State: West Virginia
Volume: 239
Term: 2017-2017
Jurisdiction(s): West Virginia
Source: https://static.case.law/w-va/239.pdf

WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

799 S.E.2d 78

TRANSPORTATION, Division of High-
ways, Petitioner Below, Petitioner

ve

Douglas-R. VEACH, Catherine D. ‘Veach;
Arvella Piercy, Aretta Turner, Rosella A.
Veach, Dorothy Veach, Deborah E.
Veach, Sheila Kay Veach, Sherwood 8.
Veach, Sharon A. Mehok, F. Craig
Veach, L. Coleman Veach, Reginald K.
Veach, Jeffrey T. Veach, Eric C. Veach,
Christopher K. Veach, St. Mary’s Catho-
lic Church And Epiphany of the Lord
Cemetery, and The Roman Catholic Dio-
cese Wheeling-charleston, Respondents
Below, Respondents

No, 16-0326
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: January 17, 2017
Filed: April 17, 2017

ran

1

nr

Respondents Douglas R. Veach, Catherine D.
Veach, Arvella Piercy, Aretta Turner, Rosella A.
Veach, Dorothy Veach, Deborah EB. Veach, Sheila
Kay Veach, Sherwood S. Veach, Sharon A. Me-
hok, F. Craig Veach, L. Coleman Veach, Regi-
nald K. Veach, Jeffrey T. Veach, Eric C, Veach,

Seott L. Summers, Esq., Summers Law
Office, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner :

..J. David Judy, IIL, Esq., Judy & Judy,

Moorefield, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondents - .

WALKER, Justice:
Petitioner West Virginia Department of
Transportation, Division | of Highways

(“DOH”), appeals the Cireuit Court of Hardy
County's March 2, 2016 order granting sum-
mary judgment against DOH and awarding
attorneys’ fees and costs to Respondents +
(“Veach Heirs”) in this condemnation action.

_ In this appeal, DOH asserts that the cir-
cuit court erred by refusing to set aside a
stipulation entered into by its. prior counsel
that conceded ownership of limestone to the
Veach Heirs as part of a mineral reservation.
The DOH now contends that the Veach Heirs
are not entitled to compensation for the lime-
stone because limestone is not subject to a
general mineral reservation and, therefore,
the Veach Heirs do not own it. DOH further
contends the circuit court erred in relying on
these stipulations and applying the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to grant the Veach
Heirs’ motion for summary judgment. Final-
ly, DOH ‘argues the circuit court erred in
finding that it acted in bad faith and award-
ing costs and attorneys’ fees to the Veach
Heirs.

The Veach Heirs assert two cross-assign-
ments of error. First, they argue that the
cireuit court erred in refusing to award attor-
neys’ fees based upon their contingency fee

Christopher K. Veach, St. Mary's Catholic
Church and Ephiphany of the Lord Cemetary
and the Roman Catholic Diocese Wheeling-
Charleston are the heirs of'Anna M. Veach and
the owners of the severed mineral rights at issue
in this case.

6 ee

contract with their counsel. The Veach Heirs
also assert that the circuit court erred by
ordering the statutory interest to commence
on the date the condemnation proceeding
was filed rather than the date the mandamus
proceeding was filed.

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and arguments, the submitted record and
pertinent authorities, we affirm the cireuit
court’s order granting summary judgment to
the Veach Heirs and setting the date of
commencement of interest from the date of
the filing of the condemnation petition. How-
ever, we reverse the circuit court’s rulings on
attorneys’ fees and costs and we remand the
case with instructions to hold a hearing to
provide both parties the opportunity to be
heard on the issues of whether the Veach
Heirs are entitled to recover attorney's fees
and costs and, if so, the reasonableness of the
amount to be awarded.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In 1968, Anna M. Veach conveyed to her
three sons approximately 405’ aeres of real
estate in Hardy County subject to a mineral
reservation. The conveyance reserved to Ms.
Veach “all minerals underlying the tracts of
real estate.” When Ms. Veach died on July
25, 2006, the Veach Heirs inherited her min-
eral rights.

In 2005, DOH began construction on a
portion of the highway known as Corridor H
near the Veach property. In the course of
construction, DOH utilized limestone re-
moved from the Veach property and a near-
by property belonging to Margaret Z. New-
ton. In October 2010, the Veach Heirs filed a
petition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit
Court of Hardy County seeking to force
DOH to institute a condemnation proceeding
for the limestone excavated from their prop-
erty. Construction on this section of Corridor
H was completed and opened to the public on
October 27, 2010.

Following discovery relating to DOH’s
duty to institute condemnation proceedings,
the parties entered into an agreed order in
March 2011 providing that DOH would insti-
tute a condemnation proceeding against the
Veach Heirs’ mineral interest, which included

the limestone. Consequently, the mandamus
proceeding was voluntarily dismissed. A simi-
lar agreed order was entered in a separate
mandamus proceeding relating to the New-
ton property.

‘The resulting condemnation action relating
to the Veach property commenced by peti-
tion filed on May 27, 2011, while the condem-
nation action relating to the Newton proper-
ty commenced on April 29, 2011. The cases
were consolidated for pre-trial hearings be-
cause, in the words of counsel for DOH, they
dealt with “exactly the same” issues. Several
pre-trial rulings were made to clarify the
trial issues, including that (1) DOH’s failure
to first contact Veach and Newton before the
commencement of construction denied them
the opportunity to determine the highest and
best use of the limestone and the just com-
pensation they were each entitled to receive;
and (2) DOH entered onto Veach and New-
ton’s respective properties and excavated and
appropriated limestone without their permis-
sion and by so doing, acted in bad faith and
in a willful trespass against their interests.
The circuit court also adopted identical jury
charges, instructions and verdict forms for
both cases other than non-substantive differ-
ences, Regarding the Veach property specifi-
cally, the parties stipulated during a hearing
in 2018 as follows:

1. That Anna M. Veach conveyed surface

only to three (8) of her sons on August,
81, 1968, reserving unto herself fee
simple ownership of all minerals un-
derlying the Veach real estate, without
limitation or restriction, and which res-
ervation and exception is free of ambi-
guity and clear in its intent.

2, That the minerals reserved by Anna
M. Veach include limestone and gravel
as defined by the Court.

Similarly, prior to trial in the Newton matter,
the parties in that case stipulated that “the
minerals reserved by Margaret Z. Newton
include limestone and gravel as defined by
the Court.”

The parties agreed that the Newton case
would be tried first. Following a three-day
trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of
Ms. Newton, finding that she had met her

burden of proving the quantity, quality, mar-
ketability, and market value of the limestone
removed by DOH and left in its natural state
on the property. The jury fixed the value of
limestone that was removed from the proper-
ty at $3.79/ton and allowed a value of $0.25/
ton for limestone remaining in the ground.
DOH appealed the verdict, which we af-
firmed in West Virginia Department of
Transportation, Division of Highways v.
Newton, 285 W.Va, 267, 778 S.E.2d av.
(2015) (“Newton I”).

After the verdict was affirmed in Newton
I, DOH retained different counsel to com-
plete the remaining litigation in the Veach
matter. New DOH counsel filed (1) a motion
for summary judgment arguing that the
Veach Heirs did not own the limestone be-
cause it is not a “mineral” subject to a gener-
al reservation of mineral rights; (2) a motion
to rescind the stipulations on those points
made by prior counsel; and (8) a motion to
certify the question to this Court as to
whether limestone is. included in a general
mineral reservation. The Veach Heirs also
moved for summary judgment on the basis of
collateral estoppel pursuant to adjudication
of the Newton case,

The various motions were heard on August,
25, 2015. On March 2, 2016, the circuit court
granted the motion for summary judgment
filed by the Veach Heirs and denied all three
DOH motions on the grounds that DOH had
stipulated to the Veach Heirs’ ownership of
the limestone, pleaded the Veach Heirs’ own-
ership of the limestone, neglected to appeal
the writ of mandamus on the subject, and
voluntarily agreed to dismiss the mandamus
proceeding. The circuit court. applied the
market values for limestone as determined
by the jury in the Newton case because the
limestone was taken from a similarly situated
property and the value had already been
adjudicated by a Hardy County jury. The
circuit court also ordered the payment of
attorneys’ fees and costs. The resulting
award to the Veach Heirs was (1)
$19,565,398.00 plus interest at a rate of 10%
per annum accruing from the date of the
take on May 27, 2011; (2) $18,051.01 plus
interest at a rate of 7% per annum for attor-
neys’ fees and costs in the mandamus action;

7

and (8) $199,248.09 plus interest at a rate of
7% per annum for attorneys’ fees and costs
in the condemnation action. Thereafter, DOH
filed this appeal.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HB “A circuit court’s entry of summary
judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Painter v, Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d
755 (1994). We review entry of summary
judgment according to the same standards as
the circuit court: “[a] motion for summary
judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to
be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is
not desirable to clarify the application. of the
law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160,

. 183 8.E.2d 770 (1963).

HM Similarly, “[wlhere the issue on an
appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
AL, 194 W.Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

Hs Finally, “{t}he decision to. award or
not to award attorneys’ fees rests in the
sound discretion of the circuit court, and the
exercise of that discretion will not be dis-
turbed on appeal except in cases of abuse.”
Beto v, Stewart, 218 W.Va. 355, 359, 582
§.E.2d 802, 806 (2008); see also Sanson v.
Brandywine Homes, Inc., 215 W.Va. 307,
810, 599 S.E.2d 730, 788 (2004) (“We ...
apply the abuse of discretion standard of
review to an award of attorneys’ fees.”).
Likewise, “[t]he trial [court] ... is vested
with a wide discretion in determining the
amount of ... court costs and counsel fees;
and the trial [court's] ... determination of
such matters will not be disturbed upon ap-
peal to this Court unless it clearly appears
that [it] has abused [its] discretion.” Syl. Pt.
8, in part, Bond v. Bond, 144 W.Va. 478, 109
S.E.2d 16 (1959),

With these standards in mind, we address
the parties’ arguments.

IIL DISCUSSION
The assignments and cross-assignments of
error are discussed separately below.

8 Le

A. The Stipulations

HH DOH’s first assignment of error con-
cerns the circuit court’s refusal to set aside
the stipulations made by prior DOH counsel
that the deed of conveyance executed by

* Anna Veach clearly reserved’ the minerals
without limitation and that the mineral reser-
vation included the. limestone and. gravel.
DOH argues that prior counsel’s agreement
to those stipulations should have been set
aside because entering into the stipulations
‘was not only improvident but also contrary to
law. - pos

HH Generally, attorneys are author-
ized to enter into stipulations on behalf of
their clients and a party is ordinarily bound
by a stipulation made by its attorney. 4 Will-
ston on Contracts § 8,50 (4th ed. 2016). How-
ever, a court may, under certain cirecum-
stances, set aside a stipulation:

Relief is ordinarily grounded in the sound

judicial discretion of the court, and is usu-

ally available only in cases of fraud, mis-
take, improvidence or material change in
circumstances, where in equity and good
conscience the stipulation ought not to
stand, To be relieved from a: stipulation,
the party seeking relief must ordinarily act
diligently, show good cause and provide
fair’ notice. Generally, relief will only ‘be
afforded if enforcement of the stipulation
will result in a manifest injustice upon ‘one
of the parties, Some courts distinguish, in
regard to relief from stipulations, between
procedural and substantive stipulations,
granting relief from the former more
readily.
Id, Similarly, in the Syllabus of Cole'v. State
Compensation Commissioner, 114 W.Va.
688, 178 S.E. 268 (1934), we explained that
“Ta] stipulation of counsel may be set aside,
upon the request of one of the parties, on the
ground of improvidence provided both par-
ties can be restored to the same condition as
when the agreement was made.” Jd. In for-
mulating this test for setting aside a stipula-
tion, the Cole court looked to Palliser v.
Home Telephone Company, 170 Ala, 841, 54
So, 499, 500 (Ala, 1911), in which the Ala-
bama court noted that counsel had the au-
thority to bind parties by agreements in rela-
tion to a cause and that such agreements

should not be set aside for any less cause
than would warrant the rescission of con-
tracts in general, namely, fraud, accident,
mistake, or some other ground of the same
nature. Id, Accordingly, we now hold that a

* circuit court is afforded wide discretion in

determining: whether or not a party should
be relieved of a stipulation, and such decision
should not be set aside absent an abuse of
discretion. Upon review of the factual cir-
cumstances present in the case before us, we
find that the cireuit court did not err in
refusing to set aside DOH’s stipulation,
Hs First, DOH: presented no evi-
dence of fraud, accident, mistake or similar
grounds. that would “warrant the rescission
of contracts in general.” Id, While contractu-
al.basis for rescission was not specifically
raised by DOH in the instant case, the rec-
ord limits the plausible arguments to only
mistake of fact or mistake of law:
A mistake of fact consists of an uncon-
scious ‘ignorance or forgetfulness of a .ma-
terial fact, past or present, or of a mistak-
en belief in the past or present existence of
a material fact which did not or does not
actually exist. A mistake of law,.on the
other hand, consists of a mistaken opinion
or inference arising from an imperfect or
incorrect exercise of judgment upon the
facts as they really are and occurs when a,
person, having full knowledge of the facts,
_is ignorant of or comes to an erroneous
conclusion as to the legal effect of his acts.
Webb v. Webb, 171 W.Va. 614, 618, 801 8.E.2d
570, 574~75 (1988) (internal citations omit-
ted). “[A] party may not avoid the legal
consequences on the ground of mistake, even
a mistake of fact, where such mistake is the
result of the negligence of the complaining
party.” Id, at 620, 301 S.E.2d at 576 (internal
citations omitted), DOH could point to no
evidence that prior counsel was under misap-
prehension of a fact; rather the “mistake” as
alluded to by DOH was the negligence of
counsel in stipulating that the ownership of
the limestone was not in dispute. DOH has
only alleged that its attorney was not suffi-
ciently diligent, which is an issue more ap-

propriate for resolution between the attorney

and DOH. Mistake of law, while arguably
present, is not grounds to rescind a contract,

er °

Finding that there are no contractual princi-
ples on which to base rescission of the stipu-

lation, we turn to whether the stipulation’

may be rescinded on the grounds .of improvi-
dence,

Cole requires that “both parties can be
restored to the same condition as when the
agreement was made” as a condition for re-
scinding a stipulation on the grounds of: im-
providence. Syl., Cole v. State Comp.
Comm’r, 114 W.Va. 688, 178 S.B. 268 (1984).
DOH asserts, without factual basis, that if
the stipulations were rescinded, the Veach
Heirs would be in the same position as when
the stipulations were made in 2018. We dis-
agree, Given the long procedural history of
this case, the Veach Heirs have demonstrat-
ed that they will experience significant preju-
dice if required effectively to “start over.”
The motion to set aside the stipulations was
not filed until after the Newton case had
been tried, after the verdict was. affirmed by
this Court and after retention of new counsel.
This motion was untimely and prejudicial to
the Veach Heirs, even if there were evidence
of improvidence,

HE Sienificantly, DOH also ignores
the fact that that it pleaded the very same
facts in its petition for condemnation filed in
2011. DOH alleged as a sworn fact that the
Veach Heirs own the mineral rights, which
encompassed the limestone, in its petition to
initiate the Veach condemnation proceeding.
While precedent may permit setting aside
stipulations under certain circumstances, it
does not permit setting aside pleadings ab-
sent timely amendment as a matter of course
or seeking léave of court pursuant to West
Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).? Such
an amendment to the pleadings at this point
is, obviously, untimely and DOH never
sought leave of court or permission of the
2, The substantive issues in this case have already

been resolved by the Newton trial, as is discussed

below in response to the collateral estoppel as-
signment of error.

3. West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)
provides:
A party may amend the party’s pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the plead-
ing is one to which no responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, the party may so

opposing party to amend its pleadings. We
previously have held that a “[pllaintiff [is]
conclusively bound by allegations of fact, ma-
terial or immaterial, contained in his plead-
ings.” Syllabus, Pettry v. Hedrick, 123 W.Va.
107, 18 S.B.2d 401 (1941). DOH altogether
failed to address this fact.

In a similar vein, we note that the circuit
court also considered: the fact that in the
underlying mandamus action, DOH initially
challenged by motion the capacity of the
Veach heirs. to file the action because the
estate of Anna Veach had not: been settled,
After conducting discovery, DOH voluntarily
agreed to abandon pursuit of that motion and
to file the instant condemnation action, in
effect acknowledging that the Veach Heirs
owned the mineral rights and specifically the
Limestone.

Petitioner urges us to rely upon State ew
rel. Crafton v; Burnside, 207 W.Va. 74, 528
§.E.2d 768 (2000), a case in which the plain-
tiffs were permitted to withdraw consent to a
bifurcated trial procedure after a change in
counsel. The Crafton plaintiffs obtained addi-
tional counsel subsequent to the entry of a
case management order providing that the
consolidated cases would be tried in a re-
verse bifurcated manner. Id, at 76, 528
8.E.2d at 770. New counsel asserted that the
initial counsel who consented was so inexpe-
rienced in toxic tort litigation that he failed
to grasp the prejudice his clients would suf-
fer as-a result of agreeing to an alternate
trial procedure. Id, The Crafton court con-
cluded that plaintiffs should have been per-
mitted to withdraw their consent to reverse
bifurcation, Id. at 79, 528 S.H.2d at 773,

HH We find Crafton inapplicable here,
This Court has previously stated. that, “[t]he

amend it’at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend the par-
ty’s pleading only by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party; and leave

. shall be freely given when justice so requires. A
party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for re-
sponse to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, ales the
court otherwise orders.

10

mere-fact of retaining new counsel, in the
absence of incompetent prior representation,
does not constitute ‘manifest injustice’ under
Rule 16, [West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure] [1992] such that it entitles ... [the
movant] to relief from the court’s previously
uncontested deadlines.” State ex rel. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Madden, 192
W.Va. 155, 161, 451 8.E.2d 721, 727 (1994).
Similarly, DOH should not’ be entitled to
relief at this stage of the proceedings from
stipulations entered when no evidence has
been presented of the incompetence of prior
counsel. Unlike the plaintiffs in Crafton,
DOH is an experienced litigant in these types
of cases and had its choice of counsel. Criti-
cally, DOH’s stipulation pertains to a sub-
stantive issue previously represented as un-
disputed as opposed to a procedural issue,
like the one in Crafton, As discussed above,
whether a stipulation relates to a procedural
or substantive issue is a dominant consider-
ation in determining whether rescission is
appropriate as the latter carries with it more
danger of prejudice. See 4 Willston on Con-
tracts § 8.50 (4th ed. 2016),

Finally, we are not persuaded by DOH’s
argument that the stipulations should have
been set aside because they are “contrary to
controlling law.” By DOH’s own admission,
whether or not limestone is reserved by a
general mineral reservation is “an issue of
first impression” for this Court and thus
there is no “controlling law.” 4 In this case,
both parties, with aid of counsel, entered into
stipulations in order to clarify the contested
issues for trial. DOH was free to enter into
such stipulations (or not) and had assistance
of counsel in so doing. DOH pleaded the facts
underlying the stipulations in its condemna-
tion petition. At this stage, the argument that
the stipulations should now be set aside as
“contrary to law” is disingenuous at best, For
all of these reasons, we find that the circuit
court did not err in refusing to set aside the
stipulations.

B. Collateral Estoppel

DOH contends that the circuit court erred
in granting the Veach Heirs’ motion for sum-
4, Because we find that the circuit court did not

err in declining to set aside the stipulations, we
find it unnecessary to address the issue of wheth-

mary judgment based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel and the stipulations dis-
cussed above. Because we find that the cir-
euit court made no error in refusing to set
aside the stipulations, we focus on the court’s
reliance on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

HH Syllabus Point 2 of Conley v
Spillers, 171 WNa. 584, 301 S.E.2d 216
(1983), provides, in part, that “{clollateral
estoppel is designed to foreclose relitigation
of issues in a second suit which have actually
been litigated in the earlier. suit even though
there may be a difference in the cause of
action between the parties of the first and
second suit.” Invocation of collateral estoppel
is termed “offensive” in this case because the
Veach Heirs are a stranger to the Newton
action and application of collateral estoppel is
to their benefit because they are not required
to prove elements of their case. Initially, “we
note that offensive use of collateral estoppel
is generally disfavored in this jurisdiction.”
Holloman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins, Co., 217
W.Va. 269, 275, 617 S.E.2d 816, 822 (2005),
Offensive application is often disfavored be-
cause it can engender the precise opposite
incentive intended—rather than encouraging
joinder and limiting repetitive litigation, in-
appropriate offensive application may instead.
encourage a party to deliberately avoid con-
solidation or joinder in the first action to
“wait and see” its outcome with nothing to
lose and everything to gain. See Conley v.
Spillers, 171 W.Va, 584, 592, 801 8.E.2d 216,
228-24 (1988). Thus, we have explained that
“a stranger's right to utilize the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is not automatic because
it may depend on the peculiar facts of a given
case,” but such application is not precluded—
the trial court has “rather broad discretion in
determining when it should be applied.” Id.
(emphasis added),

In this case, a review of the record indi-
cates the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the application of collateral estoppel in
favor of a stranger to the action were aptly
considered. There is no evidence that the
Veach Heirs were deliberately avoiding con-

er limestone is subject to a general mineral reser-
vation.

solidation or joinder; the cases had previous-
ly been consolidated for all pre-trial proceed-
ings in the interest of judicial economy and
by agreement of the parties. The parties
agreed to try the cases separately, presum-
ably to avoid jury confusion due to the very
complicated procedural history involved in
both of these cases. Further, the circuit court
is best positioned to evaluate whether there
was deliberate avoidance of joinder and is
vested with the broad discretion of determin-
ing whether offensive application of collateral
estoppel was appropriate under the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case. Accord-
ingly, we do not find that offensive use of
collateral estoppel was precluded under the
circumstances and turn to the merits of
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
was properly applied.

Ts As we have held:

Collateral estoppel will bar a claim if four
conditions are met: (1) The issue previous-
ly decided is identical to the one presented
in the action in question; (2) there is final
adjudication on the. merits of the prior
action; (8) the party against whom the
doctrine is invoked was a party or in privi-
ty with a party to a prior action; and (4)
the party against whom the doctrine is
raised had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior action,
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 8, 459
§.H.2d 114 (1995). Though raised briefly and
without specificity, DOH challenges whether
the first and fourth conditions for applicabili-
ty of collateral estoppel as set forth in State
v. Miller were met. Specifically, DOH claims
the circuit court ignored the factual questions
remaining, namely, the feasibility of quarry-
ing the limestone, the value of the limestone,
and the marketability of the limestone. DOH
also emphasizes that the property at issue in
this cage is not the same property at issue in
the Newton case. As to the fourth Miller
condition, DOH asserts that it was not af-
forded a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues previously and argues that this
Court was foreclosed from meaningful con-
sideration of trial errors on the merits in
Newton I due to its prior counsel’s failure to
preserve those issues for appellate review.

i

The Veach Heirs respond that the pro-
ceedings in the Newton and Veach cases
were identical and that DOH had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the
Newton case, They argue that quantity, qual-
ity, market value and market price were
established in Newton and that if the stipula-
tions-as to ownership are upheld, the case is
resolved.

HH With respect to the analysis of the
first Miller condition—whether the issue
previously decided is identical to the one
presented in the action in question—we have
held that it “involves not only a determina-
tion of whether the facts are similar, but also
a determination of whether the legal stan-
dards and procedures used to assess the
facts are similar.” City of Huntington v. Ba-
con, 196 W.Va. 457, 463, 478 S.E.2d 748, 749
(1996) (citing State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. at 10,
459 §.E.2d at 121), While DOH attempts to
differentiate this case from Newton, we find
the dispositive issues were indeed identical.
The two cases were combined for all pre-trial
proceedings without dispute by DOH counsel
and had identical pre-trial rulings. The oper-
ative facts and issues in the cases were, in
the words of counsel for DOH, “exactly the
same.” DOH’s failure to condemn all inter-
ests in the real estate prior to the taking was
at issue in Newton and was at issue here.
Likewise, in both cases the mineral owners
were required to seek writs of mandamus to
force DOH to initiate condemnation proceed-
ings.

Relatedly, we find that the factual issues
DOH asserts are still in dispute likewise are
resolved by application of collateral estoppel.
Specifically, DOH argues that certain factual
issues (the feasibility of quarrying the lime-
stone, the value of the limestone, and the
marketability of the limestone) are still in
dispute and are not resolved through applica-
tion of collateral estoppel’ DOH concludes
that the first element of Miller does not
apply to resolve those factual disputes and
therefore summary judgment was inappro-
priate. We disagree. The three issues DOH
contends are still in dispute all relate to the
nature of the limestone itself, which was
taken from two similarly situated properties
located about a mile apart from one another

12

and utilized forthe same purpose in building
a section of Corridor H, The same experts
were retained for both cases to present opin-
ions on these issues and were subject to
crogss-examination and impeachment by DOH
during the Newton trial. While resolution of
these issues does require consideration of the
date of the take,> the record shows that the
respective takes were a mere twenty-eight

, days apart (April 29, 2011 and May 27, 2011),
Because these. issues are so factually analo-
gous and were fully tried before a Hardy
County jury, they are precluded from a reit-
erated review by another pursuant to the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. To require re-
litigation of these issues would be a waste of
judicial resources,

r | With respect to the fourth ele-
ment—DOH’s alleged lack of full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues—we have
held that it is a basie due process right for a
party to have the opportunity to have their
arguments heard and to “have their day in
court” before application of collateral estop-
pel is appropriate.

Some litigants—those who never appeared

in a prior action—may not be collaterally

estopped without litigating the issue. They
have never had a chance to present their
evidence and arguments on the claim. Due
process prohibits estopping them despite
one or more existing adjudications of the
identical issue which stand squarely
against their position,
Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 504, 301
S,E.2d 216, 225 (1983) (internal citations
omitted), “[TJhe central inquiry on collateral
estoppel is whether.a given issue has actually
been litigated by the parties in the earlier
suit.” Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc.,
224 W.Va. 160, 177, 680 S.B.2d 791, 808
(2009) (internal citations omitted), We have
explained that “whether those. issues could
have been litigated is not important; they
actually must have been litigated.” Abadir v.
Dellinger, 227 W.Va. 388, 394, 709 S.H.2d
748, 749 (2011).

We have found this element lacking in
cases-in which a default judgment was ren-
5, In the Newton trial, the mineral owner made a

showing of marketability over an eighteen-month
period (April 29, 2011 through October 29; 2012)

dered, where the acts forming the basis of
the suit were different in the first and second
actions, or where collateral estoppel was oth-
erwise applied to a party who was not per-
mitted to participate. See Stillwell v. City of
Wheeling, 210 W.Va. 599, 607, 558 S.E.2d
598, 606 (2001) (“[alpplying collateral estop-
pel to prevent one party from mounting a
defense when the estoppel is based solely
upon another party’s procedural default runs
afoul of [due process] principles”); Christian
v. Sizemore, 185 W.Va, 409, 418, 407 S.E.2d
715 (1991) (“issues are not actually litigated
in a default judgment action and, consequent-
ly, [...] default judgments are not appropri-
ate foundations for the application of collater-
al estoppel”); Holloman v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 217 W.Va, 269, 276-77, 617 S.E.2d
816, 828-24 (2005) (finding full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue would likely not be
met where insurer altered general business
practice. between the time the insurer han-
dled the two different claims); Horkulic v.
Galloway, 222 W.Va, 450, 460, 665 S,E.2d
284, 294 (2008).(insurance company not per-
mitted to participate in settlement, enforce-
ment hearing could not be collaterally es-
topped in subsequent challenge to confessed
judgment).

We find here that DOH was given full and
fair opportunity to present its arguments on
the same set of operative facts in the Newton
trial and appeal, As discussed.above, DOH
‘was an active participant in the Newton mat-
ter and had the opportunity to litigate the
issues to the full extent of a jury trial and to
appeal that verdict to this Court. DOH was
fully afforded its “day in court” in Newton
with respect to its actions relating to these
properties. The issues had been consolidated
without DOH’s opposition and proceeded in
tandem prior to the Newton trial because, in
the words of DOH’s own counsel, they in-
volved “exactly the same issues.” DOH can-
not now claim that the operative issues are
sufficiently dissimilar to prohibit, application
of collateral estoppel. Based on the above, we
find the DOH was given full opportunity to
litigate the disputed issues.

which encompassed the date of the take in the

Veach case. See Newton I, 235-W.Va. at 276-
-773 S.B.2d at 380-81. .

HI DOH'’s claim that the lack of mean-
ingful appellate review by this Court of cer-
tain issues in Newton I renders collateral
estoppel inapplicable in this case is also una-
vailing.® While DOH believes errors were
made during the Newton trial that did not
permit this Court to review fully the jury’s
findings, it does not detract -from the fact
that DOH had the right to the counsel of its
choice and had full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues. Even if.we accept DOH’s
argument that the fourth Miller element is
not met due to lack of meaningful appellate
review in Newton I, the only issues not liti-
gated fully and fairly would necessarily be
limited to the assignments of error raised in
Newton I that were not reviewed on the
merits. It would not, as DOH may hope,
provide open season on all issues tried or
stipulated to during and prior to the Newton
trial, namely whether limestone is subject to
a general reservation of mineral rights.’ Al-
though this Court noted that such review of
errors on the merits was limited, the case
was reviewed nonetheless and the verdict
was affirmed. Full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues does not mean actual litiga-
tion of the issues, free of tactical mistakes,
Consequently, the fourth element of collater-
al estoppel is also satisfied. Accordingly, we
find the circuit court did not err in applying
the doctrine of collateral estoppel in granting
the Veach Heirs’ motion for summary judg-
ment,

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

HH As noted above, the circuit court
awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to the
Veach Heirs in both the mandamus and con-
demnation actions, DOH contends that it was
not given the opportunity to be heard on the

6. In Newton I, we held that “Rule 59(f) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure does not
preclude a party from appealing definitive pre-
trial rulings of a trial court that are in the record,
even though the party failed to file a post-trial
motion for a new trial.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, New-
ton I, 235 W.Va. 267, 773 S.E.2d 371. We re-
viewed DOH’s assignments of error that com-
plied with our holding. on the merits, but noted
that the posture of the exception to the waiver
tule in Rule 59(f) limited review of the merits of
pretrial rulings. Jd, at 273 n.12, 773 S.B.2d at
377 1,12,

“13

issue of-attorneys’ fees and costs, We consis-
tently have held that a circuit court must
afford a party notice and the opportunity to
be heard prior to awarding attorneys’ fees
and costs. See, ag. Multiplex v. Town of
Clay, 281 W.Va. 728, 749 S.B.2d. 621 (2018);
Kanawha Valley Radiologists, Inc, v. One
Valley Bank, N.A, 210 W.Va. 228, 229, 557
8.E.2d 277, 288. (2001).

Upon review of the record, weave unable
to find that any notice was given to DOH
that the circuit court was considering the
matter of attorneys’ fees and costs. Accord-
ing to the appendix presented to this Court,
no hearing regarding the issue was noticed
or conducted.® The circuit court entered its
order granting summary judgment in favor
of the Veach Heirs and simultaneously
awarded attorneys’ fees and costs based on a
finding of bad faith in a summary fashion.
‘We find that DOH was not provided the
opportunity to dispute the finding of bad
faith or statutory entitlement that resulted in
the circuit court’s award of fees to the Veach
heirs. Likewise, DOH was not provided the
opportunity to address the reasonableness of
the fee award itself. Therefore, we find the
cireuit court abused its discretion in award-
ing attorney's fees and costs without giving
DOH notice and the opportunity to be heard
on the matter.

HE s[n our recent decision in West
Virginia Department of Transportation, Di-
vision of Highways v. Newton, 289 W.Va.
615, 797 S.E.2d 592 (2017) (“Newton II”), we
established the legal framework for consider-
ation of whether an award of attorney's fees
and costs is warranted in similar circum-
stances. As we explained in Newton II,
should it be determined that the Veach Heirs

7. In Newton I we noted: “Dou also has contend-
ed that the limestone was not a mineral. Howev-
er, this contention is inconsistent with a stipula-
tion DOH: made prior to trial. That stipulation

.. states: ‘The minerals reserved by Margaret Z.
Newton include limestone and gravel as defined
by the Court.’ (Emphasis added),” 235 W.Va. at

. 273,13, 773 $,E.2d at 377 n.13.

8. While the docket sheet in the appendix suggests
that the Veach Heirs filed a motion for attorneys’
fees and costs with the circuit court, such motion
is not a part of the appellate record.

14

are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and

costs in one or both proceedings, Syllabus

Point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Compa-

ay v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156

(1986) controls:

Where attorney’s fees are sought against a
third party, the test of what should be
considered a reasonable fee is determined
not solely by the fee arrangement between
the attorney and his client. The reason-
ableness of attorney’s fees is generally
based on broader factors such as: (1) the
time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (8) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly; (4) the preclusion of other employ-
ment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) wheth-
er the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and
results obtained; (9) the experience, repu-
tation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
undesirability of the case; (11) the nature
and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases,

Indeed, as further discussed in Newton II:
“{t}he determination of whether fees are
reasonable ‘is simply a fact driven question.
that must be assessed under the Pitrolo
factors.’” Multiplex, Inc. v. Town of Clay,
231 W.Va. 728, 788, 749 S.E.2d 621, 631
(internal quotations and citation omitted).

* As such, “in order for a cireuit court to

_ determine those facts, it must allow the
parties to present evidence on their own
behalf and to test their opponents” evi-
dence by cross-examination[,]” Id.

Newton IL, at 85, 797 S.E.2d at 608,
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth

above, we reverse the circuit court’s rulings

on attorneys’ fees and costs. We remand this
matter for a hearing to provide both parties
the opportunity to be heard on the issues of
whether the Veach Heirs are entitled to re-
cover attorneys’ fees and costs, taking into

9, As set forth above, the Veach Heirs’ assigned
error to the circuit court's failure to award attor-
ney fees based on the contingency fee contract
they have with their attorney. As we explained in
Newton IT, a contingency fee contract “cannot be
the sole basis for determining the amount of the

consideration our recent decision in Newton
II. If the court makes a determination that
attorneys’ fees and costs are to be awarded,
the court shall conduct a Pitrolo hearing and
enter an order containing sufficient findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect to
the reasonableness of the amount of the
award to allow meaningful appellate review
should either party elect to file an appeal.?

E. Calculation of Interest

HE The circuit court’s judgment in favor
of the Veach Heirs included an award of
interest “at a rate of 10% per annum aceru-
ing from the date of the take on May 27,
2011.” The Veach Heirs contend, however,
that the interest calculation should com-
mence as of the date of the filing of their
petition for a writ of mandamus (October 12,
2010) rather than the date of the filing of
DOH’s petition for condemnation (May 27,
2011). In response, DOH maintains that if
prejudgment interest is to be awarded at all,
the calculation should commence as of May
27, 2011.

We have recognized that “‘[the rule that
damages are to be assessed as of the date of
the taking does not contemplate a physical
taking not sanctioned by law, but a taking by
appropriate legal proceedings....’” West
Virginia Dept. ‘of Highways v. Roda, 177
W.Va. 388, 387, 352 S.E.2d 184, 138 (1986)
(Giting 8 J. Sackman, Nichols’ The Law of
Eminent Domain, § 8.5(8) at 8-115 (1985)),
Consistent with this principle, the circuit
court's pretrial ruling states as follows:

That the date of take was the date the

WVDOH filed the Petitions and not the

date of taking of the ‘surface or the com-

mencement of construction, pursuant to

West Virginia Dept. of Highways v. Roda,

177 W.Va, 388, 352 S.E.2d 184 (1986).

We have held that “[s]tatutes
which relate to the same subject matter
should be read and applied together so that
the Legislature’s intention can be gathered

attorney's fee award.” Id. at 81, 797 S.B.2d at
603, Rather, whether the fee is fixed or contin-
gent is one of the factors to be considered in
making a determination of a reasonable fee un-
der Pitrolo, Syl. Pt. 4, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 343 S.E.2d 156.

from the whole of the enactments.” Syl. Pt. 8,
Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation
Comm’r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.H.2d 361
(1975). In addition, it is well-established that,
“Tw]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous
and the legislative intent is plain, the statute
should not be interpreted by the courts, and
in such case it is the duty of the courts not to
construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. Pt. 5,
State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No.
548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va, 187, 107 S.E.2d 353
(1959). West Virginia Code §§ 54-2-12 to -16
clearly state that interest is to be paid in
condemnations proceedings from “the date of
filing of the petition.” Contrary to the Veach
Heirs’ assertion, the “petition” referenced in
these provisions is a petition for condemna-
tion. As West Virginia Code § 54-2-21, which
specifically relates to new interest rates for
the preceding sections, provides:

The percent interest rate provided for in

sections twelve, thirteen, fourteen, four-

teen-a, fifteen, sixteen and eighteen of this
article, shall be applicable only to condem-
nation proceedings hereafter instituted.

The rate of interest previously applicable

to proceedings under the above sections

shall continue to be applicable to condem-
nation proceedings heretofore instituted.
(emphasis added),

The Veach Heirs identify no legal authori-
ty for the proposition that the “petition” ref-
erenced in these statutes is anything other
than a petition for condemnation. According-
ly, based on the above, we find no error in
the circuit court’s ruling that the prejudg-
ment interest should be calculated according
to the date of the filing of the petition for
condemnation (May 27, 2011).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
March 2, 2016, order of the Circuit Court of
Hardy County granting the Veach Heirs’ mo-
tion for summary judgment and setting the
date of commencement of interest from the
date of the filing of the condemnation pro-
ceeding. With respect to the award of attor-

1, John S. Lowe, “What Substances are Miner-
als?,” 30 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. § 2.01 (1984).
See also Don Emery, “What Surface is Mineral
and What Mineral is Surface,” 12 Oklahoma L.

15

neys’ fees and costs, the matter is reversed
and remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with this Opinion,

Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part and
remanded.

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.

Justice Ketchum, concurring:

What does the word “mineral” mean when
it is used in a deed, will, or other document
conveying an interest in land? I give great
credit to the DOH’s appellate counsel for
arguing this mineral question on appeal,
and—unlike the DOH’s original trial coun-
sel—for competently attempting to defend
the public fise. The majority opinion properly

‘did not consider appellate counsel’s well-rea-

soned arguments because the original trial
counsel had stipulated the answer and failed
to preserve the question for appeal.

However, I am certain the question of the
meaning of “mineral” will again come before
the trial courts, or even this Court, in the
fature, I offer this concurrence as a proposed.
answer.

Many courts over the last century-and-a-
half have struggled with the meaning of
“mineral,” largely because they have pre-
sumed the word is inherently ambiguous.
Read together, the court cases trying to de-
fine “mineral” ave highly confusing and often
contradictory. The legal definition of “miner-
als” is “the tarbaby of natural resources law,
because the more courts attack it, the more
stuck they become.” !

I do not believe that the word “mineral” is
inherently ambiguous when used as a term of
conveyance. As I discuss below, at its heart,
the word “mineral” has a general and clear
legal meaning. Moreover, that meaning fits
within the general intentions and expecta-
tions of the parties to the conveyance.

Deeds, wills, and contracts embody the
intentions of the parties to those writings.

Rev. 499 (1959) (describing interface between

meanings of “mineral” and “surface” as a “para-
dox.”).

16 De

: Hence, a fundamental rule of real estate law

is that any interpretation of a writing convey-
ing an interest in land will be guided by the
parties’ intent, Remember that as the lode-
star, “The controlling factor in the interpre-
tation of deeds, wills and contracts is the
intention of the parties[.]” Murphy v. Van
Voorhis, 94 W.Va. 475, 477, 119 S.E. 297, 298
(1928).

The definition of any subpart or fraction of
a parcel of land (such as an easement, a life
estate, the “surface estate” or the “mineral
estate”) always derives its meaning from its
relation to the entire parcel, The starting
point of all real estate law is that “a parcel of
land includes all interests and estates therein
from the center of the earth to the heay-
ens.”? The fee simple owner of an entire
parcel of land can carve the title into smaller
ownership interests; for instance, the owner
“may sever the land into separate surface
and mineral estates[.]”® The meanings for
the words “surface” and “mineral” are, there~
fore, intertwined. Like a mathematical equa-
tion, the sum of the parts is equal to the land
parcel as a whole. When landowners convey
or reserve “the minerals” in a writing, they
do not think of those substances as an ab-
stract, existential concept; they think of them
in relation to the surface and to the entire
parcel of land,

As we discussed at length in Faith United
Methodist, courts have struggled to delineate
a meaning for the word “surface” when used
in deeds, wills and contracts, Like the’search
for the meaning of “minerals,” these court
cases stretch back to the mid-1800s, Those
courts usually presumed that the word “sur-
face” was ambiguous and then strained to
divine the parties’ intended meaning.

This Court, however, rejected any pre-
sumption of ambiguity for the word “surface”
in Faith United Methodist, The case involved

2. State by Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Cooper, 152 W.Va.
309, 315, 162 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1968). See also
Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of
Terra Alta v. Morgan, 231 W.Va. 423, 429-30,
745 S.B.2d 461, 467-68 (2013) (‘The common
law rule—cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coe-
lum et ad inferos—is that a land owner with a fee
simple title owns everything over the land and
under it to the center of the earth.”),

a 1907 deed: conveying ownership to “the
surface only’ of a parcel of land, Over a
century later, the owner of “the surface only”
claimed the word “surface” was, as a matter
of law, ambiguous and included underground
minerals. We rejected that presumption of
ambiguity and found, in Syllabus Point 2,
that the word surface has a broad, clear
meaning:

The word “surface,” when used in an
instrument of conveyance, generally means
the exposed area of land, improvements or
the land, and any part of the underground
actually used by a surface owner as an
adjunct to surface use (for example, medi-
um for the roots of growing plants,
groundwater, water wells, roads, base-
ments, or construction footings).4

Hence, the “surface estate”. is everything
on top of a parcel of land plus whatever lurks
below that it reasonably takes to make that
estate function. A surface estate is not mere-
ly the paper-thin crust of’ soil seen with the
naked eye. The surface includes dirt deep
enough to grow a tree, or a bush, or a bushel
of beans. It includes space deep enough to
plant a telephone pole, to run irrigation lines,
geothermal loops, water wells, and water,
sewer, and gas lines, There is enough depth
to the surface to install a septic tank and
accompanying leach fields, There is also
enough depth for a building’s foundation,
which depending on the building style could
include a basement or a parking garage.
Reasonable use of a surface estate, based
upon soil type, allows for a foundation reach-
ing from just below the frost line or all the
way down to solid bedrock.

The instant case implicated the opposite
side of the land-ownership coin: what is the
definition of a mineral estate?

The DOH’s appellate counsel argued that
limestone, as a matter of law, is not a miner-

3, Id, 231 W.Va, at 430, 745 S.B.2d at 468,
4, 231 W.Va. at 425, 745 §.E.2d at, 463,

5, The same issue was implicated in the sister
case to this one. See W.Va. Dep't of Transporta-
tion v. Newton, 235 W.Va. 267, 773 S.E.2d 371
(2015) (Newton I) and W.Va. Dep't of Transporta-
tion v, Newton, 239 W.Va. 615, 797 S.E.2d 592
(2017) (Newton IT).

al and not a part of the mineral estate.
admit that there is a superficial appeal to the
DOH’s appellate argument. This Court’s goal
in the law of land ownership is to eradicate
confusion from land titles and prevent uncer-
tainty from arising in the future,’ Adopting a
black-letter rule. that limestone is not and
will never be a mineral,.as a matter of law,
certainly meets that goal and creates clarity.

Such an approach, however, would join a
nationwide erazy-quilt pattern of absurd deci-
sions finding certain substances that people
obviously, intuitively, or scientifically call
minerals are not, legally, minerals. For in-
stance, Pennsylvania thinks that oil and gas,
as a matter of law, are not minerals. Indiana
says a reservation of “oil, gas, and other
minerals” in a deed does not include coal.?
Arkansas decided that bauxite (the material
that is refined into aluminum) is not a “min-
eral deposit[ ].” 9 Michigan concluded that a
reservation. of “minerals” did not include
marble,!! while Wyoming found a reservation
of “oil, gas, and kindred minerals” did not

6. Problem is, trial counsel for the DOH stipu-
lated, in this case and in Newton J, that limestone
is a mineral. See Newton I, 235 W.Va. at 273
n.13, 773 S.B.2d at 377 0.13,

1, Faith United Methodist, 231 W.Va.‘at 431, 745
S.E.2d at 469.

8. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa, 36 (1882) (the
phrase “all minerals” does not include petro-
leum oil), The “Dunham Rule” was recently reaf-
firmed in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel.
Warren, 620 Pa. 1, 65 A.3d 885 (2013) (reserva-
tion of “one-half the minerals and Petroleum
Oils” did not include natural gas within shale).

9. Besing v. Ohio Val. Coal Co. of Kentucky, 155
Ind.App. 527, 293 N.E.2d $10, 512 (1973).

10, Carson v. Missouri Pac, R. Co., 212 Ark. 963,
209 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1948) (reservation of "all
coal and mineral deposits’ did not include baux-
ite).

11. Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89
Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807, 809 (1891).

12. Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo.
1973).

13, Rock House Fork Land Co, v. Raleigh Brick &
. Tile Co,, 83 W.Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1918).

14, See, eg., AG. Barnett, “Clay, Sand, or Gravel
as ‘Minerals’ within Deed, Lease or License,” 95

7

clude uranium.” Even West Virginia has
joined the melee, holding that brick-making
clay is not incorporated by the phrase “min-
erals of every kind and description.” 8 And I
will not even begin to distill the host of
conflicting cases which say that sand and
gravel are, or are not, oneompasserl by the
word “mineral.” 4 .

- If this Court were to presume “that thé
word “mineral” is ambiguous, it means that
every deed using that word is subject to
challenge in the courts. Ambiguity in real
estate law leads to-blind groping by the
courts, promotes instability of titles and en-
courages litigation, Many decades after a
conveying document was drafted, alleged
owners will introduce parol evidence of facts
peculiar to the transaction to create their
own subjective perception of the word’s
meaning. Through the passage of time, law-
yers, landmen and.title abstractors will be

perpetually employed to haggle over the
meaning. of “mineral” as it is used in the
writing.!6

A.L.R.2d 843 (1964). Compare Sult v. A. Ho-
chstetter Oil Co., 63 W.Va. 317, 61 S,E. 307, 310
(1908) (‘‘ ‘Mineral’ will therefore prima facie in-
clude ... every kind of stone, flint, marble, slate,
brick earth, chalk, gravel, and sand{.]”) and Rock
House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile’Co.,
83 W.Va. 20, 97 S.E. at 685 (“Numerous hold-
ings in particular cases might be found to the
effect that stone used for road making and pav-
ing, limestone, flint stone, slate, clay, and other
like materials, are minerals[.]”) with Syllabus
Point 4, W.Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Farmer, 159
W.Va. 823, 226 S.E,2d 717 (1976) (“A straight
mineral reservation does not ordinarily include
the sand and gravel.”), :

15. See, eg., Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind.
App. 236, 56 N.B.2d 672, 674 (1944) (use of the

* word “minerals” without any additional defini-
tion creates uncertainty and ambiguity that must
be construed),

16. Courts have employed a cornucopia of ap-
proaches to divine this subjective intended mean-
ing of mineral, including examining if “mineral”
is tempered by another word in the writing such
as “all,” “of all kind,” or “of every description;”’
asking if the substance at issue was thought of as
a “mineral” because it had some intrinsic special

* value apart from the soil or was capable of
economic, production at the time of writing; or
applying ejusdem generis to discern if the sub-
stance in question is of the same kind or nature
as other mineral substances listed in the writing,
Courts have also applied the “surface destruction

18

To combat the ad hoc, mineral-by-mineral
approach used by the courts, the Uniform
Law: Commissioners took an opposite ap-
proach, It proposed a statutory definition for
the word “mineral” that, essentially, com-
piled a shopping list of the substances that
are presumed to be minerals. In the 1990
Model Surface Use and Mineral Develop-
ment Accommodation Act, the Uniform Law
Commissioners suggested the following defi-
nition for “mineral”:

“Mineral” means gas, oil, coal, other gas-

eous, liquid and solid hydrocarbons, oil

shale, cement material, sand and gravel,
road material, building stone, chemical
substance, gemstone, metallic, fissionable
and nonfissionable ores, colloidal and other
clay, steam and other geothermal re-
sources, and any other substance defined
as a mineral by any law of this State.!7

Surprisingly, my research shows that in
the 1920s this Court bandied about defini-
tions of “mineral” that were even more ex-
pansive than that offered by the Uniform
Law Commissioners. This Court said:

The word “mineral” in its ordinary and

common meaning is a comprehensive term.

including every description of stone and
rock deposit whether containing metallic or

test,” and found a conveyance of “minerals”
does not include a substance that can only be
extracted by destroying the surface, reasoning an
interpretation otherwise would leave the surface
owner with nothing. See Debra Dobray, “Oil
Shale, Tar Sands, and the Definition of a Miner-
al: An Old Problem in a New Context,” 22 Tulsa
LJ. 1, 9-20 (1986). Another approach is the
community knowledge test, which asks whether,
at the time the conveyance was made, the parties
knew if a particular mineral substance existed or
was being extracted in the area. David E. Pierce,
“Toward a Functional Mineral Jurisprudence for
Kansas,” 27 Washburn L.J. 223, 226-228 (1987).

17, Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Surface
Use and Mineral Development Accommodation
Act, § 2(b) (1990). This section is patterned after
§ 2(b) of the Uniform Dormant Mineral Interests
Act of 1986, which provides:

“Minerals” includes gas, oil, coal, other gas-
eous, liquid, and solid hydrocarbons, oil shale,
cement material, sand and gravel, road materi-
al, building stone, chemical substance, gem-
stone, metallic, fissionable, and nonfissionable
ores, colloidal and other clay, steam and other
geothermal resource, and any other substance
defined as a mineral by the law of this State.

non-metallic substances. ... [I]t is immate-
rial what minerals were known to be under
the land, or were not known to be thereun-
der, if it was the intention to convey or
reserve the mineral...

Where there is a grant or reservation of
minerals without other words of limitation
or restriction, all minerals would be grant-
ed or reserved, and if the ordinary and
accepted meaning is to be changed or re-
stricted the language used to do so must
be reasonably clear to show that intent,"®

Viewing minerals in this broad, general fash-
ion, the Court of the 1920s viewed ownership
of mineral rights as “virtual ownership ... of
the land between the center of the earth and
the stratum near the top of the surface[.]”
For reasons unclear, this approach by the
Court has fallen out of vogue.

I reject an approach that picks and choos-
es which substances are minerals, and which
are not, I reject these arbitrary legal deter-
minations of the meaning of “mineral” for a
fundamental reason: they ignore the general
intent of the parties to a deed, will or con-
tract. Too many cases are nothing more than
after-the-fact calculations of the parties’ spe-
cific intentions, that is, whether they specifi-
cally intended this or that substance to be a

18, Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103
W.Va. 567, 571-573, 137 S.E. 895, 897 (1927).
The federal courts accepted Waugh as an exten-
sive and comprehensive definition of the term
“mineral.” See Stowers v. Huntington Dev. & Gas
Co., 72 F.2d 969, 972-973 (4th Cir. 1934) (“[I}t is
firmly established in the law of West Virginia
that the word ‘mineral’ in its ordinary meaning is
a comprehensive term, including every substance
which can be got underneath the surface, and, if
the intention to reserve or convey minerals ex-
ists, it is immaterial whether the parties knew
what minerals were or were not present.”). See
also, Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81
W.Va. 616, ——, 95 S.B. 26, 27 (1918) (“The
term ‘mineral,’ when employed in conveyancing
in this state, is understood to include every inor-
ganic substance which can be extracted from the
earth for profit, whether it be solid, as stone, fire
clay, the various metals and coal, or liquid, as,
for example, salt and other mineral waters and
petroleum oil, or gaseous, unless there are words
qualifying or limiting its meaning, or unless from
the deed, read and construed as a whole, it
appears that the intention was to give the word a
more limited application.”).

19. Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 99
W.Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311, 312 (1925).

mineral, These post-hoe determinations over-
look the fact that, most often, the parties
never gave any specific thought to the prob-
lem, and instead generally and broadly in-
tended to reserve or convey all minerals.
Further, these determinations are “complete-
ly without value for use in the future in
determining the character of substances
which remain unknown or are presently con-
sidered to have no intrinsic value.”

When landowners separate ownership of
the “minerals” in their land from ownership
of the “surface” of the real estate, they gen-
erally and broadly intend to create two sepa-
rate property interests. They intend: for
these two estates to be indefinite in duration
and to be disposable by sale, inheritance or
gift. Owners convey an interest in land to a
recipient knowing that, in a hundred years,
the use of the land may change. Surface used
for farmland today may be a city office com-
plex tomorrow. Worthless mineral shale too
deep underground yesterday can today pro-
duce natural gas through hydraulic fractur-
ing.

When property interests are so separated,
“The term ‘surface estate’ is generally used
to describe all the rights except those includ-
ed in the ‘mineral estate,’ ” 24 In other words,
once the surface estate is carved out of the
overall parcel, we should assume that every-
thing else is the mineral estate. This will
accord with the parties’ general intent.

In a seminal article published in 1949, Pro-
fessor Kuntz supported just such an expan-
sive definition of the term “minerals” based
upon the general intent of the parties. Pro-
fessor Kuntz acknowledged that where par-
ties made clear, specific expressions of intent
about a substance in a writing, that intent
should be given effect. But in those cases
where the parties used a general, generic
word like “mineral,” courts should not create
artificial tests and presumptions to create a
non-existent, specific intent. He said:

20. Eugene O. Kuntz, “The Law Relating to Oil

and Gas in Wyoming,” 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112-13

(1949), reprinted in 34 Okla. L. Rev. 28, 34-35
(1981).

19

The contradiction and conflict between
the cases on the point [of the meaning of
the word “minerals”] arise from the very
fact that the courts are seeking to give
effect to an, intention to include or exclude
a specific substance, when, as a matter of
fact, the parties had nothing specific in
mind on the matter at all. It is submitted
that an intention test is the proper one, but
not as applied heretofore. The intention
test should be the general intent rather
than any supposed but unexpressed specif
ic intent, and, further that general intent
should be arrived at, not by defining and
re-defining the terms used, but by consid-

. ering the purposes of the grant or reserva-
tion in terms of manner of enjoyment in-
"tended in the ensuing interests.

Professor Kuntz went on to offer the fol-
lowing general definition for the word miner-

When a general grant or reservation is
made of all minerals without qualifying
language, it should be reasonably assumed
that the parties intended to sever the en-
tire mineral estate from the surface estate,
leaving the owner of each with definite
incidents of ownership enjoyable in dis-
tinetly different manners, The manner of
enjoyment of the mineral estate is through
extraction of valuable substances, and the
enjoyment of the surface is through reten-
tion of such substances as are necessary
for the use of the surface, and these re-
spective modes of enjoyment must be con-
sidered in arriving at the proper subject
matter for each estate,

Applying this intention, the [mineral]
severance should be construed to sever
from the surface all substances presently
valuable in themselves, apart from the soil,
whether their presence is known or not,
and all substances that become valuable
through development of the arts and sci-
ences, and that nothing presently or pro-
spectively valuable as extracted substances

21. David B. Pierce, “Toward a Functional Miner-

al Jurisprudence for Kansas, 27 Washburn LJ.
223, 224 (1987).

22. Eugene O. Kuntz, “The Law Relating to Oil
and Gas in Wyoming,” 3 Wyo. L.J. at 112.

20 —

would be intended to be excluded from the

mineral estate

Accordingly, should a question arise in the
future-as to the meaning of the word “miner-
al” in a writing, courts should look to the
general intent of the parties. When a deed,
will or other conveyance includes a general
grant or reservation of all minerals without
clear qualifying language, a court should rea-
sonably ‘assume that the parties to the writ-
ing intended to sever the entire mineral es-
tate from the surface estate. The mineral
estate includes all substances presently valu-
able in themselves, whether their presence is
Imown or not, and all substances that become
valuable through development of the arts and
sciences.

This definition recognizes, wholly separate
from the meaning of the word mineral, that
the mineral owner and surface owner have
related duties to one another. The mineral
owner owes a duty of subjacent support to
the surface, while the surface owner must
provide reasonable access to remove miner-

als..““The surface estate is burdened with the
right of access, and the mineral estate is
burdened with the right of the surface owner
to insist that the surface be left intact and
that it not be rendered’ valueless for the
purposes for which it is adapted, by depletion
of sub-surface or surface substances.”

A conveyance of a mineral estate implicitly
carries with it the right of ingress, egress
and reasonable ‘surface use, otherwise the
mineral conveyance can be rendered wholly
worthless by a surface owner who denies
access. Conversely, a surface estate cannot
be made worthless through the mineral own-
ex’s actions, and the surface owner is entitled
to damages caused by production operations,
damages that vary depending upon whether

23, 3 Wyo. LJ. at 112-113,

24, See Moser v, U.S, Steel Corp.,.676 S.W.2d 99,
102 (Tex. 1984) (""[T]he general intent of parties
executing a mineral deed or lease is presumed to
be an intent to sever the mineral and surface
estates, convey all valuable substances to the
mineral owner regardless of whether their pres-
ence or value was known at the time of convey-
ance, and to preserve the uses incident to each
estate.”).

25, 3 Wyo, LJ. at 113. See also Emery, 12 Okla-
homa L.Rev. at 517 (“[UInder certain circum-

the mineral owner’s acts were negligent or
intentional. Under the definition offered by
Professor Kuntz, the mineral owner can
make reasonable use of the surface for explo-
ration and extraction, but must compensate
the surface owner for any damage caused to
the surface estate.

If the goal of this Court is to eradicate
confusion from land titles and prevent uncer-
tainty from arising in the future, then this
broad definition of “mineral” will achieve that
goal. A broad definition promotes certainty
at the same time it favors the parties’ gener-
al‘intent. Such a definition will preserve a
title examiner’s ability to determine owner-
ship of land purely from the record. It will
expedite the ability to sell and purchase
these estates in land, and will allow the own-
ers of.the mineral estate and surface estate
to plan and develop their interests efficiently.
As one commentator noted, a clear and broad
definition of “mineral” solves many-problems:

{I]t encourages stability and certainty of

land titles by completely severing the min-

erals from the surface. Severing the two
estates eliminates confusion over title to
unspecified minerals. Title readers inter-
preting a title under this approach know
immediately, without looking beyond the
words of the grant or reservation itself, the
extent of the mineral estate. The test
accommodates the passage of time and
development of technology, because any

* new substance that is diseovered or attains
special value simply becomes part of the
mineral estate6

And, of course, a clear definition shields the

courts from unnecessary litigation.

stances the surface and mineral estate should be
considered not only mutually dominant, but miu-
tially servient, and that under certain circum-
stances the owner of the surface estate should
receive damages when the enjoyment of the own-
er of the mineral estate renders impossible the
enjoyment of the surface estate by its owner.”’).

26. Brant M. Laue, “Interpretation of ‘Other Min-
erals’ in A Grant or Reservation of A Mineral
Interest,” 71 Cornell L. Rev. 618, 637 (1986).

799 S.E.2d 98
STATE of West Virginia, Respondent
v
Quinton PETERSON, Petitioner
No, 15-1220
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 4, 2017
Filed: April 20, 2017

1. Defendant Peterson was convicted in August
2008. On October 30, 2008, the circuit court
appointed Defendant Peterson an appellate law-
yer, Luke Styer. Mr. Styer failed to file an appeal
during the five and a half years that he represent-
ed Defendant Peterson. As the circuit court noted
in its April 29, 2014, order:

Luke Styer, Esq., was appointed to assist
Defendant in appealing his conviction for this
matter on October 30, 2008. To date, and fol-
lowing numerous resentencing orders, Defen-
dant's appellate counsel has yet to file an ap-
peal. In the interest of justice, this Court does
relieve Luke Styer as counsel of record{.]
Similarly, in its amended order denying Defen-

dant Peterson's motion for a new trial the circuit
court notes, “the Court finds that previous coun-

23

Connor D. Robertson, Esq., Weston Law
Office, Todd Meadows, Esq., Meadows Law

Office, Huntington, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Elbert Lin, Esq., Solicitor General, Julie A.
Warren, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondent.

Valena Beety, Esq., Melissa Giggenbach,
Esq., Erie Haught, Rule 10 Student Attor-
ney, Morgantown, West Virginia, Counsel for
Amici Curiae, The West Virginia Innocence
Project

Justice Ketchum:

Petitioner Quinton Peterson (“Defendant
Peterson”) appeals the circuit court’s Novem-
ber 20, 2015, amended order denying his
motion for a new trial. Defendant Peterson
‘was convicted of first-degree murder follow-
ing a 2008 jury trial and was sentenced to an
incarceration term of life without mercy?

After the circuit court entered its amended
order denying his motion for a new trial,
Defendant Peterson filed the present appeal,
raising numerous assignments of error in-
cluding: (1) the cirevit court erred in denying
the defendant’s motion for a new trial based

sel {Luke Styer] for the Defendant failed to pur-
sue an appeall.]” We are deeply troubled by Mr.
Styer’s failure to “pursue an appeal” on behalf of
Defendant Peterson. We hereby refer this matter
to the Lawyer Disciplinary Board to investigate
why Mr. Styer failed to file an appeal during the
five and half years that he represented Defendant
Peterson. We note that Rule 1.3 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct provides “[a] lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.” Rule 3.2 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct states “[a] lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interest of the client.” See
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 213 W.Va. 209,
579 S.E.2d 550 (2003) (Lawyer failed to file
criminal appeal on behalf of his client).

24

on the State’s failure to turn over exculpato-
ry Brady? evidence; (2) the State introduced
inadmissible hearsay evidence during the tri-
al; and (8) the prosecutor made a number of
improper statements during closing argu-
ment. .

After thorough review, we affirm the cir-
cuit court’s order.denying Defendant Peter-
son’s motion for a new trial,

IL
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2007, twenty-eight-year
old.Phillip “Slim” Simmons (hereinafter “vie-
tim”) was murdered in Huntington, West
Virginia, Following an investigation, Defen-
dant Peterson, a twenty-five-year old Colum-
bus, Ohio, resident, was indicted on one
count of first-degree murder.

Before discussing the trial in detail, we
note the State’s theory at trial was that
Defendant Peterson murdered the victim af-
ter losing approximately $500 to him over the
course of two dice games. The first dice game
occurred three days before the murder at the
home of Brin Stolze. The second dice game
occurred on the hight of the murder. Defen-
dant Peterson admitted that he and the vic-
tim were both dealing drugs and playing dice
together on the night of the murder in the
outdoor area where the victim’s body was
found. With this general background in mind,
‘we proceed to examine Defendant Peterson’s
trial, +

‘The State’s first witness at trial was Anto-
nio Smith, Mr. Smith testified that he played
dice with Defendant Peterson and the victim
at Evin Stolze’s house three nights before the
murder occurred. Mr. Smith testified that
Defendant Peterson lost four or five hundred
dollars during this dice game. Mr. Smith
stated that the victim was “boisterous” and.
“bragging” after winning the dice game, De-
fendant Peterson was upset, according to Mr.
Smith, and had a verbal confrontation with
the victim. Mr, Smith testified that as Defen-

2. Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S, 83,.83 S.Ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),

dant Peterson left the residence, he said,
“Damn, I wish I had my gun,” Also, Mr,
Smith testified that on the day before the
murder, the victim told him that he and
Defendant Peterson were going to have a
dice rematch the next day.

The State also called Donovan Wade to
testify. Mr. Wade testified that he had previ-
ously dealt drugs with the victim and that he
routinely bought drugs from the victim. Ac-
cording to Mr. Wade, he was planning to
purchase drugs on the night of the murder,
and came upon the victim and Defendant
Peterson in an alley between two buildings in’
the Doulton Avenue area of Huntington.’ Mr.
Wade stated that the two men were rolling
dice in an alley and testified that the victim
and Defendant Peterson were the only peo-
ple he saw in the alley. Mr. Wade testified
that the victim was winning the dice game
and that Defendant Peterson was losing. Mr.
Wade explained that he could tell Defendant
Peterson was losing the dice game because
“[t]he person was losing is to keep ‘putting
money down and the person that wins is
picking up the money.”

Mr. Wade testified that over the course of
“forty-five minutes to an hour” he made
three trips to and from the alley where De-
fendant Peterson and the victim were playing
dice and selling drugs. Mr. Wade explained
that he made two drug purchases from the
victim and one from Defendant Peterson dur-
ing this time. Mr. Wade stated that he re-
mained in the general Doulton Avenue area
after making his third drug purchase. At
some point after making his third drug pur-
chase, Mr. Wade observed Defendant Peter-
son approaching the alley where he and the
victim had been playing dice. Mr. Wade testi-
fied that Defendant Peterson had two guns
“in his side or his pockets.” He stated that
one gun was black and the other was chrome.
Shortly after observing Defendant Peterson
returning to the alley where the victim was,
Mr. Wade stated that he “heard one gunshot.
I took off walking because I figured the
police was going to end up coming.... So I
3, The general area Mr. Wade described is located

on or around Doulton Avenue, Seventeenth

Street and Eleventh Avenue in Huntington, West
Virginia.

started walking down Seventeenth [Street]
towards Tenth Avenue. And I was walking
slow and looking back, and I seen him [De-
fendant Peterson] going across the alley....
He ran right back across the way he came
from.” 4

Dr. James Kaplan was called by the State
and testified that the victim “suffered a fatal
gunshot wound to his left armpit. That bullet
passed, through both lungs and his heart and
caused fatal -bleeding, which caused his
death.” Dr. Kaplan testified that the estimat-
ed time of injury was 7:30 p.m, andthe
estimated time of death was 7:40 p.m.

On the. night of the murder, a motorist
driving down the alley near the Doulton Ave-
nue area noticed someone lying in the alley
and called the police. Huntington Police Offi-
cer Erie Corder received a call at 8:02 or 8:08
p.m, and proceeded to the area. Upon arriv-
ing in the area, Officer Corder found the
victim’s body lying face up, with his pants
pulled down around the’ knee area.5 Corporal
Stephen Compton, a Huntington Police Offi-
cer serving in the forensic. unit, arrived at the
crime scene at. approximately 8:30 pm. He
testified that he found dice in the crime scene
area and one nine millimeter shell casing.

The State called Julie Eplion, a twenty-
year-old woman who had dated Defendant

Peterson “on and off.” Ms. Eplion testified -

that on the night of the murder, Defendant
Peterson called her thirteen times between
7:58 p.m. and 8:16 p.m. Ms. Eplion did not
answer her phone because she was “hanging
out with friends.” Defendant Peterson contin-
ued calling until Ms, Eplion answered her
phone at 9:06 p.m, In all, Defendant Peterson
called Ms. Eplion twenty-five times between
7:58 p.m. and 9:06 pm. Ms. Eplion stated
that Defendant Peterson wanted her to pick

4. Mr, Wade testified that he gave a statement to
the police regarding what he observed on the
night of the murder a couple of weeks after the
murder occurred. Mr. Wade was picked up by
the police for active warrants and he provided
the police with the statement regarding the mur-
der at that time. During cross-examination, Mr.
Wade stated that his warrants were dismissed
after he gave his statement to the police,

5. Mr. Wade testified that the victim, who sold
crack cocaine, kept the drugs hidden in his but-

tocks, The State theorized that after shooting the

25
him up at a bowling alley and take him to his
Cousin Brandon Peterson’s house, which was
located on Doulton Avenue. Upon arriving at
the bowling alley, Ms. Eplion testified that
Defendant Peterson was in his Cousin Bran-
don’s car, He exited that car and got into Ms,
Eplion’s car. Defendant Peterson told Ms,
Eplion that he did not want to go to his
cousin's house on Doulton Avenue. Ms,
Eplion stated that she told Defendant Peter-
son that there were a “bunch of cops” around
Doulton Avenue. She further testified,
“whenever I had told him that there were
cops over there and he was, like, ‘I know
there’s cops.over there, Somebody has gotten
shot over there.” Ms, Hplion testified that
because Defendant Peterson was acting ner-
vous in the car she asked him what was
wrong and “[hJe said he couldn’t—didn’t
want to tell me because he didn’t want me to
judge him.”

While in the ear, Defendant Peterson made
a number of phone calls to a woman in
Columbus, Ohio.® Ms, Eplion stated that De-
fendant Peterson was giving the Columbus
driver directions to Huntington. The Colum:
bus driver met Ms. Eplion and Defendant
Peterson in a McDonald’s. parking lot: in
Huntington at approximately 11:30 p.m, that
evening. Defendant Peterson exited Ms,
Eplion’s car and got into the Columbus driv-
er’s car, It was undisputed during the trial
that the Columbus driver picked Defendant
Peterson up, on the night of the murder and
immediately drove him to Columbus.

The State called U.S, Marshal Craig Mar-
tin who testified that he apprehended De-
fendant Peterson on December 8, 2007, in
Columbus, Ohio. Marshal Martin went to
Defendant Peterson’s workplace in Colum-
bus.” Upon identifying himself as a law’ en-

victim, Defendant Peterson pulled down the vic-
tim’s pants and robbed him of the drugs that
were hidden in his buttocks.

6. . Defendant Peterson testified that this Columbus
woman was his girlfriend,

7. Defendant Peterson began working at a busi-
ness called ‘House Doctors" in Columbus, Ohio,
around November 19, 2008, Defendant Peterson.
was not employed by House Doctors during his
time in Huntington when the shooting occurred,

26

forcement officer, Marshal Martin testified
that Defendant Peterson ran from the build-
ing and was apprehended in the parking lot
of the business.

The State also called Huntington Police
Officer Rocky Johnson who testified that he
went to Defendant Peterson’s house in Co-
lumbus and seized various clothing and foot-
wear from this residence, The State next,
called Kevin McDowell, an employee of the
West Virginia State Police Crime Laborato-
ry. Mr. McDowell testified that one of the
pairs of shoes seized from Defendant Peter-
son’s residence “could have made the impres-
sion” of a shoeprint that was found at the
murder scene, Mr, McDowell was unable to
say, however, that the shoe recovered from
Defendant Peterson’s Columbus residence
was the exact shoe that left the impression at
the crime scene.

The defense called two witnesses: Defen-
dant Peterson and his cousin, Brandon Pe-
terson. Brandon Peterson testified that he
went bowling with Defendant Peterson on
the night of the murder. He testified that
they left his residence, located on Doulton
Avenue, to go to the bowling alley “between
7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.”

Defendant Peterson testified next. He con-
firmed that he and the victim had been in-
volved in two dice games together. Regard-
ing the first dice game, Defendant Peterson
agreed that he and the victim and Antonio
Smith had played dice at Erin Stolze’s house
three nights before the murder. He disputed
Mr. Smith’s testimony that he lost four to
five hundred dollars. Instead, Defendant Pe-
terson testified that he won a couple of dol-
lars during this game, that he did not have a
verbal altercation with the victim, and that
he did not make the comment, “Damn, I wish
I had my gun,” following the dice game,

Defendant Peterson admitted that he and
the victim played dice again on the night of
the murder. The dice game began with just
the two of them, according to Defendant
Peterson, “as time went on people were
walking by and coming and, you know, there
was a lot of activity going on ... because it’s
a lot of activity in that alley as far as drug
activity and things like that,” Defendant Pe-
terson’s lawyer then asked what kind of drug

activity was going on in the alley and Defen-
dant Peterson replied, “I mean, I was selling
drugs... . I was selling marijuana and I was
selling crack,... [The victim was] doing the
same thing.” Defendant Peterson confirmed
that State witness Donovan Wade was in the
alley on the evening of the murder buying
drugs.

Defendant Peterson further testified dur-
ing his direct examination that at the time of
the murder he was on parole following a
number of criminal convictions in Ohio. De-
fendant Peterson explained his previous
criminal convictions as follows:

I had been convicted of a misdemean-
or—of a drug charge and in Columbus—in
Ohio if you be convicted of a drug charge, I
guess they can charge you—I guess it’s a
felony to have a gun or something like
that.... I just know I have been convicted.
for weapons.

The first time I went to jail it was for
weapons under disability and tampering
with evidence. The second time I went to
jail was for a parole—the parole violation
for that and carrying a concealed weap-
on....

And then the next time I got arrested it
was off—I was on probation for those
charges and then I violated the probation.
and I had caught another gun charge. It

" was a gun in a car me and my cousin was
in and it was by his—my other cousin. This
is in Columbus anyways, and it was—it
was close to me. They charged me with it.
Defendant Peterson testified that the rea-

son he fled Huntington on the night of the

murder was because he was on parole in

Ohio and was not allowed to be in West

Virginia. He testified that he first heard

about the shooting while he was at the bowl-

ing alley. Upon hearing that the victim had
been shot, Defendant Peterson stated:

Then my criminal wheel starts spinning,

like, ‘Hold up. I cannot have—.

Like, on parole—on parole I have—this
instruction I have is, like, fifteen or twenty
rules you have to go back. And like I said
you have to notify your P.O. if you are
going to leave town. You have to random—
I mean random drug tests. You have to

report on a week—or a scheduled date. A

whole list of rules. And also you cannot

have any police interaction, anything like
that. So, I was just thinking, like, ‘Hold on.

They might try and talk to me or some-

thing” You know what I’m saying? I can’t

be down here. So, let me—you know what

I'm saying?

But I—it was all—I wasn’t trying—they
trying to make it seem like I left because I
shot ‘Slim’ [the victim]. I was already
about—I was already planning to leave. I
was already planning to leave. My girl was
already going to be coming.

Defendant Peterson denied shooting the
victim, testified that he was not losing money
in the dice game on the night of the murder,
and stated that he did not have a gun. When
asked why he ran from the U.S. Marshal at
his Columbus workplace, Defendant Peterson
testified “I don’t know. You know? I don’t
even know why I ran.”

During cross-examination, Defendant Pe-
terson admitted that he had been convicted
of seven felonies and that three of those
erimes involved weapons. Following Defen-
dant Peterson’s testimony, the defense rest-
ed.

The jury found Defendant Peterson guilty
of first-degree murder and did not recom-
mend mercy. By order entered on August 1,
2008, the circuit court sentenced Defendant
Peterson to an incarceration term of life
without mercy.

On December 12, 2012, the cireuit court
held a hearing on a motion for a new trial
filed by Defendant Peterson. This motion
was based on “newly discovered evidence”
which the defense asserted was the State’s
failure: to disclose a statement Erin Stolze
made to the police on the day before the trial
began. Erin Stolze owned the ‘house where
the first dice game, that took place three
days before the murder, occurred. ~

By way of background, on the morning
Defendant Peterson’s trial began, the follow-
ing exchange was held between Defendant
Peterson’s lawyer and the prosecutor:

Defense Counsel: I wanted to say that
this was an open-file case, an open-file
agreement with the State and that the

27

State has done an exemplary job as far as
I can tell of providing us all the informa-
tion. We have had three official discovery
conferences, and we had last night what I
call an unofficial one where they provided
me more information, including an updated
criminal history of their witnesses and a
light criminal history of the defendant.

I needed to—we haven’t asked about
this. But the State has ongoing duties un-
der Youngblood and I wanted to see if we
couldn’t get something here out of [the
prosecutor] about Youngblood.

Prosecutor: No, I disclosed things yes-
terday regarding the new information from
Antonio Smith and things going on at
Erin’s—

Defense Counsel: And she is not being
called as a witness?

Prosecutor: That's right.

Defense Counsel: We do know where
she is, She was disclosed to us and we
agree that there is nothing there. I
thought we needed to clean that up. There
is no exculpatory evidence that you know
of?

Prosecutor: No.

Defense Counsel: And you have sought
that out? ‘

Prosecutor: Oh, yes.

At the hearing on the motion for a new
trial, the defense called Erin Stolze to testify.
Ms. Stolze testified that Huntington Police
Detective Cass McMillian interviewed her
the day before Defendant Peterson’s trial
began. She testified that she told Detective
MeMillian that Defendant Peterson, Antonio
Smith, and the victim took part in a dice
game at her house. Ms. Stolze stated that she
told Detective McMillian that Defendant Pe-
terson won one hundred dollars in the dice
game. Ms. Stolze testified that she did not
witness the whole dice game because she was
upstairs giving her children a bath. She said
Detective McMillian asked her if there were
any guns or if any threats were made during
the dice game and she told-him she did not
see any guns or hear any threats. During
cross-examination, the State asked Ms. Stol-
ze about Defendant Peterson’s alleged state-
ment following the dice game, “Damn, I wish

28

I had my gun.” Ms. Stolze replied, “I mean,
if that-was said, that was said, but-I am just
telling you ... I did not hear it.... It
doesn’t mean that it wasn’t said, I didn’t hear
it”

Detective McMillian also testified at this
hearing. He testified that he had interviewed
Ms, Stolze before Defendant Peterson’s trial.
While he ‘could not recall the details of their
conversation, Detective McMillian stated:
~ I can tell you that if it would have been
» something different, then it would have

been written down and been forwarded

through my Prosecution Report to the

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office... .

[Tyhe reason we were there [at Ms. Stol-

ze’s residence] was based on Antonio

Smith’s statement. The statement that was

obtained that day [from Ms, Stolze], had it

been different from what we were told by

Antonio Smith, would have been recorded

in writing and forwarded to the Prosecu-

tor’s Office.

The cirevit court denied Defendant Peter-
son’s motion, for.a new trial based on this
“newly discovered evidence.” The circuit,
court concluded that “the defense has not put
forth persuasive evidence that there was any-
thing [Ms. Stolze] said to the police in her
statement that was substantially different
than the other testimony at trial or that
would have altered the outeome of this case.”
After the circuit court filed its November 20,
2015, amended order denying the defense’s
motion for a new trial, Defendant Peterson
filed the-present appeal.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW
HMMM Defendant Peterson appeals the
circuit court’s order denying his motion for a
new trial. We apply the following standard
when reviewing a circuit court’s order deny-
ing a motion for new trial:

In reviewing challenges to findings and’

rulings made by a cireuit court, we apply a
two-pronged deferential standard of re-
view. We review the rulings of the circuit
court concerning a new trial and its conclu-
sion as to the existence of reversible error
under an abuse of discretion standard, and

we review: the circuit court’s underlying
. factual findings under a clearly erroneous

standard. Questions of law are subject to a

de novo review. .
Syllabus Point 8, State v, Vance, 207 W.Va.
640, 585 S.E.2d 484 (2000). With these stan-
dards in mind, we proceed to discuss the
assignments of error raised by Defendant
Peterson.

In,

ANALYSIS

In this appeal, Defendant Peterson asserts
the following assignments of error: (1) the
circuit court erred in denying the motion for
a new trial based on the State’s failure to
turn over exculpatory Brady evidence; (2)
the State introduced inadmissible hearsay ev-
idence; (8) the State improperly argued pro-
pensity evidence; (4) the State introduced
inadmissible 404(a) evidence; (5) the State
solicited extremely prejudicial hearsay evi-
dence from Antonio Smith; (6) the prosecutor
improperly argued his personal beliefs and
vouched for the credibility of the witnesses
before the jury; (7) the prosecutor argued
false evidence to the jury; and (8) cumulative
error. .

A. Execulpatory Brady Evidence

Hl Defendant Peterson first argues that
the State’s failure to disclose Ms. Stolze’s
statement was a constitutional due process
violation’ under Brady. Defendant Peterson.
asserts that Ms, Stolze’s statement contra-
dicted the testimony of Antonio Smith re-
garding whether Defendant Peterson (1) lost.
money in the first dice game, (2) had a verbal
confrontation with the victim, and (8) stated,
“Damn, I wish I had my gun,” as he left the
residence. Defendant Peterson argues that
the State used Mr. Smith’s testimony to es-
tablish motive and premeditation and that
Ms. Stolze’s testimony could have been used
to impeach Mr, Smith’s testimony,

Hl The United States Supreme Court
has held that “the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused
.+. Violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 88
S.Ct. 1194. In addressing the guidelines set
forth in Brady, this Court held the following
in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Youngblood,
221 W.Va. 20, 650 S.E.2d 119 (2007);

There are three components of a consti-
tutional due process violation under Brady
2. Maryland, 873 U.S. 88, 88 S.Ct, 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1968), and State v. Hatfield,
169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.E.2d 402 (1982): (1)
the evidence at issue must be favorable to
the defendant as exculpatory or impeach-
ment evidence; (2) the evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either will-
fully or inadvertently; and (8) the evidence
must have been material, i.¢., it must have
prejudiced the defense at trial,

Our analysis of this issue requires us to
apply each of the elements of Syllabus Point
2 of Youngblood to the facts of this case. The
first Youngblood element is whether Ms,
Stolze’s statement provided favorable excul-
patory or impeachment evidence for Defen-
dant Peterson. We believe it does.

Ms. Stolze’s statement could be favorable
to Defendant Peterson as impeachment evi-
dence. Her statement contradicted the testi-
mony of State witness Antonio Smith. Mr,
Smith testified that Defendant Peterson lost
four to five hundred dollars to the victim, had
a verbal altercation with the victim, and
made a threatening statement as he left the
residence. By contrast, Defendant Peterson
testified that he won money in the first dice
game, that he did not have a verbal confron-
tation with the victim, and did not make the
threatening comment as he left the resi-
dence, Ms, Stolze’s statement supports De-
fendant Peterson’s testimony and tends to
impeach Mr, Smith’s version of events during
the first dice game. For these reasons, we
find the first element of Youngblood i is satis
fied.

The second Youngblood element requires
us to determine whether the evidence was
willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the
State. This Court discussed this element in
detail in Youngblood, stating:

[E]vidence is considered suppressed when

“the existence of the evidence was known,

or reasonably should have been known, to

the government, the evidence was not oth-

29

erwise available to the defendant through

the exercise’ of reasonable diligence, and

the government either willfully. or inadver-

tently withheld the evidence until it was

too late for the defense to make‘use of it.”
Id, at 81, n.21, 650 S.H.2d at 180, n.21, (quot-
ing United States v, Knight, 342 F.3d 697,
705 (7th Cir.2008)).

Thus, to prevail on the second Youngblood
element, Defendant Peterson is required to
demonstrate’ that (1) the State knew or
should have known about Ms, Stolze’s state-
ment, (2) Ms. Stolze’s statement was not
available to Defendant Peterson through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, and (8) the
State willfully or inadvertently withheld Ms.
Stolze’s statement.

“It is undisputed’ that the State knew that
the police had taken a statement from Ms.
Stolze on the day before the trial. This,
Defendant Peterson satisfies the first ele-
ment of the three-part test. However, Defen-
dant Peterson has failed to satisfy the second
element of this test. Defendant Peterson’s
trial lawyer stated on the morning the trial
began that Ms, Stolze had previously been
disclosed to the defense and that “we do
know where she is. She was disclosed to us
and we agree that there is nothing there.”
The State disclosed Ms. Stolze to the de~
fense, Ms. Stolze. lived in Huntington at the
time of the trial and the defense knew where

‘She was. Thus, it is clear that the defense

could have interviewed Ms. Stolze and ob-
tained her statement’ about what occurred
during the first dice game through the exer-
cise of “reasonable diligence.” Therefore, we
find that Defendant Peterson has not satis-
fied the second elemént of the three-part test
under our second Youngblood inquiry.

Assuming arguendo that Defendant Peter-
son could satisfy the second Youngblood ele-
ment, we find that his argument would nev-
ertheless fail under the third Youngblood
element. Under the third Youngblood ele-
ment, Defendant Peterson must show that
Ms. Stolze’s statement was material.

WN This Court has recognized that
“{tyhe evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of

30

the proceeding would have been different. A
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the out-
come.” State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 845, 858,
387 S.E.2d 812, 820 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Bagley, 478 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct.
3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)), Additionally, “a
showing of materiality does not require dem-
onstration by a preponderance that disclo-
sure of the suppressed evidence would have
resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquit-
tal.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US. 419, 434, 115
S.Ct. 1555, 181 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). All that is
required is a “showing that the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put
the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at
435, 115 S.Ct, 1555. Finally, the suppressed
evidence “must be evaluated in the context of
the entire record.” U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 112, 96 S.Ct, 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 842 (1976).

Viewing Ms. Stolze’s statement in the con-
text of the entire record, her testimony does
not create a reasonable probability that the
result of the trial would have been different
had she testified. Ms. Stolze’s statement was
confined to events that occurred three days
before the murder.8 The key evidence pre-
sented by the State during the trial was
testimony from multiple witnesses about
what occurred on the night of the murder.
Mr. Wade testified that he saw the victim
and Defendant Peterson dealing drugs and
playing dice together on the night of the
murder in the area where the victim’s body
was later found. Defendant Peterson did not
dispute that he was dealing drugs and play-
ing dice with the victim on the night of the
murder in the area where the body was later
found. Further, Mr. Wade testified that on
the night of the murder, he saw Defendant
Peterson with two guns, proceeding toward
the area where the victim was selling drugs.
Finally, Mr. Wade testified that shortly after
seeing Defendant Peterson heading in the
direction of the victim, he heard a gunshot,
and a minute or two later, saw Defendant
Peterson jogging away from the area,

8. The purpose of this evidence was limited solely
to motive, which is not an element of the crime

Dr. Kaplan testified that the estimated
time of death was 7:40 p.m. Julie Eplion
testified that Defendant Peterson called her
twenty-five times between 7:58 p.m. and 9:06
p.m. on the night of the murder. After pick-
ing Defendant Peterson up that evening, Ms.
Eplion testified that Defendant Peterson was
acting nervous and was repeatedly placing
phone calls to a woman in Columbus request-
ing that she drive to Huntington to pick him
up. Ms, Eplion testified that the Columbus
driver picked Defendant Peterson up at 11:30
p.m. on the night of the murder.

Defendant Peterson did not dispute that
he was with the victim on the night of the
murder selling drugs and playing dice. De-
fendant Peterson did not dispute that he
made repeated phone calls to Ms. Eplion, nor
did he dispute that he had a Columbus wom-
an pick him up at 11:30 p.m. on the night of
the murder and immediately drive him to
Columbus. Finally, Defendant Peterson did
not dispute that he fled when the U.S, Mar-
shal attempted to apprehend him in Colum-
bus. Defendant Peterson did not offer any
reason explaining why he attempted to run
away from the Marshal.

Based on this substantial evidence regard-
ing the events that occurred on the night of
the murder and of Defendant Peterson’s be-
havior and actions thereafter, we cannot find
that Ms. Stolze’s testimony about the dice
game that occurred three days before the
murder would reasonably have put the result
of the case in a different light sufficient to
undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.
Ms. Stolze’s statement simply had little to no
bearing on any of the testimony regarding
what occurred on the night of the murder or
on Defendant Peterson’s subsequent behav-
ior and actions, We therefore find that De-
fendant Peterson’s first assignment of error
fails.

B. Introduction of Inadmissible
Hearsay by the State

I Before addressing the next alleged
error, we note that all of the remaining as-
signments of error raised by Defendant Pe-

charged.

terson were not objected to by defense coun-
sel during the trial.?

First, Defendant Peterson alleges that the
State introduced inadmissible hearsay evi-
dence during its cross-examination of the
defendant. By way of background, the al-
leged hearsay evidence involved a discussion
about a pair of boots recovered from Defen-
dant Peterson’s Columbus residence. He
lived at this residence with his mother and
his younger brother. Huntington Police Offi-
cer Rocky Johnson was called by the State
and testified that the Columbus residence
had two upstairs bedrooms, one of which was
Defendant Peterson’s and one which Defen-
dant Peterson and his younger: brother
shared. When asked how he obtained the
information about the bedrooms, Officer
Johnson testified, “[t]hrough his mother and
there was some mail and some various things
in that room that had [Defendant Peterson's]
name on it.” Officer Johnson further testified
that the clothing they seized came from the
bedroom that was only used by Defendant
Peterson and that the boots were seized from.
the bedroom that was shared by Defendant
Peterson and his younger brother. During
his direct examination, Defendant Peterson
testified that the boots that were seized from
the Columbus residence were not his: “Those
ave not my boots. I don’t know whose boots
they are. My little brother wears them.
That’s what my mom says.”

With this background in mind, we turn to
the complained of exchange between the
prosecutor and Defendant Peterson, in which
Defendant’ Peterson asserts that the State
introduced inadmissible hearsay evidence.
‘The exchange is as follows:

Prosecutor: Would it surprise you if
your mother told the police that the light

9. Defendant Peterson's brief repeatedly questions
the performance of his trial counsel. For in-
stance, his brief provides “the [defendant] should
not be forced into Harmless or Plain Error analy-
sis ... for his counsel's failure to make a.simple
and necessary objection,” Further, the brief pro-
vides that Defendant Peterson ‘“‘had to object and
fight for himself for the majority of the trial as
clearly trial counsel did not know the case.”
While not specifically raised in this appeal, our
cases have made clear that a “claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is generally not ripe for
direct appellate review.” State v, Hutchinson,
215 W.Va. 313, 323, 599 S.E.2d 736, 746 (2004),

31

brown boots were yours when they execut-
ed the search?

Defendant: No, because my mom
maybe—maybe not had known that those
in the room were his or mine or just there.

Prosecutor: I believe the testimony was
that they asked your mom whose boots
were these and she said yours; that these
were your little brother’s; and that these
[light brown, boots] were yours; right?

Defendant: I didn’t get that part where
they asked her specifically whose shoes
were who.

Prosecutor: You didn’t hear Detective
Johnson say that?

Defendant: No, I heard him say that
he—that the boots were mine because they
‘were got out of my room.

Prosecutor: No, sir. He said the clothes
came out of your room and that both’ boots
came out of the other bedroom and that
your mother said the light brown boots
were yours. Does that refresh your memo-
ry of what was testified to yesterday, sir?

Defendant: If I could look at my notes
because I am pretty sure I wrote that
down,

A review of the trial transcript supports
Defendant Peterson’s assertion that there
was no testimony supporting the premise of
the prosecutor’s question—“I believe the tes-
timony was that they asked your mom whose
boots were these and she said yours ...
right?” While Officer Johnson testified that
Defendant Peterson’s mother provided infor-
mation about which bedroom was his, there
was no testimony that the defendant’s moth-
er stated that the light brown boots belonged
to Defendant Peterson.

See also Syllabus Point 10, State v. Triplett, 187
W.Va, 760, 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992) ("It is the
extremely rare case when this Court will find
ineffective assistance of counsel when such a
charge is raised as an assignment of error on a
direct appeal, The prudent defense counsel first
develops the record regarding ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding
before the lower court, and may then appeal if
such relief is denied. This Court may then have a
fully developed record on this issue upon which
to more thoroughly review an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.”).

32

This Court addressed a similar issue in
State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 685, 461
§.B,2d 168, 191 (1995), in which the prosecu-
tor asked the defendant about an alleged
statement he had made to a police officer and
defense counsel objected because the alleged
statement was not disclosed during discov-
ery. This Court noted that the prosecutor
offered no factual basis for this question
during the trial and observed that “[tJrial

. courts should preclude questions for which
the questioner cannot show a factual and
good faith basis,” Id. at 686, fn, 42, 461
S.E.2d at 192, fn, 42, .

The present casé is distinguishable from
Guthrie, however, because Defendant Peter-
son’s trial counsel did not object to the prose-
eutor’s questions about the alleged statement
Defendant Peterson’s mother had made. In
State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 316, 470
§.E.2d 618, 685 (1996), Justice Cleckley de-
scribed the “raise or waive” rule:

One of the most familiar procedural ru-
brics in the administration of justice is the
rule that the failure of a litigant to assert a
right in the trial court likely will result in
the imposition of a procedural bar to an
appeal of that issue, Our cases consistently
have demonstrated that, in general, the
law ministers to the vigilant, not to those
who sleep on ‘their rights, Recently, we
stated in State ew rel, Cooper v. Caperton,
196 W.Va, 208, 216, 470 S.H.2d 162, 170
(1996): “The rule in West Virginia is that
parties must speak clearly in the circuit
court, on pain that, if they forget their
lines, they will likely be bound forever to
hold their peace.” When -a litigant deems
himself or herself aggrieved by what he or.
she considers to be an important occur-
rence in the course of a trial or an errone-
ous ruling by a trial court, he or she
ordinarily must object then and there or
forfeit any right to complain at a later
time. The pedigree for this rule is of an-
cient vintage, and it is premised on the
notion that calling an error to the trial
court’s attention affords an opportunity to
correct the problem before irreparable
harm occurs, There is‘also an equally salu-
tary justification for the raise or waive
rule; It prevents a party from making a
tactical decision to refrain from objecting

and, subsequently, should the case turn
sour, assigning error (or even worse, plant-
ing an error and nurturing the seed as a
guarantee against a bad result). In the
end, the. contemporaneous objection re-
quirement serves an important purpose in
promoting the balanced and orderly func-
tioning of our adversarial system of justice,

(Internal citation and quotation omitted).

However, the raise or waive rule is not
absolute, In Stafe v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 8, 18,
459 S.H.2d 114, 129 (1995),. we stated: “The
‘plain error’ doctrine grants appellate courts,
in the interest of justice, the authority to
notice error to which no objection has been
made.” This Court has held: “To trigger ap-
plication of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there
must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (8) that
affects substantial rights; and (4) -seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public repu-
tation of the judicial proceedings.” Syllabus
Point 7, State v, Miller, supra,

HsIf these criteria are met this
Court may correct the plain error if it “seri-
ously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or pub-
lic reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Atlinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56
S.Ct. 891, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). As Justice
Cleckley noted in LaRock, .

an unpreserved error is‘deemed plain and

affects substantial rights only if the re-
viewing court finds the lower court skewed
the fundamental fairness or basic integrity
of the proceedings in some major respect.

In clear terms, the plain error rule should

be exercised only to avoid a miscarriage of

justice. The discretionary authority of this

Court invoked by lesser errors should be

exercised sparingly and should be reserved

for the correction of those few errors that

“seriously affect the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of the judicial proceed-

ings.” Untied States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,

Ab, 105 S.Ct, 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 12

(1985).

Id. at 817, 470 S.E.2d at 636.

HH After review, we find that the prose-
cutor’s question .was improper because there
was no factual basis demonstrating that the
defendant’s mother stated that the particular

pair of boots belonged to Defendant Peter-
son. However, we find that this brief line of
questioning did not skew “the fundamental
fairness or basic integrity of the proceedings
in some major respect.” Id. Further, we find
that this brief line of questioning did not
constitute a “miscarriage of justice.” Defen-
dant Peterson disagreed with the prosecutor
about whéther his mother had made the
statement that the boots were his. In fact,
during his direct examination, Defendant Pe-
terson testified that his mother had stated
the boots belonged to his younger brother.
Defendant Peterson also testified that his
shoe size was nine or nine and a half, and
pointed out that the boots in question were
size eight. The jury, having heard Officer
Johnson’s testimony, as well as Defendant
Peterson’s testimony, could have resolved
this factual dispute in Defendant Peterson’s
favor. Further, the evidence regarding the
pair of boots was not so crucial that it affect-
ed the fairness or integrity of the judicial
proceeding.!®

As discussed in section III. A,, the evi-
dence the State presented against Defendant.
Peterson through the testimony of Mr.
Wade, Ms. Eplion, and even the defendant
himself, was substantial. This evidence estab-
lished that (1) Defendant Peterson was with
the victim on the night of the murder in the
area where the body was found; (2) an eye-
witness saw Defendant Peterson, armed with
two guns, entering the alley where the victim
was selling drugs, heard a single gunshot
shortly thereafter, and then’ saw Defendant
Peterson jogging away from the area; (8)
Defendant Peterson made twenty-five phone
ealls to a Huntington acquaintance in the
hour after the murder occurred; (4) Defen-
dant Peterson called his Columbus girlfriend
approximately ninety minutes after the mur-
der occurred, requesting that she drive to
Huntington to pick him up; (6) Defendant,
10. We note that State witness Kevin McDowell,

an employeo.of the West Virginia State Police

Crime Laboratory, was unable to testify defini-

tively that the pair of boots recovered from the

Columbus house made the footprint impression

that was recovered from the crime scene.
11, Rule 404(a) provides:

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s

character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person

33

Peterson left Huntington and returned to
Columbus on the night of the murder at
11:80 p.m; and (6) Defendant Peterson fled
when a U.S. Marshal attempted to appre-
hend him in Columbus and offered no reason
explaining why he fled upon seeing the Mar-
shal,

By contrast to this substantial evidence the
State presented regarding the events that
occurred on the night of the murder and of
Defendant Peterson’s behavior and actions
after the murder, the evidence the State
presented about the boots was relatively. mi-
nor, Further, the jury heard Defendant Pe-
terson’s testimony that the boots did not
belong to him, and heard Officer Johnson’s
testimony regarding his search of the Colum-
bus residence.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the prosecutor's brief line of questioning
about the boots did not affect “the fundamen-
tal fairness or basic integrity of the proceed-
ings in some major respect.” LaRock, 196
W.Va. at 317, 470 S.H.2d at 686, We there-
fore conclude that Defendant Peterson’s sec-
ond assignment of error fails,

C. Bad Character Evidence/Improper
Comments During Closing
Argument.

HMI Defendant Peterson next argues
that the State introduced bad character evi-
dence in violation of Rule 404(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence.!! Defendant Pe-
terson concedes that “defense counsel solic-
ited evidence of [Defendant Peterson’s] bad
character and criminal history on direct ex-
amination.” Defendant Peterson admits that
this line of questioning. “opened the door for
the prosecutor” to question Defendant Peter-
son about his bad character and criminal
history. However, Defendant Peterson ar-
gues that the prosecutor improperly argued

acted in accordance with the character or
trait:

(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a
Criminal Case, The following exceptions apply
ina criminal case:

(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the de-
fendant's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is
admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it{.]

34

this bad character evidence to the jury dur-
ing his closing statement,

The State asserts that Defendant Peterson
did not object to any of the prosecutor’s
statements made during closing argument,
therefore, this issue was waived. Further, the
State notes that Defendant Peterson put his
criminal history into evidence as part of his
defense strategy and the prosecutor had the
right to cross-examine him on this issue and
to argue the facts raised by Defendant Peter-
son, including his criminal history, to the
wy.

After review, we find that the issue of
Defendant Peterson’s criminal past was
raised and extensively discussed during De-
fendant Peterson’s direct examination. De-
fendant Peterson readily admitted that he
had a number of previous felonies involving
weapons charges,” that he was on parole
from Ohio, and that he had been dealing
drugs in Huntington. Defendant Peterson ex-
plained that the reason he fied Huntington
on the night of the murder was because he
was not allowed to be in West Virginia under
the terms of his Ohio parole, and he feared
any contact with a West Virginia policeman
would lead to his parole being revoked. Be-
cause Defendant Peterson affirmatively
placed his criminal past into the trial, we find
no error with the prosecutor’s statements

12, Defendant Peterson introduced evidence re-
garding his previous felonies involving weapons
charges. Defendant Peterson's trial lawyer asked
Julie Eplion if she saw Defendant Peterson with
a gun on the night of the murder, to which she
answered no, In response to this line of question-
ing, the State asked Ms. Eplion if she had ever
seen Defendant Peterson with a gun, to which
she answered yes. Defendant Peterson argues
that the State’s question was improper and
should have been barred under Rule 404(a). De-
fendant Peterson’s trial lawyer did not object to
the State’s question. Thus, we find this assign-
ment of error has been waived. See LaRock, 196
W.Va. at 316, 470 S.E.2d at 635 (‘One of the
most familiar procedural rubrics in the adminis-
tration of justice is the rule that the failure of a
litigant to assert a right in the trial court likely
will result in the imposition of a procedural bar
to an appeal of that issue.”).

13. Two other assignments of error raised by De-
fendant Peterson concern alleged improper com-
ments made during the prosecutor's closing ar-
gument. In his sixth and seventh assignments of
error, Defendant Peterson alleges: The prosecu-

discussing Defendant Peterson’s criminal his-
tory during his closing argument.

HM Furthermore, in Syllabus Point 5 of
State v. Grubbs, 178 W.Va. 811, 364 S.E.2d
824 (1987), this Court held, in relevant part,
“{ilf either the prosecutor or defense counsel
believes the other has made improper re-
marks to the jury, a timely objection should
be made coupled with a request to the court
to instruct the jury to disregard the re-
marks.” This Court has also long held that
“{flailure to make timely and proper objec-
tion to remarks of counsel made in the pres-
ence of the jury, during the trial of a case,
constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the
question thereafter either in the trial court
or in the appellate court.” Syllabus Point 6,
Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va. 299, 36 S.H.2d
410 (1945). See State v. Davis, 205 W.Va. 569,
586, 519 S.B.2d 852, 869 (1999) (“In view of
our precedent, the defendant cannot argue
for the first time on appeal that the prosecu-
tor made improper remarks during the
State’s closing argument.”); State v.
Young, 185 W.Va. 827, 349 n, 25, 406 8.H.2d
758, 780 n, 25 (1991) (finding defendant
waived issue of improper remarks by the
prosecutor during closing argument because
of failure to object). Defendant Peterson did
not object to the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment. Thus, based on our clear law, we deem
this issue waived.

tor improperly argued his personal beliefs and
vouched for the credibility of the witnesses be-
fore the jury; and the prosecutor argued false
evidence to the jury. These two assignments of
error also fail because no objection was made
during closing argument. We note that in State v.
Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995),
defense counsel objected to certain statements
made during the prosecutor's closing statement.
Under that circumstance, the Court, in Syllabus
Point 6, set forth the following four-factor inqui-
ry:

Four factors are taken into account in deter-
mining whether improper prosecutorial com-
ment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1)
the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks
have a tendency to mislead the jury and to
prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks
were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the re-
marks, the strength of competent proof intro-
duced to establish the guilt of the accused; and
(4) whether the comments were deliberately
placed before the jury to divert attention to
extraneous matters.

This four-factor test is not applicable to the
present case because no objection was raised

D. Hearsay Evidence

HE The next assignment of error is De-
fendant Peterson’s contention that the State
introduced inadmissible hearsay through the
testimony of Antonio Smith. The complained
of testimony concerned Mr. Smith’s testimo-
ny that on the day before the murder, the
victim told him that he and Defendant Peter-
son were going to play dice on the following
day. The specific testimony is as follows,
“{the victim] told me Sunday they were going
to throw dice again. It was rematch day.”
Defendant Peterson argues that this state-
ment is inadmissible hearsay under Rule 801
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

At the outset, we note that defense counsel
did not object to this testimony. This Court
has held that “[flailure to make timely and
proper objection to remarks of counsel made
in the presence of the jury, during the trial
of a case, constitutes a waiver of the right to
raise the question thereafter either in the
trial court or in the appellate court.” Syllabus
Point 6, Yuncke, supra.

HR Further, we observe that

[glenerally, out-of-court statements made

by someone other than the declarant while

testifying are not admissible unless: 1) the
statement is not being offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, but for some other
purpose such as motive, intent, state-of-
mind, identification or reasonableness of
the party’s action; 2) the statement is not
hearsay under the rules; or 8) the state-
ment is hearsay but falls within an excep-
tion provided for in the rules,
Syllabus Point 1, State v. Maynard, 183
W.Va, 1, 393 S.E.2d 221 (1990). “The under-
lying rationale of the hearsay rule is to pre-
vent the admission into evidence of unreliable
or untrustworthy evidence.” State v. Boyd,
167 W.Va. 385, 397, 280 S.E.2d 669, 679
(1981).

In the present case, the complained of
testimony was neither unreliable nor untrust-
worthy. The substance of Mr. Smith’s com-
plained of testimony was that Defendant Pe-
terson and the victim were going to play dice

during the prosecutor's closing argument. See
State v. Grubbs, supra; Yuncke v, Welker, supra;

35

together on the night of the murder. Defen-
dant Peterson argues that this testimony was
hearsay. It is undisputed that Defendant Pe-
terson and the victim played dice together on
the night of the murder. Defendant Peterson
admitted this fact during his testimony. Simi-
larly, Mr. Wade testified that he observed
the victim and Defendant Peterson ‘playing
dice together on the night of the murder.

Based on the foregoing, we find no error.
E. Cumulative Error

Defendant Peterson’s ‘final assignment of
error is a one-paragraph argument that
“(tlhe cumulative nature of the above-cap-
tioned violations deprived [Defendant Peter-
son] of the right to a fair trial.”

Our standard for reviewing a cumulative
error argument was set forth in Syllabus
Point 5 of State v, Smith, 156 W.Va, 385, 198
S.E.2d 550 (1972): “Where the record of a
criminal trial shows that the cumulative ef-
fect of numerous errors committed during
the trial prevented the defendant from re-
ceiving a fair trial, his conviction should be
set aside, even though any one of. such errors
standing alone would be harmless error.”
Further, this Court has recognized that the
cumulative error doctrine “should be used
sparingly” and only where the errors are
apparent from the record. Tennant v. Mar-
ion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W.Va.
97, 118, 459 S.E.2d 874; 395 (1995),

HM After review we find no merit in
Defendant Peterson’s cumulative error argu-
ment, The majority of the alleged errors in
this matter were not objected to during the
trial, As Justice Workman noted in a coneur-
ring opinion in Finley v. Norfolle and West-
ern Ry. Co., 208 W.Va. 276, 288, 540 S.E.2d
144, 151 (1999), “unobjected to errors are not
properly the subject ofthe cumulative error
doctrine.” Because six of the alleged errors
now claimed to constitute cumulative error
were unobjected to below, this Court cannot
conelude that this case should be reversed
based upon cumulative error.

and State v. Young, supra.

36

Additionally, we-find that the alleged er-
rors in this case are not so substantial as to
have denied Defendant Peterson a fair trial,
It has been observed that “{iJf the errors,
while numerous, are insignificant or inconse-
quential, the case should not be reversed
under the doctrine.” 1 Louis J. Palmer, Jr.,
Robin Jean Davis and Franklin D. Cleckley,
Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia
Lawyers, § 103.03[1]lel, p. 87 (6th ed. 2015).

Iv.

. - CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the circuit court’s
November 20, 2015, order denying Defendant
Peterson’s motion for a new trial is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves
the right to file a dissenting Opinion.

Davis, Justice, dissenting:

“In this proceeding, the defendant, Quinton
Peterson, was convicted of first degree mur-
der and sentenced to life imprisonment with-

out the possibility of parole. Here, Mr. Peter-.

gon sets out several assignments of error.
The majority ‘opinion rejected all of the is-
sues raised as being without merit. However,
T believe one of the issues raised had merit,
and warranted the conviction being reversed
and a new trial being awarded. Consequent-
ly, for the reasons set out below, I dissent.

The issue raised by Mr. Peterson that had
merit involved his assertion that the State
suppressed material evidence in violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 878 U.S. 88, 88 S.Ct.
1194, 10 L.Ed. 2d’ 215 (1968). In resolving
this issue, the majority opinion conveniently

1, I would be remiss if I did not note that the
tenor of the case sub judice bears an eerie resem-
blance to this Court’s previous decision in
Youngblood I, wherein the Court determined that
no Brady violation had occurred and from which
decision I dissented. See State v. Youngblood, 217
W.Va. 535, 618 S.E.2d 544 (2005) (per curiam)
(Youngblood 1). Thereafter, Mr, Youngblood ap-
pealed from this Court’s ruling, and the United
States Supreme Court vacated this Court's deci-
sion in Youngblood I, remanding the case with
directions for this Court to rule upon the Brady
violation. See Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547
U.S, 867, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed. 2d 269
(2006) (per curiam). On remand, this Court con-

omitted relevant facts which, as I will show,
established a Brady violation.

The record shows that during the initial
investigation of this cdse, the police spoke
with a man named Antonio Smith. Mr; Smith
mew’ Mr. Peterson and had played dice with
him, a few days before the victim was mur-
dered, at the home of Ms. Erin Stolze. Dur-
ing Mr. Smith’s initial contact with the police,
he informed them only that he knew Mr.
Peterson, aid he knew where he lived. As a-
result of the limited information provided to
the police by Mr. Smith, Mr. Peterson had no
reason to believe that there was anything
relevant to his case that occurred during the
dice game at Ms. Stolze’s home: It was not
until'the day before trial that’ the State in-
formed Mr. Peterson, for the first time, that
the State was calling Mr. Smith as a witness
to provide evidence about events at the dice
game at Ms. Stolze’s home, The record does
not disclose that Mr, Peterson was infornied
of the exact nature of Mr, Smith’s anticipated
testimony. The State also indicated to Mr.
Peterson that Ms, Stolze had been contacted
and that the State would not be calling her as
a witness. On the first day of trial, counsel
for Mr. Peterson placed on the record his
understanding of. the contact made by the
State with Ms. Stolze on the day before trial.
The following exchange occurred regarding
this issue:

THE COURT: ... [Defense counsel] said
hé needed to put a couple things on the
record and so—well, go ahead.

DEFENSE: ... I needed to—we haven't
_ asked about this, But the State has ongo-
ing duties under [Brady] and I wanted to

chided that a Brady violation had; in fact, oc-
curred and awarded Mr. Youngblood the new
trial to which he was entitled.

Rather than learning from the errors of its
past, however, this Court seems to be repeating
its same mistakes in this case by refusing to
recognize that a Brady violation has occurred,
which violation, I submit, is even more egregious
than the Brady violation at issue in the Young-
blood case. I only hope that Mr. Peterson and his
counsel remain vigilant in their quest for a fair
adjudication of Mr. Peterson's guilt so that he,
too, will receive the same opportunity for a fair
trial as did Mr. Youngblood.

see if we couldn’t get something here out
of [the State] about [Brady].

THE STATE; No, I disclosed things yes-
terday regarding the new information from
Antonio Smith and things going on at
Erin’s— :
DEFENSE; And she is not being called as
a witness?

THE STATE: That's right,

DEFENSE: We do know where she is,
She was disclosed to us and we agree there
is nothing there, I thought we needed to
clean that up. There is no exculpatory evi-
dence that you know of Mr. Chiles?

THE STATE: No,

DEFENSE: And you sought that out?
THE STATE: Oh, yes.

Based upon the above colloquy, Mr. Peterson ~

and the court were informed by the State
that no Brady evidence existed regarding
Ms. Stolze. However, as I will show below,
the State knew of Brady material involving
Ms. Stolze at the time it denied the same in
open court, .

During the trial, the State called Mr,
Smith to provide evidence of premeditation
and motive in the killing of the victim. Mr,
Smith informed the jury that the murder
victim was the winner of the dice game at
Ms. Stolze’s home, and that Mr. Peterson
was the big loser. Mr. Smith stated that Mr.
Peterson lost approximately $400 to $500 at
the first dice game. According to Mr. Smith,
a fight almost broke out between the victim
and Mr. Peterson. Mr. Smith informed the
jury that Mr. Peterson stated, “Damn, I wish
I had my gun,” as he was leaving Ms. Stol-
ze’s home. Mr. Peterson took the stand and
denied the allegations made by Mr. Smith.

Subsequent to Mr. Peterson’s conviction,
he learned that the State had interviewed
Ms, Stolze the day before. the trial, and was
given a version of events about the dice game
which completely contradicted Mr. Smith’s
sworn version of the events. Ms. Stolze in-
formed the State that Mr. Peterson won the
dice game at her home, not the victim. Ac-
cording to Ms. Stolze, Mr. Peterson won
about $100. Ms. Stolze stated that the victim

got upset when Mr, Peterson decided to .

leave and stated, “Oh, really, you are not

37

going to let me—or give me a chance to
make up or get my Hundred Dollars back?
Like, go on with that bitch-ass-shit. Take my
bitch-ass One Hundred Dollars,” Ms, Stolze
informed the State that no threats were
made and that.she did not observe any guns,
Ms. Stolze also specifically informed the

State that she did not hear Mr. Peterson say,

“Damn, I wish I had my gun.”

It is in the above context that Mr, Peter-
son’s: Brady claim should be reviewed. The
parameters: of a Brady violation were set out
in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Youngblood,
221 W.Va. 20, 650 8.E.2d 119.(2007), as fol-
lows:

There are three components of a consti-
tutional due process violation under Brady
v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 88, 83 S.Ct, 1194, 10
L,Hd.2d 215 (1963), and State v, Hatfield,
169 W.Va. 191, 286 S.H.2d 402 (1982): (1)
the evidence at issue must be favorable to
the defendant as exculpatory or impeach-

*-ment evidence; (2) the evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either will-
fully or iiadvertently; and (8) the evidence
must have been material, i.¢., it must have
prejudiced the defense at trial.

The majority opinion correctly found that

‘the first element under Youngblood was sat-

isfied, That is, the majority opinion concluded
that “Ms, Stolze’s statement supports Defen-
dant Peterson’s testimony and tends to im-
peach Mr. Smith’s version of events during
the dice game. For these reasons, we find the
first element of Youngblood is satisfied.”

Tn its analysis of Youngblood’s second fac-
tor, the majority opinion found that Mr. Pe-
terson failed to satisfy this element. The
majority's analysis of this issue was patently
wrong. Under the second element of Young-
blood, it must be shown that the State willful-
ly or inadvertently suppressed impeachment
evidence. In a footnote in Youngblood, the .
meaning of “suppressed” in the context of a
Brady violation was explained as follows:

We will note that evidence is considered
suppressed when [1] the existence of the
evidence was known, or reasonably should
have been known, to the government, [2]
the evidence was not otherwise available to
the defendant through the exercise of rea-

38

sonable diligence, and [8] the government

either willfully or inadvertently withheld

the evidence until it was too late for the

defense to make use of it.
Youngblood, 221 W.Va. at 81 n.21, 650 S.E.2d
at 180 n.21 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). As to the first suppression factor,
the majority opinion readily admitted that
the State knew of Ms. Stolze’s impeachment,
statement “on the day before trial.””

As to the second suppression factor, the
majority opinion determined that because
Mr. Peterson knew about Ms. Stolze, he
could have, through the exercise of reason-
able diligence, learned about her impeach-
ment statement before trial. This conclusion
is inconsistent with the evidence. As I point-
ed out previously, prior to the day before
trial, Mr. Smith was not listed as a witness,
All that the State had revealed to Mr. Peter-
son was that Mr. Smith identified him to the
police, Without any further information about.
Mr. Smith, there was no need for Mr. Peter-
son to contact Ms. Stolze to see what she
could say about the dice game. Mr. Peterson
was led to believe the dice game was not an
issue. The dice game at Ms. Stolze’s home
did not become an issue until the day before
trial, when the State informed Mr. Peterson
that it was calling Mr. Smith to testify about
the dice game. Moreover, as testified to by
the State on the day of trial, it interviewed
Ms. Stolze and determined that she did not
have any Brady evidence, ie, her version of
the dice game was consistent with Mr,
Smith’s. Further, the record does not dis-
close that Mr. Peterson actually knew the
substance of Mr. Smith’s testimony until he
testified.

Under these facts, Mr. Peterson had no
reason to suspect that Ms. Stolze had any
relevant testimony. The State knew differ-
ently, and the majority opinion so found, but
the State suppressed that information. Con-
sequently, the majority opinion was wrong in
2. The majority opinion disingenuously stated that

it was “undisputed” that the State knew about

Ms. Stolze’s impeachment statement. However,

the testimony of the officer who interviewed Ms.

Stolze denied knowledge of the impeachment

version of her statement. In fact, the officer testi-

fied that he did not record her statement because
it was “consistent” with Mr. Smith's statement.

concluding that the evidence demonstrated
that Mr. Peterson, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have learned of
Ms, Stolze’s impeachment evidence before
the trial.

As to the third suppression factor, whether
the evidence was intentionally or inadver-
tently suppressed, it is clear to me that the
evidence was intentionally suppressed. The
police officer who interviewed Ms. Stolze de-
nied any recollection of her having given a
statement that was inconsistent with Mr.
Smith’s. The officer conveniently stated that
he did not record her statement because it
‘was not inconsistent with Mr. Smith’s state-
ment. However, Ms. Stolze testified that af-
ter she told the police officer what actually
happened at the dice game, the officer said
“someone was lying through his teeth.” This
statement demonstrates the intentional sup-
pression of Brady evidence. The officer knew
he had conflicting statements from two po-
tential witnesses—one statement supported
Mr. Peterson’s guilt, and the second state-
ment impeached the veracity of the first
statement. The State, through its agents the
police officer and/or the prosecutor, made the
decision to intentionally suppress the im-
peachment statement. For purposes of Bra-
dy, it is of no moment as to whether the
police officer actually informed the prosecu-
tor about Ms. Stolze’s statement. See Syl. pt.
1, Youngblood, 221 W.Va. 20, 650 S.E.2d 119
(“A police investigator’s knowledge of evi-
dence in a criminal case is imputed to the
prosecutor. Therefore, a prosecutor’s disclo-
sure duty under Brady v. Maryland, 378
US. 88, 88 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1968)
and State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 286
§.E.2d 402 (1982) includes disclosure of evi-
dence that is known only to a police investi-
gator and not to the prosecutor.”).

Under the final element of Youngblood,
the suppressed evidence must have been ma-
terial or prejudiced the defense at trial. The

It is clear that the majority opinion believed Ms.
Stolze’s version of her statement and not the
purported failed memory of the officer. There-
fore, it would have been more correct for the
majority opinion to have acknowledged that it
disbelieved the officer, rather than state that the
issue was “undisputed.”

majority opinion found that the impeachment.
evidence was not material, The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that “a show-
ing of materiality does not require demon-
stration by a preponderance that disclosure
of the suppressed evidence would have re-
sulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquit-
tal.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 484, 115
S.Ct, 1555, 1566, 181 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995),
Rather, all that is required is a “showing that
the favorable evidence could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a differ-
ent light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at
1566, 181 L.Ed.2d 490, The facts: of this case
clearly demonstrate that, as a result of Mr.
Smith’s testimony, Ms. Stolze’s impeachment
testimony was material and critical for Mr.
Peterson.

During the State’s closing argument in the
case, the State referred to the testimony of
Mr. Smith at least eight times as follows:

(1) “We have Antonio Smith telling you

that before this murder about the dice

game a few days before at Erin’s house,

Now, the defendant admitted a lot of what

Antonio said but then denied the harmful

things.”

@) “Did Antonio Smith have anything to

gain or lose when he came into this court?

Does this defendant? You judge the credi-

bility of the witnesses. Who was telling the

truth? Who was lying? Who has the most
to gain or lose?”

(8) “Antonio Smith also told you that be-

fore the murder because of that dice game

when he—when the defendant lost Three
or Four Hundred Dollars that the defen-
dant quit because he was out of money;
that the defendant was getting angry be-

cause [the victim] was maybe bragging a

little bit and joking and getting the defen-

dant a little fired up. And Antonio told you

that he heard the defendant say, ‘I wish I

had my gun,’”

(4) “And we have Antonio as part of the—

before being with [the victim] Saturday

night into early Sunday morning saying
that the rematch was going to be Sunday.

Now, how in the world did Antonio know

that except for [the victim] telling him

that? And you know what? There was ab-

39

solutely no, nobody suggesting, nobody do-
ing anything to suggest that Antonio was
actually there Sunday, knew they were
throwing dice or anything else. If the de-
fendant himsélf admits those things hap-
pened it’s funny how Antonio knew things
on what [the victim] told him the night
before that that was going to happen. Oth-
erwise, how would he have known to tell
officers that? Not just here in court, but
back in November of 2007.”
(5) “Antonio, again, had no reason to lie
about anything? He didn’t have a horse in
this race.”
(© “But Antonio knew about the dice game
because he was there, and he knew that
the other one was going to happen on
Sunday because [the victim] told him so
Saturday night. Again, Antonio couldn’t
have made that up. He knew about it
because [the victim] said it, Otherwise, he
wouldn’t have even known that it hap-
pened. But he said it was going to because
[the victim] told him so.”
(1) “Why would Antonio make up the de-
fendant saying ‘I wish I had my gun’?
Everything that ... Antonio ... testified
about that didn’t really hurt the defendant
he admitted. ... Did you catch that? Only
those things that hurt him does he deny
about Antonio[’s] ... testimony.”
(8) “Maybe he can explain why Antonio
would lie about who won or lost in that
dice game. Maybe he can explain why An-
tonio would lie about the rematch or the
street rule that the loser gets a rematch if
he wants it. Maybe he can explain how
Antonio would have known Saturday night
that the rematch was going to take place
Sunday night and how, indeed, Sunday
there they are throwing dice again.”
It is clear that the State went to great
lengths to emphasize to the jury that Mr.
Smith’s testimony was “harmful” and accu-
rate. The State emphasized the fact that only
the self-serving testimony of Mr. Peterson
challenged Mr. Smith’s testimony. Moreover,
the record clearly demonstrates that the jury
was focused on Mr. Smith’s depiction of the
dice game at Ms. Stolze’s home because dur-
ing their deliberations they sent out ques-
tions asking about her. The jury particularly

40

wanted to know why Ms, ‘Stolze was not
there to testify. The jury wanted to hear
from Ms, Stolze because Mr. Peterson testi-
fied that Mr. Smith’s testimony was not the
truth. The jury found both witnesses to be
. evedible on this issue and wanted the testi-
mony of Ms. Stolze to help them decide who
was telling the truth. The State denied the
jury this material testimony by suppressing
it, As a result of this suppression, the jury
decided it would credit Mr. Smith’s testimony
over that of Mr. Peterson. This result is
exactly what the State sought to achieve by
denying Mr. Peterson his fundamental right
to due process. Unfortunately, based upon
the decision announced by the majority’s
opinion herein, due process is no longer a
fundamental right. Therefore, I dissent.

799 S.E.2d 117

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
BOARD, Petitioner’

ow! :
Michael P. COOKE, Respondent.
No, 15-1248
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: March 8, 2017
Filed: April 20, 2017

i
P<)

Jessica H. Donahue Rhodes, Esq., Lawyer
Disciplinary Counsel, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney
for Petitioner

Michael P. Cooke, Esq., Bluefield, West.
Virginia, Pro Se Respondent

WORKMAN, Justice:

This lawyer disciplinary proceeding is be-
fore the Court upon the objection of respon-
dent Michael P. Cooke (hereinafter “Cooke”)
to the recommended discipline of the Hear-
ing Panel Subcommittee (hereinafter “HPS”)
of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board, arising
from three disciplinary complaints for which
he was found to have committed twelve viola-
tions of the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The HPS recommended that
Cooke be subjected to a three-month suspen-
sion, a requirement of petition for reinstate-
ment, one-year supervised practice, nine
hours of CLE, and payment of costs. Cooke
objects only to the requirement that he peti-
tion for reinstatement at the close of his
three-month suspension, The Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel (hereinafter “ODC”), howev-
er, requests a more severe sanction of eigh-
teen months’ suspension from practice.

This Court has before it all matters of
record, including the exhibits and a tran-
seript of the evidentiary hearing conducted
by the Board, as well as the briefs and
argument of counsel and the pro se respon-
dent. We agree with the twelve enumerated.
violations found by the HPS; however, based
on this Court’s independent review of the
record, we find that Cooke additionally vio-
lated Rule 8.4(¢) of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct by engaging in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation relative to the complaint
filed by Public Defender Services (hereinaf-
ter “PDS”). We commensurately find that
the recommended sanctions of both the HPS
and ODC are inadequate to fully effectuate
the goals of the disciplinary process. Accord-
ingly, we therefore modify the HPS’ recom-
mendation and order that Cooke be suspend-
ed from the practice of law for two years and
adopt the remainder of the HPS’ recom-
mended sanctions,

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Cooke, who was admitted to the West Vir-
ginia State Bar in 2005, practices in Blue-
field, West Virginia. His practice consists
almost entirely of court-appointed work in
the areas of criminal defense, juvenile truan-

ey, and abuse and neglect in both Mercer and
Raleigh Counties. Cooke also worked for
some unspecified period of time as a Mental
Hygiene Commissioner until 2014. The un-
derlying complaints involve conduct spanning
the two-year period of 2014 and 2015.1
Complaint of the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel

The first complaint, filed in September
2014, emanates from this Court’s referral of
Cooke to ODC for his failure to timely file a
guardian ad litem brief in an abuse and
neglect matter. By Scheduling Order entered
July 8, 2014, Cooke was to file a guardian ad
litem brief or summary response with this
Court by August 7, 2014, but failed to do so.
Upon contact by the Clerk’s office, Cooke
offered no explanation as to why he did not
file a brief, but indicated he would file one by
August 18, 2014; he once again failed to do
so. A Notice of Intent. to Sanction directed
Cooke to file a brief or summary response by
August 29, 2014, yet he again failed to do so.
Upon issuance of a Rule to Show Cause on
September 8, 2014, Cooke: filed a one-page
summary response the next day.

In his response to the ODC’s complaint,
Cooke stated that “during the time the ap-
peal was pending,” he was experiencing a
“medical issue” causing him to sleep between
ten and sixteen hours a day and underwent
two minor surgeries,? after which he was able
to file his brief. Cooke also indicated that he
had “overextended” himself by taking on too
many cases. On October 8, 2014, ODC wrote
to Cooke inquiring as to whether he had
advised this Court about his medical issues
and requesting a response within twenty
days, yet he once again failed to respond. On

1, Inasmuch as the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct were amended effective January
1, 2015, both the former and amended Rules are
implicated herein. For Rules that were not
changed as a result of the amendments or for
conduct, occurring after the amendments, only
the current version of the Rule is cited. Where
the prior Rule is applicable, it is noted herein.

2. The “medical issue” was identified by Cooke as
“low testosterone,” which he maintains can
cause fatigue, The two minor medical procedures
occurred on August 5 and August 28; Cooke
indicates he had little down-time from these pro-
cedures, however.

43

November 6, 2014, ODC wrote again, reit-
erating its request and directing Cooke to
reply by November 17. On November 18,
ODE received a letter from Cooke replying
that he had not advised the Court of his
medical issues because in his experience, “an
attorney’s personal medical issues are not of
concern to a Court.” He promised changes to
his office procedures, but complained that he
had lost two office assistants.

Ina sworn statement before the ODC,
Cooke admitted that he failed to timely file
his brief, but noted that “the chances of the
judge’s decision getting reversed were—are
almost non—non-existent” and that the chil-
dren’s “voice was heard, but it was heard
very delayed.” Testimony before the HPS by
staff members of this Court’s Clerk's office
indicated that Cooke’s delay caused adminis-
trative burden and delay to the processing of
the case.

Based on this complaint, the HPS found
four violations of the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct, as follows: Rule 13
(diligence), ? 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice),! 3.4(¢) (fairness to
opposing party and counsel)’, and 8.1(b)®
(failure to respond to disciplinary matter).

Complaint of Dana Eddy, PDS

On November 26, 2014, Dana Eddy, Exec-
utive Director of the West Virginia PDS,
wrote to Cooke about certain “billing anoma-
lies” ‘observed in his review of Cooke’s fee
vouchers, In particular, Cooke was found to
have exceeded fifteen billable hours a day on
thirty-one dates from mid-January, 2014 to
mid-September, 2014. In addition, on four

3. Rule 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in rep-
resenting a client.”

4. Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

8. Rule 3.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly
disobeyfing] an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal[.]”

6. Rule 8.1(b) prohibits a lawyer, in connection
with a disciplinary matter, from “knowingly
fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for infor-
mation from ... [a] disciplinary authority[.]”

44

dates he submitted vouchers for twenty-three
or greater billable hours and on two dates he
submitted vouchers for greater than twenty-
four hours.” In addition to the total amount
of tirhe billed for each, Mr. Eddy found that
the actual time billed appeared suspicious.
Mr. Eddy indicated that Cooke appeared to
be billing the same travel time to multiple
matters, billing multiple entries of the same
activity and amount of time on multiple mat-
ters, and outright duplicate billing of activity

oni the same file.

Mz, Eddy further expressed concern about
the cumulative amount of time Cooke was
billing to PDS annually, specifically the years
2011-2014, From 2011 through 2014 Cooke
billed $122,800.50, $108,474.50, $128,654.00,
and $157,291.50, respectively.. His annual
hours billed during this time period ranged
from a low of 2,279.8 hours in 2012 to a high
of 8,259.46 in 2014.9 :

Cooke was thereafter placed on a “watch”
list at PDS and required to include additional
detail in his billing; Mr. Eddy also requested
an explanation of the “anomalies” outlined in
his letter. Having received no response from
Cooke, Mr. Eddy wrote again on February
18, 2015 requesting a response by February
28. Cooke alleges that he faxed a letter on
February 28, requesting PDS to provide him
with a detailed accounting of his time on the
days in question such that he could provide
explanation, Mr. Eddy testified below that
his office did not receive this response, al-
though Cooke produced a copy of the letter.
As a result of his belief that Cooke had once
again failed to respond, Mr. Eddy filed a
complaint with ODC.

7, Mr. Eddy also noted that Cooke billed twenty-
seven hours on the day after Christmas in 2013.

8, Mr. Eddy referenced charges for review of or-
ders in as many as thirty-seven (37) cases on the
same day, billing the same amount of time for
each. :

9. Specifically, Cooke billed 2,568.5 hours,
2,279.3 hours, 2,671.2 hours, and 3,259.46 hours
for the years 2011-2014, respectively. These billa-
ble hours equate to an average daily billable rate

of 7 hours, 6.2 hours, 7.3 hours, and 8,9 hours, .

for 365 days,

10. Cooke apparently kept a “contact sheet” in
each client file where he would record his time,
rather than in a daily journal form.

|

On March 20, 2015, a complaint was
opened by ODC and forwarded to Cooke
with a response due on April 20; however,
Cooke failed to respond.-On April 27, 2015,
ODC once again requested a response to the
complaint and Cooke replied the day before
his response was due. In his response, Cooke
primarily complained that he was unable to
provide a better. answer to Mr, Eddy’s re-
quest for an explanation of his billing be-
cause Mr. Eddy had not provided him with
an accounting of his time and that his own
time-keeping system would not permit him to
retrieve ‘that information. In response to
the aggregate hours billed; Cooke asserted
that he is “forced to work in my office out-
side of normal business hours in order to get
things accomplished.... [t]his means that I
am working at my office, or at’ home, very
early in the mornings, late at night, and on
weekends and holidays.” With respect to
2014’s hours, Cooke indicated that the hours
billed reflected not only his billable time, but
that ‘of two contract attorneys. The record
reflects that Cooke engaged a part-time con-
tract attorney from September 2018 to April
or May 2014 4 and a full-time contract attor-
ney from December 2018 to March 21, 2014.
Cooke indicated that he simply billed their
hours as his own since they were working as
contract attorneys, but was unaware that he
was supposed to designate the time as being
performed by someone else in his voucher
submissions. °°

Subsequent to filing the complaint with
ODC, Cooke and Mr. Eddy met and, at Mr.
Eddy’s request, Cooke provided PDS explan-

11. Elsewhere within the appendix record, how-
ever, Cooke states that this attorney worked until
September, 2014. We find no evidence in the
record otherwise indicating which statement is
accurate, However, an accounting of time billed
to PDS in August, 2014, contains the billable
time of an attorney with whom Cooke was shar-
ing office space who “covered” a hearing for
him, rather than the part-time attorney previous-
ly identified.

12, Mr, Eddy explained that billing others’ time
was permissible, but that the voucher should
indicate as much in the explanation field.

atory letters for his billing on three specific
dates; these specific dates are days where
the time billed was purportedly that of Cooke
and his two contract attorneys. Upon receipt
of the explanations, PDS and Cooke entered
into a “Conciliation Agreement” wherein
Cooke would refund certain documented dou-
ble-billed items (totaling $727.80) and would
agree to a 25% ($15,554.64) reduction of
vouchers which were pending payment.!3

_ The HPS took extensive testimony from
Mr, Eddy. Mr. Eddy explained that PDS is
paying $25 million a year to court-appointed
counsel that are, in his- opinion, undercom-
pensated at $45/hour for “out of court” time
and $65/hour for “in court” time. He indi-
eated that when requesting an hourly in-
crease at the Legislature he was typically
confronted with the fact that many attorneys
were making greater than $100,000.00 a year
in court-appointed work and that the legisla-
tors took a dim view of an hourly rate in-
crease when, in their opinion, the court-ap-
pointed attorneys had given themselves a
“raise” by overbilling. Therefore, to curtail
this abuse, Mr. Eddy began the voucher
review process and began entering concilia-
tion agreements with counsel to achieve some
reimbursement and ereate a hindrance to
continued overbilling. He further expressed
concern that although he suspected overbill-
ing, he believed that he often had little actual
proof of it.

Mr. Eddy testified that upon review of the
vouchers being submitted by court-appointed

13. Mr. Eddy was careful to explain to the HPS
that these particular pending vouchers were not
themselves being scrutinized, but that the 25%
was withheld from these vouchers as a settle-
ment of sorts for “historical overbilling.” Mr,
Eddy further indicated that Cooke was in the
“lower midrange” of reductions, ie. he was not
the worst offender. He explained that the 25%
reduction was a “negotiated percentage, essen-
tially, based upon what we believe were the
additional overbillings which he did not admit or
which, frankly nobody could actually confirm
based upon the state of everybody's records in-
volved[.J” Mr. Eddy testified that Cooke’s re-
sponse to his request for an explanation of the
excessive hours was to demand more documen-
tation from PDS so that Cooke could “unravel{]
what his records should've already shown.” Mr,
Eddy stated that he found this frustrating since,
by statute, Cooke was required to maintain de-
tailed and accurate records.

45

counsel, he noted that many were billing in
excess -of fifteen hours a day on a regular
basis. He testified that based on his thirty
years of experience such billing was not sus-
tainable over a long period of time; therefore,
he endeavored to “flag” those individuals for
closer review. He explained that, by statute,
court-appointed counsel are required to
maintain “accurate and detailed” records of
time and are to bill only “actual time” ex-
pended on a.matter. He testified that initially -
he believed Cooke’s tiie could only be ex-
plained by either billing staff time as attor-
ney time and/or “value billing,” i.e, billing the
“value” of a task, rather than the actual time
it took,

After meeting with Cooke and further re-
view of his explanations, Mr. Eddy concluded
that

in most instances, he provided the services

that he indicated he did. I do believe that

he duplicated his billing at times with
respect to travel and with respect to wait-
ing im court, but that is more based upon
his complete absence of any timekeeping
system within his office.... [T]t really was

a complete lack of organization, I think,

that resulted in that overbilling,

(emphasis added). Mr. Eddy reiterated that
although Cooke overbilled, he believed it was
“due to disorganization and inadvertence.”
Nonetheless, Mr. Eddy testified that “I do
believe he’ probably engaged in some value
billing, but I had no real proof that that was
the case.” ¥ He further stated that

14. More specifically Mr. Eddy testified that the
total cost of indigent defense is $51 million. He
explained that expense for panel attorneys is
typically line-itemed in the budget for $10.3 mil-
lion, but that it typically requires approximately
$25 million, necessitating PDS to request the
Legislature to make supplemental funding from
other accounts, Mr, Eddy testified that fully fund-
ing panel counsel “may involve transfers of mon-
eys from 20 to 30 different accounts to get it for
us.”

18. For example, Mr. Eddy testified:

I had no proof that I felt I could present that
would establish a clear ethical violation. It
remains iny opinion, however, that many of
[the] entries, for example a .2 on 37 occasions
on one day for review of an order leads me to
believe that [Cooke] did not actually spend 12
minutes on each one of those orders, but I
have no proof of that.

46

this was not a situation where he was

putting down services that were not per-

formed, which is the obvious criminal activ-
ity in our view and the obvious fraudulent
view. It was still my belief however, that
he was probably charging too much time
for some of those services on a regular
basis,

(emphasis added).

Despite being charged with violation of
Rule 8.4(c)® (engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion), the HPS found only two violations of
the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule
8.4(d) 7 (conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice) and Rule 8.1(b)
failure to respond to the ODC complaint).
Based upon Mr. Eddy’s testimony, the HPS
did not find sufficient evidence to support a
finding that Cooke’s actions were “dishonest,
fraudulent, deceitful or misleading.” Rather,
it found that his actions were merely negli-
gent and that “[t]here was not clear proof
that [Cooke] overbilled the PDS[.)”

Complaint of Peggy Robinette

On or about October 10, 2014, Ms. Robi-
nette hired Cooke to represent her in voiding
a deed wherein she conveyed her property to
her son while she was in a nursing home. She
paid Cooke $1,500.00, which he promptly put
into one of his firm operating accounts. Al-
though Cooke characterized this account as a
“trust account,” it bore no such designation.
In January, 2015, Cooke wrote a letter to Ms.
Robinette’s son demanding that he contact
Cooke to discuss the deed; it appears, howev-
ér, that Cooke sent the letter to the wrong
addressee.!8 On January 26, 2015, Cooke cor-
responded with Ms. Robinette, advising that
he would file suit in February if he did not
hear from her son. Ms. Robinette claimed
that Cooke would not return her calls there-
after and filed a complaint on June 8, 2015.

16. Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct in-
volving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation[,]” Given that the vouchers are submitted
to the circuit court for approval before submis-
sion to PDS, the Investigative Panel could have
(and likely should have) charged Cooke with
making a false statement to a tribunal as prohib-
ited by Rule 3.3(a)(1). .

17. Seen. 4, supra.

Cooke’s response to Ms. Robinette’s com-
plaint was due on July 5, 2015; however, he
failed to respond. ODC wrote to Cooke to
elicit a response to the complaint by a new
deadline of July 27, 2015; he once again failed
to respond, After being subpoenaed for a
sworn statement with ODC on September 28,
Cooke finally responded to the complaint on
August 21, 2015. In his response, Cooke
claimed that he did speak with Ms. Robinette
by telephone many times (approximately ev-
ery two weeks), but that she and/or a friend
on her behalf called incessantly. Cooke fur-
ther claims that he determined that the
transfer of the property may have been done
for Medicare purposes relative to her nursing
home stay and that voiding the transfer
would require a greater time investment than
what he had envisioned and he could not
handle the matter; however, he did not con-
vey that to Ms. Robinette. On September 11,
2015, he refunded Ms. Robinette her full
$1,500.00 despite claiming to have performed
ten hours work on the matter.

During Cooke’s sworn statement regarding
this complaint, he indicated that he did not
have an IOLTA account although he knew
“from day one” that he needed to have one.
He suggested that he had attempted to get
information regarding IOLTA accounts from
the State Bar on several occasions, but had
received nothing. Documents subpoenaed
from Cooke’s bank revealed further that
none of his accounts were designated as
“trust accounts.” Finally, during the sworn
statement, ODC suggested that Cooke need-
ed to send a termination of representation
letter to Ms. Robinette, which he subsequent-
ly did. Ms. Robinette passed away before the
disciplinary hearing below.

The HPS found six violations arising out of
Cooke’s representation of Ms. Robinette.”

18. Whether this is based on faulty information
from Ms. Robinette or was Cooke’s error is un-
clear and largely inconsequential.

19. Despite not timely responding to the ODC
complaint or follow-up letter, Cooke was not
charged with violating Rule 8.1(b) for failure to
respond to a request from disciplinary counsel as
pertains to this complaint.

Because he failed to properly terminate rep-
resentation of Ms. Robinette, the HPS found
that Cooke violated Rule 1.4(a)(1) ° (prompt-
ly informing client of matters requiring in-
formed consent), 1.4(a)(8)** (keeping client
reasonably informed), and 1.4(b) (explain-
ing a matter to permit informed decision-
making), Because Cooke failed to hold her
funds in a “client trust account” or IOLTA
account, the HPS found that he violated Rule
1.15(a) and (£)8 (safekeeping property). Be-
cause he failed to promptly refund Ms. Robi-
nette’s retainer, the HPS found that Cooke
also violated Rule 1.15(d)** (safekeeping
property).

With respect to the appropriate discipline,
the HPS found that two aggravating factors
were present: multiple offenses and substan-
tial experience in the practice of law. Howev-
er, the HPS found that Cooke’s absence of a
prior disciplinary record, absence of dishon-
est or selfish motive, good faith effort to
make restitution, and imposition of other
penalties vis-a-vis the Conciliation Agree-
ment were mitigating factors.

The HPS determined that for Cooke’s “in-
tentional, and inexcusable transgressions of
his duties to his infant clients and the legal
system,” he should suffer a suspension of
some duration. However, insofar as his fail-
ure to communicate with Ms. Robinette and
safekeep her property, the HPS noted that
Cooke’s conduct did not appear to be part of
a pattern and practice of his business. More-
over, citing the absence of “clear proof that
Respondent overbilled the PDS,” the HPS
found the ODC’s recommended suspension of
eighteen months to be too harsh. According-
ly, the HPS recommended a ninety-day sus-
pension, required petition for reinstatement,
one-year supervised practice, nine hours of
20. Rule 1.4(a)(1) requires a lawyer to “promptly

inform the client of any decision or circumstance

with respect to which the client's informed con-

sent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by
these Rules[.]”

21. Rule 1.4(a)(3) requires a lawyer to “keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter.”

22, Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer to “explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to per-
mit the client to make informed decisions regard-
ing the representation.”

47

CLE, and payment of costs. Cooke thereafter
objected to the HPS’ recommended disci-
pline, giving rise to the instant proceeding.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
HME (With respect to the HPS’ findings,

[a] de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the
[HPS] as to questions of law, questions of
application of the law to the facts, and
questions of appropriate sanctions; this
Court gives respectful consideration to the
[HPS’s] recommendations while ultimately
exercising its own independent judgment.
On the other hand, substantial deference is
given to the [HP's] findings of fact, unless
such findings are not supported by reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record.

Syl. Pt. 8, Comm. On Legal Ethics of W. Va.
vu. McCorkle, 192 W.Va. 286, 452 S.B.2d 377
(1994). As pertains to the deference due the
HPS’ factual findings, the McCorkle Court
elaborated:

While this standard of review is deferen-
tial, it should not be seen in any way as
requiring this Court to “rubber stamp” the
Committee’s factual findings. In another
context ... the Supreme Court of the
United States distinguished judicial review
and judicial abdication of the review func-
tion. Speaking for the Court, Justice Mar-
shall observed that a deferential standard
of judicial review does not “shield ... [an
agency's action] from thorough, probing,
in-depth review.” The Supreme Court em-
phasized, however, that “the ultimate stan-
dard of review is a narrow one.” Justice
Marshall’s admonition [] is applicable
here. In every case involving lawyer disci-

23, Rule 1.15(a) requires client funds to be "kept
in a separate account designated as a ‘client's
trust account[.]'” Subsection (f) (formerly Rule
1.15(d)) provides that funds which are “nominal
in amount or are expected to be held for a brief
period,” must be kept in ‘‘a pooled, interest or
dividend-bearing account” in compliance with
State Bar Administrative Rule 10.

24. Rule 1.15(d) requires a lawyer to “promptly
deliver to the client ... any funds ... that the
client ... is entitled to receive[.]”

48

pline, we will review the Committee’s find-
ings of fact and not rubber stamp them.
Only by giving due deference to such fac-
tual findings and by carefully reviewing
the record can we properly perform our
reviewing task, —
Id, at 290 n.9, 452 S.B.2d at 881 0.9 (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). We are mind-
ful, however, that the Rules “require[] the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel to prove the
allegations of the formal charge by clear and
convincing evidence.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Law-
yer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 194 W.Va.
788, 789, 461 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1995). With
these standards in mind, we proceed to our
review of the HPS’ findings and recom-
mended discipline.

IIL DISCUSSION

Hl Cooke's briefing in this matter makes
clear that he does not challenge the HPS’
conclusions regarding his various violations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Nor,
apparently, does Cooke take issue with the
HPS’ recommended discipline of three
months suspension. Rather, his lone chal-
lenge to the Report of the HPS is the re-
quirement that he be required to petition for
reinstatement at the end of his three-month
suspension. With or without a lawyer’s accep-
tance of thé HPS’ findings and recommenda-
tions, as noted above, it is incumbent upon
this Court to carefully review the findings of
the HPS and “exercise[e] its own indepen-
dent judgment” with respect to recom-
mended discipline, Syl. Pt. 8, McCorkle.
“This Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics
problems and must make the ultimate deci-
sions about public reprimands, suspensions
or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to prac-
tice law.” Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal
Ethies‘v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494, 827 S.E.2d
671 (1984),

That being said, however, it is clear that
there is little utility in belaboring the HPS’
findings with respect to the violations arising
out of the ODC and Robinette complaints. As
to the ODC complaint, Cooke admitted that
he very clearly disregarded multiple Court
orders for the filing of his guardian ad litem
brief. Cooke’s dereliction to his infant clients,
by his own admission, “was clearly inappro-

priate [and] resulted in a delay of any adop-
tion proceeding for the children involved in
the appellate matter.” As to the Robinette
complaint, Cooke mishandled virtually every
aspect of this representation, resulting in
manifest violations of the standards of pro-
fessional conduct for diligence, communica-
tion, and safekeeping of property as more
particularly enumerated by the HPS. All that
remains with respect to: these matters is to
ascertain whether the recommended disci-
pline is appropriate, However, before pro-
ceeding‘to the disciplinary aspect of this
matter, our review of the adjudicatory record
reveals that closer examination of the HPS’
findings with respect to the PDS complaint is
warranted, :

A. Violations Arising Out of the Com-
plaint of PDS

Hl As indicated above, the HPS found
that the evidence presented with respect to
the PDS complaint did not establish a viola
tion of Rule 8.4(c) prohibiting conduct involv-
ing “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation.” Citing Mr, Eddy’s testimony that
Cooke was “simply [] a completely disorga-
nized individual” lacking any “nefarious pur-
pose,” who merely failed to comply with stat-
utory timekeeping requirements, the .HPS
found only that Cooke’s conduct was prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice, as pro-
hibited by Rule 8.4(d). .

With all due respect to the HPS, however,
it appears to have disregarded the more
particular testimony given by Mr, Eddy
which clearly demonstrates that, despite his
unwillingness. to overtly accuse Cooke of
fraud, he did believe that the documentation
revealed that Cooke had engaged in perva-
sive overbilling. As indicated above, Mr,
Eddy stated that he believed Cooke was
charging too much time on a regular basis,
whether. through duplicate billing ox value
billing. Mr. Eddy reiterated several times his
belief that Cooke was charging excessive
time, yet was reluctant to characterize his
conduct as fraudulent because it-was not as
egregious as others:

I still hold firm that we were billed for

duplicate—we were billed several times for

the same trip, that we were billed several

times from the same period of waiting in
court. In other words, if he had three
hearings, let’s say he waited in court for
one hearing while he was actually doing
another hearing. That’s not properly [sic]
billing. That's billing the same period of
time, So I firmly believe that that had
happened, but in looking through the
vouchers and everything else, it appeared
to be less frequent than I had seen with
other counsel?5
The only perceived fraud or deception that
still exists in my mind is the fact that he
may have been value billing, that is, billing
a..2 for an activity that should’ve only beet
a J or a .4 when it should’ve been a .2.
However, he wasn’t billing me 8.0 for these
things and he was—and he was saying 12
minutes as opposed to 240 minutes.... J
just did not see im his case the overt
deception that ewisted with many other
aitorneys.... He was unable to exonerate
- himself completely in this situation because
he had failed to cornply with that time
requirement, but that, overall, I believe
that he was zealously representing his
clients and he was providing the actual
services that were described even though
the time allotted to them may have been—
may not have been the actual time.
(footnote added) (emphasis added). More-
over, despite the HPS’ conclusion that Cooke

was not guilty of conduct which was dishon- -

est, fraudulent, deceitful or misleading, it
clearly agreed with Mr. Eddy’s impression
that Cooke's overall billable hours were sim-

ply not credible: “[TJhe hours he was billing

25. Mr; Eddy gave the example of one attorney
who “rubber-stamped” the same time for each
day and one attorney who billed 900 hours of
travel in a three-month period. He felt that “none
of what Mr. Cooke was doing, in my opinion,
raised to that level” in that he “wasn’t engaging
in what I would consider to be criminal behav-
ior.” Mr. Eddy estimated that out of 800 attor-
neys doing court-appointed work “700 of them
are probably billing honestly, in fact scrupulous-
iy.” .

26. The record does not reflect the time billed on
any other days which may have further demon-
strated a pattern of extraordinary billed hours,
yet simply fell short of the fifteen-hour bench-
mark utilized by Mr. Eddy to’ identify potential

offenders. The record further contains no infor-

49

well exceed those of any ‘super’ attorney.
Billing over two thousand, and two hundred
(2,200) hours, every year, for the past 4 to 5
years is not just an extraordinary practice
but could be seen as quite impossible.” It is
this.incongruity that compels this Court to
utilize its plenary review to ascertain the
extent of Cooke’s violation of Rule 8.4.

Hl West Virginia Code § 29-21-18a(a)
(2008) requires panel counsel for the PDS to
“maintain detailed and accurate records of
the time expended and expenses incurred on
behalf of eligible clients[.]” (emphasis added).
Subsection (d) of that statute provides that
panel counsel “shall be compensated ... for
actual and necessary time expended for ser-
vices performed and expenses incurred[.]”
(emphasis added).. Further, Syllabus Point 1
of Frasher v. Ferguson, 177 W.Va, 546, 855
8.E.2d 39 (1987) states: .

W. Va. Code, 29-21-14 [1981], which gov-

erns state payment of counsel fees for

indigent criminal defendants, envisages a

system where each client is proportionate-

ly billed according to the time spent actu-
ally vepresenting that client; consequently,
billing for more hours than are actually
worked is duplicative billing that is clearly
contrary to the system envisaged by the
legislature.

(emphasis in original),

Upon careful review of the somewhat limit-
ed adjudicatory record,”8 it appears that dur-
ing the time period of January 21, 2014,
through September 18, 2014, Cooke billed
more than fifteen hours a day’ on thirty-seven
different days.” On five of those days, he

mation from Cooke's contract attorneys to vouch
for the hours attributed to their work, nor does
there appear to have been a review of Cooke's
files to compare the time billed to the items in
the file. Moreover, as noted during oral argu-
ment, Cooke also performed work as a guardian
ad litem and mental hygiene commissioner, The
record contains no information about the
amount of time being billed to these separately
funded matters to create a more complete pic-
ture of the amount being billed to the State of
West Virginia by Cooke. ;

27. Mr. Eddy references thirty-one different dates
on which Cooke billed greater than fifteen hours;
however, the supporting documentation reveals
thirty-seven dates from January 21, 2014 through

- September 18, 2014,

50

billed in excess of twenty hours and on two of
those days, he billed greater than twenty-
four hours. Cooke maintains that during that
period of time he was billing the time of the
contract attorneys working for him, as well
as his own.”® However, per Cooke’s own testi-
mony, this would have occurred for only
some portion of the time period at issue
inasmuch as his “full-time” contract attorney
quit in late-March, leaving only the part-time
contract attorney, who likewise quit at some
point later that year.

Moreover, during this time period, Cooke
contends that he was suffering from diag-
nosed “low testosterone” which caused him to
sleep between ten and sixteen hours a day;
medical records introduced into evidence do
in fact support such a diagnosis in June,
2014, Cooke maintains that this fatigue con-
tinued throughout the time frame in which
the guardian ad litem matter was “pending”
and continued until November, 2014.29 There-
fore, giving Cooke the benefit of every doubt,
this purported fatigue and reduced working
capacity would have existed from approxi-
mately February until November, 2014—the
exact time period under scrutiny for overbill-
ing. Per Cooke’s own testimony, therefore,
during this time there would have been be-
tween only eight and fourteen hours of the
day in which he could even be awake to
perform work,

Accordingly, for three different dates dur-
ing this period— March 6, April 17, and
August 18—Cooke provided a letter of expla-
nation attempting to account for all the time

28, However, when he first proffered this expla-
nation for his hours in his response to the PDS,
Cooke stated “[nJow, given the method of track-
ing billable hours I used in the past, there is no
way I can ascertain whether that is correct[.]”

29. The abuse and neglect appeal was filed in
February, 2014; however, the deadline to perfect
the appeal was extended, resulting in Cooke's
brief being due in August, 2014, Cooke first com-
plained to his doctor of fatigue in June, 2014; by
September, 2014, his testosterone was reported
as normal in his labwork, although, as indicated,
Cooke purports that the effects lingered into No-
vember, 2014.

30. Cooke billed 33.2 hours to PDS; in his letter
of explanation, he attributes 17.5 hours to his
contract attorneys, leaving 15.7 hours billed by

billed to PDS and ferreting out the time that
was billed by others. However, despite pur-
portedly being awake only eight to fourteen
hours a day, Cooke still ostensibly billed
15.7, 19.4, and 18.3 hours, respectively, after
deducting the time which he attributed to
other attorneys. Moreover, Cooke’s itemiza-
tion of the work he performed on those dates
does not fully account for these billed hours.
For example, on March 6, Cooke accounts for
only 9.7 of his own billable hours out of the
residual 15.7 hours after deduction of the
contract attorneys’ time.” On April 17, he
accounts for only 15.5 hours of his own billa-
ble time out of the 19.4 residual hours after
deduction of others’ time. On August 18,
Cooke accounts for only 18.3 of his own
billable time of the 15,8 residual hours after
deduction of others’ time.”

While the failure to account for the time
billed to PDS is certainly indicative of over-
billing, the actual accounting of his time pro-
vided by Cooke is replete with admittedly
excessive charges. Cooke maintains, however,
that this excess billing reflects “clerical er-
rors” rather than deliberate overbilling. We
find that the volume and nature of these
errors on dates randomly selected by PDS
for further explanation—which are almost
exclusively to Cooke’s monetary benefit—be-
lie any suggestion that they are inadvertent.
While Cooke’s explanations are somewhat in-
serutable, that portion which is clear is pat-
ently demonstrative of excessive billing on its
face. Cooke billed travel multiple times and
duplicated travel and other activity across
multiple vouchers.? He billed time for activi-

Cooke himself. He accounted for only 9.7 of
those hours.

31, Cooke billed 25.7 hours to PDS; he attributed
6.3 hours to his contract attorneys, leaving 19.4
hours billed by Cooke himself. He accounted for
only 15.5 of those hours.

32. Cooke billed 18.1 hours to PDS; he attributed
2.3 hours to an attorney covering for him, leav-
ing 15.8 hours billed by Cooke himself. He ac-
counted for only 13.3 of those hours.

33. On April 17, Cooke admittedly double-billed
1.0 in travel to/from a hearing to two separate
matters, both of which were scheduled at 1:30
before the same judge. He further admitted to
duplicative billing of 2.7 additional hours. On
March 6, round trips for travel were billed on

ty which did not occur on the dates indicated
and failed to demonstrate that the time was
not duplicatively billed on the days in which
it actually occurred. Cooke frequently “val-
ue billed,” billed time at far greater than he
admittedly documented, and billed time for
the same activity over multiple vouchers.*
Moreover, he frequently billed greater
amounts of time than were available during
certain windows of activity.*® See Disciplin-
ary Counsel v. Holland, 106 Ohio St.8d 372,
835 N.E.2d 361, 868 (2005) (using similar
comparison of court docket and schedule with
hours billed by court-appointed attorney to
establish overbilling, observing that attorney
billed fees “sometimes for more in-court
hours than the juvenile court was open in a
day,” including “an impossible” number of
billable hours ranging from nine to twenty-
four hours on thirty-four different days).

Mr, Eddy observed that Cooke’s inflated
hours were frequently de minimus in nature;
however, we conclude that this is of absolute-
ly no moment. Given Cooke’s stated caseload
of approximately 200 cases, it would take
very little inflation of any given time entry
when spread among numerous matters and
multiple vouchers to aggregate appreciably

seven different vouchers on this date for a total
of 9.7 hours. On April 17, round trips to the
courthouse were billed on seven different vouch-
ers totaling 8.0 hours.

34, On March 6, Cooke admits that 2.8 hours of
another attorney’s billed activity did not occur on
this day. On April 17, he admits to .2 billable
hours which did not occur that day,

35. Cooke rarely billed activity at less than .2
hours (12 minutes); the only .1 (6 minutes) en-
tries are attempted phone calls and, occasionally,
a hearing. Review of any and all documentation
or correspondence, including email, is billed at a
minimum 2 hours. Virtually every hearing en-
tails billing .3 hours for, “waiting in court,”
which affords a higher hourly rate.

On March 6, among the time billed by one
contract attorney, Cooke admits that activity doc-
umented as .4 was billed as 4.0 hours. On April
17, Cooke further admits that travel billed at 1.0
hour was actually documented at .3 hours. On
March 6, entries for “preparing notice of ap-
peal,” “preparing brief,” and “preparing habe-
as” were billed on three different vouchers for a
total of 10.7 hours. On April 11, Cooke billed 37
separate entries for “reviewed order” on multi-
ple vouchers. .

51

excessive fees, See Holland, 835 N.E.2d at
363, 365 (finding lawyer’s “outrageous fee
charges” not “readily apparent” in court-ap-
pointed matters “because fees are claimed in
each client’s case on separate forms filed at
different times” and “present[] too small a
picture to reveal respondent’s excessive
charges”). To whatever extent Cooke’s over-
billing is not singularly impressive with re-
spect to a particular entry, his annual billings
and billable hours are a stark reflection of his
insidious activity. Despite Cooke’s ‘insistence
that his impressive hours reflect the billable
hours of, at times, three attorneys, annual
billings which precede the time period when
he had three billing attorneys are simply
implausible, In the three years preceding the
PDS’ audit, Cooke billed 2,568.5, 2,279.3, and
2,671.2 billable hours respectively.” These
hours necessitate billing an average of 7, 6.2,
and 7.8 billable hours every day for 865 days
a year, As Mr. Eddy indicated, although such
billable time .and even greater may. occur
during discrete periods of time, this pace is
not reasonably sustainable over a prolonged
period of time. See Dayton Bar Ass'n v.
Swift, 142 Ohio St3d 476, 38 N.E.8d 1, 3
(2014) (finding annual billable hours of

36. On April 17, based on Cooke’s-accounting of
his time utilizing his schedule and the court's
docket, in the two-hour window from 1:00 pan.
until a 3:00 meeting at the jail, he billed a cumu-
lative 4.3 hours of “actual time”; the activity
billed all consisted of-travel, waiting in court,
and attending hearings. Similarly, on August 18,
Cooke's in-court schedule shows hearings at
9:00, 9:30, and 10:30 with the docket resuming
at 1:00, The matters which were scheduled in the
three-hour window from 9:00 a.m. until noon,
were billed at a cumulative 6.1 hours. Additional-
ly, matters beginning at 1:15 p.m. on that date
were billed at additional 7.2 hours and consisted
solely of waiting in court, reviewing “court sum-
maries” while waiting, and attending hearings.

According to Cooke, none of these amounts
reflect multi-tasking, ie. reviewing a document
while also waiting in court. Cooke's explanatory
letter was careful to note that document review
was performed in his office and if it had oc-
curred prior to a hearing, he would have com-
mensurately reduced the time billed to “waiting
in court.”

37. As Mr. Eddy stated in his complaint to ODC:
“For five fiscal years the average yearly total
hours would be 2612.6 hours. Simply stated, this
is impossible, especially when it is maintained
continually over a five years’ period of time.”

52

2,555.5 hours, 2,967 hours and noting average
daily billable hours of 7 and 8.12 hours-for
865 days “extraordinarily high”). Further,
this time does not account for additional
hours billed in his role as mental hygiene
commissioner or serving as guardian ad litem
in abuse and neglect or family court matters,
which are payable from funding sources sep-
arate from PDS,

Based upon our review of the foregoing,
this Court concludes that Cooke was in fact
engaging in extensive overbilling to the State
of West. Virginia, misconduct which plainly
qualifies as “dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful
or misleading” in violation of Rule 8.4(c) of
the West Virginia Rules of Professional Con-
duct.8 The HPS appeared to feel unneces-
sarily confined by Mr, Eddy’s begrudging
testimony that he believed Cooke to be sim-
ply “disorganized,” despite the supporting
documentation, Mr. Eddy’s considerable ex-
perience, and the instincts of the HPS indi-
cating otherwise.*® The documentation con-
tained in the adjudicatory record undermines
any suggestion that the overbilling was iso-
lated and accidental. The randomly selected

days which Cooke was called upon to account _

for are filled with admittedly improper
and/or unsubstantiated billing. The perva-
siveness of this billing activity, the pattern of
Cooke’s billing practices, the annual figures
on their face, as well as Cooke’s admitted
duplicative and/or improper billing are suffi-
cient to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, misconduct violative of Rule
8,4(¢),40

38. This conclusion, however, does not supplant
the HPS’ finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(d) for
misconduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice, As Mr. Eddy explained, overbilling by
lawyers such as Cooke consumes already
strained resources at PDS for the investigation
and resolution of such matters, Accordingly, this
Court declines to disturb the HPS’ finding of a
violation of Rule 8.4(d), finding rather that
Cooke's conduct is also violative of Rule 8.4(c).

39, Mr, Eddy’s testimony made abundantly clear
that because Cooke was not the “worst offender”
Mr, Eddy chose to give him some benefit of the
doubt. Mr. Eddy’s testimony seemed to suggest

“that because services were in fact rendered by
Cooke, inflating the time spent on such services
was not necessarily the type of misconduct pro-

B, The Jordan Factors
Hl Turning now to the appropriate disci-
pline to be imposed in this matter, we are
guided by this Court’s holding in Syllabus
Point 4 of Office of Lawyer Disciplinary
Cownsel v. Jordan, 204 W.Va. 495, 518 8.E.2d
722 (1998): . :
Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure enumer-
ates factors to be considered in imposing
sanctions and provides as follows: “ ‘In im-
posing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct, unless otherwise provided in
these rules, the Court [West Virginia Su-
* preme Court of Appeals] or Board [Law-
yer Disciplinary Board] shall consider the
following factors: (1) whether the lawyer
has violated a duty owed to a client, to the
public, to the legal system, or to the pro-
fession; (2) whether the lawyer acted inten-
tionally, knowingly, or negligently; (8) the
amount of the actual or potential injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4)
the existence of any aggravating or miti-
gating factors.” a
As is clear from the foregoing discussion of
Cooke’s misconduct with PDS, Cooke's ex-
traordinary overbilling was not only inten-
tional and pervasive within the time period at
issue, but long-standing. Given the state of
the public fise, the actual injury to the tax-
payers of the State of West Virginia is all too
real, As the Supreme Court of Ohio stated,
overbilling the state for representing indi-
gent clients “exploit[s] an already overbur-
dened system designed to aid. the poorest
members of our society and lessen[s] public

hibited by Rule 8.4(c). This Court emphatically
disagrees.

40. We observe that Cooke’s misrepresentation of
his billable hours would also appear to give rise
to a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) which prohibits a
lawyer from “makling] a false statement of fact
or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously
made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]” Because
the vouchers reflecting a court-appointed law-
yer's time must be tendered to and approved by
the appointing circuit judge, any knowing falsity
contained therein would bé violative of the Rule.
Disciplinary authorities are cautioned to bring all
appropriate charges arising from lawyer miscon-
duct.

confidence in the legal profession and com-
promise[s] its integrity.” Holland, -835
N.E.2d at 366.-Cooke’s misconduct in that
regard, therefore, profoundly affects the pub-

lie, the legal system, and the profession. .
Moreover, while the bulk of the foregoing
discussion has been dedicated to Cooke’s ov-
erbilling to PDS, by no means does this
Court intend to minimize the seriousness of

Cooke’s other, violations. In . particular,
Cooke’s failure to timely file a guardian ad
litem brief with this Court in an abuse and
neglect matter is not only violative of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, but in com-
plete disregard of the countless warnings
issued by this Court regarding the appellate
obligations of guardians ad litem. See In re
A, N., Nos, 15-0182 and 15-0208, 2015 WL
5738019 (W. Va. Sept. 30, 2015) (disqualifying
guardian ad litem from further appointments
for failure to timely file brief on behalf. of
infant in abuse and neglect matter); In re
BL, Nos. 14-0660 and 14-0714, 2015 WL
8681681, at *2 (W. Va. June 10, 2015) (“[Wle
wish to re-emphasize how vitally important it
is for guardians ad litem to comply with Rule
11h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
and this Court’s orders in a timely fashion so
that abuse and neglect appeals can be
promptly and efficiently resolved. Guardians
ad litem must submit a response brief or
summary response that specifically responds
to each of the assignments of error raised on
appeal.”); In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 91,
n.l6, 479 S,H.2d 589, 601, n.16 (1996) (Part
of [the guardians ad litem’s] representation is
to file an appellate brief to insure that their
clients’ interests are presented.”); Rule of
Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect 18a,
Appendix A, Section E(8) (“If an appeal is
filed by another party in an abuse and ne-
glect case, the GAL is required to file a
respondent's brief or’ summary response that
adheres to the requisite provisions of Rule 11
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.”), ©

I As should be apparent to any guard-
ian ad litem, needless delay is not only a
gross disservice to his or her infant client,
but also actively perpetuates the continuing
41. See n.19 and 40, supra. Disciplinary authori-

ties are again cautioned to bring all appropriate
charges arising from lawyer misconduct includ-

53

harm occasioned by the lack of permanency.
“Unjustified procedural delays wreak havoe
on a child’s development, stability and securi-
ty.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In ve Carlita B., 185
W.Va. 618, 408 S.E.2d 865 (1991). When that
delay is directly attributable to the derelic-
tion of the court-appointed guardian ad litem,
the guardian has abdicated his or her respon-
sibilities to the child so fully that it is difficult
to surmise of a more egregious failure within
our abuse.and neglect system.

With regard to Cooke’s dilatory ‘miscon-
duet in the Robinette matter; as well as his
persistent refusal to respond to ODC, PDS,
and particularly this Court, we are equally
troubled. On the heels of being subject of a
rule to show cause issued by this Court and
an ODC complaint for his failure to timely
file a guardian ad litem brief, Cooke failed to
respond to the ODC’s request for additional
information regarding the pending complaint.
Cooke then failed to respond to PDS’ letter
demanding an explanation of his billing irreg-
ularities. and, more importantly, failed to
timely respond to the PDS disciplinary.com-
plaint. Notwithstanding the pendency of
these complaints, Cooke again failed to time-
ly file a response to the Robinette complaint
and a subsequent letter demanding a re-
sponse! Ineredibly, despite receiving the
HPS’ recommendation of suspension of his
Jaw license and despite assurances to the
HPS that he had rectified this dilatory con-
duct, Coake likewise filed his. response brief
in the instant matter untimely. .

Significantly, although Cooke has not been
formally disciplined previously, he was
“strongly warned” in the Investigative Pan-
el’s dismissal of another complaint in October
2018 that future violations of Rule 1.8 (dili-
gence) and 1.4 (communication) would sub-
ject him to more severe discipline. In that
matter, he likewise twice failed to respond to
ODC and was also warned that future fail-
ures to respond to disciplinary counsel would
be handled more harshly. Like the Robinette
complaint, Cooke had been accused in the
October 2018 complaint of taking on a matter
‘which he did not have time to handle, failing
ing but not limited to ‘charges for faijure to
respond to ODC pursuant to Rule 8.1(b).

54 |

to communicate with the client about that,
inability, and only refunding the client’s re-
tainer after an ODC complaint was filed,
Cooke was warned that he should be “aware
of his schedule and current client: list to
enable him to determine whether’ he has the
ability to take on new clients.” Just as in this
case, Cooke told ODC that “he needed to
make changes to how he runs his office which
includes returning telephone calls in a rea~
sonable time.” There remains little question
that Cooke’s assurances to the HPS and this
Court ring entirely hollow..

C. Appropriate Sanctions

I As set ‘forth hereinabove, the HPS
recommended a ninety-day suspension, re-
quirement of a petition for reinstatement,
‘one-year supervised practice, along with ad-
ditional CLE and payment of costs. ODC
recommends a suspension of eighteen
months. Focusing primarily on Cooke’s fail-
ure to timely file his guardian ad litem brief,
the HPS found support for its recommended
ninety-day suspension in similar cases involv-
ing failure to make timely filings, See Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd. v. Sturm, 237 W.Va. 115,
785 S.E.2d 821 (2016) (ninety-day suspension.
for failure to file habeas petition and appeal);
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Conner, 234
W.Va. 648, 769 S.H.2d 25 (2015) (ninety-day
suspension for failure to perfect appeal and
other violations); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v.
Sullivan, 230 W.Va. 460, 740 8.E.2d 55 (2018)
(thirty-day suspension for failure to correct
criminal sentencing and other violations);
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Santa Barbara,
229 W.Va. 344, 729 S.H.2d 179 (2012) (one-
year suspension for failure to file within stat-
ute and perfect jurisdictional notice require-
ments, and other violations).

‘As pertains to the Robinette complaint, the
HPS cited Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.

42, Certainly the 2013 complaint wherein Cooke
behaved in precisely the same manner would
suggest otherwise.

43. Cooke likewise assigned -his PDS vouchers to
Daniels Capital Corporation. As explained in Ca-
vendish,

[bly entering into a contract with Daniels Capi-
tal Corporation, a lawyer representing an indi-
gent defendant can assign what is owed to him
or her by Public Defender Services to Daniels

Morgan, 228 W.Va. 114, 717 S.B.2d 898
(2011), wherein a lawyer failed to establish
an IOLTA account, did not respond to ODC,
and took retainers for work he did not per-
form, resulting in a one-year suspension. The
HPS distinguished Cooke’s conduct from that
in Morgan, however, as “not appear[ing] to
be part of a pattern and practice of [his]
pusiness.” ‘? Moreover, with respect to the
PDS complaint, the HPS distinguished Law-
yer Disciplinary Board v. Cavendish, 226
W.Va. 827, 700 S.H.2d 779 (2010), wherein a
lawyer billed PDS for non-existent claims
and was suspended for three years. The HPS
reiterated the perceived absence of proof of
Cooke’s dishonesty and the refund of money
occasioned by the conciliation agreement.

Having concluded that Cooke did commit a
violation of Rule 8.4(¢), we take a different
view of Cavendish and find it an appropriate
starting point for evaluation of Cooke’s con-
duct. In Cavendish, a lawyer recently hired
by PDS submitted assignment schedules to
Daniels Capital Corporation for advance pay-
ment of PDS-owed fees.* Cavendish stipu-
lated that he received advance payments for
“work he had not performed by misrepre-
senting the amount due him,” work per-
formed for privately retained clients in viola-
tion of statute, and work performed under a
prior employer, which would have been enti-
tled to the fees. Jd. at 336, 700 S.E.2d at 788,
The Court found that a three-year suspen-
sion was appropriate because Cavendish vio-
lated duties to clients, the public, the legal
system, and the profession through his inten-
tional misconduct. Noting the financial injury
caused by Cavendish’s conduct that also
“Jessenfed] people’s faith and confidence in
the legal profession,” the Court found a
three-year suspension appropriate. Id. at 338,
700 S.E.2d at 790,

Capital which immediately pays the lawyer up
to 75% of the money due to the lawyer. When.
Daniels Capital Corporation receives the as-
signed payment from Public Defender Ser-
vices, Daniels Capital Corporation then pays
the lawyer the balance of the payment, less its

fee.
226 W.Va, at 330-31 n.2, 700 S.E.2d at 782-83
n2.

However, the Court likewise noted that
Cavendish attributed his conduct to a cogni-
tive disorder and expressed concern that he
was unable to maintain a law practice due to
his “memory problems.” Jd. Citing this
Court’s duty to protect the public, it found
“additional support” for a three-year suspen-
sion in Cavendish’s admitted inability to
practice law. Id. Like Cavendish, Cooke
“misrepresented the amount due him” by
inflating and/or improperly billing his time to
PDS. However, this case does not present
the same concerns about Cooke’s cognitive
ability to maintain a law practice.

Cooke’s conduet is not without highly simi-
lar precedent outside of our jurisdiction. In
Disciplinary Counsel v. Milhoan, 142 Ohio
St3d 230, 29 N.E.38d 898 (2014) a court-
appointed lawyer failed to keep proper track
of his time, resulting in improper fee applica-
tions including instances where he “billed two
separate clients for the same drive to the
Ashland County clerk of courts[.]” Id. at 282,
29 N.E.3d at 900. The court found that a two-
year suspension was warranted. In Swijt, the
court found Swift’s average daily billable
hours and annual aggregate billable hours,
along with failure to “maintain independent
time records for himself or for the other
attorneys whom he allegedly supervised”
warranted discipline. 142 Ohio St.3d at 478,
83 N.E.3d at 3. The Swift court noted that
“the sheer volume of Swift's false statements
to the affected courts, the complete absence
of any documentation to assist [the] court in
determining the full extent of his overbilling

. sufficiently egregious” to warrant two-
year suspension. Id, at 479, 33 N.B.8d at 4.
The court noted further that such discipline
was warranted as the state was essentially at
the mercy of court-appointed attorneys to
honestly submit their billings: “The courts
and the public defender’s offices must rely
upon the trustworthiness and integrity of the
attorneys who seek payment to provide accu-
rate information regarding their time and
billing.” Id. at 477, 83 N.E.3d at 3, See also

Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Tun,
428 Mad, 235, 51 A.8d 565 (2012) (indefinitely
suspending lawyer for negligent, rather than
intentional overbilling on court-appointed
cases); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md.
v. Hess, 352 Md. 488, 722 A.2d 905 (1999)

55

(suspending lawyer for three years for inflat-
ing client bills).

HE Therefore, as demonstrated in Ca-
vendish and the foregoing cases, with respect
to fraudulent billing, suspensions of years,
rather than months, appear to be the norm.
This Court considers the protection of the
public and the State coffers of paramount
importance, particularly as pertains to law-
yer disciplinary matters. “[Alttorney disci-
plinary proceedings are primarily designed
to protect the public, to reassure it as to the
reliability and integrity of attorneys and to
safeguard its interest in the administration of
justicel.]” Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W.
Va. State Bar v, Keenan, 192 W.Va. 90, 94,
450 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1994). Moreover, the
discipline meted out by this Court should
serve the equally important purpose of deter-
rence: :

In deciding on the appropriate disciplinary
action for ethical violations, this Court
must consider not only what steps would
appropriately punish the respondent attor-
ney, but also whether the discipline im-
posed is adequate to serve as an effective
deterrent to other members of the Bar and
at the same time restore public confidence
in the ethical standards of the legal profes-
sion,

Syl. Pt. 3, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Walker,
178 W.Va. 150, 358 S.H.2d 234 (1987). In view
of the foregoing, we find that Cooke’s mis-
conduct warrants a two-year suspension from
the practice of law. Cooke’s defrauding of the
State through overbilling, gross mishandling
of a client matter and funds, his dereliction of
duty to his infant clients as a guardian ad
litem—all of which is compounded by his
unrelenting pattern of unresponsiveness and
empty reassurances of remediation—plainly
justify this degree of discipline.

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we impose the
following sanctions: 1) Cooke is hereby sus-
pended from the practice of law for two (2)
years and is directed to abide by the duties
imposed pursuant to Rule 8.28 of the Rules
of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure; 2) If
Cooke is successfully reinstated in the future,

56

upon reinstatement, he is to be supervised by
another attorney approved by ODC for a
period of one (1) year; 8) Prior to being
reinstated to the practice of law pursuant to
Rule 8,32 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplin-
ary Procedure, Cooke must complete an ad-
ditional nine (9) hours of CLE with six ()
hours in office procedures and/or office man-
agement and an additional three (8) hours in
ethies; and 4) Prior to being reinstated to the
practice of law, Cooke must reimburse the
costs of these proceedings to the Lawyer
Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 3.15 of
the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure.

Law license suspended and other sanctions

imposed,

799 S.E.2d 133
Cynthia W. VAN HEYDE, Administratrix
of the Estate of Patrick A. Wolfe,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
v.

Susan MILLER, Jessica Miller Lipscomb,
and Houses & More, Inc., Defendants
Below, Respondents

No, 15-1073

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,

Submitted: February 7, 2017
Filed: April 20, 2017

>
iD :

59

William E. Ford III, Esq. Lisa Furbee
Ford, Esq., Ford Law ‘Office, Clarksburg,
West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioner

Rodney L. Bean, Esq., Monte L. Williams,
Esq., Chelsea V. Prince, Esq., Steptoe &
Johnson PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia,
Attorneys for Respondents

Workman, Justice:

This is an appeal by Cynthia W. Van
Heyde (hereinafter “petitioner”), Administra-
trix of the Estate of Patrick A. Wolfe, from
an order granting summary judgment to Su-
san Miller, Jessica Miller’ Lipscomb, and
Houses & More, Inc. (hereinafter “respon-
dents” or referenced individually) entered by
the Circuit Court of Preston County, West
Virginia, on September 30, 2015. The peti-
tioner contends the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment where genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding a real
estate transaction. Upon thorough evaluation
of the parties’ briefs, arguments, record on
appeal, and applicable precedent, this Court
finds no error in the circuit court’s determi-
nations and consequently affirms the sum-
mary judgment order,

I. Factual and Procedural History

The ‘petitioner’s uncle, Mr. Patrick A.
Wolfe, owned a sixty-aere parcel of land in
Preston County, West Virginia. Mr. Wolfe
met with Respondent Mrs. Susan Miller, a
real estate agent with the real estate broker-
age company of Houses & More, Inc. (herein-
after “Houses & More”), in June 2013 to
discuss listing his property for sale. He was
eighty-five years old at the time of the initial
meeting. Mrs. Miller and Mr. Wolfe visited
the subject property, and, according to the

60

deposition testimony of Mrs, Miller, Mr.
Wolfe advised her that he wanted to sell the
property quickly. After visiting the property
a second time independently, Mrs. Miller
met with Mr, Wolfe to discuss the list price,
Mrs. Miller contends that Mr. Wolfe wanted
to list the property for $90,000, including Mr.
Wolfe’s portion of the mineral interests. They
discussed recent comparable sales and the
unique terrain of the property, its overgrown
meadows, and the existence of high-tension
power lines through the property. Mr. Wolfe
and Mrs, Miller thereafter entered into a
listing agreement whereby Mrs. Miller would.
list the property at a price of $90,000. In a
hand-written notation, Mr, Wolfe indicated
the price included both the surface and his
portion of the mineral interests.

Respondent Jessica Miller Lipscomb is
Mrs. Miller’s daughter and is also a real
estate agent with Houses & More. On June
21, 2018, Mrs. Lipscomb met with Jason
Haskiell and Ashley Kyle (hereinafter “buy-
ers”) at the Houses & More office, The buy-
ers submitted: an offer to purchase the
property for $90,000, including Mr. Wolfe’s
portion of the mineral interests. Mr, Wolfe
accepted their offer and executed a real es-
tate purchase agreement the following day.
Mrs. Miller and Mrs. Lipscomb represented
Mr. Wolfe and the buyers as dual-agents in
the transaction, the dual agency was prop-
erly explained to the seller and buyers, and
all parties signed a Notice of Agency Rela-
tionship. The purchase agreement specified
that the sale included Mr. Wolfe’s portion of
the mineral. interests, and it required any
changes, modifications, or amendments to
the agreement be in writing and signed by

1, In deposition testimony, Mrs, Miller indicated
that she measured the road frontage, took photo-
graphs, viewed the property for points of egress

* and ingress, and inspected the neighborhood
generally,

2. A scriverner's error in the deed conveying the
property to Mr. Wolfe was thereafter identified
during the title search performed by the closing
attorney, and Mr, Wolfe had his persozial attor-
ney, Woodrow Turner, prepare a corrective quit-
claim deed properly conveying title to Mr. Wolfe.
After identification of that error, the parties en-
tered into a waiting period prior to closing.

the parties. The closing was to occur on or
before August 28, 2013.

“In August 2018, Mr. Wolfe informed Mrs.
Miller that he had changed his mind and no
longer wanted to include the mineral inter-
ests in the sale. He did not: complete any
documentation regarding this change of in-
tention, but he advised Mrs, Miller that his
nephew, husband 6f Petitioner Van Heyde,
would contact Mrs. Miller about the property
sale. On August 19, 2018, the petitioner and
her husband, residents of Florida, met with
Mr. Wolfe and Mrs. Miller. Unbeknownst to
the petitioner, her husband, or Mr. Wolfe,
Mrs. Miller recorded the meeting on an audio
recorder.3 During the meeting, the petitioner
and her husband questioned the contract
price of $90,000 for surface and mineral
vights. Mrs. Miller explained that $90,000
was the price suggested by Mr. Wolfe based
upon discussions regarding factors to be con-
sidered in valuing property, and she also
emphasized that any alteration to the pur-
chase agreement would require written docu-
mentation, pursuant to the terms of the
agreement.! On August 21, 2018, the petition-
er and her husband submitted a letter to
Mrs. Miller on Mr. Wolfe’s behalf. The letter
expressed Mr. Wolfe’s desire to continue
with the sale of the surface interests at a
“mutually agreed upon” price, but it indicat-
ed Mr. Wolfe’s intention to retain his portion
of the mineral interests. The petitioner and
her husband thereafter returned to their
home in Florida. The petitioner’s husband
later testified that, prior to leaving for Flori-
da, the petitioner had told Mr, Wolfe she
would purchase the subject property, includ-
ing the mineral rights, for $90,000. Mr. Wolfe
had rejected her offer.

3. According to the respondents’ brief, Mrs. Miller
and Mrs, Lipscomb recorded the meeting be-
cause they had previously received a warning to
be cautious of the petitioner's husband because
he had threatened to sue the brokerage as a
result of the property transaction, °

4. When the petitioner raised concerns about the
adequacy of the contract price, Mrs. Miller asked
her if she and her husband were challenging Mr.
Wolfe's mental competency to handle the proper-
ty transaction. The petitioner’s husband indicat-
ed they were not challenging Mr. Wolfe’s compe-

” tency.

Based upon Mr. Wolfe’s expressed inten-
tion to alter the terms of the purchase agree-
ment, Mrs, Miller scheduled a meeting with
the parties to the agreement. On August 26,
2018, she first met: with Mr. Wolfe in the
morning and later met with Mr. Wolfe and
the buyers in the evening. The petitioner and
her husband were not present for either
meeting. Mrs. Miller also surreptitiously re-
corded the meetings of August 26, 2013, Dur-
ing the morning meeting, the petitioner em-
phasizes Mr. Wolfe’s statement that he did
not wish to sell the property with the mineral
rights. Mrs. Miller thereafter informed him
that his refusal to sell the mineral interests
would cause him to be sued, and she advised
him to go through with the transaction. Mrs.
Miller further advised Mr. Wolfe that “since
we are representing both you and them ...,
we can’t take sides|.]”

During the evening meeting with the buy-
ers on August 26, 2018, Mr. Wolfe confirmed
that he was willing to sell both the surface
and mineral rights for the contract price of
$90,000, noting that he only owned three-
fifths of the mineral interests, The parties
thereafter memorialized their understanding
by executing an addendum to the purchase
agreement confirming the sale of both the
surface and mineral rights.

An attorney, Neil Reed, subsequently met
with Mr. Wolfe to prepare the deed transfer-
ring the property to the buyers. Mr. Reed
later testified that Mr, Wolfe did not exhibit
any indication of confusion or mental incorn-
petency during their. meeting. The parties
proceeded to the closing on August 28, 2013,
at the law office of the closing attorney,
‘Trudy Goff. Mrs. Miller and Mrs. Lispcomb,
as well as the buyers, later testified that Mr.
Wolfe evidenced a complete understanding of
the significance of that transaction. Ms. Goff
also testified that Mr," Wolfe comprehended
the details of the sale; she did not observe
any indication of undue influence over Mr.
Wolfe. .

Mr, Wolfe received a check in the amount
of $88,925.01 after the execution of the deed;
this constituted the purchase price minus

5, Subsequent testimony revealed that the peti-
tioner and her husband had not spoken with Mr.

61

settlement charges. He deposited the check
in his personal checking account that same
day and placed the documentation regarding
the transaction in the box in which he kept
other important documentation, On August
30, 2018, Mr. Wolfe visited Dr. Roger Lewis
for treatment of minor injuries he sustained
in a fall. Dr. Lewis later testified that Mr.
‘Wolfe was coherent during the examination
and had sufficient mental capacity to under-
stand the nature of his medical treatment
and to refuse to be admitted to the hospital
for further evaluation of a suspected underly-
ing cardiac issue. Dr, Lewis specifically stat-
ed he was “as certain as I can be” that Mr.
‘Wolfe was fully competent.

On September 2, 2013, Mr. Wolfe was
found dead in his home. The medical examin-
er noted the cause of death as bacterial
bronchopneumonia, with probable Alzheim-
er’s dementia as a contributing factor. The
petitioner states she was not aware that the
closing had taken place until she returned to
‘West Virginia upon Mr. Wolfe’s death.®

On May 1, 2014, the petitioner filed’ a civil
action in which she raised the following
claims against the respondents: (1) breach of
contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; and 8)
constructive fraud. The gravamen of the peti-
tioner’s claims is the allegation that the re-
spondents breached their contractual duties
to Mr. Wolfe because they knew or should
have known he was mentally incapable of
legally transferring the property. The peti-
tioner also initially named the buyers as de-
fendants and sought rescission of the deed
conveying the property. Pursuant to the
court’s scheduling order, discovery ended on
July 1, 2015. By agreed order, the petitioner
thereafter dismissed the buyers as defen-
dants and withdrew her claim regarding re-
scission of the deed. The case proceeded on
the three claims against the respondents.

On Augtst 31, 2015, the respondents filed
a motion for summary judgment, arguing the
petitioner's dismissal of the rescission of
deed claim against the buyers essentially ex-
tinguished or waived her claims against the

Wolfe since August 21, 2013.

62

respondents.® Alternatively, the respondents
argued the petitioner, as a matter of law, was
unable to establish that Mr. Wolfe lacked the
requisite mental capacity to enter into a
binding agreement on August 28, 2018. The
respondents emphasized Mrs. Miller’s uncon-
troverted testimony that Mr. Wolfe did not,
exhibit signs of mental incompetency during
her dealings with him; the testimony of Mr.
Reed and Ms. Goff that nothing about Mr.
Wolfe’s demeanor led them to discern any
mental infirmity; the petitioner’s inability to
identify specifie conduct of Mr. Wolfe during
the transaction that should have alerted the
respondents to any problem with his mental
functioning; and the testimony of Dr. Roger
Lewis concerning the medical treatment of
Mr, Wolfe two days after the closing and Mr.
Wolfe’s sufficient mental capacity to compre-
hend and consent to medical treatment.

In opposition to the respondents’ summary
judgment motion, the petitioner submitted
affidavits from three acquaintances of Mr.
Wolfe who attested to a decline in Mr.
Wolfe’s mental health. Tom DeBerry stated
Mr. Wolfe had become disoriented and for-
getful during the five to six months before
his death, Michelle Hebb similarly described
Mr. Wolfe as increasingly forgetful, lost, and
unable to identify the current day or month,
Bradley Lipscomb, who lived in rental prop-
erty owned by Mr. Wolfe, recounted inci-
dents in which Mr. Wolfe had asked the same
questions repeatedly, misplaced items, and
displayed a lack of hygiene. He also noted
that Mr, Wolfe discussed his meetings with a
real estate broker and his intention to retain
his portion of the mineral interests.

Upon evaluation of the petitioner’s claims,
the circuit court found no genuine issue of
material fact. By order entered September
80, 2015, the circuit court granted the re-
spondents’ motion for summary judgment,
and this appeal followed.

. II. Standard of Review

Hs The standards of review applicable
to issues of this nature have been clearly
stated by this Court. “A motion for summary
judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to

6. The lower court did not premise its ultimate
findings upon this waiver argument. Instead, the

be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is
not desirable to clarify the application of the
law.” Syl. Pt. 8, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Fed, Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160, 183
§.E.2d 770 (1968). In syllabus points two and
three of Williams v, Precision Coil, Inc., 194
W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 829 (1995), this Court
further held as follows:

Summary judgment is appropriate if,
from the totality of the evidence presented,
the record could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party, such
as where the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of the case that it has the burden
to prove,

If the moving party makes a properly
supported motion for summary judgment
and can show by affirmative evidence that
there is no genuine issue of a material fact,
the burden of production shifts to the non-
moving party who must either (1) rehabili-
tate the evidence attacked by the moving
party, @) produce additional evidence
showing the existence of a genuine issue
for trial, or (8) submit an affidavit explain-
ing why further discovery is necessary as
provided in Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure.

This Court reviews the circuit court’s entry
of summary judgment de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1,
Painter v. Peawy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 8.B.2d
755 (1994), With these standards as guidance,
we proceed to an evaluation of this matter.

TL. Discussion

Throughout the eleven assignments of er-
ror raised. by the petitioner, she addresses
several purported issues of material fact and
contends they should have precluded sum-
mary judgment in the respondents’ favor. We
address the petitioner’s claims in the context
of her assertions of breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive
fraud.

A, Alleged Breach of Contract

The petitioner contends the respondents
breached the contractual duties owed to Mr.
Wolfe by ignoring Mr. Wolfe’s verbal and

court proceeded to a thorough analysis of the
petitioner's claims against the respondents.

written instructions regarding the inclusion
of the mineral interests in the sale; secretly
recording three meetings with Mr. Wolfe;
and assisting Mr. Wolfe in the sale despite
their alleged knowledge that he lacked the
requisite mental capacity necessary to exe-
cute the sales contract, .

I Analyzing the facts adduced in discov-
ery below regarding the inclusion of the min-
eral rights, this Court finds the record devoid
of any evidence to contradict Mrs. Miller's
testimony that Mr, Wolfe ultimately sought
to sell both the surface and mineral rights for
$90,000. Mr. Wolfe first indicated his inten-
tion to sell the mineral interests by initialing
the notation on the original contract, indicat-
ing he was “[slelling all rights including oil
and gas.” Further, despite Mr. Wolfe’s brief
change of mind regarding his desire to sell
the mineral interests, the petitioner present-
ed nothing to contradict evidence of Mr.
Wolfe’s subsequent decision reaffirming his
‘intention to include the mineral interests,
evidenced by the August 26, 2018, addendum
to the sales contract. The undisputed evi-
dence demonstrates that Mr. Wolfe contract-
ed to sell the property, including his portion
of the mineral interests, to the buyers for
$90,000, and he executed a deed conveying
such property at the August 28, 2018, closing.
Consequently, we discern no error in the
circuit court’s findings with respect to the
petitioner's claims on this issue.

HM The petitioner also contends Mrs,
Miller breached her contract with Mr. Wolfe
by surreptitiously recording their meetings.
Neither the Listing Contract nor the Notice
of Agency Relationship restricts, limits, or
addresses the manner in which the real es-
tate agents are permitted to record informa-
tion concerning transactions. Furthermore,
recording the meetings did not violate any
law in West Virginia, and the petitioner pre-
sented no evidence contradicting the testimo-
ny of the respondents’ expert, indicating that
their conduct comported with their profes-
sional obligations. Therefore, this Court finds
no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that,
the acts of recording meetings do not sub-
stantiate the petitioner’s breach of contract
claim,

63

HEM The petitioner also argues the re-
spondents breached the contract with Mr.
‘Wolfe by assisting him in executing a binding
sales contract while allegedly knowing -he
lacked adequate mental capacity. The con-
cept of mental competence to convey land
has been repeatedly addressed by this Court.
In syllabus point one of Cyrus v. Tharp, 147
W.Va. 110, 126 S.E.2d 31 (1962), for example,
this Court explained “‘{a] person is mentally
competent to make a conveyance of land if he
knows the nature, character and effect of his
deed.’ Carrigan v. Davis, 84 W.Va, 478 [100
S.E, 91 (1919).]” In syllabus point two, this
Court further elucidated:

“The presumption of law is in favor of
the sanity and mental capacity of a grant-
or, and the person attacking his convey-
ance on the ground of his incapacity, or the
exertion of undue influence over him in
inducing him to make the deed, bears the
burden of proof. One who charges fraud
and undue influence must prove it.” Carri-
gan v, Davis, 84 W.Va. 473 [100 S.E. 91
(1919) }.

In syllabus point three of Cyrus, this Court
addressed concerns very similar to those
raised in the current matter and held:

“A grantor in a deed may be extremely
old, his understanding, memory, and mind
[elnfeebled and weakened by age, and his
action occasionally strange and eccentric,
and he may not be able to transact many
affairs of life, yet if age has not rendered
him imbecile, so that he does not know the
nature and effect of the deed, this does not
invalidate the deed. If he be capable, at the
time, to know the nature, character and
effect of the particular act, that is suffi-
cient to sustain it.” Point 5 Syllabus, Buck-
ey v. Buckey, 88 W.Va. 168 [18 S.E. 383
(4898) ].

To overcome the presumption
that the August 28, 2018, deed transfer was
valid, the petitioner must present clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. See Syl.,
William James Sons Co. v. Hutchinson, 79
W.Va. 389, 90°S.E. 1047 (1916) (“The pre-
sumption of law is that the acceptance of a
deed, made in pursuance of an antecedent
written agreement for the sale of land, is
satisfaction of all previous covenants, and,

64

although such acceptance may in some cir-
cumstances, be but partial execution of the
contract, to rebut the legal presumption, the
intention to the contrary must be clear and
convincing”). In syllabus point three of
McElwain v. Wells, 174 W.Va, 61, 822 8.E.2d
482 (1984), this Court explained: “A party
challenging the validity of a deed because of
inadequate consideration and grantor incom-
petence has the burden of proving those
facts, Absent convincing proof, a trial court
should find the challenged deed valid.” Id. at
62, 822 S.E.2d at 488.

Hs The petitioner did not present
testimony from any witness to the closing
transaction on August 28, 2013, suggesting
that Mr, Wolfe failed to understand his de-
cision to convey both surface and mineral
interests, Ms, Goff, the closing attorney, un-
equivocally denied that Mr. Wolfe was con-
fused or lacked the ability to understand the
discussions during the closing. Likewise, Mr.
Reed, the attorney who prepared the deed,
testified that Mr. Wolfe fully appreciated
the nature of the property transfer. As this
Court stated in Cyrus, “[t]he evidence of
witnesses present at the ‘execution of the
deed is entitled to peculiar weight.” 147
W.Va..at 122, 126 S.E.2d at 39 (citations
omitted)’ Thus, the circuit court properly
relied upon the testimony of witnesses to
the transaction in finding insufficient evi-
dence that the grantor was mentally incom-
petent at the time of the closing or that
Mrs, Miller had any reason to believe that
Mr, Wolfe was incompetent.

The circuit court was also correct in plac-
ing emphasis upon the testimony of Dr. Lew-
is, who had treated Mr. Wolfe for superficial
wounds on August 30, 2013, two days after
the closing. This Court has observed “[t]he

7. “The testimony of a notary public or other
official who took the acknowledgment is entitled
to peculiar weight in determining the mental
capacity of the grantor.” Cyrus, 147 W.Va. at
122, 126 S.E.2d at 39 (citing Syl. Pt. 1, Burkle v.
Abraham, 112 W.Va, 257, 164 S.E, 150 [1932]).

8. As the circuit court observed, the affidavits
do not provide any details regarding observa-
tions by these witnesses of Mr. Wolfe on Au-
gust 28, 2013, the date of closing... Instead,
the generalized observations regarding Mr.
‘Wolfe's awareness of the location of his vehi-
cle, his repetition of questions and stories, and

evidence of physicians, especially those who
attended the grantor and were with him con-
siderably during the time it was charged he
was of unsound mind, is entitled to great
weight.” Id. 122, 126 S.E.2d at 39 (citations
omitted). Even the petitioner’s retained ex-
pert, Dr. Bobby Miller, stated the Mr. Wolfe
“believed he was signing away his real estate
including surface and mineral rights” on the
date of the closing.

The three affidavits submitted by the peti-
tioner regarding Mr. Wolfe’s competence fail
to overcome the presumption of validity of
the transaction. As this Court has explained,
“{tThe point of time to be considered in deter-
mining the grantor’s mental capacity is the
time of the execution and delivery of the
deed.” Id. at 122, 126 S.H.2d at 89, The
affidavits merely contain generalized obser-
vations of Mr, Wolfe’s behavior, such as for-
getfulness, balarice and hygiene issues, or
repetition of stories.8 These observations do
not have a direct bearing on his mental ca-
pacity on the crucial date in question, and the
affiants were not present at the closing.
Moreover, the petitioner conceded in her tes-
timony: that she had no contact with Mr.
Wolfe after leaving for Florida on August 21,
2018, and that Mr. Wolfe could indeed have
changed his mind on the issue of inclusion of
both surface and mineral interests between
her conversations with him and the date of
the closing. Even in a light most favorable to
the petitioner, the evidence does not estab-
lish a genuine issue of material fact necessi-
tating jury determination on the petitioner’s
breach of contract claim, Summary judgment
on that issue was appropriate,

B. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duty

HI The petitioner also contends the re-
spondents breached their fiduciary duty to

descriptions of forgetfulness have no bearing
on the critical question of whether Mr. Wolfe
appreciated the interests he owned and con-
veyed in this deed transaction. Conversely, Mr.
Wolfe's conduct immediately following the real
estate closing—depositing the substantial
check received in his bank account on the
same day of the transaction and securing the
documents related to the transaction with his
other important documents—demonstrates his
own awareness of the important nature of the
transaction,

Mr. Wolfe by attempting to further their own
interests in receiving a sales commission
rather than protecting Mr. Wolfe’s financial
interests. The petitioner argues genuine is-
sues of material fact exist regarding this
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, based upon
(1) the decision to list the property for
$90,000; (2) the role of the respondents as
dual-agents for Mr, Wolfe and the buyers;
and (8) the act of recording the three meet-
ings without disclosing this fact to Mr, Wolfe.

In furtherance of her claims, the petitioner
submitted an appraisal indicating the value of
the surface interests alone was over $100,000.
However, the undisputed evidence indicated
the respondents sold Mr, Wolfe’s, property in
a manner consistent with his clearly articu-
lated desire to achieve a prompt sale, The
respondents’ expert testified, without contra-
diction, that listing the property in a manner
consistent with Mr, Wolfe’s desire did not
violate any professional standard governing
the respondents.’ Similarly, the petitioner
presented no evidence that dual-agency in a
real estate transaction violates a fiduciary
duty to either the buyer or the seller, The
respondents’ expert testified that the dual-
agency was consistent with the respondents’
professional obligations. Additionally, as ex-
plained above, Mrs. Miller’s decision to rec-
ord the meetings did not violate any legal or
professional standard in the real estate in-
dustry. Accordingly, the circuit court’s deci-
sion to grant summary judgment to the re-
spondents on the breach of fiduciary duty
claim was correct.

C, Alleged Constructive Fraud

HMM The petitioner also asserted a
claim of constructive fraud, alleging the re-
spondents intentionally, knowingly, and
recklessly engaged in a course of fraudulent
conduct, through both omission and misrep-
resentation of facts, to secure Mr. Wolfe’s
signature on the deed conveying the proper-
ty to the buyers. In Kadogan v. Booker, 185
W.Va. 488, 66 S.E.2d 297 (1951), this Court
addressed the. concept of undue influence
and explained as follows:

9, As the circuit court noted in granting summary

judgment, had the respondents truly desired to
act in furtherance of their own financial inter-

65

To set aside a deed on the ground of undue
influence it must be shown that such influ-
ence ‘destroyed the free agency of the
grantor and substituted the will of another
person for that of the grantor, and unless
these facts appear, motive and opportunity
to exert undue influence and failing mental
powers of the grantor are insufficient to
set aside or cancel the deed.
Id, at 458, 66 S.B.2d at 308 (citations omit-
ted). It is also instructive to consult this
Court’s definition of constructive fraud, as
follows:
“Constructive fraud” is a breach of legal or
equitable duty, which, irrespective of moral
“guilt of fraud feasor, the law declares
fraudulent, because, of its tendency to de-
eeive others, to violate public or private
confidence, or to injure public interests,
_Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor
‘intent to deceive is an essential element of
constructive fraud. An intent to deceive is
an essential element of actual fraud. The
presence or absence of such intent disti:
guishes actual fraud from constructive
fraud
Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 128
W.Va, 20, 884, 15 S.B.2d 687, 695 (1941),
In the present case, it is undisputed that
the petitioner was not present for the August
28, 2018, closing. Further, she acknowledged
she had not witnessed an omission or misrep-
resentation by the respondents, She failed to
present evidence of constructive fraud or un-
due influence on the part of any person
present at the closing; rather, she argued
that Mrs, Miller’s conduct in recording the
meetings constituted evidence of constructive
fraud. Yet, the petitioner was uriable to iden-
tify any connection between Mrs. Miller’s
recordings and Mr. Wolfe's exercise of free
will. In other words, no evidence exists indi-
cating that the act of recording the meetings
influenced Mr, Wolfe to sell the property
against his will. Thus, the cireuit court cor-
rectly concluded the petitioner failed to es-
tablish that Mr. Wolfe was the victim of
constructive fraud, and summary judgment
on this issue was appropriate.

ests, they would have attempted to sell the prop-
erty for a higher price, resulting in a higher
commission.

66
D. Additional Assignments of Error

Having concluded there are no genuine
issues of material fact with regard to the
petitioner’s three claims against the respon-
dents and that summary judgment in the
respondents’ favor was appropriate, we brief-
ly address the petitioner’s other assignments
of error. The petitioner contends that Circuit
Court Judge Andrew N. Frye, Jv., sitting by
assignment, erred by failing to recuse him-
self from this case. The petitioner argues
Judge Frye indicated bias toward the re-
spondents’ case by making statements in a
telephonic hearing on a discovery-related mo-
tion on June 4, 2015. Judge Frye remarked:
“T just said that I think I’m going to have the
competency issue decided if—as I read what
you sent to me so far—if this man’s compe-
tent, the rest of it’s over....” The petitioner
argues that such comment “is an unsolicited
and curiously mistimed statement which indi-
cates an opinion on one of the primary fact
issues of the case, which clearly favors the
frespondents].” The petitioner further main-
tains that the rapidity with which Judge
Frye granted the respondents’ motion for
summary judgment and the “geographic
proximity between Judge Frye’s home court”
and the Circuit Court of Preston County,
created “an appearance of impropriety and
partiality” toward Mrs. Miller, the wife of the
sitting Circuit Court Judge in Preston Coun-
ty.

When the petitioner sought disqualification
of Judge Frye below, Judge Frye advised
this Court of the petitioner’s motion and
informed the Court that he did not believe
his disqualification was warranted, Then
Chief Justice Margaret Workman reviewed
the matter, and an Administrative Order was
entered on July 8, 2015, indicating this Court
had “determined that the evidence set out in
support of the disqualification motion is in-
sufficient to warrant such disqualification.”
The petitioner’s arguments on appeal do not
cause this Court to reconsider its previous

10, The petitioner also argues that the circuit
court's discovery rulings concerning the timing
of the production of audio recordings were erro-
neous. Those issues were resolved significantly
prior to the circuit court’s consideration of the
summary judgment issue; they are not relevant to

order; thus, that assignment of error is with-
out merit.

HM Similarly, this Court finds the peti-
tioner’s remaining assignments of error una-
vailing. Many of the petitioner’s arguments
are speculative, unsupported by the record,
or simply immaterial to the issue of summary
judgment. She contends, for instance, that
the circuit court erroneously refused to grant
her untimely motion to amend her complaint
a second time to plead constructive fraud
with additional particularity. Yet, the circuit
court did not base its summary judgment on
the sufficiency of the petitioner’s pleadings;
rather, the summary judgement was prem-
ised upon the merits of the petitioner’s case
and the absence of any evidence of wrongdo-
ing by the respondents. Moreover, “[a] mo-
tion for leave to amend a complaint is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.” Mauck v. City of Martinsburg, 178
W.Va. 93, 96, 857 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1987)
(citations omitted). ”

HH Likewise, this Court finds no merit
in the petitioner's claim that the circuit court
limited her “available remedies” by placing
significance on the petitioner’s voluntarily
dismissal of her claim that the deed transfer-
ving the property was invalid. The circuit
court’s reference to the dismissal of that
other claim did not serve to “limit” the peti-
tioner’s claims in any manner; it simply ref-
erenced the fact that the petitioner had no
evidence to establish her claims against the
respondents. As the circuit court found, the
petitioner’s “choice of remedies does not re-
lieve her of the obligation to prove each
necessary element of her claims or to demon-
strate a disputed issue of material fact....”
Further, the circuit court specified that the
petitioner “may elect to seek any remedy to
which she believes she is entitled by law.
However, she has a concomitant obligation to
establish the essential elements of the claims
which correspond to the remedy sought.”
This Court agrees with the circuit court’s
assessment of that issue.”

that issue or this Court's opinion today. The
petitioner does not contend the discovery rulings
impacted her production of evidence in support
of her claims. We find no merit to the assignment
of error regarding the timing of production of
those audio recordings.

a
a

IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, this Court af-
firms the September 30, 2015, order of the
Cireuit Court of Preston County granting
summary judgment to the Respondents.

Affirmed.

799 S.E.2d 144
CITIZENS TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPANY OF WEST VIRGINIA db/a
Frontier Communications of West Vir-
ginia, Frontier West Virginia, Inc., De-
fendant Below, Petitioner
Vv.

Michael SHERIDAN, April Morgan, Tri-
sha Cooke, and Richard Bennis, Individ-
ually, and on behalf of other similarly-
situated Individuals, Plaintiffs Below,
Respondents

No. 16-0005

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: January 24, 2017
Filed: April 20, 2017

Likewise, we find no merit in the petitioner's
contention that the circuit court erroneously
granted the respondents’ motion in limine to
exclude from trial certain evidence regarding
Mrs. Miller’s role as caretaker for her aging

mother, Summary judgment having properly
been granted to the respondents, there will not
be a trial from which any evidence will be ex-
cluded. This issue is not a matter to be consid-
ered on appeal.

|

Thomas R. Goodwin, Esq., J. David Fen-
wick, Esq., Goodwin & Goodwin, Charleston,
West Virginia, Archis A, Parasharami, Esq,
(admitted pro hae vice), Mayer Brown LLP,
Washington, DC, Joseph J. Starsick, Jr.
Esq., Frontier Communications, Charleston,
West Virginia, Counsel. for the Petitioner

Benjamin Sheridan, Esq., Mitchel Lee
Klein, Esq., Klein Sheridan & Glazer LC,
Hurricane,: West Virginia, Jonathan J. Mar-
shall, Esq., Bailey Glasser, -LLP, Charleston,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondents

WALKER, Justice:

Citizens Telecommunications Company of
‘West Virginia d/b/a Frontier. Communica-
tions of West Virginia, Frontier West Virgi-
nia, Inc, (“Frontier”) appeals the November
80, 2015 order of the Circuit Court of Lincoln
County denying Frontier’s motion to ‘compel
arbitration in a putative class action filed by
Michael Sheridan, April Morgan, Trisha
Cooke, and Richard Bennis on behalf of
themselves and similarly-situated persons
(“Respondents”).

Frontier contends that the. circuit court
erred in refusing to enforce an arbitration
provision in the’. parties’ agreement. Upon
consideration of the parties’ briefs and argu-
ments, the submitted record and pertinent
authorities, we agree with Frontier, reverse
the cireuit court’s order and remand with
instructions to enter an order compelling ar-
bitration on an individual basis,

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Respondents are West Virginia residents
who initially subscribed to Frontier’s residen-
tial “high-speed Internet service” between
August 2007 and June 2010. Respondents
sued Frontier in October 2014 alleging that
the service was much slower than advertised

70

and that Frontier had intentionally reduced
the speed at which Respondents could con-
nect to the Internet.

As subscribers, Respondents’ relationship
with Frontier was governed by Frontier’s
Residential Internet Service Terms and Con-
ditions (“Terms and Conditions”). The Terms
and Conditions, available on Frontier’s Inter-
net website, provided that “BY USING
FRONTIER HIGH SPEED INTERNET
SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT YOU ARE
AGREEING TO THESE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS.” (Emphasis in original). At
the time Respondents subscribed to the ser-
vice, the Terms and Conditions did not con-
tain a dispute resolution provision. However,
the Terms and Conditions contained a provi-
sion that permitted Frontier to propose
changes to the terms, upon notice to custom-
ers, Continued use of the service by a cus-
tomer after any change was considered to be
the customer’s acceptance of the new term.
For exaniple, the Terms and Conditions in
effect from July 2011 until March 2013 pro-
vided:

OUR RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES

UNLESS OTHERWISE PROHIBITED
BY LAW, FRONTIER MAY CHANGE
PRICES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS
AT ANY TIME BY GIVING YOU 30
DAYS NOTICE BY BILL MESSAGE,
E-MAIL, OR OTHER NOTICE, IN-
CLUDING POSTING NOTICE OF
SUCH CHANGES ON THIS WEBSITE,
UNLESS THE PRICES, TERMS AND
CONDITIONS ARE GUARANTEED BY
CONTRACT. YOU ACCEPT THE

1, Frontier states that this was the version in
effect from July 21, 2011 until March 7, 2013,
which encompasses the relevant time frame for
the contract modifications. at issue in.this case.
Frontier further contends that the current ver-
sion of this “right to make changes” clause,
which has been in effect since March 2013, is
materially similar,

2. Frontier's revised arbitration provision pro-
vides that (1) arbitration is cost-free to the cus-
* tomer; (2) Frontier will pay a double recovery up
to $5,000 if a customer's arbitration award ex-
ceeds Frontier's settlement offer; (3) Frontier dis-
claims any right to seek attorneys’ fees; (4) either
party may bring a claim in small claims court;
(5) there is no confidentiality requirement; (6)

CHANGES IF YOU USE THE SER-

VICE AFTER NOTICE IS PROVIDED. ~
(Emphasis in original), 1

In September 2011, Frontier altered the
Terms and Conditions and added an arbitra-
tion provision requiring any dispute between
a customer and Frontier to be resolved by
binding arbitration on an individual basis.
More specifically, the arbitration provision
included waivers of the right to a trial by
jury and the right to participate in a class
action, a representative proceeding or a pri-
vate attorney general action, Frontier includ-
ed a notice of this change in the September
2011 billing statement, which provided as
follows:

As part of our Terms and Conditions of
service, Frontier has recently instituted a
binding arbitration provision to resolve
customer disputes. This provision will be-
come effective 45 days from the date of
this bill. Please refer to www-.frontier.com
or call Frontier 1-800-426-7320, option 3
for more information.

Respondents assert that they never read this
portion of the billing statement because
Frontier placed it toward the end of a multi-
page billing statement after many other no-
tices. Respondents further contend the terms
of the arbitration provision were not con-
tained in the billing statement.

In January 2012, Frontier revised the arbi-
tration provision to include terms that Fron-
tier describes as more “consumer friendly.” ?
Frontier sent a notice of these revisions to
Respondents in their January 2012 billing
statement.

the arbitrator may award the customer any form
of individual relief that a court could including
punitive damages, statutory damages, attorney's
fees, and individualized injunctions; (7) arbitra-
tion will be conducted under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”); (8)
arbitration will occur in the customer's state
unless the parties agree otherwise; (9) for claims
of $10,000 or less, customers have the exclusive
right to choose whether the arbitrator will con-
duct an in-person hearing, a hearing by tele-
phone, or a desk arbitration in which the arbitra-
tion will be conducted solely on the basis of
documents submitted to the arbitrator; and (10)
the arbitrator must issue a written decision.

In November 2012, Frontier placed a fold-
ed, paper copy of the Terms and Conditions,
including the arbitration provision, in each
customer’s billing statement and included the
following notice: .

Frontier has made revisions to the Terms
and Conditions that apply to your Residen-
tial Frontier Internet service. The revised
Terms and Conditions are posted at www.
frontier.com/terms/ and are included as a
special insert in this bill, By using and
paying for Frontier Internet services, you
are agreeing to these revised Terms and
Conditions and the requirement that dis-
putes be resolved by individual arbitration
instead of class actions and/or jury trials.
You may opt out of the revised Terms and
Conditions and instead remain subject to
your previously applicable terms by calling
1-866-606-2849 ... within 30 days from the
date of this bill.

On October 14, 2014, Respondents filed a
putative class action complaint alleging that
Frontier never provided Internet service at
advertised speeds and purposefully “throt-
tled” the speed of its customers’ Internet
service. In the complaint, Respondents
sought declaratory relief that they had not
agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from
Frontier’s service and that their putative
class action was not subject to arbitration.
Respondents also sought monetary damages,
attorneys’ fees and an injunction.

On January 30, 2015, Frontier filed a mo-
tion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the
action, or, in the alternative, to stay the
action. In an order dated November 30, 2015,
the circuit court denied the motion to compel
arbitration and to dismiss and found that: (1)
an agreement to arbitrate was never formed
because Respondents never assented to the
arbitration provision; (2) the arbitration pro-
vision was illusory and lacked consideration;
(8) the arbitration provision did not cover
claims that pre-dated adoption of the provi-
sion; and (4) the arbitration provision was
unenforceable due to its prohibition of class-
wide injunctive relief. It is from this order
and these particular findings that Frontier
appeals,

71

I STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH Frontier appeals the cireuit court’s
denial of its motion to compel arbitration and
to dismiss. This Court has held previously
that “[aJn order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is
subject to immediate appeal under the collat-
eral order doctrine.” Syl. Pt. 1, Credit Accep-
tance Corp. v. Front, 281 W.Va. 518, 745
S.E.2d 556 (2018). We recently held that,
“{w]hen an appeal from an order denying a
motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration
is properly before this Court, our review is
de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, West Virginia CVS
Pharmacy, -LLC v..McDowell Pharmacy,
Inc., 238 W.Va, 465, 796 S.E.2d 574 (2017).
Similarly, we “we apply a de novo standard
of review to [a] circuit court’s interpretation
of [a] contract.” Zimmerer v. Romano, 223
W.Va. 769, 777, 679 S.E.2d 601, 609 (2009).
Accordingly, we apply a de novo standard of
review to the issues presented in this appeal,
which is properly before this Court.

- If. DISCUSSION

In support of its challenge to the circuit
court’s order, Frontier argues that an agree-
ment to arbitrate was properly formed with
Respondents in a unilateral contract. First,
Frontier asserts that the parties mutually
assented to the arbitration provision. Second,
Frontier contends that there was consider-
ation for the parties’ overall agreement and
that the arbitration provision is not illusory
in that it binds both parties. Next, it argues
that an arbitration provision may apply to
disputes that arose prior to the formation of
the agreement to arbitrate. Finally, Frontier
asserts that an arbitration agreement may
prohibit class-wide injunctive relief. We ad-
dress each of these four issues, in turn, be-
low.

A. Mutual Assent

HM Frontier first asserts that the cir-
euit court erred in finding that the agree-
ment lacked mutual assent and thereby erred
in concluding that no agreement to arbitrate
was ever formed. The circuit court based its
finding, in part, on its characterization of the
Terms and Conditions and the arbitration
provision contained therein as an online

72

browsewrap agreement. Frontier disagrees
with this characterization, arguing that it is
an enforceable unilateral contract that Re-
spondents received in a printed, physical
form in November 2012, Finally, Frontier
argues that the circuit court erred in its
conclusion that the agreement lacked mutual
assent because it found the obscured place-
ment of the notice of Terms and Conditions
in the billing statements and. the one-time
inclusion of a paper copy of the Terms, and
Conditions insufficient to show that the Re-
spondents had agreed to such terms.
Respondents agree with the circuit court’s
characterization of the Terms and Conditions
as a browsewrap agreement and also assert
that Frontier cannot prove that any of the
Respondents actually visited Frontier’s web-
site or read the Terms and Conditions. Re-
Spondents further assert that they did not
assent to the addition of the arbitration pro-
vision to the Terms and Conditions because
they were not given adequate notice by the
billing statements or by the one-time inclu-
sion of the paper copy of the written terms.

TI A browsewrap agreement is a con-
tract arising in the context of Internet com-
merce that is formed when one accepts it
merely by browsing a website. State ew rel.
U-Haul Co. of W. Va, v. Zakatb, 282 W.Va.
482, 440 n.7, 752 S.H.2d 586, 594 n.7 (2018),
To be bound by the website’s terms and
conditions requires no other affirmative act
by the user, Jd, As noted by the circuit court
in the case before us, courts have been wary
to enforce browsewrap agreements where
the terms and conditions are heavily ob-
scured, often only briefly referenced at the
bottom of a page-buried deep within a web-
site. Because visitors to the website are often
completely unaware that they are bound by

the website’s terms simply by being on the

website, much less aware of the substance of
those terms, -browsewrap agreements in
which terms and conditions are heavily ob-
scured have been viewed with suspicion, See,
é9., Berkson v. Gogo, LLC, 97 F.Supp.8d
859, 395 (E.D.N.Y, 2015) (“Because -of the
passive nature of acceptance in browsewrap
agreements, courts-closely examine the factu-
al circumstances surrounding a consumer's
use.”); Specht v. Netscape Comm, Corp., 306

F.3d 17, 85 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining to en-
force arbitration clause in terms ‘and condi-
tions of website where there was no notice of
existence of contract terms and terms and
conditions themselves were hidden).

Although Frontier made the Terms and
Conditions accessible online, they also indis-
putably were distributed to Respondents in
the November 2012 paper billing statement,
The contract between Frontier and its cus-
tomers was not executed over the Internet or
any other electronic platform; the Terms and
Conditions merely were made available in
more than one medium. Likewise, acceptance
of Frontier's Terms and Conditions was not
manifested through use of its website alone,
which is the hallmark’ of a browsewrap agree-
ment, In fact, Frontier admits it was not
necessary for customers to ever visit the
website in order to continue service. Rather,
acceptance of the Terms and Conditions oc-
curred through continued use of Frontier’s
Internet service. Accordingly, we find that
the circuit court erroneously mischaracter-
ized the Terms and Conditions as a browse-
‘wrap agreement.

HMMM Traditional contract Jaw rather
than a novel analysis of Internet contracts
governs whether mutual assent occurred un-
der the facts of this case, While Frontier
argues correctly that arbitration provisions
may not be subject to heightened scrutiny
or notice requirements, we also note that
arbitration provisions are not entitled to
standards more lax than any other contract
provision. Syl. Pt. 7, in part, Brown v. Gene-
sis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646, 724
S.E.2d 250 (2011), overruled on other
grounds by Marmet Health Cure Ctr, Inc.
v. Brown, 565 U.S, 580, 182 S.Ct, 1201, 182
L.Bd.2d 42 (2012) (“Brown I”) (“The [Fed-
eral Arbitration] Act does not favor or ele-
vate arbitration agreements to a level of
importance above all other contracts; it sim-
ply ensures that private agreements to arbi-
trate are enforced according to their
terms.”). Notice requirements and mutual
assent to modification are contract princi-
ples that apply irrespective of the subject
matter of the term or terms being modified,
Thus, the arbitration provision added to
Frontier’s Terms and Conditions is subject

to the same scrutiny and notice require-
ments as any other modification of a con-
tract, Schwmacher-Homes of Circleville, Inc.
v. Spencer, 237 W.Va. 379, 391-92, 787
S.E.2d 650, 662-68 (2016) (“The general
tools for examining contracts are familiar to
any first-year law student: ambiguity, coer-
cion, duress, estoppel, fraud, impracticality,
laches, lack of capacity, misrepresentation,
mistake, mutuality of assent, unconscionabil-
ity, undue influence, waiver, or even lack of
offer, acceptance or consideration. If the
contract defense exists under general state
contract law principles, then it may be as-
serted to counter the claim that an arbitra-
tion agreement or a provision therein binds
the parties”); Syl. Pt. 9, Brown I, 228
W.Va. 646, 724 S.B.2d 250 (“Nothing in the
Federal Arbitration Act ... overrides nor-
mal rules of contract interpretation. Gener-
ally applicable contract defenses—such as
laches, estoppel, waiver, fraud, duress, or
unconscionability—may be applied to invali-
date an arbitration agreement.”).

TM The Terms and Conditions at issue
here are the prototypical unilateral contract.
A unilateral contract is established “where
one party makes a promissory offer and the
other accepts by performing an act rather
than by making a return promise.” Cook v.
Heck’s Inc., 176 W.Va. 868, 878, 842 S.H.2d
458, 458 (1986), We have recognized “[tJhat
an acceptance may be effected by silence
accompanied by an act of the offeree which
constitutes a performance of that requested
by the offeror.” First Nat'l Bank v. Marietta
Mfg. Co, 151 W.Va. 686, 641-42, 158 S.E.2d
172, 176 (1967). Frontier presented its Terms
and Conditions as a condition of providing
Internet service to customers, and Frontier’s
customers accepted those Terms and Condi-
tions by using and paying for that Internet
service, forming a unilateral contract.

Frontier’s advertisement that its Internet
service requires “No Contract” does not dis-
suade us from concluding there existed a
unilateral contract between the parties. Such
advertisements clearly aim to entice custom-
ers to sign up for Internet service with the
option to cancel the service at any time with-
out penalty; they do not imply that the ser-
vice is governed by no terms whatsoever. In

73

any case, Frontier did not begin advertising
“No Contract” until several years after Re-
spondents subscribed to Frontier’s residen-
tial Internet service. Moreover, aside from
alluding to the advertisements, Respondents
do not argue that the underlying Terms and
Conditions. are unenforceable as a unilateral
contract, Rather, Respondents assert that
the modifications to the Terms and Condi-
tions to include the arbitration provision did
not form an agreement. to arbitrate because
the modifications lacked mutual assent.

Most commonly, this Court has examined
the interpretation and modification of unilat-
eral contracts in the context of employee
handbooks or manuals. We have held:

A promise of job security contained in an

. employée handbook distributed by an em-
ployer to its employees constitutes an offer
for a unilateral contract; and an employee’s
continuing to work, while under no obli-
gation to do so, constitutes aeceptance’and
sufficient consideration to make the em-
ployer’s promise binding and enforceable.

Syl. Pt: 5, Cook, 176 W.Va. 868, 342 S,E.2d
458, We firid the contract and modification at
issue in the present case analogous to an
employee handbook in that Frontier agreed
to provide Internet service pursuant to its
Terms and Conditions, which would be ac-
cepted by Respondents by continuing to sub-
seribe to the service while under no obli-
gation to do so, Additionally, Frontier, like
many employers, reserved the right to make
unilateral .modifications to’ the Terms and
Conditions upon notice of the changes,

Concerning mutual assent.to contract, we
have held:

It is elementary that mutuality of assent is ©

an essential element of all contracts,

Wheeling Downs Racing Ass’n v. West

Virginia Sportservice, Inc., 158 W.Va. 985,

216 S.H.2d 284 (1975). In order for this

mutuality to exist, it is necessary that

there be a proposal or offer on the part of
one party and an acceptance on the part of
the other. Both the offer:and acceptance
may be by word, act or conduet that evince

. the intention of the parties to contract.

That their minds have met may be shown

by direct evidence of an actual agreement.

or by indirect evidence through facts from

74

which an agreement may be implied. See

Lacey v. Cardwell, 216 Va. 212, 217 S.H.2d

885 (1975); Charbonnages de France v.

Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 415-416 (4th Cir,

1979),

Bailey v, Sewell Coal Co., 190 W.Va. 188,
140-41, 487 S.E.2d 448, 450-51 (1993). This
Court analyzed mutual assent in the context
of an employer’s modifications to its unilater-
al contract with employees in Hogue v. Cecil
I. Walker Machinery Company, 189 W.Va.
848, 481 S.H.2d 687 (1998). In Hogue, we
held that “a subsequent modification may be
made unilaterally by the employer, but to
make the modification effective the employer
is required to give the employees reasonable
notice of the changes.” Jd. at 852, 481 S.E.2d
at 691.

Based upon this precedent, the issue is
whether Frontier gave Respondents reason-
able notice that a modification was being
made to the Terms and Conditions. Frontier
argues that its billing statement (1) specifi-
cally gave notice that a modification to the
Terms and Conditions was being made relat-
ing to the arbitration provision, which was to
become effective in forty-five days; (2) re-
ferred customers to its website, where the
Terms and Conditions could be accessed on-
line; and (8) advised that customers could
also call Frontier at a particular extension
for information concerning the modification.
Respondents counter that (1) the notice of
the changes was obscured because it ap-
peared on page four of the bill after many
other notices, whereas customers need only
look at the first page to make the payment;
(2) the Terms and Conditions are difficult to
find on Frontier’s website; and (8) Respon-
dents never actually read the arbitration pro-
vision because it was not printed separately
and directly on the bill but rather the entire-
ty of the Terms and Conditions was included
in the November 2012 bill.

In Collins v. City of Bridgeport, 206 W.Va.
467, 525 S.E.2d 658 (1999), we discussed the
reasonable notice requirement set forth in
Hogue. Although “reasonable notice” was not
defined, this Court found that reasonable
notice was met by printing a new policy in a
personnel policy manual. Jd. at 476, 525
§.E.2d at 667, In adopting the rule on rea-

sonable notice, however, this Court in Hogue
discussed a Washington Supreme Court case,
Gaglidari v. Denny’s Restaurants, Inc. 117
Wash.2d 426, 815 P.2d 1862 (1991), which
recognized the same right to reasonable no-
tice. In Gaglidari, the employer argued that
copies of the changed policy manual were
often left in the employees’ lounge, seemingly
by new employees who were disposing of
them. Jd, at 485, 815 P.2d at 1367. The
Gaglidari court found that it would be “whol-
ly fortuitous” that current employees might
actually read any copies of the policies left in
the employees’ lounge by the new employees,
and found this was insufficient to provide
reasonable notice to the employees of the
changes. Id,

In the present case, the facts differ drasti-
eally from those in Gaglidari because it is
not “wholly fortuitous” that Frontier custom-
ers would read their bills in their entirety.
Likewise, it would not be wholly fortuitous
that based on the notice enclosed in the bill,
Respondents would read the provision online,
read the enclosed Terms and Conditions in-
cluded in the November 2012 bill, or call to
inquire about the amended provision if they
took issue with the provision or wanted more
information. Frontier would be required to fit
all information it wanted its customers to
know onto the first page of a bill or somehow
ensure that all of its customers read their
bills in their entirety in order to conform to
the reasoning upon which Respondents rely.

There is clear evidence that Frontier pro-
vided written notice of the change to the
Terms and Conditions to its customers,
which is consistent with the reasonable notice
found in Collins. The fact that Respondents
neither availed themselves of any paper or
electronic source of information on the
change nor called the number provided for
additional information does not detract from
the reasonableness of the notice. Frontier
was entitled to rely on its customers to read
information circulated to them, particularly
when a paper copy of the Terms and Condi-
tions was included in the November 2012
billing statement. There is no dispute that
these Respondents received their September
2011, January 2012 and most importantly,
November 2012 bills, and Respondents do

not allege that Frontier otherwise failed to
provide access to the Terms and Conditions
to its customers.

Accordingly, we conclude that Frontier
provided reasonable notice to its customers
of its changes to the unilateral contract, and
Respondents asserited to the changes by vir-
tue of continuing to subscribe to Frontier’s
Internet service after the reasonable notice
was provided.

B. Consideration and Ilusoriness
WNsWe =onext address the circuit
court’s finding that the arbitration provision
lacked consideration and is illusory. “Consid-
eration is ... an essential element of a con-
tract.” Cook, 176 W.Va. at 878, 342 S.H.2d at.
458 (citations omitted), We have described
sufficient consideration as follows:
Consideration has been defined as “some
right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing
to one party, or some forbearance, detri-
ment, loss, or responsibility given, suf-
fered, or undertaken by another.” 17 Am.
Jur.2d, Contracts, Section 85. A benefit to
the promisor or a detriment to the promis-
ee is sufficient consideration for a contract.
17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, Section 96.
First Nat'l Bank, 151 W.Va. at 642, 158
§.E.2d at 177. Frontier argues at length that
additional consideration may not be required
of an arbitration provision and that consider-
ation for the whole is sufficient for an individ-
ual provision. See Syl. Pt. 6, Dan Ryan
Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 230 W.Va. 281, 737
S.E.2d 550 (2012) (“The formation of a con-
tract with multiple clauses only requires con-
sideration for the entire contract, and not for
each individual clause. So long as the overall
contract is supported by sufficient consider-
ation, there is not requirement of consider-
ation for each promise within the contract, or
of ‘mutuality of obligation,” in order for a
contract to be formed.”). However, we also
have held that “not only must such modifica-
tion or alterations be by mutual agreement.
but must be based upon a valid consideration,
and the original consideration ... cannot be
used as consideration for any agreement of
modification or alteration in connection
therewith.” Steinbrecher v. Jones, 151 W.Va.

3. See supra note 2.

vb)

462, 470, 158 S.H.2d 295, 801 (1967). Like-
wise, “[iIn the absence of a mutual agree-
ment, based on a valid consideration, estab-
lishing modification of a written contract,
there can be no subsequent modification of
such a contract without consideration, and
the mere promise of one of the parties to
perform what he is already bound to do
under the terms of the contract is not a
sufficient consideration.” Syl. Pt. 5, Bischoff
v. Francesa, 183 W.Va. 474, 56 S.E.2d 865
(1949). Thus, because the original Terms and
Conditions lacked an agreement to arbitrate,
the modification of the Terms and Conditions
to include such a provision required new
consideration.

Frontier argues that the mutual agree-
ment of the parties to arbitrate is sufficient
consideration to support the modification,
Respondents counter that the commitment, to
arbitrate cannot be adequate consideration as
it is an illusory promise because Frontier
retains the ability to change the Terms and
Conditions at its discretion. We find that the
mutual commitment to arbitrate is sufficient
consideration for the modification. As we ex-
plained in Toney v. HQT Corp., No. 18-1011,
2014 WL, 2681091 at *8 (June 18, 2014)
(memorandum decision), “the mutual commit-
ments to arbitrate alone constitute sufficient
consideration to support the contract.” As to
the subsequent modification altering the
terms of arbitration in January 2012, Fron-
tier undertook additional burdens while pro-
viding its customers with additional benefits.>
In accordance with our holding in First Nat’?
Bank, 151 W.Va. at 642, 158 S.E.2d at 177,
these additional burdens and benefits are the
hallmark of consideration. Thus, we find that
both the September 2011 and January 2012
modifications were supported by adequate
consideration.

Finally, we reject Respondents’ argument
that the promise to arbitrate was illusory by
virtue of Frontier’s right to make changes. In
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va.
52, 459 S.H.2d 329 (1995), we discussed a
“change in terms” reservation, finding that
“(rletaining the right to make changes ...
does not necessarily mean promises explicitly
or implicitly made ... are not enforceable, at

76

Jeast until such time as they are in fact
changed.” Id, at 65, 459 §.B.2d at 342. Here,
the arbitration provision itself explicitly pro-
vides that if Frontier makes any changes to
the arbitration provision, the customer has
the ability to reject the change and instead
remain subject to the previous terms relating
to dispute resolution. Thus, the agreement to
arbitrate is not an illusory promise because
both parties are bound to arbitrate and uni-
lateral changes to the agreement to arbitrate
may not be implemented without consent
from ‘Frontier customers. Accordingly, we
find that the agreement to arbitrate did not
lack consideration and was not illusory.

C. Applicability to Pre-existing Claims
Hl Frontier also asserts that the cireuit
court erred in finding that the arbitration
provision did not apply to pre-existing claims
because it relied on a mistaken reading of
New v. GameStop, Inc., 282 W.Va, 564, 758
8.E.2d 62 (2018), as holding that arbitration
agreements could not be enforced retroac-
tively. In GameStop, we held that an arbitra-
tion provision in an employee handbook was
enforceable, but that it could not apply retro-
actively pursuant to the text of the arbitra-
tion agreement itself, which provided’ that
the arbitration provision could only be ap-
plied prospectively, Id. at 570, 753 S.E.2d at
68. Therefore, the holding was a simple mat-
“ter of enforcing the parties’ agreement pur-
suant to ‘the terms outlined, not a general
prohibition on retroactive enforcement of all
agreements to arbitrate,

Frontier asserts that this Court has ap-
plied arbitration agreements retroactively by
applying a 2005 version of an arbitration
provision to a dispute arising in 2003. See
Shorts v. AT&T Mobility, No, 11-1649, 2013
WL 2995044, at *4 (W. Va. 2018) (memoran-
dum decision); State ew rel. AT & T Mobility,
LLC v. Wilson, 226 W.Va. 572, 576 n.9, 703
S.E.2d 548, 547 n.9 (2010). However, Fron-
tier’s reading of these cases is also flawed. In
those cases, the parties had already conceded
which version of the arbitration provision
‘was applicable; this Court made no finding or
holding in Shorts or Wilson regarding which
version was applicable. In those cases, we
merely observed that the concession had.

been made and was not at issue in the ap-
peal, Id. In light of the lack of binding prece-
dent specific to arbitration provisions, we
return to traditional contract principles,

HI Although Respondents argue that
subjecting Frontier customers to arbitrate
disputes arising before institution of the arbi-
tration clause would produce an unfair result,
we have previously held:

[in the absence of ambiguity we cannot be

swayed by a persuasive argument that the

intent expressed by such language may
produce a harsh result. So long as an
otherwise valid contract does not contra-
vene some principle of law or public policy,
it must stand and become operative as the
deliberate act of the parties,
Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147
W.Va. 484, 492-98, 128 S.H.2d 626, 638
(1962). Indeed,.as we cautioned in Cotiga,
“{i]t is not the right or province of a court to
alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning
and intent of the parties as expressed in un-
ambiguous language in their written contract
or to make a new or different corttract for
them.” Jd. at Syl. Pt. 3. Moreover, the sub-

,ject arbitration provision is valid, enforce-

able, and devoid of ambiguity, Thus, it is not
the province of this court to alter the terms
of that contract to exclude pre-existing dis-
putes where there is no contravening princi-
ple of law or public policy. Indeed, the Fed-
eral . Arbitration Act (“FAA”) specifically
provides that parties may agree to arbitrate
“an existing controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
The arbitration provision at issue provides
in relevant part: . .
You and Frontier agree to arbitrate all
disputes and claims between us, This
agreement to arbitrate is intended to be
broadly interpreted. It includes, but is not
limited to, all claims arising out of or relat-
ing to any aspect of our relationship,
whether based in contract, tort, statute,
fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal
theory that arose either before or during
this or any prior Agreement, or that may
arise after termination of this agreement.
This arbitration, provision clearly and explic-
itly provides that it applies to pre-existing
disputes, Because there is no contravening

authority that would preclude enforcement of
the provision as written, we conclude that the
agreement to arbitrate may be applied to
pre-existing claims,

D. Prohibition on Class-wide Injunctive
Relief

* HD Finally, Frontier argues that the cir-
cuit court erred in finding’ the arbitration
provision unenforceable due to its prohibition
on class-wide injunctive relief. Frontier con-
tends that AT&T Mobility LLC: v. Concep-
cion, 563 U.S, 888, 181 S.Ct. 1740, 179
L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) precludes such a finding
under the FAA. In response, Respondents
argue that the circuit court, having already
rendered the arbitration provision unenforee-
able on other grounds, never actually made
that finding. According to Respondents, the
circuit court simply was commenting that the
limitation on class-wide injunctive relief is
“significant and troubling.” However, Re-
spondents also assert that the circuit court
did not err in rendering the arbitration provi-
sion unenforceable due to its prohibition on
class-wide injunctive relief because ‘such a
finding did not run afoul of Concepcion. We
disagree,

In Concepcion, the United States Supreme
Court explained that “[rjequiring the avail-
_ ability of class-wide arbitration interferes
with fundamental attributes of arbitration
and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with
the FAA” and concluded that “[s]tates cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with
the FAA; even if it is desirable for unrelated

veasons.” Id, at 844, 851, 181 S.Ct. 1740.”

Subsequently, in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restawrant, 570 U.S. 228, 183
S.Ct, 2804, 186 L.Bd.2d 417 (2018), the Court
upheld a class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement, noting that neither any contrary
congressional command nor any judge-made

77

exception to the FAA requires rejection of a
class-arbitration waiver. Id, at ——, 188
S.Ct. at 2809-12, 186 L.Ed.2d at 424-27,

Similarly, in considering arbitration agree-
ments that contain class action waivers, we
consistently have recognized that inclusion of
such a waiver does not automatically render
the arbitration agreement unconscionable or
unenforceable. State ew rel, Ocwen Loan
Serv. v. Webster, 2832 W.Va. 341, 859, 752
S.E.2d 872, 390 (2013); State ew rel. Rich-
mond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders,
228 W.Va. 125, 140, 717 S.E.2d 909, 924
(2011); State ew vel. AT & T Mobility, LLC v.
Wilson, 226 W.Va. 572, 579, 708 8.E.2d 543,
550 (2010), Assuming that the circuit court
found the arbitration provision unenforceable
due to its prohibition of class-wide injunctive
relief, such ruling is prohibited by our prece-
dent and by the FAA under Concepcion, It is
permissible for parties to an arbitration pro-
vision to agree to waive class-wide injunctive
relief, The circuit court erréd in holding oth-
erwise. ~ , :

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasoris, we reverse the
November 30, 2015 order of the Circuit
Court .of Lincoln County and remand with
instructions to enter an order compelling ar-
bitration on an individual basis.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

78

799 S.E.2d 341

WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, Petitioner, Respondent
below

v

Renee L., RICHARDSON-POWERS, Re-
spondent, Petitioner below, and West
Virginia Human Rights Commission,
Respondent,

No, 15-1197
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: January 25, 2017
Filed: March 9, 2017

1. See W.Va. Code § 5-11-9 (2013),

2, The DMV also challenges the Commission's
findings that it did not engage in the interactive
process, while Ms. Powers did, and that it en-
gaged in spoliation of evidence.

3. There are no medical records to support this
diagnosis. We note additionally that on Decem-
ber 17, 2009, Ms. Powers told Harold Slaughter,
a psychologist she was referred to by the West
Virginia Division of Rehabilitation Services
(“DOR”), that she sustained this injury as the
result of performing gymnastics when she was

79

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Mary M. Downey, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, Charleston, West Virginia

Garry G. Geffert, Esq., Martinsburg, West
Virginia, Counsel for Richardson-Powers

Ann L, Haight, Esq., Deputy Attorney
General, Jerry R. Fowler II, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Human Rights Commission

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehi-
cles (“DMV”), appeals from an adverse find-
ing of discrimination against it by the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission (“Com-
mission”), The DMV challenges multiple find-
ings of the Commission including its ruling
that the respondent Renee Richardson-Pow-
ers (“Ms. Powers”) proved a prima facie case
of discrimination;! that the DMV failed to
provide the accommodations requested by
Ms. Powers; that Ms. Powers mitigated her
damages; and that the administrative law
judge’s (“ALJ’s”) findings of fact were sup-
ported by the evidence? Upon our careful
and thorough review of the record in this
case against these assignments of error, we
find that the Commission committed error
and, accordingly, reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Ms. Powers purportedly suffered a trau-
matic brain injury in a fall from a ledge near
the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.,
when she was eight years old.’ As a result of
this injury, Ms. Powers testified she has
some degree of hearing loss and struggles to
find the correct words to express herself. Dr.
James Petrick, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsy-
chologist who examined Ms. Powers,‘ testi-
fied she has “cognitive deficits” due to the

nine years old. Ms. Powers told Ms. Frick, her
DMV supervisor, that the brain injury resulted
from “a severe car accident.” Dismissing
“[t]hese supposed inconsistencies .... [as] simply
not relevant,” the ALJ concluded that “[t]he en-
tomology of those mental impairments has no
bearing on the elements of the causes of action”
at issue.

4, Dr. Petrick examined Ms. Powers on August
25, 2010—five months after she began working at
the DMV.

80 Le

neurological trauma. One of those specific
deficits is a reduction of “her capacity to
learn efficiently.” He further testified that
her perseverative tendencies make problem
solving difficult, noting that people with such
tendencies tend to “get stuck.” In explana-
tion, he opined: “[TJhey decide there’s one
way to do something, and, and they can’t be
flexible with their thinking.” Based on the
information Ms, Powers provided to Dr. Pe-
trick, he agreed with her self-assessment
that structure, repetition, and consistency
were necessary for her to learn new tasks,

In 2010, Ms, Powers applied for a custom-
er service representative (“CSR”) position
with the DMV.' Upon being hired to work at
the Kearneysville DMV office, she began her
probationary employment on March 22,
2010,” Ms, Powers did not. disclose the exis-
tence of her traumatic brain injury when she
was initially interviewed by the DMV or later
when she began her employment as a CSR!
At the start of her CSR training, all Ms.
Powers told Christine Frick, the office man-
ajer, was that she learned by repetition and
that “she liked to take lots of notes.” Ms.

- Powers began her CSR training with Angie

Kuykendall. According to Ms. Kuykendall,
she provided Ms. Powers with a notebook
that contained documents pertinent to issu-
ing driver’s licenses and to license renewals
and-further enabled her to take additional
notes regarding the various DMV procedures
she was undertaking to learn. At the end of
one.week, Ms. Kuykendall requested that she
be relieved from training Ms. Powers due to

5, See infra note 28,

6. After being laid off from her job in May 2009;
Ms. Powers sought assistance from Workforce
West Virginia and was referred to the DOR to
help her find employment; she located the DMV
position without the assistance of the DOR,

7. The probationary period of employment was

six months.

8. Several weeks into her employment, Ms. Pow-
ers told the office manager, Christine Frick, she
had a brain injury and that was why she was
having trouble retaining information, When
asked what was necessary to help her learn, Ms.
Powers indicated taking notes and repetition,
Ms. Powers made it clear to Ms. Frick that she
did not want her co-workers to know of the‘brain
injury. Due to privacy issues, Ms. Frick testified

difficulties she was experiencing that includ-
ed Ms. Powers’ refusal to take notes, her
uncooperative attitude with regard to the
training, and her failure to remain at the
DMV window with her trainer?

Danetta Calhoun, the second DMV em-
ployee to train Ms, Powers, raised concerns
similar to those expressed by Ms. Kuyken-
dall, Addressing Ms. Powers’ challenges to
Ms. Calhoun’s training, Ms. Frick noted in
the training log: © “she [Ms, Powers] is not
questioning because she does not understand,
she is questioning because she does not like
the way Danetta is processing the transac-
tion.”.Ms. Calhoun further opined that Ms.
Powers “has a negative attitude towards
training and seems like she knows it all,
already.” Also included in the log for this
week is this observation: “Renee still refuses
to take notes as she has been told by man-
agement and her trainers. Renee is coming
to management to complain about her -co-
workers.”

When Ms. Frick spoke with Ms. Powers
with regard to the issues raised by the train-
ers, Ms. Powers revealéd that a brain injuty
affected her ability to retain information. In
response, Ms. Frick “reiterated the fact
about taking notes. Notes will benefit her
processing transactions. I also told her that I
would provide her with resources to use
when she is finished training and working on
her own. She then went on again to complain
about her trainer’s way of doing things.”

After seven days of working with Ms. Cal-
houn, Ms. Powers was moved to a third CSR,

she could not inform those co-workers about Ms.
Powers’ brain-related injury.

9. Throughout the training log maintained on Ms.
Powers, the-trainers commented on Ms. Powers

* wandering away from, the window at which she
was assigned to be trained; Ms. Powers denies
that she ever left her assigned window. A nota-
tion in the log dated April 5, 2010, states; “Re-
nee does not want to run the window or stay at
her station, continues to wander until manage-
ment tells her to get back to her trainer.”

10. While Ms. Frick compiled the training log,
reports submitted by the individual trainers of
Ms, Powers were used to complete the log.

11, This entry is from the training log entry dated
March 28, 2010, to April 1, 2010, |

for training purposes. During the week that

Terry Graves was her trainer, Ms. Powers.

got upset with Ms. Graves for-correcting her

in front of a customer and complained to Ms.-

Frick. Ms. Frick explained that it was the
duty of Ms. Graves, as her trainer, to make
sure the customer was not given inexact in-
formation or sent away unnecessarily. De-
spite recognizing that “she is probably ex-
plaining things incorrectly,” Ms. Powers still
did not feel she should be remonstrated in
front of a customer. Ms. Graves observed
that Ms. Powers “is focusing tofo] much on
minor details instead of the primary details
of the job.” The log entry for April 7, 2010,
reflects that “Renee [Ms. Powers] comes to
management to say what Terry [Graves] has
told her and then questions if Terry is cor-
rect. Renee does not believe what she is
being told by her trainers. Terry states that
Renee is not taking the amount of notes that
she should and refuses to do so when Terry
suggests it to her.”

Although Ms. Powers was assigned -her
own window beginning on April 11, 2010, she
was continuing to struggle with handling ba-
sic license tag renewals and. driver's licens-
es.2 According to the log, Ms. Powers “con-
tinues to leave her window for almost every
transaction to come to management for
help.” The log entry for the week of April 25
to 80, 2010, reflects that Ms. Powers “is still
questioning at each transaction and asking
how to process and what is needed. She is
not referring to her resources or notes as we
have told her, States it is easier to come and
ask,” The following week’s. log indicates that

12, These two DMV transactions are the easiest
transactions to process, according to the testimo-
ny of Ms. Frick,

13, The log reflects for the week of May 2 to 7,
2010:

[Als long as someone was working with her
she was fine and not questioning at all, She
knew what needed to be done and did it, It
wasn't until that management member walked
away did she start asking questions again. Re-
nee [Powers] admitted repeatedly that she is
retaining the information but doesn’t like
working on her own because she is afraid she
will make a mistake,

14, Additional information related to dealing with
her co-workers is set forth in the log entry for
May 24 to 28, 2010:

81

Ms. Powers “will not take the help given by
CSR’s as instructed and management can-not
stand with her to answer her questions at
each transaction.” :

Ms, Frick noted in the log for May 9 to 14,
2010, that she tried to switch Ms. Powers
over to titles “to have her learn some more
job duties and she is visibly upset about
this.” The entry made by Ms, Frick in the log
for the following week states: “I have tried
everything possible to help Renee [Powers]
with the problems she is having with learning
her job duties. I have provided numerous
resources and cheat sheets and sat with her
and talked with her in detail at great lengths,
T have asked Renee for input and have com-
plied with her requests.” Ms, Frick observed
in the log entry for May 16 to 21, 2010,.“that
Renee.is not willing to work with her co-
workers,” 4 1

Ms, Powers met with Ms, Frick and Karrie
Whittington, the office supervisor, on May
217, 2010, for a sixty-day performance review.
Expectations and géals were discussed and
Ms, Powers said she “would work on doing
better.” When Ms. Powers claimed to have
“never been given any resources to help
her,” Ms, Frick disputed this ‘contention and
“then she admitted that she has them but
just doesn’t use them.” Citing her brain
injury, Ms. Powers requested additional
training on May 28, 2010, She told Ms. Frick
“that she did not like her training ... and
that none of the CSR’s do anything ‘correct-
ly”

She is not meeting the goals set and again is
refusing to use any of the information that she
has been given by other CSR's to make her job
easier and more understandable. CSR's still
complaining about Renee [Powers] giving cus-
tomers wrong information and being rude to
the employees when they try to help her. CSR's
do not understand why Renee will not allow

* them to assist her, They all say that she just
blows them off and will not listen, Does thirigs
her own way; which is incorrect but then will
blame the other CSR's when ... ask[ed] ...
why she processed something wrong or“ gave
wrong information.

15. In explanation, Ms, Powers stated “it is just
more convenient to come ask questions to man-
agement only instead of taking the time to refer
to her resources we provided.”

82

Ms. Frick got approval from the Regional
Coordinator, Carol Huggins, for additional
tvaining for Ms. Powers. After training Ms.
Powers for more than a week, Becky Heddon
observed that she “can do her job as long as
someone sits with her at all times.” When
Ms. Powers asked for even more training on
June 11, 2010, she was told by Ms. Frick that
“management feels that she is able to work
independently ... at this point.” To which,
Ms. Powers stated “that she does know her
job but just doesn’t want to make a mistake.”

The log entries for June 14 through July 9,
2010, relate that Ms. Powers was continuing
to question “all she is told,” 1 was “not using
notes or resources provided,” and was refus-
ing to rely on co-workers for assistance!”
Additional notations for this same period in-
dicate that Ms, Powers “is still not giving
correct information to customers” and that
she “is not showing the performance level
she should for this far into employment.”

Ms. Frick and Ms. Whittington met with
Ms. Powers on July 12, 2010, to discuss her
ninety-day evaluation/review. As documented
in the training log, Ms. Powers “did not
agree with the discussion and said that it was
not her fault but the trainers fault from day
1. She went on to blame co-workers for her
mistakes and giving wrong information and
lack of performance.” The next day, Ms.
Powers requested that Ms. Frick contact her
brain trauma counselor, Ms. Teresa Cunning-
ham. Ms. Frick told Ms. Powers that she
could not do that.

“16. Ms, Frick expanded: “She is not questioning
in a manner of not understanding, it is in a
manner of disbelief.”

17. When directed by management to go to a co-
worker, Ms. Powers relatedly “gives them an
attitude about it.”

18. As the record evidences, Ms. Powers intermit-
tently contacted Ms. Lockard, her DOR counsel-
or, to inquire about training (which was unavail-
able due to her current employment status) and
to discuss her difficulty in learning her job
duties. Ms. Lockard communicated with Ms.
Powers on June 7, 2010, about meeting to com-
plete an individual plan for employment aimed at.
work accommodations and job retention, but
that meeting never took place.

19. According to both her testimony and her log
entry corresponding to this request, Ms. Frick

Ms. Powers contacted Penny Hall, the
state director of the Americans with Disabili-
ty Act (“ADA”), Ms. Hall contacted Ms.
Frick by telephone on July 22, 2010, to in-
quire why she would not meet with Ms.
Cunningham. Ms, Frick informed Ms. Hall
that she “ha[d] not received anything from
Renee [Powers] in writing from her doctor to
prove the disability and that Renee has not
told her the complete story of her poor evalu-
ations.” Ms. Frick also communicated to Ms.
Hall that Ms, Powers “continues to change
the story around whether she has been diag-
nosed or not diagnosed” with a disability.

Five days later, Ms. Powers was informed
by letter from the Director, Human Re-
sources Division, West Virginia Department
of Transportation (“DOT”) that she could
apply for a “reasonable accommodation un-
der the ADA.” Ms. Powers filled out a series
of forms requesting an accommodation on
July 30, 2010.2! The specific accommodation
requested by Ms. Powers was to learn in a
step-by-step procedure format and through
repetition. On September 15, 2010, the DOT/
DMV accommodation committee denied ther
request, stating:

* The information submitted demonstrated
that the local Division of Motor Vehicles
office previously made multiple attempts to
assist you in learning the duties of a Cus-
tomer Service Representative in ways that
are consistent with your request as noted
above [step by step procedure format and

explained that without specific disability docu-
mentation, they were not authorized to make this
type of contact, At this point, Ms. Powers had not
provided the DMV with any documentation evi-
dencing the existence of a brain trauma-related
disability.

20. Ms. Lockard, the DOR Counselor assigned to
Ms. Powers, observed in her case notes dated
July 13, 2010, that Ms. Powers was “considering
whether and when she will share this report [Dr.
Slaughter’s psychological report dated December
17, 2009, diagnosing her with a traumatic brain
injury] with her supervisor.”

21. When she sought this accommodation, she
had yet to be seen by Dr. Petrick. The first time
that consistency in terms of both the trainers and.
the steps employed to achieve a particular task is
mentioned is in Dr. Petrick's report, dated Au-
gust 25, 2010.

through repetition]. In addition, the meth-
ods employed by DMV staff to train you in
your job are consistent with the recom-
mendations of Ms. Cunningham. Based
upon these unsuccessful attempts, it is ap-
parent that, assuming that you are. dis-
abled, no reasonable accommodation would
enable you to perform the essential fune-
tions of your job.

On September 16, 2010, Ms. Powers was
notified that effective September 30, 2010,
her employment with the DMV was being
terminated.” On September 28, 2010, Ms.
Powers filed a grievance with regard to her
termination. After eight days of hearing evi-
dence,® Robert B. Wilson, the ALJ, issued
his final decision on September 11, 2014,
finding in favor of Ms. Powers and awarding
her front and back pay, attorney’s fees, and
directing that she be reinstated.™4 By order
entered on November 9, 2015, the Human
Rights Commission adopted the decision of
Judge Wilson.” It is from this order that the
DMV now appeals,

Il. Standard of Review

TM As we detailed in Smith v. West Vir-
ginia Human Righis Commission, 216
W.Va. 2, 602 S.H.2d 445 (2004), the Commis-
sion reviews the decision of an ALJ pursuant
to the statutory procedures set forth in West
Virginia Code § 5-11-8(d)(8).° 216 W.Va. at
6, 602 S.H.2d at 449. When this Court re-
views the Commission’s ruling, we are gov-
erned by the reviewing standards set forth in

22, Her last day of work was September 20, 2010.

23; The hearings were held in December 2013
and February 2014,

24, Through her cross-appeal, Ms, Powers object-
ed to the award of reinstatement, arguing that
the reinstatement was not possible given the ani-
mosity between the parties.

25. The Commission awarded back pay damages
in the amount of $12,906.00 for the period of
unemployment following her termination on
September 30, 2010, to December 31, 2010, plus
interest. To reflect the difference between Ms.
Powers’ current part-time employment and full-
time employment, an additional award of back
pay and benefits was made in the amounts of
$11,259.99 for 2011; $6,912.00 for 2012,
$13,248.99 for 2013 and $15,443.00 for 2014
plus interest. The Commission awarded Ms. Pow-
ers $5,000.00 for humiliation, embarrassment,

83

the Administrative Procedures Act. See
W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(g) (2015); accord Syl.
Pt. 1, Cobb v. W.Va. Human Rights Comm’n,
217 W.Va. 761, 619 S.E.2d 274 (2005). To
reverse, vacate, or modify the Commission’s
order requires a determination that

the substantial rights of the petitioner or

petitioners have been prejudiced because

the administrative findings, inferences,

conclusions, decisions or order are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statuto-

ry provisions; or

(2) In excess of the statutory authority or

Jurisdiction of the agency; or

(8) Made upon unlawful procedures; or

(4) Affected by other error of law; or

(6) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable,

probative and substantial evidence on the

whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary: or capricious or character-

ized by abuse of discretion or clearly un-

warranted exercise of discretion.

W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(g).

Hs As we first pronounced in syllabus
point one of West Virginia Human Rights
Commission v. United Transportation Un-
aon, Local No, 655, 167. W.Va. 282, 280
S.E.2d 6538 (1981), “West Virginia Human
Rights Commission’s findings of fact should
be sustained by reviewing courts if they are
supported by substantial evidence or are un-
challenged by the parties.” 27 See also Syl. Pt.

emotional distress and loss of dignity as well as
$189,106.86 in attorney's fees.

26. Those standards limit the Commission's re-
view to determining whether the ALJ’s decision
ist
(A) In conformity with the constitution and the
Jaws of the state and the United States;
(B) Within the commission's statutory jurisdic-
tion or authority; .
(©) Made in accordance with procedures re-
quired by law or established by appropriate
rules of the commission:
(D) Supported by substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(E) Not arbitrary, capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.

"W.Va. Code § 5-11-8(4)(3).

27. When West Virginia Code § 5-11-11 was
amended in 1987 to provide for a direct appeal

84

1, in part, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588,
474 S,B.2d 518 (1996) (stating that this Court
“reviews questions of law presented de novo,
findings of fact by the administrative officer
are accorded deference unless the reviewing
court believes the. findings to be clearly
wrong”). Credibility determinations made by
an ALJ “are. binding unless patently without
basis in the record.” Martin v. Randolph Bd.
of Educ,, 195 W.Va. 297, 804, 465 S.E.2d 399,
406 (1995). In contrast to the deference ex-
tended to the factual determinations of an
ALJ provided such determinations are “sup-
ported by substantial evidence,” the ALJ’s
interpretation of the law or application of the
facts to law are not treated deferentially. See
id, at 304, 465 S.E.2d at 406.. With these
standards in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the rights of the DMV were preju-
diced by the ruling of the Commission.

IIL Discussion

HM The DMV challenges the legal con-
clusion reached by the ALJ, and affirmed by
the Commission, that Ms. Powers demon-
strated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the DMV breached its duty to provide
her with a reasonable accommodation. The
elements necessary to prove such a claim
were set forth in syllabus point two of Skaggs

v. Elle Run Coal Co., 198 W.Va. 51, 479 .

§.E.2d 561 (1996):

To state a claim for breach of the duty of
reasonable accommodation under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code,
5-11-9 (1992), a plaintiff must [have] al-
leged the following elements: (1) The
plaintiff is ‘a qualified person with a disabil-
ity; (2) the employer was aware of the
plaintiff's disability; (8) the plaintiff re-
quired an accommodation in order to per-
form the essential functions of a job; (4) a
reasonable accommodation existed that
met the plaintiff's needs; (6)'the employer
mew or should have known of the plain-

from the Commission to this body, the Commis-
sion’s findings of fact continued to be reviewed
pursuant to the “substantial, evidence” test,
KVRTA v. W.Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 181
W.Va. 675, 677 n.1, 383 S.E.2d 857, 859 n.1
(1989).

tiffs need and of the accommodation; and

(6) the employer failed to provide the ac-

commodation.
As Justice Cleckley explained in Skaggs, an
employer has two means of defending against
such a claim: “by disputing any of the above
elements or by proving that making such
accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the employer.” 198°W.Va. at 66, 479
S.E.2d at 576,

Hl In the instant case, the DMV specifi-
eally challenges the first element, which’ re-
quired Ms. Powers to demonstrate she was
“a qualified person with’a disability.” Under
both our case law and-our regulations, a
“qualified person with a disability” is an indi-
vidual “who is able and competent, with rea-
sonable accommodations, to perform the es-
sential functions of the job.” See Syl. Pt. 1, in
part, Coffman v. W.Va. Bd. of Regents, 182
W.Va. 78, 886 S.E.2d 1 (1988), overruled on
other grownds by Skaggs, 198 W.Va, 51, 479
§,E.2d 561; W. Va. Code R. § 7-4-2, By
statute, only an individual who is “able and
competent to perform the services required”
of a particular employment position is enti-
tled to seek relief on the grounds of unlawful
discrimination under the West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Act. See W.Va. Code § 5-11-9(1)
(2018). And, as we clarified in Ranger Fuel
Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Com-
mission, 180 W.Va. 260, 876 S.E.2d 154
(1988), “[t]he ‘able and competent’ require-
ment means that an employer has the right
not to hire or to fire employees who are
unable to perform a job because either they
are generally unqualified or they have a
handicap that impedes job performance, sub-
ject to the ‘reasonable accommodation’ re-
quirement.” Id. at 265, 876 S:E.2d at 159.

The DMV maintains that Ms, Powers was
not capable of performing the essential func-
tions of her job, even with the specific accom-
modation she requested: step- by-step train-
ing, note taking and repetition. ° Although a

" 28. Not until Ms. Powers pursued a grievance did

she identify consistency as a component of the

step-by-step training she required. Because the
individual CSR employers who trained Ms. Pow-
ers might approach the same task in a slightly
different order (same steps, just a different or-
der), she complains that this rendered her train-
ing ineffectual. :

typical CSR trainee would complete.his or
her training in two to four weeks, Ms. Pow-
ers was still struggling after months to oper-
ate a DMV window unassisted. Both the
training logs and the testimony of the CSR
workers and DMV supervisors indicate that
Ms. Powers was not competently operating a
DMV window independent of supervisory as-
sistance despite months of. hands-on and
over-the-shoulder instruction. Of additional
concern to the DMV was Ms. Powers’ appar-
ent failure to fully appreciate the need to
give customers accurate information in the
first instance and to treat them respectfully.

While the ALJ has numerous findings of
fact with regard to past employment posi-
tions that Ms. Powers successfully held,*° the
record in this case does not adequately ad-
dress whether those prior positions involved
comparable job duties and responsibilities. In
his “Statement of the Case,” the ALJ relates
that: -

The Complainant has provided evidence
that when coworkers are aware of her
condition, which causes her to have to re-
peatedly ask questions, and present the
tasks necessary to perform a job function
in a consistent step-by-step format, she
can be successful. This is demonstrated by
a work history involving similar customer
service positions, which Complainant has
held for extended periods of time with
performance that was recognized and re-
warded by her previous employers.

In the Discussion section of the Final Deci--

sion, the ALJ concludes:

29, When deposed in this case, Ms. Powers said
that at the time of her termination—six months
after being hired—she had still not completed the
training she required to perform the job. As she
explained: “TI still needed so much more in dif-
ferent things that—of training, different licenses,
different areas of that job." Besides her need for
additional training on existing procedures, she
stated that “[i]f a new process comes in, I would
need training. Unless I do the process over and
over, I would constantly need assistance...”

30. Her prior instances of employment included a
rental car agent; a cashier; a bank teller; and
an order fulfillment coordinator. Over the objec-
tion of the DMV, the ALJ allowed Ms. Powers’
sister to testify to the receipt of work-related
commendations.

85

Ms. Richardson-Powers has demonstrat-
ed that she is capable of performing simi-
Jar customer service jobs in the-past, when
she has explained her learning problems to
her co-workers.... The evidence estab-
lished that she has a record of helpful

. courteous interaction with those prior em-
ployers’ customers....The preponderance
_ of the evidence suggests that with accom-
modation, Ms. Powers is able to perform
. the duties of customer service representa-

tive with Respondent, DMV. .

For the ALJ to presume that the job
duties at the prior positions held by Ms.
Powers were sufficiently similar in nature to
those of a DMV CSR with no testimony to
that effect was improper. The singular fact of
dealing with the public across a counter does
not automatically render the prior employ-
ment positions comparable to the specific
demands and tasks of the CSR position.
What the ALJ overlooked is that part of
what affected the ability of Ms. Powers to
learn and then successfully perform a given
job in the past was determined by the sheer
repetitive nature of the tasks required.” Un-
like those positions, which Ms, Powers testi-
fied to as involving rote procedures, the CSR’
position presented issues that required prob-
lem solving—a task that would be difficult
for her according to Dr. Petrick. Critically,
and contrary to the ALJ’s avowal that Ms,
Powers previously disclosed her traumatic
brain injury to prior employers and co-work-
ers, the record suggests just the opposite.
Ms, Powers made it clear she preferred not
to disclose her condition/injury to her current,
coworkers for fear of being judged. She told

31, When Ms. Powers filled out employment in-
formation at the DOR, she indicated she would
not consider a position that was fast-paced or
required her to read. When interviewed by the
DMV, she did not reveal either of these concerns.

32. Not only did Ms. Powers testify to the routine
nature of her job as a cash office associate and
her rental car counter position, but in complet-
ing a work history document in connection with
her application for social security disability bene-
fits, she also described the bulk of her prior work
positions,.as involving rote and repetitive tasks:

. "they gave me the same thing over and over.”

86

Ms. Lockard, her DOR counselor, that she
had not revealed this information to her co-
workers in the past.

Because Ms, Powers did not previously
disclose her traumatic brain injury to her
previous co-workers and employers, the ALJ
wrongfully concluded that where her specific
needs had been made known and then prop-
erly accommodated, she could succeed, Given
the specific lack of any request for an aceom-
modation in those prior employment set-
tings, 8 the ALJ’s reasoning that Ms. Pow-
ers could handle the CSR position with an
accommodation is decidedly unfounded.
Moreover, the fact that the approach that
worked for her in the past (note taking,
repetition, step-by-step learning) did not
work in this instance suggests a dissimilar
job in terms of employment-related tasks
rather than a failure to accommodate her
learning-related needs. Seemingly overlooked
by the ALJ and then the Commission is
copious evidence that Ms. Powers regularly
refused to take additional notes when so
directed and also refused to reference notes
she had made, preferring instead to seek
supervisory assistance.

Completely ignored by the AL is the
insight that Ms. Powers’ own witness, Dr.
Petrick, provided concerning her employ-
ment-related issues at the DMV. According
to Dr. Petrick’s report and testimony, Ms.
Powers has a “Mood Disorder” related to her
traumatic brain injury and he specifically
advised that she should be “instructed as to
how her behavioral and emotional status
might be adversely effecting [sic] her capaci-
ty to maintain employment.” * When pre-
33, The ALJ wrongly conflates the prior instances

where Ms. Powers reportedly told her prior em-
ployers that she learned from repetition and step-
by-step training as a specific request for an ac-
commodation within the framework of discrimi-
nation law. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that Ms. Powers informed any of her
prior employers that she had a disability or that
she pursued an ADA-related request for an ac-
commodation based on that disability with those
prior employers.

34, And while the ALJ opted to discredit the testi-
mony of various DMV witnesses as to the use of
written materials based on the non-production of
these materials, Ms. Powers herself testified both
to note taking and to the use of a grey notebook
for reference purposes,

sented with the training log notes that indi-
cated Ms, Powers was getting frustrated by
her trainers, being angry, refusing to use her
notes, and not paying attention, Dr. Petrick
viewed those behaviors as emotional sequela
from her brain trauma. He described her
personality as “perseverative, sticky, inflexi-
ble, emotional dyscontrol, anger, frustration,
tangential, and obsessive.” Dr. Petrick stated
he was not at all “surprised” at the frustra-
tion experienced by the CSR workers who
trained Ms. Powers: “because of how Ms.
Powers presents in terms of social interac-
tion, her personal style would probably cause
a coworker to be frustrated.” In light of
these characteristics, he further acknowl-
edged that supervisors and even customers
might experience frustration in dealing with
Ms. Powers.*6

During his evidentiary deposition, Dr. Pe-
trick testified that the DMV CSR position
was not a good position for Ms. Powers
“{blecause it requires novel problem-solving.
Every customer is different, Every situation,
to some extent, is different, and.... [elvery
day is different.” After expressing his lack of
surprise that Ms. Powers’ “failed in this par-
ticular job,” Dr. Petrick opined that the fail-
ure resulted due to “a combination of her
injury, the training, and the job itself.” With
an “infinite amount of time” and training, Dr,
Petrick believed that Ms. Powers could even-
tually do the job, but he could not determine
how long that might take. In completing her
social security disability application, Ms.
Powers represented that she “became unable
to work because of my disabling condition on

35. Part of what drove Ms. Powers to contact her
DOR counselor was concern that she was going
to lose her job. She informed Dr. Petrick that she
“has had some difficulty maintaining employ-
ment.”

36. Dr. Petrick testified as to Ms. Powers being
tangential, explaining her inability to respond in
a linear fashion. Rather than answering a ques-
tion, Ms. Powers might address wholly unrelated
topics for multiple sentences before finally get-
ting around to the actual inquiry. According to
Dr, Petrick, they ran out of time during the
interview because of this condition and further
characterized her as “taxing” to deal with in the
interview.

September 80, 2010’—her last day of em-
ployment at the DMV, Her application for
disability benefits was denied with the follow-
ing explanation: “We realize that your condi-
tion prevents you from doing your past job
as a license clerk, but based on your age,
education, work experience, it does not pre-
vent you from doing less demanding work.” 3?

Incumbent in our review of administrative
cases such as these is the duty to “determine
whether the ALJ’s findings were reasoned,
i.e, whether he or she considered the rele-
vant factors and explained the facts and poli-
ey concerns on which he or she relied, and
whether those facts have some basis in the
record.” Martin, 195 W.Va. at 804, 465
S.E.2d at 406. Upon our review of the full
record in this case, we find no evidence to
support the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms, Pow-
ers is qualified to perform the essential func-
tions of the CSR job with a reasonable ac-
commodation. The DMV gave Ms. Powers
exactly what she requested from day one—
the opportunity to take notes, step-by-step
instruction, and repetition, As the record
makes clear, Ms. Powers was given months
of additional training assistance but she re-
peatedly hindered that process by her unwill-
ingness to accept what her trainers told her
and by refusing to refer to her own notes,
And, by her own words, after six months she
still did not view herself as fully trained. Dr.
Petrick testified that her failure was caused
not just by the training but by the very
nature of the job itself. The job duties cannot
be altered so as to give Ms, Powers a slow-
paced and essentially identical day-to-day
work experience. The varying transactions
that present to a CSR simply cannot be
formulaically-simplified to suit Ms. Powers,
This employer cannot be expected to provide
an “infinite” amount of open-ended training
until she fully grasps the permutations of the

37. Consistent with Dr, Petrick’s recommendation
that part-time work would be better for her, Ms,
Powers is currently holding such a position of
employment.

38. See Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379,
384 (2nd Cir. 1996).

39, The inferences taken by the ALJ based on its
conclusion of spoliation were unnecessarily
broad and improper. The reliance on biased, self-

87

job. What the ALJ should have discerned,
after months of exposure to the facts of this
case, is that this employment position was
simply not a good fit for Ms. Powers, While
the law requires that disabled individuals be
given the same opportunities as nondisabled
persons,®8 the law does not permanently tie
the hands of an employer with regard to
making personnel decisions. See Gaul v. Lu-
cent Techs. Inc., 184 F.8d 576, 581 (8 Cir,
1998) (finding proposed accommodation to
internally transfer employee whenever em-
ployee becomes stressed out by coworkers or
supervisor as improper request to establish
conditions of his employment).

Although we are reversing the Commis-
sion’s ruling on the ground that Ms. Powers
failed to meet the initial burden of demon-
strating she was a “qualified person with a
disability,’ there are numerous additional
grounds for reversal that we are not address-
ing.® See Syl. Pt. 2, Skaggs, 198 W.Va. at 58,
479 S.E.2d at 568, What the record makes
clear is that Ms. Powers failed to demon-
strate her ability and competency to perform
the CSR job with reasonable accommoda-
tions. In stark contrast to the ALJ’s conelu-
sion that the DMV discriminated against Ms.
Powers by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation, the record reveals an em-
ployer that was exceedingly patient with Ms.
Powers, both with her requests for extended
training and her need to learn the job
through repetition, note taking, and in a
step-by-step fashion.

From the outset of the final order, the
ALJ vilified the DMV as unreasonable and
unwilling to accommodate the needs of Ms.
Powers. The employer in this case was fault-
ed by the ALJ for the inadequate training it
provided Ms. Powers from day one when Ms.
Powers did not reveal her brain trauma inci-
dent, much less the existence of an actual

serving testimony as to proof of the “success” of
Ms. Powers in her former positions was improp-
erly relied upon by the ALJ. The ALJ's use of any
discrepancy between discovery testimony and tri-
al testimony as a basis for wholesale exclusion of
the witness’ testimony was erroneous. The em-
ployer was wrongly faulted by the ALJ for not
informing Ms, Powers’ co-workers of her alleged
condition—a condition that she herself chose not
to be made known.

