).

I At the time of filing, Tangipahoa
Parish was an improper venue for this
suit, since both of the defendants were
domiciled in other parishes, La.C.Civ.P.
Art. 42, and since likewise the wrongful
La.C.Civ.P.
Art. 74, This was expressly held in the

conduct occurred elsewhere,

competent jurisdiction and in the proper
venue. When the pleading presenting the
judicial demand is filed in an incompetent
court, or in an improper venue, prescrip-
tion is interrupted as to the defendants
served by the service of process.” (As
amended Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1).

Under La.0.Civ.P, Art 421, a elvil ac-
tion: “is commenced by the filing of a
pleading presenting the demand to a court
of competent jurisiiction.” (Italics ours.)

hig

earlier appeal in this proceeding, 238 So.2d
803 (La.App. Ist Cir. 1970), which re-
manded the case.

[MM However, this earlier appeal cor-
rectly held that, insofar as Breaux, the de-
clinatory exception pleading: iraproper ven-
ue was waived, since it was not filed prior
to preliminary default, as required by La.
C.Civ.P, Art, 928. The exception of im-
proper venue was therefore overruled as
to him, and the case remanded. 238 So.
2d 803, 8068.

‘The defendant contends that, under the
plain’ terms of the statute, prescription was
not interrupted, since at the time of its fil-
ing and of the service of citation the suit
was in'a court of incompetent jurisdiction
betause not the proper venue. (La.R.S.
9:5801, quoted in full in Footnote 2, pro-
vides: “* * “* When the pleading
presenting the: judicial demand is filed in
an incompetent court; or in an improper
venue, prescription is-interrupted as to the
defendant served by the service of proc-
ess.”) “On'the other hand, the plaintiff
contends that this suit was filed within a
court of competent jurisdiction (at least as
to the defendant Breaux), because the ven-
ue is proper, due’ to the defendant Breaux’s
waiver of his right to object to it, and the
Tangipahoa Parish court is thus compe-
3. ‘The intermediate court affirmed the trial

judgment holding venue improper as to

Evans, since he excepted to the venue
prior to default, but it nevertheless re-

1120

tent to rule upon the merits of the demand
against him.

I The issue is not free from doubt.
However, considering that at the time
Breaux filed his plea of prescription the
venue was proper as to him (due to this
waiver of the right to claim it was improp-
er), we have determined that, for purposes
of ruling upon prescription, this suit was
timely, since commenced (filed) in a court
of competent jurisdiction at the time such
plea was filed,

We reach this conclusion for the follow-
ing reasons:

HB () Under Louisiana jurisprudence,
prescriptive statutes are strictly construed,.
and of two permissible constructions that.
is adopted which favors maintaining rather
than barring the action, United Carbon.
Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 230
La. 709, 89 So.2d 209 (1956); Mansur v.
Abraham, 183 La. 633, 164 So. 421 (1935).
Cf. also State v. Stewart Bros. Cotton, 193
La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939) (prescription is.
stricti juris).

HE (2) The liberative prescription
here pleaded may be renounced, either ex-

pressly or tacitly. La.Civil Code Arts.

manded to permit trial of the plea of pre-
scription as to both defendants. 238 So.
2d 808, 806.

121

3460, 3461.4
draws a plea of prescription in the trial
court, he thereby renounces the prescrip-

Thus, when a party with-

tion originally pleaded and, having thus
abandoned it, may not thereafter re-urge
it, Marionneaux v. Brugier, 1 McGloins
Reports 257 (1881). Cf. also Succession
of Harvey v. Harvey, 44 La.Ann. 80, 10
So. 410 (1892); Coon v. Brashear, 7 La.
265 (1834).
where a party tacitly renounces the right
to plead a circumstance (improper venue)

Similarly, it seems to us,

which might validate a plea of prescrip-
tion, he may ‘not be permitted to re-urge
the circumstance thus renounced in order
to validate his prescription plea.

HM (3) Under La.C.Civ.P. Art. 421, a

civil action “is commenced by the filing of
a pleading, presenting the demand to a
court of competent jurisdiction.” Even if
the court. is one of improper venue, the
court is not incompetent to try the case for
that reason: if the objection to venue is
waived. -La.C.Civ.P. Arts. 925, 928. Thus,
for purposes of the Code, the decision
whether the court is one “of competent ju-
risdiction” is determined not by the situa-
tion at the time of filing the suit but in-

stead by the situation at the time the com-.

petency.of.the court is questioned.

4. La.Civ.Code ‘Art. 8460: “One can not
renounce a prescription not yet acquired,
but it is lawful to renounce prescription
when once acquired.”

La.Civ.Code Art. 8461: “Such re-
nunciation of prescription is either express
or tacit.

1122

HI We therefore construe the provi-
sion of La.R.S. 9:5801, which provides that
prescriptions are interrupted by the com-
mencement (filing) of a civil action in a
court of competent jurisdiction, to mean
that the filing of the suit interrupts pre-
scription if, at the time the exception
pleading prescription is filed, the court is
of competent jurisdiction. In the present
case, therefore, since venue was ‘proper as
to Breaux at the time he filed his’ plea of
prescription, the filing of the action in
(thus) a court of competent jurisdiction
therefore interrupted prescription as to
him. 7 .

‘We should note that, where a party files
a plea of prescription at a time when the
venue is improper, he does not waive his
right to plead that the suit is prescribed ,
because of improper venue. Mayeux v.,
Martin, 247 So2d 198 (La.App.3d Cir.
1971).

HM Forther, although ordinarily decli- .
natory objections are waived by making an
“appearance”, La.C.Civ.P. Art. 925, never-
theless “the pleading of other objections

., the filing of the peremptory ex-
ception or an answer therewith when rc-
quired by law, does not constitute a general

“A, tacit renunciation results from a fact
which gives a presumption of the relin-

quishment of the right acquired by pre-
scription.”