88

disability until weeks or even months into
her employmerit. In its order, the ALJ im-
properly expanded the scope of what Ms.
Powers asked for from the DMV in terms of
assistance in learning the job, She never, not
even when she submitted an actual request.
for an accommodation, included a request for
absolute consistency in terms of the steps by
which she. was instructed. The ALJ's failure
to consider the evidence of Ms. Powers’ per-
sonal responsibility regarding her training
issues further suggests a fundamentally
flawed outcome, Given the pattern exhibited
by Ms. Powers of refusing to accept what
any given trainer told her, preferring instead
to seek help from her supervisors, it is
doubtful that this employer could have ever
found thé perfect trainer, someone that Ms.
Powers would actually listen to and learn
from. “’ When viewed against the record in
this case, the ALJ’s decision reflects “a dis-
turbing pattern of exaggerations and out-

40, According to the testimony of Ms, Whitting-
ton, Ms. Powers didn’t trust her co-workers:
“She was combative.... she didn’t want to ...
listen to anything anyone said, If it wasn’t what

thought was supposed: to [be] done, she
didn’t want to hear it.”

41, It is not lost on this Court that the ALT who
heard and decided this case was also the ALJ in
Cobb.

42, Because the Commission's order relies heavily
on the standard of review as its basis for adopt-

vight inaccuracies” seemingly designed “to
justify a determination of discrimination.”
Cobb, 217 W.Va, at 774, 619 S.H.2d at 287,44
As: in Cobb, this Court will not allow the
deferential standard of review regarding an
ALJ’s credibility and factual determinations
to be used as a tool to accomplish a desired
result. And neither should the Commission,

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the decision of the
Commission is reversed.

Reversed.

ing the ALJ's decision and because the Commis-
sion did not take issue with even one statement,
inference, or evidentiary exclusion, it appears
that the Commission’s review of this matter was
perfunctory. We do note that the Commission
reduced the ALJ's $6,000 award for incidental
damages to $5,000, which is the current maxi-
mum amount for such damages. The Commis-
“sion viewed the improper award as a “typo-
graphical error.”

oO
oS

799 S,B.2d 520
BLACKROCK CAPITAL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION and 52"! Street Advis-
ors LLC, Defendants Below, Petitioners

ve

Jerry FISH; William Fish; and Flora Fish,
as Administratrix of the Estates of
James Eugene Fish and Jeffrey Scott
Fish; Richard T. Swain, Cathy Majoris,
and Megan Schlotter Swain, as Co-ad-
ministrators of the Estate of Steven M.
Swain; and David Scott Williams and
Ruth Williams, Plaintiffs Below; Al So-
lutions, Inc; and Tremont Associates,
LLC, Defendants Below; and Travelers
Property Casualty Company of America,
Intervenor Below, Respondents

. No, 15-1122
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
Submitted: January 25, 2017
Filed: April 24, 2017

Jeffrey A. Holmstrand, Esq. Grove,
Holmstrand & Delk, PLLC, Wheeling, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioners

Tiffany R. Durst, Esq., Nathaniel D. Grif-
fith, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanigan, Brown &
Poe, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent, AL Solutions, Ine.

Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Esq., Clayton J.
Fitzsimmons, Esq., Fitzsimmons Law Firm
PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, Mark Co-
lantonio, Esq., M. Bric Frankovitch, Esq.,
Carl A. Frankovitch, Esq., Frankovitch, Ane-
takis, Colantonio and Simon, Weirton, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Plaintiffs Below

Justice Ketchum:

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of
Hancock County, we examine the equitable
doctrine of unconscionability. Before the cir-
cuit court, a subsidiary company sought a
declaratory judgment against its parent com-
panies. The subsidiary challenged three man-
agement agreements by which the parent
companies managed, controlled and partici-
pated in the affairs of the subsidiary.

The subsidiary company claimed that two
clauses in the agreements were unconsciona-
ble. One clause said the parent companies
could never be liable to the subsidiary; the

92

other clause required the subsidiary to in-
demnify the parent companies for all legal
and liability costs. The subsidiary company
asserted the parent companies. unilaterally
imposed the clauses without giving the sub-
sidiary any meaningful choice, and asserted
that the clauses were oppressive and unjust.
‘The circuit agreed and, in an order dated
October 16, 2015, declared that the two chal-
lenged clauses were unconscionable and un-
enforceable.

One of the parent companies now appeals.
As we discuss below, we find no error in the
cireuit court’s declaratory judgment order
ruling the clauses unconscionable.

L

“FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 2010, an explosion and fire
killed three workers at a processing plant in
New Cumberland, West Virginia. The plant
processed powdered titanium and zirconium,
metals that: are pyrophorie and “liable to
ignite spontaneously‘on exposure to air.”!
Moreover, industry safety guides say that
water should never be sprayed on these met-
als if they catch fire; the titanium and zirco-
nium will dissociate water into oxygen and
hydrogen gas, and the hydrogen will then
explode.’ Prior to the fire, a water-based fire
suppression system was installed in the pro-
cessing plant.

This appeal centers on three agreements
to manage the processing plant that were
executed four years before the fire, in De-
cember 2006, These management agreements
involved three corporate parties: Tremont,

1. Oxford Dictionary of English (2012).

2, Material Safety Data Sheets (“MSDS”) in the
record state that titanium and zirconium are
“pyrophoric and may ignite in powder form.” An
MSDS for titanium’ provides that, in case of a
fire, “Do not extinguish with water.... The ap-
plication of water to burning titanium can cause
an explosion due to the evolution of hydrogen
gas.” Another MSDS says zirconium “should be
considered a dangerous fire hazard, or a danger-
ous explosion hazard if the mix is moist or hy-

drated..., Do not spray water on burning zirco-
nium..., If fire'starts ... the initial fire may be
followed by an explosion ... caused by the steam

and hydrogen generated within the burning
mass.”

Blackrock, and the subsidiary they ‘ereated,
AL Solutions.

The first corporate party, respondent Tre-
mont Associates, LLC (“Tremont”), was a
broker that connected buyers and sellers of
businesses. Tremont often took an ownership
stake in the businesses for its efforts. Tre-
mont had no employees and just two owners:
Troy Kenyon and Henry Goddard.

-In mid-2006, Tremont learned that a com-
pany (called Jamegy, Inc.) was seeking to sell
its titanium and zirconium processing busi-
ness, including the West Virginia processing
plant. Tremont then searched for investors to
buy the processing business.

‘The investors Tremont settled upon are
the second party. Petitioner Blackrock Kelso
Capital Corporation is an investment fund;
petitioner Blackiock Kelso Capital Advisors,
LLC, managed that investment fund. These
two companies operated jointly and seam-
lessly in the purchase of the West Virginia
processing plant, and we—like the parties—
refer to them singularly as “Blackrock.” It is
important to know the names of two employ-
ees of Blackrock: Marshall Merriman and
Stephen Sachman.

‘On December 6, 2006, Tremont and Black-
rock (the parent companies) came together
and incorporated the third party, AL Solu-
tions, Ine, (the subsidiary).4 The stated func-
tion of AL Solutions was to buy and operate
the West Virginia processing plant. The. doc-
uments of incorporation fixed the number’ of
directors at three. Three directors were then
appointed: Mr. Kenyon (from Tremont), and
Mr, Merriman and Mr, Sachman (from

3. On March 6, 2015, Blackrock Kelso Capital
Corporation became Blackrock Capital Invest-
ment Corporation. Blackrock Kelso Capital Ad-
visors, LLC, became 52nd Street Capital Advis-
ors LLC, and allegedly no longer serves as the
investment advisor to Blackrock Capital Invest-
ment Corporation,

4, At the same time, Tremont and Blackrock.also
created Tygem Holdings, Inc., to be nothing
more than a shell company to hold all of the
shares of AL Solutions. However, Tygem is not a
direct party to these proceedings, and our discus-
sion omits Tygem.

Blackrock), Those three directors then
anointed Mr, Goddard (from Tremont) as
president of AL Solutions, Mr. Goddard later
testified that the decision to appoint him as
president was “dictated ... by the guys at
Blackrock.”

_ On December 29, 2006, three management
agreements were executed between AL Solu-
tions on the one side (identified in the agree-
ments as “the company”), and Tremont and
Blackrock on the other (identified as “the
management parties”). Each management
agreement required Tremont and Blackrock
to provide “certain services” to AL Solutions.
The three agreements were:

@ The “Management Services Agreement,”
under which Tremont. and Blackrock
agreed to provide “certain agreed upon
management and financial services” to
AL Solutions;

eThe “Advisory Services Agreement,”
which required the provision of “certain
advisory services” to AL Solutions; and

eThe “Transaction Fee Agreement,” re-
quiring the provision of “certain consult-
ing and advisory services” to AL Solu-
tions,

Th exchange for providing “certain services”
to AL Solutions, Tremont and Blackrock
were entitled to collect fees. In an-e-rhail; Mr.
Goddard said these fees were important to

5, These agreements also involved Tygem as a
part of “the company.””

6. As an example of an indemnification clause,
paragraph 6 of the Management Services Agree-
ment provides:

6. Indemnification. The Company [AL Solu-
tions] shall:

(@) indemnify the Management Parties [Tre-
mont and Blackrock], each Related Person of
each Management Party, and each of the part-
ners, members, stockholders, directors, offi-
cers, employees, agents and controlling per-
sons of each Management Party or any of its
Related Persons (collectively, the ‘“Manage-
ment Related Parties”), to the fullest extent
Jawful, from and against any and all losses,
claims, damages and liabilities directly or indi-
rectly caused by, related to, based upon, or
arising out of the engagement of the Manage-
ment Parties pursuant to this Agreement, or
the rendering of any other advice or perform-
ance of any other services by any Management
Related Party for the Company 0 or any of its
subsidiaries; and

93

Tremont because “management. fees keep the
lights on over here.”

‘The “certain services” stromont and Black-
tock were required to provide are nowhere
defined, in the agreements or elsewhere. In
discovery, individuals from Tremont and
Blackrock all claimed in some fashion that
the agreements made them responsible for
providing AL Solutions with “management
services” or “guidance and assistance.” How-
ever, they were also ‘of the opinion that safe-
ty issues at the processing plant were not
within the scope of the agreements. For in-
stance, Mr. Sachman testified that safety was
“completely outside the purview” of the Man-
agement Services Agreement, but conceded,
“I can’t point you to a specific clause within
the agreement that explicitly says that.”

Within each of these management agree-
ments are two clauses that are the focus of
this appeal. The first is an indemnification
clause that requires AL Solutions to indemni-
fy Tremont and Blackrock “from any and all
losses, claims, damages and liabilities” aris-
ing out of the agreements or “the rendering
of any other advice or performance of any
other services[.]” § The second clause is titled
“no liability,” and says that Tremont and
Blackrock cannot be'liable to AL Solutions
“in contract: or tort or otherwise” for any-
thing arising out of the agreements.”

(b) promptly reimburse each Management Re-
lated Party for all costs and expenses (includ-
ing reasonable counsel fees and expenses), ‘as.

» incurred, in connection with the investigation
of, preparation for, or defense.of any pending
or threatened claim or any action or proceed-
ing arising therefrom, whether. or not any
Management Related Party is a party and
whether or not such claim, action or proceed-
ing is initiated or brought by or on behalf of
the Company and whether or not. such claim,
action or proceeding results in any liability.

7, As an example of a “no liability” clause, para-
graph 7 of the Advisory Services Agreement pro-
vides:

7. No Liability. The Company [AL Solutions]
agrees that no Management Related Party [Tre-
mont and. Blackrock] shall. have any liability
(whether direct or indirect, in contract or tort
or otherwise) to the Company or any of its
affiliates, or any of the security holders or
creditors of the Company or any of their re-
spective affiliates or any other Person directly
or indirectly caused by, related to; based upon,

94

At a meeting on December 29, 2006, law-
yers employed by Tremont and Blackrock
presented the three management agreements
to Mr. Goddard. No lawyer was hired to
represent the interests of AL Solutions, ei-
ther in the negotiation or the execution of the
agreements. Mr. Goddard signed the three
agreements as “president” of AL Solutions;
he then signed the same documents as the
“managing director” of Tremont. The chief
operating officer of Blackrock (Michael La-
zav) signed, and then the board of directors
for AL Solutions approved the agreements.

After signing the three management
agreements, and on the same day, Mr. God-
dard stepped down as president of AL Solu-
tions, Mr. Goddard admitted in a deposition
that his sole purpose in being appointed as
president of AL Solutions for less than one
month was to “just sign[ ] some papers to set
the shell up.”

During the period that Tremont and
Blackrock were negotiating and consummat-
ing the December 2006 purchase of the tita-
nium and zirconium business, several fires or
explosions occurred at the processing plant.
In July 2006, a worker died in a fire. Fires
also occurred on December 21, 2006, and
February 7, 2007. Testimony suggested no
one from Tremont or Blackrock investigated
the cause of these fires, Instead, even though
safety documents said water should never be
used on titanium and zirconium fires, a water
deluge system was installed. Despite the fire
suppression system, at least three more fires
occurred at the processing plant.$

or arising out of (i) the engagement of the
Management Parties pursuant to this Agree-
ment, the performance of the services to be
performed hereunder, or the rendering of any
other advice or performance of any other ser-
vices by any Management Related Party or (ii)
any Outside Activities.

8. An official 2014 report by the U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (“CSB”)
noted the recurring fires at the processing plant:

Before the 2010 incident, the New Cumberland
facility had experienced two fatal explosions
involving the ignition of metal dust. From 1993
until the December 2010 incident, the New
Cumberland VFD [Volunteer Fire Department]
responded to at least seven fires at AL Solu-
tions.... The CSB learned that several other
fires occurred at the New Cumberland facility
that did not result in a fire department re-

On December 9, 2010, another explosion
and fire occurred at the processing plant,
Three AL Solutions employees were killed in
the fire: brothers James Eugene Fish and
Jeffrey Scott Fish died inside the plant; Ste-
ven M. Swain’s skin was burnt off inside the
plant but he escaped and. collapsed outside,
only to die of his burn injuries four days
later. A contractor, David Scott Williams,
escaped but received burns. Employees Jer-
ry Fish and William Fish—brothers of dece-
dents James and Jeffrey Fish—suffered
emotional distress when they witnessed the
fire that killed their brothers.

The cireuit court noted that, over a 15-year
period culminating in December 2010, fires
and explosions had killed nearly 20% of the
workforce at this plant.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs (the injured workers and the
family members of the deceased workers)
sued defendants AL Solutions, Tremont, and
Blackrock. The plaintiffs asserted that,
through powers conferred by the three man-
agement agreements, Tremont and Black-
rock actively managed, controlled, and partic-
ipated in the daily affairs of AL Solutions.
The plaintiffs alleged that, acting together,
the three defendants recklessly operated and
managed the West Virginia processing plant
and that they knowingly failed to comply
with federal, state, and industry safety stan-
dards.

sponse. In fact, almost all employees ... re-
ported to CSB investigators that they had wit-
nessed one or more fires in the production
building,
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, AL Solutions, Inc., New Cumberland, WV,
Metal Dust Explosion and Fire (July 16, 2014).

9. For instance, in discovery, the plaintiffs
learned that Blackrock hired a computer forensic
expert to investigate whether a sales employee of
AL Solutions had misused e-mails; Blackrock
had the $20,000 bill paid by AL Solutions.

10. The plaintiffs’ complaints sought compensato-
ry and punitive damages, and asserted various
causes of action including: (1) “deliberate inten-
tion” under W.Va. Code §§ 23-4-2(d)(2)@) and
(2)(ii); (2) negligence and recklessness; (3) inten-

When AL Solutions answered the plain-
tiffs’ complaints, it also asserted a cross-
claim for contribution and/or indemnification
against its parent corporations, Tremont and
Blackrock. Tremont and Blackrock countered
by asserting claims against AL Solutions
pursuant to the indemnification and no-liabil-
ity clauses in the three management agree-
ments. Tremont and Blackrock alleged that
AL Solutions was contractually obligated to
pay for their attorney fees and costs defend-
ing against the plaintiffs’ case and to indem-
nify them from liability.

AL Solutions subsequently amended its
cross-claim against Tremont and Blackrock
and added a request for a declaratory judg-
ment, AL Solutions asked the circuit court to
declare that the indemnification and no-liabil-
ity clauses in the management agreements
were unconscionable and unenforceable. On
November 18, 2014, AL Solutions filed a
motion for partial summary judgment re-
garding the unconscionability of those two
clauses.

In an order dated October 16, 2015, the
eireuit court granted partial summary judg-
ment in favor of AL Solutions. Applying
West Virginia law to the contracts, the cireuit
court found the indemnification and no-liabili-
ty clauses procedurally and substantively un-
conscionable.

tional or reckless infliction of emotional distress;
(4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and
(5) strict liability for working with inherently
dangerous materials.

11, Tremont did not file an appeal, and on Janu-
ary 7, 2016, the circuit court authorized Tre-
mont's trial counsel to withdraw from the case.

Additionally, it has come to the Court's atten-
tion that Blackrock reached a settlement with the
plaintiffs. See Blackrock Capital Investment
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (October 6,
2016) (“Blackrock Capital Investment Corpora-
tion ... together with 52nd Street Capital Advis-
ors LLC ... have reached an agreement in prin-
ciple with the Plaintiffs to settle the actions for
$17,500,000[.1"). Despite this settlement, a dis-
pute appears to remain between AL Solutions
and Blackrock concerning their respective rights
to contribution or indemnification from the oth-
er.

12, Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
v, Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 Wa.
160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).

95

Blackrock now appeals the circuit court’s
partial summary judgment order.

i.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

WH “A motion for summary judgment
should be granted only when it is clear that
there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried
and inquiry concerning the facts is not desir-
able to clarify the application of the law.” 2

HM We review a circuit court's entry of
an order granting summary judgment, as
well as an order granting a declaratory judg-
ment, de novo. Additionally, this Court re-
views a circuit court’s interpretation of a
contract de novo.4 The term “de novo”
means “Anew; afresh; a second time.” “We
have often used the term ‘de novo’ in connec-
tion with the term ‘plenary. ... Perhaps
more instructive for our present purposes is
the definition of the term ‘plenary, which
means ‘[flull, entire, complete, absolute, per-
fect, unqualified.’ ” 1

We therefore give a new, complete and
unqualified review to the parties’ arguments
and the record before the cireuit court. Our
goal is to determine if there is any genuine
issue of fact about the unconscionability of
the two clauses, or if any inquiry concerning

13. Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va.
189, 451 S.B.2d 755 (1994). (“A circuit court’s
entry of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo.”); Syllabus Point 3, Cox v. Amick, 195
‘W.Va. 608, 466 S.B.2d 459 (1995) (“A circuit
court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is re-
viewed de novo.”).

14, W.Va. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Phar-
macy, Inc., 238 W.Va, 465, 796 S.E.2d 574, 578
(2017) (Moreover, to the extent that our resolu-
tion of this appeal necessitates our review of
contractual issues, ‘we apply a de novo standard
of review to {a] circuit court's interpretation of
[a] contract.’ ”) (citations omitted).

15. Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 193 W.Va. 687,
693, 458 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1995) (quoting Black's
Law Dictionary 435 (6th ed. 1990)).

16. State ex rel. Clark v, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
W.Va., Inc., 203 W.Va. 690, 701, 510 S.E.2d 764,
775 (1998) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1154
(6th ed. 1990)).

96

the facts is desirable to clarify the application
of the law.

IV.

ANALYSIS
Blackrock’s appeal of the circuit court’s
order boils down to two assertions of error.
Blackrock’s central argument is that the cir-
cuit court ignored a choice of law provision
within each management agreement that re-
quired the application of New York, not West
Virginia, law. When construed under New
York principles of contract law, Blackrock
argues that the indemnification and no-liabili-
ty clauses are conscionable and fair. Black-
rock’s second argument challenges the man-
ner in which the circuit court’ entered its
ruling, asserting the cirenit court ruled on an
incomplete record and thereby deprived it of
due process.
We address and, as explained below, reject
Blackrock’s two contentions.

A. _Uneonscionability in General

HI The first argument we’ address is
Blackrock’s assertion that the indemnifica-
tion and no-liability clauses are conscionable
and fair. Blackrock contends the cireuit court
erred in finding the clauses to be unconscion-
able, in part because it failed to interpret the
clauses under New York law.

The circuit court found the indemnification
clause and the no-liability clause unconscion-
able after applying West Virginia law. How-
ever, the management agreements contain a
choice of law provision providing that they

17. Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Tr. v. Blanken-
ship, 231 W.Va. 637, 644, 749 8,B.2d 329, 336
(2013). Accord, W.Va, CVS Pharmacy, LLC v.
McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 238 W.Va. 465, 796
_S,E.2d 574 (2017).

18. Gen. Elec, Co. v. Keyser, 166 W.Va, 456, 461
. 2.2, 275 S.E.2d 289, 292 n.2 (1981),

19. Mandel v, Liebman, 303 N.Y, 88, 100 N.E.2d
149, 152 (1951). Cf, Syllabus Point 12, in part,
Brown v, Genesis Healthcare Corp, 228 W.Va.
646, 724 S.B.2d 250, 261 (2011), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Marmet Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 132 8.Ct. 1201,
182 L.Bd.2d 42 (2012) (“Brown I”) ("The doc-
trine of unconscionability means that, because of
an overall and gross imbalance, one-sidedness or
lop-sidedness in a contract, a court may be justi-

would “be governed and construed in accor-
dance with the internal laws of the State of
New York(.]” This Court has recognized “the
presumptive validity of a choice of law provi-
sion” 7 and found that such a provision is
“not automatically void[.]” 8

Blackrock argues the circuit court erred in
applying West Virginia law. We agree with
Blackrock on this point, and hold that the
cireuit court should have assessed the uncon-
scionability of the two clauses under New
York law, not West Virginia law. Neverthe-
less, New York's unconscionability jurispru-
dence is structured’ almost identically to
West Virginia’s, Under a plenary review,
when we apply New York’s contract law to
the record, the outcome of this case remains
unchanged: the indemnification clause and
no-liability clause in the management agree-
ments are unconscionable,’

HMM Under New York law, like under
West Virginia law, an unconscionable agree-
ment is one that “is so grossly unreasonable
or unconscionable in the light of the mores
and business practices of the time and place
as to be unenforcible [sic] according to its
literal terms.” “{AJn unconscionable con-
tract is one such as no man in his senses
and not under a delusion would make on.the
one hand, and as no honest or fair man
would accept, on the other.” *° The doctrine
of unconscionability is rooted in equitable
principles, is flexible, and is “intended to be
sensitive to the realities and nuances of the
bargaining process[,}’ 4

fied in refusing to enforce the contract as writ-
ten.”).

20. -Mandel, 100 N.E.2d at 152 (quotations omit-
ted). Cf. McGinnis v. Cayton, 173 W.Va. 102, 113,
312 S.B.2d 765, 776 (1984) (quoting Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411, 10 S.Ct, 134, 33
L.Ed. 393 (1889) (‘It may be apparent from the
intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself;
such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other;
which are unequitable and unconscientious bar-
gains.”)).

21. State v. Avco Fin, Serv. of N.Y. Inc., 50 N.Y.2d
383, 429 N.Y.S.2d 181, 406 N.B.2d 1075, 1078
(1980). Cf. Syllabus Point 12, in part, Brown I
(“The concept of unconscionability must be ap-

Hs Like West Virginia, New York law
holds that a party alleging unconscionability
must generally show that “the contract was
both procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable when made—i.e., some showing of
an absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party.” ” “The procedural element
of unconscionability concerns the contract
formation process and the alleged lack of
meaningful choice; the substantive element
looks to the content of the contract, per
se.” 8 A court assesses the existence of over-
all unconseionability under a sliding scale
between procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability: “the more questionable the
meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance
in a contract’s terms should be tolerated and
vice versa,”

One court summarized New York’s doc-
trine of unconscionability this way:
In determining the conscionability of a
contract, no set weight is to be given any
one factor; each case must be decided on
its own facts. However, in general, it can
be said that procedural and substantive
unconscionability operate.on a “sliding
scale”; the more questionable the meaning-
fulness of choice, the less imbalance in a
contract’s terms should be tolerated and
vice versa. While there may be extreme
cases where a contractual term is so outra-
geous and oppressive as to warrant a find-
ing of unconscionability irrespective of the
contract formation process such cases are
the exception. Generally, there must be a

plied in a flexible manner, taking into consider-
ation all of the facts and circumstances of a
particular case.”).

22. Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73
N.Y.2d 1, 537 NLY.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d 824,
828 (1988) (quotations and citations omitted),
Cf. Syllabus Point 20, Brown I (‘A contract term.
ig unenforceable if it is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. However, both
need not be present to the same degree. Courts
should apply a ‘sliding scale’ in making this de-
termination: the more substantively oppressive
the contract term, the less evidence of procedur-
al unconscionability is required to come to the
conclusion that the clause is unenforceable, and
vice versa”).

Unlike West Virginia, several New York cases
have found exceptional circumstances “where a

97

showing of both a lack of a: meaningful
choice and the presence of contractual
terms which unreasonably favor one par-
ty.... Absent some violation of law or
transgression of a strong public policy, the
parties to a contract ‘are basically free to
make whatever agreement they wish, no

matter how unwise it might appear to a

third party. The doctrine of unconsciona-

‘bility, with its emphasis on the contract-

making process, is really an expression of,

rather than an éxception to, this principle.

By focusing on the mariner in which a

contract is entered into and the status of

the parties, the doctrine ‘is designed to
insure freedom of contract and not to ne-
gate it.5
As another court said, the doctrine of uncon- -
scionability ensures that contracts are “the
subject of calm and deliberate adjust.
ment{.|?

Applying New York law, we now examine
the circuit court’s finding that the two claus-
es in the management agreements were pro-
cedurally and substantively unconscionable,

B. Procedural unconscionability

HH New York courts say that weighing
procedural unconseionability requires an ex-
amination of the contract formation process
and the parties’ alleged lack of meaningful
choice. “The focus is on such matters as the
size and commercial setting of the transac-
tion, whether deceptive or high-pressured
tactics were employed, the use of fine print

- in the contract, the experience and education

of the party claiming unconscionability, and

provision of the contract is so outrageous as to
warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground
of substantive unconscionability alone,” Gillman,
537 N.Y.S,2d 787, 534 N.E.2d at 829,

23. Simar Holding Corp. v. GSC, 87 A.D.3d 688,
928 NLY,S.2d 592, 595 (2011).

24. State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 468 8 NYS: 2d
131, 145 (1983),

25, Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.8.2d 131, 145 (1983) (cita-
tions omitted).

26. Hydraulic Power Co. of Niagara Fails v. Pette-
bone-Cataract Paper Co,, 198 A.D. 644, 191
NLY.S. 12, 18 (1921).

98

whether there was & disparity in bargtsing
power.” ?7

HMM The circuit court examined the con-
tract formation process and found that the
two clauses in the management agreements
were adopted in a procedurally unconsciona-
ble manner. The circuit court found it undis-
puted that attorneys working for Blackrock
and Tremont drafted the three management
agreements; no lawyer was hired to repre-
sent the interests of AL Solutions in the
negotiation or the execution of the agree-
ments. Even though AL Solutions had no
lawyer, the cireuit court found that AL Solu-
tions was compelled to pay the attorney’s
fees incurred by Tremont during the transac-
tion.

The circuit court also found it undisputed
that, at the time the parties executed the
‘management agreements, the board of di-
rectors for AL Solutions was comprised sole-
ly of principals from Blackrock and Tremont.
That board then appointed one of the two
owners of Tremont, Mr. Goddard, as presi-
dent of AL Solutions. Hence, when Mr. God-
dard signed the three management agree-
ments on behalf of both Tremont and AL
Solutions, and the board approved those
agreements, there was no real and voluntary
meeting of the minds. The circuit court even
found that Mr. Goddard was not “consciously
aware” that the agreements contained the
no-liability clauses. Put simply, AL Solutions
did not bargain for the indemnification and
no-liability clauses, The circuit court found
the clauses were a result of Blackrock and
‘Tremont “effectively contracting with them-

27. Gillman, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d at
828. Cf. Syllabus Point 17, in part, Brown I
(“Procedural unconscionability is concerned
with inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in
the bargaining process and formation of the con-
tract. Procedural unconscionability involves a va-
riety of inadequacies that results in the lack of a
real and voluntary meeting of the minds of the
parties, considering all the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction.”).

28. See Process Am., Inc. v. Cynergy Holdings,
ELC, 35 F.Supp.3d 259, 263 (B.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Although Process America’s executives appar-
ently were not represented by counsel, neverthe-
less, ‘[tJhere is a presumption of conscionability
when the contract is between businessmen in a
commercial setting.’ ”).

selves through their exclusive control, au-
thority, and dominion” over AL Solutions,
primarily to “insulate themselves from any
and all liability.”

Blackrock does not dispute the circuit,
court’s findings. Instead, Blackrock presents
a seattershot argument that the cireuit court
misinterpreted the legal effect of these facts.
For instance, Blackrock asserts that con-
tracts between “businessmen in a commercial
setting” are presumed to be conscionable,®
or that the failure of an individual to consult
a lawyer before a contract is executed is not
enough to warrant a finding of procedural
unconscionability.® Blackrock does not ex-
plain how these principles apply in this case,
particularly where the facts present a corpo-
ration that lacks counsel or any other inde-
pendent representation, and where there was
no “businessman” acting in an arms-length
manner on AL Solution’s behalf.

Blackrock’s theory is that the contract-
execution process which the circuit court
deemed oppressive is actually fair, because it
is consistent with traditional principals of
corporate governance. Much of Blackrock’s
argument centers on Mr. Goddard and the
fact that he acted on both sides of the trans-
action, signing as president of AL Solutions
and as managing director of Tremont. Black-
rock asserts Mr. Goddard’s dual role was not,
unfair because it is a common feature of
corporate practice. Blackrock contends that
parent corporations routinely enter into
agreements with subsidiary shell companies,
and when they do so their officers necessari-
ly sign contracts on behalf of both entities.2°

29. See Reach Music Pub., Inc. v. Warner/Chappell
Music, Inc., 2014 WL 5861984, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 10, 2014) (“[TIhere is ‘no requirement in
the law that consultation with a lawyer must
occur in order to render a contractual obligation
enforceable.’ Many agreements are ehtered into
without counsel on one side, the other, or
both.”)(citation omitted). .

30. See, eg., Vendetti v. Fiat Auto S.p.A., 802
F.Supp. 886, 893 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Tt is not
uncommon for a parent company and its subsid-
iaries to have common directors and/or own-
ers.”); JLB. Equities, Inc. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp.,
131 F.Supp.2d 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (‘“It has
been established that overlapping officers and
directors are ‘intrinsic to the parent-subsidiary
relationship,’ and that they are not determinative

Blackrock argues that officers who sign
agreements on behalf of both the parent
company and the subsidiary do not violate
any fiduciary duty when they do so. Citing to
general principals of corporate law, Black-
rock argues that, “The weight of authority
holds that a parent corporation owes no fidu-
ciary duties to its wholly-owned subsid-
iary.”*! Much of Blackrock’s argument is
founded upon Anadarko Petrolewm Corpora-
tion v, Panhandle Eastern Corporation,
where the Delaware court stated:

It is a basic principle of Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law that directors are
subject to the fundamental fiduciary duties
of loyalty and disinterestedness. Specifical-
ly, directors cannot stand on both sides of
the transaction nor derive any personal
benefit through self-dealing. However, in a
parent and wholly-owned subsidiary con-
text, the directors of the subsidiary are
obligated only to manage the affairs of the
subsidiary in the best interests. of the par-
ent and its shareholders.

We note, however, that the court in Ana-
darko Petroleum focused solely upon the fi-
duciary duties of corporate directors; it did
not consider the doctrine of unconscionabili-
ty. Moreover, the trial court in Anadarko
Petrolewm explicitly avoided considering the
fairness of the contracts at issue. The trial
court-said, “For purposes of this decision it is
not necessary to evaluate the fairness of the
Disputed Agreements. Suffice it to say that
at least one of the individual defendants con-
ceded that he did not think Panhandle could
have obtained Anadarko’s approval of the

as to whether the subsidiary is a ‘mere depart-
ment’ of the parent.”).

31. Westlake Vinyls, Inc. v. Goodrich Corp., 518
F.Supp.2d 902, 917 (W.D. Ky. 2007).

32, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle East-
ern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Aviall, Inc. v. Ryder Sys.,
Inc., 913 F.Supp. 826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(“[TJhose who operate the parent company owe
no fiduciary duties to the wholly owned subsid-
iary, and even when the parent company an-
nounces a proposed spin-off of the subsidiary,
the directors of the parent and the directors of
the subsidiary owe no fiduciary duties to the
soon-to-be-independent subsidiary’s prospective
stockholders.”).

99

agreements if Anadarko had been an inde-
pendent company.” %

HE Furthermore, it is a traditional
principle of corporate governance that the
law jealously regards a contract between a
parent corporation and its subsidiary and it
is voidable for unfairness, It is well-settled
law that “[a] contract between parent-subsid-
iary corporations, even-with identical officers,
is not void, but only voidable for fraud, or
unfairness.”

[A] contract or business transaction be-
tween two corporations having all or a part
of their directors or officers in common is
not inherently invalid and is not void be-
cause of the relationship alone, but is void-
able only. However, it is generally held
that a contract between two corporations
having one ot more common directors or
officers is jealously regarded by the law,
and once such a transaction is questioned
it is thereafter subjected to the closest
scrutiny by the courts because of this rela-
tionship, and is voidable if found to be
unfair even though there be no taint of
fraud. The tule is deemed necessary to the
end that in the absence of arm’s length
bargaining the scales may not be unfairly
tipped to one side or the other even
through mistake or inadvertence.

In the instant case, “AL Solutions never
argued that the principals of Tremont or
Blackrock were violating any fiduciary
duties, whether to shareholders or anyone
else. Instead, it has asserted continuously
and strenuously that the disputed clauses
were unfairly imposed upon AL Solutions, to

33. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E.
Corp., 521 A.2d 624, 627 (Del. Ch. 1987).

34, Am. Motors Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Reve- -

nue, 64 Wis.2d 337, 219 N.W.2d 300, 305 (1974).

33. Colorado Mgmt. Corp. v. Am. Founders Life
Ins. Co. of Denver, 145 Colo. 413, 359 P.2d 665,
668 (1961). Accord Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke
Co, of W.Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64 F.2d 817,
823 (4th Cir. 1933) (‘Transactions between cor-
porations Having interlocking directorates, the
fairness and good faith of which transactions are
challenged, are jealously regarded by the law,
and those who would sustain them must show
their entire fairness.”’).

100

efit of Blackrock (and Tremont). Put suc-
einetly, we do not think AL Solutions would
have approved the two clauses in the agree-
ments if AL Solutions had been an indepen-
dent company.

Examining the extensive record presented
by the parties, we find no error in the circuit,
court's conclusion that the indemnification
and no-liability clauses were adopted in a
procedurally unconscionable manner. Tre-
mont and Blackrock disrespected the corpo-
rate form, the corporate structure, of AL
Solutions. The actions of Tremont and Black-
rock may be routine in the business world,
but that does not make those actions fair and
conscionable. By exercising complete domin-
ion over AL Solutions in the execution of the
indemnification and no-liability clauses, Tre-
mont and Blackrock disregarded the inde-
pendent corporate identity of AL Solutions.

To determine whether an agreement is
procedurally unconscionable, “we must exam-
ine the contract formation process for a lack
of meaningful choice.” %° AL Solutions clearly
had no meaningful choice in the contract
formation process. This was not an arms-
length negotiation between competent, inde-
pendent business-persons. No individual or
attorney represented AL Solutions in- the
negotiation or drafting of the indemnification
or no-liability clauses; no attorney was pres-
ent to protect the interests of AL Solutions,
while AL Solutions was forced to pay the
attorney fees for Tremont; and the person
who signed on behalf of AL Solutions, Mr.
Goddard, admitted he did not know all the
terms of the agreements.

We have given a plenary review to the

record, and weighed the contract formation’

process under New York law. We find no
error in the circuit court’s determination that

36, In re Lawrence, 24 N.Y.3d 320, 998 N.Y.8.2d
698, 23 N.E,3d 965, 976-77 (2014).

37. Gillman, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d at
829. Cf. Syllabus Point 19, in part, Brown I
(‘Substantive unconscionability involves unfair-
ness in the contract itself aad whether a contract

term is one-sided and will have an overly harsh’

effect on the disadvantaged party. The factors to
be weighed in assessing substantive unconsciona-
bility vary with the content of the agreement.”’),

its exclusive detriment and solely to the ben-

the two clauses were adopted in a procedur-
ally unconscionable manner.
C. Substantive unconscionability

TM Under New York contract law,
weighing substantive unconscionability “en-
tails an analysis of the substance of the bar-
gain to determine whether the terms were
unreasonably favorable to the party against
whom unconscionability is urged.” 9? The
courts of New York have held that “[s]ub-
stantive elements of unconscionability appear
in the content of the contract per sef.]” %
“{Clontract provisions that are oppressive,
unjust, and unreasonably deprive a party of
the benefits of his or her bargain.are sub-
stantively unconscionable.” * “Examples of
unreasonably favorable contractual provi-
sions are virtually limitless[.]”

* [IB The circuit court carefully exam-
ined the contents of the“ indemnification
clause and the no-liability clause in the con-
text of the three management agreements.
The circuit court found that both clauses
were unreasonably favorable to Tremont.
and Blackrock, and therefore substantively
unconscionable.

The three management agreements re-
quired Tremont and Blackrock to provide
unspecified “certain services.” For example,
the circuit court noted the Management Ser-
vices Agreement required Tremont and
Blackrock to provide “certain management
and financial services,” and in return they
would receive a substantial annual fee “for
performing a service that is wholly undefined
under the contract.” However, because of the
no-liability and indemnification clauses, the
circuit court found Tremont and Blackrock
“would be immune from liability for their
conduct,” and would have a claim for indem-
nity, even for their own wrongful conduct to
third parties. The circuit court found the

38. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc. v. Fitepatrick, 95
AD.3d 1169, 945 N.Y.S.2d 697, 699 (2012)
(quoting Matter of Friedman, 64 A.D.2d 70, 407
N.Y.S.2d 999, 1008 (1978)).

39. Day Op of N. Nassau, Inc. v. Viola, 16 Misc.3d
1122(A), 2007 WL 2305035, *7, 847 N.Y.S.2d
901 (Sup. Ct, 2007).

40. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 145.

“harsh effect of these provisions is that
[Blackrock and Tremont] had no responsibili-
ty to adequately perform under the agree-
ment.”

The circuit court found that, if the indem-
nification and no-liability clauses were found
to be enforceable, Tremont and Blackrock
“could be insulated from all liability even if
they would have refused to perform under
the contract. In other words, [Blackrock] and
Tremont could have refused to perform any
management services, financial services, or
advisory services, and [AL Solutions] would
haye been without recourse.” Because of this,
the circuit court concluded that the indemni-
fication and no-liability clauses are “a perfect
example of substantive unconscionability.”

The circuit court also found the two
clauses lacked any mutuality of obligation,
The indemnification clause requires AL So-
lutions to indemnify Tremont and Black-

- rock; the no-liability clause provides that
Tremont and Blackrock would never be lia-
ble AL Solutions. There is no reciprocal
provision regarding liability or indemnity
for AL Solutions. AL Solutions must inderh-
nify and defend Tremont and Blackrock
even if AL Solutions initiates the proceed-
ing or suit, The clauses have the practical
effect of preventing AL Solutions from su-
ing Tremont or Blackrock for any purpose,
including breach of the agreements. Hence,
the circuit court found the clauses were
completely one-sided and unreasonably fa-
vorable to one side.

Taken together, the cireuit court conchided
that ‘the two clauses were substantively un-
conscionable.

Blackrock concedes that the indemnifica-
tion and no-liability clauses are, by their very

41. Process Am., Inc. v. Cynergy Holdings, LLC, 35
F.Supp.3d 259, 260 (B.D.N.Y. 2014).

42, Id, (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noble
Lowndes Int'l, Inc., 84 NY.2d 430, 618 N.Y.S.2d
882, 643 N,E.2d 504 (1994)).

43. Vanderlinde Elec. Corp. v. City of Rochester, 54
AD.2d 155, 388 N.Y.8.2d 388, 391 (1976). See
also Ippolito-Lutz, Inc. v. Cohoes Hous. Auth., 22
A.D.2d 990, 254 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (1964) (“An
exculpatory clause of this nature is not always
absolute. It must be construed strictly against the

101

own terms, broad enough to hold Blackrock
harmless for negligence in the performance
of its contractual services or even an inten-
tional breach of the agreements. However,
Blackrock claims that “{ulnder New York
law, parties to a contract may agree to limit
the liability. that the other may recover from
a breach of contract.” | “A party ‘may later
regret their assumption of thé risks of non-
performance in this manner; but the courts
let them lie on the bed they made.’ ”

AL Solutions responds by point-
ing out that, under New York law, indemnifi-
cation clauses and no-liability clauses have
never been declared per se conscionable and
fair. Just the opposite is true. “‘No damage’
clauses. are not always absolute and they
must be strictly construed against the party
seeking to .avoid liability.”48 New York
courts have said that contracts must have
Sat least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties ‘outlined
in the contract,” ‘and any contract clause
modifying or limiting remedies “in an wncon-
scionable manner is subject to deletion and
in that event the remedies made available

. as if the stricken. clause had never exist-
ed.” 4 Accordingly, “It follows that contrac-

-tual limitations upon remedies are generally

to be enforced unless unconscionable.” *
Stated differently, “Contractual limitations
on remedies are generally enforced unless
entered into under circumstances evidencing
fraud or unconscionability.” 4

This Court is cognizant that under New _
York law, and the law of most other. jurisdic-
tions, it is the rare case where a contract
between two commercial parties is found to
be unconscionable. This Court has found sim-
ilarly, holding that contract law “permits
courts to protect parties from grossly unfair,

party seeking exemption from liability because of

‘his own fault.”).

44. Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd.,
23 NY.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d
685, 687 (1968) (quoting Uniform Commercial
Code, § 2-719, Official Comment 1).

43. Wilson Trading Corp., 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244
N.E.2d at 687 (emphasis added).

46. Edwards v. N. Am. Van Lines, 129 A.D.2d 869,
513 NLY,S,2d 895, 897 (1987). .

102

unconscionable bargains; it does not permit,
courts to protect commercial litigants from
stupid or inefficient bargains willingly and
deliberately entered into.” 4”

Nevertheless, unconscionability must be
assessed based on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. We have exam-
ined the indemnification and no-liability
clauses and we find them both unreasonably
favorable to Blackrock. Applying equitable
principles of New York law, these two claus-
es are outrageous and oppressive. The claus-
es prevent AL Solutions from suing Black-
rock, even if Blackrock refused to perform
any of its “certain services.” The presence of
these clauses in- the three management
agreements does not reflect the freedom of
contract, but rather shows that AL Solutions
was a hapless pawn destined for sacrifice on
the ‘altar of corporate law.

“In summary, we find no error in the cireuit
court’s conclusion that the two, clauses were
substantively unconscionable.

D. ‘Overall unconscionability

H.sNew York law requires a modi-
eum of both procedural and substantive un-
conscionability in order for a contract provi-
sion -to be unenforceable. “[P]rocedural and
substantive unconscionability operate on a
‘sliding scale’; the more questionable the
meaningfulness of choice, the less imbalance
in a contract's terms should be tolerated and
vice versa.” 48 Elements of procedural and
substantive unfairness abound in the indem-
nification and no-liability..clauses, and we
have no difficulty finding a lack of any bar-
gained-for exchange between the parties.

41. State ex rel. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Tucker,
229 W.Va. 486, 497, 729 S.B.2d 808, 819 (2012).

48. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 145.

49. Blackrock offers a one-paragraph alternative
to voiding the two clauses. It asserts. that the
circuit court should have declared all three man-
agement agreements void in their entirety. Black-
rock's argument consists of four sentences and
no citation to legal authority. A “skeletal ‘argu-
ment,’ really nothing more than an assertion,
does not preserve a claim. Judges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs. Fur-
thermore, this Court has adhered to the rule that
although we liberally construe briefs in determin-
ing issues presented for review, issues mentioned

‘The circuit court was therefore correct in its
determination that the two clauses were op-
pressive, unfair, and unconscionable, and
therefore unenforceable.®

E. Due Process

HM Blackrock’s second argument is that
it had insufficient opportunity to respond to
AL Solutions’s motion for partial summary
judgment. Blackrock contends the circuit
court violated its due process rights and
wholly precluded Blackrock from offering ev-
idence or arguments countering the asser-
tions of AL Solutions that the two clauses
were unconscionable,

AL Solutions filed its motion for partial
summary judgment on November 18, 2014.
The circuit court entered its order 333 days
later, on October 16, 2015. Between those
dates, the parties vigorously litigated two
other motions that were intertwined with the
summary judgment motion,

The first motion entangled with the sum-
mary judgment motion came from the plain-
tiffs. The insurer for AL Solutions deposited
the liability insurance policy limits with the
circuit court.° The plaintiffs moved to dis-
tribute those funds. Counsel for Tremont and
Blackrock objected because depletion of the
insurance policy funds would impair their
ability (ander the management agreements)
to recover indemnification from AL Solu-
tions.

The second entangled motion was Black-
rock’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ cases

‘for a lack of personal jurisdiction. Blackrock

asserted it was a foreign corporation that

only in passing but not supported with pertinent
authority, are not considered on appeal.” State v.
Kaufman, 227 W.Va, 537, 555 0.39, 711 S.E.2d
607, 625 n.39 (2011) (citations, quotations, and
ellipses omitted). We refuse to consider this argu-
ment.

50. The insurer'for AL Solutions stated there was
a total of $16,500,000,00 in available coverage.
However, $703,698.20 of that coverage was set
aside for defense costs and expenses on behalf of
Tremont and Blackrock, The insurer reserved the
right to seek reimbursement of those costs and
expenses in the event the indemnification and
no-liability clauses are unenforceable, and
agreed make that money available to the plain-
tiffs.

never transacted business in West Virginia.
Alternatively, it asserted that the plaintiffs’
claims did not arise out of Blackrock’s con-
tacts with West Virginia.

On May 6, 2015, the circuit court sent the
parties a letter stating it had received the
motion for partial summary judgment on un-
conscionability filed by AL Solutions. The
circuit court ordered “any party wishing to
file a response shall do so by June 12, 2015.”

Fifteen days later, on May 21*, the circuit
court entered an order granting the plain-
tiffs’ motion to distribute the insurance policy
funds. However, in that order, the circuit
court mentioned two other dates. Firstly, the
circuit court noted Blackrock’s motion to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and
anticipated Blackrock “will receive a decision
on that issue by July 1, 2015.” Secondly, and
more importantly, the circuit court discussed
Tremont and Blackrock’s claim that AL Solu-
tions was “contractually obligated to defend
and indemnify them herein pursuant to cer-
tain agreements the parties entered into in
December, 2006[.]” The circuit court stated
that, “[i]f the issue of indemnification and the
validity of the agreements ... still remains
after the [circuit court] issues its decision on
Jurisdiction, the parties must fully brief the
issue by October 30, 2015.”

On June 12, 2015, Tremont filed its re-
sponse to AL Solutions’s motion for partial
summary judgment, in compliance with the
circuit court’s letter. Tremont’s response was
18 pages long and contained 40 pages of
exhibits.

Blackrock, however, did not file a full re-
sponse. Instead, Blackrock filed a two-para-
graph “initial response” to the motion for
partial summary judgment. Blackrock stated
generally that it opposed the motion, but said
Blackrock would respond to “that motion by
October 30, 2015 in the event the issue re-

51, Blackrock contemporaneously filed a third
proceeding, a petition for a writ of prohibition, to
halt enforcement of the circuit court’s jurisdic-
tion order. The Court refused the petition on
November 4, 2015. See State ex rel. Blackrock
Capital Investment Corporation, et al. v. The Hon-
orable Ronald E, Wilson, et al., No. 15-0797.

52, See State ex rel, AL Solutions, Inc., v. The
Honorable Ronald E. Wilson, et al., No. 15-0897.

103

mains pertinent as to them following the
Court’s anticipated ruling on their [Black-
rock’s] jurisdictional motion.”

On June 18, 2015, the circuit court entered
an order denying Blackrock’s jurisdictional
motion. Lastly, on August 19, 2015, the cir-
cuit court entered a detailed “distribution
order” distributing the insurance policy
funds to the plaintiffs.

On September 18, 2015, the parties filed
two pleadings in this Court implicating the
indemnification clauses.*! AL Solutions peti-
tioned for a writ of prohibition against the
distribution order, arguing that the order
deprived AL Solutions of insurance money to
pay indemnification claims by Tremont and
Blackrock. Blackrock filed a notice of ap-
peal of the same distribution order, and as-
serted that the order removed Blackrock’s
right to indemnification under the manage-
ment agreements.

The circuit court somehow learned that the
parties’ arguments before this Court all
hinged upon the indemnification clauses. In
response, on October 8, 2015, the circuit
court sent the parties a letter stating it want-
ed AL Solutions to draft a proposed order
granting the motion for partial summary
judgment and finding the indemnification and
no-liability clauses unconscionable. The cir-
euit court required AL Solutions to submit
the proposed order by October 18", and any
party wanting to file objections was required
to do so by October 15", The goal of the
circuit court was to enter the order and
submit it to this Court no later than October
6th,

On October 18, AL Solutions submitted
its proposed order. After AL Solutions deliv-
ered its proposed order, Blackrock hand de-
livered to the circuit court a five-page re-
quest to enlarge the time to file objections
until October 30, Blackrock’s request said

The Court refused the petition on November 3,
2015.

53. See Blackrock Capital Investment Corp., et al.
v. Jeffrey Fish, et al., No. 15-0942. On November
17, 2015, this Court granted the plaintiffs’ mo-
tion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
distribution order was interlocutory and not ap-
pealable.

104

that if Blackrock had additional time then it
would be “permitted ... to file exhibits and
other evidence” to support its opposition to
the motion for partial summary judgment.
Blackrock, however, did not describe for the
eireuit court what these exhibits or other
evidence might show. The circuit court
promptly denied the request for an exten-
sion,

In accordance with the circuit court’s dead-
line, on October 15, Tremont filed its objec-
tions to the proposed order, consisting of 15
pages of arguments. Tremont also attached

- eight pages of exhibits to its objections,

Blackrock filed seven pages of objections.
Blackrock filed no exhibits of its own nor did
it make any mention of exhibits or evidence
critical to its position.™ Blackrock argued, as
it does in this appeal, that the circuit court
should have applied New York law and found
the agreements procedurally and substan-
tively fair.

The next day, October 16, 2015, the circuit,
court entered its order granting partial sum-
mary judgment to AL Solutions, and found
the indemnification and no-liability clauses
were unconscionable, A copy of the order was
e-mailed to this Court.5 .

54. An affidavit from Blackrock’s attorney was
attached to the response reasserting that Black-
rock needed until October 30th to properly re-
spond. The attorney averred that Blackrock was
prepared to meet the October 30th deadline, and
at that time would submit “opposition evi-

dencef,]”

35. On October 19th, the circuit court notified
Blackrock by letter that it did not review Black-
rock's objections until after the partial summary
judgment order was signed. Blackrock appears
to have e-mailed its objections to the circuit
judge's: law clerk, and ignored the automatic
reply message saying the law clerk was on vaca-
tion, However, despite Blackrock’s objections,
the circuit court concluded it would not with-
draw its order. While the circuit court's action
was abrupt, we have given careful and thorough
review to the issues raised by Blackrock in the
record,

56, Syllabus Point 2, in part, Taylor v. Elkins
Home Show, Ine., 210 W.Va. 612, 558 S,E.2d 611
(2001).

57. Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Cas, & Sur, Co, 148
W.Va, at 160, 133 S.B.2d at 771,

Hs Blackrock argues it was harmed
by the circuit court’s “precipitous procedural
decision” in this case, Blackrock does not
dispute that “a trial court has plenary power
to reconsider, revise, alter or amend an inter-
locutory order[.J”** Further, Blackrock
rightly states that “[a] motion for summary
judgment should be granted only when it is
clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to
be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is
not desirable to clarify the application of the
Jaw.” 57 In weighing the motion, “all exhibits
and affidavits and other matters submitted
by both parties should-be considered by the
court[,]” 8 Blackrock ‘also argues, “[I]t is a
fundamental requirement of due process to
be given ‘the opportunity to be heard “at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner,” ?” 69

Blackrock contends the cireuit court violat-
ed these fundamental rules, because it shift-
ed the briefing deadlines and ruled without
the benefit of briefing and evidence by Black-
rock,

After a review of the lengthy record, we
are not persuaded by Blackrock’s arguments,
Between the filing of AL Solutions’s motion
for partial summary judgment and entry of
the circuit court's order, Tremont (Black-
rock’s identically situated co-defendant) re-

58. Syllabus Point 3, in part,.Haga v. King Coal
Chevrolet Co., 151 W.Va, 125, 150 S.E.2d 599
(1966). Aécord, Syllabus Point 2, Aetna Cas. &
Sur, Co., 148 W.Va. at 160, 133 S.B.2d at 771
(“On a motion for summary judgment all papers
_ of record and all matters submitted by both par-
ties should be considered by the coutt.”’),

59, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.Va.
139, 154, 479 S,E.2d 649, 664 (1996) (quoting
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S, 319, 333, 96 S.Ct,
893, 47°'L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14
L.Ed.2d 62 (1965))). See also Stull v. Firemen’s
Pension & Relief Fund of City of Charleston, 202
W.Va. 440, 447, 504 S.E.2d 903, 910 (1998)
(“{I]he opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner is a fundamen-
tal requirement of due process.”); Marcus v. Hol-
ley, 217 W.Va. 508, 527, 618 S.E.2d 517, 536
(2005) (“Procedural due process rights entitle an
individual to representation by counsel, notice,
an opportunity to be heard, and the right to
present evidence.”).

peatedly succeeded in doing the things
Blackrock says it could not, At the same time
Blackrock says the circuit court stripped it of
a chance to respond, Tremont filed a detailed
reply to the motion that was replete with
argument and exhibits. Tremont also filed
detailed objections to the order proposed by
AL Solutions; again including argument and
exhibits. In light of Tremont’s actions, we
cannot say that the cireuit court wholly de-
prived Blackrock of an opportunity to submit.
“exhibits and affidavits and other matters” to
the court, or deprived it of an ability to
advise the cireuit court of argument ¢ or evi-
dence favorable to its case.

Furthermore, Blackrock claims the record
is incomplete and missing evidence crucial to
its case. The three-volume appendix record
is some 1,990 pages long, and contains depo-
sitions of the actors who participated in
forming the management agreements and-in
running AL Solutions, plus numerous docu-
ments, Nevertheless, nowhere in the record
can we find any instance where Blackrock
made an effort to proffer its supposedly cru-
cial evidence to the circuit court. Nowhere
ean we find any effort by Blackrock to advise
the circuit court what evidence existed that
created a material fact. Even in its appellate
briefs to this Court, Blackrock did not sug-
gest what this evidence might be.

HM oOnly during oral argument did coun-
sel finally indicate that Blackrock wanted to
introduce expert testimony explaining that
the indemnification and no-liability clauses
were common in these types of transactions,
and that under the law these clauses would
not be unconscionable, Blackrock seeks to
have this case returned to circuit court to
permit the revelation of this expert testimo-
ny. However, even if we were to return this
case to the circuit court, we question whether
the expert opinion would be admissible:

As a general rule, an expert witness may
not testify as to questions of law such as
the principles of law applicable to a case,
the interpretation of a statute, the meaning

” of terms in a statute, the interpretation of
case law, or the legality of conduct. It is
the role of the trial judge to determine,

60. Syllabus Point 10, France v. Southern Equip.

105

interpret and apply the law applicable to a

case,

The record shows the issue of unconsciona-
bility was well developed by the plaintiffs,
AL Solutions, Tremont and Blackrock, Tre-
mont and Blackrock’s briefs and objections to
the circuit court established the framework
of unconscionability law, and Blackrock’s -
brief to this Court further developed those
same legal arguments, On this record, we
cannot say that the circuit court deprived
Blackrock of an opportunity to respond
meaningfully to the motion for partial sum-
mary judgment. Blackrock has made no
showing that the cireuit court prevented it
from expressing some meaningful legal argu-
ment, or prevented it from revealing evi-
dence of a genuine issue of material fact, We
therefore find no. error in the manner in
which the circuit court entered the partial
summary judgment order.

Y,

CONCLUSION -

This Court accepts that indemnification
and no-liability clauses are common in busi-
ness contracts; in this instance, however, the
clauses were oppressive and unfair, We have
reviewed the record de novo, using the same
standards as the cireuit court would use, and
found the indemnification and no-liability
clauses unconscionable and unenforceable.
We further find no error in the manner in
which the circuit court entered its order,

Accordingly, the cireuit court’s October 16,
2015, order granting partial summary judg-
ment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents

and reserves the right to file a separate
opinion,

JUSTICE WALKER dissents and
reserves the right to file a separate opinion,

LOUGHRY, C. J., dissenting, joined by
WALKER, J.:

In the majority's apparent eagerness to
nullify the substantive agreements at issue, it

Co,, 225 W.Va. 1, 689 S.E.2d J (2010),

106

completely fails to appreciate the constitu-
tionally significant procedural infirmity in the
circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.
Without any justification, the cireuit court
sua sponte constricted a briefing deadline—a
deadline the parties had been operating un-
der for nearly five months—and summarily
granted a motion for summary judgment
without first permitting Blackrock to file its
brief in opposition. In so doing, the cireuit
court gave the motion’s opponents only two
days from receipt of the proposed order
granting the motion to haphazardly launch
any counteroffensive. For the same reasons
that this Court does not countenance “trial
by ambush,” I cannot sanction the cireuit
court’s stubborn refusal to timely consider
Blackrock’s opposition to the motion for sum-
mary judgment pursuant to the trial court’s
longstanding deadline for “full briefing.”
Moreover, the majority’s alleged “de novo”
review is necessarily flawed because the low-
er court precluded submission of opposing
evidence from Blackrock. The majority lauds
itself for conducting a “new, complete and
unqualified” review; yet, it fails to acknowl-
edge that Blackrock was denied the opportu-
nity to submit evidence in support of its
countervailing arguments. As such, the ma-
jority had a dispositive ruling predicated on
incomplete briefing to consider on appeal.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The facts are not in dispute, yet the major-
ity disturbingly finds them unpersuasive. The
circuit court, by letter dated May 6, 2015,
ereated a June 12, 2015, deadline for briefing
on the motion for summary judgment filed
by the respondent AL Solutions (hereinafter
the “respondent”).! For reasons that are un-
clear, a few days later the circuit court, by
order dated May 21, 2015, set the deadline
for “full briefing” on indemnification as Octo-
ber 80, 2015. In view of the inconsistency and

1. This motion involved the partially dispositive
issue of indemnification.

2. Although not expressly referenced by the cir-
cuit court, the “comments” to the proposed or-
der permitted in its October 8, 2015, letter ap-
pear to mirror those contemplated by Trial Court
Rule 24.01(c). As is obvious from the import of
the rule, such ‘‘comments” or “objections” are
not designed to be substantive opposition to the
granting or denial of the motion but, rather,
objections to the wording of the order.

out of an abundance of diligence and caution,
on June 12th, the petitioners (and other par-
ties) filed a “Notice of Intent to Respond” to
ensure that the circuit court was apprised of
their intent to oppose and substantively re-
spond to the motion for summary judgment
by the October 30th deadline instituted by
the circuit court in its order. This deadline,
upon which the parties and their counsel
undoubtedly relied in allocating their time
and resources for the next five months, re-
mained in effect and was undisturbed until
October 8, 2015.

On this date, the circuit court directed the
respondent’s counsel to prepare an order
“granting the Motion” and submit it to the
court and opposing counsel by October 18,
2015 (emphasis added). Upon receipt, the
circuit court indicated that the petitioners
would then have until October 15—a mere
two days—to provide “comments”? to the
order. In short, the circuit court initially set
a deadline for filing opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, but made its ruling
on the motion before even seeing, much less
considering, the antithetical arguments of
Blackrock. Even more inscrutable was the
circuit court's summary denial of the peti-
tioners’ motion to enlarge the “new” deadline
a mere two weeks to comport with the origi-
nal October 30th deadline and permit the
petitioners to file a substantive response. The
cireuit court, citing a conversation with this
Court’s Clerk, indicated that it had assured
the Clerk an order on the motion would be
entered by October 15th.3 Why the circuit
court would have made such an assurance
when it had previously established the Octo-
ber 30th deadline for “full briefing” simply
defies inquiry.

As if the foregoing were not sufficient
grounds to reverse the circuit court’s grant

3. It appears that two matters concerning the
interpleader of funds were pending before this
Court by way of direct appeal and a writ. It is
presumably the interplay between the merits of
those appellate matters and the substance of the
motion for summary judgment at issue which
prompted the circuit court’s discussions with this
Court's Clerk.

of summary judgment, the circuit court com-
pounded its inexplicable refusal to permit the
submission of a substantive response by fur-
ther refusing to consider the petitioners’
“comments” to the proposed order granting
summary judgment. In keeping with the cir-
cuit court's custom, the petitioners and an-
other party provided their requested “com-
ments” to the circuit court’s law clerk, whose
email auto-reply indicated she ‘was out of the
office with “limited” email access. The peti-
tioners also faxed their comments to the
Hancock County Circuit Clerk and, upon in-
quiry by the circuit court’s secretary the
following day (the same day the circuit court
was preparing its order for entry), emailed
them to her as well. The cireuit court indicat-
ed that it was, in spite of these efforts,
unaware of the petitioners’ comments until
after it had entered its order and refused to
reconsider its ruling.
_ Tam hard-pressed to find any apposite
case law taking 4 lower court to task for
altering its own briefing deadline to the uni-
lateral detriment of one of the litigants. The
reason for this is obvious—when an altered
time frame is at the center of a case, it is
typically due to a litigant’s failure to adhere
to a time frame or a litigant’s request to
extend a judicially-created time frame. In
this unprecedented instance, the circuit court
itself created the horological prejudice by
unilaterally pulling the rug out from under a
litigant, depriving Blackrock of an opportuni-
ty to file a responsive motion to a dispositive
pleading. While this admittedly peculiar rul-
* ing lacks precedent, this Court has made it
abundantly clear that rulings on motions,
particularly dispositive motions, must not

eatch litigants “by surprise” or unfairly cur- ©

tail a party’s ability to respond, See Riffle v.
C.J. Hughes Const. Co., 226 W. Va, 581, 589,
708 S.E.2d 552, 560 (2010) (“[A] circuit court
is required to give the parties notice ... and
a reasonable opportunity to present all mate-
rial made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56. In this way, no litigant will be taken by
surprise[.]”); Elliott v. Schoolcraft, 2138 W.
Va. 69, 576 S.E.2d 796 (2002) (reversing
grant of summary judgment where disposi-
tive motions were filed so quickly, opponent

4, The majority conveniently omits these facts and
misstates that the circuit court's law clerk was

107

lacked opportunity to conduct discovery); Ko-
pelman & Assocs. L.C. v. Collins, 196 W. Va.
489, 495, 473 S.E.2d 910, 916 (1996) (“The
‘reasonable opportunity’ language of Rule
12(c) [regarding conversion of a motion from
12(c) to 56] is designed ‘to prevent unfair
surprise to the parties.”); Harrison v. Davis,
197 W.Va, 651, 657 n. 16, 478 S.H.2d 104, 110
n. 16 (1996) (“Failure to treat [a 12(o) mo-
tion] ... as one for summary judgment and
to provide the litigants with notice and an
opportunity to respond can constitute revers-
ible error.”).

The majority's analysis conveniently
avoided any discussion of how the summary
judgment ruling necessarily ran afoul of pro-
cedural due process.:“The fundamental re-
quirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 383, 96 S.Ct, 898, 47 L.Bd.2d
18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 880
U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62
(1965)). This Court has explained that
“[plrocedural due process rights’ entitle an
individual to representation by counsel, no-
tice, an opportunity to be heard, and the
right to present evidence.” Marcus v. Hol-
ley, 217 W. Va. 508, 527, 618 S.E.2d 517, 586
(2005) (emphasis added). Further, in State
ex vel. Peck v. Goshorn, 162 W.Va. 420, 422,
249 S,H.2d 765, 766 (1978) this Court cor-
rectly reduced due process to its essential
elements stating that “[dJue process of law
is synonymous with fiandamental fairness.”

In reviewing the facts below, the majority
failed to establish (or even mention) whether
the cireuit court’s handling of the summary
judgment was fundamentally fair; instead, it
merely cajoled the parties with an assurance
that it “g[ave] careful and thorough review to
the issues raised by” the petitioners and
found the issues “well-developed” in general
upon its review. How the majority manages
to “carefully” and “thoroughly” review issues
presented in full by only one side defies
scrutiny, How it determines that the issues
are “well-developed” when the petitioners
never substantively responded to the disposi-

“on vacation,” rather than out of the office with
“Jimited” access to email.

108

tive motion defies all common sense. Even
more suspect is the majority's ludicrous chas-
tising of the petitioners for purportedly nev-
er advising the cireuit court “what [the] evi-
dence might be” that it would proffer if given
an opportunity.5 Had the cireuit court genu-
inely been interested in a sober consideration
of the: petitioners’ evidence, it would have
adhered to the previously-established brief-
ing deadline, Likewise, if the majority were
truly interested in conducting the “absolute,
perfect, unqualified” review, it prides itself
for conducting, it would remand this case for
the petitioners’ submission of evidence in op-
position and then consider the matter upon a
properly perfected appeal.® The petitioners
could do little else below other than re-
peatedly request an opportunity to be fully
heard and to present evidence in opposition.
to the motion—as they are clearly entitled by
the Constitution but were repeatedly denied.
See W. Va. Const. art ITI, § 10, in part (“No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of lawf.]”).
Certainly, this Court has observed that
“[t]he adoption of case-specifie case manage-

8, In a similar vein, the majority astoundingly
‘states that the petitioners failed to establish that
the circuit court “prevented it” from making a
legal argument or submitting evidence in opposi-
tion to the motion. The very notion that a party is
duty-bound to unceremoniously bombard the cir-
cuit court with arguments and evidence affer the
court has ruled on the issue and rejected the
party's request to respond in conformity with the
Scheduling Order is preposterous. The majority's
suggestion, reduced to its barest essentials, re-
quires parties to simply file pleadings, motions,
etc, at a time of their choosing in whatever

_ manner they see fit despite court rulings direct-
ing otherwise or risk this Court’s denial of relief
for their failure to act.

6, The majority, on the one hand, decries the
petitioners’ representation that it has substantive

* evidence which could affect the outcome of the
complex indemnification agreement issue pre-
sented because it purportedly never apprised the
circuit court regarding the specifics of that evi-
dence. On the other hand, despite its apparent
ignorance as to what evidence the petitioners
would proffer, it boasts a de novo review which is
“full, entire, complete[.]”

The majority then states that “only during oral
argument did counsel finally indicate” that the
petitioners proposed to provide expert testimony
about the frequency and typicality of the industry
practice the majority finds universally uncon-
scionable; the majority summarily concludes

such evidence—sight unseen—inadmissible as

ment plans is perfectly within the discretion
of a circuit court.” State ew rel. Almond v.
Rudolph, 238 W.Va. 289, 296, 794°S.E.2d 10,
17 (2016). It is equally true, however, that
“{t}rial by ambush is not contemplated by the
Rules of Civil Procedure.” McDougal v.
McCammon, 193 W. Va. 229, 287, 455 S.H.2d
788, 796 (1995). Dispositive motions, which
are routinely the subject of time frames con-
tained in Scheduling Orders,’ permit the liti-
gants and their counsel to schedule and allo-
eate both time and resources. In marked
contrast to the fast-paced fluidity of trial, ”
dispositive motions require, and are typically
accorded, sufficient time to conduct a thor-
ough and deliberate review of the evidence to
fully address the legal issues presented,
Thus, to allow a party to be “ambushed” in
regard to such motions is both unnecessary
and decidedly improvident.

Further, I wholly reject the respondent’s
crabbed view of the facts which suggest that,
the petitioners were not caught off guard
and, in fact, had more than 300 days to file |

opinion on a “question of law.” Such evidence in
no way purports to speak to a question-of law;
rather, it seeks to educate the uneducated on
corporate governance, risk allocation, and the
industry practice directly at issue in the indemni-
fication agreement at issue. Moreover, this evi-
dence was outlined on page ten of the petition-
ers’ brief: .
Indeed, the Blackrock Defendants have desig-
nated two experts who are expected. to offer
testimony regarding the relationships between
investment companies like BCIC, their advis-
ors, the companies in which they invest. See
Blackrock Kelso Capital Corporation’s And
Blackrock Kelso Capital Advisors, LLC’s Ex-
pert Witness Disclosure, filed January 20,
2015, and who would have been able to offer
evidence regarding the procedure used here
. during the formation of Tygem and AL Solu-
_ tions had the lower court followed’ the estab-
lished deadline.

7. “Rule 16(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure [1998] requires active judicial man-
agement of a case, and mandates that a trial
court ‘shall .., enter a scheduling order’ estab-
lishing time frames for the joinder of parties, the
amendment of pleadings, the completion of dis-
covery, the filing of dispositive motions, and gen-
erally guiding the parties toward a prompt, fair
and cost-effective resolution of the case.” Syl. Pt.
2, Caruso v. Pearce, 223 W.Va. 544, 546, 678
8,E.2d 50,52 (2009),

their response to the motion for summary
judgment. To suggest that the petitioners
were dilatory in relying on the court-mandat-
ed deadline for responsive briefing is utterly
disingenuous.’ As a practical matter, there is
no reason that the petitioners should have
devoted costly attorney hours to briefing and
marshaling supporting evidence to oppose
the motion for summary judgment months or
even weeks before such response was due.
The realities of modern litigation suggest
that settlement negotiations can and do oceur
at any time during the course of litigation;
thus, to prematurely expend thousands of
dollars responding to substantial motions
could easily be viewed as irresponsible litiga-
tion management and a waste of client funds.
As the procedural history of this case makes
abundantly clear, this is a complex piece of
litigation with many “moving parts,” parties,
and claims, including the interpleader and
distribution of funds; any number of develop-
ments could have affected the necessity
and/or manner of the petitioners’ response to
the dispositive motion.

Accordingly, it is pellucid « that the circuit
court committed a gross abuse of discretion
and deprived the petitioners of due process,
The majority, in its desperate desire to nulli-
fy the indemnification agreement, barely ac-
knowledges this deprivation which is the cen-
terpiece of this appeal.-It is indisputable that
unilateral alteration of the time frames con-
tained. in the circuit court’s May 21, 2016,
order prejudiced the petitioners and subvert-
ed the truth-seeking function of the courts,
Unphased by this, the majority apparently
concludes that it does not need the benefit of
evidence or the guidance of witnesses who

8. Likewise, the majority's insistence that because
‘Tremont and its counsel filed a.substantive re-
sponse to the dispositive motion, the petitioners
should have been able to do so misses the poirit
entirely. Due process demands that this Court
ensure that the proceedings below were funda-
mentally fair to the petitioners. Considering an-
other party's choice or ability to-handle their
unique aspect of the litigation differently has

_ quite literally nothing to do with whether the
petitioners were deprived of the legally-mandat-
ed opportunity to provide a substantive response
to the dispositive motion,

9. See also Lipscomb v. Tucker County Comm'n,
206 W.Va. 627, 630, 527 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1999)
(“We grant trial court judges wide latitude in

109

are actually conversant in the corporate gov-
ernance and risk allocation methods at the
core of this agreement. This case is easily
resolved by adherence, to the following hold-
ing: “A trial court abuses its discretion when
its rulings ... are clearly against the logic of
the circumstances then before the court and
so arbitrary and unreasonable’ as to shock
our sense of justice and to indicate a lack of
careful consideration.” Syl. Pt. 1, BF. Spe-
cialty Co. v. Charles M. Sledd Co., 197 W.Va.
463, 475 S.E.2d 555 (1996),? This case plainly
meets those criteria; accordingly, I would
reverse and remand with instructions to the
cireuit court to permit the petitioners to file a
response containing its legal arguments and
supporting evidentiary bases in opposition.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

799 8: E.2d 540 .

WEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
AUTHORITY, Petitioner

ve
Shane R. MARCUM, Respondent.
No. 15-1174 '

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 4, 2017
. Filed: April 26, 2017
conducting the business of their courts. Howev-
er, this authority does not go unchecked, and a

judge may not abuse the discretion granted him
or her under our law.”),

10. Even if the circuit court's ruling remains the
same upon remand, the paramount constitution
al dictates of due process will have been heeded
and the guarantees of fundamental fairness will
have been achieved, Any convern for prolonging,
the litigation or enhanced expense is the conse-
quent byproduct of the trial court's improvident
haste—and assuredly not a proper basis upon.
which to sidestep the due process protections
owing to each and every litigant in this state's
courts.

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Ben-
jamin Freeman, Assistant Attorney General,
Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Pe-
titioner

Paul M. Stroebel, Strocbel & Johnson,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney
for Respondent

Leah Perry Macia, West Virginia Regional,
Jail Authority, Petitioner

Vincent Trivelli, Morgantown, West Virgi-
nia, Attorney for Amicus Curiae, Communi-
cations Workers of America, AFL-CIO

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, John
H. Boothroyd, Assistant Attorney General,
Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for

1, See W.Va. Code § 29B~1~1 et seq.

2. This Court is grateful for the amicus curiae
briefs filed by the West Virginia Broadcasters’
Association; Communications Workers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO; and West Virginia Division of
Corrections. We value the participation of the
amici and have considered their briefs in con-
junction with the briefs of the parties.

3. “A cell extraction is forcible removal of an
inmate from a cell, utilized when an inmate has
either refused to comply with stated orders, or is

11

Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Division of
Corrections

David Allen Barnette, Vivian H. Basdekis,
Jackson Kelly, PLLC, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, West
Virginia Broadcasters’ Association

Davis, Justice:

The Petitioner in this matter, the West
Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facil-
ity Authority (“the Regional Jail”) brought
this appeal from an order of the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County. The circuit
court’s order required the Regional Jail turn
over a videotape to the Respondent, Shane
Marcum, pursuant to his request under the
West Virginia Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”).! In this appeal, the Regional Jail
contends that the videotape is exempt from
disclosure under FOIA pursuant to W. Va,
Code $§ 29B-1-4(a)(2) and (19) (2016) (Supp.
2016). After a careful review of the briefs and
the appendix record, and listening to the
argument of the parties, we reverse?

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

The relevant facts in this proceeding are
not in dispute. On February 27, 2015, Mr.
Marcum was being held on felony charges in
the Western Regional Jail in Cabell County,
West Virginia. For reasons that have not
been made clear by the parties, it was deter-
mined by authorities at the facility that Mr.
Marcum had to be physically removed from
his cell. At least four correctional officers
were initially involved in what is called a “cell
extraction.” ® To carry out the cell extraction,
the officers tossed two flash bang grenades
into the cell.“ After tossing the grenades into

engaged in harmful behavior towards himself or
other inmates.” Nina Frank, Such Visible Fic-
tion: The Expansion of Scott v. Harris to Prisoner
Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims, 32
Cardozo L. Rev. 1481, 1514 (2011).

4, See Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 776
(9th Cir. 2004) ("The flash-bang grenade is a
light/sound diversionary device designed to emit
a brilliant light and loud noise upon detonation,
Its purpose is to stun, disorient, and temporarily
blind its targets, creating a window of time in
which police officers can safely enter and secure

112

the cell, the officers removed Mr, Mareum
from his cell. The cell extraction and events
immediately following were recorded on vid-
eotape by the Regional Jail.

As a result of alleged injuries he received
during the cell extraction, Mr, Marcum filed
a civil action against the Regional Jail in
cireuit court, That proceeding was subse-
quently removed to federal court, where it is
now pending, During the proceeding in fed-
eral court, Mr. Marcum requested a copy of
the videotape that recorded his cell extrac-
tion, The Regional Jail agreed to provide a

copy of the videotape “subject to a protective -

order.” Mr, Marcum refused to accept the
videotape under protective order conditions.
Instead, Mr. Mareum requested the video-
tape pursuant to FOIA. By letter dated July
24, 2015, the Regional Jail refused to turn
over the videotape under FOIA on the
grounds that it was exempt under W. Va.
Code §§ 29B-1-4(a)(2) and (19).

In September 2015, Mr. Marcum filed a
complaint for preliminary injunction and de-
claratory relief against the Regional Jail in
circuit court, The complaint sought a court
order requiring the Regional Jail turn over
the cell extraction videotape under FOIA.
Subsequent to a hearing on the matter, the
cireuit court entered an order on November
4, 2015, requiring the Regional Jail to pro-
duce the videotape to Mr. Marcum. This
appeal of that order followed.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hs In this proceeding, ‘we are called
upon to review a circuit court order that
determined FOIA did not exempt disclosure
of a cell extraction videotape. This issue pres-
ents a de novo review standard “because [it]
requires an interpretation ‘of West Virginia’s
FOIAL]” Charleston Gazette v, Smithers, 232
W.Va, 449, 460, 752 S,E.2d 603, 614 (2018),
We have long recognized that “[w]here the
issue on an appeal from the circuit court is
clearly a question of law or involving an
interpretation of a statute, we apply a de

a potentially dangerous area."’); Terebesi v. Torre-

so, 764 F.3d 217, 225 n4 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The
grenades .,. go by-a variety of names, including

novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal
RM, v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va, 188, 459
§.E.2d 415 (1995).

In.

DISCUSSION

The Regional Jail contends that its video-
tape of the cell extraction of Mr. Marcum is
exempted from disclosure under FOIA pur-
suant to W. Va. Code §§ 29B-1-4(a)(2) and
(19). Mr, Marcum argues that there is no
language in either of the statutory provisions
that exempt release of the videotape.

HH We begin by observing the frame-
work for our statutory analysis. This Court
has long held that “‘[w]here the language of
a statute is clear and without ambiguity the
plain meaning is to be accepted without re-
sorting to the rules of interpretation.’ ” Huff
man v. Goals Coal Co., 228 W.Va. 724, 729,
679 S.B.2d 828, 828 (2009) (quoting Syl. pt. 2,
State v, Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S,H.2d 108
(1968)), On the other hand, “[a] statute that
is ambiguous must be construed before it can
be applied.” Syl. pt. 1, Farley v, Buckalew,
186 W.Va. 693, 414 S.H.2d 454 (1992), Fur-
ther, as a general matter, “the words of a
statute are to be given their ordinary and
familiar significance and meaningl.]” Amick
v. C & T Dev, Co, Inc., 187 W.Va. 115, 118,
416 S.E.2d 78, 76 (1992). “It is not for this
Court arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that
which it does not say. Just as courts are not
to eliminate through judicial interpretation
words that were purposely included, we are:
obliged not to add to statutes something the
Legislature purposely omitted.” Banker v.
Banker, 196 W.Va, 585, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d
465, 476-77 (1996).

HM sAs a general matter, “FOIA re-
quires the release of public records upon
request.” Highland Min. Co. v. West Virgi-
nia Univ. Sch. of Med., 235 W.Va. 370, 380,
774 S.E.2d 86, 46 (2015). See also W. Va,
Code § 29B-1-4(a) (“There is a presumption
of public accessibility to all public rec-
ords[.)”). It is expressly provided under W.

‘flash grenade,’ ‘stun grenade,’ ‘concussion gre-

nade,’ ‘distraction device,’ and the colloquial
‘flashbang.’ ”).

Va. Code § 29B-1-8(a) (2015) (Repl. Vol.
2015) that “{elvery person has.a right to
inspect or copy any public record of a public
body in this state, except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by [W. Va, Code § 29(B)-
1-4] of this article.” It has been recognized
that FOIA “seeks to permit access to official
information long shielded unnecessarily from
public view and attempts to create a judicial-
ly enforceable public right to secure such
information from possibly unwilling official
hands.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe
Corp, 493 U.S. 146, 151-52, 110 S.Ct. 471,
475, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989) (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted), The presumption
of disclosure of public records under FOIA
is qualified by twenty-one categories of pub-
lic records that-are exempt from disclosure
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a). The
decisions: of this Court have been clear in
holding that “[t]he disclosure provisions of
this State’s Freedom of Information Act, W.
Va. Code, 29B-1-1 et seg., as amended, are
to be liberally construed, and the exemptions
to such Act are to be strictly construed: W.
Va. Code, 29B-1-1'[1977].” Syl. pt. 4, He-
chler v, Casey, 175 W.Va: 434, 888 S.H.2d
799 (1985). Accord Farley v, Worley, 215
W.Va, 412, 420, 599 S.H.2d 885, 848 (2004).
It also has been held that “{tJhe party claim-
ing exemption from the general disclosure
requirement under West Virginia Code
§ 29B-1-4 has the burden of showing the

express applicability of such exemption to.

the material requested.” Syl. pt. 7, Queen v.
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 179 W.Va.
95, 365 S.E.2d 875 (1987).

Although the Regional Jail raised, two pro-
visions under FOIA as exempting disclosure
of the cell extraction videotape, the circuit
court’s. order addressed only the exemption
under W. Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(19). Be-
cause of our resolution of this provision, we
need not address the provision the circuit
court omitted, W. Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2).

West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(19) was
added to FOIA in-2009, This is the first
opportunity we have’had to review the provi-
5, Mr. Marcum contends that the videotape

should not be exempted from disclosure under

the provision because a videotape is not specifi-

cally mentioned in the statute. We reject this
argument because the statute does not list any

113

sion. The text of the provision sets out the
following:

“(a) There is a presumption of public ac-
cessibility to all public records, subject
only to the following categories of informa-
tion which are specifically exempt from
disclosure under the provisions of this arti-
cle: .

(19) Records of the Division of Correc-
tions, Regional Jail and Correctional Faeil-
ity Authority and the Division of Juvenile
Services relating to design of corrections,
jail and detention facilities owned or oper-
ated by the agency, and the policy di-
rectives and operational procedures of pér-
sonnel relating to the safe and secure
management of inmates or residents, that
if released, could be used by an inmate or
Tesident to escape a facility, or to cause
injury to another inmate, resident or to
facility personnel[.]

In the context of the issue presented to this
Court, we find no ambiguity in the provision,
It is apparent that this provision seeks to
maintain’ the safety and security at correc-
tional facilities by preventing public access to
records’ that could be’ used by an inmate to
escape from a facility, or to cause injury to
someone in the facility.) The Regional Jail
contends that the contents of the cell extrac-
tion videotape satisfies the exemption under
W. Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(19), because it
“contains numerous images of the inside of
the jail and the movement of various jail
personnel, which, if released, would compro-
mise the safety and security of the facility
and the inmates and staff therein.”

‘The issue of whether a videotape of a.cell
extraction of an inmate is exempt from dis-
closure, under public record statutes similar
to our FOIA, has been addressed only by a
few courts. The federal district court in Zan-
der v. Department of Justice, 885 F.Supp.2d
1 (D.D.C. 2012), is one of the few courts to

specific type of record by name. The statute
speaks in broad terms that addresses records
that could be used for an escape from a facility
or to cause harm to someone in the facility.

114

squarely address the issue. The plaintiff in
Zander, a former federal prisoner, filed a
complaint under the federal FOIA to require
the release of records relating to his incar-
ceration. Among the records sought was a
videotape of his cell extraction by correction-
al officers. A federal magistrate held a hear-
ing on the matter and issued a recommenda-
tion that the cell extraction videotape be
released to the plaintiff in a redacted form,
so that the faces of the officers involved
would not be seen. The defendants in the
case, the Department of Justice and the Bu-
reau of Prisons, objected to the magistrate’s
recommendation. The defendants argued be-
fore the district court judge that, under
FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), a public rec-
ord like the cell extraction videotape was
exempt from disclosure in any form. This
provision of the federal FOIA exempted from
disclosure “ ‘records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law en-
forcement records or information ... could
reasonably be expected to endanger the life
or physical safety of any individual.”’” Zan-
der, 885 F.Supp.2d at 6-7. The defendants
made the following specific argument:

Defendants maintain that the videotape
sought by Plaintiff shows BOP’s Calculated
Use-of-Force Team enter the Plaintiffs
cell, apply restraints, and remove him from
the cell, depicting the equipment, tactics,
movements, and procedures used during
the incident. Defendants argue that pro-
ducing the video, even with the faces of the
officers obscured, would nonetheless dis-
close the equipment, tactics, and proce-
dures utilized by the BOP Calculated Use-
of-Foree Team and that such disclosure
could reasonably be expected to endanger
the lives or physical safety of any BOP
officers who subsequently utilize those
techniques and equipment in the course of
their duties. Furthermore, defendants con-
tend that the video should be withheld
because obliterating the protected informa-
tion would be burdensome to the agency

6. See Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Dev.
Office, 198 W.Va. 563, 571, 482 $.E.2d 180, 188
(1996) (“Recognizing the close relationship be-
tween the federal and West Virginia FOIA, we

and the remaining information would be of
little value.

Zander, 885 F.Supp.2d at 7 (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted), The district
court judge agreed with the defendants and
rejected the magistrate’s recommendation.
The district court concluded as follows:
The Court finds that the video is proper-
ly withheld under FOIA exemption 7(F).
Exemption 7(F) most clearly applies to
protect law enforcement officials from dis-
closure of information that could prove
threatening to them...
[T]he Court concludes that the agency's
assessment of the possible danger to law
enforcement officials from disclosing the
video is abundantly reasonable. Removing
prisoners from their cells presents clear
dangers to the law enforcement officers
who are charged with the task. Disclosure
of a recording of a “cell extraction” pres-
ents the possibility that other prisoners
will learn the methods and procedures uti-
lized by BOP officials, and that this infor-
mation might be used to thwart the safe
application of these techniques in the fu-
ture. The Court does not mean to suggest
that plaintiff himself presents such a dan-
ger, but dissemination to the public at
large does present clear risks to law en-
forcement officials.

Zander, 885 F.Supp.2d at 7-8 (internal cita-
tions omitted). See also Center for Constitu-
tional Rights v. Central Intelligence Agency,
765 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding
FOIA exemption precluded release of cell
extraction videotapes of prisoners at Guanta-
namo Bay Naval Base); Gabrion v. United
States Dept of Justice, No. 2:15-CV-24-
WTL-DKL, 2016 WL 5121987, at *7 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 21, 2016) (“The Court finds that
Exemption 7(F) applies, as disclosure of the
video would present clear risks to law en-
forcement officials. Other prisoners might
learn this information and use it in the fu-
ture.”); International Counsel Bureau v.
United States Dep't of Def., 906 F.Supp.2d 1,
7 (D.D.C, 2012) (finding FOIA exemption

note, in particular, the value of federal prece-

dents in construing our state FOIA’s parallel
provisions.”).

precluded release of cell extraction video-
tapes of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base); In Re: Ben Richard, Jy., No. 18-
ORD-022, 2018 WL 565014 (Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. February 5, 2018) (“Release of the re-
quested video footage is a security threat
because it can be viewed by others to assess
the technology and/or procedures used by
LMDC [Louisville Metropolitan Department
of Corrections] and other law enforcement.
agents in the handling of inmates, it may be
viewed to develop strategies used to overtake
LMDC’s officers and possibly other law en-
forcement agents, and the footage can be
used to study the camera’s range of sight—
what is within the camera’s view and the
areas outside of the camera’s image which
can be used to smuggle contraband and other
strategies of takeover or escape.”); Dilworth

7. Mr. Marcum also cited in passing to the deci-
sion in Dhiab v. Obama, 70 F.Supp.3d 486
(D.D.C, 2014) as support for disclosure of his cell
extraction videotape. First off, the federal deci-
sion in Dhiab did not involve disclosure of a cell
extraction videotape under the federal FOIA. In
that case, a detainee-at the United States Naval
Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a habeas
corpus petition seeking, among other things, to
prevent the federal government from force-feed-
ing him, During that proceeding, the detainee’s
attorney obtained, under seal, copies of video-
tapes of the detainee being extracted from his
cell and force-fed. The videotapes were classified
by the government as “SECRET,” because their
public disclosure could harm national security.
‘Several news agencies intervened in the proceed-
ing and sought disclosure of the videotapes. The
intervenors sought disclosure under the First
Amendment and common law. The district court
ordered the videotapes disclosed, under the First
Amendment, in a redacted form to protect infor-
mation identifying government personnel. The
government eventually appealed the disclosure
order in the restyled opinion-of Dhiab v. Trump,
852 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir, 2017). The appellate
court reversed the district court’s disclosure or-
der for reasons that included the following:

(T]he intervenors are unable to cite a single
case in which a court—other than the district
court here—found that the First Amendment
compelled public disclosure of properly classi-
fied national security information in a habeas
proceeding, or in any other type of civil pro-
ceeding.

The government identified multiple ways in
which unsealing these recordings would like-
ly impair national security. Two of these
risks—detainees triggering forcible encounters
and developing countermeasures—together
and individually, were enough to prevent

115

v. Westchester Cty. Dep't of Correction, 98
A.D.3d 722, 940 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149 (2012)
({T]he Department established, through the
Sergeant’s affidavit, that disclosure of the
remaining electronic video surveillance rec-
ords requested by the petitioner could expose
[surveillance] limitations’ and, thereby, en-
danger the life or safety of any person.”),

Both parties in this proceeding contend
that the decision in Ballard v, Department of
Corr., 122 Mich.App. 128, 882 N.W.2d 435
(1982), supports their respective opposite po-
sitions in this appeal.’ The plaintiff in Bal-
lard filed an action under Michigan’s FOIA
in order to obtain a copy of a film showing
him being forcefully removed from his cell.
The trial court ordered the defendant to turn
over the film. The defendant appealed and
argued that the film was exempted from

these recordings from becoming public. The
government's declarations explained that the
recordings would enable detainees, assisted
by outside militants, to develop countermeas-
ures to the guards’ cell-extraction and enter-
al-feeding techniques. The district court dis-
missed this prospect because the government
had already released substantial information
about these procedures and the detainees
were already intimately familiar with them,
The government’s declarations contradict the
court’s assessment. The recordings of the
feeding process contain significantly more in-
formation than ‘previously released imagery,
and the publicly released information about
cell extractions. was outdated and described
techniques not being used at Guantanamo.
The recordings also show elements of the
procedures that take place outside the detain-
ee’s presence or, shielded from the detainee
or otherwise obstructed from view....

The government's expert judgment was
that militants could study the recordings re-
peatedly and slowly, looking for “pattems”
of “mistakes” not identifiable from first-hand
experience or written descriptions... When
detainees resist what are already hazardous
procedures for the guards, this could further
endanger government personnel at Guantana-
mo, Guards have been kicked, grabbed,
punched, knocked down, bitten, and sprayed
with bodily fluids, The government's interest
in ensuring safe and secure military opera-
tions clearly overcomes any qualified First
Amendment right of access,

Dhiab, 852 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). To the extent that Dhiab has
any relevancy to our FOIA analysis, it supports
the Regional Jail’s position that the cell extrac-
tion videotape shouldbe exempted from disclo-
sure.

116

disclosure under a provision in FOIA that
provided for nondisclosure of a record if it
_ “would prejudice -a public body's ability to
maintain the physical security of custodial or
penal institutions occupied by persons arrest-
ed or convicted of a crime or admitted be-
cause of a mental disability, unless the public
interest in disclosure under this act out-
weighs the public interest in nondisclosure,”
Ballard, 122 Mich.App. at 124, 882 N.W.2d at
436. The defendant contended that release of
the filth “would prejudice its ability to main-
tain the physical security’ of its institutions
because such films may reveal the methods,
tactics, and equipment used to restrain and
subdue prisoners and because, by studying
such films, prisoners might learn to circum-
vent such methods, tactics, and equipment.”
Id, at 125, 382 N.W.2d at 436. The appellate
court determined that the statute imposed a
case-by-case approach to the disclosure of
cell extraction film, It was said that,
the balancing test contained in the exemp-
tion at issue here suggests that a case-by-
case approach is required because it re-
veals a legislative intent to accommodate,
insofar as it is possible, the respective
public interests in institutional security
and freedom of information. If the balanc-
ing test must be performed with general-
izations rather than specifics, there will be
eases in which one of these public interests
must be sacrificed without any countervail-
ing advancement.of the other public inter-
est,
Id, at 127, 3832 N.W.2d at 437. Applying the
balancing test-to the facts of the case, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court
that the cell extraction film did not threaten
the security of the institution, because it
“showed only the use of a mattress and

8. Several other cases are cited in Mr. Marcum’s
brief that’are not relevant. The cases cited do not
involve disclosure of cell extraction videos pursu-
ant to public disclosure statutes. All of thé cases
cited simply involve the admission into evidence
of cell extraction videos during criminal proceed-
ings or at proceedings against correction officers.
See McAlister v. State Pers. Bd., No, FO68970,
2015 WL 1541107 (Cal. Ct. App. April 1, 2015)
(administrative proceeding); Department of Pub.
Safety & Corr, Servs. v. Cole, 103 Md.App. 126,
652 A.2d 1159 (1995), rev'd, 342 Md, 12, 672
A.2d 1115 (1996) (same); Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &
Corr. v, Price, No. 10AP-260, 2010 WL 4683571

overwhelming manpower to subdue plain-
tifff.]” Id. at 125, 882 N.W.2d at 496.8

We are not persuaded by the decision in
Ballard, because Michigan’s FOIA statute
expressly permitted the release of informa-
tion like a cell extraction videotape under a
balancing test. West Virginia’s FOIA provi-
sion at issue, W. Va, Code § 29B-1-4(a)(19),
does not contain a balancing test for deter-
mining whether to disclose a record that
could be used “by an inmate or resident to
escape a facility, or to cause injury to anoth-
er inmate, resident or to facility personnel.”
Our statute provides a blanket prohibition
against disclosure of any record-coming with-
in its exemption. Consequently, we believe
the decision in Zander is persuasive in un-
derstanding and applying W. Va. Code
§ 29B-1-4(a)(19).

In the instant case the trial court succinct-
ly described the contents of the cell extrac-
tion videotape as follows:

12, The video’ at issue in the instant
case depicts four individuals approaching
and entering a common area of the jail.
One of [the] individuals shouts the Peti-
tioner’s name and instructs him to-“[g]et
on the floor.” The four men proceed up-
stairs to the Petitioner's cell, and one of
the mle]n bangs on the cell door.One of
the men throws a flash bang grenade into
the cell. Then, the same individual throws
another flash bang grenade into the cell.
The Petitioner is again instructed to “[glet
on the floor.” Once the fumes from the
explosions dissipate, two individuals enter
the cell and’ restrain the Petitioner while
another watches guard. The group of four
individuals appears to be joined by others,
and Petitioner is then carried out of his
(Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010) (same); Harper v.
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., No. 08 MA 259,
2010 WL 1316236 (Ohio Ct. App: March 30,
2010) (same); Collins v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab, &
Corr., No. 2004-04370, 2009 WL 1433447 (Ohio
Ct. Cl, May 20, 2009) (excessive force claim
brought by inmate); Hawkins v, State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, No. 1386 C.D. 2013, 2014 WL 2447213
(Pa, Commw. Ct, ‘May 30, 2014) (administrative
proceeding); State v. Woolbert, 181 Vt. 619, 926
A.2d 626 (2007) (probation revocation); State v.
Magett, 355’ Wis.2d 617, 850 N,W.2d 42 (2014)
(wial); State v. Lindell, 296 Wis.2d 418, 722
N.W.2d 399 (2006) (same).

cell and down the stairs to the common
area of the facility, where he is placed on a
gurney. He is then pushed -through the
hallway, ‘apparently to medical, where
health care personnel appear to be check-
ing his vital signs. The Petitioner is then
taken outside and although dark, it ap-
pears that he is being placed into a vehicle
for transport.?

It is quite clear from the circuit court’s
description that the videotape identifies the
correction officers making the cell extraction,
shows their equipment, shows their location
before and during the entry of the cell, and
reveals the path from the cell to other areas
in the facility, including a door that leads to a
parking area of the facility. We do not be-
lieve that the legislature intended such infor-
mation to be easily accessed by the public
through FOIA, because it discloses informa-
tion involving the design of the facility and
operational procedures of personnel relating
to the safe and secure management of in-
mates, which could be used for an escape or
to cause injury.

| | After a mature consideration of the
issue, we now hold that, pursuant to W. Va.

9, This Court's independent review of the video-
tape confirmed the trial court’s description of
events.

10. It was correctly pointed out in the amicus
brief of the Division of Corrections that ‘‘[iJf an
inmate or inmate accomplice ... requests and
gets a copy of video surveillance of the transport
area and or perimeter area of the regional jail,
an inmate has videotape showing a potential
escape route.” See, eg., Black y. Swoboda, No.
95-2654-FT, 205 Wis.2d 735, 1996 WL 593827,
*1 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1996) (“The De-

+ partment of Corrections’ policy precludes provid-
ing requesters with a copy of the [cell extraction]
tape to prevent an analysis of the correctional
institution's security precautions, procedures and
capabilities.”’).

11. Mr. Marcum’s brief indicates that his counsel
has in the past requested “jail videos” from the
Regional Jail, and that such videos were pro-
duced without a protective order. We are not
concerned with any past experience of counsel in
obtaining jail videos from the Regional Jail. Our
concern is with the application of W. Va. Code
§ 29B-1-4(a)(19).on the release of cell extraction
videotapes.

12, We should note that, even though the video-
tape is exempt from disclosure under FOIA, this
does not preclude its disclosure under the discov-

117

Code § 29B-1~-4(a)(19), disclosure of a video-
tape of the cell extraction of an inmate is
prohibited, because it displays part of the
design of a correctional facility and the oper-
ational procedures of personnel relating to
the management of inmates, such that, if
disclosed, could be used by an inmate to
escape from a facility or to cause injury to
another inmate, resident or to facility person-
nel." In view of our holding; it is clear that
the circuit court committed error in ordering
the disclosure of the cell extraction video-
tape.

Iv.

CON CLUSION,

The circuit court’s order of November 4,
2015, requiring disclosure of the cell extrac.
tion videotape, is reversed. :

Reversed.

JUSTICE WORKMAN coneurs in part,
and dissents in part, and reserves the right
to file a separate opinion. .

ery rules in a civil lawsuit. See Syl. pt. 2, Maclay
v. Jones, 208 W.Va. 569, 542 S.B.2d 83 (2000)
(‘The provisions of this state's Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, West Virginia Code §§ 29B-1-1 to ~
7 (1998), which address confidentiality as to the
public. generally, were not intended to shield law
enforcement investigatory materials from a legiti-
mate discovery request when such information is
otherwise subject to discovery in the course ‘of
civil proceedings."), See also Wagner v. Warden,
Civ. Action No, ELH~14-791, 2016 WL 7178297, °
at 13 (D, Md. Dec, 8, 2016) (“Wagner seeks
discovery, among other things, of the video re-
cording of his cell extraction... Wagner is enti-
tled to‘conduct some-discovery.”); Hyatt v. Rock,
Civ. No. 9:15-CV-0089 (DNH/DJS), 2016 WL
6820378, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016) (“As to
Demand No, 67, any video of the cell extraction
on May 12, 2012 shall be provided to the Plaintiff
for viewing, if that has not been done already.”).
Such sensitive information may be disclosed in a
civil lawsuit because a trial court can impose
restrictions on its dissemination and use through
a protective order, As we noted previously, the
Regional Jail was prepared to turn over the vid-
eotape under a’ protective order. Obviously our
holding does not remove this offer from the ta-
ble.

118

WORKMAN, Justice, concurring in part,
and dissenting in part.

I concur in the result the majority reaches
in this specific case, but vehemently disagree
with the all-encompassing syllabus point four
that reads, in part: “Pursuant to W.Va. Code
§ 29B-1-4(a)(19) (2016) (Supp. 2016) disclo-
sure of a videotape of the cell extraction of
an inmate is prohibited[.]” (Emphasis added).
After watching the videotape at issue, I
concur that the Regional Jail has shown that
it is exempt from disclosure pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(19), be-
cause it shows in some detail the route of
egress from an inmate’s cell to the outside of
the facility, including the secured points.
Thus, if released, it “could be used by an
inmate or resident to escape a facility, or to
cause injury to another inmate, resident or to
facility personnel.” Id.

Each videotape of a jail cell extraction of
an inmate should be analyzed to determine
whether the circumstances in a given situa-
tion support a legal conclusion that it falls
within a FOIA exemption. The majority
should not have adopted a blanket rule with
respect to the applicability of this exemption
to all such videotapes. Rather, the majority

. should have preserved the right of the lower
courts to make these specific determinations
on a case-by-case basis because other jail cell
extraction videos may not contain such infor-
mation.

The strong tenor of the law is that the
exemptions from the mandatory disclosure
requirement of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) are both narrowly drafted and
narrowly construed. This counterbalances the
self-protective instincts of bureaucracy
which, as in any organization, would prefer to
operate under the relatively forgiving eye of
only its own members rather than the more
revealing “sunlight” of public scrutiny.

The United States Supreme Court has ex-
plained that the federal FOIA, 5 U.S.C.

1, The lower court reviewed the videotape and
made findings of fact on the incident in order to
apply the FOIA exemption statute to those facts.
Each and every member of the majority was
obligated to view the videotape before reversing
the lower court's legal analysis of the FOIA issue,
and I hope they did so.

§ 552, is “a means for citizens to know ‘what
their Government is up to.” This phrase
should not be dismissed as a convenient for-
malism, It defines a structural necessity in a
real democracy,” Nat'l Archives & Records
Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-172
(2004) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). As the Supreme Court has “consis-
tently recognized[,] ... the basic objective of
the Act is disclosure.” Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979). At the same
time, the statute represents a “balance [of]
the public’s interest in governmental trans-
parency against legitimate governmental and
private interests [that] could be harmed by
release of certain types of information.”
United Techs. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 601
F.3d 557, 559 (D.C.Cir.2010) (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted). Reflecting
that balance, the federal FOIA contains nine
exemptions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552(),
which “are explicitly made exclusive and
must be narrowly construed.” Milner v. U.S.
Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565, 181 S.Ct.
1259, 179 L..Hid.2d 268 (2011) (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted) (citing FBI
v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 680, 102 S.Ct.
2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982).

In the same way, West Virginia’s FOIA is,
indeed, a pro-disclosure statute with twenty-
one specific exemptions. See W.Va. Code
§ 29B-1-4(a), in part (“[t]here is a presump-
tion of public accessibility to all public rec-
ords, subject only to the following categories
of information which are specifically exempt
from disclosure[.]”). “This Court has made
clear that the FOIA’s exemptions are to be
strictly construed, while the FOIA’s disclo-
sure provisions are to be liberally con-
strued[.]” Highland Min. Co. v. W.Va. Univ.
Sch. of Med., 235 W.Va. 370, 881, 774 S.H.2d
36, 47 (2015). Where an enumerated exemp-
tion is relied on, the court must determine
the matter de novo,? and the public body
asserting the exemption has the burden of
sustaining the applicability of the asserted
exemption.

2. See generally Hamdan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
797 F.3d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We review
... FOIA cases in a two-step process. Berman v.
CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1139 (th Cir. 2007). First,
we review de novo whether the documents sub-
mitted by the agencies give an adequate factual
basis for the district court's decision. Id. If there
is an adequate factual basis, we then determine

By adopting a wholesale rule that such
records are categorically exempt from disclo-
sure, the majority's interpretation is imper-
missibly broad? The interaction of inmates
and correctional officers may shed light on
the operations of the correctional facilities
and their treatment of those who are incar-
cerated. “These are matters of legitimate
public concern.” Rataj v. City of Romulus,
806 Mich.App. 785, 858 N.W.2d 116, 125
(2014), In Rataj, an attorney filed suit
against city, seeking to compel release of a
videorecording showing a police officer’s al-
Jeged assault of unnamed individual who had
been arrested and handeuffed. The appeals
court found the videotape was subject to
disclosure, and noted “the video would shed
light on the operations of the [police depart-
ment] and, in particular, its treatment of
those arrested and detained by its officers.”
Id. at 125, Certainly, West Virginia citizens
enjoy the same broad rights to obtain such
public records, limited only by the coverage
of the statute and its exemptions. Where
there is a balance to be struck, the Legisla-
ture and this Court have stacked the scales
in favor of disclosure and against exemption.
These determinations are highly fact-specific,
and, therefore, should be made on a case-by-
case basis.

For these reasons, I would not adopt the
majority's bright-line approach but would
leave the door open for the disclosure of jail
cell extraction videotapes in some limited
circumstances.

‘whether the district court's decision regarding
[the] applicability of FOLA’s exemptions was cor-
rect.’ Id, Factual findings are reviewed for clear
error, but legal conclusions, including whether a
document fits within one of FOIA’s exemptions,
are reviewed de novo. Id”).

3. As this Court held in syllabus point five, in
part, of Farley v. Worley, 215 W.Va. 412, 599
S.E.2d 835 (2004);

In response to a proper Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request, a public body has a duty to
redact or segregate exempt from non-exempt
information contained within the public rec-
ord(s) responsive to the FOIA request and to

119

799 S.E.2d 550

Mohammed ASHRAF, M.D., Plaintiff
Below, Petitioner

v

STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASU-
ALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and
Wells Fargo Insurance Services of West.
Virginia, Inc., Defendants Below, Re-
spondents

No. 16-1042
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 18, 2017
Filed: April 26, 2017

disclose the nonexempt information unless
such segregation or redaction would impose
upon the public body an unreasonably high
burden or expense.
See also Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec.
Office for Immigration Review, 830 F.3d 667, 677
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (‘The statute thus sets forth the
broad outlines of a process for agencies to follow
when responding to FOIA requests: first, identify
responsive records; second, identify those re-
sponsive records or portions of responsive rec-
ords that are statutorily exempt from disclosure;
and third, if necessary and feasible, redact ex-
empt information from the responsive records.”).

-
1X)
Ss

do

Chad C. Groome, Esq., David A. Jividen,
Esq., Jividen Law Offices, PLLC, Wheeling,
West Virginia, John R. Angotti, Esq., Com-
pany Angotti & Straface, LC, Morgantown,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

Trevor K, Taylor, Esq., Taylor Law Office,
Morgantown, West Virginia, Counsel for Re-
spondent State Auto Property and Casualty
Insurance Company .

David P, Cook, Jr, Esq., MacCorkle Lay-
ender, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent Wells Fargo Insur-
ance Services of West Virginia, Inc.

Justice Ketehum:

The Cireuit Court of Marion County has
certified two questions regarding a com-
mercial fire insurance policy issued to the
petitioner, Mohammed Ashraf, M.D., (“Dr.
Ashraf”), by the respondent, State Auto
Property and Casualty Insurance Company
(‘State Auto”), Respondent Wells Fargo In-
surance Services of West Virginia, Inc,
(“Wells Fargo”), the named insurance agent
on the policy, handled the sale of the policy
issued to Dr, Ashraf.

‘The insured building, owned by Dr. Ashraf
and his wife, was rendered a total loss by
fire. Dr. Ashraf raised two coverage issues in
a declaratory judgment action which resulted
in the certified questions now before us.

First, Dr. Ashraf challenged the reduction of
the covered building loss by 15% pursuant to
the vacancy provision included in the State
Auto policy, Second, although Dr. Ashraf was
afforded coverage for asbestos removed un-
der the policy’s debris removal coverage, he
challenged State Auto's denial of coverage
for asbestos removal under the policy’s sepa-
vate coverage for pollutant removal.

The certified questions and the circuit
court’s answers are as follows:

‘Where there is a covered total loss by
fire under a fire insurance policy, may an
insurer reduce the policy's limit of cover-
age for the insured premises by fifteen
percent (15%) pursuant to a “vacancy” pro-
vision in the policy? The cireuit court's
answer: Yes,

Does .a fire insurance policy that in-
eludes a “pollutant clean up and removal”
provision that provides that the insurer
will pay the insured’s expense to extract
pollutants from land or.water, provide cov-
erage in excess of the “debris removal”
coverage afforded by the policy for the
removal of asbestos contained in a fire-
damaged or destroyed structure? The cir-
cuit court’s answer: Not
For the reasons stated, this Court con-

eludes that the circuit court answered the
certified questions correctly.
I, Factual Background
The facts pertaining to the certified ques-
- tions are not in dispute and are largely set
forth in the cireuit court’s certification order.
In 1997, Dr. Ashraf and his wife purchased
a building on Locust Avenue in the City of
Fairmont, Marion County. The purchase took
place at a sheriff's tax salé, and the amount
paid was $91,000.00. After renovations were
completed, Dr. Ashraf and his wife opened
the building as an assisted living facility. The
facility closed in 2006, and the building was
vacant thereafter. Almost six years later, on
October 29, 2012, a fire rendered the building
a total loss.
The building was insured under a commer-
cial fire insurance policy issued by State
1. Wells Fargo states that it made no coverage

decisions regarding Dr. Ashraf's claims under
the State Auto policy and takes no position re-

121

Auto, The named insured on the policy was
Dr, Ashraf.

A. The State Auto Policy

The amount of insurance coverage on the
building stated in the State Auto policy was
$410,555.00. The policy, provided adjustments
for -inflation, raising the stated total policy
coverage limit to $420,228.85 on the building.
In addition, the business personal property
‘was covered under the State Auto policy in
the amount of $21,682.00, which, according to
Dr, Ashraf, provided, with adjustments, per-
sonal property coverage of $22,141.69. In ad-
dition to the building and personal property
coverage, the State Auto policy provided sep-
arate coverages for debris removal and pollu-
tant removal,

B. Insurance Proceeds
Paid by State Auto

Dr, Ashraf reported the fire loss to State
Auto. In response, State Auto told Dr, Ash-
raf that, if the building had been vacant for
more than sixty consecutive days, the amount
of coverage payable for the loss would be
reduced by 15% pursuant to the policy's va-
caney provision.

In the meantime, the » city of Fairmont
issued notices to Dr, Ashraf asserting the
need to demolish the fire-destroyed building
and that it would file a lien for debris remov-
al if the City demolished and removed the
building. See W.Va, Code, 38-10H-1 [2010]
(providing a lien in favor of a municipality
against fire insurance proceeds for’ debris
removal), Subsequently, Dr, Ashraf demol-
ished and removed the fire- destroyed build-
ing, and no lien was filed,

In September 2018, State Auto sent Dr.
Ashraf a check in the amount of $25,000.00.
In an accompanying letter, State Auto in-
formed Dr, Ashraf that the check was an
advance, pending complétion of the investiga-
tion of the claim. Thereafter, by letter dated
January 28, 2014, State Auto sent Dr, Ashraf
two checks: $382,194.10, representing cover-
age for the building loss, and $22,141.69,

garding the certified questions or the circuit
court's answers,

122

representing coverage for the business per-
sonal property loss.

The January 28, 2014, letter stated that
the initial adjusted policy limit for the build-
ing of $420,228.35 was reduced by $68,034.25,
a 15% reduction under the policy's vacancy
provision, That reduction, with the previous
$25,000.00 advance, resulted in $332,194.10 in
coverage for the building. State Auto ex-
plained:

In Dr, Ashraf’s case, the building satis-
fies the definition to be considered vacant.
In fact, this building appears to have been
vacant for almost six years before the loss
occurred. The loss at issue was a fire and
that qualifies as a covered cause of loss.
Because the building was vacant at the
time of the loss and because this was a
covered cause of loss, then State Auto is
permitted, by the terms of the policy, to
reduce the amount they would “otherwise
pay” by 15%.

Finally, on March 8, 2014, State Auto,
having verified the absence of a municipal
lien, sent Dr. Ashraf a $10,000.00 check for
debris removal. No coverage was extended
for pollutant removal. Dr. Ashraf asserted
that he incurred approximately $30,000.00 in
demolition and debris removal costs as a
result of the fire. He further asserted that he
ineurred an additional $4,925.00 in pollutant
removal costs for the removal and testing of
asbestos.

If. Procedural Background

On August 28, 2014, Dr. Ashraf filed a
declaratory judgment action in the Cireuit
Court of Marion County. The complaint con-
sisted of five counts, the first two of which
resulted in the certified questions. In count I,

2. Counts III and IV alleged unfair claim settle-
ment practices, bad faith, and the tort of outrage
against State Auto, and count V alleged negli-
gence against Wells Fargo.

3. W.Va. Code, 33-17-9 [2005], provides in its en-
tirety:

All insurers providing fire insurance on real
property in West Virginia shall be liable, in
case of total loss by fire or otherwise, as stated
in the policy, for the whole amount of insur-
ance stated in the policy, upon such real prop-
erly; and in case of partial loss by fire or
otherwise, as aforesaid, of the real property
insured, the liability shall be for the total

designated “Stated Value of Policy,” Dr. Ash-
raf alleged entitlement to the full policy limit
for building coverage in the amount of
$420,228.35. Dr. Ashraf alleged that State
Auto improperly reduced that amount by
15% under the policy’s vacancy provision. In
count II, designated “Coverage for Pollutant
Removal,” Dr. Ashraf alleged entitlement to
the costs he incurred for the removal and
testing of asbestos under the policy’s Pollu-
tant Cleanup and Removal coverage. Dr.
Ashraf alleged that asbestos is a pollutant
and, therefore, a subject of coverage under
the State Auto policy in addition to coverage
for debris removal.” ,

In January 2015, Dr. Ashraf and State
Auto filed motions for summary judgment.
Regarding count I, Dr. Ashraf asserted that
the policy limit for the building coverage
should not have been reduced by 15% be-
cause the State Auto policy was a “valued
policy” under W.Va. Code, 33-17-9 [2005],
which requires that the face value of the
policy be paid in the event of a total loss by
fire. W.Va. Code, 38-17-9 [2005], provides in
relevant part: “All insurers providing fire
insurance on real property in West Virginia
shall be liable, in case of total loss by fire or
otherwise, as stated in the policy, for the
whole amount of insurance stated in the poli-
cy, upon such real property.” ?

In conjunction with the statute, Dr. Ashraf
cited an included endorsement in the State
Auto policy entitled “West Virginia
Changes,” section C.1. of which stated: “In
case of total loss by fire or other covered
cause of loss, we will pay the Limit of Insur-
ance stated in this Coverage Part applicable
to the real property.” 4 According to Dr. Ash-

amount of the partial loss, not to exceed the
whole amount of insurance upon the real prop-
erty as stated in the policy. This section does
not apply where such insurance has been pro-
cured from two or more insurers covering the
same interest in such real property.

4, Dr. Ashraf states that the “West Virginia
Changes” provision was included in policies like
the State Auto policy as the result of the West
Virginia Insurance Commissioner's Information-
al Letter No. 10, issued in January 1980, entitled
“Valued Policy Law.” Referring to W.Va. Code,
33-17-9, the Informational Letter states: “In the
case of total loss by fire or otherwise, as stated in
the policy, (the Company) agrees to pay the

raf, the statute and the “West Virginia
Changes” section of the policy nullified the
15% vacancy reduction.

Regarding count II, Dr. Ashraf asserted
that he is entitled to summary judgment
because asbestos, a harmful irritant common-
ly abated in the building demolition process,
should be included within the meaning of
“pollutant” under the policy. Accordingly, Dr.
Ashraf argued that any ambiguity as to the
scope of coverage for pollutant removal must
be strictly construed against State Auto.

State Auto’s motion for summary judg-
ment also concerned counts I and II of the
complaint. As to count I, State Auto acknowl-
edged that the policy issued to Dr. Ashraf
was a valued policy under W.Va. Code, 38-17-
9 [2005]. State Auto did not contest the value
of the building or its total loss by fire. How-
ever, State Auto asserted that a valued policy
does not operate to nullify conditions and
exclusions included in such a policy in antici-
pation of acts which increase the risk to the
covered property. According to State Auto,
the vacancy provision, allowing the 15% re-
duction, is such an anticipatory limitation,
especially operable here where the building
was vacant for almost six years prior to the
October 29, 2012, fire.

In addition, State Auto relies on its West
Virginia Standard Fire Policy, the provisions
of which were adopted in W.Va. Code, 33-17-2
[1957].5 Under the Standard Fire Policy, no
coverage need be provided where the struc-
ture is vacant beyond a period of sixty con-
secutive days, State Auto thus suggested that
the policy issued to Dr. Ashraf was more
favorable than the Standard Fire Policy be-
cause it resulted in a 15% reduction of the

whole amount stated in the policy declarations
upon the real property insured.”

We note that the former W.Va. Code, 33-17-9
[1957], effective in 1980, was substantially the
same as W.Va, Code, 33-17-9 [2005], currently in
effect.

5. The Standard Fire Policy Provisions were in-
corporated in the policy pursuant to W.Va. Code,
33-17-2 [1957], and constituted the New York-
West Virginia Standard Fire Policy cited by State
Auto in its motion for summary judgment. W.Va.
Code, 33-17-2 [1957], provides in part:

No policy of fire insurance covering property
located in West Virginia shall be made, issued
or delivered unless it conforms as to all provi-

123

limit of building coverage, rather than a com-
plete denial of the claim.

As to count II, State Auto noted that
coverage for pollutant removal was limited to
an insured’s expense for extracting pollutants
from “land or water.” Denying that such was
the case here, State Auto indicated that the
asbestos was confined to the components of
the building and was required by the demoli-
tion contractor to be abated prior to the
removal of the remnants of the building,

The motions for summary judgment were
held in abeyance, and on November 3, 2016,
the circuit court entered an order certifying
two questions to this Court. The circuit court
answered both questions in favor of State
Auto, On the first question, the circuit court
associated the vacancy provision with “risk of
loss,” rather than the value of the building.
Consequently, the circuit court concluded
that the vacancy provision was consistent
with the valued policy statute and West Vir-
ginia’s Standard Fire Policy and that the
15% reduction was proper under the terms of
the State Auto policy.

On the second question relating to cover-
age for pollutant removal, the circuit court
eqneluded that, under the plain language of
the policy, the phrase “land or water” re-
ferred to the natural surroundings of the
building, Therefore, the denial of coverage, in
excess of the coverage afforded by the debris
removal provision, was proper.

. IL Standard of Review

IM The procedure and standard of re-
view to be followed in certified question cases
are well-established. Pursuant to W.Va. Code,
58-5-2 [1998], a circuit court may, in its dis-

sions and the sequence thereof with the basic
policy commonly known as the New York stan-
dard fire policy, edition of one thousand nine
hundred forty-three, which is designated as the
West Virginia standard fire policy; except that
with regard to multiple line coverages provid-
ing casualty insurance combined with fire in-
surance this section shall not apply if the poli-
cy contains, with respect to the fire portion
thereof, language at least as favorable to the
insured as the applicable portions of the stan-
dard fire policy and such multiple line policy
has been approved by the commissioner.
(emphasis added).

124

cretion, certify a question of law to this
Court. The question is processed by° this
Court under Rule 17 of the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. As to the merits of the circuit,
court’s resolution of the question, we held in
syllabus point 1 of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.H.2d 172
(1996): “The appellate standard of review of
questions of law answered and certified by a
circuit court is de novo.” Accord syl. pt. 1,
Master Mechanical Insulation, Inc. .v. Sim-
mons, 232 W.Va. 581, 758 S.E.2d 79 (2018);
syl, pt. 1, Univ. Commons Riverside HOA v.
Univ. Commons Morgantown, 230 W.Va.
589, 741 S.E,2d 618 (2018).

IV. Discussion

Certified Question 1

Hl The first question asks: Where there
is a covered total loss by fire under a fire
insurance policy, may an insurer reduce the
policy’s stated amount of coverage for the
insured ‘premises by 15% pursuant to a “va-
caniey” provision in the policy? .

It is undisputed that the State Auto policy
was a valued policy under W.Va, Code, 88-17-
9 [2005]. The policy included the West Virgi-
nia Changes endorsement, derivative from
the statute, which stated that, in case of total
loss by fire or otherwise, “we will pay the
Limit of Insurance stated in this Coverage
Part applicable to the real property.” Thus,
Dr, Ashraf contends that the policy’s stated
amount of coverage for the building should
not have been subject to the 15% reduction,

The State Auto policy included two vacan-
cy provisions. The first was set forth in the
policy's “Standard Fire Policy Provisions” for
commercial property:

Conditions suspending or restricting in-
surance, Unless otherwise provided in
writing added hereto this Company shall
not be liable for loss occurring
". () while the hazard is increased by any
means within the control or knowledge of
the insured; or

(b) while a described building, whether
intended for occupancy by owner or ten-
ant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond a peri-
od of sixty consecutive days; or

(©) as a result of explosion or riot, unless
fire ensues,, and in that event for loss by
fire only,

(emphasis added).

See Vol. 5, Jeffrey E. Thomas, New Apple-
man on Insurance Law Library Edition
§ 48,03[10][e] (LexisNexis 2016) (The Stan-
dard Fire Insurance Policy “suspends all cov-
erage during periods of vacancy.”)

Although the Standard policy provision al-
lowed the denial of coverage if there is a
vacancy in excess of sixty days, the policy
had a second vacancy provision, under “Loss
Conditions,” which stated that, if a building is
vacant for more than sixty consecutive days,
State Auto will reduce the coverage amount
payable by 15%, That section of the policy
provided as follows: ~
* p, Vacancy Provisions

If the building where loss or damage
oceurs has been vacant for more than 60
consecutive days before that loss or dam-
age occurs:

(1) We will not pay for any loss or dam-

. age caused by any of the following even if
they are Covered Causes of Loss:
(a) Vandalism;
(b) Sprinkler leakage, unless you have
protected the system against freezing;
(c) Building glass breakage;
(d) Water damage;
(e) Theft; or
@ Attempted theft.

(2) With respect to Covered Causes of
Loss other than those listed in b.(1)(a)
through b.(1)(f) above, we will reduce the
amount we would otherwise pay for the
Joss or damage by 15%.

Although State Auto initially cited -vandal-
ism as a potential ground under the policy
for a complete denial of Dr. Ashraf’s claim,
State Auto nevertheless provided coverage
and applied the 15% vacancy reduction. It is
undisputed that, following the closure of the
assisted living facility in 2006, the building
vemained vacant for almost six years.

HI The valued policy statute has been in

operation in West Virginia for many years.
In syllabus point 4 of Ritchie County Bank v.

Fireman’s Ins. Co., 55 W.Va. 261, 47 S.E, 94
(1904), this Court held: “Chapter 33 of the
Acts of the Legislature of 1899 [the valued
policy statute, currently W.Va. Code; 33-17-
9], renders fire insurance companies, doing
business in this State, liable in case of total
loss by fire or otherwise, as stated in the
policy, on any real estate insured by them for
the whole amount of insurance stated in the
policy of insurance, upon said real estate.” In
so holding, this Court adopted the language
of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Cale-
donian Ins. Co. v. Cooke; 101 Ky. 412, 41
S.W, 279 (1897), as explanatory of the legisla-
tive intent concerning this State’s valued pol-
icy statute. In Caledonian Ins, Co., the Ken-
tucky court stated:

It is perfectly evident that the legisla~
ture intended to remedy the evil of over-
valuation in insurance, and, in doing so,
followed the example of many other states
of the Union, by making the insurer re-
sponsible for overvaluation; and, to do this,
the remedy was and is to compel the insur-
er to pay the full amount (in case of total
loss) for which they write their policy, and
on which the premium i is calculated and
collected[.] .

101 Ky. at 418, 41 S.W. at 280; cited in
Ritchie County Bank, 55 W.Va. at 277, 47
S.E. at 101. As this Court similarly noted in
Filiatreau v. Allstate Ins, Co., 178 W.Va. 268,
271, 858 S.E.2d 829, 882 (1987), the purpose
of the valued policy statute is to “prevent
insurance companies from over-valuing the
insured structure for premium purposes,
thereby allowing them to collect an excess
premium and later contest the value when
there is a loss.” Nevertheless, we further
noted in Filiatreau that “there are situations
where the valuation set forth in the policy

6. See C. T. Drechsier, Annotation, Applicability of
Valued Policy Statute to’ Partial Fire Loss, 36
A.LR.2d 619 (1954) (“To avoid oyerinsurance
and to overcome the haggling over the measure
of recovery so typical in case of fire loss many
state legislatures have realistically enacted spe-
cific laws, frequently termed ‘valued policy stat-
utes,’ which expressly deal with valued insurance
policies.” In the case of total loss, the-valuation
in the policy is conclusive, “at least in the ab-
sence of fraud or mistake.”),

7. See also Niagara Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Raleigh
Hardware, Co., 62 F.2d 705 (4th Cir, 1933) (The

125

‘will not be binding,” as in the case of “fraud,
misrepresentation, or collusion.” 178 W.Va. at
271, 858 S,E.2d at 882.

“A reduction of coverage payment pursuant
to a vacancy provision has never been ad-
dressed by this Court in the context of the
valued policy statute, Various cases cited by
the parties establish that the valued policy
statute was not repealed by the subsequent
adoption’ of the New York Standard Fire
Policy and that, where the fire loss is total,
the insurer has no right to contest the
amount of the loss. As such, those cases are
not dispositive. Sée Nicholas v. Granite State
Five Ins, Co., 125 W.Va. 849, 24 S.B.2d 280
(1948) (The Standard Fire Policy does not
supersede the valued ‘policy act.); Null v.
Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 114 W.Va, 179, 171 S.E.

416 (1988) (Any conflict between the New

York Standard Fire Policy and the valued
policy statute should be resolved in favor of
the valued policy statute); Teter v. Franklin
Fire Ins, Co., 74 W.Va, 844, 82 S.E. 40 (1914)
(if the logs is total, the valued policy statute

‘venders adjustment of the loss unnecessary.);

Hinkle v. North River Ins. Co., 70 W.Va. 681,
15 S.E. 54 (1912) (Where the loss is total, the
insurance company has no right to. dispute
the amount of the loss, policy provisions and
the New York Standard Fire Policy notwith-
standing.).7

State Auto does not contest the value of
the building or its total loss by fire. More-
over, the certified question before us does
not coneéern whether Dr, Ashraf’s building
was overinsured, Under the Standard Fire
Policy, included in the State Auto policy, a
vacancy beyond a period of sixty days au-
thorized a complete denial of liability for the
loss. However, the vacancy provision allowing

West Virginia valued policy statute, enacted to
avoid litigation over the amount of damages sus-
tained and to prevent the evils arising from over-
insurance, was not repealed by legislation adopt-
ing a uniform fire insurance policy.); Sayer
Brothers, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins, Co.,
150 F.Supp.2d 907 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (The pur-
pose of the West Virginia valued policy law is to
prevent over-valuing the structure for premium
purposes, and it relieves the insured from prov-
ing the full value of the structure when total loss
occurs.).

126

the 15% reduction is not located in the Stan-
dard Fire Policy language. The 15% vacancy
provision is in another section of the policy
and allowed the 15% reduction of the amount
of insurance payable for the total loss of Dr.
Ashraf’s building by fire under the facts in
this case. .

The vacancy reduction provision before
this Court is, therefore, favorable to the in-
sured in comparison to the Standard Fire
Policy Provisions of the State Auto policy
and the Standard Fire Policy adopted pursu-
ant to W.Va. Code, 33-17-2 [1957]. Moreover,
the 15% reduction applied to the stated value
of the building in the policy does not subject
the parties to a factual dispute over valua-
tion, a dispute intended to be avoided by the
adoption of the valued policy statute. Just as
the policy’s inflation adjustment of the stated
value of the property results in a liquidated
amount, so does the 15% reduction. More-
over, the 15% reduction remains the same
whether the vacancy is just over. sixty con-
secutive days before the loss occurs or, as in
the case here, where the building remained
vacant for a number of years.

Consequently, the cases cited by Dr. Ash-
raf which state that the valued policy statute
takes priority over the West Virginia Stan-
dard Fire Policy are not controlling, Further-
more, the vacancy reduction provision does
not offend the valued policy statute or the
statute’s derivative West Virginia Changes
endorsement included in thé State Auto poli-
ey. The 15% reduction is an anticipatory
limitation regarding the risk to a structure
from extended vacancy. The reduction was
clearly operable here where the building was
vacant for almost six years prior to the Octo-
ber 29, 2012, fire. See Nathan v. Saint Paul
Mut. Ins. Co., 243 Minn. 480, 68 N.W.2d 885
(1955) (Under the Minnesota valued policy
statute, recovery on the policy may be pre-
cluded where there is a change in the condi-
tion of the property after the policy is issued
which increases the risk without the consent
of the insurer.).

Accordingly, this Court holds that a vacan-
cy provision in a fire insurance policy which
provides that the insurer is allowed to reduce
by 15% the stated amount of coverage pay-
able for the total loss of a building destroyed

by fire is enforceable, where the building has
been vacant for more than 60 consecutive
days prior to the loss. The provision does not
conflict with this State’s valued policy stat-
ute, W.Va. Code, 38-17-9 [2005], or this
State’s Standard Fire Policy adopted pursu-
ant to W.Va. Code, 33-17-2 [1957]. The an-
swer of the circuit court upholding the en-
forcement of the 15% reduction is correct.
Certified Question 2

Hl In addition to the building and busi-
ness personal property coverage, the State
Auto policy provided separate coverages for
debris removal and pollutant removal. Al-
though State Auto sent Dr, Ashraf a
$10,000.00 check for debris removal, no in-
surance payment was extended for pollutant
removal. Dr. Ashraf states that he incurred
$4,925.00 in pollutant removal costs for the
removal and testing of asbestos following the
fire. Thus, the certified question asks wheth-
er the policy's “pollutant clean up and remoy-
al” provision provides coverage, in excess of
the debris coverage, for Dr. Ashraf’s expense
of removing and testing the asbestos in the
fire-destroyed building, The circuit court an-
swered the question in favor of State Auto.

The State Auto policy provided separate
coverage for pollutant removal in the amount
of $10,000.00. Section d. under “Additional
Coverages” stated:

Pollutant Clean Up And Removal

We will pay your expense to extract
“pollutants” from land or water at the
described premises if the discharge, dis-
persal, seepage, migration, release or es-
cape of the “pollutants” is caused by or
results from a Covered Cause of Loss that
occurs during the policy period. * * *

This Additional Coverage does not apply
to costs to test for, monitor or assess the
existence, concentration or effects of “pol-
lutants.” But we will pay for testing which
is performed in the course of extracting
the “pollutants” from the land or water,

“Pollutants” is defined in the policy as
“any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant
or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.
Waste includes materials to be recycled, re-
conditioned or reclaimed.”

Dr. Ashraf contends that removal costs
were incurred in extracting the asbestos
from “land or water” following the fire. He
asserts that, inasmuch as the building was
part of the land, the failure to extract a
pollutant, including asbestos in the building,
virtually guarantees that the pollutant will be
released onto the site of the insured proper-
ty. Asserting that any ambiguity in the provi-
sion should be construed in favor of coverage,
Dr. Ashraf argues that State Auto was re-
quired to provide pollutant removal coverage
in addition to the coverage provided for de-
bris removal. See syl. pt. 4, Nat? Mut. Ins,
Co, v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 177 W.Va. 734,
856 S.H.2d 488 (1987) (“It is well settled law
in West Virginia that ambiguous terms in
insurance contracts are to be strictly con-
strued against the insurance company and in
favor of the insured.”).

However, the State Auto policy is plainly
clear that to obtain pollutant clean up and
removal coverage, there must have been the
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, re-
lease or escape of the pollutant into the land
or water, caused by or resulting from a cov-
ered cause of loss, and the pollutant then
extracted from the land or water.

State Auto contends that an extraction of
asbestos from “land or water” was not the
ease here and the additional coverage was
not warranted, since the asbestos was con-
fined to the components of the building and
was required by the demolition contractor to
be abated before the building’s removal.’ An-
swering the certified question in favor of
State Auto, the circuit court concluded that
under the plain language’ of the policy the
phrase “land or water” referred to the natu-
ral surroundings of the building, and, there-
fore, the denial of additional coverage as to
Dr, Ashraf’s claim was proper.

The cireuit court cited the decision of the
United States District Court for the South-
ern District of California in Ruffin Road
Venture Lot IV v. Travelers Property Casu-
alty Co. of Am., 2011 WL 2468291 (S.D. Cal,
June 20, 2011). In Ruffin Road, the air condi-

8, State Auto maintained before the circuit court
that Dr. Ashraf’s evidence detailed the removal,
transport and legal disposal of asbestos relating
solely to certain building materials. The removal
was required to allow for the building’s demoli-

127

tioning system in the insured’s office building
‘was damaged when a water pipe burst, caus-
ing mud, rocks and other debris to circulate
through -the system. The insured filed an
insurance claim for the cost of removing
those substances from the air conditioning
system and cited the policy’s Pollutant Clean-
up and Removal provision. That provision,
similar to the provision before this Court,
stated that the insurer would pay the in-
sured’s necessary and reasonable expense “to
extract ‘pollutants’ from land or water at the
described premises, if the discharge, disper-
sal, seepage, migration, release or escape of
the ‘pollutants’ is caused by or results from a
‘specified cause of loss’ which occurs: (a) At
the described premises; (b) To Covered
Property; and (c) During the policy period.”

The District Court, in Ruffin, concluded
that the Pollutant Cleanup and Removal pro-
vision did not apply in the circumstances of
the insured’s claim. First, noting that the
claim was limited to “the contamination of an
internal, wholly contained air conditioning
system,” the District Court determined that
the mud, rocks and other debris did not
constitute pollutants within the meaning of
the Cleanup and Removal provision. Second,
the District Court concluded that the in-
sured’s claim failed under the provision’s
“land or water” component. The District
Court stated: “The ordinary and most rea-
sonable reading of this language is that the
provision is targeted at pollutants that have
contaminated the natural surroundings of the
insured property—for example, chemicals
that have leached into the soil, or waste that
has been discharged into a nearby stream.”
In Ruffin, the District Court emphasized
that the water within the damaged air condi-
tioning system was “not part of or in contact
with any naturally occurring body of water.”

In the current matter, the Pollutant Clean-
up and Removal provision is found in the
section of the State Auto policy entitled
“Building and Personal Property Coverage
Form.” Subsection A.2.h. thereof states that

tion. According to State Auto, abatement or re-
medial work concerning “land or water" was not
necessary. During his deposition, Dr. Ashraf ac-
knowledged that the asbestos had to be removed
prior to demolition.

128

covered property does not include: “Land
(including land on which the property is lo-
cated), water, growing crops or lawns.” Thus,
the plain language of the policy distinguishes
“land” and “water” for which coverage is not
extended, unless and until they have been
affected by a pollutant within the meaning of
State Auto’s Pollutant Cleanup and Removal
provision.? Nothing in the record before us
shows that land or water in the context of
that provision were affected by the asbestos
found in this case in certain materials within
the damaged building.

The circuit, court’s reliance on the opinion
in Ruffin was, therefore, warranted, and it
correctly concluded that State Auto should
not be required to provide pollutant removal
coverage in addition to the coverage it pro-
vided for debris removal, This Court holds

that a Pollutant Cleanup and Removal provi- |

sion in a fire insurance policy, which covers
the expense of extracting pollutants from
“land or water” at the inswred premises, does
not apply to asbestos testing and removal,
where the asbestos removed is located within
the fire-damaged structure,

Accordingly, the answer of the circuit
court to the second certified question is cor-
rect, .

V. Conclusion

The certified questions having been an-
swered, this matter is remanded to the Cir-
cuit Court of Marion County for further pro-
ceedings.

Certified Questions Answered.

9° See syl., Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Ant., 153
W.Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970) (“Where the
provisions of an insurance policy contract are
clear and unambiguous they are not subject to
judicial construction or interpretation, but full

799 S.B.2d 559
STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent,
Vv.
Roceo ZUCCARO, Defendant
Below, Petitioner.

No, 15-0976

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 4, 2017
Filed: April 26, 2017

effect will be given to the plain meaning intend-
ed.”). Accord syl, pt. 5, Am. Nat'l. Property and
Casualty Co. v, Clendenen, 238 W.Va, 249, 793
S.E.2d 899 (2016),

nN
| |

ad
|

Matthew D,. Brummond, Esq., Charleston,
West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Zachary Aaron Viglianéo, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charléston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Roceo Zuccaro, appeals the
September 11, 2015, order of the Circuit
Court of Brooke County sentencing him to
life in prison without the possibility of parole
for his conviction of first degree murder. On
appeal to this Court, the petitioner contends
he is entitled to a new trial because the
circuit court committed reversible error by
denying his motion for a change of venue and
by excluding alleged evidence of the victim’s
prior bad acts. In the alternative, the peti-
tioner asserts that the State’s evidence was
insufficient to prove premeditation and this
Court should reduce his conviction to second
degree murder. The State of West Virginia
responds that there was no error, After care-
fully reviewing the parties’ written and oral
arguments, the record on appeal, and the.
applicable law, we affirm the conviction,

I, Factual and Procedural Background

On the afternoon of February 19, 2018,
Dolly Pratz went to the home of her adult
son, Jason Pratz, in McKinleyville, Brooke
County. After using a ‘key to enter through
the locked back door, she found-her son dead
and-lying in a pool of blood. Police and
forensics experts would later determine that
Jason had been killed by three gunshots
_ inflicted with a 45 caliber Glock handgun.
There were droplets of blood in a hallway
‘and continuing to the back of. the home
where the body was discovered, suggesting

134

that the victim had attempted to flee from
the shooter. The front door was partly ajar,
and theré were no signs of forced entry or a
struggle. Several valuable items were left in
the home, indicating that the perpetrator had
not been there to commit a burglary.

Through their investigation, the police con-
cluded that the shooting occurred sometime
between 5:10 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. on February
18th, which was the evening before the body
was discovered. Mrs, Pratz, who lived next.
door:'to.Jason, last saw him at around 5:10
p.m, on February 18. She had called Jason on
his cellular telephone at 4:55 p.m. and they
spoke on the telephone as he walked to her
house to carry in firewood, Jason stayed at
his mother’s home approximately ten min-
utes, then went to his own home to change
clothes for a committee meeting he planned
to attend at 6:30 p.m. that evening. The
meeting was scheduled to plan the “Brooke
Hills Spook House,” a local haunted house
attraction to be held in the fall. Jason was
actively involved with the haunted house
event and told both his mother and George
Barchiesi Jx., the “haunted house’s co-di-
rector, that he was going to attend the meet-

” ing that evening. When Jason failed to ap-
pear at the meeting, Pamela Barchiesi, also a
co-director of the haunted house, sent him a
text message at 6:30 p.m. She testified that
he did not respond to this text. Later that
evening, George Barchiesi called Jason’s cel-
lular telephone three times but received no
answer. Mrs, Pratz testified that when Jason
left her home, he was wearing a blue sweat-
shirt: When his body was found, Jason was
wearing a black “Brooke Hills Spook House”
t-shirt and his cellular telephone was lying
nearby.

The petitioner and the victim were ac-
quainted, and the police investigation re-
vealed that a man matching the petitioner’s
description was in the victim’s neighborhood
during the relevant time frame. Video sur-
veillance footage taken by a neighbor’s home
security system showed a man walking up
the hill toward Jason Pratz’s home at 5:17
p.m. on February 18th. The man was wear-

1. The police confirmed that the petitioner had
purchased a .45 caliber Glock and ammunition

ing a backpack, dark pants, a white shirt, and
an orange ski cap/toboggan. The video sur-
veillance also showed the same man ten min-
utes later, running back down the hill with
the backpack in his hand. The victim’s neigh-
bors, Aaron and Brianna McConnell, testified
they saw a man wearing these clothes run
down the hill to a silver Subaru car and then
drive off at a high rate of speed. Mr. McCon-
nell described the silver Subaru as having a
black stripe down the side.

The petitioner's neighbor, Amy Lemmon,
saw the petitioner wearing a backpack, dark
pants, a white shirt, and an orange toboggan
on February 18th, and the petitioner's cousin
testified the petitioner “always” wore orange
toboggans. On February 21st, the police
stopped the petitioner while he was driving a
silver Subaru with a black stripe matching
the description given by Mr. McConnell. A
backpack, which ‘contained a white shirt and
orange toboggan, was found in the car, Both
the clothing in the backpack and the vehicle’s
steering wheel tested positive for gunshot
residue.

When interviewed by police on February
21st, the petitioner denied that he had been
in West Virginia on February 18th; rather,
he claimed to have been in a particular Star-
bueks’ coffee shop in Pittsburgh, Pennsylva-
nia, the entirety of that afternoon and eve-
ning. Based on security camera footage the
police later obtained from the Starbucks, the
petitioner’s alibi was disproven. During the
police interview, the petitioner initially de-
nied owning a gun. Later, however, he told
police that while he had owned a .45 caliber
Glock pistol, it was stolen from him.! His
story about the theft was contradicted by two
iwitnesses to whom the petitioner showed his
Glock pistol on February 15th—just three
days. before Jason Pratz was killed. One of
these witnesses, the petitioner’s friend Shau-
na-Lea Leger, testified she observed the pe-
titioner place the handgun in the backpack
that he always carried with him. Further, the
petitioner's father saw the petitioner with a
gun on February 21st, which was after the

in 2012.

victim’s death.” In addition, Ms. Leger went
to the petitioner’s house on the evening of
February 18th, but his car was not parked
outside and she saw no signs of him when
she entered the home.*

At trial, the petitioner’s counsel sought to
show that no gunshots were fired during the
time frame on February 18th when the man
with the backpack was seen on the victim’s
street.! None of the neighbors reported hear-
ing gunshots that evening, including Mrs,
Pratz who lived next door. One neighbor,
Kathy Stewart, reported hearing three gun-
shots, but it was her recollection that the
shots occurred between 1:00 p.m. and 8:00
p.m, on either February 17th or 18th. At
trial, the petitioner presented the testimony
of an acoustics expert, Julie Wiebusch, who
inspected the construction of homes in the
area, took measurements with acoustic equip-

ment, and used a mathematical model to”

estimate sound levels from various points in
the neighborhood. In Ms, Wiebusch’s opinion,
if someone had fired a .45 caliber Glock on
February 18th at around 5:18 to 5:27 p.m.,
people in the neighborhood would have heard
it.

The State presented evidence from police
officers who conducted a bullet trap test
inside the victim’s home. One officer fired a
gun multiple times into a barrel placed inside
the victim’s home, while the other officer
went to various locations in the neighborhood
to determine whether he could hear the gun-
fire. The officers determined that gunshots
could not be heard from inside two area
homes when the front doors of those homes,
and the front door of the victim’s home, were
closed. Similarly, Mrs. Pratz, who was inside
her own home next door, with her doors and
windows closed, did not hear any shots fired

2, Police never located the petitioner’s Glock
handgun.

3. Ms. Leger only entered the petitioner's kitchen
to check on some pets. She did not go through-
out the house looking for him.

4. During closing argument, the petitioner’s coun-
sel suggested that running down the street “is
consistent with” things other than committing
murder, such as “finding a friend [already] dead,
maybe doing something you shouldn’t be do-
ing[]”

135

during the bullet trap test. According to Mrs.
Pratz’s recollection, the windows in Jason’s
home were shut on the day of the February
murder.

The Brooke County Grand Jury indicted
the petitioner for first degree murder® in
April 2013. His trial was delayed, however,
due to mental health issues which caused the
petitioner to be deemed incompetent, but
restorable, to stand trial. He was temporarily
committed to Sharpe Hospital, a psychiatric
facility. On March 28, 2015, the petitioner
escaped from Sharpe Hospital by scaling a
twenty-foot wall and running away. After
conducting a multi-county search, law en-
forcement officials apprehended him. Subse-
quently, after receiving treatment, the peti-
tioner was deemed competent and a jury trial
was scheduled for July 2015.

Before trial, the petitioner filed a motion
for a change of venue due to publicity sur-
rounding the homicide, his escape from
Sharpe Hospital, and the prosecution’s pre-
trial motion asking that extra security meas-
ures be taken at trial. The circuit court held
a hearing and considered evidence that the
petitioner claimed was proof of a hostile envi-
ronment throughout Brooke County, includ-
ing news and social media items, but de-
ferred its ruling on venue until jury voir dire
could be conducted. Subsequently, after pro-
spective jurors completed lengthy question-
naires about themselves and their knowledge
of the case, the petitioner submitted addition-
al evidence and argument to the trial court in
support of his motion for a change of venue.
Ultimately, after conducting jury voir dire,
the circuit court allowed the trial to remain
in Brooke County. Although some of the
jurors had previously heard about the case,
they, and all of the other jurors who served,

5. Ms, Stewart’s recollection places the gunshots
at a time when the victim was still alive. As set
forth above, Jason Pratz’s mother testified that
Jason visited her home at around 5:00 p.m. on
February 18th to carry in firewood. However,
Ms, Stewart admitted while testifying that she
did not have a good recollection of the time
period. .

6, See W.Va. Code § 61-2-1 (2014).

136

indicated they could fairly judge the matter
upon the evidence presented,

Included in the petitioner's pre-trial fings
was a notice of intent to use Rule 404(b)7
evidence concerning alleged prior bad acts of
the victim. The petitioner indicated his inten-
-tion to assert at trial that an unknown third
party was the killer, To further that argu-
ment, he sought to offer evidence that the
victim sold drugs and firearms that could
have exposed him to dangerous people who
might have killed him. The State filed a
motion in limine to preclude the petitioner
from introducing this evidence. After hearing
testimony and argument over the course of
multiple pre-trial hearings, the circuit court
ruled against the admissibility of the alleged
evidence,

At the conclusion of the July 2015 trial, the
jury found the petitioner guilty of first de-
gree murder, After hearing evidence in a
separate mercy phase of the trial, the jury
refused to recommend mercy, Through its
September 11, 2015, order, the circuit court
sentenced the petitioner to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. This appeal
followed,

IL Discussion

The petitioner raises three assignments of
error on appeal, He asserts that: the cireuit
court committed reversible error in denying
his motion for a change of venue, and in
excluding. his proffered bad acts evidence
concerning the victim. In the alternative, he
argues there was insufficient evidence pre-
sented at trial to prove the murder was
premeditated. Hach of the petitioner’s as-
signments of error requires us to undertake
a different analysis and apply a different
standard of review. Accordingly, a discussion
of each issue, along with the respective stan-
dard of review, is set forth below.

A. Denial of Motion for
Change of Venue

Contending that pre-trial publicity created
a hostile environment in Brooke County that
poisoned the prospective jury pool against
him, the petitioner argues the circuit court
erred by denying his motion for a change of
the trial venue. The petitioner asserts that,

7. W.Va, R. Evid. 404(b) (2017); see section I-B

as a result of the Brooke County venue, he
was denied a fair trial. “The right to a trial
by. an impartial, objective jury in a criminal
case is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution and Article
IIL, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion.” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v, Derr, 192
W.Va. 165, 451 S.H.2d 781 (1994) (internal
citations. omitted), In response, the State
maintains that the circuit court correctly de-
nied the motion for change of venue and the
petitioner received a fair trial by an impartial
jury.

HN soOn appeal, we consider this issue
using an abuse of discretion standard. Syl.
Pt. 2, State v. Gangwer, 169 W.Va. 177, 286
S.E.2d 889 (1982) (“Whether a change of
venue is warranted rests in the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon
will not be disturbed, unless it clearly ap-
pears that such discretion has been
abused.”); accord Derr, 192 W.Va. at 167, 451
§.E.2d at 783, syl. pt. 1 (recognizing abuse of
discretion standard of review for venue rul-
ings). “In making our determination, we con-
sider not only the pretrial showing but also
the actual voir dire of the jury to determine
whether an abuse of discretion occurred.” Id.
at 171, 451 S.H.2d at 787 (citation omitted).
The petitioner had the burden of showing
good cause for a change of venue:

“To warrant a change of venue in a
criminal case, there must be a showing of
good cause therefor, the burden of which
rests on the defendant, the only person.
who, in any such case, is entitled to a
change of venue. The good cause aforesaid
inust exist at the time application for a
change of venue is made, Whether, on the
showing. made, a change of venue will be
ordered, rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court; and its ruling thereon will
not be disturbed, unless it clearly appears
that the discretion aforesaid has been
abused,’ Point 2, Syllabus, State v, Wool-
Gridge, 129 W.Va, 448, 40 S.H.2d 3899
(1946).” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Sette, 161
W.Va, 884, 242 S.H.2d 464 (1978).

of this opinion, infra.

Derr, 192 W.Va. at 167, 451 S.E.2d at 788,
syl. pt. 1.

I Seeking to support his argument, the
petitioner references multiple stories in the
media concerning his escape from Sharpe
Hospital as well as the prosecution’s pre-trial
motion seeking additional security measures
at trial. In some of the media reports about.
the petitioner’s escape, the Brooke County
Sheriff is quoted as saying the petitioner is a
“plotting” and “controlling” person. Further-
more, although the prosecutor’s motion was
styled “State’s Motion for Heightened Secu-
rity at the Trial of the Defendant,” a local
newspaper headline characterized the re-
quest. as “Prosecutor wants shock belt for
Zuccaro.” In particular, the petitioner relies
on unfavorable public comments posted to

internet sites, several of which expressed the ©

commentator’s belief that the petitioner was
guilty.

Downplaying the media coverage, the
State contends that the coverage was not so
extensive as to create a county-wide hostile
sentiment, The record contains one print
news article, three short articles posted on
television news websites, and a Facebook
post made by a television news station that,
according to the State, was shared 314 times.
Moreover, there is no indication from the
petitioner’s evidence that the people who
posted comments to the online stories resid-
ed in West Virginia, much less in Brooke
County, or that any of the jurors were ex-
posed to or authored the negative internet
comments.

The petitioner also points out that answers
provided in the juror questionnaires demon-
strate that some of the prospective jurors
had previously heard about the homicide
and/or his escape from Sharpe Hospital. Not-
ing that the circuit court excluded evidence
of the escape from the trial, the petitioner
argues that if it was too prejudicial for jurors
to hear in sworn testimony, then the media
coverage could have similarly impacted the
jurors in a prejudicial fashion, In a pre-trial
8. There is no indication in the appendix record

that the graduate student, who was studying the

field of statistics, personally analyzed the ques-
tionnaires to determine whether the prospective
jurors exhibited bias and/or had previously heard

137

letter to the circuit court, the petitioner's
counsel asserted that twenty-eight of the fif-
ty-two potential jurors who returned an ini-
tial batch of questionnaires either exhibited
some form of bias or saw something negative
in the media. The petitioner also hired a
graduate student who, using information pro-
vided by the petitioner’s counsel,’ broadly
calculated that “between 36.04% and 71.65%
of potential jurors” who completed question-
naires “would be biased against” the petition-
er.

HMM saving reviewed the appendix
record, we find no abuse of discretion in the
circuit court’s venue ruling, The petitioner
cites precedent which recognizes that “‘“[a]
present hostile sentiment against an accused,
extending’ throughout the entire county in
which he is brought to trial, is good cause for
removing the case to another county.” Point
2, Syllabus, State v, Dandy, 151 W.Va, 547,
158 S.E.2d 507 (1967), quoting Point 1, Sylla-
bus, State v. Siers, 103 W.Va. 30, 186 S.E.
508 (1927), Syllabus Point 2, State v. Sette,
161 W.Va. 384, 242 8.H.2d 464 (1978).” Derr,
192 W.Va, at 167, 451 S.E.2d at 788, syl. pt.
2. Critically, however, good .cause for a
change of venue is not present simply be-
cause there was publicity about a crime or a
criminal defendant, even if prospective jurors
saw or heard that publicity, As we have
explained, the focus of the inquiry “should
not be whether the community remembered
or heard the facts of the case, but whether
the jurors had such fixed opinions that they
‘could not judge impartially the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant.” Jd. at 167, 451
8.E.2d at 788, syl. pt. 8, in part. Good cause
to warrant a change of venue requires a
finding that the defendant cannot receive a
fair trial in the county. where the crime was
committed. “Widespread publicity, of itself,
does not require change of venue, and nei-
ther does proof that prejudice exists against
an accused, unless it appears that the preju-
dice against him is so great that he cannot
get a fair trial.” Gangwer, 169 W.Va, at 177,
286 S,E.2d at 391, syl. pt. 1.

about the case. At the beginning of his report, the
student wrote that “the answers [in the jury
questionnaires] ... were reviewed for bias by”
defense counsel,

138

‘The petitioner’s argument fails because he
wrongly equates the existence of jury bias
with exposure to information about the case.
The graduate student’s extremely broad cal-
culation of the number of potentially “biased”
jurors is based on the same mistaken prem-
ise. The evidence in the appendix record did
not prove that the community, as a whole,
had such fixed opinions as to prevent the
petitioner from receiving a fair trial. Indeed,
after voir dire the trial court was able to seat
a jury, and each of those jurors indicated
their respective ability to fairly consider the
evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner does
not assign error regarding the court’s deci-
sion to allow any particular juror to remain
on the panel. For the above reasons, we find
no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s
decision to hold the trial in Brooke County.

B. Denial of the Petitioner’s
Rule 404(b) Motion

HE s(Next, the petitioner argues the
circuit court committed reversible error by
denying his motion to present evidence of the
vietim’s prior. bad acts pursuant to Rule
404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evi-
dence. For this assignment of error, the peti-
tioner asks us to interpret the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence, which we do pursuant to a
plenary standard of review. “An interpreta-
tion of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence
presents a question of law subject to de novo
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Gentry v. Mangum, 195
W.Va, 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995). Further-
more, with regard to the circuit court’s ruling
on the admissibility of the particular prof-
fered evidence, this Court has explained as
follows:

“(T]he standard of review for a trial

court’s admission of evidence pursuant to

Rule 404(b) involves a three-step analysis.

First, we review for clear error the trial

court's factual determination that there is

9. The full text of West Virginia Rule of Evidence
404(b) (2017) provides:

(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime,
wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove
a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accor-
dance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice Required. This evi-
dence may be admissible for another purpose,
such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

sufficient evidence to show the other acts
occurred. Second, we review de novo
whether the trial court correctly found the
evidence was admissible for a legitimate
purpose, Third, we review for an abuse of
discretion the trial court’s conclusion that
the ‘other acts’ evidence is more probative
than prejudicial under Rule 403.” State v.
Jonathan B., 280 W.Va. 229, 236, 787
§.H.2d 257, 264 (2012) (quoting State v.
LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 310-11, 470 S.E.2d
618, 629-30 (1996)).

State v. Timothy C., 237 W.Va. 435, 443, 787
S.E.2d 888, 896 (2016). It is also well-estab-
lished that “{a] trial court's evidentiary rul-
ings, as well as its application of the Rules of
Evidence, are subject to review under an
abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 4,
State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511
S.E.2d 469 (1998), .

Rule 404(b) provides, in part, that “[elvi-
dence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the char-
acter.” ® However, the evidence may be ad-
missible for another purpose. See id. In sup-
port of his motion, the petitioner argued that
he did not kill Jason Pratz and had no motive
to do so. He contends the trial court’s eviden-
tiary ruling prevented him from offering the
remainder of his defense theory: that un-
known, dangerous third parties could have
had a motive to kill Jason Pratz because,
after losing his job, Jason became a “low
level” drug dealer and sold illegal firearms.
The petitioner’s pre-trial 404(b) notice dis-
closed his intent to offer into evidence text _
messages purportedly showing that the vic-
tim offered to sell a handgun and an illegal
silencer to his friends, as well as employment
records showing the victim was terminated

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident. Any party seek-
ing the admission of evidence pursuant to this
subsection must:

(A) provide reasonable notice of the general
nature and the specific and precise purpose for
which the evidence is being offered by the
party at trial; and :
(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the
court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial
notice,

from his employment because of workplace
drug use. In a separate motion in limine, the
State opposed and sought to exclude this
proffered evidence.

During pre-trial hearings the circuit court
heard testimony and argument regarding ad-
mission of the proposed evidence. The State
presented testimony from the person with
whom the victim had exchanged the text
messages, his friend Barbara Hershberger.
She explained the text messages concerned
her husband’s interest in a gun show the
victim was going to attend, and the victim
was not trying to sell a gun or a silencer to
either her or her husband, as the defense

counsel suggested. According to Ms. Hersh- |

berger’s testimony, a reference in the text
messages about using a silencer was simply a
joke. Furthermore, while the petitioner pre-
sented employment records which demon-
strated that the victim had been terminated
from his job at a hospital for being under the
influence of drugs, and suggesting he may
have stolen pain medication from the hospi-
tal, these employment records did not indi-
cate he ever gave or sold drugs to other
people. Defense counsel informed the cirenit
court that the only evidence through which
he would seek to show that the victim was a
drag dealer would be through the direct
testimony of the petitioner. Defense counsel
opted against presenting pre-trial testimony
from ‘the petitioner, even though the circuit
court indicated that any pre-trial testimony
would be limited to this issue. The petitioner
did not present evidence of anyone purchas-
ing drugs, guns, or gun silencers from the
victim, nor did he present any evidence
showing the victim had ever been suspected
of, arrested for, or convicted of such crimes.
In short, no evidence was presented during
the pre-trial hearings to establish the truth
of the evidence the petitioner asked to have
admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b). Moreover,
none of the petitioner’s proffered evidence
pointed to any particular third party who
might have had the means, opportunity, or
motive to kill the victim. The petitioner
10, “A defendant's desire to prove other crimes

by a third person is sometimes called ‘reverse’

Rule 404(b) evidence.” 1 Louis J. Palmer, Hand-

book on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers
§ 404.04[1 id] (6th ed. 2015).

139

merely speculated that being a drug dealer
and selling firearms could have exposed the
victim to bad people who might b have decided
to kill him.

In its pre-trial “Memorandum Decision
and Order,” the circuit court found that the
petitioner failed to provide credible evidence
to show the victim was a drug dealer or had
illegally sold guns or silencers. Furthermore,
the court found no evidence to even suggest
a connection between the victim’s alleged bad
conduct with “seedy characters” and this
murder. Accordingly, the court ruled that the
petitioner could not introduce this alleged
drug and gun evidence at trial.

On appeal, the petitioner argues the circuit
court should not have required him to pres-
ent evidence during the pre-trial hearings
that Jason Pratz was a drug dealer and
firearms seller, He contends he should have
been allowed to merely proffer these allega-
tions to the circuit court, and the jury should
have been allowed to decide the truth there-
of. Although the petitioner expressly sought
to offer this evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b),-and the circuit court complied with
well-established precedent regarding the ad-
mission of Rule 404(b) evidence, the petition-
er urges this Court to adopt different proce-
dures for the admission of “other bad acts”
evidence when it is offered by a criminal
defendant against the State.” The State’ re-
sponds in support of the circuit court’s meth-
odology and ruling. As discussed below, we
decline to adopt the special rule sought by
the petitioner.

To understand the parties’ arguments on
this issue, it is necessary to review ‘this
Court’s seminal case on the admission of
Rule 404(b) evidence in West Virginia courts,
State v. McGinnis, 198 W.Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d
516 (1994). McGinnis, like the overwhelming
majority of 404(b) issues brought to this
Court on appeal, concerned the State’s intro-
duction in a-criminal trial of the prior bad
acts of the defendant. However, nothing in
the language of Rule 404(b) limits its applica-
tion solely to the prosecution’s evidence.

11, See supra note 9.

140

Writing for the Court in McGinnis, Justice
Cleckley acknowledged the applicability of
Rule 404(6) to criminal defendants and to
parties in civil cases:

By using the “prosecution” as the sub-
ject of our discussion, we do not mean to
imply that application of Rule 404() of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence is limited
to criminal cases, Although we apply it
more often iti the criminal context, we also
apply it to civil cases. See-generally TXO
Production v, Alliance Resources, 187
‘W.Va, 457, 419 8.B.2d 870 (1992), aff'd 509
U.S. 448, 118 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366
(1998). Similarly, Rule 404(b) evidence is
equally available to a defendant in a crimi-
nal case, See generally State v. Maynard,
170 W.Va, 40, 289 S.H.2d 714 (1982). The
standards that we discuss for the admis-
sion of Rule 404(b) evidence in criminal
cases when offered by the prosecution ap-
ply to all cases. We note, however, that
under Rule 408 the risk of prejudice is not
likely to be as great when the defendant in
a criminal case offers collateral evidence
against a third person. See United States
v, Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2nd
Cir, 1984) (court observes a difference in
admissibility standard:

a defendant’s offer of 404(b) evidence “as a

shield need not be as restrictive as when a

prosecutor uses such evidence as sword”

because the problems of prejudice “are

normally absent”). ,
McGinnis, 198 W.Va. at 154 n.6, 455 S,E.2d
at 523 n.6 (emphasis added). Indeed, when
Rule 404(b) was amended in 2014, the lan-
guage of the rule’s notice requirement was
broadened to require all parties—not just
prosecutors—to provide prior notice when
they intend to offer evidence pursuant to
Rule 404(b).”—*

12. Prior to amendments made in 2014, Rule
404(b) provided, in part, that “upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general na-
ture of any such evidence it intends to introduce
at trial.” As quoted in note nine, supra, the
amended rule now provides that “any party”
seeking to offer Rule 404(b) evidence must pro-
vide notice, The 2014 comment to the rule ex-
plains that modifications to the language includ-

HR McGinnis set forth the frame-
work for the admission of Rule 404(b) evi-
dence in West Virginia state courts, After the
proponent of the evidence specifies the: pur-
pose for which. it is offered, the trial .court
does the following:

Where an offer of evidence is made un-
der Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules
of Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to
Rule 104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, is to determine its admissibility.
Before admitting the evidence, the trial
court should conduct an in camera hearing
as stated in State v, Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688,
847 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the
evidence and arguments of counsel, the
trial court must be satisfied by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the acts or
conduct occurred and that the defendant
committed the acts. If the trial court does
not find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the acts or conduct was commit-

‘ted or that the defendant was the actor,
the evidence should be ‘excluded under
Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has
been made, the trial court must then de-
termine the relevancy of the evidence un-
der Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence and conduet the balanc-
ing required under Rule 408 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence, If the trial
court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b)
evidence is admissible, it should instruct
the jury on the limited purpose for which
‘such evidence has been admitted. A limit-
‘ing instruction should be given at the time
the evidence is offered, and we recommend

* that it be repeated in the trial court’s
general charge to the jury at the conclu-
sion of the evidence,

McGinnis, 193 W.Va. at 151, 455 S.E.2d at
520, syl, pt, 2.19 Thus, after hearing the evi-

ed “broadfening] the requirement of reasonable
notice to every party, not just the state in a
criminal prosecution, of the general nature of
and the specific and precise purpose for which
the evidence is being offered by the party at
trial, ” The comment makes clear that there was

“no intent to change any rewult i in any ruling on
evidence admissibility.”

13, This point of law was later modified to require
the issuance of a limiting instruction. Syl. Pt. 5,
in part, State ex rel. Caton v. Sanders, 215 W.Va.

dence in camera, the trial court first deter-
mines whether, by'a preponderance of the
-evidence, the alleged prior bad acts occurred
and were committed by the alleged actor. Id.
Tf the court finds this showing has been
made, it determines the relevancy of the
evidence under Rules 401 “ and 402" of the

Rules of Evidence and conducts the balane- .
ing required by Rule 403" of the Rules of

Evidence. Id.

In McGinnis and the earlier TXO Produc-
tion opinion, this Court adopted many of the
procedures for the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence announced by the Supreme Court of
United States in. Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S, 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496,
99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), See McGinnis, 198
W.Va. at 155, 455 S.E.2d at 524; TXO Pro-
duction, 187 W.Va. at 470, 419 S.H.2d at 883.
As a matter of state law, however, this Court
in McGinnis chose to deviate from Huddle-
ston in one aspect. In Huddleston, the Su-
preme Court ruled that when federal trial

755, 601 S.B.2d 75 (2004) (“If the 404(b) évi-
dence is determined to be admissible, then a
limiting instruction shall be given at the time the
evidence is offered, and must be repeated in the
trial court's general charge to the jury at the
conclusion of the evidence.”’).

14, West Virginia Rule of Evidence 401 (2017)
provides:

Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tenden-
cy to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact
is of consequence in determining the action,

15, West Virginia Rulés of Evidence 402 (2017)
provides:

Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of
the following provides otherwise: (a) the Unit-
ed States Constitution; (b) the West Virginia
Constitution; (c) these rules; or (d) other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia. Irrelevant evidence is not ad-
missible,

16. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 403 (2017)
provides:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, mislead-
ing the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,

17, Federal Rule of. Evidence 104 (2017) provides,
in part:

(a) In General, The court must decide any pre-

liminary question about whether a witness is

141

courts decide the admissibility. of evidence
offered under. Federal Rule of Evidence
404(), they do so using the conditional ad-
missibility provision in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 104(b)."" Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690,
108 S.Ct. 1496; McGinnis, 193 W.Va. at 157-
58, 455 S.E.2d at 526-27. This means that
federal judges examine proposed Rule 404(b)
evidence only to determine whether the jury
could reasonably find the proffered facts to
be true by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. In contrast, this Court in McGinnis held

. that in West Virginia, trial judges shall de-

termine the admissibility of proposed Rule -
404(b) evidence pursuant to their authority in
West Virginla Rule of Evidence 104(a).8
McGinnis, 193 W.Va. at 158, 455 S.E.2d at
527, The effect of this holding is that a West
Virginia trial judge makes a preliminary de-
termination about proposed Rule 404(b) evi-
dence before the evidence may be introduced
to the jury. Specifically, “[alfter hearing the
evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial

qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is ad-
missible, In so deciding, the court is not bound
by evidence rules, except those on privilege.
(b) Relevance That Depends on a Fact, When
the relevance of evidence depends on whether
a fact exists, proof must be introduced suffi-
cient to support a finding that the fact does
exist.

The court may admit the proposed evidence on
the condition that the proof be introduced la-
ter,

18. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 104 2017)
‘provides, in part:

(a) In general. The court must decide any pre-
liminary question about whether a witness is
qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is ad-
missible, In so deciding, the court is not bound
by evidence rules, except those on privilege,
(b) Relevance that depends on a fact. When the
relevance of evidence depends on whether a
fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does exist.
The court may admit the proposed evidence on
the condition that the proof be introduced la-
ter,

@) Cross-examining a defendant in a criminal
case, By testifying on a preliminary question, a
defendant in a criminal case does not become
subject to cross-examination on other issues in
the case.
Although this rule was revised and re-worded
after McGinnis, the amendments do not impact
our decision in this case,

142

court must be satisfied by a preponderance
of the evidence that the acts or conduct
oceurred and that the defendant committed
the acts.” McGinnis, 198 W.Va. at 151, 455
S.E.2d at 520, syl. pt. 2, in part.

HHI In the case sub judice, the petitioner
urges this Court, as a matter of policy, to
depart from our McGinnis procedures when-
ever a criminal defendant offers Rule 404(b)
evidence adverse to the State. He asks that
criminal defendants be allowed to merely
proffer Rule 404(b) evidence to the trial
court, skipping the step where the judge
makes an initial determination that the other
bad acts occurred and were committed by
the alleged actor. In support of his request,
the petitioner states that the primary reason
given in McGinnis for adopting our current
approach was the protection of criminal de-
fendants from an unfair risk of conviction,
which is unnecessary when the evidence is
offered by the defendant. See McGinnis, 193
W.Va. at 158, 455 S.E.2d at 527.

We reject the petitioner’s request to modi-
fy our existing evidentiary law. As set forth
above, our McGinnis procedures are not lim-
ited solely to situations where the State of-
fers prior bad acts evidence about the crimi-
nal defendant. While the risk of prejudice is
not likely to be as great when the defendant
offers collateral evidence against a third per-
son,” the State nonetheless has a legitimate
interest in avoiding the presentation of unre-
liable and false collateral evidence to the
jury. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
808, 309, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 418
(1998) (“State and Federal Governments un-
questionably have a legitimate interest in
ensuring that reliable evidence is presented

19. See McGinnis, 193 W.Va. at 154 n.6, 455
S.E.2d at 523 n.6.

20. Courts in West Virginia also apply the McGin-
nis framework to Rule 404(b) evidence offered in
civil cases. For example, in Stafford v. Rocky
Hollow Coal Company, 198 W.Va, 593, 482
S.E.2d 210 (1996), this Court reversed the jury’s
verdict in an employment case because the trial
court failed to perform the analysis specified in
McGinnis before admitting prior bad acts evi-
dence of the defendant's parent corporation. The
trial court's missteps included failing to make a
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the prior bad acts had occurred, 198 W.Va. at
599, 482 S.E.2d at 216. In Stafford, the Court

to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed,
the exclusion of unreliable evidence is a prin-
cipal objective of many evidentiary rules.”)
(citations omitted). Moreover, the jury might
ignore evidence showing guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt because the victim was cast as
a bad person who “deserved what he got.”
The State’s interests also include avoiding
jury confusion, as well as avoiding the expen-
diture of time and resources on a “mini-trial”
within the trial to dispute the veracity of the
collateral evidence. Applying the McGinnis
procedures ensures a fair trial for all par-
ties.

Furthermore, the petitioner’s argument on
appeal fails to account for a critical aspect of
the circuit court’s ruling: that there lacked
any connection between the victim’s alleged
bad conduct and this crime. Even if the
cireuit court had accepted the petitioner's
proffer, there was nothing to link the victim’s
bad acts and this murder. It was pure specu-
lation on the petitioner’s part that some un-
known “seedy character” might have had a
reason to, and did in fact, kill Jason Pratz
because of a fantastical drug or gun transac-
tion. When any litigant offers evidence, in-
eluding Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court
considers its relevance under Rule of Evi-
dence 4017! and performs the balancing test,
required by Rule of Evidence 403. See
McGinnis, 198 W.Va. at 151, 455 S.E.2d at
520, syl. pt. 2, in part ({I]f a sufficient
showing has been made, the trial court must
then determine the relevancy of the evidence
under Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence and conduct the balancing
required under Rule 408 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence.”), Indeed, the Rule
401/408 analysis was the focus of several

acknowledged that when prior bad acts evidence
is offered in a civil case, “the risk of prejudice
under Rule of Evidence 403 is not likely to be as
great” as when such evidence is offered in a
criminal case, 198 W.Va. at 598, 482 S.B.2d at
215. Nonetheless, our reliance on the McGinnis
analysis held firm.

24. See supra note 14.

22. Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
See supra note 16.

courts that have addressed the admissibility
of reverse Rule 404(b) evidence.

MM For example, in a case where a
criminal defendant wished to offer 404(b) evi-
dence to show that an alternate suspect com-
mitted the crime, the Supreme Court of Col-
orado explained as follows:

The touchstone of relevance in this con-
text is whether the alternate suspect evi-
dence establishes a non-speculative con-
nection or nexus between the alternate
suspect and the crime charged. Where the
evidence concerns other acts by the alter-
nate suspect, a court must look to whether
all the similar acts and circumstances, tak-
en together, support a finding that the
same person probably was involved in both
the other act and the charged crime.

People v. Elmarr, 351 P.8d 481, 488 (Colo.
2015). “[E]ven relevant alternate suspect evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by countervailing
policy considerations under ... [Rule 403],
such as the danger of confusion of the issues
or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay.” Id. Commenting on the risks
inherent to speculative evidence, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals observed:

Although there is no doubt that a defen-

dant has a right to attempt to establish his

innocence by showing that someone else

did the crime, a defendant still must show

that his proffered evidence on the alleged

alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its
own or in combination with other evidence
in the record, to show a newus between the
crime charged and the asserted “alterna-
tive perpetrator.” It is not sufficient for a
defendant merely to offer up unsupported
speculation that another person may have
done the crime. Such speculative blaming
intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion,
and it invites the jury to render its find-
ings based on emotion or prejudice.
United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214, 1219
(lot Cir, 2007) (quoting United States v.
McVeigh, 158 F.8d 1166, 1191 (10 Cir,
1998)) (emphasis in original).

In Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S.
319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 508 (2006),
the Supreme Court of the United States

148
explained that “[w]hile the [United States]

Constitution ... prohibits the exclusion of
defense evidence under rules that serve no
legitimate purpose or that are disproportion-
ate to the ends that they are asserted to
promote, well-established rules of evidence
permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by certain oth-
er factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or potential to mislead the
jury.” Id. at 826, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (citations
omitted), As an example of this principle, the
Holmes Court discussed the exelusion of
speculative evidence offered by a criminal
defendant seeking to show that someone else
was the perpetrator.

A specific application of this principle is
found in rules regulating the admission of
evidence proffered by criminal defendants
to show that someone else committed the
crime with which they are charged. See,
eg, 41 C.I.S., Homicide § 216, pp. 56-58
(1991) (“Evidence tending to show the
commission by another person of the crime
charged may be introduced by accused
when it is inconsistent with, and raises a
reasonable doubt of, his own guilt; but
frequently matters offered in evidence for
this purpose are so remote and lack such
connection with the crime that they are
excluded”); 40A Am. Jur. 2d, Homicide
§ 286, pp. 186-138 (1999) (“[T]he accused
may introduce any legal evidence tending
to prove that another person may have
committed the crime with which the defen-
dant is charged.... [Such evidence] may
be excluded where it does not sufficiently
connect the other person to the crime, as,
for example, where the evidence is specula-
tive or remote, or does not tend to prove
or disprove a material fact in issue at the
defendant’s trial” (footnotes omitted)),
Such rules are widely accepted[.]

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327, 126 S.Ct. 1727.

HE Turning to the facts of this case, we
find no error in the circuit court’s exclusion
of the petitioner’s proffered 404(b) evidence
about the victim. A review of the record
reveals the circuit court fully complied with
McGinnis in making its ruling, The circuit
court correctly concluded that the petitioner
did not present evidence to prove the victim

144

was either a drug dealer or the seller of:
illegal firearms and firearms equipment. At
most, during the pre-trial. hearings the peti-
tioner established the victim was a drug user
who discussed a handgun and silencer with a
friend during an exchange of text messages.

HM More importantly, ‘even if the circuit,
court had found sufficient evidence to prove
the victim was a drug dealer and/or gun
seller (or, contrary to McGinnis, had simply
accepted the petitioner’s unsupported prof-
fer), the evidence was still properly excluded
pursuant to Rules 401 and 408, The petition-
ér’s theory was premised entirely upon spec-
ulation, There is no evidence in the appendix
record to suggest the victim was killed dur-
ing, or because of, a drug or gun transaction,
There is nothing to connect this’ homicide to
the proffered: prior bad acts. Allowing the
jury to hear about irrelevant, collateral con-
duct of this nature, even if true, would have
been confusing to the jury and wasteful of
judicial time and resources.

HE Finally, although most of the pe-
titioner’s arguments concern his request that,
we adopt a different policy regarding the
procedures for admission of reverse Rule
404(b) evidence, he also makes generalized
constitutional arguments about the Rule
404() issue, He suggests that his due pro-
cess right to defend himself was overbur-
dened because the trial court would not
merely accept his pre-trial proffer regarding
the victim’s prior bad acts. He also implies
that his rights were infringed because, as the
sole person claiming that Jason Pratz was a
drug dealer, he had-to decide whether to
testify in the pre-trial hearing to support the
404(b) proffer.s We are not convinced. The
Supreme Court explained that “well-estab-
lished rules of evidence permit trial judges to
exclude evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by certain other factors such as
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes, 547

23. Although the circuit court advised that any
pre-trial testimony and cross-examination would:
be limited solely to this issue, the petitioner elect-
ed not to testify in the McGinnis hearing. West
Virginia Rule of Evidence 104(d) directs that
“(bly testifying on a preliminary question, a de-
fendant in a criminal case does not become sub-

US. at 826, 126 S.Ct. 1727, As we have
already concluded, this purely speculative ev-
idence, even if true, was properly excluded
under Rules 401 and 403. The following dis-
cussion by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit is instructive:
The [United States] Constitution guar-
antees “a meaningful opportunity to pres-
“ent a complete defense,” Crane v, Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S, 683, 690, 106 S.Ct, 2142, 90
L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (quotation marks omit-
ted), but “not an unlimited right to ride
roughshod over reasonable evidentiary re-
strictions,” Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F.8d
°507, 512 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc). A defen-
dant must “comply with established rules
of procedure and evidence designed to as-
‘sure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence.”
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302, 98 S.Ct. 1088, 85 L.Ed.2d 297 (1978).
The right to present a complete defense—
including the third-party culpability de-
fense raised here—thus does not mean
that a defendant may introduce whatever
evidence he wishes, only that any state-law
evidentiary restrictions cannot be “arbi-
trary” or “disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.” United States
v. Scheffer, 523 U.S, 808, 308, 118 S.Ct.
-1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 418 (1998) (quotation
marks omitted).
Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 870 (6 Cir.
2010). For all of the foregoing reasons, we
find no error in the circuit court's exclusion
of evidence regarding the victim’s’ alleged
prior bad acts.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

HMM Although the petitioner concedes
there was sufficient evidence at trial from
which the jury could have found that he
murderéd Jason Pratz, he ‘argues the State
failed to prove the murder was premeditat-
ed.™ Premeditation is an essential element

ject to cross-examination on other issues in the
case.” See supra note 18.

24, The petitioner continues to maintain his inno-
cence to the homicide, but admits’ there was
evidence presented at trial from which the jury
could find all of the elements of murder except
premeditation,

of intentional first degree murder and must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The
petitioner asserts that without sufficient
proof of premeditation, this Court must re-
duee his conviction to second degree mur-
der.?6 The State responds that the conviction
of first degree murder is fully supported by
the evidence,

Hs When reviewing a claim of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews
the evidence admitted at trial and accepts all
inferences from a vantage most favorable to
the prosecution.

The function of an appellate court when
reviewing the sufficiency ‘of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine
the evidence admitted at trial to determiné
whether such evidence, if believed, is suffi-
cient to convince a reasonable person of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is wheth-
er, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any ra-
tional trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proved be-

“ yond a reasonable doubt.
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657,
461 S.H.2d 168 (1995), This review takes into
account all of the evidence, including cireum-
stantial evidence. “Circumstantial evidence
... is intrinsically no different from testimo-
nial evidence,” Id, at 668, 461°S.E.2d at 174
(quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.
121, 189-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, -99 L.Ed. 150
(1954)), “Circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence inherently possess the same proba-
tive value.” Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 669, 461
S.E.2d at 175:(quoting State v. Jenks, 61
Ohio St.8d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502 (1991)).
A criminal defendant challenging the suffi-

25. To establish first degree murder, the State
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the petitioner committed the willful, deliber-
ate and premeditated killing of Jason Pratz. See
W.Va, Code § 61-2-1; State v. ld, 237
W.Va. 773, 786, 791: S.B.2d 403, 416 (2016)
(reciting elements of first degree murder); State
v, Browning, 199 W.Va. 417, 420, 485 S.B.2d 1, 4
(1997) (same); State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657,
676, 461 S.E.2d 163, 182 (1995) (discussing first
degree murder jury instruction),

26. A murder that does not present all of the .

essential elements of first degree murder consti-
tutes second degree murder. See W.Va. Code

145

ciency of: the evidence on appeal has a heavy
burden; he or she must prove there is no
evidence from which the jury could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

A criminal defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction takes on a heavy burden, An
appellate court must review all the evi-

* dence, whether direct or circumstantial, in
the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must credit all inferences and credibil-
ity assessments that the jury might have
drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
evidence need not be inconsistent with ev-
ery conclusion.save that of guilt so long as”
the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Credibility determinations are for a
jury and not an appellate court, Finally, a
jury verdict should be set aside only when
the record contains no evidence, regardless
of how it is weighed, from which the jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.

Guthrie, 194 ‘W.Va, at 663, 461 S.E.2d at 169,
syl. pt. 8.27

Hs As: oxplained in Guthrie, “pre-
meditated” killing means that a killing is
committed after the passage of some amount
of time allowing the perpetrator to be con-
scious of the intent to kill; this period of time
cannot be arbitrarily fixed and will vary ac-
cording to the person and circumstances:

« 5. Although premeditation and deliber-
ation-are not measured by any particular
period of time, there must be some period
between the formation of the intent to kill
and the actual killing, which indicates the
killing is by prior calculation and design.

§ 61-2-1, in part (‘All other murder is murder of
the'second, degree.”), The jury at the petitioner's
trial was instructed on the elements of both first
degree murder and second degree murder.

27. As part of his argument, the petitioner con-
tends that syllabus point three of Guthrie is too
lax and is inconsistent with the standard cited by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Jack-
son v. Virginia, 443 U.S, 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), For the reasons set forth in
State v, Boyd, 238 W.Va. 420, 429 n.12, 796
S.E.2d 207,216 n.12 (2017), we summarily re-
ject this claim. :

146

This means there must be an opportunity
for some reflection on the intention to kill
after it is formed.

6. In criminal cases where the State
seeks a conviction of first degree murder
based on premeditation and deliberation, a
trial court should instruct the jury that
murder in the first degree consists of an
intentional, deliberate, and premeditated
killing which means that the killing is done
after a period of time for prior consider-
ation, The duration of that period cannot
be arbitrarily fixed. The time in which to
form a deliberate and premeditated design
varies as the minds and temperaments of
people differ and according to the circum-
stances in which they may be placed. Any
interval of time between the forming of the
‘intent to kill and the ewecution of that
intent, which is of sufficient duration for
the accused to be fully conscious of what
he intended, is sufficient to support a con-
viction for first degree murder. To the
extent that State v. Schrader, 172 W.Va. 1,
302 S.E.2d 70 (1982), is inconsistent with
our holding today, it is expressly over-
ruled.

Id. at 664, 461 S.E.2d at 170, syl. pts. 5 and 6

(emphasis added). Moreover,
“[a] jury must consider the circumstances
in which the killing occurred to determine
whether it fits into the first degree catego-
ry. Relevant factors inelude the relation-
ship of the accused and the victim and its
condition at the time of the homicide;
whether plan or preparation existed either
in terms of the type of weapon utilized or
the place where the killing occurred; and
the presence of a reason or motive to
deliberately take life, No factor is control-
ling, Any one or all taken together may
indicate actual reflection on the decision to
Kill, This is what our statute means by
‘willful, deliberate and premeditated kill-
ing’ ” State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va, 657, 675
[n.28], 461 S.H.2d 168, 181 n.23 (1995).

State v. Browning, 199 W.Va. 417, 421, 485
§.E.2d 1, 5 (1997),

28. During a jury view, the jurors personally visit-
ed the victim's street, observed the available op-
tions for parking, and observed the location
where the silver Subaru was parked.

TH In the case sub judice, the State’s
assertion of premeditation is supported by
evidence that the petitioner possessed a
handgun when he drove to the victim’s home.
There was circumstantial evidence that the
gun was hidden in his backpack, which is
where a witness saw him place it three days
earlier. Furthermore, instead of parking his
car in front of the victim’s house, the evi-
dence showed that the petitioner parked at
the bottom of a hill and around a corner.® A
reasonable jury could infer that this was to
screen the sight of his car from onlookers so
he could approach the victim’s home unno-
ticed. The evidence further suggests that the
petitioner then walked up the hill to Jason
Pratz’s home, entered the home, and re-
moved his gun, The scene of the crime
showed no signs of a struggle, which one
might expect if the killing had resulted from
an argument or other heat-of-the-moment
situation. Finally, the victim, who was un-
armed, was shot not just once, but a total of
three times, and the trail of the victim’s
blood evidenced his attempt to flee from the
shooter, The jury reasonably could have de-
termined that the time it took to accomplish
any of these steps provided the petitioner
with a sufficient opportunity for reflection on
his intent to kill. See Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at
664, 461 S.E.2d at 170, syl. pt. 5.

HH In support of this assignment of er-
ror, the petitioner argues the State failed to
provide any motive for his killing of Jason
Pratz. However, this does not control our
inquiry. Motive may be an indicator of pre-
meditation,” but it is not an essential ele-
ment of first degree murder and need not be
proven in order to sustain a conviction. Rath-
er, the jury’s duty is to consider all of the
evidence presented and to apply that evi-
dence to the charged offenses.

Considering all of the evidence in a light
most favorable to the State, we conclude
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the peti-
tioner formed the intent to kill and had a
sufficient interval of time to be fully con-

29. See Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 675 n.23, 461
S.E.2d at 181 n.23.

scious of what he intended. See id. The jury
‘was properly instructed on the crimes of first
and second degree murder and, after hearing
all of the evidence, found the petitioner guilty
of first degree murder.® This Court has no
basis upon which to second-guess the jury’s
verdict,
Il. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner’s

conviction is affirmed.

Affirmed.

799 S.E.2d 578
William G. ERPS, Defendant
Below, Petitioner
ve
Leslie MEADOWS, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

No. 16-0068

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: January 18, 2017
Filed: April 27, 2017

30. The circuit court instructed, inter alia, that “it
is the absence of premeditation and deliberation
that distinguishes murder in the second degree
from murder in the first degree[,]” and that

4

a

second degree murder is an unlawful, willful,
intentional, and malicious killing “without delib-
eration or premeditation.”

Anthony R. Veneri, Esq., Veneri Law Of-
fices, Princeton, West Virginia, Counsel for
the Petitioner

William S. Winfrey, I, Attorney at Law,
Princeton, West Virginia, ‘Counsel for’ the
Respondent.

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner William Erps appeals a Decem- ©

ber 29, 2015 Amended Judgment Order of
the Circuit Court of Mercer County award-
ing judgment to Respondent Leslie Meadows
in the amount of $85,675 following a bench
trial. Below, Meadows claimed that Erps
owed her inoney from several separate real
estate projects that she shared with him,
Erps alleges on appeal that certain findings
of fact made by the circuit court were clearly
erroneous based upon thé evidence presented
at trial, and that the circuit court abused its
discretion in awarding judgment against him.
Meadows’ raises cross-assignments of error
alleging that the amount of the circuit court’s
judgment was inadequate based upon’ the
evidence presented. Upon consideration of
the parties’ briefs and arguments, the sub-
mitted record and pertinent authorities, we

1, The other two transactions not directly at issue
in this appeal are (1) various home improve-
ments made by Erps to Meadows’s residence;
and (2) Meadows's claims related to the purchase
of and improvements to the Hatcher property,
which were withdrawn during the trial in this
matter. Although the parties had several dealings
between them, as we explain in further detail

149

affirm in part, and reverse in part, the circuit
court’s order and remand the case with di-
rections as further indicated below.

L FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Meadows filed this case against Erps in
November of 2013. Prior to filing, Meadows
and Erps had known each other for several
years. Erps provided construction services to
Meadows and -her husband through Erps’s
company, Improvements Unlimited, LLC.
After Meadows’ husband passed away in
2006, Erps continued to do construction work
for Meadows. Beginning in 2008, Meadows
and Erps were involved in four transactions
together in the Princeton area that give rise
to the present action. For purposes of this
appeal, Meadows’s claims involve two of
those transactions with Erps: (1) claims re-
lated to the purchase of, improvements to,
and sale of the Sutphin property located on
Old Oakvale Road; and (2) claims related to
the financing for the Twiford apartments on
Lovell Avenue and Guard Drive

In her complaint, Meadows alleged that
she had to take a loss on the Sutphin proper-
ty that the parties jointly purchased because
“Brps failed to repay her for the financing
she provided to him in the amount of
$35,000.” She alleged that Erps’s actions in
acquiring financing from her were willful,
deliberate, and fraudulent and that pursvant
to a contract to loan Erps money, he owed
her repayment. She also alleged that because
of his actions, she lost the opportunity to
invest her money, incurred. the expense of
collection, and suffered annoyance, aggrava-
tion and inconvenience,

With respect to the Twiford apartments,
Meadows alleged in her complaint that after
her husband died in 2006, Erps approached
her about providing him financing for the
apartments. She alleged that, beginning in

below, this matter is complicated by the almost
complete lack of record keeping by either party
in this case. This lack of record keeping made it
difficult for the circuit court to’'fully determine
the exact obligations between the parties during
the course of their involvement,together, and has
thus worked to the detriment of both parties in
this action. .

150

2008 and ending in 2009, she provided Erps
with $208,000 for those buildings, but he gave
her nothing in the way of a lien or ownership
interest in the property. She contended that
she paid Erps five separate checks in the
amounts of $67,000, $90,000, $6,000, $10,000,
and $30,000 for financing purposes.”

Following the completion of discovery, the
cireuit court conducted a bench trial on Octo-
ber 27, 2015. Meadows and Erps were the
only witnesses who testified at trial. The
cireuit court entered an Amended Judgment
Order on December 29, 2015.5 In its order,
the circuit court made the following relevant
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Regarding the Sutphin property, the cir-
cuit court found that Erps approached Mead-
ows about jointly buying the house from Mr.
Sutphin for investment and resale. Meadows
testified that she cashed a certificate of de-
posit in the amount of $21,875 in April of
2009, signed a contract to jointly purchase
the property from Mr. Sutphin for $50,000,
and gave Erps $25,000 for one-half of the
down payment that same day. Meadows also
alleged that she continued to pay for repairs
to the house by paying Erps a total of
$32,300, as itemized in Erps’s March 15,
2011, statement to her. Pursuant to terms of
the sales contract, a deed reflecting the con~
veyance of the property from Mr. Sutphin to
Erps and Meadows for $50,000 was recorded
on April 27, 2010. Erps testified that at the
closing he presented a check dated April 21,
2010 in the amount of $25,000, which he
testified came from his company. However,
the circuit court found that Erps failed to
produce the $25,000 check at trial, and in-
stead found Meadows’s testimony credible
that the $25,000 down payment came from
her cashing the $21,375 certificate of deposit.

2. The above-noted language is the extent of what.
‘Meadows alleged in her exceédingly brief com-
plaint against Meadows with respect to these two
properties. Despite the fact that the nature of the
claims alleged in Meadows's complaint lacked
factual and legal clarity, Erps answered the com~
plaint asserting the following defenses to these
claims: 1) that all claims, except a contract
claim, were barred by the statute of limitations
given that the contract claim is permitted for up
to five years for oral contracts and ten years for
written contracts after accrual, and all other
claims would be subject to, and barred by, the

The circuit court further found that on
August 10, 2010, a deed was prepared con-
veying Meadows’ undivided interest in the
Sutphin property to Erps and his wife for
$35,000, Erps paid Meadows $35,000 for her
interest in the property from the proceeds of
a loan he secured from First Community
Bank in the amount of $90,000, using the
property as collateral. Erps subsequently en-
tered into a sales contract with Mr. Shorter,
agreeing to sell him the property for $90,000.
‘The circuit court found that Meadows had
invested a total of $58,675 in the Sutphin
property ($21,375 from cashing the certificate
of deposit, plus $32,300 in payment for im-
provements as evidenced by Erps’s March
15, 2011 statement to her), but she only
recovered $35,000. The court concluded that
Meadows should have recovered at least the
amount of her investment. Accordingly, the
court’s judgment order awarded Meadows
$18,675 with respect to the Sutphin property.

In regard to the Twiford apartments, the
circuit court found that there was no written
contract between the parties whereby Mead-
ows would contribute funds for the apart-
ments and jointly own them with Erps. The
court further found that, even if there had
been evidence of an oral contract for the joint
purchase of the apartments, such a contract
would be in violation of the statute of frauds,
and therefore, would be unenforceable.

Contrary to Meadows’s allegation that she
provided financing to Erps in the form of five
checks totaling $203,000 (in the amounts of
$67,000, $90,000, $6,000, $10,000 and $80,000),
the circuit court found that Meadows only
produced two checks at trial that arguably
could be attributed to the apartments—one
for $67,000 and one for $90,000. The court
found that the $67,000 check, which was ten-
dered in July 2009, was attributable to the

two year statute of limitations; 2) that all claims
for an interest in real estate (specifically the
Twiford apartments) were barred by the statute
of frauds since there was no written contract
between the parties. Thus, the case proceeded as
a contract action.

3. The Amended Judgment Order corrected cer-
tain damages calculations made by the circuit
court in its initial Judgment Order entered on
December 22, 2015.

apartments based on Meadows’s testimony.
and the notation “APT.” written on the
check’s memorandum line, As for the $90,000
check, which was dated June 15, 2009, the
court found that the copy of the check that
was admitted into evidence had nothing writ-
ten on it to indicate that it was related to the
apartments, but the copy of the same check
that was produced to Erps in discovery con-
tained the words, “Apt. property” on the
memorandum line. Meadows conceded in her
testimony that she wrote the words “Apt.
property” on the check after it was tendered
to Erps, processed through the bank, and
returned to her. Accordingly, the cireuit
court found that the preponderance of the
evidence was that Meadows lent Erps only
$67,000 for his use toward the apartments;
thus, she was a lender of $67,000, at no
interest, and not a joint venturer with Erps
for the apartments.

The circuit court granted judgment in fa-
vor of Meadows for a total sum of $85,675
($18,675 for the Sutphin property and
$67,000 for the Twiford apartments) with
post-judgment interest. The court further
granted Meadows pre-judgment interest
from the year 2010 through the entry date of
the order. Both parties assign error to the
circuit court’s rulings.

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hs Regarding our standard of review
following a bench trial, we have held:

“Tn reviewing challenges to the findings
and conclusions of the circuit court made
after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferen-
tial standard of review is applied. The final
order and the ultimate disposition are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, and the circuit court’s underlying
factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Questions of
law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl.
Pt. 1, Public Citizen, Inc. v. First Natl.
Bank in Fairmont, 198 W.Va. 829, 480
8.E.2d 588 (1996),

Syl. Pt. 1, McConaha v, Rust, 219 W.Va. 112,
682 S.E.2d 52 (2006).

151

Il. DISCUSSION
A. Sutphin Property

Hl In his first assignment of error, Erps
contends that the circuit court made a clearly
erroneous finding of fact that he did not
produce a check at trial in the amount of
$25,000, representing his company’s payment.
of the balance owed for the Sutphin property
at closing. According to Erps, that check was
introduced as evidence as “Defendant’s Ex-
hibit #7” during the trial. The Amended
Judgment Order provides:

10. Pursuant to the Sales Contract with
Sutphin, on April 27, 2010, a Deed from
Sutphin to Erps and Meadows was record-
ed for a consideration of $50,000. At the
closing, Erps provided a check for $25,000
and stated that the funds for the payment.
came from his company.? Meadows claims
the funds came from her in the form of
cash ($21,375 of which came from the
aforementioned C.D.). The Court finds
credible Meadows’ claim that this money
was given to Erps to close the Sutphin
house.

2 However, no such check was produced by

Erps,

Erps claims that the likely reason for the
mistake was that the court reporter (1) failed
to list all fifteen of the defendant’s exhibits
on the listing sheet; (2) erroneously identified
“Defendant’s Exhibit #7” as “Invoice 2412”
instead of a check, and (8) did not file Defen-
dant’s Exhibits 7-15. He asserts that when
the court ruled, it did not have the trial
transcript before it, and it therefore believed
the check was not produced. Meadows’s re-
sponse brief does not address Erps’s allega-
tion on this point. Upon review of the record
before us, we conclude that the circuit court’s
finding on this fact was erroneous, as the
trial transcript reflects that Erps submitted
a $25,000 check as “Defendant's Exhibit #7”
at trial.

The sales contract between Sutphin, Mead-
ows and EXrps provided an advance of $25,000
for improvements in April, 2009, but the
balance of $25,000 of the total consideration
of $50,000 was not to be paid until April 22,
2010. The trial testimony of Erps was as
follows:

152

MR. VENERI: It’s already pre-marked.

Y’m handing you Defense Exhibit 7.

MR. ERPS: Yes.

“MR. VENERI; We'll see that on April 21,
2010, there’s a check from Improvements
Unlimited, LLC, to Robert Sutphin, for

“how much?

MR. ERPS: $25,000

MR. VENERI: And, that was from your

company’s account?

MR. ERPS: That’s correct.

MR. VENERI: And that was for the other

$25,000 for Sutphin. Right?

-MR. ERPS: That's correct.

MR. VENERI: So, at closing, you paid

that $25,000,

MR. ERPS: I did.

MR. VENERI: And, Ms. Meadows did

not. sO

“MR. ERPS: She did not pay it,

MR, VENERI: $6, if you paid the $25,000,

she did not sustain a loss on this property.

Did she? ;

MR. ERPS: She did not, .

MR. VENERI: She made $2,700. Correct?

MR. ERPS: That’s correct.

MR, VENERI: I move for the introdue-

tion of Exhibit 7, Your Honor, D-7,

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR, WINFREY: No, sir. ;

THE COURT: Alright, It will-be admit-

ted. . :

While the reporter’s “Defendant’s Exhibit
List” recited that “Defendant’s Exhibit #7”
was “Invoice # 2412, Improvements Unlimit-
ed, LLC,” the trial transcript reflects that
this invoice was actually introduced as “De-
fendant’s Exhibit #15” at trial. As Erps
contends, the court reporter placed a “7” on
Defendant's Exhibit 15 which mismarked the
exhibit. This discrepancy would explain why
the circuit court found that the $25,000 check
‘was not produced. The docket sheet reflects
that at the time the circuit court ruled, the
trial transcript had not yet been filed by the
court reporter. Thus, if the court reporter
and the clerk only reflected and filed seven
exhibits-introduced by Erps (mone of which
included the $25,000 check), the cireuit court
made its ruling assuming the check was not.

produced, The docket sheet confirms .that
only seven of the fifteen exhibits that were
introduced by Erps and admitted into evi-
dence at trial were timestamped for.Novem-
ber 2, 2015 and placed in the clerk's file. For.
these reasons, which are not controverted on
appeal by Meadows, we conclude that the
circuit court’s.finding that the check was not
produced was clearly erroneous.

HH Eps next alleges that. because of the
circuit court’s erroneous finding regarding
the submission of his $25,000 check, it also
made a clearly erroneous finding of fact that
Meadows invested $53,676 in the Sutphin
property. instead of $32,300. Meadows
claimed that she provided, the $25,000 at
closing based on her testimony that she
cashed a certificate of deposit in the amount
of $21,375. However, neither a certificate of
deposit nor a check totaling $21,875 were
introduced into evidence at trial. The only
evidence that was ‘close to this amount was a
cashier’s check in the amount of $21,475.73
that was payable to Meadows from her: bank,
but this check was issued on April 22, 2009,
one year before the closing on the Sutphin
property. Eps asserts that the terms of the
sales contract for the Sutphin property pro-
vided for a down payment of $25,000 to be
made “which consists of necessary repairs
being made to the house, with the balance of
$25,000 to be paid in full by April 22, 2010,” a
year later. Thus, he contends that because
the first $25,000 of the consideration paid
was only in the form of repairs to the resi~
dence and was not actual money paid to Mr.
Sutphin, it is therefore logical to conclude
that Meadows would cash the $21,475.73
check dated April 22, 2009 to use for the
repairs needed then, rather than for a year
Jater when the remaining balance was paid to
close the property. Erps does not dispute
that Meadows paid for repairs to the proper-
ty totaling $32,800, even though there are no
checks in the record actually substantiating
her payment to him, He claims that if it is
true that Meadows contributed $25,000, it
was a portion of the total amount of $82,300
that she paid him, not in addition to it. Erps
notes that the complaint only alleges that.
Meadows invested approximately $85,000 in

the Sutphin property and that the complaint
‘was never amended.

Conversely, Meadows contends that al-
though Erps produced a $25,000 check writ-
ten from his company and thus proved that
the sum of $25,000 was provided at closing,
Erps did not..conclusively prove where the
funding for the $25,000.check actually came
from. She asserts that the circuit court’s
order essentially found her version of events
more credible, as it concluded that Meadows
cashed a $21,375 certificate of deposit in ad-
dition to paying $82,300 for the repairs to the
property, as evidenced by a March 15, 2011
statement outlining the repairs that Erps
made to the Sutphin property admitted into
evidence at trial. .

We conclude that Meadows never proved
she invested more than $82,300 in the Sut-
phin property. Because the record contains a
$25,000 check dated April 21, 2010, from
Erps to Mr. Sutphin which was presented at
the closing on the Sutphin property, and
there are no checks in the record other than
the $21,475.78 cashier’s check dated April 22,
2009 that substantiate any actual payments
made by Meadows for the improvements to
the property (only Erps’s acknowledgement
on the record that Meadows paid a total of
$82,800 in repairs, per the March 15, 2011
statement), the evidence does not support the
circuit court’s finding that Meadows invested
$58,675 in the Sutphin property. Following
her cross examination, even Meadows could
not testify that she had invested any more
than $32,300 in the Sutphin property, as re-
flect in her testimony under redirect exami-
nation by her counsel at trial:

“Q. Is it your testimony today—how
much money did you contribute to the
Sutphin property in cash, repairs, whatev-

* er else? How much money did you contrib-
ute to the Sutphin property; was it $82,300
or $57,300?

A. I don’t recall.”

4, This Court has defined a joint venture as fol-
“lows:
A joint venture or, as it is sometimes referred
to, a joint adventure, is an association of two
or more persons to carry out a single business
enterprise for profit, for which purpose they

153

The above testimony was elicited after Mead-
ows confirmed during cross examination that
she never produced any checks to support
her claims that she invested more than
$82,300 in the property. Because we find that
the circuit court’s award of judgment of
$18,675 to Meadows was an abuse of discre-
tion, this portion of the indement is reversed
and vacated.

WE Turning to Meadows’s cross-assign-
ment of error, she alleges that the circuit
court’s judgment of $85,675 was inadequate
because she and Erps were engaged in a
joint venture and thus, she and Erps should
have divided the remaining balance of the
$90,000 sale price once ‘he agreed to sell the
Sutphin property to Mr. Shorter! However,
Meadows did not make this claim below. The
complaint does not mention a joint venture.
Rather, it merely states that Meadows had to
take a loss on the Sutphin property because
of “providing financing to the Defendant: of
approximately $35, 000.00 and not being re-
paid.”

-Additionally, there is no evidence in the
record that the parties agreed to split any
profits made on the sale of the Sutphin prop-
erty. To the contrary, the record reveals that
on August 9, 2010 (prior to the date that
Erps’ entered into a sales contract with Mr,
Shorter), Meadows voluntarily sold her inter-
est in the Sutphin property to Erps for
$35,000. At trial, Meadows admitted that she
accepted $35,000 from Erps for her interest
in the property, knowing what she had in-
vested.

.Q. This was—that deed: was in April. In
August, there’s a deed from you to Mr. and
Mrs. Erps conveyirig your interest in the
property for $35,000..Tell the. judge how
that deed came about, please,

A. When hé bought the property?

Q. Yes, ma‘am, Tell me how and why you
sold the property, your interest in the
property to them for $35,000.

combine their property, money, effects, skill,

and knowledge. It arises out of a contractual

relationship between the parties. The contract

may be oral or written, express or implied.
Syl. Pt. 2, Price v.-Halstead, 177 W.Va. 592, 355
S.E.2d 380 (1987),

154

A. Well, he said that’s what it would

amount to, that’s what he would pay me, so

T accepted it,

Q. At that time did you know how much

money you had in the property?

A. Yes, I did, but I figured this was all I

was going to get.

Because Meadows had the right to decline
Erps’s offer to buy her interest in the Sut-
phin property and demand a higher price, we
conclude that she is estopped from making
this argument, as it has been waived by her
conduct. See Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Parsons v.
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc, 237 W.Va.
188, 785 S.E.2d 844 (2016) (“The common-law
doctrine of waiver focuses on the conduct of
the party against whom waiver is sought, and
requires that party to have intentionally re-
linquished a known right. A waiver may be
express or may be inferred from actions or
conduct, but all of the attendant facts, taken
together, must amount to an intentional re-
linquishment of a known right ...”.) Mead-
ows voluntarily invested $82,300 in the prop-
erty, and voluntarily sold her interest in the
property to Erps for the sum of $35,000,
being fully aware of what she had invested.
Accordingly, we find that Meadows’s cross-
assignment of error has no merit.

B. Twiford Apartments

TI Meadows alleged in her complaint
that she provided Erps over $200,000 in fi-
nancing for the Twiford apartments in the
form of checks in the amounts of $67,000,
$90,000, $6,000, $10,000, and $80,000. Con-
trary to Meadows’s allegation, however, the
cireuit court found that the $67,000 check,
which was tendered in July 2009, was the

5. The parties agree, and the circuit court found,
that Erps did substantial work to Meadows’ resi-
dence. Although Erps’ testified that he believed
the repairs totaled at least $70,000.00, the court
found that Erps had no records to substantiate
the total amount that he was claiming other than
his June 29, 2009 invoice for $32,080.90. The
court also acknowledged that Meadows made
various payments to Erps for the repairs to her
home, but concluded that both parties were un-
clear about the work done on the house and
exactly when it began. Noting its concern with
the parties’ poor record keeping, the circuit court
stated:

It’s hard for the Court to determine which of
the checks submitted by Plaintiff to the Defen-

only check attributable to the apartments
based upon her testimony and the evidence
adduced at trial. Accordingly, the circuit
court found that the preponderance of the
evidence was that Meadows lent Erps only
$67,000 for his use toward the apartments.

On appeal, Erps states that he owes Mead-
ows $30,000 for a loan regarding the apart-
ments. However, he disputes that he owes
her $67,000 as awarded by the circuit court.
Erps contends that while the $67,000 check
produced by Meadows had the notation
“APT.” written on the memorandum line,
that single check achieved two purposes: it
provided a $30,000 loan to Erps for the
apartments, and it paid an invoice dated June
29, 2009 for the improvements Erps made to
Meadows’ residence in the amount of
$32,080.90.> He asserts that it is not possible,
and the record does not support, that the
$67,000 check was paid exclusively for the
apartment loan,

Upon review of the record, we conclude
that the cireuit court’s award of $67,000 was
an abuse of discretion, as it not fully sup-
ported by the evidence presented by the
parties. At trial, Meadows’s Exhibit #15, a
handwritten summary of the improvements
made to her home, was admitted into evi-
dence. The document contained the heading,
“House.” In the upper left hand corner of the
summary, Meadows wrote “$82,080.00 Pd.—
Paid”. In the upper right hand corner, she
wrote “30,000.00: Pd—Appts.” During her
testimony, Meadows testified that she wrote
the summary both (1) after the improve-
ments and repairs were made to her home
and (2) after Erps tendered the June 29,

dant in this case were for payment of repairs
to her house or for investment purposes; nev-
ertheless, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that she is entitled to reimbutsement for
investment sums. The matter is further compli-
cated by the almost complete lack of record
keeping from each of the parties in this case.

This lack of record keeping has worked to
the detriment of both parties in this action,
since it makes it difficult for the Court to
determine the exact obligations between the
parties during the course of their involvement
together.

2009 invoice for the home improvements to
her. Her testimony is consistent with her
notation in the upper left corner of her sum-
mary which states that she paid “$82,080.00”
for the repairs, as this figure is essentially
the same amount as Erps’ June 29, 2009
invoice for the work performed on her home
totaling $82,080.90.

The record further reflects that the only
amount Meadows paid to Erps after she
received the June 29, 2009 invoice for repairs
to her home was $67,000 check tendered to
Erps on July 29, 2009.6 The invoice for the
“House” improvements and repairs was not
due to be paid until July 14, 2009, and the
$67,000 check was tendered just fifteen days
later. Because Meadows owed Erps
$82,080.90 for the improvements and repairs
to her home per the June 29, 2009, invoice,
and the only check that she wrote following
receipt of that invoice was the $67,000 check,
we conclude that the $82,080 “House” im-
provements that she wrote on her summary
had to have been paid with the $67,000 check.
There is no other payment from Meadows to
Erps in the record which would satisfy the
amount due on the June 29, 2009 invoice.
While Meadows contends that the $30,000
reference in her handwritten summary was
for a separate loan that she made to Erps for
a gate and appliances, she failed to produce a
check proving payment of this specific
amount.

I In awarding Meadows $67,000, the
circuit court simply concluded that because
the check contained the notation “APT.” at
the time that it was tendered to the bank,
Meadows had established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that it was a loan for the
apartments, However, the circuit court failed
to evaluate and weigh the remaining evidence
placed before it in the record. Specifically,
the circuit court did not make any finding
that specifically addresses Meadows’s nota-
tions on her handwritten summary. Addition-
ally, the circuit court never addressed the
fact that the only check written by Meadows

6. With respect to the date on Meadows’
$67,000.00 check, her complaint states that al-
though it was dated July 29, 2007, it cleared the
bank in July of 2009. Because the record estab-
lishes that the parties did not commence any of
the four transactions between them until some-

155

to Erps after she received the invoice for the
repairs to her home was the- $67,000 check.
While we are mindful of the deference that a
trial court’s judgment is generally accorded,
this Court has held that

[w]hen the finding of a trial court in a case
tried by it in lieu of a jury is against the
preponderance of the evidence, is not sup-
ported by the evidence, or is plainly wrong,
such finding will be reversed and set aside
by this Court upon appellate review.’ Point.
4, Syllabus, Smith v. Godby, 154 W.Va,
190, 174 S.E.2d 165 (1970).

Syl. Pt. 5, In ve Boso, 160 W.Va. 38, 281
§.E.2d 715 (1977). Because the evidence ad-
duced at trial reveals that Meadows’ sum-
mary was written after she paid for the
improvements to her residence totaling
$32,080.90 with the $67,000 check, we con-
clude that the clear weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence supports that her loan
for the apartments only totaled $30,000, as
this is the amount she indicated she paid for
financing the apartments on her summary.
Accordingly, we reduce the cireuit court’s
award of judgment on the Twiford apart-
ments to $30,000,

Hl Lastly, with respect to Meadows’
eross-assignment of error alleging that the
circuit court erred by disregarding her
$90,000 check to Erps as a loan for the
apartments, we conclude that this argument
has no merit. Erps contended that the
$90,000 check dated June 15, 2009 covered
Meadows’s payments for various improve-
ments to the Hatcher property, her resi-
dence, and the Sutphin property. It is undis-
puted that Meadows added the notation “Apt
property” on the memorandum line of the
$90,000 check after the check had cleared the
bank, but before she gave the check to her
attorney to produce in discovery as one of
the checks paid for the properties at issue in
the complaint. Accordingly, the circuit court
properly disregarded the check once it deter-
mined that there was nothing written on the

time in 2008, and because Meadows’ complaint
suggests that the date on the check was incor-
rect, we assume that Meadows misdated the
check for 2007 instead of 2009, The circuit
court's order states that the check was “tendered
on July 29, 2009.”

156

memorandum line of the check when it was
tendered to Erps and processed through the
bank. For these reasons, we conclude Mead-
ows failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that thé $90,000 check was a
Joan for the Twiford apartments and we af-
firm the circuit court’s finding on this issue,

IV. CONCLUSION .

For thé foregoing reasons, the December
29, 2015 Amended Judgment Order of the
Cireuit Court of Mercer County is affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
directions to vacate the judgment for Mead-

ows on the Sutphin property, and enter judg-
ment for Meadows on the Twiford apart-
ments in the amount of $30,000, plus interest.

Affirmed, .in part;, Reversed, in part; and
Remanded with Instructions,

799 S.E.2d 707

Henry METZ, Plaintiff Below,
Respondent

vw

EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL, LLC,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0848
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: March 07, 2017
Filed: April 06, 2017

©. David Morrison, Esq. Michael J.
Moore, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson PLLC,
Bridgeport, West Virginia, Counsel for Peti-
tioner

Ronald G. Kramer, Esq., McNeer, High-
Jand, MeMunn and Varner, L.C., Clarksburg,
West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent

Brian J. Moore, Esq, Katherine B. Capito,
Esq., Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, Charleston,
West Virginia and John M. Canfield, Esq.,
Vice President and Counsel, Amicus Curi-
ae—West Virginia, Chamber of Commerce

Lonnie C. Simmons, Esq., DiTrapano, Bar-
rett, DiPiero, McGinley & Simmons, PLLC,
Charleston, West Virginia, Amicus Curiae—
West Virginia Employment Lawyers Associ-
ation and West Virginia, Association for Jus-
tice

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

This case is before us on two certified
questions from the Circuit Court of Monon-
galia County and presents related issues
concerning when the statute of limitations
begins to run with regard to an adverse em-
ployment decision in a failure to hire scenar-
io. The circuit court asks us to determine
whether the limitations period starts at the
point, when an individual first learns that he
or she was an unsuccessful job applicant
and,, secondarily, whether the discovery rule
tolls the statute of limitations until the indi-
vidual learns of the alleged discriminatory
motive underlying the adverse employment.
decision. Upon our full consideration of these

issues in conjunction with both statutory and
case law, we answer the first certified ques-
tion in the affirmative and the second ques-
tion in the negative.!

I, Factual and Procedural Background

Henry Metz, the plaintiff below and re-
spondent herein, was an active member of
the United Mine Workers of America. As a
union member, he was required to designate
jobs for which he sought consideration when
an opening arose. In July 2012, he bid on the
position “mechanic trainee” at Federal No. 2
mine owned by Hastern Associated Coal
(‘HAC”), the defendant below and petitioner
herein. While Mr. Metz learned of EAC’s
decision not to hire him on July 28, 2012, he
did not learn until January 15, 2014, that the
basis for the employment decision may have
been his age.”

On March 19, 2014, Mr. Metz filed a
charge with the United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), alleging that EAC had violated
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”)! After the requisite sixty-day pe-
riod had passed for instituting an action to
enforce the provisions of the ADEA,‘ Mr.
Metz instituted a civil action in the Circuit
Court of Monongalia County,> wherein he
asserted that EAC had committed age dis-
crimination in violation of the ADEA and
the West Virginia Human Rights Act
(“HRA”).6 On December 21, 2015, EAC sue-
cessfully removed the action to federal court
based on federal question jurisdiction. To
defeat federal jurisdiction, Mr. Metz amend-
ed his complaint to remove the ADEA claim.
‘Thereafter, the federal court remanded this
employment discrimination case to state
court.”

1, The circuit court answered both of the certified
questions in the affirmative.

2. During a union grievance proceeding held in
January 2014, Dan Ballard, EAC’s manager of
human resources, stated that Mr. Metz was not
hired because they were seeking younger work-
ers,

3. BAC filed its position statement with the EEOC
on May 28, 2014.

4, See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (2012) (providing
that civil action to enforce ADEA may not be
instituted until sixty days after lodging complaint

159

On March 7, 2016, EAC filed an Amended
Motion to Dismiss seeking dismissal of the
respondent's civil action under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
for failure to institute the suit within two
years of the alleged discriminatory act un-
derlying Mr, Metz? amended complaint. Dur-
ing the hearing on EAC’s motion to dismiss,
EAC orally moved to certify the issue of
whether the limitations period is tolled under
the HRA until a plaintiff learns of the pro-
spective employer’s alleged discriminatory
animus. As a result, the circuit court certified
the following two questions to this Court by”
order dated May 23, 2016:

Question 1: For discriminatory hiring

causes of action filed pursuant to the West

Virginia Human Rights Act, codified at

West Virginia Code § 5-11-1, et seg., does

the statute of limitations begin to run from

the date that the plaintiff learns of the
adverse employment decision?

Question 2: For discriminatory hiring

causes of action filed pursuant to the West

Virginia Human Rights Act, codified at

West Virginia Code § 5-11-1, et seg., does

the discovery rule toll the statute of limita-

tions until the plaintiff discovers the al-
leged discriminatory motive underlying the
employment decision?
The circuit court answered each of the ques-
tions in the affirmative.

IL Standard of Review

I Our review. of issues certified to this
Court from circuit courts is plenary. See Syl.
Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197
W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996) (“The ap-
pellate standard of review of questions of law
answered and certified by a circuit court is

with EEOC); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c)(1) (per-

mitting aggrieved individual to “bring a civil
action in any court of competent jurisdiction” to
seek relief under ADEA).

5. The complaint was filed on November 23,
2015.

6. See W.Va, Code §§ 5-11-1 to -20 (2013).

7. The remand was directed by order entered on
February 25, 2016.

160

de novo.”). We proceed to consider the ques-
tions presented by the circuit court.

Il. Discussion

Addressing the questions in turn, we ini-
tially consider whether the statute of limita-
tions applicable to a HRA cause of action
begins to run from the date a plaintiff learns
of an adverse employment decision.’ Both
sides agree that the applicable limitations
period is the “catch-all” two-year ‘period set
forth in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12
(2016).? See Sharp v. S. W.Va. Reg’ Health
Council, 178 W.Va. 196, 199 n4, 858 S.E.2d
455, 458 n.4 (1987) (recognizing that because
HRA does not specify statute of limitations
for civil actions brought in circuit court, limi-
tations periods set forth in W.Va. Code
§§ 55-2-12 and 55-7-8a control); accord
McCourt v. Oneida Coal Co., 188 W.Va. 647,
651, 425 S.E.2d 602, 606 (1992); see also
Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F.Supp.
1488, 1441 (S.D. W.Va, 1985) (applying two-
year statute of limitations found in W.Va.
Code § 55-2-12 to HRA action based on con-
clusion that Legislature “inten{ded] to place
the parties back into the traditional judicial
system” for limitation purposes).!°

HI Almost thirty years ago and consis-
tent with analogous federal law, we held in
syllabus point two of Independent Fire Co.
No. 1 v. West Virginia Human Rights Com-
mission, 180 W.Va. 406, 876 S.E.2d 612
(1988); “In cases alleging a discriminatory
discharge from employment under W.Va.
Code, 5-11-10, the time period for filing a
complaint with the Human Rights Commis-
sion ordinarily begins to run on the date

8, A joint amicus curiae brief was submitted by
the West Virginia Employment Lawyers Associa-
tion and the West Virginia Association for Jus-
tice; a separate amicus brief was submitted by
the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce.

9, Under this provision, “[elvery personal action
for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed
shall be brought; (a) Within two years next after
the right to bring the same shall have ac-
corued, W.Va, Code § 55-2-12.

10, The federal court looked to the language of
West Virginia Code § 5-11-13(b) that references
the filing of a HRA claim following the issuance
of a “right to sue” letter “at any time during
which such statute of limitations has not ex-
pired,” 618 F.Supp, at 1441.

when the employer unequivocally notifies the
employee of the termination decision.” Find-
ing no reason to treat HRA casés prosecuted.
in cireuit court differently, we extended this
ruling in syllabus point one of McCourt:
In cireuit court cases alleging a discrimi-
natory discharge from employment, which

a complainant might bring in the West

Virginia Human Rights Commission under

the West Virginia Human Rights Act,

W.Va, Code, 5-11-1 et seg, the statute of

limitations period for filing a complaint

with the circuit court ordinarily begins to
yun on the date when the. employer un-
equivocally notifies the employee of the
termination decision.

188 W.Va. at 648, 425 S.H.2d at 603.

HI Through the first certified question,
the circuit court essentially asks this Court
to apply the holdings of Independent Fire
and McCourt concerning the running of the
statute of limitations to cases in which the
alleged act of employment discrimination is
the decision not to hire an individual rather
than the employer's decision to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an existing
employee,” It has long been the law that
limitation periods affecting employment dis-
crimination actions ordinarily commence
when an actual or prospective employer's
decision is made and communicated in some
fashion to the affected individual. See Morris
v. Gov't Dev, Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.8d
746, 750 (1%* Cir, 1994) (citing Delaware State
Coll, v. Ricks, 449 U.S, 250, 261-62, 101 S.Ct,
498, 66 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980); Hamilton v, 1%
Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir.
1990).48 In the instance of failure-to-hire
11, This Court determined in Price v. Boone Coun-

ty Ambulance Authority, 175 WNa. 676, 337

S.E.2d 913 (1985), that actions for violations of

the HRA could be brought ir in the circuit court in
the first instance.

12. As BAC corréctly observes, the HRA does not
distinguish between failure-to-hire cases and
cases involving the discharge, of a former. em-
ployee.

13. See Hanlon v. Chambers, 195 W.Va. 99, 112,
464 S.E.2d 741, 754 (1995) (noting that, barring
statutory distinctions or other compelling rea-
sons, we analyze cases brought under HRA con-
sistent with federal anti-discrimination laws).

eases, the date on which the employer's hir-
ing decision is made known is the reference
point from which the limitations period is
calculated. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 586 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct, 2061,
158 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (identifying refusal to
hire as discrete act and finding same action:
able on date of failure to hire). The employ-
er’s decision not to hire an individual is the
alleged unlawful act for which the affected
individual is seeking redress. Accordingly, it
follows, and we so hold, that the statute of
limitations. for employment discrimination
cases brought to enforce rights under the
HRA, ineluding allegations of discriminatory
failure to hire, begins to run from the date a
plaintiff first learns of the adverse employ-
ment decision.

Proceeding to the actual crux of the case,
we consider whether the discovery rule
should operate to toll the statute of limita-
tions in cases brought to enforce the HRA
until such time as the employer’s alleged
discriminatory motive is evident, Both the
circuit court and the respondent favor appli-
cation of the discovery rule to HRA cases.
Conversely, EAC urges this Court to con-
clude, in consonance with the majority of
courts throughout the country, that the dis-
covery rule is inapplicable to employment
discrimination cases, barring those rare in-
stances where equitable estoppel or equitable
tolling is warranted based on the facts or an
employer’s concealment efforts, See, ¢9.,
Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 188, 145 (4% Cir.
2014) (stating that equitable tolling applies
“when ‘the plaintiffs were prevented from
asserting their claims by some kind of
wrongful conduct on the part of the defen-
dant, and ... when ‘extraordinary circum-
stances beyond plaintiffs’ control made it im-
possible to file the claims on time’ ”) (quoting

14, The following test was adopted by this Court
in Dunn;

A five-step analysis should be applied to de-
termine whether a cause of action is time-
barred. First, the court should identify the ap-
plicable statute of limitation for each cause of
action, Second, the court ... should identify
when the requisite elements of the cause of
action occurred, Third, the discovery rule
should be applied to determine when the stat-
ute of limitation began to run by determining
when the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, of the

161

Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.8d 825, 880 (4!
Cir, 2000));. English v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4 Cir, 1987) (“Equita-
ble estoppel applies where, despite the plain-
tiffs knowledge of the facts, the defendant
engages in intentional misconduct to cause
the plaintiff to. miss the filing deadline.”);.
Seacrist v. Metro, Sec. Servs, Inc,, No, 2:14-
24872, 2015 WL 1527768 at *4-5 (S.D, W.Va.
April 8, 2015) (discussing doctrines of equita-
ble estoppel and equitable tolling and finding
both doctrines inapplicable where plaintiff
failed to allege employer “committed some
type of misconduct or induced him into be-
lieving he was not an employee, thereby pre-
venting him from pursuing his ‘legal reme-
dies”),

In support of his position that the discov-
ery rule should apply, Mr, Metz looks to this
Court’s recent decision in Dunn v. Rockwell,
225 W.Va. 48, 689 S.H.2d 255 (2009). Specifi-
cally, he relies upon syllabus point five of
Dunn, which outlines a multi-step analysis
for determining whether a cause is time-
barred, In Dunn, this Court Sought “Ct]o
bring analytical clarity to the resolution of
statute of limitation questions” by encapsu-
lating in one synthesized point of law the
myriad considerations that govern whether a
limitations period prohibits an action from
proceeding. Id. at 52, 689 S.E.2d at 264; see
supra, note 14. Of significance, and apparent-
ly overlooked by Mr. Metz, is the fact that
Dunn did not expand the discovery rule be-
yond those causes of action in which the rule
had previously been applied, Attempting to
clarify the conflicting permutations of the
discovery rule in Dunn, we held that “[tJhe
‘discovery rule’ is generally applicable to all
torts, unless there is a clear statutory prohi-

elements of a possible cause of action, as set
forth in Syllabus Point 4-of Gaither v. City
Hosp., Ine.,.... Fourth, if the plaintiff is not
entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule,
then determine whether the defendant fraudu-
lently concealed facts that prevented the plain-
tiff from discovering or pursuing the potential
cause of action.... And fifth, the court .,.
should determine if the statute of limitation
period was arrested by some other tolling doc-
trine

225 Wa. at 46, 689S.B.2d at 258, syl. pt. 5, in

part,

162

bition to its application.” 225 W.Va. at 46, 689
§.E.2d at 258, syl. pt. 2 (emphasis supplied).

Hl In seeking to apply the discovery rule
to an employment discrimination action, Mr.
Metz glosses over the nature of an action
brought under the HRA.™ Unlike torts
whose origins are the common law, the action
at issue in this case has its genesis in statuto-
ry law. This distinction is significant. Because
a HRA cause of action is a legislative cre-
ation, the statute governs the parameters of
such claims, To illustrate, when the HRA was
first enacted in 1967, a cause of action was
required to be instituted with the West Virgi-
nia Human Rights Commission (“HRC”)
within 90 days to seek redress under the
HRA. W.Va. Code § 5-11-10 (1967). By statu-
tory amendment, that time period was later
extended to 180 days. See 1987 W.Va. Acts of
the Legislature page 246, Currently, the time
period prescribed by law to file an action
with the HRC under the HRA is 365 days.
See W.Va. Code § 5-11-10 (2018). As noted
above, this Court has permitted HRA actions
to skip the first level with the Commission
and proceed directly to circuit court since
1985.16 And because there is no statutorily-
specified limitations period for those actions
that commence in circuit court rather than
before the HRC, this Court has applied the
“catch all” two-year statute of limitations
found in West Virginia Code § 55-2-12.

As support for its position against applica-
tion of the discovery rule, EAC observes that
the Legislature has specified the chronologi-
eal springboard from which the limitations
period is launched in HRA actions. By stat-
ute, “[aJny complaint filed pursuant to this
article [W.Va. Code § 5-11-1 et seg.] must be
filed within three hundred sixty-five days
after the alleged act of discrimination.” Id.
(emphasis supplied). And while the limita-
tions period itself is not controlling for pur-
poses of HRA actions instituted in circuit
court, HAC reasons that the statutory lan-
guage specifying the parameters of institut-
ing suit with the HRC is instructive in terms
of what triggers the HRA-claim clock. Criti-

15, When questioned during oral argument as to
the non-tort nature of the case, Mr. Metz’ counsel
characterized the action as an “employment
tort.”

cally, only one event is necessary to com-
mence the limitations period under West Vir-
ginia Code § 5-11-10—“the alleged act of
discrimination.” Id, Noticeably absent from
the statute is any reference to a complain-
antv’s knowledge or awareness of the offend-
ing employer’s discriminatory animus. In-
stead, it is a singular act upon which the
right to seek recovery under the HRA
flows—the injury-causing discriminatory
event. See McCourt, 188 W.Va. at 651, 425
S.E.2d at 606 (“As a general rule, this Court
has rather consistently recognized that the
statute of limitations begins to run from the
date of injury.”). In this case, that event is
EAC’s decision not to hire Mr. Metz.

EAC’s suggestion that the statutory trig-
gering language should similarly control a
HRA case brought in circuit court has sup-
port in this Court’s jurisprudence. When con-
sidering whether an alternate trigger should
apply to circuit court-initiated HRA actions,
we concluded in McCourt “that it would be
inconsistent, illogical, and improper to adopt
a different rule for actions brought in a
circuit court which are based on fact situa-
tions identical to those which can serve as
the basis of a Human Rights Action.” 188
W.Va, at 652, 425 8,E.2d at 607. Adopting the
rationale of Independent Fire, a HRA case
filed with the HRC, we held that the limita-
tions clock for HRA actions filed in circuit,
court similarly begins ticking when an em-
ployer unequivocally notifies the employee of
the employment decision. See id. at 648, 425
S.E.2d at 602, syl. pt. 1, Extending the logic
employed in McCourt to the question before
us, EAC maintains that to apply a different
standard for purposes of discerning what
event triggers the statute of limitations for
HRA cases filed in circuit court as contrasted
to those filed with the HRC is nonsensical.
We agree. In the same fashion that the Leg-
islature designated the “alleged act of dis-
crimination” as the limitations fulerum for
HRA claims filed with the HRC, the “alleged
act of discrimination” likewise operates to
start the limitations clock when a HRA claim
is filed in circuit court. W.Va. Code § 5-11-

16. See supra note 11.

10; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S, 618, 619, 127 S.Ct. 2162,
167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (observing that
“EEOC charging period is triggered when a
discrete unlawful practice takes place”);
Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 88 (rejecting applica-
tion of discovery rule to EEOC cases, rea-
soning that statutory trigger—occwrrence of
alleged violation—is discrete event “whereas
a plaintiffs acquisition of knowledge is a
continuing process”),

Seeking to persuade this Court to toll the
limitations period in HRA cases until a pro-
spective employee has knowledge of the of-
fending employer’s discriminatory animus,
Mr. Metz contends that unsuccessful job ap-
plicants do not sustain an employment-relat-
ed injury until they learn of the employer’s
unlawful bias. Recognizing that the law does
not guarantee protected persons a job—just
protection against the denial of employment
based on their protected status—Mr. Metz
argues that actual knowledge of the discrimi-
natory animus is a necessary part of the
employment discrimination claim. We reject
both of these arguments.!”

HM The Jaw is clear that proof of an
employer’s discriminatory animus is not an
element of a HRA claim. To prove a prima
facie claim of employment discrimination un-
der the HRA, a plaintiff is required to show:
“(1 That the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class[;] (2) That the employer made
an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff[;]
[and that] (8) But for the plaintiffs protected
status, the adverse decision would not have
been made.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Conaway v.
Eastern Ass’d Coal Corp., 178 W.Va. 164, 358
S.E.2d 423 (1986). Seldom will there be direct
evidence of an employer’s discriminatory in-
tent. See id. at 170, 858°S.E.2d at 429 (“Be-
cause discrimination is essentially an element
of the mind, there will probably be very little
direct proof available.”), The absence of di-
rect evidence of discriminatory animus, how-
ever, does not create an insurmountable hur-

17. We do not address Mr. Metz’ argument, first
raised on appeal and unaddressed by the circuit
court below, that the statute of limitations was
tolled by EAC’s bankruptcy filing. See Syl. Pt. 1,
Mowery v. Hitt, 155 W.Va. 103, 181 S.B.2d 334
(1971),

163

die to bringing an employment discrimination
ease because “[dlirect proof ... is not re-
quired.” Id. As this Court explained in
Skaggs v. Hlk Run Coal Co., 198 W.Va. 51,
479 S.E.2d 561 (1996); “a plaintiff can create
a triable issue of discrimination animus
through direct or circumstantial evidence.”
Id. at 59, 479 8.B.2d at 569, syl. pt. 7, in part.
Explaining the type of evidence that will
suffice to establish that the plaintiff's protect-
ed status was the basis of the adverse em-
ployment decision, this Court explained in
Conaway: .
What is required of the plaintiff is to show
some evidence which would sufficiently
link the employer’s decision and the plain-
tiffs status as a member of a protected
class so as to give rise to-an inference that.
the employment decision was based on an
illegal discriminatory criterion. This evi-
dence could, for example, come in the form
of an admission by the employer, a case of
unequal or disparate’ treatment between
members of the protected class and others
by the elimination of the apparent legiti-
mate reasons for the decision, or statistics
in a large operation which show that mem-
bers of the protected class received sub-
stantially worse treatment than others.

178 W.Va, at 170-171, 358°S.B.2d at 429-80
(footnotes omitted),

Wi Mr. Metz mistakenly interprets this
Court’s articulation of the discovery rule in
Dunn as requiring a factual inquiry into
when he acquired knowledge. of facts suffi-
cient to form a good-faith belief that (1) EAC
hired a younger applicant in lieu of him; and
(2) that he would have been hired “but for”
his age. Just as this Court did not alter the
substantive application of the discovery rule
through Dunn, we similarly did not alter the
elements of a HRA action through that deci-
sion! See Conaway, 178 W.Va. at 166, 858
§.E.2d at 425, syl. pt. 8. As discussed above,
there is no statutory requirement that a com-

18. In characterizing decisions such as McCourt
and Independent Fire as “pre-Dunn,” Mr. Metz
wholly fails to apprehend Dunn. Dunn was hot
an employment discrimination case; accordingly,
it had no effect on HRA cases which are not torts
and thus not subject to the discovery rule by
construct.

164

plainant be aware of the employer’s discrimi-
natory animus before initiating a suit under
the HRA, See W.Va. Code § 5-11-9. As is
further made clear from the statutory frame-

work, the limitations clock begins to advance

from the time of the alleged discriminatory
‘act. That act—the failure of EAC to hire Mr.
Metz—occurred on July 28, 2012,

In seeking to apply the discovery rule to
employment discrimination cases, Mr, Metz
is swimming against the overwhelming cur-
rent of judicial decisions on this issue. The
Fourth Cireuit has clearly rejected the appli-
cation of the discovery rule to an EEOC
claim, See Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 87-88, The
plaintiff in Hamilton learned thirteen
months after his discharge that he had been
receiving a. lower salary than younger vice
presidents sharing his same job category. Id.
In response to his attempt to preserve his
claim by relying on the discovery rule, the
Fourth Cireuit held: “To the extent that no-
tice enters the analysis, it-is notice of the
employer's actions, not the notice of a dis-
criminatory effect or motivation, that estab-
lishes the commencement of the pertinent
filing period.” Id. at 88-89, In Wastak v
Lehigh Valley Health Network, 842 F.8d 281
8" Cir, 2008), a fifty-seven-year-old employ-
ee sought to convince the appellate court that
his claim did not acerue until he learned that,
his replacement was a younger individual. Jd.
at 286, Rejecting this‘ contention, the Third
Circuit ruled: “Wastak’s [the plaintiff] injury
was complete and discovered when LeHigh
Valley terminated him. At that point, Wastak
both knew of his injury—the discharge —and
the cause of his injury—Lehigh Valley’s deci-
sion to terminate’ his employment.” Id. at
287, Just as in this case, Wastak argued that
he-had no reason to believe he was the victim

of age discrimination at the time of his termi- ©

nation, Id. That argument‘ was unavailing,
because as the Third Circuit explained, “a
claim accrues ... upon awareness of actual
injury, not upon awareness that this injury
constitutes a legal wrong.” Jd, Gnternal cita-

19, Mr, Metz relies on the two cases identified in
Slusser as representing the minority position. See
Henry v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs., 204
NJ. 320, 9 A.3d 882 (2010) (remanding employ-
ment discrimination case for hearing to deter-
mine whether employee had basis for discovering

tion omitted); accord Davidson v. America
Online, Inc, 887 F.8d 1179, 1186 (10%. Cir,
2008) (recognizing that employment discrimi-
nation claim accrues-on date employee is
notified of adverse employment- decision);
Amini v, Oberlin College, 259 F.8d 498, 498-
99 (6 Cir, 2001) (holding that statute of
limitations began running when employer no-
tified plaintiff of employment action); Hulsey
v, Kmart, Inc, 48 F.3d 555, 557 (10. Cir,
1994) (deciding that statute of limitations be-
gan to run when plaintiff learned he was
demoted and transferred, not when he
learned that employment decisions may have
been motivated by age discrimination); Ogle-
tree v. Glen Rose Indep. Sch, Dist, 314
§.W.3d 450, 454-55 (Tex. App. 2010) (deciding
that employment discrimination claim was
triggered on date of discharge, not on date of
discovery of alleged discriminatory intent);
Huff v. Great W. Seed Co., 322 Or, 457, 909
P,2d 858, 859 (1996) (holding that “plaintiffs
belated discovery of an employer's unlawful
motive does not delay the commencement of
the statutory limitations period”), .

Recently, in Slusser v. Vantage Builders,
Ine., 306 P.8d 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018), the
appellate court recognized as the majority
rule among the federal circuits and state
courts that in age-based discrimination cases
the statute of limitations runs from the date
the plaintiff learns of the adverse employ-
ment action rather than from when he dis-
covers the discriminatory animus underlying
that action.!® Id, at 529. In explanation, the
court offered:

The rationale behind the majority rule’s
commencement of the statute of limitations
on the date the plaintiff discovers the ad-
verse employment action is that “when an
employee knows that he has been hurt and
also knows that his employer has inflicted
the injury, it is fair to-begin the countdown
toward repose .,. [because hJe knew the
‘stated reason for [the adverse employment
action] and could assess its legitimacy.”
Morris, 27 F.8d at 750. Like all other

facts to form basis of actionable claim); Wheatley
v. American Tel. & Tel, Co., 418 Mass, 394, 636
N.E.2d 265 (1994) (reversing grant of summary
judgment to employer on grounds that factual
question existed regarding employee’s knowledge
of his replacement by younger worker),

causes of action, “the plaintiff need not

know all the facts that support his claim in

order for countdown to commence.” Jd,

“To allow plaintiffs to raise employment

discrimination claims whenever they begin

to suspect that their employers had illicit
motives would -effectively eviscerate the
time limits prescribed for filing such com-

plaints.” Pacheco v, Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 906

(6 Cir, 1992). The United States Supreme

Court has explained that statutes of limita-

tion “protect employers from the burden of

defending claims arising from employment.
decisions that are long past.” Furthermore,
equitable principles, ... protect plaintiffs
when it would be unfair to enforce a stat-
ute of limitation against them, We agree
with and adopt the overwhelming use of

. the majority rule commencing statutes of
limitation ... when a plaintiff knows or
should know of the adverse employment
action, regardless of whether the plaintiff
then has or should have knowledge of the
employer’s discriminatory intent. _

3806 P.8d at 580 (some citations omitted).

In marked contrast to those tort cases
such as Gaither” where a plaintiff has no
basis to know of his injury (surgical sponge
left in body cavity), an employee or prospec-
tive employee knows of his injury immediate-

ly upon finding out that he or she was not-

hired or was terminated or otherwise dis-
criminated against. Consequently, there is no
need to apply the discovery rule, whose pur-
pose is to avoid barring a plaintiff from
bringing suit who had no access to the facts
underlying his claim—not the legal theo-
ries—upon which the claim will be pursued.
See Sattler v. Bailey, 184 W.Va, 212, 219, 400
S.B.2d 220, 227 (1990) (“[Mlere lack of
knowledge of the actionable wrong ordinarily
does not suspend the running of the statute
of limitations... .”); see also Almond v. Uni-
fied School Dist., 665 F.3d 1174, 1176 (10
Cir. 2011) (“In the absence of contrary di-
rectives from Congress, the Supreme Court
has read into federal statutory limitations
period a relatively consistent rule..,. [T]he
20. See 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.E.2d 901 (1997).

21, While not relevant to responding to the ques-

tions before us, we cannot fail to observe that
Mr. Metz. was fally apprised of the alleged age-

165

clock starts running when the plaintiff first
knew or should have known of his injury,
whether or not he realized the cause of his

-injury was. unlawful.”); Fahrner v. SW Myfo.,

Ine., 48 S.W.8d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2001) (stating
that while “employee may not know the true
reason for the employer’s adverse employ-
ment decision, or other facts that would tend
to show the employer has behaved unlawful-
lyL]... ‘there is no requirement that the
plaintiff actually know the specifie type of
legal claim he or she has, or that the injury
constituted a breach of the appropriate legal
standard’ ”) (citation omitted). This distine-
tion is decisive. There is simply no sound
basis for applying the discovery rule in cases
such as the one before us when the plaintiff
not only knows of his injury—the non-attain-
ment of employment—but he or she unequiv-
ocally knows the identity of the entity who
caused his injury. Given the, availability of
this crucial information, the discovery rule
serves no useful purpose.”

I Finally, we reject Mr. Metz’ conten-
tion that “[p]olicy considerations favor tolling
the statute of limitations until a plaintiff has
knowledge that an employer's hiring decision
‘was motivated by discriminatory bias.” Con-
cerns rooted in policy actually tilt in favor of
disallowing the discovery rule to further the
objective of statutes of limitation: “to compel
the bringing of an action within a reasonable
time.” Johnson v. Nedeff, 192 W.Va. 260, 266,
452 S.H.2d 68, 69 (1994); see also Morgan v.
Grace Hosp, Inc., 149: W.Va. 788, 791, 144
S.E.2d 156, 161 (1965) (“The basic purpose of
statutes of limitations’ is to encourage
promptness in instituting actions; to suppress
stale demands or fraudulent claims; and to
avoid inconvenience which may result from
delay in asserting rights or claims when it is
practicable to assert them.”). Absent the fi-
nality that statutes of limitation provide in
cases such as this, employers would be forey-
er subject to lawsuits as former employees or
prospective employees could always assert
that they only recently discovered the al-

based animus of EAC’s decision within the two-
year limitations period. He simply chose not to
- institute his state claim within that two-year peri-
od, opting instead to file a federal claim.

166

leged discriminatory basis for bringing a
HRA claim. The Legislature has determined
that these actions must be brought in a
prompt fashion to avoid stale claims and the
attendant issues such as defunct companies,
unavailable. witnesses, faded memories, and
lost records, that result from extended delays
in pursuing relief. As this Court wisely rec-
ognized in Perdue v. Hess, 199 W.Va. 299,
484 S.E.2d 182 (1997):
“Statutes of limitation are statutes of re-
pose and the legislative purpose is to com-
pel the exercise of a right of action within
a reasonable time; such statutes represent
a statement of public policy with regard to
the privilege to litigate and are a valid and
constitutional exercise of the legislative
power.”
Id, at 802, 484 8.E.2d at 185 (quoting Syl. Pt.
1, Stevens v. Saunders, 159 W.Va. 179, 220
§.E.2d 887 (1975)). Moreover, if this Court
were to apply the discovery rule to a HRA
cause of action, we would be improperly ex-
panding the limitations period beyond the
time period established by the Legislature.”

HH Upon a thorough examination of this
issue, we are not persuaded that the discov-
ery rule should operate to prevent the run-
ning of the limitations period in employment
discrimination cases until the employer’s al-
leged discriminatory animus becomes known.
Accordingly, we refuse to apply the discovery
rule to actions brought under the HRA. This
result is compelled by the purpose of the
discovery rule—to toll: the running of the
applicable statute of limitations until the
plaintiff discovers his or her injury and the
identity of the injury-causing entity. The in-
jury in this case was EAC’s nor-hiring of Mr.
Metz. Apprised of EAC’s decision not to hire
him, and given his membership in a protect-
ed class, Mr. Metz was armed with sufficient
facts to further investigate whether his age
was the basis for the adverse employment
decision.” See Olson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904

22. In contrast to the Medical Professional Liabil-
ity Act, W.Va. Code §§ 55-7B-1 to -12 (2016),
where the Legislature chose to include a discov-
ery provision within the act, the HRA contains
no comparable provision. See id. at § 55-7B-4.
Declining to judicially “append to § 626 [of the
EEOC] what Congress did not place there,” the
Fourth Circuit commented that “when Congress

F.2d 198, 202-08 (4 Cir, 1990) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that knowledge of youn-
ger person’s hiring was required to pursue
age discrimination complaint, stating: “It is
sufficient that Olson was on notice at the
moment of his alleged constructive termi-
nation ‘to inquire whether there was [a] dis-
eriminatory motive for the discharge.’ ”)
(quoting Hamilton v. First Source Bank, 895
F.2d 159, 164 (4t* Cir, 1990); accord Hulsey,
43 F.3d at 558 (“‘We may presume that
many facts will come to light after the date of
an employee’s termination, and indeed one
purpose of a charge is to initiate the process
of uncovering them.’”) (quoting Olson, 904
F.2d at 208). Consistent with the weight of
authority on this issue, we hold that the
statute of limitations for employment dis-
crimination cases brought to enforce rights
under the HRA, including allegations of dis-
criminatory failure to hire, is not tolled by
the discovery rule until a plaintiff discovers
the alleged discriminatory motive underlying
the employment decision.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we answer the
first certified question in the affirmative and
the second question in the negative.

Certified questions answered.

JUSTICES DAVIS and WORKMAN
concur in part, and dissent in part, and
reserve the right to file separate opinions.

Davis, Justice, concurring, in part, and
dissenting, in part, joined by Justice
Workman:

With the majority’s holding in new Sylla-
bus point 2, I readily concur. Establishing
the operative date from which the statute of
limitations begins to run in an employment
discrimination case alleging failure to hire as
the date upon which an employee plaintiff

has intended a discovery rule, it has proven
capable of writing one.” Hamilton, 928 F.2d at
88.

23. And, as noted above, Mr. Metz actually had
Imowledge of EAC’s alleged discriminatory ani-
mus within the controlling two-year period for
instituting suit. See supra note 21.

first learns of the employer’s adverse em-
ployment decision giving rise to such claim is
consistént with this Court’s prior decisions in
similar cases. See, eg., Syl. pt. 1, Jones v.
Trustees of Bethany Coll., 177 W.Va. 168, 351
S.E.2d 188 (1986) (“The statute of limitations
ordinarily begins to run when the right to
bring an action for personal injuries accrues
which is when the injury is inflicted.”); Syl.
pt. 2, Steeley u. Funkhouser, 1538 W.Va. 423,
169 S.E.2d 701 (1969) (“The general rule is
that a statute of limitations commences to
run on a cause of action when the right to
institute an action thereon arises.”); State ex
rel. Magun v. Sharp, 143 W.Va. 594, 599, 103
§.E.2d 792, 796 (1958) (“The statute of limita-
tions as to a cause of action commences to
run at the time of the accrual thereof.”),

However, I simply cannot agree with the
majority’s adoption of new Syllabus point 3.
This holding unnecessarily distinguishes be-
tween causes of action based upon statutory
rights and those sounding strictly in tort,
with no statutory underpinnings, as a means
for rejecting application of the discovery rule
to claims alleging discriminatory failure to
hire. Moreover, the majority's decision of this
issue fails to reconcile the remedial intent of
the Human Rights Act with the benevolent
tolling provisions of the discovery rule, Ac-
cordingly, from this portion of the majority's
opinion, I respectfully dissent.

First, I do not agree with the majority’s
adoption of Syllabus point 3 because the ma-
jority’s rejection of the discovery rule in em-
ployment discrimination cases alleging failure
to hire simply because such cause of action is
recognized by statute is preposterous. This
Court has applied the discovery rule in a
myriad of other cases whose rights of recov-
ery are inextricably intertwined with statuto-
ry law. See, ag., Syl. pt. 5, Sheena H, ex rel.
Russell H, ex vel. L.H. v. Amfire, LLC, 285
W.Va, 182, 772 S.E.2d 317 (2015) (claim for
workers’ compensation dependent’s death
benefits provided by Worker’s Compensation
Act); Syl. pts. 7 & 8, Bradshaw v. Soulsby,
210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681 (2001) (cause
of action arising under Wrongful Death Act),
See also Clark v. Milam, 192 W.Va. 398, 452
S.E.2d 714 (1994) (discovery rule applies to
action filed by receiver of insolvent insurance

167

company acting pursuant to authority con-
ferred by West Virginia Insurance Code).
Thus, the fact that Mr. Metz’s claims against
EAC come within the purview of rights and
protections secured by the West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Act does not provide sufficient
justification to categorically reject application
of the discovery rule to this right of recovery.

Moreover, denial of the discovery rule’s
application to claims filed pursuant to the
Human Rights Act directly contradicts the
Act’s own beneficent purposes. In its promul-
gation of the Act, the Legislature expressly
has stated that the Human Rights Act is
benevolent and that its provisions should be
construed so as to afford relief to all citizens
of this State, including employees who are
the victims of their employers’ discriminatory
employment practices, See generally W. Va.
Code § 5-11-2 (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2018) (de-
daring human rights public policy); W. Va.
Code § 5-11-4 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2018) (estab-
lishing powers and objectives of Human
Rights Commission). This Court, also, has
acknowledged the remedial purposes of the
Act and has construed and applied it consis-
tently with this definitive legislative intent.
See, ¢9., Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co. Inc,
198 W.Va. 51, 64, 479 S.E.2d 561, 574 (1996)
(recognizing “remedial provisions” of Human
Rights Act); State ex rel. West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va.
495, 499-500, 212 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1975) (ac-
knowledging “[t]he forceful language used by
the Legislature [in the Human Rights Act]
mandates the eradication of unlawful discrim-
ination”). By the same token, the discovery
rule secures an injured plaintiffs right of
recovery when, through no fault of his/her
own, said plaintiff does not know, or reason-
ably should know, within the statutory limita-
tions period the nature of his/or injury, the
tortfeasor, and/or the tortfeasor’s wrongful
conduct that caused such injury; a tortfea-
sor’s concealment of his/her misfeasance also
operates to toll the applicable statute of limi-
tations, See generally Syl. pt. 2, Dunn v.
Rockwell, 225 W.Va. 48, 689 S,E.2d 255
(2009) (“The ‘discovery rule’ is generally ap-
plicable to all torts, unless there is a clear
statutory prohibition to its application.”);
Harris v. Jones, 209 W.Va. 557, 562, 550
8.E.2d 98, 98 (2001) (per curiam) (“The pur-

a

168

pose of a ‘discovery rule’ is the recognition of
the inherent unfairness of barring a claim
when a party’s cause of action could not have
been recognized until after the ordinarily
applicable period of limitation.”), See also
Syl. pt. 5, Dunn, 225 W.Va. 48, 689 S.E.2d
255 (adopting analysis to determine timeli-
ness of cause of action); Syl, pt. 4, Gaither v.
City Hosp, Inc. 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.B.2d
901 (1997) (describing when statute of limita-
tions begins to run when it has been tolled by
discovery rule).

It is simply incongruous to recognize the
Human Rights Act as remedial legislation on
the one hand and to deny the citizens of this
State who seek to enforce their statutory
rights thereunder the benefit of the diseov-
ery rule to ensure that they. are permitted to
maintain such claims, Neither’ does it make
sense to categorically exclude employment
discrimination claims for failure to hire from
the purview of the discovery rule simply
because they enforce rights secured by stat-
ute, I cannot condone the creation and en-
dorsement of such inconsistent principles of
Jaw that surely will beget much confusion for
the citizens of this State as well as the at-
tendant loss of their statutorily-guaranteed
protection from unlawful discrimination, Ac-
cordingly, from the majority's adoption of PC
Syllabus point 3 and the discussion surround- _
ing this holding in the majority's opinion, I

_ respectfully dissent,

I am authorized to state that Justice

Workman joins me in this separate opinion.

799 S.E.2d 718
STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Petitioner.
Vv
Steward BUTLER, Defendant
Below, Respondent.
No, 16-0543
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 25, 2017
Filed: May 9, 2017

Ss
al

Lauren E, Plymale, Esq., Assistant Prose-
euting Attorney, Cabell County, Huntington,
West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner

Raymond A. Nolan, Esq., The Nolan Law
Firm, Lavalette, West Virginia, Counsel for
Respondent

Gregory R. Nevins, Pro Hac Vice, Atlanta,
Georgia, and, Stephen G. Skinner, Esq.,
Skinner Law Firm, Charles Town, West Vir-

ginia, Counsel for Amicus Curiae—Lambda,
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Elbert Lin, Esq., Solicitor General, Julie Ma-
rie Blake, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Ami-
cus Curiae—West Virginia Attorney General

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner (plaintiff below), State of
West Virginia, appeals the circuit court’s or-
der entered May. 18, 2016, through which it
dismissed two counts of a four-count indict-
ment returned against the respondent (de-
fendant below), Steward Butler. The two dis-
missed counts charged the defendant with
criminal civil rights violations under West
Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) (2014). The State
argues that the circuit court erred when it
dismissed Counts I and III based on its
erroneous determination that the word “sex”
in West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) was plain
and unambiguous and could not be expanded
to include “sexual orientation.” Upon our
careful review of the parties’ briefs, the argu-
ments of counsel, the appendix record sub-
mitted, and the applicable law, we affirm the
circuit court’s ruling and remand this action
to the cireuit court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion,

I. Facts and Procedural Background

The State ‘alleges that during the early
morning hours of April 5, 2015, the defendant
was riding in a car with friends in Hunting-
ton, West Virginia. While the car was sitting
at a stoplight, the defendant observed two
men, Casey Williams and Zackery Johnson,
exchange a kiss on the sidewalk. The defen-
dant allegedly voiced homophobie slurs to-
ward Williams and Johnson, exited the vehi-

1. One of the victims began to video the incident
using his cell phone. That video recording, as
well as the statements taken from the defendant's
companions, were used to identify the defendant
as the alleged perpetrator.

2, West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) provides, in
full, as follows:

If any person does by force or threat of
force, willfully injure, intimidate or interfere
with, or attempt to injure, intimidate or inter-
fere with, or oppress or threaten any other
person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him or her by the

171

cle,! and struck both Williams and Johnson in
the face with his fist, knocking Williams to
the ground,

On May 21, 2015, a Cabell County Grand
Jury returned an indictment against the de-
fendant, charging him in Counts II and IV
with battery in violation of West Virginia
Code § 61-2-9(c) (2014) and with violations of
an individual’s civil rights under West Virgi-
nia Code § 61-6-21(o)? in Counts I and III.
The defendant states that after the indict-
ment was returned against him, he expressed
his intent to challenge the applicability of
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) to the acts
for which he was indicted.

The parties represent that during a status
conference held on September 29, 2015, the
circuit court directed the parties to draft a
certified question to address the issue of
whether West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) in-
cludes protections based on “sexual orienta-
tion.” The parties did so and, by order en-
tered December 16, 2015, the circuit court
submitted the following certified question to
this Court: “Whether the provision of West
Virginia Code § 61-6-21 embodies a protec-
tion of an individual's civil rights if the viola-
tive act is based solely upon said individual’s
sexual orientation?” By order entered Febru-
ary 9, 2016, this Court refused to docket the
certified question.S

Following a status conference held on Feb-
ruary 29, 2016, the circuit court entered an
order on March 4, 2016, directing the parties
to submit briefs’ addressing the applicability
of West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b). Follow-
ing this briefing, the circuit court entered an
order on May 18, 2016, in which it stated that
it could not “reasonably hold that West Virgi-
nia Code § 61-6-21() is ambiguous”[;] that a
review of similar laws from other states dem-

Constitution or laws of the State of West Virgi-
nia or by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, because of such other person's race,
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, politi-
cal affiliation or sex, he or she shall be guilty of
a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined
not more than five thousand dollars or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both,

3. Justices Davis and Workman would have ac-
cepted the certified question for the Court's con-
sideration and decision,

172

onstrated that “there are two distinct éatego-
ries of potential discrimination: discrimina-
tion based on sex and discrimination based
on sexual orientation”[;] that the “West Vir-
ginia legislature could have included sexual
orientation as an area of protection ... [as]
[nJumerous other states have. done”[;] that it
was “bound to apply the law as it stands”[;]
and that it “cannot expand the word ‘sex’ to
include ‘sexual orientation’ within West Vir-
ginia Code § 61-6-21(b).” In this same order,
the circuit court ruled that Counts II and IV
charging the defendant with battery “shall
remain[,)” and it dismissed Counts I and ITI
charging the defendant with violating West
Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b). The State ap-
peals these rulings.
IL Standard of Review

HE The circuit court dismissed Counts I
and III of the indictment after concluding
that the word “sex” in West Virginia Code
§ 61-6-21(b) was plain and unambiguous and
could not be expanded to include “sexual
orientation.” The circuit court ruled that the
State could not properly bring such charges
against the defendant under the current law
of this state, These findings meet the criteria
under West Virginia Code § 58-5-30 (2012),
which permits the State to appeal the dis-
missal of an indictment that “is held bad or
insufficient by the judgment of a circuit
court,” Id.

Hl Through this appeal, we are asked to
examine the meaning of the word “sex” as
used in West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b). As
we have previously held, “[w]here the issue
on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly
a question of law or involving an interpreta-
tion of a statute, we apply a de novo standard
of review.” Syl. Pt..1, Chrystal R.M. v. Char-
lie A.L., 194 W.Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415

4, An amicus brief was submitted by the West
Virginia Attorney General that substantively sup-
ports the defendant's position in this matter. A
separate amicus brief was submitted by the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
that supports the State’s, ie., the prosecution’s
position.

5, See supra note 2.

6. Chapter 40 of the Acts of the Legislature of
West Virginia, Regular Session, 1987, reflects
that the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 301

(1995). With this plenary standard in mind,
we proceed to determine whether the circuit
court erred in dismissing Counts I and III of
the indictment on the basis that the word
“sex” in West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) is
unambiguous and does not include “sexual
orientation.”

Ill. Diseussion

The State asserts that the circuit court
erred by ruling that West Virginia Code
§ 61-6-21(b) does not provide protection for
an individual’s civil rights where the violative
act is based upon ‘the individual’s sexual or-
ientation and by ordering Counts I and IT of
the indictment dismissed. ‘The State also
challenges the propriety of the circuit court
ruling upon the legal issue that had been
raised in the circuit court’s certified question
after this Court refused to docket the same.
We address these issues, in turn, below.t

A. ‘West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b)

The State asserts that the word “sex” in
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) 5 is ambigu-
ous and should be interpreted to include
“sexual orientation.” Arguing that the legisla-
tive history for West Virginia Code § 61-6-21
does not reflect whether sexual orientation
was intended to be a protected status under
the statute,® the State contends the word
“sex” could nonetheless be reasonably’ con-
strued to encompass multiple meanings in
the context in which the word is used. The
State recites the definitions of the word “sex”
in Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-
Webster Dictionary in support of its argu-
ment that West. Virginia .Code § 61-6-21
would provide protection based on sexually
motivated phenomena or behavior, including
sexual orientation. Asserting that Title VII7
precedent effectively prohibits discrimination
based on sexual orientation when the dis-

was an act “to amend article six, chapter sixty-
one of the code of West Virginia ... by adding
thereto a new section ... prohibiting violations
of an individual's civil rights by reason of that
individual's race, color religion, ancestry, nation-
al origin, political affiliation or sex{.]”

7. Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination based on
an individual's “race, color, religion, sex and
national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000¢-2.

eriminatory behavior is determined to be
“because of sex,” § the State urges this Court
to apply Title VII precedent here.

Contrary to the State’s position, the defen-
dant argues that West Virginia Code § 61-6-
21(b) clearly and unambiguously includes
“sex,” but not: “sexual orientation.” Citing
State v. Sulick, 282 W.Va. 717, 758 S.E.2d
875 (2012), wherein this Court held that the
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21 was not uricon-
stitutionally vague? the defendant asserts
that the absence of the words “sexual orien-
tation” in § 61-6-21(b) reflects that the Leg-
islature did not intend for the’ statute to
include sexual orientation. Arguing that
words are to be given their common usage,
the defendant argues that this ‘Court’s prece-
dent demonstrates that courts are not free to
read into a statute language that is not there
but should apply statutes as they are written.
The defendant also quotes dictionary defini-
tions for the words “sex” and “sexual orienta-
tion” in support of his argument that these
terms have very different meanings, Main-
taining these terms are treated as separate
and distinct categories, the defendant high-
lights the fact some states have hate crime
statutes that protect and/or prohibit conduct,
based on “sexual orientation,” while other
states list both “sex” and “sexual orienta-
tion.” 0

Hl We begin our analysis by recognizing
that more than a century ago, this Court held
that “[t]he Legislature has power to create
and define crimes and fix their punish-
ment[.]” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Wood-

* ward, 68 W.Va. 66, 69 S.E. 885 (1910), Since
then,

[w]e have consistently held that subject to

certain constitutional limitations there ex-

ists in the Legislature the broad right to

8. The State briefly argues that even if sexual
orientation is not covered under West Virginia
Code §.61-6-21(b), it should still be allowed to
prosecute on Counts I and III on the basis that
the crimes would not have occurred if one of the
victims had been female, i.e., the State contends
that the defendant did commit the crimes be-
cause of the victims’ sex. Although it is unclear
from the appendix record whether the State pre-
sented this argument below, we find it to be
unavailing as it alters not only the sex of one of
the victims—from male to female—but it also
requires the hypothetical female to be heterosex-

173

define crimes and their punishment. State
ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd, [160] W.Va. [871],
284 8.E.2d 899 (1977); State ew rel. Heck’s
v Gates, 149 W.Va, 421, 141 S.H.2d 369
(1965); State v. Painter, 185 W.Va. 106, 68
SE. 2d 86 (1950).

State ex ‘vel Winter v, ' MacQueen, 161 W.Va.
380, 35, 289 S.E.2d 660, 663.(1977). .

HEM [in 1987, our Legislature exercised
its right to define crimes when it enacted
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) through
which it became a felony to violate a person’s
civil rights by threat, intimidation and/or iri-
jury to another person or another person’s
property because of specifically enumerated
characteristics, including the victim’s “sex.”
W.Va. Code, § 61-6-21(b)9 In determining
what is meant by the word “sex,” we. are
mindful that “‘wJhere the language of a
statute is clear and without ambiguity the
plain meaning is to be accepted without re-
sorting to the rules of interpretation.’ Syl. Pt.
2, State v, Hider, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.B.2d
108 (1968).” Syl. Pt. 2, King v. West Virgi-
nia’s Choice, Inc., 234 W.Va. 440, 766 S.E.2d
887 (2014); see also Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v.
Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384
(1970) (“Where the language of a statute is
free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to
be accepted and applied without resort to
interpretation.”); Syl. Pt. 2, Eggleton v. State
Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 158 W.Va. 973,
214 S.E.2d 864 (1975) (“Where a statute is
plain and unambiguous, a court has a duty to
apply and riot to construe its provisions”). -
Moreover, “[tJhat the parties disagree as to
the meaning ... of [a statutory] provision
does not of itself render [the] provision am-
biguousl,]” state of Resseger v. Battle, 152
W.Va, 216, 220, 161 S.H.2d 257, 260 (1968).

ual. In other words, the argument invokes both
the sex and sexual orientation of the alleged
victim, To the extent this argument is tied to the
State's reliance upon the “because of sex’ analy-
ses employed under remedial discrimination stat-

“utes such as Title VII, such analysis is inapplica-
ble, See infra note 11.

9. Sulick, 232 W.Va, at 719, 753 SE.2d at 876,
syl. pt. 7.

10, See supra note 2.

174

The word “sex” in West Virginia Code
§ 61-6-21(b) is undefined. We have previous-
ly addressed other undefined terms in this
statute. In Sulick, the defendant asserted
that the undefined words “force or threat of
force” contained in West Virginia Code § 61-
621(b) rendered the statute unconstitutional-
ly vague. Relying upon our precedent, such
as that discussed above, we ascribed ordinary
meaning to the words “force” and “threat”
and concluded that the language was “clear
in prohibiting the use of either physical
means or a communicated intent to inflict
harm or loss on another or on another per-
son’s property.” Sulick, 232 W.Va. at 725, 753
S.E.2d at 883.

HB As we explained in Sulick, our
precedent provides that “[uJndefined words
and terms used in‘a legislative enactment will
be given their common, ordinary and accept-
ed meaning.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State ea rel.
Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W.Va. 525, 336
§.E.2d 171 (1984); see also Syl. Pt. 4, in part,
State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No.
548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W.Va.
187, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) (“Generally the
words of a statute are to be given their
ordinary and familiar significance and mean-
ing[.]”). Affording the undefined term “sex”
its common and ordinary meaning, and for
the reasons set forth below, we find the word
to be clear and unambiguous and to have a
very different meaning and import than the
term “sexual orientation.” 4

11, The parties and the amici devote a substantial
portion of their respective briefs to arguments
involving a legal analyses employed in West Vir-
ginia Human Rights Act (W.Va. Code § § 5-11-1
to -20] and Title VII cases. Because we have
found the word “sex” in West Virginia Code
§ 61-6-21(b) to be unambiguous, such interpre-
tive analysis is inapplicable; rather, “its plain
meaning is to be accepted and applied without
resort to interpretation.” Crockett, 153 W.Va. at
715, 172 $.B:2d at 385, syl. pt. 2, in part. Fur-
ther, even if we were to find the term “sex” is
ambiguous, the “rule of lenity” would require us
to strictly construe the statute against the State
and in favor of the defendant, thereby command-
ing a similar outcome. See Syl. Pt. 5, State ex rel.
Morgan v. Trent, 195 W.Va. 257, 465 S.E.2d 257
(1995) (“In construing an ambiguous criminal
statute, the rule of lenity applies which requires
that penal statutes must be strictly construed
against the State and in favor of the defendant."’).
As we explained in Morgan, the “ ‘[t]he rule of

In Black’s Law Dictionary, the
word “sex” is defined as: “1. The sum of the
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female organism;
gender. 2, Sexual intercourse. 3. Sexual rela-
tions[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed,
2014), Although the State urges this Court to
also include “sexual orientation”. in that defi-
nition,” “sexual orientation” has a distinc-
tively different definition, as follows: “A per-
son’s predisposition or inclination toward
sexual activity or behavior with other males
or females; heterosexuality, homosexuality,
or bisexuality.” Id, The New Oxford Ameri-
can Dictionary ascribes similar meanings, de-
fining “sex” as “either of the two main cate-
gories (male and female) into which humans
and many other living things are divided on
the basis of their reproductive functions]”
and “sexual intercourse,” and defining “sexu-
al orientation” as “a person’s sexual identity
in relation to the gender to which they are
attracted; the fact of being heterosexual, ho-
mosexual, or bisexual.” New Oxford Ameri-
can Dictionary (8d ed. 2010). Likewise, Web-
ster’s New World College Dictionary defines
“sex” as either “male or female,’ “inter-
course,” and “genitalia,” whereas “sexual or-
ientation” is defined as “a person’s sexuality
... with respect to his or her sexual desire;
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality,
ete.” Webster’s New World College Dictio-
nary (5% ed, 2016). These common definitions
manifest that the words “sex” and “sexual
orientation” have clearly distinct meanings

lenity serves to ensure ... that there is fair
warning of the boundaries of criminal con-
duct[.J'” Id. at 262, 465 S.E.2d at 262 (citation
omitted),

12, As indicated above, the State contends the
word “sex” in West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b)
could be “construed to encompass multiple
meanings,” including sexual orientation. Such
argument fails. First, unambiguous statutes are
‘applied, not construed. Eggleton, 158 W.Va. at
974, 214 S.E.2d at 865, syl. pt: 2 (“Where a
statute is plain and unambiguous, a court has a
duty to apply and not to construe its provi-
sions.”), Second, the State’s “multiple mean-
ings” argument could run afoul of “the funda-
mental principle that a statute creating a crime
must be so certain and definite that a person
committing an act which it forbids can tell, when
he does so, that he has violated the law.” State ex
rel. Heck’s Inc, v. Gates, 149 W.Va. 421, 432, 141
8.E.2d 369, 377-78 (1965).

and import. This distinction is reflected in
their usage in the federal hate crime law, as
well as similar laws enacted in other states,"

Federal law provides for the prosecution of
persons who

willfully causes bodily injury to any person
or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a
dangerous weapon, or an explosive or in-
cendiary device, attempts to cause bodily
injury to any person, because of the actual
or perceived religion, national origin, gen-
der, sewual orientation, génder identity, or
disability of any person[,]

18 U.S.C. § 249(2) (emphasis added). The
vast majority of states have enacted hate
crime laws. Some states, like West Virginia,
have created distinct crimes; other states
provide for sentencing enhancements; and
some states provide for both. Whether a
separate crime, a sentencing enhancement,
or both, West Virginia and five other states
have statutes that list either “sex” or “gen-
der”; twenty states list either “sex” or
“gender” in addition to listing “sexual orien-
tation”; 8 and six states list only “sexual
orientation.” "7 Certain states list “sexual or-

13. An internet search reveals that various organi-
zations also consider sex and sexual orientation
to be distinct categories in hate crimes laws. For
example, the Movement Advancement Project, a
self-described “independent think tank that pro-
vides rigorqus research, insight and analysis that
help speed equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) people,” lists sixteen states,
including West Virginia, as having hate crime
statutes that do not cover sexual orientation or
gender identity. See http://www.lgbtmap.org/
equality-maps/hate_crime_laws (last visited May
10, 2017). Similarly, the Anti-Defamation League
describes West Virginia as having a hate crime
statute that does not include sexual orientation
(https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/
documents/assets/pdf/eombating-hate/ADL-
updated-2016-Excel-State-Hate-Crime-Statutes.
pdf (last visited May 10, 2017), as does the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (http://
‘www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/
reports/issue_maps/hate_crimes_06_13_color.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2017)).

14, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina
and Wyoming do not have hate crimes laws.

15. See Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(c)(22) (“‘sex"’);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b(1) (‘‘gender”);
Miss. Code §§ 99-19-301, 305(3), -307(a) (“‘gen-
der”); N.D, Cent. Code § 12.1-14-04 (“sex”);
Wyo. Stat, § 6-9-102 (“sex”),

175

ientation” and “gender expression” and/or
“gender identity” 8 in their hate crime stat-
utes, Other states do not include any of these
terms in their hate crime statutes. This na-
tionwide review of hate crime laws indisput-
ably demonstrates that “sex” and “sexual
orientation” are being treated as distinct cat-
egories. Further, the parties do not cite, nor
has our research revealed, any reported deci-
sions where the term “sex” was found to
either include or exclude “sexual orientation”
in those states whose hate crimes law lists
“sex” only.

Having determined that the word “sex” in
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) is unambig-
uous and clearly imparts being male or fe-
male, and does not include “sexual orienta-
tion,” we further find that our determination

is supported by the Legislature’s repeated
rejection of any attempt to add those terms
to the statute in the thirty years since it first *
enacted the statute in 1987. As the defendant
asserts, the Legislature’s repeated refusal to
amend § 61-6-21 to include “sexual orienta-

tion” is undoubtedly indicative of its intent

not to include “sexual orientation” therein. In

16, See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 41-1750(A)(3), 13-
701(D)(15); Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.55; 720 Ul.
Comp. Stat. 5/12-7.1; Iowa Code §§ 729a.1, 2.2;
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:107.2; Md, Code, Crim. Law
§§ 10-304, -305; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, $1151;
Minn, Stat. § 609.2231(4); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 557.035; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-111 to -113;
NH, Rev. Stat. § 651:6(1)( . Stat. § 2c:16-
1; N.M, Stat. §§ 31-18B-2, -3; N.Y. Penal’ Law
§ 485-05; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-38; Tenn. Code
§ 40-35-114(17); Tex, Penal Code § 12.47, Tex.
Code Crim, Proc. Art. 42.014; Vt. Stat. tit. 13,
§ 1455; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080; see also
D.C. Code §§ 22-3701, -3702, -3704. .

17. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-121; Fla. Stat.
§ 775.085; Kan, St. § 21-6815(c)(2)(C); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 532.031; Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155; Wis.
Stat. § 939.645.

18, See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-181j; Del. Code
tit, 11, § 1304; Haw. Rev, Stat. §§ 706-662, 846-
51; Mass. Gen. Laws ch, 265, § 39; Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 41.690,

19. Our research also failed to reveal any report-
ed decision where a court found the term “gen-
der” to include “sexual orientation” in those
three states with hate crime laws that list “gen-
der’ but not “sexual orientation.” See supra note
15.

176

fact, it appears that since 1987, there have
been at least twenty-six attempts to amend
the statute to include “sexual orientation,”
and each attempt has failed.2?