1123

appearance.” La.C.Civ.P. Art. 7. (Italics
ours.) Thus, when a defendant pleads pre-
scription because of filing in an improper
venue, he also does not waive the right to
question the improper venue if he files his
plea of prescription on that ground simul-
taneously with his declinatory attack on
the venue. He is “required by law” to do
so, cf. State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20
So.2d 305 (1944), since otherwise he would
waive his right to question the venue. (If
he files the peremptory exception pleading
urging prescription subsequently to filing
the declinatory exception objecting to the
venue, he thus makes a general appearance
waiving declinatory objections. La.C.Civ.
P. Arts. 7, 925.)

THM As to the co-defendant Evans, he
excepted to the venue as improper before
the default was entered and prayed that
the suit against him be dismissed. The
ing
this exception and assessing costs against
the plaintiff. Upon the plaintiff's earlier
appeal, the intermediate court affirmed the

trial court entered judgment maintaii

trial court judgment holding Tangipahoa
an improper venue as to Evans. 238 So.2d
803, 806, However, it likewise remanded
the suit to permit Evans to try his plea of
prescription in the lower court (see Foot-
note 2). Nevertheless, since the intermedi-

5. Bor instance, if we reverse the present
ruling sustaining Ivans’ plea of pre-
scription and remanded the trial of the
demand against Evans to the Tangipahoa
Parish court, the proceeding there would

1124

ate court had affirmed the trial court!
judgment holding that Tangipahoa Parish
was an improper venue and thus dismissing
the suit against Evans filed in that parish,
the effect of the affirmed judgment was to
dismiss the suit against Evans in that par-
ish. That court was no longer competent
to try a plea of prescription against the de-
mand against Evans as filed in Tangipahoa
Parish’ Ci, Hayes v. Muller, 248 La.
934, 183 So.2d 310 (1966).

We therefore set aside the trial court
judgment sustaining Evans’ plea of pre-
scription as improvidently entered. To
prevent misunderstanding on the remand,
we expressly do not rule upon such issues
as whether, by supplemental pleading, La.
C.Civ.P. Art. 1155, the plaintiff may join
Evans in the Tangipahoa Parish suit as
solidarily obligated with Breaux, La.C.
Civ.P. Art. 74, nor whether the timely filed
suit against Breaux had the effect of in-
terrupting prescription against Evans, if he
is a solidary obligor, La.Civ.Code Art.
2095.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the judgments of the trial and intermediate
courts maintaining the defendants’ pleas of
prescription, and we remand this suit to
be subject to the objection that it had
been finally adjudged such court was an

improper venue for the trial of the de-
mand. .

1125

the trial‘court for further proceedings con-
sistent with the views here expressed.

Reversed and remanded.
McCALEB, C. J., recused.

BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

RS. 9:5801 reads: “All prescriptions af-
fecting the cause of action therein sued
upon are interrupted as to all defendants,
including minors or interdicts, by the com-
mencement of a civil action in a court of
competent jurisdiction and in the proper
venue. When the pleading presenting the
judicial demand is filed in an incompetent
court, or in an improper venue, prescrip-
tion is interrupted as to the defendants
served by the service of process.” (Em-
phasis here and elsewhere supplied.) Un-
der Code of Civil Procedure Article 421 a
civil action “is commenced by the filing of
a pleading presenting the demand to a
court of competent jurisdiction”. Code of
Civil Procedure Article 5251(4) reads:
“‘Competent court’ or ‘court of competent
jurisdiction’, means a court which has ju-
risdiction over the subject matter of, and is
the proper venue for, the action or pro-
ceeding.” Since that proceeding had not
een filed in a court of proper venue when
this defendant was served with the plead-
ings, that court was not a competent court
or a court of competent jurisdiction.

1126

Since more than one year had elapsed be-
fore service of citation, the action had pre-
scribed on the date of receipt of service.

‘The effect of the holding of the majori-
ty is that the defendant is forced to first
submit a declinatory exception which does
not dispose of the case when his perempto-
ry exception would cause dismissal of the
The peremptory exception of pre-
successfully

suit.
scription could have been
pleaded by defendant, but part of the time
necessary to compute the prescriptive peri-
od was the lapse from the filing of this
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to
service on the defendant. So the exception
of prescription is based in part upon the
declinatory exception of improper venue.
The majority has held that the defendant
must first plead this declinatory exception
or waive it even though that waiver would
eliminate the right to plead the peremptory
exception. Such a result is certainly harsh
when the defendant has made a valid abso-
lute defense. Even if defendant had filed
both exceptions together, the ruling on the
lesser declinatory exception, which would
have had to be considered first, would
have barred any consideration of the per-
emptory exception by that court. After
ruling that it was a court without compe-
tency in the matter, that court could not
then consider any other issues of the case.
Extending the life of the cause of action
would give no advantage to the plaintiff,
The filing or transfer of the case to the

1127

proper court would still allow defendant to
plead the exception of prescription, but
only with the penalty of incurring addi-
tional costs of defense.

While I can understand the majority’s
desire for strict construction of the law of
prescription, the overall effect of the rule
fashioned here will in its extension work
“hardships far in excess of the value which
the majority believes will flow from this
attempt to preserve the right to maintain
‘an action against a plea of prescription.
The better rule would be one which pre-

1128

serves to a litigant the right to choose the
procedural vehicle that will finally dispose
of the matter without requiring him to ex-
haust dilatory tactics. This rule is sound
in law and logic, reasonable in application,
and easily understood and applied.

I believe that reason as well as the ex-
press language of the Code articles and the
statute, quoted above, dictates that defend-
ant’s peremptory exception of prescription
should be maintained.

I respectfully dissent.