Certainly, unsuccessful legislative efforts
can be attributed to a myriad of reasons, but
regardless of the reasons behind the numer-
ous failed attempts to amend § 61-6-21 to
include “sexual orientation,” the very fact
that there have been twenty-six failed at-
tempts cannot be ignored. Indeed, other
courts have ‘found the repeated rejection of
legislation to be clear expressions of intent.
See Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 118 n.80,
119, 104 S.Ct, 2249, 81 L.Ed.2d 88 (1984)
(recognizing repeated congressional rejection
of imposing mandatory deadlines on agency
adjudication of disputed disability claims and
describing fact that “Congress has rejected
repeated. demands for mandatory deadlines”
as a “clear ... expression of congressional
intent”); State v. Gen. Paving Co,, 590 F,2d
680, 688 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding that “[ilf the
[plrima facie evidence standard of Section
5(a) is to be changed, it is for Congress to do
so” and giving weight to “the repeated refus-
als of Congress to enact the suggested provi-
sion”); Yonga v: State, 446 Md, 188, 130 A.3d
486, 498 (2016) (“[Whhile ‘intent may be dis-
cerned from legislative inaction, it is consid-
ered most appropriate generally only when a
specific bill has been repeatedly brought to
the General Assembly and rejected[.]”).
Moreover, these unsuccessful legislative ef-
forts are not only indicative of intent, but
they are germane to the Legislature’s right
to define crimes. In this regard, the Legisla-
ture has chosen—repeatedly—not to amend.
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) so as to
include any additional characteristics that

20. In the Attorney General's amicus brief, the
following are cited as the failed legislation: “H.B.
2851 (2008); H.B. 2851 (2007); H.B. 2225
(2006); H.B, 2442 (2006); H.B, 2225 (2005); H.B.
2442 (2005); H.B, 2004 (2003); H.B. 2042
(2003); H.B. 2226 (2003); H.B. 3147 (2003); H.B.
4464 (2002); S, 23 (2001); H.B. 2354 (2001);
FHLB, 2415 (2001); S. 422 (2000); H.B. 4392
(2000); H.B, 2114 (1999); H.B, 2481 (1998); S.
495 (1997); H.B, 2481 (1997); 8. 457 (1996);
HB. 2775 (1995); S. 478 (1994); H.B. 4385
(1994); S. 319 (1993); H.B, 2426 (1993).” During
the recent 2017 regular legislative session, a bi-
partisan group of legislators introduced House
Bill 2748 to amend West Virginia Code § 61-6-21

trigger criminal responsibility under the stat-
ute.

HM As we instructed in King, “courts
must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.” 284 W.Va. at 444, 766
S.E.2d at 891 (internal citations omitted); see
also State v. J.E., 288 W.Va, 548, 649, 796
§.E.2d 880, 886 (2017) (explaining that Court
was guided by “the precept that ‘courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and meais in a statute what it
says there’” and concluding that “[hlad the
Legislature intended to include adult offend-
ers convicted of a criminal offense and adju-
dicated juvenile delinquents in W.Va. Code
§ 15-12-2(b), we presume it would have done
so explicitly.”) (internal citation omitted),
Through application of the presumption that
the Legislature said in West Virginia Code
§ 61-6-21(b) what it meant and meant what it
said, and based upon the common and plain
meaning of the word “sex,” as well as the
Legislature’s' clear intent, we are left with
the ineluctablé conclusion that the word
“sex” does not include “sexual orientation.”

| | Critically, judicial challenge “is not a
license for, [this Court] to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Mac-
Donald v. City Hosp. Inc., 227 W.Va, 707,
722, 715 S.H.2d 405, 420 (2011) (quoting
Fed Comme’ns Comm'n v.° Beach
Comme'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,318, 118 S.Ct,
2096, 124 L.Hd.2d 211 (1993)), Consequently,
although the State argues that we should
disregard the “literal sense of the words” in
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) because not
doing so leads to “injustice and absurdi-

to include, among other characteristics, “sexual
. orientation,” The bill was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee, and no further action was
taken. The amicus Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc, suggests in its brief that the
Legislature has repeatedly declined to add “sexu-
al orientation” to the statute explicitly because it
considers such coverage to be already be provid-
ed by the statute as it was enacted in 1987, It
would be utterly nonsensical, however, for vari-
ous members of the Legislature to attempt to
amend West Virginia Code § 61-6-21 twenty-six
times to add the words “sexual orientation” if
the statute already so provided.

tyL]” 2! we disagree. It is certainly not ab-
surd for this Court to recognize not only the
Legislature’s right to define crimes and their
punishment, but also the Legislature’s indis-
putable intent not to expand West Virginia
Code § 61-6-21(b).to include “sexual orienta-
tion.” Moreover, there is no injustice
where the defendant remains charged on two
counts of battery arising out of his alleged
criminal misconduct.

HM Our decision herein is guided by the
principle that “this Court is not permitted to
engage in an examination of the public policy
ramifications potentially resulting from [the
statute’s] application or to comment upon the
wisdom of the legislation as unambiguously
expressed.” State ew vel. Biafore v. Tomblin,
286 W.Va, 628, 588, 782 S.E.2d 228, 228
(2016), Accordingly, although we do not com-
ment on whether it would be good or bad
policy for the Legislature to amend West

* Virginia Code § 61-6-21 to include “sexual
orientation,” we observe that our own rules
expressly prohibit bias and discrimination in
‘the courts of this state based on several
categories, including both “sex” and “sexual
orientation.” Rule 2.3 ofthe Code of Judicial
Conduet provides, in part:

(B) A judge shall not, in the performance

of judicial duties, by words or conduct

manifest bias or prejudice, or engagé in
harassment, including but not limited to
bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon
race, set, gender, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sewual orienia-
tion, marital status, socioeconomic status,
or political affiliation, and shall not permit.
court staff, court officials, or others subject
to the judge’s direction and control to do

80,

(C) A judge shall require lawyers in pro-

ceedings before the court to refrain from

manifesting bias or prejudice, or engaging
in harassment, based upon attributes in-
cluding but not limited to race, sew, gen-

21, Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419,
127 S.E, 194 (1925).

22. In addition to “sexual orientation,” there have
been multiple unsuccessful attempts to amend
West Virginia Code § 61-6-21 to also include
actual or perceived race and gender identity.

177

der, religion, national origin, ethnicity, dis-
ability, age, sewual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political af-
filiation, against parties, witnesses, law-
yers, or others,
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 3.6()
of these same rules provides that “[a] judge
shall not hold membership in any organiza-
tion that practices invidious discrimination on
the basis of race, sew, gender, religion, na:
tional origin, ethnicity, or sexual orienta-
tion.” Id. (emphasis added), Likewise, our
Trial Court Rules guard against bias by pro-
viding that
[als to matters in issue before any court,
conduct and statements toward one anoth-
er must be without bias with regard to
such factors as gender, race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, handicap, age, and sewual orientation
when such conduct or statements bear no
reasonable relationship to a good faith ef-
fort to argue or present a position on the
merits,
T.C.R. 4.06, in part,

HH Unlike criminal statutes that impose
penalties, including the potential for impris-
onment, our court rules do not, Thus, al-
though the enumerated characteristics that
trigger criminal responsibility under West
Virginia Code § 61-6-21 are not as expansive
as the’ enumerated characteristics under our
court rules, just as the Legislature does not
prescribe our rules, “[t]his Court does not sit
as a superlegislature, commissioned to pass
upon the political, social, economic or scienti-
fie merits of statutes pertaining to proper
subjects of legislation,” Syl, Pt. 2, in part,
Huffman v. Goals Coal Co., 228 W.Va. 724,
679 S.H.2d 828 (2009); see also Banker v.
Banker, 196 W.Va. 585, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d
465, 476-77 (1996) (internal citation omitted)
(“It is not for this Court arbitrarily to read
into [a statute] that which it does not Say.”);
State ew vel. Frazier v, Meadows, 198 W.Va. -
20, 24, 454 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1994) (“Courts are
23, We observe that in 2014, the Legislature en-

acted West Virginia Code § 18-2-5h and chose to

provide protections based on an individual's sex-
ual orientation in subsection (e)(4), which pro-
vides that “[s]chools shall not collect ... (4) Any
data concerning the sexual orientation or beliefs

about sexual orientation of the student or any
student's family membert,]”

178

not free to read into the language what is
not there, but rather should apply the stat-
ute as written.”); Tug Valley Pharmacy,
LLC v., All Plaintiffs Below In Mingo Cuty.,
235 W.Va. 288, 298, 778 S.H.2d 627, 642
(2015) (Benjamin, J., concurring) (“The prin-
ciples of judicial conservatism require us ...
not to bestow upon ourselves the role of su-
perlegislature simply because we do not be-
lieve [the Legislature] went far enough.”);
accord State ex rel. Curry v. Carr, 847
S.W.2d 561, 567 (Tx. Crim. App. 1992) (Mil-
ler, J., dissenting) (“Today a majority of this
Court ... acts ... as a superlegislature
making laws which the legislature has re-
peatedly rejected and effectuating its own
intent rather than that of The Legislature.”).

HHI It is imperative to remember that
“fi}t is not for this Court arbitrarily to read
into a statute that which it does not say. Just
as courts are not to eliminate through judi-
cial interpretation words that were purposely
included, we are obliged not to add to stat-
utes something the Legislature purposely
omitted.” Syl. Pt. 11, Brooke B. v. Ray, 230
W.Va. 355, 738 8.H.2d 21 (2018). This precept:
is particularly crucial to our analysis when
the State essentially asks this Court to judi-
cially amend West Virginia Code § 61-6-21
by expanding it to create a new felony when
the Legislature has repeatedly chosen not to
do so, As we explained in Morgan v. Trent,
the “ ‘legislatures, not courts, define criminal
liability” ” 195 W.Va. at 262, 465 S.H.2d at.
262 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, we adhere to our to
law that “[w]hen a statute is clear and unam-
biguous and the legislative intent is plain, the

24, During oral argument, a question was raised
as to whether there was an Eighth Amendment
equal protection issue from the perspective of the
alleged victims. The parties neither raised nor
briefed an equal protection argument, either be-
Jow or on appeal. Consequently, such constitu-
tional challenge is not properly before the Court.

25, The State also asserts that the circuit court
erred by certifying the question under the Uni-
form Certification of Questions of Law Act,
W.Va. Code §§ 51-1A-1 to -13, which is to be
used by federal and foreign jurisdictions. The
State correctly argues that the circuit court
should have followed West Virginia Code § 58-5-
2, which requires the circuit court to answer the
question in the first instance, which the circuit

statute should not be interpreted by the
courts, and in such case it is the duty of the
courts not to construe but to apply the stat-
ute.” General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548,
144 W.Va, at 187, 107 S.E.2d at 354, syl. pt.
5. Applying West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b),
as it is currently written, the State cannot
prosecute the defendant for an alleged crimi-
nal civil rights violation arising out of the
victims’ sexual orientation. Accordingly, we
affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Counts
I and III of the indictment. The State may
move forward with its prosecution on Counts
II and IV charging the defendant with bat-
tery under West Virginia Code § 61-2-9.

B. Certified Question

Hs The State asserts that the circuit
court erred in dismissing Counts I and III of
the indictment subsequent to this Court’s
refusal to docket the question certified by the
cireuit court.2> Arguing that this. Court only
hears certified questions that are necessary
to reach a decision in the pending case and
then speculating that our refusal to docket
the certified question meant the question
need not be answered to decide the case, the
State asserts that the circuit court also erred
when it proceeded to answer the question,
which resulted in its dismissal of Counts I
and III of the indictment.

Describing the procedural history related
to the circuit court’s certified question, the
defendant asserts that the State never ob-
jected to the manner by which the lower
court proceeded and, once this Court refused
to docket the certified question, the issue of
certification, itself, was moot. Regarding the

court did not do in its certification order. Rule
17(a)(1) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure also
requires a circuit court to answer the certified
question presented. Although the circuit court
should have followed West Virginia Code § 58-5-
2 and our rule, that issue is now moot,

26. This argument is linked to the State’s asser-
tion that it may prosecute on more than one legal
theory. As previously discussed, the State offers
the alternative theory that had one of the alleged
victims been a female, the crime would not have
occurred, therefore, the defendant allegedly com-
mitted the crime because of the victims’ sex. We
have found this argument to be unavailing. See
supra note 8,

manner in which the circuit court proceeded
thereafter, the defendant asserts that the
parties agreed upon a scheduling order for
the submission of briefs on the issue of the
applicability of West Virginia Code § 61-6-
21(b), after which the circuit court ruled that
it could not expand § 61-6-21(b) to include
sexual orientation. The defendant notes that
the circuit court stayed its order dismissing
Counts I and III of the indictment to allow
the State to pursue this appeal, which has
brought the Jegal is issue back to this Court for
decision.

As provided in West Virginia Code § 58-5-
2 (2012),?"

[any question of law, including, but not
limited to, questions arising upon the suffi-
ciency of a summons or return of service,
upon a challenge of the sufficiency of a
pleading or the venue of the circuit court,
upon the sufficiency of a motion for sum-
mary judgment where such motion is de-
nied, or a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, upon the jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit court of a person or subject matter, or
upon failure to join an indispensable party,
may, in the discretion of the circuit court
in which it arises, be certified by it to the
Supreme Court of Appeals for its decision,
and further proceedings in the case stayed
until such question shall have been decided
and the decision thereof certified back.

This statute further provides that “[t]he pro-
cedure for processing questions certified pur-

27. Interestingly, our research revealed very few
reported decisions where this Court has an-
swered certified questions in criminal proceed-
ings. See, e.g., State v. Bias, 177 W.Va. 302, 352
S.E,2d 52 (1986) (answering certified questions
on basis that questions concerned circuit court's
jurisdiction); State v. Vollmer, 163 W.Va. 711,
711-12, 259°S.E.2d 837, 838 (1979) (answering
certified question on basis it raised issue of juris-
diction, as provided under W.Va. Code § 58-5-2);
State v. De Spain, 139 W.Va. 854, 81 S.E.2d 914
(1954) (finding Court did not have jurisdiction to
answer certified question addressed to sufficien-
cy of search warrant which fell outside parame-
ters of W.Va. Code § 58-5-2). In State v. Lewis,
188 W.Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992), however,
this Court questioned its jurisdiction to consider
a certified question in a criminal case, holding
that “W.Va. Code, 58-5-2 (1967), is designed for
certifying questions in civil cases.” Lewis, 188
W.Va. at 86, 422 S.E.2d at 808, syl. pt. 4, in part.
Five years after Lewis was decided, West Virginia

179

suant to this section shall be governed by
rules of appellate procedure promulgated by
the Supreme Court of Appeals.” In turn, this
Court’s procedural rules provide that when a
certified question is submitted, this Court
“may, in its discretion, schedule the case for
argument under Rule 19 or Rule 20, issue:an
order declining to accept the certified ques-
tion, or issue an otherwise. appropriate or-
der.” R.A.P. 17(a)(6), in part (emphasis add-
ed).

HMI The State mistakenly assigns legal
significance to our exercise of discretion in
refusing to docket the previously certified
question. Viewing our refusal as an indication
that the question need not be answered to
decide the case, the State argues that the
cireuit court erred by subsequently ruling on
the legal issue. Although we previously held
that “‘this Court will not consider certified
questions not necessary to a decision of the
case[,) ” °8 such holding clearly does not pre-
clude us from refusing to docket certified
questions for other reasons.” Moreover, as
we also previously held, “(tlhe action of this
court, in refusing to docket for review a case
certified under Code, 58-5-2, is not to be
construed as a final adjudication of the ques-
tions presented on the certification, or as
limiting the court in its decision upon the
record presented on final hearing.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Hastings v. Finney, 119 W.Va. 301, 193 S.B.
444 (1987), The holding in Hastings clearly
contemplates the circuit court ruling upon
the issue raised in a certified question, fol-

Code § '58-5-2 was amended to provide for “any
question of law” without limitation.

28, Syl, Pt. 6, West Va, Water Serv. Co. v. Cunning-
ham, 143 Wa, 1, 98 8.B.2d 891 (1957); see also
Syl. Pt. 5, Anderson v, Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77,
394 S,B.2d 61 (1990) (Same); Syl. Pt. 7, Shell v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 181 W.Va. 16, 380
S.E.2d 183 (1989) (same).

29, Even in cases where we have docketed a
certified question, we have sometimes declined
to answer it for a variety of reasons. See, e.g.,
Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 428 n.12,
490 S.B.2d 23, 30 n.12 (1997) (‘We decline to
answer certified question 3 in light of plaintiff's
failure to address the issue raised therein.”);
Holloman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 217 Wa.
269, 272, 617 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2005) (“Finding
the answer to the first question to be dispositive,
this Court declines to address the second certi-
fied question.”),

180

lowing this Court’s-refusal to docket the
same, and this Court retaining the ability to
address the issue if raised in a subsequent
appeal, as.in the case at bar,

Hs In addition, we further observe the
general absence of any language in our ad-
ministrative orders refusing to docket certi-
fied questions that would.restrict the manner
in which the cireuit court thereafter address-
es the issue. Accordingly, we take this oppor-
tunity to make clear, and we now hold, that
this Court’s exercise of diseretion under Rule
17 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
Procedure in refusing to docket a .certified
question presented to this Court under West.
Virginia Code § 58-5-2 (2012) is neither an
express nor an implicit ruling on the merits
of the legal issue presented therein, and the
cireuit court may thereafter take such action
and make such rulings in the matter as it
deems appropriate.

Once this Court refused to docket the cer-
tified question, the circuit court ruled upon
the legal issue, which led to its dismissal of
Counts I and IIT of the indictment, The State
has appealed that ruling, as provided under
‘West Virginia Code § 58-5-30. As contem-
plated in Hastings, the legal issue is now
before us for decision. In short, we find no
error in the circuit court ruling on the legal
question once this Court refused to docket
the certified question.

Iv.

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit
courts May 18, 2016, order dismissing
Counts I and III of the defendant's indict-
ment is hereby affirmed. This action is re-
manded for additional proceedings consistent
with this opinion. .

Affirmed and Remanded

Conclusion

JUSTICES DAVIS and WORKMAN
dissent and reserve the right to file
dissenting opinions.

Workman, Justice, dissenting, joined by
Justice Davis:

I respectfully dissent to the majority opin-
ion because it evidences a fundaniental mis-
understanding of the three-word phrase, “be-

eause of ... sex.” W.Va. Code § 61-6-21(b)
(2014). The statute clearly provides:

Tf any person does by force or threat of
force, willfully injure, intimidate or inter-
fere with, or attempt to injure, intimidate
or interfere with, or oppress or threaten
any other person in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege se-
cured to him or her by the Constitution or
laws of the state of West Virginia or by the
Constitution or laws of the United States,
because of such other person’s race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, political
affiliation or sew, he or she shall be guilty
of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be
fined not more than five thousand dollars
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both. .

Id, (emphasis added). As a matter of statyto-
ry application, the question to be answered is
whether Counts I and III of the indictment
in this case should have been. dismissed
where it is alleged that acts of violence were
committed against persons because of their
sex,

I am in agreement: with the majority’s
quotations regarding - statutory application
and the absence of justification for judicial
alteration of unambiguous statutory -pro-
nouncements. Thus, absent constitutional
considerations, no construction is warranted
where a statute is unambiguous; only applica-
tion of such statute is required. “Where the
language of a statute is clear and. without
ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accept-
ed without resorting to the rules of interpre-
tation.” Syl. Pt, 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va,
571, 165 S.H.2d 108 (1968); see also Syl. Pt. 6,
in part, State ew rel, Cohen v, Manchin, 176
W.Va, 525, 386 S.E.2d 171 (1984) (“Undefined
words and. terms used in a legislative enact-
ment will be given their common, ordinary
and accepted meaning.”); of, Jackson v. Bel-
cher, 232 W.Va, 518, 518, 753 S,E.2d 11, 16
(2018) (“this Court is required to consider the
entire language of a legislative enactment
when presented with a case questioning the
statute’s meaning; we are not at liberty to
selectively read a portion of the challenged
statutory section and to disregard the re-
mainder of the language employed by the
Legislature.”), This Court is consequently

called upon to apply the “common, ordinary
and accepted” meaning of the phrase “be-
cause of ... sex.” :

In my opinion, the meaning of “because of

. sex” is unambiguous.! Pursuant to the
statute, a crime is considered a hate crime if
certain conditions are met, In the hate crime
setting, it is the bias and ‘motivation that are
ultimately being sanctioned. So, some-of the
pertinent questions become: What was the
motivation for the conduct alleged to be crim-
inal under West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b)?
‘Was the alleged conduct affected by the vic-
tim’s sex? Was the crime committed because
of the victim’s sex? What is the meaning of
the phrase “because of”?

Illustrations are useful in contemplating
the meaning of the phrase. For instance, if a
‘woman works for a corporation, fails to con-
form to that corporation’s expectations of
appropriate “femininity” or gender identity,
and is denied opportynities for promotion,
has she been discriminated against because
of her sex? Yes, but not simply because she
possesses female anatomical parts; rather,
the actions occurred because she was per-
ceived to be behaving outside the social ex-
pectation of how a woman should conduct
herself in that corporate environment. But
for her sex, she would not have been discrim-
inated against, See Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
Kins, 490 U.S. 228, 285, 109 S.Ct. 1775,. 104
L.Hd.2d 268 (1989), seperseded by statute on
other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)
(1991), as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251, 114 S.Ct, 1488, 128
L,Ed.2d 229 (1994), In Price Waterhouse, the
United States Supreme Court applied prohi-
bitions contained in Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964 making it unlawful for employers
to discriminate “because of ... race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin” and found
the phrase “because of ... sex” includes

1, Disagreement among the parties “as to the
meaning or the applicability of [a statutory] pro-
vision does not of itself render [the] provision
ambiguous or of doubtful, uncertain or unsure
meaning.” Habursky v, Recht, 180 W.Va. 128,
132, 375 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1988) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted), A’ statute “is not
ambiguous simply because different interpreta-
tions are conceivable.” State v, Keller, 143
Wash.2d 267, 19 P.3d 1030, 1035 (2001) (foot-
note omitted), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 122

181

treatment based on sex stereotyping where a
female manager in an accounting firm was
denied partnership and advised she could
improve her chances for partnership if she
were to take “a course at charm school,”
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S, at 285, 109 S.Ct. 1775
(internal quotation marks omitted)?

Ifa Caucasian man is fired because he is
married to an African-American woman, has
he been discriminated against because of his
race? Yes, but not simply because of the hue
of his skin; rather, the act was committed
because he was perceived :to be behaving
outside the social expectation of how a Cau-
casian man should behave with an African-
American woman, But for his race, he would
not have been fired. See Holcomb v. Iona
Coll, 521 F.8d 180, 182-389 (2d- Cir. 2008)
(holding “that an employer may violate Title
VII if it takes action against an employee
because of the employee’s association with a
person of another race” and “where an em-
ployee is subjected to adverse action because
an employer disapproves of interracial associ-
ation, the employee suffers discrimination be-
cause of the employee's own race.”); Whitney
v Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adven-
tists, 401 F.Supp. 1363, 1866 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding employment termination was be-
cause of disapproval. of interracial relation-
ship); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586
F.Supp. 1442, 1445°(N.D. Ga. 1984) (“but for
their being white, the plaintiffs in these cases
would not have been discriminated against.”);
West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n ».
Wilson Estates, ‘Inc:, 202 W.Va. 152, 160, 503
S.E.2d 6, 14 (1998) (evaluating Fair Housing
Act and holding: “Consistent with that goal
“{to encourage fair housing opportunities for
all people] and with the actual language of

S.Ct, 1070, 151 L.Bd.2d 972 (2002); see also 7.
Weston, Inc. v. Mineral Cty., 219 W.Va. 564, 568,
638 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2006) (“[t]he fact that par-
ties disagree about the meaning of a statute does
not itself create ambiguity or obscure meaning.”
(internal citations omitted)).

2, See also, Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price’s Prog-
ress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidis-
crimination Law, 124 Yale L.J. 396 (2014). -

182

the Act, which specifically proscribes dis-
criminatory treatment against any person
based on race, we hold that under the West
Virginia Fair Housing Act, a cause of action
exists for discrimination directed against a
tenant based on the race of those individuals
with whom the tenant chooses to associ-
ate.”),3

If a woman is denied an employment op-
portunity because she is a lesbian, has she
been discriminated against because of her
sex? Yes, but not simply because she pos-
sesses female anatomical parts; rather, the
actions oceurred because she was in a rela-
tionship with a woman and “[t]he discrimina-
tory behavior does not exist without taking
the victim’s biological sex (either as observed
at birth or as modified, in the case of trans-
sexuals) into account.” Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmity. College of Ind,, 853 F.8d 339, 346-47
(Tth Cir. 2017), “Any discomfort, disapproval,
or job decision based on the fact that the
complainant—woman or man—dresses dif
ferently, speaks differently, or dates or mar-
ries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely
and simply based on sex.” Id, at 847.4

If a man stands on a corner kissing a man
and is beaten because he is kissing a man,
has he been assaulted because of his sex?
Yes, but not simply because he possesses
male anatomical parts; rather, the crime oc-
curred because he was perceived to be acting
outside the social expectations of how a man

3. This Court also observed in Wilson Estates that
we have “consistently looked to federal discrimi-
nation law dealing with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when interpreting provisions
of our state's human rights statutes.” 202 W.Va.
at 158, 503 S.B.2d at 12 (citation omitted).

4. The Hively court also astutely observed that a
“because of race” analysis would lead to the
inevitable conclusion that “‘both parties to [an]
interracial marriage were being denied impor-
tant rights by the state solely on the basis of their
race.” Hively, 853 F.3d at 347.

5, As noted in Hively,
[T]o the extent that the statute prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of the race of some-
one with whom the plaintiff associates, it also
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the
national origin, or the color, or the religion, or
(as relevant here) the sex of the associate. No
matter which category is involved, the essence
of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be
suffering the adverse action had his or her sex,

should behave with a man, But for his sex, he
would not have been attacked.

The indictment in this case properly al-
leged the attack occurred because of the
victims’ sex. Certain individuals are targeted
for violence because they are perceived to
violate socially-established protocols for gen-
der and sex roles, The perpetrators in such
instances have drawn conclusions that the
victim has contravened certain unspoken
rules, and the bias-motivated crime thus en-
sues. See generally, Karen Franklin, Unas-
suming Motivations—Contextualizing the
Narratives of Antigay Assailants, in Stigma
and Sexual Orientation—Understanding
Prejudice Against Lesbians, Gay Men and
Bisexwals 1, 15-20 (Gregory M. Herek ed.,
1998),

The point of origin in the majority’s opin-
ion is sound; the statute indisputably does
not include the words “sexual orientation.” °
But the majority concludes its analysis pre-
maturely. Simply finding the absence of
those two magic words fatal to the State’s
contention is the most effortless answer this
Court could conjure. But while an answer
without more in-depth analysis may be the
path of least resistance, it also gives the
shortest shrift to real critical thinking. The
majority's answer is overly simplistic and
constricted; the absence of the specific refer-
ence does not definitively resolve the ques-
tion presented by this case.’ The pertinent

race, color, national origin, or religion been
different.
Td, at 349.

6. The court in Hively recognized “[t]he question
before us is not whether this court can, or
should, ‘amend’ Title VII to add a new protected
category to the familiar list of ‘race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). Obviously that lies beyond our power.” 853
F.3d at 343. Amendments are not permissible;
nor are they required. The statute in this case, as
written, is sufficient to warrant the result es-
poused herein.

7. Nor is the absence of statutory amendments
particularly enlightening.
Legislative history ... is notoriously malleable.
Even worse is the temptation to try to divine
the significance of unsuccessful legislative ef-
forts to change the law. Those failures can
mean almost anything, ranging from the lack
of necessity for a proposed change because the

question is not whether the statute contains
the words “sexual orientation.” Rather, it is
whether the crime was committed because of
the victims’ sex. The phrase “because of ...
sex” encompasses the actions taken against
the victims in this case.

An illuminating examination of the mean-
ing of “because of ... sex” was undertaken
by Chief Judge Robert Katzmann in his con-
currence to Christiansen ¥. Omnicom Group,
Inc., 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir, 2017), In prior
decisions, Simonton v. Runyon, 282 F.3d 83
(2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), the
Second Circuit had held that sexual orienta-
tion discrimination claims were not cogniza-
ble under Title VII. Christiansen, 852 F.8d
at 202 (C.J. Katzmann, concurring). In recog-
nizing the analytical deficiencies of those pri-
or decisions, Judge Katzmann addressed the
phrase “because of ... sex” and noted the
recognition by the United States Supreme
Court that an individual is discriminated
against “ ‘because of ... sex’ if that person is
‘exposed to disadvantageous terms or condi-
tions of employment to which members of
the other sex are not exposed.’” Jd. (quoting
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140° L.Ed.2d
201 (1998) (internal citations omitted)). Fur-
ther, Judge Katzmann addressed the associa-
tional theory of discrimination (actions based
upon disapproval of one’s relationships, such
as interracial or homosexual); gender stereo-
typing® (actions based upon disapproval of
one’s failure to adhere to socially-imposed
expectations of appropriate behavior as wom-
an or man); and traditional sex discrimina-

law already accomplishes the desired goal, to
the undesirability of the change because a ma-
jority of the legislature is happy with the way
the courts are currently interpreting the law, to
the irrelevance of the non-enactment, when it
is attributable to nothing more than legislative
logrolling or gridlock that had nothing to do
with its merits.

Id. at 343-44; see also United States v. Craft, 535

U.S. 274, 287, 122 S.Ct. 1414, 152 L.Bd.2d 437

(2002) (“‘[clongressional inaction lacks persua-

sive significance because several equally tenable

inferences may be drawn from such inaction,
including the inference that the existing legisla-
tion already incorporated the offered change.”

(Gnternal citation and quotation omitted); Local

598, Council 58 Am, Fed’n v. City of Huntington,

183

tion, Each of those theories ultimately led
Judge Katzmann to the conclusion that dis-
crimination based upon sexual orientation is
an act occurring “because of ... sex.” See
also Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d
1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2017) (J. Rosenbaum,
concurring, in part and dissenting, in part)
(“Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as
Evans has, that she has been discriminated
against because she is a lesbian, she neces-
sarily alleges that she has been discriminated
against because she failed to conform to the
employer’s image of what women should
be.... And it is utter fiction to suggest that
she was not discriminated against for failing
to comport with her employer's stereotyped
view of women. That is discrimination ‘be-
cause of ... sex[.!’”); Prowel v. Wise Bus.
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (8d Cir. 2009)
(vecognizing “the line between sexual orien-
tation discrimination and discrimination ‘be-
cause of sex’ can be difficult to draw” and
holding Title VII protects homosexual man
for deviating from gender stereotypes even if
not for “sexual orientation”); Videckis v. Pep-
perdine Univ, 150 F.Supp.3d 1151, 1159
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (“Simply put, the line be-
tween sex discrimination and sexual orienta-
tion discrimination is ‘difficult to draw’ be-
cause that line does not exist, save as a
lingering and faulty judicial construct.” (in-
ternal citations omitted)); Willis v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 202 W.Va. 413, 417, 504 S.E.2d
648, 652 (1998) (addressing “because of sex”
language’ and finding discrimination based on
same-sex sexual harassment is recognized
cause of action in West Virginia).

173 W.Va. 403, 405, 317 S.E.2d 167, 168-69

(1984) (‘“The failure of the legislature to enact a

particular law is not evidence that the legislature
rejected the policy underlying that bill.”).

8. See, eg., Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No.
3:13-CV-01303-WWE, 221 F.Supp.3d 255, 2016
WL 6818348 (D. Conn. Nov. 17, 2016) (“[HJomo-
sexuality is the ultimate gender non-conformity,
the prototypical sex stereotyping animus."); Cen-
tola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 403, 410 (D. Mass.
2002) (observing that sexual orientation discrimi-
nation “is often, if not always, motivated by a
desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender
norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality
‘are directly related to our stereotypes about the
proper roles of men and women....”).

184

The precedent for application of the “be-
cause of ... sex” statutory language has
been within the civil realm of sex discrimina-
tion cases, rather than hate crimes, primari-
ly because most states now include the more
precise “sexual orientation” nomenclature in
their statutes. Thus, courts have had very
limited opportunity to address the meaning
of “because of ... sex” within the realm of
hate crimes.” The phrase has the same
meaning within hate crimes as within dis-
crimination prohibitions, Attacking a male
and shouting homophobic slurs because he is
kissing 4 man most certainly qualifies as
committing an act “because of ... sex.”
While the majority might find the crime was
actually committed “because of sexual orien-
tation,” it is a “common-sense reality that it
is actually impossible to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation without discrimi-

nating on the basis of sex.” Hively, 853 F.3d_

at 851.4.

Critically, the meaning of the phrase “be-
cause of ... sex” is not altered when one
makes the transition from civil to criminal
statutes. Nor do traditional tools of statutory
“construction” of criminal statutes interfere
with such smooth passage; as addressed
above, tools of statutory construction are not
implicated or invoked where a statute is un-
ambiguous. The rule of lenity, requiring
criminal statutes to be construed in favor of a
defendant, is not applicable where the statute
is unambiguous. See State v. Green, 207
‘W.Va. 580, 588, n,18, 584 8,H.2d 395, 408 n.13
(2000) (holding that when court finds “the
statutory text to be unambiguous ..., we do
not consider the rule of lenity.”). Thus, apply-
ing the statute by employing common, ordi-
nary meanings of phrases does not abrogate
existing constitutional or statutory protec-
tions for criminal defendants, despite the
reality that definitions of such phrases may

. 9. Because Title VIL, liké the West Virginia statute
at issue herein, does not include the words ‘“‘sex-
ual orientation,” it is the most analogous statuto-
ry scheme in which precedent on the definition
of “because of ... sex” has been extensively
developed, .

10: In fact, other than states that include the
words “sexual orientation" in their hate crime
statutes, only West Virginia and three other
States use the word sex in their listings of protec-
tions. Those other states’ hate crime statutes

have received more attention in litigation in
the civil realm. See, eg., People v. Swain, 959
P.2d 426, 488 (Colo. 1998) (holding definition
of the word “driving” in civil driver's license
revocation context also applies in criminal
context and specifying that rule of lenity for
statutory construction is inappropriate ab-
sent statutory ambiguity); In re M.S., 10
Cal.4th 698, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d
1865, 1875 and 1877 n.7 (1995) (quoting Price
Waterhouse discussion regarding meaning of
“because of” and finding definitions utilized
in civil discrimination realm equally applica-
ble to criminal prosecution for violation of
hate crime statutes, reasoning that “‘[b]e-
cause of is a term in common usage. It
connotes a causal link between the victim's
characteristic and the offender’s conduct, and
resembles language found in other civil
rights and antidiscrimination statutes.”). The
prohibitions against bias-motivated actions as
separately expressed in civil discrimination
statutes and criminal’hate crime statutes are
intertwined and have developed, to some de-
gree, in concert with one another.

In recent years,'an upsurge in racial
hostility and gender tension has been iden-
tified in apparently increasing incidents of
hate crimes, In response, numerous local,
state, and federal statutes, widely viewed
as a type of civil rights legislation, have
been enacted. This nascent wave of legisla-
tion has emerged in the context of a vast
expansion of penal legislation on the feder-
al level and a widespread movement to
‘respond harshly to crime: .

John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in A
Federal System: Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. S
1985(8)’s Equality Right, 69 Temp, L. Rev.
145, 235-86 (1996) (footnotes omitted), Anti-
hate legislation has typically taken the form
of either penalty enhancement or indepen-
dent legislation. “Both types. generally define

have not been challenged in the manner we
encounter in this case.

11, Additionally, committing an act of violence
because the victims were presumed to have vio-
lated stereotypical expectations of males would

_also constitute an act committed “because of ....
sex,” entirely circumventing the need to grapple
with concepts regarding the role of sexual orien-
tation. ,

the unlawful act as acts motivated ‘because
of’ (‘based on,’ ‘on the basis of, ‘by reason of,
ete.) ... [certain- protected statuses]. This
form is similar to Title VII, the federal em-
ployment discrimination statute, a point
Chief Justice Rehnquist invoked in upholding
the Wisconsin [criminal] statute.” Id, at 285
n,298; see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
US. 476, 487, 118 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Bd2d
486 (1998),!2

The forthright application of the plain stat-
utory language at issue herein, as I propose,
does not place this Court in the proverbial
and untenable role of both judge and jury.
The present procedural stance is the indict-
ment stage,® rather than the trial stage.
Allowing Counts I and III to stand would
provide the prosecution ample time to prove
the assertions, the jury would be. properly
instructed on evidentiary requirements and
burdens of proof, and the State would be
required to prove its allegations of statutory
violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’ At this

12, Any concerns regarding a potential violation
of the fair warning doctrine are also unfounded.
“The basic principle that a criminal statute must
give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a
crime has often been recognized by [the United
States Supreme] Court.” Bouie v. Columbia, 378
“ULS, 347, 350-51, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Bd.2d 894
(1964). The statutory application espoused herein
is not an unforeseeable judicial expansion, as
commonly prompts a fair warning doctrine anal-
ysis; the statute makes it reasonably clear that
the conduct was punishable as a criminal act.
See generally United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 267, 117 S.Ct, 1219, 137 L.Bd.2d 432
(1997). Moréover, this issue has not been ad-
dressed previously; nor is this definition indefen-

sible or unexpected in any way, “Due process is*

not ... violated simply because the issue is a
matter of first impression.” Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Parole
in Bronx, N.Y., 586 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2009),
Consequently, there is no “marked and unpre-

185

juncture, however, the evaluation must con-
centrate upon the sufficiency of the indict-
ment for a hate crime, and it is my fim
belief that the majority of this Court adopted
an overly narrow focus, metaphorically miss-
ing the forest for the trees, .

Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully
dissent to the unnecessarily constrained view
articulated by the majority herein. I would
have found Counts I and III of the indict-
ment sufficient, and I believe the circuit
court erred in dismissing those counts,

. Tam authorized to state that Justice Davis
joins me in this separate opinion.

dictable departure from prior precedent’ that
would ... constitute “an exercise of the sort of
unfair and arbitrary judicial action against which
the Due Process Clause aims to protect.” Rogers
v, Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467, 121 S.Ct. 1693,
149 L.Bd.2d 697 (2001).

13. This Court subjects sufficiency of indictment
findings to de novo review. Syl. Pt. 7, in part,
State v. Bull, 204 W.Va, 255, 512 S.E.2d 177
(1998) (“' ‘[glenerally, the sufficiency of an indict
‘ment is reviewed de novo.'” (citation omitted);
see also State v. Minigh, 224 W.Va. 112, 119, 680
S.E.2d 127, 134 (2009) (holding standard of re-
view regarding motion to dismiss indictment is
generally de novo); State v, Zain, 207 W.Va. 54,
58, 528 S.E.2d 748, 752 (1999), cert. denied, 529
US, 1042, 120 S.Ct. 1541, 146 L.Ed.2d 354
- (2000),

|

186

800 S.E.2d 224
Edith YOUNG, Plaintiff below, Petitioner
v. :
EOSCCA, Defendant below, Respondent.
"No. 16-0151

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 2, 2017:
Filed: May 17, 2017

Benjamin M. Sheridan, Esq., Klein &
Sheridan, LC, Hurricane, West Virginia,
Counsel for Petitioner

Nicholas P. Mooney, Esq., Nicholas S.
Preservati, Esq., David L. Shuman, Jr., Esq.,
Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Charles-
ton, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Edith Young, appeals from
the February 2, 2016, order of the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County granting summary
judgment to the respondent, EOS CCA!
(“EOS”), in connection with her complaint
against EOS asserting, inter alia, violations
of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and

1, According to respondent's corporate represen- © company—EOS Group, which is based in Ger-
tative, EOS USA, EOS CCA, and Collecto, Inc. many.
are the same company and have the same parent

Protection Act (the “Act”)2 Ms. Young chal-
lenges the .circuit court’s ruling that. she is
not a “consumer” within the applicable defi-
nitions of the Act.3 Upon careful scrutiny of
the Act’s provisions, we do not find that the
circuit court committed error and, according-
ly, affirm.

I, Factual and Procedural Background

Ms. Young filed her complaint against
EOS on July 28, 2014, alleging that HOS, a
debt collector, had violated the Act by engag-
ing in unreasonable or oppressive or abusive
conduct in an attempt to collect a debt. She
averred that EOS had repeatedly called her
home and continued to attempt to communi-
cate with her after she indicated she was
represented by counsel. In addition to assert-
ing violations of the Act, Ms. Young alleged
common law claims grounded in negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and invasion of privacy.

Discovery in this matter ensued in accor-
dance with the trial court’s issuance of a
scheduling order. When Ms. Young was de-
posed in November 2015, she answered pre-
liminary questions to confirm that she resid-
ed with her husband, who was then eighty-
three and suffering from Alzheimer’s,‘ and to
verify that she had the same telephone num-
ber for all times relevant to this case. Ms.

2. See W.Va. Code §§ 46A-1-1 to -8-102 (2015 &
Supp. 2016).

3. Although the parties filed a motion to withdraw
several days before the case was set for argument
indicating they had reached a settlement agree-
ment in this matter, we choose to address the
statutory issue presented in this case to resolve a
matter that is likely to be raised again and yet
evade review by this judicial body. See Syl. Pt. 1,
Israel by Israel v. W.V.S.S.A.C., 182 W.Va. 454,
388 S.E.2d 480 (1989) (announcing three-part
test for addressing technically moot issues); Syl.
Pt. 1, State ex rel. M.C.H. v, Kinder, 173 W.Va.
387, 317 S.E.2d 150 (1984) (“A case is not ren-
dered moot even though a party to the litigation
has had a change in status such that he no longer

has a legally cognizable interest in the litigation -

or the issues have lost their adversarial vitality, if
such issues are capable of repetition and yet will
evade review.”).

4, Ms. Young indicated that she, too, suffered
from some health problems and took medication
that might have an affect on her recall abilities.

5. That number was 800-478-5852.

187

Young testified regarding a document ten-
dered through discovery on which she had
recorded her receipt of numerous phone calls
from the same 800 number.> She testified
that “Bank Americard” appeared on her call-
er ID when each of those phone calls rang
into her home.' According to her testimony,
Ms. Young never picked up the phone to
speak with the caller; she just registered the
caller’s identifying information that appeared
on her phone. On one oceasion, however, Ms,
Young contends she did answer the phone.
She purportedly informed the caller on Au-
gust 18; 2018, when her caller ID revealed
the caller as Bank Americard, that they
should contact her attorney.’ She further
admits, however, that “I don’t know who was
on the other end. I didn’t hear nobody.” Ms.
Young also acknowledges that the call might
have been for someone other than herself.

While Ms. Young admittedly has a eredit-
related debt with Bank Americard,’ she does
not have any specific debt in connection with
the calls that EOS made to her land line
phone. The calls HOS placed to Ms. Young’s
home were made in an attempt to locate an
AT&T customer who was delinquent on his.
account.’ That entity is a non-party to this
lawsuit, whose identity the trial court permit-
ted the respondent to protect. Ms. Young
asserts that seventy-three such calls were

6. An affidavit prepared by Catherine Belmore, a
business analyst for EOD CCA, averred that
“BOS CCA does not cause ‘Bank of America,’
‘Bank America Card,’ ‘Bank Americard,’ or any
such similar moniker to be displayed on a caller
identification device when it places telephone

- calls to collect on an account.”

7. The record in this case contains an averment
from Catherine Belmore, business analyst, that
“BOS CCA has no record of receiving attorney
notification from Edith Young.”

8. When asked why she filed suit against EOS,
she testified, “I did not file against them.” Ms.
Young insisted that her claim involved the credit
card issuers such as Bank Americard to whom
she owed money. The record is clear that BOS
did not collect funds for Bank Americard at any
time pertinent to this lawsuit; they stopped doing
so on July 23, 2010.

9. EOS believes that it retrieved the Young resi-
dence number from a skip trace'service provided
by LexisNexis.

188

made by EOS. The corporate records of EOS
reflect that same number of contacts being
made to the phone number associated with
Ms. Young’s residence.

During the deposition of Brian Soule, the
corporate manager of training and develop-
ment at EOS USA, the petitioner’s counsel
played a recording of a purported telephone
conversation between EOS and Ms, Young
that allegedly, occurred on September 5,
2018. The caller asked for either “Jim” or
“James,” t-to which Ms. Young responded
that “he’s not home or he’s not available or
he’s not there.” !? Mr. Soule explained that
EOS would stop calling a third-party number
such as Ms, Young’s where they were simply
trying to gain information helpful to locate
the.actual consumer with the subject debt “if
they indicated to us that the person does not.
live there and we have the wrong number or
asked us to stop calling.” While Mr. Soule
testified that their company records lacked
any notation of this conversation, he indicat-
ed that such an omission may have been a
systemic collection error.

On December 11, 2015, EOS filed a motion
for summary judgment in which it asserted
Ms. Young lacked standing to seek relief
under the Act because she failed to fall with-
in the applicable definitions of “consumer”
provided in the Act, In an attempt to defeat
the standing argument, the petitioner filed
an affidavit in which she avowed her status
as a consumer in general due to debts she
owed to Bank of America, Home Depot, Sud-
denlink Communications, and several other
unnamed corporations.

10, As respondent's corporate manager of train-
ing and development explained, the phone calls
to Ms. Young’s residence—since she: was not
listed as the consumer on an AT&T account—
were being made to locate the actual consumer,

11. During the hearing on EOS’ motion for sum-
mary judgment, the petitioner's counsel argued
that the recording suggests the caller asked if
“GLEMP” was there. However, during the depo-
sition of Mr.. Soule, there was no discussion
concerning the clarity of the recording in terms
of the caller asking for either “Jim” or “James.”

12. Ms. Young testified that her husband, her. son,
and her grandson are all named James Young.

Following a hearing on the summary judg-
ment motion,!* the trial court issued an order
on February 2, 2016, granting summary
judgment to EOS and dismissing the peti-
tioner’s complaint. In its ruling, the trial

- court examined the definitions of the term

“consumer” provided in the Act and conclud-
ed that the record is clear that the petitioner
“does not owe a debt to Defendant [HOS].”
As the circuit court reasoned, the “Defendant
was calling the Number to collect a debt
owed from a non-party to this case. There. is
no ‘evidence on the record from which a jury
could reasonably find that Defendant some-
how alleged that Plaintiff owed a debt to it.”
After finding that Ms. Young did not have
standing to assert a claim under the Act
based on her non-consumer status in connec-
tion with the referenced debt, ‘the circuit
court determined that she also could not
succeed under a theory of common law negli-
gence with regard to those same allegations,
This ruling was based on a finding that Ms,
Young had failed to show there was a legal
duty on the part of EOS to “train, supervise,
monitor or otherwise control its employees”
to ensure that those employees comply with
the provisions of the Act. As to the intention-
al infliction of emotional distress claim, the
cireuit court found the absence of any evi-
dence from which a jury could reasonably
find that EOS intentionally harassed Ms.
Young or caused her severe emotional dis-
tress. As the court’s ruling accurately re-
flects, “Plaintiff testified that she had no
reaction to the phone calls about which she is
complaining.” In dismissing the petitioner’s
invasion of privacy claim, the trial court ruled
there was a lack of evidence to support this
claim. It is from this grant of summary
judgment that the petitioner seeks relief.

13, ‘The heating was held on January 12, 2016.

14. In making this finding the trial court reasoned
as follows:
There is no evidence that Plaintiff advised or
_ Tequested Defendant to stop calling the Num-
" ber; no evidence that Plaintiff advised Defen-
dant it had a wrong telephone number; no
evidence that Plaintiff advised Defendant the
person it intended to reach did not live at the
residence. There is no evidence that Defendant
even knew or had reason to know that the
Number belonged, in part,.to Plaintiff. There is
not even evidence that Plaintiff ever spoke with
Defendant. (emphasis supplied)
The final sentence is disputed as the recording
produced at Mr. Soule’s deposition purports to

Il. Standard of Review

Our review of this matter is plenary. See
Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189,
451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), It is axiomatic that a
motion for summary judgment should only
be granted when there is no genuine issue of
fact to be tried and when further inquiry into
the facts is not required for purposes of
applying the law. Seé Syl. Pt. 8, Aetna Cas, &
Surety Co. v. Fed. Ins, Co. of New York, 148
W.Va. 160, 188 S.B.2d 770 (1968). Because we
must resolve whether the circuit court cor-
rectly determined that the petitioner does
not qualify as a “customer” under the Act,
our review is further guided by this Court’s
recognition that “[wjhere the issue.on an
appeal from the cireuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
‘AL, 194 W.Va, 188, 459 8.H.2d 415 (1995),
With 'these principles in mind, we proceed to
determine whether the cireuit court conimit-
ted error in its grant of summary judgment.

I.. Discussion

I Seeking to expand the term “consum-
er,” Ms. Young contends she should be per-
mitted to pursue a cause of action against
EOS under the Act despite the fact that EOS
was not seeking to speak to her in connection
with a debt she personally owed, According
to Ms, Young, she qualifies as a “consumer”
in a generic fashion ‘based on debts she owes
to creditors other than EOS’ client. Alterna-
tively, she maintains that the-Act can be read
as allowing a claim where abusive debt col-
lection practices are being made in connec-
tion with the debt: owed by a third party.
Upon examination, each of these arguments
fails,

The fight to seek relief under the Act is
set forth in article five: “If a creditor or debt
collector has violated the provisions of this
chapter applying to ... fraudulent or uncon-
scionable conduct, any prohibited debt collec-
tion practice, ..., the consimer has a cause

be a communication between Ms. Young and an

employee of EOS.

15. The petitioner has only appealed the circuit
court’s grant of summary judgment with regard
to the claim she brought pursuant to the Act; she

189

of action to recover” actual damages and a
penalty of $1,000 per violation. W.Va. Code
§ 46A-5-101(1) (2015). The Act provides two
definitions of a “consumer.” Under the gen-
eral definitions, the term “consumer” is de-
fined as “a natural person who. incurs debt
pursuant to a consumer credit sale or a
consumer loan, or debt or other obligations
pursuant to a consumer lease.” Id. at § 46A-
1-102(12) (2015). Article two contains a sepa-
rate definition pertaining specifically to im-
proper credit collection practices. For those
specified provisions, a “consumer” is defined
‘as “any natural ; -person'‘obligated or allegedly
obligated to pay any debt.” Id. at § 46A-2-
122 (20165).

Because the petitioner specifically alleged
violations of article two of-the Act, the defini-
tion set forth in West Virginia Code § 46A+2-
122 is the governing definition. In Ballard v,
Bank, of America, N.A., No. 2:12-2496, 2018
WL 5963068 (S.D. W.Va, Novy. 7, 2018), the
district court examined the contention that a
plaintiff could come. within the article two
definition of a “consumer” based on the “al-
legedly obligated to pay” language. Id. at
*11. The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that although he was not actually obli-
‘gated to repay the subject debt, he came
within the purview of “allegedly obligated to

‘ pay” because of a foreclosure notice and his

holding. of an interest in the property that
served as security for the note at issue, Id.
Differentiating this’ scenario from one in
which a lender personally demanded pay-
ment froma non-debtor, the district court in
Ballard underscored how Bank ,of America
had made clear that the plaintiff addressee of
its letters, “had no personal obligation’ to
repay any money,” Jd, As a result, the plain-
tiff failed to meet the “critical element of the
definition of ‘consumer’ found in section
122(a)”—to show that he was “obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” Id.,
W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122,

The petitioner attempts to insinuate her- .
self as an “alleged debtor” based solely on

has not raised any error with. regard to the
dismissal of her negligence, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy
claims. .

190

the repetitive phone calls made to her house-
hold. According to Ms. Young, it is logical to
presume that she qualifies as an alleged
debtor based on the repeated occurrence of
phone calls from BOS. Where this argument
fails, however, is in its assumption that the
phone calls were being made in an attempt to
collect a debt from the petitioner. As this
ease demonstrates, a creditor or its agent
may lawfully seek contact with a third party
such as Ms. Young in an attempt to locate
the actual debtor. Significantly, there is no
evidence in the record submitted in this case
that EOS ever identified Ms. Young as a
debtor or sought to communicate that she
personally owed money. In fact, the opposite
is true as the one time that Ms. Young
ostensibly spoke with an EOS employee, she
learned instantly that she was not the indi-
vidual with whom they were seeking to com-
municate. Like the plaintiff in Ballard, the
petitioner “is unable to show that [s]he was
at least allegedly obligated.” Ballard, 2013
WL 5963068 at *11.

The parameters of what constitutes an “al-
leged obligation” were discussed in Fabian v.
Home Loan Center, Inc, No. 5:14-CV-42,
2014 WL 1648289 (N.D. W.Va. April 24,
2014), The plaintiffs argued in Fabian that
their home equity debt, while discharged in
bankruptcy, was still an “alleged obligation”
because to avoid foreclosure on their home—
the collateral for the debt—they were re-
quired to make payments. Rejecting their
argument and adopting the analysis in Bal-
lord, the court reasoned:

The phrase’ “alleged obligation” extends

the reach of the Act to certain collection

activities conducted without regard to
whether the debt is actually owed—as in

Croye,'® where the lender repeatedly as-

serted that the debtor was required to pay

the debt although the debtor had no per-

sonal obligation, or as in Diaz v. DL.

Recovery Corp., 486 F.Supp.2d 474, 475

(E.D. Pa. 2007), where the “debt” sought.

to be collected never actually existed at

all.... Here, plaintiffs have made no alle-
gation that LendingTree or BONY have
represented to plaintiffs that they remain
personally liable on the debt. Croye is

16. Croye v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 740

therefore inapposite. Plaintiffs have failed

to demonstrate that they are allegedly obli-

gated to pay within the meaning of the

Act.

Fabian, 2014 WL 1648289 at *6 (emphasis
supplied and footnote added); accord McNee-
ly v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 115 F.Supp.8d
779, 785-86 (S.D. W.Va. 2015) (finding that
ex-husband lacked standing under Act de-
spite assumption of mortgage payments fol-
lowing divorce because he neither signed
mortgage loan nor was treated by lender as
personally obligated on debt); see also Bal-
lard, 2018 WL 5963068 at *11(finding that
decision to continue making payments to re-
tain collateral does not give rise to “alleged
obligation” under the Act).

In Payne v. Green Tree Servicing, No.
2:05-ev-00293 (8.D. W.Va. March 7, 2006),
the district court considered the precise issue
presented in this case—the standing of a
third party who received telephone calls re-
lated to a debtor’s financial obligation to
pursue a claim under the Act. As in this case,
the defendant argued that the plaintiff, as a
non-consumer, lacked standing to bring an
action under the Act. And, like Ms. Young,
the plaintiff in Payne looked to the statutory
usage of “any person” with regard to the
prohibited actions set forth in West Virginia
Code § 46A-2-125, Given that the statute
prohibits debt collectors from oppressing or
abusing “any person” in connection with the
collection or attempt to collect any alleged
debt, Ms. Young asserted that framing a
statutory violation in such an expansive man-
ner while limiting recovery under the Act to
only “consumers” rendered West Virginia
Code § 46A-2-125 meaningless to non-con-
sumer.

Rejecting this same argument in Payne,
the district court explained that non-consum-
ers do have a remedy for violations of the
Act:

[T]his argument fails because other meth-
ods exist that validly can enforce the stat-
ute’s prohibition of this type of conduct to
nonconsumers. For example, a nonconsum-
er can file a complaint with the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney Gener-

F.Supp.2d 788 (S.D. W.Va. 2010).

al[‘s] Office. Section 46A-7-108 of the West,

Virginia Code allows the Attorney General

to “pursue any investigation, prosecute any

suit and take any other proper action relat-
ing to the enforcement of any consumer
protection provision in [the WVCCPA].”

Moreover, because the West Virginia Su-

preme Court of Appeals has stated that a

violation of any statute is a prima facie

case of negligence, a nonconsumer can
bring an action against a debt collecting
company under a negligence theory. Ac-
cordingly, Ms. Payne’s claim that limiting
suit under the WVCCPA to “consumers”
would render the application of West Vir-
ginia Code Section 46A-2-125 to noncon-
sumers “meaningless or useless” is without
merit.
Payne, slip op. at pp. 4-5 (internal citation
omitted). The district court reasoned further
that the Legislature intended to limit the
ability to bring a private cause of action
under the Act to consumers, See W.Va. Code
§ 46A-5-101(1). By expressly restricting such
actions to consumers, the Legislature provid-
ed that not just “any person” but only those
individuals qualifying as “consumers” may
seek recovery under the Act. See id. As the
Court sagely intuited in Payne, “[w]hile the
legislature may have wanted to prohibit ex-
cessive calls to those who were not ‘consum-
ers’ as defined by the act, it also wanted to
limit recovery under the act to actual ‘con-
sumers’ because ‘consumers’ are the class of
people most likely to be harmed by violations
of the WVCCPA.” Payne, slip op. at p. 6, We
agree,

Ms. Young would like to qualify in a
generic fashion as a consumer based on the
fact that she owes money to creditors other
than AT&T. Her attempt to cast herself as a
“consumer” under the Act fails because the
statutes at issue are clear that the individual
seeking civil recovery must owe or allegedly
owe the debt at the center of the collection
activity. That the Legislature designed the
Act in terms of connecting the prohibited
debt collection practices to the specific debt
at issue is readily apparent, Each of the
three sections under which Ms. Young as-
serts a violation of the Act links the prohibit-
ed conduct to the collection or attempt to
collect a “claim.” See W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-

191

125, -127, -128. Critically, the term “claim” is
defined for purposes of article two as

any obligation or alleged obligation of a

conswmer to pay money arising out of a

transaction in which the money, property,

insurance or service which is the subject of
the transaction is primarily for personal,
family or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to
judgment.
W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b) (emphasis sup-
plied). This statutory definition leaves no
doubt that a “consumer” seeking recovery
under the provisions of West Virginia Code
§ 46A-5-101(1) “for any prohibited debt col-
lection practice” must be obligated or alleg-
edly obligated to owe the specific debt at
issue. In the instant case, the record makes
clear that Ms. Young was neither obligated
to AT&T on the debt at issue nor was she
ever advised by its debt collector EOS that
she was obligated on the subject debt. As
discussed above, nothing in the record of this
case suggests that Ms. Young had any belief
that EOS was seeking to collect a debt from
her—alleged or otherwise.

In a final attempt to persuade us that she
has standing under the Act, Ms. Young looks
to federal case law in which nonconsumers
have been recognized to come within the
ambit of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”). See, eg, Bridge v. Ocwen
Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 361-62 (6%
Cir. 2012); of Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs, LLC, 668 F.8d 997, 1001 (8 Cir.
2011) (observing that “‘[sleveral sections of
the FDCPA’ ... ‘restrict the scope of [the
FDCPA’s] application by including the word
“consumer” in the text’ ”) (citations omitted),
In contrast to our Act, the FDCPA broadly
extends its rights of enforcement “with re-
spect to any person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)
(2012). As the Fourth Circuit recognized in
Rawlinson v. Law Office of William M. Ru-
dow, LLC, 460 Fed.Appx. 254 (4 Cir, 2012),
“any aggrieved party, not just a debtor, may
bring an action under the statute [FDCPA]”
absent statutory limitation. Id. at 257, In
marked contrast to the authorizing language
of the FDCPA, our Act expressly limits its
grant of civil enforcement suits to “eonsum-
ers.” See W.Va. Code § 46A-5-101(1). Given

192

this incontestable enforcement limitation, Ms.
Young’s contention that a coextensive grant
of broad enforcement authority exists simply
because the FDCPA and the Act both ad-
dress debt collection practices is decidedly
specious,!”

TI Under the Act, the term “consumer”
has a specific definition and only those per-
sons meeting that definition may bring a
private cause of action. Accordingly, we hold
that by limiting the right to recover for a
violation of the Act to those persons defined
as “consumers,” the Legislature has express-
ly prohibited any persons falling outside the
definition of a “consumer” from seeking dam-
ages and statutory penalties pursuant to the
provisions of West Virginia Code § 46A-5-
101. Given that Ms. Young clearly does not
come within the definition of “consumer” set,
forth in West Virginia Code § 46A-2-122, the
circuit court correctly ruled that she lacked
standing to pursue a claim under the Act.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the February 2,
2016, order of the Cirevit Court of Kanawha
County is affirmed.

Affirmed,

800 S.E.2d 230
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, Petitioner
ve .
Tammy MCGRAW, Respondent.
No. 16-0679

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 25, 2017

. Filed: May 17, 2017

17. Counsel for Ms. Young conceded during oral
argument that no existing case law, federal or
state, interprets the Act in the manner he was
advocating. As the district court sagely. recog-
nized in Payne, “[iJf the legislature wished to
create a cause of action for ‘any person’ ..., it

would have simply used the phrase ‘any person’
instead of the word ‘consumer’ as it did in West,

Virginia Code Section 46A-2-125.” Payne, supra,
at pp. 5-6. This judicial body has no authority to
rewrite legislation that clearly limits civil recov-
ery to “consumers.” If the Legislature wishes to
broaden the reach of the Act's enforcement pro-
visions to nonconsumers, it may easily amend
the Act’s limiting language.

a
al

Jan L. Fox, Esq., Mark C. Dean, Esq.,
Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

195

John D. Wooton, Esq., Wooton, Davis,
Hussell & Ellis, Beckley, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent.

Matthew S. Criswell, Esq.,. Mark L.
French, Esq. Criswell French, PLLC,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondent

Justice Ketchum:

The West Virginia Department of Edu-
cation (“the DOR”) appeals an order by the
Cireuit Court of Kanawha County. In its
order, the circuit court denied the DOE’s
motion to dismiss based on qualified immuni-
ty.

The underlying lawsuit was filed by Tam-
my McGraw after the DOE terminated her
at-will employment. The lawsuit contained
the following two claims against the DOE: (1)
a constitutional tort claim, and (2) a claim for
wrongful termination. As to her. constitution-
al tort claim, Ms. McGraw alleged that the
DOE leaked a letter it received from her
previous government employer revealing that
she was under investigation for misallocating ~
public funds for personal use. Although she
does not dispute that she was, in fact, under
investigation on those charges, she alleges
the DOE's leak of this letter violated her
constitutionally-protected liberty interest.

Upon review, we find that Ms. McGraw
failed to outline a liberty interest violation
sufficient to overcome the DOE’s qualified
immunity because the truth of the allegedly
leaked letter, i.¢., that she was under investi-
gation for misallocating public funds, was not
disputed. Therefore, the DOH’s qualified im-
munity bars Ms. McGraw’s constitutional tort
and wrongful termination claims. We reverse
the circuit courts order and dismiss Ms.
McGraw’s claims against the DOE.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from the DOE terminat-
ing Ms. McGraw’s at-will employment as its
Executive Director of the Office of Instruc-
tional Technology. This termination was, at
least in part, due to the DOR’s receipt of a

196

letter from Ms. MeGraw’s previous employer,
the Virginia Department of Education.! The
letter stated as follows:

Tammy McGraw has been the focus of
an ongoing investigation by [The Office of
the Virginia State Inspector General] and
the [Virginia] department of education for
illegal activities and misuse of state

These charges involve such
things as diverting programmatic funds to
cover personal travel expenses, purchasing
equipment for personal use, falsely submit-
ting travel invoices, and making payments
to contractors without contracts and for
work not performed.

While the investigation is still continu-
ing and a decision on the indictment has
not been made, McGraw has been relieved
of her position at the Virginia Department
of Education for the above violations of
Jaw.

(Emphasis added). In short, the letter 1 re-
vealed that Ms. McGraw was under investi-
gation in Virginia for misallocating public
funds for personal use but that a decision on
the investigation had not yet been made. The
DOE claims that Ms, McGraw failed to dis-

1, Ms, McGraw attached the letter to her com-
plaint. We have held: “A circuit court ruling on a
motion to dismiss ... may properly consider
exhibits attached to the complaini{.]” Syl. Pt. 1,
in part, Forshey v. Jackson, 222 W.Va. 743, 671
S.E.2d 748 (2008),

2, Ms. McGraw joined the Virginia Department of
Education and one of its employees as defen-
dants in her constitutional tort claim, and she
asserted various other claims against them as
well. The Virginia Department of Education and
its employee are not parties to this appeal, and
the claims against them are not pertinent to our
resolution of this dispute.

3, West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
[1998] allows a defendant in a civil action to file
a motion to dismiss a claim against him/her for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted[.]”

4, When the DOE filed its motion to dismiss, Ms.
McGraw had filed an amended complaint. The
DOE's motion to dismiss specified that it sought
dismissal of Ms. McGraw’s amended complaint
because that was the then-operative pleading,
While the motion to dismiss was pending, Ms.
McGraw filéd a second amended complaint in
which her constitutional tort and wrongful termi-
nation claims remained substantively the same.

close this ongoing investigation during her
employment interview.

Ms. McGraw does not dispute that she was
under investigation in Virginia for misallocat-
ing public funds for personal use. Instead,
she complains that the letter was leaked to
local news media in response to media inqui-
ries as to why the DOE terminated her at-
will employment. Ms. McGraw’s complaint
states the letter “was provided to the
Charleston Gazette by a member of the West
Virginia Department of Education[,]” and
“(multiple news articles were published
based on the false information contained in
the letter.”

Ms. McGraw filed a lawsuit against the
DOE asserting claims for a constitutional
tort and wrongful termination? The DOE
filed a motion to dismiss her lawsuit under
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6),$ asserting that qualified immunity
barred Ms, McGraw’s claims.‘ The circuit
court failed to order Ms, McGraw to file a
reply to the DOE’s motion to dismiss plead-

ing qualified immunity; instead, it scheduled
a a hearing on the DOE's motion.5

Because Ms, McGraw's second amended coin-
plaint was identical to the amended complaint in
regard to her constitutional tort and wrongful
termination claims, our ruling herein extends to
both the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint.

3. In Hutchison v, City of Huntington, 198 W.Va.
139, 149-50, 479 S.E.2d 649, 659-60 (1996), we
stated that when a defendant’s answer pleads the
defense of governmental immunity, the circuit
court should order the plaintiff to file a reply
tailored to.the defendant's immunity defense. We
provided: “Under the West’ Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, the plaintiff is required to file a
reply to a:defendant’s answer only if the circuit
court exercises its authority under Rule 7(a) to
order one. ... The court's discretion not to order
such a reply ought to be narrow; where the
defendant demonstrates that greater detail might
assist an early resolution of the dispute, the order
to reply should be made.” Id. Ms. McGraw’s
original complaint provided scant detail of the
basis of her. constitutional tort claim against the
DOE, and consequently, she filed two amended
compiaints in the course of the proceedings be-
fore the circuit court. Had the circuit court re-
quired Ms, McGraw to file a reply to the DOE’s
motion to dismiss pleading qualified immunity, it
might have assisted an early resolution to this
dispute.

On June 16, 2016, the circuit court entered
an order denying the DOE’s motion to dis-
miss, finding that Ms, McGraw pleaded suffi-
cient facts to outline a liberty interest viola-
tion and that qualified immunity does not bar
her claims for a constitutional tort or wrong-
ful termination. It is from that order that the
DOE brings this appeal.

I
STANDARD OF REVIEW

I In this appeal, we assess a circuit
court order denying a motion to dismiss
based on qualified immunity, We have held:
“A circuit court’s denial of a motion to dis-
miss that is predicated on qualified immunity
is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to
immediate appeal under the ‘collateral order’
doctrine.” °

HM Having established that this appeal
is properly before this Court, we review the
circuit court’s order de novo.’ “In condueting
a de novo review, we apply the same stan-
dard applied in the circuit court.” ® That is,
generally, “dismissal for failure to state a
claim is only proper where it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the alle-
gations in the complaint.” “If the complaint
alleges sufficient facts, it must survive a ...
motion to dismiss even if it appears that
recovery is very remote and unlikely.”  Un-
der this general pleading standard, “the com-
plaint is construed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff [Ms. McGraw], and its allegations
are to be taken as true,” 1! However, to the
extent Ms. McGraw’s complaint is based on

6. Syl. Pt 1, W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236
W.Va. 654, 783 S.E.2d 75 (2015).

7. Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Ewing v. Bd. of Educ. of Cty.
of Summers, 202 W.Va, 228, 503 S.B.2d 541
(1998) ("When a party .., assigns as error a...
denial of a motion to dismiss, the circuit court’s
disposition of the motion to dismiss will be re-
viewed de novo.”).

8, Forshey, 222 W.Va. at 749, 671 S.E.2d at 754
(regarding circuit court order granting defen-
dant's motion to dismiss),

9. Marple, 236 W.Va. at 660, 783'S.B.2d at 81.

10, Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin Jean Davis, &
Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litigation Handbook on

197

allegations of fraud, a heightened pleading
standard applies, and the circumstances con-
stituting fraud must be stated with particu-
larity.

il.

ANALYSIS

. The DOE argues the circuit court erred by
failing to dismiss Ms. McGraw’s claims based.
on qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity
preserves the freédom of the State, its agen-
cies, and its employees to deliberate, act, and
carry out their legal responsibilities within
the limits of the law and constitution.” ¥ As
we explain below, qualified immunity bars
recovery for Ms. McGraw’s constitutional
tort and wrongful termination claims. We
discuss the standard for qualified immunity
and its application to Ms. McGraw’s claims in
torn,

‘A. Qualified Immunity in General

“TB The first step in determining whether
a state agency is entitled to qualified immuni-
ty is:

[A] reviewing court, must first identify
the ‘natwre of the governmental acts or
omissions which give rise to the suit for
purposes of determining whether such acts .
or omissions constitute legislative, judicial,
executive or administrative policy-making
acts or involve otherwise discretionary
governmental functions.

The facts giving rise to Ms. McGraw’s suit
were the DOE’s termination of her at-will
employment and its alleged leak of a letter
explaining its non-retention of Ms. McGraw

West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure § 12(b)(6)
at 385-86 (4th ed. 2012).

11, John W. Lodge Distrib, Co., Inc. v. Texaco,
Inc., 161 W.Va. 603, 605, 245 S,E.2d 157, 158
(1978).

12, West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
T1998).

13, Marple, 236 W.Va. at 660, 783 S.E.2d at 81.

14, Syl, Pt. 10, in part, W.Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr.
Facility Auth, v. AB., 234 Wa, 492, 766 SB.2d
751 (2014) (emphasis added).

198

as an employee. We have stated, “employee

retention ... fall[s] within the category of

‘discretionary ’ governmental functions.” ©
Hl As to discretionary functions,

To the extent that governmental acts or
omissions which give rise to a cause of
action fall within the category of discre-
tionary functions, a reviewing court must
determine whether the plaintiff has dem-
onstrated that such acts or omissions are
in violation of clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights or laws of which a
reasonable person would have known or
are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or op-
pressive in accordance with State v. Chase
Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.H.2d
591 (1992). In absence of such a showing,
both the State and its officials or employ-
ees charged with such acts or omissions
are immune from liability.16

Thus, the second step in our analysis is to
determine whether the DOE violated a clear-
ly established statutory or constitutional
right or law (or otherwise acted fraudulently,
maliciously, or oppressively) in its alleged
acts or omissions giving rise to Ms.
McGraw’s suit. We now evaluate Ms.
McGraw’s claims against this qualified immu-
nity standard.

B. Constitutional Tort Claim

First, we examine Ms. McGraw’s claim
that the DOE violated her constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in her good name.
The DOE argues that qualified immunity
bars this claim for two reasons: (1) the facts
alleged in the complaint do not outline a
liberty interest violation (or any other clear-
ly-established constitutional or statutory vio-
lation); and (2) she makes no clear allegations

15, A.B., 234 W.Va. at 514, 766 S.B.2d at 773.

16, Syl. Pt. 11, A.B, 234 W.Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d
751 (emphasis added).

17. The DOE argues that Ms. McGraw presented
insufficient evidence that it leaked the letter to
local news media. Ms. McGraw’s complaint al-
leges the letter “was provided to the Charleston.
Gazette by a member of the West Virginia Depart-
ment of Education.” (Emphasis added), In assess-
ing the DOE’s motion to dismiss, “the com-
plaint{’s) allegations are to be taken as true.”
John W. Lodge Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
161 W.Va. 603, 605, 245 S.E.2d 157, 158 (1978).

of fraud, malice, or oppression. For the rea-
sons explained below, we agree with the
DOE on both these arguments.
i. There Was No Liberty
Interest Violation

Hl In her complaint, Ms. McGraw al-
leged that the DOE leaked a letter written
by the Virginia Department of Education to
the Charleston Gazette.” The letter revealed
that she was the subject of an investigation
in Virginia for misallocating public funds for
personal use. It also stated that the investi-
gation had not been completed. Ms. McGraw
does not dispute the truth of the letter, that
is, that she was under investigation in Virgi-
nia for misallocating funds for personal use.
Nevertheless, she claims that the DOE’s leak
of the letter violated her constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in her good name.
By contrast, the DOE asserts these facts are
not sufficient to outline a liberty interest
violation.

HEsWe use the following standard to
determine whether an individual's constitu-
tionally-protected liberty interest in his/her
good name has been implicated: “A liberty
interest is implicated when the state makes a
charge against the individual that might seri-
ously damage his standing and associations
in the community or places a stigma or other
disability on him that forecloses future em-
ployment opportunities.” !8 When an individ-
ual’s liberty interest is implicated, he/she
must be afforded procedural safeguards un-
der Article III, Section 10 of the West Virgi-
nia Constitution (the Due Process Clause).!

HI Under certain circumstances, this
liberty interest concept applies in the realm
of government employment, The Supreme

As required by our well-established law, for the
limited purpose of this appeal based on the
DOE’s motion to dismiss, we take as true Ms.
McGraw’s factual allegation that the DOE leaked
the letter.

18. Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Waite v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n,
161 W.Va. 154, 241 S,E.2d 164 (1977).

19, Syl. Pt. 1, Waite, 161 W.Va. 154, 241 S.B.2d
164 (“The Due Process Clause, Article III, Sec-
tion 10 of the West Virginia Constitution, re-
quires procedural safeguards against state action
which affects a liberty or property interest.”).

Court of the United States provided in Bd. of
Regents v. Roth that:

There might be cases in which a State
refused to re-employ a person under such
circumstances that interest in liberty
would be implicated.... For ‘where a per-
son’s good name, reputation, honor, or in-
tegrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential.’

Relying on Roth, this Court found in Waite v.
Civil Service Commission:

A liberty interest is implicated when the
state “makes a charge against him that
might seriously damage his standing and
associations in the community.” Bd. of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578, 92 S.Ct,
2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), The Roth
Court stated that a charge of dishonesty or
immorality would implicate an individual’s
liberty interests. We follow these princi-
ples and find that an accusation or label
given the individual [state employee] by
his employer which belittles his worth and
dignity as an individual and, as a conse-
quence, is likely to have severe repercus-
sions outside his work world, infringes
one’s liberty interest.

Again, in Major v. DeFrench, we provided:

[T]he government cannot dismiss an
employee on charges that call into ques-

20. Roth, 408 U.S, 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33
L.Ed.2d 548 (1972),

21, Waite, 161 W.Va, 154, 159-60, 241 S.B.2d
164, 167-68 (1977).

22. Major, 169 W.Va. 241, 256, 286 S.E.2d 688,
697 (1982) (emphasis added).

23. However, to be clear, “not all public employ-
ees have a protected liberty interest in continued
government employment, even when his/her ter-
mination makes him/her less attractive to future
employers.” Marple, 236 W.Va. at 665, 783
S.E.2d at 86. There are limited exceptions to this
general rule which are not at issue in this case:
tenured employees and classified civil service
employees. See Bd, of Educ. of Cnty. of Mercer v.
Wirt, 192 W.Va. 568, 574, 453 S,E.2d 402, 408
(1994) (“There can be little doubt that tenured
employees have ... liberty interests in their em-
ployment.”); Buskirk v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 175
W.Va. 279, 283, 332 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1985) (“TA]
classified civil service employee has a sufficient
interest in his continued [un]interrupted employ-
ment to warrant against the arbitrary discharge

199 |

tion her good name, or that impose a
stigma upon an employee which could fore-
close her freedom to pursue other employ-
ment opportunities, without providing the
employee notice of the charges against her
and a hearing in which the factual basis of
the charges can be contested.

Therefore, under certain circumstances, a
government employer may implicate its em-
ployee’s constitutionally-protected liberty in-
terest in his/her good name through a
statement which might seriously damage
the employee’s standing and associations in
the community or imposes a stigma which
forecloses future employment opportuni-
ties.

Although this Court has long recognized
the liberty interest concept in the area of
government employment, we have not de-
fined the elements required to state a liberty
interest tort claim by a government employ-
ee. Most courts require the following four
elements to find that a government employer
implicated its employee’s liberty interest in
his/her good name: (1) a stigmatizing state-
ment; (2) which was false; (8) was published,
or made accessible to the public; (4) in con-
nection with a serious adverse employment
action.24 Once these elements are alleged, the

of such employee under [The Due Process
Clause] of our Constitution.”).

Citing cases pertaining to tenured employees
and classified civil service employees, we held in
Syllabus Point 12, in part, of Queen v. W.Va.
Univ. Hosp., 179 WNa. 95, 365 S.E.2d 375
(1987), that: “A person employed by a state actor
cannot be summarily discharged without any
procedural protections, because the fundamental
promise of due process is freedom from arbitrary
treatment.” Despite Queen's broad language, we
recently explained, “not all public employees
have a protected liberty interest in continued
government employment[.]” Marple, 236 W.Va.
at 665, 783 S.E.2d at 86. Therefore, we question
the applicability of Syllabus Point 12 of Queen
outside the limited context of tenured employees
and classified civil service employees.

24, See, e.g., Wojcik v. Mass. St. Lottery Comm'n,
300 F,3d 92, 103 (1st Cir. 2002) (requiring fol-
lowing elements to implicate government em-
ployee’s liberty interest: stigmatizing statement;
employee must dispute charges as false; employ-
er intentionally publicized statement; and state-
ment was made in conjunction with an alteration

200

employee must be afforded due process pro-
tections.

As to the first requisite element.
to state a claim for a liberty interest viola-
tion, a stigmatizing statement, we have said:
“West Virginia does not have a bright-line
rule regarding when a charge sufficiently
stigmatizes an employee’s good name or fore-
closes his/her prospects for future employ-
ment.” 5 On the one hand, unexplained ter-
minations and mere charges of incompetence
ave not stigmatizing enough to implicate a
liberty interest.2® On the other hand, ‘state-
ments which strike at the employee’s worth
as an individual, such as charges of dishones-
ty or immorality, implicate a liberty inter-
est.2” “Allegations of substance abuse, mental
illness, criminal conduct, dishonesty, and im-
morality clearly rise to the level of stigmati-
zation required to state a claim for a depriva-
tion of a liberty interest.” In short, the

of the employee's status); Segal v. Cty. of N.Y.,
489 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2006); (establishing
following elements for deprivation of employee's
liberty interest: stigmatizing statement; statement
was made public by employer; statement was
made in close temporal relationship to plaintiff's
dismissal from employment; and in footnote 5,
providing that plaintiff must allege falsity); Sciol-
ino v. Cty. of Newport News, 480 F.3d 642, 646
(4th Cir. 2007) (“To state this type of liberty
interest claim under the Due Process Clause, a
plaintiff must allege that the charges against him:
(1) placed a stigma on his reputation; (2) were
made public by the employer; (3) were made in
conjunction with his termination or demotion;
and (4) were false.”); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d
680, 684 (Sth Cir. 1981) (“[A] constitutionally
protected liberty interest is implicated only if an
employee is discharged in a manner that creates
a false and defamatory impression about him
and thus stigmatizes him[.]"); Chilingirian v. Bo-
ris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989) (‘[W]hen a
‘nontenured employee shows he has been stigma-
tized by the voluntary, public dissemination of
false information in the course of a decision to
terminate his employment, the employer is re-
quired to afford him an opportunity to clear his
name,’"); Parker ». Town of Chelsea, 275 Fed.
Appx, 769, 773 (10th Cir, 2008) (‘[T]o support a
claim for a violation of his liberty interests, [the
plaintiff] must show that the defendants made
statements that: (1) impugned his ‘good name,
reputation, honor, and integrity;’ (2) were false;
(3) occurred in the course of termination; and (4)
were published,”); Francis C, Amendola, et al.,
What Constitutes Deprivation of Liberty Interests
of School Employees, 16D C.J.S. Constitutional
Law § 2206 (2017) (‘In order for an educator to
demonstrate a deprivation of a liberty interest by
defamatory statements, the educator must dem-

statement must impugn the employee’s good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity.

Second, the plaintiff must allege that the
statement forming the basis of his/her liberty
interest violation was false. The United
States Supreme Court has explained the ra-
tionale behind this rule as follows:

[T]he hearing required where a nonten-
ured employee has been stigmatized in the
course of a decision to terminate his em-
ployment is solely “to provide the person
an opportunity to clear his name.” If he
does not challenge the substantial truth of
the material in question, no hearing would
afford a promise of achieving that result
for him?

The majority of jurisdictions agree that it
serves no useful purpose to require a name-
clearing hearing for an employee who does
not dispute the charges against him/her.%
Our research has not revealed a single juris-

onstrate all four of the following elements: (1) the
statements impugned the educator’s good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity; (2) the statements
were false; (3) the statements must have oc-
curred in the course of terminating the educator
or must have foreclosed other employment op-
portunities; and (4) the statements must have
been published.”).

25. Marple, 236 W.Va. at 665, 783 S.E.2d at 86.

26, Syl. Pt, 5, Freeman v. Poling, 175 W.Va. 814,
338 S.E.2d 415 (1985) (“Courts are rather uni-
form in holding that an unexplained termination
or discharge from employment: does not create a
sufficient stigma to invoke a liberty interest pro-
tection.”); Marple, 236 W.Va. at 665, 783 S.E.2d
at 86 (finding no liberty interest violation in the
Board of Education's possible charge of incom-
petence against its superintendent).

27, Marple, 236 W.Va. at 665, 783 S.E.2d at 86
(“TA] charge regarding an employee's character
flaw implicate a liberty interest (ie, charges of
dishonesty, immorality, or criminality).”); Waite,
161 W.Va. at 159-60, 241 S.E.2d at 167-68 (“[A]
charge of dishonesty or immorality would impli-
cate an individual's liberty interest.””)

28, Jenny S. Brannon, The Publication Debate in
Deprivation of Occupation Liberty Claims, 47 U.
Kan, L. Rev. 171, 183 (1998).

29, Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28, 97 S.Ct.
882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977).

30. See sources cited supra note 24, at 11.

diction outside West Virginia in which a gov-
ernment employer implicates its employee’s
liberty interest through an uncontested
statement.

Nevertheless, in Waite v Civil Service
Commission, we stated in a footnote that:
“the truth or falsity of the charge does not
enhance or diminish the impairment of the
liberty interest.” ®! We are persuaded that
the United States Supreme Court was cor-
rect; there is no useful purpose behind re-
quiring a government employer to afford its
employee a hearing’to clear his/her name of
charges the employee does not dispute.

HM Therefore, we hold that to state a
claim for a violation of a government employ-
ee’s liberty interest in his/her good name, the
employee must allege that the stigmatizing
statement made against him/her was false.
To the extent that our opinion in Waite v.
Civil Service Commission,: 161 W.Va. 154,
241 S.B.2d 164 (1977), is inconsistent with
this holding, it is overruled,

HN Third, the stigmatizing and false
statement must have been made accessible to
the public for there to be a violation of the
employee’s liberty interest in his/her good
name.” The rationale behind this rule is that
if the statement is not made public, “it can-
not properly form the basis for a claim that
the [employee's] interest in his ‘good ‘name,
reputation, honor, or integrity, was ... im-
paired.” 8 A statement about a government:
employee which is kept private is not suffi-
ciently likely to affect the employee's good
name outside’ his/her work-world and thus
form a proper basis for a liberty interest
violation.

Fourth, and finally, the statement forming
the basis of the liberty interest claim must
have been made in connection with a serious
adverse employment action, This require-

31. Waite, 161 W.Va. at 161 n.5, 241 S.E.2d at
168 1.5.

32. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct.
2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Freeman, 175
W.Va. at 822, 338 S.E.2d at 423 (‘Without a
public disclosure of accusations against [the em-
ployee], he cannot claim that his ‘standing and
associations in his community’ have been dam-
aged.”).

33. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct, 2074.

201

ment is derived from Paul v. Davis, in which
the Court clearly provided that there is “no
constitutional doctrine converting every defa-
mation by a public official into a deprivation
of liberty within the meaning of the Due
Process Clausef.)”** To hold otherwise
“would make of the [Due Process Clause] a
font of tort law.” *° Thus, reputation alone,
“apart from some more tangible interest,
such as employment,..,. is [insufficient] to
invoke the procedutal protection of the Due
Process Clause]. 736

HM Therefore, we hold that a govern-
ment employer implicates its employee's’ lib-
erty interest in his/her good name when the
following elements are alleged: (1) a stigma-
tizing statement; (2) which was false; (8) was
published, o made accessible to the public;
(4) in connection with a serious adverse em-
ployment action. When these elements are
met, the employee must be afforded proce-
dural safeguards under Article III, Section
10 of the West Virginia Constitution,

Applying these priiciples to the present.
case, the facts ‘alleged in Ms. McGraw’s com-
plaint do not state a claim for a liberty
interest violation. Her complaint does not
dispute the truth of the letter, i.¢, that she
was under investigation in Virginia for misal-
locating’ public ‘funds for personal use. In-
deed, her complaint confirms that she was
accused on those charges in Virginia,

In a similar case, Melton v. City of Okla,
City,?? the court found that a police depart-
ment did not violate a terminated police offi-
cer’s liberty interest by informing news me-
dia that the FBI was investigating the officer
for perjury, even though the charge was
ultimately found to be baseless. The court
explained its finding as follows: “all the state-

34. Paul, 424 U.S. 693, 702, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47
L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).

35. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155.
36. Paul, 424 USS. at 702, 96 S.Ct, 1155,

37. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991).

202

ments made by Lt. McBride were true. Mr.
Melton was accused by the FBI of having
committed perjury[J.... Fairly read in con-
text, there is nothing contained in either
publication which suggests Lt. McBride ...
accepted the accusation as true or accepted it
as its own.” 8

Likewise, Ms. McGraw was under investi-
gation in Virginia for misallocating public
funds for personal use, and the DOE had no
part in leveling the underlying charges
against her or causing the investigation to be
brought about. Therefore, even if the DOB
leaked the letter to the Charleston Gazette,
as Ms. McGraw has alleged, the letter’s
statements were true. We find no distin-
guishing factor in this case which sets Ms.
McGraw apart from the plaintiff in Melton.

Thus, we find that under the facts of this
case, Ms. McGraw’s liberty interest was not
implicated. She was not entitled to procedur-
al safeguards under the Due Process Clause.
There was no liberty interest violation in this
case, and we do not find any other constitu-
tional or statutory right infringed upon by
the DOE.

ii, No Factual Allegations Revealing
Fraud, Malice, or Oppression

HM The DOE further argues that Ms.
McGraw failed to allege facts revealing fraud,
malice, or oppression sufficient to overcome
its qualified immunity. While Ms. McGraw’s
complaint is silent on this issue, she argues
before this Court that the DOE acted fraudu-
lently, maliciously, and oppressively in failing
to investigate the truth of the letter before
leaking it to local news media, Nevertheless,
she was, as stated in the letter, under investi-
gation in Virginia for misallocating public
funds for personal use.

To the extent Ms. McGraw relies on fraud,
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
[1998] provides: “In all averments of fraud
+, the circumstances constituting fraud
must be shall be stated with particularity.”

38, Melton, 928 F.2d at 928 (emphasis in origi-
nal).

Ms. McGraw failed to allege any circum-
stances revealing fraud. Likewise, her com-
plaint fails to indicate the DOE acted either
maliciously or oppressively.

It is undisputed that Ms. McGraw was, as
stated in the letter, under investigation in
Virginia for misallocating public funds for
personal use in her previous employment and
that she failed to disclose this investigation to
the DOE, She alleged her termination was
based on the DOE learning of this investiga-
tion through its receipt of the letter, and the
DOE seems to coneur by arguing that it
terminated her for her lack of candor in
failing to disclose the investigation during
her employment interview.

Therefore, even if the DOE leaked the
letter to local news media in response to
media inquiries on why it terminated Ms,
McGraw, it would have been an honest re-
sponse to the media’s questions, Thus, we
find no fraud, malice, or oppression in the
alleged acts giving rise to Ms, McGraw’s
constitutional tort claim.

C. Wrongful Termination.

TE Next, we examine Ms. McGraw’s
wrongful termination claim. Unlike her con-
stitutional tort claim, which was based on an
alleged leak of a letter, Ms. McGraw’s claim
for wrongful termination is based solely on
the DOE’s decision to terminate her at-will
employment.

Ms. McGraw stated in her complaint that
her employment was governed by the DOE
Employment Handbook. The Employment
Handbook provides that: “The employment
relationship of each employee is ‘at will.’ ‘At-
will’ means that it is for no definite period
and is terminable at any time at the will of
the State Superintendent, with or without
notice, cause or compensation.” Moreover, a
letter ®° sent by the DOE to Ms. McGraw
outlining some of her employment terms
states: “All [DOE] employees are non-con-
tractual, at-will employees.”

39. This letter was attached to Ms. McGraw's

complaint, and is thus properly considered in the
DOE's motion to dismiss.

As to at-will employment, we have held:
“the doctrine of employment-at-will allows an
employer to discharge an employee for good
reason, no reason, or bad reason without
ineurring liability unless the firing is other-
wise illegal under state or federal law.” “ On
this record, we find no constitutional provi-
sion, statute, policy, or other rule which pro-
hibited the termination of Ms. McGraw’s at-
will employment.

Therefore, unless the DOE acted fraudu-
lently, maliciously, or oppressively in termi-
nating her at-will employment, qualified im-
munity bars recovery under Ms. McGraw’s
claim for wrongful termination. Upon review
of Ms. McGraw’s complaint, we find no factu-
al allegations revealing fraud, malice, or op-
pression in the termination of her at-will
employment, She merely claims that the
DOE did not fully explain the reason why it
terminated her at-will employment, which is
not fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive, as
required to overcome qualified immunity. Ac-
cordingly, the circuit court erred by failing to
dismiss Ms. McGraw’s claim for wrongful
termination.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Ms. McGraw failed to outline a liberty
interest violation sufficient to overcome the
DOE’s qualified immunity because the truth
of the allegedly leaked letter, ie, that she
was under investigation in Virginia for misal-
locating funds, was not disputed. Therefore,
the DOE’s qualified immunity bars Ms.
McGraw’s constitutional tort and wrongful
termination claims. We reverse the circuit
court’s. order and dismiss Ms. MeGraw’s
claims against the DOE.

Reversed.

40. Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52,
63, 459 S.E.2d 329, 340 (1995).

41, Ms. McGraw’s complaint also contained a
separate claim for punitive damages. Ms.
McGraw voluntarily dismissed this claim, but she
still asserts the DOE is liable to pay her punitive
damages. By contrast, the DOE cites West Virgi-
nia Code § 55-17-4(3) [2002], which provides:

203
JUSTICE WORKMAN, deeming herself
disqualified, did not participate in the
decision of the Court.

JUDGE JOSEPH K. REEDER sitting by
temporary appointment.

800 S.E.2d 241
STATE of West Virginia, Respondent

Y.
Belinda Ann FULLER, Petitioner
No. 16-0153
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 2, 2017
Filed: May 17, 2017

“No government agency may be ordered to pay
punitive damages in any action.” Because we
found that qualified immunity precludes recovery
by Ms. McGraw on her constitutional tort and
wrongful termination claims, resolution of the
parties’ punitive damages argument is not neces-
sary. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.

Ss
nN

Russell S. Cook, Esq., Cabell Co, Public
Defender Office, Huntington, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner
' Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Shannon Frederick Kiser, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General Josiah M. Kollmeyer, Rule 10
Student Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent

Justice Ketchum:

MM Petitioner Belinda Ann Fuller (“De-
fendant Fuller”) appeals an order of the Cir-
cuit Court of Cabell County denying her
motion to dismiss an indictment charging her
with a felony crime—third offense of solicit-
ing an act of prostitution in violation of W.Va,
Code § 61-8-5(b) [1943]. Under W.Va. Code
§ 61-8-5(b), it is a misdemeanor crime to be
convicted of the first or second offense of
soliciting, inducing, enticing, procuring, aid-
ing, abetting, or participating in an act of
prostitution, Additionally, W.Va. Code § 61-
8-5(b) provides that the third or subsequent
violation of the statute is a felony offense
(hereinafter “third offense”) that only applies
“to the pimp, panderer, solicitor, operator or
any person benefiting financially or other-
wise from the earnings of a prostitute.”

Defendant Fuller argued that the third
offense provision of W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b)
does not apply to an alleged prostitute; rath-
er, it is intended to apply ‘only to “third
parties who derive a financial benefit from
the earnings of an alleged prostitute.” The
cireuit court rejected this argument, finding
that a prostitute who benefits financially
from her own act of prostitution is included
in the category of offenders who may be
charged with a third offense under W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b). Following entry of the cir-
cuit court’s order, Defendant Fuller filed the
instant appeal.

After thorough review, we find that the
third offense provision contained in W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b) is ambiguous. Due to this
ambiguity, the rule’ of lenity applies, requir-

1, The first iteration of this statute, W.Va, Code
§ 61-8-5(b), was enacted in 1882. It was last
amended in 1943, This Court would welcome
direction from the Legislature clarifying the third
offense provision contained in W.Va. Code § 61-

8-5(b). .

205

ing this Court to strictly construe W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b) against the State and in
favor of Defendant Fuller. We echo Justice
Cleckley’s well-reasoned statement explain-
ing why this Court applies the rule of lenity
when faced with an ambiguous criminal stat-
ute;

‘We find this is a reasonable course to take

when such substantial interests ‘are at

stake. The judiciary should be hesitant to
impose such restrictions when “it is not
clear this is the Legislature’s unequivocal
desire.
State v. Sears, 196 W.Va. 71, 82, n.21, 468
S.H.2d 824, 385, n.21 (1996) (emphasis add-
ed).

Because the third offense provision con-
tained in W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) is ambigu-
ous, we reverse the circuit court’s February
8, 2016, order denying Defendant Fuller's
motion to dismiss the indictment charging
her with a felony offense.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The facts of this matter are undisputed. On
February 4, 2015, Defendant Fuller got into
a vehicle with an undercover police officer
and agreed to perform an act of prostitution

dn exchange for. twenty dollars, The police

officer arrested Defendant Fuller. Prior to
her February 2015 arrest, Defendant Fuller
had twice been convicted of soliciting for
prostitution?

On May 4, 2015, a grand jury indicted
Defendant Fuller on a single felony count of
“3rd Offense Solicitation of an Act of Prostitu-
tion” in violation of W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b).
The indictment provides that Defendant Full-
er “unlawfully and feloniously ... offer[ed]
to perform: an-act of prostitution [on the
undercover police officer], namely oral sex
for the payment of Twenty Dollars[.]”.

2. These prior convictions occurred on October
20, 2012, and January 17, 2013.

206

Counsel for Defendant Fuller filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
she did not fall within the category of per-
sons who may be charged with a third of-
fense under W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b). Instead,
counsel argued that the third offense provi-
sion “really applies to owners of houses,
pimps, those people who are really deriving
benefits directly from what prostitutes do.”
The circuit court held a hearing on this mo-
tion and rejected Defendant Fuller’s argu-
ment, concluding: “I think the clear meaning
of it {the third offense provision] is the bene-
fits financially [language] would apply to the
individual performing the acts for which she
would have been paid, unless there is evi-
dence that she was not financially benefiting
from it.”8 Following entry of the cireuit
court’s order, Defendant Fuller filed the in-
stant appeal.

t.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hl This appeal involves an interpretation
of the third offense provision contained in
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b). Thus, our standard
of review is set forth in Syllabus Point 1 of
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie AL. 194 W.Va.
188, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): “Where the issue
on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly
a question of law or involving an interpreta-
tion of a statute, we apply a de novo standard
of review.” With our standard of review in
mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

Ii.

ANALYSIS
The issue is whether Defendant Fuller
may be charged with a third offense under
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b). Our analysis begins
with an examination of W.Va. Code § 61-8-
5(b). It provides:

Any person who shall engage in prostitu-
tion, lewdness, or assignation, or who shall
solicit, induce, entice, or procure another
to commit an act of prostitution, lewdness,

3. After the circuit court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss, Defendant Fuller entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charge contained in the indict-

ment. The circuit court accepted the conditional
guilty plea and sentenced Defendant Fuller to a

or assignation; or who shall reside in, en-
ter, or remain in any house, place, build-
ing, hotel, tourist camp, or other structure,
or enter or remain.in any vehicle, trailer,
or other conveyance for the purpose of
prostitution, lewdness, or assignation; or
who shall aid, abet, or participate in the
doing of any of the acts herein prohibited,
shall, upon conviction for the first offense
under this section, be punished by impris-
onment in the county jail for a period of
not less than sixty days nor more than six
months, and by a fine of not less than fifty
dollars and not to exceed one hundred
dollars; and upon conviction for the second
offense under this section, be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for a peri-
od of not less than six months nor more
than one year, and by a fine of not less
than one hundred dollars and not to exceed
two hundred fifty dollars, and upon con-
viction for any subsequent offense under
this section shall be punished by impris-
onment in the penitentiary for not less
than one year nor more than three
years.

The subsequent offense provision
shall apply only to the pimp, panderer,
solicitor, operator or any person benefit-
ing financially or otherwise from the
earnings of a prostitute.

(Emphasis added).

WM In examining whether Defendant
Fuller may be charged with a felony third
offense under W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b), we
begin with a review of our rules of statutory
construction. This Court has held that in
deciding the meaning of a statutory provi-
sion, “[w]e look first to the statute’s lan-
guage. If the text, given its plain meaning,
answers the interpretive question, the lan-
guage must prevail and further inquiry is
foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State
Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573,
587, 466 S.H.2d 424, 438 (1995); see also
Syllabus Point 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 158
W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where

term of imprisonment of one -to three years,
However, the circuit court suspended execution
of this sentence to permit Defendant Fuller to file
the instant appeal.

the language of a statute is free from ambi-
guity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and
applied without resort to interpretation.”);
and Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135
W.Va, 877, 65 S,E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory
provision which is clear and unambiguous
and plainly expresses the legislative intent
will not be interpreted by the courts but will
be given full force and effect.”).

Additionally, this Court has held that “[a]
statute is open to construction only where
the language used requires interpretation be-
cause of ambiguity which renders it suscepti-
ble of two or more constructions or of such
doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to
its meaning.” Sizemore v, State Farm Gen.
Ins. Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 505 S.B.2d 654,
659 (1998) (internal quotations and citation
omitted), With these rules of statutory con-
struction in mind, we turn to W.Va. Code
§ 61-8-5(b).

West Virginia Code § 61-8-5(b) sets forth
three categories of offenses and correspond-
ing penalties for those offenses. The first two
offenses in W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) are mis-
demeanors. It is undisputed that a prostitute
who offers to commit an act of prostitution
may be charged pursuant to the first and

second offenses set forth in W.Va. Code™

§ 61-8-5(b). The first two offenses set forth
in W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) expressly apply to:
Any person who shall engage in prostitu-
tion, lewdness, or assignation, or who shall
solicit, induce, entice, or procure another
to commit an act of prostitution, lewdness,
or assignation; or who shall reside in, en-
ter, or remain in any house, place, build-
ing, hotel, tourist camp, or other structure,
or enter or remain in any vehicle, trailer,
or other conveyance for the purpose of
prostitution, lewdness, or assignation; or
who shall aid, abet, or participate in the
doing of any of the acts herein prohibit-
edL.]
Clearly, the language “any person who shall
engage in prostitution ... or participate in
the doing of any of the acts herein prohibit-
ed” applies to a prostitute,
By contrast, the third offense provision of
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) is a felony offense.
The third offense provides that it “shall only

207

apply to the pimp, panderer, solicitor, opera-
tor or any person benefiting financially or
otherwise from the earnings of a prostitute.”
(Emphasis added).

Defendant Fuller argues that the third
offense provision does not apply to an alleged
prostitute; rather, it only applies to “third
parties who derive a financial benefit from
the earnings of an alleged prostitute.” Defen-
dant Fuller asserts that’unlike the first two
offenses contained in the statute that clearly
and unequivocally apply to a prostitute, the
third offense provision does not contain any
language stating that it expressly applies to a
prostitute. Instead, the third offense provi-
sion only applies to those third parties
(pimps, panderers, solicitors, and operators)
who benefit from the earnings of a prostitute.
Had the Legislature intended a prostitute to
be subject to the third offense provision,
counsel for Defendant Fuller argues, it could
have added three words to the end of the
statute “... including a prostitute.” Finally,
Defendant Fuller asserts that the first two
offenses set forth in the statute demonstrate
that when the Legislature intended to sub-
ject a prostitute to liability under this stat-
ute, it did so expressly, i.e. “any person who
shall engage in prostitution.”

The State asserts that the third offense
provision “states that any person receiving a
financial benefit from a prostitute’s earnings
may be sentenced under the subsequent of-
fense provision.” According to the State, “any
person” who benefits financially from the
earnings of a prostitute means just that—any
person. Thus, the State argues that the third
offense provision is not ambiguous and that a
prostitute who financially benefits from her
own act of prostitution may be charged pur-
suant to the third offense provision.

We find that the third offense provision in
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) is reasonably suscep-
tible to differing constructions and that “rea-
sonable minds might be uncertain or dis-
agree as to its intended meaning.” Sizemore,
202 W.Va. at 596, 505 S.E.2d at 659. There-
fore, we find that the third offense provision
contained in W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) is am-
biguous.

208

HN When faced with an ambiguous
statute, this Court has observed “[a] statute
that is ambiguous must be construed before
it can be applied.” Syllabus Point 1, Farley v,
Buckalew, 186 W.Va. 698, 414 S.H.2d 454
(1992). “The primary object in construing a
statute is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the Legislature,” Syllabus Point 1,

Smith v, State Workmen's Comp. Comm’r,
159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 861 (1975). “A
statute is ambiguous when the statute’s lan-
guage connotes doubtfulness, doubleness of
meaning or indistinctness or uncertainty of
an expression[.]” United Services Auto Ass'n
v. Lucas, 288 W.Va, 68, 78, 754 S.H.2d 754,
759 (2014) Gnternal citation and quotation
omitted), Similarly, this Court has'held that
“the initial step in such interpretative inquiry
fof a statute] is to ascertain legislative in-
tent.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Ohio Cownty
Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 301
S.E.2d 188 (1988). Also, “[w]hen a statute’s
language is ambiguous, a court often must
venture into extratextual territory in order to
distill an appropriate construction. Absent
explicatory legislative history for an ambigu-
ous statute ... this Court is obligated ‘to
consider the ... overarching design of the
statute.” State ew rel. McGraw v. Scott Run-
yan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va, 770, 777,
461 S.H.2d 516, 528 (1995), .

HE Moreover, “{iJn construing an ambig-
uous criminal statute, the rule of lenity ap-
plies which requires that penal statutes must
be strictly construed against the State and in
favor of the defendant.” Syllabus Point 5,
State ew rel. Morgan v. Trent, 195 W.Va. 257,
465 S.E.2d 257 (1995). The rule of lenity
“serves .to ensure both that there is fair
warning of the boundaries of criminal con-
duct and that legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.” Crandon v. United States,
494 US, 152, 158, 110 S,Ct.-997, 108 L.Ed.2d
182 (1990), In Syllabus Point 1 of State v,
Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 208 S.H.2d 588 (1974),
we held that “[a] criminal statute must be set
out with sufficient definiteness to give a per-
son of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his contemplated conduct is prohibited by
statute and to provide adequate standards:
for adjudication.”

In ascertaining the legislative intent be-
hind W.Va. Code: § 61-8-5(b), we find ‘that
the legislative history of the statute’s adop-
tion in 1943 does not address the ‘specific
meaning or purpose of the third offense pro-
vision. Prior to 1948, W.Va. Code § 61-8-5
did not expressly punish a woman for engag-
ing in prostitution. Under the version ‘of the
statute that existed prior to 1948, a woman
could be prosecuted for prostitution only if
she engaged in prostitution in a “house of ill
fame.” This can be seen in the case of State
v. Pyles, 86 W.Va. 636, 104 SE. 100 (1920).

The defendant in Pyles appealed following
her conviction of “guilt of keeping and main-
taining a certain house of ill fame.” Jd. On
appeal, the defendant argued that although
the evidence demonstrated that she may
have engaged in prostitution, her conviction
was invalid because she did not engage in
prostitution in a house of ill fame as required
by the statute. The Court in Pyles summa-
rized the evidence as follows:.

The accused permanently resided in the

house alone, but, according to the evidence,

_lmen singly there visited her'so often, in
such number, and under such circum-
stances as, aided by her own conduct,
tended very strongly to prove that she
there indulged in acts of prostitution with
them. But there is no proof, nor sufficient-
ly probative evidence, that any other wom-
an resorted to the house for purposes of
prostitution.

Pyles, 86 W.Va, at 636-37, 104°S.E. at 100.

The Court held that the evidence was insuffi-

cient to sustain the conviction. The following

rationale was provided:

Our’ statute does not define a house of a
fame, wherefore it is necessary to go to the
common law for its definition, Under the
common law, a house kept by one woman,
who there indulges in prostitution with
numerous men, and not resorted to by any
other lewd woman for the like purpose, is
not a house of ill fame.... [T]he reason
for the holding is that the house must
possess an element of danger to the public
peace, and it does not exist unless there is
a’ tendency to bring together crowds or
assemblages of dissolute, debauched, and
quarrelsome persons. The common-law

penalty had, for its principal purpose, pres-
ervation of the peace, not maintenance of
morality. Morality was encouraged and
vindicated by the spiritual tribunals, and
the common law ordinarily left an unmixed
question of morality or offense against mo-
rality within their cognizance.

wee

As the evidence wholly fails to make out.

a case, in view of this legal proposition, the

judgment will have to be reversed|[.]

86 W.Va. at 687-88, 104 S.E. at 100 (interna-
tional citations omitted).

‘The Court’s decision in Pyles demonstrates
that prior to 1948 the Legislature did not
seek to punish a woman for engaging in
prostitution per se. Instead, the Legislature
sought to punish engaging in prostitution in a
house of ill fame. This historical background
on the statute as it existed prior to 1948 may
explain the.ambiguity in the fact that W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b) only imposes misdemeanor,
rather than felony, offenses against a person
engaging in prostitution,

Compounding the ambiguity of W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b) is the fact that the Legisla-
ture enacted separate statutes for punishing
panderers and pimps. The pandering offense
is set forth in W.Va. Code § 61-8-7 [1986]. It
provides, in part: A

Any person who shall procure an inmate
for a house of prostitution, or who, by
promises, threats, violence, or by any de-
vice or scheme, shall cause, induce, per-
suade or encourage a person to become an

inmate of a house of prostitution, or shall
procure a place as inmate in a house of
prostitution for a person ... shall be guilty
of pandering, and, upon a first conviction
for an offense under this section, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for a period of not less than six months
nor more than one year ..., and upon
conviction for any subsequent offense ...
shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a period of not Jess than
one nor more than five years.

- The pimping offense is set forth in W.Va.
Code § 61-8-8 [1986]. It provides, in part:

Any person who, knowing another per-
son to be a prostitute, shall live or derive

209

support or maintenance, in whole or in
part, from the earnings or proceeds of the
prostitution of such prostitute ... shall be
guilty of pimping, and, upon the first con-
viction for such offense, shall be punished.
by: imprisonment in the county jail for a
period of not less than six months nor
more than one year, and by a fine of not
less than one hundred nor more than five
hundred dollars; and, upon a conviction for
any subsequent offense hereunder, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for a period of not less than one nor
more than three years.

Even though the Legislature enacted these
separate statutes for panderers and pimps,
under W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) panderers and
pimps can also be punished when a prostitute
engages in prostitution after a second convie-
tion. This discrepancy does not make sense,
but that is the effect of a literal application of
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b), W.Va. Code § 61-8-
7, and W.Va. Code § 61-8-8.

TE We next examine the overarching de-
sign of W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b). The statute
contains three offenses and corresponding
penalties for those offenses, The first two
offenses in the statute are misdemeanors
which are expressly applicable toa prosti-
tute. West Virginia Code § 61-8-5(o) makes
it abundantly clear that “any person who
shall engage in prostitution” may be charged.
pursuant to these first two misdemeanor of-
fenses, The third offense provision in W.Va.
Code § 61-8-5(b) is a felony offense and is
restricted-“only to the pimp, panderer, solici-
tor, operator or any person benefiting finan-
cially or otherwise from the earnings of a
prostitute.” (Emphasis added).

Reading the second half of the third of-
fense provision in isolation (“or any person
benefiting financially or otherwise from the
earnings of a. prostitute”) supports the
State’s argument that the phrase “any per-
son” includes a prostitute financially benefit-
ing from her own act of prostitution. Howev-
er, unlike the first two misdemeanor offenses
contained in the statute, the third offense
provision does not state that it applies to
“any person who shall engage in prostitu-
tion.” Instead, the clear focus of the third
offense provision is “only” on those third

210

parties who financially benefit from the earn-
ings of a prostitute, including a pimp, pan-
derer, solicitor, and operator. Defendant
Fuller makes a compelling argument that the
Legislature clearly and unequivocally includ-
ed a prostitute under the first two misde-
meanor offenses contained in the statute, but
did not explicitly include a prostitute under
the felony third offense provision, Because
the Legislature did not clearly and unequivo-
cally include a prostitute under the felony
third offense provision, Defendant Fuller as-
serts that W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) does not
“set out with sufficient definiteness to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that [her] contemplated conduct is prohibited
by statute[.]” Flinn, 158 W.Va. 111, 208
S.E.2d 538,

Based on our review, we conclude that the
third offense provision is susceptible to dif-
fering, constructions and that reasonable
minds might disagree as to its intended
meaning. In light of this conclusion, we apply
the rule of lenity which requires that penal
statutes must be strictly construed against
the State and in favor of the defendant.
Syllabus Point 5, State ea rel. Morgan v.
Trent, 195 W.Va. 257, 465 8.B.2d 257, Con-
struing the statute in favor of Defendant
Fuller, we find that the first two misdemean-
or offenses set forth in W.Va. Code § 61-8-
5(b) expressly apply to a prostitute. Howev-
er, the felony third offense provision does not
expressly apply to a prostitute; rather, it
expressly applies to third parties benefiting
financially from the earnings of a prostitute,
ie. a pimp, panderer, solicitor, or operator.
Thus, we find that the third offense provision
of W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b) contains an ambi-
guity and pursuant to the rule of lenity, we
resolve this ambiguity in Defendant Fuller’s
favor.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that under
the first and second offenses contained in
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b), it is a misdemeanor
erime for any person to engage in an act of
prostitution. The third or subsequent felony
offense provision contained in W.Va. Code
§ 61-8-5(b) does not apply to a person who
engages in an act of prostitution. Instead, the
third or subsequent felony offense provision
only applies to third parties who financially

benefit from the earnings of a prostitute,
such as a pimp, panderer, solicitor, or opera-
tor. Applying this holding to the present
case, we find that Defendant Fuller’s alleged
conduct does not subject her to culpability
pursuant to the third offense provision of
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b). Thus, the circuit,
court erred by denying her motion to dismiss
the indictment.

Iv.

CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s February 3, 2016, order
is reversed. We remand this case to the
cireuit court for entry of an order dismissing
the indictment against Defendant Fuller.

Reversed and Remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
Opinion,

JUSTICE WALKER dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting
Opinion. .

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, dissenting,
joined by Justice Walker:

Ignoring clear statutory language and en-
gaging in a convoluted analysis, the majority
of this Court has gone out of its way to
manufacture a non-existent ambiguity in the
prostitution statute, West Virginia Code
§ 61-8-5(b) (2014). Moreover, even under the
majority’s misguided analysis, there is no
justification for an outright dismissal of the
petitioner’s indictment. Because the majority
has imprudently overstepped its judicial au-
thority and reversed a valid conviction, I am
compelled to dissent.

A plain reading of West Virginia Code
§ 61-8-5 reveals that the statute was de-
signed to criminalize the conduct of all per-
sons engaged in the prohibited enterprise of
prostitution. Subsection (a) applies to persons
who establish, maintain, or operate a house
or other place for the purpose of prostitution.
Id. Subsection (b) criminalizes the conduet of
prostitution:

Any person who shall engage in prostitu-
tion, lewdness, or assignation, or who shall

solicit, induce, entice, or procure another
to commit an act of prostitution, lewdness,
or assignation; or who shall reside in, en-
ter, or remain in any house, place, build-
ing, hotel, tourist camp, or other structure,
or enter or remain in any vehicle, trailer,
or other conveyance for the purpose of
prostitution, lewdness, or assignation; or
who shall aid, abet, or participate in the
doing of any of the acts herein prohibited,
shall, upon conviction ... be punished[.]
W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b), in part. Thus, sub-
section (b) applies whether the misconduct is
committed by a person who sells a sex ‘act,
purchases or “procures” a sex act, solicits an
act of prostitution, induces or arranges for
another person to commit prostitution, or
aids and abets prostitution. Jd. The Legisla-
ture then mandated that persons with multi-
ple convictions for acts committed in violation
of this statute are to receive increased penal-
ties:

[The person] shall, upon conviction for the
first offense under this section, be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the county jail
for a period of not less than sixty days nor
more than six months, and by a fine of not
less than fifty dollars and not to exceed
one hundred dollars; and upon conviction
for the second offense under this section,
be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail for a period of not less than six months
nor more than one year, and by a fine of
not less than one hundred dollars and not
to exceed two hundred fifty dollars, and
upon conviction for any subsequent of-
fense under this section shall be punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
not less than one year nor more than three
years.

The subsequent offense provision shall
apply only to the pimp, panderer, solicitor,
operator or any person benefit{t}ing finan-
cially or otherwise from thé earnings of a
prostitute.

Id. (emphasis added).

The penalty provisions are patent and
wholly lacking in ambiguity. After a second
conviction, a “conviction for any subsequent
offense under this section shall be punished”
with the increased penalty of one to three
years in prison when committed by “any

211

person benefit[t]ing financially or otherwise
from the earnings of a prostitute.” Id. Be-
cause the petitioner is a person who benefits
financially from’ her own earnings as a prosti-
tute, and because this is her third instance of
being convicted for an offense prohibited by
West Virginia Code § 61-8-5(b), a straight-
forward application of the law requires this
Court to affirm her conviction and sentence.
Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, there
is nothing in this statute to limit the subse-
quent offense enhancement only to “third
parties” who derive a financial benefit. Rath-
er, the plain language in subsection (b) ap-
plies the penalty ehancement to “any per-
son” deriving a financial or other benefit
from the earnings of prostitution. There is no
ambiguity or double meaning here. “Where
the language of a statute is clear and without
ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accept-
ed without resorting to the rules of interpre-
tation.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va.
571, 165 S.H.2d 108 (1968); see also Syl. Pt.
2, State v. Epperly, 185 W.Va. 877, 65 S.H.2d
488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is
clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses
the legislative intent will not be interpreted
by the courts but will be given full force and
effect.”), Because the statutory language is
not ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not
apply. See Syl. Pt. 5, State ew rel. Morgan v,
Trent, 195 W.Va. 257, 465 S.H.2d 257 (1995)
(holding that rule of lenity applies when
courts construe ambiguous criminal statutes).

To find that the subsequent offense provi-
sion is subject to different interpretations,
the majority focuses upon the absence of the
word “prostitute” in the list “pimp, panderer,
solicitor, and operator” in the last sentence of
subsection (b). This skewed analysis blatantly
ignores two key provisions in the law. First,
the statute directs that a person convicted of
“any subsequent offense under this section”
is subject to the enhancement, and prostitu-
tion is an offense expressly set forth in this
section of the Code. See W.Va. Code § 61-8-
5(b) (emphasis added). Second, immediately
after specifying pimp, panderer, solicitor, and
operator, the Legislature included “or any
person benefit[t]ing financially or otherwise
from the earnings of a prostitute” within the
purview of the penalty enhancement. Id. (em-

212

phasis added). It was unnecessary for the
Legislature to repeat the word “prostitute”
in the last sentence of subsection (b) because
a person committing prostitution necessarily
will benefit financially or otherwise from his
or her own earnings. This Court is not at
liberty to selectively ignore words in a stat-
ute under the guise of statutory construction.
“[Slignificance and effect must, if possible, be
given to every section, clause, word or part of

the statute.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v.~

McDaniel, 238 W.Va. 61, 792 S.E.2d 72
(2016) (citation omitted); see also Jackson v.
Belcher, 232 W.Va. 518, 518, 758 S.H.2d 11,
16 (2018) (recognizing that “to fulfill a stat-
ute’s legislative intent, it is necessary to give
effect to every word and part of a statute”);
Syl. Pt. 11, in part, Brooke B. v. Ray, 230
W.Va. 355, 738 S.E.2d 21 (2018) (stating that
courts may not “eliminate through judicial
interpretation words that were purposely in-
eluded”),

Moreover, the subsequent offense provi-
sion unquestionably applies to “solicitors” of
prostitution; the word “solicitor” is expressly
delineated in the last sentence of subsection
(b). See W.Va. Code § 61-8-5(b), Conse-
quently, if we were to follow the majority’s
tortured reasoning to its logical conclusion,
this provision would enhance the sentences of
people who merely solicit acts of prostitution
but, paradoxically, would not enhance the
sentences of people who actually consummate
acts of prostitution. It simply is not reason-
able to conclude that the Legislature intend-
ed such an absurd distinction. “[T]he duty of
this Court [is] to avoid whenever possible a
construction of a statute which leads to ab-
surd, inconsistent, unjust or unreasonable re-
sults.” State v, Kerns, 183 W.Va. 180, 185,
394 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1990); see also, Syl. Pt.
2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774,
200 S.E. 350 (1988) (“Where a particular

1. The charge of “soliciting” reflects that a sex act
was not consummated; the petitioner's offer to
perform a sex act in exchange for money was
Made to an undercover police officer who
promptly arrested her.

2, An example of “benefitting ... otherwise”
could include a prostitute’s acceptance of illegal
drugs instead of money for the performance of a
sex act. .

3. Examples of people who do not “benefit finan-
cially or otherwise” from a prostitute’s "earn-

construction of a statute would result in an
absurdity, some other reasonable construc-
tion, which will not produce. such absurdity,
will be made.”), Indeed, the petitioner was
convicted of third offense “soliciting an act of
prostitution’—not third offense “committing
prostitution.” The ambiguity fabricated by
the majority regarding the application of the
subsequent offense enhancement to “prosti-
tutes” should be immaterial to this convic-
tion. Instead, the majority chooses to shield
the petitioner from punishment for being a
convicted, solicitor because she. was also the
prostitute in the proffered transaction, As
the State argues in its brief, this “amounts to
making actual prostitution a mitigating fac-
tor.” I simply cannot, concur in such a, pre-
posterous reading of the statute.

A plain reading of West Virginia Code
§ 61-8-5(b) indicates that the Legislature
intended for the subsequent offense enhance-
ment to apply to all persons who benefit
financially or otherwise® from the earnings
of prostitution, while this enhancement is
inapplicable to persons who do not benefit,
financially or otherwise from those earnings.>
This was a policy decision the Legislature
made more than seven decades ago. When
enacting additional laws in 1986 pertaining to
the offenses of pandering and pimping,‘ the
Legislature did not modify its policy regard-
ing the subsequent offense enhancement.
“The Legislature has power to create and
define crimes and fix their punishment{.]”
Syl. Pt. 2, in part; State v.- Woodward, 68
W.Va. 66, 69 S.E, 385 (1910), This Court
should not second-guess the Legislature on
matters of public policy. See Syl. Pt. 2, in
part, Huffman v, Goals Coal Co,, 228 W.Va.
724, 679 S.H.2d 328 (2009) (“This Court does
not sit as a superlegislature, commissioned to
pass upon the political, social, economic or

ings" would include persons who pay for sex
acts, and persons who aid and abet prostitution
without receiving any remuneration from the
earnings. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61~
8-5(b), these individuals are subject to an en-
hanced penalty under the second offense provi-
sion but not under the subsequent offense provi-
sion.

4. See W.Va. Code §§ 61-8-7, -8 (2014),

scientific merits of statutes pertaining to
proper subjects of legislation.”),

In a cireuitous attempt to support its tor-
tured declaration of ambiguity, the majority
quotes the more-recently enacted statutes
that address only pandering and pimping.®
However, those statutes have no bearing
upon the petitioner’s conduct or conviction.
The petitioner committed the crime of solicit-
ing an act of prostitution, not pimping or
pandering. As noted above, West Virginia
Code § 61-8-5(b) encompasses the miscon-
duct of several different participants in the
erime of prostitution, including persons who
commit acts of prostitution, solicitors of pros-
titution, aiders and abetters, etc, Persons
who violate West Virginia Code § 61-8-5(b)
in ways other than pimping and pandering
are still subject to punishment, including the
penalty enhancemeit for subsequent offenses
if they benefit financially or otherwise from
the earnings, The Legislature’s enactment of
new statutes addressing pimping and pander-
ing did not alter this statutory mechanism,

In a further effort to convolute the plain
legislative directive, the majority engages in
a wholly irrelevant discussion of the history
of the statute. The majority claims that be-
fore 1948, the Legislature criminalized hous-
es of ill fame without seeking to punish a
person for engaging in “prostitution per se.”
See Barnes West Virginia Code Ann. 1923 ch,
149 § 10 (prohibiting “houses of ill-fame”).
Even if this statement was factually accurate,
it would be of no moment. More than seventy
years ago, the Legislature unquestionably
criminalized a person’s act of engaging in
prostitution with the enactment of West Vir-
ginia Code § 61-8-5(b) (“Any person who
shall engage in prostitution ... shall, upon
conviction ... be punished[.]”). Furthermore,
a review of other statutes from the time
period reveals that pre-1943 enactments did
criminalize certain sexual behavior by indi-
viduals. See Barnes West Virginia Code Ann,
19283 ch. 149 § 6 (prohibiting adultery and
fornication); § 7 (prohibiting lewdness). Pur-
suant to the social standards of the time, the
Legislature prohibited these acts between

5, See supra note 4.

6. By entering a conditional guilty plea, the peti-
tioner conceded that she committed the crime

213

non-married adults regardless of whether the
acts happened to be performed in exchange
for financial remuneration.

Further perplexing is the relief the majori-
ty opted to grant the petitioner in this case,
After concluding that the subsequent offense
provision is ambiguous with regard to per-
sons who commit prostitution, but without
engaging in any discussion regarding the ap-
plicable relief that should be awarded, the
majority simply orders the dismissal of the
indictment. However, the statutory language
that the majority finds ambiguous is a penal-
ty enhancement provision; the challenged
provision does not dictate the elements of the
crimes of prostitution or soliciting an act of
prostitution, Cf Syl. Pts. 4-7, State v. Her-
bert, 234 W.Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014)
(recognizing that some prior convictions
merely constitute penalty enhancers, not es-
sential elements of: currently charged of-
fense). The petitioner's solicitation of a sex
act in exchange for' money would be a crime
whether it was her first offense or her third
offense, The majority’s conclusion’ that the
subsequent offense enhancement is inapplica-
ble does not serve to negate or nullify the
petitioner’s admitted criminal conduct. By
dismissing the indictment, the majority is
signaling that a person can only be convicted
of prostitution two times.-What, however, is
the State to do if a person commits the crime
of prostitution three or more times? Does the
person have free reign to thereafter commit
the prohibited offense with no risk of prose-
eution or sanction? That is: decidedly not
what the Legislature intended,

Analogous cases demonstrate the remedy
that the majority should have imposed. For
example, in State v. Palmer, 210 W.Va. 872,
557 S.E.2d 779 (2001), a defendant was con-
vieted of third offense driving while his li-
cense was previously suspended or revoked
for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Like the prostitution statute, the “driving
while suspended or revoked for DUI” stat-
ute, West Virginia Code § 17B-4-8 (1994),
included provisions enhancing the penalty to

but reserved the right to challenge the applicabil-

ity of the subsequent (i.¢., third or subsequent)
offense provision to prostitutes.

214

be imposed for second and subsequent con-
victions. On appeal, this Court concluded that.
the indictment had failed to adequately set
forth that the defendant was charged with a
subsequent offense of the crime. Palmer at
878, 557 S.E.2d at 785. Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case “for purposes of
resentencing the defendant in accord with
the punishment for first-offense driving while
suspended or revoked for DUI[.]” Jd. at 379,
557 S.H.2d at 786. In State v, Hulbert, 209
W.Va. 217, 544 S.E.2d 919 (2001), a defen-
dant appealed his conviction for, inter alia,
third offense domestic assault. See W.Va.
Code § 61-2-28 (1994) (specifying increased
penalty upon conviction for third or subse-
quent offense of domestic assault or domestic
battery). This Court concluded that the State
failed to prove the two prior convictions at
trial. Hulbert at 228, 544 S.H.2d at 930. As
relief, the Court reversed the conviction for
third offense domestic assault and remanded
the case “for entry of a new sentencing order
in connection with a conviction of first of-
fense domestic violence.” Id. Thus, when the
State could not or did not prove the status
element of prior offenses, the convictions and
sentences in Palmer and Hulbert were re-
duced—not simply dismissed in toto.

The petitioner’s indictment alerted her to
the fact she was being charged as a repeat
offender, and she acknowledged her two pri-
or convictions as part of her conditional
guilty plea to third offense soliciting. Critical-
ly, there is no challenge to the validity of the
first or second offense penalty provisions set.
forth in West Virginia Code § 61-8-5(b). The
majority's finding of ambiguity is limited
solely to the language in the subsequent (ie,
third or subsequent) offense provision, As
such, even under the majority's mistaken
application of the rule of lenity, the petition-
er’s remedy should be a remand to the cireuit,
court with directions to reduce the conviction
and corresponding sentence to that of second
offense soliciting an act of prostitution.

. By ignoring the plain and unambiguous
statutory language, the majority of this
Court has exceeded its authority, inserted
itself into the Legislature’s bailiwick of estab-
lishing crimes and setting the correspondent.
penalties, and improperly overturned a valid

conviction. Accordingly, I respectfully dis-
sent.

800 S.E.2d 252

Dreama BOWDEN, as Administratrix
of the Estate of Lowell Bowden,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v

MONROE COUNTY COMMISSION, a Po-
litical Subdivision; and Patricia Green,
Individually and in Her Official Capaci-
ty, Defendants Below, Respondents

No. 16-0597

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 19, 2017

Filed: May 18, 2017

Michael A. Olivio, Stephanie H. D. Mullett,
Olivio Law Firm, PLLC, Charleston, West.
Virginia, Attorneys for the Petitioner

J. Victor Flanagan, Daniel J. Burns, Pullin,
Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC,
Beckley, West Virginia, Attorneys for the
Respondents

Davis, Justice:

The instant matter is before this Court on
appeal by Mrs, Dreama Bowden (hereinafter
“Mrs. Bowden”), as administratrix of the es-
tate of her late husband, Lowell ,Bowden
(hereinafter “Mr. Bowden”), plaintiff below

1, Kim Blankenship was tried and acquitted of
criminal charges brought against her in relation
to the attack.

2. Justin Blankenship pled guilty to nine misde-
meanors arising out of this incident, including
involuntary manslaughter. See Bowden v. Monroe
Cty. Comm'n, 232 W.Va. 47, 50 n.1, 750 S.E.2d

217

pera petitioner herein, Mrs. Bowden’ appeals
two orders entered by the Circuit Court of
Monroe County. The first order granted
summary judgement in favor of respondents
herein and defendants below, Patricia Green
and the Monroe County Commission (herein-
after collectively “the County”), based upon
the cireuit court’s conclusion. that the evi-
dence presented by Mrs, Bowden was insuffi-
cient to establish a disputed issue of material
fact in relation to the special relationship
exception to the public duty doctrine. In its
second order, the circuit court, sua sponte,
summarily dismissed’ all of Mrs, Bowden’s
remaining claims against all defendants, We
find the circuit court’s rulings in both orders
to be erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the
orders and remand this casd for further pro-
ceedings.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
“HISTORY

It is undisputed that, on November 27,
2009, petitioner’s decedent, Mr, Bowden, who
was seventy years old at the time, was vi-
ciously attacked by four or five American Pit
Bull Terriers (hereinafter “pit bulls”) while
he was taking a walk near Landside, Monroe
County, West Virginia, an area in ‘which he
resided. Mr. Bowden later died from his inju-
ries, The pit bulls involved in the attack were
kept at the home of Kim Blankenship.! Four
of the dogs apparently were owned by her
son, Justin Blankenship, who resided in her
home.? The remaining dog, a black-and-white
pit bull named Echo, was in the care of
Justin Blankenship and was allegedly owned
by Anna Hughes and Mose Christian,’ At the
time of the attack, Patricia Green (hereinaf-
ter “Dog Warden Green”), a defendant below
and a respondent herein, served as the Mon-
oe County Dog Warden, ;

263, 266 n.1 (2013). He apparently was sen-

tenced to a period of incarceration at the Antho-

ny Center for Youthful Offenders.

3. Ultimately, all of the does were euthanized
after the attack.

218

Mrs. Bowden, as administratrix of her hus-
band’s estate, filed a complaint against the
County and others‘ alleging, in relevant
part, negligence in performing statutory
duties imposed by W. Va. Code § 19-20-1 et
seg. thereby allowing the vicious dogs to
remain at large, and wrongful death. Dog
Warden Green was sued both individually
and in her official capacity as dog warden.
Mrs. Bowden also sought punitive damages
alleging willful, wanton, and reckless conduct
by Dog Warden Green that was outside her
scope of employment.

The County filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint pursuant to Rule 12()(6) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, as-
serting a defense based upon the public duty
doctrine, Mrs. Bowden responded by assert-
ing the special relationship exception to the
public duty doctrine. Mrs. Bowden also
sought leave from the circuit court to file an
amended complaint to incorporate additional
allegations of fact in support of the special
relationship exception to the public duty doc-
trine. However, the circuit court granted the
motion to dismiss that had been filed by the
County ‘without ruling on Mrs. Bowden’s mo-
tion to amend her complaint. Mrs. Bowden
appealed the dismissal to this Court. See
Bowden v. Monroe Cty. Comm'n, 232 W.Va.
47, 750 8.E.2d 263 (2018). Finding the circuit
court erred in dismissing the matter, this
Court remanded for additional discovery and
to allow Mrs. Bowden to file her amended
complaint. Jd. On remand, Mrs. Bowden filed
her amended complaint, and the parties en-
gaged in discovery,

Thereafter, the County filed a motion
seeking summary judgment again based, in
relevant part, upon the public duty doctrine.
After receiving Mrs. Bowden’s response and
conducting a hearing, the cireuit court grant-
ed summary judgment in favor of the Coun-
ty, by order entered on May 5, 2016. In doing
so, the circuit court found that Mrs. Bowden
had failed to produce facts sufficient to estab-
lish the special relationship exception. The
parties asked the circuit court for a certifica-
tion that the summary judgment ruling was
final as to the parties and issues addressed

4. Mrs. Bowden also sued Justin Blankenship,
Kim Blankenship, Anna Hughes, Mose Christian,

therein pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. In re-
sponse, the circuit court instead entered, sua
sponte, a “Dismissal Order” dated June 2,
2016, which order dismissed the action in its
entirety and removed it from the circuit
court’s docket, This appeal followed.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE With respect to our consideration
on appeal of a circuit court’s summary judg-
ment ruling, it is well established that “[a]
circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v.
Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
Tt is equally clear that,

{iln reviewing a circuit court’s order grant-

ing summary judgment this Court, like all

reviewing courts, engages in the same type
of analysis as the circuit court. That is

“we apply the same standard as a circuit

court, reviewing all facts and reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Powderidge Unit

Owners Ass’n v. Highland Properties,

Lid., 196 W.Va. 692, 698, 474 S.H.2d 872,

878 (1996), quoting Williams v. Precision

Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 58, 459 S.E.2d

829, 835-36 (1995), citing Matsushita Elec.

Indus, Co, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

US, 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1848, 1356-57,

89 L.Ed.2d 588, 558 (1986).

Fayetie Cty. Nat'l Bank v. Lilly, 199 W.Va.
849, 353 n.8, 484 S.E.2d 282, 236 n.8 (1997),
overruled on other grounds by Sostaric v.
Marshall, 284 W.Va, 449, 766 S.E.2d 396
(2014). See also Painter, 192 W.Va. at 192,
451 S,E.2d at 758 (observing that, in deciding
motion for summary judgment, this Court
“must draw any permissible inference from
the underlying facts in the light most favor-
able to the party opposing the motion” (cita-
tions omitted)).

HH We also are cognizant that “[a] mo-
tion for summary judgment should be grant-
ed only when it is clear that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
coneerning the facts is not desirable to clari-

and American Modern Home Insurance Compa-
ny.

fy the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 3,
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of
New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 188 S.E.2d 770
(1968). In other words, summary judgment is
proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” W. Va. R. Civ.
P. 56(¢). See also Syl. pt. 2, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc, 194 W.Va, 52, 459
S.B.2d 829 (1995) (“Summary judgment is
appropriate if, from the totality of the evi-
dence presented, the record could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmov-
ing party, such as where the nonmoving par-
ty has failed to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of the case that it has
the burden to prove.”), Thus,

[ilf the moving party makes a properly
supported motion for summary judgment
and can show by affirmative evidence that
there is no genuine issue of a material fact,
the burden of production shifts to the non-
moving party who must either (1) rehabili-
tate the evidence attacked by the moving
party, (2) produce additional evidence
showing the existence of a genuine issue
for trial, or (8) submit an affidavit explain-
ing why further discovery is necessary as

bal

Specifically, Mrs. Bowden argues that the cir-
cuit court erred by misstating and misapplying
the law regarding the relationship of thé public
duty doctrine and its special relationship excep-
tion to the law of immunities for political subdi-
visions; by finding that a meeting between Mrs.
Bowden and Dog Warden Green would not
amount to an assumption of a duty to act on
behalf of Mrs, Bowden; and by finding that Mrs.
Bowden failed to present evidence to support
that the County had knowledge that its inaction
would lead to harm,

In addition, Mrs. Bowden contends that the
circuit court erred by misapplying the standards
for granting summary judgment as follows: (1)
performing credibility determinations and
weighing evidence; (2) failing to consider the
totality of the evidence presented in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party; (3)
holding that the meeting between Mr: and Mrs.
Bowden and Dog Warden Green “would not
amount to an assumption of a duty to act on
behalf of Plaintiff’ because such is a question of
fact for the jury; (4) finding that Mrs. Bowden

219

provided in Rule 56(f) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Syl. pt. 3, id.

With the foregoing standards in mind, we
address the dispositive issues herein raised.

mt.

DISCUSSION

Mrs, Bowden raises seven assignments of
error that present two dispositive issues to
this Court: (1) whether the circuit court
erred in its application of the special relation-
ship exception to the public duty. doctrine;’
and (2) whether the circuit court erred by ~
sua sponte entering a dismissal order dispos-
ing of the entire case when issues remained
that were not addressed in the summary
judgment order. We address these issues in
turn,

A. Special Relationship Exception
to the Public Duty Doctrine

The circuit court based its award of sum-
mary judgment on its conclusion that Mrs.
Bowden failed to satisfactorily prove the ele-
ments of the special relationship exception >
to the public duty doctrine. In other words,
the cireuit court ruled that Mrs, Bowden had
failed to establish any genuine issue of mate-
rial fact with respect to the existence of a
special relationship so as to overcome a mo-

failed to present evidence to support that Re-
spondents had knowledge that inaction would
lead to harm; (6) erroneously finding that “[t]he
only evidence presented by the Plaintiff is her
own testimony, and under the standard for sum-
mary judgment established in Gooch v. W. Va.
Dep't of Pub. Safety [195 W.Va. 357, 465 S.E.2d
628 (1995) ], this mere scintilla of evidence is not
sufficient.”; and’ (7) finding that “Plaintiff has
not proven direct contact between the Defen-
dants and the decedent prior to the attack on the
decedent.” .

Finally, Ms, Bowen argues that the circuit
court erred in entering a Dismissal Order on
June 2, 2016, after finding that there was ‘“noth-
ing remaining to be done” because the Order
granting summary judgment did not adjudicate
all counts against Respondents.”

6. In its order, the circuit court repeatedly mixed
up the terms “public duty doctrine’? and “special
relationship exception,” apparently using one
term when it actually intended to refer to the
other.

220

tion for summary judgment. Mrs. Bowden
claims the circuit court erred. We agree.

Recently, this Court succinctly explained
the public duty doctrine in this way:

Under. the public duty doctrine, a govern- °

ment entity or officer cannot be held liable
for breaching a general, non-discretionary
duty owed to the public as a whole. “Often
referred to as the ‘duty to all, duty to no
one’ doctrine, the publie duty doctrine pro-
vides that since government owes a duty to
“the public in general, it does not owe a
duty to any individual citizen.” [John Cam-
eron MeéMillan, Jr., “Government Liability
“and the Public Duty Doctrine,” 32 Vill. L.
Rev. 505, 509 (1987) (footnotes omitted) ].
For example, under the public duty doc-
‘trine, “the duty to fight fires or to provide
‘police’ protection runs to’ all citizens and is
to protect the safety and well-being of the
public at large[.]” [Wolfe v. City of Wheel-
‘ing, 182 W.Va. 258, 256, 887 S.E.2d 307,
810 (1989) ]. Generally, no private liability
. attaches when a fire department or police
department fails to provide adequate pro-
tection to an individual. The public duty
doctrine is restricted to “liability for non-
discretionary (or ‘ministerial’ or ‘operation-
al’) funetions[.]” [Parkulo v. West Virginia
Ba, of Prob. & Parole, 199 W.Va. 161, 174,
488 S.E.2d 507, 520 (1996) (quoting
Randall v, Fairmont City Police Dep’,
186 W.Va. 386, 846, 412 S.H.2d 737, 747
(1991) },
West Virginia State Police v. Hughes, 288
W.Va. 406, 412, 796 S.E.2d 198, 199 (2017)
(footnotes omitted).7
An exception to the public uty doctrine,
which Mrs, Bowden seeks to apply in this
case, “arises when a ‘special relationship’ ex-

7. This Court also has made clear that

[tJhe public duty doctrine is separate and
distinct from the principle of immunity. It
“does not rest squarely on the principle of
governmental immunity, but rests on the prin-
ciple that recovery may be had for negligence
only if a duty has been breached which was
owed to the particular person seeking recov-
ery.” Parkulo v. West Virginia Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 199 W.Va, 161, 172, 483
S.E.2d 507,518 (1996), In other words, the
public duty doctrine “is not based upon immu-
nity from existing liability, Instead, it is based
on absence of duty in the first instance.” “Hol-

ists between the government entity and a
specific individual. ‘The state may be liable
where it has taken on a special duty to a
specific person beyond that extended to the
general public” Id. (quoting. Barry A, Lin-
dahl, 2 Modern Tort. Low: Liability and
Litigation § 16:20 (2d ed. 2008) (footnote
omitted). .

HI Although this Court in Hughes was
addressing liability of the State, this Court
has made clear that the special relationship
exception to the public duty doctrine applies .
to political subdivisions: ©

W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(5) [1986],
which provides, in relevant part, that a
political subdivision is immune from tort
liability for “the failure to provide, or the
method of providing, police, law enforce-
ment or fire protection{,]” is coextensive
with the common-law rule not recognizing

a cause of action for the breach of a gener-

al duty to provide, or the method of pro-

viding, such protection owed to the public

“as a whole. Lacking a clear expression to

the contrary, that statute incorporates the

common-law special duty rule and does
not immunize a breach of a special duty to
provide, or the method of providing, such
protection to a particular individual.
Syl. pt. 8; Randall v. Fairmont City Police
Dept, 186 W.Va. 886, 412 S.E.2d 787 (1991)
(emphasis added).

HMM The elements required to establish
the special relationship exception to the pub-
lic duty doctrine have been previously set
forth by this Court as follows:

To establish that a special relationship
exists between a local governmental entity
and an individual, which is the basis for a

sten v, Massey, 200 W.Va. 775, 782, 490 S.E.2d
864, 871 (1997). Where the public duty doc-
trine would apply, there is simply no duty and
therefore no need to inquire as to the existence
of immunity. The public duty doctrine is not a
“doctrine of governmental immunity but one
of tort, based on the initial question applicable
to any negligence action, that. is, whether the
defendant owes the plaintiff any judicially cog-
nizable duty.” Reno v. Chung, 220 Mich.App.
102, 559 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1996) (Ludington,
. _ Judge, dissenting),
Walker v. Meadows, 206 W.Va. 78, 83, 521 S.B.2d
801, 806 (1999) (per-curiam).

* special duty of care owed to such individ
al, the following elements must be ‘shown:
(1) an assumption by the local governmen-
tal entity, through promises or actions, of
an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the
party who was injured; 2) knowledge on
the part of the local governmental entity’s
agents that inaction could lead to harm; (8)
some form of direct contact between the
local governmental entity’s agents and the
injured party; and (4) that party’s justifi-
able reliance on the local governmental
entity’s affirmative undertaking.

Syl. pt. 2, Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182

‘W.Va, 258, 887 S.E.2d 307 (1989). Accord Syl.

pt. 5, Bowden v. Monroe Cty. Comm’n, 282

W.Va. 47, 750 S.E.2d 263. The foregoing

elements for establishing a-special relation-

ship are joined with the conjunctive “and,”
signifying that all elements are required. See,

eg, Browning v. Hickman, 285 W.Va. 640,

652, 776 S.E.2d 142, 154 (2015) (“The three

factors ... are joined with the conjunctive

‘and, meaning they all must be pres-

ent....”).8 Thus, we examine the evidence

relating to each factor to see if it was suffi-
cient to establish a genuine issue of material
fact, In examining this evidence, we are

mindful that “‘{t]he question of whether a

special duty arises to protect an individual

from a local governmental entity's negligence
in the performance of a nondiscretionary ...
function is ordinarily a question of fact for
the trier of the facts, Syl. Pt. 8, in part,
Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W.Va. 258, 387
§.E.2d 807 (1989).” Syl. pt. 6, Bowden, 282
W.Va, 47, 750 S,E.2d 268,

Hl 1. An assumption by the local gov-
ernmental entity, through promises or ac-
tions, of an affirmative duty to act on
behalf of the party who was injured. To

8, See also Jan-Care Ambulance Serv,, Inc. v, Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n of W. Virginia, 206 W.Va. 183,
193 n.13, 522 S.E.2d 912, 922 n.13 (1999) (“Be-
cause of the use of the conjunctive ‘and,’ all of
the.services contained in Section 1206(b)(4)(C) of
the 1973 Act are required of an emergency medi-
cal services system.”); Ooten v. Faerber, 181
W.Va. 592, 597, 383 S.B.2d 774, 779 (1989)
(observing that ‘and’ is a conjunctive, and the
use of ‘and’ here clearly makes both conditions
necessary, not merely either of the two.”).

9. Specifically, Mrs. Bowden testified as follows:

221

support her assertion that the County had
assumed a duty to Mr. and Mrs, Bowden,
Mrs. Bowden provided deposition testimony
that'she had called 911 to complain ‘about the
pit bulls, was connected to’ Dog Warden
Green to discuss her complaint, and, thereaf-
ter, Dog Warden Green visited the Bowden
home, According to Mrs. Bowden’s testimo-
ny, she shared with Mrs, Green her belief
that the dogs were dangerous and explained
her fear of them. She further testified that,
in response, Dog Warden Green assuréd
Mrs. Bowden that the “county would take
care of it.” ®

Tn support of its motion for summary judg-
ment, the County attempted to show the
absence of a question of fact by tendering’ the
deposition testimony of Dog Warden Green,
wherein she denied receiving “a complaint
from Mys. Bowden, visiting the Bowden
home, or making any assurances in relation
to any pit bulls.

‘The circuit court concluded that Mrs. Bow-
den “failed to meet her-burden of providing
more than a scintilla of evidence that the
defendants ever assumed an affirmative duty
to act on behalf of [Mr. and Mrs. Bowden],
by making a promise or assumption.” The
circuit court additionally concluded that,

assuming, arguendo, that . [Dog Warden
Green] did go to [Mrs. Bowden’s].home in
response to her 911 complaint, the conver-
sation alleged to have occurred between
the two would not amount to an assump-
tion of an affirmative duty to act on [Mrs.
Bowden’s] behalf in a manner that would
hhave prevented’ attack on the Plaintiff's
decedent.

. ... [When you spoke to [Dog Warden
Green] about the dogs, what did you under-
stand or believe that she was going to do about
the dogs, if anything?

A. That they would no longer be roaming
around in my yard,

Q. Did she tell’ you how she planned on
accomplishing that?

A. No.

Q. Did she specifically tell you: that she
would make sure that they weren't roaming
around in the neighborhood?

A. She said—she assured me that the County
would take care of it.

222

We find that the circuit court erred by
finding no material question of fact was in
dispute as to this factor of the special rela-
tionship test. The evidence pertaining to the
existence of an assumption by the County of
an affirmative duty to address Mrs. Bow-
den’s complaint about dangerously vicious
dogs amounts to testimony by Mrs. Bowden
indicating that such an assumption was
made, and testimony by Dog Warden Green
indicating the opposite. Rather than exposing
the absence of a disputed question of fact,
the evidence offered by the County demon-
strates a quintessential factual dispute, and
the need for credibility determinations, both
of which should be resolved by a trier of fact.
See Maston v. Wagner, 236 W.Va. 488, 498,
781 S.E.2d 986, 946 (2015) (“‘In assessing
the factual record, we must grant the non-
moving party the benefit of inferences, as
credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge’” (quoting Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc. 194 W.Va, at 59, 459

§.E.2d at 336)). The fact that Mrs, Bowden

indicated in her deposition testimony that
she understood Dog Warden Green’s assur-
ance to mean that “the dogs would no longer
be in [the Bowden’s] yard,” is not dispositive
insofar as her testimony further indicated
that Dog Warden Green additionally provid-
ed assurance that “the county would take
care of” making sure the dogs were not
voaming around in the neighborhood.

Hl 2. Knowledge on the part of the
local governmental entity’s agents that in-
action could lead to harm. In support of
this second element of the special relation-
ship exception to the public duty doctrine,
Mrs. Bowden points to the evidence of Dog
Warden Green’s own personal experience
with one of the pit bulls on November 8,
2009, the same month as the fatal attack on
Mr. Bowden. Dog Warden Green testified
that, on that day, she received a complaint
from Mr. Mark Crook about the pit bull

10. See note 9, supra,

11. Dog Warden Green's husband had driven her
to the Crook residence.

named Echo jumping aggressively on his car.
Dog Warden Green related that, while she
and her husband were in their vehicle at the
Crook residence, the pit bull named Echo
appeared and jumped up on the side of her
vehicle while growling and barking. She stat-
ed that the dog scared her and her husband,
and she would not exit the vehicle. That same
evening, she went to Justin Blankenship’s
home, issued him a citation for harboring a
vicious dog, and instructed him to keep the
dog chained and fenced.!* Mrs. Bowden sub-
mits that a reasonable jury could find that a
first-hand attack of this nature, coupled with
Dog Warden Green’s years of experience as
an animal control officer and the numerous
complaints that had been made about the pit
bulls, was sufficient to establish knowledge
that inaction could lead to harm.

The County does not dispute this event,
but, rather, disputes the inferences to be
drawn therefrom. According to the County’s
reasoning, Dog Warden Green’s experience
with a single aggressive pit bull, along with
reports of one or more pit bulls acting ag-
gressively in the neighborhood, is insufficient
to establish knowledge that inaction could
result in a multi-dog attack such as that
suffered by Mr. Bowden, especially when no
one had been physically injured by any pit
bull.

The circuit court similarly found that Ms.
Bowden did “not meet her burden of provid-
ing substantial evidence that would allow a
jury to find in her favor that Defendants
Imew inaction would lead to harm.” To sup-
port its conclusion, the cireuit court reasoned
that the evidence established that Dog War-
den Green had knowledge of only one pit bull
in the neighborhood. With respect to the
complaint by Mr. Crook, the circuit court
commented that “the dog, Echo, did not at-
tack or harm Mr. Crook.” In addition, the
circuit court incorrectly found that, when
Dog Warden Green went to Justin Blanken-
ship's home and issued a citation for harbor-
ing a vicious dog, she “confirmed that no

12, However, the dog, which had not yet returned.
to the residence, was not seized, and Dog War-
den Green could not remember returning to the
Blankenship residence to ensure that the dog had
actually been chained and fenced as instructed.

other pit bulls were in his house or on his
property.” The portion of the record cited by
the circuit court to support this finding con-
tains Dog Warden Green’s testimony that
she had “never seen” any other pit bulls on
the Blankenship property. However, it is im-
portant to note that Dog Warden Green tes-
tified that when she went to the Blankenship
home and issued the citation, she did not get
out of her vehicle, Moreover, the citation
indicates that it was issued at 9:30 p.m., when
it would have been dark and difficult to
observe the grounds while seated in a vehi-
cle. Thus, the circuit court’s conclusion that
Dog Warden Green had confirmed the ab-
sence of multiple pit bulls located at the
Blankenship residence is factually incorrect
based upon the evidence in the record,

We find that the circuit court erred in
concluding that Mrs. Bowden failed to estab-
lish that facts related to the knowledge factor
of the special relationship test were in dis-
pute. Contrary to the circuit court’s findings
and the County’s arguments, the record on
appeal contains numerous statements from
neighbors living in the same rural community
as the Bowdens detailing encounters with
one or more of the pit bulls where the dogs
were running loose and acting aggressively.
For example, Philip Hunt, who characterized
the dogs as running loose constantly, testified
at the criminal trial of Kimberly Blankenship
and described four incidents involving the pit
bulls. One incident in 2009 occurred‘on East-
er Sunday, when the dogs “came up after
[his] kids” who were playing in the yard. Mr.
Hunt and his brothers-in-law had to chase
the dogs away. During another incident in
2009, Mr, Hunt’s son was chased by one of
the dogs when he went to get trash cans at
the bottom of the driveway. The boy shot at

the dog with his BB gun and was able to run.

into the house. On a third occasion the dogs
chased Mr. Hunt’s truck and prevented him
and his wife from exiting the vehicle without
first pulling into the garage. Finally, once
when he was unable to pull into his garage,
one of the pit bulls was in his driveway

13. In a written statement, Mr. Hunt described
this incident as occurring in July 2009.

14, The record contains additional statements by
other neighbors describing similar experiences

223

growling and barking at Mr. Hunt’s vehicle
so that he could not exit until the dog left.
Mr. Hunt testified. that he “called animal
control” and “nothing was done.” 4

The various complaints, combined with
Dog Warden Green’s own experience with
one of the dogs where she was too afraid to
exit her vehicle, were sufficient to establish a
question of fact with respect to the County’s
knowledge that its inaction could lead to
harm. The rationale adopted by the circuit
court and the County, that the absence of
any actual physical harm prior to the attack
on Mr. Bowden was sufficient to dispel such
knowledge, improperly draws inferences in
favor of the County and not Mrs. Bowden.
See Painter, 192 W.Va. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at
7158 (observing that, in deciding motion for
summary judgment, a court “must draw any
permissible inference from the underlying
facts in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion” (citations omitted)), In-
deed, a reasonable interpretation of the facts,
properly viewed in the light most favorable
to’ Mrs. Bowden, is that the lack of injury
was fortuitous in that the victims of the
aggressive dogs were either able to get away,
or were safely inside their vehicles and re-
fused to exit the same in the presence of the
vicious dog or dogs.

HMM 3. Some form of direct contact
between the local governmental entity’s
agents and the injured-party. This Court
has explained that “the requirement of direct
contact serves as a basis for rationally limit-
ing the class of individuals.to whom the local
governmental entity's ‘special’ duty extends.”
Wolfe, 182 W.Va. at 257-58, 887 S.H.2d at
811-12 (citing Cuffy v. City of New York, 69
N.Y.2d °255, 261, 505 N.E.2d 987, 940, 513
N.Y,S.2d 872, 875 (1987).

Hn the issue of direct contact, Mrs.
Bowden again relies on her deposition testi-
mony that, within a month prior to the at-
tack on Mr. Bowden, she spoke to Dog
Warden Green on the phone when making

. with one or more of the dogs, some of which
indicate that complaints were made to “animal
‘control’ or to “the state” and nothing was done
about the dogs.

224

her complaint about the pit bulls and that,
following the conversation, Dog Warden
Green visited the Bowden home in response
to the complaint. Mrs. Bowden argues that
her assertion that Dog Warden Green had
visited her home is supported by her testi-
mony describing Dog Warden Green’s uni-
form and the fact that she was accompanied
by a man (the record demonstrates that
Dog Warden Green’s husband typically
drove the truck for her when she went on
calls), In addition, Mrs. Bowden points to
other evidence in the record that, she as-
serts, also could be interpreted as corrobo-
yvating her testimony regarding the visit,
Such evidence includes testimony by her
daughter-in-law, Linda Ludwig,® that a
Monroe County Animal Control vehicle
stopped at the Ludwig home sometime be-
fore the fatal attack seeking directions to
the Blankenship home. Mrs.’ Bowden con-
tends that, because there was evidence that
Dog Warden Green was familiar with the
Blankenship home, having previously been
there in response to prior complaints,!® she
should not have needed directions to the
home. Thus, Mrs, Bowden reasons that a
jury could conclude that Dog Warden Green
was actually trying to find Mrs, Bowden’s
home, Mrs, Bowden also notes that an “Ani-
mal Control Expense Sheet” completed by
Dog Warden Green in relation to the cita-
tion’ she issued to Justin Blankenship on
November 8, 2009, provides additional evi-
dence that could be interpreted by a jury as
supporting her assertion that Dog Warden

Green visited the Bowden home. The ex-

pense sheet contains a notation stating
“called on (11-409) Justin Blankenship
about the Blk & White pit Bull and ask him
to pen and chain dog. Said he would do so,
but the dog has been loose. So I issued a
ticket to him [under W. Va. Code § ] 19-20-
20 for visious [sic] dog....” Mrs. Bowden
contends that a jury could find that it was

18, Mrs, Bowden contends that her daughter-in-
law, Linda Ludwig, also is Justin Blankenship’s
aunt, Thus, she asserts, the familial relationship
casts a shadow of bias on Mrs, Ludwig's testimo-
ny that should be weighed by a jury. The Cotmty
responds that Mrs, Bowden did not make this
argument below, and the record on appeal con-
tains no evidence of the relationship between
Mrs. Ludwig and Justin Blankenship. Because
we find no evidence of a family relationship

her contact with Dog Warden Green that
prompted her to call on Justin Blankenship
on November 4, 2009,

The County responds by arguing that the
evidence relied upon by Mrs. Bowden
amounts to self-serving statements and con-
jecture, which are insufficient to overcome a,
motion for summary judgment, The County
asserts that the “Animal Control Expense
Sheet” simply .evidences that Dog Warden
Green called Mr. Blankenship on November
4, 2009, and provides nothing whatsoever to
indicate any reason for the call. The County
then submits that the following evidence
demonstrates the absence of a disputed ma-
terial fact: (1) the testimony of Dog Warden
Green wherein she denied having ever visited
the Bowden home or speaking to Mrs. Bow-
den by phone; (2) the absence of any office
records documenting a visit to the Bowden
home; and (8) testimony by Robert and Lin-
da Ludwig that they had never seen animal
control at the Bowden home,

In granting summary judgment, the circuit,
court found that Mrs. Bowden’s testimony
was insufficient to satisfy her burden of over-
coming the County's motion for summary
judgment insofar as it was disputed by at
least three other people (Dog Warden Green,
Robert Ludwig, and Linda Ludwig). The cir-
cuit court’s ruling is erroneous.

HE The County is correct that self
serving statements and conjecture are insuf-
ficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.

[T]he party opposing summary judgment

must satisfy the burden of proof by offer-

ing more than a mere “scintilla of evi-
dence” and must produce evidence suffi-

cient for a reasonable jury to find in a

nonmoving party's favor..., The evidence

illustrating the factual: controversy cannot

between Mrs, Ludwig and Justin Blankenship in
the record on appeal, we will not consider Mrs.
Bowden's contentions in this regard.

16. In her deposition, Dog Warden Green testified
that, prior to the attack on Mr, Bowden, she had
been to the Blankenship residence ‘a couple of
times for dog complaints, and further, Blanken-
ship’s horses.”

be conjectural or problematic. It must have
substance in the sense that it limns differ-
ing versions of the truth which a factfinder
must resolve, The evidence must contradict
the showing of the moving party by point-
ing to specifie facts demonstrating that,
indeed, there is a “trialworthy” issue.
Williams, 194 W.Va. at 60, 459 S.E.2d at 387
(internal citation and footnote omitted), How-
ever, the County and the circuit court fail to
recognize that, before any burden is imposed
upon Mrs. Bowden to overcome summary
judgment, the County had to make a proper-
ly supported motion demonstrating that.
there was no material question of fact in
dispute. In other words, “the initial burden of
production and persuasion is upon the party
moving for a summary judgment.” Id, With
respect to the moving party’s burden, this
‘Court has held that, “{ilf the moving party
makes a properly supported motion for sum-
mary judgment and can show by affirmative
evidence that there is no genwine issue of
material fact, the burden of production shifts
to the nonmoving party....” Syl. pt. 8, in
part, Jividen v. Law, 194 W.Va. 705, 461
§.E.2d 451 (1995) (emphasis added). The evi-
dence relied upon by the County simply fails
to “show by affirmative evidence that there is
no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Rath-
er, the testimony of Mrs. Bowden and Dog
‘Warden Green was directly contradictory as
to whether a meeting between them had
occurred. The additional evidence relied upon.
by the parties does not favor one party over
the other on its own, but instead requires
drawing inferences and making credibility
determinations, which functions are not avail-
able to a cireuit court ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. See Syl. pt. 8, Painter,
192 W.Va, 189, 451 S.H.2d°755 (“The cireuit
court’s function at the summary judgment.
stage is not to weigh the evidence and ‘deter-
mine the truth of the matter, but is to deter-
mine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.”), Accord Williams, 194 W.Va. at 59,
459 S.E.2d at 386, |

Hl 4. Mrs. Bowden’s justifiable reli-
ance on the local governmental entity’s
affirmative undertaking. This Court has
recognized that .

17, See supra note 9.

225

[t]he injured party’s reliance is as eriti-

cal in establishing the existence of a

“special relationship” as is the local gov-

ernmental entity’s voluntary affirmative

undertaking of a duty to act toward the
injured party, The element of reliance
provides the essential causative link be-
tween the special duty assumed by the
local governmental entity and the injury.

Cuffy Iv. City of New York], 69 N.Y.2d
* at 261, 505 N.E.2d at 940, 513 N.Y.S.2d

at 875, ,

Wolfe, 182 W.Va. at 257, 887 S.H.2d at 811,
We find the controverted evidence related to
whether ‘Dog Warden Green visited the Bow:
den home and gave assurances that “the
county would take care of” making sure the
dogs were not roaming around in the néigh-
borhood " is sufficient to establish a question
for the jury as to whether Mr, and Mrs.
Bowden's reliance on those assurances was
justifiable.

Because we find disputed evidence on each
of the factors required to establish the spe-
cial relationship exception to the public duty
doctrine, we find the circuit- court erred by
granting summary judgment to the County,
Indeed, this Court has emphasized that

the question of whether a special duty

arises to protect an individual from a local

governmental entity’s negligence in the
performance of a nondiscretionary govern-
mental function is ordinarily a question of
-fact for the trier of the facts. Wstate of’

Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 178

Ind.App. 669, 675, 883 N,E.2d 1081, 1085

(1978); De Long v. County of Erie, 60

N.Y.2d 296, 306, 457 N.H.2d 717, 722, 469

N.Y.S.2d 611, 616 (1988).

Wolfe, 182 W.Va. at 258, 387 S.H.2d at 312,

B. Dismissal Order

Mrs. Bowden submits that counsel for all
parties to this appeal requested a certifica-
tion from, the circuit court pursuant to Rule
54(b) of the West Virginia Rules. of Civil
Procedure stating that the summary judg-
ment order was final’ as to the parties and
issues addressed therein. Rather than issue a
Rule 54(b) certification, the circuit court, sua

226 De

sponte, issued a two sentence dismissal order
stating in full:

On this day the Court reviewed the file,
and it appearing proper to [do] so, and
nothing remaining to be done, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1, The above styled action is hereby
DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to re-
move it from the docket and to provide a
copy of this order to any pro se party, and
counsel, not registered for electronic notifi-
cation{.]

Mrs. Bowden contends that, insofar as the
cireuit court’s summary judgment order did
not address certain claims contained in her
complaint,!8 it was error for the cireuit court
to dismiss those claims.

The County agrees that the summary
judgment order did not address some of Mrs.
Bowden’s claims that were subsequently dis-
missed by the circuit court and, in addition,
notes that the dismissal of some defendants
is not relevant to the County. Nevertheless,
the County contends that some of the dis-
missed issues were rendered moot by the
summary judgment order and, therefore, dis-
missal of those issues was proper.

Because we have reversed the circuit
court’s summary judgment order, upon which
the dismissal order apparently was based, we
likewise summarily vacate the circuit court’s
dismissal order. See, eg. Napier v. Napier,
211 W.Va. 208, 214 n.12, 564 S.E.2d 418, 424
n.12 (2002) (“Because the circuit court based
its decision to dismiss Ms. Napier’s counter-
claim on the fact that summary judgment
was granted to Mr. Napier, we summarily
reverse the dismissal of the counterclaim and
remand that claim for further proceedings.”).

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the reasoning set out above,
we reverse the May 5, 2016, and June 2,
2016; orders entered by the Circuit Court of

18, Namely, Count VII of her complaint, pertain-
ing to W. Va. Code § 29B-1-1 et seq. and the
United States Freedom of Information Act, 5
USC § 552(a)(3); Counts VI and IX, concerning
Punitive damages and actions by Dog Warden

Monroe County and remanding this case for
further proceedings.

Reversed and Remanded.

800 S.E.2d 264

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

v

Jerry E. BERRY, Defendant.
Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0461
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 2, 2017
Filed: May 28, 2017

Green that may have been outside the scope of
her employment; and claims against additional
defendants Anna Hughes and Mose Christian,
who are not parties to the instant appeal.

b
nN

Scott E. Johnson, Esq:, Appellate Counsel,
Public Defender Services, Charleston, West
i ia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Zachary A. Viglianco, Esq., Assistant Attor-
ney General, Gordon L. Mowen, II, Esq.,

230

Assistant Attorney General, Charleston,
West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Jerry E. Berry, appeals
from the April 15, 2016, final order of the
Circuit Court of Summers County sentencing
him to one to ten years imprisonment upon
his jury conviction of one count of the felony
offense of embezzlement.! In this appeal, the
petitioner contends the cireuit court erred by
not granting his motions for judgment of
acquittal because the State failed to present
sufficient evidence at trial to support his
conviction. The petitioner also argues the
circuit court erred by not granting his motion
for a mistrial after the prosecuting attorney
made improper remarks during the closing
argument phase of his trial. Upon consider-
ation of the parties’ briefs and oral argu-
ments, the submitted appendix record, and
the pertinent authorities, we find no error.
Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was elected to the Summers
County Commission in November 2000, and
served as a commissioner until 2012. During
his tenure on the Commission, the petitioner
was a member of the board of directors of
the regional convention and visitor’s bureau,
which does business as Visit Southern West
Virginia (hereinafter “Visit WV”)? He also
became president of the local convention and
visitor’s bureau in Summers County known
as Three Rivers Travel Council (hereinafter
“TRTC”).§ A convention and visitor’s bureau
is a “nonstock, nonprofit corporation with a
full-time staff working exclusively to promote
tourism and to attract conventions, confer-
ences and visitors to the municipality, county
or region in which such convention and visi-
tor’s bureau ... is located or engaged in

1. The petitioner was also ordered to pay restitu-
tion in the amount of $41,699.00 and all court
costs within one year following his release from
incarceration,

2, This entity is comprised of nine southern West
Virginia counties including Summers County.

3. The petitioner’s work for the convention and
visitor’s bureaus was separate from and not a
part of his duties as a county commissioner.

business within.” W.Va. Code § 7-18-14(d)(1)
(2015). Convention and visitor’s bureaus are
funded through the collection of a hotel occu-
pancy tax imposed by the governing bodies
of municipalities and counties. W.Va. Code
§ 7-18-1.

In 2015, a Summers County grand jury
returned an indictment, charging that the
petitioner “did feloniously embezzle, fraudu-
lently convert to his own use and steal ...
money ... belonging to the Commission of
Summers County, to-wit taking and convert-
ing $41,699.05 ... by virtue of his employ-
ment at Three Rivers Travel Council[.!’ The
petitioner's trial occurred on January 20 and
21, 2016. The State’s witnesses included Ar-
nold Douglas Maddy, the president of Visit
WV. He testified that sometime in late 2009
or early 2010, the Summers County Commis-
sion entered into an arrangement with Visit
‘WV to manage the hotel occupancy tax funds
that were being distributed to TRTC Ex-
plaining further, Mr. Maddy stated,

The [Summers County] convention and vis-
itors bureau [TRTC] had financial difficul-
ties. And we were getting, in my office, a
lot of phone calls from vendors that they
did business with, trying to collect out-
standing bills. And so we entered into an
arrangement with the County Commission
that we would—if they would give us the
entirety of the hotel/motel tax, we would
take the 35 percent that was to go to the
local CVB, pay their bills with them.
There’s no fee involved. We'd just manage
their money for them, pay off all their bills.
And then, of course, we would take our 15
percent and put it into our marketing ef-
fort. And we did that until all those bills
were paid. And I believe it was in January
2010. (footnote added)

4. Summers County Commissioner Lloyd Light-
ner testified that fifty percent of the hotel occu-
pancy tax collected in Summers County was used
for parks and recreation, thirty-five percent was
distributed to TRTC, and the remaining fifteen
percent was given to Visit WV.

5. The record indicates that in the early 2000s,
the local convention and visitor's bureau in Sum-
mers County, then known as the Summers Coun-
ty Convention and Visitor’s Bureau, was mis-
managed and incurred significant debt. It was

According to Mr, Maddy, after Visit WV paid
the debts of TRTC, he informed the Sum-
mers County Commission that Visit WV
wished to end their arrangement and Visit
‘WV would be returning the remaining funds
that belonged to TRTC. On January 29, 2011,
Mr, Maddy wrote a check for $41,699.05
made payable to “Three Rivers Travel Coun-
cil,” which was the balance of the hotel occu-
paney tax that the Summers County Com-
mission had allocated to Visit WV to pay the
debts of TRTC.

During Mr. Maddy’s testimony, the State
submitted into evidence a letter he wrote to
Commissioner Lightner on behalf of Visit
WV dated May 27, 2011. The letter stated, in
pertinent part:

Our Board of Directors advised us that
once the debi for the Three Rivers Travel
Council was paid off that we would no
longer be able to perform any accounting
or payroll services. Our records indicate
the debt was paid off at the end of July
2010. We also gave Commissioner Berry a
check payable to Three Rivers Travel
Council for $41,699.05 on January 29, 2011
to zero out the Summers County account.
Our understanding was a new CVB was to
be organized. (footnote added)

It is undisputed that the $41,699.05 check
was deposited into a bank account in the
name of “Timothy Jordan Berry d/b/a Three
Rivers Travel Council.” Timothy Jordan Ber-
ry is the petitioner’s son.”

eventually reorganized and became known as
Three Rivers Travel Council. However, further
poor management resulted in a lapse of TRIC’s
registration as a legal entity with the West Virgi-
nia Secretary of State in November 2009. As Mr.
Maddy testified, at that juncture, the Summers
County Commission sought the assistance of Vis-
it WV to financially rehabilitate the entity.

6. Commissioner Lightner testified that he did not
know the check was given to the petitioner until
he received this letter.

7. The evidence indicated that the account was set
up using the personal social security number of
Timothy Jordan Berry and had a balance of
$123.52 at the time the $41,699.05 check from
Visit WV was deposited. The petitioner testified
that his son “had nothing to do with the ac-
count” after it was established,

231

The State’s expert witness, Lawrence
Ickes, a forensie accountant, testified the
bank records showed that the day after the
check was deposited into the Timothy Jordan
Berry account, $10,600.00 was withdrawn us-
ing a counter withdrawal slip made out to
cash. Thereafter, numerous checks were
written against the account, most of them
were for “round, even amounts” and made
out to cash. In addition, several internal bank
transfers were made to another personal
bank account of the petitioner’s son and
$15,000.00 was paid to closely-held corpora-
tions operated by the petitioner and his son.

My. Ickes further testified that two checks
totaling $6,850.00 from BGN® Convention
and Visitor's Bureau (hereinafter “BGN”)
were deposited into the account in August
2011. BGN was the third Summers County
convention and visitor’s bureau that was in-
corporated with the Secretary of State’s of-
fice? According to Mr. Ickes, by the end of
September 2011, the account was almost de-
pleted with a balance of only $247.00.

Testifying in his own defense, the petition-
er acknowledged that the $41,699.05 check
was deposited into his son’s personal bank
account. However, the petitioner character-
ized his son’s account as a “stopgap” meas-
ure, explaining that TRTC could not main-
tain its own bank account because it had lost
its corporate status. The petitioner testified
that he withdrew the money and used it to
promote Summers County and the surround-
ing region. He stated that he went to various
travel shows in other states where he paid

8. “BGN” was used as an abbreviation for Blue-
stone, Greenbrier, and New, the three rivers that
run through Summers County.

9. Although it appears that BGN was a replace-
ment for TRTC, which had lost its corporate
status, documents in the record indicate that
BGN was doing business as TRTC. In that re-
gard, the record includes a June 21, 2011, agree-
ment whereby the Summers County Commission
agreed to distribute to BGN thirty-five percent of
the hotel occupancy taxes collected during the
term of the agreement. In exchange, BGN agreed
to provide “certain marketing/promotional ser-
vices and programs ...designed to inform poten-
tial travelers of what Summers County and the
New River Gorge Region has to offer{.)” This
Agreement stated that BGN was doing business
as TRTC. The Agreement was signed by the peti-
‘tioner as the president of BGN.

232

- “students or young people” $100 each, in
cash, to hand out brochures promoting tour-
ism in Summers County and the surrounding
area, He explained that by the time he re-
ceived the money from Visit WV, the season
of tourism marketing was well underway,
and he was unable to obtain space at these
travel shows to sét up his own booth. The
petitioner also testified that he used the mon-
ey to have brochures printed and for wages
for his son, whom he employed to set up web
pages for online promotion of Summers
County and southern West Virginia because
travel marketing was progressing in a digital
direction, With regard to why he was unable
to produce receipts to show how the money
‘was spent, the petitioner testified he had an
office at Concord University in Beckley,
West Virginia, and that at some unspecified
time, college personnel decided to re-purpose
the space, which resulted in the destruction
of his records.!°

To support his testimony regarding his
attendance at travel shows, the petitioner’s
ex-girlfriend testified on his behalf. She stat-
ed that she had accompanied the petitioner
to some of the travel shows and observed
him promoting Summers County by having
students distribute tourism brochures. She
was unable to say, however, how many travel
shows she attended with the petitioner; nor
could she recall exactly when the trips oc
curred.

After the parties gave their closing argu-
ments, the petitioner moved for a mistrial,
claiming the prosecuting attorney had made
improper remarks during his rebuttal argu-
ment that constituted an impermissible shift-
ing of the burden of proof, The trial court
denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury re-

turned a guilty verdict. On April 15, 2016, the

circuit court entered its sentencing order
confining the petitioner for an indeterminate
prison term of not less than one nor more
than ten years. This appeal followed.

10, Stephen D. Rowe, a retired professor from
Concord University; testified on behalf of -the
petitioner. Mr. Rowe stated that the petitioner
was a client of the Concord entrepreneurial de-
velopment center and was provided an office
through a grant program aimed at improving
economic conditions in the state. On cross-exam-

IL Standard of Review

HM As set forth above, ‘the petitioner
contends that the cireuit court should have
granted his motions for judgment of acquittal
made at the close of the State’s evidence and
at the end of his trial because the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to support a
conviction. “The Court applies a de novo
standard of review to the denial of a.motion
for judgment of acquittal based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Juntilla,
227 W.Va, 492, 497, 711 S.E.2d 562, 567
(2011) (citing State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va, 294,
304, 470 S.E.2d 618, 628 (1996)). In addition,

“‘ulpon motion [for judgment of aequit-
tal], the evidence is to be viewed in the
light most favorable to [the] prosecution. It
is not necessary in appraising its sufficien-
ey that the trial court or reviewing court
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the defendant; the question is
whether there is substantial evidence upon
which a jury might justifiably find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ State v. West, 158 W.Va. 825, [168
§.B,2d 716] (1969).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v
Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666
(1974).

Syl. Pt, 5; State v. Grimes, 226 W.Va, 411,
701 S.H.2d 449 (2009). Explaining further, we
have stated:

The function of an appellate court when
yeviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine -
the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, is suffi-
cient to convince a reasonable person of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, Thus, the relevant inquiry is wheth- -
er, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any ra-
tional trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt,

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 Wa. 657,
461 S,E.2d 168 (1995), :

ination, Mr. Rowe testified that when the Univer-
sity decided to re-purpose the space, he contact-
ed the petitioner and informed him he needed to
remove his personal items from his office. Ac-
cording to Mr. Rowe, the petitioner never came
to collect anything from his office. .

HM The petitioner also contends the
circuit court erred by not granting his motion
for a mistrial after the prosecutor made im-
proper remarks to the jury during his closing
argument. “Our review of a circuit court’s
decision to: deny a motion for a mistrial is
yeviewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.” State v. Robert Scott R, Jr, 283
W.Va, 12, 18, 754 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2014),
Further, we have held that “‘“{a] judgment
of conviction will not be reversed because of
improper remarks made by a prosecuting
attorney ... to a jury. which do not clearly
prejudice the accused or result in manifest
injustice,” Syl. pt. 1, State v Dunn, 162
W.Va. 68, 246 S.B.2d 245 (1978), in part.
Syllabus Point 1, State v. Barker, 168 W.Va.
1, 281 S.H.2d 142 (1981),” Syl. Pt. 7, State v,
Buck, 170 W.Va. 428, 294 S.E.2d 281 (1982).
With these standards in mind, we will ad-
dress the parties’ arguments,

Til. Discussion ©

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The petitioner contends the evi-
dence presented during his trial was in-
sufficient to support his conviction for em-
bezzlement." “The essential elements of
embezzlement are a trust relationship to
the property or money involved, belonging
to someone else and in the possession of
the defendant by virtue of his’ office 'and
converted to his own use with intent to
defraud.” Syl. Pt. 19, State v. Riley, 151
W.Va, 364,151 S.E.2d 308 (1966), over-
ruled on other’ grounds by Proudfoot »,
Dan’s Marine Serv., Inc, 210 W.Va. 498,
558'S.E.2d 298 (2001). Outlining the ele-
ments of embezzlement more distinctly,
this Court long ago held:

[In order to constitute the crime of
embezzlement, it is necessary to show (1)
the trust relation of the person charged,
and that he falls within that class of per-
sons named; (2) that the property or thing
claimed to have been embezzled or con-
verted is such property as is embraced in
the statute; (8) that it is the property of
another person; (4) that it came into the
possession, or was placed in the care, of

11, See W.Va. Code § 61-3-20 (2014) (defining

233

‘the accused, under and by virtue of his
office, place or employment; (5) that his
manner of dealing with or disposing of the
property, constituted a fraudulent conver-
sion and an appropriation of the same to
his own use; and (6) that the conversion of
the property to his own use was with the
intent to deprive the owner thereof.

Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Moyer, 58 W.Va.
146, 52 S.E. 30 (1905). The petitioner claims
that the State’s evidence was insufficient
with respect to the third, fifth and -sixth
elements of embezzlement outlined above.
We address each of these elements, -in turn,
below. - . .
1, The property of another person was
embezzled. The petitioner asserts the State
failed to prove that the money allegedly em-
bezzled was property belonging to the Sum-
mers County Commission as set forth in the
indictment, Arguing that the evidence at trial
established that the money at the time of the
alleged embezzlement was the private prop-
erty of TRTC and not public money belong-
ing to the Summers County Commission, the
petitioner maintains that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to satisfy the
third element of embezzlement set forth in
syllabus point two of Moyer, 58 W.Va, at 146,
52 SE. at 30-31, The petitioner’s argument is
premised upon his contention that “once the
hotel tax revenues had been disbursed to the
CVBs, it ceased being government money
and became the sole property of the CVB(s).”
Conversely, the State contends that whether
the money belonged to the county commis-
sion or the convention and visitor's bureaus
is irrelevant because it must only prove that
the money at issue belonged to “another”

The State’s burden with respect to proving
ownership of property in embezzlement cases
was addressed in State v. Frasher, 164 W.Va.
572, 265 S.E.2d 43 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 657, 461
S.E.2d at 168, In that case, “the threshold
question raised by the defendant [was]
whether the embezzlement indictment was
sufficient in charging that he embezzled from
[Parkerburg] Datsun [an automobile dealer-
ship,] as distinguished from Datsun’s pur-
chasers.” Frasher, 164 W.Va. at 575, 265

offense of embezzlement).

234

S.E.2d at 46, The evidence showed the defen-
dant operated a business in Charleston that
expedited the acquisition of automobile titles
by automobile dealers for their purchasers.
Id. at 574, 265 S.E.2d at 45. To accomplish
this task for Datsun, the defendant's wife
would travel to Parkersburg and obtain the
title applications and checks from the dealer-
ship covering the title taxes and license fees.
Upon her return, the defendant would depos-
it the checks and then write new checks on
his business account made payable to the
Department of Motor Vehicles to cover the
fees and tax costs, He would then deliver the
checks and applications to the Department of
Motor Vehicles. After the automobile titles
were obtained, the defendant’s wife would
return them to the Datsun dealership. Jd.

The defendant was charged with embezzle-
ment after it was discovered that he was
altering the title applications to lower the
stated value of the motor vehicles, which in
turn reduced the amount of license taxes
required to be paid. It was alleged that the
defendant paid the lower amount of title tax
and retained the difference. Id, Following his
embezzlement conviction, the defendant ap-
pealed, arguing the State failed to prove the
identity of the actual owners of the property
that was embezzled and that he was an agent
within the meaning of the embezzlement stat-
ute. The defendant maintained that “Datsun
‘was a mere conduit for paying to the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles ... the title taxes
and license fees owed by the individual pur-
chasers and that the indictment was insuffi-
cient in that it had to charge embezzlement
from the purchasers themselves.” Jd. at 575,
265 S.E.2d at 46,

Recognizing that “the hallmark of embez-
zlement is the trust relationship and the sub-
sequent conversion or appropriation of the
entrusted property,” this Court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the State was re-
quired to identify the true owner of the
property. Id. at 576-77, 265 S.H.2d at 47.
Noting that “[o]ther state courts have ...
avoided imposing technical ownership re-
quirements on the state in embezzlement
cases,” this Court explained that “[iJn both
embezzlement and larceny cases it has long
been held that a taking is wrongful, not only

from the person owning legal title, but from
any person entitled to possession.” Id. at 579-
80, 265 S.H.2d at 48 (additional citation omit-
ted). Therefore, consistent with the majority
of other courts, this Court concluded that
“embezzlement can occur from one having
the lawful possession of the property and
that the true owner of the property need not
be alleged in the indictment.” Id. at 578, 265
S.E.2d at 47.

TH In the case at bar, the State present-
ed evidence at trial which established that
the petitioner was not personally entitled to
the proceeds of the check issued by Visit WV
to TRTC. In that regard, Mr. Maddy testi-
fied that Visit WV wished to relinquish finan-
cial control of TRTC, and that he wrote the
$41,699.05 check to return the remaining ho-
tel oceupancy tax funds to TRTC. Whether
the funds actually belonged to TRTC at that
point, as opposed to the County Commission,
is of no moment, The evidence presented by
the State was sufficient to allow a rational
jury to conclude the property alleged to have
been embezzled belonged to another entity.
Accordingly, there is no merit to the petition-
er’s argument that the State failed to present,
sufficient evidence concerning the ownership
element of embezzlement.

2. Fraudulent conversion and appropri-
ation. The petitioner next claims the State
failed to present any evidence to show that
he fraudulently converted and appropriated
the $41,699.05 check for his own use. Essen-
tially, the petitioner argues that in order to
prove this element of embezzlement, the
State was required to offer direct evidence in
the form of receipts or testimony indicating
he derived some personal gain from the mon-
ey. The petitioner reasons that because “the
State could provide no positive evidence that
the money was converted to personal use
vather that used for CVB purposes,” fraudu-
lent conversion and appropriation were not
established. The State contends, however,
that it was not required to present any di-
rect, tangible proof that the petitioner con-
verted the money to his own personal use.
The State argues that circumstantial evi-
dence, which it maintains was “plentiful and
powerful” in this case, was sufficient to prove
the petitioner fraudulently converted and ap-

propriated the funds issued by Visit WV to
TRTC.

sit is well established that “this
Court may accept any adequate evidence,
including circumstantial evidence, as support
for a conviction[.]’ State v. Greenfield, 237
W.Va. 778, 786, 791 S.E.2d 408, 416 (2016).
Indeed, we have observed:
Circumstantial evidence ... is intrinsically
no different from testimonial evidence. Ad-
mittedly, circumstantial evidence may in
- some case point to a wholly incorrect re-
sult. Yet this is equally true of testimonial
evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked
to weigh the chances that the evidence
correctly points to guilt against the possi-
bility of inaccuracy or ambiguous infer-
ence. In both, the jury must use its experi-
ence with people and events in weighing
the probabilities. If the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require
no more.
Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 668, 461 S.H.2d at 174
(quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S,
121, 189-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150
(1954)). We have also explained:
A criminal defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
appellate court must review all the evi-
dence, whether direct or circumstantial, in
the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must credit all inferences and credibil-
ity assessments that the jury might have
drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
evidence need not be inconsistent with ev-
ery conclusion save that of guilt so long as
the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Credibility determinations are for a
jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a
jury verdict should be set aside only when
the record contains no evidence, regardless
of how it is weighed, from which the jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.
Guthrie, 194 W.Va, at 663, 461 S.H.2d at 169,
syl. pt. 8.

HN Upon review of the record, we find
that the State presented sufficient evidence
from which a rational jury could find that the

235

petitioner fraudulently converted and misap-
propriated the $41,699.05 check. The State’s
evidence showed that the check was deposit-
ed into an account in the petitioner son’s
name which had been previously established
using his son’s personal social security num-
ber. The evidence further showed that a ma-
jority of the withdrawals made from the ac-
count were in cash for large, even sums,
suggesting the money was not being used to
reimburse vendors or other third parties for
specific expenses. In addition, the State put
forth evidence that several transfers of mon-
ey were made to the petitioner’s son and to
corporations that the petitioner operated
with his son, While the petitioner testified
that the money transferred to his son’s other
account was for computer work he performed
on behalf of TRTC, other testimony indicated
his son was employed through an Ameri-
Corps grant program to perform that work.
In addition, the lack of receipts or other
documentation demonstrating the money was
used for tourism promotional activities could
have been viewed by the jury as evidence of
fraudulent conversion and appropriation. Fi-
nally, Summers County Commissioner Jack
Woodrum testified that the petitioner would
give “no accounting” of how the money was
spent, and when specifically asked, the peti-
tioner “told [the other Commissioners] that it
‘was proprietary information and wasn’t any
of our business.” Given all this evidence, we
find no merit to the petitioner’s argument
that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove fraudulent conversion and
appropriation,

Hl 3. Intent to deprive. The petition-
er also claims that the State failed to prove
he had the specific intent to deprive TRTC of
its money. Acknowledging that he withdrew
and spent money from the account where the
check was deposited, the petitioner maintains
there was no evidence he intended to deprive
TRTC of the money in a way that was not in
accordance with its statutory purpose to pro-
mote tourism. In contrast, the State argues
that the circumstantial evidence which dem-
onstrated fraudulent conversion and appro-
priation of the money also established a spe-
cific intent to so act.

236 |

Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecition as: Guthrie re-
quires, we find that a rational jury could
have coneluded the petitioner’s actions
showed a willful intent to deprive TRTC of.
the money. In particular, the direct transfer
of money to another personal account held by
the petitioner’s son and to corporations’ he
‘was operating with his son could have easily
been considered by the jury as evidence of a
specific intent to deprive TRTC of the mon-
ey. Moreover, the State presented evidence
that in 2011, a new local convention and
visitor’s bureau for: Summers County was
incorporated with the Secretary of State’s
office using the name BGN Convention and
Visitor’s Bureau. There was testimony that
the petitioner deposited at least two checks
from BGN’s bank account into the same ac-
count held by his son in which the $41,699.05
check was deposited. Based on this evidence,
a rational jury could have concluded that the
petitioner was not using his son’s account as

a “stopgap” measure as he claimed but in-
stead, had a specific intent to deprive TRTC
of its money. Accordingly, we find no merit
to the petitioner’s argument that the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
the intent element of embezzlement.

Based on all of the above, we find the
State presented sufficient evidence to sup-
port the petitioner’s conviction. Consequent-
ly, the circuit court did not err by denying
the petitioner’s motions for judgment of ac-
quittal.

B, The Prosecutor’s Remarks

HM The petitioner contends the trial
court erred by not granting his motion for a
mistrial because the prosecuting attorney
made comments during his closing argument
suggesting that the petitioner had the bur-
den of proof, The prosecutor’s rebuttal clos-
ing argument, in pertinent part, was as fol-
lows:

I do get the last word in this, but ’m

* limited to rebuttal. That is to. say, I can’t

bring up any new issues, I can’t really

extend on any issues that I brought up in

the first part of the closing, but only to

talk about what. was said by the defense
closing.

So let’s just get to the two questions real
quick. How was the money misused? Mon-
ey was misused in the form of $5,000 dur-
ing the time period we're talking about
here, February to September, by paying
the same to Timothy Jordan Berry, The
explanation you get? He was working un-
der a grant, He wasn’t working for the
CVB under a grant. He was working for
AmeriCorps under a grant, How else was
the money used? Well, there’s Jerry Ber-
ry, $15,400 in cash, In cash,

One of the things I wrote down when I
finished here was, I also wanted to see how
some questions were: answered. And one of
the questions I wanted to hear the defense
answer, but they did not, ‘was about the
rebates, This big chunk of even dollars. If
I'm given $100 by my principal, by my
employer, by my person who has hired me
to do something or appointed me to do
something and they say, go buy a pack of
cigarettes for me, shouldn’t I be returning
about $94, $95 back to the principal, to the
agent, to the account that set up by the
defendant? Even dollars, no rebates show-

. ing in State’s Exhibit No. 8, which is a list

of account statements, bank statements for
monthly, like everybody here has probably
gotten at one point or another,

The last thing that I wanted to do for
rebuttal, that I was waiting to hear from
Mr. Seay, who is obviously a very talented
young attorney, was to hear about the
check—checks, two checks, in August,
months after BGN .had become a valid
travel council. Why was BGN paying that
money, about $6,000 worth over into the
account of an invalid emergency ac-
count—if you believe the defendant, an
emergency account, that he had. to use it
there? Why wasn’t the money flowing in
the other direction? I know something
about the rivers in Summers County. They
flow downstream. And this one should

* have, The fourth one should have also. But

it didn’t. It flowed upstream. It flowed
from the emergency account that was set
up till they could get a proper CVB set up,
and then into the account that there was-
an emergency one that just happened to be
in his son’s name. (emphasis added)

HMM “This Court has held that whether
improper argument by the prosecution has so
prejudiced the trial process as to require
reversal must be gauged from the facts of
each trial.” State 0. Sugg, 198 W.Va. 888, 405,
456 S.H.2d 469, 486 (1995). We have also
stated that “[t]he test is whether the re-
marks ‘so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial
of due process.” Id. (quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 687, 648, 94 S.Ct,
1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 481 (1974)),

“Four factors are taken into account in
determining whether improper prosecuto-
rial comment is so damaging as to require
reversal: (1) the degree to which the prose-
cutoi’s remarks have a tendency to mis-
lead the jury and to prejudice the accused;
(2) whether the remarks were isolated or
extensive; (8) absent the remarks, the
strength of competent proof introduced to
“establish the guilt of the accused; and (4)
whether the comments were deliberately
placed before the jury to divert attention
to extraneous matters.” Syl. Pt. 6, State v,
Sugg, 198 W.Va, 888, 456 S.B.2d 469
(19965).

Syl. Pt. 6, State ea rel. Games-Neely v. Yo-
der, 287 W.Va. 301, 787 S.H.2d 572 (2016),

Considering the factors set forth above,
the petitioner argues that the questions
posed by the prosecutor in his rebuttal
caused the jury to believe he had some sort
of obligation to demonstrate his innocence,
Elaborating further, the petitioner contends
that when the prosecutor said the defense
left questions unanswered and that he want-
ed to hear more from the defense, the prose-
cutor shifted the burden of proof and easily
confused the jury. The petitioner further ar-
gues that these rebuttal comments were nec-
essarily prejudicial because he was unable to
respond. Maintaining that the State’s evi-
dence of fraudulent conversion and intent to
deprive was “flimsy if it existed at all,” the
petitioner asserts the prosecutor’s comments
clearly should have caused the trial court to
declare a mistrial,

The State submits there is simply-no au-
thority to support the petitioner's contention
that the prosecuting attorney shifted the bur-
den of proof by posing questions to the jury

237

during his closing argument. The State ar-
gues that the prosecutor’s remarks were “un-
deniably isolated” because they were only
made during rebuttal. Further, the State
claims there is no basis to classify the com-
ments as a “diversion” because they were
clearly meant to focus the jury's attention on
a favorable inference from the evidence—
“namely that the petitioner's withdrawal of
Jarge even sums of cash and failure to ever
deposit leftover money ... demonstrated
that he was using the money as a personal
slush fund.” The State concludes that in light
of the substantial amount of circumstantial
evidence presented that indicated the peti-
tioner was guilty, the remarks did not mis- -
lead the jury.

We have recognized that “[a] proper clos-
ing argument in a criminal case involves the
summation of evidence, any reasonable infer-
ences from the evidence, responses to the
opposing party’s argument, and pleas for law
enforcement generally.” Guthrie, 194 W.Va,
at 678-79 n.27, 461 S.H.2d at 184-85 n.27. As
the trial transcript shows, the petitioner’s
attorney asserted during his closing that the
prosecutor had failed to answer the question
of “how was the money misused?” He further
queried: “Why didn’t [the prosecutor] give
you all the pieces of the puzzle?” The prose-
eutor’s rebuttal comments were clearly a re-
sponse to the questions posed by the peti-
tioner’s attorney during his own closing and
an attempt to demonstrate that the evidence
did not fit within the petitioner’s theory of
the case,

We have found that a prosecutor’s use of
questions to make reasonable inferences
from the evidence and demonstrate inconsis-
tencies in the defendant’s testimony does not
constitute reversible error. See State v, John-
son, 187 W.Va. 360, 364 n.7, 419 S.E.2d 300,
304 n.7 (1992) (finding prosecutor was not
attempting to shift burden of proof when
stating to jury that defense counsel should
have explained “[wJhy the defendant is so
sure that during his blackout the shooting of
his brother was accidental”); accord Com-
monwealth v. Mattei, 90 Mass.App.Ct. 577,
62 N.E.8d 86 (2016) (concluding burden was
not shifted by prosecutor’s use of rhetorical
questions to demonstrate defendant’s expla-

238

nation for knocking down assault victim’s
door was implausible); State v. Osman, 192
Wash.App. 355, 366 P.8d 956 (2016) (holding
that prosecutor’s argument did not shift bur-
den of proof because questions were used to
demonstrate that evidence “did not support
any other reasonable explanation”). In this
case, it is clear that the prosecutor ques-
tioned the deposit of money from BGN’s
account to show that the petitioner's explana-
tion of why he put the money in his son’s
account—as a “stopgap measure”—was not
credible. Having considered the remarks in
the-context of the entire trial, we are unable
to find they were clearly prejudicial or re-
sulted in manifest injustice. Accordingly, the

cireuit court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the petitioner’s motion for a mistrial.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm
the petitioner's conviction and the circuit
court’s April 15, 2016, final order.

Affirmed.

800 S.E.2d 506
STATE of West Virginia, EX REL.
HEALTHPORT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
and Charleston Area Medical Center,
Petitioners
v
Honorable James C. STUCKY, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County,
West Virginia; and Basil Crookshanks,
on behalf of himself and all others simi-.
larly situated, Respondents

No. 17-0038

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 3, 2017
Filed: May 24, 2017

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, Russell
D, Jessee, Esq. Devon J. Stewart, Esq,
Steptoe & Johnson PLLG, Charleston, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioners

Edmund L. Wagoner, Esq., David’ E, God-
dard, Esq., Goddard & Wagonei PLLC,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Re-
spondent, Basil Crookshanks

Justice Ketchum:

In this case, a law firm paid an invoice for
a copy of a client’s medical records. The law
firm alleges the per-page-fee for those rec-
ords was excessive under state law. However,
the law firm filed a lawsuit in circuit court
over the invoice in the name of the client. As
we find below, because the client did not pay
the invoice and has suffered no personal loss
caused by the allegedly illegal fee, the client
cannot show an injury in fact, The client,
therefore, did not have standing to pursue
the lawsuit. Consequently, we grant a writ of
prohibition and direct the cirenit court to
dismiss the lawauit without prejudice,

1.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In 2015, respondent Basil _Crookshanks
had abdominal surgery for a perforated bow.
el. In his recovery, he was a patient in a
nursing home, Mr, Crookshanks alleges that
the nursing home used unsterilized tools to
treat his’ wound causing him to develop sig-
nificant infections and sepsis. Thereafter, he

was evacuated from the nursing home by
helicopter for inpatient treatment at a hospi-
tal owned by the petitioner, Charleston Area
Medical Center (“CAMC”).

Mr. Crookshanks retained a law firm to
investigate a potential malpractice claim
against the nursing home. The law firm’s
contract was on a contingent basis: the firm
would pay all litigation expenses (as permit-
ted by the West Virginia Rules of Profession-
al Conduct) and would only receive a fee, and
be reimbursed for its expenses, if there was a
recovery on Mr. Crookshanks’s behalf.

‘The law firm made a request to CAMC for
a copy of Mr. Crookshanks’s medical records.
Petitioner HealthPort Technologies, LLC
(‘HealthPort”), responded for CAMC and
sent an invoice to the law firm demanding
$4,468.48, or 55 cents per page plus sales tax
and shipping costs for the medical records.
The law firm paid the invoice, However, the
invoice troubled the law firm for two reasons:
another major West Virginia hospital had
charged the law firm $3.57 to copy a similar
medical record; and the law firm itself
spends approximately 1.4 cents per page for
copying.

On October 15, 2015, Mr. Crookshanks
filed a class action lawsuit against Health-
Port and CAMC over the 55-cent-per-page

1, W.Va. Code § 16-29-2(a) [2014] stated:

(a) A person requesting records from a provid-

er shall place the request in writing and pay a

reasonable, cost-based fee, at the time of deliv-

ery. Notwithstanding any other section of the
code or rule, the fee shali be based on the
provider's cost of: (1) Labor for copying the
requested records if in paper, or for placing
the records in electronic media; (2) supplies
for creating the paper copy or electronic me-
dia; and (3) postage if the person requested
that the records be mailed

Mr. Crookshanks alleged that, in violation of this

statute, CAMC and HealthPort failed to charge

“a reasonable, cost-based fee.”

The Legislature recently adopted significant
amendments to W.Va. Code § 16-29-2. On April
7, 2017, the Legislature passed and the Governor
signed Senate Bill 578, and determined it will
take, effect 90 days from passage. W.Va. Code
§ 16-29-2 [2017] states, in pertinent part:

(a) A provider may charge a patient or the
patient's personal representative a fee consis-
tent with HIPAA [Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996], as amended,
and any rules promulgated pursuant to HIPAA,
plus any applicable taxes.

241

fee for his medical records. First, Mr. Crook-
shanks alleged that the fee was not based on
the actual cost of labor and supplies, as re-
quired by state law,! and therefore that
HealthPort and CAMC were acting in viola~
tion of law. Second, Mr. Crookshanks assert-
ed (upon information and belief) that other
similarly-situated individuals requested. their
records from CAMC and other West Virginia
healthcare providers; that HealthPort filled
those requests; and that HealthPort charged
those individuals excessive fees in violation of
state law. In his complaint, Mr. Crookshanks
asked the circuit court to certify his case as a
class action.”

HealthPort and CAMC moved for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that, because
Mr. Crookshanks’s claims were not ripe, he
did not have standing to pursue his claim. In
discovery, Mr. Crookshanks admitted that he
did not pay the invoice to obtain copies of his
medical records. Instead, the law firm he
retained paid the invoice. Additionally, Mr.
Crookshanks has not reimbursed the law
firm, and the contract with his lawyers speci-
fied that he would only be liable for the
expense of the medical records if he recovers
from a medical malpractice defendant.
HealthPort and CAMC asked the circuit

(b) A person other than a patient or patient's

personal’ representative “requesting records
from a health care provider shall submit the
request and HIPAA compliant authorization in
writing and pay a fee at the time of delivery.
Notwithstanding any other section of the code
or rule, the fees shall not exceed: (1). A search
and handling fee of $20; (2) a per page fee of
40 cents for paper copies; and (3) postage, if
the person requested that the records be
mailed, plus any applicable taxes.
(©) if the requested record is stored by the
health care provider in an electronic form,
unless the person requesting the record specifi-
cally requests a paper copy, the records will be
delivered in electronic or digital form and the
per page fee for providing an electronic copy
shall not exceed 20 cents per page but’shall in
no event exceed $150 inclusive’ of all fees,
including a search and handling fee, except for
applicable taxes.

The amendments to W.Va. Code § 16-29-2 have

no effect on the outcome of this case.

2. See W.Va.R.Civ.Pro. Rule 23 [1998].

242

court to dismiss Mr. Crookshanks’s claims
without prejudice.

In an order dated December 14, 2016, the
cireuit court denied the motion for summary
judgment, and found that Mr. Crookshanks
could pursue a claim for the allegedly exces-
sive costs of the medical records, On January
18, 2017, HealthPort and CAMC petitioned
this Court for a writ of prohibition to stop
the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction
over Mr, Crookshanks’s case.

18

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN “A writ of prohibition will not issue
to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a
trial court. It will only issue where the trial
court has no jurisdiction or having such juris-
diction exceeds its legitimate powers. W.Va.
Code 58-1-1.”* “As jurisdictional issues are
questions of law, our review is de novo.” *

OL

ANALYSIS

HM Petitioners HealthPort and CAMC
assert that the plaintiff below, Mr. Crook-
shanks, does not have standing to pursue a
claim for excessive charges paid solely by his
lawyers for copies of his medical records.
The petitioners therefore contend that the
eireuit court has no jurisdiction over his
claims. On the record presented, we agree.

3. Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Peacher v, Sencin-
diver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).
Accord, Syllabus Point 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138
W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953) (‘Prohibition
lies only to restfain inferior courts from proceed-
ing in causes over which they have no jurisdic-
tion, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are
exceeding their legitimate powers and may not
be used as a substitute for writ of error, appeal
or certiorari.”).

4, State ex rel. TermNet Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Jor-
dan, 217 W.Va. 696, 700, 619 S.E.2d 209, 213
(2005).

5. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118
S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (citations
omitted).

6. W.Va. Code § 16-29-1(a) [2014] provides that a
health care provider “shall, upon the written

HealthPort and CAMC argue that Mr.
Crookshanks has not paid, and may never
pay, the invoice for copies of his medical
records. The allegedly excessive invoice was
addressed to the law firm representing Mr.
Crookshanks, and was paid by the law firm.
The Jaw firm has suffered an out-of-pocket
expense, while the damages that Mr. Crook-
shanks seeks “rest ] upon contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all.” 5

Mr. Crookshanks counters by arguing that.
this case is ripe for adjudication and that he
has standing to pursue his claim. Mr. Crook-
shanks asserts that his lawyers are his “au-
thorized agent or authorized representative”
under the laws governing production of medi-
cal records,’ and that his lawyers used that
authority to procure copies of his CAMC
medical records from HealthPort. Mr. Crook-
shanks asserts that the fact that his lawyers
requested and paid an excessive charge for
the records should have no effect on his
standing to bring the claim.

HMMM Article VIII, Section 6 of the West
Virginia Constitution establishes that there
must be a justiciable case or controversy—a
legal right claimed by one party and denied
by another—in order for the circuit court to
have subject matter jurisdiction.’ In part,
this means the party asserting a legal right
must have standing to assert that right, This
Court has defined “standing” as “{a] party's
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial
enforcement of a duty or right.”® Standing

request of a patient, his or her authorized agent
or authorized representative, within a reasonable
time, furnish a copy” of the patient's medical
records “to the patient, his or authorized agent
or authorized representative[.]” As noted previ-
ously, the Legislature recently amended this stat-
ute. See supra, footnote 1.

7. See generally 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3529 (3d Ed. 2008) (“Concepts of justiciability
have been developed to identify appropriate oc-
casions for judicial action... The central con-
cepts often are elaborated into more specific
categories of justiciability—advisory opinions,
feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions, and administrative
questions.”).

8. Findley v. State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co., 213
W.Va. 80, 94, 576 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2002) (quor-
ing Black's Law Dictionary 1413 (7th ed. 1999)).

yefers to one’s ability to bring a lawsuit
based upon a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy.’ Standing is composed of
three elements:

First, the party attempting to establish

standing must have suffered an “injury-in-

fact”— an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particu-
larized and (b) actual or imminent and not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct forming the basis of
the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that

the injury will be redressed through a

favorable decision of the court.!

The focus of a standing analysis is not on the
validity of the claim but instead is “on the
appropriateness of a party bringing the ques-
tioned controversy to the court.”!! The bur-
den for establishing standing is on the plain-
tiff,

HM The first clement in a standing
inquiry is whether the plaintiff has an “inju-
ry-in-fact.” “In order to have standing to sue,
a party must allege an injury in fact, either
economic or otherwise, which is the result of
the challenged action[.]” ” To establish inju-
ry in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or
she suffered “an invasion of a legally protect-
ed interest” that is “concrete and particular-
ized.” 8 For an injury to be “particularized,”
it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and

9. See Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.Va. 265, 275,
284 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1981) (“The question of
standing to sue is whether the litigant has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit so as to present the court with a justicia-
ble controversy warranting judicial resolution of
the dispute.”); Sate ex rel. Paul B. v. Hill, 201
W.Va. 248, 256, 496 S.E.2d 198, 206 (1997)
(“[S]tanding refers to one’s ability to bring a
lawsuit because he/she has such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to insure
the concrete adverseness upon which the court
depends for illumination of the questions in the
case.” (Quotation and citation omitted)).

10. Syllabus Point 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut.
Auto, Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 84, 576 S.E.2d 807,
811 (2002). See also Coleman v. Sopher, 194
W.Va. 90, 96 n.6, 459 S.E.2d 367, 373 n.6 (1995)
(same).

11, Findley, 213 W.Va. at 95, 576 S.E.2d at 822
(quoting Louisiana Environmental Action Net-
work v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir.
1996)),

243

individual way.” 4 To be a “concrete” injury,
“it must actually exist.” The injury must
also be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. “Injury in fact is easily estab-
lished when a litigant demonstrates a ‘direct,
pocketbook injury” ” #6

In the instant case, Mr. Crookshanks has
failed to establish the first element of the
standing analysis: he did not show that he
suffered an injury in fact, economic or other-
wise. Instead, reading the underlying facts
and all inferences in the light most favorable
to Mr. Crookshanks, the record demon-
strates that only Mr. Crookshanks’s lawyers
have suffered an out-of-pocket expense
caused by the alleged misdeeds of Health-
Port and CAMC.

The lawyers employed by Mr, Crook-
shanks contend that W.Va. Code § 16-29-1(d)
[2014] provides that the health care records
laws “may be enforced by a patient, author-
ized agent or authorized representative[.]”
The lawyers assert that because they pro-
cured the medical records as the agent for
their principal, Mr. Crookshanks, they may
likewise bring a lawsuit for the excessive fees
that the lawyers paid to procure those rec-
ords. We reject this notion because, if Mr.
Crookshanks does not a have an injury in
fact, and thereby standing to bring a suit,
then his agent would not have standing to
bring a suit in his name. On this record, the

12. Snyder v. Callaghan, 168 W.Va. at 275, 284
S.E.2d at 248,

13. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, —- U.S. ——, 136
S.Ct. 1540, 1548, 194 L.Bd.2d 635 (2016) (quot-
ing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Bd.2d 351 (1992)).

14, Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citations omitted).

15. Id. ‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily
synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible
injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have
confirmed in many of our previous cases that
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”
Id., 136 8.Ct. at 1549,

16. Kanawha Cty. Pub. Library Bd. v. Bd. of Educ. °
of Cty. Of Kanawha, 231 W.Va. 386, 398, 745
S.E.2d 424, 436 (2013) (quoting Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249, 256, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed.
1586 (1953).

244

law firm has sustained a direct pocketbook
injury. Mr. Crookshanks may become con-
tractually-liable to his lawyers for this alleg-
edly unlawful expense at a future date, but
until he does, his loss is contingent and con-
jectural.

Iv.

CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Crookshanks failed to estab-
lish standing to pursue his claim that Health-
Port and. CAMC charged excessive fees for
medical records, the circuit court is without
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
A-writ.of prohibition is therefore warranted,
and the circuit court is ordered to dismiss the

action below without prejudice.

Writ Granted.

JUSTICE DAVIS and JUSTICR
WORKMAN dissent and reserve the ment to
file a separate opinion,

Davis, Justice, dissenting, doined by Tustice
Workman:

In its decision of this case, the majority
determined that Mr. Crookshanks does not
have standing to pursue his claim under the
West Virginia Health Care Records Act, W.
Va. Code § 16-29-1 et seq. However, the issue
of standing is not properly before the Court.
The circuit court mentioned standing in its
order denying HealthPort’s motion for sum-
mary judgment only tangentially, and
HealthPort, itself, bases its entire petition for
writ of prohibition upon its argument that
Mr, Crookshanks’ claim is not yet ripe for
judicial consideration, As such, the issue of
standing was not the question presented for

the Court’s resolution in this case; rather, the -

matter to be addressed was one of ripeness.
Because the majority’s decision of this case is
both procedurally and legally wrong, I re-
spectfully dissent.
Majority’s Opinion is Procedurally Wrong
Procedurally, while the circuit court men-
tioned the word standing’ in its order, Health-
1, See Syl. pt. 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto,

Ins. Co., 213 W: Va, 80, 576 8.B,2d 807 (2002)
(enumerating elements of “standing”):

Port's argument before this Court, related to
said order, is that the case is not ripe for
consideration by the circuit court. Standing
and ripeness are two different things: stand-
img speaks to whether a -particular person
may bring a claim! while ripeness concerns
whether a court may properly hear a claim.”
HealthPort does not argue before this Court
that Mr. Crookshanks does not have standing
nor does HealthPort discuss the Findley
standing elements in its .brief. Rather,
HealthPort’s arguments focus on whether
the subject claim is ripe for the Court’s
consideration. Thus, the majority's opinion
focusing on standing is procedurally wrong
because an appellate court is, in the main,
constrained to consider and. resolve..only
those matters properly raised by the parties’
arguments-not those that the Court decides
to entertain sua sponte. See generally State
v. White, 228 W. Va. 580, 541 n.9, 722 S.E.2d
566, 577 n.9 (2011) (Typically, this Court will
not address issues that have not been prop-
erly briefed.” (citations omitted));. State v.
LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613,
621 (1996) (“Although we liberally construe
briefs in determining issues presented for
review, issues which are not raised, and those
mentioned only in passing ..., are not con-
sidered on appeal.” (citation omitted); State,
Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. Robert
Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759, 765, 466 S,B.2d
827, 833 (1995) (“[A] skeletal ‘argument’ ...
does not preserve a claim. ...” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)),

Majority’s Opinion is Legally Wrong

Legally, the majority's opinion also is
wrong. The opinion should have addressed
HealthPort’s arguments regarding ripeness.
“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed
to prevent the courts, through avoidance: of
premature adjudication, from entarigling
themselves in abstract disagreements[.]” Na-
tional Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department
of Interior, 588 U.S, 808, 807, 128 S. Ct. 2026,
2080, 155 L.Ed. 2d 1017. (2003) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted). The test for

2. See National Park Hosp, Ass'n v. Department of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807, 123 S. Ct. 2026,
2030, 155 L.Ed, 2d 1017 (2003) (explaining doc-
trine of ripeness”),

ripeness has been explained as follows; “De-
termining whether ... [an] action is ripe for
judicial review requires us to evaluate (1) the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and
(2) the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.” Id. at 808, 123 S, Ct. at
2080, 155 L.Ed. 2d 1017 (citation omitted).

The claim asserted by Mr. Crookshanks
arises under the West Virginia Health Care
Records Act, which specifically provides for
the enforcement of a violation of the Act:
“The provisions of this article may be en-
forced by a patient, authorized agent or au-
thorized representative, and any health care
provider found to be in violation of this arti-
cle shall pay any attorney fees and costs,
including court costs incurred in the course
of such enforcement.” W. Va. Code § 16-29-
1) (2014) (Repl. Vol. 2016). Mr. Crook-
shanks, a patient seeking his own medical
records, is a proper person to bring this
claim, and it is ripe for consideration by the
cireuit court because all of the elements giv-
ing rise to the cause of action have occurred:
“[a] person requesting records from a provid-
er shall place the request in writing and pay
a reasonable, cost-based fee, at the time of
delivery.” W. Va, Code § 16-29-2(a) (2014)
Repl. Vol. 2016). In other words, Mr. Crook-
shanks’ medical records have been requested,
delivered per the request, and a fee was
charged and paid for said medical records.
Moreover, if the court withholds consider-
ation of the claim asserted, particularly until
resolution of the underlying medical malprac-
tice action, it is likely that the statute of
limitations could bar Mr, Crookshanks’ claim
under the Act or, if such claim is stayed, that
he will incur the financial burden associated
with paying sums that were not properly
charged in the first instance.

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the
majority's opinion properly considered and
resolved the question of standing, the opinion
still is legally wrong.

Standing is comprised of three elements:
First, the party attempting to establish
standing must have suffered an “injury-in-
fact”-an invasion of a legally protected in-
terest which is (a) concrete and particular-
ized and (b) actual or imminent and not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there

245

must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct forming the basis of

the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that

the injury will be redressed through a

favorable decision of the court.

Syl. pt. 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut, Auto.
Ins. Co,, 218 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807
(2002). Mr. Crookshanks clearly has standing
to pursue a claim under the West Virginia
Health Care Records Act because “a patient”
is among the enumerated persons who may
bring a claim under the Act. See W. Va. Code
§ 16-29-1(d). Additionally, the provision of
the Act sought to be enforced in this case
requires a request for medical records, the
delivery of such records, and payment there-
for. See W. Va. Code § 16-29-2(a). This provi-
sion does not specify or require that the
patient be the actual person paying for such
records; however, even if it did, payment was
made on behalf of Mr. Crookshanks for his
medical records, and HealthPort allegedly
charged an excessive fee for such records. It
is of no concern to HealthPort who actually
paid for Mr. Crookshanks’ medical records so
long as payment was made therefor. Finally,
a favorable decision of the court will redress
the injury: the alleged overpayment for Mr.
Crookshanks’ medical records will be cured
without further injury to Mr. Crookshanks if
the court decides in his favor at the present
time.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I
respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state
that Justice Workman joins me in this sepa-
rate opinion,

Workman, Justice, dissenting:

The majority, usually slavishly devoted to
statutory law, ignores a clear statute govern-
ing this issue. West Virginia Code § 16-29-1,
providing guidelines for furnishing health
care records, expressly provides that “[t]he
provisions of this article may be enforeed by
a patient, authorized agent or authorized
representative....” Thus, the trial court was
absolutely correct in ruling that Mr. Crook-
shanks could assert a violation of the reason-
able fee standards of West Virginia Code
§ 16-29-2, despite the fact that the expense
was advanced by his attorney, as is custom-
ary and perfectly proper. The statute prohib-

246 Ee

its excessive charges and specifies that “the
person requesting records” shall “pay a rea-
sonable, cost-based fee.” In this instance, the
records were requested and paid for by Mr.
Crookshanks’ lawyers. Lawyers routinely ad-
vance expenses for their clients; this is not an
extraordinary or infrequent occurrence. Dis-
missing Mr. Crookshanks’ claim on that basis
is ludicrous, utterly unwarranted, and legally
wrong. It flies in the face of clear law and
continues the majority march against con-

sumer rights. Consequently, I respectfully
dissent and likewise join in Justice Davis’
separately filed dissent.

800 S.E.2d 833
STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent
ve
Ennis C. PAYNE II, Defendant
Below, Petitioner
No. 15-0289

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 20, 2016
Filed: October 19, 2016

g :
nN

Jason T. Gain, Esq., Gain Law Offices,
Bridgeport, West Virginia, Landon Moyer,
Esq., Cooper Law Offices, Bridgeport, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Shannon Frederick Kiser, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent.

1, The facts and procedural background as set
forth herein have been gleaned from the tran-
scripts of the suppression hearings and trial.

2. Also charged in the indictment was Darnell
Bouie. Bouie’s trial occurred in the spring of
2014, This Court affirmed Bouie’s felony-murder
and conspiracy to commit burglary convictions
in State v. Bouie, 235 W.Va. 709, 723, 776 8.B.2d
606, 620 (2015).

3, West Virginia Code § 61-2-1 provides, in part:
Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprison-
ment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing, or in the commis-
sion of, or attempt to commit, arson, kidnap-
ping, sexual assault, robbery, burglary,
breaking and entering, escape from lawful
custody, or a felony offense of manufacturing
or delivering a controlled substance as de-
fined in article four, chapter sixty-a of this
code, is murder of the first degree.

4. West Virginia Code § 61-3-11 provides, in
part:

(@) Burglary shall be a felony and any per-

son convicted thereof shall be confined in

251

LOUGHRY, Justice:

The petitioner, Ennis C. Payne II, appeals
the January 29, 2015, order of the Cireuit
Court of Harrison County through which he
‘was sentenced to life imprisonment with mer-
ey for his first degree murder conviction, to
be followed by one to five years imprison-
ment for his conspiracy to commit burglary
conviction. Seeking to set aside his convic-
tions, the petitioner challenges the denial of
his motions to suppress evidence and to
change venue; his appearance in the court-
room in jail attire and restraints during jury
voir dire; and cumulative error, Following a
careful review of the briefs, the arguments of
counsel, the record submitted, and the appli-
eable law, this Court finds no reversible er-
ror and affirms the petitioner’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural Background!

In the early fall 2012, the petitioner and
Darnell Bouie were arrested in connection
with the death of Jayar Poindexter. On May
7, 2018, a Harrison County grand jury re-
turned indictment No, 13-F-112-3 charging
the petitioner? with first degree murder in
violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-1
(2014)? and conspiracy to commit burglary in
violation of West Virginia Code §§ 61-38-11
(2014) and § 61-10-31 (2014).5 They were
tried separately.’ The petitioner’s trial oc-
curred over the course of five days in No-

the penitentiary not less than one nor more
than fifteen years. If any person shall, in the
nighttime, break and enter, or enter without
breaking, or shall, in the daytime, break and
enter, the dwelling house, or an outhouse
adjoining thereto or occupied therewith, of
another, with intent to commit a crime
therein, he shall be deemed guilty of burgla-
ry.

3. West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 provides, in
part:

It shall be unlawful for two or more persons
to conspire (1) to commit any offense against
the State if ... one or more of such persons
does any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy.

Any person who violates the provisions of
this section by conspiring to commit an of-
fense against the State which is a felony ...
shall be guilty of a felony.

6 See n.2, supra,

252

vember 2014 during which the State proceed-
ed on a. theory of felony-murder with the
predicate felony being the conspiracy to com-
mit burglary. The State presented the testi-
mony of thirty-two witnesses and seventy-
three of its exhibits were admitted into evi-
dence.’ The petitioner presented the testimo-
ny of one witness, and his five exhibits were
admitted into evidence. The petitioner did
not testify.

The evidence at trial demonstrated ‘that
during the evening of January 12, 2010, Dar-
nell Bouie, Michael Thomas, and Michael
Moran traveled to the Ordinary Bar in
Clarksburg, West Virginia. At approximately
12:51 a.m. on January 18, 2010, security cam~-
eras:in the area captured the petitioner, En-
nis Payne, entering the same bar. At that
time, he was wearing 4 Pittsburgh Pirates
“P” baseball hat and dark Timberland-type
boots.

Around 8:00 a.m., the petitioner, Bouie,
Moran, and Thomas left the Ordinary Bar
traveling in two vehicles—a car belonging to
Thomas and a truck that Leonard Hickey

had loaned to Bouie that evening at the
Ordinary Bar. Although Hickey had left the
bar earlier that evening, he later rejoined the
group, after which the men traveled in the
two vehicles to the Quarry Apartments locat-
ed on Overlook Drive in Clarksburg, West
Virginia. After arriving at the Quarry Apart-
ments, where the victim resided, the petition-
er and Bouie exited the vehicles, while the
other men waited inside the vehicles for their
return. Moran testified that after waiting for
some time, he exited Thomas’ car to see
where the'petitioner and Bouie had gone but,

7. The State’s exhibits included various photo-
graphs of the crime scene, surveillance videos,
screen shots taken from surveillance videos, shoe
castings taken at the crime scene, the .25 caliber
bullet taken from the victim, the .25 caliber cas-
ing found at the crime scene, an ammunition
magazine containing four .25 caliber cartridges,
and other evidence, as discussed infra.

8. Hall testified at trial that she could not, recall
either seeing a gun or hearing a gunshot.

9. One of the petitioner's relatives testified that
the petitioner came to see him a couple of days
after the murder; that the petitioner told him
that he shot the victim in a “robbery gone bad”;
that he did not think anyone was home at the
victim's apartment; and that someone “ended up
dead.” When asked whether the petitioner had

after walking for only a few seconds, he saw
the petitioner and Bouie walking quickly
back to the vehicles.

Jennifer Hall, the victim’s girlfriend at the
time of his death, testified that she had been
asleep in bed on the night in question when
she awoke to find the victim and another
person, whom she could not see, struggling
at the bedroom window. She stated that the
victim stopped struggling and fell to the floor
in a “frog-like” position’ In an effort to
conceal herself, Ms. Hall hid on the floor
near the bottom of the bed. Her call to 911
was made at 8:30 am. that morning. She
testified that she did not alter the crime
scene or anything else in the apartment prior
to the arrival of the Clarksburg Police: The
victim died of a gunshot wound to his chest.

Officers responded to the crime scene,
Photographs and cast molds were taken of
footprints discovered in the snow leading
both to and from the victim's bedroom win-
dow. Photographs were also taken of the
victim’s bedroom window, which the officers
discovered half-raised with the screen “cut or
torn.” A .25 caliber casing was recovered at
the scene, Later that day, a resident of the
apartment complex informed police that he
had observed a Pittsburgh Pirates “P” base-
ball hat on the grounds of the apartment
complex around 7:30 a.m. that morning. The
police recovered the hat, Surveillance video
taken prior to the crime on January 13, 2010,

“showed the petitioner near the’ Quarry

Apartments wearing a baseball cap.
The evidence at trial showed that after the
petitioner and the other men left the Quarry

indicated the purpose of the robbery, the relative
stated, “Money, drugs, money, I don't know.”

10. Surveillance video footage showed that Bouie
was the only person in the group wearing sneak-
ers on the night in question. An expert witness
for the State identified one of the sets of foot-

- prints as belonging'to a Nike tennis shoe.

11, The petitioner's trial counsel stated during
closing arguments that Moran killed the victim,
citing Moran’s ownership of footwear within one
size of the petitioner's shoe size and similar to
the footprints found outside the victim’s bedroom
window, The petitioner’s counsel also noted the
possible presence—as documented in police pho-
tographs—of a cigarillo filter on the victim's ex-
terior windowsill. Both Moran and the petitioner
were known to smoke cigarillos.

Apartments, they traveled to a nearby Go-
Mart, where security cameras captured their
arrival at 3:35 am. The gas station video
depicts the petitioner wearing what appears
to be dark boots and a jacket with white
stripes, but without the Pittsburgh Pirates
hat that area surveillance cameras had cap-
tured him wearing earlier that evening.
Thereafter, the petitioner was dropped off at
the home of his friend, Timothy Starks,
where Starks resided with his wife and chil-
dren, The petitioner had been staying “off
and on” in the first floor “living room area”
of Starks’ home over a fairly short period of
time, “crashing there when he needed to,” 2
Starks testified that when the petitioner ar-
rived around 4:00 am. that morning, the
-petitioner was carrying two guns. When
Starks awoke later that morning, the peti-
tioner was gone without any indication as to
whether he would return, The petitioner left
behind a cell phone and a Carhartt-type jack-
et}® slung over a chair in the foyer of the
first floor living area of Starks’ home.

On January 15, 2010, Clarksburg Police
Officer Mike Fazzini went to Starks’
home™ to inquire as to the petitioner’s
whereabouts. Starks did not know where the
petitioner was, but asked whether he should
keep or dispose of the petitioner’s Carhartt
jacket that the petitioner had left behind on a
chair in the foyer of Starks’ home. Fazzini
told Starks that he should “hang onto” the
jacket and then contacted Detective Wygal,
who came to Starks’ residence. Thereafter,
Starks signed a consent-to-search form for
the first floor. living, kitchen, and downstairs
bathroom of his home. Upon executing ‘the

12, This particular testimony was given by Starks
during a suppression hearing.

13, This jacket is referred to as both a “Carhartt
jacket” and a “Carhartt-type jacket.” For ease of
reference, we refer to it as either a “Carhartt
jacket” or “jacket” for purposes of this opinion.

14. Because nearly five years passed between the
victim's murder and the petitioner's trial, many
officers with the Clarksburg Police Department
had changed ranks or jobs, For purposes of this
opinion, we use their ranks and titles at the time
of the victim's murder.

15, The record indicates that Fazzini and Starks
were friends, having known each other since
childhood.

253

search, Starks confirmed that the Carhartt
jacket on a chair in the foyer of the lower
living area belonged to the petitioner. Inside
a jacket pocket, Fazzini found an ammunition
magazine containing four .25. caliber car-
tridges and court documents bearing the pe-
titioner’s name, The officers seized the jacket
and its contents. an

On January 24, 2010, Clarksburg Police
Sergeant Joshua Cox, the lead detective on
the case, filed an Affidavit and Complaint for
Search Warrant (hereinafter “affidavit”) for a
“white one story residence” located at 118
Anderson Street, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
which is where the petitioner resided.’ The
items sought by Sergeant Cox were a “black
jacket with white stripes on the sleeve and
white stripes around the collar, boots or
shoes, and any .25 caliber firearm, .25 caliber
ammunition or container, knife, box cutter,
cell phone, pager, any clothing bearing blood
stains and any gray shirts.” A circuit court

“judge issued the search warrant and, during

the execution of the warrant, officers discov-
ered and seized, among other items, two
pairs of Timberland boots—one black pair
(size 10.5) and one tan pair (size 8.5)—and a
pair of white. Nike tennis shoes (size 9).
During trial, an expert for the State testified
that the petitioner’s size 10.5 Timberland
boots fit the impression of the boot taken at
the crime scene, although he could not deter-
mine whether the petitioner’s boots actually
made the ‘impression given the absence of
any individual features in either the boots or
the impression.

In November 2010, Sergeant Cox traveled
to a federal correctional facility 7 to execute
a search warrant for the petitioner's DNA'8

46. When questioned during 4 suppression hear-
ing as to how he knew the petitioner's address,
Sergeant Cox testified, as follows:

Q. How were you aware that 118 Anderson
Street was, in fact, the residence of the de-

- fendant?

” A. Because I’ve known B.C, [Ennis Payne]
practically all of my life and also we—I ran
his driver's license or his ID number and it
came back to 118 Anderson Street.

17. The petitioner was incarcerated in the facility
on unrelated federal firearms charges,

18. Investigators wanted a sample of the petition-
er’s DNA.to compare with DNA that was taken

254

and to ascertain the petitioner's foot size.
Sergeant Cox advised the petitioner that his
DNA was being obtained to compare it to
DNA recovered from the Pittsburgh Pirates
hat found at the Quarry Apartments. The
petitioner admitted the hat belonged to him,
but added that other persons also wore the
hat. While Sergeant Cox was measuring the
petitioner's foot, the petitioner volunteered
that he wore a “ten something.”

During pretrial hearings held on February
12 and 18, 2014, the trial court received
evidence on the petitioner’s motions to sup-
press the Carhartt jacket and the ammuni-
tion magazine, which had been seized at
Starks’ residence, as well as the evidence
seized during the execution of the search
warrant at the petitioner’s home. Sergeant
Cox recited the evidence recovered at the
crime scene, the images that had been cap-
tured on the night in question by various
surveillance cameras, and the evidence recov-
ered through the execution of the search
warrant at the petitioner’s residence, includ-
ing boots and tennis shoes. Sergeant Cox
testified that his affidavit seeking the search
warrant for the petitioner’s residence con-
tained facts within his personal knowledge
and was based upon probable cause. Officer
Fazzini and Detective Wygal testified re-

from the shoes seized at the petitioner’s home

and from the Pittsburgh Pirates hat recovered at
the Quarry Apartments.

19. Sergeant Cox also described telephone com-
munications made by the petitioner while he was
incarcerated at the North Central Regional Jail
during which he threatened witnesses, including
Starks, who confirmed the threat during his testi-
mony. .

20, During a pre-trial hearing held on May 27,
2014, the trial judge observed

‘Well, there has been a history of Mr, Payne
.++ refusing to come out of his cell, refusing
to appear in court, and as the Court recalls
at least on one occasion, he battered an
inmate, I hear, in the holding facility when
he was scheduled for a court appearance in
this case.

21, The petitioner repeatedly sought new counsel,
which resulted in four attorneys being removed
from his case, new counsel being appointed, and
five trial dates being continued. The petitioner

garding their search of the first floor of
Starks’ home with Starks’ written consent
during which the petitioner’s Carhartt jacket
and the .25 caliber ammunition magazine
were found. Starks’ testimony corroborated
that given by Fazzini and Wygal, including
his consent to the search of his residence,

By order entered on May 16, 2014, the
trial court denied the petitioner’s motions to
suppress. Regarding the evidence seized at
Starks’ residence, the trial court found that
Starks had authority to consent to the search
of the first floor of his home where the
petitioner had stayed and where the jacket
and ammunition magazine were found. Re-
garding the evidence seized from the peti-
tioner’s residence, the trial court found that
under the totality of the circumstances, par-
ticularly the surveillance video that placed
the petitioner near the victim’s residence at
the time he was murdered, there was suffi-
cient information in Sergeant Cox’s affidavit
to support a finding of probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.

The record reflects that throughout this
criminal proceeding, the petitioner refused to
appear in court for hearings and other pro-
ceedings, refused to leave his jail and/or
courthouse holding cell,2” refused to meet
with his counsel, and made threats towards
his counsel and their families, as well as
witnesses. He also previously threatened
courtroom security ?* when he indicated that

also filed several pro se motions requesting new
counsel, claiming counsel had a conflict of inter-
est because he had threatened their lives and the
lives of their families,

22. An example of the petitioner's recalcitrance
‘and disrespect is reflected in the following ex-
change that took place during the May 27, 2014,
pre-trial hearing after defense counsel advised
the trial court that the petitioner did not wish to
proceed in court that day:

Judge: Any suggestions you [defense coun-
sel] have to resolve this matter?

Defense Counsel: ... My primary concern is
that Mr. Payne receive a fair trial.

Judge: Well, that the Court’s concern and
that’s been the Court's concern all along.
‘And the Court’s advised Mr. Payne previous-
ly on the record that he’s his own worst
enemy, that he needs to cooperate with his
attorney.

Petitioner: Motherf--ker, I have been coop-
erating with my Goddamn attorney.

Judge: Mr, Payne, you be quiet.

Petitioner: I ain’t got to hear that shit. I'll
say what the f--k I want.

if he did not get want he wanted, he would
grab a deputy’s gun.” Based on this history,
the trial judge advised the petitioner, imme-
diately before jury voir dire began on No-
vember 3, 2014, as follows:

Mr. Payne, the Court is obviously con-
cerned with some of the actions that have
taken place here, and some of the com-
ments that have been made by you. How-
ever, the Court is going to do something
that it hasn’t done before, and that is ’'m
going to sign an order directing that in
order to preserve your fair—your right to
a fair trial and have you not appear in
orange or in leg shackles or handcuffs, I’m
going to sign an order directing that
what’s known as locomotion restrictive hu-
mane leg restraints be put on, and they be
put on underneath your street clothing so
that the jury cannot see or have any idea
that those are being used.

However, in the event that you do not
cooperate with those devices being install-
ed, or if you refuse to change in[to] street
clothes, then the Court will direct the bail-
iffs to bring you to the courtroom for the
jury trial in jail clothing and shackles and
handeuffs, which will remain on throughout
the trial.

woe

So the choice is yours at this point in
time. The Court's tried to accommodate
you as much as what it can, But this case
is going to trial, and hopefully you'll real-
ize, as the Court’s told you in the past, that
the only person you're going to be hurting
is yourself.

The petitioner was then placed in the custody
of the bailiff to allow him to put on the
humane restraints and street clothes. Soon
thereafter, the petitioner's counsel reported

Judge: You be quiet.
Petitioner: Whatever.
Judge: You be quiet.
Petitioner: What are you going to do throw
mé in jail?
Judge: Sir, 1 told you to be quiet and I
expect you to be quiet and let your attorney
talk,
Petitioner: You going to put me in jail?
Judge: I'll address you in a minute.
Petitioner: Raising your voice don't mean
nothing, It just means you lose control,
Judge: I am in control, sir.
Petitioner: You ain’t in control of nothing. You
just talking cause you got a pair of lips.

255

to the trial court that counsel had met with
the petitioner, who refused to change into the
street clothes and the humane restraints that
were made available to him. Counsel further
stated that when he advised the petitioner
that he should do so, the petitioner respond-
ed that he “wo[uldin’t be up there for long,”
which counsel interpreted as the petitioner’s
intent “to try to create some chaos” when he
came into the courtroom. Upon receiving this
information, the trial judge stated, as follows:
The defendant has left this Court with no
choice but based upon his attitude, his
demeanor, comments he’s made, and his
actions, refusing to come out of his cell on
occasion, refusing to be brought to hear-
ings, refusing to meet with his counsel, and
his now refusal to change into street
clothes. This is not the first time that the
defendant has done this with the case set
for trial. The Court is left with no choice
but to have him brought to the courtroom
in his jail clothing with shackles and hand-
cuffs...
Thereafter, the petitioner was brought into
the courtroom wearing jail attire, shackles,
and handcuffs, and the jury voir dire began.
The trial judge admonished the jury venire
with the following instruction:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
will note that the defendant is in jailhouse
clothing and handeuffs and shackles. The
reason for this is of no concern to you, and
shall not be considered by you for. any
reason in arriving at your verdict in this
case.

Tn fact, you shall not discuss this aspect
of the case at any time during your delib-
erations, The defendant is presumed under
the law to be innocent of all charges, and

23. The petitioner articulated this threat during a
telephone call that he made from the regional
jail. During the May 27, 2014, pre-trial hearing,
Sergeant Graeber, the officer charged with
courtroom security, proffered the following opin-
ion when the trial judge asked whether he be-
lieved the petitioner posed a security risk:

Sgt. Graeber: I think it’s obviously a con-
cern of mine and my deputies knowing that
he has nothing to lose at this point; that if
he’s made threats to grab a deputy's weap-
onf,] it’s a danger to everybody in this court-
room and the general public of Harrison
County who is visiting the building. There
may be an issue with safety concerns.

256

the only way the defendant can be convict-
ed of anything is if the State of West
Virginia produces sufficient evidence by
the testimony of witnesses and/or various
exhibits to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt each and every element of the of-
fenses charged. Then and only then, may
you find the defendant guilty of any of-
fense.

Again, you are to make no reference nor
speculate as to why the defendant may be
in custody at this time,

Do each of you understand and agree
that you will give no consideration to his
appearance in this case in arriving at your
verdict if you are selected to serve on the
jury for the trial of this case?

The entire jury pool answered in the affirma-
tive.

Several months prior to jury voir dire, the
petitioner had filed a motion for a change of
venue due to pre-trial publicity. The State
opposed the motion, asserting the petitioner
had failed to put forth any eyidence, other
than stories reported in local media, that
“there exists in this County a prejudice
against [the petitioner] so great that he can-
not obtain a fair and impartial trial in this
County,” or that “a present hostile sentiment
exists against [the petitioner], extending
throughout the entirety of Harrison County.”
The trial court deferred ruling on the motion
until jury selection. During voir dire, when
questioned regarding their prior knowledge
of the case, only two members of the jury
pool indicated they had some prior knowl-
edge based on news coverage; both stated
they had formed no opinion of the case, nor
could they recall specific information derived
from the news articles.”

Hl Following the presentation of evi-
dence, the jury returned its verdict finding
the petitioner guilty of first degree murder
with a recommendation of merey and con-

24, The appendix record includes several news
articles regarding the murder.

25. One of these two jurors was selected to sit on
the petitioner's jury.

26, Notwithstanding the failure to move for a new
trial, we find the errors assigned were fully de-
veloped, carefully considered, and ruled upon by
the trial court during pre-trial proceedings be-
low. Accordingly, we will address the same, See

spiracy to commit burglary. The petitioner
directed his counsel not to file a post-trial
motion for a new trial.”5 This appeal followed,

IL Standard of Review

The petitioner assigns errors that involve
varying standards of review. Accordingly, we
will set forth those standards in our discus-
sion of each issue as we proceed to determine
whether the petitioner is entitled to relief
from his convictions,

Il. Discussion

The petitioner seeks to overturn his con-
victions on grounds related to the denial of
his motions to suppress evidence and to
change venue, as well as his appearance in
restraints and jail attire during jury voir
dire. We address each of these assignments
of error, in turn, below.

A. Search and Seizure

I The petitioner asserts the trial court
erred by refusing to suppress the evidence
seized during the police search of Starks’
residence with Starks’ consent. Citing United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S; 164, 94 S.Ct. 988,
89 L.Hd.2d 242 (1974), the petitioner argues
that consent to search an item of personal
property can only be given by someone with
“common authority” over, or other sufficient
relationship with, the item to be inspected,
and that any notion that he abandoned his
jacket would eviscerate the principles an-
nounced in Matlock, Maintaining that Starks
‘was neither a user nor possessor of the jack-
et at the time it was searched, the petitioner
contends that while the police could observe
the jacket and notice things in plain view, the
officers exceeded the scope of the consent
search and trespassed upon his jacket by
seizing items from a pocket of the jacket,
rendering such evidence inadmissible at trial,

Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Jessie, 225 W.Va. 21, 24, 689
S,E,2d 21, 24 (2009) (“Although this Court has
held that a defendant may not assign an error for
the first time on appeal that could have been
. presented initially for review in a post-trial mo-
tion, failure to raise an issue in a post-trial mo-
tion will not prevent this Court from entertaining
that issue on appeal where it is clear that the
trial court carefully and completely considered
that specific issue in a pre-trial motion.").

Relying upon State v. Dorsey, 234 W.Va.
15, 26, 762 S.H.2d 584, 595 (2014), the State
asserts there was no error because an over-
night guest has a privacy interest when stay-
ing in another’s home against everyone but
the host and those whom the host permits to
enter his or her home. The State asserts the
petitioner abandoned any privacy interest he
had in his jacket by leaving it behind in a
common area of Starks’ home with no indica-
tion that he ever planned to return or to
retrieve it. Thus, the State maintains that
any expectation of privacy the petitioner
maintained in his jacket had already been
forfeited by him at the time Starks consented
to the search of his residence.

Hs In determining whether the seizure
of the petitioner's jacket and its contents was
constitutionally reasonable and whether the
cireuit court correctly denied the petitioner’s
motion to suppress the evidence recovered
from the jacket, our standard of review is
plenary:

In. contrast to a review of the circuit
court's factual findings, the ultimate deter-
mination as to whether a search or seizure
was reasonable under the Fourth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution and_

Section 6 of Article III of the West Virgi-
nia Constitution is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo.... Thus, a cireuit
court's denial of a motion to suppress evi-
dence will be affirmed unless it is unsup-
ported by substantial evidence, based on
an erroneous interpretation of the law, or,
based on the entire record, it is clear that
a mistake has been made,

Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Lacy, 196 Wa.

104, 107, 468 S.H.2d 719, 722 (1996). We have

also observed that .

[when reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, an appellate court should con-
strue all facts in the light most favorable to
the State, as it was the prevailing party
below. Because of the highly fact-specific
nature of a motion to suppress, particular
deference is given to the findings of the
circuit court because it had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses and to hear testi-
mony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit

27, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174,

257

eourt’s factual findings are reviewed for.

clear error,

Id, at 107, 468 S.H.2d at 722, syl. pt. 1,

While the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that an overnight guest has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a host’s
home, the Court also observed that “[flrom
the overnight guest’s perspective, ..: his
possessions will not be disturbed by anyone
but his host and those his host allows in-
side.” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99,
110 S.Ct, 1684, 109 L.Hd,2d 85 (1990) (em-
phasis added). Courts have found, based on
this observation in Olson, that an overnight
guest cannot challenge a search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment when their
host has consented to the police search. See,
e.g., United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858 (2d
Cit.1978) (finding no violation of defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights where owner con-
sented to search of home in which defendant,
stayed intermittently); Wigley v. State, 73
Ark. App, 899, 44 S.W.8d 751, 754 (2001)
(finding defendant, as overnight guest in
home, did not have reasonable expectation of
privacy because “an overnight guest has no
reasonable expectation of privacy when the
host, consents to the search”),

= Here, Starks voluntarily consented
to a police search of the first floor of his
home, “‘Where a person voluntarily and
knowingly consents to a search of his premis-
es, such a search may be conducted in the
absence of a search warrant,’ Syllabus Point
1, State v. Basham, 159 W.Va, 404, 228
S.E.2d 58 (1976).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v, Ham-
brick, 177 W.Va. 26, 350 S.E.2d 587 (1986).
Further, “(t]he State and Federal Constitu-
tions prohibit only’ unreasonable searches
and seizures and there are numerous situa-
tions in which a search and seizure warrant
is not needed, such as ... property that has
been abandoned, as well as searches and
seizures made that have been consented to,”
Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Angel, 154.W.Va.
615, 177 S.H.2d 562 (1970).

HM «Because “Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights [that] ... may not
be vicariously asserted[,]” 7 “we must begin
our analysis by first determining whether the

89 S.Ct, 961, 22 L,Ed.2d 176 (1969).

258

petitioner has standing to make a claim for
violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and Section 6 of Article IIT of
the West Virginia Constitution as a result of
the search and seizure of evidence from
[Starks’] residence.” Dorsey, 234 W.Va. at 21,
‘762 8.E.2d at 590, “ ‘The Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, and Arti-
ele III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Con-
stitution protect an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. Syl. Pt. 7, State v.
Peacher, 167 W.Va. 540, 280 S.E.2d 559
(1981).” Syl. Pt. 1, Wagner v. Hedrick, 181
W.Va. 482, 888 S.E.2d 286 (1989). In this
regard, we have recognized that a claim of
“protection under the Fourth Amendment
and the right to challenge the legality of a
search depends not upon a person’s property
right in the invaded place or article of per-
sonal property, but upon whether the person
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place or thing.” Hedrick, 181 W.Va.
at 487, 883 S.E.2d at 291 (citing Katz uv.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Consequently, “if
a person is in such a position that he cannot
reasonably expect privacy, a court may find
that an unreasonable Fourth Amendment
search has not taken place.” Hedrick, 181
W.Va. at 487, 383 S.E.2d at 291.

With specific regard to the seizure of the
petitioner's jacket and its contents, which he
left behind in Starks’ home, we observe that

[t]he touchstone of Fourth Amendment

analysis is whether a person has a “consti-

tutionally protected reasonable expectation

of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

847, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576

(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz posits

a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual

manifested a subjective expectation of pri-

vacy in the object of the challenged

search? Second, is society willing to recog-

nize that expectation as reasonable?
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106
S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). Under this
two-party inquiry, our analysis does not turn
on whether the petitioner retained an owner-
ship interest in the jacket, but whether he

28. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94
S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).

29. United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st
Cir, 1994),

retained a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the jacket and its contents. Critically, the
petitioner “blore] the burden of proving not
only that the search of [his jacket] was ille-
gal, but also that he had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in that [jacket].” Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556,
65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); see also Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 181 n.1, 99 S.Ct. 421,
58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (“The proponent of a
motion to suppress has the burden of estab-
lishing that his own Fourth amendment
rights were violated by the challenged search
and seizure.”),

HE (Relying upon Matlock,® the peti-
tioner asserts that Starks could consent to
the search of his own home, but not to the
search of the petitioner’s jacket. The peti-
tioner relies upon cases addressing whether
a person could consent to the search of the
interior of a closed item that belonged to
someone else, such as a briefcase found in
the locked trunk of a vehicle” and a foot-
locker located in the defendant’s bedroom.”
However, the relevant inquiry is not whether
the pocket of the petitioner’s jacket is a
closed “container,” but whether the petition-
er had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the jacket at the time of the search and
seizure. As we recently explained,

“one who asserts a Fourth Amendment
violation must demonstrate a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in the subject of the
seizure, That expectation is to be meas-
ured both subjectively and by an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Marano v.
Holland, 179 W.Va. 156, 168, 366 S.E.2d
117, 124 (1988). Thus, an expectation of
privacy is legitimate when an individual
demonstrates that he or she personally has
an expectation of privacy in the place
searched, and also demonstrates that the
expectation is reasonable. Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 489 U.S. 128, 143-44, 99 S.Ct, 421, 58
L.Ed.2d 887 (1978). In order for an expec-
tation to be “reasonable” it must have “a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or

30. United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir.
1978).

personal property law or to understand-

ings that are recognized and permitted by

society.” 489 U.S, at 143-144 n.12, 99 S.Ct.

421, In other words, the individual’s sub-

jective expectation of privacy must be “one

that society is prepared to recognize as

‘reasonable.’ ” Id.

Dorsey, 234 W.Va, at 22, 762 S.E.2d at 591.

In determining whether the petitioner met
his burden of proving that he had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the jacket, we
examine the evidence presented at the sup-
pression hearing ®! through a “highly fact-
specific” lens. Lacy, 196 W.Va. at 107, 468
8.E.2d at 722, syl. pt. 1, in part. Importantly,
such facts are to be “construe[d] ... in the
light most favorable to the State.” Lacy, 196
W.Va. at 107, 468 S.E.2d at 722, syl. pt. 1, in
part.

Construing the facts of the case at bar in
the light most favorable to the State, we find
the petitioner failed in his burden of proving
that he had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his jacket and, thus, lacks standing to
challenge the search. The suppression hear-
ing evidence demonstrated that Starks bailed
the petitioner out of jail at the end of Decem-
ber of 2009, after which the petitioner “just
kind of hung out” with the Starks family “a
little bit,’ sometimes staying at Starks’
house, or he might “stay with somebody
else[,]’ “crashing” at Starks’ home “when he
needed to.” The evidence also showed that.
the petitioner arrived at Starks’ home during
the early morning hours of January 18, 2010,
shortly after the murder. When Starks
awoke later that same morning, the petition-
er was gone, having relinquished possession
of his jacket by leaving it in the foyer of the
home, a common area. The petitioner gave
Starks no indication as to whether he would
ever return to Starks’ home, and he left no
instructions with regard to his jacket.

In short, the petitioner could not reason-
ably have expected that no one would ever
touch or handle his jacket that he had aban-
doned on a chair in the foyer of Starks’

31, See State v. Buzzard, 194 W.Va. 544, 552, 461
$.E.2d 50, 58 (1995) (“[T]here is no authority ...
that upon appellate review, we should consider
the ... testimony at trial in upholding the trial
court’s ruling which arose out of the pre-trial
suppression hearing”); State v. Farley, 192 W.Va.
247, 253-54 n.7, 452 S.B.2d 50, 56-57 n.7 (1994)

259

home, whether it be Starks, or his wife or
children, or people Starks invites into his
home, such as Detective Wygal and Officer
Fazzini, Other courts are in agreement that
persons by their acts and deeds can lose any
expectation of privacy in personal items. See
Brown v. United States, 97 A.8d 92, 96 (D.C.
2014) (citing United States v. Boswell, 847
A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975) (“ ‘The issue is not
abandonment in the strict property-right
sense but whether the person prejudiced by
the search had voluntarily discarded, left be-
hind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in
the property in question.’ ”); Hill v. United
States, 664 A2d 347 (D.C. 1995) (finding
defendants did not have legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in apartment where they
“sometimes” stayed, where they had stayed
previous night, and were good friends with
tenant); State v. Corbin, 194 Ohio App.8d
720, 957 N.E.2d 849 (2011) (finding defendant
had no expectation of privacy in contents of
bag he had abandoned in plain view at home
of third-party who consented to search of
home where defendant was occasional over-
night guest); State v, Francisco, 107 Wash.
App. 247, 26 P.8d 1008, 1012 (2001) (uphold-
ing search and seizure of gun at mother’s
home and observing that “[defendant’s] inter-
mittent use of his mother’s house as a place
to stay overnight, do laundry, and store
clothes does not suggest that he had authori-
ty to exclude anyone from the premises or
that he could legitimately expect that items
he left there would remain undisturbed.”),
Under the specific facts and circumstances
of the instant matter construed in the light
most favorable to the State, we find no error
in the admission of the evidence seized from
Starks’ home. Accordingly, we affirm the tri-
al court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
B. Probable Cause for Search Warrant
HM The petitioner asserts the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress the
evidence seized from his residence at 118
Anderson Street because the affidavit seek-
(‘Because the defendant did not renew his mo-
tion to suppress at trial, specifically after he had

testified, he is now foreclosed from using trial
testimony to challenge the trial court's ruling.”).

32. This was less than two weeks before the vic-
tim’s murder on January 13, 2010.

260

ing the search warrant lacked a proper nexus
between the criminal activity, the place
searched, and the items sought, The petition-
er argues that the sufficiency of the affidavit
for the probable cause determination must be
based solely.on the facts within the four
corners of the affidavit. He contends Ser-
geant Cox’s affidavit contained no facts to
connect 118 Anderson Street to any of the
items or activities described therein; used
knowledge of an uncorroborated hearsay in-
formant regarding phone calls; contained a
conclusory statement that the Pittsburgh Pi-
rates hat found at the scéne belonged to the
petitioner; and failed to state where and
when the petitioner’ was seen wearing the
hat.8 For these reasons, the petitioner ar-
gues that the evidence seized pursuant to the
search warrant, including a pair of size 10.5
Timberland boots, should have been sup-
pressed at trial.

The’ State responds that the trial court
correctly ruled that the evidence seized from
within the petitioner’s home was admissible
at trial. The State asserts that reviewing
courts should grant issuing courts deference
when reviewing warrants for probable cause,
judging such warrants under the totality of
the circumstances. Regarding the statement
in the affidavit that an individual said the
petitioner endeavored to phone the victim on
the night of the murder, the State maintains
a search warrant is not invalidated merely
because it contains a misrepresentation if,
absent the misrepresentation, the balance of
the affidavit supports a finding of probable
cause, Arguing there was probable cause for
the warrant to issue, the State cites the
strong surveillance video evidence, as de-
scribed in the affidavit, first depicting the
petitioner wearing the Pirates hat and later
showing him without thé hat, combined with
the fact that a Pirates hat was found at the
crime scene, The State asserts that the lack
of specific locations in the affidavit as to
where the petitioner was seen with or with-
out the hat “bears no weight as to probable
cause.” The State also notes that the affidavit
stated the victim was murdered with a .25-

33. Although the petitioner also asserts the affida-
vit was deficient because it described the ammu-
nition magazine seized from his jacket, we have
already determined that the trial court was cor-
rect in refusing to suppress this evidence,

caliber gun and that a .25-caliber'gun maga-
zine was found in the petitioner’s jacket at a
friend’s residence, Lastly, the State asserts
the affidavit sought “specific classes of
items,” which the surveillance video evidence
indicated the petitioner possessed.

. HH. It is well-established that “[bJoth the

Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article III, Section 6 of the
West Virginia Constitution provide that no
warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation.” Syl.
Pt, 8, State v. Adkins, 176 W.Va. 618, 346
S.E.2d 762 (1986); see also W.Va.R.Crim.P.
412) “A warrant shall issue only on an
affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the
magistrate or a judge of the circuit court and
establishing the grounds for issuing the war-
rant. If the magistrate or circuit judge is
satisfied that grounds for the application ex-
ist, or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, that magistrate or circuit
judge shall issue a warrant identifying the
property or person to be seized and naming
or, deseribing the person or place to be
searched, The finding of probable cause may
be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or
in part.”),

THs the instant matter, Sergeant
Cox sought a warrant to search 118 —
Anderson Street, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
based on the following information set forth
in his affidavit:

On 01-18-10, around 0880 hrs, Jayar

. Poindexter was shot and killed with a .25
caliber gun at the Overlook Apts * in Har-
rison County. According .to an individual,
EC Payne had throughout the night at-
tempted to make contact with the victim
by phone. EC Payne’s Pirate hat was lo-
cated on the ground, across from the vic-
tim’s residence. Surveillance video showed
around 0300 hours HC Payne was wearing
the hat, At 0386 hrs, EC Payne is observed
at the Go Mart in Bridgeport without the
hat. During a search of the coat belonging

34. The Quarry Apartments are located on Over-
look Drive, Throughout this criminal proceeding,
witnesses used the names’ “Overlook Apart-
ments” and:“Quarry Apartments” to refer to the
samie apartment complex.

to EC Payne at a friend’s residence, Offi-
cers recovered a .25 auto magazine con-
taining bullets.
(Footnote added). In determining whether
there was probable cause for the circuit court
to issue the search warrant based upon this
affidavit, we are guided by the following prin-
ciples:

Probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant exists if the facts and.cir-
cumstances provided to a magistrate in a
written affidavit are sufficient to warrant
the belief of.a prudent person of reason-
able caution that a crime has been commit-
ted and that the specific fruits, instrumen-
talities, or contraband from that crime
‘presently may be found at a specific loca-
tion, It is not enough that a magistrate
believes a crime has been committed, The
magistrate also must have a reasonable
belief that the place or person to be
searched will yield certain specific classes
of items. There must be a nexus between
.the criminal activity and the place or per-

“gon searched and thing seized. The proba-
ble cause determination does not depend
solely upon individual facts; rather, it de-
pends on the cumulative effect of the facts
in the totality of circumstances.

Syl. Pt. 8, State Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595, 598,
461 S.B.2d 101, 104 (1995). Further,

[in State v. Thomas, 187 W.Va. 686, 694,
421 S.B.2d 227, 285 (1992), we quoted, ap-
provingly the standard of review of the
sufficiency of a’ search warrant, affidavit
outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S, 218,
103 S.Ct. 2817, 76 L.Ed:2d 527 (1988):

[Wle have repeatedly said that after-the-
fact scrutiny by the courts of the sufficien-
ey of an affidavit should not take the form
of de novo review. A magistrate’s determi-
nation of probable cause should be paid
great deference by reviewing courts. A
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts toward warrants, is inconsistent
with the Fourth Amendment's strong pref-
erence for searches conducted pursuant to
a warrant; courts should not invalidate
warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a common-
sense, manner,

35, Lilly, 194 W.Va.-at 598, 461 S.E.2d at 104,

261

State v, Corey, 283 W.Va, 297, 803-04, 758
§.E.2d 117, 128-24 (2014).

HM Applying these standards, we find
Sergeant Cox’s affidavit established probable
cause for the circuit court to issue the search
warrant. While the petitioner characterizes
thé reference in the affidavit to the Pirates
hat as being conclusory, the affidavit pro-
vides that this hat was discovered on the
ground near the victim’s apartment and that
surveillance video’ captured the petitioner
wearing a Pirates hat shortly before the mur-
der, but. not wearing it shortly after the
murder. Further, even if we were to remove
the statement concerning the petitioner at-
tempting to call the victim on the night of the
murder, we find the balancé of the informa-
tion in the affidavit was sufficient for the
circuit court to find probable cause to issue
the warrant, As we have previously held, “[a]
search warrant affidavit is not invalid even if
it contains a misrepresentation, if, after strik-
ing the misrepresentation, there remains suf-
ficient content to support a finding of proba-
ble cause, Probable cause is evaluated in the
totality of the circumstances.” Syl. Pt. 2,
State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va, 595, 598, 461 S.E.2d
101, 104 (1995), The affidavit further provid-
ed that the victim was shot and killed with a
.25:caliber gun and that officers had -recov-
ered a .25 caliber ammunition magazine from
the jacket the petitioner left behind at a
friend’s home. Based upon the “cumulative
effect of the facts in the totality of circum-
stances,” 95 and viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, we find

‘Sergeant’ Cox’s affidavit contained ample in-

formation establishing probable cause for the
circuit court’s issuance of the ‘search warrant.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the éxe-
cution of the warrant.

Cc. Venue

Hs The petitioner asserts the trial court
erred by failing to grant his motion for a
change of venue, alleging that newspaper
articles and extensive media coverage was so
prejudicial as to warrant either the removal
of his trial to another county or a change of

syl. pt. 3,inpart, -

262

venire by summoning potential jurors from
another county. Noting that West Virginia
Code § 62-83-18 (2014) provides that “[a]
court may, on the petition of the accused and
for good cause shown, order the venue of the
trial of a criminal case in such court to be
removed to some other county[,]” the peti-
tioner asserts that “good cause shown”
means the establishment of a “present, hos-
tile sentiment” against the accused through-
out the county in which the offense occurred,
which precludes the defendant from receiv-
ing a fair trial. Although the petitioner con-
cedes that prejudicial pre-trial publicity alone
is insufficient to require a change of venue
and that prejudice must be proven, he main-
tains that he suffered “substantial prejudice”
due to “extensive and voluminous” media
coverage in the community,

The State responds that the trial court
correctly denied the motion as there was
insufficient evidence to support a change of
venue, Noting the burden of proof for any
change of venue motion rests with the mov-
ant, the State maintains that the decision on
whether to grant a change of venue should
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
abuse of discretion. The State points out that
during -voir dive, only two potential jurors
recalled hearing news of the victim’s murder
or of the petitioner’s arrest as a suspect;
neither had formed an opinion of the case
based upon the news articles; and neither
could recall specific information derived from
the news articles.

HM It has long been the law in this
state.that

“{t]o warrant a change of venue in a
criminal case, there must be a showing of
good cause therefor, the burden of which
rests on the defendant, the only person
who, in any such case, is entitled to a
change of venue, The good cause aforesaid
must exist at the time application for a
change of venue is made. Whether, on the
showing made, a change of venue will be
ordered, rests in the sound discretion of

_ the trial court; and its ruling thereon will
not be disturbed, unless it clearly appears
that the discretion aforesaid has been
abused.” Syl. pt. 2, State v Wooldridge,
129 W.Va. 448, 40 S.E.2d 899 (1946).

Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Wilkams, 172 W.Va. 295,
805 S.E.2d 251 (1983). Importantly, “[wlide-
spread publicity, of itself, does not require
change of venue, and neither does proof that
prejudice exists against an accused, unless it
appears that the prejudice against him is so
great that he cannot get a fair trial.” Syl. Pt.
1, State v. Gangwer, 169 W.Va. 177, 286
S,E.2d 889 (1982). Moreover, a change of
venue will not be granted unless “a present.
hostile sentiment against the accused, ex-
tending throughout the entire county in
which he is brought to trial[,]’ is shown. Syl.
Pt. 1, in part, State v. Peacher, 167 W.Va.
540, 280 $.H.2d 559 (1981) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1,
State v. Siers, 108 W.Va. 30, 186 S.E, 508
(1927).

HM Here, the trial court delayed ruling
on the petitioner’s motion for a change of
venue until after jury voir dire, which ulti-
mately proved unavailing to the petitioner.
Indeed, “[oJne of the inquiries on a motion
for a change of venue should not be whether
the community remembered or heard the
facts of the case, but whether the jurors had
such fixed opinions that they could not judge
impartially the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant.” Syl. Pt, 8, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va.
165, 167, 451 S.E.2d 781, 788 (1994). As the
State points out, only two jurors had any
recollection of news coverage of the matter
and both indicated, unequivocally, that they
had no fixed opinions regarding the matter.

Although the petitioner asserts that preju-
dicial newspaper articles were magnified by
the low crime rate in his small community,
the fact remains that even if he had been
able to establish that any prejudice existed
against him, a change of venue would still not
have been warranted unless he could demon-
strate that the “prejudice against him [was]
so great that he [could not] get a fair trial.”
Gangwer, 169 W.Va. at 177, 286 S.B.2d at
391, syl. pt. 1, in part. Jury voir dire simply
did not demonstrate the prejudice about
which the petitioner speculated.

HE “Whether a change of venue is war-
ranted rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be
disturbed, unless it clearly appears that such
discretion has been abused.” Gangwer, 169
W.Va. at 177, 286 S.E.2d at 391, syl. pt. 2.

Based on the record before us, we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s deci-
sion that a change of venue was not warrant-
ed in this matter.

D. Jail attire

HI The petitioner asserts the trial court
deprived him of his constitutional right to a
presumption of innocence by compelling him
to wear orange jail attire and to be re-
strained in handcuffs and leg shackles in the
presence of the jury during voir dire. Relying
upon Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96
S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), the peti-
tioner asserts that courts cannot compel de-
fendants to stand trial while dressed in
“identifiable prison clothes....” Id. at 512,
96 S.Ct, 1691. The petitioner contends the
trial court erred by failing to permit him to
be absent from jury selection after he re-
fused to wear the street attire that was pro-
vided to him.

While agreeing that a criminal defendant
has a fundamental right not to be forced to
attend trial in identifiable prison attire, the
State asserts that a criminal defendant may
waive a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution, so long as the right was know-
ingly and willingly waived. Maintaining that
the petitioner’s repeated threats and state-
ments throughout pre-trial hearings suffice
this standard, the State recounts the efforts
made by the trial judge and the petitioner’s
counsel to have the petitioner to change into
the street attire provided to him. Because the
petitioner refused to do so, the State asserts
the petitioner waived his right not to appear
during voir dire in orange jail attire. We
agree.

HMM There is no question that “[a]
criminal defendant has the right under the
Due Process Clause of our State and Federal
Constitutions not to be forced to trial in
identifiable prison attire.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part,
State ew vel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W.Va.
129, 254 S.H.2d 805 (1979). Further, “‘{a]
criminal defendant has the right, absent
some necessity relating to courtroom security
or order, to be tried free of physical re-
straints.’” Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Brewster, 164

36. The parties represent that the petitioner ap-
peared throughout the remainder of his trial in

263

‘W.Va. 178, 261 S.E.2d 77 (1979). In address-
ing this issue of constitutional dimension, our
review is plenary. See State v. Finley, 219
W.Va. 747, 749, 689 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2006)
(addressing issue of defendant appearing at
trial in jail attire and finding that “[t]he issue
... calls on us to examine a question of
constitutional dimension and as such,
‘{w]here the issue on an appeal from the
circuit court is clearly a question of law ...
we apply a de novo standard of review.’ Syl.
Pt. 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L.,
194 W.Va, 188, 189, 459 S.E.2d 415, 416
(1995).”).

As indicated above, the record is replete
with the petitioner's threats to his counsel,
his counsel’s families, witnesses, and court-
room security; his insulting language direct-
ed to the trial judge; his disruptive behavior;
and finally his trial counsel’s stated belief
that the petitioner was going “to try to cre-
ate some chaos” in the courtroom during jury
voir dire. The record indisputably demon-
strates that the trial court went to great
lengths to protect the petitioner’s constitu-
tional rights, while also assuring courtroom
security, by offering and making available
passive restraints to be worn under the
street clothes. The petitioner’s flat out re-
fusal to change into the street clothing and
passive restraints prompted the trial judge to
find that “{tJhe Court is left with no choice
but to have him [the petitioner] brought to
the courtroom in his jail clothing with shack-
les and handeuffs.”

It is abundantly clear that every effort was
made by the trial judge and defense counsel
to have the petitioner change into the street
attire and the humane restraints. The peti-
tioner’s blatant refusal to do so leads us to
the ineluctable conclusion that the petitioner
knowingly and intelligently waived his right
not to wear jail attire. See State v. Eden, 163
W.Va. 370, 878, 256 S.E.2d 868, 873 (1979)
(“An accused may, by declaration and con-
duct, waive a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution, but it must be demonstrat-
ed that the waiver was made knowingly and
intelligently.”). Moreover, we find no merit in
the petitioner’s contention that he should

street clothing.

264

have been absented from jury voir dire due
to his refusal to change into street clothing.
Critically, the petitioner never asked to be
absent from voir dire. Had the trial court,
sua sponte, refused to allow-the petitioner to
bein the courtroom in jail attire during voir
dire, the trial court would have denied the
petitioner his constitutional right to be pres-
ent at a critical stage of his criminal proceed-
ings, See Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va.
284, 283 S.E.2d 710 (1977) (“The defendant
has a right under Article III, Section 14 of
the West Virginia Constitution to be present
at all critical stages in the criminal proceed-
ing; and when he is not, the State is re-
quired to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
that what transpired in his absence was
harmless.”); see also W.Va, R.Crim, P. 48(a)
(The defendant shall be present ... at ev-
ery state of the trial....”), For these rea-
sons, we find no error in this regard.57
IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the petition-
er’s conviction for first degree murder and
conspiracy to commit burglary are hereby

affirmed.

Affirmed,
800 S.E.2d 850
Patrick D, LEGGETT, et al., Plaintiffs
Below, Petitioners
Y. :
-EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants Below, Respondents
: » No. 16-0136
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Rehearing Granted: January 25, 2017
Submitted Upon Rehearing: May 2, 2017
Filed: May 26, 2017

37. The petitioner also asserts that the cumulative
effect of the errors he has alleged deprived him
of his constitutional right .to a fair trial and
warrants a reversal of his convictions. See Syl.

Pt, 5, State v, Smith, 156 W.Va. 385, 193 SE.2d |

550 (1972) (“Where the record of a criminal trial
shows that the cumulative effect of numerous

errors committed during the trial prevented the
defendant from receivitig a fair trial, his convic-
tion should be set aside, even though any one of
such errors standing alone would be harmless
error.”). Having failed to demonstrate any error
in the proceedings below, there is no basis to
invoke the cumulative error doctrine.

h LETT

no
S
a

Pi dt

Marvin W. Masters, Esq., Richard A. Mon-
ahan, Esq., April D. Ferrebee, Esq., The
Masters Law Firm le, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, and Michael W. Carey, Esq., Carey,
Scott, Douglas & Kessler, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, Attorneys for Petitioners

David K. Hendrickson, Esq, Carl L.
Fletcher, Jr., Esq. Hendrickson & Long
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys
for Respondents

Howard M. Persinger, III, Esq., Persinger
& Persinger, L. C., Charleston, West Virgi-
nia, Attorney for Amici Curiae, West Virginia
Land and Mineral Owners’, Association,
West Virginia Royalty Owners’, Association,
West Virginia Farm Bureau, National Asso-
ciation of Royalty Owners, Appalachia, and
Lewis Maxwell Oil & Gas LLC

Timothy M. Miller, Esq., Mychal S. Schulz,
Esq., Katrina N. Bowers, Esq., Babst, Cal-
land, Clements & Zomnir, P. C., Charleston,
West Virginia, Attorneys for Amici Curiae,
West Virginia Oil and Natural Gas Associa-
tion, and West Virginia Independent Oil and
Gas, Association

Michael J. Hammond, Esq., Dodaro, Matta
& Cambest, P. C., Canonsburg, Pennsylva-

nia, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Bounty Min-
erals, LLC

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

This case is before the Court upon certi-
fied questions presented by the United
States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of West Virginia regarding whether this
Court’s decision in Tawney v. Columbia Nat-
ural Resources, L.L.C., 219 W.Va. 266, 638
S.E.2d 22 (2006), has “any effect” upon
whether a lessee of an oil and/or gas lease
subject to West Virginia Code § 22-6-8
(1994) may deduct post-production expenses
from the lessor’s royalty. Upon original hear-
ing, a majority of this Court reformulated the
certified question and held that royalties paid
pursuant to leases which were subject. to
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 could not be
“diluted” by costs incurred downstream from
the wellhead, nor could amounts attributable
to loss or beneficial use of volume be deduct-
ed prior to calculation of royalties.

However, upon careful review of the briefs
on rehearing, the appendix record, the argu-
ments of the parties and amici curiae, and
the applicable legal authority, we conclude
that both the legislative intent and language
utilized in West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 per-
mits allocation or deduction of- reasonable
post-production expenses actually incurred
by the lessee and more specifically permits
use of the “net-back” or “work-back” method
of royalty calculation.

1, The West Virginia Land and Mineral Owners’
Association, West Virginia Royalty Owners’ Asso-
ciation, West Virginia Farm Bureau, National
Association of Royalty Owners, Appalachia, Lew-
is Maxwell Oil &Gas LLC, and Bounty Minerals,
LLC. provided amici briefs in support of the
petitioners’ position. The West Virginia Oil and
Natural Gas Association and West Virginia Inde-
pendent Oil and Gas Association provided amici
briefs in support of EQT’s position, The Court
acknowledges and enpresses its appreciation for
their submissions,

2. The statute was originally codified at West Vir-
ginia Code § 22-4-1 (1982) and subsequently re-
codified at West Virginia Code § 22B-1-8 (1985)
before ultimately being recodified a final time at
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 (1994).

3. Also named were EQT Energy, EQT Investment
Holdings, BOT Gathering, and EOT Midstream
Partners. EQT explains that EQT Production is
the exploration and development company which

267

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

The petitioners Patrick D. Leggett, et al
(hereinafter “the petitioners”) are owners of
a 75% undivided interest in the gas estate of
a 2,000-acre tract in Doddridge County. Cer-
tain wells on ‘the property are “flat-rate”
wells, i.e. wells for which the lease provides
for payment of a sum certain per well, per
year. In 1982, the Legislature enacted the
predecessor of West Virginia Code § 22-6-8,2
which provides that permits for flat-rate
wells will not be issued unless the lessee
swears by affidavit that it will pay the lessor
no less than one-eighth “of the total amount
paid to or received by or allowed to [the
lessee] at the wellhead for the oil or gas so
extracted, produced or marketed[.]” (empha-
sis added). -

The petitioners filed suit against respon-
dent EQT Production Company and affiliated
companies (hereinafter “EQT”)® for under-
payment of royalties, resulting from EQT’s
deduction of certain costs incurred for the
gathering and transporting of the gas to the
interstate pipeline. In particular, EQT takes
the full price it obtains by selling the gas at
the interstate pipeline and deducts “some” of
the costs (“midstream” costs or “postproduc-
tion” costs) incurred after it is extracted,‘ but.
before it reaches the market at the pipeline.
EQT maintains that the only way to capture
the statutorily-required “wellhead” price is to
utilize this so-called “net-back” or “work-

“acquires the leases, drills the wells, and pro-
duces the gas, and bears all of the costs of doing
so.” EQT Gathering is the “midstream compa-
ny,” which “constructs and operates the gather-
ing lines and compressors necessary to move the
gas from the wells to the interstate pipeline.”
Finally, EOT Energy is the “sales company,”
which buys the gas from.EQT Production and
sells it to third parties. All of the claims against
these defendants were dismissed in the action
before the District Court, leaving only EQT Pro-
duction Company as the named defendant. .

4, EOT asserts that it only deducts “some,” not
all of its midstream costs. In particular, it states
that it does not make deductions for deprecia-
tion, income taxes, or return (ie. profit). The
petitioners, however, dispute this and further as-
sert that these costs are payable to sister compa-
nies of EQT which makes the costs susceptible’ to
overinflation. The petitioners further allege that
nominal sales are made to sister companies for
the purpose of reducing the petitioners’ royalties.

268

back” method which deducts postproduction
expenses from the sales price to duplicate
the “wellhead” price. The petitioners contend
that neither West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)
nor the common law of West Virginia permit
deduction or allocation of costs in this man-
ner for purposes of royalty calculation.

Tl Accordingly, the District Court certi-
fied the following questions to this Court
pursuant to the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act, West Virginia Code
§ B1-LA-1 (1996) e¢ seq.: :

1, Does Tawney v. Columbia Natural

Resources, LLC, 219 W.Va. 266, 633

S.E.2d 22 (2006), which was decided after

the enactment of West Virginia Code § 22-

6-8, have any effect upon the Court’s deci-

sion as to whether a lessee of a flat-rate

lease, converted pursuant to West: Virginia

Code § 22-6-8, may deduct post-production

expenses from his lessor’s royalty, particu-

larly with respect to the language of “1/8

at the wellhead” found in West Virginia

Code § 22-6-8(e)? ; :

-2. Does West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 pro-

hibit flat-rate royalties only for wells

drilled or reworked after the statute’s en-
actment and modify only royalties paid on

a per-well basis where permits for new

wells or to modify existing wells are

sought, or do the provisions of West Virgi-
nia Code § 22-6-8 abrogate flat-rate leases

in their entirety? 5
(footnote added),

I STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has consistently held
that “‘[a] de novo standard is applied by this
court in addressing the legal issues present-
ed by certified question from a federal dis-
trict or appellate court” Syl. Pt. 1, Light v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 208 W.Va. 27; 506 S.E.2d 64
(1998).” Syl. Pt. 2, Atkens v. Débow, 208
W.Va, 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000). Moreover,
“{whhere the issue on an appeal ... is clearly

5, Like the previous majority, this Court declines
to answer the second certified question. The pre-
vious majority found that it could “discern no
claim with respect to the older wells that were
drilled prior to the statute’s enactment,” finding
it, therefore irrelevant whether West Virginia
Code § 22-6-8 abrogated flat-rate leases, as quer-
ied in the second certified question. Critically,
neither EOT nor the petitioners sought rehearing
on the previous majority's conclusion that the

a question of law or involving an interpreta-
tion of a statute, we apply a de novo standard
of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Char-
lie AL. 194 W.Va, 188, 459 S.E.2d 415
(1995), With this standard of review in mind,
we proceed to the remaining certified ques-
tion.

II. DISCUSSION

Hl Upon review of EQT’s petition for
rehearing; this Court determined that sub-
stantial justice required us to revisit the
prior opinion issued in this matter to ascer-
tain whether the previous majority had mis-
apprehended certain points of law. See W.
Va. R. App. Proce. 25(b) (“A petition for re-
hearing is granted only in exceptional cases.
The petition shall ....state with particularity
the point of law or fact which‘in the opinion
of the petitioner the Court has overlooked or
misapprehended[.]”), While an ' admittedly
uncommén occurrence, rehearing exists ex-
pressly for the purpose of ensuriig that
opinions which are not well-founded due to
misapprehension of the issues, the law, or
the facts are rectified. Justice demands this
procedural remedy, which this Court has ju-
diciously utilized when the issues or outcome
demand it. See Knotts v. Grafton City Hosp.,
237 W.Va. 169, 786 S.E.2d 188 (2016) (revers-
ing and remanding upon rehearing after
original affirm); W. Va. Regt Jail & Corr.
Facility Auth, v. A.B., 284 W.Va. 492, 498,
766 S.H.2d 761, 757 (2014) (stating that “pub-
lic policy concerns raised by our initial opin-
ion” compelled rehearing); Hosaflogk v. Con-
solidation Coal Co., 201 W.Va. 825, 329, 497
§.E.2d 174, 178 (1997) (twice granting re-
hearing in Human Rights Act case); Haines
v. Kimble, 221 W.Va, 266, 654 S.H.2d 588
(2007) (rehearing granted); Committee. on
Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. .
Farber, 191 W.Va. 667, 447 S.E.2d 602 (1994)
(same); Jewell v. Maynard, 181 W.Va. 571,

second certified question was not dispositive and
therefore neither party fully briefed the issue on
rehearing. Accordingly, we again decline to an-
swer the. second certified question. See State ex
rel, Advance Stores Co., Inc. v. Recht, 230 W.Va.
464, 468-69, 740 S.E.2d 59, 63-64 (2013) (“[T]his
Court will not address a certified question if it is
not dispositive of a controlling issue in the
case,””).

888 S.E.2d 586 (1989) (same); Dadisman v.
Moore, 181 W.Va. 779, 884 S.E.2d 816 (1988)
(same); Turner v. State Compensation
Comm’r, 147 W.Va. 145, 126 §.B.2d 879
(1962) (same); Garges v. State Compensation
Comm’r, 147 W.Va. 188, 126 S.E.2d_ 198
(1962) (same); Ellis ». Henderson, 142 W.Va.
824, 98 S.H.2d 719 (1957) (same); Reese v.
Lowry, 140 W.Va. 772, 86 S.E.2d 381 (1955)
(same); Bailey v. Baker, 187 W.Va. 85, 70
S.E.2d 645 (1952) (same); State 0, Gilliland,
51 W.Va. 278, 41 S.E. 181 (1902) (same).

As this Court has observed, reconsidera-
tion upon rehearing is often facilitated by a
more focused and clearer presentation of the
arguments by the parties, who commonly
have a better understanding of the Court’s
characterization of the dispositive issues fol-
lowing an initial opinion. See Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal, Co., 228 W.Va. 624, 667, 679
‘S,E.2d 223, 266 (2008), rev'd and remanded,
556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct, 2252, 173 LBd2d
1208 (2009) (Albright, J., dissenting) (noting
that “(t]he more narrow and focused: legal
arguments and Supporting facts of the re-
hearing process” aided in determination); A.
B., 284 W.Va. at 498, 518-19, 766 8.B.2d at
BT, T77-78 (stating that briefs . submitted
seeking rehearing compelled Court to grant
rehearing and criticizing respondent for at-
tempting to supplement inadequate record on
rehearing to meet issues discussed in initial
opinion); Haines, ‘221 W.Va, at 272-73, nnd
and 5, 654 S.E.2d at 594-95, nn3 and 5
(discussing additional arguments and at-
tempts to supplement the appendix to theet
issues raised in initial opinion), Oftentimes,
briefs upon rehearing pierce through any
insufficiency or imprecision of argument
which may have affected the Court’s initial
offering. This is particularly the case where a
matter is before the Court on the necessarily
limited record often submitted upon certified
question. When a petition for rehearing com-
pels the Court to conclude that the law may
have been misapprehended, neither hubris
nor sanetimony should give the Court pause
in granting rehearing to correct any such
error of law or fact. As Justice Frankfurter

6. The prior opinion reformulated the certified
question to reach this holding and further held
that royalties paid pursuant to West Virginia
Code § 22-6-8(e) may likewise not be reduced for
volume deductions. “Volume deductions” refer
to that volume of gas which is either lost or used

269

stated, “[w]isdom too often never comes, and
8o one ought not to reject it merely because
it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 835 U:S. 595, 600, 69
S.Ct. 290, 98 L.Ed, 259 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). . .

As pertains to the question presented in
‘this case, upon initial hearing, the majority
concluded that West Virginia Code § 22-6-
8(e) contains ai ambiguity which must be
construed in a manner which effectuates the
“overarching remedial intent” of the statute
to “ensurfe] the future flow of adequate com-
pensation to oil and gas landowners.” Such
construction, according to the previous ma-
jority, must not “curtail [] compensation”
which was intended to “right past wrongs”
and therefore prohibits dilution of royalty
payments by post-production costs, Coupled
with the common law implied covenant to
market previously recognized with respect to
oil and. gas leases, the majority concluded
that royalties must remain “supremely con-
stant,” impervious to “facile downward ma-
nipulation” by the lessee and therefore post-
production costs for “gathering, transporting,
or treating”.may not-be deducted.® _.

Upon rehearing, with all due regard to the
previous majority’s consideration: of the ad-
mittedly complex and subversively entangled
issues. implicated: in this case, we conclude
that it did, in fact, misapprehend the applica-
bility of certain common law principles and
exceeded: its charge in its interpretation of
the subject statute.

A. W. Va. Code § 22-6-8 and Valuation of
Royalties Prior to Deregulation

As initially outlined above, the petitioners
contend that post-production costs incuired
by an oil or, gas lessee may not be allocated
to the lessor in caleulation of the lesgor’s
royalty, The petitioners maintain that West
Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)’s provision that the
lessor must be paid “one-eighth of the total
amount paid to or received by or allowed to
the owner of the working. interest at ‘the
wellhead” is ambiguous with respect to pay-

in transport before it gets to market. The District

* Court's certified questions do not make inquiry,
expressly or implicitly, regarding the propriety of
deductions for volume losses; accordingly, the
majority's prior opinion was, at a sminiraum,
improvidently overbroad.

270

ment of such costs; therefore, the statute
should be construed in a manner which max-
imizes its remedial purpose. To maximize its
remedial purpose, the petitioners contend
that the phrase “at the wellhead” should be
construed to prohibit allocation of post-pro-
duction costs to lessors. The petitioners fur-
ther urge that this construction is consistent
with West Virginia’s common law purported-
ly aligning itself with several “marketable
product rule” states which require the lessee
to bear-all post-production costs incurred
until the product is marketable.”

EQT maintains that the statute is not am-
biguous since “at the wellhead” is a very
precise and definite location. However, ac-
knowledging that federal deregulation of the
industry has altered the point of sale away
from the wellhead, EQT argues that the only
way to mathematically calculate the “at the
wellhead” price for which it is obligated by
statute is to utilize the “net-back” or “work-
back” method. This method, as employed by
EQT, utilizes the interstate pipeline sales
price and makes deductions for post-produc-
tion costs;’ the resulting figure is that upon
which the royalty is paid and therefore pur-
ports to “duplicate” a wellhead price. Com-
mensurately, EQT urges the Court to join
those states which have formally adopted the
“at the well” rule regarding cost allocation,
which permits pro rata allocation and/or de-
duction of post-production expenses as ‘be-
tween the lessee and lessor. With this under-
standing of the parties’ positions, we proceed.

7. West Virginia, however, has muddied the point
to which costs must be borne by the lessee by
making reference to the “point of sale” in its
syllabus points, which may’of course vary from
the point in time in which a product becomes
“marketable.” Such inexplicable variations from
the traditional rule have created widespread dis-
illusionment with West Virginia's iteration of this
rule as discussed more fully infra.

8. Throughout the briefing of the parties, amici
curiae, and caselaw, this “cost-bearing”’ is inter-
changeably referred to as “allocation” or “de-
duction” of costs from the royalty; in other in-
stances the “net-back” or “‘work-back” method
of royalty calculation is referenced. We concur
with the following observation with regard to
these various characterizations of the issue:

Although the issue is commonly referred to as
a “deduction of costs” issue, it is more accu-
rately a “work-back” issue to adjust a down-
stream price to reflect an upstream value by

to examine the statute and applicable case-
law.

To place the parties’ arguments into prop-
er context, it is first critical to understand
the purpose and operation of West Virginia
Code § 22-6-8 and the change in the market-
place for oil and gas sales resulting from
what is commonly referred to within the
industry simply as “deregulation.” West Vir-
ginia Code § 22-6-8 was originally enacted in
1982 to prohibit lessees from continuing to
capitalize on older, “flat-rate” leases. The
statute explains that these leases were en-
tered into

when the techniques by which oil and gas

are currently extracted, produced or mar-

keted, were not known or contemplated by
the parties, nor was it contemplated by the
parties that oil and gas would be recovered
or extracted or produced or marketed from
the depths and horizons currently being
developed by the well operators.

W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(a)(8). The Legislature

then declared that the statute was enacted

because

continued exploitation of the natural re-

sources of this state in exchange for such

wholly inadequate compensation is unfair,
oppressive, works an unjust hardship on
the owners of the oil and gas in place, and
unreasonably deprives the economy of the

State of West Virginia of the just benefit of

the natural wealth of this State[.]

W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(a)(2). Recognizing,
apparently, that invalidating such leases al-

subtracting (deducting) from the downstream

price what it cost to put the wellhead gas in

the position to fetch the downstream price.
David B. Pierce, Royalty Jurisprudence: A Tale of
Two States, 49 Washburn LJ. 347, 377 n.91
(2010). Similarly, “the ‘net-back’ method does
not ‘charge’ the lessor with any expenses at all,
but instead is simply a method of determining
what the wellhead value of the gas would have
been if there had been a market for the gas at the
wellhead.” Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-
Production Costs When Calculating Royalty: What
Does the Lease Provide?, 8 Appalachian J.L. 1, 29
(2008). For ease of reading, we likewise some-
what interchangeably utilize the terms “alloca-
tion” and “deduction” of costs throughout this
opinion, However, whether referred to as cost
“allocation,” “deduction,” or use of the “net-
back” method, our opinion should be read as
encompassing any manner by which the lessee
make allowances for its cost expenditures in cal-
culating the lessor’s royalty.

together may run afoul of the Constitu-
tion,® the Legislature set out to lawfully
“discourage ... the production and market-
ing of oil and gas” under such leases. W.
Va. Code § 22-6-8(a)(4). Accordingly, to
avoid unconstitutionally impairing’ the con-
tractual obligation, the statute simply pro-
hibits the issuance of permits under such
leases. Subsection (d) therefore provides:
[N]o such permit shall be hereafter issued
for the drilling of a new oil or gas well, or
for the redrilling ... of an existing oil or
gas production well, where or if the right
to extract, produce or market the oil or gas
is based upon a lease or leases or other
continuing contract or contracts providing
for flat well royalty[.]
W. Va. Code 22-6-8(d). To avoid this prohibi-
tion, a permit applicant must file an affidavit
certifying that it will
tender to the owner of the oil or gas in
place not less than one eighth of the total
amount paid to or received by or allowed
to the owner of the working interest at the
wellhead for the oil or gas so extracted,
produced or marketed before deducting
the amount to be paid to or set aside for
the owner of the oil or gas in place, on all

»

. The statute expressly states that the Legislature

is “fully cognizant [of] the provisions of section
10, article I of the United States Constitution and
of section 4, article III of the Constitution of
West Virginia, proscrib[ing] the enactment of any
law impairing the obligation of a contract{.]” W.
Va. Code § 22-6-8(a)(4); see U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts ..."); W, Va. Const.
art. III, § 4 (‘No bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of a con-
tract, shall be passed.”),

10. As succinctly explained by the Colorado Ap-
pellate Court:

Congress took a first step toward increasing
competition in the natural gas market by en-
acting the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. § 3301, et seq., which was designed to
phase out regulation of wellhead prices
charged by producers of natural gas, and to
promote gas transportation by interstate and
intrastate pipelines for third parties. Pipelines
were reluctant to provide common carriage,
however, when doing so would displace their
own sales. Thus, in 1985, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) promulgated
Order No. 436, which contained an “open ac-
cess” rule providing incentives for pipelines to
offer gas transportation services.

271

such oil or gas to be extracted, produced
or marketed from the well.

W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e) (emphasis added). In
short, to get a permit to re-drill wells gov-
erned by a flat-rate lease, the lessee must
agree to pay the lessor a one-eighth royalty
instead of a flat rate.

The parties are in agreement that when
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 was enacted, oil
and gas sales occurred “at the wellhead,” i.e.
at the point where the product first emerges
from the ground or literally, the head of the
well. Interstate pipeline operators purchased
the product and undertook the expense of
preparing the oil or gas for sale at market in
a useable or “marketable” form. In 1978,
Congress began to “deregulate” the natural
gas market, which turned interstate pipeline
operators into common carriers.!° As a re-
sult, oil and gas are no longer sold “at the
wellhead,” but rather are sold downstream of
the wellhead, typically at the interstate pipe-
line. Importantly, one of the effects of this
change is that the sales price is enhanced
from the wellhead price because it is now a
marketable, useable product when it is first
sold at market, rather than the raw, “sour”
gas which was sold from the wellhead.

In 1992, this evolution culminated in FERC’s
Order No. 636, which required all interstate
pipelines to “unbundle” transportation ser-
vices from their own natural gas sales and to
provide common carriage services to buyers
from other sources that wished to ship gas.
This implementing regulation dramatically
changed the natural gas industry, because
pipeline companies were “no longer permitted
; +» to act as traditional merchants—buying gas
at the wellhead and reselling the gas down-
stream—producers had to now market the gas
themselves.”
The deregulation of the natural gas industry is
considered the major catalyst for the current
wave of royalty litigation because, before de-
regulation, buyers purchased gas at or near the
wellhead, thereby absorbing most post-well-
head costs. Now, most gas is purchased away
from the wellhead,

Clough v. Williams Prod. RMT Co., 179 P.3d 32,

35 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).

11. “To make the sour gas into sweet gas, which
is a usable marketable product, [impurities] are
extracted from the sour gas.” Bice v. Petro-Hunt,
LLC., 768 N.W.2d 496, 500 (N. D. 2009). As the
court further explained in Garman v. Conoco,
Tne., 886 P.2d 652, 653-54 (Colo, 1994), with
respect to costs potentially incurred in the post-
production phase, as a result of the marketplace
moving away from the wellhead:

272

However, as a result, expenses to “clean” or
“sweeten” the gas, gather and/or compress
the gas, and transport the gas are incurred
after it is extracted but before it is sold, ie.
“postproduction” costs. This case presents
the issue of whether the lessee must bear all
such post-production expenses or whether it
may pro-rata allocate them to the lessor and
deduct them from the royalty paid by opera-
tion of West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e), The
parties’ briefing indicates that they believe
that implicit within ‘that query is whether
this Court will apply ‘its previously-articulat-
ed common-law version of the “marketable
product rule” or adopt the “at the well” rule
of cost allocation,

B. Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc,
and Tawney v. Columbia Natural Re-
sources

To determine the applicability of either of
these schools of thought to the statute at
issue, it is necessary to examine West Virgi-
nia’s common law as pertains to allocation of
costs in an oil and gas lease. As noted above,
the District Court phrased the certified ques-
tion in terms of whether Tawney v. Colum-
bia Natural Resowrces has “any effect” upon
the determination of. whether use of the
phrase “at the wellhead” in West Virginia

Code § 22-6-8 permits allocation and deduc-

tion of post-production costs before calcula-

tion of royalties. The petitioners urge that
both Tawney and its predecessor, Wellman

vw Energy Resources, Inc., 210 W.Va. 200,

557 S.E.2d 254 (2001), firmly establish West

Virginia as a “marketable product” rule

state, which rule provides that the implied

duty to market requires the lessee to bear all
costs until the product is rendered “market-

Gas may require processing to remove impuri-
ties for marketing, and once marketable may
be further processed into additional compo-
nent products, Transportation is required
when gas is moved from the wellhead ‘to a
central location to prepare it for transmission
and consumption, commonly referred to as
gathering, If no market for the gas exists near
the wellhead, transportation may be required
to move the gas to a distant market, Compres-
sion may be required to create sufficient pres-
sure for the gas to enter a purchaser's pipeline,
or compression may occur to transform
gas into additional products.

(citations omitted), See also Rogers v. Westerman

Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001) as moidified

on denial of reh’g (Aug. 27, 2001) (discussing

able.” EQT, however, maintains that both
Wellman and Tawney are inapplicable to the
statute at issue and urge an interpretation
which mirrors the “at the well” rule, permit-
ting use of the “net-back” method to caleu-
late royalties “at the wellhead.” We will ex-
amine each case in turn,

Despite the District Court and parties’
pre-emptive focus on Tawney, it is Wellman
which forms the foundation of the current
state of West Virginia’s law on deduction of
post-production costs. In Wellman, the Court,
addressed an action brought by the lessors
seeking termination of certain oil and gas
leases and damages for failure to pay proper
royalties, Id. at 204, 557 S.E.2d at 258, The
leases provided for natural gas royalties of
“ ‘one-eighth (1/8) of the market value of such
gas’ at the mouth of the well[.’” Id. The
lessee deducted “certain. expenses” before
calculating royalties. Id, at 209, 557 S.H.2d at
263. In resolving the question of whether
such expenses were properly deductible, the
Court noted the widely adopted position that
“costs of discovery and production” are not
chargeable against a royalty. Id. at 210, 557
S.E.2d at 264. The Court then stated that
“fiIn spite” of this position, oil and gas pro-
ducers had begun deducting costs for trans-
porting and “treating or altering” the oil and
gas after it is “produced” to put it into
marketable condition. Id.

The Wellman Court briefly acknowledged
the split of authority regarding deduction of
such post-production costs and discussed the
rationale of those states holding that such
costs are not properly deductible from the
lessor’s royalty. Jd. at 210, 557 S.H.2d at 264.
The Court noted that pursuant to the implied
covenant to market,” such “duty to market

necessity of dehydration and compression of
“yaw gas” and specifications of interstate pipe-
line).

12. “Implied covenants are unwritten promises
by one of the patties to a contract.” John S.
Lowe, Interpreting The Royalty Obligation: The
Role Of The Implied Covenant To Market, 2003-1
RMMLF-INST 6 (2003). “The [implied covenant
to market] requires that the lessee exercise rea-
sonable diligence to market the products, defined
as ‘whatever, in the circumstances, would be
reasonably expected of all operators of ordinary
prudence, having regard to the interests of both
lessor and lessee.’ ” Rogers, 29 P.3d at 903 (citing
Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358, 361 (Colo, 1991)).
Courts and commentators alike disagree about

embraces the responsibility to.get the oil or
gas in marketable condition and actually
transport it to market.” Jd. Noting -simply
that like other marketable product rule
states, “West Virginia holds that a léssee
impliedly covenants that he will market oil or
gas produced[,)” the Court quickly concluded
that “unless the lease provides otherwise, the
lessee must bear all costs incurred in explor-
ing or, producing, marketing, and transport-
ing the product to the point of sale.” Id. at
211, 557 S.H.2d at 265, Syl. Pt. 4.8 The Court
then went a step further, holding that where
the lease provides for apportionment of any
such costs, they must be “actually incurred”

the-scope of the implied duty and its application,
See n.15, infra.

13. Notably, the Court never utilized the term
“marketable product” in Wellman or Tawney, for
that matter. In fact, aside from its basic premise,
the holding articulated in Wellman bears little
resemblance to the fully-formed marketable
product rules adopted by other such states. Rath-
er than the “point of sale” referenced in Well-
man, other courts adopting the “marketable
product rule” have held that costs need not be
shared until a “marketable” product is obtained:

Absent express lease provisions addressing al-
location of costs, the lessee’s duty to market
requires that the lessee bear the expenses in-
curred in obtaining a marketable product.
Thus, the expense of getting the product to a
marketable condition and location are borne
by the lessee. Once a product is marketable,
however, additional costs incurred to either im-
prove the product, or transport the product, are
to be shared proportionately by the lessor and
lessee, All costs must be reasonable.
Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906 (emphasis added), Addi-
tionally, the Rogers court explained that
[glas is marketable when it is in the physical
condition such that it is acceptable to be
bought and sold in a commercial marketplace,
and in the location of a commercial market-
place, such that it is commercially saleable in
the oil and gas marketplace. The determination
of whether gas is marketable is a question of
fact, to be resolved by a fact finder.
Id, at 906. Further illustrating the factual com-
plexities which are implicated in determining
whether expenses are deductible in a “market-
able product” state, the Kansas Supreme Court
held in a case where gas was sold at the wellhead
that “the duty to make gas marketable is satisfied
when the operator delivers the gas to the pur-
chaser in a condition acceptable to the purchaser
in a good faith transaction.” Fawcett v. Oil Pro-
ducers, Inc, of Kansas, 302 Kan. 350, 352 P.3d
1032, 1042 (2015). See also Mittelstaedt v. Santa
Fe Minerals, Inc, 954 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Okla.
1998) (‘When the gas is shown by the lessee to

273

and “reasonable.” Syl. Pt. 5, Wellman, .210
W.Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254,

With Wellman as background, we there-
fore turn to the Tawney decision to ascertain
the scope and import of its holdings, Tawney
answered a certified question tantalizingly
similar to the instant certified question which
inquired whether an. oil and gas lessee must
“bear all costs incurred in marketing and
transporting” the. product where the lease
states that royalties are to be calculated “at
the well,” or “at the wellhead|[.]” 219 W.Va, at
268, 688 S.E.2d at 24, Respondent Columbia
Natural Resources (“CNR”) sought to take
monetary deductions for post-production
costs as well as volume deductions “ before

be'in a marketable form at the well the royalty
owner may be charged a proportionate expense
of transporting that gas to.the point of purchase,
‘The lessee bears the burden of showing that such
cost is reasonable, and that actual royalty reve-
nues increased in proportion with the costs as-
sessed against the nonworking interest.” (cita-
tions omitted).

Moreover, the term “post-production costs”
encompasses a myriad of expenses potentially
incurred in the process, For instance, in Garman,

* the court found only that those post-production
costs incurred to create a marketable product
‘were exclusively borne by the lessee, but that any
costs which “enhance{d] the value of an already
marketable product” were assessable to the les-
sor, 886 P.2d at 661. Cf. Sternberger v. Marathon
Oil Co. 257 Kan. 315, 894-P,2d 788 (1995)
(recognizing operator's general duty to prepare
gas for market and distinguishing transportation
costs from compression costs required to make
gas marketable). See n.11, supra regarding vari-
ety of potential costs-involved in natural gas
processing. As an additional consideration, “nat-
ural gas must meet certain quality specifications
before it can enter an interstate gas pipeline and
it must be processed to achieve those specifica-
tions,” Fawcett, 352 P.3d at 1035.

As is clear from their holdings, these cases
developed guiding principles regarding not only
the “point of sale” (ie. is there a point of sale
available other than where the oil/gas was actual-
ly sold and did the costs increase the revenue
proportionately?) and “marketability” (ie, was
the gas in its natural state at the wellhead capa-
ble of being sold and when was a “marketable”
product achieved?), but also the type of costs (ie!
costs for dehydrating and compressing, as com-
pared to gathering and transporting) which were
incurred quite thoroughly. Neither Wellman nor
Tavney dignify these issues, much less develop
them, despite the fact that such considerations
give substance and equity to the rule..

14, See n.6, supra regarding volume deductions.

274

calculating the landowners’ royalty on the
involved leases. Jd. at 269, 633 S.E.2d at 25.
As in this case, CNR argued that since gas is
not sold at the wellhead, “the only logical
way to calculate royalties at the wellhead is
to permit lessees to deduct the lessors’ pro-
portionate share of post-production ex-
penses[,]” Jd, at 270, 683 S.E.2d at 26. The
Tawney Court accepted, without further
analysis, Wellman’s reliance on the implied
duty to market and resultant holding that a
lessee must “bear all costs incurred in ex-
ploring for producing, marketing, and trans-
porting the product to the point of sale[.]” Id.
at 272, 683 S.H.2d at 28 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4,
Wellman, 210 W.Va. 200, 557 S.B.2d 254),
‘The Court then narrowed the issue to wheth-
er the leases’ “at the wellhead” language was
sufficient to alter this “generally recognized
rule.” Tawney, 219 W.Va. at 272, 688 S.E.2d
at 28,

The Tawney Court found the “at the well-
head” language ambiguous because it was
“imprecise” and did not “indicate how or by
what method the royalty is to be calculated
or the gas is to be valued.” Id. at 272, 638
§.E.2d at 28 (emphasis in original). Having
found such language ambiguous, the Court
noted the absence of language evidencing “an
intent by the parties to agree to a contrary
rule” and stated that if CNR desired to pro-
rate expenses with the landowners, it “could
have written into the leases specific language
which clearly informed the lessors exactly
how their royalties were to be calculated and
what deductions were to be taken from the
royalty amounts for post-production ex-
penses.” Jd, at 272, 274, 638 S.H.2d at 28, 30.
Citing the “‘general rule as to oil and gas
Jeases ... that such contracts will generally
be liberally construed in favor of the lessor,
and strictly as against the lessee,’ ” the Court
then construed the lease against CNR and
held that the “at the wellhead” language was
insufficient to allow deduction of post-produc-
tion expenses. Id. at 278, 683 S.H.2d at 29
(quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Martin v. Consolidated
Coal & Oil Corp, 101 W.Va. 721, 183 S.E.
626 (1926)). Resting entirely on the premise
that CNR could simply have negotiated for
and/or included in their leases language re-
garding cost allocation, the Court issued the
following syllabus point setting forth the cri-

teria for expressing such an intention in an
oil and gas lease:

Language in an oil and gas lease that is
intended to allocate between the lessor and
lessee the costs of marketing the product
and transporting it to the point of sale
must expressly provide that the lessor
shall bear some part of the costs incurred
between the wellhead and the point of sale,
identify with particularity the specific de-
ductions the lessee intends to take from
the lessor’s royalty (usually 1/8), and indi-
eate the method of calculating the amount
to be deducted from the royalty for such
post-production costs.

Syl. Pt. 10, Tawney, 219 W.Va. 266, 683
S,E.2d 22.

C. Applicability of Tawney to West Virgi-
nia Code § 22-6-8(e)

Having examined Tazvney, we turn now to
the District Court’s first certified question.
At first blush, it would appear that the Dis-
trict Court’s first certified question is unnec-
essarily restrictive to reach the issue of
whether post-production costs may be prop-
erly allocated under the language of West
Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e), in that it asks
merely whether Tawney has “any effect” on
this determination. Upon further consider-
ation, however, the District Court’s question
demonstrates an awareness of and subtly
highlights the problematic nature of blind
application of Tawney’s deceptively “on-
point” holding. As noted above, both Well-
man and Tawney involved the leasing par-
ties’ use of the term “at the wellhead” in
their freely-negotiated leases. Accordingly,
those Courts were free to utilize common law
principles pertaining to oil and gas leases and
contracts generally—the implied covenant to
market and construction of a contract against
the drafter, respectively—to interpret the
lease and resolve the issue. Utilizing these
common law principles to interpret a statute,
however, is not legally sound. See Kilmer v.
Eleaco Land Servs, Inc., 605 Pa. 418, 990
A2d 1147, 1155 (2010) (recognizing states
adopting marketable product rule “have done
so as a matter of common law in interpreting
ambiguities in leases, not through statutory
interpretation of a preexisting statute.”).

First, as a paramount matter, the rules of
statutory construction are considerably dif-

ferent than the rules of contract interpreta-
tion,
The legal standards applicable to issues of
statutory interpretation have evolved sepa-
rately from those involving matters of con-
tract interpretation. Thus, despite the fact
that ... statutory and contractual lan-
guage are essentially identical, it is theo-
retically possible that the application of
each set of legal standards would yield
divergent results.... For example, the
legislature may have intended the statuto-
ry language to have a different meaning
than the one contemplated by the contract-
ing parties, even though the contract’s
drafters may have merely parroted the
language of the existing statute,
Major Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No, 98-Civ-2189 (SWK), 1995 WL 326475, at
*4 (G.D.N.Y. May 31, 1995), afd, 101 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1996); see Ford Motor Co. v.
Meredith Motor Co., No. CIV. 99-456-B, 2000
WL 1518702, at *5 (D.N.H. Aug. 24, 2000),
overruled on other grownds as recognized in
Colonial Imports Corp. v. Volvo Cars of N.
Am, Inc. No, CIV. 98-842-B, 2001 WL
274808, at *1 (D.N.H. Jan. 9, 2001) (“Statuto-
ry interpretation differs from the interpreta-
tion of contract language.”). Obviously, a
statute cannot be “construed against” a par-
ty. On a more fundamental level, however,
the flaw in applying caselaw involving freely
negotiated leases to interpret the statutory
language at issue is that the parties bound by
the statute had no hand in its terms or
negotiation. The language choice—“at the
wellhead”—was that of the Legislature. West
Virginia and other courts applying the mar-
ketable product rule to prohibit postproduc-
tion cost allocation, justify its imposition by
recognizing that parties entering into a lease
may expressly provide for the allocation of
costs in an effort to evade the imposition of a
common law rule, See Syl. Pt. 4, in part,
Wellman, 210 W.Va. 200, 557 S.H.2d 254

15, Furthermore, the use of the implied covenant
to market to reach the issue of cost allocation is
highly questionable. While there is little question
that it is uniformly recognized that a lessee has
an implied duty to make a reasonable effort to
market gas, several courts have concluded “‘that
duty does not extend beyond ‘sellfing] the gas at
a reasonable price at the well side.’” Baker v.
Magnum Hunter Prod., Inc., 473 S.W.3d 588, 595
(By. 2015) (quoting Rains v. Kentucky, 200 Ky.

275

(“... [U}nless the lease provides otherwise,
the lessee must bear all costs incurred in
exploring for producing, marketing, and
transporting the product to the point of sale.”
(emphasis added)); Syl. Pt. 10, in part, Taw-
ney, 219 W.Va, 266, 683 S.H.2d 22 (“Lan-
guage in an oil and gas lease that is intended
to allocate between the lessor and lessee the
costs of marketing the product and trans-
porting it to the point of sale must expressly
provide that the lessor shall bear some part
of the costs incurred ...” (emphasis added));
Wood v. TXO Production Corp., 854 P.2d
880, 883 (Okla. 1992) (“If a lessee wants
royalty owners to share in compression costs,
that can be spelled-out in the oil and gas
lease. Then, a royalty owner can make an
informed economic decision ...”), A lessee
subject to West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 obvi-
ously has no opportunity to “expressly pro-
vide” otherwise.

HI Moreover, other courts have recog-
nized that, in addition to making express
provisions for costs, freely negotiating par-
ties to a lease may limit the implied cove-
nants which may append to such leases. See
Garman, 886 P.2d at 664 (“The parties to an
oil and gas lease, may, by express agreement
in the lease, limit the covenants implied in
the lease.”) (Erickson, J., concurring). Like
express provisions for cost allocations, a les-
see subject to West Virginia Code § 22-6-8
has no opportunity or ability to expressly
disclaim any such implied covenants. Fur-
ther, the implied covenant to market does

hot append itself to statutes; rather, it is a

tool utilized to resolve contractual ambigui-
ties. Implied covenants have been frequently
referred to as contractual “gap-fillers” uti-
lized to implement the parties intentions
where not otherwise stated: “Implied cove-
nants, as the authorities say, are only justi-
fied on grounds of legal necessity, and to
effectuate the purposes of the contract.” Al-
len v. Colonial Oil Co., 92 W.Va, 689, 115
S.E. 842, 844 (1928)35 Accordingly, the im-

480, 255 S.W. 121, 125 (1923); see also Heritage
Resources, Inc., v. NationsBank, 939 8.W.2d 118,
129 (Texas 1996) (Owen, J., concurring) (finding
that implied duty to market cannot override ex-
press agreement evidenced by use of term “at the
well”); Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation:
Should Royalty Obligations Be Determined Intrin-
sically, Theoretically, or Realistically? Part 2, 37
Nat. Resources J. 611, 693 n.89 (1997) (“[T]he

276

plied covenant to market relied upon by the
Wellman and Tawney Courts has no applica-
tion as pertains to leases affected by West
Virginia Code § 22-6-8,

In this instance, at the times these leases
were executed, the parties contemplated nei-
ther the marketing of the product and any
implied covénants thereof, nor cost allocation
because the leases were flat-rate leases, The
lessor’s royalty issued irrespective of produc-
tion, making post-production costs and the
marketing efforts of the lessor irrelevant to
both parties for purposes of the lease. Only
by operation of West Virginia Code § 22-6-
8(e), then, is ‘cost allocation implicated in the
parties’ dealings. Accordingly, without the
commensurate ability to bargain about alloca-
tion of costs or limit any implied covenants
which may affect cost-bearing, utilizing cases
which are premised on these considerations
is of limited utility at best and inequitable at
worst. Dogmatic imposition, therefore, of
West Virginia’s so-called marketable product
rule—which was developed upon these con-
siderations—to prohibit allocation of postpro-
duction expenses as requested by the peti-
tioners yields little parity when the parties
were not free to contract otherwise.

Moreover, use of this Court’s cases involv-
ing freely negotiated contracts—which were
decided years after the statute at issue was
enacted—to foster a reading of thé statute
which affects the terms of @ contract regard-
ing matters which were not within the con-
templation of the parties is, potentially pro-
blematie on a constitutional level. This Court
has stated that “those who enter into con-
tracts do so with reference to the law as it
exists at the date thereof; and any impair-
ment by legislative action, or otherwise, of an
obligation thus created, is plainly inhibited by
both the State and Federal Constitutions.”
McClintic v. Dunbar Land Co., 127 W.Va.
454, 461, 83 S.H.2d 598, 596 (1945). While

-implied covenant to market has grown like Top-
sy. Arguably, it should be confined to its original
purpose: to require the lessee to diligently seek a
market for gas reserves that are shut-in,”),
Nevertheless, the petitioners argue that since
the Legislature is presumed to be aware of all
existing common law, it was aware of West Vir-
*ginia’s recognition of the implied covenant to
market and therefore intended that ‘the lessee
bear all post-production costs. “[T]he Legislature
is presumed to be aware of the common law

West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 itself is cogni-
zant of the delicate balancing act it under-
takes to avoid. unconstitutionally impairing
contractual rights by affecting only the issu-
ance of permits, extending the statute be-
yond that’ procedural prerequisite into the
terms of the negotiated lease between the
parties is dangerous territory, See n.9, supra.
In interpretation of a statute, it is not for this
Court to attempt to “retrofit” this Court’s
caselaw to give meaning to a statute enacted
well before such precedent, particularly when
such precedent employs a rationale wholly ©
inapplicable to ‘statutory construction and so
substantially affects the contracting parties’
rights. We therefore conclude that neither
Wellman nor Tawney are applicable to an
analysis of the “at the wellhead” language
contained in West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e),
Before leaving our discussion of Wellman
and Tawney, however, we are compelled to
further illustrate the faulty legs upon which
this precedent and its iteration of the mar-
ketable product rule purports to stand. Com-
mentators have noted that Wellman failed to
“recognize the variations in the first market-
able product doctrine from state to state”
and “whether intentionally (as a result of its
apparent antagonism against oil and gas pro-
ducers) or unintentionally (as a result of its
cursory review of the case law)... adopted
yet another version of the first marketable
product doctrine[.]” Byron C. Keeling & Ka-
rolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable
Product Doctrine: Just What Is the “Prod-
uct’?, 87 St. Mary’s LJ. 1, 77,°79 (2005),
Moreover, Wellman’s
“point of sale” approach results in an even
bigger windfall for lessors than the “mar-
ketable product” approach. Under the
“point of sale” approach, a lessor will not
only receive a royalty valued upon the gas
in its natural state at the wellhead or when

underlying particular areas of legislation.”
Thomas v. McDermitt, 232 W.Va. 159, 165, 751
S.E.2d 264, 270 (2013), Arguably, the Legislature
may certainly be presumied to have been aware
of the implied covenant to market when the
statute was enacted in 1982. However, it is whol-
ly unreasonable’ to infer that it would’or should
be aware of the Wellnian and Tawney Courts’
subsequent broadening of the covenant as a tool
to prohibit post-production cost allocation ap-
proximately twenty years later,

the gas becomes marketable, but will re-
ceive a royalty valued upon the gas in its
processed state at the point of sale after
the gas has had value added to it solely at
the lessee’s expense.

Wheeler, supra at 27-28. The Wellman and’

Tawney Courts’ refusal to. align with other
states which have more fully developed this
rule has, according to these commentators,
created “chaos” and “foster[s] the belief—
perhaps the reality—that the [marketable
product] doctrine lacks any cornerstone prin-
ciples[.}” Keeling & Gillespie, supra at 79, 80.
More importantly, still other commenta-
tors have observed that “West Virginia has
actually achieved a Marketable Product Rule
result that seems to arise more from an
unwillingness to accept the realities of dereg-
ulation in the natural gas market than from
implied covenant law.” John W. Broomes,
Waste Not, Want Not: The Marketable Prod-
uet Rule Violates Public Policy Against
Waste of Natwral Gas’ Resources, 68 U. Kan,
L, Rey. 149, 170-71 (2014). As support for
this proposition, authors have cited to Well-
man’s and Tawney’s dogged devotion to Pro-
fessor Donley’s, pre-deregulation 1951 trea-
tise “The Law of Coal, Oil and Gas in West
Virginia and Virginia.” Additionally, citing
Tawney’s stinging criticism that the lessee in
that case did not even begin deducting costs
until 1998, one author uses this statement to
establish the Tawney Court's complete mis-
understanding of the industry:
The problem with this observation [that
the lessee did not deduct costs until 1993]
is that the lessee would not have incurred
post-production costs prior to 1998 because
the pipeline company would most likely
have been purchasing gas at the wellhead
for a price that reflected the gathering,
dehydration, compression, treating, pro-
cessing, line loss, and other investments
associated with the gas as it moved from
the wellhead to the point of sale.
Pierce, supra at 368,
In sum, this Court’s jurisprudence on this
issue has been critically described as follows:
If one believes the language has a role to
play in defining the lessee’s rights and
obligations under the oil and gas lease,
then the artful approach ] of the ... West,
Virginia court[] [is] nothing more than a
re-writing of the parties’ contract to take

277

money from the lessee and give it to the

lessor, +
Id. at 874. The foregoing notwithstanding,
however under-developed or inadequately
reasoned this Court observes Wellman and
Tawney to be, the issue presently before the
Court simply does not permit intrusion into
these issues. We therefore leave for another
day the continued vitality and scope of Well-
man and Tawney.

D. Interpretation of “At the Wellhead” as
used in West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)
The foregoing leads us inexorably to the
conclusion that West Virginia Code § 22-6-
8(e) must therefore be applied and/or inter-
preted without regard to: the policy-driven
issues of whether West Virginia is or should
be a “marketable product” state as contem-
plated in Wellman and. Tawney, or should
adopt the “at the well” rule. Just as we reject
Wellman and its progeny as dispositive of
the statutory issues presented herein, we
must likewise reject the implicit entreaties of
the parties and amici curia to make “good”
policy choices in our’ interpretation of the
language of West Virgiriia Code § 22-6-8(e).

“The touchstone of the issue presented by the

District Court is ‘strictly. one of statutory
interpretation and we aie thus bound by our
well-established and extensive canons in that

‘regard, Accord Kilmer, 990 A2d 1147 (re-

jecting adoption of competing rules of post-
production cost deduction in favor of statuto-
ry interpretation).

1. Legislative Intent

HM As this Court has long-recognized,
“{tlhe primary rule of statutory construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention
of the Legislature,” Syl. Pt..8, Vest v. Cobb,
188 W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1958). “Judicial
interpretation of a statute is warranted only
if the statute is ambiguous and the initial
step in such interpretative inquiry is to as-
certain the legislative intent.” Syl. Pt. 1, Ohio
County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552,
801 S.H.2d 188 (1988). Moreover, “i]t is im-
portant to note that, if the legislative intent
is clearly expressed in the statute, this Court
is not at liberty to construe the statutory
provision, but is obligated to apply its plain
language.” Dan’s Carworld, LLC v. Serian,

278

223 W.Va. 478, 484, 677 S.E.2d 914, 920
(2009). The foregoing compels us to first
carefully examine the Legislature’s unusually
extensive statement of purpose in the statute
at issue and consider the circumstances at
the time of enactment.

As. set forth at length in West Virginia
Code § 22-6-8, the West Virginia Legislature
expressly sought to restore a “just” benefit
to those upon whom a flat-rate lease worked
an “unfair, oppressive, [and] wnjust hard-
ship” upon mineral owners and “wnreason-
ably deprive[d]” the State’s economy of such
benefit. W. Va. Code 22-6-8(a)(2) (emphasis
added). Critically, the statute expressly
states that it seeks to bring an end to “inade-
quate compensation” for the State’s natural
resources. Jd. (emphasis added). The Legisla-
ture could scarcely have used more descrip-
tive terms to convey the over-arching goal of
the statute: to ensure fair and adequate com-
pensation for the State’s mineral owners.

2 Statutory Language

HE «With this intention as backdrop,
we turn to the statute’s plain language. In
analyzing the meaning of a statute, “[wle
look first to the statute’s language. If the
text, given its plain meaning, answers the
interpretive question, the language must pre-
vail and further inquiry is foreclosed.” Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. State Taw Dep't, 195
W.Va. 578, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 438 (1995);
see also Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153
W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where
the language of a statute is free from ambi-
guity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and
applied without resort to interpretation.”);
Syl. Pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan
Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 187, 107
§.E.2d 858 (1959) (“When a statute is clear
and unambiguous and the legislative intent is
plain, the statute should not be interpreted
by the courts, and in such case it is the duty
of the courts not to construe but to apply the
statute.”),

HN The statute requires that the affida-
vit executed by the lessor, as a prerequisite
to re-permitting, aver that the lessor will

16. The petitioners brief states: ‘Petitioner can.
agree with Respondent that the ‘wellhead’ is
easily identified.” However, even if the parties
were not in such agreement, “[t]he fact that
parties disagree about the meaning of a statute

tender to the “owner of the oil or gas in place
not less than one eighth of the total amount
paid to or received by or allowed to the
owner of the working interest at the wellhead
for the oil or gas so extracted, produced or
marketed[.]” W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e). As the
parties readily agree, however, the industry
practice with respect to sale of oil or gas has
changed considerably due to deregulation
since the time the statute was enacted and
sales no longer occur “at the wellhead,” With
respect to statutes which outlive cireum-
stances existing at the time of enactment,
this Court has held: “The basic and cardinal
principle, governing the interpretation and
application of a statute, is that the Court
should ascertain the intent of the Legislature
at the time the statute was enacted, and in
the light of the cirewmstances prevailing at
the time of the enactment.” Syl. Pt. 1, Pond
Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Alewander, 187
W.Va. 864, 74 S.E.2d 590 (1958) (emphasis
added).

HEM: [n consideration of the foregoing,
we readily conclude that the phrase “at the
wellhead” is not ambiguous as used in West.
Virginia Code § 22-6-8. Despite Tawney’s
conclusion to the contrary, we disagree fully
with its rationale that “at the wellhead” is
ambiguous simply because it fails to fully
outline allocation of postproduction costs.
Rather, the absence of such terms is mere
silence and as this Court has repeatedly held,
“silence does not, in and of itself, render a
statute ambiguous.” Griffith v. Frontier W.
Va., Inc., 228 W.Va. 277, 285, 719 S.E.2d 747,
755 (2011). Moreover, “at the wellhead” is not
ambiguous on its face; indeed, even the par-
ties agree that the phrase “at the wellhead”
has a very precise and definite meaning.
See also 8 Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M.
Kramer, Williams & Meyers Oil and Gas
Law § 645.2 at 614.12(14) (2016) (“If any-
thing, the term ‘wellhead’ is very precise and
definite because it is a clearly recognizable
place which even laypersons can under-
stand.”), Courts have likewise found the
phrase easily definable and with precise

does not itself create ambiguity or obscure mean-
ing.” T. Weston, Inc. v. Mineral County, 219
W.Va. 564, 568, 638 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2006)
(citing Deller v. Naymick, 176 W.Va. 108, 112,
342 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1985).

meaning, See Piney Woods Country Life
Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 240 (6th
Cir, 1984) (“‘At the well’ means that the gas
has not been increased in value by processing
or transportation.”); Atl, Richfield Co. v.
State of Cal, 214 Cal.App.8d 588, 262 Cal.
Rptr. 683, 688 (1989) (“The term ‘at the well,’
when used with reference to oil and gas
royalty valuation, is commonly understood to
mean that the oil and gas is to be valued in
its unprocessed state as it comes to the sur-
face at the mouth of the well.”); Bice, 768
N.W.2d at 502 (“[T]he term market value at
the well is not ambiguous.”); Heritage Re-
sources, 989 S.W.2d at 129 (“The words ‘at
the well’ should be given their straightfor-
ward meaning. Market value ‘at the well’
means the value of the gas at the well, before
it is transported, treated, compressed or oth-
erwise prepared for market.”); Judice v
Mewbourne Oil Co., 989 S.W.2d 188, 186
(Tex, 1996) (“[Vlalue at the well means the
value of the gas before it has been com-
pressed and before other value is added in
preparing and transporting the gas to mar-
ket.”); see also Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626
(1962) (distinguishing between wellhead price
of gas from price received at market),

Not only is the “at the wellhead” language
clearly indicative of a legislative intention to
value the royalties paid pursuant to the stat-
ute based on the unprocessed wellhead price,
we do not believe that permitting lessors to
benefit from royalties based upon an en-
hanced, downstream price without commen-
surately sharing in the expense to create the
enhanced value effectuates the “adequate”
and “just” compensation sought by the stat-
ute. Nowhere within the stated purpose did
the Legislature utilize language which en-
abled the “maximum benefit to landowners”
construction adopted by the previous majori-
ty.” As the Atlantic Richfield court ob-
served: “This is not a case where literal
interpretation would result in absurdity, re-
quiring adroit interpretation by a reviewing
eourt.... It is [] a situation where a term
was employed by the Legislature which has

17, This is where we believe the previous majority
most clearly missed the mark, Caught up in the
passionate and persuasive statement of legislative
intent set forth in West Virginia Code § 22-6-8,
the previous majority misconstrued the intent of

279

an established meaning[.]”) 262 Cal.Rptr. at
689.

Our determination of this issue is particu-
larly reinforced by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court’s handling of a nearly identical
statutory issue. In Kilmer, the court was
required to determine whether its minimum
royalty statute permitted allocation or deduc-
tion of post-production expenses. Like the
instant matter, the lessor/landowners
“rel{ied] upon a century-old theory in oil and
gas law placing an ‘implied duty to market’
upon gas companies|,]” which implied duty
purportedly required gas companies to bear
all costs until the ‘product reached the mar-
ket. 990 A.2d at 1152. The lessor/landowners
likewise argued that the remedial “Guaran-
teed Minimum Royalty Act” was intended to
“prevent deception and exploitation of Penn-
sylvania property owners by developers[.]”
Id. at 1158, The lessor/landowners argued
that the only way to ensure the statutory
purpose of landowners being paid a minimum
one-eighth royalty was to require gas compa-
nies to pay royalties on the amount received
by the companies “when it sells the gas at
the prevailing market price, and not the illu-
sory value of the gas ‘at the wellhead.” Id.
As in the instant case, the lessor/landowners
further argued.that the costs the gas compa-
nies sought to deduct were “subject to corpo-
rate manipulation and inflation[.]” Id.

Just as in the instant case, in Kilmer, the
gas companies argued that the statute re-
quired royalties paid on gas which was “re-
moved” from the property and that the gas
was necessarily removed at the wellhead. Id.
at 1154, Accordingly, they argued that they
“must work backward from the value-added
price received at the point of sale by deduct-
ing the companies’ costs of turning the gas
into a marketable commodity” via the net-
back method. Jd. The gas companies ex-
plained that since their’ products were sold
“at various points downstream from the well-
head in various states of production and that
the further downstream the sale, the higher
the price.” Jd. Critically noting that at the

the Legislature to permit an unjustifiable wind-
fall that far exceeds the Legislative purpose of
bringing an end to “inadequate compensation”
for the State's natural resources. W. Va, Code
§ 22-6-8(a)(2) (emphasis added).

280

time the statute was enacted, “the wellhead
was the point of royalty measurement,” the
gas companies argued that the net-back
method “merely recreates the allocations
that existed at the time the [statute] was
enacted|.]” Id, at 1155.

Faced with precisely the same arguments
and called upon to interpret whether its
guaranteed minimum royalty statute permit-
ted deduction of costs, the Kilmer court first
noted that the statute was silent on this
issue. Jd. at 1157. The court then concluded
that “[g]iven the current state of the industry
where the wellhead and the point of sale are
not the same, we are required to interpret
which valuation point is most consistent with
the language of the statute,” Jd. Finding that,
the net-back method equalizes the royalty
payable to the lessor regardless of where the
“value-added” product is sold downstream,
the Kilmer court held that its statute permit-
ted the calculation of royalties at the well-
head utilizing the net-back method. Id. at
1158, The court dealt with the lessor/land-
owners’ concerns about cost inflation by not-
ing that “gas companies have a strong incen-
tive to keep their costs down, as they will be
paying seven-eighths of the costs,” but that if
the lessor suspects abuse of the cost alloca-
tion he or she may pursue an action in court.
Id; accord, Atl. Richfield, 262 Cal.Rptr. 688
(utilizing rules of statutory construction to
apply, rather than interpret, statute utilizing
phrase “market value at the well”).

Like the Kilmer court, it is the duty of this
Court to determine precisely what the goal of
‘West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 was at the time
it was enacted and construe it in a fashion
that most closely effectuates this purpose,
While the language of West Virginia Code
§ 22-6-8 differs from that of the Pennsylva-
nia statute, the import is the same: both were
intended to guarantee a fair, minimum royal-
ty to lessors calculated at the wellhead. The
petitioners fail to persuade us-that this pur-
pose is undermined in any fashion through
the pro-rata deduction or allocation of costs
incurred to enhance the value of the oil or
gas, Further, the plain and unambiguous lan-
guage of the statute has a very precise mean-
ing within the industry and the Legislature’s
use of that language at the time the statute
was enacted clearly delineates the place of
royalty valuation,

As a result, we are persuaded, as was the
Kilmer court, that the most logical way to
ascertain the wellhead: price is, in fact, to
deduct the post-production costs from the
“value-added” downstream price in an effort
to replicate the statutory wellhead value. The
Piney Woods court explained that “to adjust
for imperfect comparisons[,] ... [plrocessing
costs may,{] be deducted as an indirect
means of determining’ what a buyer would
have paid for the sour gas at the wellhead.”
726 F.2d at 240. As the Michigan Court of
Appeals similarly observed;

Basie principles of economics require that,

in determining the “gross proceeds at the’

wellhead” in the absence of an actual sale
of gas at the wellhead resulting in ascer-
tainable gross proceeds, the gross pro-
ceeds from a sale elsewhere must be extra-
polated, backwards or forwards, to reflect
appropriate adjustments due to differences
in the location, quality, or characteristics of
what is being sold. These principles apply
to natural gas as well as to other sales,
Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 223 Mich.
App. 176, 565 N.W.2d 887, 892 (1997) (em-
phasis added),

The equity of this approach is readily ap-
parent. As the Schroeder court explained, to
allow calculation of royalties at downstream
of the wellhead without concomitant cost allo-
cation would inequitably increase royalties
“as a function of defendant's own efforts to
enhance the value of the gas through post-
production investments that it has exclusively
underwritten.” Id. at 894, Similarly, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court concluded that not only
were cost deductions not in derogation of the
“one-eighth at the well” language, but that
refusal to allow all such deductions would
result in the landowner receiving more than
the agreed one-eighth:

If the landowner’s royalty is calculated on

the amount received by the lessee down-

stream minus only transportation costs,
the landowner receives more than one=
eighth the value of the raw gas produced
from his property, ie, he receives one-
eighth of the value of the processed gas, an
enhanced product, without having borne
any of the costs associated with turning
the raw gas into that more valuable prod-

uct. The “first marketable product” ap-

proach, thus distorts the seven-eighths/

one-eighth split of the “market price at the

well” for which the parties contracted.
Baker, 478 S.W.8d at 595 (emphasis in origi-
nal),

We are likewise left with the inescapable
conclusion that the petitioners herein seek to
unfairly maximize their royalty payments
without commensurately bearing the cost of
achieving that maximum value. With no hesi-
tation, we conclude that the industry-recog-
nized “net-back” or “work-back” method of
royalty calculation is equally just to both
parties and, more importantly, the closest
appreciable method of effectuating what the
Legislature envisioned.

HN Nevertheless, the petitioners insist
that the remedial nature of the statute com-
mands this Court to construe it in a manner
which curtails the “mischief” and “evil in-
tended to be suppressed.” The “evil intended
to be suppressed” through West Virginia
Code § 22-6-8 is the payment of flat-rate
royalties, which are not volume-based—no
more, no less. Mere pro-rata allocation or
deduction of post-production expenses which
equally enhance the value of the oil or gas for
both the lessee and lessor is a far ery from
“evil” or “mischief,” much less the type the
statute was intended to eliminate. More-
over, this Court long ago recognized the ap-
propriate limitations placed upon its duty to
interpret statutory language: “The limits of
the application of a statute are generally held
to be coextensive with the :.. purpose it was
intended to ... effectuate, and neither stop
short of, nor go beyond, the purpose which
the Legislative had in view.” Syl. Pt. 2, City
of Charleston v. Charleston Brewing Co., 61
W.Va. 34, 56 S.E. 198 (1906). The fact that
the statute is remedial in purpose is an inad-
equate basis upon which to exceed its stated
goals: “[TJhe breadth of a statute or the duty
to construe a remedial statute liberally can
not amount to authority to a court to extend

18. That, the petitioners characterize cost alloca-
tion as “evil” or “mischief” is unsurprising given
the precedent which bizarrely describes such le-
gitimate business accounting functions in a de-
cidedly pejorative manner. As one commentator
noted:

The court in Wellman and Tawney takes a
surprising and rather ill-informed view of the

281
a statute to a case wholly beyond its effects.”

_ Henthorn v. Collins, 146 W.Va. 108, 111, 118

8.E.2d 858, 360 (1961).

HMM Having deconstructed the first certi-
fied question to reach the issue underlying
the parties’ still-pending cause of action, we
find it appropriate to reformulate it:

When a certified question is not framed so

that this Court is able to fully address the

Jaw which is involved in the question, then

this Court retains the power to reformu-

late questions certified to it under both the

Uniform Certification of Questions of Law

Act found in W. Va. Code, 51-1A-1, et seq,

and W. Va. Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute

relating to certified questions from a cir
cuit court of this State to this Court,
Syl. Pt. 8, Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va.
404, 405, 432 S.E.2d 74, 75 (1998), We there-
fore reformulate the first certified question
into two questions as follows:

Are royalty payments pursuant to an oil or

gas lease governed by West Virginia Code

§ 22-6-8(e) (1994) subject to pro-rata de-

duction or allocation of post-production ex-

penses by the lessee?

May an oil or gas lessee utilize the “net-

back” or “work-back” method to calculate

royalties owed to a lessor pursuant to a

lease governed by West Virginia Code

§ 22-6-8?

We answer both of the reformulated ques-
tions in the affirmative,

E. Limitations on Cost Allocation or De-
~ duction

The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court
further recognizes that simply permitting
lessees to carte blanche allocate post-produec-
tion costs without additional guidance is no
more satisfying or equitable than was the
previous majority’s broad, impenetrable rule
prohibiting such allocation, Even courts in
marketable product rule states are concerned
with potential fraud or abuse, where costs
are properly deductible:

“net-back" method. Despite precedent that
clearly permitted lessees to use the “net-back””
or “work-back” method to calculate royalties,
the court in Wellman seemed to believe that
large gas companies had developed the “net-
back” method as a sham for the purpose of
cheating lessors.
Wheeler, supra at 28-29.

282

Some difficulty may arise in computing
post-production marketing costs if the op-
erations necessary to prepare the product
for market, and operations to enhance the
value of a marketable product, occur at the
same facility. When the same company
both extracts and processes the gas all
operating costs must be closely scruti-
nized..... Such a determination is a ques-
tion of fact to be decided based on compe-
tent evidence in the record.
Garman, 886 P.2d at 661, n. 28 (citing Amoco
Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of
Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979)).9
Some limitations on the deductibility or
apportionment of costs, however, do not de-
rive of fraud or self-dealing, but rather, the
law’s unwavering requirement of reasonable-
ness as both a guiding and limiting factor.
Despite its resistance to cost allocation, even
the Wellman Court recognized and explicitly
held that where costs are properly allocated
or deducted, “the lessee must prove, by evi-
dence of the type normally developed in legal
proceedings requiring an accounting, that he,
the lessee, actually incurred such costs and
that they were reasonable.” Syl. Pt. 5, in
part, Wellman. See also Piney Woods, 726
F.2d at 241 (“[T]he processing costs ...
must be reasonable.”); Garman, 886 P.2d at
661 (“To the extent that certain processing
costs enhance the value of an already mar-
ketable product the burden should be placed
upon the lessee to show such costs are rea-
sonable[.]”); Babin v. First Energy Corp.,
698 So.2d 818, 815-16 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“In
addition to the character or nature of the
costs deducted is the question of the reason-
ableness of the amount deducted.” (emphasis

19. Moreover, in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey,
630 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Okla. 1981), the court
cautioned that

Courts should take care not to allow lessors to
be deprived or defrauded of their royalties by
their lessees entering into illusory or collusive
assignments or gas purchase contracts. When-
ever a lessee or assignee is paying royalty on
one price, but on resale a related entity is
obtaining a higher price, the lessors are enti-
tled to their royalty share of the higher price.
The key is common control of the two entities.

20. The Babin court likewise noted that “the de-
ductibility of any cost may be determined with

in original)); Bice, 768 N.W.2d at 504
(“(Whhether a charge is commercially reason-
able is a question of fact{.]”).2°

HN «(We therefore hold that royalty
payments pursuant to an oil or gas lease
governed by West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)
may be subject to pro-rata deduction or allo-
cation of all reasonable post-production ex-
penses actually incurred by the lessee.
Therefore, an oil or gas lessee may utilize the
“net-back” or “work-back” method to caleu-
late royalties owed to a lessor pursuant to a
lease governed by West Virginia Code § 22-
6-8(e). The reasonableness of the post-pro-
duction expenses is a question for the fact-
finder.

As a final matter, we note the petitioners’
foreboding contention that the resolution
reached herein creates a conflict with leases
which remain subject to Wellman’s and Taw-
ney’s prohibition on such cost allocation, save
express language in the lease permitting
such allocation. The petitioners maintain that
this leads to an impermissible “inconsistent”
result. See Expedited Transp. Sys. Inc, v.
Vieweg, 207 W.Va. 90, 98, 529 S.E.2d 110, 118
(2000) (“It is the ‘duty of this Court to avoid
whenever possible a construction of a statute
which leads to absurd, inconsistent, unjust or
unreasonable results.’” (quoting State v.
Kerns, 183 W.Va. 180, 185, 394 S.E.2d 532,
587 (1990)). However, as previously indicated,
the leases at issue herein are flat-rate leases,
the royalty provisions of which have been
amended by operation of West Virginia Code
§ 22-6-8 and the required permitting affida-
vit outlined therein. The leases in Wellman
and Tawney and other such leases obviously
are unaffected by the statute and therefore
this opinion. Accordingly, we find no inconsis-
tent result where two distinct types of leases

reference to its nature” and “should focus pri-
marily on the propriety of the deduction in light
of acceptable cost accounting standards” and
include “all relevant costs.” 693 So.2d at 815.
We recognize that additional issues may arise
with respect to the propriety of certain deduc-
tions, We leave those issues to be decided upon a
developed record where such issues are properly
presented, “We have traditionally maintained
that upon receiving certified questions we retain
some flexibility in determining how and to what
extent they will be answered.” City of Fairmont v.
Retail, Wholesale, & Dep't Store Union, AFL-CIO,
166 W.Va. 1, 3-4, 283 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1980).

of completely differing character are in-
volved, one type of which is the product of
free and open negotiation and the other en-
eumbered by operation of statute. Neverthe-
less, this Court recognizes the inherent ten-
sion between holders of leases subject to our
interpretation of West Virginia Code § 22-6-
8 and those freely-negotiated leases which
vemain subject to the holdings of Wellman
and Tawney. We therefore implore the Leg-
islature to resolve the tensions as it sees fit
inasmuch as this Court may only act within
the confines of our constitutional charge.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we
answer the reformulated certified questions
in the affirmative.

Certified Questions Answered.

JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves
the right to file a separate opinion.

WORKMAN, J., concurring:

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that
the use of the phrase “at the wellhead” in
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 must be con-
strued in a manner which most closely effec-
tuates the Legislature’s intent at the time
the statute was enacted, as required by our
canons of statutory construction. I therefore
agree that, for purposes of the statutory
language, the term “at the wellhead” permits
use of the “netback” method of royalty caleu-
lation. I write separately, however, to empha-
size that the majority’s decision to allow cost
deduction may not be abused to the detri-
ment of lessors who are chargeable with pro-
rata costs and to urge the Legislature to
enact specific protections to assure fairness
and reasonableness in the calculation of post-

21, In fact, we observe that a member of the
House of Delegates introduced abil in the 2017
regular Legislative session purporting to amend
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8, The introduced bill
specifically implicated the “at the wellhead” Ian-
guage and stated that it was intended to “[c]lari-
fy[] the intent of gas royalty leases which re-
quired not less than 1/8th (12.5%) of the total
amount paid to, received by or delivered to the
owner [of the working interest].” See H. B. 3042

283

production costs. As the majority’s new sylla-
bus point states, only such costs as are rea-
sonable and actually incurred are properly
deductible. Accordingly, to the extent that a
lessor alleges that cost deductions are artifi-
cially inflated or are otherwise not commer-
cially reasonable, he or she may clearly main-
tain an action against the lessee pending
sufficient proof thereof.

The petitioners’ allegations below are, un-
fortunately, not without precedent. See HQT
Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.8d 847, 865 (4th
Cir. 2014) (alleging coalbed methane sold “at
too low a price, in part, by selling the gas to
affiliates in non-arms-length transactions”
and defendant took “improper or excessive
deductions”). Courts nationwide, whether fol-
lowing the marketable product rule or “at the
well” rule, have had occasion to address simi-
lar allegations of self-dealing or outright
fraud in the deduction of costs and/or manip-
ulation of sales price to the detriment of the
lessor. Anderson Living Trust v. Conocophil-
lips Co., LLC, No. CV 12-0089 JB/KBM, 2016
WL 1158841, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 2016)
(alleging defendant utilized intereompany
transactions and/or contracts with affiliate
companies to impose unreasonable expenses
and deductions and/or for services not actual-
ly incurred); Abraham v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
685 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2012) (alleging
netback method included an unreasonable
processing cost and gas sold at discounted
price to affiliate company); Ramming v. Nat.
Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 890 F.3d 366, 873
(6th Cir. 2004) (alleging lessee sold gas in
“sham transaction” for purposes of affecting
royalties), Nothing in the majority opinion
alters a lessor’s right to relief in the event
such conduct is established, nor should les-
sees perceive the majority to be malleable
with respect to a lessor’s right to fair and
equitable treatment in the payment of royal-
ties

(Regular Session, 2017). However, the bill ap-

pears to have died in Committee.

1. A court examining the issue of the faimess and
reasonableness of post-production costs should
be wary of lessees’ affiliate entities realizing a
profit from post-production costs. As other courts
have observed and as noted by the majority,
“[clourts should take care not to allow lessors to
be deprived or defrauded of their royalties by
their lessees entering into illusory or collusive

284

Understandably, however, the majority
opinion may illicit criticism for placing what
may be characterized as an unfair burden on
a landowner-lessor to adduce sufficient evi-
dence to, in good faith, file an action alleging
royalty underpayment. Regrettably, that is
the unavoidable consequence of the Court’s
decision. To alleviate such a burden other
states have enacted legislation designed to
compel the lessee to affirmatively provide
information and be accountable to those with
whom such costs will be shared. For exam-
ple, Montana has enacted a statute which
makes the following requirements for royalty
payments:

(1) An oil and gas producer paying royal-

ties by check, draft, or order shall include

with every payment a form showing. the

following matters relating to that paymient:
(a) the name of ‘the royalty- owner to
whom the payment is made;
(b) the date of the check, draft, or order;
(© any royalty owner identification num-
ber used by the producer for the royalty
owner; .
(d) the time period during which produc-
tion occurred for which payment is being
“made;

. (@) any number used to identify the lease

under which production occurred;
(® the type of product produced;
(g) barrels of oil and cubic feet of gas for
which payment is made;
(a) the amount and type of all taxes
withheld;
@ the net value of production;
(j) the royalty owner’s net value; and
(&) contact information for obtaining ad-
ditional information regarding the pay-
ment and answer's to questions.

(2) In addition to the information réquired
in subsection (1), an oil and gas producer
paying royalties to a royalty owner shall,
at the time of payment, specify. by line
item every charge assessed against the
royalty owner.

(8) Any person purposely and knowingly

violating the provisions of subsection (1) or

(2) is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon

assignments or gas purchase contracts.” Tara
Petroleurn Corp. v. Hughey, 630 B.2d 1269, 1275

conviction shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $1,000.

Mont. Code Ann, § 82-10-104 (West). Colora-

do has similar requirements:
Notwithstanding any other applicable
terms or arrangements, every payment of
proceeds derived from the sale of oil, gas,
or associated products shall be accompa-
nied by information that includes, at a -
minimum:
(a) A name, number, or combination of
name and number that identifies the lease,
property, unit, or well or wells for which
payment is-being made;
(b) The month and year during which the
sale occurred. for which payment is being
made;
(© The total quantity of product sold at-
tributable to such payment, including the
units of measurement for the sale of such
product;
(d) The price received per unit of measure-
ment, which shall be the price per barrel in
the case of oil and the price per thousand
eubic feet (“MCF”) or per million British
thermal units “MMBTU”) in the case of
gas;
(e) The total amount of severance taxes
and any other production taxes or levies
applied to the sale;
@) The payee’s interest in the sale, ex-
pressed as a decimal and. calculated to at
least the sixth decimal place;
(g) The payee’s share of the sale before
any deductions .or adjustments made by
the payer or identified with the payment;
(h) The payee’s share of the sale after any
deductions or adjustments made by the
payer or identified with the payment;

*@) An addréss and telephone number from
which additional information may be ob-
tained and questions answered.

2.5) Upon written request by the payee,
submitted to the payer by certified mail,
the payer’shall provide to the payee within
sixty days a written explanation of those
deductions or adjustments over which the
payer has control and for which the payer

(Okla, 1981).

has information, whether or not identified
with the payment, and, if requested by the

payee, such meter calibration testing and *

production reporting records that are re-
quired to be maintained by the payer in
accordance with section 34-60-106(1)(e).
The requirement to provide a written: ex-
planation of deductions or adjustments
‘shall not preclude the payer from answer-
ing the inquiry by referring the payee to
the royalty clause or payment provision in
a lease or other agreement,
(2.7) A payer who fails to provide informa-
tion required or requested in accordance
with subsection (2.8) or (2.5) of this section
shall be subject to penalties as provided in
section 34-60-121.
Colo, Rev. Stat, Ann, § 84-60-1185 (West),
Such statutory requirements create an ave-
nue through which a lessor may obtain infor-
mation upon which further inquiry may be
based and acknowledges the sharéd account-
ability and good faith required where post-
production costs are realized by both lessor
and lessee.
What both the foregoing and the majori-
* ty’s opinion underscores is the necessity of
the Legislature to address these policy-laden
issues and declare, by statute, the will of the
State’s citizenry in this regard. This Court is
constrained to our canons of statutory con-
Struction and does not make policy. “This
Court does not sit as a superlegislature, com-
missioned to pass upon the /political, ‘social,
_ economic or scientific merits of statutes per-
taining to proper subjects of legislation. It is
the duty of the Legislature to consider facts,
establish policy, and embody that policy in
legislation. It is the duty of this Court to
enforce legislation unless it runs afoul of the
State or Federal Constitutions.” Syl. Pt. 2,
Huffman v. Goals Coal Co., 223 W.Va. 724,
725, 679 S.E.2d 828, $24 (2009). Where the
Legislature’s inaction in the face of such
significant changes in the industry leaves this
Court to intuit its intentions and/or retrofit
outdated statutory language to evolving fac-
tual scenarios, the will of the people is im-
properly disregarded,
Accordingly, I respectfully coneur.
1, One member of the Court who was on -the
original majority opinion, Justice Benjamin, was

285
Davis, Justice, dissenting:

In this ‘proceeding, the Court was asked to
decide whether W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e) au-

thorized the Respondents to deduct from the

royalty payments of the Petitioners part of
the post-production costs associated with
drilling oil and gas. When this issue was first
presented, a majority of this Court. deter-
mined that the statute did not authorize such
deductions from the royalty payments, I vot-
ed with the majority in that decision. After
the majority opinion was filed, Respondents
filed a motion for rehearing. I voted against a
rehearing, but a majority of the Court voted
to rehear the case.! After the rehearing, a
new majority opinion was issued which con-
cluded that, under W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e),
the Respondents could, in fact, deduct post-
production costs associated with drilling oil
and gas. For the reasons set out below, I
dissent from this new majority opinion.
A. ‘Two Preliminary Issues

As a preliminary matter, theré are two
issues I wish to quickly dispose of before
addressing the merits of my dissent. First,
contrary to the unsubstantiated assertion of
the majority opinion, there is and was no
legal basis for granting a. rehearing in this
case.

Rule 25 of the West Virginia Rules of
Appellate Procedure states that a petition
for rehearing “shall state with particularity
the points of law or fact which in the
opinion of the petitioner the Cowrt has
overlooked or misapprehended[.]” (empha-
sis added). This Court has recognized that

« “well settled principles of appellate proce-
dure indicate that ‘a rehearing on an ap-
-peal can be granted only for purposes of
correcting errors that the court has made

.2” Perrine v. El. du Pont de Nem-
ours and Co., 225 W.Va. 482, 598, 694
S.E.2d 815, 931 (2010) (quoting In re Les-
ie H., 369 Il: App.3d 854, 308 Il.’ Dee. 445,
861 N! £.2d 1010, 1015 (2006)).

West Virginia. Reg’ Jail & Corr, Facility
Auth, v, A.B., 234 W.Va. 492, 519, 766 S.E.2d
‘151, 778 (2014), Moreover, “[rJepetition of
argument previously presented to the Court

no longer withthe Court when the rehearing was
decided. . .

286

in the case in not a proper basis for a petition
for rehearing.” W. Va. R. App. Proc. 25(b).

I have combed through the majority opin-
ion several times and have failed to find any
legal or factual error in the original majority
opinion that this new majority opinion relied
upon to justify granting the rehearing. All
that the new majority opinion has done is to
provide self-serving reasons as to why it
would resolve the issue presented differently.
In the final analysis, all that the new majori-
ty opinion has done is to conclude that the
operative language in the dispositive statute
was not ambiguous whereas the original ma-
jority opinion reached the opposite view of
the statute. This difference of opinion is not a
basis for rehearing. Ultimately, this is simply
an impermissible request by the Respon-
dents asking the Court to change its mind.

Second, the new majority opinion went to
great lengths to misconstrue the manner in
which the original majority opinion discussed
the decisions in Wellman v. Energy Re-
sources, Inc., 210 W.Va. 200, 557 S.E.2d 254
(2001), and Tawney v. Columbia Natural
Resources, L.L.C., 219 W.Va. 266, 688 S.B.2d
22 (2006). Contrary to the assertions of the
new majority opinion, the original majority
opinion had to discuss those’ cases because
they were part of the certified question. Af-
ter discussing those decisions, the original
majority opinion held the following:

All the preceding inevitably leads us
back to the first certified question, which
asks simply whether our 2006 decision in
Tawney has “any effect” on the proper
construction of the statutory term “at the
wellhead,” enacted in 1982 as part of West
Virginia Code § 22-6-8, in connection with
the minimum royalty payments due own-
ers of oil and gas in place subject to flat-
vate leases, Through our discussion, we
have demonstrated that Tawney and our
earlier precedents, particularly Wellman,
indeed inform the analysis of the issue, but,
the question as formulated, we believe,
imprecisely addresses the particular dis-
pute between the parties.

We. therefore reformulate the question,
in accordance with the discretion afforded
us by West Virginia Code § 51-1A-4, as

* follows:

Whenever the lessee-owner of a working

interest in an oil or gas well must comply

with West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e) by
tendering to the lessor-owner of the oil or
gas in place a royalty not less than one-
eighth of the total amount paid to or re-
ceived by or allowed to the lessee, does the
statute require in addition that the lessee
not deduct from that amount any expenses
that have been incurred in gathering,
transporting, or treating the oil or gas
after it has been initially extracted, any
sums attributable to a loss or beneficial
use of volume beyond that initially meas-
ured, or any other costs that may be char-
acterized as post-production?
We answer that question in the affirma-
tive.
Leggett v. HQT Prod. Co., No. 16-0186, 2016
WL 6885782, at *8 (W. Va. Nov. 17, 2016).
The new majority opinion wrongly stated
that the original majority opinion used con-
tract principles applicable in Wellman and
Tawney in order to decide the intent behind
the statutory meaning of “at the wellhead.”
However, as noted above, the original majori-
ty opinion reformulated the certified question
so as to take out the Wellman and Tawney
analysis as a basis for answering the ques-
tion. The reformulated question clearly was
grounded on the meaning of the statute. This
point is made clear in the original majority
opinion when it held the following:
The absence of clear, unambiguous lan-
guage [in the statute] gives rise to the
uncertainty that there may be more than
one way by which the holder of a working
interest in an oil or gas well can comply
with West Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)’s com-
mand that the landowner’s royalty be cal-
culated “at the wellhead.” It thus becomes
necessary that we resort to traditional
rules of statutory construction to accurate-
ly discern the intent of the Legislature.
See syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186
W.Va. 698, 414 S.H.2d 454 (1992) (“A stat-
ute that is ambiguous must be construed
before it can be applied.”); State v. Gen.
Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of
Foreign Wars, 144 W.Va. 187, 144, 107
§.E.2d 358, 358 (1959) (“[IIn the interpre-
tation of a statute, the legislative intention
is the controlling factor; and the intention
of the legislature is ascertained from the
provisions of the statute by the application

of sound and well established canons of

construction.”).
Leggett, 2016 WL 6835782, at *6. To be clear,
in order to justify its erroneous decision in
this case, the new majority opinion wrongly
asserted that the original majority opinion
used contract principles to analyze the stat-
ute, I have shown that the original majority
opinion expressly stated that it was relying
upon statutory principles to examine the
statute, not the law governing contracts,

B. The Operative Language in W. Va.
Code § 22-6-8(e) Is Ambiguous
The new majority opinion found that the
applicable language in W. Va. Code § 22-6-
8(e) is not ambiguous. It further erroneously
concludes that the statute clearly authorizes
the Respondents to deduct post-production
costs from the Petitioners’ royalty payments.
The majority opinion is simply wrong. The
relevant language of the statute provides as
follows:
the owner of the working interest in the
well ... shall tender to the owner of the
oil or gas in place not less than one eighth
of the total amount paid to or received by
or allowed to the owner of the working
interest at the wellhead for the oil or gas
so extracted, produced or marketed before
deducting the amount to he paid to or set.
aside for the owner of the oil or gas in
place, on all such oil or gas to be extracted,
produced or marketed from the well.
'W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e) (emphasis added).
According to the new majority opinion, there
is no ambiguity in the language of this provi-
sion. The new majority opinion determined
that this provision clearly shows that “[rJoy-
alty payments pursuant to an oil and gas
lease governed by the [statute] may be sub-
ject to pro-rata deduction or allocation of all
reasonable post-production expenses actually
incurred by the lessee,” I cannot understand
how this reasoning by the new majority opin-
ion is supported by the statute, The statute
does not contain any provisions that address
the issue of “pro-rata deduction or allocation
of all reasonable post-production expenses.”
I will not belabor this point. It is clear to
anyone reading the statute that you cannot
discern a legislative intent to allow a deduc-
tion for post-production expenses. The new

287

majority opinion has used legal sophistry to
fool only itself.

The original majority opinion correctly
found that the provision was ambiguous, In
doing so, the original majority opinion ap-
plied basic statutory construction principles
to discern the legislative intent of the statute.
The original majority opinion looked to the
whole of the statute to see if it could deter-
mine a legislative intent to force oil and gas
owners to pay for post-production costs. The
original majority opinion held that “[w]e need
not guess at the Legislature’s purpose in
enacting § 22-6-8, for the wrongs intended to
be redressed are starkly revealed in the leg-
islative findings and declarations indelibly
engraved into the statute itself.” The original
majority opinion then cited to the following
provision of the statute to reach the conelu-
sion that the Legislature did not intend to
have oil and gas owners pay for post-produc-
tion costs:

The Legislature hereby finds and de-
clares:

‘That continued exploitation of the natu-
ral resources of this state in exchange for
such wholly inadequate compensation is
unfair, oppressive, works an unjust hard-
ship on the owners of the oil and gas in
place, and unreasonably deprives the econ-
omy of the state of West Virginia of the
just benefit of the natural wealth of this
state,

W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(a)(2). After reviewing
this provision of the statute, as well as oth-
ers, the original majority opinion reached the
rational conclusion that “[i]t would have been
perversely inconsistent with the overarching
remedial intent of the flat-rate statute for a
Legislature so passionately dedicated to en-
suring the future flow of adequate compensa-
tion to oil and gas landowners to have pur-
posefully provided a mechanism of royalty
valuation specifically designed to curtail that
compensation.” Leggett, 2016 WL 6835782, at
*6, In other words, the legislative purpose of
the statute unequivocally revealed an intent
to provide oil and gas owners with the maxi-
mum possible royalty payments. The statute
was not intended as a mechanism to reduce
royalty payments or to fill the coffers of

288

companies who develop oil and gas interests.
This is the intent only of the new majority
opinion.

In order for the new majority opinion to
have reached its unsupported conclusion, it
had to create the illusion that the statute was
not ambiguous. This point is key because if
the new majority opinion had followed basic
rules of statutory construction, it would have
been compelled to reach the same conclusion
that the original majority opinion reached,

In my final thoughts on this matter, I must.
return to Wellman and Tawney. As I previ-
ously noted, those two decisions were jetti-
soned by the new majority opinion because
they. presented an impediment to the conclu-
sion that the new majority strained to reach,
Those two opinions have been the law with
respect to oil and gas contracts for over ten
years. Specifically, for over ten years those
two opinions have stood for the proposition
that oil and gas leases that contain language
requiring payment of royalty “at the well-
head,” without more, do not permit the re-
duction of royalty payments for post-produc-
tion costs, In spite of the existence of this
proposition in Wellman and Tawney for
more than ten years, the Legislature has
never amended W. Va. Code § 22-6-8(e) so as
to remove the “at the wellhead” language
from the statute for the purpose of distin-
guishing the reasoning of Wellman and Taw-
ney. In 2017, Delegate Walters introduced
the following amendment to W. Va. Code
§ 22-6-8(e) for the purpose of removing “at
the wellhead” from. the provision:

(e), To avoid the permit prohibition of
subsection (d), the applicant may file ‘with
such application an affidavit which certifies
that the affiant is authorized by the owner
of the working interest in the well to state
that it‘shall tender to the owner of the oil
or gas in place not less than one eighth of
the total amount paid to or received by or
allowed to the owner of the working inter-
est at the wellhead for the oil or gas so
extracted, produced or marketed before
deducting the amount to be paid to or set
aside for the owner of the oil or gas in
place, on all such oil or gas to be extracted,

produced or marketed from the well. If

such affidavit be filed with such applica~
tion; then such application for permit shall
be treated as if such lease or leases or

other continuing contract or contracts com-

ply with the provisions of this section.
(Strikethrough in original). This amendment
died in committee. Clearly, this amendment
was intended to remove the implications of
Wellman and Tawney from an analysis of
the statute. The Legislature chose not to
remove that implication because the implica-
tion was correct. However, the new majority
opinion has done what the Legislature re-
fused to do. The new majority opinion has
rewritten the statute to aay what it was
never intended to say,

In view of the foregoing, I dissent,

800 S.B.2d 874

Dwayne CALES, Petitioner
Below, Petitioner

vw

TOWN OF MEADOW BRIDGE: Timothy
Killen, Mayor; Patricia Jones, Recorder;
Bonnie Hicks, Eula Matlock, and Jo-
sephine Kincaid, Council Members, Re-
spondents Below, Respondents

No. 16-0324
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,

Submitted: April 19, 2017
Filed: May 80, 2017

1, We acknowledge the amicus curiae brief filed
by the West Virginia Municipal League in sup-

Barry L. Bruce, Esq., Barry L. Bruce and
Associates, L.C., Lewisburg, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner

R. Grady. Ford, Esq, The Ford Law Firm
PLLC, Lewisburg, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Respondents .
P. Stranko, Esq, Charleston,
ja, Attorney for Amicus Curiae,
West Virginia Municipal League, Ine,

Timothy
West ‘Vi

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner Dwayne Cales appeals the
March 1, 2016 order of the Circuit Court of
Fayette County denying his petition for a
writ of mandanius seeking reinstatement to
his position’ as.a member of the Meadow
Bridge Sanitary Board (“Sanitary Board”),
On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he was a
municipal officer protected by West Virginia
Code § 6-6-7 in the event of involuntary re-
moval, Respondents assert that Petitioner
was not a municipal officer for purposes of
West Virginia Code § 6-6-7 and that his re-
moval by a majority vote of Respondent
Meadow Bridge Town Council (“Town Coun-
cil”) was proper Upon consideration of the
parties’ briefs and arguments, the submitted

port of Respondents-in this case,

290

record and pertinent authorities, we affirm
the March 1, 2016 order of the Circuit Court
of Fayette County.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

In June 2015, Petitioner was appointed by
the Town Council to serve his third consecu-
tive term as a member of the Sanitary
Board. Subsequently, Sanitary Board mem-
bers voted in favor of him serving in the
capacity of vice chairman of the Sanitary
Board.

2. Municipal Code § 3-112 provides, in pertinent
part, that [alll officers appointed by the Council
may be removed from office at the pleasure of the
Council without any cause being assigned or
shown therefor, a majority of members of the
Council concurring in such removall.]” (emphasis
added).

3. Respondents are the Town of Meadow Bridge,
Mayor Timothy Killen, Recorder Patricia Jones,
and Council Members Bonnie Hicks, Eula Mat-
lock, and Josephine Kincaid.

4. West Virginia Code § 16-13-18 addresses,
among other things, the organization of a sani-
tary board:

(a) The governing body shall provide by or-
dinance the organization of the board, and that
the custody, administration, operation and
maintenance of such works are under the su-
pervision and control of a sanitary board, cre-
ated under this section.

(b) The sanitary board shall be composed of
either the mayor of the municipality, or the
city manager thereof, if the municipality has a
city manager form of government, and two
persons appointed by the governing body: Pro-
vided, That, in the event of an acquisition or
merger of an existing works, the governing
body may increase the membership to a maxi-
mum of four members in addition to the mayor
or city manager of the municipality served by
the board.

(c) During the construction period, one of
the members must be a registered professional
engineer, except that if a registered profession-
al engineer is under contract for the project,
the membership of the board is not required to
include a registered professional engineer. The
engineer member of the board need not be a
resident of the municipality. After the construc-
tion of the plant for which no registered pro-
fessional engineer is under contract has been
completed, the engineer member may be suc-
ceeded by a person not an engineer. No officer
or employee of the municipality, whether hold-
ing a paid or unpaid office, is eligible for
appointment to the sanitary board until at least
one year after the expiration of the term of his
or her public office. The appointees shall origi-

At a special meeting on September 21,
2015, a majority of the Town Council voted to
remove Petitioner from the Sanitary Board
pursuant to § 3-112 of the Meadow Bridge
Code of Ordinances (“Municipal Code”).? On
September 25, 2015, Petitioner filed a “Peti-
tion for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to West
Virginia Code § 6-6-7 and § 16-18-18”
against Respondents? seeking reinstatement.
to his position as a member of the Sanitary
Board. Petitioner alleged that Respondents
wrongfully removed him from his position as
vice chairman of the Sanitary Board “in vio-
lation of West Virginia Code § 16-18-18‘ as

nally be appointed for terms of two and three
years respectively, and upon the expiration of
each term and each succeeding term, an ap-
pointment of a successor shall be made in like
manner for a term of three years. Vacancies
shall be filled for an unexpired term in the
same manner as the original appointment.
Each member shall give bond, if any, as re
quired by ordinance. The mayor or city manag-
er shall act as chairman of the sanitary board,
which shall elect a vice chairman from its
members and designate a secretary and trea-
surer (but the secretary and the treasurer may
be one and the same) who need not be a
member or members of the sanitary board. The
vice chairman, secretary and treasurer shall
hold office at the will of the sanitary board.

(d) The members of the sanitary board are
entitled to receive compensation for their ser-
vices, either as a salary or as payments for
meetings attended, as the governing body de-
termines, and are entitled to payment for their
reasonable expenses incurred in the perform-
ance of their duties, The governing body shall
fix the reasonable compensation of the secre-
tary and treasurer in its discretion, and shall
fix the amounts of bond to be given by the
treasurer. All compensation, together with the
expenses previously referred to in this section,
shall be paid solely from funds provided under
the authority of this article. The sanitary board
may establish bylaws, rules and regulations for
its own governance,

W. Va. Code § 16-13-18 (2016). The role of a
sanitary board is set forth in West Virginia Code
§ 16-13-2, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:

(a) The construction, acquisition, improve-
ment, equipment, custody, operation and
maintenance of any works for the collection,
treatment or disposal of sewage and, in addi-
tion, for the collection and control of stormwa-
ter and the collection of revenues therefrom
for the service rendered thereby, shall be un-
der the supervision and control of a sanitary
board appointed by the governing body as set
forth in section eighteen of this article,

W. Va. Code § 16-13-2 (2016).

they had no authority to remove [him] from
his position ... and, pursuant to West Virgi-
nia Code § 6-6-7, Respondents failed to fol-
Jow the statutorily required procedure for
removal of a municipal officer.” (footnote
added).

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on
October 28, 2015, asserting that West Virgi-
nia Code § 6-6-7 is inapplicable to Petition-
er because a vice chairman of the Sanitary
Board is not a “municipal officer’ under

5. At the time of Petitioner's removal from office,
West Virginia Code § 6-6-7 provided, in perti-
nent part:

(a) Any person holding any county, school
district or municipal office, including the office
of a member of a board of education and the
office of magistrate, the term or tenure of
which office is fixed by law, whether the office
be elective or appointive, except judges of the
circuit courts, may be removed from such of-
fice in the manner provided in this section for
official misconduct, malfeasance in office, in-
competence, neglect of duty or gross immorali-
ty or for any of the causes or on any of the
grounds provided by any other statute.

(b) Charges may be preferred:

(2) In the case of any municipal officer, by
the prosecuting attorney of the county wherein
such municipality, or the greater portion there-
of, is located, any other elected officer of the
municipality, or by any number of persons
other than the prosecuting attorney or other
municipal elective officer of the municipality
who are residents of the municipality, which
number shall be the lesser of twenty-five or one
percent of the total number of voters of the
municipality participating in the election at
which the governing body was chosen which
election next preceded the filing of the petition.

(©) The charges shall be reduced to writing
in the form of a petition duly verified by at
_least one of the persons bringing the same, and
shall be entered of record by the court, or the
judge thereof in vacation, and a summons shall
thereupon be issued by the clerk of such court,
together with a copy of the petition, requiring
the officer or person named therein to appear
before the court, at the courthouse of the coun-
ty where such officer resides, and answer the
charges on a day to be named therein, which
summons shall be served at least twenty days
before the return day thereof in the manner by
which a summons commencing a civil suit
may be served.

The court, or judge thereof in vacation, or in
the case of any multi-judge circuit, the chief
judge thereof, shall, without delay forward a
copy of the petition to the Supreme Court of
Appeals and shall ask for the impaneling or
convening of a three-judge court consisting of
three circuit judges of the state. The Chief

291

West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(a), and is there-
fore not afforded the extraordinary protec-
tions and safeguards included in that stat-
ute.’ Respondents further asserted that
Municipal Code § 3-112 gave them authori-
ty to remove Petitioner from his position as -
a member of the Sanitary Board, with or
without cause, by a majority vote of the
Town Council.

Following a hearing on December 28, 2015,
and in consideration of the parties’ memoran-

Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals shall
without delay designate and appoint three cir-
cuit judges within the state, not more than one
of whom shall be from the same circuit in
which the petition is filed and, in the order of
such appointment, shall designate the date,
time and place for the convening of such three-
judge court, which date and time shall not be
less than twenty days from the date of the
filing of the petition.

Such three-judge court shall, without a jury,
hear the charges and all evidence offered in
support thereof or in opposition thereto and
upon satisfactory’ proof of the charges shall
remove any such officer or person from office
and place the records, papers and property of
his office in the possession of some other offi-
cer or person for safekeeping or in the posses-
sion of the person appointed as hereinafter
provided to fill the office temporarily. Any final
order either removing or refusing to remove
any such person from office shall contain such
findings of fact and conclusions of law as the
three-judge court shall deem sufficient to sup-
port its decision of all issues presented to it in
the matter.

(©) In any case wherein the charges are pre-
ferred by the chief inspector and supervisor of
public offices against the county commission
or any member thereof or any county district
or municipal officer, the proceedings under
this section shall be conducted and prosecuted
by the prosecuting attorney of the county in
which the officer proceeded against resides,
and on any appeal from the order of the three-
judge court in any such case, the Attorney
General of the State shall represent the people.
When any municipal officer is proceeded
against the solicitor or municipal attorney for
such municipality may assist in the prosecu-
tion of the charges.

W. Va. Code § 6-6-7 (2015) (emphasis added).
Although this statute was rewritten effective June
10, 2016, we note that its use of the terms “any
person holding any ... municipal office” and
“municipal officer” remain unchanged. W.Va.
Code § 6-6-7 (Supp. 2016). Unless otherwise not-
‘ed, we refer to the version of the statute in effect
at the time of Petitioner’s removal. Therefore,
our analysis applies equally to the current ver-
sion of West Virginia Code § 6-6-7.

292

da proposing findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the circuit court entered an “Order
Denying Relief and Dismissing Petition for
Writ of Mandamus” on March’ 1, 2016, The
circuit court held ‘that it was not reasonable,
appropriate or proper to extend the proce-
dural protections and safeguards of West
Virginia Code § 6-6-7 to a member of a
sanitary board. The circuit court determined
that Petitioner was not a public official hold-
ing a public office, and thus declined to find a
legal duty on the part of the Town of Mead-
ow Bridge to comply with the extraordinary
protections and safeguards of West Virginia
Code § 6-6-7 in removing Petitioner from his
position on the Sanitary Board. ~

Citing to our holding in Christopher v. City
of Fairmont, 167 W.Va. 710, 280 8.E.2d 284
(1981) §, the circuit court found that Petition-
er failed to establish the requisite criteria to
prove that his position at the sanitary board
was an “office.” The circuit court noted that a
sanitary board member is not expressly des-
ignated as an official in the operative statute,
West Virginia Code § 16-18-18, or in the
town ordinance, Municipal Code § 17-1187
The cirenit court also recognized public poli-
ey considerations supporting its finding that
Petitioner was not entitled to the procedural
protections set forth in West Virginia Code
§ 6-6-7, such as the substantial time, travel,
and expenditure of resources associated with
removal proceedings.: Finally, the cireuit
court noted the lack of precedent upon which
it could rely:
6, We discuss our holding in Christopher, 167

NAG 710, 280 S.B,2d 284, in further detail

7, Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 16-13-18(a)-
(b), the Town of Meadow Bridge enacted an
ordinance providing for the organization of a
sanitary board comprised of the mayor of the
municipality and two persons appointed by the
governing body, Municipal Code § 17-113, for all
intent and purpose, mirrors the guidelines estab-
lished in West Virginia Code §§ 16-13-1 through
16-13-24, Municipal Code § 17-113(1) provides
that “the Council of the Town of Meadow Bridge
does hereby create and establish a Sanitary
Board, with all powers and duties as provided in
and pursuant to the Act. (Chapter 16, Article 13,
of the Code of. West Virginia).” Municipal Code
§ 17-113(2) provides that “{iJhe Sanitary Board
shall consist of the Mayor, who shall be Chair-
man, one (1) Councilperson and one (1) other

As-there is no case law directly on point
the factual circumstances presented in the
case at: bar, and there is-rather meager
case law regarding how far the protections
-of § 6-6-7 may actually extend, it is un-
clear whether these facts would hold sway
over West Virginia Supreme Court affirm-
ing or extending § 6-6-7 protections to offi-
cials that may appear to be upon the cusp
of,.or even far removed,. from what this
Court thinks was originally contemplated
as the intended purpose behind the legisla-
ture’s development of § 6-6-7 procedural
protections and safeguards. Based upon
the existence of very limited precedence, it
is clear to this Court clarification in the
application of § 6-6-7 either by the legisla-
ture, or by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, is both desired and nec-
essary.

Petitioner appeals the circuit court’s order,

i. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, we are asked to review the
circuit court’s denial of Petitioner's writ of
mandamus. In Syllabus Point 1 of Harrison
County Commission v. Harrison County As-
sessor, 222 W.Va. 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008),
this Court established the standard of review
that guides our analysis in these types of
cases and held that “[a] de novo standard of
review applies to a cireuit court’s decision to
grant or deny a writ of mandamus.” In so
holding, we explained that:

Under this standard, “we consider de novo

whether the legal prerequisites for manda-

resident of the Town who shall be appointed for
a term of three years and until his successor is
appointed and qualifies; and the councilperson
and other resident shall be appointed by the
Town Council.” Municipal Code § 17-113(3) pro-
vides that:

‘As soon as may be practicable following the
appointment of a new member of the Sanitary
Board, the Board shall hold an organizational
meeting and choose a Vice-Chairman from
among its members, and a Secretary and Trea-
surer, who may be one (1) person and need not
be a Board member, and such officers shall
hold office at the will of the Board. No bond
shall be required of the Board members as
such, but the Treasurer, whether a, member of
the Board or not, shall give bond in the penalty
of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars for the
proper application of all money received by
him as Treasurer of the Board, and otherwise

_ conditioned according to law,

mus relief are present.” McComas v,
Board of Educ. of Fayette County, 197
W.Va. 188, 198, 475 S.H.2d 280, 285 (1996)

(quoting State ew rel. Cooper v. Caperton,

196 W.Va. 208, 214, 470 S.H.2d 162, 168

(1996)).

Id. at 28, 658 S.E.2d at 558. The prerequi-
sites for mandamus relief are:

“[t]o invoke mandamus the relator must.

show (1) a clear right to the relief sought;

(2) a legal duty on the part of the respon-

dent to do the thing relator seeks; and (8)

the absence of another adequate remedy.”

Syl. pt. 2, Myers v. Barte, 167 W.Va. 194,

279 S.E.2d 406 (1981).

Id. at 26, 658 S,E.2d at 556, syl. pt. 3.

TH Moreover, we apply a de novo review
in this case because the issue presented re-
quires us to resolve questions of law. “Where
the issue on an appeal from the circuit court
is clearly a question of law or involving an
interpretation of a statute, we apply a de
novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal
RM. v. Charlie AL, 194 W.Va, 188, 459
S.E.2d 415 (1995). Keeping these standards
in mind, we proceed to consider the parties’
arguments.

Ii DISCUSSION

Hl Petitioner presents four assignments
of error® However, the sole issie at’ the
heart of this matter is whether a member of
a municipal sanitary board is a municipal
officer entitled to the procedural protections
set forth in West Virginia Code § 6-6-7. Peti-
tioner contends he could be removed from
his position on the Sanitary Board only by
the procedures outlined in West Virginia

8. Petitioner alleges that: (1) the circuit court
wrongly determined that the position of sanitary
board member and/or vice chairman is not an
“officer” as contemplated by West Virginia Code
§ 6-6-7; (2) the circuit court failed to consider
West Virginia Code § 6-6-8. in its analysis of
whether the sanitary board was covered by West
Virginia Code § 6-6-7; (3) the circuit court
wrongly elevated Municipal Code § 3-112 over
West Virginia Code § 6-6-7; and (4) the small
size of the sanitary board has no. bearing on the
enforceability of West Virginia Code § 6-6-7.

9,. West Virginia Code § 6-6-8 provides:

The court, body or officer authorized by law
to appoint any person to any county, magisteri-
al district, independent school district, or mu-
nicipal office, a term or tenure of which is not

293

Code § 6-6-7, which include, among other
things, removal for cause following an inves-
tigation and complaint filed by the county’s
prosecuting attorney and a trial before an
appointed three-judge panel. W.Va. Code
§ 6-6-7(a)-(c). However, in order to prevail,
Petitioner must show that he was a municipal
officer under West Virginia Code § 6-6-7,
which applies to “[alny person holding any
county, school district or municipal office
+.” W.Va, Code § 6-6-7(a),

Petitioner argues that the circuit court
should have read West Virginia Code § 6-6-7
in pari materia with West Virginia Code
§ 6-6-8, He contends that while West Virgi-
nia Code § 6-6-7 applies to officers with fixed
terms, West Virginia Code § 6-6-8 applies to
officers without fixed terms. Thus, Petitioner
reasons that he must only show that he is an
officer with a fixed term, which is made clear
by West Virginia Code § 16-13-18(@, for
West Virginia Code § 6-6-7 to apply.

Petitioner further contends that contrary
to the circuit court’s holding, the reasoning in
Christopher supports a finding that sanitary
board members are municipal officers for
purposes of West Virginia Code § 6-6-7, as is
the vice chairman of a sanitary board. Specif-
ically, Petitioner alleges that:

1, The position of Sanitary Board mem-
ber is created by statute §'16-18-18(c).

2, The position of vice chairman is desig-

nated as an office under statute § 16-13-
. 18(c) and Municipal Code § 17-118.

8. The statute requires a bond if same is

“required by the enabling Municipal Code

§. 17-118, which only requires a bond of the

secretary/treasurer.?

fixed by law, may remove any person appoint-

ed to any office by such court, board, body or

officer, with or without cause whenever such

removal shall be deemed by it, them or him for

the good of the public service, and the removal

of any such person from office shall be final.
W. Va. Code § 6-6-8 (2015).

10. In Petitioner's reply brief, he additionally con-
tends that because he handled money, he was in
fact required to have a bond under West Virginia
Code § 6-2-11 and Municipal Code § 17-113.
The former provides that:

Every officer or employee of a municipality
who handles public funds or property, and
every-other officer or employee of a municipal-
ity of whom it shall be required, shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, give bond, with

294

4, The-statute § 16-18-1, et seg., does not
require an oath nor does the ordinance;
however, the appellant was given an oath
by the Mayor prior to taking office on
June 1, 2015[.] 4

5. The duties and tenure are prescribed
by statute § 16-13-18(c) and the powers of
the Sanitary Board, § 16-13-3.?

6. The statute § 16-18-18(d) states how
Sanitary Board members are to be paid.

good security, to be approved by the council or
other similar body of such municipality, and in
such penalty as such council or other similar
body shall prescribe, conditioned upon the
faithful discharge of the duties of his office or
employment and the faithful accounting for
and paying over; as required by law, of any
funds or property coming into his possession.
W.Va. Code § 6-2-11 (2015). Municipal Code
§ 17-113(8) expressly requires that:
‘The Sanitary Board may from time to time, in
its discretion, require any of its employees to
furnish a good and suitable indemnity bond,
with a recognized and reputable surety, condi-
tioned upon the faithful discharge of their
duties as such, and to deliver up and pay over
all money as provided by law. The Board shall
require all persons who collect or otherwise
handle funds of the Board to furnish a good
and proper bond, with a recognized and repu-
table corporate surety conditioned upon the
faithful performance of their duties and for the
proper handling and care of said funds in their
hands. Such bond shall be in an amount equal
to the sum of money which might at any one
time be in the hands of such person or per-
sons, as may be determined by the Board.

11. In Petitioner's reply brief, he asserts an alter-
native argument that despite the fact that the
enabling statute, West Virginia Code § 16-13-18,
expressly requires an oath only if it is required by
the enabling town ordinance, he was required to
take an oath of office under West Virginia Code
§ 6-1-3 (2016) because “every person elected or
appointed to any office in this state ... shall take
the oath...”

12, West Virginia Code § 16-13-3 provides:

‘The board shall have power to take all steps
and proceedings and to make and enter into all.
contracts or agreements necessary or inciden-
tal to the performance of its duties and the
execution of its powers under this article: Pro-
vided, That any contract relating to the financ-
ing of the acquisition or construction of any
works, or any trust indenture as provided for,
shall be approved by the governing body of the
municipality before the same shall be effective.

The board may employ engineers, architects,
inspectors, superintendents, managers, collec-
tors, attorneys, and other employees as in its
judgment may be necessary in the execution of

Additionally, Petitioner asserts that the
Sanitary Board is an autonomously run stat-
utory board within the municipal entity. Peti-
tioner contends that because West Virginia
Code § 16-13-83 and Municipal Code § 17-113
provide that the Sanitary Board has the
“power to take all steps and proceedings and
to make and enter into all contracts or agree-
ments necessary or incidental to the per-
formance of its duties and the execution of its
powers,” and because the Sanitary Board has

its powers and duties, and may fix their com-
pensation, all of whom shall do the work as the
board shall direct. All compensation and all
expenses incurred in carrying out the provi-
sions of this article shall be paid solely from
funds provided under the authority of this arti-
cle, and the board shall not exercise or carry
out any authority or power herein given it so
as to bind said board of said municipality
beyond the extent to which money shall have
been or may be provided under the authority
of this article.

No contract or agreement with any contrac-
tor or contractors for labor and/or material,
exceeding in amount the sum of ten thousand
dollars, shall be made without advertising for
bids, which bids shall be publicly opened and
award made to the best bidder, with power in
the board to reject any or all bids.

After the construction, installation, and com-
pletion of the works, or the acquisition thereof,
the board shall operate, manage and control
the same and may order and complete any
extensions, betterments and improvements of
and to the works that the board may consider
expedient, if funds therefor be available or are
made available as provided in this article, and
shall establish rules and regulations for the use
and operation of the works, and of other sew-
ers, stormwater conduits, and drains connect-
ed therewith so far as they may affect the
operation of such works, and do all things
necessary or expedient for the successful oper-
ation thereof, including, but not limited to,
those activities necessary to comply with all
federal and state requirements, including
stormwater and surface runoff water quality
improvement activities.

‘The sanitary board may declare an emergen-
cy situation in the event of collector line
breaks or vital treatment plant equipment fail-
ure and shall be exempted from competitive
bidding requirements and enter into direct
purchase agreements or contracts for the ex-
penses. All public ways or public works dam-
aged or destroyed by the board in carrying out
its authority under this article shall be restored
or repaired by the board and placed in their
original condition, as nearly as practicable, if
requested so to do by proper authority, out of
the funds provided by this article.

W. Va. Code § 16-13-3 (2016).

the ability to hire employees such as engi-
neers, architects, and attorneys, the Sanitary
Board has the ability-to bind the Town of
Meadow Bridge and is an entity of the Town
Council. He maintains that the only power
that is expressly limited under West Virginia
Code § 16-18-83 is the Sanitary Board’s abili-
ty to commit to capital funding and borrow-
ing.

Petitioner also argues that because, pursu-
ant to West Virginia Code § 16-18-18, the
Sanitary Board “may establish its own by-
laws, rules and regulations for its own gover.
nance,” it operates as an independent board
appointed by the Town Council. He argues
that pursuant to West Virginia Code § 16-13-
18(c), “the vice chairman ... shall hold office
at the will of the sanitary board,” and thus,
removal of the vice chairman could only oc-
cur by the sanitary board, not the Town
Council, or under West Virginia Code § 6-6-
7. Finally, Petitioner maintains that Respon-
dents are estopped from arguing that he was
not an officer, because in order to terminate
him under Municipal Code § 8-112, he had to
be an “officer.”

Respondents assert that an officer on a
Town Council appointed board or authority is
not necessarily a municipal officer for pur-
poses of West Virginia Code § 6-6-7. Respon-
dents warn that the effect of applying the
strictures of West Virginia § 6-6-7 to any
county or municipal board would constitute a
dramatic. change in how localities routinely
function. Respondents emphasize that the
Legislature explicitly delegated the power to
establish the organization and rules of the
municipal sanitary boards to the municipali-
ties’ governing bodies, which they may estab-
lish “by ordinance.” W. Va. Code § 16-13-
18(a) (“The governing body shall provide by
ordinance the organization of the [sanitary

13. In its amicus brief, the West Virginia Munici-
pal League identifies itself as a statewide, non-
profit, non-partisan, voluntary association of mu-
nicipal governments, including cities, towns, and
villages, established in 1968 to support local gov-
ernments and advance the interests of the citi-
zens who reside within them. It contends that
each of West Virginia's 232 municipalities are
members of the Municipal League. Urging the
Court to affirm the circuit court order, it asserts
that it has an interest in the outcome of this case
because the application of the extraordinary pro-

295

board] ...”) (emphasis added). They contend
that by delegating the authority of establish
ing the organization of the Sanitary Board to
the Town of Meadow Bridge “by ordinance,”
the Municipal Code applies to the individuals
appointed to the Sanitary Board by the Town
Council. Thus, they maintain that the remoy-
al of the Petitioner pursuant to Municipal
Code § 3-112 was entirely lawful.

Respondents additionally assert that while
the Sanitary Board was, and is, authorized to
establish bylaws, rules, and regulations re-
garding its own governance pursuant to West
Virginia Code § 16-13-18(d), it did not. They
contend that since no bylaws or regulations
were promulgated by the Sanitary Board
regarding its governance or the removal of
officers that would displace oF supersede the
Municipal Code, provisions related to remov-
al of individuals appointed to the Sanitary
Board in Municipal Code § 8-112 governs
removal of individuals appointed to the Sani-
tary Board by the Town Council.

Alternatively, Respondents argue that if
this Court finds that Petitioner was entitled
to the protections of West Virginia Code § 6-
6-7, that statute expressly provides for dis-
missal on “any of the grounds provided by
any other statute.” Respondents contend that
because the Legislature delegated the au-
thority to establish by ordinance the organi-
zation of the Sanitary Board pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 16-18-18(a), Municipal
Code § 3-112 provides appropriate grounds
under the “any other statute” language in
West Virginia Code § 6-6-7(a). Finally, they
assert that as a matter of public policy, ex-
tending the level of protection afforded by
§ 6-6-7 to a member of a sanitary board, or
any other town board or authority, and re-
quiring that expenditure of resources and
time to remove a member, simply does not
makes sense.!*

cess set forth in West Virginia Code § 6-6-7 to
the removal of public employees appointed to
non-elected positions is contrary to the intent of
the legislature, contrary to the role of elected
officials in the oversight of appointees serving at
the will and pleasure of the governing body or
other elected appointing official, and is an im-
practicable proposition that, if implemented,
would place an undue burden on both municipal-
ities and the judiciary. Specifically, it contends
that municipalities would be faced with the inev-
itable choice of either leaving on such boards or
commissions non-elected appointed members

296

We have recognized that there is a legal
distinction between a “public officer” and a
“public employee” and that:

As a general rule it may be stated that a

position is a public office when it is created

by law, with duties cast on the incimbent
which involve an exercise of some portion
of the sovereign power and in the perform-
ance of which the public is concerned, and
which are continuing in their nature and
not occasional or intermittent, But one who
merely performs the duties required of
him by persons employing him under an
express or implied contract, though such
persons themselves be public officers, and
though the employment be in or about
public work or business, is a mere employ-
ee,
State ex vel, Key v. Bond, 94 W.Va; 255, 260,
118 SE. 276, 279 (1928), In State ew rel.
Carson v, Wood, 154 W.Va, 897, 175 S.H.2d
482 (1970), we considered whether a petition-
er was an officer of the State Road Commis-

sion or a mere employee for purposes of.

determining whether he was a person who
could be bribed under West Virginia Code
§ 61-5-5. We announced the following test for
determining whether a position is an office or
a mere employment:
Among the criteria to be considered in
‘determining whether a position is an office
or a mere employment are whether the
position was created by law; whether the
position was designated an office; whether
the qualifications of the appointee have
been prescribed; whether the duties, ten-
ure, salary, bond and oath have been pre-
seribed or required; and whether the one
who are ineffective and/or engaging in miscon-
duct, or pursuing a potentially long, expensive

legal process involving the expenditure of public
funds and the time and resources of the City

Council, prosecuting attorneys, three judge filled .

‘by circuit judges from multiple counties, and this

Court. It maintains that sanitary board members
are subject to substantial oversight by the gov-
erning municipal body under West Virginia Code
§ 16-13-3, and do not have the authority to exer-
‘cise sovereign power on behalf of the municipali-
ty.

14,. As the circuit court properly determined,
. there are only two references made in West Vir-
ginia Code § 16-13-18 regarding an office or
officer, The first reference states, “[n]Jo officer or
employee of the municipality, whether holding a

occupying the position has been constitut-

ed a representative of the sovereign.
Carson, 154 W.Va. at 397, 175 8.H.2d at 483,
syl. pt. 5, Subsequently, in Christopher v.
City of Fairmont, 167 W.Va. 710, 280 S.E.2d
284 (1981), we utilized the factors set forth in
Carson to determine that a city water trans-
portation and distribution supervisor was a
public employee rather’ than public officer,
and thus, not entitled to civil service proce-
dural safeguards, Id.-at 713, 280 $.H.2d at
286.

Utilizing the criteria established in Carson
and applied in Christopher, the circuit court
determined that while the position of sani-
tary board member is established by law and
has a fixed tenure pursuant to West Virginia
Code § 16-18-18 and Municipal Code § 17-
118, Petitioner fell short of establishing that
the position was an “office” and that, in his
capacity as a member of the Sanitary Board,
he was a town official. We agree.

The circuit court properly determined that
Petitioner’s position was created by law pur-
suant to West Virginia Code §§ 16-18-2 and -
18 and Municipal Code § 17-118 and thus
satisfied the first Carson factor. Similarly,
the circuit court correctly found that the
second Carson factor was not satisfied be-
cause a sanitary board member is not desig-
nated as an official in those same statutes or
municipal ordinance. We find no statute or
ordinance expressly designating this position
as a municipal office,*

As to-the third Carson factor, the circuit
court .expressly found that “[nleither West
Virginia Code § 16-13-18 nor Municipal
Code § 17-118 prescribe any particular re-
quirements or qualifications that must be
met for a citizen of the town to be appointed
as a member of the sanitary board.” On

paid or unpaid office, is eligible for appointment
to the sanitary board until at least one year after
the expiration of the term of his or her public
office.” W. Va, Code § 16-13-18(c) (emphasis
added), The next reference states that “t]he vice
chairman, secretary and treasurer shall hold of:
fice at the will of the sanitary board.” Id. (em-
phasis added), The latter does not relate to a
board member, but rather those offices that exist
within the board and are, by statutory directive,
selected and controlled internally by the board
members themselves, See W. Va. Code § 16-13-
180

15, The circuit. court noted that West Virginia
Code § 16-13-18 does establish that, during the
initial construction period, at least one appointee
“must be a registered professional engineer, ex-

appeal, Petitioner fails to identify what, if
any, qualifications for the position have been
prescribed. Thus, we find no fault with the
circuit court’s determination that no qualifi-
cations of the appointee have been pre-
scribed.

The fourth factor we must consider is
whether the duties, tenure, salary, bond and
oath have been prescribed. The circuit court
determined that while the general duties of
the Sanitary Board and tenure for the posi-
tion are prescribed by West Virginia Code
§ 16-18-18, no particular salary, bond,’ or
oath are prescribed or required. The circuit
court properly determined that while the
subject statutes and ordinance prescribe and
outline numerous duties and obligations of
the Sanitary Board as a whole, neither the
statutes nor the ordinance establish any spe-
cifie duty or obligation on the part ofa
member of the Sanitary Board.!® Moreover,
while Petitioner was sworn in using a formal
style oath prior to accepting the position on
the Sanitary Board, no such oath was ex-
pressly required by statute or ordinance.

With respect to whether a bond was pre-
scribed or required, the circuit court specifi-
cally concluded that “while both the opera-
tive statute and ordinance reference a bond,
the statute does not require a bond and the
ordinance specifically waives any require-
ment for the posting of a bond for the Peti-
tioner’s position on the ... Board.” We agree
that West Virginia Code § 16-18-18 provides,
in pertinent part, that. “[elach member shall
give bond, if any, as required by ordinance,”
and that Municipal Code § 17-118(8) pro-
vides that “[nJo bond shall be required of the
Board members as such, but the Treasurer,
whether a member of the Board or not, shall
give bond ...” (emphasis added). However,
Petitioner makes a persuasive argument that
because he handled money, he was in fact
required to have a bond under West Virginia

Code § 6-2-11 and Municipal Code § 17-.

cept that if a registered professional is under
contract for the project, the member of the board.
ig not required to include a registered profession-
al engineer.” The circuit court concluded that
“as the facts of this case reflect that the sanitary
board at issue is not in the construction phase,
this qualification or requirement is not relevant
to this Court's determination that there are no
established qualifications to hold the Petitioner's
position on the Sanitary Board, W. Va. Code
Amn. § 16-13-18 (West).”

297

118(8). As stated above, West Virginia Code

§ 6-2-11 provides that “[e]lvery officer or em-

ployee of a municipality who handles public

funds or property, ... shall, ‘unless other-
wise provided by law, give bond....” (em-
phasis added). Furthermore, Municipal Code

§ 17-118 (8) expressly requires that [t]he

Sanitary Board may from time to time, in its

discretion, require any of its employees to

furnish a good and suitable indemnity bond
++, The Board shall require all persons who
collect or otherwise handle funds of the

Board to furnish a good and proper bond
..” (emphasis added). Thus, if Petitioner

was required to handle funds or property of

the Sanitary Board in his capacity as vice
chairman, 'a bond would in ‘fact be required.

As for whether Petitioner’s salary was pre-
scribed or required, the circuit court proper-

ly determined that West Virginia Code § 16-

18-18(d) does not preseribe a particular sala-

ry. The statute provides, in pertinent part,

that:
The members of the sanitary board are
entitled to receive compensation for their
services, either as a salary or as payments
for meetings attended, as the: governing
body determines, and are entitled to pay-
ment for their reasonable expenses in-
curred in the performance of their duties.
The governing body shall fix the reason-
able compensation of the secretary and
treasurer in its discretion, and shall fix the
amounts of bond to be given by the trea-
surer. All compensation, together with the
expenses previously referred to in this sec-
tion, shall be paid solely from funds provid-
ed under the authority of this article....

W. Va. Code § 16-18-18(d). Thus, while Peti-

tioner was required to be compensated by

the Sanitary Board for his services, he was
not entitled to receive a particular salary
under the statute.

16. For example, pursuant to West Virginia Code
§ 16-13-18, the “board may employee engineers,
architects, inspectors, superintendents, manag-
ers, collectors, attorneys and other employees as
in its judgment may be necessary in the execu-
tion of its powers and duties, ...” (emphasis add-
ed); see also Municipal Code § 17-113(4)(C) (set-

ting forth the same Powers: and duties of the
Board).

298

Finally, we consider the fifth Carson re-
quirement, which is whether the one occupy-
ing the position has been constituted a repre-
sentative of the sovereign. The circuit court
found:

[T]t is this Court’s opinion that, once a

sanitary board is created by a governing

body, ie., the Meadow Bridge Town Coun-
cil, it operates wholly within the confines of
the operative statutes and the town ordi-
nance, At no point has this Court discover-
ed where a member of the Sanitary Board
ean bind or obligate the Town Council. The
opposite is actually evidenced by the sub-
ject statutes.” A member of the Sanitary

Board may very well constitute a represen-

tative of the Sanitary Board, but it is this

Court’s opinion that a Sanitary Board

member is not a representative of the

Town Council.
We agree with the circuit court’s analysis of
the applicable statutes and ordinances and
conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrat-
ed that he served as a representative of the
sovereign or the governing body in this
ease, As Respondents note, the Legislature
expressly delegated the municipalities’ gov-
erning bodies the power to establish “by or-
dinance” the organization and rules of the
municipal sanitary boards. Moreover, West
Virginia Code § 16-13-18(c) expressly pro-
vides that the Town Council retained the
power to appoint members of the Sanitary
Board:

“The sanitary board shall be composed of

either the mayor of the municipality, or the -

city manager thereof, if the municipality
has a city manager form of government,
and two persons appointed by the govern-
ing body....The mayor or city manager
shall act as chairman of the sanitary board,
which shall elect a vice chairman from its
members and designate a secretary and
treasurer (but the secretary and the trea-
surer may be one and the same) who need.
not be a member or members of the sani-
tary board. The vice chairman, secretary

17. The circuit court stated that for example, un-
der West Virginia Code § 16-13-3, _

[the board shall have power to take all steps

and proceedings and to make and enter into all

contracts or agreements necessary or inciden-

tal to the performance of its duties and the

execution of its powers under this article: Pro-

and treasurer shall hold office at the will

of the sanitory board.
(emphasis added).

While the Sanitary Board, which retained
the authority to remove Petitioner from his
position as vice chairman, is authorized to
establish bylaws, rules, and regulations re-
garding its own governance pursuant to West
Virginia Code § 16-18-18(d), it did not do so.
Since no bylaws or regulations were promul-
gated by the Sanitary Board regarding its
governance or the removal of officers that
would displace or supersede the Municipal
Code, the provisions related to removal of
individuals appointed to the Sanitary Board
in Municipal Code § 3-112 necessarily gov-
erned the removal of individuals appointed to
the Sanitary Board by the Town Council.
Accordingly, we conclude that the removal of
the Petitioner pursuant to Municipal Code
§ 8-112 was lawful in this case.

In Town of Davis v. Filler, 47 W.Va. 413,
85 S.E. 6 (1900), a similar case decided long
ago, we stated:

If a ... mere appointee of a municipal

corporation; I may say, for this purpose, a

mere employee,—is to have a fixed tenure

for a fixed term, without power in the
council to remove him, it would cramp the
powers of the town, defeat the perform-
ance of some of its essential functions, and
be very hurtful to public interests, Public
policy overrules that contention. But how
as to law? This town exists under chapter
47, Code 1891. Section 15 provides that a
superintendent of roads, streets, and alleys
shall be appointed by council, “to continue
in office during its pleasure.” I might stop
here, as that settles the controversy; but, if
the power of removal were not given by
the Code, it would exist, because the power
to appoint carries with it as an incident the
power to remove, in the absence of consti-
tution or statutory restraint of such power.
It is called by the United States Supreme
Court, as it is, “a sound and necessary

vided, That any contract relating to the financ-

ing of the acquisition or construction of any

works, or any trust indenture as provided for,

shall be approved by the governing body of the

municipality before the same shall be effective.
(emphasis added).

rule.” Hennen’s Cases, 18 Pet. 280, 10
L.Ed. 188, Much authority sustains it. Me-
chem, Pub. Off. § 445. “Where the power
of appointment is conferred in general
terms, without restriction, the power of
removal in the discretion and at the will of
the appointing power is implied, and al-
ways exists, unless restrained and limited
by some provision of law.” Trainor v.
Board (Mich.) 15 L.R.A, 95, note (8. c. 50
N.W. 809).

It would be a costly consumption of time
and money to require a council to have an
impeachment trial over its mere appoin-
tees, who are not officers in the legal
sense, but mere employees, as shown in
Trainor v. Board (Mich.) 50 N.W. 809, 15
LBA. 95.

Id, at 418, 35 S.H. at 7, Echoing these same

concerns, the cireuit court in this case aptly

noted:

It is difficult for this Court to fathom the
slippery slope that we may embark upon
by extending the rather comprehensive
and substantial protections of § 6-6-7 to
various members of county and municipal
boards, committees, commissions, and au-
thorities. Simply put, undue time and re-
sources would be expended across this
State by counties and municipalities, pros-
ecutors and attorney generals, and multi-
ple members of the judiciary, at a time in
our history where those resources are
more valuable, and spread thinner, than
ever before.

The decision to develop various boards,
committees, commissions and authorities
to help the governing body promote the
best interests of its citizens, and the subse-
quent decision to appoint members to
serve thereon, will become a lengthy, de-
tailed process, as once the decision is made
it cannot be simply undone, Likewise, a
decision to seek removal may be delayed
or thwarted due to a possible lack or re-
sources inherently necessary to prosecute
the removal action and there may be an
observed hesitancy to proceed without a
significantly substantiated cause.

18, Because we reach this conclusion, Petitioner's
remaining assignments of error, which are prem-

299

The decision of an electorally checked
and regulated governing body will be re-
placed by the yoke and bridle; the over-
sight and involvement of the executive
branch as well as the already overbur-
dened judicial system. The courts, rather
than the electorate, will become the over-
seers shackled with the task of confirming
the decisions of the governing body.

[e]xtending such a heightened level of a
protection to a member of a sanitary board
is, comparatively speaking, akin to placing
an elevator in an outhouse or killing a gnat
with a gun; providing this level of protec-
tion [ (the protections afforded by West
Virginia Code § 6-6-7)], and expending
this level of resources and time, for the
removal of a sanitary board member, sim-
ply does not fit...

For all these reasons, we conclude that a
municipal sanitary board member does not
hold a municipal office and thus is not a
municipal officer protected by West Virginia
Code § 6-6-7 in the event of involuntary re-
moval.® Because Petitioner has failed to es-
tablish that his position as a member of the
Sanitary Board was a municipal office, he has
no clear legal right to the relief he demands.

Iv. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the March 1, 2016,
order of the Circuit Court of Fayette County
denying Petitioner’s request for relief and
dismissing his petition for a writ of manda-
mus,

Affirmed.

ised on his contention that he was a municipal
officer, need not be addressed.

300

800 S.E.2d 886
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, Plain-
tiff below, Petitioner

, v.
Steve SAYRE, as Administrator of the
Estate of Robert Sayre, Defendant
below, Respondent.

No. 16-0750
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
Submitted: May 28, 2017
: May 81, 2017

: -
—
=

Don C.A. Parker, Esq., Glen A. Murphy,
Esq., Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC,
Counsel for Petitioner

George B. Morrone III, Esq., Mundy &
Associates, Huntington, West Virginia, Car-
rie L, Newton, Esq., Ripley, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, Government Employees In-
surance Company (“GEICO”), appeals from
the July 18, 2016, order of the Circuit Court
of Jackson County granting summary judg-
ment tothe respondent, Steve Sayre, in
connection with determining the amount of
underinsured motorist insurance (“UIM”)
that is owed by GEICO to Mr. Sayre.-Find-
ing an ambiguity in the GEICO policy lan-
guage, the trial court ruled that, -because
there were two underinsured motorists in-
volved in this case, the UIM coverage was
triggered separately by each of those motor-
ists. GEICO argues that the circuit court
erred, both in its finding of ambiguity, and in
improperly applying the policy language to
require GEICO, contrary to policy limits, to
pay double the amount of UIM coverage
purchased by the respondent. Upon our care-
ful review of this matter, we conclude that.
the circuit court erred and, accordingly, re-
verse. _

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The decedent, Robert Keith Sayre, died
from injuries sustained in a car accident on
August 21, 2008, in Jackson County. At the
time of the accident, the decedent was a
guest passenger in a vehicle operated by
Richard Ryan Smith? A second vehicle was

1. Mr. Sayre filed the initial wrongful death suit
individually and as administrator of the estate of
his son, Robert Keith Sayre; in this declaratory
judgment action Mr. Sayre is named solely as the
estate administrator.

2. Mr. Smith also died : as a result of the accident,

3. Each of the policies included endorsements
providing for UIM coverage. Each of the two
policies insured two vehicles owned by Mr. Sayre
and both of the polices provided a multi-car
discount with regard to the premium.

301

involved in the accident, which was operated
by Kurtis Barnett, The accident was deter-
mined to be proximately caused by the inde-
pendent negligence of both drivers of the two
vehicles. There is no dispute based on the
damages involved and the availability of in-
surance that each of the vehicles was driven
by an underinsured motorist. It is further
undisputed that the decedent was covered by
separate automobile policies—one issued by
GEICO and one by 21 Century?

GEICO filed the underlying declaratory
judgment action on September 16, 2010, to
resolve the issue of UIM coverage. Both
GEICO and Mr, Sayre filed motions for sum-

-mary judgment on the issue of whether the

respondent was entitled to an additional
$20,000 of UIM insurance coverage rather
than the $20,000 policy limits that GEICO
had already tendered.’ By its ruling issued
on July 18, 2016, the circuit court granted
summary judgment to Mr. Sayre, ordering
GEICO to pay an additional $20,000 in UIM
coverage based on the existence of two un-
derinsured motorists involved in the acci-
dent’ -It is from this ruling that GEICO
seeks relief,

IL Standard of Review

HMMM Our review of the circuit court’s
decision to grant summary judgment is de
novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192
W.Va, 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). As we
recognized in Payne v. Weston, 195 W.Va,
502, 466 S.E.2d 161 (1995), “[t]he interpreta-
tion of an insurance contract, including the
question of whether the contract is ambigu-
ous, is a legal determination which, like the
court’s summary judgment, is reviewed de
novo on appeal.” Id, at 506-07, 466 S.B.2d at
165-66. Mindful of this governing standard,

4, On August 20, 2010, Mr. Sayre filed a wrongful
death action against Kurtis Barnett and his fa-
ther, as well as Jarhes Smith and Theresa K.
Smith, the parents of Richard Smith. Mr, Sayre
named GEICO as a defendant in that action and

sought relief from it for bad faith and unfair

trade practices.

3. The UIM benefits under the GEICO policy were
$20,000 per “each person” and $40,000 per
“each occurrence.”

6. The drivers of each of the two vehicles involved
in the accident are the underinsured motorists.

302

we proceed to determine whether the circuit
court erred in its determination that addi-
tional UIM insurance coverage was available
in this case.

I. Discussion .
I Because this case revolves around the
interpretation of the UIM endorsement lan-
guage, our analysis is necessarily controlled
by the policy language. See Syllabus, Keffer
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 153 W.Va.
818, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970) (“Where the provi-
sions of an insurance policy contract are
clear and unambiguous they are not subject
to judicial construction or interpretation, but
full effect will be given to the plain meaning
intended.”), The policy amendment providing
for UIM extends coverage for “bodily injury
and property damage which an insured is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.”
Such coverage comes into play “only after
the limits of liability under any applicable
liability policies or bonds have been exhaust-
ed by payment of judgments or settlements.”
The dispute at issue concerns the meaning of
the section of the Underinsured Motorists
Amendment that sets forth “LIMITS OF
LIABILITY.” That section provides, in perti-
nent part, the following conditions:
Regardless of the number of autos or
trailers to which this policy applies:
1. The Underinsured Motorists Bodily
Injury Liability limit for “each person” less
any liability coverage available to the in-
sured from the tortfeasor or tortfeasors is
the maximum we will pay for damages for
bodily injury, including all derivative
claims and any claim for damages for care
and loss of services, to one person in one
accident;

4, When coverage is afforded to two or

more autos, the limits of liability shall ap-

ply separately to each auto as stated in the

Declarations.

GEICO takes the position that condition
number one makes patently clear that the
underinsured per person policy limits of
$20,000 “is the maximum we will pay for
damages for bodily injury.” Mr. Sayre looks
instead to condition number four, which
states that “the limits of liability shall apply
separately to each auto.” He maintains that,

because there were two underinsured motor-
ists involved in the accident at the center of
this dispute, the $20,000 in UIM coverage
applies to each of those motorists for an
aggregate amount of $40,000 in UIM bene-
fits. We examine the merits of each of these
contentions.

In making its argument, GEICO stresses
that the policy at issue unambiguously de-
fined its provision of a $20,000 “each person”
limit of liability for UIM benefits “[rlegard-
less of the number of autos ... to which this
policy applies.” Because the decedent was the
only insured under the policy involved in the
subject accident, GEICO insists the “each
person” policy limit unequivocally governs
the issue of UIM coverage. Moreover, GEI-
CO maintains that the circuit court erred by
framing its ruling on a finding that the sub-
ject policy does not “specifically limit liability
based upon the number of underinsured mo-
torists involved in a crash.” As GEICO ex-
plains, the circuit court’s analysis both misap-
prehends the meaning of the policy language
in dispute and contravenes well-established
tenets of insurance law that permit anti-
stacking provisions where multiple cars are
insured under one policy with a discernable
premium discount.

Hl Beginning with this Court’s decision
in Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Company, 175 W.Va. 387, 382 S.E.2d
689 (1985), the validity of anti-stacking lan-
guage in an insurance policy has been set-
tled:

_ A limitation of liability clause within an
automobile liability insurance policy which
limits coverage for any one occurrence,
regardless of the number of covered vehi-
cles, does not violate any applicable insur-
ance statute or regulation, and there is no
judicial policy that prevents an insurer
from so limiting its liability and yet collect-
ing a premium for each covered vehicle
because each premium is for the increased
risk of an “occurrence.”

Id. at 889, 382 S.H.2d at 640, syl. pt. 5. In
Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Inswur-
ance Company, 188 W.Va, 81, 422 S.B.2d 803
(1992), we resolved the related and specifical-
ly apposite issue of whether a policy provid-
ing for underinsurance coverage for two sep-

arate vehicles that contained anti-stacking
language was enforceable. As we made re-
soundingly clear:

West Virginia Code § 88-6-381 (1992)
does not forbid the inclusion and applica-
tion of an anti-stacking provision in an
automobile insurance policy where a single
insurance policy is issued by a single insur-
er and contains an underinsured endorse-
ment even though the policy covers two or
more vehicles. Under the terms of such a
policy, the inswred is not entitled to stack
the coverages of the multiple vehicles and
‘may only recover up to the policy limits
set forth in the single policy endorsement.

Russell, 188 W.Va. at 81-82, 422 S.H.2d at
803-04, syl. pt. 5 (emphasis supplied).
Explaining the rationale underlying our
ruling in Russell, we stated:
[lt is easily discernible that the reason a
single policy was issued rather than multi-
ple policies was that the premium for un-
derinsured motorist coverage on the sec-
ond vehicle was set at a lesser rate than
the premium for the first vehicle. Further-
more, because of the multi-car discount
given, it is obvious that the insured appel-
lee bargained for only one policy and only
one underinsured motorist coverage en-
dorsement. This multi-car discount is of
particular import since it signifies that the
respondent was receiving a reduced rate
on his automobile insurance in return for
taking out only one policy instead of two,
Meanwhile, the insurer was assuming an
inereased risk of injury which could occur
while the insured was occupying the sec-
ond vehicle as consideration for the second
premium. The insured was therefore re-
ceiving the benefit of that which he bar-
gained for and should not receive more.
188 W.Va. at 85, 422 S.E.2d at 807. We later
clarified that the validity of anti-stacking lan-
guage applicable to UIM coverage was not
dependent on the provision of a specific mul-
ti-vehicle discount for that particular type of
coverage, as had been the case in Russell.
See Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Miller v. Lemon, 194
W.Va. 129, 459 S.H.2d 406 (1995) (“Anti-
stacking language in an automobile insurance

7. The significance of this “separate application”
language, as we explained in Payne, is ‘merely
[to] assure[] the applicability of the policy to
whichever car is involved in an accident, or to all

303

policy is valid and enforceable as to unin-
sured and underinsured motorist coverage
where the insured purchases a single insur-
ance policy to cover two or more vehicles and
receives a multi-car discount on the total
policy premium.”); accord Marvin v. Laven-
der, 194 W.Va, 819, 322, 460 S.H.2d 454, 457
(1995) (holding that Russell decision does not
make validity of anti-stacking language con-
tingent upon specific multi-vehicle discount
for UIM coverage). There is no dispute that
the GEICO policy purchased by Mr. Sayre
contained a multi-car premium discount.

This Court considered an issue analogous
to the issue at hand when addressing the
insured’s argument in Payne that he was
entitled to recover twice the policy limits
because two vehicles were covered by the
subject policy. In examining this contention,
we looked to the limiting language that
“plainly and unambiguously” set forth “the
‘each person’ policy coverage limit” as well as
Janguage verbatim to condition four in GEI-
CO’s policy providing that the terms of the
policy apply separately to each vehicle.’ 195
W.Va. at 507, 466 S.E.2d at 166. Emphasizing
the singular coverage trigger of the accident
(an “oceurrence”) and the express policy lan-
guage limiting the insured’s liability, we re-
jected the insured’s contention that the policy
limits of an insurance policy should be multi-
plied by the number of vehicles covered by
that policy. Id. at 511-12, 466 $.E.2d at 170-
71; see also Shamblin, 175 W.Va. at 848, 382
§.E.2d at 644 (concluding that negligent acts
of multiple tortfeasors caused just one occur-
rence which in turn invoked just one policy
limit of liability).

While Payne involved an attempt to stack
ability coverage based on the number of
vehicles insured under a multi-car policy, we
specifically addressed whether UIM coverage
could be stacked based on the number of cars
insured in Linkinoggor v. Nationwide Mutu-
al Insurance Company, 200 W.Va. 265, 489
§.H.2d 19 (1997). Finding the limiting lan-
guage that stated “[t]he insuring of more
than one person or vehicle under this policy
does not increase our Underinsured Motor-

the cars, and [it] does no more.” 195 W.Va. at
509 n.8, 466 S.E.2d at 168 n.8. (internal citation
omitted).

304

ists payment limits” to be unambiguous in
meaning, we rejected the insured’s attempt
to stack UIM coverage. a at 269, 489 S.E.2d
at 23,

Notwithstanding the similar limiting lan-
guage in the GEICO policy—language that
“cannot be subject to divergent interpreta-
tions” &—the trial court focused its analysis
on the absence of language which “limit{ed]
liability based upon the number of underin-
sured motorists involved in a crash.” This
analysis, as well as the trial court’s finding of
ambiguity “with respect to the various condi-
tions under which UIM coverage is limit
is misguided and devoid of merit. Of critical
import is the language prominently set forth
in the introductory language to the Limits on
Liability of the UIM endorsement that ap-

- plies to each condition—“regardless of the
number of vehicles subject to this policy”—
which is then followed by the unmistakable
limiting of the amount of UIM liability to the
UIM “per person” limit of $20,000 as the
“maximum we will pay for bodily injury.”
This language states in no uncertain terms
that the “per person” limit of UIM coverage
is the maximum amount of UIM coverage
available in this cireumstance.? Contrary to
the circuit court’s reasoning, the absence of
language directly linking the limits of UIM
coverage to the number of underinsured tort-
feasors has no stultifying effect on the unam-
biguous limiting language contained in the
UIM amendment,

While the existence of an underinsured
motorist is what triggers the payment provi-
sions of UIM coverage, the existence of mul-
tiple underinsured motorists does not oper-
ate, as the circuit court ruled, to “expand ]
UIM coverage where there is more than one
insured vehicle,” This is because the amount,
of UIM coverage is not correlatively linked
to the number of underinsured motorists any
more than the amount of liability coverage is
linked to the number of tortfeasors. See-

Shamblin, 175 W.Va. at 348, 382 S.E.2d at -

644 (recognizing that “two antecedent negli-
gent acts do not constitute two ‘occur-

8, Payne, 195 W.Va. at 509, 466 S.E.2d at 168.

9, Had two insureds been involved in that acci-
dent, the decedent and one of his insured family
members, then the "per occurrence” UIM limit
‘of $40,000 would have applied.

rences’”), The only thing that could increase
the amount of UIM coverage, as in fact
occurred in this case, is the existence of a
second insurance policy providing for UIM.%
See Payne, 195 W.Va, at 511, 466 8.B.2d at
170 (stating that whereas “liability insurance
coverage is-triggered only when the vehicle
involved in the accident is covered under the
policy, ... stacking is triggered only when
the insured is covered simultaneously by two
or more policies providing uninsured or un-
derinsured coverage”).

In viewing condition number four, the
“separate application” language, as a mecha-
nism by which to multiply the amount of
UIM ‘coverage by the number of vehicles
insured, the circuit court and the respondent
have misconstrued the meaning of ‘this lan-
guage. In providing ‘that the policy limits
apply separately to each insured vehicle,
GEICO clarified, in customary language, that
for each vehicle irisured there is a total
amount of insurance available upon a policy
occurrence or trigger. For example, if both of
Mr, Sayre’s vehicles were contemporaneously
involved in an accident, each of them would
separately be subject to the $20,000/$40,000
per person/per occurrence amount of liabili-
ty. The second vehicle would not be left
uncovered by virtue of the policy limits hav-
ing been met by the accident involving the
first insured vehicle. More importantly, how-
ever, because neither of the vehicles involved
in the subject case were the insured’s vehi-
cles, condition number four is wholly inappli-
cable to this case. See supra note 7. Thus, the
cireuit court’s reliance on this policy lan-
guage as a basis for doubling the amount of
UIM coverage in this case was contrary to
both the policy language and to our law
authorizing the use of anti-stacking provi-
sions in insurance policies. See Shamblin, 175
W.Va, at 844, 882 S.H.2d at 646 (recognizing
validity of anti-stacking insurance policy lan-
guage limiting liability regardless of the
number of vehicles to which this policy ap-
plies).

10. Mr. Sayre was awarded $100,000 in UIM
benefits under the 21st Century policy because
that insurer was unable to demonstrate it had
tendered a “reasonably commercial offer of un-
derinsured motorist coverage” to him. See W.’ Va.
Code § 33-6-31d(b) (2011).

The trial court reasoned that there was
nothing in the GEICO policy “which prevents
each of the two underinsured motorists from
activating a per person limit on separate
insured motor vehicles,” In suggesting that
each underinsured motorist involved in an
accident separately triggers the availability
of UIM insurance under one policy, the cir-
euit court wrongly sought to link each under-
insured motorist to a specific insured vehicle.
As discussed above, while the right to UIM
coverage necessarily requires the existence
of an underinsured motorist, the provision of
UIM coverage is not connected to an in-
sured’s vehicle; instead, the coverage is
linked to the exhaustion of the “limits of
liability under any applicable liability poli-
cies.” In seeking to connect separate policy
limits for each insured vehicle with each un-
derinsured motorist, the cireuit court misap-
prehends the nature of UIM. Rather than
springing into existence as a result of the
matching of an underinsured motorist with
an insured’s vehicle, the coverage is not de-
pendent on the number of insured vehicles.
As to the circuit court’s insistence that no
policy language prevented it from ruling that
an additional $20,000 of UIM coverage was
available, we need only refer to condition
number one, which expressly limits the
amount of UIM coverage to the maximum
“per person” amount’ of UIM coverage—
$20,000.

The cireuit court erred in faulting GEICO
for not including an express limitation of its
UIM liability based on the number of tort-
feasors. This Court has made clear what con-
stitutes effective limiting language and the
language included in the GEICO policy is
consistent with prior cases in which we have
upheld similar limiting language for anti-
stacking purposes. See Linkinoggor, 200
W.Va. at 269, 489 S.E.2d at 28, Shamblin,
175 W.Va. at 844, 882 S.E.2d at 646. The
circuit court, in awarding the respondent an
additional $20,000 of UIM coverage, tortured
the language of the policy and granted Mr.
Sayre benefits for which he had neither con-
tracted or paid. In choosing to purchase a
singular insurance policy from GEICO to
insure his two vehicles, Mr, Sayre purchased
just one UIM amendment to be added to his
policy, He did not purchase two UIM amend-
ments with two separate sets of liability lim-

305

its from GEICO. Thus, when the cireuit
court doubled his UIM coverage from the
$20,000 “per person” limit that he paid for, it
improperly awarded him $20,000 more UIM
coverage than he had purchased,

Hl As this Court made clear in Russell,

_an insured, such as Mr. Sayre, who pur-

chases a multi-car insurance policy that con-
tains enforceable anti-stacking language is
only entitled to recover up to the policy limits
set forth in the single policy endorsement.
See Russell, 188 W.Va. at 81-82, 422 S.H.2d
at 808-04, syl, pt. 5. Accordingly, we hold that
an insured is not entitled to stack underin-
sured motorist coverage for ‘every vehicle
covered by a single policy where the insured.
received a multi-car premium discount and
the policy contains language expressly limit-
ing the insurer’s liability regardless of the
number of vehicles insured under the policy.

_ IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the July 13, 2016,

‘decision of the Cireuit Court of Jackson

County is reversed, and this matter is re-
manded for entry of an order granting sum-
mary judgment to GEICO. on the issue of
additional UIM coverage.

Reversed and remanded.

800 S.E.2d 891

GASTAR EXPLORATION, INC,,
Defendant Below Petitioner

Y

Joyce CONTRAGUERRO, et
al., Plaintiffs Below,
Respondents

No. 16-0429"
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 28, 2017
Filed: May 81, 2017

William M. Herlihy, Esq., Spilman Thomas
& Battle, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Matthew P. Heiskell, Esq., Spilman Thomas

1, Although related, pooling and unitization have
different technical meanings in oil and gas oper-
ations. Generally speaking, pooling arises from
the bringing together of tracts of land for oil and
gas drilling based primarily upon the allowable
spacing of wells. The focus of unitization, howev-
er, is more directly on the geologic nature of the
underlying oil and gas reservoir and enhanced-
recovery techniques. See James E. McDaniel,
Statutory Pooling and Unitization in West Virgi-
nia: The Case for Protecting Private Landowners,
118 W.Va. L. Rev. 439, 455 (2015) (Although
“pooling” and “unitization” are often used inter-
changeably, pooling occurs “when separately
owned tracts of land are ‘pooled’ or joined to-
gether in order to comply with spacing require-
ments or to have sufficient acreage with which to

307

& Battle, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for Gastar Exploration, Ine.

Jeremy M. McGraw, Esq., James G. Bor-
das, Jr., Esq., James G. Bordas, III, Esq.,
James B. Stoneking, Esq., Bordas & Bordas,
PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, Counsel for
Joyce Contraguerro, et al.

Mychal S. Schulz, Esq., Matthew -Casto,
Esq., Babst Calland Clements & Zomnir,
P.C., Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for
PPG Industries, Ine.

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson,
PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, W. Henry
Lawrence, Esq., Allison J. Farrell, Esq.,
Lauren A. Williams, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, Counsel
for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Oil and
Natural Gas Association

George A. Patterson, III, Esq., John .W.
Woods, III, Esq., Bowles Rice LLP, Charles-
ton, West Virginia, Counsel for Amicus Curi-
ae, Independent Oil and Gas Association of
West Virginia, Inc.

Justice Ketchum:

This ‘appeal concerns a vehtary pooling
and unitization lease provision regarding -hor-
izontal drilling and production of oil and gas
from the Marcellus Shale Formation. The
lessor is PPG Industries, Inc., (“PPG”) and
the lessee is Gastar Exploration USA, Ine.,
aka Gastar Exploration, Inc., (“Gastar”). The
lease covered 8,285.6874 acres in Marshall
County, and 700 acres thereof were designat-
ed by the lessee, Gastar, as the Wayne/Lily
Unit for purposes of pooling the oil and gas
interests held by various individuals and enti-
ties

obtain a well permit.” By contrast, the goal of
unitization ‘‘is to consolidate enough of the inter-
ests in a particular reservoir to allow production
to be carried out in the most efficient, man-
ner[,]"). See also Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M.
Kramer, Williams & Myers, Oil and Gas Law,
§ 901 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2016)
(““{Plooling’ means the bringing together of
small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well
permit under applicable spacing rules whereas
‘unitization,’ or, as it is sometimes described,
‘unit operation,’ means the joint operation of all
‘or some part of a producing reservoir.”).

In the current matter, the parties have used the
terms “pooling” and “unitization” interchange-
ably. In this Opinion, we will refer to both terms
simply as “pooling.”

308

PPG and Gastar, defendants in the action
below, challenge the April 1, 2016, order of
the Circuit, Court of Marshall County which
granted partial summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, Joyce Contraguerro, et al.
Although not parties to the PPG-Gastar
lease, the plaintiffs (“NPRI holders”) collec-
tively hold a one-fourth nonparticipating roy-
alty interest in the oil and gas underlying a
105.9 acre parcel included within the 700 acre
Wayne/Lily Unit. The NPRI holders do not
own any interest in the surface of the 105.9
acre parcel, nor do they live on the property.

Hl Generally, a nonparticipating royalty
interest (“NPRI”) describes a right to share
in royalties from oil and gas drilling and
production operations where the holder
thereof has conveyed away all other interests
in the oil and gas he or she may have had,
including any possessory interest and the
right to lease the minerals, ‘See Benjamin
Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Problems
in Allocation of Production to Owners of
Non-Participating Royalty Interests in: the
Bra of Horizontal Drilling, 44 Saint Mary’s
L, J. 771, 799 (2018) (“An NPRI is a nonpos-
sessory interest, which means that the NPRI
owner does not own the minerals in place but
instead holds only a presently vested right to
a stated fraction of production from any and
all minerals produced.”).

Tn Davis v. Hardman, 148 W.Va, 82, 188
§,E.2d 77 (1968), the terns “nonparticipating
voyalty interest” and “interest in oil and gas
in place” were compared:

The distinguishing characteristics of a
non-participating royalty interest are: (1)
Such share of production is not chargeable
with any of the costs of discovery and
production; (2) the owner has no right to
do any act or thing to discover and pro-
duce-the oil and gas; (8) the owner has no
vight to grant leases; and (4) the owner has
no right to receive bonuses or delay rent-
als, Conversely, the distinguishing charac-
teristics of an interest in minerals in place

2. The plaintiffs are Joyce Contraguerro, Edward

Minor, Rose Hill, Janice Taylor, Danial Darrah,

Dave Darrah, Carmalou Dartah, Kim Blacke,

Joseph. Darrah, Robbie Darrah, Kellie Darrah

Haker, Theodore Minor, Harley Darrah, Orion

Darrah, Jr., Claray Yoh, Lona Minor, Karen

Walenciez, Johnathon Minor, Joshua Minor, and

Tiffany Minor.

are: (1) Such interest is not free of costs of

discovery and production; (2) the owner

has the right to do any and_all acts neces-
sary to discover and produce oil and gas;

(8) the owner has the right to grant leases,

and (4) the owner has the right to receive

bonuses and delay rentals.
(citation omitted) 148 W.Va. at 90, 188 S.E.2d
at 81-82. .

PPG and Gastar challenge the circuit
court’s entry of partial summary judgment in
favor of the NPRI holders, The. circuit court
ruled that the pooling provision in the PPG-
Gastar lease and the designated Wayne/Lily
Unit ave void until such time as pooling is
consented to and ratified by. the NPRI hold-
ers.

This Court is of the opinion, however, that
the cireuit court committed error in ruling
that the validity of the pooling provision and
the -Wayne/Lily Unit was, dependent upon the
consent and ratification of the NPRI holders.
Consequently, we reverse the April 1, 2016,
order and enter judgment in favor of PPG
and Gastar’. yO

I. Factual Background oa

A, The Nonparticipating
Royalty Interests

By deed made November 6, 1933, Mabell
Sims Theiss and her sister, Ada Sims Par-
sons, acquired a one-half interest in the oil
and ‘gas in place underlying a 105.9 acre
parcel in Franklin District, Marshall County.
Thereafter, by deed made October 2, 1946,
Mabell Sims Theiss and Ada Sims Parsons
conveyed to John Wenzel the right “to lease
said land for oil and gas purposes and receive
any and all delay rentals that may be re-
ceived under and by virtue of any lease exe-
euted by him, his heirs or assigns, covering
said land.” As a result, Mabell Sims Theiss
and Ada Sims Parsons retained a one-half
nonparticipating royalty interest in the 105.9
acres, without leasing rights which they had

3. By separate orders entered on August 10, 2016,
this Court permitted amicus curiae briefs to be
filed by the West Virginia Oil and Natural Gas
Association and the Independent Oi! and Gas
Association of West Virginia, Inc, We acknowl-
edge and appreciate the contribution of those
organizations.

conveyed to John Wenzel. Wenzel had no
right to receive royalties, His leasing rights
were later acquired by PPG.

The current NPRI holders trace their roy-
alty interest'in the 105.9 acre parcel back to
the one-fourth nonparticipating royalty inter-
est of Mabell Sims Theiss. Mabell Sims
Theiss died intestate, and her property
passed to Eva Adele Minor, her sole heir.
Eva Adele Minor also died intestate, and her
one-fourth nonparticipating royalty interest
in the 105.9 acres passed to her heirs, the
NPRI holders. The NPRI holders derived no
royalty interest from Ada Sims Parsons.

B. The Oil and Gas Lease and —
Operations Agreement.

PPG’s leasing rights, derived from the
1946 deed to John Wenzel, were described by
the cireuit court as follows: “PPG acquired
the surface acreage associated with the’ 105.9
acre mineral estate and holds an ‘executive
right’ to lease certain mineral interests un-
derlying that tract of land. Defendant PPG
does not own any royalty interest in the
105.9 acre mineral estate.” 4
* On February 25, 2011, PPG, as lessor,
entered into an Oil and Gas Lease and Oper-
ations Agreement (the “lease”) with Gastar,
the lessee.® PPG and Gastar are the only
parties to the lease, and the lease covers
8,285.6874 acres, including the 105.9 acre
parcel from which the interest of the NPRI
holders arises. The granting clause, set forth
in section 2 of the lease, provides in part:

PPG, for valuable consideration, includ-
ing the payment of the agreed lease bonus,
and subject to the provisions of this Lease,
hereby grants, leases and lets the Leased

Premises exclusively to Lessee [Gastar],

without warranties or covenants of title of *

any nature and without any other warran-
ties or representations, for the sole pur-
pose of exploring for Oil and Gas in the
Marcellus Shale Formation by geological,
geophysical, seismic, and other methods,
and of drilling, producing and operating

4, See Black's Law Dictionary 691 (10th ed. 2014)
defining “executive right” as the “exclusive right
to lease specified land or niineral rights. The
executive right is one of the incidents of the
mineral interest.”

5, Although the lease was not recorded, a memo-
randum thereof was recorded in the Office of the

SO

309

Gas Wells or Oil Wells for recovering,
removing and marketing Oil, Gas, and all

. associated Hydrocarbons from the Marcel-
lus Shale Formation and all products pro-
duced therewith or which may be © derived
therefrom[.]

Gastar was required under the lease to
make bona fide efforts to develop the leased
premises in a prudent and workmanlike man-
ner and at locations “likely to be capable of
producing Hydrocarbons in Paying Quanti-
ties.” In Séction 9 of the lease, PPG granted
Gastar the right “to pool or unitize parts of
the Leased Premises with other lands or
leases, whether owned by Lessee or by oth-
ers at a time before or after drilling to create
Pooled Horizontal Well Tracts.” Further-
more, Section 9 provided regarding royalties:
“Royalty on production of Hydrocarbons
from a Pooled Horizontal Well Tract shall be
reduced to the proportion that the amount of
the Leased Premises acreage placed within
the Pooled Horizontal Well Tract bears to
the total acreage in the Pooled Horizontal
Well Tract.”

C. The Wayne/Lily Unit and
Requested Ratification

On March 7, 2012, Gastar recorded a des-
ignation of pooled unit in the Office of the
Clerk of the County Commission of Marshall
County. The designation, known as the
Wayne/Lily Unit, provided that 700 acres of
the leased premises in Franklin District, in-
eluding the subject 105.9 acres, would be
pooled to facilitate the exploration, develop-
ment, production and marketing of oil and
gas. The designation addressed royalties as
follows: “Each royalty and overriding royalty
owner shall be compensated based on their
pro rata share of ownership in each ‘tract
within the Unit and in the proportion of their
tract acreage contribution to the total
amount of acreage included in the Unit.”

The Wayne/Lily Unit contains eight oil and

gas wells drilled by Gastar. The cireuit court

Clerk of the County Commission of Marshall
County pursuant to W.Va, Code, 40-1-8 [1993].

6. An amended designation of pooled unit was
recorded on November 7, 2012, but does not
impact the issues before this Court.

310

determined that five of the eight wells in the
Unit have horizontal well bores which pene-
trate the minerals underlying the 105.9 acre
parcel, Soon after placement of the wells,
Gastar began production operations within
the Unit. The circuit court found that the
NPRI holders were not asked to consent to
the pooling of their royalty interests prior to
the time Gastar established the Wayne/Lily
Unit or prior to the commencement of pro-
duction operations within the Unit,

Thereafter, Gastar began contacting the
NPRI holders individually, asking each
NPRI holder to sign and return a ratification
of the February 25, 2011, lease between PPG
and Gastar. The ratification covered all terms
of the lease, including the pooling provision.”
The NPRI holders state that they were un-
aware of their royalty interests before Gastar
contacted them, According to the NPRI hold-
ers, Gastar refused to provide them with the
details of the lease for their review. As a
result, the NPRI holders did not sign the
vatifications® Their royalty payments have
been placed in escrow pending the outcome
of this litigation.

II. Procedural Background

On May 29, 2014, the NPRI holders insti-
tuted a declaratory judgment action in the
circuit court against PPG and Gastar. The
NPRI holders sought a declaration of their
rights and status regarding the lease in rela-
tion to the subject 105.9 acre parcel and the
royalties payable from production opera-
tions.? In a subsequent amended complaint,

7. In answer to the NPRI holders’ second set of
interrogatories, Gastar stated that

ratification of the lease in question was sought
in order to obtain from the heirs of Mabell
Sims and Eva Minor, an acknowledgment of
the existence of the Oil and Gas Lease, the
confirmation of the extent of their interest in
the property subject to that Lease, and to in-
form them of the lease royalty applicable to the
Mabell Sims Theiss interest once its current
owners are established.

8, The NPRI holders later alleged in the amended
complaint that they were refused “a full and
complete copy” of the February 25, 2011, PPG-
Gastar lease. In response, Gastar asserted that,
according to its terms, the lease was subject to a
confidentiality clause which prohibited Gastar
from providing the entire text to the NPRI hold-
ers, Gastar stated, however, that a relevant, re-
dacted portion of the lease was provided to the
NPRI holders’ counsel. Moreover, Gastar indicat-
ed that the confidentiality clause did not include

the NPRI holders added the allegation that,
to the extent PPG held an executive right to
lease the 105.9 acres, PPG should not have
given Gastar the authority to pool the 105.9
acre parcel with other properties without the
NPRI holders’ consent.

Asserting that their royalty interests have
been diluted, the NPRI holders demanded
damages against PPG and Gastar and a dec-
Javation that the lease is invalid “to the ex-
tent that it permits Defendant Gastar to pool
and/or unitize interests owned by the [NPRI
holders] with interests owned by other indi-
viduals.” As the action proceeded, the NPRI
holders, PPG and Gastar filed motions for
summary judgment,

On April 1, 2016, the circuit court entered
an order granting partial summary judgment
in favor of the NPRI holders. The circuit
court ruled that the pooling provision in the
PPG-Gastar lease and the designated Wayne/
Lily Unit were void, “until such time as the
[NPRI holders] consent to and authorize
those operations.” Relying on court decisions
from Texas, the cireuit court concluded that
the pooling of the Wayne/Lily Unit constitut-
ed a “cross-conveyance” of the royalty inter-
ests of the NPRI holders with. the interests
of others within the Unit. In Vol. 2, Bruce M.
Kramer and Patrick H. Martin, The Law of
Pooling and Unitization, § 19.02[1][a] (Lex-
isNexis Matthew Bender 2016), the following
definition of “cross-conveyance” is offered:
“Under cross-conveyance theory, the lessors

the lease ‘memorandum which was recorded in
the Office of the Clerk of the County Commission
of Marshall County. See n, 5, supra.

9, Also named in the action as defendants were
Axiall Corporation and the “unknown and uni-
dentifiable” heirs of Ada Sims Parsons. The
NPRI holders alleged that the Axiall Corporation
obtained ownership of certain PPG facilities in
Natrium, Marshall County, and may have ac-
quired rights and interests under the PPG-Gastar
lease. The Axiall Corporation, however, was later
dismissed from the action. Ada Sims Parsons was
a predecessor of the interests of John Wenzel and
PPG. However, the circuit court found that the
NPRI holders’ interests were derived solely from
Ms. Parsons’ sister, Mabell Sims Theiss. Any po-
tential claim Ms, Parsons’ unknown heirs may
have in the 105.9 acre parcel is not before this
Court, .

would each own an undivided interest in the
others’ interest, and each would thereby have
conveyed to the others a similar interest in
the premises originally owned.”

Based on the Texas version of cross con-
veyancing, the circuit court concluded that
the consent or ratification of the NPRI hold-
ers to the pooling was required.” The circuit,
court stated:

In the present case, Defendants PPG
and Gastar entered into an oil and gas
lease agreement which permits Gastar to
pool the covered mineral acreage into oil
and gas production units and to measure
and pay oil and gas production royalties
from the entire unit proportionately to the
owners of the mineral interests based upon.
the amount of the different acreages which
make up the unit as a whole.

10. In suggesting a cross-conveyance of interests
had occurred, the circuit court relied on the
language of the Supreme Court of Texas in Min-
chen v. Fields, 162 Tex. 73, 345 S.W.2d 282
(1961):

[W]here mere executive rights are conferred or
reserved, there is no intention evidenced to
vest authority to convey a royalty interest re-
served or the royalty interest attributable to the
minerals leased and to hold that such holder
can unitize or pool the interest would allow
him to convey such royalty interest because a
unitization of the royalty and minerals under
different tracts effects a cross-conveyance to
the owners of minerals under the various
tracts of royalty or minerals so that they all
own undivided interests under the unitized
tract in the proportion their contribution bears
to the unitized tract.
(citation omitted) 345 S.W.2d at 285. See Brown
v. Getty Reserve Oil, Inc., 626 S.W.2d 810, 814
(Tex. App. 1981) (Pooling by the executive rights
holder is not binding absent the NPRI holder's
consent,), See also Ragsdale v, Superior Oil Co.,
40 Ill.2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 492 (1968), where the
Supreme Court of Illinois stated that unitization
creates ‘a single ownership of the entire unit by
the owners of the several tracts making up the
unit, subject to the terms of the oil and gas
leases.” 237 N.E.2d at 494,

11. In addition to the consent and ratification
issue, PPG challenges the denial of its own mo-
tion for summary judgment regarding PPG's ne-
gotiation of the overall terms of the PPG-Gastar
lease. The NPRI holders challenged the reason-
ableness of PPG’s entitlement under the lease to
free gas, in-kind royalties and shut-in royalties.
‘The NPRI holders asserted that such entitlements
should be treated as “production,” thereby gen-
erating additional royalties payable to the NPRI

311

Five oil and gas well drilling legs actual-
ly penetrate into the 105.9 acre tract of
Jand which includes the [NPRI holders’]
non-participating royalty interest. Proper-
ties included within the Wayne/Lily Unit
inelude properties upon which there is no
oil and gas well surface location and under
which none of the 5 oil and gas horizontal
drilling legs which penetrate the [NPRI
holders’] interest are located. Those prop-
erties which are not touched by the drilling
site and/or the drilling legs still share in
the oil and gas production from those 5
wells. This is exactly the situation contem-
plated by the cases which have found that
non-participating royalty interests may not
be pooled without consent.

Wl PPG and Gastar challenge the partial ©
summary judgment granted in favor of the
NPRI holders.

holders. In other words, the NPRI holders con-
tend that had PPG negotiated the lease different-
ly, the NPRI holders would have been entitled to
higher royalty payments. See Donahue v. Bills,
172 W.Va. 354, 305 S.B.2d 311 (1983), wherein
this Court noted that,-even though the grantor in
a deed of conveyance reserved an executive right
to lease the underlying minerals, the grantor
would nevertheless be held to “‘strict fiduciary
standards” regarding such matters as rental pay-
ments and lease inducement payments. 172
W.Va. at 356, 305 S.B.2d at 313.

However, the denial of PPG’s motion for sum-
mary judgment concerning the negotiation of the
lease and the entitlements mentioned is not prop-
erly before this Court. The April 1, 2016, order
states that questions of fact are yet to be resolved
concerning PPG's “negotiation and execution of
the lease terms,” and “proceeding shall continue
as to those issues.” See syl. Wilfong v. Wilfong,
156 W.Va. 754, 197 S.B.2d 96 (1973) (“The entry
of an order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment made at the ‘close of the pleadings and
before trial is merely interlocutory and not then
appealable to this Court.”); Aetna Casualty and
Sur, Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160,
172, 133 S.E.2d 770, 778 (1963) (“The denial of
a summary judgment is a finding that there is an
issue of fact to be tried and is.not a decision on
the issue.”). See also In Re: Timber M., 231 W.Va.
44, 59, 743 S.B.2d 352, 367 (2013) (‘Without
factual or legal findings, this Court is greatly at
sea without a chart or compass in making’a
determination as to whether the circuit court's
decision was right of wrong.” (citation omitted)).
Here, further development of the record by the
circuit court is necessary with respect to the
negotiation and execution of the PPG-Gastar
lease. .

312

Tl. Standard of Review

Hl Pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Vir-
ginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a party seek-
ing to recover upon a claim, or to obtain a
declaratory judgment, may move for sum-
mary judgment “upon all or any part there-
of.” If partial summary judgment is granted,
the standard of review on appeal to this
Court is de novo. Syl. pt. 1, W.Va. Dep't, of
Tromsp. v. Robertson, 217 W.Va. 497, 618
S.E.2d 506 (2005) (“Appellate review of a
partial summary judgment order is the same
as that of a summary judgment order, which
is de novo.”), Accord syl, pt. 1, Hinerman v.
Rodriguez, 230 W.Va, 118, 786 S.B.2d 351
(2012). Syl. pt. 8, Cow v Amick, 195 W.Va.
608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995) (“A circuit court’s
entry of a declaratory judgment’is reviewed
de novo.”), Accord syl. pt. 1, Randolph Cown-
ty Bd, of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 467
$,E.2d 150 (1995).

Hl Moreover, although findings of fact
ave generally reviewed under a clearly erro-
neous standard, “ostensible findings of fact,
which entail the application of law or consti-
tute legal judgments which transcend ordi-
nary factual determinations,” are also re-
viewed de novo. Syl. pt. 1, in part, State ew
rel, Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W.Va. 208, 470
S.E,2d 162 (1996),

IV. Discussion

IM The issue in this appeal is whether
the validity of the pooling provision in the
PPG-Gastar lease and the designated Wayne/
Lily Unit is dependent, upon the consent and
ratification of the NPRI holders, Relying on
the theory of cross-conveyancing of interests
expressed in Texas court decisions, the cir-
cuit court ruled that the consent and ratifica-
tion.of the NPRI holders are required.

“A further clarification of the respective
rights of the NPRI holders and PPG is nec-
essary. The NPRI holders in this action do
not own any interest in the surface of the
105.9 acre parcel, nor do they live on the
property. Their collective one-fourth nonpar-
ticipating royalty interest in the oil and gas

12, W.Va, Code, 36-1-11 [1923], states:

When any real property is conveyed or de
vised to any person, and no words of limitation
are used in the conveyance or devise, such
conveyance or devise shall be construed to

originated with the 1946 deed. Pursuant to
the deed, all remaining interests in the 105.9
acre parcel were. conveyed to PPG's prede-
cessor, John Wenzel. It is undisputed that
the deed is unambiguous. With regard to
leasing rights, the 1946 deed expressly con-
veyed to Wenzel the right “to lease said land
for oil and gas purposes and receive any and
all delay rentals that may be received under
and by virtue of any lease executed by him,
his heirs or assigns, covering said land.” No
reservation to the grantor was included in
the deed concerning any right to discover or
produce oil and gas, to grant leases, or to
require consent in relation thereto.

Syllabus point 1 of McDonough Co. v. EI.
DuPont DeNemours & Co. Inc. 167 W.Va.
611, 280 S.H.2d 246 (1981) holds: “Parties are
bound by general and ordinary meanings of
words used in deeds.” Accord syl. pt. 1,
Meadows v. Belknap, 199 W.Va, 243, 483
§.B.2d 826 (1997). See W.Va. Dep’t of High-
ways v. Farmer, 159 W.Va. 828, 825, 226
S.E.2d 717, 719 (1976) (“It has long been held
that where language in a deed is unambigu-
ous there is no need for construction and it is
the duty ofthe court to give to every word
its usual meaning.”),” Helpful in that regard
is the syllabus in Davis v. Hardman, 148
W.Va. 82, 188 S,E.2d 77 (1968), which holds:

Where deeds are made by which several
undivided interests in a tract of land are
conveyed, with the right in the several
grantees, their heirs and assigns, to lease
the land for oil and gas purposes.and to
receive the carrying rental, or the bonuses
and carrying rentals, but subject to reser-
vations in favor of the several grantors of
the oil and gas royalty, when produced,
such reservations do not constitute a reser-
vation of the ’oil and gas in place; but, on
the contrary, such deeds constitute a con-
veyance of the entire tract of land, includ-
ing the oil and gas in place, but subject to
mere royalty interests in the oil and gas
when such oil and gas, or both, are pro-
duced,

pass the fee simple, or the whole estate or
interest, legal or equitable, which the testator
or grantor had power to dispose of, in such
real property, unless a contrary intention shall
appear in the conveyance or will,

Accordingly, the NPRI holders have a non-
possessory interest in the oil and gas under-
lying the 105.9 acre parcel. See Andrew S.
Graham, Allison J. Farrell, Lauren A.
Williams, Amber M. Moore, One Stick in the
Bundle: Characterizing Nonparticipating
Royalty Interests Under West Virginia Law,
117 W.Va. L. Rev. 519, 520 (2014) (NPRI
holders have a “non-possessory real property
interest.”). See also 38 Am..Jur. 2d Gas and
Oil § 196 (2010) (“A nonparticipating gas and
oil royalty is a nonpossessory interest that
does not entitle the owner to produce the gas
and oil himself or herself, but does entitle the
owner to a certain share of the production
proceeds, free of the expenses of exploration
and production.”), Conversely, through the
1946 deed, PPG acquired an interest in the
parcel’s oil and gas in place, which included
an executive right to discover and produce
the oil and. gas and an attendant right to
lease the parcel.® PPG has also obtained title
to the surface of the 105.9 acre parcel.

I The Texas cases suggest that NPRI
holder consent or ratification is warranted
insofar as pooling creates undivided owner-
ship interests with other individuals and enti-
ties by cross-conveyancing across the entire
tract.!4 The NPRI holders herein ask this
Court to adopt the cross-conveyancing theo-
ry. However, that theory is but one side of a
split of authority regarding the effect of pool-
ing on such-interests. As described in Benja-
min Holliday, New Oil and Old Laws: Prob-
lems in Allocation of Production to Owners
of Non-Participating Royalty Interests in
the Era of Horizontal Drilling, 44 Saint
Mary’s L. J. ‘771 (2018), two competing theo-
ries have been applied: the eross-conveyance
theory and the contract theory. The article
explains:

[The basis for the cross-conveyance theo-

ry is the premise that mineral interests

involved in the pooled unit are actually
conveyed to other owners within the

13. See Boggess v. Milam, 127 W.Va. 654, 658, 34
S.E.2d 267, 269 (1945) (Oil and gas in place is
real estate.). See also Andrew S, Graham, Allison
J. Farrell, Lauren A. Williams, Amber M. Moore,
One Stick in the Bundle: Characterizing Nonpar-
ticipating ‘Royalty Interests Under West Virginia
Law, 117 W.Va, L, Rev. 519, 521 (2014) (“West
Virginia law is well-settled that an interest in the
oil and gas in place is a real property interest[.]”)

313

pooled unit in proportion to the acreage
allocated by each to the unit. On the other
hand, the contract basis for pooling stipu-
lates that property interests themselves
are not conveyed; rather, this approach
seeks to determine the contractual rights
associated with royalty payments.
44 Saint Mary’s L, J, at 796, Texas, Missis-
sippi, Illinois and California have adopted the
eross-conveyance theory, whereas Utah,
Oklahoma and Kansas employ the contract
theory. Id, n. 169. The article includes West
Virginia as employing the contract theory,
Under that theory, pooling results in a con-
solidation of contractual: and financial inter-
ests regarding oil and gas production from
the combined parcels of land. Joint or undi-
vided ownership interests in oil and gas
rights are not created,

In Boggess v. Milam, 127 W.Va, 654, 34
S.E.2d 267 (1945), the owner of an unleased
one-tenth oil and gas interest in a 116 acre
tract of land sought a share in the royalties
from oil and gas production regarding an
adjoining 58 acre tract, Although the owner
had no interest of any kind in the 58 acre
tract, the two tracts were under a unitization
agreement. The owner had refused to sign
both the lease of the 116 acre tract and the
unitization agreement,

In Boggess, this Court rejected the owner’s
claim to ah interest in production from the 58
acre tract. In so holding, this Court found
without merit the owner’s assertion that the
unitization agreement resulted in a merger of
the titles of the two tracts. The language in
Boggess makes clear;

We are not of the opinion that in the
instant case the land was merged: there
was a merger of contractual obligations,
the lessors agreeing to treat the two leases
as covering one boundary so far as the
lessee’s obligation to develop was con-
cerned, and the lessee agreeing to divide
the payment of royalty.on the basis of the

14, The requirement of consent: or ratification
makes more sense where cross-conveyancing has
created joint or undivided interests throughout
the pooled tract. See Nancy Saint-Paul, Vol. 4,
Summers Oil and Gas § 56:2 (3"4 ed. 2009) (In a
cross-conveyancing jurisdiction “pooling results
in the mineral interest being converted into mul-
tiple fractional royalty ownerships in all the
pooled tracts.”’)

314

fractional acreage interest in the oil and

gas. *** [T]he so-called unitization

agreement does not effect a merger of
title.
127 W.Va. at 661, 34 S.B.2d at 270.

In a subsequent case, Donahue v. Bills,
172 W.Va. 354, 805 S.E.2d 811 (1988), George
and Jeanne Bills conveyed a tract in excess
of 800 acres to Ernie and Laura Donahue.
The Bills reserved one-half of the underlying
minerals and the right to lease for drilling
purposes. Soon after, the Bills entered into a
lease resulting in the drilling of an oil and
gas well on the tract. The Donahues filed an
action to enjoin the drilling operations and
the leasing of their property without their
consent. The circuit court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Bills, the oil compa-
ny and the driller on the basis of the lan-
guage of the reservation clause.

Affirming the summary judgment in Dona-
hue v. Bills, this Court determined that the
reservation clause unambigously provided
the Bills with “an agency coupled with an
interest” known as an executive right. Thus,
confirming that the reservation clause gave
the Bills the right to lease the minerals, this
Court stated:

Often complicated business transactions
require the acquiescence of numerous per-
sons making negotiations unwieldy and un-
certain, The agency coupled with an inter-
est has numerous uses, but one of those
uses is to guarantee in advance, by an
appropriate agreement, that parties who
must acquiesce to the consummation of a
business deal will do so at the appropriate
time and in the appropriate form. In the
ease before us, it was obviously contem-
plated by the parties when they entered
into the deeds in question that the Bills
would be allowed to conduct negotiations
on behalf of the Donahues in order to
facilitate a harvesting of the mineral inter-
est.

Furthermore, there is nothing unreason-
able about such an arrangement: it is com-
mon experience that when oil and gas in-

15, The cross-conveyance theory has other disad-
vantages. For example, if one of the royalty own-
ers were to become involved in litigation con-
cerning his or her specific interest, all other
royalty owners would be affected because each
would share ownership interests throughout the

terests are owned by numerous persons,
negotiating a lease acceptable to all owners
ean be a nightmare for everyone con-
cerned. The protection that the Donahues
receive is that any lease entered into under
unfavorable terms by the Bills will deny

the Bills fully as much as the Donahues a

fair return to their jointly owned property.
172 W.Va. at 855-56, 305 S.H.2d at 312.

In the present case, the NPRI holders’
interest in the 105.9 acre parcel was deter-
mined by the 1946 deed. All remaining inter-
ests in the parcel, including the executive
right to lease, were conveyed to the grantee,
John Wenzel. The 1946 deed provided no
limit affecting the pooling provision in the
subsequent lease between PPG and Gastar
regarding drilling and production from the
Marcellus Shale Formation. Accordingly,
pursuant to contract law, the PPG-Gastar
lease and the Wayne/Lily Unit simply result-
ed in a consolidation of leasehold interests,
including the interests in the 105.9 acre par-
eel. There was no merger of titles, and the
NPRI holders did not acquire an undivided
property interest in the Unit’s 700 acres,

The adoption of a cross-conveyance theory
of pooling would inject uncertainty in this
State’s oil and gas jurisprudence. An NPRI
holder, by withholding consent, could unilat-
erally void an entire pooling agreement in-
volving thousands of acres and the bar-
gained-for rights of dozens of other interest
holders, In the current matter, by ruling that
the pooling provision in the PPG-Gastar lease
and the Wayne/Lily Unit are void, the circuit
court effectively reconveyed executive right
authority to the NPRI holders.!®

This Court’s decisions in Davis v. Hard-
man, Boggess v. Milam, and Donahue v.
Bills have provided stability in this complex
area of the law. The case before us is within
the parameters of voluntary pooling regard-
ing horizontal drilling and production from
the Marcellus Shale Formation.

HMM Consequently, we hold that the
pooling of nonparticipating royalty interests

pooled unit, Moreover, the cross-conveyance the-
ory could result in problems such as the validity
of earlier pooling agreements, increased royalty
litigation, and complications in the lease acquisi-
tion process.

with the interests of other individuals or
entities for the horizontal drilling and pro-
duction of oil and gas from the Marcellus
Shale Formation does not create a joint or
undivided property interest in the oil and gas
underlying the tract pooled. The cross-con-
veyance theory resulting in such a joint or
undivided property interest is rejected. Rath-
er, pooling results in a consolidation of con-
tractual and financial interests regarding the
drilling and production of oil and gas from
the combined parcels of land. Moreover, we
hold that where a lessee designates tracts of
land for pooling regarding horizontal drilling
and production of oil and gas from the Mar-
eellus Shale Formation, which includes non-
participating royalty interests, consent or
ratification by the holders of the nonpartici-
pating royalty interests to the pooling is not
required, where the holders of the nonpartic-
ipating royalty interests have conveyed the

16. The amici curiae maintain that horizontal or
directional drilling, pooling and unitization are
particularly suitable to development of the Mar-
cellus Shale Formation in West Virginia. In that
regard, Gastar states that it determined that it
was necessary and advisable to pool the 105.9
acres with other parcels to prevent waste, to
facilitate the orderly development of the miner-
als, to preserve correlative rights and to effect
equitable participation within the pooled unit to
be formed. See Nancy Saint-Paul, Vol. 4, Sum-
mers Oil and Gas § 56:2 (3rd ed. 2009) (‘[Tyhere
are cases holding that the power to lease does
comprehend the power to pool, and this view

315

oil and gas in place and the executive leasing
rights thereto to the lessor,

Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the
circuit court that the validity of the pooling
provision in the PPG-Gastar lease and the
designated Wayne/Lily Unit is dependent
upon the consent and ratification of the
NPRI holders.6

V. Conclusion

This Court finds reversible error in the
partial summary judgment which invalidated
the pooling provision in the PPG-Gastar lease
and the Wayne/Lily Unit, and we enter judg-
ment for PPG and Gastar. The April 1, 2016,
order is, therefore, reversed,

Reversed. .

better accords with the realities of the oil and gas
industry where pooling powers are always desir-
able, and sometimes essential, if a property is to
be developed.”).

See also W.Va. Code, 22-6A-2(a)(8) [2011], of
the West Virginia Horizontal Well Act, wherein
the Legislature declared as a matter of public
policy: “Allowing the responsible development of
our state’s natural gas resources will enhance the
economy of our state and the quality of life for
our citizens while assuring the long term protec-
tion of the environment.”

316

801 S.E.2d 194

Robert Paul JACKSON, and The Joelynn
Family Preservation Trust,
Petitioners

ve
Pamela 8. BROWN, as Administratrix
of the Estate of Harry Edward
Myer, Jr., Respondent
No. 16-0724
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 28, 2017
Filed: June 1, 2017

1, Defendant Jackson filed this motion as a “‘mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”
However, pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the West

317

David A. Mohler, Esq., Joshua A. Johnson,
Esq., Bowles: Rice LLP, .Charleston, West
Virginia, Counsel. for Petitioners .

Rodney C. Windom., Esq., Scott A, Win-
dom, Esq., Windom Law Offices PLLC, Har-
risville, West Virginia, Counsel for Respon-
dent .

Justice Ketchum:

The defendants below, Robert Paul Jack-
son (“Defendant Jackson”) and the’ Joelynn
Family Preservation Trust (“the Trust”), ap-
peal from’ the July 6, 2016, order of the
Circuit Court of Ritchie County denying
their motion for a new trial following a jury
verdict of $548,202.17 in favor of Plaintiff
Pamela 8. Brown (“plaintiff”) in a wrongful
death action arising from an automobile acci-
dent. On appeal, Defendant Jackson asserts
that the circuit court ‘erred by: 1) granting
summary judgment to the plaintiff on the
issue of Defendant Jackson’s liability for
causing the automobile. accident; 2) denying
his post-trial motion for judgment as a.mat-
ter of law! on’the ‘issue of whether the Trust

Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure this motion is

properly labeled as a motion for “judgment as a
matter of law.” As this Court noted in Fredeking

318

was liable for Defendant Jackson’s tort; and
8) incorrectly awarding prejudgment interest
on an award for lost wages.

After review, we affirm the circuit court’s
summary judgment ruling on the issue of
Defendant Jackson’s liability. However, we
reverse the circuit court's denial of Defen-
dant Jackson’s post-trial motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law on the issue of the
Trust’s liability. Our review reveals that De-
fendant Jackson was not “in the course of
administering” the Trust when the automo-
bile accident occurred. Therefore, under
W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(¢) [2011], con-
tained in the West Virginia Uniform Trust
Code, the Trust is not liable for Defendant
Jackson’s tort. Finally, we affirm the circuit
court’s award of prejudgment interest on the
plaintiff's lost wages damage award.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On the morning of June 7, 2014, Defendant.
Jackson drove a 1999 Ford F-350 flat-bed
truck? to a restaurant in Ritchie County,
West Virginia, where he ate breakfast, Fol-
lowing breakfast, Defendant Jackson went to
an Ace Hardware Store in Ritchie County
where he purchased “six or seven joints of
plastic pipe” that he was planning to install
“in the ground as a French drain to get
water away (from the residence that he lived
in).” After loading the plastic pipes into his
truck, Defendant Jackson drove a short dis-
tance before coming to a stop at the intersec-

v. Tyler, 224 W.Va. 1, 4, 680 S.E.2d 16, 19
(2009):

Prior to the amendment of Rule 50 in April
1998, a post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law was called a “motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict” or “motion
for judgment non obstante veredicto,” and we
note that these vestigial terms continue to oc-
casionally litter both this Court’s opinions and
the arguments of attorneys.

2. This Ford truck was owned by Venture Petro-
lJeum. Defendant Jackson testified, “I got an oil
company [Venture Petroleum], small one....
And [the Ford Truck] was always in Venture
Petroleum.” Venture Petroleum is not a named
defendant in this case. For ease of the reader, we
generally refer to the Ford truck as “Defendant
Jackson’s truck.”

tion of Ritchie Industrial Park Road and U.S.
Route 50.

U.S. Route 50 is a four-lane divided high-
way. Defendant Jackson’s truck was perpen-
dicular to Route 50 as he was stopped at the
intersection, His plan was to drive straight
across the two eastbound lanes and make a
left turn to merge into the westbound lanes
of Route 50. Defendant Jackson testified that
before attempting to drive his truck across
the eastbound lanes of Route 50, he looked to
his left and noticed a semi-truck coming to-
ward him. Believing that he had enough time
to clear the two eastbound lanes in front of
the semi-truck, Defendant Jackson proceed-
ed into the eastbound lanes of the highway.
However, Defendant Jackson did not see a
motoreycle that was also traveling eastbound
on Route 50 that was being driven by the
decedent, Harry Myer, Jr. (“Decedent
Myer”)$

Decedent Myer was traveling in the right
or slow eastbound lane of Route 50 when
Defendant Jackson’s truck entered the high-
way. Though Decedent Myer applied his
brakes, as evidenced by skid marks in the
slow lane of Route 50, he crashed his motor-
eycle into the left rear quarter panel of De-
fendant Jackson’s truck, The collision oc-
eurred in the right or slow eastbound lane.
Decedent Myer was injured and later died at
the scene of the accident as a result of the
injuries he suffered in the crash.

Following the crash, the West Virginia
State Police conducted an investigation, A
West Virginia State Policeman, Corporal J.L,

3. Defendant Jackson was asked during his depo-
sition if he saw the motorcycle when he started
across the intersection, he stated: “No. I never
seen a motorcycle until I got past the tractor-
trailer.” Defendant Jackson then testified that he
saw the motorcycle in his “peripheral vision”
just before the collision occurred. He explained,
“[I]t wasn't like I turned and looked at it [the
motorcycle]. I mean, I could see it, and I was just
getting out [sic] the way, and I didn’t dwell on
how it is, but I knew that—I knew it had—I
knew I had to get out of the way, and I was
afraid he was in trouble. And I was afraid that I
wasn't going to get out far enough, and I didn’t. 1
lacked a foot-and-a-half of getting away.”

Brewer, completed a “Uniform Traffic Crash
Report” in which he determined that Defen-
dant Jackson “failed to yield the right of
way” at the intersection in violation of W.Va.
Code § 17C-9-1. Corporal Brewer's report
provided that the crash occurred in the right
eastbound lane of Route 50 near the hash
marks that divide the slow and fast lanes.
Further, the report concluded that Decedent
Myer did not commit any traffic violations.
The complete narrative description contained
in the report describing the accident is as
follows:

[Decedent Myer’s motorcycle] was trav-
eling east bound on U.S. Route 50. [Defen-
dant Jackson’s truck] was coming from
Ace Hardware and sitting at the intersec-
tion of Ritchie County Industrial Park
Road and U.S. Route 50. As [Decedent
Myer’s motorcycle] was approaching the
Ritchie County Industrial Park Road inter-
section, [Defendant Jackson] pulled [his
truck] onto U.S. Route 50 causing [Dece-
dent Myer’s motorcycle] to collide into the
left rear quarter panel of [Defendant Jack-
son’s truck]. [Decedent Myer’s] motorcycle
eollided with [Defendant Jackson’s truck]
in the east bound driving lane of U.S.
Route 50 near the passing hash marks.

{Decedent Myer] applied [the motorey-
cle’s] brakes approximately 89 feet before
eolliding with [Defendant Jackson’s truck].

The plaintiff, Pamela Brown, as Adminis-
tratrix of Decedent Myer’s estate, filed a
wrongful death action against Defendant
Jackson in September’ of 2014. During Defen-
dant Jackson’s deposition,
learned about the existence of the Joelynn
Family Preservation Trust.4 Defendant Jack-
son testified that he created this Trust, that
he was a trustee, and that the three Trust
beneficiaries are his sister, Judith Basile, and
his two adult children, Jessica Jackson and
Joseph Jackson. Additionally, Defendant
Jackson testified that the house that he re-
sides in is owned by the Trust.

4, It appears from Defendant Jackson's deposition
that the trust was formed in 1993 “after the trial
I had ... in the divorce deal.” The Trust is a
“voluntary Inter Vivos Trust with a corpus of
assets consisting of certain real and/or personal

the plaintiff.

319

After Defendant Jackson’s deposition, the
plaintiff amended her complaint and named
the-Joelynn Family Preservation Trust as an
additional defendant. The plaintiff's amended
complaint alleged that Defendant Jackson
was acting “as a Trustee and agent for ...
the Joelynn Family Preservation Trust”
when he purchased the plastic pipe at the
hardware store for the “sole purpose of bene-
fitting [the Trust] by improving real estate
owned by, and titled to the Trust.”

On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff filed a
motion for partial summary judgment “on
the issue of liability.” Specifically, the plain-
tiff argued that she was entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of Defendant Jack-
son’s liability based on the following: 1) De-
fendant Jackson pulled into the path of Dece-
dent Myer in the right lane of Route 50; 2)
Decedent Myer had the right-of-way while
traveling in the right lane and Defendant
Jackson failed to yield to oncoming traffic; 3)
Corporal Brewer's report concluded that De-
cedent Myer had not committed any traffic
violations, and cited Defendant Jackson for
failing to yield the right-of-way at the inter-
section; 4) an expert witness, testifying on
behalf of the plaintiff, testified that Defen-
dant Jackson caused the accident by pulling
onto Route 50 and failing to yield to Dece-
dent Myer’s motorcycle; that Decedent Myer
reacted within 2.8 ‘seconds when Defendant
Jackson pulled onto the highway; and that
Decedent Myer “was alert and attentive and
that he did ... respond to the movement of
the truck out into the intersection;” and 5)
Defendant Jackson -did not offer any expert
testimony to rebut the plaintiff's expert’s
conclusion that Defendant Jackson's act of
negligently pulling onto the highway and fail- -
ing to yield to oncoming traffic caused the
accident,

Defendant Jackson opposed this motion,
arguing that the jury should be allowed to
consider Decedent Myer’s comparative fault.
In support of this argument, Defendant Jack-
son argued that the motorcycle’s skid marks
started in the middle of the right lane and

property.” The Trust provides that it “shall be
domiciled in and shall be interpreted and con-
strued under the laws of The State of West Virgi-
nia.” .

320

proceeded toward the “lane-dividing lines.”
However, the skid marks remained in the
motoreyele’s lane of travel. Essentially, De-
fendant Jackson argued that because the
skid marks demonstrated that Decedent
Myer’s motorcycle traveled from the middle
of the right lane toward the left edge of the
right lane, the jury should decide “whether
[Decedent] Myer acted as a reasonably pru-
dent person ... by swerving left instead of
right and possibly avoiding the collision.”

The circuit court granted the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on liability.
The circuit court’s detailed order explains:

It is undisputed that [Decedent] Myer
had the right-of-way while traveling on

US. Route 50 and had the right to operate

his vehicle in the entirety of his lane of

travel; and, that Defendant Robert Paul

Jackson had the duty to yield to oncoming

traffie while he was stopped on Ritchie

County Industrial Park Road, waiting to

cross the eastbound lanes of U.S. Route 50.

The physical evidence, the results of the
. rash investigation by West Virginia State
Police ... and the sworn deposition testi-
mony of Plaintiff's expert witness crash re-
constructionist ... who is the only crash
expert witness identified by the parties—
conclude that [Decedent Myer] was lawful-
ly traveling at or below the posted speed
limit in the right hand, eastbound lane of

US. Routel,]

The undisputed physical and sworn de-
position testimony ,.. showed Defendant
- Jackson pulled across both eastbound
lanes of U.S. Route 50 ... in the face of
oncoming traffic in a futile effort to safely
reach the westbound lanes of the four-lane
highway....
Defendant Jackson breached his duty to
yield the right-of-way to the oncoming mo-
torist [Decedent] Myer and caused Mr.

Myer to crash his motorcycle[.] ....

Defendant Jackson has produced no ex-
pert witness to offer testimony and opinion
which would contradict the findings and

8,’ The jury’s damage award was as follows:
Lost wages and fringe benefits: $32,000.00;
Funeral Expenses: $9,384.25; Headstone:
$1,817.92; Sorrow, Mental Anguish and solace
of Harry Myer Jr.'s Family, including society

opinions of Plaintiff's expert crash recon-
structionist{.] ... In this regard, expert
testimony is required because the subject.
of inquiry is one involving special skills or
training not common to the ordinary per-
son,

In a separate order, the circuit court de-
nied a motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Jackson regarding the Trust’s lia-
bility. Defendant Jackson argued that while
he “could be held personally liable for the
damages resulting from the collision,” the
plaintiff did not -present any evidence that
Defendant Jackson acted with the “sanction
of the Trust beneficiaries and under the
Trust beneficiaries’ supervision and control
at the time of the accident.” Therefore, he
argued the Trust could not be held liable,
The circuit court denied this motion, ruling:

There exists a genuine issue of material
fact, in that the jury may find that on June

7, 2014, [Defendant] Jackson was acting on
- behalf of the Joelynn Family Trust when

he traveled to Ace Hardware to purchase a

pipe for a French Drain, which was to be

installed at property which was owned by
the Joelynn Family Trust.

On May 11, 2016, a jury trial began on the
issue of damages and on the Trust’s liability.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, counsel for
Defendant Jackson moved for a directed ver-
dict regarding the Trust’s liability. The cir-
cuit court denied this motion, stating that the
Trust beneficiaries were “around some while
this work was being performed [on Defen-
dant Jackson’s residence] and they had been
in the loop” on matters regarding Trust
property. The circuit court therefore ruled
that the issue of the Trust’s liability should
be decided by the jury,

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff in the amount of $548,202.17.5 The
jury was also asked:.“Do you find that Rob-
ert Paul Jackson was acting as an agent of
the Joelynn Family Preservation Trust when
he killed Harry Edward Myer, Jr.?” The jury
answered this question in the affirmative.

companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly of-

- fices, and advice: $300,000.00; Loss of ser-

vices, protection, care and assistance provided
by Harry Edward Myer, Jr.: $200,000.00,

Defendant Jackson filed post-trial motions
requesting that the circuit court reverse its
summary judgment ruling on Defendant
Jackson’s liability, enter judgment as a mat-
ter of law that the Trust was not liable for
Defendant Jackson’s action, or, in the alter-
native, order a new trial on the Trust’s liabili-
ty based upon the court’s refusal to properly
instruct the jury regarding a trustee’s liabili-
ty. The circuit court denied these motions by
order entered on July 6, 2016. Defendant
Jackson subsequently filed the instant ap-
peal,

IL.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case involves assignments of’ error
related to' the circuit court’s rulings on three
diverse issues to which different standards of
review apply. The standards of review specif-
ic to the issues raised will be discussed in the
Analysis section of this Opinion.

ii.

ANALYSIS

The defendants assert that the circuit
court erred by: 1) granting summary judg-
ment to the plaintiff on the issue of Defen-
dant Jackson’s liability; 2) denying his post-
trial motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the issue of the Trust’s liabili-
ty; and 8) incorrectly awarding prejudgment.
interest on an award for future lost wages,

A. Summary Judgment on Liability

Hl The first issue we address is whether
the circuit court erred by granting the plain-
tiffs motion for summary judgment on De-
fendant Jackson’s liability for causing the

* aecident, Defendant Jackson argues that the
jury should have been allowed to consider

6, This Court modified our contributory negli-
gence law in State v. Bradley, 163 W.Va. 332, 256
S.E.2d 879 (1979), adopting the doctrine of com-
parative fault or comparative negligence, Under
Syllabus Point 3 of Bradley, [a] party is not
barred from recovering damages in a tort action
so long as his negligence or fault does not equal
or exceed the combined negligence or fault of the
other’parties involved in the accident.” However,
W.Va. Code §§ 55-7-13a through -13d [2015]
modified West Virginia's comparative fault law
to bar recovery only where the plaintiff's fault is

321

Decedent Myer’s comparative fault. By con-
trast, the plaintiff argues that the cireuit
court correctly determined that she was enti-
tled. to summary judgment on the issue of
liability, The plaintiff asserts that there was
no evidence demonstrating Decedent Myer’s
comparative fault,

HI Our review of this issue begins with
the applicable standard of review. We have
held that “[a] circuit. court’s entry of sum-
mary judgment is reviewed. de novo.” Sylla-
bus Point 1, Painter v, Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189,
451 S.H.2d 755 (1994). We have also stated
that: “[s]lummary judgment. is appropriate if,
from the totality of the evidence presented,
the record could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as
where the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of the case that it has the burden to
prove.” Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Preci-
ston Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 829
(1995). As this Court noted in Painter, “the
party opposing summary judgment must sat-
isfy the burden of proof by offering more
than a mere ‘scintilla of evidence, and must
produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable
jury to find in a nonmoving party’s favor.”
192 W.Va, at 192-98, 451. S.E.2d at 758-59
(internal citation omitted).

HI Ih addition to the foregoing, this
Court has provided clear direction on wheth-
er a comparative fault or negligence claim ®
should be decided by a jury or by the court.
In Syllabus Point 2 of Reager v. Anderson,
179 W.Va. 691, 871 S.H.2d 619 (1988), this
Court held, in relevant part, “[iJn a compara-
tive negligence or causation action the issue
of apportionment of negligence or causation

. where the facts are undisputed and rea-
sonable minds can draw but one inference
from them should ... be determined as a
matter of law.”7

greater than the combined fault of all other per-
sons responsible for the damages, The foregoing
statutes apply to all causes of action arising or
accruing on or after May 25, 2015, See W.Va.
Code § 55-7-13d(h) [2016], The instant matter
involves an automobile accident that occurred in
June of 2014. Thus, the comparative fault law
announced in Bradley applies to this case.

7. See also Syllabus Point 4, Hollen v. Linger, 151
W.Va, 255, 151 S.B.2d 330 (1966) (“When the
material facts are undisputed and only one infer-

322

In the instant case, the facts regarding the
collision are undisputed. First, Defendant
Jackson failed to yield the right-of-way to
oncoming traffic when he attempted to drive
his truck across the eastbound lanes of Route
50 and make a left turn into the westbound
Janes. This Court has held that “(t]he making
of a left turn ... across oncoming traffic is
one of the most dangerous movements a
vehicle can make on the highway, and the
driver of a vehicle making such movement
must ascertain if it can be done with reason-
able safety.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Ad-
dair v. Bryant, 168 W.Va. 306, 284 S.E.2d
874 (1981) (emphasis added).

Next, as noted in the police report, Defen-
dant Jackson’s failure to yield was a violation
of W.Va. Code § 17C-9-1. This Court has
held that a “[vJiolation of a statute is prima
facie evidence of negligence.” Syllabus Point
1, in part, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va.
77, 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990). It is undisputed that
Corporal Brewer concluded in his police re-
port that Decedent Myer did not commit any
traffic violations relating to the collision.

Importantly, there was no evidence indi-
cating that the plaintiff was negligent in any
manner. The only expert who testified in this
matter stated that Defendant Jackson caused
the accident by pulling onto Route 50 and
failing to yield to Decedent Myer. This ex-
pert, Daniel Aerni, testified on behalf of the
plaintiff and stated that Decedent Myer was
traveling between 55 to 64 mph, which was
below the posted speed limit, “at the start of
the 89-foot skid[.]” Regarding the amount of
time it took Decedent Myer to react to De-
fendant Jackson pulling onto Route 50, the
expert testified:

ence may be drawn from them by reasonable
minds the questions of negligence and contribu-
tory negligence are questions of law for the
court.””); Syllabus Point 1 of Graham v. Crist, 146
W.Va. 156, 118 S.E.2d 640 (1961) (“When the
evidence is conflicting, or when the facts, though
undisputed, are such that reasonable men may
draw different conclusions from them, the ques-
tions of negligence and contributory negligence
are for the jury.”); Syllabus Point 3, Graham
(“When the material facts are undisputed and
only one inference may be drawn from them by
reasonable minds the questions of negligence
and contributory negligence are questions of law
for the court.”).

I calculated that the truck driven by Mr.
Jackson accelerated over a distance of
about 52 feet and that it took him about 4.2
seconds to do so.... Furthermore, I caleu-
lated that the skid by Mr. Myer took about
1.34 seconds, as I recall, the difference
being about 2.8 seconds. That is the
amount of time that I obtain between the
very start of the acceleration by Mr. Jack-
son and the application of the brakes by
Mr. Myer,

The expert testified that Decedent Myer’s
motorcycle was within 320 feet of the impact
location when Defendant Jackson began ac-
eelerating onto Route 50 and stated “{s]o I
believe the motorcycle was in the right east-
bound lane in front of the semi and that Mr.
Jackson simply somehow failed to detect the
motoreycle.” Additionally, the expert testified
that “the skid gives me reason to believe that
Mr. Myer was alert and attentive and that he
did ... respond to the movement of [Defen-
dant Jackson’s] truck out into the intersec-
tion.” Finally, the expert testified that the
point of impact occurred near the hash-mark
line separating the two lanes of Route 50,
“Just a tiny bit on the slow lane side.”

Defendant Jackson asserts, however, that
the jury should have been allowed to consid-
er Decedent Myer’s comparative fault be-
cause the skid mark evidence demonstrates
that his motorcycle remained in the right
lane but traveled from the middle of the lane
toward the left edge of the right lane§
Therefore, according to Defendant Jackson,
the jury should decide “whether [Decedent]
Myer acted as a reasonably prudent person
... by swerving left instead of right and
possibly avoiding the collision.”

8. In Syllabus Point 2, in relevant part, of Addair,
this Court held:

Contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is an affirmative defense. There is a
presumption of ordinary care in favor of the
plaintiff, and where the defendant relies upon
contributory negligence, the burden of proof
rests upon the defendant to show such negli-
gence unless it is disclosed by the plaintiff's
evidence or may be fairly inferred by all of the
evidence and circumstances surrounding the
case.

After review, we find that the material
facts are undisputed and that “reasonable
minds can draw but one inference from
them.” Reager, Syllabus Point 2, The undis-
puted material facts demonstrate that Dece-
dent Myer was traveling below the speed
limit in the right lane of Route 50 when
Defendant Jackson failed to yield to oncom-
ing traffic in violation of W.Va. Code § 17C-
9-1. Confronted with the sudden emergency
created by Defendant Jackson, Decedent
Myer applied his brakes within 2.8 seconds of
Defendant Jackson entering the highway. In
Syllabus Point 3 of Poe v. Pitiman, 150
W.Va. 179, 144 S.E.2d 671 (1965), this Court
held:

A person in a sudden emergency, not
created in whole or in part by his own
negligence, who acts according to his best
judgment or who, because of insufficient
time for reflection, fails to act in the most
judicious manner, is not guilty of negli-
gence if he exercises the degree of care
which would be exercised by a reasonably
prudent person in like circumstances.

We reiterate that Decedent Myer applied
his brakes within 2.8 seconds of Defendant,
Jackson creating the sudden emergency by
failing to yield to oncoming traffic and pull-
ing onto Route 50. After applying his brakes,
the skid mark evidence reveals that Dece-
dent Myer’s motoreycle skidded for approxi-
mately 89 feet, starting in the center of the
right lane and colliding with Defendant Jack-
son’s truck near the left edge of the right
Jane. There is no evidence that Decedent.
Myer left the right lane at any time during
the course of this accident. Under these
facts, we find that Decedent Myer acted as a
reasonably prudent person by applying his
brakes within 2.8 seconds and by staying in
the right lane throughout the sudden emer-
gency caused by Defendant Jackson.

We also emphasize that the only expert to
testify in this matter stated that Defendant
Jackson was at fault for causing the accident.
The expert did not find any fault with the
actions Decedent Myer’s took when he was
confronted with the sudden emergency
caused by Defendant Jackson. In fact, the
expert testified that Decedent Myer’s actions
demonstrated that he was “alert and atten-

323

tive” when confronted with the sudden emer-
gency caused by Defendant Jackson’s failure
to yield to oncoming traffic.

Finally, we note that the only evidence
cited by Defendant Jackson in support of his
position ‘is the testimony of the plaintiff's
expert and of Corporal Brewer. However, the
plaintiff's expert testified that Defendant
Jackson caused the accident and did not offer
any testimony that Decedent Myer was neg-
ligent in any manner. Likewise, Corporal
Brewer's investigation concluded that Defen-
dant Jackson failed to yield to oncoming
traffic in violation of W.Va. Code § 170-9-1,
and that Decedent Myer did not commit any
traffic violations. Therefore, we find Defen-
dant Jackson’s argument fails.

Based on all of the foregoing, we find no
error with the citcuit court’s ruling granting
summary judgment to the plaintiff on the
issue of Defendant Jackson’s liability.

B. Trust Issue

The next assignment of error is whether
the circuit court erred when it denied Defen-
dant Jackson’s post-trial motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law on the issue of the
Trust’s liability for Defendant Jackson’s tort.

Our standard of review for a circuit court’s
denial of a motion for judgment as a matter
of law was set forth in Syllabus Points 1 and
2 of Fredeking, 224 W.Va. 1, 680 S.E.2d 16:

The appellate standard of review for an
order granting or denying a renewed mo-
tion for a judgment as a matter of law
after trial pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of -Civil Procedure
[1998] is de novo.

When this Court reviews a trial court’s
order granting or denying a renewed mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law after
trial under Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure [1998], it is not
the task of this Court to review the facts to
determine how it would have ruled on the
evidence presented. Instead, its task is to
determine whether the evidence was such
that a reasonable trier of fact might have
reached the decision below. Thus, when
considering a ruling on a renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law after trial,

324

the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.®

This issue requires us to’ examine our law
on whether, and under what circumstances, a
trust may be held liable for a tort committed
by atrustee. Our review begins with a review
of our common law on this issue.!

- This Court set forth our common law rule
addressing the liability of a trust for a tort
* committed by a trustee in Massey v. Payne,
109 W.Va. 529, 155 S.E. 658 (1930), and
Marion »v. Chandler, 189 W.Va. 596, 81
S.E.2d 89 (1954), In Syllabus Point 1 of Mas-
sey, decided by this Court in 1980, we held:
A trust estate is ordinarily not liable for
torts committed by the trustee, when he is
entirely free from the control of the benefi-
ciory, And such a trustee is personally
liable to third persons for his torts in
failing to keep the trust property in repair,
irrespective of his right to reimbursement.
(Emphasis added.) .

Twenty-four years later, this Court had
the opportunity to revisit this issue in Mar-
ton v, Chandler, The Court in Marion, after
describing a. number of approaches other ju-
risdictions had taken, reaffirmed the rule
announced by Massey, stating, “[t]his Court
is committed to the general rule ,.. A trust
estate is ordinarily not liable for torts com-

9. We are also guided by Syllabus Point 5 of Orr v.
Crowder, 173 W.Va. 335, 315 S.B.2d 593 (1983),
in which this Court held:

In determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict the court
should: (1) consider the evidence most favor-
able to the prevailing party; (2) assume that all
conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the
jury in favor of the prevailing party; (3) assume
as proved all facts which the prevailing party's
evidence tends to prove; and (4) give to the
prevailing party the benefit of all favorable
inferences which reasonably may. be drawn
from the facts proved.

10. In Syllabus Point 2 of Dadisman v. Moore, 181
W.Va. 779, 384 S.E.2d 816 (1988), the Court
provided the following general description of a

A‘“trust” is a legal relation between two or
more persons by virtue of which one is bound
to hold property to which he has the legal title,
for the use or benefit of the other or others
who have an equitable title or interest. It is a
right, enforceable in equity, to the beneficial
enjoyment of property, real or personal, of
which the legal title is in another. The person

mitted by the trustee, when he is entirely
free from the control of the beneficiary.” 189
W.Va. at 601,02, 81 S.H.2d at 93 (internal
citation and quotation omitted),

Tn 2011, our Legislature enacted the “West
Virginia Uniform Trust Code.” See W.Va.
Code § 44D-1-101 eé seg. [2011]. By way of
background, the model Uniform Trust Code
was promulgated in 2000 by “the National
Conference of “Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws [which] replaced the: Uniform
Trust Act with the Uniform Trust Code.”
Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees, § 732 (2016).
After an extensive five-year study of the
model Uniform Trust Code by a probate
committee of West Virginia lawyers, our
Legislature adopted the West Virginia Uni-
form Trust Code in 2011.4 It “applies to
express trusts ... and trusts created pursu-
ant to a statute, judgment, or decree that
requires the trust to be administered in the
manner of an express trust.” W.Va. Code
§ 44D-1-102 [2011].

We riow address the relevant provisions of
the West Virginia Uniform Trust Code to
the instant matter. West Virginia Code
§ 44D-10-1010(b) [2011] provides that a trus-
tee is personally liable for torts committed in
the course of administering a trust if the
trustee is personally at fault: “A trustee is

so holding the legal title or interest is called
the “trustee,” and the one having the equitable
interest and entitled to the benefit is the benefi-
ciary or “cestui que trust.” The person creating
the trust is called the “‘trustor” or “settlor.” An.
essential feature of trusts is the division of the
title to property, the vesting of the legal title in
the trustee and of the equitable title or benefi-
cial interest in the cestui que trust.

11, A description of this study is as follows:

- The most significant undertaking of mem-
bers of the Probate Committee was their advo-
cacy for the adoption of the Uniform Trust
Code in West Virginia. This important piece of
legislation was analyzed and studied by the
Probate’ Committee for five years before mem-
bers of the Probate Committee presented their
recommended version of the West Virginia
Uniform Trust Code to the Legislature. This
120-page bill was enacted by the Legislature in
2010 as new Chapter 44D of the West Virginia
Code, .

John F. Allevato, Probate Committee Serves West
Virginia in a Number of Facets; 2016-March
W.Va. Law. 18 (2016).

personally liable for torts committed in the
course of administering a. trust, or for obli-
gations arising from ownership or control of
trust property, including liability for viola-
tion of environmental law, only if the trustee
is personally at fault.”

The West Virginia Uniform Trust Code
also provides that a trust may be liable for a
tort committed by a trustee if the tort is
“committed in the course of administering a
trust[.]!” West Virginia Code § 44D-10-
1010(c) [2011] provides, “[a] claim based ...
on a tort committed in the course of adminis-
tering a trust, may be asserted in a judicial
proceeding against the trustee in the trus-
tee’s fiduciary capacity, whether or not the
trustee is personally liable for the claim.”

By way of background on the foregoing
statute, we note that W.Va. Code § 44D-10-
1010(¢) contains the same language set forth
in § 1010(c) of the model Uniform Trust
Code. The comment section to § 1010 of the
model Uniform Trust Code expressly pro-
vides that “[s]ubsection (c) alters the com-
mon law rule that a trustee could not be sued
in a representative capacity if the trust es-
tate was not liable.” Further, we note that
§ 1010(c) of the model Uniform Trust Code
and W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(c) are consis-
tent with the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
§ 105 (2012), which provides, “[a] third party
may assert a claim against a trust for a
liability incurred in trust administration by
proceeding against the trustee in the trus-
tee’s representative capacity, whether or not,
the trustee is personally liable.”

Finally, we note that the approach set
forth in the model Uniform Trust Code,
W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(c), and the Re-
statement (Third) of Trusts is followed by a
majority of jurisdictions:

As previously indicated, there has been a

statutory trend towards representative

rather than individual liability of a trus-
tee.... [A] majority of United States ju-
risdictions have adopted provisions of the

Uniform Trust Code or the Uniform Pro-

12, We note that the West Virginia Uniform Trust
Codé also provides that “[tJhe common law of
trusts and principles of equity supplement this
chapter, except to the extent modified by this
chapter or another statute of this state.” W.Va.

325

bate Code or adopted similar legislation
that exempt a trustee from personal liabili-
ty for torts committed during the adminis-
tration of a. trust unless the trustee is
personally at fault, These statutes give tort
victims a right to satisfaction from the
trust assets that may be ‘asserted in an
action against the trustee in his or her
fiduciary capacity.
Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees, § 785 (2016).
While our Legislature adopted this majori-
ty rule by enacting W.Va. Code § 44D-10-
1010(c), we note that W.Va. Code § 44D-10-
1010(¢) conflicts with our common law rule on
this issue. Our common law rule was set
forth in two cases decided in 1980 and 1954,
Massey and Marion, in which this Court
held that a trust is ordinarily not liable for
torts committed by the trustee, when the
trustee was free from the control of a trust
beneficiary. Thus, under our common law
rule, the test to determine the trust’s liability
is whether the trustee was acting under the
control of a trust beneficiary at the time the
tort occurred.

HM Under W.Va.’ Code § 44D-10-
1010(¢), the test is no longer dependent on
the degree of control a beneficiary exercises
over the trustee at the time the tort oc-
curred; rather, the test is whether the trus-
tee committed the tort “in the course of
administering a trust.” We recognize that
“[olne of the axioms of statutory construction
is that a statute will be read in context with
the common law unless it clearly appears
from the statute that the purpose of the
statute was to change the common law.” Syl-
labus Point 2, Smith v. West Virginia State
Ba, of Educ., 170 W.Va. 598, 295 S.H.2d 680
(1982), In the instant case, we find that the
purpose of W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(c) was
clearly to change the common law rule on
this issue, 42, whether a.claim based on a
tort committed by a trustee may be asserted
against the trust!?

Based on the foregoing, we hold that
W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(c), contained in

Code § 44D-1-106 [2011]. While our common
law generally supplements the West Virginia Uni-
form Trust Code, it is clear that W.Va, Code
§ 44D-10-1010(c) modified our common law rule
on a trust’s liability for a trustee’s tort,

326

the West Virginia Uniform Trust Act, pro-
vides that a claim based on a tort committed
by a trustee in the course of administering a
trust may be asserted in a judicial proceed-
ing against the trustee in the trustee’s fidu-
ciary capacity, whether or not the trustee is
personally liable for the claim. To the extent
this Court’s prior rulings in Massey v
Payne, 109 W.Va. 529, 155 S.E. 658 (1930),
and Marion v. Chandler, 189 W.Va. 596, 81
S.E.2d 89 (1954), conflict with W.Va. Code
§§ 44D-10-1010(b) and (c), those cases are
overruled.

HM Applying this holding to the instant
case, we must determine whether Defendant
Jackson was “in the course of administering”
the Joelynn Family Preservation Trust at the
time the automobile accident occurred.

Pursuant to W.Va. Code § 44D-8-801
[2011], “the trustee shall administer the trust
and invest the trust assets in good faith, in
accordance with its terms and purposes and
the interests of the beneficiaries, and in ac-
cordance with this chapter.” A number of
duties, responsibilities and obligations may
be required of a trustee in the course of
“administering” a trust. These include: 1)
collecting trust property; 2) managing, ac-
quiring, insuring, or selling trust property; 3)
managing trust money; 4) managing trust
stocks or other securities; 5) managing trust
business organizations; 6) paying taxes and
other expenses incurred in the course of
administering the trust; 7) signing and deliv-
ering contracts and other instruments relat-
ing to trust business; and 8) terminating the
trust. See Uniform Trust Code § 816.

Moreover, one law review article described
the type of third parties who typically inter-
act with a trustee-and who would typically
assert a claim against a trust for a tort that
occurred in the course of a trustee adminis-
tering the trust:

13, While a beneficiary’s control over the trustee
is not the test for determining whether a trust is
lable for a trustee’s tort under W.Va. Code
§ 44D-10-1010(c), we find that a beneficiary's
control over the trustee may be relevant when
considering whether a trustee was “‘in the course

of administering a Trust” at the time the tort
occurred. As a general matter, Defendant Jack-
son stated that when the property needs to be

Third persons, in trust law parlance, are
persons other than trustees and beneficia-
vies. These are the persons who purchase
property from the trust, sell property or
provide services to the trust, or otherwise
engage in transactions with the trus-

The provisions of the [Uniform Trust
Code] addressing trustee relations with
third persons are built on the premise that
third persons should approach transactions
with trustees the same way they approach
any: other commercial deal. The theory is
that trust beneficiaries are helped more by
the free flow of commerce than they were
by the largely ineffective protective fea-
tures of former law.

David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code
(2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Is-
sues, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 148, 209 (2002) (empha-
sis added).

TI Returning to the instant case, the
plaintiff asserts that because Defendant
Jackson bought pipe for his residence prior
to the accident, the Trust is liable for his
tort. We disagree. Under the unique facts of
this case, we conclude that Defendant Jack-
son was not “in the course of administering”
the Trust at the time the automobile accident
occurred. On the morning the accident oc-
curred, Defendant Jackson drove into town
and ate breakfast. He then stopped at a
hardware store to buy plastic pipe. While the
pipe was going to be used at his residence
that is owned by the Trust, Defendant Jack-
son was not directed to buy the pipe by any
of the Trust beneficiaries," nor was he re-
quired to buy the pipe by the Trust docu-
ment, Further, there was no evidence that
the pipe was purchased with Trust money,
Also, the truck Defendant Jackson was driv-
ing at the time the accident occurred was not
owned by the Trust. The truck was owned by
Defendant Jackson’s oil company, Venture

repaired, “I mention I’m going to need to do it to
the other trustees [beneficiaries], but I'm the one
that makes the decision on it.” Further, Defen-
dant Jackson testified about decisions regarding
the property, “I live there and do it and it was
my property to start with.” He was then asked,
“Ultimately the decision rests on you?” Defen-
dant Jackson replied, “Yes.”

Petroleum. This company was not named as
a defendant in this case.

Additionally, Decedent Myer did not con-
duct any business, provide any services, en-

gage in any transactions, or have any deal-,

ings whatsoever with the Trust. The tort in
this matter occurred because Defendant
Jackson committed a traffic violation—failure
to yield to oncoming traffic. This traffic viola-
tion was not connected to a duty, obligation,
contract, or business transaction Defendant,
Jackson was carrying out in furtherance of
the Trust. Based on these undisputed facts,
we conclude that the Trust cannot be held
liable for Defendant Jackson’s tort pursuant
to W.Va. Code § 44D-10-1010(c) because he
was not “in the course of administering” the
Trust at the time the accident occurred.

We therefore reverse the circuit court’s
order denying the defendants’ post-trial mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law on the
Trust issue. On remand, the circuit court is
directed to enter an order providing that the
Trust is not liable for Defendant Jackson’s
tort and dismissing the Trust from this case.

C. Prejudgment Interest

HH The final issue is whether the circuit
court erred by awarding prejudgment inter-
est on the $82,000.00 damage award for “lost
wages and fringe benefits.” Defendant Jack-
son argues that this award “is not a prejudg-
ment loss or special damage under W.Va.
Code § 56-6-81.” Instead, Defendant Jackson
argues that this award was for future lost
wages and that prejudgment interest is not
available for such an award, Conversely, the
plaintiff argues that the $82,000.00 award for
lost wages “was for special damages” and, as

such, was proper under W.Va, Code § 56-6- _

381 [2006].

Our standard of review for an award of
prejudgment interest was set forth in Grib-
ben, et al v. Kirk, 195 W.Va. 488, 500, 466
§.E.2d 147, 159 (1995), in which this Court
provided:

14. Defendant Jackson also asserted that the cir-
cuit court erred by refusing to instruct the jury

regarding a trustee's personal liability. Because
we find that Defendant Jackson’s motion for

327

In reviewing a circuit court’s award of
prejudgment interest, we usually apply an
abuse of discretion standard. See generally
Perdue v. Doolittle, 186 W.Va. 681, 414
S.E.2d 442 (1992). Under the abuse of dis-
cretion standard, we will not disturb a
circuit court’s decision unless the circuit
court makes a clear error of judgment or
exceeds the bounds of permissible choices
in the circumstances. However, when the
award hinges, in part, on an interpretation
of our decisional or statutory law, we re-
view de novo that portion of the analysis.

West Virginia Code § 56-6-31(a) sets forth
our law on prejudgment interest in tort ac-
tions. It provides, in relevant part:

Except where it is otherwise provided
by law, every judgment or decree for the
payment of money, whether in an action
sounding in tort, contract or otherwise,
entered by any court of this state shall
bear interest from the date thereof, wheth-
er it be so stated in the judgment or
decree or not: Provided, That if the judg-
‘ment or decree, or any part thereof, is for
special damages, as defined below, or for
liquidated damages, the amount of special
or liquidated damages shall bear interest
at the rate in effect for the calendar year
in which the right to bring the same shall
have accrued, as determined by the court
and that established rate shall remain con-
stant from that date until the date of the
judgment or decree, notwithstanding
changes in the federal reserve district dis-
count rate in effect in subsequent years
prior to the date of the judgment or de-
eree. Special damages includes lost wages
and income, medical expenses, damages to
tangible personal property and similar out-
of-pocket expenditures, as determined by
the court.

(Emphasis added.)

I After review, we find that the circuit
court did not err by awarding prejudgment
interest on the lost wages award. First, there
is no question that the jury awarded “lost
wages” to the plaintiff and that “lost wages”

judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the

Trust issue should be granted, the jury instruc-
tion assignment of error is moot.

328

ave a special damage -under W.Va, Code
§ 56-6-31(a), Next, as this Court explained in
Grove v. Myers, 181 W.Va. 842, 382 S.E.2d
586 (1989), prejudgment interest shall- be
awarded on such damages from the date the
cause of action accrued until the date judg-
ment is rendered. In Syllabus Point 3 of
Grove, in part, this Court held, “[uJnder
W.Va. Code, 56-6-31, as amended, prejudg-
ment interest is to be recovered on special or
liquidated damages incurred by the time of
the trial, whether or not the injured party
has by then paid for the same.”

The Court in Grove also stated in Syllabus
Point 2, in part, that “prejudgment interest
on special or liquidated damages is calculated
from the date on which the cause of action
aecrued, which in a personal injury action is,
ordinarily, when the injury is inflicted.”
Thus, according to this Court’s ruling in
Grove, prejudgment interest shall be award-
ed on special damages under W.Va. Code 56-
6-31 from the date the cause of action ac-
crued until the date judgment is rendered.

In the present case, both parties presented
expert financial testimony during the trial.
While the experts did not agree on the total
value of Decedent Myer’s future earning ca-
pacity, they did agree that Decedent Myer
was making $32,000.00 per year at the time
of his death. Thus, it is clear that the jury
awarded Decedent Myer the equivalent of
one year of lost wages—$32,000.00,

Additionally, the cause of action accrued on
the date the accident took place—June 7,
2014, The judgment was rendered on May
12, 2016, Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled
to a prejudgment interest award on the lost
wages award because the award was equiva-
lent to one year of Decedent Myer’s salary
which he would have received between the
date the cause of action accrued (2014) and
the date the date judgment was rendered
(2016),

Defendant Jackson argues that prejudg-
ment interest is not available on an award for
“future lost. wages.” In support of this argu-
ment, Defendant Jackson relies on Syllabus
Point 15 of Pasquale v, Ohio Power Co., 187
W.Va, 292, 418 S.E.2d 788 (1992), in which
this Court held, “[f]uture wage loss, accruing
after the jury verdict, is not a prejudgment

loss or special damage under W.Va. Code, 56-
6-81 (1981).” (Emphasis added). We find De-
fendant Jackson’s reliance on Pasquale is
misplaced, .

In Pasquale, the plaintiff asserted a
wrongful death claim against a utility compa-
ny, and the jury awarded the plaintiff a
substantial lost wages damage award. The
cireuit court awarded prejudgment interest
on the entire lost wages award and the de-
fendant appealed. On appeal, the defendant
conceded “that it was proper to award pre-
judgment interest on the potential earnings
from August 19, 1987 [the date the cause of
action accrued], until trial,” but contended
that prejudgment interest should not have
been awarded on future earnings after the
verdict was rendered, 187 W.Va. at 311, 418
$.E.2d at 757, The Court ruled:

the plaintiff was entitled to recover pre-

judgment interest on the decedent's lost

wages from the date of his death until the
date of the judgment on the jury verdict.

However, the trial.court did not calculate

prejudgment interest for this period only,

but calculated interest on the entire future
wage loss, Clearly, the future wage loss

accruing after the’ jury verdict is not a

prejudgment loss or “special damage” un-

der W. Va. Code, 56-6-31.

(Emphasis added.)

In the present case, ‘the $32,000.00 lost
wages award was equivalent to one year of
Decedent Myer’s salary, which-would have
accrued between June 2014 (when the acci-
dent occurred) and the trial date. Thus, it
was proper under W.Va, Code 56-6-31 for the
cireuit court to award prejudgment interest
on this award.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the
circuit court’s ruling granting summary
judgment to the plaintiff on the issue of
Defendant Jackson’s liability. We reverse
the cireuit court’s ruling denying Defendant
Jackson’s post-trial motion for judgment as
a matter of law on the issue of the Trust’s
liability and remand the case to the circuit

court for entry of an order granting Defen-
dant Jackson’s motion and dismissing the
Trust from this case. Finally, we affirm the
circuit court’s award of prejudgment inter-
est on the plaintiffs lost wages damage
award.

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in ats and
remanded with directions.

801 S.E.2d 207

ERIE INSURANCE PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, a ‘corporation,
and Stephen Myers, Defendants Below,
Petitioners

ve

Dimitri CHABER and Mary Chaber,
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No, 16-0490 .
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 19, 2017

Filed: June 1, 2017

329

Amy M. Smith, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
PLLO, Bridgeport, West Virginia, Michelle
Gaston, Esq., Katrina N. Bowers, Esq., Step-
toe & Johnson PLLC, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, Counsel for Petitioners

Clayton G. Anderson, Esq., The Masters
Law Firm, LC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondents

Workman, Justice:

This is an appeal by Erie Insurance Prop-
erty and Casualty Company and Stephen
Myers (hereinafter jointly referenced as the
“Petitioners” or separately as “Erie” and
“Mr. Myers”). The Petitioners contend the
circuit court erred by granting declaratory
judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs, Dimitri
Chaber (hereinafter the “Respondents”) on
an insurance policy claim. Upon thorough
evaluation of the arguments of the parties,
the record designated for this Court’s review,
and applicable precedent, we reverse the cir-
cuit court’s decision and remand this matter
with instructions to enter declaratory judg-
ment for the Petitioners on the declaratory
judgment portion of the complaint.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The Respondents own property in St. Al-
bans, West Virginia. One of five commercial
rental units on that property was leased by
the Respondents to a motorcycle shop. On
February 19, 2014, soil and rock slid down a
hill located to the rear of the Respondents’
property and damaged the motorcycle shop.
The Respondents subsequently submitted a
elaim for property damage to their insurance
carrier, Erie. Mr. Myers, an adjuster for
Erie, examined the damage and observed
that a mass of rock and soil had fallen down
the steep slope behind the Respondents’
property. Mr. Myers met with Mr. Chaber
and discussed the insurance policy’s exclu-
sion of coverage for damage caused by a
landslide. The policy contains the following
exclusionary language:

SECTION III—EXCLUSIONS

1, The “ensuing loss” refers to the final portion of

331

A. Coverages 1, 2,8, 4, and 5

We do not cover under Building(s)—Cov-
erage 1; Business Personal Property and
Personal Property of Others—Coverage 2;
Additional Income Protection—Coverage
8; Glass and Lettering—Coverage 4; and
Signs, Lights, and Clocks—Coverage 5
“loss” or damage caused directly or indi-
rectly by any of the following. Such “loss”
or damage is excluded regardless of any
cause or event that contributes concurrent-
ly or in any sequence to the “loss”:

5, Earth Movement
a, Earthquake, including tremors and aft-
ershocks, and any earth sinking, rising, or
shifting related to such event;
b. Landslide, including any earth sinking,
rising, or shifting related to such event;
e. Mine subsidence, meaning subsidence
of a manmade mine. whether or not mining
activity has ceased; or
d. Earth sinking (other than sinkhole col-
lapse), rising, or shifting including soil con-
ditions which cause settling, cracking or
other disarrangement of foundations, or
other parts of realty. Soil conditions in-
clude contraction, expansion, freezing,
thawing, erosion, improperly compacted
soil, and the action of water under the
ground surface,

This exclusion applies regardless of wheth-

er any of the above, in Paragraphs 5.a,

through 5.d,, is caused by an act of nature

or is otherwise caused.

But if Harth Movement, as described in

5.a. through 5.d. above, results in fire, ex-

plosion, sprinkler leakage, volcanic action,

or building glass breakage, we will pay for
the “loss” or damage caused by such per-
ils.

By letter dated March 24, 2014, Brie de-
nied coverage based upon its conclusion that
the Respondents’ loss was not covered due to
the policy's earth movement exclusion, That
letter further explained Erie’s determination
that coverage was available for the replace-
ment of the Respondents’ broken glass pur-
suant to the ensuing loss! exception to the

the policy language quoted above, specifically the

332

earth movement exclusion; however, the
$8,688.78 estimate for such repair was below
the Respondents’ $10,000.00 deductible.

On June 16, 2014, the Respondents filed a
complaint against Erie and Mr. Myers, as-
serting the following claims: (1) breach of
contract, breach of covenants of good: faith
and fair dealing, and violations of the West
Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act? by Erie
and Mr. Myers;.(2) fraud and/or fraudulent
misrepresentation by Mr. Myers; and (8) de-
claratory judgment as to whether coverage
exists. By order dated April ‘21, 2015, the
circuit court bifurcated the action and stayed
all discovery unrelated to the declaratory
judgment claim.

Erie hired Ms. Tammy St. Clair, an expert
in engineering, to render an opinion regard-
ing the cause of the landslide, Ms. St. Clair
initially provided an oral report in which she
opined the landslide was caused by improper
excavation of the hillside behind the building.
Her subsequent formal report indicates the
damage was caused by a rockfall resulting
from seasonal climate change.

The Respondents hired Mr. Jack Spadaro,
an expert in geotechnical engineering, to de-
termine the proximate cause of the landslide.
In his. August 16, 2015, report, Mr, Spadaro
opined that the improper excavation of the
highwall area at the rear of the Respondents’
property caused the rockfall and that high-
wall failure resulted from a rockfall rather
than a-landslide.

On September 15, 2015, the Petitioners
filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on the declaratory judgment portion of the
claims, By order dated January 12, 2016, the
circuit court denied the Petitioners’ motion
for partial summary judgment, reasoning
that genuine issues of material fact existed
yegarding the cause of the Respondents’
damages and whether such cause was man-
made, natural, or a combination of both. The
circuit court further found genuine issues of
material fact “as to whether or not there is
insurance coverage for ‘the damages

provision that “if Barth Movement ,., results in
fire, explosion, sprinkler leakage, volcanic’ ac-
tion, or building glass breakage, we will pay for
the ‘loss’ or damage caused by such perils.”

claimed....” During a bench trial held on
the: declaratory judgment issue on January
11 and 12, 2016, Erie’s counsel argued that
the determinative issue is a legal question
appropriate for summary judgment. In sup-
port of that contention, Mr. Myers testified it
was irrelevant under the policy whether the
earth movement occurred as a result of natu-
ral or man-made causes because damages
due to earth movement, whether such move-
ment is. caused: by natural or man-made
forces, are clearly excluded under the policy.
Mr. Myers further testified that a rockfall is
considered a landslide in the context of the
policy language.

The cireuit court entered a’ February 1,

* 2016, order granting declaratory judgment to

the Respondents. The circuit court found cov-
erage exists under the policy based upon
evidence of earth’ movement caused by both
natural and man-made events, specifically an
improperly excavated hillside. The court fur-
ther found the policy did not unambiguously
exclude damage caused by rockfall due to
man-made events and the policyholders could
reasonably expect coverage for the: earth
movement in question. The court also found
the glass breakage exception ambiguous and
concluded it should be construed i in favor of
the Respondents.

On April 4, 2016, the circuit court en-
tered an order certifying final judgment on
the declaratory judgment claim under West
Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and
continuing the stay’ of the Respondents’ re-
maining claims. The Petitioners thereafter
appealed to this Court.

IL. ‘Standard of Review

HE “A cirenit court’s entry of a declar-
atory judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt.
8, Cow v. Amick, 195 W.Va, 608, 466 S.H.2d
459 (1995). This Court’s review of the circuit
court’s findings subsequent to a bench trial is
premised upon the following standard of re-
view:

2, The Respondents actually used the phrase “Un-
fair Trade Protection Act,” but their claim was
presumably intended as an Unfair Trade Prac-

tices Act claim under West Virginia Code §§ 33-
11-1 to -10 (2016).

In reviewing challenges to the findings
and conclusions of the cireuit court made
after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferen-
tial standard of review is applied. The final
order and the ultimate disposition are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, and the circuit court’s underlying
factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous’ standard, ‘Questions of
law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 198 W.Va. 829, 480 $.E.2d 588 (1996).

This Court has also clearly articulated the.

standard for reviewing ‘findings of ambiguity
within insurance contracts. “[Tyhe interpreta-
tion of an insurance contract, including the
question of whether the contract is ambigu-
ous, is a legal determination which ... is
reviewed de novo on appeal.” Dairyland Ins.
Co. v, Fow, 209 W.Va. 598, 601, 550 S.E.2d
888, 891 (2001) (quoting Payne v. Weston,
195 W.Va. 502, 506-07, 466 S,E.2d 161, 165-66
(1995), With these staridards as guidance,
this Court proceeds to consider whether the
circuit court’s ruling was erroneous,

TIL Diseussion

A. Earth Movement Exclusion

HI The Petitioners contend the circuit
court erred in holding the policy’s earth
movement exclusion fails to unambiguously
preclude coverage in this instance. They ar-
gue the earth movement exclusion clearly
and unambiguously excludes coverage for all
earth movement, regardless of whether such
movement was caused by an act of nature or
was otherwise caused, quoting the pivotal
policy language, as follows: “This exclusion
applies regardless of whether any’ of the
above ... is caused by an act of nature or is
otherwise caused.”

HM This Court has not had prior ocea-
sion to address this particular exclusionary
language; thus, this is a matter of first im-
pression. In articulating our standard for
determining ambiguity in insurance policies,
this Court has consistently observed that
«« “whenever the language of an insurance
policy provision is reasonably susceptible of

3. The Murray decision, is helpful to the Court's
analysis of the present case to the extent it clari-

333

two different meanings or is of such, doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might be-un-
certain or disagree as to its meaning, it is
ambiguous.”’ Syl. pt. 1, Surbaugh v. Stone-
wall Casualty Co., 168 W.Va. 208, 288 S.E.2d
859 (1981), quoting syl. pt. 1, Prete v. Mer-
chants Property Insurance Co., 159 W.Va.
508, 228 S.H.2d 441 (1976).” Syl. Pt. 1, Sham-
blin v. Nationwide Mut, Ins. Co., 175 W.Va.
387, 832 S.E.2d 639 (1985). As*the Court

-observed in Payne,

[only if the cout makes the determination.
that the contract cannot be given a certain
and ‘definite legal meaning, arid is there-
fore ambiguous, can a question of fact be
submitted to the jury as to the meaning of
the contract. It is only when the document
has been found to be ambiguous that the
determination, of intent through extrinsic
evidence become a question of fact.’ *

-195 W.Va, at 507, 466 S.H.2d at 166. “[A]

court[, however,] should read policy provi-
sions to avoid ambiguities and not torture the
language to create them.” Id.

In attempting to evaluate the exclusionary

“ language in the present case, the circuit

court relied extensively upon this Court’s
holding in Murray v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 208 W.Va. 477, 509 S.H.2d 1
(1998), The exclusionary language this Court
addressed in Murray, however, was marked-
ly different from’ that contained in the insur-
ance policy at issue herein. This Court found
the exclusionary language in Murray ambig-
uous because the policy excluded certain loss-
es regardless of whether the event “arises
from natural or external forces, or occurs as
a result of any combination of these.” Id. at
489, 509 S.H.2d at 18 (emphasis added). In
analyzing that policy, this Court focused
upon the ambiguity of the term “external,”
concluded the term was ambiguous, and re-
fused to “define the word to inchide man-
made forces as [the insurer] would have us
do.” Id.

By contrast, the language found to be am-
biguous in Murray is nonexistent in the

.present case; consequently, the Murray anal-

ysis is not dispositive of the present case.

fies the meaning of the word “landslide” in the
policy, as explained in syllabus point four of

334

Critically, the language of the exclusionary
clause utilized in the present case, specifical-
ly the phrase “caused by an act of nature or
is otherwise caused,” was developed by the
Insurance Services Office, in 2018 and was
apparently designed to minimize confusion
regarding the scope of coverage and the na-
ture of earth movement exclusionary lan-
guage. See generally William A. Schreiner,
Jr., Recent Developments in Property Insur-
ance Coverage Litigation, 49 Tort Trial &
Insur, Prac. L. J. 401 (2018). Due to its
relatively recent inclusion in insurance poli-
cies, courts have had limited opportunity to
analyze the contours and applications of this
exclusionary language to various factual sce-
narios. However, the language has been im-
plicated in some manner in several cases
since its inception, and it has not been
deemed ambiguous. In Citi Gas Convenience,
Ine, v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 15-6691,
2016 WL 492474 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2016), for
instance, the United States District Court in
Pennsylvania addressed the phrase “is
caused by an act of nature or is otherwise
eaused” and found the plaintiff's argument
against the insurance company ineffectual,
explaining its rationale:

All in all, Citi Gas’s arguments are una-
vailing. While dictionary definitions of
“surface water” may suggest naturally oc-
curring water, Citi Gas ignores the lan-
guage of the policy that modifies the term
“surface water.” “Surface water” is a term
in Paragraph 1 of the policy’s water exclu-
sion, The water exclusion states that it
“applies regardless of whether any of the
above in Paragraphs 1. through 5., is
caused by an act of natwre or is otherwise
caused.” See Def.’s Mot, Ex. B, at 50.
Thus, the policy clearly and plainly ex-
cludes damage from “surface water” that
“is caused by an act of nature or is other-
wise caused.” Even in the absence of a
specific definition, then, “surface water,”
as used in this policy, encompasses both
Murray, as follows: “The plain, ordinary meaning
of the word ‘landslide’ in an insurance policy
contemplates a sliding down of a mass of soil or
rock on or from a steep slope.” 203 W.Va. at
479, 509 S.E.2d at 3.

4, The Insurance Services Office is an advisory
organization comprised of approximately 1,400
property and casualty insurers. It promulgates

“surface water” from natural sources and
“surface water” from man-made sources,

Id. at *8 (emphasis added and footnote omit-

ted). With regard to cases cited by the plain-

tiffs in the Citi Gas case, the court noted:
Even if those cases were somehow binding
on this Court, the exclusion clauses in the
insurance policies discussed in those cases
did not contain language like the language
in the Citi Gas policy that clarified that the
exclusion applied “whether any of the
above in Paragraphs 1. through 5., is
caused by an act of nature or is otherwise
caused,”

Id. at *4 n.6 (emphasis added); see also Pa-
vos Props. LLC v, Colorado Cas, Ins. Co., 885
F.8d 1264, 1274-75 (10 Cir. 2016) (“(UInder
the Policy it makes no difference whether
any water causing the avalanche had been
diverted by manmade features; mudslide
damage is excluded whether the mudslide ‘is
caused by an act of nature or is otherwise
caused.’ ”); Ski Chalet Village Owners Club,
Inc, v. Empl’r Mut. Cas, Co., No. 3:16-CV-20-
TAV-HBG, 2016 WL 6892759, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. Nov. 22, 2016) (holding earth move-
ment and water exclusions applied “regard-
less of whether ... caused by an act of
nature or is otherwise caused....”);
SWJKM, LLC v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., No. A-
18-447, 2014 WL 2727101, at *8 (Neb. Ct.
App. June 17, 2014) (quoting portion of policy
applying water damage exclusion “regardless
of whether any of the above ... is caused by
an act of nature or is otherwise caused” and
finding “[(t]here is nothing ambiguous about
the water exclusion in [the] policy.”).

Evaluating the exclusionary language in
the context of a declaratory judgment action,
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Di-
vision, in Harleysville Inswrance Co. of New
York v. Potamianos Properties, LLC, 108
A.D.3d 1110, 969 N.Y.S.2d 342 (N.Y. App.
Div, 2018), applied the language “regardless

standard form insurance policies to be presented
to state insurance regulators for approval. See
Christopher C. French, Insuring Landslides:
America’s Uninsured Natural Catastrophes, 17
Nev. LJ. 63, 96 (2016); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 772, 113 S.Ct. 2891,
125 L.Bd.2d 612 (1993).

of whether [the loss] is caused by an act of
nature or is otherwise caused” and held the
Joss was excluded under the “wnambiguous
terms in the policy.” Id. at 348 (emphasis
added). The court explained the exclusion
pertaining to water “applies even though the
loss resulted from a ruptured pipe rather
than from a natural phenomenon, The en-
dorsement expressly provides that its exclu-
sions are applicable regardless of whether
the occurrence is ‘caused by an act of nature
or is otherwise caused....’” Id. at 343-44;
see also YMCA of Pueblo v. Secura Ins. Cos.,
No. 14-CV-00931-MJW, 2015 WL 585958, at
*1 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2015); Theater Grp. 8,
LLC, & Theater Grp. IV, Inc. v. Seewra Ins.
Co., No. 317898, 2014 WL 6494818, at *2
(Mich, Ct. App. Nov, 18, 2014); Ashrit Realty
LLC v, Tower Nat. Ins, Co., No, A-1647-
1374, 2015 WL 248490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 20, 2015).

Hl We have unearthed no authority for a
finding of ambiguity in this exclusionary
phrase. The phrase clearly and unambiguous-
ly excludes coverage for a landslide resulting
from a natural event or otherwise. A provi-
sion in an insurance policy excluding a loss
regardless of whether such loss is “caused by
an act of nature or is otherwise caused” is
not ambiguous and excludes coverage for the
Joss whether it is caused by a man-made or a
naturally-occurring event. Thus, in the pres-
ent case, whether the event was triggered by
natural forces or improper excavation of the
hillside at the rear of the property, the exclu-
sion applies. The Court consequently re-
verses the decision of the lower court on that,
issue.

5. See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
499 F.3d 419, 429-431 (Sth Cir. 2007) (finding
anti-concurrent causation provision unambigu-
ous and enforceable and excluding coverage
where loss caused by combination of covered
peril [hurricane winds] and excluded peril [flood-
ing]); Cooper v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 184
F.Supp.2d 960, 962 (D, Ariz, 2002) (anti-concur-
rent causation provision prevented recovery for
loss caused by excluded peril [mold] even though
covered peril [water] may also have contributed).

6. See Steven Plitt et al., 7 Couch on Insurance
§ 101:55 (3d ed. 2006) (“The efficient proximate
cause rule permits recovery under the insurance
policy for a loss caused by a combination of a

335

B, Assertions Regarding Efficient Proxi-
mate Cause, Anti-Concurrent Causation
Clause, and Reasonable Expectations

Having concluded the exclusionary lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, the remain-
ing arguments regarding efficient proximate
cause, the anti-concurrent causation clause,
and reasonable expectations are rendered in-
consequential. An anti-concurrent causation
clause provides that where a loss is caused
by a combination of excluded and covered
perils, the entire loss is excluded. The anti-
concurrent causation clause in this case pro-
vided that the enumerated excluded losses
would be excluded “regardless of any cause
or event that contributes concurrently or in
any sequence to the ‘loss[.)”

HM Thus, unless the efficient proximate
cause ® of the loss is determined to be a
covered risk, the anti-concurrent causation
clause does not become relevant to the analy-
sis. In other words, where neither of the
alleged “causes” is covered by the insurance
policy, there is no event or occurrence to be
evaluated to determine which of the two is
the efficient proximate cause; such evaluation
would be an exercise in futility.’ An anti-
concurrent causation clause is only applicable
where there is both a covered loss and an
excluded loss. See Peter Nash Swisher, Caw-
sation Requirements in Tort and Insurance
Law Practice: Demystifying Some Legal
Causation “Riddles,” 43 Tort Trial & Ins.
Prac. L.J, 1, 26 (2007) (explaining concur-
rent-causation controversies arise where
some causes of loss are covered and some are
excluded).

covered risk and an excluded risk only if the
covered risk ... is one that sets the other causes
in motion that, in an unbroken sequence, pro-
duced the result for which recovery is sought.”).

1. This would be equally true where both of the
asserted “causes” of the damage were covered
losses. See, e.g., Ken Johnson Props., LLC v. Har-
leysville Worcester Summary Ins. Co., 2013 WL
5487444, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2013) (‘The
Court finds, however, that the efficient proximate
cause inquiry undertaken by courts to distinguish
between covered and excluded causes of loss is
not the appropriate inquiry when presented with
two covered causes of loss.”).

336

Based upon this Court’s conclusion that
the policy’s earth movement exclusion unam-
biguously precludes coverage for earth move-
ment caused by either natural or man-made
events, the question of the proximate cause
of the landslide is not relevant. Whether
caused by nature or otherwise caused by an
improperly excavated hillside, the loss is ex-
cluded, and application of the anti-concurrent
causation clause is unnecessary.

‘Likewise, this Court’s conclusion regarding
the clear and unambiguous exclusionary lan-
guage renders an analysis of the policyhold-
ers’ reasonable expectations unnecessary and
inconsequential. The Court.has very clearly
explained “[bJefore the doctrine of reason-
able expectations is applicable to an insur-
ance contract, there must be an ambiguity
regarding the terms of that contract.” Mur-
ray, 203 W.Va, at 490 n.12, 509 S.E.2d at 14

nl2 (citing Syl. Pt. 2, Robertson v. Fowler,

197 W.Va, 116, 475 S,E.2d 116 (1996)), There
is no ambiguity in the policy exclusion at
issue herein, As the District Court of Appeal
of Florida observed in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Castillo, 829 So.2d 242 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002), “[w]hile it is certainly
understandable that the [insureds] may have
reasonably expected their homeowner's poli-
ey to cover the damages in question, [the
insurer] correctly points out that it is the
policy's terms which define the coverage, not
the insureds’ reasonable expectations.” Jd. at
247, .

HE Similarly, in Chase v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 780 A.2d 1128 (D.C.
2001), the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals recognized that “purchasers of insur-
ance may often retain expectations that are
contrary to the language of their policies,”
Id. at 1132, “We appreciate that even if
policy language is explicit, insureds may not
actually read it; or, if they do read it, that
they may not comprehend fully all the ramifi-
cation of the unavoidably complicated provi-
sions concerning coverage and exclusions
from coverage....” Id. “Nonetheless, the
reasonable expectations doctrine is not a
mandate for courts to rewrite insurance poli-
cies and reallocate their assignment of risks
between insurer and insured.” Id. (emphasis
added). Where policies “are clear and unam-

biguous, they will be enforced by the courts
as written, so long as they do not ‘violate a
statute or public policy.” Jd. (internal cita-
tions omitted).

C. Ensuing Loss Provision

HM The Petitioners contend the circuit
court erred in finding the ensuing loss provi-
sion ambiguous and in construing it to pro-
vide coverage for the entire loss rather than
the limited portion of the loss caused by
glass breakage, As quoted above, the ensuing
loss provision provides: “But if Earth Move-
ment, as described in 5.a, through 5.d. above,
results in fire, explosion, sprinkler leakage,
voleanic action, or building glass breakage,
we will pay for the ‘loss’ or damage caused
by. such perils.” The cireuit court found the
phrase.“such perils” to be reasonably suscep-
tible to two different meanings and therefore
ambiguous. Consequently, the cireuit court
construed the provision in favor of the Re-
spondents, noting their assertion “that glass
breakage is a damage, not a peril, and that
the damage resulting from a rockfall, a peril,
is covered.”

The circuit court’s interpretation of the
ensuing loss provision is unjustifiable, based
upon the purpose and express language of
the ensuing loss provision. The effect of an
ensuing loss provision is to provide coverage
for certain losses occasioned by events; the
entirety of the logs, however, is not covered
by an ensuing loss provision,

Some insurance policies contain “ensuing
loss provisions,” that provide coverage for
certain covered perils which would other-
wise be covered even when that covered
peril was caused by an excluded peril. In
other words, an ensuing loss provision pro-
vides coverage for specific types of losses
that are otherwise covered in the policy
when that loss is the result of the occur-
rence of an-excluded peril. For example, a
policy may provide that it does not cover
any loss caused by earth movement; how-
ever, any ensuing loss by fire which is not
excluded or excepted is covered, This
means the policy covers loss caused by fire
that would not have occurred but for the
earth movement; however, other damage

caused by the earth movement is not cov-
ered.

11 Couch on Insurance § 158:70 (8d ed.
2014).

This Court has not evaluated ensuing loss
provisions; however, other jurisdictions have
not found such provisions unenforceable. In
BSI Constructors, Inc. v. Hartford Fire In-
surance Co., 705 F.8d 380 (8th Cir. 2018), for
instance, the Bighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found no ambiguity in an ensuing loss provi-
sion related to faulty workmanship and spe-

cifically declined to adopt a “strained inter-*

pretation of the language of the policy in
order to create an ambiguity where none
exists.” Id. at 334 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, in Vision One, LLC v. Philadel-
phia Indemnity Insurance Co., 174, Wash.2d
501, 276 P.3d 800 (2012), the court explained
the impact of an ensuing loss provision: “[IIf
one of the specified uncovered events takes
place, any ensuing loss which is otherwise
covered by the policy will remain covered.
The uncovered event itself, however, is never
covered.” Jd. at 307 (internal citations omit-
ted). “While coverage may be excluded when
a certain peril causes a loss, a resulting or
ensuing loss clause § operates to carve out an
exception to the policy exclusion.” Jd. oot.
note added)

This approach is consistent with the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court of Texas in
Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 8.W.8d 744
(Tex, 2008), That court explained the logic of
an ensuing loss provision within policy lan-
guage as follows:

The [insureds] argue that we must disre-

gard how this policy provision starts (“We

do not cover loss caused by mold”) because
of how it ends (“We do cover ensuing loss
caused by water damage”). We disagree; it
has again long been the rule that we must.
read all parts of a policy together, giving
meaning to every sentence, clause, and
8, Whether an insurance policy uses the term

“ensuing loss” or “resulting loss” is of no mo-

ment. “Resulting loss clauses are sometimes de-

nominated ensuing loss clauses. The distinction
is simply a matter of different wot
insurance policies. There is no legal

ni
to using one phrase over the other.” Vision One,
276 P.3d at 306 n.6.

337

word to avoid rendering any portion inop-

erative.
Id, at 748, As the court in Fiess cogently
articulated, an ensuing Joss provision must
not be applied to “make an excluded loss
reappear as a covered loss.” Id, at 752, An
ensuing loss provision does not serve to re-
vive coverage for an excluded event. It sim-
ply carves out a narrow exception to the
exclusion, “limit[ing] the scope of what is
otherwise excluded under the policy.” Vision
One, 276 P.8d at 307; see also Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins, Co. v. Lillard-Roberts, No,
CV-01-0862-ST, 2002 WL 81488248, at *8 (D.
Or. June 14, 2002) (quoting Cooper, 184
FSupp.2d at 964) (holding ensuing loss
clause “‘does not reinsert coverage for ex-
cluded losses, but reaffirms coverage for sec-
ondary losses ultimately caused by excluded
perils.’ ”).

HE Upon this Court’s evaluation of the
ensuing loss provision, we hold that an unam-
biguous ensuing or resulting loss clause of an
exclusion contained in an insurance policy
provides a narrow exception to the exclusion
‘but does not revive or reinstate coverage for
losses otherwise unambiguously excluded by
the policy. Where an uncovered event occurs,
an ensuing or resulting loss that is otherwise
covered by the policy will remain covered,
but the uncovered event itself is not covered,

In-the case sub judice, this Court finds the
plain and unambiguous terms of the ensuing
loss provision provide a narrow exception to
the earth movement exclusion and permit
coverage for the portion of the loss caused by
glass breakage. Thus, pursuant to the unam-
biguous policy language, to the extent the
earth movement results in building glass
breakage, such glass breakage is covered;
the other damage caused by the earth move-
ment is not covered.’

IV. Conélusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court re-

verses the declaratory judgment granted to

9, Erie does not dispute that the policy provides
coverage for the Respondents’ broken glass; how-
ever, the estimate of $3,683.73 for the broken
glass does not exceed the Respondents’ $10,000
deductible.

338

the Respondents by the circuit court and
remands this action with instructions to enter
declaratory judgment for the Petitioners on
Count III of the complaint.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

801 S.E.2d 216
STATE of West Virginia EX REL. UNI-
VERSAL UNDERWRITERS INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, and Zurich Ameri-
can Insurance Company, Petitioners

v

‘The Honorable Patrick N. WILSON, Judge
of the Cireuit Court of Marion County,
West Virginia, Christina M. Varvel, Ad-
ministratrix of the Estate of David
Ralph Allen, Deceased, Salvatore Cava,
Dan’s Car World, LLC, Dan Cava’s Toy-
ota World, and Daniel A. Cava, Respon-
dents

No, 17-0004
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 3, 2017
Filed: June 1, 2017

ww

Arie M, Spitz, Esq., Jill C, Rice, Esq.,
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Charleston, West
Virginia, Counsel for Petitioners, Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co., and Zurich
American Insurance Co.

Gregory H. Schillace, Esq., Schillace Law
Office, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Counsel
for Respondents, Salvatore Cava, Dan’s Car,
World, LLC, Dan Cava’s Toyota World, and
Daniel A. Cava

Jeffrey M. Wakefield, Esq., Flaherty Sen-
sabaugh Bonasso PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, Attorney for Amicus Curiae, West
Virginia Insurance Federation
1, Universal Underwriters Insurance Company is

a subsidiary of Zurich American Insurance Com-

pany,

40 ee

WORKMAN, Justice:

The petitioners herein and defendants be-
low, Universal Underwriters Insurance
Company, and Zurich American Insurance
Compaiy (hereinafter collectively “Zurich”),
invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction seek-
ing a writ of prohibition to prevent enforce-
ment of the December 8, 2016, order en-
tered by the Honorable Patrick N. Wilson,
Judge of the Circuit Court of Marion Coun-
ty, West Virginia. In that order, the circuit
court denied Zurich’s motion to dismiss the
cross-claims of the respondents herein and
defendants below, Salvatore Cava, Daniel A.
Cava, and Dan’s Car World, LLC, d/b/a Dan
Cava’s Toyota World (hereinafter collectively
the “Cava defendants” and/or individually),
After review of the appendix record and
briefs of the parties, contemplation of the
matters raised during oral arguments, and
full éonsideration of the applicable law, we
find the Cava defendants’ cross-claims
against Zurich are not ripe for adjudication.
Thus, the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we grant a writ of
prohibition, as moulded?

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

A. The Underlying Litigation

On May 80, 2014, nineteen-year-old Salva-
tore Cava was driving a 2014 Toyota Rav4
sports utility vehicle when he was involved in
a motor vehicle accident with sixty-six-year-
old David R. Allen, who was driving a motor-
eycle. Mr, Allen suffered catastrophic inju-
ries in the accident and died: nine days later
at Ruby Memorial Hospital in Morgantown,
West Virginia.

Salvatore Cava, a college student residing
in his parents’ home, is the son of Daniel A.
Cava, member of. Dan’s Car World, LLC,
d/b/a Dan Cava’s Toyota World (“Dan’s Car
World”). This business owned the Rav4, Sal-
vatore Cava was an employee of Dan’s Car
World, although he was not engaged in any

2, We wish to acknowledge.the amicus curiae
brief filed by the West Virginia Insurance Feder-
ation in support of the Petition for Writ of Prohi-
bition. We value its participation in this case.

activity on behalf of the business at the time
of the collision? It is undisputed that Salva-
tore Cava was driving the Rav4 with per-
mission from his father at the time of the
accident, Dan’s Car World purchased the in-
surance policy at issue from Zurich. Part
500 of this policy, titled “garage coverage,”
provides up to $800,000 in liability coverage.
Part 980 of this policy, titled “commercial
umbrella coverage,” provides up to
$5,000,000 in liability coverage,

In December 2014, the plaintiff below,
Christina M. Varvel, Administratrix of Mr.
Allen’s estate, filed suit against Salvatore
Cava and Dan’s Car World with respect to
the vehicular accident. She alleged that Sal-
vatore Cava was an employee, agent, and/or
servant of Dan’s Car World, The plaintiff
also asserted a declaratory judgment action
against Zurich to determine the amount of
insurance coverage available.‘

Zurich determined that the complaint trig-
gered its duty to defend under the policy; it
retained counsel for Salvatore Cava and sep-
arate counsel for Dan’s Car World. Zurich
also retained counsel to defend itself in the
declaratory judgment action brought by the
plaintiff. Zurich admitted that the garage
policy provides liability coverage to Salvatore

3, In June 2015, Salvatore Cava testified at depo-
sition that he began working for Dan’s Car
World in the summer of 2012. He worked mostly
during the summer months and performed vari-
ous duties such as washing and valeting cars. He
could not recall, however, if he worked for his
father’s business during the summer of 2014; he
did recall working at a local restaurant that
summer.

4. See Syl. Pt. 3, Christian v. Sizemore, 181 W.Va.
628, 383 S.E.2d 810 (1989) (“An injured plaintiff
may bring a declaratory judgment action against
the defendant's insurance carrier to determine if
there is policy coverage before obtaining a judg-
ment against the defendant in the personal injury
action where the defendant's insurer has denied
coverage.”), Justice Miller, writing for the major-
ity in Christian, recognized that a declaratory
judgment action “provides a prompt means of
resolving policy coverage disputes so that the
parties may know in advance of the personal
injury trial whether coverage exists. This facili-
tates the possibility of settlements and avoids
potential future litigation as to whether the i insur.
er was acting improperly in denying coverage."
Id. at 632, 383 §.E.2d at 814,

5. Zurich’s position remains that there is.no cov-
erage available under the commercial umbrella

“B41

Cava with respect to the plaintiff's claims.
However, Zurich maintained that the umbrel-
la policy did not cover the plaintiff's claims®
Zurich offered the plaintiff $300,000 to settle
this matter, and she rejected the offer. The
plaintiff contends the umbrella policy pro-
vides additional liability coverage with re-
spect to this lawsuit.

In January 2016, the plaintiff filed a mo-
tion for‘ leave to file her first amended com-
plaint, which the circuit court granted in
March 2016. In her amended complaint, the
plaintiff added Daniel A. Cava as an individu-
al defendant and asserted negligent entrust-
ment and family use claims against him. De-
fense counsel for Daniel A. Cava, retained by
Zurich, answered the amended complaint on
his behalf and denied all claims.

B. The Cava Defendants’ Cross-claims

In March 2016, the Cava defendants, by
personal counsel, mounted a sweeping attack
on Zurich’s defense strategy or alleged lack
thereof, and filed individual cross-claims
against Zurich.’ The Cava defendants assert-
ed two cotints in the cross-claims: in Count I,
they alleged violations of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“UTPA”), West Virginia Code
§ 88-11-4 (2011),” and-breach of contract; in

policy because at the time of the vehicle accident
Salvatore Cava was not operating the Rav4 for
business purposes, nor was he an employee of
- Dan’s Car World.

6, The Cava defendants did not file claims against
counsel Zurich retained to defend them,

7, The cross-claims assert violations of West Vir-
ginia Code §§ 33-11~ 4(9)(@), &), ©), and @),
which provide:

(9) Unfair claim settlement “practices. —No
person shall commit or perform with such
frequency as to indicate a general business
practice any of the following:

(@) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insur-

ance policy provisions relating to coverages at
issue;

(b) Failing to acknowledgé and act reason-
ably promptly upon communications with re-
spect to claims arising under insurance poli-
cies;

(c) Failing to adopt.and implement reason-
-able standards for the prompt investigation of
claims arising under insurance policies;

(@) Refusing to pay claims without conduct-
ing a reasonable investigation based upon all
available information[,]

342

Count II, they alleged breach of the “com-
mon law duty to deal fairly and in good faith”
in the investigation, defense and indemnifica-
tion of this action. The Cava defendants as-
serted, generally, that Zurich placed its in-
terest above theirs during the course of this
litigation, and acted in bad faith by failing to
investigate the matter properly and settle
the case, They accused Zurich of engaging in
intentional, wrongful litigation conduct.

Specifically, Salvatore Cava asserted that
he has suffered, and continues to suffer,
“emotional and mental distress,” some of
which has “resulted in physical conse-
quences” arising from the vehicle collision,
the death of Mr. Allen, the police investiga-
tion, the allegations that the collision was his
fault, “as well as, the institution of this civil
action[.]” He further stated his “emotional
stress and mental anguish” have been and

_ continue “to be increased and compounded
by the wrongful, reckless and intentional con-
duct” of Zurich. Salvatore Cava noted that.
prior to the institution of the plaintiffs civil
action, he made a demand on behalf of Zu-
rich “that all claims of the plaintiff be imme-
diately resolved within the policy limit of all
policies[.]”

Daniel A. Cava asserted he advised a rep-
resentative of Zurich, prior to the motor
vehicle accident, to make sure Salvatore
Cava was an insured on all policies issued by
Zurich, He claimed to have “endured addi-
tional mental and emotional strain” as a re-
sult of the mental and emotional strain of
Salvatore Cava. He asserted Zurich engaged
in wrongful litigation conduct, such as at-
tempting to obtain a court order to take his
deposition, which the circuit court denied’
and not objecting to the plaintiff's motion to
amend her complaint to add Daniel A. Cava
as a defendant.

Dan’s Car World asserted that Zurich en-
gaged in wrongful litigation conduct by
“falsely asserting” that Salvatore Cava was
not an employee of the business. Dan’s Car

8 During the course of discovery in the declara-
tory judgment action, Zurich deposed Tiffany
Moine, Controller for Dan’s Car World, as its
Rule 30(b)(7) representative. However, Zurich
claimed that Ms. Moine was unable to fully testi-
fy to the knowledge of Dan’s Car World with
respect to subject matters contained in the

World demanded the same damages as Sal-
vatore Cava and Daniel A. Cava, specifically:
(a) That it have judgment against [Zu-
rich] in the amount of any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff in this action;

(b) That it have judgment against [Zu-
rich] for compensatory damages in an
amount to be determined at the trial of
this action, said damages to include, but
not be limited to, the cost and reasonable
attorneys’ fees ... in the defense of this
action;

(c) That [it] be awarded its costs herein
expended, including reasonable attorneys’
fees in prosecution of this civil action, all in
accordance with West Virginia law;

(d) That [it] have judgment against [Zu-
rich] for punitive damages in an amount to
be determined to be fair, equitable and
proper by the jury; and

(e) That [it] have such other relief, both
general and special, as to the Court ap-
pears equitable and proper.

Zurich filed a motion to dismiss the Cava
defendants’ cross-claims under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. It argued the Cava defendants failed to
state claims for which relief can be granted
because their claims “are either barred by
the litigation privilege, do not seek compen-
sable damages, or have not yet accrued.”
Zurich stated it provided defense for the
lawsuit and continues to defend; moreover,
its duty to indemnify has not yet ripened.
Zurich denied engaging in bad faith simply
because it defended its rights in a declarato-
ry judgment action initiated by the plaintiff.
It also stated that the Cava defendants can-
not recover damages due to the stress of
litigation.

The Cava defendants filed a consolidated
response opposing Zurich’s motion to dis-
miss, and stated they asserted recognized
first-party bad faith causes of action against

amended notice of deposition, and filed a motion
to compel Dan's Car World to produce Daniel A.
Cava as its representative for deposition. After
considering the arguments of the parties on this
matter at hearing, the circuit court denied Zu-
rich’s motion.

Zurich.’ The circuit court agreed, and denied
Zurich's motion to dismiss the Cava defen-
dants’ cross-claims.!" With scant analysis, the
circuit court determined that “the Cava de-
fendants assert[ed] recognized causes of ac-
tion” against Zurich, their insurer.

IL STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE
OF WRIT

HB Zurich filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition with this Court. “Remedies of
this nature, being extraordinary in nature,
are generally reserved for really extraordi-
nary causes.” State ex rel. Brooks v. Zakaib,
214 W.Va, 258, 259, 588 S.H.2d 418, 424
(2008) (internal quotations and citation omit-
ted). This Court has held that:

“A writ of prohibition will not issue to
prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a
trial court. It will only issue where the trial
court has no jurisdiction or having such
jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.

9. This Court has explained:
The terms “first-party” and “third-party” have
distinctively different meanings in the context
of bad faith settlement actions against insurers.
For definitional purposes, a first-party bad
faith action is one wherein the insured sues
his/her own insurer for failing to use good faith
in settling a claim brought against the insured
or a claim filed by the insured. A third-party
bad faith action is one that is brought against
an insurer by a plaintiff who prevailed in a
separate action against an insured tortfeasor.

State ex rel. Allstate Ins. v. Gaughan, 203 W.Va.
358, 369, 508 S.B.2d 75, 86 (1998) (footnotes
omitted). The Cava defendants’ cross-claims are
first-party bad faith actions because they are
suing their own insurer, Zurich. This Court has
recognized two types of first-party bad faith
claims:
One such action may arise when the insurer
fails to use good faith in settling a claim by
someone the insured harmed or injured.
However, the second type of first-party ba
faith action against an insurer concerns a
claim brought by the insured against the insur-
er, @.g., house burned down [and the insurer
has refused to settle the claim].
Id, at 370 n.17, 508 S.E.2d at 87 0.17.

10. The circuit court also granted Zurich's motion
to bifurcate the cross-claims from the claims
asserted by the plaintiff below with respect to the
vehicle collision, and took under advisement Zu-
rich’s motion to stay and for protective order.
This Court has held that a circuit court has
discretion when determining whether to bifur-
cate and stay proceedings in a first-party bad
faith action against an insurer, See Syl. Pt. 2,
Light v. Allstate Ins. Co, 203 W.Va. 27, 506

343

W.Va. Code 58-1-1.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel.
Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233
S8.E.2d 425 (1977).

Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. York v. W.Va. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 231 W.Va. 188, 744
§.E.2d 298 (2013), As jurisdictional issues are
questions of law, our review is de novo. Syl.
Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie AL, 194
W.Va, 188, 459 S.B.2d 415 (1995).

Ill, DISCUSSION

Zurich seeks a writ of prohibition to
prevent the circuit court from enforcing the
order denying its motion to dismiss the
cross-claims asserted by the Cava defendants
on the grounds that this ruling is clearly
erroneous as a matter of law. Zurich asserts
its duty to indemnify the Cava defendants
has not yet been triggered, so they cannot
bring claims for common law and statutory
bad faith breach of this duty! Moreover,

S.E.2d 64 (1998) (“In a first-party bad faith ac-
tion against an insurer, bifurcation and stay of
the bad faith claim from the underlying action
are not mandatory. Under Rule 42(c) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure a trial court, in
furtherance of convenience, economy, or to avoid
prejudice, may bifurcate and stay a first-party
bad faith cause of action against an insurer.”’).

In Light, the plaintiffs brought the second type
of first-party bad faith action identified in Gau-
ghan, namely, they filed suit against their insurer
to recover their own damages. Mr, and Mrs,
Light were in a motor vehicle accident with
another driver and Mrs. Light sustained serious
injuries. The Lights accepted the full policy limits
of $100,000 from the other driver’s insurance
company. Thereafter, the Lights submitted a
claim to their insurer to collect from their under-
insured motorist coverage for Mrs. Light's dam-
ages exceeding the amount recovered from the
other driver's policy. The insurer refused to pay
the underinsured motorist coverage. Id. at 28,
506 S.E.2d at 65. Thereafter, the Lights filed a
complaint against their insured alleging breach
of contract, and unfair settlement practices un-
der the UTPA. Critically, the Lights did not file
suit against the other driver and the insurer was
the only named defendant. Id. at 29, 506 S.E.2d
at 66.

11. Zurich relies on Noland v. Virginia Insurance
Reciprocal, 224 W.Va. 372, 686 S.E.2d 23 (2009).
However, Noland is distinguishable; in that case,
this Court addressed a first-party bad faith claim
based on an insurer's refusal to defend. In the
instant case, Zurich did not refuse to defend the
Cava defendants.

344

because an excess judgment has not been
entered against the Cava defendants, they
have suffered no damages, Thus, Zurich con-
tends the cross-claims are premature. Zurich
further posits that if this Court does not
intervene, it will not be able to properly
defend itself in the declaratory judgment ac-
tion because of the ongoing threat that any
action it takes will be used as grounds to
further the Cava defendants’ cross-claims for
“wrongful litigation conduct.”

The Cava defendants respond that Zurich’s
petition is nothing more than an ‘attempt at
an interlocutory appeal, and that Zurich’s
claims do not warrant extraordinary relief.
They argue ‘the cross-claims are recognized
first-party claims against their insurer for
breach of the common law duty to provide an
effective defense, breach of contract, and vio-
lations of the UTPA. The Cava defendants
rely heavily on State ex, rel. State Auto Prop-
erty Ins, ‘Co. v. Stucky, No. 15-1178, 2016 WL
3410852, (W.Va. June 14, 2016) (memoran-
dum decision), In State Auto, this Court de-
nied an insurer's petition for writ of prohibi-
tion and permitted a first-party common law
bad faith claim to proceed in the absence of
excess judgment, where the insured alleged
insurer failed to use good faith in settling the
claim, Id. at *4, State Auto is distinguishable,
however, because our review in that case was
limited to whether the circuit court had suffi-
ciently appraised the third-party complaint
under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), The parties did not raise the issue of
ripeness because the declaratory judgment
action in State Auto was resolved, and result-
ed in an agreement as to all coverage issues.
Thus, the insured’s alleged economic dam-
ages would have aecrued in State Auto. In
the instant case, the plaintiffs declaratory
judgment action concerning the umbrella
coverage remains in litigation,

12, The plaintiff made a demand upon Zurich to
preserve the Rav4 for purposes of this litigation,

and the vehicle remains unrepaired in storage to
this date.

13. See also Syl, Pt. 10, Barefield, 215 W.Va. at
547, 600 8.B.2d at 259 (‘An insurance company
cannot be held liable under the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act, W.Va. Code, 33-11-1
to -10, for the actions of a defense attorney
retained to defend an insured, when the defense

While the defense is ongoing. Zurich claims

Emphasizing that Zurich’s actions will
force them to expend their own money to
obtain a release of liability from the plaintiff,
the Cava defendants state this is not the
situation: they anticipated when they pur-
chased insurance coverage. The Cava defen-
dants filed a supplemental appendix shortly
before argument in this matter in support of
their claim that Zurich only recently began
actively defending them. For example, coun-
sel retained by Zurich to represent Salvatore
Cava served his notice to inspect the Rav4
and motorcycle in March 2017, more than
two years after the plaintiff filed her com-
plaint.2

Zurich counters that the issue of whether
or not defense counsel hired by Zurich have
adequately represented the Cava defendants
is a question that is “in flux” because the
representation is ongoing. Zurich urges the
Court to explicitly reject the new cause of
action proposed by the Cava defendants and
hold that an insurer cannot be pulled into
litigation to defend the actions of the defense
counsel it retained to protect the insured,

this cause of action is nonsensical because it
has no right to control the litigation strategy
of counsel it retained to’ defend the Cava
defendants, See Syl. Pt. 8, Barefield v. DPIC
Cos., Inc, 215 W.Va, 544, 600 S.B.2d 256
(2004) (“Because a defense attorney is ethi-
cally obligated to maintain ati independence
of professional judgment in the defense of a
client/insured, an insurance company .pos-
sesses no right to control the methods or
means chosen by the attorney to defend the
insured.”)8

HH We begin our analysis by recognizing
that “{ulnder the terms of most liability in-
surance policies, the insured agrees to permit
the insurer to choose counsel to defend the
insured against claims by third parties,” 4

attorney's strategy and tactics are a result of the
attorney's independent, professional discretion
with regard to the representation of the client-
insured, and are not-otherwise relied upon or
ratified by the insurance company in a manner
contrary fo the Act. a

14, The appendix recs before this Court does
not contain the insurance policy at issue in this
case.

Allstate Ins, Co. v. Campbell, 384 Md. 381,
689 A.2d 652, 658. (1994), Generally, the in-
surer and insured have compatible interests
and goals in responding to a tort claim. How-
ever, their interests may diverge at times,
creating a potential or actual conflict of inter-
est. This case presents the common situation
where the conflict of interest between Zurich
and the Cava defendants concerns the
amount of coverage available under the poli-
cy, On this issue, the Cava defendants’ inter-
ests are more in line with the plaintiff's
interest, as they want to establish that the
umbrella policy covers her claims against
Salvatore Cava, This evident conflict of inter-
est made it necessary for Zurich to retain
independent counsel for the Cava deféndants
. and itself,

Hl A prerequisite for any first-party bad
faith action is an underlying claim for cover-
age or benefits or an action for damages
which the insured alleges was handled in bad
faith by its insurer. In the instant case, the
Cava defendants, frustrated by the fact -Zu-
rich has not increased its settlement offer to
the plaintiff above the $300,000 limit of the
garage liability policy during the pendency of
the declaratory judgment action, filed their
cross-claims against Zurich for intentional,
willful, and malicious wrongful litigation con-
duct. Beyond the hyperbole, however, their
complaints amount to no more than attacks
on Zurich for defending itself in the declara-
tory judgment action and second-guessing of
strategic decisions made by the defense
counsel retained by Zurich, But, the Cava
defendants offer no authority to support
their proposition that an insured has a bad
faith cause of action against his or her insur-

15. The doctrine of ripeness requires: “(1) a suffi-
ciently concrete case or controversy within the
meaning of Article III of the Constitution, and
also, (2) prudential considerations must justify
the present exercise of judicial power.” Gopher
Oil Co. v. Bunker, 84 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir,
1996) (citations and quotations omitted). ‘A live
dispute must exist between the parties at the time
of the court's hearing.’” Id. (quoting Caldwell-v.
Gurley Ref. Co., 755 F.2d 645, 649 (sth Cir,
1985)), However, “a plaintiff does not have to
‘await consummation of threatened injury’ before
bringing a declaratory judgment action.” S.D.
Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence Cty, 155 F:3d 1005,
1008 (8th Cir, 1998) (quoting Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S, 289, 298, 99
S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979), Instead, an

345

er when the insurer has not declined to
defend the insured, and is continuing to
defend the insured with independent counsel,
while simultaneously defending its own de-
claratory judgment action, The Cava defen-
dants’ allegations are-not that Zurich refused
a defense, but that it is ewrrently consciously
undermining their defense, In our view,
these facts lead to the unavoidable conclusion
that their cross-claims are premature, and,
therefore, not ripe for adjudication.

HEM The ripeness doctrine “seeks to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of pre-
mature adjudication, from entangling them-
selves in abstract disagreements.” ‘Paraquad
v. St, Lowis. Housing Auth, 259 F.3d 956,
958 (8th Cir, 2001) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).!5.“Questions that may nev-
er arise or are purely advisory or hypotheti-
cal do not establish a justiciable controversy.
Because an unripe claim. is not justiciable,
the cireuit court has no subject matter juris-
diction over it.” Doe v, Golden & Walters,
PLLC, 178 S.W.8d 260, 270 (Ky. Ct, App.
2005) (footnotes omitted);!9 see generally 13
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § $529 (8d
ed, 2008) (recognizing central concepts of
justiciability often are elaborated into specific
categories including advisory opinions, stand-
ing, ripeness, mootness, ‘and political ques-
tions),

HE sIt is well established that the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time, even sua sponte by this
Court. “This Court, on its own motion, will
take notice of lack of jurisdiction at any time
or at any ‘stage of the’ litigation pending

action is ripe for adjudication if the plaintiff
faces injury that “is certainly impending.” Bab-
bitt, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct, 2301.

16. Doe primarily addressed ripeness as it relates
to legal malpractice, At issue in that case was
when the damages for legal malpractice become
fixed and non-speculative. The ‘court found the
plaintiffs’ claims were ‘not ripe for adjudication
because they filed their complaints before the
asserted causes of action accrued, reasoning that
“whether the attorney's negligence has caused
any injury or damages necessarily is contingent
on the final outcome of the underlying case[.]”"
173 8.W.3d at 271."

346

therein.” Syl. Pt. 2, In re Boggs’ Estate, 135
W.Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497 (1951). Further-
more, “[t]he urgency of addressing problems
regarding subject-matter jurisdiction cannot
be understated because any decree made by
a court lacking jurisdiction is void.” State ew
rel. TermNet Merch, Servs, Inc. v. Jordan,
217 W.Va. 696, 700, 619 S.E.2d 209, 218
(2005); see also Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin
Jean Davis, and Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litiga-
tion Handbook on W.Va. Rules of Civ. Pro.,
§ 12()(1), at 325-26 (4! ed. 2012) (“Any
judgment or decree rendered without such
jurisdiction is utterly void.”).

HM “Like other challenges to a court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, motions raising
the ripeness issue are treated as brought
under Rule 12(b)(1) even if improperly identi-
fied by the moving party as brought under
Rule 12(b)(6).” 7 St. Clair v. City of Chico,
880 F.2d 199, 201 (9 Cir. 1989). As ex-
plained below, it is apparent from the appen-
dix record and representations during oral
arguments that the Cava defendants’ cross-
daims are not ripe for adjudication.

HE “A claim is not ripe for adjudica-
tion if it rests upon contingent future events
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States,
523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140
L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), As this Court recog-
nized in State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. v. Schatken, 230 W.Va. 201, 737
S.E.2d 229 (2012),

17, This Court has previously explained that
[blecause the West Virginia Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, we often refer to interpreta-
tions of the Federal Rules when discussing our
own rules. See Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189,
192 n.6, 451 S.E.2d 755, 758 n.6 (1994) (““Be-
cause the West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are practically identical to the Federal
Rules, we give substantial weight to federal
cases ... in determining the meaning and
scope of our rules,”). See, e.g., State v. Sutphin,
195 W.Va. 551, 563, 466 S.B.2d 402, 414
(1995) ("The West Virginia Rules of Evidence
are patterned upon the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, ... and we have repeatedly recognized
that when codified procedural rules or rules of
evidence of West Virginia are patterned after
the corresponding federal rules, federal deci-
sions interpreting those rules are persuasive

courts will not ... adjudicate rights which
are merely contingent or dependent upon
contingent events, as distinguished from
actual controversies. Likewise, courts [will
not] resolve mere academic disputes or
moot questions or render mere advisory
opinions which are unrelated to actual con-
troversies.

Indeed, a matter must be ripe for consid-
eration before the court may review it,
Courts must be cautious not to issue advi-
sory opinions.
Id. at 210, 737 S.H.2d at 238 (quoting Zaleski
v West Virginia Mut. Ins, Co, 224 W.Va.
544, 552, 687 S.H.2d 128, 181 (2009) (quota-
tion marks omitted)).

HN We hereby hold that subject matter
jurisdiction does not exist over claims that
are not ripe for adjudication. See Dakota,
Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 362
F.8d 512, 520 (8 Cir, 2004) (“The issue of
ripeness ... is one of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.”); City of Chico, 880 F.2d at 201
(“Whether a claim is ripe for adjudication
goes to a court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion[.]”).

The gravamen of the Cava defendants’
eross-claims is that they should not have to
endure a trial for which the lawyers retained
to represent them by Zurich are “anpre-
pared” which may cause them to suffer a
potential verdict in excess of the to-be-deter-
mined policy limit. However, the issue of
whether the Cava defendants will suffer any
of their alleged economic damages ¥ is con-

guides in the interpretation of our rules.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
Keplinger v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 208
W.Va. 11, 20-21 n.13, 537 S.E.2d 632, 641-42
n,13 (2000),

18. Salvatore Cava and Daniel A, Cava’s claims
related to litigation-induced emotional distress
are not ordinarily recoverable as element of dam-
ages. See generally Zimmerman v. Direct Fed.
Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 79 (18 Cir. 2001)
(recognizing considerable weight of authority
holds that litigation-induced stress is not ordi-
narily recoverable as element of damages).
Sound policy reasons-support this rationale; an
insurer should have the right to defend itself in a
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action without
risking exposure merely because the strain inher-
ent in litigation discomfits its insured,

tingent on future events: the resolution of the
plaintiffs claims against the Cava defen-
dants, and her declaratory judgment action
against Zurich, As these claims are pending
before the circuit court, certain damages are
not impending and the issue is not ripe for
adjudication,

For this reason, relief in this matter lies in
a writ of “prohibition ... [as its purpose is]
to restrain inferior courts from proceeding in
causes over which they have no jurisdiction,
or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are
exceeding their legitimate powers[.]” Syl. Pt.
1, in part, Crawford v. Taylor, 188 W.Va. 207,
15 S.E.2d 870 (1958). Accordingly, we grant.
the writ as moulded, and direct the circuit
court to dismiss the Cava defendants’ cross-
claims without prejudice for want of subject
matter jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the circuit court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the December 8,
2016, order that denied Zurich’s motion to
dismiss the cross-claims asserted by Salva-
tore Cava, Daniel A. Cava, and Dan’s Car
World is void and unenforceable, According-
ly, this Court grants the writ of prohibition
sought by Zurich, as moulded. We order the
circuit court to dismiss those cross-claims
without prejudice.”

Writ granted as moulded.

19. We therefore do not reach the issue of wheth-
er Zurich's litigation conduct is privileged.

20. To the extent Dan’s Car World asserts it
brought a first-party property damage claim
against Zurich for the Rav4, we note it devotes
only one sentence to this issue in its response
brief. This Court is not responsible for searching
the appendix record for details that may be fa-
vorable to a party's position, and, therefore, we
will not speculate or guess about whether Dan’s
Car World pled a cognizable first-party property

347

801 S.E.2d 225

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
BOARD, Petitioner

vw
Mark S. PLANTS, Respondent
No. 15-0957

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: February 7, 2017
Filed: June 1, 2017

damage claim, Indeed, we find that, by failing to
adequately set out an argument pertaining to this
issue, Dan’s Car World has waived it. This Court
has previously adhered to the rule that, “[all-
though we liberally construe briefs in determin-
ing issues presented for review, issues which are
not raised, and those mentioned only in passing
but are not supported with pertinent authority,
are not considered[.]” State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va.
294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996).

Joanne M. Vella Kirby, Rachael L.: Fletch-
er -Cipoletti, Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Petitioner -

James M. Cagle, Charleston, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for the Respondent,

WALKER, Justice:

This lawyer disciplinary proceeding is be-
fore.the Court upon the written objection of
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) of
the Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“LDB”) to
the sanctions recommended by the Hearing
Panel Subcommittee (“HPS”) of the LDB.
The HPS found that Respondent Mark S.
Plants violated three provisions of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct and
recommended that Mr. Plants be publicly
reprimanded and pay the costs of these pro-
ceedings. Mr. Plants does not challenge the
recommended sanctions.

The: ODC asserts that the appropriate
sanction in this case is a suspension of Mr.
Plants’s license to practice law for three
months based upon the seriousness of the
violations involving domestic battery and the
knowing violation of a court order by this
former -elected prosecuting attorney, The
ODC also urges this Court to address the
admissibility of expert testimony offered on
the issue of violations of the West Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct.

Upon consideration. of the parties’ briefs
and arguments, the submitted record and
pertinent authorities, this Court finds that
there is clear and convincing evidence! to
support the findings of the HPS that Mr.
Plants violated Rules 1.7(b), 3.4(e) and 8.4(b)
and (d) of the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
1, Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary

Procedure states: “In order to recommend the
imposition of discipline of any lawyer, the allega-

®

sional Conduct. For the reasons explained
below, we adopt the sanctions recommended
by the HPS.

_ LL FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Mr. Plants has been licensed to practice
law in the State of West Virginia since 2004.
He was elected prosecuting attorney of Ka-
nawha County in 2008 and re-elected in 2012,
The underlying charges involve conduct that
occurred in 2014 while he was the prosecut-
ing attorney. Since his removal from elected
office in October of 2014, Mr. Plants has
practiced law as a sole practitioner in South
Charleston, *

A. Incidents and Criminal Complaints

The charges filed by the ODC against Mr.
Plants arose out of two incidents that result-
ed in criminal complaints against him. First,
on February 26, 2014, Allison Plants, Mr,
Plants’s ex-wife (“Ms. Plants”), reported to
the West Virginia State Police that Mr.
Plants had injured their son by whipping him
with a belt. The next day, Ms. Plants filed a
Domestic Violence Petition seeking protec-
tion for herself and their two minor children.
‘The magistrate/family court issued a Domes-
tie Violence Emergency Protective Order

“Emergency Protective Order”) on Febru-

ary 27, 2014, concluding that Ms. Plants had
proved “the allegations of domestic violence
or abuse by clear and convincing evidence of
immediate and present danger of abuse.”

The Emergency Protective Order provided
that Mr. Plants (1) “shall refrain from abus-
ing, harassing, stalking, threatening, intimi-
dating or engaging in conduct that places
[Ms. Plants and the two children] ... in
reasonable fear of bodily injury”; (2) “shall
refrain from contacting, telephoning, commu-
nicating with, harassing, or verbally abusing
{Ms. Plants]”; (8) “shall refrain from entering
any school, business, or place of employment
of [Ms. Plants]”; and (4) “shall refrain from
entering, or being present in the immediate
environs of [Ms. Plants’s] residence.”

tions of the formal charge must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence.”

On March 17, 2014, while the Emergency
Protective Order was in effect, Ms. Plants
reported that in the parking lot at the Fruth
Pharmacy in Charleston, West Virginia, Mr.
Plants spoke to their two children at her
vehicle and then spoke to her. During the
hearing before the HPS, Mr. Plants admitted
that he spoke with his children but denied
that he communicated with Ms. Plants. Mr.
Plants further acknowledged that he was
aware of the terms of the Emergency Protec-
tive Order at the time of this incident. The
evidence adduced during the hearing was
that as Mr. Plants was exiting Fruth Phar-
macy, Ms, Plants entered the same location.
After exiting Fruth Pharmacy, Mr. Plants
observed his children waving to him from
inside Ms. Plants’s car in the parking lot and
he walked over to speak with them. After
Ms. Plants returned to her car, Mr. Plants
walked away. The next day, the State Police
filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court
charging Mr, Plants with violating the Emer-
gency Protective Order based upon this inci-
dent,

On March 21, 2014, the family court modi-
fied the Emergency Protective Order accord-
ing to an agreement between the parties.
Among other things, the modified Emergen-
cy Protective Order permitted Mr. Plants to
have supervised visitation with the children
and to communicate with the children. Ex-
cept as otherwise agreed by the parties, the
original terms of the Emergency Protective
Order continued in full force and effect.

On March 31, 2014, the State Police filed a
criminal complaint charging Mr. Plants with
domestic battery based upon the report on
February 26 by Ms. Plants that Mr. Plants
had whipped their son with a belt. On April
7, 2014, Mr. Plants filed a motion to dismiss
this charge on the grounds that he had a
constitutionally protected right to discipline
his child and that there is no liability for the
reasonable use of corporal punishment for
disciplinary purposes. Mr. Plants admitted
that he “spanked his son with his leather
belt.”

On June 19, 2014, the family court entered
a 90-day Domestic Violence Protective Order
at the final hearing to address the status of
the Emergency Protective Order, The family

351

eourt found that Ms. Plants “proved by a
preponderance of the evidence ... allega-
tions of domestic violence or abuse” under
West Virginia Code § 48-27-501. The family
court further found that “[tJhough Mr. Plants
did not intend to injure his son, the incident
was significant and serious enough to war-
rant the issuance of a protective order.” The
Domestic Violence Protective Order expired
by its own terms on September 17, 2014.

On July 14, 2014, Mr. Plants and the Spe-
cial Assistant Prosecuting Attorney (“Special
Prosecutor”) entered into a Pretrial Monitor-
ing Agreement as a Condition of Bond
(“Monitoring Agreement”) relating to both
criminal complaints. In that Agreement, Mr.
Plants agreed, among other things “to com-
ply fully with the provisions of this agree-
ment for a period of six (6) months or upon
completion of the BIPPS (Batterers Inter-
vention and Prevention Program) class,
whichever occurs last.” The Agreement also
provided that if Mr. Plants “successfully
completes [the BIPPS] class and fully com-
plies with all of the other terms of the
Agreement, the circumstances would be com-
municated to the Special Prosecutor for con-
sideration prior to the final compliance hear-
ing.”

On May 21, 2015, the magistrate court
dismissed both criminal complaints against
Mr. Plants with prejudice based upon a
joint motion in which the Special Prosecutor
attested that Mr. Plants had successfully
eompleted the BIPPS program and had not
violated any terms of the Monitoring Agree-
ment.

B. Collateral Proceedings

After the incidents that resulted in misde-
meanor criminal complaints against Mr.
Plants, three collateral proceedings relating
to his position as prosecuting attorney en-
sued. First, on April 11, 2014, the ODC peti-
tioned this Court, pursuant to Rule 3.27 of
the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure,
for immediate, temporary suspension of Mr.
Plants and/or the disqualification of Mr.
Plants and the Kanawha County Prosecutor's
Office from instituting actions or prosecuting
claims related to domestic violence involving
a parent or guardian and a minor child. The

352

ODC alleged that the temporary suspension
was necessary due to a conflict of interest
that posed.a substantial threat of irreparable
harm to the public.

In its Rule 8,27 petition, the ODO asserted
that by denying the domestic battery charges
against him, Mr. Plants created a non-waiva-
ble conflict of interest in violation of Rule
1,%(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in which his personal inter-
ests materially limited his ability to execute
properly his official duties. Mr. Plants re-
sponded that temporary suspension ‘or dis-
qualification was unnecessary because the ac-
tion taken at the circuit court by entering an
order disqualifying him from certain cases
was sufficient to protect the public, We de-
nied the ODC’s petition on the grounds that
the Cireuit Court of Kanawha County, pursu-
ant to a petition for writ of prohibition by the
City of Charleston (“City”) and the Charles-
ton Police Department (“Police Depart-
ment”), properly removed Mr. Plants from
any cases involving the subject matter simi-
lar to the pending criminal charges against
him thereby removing the threat of a possi-
ble conflict of interest. Office of Lawyer Dis-

2, West Virginia Code § 6-6-7 was amended effec-
tive June 9, 2016, At the time of the underlying
proceedings, it stated in relevant part as follows:

(a) Any person holding any county, school dis-
trict or municipal office, including the office of
a member of a board of education and the
office of magistrate, the term or tenure of
which office is fixed by law, whether the office
be elective or appointive, except judges of the
circuit courts, may be removed from such of
fice in the manner provided in this section for
official misconduct, malfeasance in office, in-
competence, neglect of duty or gross immorali-
ty or for any of the causes or on any of the
grounds provided by any other statute.

(b) Charges may be preferred:

(1) In the case of any county officer, mem-
ber of a district board of education or magis-
trate, by the county commission, or other tri-
bunal in lieu thereof, any other officer of the
county, or by any number of persons other
than such county officers, which number shall
be the lesser of fifty or one percent of the total
number of voters of the county participating in
the general election next preceding the filing of

~ such charges...
(c) The charges shall be reduced to writing in

_ the form of a petition duly verified by at least
one of the persons bringing the same, and shall
be entered of record by the court, or the judge
thereof in vacation, and a summons shall
thereupon be issued by the clerk of such court,
together with a copy of the petition, requiring

ciplinary Counsel v. Plants, 233 W.Va. 477,
485, 759 S.E.2d 220, 228 (2014),

As referenced above, while the ODC’s Rule
3.27 petition’ was proceeding, the City and
the Police Department filed a petition for
writ of prohibition, on April. 14, 2014. The
petition sought to prohibit’ Mr. Plants and
the Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney’s
Office from prosecuting allegations of domes-
tic violence involving parents and minor chil-
dren reported, investigated or charged by
the City and the Police Department until the
conflict of interest issue identified by the

“ODC was resolved. Following a hearing, the

circuit court entered an agreed order in
which Mr. Plants and the Kanawha County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office agreed to be
disqualified from three categories of cases:
(1) crimes of violence against a child; @)
abuse and neglect; and (8) criminal violations
of domestic violence protection orders.

Finally, on August 15, 2014, the Kanawha
County Commission instituted proceedings
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 6-6-
7(¢)(1985)® to remove Mr, Plants from the

the officer or person named therein to appear
before the court, at the courthouse of the coun-
ty where such officer resides, and answer the
charges on a day to be named therein, which
summons shall be served at least twenty days
before the return day thereof in the manner by
which a summons commencing a civil suit
may be served,

The court, or judge thereof in vacation, or in
the case of any multi-judge cirouit, the chief
judge thereof, shall, without delay forward a
copy of the petition to the supreme court of
appeals and shall ask for the impaneling or
convening of a three-judge court consisting of
three circuit judges of the state. The chief
justice of the supreme court of appeals shall
without delay designate and appoint three cir-
cuit judges within the state, not more than one
of whom shall be from the same circuit in
which the petition is filed and, in the order of
such appointment, shall designate the date,
time and place for the convening of such three-
judge court, which date and time shall not be
less than twenty days from the date of the
filing of the petition.

Such three-judge court shall, without a jury,
hear the charges and all evidence offered in
support thereof or in opposition thereto and
upon satisfactory proof of the charges shall
remove any such officer or person from office
and place the records, papers and property of
his office in the possession of some other offi-

office of prosecuting attorney. After a hear-
ing, the three-judge panel appointed to con-
sider the matter ruled that Mr. Plants should
be removed from office on the grounds of
malfeasance in office by committing wrongful
conduct affecting the performance of his,
duties, The panel further found that Mr.
Plants had neglected the duties of his office
by voluntarily agreeing to a disqualification
that had, in effect, prevented him from giving
appropriate attention to a substantial and
important part of his statutory duties. Mr.
Plants did not appeal the panel’s decision.

C. Charges by the Lawyer Disciplinary -

Board

The LDB filed a formal Statement of
Charges on October 2, 2015, alleging that.
Mr. Plants violated Rules 1.7(b) (conflict of
interest),? 8.4(c) (knowingly disobey rule of a
tribunal), 8.4(b) (criminal act),5 and 8.4(d)
(prejudice to the administration of justice).
In his answer, Mr. Plants denied any viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct but
admitted that the two incidents occurred, In
his answer and during the hearing before the
HPS, Mr. Plants contended that corporal
punishment was an acceptable form of disci-
pline to which he and Ms. Plants had agreed
and noted that the family court judge had
ruled that he did not intend to injure his son,
Mr, Plants also explained his ‘concerns for
the safety of his children when he saw them
in Ms. Plants’s car in the parking lot of

cer or person for safekeeping or in the posses-
sion of the person appointed ‘as’ hereinafter
provided to fill the office temporarily. Any final
order either removing or refusing to remove
any such person from office shall contain such
findings of fact and conclusions of law as*the
three-judge court shall deem sufficient to sup-
port its decision of all issues presented to it in
the matter.

W.Va. Code § 6-6-7 (1985),

3. Because the subject conduct occurred prior to
January 1, 2015, the version of the Rules of
Professional Conduct in effect prior to the Janu-
ary 1, 2015 amendments applies. The applicable
version of Rule 1.7(b) provided “[a] lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to third per-
son, or by the lawyer's own interests...” All
references in this opinion to Rule 1.7(b) shall be
to the pre-January 1, 2015 version of the rule.

353

Fruth Pharmacy. Mr. Plants denied know--
ingly or willfully violating the ® Bmengeney
Protective Order.

D. Discovery and Expert Testimony

During the course of discovery, Mr. Plants
retained Robert H. Davis, Jr., who had previ-
ously served as his legal counsel, as an ex-
pert witness on the Rules of Professional
Conduct. In an evidentiary deposition, Mr.
Davis testified that Mr. Plants’s conduct did
not violate the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. The ODC filed a pre-hearing
motion in limine to preclude the expert testi-
mony. The HPS denied the motion, conclud-
ing that “having reviewed the transcript in
its entirety, [the HPS] will give said testimo-
ny such weight as the Hearing Panel Sub-
committee members determine appropriate
when’ making the recommended disposition
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, pursuant to Rule 8.10 of the Rules
of Disciplinary Procedure.” *

E. Report of the Hearing Panel Subcom-
mittee

Following a lengthy hearing on May 19
and 20, 2016,” the ‘HPS filed a report with
this Court on September 19, 2016. Providing
a detailed analysis of the testimony and other
evidence presented at the hearing, the HPS
concluded:

4, Rule 3.4(c) provides “‘[a] lawyer shall not: ...
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on
an assertion that no valid obligation exists..

5. Rule 8,4(b) provides “{ilt is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to: ... commit a criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's hones-
ty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects;....””

6. Rule 8.4(d) provide “i]t is professional miscon-
duct for a lawyer to: ... engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice,”

7. In addition to Mr. Plants and Ms. Plants, the
HPS heard testimony from Sergeant Matthew
Adams, Sergeant Brian Hammontree, Sergeant
Anthony Colagrasso, Paul Ellis, Melissa Foster-

Bird, Dan Holstein, and Donald Morris, The tes- ' “

timony of Robert H. Davis, Jr. was offered by
deposition.

354

The Hearing Panel finds that the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel has proven by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent
(Mr. Plants] violated Rules 1.7(b), 3.4(0),
8.4(b) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Profession-
al Conduct, By his behavior/conduct, which
result[ed] in domestic battery charges be-
ing filed against him pursuant to West
‘Virginia Code § 61-2-28(a), while simulta-
neously serving as the Prosecuting Attor-
ney of Kanawha County, West Virginia, a
conflict of interest was created. Additional-
ly, Respondent knowingly disobeyed an ob-
ligation under the rules of a tribunal when
he knowingly violated the Domestic Vio-
lence Emergency Protective Order, en-
tered on February 27, 2014, by communi-
cating with Petitioner Allison Plants and
their children outside of the Fruth Phar-
macy in Charleston, West Virginia, on or
about March 17, 2014. He did so without
asserting that no valid obligation existed
for him to follow the Protective Order.
Finally, Respondent committed a criminal
act that reflects adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, and engaged in conduct.
prejudicial to the administration of justice
when he knowingly violated the Domestic
Violence Emergency Protective Order, en-
tered on February 27, 2014, by communi-
cating with Petitioner Allison Plants and
their children outside of the Fruth Phar-
macy in Charleston, West Virginia on or
about March 17, 2014.
The HPS evaluated Mr. Plants’s conduct in
accordance with applicable standards to de-
termine whether discipline should be im-

posed, including mitigating and aggravating .

factors, and concluded that he should be
sanctioned with a public reprimand and with
payment of the costs of these proceedings.
As the HPS explained:

Accordingly, Respondent should be sane-
tioned for his misconduct. For the public to
have confidence in our State’s disciplinary
and legal systems, lawyers who engage in
the type of conduct exhibited by Respon-
dent must be sanctioned, pursuant to
Rules 8.15 of the Rules of Lawyer Disci-
plinary Procedure in the form of a Public
Reprimand. Such a sanction is also neces-
sary to deter other lawyers from engaging

in similar conduct and to restore the faith
of the general public in the integrity of the
legal profession. Although Respondent's
lack of disciplinary history and his removal
from his position as the elected Prosecut-
ing Attorney of Kanawha County, West
Virginia, are mitigating factors, as is the
fact that the criminal charges against him
were dismissed, it must be remembered
that Respondent, as the elected Prosecut-
ing Attorney, was held to a higher stan-
dard. Therefore, especially under the facts
herein, the ethical violations he commits
are considered more egregious because of
the betrayal of the public trust attached to
the office. Importantly, despite the fact
that Respondent held public office at the
time of the incidents in question and, as
such, may be held to a higher standard in
these proceedings, the sanctions imposed
must be justified by the conduct of Re-
spondent, rather than linked to any public-
ity the matter may have received.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM We review lawyer disciplinary pro-
ceedings using the following standards:

A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the
{Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to ques-
tions of law, questions of application of the
law to the facts, and questions of appropri-
ate sanctions; this Court gives respectful
consideration to the [Board’s] recommen-
dations while ultimately exercising its own
independent judgement. On the other
hand, substantial deference is given to the
[Board’s] findings of fact, unless such find-
ings are not supported by reliable, proba-
tive, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.

Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal Ethics v.
McCorkle, 192 W.Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 877
(1994), We have determined that “[t]his
Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics prob-
lems and must make the ultimate decisions
about public reprimands, suspensions, or an-
nulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice
law.” Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal Ethics
v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494, 327 S.E.2d 671

(1984). We are mindful of the multiple con-
siderations in these cases:

In deciding on the appropriate disciplin-
ary action for ethical violations, this Court
must consider not only what steps would
appropriately punish the respondent attor-
ney, but also whether the discipline im-
posed is adequate to serve as an effective
deterrent to other members of the Bar and
at the same time restore public confidence
in the ethical standards of the legal profes-
sion.

Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Walker, 178 W.Va. 150, 358 S.H.2d 234
(1987). With respect to public confidence in
the ethical standards of the legal profession
and public officials, in particular, we have
emphasized that “[e]thical violations by a
lawyer holding a public office are viewed as
more egregious because of the betrayal of
the public trust attached to the office.” Syl.
Pt. 3, Commitiee on Legal Ethics of West
Virginia State Bar v. Roark, 181 W.Va. 260,
382 §.E.2d 318 (1989).

Applying these standards, we turn to the
case before us,

I. DISCUSSION

Hl The ODC urges this Court to impose
a harsher sanction than public reprimand in
this lawyer disciplinary matter but takes no
other issue with the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the HPS. According to
the ODC, Mr. Plants’s conduct warrants a
stronger sanction to send a clear message
that when an elected prosecuting attorney
engages in conduct that results in a conflict
of interest and knowingly violates the terms
of a court order, this Court will suspend that
prosecutor's license because such conduct vi-
olates the public trust in the very official
elected to enforce the law. The ODC urges
this Court to impose a three-month suspen-
sion of Mr, Plants’s law license.

8. While Mr, Plants consented to the sanction, he
takes issue in his brief with the HPS’s conclu-
sions regarding conflict of interest and knowing
violation of a court order. However, Mr. Plants
did not file an objection as required by Rule 3.11
of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure to

355

Mr. Plants consented to the sanction of
public reprimand and costs recommended by
the HPS.

In considering the ODC’s challenge to the
HP§’s recommended sanctions, we rely upon
Syllabus Point 4 of Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W.Va. 495, 518 S.B.2d
722 (1998):

Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure enumer-
ates factors to be considered in imposing
sanctions and provides as follows: “In im-
posing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct, unless otherwise provided in
these rules, the [West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals] or [Lawyer Disciplinary
Board] shall consider the following factors:
(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty
owed to a client, to the public, to the legal
system, or to the profession; (2) whether
the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly,
or negligently; (8) the amount of the actual
or potential injury caused by the lawyer's
misconduct; and (4) the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factors.”

Id. at 497, 518 S.E.2d at 724, syl. pt. 4,

In a detailed analysis of the first three
Jordan factors, the HPS found that Mr.
Plants’s conduct resulting in the domestic
battery charges created an unwaivable con-
flict of interest violating his duty to his client,
the citizens of Kanawha County, and the
public and the legal system. The HPS also
determined that Mr. Plants knowingly violat-
ed the Emergency Protective Order. The
HPS further concluded that Mr. Plants’s mis-
conduct created actual and potential injury to
the public, the legal system and the legal
profession.

HM (With regard to the fourth Jordan
factor, we have explained that “[mlitigating
factors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding
are any considerations or factors that may
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
to be imposed.” Syl, Pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplin-
avy Board v. Scott, 218 W.Va. 209, 579

raise these issues before this Court. Accordingly,
we decline to consider them. However, we con-
sider individual facts in the record relating to the
issues raised by Mr. Plants in the context of the
appropriate sanction, which is the issue before
us.

356

§.H.2d 550 (2008). We consistently have de-
scribed mitigating factors as follows:
Mitigating factors which may be consid-
ered in determining the appropriate sanc-
tion to be imposed against a lawyer for
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct,
include; (1) absence of a prior disciplinary
record; (2) absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive; (8) personal or emotional prob-
lems; (4) timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; (5) full and free disclosure to
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward proceedings; (6) inexperience in the
practice of law; (7) character or reputation;

(8) physical or mental disability or impair-

ment; (9) delay in disciplinary proceedings;

(10) interim rehabilitation; (11) imposition

of other penalties or sanctions; (12) re-

morse; and (18) remoteness of prior of-

fenses.
Id, at 210, 579 S.B.2d at 561, syl. pt. 8.9 In
contrast, “[alggravating factors in a lawyer
disciplinary proceeding are any. consider-
ations or factors that may justify an increase
in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”
Id, syl, pt. 4, :

Tn this case, the. HPS found three mitigat-
ing factors: (1) Mr. Plants did not have a
prior disciplinary record; (2) Mr. Plants had
been removed from office as the elected
Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County;
and (8) the magistrate court dismissed the
misdemeanor criminal complaints against
Mr. Plants, The HPS also found one aggrava-
ting factor: Mr, Plants refused to acknowl-
edge his wrongful conduct when he main-
tained that he did not commit a crime by
speaking with his children in violation of the
Emergency Protective Order. Taking into ac-
count these mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors, the HPS recommended that Mr. Plants,
be publicly reprimanded.

Notwithstanding the HPS’s findings, the
ODC maintains that a three-month suspen-
sion is more appropriate. The ODC notes
that this Court has routinely suspended pros-
ecutors for misconduct. However, the sanc-
9. In Scott, we adopted the mitigating factors

proposed by the American Bar Association in its

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd, v, Scott, 213 W.Va. at 214, 579

tions we have imposed in cases involving
prosecuting attorneys have ranged from out-
right dismissal of the charges to three-year
suspensions and annulment, For example, in
Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Jarrell,’ 206
‘W.Va. 236, 523 S.H.2d 552 (1999), we dis-
missed the charges filed against a county
prosecutor based upon extraordinary mitigat-
ing circumstances. We determined that while
ethical violations occurred in some of the
counts charged, none involved criminal con-
duct, the attorney was inexperienced in crim-
inal law and lacked advisors, no harm or
prejudice resulted to anyone, and the prose-
eutor chose not to run for office again, Id. at
244, 523 S.E.2d at 560,

- Notably, in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
Sims, 212 W.Va. 468, 468, 574 S.H.2d 795,
800 (2002), we declined to accept a recom-
mendation to suspend for ninety days a pros-
ecutor who had already been removed from
office. In that case, we stated that “removal
of a lawyer from an elected office is an
effective, dramatic, and powerful punishment
which serves as a ‘deterrent to other mem-
bers of the Bar’” Id. at 468, 574 S.H.2d at
800, After concluding that Sims’s removal
from office as prosecuting attorney for his
conduct must “in fairness be considered a
mitigating factor,” we further stated that
“[florfeiture of a public office and removal
therefrom is a harsh and drastic sanction
indeed.” Id. at 469, 574 S.E.2d at 801. In
Sims, we concluded that “ander all the cir-
cumstances of this case, including the fact
that Mr, Sims was removed from office, a
public reprimand and payment of the costs
incurred in this proceeding are appropriate
and adequate sanctions.” Id,

On the other hand, in Committee on Legal
Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v.
Roark, 181 W.Va, 260, 382 S8.H.2d 318 (1989),
we suspended a mayor and former county
prosecutor’s license for three years based
upon his criminal conduct while in office,
After a federal indictment on thirty criminal
charges, Mr, Roark pled guilty to six counts
of felony misdemeanor possession of cocaine,

$.B.2d at 555. We noted, however, that these
mitigating factors are not to the exclusion of
others that a particular case may present. Id. at
214 n.33, 579 S,E.2d at 555,n.33.

resigned from office as mayor of the City of
Charleston, served 179 days in federal pris-
on, served three years of probation and paid
a $5,000 fine. Jd. at 262 n.2, 382 S.H.2d at 815
n.2, In these circumstances, we held “{elthi-
eal violations by a lawyer holding a public
office are viewed as more egregious. because
of the betrayal of the public trust attached to
the office,” Id, at 260, 382 S.E.2d at 818, syl,
pt. 8. See also, Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
Busch, 238 W.Va. 48, 754 S.E.2d 729 (2014)
(icense of prosecuting attorney who failed to
cooperate with opposing counsel, lied to cir-
euit court, and avoided giving up exculpatory
evidence suspended for three years); Lawyer
Disciplinary Board v. Scott, 218 W.Va. 209,
579 S.E.2d 550 (2008) (prosecuting attorney’s
license suspended for three years based upon
ethical violations of dishonesty for lying in
and out of court and falsifying court docu-
ments); Committee on Legal Ethics of the
West Virginia State Bar v. White, 189 W.Va.
185, 428 S,E.2d 556 (1998) (prosecutor's li-
cense suspended for two year's based on illicit
drug use that led to federal investigation. in
which he pled guilty to possession of marijua-

na, cocaine and percocet); Lawyer Disciplin- °

ary Bd, v. Clifton, 236 W.Va. 362,°780 8.H.2d
628 (2015) (assistant prosecuting attorney’s
repeated sexual misconduct by using position
of power over vulnerable wornen in criminal
system resulted in annulment of law license),

Likewise, the sanctions imposed in our pri-
or decisions involving other public officials
have ranged from public reprimand to annul-
ment, depending upon the conduct and ag-
gravating and mitigating factors’ present in
the particular case, See In re Matter of Cal-
laghan, 238 W.Va. 495, 796 S,E.2d 604 (2017)
(law license of judge-elect suspended for two
years for violating Rule 8.4(d) and engaging
in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice, along with other violations of Code
of Judicial Conduct); Lawyer Disciplinary
Board v, Blyler, 2837 W.Va. 325, 787 S.E.2d
596 (2016) (aw license of court appointed
special commissioner suspended for sixty
days for violation of rule requiring safekeep-
ing of funds); Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
McGraw, 194 W.Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850
(1995) (public reprimand of Attorney General
who violated ethics rule requiring client con-
fidentiality); Committee on Legal Ethics of

357

the West Virginia State Bar v. Boettner, 188
W.Va. 1, 422 S.E.2d 478 (1992) (license of
former Senate President who pled guilty to
willfully evading payment of federal taxes for
failing to report payment of interest by a
third person on a campaign loan suspended
for three years); Committee on Legal Ethics
of the West Virginia State Bar v. Grubb, 187
W.Va, 608, 420 S.H.2d 744 (1992) (license of

* inactive member of bar annulled after convic-

tion in federal court of bribery of public
official, mail fraud, conspiracy, witness tam-
pering, obstruction of justice, RICO, and aid-
ing and abetting); Committee on Legal Eth-
ics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Moore,
186 W.Va. 127, 411 S.H.2d 452 (1991) (aw
license of former governor who pled guilty to
three federal felonies including obstruction of
justice and Hobbs Act violation annulled).

HAs in all disciplinary cases, however,
we remain mindful of our obligation to ‘von-
sider facts on a case-by-case basis in deter-
mining appropriate sanctions: ©

In disciplinary proceedings, this Court,
rather than endeavoring to establish a uni-
form standard of disciplinary action, will
consider the facts and circumstances in
each case, including mitigating facts and
circumstances, in determining what disci-

* plinary action, if any, is appropriate, and

when the committee on legal ethics initi-
” ates proceedings before this Court, it has a

duty to advise this Court of all pertinent

facts with reference to the charges and the

recommended disciplinary action.
Syl. Pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics of the
West Virginia State Bar v. Mullins, 159
W.Va. 647, 226 -S.H.2d 427 428 (1976), over-
ruled on other grounds by Committee on
Legal Ethics v. Cometti, 189 W.Va. 262, 430
§.E.2d 320 (1993).

As the final arbiters of the discipline to be
imposed in this case, we know we must keep
in mind our prior decisions involving public
officials generally and prosecuting attorneys
specifically and take into account our respon-
sibility to consider not only appropriate pun-
ishment on a case-by-case basis, but also our
goals of achieving a deterrent effect and the
restoration of public confidence in the ethical
standards of the legal profession, Given the

358

facts and circumstances of this case, we are
not persuaded that suspending Mr, Plants
would achieve the goal of holding him to a
higher standard as a former prosecutor or
would send a stronger message than a public
reprimand.

In fact, we have previously analyzed the
necessity for suspension and have concluded
that in some circumstances this sanction is
not necessary to punish the respondent ap-
propriately or restore public confidence. For
example, in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v.
Losch, 219 W.Va. 816, 633 S.E.2d 261 (2006),
we concluded, “[w]e believe that suspension
from the practice .of law and supervision for
one year is not necessary for the purposes of
punishment of the respondent or restoration
of public confidence in the ethical standards
of the legal profession.” Id. at 820, 683
§.E.2d at 265. We see no reason why these
same considerations could not arise in a case
involving a public official. Moreover, we have
applied this analysis of our prior decisions
involving public officials as demonstrated
above by the wide array of sanctions, many
Jess than a three-month suspension. More-
over, in this specific case, the mitigating fac-
tors fully support the recommendation of the
HPS. .

The misdemeanor criminal charges against
Mr. Plants were dismissed based upon his
full compliance with the requirements of a
pre-trial monitoring agreement. He accepted
the ruling removing him from office as prose-
cuting attorney and did not extend those
proceedings by filing an appeal. Finally, we
note that he had no prior disciplinary record.
We agree with the HPS, which observed that
“despite the fact that [Mr. Plants] held pub-
lie office at the time of the incidents in
question and, as such, may be held to a
higher standard in these proceedings, the
sanctions imposed must be justified by the
conduct of Respondent, rather than linked to
any publicity the matter may have received.”
The hearing record is replete with testimony
regarding personal and political matters, the
discussion of which would not serve our goals
for this proceeding. We conclude that given
Mr. Plants’s cireumstances as a former pros-
ecutor and current sole practitioner, suspen-
sion would not serve as a greater punishment.
to him or deterrent to others than removal
from office has already served.

HM Finally, with respect to the ODC’s
request that this Court address the HPS’s
admission of expert testimony on the issue of
what conduet violates the West Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct, we find that
the issue is moot. As Justice McHugh noted,
“{t]he law on this point is well settled in West
Virginia. ‘Moot questions or abstract proposi-
tions, the decision of which would avail noth-
ing in the determination of controverted
rights of persons or of property are not
properly cognizable by a court.’ ” State ew rel.
Durkin v, Neely, 166 W.Va. 558, 556, 276
§.E.2d 311, 318 (1981) (citing, inter alia, Syl.
Pt. 1, State ew rel. Lilly v. Carter, 63 W.Va.
684, 60 S:E. 873 (1908). See also, Syl. Pt. 4
Cline v. Mirandy, 234 W.Va. 427, 765 S.B.2d
588 (2014),

In this case, while the HPS ruled in a pre-
hearing motion that the deposition testimony
could be offered into evidence at the disci-
plinary hearing, the HPS ultimately gave no
weight whatsoever to Mr. Davis’s opinions in
its report to this Court. Since we have
adopted the HPS’s recommended sanction of
public reprimand without modification in this
proceeding, the HP§’s admission of the testi-
mony of Robert M. Davis, Jr. ‘is moot. Con-
sideration of its admissibility at the hearing
below would avail nothing in the determina-
tion of the appropriate sanction to be im-
posed upon Mr, Plants, which is the only
issue before us. See, eg, U.S. v. Bernard,
757 F.2d 1489 (4 Cir, 1985) (expert testimo-
ny not relied upon by jury in arriving at its”
verdict on an unrelated charge; therefore,
issue of admissibility of expert’s testimony on .
appeal of conviction on unrelated charge is
moot).

Iv. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we impose the

“following sanctions pursuant to Rule 3.15 of

the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure:
(1) Public reprimand of Mr. Plants; and (2)
order that Mr. Plants reimburse the Lawyer

‘Disciplinary Board the costs of the proceed-

ings on the formal statement of charges.
Public Reprimand and Costs.

801 S.E.2d 237
IN RE: Remains of Chester
Howard WEST

No. 16-0410
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,

Submitted: February 15, 2017
Filed: June 6, 2017

Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Morgantown,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

John R. Teare, Jr., Spilman, Thomas &
Battle, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent.

“WALKER, Justice:

This appeal arises from a petition filed in
the Circuit Court of Mason County seeking

” authorization to disinter the remains of Ches-

ter Howard West, a World War I Medal of
Honor recipient, and bury him with full mili-
tary honors at the Gold Star Family Memori-
al Monument located within the Donel C.
Kinnard Memorial State Veterans Cemetery
in Institute, West Virginia (“Veterans Ceme-
tery”). Hershel Woodrow Williams, a Medal
of Honor recipient, filed the petition for Mr.
West to be recognized as a recipient of the
highest award a citizen can receive for brav-
ery and valor. In an order dated March 28,
2016, the Circuit Court of Mason County
granted Mr, Williams’s petition,

Petitioner Roger VanSickle urges this
Court to reverse the order below onthe
grounds that the circuit court lacks the au-
thority to rule on the question of disinter-
ment of Mr. West's remains. Alternatively,
Mr. VanSickle argues that the circuit court
abused its discretion in concluding that the
equities favor disinterment over the wishes
of the surviving spouse at the time of Mr.
West's death and the living VanSickle family
relatives.

Mr. Williams argues that the circuit court
properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction
and carefully balanced the equities in favor of
disinterment of Mr, West’s remains, He con-
tends that Mr. West’s remains should be
moved to the Veterans Cemetery so that he
is honored for his heroic service and his
grave is properly maintained.

Upon consideration of the parties’. briefs
and arguments, the submitted record: and
pertinent authorities, we affirm the March
28, 2016 order of the Circuit, Court of Mason
County,

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Mr. West received the Medal of. Honor for
his heroic service in World War I. According
to facts in the hearing record below and
undisputed by the parties, he was a 20-year-
old first sergeant in an automatic rifle section
of the 363" Infantry Regiment, United
States Army’s 91* “Wild West” Division. On
September 26, 1918, the opening day of the
Allies’ Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Mr. West
approached German lines near Bois-de-Chep-
py, France. Mr, West’s Medal of Honor cita-
tion stated:

While making his way through a thick fog,

his advance was halted by direct and un-

usual machine gun fire from two guns,

Without aid, he at once dashed through the

fire and, attacking the nest, killed two of

the gunners, one of whom was an officer.

This prompt and decisive hand-to-hand en-

counter on his part enabled his, company to

advance farther without the loss of a man.
After the war, Mr. .West settled in Mason
County, West Virginia and married Maggie
Elizabeth VanSickle (“Maggie VanSickle”).in
1982, On May 20, 1935, Sam McClausland
fatally shot Mr. West while Mr. West was
working on the. McClausland farm in Mason
County,

Maggie VanSickle had her husband buried
in the VanSickle family cemetery, which is
located now within the property encompass-
ing the Chief Cornstalk Wildlife Management
Area (“Cornstalk WMA”) owned by the State
of West Virginia, Once acquired by the State,
the road leading to the VanSickle family
cemetery was gated, With the passage of
time, the road merged with the surrounding
forest.

In 2015, a Boy Scout learned of Mr. West’s
Medal of Honor status and burial in Mason
County and sought to locate the VanSickle
family cemetery as an Eagle Scout project.
The Boy Scout, with the help of family mem-
bers and other scouts, located the cemetery
and cleared it. The work included removal of
a large oak tree that had fallen and damaged
1, In his testimony, Mr. Williams referred to

Keith Gwinn as the Director of the Department

of Veterans Affairs. In 2011, the Legislature elim-
inated the former Division of Veterans Affairs

361

two of the headstones, inending Mr. West's
headstone.

Mr. Williams filed his petition on Septem-
ber 14, 2015, seeking authority under West
Virginia Code §§ 37-18-1 through 7 (2015) to
move Mr, West’s remains from the VanSickle
family cemetery to the Veterans Cemetery.
According to Mr. Williams, his research
through the Medal of Honor Foundation
(‘the Foundation”) revealed no next of kin of
Mr. West, He also represented that he con-
firmed that the remains of Mr. West were
located in the VanSickle family cemetery,
which had been overgrown and only discover-
ed when recently cleared,

In Mr, VanSickle’s answer to the Mr.
Williams’s petition, he noted that family
members could have been identified by tax
records, land records and phone records. He
strenuously objected to moving Mr, West’s
vemains from the VanSickle family cemetery,
explaining that ever! though her husband was
a distinguished Medal of Honor recipient,
Maggie VanSickle chose to bury him in‘the
family cemetery. Mr. VanSickle also repre-
sented that plans had been under way to
clear the cemetery when the Boy Scout re-
quested permission to do so as his Hagle
Scout project,

The Cireuit Court of Mason County con-
ducted its hearing on February 29, 2016, and
heard the testimony of five witnesses, Mr.
Williams testified that he learned of a Medal
of Honor recipient buried somewhere in Ma-
son County from Keith Gwinn, the Secretary
of the Department of Veterans Assistance}
in approximately 2012, Several years later,
he arranged through a friend to meet with
another couple and walk into Cornstalk
‘WMA to the cemetery. Mr. Williams testified
it was quite a distance. He further testified
that although Mr. West's headstone was bro-
ken into two pieces and was so worn by the
weather it was difficult to make out, he was
able to see part of the name and the unit
within which Mr, West served,

and created an agency entitled the Department of

Veterans Assistance. Its administrative head is
the cabinet secretary.

362 ee

Mr. Williams also described that he had
arranged for a funeral home to remove Mr.
West's remains for reinterment in a new
resting place, He testified that the Hunting-
ton Police Department would provide an es-
cort and that the Veterans Cemetery would
provide Mr. West with a gravesite and full
military honors. All of these services would
be provided at no cost, according to Mr.
Williams.

When asked why he wanted to reinter Mr.
West's remains, Mr. Williams testified as fol-
lows:

Well, since he is a [Mledal of [H]onor

recipient, having received the highest

award that our country can give for bray-
ery and valor, we feel that he is entitled to
be in a location where people can recognize
the service that he did for our country, and
“that he has earned the right to have a
place where others can realize and recog-
nize the fact that he is a hero. So I feel
that the [Donel] C. Kinnard [Clemetery,
our only West Virginia state veterans cem-
etery, would be a proper place[,] and they
would certainly give all of the care, year-
round care, to care for his gravesite.

Robert Sullivan, a police officer assisting
the Foundation with information relating to
the disinterment of Mr. West’s remains, also
testified at the hearing regarding the condi-
tion of the VanSickle family cemetery. De-
seribing a 2015 trip with Mr. Williams, Mr.
Sullivan testified that he only had GPS coor-
dinates to find the cemetery. The road shown
on the tax map was not actually there, so
they were forced to walk, Mr. Sullivan fur-
ther testified that the road to the cemetery
had not been maintained since the State ac-
quired the land. While walking in, they then
came upon a man who told Mr. Sullivan that
it had been twenty to thirty years since
anyone had actually maintained the road. Mr.
Sullivan testified that grass now covered the
road. He commented that he never knew the
road existed even though he has hunted in
Cornstalk WMA for years. Mr. Sullivan stat-
ed that he and Mr. Williams walked on a
worn path. He further described that the
cemetery itself looked “reasonable” when
they saw it in 2015 because Boy Scouts had
cleaned it up for a project. Nonetheless, Mr.

Sullivan noted it was “just so isolated in the
middle of nowhere.”

Mr. VanSickle testified that Maggie Van-
Sickle remarried and moved to Charleston
where she died in 1950, He represented that
Mr. West was his great uncle by marriage
and that all the other witnesses opposing
removal of Mr. West's remains have the
same degree of relation as he has to Mr.
West. Mr, VanSickle testified that to his
knowledge Mr. West had no children or sib-
lings. Mr. VanSickle agreed that the ceme-
tery is a 50-by-65 foot private family ceme-
tery located on State land. He also confirmed
that several VanSickle family members are
buried in that cemetery. Mr. VanSickle fur-
ther stated that Maggie VanSickle decided to
bury Mr. West at the family cemetery and
for that reason, he felt Mr. West should
remain there.

Doug Hudson testified that in 2008, the
VanSickle family cemetery was in “bad
shape.” Mr. Hudson explained that the rea-
son the cemetery was in that condition was
because it was isolated and nobody could get
there. He testified that he attempted to ob-
tain a permit to bring equipment in to clean
off the cemetery but was told by Cornstalk
WMA officials that he had to walk in and
carry his own equipment. He testified he
cleaned it off several summers himself but
could no longer do it. He further represented
that he had some people to help him but
could not get a permit. Mr. Hudson did not
identify his relationship to Mr. West.

Carolyn Bailey testified that her mother
was Maggie VanSickle’s niece. Ms. Bailey
testified that she firmly believed Maggie
VanSickle would have wanted to be buried
beside Mr. West. For this reason, Ms. Bailey
testified she felt Mr. West’s remains should
stay in the VanSickle family cemetery. Ms.
Bailey speculated that weather conditions in
the winter of 1950 prevented Maggie Van-
Sickle from being brought to Mason County
for burial. Because more than eighty years
had passed and the relatives do not believe
that the wishes of Maggie VanSickle should
be disregarded, Ms. Bailey suggested that a
reasonable alternative would be to build a
memorial in Mr, West’s honor at the Veter-
ans Cemetery,

On March 23, 2016, the circuit court grant-
ed Mr. Williams permission to enter “upon
the lands of the State of West Virginia and
into the VanSickle cemetery to carefully re-
move the remains of Chester Howard West
therefrom, together with the headstone there
situate and to re-inter such remains at the
[Donel] C. Kinnard Cemetery at Institute,
“West Virginia.” Mr. VanSickle appeals the
circuit court's order.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN We have long held that “[t]his
Court reviews the circuit court’s final order
and ultimate disposition under an abuse of
discretion standard. We review challenges
to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous
standard; conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo.” Syl. Pt. 4, Burgess v. Porterfield,
196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.H.2d 114 (1996). We
likewise find that in cases regarding disin-
terment of human remains, an abuse of dis-
eretion standard governs our review of the
circuit court's final order and ultimate dis-
position in the exercise of its inherent pow-
ers in equity. See State v. Highland, 71
W.Va. 87, 92, 76 S.B. 140, 142 (1912) (no
abuse of discretion when circuit court re-
fused to allow disinterment of remains for
evidentiary purposes in a murder trial).

Il. DISCUSSION

Hl In his petition below, Mr. Williams
requested authority to disinter and transfer
Mr. West’s remains under the provisions of
West Virginia Code §§ 37-13-1 through -7
(2011), which establishes a process by which
a party may seek authorization from the
circuit court to remove human remains from
a gravesite located on private land. However,
based on the facts adduced during the hear-
ing, the circuit court concluded that the pro-
visions of West Virginia Code §§ 87-18-1
through -7 did not apply to this proceeding
because Mr, West’s remains were not located
on private land? The circuit court thus pro-
ceeded to act in equity, explaining:

2. West Virginia Code § 37-13-1 provides in rele-
vant part that “[tlhe circuit court of any county

shall have jurisdiction and authority to permit
and order the removal, transfer and re-inter-

363

Because there appears to be no specific
statutory enactment which would address
the factual circumstances herein, this
Court may act in equity, with the inherent
power to provide equitable relief to the
Petitioner if the relief also is equitable to
honor the memory of Chester Howard
West.

After considering the facts and balancing the
equities, the circuit court ordered that Mr.
Williams may enter Cornstalk WMA and the
VanSickle family. cemetery “to carefully re-
move the remains of Chester Howard West”
and lay them to rest at the Veterans Ceme-
tery.

HE On appeal, Mr. VanSickle argues for
the first time that there is a statutory prohi-
bition against the circuit court’s exercise of
its equitable jurisdiction, In reliance upon
Hairston v. General Pipeline Construction,
Inc., 226 W.Va. 668, 704 S.E.2d 668 (2010)
(Hairston I), Mr. VanSickle asserts. that .
West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a (2013)
preempted the circuit court’s common law

« jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether

the remains of Mr. West should be disin-
terred and buried in another location,

In response, Mr. Williams argues that
while the Legislature enacted West Virginia
Code § 29-1-8a to prohibit disturbance of
certain graves, it remains within the jurisdic-
tion of the circuit court to rule in equity
regarding the disinterment of Mr. West’s
remains. Moreover, Mr. Williams states that
he is prepared through a qualified funeral
director to obtain any permits that may be
required.

West Virginia recognizes a common law
right to petition the circuit court to resolve
disputes involving the disinterment of human
remains. In Sherrard v. Henry, 88 W.Va.
815, 106 S.E. 705 (1921), this Court reversed
a circuit court’s injunction preventing the
disinterment of remains buried in another's
claimed burial plot and found that the equi-
ties favored the party seeking disinterment.
Id, at 822, 106 S.E. at 708. Resolving the
issue of the power of the court to act in

ment, or other disposition, of remains in any
graves located upon privately owned land within
the boundaries of such county....” W.Va. Code
§ 37-13-1. :

364

equity, we noted that it is well established
that “a court of equity will interfere to pre-
vent desecration of places of burial of the
dead or to prevent the removal of bodies
properly buried....” Jd, at-319, 106 S.B. at
‘707. We further explained:

There is no property in a dead body,
and, this being true, the law can afford no
remedy in a case where the removal of
such a body is sought or attempted, The

- courts do, however, recognize that, ‘while
there is no property in the body, the close
relatives have a right to protect the same,
-and to prevent its removal or the desecra-
tion of the grave. This being true, there is
no other remedy except resort to a court of
equity when the removal of a dead body is
attempted: or threatened, and then such
relief is granted as the circumstances re-
quire, and as is in consonance with the
feelings of mankind, .

Id, at 319-820, 106 §.E. at 707 (internal cita-

tions omitted), See also, Highland, 71. W.Va.
at 89-90, 76 S.E. at 141 (request to disinter
vietim’s remains for autopsy denied because
relatives of déceased have quasi property
right which the courts will protect); Syl, Pt.

1, England & Bishop v. Central Pocahontas

Coal Co., 86 W.Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920)

(ight to bury corpse and preserve remains is

a quasi property right that may be redressed

in courts in action for unlawful disinterment,
and desecration of gravesites).

Hl Accordingly, the Circuit Court of Ma-
son County had the authority under common.
law to rule on Mr, Williams’s petition in
equity. We next consider whether West Vir-
ginia Code § 29-1-8a preempted the circuit
court's common law jurisdiction to decide the
issue’ of whether the remains of Mr. West,
should be disinterred and buried in another
location,

Hl In Hairston I, we considered a certi-
fied question whether West Virginia Code
§ 29-1-8a preempted a common law cause of
action for direct or indirect desecration of
graves. We observed that “the statute dis-
closes a clear legislative intent to preempt
common law desecration claims with respect
to the narrowly-defined. matters identified
and covered by the statutory protection.”

Hairston I, 226 W.Va. at 670, 704 S.H.2d at
670. Accordingly, we held:

West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a (1993)
preempts common law with respect to the
matters specifically addressed in the stat-
ute. The statute preempts all common law
claims ‘involving “historic or prehistoric
ruins, burial grounds, archaeological site,
or human skeletal remains, unmarked
grave, grave artifact or grave marker of
historical significance.” W. Va. Code § laa

. 18a),
Id, at 665, 704 S.B.2d at 665, syl. bh 2

. However, we specifically noted that “{t]he

preemptive effect’ of the statute applies only

to the narrowly-defined categories of graves

and other related items that the statute de-
lineates.” Id, at 670, 704 S.B.2d at 670 (em-
phasis added), We further’ explained that

“common law is not preempted by the statute

where the legislature has not specified statu-

tory protection in West Virginia Code § 29-1-

8a.” Id.

We considered West Virginia Code § 29-1-
8a again in General Pipeline Construction,
Inc. v. Hairston, 284 W.Va. 274, 765 S.E.2d
168 (2014) (Hairston IT). The salient issue in
Hairston II was whether West Virginia Code
§ 29-1-8a gave rise to a private cause of
action for negligence. In holding that it does
not, we relied in part upon the clear legisla-
ture purpose of West Virginia Code § 29-1-
8a: :

. The stated legislative purpose of W.Va,
Code § 29-1-8a(a) is to defend “the safety
and sanctity of unmarked graves,” so as to

_ allow the “appropriate pursuit” of “worthy
scientific and educational activities” by
“those persons engaged. in the scientific
study or recovery of artifacts[.]” In other
words, the statute is intended to protect
the rights of people engaged in the scienti-
fie study of ancient, historic graves.

Hairston IT, 284 W.Va, at 282-88, 765 S.E.2d

at 171-72, We further concluded that the

Legislature did not intend to infer the cre-

ation of a private cause of action. Id. at 288,

765 S.B.2d at 172.

Thus, in order to determine whether West
Virginia Code § 29-1-8a preempted the cir-
euit court’s common law jurisdiction in the
ease before us, we examine whether Mr.

Williams’s claim falls within “the narrowly-
defined matters identified and covered by the
statutory protection.” Hairston I, 226 W.Va.
at 670, 704 S.E.2d at 670, As we referenced
in Hairston II, no conjecture or inference is

necessary to ascertain the legislative purpose _

and scope of West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a,
The statute plainly states:

The Legislature finds that there is a real
and growing threat to the safety and sanc-
tity of unmarked human graves in West
Virginia and the existing laws of the state

. do not provide equal or adequate protec-
tion for all such graves. As evident by the
numerous incidents in West Virginia which
have resulted in the desecration of human
yemains and vandalism to grave markers,
there is an immediate need to protect the
graves of earlier West Virginians from
such desecration. Therefore, the purpose
of this article is to assure that all human
burials be accorded equal treatment and
respect for human dignity without refer-
ence to ethnic origins, cultural back-
grounds, or religious affiliations.

The Legislature also finds that those

" persons engaged in the scientific study or
recovery of artifacts which have been ac-
quired in accordance with the law are en-
gaged in legitimate and worthy scientific
and educational activities. Therefore, this
legislation is intended to permit the appro-
priate pursuit of those lawful activities,

Finally, this legislation is not intended to
interfere with the normal activities of pri-
vate property owners, farmers, or those
engaged in the development, mining or
improvement of réal property.

W. Va. Code § 29-1-8a(a), Clearly, the matter

of whether the remains of a Medal of Honor
recipient should be disinterred and moved to
the Veterans Cemetery does not fall within
the legislative purpose plainly stated in West

Virginia Code § 29-1-8a. Mr. West’s grave is

not unmarked, has not been vandalized, and
is not the subject of any scientific or edu-
cational study of artifacts.

We next consider whether Mr. West's
grave is subject to the protection of West

Virginia Code § 29-1-8a. Mr. VanSickle con-

3. We note that Mr. VanSickle did not present
this argument below of in his brief. Rather, coun-

365

tends that Mr. West’s headstone marking the
location of his remains meets the statutory
definition of “grave marker,” which is defined
as “any tomb, monument, stone, ornament,
mound, or other item of human manufacture
that is associated with a grave[.]” W.Va.
Code § 29-1-8a(b)(4). Thus, he argues, the
statute’s directive that no person may “re-
move, destroy or otherwise disturb ... any
grave marker of historical significance” ap-
plies. W:Va. Code § 29-1-8a(e)(1). Mr. Van-
Sickle asserts that Mr. West’s grave marker
is “of historical significance” because he was
a World War I Medal of Honor recipient.
Accordingly, Mr. VanSickle asserts that Mr.
Williams's claim is preempted by West Virgi-
nia Codé § 29-1-8a8 .

While Mr. West’s grave marker may meet.
the statutory definition of “grave marker,”
the question we consider is whether it is “of
historical significance” as that phrase is used
in West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a(c)(1). The
statute offers no definition of “historical sig-
nificance” and Mr. VanSickle provides no
analysis of the statutory meaning. However,
we find that “historical significance” must be
considered:in the context of the clearly artic-
ulated purposes of the statute,

As diseussed above, the Legislature articu-
lated two purposes for West Virginia Code
§ 29-1-8a, The first purpose is to protect
desecrated’ and vandalized graves left un-
marked due to previous lack of respect for
the sanctity of human remains. Second, the
statute recognizes and permits the scientific
study or recovery of artifacts. We consider
the meaning of the term “historical signifi-
cance” with those clear purposes in mind and
find that Mr. West’s grave marker is not
protected by West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a.
While Mr. West’s service in World War I and
his Medal of Honor are unquestionably sig-
nificant in history, his grave marker does not
fall within “the narrowly-defined matters
identified and’ covered by the statutory pro-
tection” of West Virginia Code § 29-1-8a,
Hairston I, 226 W.Va. at 670, 704 S.E.2d at
670, Accordingly, the claims of Mr. Williams
are not preempted by West Virginia Code
§ 29-1-8a,

sel argued the preemptive effect of West Virginia
Code § 29-1-8a solely during oral argument.

366

Hl Finally, we consider Mr. VanSickle’s
argument that the circuit court abused its
discretion in weighing the equities and grant-
ing Mr. Williams’s petition. Mr. VanSickle
asserts that the overriding factor controlling
the decision to disinter the remains within a
gravesite should be the wishes of the family.
To the contrary, our prior case law estab-
lishes that while the family’s quasi property
right includes the possession and custody of
the body for burial or other disposition, the
custody of the remains after burial is in the
law and must be resolved in the courts. See
Sherrard, 88 W.Va. at 819-20, 106 S.E. at
‘707.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
succinctly addressed the difficult subject of
what courts should consider in disinterment

* cases as follows:

The rights of relatives and friends re-
specting the care and control of. the re-
mains of their dead can be best determined
and administered by the rule of reason-
ableness. The fact that jurisdiction over
these matters is given to courts of equity is
a persuasive reason why a liberal proce-
dure in determining the rights of the par-
ties should be adopted, There is nothing
that touches more intimately the feelings
and sensibilities of people than controver-
sies relating to the disposal and control of
the remains of their dead. And such meth-
ods should be adopted in dealing with
these unfortunate disputes as are best cal-
culated to reach just and equitable results,
and to inflict the least trouble and distress
upon the parties,

The. court in the trial of such an action,
having found the facts, should be guided in
making his decree by what is “fit and
proper” to be done, taking into consider-
ation all the special circumstances sur-
rounding that particular case; due regard
being given to the wishes of the decedent,
the rights of relatives and friends, and the
welfare of the public.

Lavigne v. Wilkinson, 80 N.H, 221, 228, 116
A. 82, 88 (1921). More recently, courts have
accumulated a number of factors to be con-
sidered given the particular circumstances of
a case:

There is no rigid rule for either permit-
ting or refusing removal of a body once
interred, and each case must be deter-
mined on its own merits, Thus, whether
reasonable cause for reinterment has been
shown will depend upon the respective
weight, or persuasiveness, of a variety of
factors. Among the factors that are to be
given due regard in reinterment decisions

are:

© the interests of the public

© the wishes of the decedent

the rights and feelings of those entitled
to be heard by reason ‘of relationship or
association with the decedent

@the degree of relationship to the. dece-
dent of those opposing or seeking disin-
terment,

@the conduct of the parties seeking and
opposing reinterment, especially as it re-
lates to the circumstances of the original
interment

®the integrity and capacity of the person
seeking reinterment to provide a secure
and comparable resting place for the de-
cedent

any agreement with, or regulations of,
the persons or associations maintaining
the cemetery in which the decedent is
buried

whether consent was given, by persons
with authority to do so, to the burial in
the first place of interment

224 Am. Jur. 2d Dead Bodies § 65 (2018),
See also, Maffei v. Woodlawn Memorial
Park, 180 Cal.App.4th 119, 124-125, 29 Cal.
Rptr.3d 679, 688 (2005).

In a case involving facts similar to those
before us, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia found that a circuit court, exercising
its power in equity, did not commit error in
denying an injunction sought by family mem-
bers opposed to disinterment of relatives.
Grinnan v. Fredericksburg Lodge No. 4 AF.
& AM, 118 Va. 588, 88 S.E. 79, 80 (1916).
The family members objected to the reburial
of the remains of their loved ones in another
site within the same Masonic Cemetery in
order to make room for a memorial to
George Washington, who became a Mason at
that lodge. Id. at 79-80. Relying in part upon

the fact that “the condition of this cemetery
for the past 50 years has been melancholy
indeed,” the Grinnan court affirmed the low-
er court’s consideration of the equities, in-
cluding the interests of Masons as well as the
general public, over the interests of the few
objecting family members. Jd. at 81. The
Grinnan court further noted that the dignity
of the buried and their descendants would be
honored in the disinterment and reburial
process and that “the removal proposed in
this case would, instead of desecrating the
sepulcher of complainants’ dead, rather tend
to preserve and beautify their resting place.”
Id, at 80-81.

In the case before us, Mr. VanSickle ar-
gues that the equities favor reversing the
cireuit court’s decision below because: (1)
Maggie VanSickle’s wishes were that her
husband be buried in the VanSickle family
cemetery; (2) the only surviving relatives of
the couple strongly oppose disinterment of
Mr. West’s remains; (8) no evidence has been.
presented of other, closer next-of-kin, whose
wishes differ from the surviving relatives; (4)
the VanSickle family has been repeatedly
denied access to Mr, West's gravesite to
maintain it; and (5) other suitable alterna-
tives exist to honor Mr. West without causing
emotional injury to Mr. West's family,

Undeniably, the record contains no evi-
dence of living blood relatives of Mr. West.
While Mr. VanSickle filed an objection to Mr.
Williams’s petition to disinter Mr, West’s re-
mains and others testified at the hearing, all
of those objecting to the removal have no
direct, familial connection to Mr. West. Mr.
West’s surviving spouse remarried and died
over sixty-five years ago, leaving no docu-
mented sentiment as to her own burial with
her first husband. The VanSickle family cem-
etery is now overgrown and neglected in a
remote section of a publie wildlife manage-
ment area owned by the State. To date, no
one on Mr. West’s behalf has asserted any
right to enter into the Cornstalk WMA to
provide upkeep to the cemetery and particu-
larly the gravesite of this Medal of Honor
recipient.

On the other hand, upon discovery of Mr.
West’s remains, Mr. Williams has expended

time and energy to arrange for persons qual-

367

ified to undertake Mr. West’s disinterment
with dignity and care, transport his remains
with honor, reinter them with full military
honors, and provide perpetual care for his
gravesite. We understand that the VanSickle
family has been denied the opportunity to
enter Cornstalk WMA with the necessary
equipment to keep the cemetery in the condi-
tion deserving of their loved ones. The fact
remains that the cemetery where he is bur-
ied is in a location where perpetual care is
highly unlikely. Mr. Williams has demon-
strated the integrity and capacity to provide
a most suitable and deserving resting place
for Mr. West’s remains. Accordingly, we hold
that the Circuit Court of Mason County did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
equities favored the disinterment of the re-
mains of Mr. West and granting the petition
of Mr, Williams.

Iv. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
March 28, 2016 order of the Cireuit Court of
Mason County.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, dissenting:

“Als to the dead, who are not here to
answer for themselves, it would be the height
of injustice and cruelty to disturb their ashes,
and violate the sanctity of the grave[.)”
Haudenschilt v. Haudenschilt, 129 W.Va. 92,
121, 89 S.H.2d 328, 343 (1946) (Kenna, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted). Yet,
the majority of this Court has done just that
and, in the process, they have opened Pando-
va’s Box. Critically, “[glood intentions ...
like bad facts[] sometimes make bad law.”
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Huron Rd. Hosp.,
78 Ohio St3d 391, 658 N.E.2d 235, 239
(1995). Consequently, I am impelled to dis-
sent, .

Chester Howard West was a veteran of
World War I. Prior to his death, his distin-

368

guished military service was recognized when
he was awarded the Medal of Honor, the
United States of America’s highest military
honor:

“The Medal of Honor is the highest’ award
for valor in action against an enemy force
which ‘can be bestowed upon an individual
serving in the Armed Services of the Unit-
ed States. [It is] [glenerally presented to
its recipient by the President of the United
States of America in the name of Con-
gress.

See http://www.emohs.org/. Although Mr.
West survived the war, he was murdered in
1985. At the express request of his widow,
Maggie VanSickle West, Mr. West’s body
was laid to rest in her family’s cemetery
located in Mason County, West Virginia.

The respondent, Hershel Woodrow

Williams, is also a Medal of Honor recipi- -

ent, and he is associated with the Medal of
Honor Foundation. Upon learning of Mr.
West’s status as Medal of Honor recipient,
he became concerned that Mr. West's dis-
tinguished military service was not being
adequately honored because the VanSickle
family cemetery, including Mr. West's burial
monument, were not being maintained.!
Having neither a familial nor legal relation-
ship to Mr. West, Mr, Williams nonetheless
filed a petition in the cireuit court seeking
to exhume Mr, ‘West’s corporeal remains for
the purpose of reinterment in The Donel C.
Kinnard Memorial State Veterans Cemetery
located in Institute, West Virginia? Al-
though Mr. Williams’s intent and purpose
were clearly honorable, the circuit court
should have dismissed the petition on ‘its
face given the obvious Tack of standing to
file the action,

_Under West Virginia law,

1,. The VanSickle family’ cemetery, once located
on private property, is now within the Chief
Cornstalk Wildlilfe Refuge owned by the State of
West Virginia. Representations were made before
the circuit court that the State has blocked the
VanSickle family’s efforts to access the cemetery
for maintenance, I trust that such matters can be
resolved so that the family may access the ceme-
tery for visitation, decoration, and/or mainte-
nance purposes.

[sltanding is comprised of three ele-
ments: . First, the party attempting to es-
tablish standing.must have suffered an
“injury-in-fact”—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or immi-
nent and not conjectural or hypothetical.
Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct form-
ing the basis of the lawsuit. Third, it must.
be likely that the injury will be redressed
through a favorable decision of the court.

Syl. Pt. 5, Findley v, State Farm Mut, Auto.
Ins, Co,, 218 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002).
Mr. Williams clearly cannot meet the Find-
ley test. What is his injury, 4¢., what legally
protected interest has been invaded? Fur-
ther, what is the causal connection between
the injury and the conduct? Other courts
have been wisely circumspect in granting
standing when the disinterment of a body is
sought. See, 2g. Grisso v. Nolen, 262 Va.
688, 554 S.E.2d 91, 95-96 (2001) (“Dillard
Nolen [former hysband] was a legal stranger
to Lorraine Nolen as the result of a divorce
decree.. As such, and notwithstanding what.
evidence he might have regarding Lorraine
Nolen’s wish as to the final resting place of
her body, he had no cognizable interest in
the place. of her burial and, thus, no standing
to seek the disinterment of her body for
reburial.”); In re Elman, 152, Mise.2d 656,
578 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding
decedent's sisters, his closest surviving next
of kin, had standing to represent wishes of
decedent and seek disinterment and reburial
in a family plot); In ve Estate of Puder, 2011
WL 112424 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div., Jan.”
14, 2011) (finding decedent’s mother had no
standing under New Jersey rule and statute
to challenge decedent's husband’s decision to
disinter decedent from crypt and bury dece-
dent in Jewish section of cemetery in familial

2, Dedicated on May 31, 2012, the cemetery is
operated by the West Virginia Department of
Veterans Assistance. http://www.veterans.wv.gow/
offices-facilities/Pages/Donel-C.-Kinnard-
Memorial-State-Veterans-Cemetery-.aspx.  Fol-
lowing federal guidelines and requirements for
eligibility for burial, the cemetery provides “an
honorable, dignified resting place for West Virgi-
nia’s cherished veterans and their closest family
members{,]” and it will be able to “accommodate
burial space for approximately 60,000 qualified
individuals.” Id.

plot); Sacred Heart of Jesus Polish Nat. C.
Church »v. Soklowski, 159 Minn. 331, 199
N.W. 81, 82 (1924) (finding cemetery owner
had standing to seek to enjoin disinterment,
reasoning that “in guarding the repose of the
dead there interred, and as interested in
carrying out the expressed desire of its mem-
bers as to their final resting place, we think
there can be no question of plaintiff's right to
maintain an action of this sort,”).

Without regard for the clear absence of
standing, and with no one to raise the issue
since Roger Lee VanSickle, who responded
to the petition on behalf of the family, was
self-represented below, the circuit court pro-
ceeded to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
petition, Familial descendants of Mr. West®
testified that they did not want his remains
to be disturbed as they were buried in the
VanSickle family cemetery at the express
request of his widow. Notwithstanding the
family’s opposition, and lacking any statutory
authority to grant the petition,’ the circuit
court invoked its inherent power to rule in
equity and ordered the exhumation of Mr.
West's corporeal remains and reinterment in
the veteran’s cemetery in Institute so that
his “memory is preserved as a recipient of
the Medal of Honor.” As discussed more fully
below, there are other means through which
this commendable goal may be realized.

It is incumbent upon us all to honor the
lives of our veterans who have fought to

3. It appears that Mr. West has no consanguine
descendants. The family members who appeared
to oppose Mr. West's exhumation were related to
him by marriage through his widow, who died in
1953. See, eg, W.Va. Code § 11-6B-2(3)
(“Family member’ means a person who is relat-
ed by common ancestry, adoption or marriage
including, but not limited to, persons related by
lineal and collateral consanguinity.”).

4. There are highly limited instances under West
Virginia statutory law where a body may be
disinterred, none of which are applicable in the
instant matter. See, eg., W.Va. Code § 37-13-1
(providing that owner of private property may
bring action seeking order allowing for disinter-
ment of human remains on said property for
reburial).

3. Thousands of our nation’s ‘servicemen and
women are laid to rest in locations throughout
the world, Just a few examples include the
Aisne-Marne American Cemetery located in Bel-
leau, Northern France, where 2,289 members of

369

safeguard our liberties and freedom, There is
perhaps no higher cause than answering the
call to defend one’s country when peaceful
resolutions fail, Recognizing the nearly im-
measurable sacrifice made by our veterans, I
am moved, as are so many: West Virginians,
by the hallowed grounds of our military cem-
eteries—not only those here at home but also
those scattered around the globe.5 As Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, a highly-decorated
veteran himself, once remarked: “I do not
believe that any nation in the history of the
world has buried its soldiers farther from its
native soil than we Americans—or buried
them closer to the towns in which they grew
up.” To this I can attest,

At different points in my life, I have been.
to many of these sacred venues both here
and abroad. As a young man, I visited the
Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia,
which has been aptly called a place “where
valor rests.” Anyone who has witnessed the
inimitable “Changing of the Guard” ceremo-
ny at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier can
speak to the solemnity of this consecrated
place, Some years later, I had the privilege of
visiting the Normandy American Cemetery
and Memorial in France where I paid my
respects to those lost during the Battle of
Normandy, many of whom were killed on D-
Day. The incredible emotion that rises up as
you survey that picturesque yet tragic site

the United States military who died in World
War I are buried; the Ardennes American Ceme-
tery in Ardennes, Belgium, where the graves of
5,329 members of the United States military who
died in World War Il are located; the Brook-
wood American Cemetery in the British Isles and
home to the graves of 468 members of the United
States military who died in World War I; the
Cambridge American Cemetery in Cambridge,
England, which has approximately 3,812 graves
of American military persons, including airmen
who, died over Europe and sailors from North
Atlantic convoys; the Epinal American Cemetery
located in Dinozé, France, which has graves of
5,255 United States’ military who died in mili-
tary campaigns during World War II; the Flor-
ence American Cémetery in Florence, Italy,
which is home to 4,402 members of the United
States military who died during World War II;
and the Manila American Cemetery located in
Manila, Philippines, where there are the graves
of 17,206 U.S. personnel killed during World
War II, See _httpsv/abme.gov/cemeteries-
memorials#,WLRD500zWos,

370

remains with you for a lifetime. From every
angle and vantage point, the white crosses
stand in’ perfect symmetry, each represent-
ing its own noble narrative about an Ameri-
can warrior who made the ultimate sacrifice
for our nation, Such hallowed places serve as
poignant reminders of the truly heart-rend-
ing cost of freedom.

We need not travel beyond our own state
to find a place of such reverence built to
accommodate for all eternity the finest
among us. West Virginia has its own veter-
ans cemeteries and, in my humble estimation,
The Donel C. Kinnard Memorial State Veter-
ans Cemetery is as beautiful and dignified a
resting place as any veterans’ cemetery in
the world. It is indisputable that being laid to
rest among fellow patriots in so honorable a
place provides our West Virginia veterans
with the respect befitting their service and
sacrifice. Yet, we cannot lose sight of the fact
that, both legally and equitably, the highest
honor that can be bestowed on those who
have fought for our freedoms is one which
protects, not disrespects, their chosen final
resting place.

Perhaps most important to this matter is
the fact that there are other ways to honor
Mr. West’s distinguished military service and
status as a Medal of Honor recipient short of
instituting a legal proceeding seeking to com-
pel his exhumation. As one family member
suggested during her testimony, Mr.
Williams could set a monument to honor the
veterans of Mason County and leave Mr.
West's remains undisturbed. In fact, there is
a long tradition in this country of honoring
those persons who have distinguished them-
selves in service to our country, but whose
corporeal remains lay elsewhere,

6. In 1988, as a high school senior, I had the
honor of participating in the Presidential Class-
room, a week-long educational program held in
Washington, D.C. Already possessing a deep re-
spect for the brave and selfless service provided
by this nation's veterans, including my father,
who is an Air Force veteran, I was particularly
moved by the memorials to our veterans that I
visited that week. When later interviewed by the
Dominion Post concerning my experience in our
nation’s capital, I shared my observations in vis-
iting the Viemam Memorial, as follows:

“probably the most touching thing we saw
was the Vietnam Memorial,” {Loughry] said.
“When you hear people talking [about] 58,-

Our nation’s Capitol is home to numerous
monuments, such as the Washington Monu-
ment, the Jefferson Memorial, and the Lin-
coln Memorial. Yet, President Washington is
entombed at Mount Vernon; President Jef-
ferson is buried at Monticello; and President
Lincoln is entombed in Springfield, Illinois.
Although the physical remains of these great
men do not lay beneath their memorials in
Washington, D.C., we honor and respect
their service to this country through these
commemorations. Another example is the Vi-
etnam Memorial in Washington, D.C., on
which the names of more than 58,000 Ameri-
cans who gave their lives in service to our
nation during the Vietnam War are inscribed.
Clearly, we honor the service and sacrifice of
each person on the Wall even though their
bodily remains were laid to rest elsewhere.®

In short, the exhumation of Mr. West’s
earthly remains is completely unnecessary to
fulfill Mr. Williams’s admirable wish to honor
Mr. West's distinguished military service. In
fact, the circuit court’s order references the
Gold Star Family Memorial Monument es-
tablished by the Medal of Honor Foundation
within The Donel C. Kinnard Memorial State
Veterans Cemetery. If that particular monu-
ment cannot be employed in some manner to
honor Mr. West’s memory and status as a
Medal of Honor recipient, then perhaps an-
other monument could be erected in the cem-
etery to honor not only Mr. West, but all
West Virginians who receive the Medal of
Honor but who either have been or will be
laid to rest elsewhere.

Not only is the majority’s decision both
legally and equitably wrong, I am deeply
concerned that a dangerous precedent has

000 people [who] died in that war, you say[,]
“That's a lot of people.’ But to actually see
the names written on the [wall] and see the
parents, the brothers and sisters standing
there and crying, it brings it home. It makes
you think,”
Kathy Plum, Tucker student spends week in D.C.,
Dominion Post, April 24, 1988. The emotions
experienced by me and many other students on
that day more than twenty-nine years ago were
felt because of the powerful and respectful man-
ner through which those brave men and women
were being honored, regardless of the fact that
their corporeal remains were laid to rest else-
where,

been set that threatens the sanctity of burial
in this state. Will third-parties now have an
imprimatur to seek the disinterment of any
person with whom they have no relationship,
either legal, familial, or otherwise, if their
purpose is sufficiently laudable? Further, will
a laudable purpose alone be sufficient,.or will
an ill-maintained cemetery also be required
for court-ordered disinterment? Moreover,
by what standards will a circuit court deter-
mine whether the purpose for disinterment is
sufficiently commendable or whether a ceme-
tery’s maintenance is sufficiently inadequate
to warrant disinterment?

Lastly, and to the extent the majority's
holding extends the risk of a judicially or-
dered disinterment to any deceased person in
this State, I would caution lawyers engaged
in estate work to apprise their clients—veter-
ans and non-veterans alike—that if they wish
their final resting place to be just that—
final—their wish needs to be explicitly set
forth in their testamentary papers with the
caveat that their corporeal remains never be
moved absent particularized circumstances.
Unlike Mr. West, there may not be someone
to defend a decedent’s final resting place, but
perhaps a recorded will containing specific
burial instructions would, carry some weight
when a legal action is instituted seeking to
disinter a person twenty, fifty or, as in the
ease at bar, nearly a hundred years later.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

WORKMAN, Justice, dissenting:

In this case, we confront the question of
whether a person with honorable intentions
out absolutely no personal connection to or
familial relationship with a deceased person
has a unilateral right to remove the de-
ceased’s remains, contrary to both the wishes
of his widow and his remaining kin. The
majority permits this result in the face of
such familial objection ostensibly because it
agrees that a stranger to the deceased will
provide a resting place more befitting the
deceased than his family.

An American hero, First Sergeant Chester

~ Howard West (hereinafter “Sgt. West”) was
the recipient of the Congressional Medal of
Honor for his courageous service at the age
of 20 during battle as a member of the 363"?

871

Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army 91%
Division, Sgt. West survived the war, but
died seventeen years later, still a young man
at age 87, leaving a young widow, Maggie
VanSickle. Maggie made the decision to bury
her husband in the VanSickle family ceme-
tery in Mason County, and he has been at his
eternal rest for now more than eighty-two
years, :

Hershel Woodrow Williams (hereinafter
“Mr. Williams”), another American hero and
recipient of the Congressional Medal of Hon-
or, discovered that Sgt. West’s gravesite was
not well-cared for in the VanSickle family
cemetery, which is located in a remote area
of Mason County within the Chief Cornstalk
Wildlife area which is owned and managed
by the State. Mr. Williams unilaterally decid-
ed that Sgt. West’s remains should be re-
moved to the Donald C. Kinnard eemetery—
a location which Mr, Williams believes to be
a more honored resting place. The lower
court and the majority permit this disinter-
ment by Mr. Williams on the basis of a
weighing of the equities, finding that the
VanSickle family cemetery is not a-“place of
honor” and that by being removed to the
Kinnard cemetery, he may be more appropri-
ately honored and potentially re-connected
with “lost family member{s].”

This analysis is simplistic and to some
appealing, but there is a major obstacle to
this reasoning: the important concept in
American jurisprudence called “standing,”
which the majority does not even address,
“The ‘point of standing is to ensure that a
person who asserts a position has a substan-
tial legal right to do so[.J” Cupp v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 318 8.H.2d 407, 411
(1984) (intérnal citation omitted). More spe-
cifically, “[s]tanding requires that a party
seeking relief have a legally cognizable inter-
est in the subject matter and that he has a
threatened or actual injury.” Hastern Mo.
Laborers Dist. Council v. St. Louis Cty., 781
S.W.2d 48, 46 (Mo. 1989) (emphasis added).
In this matter, despite his noble intentions,
Mr. Williams lacks standing because he fails
to articulate a legally cognizable interest and
threatened or actual injury entitling him to
remove Sgt. West’s remains.

372

The United States Supreme Court has ex-
plained that “[t]o meet the standing require-
ments ... {a] plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s al-
legedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief’” Raines
», Byrd, 521 U.S, 811, 818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2812,
188° L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (quoting Allen v,
Wright, 468 U.S, 787, 751, 104 S.Ct, 3815, 82
L.Ed.2d 656 (1984) (emphasis in original)).
Articulating further, the United States Su-
preme Court has stated that: such injury
must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 nil, 112 S.Ct. 2180, 119
L,Ed.2d 351 (1992) (emphasis added). While
the importance of veterans’ issues to Mr.
Williams is well-known, being deeply in-
volved in such issues is not tantamount to
having a “legally protected interest” which is
“concrete and particularized” and therefore
actionable. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2180,

To be clear, standing is not merely a tech-
nical matter which can be overlooked when
the equities of a matter militate against such
consideration. Rather, standing goes to the
very authority of a court to consider a mat-
ter. “Standing is a condition of justiciability
that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to invoke
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the
first place.” Bank of Am, N.A, v. Greenleaf,
124 ASd 1122, 1125 (Me. 2015), If a party
lacks standing, the court must dismiss the
ease because it does not have jurisdiction
over the issues presented, “Standing is a
jurisdictional matter antecedent to the right
to relief.” Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S,W.3d 447,
451 (Mo, 2002) (emphasis added); see also
Greenleaf, 124 A8d at 1125 (“A plaintiff's
Jack of standing renders that plaintiff's com-
plaint nonjusticiable—ie., incapable of judi-
cial resolution.”), .

It is well-established that jurisdictional is-
sues can be raised at.any time, even sua
sponte by this Court, “This Court, on its own
motion, will take notice of lack of jurisdiction
at any time or at any stage of the litigation
pending therein.” Syl. Pt. 2, In ve Boggs’
Estate, 185 W.Va. 288, 63 S.H.2d 497 (1951);
Greenleaf, 124 A8d at 1125 (observing that.
standing is “an issue cognizable at any stage
of a legal proceedingf.]”). Furthermore,

“(tlhe urgency of addressing problems re-
garding subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be
understated because any. decree made by a
court lacking jurisdiction is void.” State ex
rel. TermNet.Merch. Servs. Inc. v. Jordan,
217 W.Va. 696, 700, 619 S.E.2d 209, 218
(2005); see also Franklin D, Cleckley, Robin
Jean Davis, and Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litiga-
tion Handbook-on W.Va, Rules of Civ. Pro.,
§ 12()(1), at 825-26 (4". ed. 2012) (“Any
judgment or decree rendered without [sub-
ject matter] jurisdiction is utterly void.”),

Other courts have properly considered the
issue of standing in the context of disturbing
the resting places of those souls who have
passed. In Grisso v. Nolen, 262 Va. 688, 554
§.E.2d 91 (2001), the court addressed the
issue of whether Mr. Nolen, who divorced the
decedent prior to her death, had a sufficient
legal interest iri Ms. Nolen’s wish regarding
her final resting place so as to permit the
court to invoke its equity authority to grant
his petition. The court rejected the proposi-
tion that Mr. Nolen had any cognizable inter-
est or legal standing with respect to matters
concerning his former wife. It reasoned that
Mr. Nolen “was a legal stranger” to Ms.
Nolen “as the result of a divorce decree. As
such, and notwithstanding what evidence he
might have regarding [Ms.] Nolen’s wish as
to the final resting place of her body, he had
no cognizable intérest in the place of her
burial and, thus, .no standing to seek the
disinterment of her body for reburial.” Jd. at
95.

The same rationale applies ‘here. Mr.
Williams has even less of a connection with
Sgt. West; he in fact has none; Further be-
cause Mr, Williams never pled a judicially
cognizable “injury” or other legitimate per-:
sonal legal interest, the lower court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Recent-
ly, the United States Supreme Court empha-
sized that “injury in fact” is an essential
element to standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob-
ins, — U.S, ——, 186-8.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194
L.Bd.2d 635 (2016) (“To establish injury in
fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she
suffered an invasion: of a legally protected
interest that is. concrete and particularized
and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Accordingly, this Court should have
reversed and remanded the matter to the
lower court with directions to dismiss the
petition for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion,

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we
assume, arguendo, that Mr. Williams had
standing, the lower court unmistakably
abused its discretion in weighing the equities
and granting the petition for disinterment
considering the strong common law presump-
tion in favor of repose. The majority blindly
follows suit and, concluding that the family’s
lack of blood relationship to Sgt- West dimin-
ishes their interest in the matter, finds Mr.
Williams’ “integrity and capacity to provide a
most suitable and deserving resting place”
for Sgt. West dispositive. The majority is
seemingly unaware of the irony of finding
that the VanSickles’ lack of “direct familial
connection” 1 requires their wishes to subvert
to those of Mr. Williams—a total stranger,
legally and personally, to Sgt. West.

An appeal to equity requires a weighing of
the factors or equities that affect the judg-
ment—a function which requires the exercise

~ of judicial discretion, Equity can, at times, do
complete justice in the resolution of the con-
troversy before the court, and the court will
use the remedy in order to prevent the same
controversy in the future. See Fullerton
Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 80
N.W.2d 461, 465 (1957). However, ‘the majori-
ty wholly fails to consider the strong common
Jaw presumption in favor of repose, Had it
applied the appropriate standard, the majori-
ty would have held Mr. Williams to a heavy
burden when he petitioned to disinter the
remains of Mr. West against the wishes of
his family. As summed up by one commenta-
tor:

Despite the inconsistencies with which
American cases on exhumation and remov-
al of remains are rife, to this extent they
all agree in principle: The normal treat-
ment of a corpse, once it is decently bur-
ied, is to let it lie. This idea is so deeply
woven into our legal and cultural fabric
that it is commonplace to hear it spoken of
as a “right” of the dead and a charge on
the quick. Neither the ecclesiastical, com-

1. The VanSickles are relatives by marriage, rath-

373

mon, nor civil system of jurisprudence per-
mits exhumation. for less than what are
considered weighty, and sometimes com-
pelling, reasons. Securing “unbroken final
repose” has been the object of both civil
and criminal legislation.

Peter Zablotsky, “Curst Be He’ That Moves
My Bones:” the Surprisingly Controlling
Role of Religion in Equitable Disinterment
Decisions, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 361, 363 (2007)
(footnotes, quotations, and citations omitted).

There is no doubt that we deal here with a
most sensitive matter. Disputes: regarding
burial and. disinterment touch deep-seated
emotions and evoke. strongly held personal
and religious beliefs. Mr. Williams, a well-
known Medal of Honor recipient, believes
Mr. West’s remains should be moved. to the
State Veterans Cemetery in Institute, West
Virginia, so that he can be honored there for
his service, and his grave can be properly
maintained. On the other ‘hand, Mr. Roger
VanSickle, a great-nephew of Mr. West, and
other family members believe that Mr. West
should remain, at rest, in the family ceme-
tery that is located‘ within Chief ‘Cornstalk
Wildlife Management ‘Area, in Southside,
West Virginia. Mr. West’s widow, Maggie
VanSickle West, buried Mr. West in the fam-
ily cemetery, and they assert her wishes
must be respected. Notably, the family pro-
posed ‘an alternative that would have re-
solvéd this matter amicably: leave Mr. West's
grave undisturbed and build a memorial in

his honor’ at the Veterans Cemetery.

By rejecting this judicious proposition
without explanation, the majority summarily
concludes that: “Mr, Williams has, demon-
strated the. integrity and capacity to provide

“a most suitable and. deserving resting place

for Mr,. West’s remains.” Clearly, no one
questions Mr. Williams’ sincerityor integrity.
In fact, I suspect the majority disregards the
strong common law presumption in favor of
repose in large part: because Mr. Williams is
held in such high esteem. However, in mat-
ters such as these, the Court must be espe-
cially on guard to apply the rule of law in a
neutral manner. “The quiet of the grave, the

repose of ‘the dead, are not lightly ‘to be

er than relatives by blood,

374

disturbed. Good and substantial reasons must.
be shown before disinterment is to be sanc-
tioned.” Lipiner v. Plaza Jewish Cty. Chapel,
41 N.Y.S.8d 884, 387, 58 Mise.8d 1080 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2016) (citation omitted),

There is hundred-year-old case law recog-
nizing a strong common law presumption in
favor of repose. In fact, since antiquity, most,
societies have held burial grounds in great
reverence. See Memphis State Line R.R. v.
Forest Hill Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn. 400, 94
S.W. 69, 78 (1906) (observing that reposito-
ries of déad are regarded with veneration);
Mills v, Carolina Cemetery Park Corp. 242
N.C. 20, 86 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1955) (accord).
The early common law protected the sanctity
of the grave by recognizing the “right” to a
decent burial and the “right” to undisturbed
repose. Carney-v. Smith,-222 Tenn, 472, 4387
S.W.2d 246, 247 (1969); Thompson v. State,
105 Tenn. 177, 58 S.W. 218, 213 (1900). Ac-
cordingly, unless a good and substantial rea-
son existed, the common law strongly disfa-
vored disturbing a body once it had been
suitably buried. In the words of Justice Car-
dozo, then a member of the New York Court.
of Appeals, “[t]he dead are to rest where
they have been laid unless reason of sub-
stance is brought forward for disturbing
their repose.” Yome v. Gorman, 242 N.Y.
895, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (Ct. App. 1926),

The majority ignored fundamental rules of
law when it did not properly recognize the
substantial rights of the VanSickle family to
honor the decision of their ancestor, Mr.
West’s widow. By .reason of their familial
relationship with the decedent, their wishes
are of paramount importance.

First. That the paramount right is in the

surviving husband or widow, and, if the

parties were living in the normal relations
of marriage, it will require a very strong
ease to justify a court in interfering with
the wish of the survivor. Secondly. If there
is no surviving husband or wife, the right
is in the next of kin in the order of their
relation to the decedent, as children: of
proper age, parents, brothers and sisters,
or more distant kin, modified, it may be,
by cireumstances of special intimacy or
association with the decedent. Third[.]

How far the desires of the decedent should

prevail against those of a surviving hus-

band or wife is an open question, but as

against remoter connections, such wishes
especially if strongly and recently ex-
pressed, should usually prevail. Fourthly.
With regard to a reinterment in a differ-
ent place, the same rules should apply, but
with a presumption against removal grow-
ing stronger with the remoteness of con-
nection with the decedent, and reserving
always the right of the court to require
reasonable cause to be shown for it.
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A.
878, 880 (1904) (emphasis added); see also
Mallen v. Mallen, 520 S.W.2d 736, 737-88
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (stating “the wishes of
the spouse seem to command first consider-
ation”). The majority places undue emphasis
on the fact that the VanSickle family is relat-
ed to Mr. West by marriage, not blood, be-
cause Mr. West had no biological children.
This distinction is completely irrelevant. The
VanSickle family is still Mr. West’s family.
In contrast, Mr. Williams—although he peti-
tions with laudable purpose—is a legal
stranger to the West/VanSickle family. .
Even though he prevailed in this case, I
encourage Mr. Williams to reconsider his
position, respect the wishes of the VanSickle
family, and leave Sgt. West’s remains where
they have been laid to rest. The most excel-
lent way to honor our nation’s brave military
heroes who sacrificed to preserve our free-
doms is to follow the rule of law, without fear
or favor, The majority has failed to do so.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

801 S.E.2d 252
William F, CRAWFORD, Claimant
Below, Petitioner

ve
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS-WORK RELEASE,
Respondent Below, Respondent.
No. 16-0043
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 16, 2017
Filed: June 8, 2017

376

John Skaggs, The Calwell Practice, LC,
Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for the
Petitioner .

Steven K. Wellman, Jenkins Fenstermak-
er, PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, Attor-
ney for Amicus Curiae, Deferise Trial Coun-
sel of West Virginia ;

Jonathan J. Jacks, Lisa Warner Hunter,
Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia Attorneys
for the Respondent

Davis, Justice:

In this appeal from an order of the Work-
ers’ Compensation Board of Review (“the
Board”), Mr. William F. Crawford (“Mr.
Crawford”), petitioner herein and claimant
below, challenges the Board’s finding that he
is not eligible to receive workers’ compensa-
tion benefits for an injury he sustained while
he was an inmate participating in a work-
release program.’ Having considered the
briefs,2 the record submitted on appeal, the
relevant law, and the oral argument present-
ed by the parties, we affirm,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

This case involves a former inmate, Mr.
Crawford, who seeks workers’ compensation
benefits for an injury he sustained during his
period of confinement at the Charleston
Work Release Center.’ In order to be placed.
at the Charleston Work Release Center, Mr.
Crawford was required to sign a “Contract

1, The case was before the Board on appeal from
a ruling of the Worker's Compensation Office of
Judges (‘‘OOJ"’), The Board's order affirmed the
ruling of the OOS that, in turn, had affirmed the
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Claims
Administrator,

2, We recognize the participation’of Amicus Curi-
ae, the Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia,
who filed a brief in support of the respondent,
the Department of Corrections, We value the
contribution of the amicus and will consider its
brief in conjunction with the parties’ arguments.

3, The Charleston Work Release Center has been
replaced by the Charleston Correctional Cenfer,
which-was opened on May 1, 2015.

for Placement at a Work Release Center.”
The contract set out certain conditions for
participation in a work-release program, and
provided that Mr, Crawford could be re-
turned to his parent institution at any time.
After completing a thirty-day probationary
period, Mr. Crawford was assigned to a road
erew working for the West Virginia Division
of Highways (“DOH”). Inmates at the
Charleston Work Release Center, including
Mr. Crawford, were able to provide work to
DOH by virtue of a “Statewide Convict
Workforce Agreement” made between DOH
and the West Virginia Division of Corréc-
tions (“Corrections”),! the respondent herein.
and below. Under the particular agreement
in effect at the time relevant to this appeal,
which was dated April 26, 2012, Corrections
would make available to DOH “a number of
erews, which will vary both according to
availability of inmates and the seasonal needs
of [DOH].” In return, DOH agreed to “reim-
burse Corrections for inmate pay.” In addi-
tion, pursuant to the express terms of the
agreement,

[DOH] and Corrections agree that the
inmates performing services under this
agreement will not be employees of the
State entitling them to any benefits such
employees might have including, but not
limited to, insurance, worker [sic] compen-
sation, benefits, pensions, sick, and annual
leave.

(Emphasis added). In order to be on a road
crew, Mr. Crawford also was required to sign
a Corrections document titled “Contract for
Placement on Road Crew or Community
Crew.” This document established various

4, The respondent to this appeal has been incor-
rectly identified in the style of the case as "De-
partment of Corrections.” We note that the Leg-
islature reorganized the executive branch of state
government in 1989. That reorganization, in rele-
.Vant part, incorporated the Department of Cor-
rections into the Department of Public Safety
and designated it as the Division of Corrections.
See W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1()(8) & (j) (1989)
(Repl, Vol. 1990), Thereafter, the Department of
Public Safety was redesignated-as the Depart-
ment of Military Affairs and Public Safety. See W.
Va. Code §§ SF-2-1(e)(7) & (j) (1992) (Repl. Vol.
1993), The relevant provisions are now found at
W. Va. Code §§ SF-2-1(1)(8) & (0) (2011) (Repl.
Vol. 2015).

restrictions for inmate participation on a
road crew. For example, pursuant to the
contract, “[DOH] staff members have no au-
thority to excuse an inmate Road Crew mem-
ber from work.” Moreover, “[ajll inmate
Road Crew members must remain on their
designated crew unless given written permis-
sion to leave that assigned employment
placement. An inmate Road Crew member
will not be permitted to leave the assigned
erew until replaced by another person, ex-
cept in cases of parole or discharge.” Like-
wise, under. the contract, a Corrections “Em-
ployment Officer may terminate an inmate’s
work assignment at any time or may reas-
sign an inmate to a different work crew at
his/her discretion.”

While working on’a road crew serving
DOH, Mr. Crawford’s hand was severely in-
jured on March 28, 2018, when it was caught
in a wood chipper. His injuries resulted in
surgery and hospitalization, with medical
bills in excess of $90,000 that were paid by
Corrections. Mr. Crawford was paroled soon
after his release from the hospital.

Mr. Crawford initiated a claim for workers’
compensation and, on November 15, 2013,
the Claims Administrator rejected Mr. Craw-
ford’s application for benefits based upon its
determination that he did not suffer an inju-
ry in the course of and resulting from his
employment. The claims administrator found
that Mr. Crawford was an inmate and not an
employee as defined under West Virginia
Code § 28-4-1(a) (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2010). The
Office of Judges (“OOJ”) affirmed the deci-
sion of the claims administrator. The OOJ
found that Mr, Crawford was still inearcerat-
ed and an inmate while housed at the
Charleston Work Release Center. Moreover,
the work agreement between Corrections
and DOH made clear that the workers from
work release centers were considered in-
mates and not employees. The OOJ conclud-
ed that, pursuant to West Virginia Code
§ 28-4-1e(b) (2011) (2016 Supp.), Mr. Craw-
ford was ineligible to receive workers’ com-
pensation benefits for an injury he réceived
while in a work-release center performing
work for DOH. The Board affirmed the Or-
der of the OOJ. This appeal followed. By
order entered on February 16, 2017, this
Court directed the parties to file supplemen-

377

tal briefs. The case subsequently was snbmit-
ted on briefs and oral argument.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Board decision under review
affirmed prior rulings by the claims adminis-
trator and the OOJ, the standards for this
Court’s review of the Board’s rulings are set
out in W. Va. Code, §§ 28-5-15(b & e) (2005)
(Repl. Vol. 2010):

(b) In reviewing a decision of the board
of review, the supreme court of appeals
shall consider the record provided by the
board and give deference to the board’s
findings, reasoning and conclusions, in ac-
cordance with subsections (¢) and (d) of
this section.

(©) If the decision of the board repre-
sents an affirmation of a prior ruling by
both the commission and the office of
judges that was entered on the same issue
in the same claim, the decision of the
board may be reversed or modified by the
supreme court of appeals only if the deci-
sion is in clear violation of constitutional
or statutory provision, is clearly the result
of erroneous conclusions of law, or is
based upon the board’s material misstate-
ment or mischaracterization of particular
components of the evidentiary record. The
court may not conduct a de novo re-weigh-
ing of the evidentiary record. If the court
reverses or modifies a decision of the
board pursuant to this subsection, it shall
state with specificity the basis for the re-
versal or modification and the manner in
which the decision of the board clearly
violated constitutional or statutory provi-
sions, resulted from erroneous conclusions
of law, or was based upon the board’s
material misstatement or mischaracteriza-
tion of particular components of the evi-
dentiary record,

(Emphasis added). We have previously rec-
ognized, however, that this Court “review[s]
de novo legal conclusions of the Workers’
Compensation Board of Review, Johnson v.
W. Va, Office of Ins. Comm’r, 226 W.Va. 650,
654, 704 S.B.2d 650, 654 (2010),” Sheena H.

378

ex vel. Russell H. ew rel. L.H. v. Amfire,
LLC, 285 W.Va. 182, 185, 772 S.E.2d 817, 320
(2015). Finally, to the extent that our resolu-
tion of the case sub judice requires that we
engage in statutory construction, our review
likewise is de novo. See Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal
RM. v. Charlie AL., 194 W.Va, 188, 459
§.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Where the issue on an
appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.”). With regard for the forgoing stan-
dards, we address the dispositive issues here-
in raised,

TL

DISCUSSION

To resolve the instant matter, we must
address two issues raised in this appeal: (1)
Whether an inmate who is participating in a
work-release program and is assigned to
work for a state agency is prohibited from
receiving workers’ compensation benefits by
W. Va. Code § 28-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016);
and (2) Whether denying workers’ compensa-
tion benefits to an inmate who is participat-
ing in a work-release program violates equal
protection.® We address these issues in turn.

A. W. Va. Code § 23-4-Ie(b)

Mr. Crawford contends that W. Va. Code
§ 28-4-1e(b), which he characterizes as ex-
cluding workers’ compensation coverage for
work “imposed by the administration of the
state correctional facility or jail,” is unambig-
uous and does not exclude workers’ compen-
sation coverage for work-release employment
because such employment is voluntary as
opposed to being imposed by the administra-
tion of the state correctional facility or jail.

5. Mr. Crawford additionally attempts to argue
that denying him workers’ compensation benefits
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. We
reject this issue as inadequately briefed. See State
v. White, 228 W.Va. 530, 541 n.9, 722 S.E.2d
566, 577 n.9 (2011) (Typically, this Court will
not address issues that have not been properly
briefed.”); State v, LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 302,
470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (“Although we lib-
erally construe briefs in determining issues pre-
sented for review, issues which are ... men-
tioned only in passing but are not supported with
pertinent authority, are not considered on ap-
peal.”); State, Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
Child Advocate Office v. Robert Morris N., 195

In support of his argument, he relies on
Syllabus point 5 of State ew rel. Gillespie v.
Kendrick, 164 W.Va. 599, 265 S.H.2d 587
(1980), which refers to court-granted work
release pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1
and describes that program as a privilege.

Agreeing that W. Va. Code § 28-4-le(b) is
unambiguous, Corrections argues that its
plain language precludes work release in-
mates from receiving workers’ compensation
benefits, Corrections disagrees with Mr.
Crawford’s characterization of his work for
DOH as voluntary. Rather, Corrections con-
tends that, while inmates may voluntarily
request the privilege of participating in the
work-release program, once an inmate is ac-
cepted into the program the requirement of
work is imposed on inmates as a condition of
their continued participation in the work-
release program.’ If for any reason an in-
mate fails or refuses to work, the inmate is
returned to the correctional facility from
whence he or she came to resume serving his
or her term of incarceration at that facility.
See, eg., Syl., Craigo v. Legursky, 183 W.Va.
678, 398 S.E.2d 160 (1990) (“A convict con-
fined in the penitentiary or medium security
prison who is transferred to a work release
and/or study center established pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 25-1-3 (1977) remains in the
eustody of officers of the Department of Cor-
rections. Consequently if such convict ab-
seonds from a work release and/or study
center, he shall be deemed guilty of felony
escape pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-8-1
(1959).”). Corrections reasons that, because
Mr. Crawford would be returned to his origi-
nal facility if he violated his work agreement,
the work is imposed and not voluntary.

W.Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (“[A]
skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an
assertion, does not preserve a claim[.]” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). Accord W. Va.
R. App. P. Rule 10(c)(7).

6. Corrections explains that, during his first
month housed at the Charleston Work Release
Center, Mr. Crawford, like other work-release
inmates, was required to work within the facility.
‘Thereafter, he was given the option of finding
work in the private sector that might extend
beyond his incarceration or performing work for
DOH.

In our endeavor to settle the meaning of
W. Va. Code § 28-4-le(b) in the context of
the facts herein presented, we observe the
well-established principle that “[t]he primary
object in construing a statute is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the Legisla-
ture.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s
Comp. Comm’r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.H.2d
861 (1975). Therefore, “{a] statutory provi-
sion [that] is clear and unambiguous and
plainly expresses the legislative intent will
not be interpreted by the courts but will be
given full force and effect.” Syl. pt. 2, State v.
Epperly, 185 W.Va. 877, 65 S.B.2d 488 (1951).
In other words, “[wle look first to the stat-
ute’s language. If the text, given its plain
meaning, answers the interpretive question,
the language must prevail and further inqui-
ry is foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v.
State Tam Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va.
578, 587, 466 S.H.2d 424, 438 (1995). See also
Foster Found. v. Gainer, 228 W.Va. 99, 110,
T17 S.B.2d 883, 894 (2011) (“Statutes whose
language is plain must be applied as writ-
ten,”). On the other hand, “[a] statute that is

ambiguous must be construed before it can
be applied.” Syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew,
186 W.Va. 698, 414 S.H.2d 454 (1992), See
also Foster Found. v. Gainer, 228 W.Va. at
110, 717 S.H.2d at 894 (“Statutes ... whose
language is ambiguous must be construed
before they can be applied.”).

HM Pursuant to the relevant portion of
W. Va. Code § 28-4-1e,

7. The full text of this code section provides:

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this
code to the contrary, no person confined in a
state correctional facility or jail who suffers
injury or a disease in the course of and result-
ing from his or her work during the period of
confinement which work is imposed by the
administration of the state correctional facility
or jail and is not suffered during the person's
usual employment with his or her usual em-
ployer when not confined shall receive benefits
under the provisions of this chapter for the
injury or disease: Provided, That individuals
otherwise’confined in a state correctional facil-
ity or jail, or at a juvenile services facility, and
working in a program authorized by sections
fourteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] or sixteen
[W. Va. Code § 25-7-16] of article seven, chap-
ter twenty-five of this code, shall be eligible to
receive benefits under the provisions of this
chapter while working in an authorized pro-
gram. The coverage for benefits may be ob-
tained either by the private entity or by agree-

379

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this
code to the contrary, no person confined
in a state correctional facility or jail who
suffers injury or a disease in the course of
and resulting from his or her work during
the period of confinement which work is
imposed by the administration of the state
correctional facility or jail and is not suf-
fered during the person’s usual employ-
ment with his or her usual employer when
not confined shall receive benefits under
the provisions of this chapter for the inju-
ry or disease[.]

(Emphasis added).” While we agree that the
foregoing language is plain, we disagree with
the interpretation of that language proposed
by the parties to this appeal. Disagreement
as to the meaning of the statute does not,
however, render the statute vague. See 7.
Weston, Inc. v, Mineral Cty., 219 W.Va. .564,
568, 688 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2006) (“The fact
that parties disagree about the meaning of a
statute does not itself create ambiguity or
obscure meaning.”); In re Resseger’s Estate,
152 W.Va, 216, 220, 161 S.E.2d 257, 260
(1968) (“That the parties disagree as to the
meaning or the applicability of each [statuto-
ry] provision does not of itself render either
provision ambiguous or of doubtful, uncertain
or obseure meaning.”).

The plain language of the foregoing statu-
tory provision identifies two types of work:
(1) work performed during the period of

ment with the state agency as specified in
subsection (5), subsection (a) of sections four-
teen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] and sixteen [W.
Va. Code § 25-7-16] of article seven, chapter
twenty-five of this code.
W. Va. Code § 23-4-ie(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016).
The parties agree that the exceptions contained
in W. Va. Code § 25-7-14 & § 25-7-16, which
pertain to the Prisoners’ Industries Enhancement
(“PIE”) program that apparently has never been
implemented, do not apply to Mr. Crawford.
Corrections asserts that the different treatment
afforded the PIE program, which was crafted to
comply with federal law, was to ensure that
participating private industries received no un-
fair advantage from using inmate workers. The
purpose was not to protect inmate workers. See
McMaster v. State of Minn., 30 F.3d 976, 981 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“We conclude that Congress’ purpose
in enacting the Ashurst-Sumners Act was to pro-
tect private business, not to protect the inmate
worker.”).

380

confinement which work is imposed by the
administration of the state correctional facili-
ty or jail; and (2) the person’s usual employ-
ment with -his or her usual employer when
not confined. Under the. statute, workers’
compensation benefits are not provided to a
person confined in a state correctional facility
or jail for an injury sustained while the per-
son is engaged in the first type of work, ie,
work performed during the inmate’s period
of. confinement, which, as the statute plainly
recognizes, necessarily “is imposed by the
administration of the state correctional facili-
ty or jail.” Workers’ compensation benefits
are, however, available to a person confined
in a state correctional facility or jail for an
injury sustained while he or she is engaged
in the second type of- work, that is, the
person’s' usual employment with his or her
usual employer when not confined,

TH Accordingly, we now expressly hold
that W. Va. Code § 28-4-Le(b) (2011) (Supp.
~ 2016) prohibits a person confined in a state
correctional facility or jail who is participat-
ing in a work-release program from receiving
workers’ compensation benefits for any inju-
ry sustained while engaged in such work
during the person’s period’ of confinement.§
Applying the foregoing holding to the facts
of the instant case, it is clear that Mr. Craw-
ford is not entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits for the injury he sustained, Mr,
Crawford was injured during his period of
confinement while participating in a work-
release program ‘through the Charleston
Work Release Center, which is a state cor-
rectional facility. See W. Va. Code § 25-1-3(d)

8. We reach this holding based upon Mr. Craw-
ford’s employment by a state agericy, and we
render no decision regarding an incarcerated
inmate's employment by a private employer, as
those are not the facts presently before us.

9. Also raised in this appeal is the question of
whether Mr. Crawford qualified as an “employ-

- ee” pursuant to W. Va, Code § 23-2-1a (1999)
(Repl. Vol. 2010). However, this question is ren-
, dered moot by our determination that Mr, Craw-
ford is barred from receiving workers’ compen-
sation benefits by operation of W. Va. Code § 23-
4-1e(b), which, by its own terms, prevails over
other provisions of the Code. See W. Va. Code
§ 23-4-1e(b) (beginning with “ ‘notwithstanding
any provision of this code to the contrary. .
See also State ex rel. Canterbury v. Paul, “208
W.Va. 665, 669 n.2, 520 S.B.2d 662, 666 n.2

(2018) (Repl. Vol. 2018) (providing “[t]he
Commissioner of Corrections may establish
work and study release units as eatensions
and subsidiaries of those state institutions
under his or her control and authority” (em-
phasis added)); Syl. in part, Craigo v. Legur-
sky, 183 W.Va. 678, 398 S.E.2d 160 (“A con-
viet confined in the penitentiary or medium
security prison who is transferred to a work
release and/or study center established pur-
suant to W. Va. Code § 25-1-8 [ (2018) (Repl.
Vol. 2013) ] remains in the custody of officers
of the Department of Corrections.”), There-
fore, we find no error in the Board’s ruling
that Mr. Crawford was ‘not entitled to work-
ers’ compensation benefits pursuant to W.

“Va. Code § 23-4-Le(b).!

“B, Equal Protection ©

Mr, Crawford additionally argues that his
equal protection rights have been violated
insofar as he is a member of a class in which
all persons are not treated equally. He con-
tends that some incarcerated prisoners who
work while serving their period of confine-
ment, i¢., those who work for private em-
ployers, are mandated to receive workers’
compensation, while those, such as himself,
who work for a state agency, are not. Mr.

. Crawford avers that, had he been doing the

same work for a private employer, he would
have received workers’ compensation bene-
fits. He argues that the denial of workers’
compensation benefits to work-release in-
mates serving a state agency advances no
reasonable government interest, nor is there
a rational basis for such a denial.!°

(1999) (“"‘Mdot questions or abstract proposi-
tions, the decision of which would avail nothing
in the determination of controverted rights of
persons or property, are not properly cognizable
by a court.’ ” (quoting Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Lilly
v, Carter, 63 W.Va. 684, 60 S.E, 873 (1908))).
Accord Syl. pt. 4, Cline v. Mirandy, 234 W.Va.
427, 765 S.B.2d 583 (2014); Syl. pt, 1, State ex
rel, Durkin v. Neely, 166 W.Va. 553, 276 S,E.2d
~ 311 (1981).

10... Mr. Crawford additionally asserts that he was
released from custody upon his release from the
hospital. He claims that his lack of treatment has
put him at a significant disadvantage in re-enter-
ing society, Mr. Crawford fails to identify any
specific treatment that was denied to him, In-
stead, according to the appellate record, Mr,
Crawford received treatment for -his injury at a

Corrections contends that,Mr. Crawford’s
argument fails because he cannot establish
that he was discriminated against as com-
pared to other incarcerated individuals. In
this regard, Corrections avers that Mr,
Crawford had the opportunity to seek private
employment. Corrections further asserts that
it has not been established in the record that
work-release inmates working in the private
sector actually receive workers’ compensa-
tion benefits.!! Nevertheless, Corrections
contends that, even if discrimination is found,
any such discrimination bears a rational basis
to a proper governmental purpose in that
there is a substantial governmental interest
in maintaining fair business practices and a
fiscally sound state budget. Corrections ex-
plains that, if the private sector was permit-
ted to employ inmates without providing the
benefits afforded to other employees, the
businesses would receive an unfair advantage
ih competition versus other private busi-
nesses not utilizing inmates. Corrections fi-
nally argues that imposing a duty on state
agencies to provide workers’ compensation
for inmate workers would have a substantial
negative impact on the State’s budget.

HM The right to equal protection is ex-
pressly provided by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution,
which declares in relevant part that “[nJo
state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Likewise, this Court has recognized that

cost in excess of $90,000, which amount was
paid by Corrections,

11. The only evidence in the record pertaining to
whether work release inmates working in the
private sector receive workers’ compensation
was the following deposition testimony by Mr,
Jeff Stinnett, Administrator of the Charleston
Work Release Center:

Q. And would those wages [earned by inmates
working for private employers} be reported[,] if
you know, by the employers as towards their
Workers’ Compensation premiutns?

. As far as I know, yes.

12, This Court has held that,

“««cetwibere economic rights are con-
cerned, we look to see whether the classifica-
tion is a rational, one based on social, econom-
ic, historic or geographic factors, whether it
bears a reasonable relationship to a proper

381

“West Virginia’s constitutional equal protec-
tion principle is a part of the Due Process
Clause found in Article III, Section 10-of the
West’ Virginia Constitution.” Syl. pt. 4, Israel
by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Sch.
Activities Comm'n, 182 W.Va. 454, 388
§.E.2d 480 (1989). In practice, “[e]qual pro-
tection of the law is implicated when a classi-
fication treats similarly situated persons in a
disadvantageous manner. The claimed dis-
crimination must be a product of state action
as distinguished from a purely private activi-
ty.” Syl. pt. 2, 4d. Accord Syl. pt, 4, Kanawha
Cty. Pub. Library Bd. v. Board of Educ. of
Cty. of Kanawha, 231 W.Va, 386, 745 S.H.2d

424 2018).

Hl Under the facts herein presented, we
need not address the existence of a rational
basis or whether the denial of workers’ com-
pensation benefits to inmates bears a reason-
able relationship to a proper governmental
purpose,” because we find there has been no
violation of Mr. Crawford’s equal protection
rights, Assuming, arguendo, that inmates
who work for private businesses through the
work-release program do, in fact, receive
workers’ compensation benefits, the receipt
of such benefits does not demonstrate disad-
vantageous treatment of inmates who instead
work for a state agency. Clearly both classes
of inmates receive treatment for work-relat-
ed injuries. With respect to privately em-
ployed inmates who presumptively receive

governmental purpose, and whether all per-
sons within the class are treated equally.
Where:such classification is rational and bears
the requisite reasonable relationship, the stat-
ute does not violate Section 10 of Article III of
the West Virginia Constitution, which is our
equal protection clause.” Syllabus Point 7, [as
modified,] Atchinson v, Erwin, [172] W.Va. [8],
302 S.E.2d 78 (1983).’ Syllabus Point 4, as
modified, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheel-
ing Wholesale Grocery Co., [174] W.Va. [538],
328 S.E.2d 144 (1984),” Syl. pt. 4, Gibson v.
West Virginia Department of Highways, 185
W.Va. 214, 406 S:E.2d 440 (1991),’ Syllabus
Point 2, Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, 186 W.Va. 720, 414 S.B.2d 877
(1991).” Syllabus point 2, E.H. v. Matin, 189
W.Va, 102, 428 S.E,2d 523 (1993).

Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 198

W.Va, 545, 482 S.B,2d 162 (1996), modified on

other grounds as recognized by Fitzgerald v. Fite-

gerald, 219 W.Va. 774, 783, 639 S.E.2d 866, 875

(2006), . ° .

382

workers’ compensation benefits, we note that
the Legislature has declared its intention
that the Workers’ Compensation Code oper-
ate, in part, “to assure the quick and efficient
delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to
injured workers.” W, Va. Code § 23-1-1
(2007) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Likewise, inmates
working for a state agency, such as DOH,
receive treatment for their injuries provided
by Corrections: “[t]here is no question that a
governmental unit, such as [a] Correctional
Center, has an ‘obligation to provide medical
care for those whom it is punishing by incar-
ceration,’ Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 108,
97 S.Ct. at 290, 50 L.Ed. 2d at 259 (1976).”
Nobles v. Dumeil, 202 W. Va. 528, 588, 505
S.E.2d 442, 452 (1998). It is clear, therefore,
that all inmates participating in a work-re-
lease program receive treatment for their
injuries sustained in the course of and result-
ing from their work? In the case of inmates
assigned to a state agency, treatment is paid
for by Corrections. Indeed, Mr. Crawford
has admitted that Corrections paid more
than $90,000 for the treatment of his injury.
In the case of inmates working for private
employers who subscribe to workers’ com-
pensation, treatment is paid for by the em-
ployer through such coverage.!4 Under these
circumstances, we find no equal protection
violation.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing discussion, we
affirm the December 21, 2015, decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board of Review
finding that Mr. Crawford is not eligible to
receive workers’ compensation benefits for
an injury he sustained while he was an in-

13. We recognize that there are disability benefits
provided under workers’ compensation in addi-
tion to medical treatment benefits; however, the
parties have not raised those specific benefits in
their equal protection arguments. Instead, the
parties have referred to workers’ compensation
in a general sense. Because the parties have not
briefed specific workers’ compensation disability
benefits, we will not address the same.

14, Mr. Crawford relies on State ex rel. Boan v.
Richardson, 198 W.Va. 545, 482 S.B.2d 162
(1996), in support of his equal protection argu-
ment. We find this case is distinguishable and

mate participating in a work-release pro-
gram.
Affirmed.

801 S.E.2d 260
IN RE: A.L.C.M.
No, 16-0786

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: February 28, 2017
Filed: June 9, 2017

not supportive of Mr. Crawford’s position. In
Boan, this Court found that W. Va. Code § 23-4-
23 (1994) violated equal protection insofar as it
reduced permanent total disability benefits to
individuals receiving old age social security ben-
efits. The conclusion reached by this Court was
based upon the fact that old age social security
benefits served a different purpose than perma-
nent total disability benefits. In the instant mat-
ter, all inmates receive treatment for work-relat-
ed injuries, it is merely the source of payment for
those injuries that differs.

we
ied
rs

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General,
Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General, Erica N. Peterson, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Charleston, West Virginia, At-
torneys for the Petitioner, West Virginia De-
partment of Health and Human Resources

Joseph J. Moses, Wheeling, West Virginia,
Petitioner and Guardian ad Litem for the
Minor Child, A.L,C.M.

Betsy Griffith, McPhail Law Office, Wheel-
ing, West Virginia, Attorney for the Respon-
dent, Father A.C:

Davis, Justice:

The instant proceeding is before the Court
upon a question certified by the Cireuit
Court of Ohio County regarding the parame-
ters of an abuse and neglect proceeding. By
order entered August 17, 2016, the circuit
court certified the following question to this
Court:

Is a Petition for Relief from Parental

Abuse and Neglect alleging abuse and/or

neglect of an unborn child who is subse-

quently born alive, actionable under West

Virginia law?

The cireuit court answered this question
“YRS.”

Under the power vested in this Court by
the governing authorities, we deem it neces-
sary to reformulate the circuit court’s certi-
fied question to more accurately address the
facts involved in and issues raised by the
case sub judice. See Syl. pt. 2, Martino v.
Barnett, 215 W.Va, 128, 595 8.E.2d 65 (2004)
(“When a certified question is not framed so
that this Court is able to fully address the
law which is involved in the question, then
this Court retains the power to reformulate
questions certified to it under both the Uni-
form Certification of Questions of Law Act
found in W. Va, Code; 51-1A-1, et seg. and W.
Va. Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating
to certified questions from a circuit court of
this State to this Court.’ Syl. Pt. 8, Kincaid
v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404, 482 S.B.2d 74
(1998).”). Accordingly, we reformulate the
subject query as follows:

When a child:is born alive, is the presence

of illegal drugs in the child’s system at

birth sufficient evidence that the child is an
abused and/or neglected child to support
the filing of an abuse and neglect petition?
We answer this question in the affirmative:
when a child is born alive, the presence of
illegal drugs in the child’s system at birth
constitutes sufficient evidence that the child

is an abused and/or neglected. child, as those
terms are defined by W. Va. Code § 49-1-201
(2015) (Repl. Vol. 2015), to support the filing
of an abuse and neglect petition pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 49-4-601 (2015) (Repl. Vol.
2015).

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

The child subject to the underlying abuse
and neglect proceeding, A.L.C.M.,! was born
alive in February 2016 at 25 8/7 weeks gesta-
tion; upon birth, the child’s umbilical cord
tested positive for cocaine, opiates, codeine,
hydrocodone, and oxycodone, which is indica:
tive of Mother’s undisputed prenatal drug
use. The child’s twin was not born alive; it is
believed that A.L.C.M.’s twin died as a result
of twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome? and
conditions related to the twin’s premature
birth.’ Following the child’s birth, A.L.C.M.
was. transferred from Ohio Valley Medical
Center in Wheeling, West Virginia, to Ruby
Memorial Hospital in Morgantown, West Vir-

1. We follow our longstanding practice’ in ‘cases
involving sensitive facts and refer to the child by
the child's initials only, See, e.g., In re: S.H., 237
W.Va. 626, 628 n.1,, 789 S.E.2d 163, 165 nl
(2016), See also W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e) (restrict-
ing use of personal identifiers in cases involving
children).

2. Twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome is defined
as

[a] complication of monochorionic multiple
pregnancies in which one fetus receives a
greater flow of blood than the other from the
placenta. It is diagnosed by fetal ultrasonogra-
phy: one twin’s amniotic sac has polyhydramn-
ios (excessive amniotic fluid), while the other
twin’s sac has oligohydramnios (insufficient
amniotic fluid). Death of one or both twins will
occur without intervention, Treatments include
repeated amniocenteses, laser therapy to pre-
vent the exchange of blood between twins, or
intrauterine surgery...

Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 2360-61
(22d ed. 2013). Accord Dorland’s Illustrated Med-
ical Dictionary 1851-52 (32d ed. 2012) (indicat-
ing that, in twin-twin transfusion syndrome, re-
cipient twin usually develops congestive heart
failure). The deceased twin of A.L.C.M., who was
larger than A.L.C.M., appears to have been the
recipient twin because that twin received a great-
er’ proportion of the prenatal blood supply than
did A.L.C.M. .

385
ginia, where the child remained in the NICU

until being discharged on October 26, 2016,

It appears from the record’ that Mother
and Father had a ‘casual relationship that
began in spring 2015. During this time,
Mother used illegal drugs and prescription
medications that had not been prescribed for
her, predominantly using heroin. Father, who
has an extensive criminal record for dealing
and distributing drugs, does not appear to
have been dealing, distributing, or using any
illegal drugs or ill-gotten prescription drugs
during this time. The record also indicates
that Father was working various construc-
tion jobs, while Mother was not employed.
Upon learning of Mother's pregnancy in De-
cember 2015, around the 16th week of gesta-
tion, Mother and Father commenced a more
committed dating relationship and began liv-
ing together. Father testified that, while they
cohabited, he discouraged Mother’s use of
drugs and would ask her to leave the apart-
ment whenever he found evidence of Moth-
er's drug use. Mother.testified-that she was
aware of Father's disapproval of her drug
use and admitted that she would lie to Fa-

3. A.L.C.M.’s neonatologist could not definitively’
say to what extent Mother’s prenatal drug use
caused or contributed to the death of A.L.C.M.'s
twin as compared to the twin’s other conditions
of twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome and prema-
turity. However, the doctor testified that Moth-

er’s prenatal use of cocaine could have contribut- |”

ed to.the twins’ premature births, The underlying
abuse and neglect petition attributes the twin’s
death to twin-to-iwin transfusion syndrome, pre-
maturity, and fetal hydrops, See Mosby's Medical
Dictionary 866 (9th ed. 2013) (defining ‘fetal
hydrops” as “massive edema in the fetus or
newborn, usually in association with severe er-
ythroblastosis fetalis. Severe anemia and effu-
sions of the pericardial, pleural, and peritoneal
spaces also occur, The condition usually leads to
death, even with immediate exchange transfu-
sions after delivery.”).

4. The record in this case consists primarily of _
DHHR’s abuse and neglect petition, the Guard-
ian ad Litem’s report, Various circuit court .or-
ders, Father's motion to dismiss, and hearing
transcripts from Mother's adjudicatory and dis-
positional hearings and Father's adjudicatory
hearing, although the circuit court has held Fa-
ther’s adjudication, in abeyance pending our res-
olution of the instant certified question. See infra
note 19, As such, the statement of alleged facts in
this opinion is derived from these sources insofar
as the circuit court's findings of fact are limited
to those set forth in its certification order.

386

ther about needing money to buy household
supplies and personal hygiene items in order
to fund her addiction.

From December 2015, when Mother’s
pregnancy was discovered, until the child’s
birth in February 2016, Father took Mother
to two ® prenatal doctor’s appointments.® The
record also demonstrates that Father drove
Mother to an out-of-state Subutex” clinic for
treatment and paid for her Subutex prescrip-
tion when he could afford to do so.8 Addition-
ally, Father stated that he contemplated hav-
ing Mother involuntarily committed to a
mental health facility so that she could re-
ceive treatment for her drug addiction, but
Mother convinced him that she would agree
to a voluntary commitment. Upon arrival at
the facility, however, Mother changed her
mind and refused to enter the facility’s reha-
bilitation program. Father testified that, dur-
ing this time, he continued to live with Moth-
er in order to provide her support and to
make sure she received the proper nutrition
she needed for her pregnancy; he also said
that he believed if he could provide Mother
with a stable home environment, he might be
able to encourage her to stop using drugs,
particularly for the sake of the babies.

As previously noted, the twins were born
prematurely in February 2016. On the day of
their birth, Father stayed at the Wheeling

5. The record reflects that Mother had only two
prenatal doctor's appointments between the time
she learned of her pregnancy and her premature
delivery of the twins.

6, It is unclear from the record to what extent
Mother's prenatal drug use was discussed at
these doctor's appointments, whether Father was
permitted to accompany Mother into the exam
room, or whether Father was given the opportu-
nity to speak with Mother’s doctor during these
appointments.

7. The medication Mother received as treatment
for her heroin addiction is alternately referenced
in the record as Subutex and Suboxone. Both of
these medications are used to wean persons ad-
dicted to heroin from the drug and to lessen
withdrawal symptoms, which was a concern
herein given Mother's pregnancy. See generally
Drug Identification Bible 2014/2015 Edition 881
(2014/2018) (describing both “Subutex” and
“Suboxone” as the ‘[b]rand name for a Schedule
II medication used to treat narcotic addiction”).

8, Testimony elicited during the hearings below
indicated that the cost for the Subutex clinic

hospital with the deceased twin and Mother
until Mother’s friend arrived to stay with
her. Father then drove to Morgantown to
visit A.L.C.M., who had been transferred
there by helicopter following birth. Mother
left the Wheeling hospital later that same
day against medical advice. Father stated
that, out of concern for Mother, her ongoing
drug use, and her ability to parent A.L.C.M.,
he filed a mental hygiene petition that result-
ed in Mother's involuntary commitment to
Hillerest Behavioral Health Services on Feb-
ruary 27, 2016, during which time she went
through withdrawal.

On March 4, 2016, the West Virginia De-
partment of Health and Human Resources
(DHHR”) filed the instant abuse and ne-
glect petition against both Mother and Fa-
ther alleging that A.L.C.M. was an abused
and/or neglected child.? The allegations of
Father’s misconduct vis-a-vis his child! in-
clude his failure to protect A.L.C.M. from
Mother's drug use—both prenatal and ongo-
ing after the twins’ births—and his continued
association with Mother, who DHHR consid-
ers to be a danger to and an unsuitable
guardian for the child in light of her ongoing
drug use and history of prior abuse and
neglect proceedings." In this regard, the pe-
tition specifically alleged that:

treatment and prescription was several hundred
dollars per month. See supra note 7.

9, DHHR’s petition concerned only A.L.C.M;
DHHR did not include A.L.C.M.’s deceased twin
in this petition or file a separate petition alleging
A.L.C.M.’s deceased twin to be an abused and/or
neglected child,

10. During the pendency of the underlying abuse
and neglect proceedings, Mother voluntarily re-
linquished her parental rights to A.L.C.M. and,
thus, is not a party to the case sub judice. Never-
theless, it should be noted that, in addition to
Mother's prenatal drug use, she has had her
parental rights to one child involuntarily termi-
nated, and she has placed her two other children
in her grandmother's care. A.L.C.M., and the
child's twin, are Father's first and only children,
and he has had no prior charges of child abuse
and/or neglect.

11. Following the circuit court's certification or-
der, DHHR moved to amend the underlying
abuse and neglect petition, which motion the
circuit court granted, Insofar as the record con-

The Respondent [Father] has been dat-
ing [Mother] for the last year and a’ half.
[Father] knew or should have known of
[Mother’s] drug abuse during her pregnan-
ey and took no steps to try to stop the
same.

[Father] has a history involving drug
abuse and drug dealing and/or involvement
with drugs himself, and this has led to
criminal activity that has resulted in his
incarceration.

[Father] has a criminal history including
a conviction for unlawful taking of a vehicle
in 1996; a conviction for conspiracy with
intent to deliver crack cocaine in 1998, for
which he was incarcerated for 87 months; a
revocation of his supervised ‘release in
2005; conviction for distribution of cocaine
in 2005, with a 40 month sentence; a con-
viction in 2012 for delivery of marijuana,
with a 1 to 5 year sentence; a conviction in
2018 for manufacturing or delivery of a
controlled substance with a sentence of 1
to 5 years.

The Department cannot ensure the safe-
ty of the child in the care of [Father] or
[Mother].

The infant [A.L.C.M.] has significant
health issues, and [the child] will require
extensive medical care and very attentive
custodians, The Department cannot rely on
Respondents [Mother and Father] to make
sure this necessary medical care and atten-
tion is provided for the infant.

The petition further alleged that A.L.C.M. is
an abused child and/or neglected child, as
those terms are defined by W. Va. Code
§ 49-1-201 (2015) (Repl. Vol. 2015). Finally,
the petition alleged that

Respondents’ [Mother’s and Father's]
drug and/or alcohol use is pervasive and
threatens the child’s safety.

The infant [A.L.C.M.] is in imminent
danger inasmuch as an emergency situa-
tains no evidence or testimony to support or
refute the additional allegations of abuse and/or
neglect, our consideration of this matter is limit-

ed to the allegations contained in the initial peti-
tion filed in March 2016.

12, See id. From the time of the child’s birth until
the filing of the petition, the child was in the
hospital and never resided with the Respondent

387

tion exists that threatens the welfare or
the life of the child, pursuant to West
Virginia Code § 49-1-201, as there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the infant is
threatened by non-accidental trauma; sub-
stantial emotional injury inflicted by a par-
ent, guardian or custodian; and the parent,
guardian or custodian’s abuse of alcohol or
drugs or other controlled substance has
impaired his or her parenting skills to a
degree as to pose an imminent risk to the
child’s health or safety.421

(Footnote added).

Though both parents waived their prelimi-
nary hearings, Father nevertheless ques-
tioned his paternity of A.L.C.M. because of
the possibility that another man was the
child’s father. During her dispositional hear-
ing on June 2, 2016,8 Mother voluntarily
relinquished her parental rights to A.L.C.M.
Following confirmation through paternity
testing that Father is A.L.C.M.’s biological
father, Father’s adjudicatory hearing was
scheduled. Prior to said hearing, however,
Father filed a motion to dismiss the subject
petition claiming that, pursuant to this
Court’s recent decision in State v. Louk, 237
W.Va. 200, 786 S.E.2d 219 (2016), an abuse
and neglect proceeding could not be brought
to protect a child who has not yet been born,
and, thus, by extension, a parent could not be
charged with injuries sustained in utero. The
cireuit court heard both Father’s motion to
dismiss and evidence regarding his adjudica-
tion on August 9, 2016.

Following the conclusion of the hearing,
the cireuit court held in abeyance a determi-
nation as to whether Father should be adju-
dicated to be an abusive and/or neglectful
parent pending resolution of Father’s motion
to dismiss, As to this issue, the parties
agreed to certify the following question to
this Court insofar as it was deemed to be
determinative of Father’s motion to dismiss:

parents, including Father, who has no other chil-
dren and has never been charged with child
abuse and/or neglect until the instant proceeding.
See supra note 10.

13. Father's adjudicatory hearing was stayed
pending the outcome of the paternity testing.

388

Is a Petition for Relief from Parental
Abuse and Neglect alleging abuse and/or
“neglect of an unborn child who is subse-
quently born alive, actionable > under ‘West.
Virginia law?
The cireuit court answered this question in
the affirniative by order entered August 17,
2016." This Court then accepted the certified
question for consideration,

Ih

STANDARD OF REVIEW

With respect to questions certified to this
court by a circuit court, we previously have
held that “[t]he appellate standard of review
of questions of law answered and certified by
a circuit court is de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Galla-
poo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,, 197 W.Va. 172,
475 S,H.2d 172 (1996), In accordance with
this standard, we will consider the parties’
arguments, .

i.

DISCUSSION

“HH The instant proceeding is before this
Court upon certification of a question of law
by the Circuit Court of Ohio County.
Through this question, we are called upon to
determine the extent to which, if any, a
parent can be charged with abuse and/or
neglect of a child who has suffered injuries in
utero as a result of illegal drug use by the
child’s mother during her pregnancy. In this
regard, the circuit court certified the follow-
ing question to this Court:

Is a Petition for Relief from Parental

Abuse and Neglect alleging abuse and/or

neglect of an unborn child who is subse-

quently born alive, actionable under West
* Virginia law?

14. Following entry of the circuit court's certifica-
tion order, Father’s motion for custody of his
child was denied. A.L.C.M. was discharged from
the hospital on October 26, 2016, and placed
with a foster family who is equipped to care for a
child with special needs.

15. At this juncture, we wish to recognize Fa-
ther's counsel for her diligent representation of
her client and her astute recognition of a possible
discrepancy between DHHR’s petition charging
Father with abuse and/or neglect, the facts of the

During the proceedings below, which gave
rise to the subject certified question, DHHR
filed a petition alleging that the subject child,
A.L.C.M., was an abused and/or neglected
child. This petition was, filed after the child
was born alive. Furthermore, DHHR did not
file. a separate petition alleging that the
child’s twin, who was not born alive, was an
abused and/or neglected child or include the
twin in the petition it filed regarding
A.L.C.M, Therefore, DHHR never sought to
protect a child in utero, but, rather, sought
only to protect a child who had ‘been born
alive, In light of these facts of the case sub
judice, we. find it necessary to reform the
certified question to more accurately depict
the nature of the instant controversy.

Hl Inherent in this Court’s power to an-
swer certified questions is the corresponding
ability of this Court to rephrase a certified
question when the facts and circumstances
giving rise to the question so warrant. See
Syl. pt. 2, Martino v. Barnett, 215 W.Va.
128, 595 8.E.2d 65 (2004) (“ When a certified
question is not framed so that this Court is
able to fully address the law which is in-
volved in the question, then this Court re-
tains the power to reformulate questions
certified to it under both the Uniform Certi-
fication of Questions of Law Act found in W.
Va. Code, 51-1A-1, et seq. and W. Va, Code,
58-5-2 [1967], the statute relating to certified
questions from a circuit court of this State
to this Court.’ Syl. Pt. 3, Kincaid v, Man-
gum, 189 W.Va, 404, 482 S.E.2d 74 (1998).”).

I Here, the certified question assumes
facts that were not before the circuit court,
4,¢., an unborn child, and asks us to resolve a
hypothetical controversy insofar as the ques-
tion contemplates the filing of an abuse and
neglect petition seeking to protect, an unborn
child who later is born alive. However, this

case sub judice, and the recent decision of this
Court in State v, Louk, 237 W.Va. 200, 786
S.E.2d 219 (2016), and, further, her determina-
tion to bring this matter to the circuit court's
attention in the interest of vindicating her client's
rights to his child. In fact, were it not for coun-
sel's intrepid perseverance to achieve justice for
her client, it is doubtful that we ever would have
been presented with this critical issue of first
impression.

Court is comprised to resolve only actual,
not potential, controversies. See, e.g., Syl. pt.
2, in part, Harshbarger v. Gainer, 184 W.Va.
656, 408 S.H.2d 899 (1991) (“ ‘Courts are not
constituted for the purpose of making adviso-
ry decrees or resolving academic disputes.’
Mainella v. Board of Trustees of Policemen’s
Pension or Relief Fund of City of Fairmont,
126 W.Va, 188, 185-86, 27 S.E.2d 486, 487-88
(1948).”), See also State ea rel, ACF. Indus,
Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W. Va. 525, 688 n.18, 514
S.E.2d 176, 184 n.13 (1999) (“{T]his Court
cannot issue an advisory opinion with respect,
to a hypothetical controversy.”),

Hl Moreover, the cireuit courts question
addresses the abuse and/or neglect of an
unborn child who is subsequently born alive.
However, DHHR never sought to protect an
unborn child in this case, Rather, DHHR
waited until after A.L.C.M’s birth to file the
underlying abuse and neglect petition, which
was based, in part, upon the injuries the
child received in utero as a result of the
illegal drug use of the child’s mother during
her pregnancy; the petition also alleged that
Father had failed to protect the child. Insofar
as a court reviewing a petition alleging that a
child has been abused and/or neglected must
“base[ ] [its findings] upon conditions existing
at the time of the filing of the petition and
proven by clear and convincing evidence,” W.
Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) (2015) (Repl. Vol.
2015),!8 the -certified question arising from
such petition also should be based upon facts
“existing at the time of the filing of the
petition,” id, Because the subject child had
already been born alive #7 when DHHR ‘filed

‘46, ‘Accord Syl. pt. 1, In Interest of 8.C., 168 W.Va.
366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981) (“W. Va. Code; 49-6-
2(@) [1980] [now W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i)],
requires the State Department of Welfare [now
the Department of Health and Human Services],
in a child abuse or neglect case, to prove ‘condi-
tions existing at the time of the filing of ‘the
petition ... by clear and convincing proof’ The
statute, however, does not specify any particular
manner or mode of testimony or evidence by
which the State Department of Welfare is obli-
gated to meet this burden,”); Syl. pt. 6, In re
Simmons Children, 154 W.Va. 491, 177 §.E.2d
19 (1970) (“The right to custody of children by
the parents is not absolute but is founded on
natural law, and in order.to separate a child
from its parents on the ground of unfitness of the
parents there must be clear, cogent and convinc-
ing proof.”).

389

its petition, we therefore find it necessary to
reformulate the circuit court’s certified ques-
tion to correspond with the conditions exist-
ing at that time, as follows:
When a child is born alive, is the presence
of’ illegal drugs in the child’s system at
birth sufficient evidence that the child is an
abused and/or neglected child to support
the filing of an abuse and. neglect petition?

To resolve this query, we first must look to
the statutes governing abuse and neglect
cases for the definition of those terms.!8 W.
Va. Code § 49-1-201 (2015) (Repl. Vol. 2015)
defines an “abused child” as follows:

“Abused child” means a child whose
health or welfare is being harmed or
threatened by:

(A) A parent, guardian or custodian who
knowingly or intentionally inflicts,. at-
tempts to inflict or knowingly allows anoth-
er person to inflict, physical injury or men-
tal or emotional injury, upon the child or
another child in the home. Physical injury
may include an injury to the child as a
result of excessive corporal punishment;

(B), Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation;

(C) The sale or attempted sale of a child
by a parent, guardian or custodian in viola-
tion of section fourteen-h, article two,
chapter sixty-one of this code; or

(D) Domestic violence as defined in sec-
tion two hundred two, ‘article twenty-s sever,

- chapter forty-eight of this code.

Additionally, W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 de-
fines “neglected child” as follows:

17. As such, we find the circuit court's reliance on
this Court's prior decision in Farley v. Sartin, 195
W.Va. 671, 466 S.E.2d 522 (1995), to be mis-
placed insofar as Farley concerned an unborn
child en ventre sa mere whereas the facts of the
case sub judice involve a child’ who was born
alive,

18. For this reason, we find our recent decision in
State y. Louk, 237 W.Va. 200, 786 $.B.2d 219
(2016), to be distinguishable insofar as it decided
matters regarding W. Va. Code § 61-8D-4a
(1997) (Repl? Vol. 2014), a criminal statute,
whereas the case sub judice arises in the context
of abuse and neglect proceedings governed by W.
Va. Code § 49-1-101 et seq.

390

“Neglected child” means a child:

(A) Whose physical or mental health is
harmed or threatened by a present refusal,
failure or inability of the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian to supply the child
with necessary food, clothing, shelter, su-
pervision, medical care or education, when
that refusal, failure or inability is not due
primarily to a lack of financial means on
the part of the parent, guardian or custodi-
an;

(B) Who is presently without necessary
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, edu-
cation or supervision because of the disap-
pearance or absence of the child’s parent
or custodian;

(C) “Neglected child” does not mean a
child whose education is conducted within
the provisions of section one [§ 18-8-1],
article eight, chapter eighteen of this code.

HE (When interpreting statutory provi-
sions, we are guided by our longstanding
rules of statutory construction. Our inquiry is
bound by the Legislature’s intent in promul-
gating the provision under review. “The pri-
mary object in construing a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Work-
men’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219
$.E.2d 361 (1975). Accord Lowe v. Richards,
234 W.Va, 48, 55, 763 S.E.2d 64, 71 (2014)
(“In our review of a statutory provision, it is
essential to afford the enactment an interpre-
tation that comports with the intent of the
Legislature.”); In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va.
625, 683, 619 S.E.2d 138, 146 (2005) (“The
cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
first identify the legislative intent expressed
in the promulgation at issue.”); Ewing v.
Board of Educ. of Cnty. of Summers, 202
W.Va. 228, 241, 503 S.E.2d 541, 554 (1998)
(“To interpret a statutory provision, we must
determine the legislative intent underlying
the statute at issue.” (citation omitted)).

HM «Where the legislative intent is
plain, we apply the statute as written without
resorting to interpretative rules. “[I]f the
legislative intent is clearly expressed in the
statute, this Court is not at liberty to con-
strue the statutory provision, but is obligated
to apply its plain language.” Dan’s Carworld,
LLC ». Serian, 223 W.Va. 478, 484, 677

S.E.2d 914, 920 (2009). Accord State ew rel,
McGraw v. Combs Servs., 206 W.Va, 512,
518, 526 S.E.2d 34, 40 (1999) (“Once the
legislative intent underlying a particular stat-
ute has been ascertained, we proceed to con-
sider the precise language thereof.”); Henry
v. Benyo, 208 W.Va. 172, 177, 506 S.E.2d 615,
620 (1998) (“When the legislative intent of a
statute’s terms is clear, we will apply, not
construe, its plain language.”).

HE Furthermore, where the statutory
language is plain, we apply it without further
construction. “When a statute is clear and
unambiguous and the legislative intent is
plain, the statute should not be interpreted
by the courts, and in such case it is the duty
of the courts not to construe but to apply the
statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel
Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign
Wars, 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.H.2d 353 (1959).
Accord Syl. pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153
W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where
the language of a statute is free from ambi-
guity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and
applied without resort to interpretation.”);
Syl. pt. 1, Dunlap v. State Comp. Dir., 149
W.Va, 266, 140 S.E.2d 448 (1965) (“Where
the language of a statute is plain and unam-
biguous, there is no basis for application of
rules of statutory construction; but courts
must apply the statute according to the legis-
lative intent plainly expressed therein.”); Syl.
pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 185 W. Va. 877, 65
S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision
which is clear and unambiguous and plainly
expresses the legislative intent will not be
interpreted by the courts but will be given
full force and effect.”).

HE Applying these tenets to the stat-
ute defining “abused child” and “neglected
child,” we find the Legislature’s intention to
be clear and the statute’s wording to be
plain. In essence, the provisions of W. Va.
Code § 49-1-201 seek to protect a child who
is harmed or threatened with harm from the
person inflicting such injury or failing to
meet the child's needs. As it relates to the
instant proceeding, abuse may be inflicted
knowingly or intentionally. Alternatively, the
harm to the child does not have to be consu-
mated, but may be only attempted and still

constitute abuse. Finally, a person who know-
ingly-allows another person to.abuse a child
may-also be charged with the abuse of that
child. Similarly, neglect includes conduct that
harms or threatens a child’s welfare based
upon the “refusal, failure or inability’ to
meet the child’s needs. Neglectful conduct
does not include, however, deprivation of a
child’s needs due to an economic inability to
satisfy them. See W. Va. Code § 49-1-201,

The abusive and/or neglectful conduct at
issue herein is twofold: (1) Mother’s use of
illegal drugs during her pregnancy and the
resultant injuries that A.L.C.M. sustained as
a result of such substance abuse and (2)
Father’s alleged ® failure to stop Mother’s
use of illegal drugs during her pregnancy.
Common sense dictates that the presence of
drugs in a child’s system at birth oceurs in
one of two ways—as a result of medical
treatment administered to the pregnant
mother or child in utero or because of the
mother’s substance abuse during pregnancy.
Here, there is no evidence that the twins
received medication in utero as part of their
prenatal care during Mother’s pregnancy.
Therefore, the only other logical explanation
for the presence of cocaine, opiates, codeine,
hydrocodone, and oxycodone in A.L.C.M.’s
system at birth is Mother’s prenatal drug
use, Which she has admitted and which the
record evidence confirms did, in fact, occur.

HM A petition alleging that a child-has
been abused and/or neglected may be filed
under the following circumstances:

If the department [DHHR] or a reputa-
ble person believes that a child is neglect-
ed or abused, the department or the per-
son may present a petition setting forth
the facts to the cireuit court in the county
in which the child resides, or if the petition
is being brought by the department, in the
county in which the custodial respondent
or other named party abuser resides, or in
which the abuse or neglect occurred, or to
the judge of the court in vacation. Under
no circumstance may a party file a petition
in more than one county based on the
same set of facts.

19. The abusive and/or neglectful conduct attrib-

uted to Father is “alleged” because the circuit
court held his adjudicatory hearing in abeyance

391

W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(a). W. Va. Code
§ 49-4-601(b) defines the information that
must be included in the petition alleging that
a child has been abused and/or neglected:
‘The petition shall be verified by the oath
of some credible person having knowledge
of the facts. The petition shall allege spe-
cific conduct including time and place,
how the conduct comes within the statuto-
ry definition of neglect or abuse with ref-
erences thereto, any supportive services
provided by the department to remedy the
alleged circumstances and the relief
‘sought. : .

(Emphasis added). We find these statutes

also to be clear and unambiguous, and, thus,
we apply the plain language used by..the
Legislature. See, eg, Syl. pt. 5, General
Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, 144 W.Va. 187,
107 S.B.2d 853. Pursuant to these provisions,
a petition alleging. that a child has been
abused and/or neglected is sufficient if the
conduct alleged to be abusive and/or neglect-
ful “comes within the statutory definition” of
those terms. W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(b).

In other words, if the conduct alleged to
constitute abuse and/or neglect comes within
the statutory definition of “abuse” and/or
“neglect;” such conduct is the proper subject
of an abuse and/or neglect petition. As we
observed, the presence of illegal drugs in a
child’s system at birth is indicative of the
mother’s use of such substances during her
pregnancy, which conduct satisfies both the
statutory definition of “abused child,” i¢.,
“{a] parent ... who knowingly ... inflicts
.+. physical injury ... upon the child,” W.
Va, Code § 49-1-201, and the statutory defi-
nition of “neglected child” ie¢, a child
“fw]hose physical ... health is harmed ...
by a present refusal [or] failure ... of the
child’s parent ... to supply the child with
necessary ... supervision [or] medical care
... When that refusal [or] failure ... is not
due primarily to a lack of financial means,”
id.

Moreover, with respect to Fa-
ther’s alleged failure to stop Mother’s illegal

pending this Court’s resolution of the instant
certified question. See supra note 4.

392

drug use during her pregnancy, the statutes
governing abuse and neglect proceedings al-
low a finding of abuse to be based upon a
parent's knowledge that another person is
harming his/her child. In this regard, W. Va.
Code § 49-1-201 includes within the defini-
tion of “abused child” :

a child whose health. or welfare is being

harmed or threatened by:

(A) A parent ... who knowingly
allows another person to inflict ... physi-
eal injury or mental or emotional injury
... upon the child....

With respect to this statutory language, we
previously have held that “W. Va. Code, 49-1-
8(a) (1984) [now W. Va. Code § 49-1-201
(2015) ], in part, defines an abused child to
include one whose parent knowingly allows
another person to commit the abuse,” Syl. pt.
8, in part, In re Betty J.W., 179 W.Va, 605,
871 S.H.2d 326 (1988). Moreover,

[t]he term “knowingly” as used in West

Virginia Code § 49-1-3(a)(1) (1995) [now
~ W. Va. Code § 49-1-201] does not require
that'a parent actually be present at the
time the abuse occurs, but rather that the
parent was presented with sufficient facts
from which he/she could have and should
have recognized that abuse has occurred.

Syl. pt. 7, West Virginia Dep't of Health &
Human Res, ev vel. Wright v. Doris S., 197
W.Va, 489, 475 S.H.2d 865 (1996), Thus, for a
child to’ be determined to be an “abused
child,” the parent charged with such abuse
need not commit the abuse him/herself, so
long as he/she knew that’ the subject abuse
was being perpetrated, even if the alleged
abuse occurs outside of the presence of the
parent charged with such abuse. Id,

20. This holding, as well as its attendant discus-
sion, necessarily is limited by the facts at issue in
this case that have given rise to the question
certified by the circuit court. That is to say that,
as noted in this opinion, DHHR filed the subject
abuse and neglect petition against parents of a
newborn child, not against parents of a child still
in utero, As such, we do not decide, and this
opinion should not be construed as deciding,
whether such a petition may be brought against
parents of a child in utero.

21, We note that this holding is consistent with
the result obtained in numerous cases previously
decided by this Court in which we upheld a

HM Accordingly, we now hold that when
a child is born alive,’ the presence of illegal
drugs in the child’s system at birth consti-
tutes sufficient evidence that the child is an
abused and/or neglected child, as those terms
are defined by W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 (2015)
(Repl. Vol. 2015), to support the filing of an
abuse and neglect petition pursuant to W.
Va. Code § 49-4-601 (2015) (Repl. Vol.
2015)! Therefore, we answer the certified
question, as reformulated, in the affirmative.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The certified question having been an- °
swered, we remand this case to the Cireuit
Court of Ohio County for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Certified Question Answered.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a coneurring
opinion, ~

JUSTICE WALKER concurs and reserves
the right to file a concurring opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, coneurring,
joined by WALKER, J.:

I concur whole-heartedly in the majority's
conclusion that an abuse and neglect petition
may be properly filed based upon the pres-
ence of drugs in a newborn’s system. In my
view, there is simply no question that a preg-
nant mother’s drug use is child abuse of the
type that must be remedied through our
abuse and neglect system and prosecuted
through our criminal justice system. I write
separately, however, to cast a light on the

finding of abuse and/or neglect based upon the
mother’s illegal drug use during pregnancy and
the presence of such illegal substances in the
child’s system at birth. See, eg., State ex rel.
JEHG. v. Kaufman, No.’ 16-0931, 2017 WL
526398 (W. Va. Feb. 8, 2017) (memorandum
decision); In re L.L., No. 15-0703, 2016 WL
700555 (W. Va. Feb, 16, 2016) (memorandum
decision); In re J.J., No, 13-0094, 2013 WL
5476390 (W. Va. Oct. 1, 2013) (memorandum
decision); In re J.W., No, 12-0496, 2012 WL
4069651 (W. Va. Sept. 7, 2012) (memorandum
decision); In Re; Dejah Rose P., 216 W.Va. 514,
607 S.E.2d 843 (2004),

majority’s plainly-manifested hypocrisy and
result-oriented. analysis in addressing pre-
cisely the same conduct last year in State v,
Louk, 287 W.Va. 200, 786 S.E.2d 219 (2016),
The majority evades the question squarely
preserited in this case for the sole purpose of
“distinguishing” the Louk decision and dis-
guising the contradictory reasoning em-
ployed therein. In Louk, the majority allowed
a mother to escape prosecution for her in
utero abuse of her child by focusing exclu-
sively on the fact that the injurious conduct
occurred in utero. Now, the majority re-
verses course and completely ignores the fact
that the injurious conduct occurred in utero,
for purposes of permitting an abuse and ne-
glect petition in this matter. While I agree
entirely with the majority’s ultimate conclu-
sion that such a petition is proper, the machi-
nations it undertakes to reach that conclusion
and camouflage its previous error warrants
discussion. .

The facts of this case are heart-breaking
and infuriating at once. A.L.C.M, is the sur-
viving twin who was born at approximately
twenty-five weeks gestation; his twin broth-
er died at birth. His mother, with the knowl-
edge of the respondent, abused | drugs
throughout her pregnancy. A.L.C.M. was im-
mediately life-flighted to the neonatal inten-
sive care unit at Ruby Memorial Hospital in
Morgantown at birth, where, as of the time
of the below proceedings, he remained with a
variety of very serious health concerns. Dur-
ing the course of these proceedings,
A.L.C.M’s mother voluntarily relinquished
her rights to the infant. Expert testimony
below described how A.L.C.M. was deprived
of essential bonding and physical nurturing
immediately after birth due to his mother’s
refusal to visit him—bonding and nurturing
even more critically vital due to his prema-
ture birth and attendant health complica-
tions,

The certified question presented by the
circuit court plainly and unmistakably asked
this Court to answer whether an abuse and
neglect petition was permissible where the
abuse and/or neglect occurred while in utero,
The majority tersely explains that since the
petition was filed after A.L.C.M. was born
alive, there is no “unborn child” at issue in

393

this case and casually reformulates the certi-
fied question to suit its preferred discussion
points. Without once dignifying the fact that.
the abuse in this case occurred exclusively
while A.L.C.M. was in utero, the majority
chooses to analyze the issue in a more politi-
cally comfortable manner and reaches the
fairly obvious conclusion that a post-natal
child who was abused by his or her mother’s
drug abuse im ‘utero is properly made the
subject ofan abuse and neglect petition. By
reformulating the question in this manner,
the majority attempts to evade the question
it so badly bungled in Louk: whether an
unborn child is in fact a “child” for purposes
of our system of justice.

In Louk, the majority purported to simply
apply the statutory definition of “child,”
blithely suggesting that had the Legislature
intended to criminalize Louk’s conduct of
harming her unborn child, it could have sim-
ply indicated as much. 287 W.Va. at 206, 786
S.E.2d at 225, Therefore, it concluded, Louk
could not be criminally prosecuted for child
abuse resulting in death, Id. at 209, 786
§.H.2d at 228, As I noted in my dissent, this
conclusion ignores completely West Virgi-
nia’s observance of the “born alive” rule
which would unquestionably have criminal-
ized Louk’s behavior and permitted prosecu-
tion. Id, at 215-18, 786 S.E,2d at 234-37
(Loughry, J., dissenting), Nonetheless, de-
spite suggesting that the issue was as simple
as applying the statutory definition of
“child,” the majority in Louk belabored at
length the fact that the abuse in that case
was “prenatal conduct that affects a fetus in
a manner apparent after birth[.]” Id. at 206,
786 §.B.2d at 225 (emphasis added). Foeus-
ing heavily on the timing of the injurious
conduct, the majority therein aligned itself
with jurisdictions which likewise refused to
permit prosecution “for prenatal conduct
causing harm to the subsequently born
child[.]” Jd. at 207, 786 S.E.2d at 226 (empha-
sis added). In short, the Louk majority deter-
mined that because Louk’s unborn child was
not, in its view, a statutorily-defined “child”
at the time of the criminal conduct, criminal
liability would not lie.

In the instant case, however, the majority
neglects to address whether A.L.C.M. was a

394

statutorily defined “child” at the time of the
injurious conduct, choosing instead to focus
on whether he was a child when the abuse
and neglect petition was filed.1 In a remarka-
ble turnabout, the majority abandons its
Louk vantage point and ascertains that the
proper measuring stick for actionable con-
duct is the purely procedural issue of the
child’s status as of the time the abuse and
neglect petition is filed, rather than at the
time of the alleged abuse and neglect. Dem-
onstrating that the reasoning in Loult is com-
pletely incongruous with the majority’s ratio-
nale herein, a Tennessee Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the Louk-type reasoning
regarding the timing of the harm to conclude
that a finding of abuse may be based on in
utero abuse: “[A] finding of abuse can be
based on conduct that occurs at one time and
injury that occurs at another. The Mother's
argument that all the components of abuse
must ‘exist concurrently’ is a prime example
of circular reasoning that offers nothing oth-
er than its own weight for support.” In re
Benjamin M., 810 8.W.8d 844, 848-49 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2009). By shifting focus to this
procedural timing issue, the majority appar-
ently believes it side-steps the issue of
whether injurious conduct to an unborn child
is actionable. In reality, all this analysis does
is demonstrate how fickle the majority and
malleable its reasoning when faced with hot-
button social issues.”

That said, the majority plows no new
ground in determining that an abuse and
neglect petition is properly based upon a
mother’s drug abuse during pregnancy. As
one New York family court stated:

{I]t would be incongruous to imagine the

Family Court Act’s clear purpose being

anything other than to protect children,

including unborn children, from harm.

Making a child endure an unsafe environ-

ment in the womb is ludicrous when this

1. The majority reasons that since A.L.C.M. quali-
fied as an “abused” or “neglected” child at the
time the petition was filed, the petition was statu-
torily compliant. However, were we to take the
majority's crabbed analysis to its logical conclu-
sion, in point of fact, A.L.C.M. would never have
been an abused or neglect “child” since neither
mother nor the respondent has so much as had
the opportunity to cause or inflict any degree of
abuse or neglect since his birth—the time the

same child is afforded protection from ille-
gal drugs and an unsafe environment the
moment it takes its first breath outside the
womb.

In ve Unborn Child, 179 Mise.2d 1, 688
N.Y.S.2d 366, 370 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998). This
Court further reasoned that “[s]ince the com-
mon law of this state protects the fetus from
negligent acts of a third party, then surely it
may be found to encompass protection of the
fetus from intentional acts by its mother,
which acts could cause the child to begin life
in an impaired condition.” Id. See also In re
M.M., 200 Vt. 540, 183 A.3d 879 (2015) (find-
ing child born, in part due to mother’s sub-
stance abuse, addicted to opiates to be child
in need of care of supervision); S.P. v, Cabi-
net for Health & Family Servs., No. 2012-
CA-000379-ME, 2012 WL 5830076 (Ky. Ct.
App. Nov. 16, 2012) (finding that neglect of
child by use of illegal drugs during pregnan-
ey); In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 90 Ohio
Std 197, 736 N.E.2d 462, 465 (2000) (“When
a newborn child’s toxicology screen yields a
positive result for an illegal drug due to
prenatal maternal drug abuse, the newborn
is, for purposes of R.C. 2151.031(D), per se an
abused child.”); In re Troy D., 215 Cal.
App.3d 889, 268 Cal-Rpir. 869, 873 (1989)
(“{A] living child must be afforded the pro-
tection of the juvenile court even though he
is at risk because of his mother’s actions
before his birth.”); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio
Mise.2d 81, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Com.
PI. 1986) (finding because “a child does have
a right to begin life with a sound mind and
body,” viable fetus is a child under the exist-
ing child abuse statute and harm to it may be
considered abuse) Matter of Baby X, 97
Mich. App. 111,298 N.W.2d 786 (1980) (finding
newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal
symptoms as a consequence of prenatal ma-
ternal drug addiction may properly be con-

majority clearly believes he became a statutorily-

defined “child.” A.L.C.M. was never in the custo-

dy or control of either parent from the time he
was born.

2. Notably absent in this case is the legion of
amici curia which filed briefs in the Louk case
imploring the Court to yield to their public policy
positions.

oe
oS
Ot

sidered a neglected child within the jurisdic-
tion of the probate court).

In sum, as my dissent in Louk and the
foregoing emphasize, I agree whole-heartedly
that “a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body” and that our
system of justice serves no higher purpose
than when it endeavors to preserve that
right. Baby X, 293 N.W.2d at 739. I trust
that this Court, when faced with legal issues
bearing upon this right, will resolve such
matters with judicious and sound reasoning
which properly venerates that right. Accord-
ingly, I respectfully concur.

801 S.E.2d 273
John D, WILLIAMS Plaintiff
Below, Petitioner
v.

Kenneth L. TUCKER and Deborah
A. Tucker Defendants Below,
Respondents

No, 16-0657

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 28, 2017
Filed: June 18, 2017

3, Moreover, although not the question presently
before the Court, in my view, a father’s failure
to act in the face of a mother’s drug abuse,
renders him an abusive and neglectful parent as
per the objectives of our abuse and neglect sys-
tem. Again, other courts have had little difficulty
in agreeing with this conclusion. See In re J.C.,
233 Cal.App.4th 1, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 (2014)
(upholding neglect finding where there was suf-
ficient evidence that father knew mother was
taking drugs while she was pregnant and did
nothing to protect his unborn child from her
conduct); Edward B. v. Arizona Dept. of Econ.
Sec., No. 1 CA-JV 11-0235, 2012 WL 1207388,

at “i (Ariz. Ct, App. Apr. 10, 2012) (finding
abuse and neglect petition proper where father,
while living with mother during the pregnancy
and being aware of her drug addiction, “neglect-
ed his child by failing to protect the child from
Mother’s substance abuse while pregnant with
the child.”); In re S.K.A., No. 10-08-00347-CV,

was sufficient to establish that he knowingly al-
lowed the child to remain in conditions and
surroundings that endangered the child's physi-
cal well-being).

1, The Tuckers (by counsel) did not comply with
the deadline to file their brief and moved this
Court for leave to file their brief out-of-time,

Stuart A. McMillan, Daniel J. . Cohn,
Bowles Rice LLP, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner _

James B, Atkins, Atkins & Ogle Law Of-
fices, LC, Buffalo, West Virginia, Counsel for
the Respondents _

WALKER, Justice:

-Petitioner John D. Williams (Mr.
Williams”) appeals the June 17, 2016 order of
the Cireuit Court of Putnam County denying
his motion for a preliminary and permanent
injunction to prohibit Respondents Kenneth
L, Tucker and Deborah A, Tucker (“the
Tuckers”) from pursuing their claims
through arbitration. Mr. Williams alleges the
cireuit court erred by abdicating its authority
to consider questions of waiver and estoppel
to an arbitrator. Mr. Williams further alleges
that the court erred in failing to find that the
arbitration was barred as a matter of law
because (1) it constitutes an impermissible
collateral attack on a prior award in favor of
Mr. Williams; and (2) the Tuckers waived
their right to arbitration. Upon consideration
of the parties’ briefs, oral argument,! the
submitted record and pertinent authorities,
we reverse the circuit court's order.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
- BACKGROUND
The Tuckers began investing with Mr.
Williams’s investment firm in October 2007.

+ At the outset of the proféssional relationship

between Mr. Williams and the Tuckers, the
parties entered into an Asset Management.
Agreement (“Agreement”)-on September 19,
2007. Among other’ things, the Agreement
. Their motion was granted, but they were deemed

ineligible to participate in oral argument as a
sanction. W. Va. R. App. P. 5(e) and 10 (i).

398

specifically provides for arbitration of dis-
putes between the parties as follows:
Disputes—This agreement contains a pro-
vision which requires that all claims arising
between the parties in respect to this
Agreement shall be resolved through arbi-
tration.
Client is aware that:
1, Arbitration is final and binding on all
parties.
2. The parties are waiving their right to
seek remedies in court, including the right
to a jury trial.
8. Pre-arbitration discovery is generally
more limited than and potentially different
in form and scope than court proceedings.

4. The Arbitration Award is not required
to include factual finding or legal reasoning
and any party’s right to appeal or to seek
modification of a ruling by the arbitrators
is strictly limited.

5. The panel of arbitrators will typically
include a minority of arbitrators who were
or are affiliated with the securities indus-
try.

Unless unenforceable due to applicable
federal or state law, any controversy aris-
ing out of or related to any transaction
with Advisor or its officers, directors,
agents, or employees, or to this agreement
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules
then in effect of the American Arbitration
Association. Judgment upon any award
rendered by the arbitrators may be en-
tered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.

2, FINRA is the successor to the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”), a self-
regulatory organization established under the
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a through -78qq (2012). “FINRA is
dedicated to investor protection and market in-
tegrity through effective and efficient regulation
of broker-dealers.” FINRA, http:/finra.org/about
(last visited June 2, 2017). FINRA is vested with
the authority to create rules that govern its mem-
bers and has regulatory oversight over “all secu-
rities firms that do business with the public.” 72
Fed. Reg. 42170 (2007).

3. The Central Registration Depository (“CRD”) is
an on-line registration and licensing system for

In July 2009, the Tuckers transferred their
account to a self-directed online investment
platform, by which time their account bal-
ance had declined twenty-nine and one-half
percent. Mr. Williams faults the economic
crisis for the decline and asserts that the
decline is less than or on par with other
mutual funds across the market during this
time period. On February 8, 2011, the Tuck-
ers commenced an arbitration alleging that
Mr. Williams had breached their contract
and made unsuitable investments contribut-
ing to the decline.

Although the Agreement required binding
arbitration in accordance with the rules of
the .American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) in the event of a dispute between
the parties, the Tuckers instituted arbitration
proceedings against Mr. Williams before the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
Inc. (“FINRA”)? Before Mr. Williams re-
sponded to the FINRA arbitration demand,
the Tuckers withdrew their arbitration de-
mand. By letter dated April 5, 2011, FINRA
acknowledged withdrawal of the claims.
However, the dispute remained a matter of
record relating to Mr. Williams’s registration
with the Central Registration Depository
(“ORD”)3

Mr. Williams then instituted expungement.
proceedings by filing his own arbitration de-
mand with FINRA on March 31, 2011, The
Tuckers consented to FINRA jurisdiction,
but declined to exercise their right to partici-
pate in the proceedings and did not oppose
expungement. The arbitration panel ren-
dered an arbitration award in favor of Mr.
Williams. Pursuant to the Agreement and
FINRA rules, Mr. Williams filed an action in

the United States securities industry, state and
federal regulators, and self-regulatory organiza-
tions administered by FINRA. The CRD contains
“administrative information (personal, organiza-
tional, employment history, registration and oth-
er information) and disclosure information
(criminal matters, regulatory disciplinary ac-
tions, civil judicial actions, financial information,
and information relating to customer disputes)’”
from a variety of sources. See NASD Notice of
Proposed Rule Change, SR-NASD-2002-168
(filed Nov, 18, 2002) available at https:/Awww.
finra.org/sites/default/files/RuleFiling/p001015.
padf (last visited June 2, 2017),

the Circuit Court of Kanawha County and
moved the court to confirm the FINRA arbi-
tration panel’s award in his favor. The Tuck-
ers accepted service, but did not file a re-
sponsive pleading or otherwise oppose the
expungement. An Agreed Order Granting
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award was
subsequently entered by the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County on January 27, 2012,

Four years later, on January 10, 2016, the
Tuckers filed an arbitration demand with the
AAA asserting the same claims against Mr.
‘Williams as in their original FINRA arbitra-
tion demand. Mr. Williams demanded with-
drawal of the arbitration proceeding and the
Tuckers refused. Mr. Williams then filed a
motion in the Cireuit Court of Putnam Coun-
ty for a preliminary and permanent injunc-
tion to prevent the Tuckers from pursuing a
second arbitration, Mr, Williams argued that
the second arbitration was barred because
the claims were precluded as an impermissi-
ble collateral attack on the prior FINRA
arbitration award that had been confirmed
by order of the Cireuit Court of Kanawha
County, Mr. Williams also argued that the
Tuckers had waived their right to arbitration.
The Tuckers responded that they had not
waived their right to arbitrate, and, in any
case, the preclusive effect of the prior judg-
ment and determination of whether they
waived their rights to arbitrate are questions
for an arbitrator, not the court. The court
below denied the injunction and ordered ar-
bitration, reasoning that Mr. Williams’s de-
fenses to the arbitration were themselves
arbitrable. It is from this Order that Mr.
Williams appeals.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HN s(We consider in this appeal the cir-
cuit court’s disposition of Mr. Williams’s re-
quest for injunctive relief, which resulted in
the circuit court compelling arbitration, We
have held that “[t]he denial or granting of an
injunction by a trial court is discretionary
and will not be disturbed upon an appeal
unless there is an absolute right for an in-
junction or some abuses shown in connection
with the denial or granting thereof.” Syl. Pt.
6, West Virginia Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v.
Storch, 146 W.Va. 662, 122 S.E.2d 295 (1961).

399

Here, however, we must maintain a two-
pronged standard of review because the deni-
al of injunctive relief rested on a question of
law. In this regard, “[w]here the issue on
appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
AL, 194 W.Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415, (1995).
Accordingly, the circuit court’s order denying
the injunction is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, but we examine de novo the un-
derlying legal conclusions on which the denial
is based. With these standards in mind, we
consider the arguments of the parties.

Il. DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that the parties entered
into a valid agreement to arbitrate their dis-
putes and that the Tuckers’ claims fall within
the scope of the arbitration agreement. That
said, the questions presented on appeal are
whether the defenses of waiver and estoppel
are to be determined by the court and, if so,
whether the court should have enjoined the
arbitration on the grounds of waiver or es-
toppel. We will address each in turn.

A. Is Waiver Determined by the Court or
an Arbitrator?

Hl We first recognize that arbitration is
purely a matter of contract. State ex rel.
Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Hill, 208 W.Va.
168, 168, 589 S.E.2d 106, 111 (2000). It is
undisputed that Mr. Williams and the Tuck-
ers contracted to submit their disputes to
arbitration. However, the Tuckers contend
that whether they waived their contractual
right to arbitrate is a matter to be deter-
mined by the arbitrator. We disagree.

HH We consistently have recognized the
role of the court in evaluating the enforce-
ability of an arbitration agreement under
state contract law. In Schwmacher Homes of
Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 237 W.Va. 879,
787 S.E.2d 650 (2016), we observed:

Once the arbitration clause has been
severed or separated out for scrutiny, the
FAA limits the trial court to considering
only two threshold questions: (1) Under
state contract law, is there a valid, irrevo-

400

cable, and enforceable arbitration agree-
ment between the parties? And, (2) ‘Does
- the parties’ dispute fall within the scope of
the arbitration agreement?
Id, at 388, 787 S.E.2d at 659 (emphasis add-
ed). We find that the issue of waiver before
us'in this appeal relates to the first threshold
question of enforceability. Regarding the’ ap-
plication of state contract law, we have ob-
served, “[nJothing in the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, overrides normal rules of
contract interpretation. Generally applicable
contract defenses—such as laches, estoppel,
waiver, fraud, duress, or unconscionability—
may be applied ‘to invalidate an arbitration
agreement.” Syl. Pt. 9, Brown v. Genesis
Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va, 646, 724 S.H.2d
250 (2011) (reversed on other grounds by
Marmet Health Care Ctr. Inc. v. Brown, 565
_ US. 580, 182 S.Ct. 1201, 182 L.Ed.2d 42
(2012) (emphasis added). See also Geological
Assessment & Leasing v. O'Hara, 236 W.Va.
881, 887, 780 S.H.2d 647, 653. (2015) (“[Ilf the
contract defense exists under general com-
mon law principles, then it may be asserted
to counter the claim that a ... provision
binds the parties.”).

We discussed waiver in the context of arbi-
tration in Parsons v. Halliburton Energy
Services, Inc,, 237 W. Va, 188, 785 S.E.2d 844
(2016):

Stated differently, “[t]he FAA recog-
nizes that an agreement to arbitrate is a
contract. The rights and liabilities of the
parties are controlled by the state law of
contracts.” .,. “Thus, the question of
whether there has been waiver in the arbi-

- tyation agreement context should be ana-
lyzed in much the same way as in any
~ other contractual context.”

HE [. at 147, 785 S.E.2d at 858 (cita-
tions omitted). Based on that reasoning, we
held in Parsons that “[t]he right to arbitra-
tion, like any other contract right, can’ be
waived.” Id. at Syl. Pt, 6, in part, Our law is
clear that waiver is a general contract de-
fense that’ may be applied to invalidate a
contract. We now hold that in the absence of

4, , There is no delegation provision in the Agree-
merit, In the absence of a “clear and unmistak-
able” delegation provision evincing that the par-
ties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, the default

an agreement to the contrary, waiver of a
contractual right‘to arbitration is a threshold
question of enforceability to be’ determined
by a court, not an arbitrator.t Having deter-
mined that the issue of waiver below should
have been determined by the court and being
fully apprised of the facts and arguments, we
now turn to our state contract law relating to
whether the Tuckers waived their right to
arbitrate,

B. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate

HM. As we discussed in Parsons, “the
question of whether there has been waiver in
the arbitration agreement context should be
analyzed.in much the sdme way as in any
other contractual context, The essential ques-
tion is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defaulting party has acted
inconsistently with the arbitration right.”
Parsons, 287 W.Va. at 147, 785 S.H.2d at 858
(quoting Nat'l Found, for Cancer Research v.
AG. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821-F.2d 772,
774 (D.C. Cir, 1987)), “To effect a waiver,
there must be evidence which- demonstrates
that a party has intentionally relinquished a
known right.” Syl. Pt, 2, in part, Ara v. Brie
Ins. Co., 182 W. Va. 266, 267, 387 S.E.2d 820,
821 (1989). Waiver “may be made by -an
express statemient or agreement, or it may
be implied from the conduct of the party who
is alleged to have waived a right.” Parsons,
237 W. Va. at 144, 785 S.H.2d at 850. Fur-
ther, we have held:

The common-law doctrine of waiver fo-
cuses on the conduct of the ‘party against
whom waiver is sought, and requires that
party to have intentionally relinquished a
known right. A waiver may be express or
may be inferred from actions or conduct,
but all of the attendant facts, taken togeth-
er, must amount to an intentional relin-
quishment of a known right. There is no
requirement of prejudice or detrimental
reliance by the party asserting waiver,

Syl. Pt. 2, Parsons. Thus, “[t]here must be
first, the existence of the right; second,
knowledge of the existence of such right; and

expectancy is that a court resolves questions of
arbitrability. See Schumacher Homes of Circle-
ville, Inc. v. Spencer, 237 W. Va. 379, 391, 787
S.E.2d 650, 662 (2016).

“third, voluntary intention to relinquish.”
Hoffman v. Wheeling Sav, & Loan Ass’n, 1388
W. Va, 694, 718, 57 S.H.2d 725, 785 (1950),
Applied in the arbitration context:

To establish waiver of a contractual
right to arbitrate, the party asserting waiv-
er must show that the waiving party knew
of the right to arbitrate and either ex-
pressly waived the right, or, based on the
totality of the circumstances, acted incon-
sistently with the right to arbitrate
through acts or language.

Syl. Pt. 6, in part, Parsons.

HM As discussed above, there is no dis-
pute that the Tuckers had the right to arbi-
trate pursuant to the Agreement. Relating. to
knowledge of the right, we have held that it
may be actual or constructive. Id. at 147, 785
S.E.2d at 858. Further, we have noted that
“it does not seem unduly onerous to charge
the parties to a contractual dispute with con-
structive knowledge of the terms of the un-
derlying contract” and, likewise, that “a par-
ty should be deemed to have knowledge of
the terms of agreements that he has execut-
ed.” Id. (quoting Thomas J. Lilly, Jr., Partic-
ipation in Litigation ‘as a Waiver of the
Contractual Right to Arbitrate: Toward a
Unified Theory, 92 Neb, L. Rev. 86, 122
(2013); Bros. Jurewicz, Inc. v, Atari, Inc,
296 N.W.2d 422, 429 (Minn. 1980)). Thus, the
execution of the Agreement by the Tuckers
imputes to them constructive knowledge of
the terms of the Agreenient. Moreover, the
institution of arbitration proceedings by the
Tuckers with FINRA in 2011, evinces, at
minimum, constructive knowledge of the ex-
istence of the right to arbitrate, albeit in an
improper forum,

We next consider, as we did in Parsons,
whether a party’s participation in other pro-
, ceedings constituted waiver of the right to
arbitrate. In Parsons, the plaintiff filed a
civil action in circuit court against his em-
ployer under the West Virginia Wage Pay-
ment and Collection Act 5 for failing to pay
final wagés in a timely fashion. Parsons, at
142-48, 785 S.E.2d at 848-49, The plaintiff's
employment contract, however, provided that
all disputes with the defendant would be

5. W. Va. Code §§ 21-5-1 to -18.

401

“finally and conclusively resolved through ar-
bitration ... instead of through trial before a
court.” Id, at 142, 785 S.H.2d at 848, The
defendant employer repeatedly sought exten-
sions to file a responsive pleading.and volun-
teered to produce class-wide discovery before
moving to compel arbitration. Id. at 144, 785
S.E,2d at 850, The plaintiff. contended that
the defendant's participation. in litigation
served to waive the right to arbitrate. Jd. We
disagreed, reasoning that the defendant had
made no formal, substantive response to any
of the plaintiff's requests, neither party had
formalized and filed a written stipulation
agreeing to an enlargement of time to re-
spond pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the West
Virginia Rules ‘of Civil Procedure, and the
defendant’s first filing with the circuit court
‘was a motion to dismiss that clearly asserted
the right to arbitration, Id. at 148-149, 785
S.E.2d at 854-55.

The facts in the case before us differ from
those in Parsons’ in several respects. First,
we are not analyzing the effect of a party
participating in litigation on the right to arbi-
trate, but ‘rather the effect of instituting a
prior arbitration on the right to arbitrate.
Second, the attendant facts and circum-
stances vary drastically concerning the
amount’ and type of participation,

Relating to the first incongruity, we note
that the analysis is much the same, but call
attention to it here because the facts below
add to the conclusion that the Tuckers acted
inconsistently with their right to arbitrate
under the Agreement despite having actually
asserted their claims in arbitration, As dis-
cussed above, the parties’ contract controls
their respective rights and liabilities, The
Agreement dictated that the Tuckers had the
right to have their issues resolved in arbitra-
tion pursuant’ to the AAA, The Tuckers
chose instead to pursue their claims in a
different forum when they filed their claim
with FINRA.

Hl Mr. Williams, as a FINRA member,
is required to abide by FINRA’s rules, in-
cluding its arbitration provisions, FINRA’s
arbitration rules provide that if “requested
by the customer” a FINRA member must

402

arbitrate a dispute that “arises in connection
with [their] business activities” under the
FINRA Rules. FINRA R. 12200. While Mr.
Williams, by virtue of being a FINRA mem-
ber, had a default obligation to arbitrate with
the Tuckers under the FINRA Rules, the
parties superseded and modified that obli-
gation through contract. See, e.9., Goldman,
Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.8d 738,
741 (9th Cir. 2014) (“LA] contract between the
parties can supersede the default obligation
to arbitrate under the FINRA Rules.”); UBS
Fin. Servs. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319,
828 (4th Cir. 2018) (“{Tyhe obligation to arbi-
trate under FINRA Rule 12200 can be su-
perseded and displaced by a more specific
agreement by the parties.”). Thus, one forum
is to the exclusion of the other: the Tuckers
did not have dual rights to arbitrate under
both FINRA and the AAA, The Tuckers
initiated proceedings under FINRA, with-
drew their complaint, and did not oppose
expungement or otherwise participate in
FINRA’s determination of the merits of their
claim, Moreover, the Tuckers signed an
agreed order expunging their claims against
Mr. Williams which was entered by the Cir-
cuit Court of Kanawha County, The Tuckers’
abandonment of their claims in the forum
they improperly chose demonstrates conduct
inconsistent with their right to arbitrate un-
der the AAA, We have held:

A party to a binding, irrevocable arbitra-
tion cannot unilaterally withdraw from
participation in the arbitration after it
has begun. If a party to a binding irrevoca-
ble arbitration unilaterally withdraws from
the arbitration, the claims or issues raised
by the withdrawing party are abandoned,
thereby precluding them from being pur-
sued in any subsequent arbitration or civil
action.

Syl. Pt. 1, Crihfield v. Brown, 224 W. Va.
407, 686 S.E.2d 58 (2009) (emphasis added).
In Crihfield, the parties agreed to arbitrate
under the AAA, which, we explained, does
not have a rule permitting the unilateral
withdrawal of a party in an arbitration, Id. at
412, 686 S.H.2d at 63. We further explained
6, We speak here only to the Tuckers’ initial arbi-

tration demand and not to subsequent expunge-
ment proceedings initiated by Mr. Williams. Of

the policy perspective of barring a second
arbitration as follows:

To hold otherwise and to give [the plain-
tiff] yet another bite at the apple would be
to place the whole system of arbitration in
peril. The case law is clear that irrevocable
arbitration is just that—irrevocable. To al-
low a party to simply walk away from a
binding, irrevocable arbitration with no
consequence defeats the purpose of arbi-
tration and is unduly prejudicial to the
other parties to the arbitration who are
trying to get the matter resolved. There
simply is no basis for allowing a party who
unilaterally withdraws from a binding, ir-
revocable arbitration to reinitiate the pro-
cess that the party voluntarily chose to
abandon.

Id, at 418, 686 S.E.2d at 64.

Here, the Agreement specifically states
that the parties will arbitrate disputes under
the AAA rules and further states that “[alr-
bitration is final and binding on all parties.”
While FINRA may permit withdrawal of a
complaint without prejudice, Mr. Williams
did not consent to be governed by FINRA
Rules for the arbitration of their disputes,®
nor did the parties’ agree that FINRA rules
would override their intent to make any arbi-
tration final, binding and irrevocable pursu-
ant to the AAA. Rather, Mr. Williams was
saddled with operating within FINRA’s ju-
risdiction once the Tuckers had filed their
claims in that forum in order to expunge his
record. We find our reasoning in Crihfield
equally applicable to the facts before us and
decline to allow the Tuckers to reinitiate the
arbitration process under the AAA after hay-
ing voluntarily abandoned their claims in ar-
bitration under FINRA.

Being represented by counsel, the Tuckers
are assumed to have been advised of the
implications of the expungement proceedings,
ie, that their claims would be substantively
reviewed by a panel of FINRA arbitrators
and affirmative factual findings made in or-
der to determine whether the circumstances
met one of the grounds for expungement. See
FINRA R. 12805; 2080, The Tuckers were

course, outside of the instant context, Mr.

Williams, as a FINRA member, is subject to
FINRA Rules.

provided with notice of the hearing so as to
present their claims against Mr. Williams
and defenses to the expungement of his rec-
ord with the CRD. The Tuckers not only
declined to participate in the expungement
proceedings, but also explicitly stated they
did not oppose the expungement. Further,
the Tuckers signed the Agreed Order Grant-
ing Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award
entered by the Cireuit Court of Kanawha
County. Viewed together, the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates the Tuckers
waived their right to pursue any future arbi-
tration under the Agreement.’

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with our resolution of the
dispositive issues herein raised, we reverse
the June 17, 2016 Order of the Circuit Court
of Putnam County, and remand for the entry
of an order enjoining the Tuckers from pur-
suing further arbitration and for any other
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a separate
opinion,

JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs and
reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

LOUGHRY, C.J., concurring, joined by
WORKMAN, J.:

I concur in the majority’s reversal of the
cireuit court’s patently erroneous refusal to
grant an injunction to the petitioner and
order the respondents to withdraw their ar-
bitration. However, in lieu of the majority's
determination to decide the matter by wad-
ing into the swamp of “arbitrability’ and
waiver, I believe the issue is far more
straightforward. As argued primarily by the

7. In Parsons, we discussed that a party need not
show detrimental reliance to effect a waiver and
differentiated the concept of waiver from that of
estoppel. See Parsons, 237 W. Va. at 145, 785
S.E.2d at 851 (‘“the distinction between the com-
mon law doctrines of estoppel and waiver is
simple: estoppel requires proof of prejudice or
detrimental reliance; waiver does not.... ‘the
terms “waiver” and “estoppel” have often been
used without careful distinction, and thereby
abused and confused.’ ”) (citations omitted). The

403

petitioner, the respondents’ latest arbitration
filing is an improper collateral attack on the
prior arbitration ruling of the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), as
well as the subsequent circuit court order
confirming that ruling. While collateral at-

.tack, waiver, estoppel, and the like are fairly

considered different facets of the issues
raised herein, there is little utility in over-
complicating what is plainly an impermissible
attempt to re-litigate a matter that has been
affirmatively decided and put to rest.

A more pointed examination of the facts
aids in highlighting the inappropriateness of
the respondents’ most recent arbitration de-
mand and the simplicity of this matter. It
appears the respondents opened an invest-
ment advisory account with the petitioner
two days before the market’s high point and
then closed the account shortly after the
market low was reached. The respondents’
account declined twenty-nine and one-half
percent, which is represented to be consis-
tent with or less than other balanced mutual
funds. The respondents filed an arbitration
demand with FINRA, alleging the petitioner
had made unsuitable investments. Before the
petitioner could respond, the respondents
voluntarily withdrew their arbitration de-
mand and personally apologized to the peti-
tioner for having instituted the arbitration.

Notwithstanding the respondents’ with-
drawal of their arbitration demand, their un-
resolved claims remained a part of the peti-
tioner’s record on the Central Registration
Depository, which is the central licensing and
registration system for the United States
securities industry. Accordingly, the petition-
er instituted a FINRA arbitration seeking to
expunge that record, The respondents, repre-
sented by counsel, consented to FINRA ju-
risdiction, but declined to participate and

facts before us present not only a waiver through
conduct, but an inducement on behalf of another
party to institute expungement proceedings.
However, because we find that the Tuckers
waived their right to arbitrate through their own
conduct, we need not analyze whether the Tuck-
ers would have been estopped from pursuing a
second arbitration. Likewise, because we hold
that the Tuckers waived their right to arbitrate,
we need not consider the remaining assignments
of error,

404

agreed in writing not to oppose the ewpunge-
ment,

Thereafter, a three-member arbitration
panel held a full evidentiary hearing on the
matter. The respondents did not: participate
in that hearing. The FINRA panel conclud-
ed, on the merits of the action, that “[tJhe
claim, allegation, or information is factually
impossible or clearly erroneous” and award-
ed expungement, As directed by FINRA,
and to give legal effect to the expungement,
the petitioner instituted a civil action in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County seeking
confirmation and ‘validation of the FINRA
expungement, The respondents accepted ser-
vice of the civil action, but filed no responsive
pleading. Instead, the respondents, by coun-
sel, executed an Agreed Order confirming
the expungement, which was entered by the
cireuit court. For obvious reasons, no appeal
of that order was pursued.

Nearly four years later, having retained
different counsel, the respondents have filed
another arbitration demand that raises the
same allegations previously found to be “fac-
tually impossible or clearly erroneous” by the
FINRA panel. In response, the petitioner
filed the instant action, seeking injunctive
relief against the respondents’ collateral at-
tack on the FINRA arbitration award, as
confirmed by order of the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County,

Courts have long refused to allow subse-
quent civil suits attacking arbitration awards.
See Corey v. N.Y. Stock Hwch., 691 F.2d 1205,
1211-12 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding subsequent
federal suit alleging irregularity in-prior ar-
bitration decision “is no more, in substance,
than an impermissible collateral attack on
the award itself”); Sander v, Weyerhaeuser
Co., 966 F.2d 501, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (reject-
ing attempt to file federal action subsequent
to arbitration, noting court’s “unwilling[ness]
to upset the streamlined nature of arbitration
by permitting the launching of collateral at-
tacks[.J”). This refusal to permit collateral
attacks has been found equally applicable
when the subsequent collateral attack also
oceurs in an arbitration forum: “[I]t is logical
to extend ... [refusal to permit subsequent
attack in federal court to] claims presented in
a second arbitration.” Decker v, Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 205
F.8d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2000), Subsequent
collateral attacks are inappropriate “whether
a party attempts to attack the award through
judicial proceedings or through a separate
second arbitration.” Id; see also Prudential
Sec. Inc. v. Hornsby, 865 F.Supp. 447; 451,
458 (N.D. Ill, 1994) (finding second arbitra-
tion filing “attempt to augment and modify
the first arbitration award” and, therefore,
“an impermissible collateral attack on his
previous arbitration award.”).

The majority's unnecessarily complex as-
sessment of waiver belies the simplicity of
this case, Collateral attacks through subse-
quent proceedings subvert finality and are
widely held to be impermissible, Accordingly,
T respectfully concur.

* 801 S.E.2d 282

Yeshiareg MULUGETA, Respondent
Below, Petitioner

ve

Dimitri MISAILIDIS, Petitioner
Below,, Respondent.

No. 16-0494 +

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 19, 2017
Filed: June 18, 2017

Gregory A. Bailey, Esq., Arnold & Bailey,
PLLC, Charles Town, West Virginia, Coun-
sel for Petitioner

Cinda L. Scales, Esq., Scales Law Office,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Re-
spondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

This divorce action is before the Court
upon the appeal of Petitioner Yeshiareg Mu-
lugeta (hereinafter “Wife”) from the April
15, 2016, order of the Circuit Court of

Berkeley County, West Virginia, which af-
firmed the final order of the family court. On
appeal, Wife contends the court abused its
discretion with regard to the permanent
spousal support award of $4,000.00 per
month. She claims this figure was “grossly
inadequate considering the enormous dispar-
ity in income” between the parties. Wife also
disputes the court’s equitable distribution
findings, specifically, classification of certain
retirement accounts of Respondent Dr. Dim-
itri Misailidis (hereinafter “Husband”) as
pre-marital, and classification of certain ex-
penditures he made as marital expenses.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm
the circuit court’s order with regard to the
equitable distribution findings, with the ex-
ception of the finding on Husband’s premari-
tal portion of his 401K retirement account;
we reverse that finding because the unrefut-
ed evidence showed $249,685.00 of that ac-
count was premarital. We also reverse the
award of spousal support, and remand this
case to the circuit court with directions to
enter an order remanding the case to the
family court for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

Husband and Wife hold medical degrees
from a University in Greece. Husband is a
principal with Martinsburg Radiology Associ-
ates, Inc. Wife has never worked outside the
home. They were first married in 1982, and
that marriage ended in 1990, Following their
first divorce, Husband paid rehabilitative
spousal support to Wife for five years, and
financed Wife’s efforts to obtain her Master’s
Degree in Public Health from George Wash-
ington University. The parties remarried in
2000, and their second marriage lasted four-
teen years.

The parties have two adult children, and
Husband has an adult child from another

1, Wife is a cancer survivor; the disease is now in
remission.

2, The value of the marital residence is approxi-
mately $400,000.00; there is no debt on this
property.

407

relationship. The parties lived comfortably in
Martinsburg, West Virginia, on Husband’s
annual salary of approximately $500,000.00.
The parties acquired real estate (the marital
residence and three condominiums in Mary-
land), retirement accounts, automobiles, and
incurred little debt.

Economie comfort, however, did not make
for a successful marriage. They last lived
together on or about August 28, 2014. Wife
moved to one of the condominiums the par-
ties owned in Maryland. Husband claims that
at the time she moved out, she advised him

that she was doing so to be close to her

medical treatment.! However, shortly there-
after Wife informed him that she no longer
wanted to be married.

Husband filed for divorce in November
2014, on the grounds of irreconcilable differ-
ences, The family court held its final hearing
the following year. Generally, the parties
agreed upon the values of their assets, which
approximate $4 million. On its Marital Prop-
erty Allocation/Distribution of Property
spreadsheet, the family court arrived at a net
marital estate of over $2.1 million, This fig-
ure, however, does not take into consider-
ation an Ameritrade stock account of $1.6
million that the parties divided equally, and
the marital residence. The parties agreed to
sell the marital home, and split those pro-
ceeds.” The family court granted the divorce,
distributed the marital property,’ and award-
ed Wife $4,000.00 a month in permanent
spousal support.

When the family court entered its order,
Wife was sixty-two years old, and Husband
was sixty-three years old. Looking ahead to
Husband's eventual retirement, the family
court determined that his retirement would
constitute a significant change in circum-
stances, subjecting the final order to modifi-
cation.

* 3. Wife received two condominiums of her choice,
and Husband received the remaining one. To
equalize the equitable distribution, the family
court ordered Husband to pay Wife $226,721.23;
these funds will be transferred from Husband’s
Radiology Associates 401K to Wife's Radiology
Associates 401K by qualified domestic relations
order to be prepared by counsel for Wife.

“408

Wife appealed portions of the family
‘court’s ruling. to the cireuit court, and it
affirmed; The cireuit court stated: “The con-
clusions of a.trial judge, sitting without a
jury, on questions of. fact are entitled to
peculiar weight and consideration because
the judge is in the best position to determine
the credibility of the witnesses.” It concluded
that the factual determinations made by the
family court were not clearly erroneous, and
it did not abuse its discretion in applying the
Jaw,

On appeal to this Court, Wife raises the
same assignments of error she raised below.
We will discuss the relevant facts in ‘more

detail below as they relate to our resolutions:

of the ‘issues. Specifically, Wife contends the
spousal support award was “grossly inade-
quate” because of the disparity of the parties’
incomes, Wife also asks us to overturn four
factual determinations that form the founda-
tion of the family court’s equitable distribu-
tion order, She contends the family court
improperly classified an Individual Retire-
ment Account (RA), worth $76,363.00, and
$271,115.00 of Husband’s 401K,‘ as Hus-
band’s premarital property, She also con-
tends the family court improperly classified
two payments Husband made from the mari-
tal bank account, after the parties separated
but before the divorce action was filed, as
marital expenditures: $88,700.00 to a family.
friend for the care of Husband’s ailing par-
ents; and $25,000.00 to the mother of his
other child for that child’s college expenses.
We address these issues below.

Tl, STANDARD OF REVIEW |
HI This Court has held that;

“In reviewing -challenges to findings
made by a family court judge that also
were adopted by a circuit court, a three-
pronged standard of review is applied. Un-

‘ der these circumstances, a final equitable
distribution order is reviewed under an.
abuse of discretion standard; the underly-

4, The family court mistakenly listed the
$271,115.00 figure in the equitable distribution
worksheet. The parties agreed that the amount of
the 401K claimed by Husband to be premarital
‘was $249,685,00.

ing factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard; and questions
of law and statutory interpretations are
subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt, 2,
Lucas v. Lucas, 215 W.Va. 1, 592 S.E.2d
646 (2003),

Syl. Pt. 1, Conrad v, Conrad, 216 W.Va. 696,
612 S.E.2d 772 (2005),

Hl With regard to spousal support, this
Court has held: “Questions relating to alimo-
ny ... are within the sound discretion of the
court and its action with respect to such
matter[] will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it clearly appears that such discretion
has been abused.” Syl., in part, Nichols v,
Nichols, 160 W.Va, 514, 236 S.B.2d 36 (1977).

HM Furthermore, with regard to the
family court’s factual findings that underlie
its equitable distribution order, this Court
will not set aside findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, un-
less they-are clearly erroneous. See e.g., Gor-
don v, Gordon, 174 Md.App. 588, 923 A.2d
149 (2007) (observing that identification of
marital and non-marital' property is question
of fact and appellate court will not disturb
factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous).
Generally, if there is competent evidence to
support factual findings, this Court will not
reverse those findings as clearly erroneous,
See Syl. Pt. 8, Hstate of Bossio v. Bossio, 287
W.Va, 180, 785 8.H.2d 886 (2016) (“‘A finding
is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support the finding, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm. conviction that a mis-
take has been committed. However, a review-
ing court may not overturn a finding simply
because it. would-have decided the case dif-
ferently, and it must affirm a finding if the
circuit court’s account of the evidence is plau-
sible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety,” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Tiffany
Marie S. 196 W.Va. 228, 470 S.E.2d 177
(1996).”).® It is within the sole province of the
5. See also Rebel v, Rebel, 833 N.W.2d 442, 448

(N.D. 2013) (noting "court's division of property

is a finding of fact that will not be overturned

unless it is clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are
presumptively correct. The complaining party

bears the burden of demonstrating on app:
that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous. A

family court, as fact-finder, to decide issues
of credibility, and this Court will not disturb
those determinations.® Even where testimony
is uncontroverted, a fact-finder is free to
disregard such testimony if it finds the evi-
dence self-serving, and not credible.

Ill DISCUSSION

A. Spousal Support

In West Virginia Code § 48-6-301(b)
(2015), the Legislature set forth a compre-
hensive list of factors that the family court
“shall” consider in determining the amount of
spousal support. These factors include:

(1) The length of time the parties were

married;

(2) The period of time during the marriage

when the parties actually lived together as

husband and wife;

(8) The present employment income and

other recurring earnings of each party

from any source;

(4) The income-earning abilities of each of

the parties, based upon such factors as

educational background, training, employ-

ment skills, work experience, length of ab-

sence from thé job market and custodial

responsibilities for children;

(6) The distribution of marital property to
be made under the terms ‘of a separation
agreement or by the court under the provi-
sions of article seven of this chapter, inso-
far as the distribution affects or will affect
the earnings of the parties and their ability
to pay or their need to receive spousal
support, child support or separate mainte-
nance: Provided, That for the purposes of
determining a spouse’s ability to pay
spousal support, the court may not consid-
er the income generated by: property allo-
cated to the payor spouse in connection
with the division of marital property unless
the court makes specific findings. that a
failure to consider income from the allocat-

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced
by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence
exists to support it, or, although there is some
evidence to support it, on the entire record, we
are left with a definite and firm conviction a
mistake has been made.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

409

ed property would result in substantial
inequity;

(6) The ages and the physical, mental and
emotional condition df each party; ~

() The educational qualifications of each
party;

(8) Whether. either party has foregone or
postponed economic, education or employ-
ment. opportunities during thé course of
the marriage;

(9) The standard of living established dur-
ing the marriage;

(10) The likelihood that. the party seeking
spousal support, child support or separate
maintenance can substantially increase his
or her income-earning abilities within a

" yeasonable time by acquiring additional ed-
“ ueation or training;

(11) Any financial or other contribution
made by either party to the education,
training, vocational skills, career or earn-
ing capacity of the other party;

(12) The anticipated expense of obtaining
the education and training described in
subdivision (10) above;

(18) The costs of educating minor children;
(14) The costs of providing health care for
each of the parties and their minor chil-
dren;

* (15) The tax consequences to each party;

s

(16) ‘The extent to which it would be inap-
propriate for a party, because said party
will be the custodian of a minor child or
children, to seek’ employment outside the
home;

(17) The financial need of each party;

(18) The legal obligations of each party to
support himself or herself and to support,
any other person;
(19) Costs and care associated with a mi-
nor or adult child’s physical or mental
disabilities; and

See also Vargo v. ‘Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459 (Pa,
Super. Ct. 2007) (stating finder-of-fact in divorce
action is entitled to weigh evidence presented
and assess its credibility and in so doing, firider-
of-fact is free to believe all, part, or none of
evidence and appellate court will not disturb its
credibility determinations).

410

(20) Such other factors as the court deems
necessary or appropriate to consider in
order to arrive at a fair and equitable
grant of spousal support, child support or
separate maintenance.

Id. § 48-6-301(b), in part.

In reviewing the spousal support order in
this case, we readily observe that the family
court focused heavily on the fifth statutory
factor. It stated that Wife received “signifi-
cant assets as a result of equitable distribu-
tion,” including the Ocean City condominium
which is rental property (that could be sold
for $250,000.00), her half of the Ameritrade
account of $800,000.00, and a separate retire-
ment account of $200,000.00. The court deter-
mined these assets should generate $5,000.00
per month.’ Relying on the fourth statutory
factor, the court imputed income to Wife of
$25,000.00 per year, which is approximately
$1,500.00 per month. The court noted that
Wife claimed her monthly expenses.were ap-
proximately $12,000.00, but it found her ex-
penses were “overstated.” The court also not-
ed the length of the current marriage and
the fact that Husband paid Wife rehabilita-
tive alimony following the first marriage.
Based on these considerations, the court
awarded Wife $4,000.00 a month in perma-
nent spousal support.8

Hl Wife maintains the family court arbi-
trarily determined that her expenses were
inflated. Moreover, she claims it failed to
appropriately consider the huge disparity in
the parties’ income considering the fact Hus-
band earns $40,000.00 a month and she has
no income, and none is anticipated. She
claims that spousal support of $4,000.00 is
not enough to cover even her basic housing
and health insurance costs. Wife argues that
the court gave little weight to many of the
statutory factors, including the total amount
of time the parties were married and the fact
that she has never worked outside the home.

7. Even though Wife was eligible to draw Social
Security retirement benefits based upon Hus-
band’s contribution, the court did not factor in
this potential income.

8. The family law judge apparently failed to rec-
ord the parties’ testimony and argument from
counsel on the issue of spousal support.

Husband disagrees with Wife’s attempt to
characterize herself as a homemaker, and he
claims to be the one who was more responsi-
ble for caring for the children. He agrees
with the family court’s assessment that Wife
could easily earn $25,000.00 a year. Husband
essentially faults Wife for choosing not to
gain employment, while at the same time
moving to an area outside of Washington,
D.C., where the cost of living is much great-
er. Ultimately, he supports the family court's
award of $4,000.00 a month, and states that
Wife can more than meet her monthly ex-
penses.

Hl We recognize that as long as the fam-
ily court fully considers the mandatory statu-
tory factors, and its award of spousal support
is within the parameters of reasonableness,
this Court should not disturb the award on
appeal. See Syl., Nichols, 160 W.Va. at 514,
236 S.E.2d at 86, However, in this case, we
conclude that the facts show Wife was harsh-
ly short-changed, considering the great dis-
parity of the parties’ income. Moreover, in-
cluded among the factors that the family
court was required to consider in determin-
ing the amount of the spousal support award
is “[t]he standard of living established during
the marriage[.]” W.Va. Code § 48-6-301(9).
The family court largely ignored this factor.
As a practical matter, its ruling would effec-
tively force Wife to deplete her retirement
savings while Husband continues to earn a
substantial monthly income and enhance his
retirement savings. .

Although the family court must consider
Wife’s income-earning ability pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 48-6-301(b)(4), it was
also required to consider the other factors,
including those “necessary or appropriate
... to arrive at a fair and equitable grant of
spousal support[.]” Id. § 48-6-301(b)(20), We
find that under the facts presented here, the
court’s imputation of income to her constitut-
ed a clear abuse of discretion, requiring re-

9. Wife asks us to add the years from the parties’
first and second marriage. We decline to do so,
especially considering the fact that Husband paid
rehabilitative alimony following the first mar-
riage.

versal. Wife has never worked outside the
home, and Husband clearly accepted this sta-
tus quo when the couple remarried in 2000.
Wife was sixty-two years of age when this
divorce action was filed, and she certainly
has no plans to join the workforce . now.
Therefore, given the Wife’s lack of present
employment, the length of this marriage, the
standard of living enjoyed by the parties, and
the Husband’s undisputed ability to pay,
there is no statutory or other mandate that
the family court impute income requiring
that she obtain a full-time job at this stage of
her life,

Simply stated, an unemployed party seek-
ing alimony was awarded only 10% of the
payor’s gross monthly income of $40,000.00,
Considering the duration of this fourteen-
year marriage, this spousal support award
was patently unfair. Accordingly, we reverse
the judgment with regard to spousal support
and remand to the circuit court with instruc-
tions to remand to the family court, The
family court must reconsider the amount of
spousal support in view of all the statutory

factors, and the totality of the circumstances
that exist in this case to arrive at a fair and
equitable grant of spousal support.

B. Equitable Distribution

Wife further disputes the family court’s
factual findings with regard to certain items
of equitable distribution. Although she sets
set forth four assignments of error on this
issue, in all assignments she essentially as-
serts that the family court erred in finding
that Husband established, with the requisite
degree of evidentiary certainty, the classifica-
tion of certain retirement accounts of Hus-
band as pre-marital, and classification of cer-
tain post-separation expenditures he made as
marital expenses. Husband contends that he
produced uncontroverted evidence on these
items and Wife failed to present sufficient
evidence to challenge his evidence or credi-
bility.

HM We begin with the basic premise that
the family court “shall divide the marital
property of the parties equally between the
parties.” W.Va. Code § 48-7-101. The statute
defines marital property as all property ac-
quired during the marriage with the excep-
tion of gifts of inheritance. Id. § 48-2-1. The

411

same principle applies to marital debts, e.g.,
obligations or payments made during the
marriage. See Downey v. Kamka, 189 W.Va.
141, 144, 428 S.H.2d 769, 772 (1998) (stating
“equitable distribution allocates the assets
and liabilities between the parties.”). In sylla-
bus, point two of Stuck v. Stuck, 218 W.Va.
605, 625 $.B.2d 367 (2005), this Court held:

“Equitable distribution ... is a three-
step process. The first'step is to classify
the parties’ property as marital or nonmar-
ital. The second step is to value the marital
assets. The third step is to divide the
marital estate between the parties in ac-
cordance with the principles contained in
[former] W.Va. Code, 48-2-82 [now W.Va.
Code § 48-7-103].” Syllabus Point 1, Whit-
ing v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d
413 (1990).

TE Wife disputes the classification of
Husband’s IRA worth $76,363.00 as premari-
tal property despite the absence of any docu-
mentation that he acquired these funds be-
fore the date of their marriage. Husband
testified that he set up this account when he
moved to Martinsburg, twenty-five years
ago, prior to the marriage. Husband worked
a second job in Kentucky and would fly there
to work over the weekend, for two years.
Husband testified that he did not have any
documentary evidence that he acquired this
account prior to marriage; he explained that
he never put any funds in the account during
the marriage and the account increased due
to passive appreciation and growth. Wife of-
fered no rebuttal testimony on this issue. On
appeal, she does not challenge Husband’s
credibility, but essentially argues that in the
absence of documentary evidence overcoming
the statutory presumption of equal distribu-
tion of the property, she is entitled to one-
half of these proceeds. Wife relies on Crea v.
Crea, 222 W.Va. 888, 664 S,E.2d 729 (2008),
wherein we affirmed the family court’s find-
ing that Mr. Crea failed to meet his burden
of proof in showing that certain credit card
debt was marital debt because he “provided
no documentary evidence, nor did he provide
any explanation as to why he could not obtain
the proper documentation, even though the
credit cards at issue were in his name and

412

under his dominion.” Id. at 891, 664 S.H.2d at,

Husband responds that the instant case is
distinguishable from Crea, and we agree.
Husband provided an explanation as to why
he could not obtain documentation due to the
age of the account, and because’ it was con-
verted by the pension administrator several
times, Husband testified that he attempted
to gather documentary evidence but was un-
able to do so, Significantly, the family court
found his testimony on this issue to be credi-
ble. .

This Court will not disturb the family
court’s credibility finding. Husband’s burden
required him to overcome a legal presump-
tion that the subject monies comprised mari-
tal funds. The family court properly applied
this presumption, held him to his burden and
employed a preponderance of evidence stan-
dard, After applying the correct burden of
proof, the family court found Husband's tes-
timonial evidence was adequate and persua-
sive. The absence of documentary support for
Husband's testimony does not invalidate the
ruling, because it was within the province of
the family court to determine the weight
accorded his testimony. See eg., In re Mar-
riage of Henke, 318 Il.App.8d 159, 245 Il.
Dec, 780, 728 N.E.2d 1187 (2000) (finding
trial court had properly classified’ certain
amount of property as marital where wife’s
testimony concerning contributions was suffi-
cient to trace contributions of marital estate
to nonmarital property by clear and convine-
ing evidence),

HH Similarly, Wife disputes the classifi-
cation that $271,115.00 of Husband’s 401K
(valued at $1,217,584.00) was premarital
property despite the absence of any docu-
mentation of the actual value of this account
on or around the date of their marriage. This
account was an employer-based 401K
through Husband's medical practice, Hus-
band worked for his business prior to the
marriage and had contributed to the retire-
ment account prior to marriage. The original
retirement plan was in the form of a defined
benefit plan; it later changed to a defined
contribution plan, and the plan administrator

10, It is not clear from the appendix record when

changed several times. Husband submitted
evidence from a certified public accountant
who determined the present value of the
premarital portion of this 401K. On appeal,
Wife claims the family court erred in finding
this’ portion was premarital when Husband
failed to produce a statement from his 401K
at or around the: date he claims this premari-
tal cash equivalent was deposited,

Husband counters that the lower court
properly relied on the opinion from his certi-
fied public accountant regarding the present
value of the premarital portion of the 401K.
Husband testified below that he attempted to
contact all previous plan administrators but
was unable to obtain any specific information
and no specific documentary evidence was
available as to the amount in the pension
plan because it was more than sixteen years
old, The family court accepted his testimony
on this issue and specifically found him to be
credible. We will not disturb this credibility
finding. However, we recognize that the fam-
ily court clearly made a mistake in the mari-
tal allocation worksheet on this issue, The
parties agreed below that Husband was
claiming that the premarital portion of this
account was $249,685.00, not $271,115.00.

HM Wife next disputes the classification
that Husband’s $83,700.00 payment to his
family friend, Mr. George Mouratides, on
October 1, 2014, for the care he provided to
Husband's elderly parents in Ethiopa, was a
legitimate, marital expenditure. Wife does
not allege any impropriety with regard to
this transaction, but simply contends Hus-
band failed to offer any documentation (other
than the check) to support it. She notes this
payment was made more than four years
after Husband’s father passed away.!° Wife
argues that, pursuant to West Virginia Code
§ 48-1-237(5), this expenditure was presump-
tively non-marital. See id.. (providing that
separate property acquired after date of sep-
aration but before order of divorce, is sepa-
rate property).

Husband responds that the family court’s
finding was not clearly erroneous. His par-
ents’ caregiver, Mr. Mouratides, moved to
the United States and told Husband he owed

Husband's mother passed away.

him for taking care of his ailing parents, and
Husband agreed.!! Husband claims he made
the payment to Mr, Mouratides before he
was even aware that Wife wanted to end
their marriage; Wife told him at the time she
moved to Maryland that she wanted to be
near her medical provider. Husband states
that in October 2014, he was making pay-
ments to reduce the parties’ debts, and, this
payment was simply one of those marital
expenses. In fact, Husband paid over
$100,000.00 in advance mortgage payments
on the condominium where Wife was living
during this time. The family court accepted
his testimony on this issue and specifically
found Husband to be credible. We will not
disturb this credibility finding. .

HH Finally, Wife disputes the classifica-
tion that Husband’s $25,000;00 payment to
the mother of his other child, Ms. Tersit
Galelat, for college expenses for this child,
made after the parties separated, was a legit-
imate marital expenditure.” Wife claims that
she should not be responsible for this pay-
ment. It was personal to Husband, complete-
ly voluntary, and not a court-ordered domes-
tie support obligation,

Husband replies that he made similar pay-
ments for his son throughout the marriage;
he reimbursed the child’s mother for the last
four years when she paid this child’s tuition
at Virginia Tech, Husband further testified
that since his son was graduating, this was
his last tuition payment. He treated all the
children the same and Wife never previously
complained. He asserts the family court
properly found this was a marital expendi-
ture especially when he made this payment
before he was even aware there were marital
difficulties. The family court accepted Hus-~
band’s testimony on this issue and specifical-

11. Husband explained: "my father had a’ stroke
in April, and he died in July, so all these months
he had to be taken care of, My mother had a hip
fracture, had a tumor and injury on her brain
with seizures, and so, she was bedridden for a
whole year[J” Husband relied on Mr. Moura-
tides to make arrangements for the care for his
parents in Ethiopia, while husband worked in
the United States.

12, The parties had 529 savings accounts for the
children’s educational expenses. At the final
hearing, they agreed to utilize these accounts for

413

ly found him: to be credible. We will not
disturb this credibility finding.

In sum, Wife left Husband’s evidence on
the above issues wholly unchallenged, decid-
ing ‘instead to rest her arguments on his
burden of proof. This position’ is unavailing.3

" Having concluded that the family court’s fac-

tual findings regarding classification of assets
were not clearly erroneous, we likewise con-
clude that its relatively equitable division of
the parties’ marital assets was not an abuse
of discretion. ©”

IV. CONCLUSION .

For the reasons stated above, we find suf-
ficient factual support in the record for the
family court’s equitable distribution findings;
thus, we affirm that portion of the circuit
court’s order, with the exception that’ we
order the cireuit court to make the correction
that Husband’s premarital portion of his
401K retirement account’ was $249,685.00.
We reverse the award of spousal support,
and remand this case to the cireuit court with
directions to enter an order remanding the
case to the family court for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed, in part, reversed,.in part, and
remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs in
part, dissents in part, and reserves the right
to file a separate opinion. *

LOUGHRY, C.J.,. -eoneurring, in part, and

‘dissenting, i in part:

I concur with the majority’s decision inso-
far as it directs the circuit court to correct a
mistake in the marital allocation worksheet
and clarify that Husband’s premarital portion
of his 401K retirement account was

the children’s education, and divide any unused
funds equally among the three children as gifts.

13. This Court has held that a criminal conviction
may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim, unless such testimony is inherently in-
credible, and that is a question for the finder-of-
fact. See State-v. Beck, 167 W.Va. 830, 844, 286
S.E.2d 234, 243 (1981). Clearly then, a family
court's classification of property for purposes of
equitable distribution can rest on credible, un-
corroborated testimony of a party.

414

“$249,685.00. Likewise, I agree with the ma-
jority’s decision to affirm the family’s court
findings pertaining to the classification of
certain assets and the equitable division of
the parties’ marital property. I dissent, how-
ever, to the reversal of the family court’s
award of spousal support. We have long held
that “[q]uestions relating to alimony ... are
within the sound discretion of the court and
its action with respect to such matters will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly
appears that such discretion has been
abused.” Syl., in part, Nichols v, Nichols, 160
W.Va. 514, 236 S.E.2d 86 (1977). In this case,
there was no basis to conclude that the fami-
ly court abused its discretion by failing to
grant Wife a permanent spousal support
award greater than $4,000 per month.

The majority hinges its decision on the
family court's “imputation of income” to
Wife, finding that it “constituted a clear
abuse of discretion, requiring reversal” of the
spousal support award, This reasoning has no
basis in fact, however, because Wife actually
stipulated that she was able to be employed
and able to earn at least $24,000 per year
with her medical degree and master’s degree
in public health.t Given Wife’s stipulation, it
cannot reasonably be said that the family
court abused its discretion by attributing in-
come to her.

Furthermore, the record reflects that the
family court considered all the relevant statu-
tory factors? in determining that a $4,000
monthly spousal support award was fair and
equitable under the circumstances. In that
regard, the family, court recognized the sub-
stantial amount of real property and invest-
ments * Wife has received through equitable
distribution and the ability of those assets to

1, In both her petition for appeal of the family
court's order and her brief submitted to this
Court, Wife acknowledged and accepted $2,000
per month of attributed income. The family court
order actually states that the parties stipulated
that Wife could earn at least $25,000 per year.

2, “It is not necessary to make specific findings as
to each statutory [spousal support] factor recited
but only those applicable and appropriate to the
case.” Banker v. Banker, 196 WNa. 535, 549, 474
S.E.2d 465, 479 (1996) (quoting Burnside v.
Burnside, 194 Wa. 263, 275 n.30, 460 S.B.2d
264, 276 n.30 (1995),

generate as much as $5,000 in monthly in-
come. The family court noted that Wife
would receive one-half of the proceeds from
the sale of the marital home, which was
valued at more than $400,000, and that now,
at age 62, she is able to utilize her invest-
ment and retirement accounts without incur-
ring penalties. In addition, Wife is eligible to
receive social security retirement benefits
based upon Husband’s contribution which
will provide her with more monthly income.

Although there is a significant disparity in
the parties’ income, the evidence reflects that
Wife actually increased her monthly ex-
penses by voluntarily moving from Berkeley -
County, West Virginia, to Montgomery
County, Maryland, which has a higher cost of
living because of its proximity to Washing-
ton, D.C. In addition, Wife chose the parties’
condo in Montgomery County that was sub-
ject to a mortgage for her residence. Wife
refused to take possession of the parties’
other condo in the same location that was not
encumbered by a mortgage.‘ Yet, even with a
mortgage, the record reflects that wife has
sufficient income to meet all her monthly
expenses.5

We have held that “[ulnder the clearly
erroneous standard, if the findings of fact
and the inferences drawn by. a family [court
judge] are supported by substantial evidence,
such findings and inferences may not be
overturned even if a circuit court may be
inclined to make different findings or draw
contrary inferences.” Syl. Pt. 3, Stephen L.H.
v. Sherry L.H., 195 W.Va. 384, 465 S.E.2d
841 (1995), superceded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Sharon B.W. v. George
B.W., 205 W.Va. 594, 519 S.H.2d 877 (1999).
Elaborating further, we explained that “if the

3. Through equitable distribution, Wife received
the parties’ rental property in Ocean City, Mary-
Jand and her half of the parties’ Ameritrade
account, which was $800,000. In addition, Wife
has a separate retirement account in the amount
of $200,000.

4, Husband received the other condo through eq-
uitable distribution.

5. According to the parties’ testimony, the condo
Wife received was valued at $550,000 and the
mortgage debt was $150,000.

lower tribunal’s conclusion is plausible when
viewing the evidence in its entirety, the ap-
pellate court may not reverse even if it would
have weighed the evidence differently if it
had been the trier of fact.” 195 W.Va. at 396,
465 S.E.2d at 195 (citation omitted). The
majority has clearly turned a blind eye to
these well-established precepts as its flawed
analysis reflects that it has engaged in a de
novo weighing of the evidence to reach its
desired result.

While family courts must consider financial
need when making spousal support determi-
nations, alimony may not be awarded to
equalize the parties’ income. Stone v. Stone,
200 W.Va. 15, 488 S.E.2d 15 (1997), In this
case, the family court found that a $4,000

415

monthly spousal support award was appro-
priate given the parties’ earnings and earn-
ing ability, the distribution of the marital
property, the parties’ education, and their
ages. In light of the foregoing and given the
deference afforded to the family court, I
would have affirmed its decision with respect
to the spousal support award. Accordingly, I
coneur, in part, and dissent, in part.

16

© 801 S.B.2d 431

VALENTINE & KEBARTAS, INC.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

Y

Gary J. LENAHAN, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent.

No, 16-0127
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,

Submitted: January 17, 2017
Filed; June 12, 2017

Albert C. Dunn, Jr., Esq., Bailey & Wyant,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

Ralph C. Young, Esq,’ Christopher B,
Frost, Esq., Steven R. Broadwater, Jr, Esq.,
Jed R. Nolan, Esq., Hamilton, Burgess,
Young & Pollard, plle, Fayetteville, West Vir-
ginia, Counsel for Respondent

WALKER, Justice:

Valentine & Kebartas, Ine. (“V&K”) ap-
peals the January 15, 2016 Verdict Order of
the Cireuit Court of Raleigh County. Follow-
ing a bench trial, the circuit court ruled ‘in
favor of Respondent Gary J. Lenahan (“Mr.
Lenahan”) that V&K violated the West Virgi-
nia Consumer Credit and Protection Act
(“Act”)! V&K challenges the circuit court’s
determination that the volume. of telephone
calls made by a debt collector to the consum-
er in this case, absent any other evidence of
intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten,
is sufficient to establish a violation of West
Virginia Code §.46A-2-125(d) (1974), Upon
consideration of the parties’ briefs and argu-
ments, the submitted record and pertinent
authorities, we reverse the circuit court’s or-
der,

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

V&K is a third-party debt collector ‘who
purchased Mr, Lenahan’s delinquent consum-
er account from ADT, a home security sys-
tem provider, ADT informed V&K that Mr,
Lenahan owed $1,349.58 on the account. The
facts are undisputed that Mr, Lenahan. in-
formed ADT that he denied owing the debt.
Similarly, there is no dispute that Mr. Lena-
han never notified V&K that he denied owing
the debt.

1, W.Va. Code
(Supp. 2016).

2,” Ms, Diaz testified that V&K conforms its prac-
tices to federal consumer law. For example, the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692 through -1692p (2012) ("FDCPA”), pro-
hibits a débt collector from communicating with
a consumer “at any unusual time or place or a
time or place known or which should be known
to be inconvenient to the consumer.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692c(a)(1). The statute further provides that

§§ 46A-1-101 through 8-102

417

V&R’s collection efforts commenced with a
March 9, 2012, letter to Mr. Lenahan notify-
ing him of V&K’s intent to collect the debt on
the ADT account. Mr. Lenahan admitted re-
ceiving the letter, Thereafter, V&K made
telephone calls to the telephone number pro-
vided by ADT for Mr. Lenahan. According to
the testimony of Linda Diaz, V&K’s Chief
Compliance Officer, V&K used a computer
referred to as an auto dialer to. place the
telephone calls,

As, Ms. Diaz testified, V&K directs its
managers to schedule auto dialer campaigns
for selected accounts on a daily basis. The
auto dialer is programmed to make telephone
calls according to certain parameters such as
time of day and number of calls per day or
week in compliance with applicable laws Ms.
Diaz further testified that the auto dialer
campaigns may be programmed to call dur-
ing the “prime time” hours of a particular
consumer’s time zone, Pursuant to V&K poli-
cy, managers scheduled auto dialer calls dur-
ing a consumer’s prime time hours all in an
effort to comply with the law while maximiz-
ing the chances of actually reaching the con-
sumer at a time he or she would be home to
answer the phone,

Ms. Diaz further testified that a manager
cannot schedule the specific time of a call or
calls, The exact time the auto: dialer places
the calls within the parameters set by V@K
is chosen randomly by. the computer. In the
case of Mr. Lenahan, the auto dialer cam-
paigns were programmed not to leave a mes-
sage.® If the call was answered, the auto
dialer was programmed to connect a collec-
tion agent with the person answering the
call. Mr. Lenahan offered no evidence to
contradict Ms. Diaz’s testimony regarding
V&K's process and procedures,

the convenient time to communicate with a con-

sumer, unless established otherwise by the con- .

sumer, is after 8:00 a.m, and before 9:00 pan,
local time at the consumer's location. Id.

3. The-trial transcript contains conflicting testi-.
mony about whether the auto -dialer lef one
message over the eight-month timeframe at issue
here, but this fact, in itself, is not material to our
inquiry. The parties do not dispute that Mr, Len-
ahan did not answer the call.

418 —

The number of telephone calls placed by
V&K to Mr. Lenahan is also not in dispute.
Between March 10 and 25, 2012, V&K used
its auto dialer to call Mr. Lenahan twenty-
two times. Between March 26 and 28, 2012,
the auto dialer placed seventeen additional
calls to Mr. Lenahan. Beginning on March 29
and continuing through November 17, 2012,
the auto dialer attempted 211 more calls to
Mr. Lenahan at times after 8:00 am, but
before 9:00 p.m. on various days, never more
than six times per day. The parties agree
that V&K attempted to call Mr. Lenahan 250
times during the eight-month period between
March 10, 2012, and November 17, 2012.4

Mr. Lenahan testified that the telephone
number provided by ADT to V&K had been
his cell phone number for twenty years. Dur-
ing 2011 and 2012, he had encountered signif-
icant financial difficulties and was receiving
approximately twenty to thirty collection
calls each day from various parties. Accord-
ing to Mr. Lenahan, he made a conscious
decision during this time frame not to answer
the phone if he thought the call was from a
debt collector. The facts are undisputed that
Mr. Lenahan did not answer the 250 tele-
phone calls placed by V&K, kept no record of
those calls, and never contacted V&K by
telephone or otherwise to contest the debt.

Mr. Lenahan filed suit against V&K in
March 2018. During the bench trial on Feb-
ruary 2, 2015, Ms. Diaz and Mr. Lenahan
were the only two witnesses who testified. On
May 22, 2015, the circuit court ruled in a
memorandum opinion that V&K’s unan-
swered telephone calls to Mr. Lenahan vio-
lated West Virginia Code § 46A-2-

4. Following the 250 attempted telephone calls,
the record indicates that three additional phone
calls from V&K were answered by Mr. Lenahan
on November 17, 19 and 20; 2012. Mr. Lenahan
argued at trial that he informed V&K during one
or more of these three phone calls that he was
represented by counsel. He asserted at trial that
one or two of the subsequent calls were made in
violation of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-128,
which among other things limits a debt collector
from contacting a consumer once the debt collec-
tor received-notice that the consumer is repre-
sented by counsel. The circuit court did not rule
on this claim and neither party raises it on ap-
peal. Therefore, we need not address the issue.

125(d)(1974). On January 15, 2016,5 the cir-
cuit entered its Verdict Order * awarding Mr.
Lenahan $75,000 in damages.

In its Verdict Order, the circuit court con-
eluded that the first twenty-two telephone
calls to Mr. Lenahan attempted from March
10 through 25, 2012, did not violate West
Virginia Code § 46A-2-125, However, the cir-
cuit court found that V&K “ramped up its
collection campaign” with the seventeen calls
placed on March 26, 27 and 28, 2012. As the
cireuit court explained:

The Court cannot fathom any possible
legitimate purpose that could be served by
inereasing the volume and frequency of
collection calls to a consumer who is known
to exercise dominion over the telephone
number being called and who has already
been informed that [V&K] was collecting a
debt by mail. Thus, the only logical conelu-
sion is that [V&K] increased its volume
and frequency of collection calls to Mr.
Lenahan in an attempt to harass or op-
press him into answering [V&K]’s tele-
phone calls.

Thus, the circuit court ruled that beginning
with the first call on March 26, 2012, V&K’s
230 subsequent unanswered collection calls to
Mr. Lenahan violated West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125, The circuit court awarded Mr.
Lenahan a statutory penalty of $326.08 per
call for a total of $75,000.7

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM This Court has established the fol-
lowing standard of review following a bench
trial:

5. The record offers no explanation for the eight-
month delay between the circuit court's Memo-
randum Opinion and Verdict Order.

6. The Verdict Order incorporated the Memoran-
dum Opinion by reference.

7, The circuit court noted that the minimum stat-
utory penalty of $100, when adjusted for infla-
tion since 1974, would be $475.33. Relying upon
Mr. Lenahan’s stipulation that in no event would
his recovery be more than $75,000, the court
assessed a penalty of $326.08 for each of the 230
phone calls for a total of $75,000. The court
found that Mr. Lenahan’s claims for actual dam-
ages, attorneys’ fees and costs were moot given
the stipulated cap on damages.

“Tn reviewing challenges to the findings
and conclusions of the circuit court made
after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferen-
tial standard of review is applied. The final
order and the ultimate disposition are re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, and the circuit court’s underlying
factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Questions of
law are subject to a de novo review.” Sylla-
bus Point 1, Public Citizen, Inc v. First
National Bank in Fairmont, 198 W.Va.
829, 480 S.E.2d 588 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 2, Timberline Four Seasons Resort
Management Co. v. Herlan, 223 W.Va. 730,
679 S.H.2d 829 (2009). With these standards
in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

IIL DISCUSSION
HM Whether the number of collection
calls alone is sufficient to find V&K liable to
Mr. Lenahan under West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125(d) (1974) is the issue raised in
this appeal and is a matter of first impres-
sion, The version of West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125 in effect at the time of the bench

trial in this case states as follows:

No debt collector shall unreasonably op-
press or abuse any person in connection
with the collection of or attempt to collect
any claim alleged to be due and owing by
that person to another. Without limiting
the general application of the foregoing,
the following conduct is deemed to violate
this section:

(a) The use of profane or obscene lan-
guage or language that is intended to un-

reasonably abuse the hearer or reader;

(b) The placement of telephone calls with-
out disclosure of the caller’s identity and

8. The West Virginia Legislature amended this
section of the Act effective June 12, 2015, See
2015 W.Va. Acts ch. 63, As a result, subsection
(@) now more specifically addresses call volume
by prohibiting the following conduct:

Calling any person more than thirty times
per week or engaging any person in telephone
conversation more than ten times per week, or
at unusual times or at times known to be
inconvenient, with intent to annoy, abuse, op-
press or threaten any person at the called
number. In determining whether a debt collec-
tor’s conduct violates this section, the debt
collector's conduct will be evaluated from the

419

with the intent to annoy, harass or threat-
en-any person at the called number.
(©) Causing expense to any person in the
form of long distance telephone tolls, tele-
gram fees or other charges incurred by a
medium.of communication, by concealment.
of the true purpose of the communication;
and ‘
(d) Causing the telephone to ring or en-
gaging any person in telephone conver-
sation repeatedly or continuously, or at
unusual times or at times known to be
inconvenient,’ with the intent to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten any person at.
the called number.
W.Va. Code § 46A-2-125.8 We focus our at-
tention on whether the circuit court erred in
determining that the volume of V&K’s tele-
phone calls to Mr. Lenahan constituted abuse
or unreasonable oppression by virtue of
“causing a telephone to ring ... repeatedly
or continuously ... with intent to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten” under West Vir-
ginia Code § 46A-2-125(d).

Relying solely on the volume of telephone
ealls placed by V&K’s auto dialer to Mr.
Lenahan, the cireuit court found V&K liable
under West Virginia Code § 46A-2-125(d).
The cireuit court reasoned that V&K
“amped up” its ‘collection campaign begin-
ning with six telephone calls on March 26,
five telephone calls on March 27 and six
telephone calls on March 28, 2012. Without
reference to any. evidence other than the
number of telephone calls on those three
days, the circuit court observed:

The Court cannot fathom any possible
legitimate purpose that could be served by
inereasing the volume and frequency of
collection calls to a consumer who is known

standpoint of a reasonable person. In the ab-
-sence of knowledge of circumstances to the
contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the
convenient time for communicating with a
* consumer is after eight o'clock antemeridian
and before nine o’clock postmeridian, local
time at the consumer's location.
W.Va. Code § 46A-2-125(d) (2015). We decline to
consider this amendment 'because it was not in
effect as of the date of the bench trial in this
matter. All subsequent references to West Virgi-
nia Code 46A-2-125 shall be to the version in
effect at the time of the bench trial in this case,
which was promulgated in 1974.

420

to exercise dominion over the telephone
number being called and who has already
been informed that [V&K] was collecting a
debt by mail.

Based on this finding of lack of legitimate
purpose, the. circuit court concluded that
V&K “increased its volume and frequency of
collection calls to Mr. Lenahan in an attempt
to harass or oppress him into answering” its
calls, The circuit court also inexplicably ap-
plied its conclusion about the “ramped up”
calls on March 26-28, 2012, to the 211 unan-
swered calls made from March 29 through
November 17, 2012,

In support of its conclusion that the al-
leged “repeated or continuous” call valume is
sufficient to. prove intent under the Act, the
circuit court relied in part upon the decision
of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia in Ferrell
v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 859
F.Supp.2d 812 (S.D.W.Va. 2012). The Ferreli
court denied the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment in a case in which the plain-
tiffs alleged they received numerous calls
after having advised the defendant they had
retained counsel regarding a debt owed. Fer-
rell, 859 F.Supp.2d at 816-17. In support of
its motion for summary judgment on plain-
tiffs claims under West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125(d), the defendant contended that
there was no evidence that the telephone
calls were unreasonably oppressive or abu-
sive or that the telephone calls were placed
with intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or
threaten, Id. at 816, The Ferrell court denied
the motion and found that there was suffi-
clent evidence to allow a jury to consider the

Petitioner urges this Court instead to rely
upon the decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of West,
Virginia in Bourne v. Mapother & Mapother,
PS.C,, 998 F.Supp.2d 495 (8.D.W.Va. 2014),
In Bourne, the district court granted sum-

9, This provision of the FDCPA states:
A debt collector may not engage in any con-
duct the natural consequence of which is to
. harass, oppress, or abuse any person in con-
nection with the collection of a debt. Without
limiting the general application of the forego-
ing, the following conduct is a violation of this

mary judgment to a defendant where there
were no facts in the record to support a
finding of intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or
threaten, Id, at 502-03, The defendant law
firm hired to collect debts was mistakenly
calling the plaintiff regarding a debt owed by
the plaintiff's aunt. Jd, at 499, Coincidentally,
the plaintiff also owed a debt.being pursued
by the law firm, Id, Plaintiff never answered.
the law firm’s calls. about his aunt’s debt,
which were placed by the law firm’s. auto
dialer that did not leave messages. Id.

Analyzing other cases in the Southern Dis-
trict of West Virginia denying summary
judgment on claims under West Virginia
Code § 46A-2-125(d), the Bowrne court ob-
served that the cases “involved many more
telephone calls and other evidence which
suggested abuse.” Bourne, 998 F.Supp.2d at
502 (emphasis added). For example, the court
noted a denial of a motion for summary
judgment in Duncan v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 5859698 (8,D.W.Va.
2011) based not only on the volume of tele-
phone calls, but also on evidence that abusive
language was used in at least one of the
phone calls, Id, at 502-03. The Bowrne court
concluded that “[e]lven accepting that twenty-
seven phone calls over the course of eight
months at, normal times of the day could be
considered causing the telephone to ring ‘re-
peatedly or continuously’—a proposition that
is highly doubtful—plaintiff has failed to es-
tablish that [defendant] intended to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten plaintiff or any-
one else.” Jd, In other words, despite the fact,
that the unanswered calls might suffice to
establish the requireinent of being placed
“repeatedly or coritinuously,” the phone calls
alone were not sufficient as a matter of law
to establish intent to annoy, abuse, oppress
or threaten in that case. Id.

The Bowrne court further noted that sev-
eral other ‘courts interpreting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692d(5),? the provision of the “FDCPA”

bane
(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging
any person in telephone conversation repeated
ly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse,

or harass any person at the called number,
15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2012).

nearly identical. to West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125(d), have also found that call vol-
ume alone absent evidence of other abusive
conduct is insufficient to sustain a claim:

Finally, the cases interpreting the analo-
gous FDCPA provision—cases which
plaintiff encowraged this court to con-
sult—are even more supportive of defen-
dants’ summary judgment motion. These
cases generally go as far as asserting that
even daily phone calls, without other abu-
sive conduct are insufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact for the jury. See Saliz-
man v. 1.C. Sys. Inc., No. 09-10096, 2009
WL 3190359, at *7 (E.D. Mich, Sept. 30,
2009) .“[A] debt collector does not neces-
sarily engage in harassment by placing one
or two unanswered calls a day in an unsuc-
cessful effort to reach the debtor, if this
effort is unaccompanied by any oppressive
conduct such as threatening messages.”);
Arteaga v, Asset Acceptance, LLC, 788
FSupp.2d 1218, 1229 (B.D. Cal. 2010)
(finding that “daily” or “nearly daily”
phone calls alone fail to raise an issue of
fact for a jury to determine whether the
conduct violates § 1692d and § 1692(d)(5));
Tucker v. CBE Grp. Inc, 710 F.Supp.2d
1801, 1805 (M.D. Fla, 2010) (noting that
despite 57 calls over a 20-day period being
“somewhat high,” the conduct still did not
violate § 1692(d)(5) as a matter of law
where defendant left six messages, made
no more than seven calls in‘a single day,
and did not call back the same day after
leaving a message); Durthaler v. Accounts
Receivable Mgmt, Inc., 854 F.Supp.2d 485
(S.D. Ohio 2012) (finding no FDCPA viola-
tion even though debt collector made 80
calls to debtor's phone numbers, one of
which was made after the debt collector
was informed that the number did not
belong to the debtor, and two calls to
debtor’s roommate in 78 day period); Katz
v Capital One, No. 1:09-cv-1059, 2010 WL
1039850 (E.D. Va. March 18, 2010) (15-17
calls, not more than two in a day and not
at inconvenient times, after debtor notified
debt collector of attorney representation
did not violate the FDCPA).

10. Bourne, 998 F.Supp.2d at 502.

421

Bourne, 998 F.Supp.2d at 508 (emphasis add-
ed). As another district court has noted:

» A-yvemarkable volume-of telephone calls
is permissible under FDCPA jurispru-
dence, See VanHorn v. Genpact Servs,
LLC, No. 09-1047-CV-S-GAF, 2011 WL
4565477, at *1 (W.D. Mo, Feb. 14, 2011)
(finding 114 calls in a four-month period
did not violate the FDCPA); Corman v.
CBE Grp. Inc, 782 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1232
(D. Kan, 2011) (granting summary judg-
ment in favor of:a defendant who placed
149 telephone calls to the plaintiff during a
two-month..period); Clingaman v. Certegy
Payment Recovery Servs,, No. H-10-2483,
2011 WL 2078629, at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 26,
2011) (granting summary judgment for a
defendant who placed 55 phone calls over
three and one-half months),

Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Assoc, Inc,
870 F.Supp.2d 694, 707 (D. Minn, 2012).
Clearly, the weight of federal authority re-
quires some evidence of intent to establish
liability under the federal equivalent to West
Virginia Code § 46A-2-125(d),

We agree with the reasoning of these fed-
eral courts interpreting a nearly identical
statute, Despite the fact that. the district
court in Bowrne stated that “the requisite
intent to annoy, abuse, oppress, or threaten
ean be established by the volume of tele-
phone calls or the nature of the telephone
conversations,” "9 the Bowrne court ruled
that the volume of unanswered calls in that,
case did not establish intent in violation of
West Virginia Code § 46A-2-125(d). We simi-
larly find that the volume of unanswered
calls in this case does not establish intent in
violation of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-
125(a). Rather than answer any one of the
211 calls made by V&K in compliance with
federal law over eight months, Mr. Lenahan
remained silent and never informed V&K of
the simple fact that he disputed the debt.
Accordingly; we find that the circuit court
erred as a matter of law in finding that V&@K
violated West Virginia Code-§ 46A-2-125(d).

The cireuit court gave no apparent consid-
eration to the unrefuted evidence in the rec-
ord of V&K’s intent in placing the auto dialer
calls to Mr. Lenahan, Mr. Lenahan acknowl-

422

edged in his testimony that he had received a
letter advising him of V&K’s attempt to col-
lect the ADT debt, According to the trial
testimony of Ms. Diaz, V&K continued to call
Mr; Lenahan in an effort to collect the debt:

. This telephone number [of Mr.
-Lenahan] was provided by our client in
question that we were attempting to collect
money owed to a third-party collection
agency. .

“We received the telephone contacts, we
attempted to make the telephone calls with
no communication, we attempted to reach
out to the consumer, your client, in an
attempt to collect a debt, and we were
never ever told otherwise. We did not have
communication advising do not call this
number, do not telephone me at this incon-
venient or harassing time or any of that
nature so, therefore, the attempted tele-
phone calls continued to make contact.

Similarly, the circuit court made no ‘mention.
of the unrefuted testimony of Ms. Diaz re-
garding V&K’s procedures to assure that its
auto dialer placed calls within established
limits as to time and volume in compliance
with applicable laws. The record is devoid of
any evidence contradicting V&K’s stated in-
tention to collect a debt. The calls continued.
becavise Mr. Lenahan never answered the
telephone calls and never informed V&K that
he contested the debt.

Rather, the circuit court made an inference
of intent to “harass or oppress” based upon
its own inability to “fathom any possible le-
gitimate purpose” for V&K’s auto dialer plac-
ing more calls over a three-day period in the
third week of its eight-month collection effort
than it placed in the first two weeks. The
cireuit court surmised that after a certain
amount of unanswered calls, a reasonable
debt collector should know that the consumer
does not want to be contacted. However, the
circuit court's inference was based entirely
on the volume of calls and no other evidence.
Moreover, the circuit court overlooked en-
tirely the unrefuted evidence of V&K’s intent
to, collect the debt. Accordingly, the circuit
court’s ruling is deficient as a matter of law.
Some evidence of V&K’s intent to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten Mr. Lenahan is

necessary in order to find liability under
West Virginia Code § 46A-2-125(d),

TM In addition, we note that inquiring
into the “legitimate purpose” for placing debt
collection telephone calls, and then drawing a
negative inference when no legitimate pur-
pose is found, inappropriately relieves the
plaintiff of his burden of proof. Relying upon
the circuit court’s approach, the plaintiff had
no burden of proof other than to “perceive” a
“ramp up” in the telephone calls, requiring
V&K to, rebut that perception by justifying
the placement of the auto dialer calls. The
plain language of West Virginia Code § 46A-
2-125(d) does not support this approach; it is
the plaintiff's burden to prove intent to an-
noy, abuse, oppress or threaten.

We further note that Mr. Lenahan’s si-
lence alone was insufficient to have imputed
knowledge to V&K that it should discontinue
the auto dialer calls, Like the ill-advised anal-
ysis of whether V&K had a “legitimate pur-
pose” for placing auto dialer calls, it is like-
wise erroneous as a matter of law to impose
a duty on a debt collector to discontinue debt
collection efforts based solely on the fact that
the consumer does not want to be contacted.
after a certain period of time that is subjec-
tively known only to the consumer.

Based upon the undisputed facts, there is
no evidence that V&K intended to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten Mr. Lenahan in
violation of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-
125(d). Accordingly, the circuit court erred as
a matter of law in finding in favor of Mr,
Lenahan in its Verdict Order of January 16,
2016,

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
January 16, 2016, order of the Circuit Court
of Raleigh County.

Reversed.

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves
the right to file a dissenting opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

WORKMAN, J., dissenting:

Without even attempting to find support
in precedent or reason, the majority re-
verses the trial court’s verdict in direct con-
tradiction of a universally-accepted rule per-
taining to evidence from which intent may
be inferred for purposes of unlawful debt
collection practices. The majority's reversal
of the trial court further insinuates itself
into the purely factual issue of whether a
debtor has proven intent relative to a viola-
tion of West Virginia Code § 46A-2-125
(1974), What the majority plainly believes,
but disingenuously refuses to expressly
state, is that call volume and frequency
alone is insufficient evidence from which to
infer intent for purposes of West Virginia
Code § 46A-2-125(d). Despite characterizing
this issue as one of “first impression,” the
majority issues no new syllabus point to
this effect, undoubtedly because it flies di-
rectly in the face of all written authority
and common sense. This extraordinary and
stark departure from well-established feder-
al caselaw interpreting our statute’s federal
counterpart creates an untenable situation
where a debt collector’s conduct may violate
a federal statute, but not its virtually identi-
eal state equivalent. Because the majority's
position is neither legally nor rationally
sound, I respectfully dissent.

The debt collection provisions of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act’s
(WVCCPA”) are contained in West Virginia
Code §§ 46A-2-122 through 129a. The perti-
nent provision provides:

No debt collector shall unreasonably op-
press or abuse any person in connection
with the collection of or attempt to collect
any claim alleged to be due and owing by
that person or another. Without limiting
the general application of the foregoing,
the following conduct is deemed to violate
this section:

eee

1. The statute was subsequently amended in 2015.
In this case, the 1974 version is the applicable
statute.

2. In view of the fact that a debt collector may,
without violating the statute, make non-harassing

423

(d) Causing a telephone to ring or en-
gaging any person in telephone conversa-
tion repeatedly or continuously, or at
unusual times or at times known to be
inconvenient, with intent to annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten any person at
the called number.

W. Va. Code § 46A-2-125(d) (emphasis add-
ed) The Federal Debt Collection Practices
Act’s (“FDCPA”) equivalent provision like-
wise prohibits “[clausing a telephone to ring
or engaging any person in telephone conver-
sation repeatedly or continuously with intent
to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the
ealled number.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). The
unmistakably plain language of both statutes
clearly permit recovery based solely upon
volume and/or frequency of calls placed to a
debtor, so long as the fact-finder discerns
sufficient evidence of intent to annoy, abuse,
oppress, or harass.

Sitting as the trier of fact, the trial court
below expressly found that petitioner caused
respondent’s telephone to ring with the in-
tent to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten
respondent. More specifically, the trial court
found that the volume, frequency, and pat-
tern of calls provided sufficient evidence
from which it discerned an intent to oppress
and abuse as required by West Virginia Code
§ 46A-2-125(d). As carefully outlined by the
trial court, the undisputed evidence estab-
lishes that petitioner caused respondent’s
telephone to ring 252 times over an eight-
month period? The trial court observed that.
after an initial two-week period of reasonable
attempts to contact respondent, the petition-
er immediately thereafter “ramped up its
collection campaign,” as follows:

On March 26, 2012, [petitioner] placed six

(6) calls to [] Mr. Lenahan, three (8) of

which were separated by less than an hour.

Like the 22 before it, these calls went

unanswered. The next day, [petitioner]

placed five (5) additional calls to Mr, Lena-
han with as little as twenty-eight (28) min-
utes separating calls. None of these calls

telephone contact with a debtor, the trial court
found that the first twenty-two calls, placed over
a two-week period and which did not ever ex-
ceed three calls a day, lacked any intent to ha-
rass,

424

were answered. On the third day, March

28, 2012, [petitioner] again placed six (6)

calls to Mr, Lenahan with some ealls sepa-

rated by only thirty-two (82) minutes.
From these facts, the trial court found that
petitioner “increased its volume and frequen-
cy of collection calls to Mr, Lenahan in an
attempt to harass or oppress him[.)” ”

The majority now reverses that finding
and without any regard whatsoever for our
standard of review, summarily declares that
the call volume in this particular case is
insufficient to establish evidence of intent.
The majority inexplicably fails to state, as
required by our standard of review, that the
trial court’s factual finding of intent was
“clearly erroneous”; rather, it simply urges
its disagreement with the trial court and
reverses on that basis with no explanation
whatsoever as to why the particular call vol-
ume and frequency in this’ case was insuffi-
‘cient to establish a statutory violation? This
Court has made clear that “[flollowing’ a
bench trial, the circuit court’s findings, based.
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
overturned unless clearly erroneousf.]”
Brown v, Gobble, 196 W. Va. 559, 563, 474
§.E.2d 489, 498 (1996). Further,

filt is well settled in this jurisdiction that in

a case tried without the aid of a jury, the

trial court, and not the appellate court, is

the judge of the weight of the evidence.

Actually, in a nonjury trial, the trial judge

vhas usually been regarded as a surrogate

for the jury, and his or her findings are
accorded corresponding weight.
Id, at 565, 474 §.E.2d at 495 (emphasis add-
ed). To whatever extent the foregoing was
not perfectly, clear, the Brown Court sought
to emphasize the sanctity of the trial court’s

findings upon a non-jury trial by quipping °

that “[w]e will disturb only those factual
findings that strike us wrong with the ‘force
of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead

3, The majority likewise curiously and tersely
mentions that respondent “remained silent” and
never advised petitioner “of the simple fact that
he disputed the debt.” On what basis it discerns
a legal obligation on the part of a debtor to speak
with a harassing debt collector and affirmatively
disclaim the debt, the majority does not state.
Despite the majority and petitioner’s apparent
belief to the contrary, the statute does not require

fish.” Id, at 568, 474 S.H.2d at 498 (quoting
United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1809, 1819
(7th Cir, 1998), cert. denied, 514 U.S, 1010,
115 §,Ct, 1827, 181 L.Ed.2d 206 (1995)), Ap-
parently, however, despite this unequivocal
cautionaiy instruction, the majority sees fit
to summarily disregard the trial court’s as-
sessment of the evidence and reverse the
judgment entered below,

Furthermore, not only does the majority
improperly invade the trial court’s exclusive
province to determine intent in this matter, it
completely misrepresents the trial court’s
support for its findings. Despite the trial
court’s painstaking and detailed outline of
the call activity which supported its conclu-
sion that petitioner was “ramping up” its
efforts from which it inferred intent to ha-
rass, the majority incredibly claims that the
trial court referenced nothing other than the
“number of telephone calls on [] three
days[.]” As is obvious from its order, the trial
court considered not mere volume, but rather
the timing and repetitive nature ‘of the calls
including six calls in a day, with three sepa-
rated by less than an hour, and five and six
calls on consecutive days with such calls sep-
arated by roughly half an hour. This unre-
lenting re-dialing is exactly the type of evi-
dence that other courts have found to be
demonstrative of intent to harass. See Kuhn,
865 F.Supp. at 1458 (finding six phone calls
in a span of twenty-four minutes constituted
harassment); Bingham v. Collection Bureau,
Ine, 505 F.Supp. 864, 873 (D.N.D. 1981)
(holding that when call was terminated and
the collection agency called back immediate-
ly, subsequent call alone could constitute
harassment). .

More to the point, however, the majority's
reversal is obviously based upon its conclu-
sion that call volume alone is insufficient as a
matter of law. Throughout the majority opin-
ion, it belabors the lack of additional evidence
beyond call volume, stating that respondent

that the recipient of the calls answer, that the
debtor communicate at any time about the debt,
or that any particular number, frequency, or
pattern of calls exist. Rather, for purposes of this
case, the statute unmistakably prohibits the mere
causing of a telephone to ring repeatedly or
continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse,
oppress or threaten any person at the called
number.

was “without other evidence,” that the trial
court “[rlel[ied] solely on the volume of tele-
phone calls,” that the “weight of federal au-
thority requires some evidence of intent,”
that “[tJhe record is devoid of any evidence
contradicting V & K’s stated intention,” and:
that “some evidence of V & K’s intent” was
necessary. It criticizes the trial court’s find-
ing of intent stating that it was “based en-
tirely on the volume of calls and no other
evidence.” Incredibly, the majority declares
that federal caselaw “support[s] the conclu-
sion that call volume alone absent other. in-
-tent to annoy, abuse or harass is insufficient
to sustain a claim[.]” Quite simply, this state-
ment is patently incorrect, as evidenced by a
legion of federal decisions and, remarkably,
even the very case which the majority. cites
in support of this statement.

Federal courts have wniformly found that.
intent to harass pursuant to this prohibited
debt collection practice may, in fact, be in-
ferred strictly from the volume and/or pat-
tern of the calls themselves. ‘As explained by,
the Northern District of Illinois:

Courts have generally considered two

types of evidence of an intent to harass,

First, where a plaintiff has shown that he

asked the collection agericy to stop calling

or has informed the collection agency that
it has the wrong number, and the collec-
tion agency nevertheless continued to call
the plaintiff, courts have found intent. Sec-
ond, the volume and patiern of the calls
may themselves evidence an intent to ha-
‘rass,
Hendricks v. CBE Grp. Inc, 891 F.Supp.2d
892, 896 (N.D. IIl. 2012) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). See Chavious v. CBE Grp,
“Inc, No, 10-CV-1298 (JS) (ARL), 2012 WL
118509, at “2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) (In
evaluating whether repeated phone calls
were made ‘with intent to annoy, abuse, or
harass,’ courts generally consider the volume
and pattern of calls.”); Lynch v. Nelson Wat-
son & Assocs., LLC, No, 10-2025-EFM, 2011
WL 2472588, at *2 (D. Kan, June 21, 2011)
(“In determining liability, courts often con-
sider the volume and pattern of calls’ suffi-
cient to raise a triable issue of fact regarding
intent to annoy abuse or harass.”); Hicks v,
Am.’s Recovery Sols, LLC, 816 F.Supp.2d

425

509, 515 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (“[A] court may
consider the “frequency, persistence, and vol-
ume of the telephone calls” to determine
intent[.]”); Carman v, CBE Grp, Inc, 782
F.Supp.2d 1228, 1228 (D. Kan. 2011) (“In
determining liability under [the FDCPA]
courts often consider the volume and pattern
of calls made to the debtor.”); Arteaga v.
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 738 F.Supp.2d 1218,
1228 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Calling a debtor nu-
merous times in the same day, or multiple
times in a short period of time, ean constitute
harassment under the FDCPA.”); Pugliese v.
Prof Recovery Serv, Inci, No, 09-12262,
2010 WL 2632562, at *9 (E.D. Mich, June 29,
2010) (“To determine whether Defendants’
calls amount to harassment, annoyance or
abuse, the volume of the calls must be exam-
ined along with the pattern in which they
were imade[.]”); Majeski v. I.C. System, Inc,
No. 08 CV 5583, 2010 WL 145861, at *3 (N.D.
Il. Jan. 8, 2010) (“Actionable harassment or
aimoyance turns on the volume and pattern
of calls made, irrespective of the substance of
the messages”); Bassett v. I.C. System; Inc,
715-F.Supp.2d 808 (N.D, Ill, 2010) (finding
that volume of calls over discrete period of
time sufficient to raise an, issue for trial);
Martin v. Select Portfolio Serving Holding
Corp., No. 1:05-cv-278, 2008: WL 618788, at
*6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2008) (“In determining
whether the debt collector intended to annoy,
abuse and harass the consumer, the Court
may consider frequency, persistence, and vol-
ume of the telephone calls.”); Kerwin v. Re-
mittance Assistance Corp., 569 F.Supp.2d

_ i117, 1124 (D. Nev. 2008) (“Intent to annoy,

abuse,.or harass may be inferred from the
frequency of calls, the substance of the calls,
or the place to which phone calls are made.”);
Lovelace v. Stephens & Michaels Assocs.
Ine., No. 07-10956, 2007 WL 3888019, at *7
(.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2007) (“Repeatedly call-
ing a number . may violate [the
FDCPA].”); Sanchez v. Client Servs, Inc,
520 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(‘T]he frequency and volume of the tele-
phone calls show that defendants intended to
annoy, abuse and harass plaintiff[.J”); Alal-
wadi v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc, $86,
F.Supp.2d 492, 505 (D. Md. 2004) (“Whether
there is actionable harassment or annoyance
turns not only on the volume of calls made,

426

but also on the pattern of calls.”); Joseph v.
JJ. Mac Intyre Companies, L.L.C., 288
F.Supp.2d 1158, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(same); Kuhn v. Account Control Tech, Inc.,
865 F.Supp. 1448, 1458 (D. Nev. 1994) (find-
ing harassment where collector made six
telephone calls in twenty-four minutes);
United States v, Central Adjustment Bu-
vreau, Inc., 667 F.Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1986),
affd, 823 F.2d 880 (th Cir. 1987) (finding
harassment based upon four or five tele-
phone calls to the same debtor in one day).

The reasoning behind the federal courts’
universal agreement in this regard is obvi-
ous. A debtor could scarcely conjure up addi-
tional evidence of intent where he or she
chooses not to engage an unrelenting and
harassing debt collector by answering the
phone. Obviously, where a debtor answers
any of the collection calls and a debt collector
is abusive or threatening, intent is fairly
simple to ascertain, However, where the
debtor does not answer the calls and the only
means of harassing the debtor is the very act
of causing the telephone to ring, the only
possible evidence of intent that the debtor
could produce is the volume, frequency, and
pattern of the calls themselves, Without
question, the statute prohibits simply “caus-
ing the telephone to ring ... repeatedly or
continuously” with an intent to “annoy,
abuse, oppress or threaten[.]” W. Va. Code
§ 46A-2-122(d),

In fact, the cases cited by both the majori-
ty and petitioner demonstrate that federal
courts in West Virginia, interpreting the stat-
ute at issue, have applied precisely this rule.
Astonishingly, the very case relied upon ea-
clusively by the majority expressly contra-

4. The majority includes a quote from Bourne
string citing cases where the specific call volume
in those cases was insufficient to support a find-
ing of intent. Not only did these cases not state
that additional evidence was necessary or that
the absence of such was dispositive, but the vol-
ume described therein does not even come close
to approximating the volume and repetitive man-
ner of calling in the instant matter. See Saltzman
v, LC. Sys. Inc. No. 09-10096, 2009 WL
3190359 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding
average of one to two calls per day over limited
periods of time insufficient volume alone to sup-
port violation); Arteaga, 733 F.Supp.2d at 1229
(finding that “daily” or “nearly daily” phone
calls alone are insufficient to support violation);
Tucker v. CBE Grp., Inc., 710 F,Supp.2d 1301,

dicts the majority’s apparent belief that call
volume alone is insufficient. In Bourne v.
Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C., 998 F.Supp.2d
495, 502 (S.D.W. Va. 2014) the District Court
stated: “The requisite intent to annoy, abuse,
oppress, or threaten can be established by
the volume of telephone calls or the nature of
the telephone conversations.” (emphasis add-
ed). Despite acknowledging this statement in
Bourne, the majority nevertheless states that
Bourne cites cases which “have also found
that call volume alone absent evidence of
other abusive conduct is insufficient to sus-
tain a claim[.]” Not only does this contradict
the express language in Bowrne itself (which
language the majority quotes), the only con-
clusion reached in the cases cited or dis-
cussed by Bowrne is that the call volume in
those particular cases was insufficient, in the
opinion of those courts, to evince an intent to
harass,‘ Nowhere in those cases do the courts
hold that additional evidence was necessary.
To the contrary, federal courts have ob-
served that “the nature of telephone calls,
including their frequency, substance, or the
place to which they are made, provides
grounds to infer a debt collector’s intent to
annoy, abuse, or harass without any other
evidence of the debt collector’s motive in
calling.” Brown v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC,
748 F.Supp.2d 847, 852 (W.D. Tenn, 2010)
(emphasis added); accord Durthaler, 854
F.Supp.2d at 489.

‘Furthermore, the majority makes refer-
ence to the Bourne court’s passing reference
to Duncan v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.
A., where additional evidence of intent, ie.
abusive language, was presented. No. 5:10-

1305 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (finding average of three
calls per day “somewhat high” but insufficient to
find violation); Durthaler v, Accounts Receivable
Mgmt., Inc., 854 F,Supp.2d 485 (§.D. Ohio 2012)
(finding no FDCPA violation where average of
‘one call every two days); Katz v. Capital One, No.
1:09-cv-1059, 2010 WL 1039850 (E.D. Va. March
18, 2010) (finding no more than two calls a day
insufficient to prove violation), As noted above,
on three successive days, petitioner called re-
spondent 5-6 times each day at intervals close in
time. Petitioner called respondent 252 calls over
an eight-month period and as many as 54 times
in a single month. For obvious reasons, the ma-
jority undertakes no analysis of the pattern and
frequency of calls in this matter as compared
with the calls in the cited cases.

ev-010149;5:10-cv-01118, 2011 WL 5359698
(S.D.W. Va. Nov. 4, 2011), The majority em-
phasizes, without analysis, the Bourne court’s
reference to the existence of additional evi-
dence of intent in Duncan. However, the fact
that additional evidence happened to exist in
that case does not support the majority's
illogical leap that the court found such addi-
tional evidence necessary to find a violation.
In fact, the Duncan court expressly acknowl-
edged that volume alone can support a viola-
tion: “The plain language of [W. Va. Code
§ 46A-2-125(d) ] aptly sets forth that a statu-
tory violation can be bourne [sic] from the
mere volume of calls placed to a debtor.” * Id.
at *4, More specifically, the Duncan court
correctly noted that “a Court can glean ‘in-
tent’ from the continuous nature of the calls
by highlighting a distinctive pattern, such as
the number of calls placed in one day, or the
time in which those calls were placed” and
expressly declined “to find that ‘something
more’ or a ‘volume plus’ type of analysis is
required to demonstrate a violation of [West
Virginia Code § 46A-]2-125(a).]” Id.

Having established the universally-recog-
nized rule that intent to annoy, abuse, op-
press, or harass may clearly be inferred from
pattern, volume, and/or frequency of calls, it
is equally clear that there is no particular
threshold of calls which much be exceeded to
violate the statute. Critically, “there is no
bright line rule regarding the number of calls
which creates the inference of intent.” Hicks,
816 F.Supp.2d at 515. Accordingly, it is obvi-
ous that such an issue is exclusively one for
the trier of fact—in this case, the trial court.
“Ordinarily, whether conduct harasses, op-
presses, or abuses will be a question for the
jury.” Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d
1168, 1179 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Hen-
dricks, 891 F.Supp.2d at 896 (“Whether or
not the volume and pattern of calls is indica-
tive of an intent to harass is often a question
5. See also Ferrell v. Santander Consumer USA,

Inc., 859 F.Supp.2d 812, 818 (S.D.W. Va. 2012)

(denying summary judgment to debt collector

based on “sheer volume of the calls’). I note

further that federal district court cases cited by
petitioner where summary judgment was granted
to the debt collector are plainly distinguishable
» and/or bear little factual similarity to the case

sub judice, See Adams v. Chrysler Fin. Co., LLC,
2013 WL 1385407 (S.D.W. Va. April 3, 2013)

427

for the jury.”); Pace v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs, LLC, 872 F.Supp.2d 861, 864 (W.D.
Mo. 2012), aff'd, 512 Fed.Appx. 648 (8th Cir.
2018) (same); Carman, 782 F.Supp.2d at 1280
(‘{Tyhe reasonableness of the volume and
pattern of telephone calls is a question of fact
best left to a jury.”); Regan v. Law Offices of
Edwin A. Abrahamsen & Associates, P.C.,
Civil Action No. 08-5928, 2009 WL 4396299
(ELD. Pa, Dee. 1, 2009) (finding whether pat-
tern of calls was .sufficiently. harassing was
issue for jury); Akalwadi, 336 F.Supp.2d at
506 (“The reasonableness of this volume of
calls and their pattern is a question of fact
for the jury.”); Gill v. Kostroff, 82 F.Supp.2d
1354, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (“{Tyhe inquiry
into whether a debt collector’s procedures
are reasonable is, ‘by its nature, fact-inten-
sive, and should therefore typically be left to
the juryL?” (quoting Narwick v, Wenler, 901
F.Supp. 1275, 1282 (N.D, Ill. 1995))), The
majority provides absolutely no support
whatsoever for its unprecedented conclusion
that a certain type of evidence is per se
insufficient to establish the highly fact-specif-
ic issue of intent.

Finally, in its somewhat cryptic closing
analysis, the majority discusses petitioner’s
“stated intention” and “unrefuted evidence of
{petitioner’s] intent to collect the debt.” Al-
though difficult to surmise, the majority ap-
pears to be asserting that since petitioner
established that its’ “intent” was merely to
collect a debt, rather than to harass, the trial
court erred in finding for respondent. The
nonsensical and circular reasoning employed
by the majority in this regard further illus-
trates the error of its resolution, Unquestion-
ably, a debt collector accused of violating
West Virginia Code § 46A-2-122(d) will nec-
essarily be attempting to collect a debt. In
fact, attempting to collect a debt is a neces-
sary prerequisite to bringing an action: “[A]
threshold requirement for application of [a

(granting summary judgment to debt collector
where debtor failed to allege any actions prohib-
ited by Section 125(d) and further failed to re-
spond to motion for summary judgment); White
v. Ally Fin., Inc., 2013 WL 1857266 (S.D.W. Va.
May 2, 2013) (granting summary judgment to
debt collector where only evidence of intent was
that debt collector was attempting to identify
estate representative and stopped calling once
information was provided).

428

debt collection practices act] is that prohibit-
ed practices are used in attempt to collect a
‘debt’” Mabe v. G.C. Servs, Lid. P’ship, 82
F.8d 86, 88 (4th Cir, 1994), What West Virgi-
nia Code § 46A-2-122 and its federal equiva-
lent seek to prohibit is the use of harassing
or abusive practices while attempting to col-
lect a debt. Therefore, the majority’s con-
founding conclusion” that petitioner may
evade a violation of the statute by simply
claiming that it was merely trying to collect
the debt or reach the debtor is fairly absurd
and further underscores the majority's com-
plete failure to comprehend the activity
which the statute seeks to prohibit.

To be clear, the majority’s reversal of this
matter is not only without analytical or prec-
edential support, but effectively guts the im-
port of the statute. Under the majority’s
analysis, a debt collector could conceivably
cause a debtor's telephone to ring every five
minutes into perpetuity and not run afoul of
the statute, In that event, under the majori-
ty’s analysis, the sheer volume and frequency
of the calls are insufficient, without more, to
establish intent to harass. What type of “oth-
er evidence” is needed or how a debtor could
obtain such “other evidence” of intent to
harass, the majority does not explain. Rath-
er, it places an impossible burden upon a
debtor to adduce “other evidence”—aside
from the plainly harassing volume and fre-
quency of calls themselves—of an intent to
harass. In so doing, the majority has eviscer-
ated the “causing a telephone to ring” prohi-
bition of subsection (d) in its entirety.

Because this complete departure from the
overwhelming consensus of courts addressing
this issue is entirely unsupported by the
majority’s scant and illogical analysis, I re-
spectfully dissent. I am authorized to state
that Justice Davis joins me in this dissent.

801 S.B.2d 443

JANE DOE-1, Individually and as Parent,
Guardian, and Next Friend of J.T., a Mi-
nor, and W.T., a Minor; John Doe-1, In-
dividually; Jane Doe-2, Individually and
as Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of
ZW., a Minor, and A.W., a Minor; Jane
Doe-3, Individually and as Parent,
Guardian, and Next Friend of C.H., a
Minor; John Doe-3, Individually; Jane
Doe-4, Individually and as Parent,
Guardian, and Next Friend of A.B., a
Minor; Jane Doe-5, Individually and as
Parent, Guardian, and Next Friend of
T.S., a Minor, and M.S., a Minor; John
Doe-5, Individually; Jane Doe-6, Individ-
_ually and as Parent, Guardian, and Next
Friend of P.C., a Minor; and John Doe-6,
Individually, Plaintiffs Below, Petition-
ers . :

y.

CORPORATION OF the PRESIDENT OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Steven
Grow, Don Fishel, Christopher Michael
Jensen, Christopher Jensen, Sandralee
Jensen, and Unnamed Defendant-1, De-
fendants Below, Respondents

No. 16-0008

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 16, 2017
Filed; June 14, 2017

6p
+

. Currently, the plaintiffs are Jane Doe-1, indi-
vidually and as parent, guardian, and next friend

Robert P, Fitzsimmons, Esq., Fitzsimmons
Law Firm PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia

Carl S, Kravitz, Esq., Zuckerman Spaeder
LLP, Washington, DC, Counsel for the Peti-
tioners

Thomas V. Flaherty, Esq., Flaherty Sensa-
baugh Bonasso PLLC, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, Counsel for the Respondent UD-1

Mark A. Atkinson, Esq., John J. Polak,
Esq., Atkinson & Polak, PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondents
Christopher Jensen and Sandralee Jensen

Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. Esq,, Jackson Kel-
ly PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia

William J. Powell, Esq., Jackson - Kelly
PLLC, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel
- for the Respondents Corporation of the Pres-
ident of The Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints, Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, Steven Grow, and Donald
Fishel

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioners (plaintiffs below) are nine
minors and their parents, individually and as
parents, guardians, and next friends, in this

of J.T., a minor, and W.T., a minor; John Doe-1,
individually; Jane Doe-2, individually and as par-

434

action alleging various negligence claims,
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, assault, battery, and civil conspiracy
related to, arising from, and resulting in
defendant Michael Jensen’s known and al-
leged sexual abuse of the minor plaintiffs?
Following extensive discovery, the circuit
court entered an order on December 4, 2015,
through which it granted summary judgment
in favor of the respondent (defendant below),
Unidentified Defendant-1 (“UD-1”), against
whom conspiracy was the only claim assert-
ed. On December 30, 2015; the circuit court
entered an order granting several of the
defendants’ motions in limine which eliminat-
ed a large portion of the plaintiffs’ cireum-
stantial evidence in support of their conspira-
cy claim.? The following day, December 31,
2015, the cireuit court entered an order
granting summary judgment on the plain-
tiffs’ conspiracy claim in favor of the respon-
dents (defendants below), Corporation of the
President of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, Corporation of the Presid-
ing Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, Steven Grow, and Don
Fishel (collectively the “Church defendants”),
and in favor of the respondents (defendants
below), Christopher Jensen‘ and Sandralee
Jensen.>

On January 11, 2016, the circuit court en-
tered an order certifying its interlocutory
summary judgment rulings as final judg-

ent, guardian, and next friend of Z,W., a minor,
and A.W., a minor; Jane Doe-3, individually and
as parent, guardian, and next friend of CH, a
minor; John Doe-3, individually; Jane Doe-4, in-
dividually and as parent, guardian, and next
friend of A.B., a minor; Jane Doe-5, individually
and as parent, guardian, and next friend of T.S.,
a minor, and M.S., a minor; John Doe-5, individ-
ually; Jane Doe-6, individually and as parent,
guardian, and next friend of P.C., a minor; and
John Doe-6, individually. During the course of
this litigation, certain of the original minor plain-
tiffs were dismissed without prejudice; John Doe-
2 was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation.

2. Michael Jensen is currently incarcerated on
convictions for his sexual abuse of two of the
minor plaintiffs, J.T. and W-T., as discussed more
fully infra, section I. He did not participate in
this appeal.

3. The order granting summary judgment in favor
of UD-1 was entered prior to these in limine
rulings.

ments pursuant to West Virginia Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 54(b).$ In addition to
seeking a reversal of the summary judgment
orders, the plaintiffs ask this Court to re-
verse those in limine rulings. They assert
these rulings facilitated the circuit court’s
issuance of summary judgment rulings with-
out first evaluating the evidence offered in
support of their conspiracy claims under the
strictures applicable to summary judgment.

Upon our careful review of the parties’
briefs, the arguments of counsel, the appen-
dix record submitted, and the applicable law,
we reverse the summary judgments and in
limine rulings and remand this action for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.

I Facts and Procedural Background’

In late 2004, Chris and Sandralee Jensen
(collectively the “Jensen parents”) and their
children were residing in or near Provo,
Utah, Their son Michael Jensen, who was
then thirteen years old, was arrested at his
middle school and charged with two felony
counts of sexual abuse of a child. The inci-
dents occurred in November and December
of 2004, and his female victims were twelve
and thirteen years old, respectively. On both
occasions, Michael waited for his victim to
exit a classroom before pinning her against a
wall and grabbing her buttocks and breasts
without her consent. One of the victims indi-

4, Consistent with the parties’ briefs, Christopher
Jensen will be referred to as “Chris” Jensen,

5. At times, the Church defendants and the Jensen
parents are jointly referred to as the “defen-
dants.”

6. Rule $4(b) provides, in part, as follows:

Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving
Multiple Parties—When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.

7. With a couple of exceptions, the majority of the
testimony referenced herein was taken during
depositions.

cated in her statement to the police that
during Michael’s attack upon her person, he
told her that they needed to have sex; that.
she was “really scared”; and that she had
kneed Michael in the groin to get away. The
defendants minimize the severity of the inci-
dents describing them instead as brief grop-
ing of two female classmates over their
clothes while at school.

The plaintiffs allege that a conspiracy be-
gan in Provo when The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Church”) influ-
enced Michael’s criminal proceeding, which
resulted in the two felony charges being re-
duced to misdemeanor sexual offenses.
Among other assertions, the plaintiffs state
that Michael’s paternal grandfather, Blaine
P. Jensen, who has held very high positions
within the Church§ attended a meeting be-
tween Michael and Michael’s attorneys, and
was present for Michael’s dispositional hear-

8. Blaine Jensen's positions have included Di-
rector of International Affairs for the Church and
worldwide Director of Physical Facilities for the
Church. There is a representation in the record
that Mr. Jensen currently serves as the Stake
Patriarch in Provo, a life-long position. During
his deposition, Mr. Jensen acknowledged both
professional and personal relationships with two
former Church Presidents and the current Presi-
dent of the Church, which the plaintiffs rely upon
to support their theory of the Church’s influence
in Michael's case.

9, The Church is divided into “wards,” which
encompass defined geographic _ territories.
Church members belong to the ward associated
with his or her residence. Several wards in a
geographical area form a “stake.” The clergyman
of each ward is a bishop, and the clergyman of
each stake is a president, These positions are
held by volunteers for a number of years.

10, The SBRA reflects that the first appointment
for the assessment was not completed. Once the
psychologist explained the testing process to Mi-
chael and his father, Chris, “Mr. [Chris] Jensen
appeared somewhat angry” and was ‘visibly up-
set” when told that he would “not be allowed to
be present” during the evaluation because it
“would compromise the integrity and validity of
the assessment.” The SBRA further reflects that
Mr. Jensen became “more assertive and tena-
cious” and eventually stated that he and Michael
“syould pass” on the evaluation. A second ap-
pointment was scheduled and Michael was
brought to that appointment by his mother, San-
dralee, According to the SBRA, Michael reported
to the evaluating psychologist that his attorney
had told him not to discuss what had happened,

435

ing in January 2015. Dale Swensen, Michael’s
Church bishop ® in Provo, also attended the
dispositional hearing. During this hearing,
the juvenile petition was read and reports
were submitted, including a Sexual Behavior
Risk Assessment (“SBRA”),° which indicat-
ed that Michael’s offenses are based primari-
ly on opportunity” and that he “will offend if
given the opportunity.” The juvenile court
then accepted Michael’s admission to reducéd.
charges of two misdemeanor counts of lewd-
ness involving a child; placed him on proba-
tion; ordered his parents to comply with the
terms of probation; and ordered him to com-
plete fifty hours of community service and a
Sexual Appropriateness Class with the family
component with proof of completion to be
provided to the court. The defendants allege
the plaintiffs have no evidence the Church
influenced Michael’s proceeding in any man-

but he. proceeded to do so anyway. He also told

_the evaluating psychologist that he stopped baby-
sitting his younger siblings, including two sisters,
ages seven and five, after the charges were filed
against him. The psychologist stated in the SBRA
that Michael, “denied knowing the meaning of
consent and denied knowing how age makes a
difference in giving consent for sexual activity.”
When asked about the impact his actions had on
his victim, Michael replied: “They could probably
damage her for life, she might be scared of boys
nowf.]”

‘The SBRA contains the psychologist’s observa-
tion that Michael “displays significant thinking
errors: regarding ‘sexuality and children” and
that his “attitude about the alleged abuse is of
significant concern given that he blames’ the'vic-
tim and much anger appeared to exist regarding
his reported resistance by the victim towards his
alleged demonstrations of affection.” The psy-
chologist recommended that the court order sex
offender specific treatment due to Michael's
“low motivation for treatment” and his father’s
“defensiveness.” As the psychologist cautioned:
“the issues that exist ... could again arise at a
later date when Michael would be at risk for
more severe consequences.... It would be best
to be less defensive in Michael's interest and
confront the issues that exist in a productive
manner.” The psychologist concluded that Mi-
chael was a “low to moderate” risk to offend
with peer-aged females, but that he also needed
“to be supervised with any female, including his
sisters ... until his therapist considers that his
risk is reduced.” The plaintiffs state that there is
no evidence that any therapist ever concluded
that Michael's risk was reduced and that their
expert is expected to testify that the SBRA was
“a flashing red warning light” of likely future

436

ner and that affidavits and declarations from
the prosecutors involved in Michael’s juvenile
proceeding refute the existence of any such
influence. Although the defendants allege
Blaine Jensen’s involyement was simply that
of a grandfather assisting his grandson, the
plaintiffs point to evidence that Michael told
his friend, J.C., that he had been in legal
trouble in Utah and that his grandfather
“was in a leadership position for the church

.. [and] helped take care of whatever need-
ed to be taken care of.”

The plaintiffs further allege that although
the Church knew that Michael had pled
guilty to two sex offenses in Utah, it did
nothing to warn or protect, despite the exis-
tence of an abuse “prevention and response”
procedure, referred to as an “annotation sys-
tem.” The defendants allege that their evi-
dence demonstrates that the Church “rarely”
annotates its records for children, and “even
less so where the misconduct does not indi-
cate a danger to much younger children.” ?

During the summer of 2005, the Jensen
farnily moved to Martinsburg, West Virginia.
Soon thereafter, Sandralee Jensen was asked
to serve as the Church’s Relief Society Presi-
dent for her new ward, which she accepted.

abuse by Michael Jensen if he did not receive
treatment.

11. In its in limine ruling that excluded any alle-
gations of the Church’s influence over these Utah

- court proceedings, the circuit court found “Mi-
chael’s cryptic boast to a friend” to have “limited
probative value,”

12, The entirety of the plaintiffs’ evidence con-
cerning Michael's juvenile criminal proceeding
in Utah, including the SBRA, was excluded in
the circuit court’s in limine ruling,

13, A document in the appendix record describes
this position as "[t]he second most important job
in the ward.”

14. The Church defendants state that the Stake
» High Council is an advisory group that delivers
the stake president's messages to wards and as-
sists in certain ecclesiastical disciplinary hear-

ings.
15, All evidence concerning this 2006 or 2007

Stake High Council meeting was excluded by the
circuit court in its in limine ruling,

16. The plaintiffs allege that shortly after the Jen-
sens moved to West Virginia, Michael’s youngest
sister, R.J., who was six or seven years old at the

In that role, Mrs. Jensen reported directly to
her ward bishop, who was at that time Mat-
thew Whitcomb. She also oversaw the Sun-
day class for the women and was responsible
for “compassionate service” for all- ward
members. Shortly thereafter, Chris Jensen
was placed on the Stake High Council,
which is an advisory body to the Stake Presi-
dent, who at all relevant times was defendant
Stephen Grow.

In their effort to further demonstrate the
defendants’ knowledge and awareness of Mi-
chael’s history as an abuser, the plaintiffs
allege there was a Stake High Council meet-
ing in 2006 or 2007,'* during which leaders of
the Martinsburg Stake discussed Michael
Jensen’s abuse .of a younger sister !® and
possibly another girl, and Chris Jensen’s pos-
sible abuse of his son Michael. They further
allege that at this same time, Stake Presi-
dent Grow asked UD-1 to “keep an eye” on
Chris Jensen, who was UD-1’s close friend,
and to report back to him. UD-1 indicated
during a recorded interview that through his
position on Church councils, he was aware
that Church leaders had been working hard
with Michael Jensen to get him the help that
he needed in the 2007-2008 time frame,"’ The

time, removed her clothing at a Church function
and displayed her genitals to same-aged boys.
The plaintiffs rely upon this incident to show that
by 2006, the defendants knew that Michael had
committed two’ sexual offenses in Utah and that
his youngest sister was exhibiting signs of sexual
abuse, as opined by the plaintiffs’ expert. Con-
versely, the defendants state that there is no
evidence that RJ. was abused by anyone; that
the plaintiffs’ expert could not definitively say
that RJ. had been’ abused; that the plaintiffs’
“signs” are explained by R.J.’s “developmental
disability” and limited 1.Q.; and that the plaintiffs
have made this “scurrilous and offensive specu-
lation” concerning R,J. to try to correct a prob-
Jem in their evidence. This purported problem
related to the plaintiffs’ allegation that Michael
Jensen's sexual abuse of.a younger sibling was °
discussed at the alleged Stake High Council

meeting in 2006 or 2007, when the only certain,

abuse of a younger sibling by Michael involved
his sister KJ. in 2010, The plaintiffs’ evidence
concerning this incident involving RJ. was ex-
cluded through the circuit court's in limine rul-
ing.

17. UD-1 was interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel in
January of 2014. At that time, he referenced
discussions years earlier at the Church’s Stake
High Council level concerning the Jensens; the

defendants deny that this 2006-2007 Stake
High Council meeting ever took place or. that
Stake President. Grow ever made such a
monitoring arrangement with UD-1.

The plaintiffs allege’ that by April 2007,
through her role as Relief Society President,
Sandralee Jensen was arranging for Michael
to babysit the children of ward families. They
further allege that because there had been
no disclosures concerning Michael’s prior sex
offenses in Utah by the Jensens or the
Church defendants, the plaintiff Doe-6 par-
ents allowed their four-year-old daughter
P.C, to be babysat by Michael, who sexually
and physically abused her by repeatedly lay-
ing down in bed with her and making her
touch his penis. The plaintiffs further allege
that when the Doe-6 parents returned home,
P.C, was extremely upset; had a handprint-
shaped bruise on her bottom; and was terri-
fied of Michael. When Jane Doe-6 confronted
the Jensens parents, who were both Church
officers at the time, they explained that P.C.
‘was upset because Michael had not fed the

Doe-6 children properly. Sandralee Jensen’

assumed that Michael had spanked P.C., and
Chris Jensen believed that Michael needed
more “tutelage from his mother” to become a
better babysitter.

Moving forward to June 2007, the plaintiffs
allege that Michael Jensen assaulted J.M., a
fourteen-year-old girl. J.M. testified that Mi-
chael invited her to go to the movies, telling
her there was a “huge group of people” from

charges that had been brought against Michael
when he was twelve or thirteen years old in
Utah; and how he knew the prosecutor “really
worked hard with the Jensens to try to get
Michfalel the help that he needed, and I know
that the ecclesiastical leaders had worked hard
with the Jensens and with Michael to get him the
help that he needed.” UD-1 remarked on the
manner in which Chris Jensen reacted after be-
ing “given sweetheart deals to get his son the
help that his son needs, for him to violently react
the way he did, to storm out of the room and that
type of thing. ..."" See supra note 10, When UD-1
was deposed several months later, he testified
quite differently concerning these matters, which
he attributes to plaintiffs’ counsel's “imprecise,
vague, and leading questions” when he was in-
terviewed. Whereas UD-1 referenced the earlier
Stake High Council meetings during which abuse
“by Michael was discussed and remarked as to
Chris Jensen's “violent{] _ react[ion]

stormfing] of the room” when his son Michael

437

the church going, According to J.M., after
her mother dropped her off at the movie
theater, Michael purchased her ticket and, as
they walked through the door of the theater,
he grabbed her, pulled her close, and started
touching her breasts. She testified that he
then pulled her outside the theater, pushed
her up against a wall, and continued touch-
ing, kissing, and “doing’ all this other stuff”
as she tried to press him back, Explaining
further, she testified that Michael’s older’
brother, Blaine, came out of the theater,
yelled Michael’s name, “dr[agged] him [Mi-
chael] inside the theater,” and thereafter
kept Michael away from her, She testified
that she was upset; that Michael had made
her feel as if she “owed him something just
because he paid for [her]. ticket”; and that.
she did not report the incident to the police
because she was humiliated. She further re-
counted’ subsequent contact with Mrs. Jen-
sen, who approached her and asked whether
she.was okay and “do we have a problem?”
‘The plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Jensen “linked
in her mind” the incident with J.M. to Mi-
chael’s Provo sex offenses, which prompted
her to confer with Bishop Whitcomb about
the matters. Mrs. Jensen testified that the
only “link” in her mind was her concern, as a
religious woman, with Michael’s “pre-marital
displays of sexuality[,]” and that her conver-
sation with Bishop Whitcomb was along
those lines with only a passing reference to
Michael’s offenses in Utah,!®

was “given sweetheart deals” to get the help he
needed, UD-1 backed away from these state-
ments when deposed.

418. Although the physical abuse was evident, P.C.
did not report the sexual abuse until 2012. The
appendix record contains a police report that
discusses an interview of P.C. at the Child Advo-
cacy Center regarding Michael's alleged abuse of
her. As reflected in this report, P.C. alleged that
when Michael put her down for a nap, he would

. lock-the door to her bedroom because her broth-
ers were’ also in the house; that Michael was
afraid that her brothers would discover that he
was making her touch his penis; that this hap-
pened several times in her bed; and that she
described the feeling. as being “hairy down
there.”

19. Through its in limine rulings, the circuit court
excluded all evidence concerning the J.M, inci-
dent, .

438

During the fall of 2007, the plaintiffs allege
that Church leaders discussed Jane and John
Doe-1’s marital difficulties and that Sandra-
lee Jensen, as Relief Society President, of-
fered Michael as a babysitter if the Doe-1
parents needed some time alone. Mrs. Jensen
testified that she did not disclose Michael’s
sex offenses in Utah or the injury he had
inflicted on P.C, to Jane Doe-1. The plaintiff's
allege Mrs, Jensen also failed to mention that
Michael was no longer allowed to babysit his
siblings, Michael’s assault of J.M., or her
conclusion that he should not babysit unsu-
pervised. Jane Doe-1 accepted Mrs. Jensen's
offer of child care, and Michael babysat J.T.,
then aged three, and W.T., then aged four.
‘These children would later disclose to their
parents that the evening Michael babysat
them, he blindfolded them, put ketchup on
his penis, and forced them to perform oral
sex on him, Criminal charges for these of-
fenses were brought against Michael in 2012.
He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
thirty-five to seventy-five years in the peni-
tentiary, and he has been designated a “vio-
Jent sexual predator.” 9 - .

In early 2008, UD-1’s two-year-old son,
C.P., was cared for in the Jensen home and
came home with a swollen penis and abra-
sions on the inner part of his upper thighs,
Neither UD-1 nor his wife, S.P., who was at
that time a neonatal intensive care nurse,
sought medical treatment for C.P., which the
plaintiffs allege was because they knew it

20. See W.Va. Code § 15-12-2a (2014).

21. The plaintiffs state S.P. responded affirmative-
ly during her deposition when asked whether she
and UD-1 did not seek medical treatment for C.P.
because they knew any health care provider
would have to report to state authorities if a
child presented with these injuries. $.P. submit-
ted an errata sheet and the court reporter signed
a declaration, both indicating S.P. had given a
negative response to this question. Our review of
this portion of the videotape of S.P.’'s deposition
confirms her negative response. Our review fur-
ther revealed S.P.’s testimony that had her son
come to the hospital with those abrasions and a
swollen penis, she, as a nurse, would have been
required to take such physical evidence at “face
value” and further would have reported it to
authorities.

22, S.P. testified she could not recall any discus-
sion about diaper rash. She further testified she
did not suspect Michael of having been involved

would result in mandatory reporting to state
authorities! UD-1 and his wife knew C.P.’s
injuries could not have been self-inflicted be-
cause of his physical disabilities. When inter-
viewed by the plaintiffs’ counsel, UD-1 stated
that Sandralee suggested to his wife that
C.P’s injuries might be diaper rash, which
his wife, who was a nurse, knew it was not.”
UD-1 also stated during this interview, as did
S.P. during her deposition, that C.P., who
had been potty-trained, thereafter began
wetting the bed again.

The plaintiffs allege that sometime be-
tween February through April of 2008, Jane
Doe-2 approached Sandralee’ Jensen, who
was still serving as Relief Society President,
about her need for after-school child care for
her sons, four-year-old Z.W. and six-year-old
A.W. According to Mrs. Jensen’s testimony,
she proposed Michael to babysit the children
in the Jensen home, indicating she would be
there, as well. She did not disclose any infor-
mation to Jane Doe-2 about Michael’s prior
offenses, as discussed above, or his fitness as
a babysitter. Over the following weeks, the
plaintiffs allege that Michael forced Z.W. to
perform oral sex on him and forced A.W. to
watch. Z.W. testified that on one occasion

when he told Sandralee that Michael was

abusing him, she said, “okay and just ignored
it.”*8 In April 2008, Z.W. told his mother
about the abuse. Jane Doe-2 testified that
she saw the fear in her son’s eyes and never

in any fashion and thought, at the time, her son
and a younger Jensen child had engaged in ex-
ploration that resulted in C.P.’s injuries. She also
testified that from that point forward, if they
used the Jensens as babysitters, it was one of two
Jensen children, neither of whom was Michael.

23. This testimony was given during a pretrial
hearing held in the criminal prosecution of Mi-
chael Jensen for his sex crimes against victims
J.T. and W.T. In Z.W.'s deposition taken in the
instant matter, he described the ways that Mi-
chael would abuse him, including placing Z.W:
in a cabinet in the basement of the Jensen home
and refusing to let him out until Z.W. performed
oral sex on Michael, who would insert his penis
in a hole in the cabinet. Z.W. further testified
that when he told Mrs. Jensen on one occasion
that ‘Michael was doing stuff down in the base-
ment,” and more specifically that “Michael is
making me suck his weiner{,]” he thinks she
said, “I don’t really care about that or something
like that,”

doubted his truthfulness about what had hap-
pened, She told Sandralee what Michael had
done and, a day or two later, Michael and his
father Chris appeared at her home, denying
the abuse ever happened in an aggressive
manner that caused her’ to feel intimidated.

Jane Doe-2 further testified that she and
her husband arranged a meeting with defen-
dant Bishop Fishel during which they dis-
closed Michael's sexual abuse of Z.W., and
Bishop Fishel indicated he would look into
the matter. According to Jane Doe-2, when
she saw Bishop Fishel at church approxi-
mately one week later, he told her that he
had spoken to Michael; that he did not be-
lieve that Michael had abused Z.W.;%* and
that ZW. might have been exposed to por-
nography. John Doe-2 testified to a separate
but similar conversation with Bishop Fishel.
When Bishop Fishel was deposed, he denied
ever speaking to Jane Doe-2 about Michael’s
alleged sexual abuse of her son, and asserted
any conversation he had with John Doe-2 did
not involve sexual abuse. Bishop Fishel’s tes-
timony reflects that a few weeks later, he
selected Michael Jensen and his brother
Blaine Jensen to be First and Second Assis-
tant to the Bishop, an honor within the
Church,

The defendants allege that neither of
Z.W’s parents “believed Z.W.’s account
enough to report the abuse to the authori-
ties” and John Doe-2 never disclosed any
abuse of his son “by anybody.” Conversely,
Jane Doe-2 testified she and her husband
considered reporting the abuse to authorities
but after speaking to Bishop Fishel, they
decided that Z.W. had been through enough;
that his allegation would be questioned; that
there would be persons who would not be-
lieve him because it would have been Z.W.’s
word against Michael Jensen’s denial; and
that she did not want Z.W. to be ostracized.

24. During her deposition, Jane Doe-2 was ques-
tioned regarding whether Bishop Fishel had said
that the abuse had not happened or that he did
not believe that it had happened and what her
husband took from his response. Mrs. Doe-2 ex-
plained that her husband believes that church
leaders

are called of God and that they can have
Imowledge from God whether something is

439

By early 2009, Sandralee Jensen was no
longer the Relief Society President but had
assumed oversight of the Church’s Cub Scout
program. When Jane and John Doe-3 indicat-
ed their inability to attend her Cub Scout
training one evening because someone would
need to watch their young children, Sandra-
lee offered to have her children babysit the
Doe-3 children. Jane Doe-8 testified that Mi-
ehael and a Jensen daughter babysat her
children in the Jensen home, including her
three-year-old son, C.H., who later disclosed
Michael followed him into the bathroom, shut
the door, and when he pulled down his pants
to use the toilet, Michael touched his penis.
Although the defendants state C.H. denied
Michael had ever abused him, the plaintiffs
point to contrary evidence in the appendix
record and to the cireuit court’s denial of the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on the claims of C.H. and his parents.

The record reflects that around this same
time in 2009, Sandralee emailed her former
bishop, Matt Whitcomb, expressing her con-
cern that Michael posed a risk to her other
children. She advised Mr. Whitcomb that she
and her husband were “trying to think[] of
different options to help protect [Michael]
from himself” and asking whether there were
any farmers in his area who would be willing
to take in Michael. She also expressed to Mr,
Whitcomb her comfort in seeking his help
because he “knew some of the history.”

In early 2010, Chris Jensen found eigh-
teen-year-old Michael in the bedroom of his
twelve-year-old sister K.J., who was lying on
her bed. Mr. Jensen testified that he had
Michael leave the room after which his
daughter told him that Michael had lain on
top of her and tried to kiss her. During her
deposition, K.J. described this incident as
Michael first lying down beside her on her
bed, then “climb[ing] on top” of her after
which he kissed her for what seemed like ten
to twenty minutes, and also “possibly” mov-

true or not: So [her husband’s] belief that his
bishop can say I know this didn’t happen ....
meant, {to her husband] that he (Bishop Fish-
el] had prayed about it and the Lord had told
him it hadn't happened. And so in that sense,
[her husband] could’ve felt like, yes, he
[Bishop Fishel] would’ve known it (Michael’s
abuse of Z.W,] didn’t happen }.

440

ing his pelvis against her. She stated that she
was terrified. From that point forward, the
Jensens banned Michael from their home,
although he stayed in a tent in their back-
yard at.various times.

‘The Jensens met with Bishop Chris Vin-
cent, who was a bishop in their Stake but was
not théir ward bishop, and reported Mi-
chael’s abuse of K.J. Bishop Vincent testified
that during this meeting, KJ. told him about
a court case in another state where Michael
was tried for hitting a girl. Bishop Vincent
testified that he told no one else within the
Church about his meeting with the Jensens;
that he agreed to counsel Michael; that he
did not ask Michael about his abuse of K.J.
or his earlier case that she had referenced;
and that he gave Michael keys to the church
building so he would have a safe place to
sleep. .

Between 2010 and June of 2011, Michael
sometimes lived with Church families, includ-
ing the Doe-4 family, who took him on a
fainily trip to South Carolina, Jane Doe-4’s
son, J.C,, who was Michael’s friend, testified
the only concern he was aware of Mrs. Jen-
sen expressing was her worry that Michael
would “mess[ ] up or hook[ Jup” with a girl at
the beach, Michael went on that trip during
which he allegedly abused the Doe-4s’ eight-
year-old daughter, A.B,, touching her geni-
tals over her clothing.*5 Sandralee Jensen
testified that she knew Michael was living
with the Doe-4 family, but she did not dis-
close anything to them about Michael's histo-
ry of abuse, including his recent abuse of his
sister K.J,"As Sandralee explained, she did
not feel any need to warn the Doe-4 parents
because K.J, was more “developed” than the
Doe-4s’ daughter who was ‘about the same
age. . .

During this same time, the plaintiffs allege
that the Church continued to hold Michael
out as a trustworthy member of the commu-
nity and, in early 2011, he was asked to serve
as: a substitute teacher in the Church’s pri-
mary program and taught a class of four-
year-old children, In June 2011, Michael was

28, The plaintiffs place A.B’s age at five, During
her deposition, A.B. testified that she was eight
years old at the time,

approved for a Church mission, which UD-1
indicated had been -delayed while Bishop
Fishel worked with Michael on his various.
In January of 2012, while Michael was on
his mission, J:T. and W.T. disclosed to their
parents, John and Jane Doe-1, that Michael
had abused them five years earlier. Jane
Doe-l repérted the abuse to the West Virgi-
nia State Police. Bishop Vincent informed
President Grow about these allegations
against Michael involving the Doe-1 children,
including that le had called the Church's
Helpline to advise Church officials in Utah of
the West Virginia State Police investigation
and that the State Police wanted to interview
Michael. Although the Church brought Mi-
chael back to West Virginia early from his
mission in Arizona, the plaintiffs allege that
the Jensens‘ and Church leaders met and
agreed to not disclose his return to the po-
lice. The plaintiffs further allege Michael fa-
bricated a story that he returned early from
his mission due to a bicycle accident, and that
Stake President Grow: did nothing to correct
the fabrication,

The Jensens state that Chris Jensen was
deployed when’ Michael returned early from
his mission, and because Mrs. Jensen did not
want Michael living at home without his fa-
ther there, Mr. Whiteomb, who was then a
Stake High Councilor, agreed to let Michael
liye with him and his wife. Mr. Whitcomb
testified that when his daughter and grand-
children planned a visit, he told Michael to
find another place to live because there was
not enough room in his home for everyone2®
Mr. Whitcomb asked John Doe-5 if Michael
could live with his family. Although the Doe-
5s had young children, the plaintiffs allege
that neither Mr. Whitcomb, nor any Church
official or defendant, told the Doe-5s the
reason for Michael’s early return from his
mission, or about Michael’s history of sexual
abuse. Mr. Whitcomb testified that he be-
lieved John Doe-5 was aware of the allega-
tions against Michael based on conversations
he had with John Doe-5, but he could not

26. The plaintiffs contend the reasonable infer-
ence to be drawn is that Mr. Whitcomb did not
want to risk Michael having access to his grand-
children.

specifically recall the dates of those conversa-
tions,

John Doe-5 testified that both Stake Presi-
dent Grow and’ Bishop Fishel encouraged
him to ‘allow Michael to live in his home.
Michael Jensen lived with the Doe-5s from
May 2012 until August 2012.2” John and Jane
Doe-5’s son M.S. testified that Stake Presi-
dent Grow told him it was good that Michael
‘was living with the Doe-5 family; that Mi-
chael was a “good guy;” and that he would be
a “good role model” for M.S. The plaintiffs
allege that during this same time, Stake
President Grow was “counseling” Michael on
a regular basis.

The plaintiffs further allege that while Mi-
chael lived with the Doe-5 family, he touched
the genitals of the Doe-5 boys, six-year-old
T.S. and ten-year-old M.S., on several occa-
sions, During therapy with a psychologist,
'T.S. described looking into the living room at
his home on one occasion and seeing Michael
holding his brother’s head down to Jensen’s
erotch and “humping” his brother M.S’s
face; he drew a picture of what he had ob-
served, The defendants allege the Doe-5 boys
thought Michael's touching of them was acci-
dental, while they were “wrestling,” until
their father suggested it was not. They add it
was the Doe-5’s oldest son, M.S.-2, who origi-
nally suggested that Michael live with their
family.

In February of 2018, Michael Jensen was
tried and convicted of the sexual abuse of the
Doe-1 children, J.T. and W.T. During Mi-
chael’s criminal trial, the Doe-2’s son, Z.W.,
testified under Rule 404(b) about his own
sexual abuse by Michael.?8

After additional children came forward, al-
leging they had been sexually abused by
Michael, the Church organized a support
group meeting for their families in March

27. In August of 2012; the Doe-5Ss learned ‘that
Michael had been crizhinally charged with child
sexual abuse.

28. In August of 2013, Michael Jensen was ex-
communicated from the Church based upon his
alleged abuse of at least three Church families’
trust. Stake President Grow testified during his
deposition in the instant matter that when he
visited Michael in jail, Michael admitted the vic-
tims’ testimony at his criminal trial was true.

441

2018 in which some of the plaintiff families
participated. UD-1 attended this support
meeting, after which he reported on the
meeting to Stake President Grow. The plain-
tiffs allege UD-1 continued to keep President
Grow informed of what he learned from the
plaintiff families and of the conversations he
had with John Doe-5's lawyer. The appendix
record contains an email from UD-1 to Grow
that begins, “As promised here is what we
[he and John Doe-5] talked about last
night,”

On September 16, 2018, the plaintiffs filed
their complaint in the circuit court against
the Church defendants and the’ Jenséns
(Chris, Saridralee, and Michael) alleging civil
conspiracy, fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and various negligence
claims; they also asserted an assault and a
battery claim solely against Michael Jensen,
On February 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint naming UD-1 as a defen-
dant on their claim of civil conspiracy, .

Following extensive discovery, multiple
motions for summary judgment were filed, as
well as numerous motions in limine. During a
status conference held on. August 81, 2015,
the circuit judge, expressing his concern re-
garding the impact that a six-week trial
would have on his docket, identified a need to
find ways to shorten the trial’s duration.

On December 4, 2015, prior to its in limine
rulings, the circuit court-entered an order
granting UD-1’s motion for summary judg-
ment, finding the plaintiffs could not prove
the elements of conspiracy against him,
Through its order entered on December 30,
2015, the circuit court granted several of the
defendants’ motions in limine, effectively
eliminating much of the plaintiffs’ evidence
offered in opposition to the defendants’ mo-
tions for summary judgment on the conspira-
ey claim.” Although the. circuit court had
29. In that digital exchange, UD-1 counseled John

Doe-5 against pursuing a legal claim against the

Church, citing the eternal ‘consequences of doing
$0.

30, The circuit court’s in limine rulings are ad-
dressed more fully in section IILB,, infra.

442

previously indicated its intent to allow the
plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim against the re-
maining defendants to go to trial, the follow-
ing day, December 31, 2015, the court en-
tered an order granting summary judgment
in favor of the remaining defendants on that
claim. After observing in this order that it
had “eliminated much of the circumstantial
evidence that Plaintiffs intended to use in
support of their conspiracy claim,” the circuit
court found the plaintiffs had no direct evi-
dence of a conspiracy and no evidence of a
“concerted action by the alleged conspira-
tors,” a “common plan or mutual agreement
by the alleged conspirators,” or any evidence
that “the alleged conspirators combined and
agreed to violate a duty owed to the Plain-
tiffs,”

On January 11, 2016, the circuit court en-
tered an order of final judgment pursuant to
‘West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
concerning its summary judgment orders.
The circuit court ruled these orders were
final because they entirely disposed of all
claims against UD-1 and all conspiracy
claims against all ‘defendants. No party ob-
jected to the entry of this order. This appeal
followed.

II. Standard of Review

HM The plaintiffs have appealed two sum-
mary judgment orders. Our review is plena-
ry. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va.
189, 451 S.H.2d 755 (1994) (“A cireuit court’s
entry of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo.”), To the extent other standards apply
to our review of the circuit court’s Rule 54(b)
certification and its evidentiary rulings, those
standards are set forth below.

TL.

The circuit court certified its summary
judgment orders under West Virginia Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). Following our consid-
eration of the Rule 54(b) certification, we will
then address the circuit court's in limine
rulings and conclude with our review of the
summary judgment decisions.

Discussion

31, See supra note 6.

A. Rule 54(b) certification

Hl In its Rule 54()* order, the cireuit
court found that its summary judgment or-
ders had disposed of the only claim (conspir-
acy) asserted against UD-1, as well as the
conspiracy claim against all other defendants,
and that there was no just reason for delay-
ing entry of final judgment with respect to
those claims. As the circuit court explained:

(a) appellate review of those orders and
any necessary evidentiary rulings will pro-
mote judicial efficiency by maximizing the
chance that this lengthy and complex case
is tried only once, with the benefit of defin-
itive rulings on the admissibility of certain
evidence and the viability of certain claims;
and (b) the special nature of this case,
where sexually abused children will be
called upon to testify, strongly supports
appellate review of these matters before
trial. Testifying, and reliving their abuse, is
re-traumatizing, and whatever appropriate
steps are available should be taken to en-
sure that this happens only once,

All parties assented to the circuit court’s
Rule 54(b) ruling as being proper and meet-
ing the criteria of Rule 54(b) at the time it
was made. Notwithstanding the defendants’
agreement to entry of the Rule 54(b) order
below, and the fact they did not file a motion
to dismiss this appeal or cross-assign as er-
ror the circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certification,
they now argue that this interlocutory appeal
under Rule 54(b) is improper because civil
conspiracy merely extends liability for an
underlying tort, which makes it inseparable
from the merits of the underlying torts that
remain pending below. For the reasons set

. forth below, we disagree.

HH Our review of the cireuit court's
Rule 54(b) certification is guided by the fol-
lowing test:

In reviewing a circuit court’s certifica-
tion under Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court ap-
plies a two-prong test. First, we scrutinize
de novo the circuit court’s evaluation of the
interrelationship of the claims, in order to
decide whether the circuit court completely

32. UD-I does not challenge the Rule 54(b) certi-
fication.

disposed of one or more claims, which is a

prerequisite for an appeal under this rule.

As to the second prong of the inquiry

under the rule—whether there is any just

reason for delay—this Court accords the
cireuit court’s determination considerably
more deference than -its first-prong deter-
mination. The circuit court’s assessment,
that there is “no just reason for delay” will
not be disturbed unless the circuit court’s
conclusion was clearly unreasonable, be-
cause the task of balancing the contending
factors is peculiarly one for the trial judge,
who can explore all the facets of a case.
Syl. Pt. 1, Province v. Province, 196 W.Va.
478, 478 S.E.2d 894 (1996).

Hl Regarding the first Province prong,
the circuit court found that its summary
judgment rulings had disposed of the plain-
tiffs’ conspiracy claim against UD-1, which
was the only cause of action asserted against
him, and their conspiracy claim against all
other defendants. We have previously recog-
nized conspiracy as a separate claim, As we
stated in Dunn v. Rockwell, 225 W.Va. 48,
689 S.H.2d 255 (2009), “‘{tlhe law of this
State recognizes a cause of action sounding
in civil conspiracy.” Id. at 56, 689 S.E.2d at
268 (quoting Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W.Va. 95,
128, 511 S.E.2d 720, 758 (1998), The fact that
a civil conspiracy claim requires an underly-
ing tort or harm resulting from the conspira-
ey does not make it any less a claim that can
be disposed of separately from the remaining
causes of action.

TN The defendants assert that civil
conspiracy is inseparable from the merits of
the underlying torts, is based on the same
facts, and seeks the same recovery. While the
same facts might be relevant to the conspira-
ey claim, as well as the negligent and inten-
tional tort claims that remain pending below,
this does not preclude the circuit court’s Rule
54(b) certification of its final ruling on the
plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim. Indeed,

“fwihen the mischief is accomplished,
the conspiracy becomes important, as it
affects that means and measure of redress;
for the party wronged may look beyond

33. See Syl. Pt. 7, Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in
Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982)

443

the actual participants in committing the
injury, and join with them as defendants
all who conspired to accomplish it, The
significance of the conspiracy consists,
therefore, in this; That it gives the person
injured a remedy against parties not other-
wise connected with the wrong. It is also
significant as constituting [a] matter of
aggravation, and as such tending to in-
crease the plaintiff's recovery.”
Gosden v. Lowis, 116 Ohio App.8d 195, 687
N.E.2d 481, 497 (1996) (citation omitted).
Further, a conspiracy claim “enlarge[s] the
pool of potential defendants from whom a
plaintiff may recover damages and, possibly,
an increase in the amount of those dam-
ages[.]” Id. at 498; see also Premier Therapy,
LLC. v, Childs, — Ohio St.3d ——, 75
N.E.3d 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (observing
that where additional damages are awarded
on conspiracy claim there must be evidence
to support damages award). In the case at
bar, the plaintiffs argue that “conduct that
establishes conspiracy liability, but not sepa-
rate tort liability, could cause harms not re-
coverable on the separate tort claims.”

We have previously recognized the possi-
bility of separate damages for conspiracy. In
Slack v. Kanawha Cownty Housing and Re-
development Authority, 188 W.Va. 144, 423
S.E.2d 547 (1992), after ordering the rein-
statement of the verdict for the plaintiff's
emotional injuries awarded on her invasion of
privacy claim, we addressed the errors the
plaintiff asserted concerning her conspiracy
claim. In Slack, “the only damages the plain-
tiff proved ... were damages for emotional
distress and mental anguish.” Id. at 155, 428
§.E.2d at 558. We recognized the “identicali-
ty of the damage claim asserted under the
civil conspiracy theory,” but declined to ad-
dress “whether, from a substantive stand-
point, there was sufficient evidence to prove
such a theory.” Id, at 156, 423 S.H.2d at 559,
On remand, we instructed that “the plaintiff
is free to develop the claim for civil conspira-
cy, but unless the damages are separate and
distinct from those already obtained on the
invasion of privacy verdict, there can be no
recovery under Hariess.” * Slack, 188 W.Va.

(‘It is generally recognized that there can be
only one recovery of damages for one wrong or

444

at 156, 423 S.E.2d at 559; see also Wells v.
Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 105-06, 297 S.H.2d 872,
880 (1982) (overruled on other grounds in
Garnes v, Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va,
656, 418 S.E,2d 897 (1991) (finding that had
“Jury been properly instructed on the appel-
lants’ ‘conspiracy theory they may well have
returned a verdict for compensatory dam-
ages against Settimio by virtue of the evi-
dence of his participation in the conspiracy”),

While the deference this Court affords to a
circuit court’s Rule 54(b) certification under
the first prong of Province is clear, we
afford’ even greater deference to the circuit
court's: decision under the second prorg of
Province. As indicated above, the circuit
court found no just reason for delay because
appellate review of its orders would “promote
judicial efficiency by maximizing the chance
that this lengthy and complex case is tried
only once, with the benefit of definitive rul-
ings on the admissibility of certain evidence
and the viability of certain claims[.]” These
findings “will not be disturbed unless the
cirevit court’s conclusion was clearly unrea-
sonable[.]” Province, 196 W.Va. at 475, 478
§.E.2d at 896, syl..pt. 1, in part.

Under the authority set forth above, and
upon giving the requisite deference to the
cireuit court’s Rule 64(b) ruling, we conclude
there was no abuse of diseretion in its deter-
mination that the summary judgment rul-
ings completely disposed of the plaintiffs’
conspiracy claims. Further, we give substan-
tial deferenee to and concur in the cireuit

. court's conclusion that “the special nature of
this case, where sexually abused children
will be'called upon to testify, strongly sup-
ports appellate review of these matters be-

injury. Double recovery of damages is not per-

mitted; the law does not permit a double satisfac-

tion for a single injury. A plaintiff may not recov-

er damages twice for the same injury simply
+ because he has two legal theories.”).

34, See State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Clawges, 206 W.Va. 222, 228, 523 S.E.2d 282,
288 (1999) (citing Province and stating “{tlhat
this Court affords great deference to the intent of
the circuit court in its determination of whether
an order is final for purposes of Rule 54(b)
certification is indisputable.’’).

38, Although the defendants assert there is no
indication that it would be traumatizing if the

fore trial.” > Accordingly, we find.no abuse
of discretion in the circuit court’s Rule 54(b)
certification, and we will exercise our appel-
late jurisdiction in this matter.

B. In limine rulings

: HE Having upheld the cireuit court’s Rule
54(b) certification, we observe that

“‘fw]here an appeal is- properly obtained
from an appealable decree either final or
interlocutory, such appeal will bring with it
for review all preceding non-appealable de-
crees or orders, from which have arisen
any of the errors complained of in the
decree appealed from, no’ matter how long
they may have been rendered before the
appeal was taken.’ Point 2, syllabus, Lloyd
v. Kyle, 26 W.Va. 584 [1885].” Syllabus
point 5, State ew rel. Davis v. Iman Min-
ing Co, 144 W.Va. 46, 106 S.E.2d 97
(1958). .

Syl. Pt. 6, Riffe v. Armstrong, 197 W.Va. 626,
477 §.E.2d 585 (1996). Necessarily inter-
twined with the. cireuit court’s summary
judgment rulings entered in favor of the
Church defendants and the Jensen parents
are its antecedent in limine rulings.*°

HMM Notwithstanding our holding in
Riffe, the Church defendants strongly urge
this Cou to refuse consideration of the’ cir-
cuit court’s in limine rulings. Citing our “fi-
nality rule,” they argue that the plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate that the in limine rulings
“were so integral to the conspiracy order as
to ‘give rise’ to the purported errors con-
tained therein”; that “[nJothing in the circuit.
court’s expressed reasons for granting sum-
mary judgment suggests that the outcome
would have been different if some or all of

minor plaintiffs had to testify more than once,
citing the multiples times each had already relat-
ed what had happened, we agree with the circuit
court’s concern. As we recently recognized,
“each new publication [of child pornography]
would cause new injury to the child’s ... emo-
tional well-being.” State v. Riggleman, 238 W.Va.
720, 726, 798 S.E.2d 846, 852 (2017) (citation
omitted). Similarly, a child’s emotional well-be-
ing could be harmed each time the .child is
. required to recount his or her abuse.

36. As indicated previously, the circuit court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of UD-1 prior
to issuing the subject in limine rulings.

the excluded evidence had not been exclud-
ed”; and that “{tJhere is no meaningful way
for this Court to determine that any excluded
evidence, much less which evidence, resulted
in the alleged error in the conspiracy ruling.”
The Jensen parents take a somewhat differ-
ent stance. They first argue that this Court
should not review the in limine rulings, but
then acknowledge that the instant appeal is
“tied up with the evidentiary rulings that
have been decided,” adding that any review
of those rulings should be limited “to the
extent they impact the outeome of the sum-
mary judgment ruling on the conspiracy
cause of action.”

Rejecting the notion that the in limine
rulings are distinct from the summary judg-
ment rulings, the plaintiffs maintain that this
Court can properly review these evidentiary
rulings under Riffe. They highlight the cir-
cuit court’s statement in its summary judg-
ment order that it had “eliminated much of
the circumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs in-
tended to use in support of their conspiracy
claim” through its in imine rulings. Although
the defendants argue that any alleged error
in the summary judgment ruling did not
arise from the prior in limine rulings, we find
that the circuit judge’s comments made dur-
ing the Rule 54(b) hearing indicate other-
wise: “I don’t know how you get around the
motions in limine .... aren’t you going to
have to look at those as part of the appeal?

. I don’t know how you cut that out of
it.” 87 It is clear to this Court, as well, that
the in limine rulings and the summary judg-
ment rulings are inextricably entwined.

HE Typically, a motion in limine is “a
pre-trial request .., that the court not per-
mit certain anticipated evidence to be admit-
ted in the trial and not be seen or heard by
the jury.” ®8 While the circuit court’s in limine
rulings may have been made, in part, for
such purposes, it is equally clear that these
in limine rulings allowed the circuit court to
evade review of that evidence and the attend-

37. .We note that defense counsels’ comments at
this same hearing reflect contemplation of the
necessity of this Court’s review of the in limine
rulings.

38, State v. Poling, 207 W.Va. 299, 307 n.1, 531
S.E.2d 678, 686 n.1 (2000).

445

ant duty to draw all reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, as is required of a court in
ruling upon a motion for summary’ -judg-
ment. Other courts have cautioned against
proceeding in such a manner.

In C & E Services, Inc, v. Ashland Inc.,
539 F.Supp.2d 816 (D. D.C. 2008), the court
found that “a motion in limine should not be
used to resolve factual disputes or weigh
evidence[;]” rather, such should be accom-
plished through “a motion for summary judg-
ment, with its accompanying and crucial pro-
cedural safeguards,” Id. at 828. Similarly, in
Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. 3. Mogi Trad-
ing Co., 100 F.8d 1853 (7th Cir, 1996), the
court determined that the sufficiency of evi-
dence concerning lost profits was for sum-
mary judgment or judgment as matter of
Jaw, not a motion in limine. Id. at 1863; see
also Meyer Intellectual Prop.’s. Ltd. v. Bo-
dum, Inc., 690 F.3d 1854, 1878 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (observing that “motion in limine is not
the appropriate vehicle for weighing the suf-
ficiency of the evidence”); Williams v. John-
son, 747 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D. D.C. 2010)
(‘Motions in limine are designed to narrow
the evidentiary issues at trial. ** * In light
of their limited purpose, motidns’ in limine
‘should not be used to resolve factual dis-
putes,’ which remain the ‘function of a motion
for summary judgment’ ”) (citation omitted);
Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745
A2d 147, 150-51 (R.L. 2000) (finding tiial
judge had improperly used motion in limine
to effectively make summary judgment rul-
ing).

While not expressly considering the pro-
priety of utilizing in limine rulings to resolve
factual disputes, this Court has addressed
the effects of a circuit court’s elimination of
evidence through an in limine ruling to facili-
tate summary judgment. In San Francisco v.
Wendy's International, Inc, 221 W.Va. 734,
656 S.E.2d 485 (2007), the cireuit court ex-
cluded the testimony of the plaintiffs’ causa-

39. The standards and guidelines applicable to a
circuit court’s consideration and ruling upon a
motion for summary judgment are discussed in-
fra, section IIL.C,

446

tion experts through an in limine ruling after
which it “went on to grant summary judg-
ment to.the defendant, on the basis that the
plaintiffs did not have sufficient evidence to
support their claim.” Jd. at 738, 656 S.B.2d at
489, This Court concluded that

{hlaving found that the circuit court erred

in excluding both of the appellants’ causa-

tion experts, we now find that the appel-
lants made a sufficient showing on an es-
sential element of the case that they had
the burden to prove. Accordingly, because
it now appears from the record that genu-
ine issues of fact exist to be tried, we find
that the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment.
Id, at 751, 656 §.H.2d at 502, Similarly, in
Buckhannon Sales Co, Inc. v. Appalantic
Corp., 175 W.Va. 742, 388 S.E.2d 222 (1985),
the circuit court first granted the defendant’s
motion in limine “to prevent the introduction
of parol testimony concerning the various
documents, contending that the court should
not admit parol evidence and that the terms
of the various contracts were unambiguous.”
Id, at 744, 888 S.E.2d at 224. The court later
granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. After analyzing the parol evidence
rule, this Court reversed’ the award of sum-
mary judgment after determining that “the
motion in limine was erroneously sustained”
and that “the parties should have the oppor-
tunity to explain the agreements.” Id. at 745,
888 S.H.2d at 224,

Although the defendants contend there is
nothing in the circuit court’s reasoning for
granting summary judgment that would sug-
gest a different outcome had some or all of
the excluded evidence not been eliminated,
we disagree. The fact that the circuit court
first eliminated a large portion of the plain-
tiffs’ circumstantial evidence offered in sup-
port of their conspiracy claim before it grant-
ed the Church defendants’ and the Jensen
parents’ summary judgment motions on that
claim strongly suggests otherwise, While the

40. We reject the plaintiffs’ request that we apply
a de novo review to these evidentiary rulings.
The issues before us do not involve an interpreta-
tion of the rules of evidence, which would re-
quire a de novo review; rather, we review the
circuit court’s application of those rules to ex-
clude evidence through its in limine rulings. See
Lacy v. CSX Transp. Inc., 205 W.Va. 630, 646,

defendants afford little significance to the
circuit .court’s pronouncement that it had
eliminated much of the: plaintiffs’ evidence
through its prior in limine rulings, we find
the statement reveals precisely what the cir-
cuit court hoped to accomplish.

HM Turning to the circuit court’s in li-
mine rulings, we first observe that “{a] trial
court’s ruling on a motion in limine is re-
viewed on appeal for an abuse of discre-
tion.” ” Syl. Pt. 1, McKenzie v. Carroll In-
tern. Corp., 216 W.Va. 686, 610 S.E.2d 341
(2004). Our consideration necessarily begins
with a review of the evidentiary rules appli-
cable to the circuit court’s rulings. Although
the circuit court’s in limine rulings are sparse
in terms of any factual or legal analysis, the
order does reflect a cursory application of
Rules.401 and 408 of the West Virginia Rules
of Evidence.

Under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 401,
“felvidence is relevant if: (a) it has any ten-
dency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.” Id. Relevant evidence may be
excluded, however, “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly pre-
senting cumulative evidence.” W.Va. R. Evid.
408, in part.

Hn all but one of the in limine rulings
being challenged, the cireuit court found, in-
ter alia, that the evidence would be “wasting
time” and would cause “undue delay,” which
are Rule 408 considerations. The circuit court
did not explain in its order why this evidence
would be a waste of time or cause undue
delay, nor did it offer any analysis as to why
this evidence is unfairly prejudicial or how
that unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
its probative value. Importantly, however,

520 S.B.2d 418, 434 (1999) (“‘{A] trial court’s
ruling on the admissibility of testimony is re-
viewed for an abuse of discretion, “but to the
extent the [circuit] court’s ruling turns on an
interpretation of a [West Virginia] Rule of Evi-
dence our review is plenary.”’ State v. Sutphin,
195 W.Va. 551, 560, 466 S.B.2d 402, 411 (1995)
(citations omitted)[.]”).

“wasting time” and “undue delay” should not
be employed to exclude relevant evidence
whose probative value substantially out-
weighs the risk presented by these concerns.
Indeed, notwithstanding the circuit court’s
stated desire to find ways to shorten what
will clearly be a lengthy trial in this matter,
care must be taken to ensure that efficiency
considerations do not lead to the exclusion of
highly probative evidence. See U.S. v. Siegel,
586 F.8d 306, 320 (4 Cir, 2008) (“sympa-
thiz[ing] with the district court’s concern
about the length and complexity of the trial”;
agreeing that “the district court excluded the
Other Crime Evidence without sufficiently
considering the importance of the evidence to
the government’s case”; and finding that the
district court had “other tools available to it
to ensure that the trial proceeds as expedi-
tiously as possible”); Johnson v. Ashby, 808
F.2d 676, 678 (8 Cir. 1987) (recognizing trial
court’s need to control length of trial but also
observing that “it may be an abuse of the
trial court’s discretion to exclude probative,
non-cumulative evidence simply because its
introduction will cause delay”). We bear
these cautions in mind as we consider the
circuit court’s in limine rulings“! that have
been challenged in this appeal.

1. Exclusion of Utah Sex
Offense Evidence

HB The circuit court ruled that the alle-
gations of the Church’s influence in the juve-

41. Confining our decision to the bases cited in
the circuit court’s December 30, 2015, in limine
order, we recognize that other evidentiary chal-
lenges may arise concerning this same evidence,
as the evidence unfolds at trial.

42, As indicated previously, Michael told his
friend J.C. (lane Doe-4’s son), that he had been
in legal trouble with a girl in Utah before moving
to West Virginia, and that his grandfather “was
in a leadership position for the church ... [and]
helped take care of whatever needed to be taken
care of.”

43. See supra note 10.

44, The plaintiffs contend the reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn from their circumstantial evi-
dence in this regard demonstrate that the Jensen
parents are not being truthful when they claim
they did not see the SBRA.

48. The circuit court also found that the records
from the Utah proceeding should remain “confi-

447

nile criminal proceedings in Utah were based
on “Michael’s cryptic boast to a friend” ? and
other circumstantial evidence of similarly
“limited probative value,” which was substan-
tially outweighed by a danger of unfair preju-
dice to the defendants, as well as concerns
rooted in confusing the issues, wasting time,
and undue delay. The circuit court found a
dissimilarity in conduct between Michael's
criminal offenses in Utah and the instant
abuse allegations, adding that the Utah court
records contained more information than ei-
ther the Jensen parents, Michael’s paternal
grandfather, or Bishop Swensen would have
contemporaneously been aware of. Regarding
the SBRA,“ which was part of the Utah
proceeding, the cireuit court found there was
no evidence that the Jensen parents or
Church leaders ever saw the SBRA;“ there- ©
fore, it had low probative value that was
substantially outweighed by its potential for
confusing the issues, undue delay, and wast-
ing time.’

The plaintiffs assert that these rulings are
in error because the events in Utah marked
the inception of the concerted action they
have alleged. They insist that the direct evi-
dence concerning Michael’s early history of
sex offenses in Utah is intrinsic to their
claims, particularly where “disputes abound”
regarding when the defendants had notice
that Michael was a risk to children,“* whether
they concealed both the abuse and the risk,
and whether Michael should have been spon-

dential and inadmissible absent an order from
the appropriate Utah court authorizing its re-
lease.” Even assuming, arguendo, that a Utah
court could control the admission of evidence at
trial in West Virginia, the fact remains that these
records were previously released in numerous
ways without a Utah court order, but in accor-
dance with Utah court rules, including to the
West Virginia State Police, They were also pro-
duced in response to the Church's subpoena to
the West Virginia State Police and by the Jensen
parents in discovery; they have been used in
multiple ways in this litigation, including by ex-
perts in rendering opinions.

46. The defendants discount Michael's sex of-
fenses in Utah in many ways, including that there
was no evidence that he had abused any child
before 2007. However, Michael's victims in Utah
were minors.

448

sored as a fit babysitter for Church families
in West Virginia, or as a boarder in their
homes, Regarding the circuit court’s finding
that this evidence. would be a “waste of time”
because the Utah offenses were too “dissimi-
lar” to Michael’s later abuse of children, the
plaintiffs posit the question; What parent
would not want to know that the person
being proffered to babysit his or her child or
board in his or her home had prior sexual
offenses, and what parent would not think
that persons with knowledge of those of-
fenses had a.duty to disclose that knowledge
before urging unsuspecting parents to allow
that person into their home and/or to babysit
their children? 4

Regarding the cirenit court’s acceptance of
the Jensens’ denial they never saw the SBRA
or knew of its contents, the plaintiffs assert
this was.a credibility determination made by
the circuit court in the face of contrary cir-
cumstantial evidence that calls into question
the veracity of the Jensens’ denial. The plain-
tiffs further argue that it should be for a

- jury, not'the circuit court, to decide whether
thére is a connection between Michael’s Utah
sex offenses and his later abuse of the minor
plaintiffs and whether the Church influenced
the outcome of the proceeding in Utah
through the involvement of Michael’s pater-
nal grandfather, who held powerful positions
within the Church. Maintaining that the con-
tested facts concerning what happened in
Utah, whether the conduct was serious, and
whether it was predictive of Michael being a
threat to re-offend were all disputed, the

47, Although the defendants argue that no
“Church leader” placed Michael in babysitting
positions, the plaintiffs look to the following alle-
gations to disprove this contention: that Sandra-
Tee Jensen in her role as Relief Society President
arranged for Michael to babysit several of the
minor plaintiffs; that in her later role as a scout
leader for the Church she arranged for Michael
to babysit for another plaintiff family; and, later,
after Michael was banned from the Jensen home
for sexually abusing his twelve-year-old sister,

. Church leaders assisted and recommended Mi-
chael's placement as a boarder with yet another
family.

48, Serving to further highlight the innumerable
factual disputes in this matter, the defendants
contend that the SBRA evaluator concluded that
Michael posed a low to moderate risk to act out
again with girls his age and that he was not a
risk to his prepubescent sisters. However, the

plaintiffs assert the circuit court erred in
resolving these disputed facts in favor of the
defendants before also finding that this evi-
dence had limited probative value and would
be a waste of time.-

Rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the
defendants contend the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion because the plaintiffs
have no evidence that Michael, his parents,
or any Church leaders ever saw the SBRA
or knew of its contents and that the plain-
tiffs have distorted the record when they
claim the Jensen parents knew Michael was
a danger to children because they no longer
allowed him to babysit his younger sib-
lings. Arguing further, the defendants state
that the circuit court properly excluded the
SBRA, which has low probative value given
the dissimilarities between Michael’s Utah
conduct and the instant, abuse allegations,
and which value was substantially out-
weighed by its potential for issue confusion,
undue delay, and wasting time. The defen-
dants contend that the plaintiffs have no
evidence of Church influence in Michael's
Utah proceedings; that those persons in-
volved in that proceeding, including the
prosecutors, have testified they were not in-
fluenced in their handling of Michael’s pros-
ecution; and that Michael’s parents and
grandfather participated in the proceeding
as any parent or grandparent would in such
circumstances,

Based on our review of this evidence, we
conclude that the circuit court abused its

defendants omit that the SBRA evaluator also
concluded that Michael needed “to be supervised
with any female, including his sisters ... until his
therapist considers that his risk is reduced.” (em-
phasis added), While the defendants contend that
proof of the therapy’s completion was provided
to the Utah court, the plaintiffs allege there is no
“proof” of completion in Michael's Utah court
file, which was confirmed during the testimony
of defense expert Frank Yannelli. Mr. Yannelli is
an assistant prosecutor in the county whiere Mi-
chael was prosecuted in Utah. With the permis-
sion of his supervisor, who is the elected Utah
County Attorney, Mr. Yannelli is a paid expert for
the Church in the case at bar.

49, This Court is‘ confident that the parties will
marshal their experts and other evidence in sup-
port of their respective positions on this issue for
purposes of trial.

discretion in excluding evidence of
Jensen’s juvenile criminal proceeding in
Utah. Evidence of the Utah offenses, includ-
ing the SBRA, are clearly relevant and pro-
Dative of who knew what and when, which is
at the heart of the plaintiffs’ conspiracy
claim, and is probative of notice of Michael’s
risk to re-offend sexually.° Moreover, ‘it is
neither speculative nor unreasonable to con-
clude that a jury might infer’that Michael's
parents had access to information associated
with their minor son’s criminal proceeding,
including the SBRA,"! which cautioned that
Michael should’ be supervised with any. fe-
male, including his young sisters, until ‘his
therapy was completed and the risk reduced,
What purpose would such a warning serve if
it were not shared with the very. persons
intended to implement the protections ad-
dressed by the caution? Moreover, the par-
ties’ experts have relied, in part, on the
SBRA in rendering their opinions, Further,
regarding the Church’s alleged influence in
that proceeding, it is difficult to ignore Mi-
chael’s friend J.C., who testified that Michael
said he had been in legal trouble with a girl
in Utah before moving to West Virginia, but
his grandfather “was in a leadership position
for the church ... [and] helped take care of
whatever needed to be taken care of.” While
the cirenit court found this statement to be
merely a “boast,” Michael has declined to
testify in this matter; thus, there is no basis
for such conclusion,

Just because highly probative evidence
may prejudice the opposing party, that basis
alone does not warrant the exclusion of such
evidence which is the case here. Moreover,
concerns about the length of trial do not
warrant the exclusion of this evidence based
on waste of time, undue delay or confusion
for a jury. It will be for a jury to.resolve.any.
factual disputes associated with this evidence,
draw reasonable inferences from this, evi-
dence, as it-may, and determine whether this
evidence. supports the plaintiffs’ conspiracy
claim, |
50, The plaintiffs allege that the Church’s expert

admitted that Michael’s .sex offenses in Utah

“yortended an increased risk of re-offending

with @ range of victims, including young chil-

en,

449

2,- Exclusion of evidence of Michael -
Jensen’s alleged assault of J.M. °
in 2007

HM The circuit court found the evidence
of Michael Jensen’s alleged assaillt upon J.M.
in 2007 to be of limited probative. value for
purposes of establishing notice that Michael
was a danger to young children, and that any
probative value of this evidence was substan-
tially outweighed by its potential for issue
confusion, undue delay, and “wasting time
during what is expected to be a long trial.”
The plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred
by rejecting their argument that whether
this evidence provides notice that Michael
was a risk to a range of potential victims is a
jury question. Arguing further, the plaintiffs
maintain that Sandralee Jensen, who was.a
Church officer at the time, connected the
J.M. assault with Michael’s offenses in Utah,
bringing both- matters to the attention of
Bishop Whiteomb—all of which occurred be-
fore Michael was “placed as a babysitter for
the Doe-1 family in November 2007, the Doe-
2 family in February/March, 2008, and into
the homes of the other plaintiffs thereafter.”

The defendants respond that no local
Church leader knew anything about the J.M,
incident and that, at most, Sandralee Jensen
may have mentioned this incident in a “pass-
ing comment” to Bishop Whitcomb. They
further argue it was not until J.M.’s deposi-
tion in May of 2014 that either the Jensens
or anyone else learned that the incident had
been anything but conserisual. Finally, they
contend that regardless of what they knew
about this incident, it “would not act a8 a
predictor that Michael might abuse young
children.”

We find the ‘yelevancy, and probity of this
evidence outweighs any concern for issue
confysion, undue delay, or wasting time. This
is simply another piece of evidence from
which a jury could infer a conspiracy to
conceal incidents of Michael’s sexual abuse of

51, Weare persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument
that the Jensens,-as his parents, could obtain-the
SBRA as Michael’s power of attorney under. Utah
Judicial rales, We further observe that parents
may have access to private court records if the

.subject of that record is their unemancipated
minor child. Ut. Jud. Admn. R. 4-202.03(4)(B).

450

others, including J.M., and to suppress infor-
mation of the ongoing danger and threat that
he posed. Certainly, Sandralee Jensen, who
is alleged to be part of the conspiracy and
who was then serving as Relief Society Presi-
dent, had concerns at the time, prompting
her to ask J.M. whether she was okay and
“do we have a problem?” Mrs. Jensen also
reported the incident to Bishop Whitcomb
during a conversation in which she raised the
topic of Michael's offenses in Utah. Accord-
ingly, we find that the circuit court abused its
discretion in excluding this evidence,
8. Exclusion of any reference to
an alleged 2006-2007 Stake
High Council meeting

HH The plaintiffs have circumstantial ev-
idence that a Stake High Council meeting
occurred in either 2006 or 2007 during which,
inter alia, Michael Jensen’s abuse of a youn-
ger sister was allegedly discussed, and Stake
President Grow asked UD-1 to monitor Chris
Jensen and report back to him, which UD-1
agreed to do. The circuit court excluded this
evidence, finding the plaintiffs had no “first-
hand evidence of such a meeting” and the
probative value of the plaintiffs’ hearsay evi-
dence, even if the court were to find it admis-
sible, was substantially outweighed by a dan-
ger of undue delay and a waste of time.

In making this particular in limine ruling,
the circuit court referenced, without discus-
sion, its earlier order granting summary
judgment in favor of UD-1, The circuit court
found in its prior order that UD-1 was indis-
putably not a member of the Stake High
Council until 2008; that the transcript of
plaintiffs’ counsel’s interview of UD-1 re-
flected that UD-1 did not specify a date for
this Stake High Council meeting; that every-
one who was indisputably a member of the
Stake High Council at that time had denied
that any such meeting took place; that the
plaintiffs’ assertion that the meeting was
prompted by Michael’s abuse of a younger
sister was not supported by the record; and
that the only record evidence of a sexual
incident between Michael and a younger sis-
ter was the subsequent incident that oc-
52. The circuit court also mentioned that the

plaintiffs’ evidence was hearsay. Any hearsay ob-
jections can be addressed at trial.

eurred in 2010 with his then twelve-year-old
sister, K.J.

The plaintiffs argue there is extensive evi-
dence that this meeting took place within the
time frame they allege, including separate
conversations that John Doe-5 had with
Stake President Grow; President Grow’s ex-
ecutive secretary at the time, Tony Naegle;
and UD-1. They allege UD-1 told multiple
plaintiffs about these Stake discussions dur-
ing a parent support group meeting in 2013,
referencing the 2007 time frame both then
and when he was interviewed by plaintiffs’
counsel. Rejecting these arguments, the de-
fendants essentially echo the circuit court’s
findings, including that persons who served
on the Stake High Council during that time
frame have all denied that such discussion
regarding the Jensens ever took place.

We find the circuit court abused its discre-
tion by crediting the defendants’ denials that
this meeting took place when the record con-
tains circumstantial evidence to the contrary.
While the evidence is clearly conflicting, it
will be for the jury to assess the credibility of
witnesses, to determine whether this Stake
High Council meeting took place and, if so,
whether concerns regarding Michael’s abuse
of others was discussed.” A jury’s resolution
of this conflicting, but relevant and probative
evidence, will necessarily bear on who knew
what and when, whether Church leaders
were on notice of the risk that Michael posed,
and whether the evidence supports the plain-
tiffs’ conspiracy claim.

4, Exclusion of any reference to Mi-

chael Jensen’s sister, R.J., allegedly
exhibiting signs of sexual abuse

HMM The circuit court found there is no
direct evidence that abuse of R.J.5 was “dis-
cussed at a high council meeting” or that
Michael was the abuser, even if RJ. had
been abused. It then concluded that the
“very low probative value of Plaintiffs’ cir-
eumstantial evidence of the alleged abuse of
B.J. is substantially outweighed by its poten-
tial for confusing the issues, undue delay, and
wasting time.” The plaintiffs contend the cir-

53. See supra note 16.

euit court misunderstood their intended use
for this evidence, which is not to argue that
RJ. was abused; rather, they contend that
she “exhibited well-accepted signs of abuse”
at a time when both Jensen parents held
high positions within the Church; were aware
of their son’s history of sexual offenses; and
when Sandralee Jensen, who was aware of
this incident, was offering: Michael’s babysit-
ting services to Church families in her role as
Relief Society President. The defendants
counter that even if R.J.’s behavior were
suggestive of prior sexual abuse, this evi-
dence has limited, if any, probative value
because the plaintiffs do not allege that any
Church leader was aware of the incident;4
there was no attempt to conceal the event;
and the Jensen parents never interpreted
R.J.’s behavior as being indicative of sexual
abuse by anyone, including Michael.

‘We find the probative value of this evi-
dence outweighs any concern for issue confu-
sion, undue delay, or wasting time. Having
previously found that the plaintiffs’ cireum-
stantial evidence concerning the Stake High
Council meeting in the 2006-2007 time frame
was improperly excluded by the circuit court,
the relevancy and probative value of the evi-
dence concerning R.J. becomes more clear.
Although the defendants argue the plaintiffs
have concocted this theory of sexual abuse of
R.J.,® if a jury finds there was a 2006-2007
Stake High Council meeting during which
the abuse of a Jensen daughter was dis-

54, These arguments are inconsistent with evi-
dence that the Jensen parents held. leadership
positions in the Church during this time frame.
Further, if no effort was made to conceal the
incident, then a jury could reasonably infer that
other Church leaders would have learned of this
incident, which was arguably further evidence of
notice as to Michael's improper sexual propensi-
ties,

55. The defendants state that once the plaintiffs
realized their original theory that Michael’s
abuse of his sister, K.J., could not have been the
subject of Stake discussions in 2006-2007 be-
cause the abuse of K.J. occurred in 2010, the
plaintiffs created this theory that RJ. showed
signs of sexual abuse. See supra note 16.

36, Again, Stake President Grow has denied task-
ing UD-1 to monitor Chris Jensen and report
back on his observations. This is a disputed issue
of fact that a jury will necessarily decide through
its credibility determinations.

451

cussed, the jury could conclude that-R.J. was
that daughter, and that related concerns
prompted Stake President Grow to ask UD-1
to monitor Chris Jensen. Accordingly, we
find the circuit court abused its discretion by
excluding this evidence.

5. Exclusion of 1999 purported .
Helpline form document

HM As part of the evidence supporting
their conspiracy ¢laim, the plaintiffs planned
to offer at trial a Helpline form document to
show how the Church’s abuse prevention and
response systems are intended to protect the
Church from liability rather than to prevent
abuse, as the Church proclaims. The plain-
tiffs state this- document was provided to
their counsel by Unnamed Witness-1, who
has averred that she telephoned the Chureh’s
Helpline in 1999 concerning an abusive situa-
tion and that when the documents she had
forwarded were later returned to her, this
particular form document was included.” Al-
though the form appears on its face to be an
instruction sheet for Helpline workers taking
ealls, the circuit court excluded the form,
observing that the only Helpline call made in
the instant matter was made by Bishop Vin-
cent more than twelve years after the date
on the.form. The lower court further found
the document to be- unauthenticated hearsay
and irrelevant.

While this form is very much in dispute,
the Church defendants assert “[elven the

37. The appendix record reflects that this form
document was completed by Allen Gundry in
1999, when he received a call to the Helpline
from Unnamed Witness-1. According to the de-
position testimony given in 2000 in an unrelated
matter by Harold Brown, who was then the
managing director of the Welfare Services De-
partment of the Church, Mr. Gundry was the
person primarily responsible for the Helpline at
that time. Mr. Brown testified that the form
would have been developed by the Church's
Family Services with help from legal counsel;
that the form contains various topics to discuss
and handle when a call comes into the Helpline;
and that once a particular situation is resolved,
the form would be destroyed. For unknown rea-
sons, this particular document was among the
documents returned by the Church to Unnamed
Witness-1.

452

purported Helpline form produced by Plain-
tiffs” supports their position that the purpose
of the .Church’s Helpline is “to . assist
[Church] bishops and stake presidents in
ministering to victims and affected families in
abuse situations, and to ensure that they
comply with all applicable reporting laws.”
Although the defendants champion the exclu-
sion of this form at trial as being irrelevant
and unauthenticated,® they also claim it re-
flects the Church’s vigorous policy of protect-
ing and helping abuse victims. Conversely,
the plaintiffs contend they can authenticate
this form, which is relevant and supportive of
their conspiracy claim.

. This alleged Helpline form warns that
Helpline “PERSONNEL SHOULD NEVER
ADVISE A PRIESTHOOD LEADER TO
REPORT ABUSE, COUNSEL OF THIS
NATURE SHOULD COME ONLY FROM
LEGAL COUNSEL[]’ The plaintiffs argue
their intent is not to show that this form was
used when Bishop Vincent’ telephoned: the
Helpline in 2012, but to support their claim of
institutional concealment © and their position
that the Helpline was implemented to protect
the Church from civil liability rather than
simply to protect victims from sexual abuse.
They add the form is indicative of a “general
strategy in responding to assertions of sexual
abuse in the Mormon community,” which is
as true today as it was when the Helpline
was first implemented in the 1990s. The
Church defendants refute this assertion, ar-
guing that any notion that its Helpline proce-
dure has not changed since 1995 is “flatly
contradicted by the record” and that “[w]it-
nesses familiar with the Helpline procedure
testified that no such form is used today;
[and that] they have no knowledge of the
purported Helpline form or any written pro-
tocol,”

While this particular evidence, as well as
other evidence in the appendix record, would
support the inference urged by the plaintiffs,
it also arguably supports the Church defen-
dants’ position that this form is indicative of

38, In the plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion in
limine filed below, they stated that the defen-
dants have refused to produce Mr. Gundry for
deposition, representing that he could not recall
the particular Helpline call from Unnamed Wit-
ness-1, and that their motion to compel his depo-

the Church’s purported laudatory policy and
goal of preventing and protecting abuse vic-
tims. Although the defendants contend this
form document has no bearing on the plain-
tiffs’ conspiracy claim, we find a jury could
reasonably infer that the defendants’ silence
in the face of repeated reports of alleged
abuse by Michael Jensen, while simulta-
neously holding him out as a suitable babysit-
ter and boarder to Church families, was con-
sistent with this form document's warning to
“never advise a priesthood leader to report
abuse.” Accordingly, we find this document
to be relevant and probative of the plaintiffs’
conspiracy claim, With that said, this Court
does not know by what means the plaintiffs
will seek to admit this evidence at trial. In
other words, the circuit court must deter-
mine at trial whether the plaintiffs can au-
thenticate the document, as they aver they
can, and whether they can overcome the
defendants’ evidentiary objections in that re-
gard.

6. Church’s Annotation System

HH In essentially two sentences, the cir-
cuit court excluded evidence relating to the
Church’s annotation system, finding that “us-
ing an internal recordkeeping mechanism ...
against the Church ... would create First
Amendment concerns,” without offering any
further explanation or analysis as to what
that concern might be. The annotation sys-
tem is part of the Church’s abuse “preven-
tion and response” procedure for annotating
records of members who commit child abuse
or might otherwise pose a threat, The circuit
court concluded that because the Church did
not use its annotation system to annotate
Michael Jensen’s Church membership rec-
ord, any probative value was substantially
outweighed by “the potential for confusing
the issues, undue delay, and wasting time.”
The plaintiffs assert the circuit court erred in
this regard, notwithstanding its further rul-
ing that the Church defendants could not use
the annotation system in their defense,

sition had not been ruled upon by the discovery
commiséioner.

59, It appears that the Church’s documents relat-
ed to a call to the Helpline are destroyed after
the call is resolved.

HM The plaintiffs argue the Church has
“touted its abuse response and. prevention
procedures as the gold standard,” which in
the opinion of the Church defendants’ expert,
exceeds the seculai standard of care for
youth-serving institutions. A part of these
procedures is the Church’s Helpline, as dis-
cussed above, as well as its annotation sys-
tem. The plaintiffs planned to offer evidence
at trial that Bishop Swensen did not annotate
Michael Jensen’s Church membership record
following his admission to sex offenses in
Utah and, had he done so, Church leaders in
West Virginia would have received earlier
notice of Michael’s sex offenses, which could
possibly have prevented the abuse of the
minor plaintiffs through the Church’s secular
duty to warn. Arguing further, the plaintiffs
state this evidence is relevant and is not a
“waste of time” when they have alleged the
Church’s failure to warn is part of the al-
leged conspiracy. Rather than substantively
challenging the Church’s failure to annotate
Michael’s record following his Utah offenses
as a matter of Church doctrine, the plaintiffs
assert their intent to simply show that the
Church did not use its system to warn and
protect.® Although the defendants argue the
annotation system is irrelevant to Michael
Jensen because it only restricts the types of
church callings a congregant can have, and
Michael’s abusive conduct was ““out-of-
church” conduct, the plaintiffs counter that
Church leaders placed him as a babysitter in

60. Other than a vague reference to “First
Amendment concerns[,]” the circuit court's De-
cember 30, 2015, in limine order contains no
analysis of this particular concern, The defen-
dants argue that allowing a jury to assess wheth-
er the Chureh’s annotation system was properly
applied to Michael “would necessarily involve
excessive entanglement by the government with
the Church in violation of the Establishment
Clause.” Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints, 18 $.W.3d 877, 897 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000). The defendants also rely upon Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601,
21 LBd.2d 658 (1969), wherein the Court cau-
tioned against civil courts “engag{ing] in the
forbidden process of interpreting and weighting
church doctrine.” Id, at 451, 89 S.Ct. 601. Con-
‘versely, the plaintiffs assert they do not challenge
substantively the Church’s failure to annotate
Michael Jensen's record following thé Utah of-
fenses ‘as a matter of Church doctrine.” They
cite Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Di-

453

several homes," as a boarder in others, and
as an unsupervised substitute teacher in the
Chureh’s primary class of four-year-old chil-
dren.

Regarding the defendants’ argument that
their evidence. demonstrates that only adult
records are annotated, the plaintiffs point to
contrary evidence in the appendix record, In
response to the defendant’s assertion that
annotating Michael’s record would have
made no difference because it would only
have been seen: by his bishop and Stake
president, the plaintiffs point to the Church’s
Rule 30(b)(7) witness who testified that the
purpose of notifying the bishop: and Stake
president is so that they can, in theory, take
steps to protect potential victims. -

We find the circuit court abused its disere-
tion in excluding evidence of the existence of
a system that the defendants have described
as’ theeting, if not exceeding, the Chureh’s
secular duty as a youth-serving organization.
This evidence is not only relevant and proba-
tive of the Church defendants’ defense, it is
equally relevant and probative to the plain-
tiffs’ claims, particularly wheni notice and the
Chureh’s failure to warn is part of the con-
spiracy claim. Any factual disputes presented
by the evidence at trial may be resolved by a’
jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the pro-
bative value. of this evidence is hot out-
weighed by any potential for confusion of the
issues, undue delay, and wasting time, and it

ocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999),
for the proposition that a church’s actions are
“facts” that can be considered if a party does not
challenge that action as “‘true or'false.” Here, the
plaintiffs plan to show, “as a matter of fact,” that
the Church had a system to warn and protect,
thereby making it feasible to warn and protect,
but failed to use that system. We do not see this
purpose as raising a First Amendment concern.
If the plaintiffs veer from their stated purpose for
this evidence at trial such that a constitutional
concern arises, the circuit court can address any
such concern at that time.

61. The plaintiffs are referring to the babysitting
arrangements that Sandralee Jensen made for
Michael in her leadership position as the
Church's Relief Society President ahd later offer-
ing Michael as a babysitter for the Doe-3 chil
dren so that Jane and John Doe-3 could attend

her scout training meeting when she had over-
sight of the Church’s Cub Scout program.

454

was error for the circuit court to have exclud-
ed this evidence.
C. Partial Summary Judgment in Favor
of Church Defendants and the Jensen
Parents on Conspiracy Claim

HHI Jn its order entered on December
81, 2015, the circuit court awarded partial
summary judgment in favor of these defen-
dants pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Civil Procedure, Under this
rule, a party is entitled to summary judg-
ment if it can show “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Id., in part. Specifically, the
circuit court granted summary judgment on
the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim after observ-
ing that it had “eliminated much of the cir-
cumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs intended
to use in support of their conspiracy claim[,]”
and that the plaintiffs had no direct evidence
of a conspiracy. In its rather cursory five-
page order, the circuit court found that the
plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim was based on
speculation, conjecture, cumulative infer-
ences, and was so implausible that no rea-
sonable juror could conclude that local
Church leaders in two different states con-
spired with Michael Jensen and his parents
over a number of years to conceal his abuse,
or to “actively facilitate his pedophilia by
trumpeting his moral worthiness to the con-
gregation and obstructing a criminal investi-
gation.” The cireuit court concluded it was
“insufficient for Plaintiffs to show that multi-
ple people happened to do the same thing, or
refrained from doing the same thing, particu-
larly when they all deny knowing that Mi-
chael Jensen was an abuser, and when the
Church condemns child sexual abuse.”

In seeking a reversal of the circuit court’s
ruling, the plaintiffs assert the lower court
engaged in impermissible fact-finding by
weighing conflicting evidence, resolving cred-
ibility disputes, dismissing and resolving
doubts and drawing: inferences in favor of
defendants, when those inferences should
hhaye been drawn in their favor, as the non-

62. Cook v. Heck’s Inc., 176 W.Va. 368, 375, 342
8.B.2d 453, 460 (1986) (“ ‘Agents and employees
of a corporation cannot conspire with their cor-
porate principal or employer where they act in

moving party. Arguing further, the plaintiffs
assert that the lower court substituted its
judgment for that of a jury on the weight,
existence, and sufficiency of plaintiffs’ évi-
dence through its in limine rulings. Maintain-
ing that whether there was sufficient evi-
dence for trial should have been evaluated
under the procedural requirements and
guidelines for deciding a Rule 56 motion—
not as a motion in limine—the plaintiffs state
that their conspiracy claim is based on inten-
tional acts and intentional torts and that the
defendants conspired with Michael Jensen to:
promote and create opportunities for Mi-
chael Jensen to babysit and live in homes
with small children; cover up incidents of
sexual abuse of minors by Michael Jensen;
prevent disclosure of Michael Jensen’s sex-
ual abuse of young children; thwart and/or
hinder enforcement actions by civil and
criminal authorities to prevent further
abuse and protect minor children; and to
engage in the other conduct alleged herein.
Based on these actions, the Defendants
conspired for the unlawful purpose of facil-
itating Michael Jensen’s criminal and tor-
tious acts against the minor Plaintiffs, and
for the further unlawful purpose of con-
cealing and suppressing information on the
danger and threat that Michael Jensen
posed to unsuspecting children.

HE, The plaintiffs assert that when a
conspiracy: produces a tort, “ ‘every conspira-
tor is liable for that tort, including a conspir-
ator who promoted but did not commit the
tort[.!” Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 57, 689 S.H.2d
at 269 (citations omitted). They further argue
that “once the conspiracy is formed, all of its
members are Hable for injuries caused, by
any unlawful acts performed pursuant to and
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id, Al-
though a principal cannot conspire with its
agent, the plaintiffs assert “a corporation
can act only through its agents or employ-
ees”; therefore, when thé Jensen parents
“were not acting as Church agents ... they
were members of the conspiracy in‘their own
right, and could conspire with the

their official capacities on behalf of the corpora-

tion and not as individuals for their individual
advantage.'”) (citations omitted). “

Church[,]’ and when they were “acting as
agents of the Church, then their acts were on
behalf of the Church and [the Church’s] par-
ticipation in the conspiracy.” ® The plaintiffs
add that even if the Jensens are considered
to have been agents of the Church at ail
times, which no one claims, a civil conspiracy
requires only two members, and Michael
Jensen was always a member of the conspir-
acy. Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 56, 689 S.H.2d at
268 (“{A] civil conspiracy is a combination of
two or more persons[.]”) (citation omitted).

Discounting the plaintiffs’ arguments, the
defendants contend that the plaintiffs have
built their conspiracy claim on “layers of
unreasonable inferences[,]” which are so im-
plausible that no reasonable jury could con-
clude otherwise. They maintain there is no
evidence from which a jury could reasonably
infer a preconceived common agreement to
cover up or minimize any abuse or identify
any concerted action in furtherance of a con-
spiracy. Arguing further, they state that,
“[alt worst, there were unrelated incidents of
ordinary negligence by individual actors”
which, if proven, would allow the plaintiffs to
recover on their remaining negligence and

fraud claims. The Church defendants insist,»

with the possibility of a single exception,
they were not involved with the babysitting
and living arrangements that resulted in the
abuse. They contend the plaintiffs’ theory
that the conspirators “facilitated” and “creat-
ed opportunities” for Michael to have access
to children that he could then sexually
abuse ® lacks any evidentiary support and is
“atterly unreasonable and unbelievable on its
face.”

In addition to echoing many of the Church
defendants’ arguments, the Jensen parents
add that there was no conspiracy of silence

63. Heck’s Inc., 176 W.Va. at 375, 342 S.B.2d at
460 (commenting that corporation “can act only
through its agents or employees”).

64, Presumably, the defendants are referring to
Bishop Vincent approaching a Church family,
the Keogans, about taking Michael Jensen into
their home to live and asking Mrs. Keogan if
there were any "young women” in her house.
Bishop Vincent's inquiry was made after he
Iearned that Michael had been banished from his,
family’s home for abusing his then twelve-year-
old sister, K.J.

455

because their alleged co-conspirators had no
reason to believe Michael had sexually
abused any children, and they were unaware
of Michael’s babysitting activities. They fur-
ther argue that R.J. was never abused by
anyone; that Bishop Whitcomb assigned San-
dralee Jensen as the Relief Society President
and advanced Michael in the Church’s Aaron-
ic Priesthood at a time when he had no
knowledge of Michael’s offenses in Utah; and

. that even if the alleged 2006-2007 Stake High

Council meeting occurred, such event does
not prove they were part of a conspiracy. In
addition, they assert there is no evidence
that the alleged co-conspirators were aware
of any sexual abuse committed by Michael,
except the possible abuse of Z.W. that was
allegedly disclosed to them and to Bishop
Fishel in 2008. They add that there is no
evidence of a conspiracy of silence related to
Michael’s abuse of his younger sister, K.J.,
when they “immediately kick[ed] Michael out
of the house, which would have raised ques-
tions,” and given that they also spoke to
Bishop Vincent about the incident, asking
him to help Michael. The Jensens state that,
at worst, the evidence shows that different
people conceivably knew “bits and pieces of
alleged misconduct by Michael, but there is
no evidence of some grand scheme to conceal
this misconduct—no evidence of any agree-
ment to cover up, not to report, or to prevent
disclosure.” ,

Hs [tis axiomatic that “(s]ummary
judgment is appropriate if, from the totality
of the evidence presented, the record could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party[.]” Syl Pt. 2, in part,
Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va.
52, 459 S.H.2d 829 (1995), Further, as we

65. Contrary to the defendants, we view the plain-
tiffs’ theory as alleging that the defendants’ ac-
tions to conceal Michael's abuse while simulta-
neously holding him out as a fit babysitter and
boarder resulted in unsuspecting Church families
allowing him to do both,

66, The Jensens impute knowledge to their
church leaders and church family for certain
things, such as kicking Michael out of their
home, but not for other things, such as RJ.
disrobing and exposing her body at a church
fonction.

456

held long ago, “summary judgment ... must
be denied if there is a genuine issue as to a
material fact[,]” and that “[t]he question to
be decided on a motion for summary judg-
ment is whether there is a genuine issue of
fact and not how that issue should be deter-
mined.” Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Syl. Pt. 5, Aetna
Cas, & Sur, Co. v. Fed, Ins, Co, of New York,
148 W.Va. 160, 188 S.E.2d 770 (1968).

We ‘previously articulated guidelines for
evaluating a motion for summary judgment,
as follows: .

The circuit court’s function at the sum-
mary judgment stage is not “to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Consequently, we
must draw any permissible inference from
the underlying facts in the most favorable
light to the party opposing the motion. In
assessing the factual record, we must
grant the nonmoving party the benefit of
inferences, as “[c]redibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the

drawing of legitimate inferences from tlie.

facts are jury functions, not those of a
judgel.]”
Williams, 194 W.Va, at 59, 459 S.H.2d at 336
(nternal citations omitted). Applying these
guidelines and precepts to a review of the
circumstantial evidence previously excluded
by the circuit court, as well as all other
evidence, readily demonstrates the existence
of a myriad of genuine issues of material fact
that should have precluded entry of summary
judgment. Indeed, other than the parties’
identities and Michael Jensen’s convictions in
West Virginia, there appear to be very few
facts upon which the parties agree. Nearly
every factual allegation is contested in some
fashion, whether by inconsistencies between
interviews, depositions, and affidavits, often
from the same individuals, or interpretations
67, During his deposition, Mr. Yannelli testified
thete was a departure from the SBRA recom-
mendation that Michael receive more substantive
sex offender treatment; the SBRA’s recommen-
dation that he be supervised with any female was

ignored; and there was no order entered prohib-
iting contact with the victims.

68, Although Mr, Yannelli indicated in his witness
statement that the reduction in the two felony
" charges to class A misdemeanors “would be con-

of the evidence, or the inferences .to be
drawn from that evidence. .

For instance, the: plaintiffs contend the
conspiracy to protect Michael Jensen and to
eonceal his offenses began after he was
charged with félony sex offenses in Provo,
Utah, as a teenager, They discuss various
facts in support of their theory, including the
involvement in that proceeding by Michael's
paternal grandfather, who held a powerful
position within the Church in Provo. They
also cite the testimony of defense expert
Frank Yannelli who testified that the charges
against Michael in Utah were reduced more
than commonly done; that there were numer-
ous other atypical factors in the proceeding;®”
and that Michael received a lenient punish-
ment without follow up consequences. Con-
versely, the defendants point to Mr. Yannel-
l?s April 8, 2015, witness statement in which
he stated that the outcome of Michael’s case
in Utah: “was typical for such a case.” &

HM Another disputed issue of material
fact involves the parties’ basic disagreement
regarding the precise nature of Michael's
offenses in Utah and whether they provided
notice of his risk to re-offend sexually. The
plaintiffs describe Michael’s offenses, which
resulted in his arrest at his middle school
and being charged with two felony sex of-
fenses, as him waiting for each victim, pin-
ning her’ against a wall, and grabbing her
breasts and buttocks against her will, a de-.
scription that is consistent with victim state-
ments in the appendix record. Conversely,
the defendants describe the incident as Mi-
chael briefly groping two peer-aged girls
over their clothes, which the Jensen parents
contend were “offenses that were not atypi-
eal for a male of his age.”

HH Additional disputed facts in the al-
leged conspiracy time line include Sandralee
Jensen’s report of the J.M. incident to Bish-

sidered a significant reduction of the charges,
but one that was clearly justified by the facts of
the case{,]” he testified during his deposition that
other prosecutors might disagree.

69. .Given the victims’ accounts of what hap-
pened, this pronouncement by the Jensens and
the defendants’ description of the Utah offenses
as “briefly groping” are troubling.

op Whitcomb, whether there was a “linkup”
in her mind between that incident and Mi-
chael’s offenses in Utah and whether she
conveyed the same to Bishop Whitcomb, and
the concern she expressed to J.M. asking if
she was all right and whether they had a
problem. Michael's alleged assault of J.M. is
described above and will not be repeated
here, It will be for a jury to make credibility
determinations in this regard.

There are also disputed issues of material
fact concerning the alleged Stake High Coun-
cil meeting during which the plaintiffs con-
tend that Church leaders discussed the issue
of sexual abuse and the Jensens in the 2006-
2007 time frame. The defendants assert that
all those who would have participated in such
a meeting have denied it ever occurred; that
UD-I1 could not have participated because he
was not placed on the Stake High Council
until 2008; that John Doe-5’s testimony that
Stake President Grow told him that such a
meeting took place is self-serving hearsay;
and that no such discussion could have hap-
pened because no Church leader learned of
Michael's abuse until after his arrest in 2012.
The plaintiffs counter that John Doe-5 testi-
fied during his deposition that Stake Presi-
dent Grow confirmed to him such discussions
about the Jensens had taken place in the
time frame in question and that he had asked
UD-1 to keep an eye on Chris Jensen and
report back to him; .and that President
Grow’s executive secretary also confirmed
that these Stake discussions concerning the
Jensens took place. The plaintiffs also point
to UD-1’s interview by their counsel during
which he stated, “I was on councils,” refer-
ring to Stake High Councils, where the issue
of sexual abuse by Michael was discussed
during the relevant time frame, as contrasted
with the conflicting statements made by UD-
1 during his subsequent deposition. They also
point to the depositions of those adult plain-
tiffs who testified to having similar disclo-
sures made to them by UD-1.

WM. These and many other genuine
issues of material fact arise out of the plain-
tiffs’ circumstantial evidence, Although the
circuit court stated the plaintiffs’ have no
direct evidence, none is required to prove

457

their conspiracy claim. As we previously ex-
plained:
“Circumstantial evidence is information
that tends directly to prove or disprove not
a fact in issue but a fact or circumstance
from which, either alone or in connection
with other facts and civeumstances, one
may, according to the common experience
of mankind, reasonably infer the existence
or nonexistence of a fact that is in is-
sue.... In West Virginia and in federal
courts, civil and criminal verdicts may be
based entirely upon circumstantial evi-
dence.”
Cmty. Antenna Serv, Inc. v, Charter
Comme’ns VI, LLC, 227 W.Va. 595, 607, 712
S.E.2d 604, 516 (2011) (citation omitted),
Further, “(clireumstantial evidence, especial-
ly evidence of concerted activity directed to-
ward achievement of a common goal, is as
probative as direct evidence” of conspiracy.
United States v. Amer. Grain, 768 F.2d 812,
315 (8th Cir, 1985); see also Xie v, City of
Chicago, No. 14-cv-6082, 2016 WL 6198981,
at *10 (N.D. Ill.’ Oct, 24, 2016) (“{Dlirect
proof of such an agreement is rarely avail-
able, since conspiracies are by their’ very
nature ‘secretive; thus, the existence of a
conspiracy may be inferred through the com-
bination of common sense and cireumstantial
evidence.”); Maersk, Inc, v. Neewra, Inc, 687
FSupp.2d 800, 319-20 (S.D. N.Y, 2009), aff'd
Maersk, Inc. v. Sahni, 450 Fed.Appx. 8 (2d
Cir, 2011) (citation omitted) (“As is true in
eriminal conspiracies, agreements in civil
conspiracies will not easily be shown by di-
rect evidence, but may be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence.”); Adcock v, Bralegate,
Lid., 164 IllL2d 64, 206 [l,Dec. 686, 645
N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. 1994) (“[A] conspiracy is
rarely susceptible of direct proof; instead, it
is established from circumstantial evidence
and inferences drawn from evidence, coupled
with commonsense knowledge of the behav-
ior of persons in similar circumstances.”);
Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., No, 78-0886-
A, 1980 WL 1856, at “6 (E.D, Va. June 18,
1980), rev'd on other grownds, 652 F.2d $75
(1981) (internal citations omitted) (“[Clourts
long have held that conspiracies may be in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence.... No
formal or express agreement need be
shown.”); Dickerson v. Gynecological As-

458

soc.’s, Inc., No. 82148-9-I, 1996 WL 751461,
at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1996) (agree-
ing with defendant that “circumstantial evi-
dence is as probative as direct evidence and
that conspiracy can rarely be proved by di-
rect evidence”).

Hs Inasmuch as a conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence, we con-
sider the evidence the plaintiffs have offered,
including the circumstantial evidence that
had been excluded by the circuit court. In
undertaking that task, we are mindful that
under West Virginia law,

[a] civil conspiracy is a combination of
two or more persons by concerted action to
accomplish an unlawful purpose or to ac-
complish some purpose, not in itself unlaw-
ful, by unlawful means. The cause of action
is not created by the conspiracy but by the
wrongful acts done by the defendants to
the injury of the plaintiff.

Dunn, 225 Wa. at 47, 689 S.B.2d at 259,
syl. pt. 8. Further, “[a] civil conspiracy is ...
a legal doctrine under which liability for a
tort may be imposed on people who did not
actually commit a tort themselves but who
shared a common plan for its commission
with the actual perpetrator(s).” Dunn, 225
W.Va. at 47, 689 S.E.2d at 259, syl. pt. 9; see
also O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W.Va. 590, 625, 703
§.E.2d 561, 596 (2010) (“[A] civil conspiracy
must be based on some underlying tort or
wrong.”). Moreover, “[a] conspiracy may pro-
duce one or more torts. If it does, then every
conspirator is liable for that tort, including a
conspirator who promoted but did not com-
mit the tort.” Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 57, 689
S.E.2d at 269 (quoting Segall v. Hurwitz, 114
Wis.2d 471, 389 N.W.2d 388, 388 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) (citations omitted).). Further, we
recognize that not every member of a con-
spiracy must be aware of every action taken
in furtherance of it. See, e.9., Potter Press v,
C.W. Potter, Inc., 308 Mass. 485, 22 N.E.2d
68, 72 (1989) (“One may be held a member of
a[]... conspiracy and responsible for all its
doings, although he was not aware of its

70. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs
have alleged the intentional torts of fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress; they
also allege the intentional torts of assault and
battery solely against Michael Jensen.

entire scope, or all its details, or the identi-
ties, of all its members, and although his own
share in its activities was small, did not begin
until its activities were well under way.)”);
Lesikar v. Rappeport, 88 S.W.3d 282, 302
(Tx, Ct, App. 2000) (“The general rule is that
conspiracy liability is sufficiently established
by proof showing concert of action or other
facts and circumstances from which the natu-
val inference arises that ... acts were com-
mitted in furtherance of ... [the] purpose of
the alleged conspirators * * *.... It is not
required that each and every act of a con-
spirator be shown to have been in concert
with the others or that it be established by
direct evidence that all combined at a given
time prior to each transaction.”) (citations
omitted),

Although the defendants assert the con-
spiracy claim fails because failure to warn is
negligence, and persons cannot conspire to
be negligent, the plaintiffs have alleged a
conspiracy to commit intentional torts and
to accomplish the unlawful purpose of con-
cealing and harboring a “sex offender” 7 that,
resulted in harm to them. A jury, after sift-
ing through the evidence, resolving credibili-
ty disputes, and drawing all reasonable infer-
ences from the evidence, could conclude, as
the plaintiffs argue, that the defendants’ con-
duct,

in ignoring, minimizing, trivializing and de-
nying the abuse; actively concealing and
keeping silent about the abuse; promoting
and misrepresenting Michael Jensen as an
exemplary and trustworthy member of the
Church; promoting and misrepresenting
him as fit to babysit for or live in a house
with young children; and facilitating the
abuse by engaging in the foregoing and
placing him in homes with young children
as a babysitter or boarder, were taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy’s unlawful
purposes.

Moreover, as the plaintiffs contend, “even if
some of those acts, taken independent of the

71. The Jensen parents object to the plaintiffs’
reference to their son Michael as a “sex offend-
er,” arguing that Michael’s crimes in Utah did
not qualify him as a sex offender under Utah law
because he was adjudicated as a juvenile.

conspiracy, would be. lawful,” a jury -could
still find that the conspiracy was proven. See
Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Diwon v. Am. Indus.
Leasing Co., 162 W.Va, 882, 253 S.E.2d 150
(1979) (“In order for civil conspiracy to be
actionable it must be proved that the defen-
dants have committed some wrongful act or
have committed a lawful act in an unlawful
manner to the injury of the plaintiff[.]”).

HM Regarding the defendants’ argument
that an agent cannot conspire with his or her
principal,” even if the Jensen parents were
found to have been agents of the Church at
all times, the conspiracy claim is not defeated
because a civil conspiracy requires only two
members. Michael Jensen is alleged to have
always been a member of the conspiracy.

The evidence discussed above serves to
highlight but a few of the innumerable issues
of material fact in this matter and the con-
flicting inferences being drawn by all parties
from those disputed facts. It will be for a
jury, not the circuit court or this Court, to
decide whether there was a conspiracy after
resolving the disputed facts, making the nec-
essary credibility determinations, and deter-
mining what was known by whom and when,
and what those persons did with the informa-
tion they had and for what purposes, It will
also be for a jury to determine whether the
evidence proves a conspiracy that resulted in
harm to the plaintiffs.

Skirting its duty to allow a jury to ad-
dress the multitude of disputed factual is-
sues present in this case, the cireuit court
wrongly invaded the jury’s province by re-
solving these factual disputes and making
eredibility determinations, And when it cred-
ited the defendants’ denials or their alterna-
tive facts in the face of countervailing evi-
dence, the circuit court violated the long-
established standard of resolving doubts in
favor of the nonmoving party. Despite the
defendants’ assertion that the plaintiffs’ “far-
fetched conspiracy theory is utterly implau-
sible” and that “[njo reasonable jury would
draw the outlandish inferences necessary to
find in Plaintiffs’ favor[,]” the plaintiffs have
aptly argued:

72, See supra notes 62 and 63.

459

Neither the circuit court’s presumption of
good faith by a religious institution based
on its public pronouncements, nor its dis-
missal of an eight year record of contrary
conduct as multiple Church officials just
happening to do the same thing with re-
spect to Michael Jensen, should have sup-
planted the jury’s consideration of the evi-
dence, which was more than sufficient to
support an inference of conspiracy.

HE This appeal is not about whether the
plaintiffs will prevail on their conspiracy
claim at trial but whether they have alleged
sufficient evidence to survive summary judg-
ment on that claim. We agree that they
“* “cannot create a genuine issue of material
fact through mere speculation or the building
of one inference upon another.”’” Dellinger
v. Pediatrix Med. Group, P.C., 232 W.Va,
115, 122, 750 S.B.2d 668, 675 (2018) (citations
omitted). Although the circuit court found the
plaintiffs’ evidence to be speculative, and the
defendants contend the plaintiffs’ evidence is
nothing more than unreasonable, cumulative
inferences, the necessary basis for granting
summary judgment is clearly not present in
this case,

Having found the circuit court erred in
excluding the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evi-
dence in support of their conspiracy claim,
and upon our consideration of that evidence,
as well as all other evidence relied upon, we
find there are genuine issues of material fact
for trial. Drawing all permissible inferences
from the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs and leaving all factual disputes
and credibility determinations to the jury, we
conclude that the circuit court erred. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of the
Chureh defendants and the Jensen parents
on the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim.

D. Summary Judgment in favor of UD-1

HM Through its order entered on De-
eember 4, 2015, the circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of UD-1, finding
the plaintiffs could not prove the elements of
conspiracy against him. For the reasons set
forth below, we disagree.

460

The circuit court determined that to the
extent UD-1 was an agent of the Church, he
could not conspire with his principal; that
plaintiffs had not produced any evidence that
would create a genuine issue of material fact
as‘ to whether UD-1 joined a conspiracy to
facilitate or conceal Michael Jensen’s abuse
of children; that even if UD-1 had knowledge
of Michael’s abuse of children and failed to
disclose it, he had no duty to warn; that
there is no evidence his silence enabled or
assisted Someone who had such a duty; that
UD-I’s attendance at the victims’ parents’
support meeting in 2018 was not evidence of
furthering the alleged conspiracy where John
Doe-5 invited UD-1 to that meeting and
knew UD-1 would be reporting on the meet-
ing to Stake President Grow; and that even if
UD-1 made statements during his deposition
that contradicted statements he had- previ-
ously made when interviewed by plaintiffs’
counsel, Michael’s crimes were already
known at that juncture; therefore, UD-I’s
actions could not have been taken to keep
Michael’s misconduct a secret, The plaintiffs
assert that in making these findings, the
circuit court clearly engaged in impermissi-
ble fact-finding to conclude as a matter of
Jaw that no reasonable juror could infer from
UD-1’s conduct that he had agreed with oth-
er Church officials to conceal’ Michael Jen-

73. See supra note 62.

74, The circuit court cited in its summary judg-
ment order West Virginia Code § 49-2-803(a),
which imposes a duty on certain persons to re-
port the suspected abuse of a child. The circuit
court found that the duty only extends to the
child who is suspected of being abused; there-
fore, even if UD-1 had a duty to report based on
knowledge he purportedly gained at the alleged
2006-2007 Stake High Council meeting, it would
only extend to children discussed at that meet-
ing, which were indisputably not the minor
plaintiffs. However, regardless of whether UD-1
had a statutory duty to report, including the
purported abuse of his own son, if a jury resolves
the factual disputes and draws reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the plaintiffs, it could find that
UD-1's action and inaction demonstrated his par-

* ticipation in a conspiracy by furthering the un.
lawful purposes of those who did have a duty to

. report,

78. In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged alternative theories of conspiracy liabili-
ty. First, they alleged that UD-1 had a special
relationship with the Church’s congregation, as a

sen’s conduct, which facilitated harm to the
minor plaintiffs.

In support of their argument that UD-1
‘was a participant in the alleged conspiracy
beginning in 2006-2007, they contend that
their evidence shows his knowledge of Stake
discussions around that time regarding Mi-
chael’s abuse of a younger sibling and possi-
bly another girl; UD-1’s monitoring of Chris
Jensen during that same time period at
Stake President Grow’s request, including
making reports back to President Grow; his
“inside knowledge” of Michael’s Utah of-
fenses; and his decision not to seek medical
care for his two-year-old:son who came home
from childcare conducted in the Jensen home
in 2008 with a swollen penis and abrasions on
his inner thighs when it was physically im-
possible for his child to have self-inflicted the
injuries.” The plaintiffs algo point to UD-1’s
placement on the Stake High Council in 2008;
his email to John Doe-5 in 2018 reflecting
that he and his wife believed in 2008 that
Michael had abused their son and had con-
fronted the Jensen parents, but “nothing was
done”; his attendance at the parent support
group meeting in 2018, and his report on that
meeting to Stake President Grow; his for-
warding of private emails he exchanged with
John Doe-5 concerning the abuse and this
lawsuit to Stake President Grow; and the
change in his accounts of these various

volunteer or a Stake High Councilor appointed
by Church officials and was “held out by the
Church as its agent[] and placed in [a] position]
of responsibility and authority over Church mem-
bers.” In the alternative, they alleged that if UD-
1 was not an agent of the Church, then the other
defendants conspired with him for the same un-
lawful purposes they had alleged. It will be for a
jury to resolve the facts in terms of what UD-1
knew and when and whether at those times he
was acting individually or as an agent of the
Church. We previously addressed the issue of
whether a corporation can conspire with its em-
ployees or agents, See supra note 62.

76. Although UD-1 and his wife have testified that
their decision not to seek medical care for their
son was not, motivated by any concern there
would be a mandatory report to State authori-
ties, UD-1’s wife, who was a nurse, testified in
her deposition that if a child presented to the
hospital with her son's injuries, she would have
been obligated to report it. See also supra note
21.

events” to align himself with the Church’s
defense.

Notwithstanding the factual allegations re-
counted above, UD-1 argues that the circuit,
court correctly found that the plaintiffs’ con-
spiracy claim against him fails, as a matter of
law, because there is no genuine issue of fact
relating to whether he entered into a conspi-
ratorial agreement, whether there was con-
certed action, or whether he committed an
unlawful act or pursued an unlawful pur-
pose.”* He further argues that even if he took
all of the actions outlined above, none were
either unlawful or done for an unlawful pur-
pose. He further argues that failure to warn
is not unlawful unless he had.a duty to warn,
and he had no such duty.”

71, ‘This is in reference to statements made by
UD-1, -when interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel
and during conversations he allegedly had -with
certain of the plaintiffs, as contrasted. with his
subsequent, contradictory deposition testimony.

78. UD-1 also asserts that plaintiffs have failed to
sidentify damages proximately caused by-or dis-
tinctively arising from the conspiracy since the
damages sought for the conspiracy are the sanie
damages sought on their remaining causes of
action, This issue was addressed in section’ ILA,
supra.

79. The circuit court found that UD-1’s failure to
report the purported sexual abuse of his own son
when he was cared for at the Jensen home does
not support a finding that he participated in a
conspiracy unless he’ personally had a duty to
disclose or assisted another having such a duty.
Setting aside.whether a person. has a duty to
report the sexual abuse of his or her child, it will
be for a jury to determine when UD-1 came to
believe that his son had been abused, and wheth-
er that knowledge contributed to a conspiracy
with Church officials and the Jensens that
harmed the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have circum-
stantial evidence that could cause a reasonable
jury to conclude that UD-1 immediately believed
‘his son had been abused by Michael.

80, Ash’v, Allstate Ins, Co., No, 12-1533, 2013 WL
5676774, at "5 (W.Va. Oct. 18, 2013) (memoran-
dum decision).

81, Our research reveals a split of authority in
those few courts that have addressed that ques-
tion, See, e.g., Boorman v, Nevada Mem. Crema-
tion Soc’y, Inc., 772 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1315 (D.
Nev. 2011) (applying Nevada law; observing that
“Nevada has not stated that it would require
each conspirator to owe the duty that forms the

461

We first address the circuit court’s finding,
and UD-1’s argument, that because he did
not owe a duty to plaintiffs to warn, there-
fore, he could not be found liable for conspir-
acy. Critically, neither UD-1 nor the’ circuit
court have cited any authority for the propo-
sition that UD-1 had to owe an independent
duty to the plaintiffs before he could -be
found liable for conspiracy, which is the only
claim that has-been ‘assertéd against him.
While this Court has said that “the propo-
nent of a civil conspiracy claim must produce
at least circumstantial evidence that each
member of the alleged conspiracy shared the
same conspiratorial objective and mutual
agreement[,]” 8 we have not said that each
member of a conspiracy must independently
owe a duty to the plaintiff at

predicate for the underlying tort”; and conclud-
ing that “Nevada does not require ‘that each
conspirator owe’ an indepéndent’ duty to the
plaintiff to support a civil conspiracy claim.”);
Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 150 (Del.
1987) (agreeing with, but finding irrelevant, de-
fendant’s argument that it had’no duty to warn
customers because lability attaches “as a result
of the active misconduct. of intentionally sup-
pressing material information” and finding that
if plaintiffs ‘establish that Nicolet was a member
of a conspiracy which actively ‘suppressed and
concealed material’ facts ... Nicolet would be
. jointly and severally liable with its co-conspira-
tors for resulting damages.”); but see, e.g., Chav-
ers v, Gatke Corp., 107 Cal.App.4th 606, 132
CaL.Rpir.2d 198, 201 (2003) ‘(citing Applied
Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., ‘7 Cal.4th
503, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d. 475,-869 P.2d 454 (1994)
(observing that under California law, “before one
can be held liable for civil conspiracy, he must be
capable of being individually liable for the under-
lying wrong as a matter of substantive tort law.
And that requirement, of course, means he must
have owed.a legal duty of care to the plaintiff,
one that was breached to the latter's injury.”);
Valles v. Silverman, 135 N.M. 91, 84 P.3d 1056,
1064, 1065 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting Wal-
Mart's argument that plaintiffs “must be able to
recover on the underlying tort against every co-
conspirator before that coconspirator can be lia-
ble for its part in the conspiracy” but also finding
that Wal-Mart must be “legally capable” of com-
mitting malicious abuse of process to be held
* Hable as a coconspirator.”’). As one commentator
has observed: “‘The acts of any one co-conspira-
‘tor are deemed the acts of all’ and “{nJeither a
co-conspirator’s culpability nor the increased
risk of harm caused by his or her entering into a
combination is related to whether the co-conspir-
ator owes the underlying duty.” Martin H, Priti-
kin, Toward Coherence in Civil Conspiracy Law: A

462

HM As we have explained, “every con-
spirator is liable for th[e] tort, including a
conspirator who promoted but did not com-
mit the tort.” Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 57, 689
S.E.2d at 269 (citations omitted). Further,
there were times during the course of the
alleged conspiracy when UD-1 served on the
Church’s Stake High Council. In that leader-
ship role, he may have possessed a duty to
other Church members, including the plain-
tiff families, which the circuit court also did
not address. In addition, we disagree with
the circuit court’s finding that the plaintiffs
hhave no evidence that UD-1 enabled or as-
sisted someone who did have a such duty. A
jury could reasonably infer from the plain-
tiffs’ circumstantial evidence, some of which
is outlined above, that UD-1 did enable and
assist those who had such a duty. It will be
for a jury to resolve all evidentiary disputes
and make credibility determinations in this
regard.

Moreover, one can conspire “to accomplish
an unlawful purpose or to accomplish some
purpose, not in itself unlawful, by unlawful
means.” Dunn, 225 W.Va. at 47, 689 S.H.2d
at 259, syl. pt. 8, in part. Contrary to UD-1’s
argument, this does not imply that each
member of the conspiracy must engage in
unlawful acts. See Kessel v, Leavitt, 204
W.Va. at 129, 511 S.E.2d at 754 (citations
omitted) (finding civil conspiracy “actionable
. +. [if it] be proved that the defendants have
committed some wrongful act or have com-
mitted a lawful act in an unlawful manner to
the injury of the plaintifff.]”); see also 15A
C.J.S. Conspiracy § 5 (2012) (footnotes omit-
ted) (“When the purpose of a combination is
illegal, every act in furtherance of it is illegal.
Acts that are themselves legal lose that char-
acter when they become constituent elements
of an unlawful scheme.”).

Proposal to Abolish the Agent's Immunity Rule,
84 Neb. L. Rev. 1, at “*9, 13 (2005).

82, UD-1 cites syllabus point two of Porter v.
Mack, 50 W.Va. 581, 40 S.B, 459 (1901), holding
that “[tJhere can be no conspiracy to do that
which is lawful in a lawful manner.” Here, how-
ever, the plaintiffs have alleged unlawful pur-
poses as the object of the alleged conspiracy,
including protecting Michael Jensen, who was
known to have committed sexual offenses, and
promoting Michael's exposure to children he
then assaulted. They have also offered evidence,

TM As with the other defendants, the
circuit court faults the plaintiffs for not hav-
ing any direct evidence that UD-1 agreed to
join the conspiracy or possessed personal
knowledge of a conspiracy. The circuit court
found the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence
of UD-1’s participation in the alleged conspir-
acy to be “too conjectural and speculative to
raise an issue of fact.” However, much of the
plaintiffs’ evidence came directly from UD-1,
as recounted in the deposition testimony of
several plaintiffs and as reflected in UD-I’s
email exchanges with certain plaintiffs and
the statements he made when interviewed by
plaintiffs’ counsel. In addition to the circuit
court’s credibility determinations being im-
proper, an “agreement need not be express
but may be based upon evidence of a course
of conduct from which the agreement to act
in concert may be implied.” 16 Am.Jur.2d
Conspiracy § 51 (2017) (footnotes omitted);
see also First Fin. Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Am.
Bankers of Florida, Inc., Nos. 88-88-CIV-5-
H, et al, 1990 WL 302790, at *2 ( B.D. N.C,
Apr. 17, 1990) (“The agreement need not be
express, formal, or definite; evidence estab-
lishing a ‘tacit understanding’ among the con-
spirators to further a common purpose is
sufficient.”).

The circuit court also found that neither
UD-1’s participation in the parent support
group meeting in 2018, nor his contradictory
statements between when he was interviewed
by the plaintiffs’ counsel in April of 2018 and
deposed in December of 2013, could have
been in furtherance of a conspiracy of silence
or harmed the plaintiffs because Michael had
already been convicted for sexually abusing
the Doe-1, children and the plaintiffs had
already hired counsel to’ pursue this action.
We view this evidence quite differently be-

albeit contested, that the conspiracy produced
intentional torts and intentional acts in further-
ance of the conspiracy’s unlawful purposes.

83. Evidence concerning the alleged 2006-2007
Stake High Council meeting and President
Grow’s assignment of UD-1 to monitor Chris
Jensen was not only from UD-1. John Doe-5
testified that Stake President Grow told him (1)
about conversations at the stake level in 2006 or
2007 concerning abuse and the Jensens and (2)
that he had asked UD-1 to monitor Chris Jensen
at that time,

cause a purpose of the alleged conspiracy
was not just to protect Michael, but also to
also cover up the Church’s alleged role in
facilitating Michael’s abuse.

Certain statements made by UD-1 when
he was interviewed by the plaintiffs’ counsel
are clearly adverse to the defense in this
matter in terms of what the defendants knew
and when. When UD-1 was subsequently de-
posed, after meeting with the Church’s law-
yers for twelve to thirteen hours, he contra-
dicted his earlier statements given in the
interview. He explains this altered tack by
criticizing the “imprecise, vague, and leading
questions” asked previously by the plaintiffs’
counsel.®! A jury could reasonably infer, how-
ever, that UD-1 changed “his story” in fur-
therance of a purpose of the conspiracy—to
conceal the Church’s involvement—regard-
less of whether another purpose of the con-
spiracy—to protect Michael—could no longer
be served, As John Doe-5 testified during his
deposition, UD-1 “always told [him] that he
would not do anything to hurt the church.”

Similar to the conspiracy claim against the
other defendants, there are numerous mate-
rial issues of fact and disagreement as to the
inferences to be drawn from those disputed
facts. It is clear, however, that the circuit
court improperly made determinations re-
served to a jury and wrongly assumed the
veracity of statements made by defense wit-
nesses as a precursor to its conclusion that
“[t]here is no evidence that UD-1 knew about.
Michael Jensen’s abuse of the minor Plain-
tiffs until after Michael Jensen was arrest-
ed.... There is also no evidence that UD-1’s
actions helped or assisted other Defendants
in breaching a duty that harmed Plaintiffs.”

If a jury were to resolve the disputed
evidence, make credibility determinations,
and draw reasonable inferences, all in the
plaintiffs’ favor, it could find that UD-1 was
part of a conspiracy and that his conduct
furthered or promoted unlawful purposes de-
signed to protect the Jensens and conceal the
Church’s involvement, which resulted in in-
tentional torts and the plaintiffs’ alleged
harm, Accordingly, and for these reasons, we
find the circuit court erred in granting UD-
V’s motion for summary judgment. The cir-

84, See supra note 17.

463

euit court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ re-
quest for punitive damages against UD-1 in
light of its summary judgment ruling. Be-
cause we reverse the award of summary
judgment in favor of UD-1, we also reverse
the circuit court’s ruling on punitive dam-
ages.
IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the
circuit court’s December 4, 2015, order
granting summary judgment in favor of UD-
1 and dismissing the plaintiffs’ request for an
award of punitive damages against him. We
also reverse the particular in limine rulings
in the cireuit court's December 30, 2015,
order that have been addressed herein. Fi-
nally, we reverse the circuit court’s Decem-
ber 31, 2015, order granting summary judg-
ment in favor of the Church defendants and
Chris and Sandralee Jensen on the plaintiffs’
conspiracy claim. This action is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion,

Reversed and Remanded.

801 S.E.2d 478

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent.

v.

Zachary Elijah BLAND, Defendant
Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0592
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 25, 2017
Filed: June 14, 2017

Lorena E, Litten, Esq, Assistant Public
Defender, WV Public Defender Corporation,
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Clarksburg, West.
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner .

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Benjamin F. Yancey, III, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner Zachary Elijah Bland, defendant
below (“Petitioner”), appeals the'May 18,
2016, order of the Cireuit Court of Harrison

466

County affirming his magistrate court convic-
tion of the offense of domestic assault, Peti-
tioner asserts that the magistrate court
erred by instructing the jury on the offense
of domestic assault when he was charged
solely with domestic battery. Upon consider-
ation of the parties’ briefs and arguments,
the submitted record and pertinent authori-
ties, we affirm the circuit court’s order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Petitioner’s trial in magistrate court oc-
eurred on January 18, 2016. The primary
witnesses at trial were Petitioner’s wife, Mrs.
Bland, Petitioner’s stepson, Mr. Wanstreet,
and Petitioner. Mrs. Bland testified that on
the evening of February 17, 2015, she and
Petitioner went to their neighbors’ house to
visit with friends. After having some drinks,
Mrs. Bland got into an argument with Peti-
tioner after she saw him “getting flirtatious
with a girl” and, according to Petitioner, Mrs.
Bland “hauled off and smacked [him] in the
face ...” Following this argument, the cou-
ple left their friends’ house to go home. On
the way home, Petitioner and Mrs, Bland
continued to argue, Shortly after they got
home, Mrs. Bland went into the bedroom to
go to sleep.

At some point that night, Petitioner went
into the bedroom to retrieve a pillow, and the
couple began arguing again when Petitioner
took her pillow. Petitioner testified that when
he went back to his chair in the living room,
the argument escalated when Mrs. Bland,
who had been yelling and screaming at him,
followed him to his chair and began smacking
him. The testimony varies about the series of
events that next occurred. According to Mrs.
Bland, Petitioner then picked her up by her
shirt over his head, told her he had had
enough of her “fing sh-t,” that she needed to
“show him some respect.” She alleged that
Petitioner then threw her on the couch and
hit her in the face.

At the time of this incident, Mrs, Bland’s
sons (and Petitioner’s stepsons), Mr. Wan-
street and Mark Richards, were also in the
living room. Mr. Wanstreet testified that

1. The jury was instructed on the offense of do-

when he saw Petitioner hit his mother, he
tried to intervene by getting in between
them and shoving Petitioner back with his
shoulders. Petitioner began shoving Mr.
Wanstreet back and at one point during the
incident, Petitioner punched Mr. Wanstreet
in the mouth and chipped his tooth.

According to trial testimony, the violence
then de-escalated for approximately five min-
utes. However, after Mrs. Bland went into
the kitchen, a second incident occurred when,
according to Mrs. Bland, Petitioner “picked
{her] up ... slammed [her] against the cabi-
net ... and then threw [her] on the floor.”
Mrs. Bland testified that as Mr, Wanstreet
came into the kitchen to ask what was going
on, Petitioner asked Mr. Wanstreet “if he
wanted some more,” after which Petitioner
“snatched him up, threw [Mr. Wanstreet]
against the sink and tried to throw him on
the floor[,]” After that incident subsided, the
parties subsequently went into the living
room. Mrs. Bland testified that Petitioner
then “punched the TV, ... picked it up and
busted it over his knee and then threw it on
the floor[.]” At that point, Mr. Wanstreet
“picked [his mother] up and carried [her]
next door to the neighbors” and called the
police,

Following this incident, Petitioner was
charged with one count of domestic battery
against Mrs. Bland and one count of domes-
tie battery against Mr. Wanstreet. At trial,
Petitioner did not dispute that he made phys-
ical contact with both Mrs, Bland and Mr,
Wanstreet. Rather, he maintained that he
was attacked first and in self-defense, had to
use force to protect himself. At the close of
the evidence, the State submitted proposed
jury instructions not only on domestic bat-
tery but also on domestic assault as a lesser
included offense of domestic battery. Peti-
tioner objected to the State’s proposed jury
instruction of domestic assault asserting that
he was not charged with domestic assault
and that the evidence presented by the State
did not prove domestic assault. The magis-
trate court instructed the jury on both do-
mestic battery and domestic assault, as a
lesser included offense.) Following delibera-

mestic assault as follows:

tions, the jury returned a verdict finding
Petitioner not guilty of committing domestic
battery against Mrs. Bland and Mr. Wan-
street, and not guilty of committing domestic
assault against Mrs. Bland. However, it con-
victed Petitioner on the charge of domestic
assault against Mr. Wanstreet. In February
2016, Petitioner appealed his conviction to
the Circuit Court of Harrison County. The
circuit court conducted a hearing in April
2016, and on May 18, 2016, entered an order
affirming Petitioner’s magistrate court con-
viction. This appeal followed.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
HH In this case, we must determine
whether the jury was properly instructed.
“As a general rule, the refusal to give a
requested jury instruction is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. By contrast, the question
of whether a jury was properly instructed is
a question of law, and the review is de novo.”
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Hinkle, 200 W.Va, 280, 489
§.E.2d 257 (1996), Additionally, “[i]f an objec-
tion to a jury instruction is a challenge to a
trial court’s statement of the legal standard,
this Court will exercise de novo review.”
State v, Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 671, 461
§.E.2d 168, 177 (1995). However,
“(wJhether facts are sufficient to justify the
delivery of a particular instruction is re-
viewed by this Court under an abuse of
discretion standard. In criminal cases
where a conviction results, the evidence
and any reasonable inferences are consid-
ered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.” Syl. Pt. 12, State v. Derr, 192
W.Va. 165, 451 S.H.2d 781 (1994).
Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Bradford, 199 W.Va. 338,
484 S.E.2d 221 (1997). With these standards
in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

I. DISCUSSION

HH Petitioner alleges that the magis-
trate court erred by instructing the jury on
the offense of domestic assault when he was

[Blefore the Defendant, Zachary Elijah
Bland, can be convicted of the domestic as-
sault, the State of West Virginia must ...
prove to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Zachary
Elijah Bland, ... on or about the 17th day of
February, 2015, did unlawfully attempt to use

467

charged solely with domestic battery. We
have held that “[wlhen a defendant is
charged with a crime in an indictment, but
the State convicts the defendant of a charge
not included in the indictment, then per se
error has occurred, and the conviction cannot
stand and must be reversed,” Syl. Pt. 7, State
v. Corra, 228 W.Va. 578, 678 S.H.2d 806
(2009). However, “a defendant may be con-
vieted of a lesser included offense of the
specific charge set forth in the indictment
without violating the constitutional notice re-
quirement.” State v. Henning, 238 W.Va. 198,
196, 793 S.E.2d 848, 846 (2016). Indeed, the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that a “defendant may be found
guilty of an offense necessarily included in
the offense charged or of an attempt to com-
mit either the offense charged or an offense
necessarily included therein if the attempt is
an offense.” W.Va. R. Crim. Proe. 31(¢).

HMM Petitioner argues that domestic
assault is not a lesser-included offense of
domestic battery. Generally,

“(t]he question of whether a [party] is enti-
tled to an instruction on a lesser included
offense involves a two-part inquiry. The
first inquiry is a legal one having to do
with whether the lesser offense is by virtue
of its legal elements or definition included
in the greater offense. The second inquiry
is a factual one which involves a determi-
nation by the trial court of whether there
is evidence which would tend to prove such
lesser included offense. State v. Neider,
170 W.Va. 662, 295 S.H.2d 902 (1982).” Syl.
Pt. 1, State v. Jones, 174 W.Va. 700, 329
S.E.2d 65 (1985).

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Wilkerson, 230 W.Va. 366,
738 S.E.2d 82 (2018). With respect to the
first inquiry, this Court has held:
“(t]he test of determining whether a par-
ticular offense is a lesser included offense
is that the lesser offense must be such that
it is impossible to commit the greater of-

force capable of causing physical pain or inju-
ry against Tony Wanstreet and/or committed
an act which placed Tony Wanstreet a [sic]
reasonable apprehension of immediately suf-
fering physical pain or injury, and which Tony
Wanstreet is a family or household member of
the Defendant.

468

fense without first having committed the
lesser offense, An offense is not a lesser
included offense if it requires the inclusion
of an element not.required in the greater
offense.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v Louk, 169
W.Va. 24, 285 S.H.2d 482 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Jenkins, 191
W.Va. 87, 448.S.H.2d 244 (1994),

Id, at Syl. Pt. 4, In other words,

“Before a lesser offense can be said to
contribute a necessary part of a greater
offense, all the legal ingredients of the
corpus delicti of the lesser offense must be
included in the elements of the greater
offense. If an element necessary to estab-
lish the corpus delicti of the lesser offense
is irrelevant to the proof of the greater
offense, the lesser cannot be held to be a
necessarily included offense.” Syl. Pt. 5,
State v. Vance, 168 W.Va. 666, 285 S.E.2d.
487 (1981).

Id, at'Syl. Pt, 5.

The offenses of domestic battery and do- _

mestic assault are codified in West Virginia
Code § 61-2-28 (2014), which provides:
(a) Domestic battery—Any person
who unlawfully and intentionally makes
» physical contact force capable of causing
physical .pain or injury to his ... family
«+» member or unlawfully and-intentional-
. ly causes physical harm to his ... family
«+ Member, is guilty of a misdemeanor{[.]
“(b) Domestic assault.—Any person who
unlawfully attempts to use force capable of
causing physical pain or injury against his
... family ... member or unlawfully com-
mits an act that places his ... family ...
. Member in reasonable apprehension of im-
mediately suffering physical pain or injury,
is guilty of a misdemeanor{.] .
Pursuant to the statute, domestic battery can
be committed in two ways. First, this offense
is committed when a person unlawfully and
intentionally “makes physical contact force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to
his ... family ... member.” Second, the
offense is committed when a person unlawful-
ly and intentionally “causes physical harm to
i - member.” W.Va. Code

Likewise, domestic assault can be commit-
ted in two ways, First, the offense is commit-
ted when a person unlawfully “attempts to
use force capable of causing physical pain or
injury against his ... family ... member.”
Second, the offense is committed when a
person unlawfully “commits an act that
places his ... family ... member in reason-
able apprehension of immediately suffering
physical pain or injury.” W.Va, Code § 61-2-
28),

The first form of domestic assault essen-
tially is an attempted domestic battery. Pur-
suant to West Virginia Code § 61-2-28(a),
domestic battery occurs when a defendant
“makes physical contact foree capable of
causing physical pain or injury to his ...
family ... member.” Likewise, under West
Virginia Code § 61-2-28(b), domestic assault
occurs when a defendant “attempts to use
force capable of causing physical pain or
injury against his ... family ... member,”

As set forth. above, a “defendant may be
found guilty of an offense necessarily includ-
ed in the offense charged or of an attempt to
commit either the offense charged or an
offense necessarily included therein if the
attempt is an offense.” W.Va. R. Crim. P.
81(c) (emphasis added); Henning, 288 W.Va.
at 196, 793 S.E.2d at 846. Accordingly, the
first method of committing domestic assault
is-a lesser included offense of domestic bat-
tery.

The second form of domestic assault oc-
eurs when a defendant places the victim in
“reasonable apprehension” of immediately
suffering physical pain or injury. W.Va. Code
§ 61-2-28(b). Petitioner argues that because
“reasonable apprehension” is not an element
of domestic battery, domestic assault is not a
lesser included offense. We: recently ad-
dressed this same argument in State v. Hen-
ning, 238 W.Va. 198, 798 S.E.2d 843. In that,
case, the defendant was charged under West
Virginia Code § 61-2-9 with malicious assault
but convicted of misdemeanor assault, anoth-
er offense within the same statute. Id. at 196,
798 S.H.2d at 846, The defendant argued that
the absence of the “reasonable apprehension”
element from malicious assault precluded

misdemeanor assault from being a lesser in-
eluded offense, Id. at 197, 798 S.H.2d at 847,
In Henning, we observed that:

West Virginia Code § 61-2-9 is struc-
tured to define the various forms of assault
and assign punishments therefor, depend-
ing upon the extent the crime was complet-
ed, the culpability of the perpetrator, and
the degree of harm perceived by the vie-
tim, The statutory penalties decrease from
malicious assault to unlawful assault to
battery to assault,

Id, at 198, 798 S.E.2d at-848, We also noted
that’ “[wlhen the strict elements test is ap-
plied to the various forms of assault set forth
in the statute, only assault‘ committed by
placing another in reasonable apprehension
of suffering physical pain or injury contains
an element not required for the greater of-
fenses.” Id.

HMI Upon considering the common law

pertaining to assault and battery and our

rules of statutory construction which require
us to construe statutes to avoid an absurd
result, we concluded that “the legislature in-
tended the lesser degrees of assault to be
lesser included offenses.” Id. at 199, 793
§.E.2d at 849, Explaining further, we stated:
if we were to find that the offense of
assault, when committed by placing anoth-
er in apprehension of pain or injury, is not
a lesser included offense of malicious as-
sault, then an accused could potentially be
charged with both offenses for the same
act or transaction, Double jeopardy princi-
ples, however, would preclude convictions
for both offenses. In that regard, “[a] claim
that double jeopardy has been violated
based on multiple punishments [for the
same offense] imposed after a single trial

2. West Virginia Code § 61-2-9 (2014), provides,
in pertinent part:

(b) Assault—Any person who unlawfully
attempts to use physical force capable of caus-
ing physical pain or injury to the person of
another or unlawfully commits an act that
places another in reasonable apprehension of
immediately suffering physical pain or injury,
he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, shall be confined in jail for not
more than six months, or fined not more than
$100, or both fined and confined.

(c) Battery.—Any person who unlawfully
and intentionally makes physical contact with

469

is resolved by determining the legislative
intent as to punishment.” Syl. Pt. 7, State
v. Gill, 187. W.Va. 186, 416 S.E.2d 268
(1992). By imposing different degrees of
punishment depending on the extent to
which the assault was completed, the legis-
lature has made it clear that it did not
intend to impose multiple punishments for
a single act involving one victim when it
codified the offenses of assault and bat-
tery. Instead, the legislature has created a
_hierarchy of lesser included offenses in
West Virginia Code § 61-2-9 in aceordance
with the common law.
Id. footnoted omitted). Accordingly, we held
in syllabus point-6 of Henning that. “[t]he
crime of assault.as defined by West Virginia
Code § 61-2-9(b) (2014) is a lesser included
offense of malicious assault.as set forth in
West Virginia Code § 61-2-9(a).” Id, at Syl.
PL .

“THI Applying Henning to the case at
bar, we conclude that like the offenses con-
tained in West Virginia Code § 61-2-9 (2014),
the placement of the statutory offenses of
domestic assault arid domestic battery within
West Virginia Code § 61-2-28 evidences leg-
islative intent to set forth differing degrees
of punishment depending upon the severity
of the form of the crime committed. But for
the domestic violence ‘application, the of-
fenses of domestic battery and domestic as-
sault are virtually identical to the offenses of
‘battery and assault set forth in West Virginia
Code § 61-2-92 In fact, West Virginia Code
§ 61-2-28¢) expressly provides that “[a] per-
son charged with a violation of this section
may not also be charged with a violation of
subsection (b) [assault] or (¢) [battery], sec-
tion nine of this article for the same act.”*

force capable of causing physical pain or inju-
ry to the person of another or unlawfully and
intentionally causes physical pain or injury to
another person, he or she is guilty of a misde-
meanor and, upon conviction, shall be con-
fined in jail for not more than twelve months,
or fined not more than $500, or both fined and
confined,

3. Furthermore, West Virginia Code § 61-2-9(d)
rovides:

(a) Any person convicted of a violation of

subsection (b) or (c) of this section who has, in

the ten years prior to said conviction, been

470

Accordingly, we conclude that the crime of
domestic assault as defined by West Virginia
Code § 61-2-28(b) is a lesser included offense
of domestic battery as set forth in West
Virginia Code § 61-2-28(a).

Having found that domestic assault is a
lesser included offense of domestic battery,
‘we must now determine “whether there [was]
evidence [at trial] which would tend to prove
[the] lesser included offense” of domestic as-
sault. Syl. Pt. 8, Wilkerson. First, while the
jury heard evidence at trial that Petitioner
struck Mr. Wanstreet, it also heard evidence
that during the altercation in the kitchen,
Petitioner “threw [Mr. Wanstreet] against
the sink and tried to throw him on the
floor[.!” Thus, considering this evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude that the issue of whether a
domestic assault was committed by Petition-
er attempting, but failing, to throw Mr. Wan-
street on the floor was a question of fact for
the jury. Furthermore, there was evidence
from which the jury could conclude that Mr.
Wanstreet was, at different times, placed in
reasonable apprehension of bodily injury.
Mrs, Bland testified that Petitioner asked
Mr. Wanstreet, “if he wanted more” during
the altercation, and subsequently punched
and broke a television over his knee during a
fit of rage. Additionally, Mr. Wanstreet testi-
fied that during his efforts to protect his
mother from Petitioner, “[he] was in shock
and [his] adrenalin was going because of
what was going on around [him][.]” Given
this evidence, we conclude that the jury in-
struction on domestic assault was warranted
and that the jury was properly instructed on
the offense of domestic assault regarding Mr.
Wanstreet,

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm the May
18, 2016 order of the Cireuit Court of Harri-

convicted of a violation of either subsection (b)
or (c) of this section where the victim was a
current or former spouse, current or former
sexual or intimate partner, a person with
whom the defendant has a child in common, a
person with whom the defendant cohabits or
has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defen-
dant's child or ward or a member of the defen-
dant’s household at the time of the offense or
convicted of a violation of section twenty-eight

son County affirming Petitioner’s conviction
for domestic assault.

Affirmed.

801 S.E.2d 485

STATE of West Virginia EX REL. AMER-
ICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC;
American Electric Power Service Corpo-
ration; Ohio Power Company and Doug
Workman, Defendants Below, Petition-
ers

ve

The Honorable Derek C. SWOPE, Lead
Presiding Judge, Gavin Landfill Litiga-
tion, Mass Litigation Panel, The Estate
of Bobby Clary, by Joy Clary, et al.
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No. 16-1148

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: March 8, 2017
Filed: June 14, 2017

of this article or has served a period of pretrial
diversion for an alleged violation of subsection
(b) or (c) of this section or section twenty-eight
of this article when the victim has such present
or past relationship shall upon conviction be
subject to the penalties set forth in section
twenty-eight of this article for a second, third
or subsequent criminal act of domestic vio-
lence offense, as appropriate.

472

1, The parties to this litigation use different termi-
nology to refer to these twelve plaintiffs, who are
family members that shared a residence with
spouses, parents, or children who worked on-site
at the Gavin Landfill, While Respondents and the
MLP refer to the twelve plaintiffs as the “non-
working direct claim” plaintiffs, Petitioners refer

po
|
a

James W. Turner, Esq., Ancil G, Ramey,
Esq., Jessica L. Wiley, Esq., STEPTOE &
JOHNSON PLLC, Huntington, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for Petitioners

Christopher J, Regan, Esq., J. Zachary
Zatezalo, Esq., Laura P. Pollard, Esq., BOR-
DAS & BORDAS, PLLC, Wheeling, West
Virginia, Counsel for Respondents

L, David Duffield, Esq., Chad 8. Lovejoy,
Esq., Duffield, Lovejoy, Stemple & Boggs,
PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, Counsel
for Respondents

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioners American Electric Power Com-
pany, Ine,, American Electrie Power Service
Corporation, Ohio Power Company, and
Doug Workman (“Petitioners”) invoke this
Court’s original jurisdiction seeking a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the ‘Mass Litigation
Panel (“MLP”) from enforcing its order de-
nying a motion to dismiss twelve plaintiffs
who allege that they suffered injury as a
result of “take-home” exposure in the Coal
Combustion Residuals (“CCR”) mass litiga-
tion. Petitioners contend that the MLP’s
determination that Ohio's Mixed Dust Stat-
ute? is contrary to West Virginia public poli-
ey was clearly erroneous and that the appli-
cation of West Virginia substantive law to the
NWDC Plaintiffs’ claims violates Petitioners’

to these plaintiffs as “off-premises” plaintiffs. For

purposes of this Opinion, we collectively refer to
these plaintiffs as the. "NWDC Plaintiffs.”

2, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2307.84 through .902
(2017).

due process rights. Upon consideration of the
parties’ briefs and arguments, the submitted
record and pertinent authorities, we grant
the writ of prohibition and remand this mat-
ter for further proceedings consistent with
this Opinion.

I, FACTUAL AND. PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

This case was previously before this Court
in State ew rel, AEP v. Nibert, 287 W.Va. 14,
784 S.E.2d 718 (2016) (“AHP J”). In the prior
case, Petitioners filed a writ of prohibition
challenging the circuit court’s denial of their
motion to dismiss on the issue of forum non
conveniens. We found that the circuit court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing Peti-
tioner’s motion to dismiss, denied Petitioners’
writ of prohibition, and referred the case to
the MLP. Jd, at 17, 784 S.E.2d at 716.

Following this Court’s decision in AHP J, .

Respondent Plaintiffs (“Respondents”) filed
an amended complaint joining the separate
claims of seventy-nine individual plaintiffs,
who allege that they or their family members
were ‘injured by exposure to CCR generated
at the General James M. Gavin Power Plant
and disposed of at the associated Gavin

3. As we indicated in AEP I, the Respondents
originally filed the underlying action against Peti-
tioners in the Circuit Court of Mason County.
AEP I, 237 W.Va. at 18, 784 S.E.2d at 717.
Respondents allege that they have developed nu-
merous different types of cancer and/or other
health problems from their exposure to CCR.
Specifically, Respondents claim that such CCR,
or fly ash, contains a variety of heavy metals
such as beryllium and silica, among others. Of
the seventy-nine plaintiffs named in the Amended
Complaint, approximately nine plaintiffs are
West Virginia residents; the remaining plaintiffs
are primarily residents’ of Ohio and Kentucky,
while a few reside in other states.

Respondents allege that the named corporate
entities owned and/or operated the Gavin Land-

fill during the time period relevant to this action .

and that their employee and named defendant
below, Doug Workman, specifically directed the
plaintiffs to work in and around the coal waste
and fly ash, Respondents further allege that Mr.
Workman failed to address concerns raised by
some of the plaintiffs questioning the safety, of
coal waste exposure, that they were not provided
with protective gear to minimize the effects of
such exposure, and that AEP and Mr. Workman
intentionally concealed the hazardous effects of
the coal waste and exposure thereto.

4. In addition to the twelve NWDC Plaintiffs at
issue in this case, thirty-nine plaintiffs allege that

473

Landfill, both of which are located in Gallipo-
lis, Ohio (collectively “Gavin Landfill”), Peti-
tioners allege that the Gavin Landfill was
owned or operated by American Electric
Power Company, Inc. (“AEP”), American
Electric Power Service Corporation, and
Ohio Power Company during the period rele-
vant to this action.’ The twelve NWDC Plain-
tiffs allege that they suffered injury as a
result of take-home exposure to CCR—expo-
sure not by visiting the landfill or the plant,
but as a result of sharing a residence with
independent contractor . plaintiffs who
brought CCR home on their clothing and
shoes * :

On August 15, 2016, Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss the claims of the NWDC
Plaintiffs seeking, among other things, dis-
missal of the claims pursuant ‘to the Ohio
Mixed Dust Statute, Ohio Rev. Code
§§ 2807.84 through .902, which provides that
premises owners are not liable for alleged
off-premises mixed dust-exposure of the type
that the NWDC Plaintiffs allege.> On August
29, 2016, Respondents filed a response to
Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss asserting vari-
ous arguments regarding why dismissal was

they were exposed to CCR while working at the
Gavin Landfill for independent contractors, and
twenty-seven plaintiffs allege loss of consortium
claims derived from the claims of independent
contractor’ plaintiffs, One of the seventy-nine
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his claim,

8. Ohio Rev. Code Ann, §§ 2307.84 through .902
prohibits any claim against a premises owner
based on alleged exposure to “mixed dust” un-
less the exposure occurred on the premises, By
its express terms, that bar applies to “any claim
for damages ... in any way related to inhalation
of, exposure to, or contact with mixed dust,”
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307,83(N).

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss (1) all of
Respondents’ claims due to their failure to follow
statutory requirements under-Ohio's Mixed Dust
Statute, (2) all of the NWDC Plaintiffs for failure
to follow Ohio statutory requirements for mixed
dust exposure against premises owners where
the exposure did not occur on the premises, and
(3) the “medical monitoring” and “failure to
warn, eliminate, protect” claims on the separate
grounds that those stand-alone causes of action
are not recognized in Ohio, In this proceeding,
Petitioners only challenge the MLP’s rulings re-
garding the twelve NWDC Plaintiffs,

474
improper.$

HH «(On October 21, 2016, the MLP de-
nied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The MLP
found that because the alleged exposures all
occurred entirely within the State of Ohio,
the doctrine of lew loci delicti required the
application of Ohio law to the claims of the
NWDC Plaintiffs.’ The MLP further found
that the take-home exposure claims fell with-
in the scope of the Ohio Mixed Dust Statute
because they allege off-premises exposure to
mixed dust as defined by the statute. With
regard to the applicability of the Ohio Mixed
Dust Statute, the MLP specifically found:

Based upon the findings of fact, the Pan-
el concludes that there are sufficient alle-
gations that the Plaintiffs were exposed to
“mixed dust” as defined by Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2807.84([M]). That statute defines
a “mixed dust” as a “mixture of dusts
composed of silica and one or more other
fibrogenic dusts capable of inducing pulmo-
nary fibrosis if inhaled in sufficient quanti-
ty.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2807.84([M]).
Plaintiffs’ allegations describing coal com-
bustion waste are specific and express alle-
gations that coal combustion waste consists
of mixed dust. ... These allegations are all
that is required to allege a “mixed dust”
claim under Ohio’s mixed dust statute.

Ohio’s mixed dust statute further defines
a “mixed dust disease claim” as “any claim
for damages, losses, indemnification, con-

6. Specifically, Respondents alleged that: (1) their
claims, which were not “dust” claims, did not
fall within the purview of the Ohio Mixed Dust
Statute because (a) their claims did not fall with-
in the types of illnesses and exposures addressed
by Ohio Revised Code § 2307.84, which specifi-
cally addressed nonmalignant conditions and
lung cancer, (b) they were not required to com-
ply with the procedural requirements of the Ohio
Mixed Dust Statute for filing expert reports and
test results regarding Respondents’ physical im-
pairments following exposure, (c) the doctrine of
Jaches prohibited Petitioners from asserting, two
years into the litigation, that the Ohio Mixed
Dust Statute barred Respondents’ claims, (d) the
Ohio Mixed Dust Statute, which was not retroac-
tive in nature, did not apply to the instant case
because it was enacted after the dates of Respon-
dents’ exposures, and (e) West Virginia's public
policy exception to the rule of lex loci delicti
applied to prevent Ohio’s Mixed Dust Statute
from barring Respondents’ claims; (2) Ohio law
permits recovery for future medical monitoring

tribution, or other relief arising out of,
based on, or in any way related to inhala-
tion of, exposure to, or contact with mixed
dust.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.84(
(N]). The definition includes claims for
“mental or emotional injury, death, or loss
to person, risk of disease or other injury,
costs of medical monitoring or surveillance,
or any other effects on the person’s health
that are caused by the person’s exposure
to mixed dust.” Id, This is exactly what the
paragraphs of the Amended Complaint
identified above allege. To come within the
statute, no more need be alleged. Accord-
ingly, Plaintiffs have asserted mixed dust
disease claims falling within the ambit of
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2807.84 et seq.

Despite these findings, the MLP found
that application of the Ohio Mixed Dust Stat-
ute violates the public policy of West Virginia
because it bars the claims of the NWDC
Plaintiffs, who were not exposed to coal com-
bustion waste while at the Gavin Landfill, but
rather, were exposed when the “working di-
rect claim” plaintiffs with whom they resided
brought CCR home on their clothes. Relying
on our decision in Mills v. Quality Supplier
Trucking, Inc., 208 W.Va. 621, 510 S.E.2d
280 (1998), the MLP found that “the doctrine
of lea loci delicti will not be invoked where
‘the application of the substantive law of a
foreign state ... contravenes the public poli-
ey of this State’” Id. at 624, 510 S.E.2d at

and treatment; (3) Respondents’ claims for “fail-
ure to warn, eliminate, protect” are not stand-
alone claims, but rather, are included as allega-
tions within their negligence claims; and (4) Re-
spondents sufficiently pled claims for fraud and
fraudulent misrepresentation that would survive
even if the MLP concluded that the Ohio Mixed
Dust Statute barred Respondents’ remaining

7. “In general, this State adheres to the conflicts
of law doctrine of lex loci delicti.” Syl. pt. 1, Paul
v. Nat'l Life, 177 W.Va. 427, 352 S.B.2d 550
(1986). Pursuant to this doctrine, “the substan-
tive rights between the parties are determined by
the law of the place of injury.” McKinney v.
Fairchild Intern., Inc., 199 W.Va, 718, 727, 487
S.E.2d 913, 922 (1997) (citing Blais v. Allied
Exterminating Co., 198 W.Va. 674, 482 S.B.2d
659 (1996); Paul v. National Life, 177 W.Va. 427,
352 S.E.2d 550; Vest v. St. Albans Psychiatric
Hospital, Inc., 182 W.Va. 228, 229, 387 $.B.2d
282, 283 (1989)).

283. In applying West Virginia’s public policy
exception to the rule of lex loci delicti, the
MLP declined to apply Ohio law and conelud-
ed it was. compelled by West Virginia public
policy to allow the NWDC Plaintiffs’ claims
to go forward even though those claims are
prohibited by Ohio law. Citing this Court’s
decision in Bower v. Westinghouse, 206
W.Va. 188, 522 S.E.2d 424 (1999), which per-
mitted’ medical monitoring claims, the MLP
concluded that “the causes of action [Peti-
tioners] seek to dismiss through -the applica-
tion of foreign law exist under West Virginia
Jaw on public policy grounds.” §

On December 12, 2016, Petitioners filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition in this Court
seeking to prohibit the MLP from enforcing
its order denying its motion to dismiss the
NWDC Plaintiffs. Respondents filed a re-
sponse to the petition on January 10, 2017.
By order entered January 25, 2017, this
Court issued a rule to show cause and set
this matter for oral argument.

Tl, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM «Petitioners seek a writ of prohibi-
tion. We have held that, “[a] writ of prohibi-
tion will not issue to prevent a simple abuse
of discretion by a trial court. It will only
issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction
or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legiti-
mate ‘powers[.]” Syl. pt. 2, State ew rel,
Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 288
S.E.2d 425 (1977), As we stated in AEP I:

As an extraordinary remedy, this Court
reserves the granting of such relief to

“really extraordinary causes.” State ex rel,

Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 889, 345,

480 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1996) (internal quota-

tions and citations omitted),

8, In addition to the above-stated grounds, the
MLP declined to dismiss Respondents’ claims for
the following additional reasons: (1) it declined
to apply the procedural out-of-state expert report
requirements set forth in Ohio Revised Code
§ 2307.87 and concluded that expert discovery
was governed by West Virginia Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 and the MLP’s Rule 16 Case Man-
agement Order; (2) it concluded that Ohio law
permitted recovery for medical monitoring
claims under Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656
F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2011), and that Respon-
dents had pled sufficient factual allegations to

475

“[T]his Court will use prohibition .... to
correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal er-
rors plainly in contravention of a clear
statutory, constitutional, or common law
mandate which may be resolved indepen-
dently of any disputed facts and only in
cases where there is a high probability
that the trial will be completely reversed if
the error is not corrected in advance.” Syl.
pt. 1, in part, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va.
112, 262 S.H.2d 744 (1979), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in State
ex rel. Thornhill Grp, Inc. v. King, 233
W.Va, 564, 759 S.E.2d 795 (2014),

AEP I, 287 W.Va. at 19, 784 S.E.2d at 718.

HI When deciding whether the writ of
prohibition should issue in a given case, we
have held as follows:

In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
involving an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is claimed that the lower
tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers,

this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (5) whether the lower
tribunal’s order raises new and important.
problems or issués of law of first impres-
sion.

Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ew rel. Hoover v.
Berger, 199 W.Va, 12, 483 S.H.2d 12 (1996).

support their claims for recovery of future medi-
cal treatment and testing; and (3) it declined to
dismiss Respondents’ other allegations (a) re-
garding Petitioners’ failure to warn, failure to
eliminate, and failure to protect the plaintiffs
while working at the Gavin Landfill from expo-
sure to coal combustion waste, finding that they
were simply elements or illustrations of negli-
gence, not stand alone counts, and (b) determin-
ing that Respondents’ claims for fraud and fraud-
ulent concealment had been sufficiently pled and
that they would survive even if their remaining
claims could be dismissed.

476

Keeping these standards in mind, we proceed
to consider the parties’ arguments.

Il. DISCUSSION .

HM The sole issue this Court must
consider is whether the MLP incorrectly ap-
plied the public policy exception to our long-
standing rule of lew loci delicti.?. Petitioners
assert that the MLP’s refusal to apply lea
loci delicti is contrary to the prior decisions
of this Court that made clear that. the pub-
lic policy exception is not warranted merely
because the law of another state is less fa-
vorable to plaintiffs than the law of West
Virginia. They contend that the public policy
exception is only warranted when the appli-
cation of a foreign State’s law is “offensive
to the deeply ingrained or strongly felt poli-
cy of the state.” See Nadler v. Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins, Co., 188 W.Va. 829, 386, 424
S.H.2d 256, 268 (1992) (quoting Boardman
v, United Servs, Auto, Ass’n, 470 So.2d
1024, 1088 (Miss, 1985)). Even when another
State’s law offends the public policy of West
Virginia, this State still must have sufficient
contacts to the conduct underlying the suit
before it will use the public policy exception
as a means to disregard the other State’s
law. See Paul 0. Nat'l Life, 177 W.Va. 427,
852 S.H.2d 650 (1986). Petitioners argue
that the MLP committed clear error in not
following this Court’s holdings in Nadler
and Paul.

Petitioners assert that although the scope
of any duty on the part of premises owners
to protect off-premises individuals from take-
home exposure has been widely discussed
and litigated over the past decade in courts
and legislatures across the country, neither
this Court nor the West Virginia Legislature
has addressed whether West Virginia recog-
nizes a take-home duty. Accordingly, Peti-
tioners contend that application of Ohio’s
Mixed Dust statute does not violate West

9, Although not raised before the MLP, Petition-
ers additionally argue that application of West
Virginia substantive law to the claims of the
NWDC Plaintiffs would violate its due process
rights, as well as the full faith and credit clause,
where the claims involve Ohio premises, alleged
exposure in Ohio, and alleged injury in Ohio,
This Court typically does not address arguments
that were not raised below. We have, however,
held that [a] constitutional issue that was not

Virginia public policy. Petitioners also con-
tend that even those states that recognize

- that a premises owner owes a duty to spous-

es of its independent contractors limit liabili-
ty according to whether that State’s law
would allow the independent contractor to
recover. See Kesner v. Superior Court, 1
Cal.5th 1182, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 384 P.8d
288, 802 (2016). They argue that under the
MLP’s order, West Virginia law will govern
the claims of the NWDC Plaintiffs even
though (1) none of those plaintiffs: were citi-
zens or residents of West: Virginia at the
time of their alleged exposure; (2) all of their
alleged exposure occurred in Ohio; (8) AEP’s
operations at issue were only in Ohio; (4)
Ohio law states Petitioners had no duty to
such plaintiffs; and (6) Petitioners had no
reason to expect that their conduct was not
governed by Ohio law.

: Respondents counter that the MLP prop--
erly applied the public policy exception to the
lex loci delicti doctrine in support of its
decision to deny Petitioners’ motion to dis-
miss the NWDC Plaintiffs. Respondents as-
sert that, contrary to Petitioners’ conten- -
tions, the MLP’s decision does not mandate
that Ohio citizens be permitted to recover for
take-home exposure. Rather, the MLP de-
clined to dismiss the NWDC Plaintiffs at this
stage. Respondents contend that the MLP
correctly found that the application of the
Ohio Mixed Dust Statute offends the public
policy of West Virginia because West Virgi-
nia permits recovery for claims of personal
injuries arising out of another party’s negli-
gence, as well as for claims of intentional acts
or omissions such as fraud and misrepresen-
tation, both of which they allege happened in
this case, Thus, Respondents argue that this
is not a matter of Ohio law being less favor-
able to the NWDC Plaintiffs, but rather that
Ohio law denies the NWDC Plaintiffs any
opportunity to recover for injuries sustained

properly preserved at the trial court level may, in
the discretion of this Court, be addressed on
appeal when the constitutional issue is the con-
trolling issue in the resolution of the case.” Syl.
pt. 2, Louk v. Cormier; 218 W.Va. 81, 622 S.E,2d
788 (2005). Because this case can be resolved on
the first issue presented, the applicability of the
public policy exception, we need not address the
remaining issues presented by Petitioners.

as a result of Petitioners’ alleged negligence
and fraud. They contend that Petitioners
should have expected West Virginia law to
govern their conduct since it has long been
operating coal combustion plants in this state
and plants and landfills near the border of
West Virginia. According to Respondents,
AEP employs West Virginia citizens with
significant frequency, and it had every rea-
son to know that harmful material produced
at its plants, including the Gavin Plant, and
disposed of at the Gavin Landfill, would be
taken home by on-site workers, whether in
Ohio or West Virginia. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the MLP’s
application of the public policy exception to
lew loci delicti was’ erroneous in this’ case,

In Paul, an administrator of an automobile
passenger’s estate brought a wrongful death
action against the driver’s estate arising out
of a one-car collision that occurred in
Indiana. Paul, 177 W.Va. at 428, 352 S.E.2d
at 550. Both of the women involved in the
collision were West Virginia residents. Id.
We held that Indiana’s automobile guest pas-
senger statute that provided the driver im-
munity from liability violated West Virginia’s
clearly recognized public policy that “persons
injured by the negligence of another should
be able to recover in tort.” Id, at 438-34, 352
§.B.2d at 556. In so holding, we engaged in
an extensive analysis of the lew loci delicti
rule and alternative conflicts of law ap-
proaches such as the so-called Restatement
approach, which analyzes which state has the
most significant relationship to the occur-
vence or the tort.!° We specifically rejected
the Restatement approach on the basis that it
lacked concrete guidelines and reaffirmed
our adherence to the rule of lea loci delicti,
finding that it provided a more predictable
rule, Id, at 488, 352 S,E.2d at 556. However,
we also acknowledged that “comity does not
require the application of the substantive law
of a foreign state when that law contravenes
the: public policy of this State.” Id. (citing
Dallas v, Whitney, 118 W.Va, 106, 188 S.E.
766 (1986).

10. Id. (explaining that under § 146 of Restate-

ment (Second) of Conflicts of Law, in action for
personal injury, local law of state where injury

417

Noting that West Virginia had never en-
acted an automobile guest passenger statute,
we concluded in Paul that it was the “strong
public policy of this State that persons in-
jured by the negligence of another should be
able to recover in tort” and offered examples
of other scenarios where this same public
policy of allowing recovery for another’s neg-
ligence was acknowledged. Id. (citing Coffin-
daffer v, Coffindaffer, 161 W.Va. 557, 244
§.E.2d 888 (1978) (abolishing doctrine of in-
ter-spousal immunity to permit recovery in
tort); Bradley v, Appalachian Power Co., 168
W.Va, 382, 256 S.H.2d.879 (1979) (adopting
doctrine of comparative negligence over con-
tributory negligence to permit recovery in
tort); Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp, 149 W.Va.
705, 148.S.E.2d 154 (1965) (abolishing chari-
table. immunity for hospitals to permit recov-
ery in tort); Higginbotham v. City of
Charleston, 157 W.Va. 724, 204 S.H.2d 1
(1974) (finding no common law governmental
immunity for municipal corporations to per-
mit recovery in tort); Lee v. Comer, 159
W.Va, 585, 224 S.H.2d 721 (1976) (abrogating
doctrine of parental immunity to permit un-
emancipated minor child to recover in tort).

In applying the public policy exception, we
cautioned that: .

[alithough we intend this to be a rule of

general application, we do not intend it as

an invitation to flagrant forum: shopping,

For example, were: a resident of a guest

statute jurisdiction to sue another resident

of a guest statute jurisdiction over an acci-
dent occurring in a guest statute jurisdic-
tion, the simple fact that the plaintiff was
. able to serve process on the defendant
within our State borders would not compel
us to resist application of any relevant
guest statute. This State must have some
connection with the.controversy above and
beyond mere-service of process before the
rule we announce today will be applied. In
other words, venue must be proper under

some provision other than W.Va. Code 56-

1-1(a)(4) [1986].

Paul, 177 W.Va. at 484 n.14, $52 8.B.2d at
557 n.14 (emphasis added).
occurred determines rights and liabilities of par-

ties, unless with respect to particular issue, some
other state has more significant relationship).

478 -

Hl In Nadler, we answered a certified
question from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding
whether the substantive law of Ohio or the
substantive law of West Virginia was to be
applied to determine the rights of parties
under contract for underinsured motorist
coverage. Nadler, 188 W.Va. at 331, 424
§.E.2d at 258, This Court. held that the provi-
sions of a motor vehicle’ insurance policy
should be construed according to the laws of
the state where the policy was issued and the
risk insured was principally located, unless
another state had a more significant relation-
ship to the transaction and parties. Id. at 338,
424 §.E.2d at 265, Syl. pt. 2 (quoting Syl. pt.
2, Lee v, Saliga, 179 W.Va. 762, 373 S.H.2d
845 (1988). In so holding, we explained that

[t]he mere fact that the substantive law of

another jurisdiction differs from or is less

favorable than the law of the forum state
does not, by itself, demonstrate that appli-
cation of the foreign law under recognized
conflict of law principles is contrary to the
public policy of the forum state. °

Syl. pt. 8, Nadler, 188 W.Va. at 386, 424
§.E.2d at 263. We concluded that where a
choice of law question arose with regard to
interpretation of coverage provisions in a
motor vehicle insurance policy executed in
another state, public policy considerations
were adequately addressed by application of
a significant relationship conflict of laws test
enunciated in Lee. See id. at Syl. pt. 4. Thus,
we determined that Ohio law applied to the
interpretation of the insurance agreement
between parties. Id. at 388, 424 S.E.2d at
265. We specifically held that “a court should
not refuse to apply foreign law, in otherwise
proper circumstances, on public policy
grounds unless the foreign law ‘is contrary to
pure morals or abstract justice, or unless
enforcement would be of evil example and
harmful to its own people’” Jd. (citing 16
Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 18).

Following Nadler, we addressed the same
type of conflicts of law issue that the MLP
was asked to examine here, and we set forth
grounds for application of the public policy
exception to the doctrine of lew loci delicti in
Mills v, Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 208
W.Va, 621, 510 S.H:2d 280 (1998). The plain-

tiff in Mills brought claims for negligent
hiring and wrongful death on behalf of her
deceased husband, a truck driver employed
by a West Virginia company, who was shot
and killed in Maryland by another truck
driver who was employed by a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Ohio, Jd. at 622, 510 S.E.2d at 281.
The defendant trucking company argued that
Maryland law should govern both the issue of
negligent hiring and wrongful death. Jd. The
plaintiff argued that, while Maryland law
should apply to the negligent hiring issue,
West Virginia law should control the claim
for wrongful, death because Maryland law
would have allowed the defenses of contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of the risk to
operate as complete bars to recovery by a
plaintiff, whereas West Virginia law would
not. Id, Concluding that the contributory
negligence doctrine of Maryland contravened
the public policy of this State, this Court held
that West Virginia law should govern the
resolution of the wrongful death claims that
were alleged in that case. Id. at 624, 510
S.E.2d at 283,

In the case before us, the MLP relied upon
Mills to find that the public policy exception
should apply in this case. In its order, the
MLP discussed how applying the Ohio Mixed
Dust Statute would deny the NWDC Plain-
tiffs certain claims to which they are entitled
under West Virginia public policy:

West Virginia has a strong public policy
that persons injured by the negligence of
another should be able to recover in tort.
West Virginia has long “adhere[d] to the
rule that the doctrine of lex loci delicti will
not be invoked where ‘the application of
the substantive law of a foreign state ...
contravenes the public policy of this
State’” Mills v. Quality Supplier Truck-
ing, Inc., 203 W.Va, 621, 624, 510 S.E.2d
280, 288 (1998) (quoting Paul, 177 W.Va. at
483, 852 S.E.2d at 556), .

The public policy exception is designed
to enforce the public policy of West Virgi-
nia in actions filed in the state of West
Virginia, Mills v. Quality Supplier Truck-
ing, Inc., 208 W.Va. 621, 624, 510 S.E.2d
280, 288 (1998) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court of Appeals noted, in
this very case, that West Virginia and its
citizens have an important interest in the
proper resolution of this case, the conduct
of the Defendants, and the.claims of the
Plaintiffs, whether they are West Virgini-
ans or citizens of other states. Beyond
public policies at stake, the Supreme Court
found that West Virginia has a direct in-
terest in this case:

We conclude the consideration of this
State’s public interest also weighs in fa-
vor of retention of the Plaintiffs’ claims
in West Virginia ... to the extent that
the corporate defendants operate coal-
fired power plants both in Gallia County,
Ohio, and Mason County, West Virginia,
and the coal waste generated by such
power plants has adversely affected the
residents of Mason County, West Virgi-
nia, these citizens have an interest in
deciding the instant controversy.

State ex rel. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Ni-

bert, 287 W.Va. 14, 784 S.E.2d 718, 726

(2016).

Moreover, the causes of action Defen-
dants would seek to dismiss through the
application of foreign law exist under West
Virginia law on public policy grounds. For
example, in Bower v. Westinghouse, the
Supreme Court of Appeals explicitly
grounded the adoption of a medical moni-
toring claim on public policy grounds. See
id., 206 W.Va. 188, 140, 522 S.B.2d 424, 481
(1999).

The MLP took note of public policies in
Bower of (1) the public health interest in
fostering access to medical testing for indi-
viduals exposed to toxie chemicals; (2) the
deterrence value of allowing a plaintiffs re-
covery for medical monitoring costs; (8) the
benefit of early detection of cancer; and (4)
societal notions of fairness and justice. Bow-
er, 206 W.Va, at 140, 522 S.E.2d at 431. The
MLP then explained, “[tJhe policies de-
seribed in Bower, for the benefit of those who
are not yet sick, apply a fortiori, to the
claims of those who have actually contracted
disease and for which West Virginia clearly
imposes liability.” The MLP accordingly de-
clined to apply the Ohio Mixed Dust Statute
because it would bar the NWDC Plaintiffs

479

from any recovery because they were not
exposed to CCR while at the Gavin Landfill,
but rather by the waste brought home on
their family member's clothes. We conclude
that the MLP’s application of the publie poli-
ey exception was clearly erroneous in this
case,

In Mills, a case involving a West Virginia
corporation and West Virginia plaintiffs, this
Court concluded that the contributory negli-
gence doctrine of Maryland contravened the
public policy of this State because we had
already affirmatively rejected the contributo-
ry negligence doctrine in Bradley v. Appala-
chian Power Co., 168 W.Va. 382, 256 S.E.2d
879 (1979). Mills, 203 W.Va. at 623 n.8, 510
S.E.2d at 282 n.8. In Powl, a case involving
two West Virginia residents who were in a
collision in Indiana, this Court applied the
public policy exception in a circumstance
where our Legislature had never statutorily
enacted an automobile guest statute although
many other states had historically done so.
Id. at 433, 352 S.E.2d at 556. In both cases,
this State had somie connection with the con-
troversy above and beyond mere service of
process compelling us to resist the applica-
tion of foreign state law. Id. at 484 n.14, 852
§.E.2d at 556 n.14.

While we determined in AHP I that the
consideration of this State’s public interest
weighed in favor of retention of the case in
West Virginia courts, we did not decide
whether West Virginia law would necessarily
apply to any of the plaintiffs’ claims. Critical-
ly, in the set of circumstances before us, none
of the twelve NWDC plaintiffs were citizens
or residents of West Virginia at the time of
their alleged exposures, and none of their
exposures occurred in this State. Thus, al-’
though West Virginia has a strong public
policy that persons injured by the negligence
of another should be able to recover in tort,
in this particular case, where these twelve
plaintiffs lack a sufficient connection with the
state of West Virginia, we. are not strongly
compelled to resist application of Ohio's
Mixed Dust Statute. The MLP committed
clear error in not following this Court’s hold-
ing in Paul.

The claims of the NWDC: Plaintiffs in this
case present exactly the type of forum shop-

480

ping the rule of lew loci delicti was intended
to prevent. As we cautioned in Paul, in order
to avoid flagrant forum shopping, “[t]his
State must have some connection with the
controversy above and beyond mere service
of process before the [public policy exception
to the doctrine of lew loci delicti] will be
applied[.}” Paul, 177 W.Va. at 484 n.14, 352
S.E.2d.at 556 n14, For these reasons, we
conclude that the MLP’s application of the
public policy exception to the doctrine of lex
loci delicti was clearly erroneous in this case.
Accordingly, under Ohio’s Mixed Dust Stat-
ute, Petitioners’ motion to dismiss should
have been granted as to, these twelve NWDC
Plaintiffs,

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we grant the requested writ
and remand with directions that as to the
claims of the NWDC Plaintiffs, Petitioners’
motion to dismiss be granted,

Writ Granted,

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and
reserves the right'to file a separate opinion.

Justice Ketchum, concurring:

Defendants American Electric’ Power
Company and Ohio Power Company (“power
companies”) have now sought relief in this
Court on two issues, ie, forum non .conve-
niens ‘and West Virginia publie policy. How-
ever, the crucial issue in this case is whether
a West Virginia court has. personal jurisdic-
tion over the power companies for their al-
leged torts committed in Ohio, Before this
case proceeds any further, it should be deter-
mined if West Virginia courts have personal
jurisdiction over the power companies for
their alleged torts committed in Ohio,

The power companies allegedly are not
incorporated in West Virginia and do not
have their principal place of business in West
Virginia, Further, the alleged torts and inju-

1, BNSF Ry. Co, v. Tyrrell, — US. —, 137
S.Ct. 1549, 198 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187
L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), See also, State ex rel. Ford
Motor Co. v. McGraw, 237 W.Va. 573, 788 S.E.2d
319 (2016). The U.S, Supreme Court also heard
argument on another personal jurisdiction case
in May 2017 styled Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.

ries did not occur in West Virginia. There-
fore, under yery recent United States Su-
preme Court cases, West Virginia’s courts
may not have personal jurisdiction over the
power companies!

The United: States Supreme Court has
made it clear that the due process clause
does. not permit a state to haul an out-of-
state corporation before its courts when: 1)
the corporation is not “at home” in the state;
and 2) the episode-in-suit occurred out of
state, Specifically, the Supreme Court stated,
“{olur precedent, however, explains that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
does not permit a state to hale an out-of-
state corporation before its courts when the
corporation is not ‘at home’ in the state and
the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.” ?

Therefore, there are two ways a state can
obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-
state corporation. First, a state may obtain
personal jurisdiction over a corporation if it
is “at home” in the state. This is called
general jurisdiction, A corporation is “at
home” in a state if it is the corporation’s
place of incorporation or its principal place of
business. However, in an exceptional case, a
corporation’s operation in a foreign state may
be so substantial as to render the corporation
“at home” in the foreign state.

A state may also obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state corporation if the
corporation elects to do business in the state,
these activities result in a cause of action
occurring in the state, and the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable,
‘This is called specific jurisdiction.

In the instant case, it appears the issue of
personal jurisdiction has not been explored.
In my opinion, personal jurisdiction should
be determined before this case proceeds any
further. Nevertheless, I agree with the ma-

California, Case ’No. 16-466, An opinion is ex-

pected in June 2017,

2. BNSF Railway, supra, 137 S.Ct. at 1554.
3. BNSF Railway, supra, 137 §,Ct, at 1558,

4, Daimler ¥: State ex rel. Ford Motor Co., supra.

&

jority opinion on the limited issue raised in
this case.

801 S.E.2d 496

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
BOARD, Petitioner

Y

Kevin C. DUFFY, a suspended member
of The West Virginia State Bar,
Respondent.

Nos. 16-0181 & 16-0614
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: April 18, 2017 :
Fil june 15, 2017

Renée V. Frymyer, Esq., Lawyer Disci-
plinary Counsel, Office of Disciplinary ‘Coun-
sel, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for
the Petitioner

Kevin C. Duffy, Pro Se, Clay, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for the Respondent

Walker, Justice:

This lawyer disciplinary proceeding arises
from charges filed by the Petitioner, the
Lawyer Disciplinary Board (“Board”) against,
the Respondent, Kevin C. Duffy (Mr. Duf-
fy”), a lawyer currently suspended, pursuant,
to two consolidated statements of charges,
The charges relate to Mr. Duffy’s represen-
tation of clients in sexual assault and sexual
abuse and child abuse and neglect proceed-
ings, unprofessional and inappropriate inter-
action with persons involved in his lengthy
and contentious divorce proceedings, and
inisdemeanor theft and drunken driving
charges in Ohio.

The Board’s Hearing Panel Subcommittee
(“HPS”) recommended that this Court adopt
the jointly proposed findings of fact and con-
clusions of law by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (“ODC”) and Mri Duffy as to the
numerous violations of the West’ Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct, which will be
discussed in detail below. The HPS also rec-
ommended adoption of the jointly proposed
1. Most generally used in treatment programs

such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics

Anonymous, Twelve-Step Programs are a com-
monly recommended treatment modality that

485

recommendations as to discipline with two
modifications. The jointly proposed sanctions
included 1) a three-month suspension served
retroactively from the date of Mr. Duffy’s
current temporary suspension, 2) an auto-
matic reinstatement followed by two years of
supervised practice, 3) regular attendance at
12-step program! meetings with written
proof provided to the ODC, and 4) payment
of costs.

The HP§’s suggested modifications to the
joint recommendations were that Mr. Duffy
be required to apply for reinstatement and
that the ODC and Mr. Duffy work with the
West Virginia Lawyer Assistance Program
(“LAP”) to develop a detailed plan and ac-
countability schedule so that he may receive
the full spectrum of support, which the HPS
concluded he needed to avoid recidivism.

The ODC filed a consent letter with this
Court agreeing to the suggested modifica-
tions to the joint’ recommendations as to
discipline, Mr. Duffy did not file an objection.
In our order dated January 4, 2017, we noti- -
fied the parties that the Court did not coneur
with the recomniendations of the HPS and
scheduled the matters for oral argument.

_Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and arguments, the submitted record and
pertinent authorities, this Court finds that
there is clear and convincing evidence to
support the HPS’s recommendations regard-
ing the violations of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct. We concur with the
recommended sanctions of 1) petition for re-
instatement, 2) referral to the LAP and 8)
payments of costs. However, for the reasons
explained below, we suspend Mr. Duffy’s li-
cense to practice law for twelve months ret-
roactively to June 2, 2016, the date of Mr.
Duffy’s temporary suspension: pursuant to
this Court’s order in ODC v. Diiffy, 287 W.
Va, 295, 787 S.H.2d 566 (2016).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND.

: Mr. Duffy is a suspended lawyer who prac-

tices in Clay County, West Virginia. Mr.

outlines a course of action for coping with alco-
hol and drug addiction as well as other behavior-
al issues.

486

Duffy was admitted to the West Virginia
State Bar on November 20, 1996. The mat-
ters before us involve two disciplinary. pro-
ceedings that have been consolidated for pur-
poses of disposition.

A, Matter No. 16-0181

HM Count I relates to Mr. Duffy's repre-
sentation of Charles R. Emerson who was
convicted of first-degree sexual assault and
first-degree sexual abuse. Mr. Duffy appeal-
ed his client’s convictions, which this Court
affirmed in State v. Emerson, No. 13-0571,
2014 WL 1672953 (W. Va. April 25, 2014)
(memorandum. decision). Thereafter, Mr.
Emerson filed a complaint with the ODC
alleging that Mr. Duffy failed to forward his
case file so that he could petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. In response to the complaint,
the ODC directed Mr. Duffy by letter dated
August 28, 2014, to provide a copy of the
complete file to Mr. Emerson within twenty
days and to provide the ODC with verifica-
tion that he had complied with the directive.
Nearly one month later, Mr. Emerson again
notified the ODC that he never received his
file. Mr. Duffy also never provided the ODC
with verification that he had followed
through with its directive of August 28, 2014.

The ODC opened the complaint and sent
Mr. Duffy a letter dated October 15, 2014,
providing him with a copy of Mr. Emerson’s
complaint and requesting a response within
twenty days. Again, Mr. Duffy did not re-
spond. On December 18, 2014, the ODC sent
another letter, this time sent certified, mail
with return receipt requested, directing Mr.
Duffy to file a response by January 5, 2015,
and advising him that failing to do so could
result in the ODC issuing a subpoena requir-
ing Mr. Duffy to appear for a sworn state-
ment. Mr. Duffy signed for the certified let-
ter on December 23, 2014.

Once again, Mr. Duffy did not file a veri-
fied response to the complaint of Mr. Emer-
son. Therefore, the ODC issued a subpoena
on March 4, 2015, for Mr. Duffy to appear on
April 21, 2015 to give a sworn statement. Mr.
Duffy appeared and provided a verified, writ-
2. Rule 8.1(b) provides “[a] lawyer in connection

with ... a disciplinary matter shall not ...
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for

ten response to Mr. Emerson’s complaint,
over five months past its original due date,
explaining that he had provided a copy of the
complete file to Mr, Emerson’s current coun-
sel and that Mr. Emerson instructed numer-
ous times that while he was incarcerated, Mr.
Duffy was not to send him any items related
to his conviction out of fear for his safety.
Mr. Duffy also stated that the handwriting in
the complaint was not Mr. Emerson’s hand-
writing.

When asked why he did not just file a
verified response to the October 15, 2014,
letter, Mr. Duffy answered under oath, “I
just can’t stand your office and [I was] just
being obnoxious to you. That’s my reason.”
Mr, Duffy explained that he was angry that
his malpractice insurance had increased be-
cause of other pending ethics complaints
docketed by the ODC that he felt were frivo-
lous. With respect to resolution of the com-
plaint, Mr, Emerson later admitted that his
current attorney had his case file and that, at
one point, he had instructed Mr. Duffy not to
send his case file to him in prison.

However, because of his repeated failure to
respond to numerous lawful requests for in-
formation by the ODC, the Investigative
Panel (“IP”) charged Mr. Duffy with violat-
ing Rule 8.1(b)? of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct.

HE sCount II arises from Mr. Duffy's
representation of Glen W. Tanner in a child
abuse and neglect case that resulted in the
termination of Mr, Tanner's parental rights
in July 2014. After the appeal period passed,
Mr, Tanner filed a complaint on October 9,
2014, alleging that Mr. Duffy failed to appeal
the decision to terminate his parental rights
as Mr. Tanner requested.

HM Exhibiting the same pattern of con-
duet as in the complaint of Mr. Emerson, Mr.
Duffy received a letter from the ODC direct-
ing him to contact Mr. Tanner and provide a
detailed update as to the status of his case
within ten days and then follow up with
written verification to the ODC that he had
complied with the directive. On November

information from ... discipliriary authority, ex-

cept that this rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”

12, 2014, Mr. Tanner complained that he had
not had any further contact with Mr. Duffy.
Similarly, the ODC had not received verifica-
tion from Mr. Duffy that he had complied
with its directive. The ODC opened a com-
plaint, and on December 12, 2014, the ODC
sent a letter to Mr. Duffy with a copy of Mr.
Tanner’s complaint and asked him to file a
response within twenty cays. Mr. Duffy did
not respond.

The ODC sent a second letter on January
15, 2015, this time sent certified mail with
return receipt requested, advising Mr. Duffy
to file a response within seven days or re-
ceive a subpoena to appear in person and
give a sworn statement. Mr. Duffy signed for
the certified letter on January 22, 2015. How-
ever, he did not file a response to the com-
plaint. As in the Emerson complaint, the
ODC issued the subpoena commanding Mr,
Duffy to appear on April 21, 2015. In his
sworn statement, Mr. Duffy said he failed to
respond because he thought he was getting
information about a different complaint, and
he did not read the correspondence from the
ODC, As he had previously stated, “I just
ean’t stand your office and [I was] just being
obnoxious to you,” when asked to explain his
failure to respond.

Mr. Duffy defended his representation of
Mr. Tanner asserting that Mr. Tanner lost
his parental rights becanse of his own failure
to pass multiple drug screens, his repeated
failure to attend hearings, and his prior crim-

3. The Rules of Professional Conduct were
amended and took effect in January 2015. All
references herein to the Rules of Professional
Conduct are made to those in effect at the time of
the violation,

4, Rule 1.2(a) provides “[a] lawyer shall abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and
(©), and shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to
accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the
client's decision, after consultation with the law-
yer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive
jury trial and whether the client will testify.”

5. Rule 1.3 provides “[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in repre-
senting a client.”

6. Rule 1.4 provides:

487

inal convictions for manslaughter, grand lar-
ceny and multiple misdemeanors. Mr. Duffy
did not believe there was any good faith basis
for an appeal, but he did not communicate
that to Mr, Tanner and did not attempt to
withdraw as counsel. Moreover, he did not
seek informal advice from the ODC regard-
ing his obligation to file an appeal on behalf
of a client in an abuse and neglect matter.

The IP charged Mr. Duffy with four viola-
tions of the West Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ® as a result of this complaint.
The first was a violation of Rule 1.2(a) (scope
of representation) * because Mr. Duffy failed
to abide by Mr. Tanner's decisions concern-
ing the objectives of the representations re-
lating to filing the appeal that raised argua-
ble points of error. Second, the IP charged
Mr. Duffy with a violation of Rule 1.3(dili-
gence) ° because he failed to file the appeal
on behalf of Mr. Tanner or withdraw as his
lawyer. The third violation was of Rule 1.4
(communication) ® because Mr. Duffy failed
to respond to Mr. Tanner’s requests for in-
formation and failed to explain to Mr. Tanner
the reason that he did not file Mr. Tanner’s
appeal. Fourth, the IP charged that Mr. Duf-
fy violated Rule 8.1(b)7 for failing to respond
to the ODC’s lawful request for information.’

B. Matter No. 16-0614,

Hl Mc. Duffy was arrested for theft and
driving under the influence of alcohol or

“(@) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the repre-
sentation.”

7. See supra, n.2.

8. This disciplinary matter originally included
four counts in the Statement of Charges filed on
February 22, 2016. In its “Stipulations Regard-
ing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation as to Discipline,” the ODC de-
clined to pursue the violations as charged in
Counts III and IV. Both of these counts related
to complaints of vulgar and inappropriate tele-
phone calls and emails in 2015 with health care
professionals involved in Mr. Duffy's lengthy and
contentious divorce proceeding.

488

drugs in the state of Ohio on February 5,
2016. On that day, he attempted to purchase
beer at a convenience store, but the clerk
refused to let him make the purchase, Rather
than leave, he took the beer and other mer-
chandise and drove off. The convenience
store employee called the police and reported
the theft by an intoxicated man. The police
stopped Mr. Duffy at a traffic light down the
road and identified him as the person report-
ed by the convenience store employee, The
police took Mr. Duffy to the hospital and
released him on his own recognizance for
medical treatment, However, the police is-
sued him a citation that included a summons
to appear in municipal court for a hearing on
February 9, 2016. The summons also includ-
ed an order suspending Mr, Duffy’s right to
drive, When Mr. Duffy failed to appear, a
Capias with Bond Order was issued on Feb-
ruary 11, 2016, commanding any police offi-
cial or sheriff to immediately take Mr. Duffy
to answer for the charges against him. The
next day, Mr, Duffy voluntarily appeared in
the municipal court. He pled guilty to the
misdemeanor offenses of operating a vehicle
while intoxicated and disorderly’ conduct, As
a result, Mr. Duffy was fined, sentenced to
one year of probation and assessed court
costs,

HM In a letter dated February 17, 2016,
Circuit Judge Alsop reported to the ODC
that Mr. Duffy represented two clients in
separate felony cases in Clay County and
that between January 19, 2016, and February
8, 2016, he failed to appear for every hearing,
seven in total, scheduled in those two cases,
Judge Alsop also reported that Mr. Duffy
initially said he failed to appear because he
was ill, and then later said that his vehicle
had broken down. Mr, Duffy failed to men-

9, Rule 1.1 provides [a] lawyer shall: provide
competent representation to a client, Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge,
‘skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”

10. See supra, 0,3.

11, Rule 3.2 provides “[a] lawyer shall make rea~
soriable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
‘with the interest of the client,”

12. Rule 8,4(b) provides “[iJt is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to: ... commit a criminal

tion to Judge Alsop that he was arrested on
February 5, 2016, for theft and driving under
the influence of alcohol and that he failéd to
appear before the municipal court on Febru-
ary 9, 2016 in violation of a lawfully issued
summons. Judge Alsop subsequently re-
moved: Mr. Duffy from these two felony
eases. Further, on March 1, 2016, Judge Al-
sop entered an Order Removing Attorney
From Appointed Counsel Panel, which re-
moved Mr, Duffy from the approved list of
court-appointed panel counsel for indigent
defendants until further order of the court.

The ODC then filed a petition pursuant to
Rule 3.27 of the West Virginia Rules of Disci-
plinary Procedure. In its petition, the ODC
alleged that Mr, Duffy’s unethical conduct
posed a substantial threat of irreparable
harm to the public. After a hearing, this
Court suspended Mr, Duffy’s license pending
the outcome of formal charges.

Based upon the delay of the felony cases in
Clay County and the criminal behavior in
Ohio, the .IP charged Mr. Duffy with the
violation of five of the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct. They include Rule 1.1
(competence),’ Rule 1.3.(diligence),! Rule 3.2
(expediting litigation), Rule 8.4(b) (criminal
act)? and Rule 8.4(d) (prejudice to adminis-
tration of justice).8 The ODC declined to-
pursue a charge that Mr. Duffy violated Rule
8.4(c) (dishonesty).

C. HPS Hearing

The HPS held a hearing on the charges in _
the consolidated matters on August 80, 2016,
Mr. Duffy was the only witness who testified,
The ODC and Mr, Duffy submitted a Joint
Exhibit entitled “Stipulations Regarding
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law™ and

act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's hones-
ty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects [.]”

13. Rule 8,4(d) provides “[iJt is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to: engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice,”

14. The findings of fact and conclusions of law
recite the factual allegations and the violations of
the rules set forth in the Statement of Charges
for the consolidated matters.

Recommendation as to Discipline,” (“Joint
Stipulations”) which the HPS admitted into
evidence without objection. Specifically, the
joint recommendations as to discipline were:

1) That Mr. Duffy’s law license be sus-
pended for a period of three months,
served retroactively based upon the Su-
preme’Court’s Order of June 2, 2016,
which immediately suspended Mr. Duffy’s
license ‘to. practice law pending the out-
come of formal disciplinary charges;

2) That upon automatic reinstatement
pursuant to 3.31 of the Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedure, Mr. Duffy’s prac-
tice be supervised for a period of two years
by an attorney agreed upon by the ODC
and Mr. Duffy;

8) That Mr, Duffy be required: to regu-
larly attend twelve-step program meetings

- and provide the ODC with proof of the
attendance in writing; and

4) That Mr, Duffy be required to pay the
costs of thé disciplinary proceedings pursu-
ant to Rule 8.15 of the Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedure,

On October 31, 2016, the Board filed its
recommendations to this Court as set forth in
the “Report of the Hearing Panel Subcom-
mittee” (“Report”). In the Report, the HPS
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions
of law in the Joint Stipulation without modifi-
cation, Thus, the HPS recommended that
this Court also adopt the facts relating to the
complaints and the criminal conduct of Mr.
Duffy and the conclusions regarding the re-
sulting violations of the West Virginia Rules
of Professional Conduct.

The HPS undertook a review of Mr. Duf-
fy’s misconduct pursuant to Rule 3.16 of the
Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure and
concluded that Mr. Duffy had breached a
duty to clients, the public; the legal system,
and the profession by virtue of his conduct
and had acted intentionally and knowingly in
doing so. Further, the HPS found that his
misconduct.caused harm to his clients due to
his lack of diligent representation and also to
the legal system in relation to his lack of
cooperation with the ODC. Likewise, the
HPS identified the following mitigating fac-
tors: (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive; (2) personal or emotional problems

489

connected to Respondent's ‘divorce; (8) full
and free. disclosure to disciplinary board; (4)
interim rehabilitation by way of outpatient
therapy-and alcohol education classes; and (5)
remorse. On the other hand, the HPS also
noted that his prior discipline as recently as
October 26, 2018 under Rules 1.8 and 1.4 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct was an
aggravating factor.

‘After considering the mitigating and ag-
gravating factors and reviewing the joint
stipulations regarding the recommendation
as to discipline, the HPS suggested two mod-
ifications. The HPS suggested that Mr. Duffy
seek reinstatement of his license pursuant to
Rule 3.82 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplin-
ary Procedure instead of automatic reinstate-
ment since his temporary suspension had
already exceeded the three-month maximum
suspension permitted for automatic reinstate-
ment under Rule 3.81 of those rules, Next,
the HPS suggested that Mr. Duffy be re-
ferred to the LAP since the availability of 12-
step meetings or other services in his rural
county was very limited. The HPS felt
strongly that Mr. Duffy could benefit from
working with the LAP to “develop a detailed
plan and accountability schedule so [Mr. Duf-
fy] can receive the full spectrum of support
which we think he clearly needs to avoid
recidivism.” The HPS acknowledged that this
suggestion is broader than what the ODC
recommended but noted that it “consider[ed]
it necessary for [Mr. Duffy] in continuing to
deal with his family and child custody issues,
his practice and with the public.”

Although the ODC filed its consent to the
modifications by letter dated November 4,
2016, and Mr. Duffy did not file an objection
to the Report, this Court does not concur
with all recommendations made by the HPS.
We will address our objections tothe recom-
mendations in turn,

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
HN We review the recommendations of
the HPS in lawyer disciplinary proceedings
under the following standards:
A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the
[Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to ques-

490

tions of law, questions of application of the
~ law to the facts, and questions of appropri-

ate sanctions; this Court gives respectful

consideration to the [Board’s] recommen-
dations while ultimately exercising its own
independent judgment. On the other hand,
substantial deference is given to the
[Board’s] findings of fact, unless such find-
ings are not supported by reliable, proba-
tive, and substantial evidence on the whole
record,
Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal Ethics v.
McCorkle, 192 W. Va. 286, 452 S.E.2d 3877
(1994),

Hl With respect to any disciplinary ac-
tion to be taken for violations of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct,
“(tlhis Court is the final arbiter of legal
ethics problems and must make the ultimate

- decisions about public reprimands, suspen-
sions or annulments of attorneys’ licenses to
practice law.” Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on Legal
Ethics v. Blair, 174 W. Va. 494, 827 S.E.2d
671 (1984),

Hs I» exercising this authority, we re-
main aware that “this Court must consider
not only what steps would appropriately pun-
ish the respondent attorney, but also wheth-
er the discipline imposed is adequate to serve
as an effective deterrent to other members of
the Bar and at the same time restore public
confidence in the ethical standards of the
legal profession.” Syl. Pt. 8, Committee on
Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W. Va. 150, 358
S.E.2d 234 (1987). Mindful of these stan-
dards, we turn to the case before us.

Il. DISCUSSION

HM “‘Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedure, effective July 1,
1994, requires the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel to prove the allegations of the for-
mal charge by clear and convincing evidence.’
Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd.
v. McGraw, 194 W. Va. 788, 461 S.E.2d 850
(1995).” Syl. Pt. 8, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd.
v. Nessel, 234 W. Va. 695, 769 S.H.2d 484
(2015).

15. Mr. Duffy does, however, contest the HPS
recommendation that he be required to apply for

In this case, this standard is easily met
because Mr. Duffy does not contest-that he
violated the provisions as found by the HPS.
He acknowledges that the findings of fact
and conclusions of law are correct, sound,
and fully supported by reliable, probative
and substantial evidence and has accepted
the HPS recommendations.® We have dis-
eussed that “[iJn the absence of arguments
contrary to the HPS’s findings, this Court
will not disturb the underlying determination
that [the attorney] violated various provisions
of the West Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct.” Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Con-
ner, 234 W. Va. 648, 655, 769 S.E.2d 25, 33
(2015); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunning-
ham, 195 W. Va. 27, 34-85, 464 S.E.2d 181,
188-89 (1995) (“The burden is on the attor-
ney at law to show that the factual findings
are not supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole adjudicato-
ry record made before the Board.”) (internal
citation omitted). Thus, our analysis is limit-
ed to the propriety of the recommended
sanctions.

A, Suspension of Mr. Duffy’s License to
Practice Law

HM The HPS recommended that Mr.
Duffy’s license be suspended for a period of
three months, to be applied retroactively to
include his period of suspension from the
date of our order temporarily suspending his
license pursuant to Rule 3.27 of the Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure. In determin-
ing whether a particular sanction is appropri-
ately tailored to an attorney’s misconduct, we
rely upon Syllabus Point 4 of Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel v. Jordan, 204 W. Va. 495,
518 S.H.2d 722 (1998):

Rule 3.16 of the West Virginia Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure enumer-
ates factors to be considered in imposing
sanctions and provides as follows: “In im-
posing a sanction after a finding of lawyer
misconduct, unless otherwise provided in
these rules, the [West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals] or [Lawyer Disciplinary
Board] shall consider the following factors:

reinstatement.

(1) whether the lawyer has violated a duty
owed to a client, to the public, to the legal
system, or to the profession; (2) whether
the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly,
or negligently; (8) the amount of the actual
or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s
misconduct; and (4) the existence of any
aggravating or mitigating factors.”
Syl. Pt. 4, Jordan. Our analysis of these
factors is grounded in the notion that “attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings are primarily
designed to protect the public, to reassure it
as to the reliability and integrity of attorneys
and to safeguard its interest in the adminis-
tration of justice[.]’ Committee on Légal
Ethics v. Keenan, 192 W. Va. 90, 94, 450
S.E.2d 787, 791 (1994). This Court considers
these factors on a case-by-case basis in de-
termining appropriate sanctions:

In disciplinary proceedings, this Court,
rather than endeavoring to establish a uni-
form standard of disciplinary action, will
consider the facts and circumstances in
each case, including mitigating facts and
circumstances, in determining what disci-
plinary action, if any, is appropriate, and
when the [Lawyer Disciplinary Board] ini-
tiates proceedings before this Court, it has
a duty to advise this Court of all pertinent
facts with reference to the charges and the

. recommended disciplinary action. .
Syl. Pt. 2, Committee on Legal Ethics of the
West Virginia State Bar v. Mullins, 159 W.
Va. 647, 226 S,E.2d 427, 428 (1976), overruled
on other grounds by Committee on Legal
Ethics v. Cometti, 189 W. Va. 262, 480 S.E.2d
820 (1998),

HM After a thorough review of the rec-

- ord, we find that Mr. Duffy’s conduct, consid-
ered under the Jordan factors, warrants a
suspension of twelve months rather than
three months as recommended by the HPS.
Relating to the first Jordan factor, Mr. Duffy
stipulated that he had breached duties owed
to his clients, to the public, and to the legal
profession. He owed his clients duties of dili-
gence, communication and loyalty, and
breached those duties by failing to promptly
address a client’s right to appeal and by
failing to attend his clients’ hearings. Mr.
Duffy likewise breached duties owed to the
public and to the legal profession by engag-

491

ing in criminal conduct and in his refusal to
cooperate with the ODC. Second, the parties
stipulated that Mr. Duffy’s conduct was
knowing and intentional—the most culpable
mental states. See In re Hernandez, 46 So.8d
1244 (La. 2010) (stating attorney knowingly
and intentionally violated duties owed to pub-
lic, legal system, and legal profession by
failing to appear in court on several occasions
and failing to cooperate with ODC). Third,
we find there is ample basis to support the
ODC’s finding that Mr. Duffy’s conduct
caused harm. Mr. Duffy adversely affected
his clients by failing to attend hearings on
their behalf and failing to respond -to his
client relating to an appeal. Likewise, Mr.
Duffy’s conduct toward the ODC and his
criminal conduct are harmful to the public
and to the legal profession. See In re Baer,
21 So.8d 941, 948 (La. 2009) (recognizing
“serious harm results when members of the
legal profession engage in criminal acts,
which give rise to a lack of confidence by
members of the public in those who are
officers of the court.”).

HE Regarding the fourth Jordan fac-
tor, we have explained that “[mlitigating fac-
tors in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding are
any considerations or factors that may justify
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be
imposed.” Syl. Pt. 2, Lawyer Disciplinary
Board v. Scott, 218 W. Va. 209, 579 S.E.2d
550 (2003). We have expounded on relevant
mitigating factors as follows:

Mitigating factors which may be consid-
ered in determining the appropriate sanc-
tion, to be imposed against a lawyer for
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct
include: (1) absence of a prior disciplinary
record; (2) absence of a dishonest or selfish
motive; (8) personal or emotional prob-
Jems; (4) timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; (5) full and free disclosure to
disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward proceedings; (6) inexperience in the
practice of law; (7) character or reputation;
(8) physical or mental disability or impair-
ment; (9) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(10) interim rehabilitation; (11) imposition
of other penalties or sanctions; (12) re-

492

morse; and (18) remoteness of prior of-

fenses.

Id, at Syl. Pt. 8. On the other hand, “[alg-
gravating factors in a lawyer disciplinary
proceeding are any considerations or factors
that may justify an increase in the degree of
discipline to be imposed.” Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
“The HPS and the parties concurred that
the following mitigating factors were present:
(1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(2) personal or emotional problems connected

* to Respondent’s divorce; (3) full and free
disclosure to disciplinary board; (4) interim
rehabilitation’ by way of outpatient therapy
and alcohol education classes; and (5) re-
morse. We find that the ODC properly iden-
tified several mitigating factors, not the least
of which is Mr. Duffy’s willingness to partici-
pate in substance abuse treatment.

As to aggravating factors, the HPS ac-
knowledged only that Mr. Duffy. had previ-
ously been subject to prior discipline for
violating Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct as: recently as October
26, 2018. However, we believe there are addi-
tional aggravating factors that warrant an
inerease in suspension, from three months to
twelve months, We are particularly troubled
by Mr. Duffy’s statements relating to his
disdain for the ODC as the source of his
refusal to respond to disciplinary complaints.
His conduct in this regard. was intentional,
knowing, and egregious. Further, his conduct
relating to the ODC was harmful to the
ODC’s ability to meaningfully review and
timely address complaints of clients. See Syl,
Pt. 1, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Martin,
187 W. Va. 840, 419 S,H.2d 4 (1992) (attorney
violates West Virginia Rule of Professional
Conduct 8.1(b) by failing to respond to re-
quests for information in connection with an
investigation of an ethiesy complaint). As a
self-regulated profession, lack of respect for
the administration of our ethical rules and
procedures is not to be taken lightly.

HM Likewise, we emphasize that Mr.
Duffy engaged in. serious criminal conduct.
Failure to abide by the law epitomizes a lack
of respect for the law and thereby diminishes
publie confidence in the legal profession. We

16, These mitigating factors are not to the exclu-
sion of others that may be present in a particular

acknowledge, howéver, that often such illegal
conduct stems from alcohol, drug or: other
addictions, Where an attorney is committed
to recovery from those addictions, the sanc-
tion levied may be moderated to reflect that
commitment. See In re Tribert, 843 S.C. 826,
540 S.H.2d 467 (2000) (noting attorney's com-
mitment to sobriety and participation in sub-
stance abuse treatment program relevant to
sanctions).

We find that a twelve-month suspension
retroactive to the initial order of suspension
entered on June 2, 2016 adequately accounts
for the seriousness of Mr. Duffy’s conduct
while also taking into consideration the emo-
tional turmoil of his divorce and his aleohol
addiction. We consider the facts and circum-
stances of each individual case rather than
attempting to establish uniform disciplinary
action, See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Ven-
eri, 206 W. Va, 384, 524 S.H.2d 900 (1999),
Still, a twelve-month ‘suspension and the oth-
er recommended sanctions are consistent
with our previous decisions in which attor-
neys engaged in illegal conduct, failed to
adequately represent their clients or declined
to cooperate with the ODC, See Lawyer Dis-
ciplinary Bd. v. Sturm, 237 W. Va. 115, 785
S.E.2d 821 (2016) (concurrent ninety-day sus-
pensions and two-year period ‘of supervisory
practice for rule violations relating to failure
to file an appeal and habeas petition on be-
half of clients, and failure to comply with the
ODC’s requests for information); Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd. v. Conrer, 234 W. Va. 648,
769 S.E.2d 25 (2015) (ninety-day suspension
and two-year period of supervisory practice
for failure to communicate with clients, file
an appeal or otherwise take action in cases,
and to comply with the ODC’s requests for
information); Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v, Alderman, 229 W. Va, 656, 784 S.E.2d 737
(2012) (one year retroactive suspension and
one-year suspension held in abeyance pend-
ing two years of supervised practice for two
misdemeanor criminal convictions relating to
drug charges); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v.
Roberts, 217 W. Va. 189, 617 S.E.2d 539
(2005); (public reprimand and supervised
practice for two years stemming from mis-
conduct in representing clients while under-
going medical treatment for pain); Office of

case, Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Scott, 213 W. Va.

at 214 n,33, 579 S.B,2d at 555 n.33,

Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Albers, 214
W. Va. 11, 585 S.E.2d 11 (2008) (five-month
suspension for assault, larceny, and harass-
ment).

Based on the totality of the cireumstances,
we believe a twelve-month suspension served
retroactively, in conjunction with the other
sanctions discussed herein, will best ensure
that Mr. Duffy’s misconduct will not recur.
We have previously permitted suspensions to
be applied retroactively. In Committee on
Legal Ethics v. White, 189 W. Va. 185, 428
§.E.2d 556 (1998), we discussed that retroac-
tive application of a suspension may be ap-
propriate in certain circumstances because it
“accounts for both the seriousness of [the]
crimes ... and the mitigating facts and cir-
cumstances of ... later behavior.” .White, 189
W. Va. at 140, 428 S.H.2d at 561. Likewise, in
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Alderman,
229 W. Va. 656, 784 S.E.2d 787 (2012), we
permitted a suspension to apply retroactively
where the attorney voluntarily ceased the
practice of law and entered into an addiction
program. Here, we find that Mr. Duffy has
demonstrated a willingness to _ participate
meaningfully in rehabilitation services and
the time he has already served on suspension
should be applied to the twelve-month sus-
pension. Further, because we find that a
twelve-month suspension is a more appropri-
ate sanction under the circumstances, Mr.
Duffy will be required to apply for'reinstate-
ment pursuant to Rule 3.32 of the Rules of
Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure; this rule re-
quires a person whose license has been sus-
pended for more than three months to peti-
tion the Court for reinstatement.

B. Referral to the Lawyer Assistance
Program —

The HPS recommended that Mr. Duffy

work with the LAP to develop a detailed plan

17, We note that this Court has proposed revi-
sions to the rules governing the Lawyer Assis-
tance Program. The ed rule revisions

+ opened for public comment to conclude on May
11, 2017, but are not yet effective as of the date
of this Opinion.

18, Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Lawyer Assis-
tance Program provides;
Any diversion or other program which requires
involvement of WVLAP in rehabilitative efforts
on the part of the lawyer that is a result. of an

493

and accountability schedule so ‘that he can
receive the necessary support to avoid re-
lapse and Mr. Duffy expressed his willing-
ness to- participate with the LAP. Use of this
-program furthers our goal of providing attor-
neys with personal and professional support
to combat impairing addictions. Where pro-
fessional misconduct arises from such addic-
tions, utilization of the LAP promotes and
monitors the attorney’s recovery from drug
and alcohol addictions and thereby serves to

“prevent recidivism.

Accordingly, Mr. Duffy will enter into a
contractual agreement with the LAP detail-
ing a plan for treatment and an accountabili-
ty schedule as 4 means to reduce the risk of
relapse. As part of this agreement, the ODC
will periodically confirm with the LAP that
Mr. Duffy is in compliance with his contrac-
tual agreement. Details relating to Mr. Duf-
fy’s treatment plan and progress will remain
confidential pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules
of the West Virginia Lawyer Assistance Pro-
gram 1” unless and until he petitions for rein-
statement, at which time such information
may be filed under seal for the sole. purpose
of considering his petition.!8 See In re Alex-
ander, 984 So.2d 702 (La. 2008) (suspending
attorney from practice of law for one year
and one day and directing attorney to exe-
cute a five-year recovery agreement with
LAP); Bd. of Professional Responsibility v.
Love, 256 8.W.3d 644 (Tenn. 2008) (reinstat-
ing suspended attorney's five-year contract
with LAP); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ault, 110
Ohio St.8d 207, 852 N.H.2d 727 (2006) (sus-
pending attorney from practice of law for
twelve months stayed on condition that he
complete a contract with LAP).

IV. CONCLUSION
This ‘Court has conducted a thorough re-
view of the record and concludes that the

agreement with the Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel or otherwise imposed by order of the Su-
preme Court of Appeals, shall govern the extent
and scope of confidentiality which may be assert-
ed by the lawyer. To the extent such agreement
and/or order may require WVLAP to violate a
confidentiality protection granted under these
rules, the order or agreement shall control and
any disclosure made pursuant thereto shall not
be deemed a breach of confidentiality otherwise
imposed by these rules.

494

findings of fact and conclusion of law of the
HPS are supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence. For those reasons,
we adopt the recommendations of the HPS
with the exception that Mr. Duffy be sus-
pended for twelve months, rather than the
recommended three-month suspension, Ac-
cordingly, this Court orders the following: (1)
Mr. Duffy is suspended from the practice of
law for twelve months, to be served retroac-
tively based upon this Court’s June 2, 2016
order; (2) Mr. Duffy will be required to apply
for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 3.82 of
the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure;
(8) if reinstated, Mr. Duffy’s practice will be
supervised for a period of two years by an
attorney agreed upon by the ODC and Mr.
Duffy; @) Mr. Duffy will immediately enter
into a contractual agreement with the LAP;
and (5) Mr. Duffy will be required to reim-
burse the Lawyer Disciplinary Board the
costs of this disciplinary proceeding pursuant
to Rule 3.15 of the Rules of Lawyer Disci-
plinary Procedure.

Law license suspended and other sanctions

imposed.

801 S.E.2d 509
QUICKEN LOANS, INC., Petitioner
ve

Marsha Gale WALTERS, administratrix
FOR Sue WALTERS, Respondent

No. 16-0298

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 19, 2017
Filed: June 16, 2017

496

1, The parties variously designate the statute the
“dlegal loan” statute and the “appraisal statute,”
and both terms are used in this opinion depend-
ing on context,

Jeffrey J, Bresch, Esq, JONES DAY,
Pittsburgh, PA

Carrie Goodwin Fenwick, Esq., GOOD-
WIN & GOODWIN, LLP, Charleston, WV,
Counsel for Petitioner

Sarah K. Brown, Esq., Bren Pomponio,
Esq, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE,
Charleston, WV, Counsel for Respondent.

WALKER, Justice:

Following a five-day trial in the Cireuit
Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, a
jury found that Petitioner Quicken Loans,
Ine. (“Quicken Loans”) violated the “illegal
Joan”. provision of the West Virginia Residen-
tial Mortgage Lender, Broker and Servicer
Act, West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8)! in
originating a primary mortgage loan for Re-
spondent Sue Walters * and was liable to Ms,
Walters for damages in the amount of
$27,000.00. The jury found in favor of Quick-
en Loans on Ms. Walters’s claim of fraud,
and further found that Quicken Loans had
not acted with malice.

Significantly, for purposes of this appeal,
Ms. Walters had earlier settled her claims
against co-defendants Kirk Riffe, an apprais-
er, and Bank of America N.A. (“BOA”), the

2, Ms, Walters died during the pendency of this
appeal, and this Court granted leave to substitute
Marsha Gale Walters, administratrix, as party
respondent,

entity that sérviced the subject loan, for
$75,000.00 and $28,000.00, respectively. Of
these amounts, a total of $65,500.00 was des-
ignated to be paid to Ms. Walters or on her
behalf, and $82,500.00 was designated as pay-
ment of attorney fees. In post-trial proceed-
ings, the court below offset the settlement
amounts designated to be paid to Ms. Wal-
ters against the $27,000.00 in. damages
awarded by the jury. Subsequently, in con-
sidering Ms. Walters’s request for an award
of attorney fees and costs, the court offset
the settlement amounts designated as attor-
ney fees against the fees sought by Ms.
Walters’s counsel. Thus, in total the court
offset. only $59,500.00 of the $98,000.00 paid
by the settling defendants, against the total
damages, costs and fees awarded against
Quicken Loans. .

In this appeal, Quicken Loans contends
that the circuit court erred in allowing the
illegal loan claim to go to the jury, arguing
that W. Va. Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) applies
only where there are two or more mortgages
on the property and the aggregate -principal
amount of the mortgage loans exceeds the
property's fair market value. Quicken Loans
‘also contends that the court erred in award-

ing any attorney fees, arguing that-Ms. Wal- .

ters did not prevail because the jury’s verdict
was effectively wiped out by application of
the offset. Alternatively, Quicken Loans ar-
gues that the award of attorney fees cannot
be sustained under the principles articulated
in this Court’s seminal decision in Aetna
Casualty & Swrety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va.
190, 842 S.H.2d 156 (1986), Finally, Quicken
Loans argues that the court erred in offset-
ting only a portion of the settlement monies
received from appraiser Riffe and BOA
against the total compensatory damages re-
ceived by Ms. Walters, which damages in-
clude attorney fees and costs.

After careful review of the parties’ briefs
and arguments, the Appendix. Record, and
the applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. .

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In the sumimer of 2007, Ms. Walters called
Quicken Loans seeking to refinance the ex-

497

isting mortgage loan on her home in Mab-
scott, Raleigh County, West Virginia. Ms,
‘Walters, who was responding to a Quicken
Loans advertisement, was interested-in ob-
taining a lower interest rate and a lower
mortgage payment,

. On September 14, 2007, Quicken Loans
originated a fixed-rate, 30-year mortgage
loan in the’ amount of $186,000.00. As part of
the loan approval process, Quicken Loans
had contacted Title Source Inc, an entity
described by Quicken Loans as “a related but
independent company,” which in turn con-
tracted with Kirk Riffe, a licensed appraiser,
In performing the appraisal, Mr, Riffe com-
pared Ms. Walters’s Mabscott home to prop-
erties in the. Woodlawn neighborhood of
Beckley, concluding that the home was worth
$152,000.00. In fact, evidence at trial indicat-
ed that the fair market value of the property
in September, 2007, was $64,000.00, and that
Mr. Riffe’s appraisal methodology \ was ‘atally
flawed.

As of the date of closing of the Quicken.
Loans loan, no other mortgage loans existed
on Ms. Walters’s home; the purpose of the
loan was to refinance her existing mortgage
obligation, ie, to pay off the existing mort-
gage loan and replace it with a loan carrying
a lower rate of interest. -

Immediately after originating the Joan,
Quicken Loans sold it to Countrywide Finan-
cial, which in turn. sold it to BOA, Ms. Wal-
ters made regular payments on the loan for
approximately twenty months, after which
she found herself in financial difficulty and
attempted, unsuccessfully, to work out a
modification with BOA.

Thereatter, in December, 2011, Ms. Wal-
ters filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans,
Riffe and BOA, asserting three claims
against Quicken Loans (unconscionable in-
ducement, illegal loan, ‘and fraud), two
against Riffe (negligence and acceptance of a
fee contingent on a predetermined conelu-
sion), and one against BOA (illegal debt col-
lection practice). In -its answer, Quicken
Loans admitted certain allegations, including,
of relevance to this appeal, the principal
amount of the loan. Further, Quicken Loans

498

asserted affirmative defenses, including, of
relevance to this appeal, that it had made the
loan to Ms. Walters on reliance upon a bona
fide written appraisal of the property made
by Kirk Riffe, an independent third-party
appraiser duly licensed or certified by the
West Virginia Real Estate Appraiser Licens-
ing and Certification Board, and prepared in
compliance with the uniform standards of
professional appraisal practice. Finally,
Quicken Loans filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, arguing that Ms. Walters’s
illegal loan claim failed as a matter of law
because the statute on which the claim was
based, West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8),
applies only where there are two or more
mortgages on the property whose aggregate
total exceeds the property's fair market val-
ue,

The case was hotly contested for more
than three years, The docket sheet for the
litigation evidences voluminous written dis-
covery, multiple dispositive motions, motions
in limine, multiple hearings on motions, sev-
eral court-led mediations, a motion to exclude
“pattern and practice” witnesses and an evi-
dentiary hearing on the motion, and the like.
Ultimately, as noted above, Ms. Walters set-
tled with Mr. Riffe and BOA and dismissed
her claim against Quicken Loans for uncon-
scionable inducement, deeming it duplicative.
On March 2, 2015, Ms. Walters’s case against
Quicken Loans proceeded to trial on the two
remaining claims (illegal loan, and fraud),
resulting in a finding for Ms. Walters on the
illegal loan claim, a finding for Quicken
Loans on the fraud claim, and a finding that
Quicken Loans had not acted with malice, As
noted, the jury awarded Ms. Walters
$27,000.00 in compensatory damages. In light
of its finding on the fraud claim, the jury did
not address the issue of punitive damages.

In post-trial proceedings, Quicken Loans
filed a motion to correct the verdict pursuant
to Rule 60(a) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, requesting that the circuit
court apply an offset of the Riffe/BOA settle-
ment monies as follows: $27,000.00 to be off-
set against the jury’s award of damages, and
the remaining $71,000.00 to be offset against

3. The $50,000.00 attributed as damages in the
Riffe settlement was not paid directly to Ms.

any attorney fees that might be awarded to
Ms. Walters’s counsel. Ms. Walters, in turn,
filed a petition for an award of attorney fees,
seeking $180,312.55 in fees and costs for 675
hours of work. After requiring Ms. Walters’s
attorneys to refine their billing entries, in
order to allow the court to better distinguish
work done and costs incurred on claims
against settling defendants and claims in
which Ms, Walters did not prevail, and fol-
lowing a hearing on both outstanding mo-
tions, the court below ruled that Ms. Walters
had “suffered a single indivisible loss arising
from the combined actions of Defendant
Quicken Loans and the settling co-defen-
dants, Bank of America and Kirk Riffe ...
[and therefore] Defendant Quicken Loans is
entitled to an offset as a matter of law”; and
Ms. Walters prevailed on her claim based on
a violation of the appraisal statute “regard-
less of the dollar amount of damages actually
awarded...,” and therefore was entitled to
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

The court applied the offset not as Quicken
Loans had requested but as follows: (1) the
portion of the combined Riffe/BOA settle-
ments payable to Ms. Walters or on her
behalf ($65,500.00)? was offset against the
damages awarded by the jury against Quick-
en Loans, effectively wiping out the jury
award; and (2) the portion of the settlements
designated as attorney fees ($32,500.00) was
offset against the fees and costs sought from
Quicken Loans. The total amount of the fees
and costs awarded to Ms. Walters’s attorneys
by the court, after application of the offset,
was $156,653.38.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM It is well established in this Court’s
jurisprudence that “{w]here the issue on an
appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.L. v. Charlie
A.L., 194 W. Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

With respect to our review of an award of
costs and damages, we have held that:

‘Walters; rather, it was paid to reduce the balance
of her outstanding mortgage indebtedness.

“{Tyhe trial [court] ... is vested with a
wide discretion in determining the amount
of ... court costs and counsel fees; and the
trial [court’s] ... determination of such
matters will not be disturbed upon appeal
to this Court unless it clearly appears that
fit] has abused [its] discretion.” Syl. Pt. 8,
in part, Bond v. Bond, 144 W.Va. 478, 109
8.E.2d 16 (1959).

Syl. Pt. 1, Heldreth v. Rahimian, 219 W.Va.

462, 687 S.E.2d 359 (2006),

i, DISCUSSION

A. Applicability of West Virginia Code

§ 31-17-8(m)(8)

The first issue we consider is whether
West Virginia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8) applies
where, as here, the mortgage at issue is the
sole mortgage on the subject property.
Quicken Loans contends that by its express
terms, West Virginia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8)
applies only where there are two or more
mortgages on the property and the aggre-
gate principal amount of the mortgage loans
exceeds the property's fair market value. In
furtherance of its position, Quicken Loans
presents the relevant portion of the statute
as follows:

In making any primary or subordinate
mortgage loan, no licensee may, and no
primary or subordinate mortgage lending
transaction may, contain terms which: ...
(8) Secure a primary or subordinate mort-
gage loan in a principal amount that, when
added to the aggregate total of the out-
standing principal balances of all other
primary or subordinate mortgage loans
secured by the same property, exceeds
the fair market value of the property on
the date that the latest mortgage loan is
made. ... (Emphasis in Quicken Loans
brief)

Hl In reliance on the longstanding rule
of statutory construction “that significance
and effect must, if possible, be given to every
section, clause, word or part of the statute,”
Syl. Pt. 8, in part, Meadows v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc,, 207 W.Va. 203, 580 S.E.2d 676
4. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v.

Karl, 220 W.Va. 463, 477 n. 18, 647 S.E.2d 899,
913 n. 18 (2007) (“While federal court opinions

499

(1999), Quicken Loans argues that under the
clear and unambiguous terms of the empha-
sized language, a single mortgage loan, even
one in a principal amount that exceeds the
property’s fair market value, does not fall
within the statutory prohibition. Quicken
Loans points out that in Skibbe v. Accredited
Home Lenders, Ine., No. 2:08-cv-01898, 2014
WL 2117088 at *6 (S.D. W. Va. May 21,
2014), the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia so
held, and that this Court should find Judge
Goodwin’s opinion to be persuasive, if not
dispositive.*

In contrast, Ms. Walters contends that by
its express terms, West Virginia Code § 31-
17-8(m)(8) applies to any primary or second-
ary loan whose principal amount exceeds the
property’s fair market value. In furtherance
of her position, Ms. Walters presents the
relevant portion of the statute in her brief as
follows:

In making any primary or subordinate
mortgage loan, no licensee may, and no
primary or subordinate mortgage lending
transaction may, contain terms which: ...
(8) Secure a primary or subordinate mort-
gage loan in a principal amount that, when
added to the aggregate total of the out-
standing principal balances of all other pri-
mary or subordinate mortgage loans se-
cured by the same property, exceeds the
fair market value of the property on the
date that the latest mortgage loan is made.
... (Emphasis in Ms. Walters’s brief)

In reliance on the same rule of statutory
construction as set forth above, Ms. Walters
argues that literal application of the “aggre-
gate total” language would effectively elimi-
nate all primary loans, including consolida-
tion loans, from the statute’s ambit, as only
secondary loans are defined under the Act as
those “... subject to the lien of one or more
prior recorded mortgages or deeds of trust.”
‘W. Va. Code § 81-17-1(0). Ms. Walters fur-
ther suggests that in this case the “aggregate
total of the outstanding principal balances of
all other primary or subordinate mortgage
loans. ..,” equals zero, an attempt to finesse

applying West Virginia law are often viewed per-

suasively, we are not bound by those opinions.”),

500

Quicken Loans’s argument by focusing solely
on the amount of total indebtedness, not the
number of mortgages on the property.

“In short, we are presented with an inter-
esting situation in which both parties contend
that West Virginia Code -§ 31-17-8(m)@) is
clear and unambiguous—and then reasonably
argue, utilizing the same rule of statutory
construction, that the statutory provision has
two entirely irreconcilable clear and unam-
biguous meanings. On this basis alone it
might be tempting for this Court to conclude
that the statute is ambiguous, but our prece-
dents counsel against a rush to such-conelu-
sion. See Habursky v. Recht, 180 W.Va. 128,
182, 875 S,B.2d 760, 764 (1988) (disagreement
among the parties “as to the meaning or the
applicability of [a statutory] provision does
not of itself render [the] provision ambiguous
or of doubtful, uncertain or obscure mean-
ing.”) Gnternal quotations and citations omit-
ted); see also T. Weston, Inc. v, Mineral Cty.,
219 W.Va. 564, 568, 6838 S.E.2d 167, 171
(2006) (“[t}he fact that parties disagree about
the meaning of.a statute does not itself ere-
ate ambiguity or obscure meaning,”) (internal
citations omitted). Rather, we will look be-
yond the parties’ arguments, and their laser
focus on a single rule of statutory, construc-
tion, in order to determine whether our prec-
edents provide a path to a more enlightened
analysis.

As a threshold matter, we reject Ms. Wal-
ters’s claim that this issue was resolved in
Quicken Loans v. Brown, 230 W.Va. 306, 737
S.E.2d 640 (2012) (Quicken Loans I), either
directly or sub silentio. Although one count
of the complaint in Quicken Loans I alleged
a violation of West Virginia Code § 31-17-
8(m)(8) in the origination of a primary loan—
a consolidation loan, as in the instant case—
the trial court’s ruling that the statute ap-
plied to a single primary loan was not chal-
lenged on appeal. Rather, the illegal loan
count was raised on appeal only in the con-
text of whether the lower court erred in
finding that a negligent violation of the stat-
ute supported the remedy of cancellation of
the loan.® Quicken Loans I, 230 W.Va. at
825-26, 787 S.E.2d at 659-60. We found this

5. As in the instant case, in Quicken Loans I
Quicken Loans’s violation of W. Va, Code § 31-

ruling to be error. The remainder of the
Quicken Loans I decision dealt with issues
involving attorney fees and punitive dam-
ages, all. arising from the court’s findings
that Quicken Loans was liable. for common
Jaw fraud and various claims under the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act, West Virginia Code §§ 46A-1-1 through
8-102, Thus, whether the appraisal statute
applied to a single primary loan was neither
raised in the appeal nor material to its dispo-
sition,

Similarly, we reject Quicken Loans’s urg-
ing that we treat Judge Goodwin's ruling in
Skibbe as persuasive authority. Judge Good-
win held that “[by] its terms, the statute does
not apply when a borrower takes out her
first mortgage loan and the principal balance
of that loan exceeds the fair market value of
the property at the time the loan is made.
.«.” Skibbe, 2014 WL 2117088, at *6. Howev-
er, the district court provided no analysis to
support his reasoning, and cited no préce-
dents or other authority upon which he had
relied, and we do not find a bald conclusion
to be persuasive,

Hl As this Court has instructed on many
occasions, “‘[t]he primary rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the intention of the Legislature.’ Syl. Pt. 8,
Vest v. Cobb, 188 W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885
(1958).” Syl Pt. 1, Sheena H. for Russell H.
vu Amfire, LLC,. 285 W.Va. 182, 772 S.E.2d
817 (2015). More specifically, and of particu-
lar relevance to this case, we have held that
“fwlhere a particular construction of a stat-
ute would result in an absurdity, some other
reasonable construction, which will not pro-
duce such absurdity, will be made.’ Syl. Pt. 2,
Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200
S.E. 350 (1988).” Syl. Pt. 8, Sheena H.

West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) is con-
tained in.Article 17, Section 8 of the WEST
VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
LENDER, BROKER AND SERVICER
ACT. W. Va. Code §§ 31-17-1 through -20
(2015). Article 17, Section 8 is entitled Maxi-
mum interest rate on subordinate loans;
prepayment rebate; maximum points, fees

17-8(m)(8) had been found to be negligent, not
willful.

and charges; overriding of federal limita-
tions; limitations on lien documents; pro-
hibitions on primary and subordinate
mortgage loans; civil remedy; and consis-
tent with the tenor of this title language, all
of the Section 8 provisions fall within one or
both of two categories, restrictions on mort-
gage lenders, brokers and servicers, and
protections for borrowers. W.Va. Code
§§ 81-17-8, Section 8(m)(8) falls within the
former category: it is a restriction on a lend-
* evs ability to extend either a primary or
subordinate loan which, in lay terms, puts
the borrower “underwater” on his or her
mortgage indebtedness. The Legislature
enumerated only two defenses to this statu-
tory restriction, both very specific. The first
exception provides that ~
[flor purposes of this paragraph
[§ 8(m)(8)], a broker or lender may rely
upon a bona fide written appraisal of the
property made by an independent third-
party appraiser, duly licensed or certified
by the West Virginia Real Estate Apprais-
er Licensing and Certification Board and
prepared .in compliance with the uniform
standards of professional appraisal prac-
tice.
W.Va. Code § 81-17-8(m)(8), Pursuant to this
statutory exception, Quicken Loans asserted
as an affirmative defense that it had relied on
a bona fide written appraisal made by an
independent third-party appraiser, a cdaim
the jury necessarily rejected,

The second exception was set forth in the
statute as modified in the 2012 Regular Ses-
sion of the West Virginia Legislature, and
provides that

commencing January 1, 2012, and con-
tinuing until January 1, 2015, this prohi-
bition does not apply to any mortgage
modification or refinancing loan made jn
participation with and in compliance with
the federal Homes Affordable Modifica-
tion Program, a part of the federal Mak-
ing Home Affordable program, or any
_ other mortgage modification or refinanc-
ing loan funded through any other federal

6, In Acts 2016, c. 157, the Legislature rewrote
the proviso to delete the discrete time frame,

501
or state program or litigation settlement.

W.Va. Code § 81-17-8(m)(8)° It is beyond
dispute that this exception does not apply to
Ms. Walters’s loan, which was originated by
Quicken Loans in 2007.

In short, Chapter 81, Article 17, Section 8
of the West Virginia Code a8 a whole, and
§ 81-17-8(m)(8) in particular, evidence a leg-
islative intent to protect West Virginia home-
owners from predatory lending in its various
forms. The prohibition contained in the ap-
praisal statute is broad and the exceptions
are narrowly drawn. We cannot find, and
indeed cannot envision, any basis for conclud-

‘ing that the Legislature intended the statuto-

ry prohibition to extend only to second or
subsequent loans where, as here, it specifical-
ly included primary loans within the statute’s
ambit. In this regard, primary and subor-
dinate mortgage loans are defined in West
Virginia Code §§ 81-17-1(m) & (0) respec-
tively: oan

(m) “Primary mortgage loan” means any
loan’ primarily for personal, family or
household use that is secured -by a mort-
gage, deed of trust or other equivalent
consensual security interest on a dwelling
as defined in Section 103(w) of the Truth in
Lending Act or residential real estate upon
which is constructed or intended to be
constructed a dwelling.

eee

- (0) “Subordinate mortgage loan” means
any loan primarily for personal, family or
household use that is secured by a mort-
gage, deed of trust or other equivalent
consensual security interest on a dwelling
as defined in Section 103(w) of the Truth in
Lending Act or'residential real estate upon
which -is constructed or intended to be
constructed a dwelling and is subject to the

* lien of one or more prior recorded mort-
gages or deeds of trust.
W.Va. Code §§ 31-17-1(m) and (0) (emphasis
added),
It is readily apparent that if, as Quicken
Loans contends, the appraisal statute applies

which had expired.

502

only to loans “... in a principal amount that,
when added to the aggregate total of the
outstanding principal balances of all other
primary or subordinate mortgage loans ...
exceeds the fair market value of the proper-
ty...,” then the statute applies only to sub-
ordinate mortgage loans, since by definition
only subordinate mortgage loans are “sub-
ject to the lien of one or more prior recorded
mortgages or deeds of trust.” This would be
an absurd result, as the statute expressly
states, multiple times, that it applies, inter
alia, to primary mortgage loans and primary
mortgage loan transactions,

As noted above, “ ‘[w]here a particular con-
struction of a statute would result in an
absurdity, some other reasonable construc-
tion, which will not produce such absurdity,
will be made.’ Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Penny-
backer, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 850 (1938).”
Syl. Pt. 8, Sheena H.

Hl Accordingly, we hold that the provi-
sions of West Virginia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8)
apply to any primary or subordinate mort-
gage loan that exceeds the fair market value
of the property at the time the loan is made,
either singly, in the case of a first or consoli-
dation mortgage loan, or in combination with
any outstanding balances of any other exist-
ing loans.

B. Award of Attorney fees and Costs

HM The second issue presented for res-
olution is whether the trial court erred in
finding Ms. Walters to be a prevailing party
and awarding her $156,658.38 in attorney
fees and costs. In this regard, we reiterate
our longstanding rule .that “{TJhe trial
[court] ... is vested with a wide discretion in
determining the amount of ... court costs
and counsel fees; and the trial [court’s] ...
determination of such matters will not be
disturbed upon appeal to this Court unless it

7. In her complaint, Ms. Walters asserted three
claims against Quicken Loans: unconscionable
inducement, illegal loan, and fraud. Ms. Walters
dismissed the first claim prior to trial, believing
it to be duplicative, and thereafter the jury found
in her favor on the illegal loan claim and in
Quicken Loans’s favor on the fraud claim.

8, As we held in Quicken Loans I, 230 W.Va. at
325-26, 737 S.E.2d at 659-60, a finding of malice
‘was a condition precedent for Ms. Walters to

clearly appears that [it] has abused [its] dis-
cretion.’ Syl. Pt. 8, in part, Bond v. Bond, 144
W.Va. 478, 109 S.E.2d 16 (1959).” Syl. Pt. 1,
Heldreth v. Rahimian, 219 W.Va. 462, 6387
§.E.2d 859 (2006). See also Vanderbilt Mortg.
and Fin, Inc. v. Cole, 280 W.Va. 505, 515,
740 S.H.2d 562, 578 (2018) (“The controlling
Jaw places the decision of whether to award
attorney fees squarely within the discretion
of the circuit court.”).

Quicken Loans contends that Ms. Walters
did not substantially prevail at trial because
(1) the jury found in her favor on only one of
her two claims’ and found that Quicken
Loans had not acted with malice; (2) the
amount of damages awarded by the jury,
$27,000.00, was far less than the amount
sought by her counsel in closing argument;
and (8) the entire amount of the jury’s award
was offset by her earlier settlements with
appraiser Riffe and Bank of America, thus
“result[ing] in no success, no additional mo-
nies, and no benefit to Walters,” in Quicken
Loans’s view. In the alternative, Quicken
Loans argues that in determining the amount
of fees and costs to be awarded, the trial
court failed to do a proper analysis utilizing
the factors enumerated in our seminal deci-
sion in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pi-
trolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986).
Additionally, Quicken Loans contends that
the court erred in failing to offset the entire
amount of Ms. Walters’s settlements with
appraiser Riffe and BOA against the entire
amount of Ms. Walters’s combined compen-
satory award, including attorney fees and
costs, thus depriving Quicken Loans of the
benefit of $38,500.00 of the offset to which it
‘was entitled.

In response, Ms. Walters argues that pur-
suant to West Virginia Code § 31-17-17(¢), a
violation of the appraisal statute entitles the
borrower to file an action for damages, rea-

seek the remedy of cancellation of the principal
amount of the loan.

9. In his closing argument, counsel did not sug-
gest any specific amount of compensatory dam-
ages, focusing instead on the punitive damages
sought—all of which became moot when the jury
found in favor of Quicken Loans on the fraud
claim.

sonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and that
the statute “does not dictate any level of
suecess necessary for the consumer to recov-
er attorney's fees ...,” although the result
obtained in litigation is one factor to be con-
sidered. Quicken Loans v. Brown, 236 W.Va.
12, 80, 777 S.E.2d 581, 599 (2014) (Quicken
Loans ID), Further, Ms. Walters argues that
“{blecause attorney’s fees themselves are a
measure of compensatory damages, Mrs.
Walters’s total damages award is not the
$27,000.00 awarded by the jury, but the
jury’s award of actual damages combined
with the court’s award of attorneys (sic) fees
for a total of $188,653.88—a sum which is not
entirely offset by Mrs. Walters’s earlier set-
tlements.” As to the reasonableness of the
fee award, Ms. Walters argues that the trial
court did a thorough Pitrolo analysis and
that the court's actions were well within the
broad ambit of its discretion, Finally, Ms.
Walters argues that the trial court correctly
handled the offset because claim against
Quicken Loans giving rise to the award of
fees and costs was “wholly separate and divi-
sible” from the claims asserted against either
appraiser Riffe or BOA.

We begin our discussion with West Virgi-
nia Code § 81-17-17(¢), which provides that
“{alny residential mortgage loan transaction.
in violation of this article shall be subject to
an action, which may be brought in a circuit
court having jurisdiction, by the borrower
seeking damages, reasonable attorneys fees
and costs.” (Emphasis added). As we ex-
plained in Heldreth, a case involving the fee-
shifting provision in the West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Act, West Virginia Code § 5-11-
18(c) (1998), such provisions provide “the eco-
nomie incentive ... to attract competent
counsel for the purpose of enforcing ... laws
that serve to protect the interests of this
state’s citizenry.” Heldreth, 219 W.Va. at 467,
687 S.E.2d at 864 While acknowledging this
general principle, Quicken Loans argues that
fee shifting statutes come into play only
where the fee applicant “was the prevailing
party at trial, and for a party to ‘prevail’ at
trial, he need not show success on every
claim brought but he must demonstrate sig-
nificant success on a significant claim.”
Schartiger v. Land Use Corp. 187 W.Va. 612,
616, 420 S.E.2d 888, 887 (1991). In this case,

503

Quicken Loans claims, Ms, Walters cannot
meet the Schartiger test because she suc-
ceeded on only one of the two causes of
action that went to the jury; because the
amount of the jury’s damages award was
only slightly more than the amount Quicken
Loans had previously offered in settlement;
and because the damages award was totally
offset by the Riffe/BOA settlements, effec-
tively leaving Ms. Walter with nothing but a
“hollow victory” on a “minor claim.”

We disagree. First, as we observed in Van-
derbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc. v. Cole, 230
W.Va. 505, 516, 740 8.E.2d 562, 578 (2018), in
construing the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act, “[nJeither the
[statute] nor our case law requires that
[plaintiff] prevail on the majority of her
claims in order to receive attorney fees.”
Additionally, although Quicken Loans recites
the standard set forth in Schartiger, it com-
pletely ignores the Court’s further explana-
tion that “the trial court is to examine all of
the facts as they relate to the ‘prevailing
party’ standard, The most pertinent of these
facts are those relating to settlement offers.
.+-” 187 W.Va. at 616, 420 8.E.2d at 887. The
Schartiger court continued:

The fee-shifting rules adopted by the
legislature in the statute under consider-
ation and enforced by this court are meant.
to cover two extreme cases as well as all of
the cases in between. If a tort-feasor ap-
proaches his victim immediately after the
tort and makes a reasonable offer that
includes reasonable attorneys’ fees up to
the time of the offer, only to be rebuffed
by a greedy victim or victim’s lawyer, and
the jury awards less than the tort-feasor
originally offered for damages alone, then
it would be an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to-award attorneys’ fees to the
plaintiff.

On the other hand, if the tort-feasor
chases down the plaintiff on the courthouse
steps minutes before trial only to make an
offer that might minimally cover the plain-
tiffs damages, but that would not cover
plaintiffs attorneys’ fees expended to that
point, and the jury awards damages rough-
ly equivalent to the tortfeasor’s offer, then
it would be an abuse of diseretion for the

504

trial not to award attorneys’ fees to the
plaintiff,
Most cases do not fit either of these

extremes but fall somewhere in between.
Id, 187 W.Va, at 617, 420, S.H.2d at 888
(emphasis in original),
"In reviewing the record in this case, we
conclude that the circumstances herein are
far closer to the second extreme example
cited in Schartiger than to the first, This case
‘was litigated for more than three years, and
the circuit court’s docket sheet contains 467
entries evidencing multiple -pleadings, re-
quests for discovery, briefs, responses and
motions, as well as numerous depositions and
hearings, and several court-led- mediation
sessions, Ms. Walters represents that Quick-
en Loans’s sole offer of $25,000.00 was made
approximately one week before trial com-
menced.”. Pursuant to Schartiger, this offer
cannot be deemed “reasonable” since, al-
though it could be said to “minimally cover
the plaintiff's damages, ..,” it did not cover
any fees and expenses incurred over the
three-year course of the litigation, and the
jury-awarded more in damages than Quicken
Loans had offered to pay, albeit not much
more. See Rice v, Mike Ferrell Ford, 184
W.Va, 757, 762 n.7, 408 S.E.2d 774, 779 1.7
(1991) (recognizing that “as a practical mat-
ter,” in many situations the amount of dam-
ages awarded on a statutory claim will be so
small that few attorneys will pursue a.client’s
case with diligence unless the amount of the
fee is proportional to the work required,
rather than to the amount involved). .

But wait, says Quicken Loans, not.only did
Ms, Walters prevail on just one claim, but
also the jury’s award of damages was com-
pletely offset by the prior settlements with
appraiser Riffe and BOA, meaning that Ms.
Walters effectively received nothing. Again,
we disagree, Ms, Walters’s claim pursuant to
the illegal loan provision of the West Virginia
Residential Mortgage Lender, Broker and
Servicer Act, West Virginia Code § 31-17-
8(m)(8) was not a “minor claim”; Quicken
Loans’s actions in originating a loan that far
exceeded the fair market value of Ms. Wal-

10. Quicken Loans stated in proceedings before
-the trial court that it had “offered to settle” the
case some months before the trial, but did not

ters’s home violated the law. And Ms. Wal-
ters’s victory was not a “hollow” one, as the
jury’s verdict not only awarded her damages
but also gave rise to her claim for payment of
costs and attorney fees—a sum that in its
totality exceeds the amount of the Riffe/BOA
settlements,

In consideration of all of these facts and
circumstances, and acknowledging the trial
court’s familiarity with all of the “ins and
outs” of this litigation, we cannot conclude
that the court abused its discretion in finding
that Ms. Walters.was a prevailing party,

HH Next, Quicken Loans argues that
the court did not do a full and fair analysis of
Ms, Walters’s fee petition as required under
Syllabus Point 4 of Aetna. Casualty & Surety
Co. », Pitrolo, 176 W.Va, 190, 342 $.E.2d 156
(1986):

Where attorney's fees are sought
against a third party, the test of what
should be considered a reasonable fee is
determined not solely by the fee arrange-
ment between the attorney and his client.
The reasonableness of attorney's fees is
generally based on broader factors such
as: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (8)
the ‘skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of oth-
er employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary
fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contin-
gent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
dient or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases,

Syl. Pt. 4, Pitrolo, Quicken Loans further
argues that the court did not make ‘adequate
findings and conclusions with respect to the
propriety of the requested fees and costs, a
condition precedent to meaningful appellate
review.

clarify whether this was simply an expression of

general willingness or a concrete monetary offer.

Specifically, Quicken Loans complains that
while the court held a Pitrolo hearing; it was
not an evidentiary hearing, as Quicken Loans
had requested; therefore Quicken Loans did
not have an opportunity to contest the evi-
dence submitted by Ms. Walters’s counsel in
support of the petition for costs and fees, and
as a result many of the court's findings were
based on incomplete evidence. In this regard,
we do not understand Quicken Loans to be
claiming that the rates charged by the attor-
neys and paralegals were unreasonable, that
the work claimed wasn’t actually performed,
or that the hours in the time records were
inflated! Rather, Quicken Loans’s attack on
the time records submitted by Ms. Walters’s
counsel is that most of the time reflected in
the records was incurred in the’ proceedings
against Kirk Riffe and Bank of America, or
incurred in pursuing the fraud claim on
which Quicken Loans prevailed.

This Court has held that in order for a
court to determine the reasonableness of a
fee request, “... it must allow the parties to
present evidence on their own behalf and to
test their opponents’ evidence by cross-exam-
‘imation, ‘the greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth[.?” Multi-
plex, Inc: v. Town of Clay, 231 W.Va. 728,
738, 749 S.B.2d 621, 681 (2018) (emphasis
supplied and citations omitted). Cf In Re:
John T., Michael T., Natalie T. and Clare T.,
225 W.Va. 688, 645, 695 S.E.2d 868, 875
(2010) (case remanded to the cireuit court to
permit the parties to present evidence re-
garding costs and attorney fees); Daily Ga-
zette Co. v. Canady, 175 W.Va, 249, 251, 282
§.E.2d 262, 8828.B.2d 262, 264 (1985) (award.
of attorney fees requires notice-and an op-
portunity to be heard).

We believe that this language in Multiplew,
although not encompassed in a syllabus
point, compels the conclusion that Quicken
Loans was entitled to the evidentiary hearing

11. It should be noted that the time records sub-
mitted by Ms. Walters's attorneys were prepared
contemporaneously, not after the fact.

12, We are troubled by Quicken Loans’s counsel's
statement, at the outset of his argument at the
Pitrolo hearing held on October 8, 2015, that “I
think that I can be perhaps uncharacteristically
brief with you this morning. I think that the
papers that we had presented before you do a

505

it sought, and that the court erred in refus-
ing to allow it. Although it is not readily
apparent what factual evidence could be pre-
sented to rebut Ms. Walters’s attorneys’ fee
records and affidavits, it is not for this’ Court
to second-guess Quicken Loans’s assertion
that it was entitled, at the least, to test the
records and affidavits through cross-exami-
nation,”

In light of our holding that this case must,
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing, we
need not address Quicken Loans’s claims
that certain of the trial court’s Pitrolo find-
ings were factually unsupportable and/or
based solely on Ms, Walters’s evidence with-
out consideration of Quicken Loans’s evi-
dence. However, inasmuch as the issue of
offset will necessarily arise again on remand,

we proceed to address the manner in which
the trial court handled offset of the Riffe/
BOA settlements.

In Quicken Loans I, 280 W.Va. at 382, 737
§.E.2d at 666, we wrote that “in general, fee-

- shifting statutes are compensatory and not

punitive in nature...,” for purposes of deter-
mining a compensatory-to-punitive damages
ratio, Thereafter, in Quicken Loans, Inc.
Brown, 236 W.Va. 12, 777 S.E.2d 581 (2014)
(Quicken Loans II), at syllabus point 3, we
extended the reasoning underpinning Quick-
en Loans I and held that “[alttorney fees and
costs awarded under West Virginia Code
§ 46A-5-104 (1994) of the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act are com-
pensatory in nature and shall be subject to
offset by the amount of any good faith settle-
ments previously made with the plaintiff by
other jointly liable parties.” In our discussion
of this issue, we cited our earlier holding in
syllabus point 1 of Burgess v. Porterfield, 196
‘W.Va. 178, 469 S.H.2d 114 (1996) that “(dle-
fendants in a civil action against whom
awards of compensatory and punitive dam:
very nice job of squarely putting the matter be-
fore you.” This language could be construed as
an acknowledgement by Quicken Loans that the
court could properly decide the fee issues with-
out anything more than the information con-
tained in the parties’ written submissions, How-
ever, we do not read counsel's statement as a
waiver of Quicken Loans’s right to raise the
evidentiary hearing issue on appeal.

506

ages are rendered are entitled to a reduction
of the compensatory damages award, but not
the punitive damage award, by the amount of
any good faith settlements previously made
with the plaintiff by other jointly liable par-
ties.” Quicken Loans IT, 236 W.Va. at 44, 777
§.E.2d at 618. In this latter regard, the trial
court, which had a birds-eye view of the
entirety of this litigation, specifically found in
its Order Granting Defendant Quicken
Loans, Inc.’s Motion to Correct the Verdict
that “the plaintiff suffered a single indivisible
loss arising from the combined actions of
Defendant Quicken Loans and the settling
co-defendants, Bank of America and Kirk
Riffe. ...,” and further that “because all of
plaintiffs damages flowed from the actions
undertaken by all three (8) defendants here-
in, Defendant Quicken Loans is entitled to an
offset as a matter of law.” Ms, Walters has
not assigned error to these rulings.

Hl We believe our decision in Quicken
Loans II, although specifically limited by its
terms to fees and costs sought pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 46A-5-104, was grounded in
law and logic that extend to the instant case,
where Ms. Walters seeks an award of fees
and costs under West Virginia Code § 31-17-
17@, another fee-shifting statute, for suc-
cessfully prosecuting her claim against
Quicken Loans under the appraisal statute,
West Virginia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8). Accord-
ingly, we hold that attorney fees and costs
awarded under West Virginia Code §-31-17-
17(c) are compensatory in nature and shall
be subject to offset by the amount of any
good faith settlements previously made with
the plaintiff by other jointly liable parties.

‘We turn now to the application of our
holding to the facts of this case, and conelude
that the trial court erred in awarding only a
partial offset of the Riffe/BOA settlement
monies. The court fashioned what appears to
be some sort of apples-to-apples methodolo-
gy, offsetting the jury’s damages award by
that portion of settlements payable to the
plaintiff or on her behalf, and offsetting the
attorney fees award by that portion of the

13. In its order awarding fees and costs, the trial
court concluded that 45.2 hours set forth in Ms,
Walters’s fee petition was attributed to matters
related exclusively to appraiser Riffe, and 25.9

settlements payable to the attorneys—with
the end result that Quicken Loans did not
receive the offset benefit of $38,500.00 of the
prior settlements. We can find nothing in the
Jaw to support this approach, as more than
thirty years ago the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an attorney fee
award belongs to the client, not the attorney.
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 US. 717, 730-81 & n.19,
106 S.Ct. 1581, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). See
also Heldreth, 219 W.Va. at 471, 637 S.E.2d
at 868 (“the fee-shifting statute at issue con-
templates that the fee award belongs to the
successful complainant.”); Farley v. Zapata
Coal Corp., 167 W.Va. 680, 639, 281 S.E.2d
238, 244 (1981) (purpose of a fee shifting
statute is to make the plaintiff whole). This is
entirely consistent with our cases holding
that an award of attorney fees and costs,
where appropriate, is an element of compen-
satory damages for a prevailing party; the
character of the award does not change de-
pending on who cashes the check, which
seems to have been an underlying assump-
tion of the trial court in the instant case.

The correct procedure to be employed on
remand, after an evidentiary hearing, is
three-fold. First, the court will analyze Ms.
Walters’s costs and fees submission, in light
of the parties’ arguments and any evidence
presented, to determine which entries cannot
be fairly attributed to Ms. Walters’s success
on her illegal loan claim. In this regard, we
acknowledge that the trial court did make
findings as to the number of hours attribut-
able solely to the claims against appraiser
Riffe and solely to the claim against BOA;!*
however, the court made no findings as to
the number of hours, if any, attributable
solely to the fraud claim against Quicken
Loans, on which Quicken Loans prevailed.
Our case law requires this analysis, “The
calculation of attorney’s fees in a human
rights action requires, as this Court has pre-
viously recognized, the exclusion of hours
spent on unsuccessful claims.” Heldreth, 219
W.Va. at 467, 687 S.H.2d at 864. See also Syl.
Pt. 5, in part, W. Va. Highlands Conservan-
cy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl Prot., 198

hours to matters related exclusively to Bank of
‘America, These figures may or may not change
after the court hears the evidence Quicken Loans
wishes to present,

W.Va. 650, 458 S.E.2d 88 (1995) (“Apportion-
ment of attorney’s fees is appropriate where
some of the claims and efforts of the claimant.
were unsuccessful.”), Second, the court will
deduct these hours from the total hours, to
arrive at the number of hours of work on
which a fee award may properly be based.
Third, the court will then offset the total
amount of the prior settlements, $98,000.00,
against the total compensatory damages, i.e.,
the sum of the jury’s award of damages and
the court’ award of costs and fees.

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s ruling with re-
spect to the applicability of West Virginia
Code § 81-17-8(m)(8) to a single primary
mortgage loan, and affirm the court’s ruling
that Ms. Walters was a prevailing party and
is thus entitled to an award of fees and costs.
However, we reverse the court's award of
fees and costs and remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing, after which the court
will reconsider its Pitrolo findings on the
basis of all the evidence presented by the
parties, determine an appropriate award of
fees and costs, and thereafter offset the en-
tire amount of the prior settlements against
the entirety of Ms. Walters’s compensatory
damages, which include both the jury’s
award of damages and the court’s award of
fees and costs.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and
remanded,

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
opinion,

JUSTICE KETCHUM dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

LOUGHRY, C.J., dissenting, joined by
KETCHUM, J.:

The majority’s illogical and legally un-
sound opinion takes a perfectly straightfor-
ward statute and, despite declaring it to be
unambiguous, badly misconstrues it, making
a perfectly lawful banking transaction illegal.
West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) prohibits
only the predatory practice of making loans
which on their face appear to be adequately
collateralized, but actually exceed the secur-

507

ing property’s fair market value when aggre-
gated with other loans. In no way does the
statute prohibit making loans which exceed
100 percent “loan-to-value”; nevertheless, the
majority now prohibits this otherwise lawful
practice and compounds this error by award-
ing respondent Walters (the “respondent”)
with attorney's fees for prosecuting a claim
that garnered her nothing. Because this
Court is neither empowered to sua sponte
create regulatory banking legislation nor sits
as an arbiter of “moral” victories, I respect-
fully dissent.

I. Inapplicability of West Virginia Code
§ 81-17-8(m)(8)

The respondent refinanced her existing
mortgage with the petitioner, Quicken Loans,
Inc. (the “petitioner”) in the amount of
$136,000.00 for the purpose of lowering her
interest rate and monthly payment, Her
property was apparently only worth
$67,000.00 at the time of the loan, despite a
licensed appraiser valuing the property at
$152,000.00, The respondent filed a complaint
against the petitioner, the appraiser, and the
loan servicer. She settled for $98,000.00 with
the appraiser and loan servicer and proceed-
ed to trial against the petitioner on her
claims of an “illegal loan” prohibited by West
Virginia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8) and fraud; she
sought punitive damages and a determination
that the statutory violation was “willful” for
purposes of voiding the loan. A jury rejected
all of the respondent’s claims except for a
single violation without malice of West Virgi-
nia Code § 81-17-8(m)(8). Prior to trial, the

(petitioner moved the circuit court for judg-

ment as a matter of law on the respondent’s
claim for a violation of West Virginia Code
§ 81-17-8(m)(8), which the circuit court erro-
neously denied. .

The majority concludes, as did the circuit
court, that this statutory provision prohibits
the making of a singular mortgage loan in an
amount that exceeds the fair market value of
the property. In fact, it does no such thing.
West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) provides
in pertinent part:

In making any primary or subordinate

mortgage loan, no licensee may, and no

508

primary or subordinate mortgage lending

transaction may, contain terms which:

(8) Secure a primary or subordinate
mortgage loan in a principal amount
that, when added to the aggregate to-
tal of the outstanding principal bal-
ances of all other primary or subor-
dinate mortgage loams secured by the
same property, exceeds the fair mar-
ket value of the property on the date
that the latest mortgage loan is made.

(Emphasis added). Without necessity of in-
terpretation or construction of the statute,
even the most casual reader can ascertain
that the statute forbids only making a loan
(whether primary or subordinate) which
“when added to the aggregate total ... of all
other ... loans secured by the same proper-
ty” exceeds the property’s fair market value.
(Emphasis added), This clear and simplistic
language plainly proscribes making a loan
that, when aggregated with other loans, ex-
ceeds the property’s fair market value. The
sine qua non of this prohibition is the exis-
tence of “other primary or subordinate mort-
gage loans” which aggregate, along with the
subject loan, to exceed the property’s fair
market value, The necessity of the existence
of other loans is further: made clear by the
operative date for the fair market valuation
of the property—“the date that the latest
mortgage loan is made,” (Emphasis added).
The rationale behind the mortgage loan
prohibition, as stated in the statute, rather
than the one created by the majority, is not
difficult to discern, Loans which on their face
alone do not exceed the property's fair mar-
ket value, but do so when added to other
encumbrances, may deceptively lure a con-
sumer into believing the property adequately
collateralizes the individual loan. In reality,

1, As stated within the precedent cited by the
majority, ascertaining and giving effect to the
- intention of the Legislature is the primary rule
_ of “statutory construction.” Syl. Pt. 1, Sheena
Hi, For Russell H. v. Amfire, LLC, 235 W.Va,
132, 772 §.E.2d 317 (2015) (emphasis added),
Further, avoidance .of absurdity in’ favor of rea-
sonableness are methods of “construction of a
statute[.]” Syl. Pt, 3, Jd, (emphasis added), The
majority apparently overlooks the threshold,
fundamental principle that “[jludicial interpre-
tation of a statute is warranted only if the stat-
ute is ambiguous[.J” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Ohio
Cnty Com’n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 301

however, such a loan creates potential per-
sonal exposure for the consumer because the
property has insufficient value to cover the
aggregate combined total of the loans, which
aggregated total may be unknown to or not
easily ascertained by the consumer. It is this
type of deceptive and predatory practice that.
the statute seeks to preclude. On the other
hand, a singular primary mortgage loan, the
value of which exceeds the property's fair
market-value, would be hard for even the
most unsuspecting ‘consumer to overlook,
More importantly, such a loan may quite
purposefully exceed the property’s value in
order to provide additional funds for other
purposes, such as paying off other unsecured
debt. See McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N. A, 810 F.8d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2016)
(noting that excess proceeds of under-collat-
eralized loan provided McFarland “with mon-
ey he needed to pay off approximately
$40,000 of student and automobile debt, as he
had hoped.”),

The majority, despite declaring West Vir-
ginia Code . § 81-17-8(m)(8) unambiguous,
launches into a lengthy discussion of the rule
of statutory, construction regarding avoid-
ance of absurd results and the Legislative
intent behind the statutory scheme to reach
its erroneous conclusion that a.single, stand-
alone loan that exceeds the property’s fair
market value is prohibited by this statute.t
Focusing exclusively on the use of the terms
“primary or subordinate” mortgage, the ma-
jority, like the respondent, grossly oversim-
plifies the statute, rendering meaningless
more than half of the remaining language in
the statute, The majority apparently believes
this reverse engineering is necessary to
reach the immaterial conclusion that the stat-

S.E.2d 183 (1983), Having declared the statute
unambiguous, it is unclear why the majority re-
lies upon these canons of statutory construc-
-tion—there is quite simply nothing to construe.
See Syl. Pt, 6, Leggett v, EQT Productian Co.,
239 W.Va. 264, 800 S.E.2d 850, 2017 WL
2333083 (2017) (‘When a statute is clear and
unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain,
the statute should not be interpreted by the
courts, and in such case it is the duty of the
courts not to construe but to apply the statute.’
Syl. Pt, 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post

> No, 548, VF.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353
(1959).").

ute “applies” to “primary” or “first” mort-
gages. Certainly, it does. Depending upon
whether the subject loan is a primary or
subordinate loan, the statute is potentially
applicable,

However, it is the majority's lack of famil-
iarity with lending practices which reveals
the fallacy in its logic when it states that “by
definition only subordinate mortgage loans
are ‘subject to the lien of one or more prior
recorded mortgages or deeds of trust.’” In
short, the majority apparently believes that
the only time a “primary mortgage loan”
could be effectuated is when no other loans
already exist. Quite the contrary, loans which
assume the first-lien priority status, i.e., “pri-
mary” loans, are commonly entered into
when, other, “subordinate” loans exist,”
Through use of a garden-variety subordina-
tion agreement, the refinance of a “primary
mortgage” preserves the first lien status of
the mortgage despite the existence of “prior
‘recorded mortgages or deeds of trust.”? In
this event, the statute could be violated if this

“primary” loan was entered into where there
are additional “subordinate” loans which, ag-
gregated with the subject primary loan, ex-
ceed the property's fair market value as of
the date of the “latest” mortgage loan. The
reason the statute prohibits such practice—
regardless of whether the subject loan is a
primary or subordinate loan—is to account
for this very scenario, i.e. the refinance of a
primary loan, which will continue to occupy
first-lien status.‘ The prohibition against this
practice as to primary loans does not mean
that a singular, stand-alone primary mort-
2, The statutory definitions provide that the only

difference in a primary and subordinate mort-
gage loan is that the “subordinate mortgage
loan” is “subject to the lien of one or more prior
recorded mortgages or deeds of trust.” W.Va.

Code § 31-17-1(m) and (0), “Primary mortgage

loan” is not defined as a singular loan which

exists to the exclusion of all other loans: Rather,

itis simply a mortgage loan which occupies first-
lien position.

3. “A mortgage subordination agreement is a doc-
ument frequently used when there are two mort-
gages on a home, and the homeowner is looking
to refinance the first.mortgage. The mortgage
subordination agreement specifies which mort-
gage takes precedence over the other.” http://
‘www.mortgage 101.com/article/what-is-mortgage-

509

gage that exceeds 100 Pereent I loan-to-value
violates-the statute.

This is the same conclusion reached by
Judge Goodwin in the Southern District of
West Virginia—the only jurist to have previ-
ously addressed this precise issue. In Skibbe
v, Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., No. 2:08-
ev-01398, 2014 WL 2117088 *6 (May 21, 2014,
S.D. W.Va.), Judge Goodwin similarly rea-
soned that “the plain language of the statute
requires the existence of other mortgage

“loans before it will apply.” I can scarcely

improve upon: Judge Goodwin's straightfor-
ward reading of the plain language of the
statute:
By its terms, the statute does not apply
when a borrower takes out her first mort-
gage loan and the principal. balance of that
loan exceeds the fair market value of the
property at the time the loan is made. This
section applies when a borrower takes out,
an additional mortgage loan, and the prin-
. cipal balance of that loan, when added to
the outstanding balance of other existing
loans, “exceeds the fair market value of
the property on. the. date that the latest
mortgage loan is made.” .
Id, (Emphasis in original). This conclusion is
entirely unaffected by the respondent’s
string cite of ‘cases, which purportedly con-
clude that “the statutory prohibition applies
to both primary and subordinate mortgage
loans.” These cases either did involve multi-
ple loans (te which the statute plainly ap-
plies) or failed altogether to address the is-
sue presented herein: the applicability of the
statute to a singular loan that exceeds the
property’s fair market value® To state that

subordination-agreement (last visited June 12,
2017),

4, Were the statute not to make such a provision
for primary loans, a predatory lender could sim-
ply refinance the first-lien mortgage and obtain
subordination of any other loans, thereby duping
the debtor into encumbering his or her property
for a greater aggregate amount than the property
is worth—the precise practice prohibited by the
statute, .

5. Fabian v. Home Loan Center, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-
42, 2014 WL 1648289 (N.D. W.Va. Apr. 24,
2014), and Robinson v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 988
F.Supp.2d 615 (S.D. W.Va, Dec. 24, 2013), both

: involved a primary mortgage and a secondary
home equity line of credit. O'Brien v. Quicken

510

the statute “applies” to primary or subor-
dinate mortgage loans is to miss the entire
issue presented herein,

The majority’s reading of West Virginia
Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) requires one to com-
pletely disregard the primary operative lan-
guage of the statute, ie, the aggregation
language. In order to give significance to this
language, the respondent flimsily suggests
that when there is no other such loan(s) with
which to aggregate, the “outstanding princi-
pal balance” added to the subject loan is
simply zero. However, if the Legislature had
intended to wholly proscribe loans which,
alone or in the aggregate, exceed a proper-
ty’s fair market value, it certainly could have
done so by simply writing the statute to
prohibit a mortgage loan that either singly or
“when added to the aggregate total of the
outstanding principal balances of all other
primary or subordinate mortgage loans, if
any, secured by the same property, exceeds
the fair market value....” The Legislature
simply did not so intend.6 Nor did the Legis-
lature see fit to expand the statute to include
single, primary mortgage loans when the
statute was amended in 2001, 2002, 2010,
2012, and 2016,

The foregoing leads to the core fallacy
underlying the majority’s conclusion: there is
simply nothing illegal or unlawful about mak-
ing a loan in excess of a property’s fair
market value should a lender choose to ac-
cept such risk.’ There is no federal prohibi-
tion on such a practice identified by the
respondent and such loans create greater
risk to the lender than the consumer. In

Loans, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-5138, 2013 WL 2319248
(S.D. W.Va. May 28, 2013), Hixson v. HSBC
Mortgage Services, Inc., No. 09-ap-42, 2011 WL
4625374 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2011),
Bishop v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-1076,
2011 WL 1321360 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 4, 2011),
Croye v. GreenPoint Mortg, Funding, Inc., 740
F.Supp.2d 788 (8.D. W.Va. 2000), and Quicken
Loans, Inc., v. Brown, 230 W.Va. 306, 737 S.E.2d
640 (2012), were all disposed of on pleading or
evidentiary issues or did not otherwise address
the issue presented in any fashion. All of these
cases, except for Hixson, involved the respon-
dent's counsel.

6. In fact, before inclusion of these and other
provisions into this Article, it was entitled "Sec-
ondary Mortgage Loans.” See W.Va. Code Chap-

McFarland, 810 F.3d at 278, faced with pre-
cisely the same scenario, the Fourth Circuit
explained: :
Whatever the pitfalls, receiving too much
money from a bank is not what is generally
meant by “overly harsh” treatment....
[I]t is not the borrower but the bank that
typically is disadvantaged by an under-
collateralized loan. That is why borrowers
may pay a premium for under- or non-
collateralized loans, why it is common
practice for banks, as many borrowers can
attest, to ensure that their real estate
loans are for significantly less than proper-
ty value, and why a generous mortgage
loan is usually cause for celebration and
not a lawsuit.
Id. at 280 (citations omitted). Further, as
Judge Goodwin aptly reasoned in the under-
lying District Court opinion concerning this
scenario:
The notion that [a consumer is] harmed by
[a mortgage loan that exceeds the secured
property’s fair market value] is ridiculous.
Consumers using credit cards to incur
more charges than they can repay are not
disadvantaged by their high credit limits.
Students financing their education are not
disadvantaged by their ability to obtain
such financing. The plaintiff obviously owes
a larger debt than he otherwise would if he
accepted a smaller loan. But that is exactly
how loans work, and there is nothing un-
fair about it.
McFarland v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 19
F.Supp.3d 668, 670 (S.D. W.Va. 2014), affd
im part, vacated in part, 810 F.8d 278 (4th

ter 31, Article 17 (1996). In 2000, subsection
(m)(8) was added to West Virginia Code § 31-17-
8 and the statute was amended to govern mort-
wages, generally, removing references to “sec-
ondary” mortgage loans and altering the title to
simply “Mortgage Loans.” However, the particu
lar portion of West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8)
at issue herein has remained unaltered since its
inclusion in 2000, and has always forbidden pri-
mary or subordinate mortgages insofar as such
mortgages aggregated with other outstanding
loans exceeds fair market value.

7. This would be subject, of course, to any and all
applicable state and federal lending guidelines in
the making and consummation of the loan. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (governing “Consumer
Credit Cost Disclosures”).

Cir, 2016). In fact, the Fourth Cireuit fully
embraced Judge Goodwin's cogent analysis
that “filf anything an undersecured
mortgage disadvantages the lender, not the
borrower” when affirming Judge Goodwin’s
conclusion that such a loan is not, on its
terms alone, substantively unconscionable’

The foregoing is utilized not necessarily as
dispositive of the meaning of the statute at
issue, but as an illustration that loans that
exceed a property's fair market value are
neither unheard of nor inherently suspect. In
fact, under the federal “Home Affordable
Refinance Program” such loans are often
written by lenders with no loan-to-value ratio
(“LTV”) requirements. See _hittp://
harpprogram.org/faq.php (“There is no long-
er a maximum LTV limit for borrower eligi-
bility. If the borrower refinances under
HARP® and their new loan has a fixed
rate mortgage, there is no maximum LTV. If
the borrower refinances under HARP® and
their new loan is an adjustable rate mort-
gage, their LTV may not be over 105%.”).
While such loans are expressly exempted
from the reach of West Virginia Code § 31-
17-8(m)(8), their mere existence demon-
strates that the practice now made unlawful
by the majority is, if perhaps not common-
place, perfectly legitimate. As Judge Good-
win astutely noted, “[flollowing the plaintiffs
logic, all unsecured loans are substantively
unconscionable[.]” McFarland, 19 F.Supp.3d
at 670, Just as unsecured loans are not per se
unconscionable, singular loans that exceed
100% loan-to-value are not unlawful. As such,
there is simply no reason why the Legisla-

8. Interestingly, despite being represented by the
same counsel as the respondent herein—Moun-
tain State Justice—and presenting ostensibly
identical facts involving only a singular, under-
collateralized loan, McFarland did not bring an
action for violation of West Virginia Code § 31-
17-8(m)(8). Rather, he only asserted claims for
substantive unconscionability and unconsciona-
ble inducement; the Fourth Circuit allowed only
the claim of unconscionable inducement to pro-
ceed, The respondent in the case at bar voluntari-
ly dismissed her claim of unconscionable induce-
ment,

9. See Marks v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. 03:10-
CVO08039PHXJAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *5 (D.
Ariz, June 22, 2010) (“On October 8, 2008, Presi-
dent Bush signed into law the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.L, No. 110-
343, 122 Stat, 3765 (codified 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201

511

ture would have chosen to forbid under-se-
cured loans in a statutory scheme designed
to prohibit predatory lending practices. See
Herrod v. First Republic Mortg. Corp., 218
W.Va. 611, 618, 625 S.E.2d 378, 880 (2005)
(deseribing W.Va. Code § 81-17-8(m) as part
of West Virginia’s “predatory lending law”).

In short, the majority has ham-handedly
rendered a perfectly lawful lending transac-
tion “predatory” in nature and, therefore,
“illegal.” For those of us not immersed in the
industry, it is difficult to predict the sweep-
ing implications of the majority’s uninformed
decision. What is clear, however, is that it is
now incumbent upon the Legislature to recti-
fy this “judicial legislation” and cure any
economic implications created by the unwary
majority, which was apparently bent on sal-
vaging the respondent's self-proclaimed “vic-
tory” that was only marginally obtained in
the first instance.

Il, Erroneous Attorney’s Fee Award

The respondent’s self-proclaimed “victory”
leads me to the majority's second, equally
inscrutable and erroneous conclusion: that
the respondent somehow “prevailed” in the
underlying litigation, making her entitled to
a potential award of more than $150,000.00 in
attorney's fees, despite securing not a single
penny in judgment from the petitioner for its
alleged statutory violation, As indicated
above, the jury awarded the respondent
$27,000.00 in damages for the petitioner’s

et seq.) (“EESA"). Section 109 required the Sec-
retary of the Treasury (“the Secretary”) to take
certain measures in order to encourage and facil-
itate loan modifications, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5219....
The EESA authorized the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac to
create the Making Home Affordable Program on
February 18, 2009, which consists of two compo-
nents: (1) the Home Affordable Refinance Pro-
gram [“HARP”, and (2) the HAMP ["‘Home Af-
fordable Modification Program’’].”).

10. See http:/harp.gov/About (‘Introduced in
March 2009, HARP enables borrowers with little
or no equity to refinance into more affordable
mortgages without new or additional mortgage
insurance. HARP targets borrowers with loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios equal to or greater than 80
percent and who have limited delinquencies over
the 12 months prior to refinancing.”).

512

non-willful statutory violation. Having previ-
ously settled with the other co-defendants in
the total amount of $98,000.00 ($65,500.00 in
compensatory damages and $32,500.00 for at-
torney’s fees), after offset, the respondent
received nothing from the petitioner. This
perceived “moral victory” is wholly insuffi-
cient to substantiate an award of attorney's
fees, In rejecting the same argument, the
United States Supreme Court stated:

The only “relief” [plaintiff] received was
the moral satisfaction of knowing that a []
court concluded that his rights had been
violated. The same moral satisfaction pre-
sumably results from any favorable state-
ment of law in an otherwise unfavorable
opinion, .... [A] favorable judicial state-
ment of law in the course of litigation ...
does not suffice to render him a “prevail-
ing party.” Any other result strains both
the statutory language and common sense.

Hewitt v, Helms, 482 US. 755, 762-68, 107
S.Ct, 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987).

A. The respondent did not “prevail”

The United States Supreme Court has fur-
ther explained that “plaintiffs may be consid-
ered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees
purposes if they succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit-the parties sought in bringing suit.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S, 424, 488, 103
S.Ct, 1988, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (citing Na-
deau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st
Cir, 1978) (emphasis added)), The respondent
can identify absolutely no “benefit” the trial
and jury verdict rendered. Similarly,’ this
Court has held that “[flor a plaintiff to have
‘prevailed’ at trial, ... he must demonstrate
that the litigation effected the material alter-
ation of the legal relationship of the parties
in a manner which the legislature sought to
promote in the fee statute.” Schartiger v.
Land Use Corp., 187 W.Va. 612, 613, 420
S.E.2d 888, 884 (1991), The respondent’s “vic-
tory” of a mere finding of a single, non-willful
statutory violation resulted in absolutely no
alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties: the petitioner paid the respondent
nothing and the ‘debt remained intact due to

11, The circuit court granted the petitioner's mo-
tion to correct the verdict to reflect an offset of

the finding of a non-willful violation, More to
the point, this Court has expressly stated:

A party who needlessly pursues litigation

after he’ has beer offered a settlement that

exceeds what the jury finally awards by an
amount sufficient to have compensated the
plaintiff for all his attorneys’ fees and ex-
penses at the time the offer was made ‘is
not. entitled to any attorneys’ fees that
acerued after the offer was made.
Id. at 616, 420 S.E.2d at 887. This is precisely
what occinred in this case. As indicated in
the petitioner’s brief, months before trial it
extended a settlement offer to: the respon-
dent, which she rejected. The respondent
then “needlessly pursue[d] litigation” and
gained nothing. Id.

The majority appears to be implicitly oper-
ating under a misapprehension that the pre-
offset verdict is of some legal consequence in
this analysis. Let me be clear: the offset in
this matter was not levied as a “favor” to the
petitioner, nor is it a mere technicality which

- creates the illusion that the respondent did

not prevail. An offset for amounts already
paid by jointly tortious defendants is legally
required and serves to fix, by law, the
amount which the respondent is legally enti-
tled to recover from the petitioner. Indeed,
“(defendants in a civil action against whom a
verdict is rendered are entitled to have the
verdict reduced by. the amount of any good
faith settlements previously made with the
plaintiff by other jointly liable parties.” Syl.

* Pt. 7, Bd of Educ. of McDowell Cty. v.

Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 182 W.Va.
597, 600, 390 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1990). In this
case, the respondent is entitled to recover
nothing by operation of law. Until the offset
is applied, the judgment is neither fixed, nor
final. See Groves v, Compton, 167 W.Va. 878,
880, 280 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1981) (stating that
when jury is not apprised of prior settlement
amount “the trial court deducts the settle-
ment figure from the award before entering
the judgment”) (emphasis added), Therefore,
focus on the pre-offset verdict of $27,000.00 is
pointless.

Accordingly, the final appealable judgment
entered in this matter was zero.! The judg-

$65,500.00, leaving a verdict of zero.

ment is precisely the same as if the jury had
found no violation or a violation, yet no dam-
ages. Other courts have had little difficulty in
reaching the inescapable conclusion that
somehow eludes the majority: that the trial
and verdict must have benefitted the respon-
dent in some manner for her to have “pre-
vailed,” See Goodman v. Lozano, 47 Cal.4th
1827, 104 Cal.Rptr.dd 219, 223 P.38d 77, 78
(2010) (finding plaintiff “ordered to take
nothing against the nonsettling defendants
due to the settlement offset” was not prevail-
ing party); Imperial Lofts, Ltd. v. Imperial
Woodworks, Inc., 245 S.W.8d 1, 7 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that because “settlement
eredits and insurance payment exceeded the
jury’s damage award ... [plaintiff] was not
the prevailing party and was not entitled to
recover its attorney's fees.”); Blizzard v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801,
806 (Tex, Ct, App. 1988) (“It is one thing to
allow a party an award of attorney fees on a
successful claim notwithstanding an opposing
party’s success on an offsetting claim. It is
quite another to allow attorney fees on a
claim which, although successful, was paid in
full [through prior settlements] before tri-
al.”); Stout v. State, 60 Wash.App. 527, 803
P.2d 1852, 1854 (1991) (holding “one who
obtains a verdict for an amount equal to or
less than what is already in hand has not
received an affirmative judgment and is not
the prevailing party” for purposes of attor-
ney’s fee award).

In absence of damages—a necessary ele-
ment of any cause of action—what has the
respondent successfully accomplished? The
respondent did not seek a mere declaration
that the petitioner violated West Virginia
Code § 31-17-8(m)(8). She proceeded to trial
under the belief that her action against the
petitioner would garner her a damages
award in excess of those amounts she had
already recéived; she was wrong. Under the
respondent’s argument, the only party who
benefitted from that erroneous risk assess-
ment is her attorney. Quite simply, West
Virginia Code § 81-17-8 does not exist to
generate fees for lawyers. Under the majori-
ty’s decision, there is no disincentive for at-
torneys to encourage their clients to endure
the rigors of trial since, at worst, their client.
recovers nothing, yet they still recover their

513

fees. This transforms the statute into a mere
fee-generating mechanism for attorneys.

B. Attorney’s fees _wnder West Virginia
Code § 81-17-17 are not compensatoty
I further take extreme issue with the cir-
cular position that, since attorney’s fees were
recoverable under the statute, such fees
therefore form part of the compensatory
damages to which the respondent was enti-
tled, thereby justifying an award of attorney
fees. Boiled to its essence, ‘the respondent
argues that the statutory allowance for attor-
ney’s fees supports the notion that she “pre-
vailed”; since she prevailed, she is thereby
entitled her to attorney's fees. Aside from
being entirely circular, this argument con-
tains a more obvious fallacy: that she is
necessarily “entitled” to attorney's fees un~
der the statute.

-As set forth in my dissent in Quicken
Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 286 W.Va. 12, 777
§.H.2d 581 (2014) (“Quicken II”), attorney’s
fees and costs are not per se compensatory
damages, the. type to which a claimant is
entitled, Although the discussion in Quicken
IT regarded recovery of attorney's fees under
the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Pro-
tection Act, the analysis is the same. Like the
Corisumer Credit and Protection Act, West
Virginia Code § 31-17-17(c) makes fees per-
missible, not mandatory: “Any residential
mortgage loan transaction in violation of this
article shall be subject to an action ... by
the borrower seeking damages, reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs[.]” While a borrow-
er may “seek” attorney's fees, there is no
language whatsoever in the operative statute
making an award’ of fees mandatory under
any circumstances. As I explained in Quicken
IT, “(logic suggests that recovery of [attor-
ney’s fees] would have been structured as
mandatory if the Legislature had intended
attorney’s fees and costs to be deemed com-
pensatory in nature[.]” Id. at 46, 777 S.H.2d
at 615 (Loughry, J., dissenting). Moreover, a
separate delineation of attorney’s fees and
costs, in addition to “damages,” further sug-
gests that such an award does not represent.
part of the recovery needed to compensate a
plaintiff. Finally, the type of predatory lend-
ing behavior West Virginia Code §. 31-17-8

514

seeks to preclude is clearly “bad behavior”;
the purpose for which attorney's fees are
awarded for such behavior is to “punish[]
and discourage.” Boyd v. Goffoli, 216 W.Va.
552, 569, 608 S.H.2d 169, 186 (2004). Thus, it
makes little sense to argue that the avail-
ability of attorney’s fees, if appropriate, con-
stitutes some sort of compensatory element
of the respondent's damages which itself is
sufficient to justify an award of attorney's
fees. I therefore find the majority’s new syl-
labus point declaring these permissive fees to
be compensatory wholly without support.

C. The cirewit court's attorney's fee anal-
ysis was error
Assuming, arguendo, that the respondent’s
“moral victory” against the petitioner made
her the “prevailing” party for purposes of an
attorney’s fee award, it is clear that the
cireuit court erred in summarily awarding
fees generated prosecuting the entire cause
of action against all defendants and only
allowing an offset of a nominal, non-represen-
tative figure for attorney’s fees received in
the prior settlements. It is well-established
that “when a complainant sets forth distinct
causes of action so that the facts supporting
one are entirely different from the facts sup-
porting another, and then fails to prevail on
one or more such distinct causes of action
attorneys’ fees for the unsuccessful
causes of action should not be awarded.”
Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyers, 181 W.Va. 71, 88,
880 S.E.2d 288, 250 (1989). The figure pre-
sented by the respondent to the circuit court
reflected fees generated in pursuit of the
entire case against all defendants, as re-
flected in the cireuit court’s order. Further,
the figure requested by the respondent plain-
ly represented efforts expended in pursuing
its entire case against the petitioner, includ-
ing her fraud claim on which she did not
prevail. Any fee award should have consisted
only of those fees and costs generated in
pursuit of the respondent’s singular “success-
ful” claim against the petitioner: the nominal
statutory violation,

The circuit court attempted to ameliorate
the obvious inequity of the significant fee
award by offsetting those amounts received
from the settling co-defendants that were

designated as “attorney's fees” within those
settlements. However, the round figures
which purportedly represented - attorney’s
fees in the prior settlements—$25,000.00 and
$7,500.00—signify literally nothing. There is
no evidence those amounts represented actu-
al fees incurred and attributable to the
claims against those parties. As settlement
figures, they reflected compromised amounts
yather than a precise calculation of fees and
costs payable by that particular party in
settlement of a claim for attorney’s fees,
Moreover, the circuit court summarily desig-
nated certain amounts to pursuit of claims
against the settling defendants and conclud-
ed that, since such amounts were less than
the actual settlement amounts, the respon-
dent was getting some added benefit from
offsetting the attorney's fee settlement sums.
Significantly, however, since the circuit
court’s order contains no itemization of these
fees and costs, it evades this Court’s review.
Further, the fact that the circuit court found
that time dedicated to pursuing the settling
defendants was actually less than they paid
in settlement for those fees fully demon-
strates how arbitrary and unmeaningful the
offset truly is.

The flaws in the circuit court’s analysis of
the attorney’s fee award are patent. Rather
than clumsily retrofitting the settlement
amounts to the clearly over-inclusive fee sub-
mission by the respondent, the circuit court,
on remand, should dredge out of the fee
statements only those amounts reasonably
attributable to prosecution of the singular
statutory violation upon which the respon-
dent received a favorable result, As indicated
above, this is required by our caselaw, The
circuit court should then itemize those en-
tries in its order making appellate review of
such award feasible. In absence of this meth-
odology, the attorney’s fee award is a wholly
arbitrary and unreviewable, such that the
award that should not stand.

III. Conclusion

The majority's wholly misguided handling
of this marginal verdict, both substantively
and with respect to the fee award, is not
only troubling, but has serious and far-
reaching implications that will clearly re-

quire legislative correction. Further, the ma-
jority’s decision virtually demands that this
Court thoroughly revisit its attorney’s fee
award precedent, particularly that articulat-
ed in Quicken Loans I and II, rather than
simply tossing in a new syllabus point on the
issue while remanding for a badly mishan-
dled fee award. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent,

Justice Ketchum, dissenting

T dissent because the statute under which
Quicken Loans was found liable, West Virgi-
nia Code § 81-17-8m(8), does not apply to
this case,

West Virginia Code § 81-17-8m(8) pro-
vides, in pertinent part:

In making any primary or subordinate
mortgage loan, a licensee may not, and a
primary or subordinate mortgage lending
transaction may not, contains terms which:

(8) Secure a primary or subordinate
mortgage loan in a principal amount that,
when added to the aggregate total of the
outstanding balances of all other primary
or subordinate loans secured by the same
property, exceeds the fair market value of
the property on the date that the latest
mortgage loan is made!
By its plain terms, this statute pertains to
additional mortgage loans, which when add-
ed to all other primary or subordinate loans
secured by the same property, exceeds the
fair market value of that property. Clearly,
the existence of other mortgage loans is re-
quired for Section 31-17-8(m)(8) to apply.

My position is supported by the well-rea-
soned opinion by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin
writing for the Southern District of West
Virginia, which perceptively recognized: “By
its terms, the statute does not apply when a
borrower takes out her first mortgage loan
and the principal balance of that loan exceeds
the fair market value of the property[.]”?

Here, Ms. Walters refinanced her home
through Quicken Loans, the result of which
was a decrease in her interest rate and

1, (Emphasis added).

515

monthly mortgage payment. Once the loan
was completed, it was the only mortgage loan
secured by her home. Because there were
not multiple mortgages secured by Ms. Wal-
ters’ home, West Virginia Code § 81-17-
8(m)(8) provides her no relief as a matter of
law. The cireuit court erred by finding other-

wise,

T dissent.
801 S.E.2d 530

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

ve

Chaz A. SIMMONS, Defendant
Below, Petitioner

No. 15-0715
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 8, 2017
Filed: June 16, 2017

2. Skibbe v. Accredited Home Lenders Inc., 2014
WL 2117088 at 6 (S.D.W.Va. 2014).

—

Jason D. Parmer, Esq., Appellate Advoca-
ey Division, Public Defender Services,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Benjamin F. Yancey, III, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent

WALKER, Justice:

Chaz A, Simmons appeals the July 21,
2015, Amended Order of the Circuit Court of
Roane County, West Virginia, entering a
guilty verdict on a two count Indictment for
driving under the influence of alcohol
(‘DUI’). The cireuit court sentenced him to
two to ten years for the felony Count I, DUI
Resulting in Death, and one year for the
misdemeanor Count II, DUI Resulting in
Injury.

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Simmons
argues the circuit court erred in admitting
his statements to police into evidence at trial.
Specifically, in his first assignment of error,
Mr. Simmons argues that the circuit court
committed reversible error for failing to ful-
fill its mandatory duty to conduct a hearing
on the voluntariness of a written (“first”)
statement he signed while at the hospital
shortly after the vehicular accident, Mr. Sim-
mons asserts that, pursuant to State v. Fort-
ner, 150 W.Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966),
this Court must remand this case for that
hearing. In his second assignment of error,
Mr. Simmons argues that the cireuit court
committed reversible error in admitting a
recorded (“second”) statement into evidence
at trial. He asserts that the police delayed
presenting him to the magistrate for the
primary purpose of obtaining that second
statement in violation of the prompt present-
ment rule codified in West Virginia Code
§ 62-1-5(a)(1) (2014) and Rule 5(a) of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure,

1, At the time of the vehicular accident on July
18, 2013, Matthew “Bo” Williams was a deputy
employed by the Roane County Sheriff's Office.
At the time of the suppression hearing on May

519

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and arguments, the submitted record and
pertinent authorities, we affirm the order of
the cireuit court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

At approximately 2:34 am. on July 18,
2018, Mr. Simmons drove a truck into a
building located along Route 36 near Looney-
ville, Roane County, West Virginia, killing a
woman and seriously injuring a man while
they slept. The police arrived at the scene
approximately twenty-five minutes later and
instructed the first responders to transport
Mr, Simmons to Roane General Hospital
(RGH”) to be evaluated for any injuries.
Police arrested Mr. Simmons between 4:30
and 6:00 a.m. and subsequently presented
him to the magistrate between 8:00 a.m. and
10:00 a.m. that same morning,

On January 29, 2014, a Roane County
Grand Jury issued a two count Indictment
charging Mr. Simmons with violation of West
Virginia Code § 170-5-2(a), DUI Resulting
in Death and West Virginia Code § 170-5-
2(c), DUI Resulting in Bodily Injury.

On May 27, 2014, counsel for Mr. Simmons
filed a motion to suppress all “statements
made by the defendant,” asserting that
“falny statement taken from the defendant
was not free and voluntary.” The motion was
not specific as to what statement or state-
ments Mr, Simmons was seeking to suppress.
Two days later, on May 29, 2017, the circuit
court held a pre-trial hearing for the presen-
tation of arguments on the motion to sup-
press.

Sergeant Matthew “Bo” Williams (“Deputy
Williams”)! testified regarding the second
statement he obtained from Mr, Simmons
after his arrest. Deputy Williams testified
that he arrested Mr. Simmons at RGH be-
tween 4:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. With respect to
the time period between Mr. Simmons’s ar-
rest and his presentment to the magistrate,
Deputy Williams testified as follows:

29, 2015, he had changed employment and now
worked for the City of Spencer as a sergeant. For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to Sergeant
‘Williams as Deputy Williams.

520

He was taken to the sheriffs department,
placed in the holding cell while I—I believe
while I worked on the search warrant for
the vehicle, and then after that he was
taken from the cell, we went back into the
kitchen area, conducted our interview and
then he was, I believe, taken back to the
cell while I finished my criminal complaint,
and then we went to magistrate court.
ae oe

And our—the processing—our processing
is basically a criminal complaint, finger-
prints, CDR, and then they go to magis-
trate court. And then they're in—anything
else we do after the fact so that we don’t
waste a lot of time before hand and waste
people’s time, judge's time and stuff.

‘With respect to the interview itself, Depu-
ty Williams testified that he filled out the
Miranda? form and.read the entirety of the
document to Mr, Simmons in the presence of
State Police Sergeant Fred Hammick. He
testified that the interview took place in the
“kitchen/interrogation” room at the table in
the Roane County Sheriff's Department. Ac-
cording to Deputy Williams, the process he
uses when taking a statement is to read each
question and put a check-mark beside that
line and turn the paper over to the suspect to
sign by each line. He testified that when he
is finished with the whole form, he puts an
“X” by the signature line for the waiver of
rights and turns the form over to the suspect
to sign and date. Deputy Williams testified
that he advised Mr, Simmons at the time of
the interview that he was under arrest. He
further testified that Mr. Simmons signed
the waiver form and gave a second statement
confessing to driving the truck into the build-
ing off Route 86, killing Kelly Casto and
injuring William Cottrell. Deputy Williams
indicated that he recorded the statement on
adise,

In response to various questions about how
he conducted the interview, Deputy Williams
testified as follows:

Q: Was Mr, Simmons handeuffed at the
time? .
A; I don’t believe so.

Ree

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 86 S.Ct.

Q: Did he ever ask to stop the interview?
A: No, sir,
ee
Q; At any time did he ask this statement
to stop?
A: No,

eek

Q: Were there any threats or promises
made to him?

A: No, sir,

Kee

Q: During the course of the statement,
did you promise him anything, lenience, or
that you [would] put in a good word [with]
the prosecuting attorney?

A: I don’t believe so.

As to questions regarding Mr, Simmons’s
demeanor, Deputy Williams reported that he
was emotional, but not belligerent or ex-
tremely intoxicated. He further explained
that Mr, Simmons could understand ques-
tions, initial the forms, sign his name, and
read the Miranda form, all without difficulty.

Deputy Williams testified that he recorded
the second statement taken at 7:30 a.m., and
that the magistrates are usually available
between 8:30 a.m, and 9:00 a.m. When asked
what time he took Mx. Simmons to the mag-
istrate, Deputy Williams stated that he first
had to finish processing paperwork after the
interview, but it was “anywhere between 8:00
and 10:00 probably,” As a final question, the
prosecutor asked Deputy Williams, “[wlas
there any intended delay in taking him up to
the magistrate?” Mr. Simmons responded,
“{n]o, sir.”

. Thereafter, the circuit court ruled that the
second statement could be admitted into evi-
dence at trial. In response to Mr. Simmons’s
argument that the State violated the prompt
presentment rule, the court reasoned:

There is no evidence here that this man
was impaired to the extent that he could
not understand what his . constitutional
rights were, There’s no evidence of police
mistreatment, ‘extended delays, any of
.that. What the policeman was doing here
[were] legitimate law enforcement activi-

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

-ties. The delay was occasioned by the re-
quirement[s] under state law that the po-
liceman process the person who is arrested
and that includes fingerprinting and other
steps in the processing of a person that’s
-arrested. All that’s mandated by state law.

In- addition, some of the delay here was
obviously occasioned by the application for
these two warrants or at least one of the
warrants. So there’s no evidence that this
man was promised anything or threatened.
in any way [or that] the police used other
unlawful [iInducements.

The trial took place on February 10, 11,
and 12, 2015. The State called West Virginia
State Police Corporal Pete Fisher to testify
about ‘the circumstances surrounding the
first statement taken from Mr. Simmons,
Corporal Fisher first saw Mr, Simmons in
the emergency room. Corporal Fisher testi-
fied that he did not arrest or detain Mr,
Simmons, but he did take a statement from
him. After the first statement was admitted
into evidénce without objection from Mr.
Simmons, Corporal Fisher answered ques-
tions from defense counsel regarding wheth-
er Mr. Simmons drove the truck that night.
Corporal Fisher explained:

When I first got there, I asked him what
happened this evening, he said—and this is
where the statement comes in, when I
asked him, he says—and this is prior to
“taking the statement—that I was driving
my truck and I got in an accident. I then
get my paper out, I write the statement of
everything that was written there.

West Virginia State Police Sergeant Fred
Hammick also testified at trial that he assist-
ed Deputy Williams. Sergeant Hammick af-
firmed that he performed the search of the
pickup truck and that he was present when
Deputy Williams recorded the second state-
ment. He testified that “... [Deputy
Williams] wanted to do an interview with the
suspected driver of the vehicle, and we did a
search warrant as well.”

At the close of the State’s case-in-chief,
counsel for Mr, Simmons made a motion for
acquittal arguing that the State’s evidence
was insufficient to support a case for DUI

3, .Mr. Simmons also filed a post-trial motion for
acquittal based upon the same arguments made

521

because the State had not presented evidence
on all of the elements of that crime, Mr.
Simmons did not raise any objection regard-
ing admission of the first or second state-
ments at this time. The circuit court denied
the motion on the grounds that the evidence
‘was sufficient to support both counts of DUI.

Mr. Simmons presented witnesses and tes-
tified on his own behalf, He did not testify
that Deputy Williams or Sergeant Hammick
interrogated him or engaged in conduct that
in any way coerced or induced him to give an
incriminating statement. When asked if he
was so intoxicated he did not know what he
was doing when he signed the Miranda waiv-
er form, Mr. Simmons testified “I’m not say-
ing that at all, I was in shock.”

At the close of the trial, the jury returned
a verdict convicting Mr. Simmons on both
counts of DUI. Thereafter, Mr. Simmons
filed a post-trial motion for a new trial.? At
the hearing on March 17, 2015, Mr, Simmons
argued that the second statement should not,
have been admitted because he was intoxicat-
ed and therefore, could not knowingly and
intelligently have waived his Miranda rights,
Mr. Simmons did not argue at this hearing
that the circuit court admitted the second
statement into evidence at trial in violation of
the prompt presentment rule. He also did not
argue that the circuit court erroneously ad-
mitted the first statement for failure to fulfill
his mandatory duty to conduct the voluntari-
ness hearing, The circuit court stated at the
hearing “I’m not presented with anything to
change the ruling on the admissibility of
Chaz’s [Mr. Simmons’s] statement....”
Likewise, in the order entered on April 6,
2015, the circuit court formally ruled that
“{ulpon consideration of argument of counsel
the Court finds no reason to change any
prior rulings concerning the admission of the
Defendant's [Simmons’s]: [second] _ state-
ment....” Thus, the court denied the motion
for a new trial and set the hearing date for
sentencing, The circuit court subsequently
sentenced Mr. Simmons to two to ten years
in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions for the felony conviction on Count I

at the close of the State’s case-in-chief. The cir-
cuit court denied this motion as well,

522

(DUI Resulting in Death) and one year in
the custody of the Regional Jail Authority for
the misdemeanor conviction on Count IT
(DUI Resulting in Injury). The cireuit court
ordered that Mr. Simmons serve the sen-
tences consecutively. The circuit court en-
tered the July 21, 2015, Amended Order,‘
and Mr. Simmons filed the instant appeal.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hl The first assignment of error Mr.

. Simmons raises relates to the duty of the
circuit court, as a matter of law, to conduct a
voluntariness hearing on the admissibility of
his first statement, “Where the issue on an
appeal from the circuit court is clearly a
question of law or involving an interpretation
of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of
review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
A.L., 194 W.Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

HOM. Simmons’s next assignment of
error relates to the circuit court’s ruling at
the pre-trial hearing permitting the admis-
sion of his second statement into evidence at
trial. In this regard, we apply the following
standard of review:

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, an appellate court should con-
strue all facts in the light most favorable to
the State, as it was the prevailing party
below. Because of the highly fact-specific
nature of a motion to suppress, particular
deference is given to the findings of the
cireuit court because it had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses and to hear testi-
mony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit
eourt’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lacy, 196
W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Johnson, 219 W.Va. 697,
639 S.E.2d 789 (2006).

With these standards of review in mind,
we proceed with addressing the merits of the
issues before us.

IIL DISCUSSION
Mr. Simmons raises two assignments of
error in this appeal. The first issue is wheth-
4, Mr. Simmons's appellate counsel was appoint-

ed on July 1, 2015, after entry of the verdict
order. For purposes of appeal, the circuit court

er the circuit court had a mandatory duty to
conduct a hearing, sua sponte, out of the
presence of the jury, as to the voluntariness
of his first statement prior to its admission
into evidence at trial. The second issue is
whether Mr. Simmons’s second statement,
should have been admitted into evidence, as
Mr. Simmons argues it was obtained in viola~
tion of the prompt presentment rule.

A. Mandatory Duty of Circuit Court to
Conduct Voluntariness Hearing

HE Mr. Simmons argues that West Virgi-
nia law establishes that a circuit court has a
mandatory duty to conduct a voluntariness
hearing on its own motion, despite the fact
that he failed to file a motion to suppress the
first statement or raise the issue in a post-
trial motion. He asserts that the first state-
ment was not voluntarily given and should
have been excluded from evidence because
the record shows that he was intoxicated and
in a custodial environment. The State argues
that the mandatory hearing requirement
does not apply in this case because Mr. Sim-
mons was coherent when he signed the first
statement and it was taken prior to any
action by Corporal Fisher or any other police
officer and before any accusation, arrest, or
custodial interrogation.

TE sBefore considering Mr. Simmons’s
first assignment of error, however, we must
first consider whether the issue is properly
before this Court. In State v. Salmons, 208
W.Va. 561, 509 S.E.2d 842 (1998), we held
“fajs a general matter, a defendant may not
assign as error, for the first time on direct
appeal, an issue that could have been pre-
sented initially for review by the trial court
on a post-trial motion.” Id. at Syl. Pt. 2. We
have, in criminal cases presenting a narrow
set of cireumstances on a significant issue,
exercised our discretion under the “raise or
waive” rule as follows:

When a defendant assigns an error in a
criminal case for the first time on direct
appeal, the state does not object to the
assignment of error and actually briefs the
entered the July 21, 2015 Amended Order, which

the Public Defender Appellate Division appealed
on July 24, 2015.

matter, and the record is adequately devel-

oped on the issue, this Court may, in its

discretion, review the merits of the assign-

ment of error.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 8. The facts in the record
demonstrate that Mr. Simmons did not raise
the involuntariness of his first statement at
the trial court level, and for purposes of
appeal, he has waived the issue. However,
the State has not objected to the assignment
of error and actually briefed the matter.
Thus, we find the record is adequately devel-
oped, and we exercise our discretion to re-
view the merits of this assignment of error
given the narrow circumstances under which
our current common law imposes a mandato-
ry duty on a trial court to conduct a volun-
tariness hearing on its own motion, despite
the obligation of a criminal defendant to raise
the issue prior to trial.

Whether the cireuit court had a mandatory
duty to conduct a pre-trial voluntariness
hearing regarding the first statement, in the
absence of a motion to suppress, is controlled
by Rule 12 of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Specifically Rule
12(b)(8) requires that a motion to suppress
an inculpatory statement be raised as fol-
lows:

(b) Pretrial motions.—Any defense, ob-
jection or request which is capable of de-
termination without the trial of the general
issue may be raised before trial by motion.
Motions may be written or oral at the
discretion of the judge. The following must.
be raised prior to trial:

eee

(8) motions to suppress evidence unless
the grounds are not known to the defen-
dant prior to trial; ...5

eee
W.Va. R. Crim, Pro. 12(b)(8) (footnote: add-
ed).

Rule 12(f) sets out the consequences of a
defendant's failure to properly move the trial
court to suppress a confession;

() Effect of Failure to Raise Defenses
or Objections. Failure by a party to raise

5. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Sim-
mons was unaware of his first statement prior to

523

defenses or objections or to make requests

which must be made prior to trial, at the

time set by the court pursuant to subdivi-
sion (¢), or prior to any extension thereof
made by the court, may constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown
should grant relief from the waiver.

W.Va. R. Crim. Pro, 12(f).

Hl A review of these provisions of Rule
12 establishes three points unequivocally.
First, the rule does not require the circuit
court, sua sponte, to conduct a hearing prior
to trial, out of the presence of the jury, to
determine whether an inculpatory statement
is voluntary. Second, the rule imposes an
obligation on a defendant to raise the issue.
And third, the rule establishes that if a de-
fendant fails to timely raise the issue of the
voluntariness of his or her inculpatory state-
ment, the issue may be deemed waived.

This Court summarily addressed the issue
of waiver under Rule 12 in State v. Strock,
201 W.Va. 190, 495 S.H.2d 561 (1997). In
Strock the defendant was charged with alco-
hol related driving offenses and providing
false information to a police officer. The de-
fendant was convicted of the charges in mag-
istrate court. The defendant brought a de
novo appeal in circuit court. Although the
defendant made an oral confession when he
was arrested, he failed to ask the circuit
court to suppress the statement prior to trial.
After his confession was introduced into evi-
dence, the defendant moved the circuit court
to strike the testimony. The trial court de-
nied the motion to strike. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred in
failing to strike his confession. We rejected
the argument succinctly as follows:

This Court believes that the appellant's
first claim on appeal, that the trial court
erred in failing to strike the testimony
relating to his statements, is without merit.
Rule 12(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure specifically states:
“The following must be raised prior to
trial: ... (8) Motions to suppress evidence
unless the grounds are not known to the
defendant prior to trial ... [.]” The Court

trial.

524

believes that the appellant, by failing to
move to suppress the statements in issue,
of which he was well aware, prior to trial,
effectively waived his right to challenge
their admission into evidence,

Id, at 192, 495 S.E.2d at 568. In Strock we

said:
“The following must be raised prior to
trial: ... (8) Motions to suppress evidence
unless the grounds are not known to the
defendant prior to trial ... [.]” Part, Rule
12), West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure,

Id, at Syl, Pt, 1. See Walker v. Ballard, No.
12-0188, 2018 WL 1682113, at *17 (W. Va.
Apr. 16, 2018) (memorandum decision).

Hs As such, consistent with our opin-
ion in Strock, we now hold that under Rule
12(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, if a defendant fails to seek to
suppress a confession or other inculpatory
statement prior to trial as required under
Rule 12(b)(8), such failure constitutes waiver,
absent a showing of good cause. See State v.
Sugg, 198 W.Va. 888, 408, 456 S.E.2d 469, 484
(1995) (“[flailure to make this motion [to
suppress] will under most circumstances con-
stitute waiver under Rule 12(f) of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.”). Likewise, under
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, defendants are required to raise
the issue of the voluntariness of an inculpato-
ry statement, or the matter may be deemed
waived. See, e.g. United States v. Jones, 558
Fed.Appx. 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2014) (objection
to government’s technique in obtaining con-
fession was waived because of failure to file a
pretrial suppression motion); United States
v, Lago Guerrero, 524 F.8d 5, 11 (1st Cir.
2008) (motion to suppress filed two-and-one-
half months after the deadline set by court
constitutes waiver); United States v. Kirk-
land, 567 F.3d 816, 322 (7th Cir. 2009) (de-
fendant must raise a suppression motion pri-
or to trial to avoid waiver or forfeiture as
well as comply with any timing requirements
set by the district court); United States v.
Nayyar, 221 F.Supp.3d 454 (S.D.N.Y, 2016)
(a suppression motion that is not made be-
fore trial “is untimely,” and may not be con-
sidered unless good cause shown).

Although it is clear that under Rule—
12(b)(8) Mr. Simmons waived the issue of the
suppression of his first statement, he none-
theless contends that the issue is not waived
in reliance upon our holding in Syllabus Point
1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571, 148
§.H.2d 669 (1966), overruled in part by State
ex rel. White v. Mohn, 168 W.Va. 211, 212,
288 S.E.2d 914 (1981), which states:

It is the mandatory duty of the trial
court, whether requested or not, to hear
the evidence and determine in the first
instance, out of the presence of the jury,
the voluntariness of an oral or written
confession by an accused person prior to
admitting the same into evidence, and the
failure to observe this procedure consti-
tutes reversible error.

Syl. Pt. 1, Fortner. However, the holding in
Fortner must be placed in its proper context.
The decision in Foriner was rendered prior
to our adoption of Rule 12 of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1981.
Fortner created a prophylactic procedure to
protect the rights of defendants from coerced
confessions at a time when no criminal proce-
dures existed. With the adoption of these
procedural rules, and Rule 12 in particular,
we put a system in place to protect the rights
of defendants in all aspects of criminal pro-
ceedings. Nevertheless, even though begin-
ning in 1981 Rule 12 specifically addressed
and controlled the issue of determining the
voluntariness of an inculpatory statement,
our cases continued to recognize the Fortner
holding. See, e.g., State v. Holpp, No. 14-0758,
2015 WL 1740293, at *2 (W.Va. Apr. 18,
2015) (memorandum decision); State v. Black,
227 W.Va. 297, 304, 708 S.E.2d 491, 498
(2010); State v. Haller, 178 W.Va. 642, 644,
863 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1987); State v. Gwinn,
169 W.Va. 456, 462, 288 S.H.2d 533, 587
(1982).

HM In the final analysis, Fortner con-
flicts with Rule 12, and when there is a
conflict between the rules of criminal proce-
dure and a judicial opinion of this Court on
that subject, Syllabus Point 5 of State v,
Wallace, 205 W.Va, 155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999),
instructs as follows: .

The West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure are the paramount authority

controlling criminal proceedings before the
circuit courts of this jurisdiction; any statu-
tory or common-law procedural rule that
conflicts with these Rules is presumptively
without force or effect. .
Id. See State v. Davis, 178 W.Va. 87, 90, 357
S.E.2d 769, 772 (1987) (holding that W.Va. R.
Crim. Pro. 7(¢)(1) supersedes the provisions
of W. Va. Code § 62-9-1.(1981), to the extent
that the statute requires the indorsement of
the grand jury foreman and attestation of the
prosecutor on the reverse side of the indict-
ment), overruled on other grownds, State ew
rel. RL, v. Bedell, 192 W.Va. 435, 452. $.E.2d
898 (1994); Reed v. Wimmer, 195 W.Va. 199,
205, 465 S.E.2d 199, 205 (1995) (“[T]o the
extent our prior cases are inconsistent or
incompatible with the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, they have been implicitly over-
ruled by Rule 402.”), In light of this holding
in Wallace, we now hold that Syllabus Point
lof State v. Foriner, 150 W.Va. 571, 148
§.E.2d 669 (1966), has been superseded by
Rule 12 of the West Virginia Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure and is of no force or effect.
Notably, our recognition that Rule 12 does
not require the circuit court to conduct, sua
sponte, a voluntariness hearing is consistent
with federal law in general. For instance, in
the federal courts, a district court need not
conduct a voluntariness hearing unless the
defendant objects to the admissibility of his
or her statement. Wainwright v. Sykes, 483
_ US. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 58 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
In Wainwright, the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed an order in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding in which the dis-
trict court ordered that the state court con-
duct a voluntariness hearing regarding an
ineulpatory statement made by a defendant.
The defendant argued that he was entitled to
a voluntariness hearing despite his’ own fail-
ure to object to the admissibility of his state-
ment prior to or at trial. Justice Rehnquist,
writing the majority opinion for the Court,
noted the “[lJanguage in subsequent deci-
sions of this Court has reaffirmed the view
that the Constitution does not require a vol-
untariness hearing absent some contempora-
neous challenge to the use of the-confession.”
Id. at 86, 97 S.Ct. 2497. Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that a district court did not abuse its disere-

525

tion in concluding that the defendant was not
entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of
an incriminating statement because he failed
to raise the issue until the day of trial. Unit-
ed States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 178 (1990).
The Fourth Circuit explained: “[clourts have
never interpreted the statute’s provisions [18
U.S.C. § 8501(1982) requiring pre-trial vol-
untariness determination] as imposing a duty
on the district, court sua sponte to raise the
issue of voluntariness in the absence of a
defendant’s objections.” Wilson, 895 F.2d at
172-78 (internal citations omitted). The
Fourth Circuit confirmed that the waiver
also applied when raised for the first time on
appeal:

[Defendant] now contends that the cir-
cumstances surrounding the statement
give rise to an inference of involuntariness.
[Defendant] admits that his trial counsel
did not file any motion to suppress the
statement, but argues nevertheless that
the trial court had an obligation to review
the voluntariness of his statement sua
sponte under United States v. Powe, 591
F.2d 888, 847 (D.C. Cir, 1978). This court:
has held, however, that the issue of volun-
tariness must be timely raised or it is
thereafter waived. United States v. Wilson,
895 F.2d 168, 172-78 (4th Cir. 1990), Since
the voluntariness issue was never raised
until appeal, it is not properly before the

United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 89, 43-44
(4th Cir. 1991). .

In the case at hand, Mr, Simmons argues
that the admission of the first statement
taken at RGH entitles him to an automatic
remand because the circuit court did not, sua
sponte, conduct a yoluntariness hearing.
However, while Mr. Simmons filed a motion
to suppress generally objecting to the admis-
sion of “any statement made by the defen-
dant,” his counsel only argued to suppress
the second statement at the hearing. He
never asked to suppress the first statement.
Moreover, when the prosecution moved to
admit the first statement into evidence at
trial, counsel for Mr. Simmons stated “[nJo
objection.” In addition, counsel for Mr, Sim-
mons cross-examined Corporal Fisher once
the cireuit court admitted the first statement

526

into evidence. This is-not the conduct of a
defendant who, along with his counsel,
wished to challenge his first statement as
involuntary.

Significantly, even after the circuit court.
read the jury verdict and at the hearing on
the post-trial motions, counsel for Mr. Sim-
mons still did not challenge the admission of
the first statement into evidence. Based upon
his failure to raise an objection as required
by Rule 12(b)(3), we hold that Mr. Simmons
waived his right to a voluntariness hearing
on the admissibility of his first statement.

B. Prompt Presentment Rule

HM Mr. Simmons argues that Deputy
Williams took him to the Roane County
Sheriff's Office and failed to timely present
him to a magistrate for the primary purpose
of obtaining an incriminatory statement. The
State responds that the totality of the cir-
cumstances do not establish that any delay
was for the primary purpose of obtaining a
statement, ‘The State further asserts that
Deputy Williams performed good police work
and any delays were related to transporta-
tion from the hospital and necessary booking,
processing and preparation of the warrant to
search the truck involved in the accident.

The prompt presentment rule is codified in
West Virginia Code § 62-1-5(a)(1)(2014):

An officer making an arrest under a war-
rant issued upon a complaint, or any per-
son making an arrest without a warrant
for an offense committed in his presence or
as otherwise authorized by law, shall take
the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before a magistrate of the county
where the arrest is made.

Correspondingly, Rule 5(a) also provides
that:

In general—An officer making an arrest

under a warrant issued upon a complaint

or any person making an arrest without a

warrant shall take the arrested person

without unnecessary delay before a magis-
trate within the county where the arrest is

made.... .

W.Va. R. Crim. Pro. 5(a).

Hs In providing guidance to the circuit

courts as to whether an inculpatory state-

ment should be suppressed due to a violation
of the prompt presentment rule, we estab-
lished in Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Persing-
er, 169 W.Va, 121, 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982) that
“(t]he delay in taking the defendant to a
magistrate may be a critical factor where it
appears that the primary purpose of the
delay was to obtain a confession from the
defendant.” Id. at 121, 286 S.B.2d at 263, We
emphasized in Persinger that the prompt
presentment rule is “not subject to. any pre-
cise time period.” Id, at 185, 286 S.E.2d at
270, Rather, the policy behind the rule is
“not so much on the length of the detention
but whether the police were primarily using
the delay in bringing the defendant before a
magistrate to obtain a confession from him.”
Id, at 186, 286 $.E.2d at 270 (footnote omit-
ted).

HM Shortly thereafter, we refined our
holding in Persinger to emphasize that many
factors in the particular circumstances of a
case may apply when determining whether a
violation of the prompt presentment rule oc-
curred: .

“The delay in taking a defendant to a
magistrate may be a critical factor [in the
totality of circumstances making a confes-

- sion involuntary and hence inadmissible]
where it appears that the primary purpose
of the delay was to obtain a confession

from the defendant.” Syllabus Point 6,

State v. Persinger, [169] W.Va. [121], 286

§.E.2d 261 (1982), as amended.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 173 W.Va. 290,
815 S.E.2d 897 (1984),

Nevertheless, in State v. McCartney, 228
W.Va. 315, 719 S.E.2d 785 (2011), while we
cited the principle established in Persinger
and Guthrie, we noted that our prior deci-
sions on numerous occasions have found that,
delays in taking the accused to the magis-
trate did not violate the prompt presentment
rule. Id.. at 325-26, 719 S.E.2d at 795-96.
While holding that there was no violation of
the prompt presentment rule, we took the
opportunity to make this point by quoting
State v. DeWeese, 218 W.Va. 339, 582 S.E.2d
786 (2008) as follows:

To be clear, merely detaining a defendant

in jail under an arrest warrant for fifteen

hours before taking him/her to a magis-
trate will not trigger a sanctionable viola-
tion of the prompt presentment rule. A
sanctionable violation occurs if the purpose
for detaining the defendant is to conduct
an interrogation to obtain an incriminating
statement from the defendant about his or
her involvement in the crime for which he
or she was arrested.
Id, at 344 n.8, 582 S.E.2d at 791 n.8 (internal
citations. omitted) (emphasis added). Like-
wise, in State v. Johnson, 219 W.Va. 697, 689
§.E.2d 789 (2006), the defendant argued that
the primary purpose for the delay in present-
ing him to the magistrate after his arrest on
charges of first-degree robbery was to “ob-
tain an incriminating statement.” Id. at 702,
639 S.E.2d at 794, Rejecting his argument,

we explained, “Johnson has produced no evi- ~

dence that the delay in his presentment was
for the purpose of obtaining a statement, and
we can find no evidence of such a motive
either.” Id, at 708, 639 S.E.2d at 795 (empha-
sis added). Thus, we found no violation of the
prompt presentment rule,

(HEBs(With respect to the length of a
delay, the prompt presentment rule is trig-
gered when the defendant is placed under
arrest. Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Humphrey,
177 W.Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 618 (1986), We
also defined thé scope of the length of a
delay in Humphrey when we stated, “[ulnder
our prompt presentment rule, the significant

“ time period when an accused is in police
custody is the time between the arrest ...
and the time a statement is obtained from
the accused.” Id. at 269, 351 S.E.2d at 617-18,
In other words, the delay which precedés the
confession is most critical because that is the
window of opportunity for the police or the
authorities to coerce or induce a confession,
In State v. Wickline, 184 W.Va. 12, 399
§.E.2d 42 (1990), we explained:

The delay between the time of the arrest
or custodial interrogation and the giving of

a confession is most critical for prompt

presentment purposes because during this

time period custodial confinement and in-
terrogation can be used to attempt to pro-
duce a confession.
Syl. Pt. 4, Wickline. See also, State v. Judy,
179 W.Va, 784, 789, 872 S.E.2d 796, 801

527

(1988) (“... the proper focus in prompt pres-
entment cases is on delay which precedes a
confession.”), .

HE Moreover, any delay in presentment
after a statement is given does not render
the confession inadmissible. Again, in Hum-
phrey, we held that “folrdinarily the delay in
taking an accused who is under arrest to a
magistrate after a confession has been ob-
tained from him does not vitiate the confes-
sion under our prompt presentment rule.”
Syl. Pt. 4, Humphrey. (emphasis added).

HH Within that critical period, however,
we have identified a number of cireumstances
that are not part of the “delay” for purposes
of determining if a violation of the prompt
presentment rule occurred. For instance,
time spent by police in certain activities such
as transporting the defendant to the police
headquarters or completing normal booking,
processing and paperwork must not be in-
cluded in the time frame of any “delay.” See
State v. Rogers, 231 W.Va. 205, 211, 744
§.E.2d 315, 321 (2013) (driving defendant to
police barracks and normal booking proce-
dure, including interview of suspect after ar-
rested if willing to give statement not includ-
ed in calculating “delay”); State v. Newcomb,
223 W.Va. 848, 866, 679 S.H.2d 675, 698
(2009) (being kept at scene “for legitimate
law enforcement purposes” not included in
calculating “delay”); Wickline, 184 W.Va. at
17, 399 S.H.2d at 47 (finding one hour drive
from crime scene to police barracks not in-
cluded in calculating “delay”); State v. Whitt,
184 W.Va. 340, 344, 400 S.E.2d 584, 588
(1990) (stating routine processing, side trip
agreed to by defendant, and subsequent in-
ventory of stolen property not included in
calculating “delay”); Judy, 179 W.Va. at 789,
872 S.E.2d at 801 (holding one hour delay
“attributable in substantial part to transpor-
tation and to the performance of routine
administrative procedures”). See also, Per-
singer, 169 W.Va. at 185, 286 S.H.2d at 270
(itemizing specific types of booking and ad-
ministrative procedures for processing ar-
rests).

In the case at hand, Deputy Williams
placed Mr. Simmons under arrest at RGH
and drove him from there to the Roane

528

County Sheriff's Office. This occurred be-
tween 4:30 am. and 6:00 am, Deputy
Williams testified at the suppression hearing
and at trial that upon arrival he prepared the
warrant to search the truck that drove into
the building. He also stated that he did not
talk to Mr. Simmons but kept an eye on him
through a camera placed in the jail cell area,
When finished with the paperwork, Deputy
Williams took Mr. Simmons to the “kiteh-
en/interrogation” room of the sheriff's office
and proceeded with reading each line of the
Miranda rights form to him, each of which
My. Simmons separately initialed. This all
oceurred in the presence of Sergeant Ham-
mick, according to the undisputed testimony.
Deputy Williams then testified that all three
signed the form. After Mr. Simmons waived.
his Miranda rights, Deputy Williams asked
for a statement to which Mr, Simmons
agreed by voluntarily giving a recorded
statement.’ The record reflects from Deputy
Williams’s testimony that this process start-
ed at about 7:30 a.m. on July 18, 2018, and
did not take very long.

At that point, Deputy Williams fingerprint-.
ed Mr. Simmons, returned him to the cell
and arranged to have him taken to a magis-
trate who usually returned to. duty at around
8:30 a.m, Deputy Williams testified that he
did not have an exact time but estimated that.
he presented Mr, Simmons to the magistrate
between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on July 18,
2018,

Based upon the window of opportunity that
Deputy Williams and Sergeant Hammick al-
legedly had to coerce or induce a confession
from Mr. Simmons, the record reveals noth-
ing to support a violation of the prompt
presentment rule. Between 4:30 am., the
earliest Deputy Williams gave as an arrival
time at the sheriff's office, and shortly after
7:30 a.m., the latest Deputy Williams gave as
the time for completion of the Miranda
rights form and the recording of the second
statement, is the critical time in the case at
hand “to attempt to produce a confession.”
Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Wickline, From these
three hours, we must exclude the time for
travel from RGH to the sheriff’s office, for

6. Despite having raised the issue of voluntarinéss
of his second statement at the suppression héar-

the preparation of the search warrant, and
other processing. Additionally, none of the
time shortly after 7:30 a.m. until presentment
to the magistrate is included in the “delay”
time-frame. More importantly, Mr. Simmons
provides no argument or evidence that per-
suades us to deviate from this general rule.
See Syl. Pt. 4, Humphrey “Ordinarily the
delay in taking an accused who is under
arrest to a magistrate after a confession has
been-obtained from him does not vitiate the
confession under our prompt presentment
rule.”) (emphasis added),

With the minimal amount of time that
must have remained, the record reflects that
Deputy Williams observed Mr. Simmons via
camera while he processed the necessary pa-
perwork. Our review of the record does not
reveal any other conduct or activity that
suggests any motive or purpose to coerce or
induce a confession from Mr. Simmons by
Deputy Williams, Concurrently, Sergeant
Hammick spent part of the relevant’ time
conducting the search of the truck, but as to
the time he was at the sheriff's office, the
record does not contain any evidence of
statéments, conduct or motive on his. part to
coerce or induce Mr, Simmons into giving a
confession.

The primary argument raised by Mr. Sim-
mons is that Deputy Williams delayed pre-
senting him to the magistrate to keep him in
the holding cell to sober him up to give a
statement. Deputy Williams's testimony from
the suppression hearing was:

Q. So your purpose for bringing him
back to the sheriff's department, was to
get a statement from him?

A. To get a.statement and to process. I
mean, I don’t know what I’d do with them
other then take them to the sheriff's office
to process. .

Deputy Williams responded to this ques-
tion after explaining his normal procedures
for. processing a suspect under arrest. In
addition, Sergeant Hammick’s testimony cor-
roborated Deputy Williams’s statements re-
garding the processing needed in the case:
“... [Deputy Williams] wanted to do an in-

ing, Mr. Sitnmons does not raise this assignment
of error on appeal,

terview with the suspected driver of the vehi-
cle, and we did a search warrant as well.” We
find these statements regarding interviewing
a cooperative suspect: uncharacteristic of a
police officer determined to coerce a confes-
sion. Furthermore,.Mr. Simmons did not con-
tradict the statements of these police officers
when he testified.

Our prior decisions raising a violation of
the prompt presentment rule have drawn a
clear distinction between appropriate police
conduct in interviewing a suspect who wishes
to give a voluntary statement and police con-
duct that reveals coercive or inappropriate
means of obtaining a confession. In New-
comb, after we concluded that the police offi-
cers acted properly in holding the defendant
at the crime scene for a reasonable time to
secure the scene, we quoted, with agreement,
the circuit court’s response to the defendant’s
argument that the police violated the prompt
presentment rule. The circuit court stated
that “it.certainly is well within his [Deputy
Sutherland’s] purview as an officer 'to try and
take a statement after giving the Defendant
his rights and giving him an opportunity to
exercise those rights which the Defendant
chose not to do.” Newcomb, 228 W.Va. at 867,
679 S.E.2d at 699.

As we stated in Persinger and repeated in

Humphrey and other cases, the primary pur- _

pose of the prompt presentment rule is to
prohibit lengthy interrogations aimed at
coereing or inducing a “confession” out of a

529

suspect. In the circumstances of this partieu-
lar case, there is no basis upon which to infer
that Deputy Williams or Sergeant’ Hammick
would have such motives. Furthermore, Dep-
uty Williams testified that while he did pa-
perwork, he let Mr. Simmons rest, and he
then read Mr, Simmons his Miranda rights
and requested a statement in the presence of
Sergeant Hammick. Mr. Simmons did, not
provide any testimony to the contrary on this
point, The only evidence in the record is from
the officers who flatly denied that they
coerced Mr, Simmons or made any promises
to him. We, therefore, find that the record is
simply devoid of any evidence to support Mr.
Simmons’s argument that the circuit court
erred in failing to suppress the second state-
ment due to a violation of the prompt pres-
entment rule. .

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm
the conviction and the July 21, 2015, Amend-
ed Order of the Cireuit Court of Roane
County. .

Affirmed,

530
803 S.E.2d 500

Wanda WILLIAMS, individually and on
behalf of the Estate and Wrongful
Death Beneficiaries of Robert Thomp-
son, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner,

v.

CMO MANAGEMENT, LLC, (as to Nich-

olas County Nursing & Rehabilitation),
Defendant Below, Respondent.

No. 15-0553.

Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.
Submitted April 27, 2016.
Decided May 19, 2016,

James B, McHugh, Esq., Michael J. Full-
er, Jr., Esq., D, Bryant Chaffin, Esq., Amy J.
Quezon, Esq., A. Lance Reins, Esq., McHugh
Fuller Law Group, PLLC; Hattiesburg, MS,
for Petitioner.

Jeffrey M. Wakefield, Esq., Mark A. Rob-
inson, Esq., Ryan A. Brown, Esq., Flaherty
Sensabaugh Bonasso PLLC, Charleston,
WY, for Respondent.

LOUGHRY, Justice:

The petitioner and plaintiff below, Wanda
Williams, individually and on behalf of the

582

estate and wrongful death beneficiaries of
Robert Thompson, appeals from the May 11,
2015, order of the Circuit Court of Nicholas
County denying her motion for a new trial
following a plaintiff's verdict in a case involv-
ing allegations of negligent medical care and
wrongful death instituted against the respon-
dent, CMO Management, LLC (“CMO”). As
grounds for her appeal, the petitioner asserts
the trial court erred by applying the two-
year limitations period in a manner that pre-
vented her from introducing pertinent evi-
dence of Mr, Thompson’s injuries, which he
allegedly sustained while residing at Nicholas

* County Nursing & Rehabilitation (“nursing
facility”)! The trial court further erred, ac-
cording to the petitioner, in failing to apply
the discovery rule and the tolling provisions
of the general disability savings statute
(“savings statute”)? and in making several
evidentiary rulings. Upon our careful review
of the law against the record in this ease, we
conclude that the trial court committed error
in its application of the statute of limitations
for evidentiary purposes to the petitioner’s
personal injury claim, Based on the petition-
er’s concession during oral argument that a
yemand limited to the personal injury claim
is proper given the assignments of error, we
find it unnecessary to review the denial of a
new trial as to the wrongful death claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision not to
grant a new trial as to the wrongful death
claim; reverse the decision not to grant a
new trial as to the personal injury claim; and
remand this matter for a new trial solely on
the personal injury claim.

1, The subject nursing facility is managed by
cMoO. | :

2, See W.Va.Code § 55-2-15 (2008) (providing for
extended claim filing periods for minors or indi-
viduals suffering from mental infirmities).

3. Included among the various causes of action
alleged in the complaint were corporate negli-
gence, negligence, gross negligence, willful, wan-
ton, reckless, malicious and/or intentional con-
duct, violations of the West’ Virginia Nursing
Home Act (W.Va.Code § 16-5C-15), medical
malpractice for both lethal and non-lethal inju-
ries, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, premises
liability, and violations of the West Virginia Con-
sumer Credit and Protection Act (W.Va.Code
§§ 46A-6-101 to-110).

I Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Thompson, who suffered from Al-
zheimer’s disease, resided at the nursing fa-
cility from June 14, 2001, to June 27, 2011.
Following his death on July 2, 2011, the
petitioner filed suit against CMO on June 19,
2018, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Thomp-
son’s injuries and death resulted from the
abuse and neglect he suffered while a resi-
dent at the nursing facility! The petitioner
also sought damages in connection with sys-
temic problems at the nursing facility con-
cerning staffing, budgeting and allocation of
resources, and inappropriate policies and
procedures, She sought to recover for Mr.
Thompson’s injuries from 2009 until. his
death.t The parties stipulated below that
Mr. Thompson was mentally incompetent
during all times relevant to. the petitioner’s
cause of action,

On September 12, 2014, CMO filed a “Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Meet the Applicable Statute of Limitations
Regarding Claims Accrued Prior to April 19,
2011.” Arguing that the Medical Profession-
al Liability Act (“MPLA”) ® applied to all of
the petitioner’s claims, CMO asserted that
the two-year limitations period for MPLA
claims ° barred any claims that accrued prior
to April 19, 2011.7 Responding to the sum-
mary judgment motion, the petitioner argued
that not all of her claims fell under the
MPLA based on this Court’s decision in
Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 284 W.Va. 57,
768 S.E.2d 78 (2014), which turned on the
MPLA. definitions of “health care” and

4. At trial, the petitioner introduced evidence of
injuries that included falls, subdural hematoma,
hip fracture, malnutrition, personal dignity viola-
tions, and extreme pain.

5, See W.Va.Code §§ 55-7B-1 to -12 (2008 &
Supp.2015). .

6. See W.Va.Code § 55-7B~4.

7, To arrive at this date, CMO started with the
date ‘the complaint was filed Gune 19, 2013),
subtracted two years (the limitations period for
bringing an MPLA action), and then subtracted
another sixty days due to the time allotted under
the MPLA for filing a notice of claim and re-
sponding to same, See W.Va.Code .§°55~7B-
6(h).

“health care provider.”®. She argued that
while some of her claims fell squarely within
the MPLA, other claims, which did not in-
volve medical care or treatment, fell outside
the MPLA. In further support of her posi-
tion, the petitioner raised the applicability of
the discovery rule and the tolling provisions
of the general disability savings statute.

In ruling on the summary judgment mo-
tion based on the MPLA limitations period,
the trial court relied upon a recent memoran-
dum decision issued by this Court in Martin
v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc, No,
12-0710, 2018 WL 2157698 (W.Va. May 17,
2018). We determined in Martin that adults
who allege a medical professional liability
action under the MPLA have a two-year
statute of limitations, except in cases where
discovery is an issue. Jd. at “2, The trial
court found the reasoning of Martin instrue-
tive on the issue of whether the savings
statute should toll the petitioner’s claim.
Citing the rule of statutory construction that
a specific statute controls in comparison to a
general statute, the trial court ruled that the
MPLA’s “more specific two-year statute of
limitations” should apply in lieu of the gener-
alized provisions of the savings statute.!? In
applying the two-year limitations period, the
trial court decided that any claims arising
from the care and treatment provided by the
nursing facility prior to April 19, 2011, were
time barred. Because Mr. Thompson died
on July 2, 2011, the effect of this ruling. was
to limit the petitioner to introducing evidence
of injuries that occurred during a two-and-a-

8 ‘When the Manor Care decision was issued, and
during all time periods relevant to this case, the
definition of “health care” did not extend to
staffing-related issues. In 2015, the Legislature
amended West Virginia Code § 55-7B-2(e) to
include matters related to staffing within the
definition of “health care” under the MPLA.
Those amendments have no impact on the out-
come of this case,

9. See supra note 2.

10, This Court observed in Martin that “[Elor most
general causes of action, those under a disability
have up to twenty years to file suit pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 55-2-15.”
2157698 at *2.

11. The trial court granted CMO’s motion to di-
rect a verdict as to punitive damages after find-
ing that the petitioner “failed to produce any

2013 WL

533

half-month period (April 19, 2011, to July 2,
2011).

At the conclusion of terial, which began on
October 21, 2014, the jury returned 4 verdict
in favor of the petitioner. The jury respond-
ed to special interrogatories and found that
CMO deviated from the standard of care in
its treatment of Mr, Thompson. After as-
sessing the negligence of CMO, the jury
decided that.75% of the negligence was medi-
cal in nature and 25% was non-medical, as it
pertained to inadequate staff and/or training,
In awarding compensatory damages," the
jury determined that $10,000 was attribut-
able to damages suffered by Mr. Thompson
and $90,000 was suffered by the estate for
his wrongful death.

In seeking a new trial? the petitioner
faulted the trial court for its refusal to apply

the tolling provision found in the savings

statute, Rather than relying on Martin as
the basis for refusing to apply the savings
statute, she posited that the trial court
should have applied the holding in Mack-
Evans v, Hilltop Healthcare Center, Inc., 226
W.Va. 257, 700 S.H.2d 817 (2010), to this
ease’ She further argued that the trial
court erred in failing to apply the discovery
rule to toll the statute of limitations until Mr.
Thompson’s date of death due to his incom-
petency and the absence of a legal represen-
tative charged to act on his behalf. The
petitioner also challenged the trial court’s
decision to limit the introduction of spécifie
demonstrative evidence and to admit other
irrelevant testimonial evidence. - Upon its

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
base an award of punitive damages;” the peti-
tioner has not appealed the issue of punitive
damages.

12, See W.Va. R. Civ. P. 59.

13. In Hilltop Healthcare, this Court found the
tolling provision of the savings statute applicable
to a lawsuit instituted under West Virginia Code
§ 55-7-8a by the decedent’s personal representa-

~ tive following the death of an incompetent indi-
vidual. Because the ‘parties stipulated that Mr.
Thompson was mentally incapacitated due to
having Alzheimer’s, the petitioner maintains the
tolling provisions of West Virginia Code § 55~7-
8a should apply to her cause of action under
authority of Hilltop Healthcare.

534

consideration of these arguments, the trial
court denied the petitioner’s motion for a
new trial by its order of May 11, 2015. It is
from this denial that the petitioner now ap-
peals.
IL Standard of Review
HMM As we explained in Williams v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc, 215
W.Va. 15, 592 S.H.2d 794 (2003):
‘As a general proposition, we review a
cireuit court’s rulings on a motion for a
new trial under an abuse of discretion
standard.... Thus, in reviewing chal-
lenges to findings and rulings made by a
cireuit court, we apply a two-pronged def-
erential standard of review. We review
the rulings of the circuit court concerning
a new trial and its conclusion as to the
existence of reversible error under an
abuse of discretion standard, and we re-
view the circuit court’s underlying factual
findings under a clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Questions of law are subject to a de
novo review.’
Id, at 18, 592 §.E.2d at 797 (quoting Tennant
v Marion Health Care Found, Inc, 194
W.Va. 97, 104, 459 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1995) and
internal citation omitted). The deference we
accord a trial court in regard to a new trial
ruling is not without limits:

Although the ruling of a trial court in
granting or denying a motion for a new
trial is entitled to great respect and
weight, the trial court’s ruling will be re-
versed on appeal when it is clear that the
trial court has acted under some misappre-
hension of the law or the evidence.

Syl. Pt. 4, Sanders v. Georgia-Pac. Corp.
159 W.Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976). With
these standards in mind, we proceed to de-
termine whether the trial court erred in de-
nying the petitioner’s motion for a new trial,

IM. Discussion

The statute of limitations issue at the cen-
ter of this appeal concerns the time period
for which the trial court permitted evidence
to be introduced related to personal injuries
14. There is no dispute that the applicable limita-

tions period under the MPLA is two years and

there is no issue regarding the petitioner's timely

filing of her complaint.

the petitioner alleges Mr. Thompson sus-
tained while living at the nursing facility.
The crux of the petitioner’s position is that,
because Mr. Thompson’s incapacity statutori-
ly prevented the running of the two-year
limitations period until the point of his death,
she should have been permitted to introduce
evidence for the two-year period preceding
his death as opposed to the two-year period
that anteceded the lawsuit’s filing. She con-
tends the trial court erred in deciding the
savings statute did not toll the running of the
applicable two-year limitations period until
the date when Mr. Thompson died. In rely-
ing on Martin and refusing to apply the
holding in Hilltop Healthcare,® the petition-
er contends the trial court failed to appreci-
ate critical distinctions between Martin and
this case. Conversely, CMO maintains that
the Martin decision is both apposite and
controlling.

To address the issues in this appeal, we
find it necessary to revisit this Court’s deci-
sion in Martin. The only issue in that case
was whether a lawsuit filed in 2012 could be
maintained for medical injuries sustained by
an incapacitated individual in 2007. Mr.
Martin, who was legally and mentally inca-
pacitated as the result of a work-related inci-
dent, developed numerous ulcers while hospi-
talized after the May 2007 accident. His
wife was appointed as his guardian and con-
servator on February 26, 2008. When the
circuit court granted the defendant hospital’s
motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
passing of the MPLA two-year statute of
limitations before the suit was filed, Mrs.
Martin appealed. As the basis for her ap-
peal, she raised the issue of whether the
savings statute should operate to toll the
statute of limitations based on Mr. Martin’s
mental incapacity.

Because Mrs. Martin was her husband’s
legal representative and because she was
eontemporaneously aware of his ulcers dur-
ing his hospital stay, there was no issue as to
the application of the discovery rule to the

15, See supra note 13.

case.® Martin, 2018 WL 2157698 at *2, n. 3;
see Legg v. Rashid, 222 W.Va. 169, 174, 668
S.E.2d 628, 628 (2008) (stating that “{U]n-
der the “discovery rule,” the statute of limi-
tations is tolled until a claimant knows or by
reasonable diligence should know of his
claim, ”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Gaither
v. City Hosp, Inc. 199 W.Va. 706, 487 S.B.2d
901 (1997)). This Court was asked to decide
whether the two-year MPLA statute ran in
2009, two years after the ulcers first formed,
or whether a longer limitations period of up
to twenty years should apply under the sav-
ings statute.!7 In considering whether the
savings statute should toll the claim for Mr.
Martin’s injuries beyond the two-year statute
of limitations provided by the MPLA, we
determined that “adults alleging a medical
professional liability action under [the]
MPLA have a two-year statute of limitations,
except in cases where discovery is an issue.”
Martin, 2018 WL 2157698 at *2 (emphasis
supplied). Because the discovery of the sub-
ject injuries was not an issue in Martin and
because Mr. Martin had an appointed legal
representative, this Court determined that
the two-year limitations period ran from the
date the cause of action accrued in 2007. Id,
Since the complaint was not filed within two
year's of the alleged injuries, we affirmed the
circuit court’s dismissal of the complaint for
failing to meet the applicable statute of limi-
tations.

Although the trial court and CMO both
take the view that the instant case falls
squarely within the holding of Martin, this
case includes several issues that were not
present in Martin. In contrast to Martin,
the case before us presents a question of
when Mr. Thompson’s injuries could have
been legally discovered which is linked to yet
another distinction—the absence of a legal
representative appointed prior to Mr.
Thompson’s death. While Mr. Martin was
still living when his medical malpractice suit
16. The MPLA expressly incorporates the discov-

ery rule as it provides that a cause of action

“must be commenced within two years of the

date of such injury, or within two years of the

date when such person discovers, or with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have dis-
covered such injury, whichever last occurs...”

W.Va.Code § 55-7B-4(a).

535

was instituted on his behalf, Mr. Thompson’s
cause of action was only asserted after his
death. The trial court overlooked these sig-
nificant differences, limiting its analysis to
our brief recognition in-Martin of the rule of
statutory construction which “‘requires that
a specific statute be given precedence over a
general statute relating to the same subject
matter where the two cannot be reconciled.’ ”
Id. (quoting Zimmerer v. Romano, 223
W.Va. 769, 784, 679 S.E.2d 601, 616 (2009),
Though the legal analysis we employed in
Martin was admittedly scant, the trial court
mistakenly concluded that the limitations pe-
riod issue presented in this case—one that
clearly does not require a quantitative deter-
mination of two versus twenty years for pur-
poses of instituting an MPLA lawsuit—was
resolved by the ruling we issued in Martin.

Unlike the situation existing in Martin, the
viability of pursuing a medical malpractice
action was never in question here, The par-
ties agreed that a two-year limitations period
was controlling and that it had been met; the
only issue was an identification of which two-
year time period applied for purposes of
introducing evidence of Mr. Thompson’s al-
leged injuries. In contrast to Martin where
there was no need to apply the discovery
rule, this case involved an issue of when Mr.
Thompson’s injuries could reasonably have
been discovered.8 While Mr. Martin’s legal
guardian was immediately aware of his ul-
cers, in the case before us, the lack of an
appointed legal representative created an is-
sue as to when Mr. Thompson’s alleged inju-
ries were subject to discovery. Given the
material differences between Martin and the
case sub judice, we do not find it determina-
tive of the issues in this case.

HN Turning to the issue of when Mr.
‘Thompson’s injuries could have been discov-
ered, CMO contends the medical power of

17. Under the savings statute, the applicable stat-
ute of limitations is tolled until the injured indi-
vidual either gains the age of majority or regains
his/her mental competency. In no event, howev-
er, can such an action be brought more than
twenty years after the accrual of the right to sue.
See W.Va.Code § 55-2-15.

18. See supra note 16.

536

attorney that the petitioner had with regard
to-Mr, Thompson is sufficient to charge her
with knowledge of his injuries for purposes
of a statute of limitations analysis, We dis-
agree. As this Court discussed in State ex
rel, AMFM, LLC v, King, 280 W.Va. 471,740
§.E.2d 66 (2013), persons who hold a medical
power of attorney or serve as a health care
surrogate “have, as their sole function, the
authority to make health care decisions on
behalf of an incapacitated person.” Id. at
481 n. 9, 740 S.E.2d at 76 n: 9, An individual
with a medical power of attorney does not
have the power to make binding legal deci-
sions for the subject incapacitated person,
See Tex. Cityview Care Cir, LP v. Fryer, 227
S.W.8d 845, 352 (Tex,Ct.App.2007) (“[N]Joth-
ing in the medical power of attorney indi-
cates that it was intended to confer authority
... to make legal, as opposed to health care,
decisions....”); accord Johnson v, Kindred
Healthcare, Inc, 466 Mass, 779, 2 N.E.3d
849, 857 (2014) (“Our conclusion that a health
care agent does not have the authority to
bind the principal to an arbitration agree-
ment comports with the view of a majority of
courts in other jurisdictions that have consid-
ered similar issues,”); Koricic v, Beverly En-
ters.-Neb., Inc, 278 Neb, 718, 778 N.W.2d
145, 151° (2009) (finding that son’s authority
to sign ‘health care documents on mother’s
behalf did not authorize him to sign arbitra-
tion agreement on her behalf); Primmer v.
Healthcare Indus. Corp. 48 N.E.8d 788, 798
(Ohio App.2015) (holding that daughter's
medical power of attorney did not authorize
her to sign arbitration agreement on father’s
behalf, reasoning that “the terms -of this
health care power of attorney do not encom-
pass decisions to waive trial by jury or the
court in favor of arbitration”); see also
Blankfeld v, Richmond Health Care, Inc,
902 So.2d 296, 301 (Fla.App.2005) (“There is
nothing in the statute to indicate legislative
intent that such a [health care] proxy can
19. A personal representative is authorized to

bring a cause of action that survives a person's

death “[i]f the injured party dies before having

begun any such action and it is not at the time of

his death barred by the applicable statute of

limitations,” W,Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c). A per-

sonal injury is among those causes that survive

beat under the statute. See W.Va.Code § 55-7~

enter into contracts which’ agree to things
not strictly related to health care deci-
sions.”); of Owens v. Natl, Health Corp,
268 S.W.8d 876, 888-85 (Tenn.2007) (applying
statutory definitions to hold that health care
power of attorney authorized attorney-in-fact
to.enter into arbitration agreement as part of
contract admitting nursing home resident),
As a result, the fact that the petitioner may
have had concerns about the care Mr.
Thompson was receiving in 2009 did not im-
pose upon her a duty to,institute a suit on his
behalf based on that alleged knowledge. Un-
til she was appointed as his legal representa-
tive following his death, the petitioner had no
power to stand in Mr, Thompson’s legal
shoes. Because a medical power of attorney
is not the equivalent of a general power of
attorney, she cannot be charged with knowl-
edge of his injuries for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.

Hl Given that Mr. Thompson was-incom-
petent and had no legal representative who
could have initiated an MPLA action on his
behalf, the petitioner argues the statute of
limitations could not have begun to run until
his death. In support of her position, she
cites this Court’s decision in Hilltop Health-
care, a case in-which we considered whether
the savings statute applied to personal injury
claims brought by a personal representative,
under authority of West Virginia Code § 55-
7-8a(c),!9 upon the death of a person with a
mental disability. In examining the lan-
guage of West Virginia Code § 55-7-8a(c),
we recognized that the savings statute is
directly involved in deciding whether a per-
sonal representative may bring suit following
death.29 As a result, we determined that
“the statute [W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c)] is im-
pacted by the mental disability tolling provi-
sions under W.Va.Code § 55-2-15.” 226
W.Va. at 259, 700 8.H.2d at 319, Based on
this recognition, we held in syllabus point
five of Hilltop Healthcare:

20, The determination of whether a personal rep-
resentative can bring an action upon death is
statutorily dependent on the limitation periods
set forth in “articles two [§§ 55-2-1 et seq.] and
two-A [§§ 55-2A-1 et seq.] of this chapter.”
W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c).

‘The statute of limitations for a personal
injury claim brought under the authority
of W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c) (1959) (Repl.
Vol.2008) is tolled during the period of a
mental disability as defined by W.Va.Code
§ 55-2-15 (1928) (Rep].Vol.2008). In the
event the injured person dies before the
mental disability ends, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run on the date of the
injured person’s death.

226 W.Va. at 259, 700 S.E.2d at 319.

HM Logic impels the conclusion that an
incompetent individual’s death is a natural
moratorium for the tolling of the statute of
limitations that was invoked due to a disabili-
“ty. See Roberson v. Teel, 20 Ariz.App. 489,
518 P.2d 977, 988 (1978) (stating that “where
a statute of limitation is tolled because of
incompetency, the tolling of the statute ends
upon the death of the incompetent”), In
Martin, there was no need to consider how
the death of an incompetent person termi-
nates the statutory tolling of the applicable
statute of limitations because Mr. Martin was
still living when the lawsuit’ was initiated.
See W.Va.Code § 55-2-15. To the extent that
our ruling in Martin may have permitted an
inference that the tolling provisions of West
Virginia Code § 55-2-15 do not come into
play in regard to a medical malpractice claim
posthumously initiated on behalf of an incom-
petent person, we expressly disavow that
conclusion. As we previously recognized in
Hilltop Healthcare, a published opinion,” the
statutory authority for a personal represen-
tative to bring an action following the death
of an individual is examined with specific
reference to the tolling provisions provided
under the savings statute, 226 W.Va. at 266,
100 S.E.2d at, 326. To suggest that the
tolling provisiohs are not applicable to an
MPLA claim brought by a personal repre-

21. See State v. McKinley, 234 W.Va. 143, 153,
764 8.E.2d 303, 313 (2014) (stating that signed
opinions “should be the primary sources relied
upon in the development of the common law”).

22, The MPLA provides that a “cause of action for
injury to a minor, brought by or on behalf of a
minor who was under the age of ten years at the
time of such injury, shall be commenced within
two years of the date of such injury, or prior to
the minor’s twelfth birthday, whichever provides
the longer period.” W.Va.Code § 55-7B-4(b).

537

sentative following death i is simply not tena-
ble.

CMO suggests the Legislature’s failure to
include a provision within the MPLA that
specifically addresses the tolling of the limi-
tations period for incompetent persons when
it specifically addressed a tolling period for
minors” is evidence that the tolling provi-
sions of the savings statute do not apply.
We disagree. The fact that the Legislature
chose to address how the two-year MPLA
limitations period impacts a certain class of
minors does not establish an intent to nullify
the effect of the savings statute on medical
injuries suffered by incompetent persons.
By failing to carve out any treatment differ-
ent than that already existing with regard to
the limitations periods applicable to causes of
action brought on behalf of incompetent per-
sons, it arguably does the opposite. All
MPLA: actions brought by a personal -repre-
sentative following an incompetent individu-
al’s death necessarily ave instituted under
authority of West Virginia Code § 55~7~
8a(c). And, as addressed above, a personal
vepresentative’s authority to bring suit fol-
lowing the death of an incompetent individual
is expressly linked to the tolling provisions
provided under the savings statute. See
Hilltop Healthcare, 226 W.Va. at 268, 700
S.E.2d at 326,

HM As the foregoing analysis makes
clear, there is simply no basis for finding that
the tolling provisions of the savings statute
do not apply to MPLA actions that are insti-
tuted by a personal representative following
the death of an incompetent individual.
The authority of a personal representative to
bring a personal injury action on behalf of a
deceased individual pursuant to West Virgi-
nia Code § 55-7-8a(¢) includes the authority

23, See supra note 20, -

24. We observe, however, that as in cases like
-Martin, where the incompetent person has a duly
appointed legal ‘representative who is aware of

~ an alleged act of medical malpractice, it would
be prudent to promptly initidte the claim rather
than waiting until after the incompetent person's
death. Otherwise; it is likely that issues based on
staleness and faded memories may negatively
impact such claims.

538

to bring a medical malpractice action under
the MPLA for injuries sustained prior to
death that did not result in death, Because
West Virginia Code § 55~7-8a(c) incorpo-
rates the general disability savings statute,
the tolling provisions of the general disability
savings statute apply to a medical malprac-
tice cause of action brought by a personal
representative under authority of West Virgi-
nia Code § 557-825 Given that the appli-
cable tolling provisions terminate upon the
death of an incompetent individual, the two-
year statute of limitations begins to run on
the date of the injured person’s death. See
Hilltop Healthcare, 226 W.Va. at 259, 700
S.E.2d at 319, syl. pt. 5.

HI In this case, the cause of action was
timely filed within two years of Mr. Thomp-
son’s death. However, the trial court con-
strictively applied the limitations period to
prevent the petitioner from introducing evi-
dence related to a two-year period of time
when Mr, Thompson was actually alive and
susceptible to injury. By its ruling, the trial
court effectively shortened the legislative
grant of a two-year period in which to seek
recovery for injuries that were sustained.
Obviously, no personal injuries were sustain-
able beyond the point of death. As a result,
the trial court erred in limiting the petitioner
to introducing evidence for the two-year-peri-
od directly preceding the filing of her suit.
Accordingly, this matter is reversed and re-
manded solely on the issue of the personal
injury claim and the trial court is directed to
permit the introduction of admissible evi-
dence for the two-year period that preceded
Mr. Thompson’s death.

Given our determination of reversible er-
ror, we do not address the petitioner’s allega-
tions of error with regard to the demonstra-
tive survey evidence,”® observing only that it
will now presumably fall within the time peri-
od for which evidence may be introduced that

25. Because Mrs. Martin filed her MPLA cause of
action during her husband's lifetime, the provi-
sions of West Virginia Code § 55-7-8a were not
relied upon to institute suit. As a result, the
tolling provisions of West Virginia Code § 55-2-
15 were not automatically invoked by operation
of the statute. See W.Va.Code § 55-7-8a(c).

26. The survey evidence was comprised of state
inspections performed at the nursing facility,

is relevant to the petitioner’s MPLA claim.””
Based on the remand of this matter, we find
no need to address the alleged error as to
testimonial evidence provided by Dr. DeLa-
Garza.’
IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the order of the
Circuit Court of Nicholas County denying a
new trial to the petitioner is affirmed as to
the wrongful death claim; reversed as to the
personal injury claim; and this matter is
remanded for a new trial solely on the per-

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part; and
remanded.

Justice DAVIS, deeming herself
disqualified, did not participate in the
decision in this case.

Judge ALSOP sitting by special
assignment,

803 S.E.2d 508

Patricia S. REED, Commissioner, West
Virginia Division of Motor
Vehicles, Petitioner

v.
Frederick STAFFILENO, Respondent.
No. 16-0487

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 25, 2017
Filed: May 5, 2017

27. We make no ruling’as to the admissibility of
the survey evidence.

28. The petitioner argued that the expert witness
‘was wrongly permitted to testify about the falls of
other patients and to testify, without proper foun-
dation, about a restraint device called a Posey
Vest,

540

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General,
Elaine L, Skorich, Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for
Petitioner

Mare B. Chernenko, William E. Watson &
Associates, Wellsburg, West Virginia, Attor-
ney for Respondent

Davis, Justice:

Patricia S. Reed, Commissioner of the
West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles
(hereinafter “DMV”), appeals from a final
order of the Circuit Court of Brooke County.
The circuit court’s order reversed the deci-
sion of the Office of Administrative Hearings
(hereinafter “OAH”) that had affirmed
DMV's revocation of: the driver’s license of
the Respondent, Frederick Staffileno (here-
inafter “Mr. Staffileno”). In this appeal,
DMV contends that the circuit court commit-
ted error in concluding that (1) OAH’s delay
in issuing its decision was prejudicial to Mr.
Staffileno, (2) DMV failed to prove that Mr.
Staffileno knew the person driving his car
was under the.influence of aleohol, and (8) a
new hearing examiner could not decide the
case based solely upon a review of the rec-
ord, After a careful review of the briefs, the
record submitted on appeal, the applicable
law, and listening to the argument of the
parties, we affirm.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
The record indicates that on August 29,
2011, at around 9:20 pm, State Trooper K,
Castle (hereinafter “Trooper Castle”) was on
routine patrol on Route 2, in Brooke County,
when he observed a vehicle being driven with
the driver’s side headlight out. Trooper Cas-

tle stopped the vehicle as a result of the
headlight being out, Upon engaging the driv-
er of the vehicle, Tiffany Haynes, Trooper
Castle detected the odor of alcohol on her
and observed that her eyes were bloodshot
and glassy. After Ms, Haynes admitted to
drinking two beers, Trooper Castle subjected
her to field sobriety tests. Ms. Haynes
passed the one-leg stand. test, but failed the
horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the walk-
and-turn test. Trooper Castle then adminis-
tered the preliminary breath test, which Ms,
Haynes also failed by registering a blood-
alcohol content of .167 percent Trooper Cas-
tle thereafter placed Ms. Haynes v under ar-
rest for DUI.

Trooper Castle also at some point ap-
proached the passenger side window and en-
gaged Mr, Staffileno, Trooper Castle detect-
ed the odor of alcohol emitting from Mr,
Staffileno as he spoke with him: Mr. Staffile-
no informed Trooper Castle that he’ and Ms.
Haynes had been drinking at a bar, and that
he allowed her to drive his vehicle because he
had drunk more than she had. Trooper Cas-
tle thereafter placed Mr. Staffileno under
arrest for knowingly permitting his vehicle to
be driven by Ms. Haynes while she was
under the influence of alcohol.

Subsequent to Mr. Staffileno’s arrest,
DMV issued an order, dated September 15,
2011, revoking his driver's license for a peri-
od of ninety days. Mr. Staffileno requested
an administrative hearing to contest the rev-
ocation.! An administrative hearing was held
on August 1, 2012, before hearing examiner
Erica Tamburin. Evidence was presented at
the hearing by Mr, Staffileno, who was rep-
resented by counsel, and Trooper Castle. The
hearing examiner resigned, at some’ point
after the hearing, without rendering a deci-
sion, A new hearing examiner, William L,
Bands, was assigned to the case. Mr. Bands
rendered a decision on October 18, 2015, that
upheld the revocation of Mr, Staffileno’s driv-
er’s license. On the same day, the Chief
Hearing Examiner entered an order adopt-
ing Mr. Bands’ decision.

1. The revocation has been stayed throughout the
proceedings.

Bal

Mr. Staffileno appealed the decision of
OAH to the circuit court, In the appeal, Mr.
Staffileno contended that the decision of
OAH should be reversed because of a delay
of more than three years in issuing the deci-
sion, DMV failed to prove that he knew Ms.
Haynes was intoxicated, and the new hearing
examiner could not decide the case based
solely upon a review of the record. The cir-
cuit court agreed with all three of Mr. Staffi-
leno’s contentions and reversed the decision
of OAH. This appeal by DMV followed.

Ih

STANDARD OF REVIEW
” TBE s«oOur review of a cireuit court’s deci-
sion involving an administrative agency order
proceeds under the standard announced in
Syllabus point 1 of Muscatell v. Cline, 196
W.Va, 588, 474 S.H.2d 518 (1996):

On appeal of an administrative order
from a circuit court, this Court is bound by

*" the statutory standards contained in W.

Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews ques-

tions of law presented de novo; findings of
_ fact by the administrative officer are ac-

corded deference unless the reviewing

court believes the findings to be clearly

‘wrong.
Moreover, “[ijn cases where the circuit court
has amended the result before the adminis-
trative agency, this Court reviews the final
order of the circuit court and thé ultimate
disposition by it of an administrative law case
under an abuse of discretion standard and
reviews questions of law de novo.” Syl. pt. 2,
Muscatell, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518,
With these standards in mind, we proceed to
the parties’ arguments.

Ti.
- DISCUSSION

DMV contends that the cireuit court erred
in finding that the delay of over three years
in-issuing a final decision hy OAH. was preju-
dicial to Mr. Staffileno.2 DMV argues that
2. The DMV contends that it was prejudiced be-

cause of language in the circuit court’s order that

held. it responsible for the delay. Although the
circuit court’s order does in fact refer to DMV

542

Mr. Staffileno was allowed to present all his
evidence during the hearing; therefore, the
fact that the final order was not entered until
over three years after the hearing concluded
is not in and of itself prejudicial. According
to DMV, under the decision in Miller v.
Moredock, 229 W.Va. 66, 726 S.E.2d 34
(2011), “relief for delay is only warranted if a
driver’s ability to defend himself is compro-
mised.” Miller does not stand for such a
proposition. .

As a preliminary matter, we will note that
the law governing revocation proceedings be-
fore OAH does not impose time constraints
on the issuance of decisions by that agency
following an administrative hearing. See W.
Va. Code § 17C-5C-1 et seg. and 105 CSR
§ 1-1 ef seg. However, this Court has long
recognized the constitutional mandate that
“Sustice shall be administered without ...
delay’ W. Va. Const. Art. III, § 17.” Frante
v, Palmer, 211 W.Va. 188, 192, 564 S.E.2d
398, 402 (2001). We further have recognized
that “administrative agencies performing
quasi-judicial functions have an affirmative
duty to dispose promptly of matters properly
submitted.” Syl. pt. 7, in part, Allen v. State
Human Rights Comm’n, 174 W.Va. 189, 824
S8.E.2d 99 (1984),

Turning now to the decision in Miller, we
observe that this was an appeal by DMV
from an order of the circuit court that had
reversed its suspension of the Respondent's
driver's license for DUI# The circuit court in
Miller reversed the decision because of a
seventeen month delay between the adminis-
trative hearing and entry of the final order
revoking the Respondent's driver’s license.
The circuit court determined that such a
delay was “presumptively” prejudicial. On

and OAH as a single entity in causing the delay,
we find this to be harmless verbiage. In fact, the
circuit court, in an amended order, clarified that
it was aware that DMV and OAH were separate
entities, In that amended order, the circuit court
made clear that its findings regarding the preju-
dice caused to Mr. Staffileno remained. It should
be pointed out that, prior to 2010, the adminis-
trative hearing process was under the control of
DMV. See W. Va. Code § 17C-5C-5(a) (Repl. Vol.
2013) (2010) (recognizing the “transition of the
administrative hearing process from the Division
of Motor Vehicles to the Office of Administrative
Hearings"). In 2010, “[t]he Office of Administra-
tive Hearings [was] created as a separate operat-

appeal, DMV contended “that the circuit
court failed to find that [Respondent] suf-
fered any actual prejudice as a result of the
delay and that, absent such a finding, the
revocation order should have been affirmed.”
Miller, 229 W.Va. at 70, 726 S.E.2d at 88. We
agreed with DMV in Miller that the circuit
court erred in using a presumption of preju-
dice standard to reverse the revocation or-
der. The decision in Miller set out the follow-
ing standard for determining prejudice from
a delay in the issuance of a revocation order
after a hearing has been held:
On appeal to the cireuit court from an
order revoking a party's license to operate
a motor vehicle in this State, when the
party asserts that his constitutional right
to due process has been violated by a delay
in the issuance of the revocation order by
the Commissioner of the Division of Motor
Vehicles, he must demonstrate that he has
suffered actual and substantial prejudice
as a result of the delay. Once actual and
substantial prejudice from the delay has
been proven, the circuit court must then
balance the resulting prejudice against the
reasons for the delay.4
Syl. pt. 5, Miller, 229 W.Va. 66, 726 S.H.2d 34
(footnote added),

HM Our holding in Syllabus point 5 of
Miller is dispositive of the resolution of the
issue in this case. However, because Miller
was decided under the old administrative
system that was controlled by DMV, we take
this opportunity to modify Syllabus point 5 of
Miller to reflect the current administrative
system under OAH. Consequently, we now
hold that on appeal to the circuit court from
an order of the Office of Administrative
Hearings affirming the revocation of a par-

ing agency within the Department of Transporta-

tion.” W. Va. Code § 17C-5C-1(a) (2010) (Repl.
Vol. 2013).

3. The decision in Miller was decided under the
old system when the administrative procedure
was under the control of DMV.

4, We reversed the circuit court's order in Miller
and remanded the case with instructions to the
circuit court to take evidence on the issue of
prejudice from the seventeen month delay in
issuing a decision.

ty’s license to operate a motor vehicle in this
State, when the party asserts that his or her
constitutional right to due process has been
violated by a delay in the issuance of the
order by the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings, the party must demonstrate that he or
she has suffered actual and substantial preju-
dice as a result of the delay. Once actual and
substantial prejudice from the delay has been
proven, the cireuit court must then balance
the resulting prejudice against the reasons
for the delay.

Hl As previously stated, DMV contends
that, under Miller, Mr. Staffileno is entitled
to relief only if he establishes that his ability
to defend himself was compromised. Al-
though the decision in Miller did not discuss
the nature of the prejudice that must be
shown, we have little hesitancy in rejecting
the standard that DMV seeks to impose.
DMV seeks to apply a standard that is ap-
propriate when a party challenges a pre-
hearing delay. The issue of a party’s ability
to mount a defense is relevant when there is
a substantial delay in holding an actual hear-
ing. See Meadows v, Reed, No, 14-0188, 2015
WL 1588462 (W. Va. Mar, 16, 2015) (memo-
randum decision) (determining four year de-
lay before hearing was prejudicial to driver's
ability to defend himself); Reed v. Conniff,
236 W.Va. 300, 779 S.H.2d 568 (2015) (con-
cluding four year delay before hearing did
not prevent driver from mounting a defense);
Petry v. Stwmp, 219 W.Va. 197, 682 S.E.2d
858 (2006) (uling driver prejudiced by six
year delay in holding a rehearing); In re
Petition of Donley, 217 W.Va. 449, 618
§.H.2d 458 (2005) (finding no prejudice from
three year delay in holding hearing); John-
son v. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 173
W.Va. 565, 318 S.E.2d 616 (1984) (observing
no prejudice from pre-hearing delay). How-
ever, the decision in Miller did not involve a
pre-hearing delay. The delay in Miller was a
post-hearing delay in the issuance of a final
order. In the context of a delay in issuing an
order after a hearing has been held, the issue
of prejudice necessarily involves prejudice to
a party that occurred after the hearing was
held. As a general matter, under Miller the
standard for post-hearing prejudice will ordi-
narily involve some type of change in a par-
ty’s circumstances that may have been sub-

543

stantially prejudiced because of the delay in
issuing a final order by OAH.

Tn the instant case, the circuit court found
that Mr. Staffileno “suffered substantial and
actual prejudice as a result of the delay in
this matter and his due process rights have
been violated.” The circuit court made the
following findings that established substan-
tial and actual prejudice by the delay in
issuing the order:

1] During the 89 month period between
the August 1, 2012 hearing and the Octo-
ber 28, 2015 Decision, Petitioner made a
career change that is now adversely affect-
ed by the potential revocation of his Driv-
er’s License.

[2] At the time of the hearing in August
2012, Petitioner was employed by the West
Virginia State Tax Department as an ac-
countant where, for more than 30 years, he
held a desk job at the Department’s Of-
fices in Wheeling.

[3] In June or July of 2018, Petitioner
applied to the West Virginia Department.
of Motor Vehicles to obtain a commercial
driver's license (CDL) which was issued to
Petitioner in or about July 2018,

[4] In November 2018, Petitioner be-
came a temporary/substitute school bus
driver for the Brooke County Board of
Education.

5] In reliance upon his having obtained
a CDL and being employed as a bus driv-
er, Petitioner retired from his Tax Depart-
ment position in July 2014.

(6] Petitioner became a permanent full
time school bus driver for the Brooke
County Board of Education in November
2014.
'7] Petitioner is required to maintain his
valid CDL as a condition of his employ-
ment and thus, if he is unable to drive, he
can no longer be employed as a school bus
driver.

In essence, the circuit court determined that,
Mr, Staffileno would not have retired when
he did, and changed his employment to that
of a school bus driver, if OAH had issued a
timely decision. It is obvious, and we so find,
that as a result of Mr, Staffileno’s change in

544

employment, he will suffer substantial and
- actual prejudice by the imposition of the
untimely decision by OAH.

HE Under Miller and our reformulation
of its holding, the cireuit court was required
to balance the resulting prejudice to Mr.
Staffileno against the reason for the delay by
OAH. The circuit court's order does not dis-
cuss any reason for the delay. Obviously, Mr.
Staffileno did not have the burden of explain-
ing why OAH failed to timely render its
decision. In this appeal, DMV has not assert-
ed any reason for the delay, In fact, DMV
has gone to great pains to point out that it
did not cause the delay. While we can appre-
ciate DMV’s efforts to disassociate itself with
causing the delay, ultimately the burden was
upon it to inform the circuit court and this
Court of the possible reason for the delay.®
See, eg. State ex rel. Knotts v. Facemire,
223 W.Va. 594, 604, 678 S,E.2d 847, 857
(2009) (“If Petitioner is able to meet his
burden of demonstrating actual substantial
prejudice, then the trial court should proceed
to consider the reasons offered by the State
for the delay and determirie, after weighing
the tendered: justifications against the dem-
onstrated prejudice, if due process was de-
nied based on the preindictment delay.”). In
light of the evidence establishing prejudice
from the delay in issuing the order and the
absence of any evidence showing the reason
for the delay, we find no basis to disturb the
cireuit ‘court’s decision on this dispositive is-
sue!

The recent decision in Warner v. Reed, No.
15-0229, 2016 WL 870614 (W. Va, Mar. 7,
2016) (memorandum decision), is distinguish-
able from the facts of this case.’ In Warner,
one of the issues raised by the driver was
that he was prejudiced by a two year delay
between the time that his administrative
hearing was held: and the issuance of the
order revoking his license, We rejected this

5, During oral argument, counsel for DMV indi-
cated that she did not know what caused the
delay, but that she was aware that OAH was
correcting a systemic problem it had in timely
issuing decisions,

6. We previously noted that the hearing examiner
who took evidence in this matter resigned and a
new hearing examiner was assigned to the case.
This fact was not.presented by DMV as a reason.

argument because the driver failed to pres-
ent any evidence of prejudice from the delay:
Finally, the Court similarly finds no vio-
lation of petitioner’s due process rights in
the approximately two-year delay between
the administrative hearing and the issu-
ance ofthe order revoking petitioner's li-
cense, In support of this assignment of
error, petitioner alleges only that this de-
lay caused him prejudice because the mat-
ter was transferred from the hearing ex-
aminer who actually presided over his
hearing to another hearing examiner who
later entered the order revoking -his li-
cense, According to’ petitioner, even if the
original examiner had drafter [sic] the or-
der, the delay likely would have caused her
to be unable to recall crucial elements of
his case, We note, however, that petitioner
provides no evidence to support this claim.
We further find that, while the DMV did
engage in an unnecessarily long delay in
issuing the order, there is no evidence in
the record that the hearing examiner
would have made different findings. if the
order had been entered sooner. For these
reasons, given the specific facts of this
case, we find that the delay between the
hearing and the issuance of the order re-
voking petitioner’s license did not consti-
tute a violation of his due process rights,
Warner, 2016 WL 870614, at *6.° Clearly,
Warner is distinguishable from the instant
ease, because the driver in Warner failed to
present any evidence of prejudice from the
delay in issuing the revocation order. ~
HI DMV also has argued that the cireuit
court could not consider post-hearing evi-
dence regarding Mr. Staffileno’s change in
employment because such evidence was not
considered by OAH, This evidence was prop-
erly before the circuit court under our rea-
soning in Miller and W. Va. Code § 29A-5-
4(f) (1998) (Repl, Vol, 2015). This statute

for the delay of over tliree years. Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that a change in hearing
examiners would cause some delay, such delay
should not have extended to over three years.

‘L. Warner was litigated under the old adminiétra-
tive system when DMV actually issued the final
order after a revocation hearing,

specifically authorizes a cireuit court to hear
matters not addressed at an administrative
hearing “in cases of alleged irregularities in
the procedure before the agency|.]” The de-
lay of more than three years in rendering the
decision by OAH is a procedural “irregulari-
ty.” Consequently, the statute permitted the
cireuit court to address the prejudice caused
by the delay even though the issue was not
presented to OAH. Moreover, our holding in
Miller would be meaningless if the circuit,
court could not consider post-hearing evi-
dence of prejudice caused by a delay in issu-
ing an order.

HM DMV has further argued that Mr.
Staffileno is not entitled to relief because he
did not file a petition for a writ of mandamus
to compel OAH to issue an order sooner. See
Syl. pt: 2, in part, Kanawha Valley Transp.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 159 W.Va. 88,
219 S.H.2d 882 (1975) (“If a decision is undu-
ly delayed, a proceeding in mandamus may
be instituted to compel a decision but not:
how to decide,”). We addressed and rejected
this argument by DMV in footnote 7 of Mil-
ler as follows:

It is the Commissioner’s contention that
because Appellee did not attempt to hasten
the Commissioner's ruling by filing a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus, he waived the
argument that the Commissioner’s delay in
issuing the revocation order violated his

~ due process rights.

In the present case, although Appellee
could-have sought to hasten the Commis-
sioner’s decision by filing a petition for
writ of mandamus in the cireuit court, Ap-
pellee did not waive the argument that he
was prejudiced by the delay in his circuit

* court appeal of the revocation order, De-
spite the availability of extraordinary relief
as a.means of seeking the issuance of
delayed decisions, a party whose driver’s
license has been revoked should not have
to resort to such relief to obtain a final
decision by the Commissioner within a rea-
sonable period of time following the admin-
istrative hearing. By the same token, when
a party avers that his due process rights
have been violated by a delay in the Com-

545

“missioner’s decision—that is, that he has
suffered actual and substantial prejudice
from the delay—but. elects not to seek
mandamus relief, the reviewing court may
consider this fact in determining whether
any such prejudice has occurred. ...

To be cléar, a party who elects not to
seek mandamus relief but who, instead,
raises the delay issue for the first time on
appeal to the cireuit court, does so at his
peril. The reviewing court is free to consid-
er the aggrieved party’s failure to pursue a
ruling as a factor in determining whether
he has suffered actual and substantial prej-
udice as a result of the delay.

Miller, 229.W.Va. at 72 n.7, 726 8.H.2d at 40
n.7 (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted).

It is clear from the above passage that the
decision in Miller indicated that a circuit
court has discretion to consider the impact of
a party’s failure to seek a writ of mandamus
to compel issuance of a revocation order after
a hearing. Such discretion means that a court
may give substantial or no weight to such
evidence, In the instant case, the circuit
court’s order is silent on this issue, even
though DMV asserted the issue in its re-
sponse brief before the circuit court. Insofar
as the issue of filing a mandamus petition
was raised below by DMV, we must assume
that through its silence, the circuit court
rejected the argument. See State v. Darrell
L., No, 18-1208, 2014 WL 6634867, at *4 (W.
Va. Nov. 24, 2014) (memorandum decision)
(‘The circuit court’s order following the hear-
ing is silent as to any statements made to the
child, aside from that previously mentioned,
and, as such, it is presumed that the circuit
court properly performed. its duty in ruling
on these allegations below.”); Mumaw v, U.S.
Silica Co., 204 W.Va, 6, 9, 511 S.H.2d 117,
120 (1998) (“The cireuit court's order was
silent on factor C, Therefore; this Court must.
presume for summary judgment purposes
that the circuit court found in favor of Ad-
ministrator Mumaw regarding factor O,”).
We find no abuse of discretion in the circuit
court’s determination, through silence, to
give no weight to the mandamus issue under

546

the facts of this case.

Because we have determined that the cir-
euit court was correct in finding that Mr.
Staffileno was prejudiced by the delay in
OAH’s issuance of its order, we need not
address the merits of DMV’s two remaining
assignments of error. See Travelers Indem.
Co. v, U.S. Silica Co., 237 W.Va. 540, 549 n.6,
788 S.E.2d 286, 295 n.6 (2015) (“Insofar as
resolution of notice is dispositive, we need
not address the remaining assignments of
error.”).

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court’s order of April 6, 2016,
reversing the decision of OAH, is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, dissenting:

The OAH’s post-hearing delay in issuing
its order affirming the DMV Commissioner’s
revocation order is seriously troubling. Nei-
ther a licensee nor the DMV Commissioner
should be required to wait such a long period
of time to obtain a decision in an administra-
tive appeal. Nonetheless, the delay in this
case did not present grounds for the circuit
court to overturn the revocation of the re-
spondent’s driver’s license. Both the circuit
court and the majority of this Court have
overlooked that the respondent simply gam-
bled on winning his appeal when he accepted
a new job without first contacting the OAH
or taking any legal steps to obtain a decision.
The majority has also wrongly chosen to
ignore the circuit court’s erroneous legal con-

8. During oral argument, counsel for DMV also
indicated that Mr. Staffileno could have written a
timely letter to OAH to alert it that a decision
had not been forthcoming. Mr. Staffileno did not
have the burden of writing a letter asking OAH to
act timely on his appeal, anymore than DMV had
the burden to write a letter asking OAH to
promptly render a decision in a case in which it
was a party,

1, The result of a secondary chemical test of Ms.
Haynes’s breath revealed that her blood alcohol

clusions regarding who was responsible for
the post-hearing delay. In allowing a DUI
revocation order to be overturned under
these facts, the majority has thrown open the
floodgates to allow a tsunami of drunk driv-
ers to gain reinstatement of their licenses
due solely to dilatory administrative prac-
tices.

The respondent’s driver’s license was re-
voked because he allowed his intoxicated!
friend, Ms. Haynes, to drive his vehicle on
the roadways of Brooke County. He gave her
the keys to his car despite the fact that they
had been at a bar for the preceding two and
one-half hours, and despite Haynes’s admis-
sion that she had been drinking beer. The
respondent admitted he had been observing
Ms. Haynes’s driving prior to the traffic stop
because he was aware of her alcohol con-
sumption. A person who knowingly permits
his or her vehicle to be driven by someone
under the influence of alcohol is subject to
the same administrative license revocation as_
if he or she had personally driven while
intoxicated. See W.Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(j)
(2013 & Supp. 2016). Accordingly, the DMV
Commissioner issued an order revoking the
respondent’s driver’s license for knowingly
allowing Ms. Haynes to drive his vehicle
while she was under the influence of alcohol.

The respondent’s revocation was automati-
cally stayed when he appealed to the OAH?
After the OAH held an evidentiary hearing
on his appeal, but while the matter was still
pending a decision, the respondent decided to
quit his job as a state tax auditor and become
a school bus driver. Thus, even though he
knew that the revocation of his driver’s li-
cense had merely been stayed pending the
outcome of his appeal, he elected to accept a
job that required him to hold a valid driver’s
license. This career change is the sole basis

content was .159 percent, which is more than
twice the legal limit and constitutes aggravated
DUI. See W.Va. Code §§ 17C-5-2(a)(E), (e) (2013
& Supp. 2016).

2. Because of the automatic stay that took effect
when the petitioner filed his appeal to the OAH
and because the circuit court stayed the OAH’s
decision, the respondent has retained his driver's
license throughout these proceedings.

for his claim of actual and substantial preju-
dice from the OAH’s delay. However, there is
nothing in the appendix record to show that
the respondent was forced to retire from his
auditor position, or that he was forced by
circumstances to take a job driving school
children. Indeed, at the circuit court’s hear-
ing on the respondent’s motion to stay the
OAH decision, the respondent testified he
could have remained ‘at his prior employ-
ment. It is clear that his change of employ-
ment, and any alleged prejudice, resulted
entirely from his voluntary decisions. Obvi-
ously, the respondent gambled on the possi-
bility that he would win his appeal and get
the revocation order overturned.

Despite the respondent’s decision to obtain
a job that required a valid driver’s license,
and with knowledge that the revocation order
was only temporarily stayed, neither he nor
his lawyer ever communicated in any fashion
with the OAH in an attempt to hasten the
issuance of the critical decision. The petition-
er also did not exercise his right to file a
petition for a writ of mandamus: “The mere
delay in the disposition or decision of a case

does not vitiate the order or judgment. If a -

decision is unduly delayed, a proceeding in
mandamus may be instituted to compel a
decision but not how to decide.” Syl. Pt. 2,
Kanawha Valley Transp. Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Comm’n, 159 W.Va. 88, 219 S.E.2d 332
(1975). This Court has warned licensees
against waiting to raise the issue of delay for
the first time on appeal to the circuit court:
[A] party who elects not to seek manda-
mus relief but who, instead, raises the
delay issue for the first time on appeal to
the circwit cowrt, does so at his peril. The
reviewing court is free to consider the
aggrieved party’s failure to pursue a ruling
as a factor in determining whether he has
suffered actual and substantial prejudice
as a result of the delay.
Miller v. Moredock, 229 W.Va. 66, 78 0.7, 726
S.E.2d 84, 41 n.7 (2011) (emphasis added).
While I am sympathetic to the fact that
litigants should not be required to file man-
damus petitions just to receive a decision in
administrative appeals, it would have been
reasonable for the respondent to have con-
tacted the OAH or filed a petition for manda-

547

mus before making a career change—partic-
ularly to a job requiring a valid driver’s
license as a qualification! Given these facts,
the circuit court should have taken into con-
sideration the respondent’s failure to affirma-
tively pursue a ruling on his appeal.

According to the majority, when a delay
oceurs after the administrative hearing is
held, the issue of prejudice “will ordinarily
involve some type of change in a party’s
circumstances that may have been substan-
tially prejudiced because of the delay in issu-
ing a final order by OAH.” The majority then
concluded that the facts of this case—where
the only prejudice was a job change wholly
within the respondent's control and where
the respondent rolled the dice rather than
pursuing a ruling—justified the circuit
court's overturning of the administrative
agency's decision. I completely disagree. Af-
ter considering all of the facts and the proce-
dural history of this case, it is clear that the
petitioner did not present evidence of actual
and substantial prejudice rising to the level
of a due process violation.

Woefully, I fear that the majority’s reli-
ance on the weak evidence of prejudice in
this case may result in countless drunk driv-
ers securing the unwarranted reinstatement
of their licenses. During oral argument, the
Commissioner’s attorney, who explained that
she handles DMV appeals on a full-time ba-
sis, informed the Court of a backlog of cases
at the OAH. Additionally, in her Notice of
Appeal filed on February 17, 2017, the Com-
missioner listed thirteen pending cireuit
court appeals presenting issues of post-hear-
ing delay by the OAH. Armed with the ma-
jority’s opinion in this case, every licensee
who has experienced post-hearing delay, in-
cluding drivers who committed serious drunk
driving violations and harmed innocent peo-
ple, will now be motivated to seek the rever-
sal of their license revocations by citing to or
worse yet, creating, a ‘change of circum-
stances in their lives.

Equally problematic are the glaring in-
stances of legal error in the circuit court’s
final order. Upon finding the presence of
actual and substantial prejudice to the .re-
spondent, the court was then required to
balance that prejudice against the reasons

548

for the administrative delay. See Miller, 229
W.Va, at 67-68, 726 S.E.2d at 35-86, syl. pt.
52 ‘The circuit court made no findings ad-
dressing the reasons for the delay and failed
to engage in the required balancing. These
omissions are most likely the result of the
circuit court’s repeated insistence that the
OAH and the DMV are the same or “allied”
agencies, Although there is no dispute that
the post-hearing delay was entirely attribut-
able to the OAH, the circuit court faulted the
DMV. The court concluded that the “Respon-
dent [DMV] has been reckless in failing to
accord Petitioner [Mr. Staffileno] his due
process rights” and “(ulfortunately, Respon-
dent's [DMV’s] dilatory practices in license
revocation cases are judicially well known.” 4
‘The circuit court supported this second state-
ment with citations to three cases that in-
volved the prior system where the DMV
Commissioner was responsible for the admin-
istrative hearing process. However, in 2010
the Legislature designated the OAH as the
agency to hear and decide all driver’s license
revocation appeals.’ By design and express
statement of law, the OAH is a separate
agency’ from the DMV.° The DMV partici-
pates in the administrative hearings only as a
party litigant.’ The OAH hearing examiners
who preside over the hearings, and the chief
hearing examiner responsible for rendering
the ultimate decision, are not within the em-
ployment, supervision, or control of the DMV
or the DMV Commissioner.’ Given its insis-
tence. on looking to and blaming the wrong
3.. Relying on Miller, the majority of this Court

incorporated this balancing test into its new syl-
labus point two.

4, Because Mr. Staffileno filed the appeal in cir-
cuit court, he was designated as the petitioner
and the DMV was designated as the respondent
in the court's order.

5. See, eg, W.Va. Code § 17C-5A-2 (2013 &
Supp. 2016) (directing OAH to preside over and
decide driver's license revocation appeal hear-
ings); W.Va, Code §§ 17C-5C-1 to -5 (2013)
(creating OAH and specifying its jurisdiction);
§ 17C-5C-4 (2013) (designating DMV Commis-
sioner as party who may be represented by coun-
sel at OAH hearing).

6. See supra note 5. West Virginia Code § 17C-
SC-1(a) states, “[t]he Office of Administrative
Hearings is created as a separate operating agen-
cy within the Department of Transportation.”

agency, the circuit court lacked the informa-
tion it needed to address and weigh the
reasons behind the delay.

Selecting to side-step the circuit court’s
failure to apply the balancing test, the major-
ity coneliides that once a licensee shows actu-
al and substantial prejudice from a post-
hearing delay, the burden is then shifted to
the DMV Commissioner to inform the circuit
court of the reason for the delay. Inasmuch
as the DMV Commissioner was not responsi-
ble for the delay, but was merely another
party in the appeal, it is unclear how the
Commissioner would even know the reason.
Requiring such a showing made sense under
the old statutory framework, but it lacks any
basis under the current law.

_For all of the foregoing reasons, I can only
conclude that the circuit court’s decision to
reverse the OAH on the basis of the post-
hearing delay was clearly wrong, character-
ized by an abuse of discretion, and based
upon mistake of law, Accordingly, T respect-
fully dissent,

7. See W.Va. Code § 17C-5C-4,

8, See W.Va. Code § 17C-5C-1 (designating OAH:
as separate agency and authorizing appointment
of chief hearing examiner); § 17C-5C-2 (autho-
rizing chief hearing examiner to employ other
hearing examiners).

9, The majority states that the circuit court issued
an amended order clarifying its awareness that
the DMV and the OAH are separate agencies.
However, the only amended order in the appen-
dix record was entered on November 20, 2015,
and pertains to the circuit court's stay order.
Despite seeming to acknowledge in that amended
stay order that the DMV and the OAH are differ-
ent, the circuit court, in its final order entered on
April 8, 2016, once again conflated the two agen-
cies,

“549

* 803 S.E.2d 519
DAN RYAN BUILDERS, INC., Third-
Party Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
ve .
CRYSTAL: RIDGE DEVELOPMENT,
- INC., Lang Brothers, Inc,, And Robert 8.
Lang, Third-Party Defendants Below,
Respondents

and
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc., Third-Party
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner,
v.

Horner Brothers Engineers, Third-Party
Defendant Below, Respondent. .

No. 16-0401, No. 16-0402
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
, Submitted: April 18, 2017+
Filed: June 8, 2017

e |
16

)

Avram Levicoff, Esq., Julie A. Brennan,
Esq., The Levicoff Law Firm, P.C., Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, Counsel for the Peti-
tioner

Tiffany R. Durst, Esq., Nathaniel D, Grif-
fith, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown &
Poe, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia,

552

Frank E, Simmerman, Jr., Esq., Chad L.
Taylor, Esq. Frank E. Simmerman, III,
Esq. Simmerman Law Office, PLLO,
Clarksburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Re-
spondent Horner Brothers Engineers

Justice Ketchum:

In these consolidated appeals from the Cir-
cuit Court of Harrison County, we examine
the res judicata effect of a federal court
judgment on a state court third-party com-
plaint, The circuit court found that the feder-
al court case involved the same parties as
those in the third-party complaint; the third-
party complaint was based on the same evi-
dence as the action litigated in federal court;
and the final federal court judgment resolved
the merits of the parties’ disputes. The cir-
cuit court therefore dismissed the third-party
complaint on res judicata grounds,

As we discuss below, we affirm the circuit
court’s ruling,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

‘This case arises out of the construction of
a residential community called “Crystal
Ridge” on an empty 70-acre tract in Harrison
County, West Virginia, The family of Robert
S, Lang owned the tract, and in 2005, Mr.
Lang transferred ownership to a family com-
pany, Crystal Ridge Development, Inc. Mr.
Lang anticipated that excavation, grading
and construction of the housing lots and the
infrastructure—the roads, drainage culverts,
utilities and such—would be done by the
family construction business, Lang Brothers,
Ine, We refer to Mr. Lang, Lang Brothers,
and Crystal Ridge Development singularly as
“the Lang Defendants.” .

1. The first paragraph of the Lot Purchase Agree-
ment identifies the “seller’’ of the lots as “Crystal
Ridge, Inc.” The signature line at the end of the
Agreement identifies the seller as ‘Lang Broth-
ers, Inc,” and its president, Robert S, Lang,
signed the contract. .

Counsel for Respondents Crystal Ridge De-
velopment, Inc; Lang Brothers, Inc; and
Robert 8, Lang

The Lang. Defendants retained Horner
Brothers Engineers to design the infrastruc-
ture for the housing subdivision. Because the
land had steep slopes, Horner Brothers also
designed the contour of the landscape. The
parties planned to create 143 single-family
house lots.

On June 80, 2005, the Lang Defendants
entered into a “Lot Purchase Agreement”
with Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. (“Dan Ryan”).
The Agreement allowed Dan Ryan to buy
individual lots, as many as 148, in the Crystal
Ridge subdivision. The Lot Purchase Agree-
ment specified that the Lang Defendants
would grade and contour the lots for con-
struction and would build the infrastructure,
while Dan Ryan would construct and sell the
houses it built on the lots, Grading and con-
struction on Phase I of the subdivision, com-
prising Lots 1-50, began in fall of 2005.

The main road built through Crystal Ridge
was Emerald Drive. To one. side of Emerald
Drive was a steep upward slope; to the other
was a steep downward slope. To create usa-
ble lots on the downward slope (including
Lots 1 through 7), on April 4, 2006, Dan
Ryan and the Lang Defendants entered into
a second agreement, titled “Contract With
Independent Contractor.” Under the agree-
ment, for a fee, the Lang Defendants re-
moved dirt and rock from one part of Crystal
Ridge, and then contoured and constructed
that material-into.a massive “fill slope” down-
hill from Emerald Drive. The Lang Defen-
dants say they moved materials according to
engineering plans drawn by Horner Broth-
ers?

Dan Ryan and the Lang Defendants en-
tered into a third contract, the “Trade Con-
tract,” on June 2, 2006, whereby the Lang
Defendants agreed to perform excavation,
dampproofing, and backfilling for the founda-
tions of houses to be constructed.

In August 2006, Dan Ryan purchased its
first 12 contiguous finished lots in Crystal
Ridge pursuant to the Lot Purchase Agree-

2, Under this contract, the Lang Defendants were
to “provide the cut and fill necessary to deliver
finished buildable lots as described in the mass
grading cross sections provided by Horner
Brothers Engineers” for Lots 1 through 9 and
Lots 19 through 26.

ment, Almost immediately, Dan Ryan began
selling the 12 lots and then constructing sin-
gle-family homes thereon for the purchasers.
Dan Ryan purchased another five contiguous
Jots in January 2007. In May 2007, Dan Ryan
and the Lang Defendants signed a fourth
contract, the “First Amendment to Lot Pur-
chase Agreement” that, among other things,
changed the lot price in. return for Dan
Ryan’s purchase of the final batch of 38 lots,
By March 2007, it appears that the fill
slope behind Lots 1 through 7 began to
. move, In- December 2007, the fill slope be-
hind Lot 7 moved significantly, dropping
three feet, opening large fissures in the
ground, and compromising the integrity of
the single-family house built on Lot 7. Dan
Ryan repurchased the lot from the home-
owner and demolished the house. Thereafter,
Dan Ryan began to reconstruct the entire fill

slope.

A. . The State Court Case

On February 2, 2009, numerous Crystal
Ridge homeowners filed a lawsuit against
Dan Ryan in the Circuit Court of Harrison
County.? The named homeowners had all
purchased a lot with a single-family house
financed and constructed by Dan Ryan. The
state court complaint also sought class-action
status for all lot and house purchasers in
Orystal Ridge. The plaintiff-homeowners al-
leged that in constructing the Crystal Ridge
development, Dan Ryan had .

"excavated, graded and removed and/or
moved soil, rock, .timber, vegetation and
other materials, ... installed underground
utility and water lines, and constructed
roads and drainage culverts, all of which
should have required careful planning, re-
search, study, supervision and the invest-
ment of adequate capital and resources.

The homeowners further alleged in their

complaint that Dan Ryan had “caused or

substantially contributed to a portion of the

Orystal Ridge Development to subside, fall

3. The plaintiffs’ complaint lists as defendants
Dan Ryan Builders, Inc.; Dan Ryan Builders
Realty, Inc; DRB Enterprises, Inc.; Monocacy
Home Mortgage, LLC; Christopher Rusch; Crys-
tal Rankin; and John Doe. See Frank M.
Williams, et al. v. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc., et al.,
Civil Action No, 09-C-57, 2016 WL 7985466
(Harrison Co.).

553

away or slip damaging the Plaintiffs’ lots and
Jand and the Development as a whole and
forcing the demolition of at least one newly
built home in the Development to date.” The
homeowners’ complaint contends that Dan
Ryan “failed to maintain sufficient support
for the soil” and “improperly altered the flow
of water” in Crystal Ridge, causing subsi-
dence or the “loss of lateral and subjacent,
support” necessary to support houses on the
tract,

Based on these allegations, the -home-
owners asserted various legal theories for
relief including negligence, breach of warran-
ty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and vicari-
ous liability, The homeowners contended that
Dan Ryan failed to “exercise reasonable care
in planning, construction, excavation, [and]
site development” of Crystal Ridge, and that
Dan Ryan failed to “supervise” or “make.a
proper and reasonable inspection” of work
done by others,

In their initial complaint, and likewise in
three subsequent amendments to that com-
plaint, the plaintiff-homeowners never assert-
ed‘ any claims against the Lang Defendants
or Horner Brothers.

“Furthermore, at this point in the state
court case, Dan Ryan also did not assert any
claims against the Lang Defendants or Hor-
ner Brothers, specifically by way of a third-
party complaint alleging they were liable for
part or all of the homeowner's claims, In-
stead, Dan Ryan filed a civil case in federal
court against the Lang Defendants,

B._The Federal Court Case

Ten months after the homeowners filed the
state court case, on December 8, 2009, Dan
Ryan filed a new lawsuit against the three -
Lang Defendants in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of West
Virginiat The complaint was based on the
federal court’s diversity jurisdiction.> The
federal court complaint also centered upon

4, Dan Ryan Builders, Inc, v. Crystal Ridge Devel-
opment, Inc., et al., No. 1:09CV161 (N.D.W.Va,). -

3, See 28 U.S.C. § 1332..

554

the Crystal Ridge subdivision and generally
alleged that the Lang Defendants were re-
sponsible for the same actions at issue in the
state court case, including:
the development of various designs and
plans for construction of Subdivision infra-
structure ... including, but not limited to:
clearing and establishing grades on lots
. mass site grading; on-lot fill compac-
tion; ... design and construction of storm
water and sewer management systems;
roadway curb and gutter installation; road-
way paving installation; certain landscap-
ing installation; certain street element in-
stallation; and certain utility installation.
Count I of Dan Ryan’s complaint asserted
a cause of action for negligence. It asserted
that the Lang Defendants failed to act with
reasonable care in the “placement of fill and
compaction of fill material under Subdivision
lots,” the “installation of roadways and gut-
ters,” the “installation of storm water and
sewer systems,” and the “installation of utili-
ties.” The complaint alleged the Lang Defen-
dants were negligent because they “devi-
at[ed] from original, approved construction
designs and plans when performing excava-
tion work[.]” As evidence of the Lang Defen-
dants’ duties—duties that were breached in
negligence—Dan Ryan cited to the obli-
gations established in the Lot Purchase
Agreement; the Trade Contract; and the
First Amendment to the Lot Purchase
Agreement.6
Count II of Dan Ryan’s complaint alleged
breach of contract (including for “negligently
performing the construction activities”). Dan
Ryan asserted the Lang Defendants breach-
ed the same contracts, and the same obli-

6. Dan Ryan’s federal court complaint omits men-
tion of the “Contract With Independent Contrac-
tor,” where the Lang Defendants agreed to dig,
dampproof, and backfill foundations of houses
constructed by Dan Ryan.

7. In Count Il of the complaint, Dan Ryan assert
ed a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresen-
tation. However, it abandoned this legal theory
at trial.

8. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47
L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). See also, McLaughlin v.
United Virginia Bank, 955 F.2d 930, 934-35 (4th
Cir, 1992) (Under Colorado River, “The court

gations, set forth in the negligence count,
Count 1.7

Finally, the initial complaint that Dan
Ryan filed in federal court included a count
seeking “Defense and Indemnification.” Dan
Ryan asserted in Count IV that homeowners
had named it as a defendant in the aforemen-
tioned civil action in state court. Dan Ryan
contended that the plaintiff-homeowners in
the state court action were alleging damages
“that arise from and are a direct and proxi-
mate result of [the Lang] Defendants’ negli-
gence as alleged in Count I” of Dan Ryan’s
complaint, Dan Ryan’s initial complaint de-
manded the Lang Defendants provide both a
defense and “indemnification and/or contribu-
tion for any damages awarded for plaintiffs”
in the state court action.

The Lang Defendants moved to dismiss
Dan Ryan’s federal court lawsuit. The Lang
Defendants argued, pursuant to the Colorado
River abstention doctrine, that the complaint
should be dismissed because a pre-existing
parallel suit was pending in state court.
Under Colorado River, “Suits are parallel if
substantially the same parties litigate sub-
stantially the same issues in different fo-
rums.” ® Dan Ryan responded that Colorado
River did not apply by arguing that the Lang
Defendants were not named parties in the
state court action. However, despite Dan
Ryan’s response, the federal judge expressed
an inclination to dismiss part or all of Dan
Ryan’s federal complaint because of the in-
demnification-contribution-defense count.
The federal judge stated:

[Alt the end of the day, Count 4 is where
T’m focused because I think your whole effort
to litigate this thing in federal court collapses

should consider 1) the preference accorded to the
first court assuming jurisdiction over a res; 2) the
relative inconvenience of the state and federal
forums; 3) the need to avoid piecemeal litigation;
and 4) the’relative order of the state and federal
suits. Later, the Court added additional factors
such as whether a federal question is presented in
the case and whether either the state or the federal
suit ‘was a contrived, defensive reaction’ to the
other.” (Citations omitted).

9. New Beckley Min. Corp. v. Int'l Union, United
Mine Workers of Am., 946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th
Cir. 1991).

on Count 4. You brought it in here specifical-
ly seeking defense and indemnification for
the state case from Lang Brothers and
that—that is not something I’m going to rule
on,

Now if you want to go back and amend
your complaint and get that out and seek
defense and indemnification over in state
court by way of third party, I don’t know, but.
if this is in here, here’s what you're going to
get from me. Hither I’m going to grant the
motion to dismiss as to that particular count,
if I can do it and I don’t know if I can or if I
have to dismiss the whole thing, I’m going to
stay the whole thing until the state court
aetion’s over because of the defense and in-
demnification issue.

After the hearing, Dan Ryan amended its
federal court complaint and removed Count
IV. Following the amendment, the federal
court refused to dismiss the case and pro-
ceeded to exercise jurisdiction,

Thereafter, the Lang Defendants filed a
third-party complaint in federal court against
Horner Brothers. The Lang Defendants as-
serted, because Dan Ryan’s complaint impli-
cated the engineering work of Horner Broth-
ers in the development and construction of
Crystal Ridge, ‘that Horner Brothers should
be liable under theories of implied indemnity,
contribution, and breach of contract.

C._Dan Ryan’s Third-Party
Claim in State Court

Hl In March of 2012—nearly two years
after voluntarily dismissing its federal court
claims for contribution and indemnification,
and nearly three years after the homeowners
filed their lawsuit against Dan Ryan—Dan

10. Rule 14(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure permits a defendant to file a third-
party complaint against anyone who may be lia-
ble “for all or part of the plaintiff's claim”
against the defendant.

A third-party complaint filed pursuant to Rule
14(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is proper only when the party to be joined is
or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all
or part of the original plaintiff's claim(s) against
the third-party plaintiff. A third-party complaint
is not proper merely because it arises from the
same transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
ject matter of the original plaintiff's complaint
against the defendant.

555

Ryan filed a third-party complaint in the
homeowners’ state court case. This third-
party complaint—the pleading at the heart of
this appeal—was against the Lang Defen-
dants and Horner Brothers.” Dan Ryan al-
leged that the Lang Defendants and Horner
Brothers were responsible for the design,
engineering, and construction of the fill slope
that the homeowners alleged to be defective.
The third-party complaint specifies that the
Lang Defendants’ duties in the subdivision
were set forth in three contracts: the Lot
Purchase Agreement; the Contract With In-
dependent Contractor; and the Trade Con-
tract! Dan Ryan’s third-party complaint
sought common-law contribution for negli-
gence, contractual contribution, and damages
for breach of contract.

The Lang Defendants and Horner Broth-
ers answered the third-party complaint.
Shortly thereafter, the state court entered an
order preventing the parties from conducting
discovery against the Lang: Defendants or
Horner Brothers until the conclusion of fed-
eral court proceedings.

D._The Federal Court Trial

In August 2012, the federal. court conduct-
ed a bench trial on Dan Ryan’s breach of
contract and negligence theories, and issued

- a 90-page decision on September 24, 2018.”

The federal court found that Dan Ryan al-
leged various obligations and duties owed by
the Lang Defendants, obligations which
arose from several contracts. Much of the
federal court’s discussion centered upon the
Lang Defendants’ duty to construct the fill
slope downhill of Emerald Drive. The federal
court’s decision extensively details the trial
evidence showing that the “fill slope placed

Syllabus Point 1, Braxton Lumber Co. v. Lloyd's
Inc., 238 W.Va. 177, 793 SE2d 341 (2016).

11. Unlike its federal court complaint, Dan Ryan's
state court third-party complaint omits reference
to the First Amendment to the Lot Purchase
Agreement but includes the Contract With Inde-
pendent Contractor. Two of the contracts refer-
enced in the state third-party complaint were
clearly addressed in both the federal complaint
and federal trial (the Lot Purchase Agreement
and the Trade Contract).

12. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Dev.,
Inc, No. 1:09CV161, 2013 WL 5352844
(N.D.W.Va. Sept. 24, 2013),

556

by [the Lang Defendants] on top of the pre-
existing slope had been poorly constructed,
creating an unstable fill embankment.” * Ex-
pert evidence presented-at trial by Dan Ryan
noted the “poor construction practices” by
the Lang Defendants, including “over-steep-
ened slope faces, .., inadequate drainage,
lack of proper benching, and uncontrolled fill
placement and compaction[.]” *

At trial, to the extent Dan Ryan based its
ease on the various contracts between the
parties, the federal court found Dan Ryan
had narrowed its case down to four specific
breaches of contracts by' the Lang Defen-
dants. The federal court, however, concluded
Dan Ryan had failed to prove all but one of
those breaches. For instance, the federal
court found, “While there is a significant
dispute in this case about whether [the Lang
Defendants] properly constructed the fill
slope, there is no dispute that [the Lang
Defendants] completed the grading work and
was paid in full by [Dan Ryan Builders].”
In other words, Dan Ryan failed to show the
breach of any contract because the evidence
established the Lang Defendants had in fact,
constructed the fill slope and Dan Ryan had
not introduced any compelling evidence to
show it was done improperly.

The federal, court found the Lang Defen-
dants breached, only one of its duties under
one contract: an agreement to patch road-
ways and repair’ curbs, The federal court’s
order awarded Dan Ryan $175,646.24 in dam-

* ages (plus another $77,615.24 in pre-judg-
ment interest) against the Lang Defendants.

As for Dan Ryan’s theory that the Lang
Defendants were negligent, the federal court
found that claim entangled with the contract
claims and barred by the “gist of the action”
doctrine. At trial, Dan Ryan alleged that the
Lang Defendants’ “negligence caused (1) the
13. Id., 2013 WL 5352844, at *8.

14. Id,

15. Id. at *5.

16, Id, at *22.

17. Cochran v. Appalachian Power Co., 162 W.Va.

86, 92, 246 S.E.2d 624, 628 (1978) (quoting 1

Am.Jur.2d Actions § 8 (1962)).

18. Gaddy Eng’g Co. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff
& Love, LLP, 231 W.Va. 577, 586, 746 S.E.2d

failure of the fill embankment along Lots 2
through 7, (2) the failure of the cut slope
behind Lots 15 through 17, (8) compaction
issues on other lots; and (4) issues with ‘bad
soil’ on Lot 10,”

However, a negligence action requires a
plaintiff to show a defendant breached a duty
of care, The gist-of-the-action doctrine is
triggered when the asserted duty of care
derives, in fact, from a contract:

If the action is not maintainable without
,pleading and proving the contract, where
the gist of the action is the breach of the
contract, either by malfeasance or nonfea-
sance, it is, in substance, an action on the
contract, whatever may be the form of the
. pleading.!7

Under this doctrine, “recovery in tort will be
barred” when any of the following factors are
demonstrated: .

(1) where liability arises. solely from the
contractual relationship between the par-
ties; (2) when the alleged duties breached
were grounded in the contract itself; (8)

_ Where any liability stems from the con-
tract; and (4) when the tort claim essential-
ly duplicates the breach of contract claim
. or where the success of the tort claim is
dependent on the success of the breach of
contract claim,

The federal court found that Dan Ryan’s
“characterization of the legal duty owed in
this case has been a moving target.”.!° How-
ever, by the conelusion of the trial, the feder-
al court, determined that the primary duty of
care asserted by Dan Ryan was the Lang
Defendants’ implied warranty they would ex-
ercise reasonable skill in completing their
contractual duties. In other words, the war-
ranty duties asserted by Dan Ryan arose

568, 577 (2013) (er curiam) (quoting Star v.
Rosenthal, 884 F,Supp.2d 319, 328-29 (E.D.Pa.
2012)). See also Syllabus Point 9, in part, Lock-
hart v. Aitco Heating & Cooling, Inc., 211 W.Va.
609, 567 S.B.2d 619 (2002) (“An action in tort
will not arise for breach of contract unless the
action in tort would arise independent of the
existence of the contract.”’).

19, Dan Ryan Builders, 2013 WL 5352844, at *28,

from the contracts between Dan Ryan and
the Lang Defendants, and were not indepen-
dent tort duties. Hence, because the duties
alleged to have been breached were ‘fully
grounded in contract, allowing Dan Ryan
“recovery in tort in this instance would dis-
rupt the well founded expectations the par-
ties held upon entering their contract.” 2° The
cireuit court therefore concluded Dan Ryan
failed, as a matter of law, to establish its
negligence claims.

Having ruled on Dan Ryan’s claims against
the Lang Defendants, the federal court then
dismissed the Lang Defendants’ third-party
claim for contribution against Horner Broth-
ers, The federal court found the claim moot
because Dan Ryan “has failed to prove any
damages sounding in negligence.”

Dan Ryan appealed, but the federal dis-
trict court’s decision was affirmed. In a pub-
lished opinion, the federal court of appeals
recognized the ambiguous, wide-ranging na-
ture of Dan Ryan’s federal case: .

This is a messy case, spanning four years
and thousands of pages of trial submissions.
During the course of such protracted litiga-
tion, parties must be vigilant not to lose sight
of the necessity of pleading and proving all of
the elements of each cause of action,

The district court properly dismissed Dan
Ryan’s tort claim, alleging negligence in con-
struction of the fill slope, because Dan Ryan
rested that claim solely on asserted breach of
two contracts—the [Lot Purchase Agree-
ment] and the [First] Amendment [to the Lot
Purchase Agreement]. We now hold that Dan
Ryan never alleged, and the parties never
consented to trial on, a claim of breach of the
fill slope contracts, Contrary to Dan Ryan’s

20. Dan Ryan Builders, 2013 WL 5352844, at *29,

21, Id., 783 F.3d at 982 (quoting Gaddy, 746
SB.2d at 577).

22, Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Devel-
opment, Inc., 783 F.3d 976, 982 (4th Cir.2015).

23. Dan Ryan asserts we should disregard Horner
Brothers’ arguments on res judicata because the
affirmative defense was not included in its an-
swer to the third-party complaint. Res judicata /
claim preclusion is an affirmative defense that
should be raised under Rule 8(c) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, a party may raise
res judicata by summary judgment motion when

557

contention, this result does not unfairly pe-
nalize it for a purely formal error. Rather, it
simply holds Dan Ryan to the requirements
of the law, A claim grounded on breach of
contract (here, the LPA and the Amend-
ment) does not give rise to tort liability, and
a claim never pled (here, breach of the fill
slope contracts) will not be regarded as pled
unless actually tried by consent. These are
the only fair standards, for without them
litigants and courts alike would be unable to
ever adequately prepare for trial. Parties
would be forced to defend against shadow
claims, and trial courts would be forced to
search, as for a needle in a haystack, for
unpled causes of action purportedly hiding in
the parties’ submissions.

The federal appeals court found that “this
is precisely the kind of case in which [Dan
Ryan’s] claims are ‘simply breach of contract
claims masquerading as’ tort claims.”*! As
the federal appeals court succinctly stated,
“Dan Ryan’s ‘negligence’ claim was actually a
claim for breach of contract, Thus, Dan
Ryan’s negligence claim fails as a matter of
law.” 2

E. Summary Judgment in State Court

Zz Following the conclusion of pro-
ceedings in federal court, in October 2015,
the Lang Defendants and Horner Brothers
filed motions for summary judgment in state
court to dismiss Dan Ryan’s third-party com-
plaint on the ground of res judicata.”® These
third-party defendants argued that Dan
Ryan’s third-party complaint referenced the
same contracts, and the same allegedly negli-
gent actions, that were the focus of the feder-
al court trial.

the defense was unavailable at the time of the
original answer. See Kendall v. Avon Prod., Inc.,
711 F.Supp. 1178, 1179 n.2 (8.D.N.Y..1989) (Res
judicata and collateral estoppel “may be properly
raised for the first time in a motion for summary
judgment in a situation where these defenses
were unavailable at the time of the original an-
swer. Indeed, these defenses may be raised at the
pre-trial stage in the interest of efficient and
expeditious judicial administration and in cir-
cumstances where, as here, the plaintiff is pro-
vided with an adequate opportunity to present
arguments rebutting the defense.” (Citations and
quotes omitted).

558

In orders dated March 17 and March 24,
2016, the circuit court granted, respectively,
the Lang Defendants’ and Horner Brothers’
motions. In both orders, the cireuit court
found-that Dan Ryan’s third-party complaint
involved the same parties and the same cause
of action, based upon the same operative
facts and transactions, as was asserted in
federal court, and that the federal court ac-
tion resulted in a final judgment on the mer-
its. The circuit court found that Dan Ryan’s
third-party complaint was barred by the doc-
trine of res judicata.

Dan Ryan now appeals the cireuit court’s
summary judgment orders.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW
IE We review a circuit court’s orders
granting summary judgment de novo.

Ii.

ANALYSIS

Dan Ryan argues that the circuit court had
a misconception about, or incorrectly applied,
the doctrine of res judicata and claim preclu-
sion. Dan Ryan asserts that the damages
sought by the homeowners in state court
were not litigated in the federal case between
Dan Ryan, the Lang Defendants and Horner
Brothers. Because claims for contribution
could only be litigated in the state court
proceeding brought by the injured home-
owners, Dan Ryan contends that it was im-
possible for those claims to have been adjudi-
cated by the federal court. Furthermore, Dan
Ryan argues that the claims it asserted in
federal court are not the same causes of
action as those asserted in its state court

24, Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va.
189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

25. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
18-Moore’s Federal Practice § 133.10 (34 Ed.
2017) (“The rule that state courts must give bind-
ing effect to federal court proceedings is uncontr-
oversial.”); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res
Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741, 744 (1976) (There is a
“clearly established rule that state courts must
give full faith and credit to the proceedings of
federal courts[.] That this is the rule is beyond
doubt, and the state courts have generally ac-
cepted it.”).

contribution claims. Overall, Dan Ryan ar-
gues that applying res judicata or claim pre-
clusion to foreclose its contribution claims is
fundamentally unfair and defeats the ends of
justice.

The Lang Defendants and Horner Broth-
ers counter that it would be fundamentally
unfair to require them to spend thousands of
dollars defending against Dan Ryan’s third-
party claims in state court, when they have
already spent thousands of dollars defending
against the same claims, based upon the
same evidence and same witnesses and same
contracts, as were litigated in federal court.
They argue that Dan Ryan initially brought
its contribution claim in federal court, but
then dismissed that claim when the federal
court threatened either to delay or to dismiss
the entire federal case in favor of letting the
previously filed state court case proceed to a
conclusion. The Lang Defendants and Hor-
ner Brothers assert that Dan Ryan could
have litigated all of its claims in state court,
but it strategically chose to go elsewhere—
and lost. They contend they should not be
penalized in successive litigation for Dan
Ryan’s legal missteps.

HN Unquestionably, a federal court’s
judgment is binding upon a West Virginia
state court.2> Nevertheless, before turning to
Dan Ryan’s arguments, the first issue we
must address is this: which law determines
the preclusive effect of a federal court judg-
ment upon a state court proceeding? Federal
law or state law? This distinction is of prac-
tical consequence because West Virginia’s
rules of ves judicata and claim preclusion
differ somewhat from the rules used by fed-
eral courts,”

26. When considering res judicata or claim pre-
clusion, West Virginia applies a narrow “same
evidence” test which examines whether “the
same evidence would support both actions or
issues.” Syllabus Point 4, Slider v. State Farm
Mut, Auto. Ins. Co., 210 W.Va. 476, 557 8.B,2d
883 (2001). Federal courts apply a broader
“same transaction” test which examines whether
“the new litigation arises out of the same trans-
action or series of transactions as the claim re-
solved by the prior judgment.” Pittston Co. v.
United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999).

Hl “The preclusive effect of a federal-
court judgment is determined by federal
common law.” 27 However, the federal com-
mon law contains different rules of claim
preclusion that change depending on the
form of jurisdiction exercised by the federal
court that rendered the underlying judg-
ment.

HH On the one hand, if the rendering
federal court resolved a federal question (ex-
ercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1881),
then federal law requires a subsequent court
to apply substantive federal rules of claim
preclusion to determine the preclusive effect
of the prior federal court judgment.’ On the
other, if the rendering federal court sat in
diversity and ruled upon questions of state
law (exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1882), then federal law requires a subse-
quent court to assess the preclusive effect of
the federal court judgment using “the law
that would be applied by state courts in the
State in which the federal diversity court
sits.” 2° In other words, “[flor judgments in
diversity cases, federal law incorporates the
rules of preclusion applied by the State in
which the rendering court sits.” 9°

TN We therefore hold that in a state
court proceeding, federal rules of res judica-

27. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891, 128 S.Ct.
2161, 171 L.Bd.2d 155 (2008).

28. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 488 n.9, 114
S.Ct, 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (‘State
courts are bound to apply federal rules in deter-
mining the preclusive effect of federal-court deci-
sions on issues of federal law.”’).

29. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 508, 121 S.Ct, 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32
(2001).

30, Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891 n.4, 128 S.Ct. 2161.
One caveat, however, is that “[tJhis federal refer-
ence to state law will not obtain, of course, in
situations in which the state law is incompatible
with federal interests.” Semtek, 531 U.S. at 509,
121 S.Ct, 1021.

31, In State ex rel. Small v. Clawges, 231 W.Va.
301, 314, 745 S.B.2d 192, 202 (2013) er cu-
riam), this Court broadly stated in dicta, “ ‘[t]he
preclusive effect of a prior federal court judg-
ment is controlled by federal res judicata rules.’
Jefferson Marine Towing, Inc. v. Kostmayer
Constr. LLC., 32 So.3d 255, 259 (La.Ct.App.
2010).” This rule is correct only to the extent it
applies to federal court rulings upon federal
questions; it is wrong when applied to rulings

559

ta or claim preclusion dictate the preclusive
effect of a federal court judgment on a feder-
al question. However, for a federal court
judgment applying state law, that state’s
rules of res judicata or claim preclusion dic-
tate the preclusive effect of the judgment.

HH In this case, the federal court exer-
cised diversity jurisdiction over Dan Ryan’s
complaint, and applied West Virginia’s laws.
Hence, we weigh the preclusive effect of the
federal court’s judgment in the circuit court
using West Virginia’s rules of res judicata
and claim preclusion.

HM sUnder West Virginia law, the
doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion
assures that judgments are conclusive, thys
avoiding relitigation of issues that were or
could have been raised in the original ac-
tion. Res judicata “relieve[s] parties of
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve[s] judicial resources, and, by pre-
venting inconsistent decisions, encourage[s]
reliance on adjudication.” “Res judicata
precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a
single cause of action or relitigation of the
same cause of action on a different legal
theory or for different relief.” 4

issued in diversity. Accordingly, to the extent
Small conflicts with our holding today, it is mod-
ified,

32. State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 9, 459 S.E.2d
114, 120 (1995). See also White v. SWCC, 164
W.Va, 284, 289, 262 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1980)
(“The doctrine of res judicata is based on a
recognized public policy to quiet litigation and
on a desire that individuals should not be forced
1o litigate an issue more than once.”).

33. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct.
411, 66 L.Bd.2d 308 (1980), See also Conley v.
Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 588, 301 S.B.2d 216,
220 (1983) (quoting Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct, 970, 59 L.Bd.2d
210 (1979) (“To preclude parties from contesting
matters that they have had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate protects their adversaries from
the expense and vexation attending multiple law-
suits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters
reliance on judicial action by minimizing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions.”)).

34. Gonzales v. California Dep't of Corr., 739 F.3d
1226, 1232 (9th Cir, 2014) (quoting Mycogen
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal.4th 888, 123 Cal.
Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297, 302 (2002)).

560

HE “Res judicata or claim preclusion
bars a party from suing on a claim that has
already been litigated to a final judgment by
that party or such party's privies and pre-
cludes the assertion by such parties of any
legal theory, cause of action, or défense
which could have been asserted in that ac-
tion.” 8 We have established a three-part
test to determine the claim-preclusive effect
of a prior judgment:.

Before the prosecution of a lawsuit may
be barred on the basis of res judicata,
three elements must be satisfied, First,

there must have been a final adjudication ~

on the merits in the prior action by a court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings, Sec-
ond, the two actions must involve either
the same parties or persons in privity with
those same parties. Third, the cause of
action identified for resolution in the sub-
sequent proceeding either must be identi-
cal to the cause of action determined in the
prior action or must be such that. it could
have been resolved, had it been presented,
in the prior action.**

As for the first and second elements, there
is no reasonable question but that the final
judgment issued by the federal district court
was @ “final adjudication on the merits” in-
volving the “same parties or persons in privi-
ty.” Dan Ryan’s claims in both federal and
state court involve the Lang Defendants and
Horner Brothers, and the federal district
court entered a judgment that was subse-
quently affirmed by a federal court of ap-
peals. 7

Hs The parties’ real dispute centers
on the third element: whether the state court
third-party complaint is based on the same
cause of action that Dan Ryan pursued in
federal court. We have adopted the following

38. State ex rel. Small v. Clawges, 231 W.Va. at
311, 745 S.E.2d at 202 (quoting Ohio Valley
Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 386 F.3d 177,
210 (4th Cir, 2009).

36. Syllabus Point 4, Blake v. Charleston Area
Med. Cs Inc., 201 W.Va, 469, 498 S.E.2d 41
1997).

37, Syllabus Point 4, Slider v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 210 W.Va. at 478, 557 S.E.2d at
885. Accord, Blake, 201 W.Va, at 476, 498 S.E.2d
at 48 (quoting White v. SWCC, 164 W.Va. at 290,

guide to measuring the sameness of actions
pursued in different courts:

"For purposes of res judicata or claim
preclusion, “a cause of action” is the fact or
facts which ‘establish or give rise to a right
of action, the existence of which affords a
party a right to judicial relief’ The test to
determine if the issue or cause of action
involved in the two suits is identical is to
inquire whether the same evidence would
support both actions or issues. If the two
cases require substantially different evi-
dence to sustain them, the second cannot
be said to be the same cause of action and
barred by res judicata,2”

Applying our analysis to Dan Ryan’s state
court third-party. claims against the Lang
Defendants and Horner Brothers, it is clear
that the same evidence would support both
the state and the federal actions. Both the
state court and federal court actions relate to
the work performed by the Lang Defendants
and Horner Brothers in the Crystal Ridge
subdivision. Both actions allege the Lang De-

_fendants and Horner Brothers failed to prop-

erly design and/or construct the infrastruc-
ture and the fill slope between 2005 and 2007,
as required by various contracts with Dan
Ryan. Thus, both’ the federal action and the
state action rely upon the same facts,-and are
virtually identical in terms of time, space,
and origin.

HE Furthermore, the record reflects
that Dan Ryan could and did include a claim
for contribution or indemnification in its orig-
inal federal court complaint. Dan Ryan volun-
tarily amended its complaint and dismissed
that claim to prevent the federal court’s exer-
cise of the Colorado River abstention doc-
trine. However, “The voluntary dismissal of
the complaint does not preserve or withhold

262 S.E.2d at 756 (ellipses omitted)) (“‘[flor pur-
poses of res judicata, ‘a cause of action’ is the
fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right
of action, the existence of which affords a party a
right to judicial relief. The test to determine if the
cause of action involved in the two suits is identi-
cal is to inquire whether the same evidence
would support both actions or issues. If the two
cases require substantially different evidence to
sustain them, the second cannot be said to be the
same cause of action and barred by res judica-
ta.”),

it from the doctrine of res judicata; indeed,
one of the underlying rationales for the. doc-
trine is to prevent this type of ad infinitum
claim splitting and piecemeal litigation.”
“Like res judicata, claim splitting ‘prohibits a
plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal,
and requires that all claims arising out of a
single wrong be presented in one action” ”
As the Fourth Cireuit explained:

‘Were we to focus on the claims asserted in
each suit, we would allow parties to frus-
trate the goals of res judicata through
artful pleading and claim splitting given
that “[a] single cause of action: can mani-
fest itself into an outpouring of different
claims, based variously on federal statutes,
state statutes, and the common law.”

“Bspecially in cases where a party voluntari-
ly drops a claim in a’ first action, and then
later seeks to maintain a separate second
action on the abandoned claim, the rule
against splitting causes of action applies to
preclude that party from maintaining the
separate second suit on the abandoned
claim.” 4

HH West Virginia’s law of res judicata
prohibits not only the re-litigation of claims
that were actually asserted in the prior ac-
tion, but also precludes “every other matter
which the parties might have litigated as
incident thereto[.]” We recognize that, be-
cause of this facet of res judicata, a party
with both state and federal questions may

38. Canterbury v. J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp.,
958 F.Supp.2d 637, 648 (W.D, Va. 2013),

39, Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs.
Corp. 452 F.Supp.2d 621, 626 (D. Md. 2006)
(quoting Myers v. Colgate~Palmolive Co,, 102
F.Supp.2d 1208, 1224 (D.Kan,2000)),

40. Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 355
(4th Cir, 2004) (quoting Kale v. Combined Ins, Co.
of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1166 (Ist Cir, 1991),

41, Dade Cty. v. Matheson, 605 So.2d 469, AR
(Fla.Ct.App. 1992),

42, Blake, 201 W.Va. at 477, 498 S.B.2d at 49
(quoting Syllabus Point 1, Sayre’s Adm’r v. Har-
pold, 33 W.Va, 553, 11 S.E, 16 (1890)).

43. 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 133.13.

44, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
* 465 U.S. 89, 123, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67

561

face a conundrum when choosing a court-

room forum.
One choice is to bring all claims in state
court, foregoing the federal forum for
federal constitutional or statutory claims,
Another, for litigants who find access to
federal court for their federal claims a
paramount objective, is to simply forgo li-
tigating their. state claims. A third choice
is to. split the federal and state claims,
and wait to see which court decides
first.

“That a litigant’s choice of forum is re-
duced ‘has long been understood to be a
part of the tension inherent in our system
of federalism.’”“! To be clear, however,
that conundrum did not exist in the instant
ease because all of Dan Ryan’s negligence
and contract claims involved state law ques-
tions and no federal questions.

Dan Ryan voluntarily abandoned its feder-
al court claim for contribution and inderinifi-
cation, intentionally choosing to split that
dlaim from its other direct’ claims of negli-
gence and breach of contract. It now seeks to
maintain a new, state court action based
upon that abandoned federal court claim.
Dari Ryan states that a defendant’s claims
for inchoate contribution in a state case must
be asserted through a third-party complaint
in the underlying action, and that such claims
cannot be filed in a separate federal action.®
Dan Ryan contends that its claim for contri-
bution “could [not] have been resolved, had it
been presented, in the prior action.” 4° It

(1984) (quoting Employees v. Missouri Public
Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 298, 93
S.Ct, 1614, 36 L:Bd.2d 251 (1973)) (Marshall, J,
concurring in result).

48. See Syllabus Points 4 and 5, in part, Howell v,
Luckey, 205 W.Va, 445, 518. S.E.2d 873 (1999)
(“The right of contribution .,. is not mandatory
but must be asserted by the defendant by filing a
third-party claim.” Furthermore, “A defendant
may not pursue a separate cause of action
against a joint tortfeasor for contribution after
judgment has been rendered in the underlying
case, when that joint tortfeasor was not a party
in the underlying case and the defendant did not
file a third-party claim pursuant to Rule 14(a) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.”),

46, Syllabus Point 4, Blake, 201 W.Va, at 472, 498
S.E.2d at 44,

562

argues that it must, as a matter of law, be
permitted to file two separate, piecemeal ac-
tions in federal and state court using the
same evidence.

Dan Ryan’s argument, however, ignores
that the focus of our contribution holdings is
to eliminate piecemeal adjudications and to
encourage unified proceedings. We have said
that a defendant’s claim for contribution
against a third party must be joined in the
same suit as the underlying plaintiff's claims,
because “such a procedure ... furthers one
of the primary goals of any system of jus-
tice—to avoid piecemeal litigation which cul-
tivates a multiplicity of suits and often re-
sults in disparate and unjust verdicts.” 47

HE The “application of res judicata is
dependent upon the distinctive characteris-
tics of a particular case.” 8 The record clear-
ly establishes that Dan Ryan’s state court
claims are “based on the same cause of ac-
tion” that was pursued to a final judgment in
federal court. Dan Ryan plainly could and
should have pursued all of its factually inter-
twined claims against the Lang Defendants
and Horner Brothers in the state court case.
Rule 14(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a defending party in a suit (like Dan
Ryan) to bring a third-party, complaint
against another who may be liable “for all or
part of the plaintiffs claim” against the de-
fending party. Once that defending party
asserts a valid third-party complaint that
meets the requirements of Rule 14(a),!” Rule
18(a) allows that party to also join in the
third-party action “as many claims, legal or
equitable, as the party has against” the third-
party defendant. Dan Ryan deliberately
chose not to avail itself of this process.

Tn light of the federal court’s statements in
a hearing that it would not receive a favor-
able ruling on its contribution and indemnity
claim, Dan Ryan dismissed the claim. Dan

47, Charleston Area Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Parke-
Davis, 217 W.Va. 15, 21, 614 S.E.2d 15, 22
(2005).

48. Beahm v. 7 Eleven, Inc., 223 W.Va. 269, 276,
672 S,E.2d 598, 605 (2008) (ver curiam).

49. See, e.g., Braxton Lumber Co. v. Lloyd’s Inc.,
238 W.Va. at 182, 793 S.B.2d at 346 (finding
third-party claim was improper because’ it did

Ryan made the strategie decision to pursue
its claims in a piecemeal fashion, asserting
different theories and measures of relief in
different courts. Regardless of the merits of
its state court claims, permitting Dan Ryan
to proceed would impose the unfair and un-
just costs and vexation of a second, unneces-
sary lawsuit upon the Lang Defendants and
Horner Brothers. This is precisely what the
doctrine of res judicata was designed to pre-
clude.

Succinetly stated, we find Dan Ryan’s state
court claims for contribution and indemnifica-
tion barred by res judicata.

Iv.

CONCLUSION
Dan Ryan’s third-party complaint against
the Lang Defendants and Horner Brothers is
barred by res judicata. The circuit court’s
orders dismissing the third-party complaint
are therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a separate
opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, dissenting:

The majority has fallen victim to its own
ill-conceived precedent regarding claims for
contribution and, in its attempt to skirt this
precedent, has put the petitioner to the im-
possible task of predicting that this Court
would later hold its attempt to adhere to the
letter of the law against it. Hiding behind a
swarm of federal and state res judicata case-
law, the majority fails to address the peti-
tioner’s primary argument in this matter:
that it was prohibited by our caselaw from
bringing its contribution claim in the federal
court action, As the petitioner correctly

not relate to “all or part” of the plaintiff's under-
lying claim).

50. Rule 18(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, “A party asserting a claim to relief as
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, may join, either as indepen-
dent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal
or equitable, as the party has against an oppos-
ing party.”

brings to the majority's attention, Charleston
Area Medical Center, ‘Inc. v. Parke-Davis,
217 W.Va. 15, 17, 614 S.E.2d 15, 17 (2005),
prohibits pursuit of a-contribution claim in a
separate action not initiated by the tortfea-
sor. Syllabus point six of Parke-Davis states
in pertinent part: “The inchoate right of
contribution recognized by this state can
only be asserted by means of third-party
impleader in an action brought by the in-
jured party against a tortfeasor.” (emphasis
added). Nonetheless, the majority now holds
that the petitioner is barred from pursuing
its claim for contribution in the very manner
which Parke-Davis mandates.

Despite the majority's attempt to obfus-
cate the inequity of its result in its elaborate
factual recitation, the facts in this case are
quite simple. The Crystal Ridge homeowners
filed suit against the petitioner in the Circuit
Court of Harrison County, alleging that the
petitioner negligently constructed the devel-
opment. The actual construction work re-
garding the fill slope which failed and gave
rise to the homeowners’ suit was performed
by the Lang Defendants and Horner Broth-
ers. Thereafter, the petitioner filed suit in
federal court seeking relief against the Lang
Defendants, for damages the petitioner itself
incurred in trying to rectify the failing fill
slope before further damage to the home-
owners resulted; the Lang Defendants
brought a third-party claim against the Hor-
ner Brothers, The petitioner explained that it
did not wish for its claim for its own damages
to effectively become “lost in the shuffle” of
the homeowners’ lawsuit. In the federal court.
action, the petitioner’s complaint erroneously
sought contribution and indemnification rela-
tive to the pending state court suit.1 Howev-
er, upon the Lang Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the federal court specifically high-
lighted the inappropriateness of such a claim
in the federal action, suggesting that it be
brought in state court. Recognizing its error,
the petitioner voluntarily withdrew that claim
and filed a third-party action against. the

1, The petitioner's counsel indicated in oral argu-
ment that the inclusion of such claim was an
error of draftsmanship by prior counsel, which
was subsequently rectified through voluntary dis-
missal of that claim. Why the majority ascribes
any nefarious intent to such activity is unclear.
Certainly, mistakes can and do occur; nothing in

563

Lang Defendants and Horner Brothers in
the state court action for contribution and
indemnity. The federal court action proceed-
ed to trial and the petitioner was awarded
damages for the Lang Defendants’ negli-
gence in constructing the fill slope.

The majority takes issue with these proce-
dural maneuvers and holds that because the
petitioner voluntarily dismissed its claim for
contribution and indemnity in the federal
court action, these claims are precluded from
being litigated in the state court action
through the doctrine of res judicata. Citing
Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. Inc., 201
W.Va. 469, 498 S,E.2d 41 (1997), the majority
concludes that res judicata prohibits not only
the re-litigation of claims asserted in a prior
action, but “every other matter which the
parties might have litigated as incident
thereto[.]” Id. at 477, 498 S.H.2d at 49. (em-
phasis added). It is at this point that the
majority’s analysis crumbles entirely. In the
face of the petitioner’s claim that Parke-
Davis in fact forbids the bringing of a claim
for contribution in a separate action and
therefore does not qualify as a “matter which
the parties might have litigated” in the sepa-
rate federal action, the majority retreats to
vague incantations about avoiding “piecemeal
litigation” rather than offering any substan-
tive law or addressing the directly on-point
holding of Parke-Davis.

The reason for this is obvious: the holding
in Parke-Davis is poorly reasoned, over-
broad, and, most importantly, does not fit the
majority’s desired resolution of this matter.
I, too, have repeatedly lamented the “com-
mon sense-defying logic” and “tortured con-
clusions” employed in Parke-Davis. Modular
Bldg. Consultants of W. Va., Inc. v. Poerio,
Ine., 235 W.Va. 474, 488-89, 774 S.E.2d 555,
569-70 (2015) (Loughry, J., concurring); see
also State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins, Co. v. Al-
Ko Kober, No. 14-0556, 2015 WL 3631685, at
*4 (W. Va. June 10, 2015) (Lougliry, J., con-

the record would suggest anything untoward.
When litigants rectify such errors in accordance
with our caselaw, the majority's knee-jerk reac-
tion to ascribe gamesmanship to mere inadver-
tence does little to encourage litigants to admit
error and conform their pleadings to our case-
law.

564

curring) (criticizing Parke-Davis)? While I
have- made clear that I “do not advocate
piecemeal litigation for purposes of pursuing
contribution or indemnity [and] [w]here an
action is filed, all claims should be brought
therein via impleader or consolidation[,]”
Parke-Davis’ overly restrictive requirement
that contribution claims may only be brought
in an action filed by the tortfeasor is proble*
matic for the reasons stated in my concur-
rences and as further demonstrated herein.
State Auto, 2015 WL 8631685 at *4,

Nonetheless, the holding in Parke-Davis
yemains undisturbed and is the current appli-
cable law regarding the required forum in
which to bring claims for contribution. This
holding plainly mandates that such claims
“can only be asserted by means of third-
party impleader in an action brought by the
injured party against a tortfeasor.” Id., syl.
pt. 6, I previously bemoaned the potential
lack of future opportunity to revisit Parke~
Davis because “tortfeasors will undoubtédly
be reluctant to risk rurining afoul of the
Parke-Davis holding,” thereby evading our
review. State Auto, 2015 WL 8631685 at “4.
This prediction is fully borne out in this case.
Attempting to strictly comply with the
Parke~Davis holding lest it jeopardize its
inchoate right of contribution, the petitioner
voluntarily dismissed its contribution claim in
the federal court action and brought its con-
tribution claim by way of third-party im-
pleader in the state court action—just as the
syllabus. point requires. Now, the majority
finds that the petitioner’s claim is barred
because it did precisely that, This Court can-
not on the one hand demand that litigants
proceed in a particular manner regarding a
specific cause of action, then penalize them
for doing so.

2. I would be remiss if I failed to note'that the

majority's author, despite refusing to'discuss the
implications of Parke-Dayis in the opinion,

joined in my State Auto concurrence criticizing

the case and agreed that it was “wrongly decid-
ed.” 2015 WL 3631685 at *4,

3, Furthermore, the majority’s professed abhor-
rence of “piecemeal” litigation is undermined by
its refusal to utilize the more appropriate con-
cept which would limit the duplication of litiga-
tion in the instant matter: collateral estoppel. As
indicated above, the federal court found that the
Lang Defendants and Horner Brothers were neg-

The majority's refusal to address the peti-
tioner’s primary argument—that it was legal-
ly foreclosed from proceeding as the majority
now finds it should have—is telling, to say
the least. Moreover, while the majority takes
the petitioner to task for attempting “two
bites” at the apple, it fails to appreciate that
the petitioner was already victorious in feder-
al court, obviating the need for a “second

* bite.” The majority fails to. appreciate that

the petitioner does not seek additional dam-
ages in the state court action. Rather, it
seeks merely to ensure, in the state court
action, that it is not held liable for greater
than its own proportionate share of fault. It
was long-ago established that “[iJn West Vir-
ginia one joint tort-feasor is entitled to con-
tribution from another joint tort-feasor[.)”
Haynes v, City of Nitro, 161 W.Va. 230, 280,
240 S.H.2d 544, 545 (1977): The majority’s
refusal to permit the petitioner to preserve
this indelible right via a claim for contribu-
tion for fear that some duplication of proof
may occur is nonsensical. .

As is apparent, the petitioner sought re-
covery of its own damages in the federal
court action and, as plaintiff, had every right
to choose its forum. As this Court has little
trouble recognizing when a traditional per-
sonal injury plaintiff is involved, “the plain-
tiffs choice of forum should rarely be dis-
turbed.” Nezan v. Aries Techs. Inc., 226
W.Va. 631, 644, 704 S.E.2d 681, 644 (2010)
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 380 U.S.
501, 67 S.Ct..889, 91 L.Ed, 1055 (1947). The
same holds true of the petitioner. Simply
because the petitioner is named as a defen-
dant in a parallel action instituted by a differ-
ent party who was likewise injured by the
same joint tortfeasors does not require the
petitioner to subordinate its choice of forum

ligent in their construction of the fill slope, Ac-
cordingly, in my view, the petitioner should have
been entitled to assert collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion against the Lang Defendants and Hor-
ner Brothers in the state court action. “Collateral
estoppel is designed to foreclose relitigation of
issues in a second suit which have actually been
litigated in the earlier suit even though there may
be a difference in the cause of action between the
parties of the first and second suit.” Conley v.
Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 586, 301 S.B.2d 216,
217 (1983).

for its own damages. Multiple or-overlapping
litigation is not invariably avoidable. Differ-
ing parties having differing rights and reme-
dies to pursue may occasionally cause multi-
ple pending actions to ensue on parallel
tracks, Where joinder is not mandatory by
way of our Rules of Civil Procedure or-sub-
stantive law, it is inappropriate for this Court
to second-guess choices made in the course of
litigation for no other reason than it would
have preferred the matters all he decided in
one action, :

Moreover, any suggestion by the majority
that the petitioner should have pursued its
own claim for damages in the state court
litigation initiated first by the homeowners, is
completely incorrect. West Virginia Rule of
Civil Procedure 14(a) provides that the third-
party complaint serves to implead those “who
[ave] or may be liable to the third-party
plaintiff for-all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff.” It does not
authorize the assertion, via third-party com-
plaint, of causes of action independent of the
plaintiff's claim, regardless of whether it
stems from the same underlying facts. Other
states with similar rules have held that,

-[allthough third-party practice is properly
used to reduce litigation where the third-
party claim arises out of the same. basic
facts which determine the plaintiff's claim
against the defendant, it can not be used to
maintain an entirely separate and indepen-
dent claim against a third party, even if it
arises out of the same general set of facts
as the main. claim,

Filipponio v. Bailitz, 73 Il.App.8d 389, 29
Il.Dee. 466, 392 N.E.2d 28, 26 (1978) (empha-
sis added). Federal courts interpreting the
identical language contained in their federal
counterpart to our Rule 14 agree! As ex-
plained in one leading treatise on civil proce-
dure:
If the claim is separate or independent
from the main action, impleader will be
denied. The claim against the third-par-
ty defendant must be based upon plain-
tiffs claim against defendant. The cru-
cial-characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is
that defendant is attempting to transfer
4, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) simi-

larly provides that a “defending party may, as
third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and com-

565

to the third-party defendant the liability
asserted against defendant by the origi-
nal plaintiff The mere fact that the
alleged third-party claim arises from
the same transaction or set of facts as
the-original claim is not enough,

6 Fed, Prac, & Proc, Civ. § 1446 (8d ed.); see

Stewart v, Am. Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d
196, 199 @th Cir. 1988) (“[A] third-party
claim may be asserted only when the third
party’s liability is in some way dependent on
the outcome of the main claim and is second-
ary or derivative thereto.”); Kenneth Leven-
thal & Co. v. Joyner Wholesale Co., 736 F.2d.
29, 81 (2d Cir, 1984) (“The third party's
lability here is neither dependent upon the
outcome of the main claim nor is the third
party potentially secondarily liable as a con-
tributor to the defendant.”); Hefley v. Tew-
tron, Inc, 718 F.2d 1487, 1498 (10th Cir,
1988) (same); Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1979) (same); McCain v. Clearview Dodge
Sales, ‘Inc. 574 F.2d: 848 (6th Cir. 1978)
(same); United States v. Joe Grasso & Son,
Inc., 880 F.2d 749, 751 (6th Cir. 1967) (“[A]n
entirely sepaiate and independent claim can-
not be maintained against a third party un-
der Rule 14, even though it does arise out of
the same general set of facts as the main
claim.”); Cordova v. FedEx Ground Package
Systems, Inc., 104 F.Supp.8d 1119 (D. Or.
2015) (sarne); Polymeric Res. Corp. v. Estate
of Dumouchelle, No. 10-14718, 2014 -WL
2815681, at *2 (B.D. Mich. June 28, 2014)
(dismissing third-party claim which was inde-
pendent of plaintiff's claim and did not seek
to apportion liability of plaintiffs claim
against third-party plaintiff); Colony Ins. Co.
v. Kwasnik, Kanowitz & Associates, P.C.,
288 F.R.D, 340 (D.N.J, 2012) (same); iBasis
Global, Inc. v.. Diamond Phone Card, Inc.,
278 F.R.D. 70 (E.D, N.Y. 2011) (same); Am.
Contractors Indem. Co. v. Bigelow, No. CV
09-08108-PCT-MHM, 2010 WL 5638782, at
*2 (D. Ariz, July 80, 2010) (“[A] third-party
claim may be asserted only where a third-
party defendant’s liability to the third-party
plaintiff is dependent on the outcome of the
main claim and is secondary or derivative
thereto.”); Hi. DuPont de Nemours and Co.

plaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it
for all or part of the claim against it.” (emphasis
added), .

566

v. Kolon Industries, Inc., 688 F.Supp.2d 448
(E.D. Va. 2009) (same).

Therefore, as demonstrated above, the pe-
titioner was required by our long-standing
caselaw to bring the action for contribution in
the state court action by way of third-party
complaint. Further, the petitioner cowld not
have pursued its independent claim for dam-
ages in the state court action and was fully
permitted to choose its forum. Simply put,
there was no legally permissible way for the
petitioner to have proceeded in this matter
other than precisely how it did. This is quite
simply a scenario where some multiplicity of
suit was unavoidable. The majority complete-
ly misses the forest for the trees in its analy-
sis; by doggedly focusing on the narrow
legal issue of res judicata and its elements, it
fails entirely to appreciate that the practical
realities of. the claims in this case, coupled
with controlling precedent, required the peti-
tioner to proceed in exactly this manner,

Where the law requires that a matter be
pursued in a specific forum in a specific
manner, it is quite simply inconceivable to
me how a majority of this Court concludes
that a litigant that adheres to precisely this
procedure somehow relinquishes its right to
have its cause of action heard. This injury to
the petitioner is compounded by the insult of
the majority’s abject refusal to so much as
dignify the caselaw upon which the litigant
adhered and relied to its detriment. Accord-
ingly, I respectfully dissent.

803 S.E.2d 536
Brandon FLACK, Petitioner
Below, Petitioner

ve
David BALLARD, Warden, Mount Olive
Correctional Complex, Respondent.
Below, Respondent
: No. 15-0901
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: February 8, 2017
Filed: June 9, 2017

5
re}

Sidney H. Bell, Esq., Attorney at Law,
Beaver, West Virginia, Counsel for the Peti-
tioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Zachary Aaron Viglianco, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent.

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner Brandon Flack appeals the Au-
gust 24, 2015 order of the Circuit Court of
Mercer County granting, in part, and deny-
ing, in part, his petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner alleges that the habeas court erred
in (1) denying his claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel; (2) denying habeas relief on
the basis that the State knowingly introduced
false evidence; and (8) denying habeas relief
on the basis that the State made inappropri-
ate comments during closing argument. Re-
spondent Warden, Mount Olive Correctional
Complex (“the State”), asserts a cross-as-
signment of error alleging that the habeas
court erred in partially granting Petitioner
habeas relief on double jeopardy grounds.
We have considered the parties’ briefs and
arguments, the submitted record and perti-
nent authorities. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the
order of the habeas court and remand this
matter with instructions as further indicated
below.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts were established at
the trial in this matter and set forth in
Petitioner’s direct appeal to this Court in
State v, Flack, 232 W.Va, 708, 753 S.E.2d 761
(2018), Sometime in late January 2011, Peti-
tioner and his accomplices came up with a
plan to burglarize the home -of Petitioner’s
unele, David Flack (the “Flack Residence”).
Id. at 710, 758 S.E.2d at 763. On the evening
of January 28, 2011, Petitioner and his ac-
complices, who lived in Pulaski, Virginia,
1. Because Petitioner's claims stem from the un-
derlying trial in this matter, we refer to Respon-
dent simply as “the State.” See Tex S. v. Pszezol-

kowski, 236 W.Va. 245 n.2, 778 S.E.2d 694. n.2
(2015).

2. The record before the Court reflects that Jo-
seph Flack was blind,

3. According to the testimony of India Simmons
at trial, a minor child, who was asleep on the

571

drove to Bluefield, West Virginia, where the
Flack Residence was located. Id. Arriving
shortly after midnight on January 29, 2011,
Petitioner and two of his accomplices, Jas-
man Montgomery and Jacob Thomas, put on
the ski masks, obscuring their faces, and
approached the back of the Flack Residence
and knocked on the door. Jd. A fourth man,
Joseph Flack, remained in the car.? Id.

Matthew Flack (Petitioner’s second cous-
in), India Simmons (Matthew’s cousin), and
Milton (“Mel”) Thomas (Matthew's friend),
were inside the house* Jd. Hearing the
knock on the back door, Matthew looked
through a curtain and saw three masked men
standing at the back door. Jd. Matthew then
ran upstairs to get a gun. Jd. As Matthew
headed up the stairs, one of the men kicked
in the back door. The three men then en-
tered the Flack Residence. Id. Following
Matthew, Petitioner ran up the stairs and
began wrestling with him. Jd. While Petition-
er and Matthew struggled on the landing,
Mr. Montgomery ran up the stairs, pulled
out a gun and shot Matthew Flack in the
face, Id. Petitioner was also shot when Mat-
thew Flack fired his gun.’ Id.

Petitioner and his accomplices.ran out of
the Flack Residence and fled from the scene.
Id. The men took Petitioner, who was visibly
injured, to the hospital. Jd. at 711, 758 S.E.2d
at 764, There, the men told hospital staff that,
Petitioner had been shot in a drive-by-shoot-
ing. Petitioner's injuries were reported to the
police by hospital staff and several officers
were dispatched to investigate. Jd, Upon
their arrival, one of the officers noticed blood
on the inside and outside of the car that
Petitioner and his accomplices had driven to
the hospital. Id. The officers asked for and
were given permission to search the car by a
young woman named Heather Davis, whose

couch during these events, was also present in
the house.

4. The record before us in this proceeding reflects
that at trial, co-defendant Jasman Montgomery
testified that when he turned around, he heard
either Petitioner or Jacob Thomas kick in the
back door.

5. At trial, Petitioner claimed, and the State did
not contest, that he was unarmed,

572

grandfather owned the car, Two handguns
and ski masks were found in the trunk.§ Id,

Petitioner was subsequently arrested and
charged with one count of first degree-mur-
der, one count of burglary, one count of first
degree robbery, and one count of conspiracy,
Id, Pleading not guilty, Petitioner's case pro-
ceeded to trial. Id, At trial, the State’s wit-
nesses included Petitioner’s accomplice, Mr.
Montgomery, and Dr. James Kaplan, ‘the
State Medical Examiner.’ Id.

Mr, Montgomery pled guilty to first de-
gree murder and was sentenced to life with
the possibility of parole. Id. As part of his
plea agreement, Mr. Montgomery testified
for the State and told the jury about the plan
they had devised, their forced entry into the
Flack Residence, his shooting of Matthew
Flack, and driving Petitioner to the hospital.
Id, During the course of the trial, defense
counsel did not request any limiting or cau-
tionary instruction regarding the consider-
ation the jurors were permitted to give Mr,
Montgomery's guilty plea or his testimony
that he murdered Matthew Flack, Id.

At trial, Dr. James Kaplan testified that
Mr. Flack died ‘as a result of a gunshot
wound. Id. However, the pathologist who
prepared the autopsy report did not testify
at trial and defense counsel did not object,
Id.

On April 26, 2012, following a three-day
trial, a jury convicted Petitioner of all
charges and recommended mercy for the

6, Although there is a dispute in the record before
the Court regarding the point at which Ms. Davis
and Ms. Burelson joined the men, it is undisput-
ed that Ms, Davis and her friend, Ashley Burel-
son, were at the hospital with Petitioner's accom-
plices when officers arrived to investigate.

7. The State also presented several other wit-
, nesses at trial: Officers R,S, Gibson and R.D.
Davis, who responded to and investigated the
crime scene and the car driven by Petitioner and
his accomplices on the night of the crime; Lieu-
tenant Scott Myers, the lead investigating officer
on the case; Officer John Whitt, who responded
to the crime scene-and assisted in processing the
evidence found at the crime scene and in the car;
Mel Thomas (the victim’s friend) and India Sim-
mons (the victim’s cousin), who were. in the
Flack Residence at the time of the crime, who
testified regarding the men’s forced entry into
the home, Matthew Flack’s struggle with one of
the masked men, and the gunshots they heard:

murder charge.’ Petitioner then moved for a
new trial, asserting that his rights were wvio-
lated when the trial court failed to sua sponte
give the jury a limiting instruction regarding
Mr. Montgomery's testimony about his guilty
plea, Id. Petitioner also argued that because
there were no African-American members on
his jury panel, his constitutional rights were
violated, Jd. On June 7, 2012, the trial court
denied Petitioner's motion for a new trial. Id.
Because the State had pursued the murder
charge based on a felony murder theory, the
trial court merged the counts of first degree +
murder and burglary, resulting in the dis-
missal of the burglary conviction. Petitioner
‘was sentenced to life with mercy for the first
degree murder offense, forty years for the
first degree robbery offense and an indeter-
minate term of one to five years for the
conspiracy offense, with all sentences to run
consecutively. Petitioner was given 495 days
jail credit. -

Petitioner filed an appeal of his convictions
for first degree murder, first degree robbery
and conspiracy alleging that: (1) defense
counsel’s failure to object to or request a
limiting instruction following Mr, Montgom-
ery’s testimony on behalf of the State and
the relation of his guilty plea to the jury, was
plain error requiring a reversal of his convic-
tions under State v. Caudill, 170 W.Va. 74,
289 S.E.2d 748 (1982); (2) his right to be tried
by a jury drawn from a cross-section of his
community was violated; (8) that Mercer
County did not comply with the statutory

Amanda Shorter, a woman who was staying ina
house near Flack Residence on the night of the
crime, who testified that she witnessed four men
get out of a car, change into dark clothing, and
enter and exit the Flack Residence; Lt. Roger
Reed, section head of the forensic firearm and
tool mark section of the West Virginia State
Police Forensic Laboratory, who examtined the
firearms collected from the crime scene and the
car; Koren Powers, section supervisor of the
trace evidence at the West Virginia State Police
Forensic Laboratory who examined all of the
evidence submitted from the crime scene for
gunshot residue; Mary Heaton, a DNA analyst at
the West Virginia State Police Forensic Labora-
tory who confirmed that Petitioner's DNA was
found on one of the ski masks found in the car;
and Dr, Byron Smith, the emergency room phy-
sician who treated Petitioner for his gunshot
wounds.

requirements for assembling a jury pool; and
(4) the admission of Dr. Kaplan’s testimony
concerning the cause of Matthew Flack’s
death based on findings in an autopsy report,
prepared by someone other than Dr, Kaplan
was plain error. See Flack, 232 W.Va. at 712,
158 §.E.2d at 765. Finding no reversible er-
ror, we affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. Id,

On January 7, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro
se habeas petition alleging various grounds
for relief. The habeas court appointed coun-
sel for Petitioner, who then filed a supple-

mental petition on his behalf on July 29,

2014. As discussed in detail below, Petitioner
contended that despite the fact that the State
proceeded under a felony murder theory,
defense counsel should have vigorously devel-
oped and presented an identity of the shooter
defense, Petitioner argues that defense coun-
sel could have asserted that Matthew Flack’s
death was the result of being accidentally
shot by his friend, Mel Thomas, who was
positioned above him on the stairwell, and
that the fatal shot came from a handgun that
‘was still at the scene when the police arrived
and not in the trunk of the car at the hospi-
tal. Maintaining that this theory of defense
should have been pursued, Petitioner pre-
sented the following allegations of error to
the habeas court below: (1) the robbery of-
fense was a lesser-included offense to the
felony murder offense predicated on burglary
and, as such, double jeopardy attached when
the two were merged; (2) ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for (a) failure to hire an
investigator, an expert in forensic pathology,
and a firearms expert and to cross-examine
the State’s experts; (b) failure to object to
the autopsy evidence being elicited from a
different pathologist than the one who per-
formed the autopsy; (c) failure to object to
the co-defendant testifying in front of the
jury in prison attire; (d) failure to request a
Caudill instruction regarding the co-defen-
dant’s testimony; (e) failure to request a copy
of the co-defendant’s written plea agreenient;
f) failure to request a self-defense instruc-
tion; and (g) failure to subpoena certain de-
fense witnesses for trial; and (h) failure to
object to the medical examiner’s testimony as
denying him the ‘ight of confrontation under

8. The substance of Mr. Lefler’s testimony is dis-

573

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S, 36, 124
S.Ct. 1854, 158 L.Ed.2d-177 (2004) and State
v, Frazier, 229 W. Va, 724, 785 S.H.2d 727
(2012). The State filed.a response to the
habeas petition asserting that Petitioner’s
sentences complied with double jeopardy
protections, that Petitioner received effective
counsel at trial,-and that it was inappropriate
to second-guess his counsel’s strategy in a
petition seeking habeas relief.

‘The habeas court held, an. omnibus hearing
on July 81, 2015, during which Petitioner
testified and called five other witnesses to
testify in support of his petition: Officer R.S.
Gibson and Lt. C.S. Myers, both with the
Bluefield Police Department, Larry Dehus,
Danny Lane, and defense counsel Derrick W.
Lefler. Officer Gibson, the first officer on the
scene of the crime, testified regarding the
location of a handgun at the scene, a Hi-Point
pistol, and another spent shell casing he ob-
served laying on the second set: of stairs on
the landing..at the crime scene. Lieutenant
Myers, the detective on call on the night of
the shooting, testified regarding (1) the loca-
tion of the firearms and casings that were _
found at the crime scene and submitted to
the State Crime Lab; (2) his investigation of
the crime and his belief that Mr. Montgom-
ery fired the fatal shot killing Matthew
Flack; (8) his interview of Amanda Shorter,
the witness who saw four masked men ap-
proaching and exiting the Flack Residence;
and (4) his interview of Heather Davis and
Ashley Burelson, two females who accompa-
nied Petitioner and his co-defendants on the
night of the crime, who were picked up and
brought to the station for questioning.

Mr. Lefler, Petitioner’s defense counsel at
trial, testified regarding his initial investiga-
tion of the case, the theory of defense pre-
sented at trial, and’ his thought process re-
garding trial tacties and strategy.’ Larry
Dehus, an expert in forensic science, fire-
arms and ballistics who was retained by Pe-
titioner’s habeas ‘counsel, testified that it was
‘improbable that Mr. Montgomery fired the
fatal shot killing Matthew Flack based on
the trajectory of his wounds and the position
of Mr, Montgomery during the crime.

cussed in further detail below,

574

‘Danny Lane, a homicide investigator, fire-
arms expert, and former law enforcement
officer retained by Petitioner’s habeas coun-
sel, testified regarding his personal investiga-
tion of the case, what types of opinions a
firearms expert would have presented at tri-
al, including a recreation of the crime scene,
and his opinion of how the fatal shot killing
Matthew. Flack occurred, He also. testified
regarding his interview of Heather Davis,
one of the women accompanying Peti-
tioner on thé? night of the crime, and his
opinion that ‘Ms, Davis’s testimony would
have been helpful to the defense because it
would have discredited Ms. Shorter’s testi-
mony. He testified that cell phone extractions
from Jacob Thomas’s and Heather Davis’s
cell phones indicated that Ms, Davis and Ms.
Burelson did not accompany Petitioner and
his co-defendants to the crime scene. He
asserted that because the two women were
left by Petitioner at a relative’s home while
they went to buy beer at a convenience store,
this evidence would have conflicted with
Amanda Shorter’s account of events.

On August 24, 2015, the habeas court en-

- tered an order granting; in part, and deny-
ing, in part, Petitioner’s habeas petition and
an order correcting Petitioner’s sentence
- pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia
Rules of Criminal Procedure, The habeas
court concluded that Petitioner had failed to
prove both prongs of the ineffective assis-
tance of counsel test in State v, Miller, 194
W.Va. 8, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). The habeas
court also rejected Petitioner’s assertions
that false evidence had been presented by
the State at trial, finding that inconsistencies
in various witnesses’ testimony did not prove
falsity but rather, constituted credibility de-
terminations that remained in the province of
the jury. However, regarding Petitioner's
double jeopardy claim, the court found that
Petitioner proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he had been improperly sen-
tenced to an additional forty years on the
robbery offense because the robbery was
also a lesser-included offense to the first
degree felony murder charge and he should
not have been convicted for the lesser-includ-
ed offense. The habeas court dismissed the
robbery conviction and, pursuant to Rule
35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal

Procedure, corrected Petitioner’s sentence to
life with mercy for the first degree felony
murder conviction and to an indeterminate
term of one to five years for the conspiracy
conviction. On appeal, both parties assign
error to the habeas court’s rulings.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
HH A circuit court’s order granting or
denying habeas relief is subject to a three-
prong standard of review:

“Tn reviewing challenges to the findings
and conclusions of the circuit court in a
habeas corpus action, we apply a three-
prong standard of review. We review the
final order and the ultimate disposition
under an abuse of discretion standard; the
underlying factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard; and questions of law
are subject to a de novo review.” Syllabus
point 1, Mathena v, Haines, 219 W.Va.
417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006). ’

Syl. Pt, 1, State ex rel. Franklin v. McBride,
226 W.Va. 375, 701 S.E.2d 97 (2009), With
these principles in mind, we consider the
arguments of the parties.

UL DISCUSSION _
A, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner asserts an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim that his court-appointed at-
torneys, Derrick W. Lefler and Ward Mor-
gan (collectively, “defense counsel”), failed to
investigate adequately what he alleges is a
setious, complex case. Petitioner bases his
claim upon several acts or omissions by de-
fense counsel: (1) failure to interview, sub-
poena, or otherwise attempt to secure the
appearance of Heather Davis and Ashley Bu-
relson; (2) failure to hire an investigator or
expert witnesses; (8) failure to cross-examine
the State’s firearms expert or recognize the
discrepancy between the testimony of various
witnesses with respect to the firearms used
in the shooting and entered into evidence; (4)
failure to object to the testimony of the
State’s medical expert on hearsay and con-
frontation clause grounds; (6) allowing Peti-
tioner’s accomplice, who had previously pled
guilty to first degree to appear in prison
attire when testifying on behalf of the State;

(6) failure to request a limiting instruction
concerning the accomplice’s guilty plea, as
permitted by Caudill, 170 W.Va. 74, 289
S.E.2d 748; and (7) failure to request a jury
instruction on self-defense.

HH With respect to the standards that
guide our analysis in claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel, we have held:

In the West Virginia courts, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are to be
governed by the two-pronged test estab-
lished in Strickland v. Washington, 466
US. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,
(1984): (1) Counsel's performance was defi-
cient under an objective standard of rea-
sonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different,

Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459
S.E.2d 114 (1995). Noting that “[jJudicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential,” we further have held:

In reviewing counsel’s performance,
courts must apply an objective standard
and determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or omis-
sions were outside the broad range of pro-
fessionally competent assistance while at
the same time refraining from engaging in
hindsight or second-guessing of trial coun-
sel’s strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing
court asks whether a reasonable lawyer
would have acted, under the circum-
stances, as defense counsel acted in the
case at issue.

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

WM “ITyhe cases in which a defendant
may prevail on the ground of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel are few and far between
one another.” Jd. at 16, 459 S.H.2d at 127,
Indeed, ineffective assistance claims are
rarely granted and only when a claim has
substantial merit. State ew rel. Daniel v. Le-
gursky, 195 W.Va. 814, 819, 465 S.E.2d 416,
421 (1995). In Miller, we explained that:

[W]e always should presume strongly
that counsel’s performance was reasonable
and adequate. A defendant seeking to re-
but this strong presumption of effective-
ness bears a difficult burden because con-

575

stitutionally acceptable performance is not
defined narrowly and encompasses a “wide
vange.” The test of ineffectiveness has lit-
tle or nothing to do with what the best
lawyers would have done. Nor is the test
even what most good lawyers would have
done. We only ask whether a reasonable
lawyer would have acted, under the cir-
cumstances, as defense counsel acted in
the case at issue. We are not interested in
grading lawyers’ performances; we are in-
terested in whether the adversarial pro-
cess at the time, in fact, worked adequate-
ly.
194 W.Va, at 16, 459 S.H.2d at 127. “[Tyhe
burden is on the defendant to prove ineffec-
tive assistance by a preponderance of the
evidence.” State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191,
209, 286 S.H.2d 402, 413 (1982).

()) Fact Witnesses

TM Petitioner contends that defense
counsel should have called Heather Davis
and Ashley Burelson as fact witnesses at
trial. Ms. Davis and Ms. Burelson were with
Petitioner and his accomplices during the
night of the incident at the Flack Residence.
Petitioner argues that their testimony could
hhave been used to undermine the testimony
of Amanda Shorter, an eyewitness. Ms.
Shorter testified at trial that after 11:00 p.m.
on the night of January 29, 2011, she saw
four men get out of a car, change into dark
clothes and put toboggans on their heads,
She testified that the men, who were laugh-
ing and being loud, walked up to the back
door of the Flack Residence and knocked
before the door opened and they entered the
house. She further testified that subsequent
to the men entering the Flack Residence, she
heard gunshots and observed two women,
Ms. Davis and Ms. Burelson, run up to the
same car and get into the backseat before
Petitioner and his co-defendants fled the
scene. Petitioner contends that contrary to
Ms. Shorter’s testimony, the police deter-
mined that Ms. Davis and Ms. Burelson
stayed behind at an apartment and were
nowhere near the crime scene. Petitioner
argues that the testimony of the two women
could have been used to discredit the testi-
mony of Ms. Shorter, and they would have

576

testified that there was no discussion of any
plan to commit a crime,

Petitioner claims that the private investi-
gator he retained for his habeas corpus case
located Ms. Davis, who cooperated with him
and gave a recorded interview. He contends
that had she been subpoenaed by defense
counsel, she would have testified that there
was no discussion of a plan to ‘commit a
robbery, burglary, larceny or any other
crime. He also: claims that she would have
testified that their car had a full tank: of
gasoline and they had money to purchase
beer, food or anything else that they and
Petitioner may have wanted or needed that
night. He asserts that this evidence could.
have discredited several state witnesses and
supported Petitioner’s version of the events
leading up to his entry into the Flack Resi-
dence. Petitioner contends that prior to going
to the Flack Residence, he left Ms, Davis and
Ms. Burelson at a relative’s home in order to
buy beer at a convenience store and they
were waiting on him to return because they
were planning to, ride home with him in Ms,
Davis’s grandfather's car.

The State responds that defense counsel’s
decision not to subpoena these witnesses was
a matter of trial strategy and, absent ex-
traordinary, circumstances, is outside the
purview of an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim. The State contends that the theory
of the defense presented at trial was that
Petitioner and his accomplices did not arrive
at the Flack Residence intending to commit
any crime and that the conduct of the group
as they exited their car and approached the
Flack Residence demonstrated their lack of
criminal intent, Mr. Lefler stated in his clos-
ing argument that there “was no plan [to
commit a robbery]” and made reference to
Ms. Shorter’s testimony recounting her ob-
servations of the behavior of Petitioner and
the others as they approached the Flack
Residence, . .

At the omnibus hearing, defense counsel
Mr, Lefler testified that “we were certainly
aware the State intended to proceed: on a

felony murder theory, and the particulars [of-

how and by whom Matthew Flack was

killed], in all honesty, weren’t our focus.” Mr."

Lefler described Ms, Shorter as “the best

witness we had.” He reasoned that her testi-
mony was “potentially very beneficial,” and
that “the last thing they wanted to do” was
discredit her, Mr. Lefler testified that Ms.
Shorter confirmed that Petitioner and his
accomplices made a lot of noise and did not
appear to be concerned with being quiet or
approaching the house in a fashion that was
undetectable, Additionally, because Ms,
Shorter testified that she did not see a door
kicked in, the defense sought to use her
testimony to-establish that Petitioner and his
accomplices approached the house in a man-
ner that did not appear to be for evil intent, .
Moreover, Mr, Lefler stated that had Ms.
Shorter not been called by the State during
its case-in-chief, he would have called her as
a defense witness. When Petitioner inquired
why Ms. ‘Davis and Ms. Burelson were not
subpoenaed to testify, Mr. Lefler explained
that although he initially looked for these
witnesses when he began investigating the
case, he could not locate them.

In Daniel v, Legursky, 195 W.Va, 814, 828,
465. S,H.2d 416, 430 (1995), we stated that
“{a] decision regarding trial tactics cannot be
the basis for.a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel unless counsel’s tactics are shown
to be ‘so ill chosen that it permeates the
entire trial with obvious unfairness.’” (quot-
ing Teague v, Scott, 60 F.8d 1167, 1172 (6th
Cir.1995)), We have also noted, “[w]hat de-
fense to carry to the jury, what witnesses to
call, and what method of presentation to use
is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it
is one that we will seldom, if ever, second
guess.” Miller, 194 W.Va. at 16, 459 S.H.2d at.
127, .

HM As we explained in Miller, “with [the]
luxury of time and the opportunity to focus
resources on’ specific facts of a made record,
[habeas counsel] inevitably will identify
shortcomings in the performance of prior
counsel.” Jd, at 17, 459 S,H.2d at 128. “[Pler-
fection is not the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Id. Only if an identi-
fied error is “so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment” is the
first prong of the Strickland test satisfied.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

As the habeas court correctly determined,
defense counsel’s decision not to call the two
witnesses was a matter of trial strategy.
According to the record, defense counsel was
aware that these two female witnesses were
not present during the shooting. It is clear
that defense counsel considered these. issues
but focused on attacking the burglary charge
when the State offered it as the predicate
offense for felony-murder and the robbery
charge. Mr. Lefler explained that because hée
believed that Ms, Shorter was Petitioner’s
best witness and that her testimony would be
very beneficial to Petitioner, he did not want
to discredit:her at trial.

This Court has previously rejected habeas
claims predicated upon a failure to interview
or call a particular witness. See eg., State ex
rel.’ Azeez v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 168, 465
S.E.2d 168 (1995); State v. Spence, 182 W.Va.
472, 388 S.E.2d 498 (1989); State v. Jacobs,
“171 W.Va. 800, 298 S.E.2d 836 (1982); Foster

v. Ballard, No. 14-1028, 2015 WL 6756866 _

(W.Va. Nov. 4, 2015) (memorandum decision);
Boothe v. Ballard, No. 18-0740, 2014 WL
2782127 (W.Va, June 19, 2014) (memorandum
decision). We have also held that so long as
the failure to call a witness is not “due to
dereliction’ on the part of counsel, there is no
ineffective assistance,” Legursky, 195 W.Va.
at 829, 465 S.H.2d at 431. For these reasons,
we conclude that the decision not to call Ms,
Davis or Ms. Burelson for the purpose of
discrediting Ms. Shorter’s testimony was ob-
jectively reasonable and we affirm the habe-
as court’s finding on this issue.

(2) Expert Witnesses

Hl Because Petitioner contends that his
case involved a complicated crime scene and
forensic evidence, he asserts that defense

- counsel's decision not to hire an investigator
or retain a firearms expert, a forensic pathol-
ogist, or a crime scene reenactment expert to
discredit the State’s theory of the case con-
stituted a constitutionally-inadequate per-
formance at trial. He argues that defense
counsel also made no effort to challenge the
State’s forensic evidence by way of cross-
examination, or to object to the state’s foren-
sic autopsy evidence that was elicited from

- the testimony of Dr. Kaplan, who did not

517

perform the autopsy. Petitioner also claims
that counsel’s failure to object to Dr, Kap-
lan’s testimony allowed hearsay testimony
that denied Petitioner's right of confrontation
and was reversible error.

HM Petitioner asserts that if defense
counsel had retained a crime scene expert
prior to trial, he or she would have presented
to the jury expert conclusions that the
State’s theory of the case and the testimony
of co-defendant Jasman Montgomery were
not accurate and that it is more likely than
not that neither Petitioner nor any of his
companions caused Matthew Flack’s death,
Petitioner relies upon on our holding in Syl-
labus Point 4 of State ew vel, Davis v, Fou,
229 W.Va. 662, 785 S.E.2d 259 (2012), that
“fwlhen a co-perpetrator is killed by the in-
tended victim of a burglary during the com-
mission of a crime, the surviving co-perpetra-
tor cannot be charged with felony murder
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-2-1
(2010).” Thus, Petitioner argues defense
counsel should have presented a defense that
Matthew Flack was accidentally shot by Mel
Thomas, who was positioned above him on
the stairwell. According to this defense, the
fatal shot came from a handgun that was still
at the scene when the police arrived and not

“in the trunk of the car at the hospital. Peti-

tioner asserts that the jury would likely have
found reasonable doubt of his guilt and ac-
quitted him if his defense counsel had pre-
sented this defense that Matthew Flack was
not shot from below by Mr, Montgomery,
who clearly could not have fired at Matthew
Flack with the Hi-Point pistol that Patrol-
man Gibson observed at the house near Mat-
thew Flack,

The State responds that defense counsel
chose to pursue a trial strategy designed to
attack the felony charges of burglary and
robbery in order to attack collaterally the
felony murder charge. Accordingly, as de-
fense counsel testified at the omnibus hear-
ing, they believed that the jury would not be
receptive to a defense case focused on the
identity of the shooter. Defense counsel fo-
cused on the theory that Petitioner and his
co-defendants were not intending to commit
a burglary or a robbery, but rather, were
simply going to the Flack Residence to visit

578

with Matthew Flack and the shooting was
the product of a tragic, late-night misidentifi-
cation. According to the State, such a strate-
gy did not require expert testimony or the
retention of an investigator.

While counsel's general duty to prepare
necessitates an investigation of the facts,
there is no constitutional demand. that an
investigator be hired or for experts to be
retained in every case. Given the State’s
decision to charge Petitioner with felony
murder in this case, defense counsel’s deci-
sion to attack the other felonies, along with
the decision not to challenge the State’s evi-
dence concerning the identity of the man who
shot Matthew Flack, were strategic choices
made in furtherance of a clear trial strategy.

TM Addressing the elements of felony
murder, we have held:

“{Tjhe elements which the State is re-
quired to prove to obtain a conviction of
felony murder are: (1) the commission of,
or attempt to commit, one or more of the
enumerated felonies; (2) the defendant's
participation in such commission or at-
tempt; and (8) the death of the victim as a
result of injuries received during the
course of such commission or attempt.”
State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, [810,]
805 S.E.2d 251, 267 (1983).

Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Mayle, 178 W.Va. 26, 357
§.E.2d 219 (1987) (emphasis added). We re-
cently limited the scope of the felony murder
doctrine as it applies to certain cireum-
stances involving the death of a co-perpetira-
tor in Davis, 229 W.Va. 662, 735 S.E.2d 259.
However, Davis has not altered the rule
articulated in Mayle, which is applicable to
the facts in this case.

9. Our holding in Davis was consistent with our
prior decision in State ex rel. Painter v. Zakaib,
186 W.Va. 82, 411 S.E.2d 25 (1991) that a co-
perpetrator could not be charged with felony
murder when the only death that occurred dur-
ing the commission of the felony was the suicide
of a co-perpetrator, In both cases, we discussed
the felony murder doctrine as it existed at com-
mon law. We noted in Davis that “the statutory
offense of felony murder remains deeply en-
sconced in its common-law foundations,” and
emphasized that, at common law, “the death in a
felony murder case was prototypically that of an
innocent individual.” Davis, 229 W.Va. at 668,
735 S.E.2d at 265.

Accordingly, we conclude that defense
counsel’s strategy in this case did not require
expert testimony to challenge the State’s
firearms expert or medical examiner, as the
identity of the shooter and the specific details
of Matthew Flack’s death were irrelevant to
the felony murder theory of the case present-
ed. So long as Petitioner’s criminal act of
going to the Flack Residence with the intent
to commit burglary and robbery resulted in
Matthew Flack’s death, the jury could still
properly convict Petitioner of felony murder
under Mayle. Under these circumstances, an
alternate shooter theory was inapposite.

Similarly, Mr. Lefler testified that he did
not hire a medical examiner because the
manner of Matthew Flack’s death did not
matter. Mr, Lefler reasoned that “had Mat-
thew Flack had a heart attack when he saw a
gun and passed ... it would have still been
felony murder.” The same principle applies
to the testimony of Dr. Kaplan, to which
defense counsel did not object. Dr. Kaplan
only confirmed that Matthew Flack died of a
gunshot wound, a fact not contested by any-
one. As this court explained in Petitioner’s
direct appeal,

... the error raised by [Petitioner] was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Un-

like the facts we addressed in [State v.]

Frazier, [ 229 W.Va. 724, 785 S.H.2d 727

(2012) ], where the manner of death was

very much in contention, Dr. Kaplan’s tes-

timony at [Petitioner’s] trial had little pro-
bative value and mirrored testimony from
other witnesses. Montgomery testified and
admitted to shooting Matthew Flack. [Pe-
titioner] did not contest Montgomery’s tes-
timony that he was the shooter. Dr. Kap-
lan merely confirmed that Matthew Flack

The State correctly contends that while this
Court acknowledged in Davis that West Virgi-
nia’s felony murder statute does not “encom-
pass[] every death that occurs in the course of a
statutorily-enumerated felony regardless of who
causes the death,” Id. at 668, 735 S.E.2d at 265,
nothing in Davis suggested that the death of an
innocent victim caused by the action of another
victim (but linked to the perpetrator through the
felonious criminal acts that created the foresee-
able risk of harm) would fall outside of the scope
of the felony murder doctrine.

died as a result of a gunshot wound, and
that the death was a homicide. Of critical
import is that nothing in Dr. Kaplan’s tes-
timony implicated [Petitioner] in the homi-
cide, linked him to the crimes charged, or
made it more likely or less likely that
[Petitioner] committed the murder of Mat-
thew Flack.
Flack, 282 W.Va. at 716, 758 S.E.2d at 769
(emphasis in original). Likewise, although
Petitioner contends that defense counsel
missed the discrepancy concerning the loca-
tion of the Hi-Point pistol that fired the
lethal shot, the location of the weapon was
not dispositive of any relevant fact in this
ease. For all these reasons, we affirm the
habeas court’s finding that defense counsel’s
tactics were not unreasonable from an objec-
tive point of view in a felony murder case.

(3) Caudill Instruction

Petitioner asserts that defense counsel im-
properly failed to object to co-defendant Mr.
Montgomery telling the jury that he had pled
guilty to first-degree murder and was serv-
ing a life sentence.” Petitioner contends that
the State was attempting to use Mr. Mont-
gomery’s testimony as substantive evidence
to prove Petitioner's guilt. Petitioner asserts
that defense counsel also failed to ask for a
Caudill instruction to be given to the jurors
that the evidence of the co-defendant’s guilty
plea and sentence could only be considered
on the issue of his credibility and not on the
issue of Petitioner's guilt.

HE In Syllabus Point 3 of Caudill, this
Court held:

In a criminal trial an accomplice may
testify as a witness on behalf of the State
to having entered a plea of guilty to the
crime charged against a defendant where
such testimony is not for the purpose of
proving the guilt of the defendant and is
relevant to the issue of the witness-accom-
plice’s credibility. The failure by a trial

10. Petitioner also argues that defense counsel
failed to object to Mr. Montgomery testifying in
jail clothes, but cites no legal authority for the
proposition that permitting a witness for the
State to testify in “inmate orange” constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel.

11. On appeal, the State now argues that defense
counsel’s failure was not error because Mr.

579

judge to give a jury instruction so limiting
such testimony is, however, reversible er-
ror.

Syl. Pt. 8, Caudill, 170 W.Va. 74, 289 S.E.2d
748. We explained in Caudill that.while testi-
mony elicited solely for the purpose of prov-
ing guilt is impermissible, “where the testi-
mony regarding the plea-is but a small part
of an accomplice’s testimony” and the accom-
plice’s testimony is otherwise “general and
extensive in nature,” the prejudice caused by
such testimony is limited. Id. at 81, 289
S.E.2d at°755. However, we mandated the
issuance of a limiting instruction to ensure
that a jury did not “misinterpret the purpose
for which testimony [concerning a guilty
plea] is offered.” Id. .

In Petitioner’s direct appeal of his convic-
tion, we recognized that a limiting instruction
might only draw attention to an otherwise
innocuous mention and that it is better for
defense counsel to determine when testimony
concerning a plea is of the character that it
might be misconstrued by the jury (and thus
warrant a limiting instruction). Flack, 282
W.Va. at 718, 758 S.E.2d at 766. We there-
fore modified our prior holding in Caudill,
concluding that for tactical reasons, a defen-
dant might not want such a limiting instruc-
tion and therefore that while the failure to
issue the Caudill instruction can be revers-
ible error, it is not unless such an instruction
is requested by the defense. Jd.

HMI Turning to the case at hand, it, is
evident from the record that defense counsel
admitted error in failing to seek a Caudill
instruction. Defense counsel acknowledged in
post-conviction proceedings that they were
unaware of this Court’s holding in Caudill.
Thus, for purposes of this proceeding, we
find that the first prong of Strickland has
been satisfied and that defense counsel’s per-
formance was deficient under an objective
standard of reasonableness." Miller, 194

Montgomery's testimony was not elicited for pur-
poses of proving Petitioner's guilt, but rather to
aid the jury's credibility determination. However,
because defense counsel admitted in post-convic-
tion proceedings that they were unaware of this
Court's holding in Caudill, the habeas court
properly determined that defense counsel com-
mitted error.

580

W.Va, 8, 459 S.H.2d 114, However, the habe-

_ a8 court determined that the second prong of
Strickland (proof that but for counsel’s un-
professional errors, the result of the proceed-
ings would have been different) was not sat-
isfied. Id. We agree.

As we found in Petitioner’s direct appeal,
“[t]here was no evidence that the prosecutor
sought to infer.the defendant’s guilt by virtue
of Montgomery's guilty plea, nor was there
evidence of any aggravating circumstances
surrounding Montgomery’s. testimony.”
Flack, 282 W.Va. at 714, 758 S.E.2d at 767.
The State contends, and we conclude, that it
did not emphasize the fact that Mr. Mont-
gomery had pled guilty in the presentation of
its case, Mr. Montgomery provided wide-
ranging testimony concerning his personal
knowledge of the incident in question. While

. the State briefly mentioned Mr. Montgom-
ery’s incarceration at the beginning of his
direct examination because he was wearing a
prison jumpsuit, it is evident from the State’s
line of questioning that its intent was to
assist the jury in making its credibility as-
sessment. The State asked Mr. Montgomery
the following question:

Q. ‘As a part of the plea agreement in the

matter whereby you pled guilty to first-

degree murder, did you agree to come
forward and give truthful testimony, if nec-
essary?

AL Yes.

Following that question, defense counsel
asked Mr. Montgomeiy numerous questions
concerning the facts and circumstances of the
crime, none of which contained any reference
to his plea agreement. The only time the plea
agreement was mentioned again was briefly
in the prosecutor’s closing argument when he
noted that “Jasman Montgomery accepted
his responsibility and his punishment, life, no
guarantee of ever being paroled.” According-
ly, it is clear from the record that the State
did not elicit testimony about Mr. Montgom-
ery’s guilty plea with the intent of relying on
that testimony as substantive evidence.
Therefore, because Petitioner has failed to

12. There is no such legal concept. Self-defense
and defense of another are two separate doc-
trines. See State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. 591, 598, 515
S.E.2d 127, 134 (1999) (discussing both doc-

demonstrate that defense counsel’s decision
not to request a limiting instruction was so
prejudicial as to change the outcome of the
trial, we affirm the habeas court’s ruling on
this issue. :

(4) Self-Defense Instruction -'

HI Petitioner alleges that defense coun-
sel was ineffective for not requesting or of-
fering jury instructions on self-defense. Peti-
tioner asserts that the State's evidence was
that Mr, Montgomery shot at Matthew Flack
only after Matthew Flack shot Petitioner,
who was unarmed. Petitioner also contends
that without an instruction on “self-defense
by defense of another,” ” the jury was told
only that the State’s burden of proof was
limited to proving that Matthew Flack’s
death occurred during the commission of a
burglary. Petitioner argues that in State v.
Wade, 200 W.Va. 687, 490 S,E.2d 724 (1997),
this Court recognized that in certain cireum-
stances, other jurisdictions have allowed self-
defense instructions in felony murder cases
in which the facts support such a defense.
Accordingly, the evidence of Petitioner being
shot first, before Mr. Montgomery fired a
shot at Matthew Flack, would have sup-
ported a sélf-defense instruction to the jury.
In response, the State contends that Petition-
er was not entitled to such an instruction.

In Wade, we addressed whether a self-
defense instruction was available in response
to a charge of felony murder where the
predicate felony was delivery of controlled
substance. Id. at 645, 490 S.H.2d at 782. As a
threshold matter, we explained ‘that “any
claim of self-defense in response to a charge
of felony-murder must be asserted with re-
gard to the predicate felony.” Jd. Acknowl-
edging the traditional applications of self-
defense and provocation, we noted that self-
defense is typically only available when

[a] defendant who is not the aggressor

... has reasonable grounds to believe, and

actually does believe, that he is in immi-

nent danger of death or serious bodily

harm from which he could save himself

trines), While Petitioner sets forth case law re-

garding the doctrine of self-defense, he does not

develop an argument pertaining to the doctrine
. of defense of another.

only by using deadly force against his as-
sailant has the. right to employ deadly
force in order to defend himself.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State wv .

W.J.B., 166 W.Va. 602, 606, 276 S.E.2d 550,
558 (1981)). Finding no circumstances where
the offense of delivery of a controlled sub-
stance, standing alone, would yiéld to a claim
of self-defense or provocation, we ultimately
concluded that the defendant was not entitled
to a self-defense instruction in that case. Jd.

In the case before us, the evidence pre-
sented at trial did not support a request for a
self-defense instruction, The jury heard testi-
mony that Petitioner and his accomplices,
armed with handguns and donning ski
masks, kicked in the back door of and en-
-tered the’ Flack Residence, this demonstrat-
ing that Petitioner was the aggressor. Ac-
cordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in
the habeas court’s denial of habeas relief on
this issue, .

B. False Evidence

Petitioner additionally contends that the
State presented evidence that it knew, or had
reason to believe, was false. Specifically, Pe-
titioner relies upon: (1) various alleged incon-
sistencies and inaccuracies in the testimony
of Ms. Shorter; (2) Mr. Montgomery’s failed
polygraph test; and (8) the inconsistent testi-
mony of two police officers about where the
Hi-Point pistol used to kill Matthew Flack
was found. The State contends, and the habe-
as court found, that all of Petitioner’s claims
are grounded solely upon inconsistent wit-
ness testimony and because credibility deter-
minations remain in the province of the jury,
Petitioner has not made the requisite show-
ing of falsity.

HM In State ex rel. Franklin v.
McBride, 226 W.Va, 875, 701 S.E.2d 97
(2009), this Court recognized that “[i]t is a
basic principle of law that ‘[plrosecutors have
a duty to the court not to knowingly encour-
age or present false testimony.’” Id. at 378-
79, 701 S.E.2d at 100-01 (quoting State v.
Rivera, 210 Ariz, 188, 109 P.8d 83, 89 (2005)).
“When the State obtains a conviction through
the use of evidence that its representatives
now to be false, the conviction violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

581

Amendment.” Id., (quoting State v. Wilker-
son, 863 N.C. 382, 688 S.E.2d 174, 187
(2009)); see also People v. Diaz, 297 Tl.
App.8d 362, 231 IllDee, 528, 696 N.E.2d 819,
827 (1998) (“The State’s knowing use of per-
jured testimony to obtain a criminal convie-
tion constitutes a violation of due process of
law.”).

* [IN We have previously held that “[all-
though it is a violation of due process for the
State to convict a defendant based on false
evidence, such conviction will not be set aside
unless it is shown that the false evidence had
‘a material effect on the jury verdict.” Syl. Pt.
2, In ve Investigation of W. Va. State Police
Crime Lab. Serology Div. 190 W.Va. 321,
488 S.E.2d 501 (1993); sée also United States

-v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-79, 105 9.Ct.

8875, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“ [A] conviction
obtained by the knowing use of perjured
testimony is, fundamentally unfair, and must
be set aside if there is any reasonable likeli-
hood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury. [United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct.
2392, 2897, 49 L.Ed.2d 842.(1976) ].”).

In Franklin, we articulated the
following test that’ applies to a claim that the
State presented false evidence:

In order to obtain a new trial on a claim
that the prosecutor presented false testi-
mony at trial, a defendant must demon-
strate that, (1) the prosecutor presented
false testimony, (2) the prosecutor knew or
should have known the testimony was
false, and (8) the falsé’ testimony had a
material effect on the jury verdict.

Syl. Pt. 2, Franklin, 226 W.Va 875, 701
S.E.2d 97. Inconsistencies between ‘a wit-
ness’s trial testimony and their previous
statements, or between the testimonies of
multiple witnesses, do not necessarily demon-
strate falsity. As we stated in Franklin, “[ilt
[is] the role of the jury to weigh the evidence
and make credibility assessments after it ob-
served the witnesses and heard their testi-
mony. The jury made its determination, and
this Court will not second guess it simply
because we may have assessed the credibility
of the witnesses differently.” Id, at 379, 701

-S.E,2d at 101 (quoting State v. Brown, 210

582

W.Va. 14, 27, 552 S.E.2d 890, 408 (2001)); see
also Rivera, 109 P.3d at 89 (“Absent a show-
ing that the prosecution was aware of any
false testimony, the credibility of witnesses is
for the jury to determine.”); Syl. Pt. 8, in
part, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461
S.E.2d 163 (1995) (“Credibility determina-
tions are for a jury and not an appellate
court.”). Petitioner’s claims of false evidence
arising from the inconsistent testimony of
Ms. Shorter and the proffered testimony of
Heather Davis, and the inconsistent testimo-
ny concerning the recovery location of the
Hi-Point pistol, fail because he has not made
the requisite showing of falsity, To the extent
that Petitioner’s claims rely solely on incon-
sistent witness testimony, we therefore find
Petitioner’s arguments unavailing. ©

HE (We likewise find Petitioner’s ar-
gument that Mr. Montgomery failed a poly-
graph examination equally unconvincing.
This court has held that “{plolygraph test
results are not admissible in evidence in a
criminal trial in this State.” Syl. Pt. 2, State
v. Frazier, 162 W.Va. 602, 252 S.E.2d 39
(1979). Similarly, th fact that Mr. Montgom-
ery had a potential motive to lie is not
enough to satisfy Petitioner’s burden. This
Court rejected a similar argument in State v.
Brown, 210 W.Va, 14, 552 S.E.2d 890 (2001).
The defendant in Brown was convicted by a
jury of two murders. One of the issues raised
in the appeal involved alleged false testimony
by the State’s witnesses. The Brown opinion
set forth the argument as follows:

[The defendant claims that the prose-
cuting attorney should have known. there
was a substantial probability that some
evidence against the defendant was false,
and that this false evidence materially af-
fected the verdict.... The defendant
points to the low character and incentive to
lie of the State’s witnesses, and appears to
argue that this should have put the prose-
cutor on notice that these witnesses were
not telling the truth,

Id, at 27, 552 S.B.2d at 408. In rejecting the
defendant’s argument in Brown, we stated:

13. Additionally, Petitioner contends that even
though defense counsel did not object, the State
during closing arguments made several imper-

We are not convinced by the defendant’s
argument, Not only is there no evidence in
the record which supports the claim that
the prosecutor knew or should have known
that evidence was false, there is no proof
that any of the State’s evidence was actual-
ly false. Rather, all that the defendant can.
demonstrate is that [the] State’s witnesses
were disreputable persons who had rea-
sons to lie. The witnesses’ characters and
motives were adduced at trial and argued
at length to the jury.

It was the role of the jury to weigh the
evidence and make credibility assessments
after it observed the witnesses and heard
their testimony. The jury made its deter-
mination, and this Court will not second
guess it simply because we may have as-
sessed the credibility of the witnesses dif-
ferently. :

Id. at 2%, 552 S.E.2d at 408; sce also Rivera,
109 P.3d at 89 (“Absent a showing that the
prosecution was aware of any false testimo-
ny, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury
to determine.”), Petitioner has done no more
than argue, like the defendant in Brown, that
Mr. Montgomery had a motive to lie. Such an
assertion is legally insufficient to sustain a
claim that the State knowingly presented
false testimony. Even if Petitioner was able
to prove that the State knew that Mr. Mont-
gomery’s testimony was false, Petitioner still
fails to prove that any false testimony had a
material effect on the jury verdict. Although
Mr. Montgomery's testimony was helpful to
the State in proving Petitioner’s criminal in-
tent, there were numerous other witnesses
who testified about the events that occurred
on the night of the crime and ample evidence
of intent, including ski masks and firearms,
presented at trial. Thus, even if the jury
found that Mr. Montgomery was not a credi-
ble witness, there was still sufficient evidence
to convict Petitioner.

HM We therefore find no abuse of dis-
cretion in the habeas court’s rejection of
Petitioner’s assignment of error based upon
alleged false evidence presented by the
State.

missible statements vouching for the credibility

of Mr. Montgomery that constituted plain error
and substantially contributed to a clear miscar-

and prove to the satisfaction of the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The Defendant

C. Double Jeopardy

In its cross-assignment of error, the State
asserts that the habeas court erred when it
concluded that Petitioner’s sentence for his
robbery conviction violated double jeopardy.
In ruling on this issue, the habeas court
stated in its order:

The jury was properly instructed on the
felony murder doctrine whereby the jury
had to be instructed as to which felony or
felonies were the underlying felony of-
fenses to the murder. The jury was in-
structed that burglary was the underly-
ing felony offense to the felony murder
and the subsequent conviction and pen-
alty therefore was properly merged with
the murder offense. The Petitioner has
argued that in this case, the burglary
offense was dependent upon the robbery
offense, which was also instructed to the
jury:

Murder of the First Degree is com-
mitted when any person in the commis-
sion of or attempt to commit burglary
kills another person. Under the felony-
murder doctrine, Murder of the First
Degree does not require proof of the
elements of willfulness, deliberation, pre-
meditation, malice or specific intent to
kill. It is deemed sufficient if the homi-
cide occurs during the commission of or
the attempt to commit burglary.

Burglary is committed when any per-
son breaks and enters, or enters without
breaking either in the daytime or night-
time a dwelling house or outhouse ad-
joining thereto, or occupied therewith of
another person with the intent to com-
mit a crime therein, including, but not
limited to robbery, larceny, or brandish-
ing.

Before the Defendant can be convicted
of Murder of the First Degree under the
Felony-Murder Doctrine, the State of
West Virginia must overcome the pre-
sumption that the Defendant is innocent

riage of justice and the denial of his right to a
fair trial, Although Petitioner raised this issue as
a ground for relief when he filed his Losh check-
list with the habeas court, this argument was
never developed in Petitioner's habeas petition
below or discussed during the omnibus hearing.
‘The habeas court summarily found that because

2. in Mercer County, West Virginia
3. on or about January 29, 2011
4, with the intent to commit the of-
fense of Burglary
5. did enter without breaking in the
nighttime
6. the dwelling house
7, belonging to David and Matthew
Flack
8. with the intent to commit the
erime of armed robbery and/or larce-
ny therein
9, and that the Defendant and/or his
accomplices in the commission of Bur-
glary
10. did ;
11. in Mercer County, West Virginia
12. on or about January 29, 2011
18, Cause the death of Matthew F.
Flack,
If after impartially considering, weigh-
ing and comparing all the evidence,
+ (both that of the State and that of the
Defendant) the jury and each member of
the jury is convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt of the truth of the charge as
to each of these elements of Murder of
the First Degree, you may find the De-
fendant guilty of Murder of the First
Degree as charged in Count One of the
indictment. If the jury and each member
of the jury have a reasonable doubt of
the truth of the charge as to anyone or
more of these elements of Murder of the
First Degree, you shall find the Defen-
dant not guilty. (emphasis [in original] )
Based upon the jury instructions, and
the fact that the robbery was the com-
mon denominator to the burglary and to
the first degree murder offense, this

it did not hear any evidence supporting this
enumerated ground, this argument was without
merit, insofar as the issue had not been proven
by a preponderance of the evidence. We affirm
the habeas court's finding, as the issue was unde-
veloped and therefore waived.

584.

Court improperly sentenced the Peti-

tioner to an additional forty years on’

the robbery offense—the robbery should
have been merged with the felony mur-
der as the other underlying predicate
felony offense. The instructions provided
that in addition to the burglary, the
robbery also served as an element to the
first degree murder charge, accordingly,
the robbery was also a lesser included
offense to the murder, and the Petition-
er should not have been convicted and
punished for that lesser included crime
as well.

In the case sub judice, there was only
one murder victim, therefore the underly-
ing felonies (both burglary and robbery)
should have been merged with the felony
murder conviction. The Court agrees with
the Respondent that on the appeal in this
matter, the Supreme Court of Appeals not-
ed the sentence, but made no other com-
ment about it, However, the Court is
aware that the issues raised herein, double
jeopardy and excessive or severe sen-
tences, were not raised on appeal, there-
fore, those issues were not before the Su-

. preme Court, Nevertheless, after review of
the legal precedent, the Court agrees with
the Petitioner: the Petitioner’s conviction
for robbery should have been dismissed
and the sentence therefore should have
been subsumed by the greater felony mur-
der . offense, Accordingly, the Court

FINDS and CONCLUDES that the Peti-

tioner’s grounds for double jeopardy, ex-

cessive sentence, and severer sentence
than expected were proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.

(Emphasis added).

The State contends that robbery is not a
lesser-included offense of either burglary or
felony-murder predicated upon a burglary, as
the habeas court concluded. According to the
State, the fact that a burglary can be predi-
cated upon a showing that an individual in-
tended to or completed a robbery does not
reduce: robbery to a lesser-included offense
of burglary and does not make robbery the
predicate offense to this felony-murder. The
State also contends that in Petitioner’s case
the crimes of robbery and burglary “require

proof of a fact which the other does not.”
State v. Pancake, 170 W.Va. 690, 695, 296
§.E.2d 87, 42 (1982) (quoting Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76
L.Ed. 806 (1982)). The difference in the re-
quired elements and proof for robbery and
burglary is clear and, in the Petitioner's case,
are separate and distinct crimes not preclud-
ed by double jeopardy. Accordingly, the
State asserts that the jury concluded that
Petitioner entered the Flack Residence with
the intent to take property or money, that
Petitioner knew his co-defendant was armed,
and that Petitioner struggled with the victim
in the home before the victim was shot, thus
convicting him on all charges.

In response, Petitioner alleges that the
prosecution chose to present this case under
the felony-murder rule to take advantage of
the significant benefits to the State of not
having to prove, premeditation, deliberation,
malice or even a specific intent to kill, Peti-
tioner claims that in exchange for those sub-
stantial advantages and reduced burden of
proof, the State should not be able to then
seek additional sentences for the underlying
enumerated offenses, He asserts that be-
cause the State had to prove an intent to
commit robbery as an element of proving
burglary, this made it impossible for the
court to determine which offense was the
basis of the felony-murder verdict.

HMM “The double jeopardy clauses of our
federal and state constitutions protect an ac-
cused in a criminal proceeding from multiple
prosecutions and multiple punishments for
the same offense.” Williams, 172 W.Va. at
810, 305 S.E.2d at 266, However, double
jeopardy does not. preclude a State from
imposing separate punishments for each sep-
arate and distinct crime that arises from a
single factual occurrence. See e.g., Pancake,
170 W.Va. at 694-97, 296 S.H.2d at 41-44
(upholding defendant’s convictions for both
burglary and rape arising from the same
criminal transaction); see also State ex rel.
Johnson v. Hamilton, 164 W.Va. 682, 266
§.H.2d 125 (1980).

HHI In the absence of any expression of
legislative intent on the issue, the test of
whether violations of separate statutory pro-
visions arising out of one criminal episode

constitute the “same offense” for double
jeopardy purposes is the “same evidence”
test, Williams, 172 W.Va. at 811, 805 S.E.2d
at 267. We have held that “{t]he applicable
rule is that where the same act or transac-
tion constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or
only one, is whether each provision requires
proof of a fact which the other does not.”
Pancake, 170 W.Va. at 695, 296 S.H.2d at 42
(quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284
US. 299, 804, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed, 306
(1982).

Hl in Syllabus Point 8 of Williams, we
held that “[dlouble jeopardy prohibits an ac-
eused charged with felony-murder, as defined
by W.Va. Code § 61-2-1 (1977 Replacement
Vol.) from being separately tried or punished
for both murder, and the underlying enumer-
ated felony.” Syl. Pt. 8, Williams, 172 W.Va.
295, 805 S.H.2d 251, As we explained in
Williams: .

[Alpplyling] the same evidence test ...
we think it is clear that the [underlying
felony] upon which a felony-murder case is
based constitutes a lesser included offense.
The commission of the [underlying felony]
was an essential element of the crime of
felony-murder as proved by the State. The
statute[ ] which define[s] [the underlying
felony] do[es] not require proof of any fact
which the felony-murder provision did not.
Consequently ... we hold that double
jeopardy prohibits an accused charged
with felony-murder ... from being sepa-
rately tried or punished for both murder
and the underlying enumerated felony.

Id, at 811, 805 S.E.2d at 267-68. We conclud-
ed in Williams that because the jury was
instructed that it might return a guilty ver-
dict on the felony murder charge upon a
finding that the appellant participated in the
commission of either the robbery or the ar-
son, it was impossible for us to determine
which of the two charges the jury found to be
the underlying felony. Jd. at 312, 305 S.E.2d
at 268. Accordingly, to ensure that double
jeopardy principles were not violated, we re-
versed the sentences for both the arson and
robbery convictions and remanded the case
for resentencing. Id.; see also State v. Tes-

585

ack, 181 W.Va. 422, 888 S.E.2d 54 (1989)
(remanding case in order to determine which
sentence should be merged, since it was not
clear to Court which felonies (burglary, at-
tempted robbery, or assault) served as basis
of defendant’s felony murder conviction).

HH In this case, Petitioner was convict-
ed of the charges of conspiracy, robbery,
burglary, and felony murder. It is evident
from the record that the underlying felony
upon which the felony murder charge was
predicated was burglary. Therefore, the ha-
eas court’s ‘merger of those two offenses
was proper under Williams. However, the
habeas court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s
robbery conviction violated double jeopardy
was erroneous because robbery is not a-less-
er included offense of burglary or a felony
murder predicated upon burglary, Hach pro-
vision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not,

West Virginia Code § 61-2-12(a) (2014)
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person who commits or attempts to
. commit robbery by: (1) Committing vio-
lence to the person, including, but not lim-
ited to, partial strangulation or suffocation
or by striking or beating; or (2) uses the
threat of deadly force by the presenting of
a firearm or other deadly weapon, is guilty
of robbery in the first degree and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in a

state correctional facility not less than ten

years.

In State v. Harless, 168 W.Va. 707, 709-10,
285 S.E.2d 461, 463-64 (1981) we previously
explained that

[alt common law, the definition of rob-
bery was (1) the unlawful taking and car-
tying away, (2) of money or goods, (8) from
the person of another or in his presence,

(4) by force or putting him in fear, (5) with

Antent to steal the money or goods, (Inter-

nal citations omitted), Thus, at common

law, robbery could be accomplished either
by actual physical foree or violence inflict-
ed on the victim or by intimidating the
victim by placing him in fear of bodily
injury. (Internal citations omitted) ...

There were no degrees or grades of com-

mon law robbery.

586

W.Va. Code, 61-2-12, enacted in 1981,
divides robbery into two separate classes
and calls for different penalties: (1) rob-
-bery by violence.or by the use of a danger-
ous weapon, and (2) all other robberies. By
dividing robbery into these two categories,
our legislature joined a number of other
legislatures in recognizing a greater culpa-
bility and more severe punishment for a
robbery committed by violent means than
for a robbery committed by nonviolent
means. (Internal citation omitted).

(footnotes omitted), In discussing the essen-
tial elements to prove robbery in light of the
amendments to West Virginia Code § 61-2-
12, we stated in Harless:

[wle previously noted that under the
common law definition robbery could be
committed by two general means. The first
was by force and violence to the person, in
which event there is no necessity to prove
that the victim was placed in fear of bodily
injury, since the actual force on the victim
can be presumed to have engendered fear.
(Internal citations omitted).

‘The second common law means of com-
mitting robbery was through intimidation,
that is, by placing the victim in fear, usual-
ly of bodily injury. It is this second catego-
ry under the common law definition which
encompasses our nonaggravated [second
degree] form of statutory robbery. There-
fore, the distinguishing feature of a nonag-
gravated [second degree] robbery is that it
is accomplished, not through violence to
the victim or the threat or presentation of
firearms or other deadly weapon or instru-
mentality, but through intimidation that
induces fear of bodily injury in the victim.
In the case of an aggravated [first degree]
robbery, fear of bodily injury is not an
essential element of the crime, since the
actual physical force or violence or threat
or presentation of firearms or other deadly
weapon or instrumentality can be pre-
sumed to have created fear of bodily inju-
ry.

168 W.Va. at 712, 285 S.E.2d at 465 (foot-
notes omitted), Thus, we noted:

[aln appropriate charging portion of an
instruction for “aggravated” robbery would
be:

“Aggravated robbery is defined as the
unlawful taking and carrying away of mon-
ey or goods from the person of another, or
in his presence, by the use of force or
violence on the victim or through the use
of a dangerous or deadly weapon or instru-
mentality, and with the intent to steal such
property.”

Id. at 712 n8, 285 8.E.2d at 465 n.8. This
Court further clarified in State v. Gibbs, 288
W.Va. 646, 797 S.E.2d 623 (2017) that:

[A] plain reading of subsections (a) and
(b) of W.Va. Code, § 61-2-12 shows that
the Legislature has more or less codified
the common law definition of robbery and
graded the degrees of robbery according
to the level of violence involved, with First
Degree encompassing the more dangerous
and violent forms of robbery (the common
law equivalent of “robbery by force”) and
Second Degree encompassing the less dan-
gerous forms of robbery (the common law
equivalent of “robbery by fear”).

[Thus,] First Degree Robbery require[s]
that the State prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offense alleged was commit-
ted with “violence to the person” or that
the offense was committed with a “threat
of deadly force by the presenting of a
firearm or other deadly weapon.” W.Va.
Code, § 61-2-12 (a)[.]

State v. Gibbs, 238 W. Va. at 658, 797 S.E.2d
at 635 (quoting State v. Hatley, 223 W.Va.
TAT, 758-54, 679 S.E.2d 579, 585-86 (2009)
(Ketchum, J., concurring)). Accordingly, in
this case, to prove the count of robbery, the
State was required to prove the following
elements: (1) the unlawful taking and carry-
ing away, or the unlawful attempt to take
and carry away, (2) money or goods, (8) from
the person of another or in his presence, (4)
by violence or threat of deadly force by the
presenting of a firearm or other deadly
‘weapon, (5) with intent to steal the money or
goods. Harless, 168 W.Va. at 709, 285 S.E.2d
at 463,
In contrast, West Virginia Code § 61-3-
11(a) (2014) provides:
(a) Burglary shall be a felony and any
person convicted thereof shall be con-

fined in the penitentiary not less than
one nor more than fifteen years. If any
person shall, in the nighttime, break
and enter, or enter without breaking,
or shall, in the daytime, break and
enter, the dwelling house, or an out-
house adjoining thereto or occupied
therewith, of another, with intent to
commit a crime therein, he shall be
deemed guilty of burglary.

Thus, in order to obtain a conviction for
burglary under West Virginia Code § 61-8-
11(a), the State was required to prove the
following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) entrance, with or without a break-
ing at night, but requiring a breaking during
the day, (2) into a dwelling house or adjoin-
ing outhouse, (8) of another, (4) with intent to
commit a crime therein. W. Va. Code § 61-3-
11(a); see also State v. Louk, 169 W.Va. 24,
25, 285 S.H.2d 482, 434 (1981).

When we compare the required elements
for robbery and burglary, it is evident that
each provision requires proof of a fact that
the other does not. In order to obtain a
conviction for each separate offense, the
State was required to put on evidence dem-
onstrating Petitioner entered the Flack Resi-
dence intending not only to steal (burglary),
but also to steal by committing violence to
Matthew Flack (robbery). Here, the jury
concluded that Petitioner was either aware
that Mr. Montgomery had a weapon, or he
used force when he put his hands on Mat-
thew Flack and they struggled in the stair-
well.

HI The same logic applies when we
compare the elements of robbery and felony
murder predicated on burglary. As to felony
murder:

“The elements which the State is re-
quired to prove to obtain a conviction of
felony murder are: (1) the commission of,
or attempt to commit, one or more of the
enumerated felonies; (2) the defendant's
participation in such commission or at-
tempt; and (8) the death of the victim as a
result of injuries received during the
course of such commission or attempt.’
State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, [810,]
805 S.E.2d 251, 267 (1988).”

587

Syl. Pt. 5, Mayle, 178 W.Va. 26, 357 S.E.2d
219. As the State correctly contends, the
elements of a felony murder predicated on
burglary are the elements of burglary, plus
the death of a victim. Accordingly, in proving
the elements of felony murder predicated on
burglary, the State was required to prove a
fact that it was not required to prove in
establishing the elements of robbery, and
thus, robbery is not a lesser included offense
of felony murder predicated on burglary.
Therefore, double jeopardy does not prohibit
the imposition of a punishment for both
crimes.

Accordingly, we conclude that double jeop-
ardy did not preclude the imposition of a
separate sentence punishing Petitioner for
the robbery conviction in this case, and the
habeas court erred when it granted Petition-
er relief habeas relief from the robbery sen-
tence.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he
is entitled to habeas relief, Moreover, the
habeas court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s rob-
bery conviction was erroneous. Accordingly,
we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the
August 24, 2015 order of the Cireuit Court of
Mercer County, and we remand this matter
with instructions to reinstate Petitioner’s
conviction and sentence for robbery on the
terms previously imposed.

Affirmed, in part, Reversed, in part, and
Remanded with Instructions.

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs, in part,
and dissents in part, and reserves the right
to file a separate opinion.

JUSTICE KETCHUM, concurring, in
part, and dissenting, in part.

While I generally agree that the petitioner
is not entitled to habeas relief, I take excep-
tion on one issue. I disagree with the majori-
ty’s conclusion that double jeopardy did not
prevent the petitioner from being tried and
punished for both felony-murder and rob-
bery. I would uphold the ruling of the habeas
court which dismissed the robbery conviction,

588

thereby ‘correcting a double jeopardy viola-
tion which occurred at the trial court level.

* Both burglary and robbery are included,in.
the list of predicate offenses pertaining to
felony-murder in W.Va, Code, 61-2-1 [1991].
Here,.as.the trial court’s instructions demon-
strate, both burglary and robbery were
placed before the jury in the context-of felo-
ny-murder. Although the trial court later dis-
missed the burglary conviction as having
merged with the felony-murder conviction,
the petitioner was nevertheless convicted of
robbery. The result was an additional peni-
tentiary sentence of forty years for robbery
to be.served consecutively with the murder
and conspiracy convictions. The robbery
charge was, thus, treated by the trial court
as both an element of felony-murder and as a
separate offense, resulting in the additional
sentence, ,

Even though the jury was instructed that
robbery, under the circumstances, could be
considered in conjunction with burglary, it is
impossible to tell from the trial record: the
respective weight the jury assigned to the
burglary and robbery charges. If the jury
based its felony-murder conviction on rob-
bery, double jeopardy would: prohibit the pe-
titioner from being convicted and sentenced
for both felony-murder and robbery. It can
reasonably be inferred that the jury gave
significant consideration to the robbery
charge inasmuch as the petitioner was found
guilty of robbery in the first degree.

Syllabus point 8 of State v. Williams, 172
W.Va, 295, 805 S.H.2d 251 (1988), holds:
“Double jeopardy prohibits an accused
charged with felony-murder, as defined by
W.Va. Code § 61-2-1 (1977 Replacement
Vol,), from being separately tried’ or pun-
ished for both murder and the underlying
enumerated felony.” Based upon Williams, I
agree with the conclusion of the habeas court
that the trial court “improperly sentenced
the Petitioner to an additional forty years on
the robbery offense—the robbery should
have been merged with the felony murder as
the other. underlying. predicate felony of-
fense,” . -

Therefore, for the reasons stated, I concur,
in part, and dissent, in part,

803 S.E.2d 558

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

v

Paul Darren SPINKS, Defendant
‘Below, Petitioner

No, 15-1145

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: May 8, 2017
Filed: June 16, 2017 ©

oa
S
fY-J

J. Steven Hunter, Esq., Robert P. Martin,
Esq., Steve Hunter Associates, lc, Lewis-
burg, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Zachary Aaron Viglianco, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner Paul Darren Spinks (“Petition-
er”) appeals the November 1, 2015, order of
the Circuit Court of Nicholas County sen-
tencing him to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for the 2007 murder of
his wife. Petitioner asserts that the trial
court erred by: (1) refusing to dismiss the
indictment returned by the grand jury based
upon fraud; 2) improperly admitting evidence
of prior domestic violence, marital discord,
and threats made by Petitioner against his
wife; 3) refusing to instruct the jury on lesser
included offenses; and 4) denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal when the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support
‘his conviction. Upon consideration of the par-
ties’ briefs and arguments, the submitted
record and pertinent authorities, we affirm
Petitioner’s conviction,

1, Elizabeth was shot in the upper left chest.
Petitioner stated that at the time of the shooting,
he and Elizabeth were sitting face-to-face on the
porch. He described that Elizabeth was sitting

with her back facing the house and he was sitting
with his back away from the house.

2. Pursuant to the evidence admitted at trial, Peti-
tioner’s cell phone records revealed that he made

595

I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The evidence presented at trial was that at
1:06 p.m. on October 81, 2007, Petitioner
placed a 911 call claiming that he and his
wife, Elizabeth Spinks, had been shot from a
distance by an unknown shooter while seated
on the front porch of their home. According
to Petitioner’s recorded statement taken by
police at the hospital, Petitioner and Hliza-
beth were seated on their front porch smok-
ing when Petitioner heard what he thought
was a “firecracker”, and Elizabeth “stood up
and grabbed her ... neck and fell down on
the porch in front of [him].” ! Petitioner stat-
ed that upon seeing Elizabeth drop to the
ground, he ran into the house to get their cell
phone to call 911, came back out onto the
porch, and while bending over Elizabeth to
check her and talking to the 911 dispatcher,
he likewise sustained a gunshot wound to his
left thigh.

Petitioner stated that ‘after calling 911, he
went back into the house and into their bed-
room, where he continued to talk with the
dispatcher and tell her what had occurred.
According to his recorded statement, Peti-
tioner then got Elizabeth’s gun, a 800 Win-
chester Magnum, out of the gun cabinet and
went into the bathroom to hide for fear that
the shooter would come into the house and
try to kill him. He remained in his home and
made other telephone calls while waiting for
an ambulance and officers to respond to the
seene.? He contended that during the wait, he
passed out twice. He also stated that he
dropped the phone and had to look for it in
the pool of blood on his bathroom floor.

Petitioner was still inside the residence
when emergency personnel arrived. He
emerged from the home when the 911 dis-
patcher instructed him to exit the house. The
officers who responded to the scene, West
Virginia State Police Sergeants Ron. Lilly

thirteen phone calls between the time of his
initial 911 call and when he exited his house to
meet law enforcement officers and first respond-
ers. Three of those calls were made to 911. The
other calls were made to Petitioner's mother and
father, BB&T bank, and two other unidentified
numbers.

596

and Anthony Webh, testified that when Peti-
tioner exited the residence, his hands ap-
peared to be clean despite the fact that his
leg was bleeding very heavily. Moreover,
while Petitioner was lying on his back as
paramedics prepared to transport him from
the scene, Petitioner, stretching back and
pointing up over his head, called Sergeant
Lilly’s attention to a bullet hole located on
the-front of the house. Petitioner was flown
to the hospital for medical treatment,

Tn his recorded statement taken at the
hospital by Corporal BJ. Wriston, a West
Virginia State Police trooper, Petitioner indi-
cated that when he was out on the porch
ealling 911, he saw an older model white
Chevrolet truck sitting in the lower end of
the parking lot of a nearby elementary
school. He surmised that the shots possibly
may have come from that truck, When Cor-
poral Wriston asked if Petitioner and Hliza-
beth had been having any marital problems,
Petitioner denied any. When Corporal Wri-
ston asked if they had any problems with
anyone else in the past, Petitioner stated that.
a man named Harvey Hersman had been
calling Elizabeth’s cell phone in the last six
months threatening Petitioner, claiming that
he was going to burn down their house and
garage. Petitioner indicated, however, that
Mr. Hersman had not made any calls threat-
ening him for approximately: the last month.
When asked if Mr. Hersman had ever specifi-
cally threatened to shoot Petitioner during
these calls, Petitioner replied that “[hle had
told some other people that, and it got word
back around to me, but he—he’s the type of
pergon.I figure he’d get somebody else to do
it.... But my wife never done nothing.”
Before concluding the statement, Corporal
Wriston asked whether’ Petitioner had any-
thing to add, and Petitioner said, “I’d like
you to check my hands for powder or what-
ever they do ... because I didn’t fire no gun,
She didn’t firé no gun.”

At approximately 4:15 p.m, a West Virgi-
nia State Police crime scene response team
arrived at the, Spinks’ residence and thor-
oughly investigated the scene, collecting .nu-
3, Darren Francis, an employee of the West Virgi-

nia State Police Forensic Laboratory (“State Fo-
rensic Lab”), testified that he tested both of the

merous pieces of evidence, Corporal H.C.
Mitchell, a West Virginia State Police troop-
er, testified that he collected a fired...22 cali-
ber bullet from a- bookcase located in the
living room of the residence, which appeared
to have traveled through a plastic chair on
the porch and the siding on the front of the
house. Corporal Mitchell also recovered a
Savage Model 110K, caliber .222, Remington
rifle from a gun cabinet in the bedroom.
West Virginia State Police Sergeant Robert
Richards collected a second fired .22 caliber
bullet from the front porch and another gun,
a .800 Winchester Remington Model 700, lo-
eated on the bathroom floor.’ Sergeant Ron
Lilly, a detachment commander for the West
Virginia State Police who was the custodian
of the evidence in this case, testified that
several other guns were seized and taken
from Petitioner's residence, However, only
three were submitted to.the West Virginia
State Forensic Lab for testing because the
wound that Elizabeth suffered appeared to
be from a smaller caliber gun.
* West Virginia State Police Sergeant Bruce
Clendenin, the lead investigator on the case,
testified that there was a significant amount
of Petitioner's blood inside the house, on the
floor of the bathroom, and iri the bedroom.
Moreover, various witnesses testified that al-
though there’ was no trail of blood leading
from the porch into the house, there was a
pool of blood in the bathroom leading into the
master bedroom and less toward the front,
door, Sergeant Clendenin testified that one
thing that stood out as odd to him that day
was that the bathroom sink was wet, freshly
used. Sergeant Clendenin took several meas-
‘urements at the crime scene, in particular of
the bullet hole in the siding of the house in
relation to the green lawn chair that also
appeared to have a bullet hole in it. He noted
that there was no blood on any of the*porch
furniture or the walls, and that the majority
of the blood was underneath Elizabeth’s body
and nowhere else.

Sergeant Clendenin also testified that
when he and other officers were searching
Petitioner’s home, he observed a small hump |

bullets retrieved from the scene, and neither had
any blood on them.

or “puffed up” disturbance in the carpet on
the bathroom floor, so the carpet was cut
back in that area and he observed what he
believed to be an apparent bullet hole in the
bathroom floor. The portion of the particle
board floor containing this hole was cut out
by Sergeant Anthony Webb and was placed
into evidence. Sergeant Lilly testified that
the piece of carpet laying over the bullet hole
did not have a hole in it, Sergeant Clendenin
also testified that officers conducted a search
underneath the home to retrieve a bullet, but.
because there was a large amount of nails
and metal debris underneath it, their metal
detectors were unable to locate anything.

The question of whether the hole in the
bathroom floor was caused by a bullet was in
dispute at trial. Philip Cochran, a firearm
and tool-mark examiner employed with the
State Forensic Lab, testified that he could
not confirm by the presence of chemical resi-
due that the hole was caused by a bullet.
However, he testified that the damage to the
wood and the size of the hole were not
inconsistent with having been caused by a
bullet. He stated that if a bullet had passed
through carpet or padding before going
through the wood, any of the residues that he
would have been looking for would have been
removed, and thus, he did not rule out the
possibility that the hole in the bathroom floor
was caused by a bullet. He also determined
that of the guns submitted to the State Fo-
rensic Lab for testing, none of the firearms
matched the two bullets that were found at
the scene.

Additionally, Koren Powers, an employee
of the State Forensic Lab who worked in the
trace evidence section, conducted gunshot
residue testing and determined that no gun-
shot residue was found on either Petitioner,
Elizabeth, or the piece of carpet that was
removed from the bathroom floor by investi-
gators. Meredith Chambers, a DNA analyst

* eniployed with the State Forensic Lab, testi-
fied that she tested swabs collected from the
bathroom carpet, the Remington 700 rifle
taken from the bathroom floor, and Petition-

4, Sergeant Walter Shafer, an officer with the
Nicholas County Sheriff's Department, saw an
individual who he believed to possibly be Harvey
Hersman walking past the Go-Mart on Route 82
near Petitioner’s home as he was responding to

597

er’s cell phone and that the results identified
from the swabs collected were . consistent
with Petitioner's DNA.

Petitioner subsequently gave another re-
eorded statement to police on January 7,
2008, and provided details about the events
that occurred on the night of the crime that
were consistent with his prior recorded state-
ment. In that second recorded statement,
Petitioner offered, among -other things, fur-
ther details regarding the nature of his
strained relationships with Elizabeth’s father
and sister. However, Petitioner again denied
having any prior domestic violence incidents
with Elizabeth, He also offered further de-
tails about his relationship with Harvey
Hersman and his belief that he was responsi-
ble for the shooting.

Mr. Hersman was interviewed by Sergeant
Clendenin, who determined that Mr. Hers-
man had a plausible alibi at the time of the
murder because he was with his wife that
day. Sergeant Clendenin interviewed Mr.
Hersman’s wife and she confirmed Mr. Hers-
man’s alibi, Sergeant Clendenin also testified
that Mr. Hersman’s cell phone records indi-
cated that he had not called either Hliza-
beth’s or Petitioner’s phone, contrary to Peti-
tioner’s statement, Thus, Mr, Hersman was
ruled out as a suspect! No arrests were
made following the initial investigation of the

Seven years later, James Milam, Nicholas
County Prosecuting Attorney, wrote a letter
in June of 2014 to Lieutenant Colonel Jack
Chambers with the West Virginia State Po-
lice requesting that they reopen the investi-
gation of Elizabeth’s murder on the basis of
“evidence which has come to-light in another
murder in the Birch River area.” The case
‘was re-investigated by Corporal D.P. White,
a West Virginia State Police cold case inves-
tigator. He testified before the grand jury on
September 9, 2014.

At the grand jury hearing, Corporal White
testified that although Petitioner bled heavily
on the day Elizabeth’ was shot, and although

the scene following Petitioner’s 911 call. Howev-
er, after reviewing mug shots of both Mr. Hers-
man and Mr. Hersman’s brother, Sonny Propps,
Sergeant Walters determined that the individual
he saw that day was Mr. Propps. . .

598

he told police that he dropped his phone
while hiding in the bathroom and fumbled to
recover it in his blood pools, his hands were
relatively clean when he met officers at the
door. He testified that prior to leaving the
residence for the hospital, Petitioner pointed
out a bullet hole on the side of the house and
said that he believed the shooter was in a
white pickup truck in the parking lot of the
school adjacent to his house. He also testified
-that a bullet recovered from the vicinity. of
Elizabeth’s body adjacent to her head, and
another recovered from the side of the house,
had no human tissue and blood on them.

Corporal White testified that pursuant to
the autopsy report, the projectile track of the
bullet recovered from Elizabeth’s body was
inconsistent with the manner in which Peti-
tioner described the incident. The projectile
tract was from front to back, left to right and
downward. Although there was a pool of
blood underneath where Elizabeth laid on
the porch, there was no blood spatter any-
where, Furthermore, no blood spatter was
found on the porch where Petitioner stated
he was shot, and there was no path of blood
where Petitioner stated that he turned to-
ward the door. Corporal White testified that
there was also what appeared to be a bullet
hole in the bathroom floor where Petitioner
told police he hid, along with a substantial
amount of blood. There was also a blood trail
from the bathroom leading back out to’ the
front porch,

Corporal White also testified that following
the murder, Petitioner’s house burned down,
and it remained an unsolved arson case.
However, despite the fire, the original con-
erete porch remained intact and a new mo-
bile home had been attached. He testified
that using a laser rangefinder, the distance
to Petitioner’s porch fromthe school was 262
yards, and would have required the rifle to
be held “three inches high” to hit Elizabeth
as it did. However, automobiles were parked
between the school and Petitioner’s porch
when Elizabeth was shot. He testified that
Petitioner’s pants were found to be negative
for gunshot residue and positive for Lead-
Free. He testified that he believed LeadFree
was a cleaning solvent used to clean firearms.

The bullets that passed through both Eliza-
beth and Petitioner were not recovered.

Corporal White testified regarding the do-
mestie violence petition that Elizabeth had
filed against him in April of 2007, wherein
she ‘stated that Petitioner had shoved her
around, slammed her to the floor, and threat-
ened her, making her fear for not only her
life but for the safety of their kids. He also
testified regarding the divorce papers that
were found hidden in the springs underneath
the driver's seat in Elizabeth’s car that indi-
cated that his Elizabeth was planning to file
for a divorce,

With respect to Petitioner’s allegations
that he believed Harvey Her'sman had shot
them, Corporal White stated those allega-
tions were not true. He indicated that Mr.
Hersman, who had an alibi, was now de-
ceased’ and had been killed in an unrelated
case, Although Petitioner told police that the
shot that wounded him came approximately
twenty seconds after the shot that killed
Elizabeth, Corporal White told the grand
jury that upon his re-interview of every wit-
ness, neighbor and various teachers at the
adjacent school, these witnesses told police
that they heard shots approximately three to
eight minutes apart, with the first shot being
loud, as if it was outside, and the second shot
muffled, as if it was inside.

Corporal White also testified about the
allegations Petitioner made in a third record-
ed statement given in 2014, after Corporal
White told Petitioner that based upon the
trajectory of their wounds, they could not
have been shot from the school parking lot.
Petitioner surmised that his neighbor, Mike
Butcher, a known alcoholic, may have shot
them from an upstairs window in his home.
Corporal White indicated that although Mr.
Butcher was deceased, having died from nat-
ural causes, he interviewed the woman that
Mr. Butcher lived with at the time of the
murder, Lexy Cutlip. Ms, Cutlip remem-
bered that Mr. Butcher was heavily intoxicat-
ed on the day in question. She granted Cor-
poral White permission to come into their
home and operate a laser rangefinder from
the upstairs window targeting Petitioner's
front porch. Corporal White testified that he
determined, once again, that it was physically

impossible for the bullet to strike Petitioner
and Elizabeth from that location, based on
the trajectories.

Corporal White testified that he never re-
ceived any specific information from the
prosecutor regarding the new evidence that
had come to light in another murder investi-
gation in the Birch River area, other than
that he was told “it was due to receiving a
conversation with one of the defense attor-
neys here on—on another murder, and that’s
what led him to bring this to me.” While
Corporal White knew that there was only one
other open murder investigation in the Birch
River area, he did not obtain any evidence
from that investigation or speak with the
attorneys involved in that case, Based on the
testimony of Corporal White, the Nicholas
County Grand Jury returned an indictment
in September 2014.

In December 2014, Petitioner filed a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that the grand jury testimony of Corporal
White was speculative, misleading and tanta-
mount to fraud. During a hearing held by the
trial court on January 16, 2015, Petitioner’s
counsel provided lengthy argument concern-
ing portions of the grand jury transcript and
the State objected to the motion. In an order
entered March 25, 2015, the trial court de-
nied Petitioner’s motion finding that Petition-
er had not shown that Corporal White's
grand jury testimony was willfully or inten-
tionally fraudulent, and therefore, the court
was not permitted to “go behind an indict-
ment” to inquire into the evidence considered
by the grand jury.

Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to
admit intrinsic evidence of domestic abuse.
Specifically, the State sought to introduce
evidence of: (1) prior domestic violence be-
tween Petitioner and Elizabeth that occurred
on April 22, 2007, resulting in an emergency
domestic violence protective order obtained
by Elizabeth, and other prior incidents of
domestic violence occurring in November
2006 and March 2007; (2) ongoing marital

5. The circuit court also concluded that three
exhibits offered by the State during the hearing
(the police report prepared by Sergeant Nunley,
Ms. Hooker's notes from her meeting with Eliza-
beth, and the domestic violence protective order)
would not be admissible at trial. In determining

599

problems between them; and (8) threats
made by Petitioner to Elizabeth. Petitioner
opposed the motion, arguing that the April
22, 2007, incident was isolated, the domestic
violence proceeding was voluntarily dis-
missed by Elizabeth, and that Elizabeth told
the family court that she was “angry” when
she filed her petition. An in camera hearing
was conducted on June 12, 2015, and the
court heard testimony from Sergeant William
Nunley, a Nicholas County Sheriff's Depart-
ment officer, who responded to the April 22
domestic call; Tabitha Hooker, a domestic
violence advocate who assisted Elizabeth in
filing the petition for domestic violence pro-
tective order; Catherine Gregory (“Cather-
ine”), Elizabeth’s sister; and Michelle Cow-
ger (“Michelle”), Elizabeth’s daughter.

On August 7, 2015, the circuit court en-
tered an order granting the State’s motion
and admitting the evidence, finding the evi-
dence of domestic violence on April 22, 2007,
intrinsic. However, the court found state-
ments made by Elizabeth to Sergeant Nun-
ley and Ms. Hooker regarding the April 22,
2007, incident to be testimonial in nature and
barred by the confrontation clause. Hach of
the four witnesses presented were permitted
to testify as to their observations and actions.
The court determined that Catherine and
Michelle were permitted to testify at trial
about statements Elizabeth made to them.
‘The court found the instances occurring prior
to that event to be “too remote to be intrin-
sie’ and engaged in a Rule 404(b) analysis,
ultimately determining that petitioner’s prior
violence against Elizabeth was relevant and
more probative than prejudicial.®

At trial, the State elicited testimony from
Dr. Zia Sabet, the State medical examiner
who conducted Elizabeth’s autopsy, indicat-
ing that the entrance wound on Elizabeth’s
body was near her clavicle and the exit
wound on her “mid-lower back.” No bullet
was found in Elizabeth’s body upon autopsy
examination. Dr, Sabet opined that if she had

that the Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible, the
court ordered that the proper limiting instruc-
tions required by State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va.
147, 455 $.B.2d 516 (1994) and Rule 105 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence would be pro-
vided.

600

been sitting upright when the bullet struck
her, as Petitioner alleged in his prior state-
ments, and if the shot was fired from the
distance Petitioner claimed, the only way a
bullet could have entered and exited Eliza-
beth’s body in the manner it did was if that
bullet had been fired “from the top or ...
third or fourth floor on some building or
maybe [from an] airplane.” When asked if
Dr, Sabet could determine what size bullet
likely killed Elizabeth, he testified that he
could not make a determination due to the
skin’s elasticity,

The State’s trajectory and blood spatter
expert, Sergeant Michael Lynch with the
West Virginia State Police, presented various
trigonometry calculations to the jury to dem-
onstrate that if Petitioner had been sitting
upright when she was shot, from the distance
Petitioner claimed in his statements, the
shooter would have had to have fired from at,
least several hundred feet above Elizabeth,
Sergeant Lynch stated that the location of
Elizabeth’s wounds were consistent with her
being shot from a much closer distance while
she was in a different position such as bent
over to tie her shoes, getting ready to leave,
He also noted the lack of blood in the photo-
graphs despite the fact that he opined she
would have bled immediately, With respect
to Petitioner’s injuries, Sergeant Lynch testi-
fied that the location of the entry and exit
wounds that Petitioner suffered were incon-
sistent with his own sketched representations
that he drew posturing himself on the porch.
He testified that there should have been
blood trails and stains visible on the front
porch if Petitioner was shot f in the manner in
which he claimed.

With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he
was shot shortly after Elizabeth was hit, the
State presented testimony from Donna Park,
JoAnn Davis, Betsy Strickland, and Mitzi
Frame, who were inside the nearby elemen-

6, JoAnn Davis, who worked part-time as a parent
coordinator at the school, testified that the truck
was moving when she observed it and she heard.
the second gunshot five minutes later. Betsy
Strickland, a special education teacher, testified
that the white truck was still in the parking lot at
the time the second shot was fired, Mitzi Frame,
‘who worked as a tutor, testified that when she
saw the truck after hearing the first gunshot, it
was rolling, headed down towards Birch River.

tary school at the time of the shooting, Don-
na Park testified that she was teaching in a
classroom on the backside of the building

“near the playground when she heard one

loud gunshot that sounded like it came from
behind the building. When she looked out the
window to determine whether someone had
shot at the school, she did not see any people
or movement anywhere. The other three wit-
nesses were also working at the school and
were located in the multi-purpose room on
the other end of the building, near the park-
ing lot. When they heard the first shot, which
they testified sounded very loud and close,
they looked at the window and observed an
older model white truck. They each testified
that there was a delay of approximately five
minutes between when they heard the initial
shot and when they heard the later one.
Each of the witnesses had different recollec-
tions regarding whether the white truck was
still present at the time they heard the sec-
ond shot fired.®

Finally, Michelle testified that she ob-
served several arguments between Elizabeth
and Petitioner. During two of those argu-
ments, one in November 2006 and the other
in Mareh 2007, Petitioner struck or,was oth-
erwise physically aggressive toward Eliza-
beth. She also testified about two separate,
occasions on which Petitioner threatened
Elizabeth’s life, One incident occurred on
April 22, 2007, when Michelle was. supposed
to drive Petitioner’s Camaro to the prom. At
some point throughout the night, Michelle
and Petitioner got into.a dispute over her use
of the car and Michelle decided to take Cath-
erine’s car instead. Michelle testified that
once Petitioner found out that they had left
his car parked at her grandfather’s house, he
threatened that “Catherine or anybody in
[her] family better not move the car, or he
was going to kill [Elizabeth].” Catherine tes-
tified that Elizabeth also called her that

The State also presented testimony from Petition-
er’s neighbor, Katie Coffman, who testified that
while she was sitting near a partially opened
glass door in her dining room on the day of the
shooting, she heard two shots from the direction
of Petitioner’s house, Like the teachers that testi-
fied, Mrs. Coffman testified that she heard the
second shot five minutes after she heard the first
shot.

night and-when she learned that Catherine
gave Michelle her own car and had then
driven Petitioner’s Camaro to their father’s
house to park it, Elizabeth told her “{h]e
can’t know you drove it down there. Don’t
tell him. ... He’s on his way home. Don’t eall
here. He can’t know.” Elizabeth filed a do-
mestic violence petition on the same night.
Michelle also testified that subsequently, in
the summer of 2007, Elizabeth got into a
shouting match with Petitioner, during which
Elizabeth said she was: “gonna pack her
bags” and Petitioner replied that “he was
gonna bury her before ... she left him.”

Michelle further testified that in either
August or September of 2007, she went with
Elizabeth to pick up divorce papers, started
filling them out, and then hid them under the
Dale Harnhardt seat covers in Hlizabeth’s
car, Those divorce papers, which were dis-
covered when Petitioner sold Hlizabeth’s car,
were the subject of testimony and exhibited
at trial. Catherine testified that because she
knew Elizabeth was going to divorce Peti-
tioner, she had the name on Elizabeth’s
gravestone changed to reflect her maiden
name, . Michelle also provided testimony
about the various types of guns that Petition-
er kept in the home and in his vehicle. She
testified specifically that Petitioner kept a .22
and: a .9 millimeter handgun in his truck.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury
found Petitioner guilty of murder in the first
degree. He was sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment in the state penitentiary with-
out the possibility of parole. Petitioner now
appeals his conviction,

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Petitioner presents four issues for this
Court’s consideration, each of which have
specific review standards.’ Accordingly, in-
stead of setting forth a general standard of
review, we will discuss the specific standards
of review separately as we address each issue
presented, .

7. While Petitioner's brief asserts six assignments
of error, the last two assignments merely pro-

‘vide: (1) that the cumulative ‘effect of all error
assigned denied his right to a fair trial and (2)

601
Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Refusal to Dismiss the Indictment

Petitioner alleges: that the State obtained
the indictment against him by making sever-
al critical fraudulent misrepresentations be-
fore the grand jury. Specifically, Petitioner
identifies four pieces of evidence presented
to the grand jury that he contends are indic-
ative of the State’s fraudulent efforts to ob-
tain an indictment.

First, Petitioner argues that none of the
“bullet holes” that Corporal White identified
were ever tested or confirmed to be bullet
holes, with the exception of the piece’ of
flooring cut out of the bathroom, which he
alleges was determined not to contain a bul-
let hole. Second, he alleges that there was no
gunshot residue located on either Elizabeth
or Petitioner, or any of the items submitted
to the State Forensic Lab for gunshot resi-
due testing, including the piece of carpet
removed from the bathroom, Elizabeth’s red
shirt, and Petitioner’s blue jeans. He main-
tains that significantly, Petitioner’s blue
jeans did not test positive for LeadFree, as
Corporal White told the grand jury. Rather,
they tested positive for “lead wipe” and Mr,
Cochran, the State Forensic Lab examiner,
testified that, “I did find lead wipe around
those defects to show that those were consis-
tent with the passage of a bullet.” Petitioner
argues that contrary to the grand jury testi-
mony of Corporal White, Mr. Cochran testi-
fied that the substance identified on Petition-
er’s blue jeans was not a substance used to
wipe off lead or gun powder residue,

Third, Petitioner alleges that Corporal
White’s representation that Petitioner “shot
himself in the leg’to try and make himself
look like a victim” was willfully and intention-
ally fraudulent because this theory was not
supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Fourth, Petitioner contends that Corporal
White’s testimony concerning Petitioner's al-
leged motive that he did not want Elizabeth
to divorce him and statements related to a
domestic violence protective order that was
initially obtained but subsequently dropped

that all other error apparent from the face of the
record should be considered, Because Petitioner
fails to address, factually or legally, either of
these two errors, we deem them waived, -

602

by Elizabeth were also misrepresentations.
Petitioner also alleges that the basis for the
reinvestigation of this case was based upon a
false representation made by the prosecuting
attorney of Nicholas County in a letter indi-
eating that new evidence had been discover-
ed when Corporal White testified during the
grand jury hearing that no such evidence was
discovered or pursued by him. In response,
the State asserts that Petitioner failed to
make a prima facie showing of fraud.

Hs “Our standard of review of a mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment is generally de
novo.” State v. Davis, 205 W.Va. 569, 578, 519
S.E.2d 852, 861 (1999). The well-settled rule
in West Virginia is that “{e]xcept for willful,
intentional fraud the law of this State does
not permit the court to go behind an indict-
ment to inquire into the evidence considered
by the grand jury, either to determine its
legality or its sufficiency.” Syllabus, Barker
v. Fou, 160 W.Va. 749, 288 S.E.2d 285 (1977).

HH sIn State ex rel. Pinson v. May-
nard, 181 W. Va, 662, 383 S.E.2d 844 (1989),
we observed that:

Criminal defendants have frequently

sought to challenge the validity of grand

jury indictments on the ground that they
are not supported by adequate or compe-
tent evidence. (citations omitted). This con-
tention, however, often runs counter to the
function of the grand jury, which is not to
determine the truth of the charges against
the defendant, but to determine whether
there is sufficient probable cause to re-
quire the defendant to stand trial. (cita-
tions omitted).
Pinson at 665, 383 S.E.2d at 847, Thus, we
have held that: “ [mJost courts hold that as a
general rule, a trial court should not grant a
motion to dismiss criminal charges unless the
dismissal is consonant with the public inter-
est in the fair administration of justice.’ Syl.
Pt. 12, in part, Myers v. Frazier, 173 W.Va.
658, 319 S.H.2d 782, 786 (1984).” Id. at Syl.
Pt. 4. Furthermore,

“{D]ismis{s]al of [an] indictment is appro-

priate only ‘if it is established that the

violation substantially influenced the grand
jury’s decision to indict? or if there is

‘grave doubt? that the decision to indict

was free from substantial influence of such
violations.” Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 261-62, 108 S.Ct. 2369,
101 L.Ed.2d 228, 288 (1988) (citing United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78, 106
S.Ct. 988, 945, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 6. See also State v. Slie, 158
W.Va. 672, 213 S.E.2d 109 (1975); State v
Riley, 151 W.Va, 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966).
Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that some illegal
or improper evidence has been received be-
fore the grand jury ... will not invalidate an
indictment where other legal evidence was
received in its support.” State v. Clark, 64 W.
Va, 625, 63 S.E. 402, 403 (1908).

HM The question before this Court is
whether Petitioner made a prima facie case
that such fraud occurred before this grand
jury. With respect to Corporal White’s com-
ment related to the bullet hole in the bath-
room floor and his representation that Peti-
tioner shot himself in the leg in an effort to
deceive law enforcement, these statements
are not fraudulent simply because they are
inconsistent with statements of the accused.
As previously stated, the issue of whether
the hole in the bathroom floor was actually
caused by a bullet was in dispute at trial.
Although Mr. Cochran, the State’s firearms
expert, could not confirm the presence of
chemical residue demonstrating that the hole
was caused by a bullet, he testified that the
damage to the wood and the size of the hole
were not inconsistent with having been
caused by a bullet. He stated that if a bullet
had passed through carpet or padding before
going through the wood, any of the residues
that he would have been looking for would
have been removed, and thus, he did not rule
out the possibility that the hole in the bath-
room floor was caused by a bullet. Addition-
ally, the other evidence introduced before the
grand jury concerning the lack of blood spat-
ter on the front porch and the location of the
blood trails and pools at the crime scene
supported the State’s theory that Petitioner
‘was attempting to cover up his involvement.
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish
that these statements were fraudulent.

Hl In addition, with respect to Corporal
White’s statement that Elizabeth obtained a

domestic violence petition in April of 2007
against her husband in which she stated a
genuine fear for her life, the fact that she
stated in a subsequent family court hearing
that she was “more angry than fearful” when
she initially filed the petition and ultimately
asked the family court judge not to issue a
protective order does not make her initial
statements in the petition irrelevant. This
Court has recognized that “domestic violence
eases inherently present a combination of
circumstances that obstruct, yet simulta-
neously intensify the need for, successful
criminal prosecutions: low victim cooperation
and high same-victim recidivism.” State v,
Mechling, 219 W. Va. 866, 879, 683 S.E.2d
811, 324 (2006) (citing Tom Lininger, “Prose-
cuting Batterers after Crawford,” 91 Va.
L.Rev. 747, 768-71 (2005)). For example,
“[alecording to one recent estimate, eighty to
ninety percent of domestic violence victims
who appeal to the criminal justice system for
help recant or otherwise fail to assist the
prosecution at some point in the proceed-
ings.” Id. (quoting Lininger, 91 Va.L.Rev. at
768 n. 103; Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro,
“Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay
Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence Vic-
tims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive
Evidence,” 11 Colum. J. Gender & L., 1, 3
(2002)). Moreover, Corporal White explained
to the grand jury that Elizabeth subsequent-
ly dropped the domestic’ violence petition.
Thus, White’s statements about the domestic
violence petition were not fraudulent.

Hl Likewise, Corporal White did not lie
or misrepresent to the grand jury that Peti-
tioner knew that Elizabeth was planning to
divorce him. The following exchange oc-
curred between the prosecutor and Corporal
White during the grand jury proceeding:

Q; And that this was a premeditated mui-

der in your opinion based on his finding

out that she was planning to divorce or
separation (sic)?

A: Yes, sir. I’m not sure exactly what

caused this. I don’t know if he knew about

the divorce or not. To my knowledge, he
still doesn’t know that we discovered the
divorce papers. What makes me as a police
officer believe-that it was a premeditated
killing is the great steps he has taken in

603

the last six and a half years to conceal

what happened on that front porch.

Thus, Petitioner fails to show how Corporal
White’s statements regarding Petitioner's al-
Jeged motive to kill Elizabeth were fraudu-
Jent.

Hl With respect to Corporal White’s
statement that Petitioner's pants tested posi-
tive for LeadFree, he told the grand jury:

[Petitioner’s] pants was cut off him \...

They was collected by our crime scene

team, and they was sent to our lab, and

... they tested negative for gunshot resi-

due. What they did test positive for, how-

ever, was something our crime lab referred
to as LeadFree. Anybody that hunts and
has firearms, you have to clean those fire-
arms, do you not? ... Again, I’m no ex-
pert, but my cleaning solvents ... contains

a substance called LeadFree.”

The State contends that given the technical
nature of the term “lead wipe,” and taking
into account both White’s admission that he
is not a ballistics expert and his considerable
familiarity with firearms in general as a po-
lice officer and hunter, it is understandable
that he might misconstrue this particular
piece of evidence.

The characterization of this evidence was
undoubtedly incorrect. Despite this, “the
mere fact that some illegal or improper evi-
dence has been received before the grand
jury ... will not invalidate an indictment
where other legal evidence was received in
its support.” Clark, 64 W. Va. at 625, 63 S.E,
at 403; see also United States v. Estes, 798
F.2d 465, 466 @d Cir. 1986) (holding that
“the mere fact that some incompetent or
privileged testimony is heard by a ... grand
jury” will not “invalidate an indictment re-
turned by it”); State v. Bonham, 184 W. Va.
555, 558, 401 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1990) (holding
that “although the Court believes that the
chief investigating officer’s testimony was im-
proper, the State did introduce substantial
legal and competent evidence upon which the
grand jury reasonably could have found the
indictment against the defendant” and there-
fore the Court “cannot conclude that the
testimony of the chief investigating officer
‘was so prejudicial as to invalidate the indict-
ment”).

604

Despite the fact that Corporal White’s tes-
timony concerning’ LeadFree was incorrect,
this statement alone was not so prejudicial as
to invalidate the indictment. There was other
substantial and legal evidence presented. to
the grand jury upon which it could have
indicted Petitioner, including: (1) the projec-
tile track of the bullet wounds on Elizabeth’s
body being inconsistent with Petitioner’s de-
scription of the incident; (2) the lack of blood
spatter, although there was a pool of blood
underneath where Elizabeth laid on the
porch; (8) the lack of any blood spatter on
the porch where Petitioner stated he was
shot and no path of blood was found where
Petitioner stated that he turned toward the
door; (4).the existence of blood leading from
the bathroom to the porch where Petitioner
met police; and (5) the fact that Petitioner
told police that the shot that wounded him
came approximately twenty seconds after the
shot that killed Elizabeth, although multiple
other witnesses told police that they heard
shots several minutes apart. This evidence
was substantially similar to the evidence
eventually presented at trial. Thus, the incor-
rect evidence did not substantially influence
the decision to indict. Pinson at Syl. Pt. 6.
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit
court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to dis-
miss the indictment was proper.

B. Admission of Evidence Regarding Pri-
or Domestic Violence and Marital Dis-
cord

Petitioner challenges the cireuit court’s ad-
mission of evidence regarding prior domestic
violence and marital discord: We will discuss
each of these types of evidence in turn.

i, Testimony Regarding Incident on
April 22, 2007

Both Michelle and Catherine tes-

tified about the events on April 22, 2007,

8 Additionally, the circuit court ruled that the
testimony of Michelle and Catherine did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause. Petitioner asserts
that he disagrees with the circuit court's determi-
nation on this issue, however, he fails to set forth
any reasoning supporting this assertion. Because
Petitioner fails to develop this argument, we will
not address it on appeal. State v. LaRock, 196
W.Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996)
(“Although we liberally construe briefs in deter-

when Michelle borrowed Petitioner’s car and
Elizabeth spoke with both her sister and
daughter by telephone because she was con-
cerned that Petitioner would be angry. Mi-
chelle testified that she heard Petitioner
threaten to kill Elizabeth while the two were
on the phone that day. The circuit court
found that (1) this evidence was intrinsic and
not too remote in time to be considered
because it occurred close in time to Hliza-
beth’s murder and was reflective of the vio-
lent relationship between her and Petitioner;
and (2) the statements made by Elizabeth to
Michelle and Catherine regarding the events
occurring on April 22, 2007, were “out-of-
court statements made by someone other
than the declarant while testifying” but were
nevertheless admissible at trial because they
were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, but were rather admitted solely for
the purpose of showing Elizabeth’s state of
mind and the reasonableness of her actions
in fleeing her home, calling 911 and obtaining
a domestic violence protective order. The
circuit court determined that alternatively,
the statements fell within the present sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule un-
der Rule 808(1) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence.®

Petitioner first asserts that the circuit
court’s ruling that the events of April 22,
2007, were intrinsic was erroneous because
the testimony presented at the evidentiary
hearing and trial was that Elizabeth subse-
quently recanted the allegations and state-
ments she had made to the State’s witnesses
in filing a domestic violence protective order.
Moreover, when questioned by the family law
judge about seeking to voluntarily dismiss
the domestic violence petition, Elizabeth stat-
ed that she was simply “angry”, rather than.
fearful, at the time of the complaint, Petition-
er likewise asserts that the circuit court erro-
neously concluded that evidence of the events

mining issues presented for review, issues which
are not raised, and those mentioned only in pass-
ing [which] are not supported with pertinent au-
thority, are not considered on appeal.” (emphasis
added) (citation omitted); see also Ohio:Cellular
RSA Ltd. P’ship v, Bd. of Pub. Works of W.Va,
198 W.Va. 416, 424 n, 11, 481 $,B.2d 722, 730 n,
11 (1996) (refusing to address issue on appeal
that had not been adequately briefed),

on April 22, 2007, was inextricably inter-
twined with the crime charged and was
therefore admissible, as this was an isolated
incident.

HM “A trial court’s evidentiary rulings,
as well as its application of the Rules of
Evidence, are subject to a review under an
abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 1,
State v. Varlas, 287 W.Va. 899, 787 S.E.2d
670 (2016) (citing Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Rodous-
salis, 204 W.Va, 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998)),
With respect to a trial court’s determination
that evidence is intrinsic, this Court has ex-
plained that:

Our cases have “consistently held that
evidence which is ‘intrinsic’ to the indicted
charge is not governed by Rule 404(p).”
State v. Harris, 280 W.Va. 717, 722, 742
§.E.2d 188, 188 (2018). In [State v.] LaR-
ock, [196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.H.2d 618
(1996) ], we noted that other bad acts “evi-
dence is intrinsic when the evidence of the
other act and the evidence of the crime
charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or
both acts are part of a ‘single criminal
episode’ or the other ‘acts were necessary
preliminaries to the crime charged.” LaR-
ock, 196 W.Va. at 812 n, 29, 470 S.E.2d at
631 n. 29 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). In Syllabus point 83 of State v
Ferguson, 165 W.Va, 529, 270 S,H.2d 166
(1980), overruled on other grownds by
State v. Kopa, 178 W.Va. 48, 811 S.H.2d
412 (1988), we held:

Events, declarations and circumstances

which are near in time, causally connect-

ed with, and illustrative of transactions

being investigated are generally consid-

ered res gestae and admissible at trial.
State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 148, 155, 764
§.H.2d 308, 315 (2014), We have further held
that:

Tf the proffer fits into the “intrinsic” cate-

gory, evidence of other crimes should not

be suppressed when those facts come in as

‘res gestae—as part and parcel of the proof

charged in the indictment. See United

States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 88, 86 (4th Cir.

1980) (stating evidence is admissible when
9. The trial court also ruled in the alternative that

if it had not found the evidence to be intrinsic it
would have been properly admitted under Rule

605

it provides the context of the crime, “is
necessary to a ‘full presentation’ of the
ease, or is ... appropriate in order ‘to
complete the story ofthe crime on trial by
proving its immediate context or the “res
gestae”’”), (Citations omitted),

State v. Bowling, 232 W. Va. 529, 547, 753
S.H.2d 27, 45 (2018)(quoting LaRock, 196 W.
Va. at 312 n.29, 470 S.E.2d at 631 n.29),

As the circuit court properly determined,
in the six months leading up to her death,
Elizabeth’s relationship with, Petitioner was
“marked by a pattern of domestic violence,
marital discord and threats of violence,” and
the events on April 22, 2007, were “illustra-
tive of that relationship and not too remote in
time to be intrinsic.” Because, the State’s
theory of the case was that marital issues
and domestic violence between Petitioner and
Elizabeth provided his motive to kill her, the
circuit court properly determined that testi-
mony of Michelle and Catherine regarding
the events on April 22, 2007 demonstrated
the motive and setup of the crime and was
“necessary to a full presentation of the case,
... [and] is appropriate in order ‘to complete
the story of the crime .on trial....’”.° Id,

HH With respect to the circuit court’s
hearsay ruling, Petitioner asserts that the
circuit court erroneously concluded that the
statements thade: by Elizabeth to Michelle
and Catherine were admissible at trial be-
cause the State’s purpose,in admitting such
evidence showed Hlizabeth’s state of mind
and the reasonableness of Elizabeth's ac-
tions. Petitioner asserts that because Eliza-
beth testified that she was simply angry with
Petitioner when she sought the domestic vio-
lence protective order, seeking.such an order
was certainly “not reasonable” under any
analysis, Petitioner. further contends that in
order to determine that this testimony con-
stituted a present sense impression Rule
803(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Hvi-
dence, the circuit court had to erroneously
disregard this evidence and also ignore the
openly hostile relationship between Michelle
and Petitioner as well as her sketchy recol-

404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence 'to
show motive and intent to kill. .

606

lections on the events that she testified
about.

MMM Hearsay is defined in the West Vir-
ginia Rules of Evidence as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” W. Va. R. Evid. 801(c). Ordinarily,
hearsay is inadmissible. W. Va. R. Evid. 802.
‘This Court has held that:

“Generally, out-of-court statements
made by someone other’ than the declarant
while testifying are not admissible unless:
1) the statement is not being offered for
the truth of the matter asserted, but for
some other purpose such as motive, intent,
state-of-mind, identification or reasonable-
ness of the party’s action; 2) the statement
is not hearsay under the rules; or 8) the
statement is hearsay but falls within an
exception provided for in the rules.” Syl.
Pt. 1, State v. Maynard, 183 W.Va. 1, 393
S.E.2d 221 (1990),

Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Morris, 227 W.Va. 76, 705
S.E.2d 588 (2010).

Based on the evidence presented in this
case, we conclude that the circuit court did
not abus¢ its discretion in determining that
the statements made by Elizabeth to Mi-
chelle and Catherine regarding the incidents
occurring on April 22, 2007, were admissible
because they were not offered for the truth
of the matter asserted, but were, rather ad-
mitted solely for the purpose of showing
Elizabeth’s state of mind. Because the state-
ments were used for that limited purpose,
they did not constitute inadmissible hearsay.

HE Moreover, as the lower court alter-
natively recognized, Elizabeth’s comments to
Michelle and Catherine were made when she
was describing the ongoing events that led
her decision to seek a domestic violence pro-
tective order. Thus, these comments, even if
hearsay, would have still been admissible
under the “present sense impression” excep-
tion in Rule 803(1) of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence, which provides that “[a]
statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immedi-

ately thereafter” is not excluded by the hear-
say rule. Id.

HM This Court has stated that:

It is within a trial court’s discretion to

admit an out-of-court statement under

Rule 803(1), the present sense impression

exception, of the West Virginia Rules of

Evidence if: (1) The statement was made

at the time or shortly after an event; (2)

the statement describes the event; and (8)

the event giving rise to the statement was

within a declarant’s personal knowledge.
Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Phillips, 194 W. Va. 569,
461 S.E.2d 75 (1995), overruled on other
grounds by State v, Sutherland, 231 W. Va.
410, 745 S.H.2d 448 (2018).

In properly considering the factors out-
lined in Phillips, the circuit court noted that
(1) the statements made by Elizabeth were
directly after the occurrence of the incident
of domestic violence; (2) the statements de-
seribed the event; and (8) the event giving
rise to the statement was within Elizabeth’s
personal knowledge. See id. Accordingly, we
conclude that the circuit court’s admission of
this testimony was not an abuse of discretion.

ti. Testimony Regarding Incidents in
November 2006 and March 2007

HM The circuit court also addressed the
State’s request to admit testimony regarding
some alleged incidents of domestic violence
allegedly witnessed by Michelle in ‘November
2006 and. March 2007. Specifically, Michelle
testified that she witnessed a physical alter-
cation between Petitioner and Elizabeth in
November 2006 when she pulled up in the
driveway and saw Petitioner grab Hlizabeth’s
arms “and stuff’ and hit her in the arm “a
couple times.” Michelle testified that she did
not intervene but, instead, sat in her car in
the driveway. She also testified about anoth-
er incident that occurred in March 2007 in-
volving an altercation that was related to one
of Petitioner’s sons. Michelle testified that
there was a lot of yelling during the incident
and that she witnessed Petitioner shove Eliz-
abeth before the couple continued back into
another room and shut the door.

The circuit court determined that Mi-
chelle’s testimony regarding these incidents

of domestic violence in November 2006 and
March 2007 were admissible, but that they
were too remote to be intrinsic, as they
occurred seven to eleven months before Eliz-
abeth’s death. Accordingly, the circuit court
conducted an analysis under Rule 404() of
the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and
determined that these prior incidents were
relevant to show motive and intent to kill
Elizabeth, that the incidents were reliable
and highly probative of the relationship be-
tween Petitioner and Elizabeth, and that the
probative value of this evidence outweighed
any danger of unfair prejudice under Rule
403.

Petitioner asserts that the probative value
of this proposed evidence is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
because it was duplicative and cumulative of
the testimony concerning the incident that
took place on April 22, 2007. He additionally
argues that while Michelle presented testi-
mony concerning the parties’ arguments over
petty things, the trial court made a signifi-
cant leap when it characterized these inci-
dents as violence inflicted upon her. Further,
as to the court’s finding that these state-
ments tended to show Petitioner’s motive and
intent, he contends that there is no evidence
in the record of the June 12, 2015 hearing,
nor of the trial, that he had any knowledge as
to the existence of the divorce packet or of
any plans that Elizabeth had of pursuing a
divorce.

Hs With respect to the standard ap-
plicable to our review of a Rule 404(b) ruling,
we held in LaRock that:

The standard of review for a trial court’s

admission of evidence pursuant to Rule

404(b) involves a three-step analysis.

First, we review for clear error the trial

court’s factual determination that there is

sufficient evidence to show the other acts
occurred. Second, we review de novo
whether the trial court correctly found the
evidence was admissible for a legitimate
purpose. Third, we review for an abuse of
discretion the trial court’s conclusion that
the “other acts” evidence is more proba-

tive than prejudicial under Rule 403.
LaRock at 310, 470 8.H.2d at 629 footnotes
and citations omitted). In syllabus point one

607

of State v. McGinnis, 193 W. Va. 147, 455

§.E.2d 516 (1994), we held that:
When offering evidence under Rule 404(b)
of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,
the prosecution is required to identify the
specific purpose for which the evidence is
being offered and the jury must be in-
structed to limit its consideration of the
evidence to only that purpose. It is not
sufficient for the prosecution or the trial
court merely to cite or mention the litany
of possible uses listed in Rule 404(b). The
specific and precise purpose for which the
evidence is offered must clearly be shown
from the record and that purpose alone
must be'told to the jury in the trial court’s
instruction.

Id, at Syl. Pt. 1. We have provided the

following guidance for how a trial court must

consider proposed Rule 404(b) evidence:
Where an offer of evidence is made under
Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, the trial court, pursuant to Rule
104(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evi-
dence, is to determine its admissibility.
Before admitting the evidence, the trial
court should conduct an in camera hearing
as stated in State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688,
847 S.E.2d 208 (1986). After hearing the
evidence and arguments of counsel, the
trial court must be satisfied by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the acts or
conduct occurred and that the defendant
committed the acts. If the trial court does
not find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the acts or conduct was commit-
ted or that the defendant was the actor,
the evidence should be excluded under
Rule 404(b). If a sufficient showing has
been made, the trial court must then de-
termine the relevancy of the evidence un-
der Rules 401 and 402 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence and conduct the balanc-
ing required under Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence. If the trial
court is then satisfied that the Rule 404(b)
evidence is admissible, it should instruct
the jury on the limited purpose for which
such evidence has been admitted. A limit-
ing instruction should be given at the time
the evidence is offered, and we recommend
that it be repeated in the trial court’s

608

general charge to the jury at: the conelu-

sion of the evidence, .

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2. We have further explained
that:

It is presumed a defendant is protected

from undue prejudice if the following re-

vquirenients are met: (1) the prosecution
offered the evidence for a proper purpose;

(2) the evidence was relevant; (8) the trial
* court made an on-the-record determination

under Rule 408 of the West Virginia Rules

of Evidence that the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by

its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4)

the trial court gave a limiting instruction.
Syl. Pt. 8, LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 8.B.2d
613,

In the present case, the trial court con-
ducted .an in camera hearing on June 12,
2015, and heard the proposed evidence of
alleged prior abuse, The circuit court’s order,
which thoroughly analyzes each of the factors
required in McGinnis, made the proper de-
termination that. evidence that Petitioner
previously abused Elizabeth would have the
tendency to make it more probable that Peti-
tioner intended to and did cause her death,
and therefore, it was relevant to show his
motive or intent,

In LaRock, we elaborated on the impor-
tance of evidence of prior violence in a mur-
der prosecution:

The theory underlying the introduction of

evidence regarding a prior violent relation-

ship in a murder prosecution is not that
the assailant is a bad person and that bad
‘people are likely to commit the charged
offense, It is precisely this train of thought
that Rule 404 prohibits, Instead, the theo-
ry under which such evidence is allowed
arises from the idea that, when a-defen-
dant has demonstrated the same type of
violence towards a victim on a recent occa-
sion, it is probative of his or her intent,
motive, malice, and premeditation. Thus, in
» the present case, the prosecutor under-
standably attempted to demonstrate some
prior animosity to explain why the accused
had a motive to do the illegal acts charged
in the indictment..... Not only is evi-
dence of the prior relationship between the
‘defendant and his deceased son relevant,

* it also is considered crucial evidence in
proving premeditation.
Id. at 811-12 n.27, 470 S.H.2d at 681 1.27
(emphasis added). Thus, the fact that Peti-
tioner had demonstrated the same type of
violence toward Hlizabeth on a recent occa-
sion was relevant and highly probative of the
nature of their relationship and Petitioner’s
motive and intent, and weighing those factors
in favor of admissibility, the circuit court’s
determination that the probative value of this
evidence outweighed any danger of unfair
prejudice was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
at 812, 470 S.H.2d at 681, For these reasons,
we conclude that this testimony was neither
unfair nor duplicative in nature. In addition,
while the jury heard Michelle’s testimony
regarding the fact that Elizabeth planned to
divorce Petitioner, Petitioner vehemently de-
nied any knowledge of her plans in closing
arguments and the jury heard evidence that
the divorce packet had been hidden under
the seat covers in Hlizabeth’s vehicle. The
jury weighed all of this evidence accordingly.
Thus, the circuit court’s admission of this
testimony was not an abuse of discretion,

» Wii. Testimoriy Regarding Marital Dis-
cord :

HE The circuit court next addressed the
State’s request to introduce evidence of the
marital relationship between Petitioner and
Elizabeth. Michelle and Catherine offered
testimony regarding other marital problems
between the couple, the history of their rela-
tionship, and Petitioner's controlling behav-
ior. However, because their testimony coy-
ered issues that arose as early as 2001
through 2005, the circuit court determined
that historical relationship evidence was too
remote in time to be admissible as extrinsic
evidence,

Michelle also offered relationship testimo-
ny related closer in time to Elizabeth’s death,
She testified regarding arguments during the
summer of 2007 over: petty things, Hliza-
beth’s plans to divorce Petitioner, and the
divorce packet that she and Elizabeth picked
up. The circuit court determined -that Mi-
chelle’s testimony: regarding their relation-
ship during the six months preceding Eliza-
beth’s death was relevant and admissible as

intrinsie evidence, concluding that “‘it
seem[ed] doubtful that this case could [be]
appropriately presented without such suffi-
cient background information,’ State v. Den-
nis, 216 W. Va. 881, 852, 607 S.B.2d 437, 458
(2004)” and: was necessary to “ ‘complete the
story of the violence [Petitioner] inflicted
upon her,’ State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 148,
164 S.E.2d 303, 316 (2014).” The cireuit court
also concluded that these statements were
non-testimonial in nature and did not consti-
tute inadmissible hearsay because they were
admitted for the purpose of showing Petition-
er’s motive and intent, and Elizabeth’s state
of mind. Petitioner asserts that this testimo-
ny was duplicative and cumulative and that
these incidents were not indicative of any
violence inflicted upon her. However, for the
reasons stated by the circuit court, we con:
clude that the circuit court’s admission of
these statements was not an abuse of discre-
tion. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit
court’s ruling on this issue,

C. Refusal to Give Instruction on Lesser
Included Offenses

HEM) Petitioner alleges that the circuit
court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-
ineluded offenses of second degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary
manslaughter. Although Petitioner alleges
that he requested these instructions at trial,
he admits that the record reveals no such
request and that counsel did not submit such
proposed jury instructions to the trial court.
Accordingly, Petitioner alleges that this was
plain error as contemplated by Rules 30 and
52(b) of the West. Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure, This Court has held that:

The plain error doctrine contained in
Rule 30 and Rule 52(b) of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Criminal Procedure is identi-
cal, It enables this Court to take notice of
error, including instructional error occur-
ring during the proceedings, even though
such error was not brought to the atten-
tion of the trial court. However, the doc-
trine is to be used sparingly and only in
those circumstances where substantial
rights are affected, or the truth-finding
process is substantially impaired, or a mis-
carriage of justice would otherwise result.

609

Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Hngland,.180 W. Va. 342,

876 S.E.2d 548 (1988), This Court has held

that, generally:
“The question of whether a defendant is
entitled to an instruction on a lesser in-
eluded offense involves. a two-part inquiry.
The first inquiry is a legal one having to do
with whether the lesser offense is by virtue
of its legal elements or definition included
in the greater offense, The second inquiry
is a factual one which involves a determi-
nation by the trial court of whether there
is evidence which would tend to prove such
lesser included offense. State v. Neider,
170 W.Va. 662, 295 S.H.2d 902 (1982).” Syl.
-Pt, 1, State v. Jones, 174 W.Va, 700, 829
S.E.2d 65 (1985).

Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Wilkerson, 230 W. Va. 866,

738 S.E.2d 82 (2018),

HAs to the first inquiry identified
in Wilkerson, there is no question that sec-
ond degree murder, voluntary manslaughter,
and involuntary manslaughter are lesser in-
cluded offenses of murder. See W, Va. Code
§§ 61-2-1 through 61-2-5 (2014). With respect
to the second inquiry, we must determine
whether there was sufficient evidence intro-
duced at trial to support a verdict on one of
the lesser-included offenses. “ ‘Jury instruc-
tions on possible guilty verdicts must only
include those crimes for which substantial
evidence has beeri presented upon which a
jury might justifiably find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Syl. pt. 5,
State v. Demastus, 165 W.Va. 572, 270 S.H.2d
649 (1980).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. ‘Leonard, 217
W. Va. 608, 619 S.H.2d 116 (2005), “When
there is no evidence to support giving a
particular instruction the trial court is not
obligated to give that instruction.” State v.
Sapp, 207 W. Va. 606, 615, 585 S.H.2d 205,
214 (2000).

We conclude that in this case, there was no
eyidence to support giving an instruction on
these lesser included offenses because Peti-
tioner presented an identity of the shooter
defense. In doing so, Petitioner did not pres-
ent any evidence from which the jury could
have concluded that Petitioner killed Eliza-
beth without premeditation. Nor did he claim
that he was suddenly provoked by something
Elizabeth said or did. See eg., Sapp, 207 W.

610

Va. at 615, 585 S.H.2d at 214 (“The defendant
does not claim he was suddenly provoked by
something [the victim] said or did; he claims
he did not kill him, [someone else] did. Based
upon this evidence, an instruction on volun-
tary manslaughter was not warranted.”), The
State offered ample evidence of premedita-
tion and deliberation in demonstrating that
Petitioner had committed prior acts of vio-
lence against Elizabeth, that Elizabeth had
planned to divorce Petitioner, and that Peti-
tioner had threatened to kill her if she tried
to leave him. Because there was no evidence
relating to second-degree murder or man-
slaughter introduced at trial, the circuit court
‘was not required to give an instruction on
lesser-included offenses and its failure to do
so was not plain error.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

TH Petitioner alleges that the circuit
court erred in denying his motion for judg-
ment of acquittal because the evidence pre-
sented by the State was insufficient to con-
vince a reasonable jury that Petitioner was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifical-
ly, he asserts that despite the State’s theory
that Petitioner shot Elizabeth and then shot.
himself in the bathroom, no gunshot residue,
flashing or stippling was found on either
Petitioner or Elizabeth, and there was no
mixing or crossing of the locations where
Petitioner and Elizabeth’s blood was found.
He also maintains that (1) none of the alleged
bullet holes were confirmed to be bullet
holes; (2) no one was seen coming or leaving
the residence around the time of the shoot-
ing; and (8) although multiple officers were in
exclusive possession of the crime scene for
eight hours conducting an extensive investi-
gation using metal detectors, none of this
evidence that the law enforcement officers
presented at trial implicated Petitioner. Fur-
thermore, he contends that the State failed
to establish any motive to kill his wife, as one
incident of domestic violence six months pri-
or to the murder wherein she later recanted
her statements, and a couple of other argu-
ments, did not establish motive. In response,
the State contends that it is evident from the
record that the State introduced more than
enough direct evidence related to Petitioner’s
willingness to harm Elizabeth, and a copious

amount of circumstantial evidence from
which a jury could infer that Petitioner shot
her,

HN. (We apply 2 de novo standard of
review to the denial of a motion for judgment
of acquittal based upon the sufficiency of the
evidence. LaRock, 196 W.Va. at 804, 470
S.E.2d at 628, With regard to the standard of
review applied to challenges to the sufficien-
ey of the evidence, this Court has explained
as follows:

The function of an appellate court when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine
the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, is suffi-
cient to convince a reasonable person of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is wheth-
er, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any ra-
tional trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Gutirie, 194 W. Va. 657,
461 S.E.2d 168 (1995), Accordingly, we have
held that:

A criminal defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
appellate court must review all the evi-
dence, whether direct or circumstantial, in
the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must credit all inferences and credibil-
ity assessments that the jury might have
drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
evidence need not be inconsistent with ev-
ery conclusion save that of guilt so long as
the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Credibility determinations are for a
jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a
jury verdict should be set aside only when -
the record contains no evidence, regard-
less of how it is weighed, from which the
jury, could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. To the extent that our prior cases
are inconsistent, they are expressly over-
ruled.

Id. at Syl. Pt 8 (emphasis added). In empha-
sizing the necessity to view all evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution

and to resolve all evidentiary conflicts in
favor of the prosecution, we have stated:

When a criminal defendant undertakes a

sufficiency challenge, all the evidence, di-

rect and circumstantial, must be viewed

from the prosecutor's coign of vantage, and
the viewer must accept all reasonable in-
ferences from it that are consistent with
the verdict. This rule requires the trial
court judge to resolve all evidentiary con-
flicts and credibility questions in the prose-
cution’s favor; moreover, as among com-
peting inferences of which two or more are
plausible, the judge must choose the infer-
ence that best fits the prosecution’s theory
of guilt.

Syl. Pt. 2, LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d

613.

This Court has previously ruled that we
may accept any adequate evidence, including
circumstantial evidence, as support for a con-
viction. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 668, 461 S.E.2d
at 174, It was noted in Guthrie that:

Circumstantial evidence ... is intrinsically

no different from testimonial evidence. Ad-

mittedly, circumstantial evidence may in
some case point to a wholly incorrect re-
sult. Yet this is equally true of testimonial
evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked
to weigh the chances that the evidence
correctly points to guilt against the possi-
bility of inaccuracy or ambiguous infer-
ence, In both, the jury must use its experi-
ence with people and events in weighing
the probabilities. If the jury is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require
no more,

Id, at 668, 461 S.H.2d at 174 (quoting Hol-

land v. United States, 348 U.S, 121, 189-40,

75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954)),

In the case at bar, the State introduced
significant evidence from which a rational
jury could have relied in order to satisfy the
elements of first-degree murder. The State
introduced evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of malice and premeditation, includ-
ing various threats the Petitioner made to-
ward Elizabeth, their history of violence, and
Elizabeth’s plans to divorce Petitioner.

Furthermore, the State provided ample ev-
idence to implicate Petitioner circumstantial-

611

ly and to discredit his version of the events.
The State’s trajectory expert and the medical
examiner opined that based upon the location
of Elizabeth’s entry and exit wounds, it was
virtually impossible for Elizabeth to have
been shot in the manner in which Petitioner
claimed at the time of the shooting. Addition-
ally, the State presented undisputed testimo-
ny regarding the lack of a blood trail on the
front porch and the lack of blood on any
furniture or walls, along with the existence of
blood leading from the interior bathroom and
bedroom to the front door. Unexplainably,
the two bullets that were recovered from the
scene had no human blood or DNA on them.
This evidence, combined with all of the wit-
ness testimony regarding whether the hole in
the bathroom floor was actually a bullet hole,
and the heavy amount of Petitioner’s blood
found in the bathroom, all circumstantially
implicated the Petitioner,

The jury heard the testimony of Petition-
er’s crime scene reconstruction and ballistics
expert, Mark McMillian, who countered the
State’s experts’ opinions and provided his
own opinions regarding the manner in which
the responding officers investigated the
erime scene, gunshot range and distance de-
terminations, and gunshot residue testing,
among other things, and the jury weighed all
of this evidence accordingly. Additionally, the
jury heard a great deal of testimony from
various witnesses in and around the elemen-
tary school that day concerning the gunshots
that they heard and the fact that they all
remembered hearing the second gunshot ap-
proximately five minutes after the first gun-
shot.

Moreover, although Petitioner argues that
no gunshot residue was found on Petitioner’s
hands, the State introduced evidence that the
bathroom sink was wet and Petitioner's
hands were noticeably clean when he
emerged from his home after the arrival of
emergency personnel. The jury also heard
evidence that directly following the incident,
Petitioner asked to have his hands tested for
gunshot residue to demonstrate that he
“didn’t shoot no gun.” Further, Petitioner
called Sergeant Lilly’s attention to a bullet
hole located on the front of the house as he

612

was lying on his back while paramedics pre-
pared to transport him from the scene.

All of this evidence supported the State’s
theory that Petitioner took efforts to cover
up his involvement, clean the gunshot residue
off of his hands, and then bring his lack of
gunshot residue to the attention of law en-
forcement, and these were all credibility de-
terminations that the jury properly made.
Based upon the evidence presented, we find

no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that .

the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict,

Iv. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Nicholas County convicting Petition-
er of. first-degree murder and sentencing him
to life in prison without the possibility of

parole,

Affirmed,
803 S.E.2d 582
Helio MARTINEZ, Petitioner *

v.

ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT
CO., Respondent

No. 17-0039
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
" Submitted: May 16, 2017
Filed: June 16, 2017

Allan N, Karlin, Esq, Jane E. Peak, Esq.,
Benjamin J. Hogan, Esq., Allan N. Karlin &

Associates, Morgantown, West Virginia,
Counsel for Petitioner

Joseph U, Leonoro, Esq., Steptoe & John-
son PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Mi-
chael J. Moore, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
PLLO, Bridgeport, West Virginia, Counsel
for Respondent.

WALKER, Justice:

This case is before us on two certified
questions from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia. We consider whether two recently en-
acted statutes relating to damages—West
Virginia Code §§ 55-7-29 and 55-7H-8—apply
in a trial conducted after the effective date of
the statutes when the underlying facts in the
ease occurred prior to that effective date.
Finding the two statutes at issue to be reme-
dial, we answer the certified questions in the
affirmative.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Petitioner Helio Martinez was employed
by Respondent Asplundh Tree Expert Co.
(“Asplundh”) to perform tree cutting services
from 2011 until he was discharged on Sep-
tember 18, 2018. Mr. Martinez is an Ameri-
can citizen originally from Puerto Rico. He
worked on a four-person work crew first
assigned to work in Pennsylvania but then
transferred to work in West Virginia by As-
plundh. Mr. Martinez’s work crew was com-
prised entirely of Hispanic individuals and,

according to Mr. Martinez, they were treated
less favorably than other work crews as they
were provided inferior equipment. Moreover,
he alleges that at least one member of As-
plundh management referred to them as the
“Mexican crew” even though none of the
crew members were of Mexican descent.

On September 18, 2018, Asplundh sum-
marily terminated Mr. Martinez’s employ-
ment on the grounds of theft, Although Mr,
Martinez denied any wrongdoing, he was not
provided any opportunity to respond to the
accusation of wrongdoing. The separation no-
tice documenting the termination was pre-
pared by Mr. Martinez’s direct supervisor,
Terry McFarlan, and states: “Took our truck
to shop, was caught stealing from a Jaflo
truck on camera.” Mr, Martinez’s entire work
crew was terminated as a result of the al-
Jeged theft of a cell phone charger from the
truck of a competitor (Jaflo) parked at a
truck repair facility (United Auto).

Mr, McFarlan and his supervisor, Tim
Blankenship, admitted in their depositions
that that the video surveillance upon which
the decision to fire Mr. Martinez was based
did not show him stealing the cell phone
charger. Rather, Asplundh now claims that
the video surveillance revealed Mr. Martinez
was in a position to observe two other crew
members steal the cell phone charger. Al-
though counsel for Mr. Martinez requested a
copy of the video surveillance within days of
the discharge, it disappeared without expla-
nation, Mr. MeFarlan suggested in his depo-
sition that the video “erased itself.”

Following his discharge, Mr. Martinez filed
a complaint against Asplundh with the West
Virginia Human Rights Commission (“Com-
mission”). The Commission subsequently is-
sued a Notice of Right to Sue on December
30, 2014, On January 25, 2015, Mr. Martinez
filed a civil action against Asplundh in the
Cireuit Court of Harrison County alleging
that he was wrongfully discharged from em-
ployment in violation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, §§ 5-11-1 through -20
(2018) (the “Human Rights Act”). Mr. Mar-
tinez claims that he was unlawfully discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race, national
origin and/or ancestry.

On February 25, 2015, Asplundh removed
the case to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia on
the basis of diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1882 (2012). Prior to trial, the parties joint-
ly moved the district court to stay the case
and certify the questions we now consider.

By order entered on January 1, 2017, the
district court certified the following questions
to this Court:

1. Does W.Va. Code § 55-7E-8, which ab-

rogates Mason County Bd. of Educ, v.

State Superintendent of Sch., 170 W.Va.

632, 295 SB.2d 719 (1982), apply to a

wrongful discharge case under the West

Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code

§ 5-11-9(1), where the plaintiff employee

was discharged on September 8, 2018, the

effective date of the statute is June 8, 2015,

and this case is set for trial after June 8,

20157 :

2, Does W.Va. Code § 55-7-29, which limits

punitive damage awards, apply to a wrong-

ful discharge case under the West Virginia

Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code § 5-11-

9(1), where the plaintiff employee was dis-

charged on September 8, 2018, the effec-

tive date of the statute is June 8, 2015, and

this case is set for trial after June 8, 2015?
We proceed to consider the issues raised by
the certified questions.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
TH As we have established, “[a] de novo
standard is applied by this Court in address-
ing the legal issues presented by a certified
question from a federal district or appellate
court.” Syl. pt. 1, Light v, Allstate Ins. Co.,
208 W.Va. 27, 506 §.H.2d 64 (1998), We con-
sider the certified questions presented by the

district court according to this standard.

IIL DISCUSSION

To begin, we summarize the arguments
advanced by the parties, which are virtually
the same for both certified questions. Peti-
tioner argues that responding to the certified
questions in the affirmative would impose an
impermissible retroactive application of West
Virginia Code §§ 55-7-29 and 55-7H-8. As-
serting that the law of damages is substan-
tive, Petitioner contends that application of

615

the statutes at issue would impair substan-
tive rights contrary to this Court’s prior
holding that “[a] statute that diminishes-sub-
stantive rights or augments substantive lia-
bilities should not be applied retroactively to
events completed before the effective date of
the statute ... unless the statute provides
explicitly for retroactive application.” Syl. Pt.
2, Public Citizen, Ine. v. First Nat. Bank in
Fairmont, 198 W.Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538
(1996). To hold otherwise, Petitioner states,
would be contrary to our observation that
“i]t has been stated repeatedly that new
legislation should not generally be construed
to interfere with existing contracts, rights of
actions, suits, or vested property rights.”
Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W.Va. 845,
351 n.10, 452 S.E.2d 486, 442 n.10 (1994)
(citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S.
244, 114 S.Ct, 1488, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994),
Petitioner further argues that the statutes at
issue are neither procedural nor remedial,
and absent contrary language in the legisla-
tion, may not be applied retroactively to a
ease based on a discharge from employment
that preceded the statute’s effective date of
June 8, 2015.

Conversely, Respondent asserts that a
plaintiff does not have a right to damages
until they are proven at trial and thus Mr.
Martinez had no vested right to unmitigated
front pay or punitive damages prior to trial.
Respondent relies upon the language of each
statute referring to an “award” for its argu-
ment that applicability is not triggered until
damages are awarded. Consequently, Re-
spondent posits that it is not seeking to apply
the subject statutes retroactively. Respon-
dent’ urges this Court to rely upon our prior
holding that “{a] law is not retroactive mere-
ly because part of the factual situation to
which it is applied occurred prior to its enact-
ment; only when it operates upon transac-
tions which have been completed or upon
rights which have been acquired or upon
obligations which have existed prior to its
passage can it be considered to be retroactive
in application.” Syl. Pt, 8, Sizemore v. State
Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r., 159
W.Va. 100, 219 S.E.2d 912 (1975). Respon-
dent requests that “the law in effect on the
date of trial be applied in this case” and

616

urges this Court to disregard what it charac-
terizes as a “cloud of confusion” created by
Petitioner's retroactivity argument.

‘We now address each certified question in
turn, ; .

A. West Virginia Code § 55-7E-3

The first certified question is based upon
West Virginia Code § 55-7H-8, which ad-
dresses the recovery of front pay! and back
pay? in employment cases and states:

.(a) In any employment law cause of ac-
tion against a current or former employer,
regardless of whether the cause of action
arises from a statutory right created by
the Legislature or a cause of action arising
under the common law of West Virginia,
the plaintiff has an affirmative duty to
mitigate past and future lost wages, re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff can prove
the defendant employer acted with malice
or malicious intent, or in willful disregard
of the plaintiffs rights. The malice excep-
tion to the duty to mitigate damages is
abolished. Unmitigated or flat back pay
and front pay awards are not an available
remedy. Any award of back pay or front
pay by a commission, court or jury shall be
reduced by the amount of interim earnings

, or the amount earnable with reasonable

diligence by the plaintiff. It is the defen-
dant’s burden to prove the lack of reason-
able diligence, .
- (b) In any employment law claim or
cause of action, the trial court shall make a
preliminary ruling on the appropriateness
of the remedy of reinstatement versus
front pay if such remedies are sought by
the plaintiff. If front pay is determined to
be the appropriate remedy, the amount of
front pay, if any, to be awarded shall be an.
issue for the trial judge to decide.

W.Va, Code § 55-7E-3 (2016). The effective
daté of this statute was June 8, 2015.8 .

1, “Back pay” is defined as “the wages that an
employee would have earned, had the employee
not suffered from an adverse employment action,’
from the time of the adverse-employment action
through the time of trial.” W.Va, Code § 55-7E-
If). i .

This new article of Chapter 55 also in-
cludes articulated findings and a declaration
of purpose, According to West Virginia Code
§ 55-7H-2(a)(8), “the goal .of compensation
remedies in employment law cases is to make
the victim of unlawful workplace actions
whole....” W.Va. Code § 55-7H-2(a)(8).
Moreover, “[ijn West Virginia, the amount of
damages recently awarded in statutory and
common law employment cases have been
inconsistent with established federal law and
the law of surrounding states, This lack of
uniformity in the law puts our state and its
businesses at a competitive disadvantage.”
W.Va. Code § 55-7E-2(a)(4), Finally, “tlhe
purpose of this article is to provide a frame-
work for adequate and reasonable compensa-
tion to those persons who have been subject-
ed to an unlawful employment action, but to
ensure that compensation does not far ex-
ceed the goal of making a wronged employee
whole.” W.Va. Code § 55-7E-2(b).

Hl To answer the certified question pre-
sented by the district court, we first examine
our precedent relating to the applicability of
statutory .enactments. We begin with the
statutory proposition that “[a] statute is pre-
sumed to be prospective in its operation un-
less expressly made retrospective.” W.Va,
Code § 2-2-10(bb) (2018). “The presumption
is that a statute is intended to operate pro-
spectively, and not retrospectively, unless it
appears, by clear, ‘strong and imperative
words or by necessary implication, that the
Legislature intended to give the statute ret-
roactive force and effect. Syl. pt. 4, Taylor v.
State Compensation Comm’r, 140 W.Va. 572,
86 S.H.2d 114 (1955).” Syl. Pt. 2, In re Peti-
tion for Attorney Fees and Costs: Cassella v.
Mylan Pharm, Inc., 284 W.Va. 485, 766
§.E.2d 482 (2014),

HE How statutory amendments apply
may be determined by the subject matter of
the statute. For example, “[s]tatutory
changes that are purely procedural in-nature
2. “Front pay” is defined as “the wages that an

employee would have earned, had the employee

not suffered from an adverse employment action,
from the. time of trial through a future -date,”

W.Va. Code § 55-7B-1(b).

3," 2015 W.Va. Act ch. 5.

will be applied retroactively.” Syl. Pt. 4, Mil-
ler v. Smith, 229 W.Va. 478, 729 S.E.2d 800
(2012), On the other hand, we have held that
“[a] statute that diminishes substantive
rights or augments substantive liabilities
should not be applied retroactively to events
completed before the effective date of the
statute (or the date of enactment if no sepa-
rate effective date is stated) unless the stat-
ute provides explicitly for retroactive applica-
tion.” Public Citizen at Syl. Pt. 2. -

Hl Adaressing whether a statute applies
retrospectively, we have held, “[t]he law is
not retroactive merely because part of the
factual situation to which it is applied oc-
curred prior to its enactment; only when it
operates upon transactions which have been
completed or upon rights which have been
acquired or upon obligations which have ex-
isted prior to its passage can it be considered
‘to be retroactive in application. Syl. pt. 3,
Sizemore v. State Workmen's Comp.
- Comm’r, 159 W.Va, 100, 219 S.E.2d 912
(1975).” Cassella at Syl. Pt. 8. .
Turning to the first certified question, we
note that the Legislature’s findings and dec-
lavation of purpose set forth explicitly in
West Virginia Code § 55-7E-2 state that “the
amount of damages recently awarded in stat-
utory and common’ law employment cases
have been inconsistent with established fed-
eral law and the law of surrounding states.”
Id. This inconsistency originated with this
Court’s holding more than 80 years ago re-
garding an employee’s duty to mitigate dam-
ages:

Unless a wrongful discharge is mali-
cious, the wrongfully discharged employee
has a duty to mitigate damages by accept-
ing similar employment to that contemplat-
ed by his ‘or her contract if it is available in
the local area, and the actual wages re-
ceived, or the wages the employee could
have received at comparable employment
where it is locally available, will be deduct-
ed from any back pay award; however, the
burden of raising the issue of mitigation is
on the employer.

Syl. Pt. 2, Mason County Board of Educ. v.
State Superintendent of Sch., 170 W.Va, 682,

4, Amber Marie Moore, Student Work, Can Dam-

ages Be Too Damaging? Examining Mason Coun-

617

295 S.E.2d 719 (1982), Eventually, this Court
extended this so-called “malice exception” be-
yond a plaintif’s duty to mitigate back pay
damages and applied the exception to front
pay damages. See Burke-Parsons-Bowlby
Corp. v. Rice, 230 W.Va. 105, 115, 786 S.E.2d
888, 348 (2012); Peters v. Rivers Edge. Min-
‘ing, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 184, 680 S.E.2d 791,
815 (2009); West Virginia Am. Water Co. v.
Nagy, No. 10-1229, 2011 WL 8583425 at *3
(W.Va. June 15, 2011) (memorandum deci-
sion). As a result, this State adopted a con-
cept of unmitigated front and back ‘pay un-
recognized by any other state.

West Virginia Code § 55-7H-3 abrogates
Mason County and its progeny, providing
that “in any employment law cause of ac-
tion,” “[uJnmitigated or flat back pay and
front pay awards are not an available reme-
dy. Any amount of back pay or front pay by
a commission, court or jury shall be reduced
by the amount of interim earning or the
amount earnable with reasonable diligence
by the plaintiff.” W.Va. Code § 55-7H-3(a)-
(b). Moreover, the statute provides that
“{tThe amount of front pay, if any, to be
awarded shall be an issue for the trial judge
to decide.” W.Va, Code § 55-7E-3(b).

We now consider whether this statute ap-
plies to an employment case that is based
upon a claim for unlawful discriminatory dis-
charge that occurred prior to June 8, 2015,
and is set for trial after the effective date of
West Virginia Code § 55-7E-3. As we have
stated, “(statutes which do not create new
rights or take away vested ones are deemed
to be remedial and are not within the strict
application of the rule of presumption against
retroactivity.”. Mildred L.M., 192 W.Va. at
861 n.10, 452 S.H.2d at 445 n.10 (citing Joy v.
Chessie Emp. Fed. Credit Union; 186 W.Va.
118, 411 S.H.2d 261 (1991). Generally, a re-
medial statute has been defined as “a statute
that relates to practice, procedure, remedies
and does not affect substantive or vested
rights.” 73 Am, Jur. 2d Statutes § 7 (2017).
Accordingly, we consider whether the'statute
at issue is remedial.

ty and its Progeny, 155 W. Va, L. Rev. 807, 837
(2012).

618

A remedial statute improves or facilitates
remedies already existing for the enforce-
ment or rights of redress of wrongs, as op-
posed to an enactment extinguishing a cause
of action or barring a party from prosecuting
a cause of action that affects substantive
rights and, therefore, is not remedial. 73 Am.
Jur. 2d Statutes § 7; see also Langston v.
Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 754 A2d 889, 395-96
(2000). West Virginia Code § 55-7E-1 ad-
dresses the procedure by which an award of
back pay or front pay is considered at trial
by eliminating the former “malice exception”
to a plaintiffs duty to mitigate wage dam-
ages, As the Iowa Supreme Court observed,
“fit has been held that a plaintiff has no
vested right in a particular measure of dam-
ages.” Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice
Petrides-Donohue & Assoc, 473 N.W.2d 612,
619 (Iowa 1991) (citations omitted), Several
other courts have agreed with this approach.
Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765
F.2d 736 (8 Cir, 1985) (applying statute
removing punitive damages as remedy to
case filed prior to statute’s enactment); Dar-
deen v. Heartland Manor, Inc., 186 Il.2d
291, 238 DLDec. 30, 710 N.H.2d 827, 831-32
(1999) (“Because no vested right is affected,
the application of the [amended statute abol-
ishing treble damages] to plaintiff's pending
suit is proper, irrespective of when the cause
of action accrued or the complaint was
filed.”); Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 288
Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488, 504 (1989) (“There is
no vested right to exemplary damages and
the legislature may, at its will, restrict or
deny the allowance of such damages”) (cita-
tion omitted); Vaughan v, Taft Broadcasting
Co, 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986) (“[U]n-
der Missouri law, punitive damages are re-
medial and a plaintiff has no vested right to
such damages prior to the entry of judg-
ment.”), Although these cases specifically ad-
dress punitive damages, which is the subject
of the second certified question, we find this
analysis equally applicable to front and back
pay damages.

I We find that West Virginia Code
§ 55-7H-3 is a remedial statute that does not
impact a vested right, Because it neither
diminishes substantive rights nor augments

5. A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-

substantive liabilities, it is not subject to a
retroactivity analysis under syllabus point 2
of Public Citizen. We note that retroactivity
ought to be judged with regard to the act or
event that the statute is meant to regulate.®
On that point, West Virginia Code § 55-7E-3
clearly regulates the award of back pay and
front pay at trial in an employment case. As
we have stated, “[elven absent specific legis-
lative authorization, application of new stat-
utes passed after the events in suit is un-
questionably proper in many situations.
When the intervening statute authorizes or
affects the propriety of prospective relief,
application of the new provision is not retro-
active... .” State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servic-
ing, LLC v. Webster, 232 W. Va, 841, 351, 752
S.E.2d 872, 382 (2018) (quoting Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 278-74, 114 S.Ct. 1488). It is
recognized that “{iJn general, statutes deal-
ing with a remedy apply to actions tried after
their passage even though the right or cause
of action arose prior thereto.” 3 Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 60:1 (7 ed. 2016).
We therefore hold that West Virginia Code
§ 55-7E-3, abrogating Syllabus Point 2 of
Mason County Board of Education v. State
Superintendent of Sch., 170 W.Va. 682, 295
§.E.2d 719 (1982) and its progeny is a reme-
dial statute that does not impact a vested or
substantive right, Accordingly, its provisions
are applicable irrespective of when the cause
of action accrued or when the claim or suit is
filed, thereby imposing an affirmative duty
on the part of the plaintiff to mitigate any
claim for past and/or future wages and re-
quiring an award, if any, of back pay and
front pay to be reduced by the amount of
interim earnings or the amount that may be
earned with reasonable diligence by the
plaintiff. Thus, we answer the first certified
question in the affirmative.

B. West Virginia Code § 55-7-29

We now turn to the second certified ques-
tion, which is whether West Virginia Code
§ 55-7-29 applies to a case that is based upon
a claim for unlawful discriminatory discharge
that occurred prior to June 8, 2015, and is set
for trial after that effective date of West
Virginia Code § 55-7E-8, West Virginia Code

pretation of Legal Texts § 41, p. 263 (2012).

§ 55-7-29 pertains to punitive damages and

states in relevant part as follows:
(a) An award of punitive damages may
only oceur in a civil action against a defen-
dant if a plaintiff establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that the damages suf-
fered were the result of the conduct that.
was carried out by the defendant with
actual malice toward the plaintiff or a con-
scious, reckless and outrageous indiffer-
ence to the health, safety and welfare of
others.
(b) Any civil action tried before a jury
involving punitive damages may, upon re-
quest of any defendant, be conducted in a
bifurcated trial in accordance with the fol-
lowing guidelines:

(1) In the first stage of a bifurcated trial,
the jury shall determine liability for com-
pensatory damages and the amount of
compensatory damages, if any.

(2) If the jury finds during the first
stage of a bifurcated trial that a defendant
is liable for compensatory damages, then
the court shall determine whether suffi-
cient evidence exists to proceed with a
consideration of punitive damages.

(8) If the court finds that sufficient evi-
dence exists to proceed with a consider-
ation of punitive damages, the same jury
shall determine if a defendant is liable for
punitive damages in the second stage of a
bifurcated trial and may award such dam-
ages. :

@) If the jury returns an award for
punitive damages that exceeds the
amounts allowed under subsection (¢) of
this section, the court shall reduce any
such award to comply with the limitations
set forth therein. .

(©) The amount of punitive damages that
may be awarded in a civil action may not
exceed the greater of four times the
amount of compensatory damages or
$500,000, whichever is greater.
W.Va. Code § 55-7-29 (2016). The effective
date of this statute was also June 8, 2015.
‘West Virginia Code § 55-7-29 is similar to
West Virginia Code § 55-7H-3 in that both
address the process for consideration of dam-

6. 2015 W.Va. Acts ch, 6.

619

ages at trial. The latter statute articulates
the evidentiary standard and procedure for
an award of punitive damages at trial and
imposes a cap on such awards. As explained
above, “[s]tatutes which do not create new
rights or take away vested ones are deemed
to be remedial and are not within the strict,
application of the rule of presumption against
retroactivity.” Mildred L.M., 192 W.Va. at
851 n.10, 452 S.E.2d at 445 n.10 (citation
omitted).

Hs in reliance on the same authorities
cited in our discussion of the first certified
question, we hold that West Virginia Code
§ 55-7-29 is a remedial statute that does not
impact a vested or substantive right. Accord-
ingly, its provisions are applicable irrespec-
tive of when the cause of action accrued or
when the claim or suit is filed. As such, West
Virginia Code § 55-7-29 is not subject to a
retroactivity analysis under syllabus point 2
of Public Citizen. As the Supreme Court of
the United States explained in Landgraf:

Even absent specific legislative authori-
zation, application of new statutes passed
after the events in suit is unquestionably
proper in many situations. When the inter-
vening statute authorizes or affects the
propriety of prospective relief, application
of the new provision is not retroactive.

Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 278, 114 S.Ct: 1483, A
plaintiff has no right, much less a vested
right, to an award of punitive damages prior
to trial. Thus, we answer the second certified
question in the affirmative.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having answered each of the two certified
questions in the affirmative, this matter is
dismissed from the docket of this Court,

Certified questions answered.
CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs

and reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.

620

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves
the right to file a dissenting opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN dissents and
resetves the right to file a dissenting opinion,

LOUGHRY, O.J., concurring, joined by
KETCHUM, d.:

The Legislature, in enacting West Virginia
Code § 55-7E-3, commendably sought to
eradicate West Virginia’s outlier status re-
garding unmitigated back and front pay in
employment claims and thereby eliminate an
unjustifiable windfall to plaintiffs. The duty
of an injured plaintiff to mitigate damages is
a long-standing and universally recognized
principle that Mason County Board of Edu-
cation v. State Superintendent of Schools,
170 W.Va. 632, 295 S.E.2d 719 (1982), obliter-
ated, thereby creating a blight on our state’s
wrongful discharge law. West Virginia Code
§ 55-7E-3 further recognizes the surrepti-
tious manner in which Mason County was
extended to allow not only unmitigated back
pay, but front pay as well. See Peters %,
Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160,
184, 680 S.E.2d 791 (2009) (applying Mason
County to:front pay award in absence of new
syllabus point). This statute laudably imposes
a legislative check on‘ the Court’s prior at-
tempts at “judicial legislation.” Properly ven-
erating the clarity of the statute and its
intended reach, the majority succinetly.con-
cludes that damages are not vested rights
and that the Legislature clearly intended the
statute to affect every. award of damages
from the effective date of the statute. There-
fore, I concur with the majority’s conclusion
that West Virginia Code § 55-7H-3 and West
Virginia Code § 55-7-29, which limits puni-
tive damages, are remedial statutes applica-
ble to causes of action that accrued and/or
were filed prior to the statute’s effective
date.

The Legislature left little doubt of its in-
tentions in enacting West Virginia Code
§ 55-7E-3. In its declaration of purpose, the
Legislature stated:

The citizens and employers of this state

are entitled to a legal system that provides

adequate and reasonable compensation to
those persons who have been subjected to
unlawful employment actions, a legal sys-

tem that is fair, predictable in its out-
comes, and a legal system that functions
within the mainstream of American juris-
prudence.... The. goal of compensation
remedies. in employment law cases is to
make the victim of unlawful workplace ac-
tions whole, including back pay; reinstate-
ment or some amount of front pay in lieu
of reinstatement; and under certain stat-
utes, attorney's fees for "the successful
plaintiff.

W.Va. Code § 55-7H-2(a)(2) and (8). Hower
er, the Legislature noted that “[iJn West
Virginia, the amount of damages recently
awarded in-statutory and common law em-
ployment cases have been inconsistent with
established federal law and the law of sur-
rounding states. This lack of uniformity in
the law puts our state and its businesses at a
competitive disadvantage.” Id. at § 55-7E-
2(a)(4). Accordingly, it enacted this statute
with the precise objective to eliminate unmit-
igated front and back pay, and expressly
indicated by the absence of any provision to
the contrary, that this injustice would be
abolished concurrent with the effective date
of the statute.

Front pay has been aptly described as
requiring “a sensitivity to the competing in-
terests of the employee, on the one hand, in
being made whole and the employer, on the
other hand; in being spared the duty to sub-
sidize a prospective windfall.” Quinlan v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 835, 41
A.8d 789, 749 (2012). Observing that the duty
to mitigate damages in wrongful discharge
cases is “rooted in an ancient principle of
law,” the United States Supreme Court has
held that federally-based employment claims
“require[] the claimant to use reasonable
diligence in finding other suitable employ-
ment, Although the unemployed or underem-
ployed claimant need not go into another line
of work, accept a demotion, or take a de-
meaning position, he forfeits .his right to
backpay if he refuses a job substantially
equivalent to the one he was denied.” Ford
Motor Co. v, E.H.0.C., 458 U.S. 219, 281-82,
102 S.Ct, 8057, 78 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). The
rationale underlying the duty to mitigate is
obvious; “Since only actual losses should be
made good, it seems fair that deductions

should be made not only for actual earnings
by the worker but also for losses which he
willfully incurred.” Phelps. Dodge Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 818 U.S. 177,198, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85
L.Ed. 1271 (1941), Accordingly, the legisla-
tive foreclosure of unmitigated front and
back pay. returns West Virginia to the main-
stream of jurisprudence on such awards and
equitably prohibits employer subsidy of “pro-
spective windfall[s].” Quinlan, 41 A.8d at
749,

The equity of West Virginia Code § 55-7E-
3 notwithstanding, it is clear that the majori-
ty’s conclusion that the statute applies to
damages awards rendered for actions accru-
ing and/or filed before the statute’s enact-
ment is likewise sound. “{Plrocedural and
remedial laws generally do not affect vested
rights, which are property rights that the
Constitution protects like any other property.
Such procedural and remedial laws that do
not affect vested rights should be enforced as
they exist at the time judgment is rendered.”
City of Austin v. Whittington, 884 S.W.8d
766, 790 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted); see
also 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 498
(“Unless the remedy is one that is expressly
protected by ‘a constitutional provision, there
is no vested right to a particular remedy, and
existing remedies may be’ changed or abol-
ished provided a substantial remedy re-
mains.”).

With respect specifically to statutes affect-
ing remedies that are enacted while matters
are pending, “[i]t is well established that a
plaintiff has no vested property right in a
particular measure of damages, and that the
Legislature possesses broad authority to
modify the scope and nature of.such dam-
ages.” Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Cmty.
Hosp., 86 Cal.8d 859, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 688
P.2d 670, 676 (1984); see also 16A O.J.S,
Constitutional Law § 499 (“A, statute which
relates merely to matters of remedy may be
made applicable to pending proceedings at
any time before the final judgment of the
court becomes effective.”)..- Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit has observed, “[p}rocedural
statutes that affect remedies are generally
applicable to cases pending at the time of
enactment.” Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702, 706

621

(4th Cir, 1974), As the United States Su-
preme Court long-ago explained,

[clonsidering the Act ... as providing a

remedy only, it is entirely unexceptionable,

It has been repeatedly decided in this

court that the retrospective operation of

such a law forms no objection to it, Almost
_ every law, providing a new remedy, affects

-and operates upon causes of action existing

at the time the law is passed.

Sampeyreac v. United States, 32 US. 7 Pet.
222, 289, 8 L.Ed, 665 1883.

Furthermore, the notion that particular
categories of damages are not “vested rights”
is well-recognized. The defining characteris-
tics of a “vested right” has been explained as
follows: “[A] right has not vested until it is so
perfected, complete, and unconditional that it
may be equated with a property interest.”
White v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 295 Il.
App.8d 296, 280 Ill.Dec. 197, 692 N.H.2d
1363, 1866 (1998), As the White court further
explained:

Because not all ‘expectations are vested
* rights, a ‘thew law is not retroactive “just

because it relates to antecedent events, or

because it draws upon antecedent facts for
its operation.” United States Steel Credit

Union v. Knight, 82 Tl.2d 188, 142, 204

N.E.2d 4 (1965).... [T]his is especially

true of statutes that leave substantive

rights.in place and change only the proce-
dures and remedies used to enforce those
rights, Most directly pertinent here, the
ease law leaves no doubt that, prior to
+ judgment, a plaintiff has no.vested right to
a statutory penalty such as [] punitive
damages[.]
230 IlDee, 197, 692 N-E.2d at 1866; see
Weingrad v, Miles, 29 So.8d 406, 416 (Fla,
Dist, Ct, App. 2010) (finding plaintiff “had no
vested right to a particular damage award”),

The foregoing technical analysis notwith-
standing, a plain reading of the statutes at
issue demonstrates their applicability and op-
eration, The applicability of the statutes was
made clear in the Legislature’s precise use of
the term “award”: “Any award of back pay
or front pay by a commission, court or jury
shall.be reduced by the amount of interim
earnings or the amount. earnable with rea-
sonable diligence by the plaintiff.” W.Va.

622

Code § 55-7E-3(a) (emphasis added); “An
award of punitive damages may only occur

..” W.Va, Code 55-7-29(a) (emphasis add-
ed); “The amount of punitive damages that
may be awarded in a civil action ...” W.Va.
Code 55-7-29(e) (emphasis added), Clearly,
the Legislature contemplated application of
the statutes to any “award” of such damages,
a defined event that occurs only at trial.
Even without the necessity of the “vested
right” analysis, the statutes’ plain language
demonstrates that, as of its effective date,
any award of back pay or front pay must be
reduced in accordance therewith and punitive
damages may only be awarded in compliance
with West Virginia Code § 55-7-29. “A statu-
tory provision which is clear and unambigu-
ous and plainly expresses the legislative in-
tent will not be interpreted by the courts but
will be given full force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 2,
State v. Epperly, 185 W.Va. 877, 65 S.H.2d
488 (1951). That is to say, “[w]here the lan-
guage of a statutory provision is plain, its
terms should be applied as written and not
construed.” DeVane v. Kennedy, 205 W.Va,
519, 529, 519 S.E.2d 622, 682 (1999).

The Legislature’s message is clear: unmiti-
gated front pay and back pay are no longer
permitted in West Virginia as of the effective
date of the statute. Likewise, limitless puni-
tive damages are no longer available. The
Legislature could use no plainer language to
convey to the public, litigants, and the courts
that West Virginia’s outlier status with re-
gard to unrestrained damages awards is not
only inequitable and legally imprudent, but
harmful to the state and, therefore, its citi-
zens; and that it intends to foreclose such
awards immediately. Accordingly, I respect
fully concur.

Davis, Justice, dissenting, joined by Jt ‘astice
Workman:

I respectfully dissent to the majority opin-
ion in this case because it-is shamefully in-

1, Interestingly, a procedural or remedial statute
is often found to be retroactive because it relates
to certain issues. For instance, the United States
Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
S11 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Bd.2d 229
(1994), explained that “[rletroactive legislative
provisions ‘may serve legitimate purposes, such
as responding to emergencies; correcting mis-

consistent with the established precedent of
this State. In order to reach a very result-
oriented decision, the majority distorts the
paradigm of analysis engaged in by this
Court for decades regarding the retroactivity
of statutes,

The approach to be utilized in determina-
tions of retroactive or prospective statutory
application is very clear. The analysis begins
with the presumption that a statute operates
only prospectively unless the legislative in-
tent for retroactive application is clearly stat-
ed. Syl. pt. 3, Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 165 W. Va. 305, 270 S.H.2d 178
(1980). Exceptions exist where the matters
addressed are procedural or remedial; even
those eaceptions, however, do not apply
where the alterations attach a new legal con-
sequence to a completed event. See Public
Citizen, Inc. v. First Natl Bank in Fair-
mont, 198 W. Va. 329, 835, 480 S.E.2d 588,
544 (1996) (emphasis added). The majority’s
opinion is a classic example of the exception
swallowing the rule.

As this Court explained in Public Citizen,
the pertinent inquiry is whether the statuto-
ry alteration “diminishes substantive rights
or augments substantive liabilities...” Id.
at 331, 480 S.E.2d at 540. If it does, it is
substantive and not retroactive. Even if it is
considered procedural or remedial, as the
majority believes the two alterations in this
case are, the alteration still is not retroactive
in all instances. This Court previously has
warned that “even here the procedural/sub-
stantive distinction is not talismanic.” Id. at
835, 480 S.E.2d at 544.

The test of the interpretive principle laid

down by'the United States Supreme Court

in Landgraf is unitary. Tt is whether the

[sic] “the new provision attaches new legal

consequences to events completed before its

enactment.” If a new procedural or reme-
dial provision would, if applied in a pend-
ing case, attach a new legal consequence to

takes, preventing against the circumvention of a
new statute during the time after it is proposed
but before it is enacted, and serving to advance
health, welfare, or safety.” Id. at 267-68, 114
S.Ct. at 1498, 128 L.Ed.2d 229. These types of
considerations are quite obviously not present in
the case sub judice, *

a completed event, then it will not be ap-
plied in that case unless the Legislature
has made clear its intention that it shall
apply.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 611 U.S. 244,114 S.Ct. 1488,
128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994),

In Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548
U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323
(2006), the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the “sequence of analysis” in de-
termining retroactivity, as follows:

[Wle ask whether applying the statute to

the person objecting would have a retroac-

tive consequence in the disfavored sense of

“affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or

duties [on the basis of] conduct arising

before [its] enactment,” Landgraf, supra,
at 278, 114 S.Ct. 1488.... If the answer is
yes, we then apply the presumption
against retroactivity by construing the
statute as inapplicable to the event or act

in question owing to the “absen[ce of] a

clear indication from Congress that it in-

tended such a result.”

548 U.S. at 87, 126 S.Ct. at 2428, 165 L.Bd.2d
828 (emphasis added and citations omitted)?

The statutory alterations at issue in the
present case undeniably attach new legal
consequences to events already accom-
plished. Specifically, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of West
Virginia asks this Court to determine wheth-
er two recently enacted statutes, which limit-
ed the amount of damages the plaintiff would

2. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 283, 114 S.Ct. at
1507, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (holding that Civil Rights
‘Act of 1991 could not be retroactively applied
because its punitive damages provision estab-
lished new right to monetary relief), See also U.S.
Fid. & Guar, Co, v. United States, 209 U.S. 306,
314, 28 S.Ct. 537, 539, 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908)
(“There are certain principles which have been
adhered to with great strictness by the courts in
relation to the construction of statutes as to
whether they are or are not retroactive in their
effect. The presumption is very strong that a
statute was not meant to act retrospectively, and
it ought never to receive such a construction if it
is susceptible of any other. It ought not to receive
such a construction unless the words used are so
clear, strong, and imperative that no other mean-
ing can be annexed to them, or unless the inten-
tion of the legislature cannot be otherwise satis-
fied.”

623

be entitled to receive, can be applied retroac-
tively. The facts show that the plaintiff's
cause of action for wrongful termination ac-
erued on September 13, 2013, the date of his
discharge. In 2015, the West Virginia Legis-
lature enacted two statutes that limited dam-
ages in civil litigation. The first statute, W.
Va. Code § 55-7E-3, reduced the amount of
front-pay and back-pay a fired employee
could receive for failure to mitigate damages,
even if he or she proved the employer had
acted with malice. The second statute, W. Va.
Code § 55-7-29, placed a cap on the amount
of punitive damages a plaintiff may receive.
Because both statutes were enacted after the
plaintiff's cause of action accrued, the Dis-
trict Court asked this Court to decide wheth-
er the statutes could be applied to the plain-
tiff. I strongly disagree with the majority’s
opinion that the statutes are procedural and
remedial and can be applied retroactively.

Over one hundred years ago, this Court
held the following in Syllabus point 3 of
Rogers v. Lynch, 44 W. Va. 94, 29 8.E. 507
(1897):

No statute, however positive, is to be
construed as designed to interfere with
existing contracts, rights of action, or suits,
and especially vested rights, unless the
intention that it shall so operate is express-
ly declared; and the courts will apply new
statutes only to future cases unless there is
something in the very nature of the case or
in the language of the new revision which
shows that they were intended to have a
retroactive operation.

3, Because both statutes limit damages, I will not
make a distinction between them in this discus-
sion. However, it is obvious that the new statute
regarding mitigation of damages creates and im-
poses upon the plaintiff a distinctly different duty
than that which existed at the time of his termi-
nation, thus altering the legal consequence of the
his actions immediately following his termi-
nation. Likewise, the placement of a new cap on
punitive damages alters the rights the plaintiff
had as of the time of the alleged wrongful act.
See, eg., Heffelfinger v. Connolly, No. 3:06-CV-
2823, 2009 WL 112792, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15,
2009) (“Ohio courts construing earlier damage
cap statutes have similarly concluded that the
date plaintiff's cause of action accrued ... is the
relevant date for determining whether a new
damages regime applies.”).

624

See Syl. pt. 8, Shanholiz, 165 W.Va, at 305,
270 S.E.2d at 179 (“A statute is presumed to
operate prospectively unless the intent that it
shall operate retroactively is clearly ex-
pressed by its terms or is necessarily implied
from the language of the statute,”). See also
Syl. pt. 5, Arnold v. Turek, 185 W. Va. 400,
407 S.H.2d 706 (1991) (“Statutory changes in
the manner and method of distributing the
proceeds of a judgment or settlement for
wrongful death will not be given retroactive
effect, and the statute in effect on the date of
the decedent’s death will control.”).* Until the’
majority’s opinion in this case, our law has
been crystal clear that a statute ‘operates
prospectively absent a clear legislative intent
tothe contrary. There is absolutely no lan-
guage in either W. Va, Code § 55-7E-8 or W.:
Va. Code § 55-7-29 that évidences a legisla-
tive intent that either statute should apply
retroactively. The majority’s opinion has tor-
tured time-honored legal principles in order
to reach a result that, as I will show, the
overwhelming majority of the courts in the
country have resolutely rejected. .

‘It has been recognized that “most courts
that have considered the issue disallowed.
retroactive application ofa statutory dam-
ages cap.” Prince George’s Cty. v. Longtin,
419 Md. 450, 487, 19 A8d 859, 881 (2011).5
See Miles v. Weingrad, 164 So.8d 1208, 1218
(Fla. 2015) (determining that statutory cap
on damages could not be applied retroactive-
ly as “precedent from this Court ‘has refused
to apply the statute retroactively if it impairs

4, This Court has applied these principles in a
variety of contexts. In Beard v, Lim, 185 W.Va.
749, 408 S.E.2d 772 (1991), for instance, this
Court addressed the issue of alterations to a
statute regarding prejudgment interest as applied
to special damages and observed that changes in
the statutory scheme could not be retroactively
applied, Jd, at 753 0.7, 408 S.B.2d at 776 n.7.

5. The court in Prince George’s County also noted:

It is patent that the enormous loss to ... [the
- plaintiff]. from application of the statutory cap
would ‘impair’ his cause of action. According-
ly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals
that ... [the plaintiff] had a vested right in
bringing his cause of action—with no, statutory
cap on damages—prior to the enactment of the
.» [Local Government Tort Claims Act] revi-
sions. Although the’ legislature may, in its wis-
dom, limit tort damages prospectively, sce, e.g.,
Murphy v. Bdmonds [,] 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d

vested rights, creates new obligations or im-
poses new penalties,’” (citation omitted)); So-'
corro v, New Orleans, 579 So.2d 981 (La.
1991) (same); United States v. Searle, 322
Ma. 1, 6, 584 A.2d 1263, 1265 (1991) (same);
Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med, Ctr., 811 8.W.8d
7152, 760 (Mo. 2010) (same); Estate of Bell v.
Shelby Cty, Health Care Corp., 318 S.W.8d
823, 888 (Tenn. 2010) (sate); Neiman v. Am.
Nat'l Prop, & Cas, Co,, 286 Wis, 2d 411, 422,
428, 618 N.W.2d 160, 164-65, 167 (2000)
(Strong common-law tradition defines the
legislature’s primary function as declaring
law to regulate future behavior. Thus, as a
matter of justice, no law should be enforced
before people can learn of its existence and
conduct themselves accordingly. In short,
retroactivity disturbs the stability of past
transactions.” (citations omitted)); Martin
by Scoptur v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 212,
581 N.W.2d 70, 98 (1995) (same); Berghauer
ew vel, Estate of Berghauer v. Heyl, 249 Wis.

2d 488, 639 N.W.2d 228 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)
(game); Bramble v. Virgin Island Port Auth.,

No. ST-06-CV-678, 2015 WL 1744241, at *6
(V.I. Super, Apr, 10, 2015) (same). See also
Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 682 So.2d
1852, 1858 (Fla, 1994) (same); Hwee. Builders,
Ine. v. Trisler, 741 N.E.2d 851, 361 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (same); Murphy Homes, Inc. v.
Muller, 337 Mont. 411, 429, 162 P.38d 106, 120
(2007). (same); Seltzer v. Morton, 336° Mont.
225, 270, 154 P.8d 561, 595 (2007) (same);
Blair v. McDonagh, 177 Ohio App. 8d 262,
282, 894 N.E.2d 877, 391 (2008) (same).° The

102 (1992) (upholding statutory cap on non-
economic tort damages which applied prospec-
tively), the constitution protects against retro-
active application of these limitations.

419 Md. at 489-90, 19 A.3d at 883,

6. Compare Carswell v. Oklahoma State Univ., 62
P.3d 786, 789 (Okla. Civ, App. 2003) (holding
statute that increaséd the amount of. recovery
effected a substantive change in the law and
operates prospectively); Greenvall v. Maine Mut.
Fire Ins, Co., 788 A.2d 165, 167 (Me. 2001)
(same); Schultz v. Natwick, 249 Wis. 2d 317, 328,
638 N.W.2d 319, 325 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)
(same); and Greenwald v. Sugarloaf Residential
Prop. Owners Ass'n, Tne., No, A17A0420, 341
Ga.App. 451, 454, 800 S.E.2d 621, 623-24, 2017
WEL 2243130, at "3 (Ga. Ct. App. May 23, 2017)
(statute permitting award of attorney's fees and
expenses could not be applied to case filed before
effective date of statute).

reason for this is that “[alpplication of a
damages cap deprives a person of compensa-
tion, just as abrogating a cause of action
does.” Prince George’s Cty., 419 Md. at 487,
19 A.8d at 881.

Although the majority’s opinion, at its best,
crudely tries to argue that a law limiting
damages is procedural and remedial, this ar-
guinent is hollow and woefully wiconvineing.
It was observed in Estate of Bell that “for
more than three decades Tennessee’s appel-
late courts have consistently ruled that a
change. to the law that alters the amount of
damages constitutes a substantive, as op-
posed to a procedural or remedial, change.”
818 S.W.8d at 829-30, A statute altering the
amount of damages “is clearly substantive as
opposed to merely procedural because it has
the effect of changing the law regarding the
amount of damages recoverable in personal
injury lawsuits. The very substance of the
claim for damages, the amount thereof, is
affected by the legislation.” Socorro, 579
So.2d at 944, In Klotz, the court articulated
an “underlying repugnance” to a retroactive
application of laws and held, that a court
“cannot change the substantive law for a
category of damages after a cause of action
has aéerued[.]” Klotz, 311 S.W.8d at 760.

To be clear, “[uJnder the great weight of
authority, the measure and elements of dam-
ages are matters pertaining to the substance
of the right and not to the remedy.” Thomas
v. Cumberland Operating Co., 569 P.2d 974,
977 (Okla. 1977). Thus, “[s]tatutes and
amendments imposing, removing or changing
a monetary limitation on recovery for per'sohn-
al injuries-or death are generally held to be
prospective only.” Thomas, 569 P.2d at 976,
For example, in Seltzer, the plaintiff brought
an action against the defendants for mali-
cious prosecution and abuse of process. 386
Mont. at 228, 154 P.8d at 569-70. A jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
that included punitive damages. Id. at 267,
154 P.8d at 593. On appeal, the defendants
argued that the punitive damages should
have been reduced based upon a recently
enacted cap on such damages. The appellate
court disagreed, ruling as follows:

In Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation

District, 196 Mont. 167, 639 P.2d 62,

625

(1981), ... the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 compen-
satory damages and $40,000 punitive dam-
ages against each of the three defendants.
On appeal, this Court considered whether
a statute prohibiting punitive damages
awards against government entities was
applicable to a cause of action that arose
before the statute was enacted.... In re-
solving the appeal, this Court observed
that the plaintiffs’ cause of, action arose in
1974, while § .2-9-105, MCA, was not enact-
ed until 1977. Even though § 2-9-105,
MCA, was in effect when the jury ren-
dered its verdict in 1980, this Court held
that the statute was not applicable to the
case because it was enacted after the plain-
tiffs’ cause of action arose,

the punitive damages awards, the District

Court relied on Dvorak in concluding that.

except as otherwise expressly provided by

the Legislature, a new law limiting recov-
ery of punitive damages does not apply to
punitive damages awarded on a claim that
acerued prior to the effective date of the
statute, Thus, observing that Seltzer's tort
_ claims accrued prior to, the, effective date
of [the statute], the District Court deter-
mined that the statutory cap does not re-
quire a reduction of the jury's punitive
damages awards against the Defendants,

We agree, .
Selizer, 336 Mont. at 268-70, 154 P.8d at 594-
95 (internal quotations omitted),

Additionally, in Alamo Rent-A-Car, the
plaintiff filed an action for malicious prosecu-
tion against the defendant.-632 So,2d at 1854.
A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
One of the issues raised on appeal was
whether a statutory amendment that capped
punitive damages applied retroactively. to the
plaintiff's cause of action, The Florida Su-
preme Court held that it did not for the
following reasons:

The amendment became effective October

1, 1987. The instant cause of action arose

during September 1986, which was ...

before the effective date of the amend-

ment. This action was filed on October 2,

1987, one day after the effective date of the

626

amendment. To determine whether the

amendment applies to the instant cause of

action, we must examine whether the
amendment is one of substantive or proce-
dural law.

A substantive statute is presumed to
operate prospectively rather than retro-
spectively unless the Legislature clearly
expresses its intent that the statute is to
operate retrospectively. This is especially
true when retrospective operation of a law
would impair or destroy existing rights.
Procedural or remedial statutes, on the
other hand, are to be applied retrospec-
tively and are to be applied to pending
cases.

[Slubstantive law prescribes duties
and rights and procedural law concerns the
means and methods to apply and enforce
those duties and rights. Following this ra-
tionale, we find section 768.78(1)(a) to be a
substantive rather than procedural statute.
Punitive damages are assessed not as com-
pensation to an injured party but as pun-
ishment against the wrongdoer. Conse-
quently, a plaintiffs right to a claim for
punitive damages is subject to the plenary
authority of the legislature. The establish-
ment or elimination of such a claim is
clearly a substanitive, rather than proce-
dural, decision of the legislature because
such a decision does, in fact, grant or
eliminate a right or entitlement. Because
we find that section 768,73(1)(a) is substan-
tive rather than procedural, we find that
the amendment to section 768.73(1)(a) does
not apply to the instant cause of action.
This is true even though Maneusi’s cause
of action was filed after the effective date
of the amendment.

Alamo, 632 So.2d at 1858 (internal citations
omitted).

Finally, in Martin by Scoptur, a child and
her parents brought a medical malpractice
claim for treatment the child received after
she suffered injuries from riding her bicycle
into the back of a truck. 192 Wis. 2d at 162-
68, 581 N.W.2d at 78, At the time of the
injury, there was no limit on the amount of
noneconomic damages a plaintiff could recov-
er in a medical malpractice action. Almost a
year after the malpractice occurred, the leg-

islature enacted a cap on such damages of
$1,000,000. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a
medical malpractice action, and a jury award-
ed the plaintiffs $2,150,000 in noneconomic
damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that applying the cap to the plain-
tiffs’ verdict would have changed what they
would have recovered under the law that
existed at the time of the accident. In finding
the cap could not apply retroactively, the
Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
Since the cause of action accrued at a time
when no cap existed on the amount of
noneconomic damages recoverable, applica-
tion of the cap to the Martins’ cause of
action constitutes a retroactive application.
If we allowed the cap, it would act here to
limit the recovery of a cause of action
which, when it accrued, was unlimited.

To deprive the Martins and litigants like
them of their recovery in the ephemeral
hope that this retroactive application will
further the few purposes cited for the ret-
roactive application of the cap, violates the
most fundamental notions of fairness and
strikes at the heart of due process.
Accordingly, we hold that retroactive ap-
plication of the cap on noneconomie dam-
ages ... would be unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause of the United
States and Wisconsin Constitutions.
Id, at 199 & 212, 581 N.W.2d at 88 & 93,

In the final analysis, “legislation which in-
volves mere procedural or evidentiary
changes may operate retrospectively; howev-
er, legislation which affects substantive
rights may only operate prospectively.”
Fowler Props, Inc. v. Dowland, 282 Ga. 76,
78, 646 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2007). This basic
principle of fairness has been unjustifiably
gutted by the majority’s unbalanced, severely
skewed, and result-driven scales of justice.

In view of the foregoing, I dissent. I am
authorized to state that Justice Workman
joins me in'this dissenting opinion.

804 S.E.2d 877
STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent.

v.

Michael L. BLICKENSTAFF, Defendant.
Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0666
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 6, 2017
i September 18, 2017

F
a

Es
Po
| ;

Dana F. Eddy, Esq., Director Public De-
fender Services, Scott B. Johnson, Esq., Pub-
lic Defender Services, Appellate Advocacy
Division, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

“Robert L, Hogan, Esq., Deputy Attorney
General, Charleston, West Virginia

Brandon C., H. Sims, Esq., Assistant Pros-
ecutor, Jefferson County Prosecuting Attor-
ney, Charles Town, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Respondent

Justice Ketchum:

The Defendant, Michael Blickenstaff, was
indicted for kidnapping his ex-girlfriend, Ni-
cole M., after he allegedly drove her around
for five hours at knifepoint. Nicole M. did not
physically resist the kidnapping.

The State argued at trial that Nicole M.
did not physically resist because she feared
Mr. Blickenstaff after he subjected her to
domestic violence during’ their previous rela-
tionship. It presented expert witness testimo-
ny that domestic violence victims are often
more compliant with their’ abusers ‘out of
fear. ‘The State also introduced into evidence
Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous conviction for sec-
ond-degree domestic assault against Nicole
M. At the end of his trial, Mr, Blickenstaff
was convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to
life without parole,

Mr. Blickenstaff argues that the trial court.
abused its discretion in the following two

ways: (1) it allowed the State’s expert wit-
ness to offer improper testimony; and (2) it
caused undue prejudice to, his defense -by
admitting his previous conviction into evi-
dence. We find that Mr. Blickenstaff failed to
timely and specifically object to the expert
witness’s testimony, and therefore, he waived
this issue for appellate review. In addition,
we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit
court’s admission of his previous conviction.
Therefore, we affirm Mr. Blickenstaff's con-
viction. and sentencing.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On the morning of August 25, 2014, Nicole
M. was driving hér four-year-old daughter,
EM.) to dayeare in their hometown of
Smithburg, Maryland. Mr. Blickenstaff, who
‘was in town to visit E.M. (also his daughter),
rode in the car’s front-passenger seat, The
car needed gas, and Nicole M. pulled into the
gas station where the alleged ‘Kidnapping be-
gan,

Nicole M, testified that after’ the car
stopped, Mr. Blickenstaff flashed his knife at
her. He said, “not to do anything stupid, that
it was going to be the worst day of [her] life,
to get into the passenger seat, and’ he was
taking over from here.” Nicole M. did what
Mr. Blickenstaff told her to do without put-
ting up any physical resistance or calling for
help. E.M, was still-in the car.

Mr. Blickenstaff’ drove Nicole M. and E.M.
around Maryland, West Virginia, and Virgi-
nia for five hours. When they crossed into
West Virginia, Mr. Blickenstaff threw Nicole
Ms cell phone out the car window and
threatened to stab her. He also told her he
was going to carve his initials into her fore-
head, and when she tearfully stated that she
did not care what kind of lettering he used,
he responded: “I like it that you left it to the
artist,” Fortunately, Mr. Blickenstaff did not
carve his initials into Nicole M.’s forehead.
However, before leaving West Virginia, he
1, Because E.M. is a child, we follow our practice

under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure

40(e) and use her initials to refer to her, Because
Nicole M. and E.M. have the same last name, we

629

punched her in the mouth so forcefully that
her tooth broke through her upper lip, and
he cut her throat with his knife, leaving
visible marks. Finally, they left West Virgi-
nia for Maryland. He did not physically harm
E.M., who was in the car during this time.

Mr. Blickenstaff, Nicole M., and E.M. ar-
rived at Nicole M,’s apartment that after-
noon, Nicole M, reported her kidnapping the
following day when her boss, who saw the
bruises from Mr. Blickenstaff's punch and
the knife-mark on her throat, persuaded her
to do so, By the time Nicole M. reported her
kidnapping, Mr. Blickenstaff had absconded
from her apartment with E.M. The authori-
ties conducted a search and found E.M, with
Mr. Blickenstaff at a Pennsylvania motel.
The authorities immediately returned her to
Nicole M.

Mr, Blickenstaff was tried and convicted in
Maryland on one count of false imprison-
ment, and in West Virginia, he stood trial on
one count of kidnapping. In his kidnapping
trial, the State addressed Nicole M.’s failure
to physically resist by presenting expert tes-
timony from Katherine Spriggs, a program
manager from Shenandoah Women’s Center
who works full-time with domestic violence
victims. Ms. Spriggs testified ‘that victims of
domestic violence are’ often more compliant
with their abusers out of fear, not-consent.
The State also introduced into evidence Mr,
Blickenstaff’s ‘previous conviction for second-
degree domestic assault against Nicole M.

Before his trial, Mr. Blickenstaff filed a
motion to exclude Ms. Spriggs’s testimony.
He claimed that her testimony as a whole
would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial,
but he provided no explanation as to why. In
a separate motion, he also objected to the
introduction of his previous .conviction into
evidence. After a pretrial hearing on his mo-
tions, the trial.court overruled Mr. Blicken-
staffs objections, Mr. Blickenstaff did not
object: to Ms. Spriggs’s testimony at trial.

At the end of his trial, Mr, Blickenstaff
was convicted on his kidnapping charge and

refer to Nicole M. by her last-name initial. State
v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 645 n.1,
398 S.E.2d 123, 127 n.1 (1990). ~

630

sentenced to life without parole. He now
appeals his’ conviction and sentencing.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hl We are asked to determine whether
the trial court erred in the following two
ways: (1) permitting an expert witness to
offer improper testimony; and’ (2) admitting
Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous conviction into ev-
idence, thereby causing undue prejudice to
his defense. The standard of review for both
assigned errors is abuse of discretion. As to
. the expert witness’s testimony, we have pro-
vided: “The decision to admit or reject expert
evidence is committed to the sound discretion
of a trial court, and the court’s determina-
tions are reviewable only for abuse of discre-
tion.” ? Likewise, “we review for an abuse of
diseretion the trial court’s conclusion thatthe
‘other acts’ evidence is more probative than
prejudicial under [West Virginia Rule of Wwe
dence] 403.”

In.

ANALYSIS
-. My. Blickenstaff argues that his conviction
‘and sentencing should be reversed for the
following two reasons: (1) the trial court per-
mitted Katherine Spriggs, an expert witness
for the State, to offer improper testimony;
and (2) it unduly prejudiced his defense by
admitting his previous conviction into evi-
dence, Because Mr, Blickenstaff did not raise
a timely and specific objection to Ms.
Spriggs’s testimony, we find that he waived
this issue for appellate review. Furthermore,
we find no abuse of discretion in the admis-
sion of his previous conviction. Therefore, we
affirm Mr. Blickenstaff’s conviction and sen-
tencing.
A, Expert Witness Testimony

Mr. Blickenstaff’s first argument pertains
to the State’s expert witness, Ms. Spriggs,
who testified that victims of domestic vio-

2. State v. LaRock 196 W.Va. 294, 306, 470 S.E.2d
613, 625 (1996).

3. LaRock, 196 W.Va. at 310-11, 470 S.B.2d at
629-30.

lence, such as Nicole M., are often more
compliant with their abusers out of fear, not
consent. On appeal, he complains that: (a)
she briefly discussed the lethality index—
that is, a set of factors used by law enforce-
ment to determine whether a relationship
may end in the abuser killing his/her victim;
and (b) she bolstered Nicole M.’s credibility,

By contrast, the State argues that Mr.
Blickenstaff failed to raise a timely and spe-
cifie objection in the trial court to Ms.
Spriggs’s testimony, and therefore, he
waived his assigned errors regarding her
testimony for appellate review. As we have
noted; “Our cases consistently have demon-
strated that, in general, the law ministers to
the vigilant, not to those who sleep on their
rights.... When a litigant deems himself or
herself aggrieved ... he or she ordinarily
must object then and there or forfeit any
right to complain at a later time.” 4

Mr. Blickenstaff did not object to Ms.
Spriggs’s testimony during his trial. Howev-
er, before trial, he filed a motion to exclude
her testimony as a whole on the grounds of
relevancy and undue prejudice. He provided
no explanation as to why her testimony
would be irrelevant or unduly prejudicial. In
addition, after his trial, Mr. Blickenstaff filed
a motion for a new trial and a separate
motion for a judgment of acquittal partly
based on Ms. Spriggs’s alleged bolstering of
Nicole M.’s credibility. His postirial motions
did not mention Ms. Spriggs’s brief diseus-
sion on the lethality index.

HI Under West Virginia Rule of Evi-
dence 103(a): “A party may claim error in a
ruling to admit ... evidence only if ... (1)

. a party, on the record: (A) timely objects
or moves to strike; and (B) states the specific
ground, unless it was apparent from the
context.” > Likewise, we have held: “An ob-

“jection to a circuit court ruling that admits

evidence must be timely made and must
state the specific ground of the objection, if
the specifie ground is not apparent from the

4, LaRock, 196 W.Va, at 316, 470 S.B.2d at 635,

5. Emphasis added,

context.” ° This rule is in place so that trial
courts have a fair opportunity to address
legal errors before or as they arise, thereby
obviating the need for an appeal.” Of course,
this objective is more achievable when the
aggrieved party provides the trial court with
timely and full disclosure of the reason(s) he
or she is objecting.®

HH Generally, objections are waived if
they are raised too late for the trial court to
address the alleged error, which is why we
held that: “Failure to make timely and prop-
er objection to remarks of counsel made in
the presence of the jury, during the trial of a
case, constitutes a waiver of the right to raise
the question thereafter either in the trial
court or in the appellate court.” ° In the same
vein, as to specificity, we have held: “To
preserve an issue for appellate review, a
party must articulate it with such sufficient
distinctiveness to alert a circuit court to the
nature of the claimed defect.” Indeed: “Tri-
al courts should not have to guess the nature
of claimed defects.... [and] this Court
should not have to examine with a fine tooth
comb the lines of trial transcripts to discern
the true meaning of objections made at tri-
al.” Bee

HI With these principles in mind, we
first address Mr. Blickenstaff’s pretrial mo-
tion to exclude Ms, Spriggs’s testimony. He
claimed in this motion that Ms. Spriggs’s
testimony, as a whole, would be irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial, but he provided no
explanation as to why, At a hearing on his
motion, he merely stated that: “[Ms. Spriggs

6. Syl. Pt. 3, Perrine v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 225 W.Va. 482, 694 S.E.2d 815 (2010) (em-
phasis added).

7. Louis J. Palmer, Robin J. Davis, & Franklin D,
Cleckley, 1 Handbook on EVIDENCE for West
Virginia Lawyers § 103.0[2][h] at 65(6th ed.
2015) (‘The rationale behind Rule 103 is to re-
quire full disclosure of the reasons why ... an
objection is being pressed in the trial court, so
that the trial judge is given a fair chance at an
informed ruling and the opponent has a mean-
ingful opportunity to obviate any legal impedi-
ment raised to the matters they present.”),

8, Id.

9, Syl. Pt. 6, Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va, 299, 36
S.E.2d 410 (1945) (emphasis added),

631

has] never spoken to either the Defendant or
the victim. She’s just going to speak in gen-
eralities. She has no idea of what—she’s a
fact witness, She has nothing factual to add
of value.” Unsurprisingly then, the trial
court’s pretrial ruling on Mr. Blickenstaff's
motion addressed the broad grounds he
raised in his motion, not the specifie grounds
he now raises before this Court (her discus-
sion on the lethality index and alleged bol-
stering of Nicole Ms credibility). In addi-
tion, Mr. Blickenstaff raised no objection to
Ms. Spriggs’s testimony at trial,

On this record, we find that Mr. Blicken-
staffs pretrial motion did not alert the trial
court to the specific nature of his claimed
defect, which did not afford the trial court a
fair opportunity to address his claimed legal
errors. Therefore, it did not meet Rule 103’s
specificity requirement.

Hl Next, we examine Mr. Blickenstaff’s
contention that it was error to allow Ms.
Spriggs to bolster Nicole M.’s credibility. He
did not raise this issue until after his trial—
when it was too late for the trial court to
address the alleged error. Therefore, his
posttrial objection to Ms. Spriggs bolstering
Nicole Ms credibility did not meet Rule
108’s timeliness requirement.

Mr. Blickenstaff was required under West
Virginia Rule of Evidence 108(a) to raise a
timely and specific objection to Ms. Spriggs’s
testimony. Because he failed to do so, we find
that he waived this issue for appellate re-
view,”

10. Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196
W.Va. 208, 470 S.E.2d 162 (1996) (emphasis
added),

11, State v, Ladd, 210 W.Va. 413, 428-29, 557
S.E.2d 820, 835-36 (2001).

12, In addition to asserting the trial court erred
by allowing Ms. Spriggs to testify on the lethality
index and bolster Nicole M.'s credibilty, Mr.
Blickenstaff also asserted that the trial court
erred by allowing Ms. Spriggs to testify as to the
effect of domestic violence on victims. We dis-
agree, Ms. Spriggs’s testimony on Nicole M.’s
state of mind during her kidnapping, as influ-
enced by Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous domestic
violence against her, is relevant to whether she
consented to her kidnapping.

632

B. Mr. Blickenstaff’s Previous

- Conviction

Mr. Blickenstaff also argues that the trial
court erred by admitting his previous convic-
tion for domestic assault against Nicole M.
into evidence. West Virginia Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b) ! states, in part:
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts,
‘© Prohibited Uses, Evidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissi-
ble to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the char-
acter.
‘() Permitted Uses; Notice Required,
This evidence may be admissible for anoth-
er purpdse, such as proving motive, oppor-
tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident,
Furthermore, we have held: “W.Va. R. Evid.
404(b) is an ‘inclusive rule’ in which all rele-
vant evidence involving other crimes or acts
is admitted at trial unless the sole purpose
for the admission is to show criminal disposi-
tion.” 4

Before trial, the State filed a “Notice of
Intent to Present Evidence Under Rule
404(b),” revealing that it intended to use Mr,
Blickenstaff’s previous domestic assault con-
viction to show that Nicole M, failed to physi-
cally resist her kidnapping out of fear, not
consent. In other words, the State sought to
introduce Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous convie-
tion to establish that Nicole M. was kid-
napped against her will.

Hl Mr. Blickenstaff asserts the trial
court unduly prejudiced his defense by ad-
mitting his previous conviction. To this point,
we have held:

It is presumed a defendant is protected
from undue prejudice if the following re-
quirements are met: (1) the prosecution
offered the evidence for a proper purpose;
(2) the evidence was relevant; (8) the trial

13, Shortly after the alleged kidnapping, on Sep-

tember 2, 2014, Rule 404(b) was amended in
ways that do not affect this appeal’'s outcome.

14, State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641,
647, 398 S.E.2d 123, 129 (1990),

court made an on-the-record determination
under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules
of Evidence that the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4)
the trial court gave a limiting instruction.!>

We find that all the aforementioned require-
ments were met; therefore, Mr, Blicken-
staff's argument that the trial court erred by
admitting his previous conviction is unper-
suasive,

Hl First, Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous con-
viction was admitted for a proper purpose,
and it was relevant for that purpose. We
have held: “Where the lack of consent is an
element of the crime, we have recognized
that evidence of a defendant’s prior violent
behavior or incidents of bodily harm toward
the victim or others of which the victim is
aware may be admissible to show that her
actions were not consensual, but were in-
duced by fear,” * Lack of consent is an ele-
ment of kidnapping, so. Mr, Blickenstaff’s
previous domestic violence against Nicole M.
may he admitted to show that her actions
during her kidnapping were induced by fear,
not consent. Furthermore, it is undisputed
that the trial court issued a limiting instruc-
tion to the jury when Mr, Blickenstaff’s pre-
vious conviction was admitted into evidence,
and the limiting instruction was repeated in
the trial court’s general charge to the jury at
the conclusion of the-evidence,

Hl What remains then, is whether the
trial court made an on-the-recordl determina-
tion that the previous conviction’s probative
value was not substantially outweighed by its
potential for urifair prejudice. As to this fac-
tor, we have stated: “The balancing of proba-
tive value against unfair prejudice is weighed
in favor of admissibility[.] ... This Court
reviews disputed evidence in the light most
favorable to its proponent, maximizing its
15, Syl. Pt. 3, State v.LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470

S.E.2d 613 (1996).

16, State v. Hanna, 180 Wa. 598, 607, 378
S.B.2d 640, 649 (1989),

probative value and minimizing its prejudicial
effects.” 17

Mr, Blickenstaff argues that the trial court
erred in its on-the-record determination be-
cause evidence of his previous conviction was
not necessary. That is, in light of Nicole M.’s
testimony that Mr. Blickenstaff ‘pulled a
knife on her when he kidnapped her, his
previous instance of domestic violence was
not needed to establish that she was in-fear
at that time.

TH We disagree with Mr. Blickenstaff’s
argument, Evidence of previous misconduct
is not made inadmissible merely because. al-
ternative evidence is available.!* In a similar
case, State v. Rollins!® which involved a
defendant's trial for murdering his wife, the
defendant claimed that his wife’s death was
an accident. To rebut the defendant’s claim,
the State introduced evidence that the defen-
dant had physically abused his wife on previ-
ous occasions.” When the defendant, on ap-
peal, asserted that evidence of his previous
domestic abuse was not necessary in light of
a witness's testimony that he confessed to
killing his wife, we found no abuse of discre-
tion?! We adopted the circuit court’s reason-
ing that: “With respect to other forms of
proof, ... it appears that there is other
evidence to show that [Mrs.] Rollins’s death
was not accidental, but the evidence of prior
abuse is the best proof of the nature of the
relationship between the Defendant and this
wife].” 2

We find no meaningful distinction between
this case and Rollins. Mr. Blickenstaff dis-
puted that he took Nicole M. against her will,
an issue which would have been dispositive in
his kidnapping trial had he prevailed. And
because he attacked the credibility of Nicole
M/s testimony, alternative forms of. proof
became more necessary for the State to
prove her lack of consent. Likewise, his pre-
vious conviction was the best proof of Nicole

17, LaRock, 196 W.Va. at 312, 470, S.E.2d at 631.

18, See Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S, 172, 183 1.7,
117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (Evidence
of previous misconduct is not unduly prejudicial
merely because there was “some alternative
means of proof that the prdsecution in its broad
discretion chose not to rely on.”).

633

Ms state of mind during her kidnapping. We
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
admission of Mr. Blickenstaff’s previous con-
viction for second-degree domestic assault in
his kidnapping trial.

Tv.

CONCLUSION

-.We find no reversible error in the. trial
court’s handling of the State’s expert witness
or in its admission of Mr. Blickenstaff’s pre-
vious conviction into evidence. Therefore, we
affirm Mr. Blickenstaif's conviction ‘and sen-
tencing. ~

Affirmed.

804 S.E.2d 883

Patrick MORRISEY, in his official capac-
ity as West Virginia Attorney General,
and The State of West. Virginia, Defen-
dants Below, Petitioners

v.

WEST VIRGINIA AFL-CIO, et al.,
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No, 17-0187
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 5, 2017
Filed: September 15, 2017
Coneurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Workman
September 19, 2017
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Davis
October 2, 2017

19, 233 W.Va. 715, 760 S.B.2d 529 (2014).

20, Rollins, 233 W.Va. at 737, 760 8.E.2d at 551.
21, Id., 233 W.Va. at 738, 760 S.B.2d at 552.

22. Id., 233 W.Va. at 737, 760 S.B.2d at 551.

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, El-
bert Lin, Solicitor General, Thomas M. John-
son, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, Gilbert
Dickey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles-
ton, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petition-
ers

Vincent Trivelli, Esq., The Law Office of
Vincent Trivelli, Morgantown, West Virginia,
Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Esq., Morgantown,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondents

Matthew B, Gilliam, Esq., National Right
to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.,
Springfield, Virginia, Counsel for Amici Curi-
ae National Right to Work Legal Defense
and Education Foundation, Inc, and 4 Reg
nald Gibbs .

Derk A. Wilcox, Esq., Mackinac Genter for
Public Policy, Mackinac Center Legal Foun-
dation Midland, Michigan, Danielle Waltz,
Esq., Jackson Kelly PLLC, Charleston; West
Virginia, Counsel for Amicus Curiae Macki-
nae Center for Public Policy :

1, Syllabus Point 2, ‘in part, Huffinan v. Goals
Coal’ Co., 223 W.Va. 724, 725, 679 §.B.2d 323,

John D. Hoblitzell, III, Esq., Kay Casto &
Chaney, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for The Honorable James ©, Justice,
in his Official Capacity as Governor of the
State of West Virginia

Maneesh Sharma, Esq., Washington, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Thomas P, Maroney, Esq.,
Maroney Williams Weaver & Pancake
PLLG, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for Amicus Curiae American Federation of
Labor and Congress ot Industrial Organiza-
tions

Jeffrey G. Blaydes, Esq. Carbone &
Blaydes, P.L.L.C., Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Amici Curiae West Virginia Em-
ployment Law Association and West Virginia
Association for Justice

Justice Ketchum:

In this appeal, we examine a preliminary
injunction issued by the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County that stopped the implemen-
tation of West Virginia’s new “right to work”
law. In limited circumstances, a cireuit court
may issue a preliminary injunction when the
plaintiff shows that his or her lawsuit is
likely to succeed on its merits.

The plaintiffs in this case are several u un-
ions. The gist of their argument is that the
right to work law is unconstitutional because
it is unfair to unions and union members. The
defendants are officials for the State of West
Virginia. Their argument is that the law is
fair because it protects workers who do not
want to join or pay dues to a union,

HMM Whether a Jaw is fair or unfair is
not a question for the judicial branch of
government, Courts cannot dwell “upon the
political, social, economic or scientific merits
of statutes[.]” 1 The wisdom, desirability, and
fairness of a law are political questions to be
resolved in the Legislature. Those decisions
may only be challenged in the court of public
opinion and the ballot box, not before the
judiciary. Our duty boils down to weighing
whether the preliminary injunction was prop-
er, and whether the unions showed they are

324 (2009). *

likely to prevail in their ultimate claim that
’ the law is unconstitutional. .

As we discuss below,’ we find that the
unions failed to show a likelihood of success
in their legal challenge to the law’s constitu-
tionality. Twenty-eight states, including West
Virginia, have a right to work law, yet the
unions have not directed us to any federal or
state appellate court that, in over seven dec-
ades, has struck down such a law. Therefore,
the circuit court erred in granting the pre-
liminary injunction.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

‘This appeal concerns a preliminary injunc-
tion temporarily halting the implementation
of provisions in Senate Bill 1, enacted in the
2016 Regular Session of the West Virginia
Legislature.? The Legislature euphemistically
titled Senate Bill 1 as the “Workplace Free-
dom Act,” and in the same way calls it a
“ight to work” law.

Similar to right to work laws adopted in
twenty-seven other states, Senate Bill 1
_ amends West Virginia’s labor relations laws
to change the way unions represent employ-
ees in a workplace. First, the bill prohibits a
union and an employer from entering a col-
lective bargaining agreement that compels all
employees to join the union, Second, the bill
eliminates a union’s ability to compel non-
union employees to pay any dues, fees, or
assessments, of any kind, in exchange for the
union’s assistance. Nevertheless, when a’ un-
ion assumes representation of a workplace,
other federal and staté laws require the un-
ion to fairly represent all employees in the
workplace, even employees who are not un-
ion members and have paid no fees to the
union.

2, See 2016 Acts of the Legislatire, ch. 142.

3. See generally, W.Va. Code §§ 21-5G-1 to -7
[2016]. We discuss the bill in detail in the discus-
sion below.

4, The plaintiffs are the West Virginia AFL-CIO;
the West Virginia State Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council, AFL-CIO; the Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, and Helpers Local No. 175; the Unit-
ed Mine Workers of America, AFL-CIO; and the

637

The plaintiffs are several unions who sued
various officers of the State of West Virginia
to challenge the enforceability of Senate Bill
14 The unions’ complaint asserted a hodge-
podge of theories..

However, the unions raised three constitu-
tional claims as the basis for seeking a pre-
liminary injunction. The unions maintained
that Senate Bill 1 violates the West Virginia
Constitution because it impairs the associa-
tional rights of unions to consult for the
common good; it takes the unions’ property
without just compensation; and it violates the
unions’ liberty interests, by requiring unions
to expend their labor for nonunion employees
without the‘ ability to charge a fee for that
labor. The unions argued that, if the law took
effect, the unions would be harmed because
they would be unable to bargain for compul-
sory membership and fees in new collective
bargaining agreements without potentially vi-
olating the law. The unions asked the circuit
court to halt implementation of Senate Bill 1
until the merits of the unions’ complaint
could be resolved,

In an order dated February 24, 2017, the
cireuit court imposed a preliminary injune-
tion. The circuit court ruled that the provi-
sions of Senate Bill 1 would not go into effect
until the circuit court ruled on the merits of
the unions’ arguments.

The State now appeals the circuit court’s
preliminary injunction order.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM The granting or #efusal of an in-
junction calls for a cirenit court to exercise
judicial discretion. We apply a three-pronged
deferential review to the circuit court's deci-
sion. “We review the final order granting the

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, Locals 141, 307,. 317, 466, 596, and
968; and Amanda Gaines, a union member. The
defendants included the Governor of the State of
‘West Virginia, originally Harl Ray Tomblin, who
was succeeded in January 2017 by James C.
Justice; and the Attorney General, Patrick Morri-
sey. The State of West Virginia subsequently in-
tervened in the suit.

638

[preliminary] injunction and the ultimate dis-
position under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, we review the circuit court’s underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard, and we review questions of law de
novo.” ®

i.

ANALYSIS

Hs A fundamental rule of governance
is that courts must presume a law is constitu-
tional unless a party proves, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the law violates the Con-
stitution.’

In considering the constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, courts must exercise
due restraint, in recognition of the princi-
ple of the separation of powers in govern-
ment among the judicial, legislative and
executive branches, Every reasonable con-
struction must be resorted to by the courts
in order to sustain constitutionality, and
any reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive enactment in question. Courts are not
concerned with questions relating to legis-
lative policy. The general powers of the
legislature, within constitutional limits, are
almost plenary. In considering the consti-
tutionality of an act of the legislature, the
negation of legislative power must appear
beyond reasonable doubt.”

To ultimately succeed in this case, the unions
must show beyond reasonable doubt that
Sénate Bill 1 violates constitutional bounds.
Challenges to the constitutionality of a law
cannot be made lightly and without concert-
ed, focused effort. Indeed, “One who attacks

3. Syllabus Point 1, in part, State by and through
McGraw v. Imperial Marketing, 196 W.Va. 346,
A72 S.E.2d 792 (1996) (citations omitted).

6, Syllabus Point 2, in part, State ex rel. Frazier v.
Meadows, 193 W.Va. 20, 454 S.E.2d 65 (1994)
(“Acts of the Legislature are presumed to be
constitutional, and courts will interpret legisla-
tion in any reasonable way which will sustain its
constitutionality.””); State ex rel. City of Charleston
v. Coghill, 156 W.Va. 877, 883, 207 S.E.2d 113,
118 (1973) (same).

7, Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel, Appalachian Pow-
er Co. v. Gainer, 149 W.Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351
(1965).

a statute on constitutional grounds, defended
as that statute is by a strong presumption of
constitutionality, should bring up his heavy
artillery or forego the attack entirely.” ®

HM The unions sought and received a
preliminary injunction based upon their con-
stitutional attack upon Senate Bill 1. For
many decades, West Virginia courts have
applied the following guide when granting or
refusing an injunction:

The granting or refusal of an injunction,
whether mandatory or preventive, calls for
the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
view of all the circumstances of the partic-
ular case; regard being had to the nature
of the controversy, the object for which the
injunction is being sought, and the compar-
ative hardship or convenience to the re-
spective parties involved in the award or
denial of the writ.

The central core of this decades-old analysis
is the “comparative hardship” of the parties.
The federal courts have evolved a detailed
methodology to guide courts in balancing the
hardship of the parties. West Virginia trial
courts apply this same four-factor methodolo-
gy when weighing the granting or refusal of
a preliminary injunction:
Under the balance of hardship test the
district court must consider, in ‘flexible
interplay,’ the following four factors in de-
termining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction; (1) the likelihood of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff without the injune-
tion; (2) the likelihood of harm to the de-
fendant with an injunction; (8) the plain-
tiffs likelihood of success on the merits;
and (4) the public interest.!°

8. Southern Valley Grain Dealers Ass'n v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm'rs of Richland Cty., 257 N.W.2d 425,
434 (NLD, 1977).

9. Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Donley v. Baker,
112 W.Va, 263, 164 S.E. 154 (1932).

10. Jefferson Cty. Bd, of Educ. v. Jefferson Cty.
Educ. Ass'n, 183 W.Va. 15, 24, 393 S.E.2d 653,
662 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley,
756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4h Cir, 1985)).

HH In this appeal, the State’s arguments
center upon the third factor: the unions’ like-
lihood of success on the merits of their con-
stitutional arguments. The State argues on
appeal that the constitutional claims ad-
vanced by the unions have been tested before
in other courts and rejected. Twenty-seven
other states have adopted right to work laws
similar to West Virginia’s, and the unions
have not shown a single one that has been
struck down by an appellate court, Moreover,
the unions did not plainly articulate to the
circuit court which provision of the West
Virginia Constitution provides, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that a right-to-work law is
improper. Because the unions did not demon-
strate a likelihood of success, the State ar-
gues the circuit court should not have grant-
ed a preliminary injunction. We agree.

Congress enacted the National Labor Re-
lations Act (also called the “Wagner Act”)
in 1985 to protect the rights of employees
and employers, and to encourage collective
bargaining. Congress amended it through the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
better known as the “Taft-Hartley Act.” Sec-
tion 8(a)@) of the Taft-Hartley Act prohibit-
ed a “closed shop,” a union security agree-
ment whereby an employer agreed to employ
only union members.” Section 8(a)(8) still
permitted “less severe forms of union-securi-
ty arrangements” such as a union-employer
agreement “requiring nonunion members to
pay to the union $2 a month ‘for the support

11, 29 U.S.C, §§ 151-169.

12. Section 8(a)(3) is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) [1979].

13. NLRB. v. Gen, Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,
739-40, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 10 L.Bd.2d 670 (1963),
Section 8(a)(3) provides that nothing “shall pre-
clude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization ... to require as a
condition of employment membership therein[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).

14, Int'l Union of the United Ass'n of Journeymen
& Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting In-
dus, of the U. 8. & Canada, Local Unions Nos.
J41, 229, 681, & 706 v. N. L. R. B,, 675 F.2d
1257, 1266-1269 (D.C, Cir. 1982) (Mikva, J. dis-
senting).

15, Section 14(b), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)
[1959], provides:

639

of the bargaining unit.’” ¥ It also permitted
a workplace where the employer was free to
hire anyone, but could require new employ-
ees to join the union after they were hired.

Although Section 8(a)(@) of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act permitted the adoption of such less
restrictive union-security agreements, a pro-
vision of the Act also left states free to ban
them altogether. Section 14(b) of the Act
ereates an exception to Section 8(a)(8), and
provides that states may pass laws that pro-
hibit “agreements requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employ-
mentf.)” 5 The United States Supreme Court
has examined the interplay between Section
&(a)(8) and Section 14(b) and found that
“Congress left the States free to legislate”
and adopt laws “restricting the execution and
enforcement of union-security agreements,”
and even free to go so far as to “outlaw” a
union-security arrangement.16

‘When Congress passed Section 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, twelve states had
right-to-work laws.!’ “These laws fell into
two different categories. The first broadly
disallowed compulsory union membership.
‘The second included specific provisions out-
lJawing compulsory payment of dues or fees
to labor organizations.” ® “Congress knew
precisely what state laws it was validating
when it passed § 14(b). The House [of Rep-
resentatives’] report listed each state which
had passed a right-to-work law or constitu-

(b) Agreements requiring union membership in
violation of State law, Nothing in this Act shall
be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of
employment in any State or Territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law. .

16. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 102-03, 84 S.Ct.
219, 11 L.Bd.2d 179 (1963). See also United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., Kentucky, 842
F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2016) (“‘state” in § 14(b)
includes political subdivisions).

17. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 370
v. Wasden, 217 F.Supp.3d 1209, 1221 (D. Idaho
2016).

18. Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir.
2014).

640

tional provision.” The clear purpose of Sec-
tion 14(b) “was to preserve the efficacy of
laws like these—statutes that allowed states
to place restrictions of their choosing on un-
ion-security agreements[.]” 2°

Hl [nm sum, under federal law, states
may decide whether to allow or prohibit em-
ployers and unions to negotiate agreements
requiring compulsory union membership, or
vequiring nonunion employees to pay dues or
fees to the union.

In Senate Bill 1, the West Virginia Legis:

lature chose to prohibit both compulsory un-
ion membership and compulsory dues for
union representation. The bill provides that
an employee may not be compelled,
as a condition or continuation of employ-
ment, to:

(1) Become or remain a member of a
labor organization;

(2) Pay any dues, fees, assessments or
other similar charges, however denom-
inated, of any kind or amount to any labor
organization; or

(8) Pay any charity or third party, in lieu
of those payments, any amount that is
equivalent to or a pro rata portion of dues,
fees, assessments or other charges re-
quired of members of a labor organiza-
tion?!

’ The'bill goes on to declare as “unlawful, null
and void, ‘and of no legal effect” any agree-
ment between a labor organization and an
employer that requires membership in the
organization,” and imposes criminal and civil
penalties for the adoption of such an agree-
ment,8 ;

In the unions’ complaint for relief and
request’ for a preliminary injunction, the un-
ions offered the aforementioned three argu-

19, Int'l Union of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Indus., 675 F.2d at 1260.

20. Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 663.

21, W.Va. Code § 21-5G-2 [2016],

22, W.Va. Code § 21-5G-3 [2016].

23, W.Va, Code §§ 21-5G-4 and -5 [2016].

24, The unions base their argument on two con-
stitutional provisions. Article III, § 16 of the

ments why Senate Bill 1 is unconstitutional.
The State counters that the unions have not,
demonstrated a likelihood: of success on the
constitutional arguments they have so far
advanced. Hence; the State argues that the
circuit court abused its discretion in granting
the preliminary injunction. We therefore
must examine the three constitutional argu-
ments thus far proffered by the unions.

The unions first argue that Senate Bill 1
violates their constitutional right to freedom
of association under the West Virginia Con-
stitution.“ The unions contend that the bill is
unconstitutional because it impairs their abil-
ity to associate with employees to advance
workers’ causes, :

HE “There is no doubt that union

workers enjoy valuable rights of association |

and assembly that are protected by the First
Amendment.” > However, we see nothing in
Senate Bill 1 that prevents a person from
making a voluntary choice to associate with a
union or to pay union dues. Additionally, the
constitutional freedom of association argu-
ment proffered by the unions is nearly identi-
eal to one rejected by the United. States
Supreme Court almost seven decades Ae°.
The Supreme Court stated:
The constitutional right of workers to as-
semble, to discuss and formulate plans for
furthering their own self interest’ in jobs
cannot be construed as a constitutional
. guarantee that none shall get and hold jobs
except those who will join in the assembly
or will agree to abide by the assembly’s
plans.26
The Supreme Court plainly held that the
constitutional right to assemble and associate
does not entitle a union to compel nonmem-
bers to “participate in union assemblies” as a

West Virginia Constitution provides, “The right
of the people to assemble in a peaceable manner,
to consult for the common good, to instruct their
representatives, or to apply for redress of griev-
ances, shall be held inviolate.” Article III, § 7,
provides in part, “No law abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, shall be passed{,]”

25. Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 670.
26. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L.

v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
531, 69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed, 212 (1949),

condition of employment.” Likewise, “anions
have no constitutional entitlement [under the
First Amendment] to the fees of nonmember-
employees.” 8
We find no fault with the unions’ assertion
“that membership and dues are the lifeblood
of any labor organization. We also find no
fault with the State’s contention that, just as
there is a right for employees and unions to
associate, there is a right to not associate.”
‘The question we must decide is whether the
unions have shown a likelihood of success in
pressing their argument that Senate Bill 1 is
unconstitutional because it impairs their free-
dom of association, At least twenty-seven
other states have some form of a right to
work law today, many in existence since the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, The
unions have not directed us to any state or
federal appellate decision accepting their
constitutional freedom of association argu-
ment and disapproving of a right to work law
on similar grounds,

Put simply, the unions have not estab-
lished a likelihood that they will ultimately
succeed on their contention that Senate Bill 1
violates their constitutional right of associa-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt.

HE The second constitutional argu-
ment proffered by the unions is that Senate
Bill 1 is an unconstitutional taking of union
property, Federal and: state law requires un-
ions to provide equal services and represen-
tation to all employees who are members of a
collective bargaining unit. It costs a union

27. Id.

28. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551
U.S. 177, 185, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 168 L.Bd.2d 71
(2007) (citing Lincoln Fed. Labor Union, 335 U.S.
at 529-531, 69 S.Ct. 251).

29. Adkins vy, Miller, 187 WNa. 774, 777, 421
S.E.2d 682, 685 (1992) (quoting Rutan v. Repub-
lican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 76, 110 S.Ct.
2729, 111 L.Bd.2d 52 (1990)).

30. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,
202-03, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944) (The
Railway Labor Act “expresses the aim of Con-
gress to impose on the bargaining representative

. the duty to exercise fairly the power con-
ferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it
acts, without hostile discrimination against
them.”), See also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S, 330, 337-38, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97, L.Ed. 1048

641

money to negotiate, administer and enforce
an agreement with an employer. The unions
argue that a state law prohibiting the union
from collecting fees from nonmembers, while
the law requires the union to provide equal
services to these “free riders,” effects an
unconstitutional taking of property.*!

HE The State contends that a unilat-
eral expectation of fees is not a constitution-
ally protected property right. For purposes
of due process challenges,.“A ‘property inter-
est’ includes not only the traditional notions
of real and personal property, but also ex-
tends to those benefits to which an individual
may be deemed to have a legitimate claim of
entitlement under existing rules or under-
standings.” * “A ‘property’ interest protected
by due process must derive from private
contract or state law, and must be more than
fa] unilateral expectation... .” 8

These due process guides are instructive in
the context of the alleged taking of a proper-
ty interest, In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement, unions have only a
“unilateral expectation” of receiving fees
from nonunion employees,.Prior to the pas-
sage.of Senate Bill 1, unions could.only spec-
ulate whether they would be able to negoti-
ate new agreements with employers that
would require the collection of fees from
nonunion employees. The formation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement with a fee-col-
lection provision was contingent upon the
consent of a third party: the employer.

(1953) (extending duty of fair representation to

the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 159 ("Representatives

designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
“tive bargaining by the majority of the ‘employees

.: shall be the exclusive representatives of all

the employees[.]”; and W.Va, Code § 21-1A-5(a)

(game).

31, W.Va. Const., Article IIL, § 9 ("Private prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation,”)

32. Syllabus Point 3, Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
"161 W.Va. 154, 241 S.B.2d 164 (1977) (overruled
on other grounds by'W.Va. Dep't of Educ.’ v.
McGraw, 239 W.Va. 192, 800 S,E.2d 230 (2017)),

33, Syllabus Point 3, in part, Oyteza v. Mononga-
_ lia Cty. Gen. Hosp., 173 W.Va, 461, 318 S.B.2d
40 1984) (emphasis added).

|

642

Hence, in the absence of an actual collective
bargaining agreement, the unions have only a
unilateral expectation that they will receive
fees from nonunion employees. Senate Bill 1
does not affect existing contracts; it affects
only future agreements that unions and em-
ployers have not yet negotiated or accepted.
The unions therefore have no protected prop-
erty right that the Legislature has taken
through the adoption of Senate Bill 1.

Moreover, the unions have offered no au-
thority that any other appellate court in this
country has examined a taking challenge to a
right to work law and accepted a similar
argument. Hence, we cannot say that the
union demonstrated a likelihood of success on
their claim that Senate Bill 1, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, is an unconstitutional taking
of union property,

The unions’ third and final argument—set
forth in a single paragraph—is that Senate
Bill 1 deprives them of their liberty interest
in their labors. The unions assert that the
Constitution safeguards individual “liberty,”
a concept that includes “the right of man to
be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with
which he has been endowed by his Creator”
and “the right of one to use his faculties in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will,
to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling,
and to pursue any lawful trade or avoca-
tion.” The unions then state that Senate
Bill 1 will require unions and union officials
to work for nothing, thereby contravening
their liberty interest.

The unions failed to develop their legal
argument as to how Senate Bill 1 violates a
liberty interest under the West Virginia
Constitution. This Court routinely rejects
skeletal arguments like that offered by the
unions.*> Nevertheless, as with the unions’
other two constitutional claims, the union has
failed to show that any other appellate court

34, Lawrence v. Barlow, 77 W.Va. 289, 292, 87
S.E, 380, 381 (1915).

35, See State, Dept. of Health v. Robert Morris N.,
195 W.Va. 759, 765, 466 S.B,2d 827, 833 (1995).

36. The record indicates the plaintiffs filed their
request for a preliminary injunction on June 27,
2016, four days before Senate Bill 1 took effect
on July 1, 2016, A hearing on the request was
held on August 10, 2016, and a proposed order

in this country has adopted a similar argu-
ment to strike down a similar right to work
Jaw. Hence, on the grounds offered by the
unions, we are not persuaded that they es-
tablished a likelihood of success on their
claim that Senate Bill 1 violated their liberty
interests.

In the absence of a likelihood of success on
the merits, the circuit court abused its dis-
eretion when it granted the unions’ request
for a preliminary injunction. The circuit
court’s order must be reversed and the case
remanded for final resolution.

Tv.

CONCLUSION

The unions failed to establish a likelihood
of success on the merits of their three consti-
tutional claims. The circuit court therefore
abused its discretion in granting a prelimi-
nary injunction. The cireuit court’s February
24, 2017, order is therefore reversed, the
preliminary injunction dissolved, and the case
remanded for the cireuit court to conduct a
final hearing on the merits of the parties’
various contentions.®>

Reversed and remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a separate
Opinion.

JUSTICE DAVIS dissents and reserves
the right to file a separate Opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs, in part,
and dissents, in part, and reserves the right
to file a separate Opinion.

Loughry, C. J., concurring:

The circuit court’s issuance of an injunc-
tion in this matter was not merely impru-

‘was submitted to the circuit court on August 19,
2016. The circuit court only entered the pro-
posed order five months later, on February 24,
2017, after the Attorney General threatened to
seek mandamus relief from this Court. Because
of the far-reaching effect of Senate Bill 1 and its
potentially substantial impact upon public inter-
ests, in the future, we encourage the circuit court
to act with greater celerity in bringing this case
to a resolution.

dent, but profoundly legally incorrect. Not
only did the circuit court utilize an overruled
legal standard for the issuance of an injune-
tion, it blithely stated that the respondents’
constitutional challenge to West Virginia’s
“yight-to-work” law was “likely” to succeed,
entitling them to an injunction. In fact, pre-
cisely the opposite was, and is, true: in the
absence of any legal authority supporting its
constitutional challenge and in the face of
United States Supreme Court holdings un-
dermining their position, the respondents’ ac-
tion fails on all fronts. While the majority
opinion largely limits its discussion to the
propriety of the injunction and therefore un-
derstandably declines a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the underlying constitutional chal-
lenge, I write separately to demonstrate how
fatally unsupported and lacking in merit the
respondents’ constitutional challenge is,
thereby making the circuit court’s issuance of
an injunction all the more inexplicable.

West Virginia’s “Workplace Freedom Act,”
West Virginia Code § 21-5G-1 to ~7 (herein-
after “the Act”), prohibits compulsory union
membership and/or compulsory union dues
by non-union employees. This Act preserves
to the employee whether he or she wishes to
participate in the union and prohibits em-
ployers from making such membership a con-
dition of employment. The respondents effec-
tively make two constitutional challenges to
the Act. First, the respondents claim that the
Act infringes on the union’s constitutional
right of freedom of association under the
West Virginia Constitution. Secondly, the re-
spondents claim that the statute effects an
unconstitutional taking of union property.

Regarding the freedom of association
claim, the respondents assert that by merely
allowing employees to choose whether to join
the union, the Act impairs the union’s ability
to associate with employees. The United
States Supreme Court effectively rejected
this argument more than half a century ago.
In Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129,
AF. of L. v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 581, 69 S.Ct, 251, 98 L.Ed. 212 (1949),
the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he consti-
tutional right of workers to assemble, to dis-
cuss and formulate plans for furthering their
own self interest in jobs cannot be construed

643

as a constitutional guarantee that none shall
get and hold jobs except those who will join
in the assembly or will agree to abide by the
assembly's plans.” Upholding North Car-
olina’s and Nebraska’s right-to-work laws,
the Supreme Court further held: “Just as we
have held that the due process clause erects
no obstacle to block legislative protection of
union members, we now hold that legislative
protection can be afforded non-union work-
ers.” Lincoln Fed., 885 U.S. at 587, 69 S.Ct.
251 (emphasis added). The ability of states to
prohibit compulsory union membership arose
within the federal Taft-Hartley Act, enacted
in 1947, which eapressly provides that states
may pass laws that prohibit “agreements re-
quiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment[.]” 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b). Simply put, just as employees have
a constitutionally protected right to assemble
and belong to a union, non-union members
have a commensurate right not to belong to
the union. Protecting union members’ right
to join the union neither requires nor permits
compulsory membership for those who
choose not to join, Right-to-work laws simply
protect’ the non-member’s right to decline
union membership.

Turning to the respondents’ unconstitu-
tional takings claim, they assert that being
forced to engage in labor negotiations in
absence of a requirement that all employees
be dues-paying union members provides non-
members with a “free ride.” There is little
question that this is true; the question is
whether this is unconstitutional. It is well-
established that a “takings” claim exists only
if there is a taking of a constitutionally
protected property interest. This Court has
held that “[a] [constitutionally protected]
property interest ... must derive from pri-
vate contract or state law, and must be more
than the unilateral expectation [.]” Syl. Pt. 3,
Orteza v. Monongalia Cty. Gen. Hosp., 178
W. Va. 461, 462, 318 S.E.2d 40, 41 (1984)
(quoting Major v. DeFrench, 169 W. Va. 241,
251, 286 S.E.2d 688, 695 (1982)). However,
the respondents have absolutely no entitle-
ment to the fees of non-members; in fact, the
United States Supreme Court has expressly
stated as much: “[U]nions have no constitu-
tional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-
employees.” Davenport v. Washington Educ.

644

Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 185, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 168
L.Hd.2d 71 (2007). The respondents’ expecta-
tion of compelling fees from non-members is
but a “unilateral expectation” insufficient to
create a property interest which is constitu-
tionally protected. Simply stated, merely be-
eause the Act preserves a non-member'’s
right and ability to decline to participate in
union membership does not mean that the
Act has “taken” anything to which the unions
were entitled: “[A] legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right does not infringe the right[.]” Regan v,
Tanation With Representation of Wash., 461
US. 540, 549, 108 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129
(1988).

Were it not enough that the Taft-Hartley
Act expressly allows for the states to prohibit
compulsory union membership and/or dues
remittance, the United States Supreme
Court has essentially spoken on all critical
aspects of this issue. The Supreme Court has
addressed the premises underlying the re-
spondents’ challenge, as demonstrated above,
but has also dealt with it more directly, In
Retail Clerks International Association, Lo-
cal 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 875
US. 96, 102-08, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179
(1968), the Supreme Court stated that “even
if [a] union-security agreement clears all fed-
eral hurdles, the States by reason of [29
U.S.C, 164(b) ] have the final say and may
outlaw it,” (Emphasis added). That is pre-
cisely what the Act does, Although the re-
spondents unavailingly split hairs regarding
the seope of Lincoln Federal, the Supreme
Court could scarcely be clearer than when it
held that “[t]here cannot be wrung from a
constitutional right of workers to assemble to
discuss improvement of their own working
standards, a further constitutional right to
drive from remunerative employment all oth-
er persons who will not or can not, partici-
pate in union assemblies.” 385 U.S. at 531, 69
S.Ct, 254,

In view of the clarity of the Supreme
Court’s precedent on the underpinnings of
the respondents’ constitutional challenge, the
Seventh Circuit has rejected arguments iden-
tical to the respondents’ relative to Indiana’s
vight-to-work law. In Sweeney v. Pence, the
Court rejected takings and associational, con-

stitutional challenges to Indiana’s right-to-
work law, stating:

There is no doubt that union workers en-

joy valuable rights of association and as-

sembly that are protected by the First

Amendment. See, eg., Thomas v, Collins,

828 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 815, 89 L.Ed. 480

(1945), But as in Lincoln Federal, that

right alone cannot operate as an offensive

weapon to wrest rights from others: here,
the Hoosier workers whose rights not to
associate with the union are protected by
the new legislation.
767 F.8d 654, 670 (7th Cir, 2014). Wisely
noting that the Taft-Hartley Act, long ago
enacted, preserved to the states the ability to
enact precisely such laws, the Sweeney court
observed the quintessentially legislative is-
sues presented by such right-to-work laws
and the commensurate: limitations of the
Court to strike down such legislation:
[T]he controversy is one that ought to be
addressed and resolved at the level of leg-
islative politics, not in the courts, The stat-
utory question posed is whether Indiana’s
new law is preempted by federal labor law,
- or threatens the Union's First Amendment
rights, The answer is an emphatic no,

Right-to-Work laws like Indiana’s have

existed since before the passage of the

Taft-Hartley Act and the inclusion of See-

tion 14(b) of the NLRA. Congress specifi-

cally reserved to-the states the power to
write and enforce laws of this nature, in
accordance with individual states’ needs
and wisdom. It is not our province to
wrest this authority, which has been intact
and undisturbed for over sixty-five years,
from the states and erase.the distinction
between right-to-work states and non-
vight-to-work states,

Id, at 671 (emphasis added),

The clarity of the foregoing leads inexora-
bly to the circuit court’s unsubstantiated de-
cision to issue a preliminary injunction. De-
spite the circuit court’s terse and astonishing
statement that the respondents had “demon-
strated a substantial likelihood of success,” it
is nevertheless clear that the circuit court
granted the injunction under.a lax and im-
proper standard. Finding merely that the
constitutional challenges were “substantial,

serious, and difficult,” the circuit court below
incorrectly found that a preliminary injunc-
tion may issue if the likelihood of harm to
plaintiff outweighed the likelihood of harm to
defendant, ie. a “balancing of hardships.”
Critically, this out-dated standard provides
that a plaintiff need not show that he or she
is likely to succeed before an injunction may
issue. See Blackwelder. Furniture Co, v, Seil-
ig, 550 F.2d 189, 195 (4% Cir, 1977) (“If that
balance is struck in favor of plaintiff, it is
enough that grave or serious questions are
presented; and plaintiff need not show a like-
lihood of success.”), This standard was ex-
pressly overruled by the Fourth Circuit in
Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal
Election Commission, 575 F.3d 842 (4 Cir,
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated on
other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089, 180 S.Ct. 2371,
176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010), and adhered to in
part sub nom. The Real Truth About Obama,
Inc. v, F.E.C., 607 F.8d 855 (4 Cir, 2010);
“[Tyhe Blackwelder balance-of-hardship test
may no longer be applied in granting or
denying preliminary injunctions[,]”
Nevertheless, the circuit court relied on
this overruled case and repeatedly echoed its
now-defunct holding in finding that the con-
stitutional challenges presented were so
“substantial, serious, and difficult,” a prelimi-
nary injunction was warranted. See Black-
welder, 550 F.2d at 195 (granting injunction
where questions are “so serious, substantial,
difficult, and doubtful, as to make them fair
ground for litigation and thus for more delib-
erate investigation”), The circuit court’s reli-
ance on Blackwelder to cireumvent the re-
quirement that the respondents demonstrate
a “likelihood of success” was undoubtedly
because they could not do so, as demonstrat-
ed above. Utilizing such ham-handed tactics
to enjoin a presumptively constitutional legis-
lative enactment is unseemly, at best. If
nothing more than presenting a “serious,
substantial, [and] difficult” question was suf-
ficient to enjoin législation duly enacted by
our elected officials, there would be. scarcely
any legislation that would not be immediate-
ly enjoined simply by its opponents offering

1, See W.Va. Code §§ 21-5G-1 to ~7 (2016).

2. In re Estate of Reilly, 933 A.2d 830, 834-35
(D.C. 2007). .

645

up a whisper of a constitutional challenge in
court, Opponents of the legislation could then
successfully suffocate duly enacted laws with
arcane challenges to the laws which languish,
unresolved, at the feet of dilatory or recalei-
tvant judges. The “likelihood of success” is a
required element for issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction for the sole purpose of
thwarting such efforts and weeding out
toothless claims, such as those raised here,

In short, twenty-eight states have a right-
to-work law. None has been struck down,
much less on the grounds advanced by the
respondents. United States Supreme Court
precedent has effectively rebuffed all of the
challenges and subsidiary positions advanced
by the respondents, The respondents have
demonstrated no likelihood of success and
their failure was abetted by the circuit
court’s use of an overruled, effectively mean-
ingless standard for issuance of a preliminary
injunction, This monumental failure of legal
reasoning was compounded by extraordinary
and baseless delay occasioned by the circuit,
court. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in
‘the majority’s reversal’ of the preliminary
injunction and remand for further proceed-
ings. I further encourage the circuit court to
assiduously avoid further delay and grant
this matter its foremost attention.

WORKMAN, Justice, concurring in part, |
and dissenting in part:

(Filed September 19, 2017)

The one and only issue properly before
this Court is whether the circuit court erted

.in granting a preliminary injunction of the

Workplace Freedom Act, also known as the
“right to work” law. The law is erystal clear
that an appellate court’s review of an order
granting a preliminary injunction is strictly
confined to the limited issue of the propriety
of the injunctive relief? Our jurisdiction at
this point is “not to resolve the overall merits
of the dispute between the parties[,?’? and not
to decide the constitutionality of the law until
there is a full hearing on these issues below
and the entry ‘of a full order capable of

“3, Id. (emphasis added).

646

review. The majority purports to remand this
ease, but in fact so completely resolves the
underlying constitutional issues that it ren-
ders such remand nothing but a perfunctory

This appeal of the temporary injunction
should have been treated as a petition’ for a
writ of mandamus to require the lower court
to issue a ruling. I would have granted man-
damus and ordered the lower court to issue a
fall order and opinion within ten days.t We
could have then expedited the appeal thereof
and promptly issued a full opinion based on a
complete record and full argument.

Thus, I concur that this case should be
remanded, but I dissent on this Court’s stun-
ning failure to recognize our jurisdictional
limits in that they so explicitly resolved the
underlying constitutional issues in the con-
text of the review of a mere preliminary
injunction prior to full hearing and the entry
of an order below capable of full review.

Justice Franklin D. Cleckley emphasized
during his tenure on this Court that our first
obligation when reviewing a circuit court’s
decision is to articulate the standard of re-
view—i.e., our criterion for assessing the va-
lidity of the cireuit court’s ruling. “This re-
quirement serves two functions: it informs
the parties of the extent of the review and,
most important, reminds the appellate court

4, See W.Va. R. App. P.’2 (‘In the interest of
expediting decision, or for other good cause
shown, the Supreme Court may suspend the re-
quirements or provisions of any of these Rules in
a particular case on application of a party or on
its own motion and may order proceedings in
accordance with its direction, These Rules shall
be construed to allow the Supreme Court to do
substantial justice.”); see generally GMS Mine
Repair & Maint., Inc..v. Miklos, 238 W.Va. 707,
798 S.B.2d 833 (2017) (considering appeal of
interlocutory order as petition for writ of prohi-
bition); State ex rel. Register-Herald v. Canterbury,

. 192, W.Va, 18, 19 nt, 449 S.E.2d 272, 273 ni
(1994) (“In this case, it is logical to treat the
appeal filed by Mr. Thomas as a prohibition since
it-challenges the scope of the injunction-entered
by the circuit court.”),

5. North Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling
Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 626 (Fla.
2003).

6. People v. Jackson, 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 27
Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 601 (2005)

of the limitations placed on its own authority
by the appellate process.” 5 However complex
the issues, “the standard of review is the
compass that guides the appellate court to its
decision. It defines and limits the course the
court follows in arriving at its destination,
Deviations from the path, whether it be one
most or least traveled, leave writer and read-
er lost in the wilderness.” §

An overwhelming body of law in this coun-
try supports the proposition that, in the ap-
peal of an interlocutory order, the scope of
appellate review is strictly confined to the
issues necessary to determine the propriety
of the interlocutory order itself.7 Thus, the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to deter-
mining whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in granting a preliminary injunc-
tion. “A preliminary injunction is a provision-
al remedy. Its function is not to determine
the ultimate rights of the parties, but to
maintain the status quo until there can be a
full hearing on the merits.” § The fundamen-
tal purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to
prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve
. ++ [a] court’s ability to render a meaningful
decision on the merits.” ® Thus, it is essential
for this Court to refrain from offering its
view of the ultimate merits of the parties’
arguments to allow the circuit court the lati-
tude to make those rulings in the first in-
stance.10

7. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure Volume 7, § 3291.1 (2d.ed. 2011) (“‘Ordi-
narily the scope of appellate review ... is con-
fined to the issues necessary to determine the
propriety of the interlocutory order itself.”).

8. Pamela Equities Corp. v. 270 Park Ave. Café
Corp., 62 A.D.3d 620, 881 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

9. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 627 (Sth Cir, 1985).

10. See Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heile-
man Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1356 (6th Cir.
1985) (‘An appellate court in reviewing the pro-
priety of a preliminary injunction should refrain
from the unnecessary comment on the evidence
or review of the merits of the case since the case
has yet to be heard in full on the merits.”);
DiLucente Corp. v. Pa. Roofing Co., 655 A.2d
1035, 1037-38 (Pa. Super. 1995) (“When review-
ing the denial of a preliminary injunction, this
Court will not inquire into the merits of a contro-

Yet the majority—without a dispositive or-
der by the circuit court on the petition for
declaratory relief—steamrolls over our juris-
dictional limits in resolving these significant
constitutional issues,

The urgency of the Petitioners to have a
final ruling is understandable, And certainly
it is troubling that this matter has been ripe
for decision by the circuit court since Decem-
ber of 2016. Perhaps that is why the majority
felt so emboldened to ignore the limits of our
jurisdiction and resolve the entire case imme-
diately under the guise of reviewing a prelim-
inary injunction.

A review of the procedural history reflects
that on June 27, 2016, the Respondents filed
the petition for a preliminary injunction and
declaratory relief in the circuit court of Ka-
nawha County. On February 24, 2017, after a
hearing on the petition for injunctive relief,
the Honorable Jennifer Bailey entered an
order temporarily enjoining the enforcement
of the statute, Although the order contained
some discussion of the underlying constitu-
tional issues, the court did not resolve them
fully or in anything other than a cursory and
preliminary fashion. Instead, the court set a
date for full briefing and argument of those
issues. After conducting a hearing on the
parties’ motions for summary judgment in
the declaratory judgment action in December
of 2016, the circuit court has yet to make a
decision,

During this long delay, the Petitioners
have had at their command the office of
mandamus, which is the proper remedy to
compel tribunals and officers exercising dis-
eretionary and judicial powers to act when
they unreasonably neglect or refuse to do
so,!! but they failed to use that tool. Instead,
on February 27, 2017, they filed an appeal of
the circuit court’s preliminary injunction and

versy, but will examine the record to determine if

any apparently reasonable grounds exist for the
trial court's action.”).

11, See State ex rel. State v. Reed, 204 W.Va. 520,
514 S.E.2d 171 (1999),

12. Associate Justice Rubin serves on the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court; he is a Professor of Law
at Georgetown University,

647

made a motion for expedited relief before
this Court.

In an insightful presentation on United
States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s approach to judicial decision-mak-
ing, Justice Peter J. Rubin” cited Justice
Ginsburg strong view that appellate courts
must be attentive to their proper role. He
also pointed out that Justice Ginsburg’s juris-
prudence is animated by recognition that an
appellate court must refrain from adopting a
position that has not been tested “in the
crucible of the adversary process[.]” # Issues
that are fully pled, briefed, argued, and de-
cided in the first instance by a lower court
not only provide the jurisdictional basis for
appellate court review, but well-serve the
process that the creators of our system fore-
saw, That is how our system is set up, and no
matter how controversial or politically
charged an issue is, that is how cases should
be decided. This Court should not do an end-
run around a pending declaratory judgment
action involving constitutional issues by re-
solving all the issues pending below without
the benefit of full proceedings and a ruling
from the circuit court. “Furthermore, princi-
ples of judicial restraint counsel against ad-
dressing issues—particularly constitutional
issues—which are not squarely ... before
the court.” La

The majority examines, discusses, and
makes significant legal statements on the
standard for granting injunctive relief, Im-
portantly, however, they never enunciate a
new syllabus point of law on the proper
standard, despite the fact that our State ju-
risprudence has no existing syllabus points
relating to the proper criteria for preliminary
injunctive relief. This Court has stated that

[t]he customary standard applied in

West Virginia for issuing a preliminary

injunction is that a party seeking the tem-

porary relief must demonstrate by a clear

13. See Peter J. Rubin, Keynote Address: Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Perspective, 70
Ohio St. L.J. 825, 832 (2009).

14, Florida Carry, Inc. v. Univ. of N. Fla., 133
$0.3 966, 981 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Wethe-
rell, J., concurring).

648

showing of a reasonable likelihood of the
presence of irreparable harm; the absence
of any other appropriate remedy at law;
and the necessity of a balancing of hard-
ship test including: “(1) the likelihood of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff without
the injunction; (2) the likelihood of harm to
the defendant with an injunction; (8) the
plaintiff's likelihood of success on the mer-
its; and (4) the public interest.” Jefferson
Cownty Bd, of Educ. v. Jefferson County
Educ, Ass'n, 183 W.Va, 15, 24, 393 S.H.2d
658, 662 (1990) (quoting Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, v. Bradley,
756 F.2d 1048, 1054 (4th Cir.1985))[,] 8

In Jefferson County; we stated that courts
must consider these factors in “flexible inter-
play” when determining whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, which seems to sug-
gest a movant must make a showing on all
factors and the court has discretion in weigh-
ing them.!6 While the factors set forth in
Jefferson County have become the apparent
standard in -West Virginia, we have not
adopted them in a syllabus point, Because
the preliminary injunction is an extraordi-
narily powerful remedy, the majority drops
the hall badly by setting forth constitutional
conclusions while failing to even clarify our
standard for a preliminary injunction, The

15, State ex rel. McGraw v, Imperial Mktg., 196
W.Va. 346, 352 n.8, 472 S.E.2d 792, 798 n.&
(1996).

16. Jefferson County, 183 W.Va. at 24, 393 8.B.2d
at 662; see also Horton y, City of St. Augustine,
272 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating it is
well established that preliminary injunction is
extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be
granted unless movant clearly establishes burden
of persuasion as to all elements),

17, Seo Richard RWW, Brooks & Warren F.
Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficien-
cy, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58
Stan.L.Rev. 381, 389-90 °(2005) (‘Most courts,
when deciding whether to grant an injunction,
rely on a four-part standard that (to varying
degrees): considers (1) plaintiff's likelihood of
success on the merits, (2) the amount of irrepara-
ble harm likely in the absence of the injunction,
(3) a balancing of expected harms to plaintiff and
those to defendant, and (4) the public interest.
Within the jurisdictions that use this four-part
standard, there is no-uniform application. Courts
outside these jurisdictions apply entirely different
standards that may, for example, limit consider-
ation to a combination of plaintiff's probable

fact that there are substantial differences in
the law governing the proper standard of
review of a preliminary injunction in both
state 1” and federal courts % should have also
impelled the majority to put these:-issues
through that “crucible of the adversarial pro-
cess.”

While the Respondents clearly have an
uphill battle to demonstrate that this legisla
tion is unconstitutional, both parties deserve
to have the merits of their claims fully adju-
dicated below, and to have a full review by
this Court of a full and complete order on the
petition for declaratory relief before this
Court rushes to judgment.

Thus, I coneur that this case should be
remanded, but I dissent on this Court’s stun-
ning failure to recognize our jurisdictional
limits in explicitly resolving constitutional is-
sues in the context of the review of a prelimi-
nary injunction with no entry of an order
below capable of full review.

Davis, Justice, dissenting:
(Filed October 2, 2017)

It is well-established that.
“{t]he designation of a union as exclusive
representative carries with it great re-

success on the merits and her irreparable harm
or a balance of hardships that favors plaintiff.”’)
(footnotes omitted),

18, See Thomas R, Lee, Preliminary Injunctions
and the Status Quo, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109,
110 (2001) (‘The federal courts of appeals are in
substantial disarray on an issue of threshold i
portance to the issuance of preliminary injunc-
tive relief, One set of circuits says that the tradi-
tional role of such relief is the preservation of the
‘status quo,’ and thus accords disfavored status
to preliminary orders that are mandatory in form
or that otherwise upset the status quo. In these
circuits, a party seeking a preliminary injunction
must satisfy a heightened standard of proof re-
quiring a clear and compelling. showing of the
propriety of such relief. Another set of circuits
rejects this view. These circuits apply a uniform
standard to all requests for preliminary relief.”);
Rachel A. Weisshaar, Hazy Shades of Winter:
Resolving the Circuit Split over Preliminary In-
junctions, 65 Vand.L.Rev. 1011, 1014-15 (2012)
(discussing split of authority among federal dis-
trict courts as to proper standard following Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's decision in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 129 S.Ct, 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).

sponsibilities, The tasks of negotiating and
administering a  collective-bargaining
agreement and representing the interests
of employees in settling disputes and pro-
cessing grievances are continuing and dif-
ficult. ones. ‘They -often entail expenditure
of much time and money. The services of
lawyers, expert negotiators; economists,
and a research staff, as well as general
administrative personnel, may be required.
Moreover, in carrying out these duties, the
union is obliged fairly and equitably to
represent all employees ...; union and
nonunion, within the relevant unit.”
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 US.
507, 552-53, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1976, 114 L.Ed.
2d 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring, in part,
and dissenting, in part) (emphasis added)
(quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 481
US. 209, 221-22, 97 S, Ct, 1782, 1792-98, 52
L.Ed. 2d 261 (1977) (additional quotations
and citations omitted; footnote omitted)). The
majority's misapprehension of the realities of
the collective bargaining process notwith-
standing,’ the Respondent unions herein ac-
knowledge and embrace their duty of fair

representation and neither shirk’ nor deny’

their responsibility to union and nonunion.
members alike.

In its opinion, the majority opines that the
case sub judice raises concerns of fairness.
This is an absolutely correct statement of the

1, My brethren suggest that the Respondent un-
ions, themselves, have created’ ‘the problem
‘which they now ask the judiciary to solve by
declaring the subject statutory scheme unconsti-
tutional insofar as the unions, themselves, have
sought the coveted position as exclusive repre-

sentative of their employees, and, thus, necessari-*

- ly have incurred and. assumed the expenses at-
tributed to the free-riding nonunion employees.
This brief summation of the majority's under-
standing of the issue demonstrates an inordinate
lack of comprehension of basic tenets of labor
law: the election of an exclusive union represen-
tative is a matter of necessity, not of choice. But
for the existence of an exclusive union represen-
tative to facilitate negotiations, there would be no
collective bargaining agreement to reconcile and
govern the often divergent and discordant inter-
ests of employers and employees in the first
instance, and the entire statutory scheme at issue
herein, which seeks to regulate such union activi-
ties, would be a mere nullity.

2. The term “free rider” refers to nonunion mem-
bers who nevertheless are represented by their

649

issues underlying the instant proceeding be-
cause the Respondent unions rightfully ques-
tion how it can be fair that they are required
to expend time-and resources to ensure that
nonunion members are equally represented
while those same nonunion members are al-
lowed a free ride? to benefit from the union’s
collective bargaining activities without having
to contribute to. the cost of providing such
services. Indeed, there exists

a correlation between the rights and duties
of the union, on the one hand, and the
“ nonunion members of the bargaining unit,
on the other, Where the state imposes
upon the union a duty to deliver services, it
may permit the union to demand reim-
bursement for them; or, looked at from the
other end, where the state creates in the
- nonmembers a legal entitlement from the
union, it may compel them to pay the cost.

Lehnert, 500 US. at 556, 111 8. Ct. at 1978,
114 L.Ed. 2d 572 (Scalia, J., concurring, in
part, and dissenting, in part) (emphasis add-
ed). This quid pro quo arrangement, con-
doned by Congress and secured by constitu-
tional protections, seeks to promote the dual
interests of unions in ‘providing collective
bargaining services to all employees without
regard for union membership and of erhploy-
ees in choosing not to become union mem-
bers, while ensuring that all employees bene-

unit's exclusive representative union: “‘ ‘the free
rider Congress had in mind was the employee
the union was required to represent and from
‘whom it could not withhold benefits obtained for
its members.’” Lehnert v, Ferris Faculty Ass’n,
500 U.S. 507, 552-53, 111 S, Ct, 1950, 1976, 114
L.Ed. 2d 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring, in
part, and dissenting, in part) (quoting Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline -&-S.S. Clerks, Freight
Handlers, Express & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435,
452, 104 S, Ct. 1883, 1894, 80 L.Ed. 2d 428
(1984),

3. Torthis end,

[ulnder the] [fair representation] doctrine, the
exclusive agent's statutory authority to repre-
sent all members of a designated unit includes
a statutory obligation to serve the interests of
all members without hostility or discrimination
toward ary, to exercise its discretion with
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct. :

Vaca v, Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 8. Ct. 903,

910, 17 L.Ed. 2d 842 (1967) (citation omitted).

650

fitting from such services share in the cost of
their provision.

Nevertheless, while the majority astutely
recognizes that matters of public policy are
within the realm of the Legislature, it fails to
appreciate that matters of constitutionality
squarely reside in the judicial branch of gov-
ernment. By this I mean that while statutes
must be read so as to conform to the consti-
tution where possible,! it is not the Court’s
provinee to contort the law to achieve a
finding of constitutionality by resorting to
“disingenuous evasion” to achieve a result
that clearly is contrary to legislative intent.
Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck,
487 U.S, 785, 762, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2657, 101
L.Ed, 2d 684 (1988) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). In establishing the federal
framework within which the instant contro-
versy is reposed, the majority stops short of
considering the law governing the resolution
of the issue herein presented, concluding suc-
cinetly that, “[iIn sum, wnder federal law,
states may decide whether to allow or pro-
hibit employers and unions to negotiate
agreements requiring compulsory union
membership, or requiring nonunion employ-
ees to pay dues or fees to the union.” (Em-
phasis added). Because the majority fails to
consider the applicable federal law, however,
it inevitably misconstrues the limitations on
states’ authority to regulate union activity
and ignores the clear recognition that Con-
gress, not the states, has defined the extent
to which a nonunion employee may be re-
quired to pay representational fees to a un-
ion. In light of these shortcomings in the
majority's opinion, I respectfully dissent.

_ Preemption

Congress enacted the Labor Management:
Relations Act (“LMRA”)5 to provide unifor-
mity and predictability in the field of labor
law by establishing the permissible bounds of
relationships between unions, employers, and
employees. “‘(I]n passing the NLRA® Con-
4, See Frantz v. Palmer, 211 W. Va. 188, 194, 564

$.E.2d 398, 404 (2001) (recognizing Court’s “ob-

ligation to respect the legislative will and to
uphold all constitutionally valid legislative provi-
sions” (citation omitted); State ex rel. City of

Charleston v. Coghill, 156 W. Va. 877, 883, 207

S.E.2d 113, 118 (1973) (‘Acts of the Legislature

are always presumed to be constitutional, and

this Court will interpret legislation in any reason-

gress largely displaced state regulation of
industrial relations, and thus, states ‘may not
regulate activity that the NLRA protects,
prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.’ ”
Simms v. Local 1752, Int'l Longshoremen
Ass’n, 838 F.3d 618, 617 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus. Labor &
Human Relations v. Gould Ine, 475 US.
282, 286, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1061, 89 L.Ed. 2d
223 (1986)) (footnote added; additional cita-
tion omitted). Section 8(a)(8) of the LMRA
precludes compulsory union membership as a
condition of hiring for employment, but still
allows employers and unions to enter agree-
ments to require, as a condition of continued
employment, employees to join a union after
they have been employed for a specified peri-
od of time. See generally 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(8). The validity of such an arrange-
ment, while permitted under federal law,
may nevertheless be altered by the exercise
of a state’s authority to determine whether
such compulsory union membership may be
required under state law. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(h) (“§ 14(b)”).

Despite Congress’ grant of such authority
to the states, however, the United States
Supreme Court consistently has recognized
that free riders, i¢., nonunion members who
enjoy the benefits of a union’s collective bar-
gaining activities through the union’s duty of
fair representation but who, as nonunion
members, do not correspondingly pay union
dues to reimburse the cost of the union’s
provision of such services, have an “obli-
gation to support union activities ... ger-
mane to collective bargaining, contract ad-
ministration, and grievance adjustment.”
Beck, 487 U.S. at 745, 108 S. Ct. at 2648, 101
L.Ed, 2d 634, In this regard, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “Congress author-
ized compulsory unionism only to the extent
necessary to ensure that those who enjoy
union-negotiated benefits contribute to their
cost,” id., 487 U.S. at 746, 108 S. Ct. at 2649,

able way which will sustain its constitutionali-
ty."). .

5. This Act is also known as the Taft-Hartley Act.

6. The NLRA, ie. National Labor Relations Act,
is the predecessor to the LMRA.

101 L.Ed. 2d 684, “but the ‘membership’ that
may be so required has been ‘whittled down
to its financial core.”” Id., 487 U.S. at 745,
108 S. Ct. at 2648, 101 L.Ed, 2d 684 (quoting
National Labor Relations Bd. v. General
Motors Corp., 873 U.S. 784, 742, 88 S. Ct.
1458, 1459, 10 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1968). Stated
otherwise, “ ‘Congress’ decision to allow un-
ion-security agreements at all reflects its
concern that ... the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement be allowed to provide
that there be no employees who are getting
the benefits of union representation without
paying for them?”7? by “ensuring that non-
members who obtain the benefits of union
representation can be made to pay for [their
fair share of] them.”®

Having recognized these corresponding
rights and obligations of unions and free-
rider nonunion members, it is important to
note that the United States Supreme Court
has not declared that the authority of states
to determine their own, parameters of union
membership extends so far as to require
unions to undertake their duty to fairly rep-
resent nonunion free riders on a gratis basis.
And, it further should be noted that this is
the foundational context within which Senate
Bill 1 was promulgated—not the incomplete
historical framework recited in the majority's
opinion that completely and conveniently ig-
nores the corollary duty of nonunion mem-
bers to pay for the services the unions are
obligated to provide them.

In light of Congress’ intent to permit un-
ions to recoup representational fees from
nonunion members and to negotiate with em-
ployers to incorporate such terms in collec-
tive bargaining agreements, it is clear that
the specific terms of such an arrangement
must be decided with respect to federal, not
state, law in the interest of preserving the
uniform and predictable enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements. “Preemption
under the LMRA is grounded in substantial
part on the desire for uniformity in the inter-
pretation of labor contracts.” General Motors

7. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 750, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 2651, 101 L.Ed.
2d 634 (1988) (quoting Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers, Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
426 U.S. 407, 416, 96 S. Ct. 2140, 2144, 48 L.Ed,
2d 736 (1976).

651

Corp. v. Smith, 216 W. Va. 78, 88, 602 S.H.2d
521, 581 (2004) (per curiam) Maynard, Cd.,
dissenting). In other words,

[t]he interests in interpretive uniformity
and predictability that require that labor-
contract disputes be resolved by reference
to federal law also require that the mean-
ing given a contract phrase or term be
subject to uniform federal interpretation.
Thus, questions relating to what the par-
ties to a labor agreement agreed, and what
legal consequences were intended to flow
from breaches of that agreement, must be
resolved by reference to uniform federal
law. .

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Luce, 471 U.S. 202,
211, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1911, 85 L.Ed. 2d 206
(1985). As such, “[tJhe governing consider-
ation is that to allow the States to control
activities that are potentially subject to fed-
eral regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict with national labor policy.” San Die-
go Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union,
Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S, 286, 246, 79
S. Ct. 778, 780, 8 L.Ed. 2d 775 (1959) (foot-
note omitted). Thus, “[ilt is federal law alone
that defines the relationship between the
parties to a labor contract, and ‘[a] state rule
that purports to define the meaning or scope
of a term in [such] a contract’ is preempted.”
Lowe v. Imperial Colliery Co., 180 W. Va.
518, 528, 877 S.H.2d 652, 657 (1988) (quoting
Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 210, 105 8. Ct. at
1911, 85 L.Ed. 2d 206).

Therefore, there can be no question that
this area of the law has been preempted by
Congress and is not a proper area within
which the states may legislate. This is so
because arrangements between unions and
employers to charge nonunion employees
with their proportionate share of the union’s
collective bargaining expenses necessarily
are achieved through the collective bargain-
ing process, itself, and the interpretation of
specific terms of a collective bargaining
agreement is subject to federal law to ensure

8. Beck, 487 U.S. at 759, 108 S. Ct. at 2656, 101
L.Ed. 2d 634.

652

consistency in the construction and enforce-
ment of such agreements. See Syl. pt. 4,
Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co, Inc., 199
W. Va. 447, 485 8.E.2d 391 (1997) (“An appli-
cation of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only
if such application requires the interpretation
of a collective-bargaining agreement.”). See
also Syl. pt. 1, Cutright v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 201 W. Va. 50, 491 8.E.2d 808 (1997)
(“The Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, in-
validates state laws that interfere with or are
contrary to federal law.”); Syl. pt. 4, Lowe,
180 W. Va. 518, 877 S.H.2d 652 (“While Sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947), does not divest.
state courts of jurisdiction in labor cases, the
federal labor law is supreme and is to be
applied by state and federal courts alike.
State law to the contrary is preempted.”
(emphasis added)), Accordingly, it is clear
that Senate Bill 1’s prohibition of the charg-
ing of representational agency fees to non-
union members is an invalid exercise of the
State’s legislative power given that this par-
ticular area of the law has been preempted.
To the extent that the majority has upheld
this proposed statutory language, it was
wrong, and from that decision, I dissent.
Constitutionality

Assuming arguendo that the subject provi-
sion has not been invalidated by federal pre-
emption, the promulgation adopted by the
Legislature still cannot stand because it is
unconstitutional under both the federal and
State constitutions as an unlawful taking of
private property. The Fifth Amendment: to
the United States Constitution, also known
as the Takings Clause, prohibits the taking of
private property without just compensation
therefor. “The Takings Clause provides that
‘private. property [shall not] be taken for
public use without just compensation. U.S.
Const, amend. V.” International Union of
Operating Eng’rs Local 870 v. Wasden, 217
F. Supp. 8d 1209, 1228 (D. Idaho 2016) (mem.
decision), Likewise, article III, § 9 of the
West Virginia Constitution also precludes the
unlawful seizure of property; “Private prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public
use, without just compensation[,]” Jd.

In the case sub judice, the position that
the Legislature proposes, and which the ma-
jority of the Court endorses, would require
unions serving as an exclusive representative
to equally serve union’ and nonunion mem-
bers alike in their pursuit of collective bar-
gaining activities and their provision of ser-
vices attendant thereto, while permitting
free-riding, nonunion members to enjoy such
benefits without paying a single dime for
them. Unquestionably, such free riders would
be unjustly enriched while both the unions
and their dues-paying members would be
unduly, and unfairly, punished by the neces-
sity of absorbing the costs associated with
the free riders’ representation, which costs
inevitably would trickle down from the un-
ion’s incursion thereof to the countless union
members required to subsidize their free-
riding coworkers. Moreover, this proposed,
and endorsed, arrangement directly contra-
yenes the constitutional prohibitions of tak-
ing one’s private property both without just
compensation and for a private use:

_The two most basic economic rights en-
joyed in the United States are (1) that the
government may not confiscate private
property for public use without just com-
pensation, and (2) that the takings power
must be exercised for a public purpose,
and so the government may not take the
property of one private party for the sole
purpose of transferring it to, another pri-
vate party, regardless of whether. “just”
compensation is paid,

Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 688 (7th Cir.

2014) (Wood, C.J:, dissenting) (citing Kelo v.

City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S.
469, 477, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661, 162 L.Ed. 2d
489 (2005)), Accord Riggs v. State Rd.
Comm’r, 120 W. Va, 298, 801, 197 S.E. 818,
814 (1938) (“Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use, without just
compensation...’ West Virginia Constitu-
tion, Article III, Section 9. It is imperative
that this paramount provision of our organic
law be given effect,”); Syl. pt. 1, Hench v.
Pritt, 62 W. Va. 270, 57 S.E. 808 (1907)
(“Under our, Constitution private property
cannot be taken for private use, either with
or without compensation.”).

Absent the ability to seek such contribu-
tions from free riders, unions are expected to
continue providing their collective bargaining
services with no recourse for seeking recoup-
ment of their costs of providing such repre-
sentation, Legally requiring exclusive repre-
sentative unions to expend such resources
while foreclosing their ability to obtain remu-
neration therefor amounts to an unlawful,
and unconstitutional, taking of private prop-
erty plain and simple. The unconstitutionality
of this arrangement could not be clearer,
and, yet, the majority blithely ignores the
impudence and inequities attendant to such a
scheme, instead blaming the unions for com-
plaining about the representational duties
they have agreed to assume, Just because a
union voluntarily agrees to assume or willing-
ly seeks the title of exclusive representative,
however, does not mean that it should be
forced to provide its collective bargaining
services free of charge. As exclusive bargain-
ing agents between employers and employ-
ees, Congress has recognized the valuable
role unions play in creating and maintaining
harmonious workplaces and working environ-
ments in our country. See generally Sweeney,
167 F.3d at 684 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing benefits from exclusive representa-
tive unions enjoyed by employers). That un-
ions accept the responsibilities of exclusive
representative status is of no moment. That,
free-riding nonunion members are being ex-
cused from paying their fair share of the
union’s collective bargaining expenses that
have inured to the free riders’ benefit is the
problem—which the majority declines to ac-
knowledge, much less redress.

In short, the majority’s failure to recognize
these fatal deficiencies of Senate Bill 1 dem-
onstrates its blatant lack of appreciation for
the sanctity of basic constitutional protec-
tions guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. “In
our country, the state is not entitled to force
private organizations or persons to render
uncompensated services to others. The Tak-
ings Clause, which applies to the states, says
as much.” Sweeney, 767 F.8d at 684-85
(Wood, C.J., dissenting). Yet, because exclu-

9. See Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Jefferson Cty.
Bduc, Ass’n, 183 W. Va. 15, 393 S.B.2d 653
(1990); Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Donley v. Baker,
112 W. Va, 263, 164 S.B. 154 (1932).

653

sive representative unions have an obligation
to represent all employees in a workplace
fairly and without regard for their union
membership or affiliation, and the majority
has failed to understand that there exists a
corollary right to expect nonunion member
free riders to bear their proportionate share
of the cost of the union’s collective bargain-
ing activities, the right to be free from the
unfettered taking of one’s property no longer
is a right guaranteed by the ‘laws of this
State. Because the preclusive effect of Senate
Bill 1 leaves unions with no ability to enforce
the corollary duty of free-riding nonunion
members to pay for the services which the
unions are obligated to provide to them, and
because the majority has upheld the validity
of this provision despite its blatant unconsti-
tutionality, I respectfully dissent,
Injunctive Relief

The foregoing analysis of the validity of
Senate Bill 1 is essential because it is instruc-
tive to the resolution of the pivotal issue
presented by the case sub judice:Sare the
Respondent unions entitled to the injunctive
relief they herein seek. Whether such a de-
termination is made pursuant to the authori-
ties cited in the majority’s opinion® or ac-
cording to the standard urged by Justice
Workman in her separate opinion,! the re-
sult should be the same: the Respondents
undeniably have established their entitlement .
to a preliminary injunction to prevent the
enforcement of Senate Bill 1 because the
Respondent unions have demonstrated the
likelihood of success on the merits of their
underlying complaint.

Moreover, with respect to the Respondent
unions’ unconstitutional taking argument,
this Court specifically has held that “[aln
injunction lies to prevent the taking of one’s
private domain, for uses of the public, con-
trary to the constitutional mandate, regard-
Jess of any question of damages.” Syl. pt. 3,
Lovett v. West Virginia Cent. Gas Co., 65 W.
Va, 739, 65 S.E. 196 (1909). Accord Interna-
tional Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 189
v. Schimel, 863 F.8d 674, 678 n. 2 (7th Cir.
10, See, e.g., State of West Virginia, By & Through

McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 196 W. Va. 346, 472
S.E.2d 792 (1996).

654

2017) (“It is well accepted that, when the
government has taken property for a private,
rather than a public, use, injunctive or de-
claratory relief may be appropriate.” (inter-
nal quotations and citations omitted)). See
also Syl. pt. 4, Lovett, 65 W. Va. 789, 65 S.E.
196 (“A question of right, and not one of
damages, is raised upon an application for an
injunction to prevent the taking of private
property for public uses contrary to the Con-
stitution and laws.”),

I acknowledge that Congress has granted
the states authority to enact laws regulating
union activities within their borders. See gen-
erally 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). However, such
grant of authority does not permit states,
including West Virginia, to promulgate legis-
lation that is patently unconstitutional. Even
the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized this limitation on states’ power. See
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129, Am.

Fed’n of Labor v. Northwestern Iron & Met-
al Co., 335 U.S. 525, 586, 69 S. Ct. 251, 257,
98 L.Ed. 212 (1949) (“[Sltates have power to
legislate against what are found to be injuri-
ous practices in their internal commercial
and business affairs, so long as their laws do
not run afoul of some specific federal consti-
tutional prohibition, or of some valid federal
law.” (emphasis added; citations omitted)).
This Court, however, obviously has not, and,
because the majority has complicitly con-
doned these legislative efforts to trammel the
rights of unions and union members through-
out this State, I respectfully dissent.

805 S.E.2d 416
EDWIN K., Respondent Below, Petitioner
ve
BONNIE W., and Bureau for Child
Support Enforcement, Petitioners
Below, Respondents
No. 15-1161

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: February 14, 2017
Filed: April 18, 2017

Daniel R. Grindo, Esq., Law Office of Dan-
iel R. Grindo, PLLC, Gassaway, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for the Petitioner

‘Dee-Ann Burdette, Hsq., West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Re-
sources, Bureau for Child, Support Enforce-
ment, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for
the Respondent

WALKER, Justice:

Petitioner Edwin K.! appeals the Novem-
ber 2, 2015 order of the Circuit Court of
Gilmer County affirming the September 17,
2015 order of the Family Court of, Gilmer
County making an upward modification of his
child support obligations by attributing in-
come based on his prior employment. The
West Virginia Department of Health and Hu-
man Resources, Bureau for Child Support
Enforcement (“BOSE”) filed a response on
behalf of the mother, Bonnie W. Upon con-
sideration of the parties’ briefs and argu-
ments, the submitted record and pertinent
authorities, we affirm the upward modifica-
tion of Petitioner's child support obligation.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The parties were never married but have
one child together, who was born on April 27,
2005. By order entered by the family court in
October 2007, Petitioner was required to pay
Respondent $147.40 per month in child sup-

1, Because this case involves sensitive facts, we
protect the identities of those involved by using
the parties’ first names and last initials only. See

* State ex rel. W. Va. Dep't. of Human -Servs. v.
Cheryl M., 177 W.Va. 688, 689 n.1, 356 S.E.2d
181, 182 n.1 (1987).

2. Until the underlying petition to modify child
support based on a significant change in income

port. Prior to the entry of that order, Peti-
tioner had voluntarily left his employment
with an income of $62,000 per year to become
self-employed, Although the family court at
the time noted that it could have’ imposed
upon Petitioner an obligation based upon the
$62,000 per-year salary, the family court did
not do so and instead attributed an income to
Petitioner in the amount of the then-current
federal minimum wage. At some point after
the entry of the October 2007 child support
order,? Petitioner began employment with an
entity identified as Union Drilling, which was
subsequently acquired by an entity identified
as Sidewinder. The undisputed evidence is
that Petitioner’s income from Union Drill-
ing/Sidewinder was $86,514 in 2014, Petition-
er testified that he left his job with Union
Drilling/Sidewinder at the end of 2014 or
early 2015 because of lack of work or because
he would be required to perform difficult
work.’ In January 2015, Petitioner testified
that he became employed with Blue Dot, a
pressure testing company. Petitioner stated
that he subsequently left his employment
with Blue Dot in April 2015 because he “was
going to get laid off anyway” and his parents
needed help remodeling their home for hand-
ieapped needs. Petitioner also contends he
left employment with Blue Dot to pursue
self-employment as a plumber because he
‘was presented with an opportunity to grow
his plumbing business, which had been in
existence since the late 1990s. For the period
of January to April 2015, Petitioner had in-
come of $15, 948: 99,

In June 2018, BCSE filed ‘the underlying
petition on behalf of Bonnie W. seeking up-
ward modification of Petitioner's child sup-
port obligation due to his significant change
in income subsequent to the October 2007
initial child support order, Petitioner did not
provide any financial disclosures for past or
present income. At a September 2, 2015

was filed in June 2015, no notification was made
to the family court on behalf of either party to
indicate that Petitioner's income had significant-
ly increased. : .

3. ‘The testimony at the heating regarding the
timing and reasons for Petitioner's resignation
from Union Drilling/Sidewinder was contradicto-
ry. :

hearing, Petitioner testified that his then-
current income from his self-employment, in
combination with all other sources of income
was around $500 per month, which is less
than the fulltime minimum wage. BCSE ar-
gued that the Petitioner's child support obli-
gation should not be based on the federal
minimum wage or actual earnings, but his
income in 2015 before he voluntarily left
employment. Both. parties testified relating
to income and expenses, and Petitioner was
heard on the circumstances surrounding his
departure from employment from Blue Dot
and his pursuit of self-employment. On Sep-
tember 17, 2015, the family court granted the
upward modification, attributed to Petitioner
an income of $5,816,383 per month, and or-
dered him to pay child support in the amount.
of $580.64 per month effective August 1,
2015.

Petitioner appealed the family court’s or-
der to the Circuit Court of Gilmer County,
arguing that the family court had not made
the necessary findings of fact and conclusions
of law necessary to attribute prior income,
The circuit court refused the appeal and
noted that although the family court did not
use the precise language of the statute in its
findings, the factual findings were sufficient
to attribute prior income and it was well
within the purview and authority of the fami-
ly court to do so. It is from this order that
Petitioner appeals,

Il, STANDARD OF REVIEW
TH As discussed above, the circuit court
affirmed the family court’s September 17,
2015 order. In these procedural circum-
stances, we have held:

[I]n reviewing a final order entered by a
circuit judge upon a review of, or upon a
refusal to review, a final order of a family
court judge, we review the findings of fact

4, “Attributed income” is defined in West Virginia
Code § 48-1-205(a) as follows:

“Attributed income” means income not actual-

ly earned by a parent but which may be attrib-

uted to the parent because he or she is unem-

. ployed, is not working full time or is working

below full earning capacity or has nonperform-

ing or underperforming assets. Income may be

attributed to a parent if the court evaluates the

parent's earning capacity in the local economy

657

made by the family court judge under the
clearly erroneous standard, and the appli-
cation of the law to the facts under an
abuse of discretion standard. We review
questions of law de novo.

Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216 W.Va. 474,
607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

Il; ANALYSIS

Tl Petitioner asserts on appeal that the
cireuit court erred in affirming the Septem-
ber 17, 2015 family court order that made an
upward modification of his child support obli-
gation through attribution of income. Peti-
tioner argues that the circuit court erred in
finding the court made adequate findings in
its order relating to the statutory factors to
support upward modification and specifically
failed to find that his self-employment is
exempt from income attribution pursuant to
the applicable statute. We disagree,

I We have observed that West Virginia
Code § 48-1-205 allows a family court or
circuit court to attribute income to a parent
“when there is evidence that the parent has,
without justifiable reason, voluntarily acted
to reduce their income.” Porter v, Bego, 200
W.Va. 168, 175-76, 488 S,H.2d 448, 450-51
(1997), As we explained i in Syllabus Point 4 of
Porter:

“Attributed income” means income not ac-
tually earned by a parent, but which may
_ be attributed to the parent because he or
she is unemployed, is not working full
time, is working below full earning capaci-
ty,.or has non-performing or underper-
forming assets. [W. Va. Code § 48-1-205
(2008) ].4 Attributed income consists of
moneys which a support obligor should
have earned had he or she diligently pur-
sued reasonable employment opportunities,

(giving consideration to relevant evidence that
pertains to the parent's work history, qualifica-
tions, education and physical or mental condi-
tion) and determines that the parent is unem-
ployed, is not working full time or is working
below full earning capacity. Income may also
be attributed to a parent if the court finds that
.the obligor has nonperforming or nderper-
forming assets,

658

or reasonably utilized, applied or invested

his or her assets.
(footnote added).>

West Virginia Code § 48-1-205(b) outlines
a three-part test to evaluate whether attribu-
tion of income to a parent is appropriate. The
statute provides:

If an obligor: (1) Voluntarily leaves em-

ployment or voluntarily alters his or her

pattern of employment so as to be unem-
ployed, underemployed or employed below
full earning capacity; (2) is able to work
and is available for full-time work for
which he or she is fitted by prior training
or experience; and (8) is not seeking em-
ployment in the manner that a reasonably
prudent person in his or her circumstances
would do, then an alternative method for
the court to determine gross income is to
attribute to the person an earning capacity
based on his or her previous income. ...

[iJn order for the court to consider attribu-

tion of income, it is not necessary for the

court to find that the obligor’s termination

or alteration of employment was for the

purpose of evading a support obligation.
'W. Va. Code § 48-1-205(b) (2015).

The first element requires only that the
departure from employment be voluntary
and, in this case, that the Petitioner be em-
ployed below full earning capacity. Here,
there is no dispute that Petitioner left his
employment with Blue Dot voluntarily. Al-
though Petitioner claims he “knew he was
going to be laid off,” he testified that he
could have continued working for as long as
work was available and further testified that
he was not served with any notice that his
employer would be making layoffs or that he
would be put on low earnings (unemployment
benefits). Petitioner submitted no evidence
that layoffs were imminent or expected aside
from his own testimony that he thought he

5. The original provisions governing attribution of
income were in the Code of State Rules. In 1996,
the Legislature enacted West Virginia Code
§ 48A-1A-3 to govern income attribution for pur-
poses of calculating child support. See Porter, 200
‘W.Va. at 173-74, 488 S.E.2d at 448-49, The stat-
ute has been amended several times including in
1997, 2001 and most recently in 2008. The appli-
cable statute is now West Virginia Code § 48-1-
205. In addition to making minor stylistic

would be laid off. Petitioner also indicated he
left his employment to aid his parents in
making their home handicap accessible and
in order to pursue self-employment through
his existing plumbing business. The undis-
puted evidence regarding the dormancy
and/or lack of profitability of his plumbing
business demonstrates that, as compared to
his lucrative prior employment with drilling
companies, he is employed below full earning
capacity. Thus, this first element is readily
satisfied from the record.

As to the second element, Petitioner sub-
mitted no evidence to rebut the fact that he
was able and available for work. Rather,
Petitioner’s testimony was that he chose to
pursue his own business for reasons unrelat-
ed to his ability to work.

Petitioner’s primary challenge to the
court’s decision relates to the third element,
which provides for attribution where an indi-
vidual “is not seeking employment in the
manner that a reasonably prudent person in
his or her circumstance would do....” W.Va.
Code § 48-1-205(b)(8). We have interpreted
this element as requiring a family court to
“examine what a reasonable, similarly-situat-
ed parent would have done had the family
remained intact or, in cases involving a non-
marital birth, what the parent would have
done had a household been formed.” Porter,
200 W.Va. at 176, 488 S.E.2d at 451. Petition-
er argues that pursuing self-employment and
establishing a business is consistent with
what the “reasonably prudent person” would
do in the same or similar circumstances.

Petitioner further argues that the legisla-
ture has enumerated self-employment as ex-
empt from attribution of income. The rele-
vant portions of the statute relied upon by
Petitioner are as follows:

(c) Income shall not be attributed to an

obligor who is unemployed or underem-

changes over the years, the Legislature amended
the statute to permit the attribution of income
from nonperforming or underperforming assets
and to insert the last sentence in subsection (b),
which provides that “[iJn order for the court to
consider attribution of income, it is not necessary
for the court to find that the obligor’s termi-
nation or alteration of employment was for the
purpose of evading a support obligation.” W.Va.
Code § 48-1-205(b).

ployed or is otherwise working below full
earning capacity if any of the following
conditions exist:

(2) The parent is pursuing a plan of eco-
nomic self-improvement which will result,
within a reasonable time, in an economic
benefit to the children to whom the sup-
port obligation is owed, including, but not
limited to, self-employment or education:

Provided, That if the parent is involved in

an educational program, the court shall

ascertain that the person is making sub-

stantial progress toward completion of the

program[,]
W. Va. Code § 48-1-205(c)(2). Petitioner ar-
gues that his circumstances are similar to
those in Cassandra W. v. Scott M., No, 14-
1002, 2015 WL 3448211 (W. Va. May 29,
2015) (memorandum decision). In that case,
we discussed this statutory exemption from
attribution of income because the parent was
pursuing his education. Id. at *8. In Cassan-
dra W., the child’s father was a contractor
for the federal government in Afghanistan.
Id. at *1. He received a separation letter
allowing him to renew his contract for only
one month, after which time he would be laid
off. Id. The father chose not to renew the
one-month contract and instead enrolled in
training that would be completed in four
weeks’ time, after which he would be able to
obtain a higher rate of employment in the
local job market. Jd. at *1-2. We affirmed the
family court’s refusal to attribute the income
from his former employment as he was pur-
suing a plan of economic self-improvement
that would result in an economic benefit to
the child within a reasonable amount of time.
Id. at *3,

Although the ‘fathér in Cassandra W. did
leave his employment while he could have
continued to work, his circumstances were
vastly different from those in this case. First,
as discussed above, Petitioner has not pro-
duced any evidence that layoffs were immi-
nent, In contrast, the father in Cassandra W.
was provided with a notice that he would be
laid off in one month. Second, in Cassandra
W., there was a finite amount of time (only
four weeks) to complete the training pro-
gram, and the father demonstrated that,

659

upon its completion, he would be able to
obtain a higher rate of employment in the
local job market. While we acknowledge that
self-employment is considered a plan of eco-
nomic self-improvement pursuant to the stat-
ute, Petitioner failed to provide evidence that
his plumbing business will result, within a
reasonable time, in economic benefit to his
child. In fact, as discussed more thoroughly
below, his departure from employment from
Blue Dot and pursuit of self-employment has
and is projected to continue to result in
economic detriment to his child, including the
Joss of health care insurance coverage.

We find the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding Petitioner’s departure from em-
ployment are more akin to those in Melinda
A. v. William R., 280 W.Va. 781, 742 8.B.2d
419 (2018). In Melinda H., the father left
full-time employment with a salary of
$6,919.48 per month for employment with
Marble King, owned by his fiancé’s mother,
at a rate of $10 per hour. Id. at 734, 742
§.E.2d at 422. The family court set his child
support obligation pursuant to the $10 per-
hour figure. Jd. In reversing the family
court’s decision, we noted that, while the
father may have had a “long term plan” to
run or share in running Marble King with his
fianeé, testimony from his future mother-in-
law revealed no immediate plans to turn the
business over to his fiancé, nor was there any
plan to do so in the foreseeable future. Jd. at
786, 742 S.E.2d at 424. Moreover, the father’s
income would be based on a small percentage
of profits from contracts resulting in no more
than a few thousand dollars here and there
on a sporadic basis. Id. Accordingly, we held
that such a “long term plan” was not expect-
ed to result in economic benefit to the child
within a reasonable amount of time. Id.

Here, Petitioner’s foray into the plumbing
business has a similar, vague financial out-
look with sporadic earnings that are not ex-
pected to result in economic benefit to the
child within a reasonable amount of time,
Petitioner previously attempted self-employ-
ment, having obtained his plumbing license in
1997 or 1998, and has acknowledged that his
plumbing business has never been very suc-
cessful. Petitioner indicated on his 2014 tax
return that his plumbing business was dor-

660

mant. He testified that as of the time of the
hearing in 2015, the business had income of
$500 per month and expenses of approxi-
mately “a couple thousand” dollars per
month, and thus it was currently operating at
a loss. Petitioner testified that he had been
living off of loans and his-savings, which had
been diminished from around $8,000 to less
than $1,000. Petitioner offered no specific
evidence of any future financial outlook what-
soever,

It is clear that, had a household been
formed, a reasonable, similarly-situated par-
ent would not have left gainful and lucrative

* employment with health benefits in the local
job market to pursue self-employment in a
field in which he had been previously unsuc-
cessful and which was not providing ample
income to support the business itself, much
less its owner and his child. There was no
evidence presented that business was becom-
ing profitable or would become successful
enough to provide for his child within a rea-
sonable time. To the contrary, there is ample
evidence in the record and in the tenor and
substance of the family court’s questioning to
confirm that the statutory tests were applied
and the family court determined that the
exception did not apply to Petitioner's partic-
ular circumstances. Accordingly, although
the family court’s order did not make explicit
findings of fact and conclusions of law in its
order relating to application of the three-part
statutory test, we find no error,

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, .we affirm the
November 2, 2015 order of the Circuit Court
of Gilmer County,

Affirmed.

805 S.E.2d 421
STATE of West Virginia, Respondent
v.
Wayne DUBUQUE, Petitioner
No. 16-0357 .
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 18, 2017
Filed: September 21, 2017

3 .
oO

1, Mr, Dubuque appealed and this Court affirmed
the circuit court’s order in a memorandum deci-
sion. See State v. Dubugue, No. 16-0357, 2017
WL 385791 (W.Va. Jan. 27, 2017) (memorandum
decision). Mr, Dubuque subsequently filed a peti-
tion for rehearing which this Court granted.

Kevin D. Mills, Esq., Shawn R. McDer-
mott, Esq., Mills McDermott, PLLC, Mar-
tinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Petition-
er

Scott E, Johnson, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, Charleston, West Virginia, Brandon
C. H. Sims, Esq., Jefferson County Assistant
Prosecutor, Charles Town, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent

Justice Ketchum:

Petitioner Wayne Dubuque (“Mr, Du-
buque”) appeals from the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County’s March 16, 2016, sentenc-
ing order following his guilty plea to five
counts relating to his possession of material
visually depicting a minor engaged in sexual-
ly explicit conduct in violation of W.Va. Code
§ 61-8C-8 [2014]! The plea agreement pro-
vided that Mr. Dubuque retained “the right
to appeal the Court’s ruling as to the multi-
plicity of counts 5-9” to which he pleaded
guilty.

On appeal, Mr, Dubuque asserts that the
circuit court erred when it ruled that his
possession of five individual VHS tapes con-
taining child pornography subjected him to
five separate violations of our child pornogra-
phy statute. Mr. Dubuque argues that our
child pornography statute does not permit a
separate count of possession for each of the
five VHS tapes; rather, it only permits him to
be charged with a single count of possession.
Thus, he argues that he was subjected to
multiple punishments for the same criminal
offense in violation of the double jeopardy
clauses of the West Virginia and United
States constitutions.”

After review, we find that the plain lan-
guage of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 does not
permit Mr. Dubuque to be charged with five
separate violations of the statute. We there-

2. W. Va. Const. art. Il, § 5 (“No person shall
... be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for
the same offence.”); U.S. Const. amend. V (‘No
person shall ... be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]")

fore reverse the circuit court’s March 16,
2016, order sentencing Mr. Dubuque for five
separate violations of W.Va. Code-§ 61-80-3.
We remand this matter to the circuit court
for entry of a new sentencing order consis-
tent with our ruling herein.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2014, Mr. Dubuque’s girl-
friend, D.G.,? contacted the Jefferson County
Sheriff's Office and reported that Mr. Du-
buque had sexually assaulted her, Sergeant
Steven Holz of the Jefferson County Sheriff's
Office investigated the sexual assault at Mr.
Dubuque’s residence. During the course of
this investigation, Sergeant Holz found a box
in Mr. Dubuque’s basement that was sealed
with duct tape and had a note attached to it
that provided, “Mom and Dad, if you are
reading this then something must have hap-
pened on my trip. If so, Do not open this box.
It is my request that this box and the con-
tents inside be destroyed—No Questions
Asked! Please know that I love you both,
Please honor this request, Love, Wayne.”
Sergeant Holz testified that this box con-
tained material visually depicting child por-
nography including Polaroid pictures and five
VHS tapes. In addition to the material seized
from this box, Sergeant Holz stated that
other items were seized from the residence
“including computers, [and] memory sticks.”

Following this investigation, Mr. Dubuque
was indicted by a Jefferson County grand
jury on twenty criminal counts. The first four
counts related to Mr. Dubuque sexually as-
saulting D.G. Counts five through nineteen
involved possession of material depicting a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in
violation of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3. Specifical-
ly, counts five through seven charged Mr,
Dubuque with possession of material depict-
ing a minor engaged in sexually explicit con-
duet depicting violence against the minor;
counts eight through nineteen charged Mr.
Dubuque with possession of material depict-

3, Due to the sensitive facts, we refer to D.G. only
by her initials. See In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va.

663

ing a minor engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct; and count twenty charged Mr. Dubuque
‘with possession of child erotica.

Mr. Dubuque filed a motion to dismiss the
multiple counts relating to his possession of
child pornography. In this motion, counsel
for Mr. Dubuque argued that “[bJased upon
the plain language of the statute [W.Va. Code
§ 61-8C-3], Mr. Dubuque should have been
charged with a single violation for possession
of child pornography.” The circuit court de-
nied this motion, .

Thereafter, a plea agreement was reached
in which Mr. Dubuque entered a guilty plea
to 1) count one of the indictment regarding
his second-degi'ee sexual assault of D.G., and
2) counts five through nine of the indictment,
regarding his possession of child pornogra-
phy that was contained on the five VHS
tapes recovered from his residence.

At the plea hearing, the State informed the
circuit court that the five VHS tapes were
made by Mr. Dubuque in New York and
depicted Mr, Dubuque sexually abusing his
minor niece. During this hearing, counsel for
Mr. Dubuque told the circuit court that “this
case is not about the abuse that occurred [on
the VHS tapes], this case is not about the
filming or the creation of those things, those
things if prosecuted would be in New York.
They still could be. I don’t know what is
going on ... I can’t say definitively. It could
happen in New York but those are New York
charges, All that has to.do with New
York.... When we are talking about this
prosecution the only thing that this involves
is possession.” We emphasize that the only
issue before this Court in the instant appeal
is the interpretation of West Virginia’s child
pornography statutes, and their application

‘to Mr. Dubuque’s possession of material de-

picting a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct.
The plea agreement entered into by the
parties provides as follows:
1, The defendant will plead guilty to
counts five through nine of the indictment.
Counts 5-7 allege the felony offense of

625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005).

664

Possession of Material Depicting.a Minor
Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct with
Violence .to the Minor. Counts 8 and 9
allege the felony offense Possession of Ma-
terial Depicting a Minor Engaged in Sexu-
ally Explicit Conduct with such Material
containing over 600 images. Hach of these
counts carries a sentence of not less than
five (5) nor more than fifteen (15) years in
the state penitentiary, There is no, agree-
ment as to how these sentences are to be
served (consecutively or concurrently).

2, The defendant will also plead guilty to
the offense of Second Degree Sexual As-
sault as charged in count 1 of the itidict-
merit. He will be sentenced to not less than
ten nor more than twenty years in the
penitentiary upon his conviction for this
offense, This sentence will be served ‘con-
currently with the sentence set forth in
paragraph # 1. Thus, the defendant would
be exposed to: a maximum possible sen-
tence of not less than twenty five (25) nor
more than seventy five (75) years in the
state penitentiary,

6, The parties agree that the Defendant
will retain the right to appeal. the Court’s
ruling as to [the] multiplicity of counts 5-9
to which he is pleading,

The cireuit court entered a sentencing or-
der on March 16, 2016, ruling that the five
convictions for possession of child pornogra-
phy would be served consecutively. Thus, the
cireuit court sentenced Mr, Dubuque to a
total period of incarceration of twenty-five to
seventy-five years, Mr, Dubuque now appeals

* the circuit court’s sentencing order.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hl This Court's standard of review for
an appeal from a sentencing order is set
forth in Syllabus Point 1, in relevant part, of
State 0. Lucas, 201 W.Va, 271, 496 S.H.2d 221
(1997): “The Supreme Court of Appeals re-
views sentencing orders .., under a deferen-
tial abuse of discretion standard, unless the
order violates , statutory or constitutional
commands.”

HM The issue in this appeal involves a
matter of statutory interpretation. “Where
the issue on an appeal from the circuit court
is clearly a question of law or involving an
interpretation of a statute, we apply a de
novo standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1,
Chrystal R.M, v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va.
188, 459 S,E.2d 415 (1995).

il.

ANALYSIS

IM The issue in this appeal is whether
Mr, Dubuque may be charged with five viola-
tions of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 based on his
possession of five individual VHS tapes con-
taining child pornography. Mr. Dubuque ar-
gues that he received multiple punishments
for the same offense in violation of his double
jeopardy rights under both the federal and
state constitutions,

Wl This Court addressed double jeopar-
dy protections under the federal constitution
in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Gill, 187 W.Va.
186, 416 S.H.2d 258 (1992): *

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution consists of three separate con-
stitutional protections. It protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after con-
viction, And it protects against multiple
punishments for the same offense,

HI This Court addressed double jeopar-
dy protections under the state constitution in
Syllabus Point 1 of Conner v. Griffith, 160
W.Va, 680, 288 S.E.2d 529 (1977): “Fhe Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section’5
of the West Virginia Constitution, provides
immunity from further prosecution where a
court having jurisdiction has acquitted the
accused. It protects against a second prose-
cution for the same offense after conviction.
It also prohibits multiple punishments for the
same offense,”

HN Me. Dubuque invokes the third
double jeopardy prohibition—multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense, This Court
held in Syllabus Point 4 of State v, Goins, 231
‘W.Va, 617, 748 8.H.2d 818 (2018), that “[t]he

analysis of whether a criminal defendant may
be separately convicted and punished for
multiple violations of a single statutory provi-
sion turns upon the. legislatively-intended
unit of prosecution.” 4 “The unit of prosecu-
tion of a statutory offense is generally a
question of what the legislature intended to
be the act or course of conduct prohibited by
the statute for purposes of a single conviction
and sentence.” Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426,
585 A.2d 485, 489 (1988).

Hl Our determination of the legislatively-
intended unit of prosecution for possessing
child pornography pursuant to W.Va. Code
§ 61-8C-3 begins with a review of our rules
of statutory construction. This Court has
held that in deciding the meaning of a statu-
tory provision, “[wle look first to the statute’s
language. If the text, given its plain meaning,
answers the interpretive question, the lan-
guage must prevail and further inquiry is
foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State
Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 578,
587, 466 S.H.2d 424, 488 (1995); see also
Syllabus Point 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 158
W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 884 (1970) (“Where
the language of a statute is free from ambi-
guity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and
applied without resort to interpretation.”);
and Syllabus Point 2, State v. Epperly, 185
W.Va. 877, 65 8.H.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory
provision which is clear and unambiguous
and plainly expresses the legislative intent
will not be interpreted by the courts but will
be given full force and effect.”).

The issue before this Court is whether
W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 subjects a person who
possesses child pornography that is’ con-

4. See also Syllabus Point 7, State v. Gill, supra
(“A claim that double jeopardy has been violated
based on multiple punishments imposed after a
single trial is resolved by determining the legisla-
tive intent as to punishment.”).

5. Our analysis of this issue is confined to the
factual scenario before us—a person who possess
child pomography on individual physical media
storage devices that are stored together in the
same place, i.e,, in a box found in Mr. Dubuque’s
residence. We decline to address whether a per-
son who possess child pornography on multiple
individual media storage devices that are kept in
different locations, such as a residence, an auto-
mobile, or the workplace, is subject to multiple
violations of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3.

665

tained on separate physical media storage
devices, i.¢, five VHS tapes, to multiple viola-
tions of the statute.

We begin by noting that W.Va, Code § 61-
80-8 was amended in 2014, Prior’ to its
amendment, W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 [1988]
provided:

Any person who, with knowledge, sends
or causes to be sent, or distributes, exhib-
its, possesses or displays or transpoits any
material visually portraying a minor en-
gaged in any sexually explicit conduct is
guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary not more than two years, and fined
not more than two thousand dollars.

This Court discussed the unit of prosecu-
tion under the prior version of W.Va, Code
§ 61-8C-8 in Morgan v. Ballard, No, 11-1677,
2018 WL 149602 (W.Va, Jan. 14, 2018) (mem-
orandum decision). In Morgan, the petitioner
sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that
his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to
raise a double jeopardy argument in relation
to his multiple convictions of violating W.Va.
Code § 61-80-8 [1988]. He asserted that his
ten convictions should have been considered
in the aggregate as one count, This Court
rejected his argument and determined that
“our statutes protecting children from exploi-
tation are interpreted to mean that posses-
sion of each photograph is a separate act and
is a distinct and separate unit of prosecution
allowing the State of West Virginia to charge
separate counts and prosecute each act of
possession.” Id. at *19, (Emphasis added).

In 2014, the Legislature amended W.Va.
Code § 61-8C-8, substantially changing the

6. This Court also addressed the unit of prosecu-
tion under the prior. version of W.Va. Code § 61-
8C-3 in State v. Shingleton, 237 W.Va. 669, 790
S.E.2d 505 (2016). In Shingleton, the defendant
was ‘convicted of twenty counts:of possession of
child pornography under the prior version of
W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 based on his possession of
twenty individual images depicting child pornog-
raphy. In rejecting the defendant's double jeopar-
dy challenge: to ‘his multiple convictions, the
Court in Shingleton relied on: the Court's ruling
in Morgan and determined that the prior version
of W.Va, Code § 61-8C-3 allowed each image
depicting child pornography to be charged as a
separate violation of the statute.

666

statute and adding a number of subsections
that did not appear in the previous version.
The 2014 amended version of W.Va. Code
§ 61-8C-8 provides:

(a) Any person who, knowingly and willful-

ly, sends or causes to be sent or distrib-

utes, exhibits, possesses, electronically ac-
cesses with intent to view or displays or
transports any material visually portraying

a minor engaged in any sexually explicit

conduct is guilty of a felony.

(b) Any person who violates the provisions

of subsection (a) of this section when the

conduct involves fifty or fewer images

shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in a

state correctional facility for not more than

two years or fined not more than $2,000 or
both,

@ Any person who violates the provisions

of subsection (a) of this section when the

conduct involves more than fifty but fewer
than six hundred images shall, upon con-
viction, be imprisoned in a state correction-
al facility for not less than two nor more

. than ten years or fined not more than

$5,000, or both.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-
sections (b) and (¢) of this section any
person who violates the provisions of sub-
section (a) of this section when the conduct
involves six hundred or more images or
depicts violence against a child or a child
engaging in bestiality shall, upon convic-
tion, be imprisoned in a state correctional
facility for not less than five nor more than
fifteen years or fined not more than
$25,000, or both.
© For purposes of this section each video
clip, movie or similar recording of five
minutes or less shall constitute seventy-
five images. A video clip, movie or similar
recording of a duration longer than five
minutes shall be deemed to constitute sev-
enty-five images for every two minutes in
length it exceeds five minutes.

As an initial matter, we find that the 2014
amended version of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 is
not ambiguous. Under this amended version
of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3, subsection (a) de-

7. The word “material,” when used as a noun, is
often treated as plural. Black's Law Dictionary
1125 (10th ed. 2014) (“‘material, n. (often pl.) ...

fines the elements of the offense and, rele-
vant to the instant matter, provides “[a]ny
person who, knowingly and willfully ... pos-
sesses ... any material visually portraying a
minor engaged in any sexually explicit con-
duct is guilty of a felony.” While the parties
in the instant matter disagree over the mean-
ing of the phrase “any material” contained in
subsection (a), we find that the meaning of
this phrase is abundantly clear when read in
the context of the remaining subsections of
W.Va. Code § 61-80-83.

The next three subsections of the statute
set forth increasing penalties based upon the
number of images or videos that a person is
found to have possessed. Specifically, subsec-
tion (b) sets forth the penalty for possessing
“fifty or fewer images” as up to two years,
Subsection (¢) sets forth the penalty for pos-
sessing “more than fifty but fewer than six
hundred images” as not less than two nor
more than ten years. The conduct Mr. Du-
buque plead guilty to is set forth in subsec-
tion (d), which pertains to possession of more
than 600 images of child pornography or
possession of child pornography that depicts
violence “against a child.” Subsection (e) pro-
vides a formula for calculating the number of
images contained on a “video clip, movie or
similar recording.”

It is clear that under the amended version
of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3, each child pornog-
raphy image a person possesses is not a
separate act which allows the State to charge
a person with a separate and distinct viola-
tion of the statute, Instead, the 2014 amend-
ed version of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 requires
an aggregation of the images and videos
possessed by a person in order to determine
the proper punishment under subsections
(b)-(d). Otherwise, no effect would be given
to the additional subsections, (b)-(e), which
the Legislature added to the statute in 2014,
Therefore, it is clear that the phrase “any
material” contained in subsection (a) refers in
the aggregate to all of the material found in a
person’s possession at a particular time and
place.”

3. Information, ideas, data, documents, or other

things that are used in reports, books, films,
studies, etc.”), Also, in McKneely v. W.Va. Consol.

The State concedes that under the current
version of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3, the penalty
for possessing “still photos” depicting child
pornography requires that the number of
images be aggregated. Thus, there is no dis-
pute that under the current version of the
statute, each still photograph is not a sepa-
vate act and does not permit the State to
charge separate counts based on each indi-
vidual image. Instead, the individual photo-
graphs must be aggregated and the penalty
is determined based on the total number of
images possessed pursuant to the directions
set forth in W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3(b)-(d).

However, the State argues that unlike
“still photos,” a person who possesses multi-
ple physical media storage devices depicting
child pornography, like the five VHS tapes at
issue, may be charged with multiple viola-
tions of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-8, We find the
plain language of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-8 does
not support the State’s argument.

West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 does not
provide that the unit of prosecution for pos-
sessing child pornography varies depending
on whether the images are contained on still
photographs or on a physical media storage
device, like a VHS tape. That is, if a person
possessed 100 still photographs, it is undis-
puted that the unit of prosecution is plwral—
all of the 100 photographs would be aggre-
gated and the possessor would face a single
count of possession pursuant to subsection
(©) of the statute. However, according to the
State, if a person possessed five individual
VHS tapes, the unit of prosecution is singu-
lar—each individual tape is a separate and
distinct violation of the statute. We find
nothing in the plain language of the statute
supporting the’ contention that the unit of
prosecution varies depending on whether the

Pub. Ret. Bd., 226 W.Va. 553, 559, 703 S.B.2d
524, 530 (2010), this Court stated that the word
“any” could have a variety of meanings, includ-
ing every", depending on the context in which it

As we held in syllabus point four of Williams
v, W.Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 187 W.Va.
406, 407, 419 S.B.2d 474, 475 (1992), “‘[t]he
word “any,” when used in a statute, should be
construed to mean any.’ Syl. pt. 2, Thomas v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 164 W.Va. 763,
266 S.B.2d 905 (1980).” This Court has recog-

667

images are contained on a still photograph or
on a media storage device,

Additionally, we find that the State’s posi-
tion that the unit of prosecution varies de-
pending on the storage device could lead to
absurd results. An example of this potential
absurdity can be seen in the following sce-
nario: one coniputer containing 20,000 images
of child pornography would subject a person
to one-violation of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3(d).
However, a person with the exact same con-
tent, 20,000 images, spread out evenly over
five separate computers, would be subject to
five violations of W.Va. Code § 61-80-3(d).
Thus, under the State’s argument, the severi-
ty of the punishment would not depend on
the conduct of possessing child pornography,
it would depend on the type of media storage
device that stored the images. We find that
this interpretation is not supported by the
plain language of the statute and could lead
to inequitable results. “Where a particular
construction of a statute would result in an
absurdity, some other reasonable construc-
tion, which will not produce such absurdity,
will be made.” Syllabus Point 2, Newhart v.
Penmybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 850
(1988). .

Further, we find that when the Legisla-
ture amended W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3, ‘it
could have explicitly stated that a separate
and distinct violation of the statute occurs
based on each individual media storage de-
vice found in a person’s possession that con-
tains child pornography. The Legislature
chose not to include such direction in the
statute. In examining other jurisdictions, we
note that a number of states provide explicit
direction defining the precise unit of prose-
eution in their child pornography statutes.
See’ Ala. Code 1975 § 18A-12-190 (16) [2006]
(“The depiction of an individual less than 17

nized the term “any” to be “diversely defined.”
Shaffer v. Fort Henry Surgical Associates, Inc.,
215 W.Va. 453, 458, 599 S.E.2d 876, 881
(2004). Indeed, “any” means, inter alia, “[olne,
no matter which, from three or more; a, an, or
some; [slome, regardless of quantity or num-
ber{;][tThe smallest quantity or number of; even
one; [elveryl.]” American Heritage Dictionary
59, (1980). Clearly, in the context of W.Va.
Code § 15-2-29, the meaning of the word
“any” is “every.”

668

years of age that violates this division shall
constitute a separate offense for each single
visual depiction.”); Alaska Stat. § 11.61.127
[2010] (“Each film, audio, video, electronic,
or electromagnetic recording, photograph,
negative, slide, book, newspaper, magazine,
or other material that visually or aurally
depicts conduct described in AS 11.41.455(a)
that is possessed or accessed in violation of
(a) of this section is a separate violation of
this section”); Florida Stat. Ann.
§ 827,071(6)(a) [2012] (“The possession, con-
trol, or intentional viewing of each such pho-
tograph, motion picture, exhibition, show,
image, data, computer depiction, representa-
tion, or presentation is a separate offense. If
such photograph, motion picture, exhibition,
show, representation, image, data, computer
depiction, or other presentation includes sex-
ual conduct by more than one child, then
each such child in each, such photograph,
motion, picture, exhibition, show, representa-
tion, image, data, computer depiction, or oth-
er presentation that is knowingly possessed,
controlled, or intentionally viewed is a sepa-
vate offense.”); Iowa Code § 728,12(8) [2012]
(“A visual depiction containing pictorial rep-
resentations of different minors shall be
prosecuted and punished as separate of-
fenses for each pictorial representation of a
different minor in the visual depiction, How-
ever, violations of this subsection involving
multiple visual depictions of the same minor
shall bé prosecuted and punished as one
offense.”).§

HEM. Our Legislature is, of course, free

to provide explicit direction defining the pre-.

cise. unit of prosecution in W.Va. Code § 61-
8C-3 and may, if it deems proper, permit
separate violations of the statute based on
each individual media storage device.? How-
ever, in the absence of such direction, this
Court may not read into W.Va. Code § 61-
8C-8 that which it plainly does not say. As
this Court held in Syllabus Point 2 of Huff

8, See alfo 21 OkL.St.Ann. § 1024.1 [2012].

9, It is beyond dispute that possessing child por-
nography’ is a loathsome crime. As this Court
explained in State v. Riggleman, 238 W.Va. 720,
727, 798 $.B.2d 846, 853 (2017): “Cognizant of
this harm, the West Virginia Legislature deter-
mined long ago that it was necessary to prohibit
possession of child pornography in order to halt

man v, Goals Coal Co., 228 Wa. 724, 679
S,E.2d 823 (2009):

This Court does not sit as a superlegisla-
ture, commissioned to pass upon the politi-
eal, social, economic or scientific merits of
statutes pertaining to proper subjects of
legislation. It is the duty of the Legislature
to consider facts, establish policy, and em-
body that policy in legislation. It is’ the
duty of this Court to enforce legislation
unless it runs afoul of the State or Federal
Constitutions. 10

Based on all of the fovegoing we hold that
under W.Va. Code § 61-8C-83(a), any person
who knowingly and willfully possesses any
material visually portraying a minor engaged
in any sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a
felony. Further, under W.Va, Code § 61-8C-
3(b), any person who knowingly and willfully
possesses fifty or fewer images visually por-
traying a minor engaged in any sexually
explicit conduct is guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for not
more than two years or fined not more than
$2,000 or both. Additionally, under W.Va,
Code § 61-8C-3(c), any person who knowing-
ly and willfully possesses more than fifty but
Sewer than six hundred images visually por-
traying a minor engaged in any sexually
explicit conduct is guilty of a- felony and,
upon conviction, shall be imprisoned not less
than two nor more than ten years or fined
not more than $5,000, or both, Also, under
W.Va. Code § 61-8C-8(d), any person who
knowingly and willfully possesses sia hun-
dred or more images visually portraying a
minor engaged in any sexually, explicit con-
duct or images depicting violence against a
child or images depicting a child engaging in
bestiality shall, upon conviction, be impris-
oned for not less than five nor more than
fifteen years or fined not more than $25,000,
or both. Finally, under W.Va. Code § 61-8C-
8,, the total number of images visually por-

sexual exploitation and abuse of children when it
enacted West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3.”

10, Similarly, this Court has held that “[t]he Leg-
islature has power to create and define crimes
and fix their punishment[.]” Syllabus Point,2, in
part, State v. Woodward, 68 W.Va. 66, 69 S.E.
385 (1910).

traying a minor engaged. in any sexually
explicit conduct possessed by. a person, at the
same time and place, must be aggregated to
determine the appropriate sentence pursuant
to W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3(b), (¢), or (d).

Applying this holding to the instant case,
we find that the circuit court erred when it
sentenced Mr. Dubuque for multiple vidla-
tions of W.Va, Code § 61-8C-8(d) based on
his possession of five individual VHS tapes.
Based on the unit of prosecution as set forth
by the plain language of W.Va. Code § 61-
8C-8, Mr. Dubuque’s possession of five VHS
tapes subjects him to one violation of W.Va.
Code § 61-8C-3(d), Therefore, we remand
this matter to the cireuit court for entry of a
new sentencing order.

IV.

CONCLUSION |
The cireuit court’s March 16, 2016, sen-
-tencing order is reversed and this matter is
remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Reversed and Remanded With Directions.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a concurring
Opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
Opinion,

JUSTICE WALKER concurs and reserves
the right to file a concurting Opinion.

* LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, concurring,
joined by WORKMAN, J., and WALKER, J.:

In consideration of the Legislature’s 2014
amendments to West Virginia Code § 61-8C-
8, I am compelled to concur in the decision to
remand this action to the circuit court for
resentencing. While I might wish to affirm
the sentence that was imposed upon the peti-
tioner, the current version of West Virginia
Code § 61-80-83 prevents me from doing so.

In State v. Shingleton, 237 W.Va, 669, 790
§.E.2d 505 (2016), the defendant was convict-
ed of twenty counts of possession of material
visually portraying a minor engaged in sexu-
ally explicit conduct, Because the defendant's

669

eriminal conduct occurred prior to 2014, he
was tried and convicted under the 2010 ver-
sion of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3, which
provided, in its entirety, as follows:

Any person who, with knowledge, sends
or causes to be sent, or distributes, exhib-
its, possesses or displays or transports any
material visually portraying a minor en-
gaged in any sexually’ explicit conduct is
guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary not more than two years, and fined
not more than two thousand dollars.

‘The defendant appealed and argued, in part,
that his sentencing on twenty counts of pos-
session of a minor engaged in sexually explic-
it conduct, as depicted in twenty separate
photographs, violated double jeopardy. Upon
our examination of our prior case law ad-
dressing double jeopardy and our analysis of
the unit of prosecution intended by the Leg-
islature in West Virginia Code § 61-80-83
(2010), we concluded that :

yather than utilizing the plural word “ma-
terials,” the Legislature chose to use the
word “material” in West Virginia Code
§ 61-8C-8. We agree with the. State that as
used in this statutory context, “material”
refers to the particular media that is “visu-
ally portraying a minor engaged in any
sexually explicit conduct[,]” whether it be a
photograph, digital image, video, etc.
Moreover, the use of the singular “minor,”
rather than the plural “minors,” reflects
the Legislature’s intent to protect each, and
every child victim. .

Shingleton, 237 W.Va. at 687, 790 S.E.2d at,
528; see also Morgan v. Ballard, No, 11-1677,
2018 WL 149602 (W.Va, Jan. 14, 2018) (mem-
orandum decision) ‘(affirming circuit court’s
denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus
where petitioner had been convicted on ten
counts of violating West Virginia Code § 61-
8C-8 (2010) for his possession of ten photo-
graphs); State v. Richard D., No. 18-1250,
2015 WL 8751819 (W.Va. June 15, 2015)
(memorandum decision) (affirming .defen-
dant’s convictions on five counts of posses-
sion of material depicting minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct in violation of West
Virginia Code § 61-8C-8 (2010)).

670 a

In 2014, the Legislature enacted significant
amendments to West Virginia Code § 61-8C-
8 that resulted in substantial changes, includ-
ing a graduated sentencing scheme. The
amended version of this statute currently
provides, as follows:

(a) Any person who, knowingly and willful-

ly, sends or causes to be sent or distrib-

utes, exhibits, possesses, electronically ac-
cesses with intent to view or displays or
transports any material visually portraying

a minor engaged in any sexually explicit

conduct is guilty of a felony.

(b) Any person who violates the provisions

of subsection (a) of this section when the

conduct involves fifty or fewer images

shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in a

state correctional facility for not more than

two years or fined not thore than $2,000 or
both.

@ Any person who violates the provisions

of subsection (a) of this section when the

conduct involves more than fifty but fewer
than six hundred images shall, upon con-
viction, be imprisoned in a state correction-
al facility for not less than two nor more
than ten years or fined not more than

$5,000, or both. .

-(@) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-

sections (b) and (c) of this section any
person who violates the provisions of sub-
section (a) of this section when the-conduct
involves six hundred or more images or
depicts violénce against a child or a child
engaging in bestiality shall, upon convic-
tion, be imprisoned in a state correctional
facility for not less than five nor more than
fifteen years or fined not more than
$25,000, or. both.
(©) For purposes of this section each video
clip, movie or similar recording. of five
minutes or less shall constitute seventy-
five images. A video clip, movie or similar
recording of a duration longer than. five
minutes shall be deemed to constitute sev-
enty-five images for every two minutes in
length it exceeds five minutes.

While this Court could have upheld the
petitioner’s convictions and sentencing on
five counts of violating West Virginia Code
§ 61-8C-8 under the 2010 version of that
statute, just as we affirmed multiple viola-

tions and convictions in Morgan, Richard D.,
and Shingleton, the current version of the
statute mandates that images of child por-
nography be aggregated for sentencing pur-
poses. Although the State argues that the
unit of prosecution under West Virginia Code
§ 61-8C-8 (2014) varies depending on the
storage device, the current statutory context
does not support that conclusion. Moreover,
the State’s position would lead to inequitable
yesults, as aptly explained in this Court's
opinion in this matter.

Certainly, it is within the purview of the
Legislature to make each image of child por-
nography a statutory violation. While it has
not done so, other states have. See, ¢g., Ala.
Code 1975 § 18A-12-190(16) [2006] (“SEPA-
RATE OFFENSE. The depiction of an indi-
vidual less than 17 years of age that violates
this division shall constitute a separate of-
fense for each single visual depiction.”); Alas-
ka Stat. § 11.61.127(c) (2010) (“Hach film,
audio, video, electronic, or electromagnetic
recording, photograph, negative, slide, book,
newspaper, magazine, or other material that
visually or aurally depicts conduct described
in AS 11,41.455(a) that is possessed or ac-
cessed in violation of (a) of this section is a
separate violation of this section.”); Fla. Stat,
Ann. § 827.0716)(a) (“It is unlawful for any
person to knowingly possess, control, or in-
tentionally view a photograph, motion pic-
ture, exhibition, show, representation, image,
data, computer depiction, or other presenta-
tion which, in whole or in part, he or she
knows to include any sexual conduct by a
child. The possession, control, or intentional
viewing of each such photograph, motion pic-
ture, exhibition, show, image, data, computer
depiction, representation, or presentation is a
separate offense. If such photograph, motion
picture, exhibition, show, representation, im-
age, data, computer depiction, or other pres-
entation includes sexual conduct by more
than one child, then each such child in each
such photograph, motion picture, exhibition,
show, representation, image, data, computer
depiction, or other presentation that is know-
ingly possessed, controlled, or intentionally
viewed is a separate offense.”).

Child pornography is not only a heinous
crime, it is an act of violence against a child:

Distributing and exhibiting material de-

picting minors engaged in sexually explicit,

conduct in violation of West Virginia Code

§ 61-8C-8 (2014) is a crime that “involve[s]

an act of violence against a person” within

the meaning of West Virginia Code § 27-

-6A-8(h) (2018) because it derives from and

is proximately linked to physical, emotion-

al, and psychological harm to children.
Syl. Pt. 5, State v, Riggleman, 288 W.Va. 720,
798 S.H.2d 846 (2017). It is critical to remem-
ber that

[t]he “end user” of child pornography is

not just tenuously involved with the com-

mission of those violent, abhorrent crimes
against children; those acts of violence

‘were committed, videotaped, and distribut-

ed electronically for his or her use. Simply

stated, those acts are so intrinsically relat-

ed to the abuse of children, they result in

criminal prosecution and lengthy terms of

incarceration and supervised release.
Riggleman, 238 W.Va. at 728, 798 S.B.2d at
854.

Clearly, such violence demands a harsh
punishment. Under the 2010 version of West
Virginia Code § 61-8C-3, harsh punishments
could be imposed, and this Court affirmed
such punishments in Morgan, Richard D.,
and Shingleton. However, this Court must
apply West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3, as it is
currently written. Consequently, on remand,
the original consecutive sentencing imposed
upon the petitioner of twenty-five to seventy-
five years imprisonment will be reduced pur-
suant to the current version of the statute to
five to fifteen years imprisonment for his
possession of five VHS tapes depicting sexual
violence against a young girl. It is now up to
the Legislature to decide whether it will
bring West Virginia in line with other states
that have statutes expressly making each
image of child pornography a separate statu-
tory offense.

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

805 S.E.2d 432

LAWYER DISCIPLINARY
BOARD, Petitioner

ve

David A. DOWNES, a member of
The West Virginia State
Bar, Respondent.

No. 15-0702
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 18, 2017
Filed: September 21, 2017

Joanne M. Vella Kirby, Esq., Lawyer Dis-
ciplinary Counsel, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney
for Petitioner

David A, Downes, Esq., Front Royal, Vir-
ginia, Pro se Respondent

673
LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

This lawyer disciplinary proceeding was
initiated pursuant to Rule 3.20 of the West
Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Pro-
cedure (““RLDP”), which directs this Court
to impose reciprocal professional discipline
when a member of The West Virginia State
Bar is either sanctioned by a lawyer disci-
plinary authority in another jurisdiction or
voluntarily surrenders his or her law license
issued by another jurisdiction in connection
with a disciplinary proceeding. On June 26,
2018, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board issued a public reprimand with pro-
bationary terms to the respondent herein,
attorney David A. Downes, for his negligent
misappropriation of client funds and his fail-
ure to properly maintain a client trust ac-
count in violation of Virginia Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct 1.15. Furthermore, in
connection with a lawyer disciplinary case
initiated in the District of Columbia
«D,C.”) based upon the same Virginia disci-
plinary matter, the respondent consented to
the annulment of his D.C. law license effee-
tive September 25, 2014.

The facts sirrounding the respondent's
misconduct and sanction in Virginia, and the
voluntary surrender of his law license in
D.C., were undisputed during the reciprocal
disciplinary hearing held by 4 Hearing Panel
Subcommittee of the West Virginia Lawyer
Disciplinary Board (“HPS”). In addition, the
HPS found that the respondent failed to
timely report both’ the Virginia and the D.C,
matters to the West Virginia Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel (“ODC” or “West Virginia
ODC”) as required by RLDP 3.20(b). Upon.
consideration of the record, the applicable
Jaw, and the arguments of the parties, we
order that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law in West Virginia for thirty
days. Upon completion of his suspension, the
respondent shall be on probation with The
‘West Virginia State Bar for eighteen months,
during which time he shall submit to random
reviews of his trust account records as de-
scribed below. Finally, the respondent is or-
dered to pay the costs of the trust account.
reviews and the costs of this disciplinary
proceeding,

674

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was admitted to The West
Virginia State Bar in 1988, As indicated
above, he is also a member of the Virginia
State Bar and, until the events set forth
herein, was a member of the D.C. Bar. The
respondent testified that he is presently a
solo practitioner in Front Royal, Virginia,
engaged primarily in criminal defense work.
Because this is a reciprocal matter originat-
ing with lawyer discipline imposed by the
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, the
HPS relied heavily upon the record created
by the Virginia disciplinary authorities to
ascertain the following undisputed facts.

In 2006, the respondent represented a
plaintiff, James Brown Sr., in a wrongful
death suit pertaining to the death of Mr.
Brown’s minor son in a motor vehicle acci-
dent in Virginia. The child was killed while
viding in a car driven by his mother, the
defendant/alleged tortfeasor Samantha Gra-
dy. In October 2006, the respondent received
an insurance check for $15,000 in medical
payments coverage made payable to himself
and to both of the deceased child’s parents,
Mr. Brown and Ms. Grady. According to the
respondent, he instructed his paralegal not to
deposit the check because he did not repre-
sent the opposing party, Ms. Grady. Further-
more, he informed Mr. Brown that the check
would be returned to the insurance company
for correction. Nonetheless, on October 11,
2006, the $15,000 check was deposited into
the respondent’s fiduciary aceount at BB&T
bank without any signatures for Mr, Brown
or Ms. Grady. The respondent has testified
that he was unaware a member of his staff
had deposited the check in contradiction to
his instructions and soon, thereafter, his rep-
resentation of Mr. Brown ended.”

On May 7, 2007, the respondent closed his
BB&T fiduciary account and deposited the
funds therein, which presumably included the
$15,000 medical payments benefits in the
Brown case, into his law office operating
aceount at Marathon Bank. On May 28, 2007,
1. Records obtained from the disciplinary author-

ities in Virginia and D.C. were admitted into
evidence at the HPS hearing.

2, Mr. Brown’s case was taken over by a different
law firm.

the respondent moved $44,816.66 from his
operating account into his newly-opened
IOLTA trust account at First Citizens Bank.

On September 22, 2008, attorney Steven
M. Levine, who was counsel for Ms. Grady,
wrote to the respondent inquiring about the
medical payments check mailed almost two
years earlier. Not receiving an immediate
response, Mr. Levine wrote additional letters
to the respondent on September 29, October
1, October 10, and October 17, 2008. The
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board has
found that upon receiving Mr. Levine’s first
letter, the respondent promptly conducted an
investigation. The respondent’s Quickbooks
records did not reflect a deposit of $15,000 in
the months of October or November 2006,
and there were delays in obtaining records
from BB&T regarding the closed fiduciary
account. On October 21, 2008, BB&T provid-
ed the respondent with a copy of a deposit
slip showing the $15,000 check had, in fact,
been deposited into his account on October
11, 2006.

The respondent has testified that before
receiving Mr. Levine’s letters, he did not
know there was a problem regarding the
medical payments check. On October 21,
2007, which was the same day he received a
copy of the deposit slip from BB&T, he wrote
to Mr. Levine and offered to immediately
pay the $15,000. The next day, October 22,
2008, the respondent delivered a $15,000
check to lawyer E, Eugene Gunter, counsel
for the decedent child’s estate? The reim-
bursement check was written on the respon-
dent’s IOLTA trust account at First Citizens
Bank.

Meanwhile, Mr. Levine filed an ethies com-
plaint with the Virginia State Bar. During an
April 22, 2010, interview conducted by a Vir-
ginia State Bar investigator, the respondent
admitted he did not know whether his ac-
countant had performed quarterly reconcilia-
tions of his fiduciary and law office operating
accounts during the time period in question,
3. Mr. Gunter agreed to hold the medical pay-

ments money in trust until it could be deter-
mined who was entitled to a share,

and he did not personally review any recon-
ciliations. Furthermore, the investigator no-
ticed that the First Citizens IOLTA account,
had dropped below $15,000 on “numerous
oceasions” between May 2007 and August
2008. Ultimately, in or about April 2018, the
Virginia Bar Counsel and the respondent
stipulated to facts and to a violation of Rule
1.15 of the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct. This rule requires a lawyer to, inter
alia, hold a client’s funds in an identifiable
escrow bank account separate from the law-
yer’s own funds; promptly notify a client of
the receipt of the client’s funds; maintain
complete records of all client funds; render
appropriate accountings to the client; and
promptly deliver funds to the client. Jd. With
regard to the record-keeping requirements,
the rule requires the lawyer to maintain a
journal listing all funds deposited into an
escrow account, including the source and the
date deposited; a subsidiary ledger contain-
ing a separate statement of account for each
client; and records of reconciliations of the
escrow account. Id.4

The respondent and Virginia Bar Counsel
also stipulated to mitigating and aggravating
factors to be considered for the purpose of
ascertaining a sanction. The stipulated miti-
gating factors were that the respondent co-
operated fully with the investigation; made
prompt restitution; exhibited remorse; lacked
any dishonest, selfish, or fraudulent motive;
had no training or prior experience in ac-
counting and bookkeeping; and took remedial
measures during the ensuing six and one-half
years including declining all personal injury
cases and personally reconciling his bank
accounts without further incident. The
agreed-upon aggravating factors included the
existence of a prior disciplinary record ® and
substantial experience in the practice of law.
At an evidentiary hearing before the Virginia
State Bar Disciplinary Board, the respondent
presented witnesses attesting to his good
character and skills as a lawyer, as well as
the testimony of an accountant who explained

4, Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15
bears many similarities to West Virginia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.15; both are based upon
an American Bar Association model rule,

5. The respondent's previous lawyer discipline in-
cludes a public reprimand in West Virginia for

~ Board issued a

675

the respondent’s efforts to improve the ree
ord keeping’ in his office.

After considering the stipulations and evi-
dence presented, by order entered June 26,
2013, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
“publie reprimand with
terms” to the respondent, The specified
terms were probationary: he was prohibited
from’ engaging in any further professional
misconduct for a period of eighteen months;
during the eighteen-month period, he was
required to submit to a minimum of four and
a maximum of eight periodic, random reviews
of his trust account records and reconcilia-
tions; and he was required to pay all costs of
those reviews. The order warned that if the
respondent failed to comply with these
terms, he faced a suspension from the prac-
tice of law in Virginia, Finally, the respon-
dent was ordered to pay the costs of the
Virginia disciplinary proceeding.

Based upon the June 26, 2013, order of the
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, the
D.C. Office of Bar Counsel opened a lawyer
disciplinary complaint in that jurisdiction. On
September 11, 2013, Joseph C. Perry, Assis-
tant D.C. Bar Counsel, wrote to the respon-
dent asserting that even in cases of negligent
misappropriation of client funds, the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals has specified
that.a period of suspension from the practice
of law is the appropriate sanction to be im-
posed, The respondent answered this letter
by arguing that application of the D.C. Bar’s
rules should result in the imposition of the
same sanction as was imposed in Virginia.
Subsequently, however, the respondent con-
sented to be disbarred in D.C. instead of
continuing to defend the disciplinary case. In
an affidavit signed on August 27, 2014, the
respondent acknowledged the truth of the
material facts upon which the allegations
rested; acknowledged that in accordance with
D.C. case law, he had recklessly misappropri-
ated funds entrusted to him in Mr. Brown's

making a misrepresentation to a federal judge in
1992; a dismissal with terms, i.e., a review of his
trust account records, in Virginia that arose from
an ethics complaint filed in 1995 by opposing
counsel in the respondent's own divorce case;
and two private admonitions in Virginia.

676

case; and admitted he could not successfully
defend the allegations in D.C, Accepting the
respondent’s affidavit, by order of September
25, 2014, the D.C. Court of Appeals disbarred
the respondent from the practice of law in
that jurisdiction. .

On October 7, 2014, the D.C, Office of Bar
Counsel forwarded a certified copy of the
D.C. disbarment order to the West Virginia
ODC. On October 29, 2014, Joanne M. Vella
Kirby, West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary
Counsel, wrote the ‘respondent inquiting
whether he wished to consent to the annul-
ment of his West Virginia law license pursu-
ant to our rules of reciprocal discipline. See
RLDP 3.20.6 In a letter dated November 4,
2014, the respondent informed the ODC that
the D.C, matter was based entirely upon the
Virginia misconduct and discipline. He set
forth the history of his office’s mishandling of
the medical ‘payments check, and he asserted
that he only consented to disbarment in D.C,
because he did not use that law license. He
requested that as reciprocal discipline, this
Court should impose the same sanction that

was imposed in Virginia.

6. RLDP 3.20, effective January 1, 1995, provides
as follows:

(a) A final adjudication in another jurisdic-
tion, whether state or federal, of misconduct
constituting grounds for discipline of a lawyer

” or a voluntary surrender of a license to prac-
tice in connection with a disciplinary proceed-
ing shall, for the purposes of proceedings pur-
suant to these rules conclusively establish such
conduct. Accordingly, a Hearing Panel Sub-
committee’ may take action without conducting
a formal hearing.

(b) Any lawyer who is a member, active or

. inactive, of The West Virginia State Bar
against whom any form of public discipline has
been imposed by the authorities of another
jurisdiction, whether state-or federal, or who
voluntarily surrenders his or her license to
practice law in comnection with disciplinary
proceedings in another jurisdiction, whether
state or federal, shall notify the Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel of such action in writing with-
in ten days thereof. Failure to notify the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel shall constitute an ag-
gravating factor in any subsequent disciplinary
proceeding.

(c) Upon receiving notice that a lawyer who
is a member, active or inactive, has been pub:
licly disciplined or has voluntarily surrendered
his or her license to practice law in another
jurisdiction, whether state or federal, Disci-
plinary Counsel shall, following an investiga-

On July 21, 2015, the ODC moved the HPS
to refer this matter to our Court with a
recommendation that the respondent be pub-
lically reprimanded in West Virginia. With-
out holding a hearing, on October 26, 2015,
the HPS filed a réport recommending that
we issue a public reprimand, None of the
probationary terms imposed by the Virginia
State Bar Disciplinary Board were included
in the HPS’s recommendation, Moreover, the
HPS did not address why it declined to rec-
ommend the same disposition that occurred
in D.C, After reviewing the HPS’s October
26, 2015, report, this Court remanded the
case for a hearing to determine whether the
respondent's misconduct warranted the im-
position of different professional discipline,

The HPS held an evidentiary hearing on
July 22, 2016, where disciplinary counsel and
the HPS members questioned the respon-
dent about the events set forth above. The
respondent acknowledged his responsibility
for mishandling his trust account and the
Brown medical payments check, as well as
his violation of Virginia Rule of Professional

tion pursuant to these rules, refer the matter to
a Hearing Panel Subcommittee for appropriate
action, *~

(d) If the lawyer intends to challenge the
validity of the disciplinary order entered in the
foreign jurisdiction with a disciplinary pro-
ceeding, the lawyer must request a formal
hearing and file with the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel a full copy of the record of the disci-
plinary proceedings which resulted in imposi-
tion of the disciplinary order or the voluntary
surrender of a license to practice law.

(e) At the conclusion of proceedings brought
under this section, the Hearing Panel Subcom-
mittee shall refer the matter to the Supreme

* Court of Appeals with the recommendation
that the same discipline be imposed as was
imposed by the foreign jurisdiction unless it is

_ determined by the Hearing Panel Subcommit-
tee that (1) the procedure followed in the for-

_eign jurisdiction did not comport with the re-
quirements of due process of law; (2) the proof
upon which the foreign jurisdiction based its
determination of misconduct is so infirm that
the Supreme Court of Appeals cannot, consis-
tent with its duty, accept as final the determi-
nation of the foreign jurisdiction; (3) the impo-
sition by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the
same discipline imposed in the foreign juris-
diction would result in grave injustice; or (4)
the misconduct proved warrants that a sub-
stantially different type of discipline be im-
posed by the Supreme Court of Appeals,

Conduct 1.15. He testified, without any con-
tradiction by the ODO, that he fully and
successfully complied with the probationary
terms imposed by the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board. Furthermore, the re-
spondent explained that he only took Mr.
Brown’s case to preserve the statute of limi-
tations, and not long after the check was
deposited the case was transferred to a law
firm more experienced in wrongful death
cases. The respondent also testified that he
was distracted during the relevant time peri-
od because the day after the check was de-
posited, his twin children were born and one
child suffered medical complications. Al-
though he agreed to a voluntary disbarment
in D.C., he explained that he did so in order
to avoid litigating about a law license he no
longer wished to maintain. According to the
respondent’s testimony, he had not handled a
ease in D.C. for several years and did not
enjoy practicing law there. The respondent,
argued there was no indication the sanction
in D.C. would have been disbarment if he
had proceeded to litigate the case. Finally,
the respondent explained his personal ties to
West Virginia and expressed a desire to re-
tain his law license in this State.

The only disputed factual issue at the HPS
evidentiary hearing was whether the respon-
dent complied with his duty pursuant to
RLDP 38.20(b) to notify the West Virginia
ODC, in writing, within ten days of the impo-
sition of the Virginia sanctions.’ During the
hearing, the respondent claimed that he had
provided timely notice back in 2018, but he
did not have a copy of the notification and
‘was unaware that notification was an issue in
this case, However, the ODC checked its
records and found no such notice. After hear-
ing the evidence and considering proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law ‘sub-
mitted by the ODC, the HPS found that the
respondent did not timely report either the
Virginia or the D.C. matters to the ODC,

7. The respondent acknowledged that he did not
provide the ODC with timely notice of the sur-
render of his D.C. law license.

8 Although he was given the opportunity to pro-
vide the HPS with proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a recommended sanc-
tion, the respondent did not do so.

677

The HPS filed a second report with this
Court on January 17, 2017, this time urging a
harsher sanction than it had previously rec-
ommended. The HPS now suggests that the
respondent be suspended from the practice
of law in West Virginia for a period of thirty
days. In addition, consistent with the proba-
tionary terms imposed in Virginia, the HPS
recommends that this Court require the re-
spondent to undergo, over a period of eigh-
teen months, a minimum of four and a maxi-
mum of eight periodic, random reviews. by
the West Virginia State Bar of -his trust
aceount records and reconciliations. Finally,
the HPS recommends that the respondent
pay all costs incurred for those reviews, as
well as the costs of this disciplinary proceed-
ing. To explain the increase in its recom-
mended penalty, the HPS noted that it was
previously unaware of the respondent’s fail-
ure to report the two out-of-state disciplinary
matters, Thereafter, the ODC filed a state-
ment of no objection.to the HPS’s second
report,

After reviewing the second report, we set
this matter for briefing and oral argument.
In its brief, the ODC argues in support of the
recommendations in the HPS’s second re-
port. The respondent, in a written summary
response, requests that any review of his
trust account records be limited to those of
his West Virginia clients, but he makes no
other objection. The ODC presented oral ar-
gument on September 18, 2017,!° and this
matter is now ready for decision,

Il. Standard of Review

HE. The respondent’s professional mis-
eonduct in Virginia has already been conclu-
sively proven. “Pursuant to Rule 8.20 of the
West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedure, a final adjudication of profession-
al misconduct in another jurisdiction conelu-
sively establishes the fact of such misconduct

9, In his summary response dated June 1, 2017,
the respondent “notes that he has declined all
representations in West Virginia Courts since
these proceedings were initiated in July of 2015
and does not currently have any clients involving
West Virginia legal matters.”

10. The respondent waived his right to participat
in the oral argument. .

678

for purposes of reciprocal disciplinary pro-
ceedings in this state.” Syl. Pt. 1, Lawyer
Disciplinary Bd. v. Post, 219 W.Va. 82, 631
§.E.2d 921 (2006). However, with regard to
any new evidence or issues addressed by the
HPS, and on the question of the reciprocal
sanction to impose, we apply the following
standards:

A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the
[Hearing Panel Subcommittee of the Law-
yer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of
law, questions of application of the law to
the facts, and questions of appropriate
sanctions; this Court gives respectful con-
sideration to the [Subcommittee’s] recom-
mendations while ultimately exercising its
own independent judgment. On the other
hand, substantial deference is given to the
‘[Subcommittee’s] findings of fact, unless
such findings are not supported by reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record.

Syl. Pt. 8, Comm. on Legal Ethics v. McCor-
kle, 192 W.Va. 286, 452 S.H.2d 877 (1994),
While we respectfully consider the HPS’s
recommendations on the sanction, “[t]his
Court is the final arbiter of legal ethics prob-
Jems and must make the ultimate decisions
about public reprimands, suspensions or an-
nulments of attorneys’ licenses to practice
law,” Syl. Pt. 8, Comm. on Legal Ethics of
the W.Va. State Bar v. Blair, 174 W.Va. 494,
327 S.E.2d 671 (1984). With these standards
in mind, we‘ address the issues before us.

Il. Discussion

Hl Pursuant to the Rules of Lawyer Dis-
ciplinary Procedure applicable to all mem-
bers of The West Virginia State Bar, this
Court will impose reciprocal professional dis-
cipline when a member receives “any form of
public discipline ... by the authorities of
another jurisdiction” or “voluntarily surren-
ders his or her license to practice law in
connection with disciplinary proceedings in
another jurisdiction[.]” RLDP 3.20(b)4 As
set forth above, the adjudication of profes-
sional wrongdoing in another jurisdiction
“conclusively establishes the fact of such mis-

11, See supra note 6.

conduct for purposes of” a reciprocal pro-
ceedirig in West Virginia. Post, 219 W.Va. at
82, 631 S.H.2d at 921, syl. pt. 1, in part
(discussing RLDP 3.20). Moreover, in recip-
rocal disciplinary cases, the HPS’s recom-
mendations to this Court are limited to the
following:

At the conclusion of proceedings brought
under this section, the Hearing Panel Sub-
committee shall refer the matter to the
Supreme Court of Appeals with the recom-
mendatiori that the same discipline be im-
posed as was imposed by the foreign juris-
diction unless it is determined by the
Hearing Panel Subcommittee that (1) the
procedure followed in the foreign jurisdic-
tion did not comport with the requirements
of due process of law; (2) the proof upon
which the foreign jurisdiction based its
determination of misconduct is so infirm
that the Supreme Court of Appeals cannot,
consistent with its duty, accept as final the
determination of the foreign jurisdiction;
(8) the imposition by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of the same discipline imposed in
the foreign jurisdiction would result in
grave injustice; or (4) the misconduct
proved warrants that a substantially differ-
ent type of discipline be imposed by the
Supreme Court of Appeals.

R.L.DP. 8.20(e). “The provisions of Rule 3.20

. require the imposition of the identical
sanction imposed by the foreign jurisdiction
unless one of the four grounds provided for
challenging the discipline imposed by a for-
eign jurisdiction is both asserted and estab-
lished.” Post, 219 W.Va, at 83, 681 S.E.2d at
922, syl. pt. 4, in part.

Hl in this case, the respondent received
public discipline in Virginia and he voluntari-
ly surrendered his law license in D.C. Pursu-
ant to RLDP 38.20,” each of those events
triggers the initiation of reciprocal disciplin-
ary action in our State. However, in its sec-
ond report, the HPS determined that under
the specific facts and circumstances of this
ease, the appropriate reciprocal discipline to
be imposed by this Court should be based
upon the Virginia disposition, not the D.C.
outcome, We agree. The respondent’s volun-

12, See supra note 6.

tary disbarment in D.C., although a more
severe outcome than in Virginia, was pursu-
ant to a charge based entirely upon the
conduct committed and penalized in Virginia.
Moreover, there is no indication that D.C.
authorities would have disbarred the respon-
dent had the matter been litigated to a con-
clusion; rather, in his September 11, 2018,
letter, the D.C. Bar Counsel advised the
respondent he was facing a suspension for
negligent misappropriation. The record is
clear that the respondent voluntarily surren-
dered his D.C. law license because he saw no
utility in undertaking the expense or effort
toward maintaining that license. Accordingly,
after considering the respondent’s underlying
misconduct and the reasons for the surren-
der of his D.C. law license, we are convinced
the respondent’s actions warrant a substan-
tially different disposition than occurred in
D.C. See RLDP 8,20(e)(4).

HE «We next consider whether, pursu-
ant to the provisions of RLDP 3.20 and Post,
our reciprocal sanction should be identical to
that imposed in Virginia. There are no chal-
lenges to the procedures followed, or to the
quality and quantum of proof offered, in the
Virginia disciplinary proceeding. There is
also no claim that imposing the same disci-
pline in West Virginia would result in a grave
injustice. Moreover, the HPS concluded that
the misconduct in Virginia, by itself, would
not warrant a substantially different type of
discipline in this State. However, the HPS
determined that the respondent committed
related misconduct in West Virginia that
constitutes an aggravating factor and thus
warrants a substantially different sanction
herein. Specifically, the HPS recommends a
thirty-day suspension, instead of the public
reprimand imposed by the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board, because the respondent,
failed to timely report both the Virginia and
D.C. matters to the West Virginia ODC.
Pursuant to RLDP 3.20(b), he was required
to notify the ODC of each of those matters
within ten days of issuance.” This rule “im-
poses an affirmative duty on a lawyer to
report the fact that he has been publicly
disciplined or has voluntarily surrendered his
license to practice in a foreign jurisdiction.”

13, See supra note 6.

679

Post, 219 W.Va. at 82, 631 S.H.2d at 921, syl.
pt. 2, in part.

The HP§'s finding that the respondent
failed to abide by the reporting requirement
is supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence. The record establishes that the ODC’s
knowledge originated from the D.C. Bar
Counsel, not the respondent, The respondent
even conceded that he failed to report the
D.C. matter. However, during the HPS hear-
ing the respondent claimed, for the first time,
that he had provided the ODC with timely
written notification of his Virginia sanction,
The ODC has no record of any such report,
and the respondent has never produced a
copy of this alleged correspondence. More-
over, when responding to the ODC’s inquiry
in November of 2014, the respondent gave a
detailed explanation of the Virginia disciplin-
ary case without ever mentioning a prior
notification. The tone of his November 4,
2014, letter suggests that the respondent was
providing the information to the West Virgi-
nia authorities for the very first time. This
letter was written approximately sixteen
months beyond the ten-day mandatory re-

* porting period. Finally, the respondent failed

to dispute or even discuss this HPS finding
in the summary response he filed with this
Court.

The failure to disclose public discipline im-
posed in another jurisdiction, and the failure
to disclose the voluntarily surrender of a law
license in another jurisdiction in the face of a
disciplinary proceeding, are extremely seri-
ous matters. The mandatory reporting re-
quirement of RLDP 3.20(b) constitutes a fun-
damental tenant of the self-regulating legal
profession. If the ODC, Lawyer Disciplinary
Board, and ultimately this Court are not
informed of such matters, we cannot act to
protect the people of this State from poten-
tially unethical treatment at the hands of
lawyers already proven to have committed
professional misconduct. The mandatory re-
porting requirement serves to prevent law-
yers from sidestepping the disciplinary and
remedial measures found necessary in other
jurisdictions by moving their law practices to
West Virginia.

680

HH Rule 8.20(b) directs that the failure to
timely report “shall constitute an aggrava-
ting factor in any subsequent disciplinary
proceeding.” Aggravating factors “are any
considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline -to be
imposed.” Syl, Pt. 4, in part, Lawyer Disci-
plinary Bd. v. Scott, 218 W.Va. 209, 579
§.E.2d 550 (2008), Other jurisdictions ‘have
also recognized that failing to comply with a
reporting obligation is grounds for enhancing
the sanction imposed in a reciprocal disciplin-
ary action, For example, Texas lawyer disci-
plinary authorities imposed professional dis-
cipline upon a lawyer who was also licensed
in Oklahoma;.the lawyer failed to report the
Texas discipline to the Oklahoma Bar Associ-
ation and then failed to participate in the
Oklahoma reciprocal proceeding. See State ex
rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Knight, 330 P.8d
1216 (Okla, 2014), The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma observed that “additional disci-
pline for [the lawyer’s] misconduct is war-
ranted by his failure to report and lack of
respect for this Court's authority.” Id. at
1220. Similarly, in Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. v. Ross, 81 Ohio St3d 45, 689
N.E.2d.20 (1998), an attorney licensed in.
Ohio failed to advise the Ohio Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel that he had received a repro-
val ‘and a ninety-day suspension from the
practice of law in California, Because of the
lawyer's failure to abide by the mandatory
reporting requirement, the Supreme Court of
Ohio enhanced the reciprocal sanction to a
six month suspension, Jd. at 22,

HH To reinforce the importance of the
mandatory reporting obligation, we now hold
that pursuant to Rule 8.20(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Proce-
dure, a member of The West Virginia State
Bar, whether on active or inactive status,
shall notify the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
of any form of public discipline imposed by
the authorities of another jurisdiction, or of
the voluntary surrender of his or her license
to practice law in connection with disciplinary
proceedings in another jurisdiction, A mem-
ber’s failure to comply with this rule shall
constitute an aggravating factor in a recipro-
eal disciplinary proceeding and may result in
an increase in the sanction imposed by this
Court, In the case sub judice, the respon-

dent’s failure to timely report the Virginia
public discipline and the D.C. voluntary dis-
barment to the West Virginia ODC consti-
tutes an aggravating factor warranting the
ineréase of his sanction to 4 thirty-day period
of suspension from the practice of law in
West Virginia, instead of a public reprimand
as was issued in Virginia,

With regard to the probationary terms
imposed by the Virginia State Bar Disciplin-
ary Board, the parties have failed to estab-
lish any basis for deviating from that sanc-
tion, See Post, 219 W.Va, at 88, 681 S.E.2d
at 922, syl, pt, 4° (requiring imposition of
identical sanction imposed by foreign juris-
diction unless one of four specified grounds
is established). An eighteen-month period of
probation, to include periodic reviews of the
vespondent’s trust accounts by the West Vir-
ginia State Bar or its designee, conducted at
the respondent’s expense, is certainly war-
ranted by the respondent's acts of misappro-
priation of client funds and mishandling of a
client trust account,

Finally, we note that from the very begin-
ning of this reciprocal matter, the respondent
has sought for this Court to impose the same
disciplinary terms that were ordered in Vir-
ginia, However, for the first time in his June
2017 summary response, the respondent re-
quested that any review of his trust account
records be limited to ‘records pertaining to
West Virginia clients only, We reject this
eleventh-hour request. Not only has the re-
spondent failed to prove, any grounds to sup-
port this request, such a limitation would not
serve to ensure the safekeeping of client
funds. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the respondent maintains a sep-
arate trust account and records just for West.
Virginia clients, so to be accurate, any review
would necessarily require an examination of
all accounts and records.

IV. ‘Conclusion:

For the reasons set forth above, this Court
orders the following:

1) The respondent shall be suspended from
the practice of law in West Virginia for

a period of thirty days;

2) upon completion of his suspension, the
respondent shall be placed on probation
with The West Virginia State Bar for a
period of eighteen months, During the
probationary period, the respondent is
ordered to submit to a minimum of four
and a maximum of eight periodic, ran-
dom reviews of his trust account rec-
ords and reconciliations by The West
Virginia State Bar or its designee; and

8) the respondent is ordered to pay all
costs for the trust account reviews, and
is ordered to pay the costs of this disci-
plinary proceeding.5

Suspension and Probation with Conditions.

805 S.B.2d 442

Jeannette WAKIM, as personal representa-
- tive of the Last Will and Testament of
Lawrence J. Belt, Defendant Below, Pe-
titioner

v

Christopher PAVLIC, as personal repre-
sentative of the Last Will and Testa-
ment of Lila Belt, Plaintiff Below, Re-
spondent .

No. 16-0906
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 18, 2017
Filed: September 21, 2017

14, With respect to any West Virginia clients or
cases, the respondent is required to comply with
the duties of a suspended lawyer set forth in
RLDP Rule 3,28. Pursuant to RLDP 3.31, the
respondent shall automatically be reinstated to

681

the practice of law at the conclusion of his sus-
pension.

15, See RLDP 3.15 (providing for payment of
costs of disciplinary proce

682

Robert G. McCoid, Esq., MeCamic, Sacco
& McCoid, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia,
Paul J. Harris, Esq., Shawn L, Fluharty,
Esq., Harris Law Offices, Wheeling, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

Elgine Heceta McArdle, Esq. McArdle
Law Office, Wheeling, West Virginia, Coun-
sel for the Respondent

Justice Ketchum:

This appeal concerns the disposition of
funds withdrawn from joint bank accounts
owned by Lawrence Belt and Lila Belt dur-
ing their marriage. The funds were with-

drawn from the joint accounts by Lawrence.
Several months after the withdrawals, Lila
filed for divorce but died while the divorce
action was pending. The divorce action was
dismissed with prejudice and without any
rulings regarding any marital property, Law-
rence died thereafter.

Lawrence’s estate, through his executrix
Jeannette Wakim (the petitioner), and Lila’s
estate, through her executor Christopher
Pavlic (the respondent), are now fighting
over ownership of the funds Lawrence with-
drew from the joint accounts before Lila filed
for divorce. The funds are currently in an
IOLTA account held on Lawrence’s behalf.

The Circuit Court of Ohio County split the
funds in half, not on the basis of divorce law,
but simply to prevent the perceived unjust
enrichment of Lawrence’s estate. Wakim, as
executrix of Lawrence’s estate, appeals to
this Court from the circuit court’s decision.

We reverse the cireuit court and conclude
that Lawrence had the right to withdraw the
funds from the joint accounts by virtue of
W.Va. Code, 81A-4-83 [1994], which states
that bank deposits may be paid to any named
depositor, or the survivor of them, of an
account held in joint tenancy. Here, the bank
accounts were joint accounts with the right of
survivorship, and we note that withdrawals
were made by both Lawrence and Lila, inde-
pendently, during the marriage. The funds
withdrawn by Lawrence during the marriage
became the sole property of Lawrence upon
their withdrawal.

The circuit court’s ruling splitting the
funds in half and granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Lila’s estate is reversed;
judgment is entered in favor of Wakim as
executrix of Lawrence’s estate; and this ac-
tion is remanded with directions to enter an
order releasing the funds in the IOLTA ac-
count to Lawrence’s estate.

I. Factual Background

Lawrence and Lila were married on No-
vember 29, 1975. Although no children were
born of the marriage, Lawrence had at least
one child from a previous marriage and two
granddaughters, Jennifer Swiger and peti-
tioner Wakim. Lila had three children from a

previous marriage: respondent Christopher
Pavlic, Mark Pavliec and Karen Cutter. Law-
rence and Lila appeared to be financially
secure during their 36 year marriage.
On October 5, 2006, Lila executed a Will in
which she devised and bequeathed her entire
* estate to Lawrence. She named as co-execu-
tors Christopher Pavlie and Mark Pavlic, The
Will provided that, if Lawrence were to pre-
decease Lila, her estate would go to Christo-
pher and Mark, share and share alike. Al-
though Lila’s daughter, Karen Cutter, was
not included in the Will, Lila executed a
document, also dated October 5, 2006, stating
that Karen is mentally incompetent and pro-
viding that, if Lawrence is deceased, the co-
executors would have the discretion to in-
clude Karen in the proceeds of Lila’s estate.

On September 12, 2008, Lawrence execut-
ed a Will in which he devised and bequeathed
his entire estate to Lila, Lawrence named
Lila as executrix. The Will provided that, if
Lila were to predecease Lawrence, his estate
would go to his granddaughters, petitioner
Wakim and Jennifer Swiger, share and share
alike, Wakim was named as an alternate
executrix,

A. The Joint Accounts and Withdrawals

During the marriage, Lawrence and Lila
opened a number of joint bank accounts be-
tween 1999 and 2006 in their names with the
right of survivorship. In June 2009, Lila was
diagnosed with cancer. Thereafter, on July
80, 2010, Lila opened two additional joint
accounts: the first in the names of Lawrence,
Lila or Mark Pavlic and the second in the
names of Lawrence, Lila or respondent
Christopher Pavlic.

In July 2011, Lila learned that her cancer
was terminal. On July 15, 2011, Lawrence,
age 95, withdrew $242,773.62 from the joint
accounts and placed the funds in new ac-
counts opened in his name only at the same
banking institutions. Petitioner Wakim, Law-
vence’s executrix, asserts that Lawrence
1, The circuit court found that Wakim and Pavlic

were well aware of Lawrence: and Lila’s respec-

tive ages, Lawrence’s life expectancy, and Lila’s
terminal illness.

2, The action was styled In re: The Marriage of
Lila L. Belt v. Lawrence John Belt, Civil Action

683

made the withdrawals to protect. the assets
upon learning that Lila had transferred at
least $68,819.30 to respondent Pavlic without
Lawrence’s knowledge and consent. Wakim
contends that Lila, in her 80s, was under the
undue influence of respondent Pavlic. Con-
versely, Pavlic contends that Lawrence was
under the undue influence of petitioner Wak-

B. The Divorce Action and New Will

On October 17, 2011, Lila filed a divorce
action in the Family Court of Ohio County on
the ground of irreconcilable differences”
During the divorce. proceedings, Lila filed a
motion for emergency,. temporary relief al-
leging that Lawrence had removed in excess
of $200,000.00 in marital assets from the joint
accounts. Lila sought an order directing
Lawrence to transfer half of the funds to
Lila.

Later, on October 21, 2011, Lila executed a
new Will revoking her 2006 Will and disin-
heriting Lawrence, The new Will stated: “I
am currently married to Lawrence J. Belt,
but have retained an attorney to file for
divorce, I leave Lawrence J. Belt nothing. I
disinherit him entirely.” The new Will gave
$1.00 to Mark Pavlic and devised ‘and be-
queathed the remainder of the estate to re-
spondent Christopher Pavlic. Respondent
Pavlic was designated as sole executor. Al-
though the new Will provided remote contin-
gencies for minors or incompetents, the new
Will made no reference to Lila’s daughter,
Karen Cutter,

The Family Court entered a temporary
order on February 9, 2012, directing that
Lawrence place the funds he withdrew in
escrow. As a result, the funds withdrawn by
Lawrence from the joint bank accounts were
deposited in an IOLTA account maintained
by an attorney on Lawrence’s behalf.? Soon
after, on February 21, 2012, Lila, age 84,
died while the divorce action was pending.
Upon the filing of a suggestion of death, the
Family Court entered an order on March 28,

No. 11-D-367 (Family Court of Ohio County-
2011).

3. See Rule 1.15. of the West Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct regarding the safeguarding
of client property in an IOLTA account (“Interest
on Lawyers Trust Account”).

684

prejudice,” The Family Court made no rul-
ings regarding the. money Lawrence with-
drew from the joint bank accounts prior to
dismissing the divorce ‘action,
Ii. Procedural Background
In March 2018, Pavylic, as Lila’s executor
under the new Will, filed a declaratory judg-
ment action in the Circuit Court of Ohio
County.! Pavlic alleged that Lawrence, under
the undue influence of petitioner Wakim,
“transferred, dissipated, or otherwise dimin-
ished” funds belonging to the marital estate,
thereby denying Lila access thereto.

Pavlic further alleged that, in view of Lila’s
new Will disinheriting Lawrence, Lawrence’s
share of the funds would be limited to his
elective share of Lila’s estate as determined.
by W.Va, Code, 42-3-1 [1995]. That statute
provides for a surviving spouses’s right to an
elective share, calculated in proportion to the
length of the marriage, against disinheritance
under the decedent’s Will, The parties agree
that Lawrence's elective share would .be
50%.5 Consequently, Pavlic alleged that Law-
rence’s remedy upon being disinherited
would be througli probate court, rather than
claiming ownership of the funds through his
prior unilateral transfers from the joint bank
accounts, Pavlic, therefore, asked the circuit

4, The complaint was styled Christopher Pavlic, as
personal representative of the Last Will and Testa-
ment of Lila L. Belt v. Lawrence John Belt, an
individual, and Paul Harris, as trustee for monies
owned by Lawrence John Belt located within a
client Trust Account, and Jeannette Wakim, an
individual, Civil Action No. 13-C-89 (Ohio Coun-
ty-2013), The record indicates that Wakim, indi-
vidually, was dismissed from the action,

5. W.Va, Code, 42-3-1(a) [1995], states in part:

The surviving spouse of a'decedent who dies
domiciled in this State has a right of election,
against either the will or the intestate share,
under the limitations and conditions stated in
this part, to take the elective-share percentage
of the augmented estate, determined by the
length of time the spouse and the decedent
were married to each other, in accordance
with the following schedule; * * * 15 years or
more—50% of the augmented estate,

6, Lawrence also filed a counterclaim and alleged
that Lila lacked the mental capacity in October
2011 to form a testamentary intent to execute the
new Will, Therefore, according to Lawrence, the
new Will should be set aside and Lila’s estate

2012, dismissing the divorce: action “with |

court to impose a constructive trust on the
funds held in the IOLTA account pending the
outcome of probate Proceedings regarding
Lila’s new Will,

Lawrence filed a motion to dismiss which
alleged that, because the divorce action was
dismissed with prejudice, the current action
is barred by collateral estoppel. In response,
Pavlic asserted that the current action, which
challenges the validity of Lawrence’s trané-
fers from the joint bank accounts, seeks de-
lavatory relief rather than relief under any
domestic relations statute, and, therefore,
collateral estoppel does not apply. The circuit
court agreed with Pavlic and denied the mo-
tion to dismiss, Lawrence then filed an an-
swer alleging that, as an owner of the joint
bank accounts, he was entitled to all of the
funds he withdrew by operation of law.®

In December 2018, the circuit: court placed
a temporary constructive trust on the'funds
placed in the IOLTA account until the rego-
lution of Lila’s estate in probate, Thereafter,
Pavlic filed a motion for summary judgment
which alleged that Lila’s estate is entitled to
the funds in the IOLTA account, subject to
Lawrence's 50% elective share.

On October 29, 2015, the cireuit court
granted Pavlie’s motion for summary judg-

probated under her 2006. Will in which she de-

* vised and bequeathed her entire estate to Law-
rence. In support, Lawrence alleged (1) that
Lila’s new, Will was the result of Pavlic’s undue
influence; (2) that Pavlic assumed responsibility
for Lila when she became ill with cancer but
failed to provide a clean and safe environment
for her care; and (3) that Lila had transferred
significant funds to respondent Pavlic, Mark
Pavlic, and their children.

Lawrence alternatively alleged in the counter-
claim that, if Lila’s new Will is found to be valid
and enforceable, that Lawrence be- permitted to
execute his right to his elective share pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 42-3-1 [1995]. In that regard, Law-
rence emphasized that respondent Pavlic had
already received a legacy from Lila’s estate be-
cause of the funds transferred to Pavlic prior to
Lila’s death.

‘The circuit court ruled that neither Lila’s 2006
‘Will nor the new 2011 Will were relevant to the
issue of Lawrence’s withdrawals from the joint
accounts. We agree, The current declaratory
judgment action concerns the withdrawn funds
presently in the IOLTA account, As discussed
herein, Lila’s new Will and Lawrence's elective
_share are not dispositive in this appeal. °

ment and confirmed the constructive trust
imposed on the funds in the IOLTA account.
The circuit court concluded that, at the time
of Lawrence’s withdrawals on July 15, 2011,
the funds would have been marital assets in
the divorce action that had been previously
dismissed without any ruling on the parties’
property, including the joint bank accounts,
‘The circuit court determined that 50% of the
funds in, an amount to be determined be-
longed to Lila’s estate, with the remaining
50% constituting Lawrence’s elective share of
Lila’s estate under W.Va. Cade, 42-8-1 [1995].

The circuit court found no evidence of un-
due influence but noted that, in the divorce
action, Lila raised the issue of ownership of
the funds Lawrence had withdrawn. The cir-
cuit court stated that the type of joint ac-
counts involved here: “are opened with the
intention that they will jointly benefit both
the husband and the wife, and’with a further
assumption that when the joint accounts are
opened it is not the intention of either spouse
to unjustly enrich the other or to deprive the
child of either spouse their fair share, of their
parents’ money.”

On March 2, 2016, the circuit court entered
an order finding the total funds withdrawn to
be $242,778.62 and awarding $121,386.81 to
Lile’s estate and $121,386.81 to Lawrence.
Lawrence died on April 1, 2016, The circuit
court entered an order on August 29, 2016,
clarifying its prior rulings, therein stating
that both sides were to receive $121,386.81,
“without any further addition to Lawrence or
any reduction to Lila’s estate.” Lawrence’s
executrix, petitioner Wakim, appeals to this
Court from the rulings of the circuit court.

IIL Standards of Review

Hl Pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Vir-
ginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for
summary judgment may be filed in a declara-
tory judgment action. A declaratory judg-
ment thus entered is reviewed by this Court
de novo. Syllabus point 3 of Cow v. Amick,
195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995), holds:
“A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judg-
ment is reviewed de novo.” Accord syl. pt. 1,

+7, Inan affidavit dated December 4, 2014, Wakim
stated that Lawrence left some funds in the ac-
counts for the care and maintenance of Lila and,

* 685

Flanagan v. Stalnaker, 216 W.Va. 436, 607
8.E.2d 765 (2004),

In Cow, this Court observed that, because
the purpose of a declaratory judgment action
is to resolve legal questions, “a circuit court's
ultimate resolution in a declaratory judgment
action is reviewed de novo; however, any
determinations of fact made ‘by the circuit,
court in reaching its ultimate resolution are
reviewed pursuant to a clearly erroneous
standard.” 195 W.Va, at 612, 466 S.E.2d at
463. See W.Va. Code, 55-18-7 [1941] (Orders,
judgments and decrees entered under the
West Virginia Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act “may be reviewed as other orders,
judgments and decrees,”),

IV.: Discussion
A. The Terminated Divorce Action

Hl The circuit. court, in the declaratory
judgment action, placed a, constructive trust
on the IOLTA account and awarded half of
the funds. to Lila’s estate and half of the
funds to Lawrenee’s estate. The circuit court
reasoned that the funds were, marital assets
and, without the constructive trust, Law-
rence would have been unjustly enriched by
the withdrawals. See Annon v. Lucas, 155
W.Va. 368, 382, 185 S.E.2d 848, 352 (1971)
A constructive trust is substantially an ap-
propriate remedy against unjust envich-
ment.”),

Petitioner Wakim contends that, in award-
ing Lila’s estate half of the funds, the cireuit
court committed error by posthumously re-
viving. the divorce action even though no
divoree was granted and no order was en-
tered regarding the property rights of the
parties, Wakim asserts that Lawrence, as an
owner of the joint accounts, was entitled to
withdraw the funds by operation of law.
Moreover, Lawrence’s complete ownership of
the funds was confirmed by his survivorship
upon Lila’s death. Wakim further asserts
that Lila had also withdrawn funds from the
accounts and that Lawrence’s withdrawals
were made. to protect the assets when he
learned that Lila had transferred at least
$68,819.30 to Pavlic.” Pavlie, however, empha-

in addition, ‘made monthly contributions to her

* care, as well as paid Lila Belt's medical bills.”

686

sizes that Lawrence and Lila agreed during
the divorce action that no monies would be
removed from the IOLTA account without
the other’s consent, and, as such, a construc-
tive trust was warranted which ultimately
resulted in an equitable distribution of
$121,386.81 to each estate in the declaratory
judgment action.

HH it is well established that actions
for divorce are personal and terminate upon
the death of a party. Only those property
rights finally adjudicated in a family court
decree survive the divorce. In syllabus point
1 of Bridgeman v. Bridgeman, 182 W.Va.
677, 391 S.E.2d 367 (1990), this Court held:
“Divorce actions, and appeals therefrom,
abate at the death of a party, except as to
property rights.” Accord syl. pt. 4, Zikos v.
Clark, 214 W.Va. 235, 588 S.E.2d 400 (2003).
In Bridgeman, a divorce decree was entered,
and the husband was ordered to pay alimony
in the lump sum of $68,500.00, plus attorney
fees and costs, The husband died shortly
after the divorce decree was entered, Never-
theless, this Court in Bridgeman affirmed
the ruling of the circuit court that the alimo-
ny award was chargeable against the hus-
band’s estate.’ Similarly, in Zikos v. Clark
this Court remanded an action to the lower
court for a determination of alimony arrear-
ages payable to the wife’s estate. In Zikos,
the wife died after the entry of the divorce
decree which directed the husband to pay
alimony in the amount of $300.00 per month.

The circumstances here are very different.

_ Lila died during the divorce proceedings, and
no divorce decree was entered. More impor-
tantly, no marital or individual property
rights were adjudicated in the divorce pro-
ceeding before it was dismissed. Although
the funds Lawrence withdrew were placed in
the IOLTA account pending the outcome of
the divorce action, a constructive trust on the
funds was not contemplated until the filing of
the current declaratory judgment action long
after Lila died and the divorce action was
terminated. The constructive trust was im-

8. See Whitlock ex rel. Pack v. Whitlock, 2013 WL
2462167 (W.Va. 2013) (Under Bridgeman, an ac-
tion may be maintained for “attendant property
rights, if those rights survive a party’s death and

posed in the declaratory judgment action
pursuant to the circuit court’s December
2018 and October 2015 orders. The circuit
court then awarded half the funds to each
estate on the basis of unjust enrichment, not
on the basis of divorce law. See, eg., W.Va.
Code, 48-5-508 [2001] (authorizing a construc-
tive trust to preserve property during pen-
dency of divorce action).

This Court concludes that the divorce ac-
tion is of no moment in resolving the issue of
Lawrence’s withdrawals from the joint bank
accounts, The cireuit court committed error
to the extent it posthumously revived the
divorce action in its rulings below. See Fran-
cis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Effect of
Death of Party to Divorce Proceeding Pend-
ing Appeal or Time Allowed for Appeal, 38
A.L.R.4th 47 § 2 (1984) (Generally, a cause
of action for divorce is purely personal, and
“Sf an action for a divorce is commenced, and
one of the parties dies thereafter but before
the entry of the final decree, the action
abates.”).

Moreover, the imposition of the construc-
tive trust was unwarranted. The record re-
veals, and the cireuit court specifically found,
no undue influence. Nor does the record
indicate that Lawrence or Lila lacked the
mental capacity to make their respective
withdrawals from the joint accounts or to
make and execute their Wills. Furthermore,
the record does not show that Lawrence
diminished the withdrawn funds for his per-
sonal use. To the contrary, petitioner Wakim
maintains that Lawrence left some funds in
the accounts for Lila’s care, made later con-
tributions for Lila’s benefit, and paid her
medical bills. See n. 7, supra. In In Re:
Shéflett, 200 W.Va. 818, 821 n. 28, 490 S.E.2d
902, 910 n. 28 (1997), we observed that a
constructive trust is an implied trust and
arises by operation of law “when equity so
demands.” In the current matter, the circuit
court overreached its authority in imposing
the constructive trust on the IOLTA ac-
count?

are enforceable in favor of, or against, a party's
estate.”’).

9, See 76 Am, Jur.2d Trusts § 169 (2016): “[T]he
doctrine of constructive trust does not allow a

B. The Joint Accounts and Withdrawals

During the marriage, Lawrence and Lila
opened a number of joint accounts with the
right of survivorship. On July 15, 2011, Law-
rence withdrew funds from the joint accounts
and opened new accounts in his name only at
the same banking institutions. According to
petitioner Wakim, Lawrence made the with-
drawals to protect the assets upon learning
that Lila transferred at least $68,818.30 to
Pavlic without Lawrence’s knowledge and
consent,

Regardless of Lawrence’s intent, or Lila’s
intent, the withdrawals in question made by
Lawrence, were governed by W.Va. Code,
81A-4-88(b) [1994], which states:

When a deposit is made by any person
‘in the name of such depositor and another
or others and in form to be paid to any
one of such depositors, or the survivor or
survivors of them, such deposit, and any
additions thereto, made by any of such
persons, upon the making thereof, shall
become the property of such persons as
joint tenants. All such deposits, together
with all interest thereon, shall be held for
the exclusive use of the persons so named,
and may be paid to any one of them dur-
ing the lifetime of them, or to the survivor
or survivors after the death of any of
them.

In a sworn statement, bank employee Dor-
othy Billetter indicated in layman’s terms
that the joint accounts were in a form which
permitted either Lawrence or Lila to trans-
fer money or redeem certificates of deposit,
“whatever they wanted to do.”

Hl The syllabus point in Lett v. Twenti-
eth Street Bank, 188 W.Va. 759, 77 S.E.2d
818 (1958), holds:

A joint tenancy is created in money de-
posited in a bank in the names of two or
more persons, “in form to be paid to ei-
ther,” under Code, 31-8-23 [currently

court to disregard existing legal rights merely to
fashion a result that it deems fairer than that
created by the parties. ‘Unfairness’ is not reason
enough to impose a constructive trust.”

10. Although Lawrence gave Wakim a power of
attorney in 2011, it played no part regarding
Lawrence's July 13, 2011, withdrawals from the

687

W.Va. Code, 31A-4-33], and the same may
be withdrawn by any of the persons so
named, In the event of the death of one or
more of such depositors, a sole survivor is
entitled to the entire amount remaining in
such deposit.

See Koontz v. Long, 181 W.Va. 800, 802, 884
§.E.2d 887, 839 (1989) (citing Lett and noting
that “when a party’s name is added as a joint
tenant with the right of survivorship on a
bank or like account, there is a presumption
that the person adding the joint tenant's
name intends to make a gift of the funds in
the account,”). .

HI In syllabus point 3 of Dorsey v. Short,
157 W.Va. 866, 205 S.E.2d 687 (1974), we
stated: “Prior to the death of a donor deposi-
tor, a rebuttable presumption exists under
the provisions of Code, 1981, 31A-4-33, as
amended, that the ownership of the funds is
joint, a presumption which may be overcome
by competent evidence.” Accord syl. pt. 2,
McComas v. McComas, 178 W.Va. 188, 858
§.E.2d 217 (1987).

There is no evidence that Lawrence, age
95, withdrew the funds in contemplation of
divorce or that he depleted the funds thereaf-
ter. With relatively small deductions, the
funds in question were transferred intact
from the joint bank accounts to Lawrence’s
personal accounts and then to the IOLTA
account. Nor did Lawrence’s relationship to
Lila reach the level of a fiduciary duty with
respect to her illness. As the circuit court
suggested, the joint bank accounts were
opened for the benefit of both Lawrence and
Lila, and Pavlic assumed responsibility for
Lila as her illness progressed. Denying un-
just enrichment, petitioner Wakim asserts on
Lawrence’s behalf that Pavlic had already
received substantial funds through transfers
by Lila.

Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 381A-4-33(b)
[1994], the funds in the joint bank accounts

joint accounts. In the October 29, 2015, order,
the circuit court stated: “The power of attorney
held by Jeannette Wakim is not relevant to this
controversy because Lawrence Belt was the per-
son who transferred all of the money from the
joint tenancy account of Lila Belt and Lawrence
Belt to his personal account.”

688

were non-probate assets jointly owned by
Lawrence and Lila, and Lawrence had a
right to withdraw the funds on July 15, 2011,
as a matter of law. Lila’s withdrawals from
the joint accounts were also proper as a
matter of law, Upon her death on February
21, 2012, Lawrence was entitled to the bal-
ance of the funds left in the joint accounts by
way of survivorship. The funds are not part
of Lila’s Estate. We find no evidence, includ-
ing the terminated divorce action or Lila’s
new Will, which alters this result.
V. Conclusion

The withdrawals from the joint accounts
by both Lawrence and Lila during the mar-
riage were proper under W.Va. Code, 81A-4-
83 [1994], pertaining to joint bank accounts

with the right of survivorship, Consequently,
the August 29, 2016, order of the Circuit
Court of Ohio County is reversed, judgment
is entered in favor of petitioner Wakim as
executrix of Lawrence’s estate, and this ac-
tion is remanded with directions to enter an
order releasing the funds in the IOLTA ac-
count to the estate of Lawrence Belt.

Reversed and Remanded.

805 S.E.2d 800

STATE of West Virginia EX REL. ERP
ENVIRONMENTAL FUND, INC.,
Petitioners
ve

Honorable Warren D. MCGRAW, Judge of
the Circuit Court of Wyoming County,
West Virginia; West Virginia Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection; Aus-
tin Caperton, in his role as Cabinet Sec-
retary of the West Virginia Department
of Environmental Protection; Avary H.
& Betty Jo Bailey; Jason’ A. & Ronche-
ski Bailey; Newman & Katherine
Brown; Algie D. & Katherine Cook; Al-
gie R. & Peggy Ann Cook; Dennis L.
Cook, Jr. & Michelle Cook; Dennis L.
Cook, Sr. & Brenda K. Cook; William C.
& Regina Cook; Donna Fraley; Maybeth
Fraley; Westley & Judy Fraley; Doyle
Lee & Phyllis Johnson; Glen & Mary
Johnson; Elizabeth L. Kennedy; William
D. & Jenny Lafferty; Michael E. Mar-
cum; Helen M. McGinnis; Onnie & Vir-
ginia Paynter; Earl R. Pelphrey; Larry
& Becky Reed; Everett & Freda Smith;
William L. & Jessica N. Stepp; Jacque-
lyn A. Whitley; Billy Ray Willard; Teddy
& Dorothy Wykle, Respondents

No. 17-0148
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 12, 2017
Filed: October 5, 2017

689

690

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson
PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, John J.
Meadows, Esq., Peter J. Raupp, Esq., Devon
J. Stewart, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson PLLC,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Peti-
tioners

Jason Wandling, Esq., West Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Protection, Office
of Legal Services, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for DEP and Austin Caperton

Kevin W. Thompson, Esq., David R. Bar-
ney, Jr., Esq., Thompson Barney, Charles-
ton, West Virginia, Counsel for Individual
Respondents

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The ERP Environmental Fund, Ine.
(“ERP”) seeks a writ of prohibition in con-
nection with the February 25, 2016, order of

1. ERP is the current permit holder subject to the
DEP’s directives.

2. See W.Va. Code §§ 22-3-1 to -38 (2014 & Supp.
2017). We use the acronym "SMCRA” to com-
port with its federal analogue, the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act. See 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201 to -1328 (2012),

3. Specifically, ERP asserts that the Residents
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies

the Circuit Court of Wyoming County com-
pelling the West Virginia Department of En-
vironmental Protection (“DEP”) to direct
Eastern Associated Coal, LLC (“Eastern”) 1
to provide emergency drinking water, tempo-
rary potable water, and ultimately perma-
nent water replacement to the individually-
named respondents (hereinafter referred to
as the “Residents”) pursuant to the provi-
sions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Min-
ing and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”)? As
grounds for seeking relief, ERP argues that
the circuit court’s order is unenforceable due
to both procedural and substantive infirmi-
ties.? Upon our careful review of this matter,
we find that the circuit court lacked the
authority to direct the DEP to obtain water
replacement for the Residents on the record
developed in this case. Accordingly, the writ
of prohibition requested by ERP is hereby
granted.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 4, 2011, the Residents filed
an administrative claim with the DEP in
connection with their allegation that a re-
claimed water impoundment (the “Impound-
ment”) on property subject to a permit held
by Eastern ‘ had contaminated their well wa-
ter in violation of SMCRA® After two years
of investigating the complaint, DEP Environ-
ment Resource Specialist, III, Dustin C.
Johnson authored a report dated April 4,
2018, stating:

In conclusion, there is a lack of evidence
that water emanating from the 0001983
permit is causing detrimental environmen-
tal damage to the hydrologic balance in
which the alleged groundwater contaminat-
ed wells are located. The sampling results
from outlet 013, as well as the DMRs,
illustrate a history of compliance from this
site.

and failed to join an indispensable party to the
underlying mandamus proceeding. Additional
grounds raised by ERP include the absence of a
non-discretionary act; the primary jurisdiction
doctrine; improper venue; and a bankruptcy stay.

4. See supra note 1.

5. The claims were asserted under West Virginia
Code §§ 22-3-24 to -25 (2014).

The Residents refiled their administrative
claim with the DEP on April 18, 2013. On
May 22, 2018, the DEP conducted a “fourth
and final follow. up to the original complaint”
filed by the Residents in November 2011. As
a result of that final inquiry, the DEP termi-
nated the investigation of the Residents’
complaint after finding no evidence that the
permitted area—the Impoundment—was the
contaminating source of the Residents’ water
supply. Opting not to appeal the final deci-
sion terminating their complaint,’ the Resi-
dents chose instead to file yet another com-
plaint with the DEP on May 22, 2015, in
which they asserted the same facts as the
earlier two administrative complaints.”

On September 16, 2015, the Residents filed
a mandamus action in the Cirenit Court of
Wyoming County through which they sought
to require Eastern to provide emergency,
temporary, and permanent water replace-
ment pursuant to West Virginia Code § 22-3-
24 (2014). The Residents named the DEP
and its cabinet secretary § as respondents but
did not include Eastern or ERP as respon-
dents to the mandamus proceeding.

On December 2, 2015, the circuit court
held an evidentiary hearing on the Residents’
mandamus petition, Neither Eastern nor
ERP participated in the hearing..° Through
its ruling issued on February 25, 2016, the
cireuit court directed the DEP to “require

6, See W.Va. Code § 22-3-17(e) (2014).

7, The record before us does not indicate the
status of that complaint.

8. Randy Huffman was named as the DEP Cabi-
net Secretary; that position is now held by Austin
Caperton.

9, The reason for the non-inclusion of Eastern
was the pending bankruptcy proceeding that in-
volved Eastern and its parent company Patriot
Coal Corporation that was filed on May 12, 2015.
See In re: Patriot Coal Corp. et al., Case No. 15-
32450 (B.D. Bankr. E.D. Va.).

10, Counsel for the Residents emailed a copy of
the mandamus petition and the order setting the
evidentiary hearing to counsel for Eastern/ERP
on October 15, 2015. Counsel for Eastern/ERP
attended the December 2, 2015, hearing but did
not intervene or otherwise participate in the pro-
ceeding.

11. Dr. Simonton is an environmental engineer-
ing professor at Marshall University. As a non-

691

Eastern to provide emergency water and
temporary water replacement to Petitioners
[Residents] until such time as Hastern can
establish a permanent water supply for
them.” In making its ruling, the circuit court
discarded the testimony and findings of the
DEP’s witness, Dustin C. Johnson, prefer-
ring instead to rely on the testimony of the
Residents’ expert witness, D, Scott Simon-
ton." Citing Dr. Simonton’s opinion that “the
presence of the hydrogen sulfide gas is an
indicator of Eastern’s mining impact.on Peti-
tioners’ [Residents’] water sources, even
though the level of sulfate concentration may
not have exceeded any applicable standard,”
the circuit court sua sponte determined that
the Residents’ “evidence of contamination
demonstrates that Hastern’s mining opera-
tions impacted their sources of water.”

In compliance with the circuit court’s di-
rective to secure water replacement for the
Residents, the DEP issued two water re-
placement orders ” to Eastern under author-
ity of West Virginia Code § 22-83-24 and ten-
dered the orders to ERP for compliance
purposes.!8 As a non-party to the mandamus
action, ERP struggled to identify the forum
in which to challenge these orders—orders
that were not even issued against ERP 4—
which involved the expenditure of significant
financial resources.® Seeking to resolve this

party to the mandamus proceeding, ERP lacked
the opportunity to challenge Dr. Simonton’s ex-
pertise to testify and to cross-examine him with
regard to his findings.

12, Those orders were issued on March 4 and 25,
2016.

13, See supra note 1.

14, When a third water replacement order was
issued on October 16, 2016, ERP was finally
identified as the permit holder.

15. In its Notice of Appeal filed with the West
Virginia Surface Mine Board, ERP represented
those costs to include $26,000 per month for
delivery services to twenty-six residential loca-
tions and a one-time equipment cost for the
purchase and installation of twenty-six 1,100 gal-
jon water tanks at $4,000 per tank. The final
phase that would require permanent water re-
placement was estimated to cost approximately
$7,000,000.

692

matter in the administrative setting in which
it was initiated, BRP filed an appeal with the
West Virginia Surface Mine Board (the
“Board”) requesting that the Board vacate
the DEP orders. As grounds for its request
for relief from the Board, ERP asserted that.
the circuit court’s order “was both unlawful
and directly.contrary to the WVDEP’s prior
investigations.”

During a June 16, 2016, hearing before the
Board, the DEP provided testimony concern-
ing its decision to terminate the ‘Residents’
complaint. Dustin Johnson “explained: “I
didn’t find any evidence that any mining—
any permitted mining impact was contami-
nating the groundwater regime in this area.”
He opined further that “[sJulfates are gener-
ally’ used by us in [sic] an indication that
there has been some mining contamination if
you have highly elevated sulfates.” Here, the
“sulfates were particularly low in most well
samples, indicating very little influence from
mine drainage.” While acknowledging that
“ERP has a compelling argument that cannot
be overlooked” with regard to a denial of due
process or lack. of jurisdiction, the Board
concluded that it lacked “the power to review
a decision [issued] by a circuit court.” Follow-
ing the Board’s dismissal of the appeal, ERP
petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition.

IL Standard of Review

‘IBD As this Court pronounced in sylla-
bus point one of Harrison County Commis-
sion v, Harrison County Assessor, 222 W.Va.
25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008), “[a] de novo stan-
dard of review applies to a circuit court’s
decision to grant or deny a writ of manda-
mus.” In conducting this plenary review, our
task is to consider “whether the legal prereq-
uisites for mandamus relief are present.”
State ew rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W.Va.
208, 214, 470 S.H.2d 162, 168 (1996). In this
case, our review is subject to the principle
that “{mJandamus lies to require the dis-
charge by a public officer of a nondiseretion-
ary duty.” Syl. Pt. 8, State ex rel. Greenbrier
Cty. Airport Auth. v. Hanna, 151 W.Va, 479,
158 S.B.2d 284 (1967). Bearing these pre-
cepts i in mind, we now consider whether the
circuit court’s issuance of a writ of manda-
mus was proper.

Ii. Discussion

I As a starting point to our review of
the circuit court's award of replacement wa-
ter to the Residents, we observe that this
type of extraordinary relief is governed by
the following requirements: “To invoke man-
damus the relator must show (1) a clear right
to the relief sought; (2)-a legal duty on’ the
part of the respondent to do the thing relator
seeks; and (8) the absence of another ade-
quate remedy.” Syl, Pt. 2, Myers v. Barte,
167 W.Va. 194, 279 8.E.2d 406 (1981). As
evidence of their entitlement to the relief
granted by the cireuit court, the Residents
point to their right as citizens to enforce the
provisions of SMORA. See W.Va, Code § 22-
3-25 (2014),

The Legislature clearly has authorized the
bringing of citizen suits to compel compliance
with SMCRA, Under West Virginia Code
§ 22-83-25, “any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected may
commence a civil action in the circuit court of
the county to which the strface-mining oper-
ation is located....” Such a suit may be
instituted “{algainst the director, division,
surface mine board or appropriate division
employees, ... where there is an alleged
failure of the above to perform any act or
duty under this article which is not discre-
tionary.” Id. at § 22-3-: 252) (emphasis
supplied).

Hl In their attempt to identify a non-
discretionary duty that was not performed in
this matter, the Residerits reference the
mandatory duty for the DEP director under
West Virginia Code § 22-8-17 (2014) to
“cause a notice of violation to be served upon
the operator or operator’s authorized agent”
for non-compliance with any of the require-
ments of SMORA, its legislative rules, or
specified permit conditions, The Residents
alleged that Eastern violated the provision of
SMCRA that required it to “[m]inimize the
disturbances to the prevailing hydrologic bal-
ance at the mine site and in associated off-
site areas,” W.Va. Code § 22-3-18(b)(10);
W.Va. C.S,R. § 88-2-14.5, Given that the
DEP director is statutorily required to act in
the instance of non-compliance with SMCRA,
the Residents submit that DEP’s non-issu-°
ance of a violation notice constitutes the req-

uisite non-discretionary act to warrant man-
damus relief.

What the Residents overlook in their zeal
to locate the necessary unfulfilled duty by
the DEP is the discretion necessarily im-
posed upon the DEP to determine in the first
instance whether there has been a violation
of SMCRA, the supporting’ regulations, or a
permit, When the Residents filed their ad-
ministrative complaint pursuant to SMCRA
in 2011, the DEP undertook an investigation
to determine whether the Impoundment was
the source of the alleged groundwater issues,
At the end of that investigation, which includ-
ed ground water sampling and site visitation,
DEP specialist Dustin Johnson determined
that the Impoundment was not “contaminat-
ing the groundwater regime in this area.”
Based on the specific results obtained from
the water testing, the DEP terminated the
complaint after determining that the permit-
ted area was not the source of the Residents’
water issues.!6

In its order granting relief, the trial court
included the following finding:
According to Mr. Johnson, there was noth-
ing to connect the exceedances to a viola-
tion. Mr. Johnson explained that, after
consulting with inspectors and others, he
believed that the abandoned slate dump
adjacent to Hastern’s impoundment was
the cause of the water standard excee-
dances, not anything related to Eastern’s
permit, including the impoundment. Mr.
Johnson also did not believe there was any
evidence of seepage from the impound-
ment which would contaminate the Peti-
tioners’ [Residents’] well water.
Discarding the legislative authority expressly
reposed in the DEP to reach this conclusion,
the trial court decided that the DEP's deci-
sion to terminaté the Residents’ complaint

16. In his April 4, 2013, report, Mr. Johnson
acknowledged a possible source of the water
contamination was the “un-reclaimed pre-
SMCRA refuse dump located to the east of the
impoundment.”

17. Despite its clear objections to the Residents’
entitlement to mandamus relief during the pro-
ceedings below, the DEP fully complied with the
circuit court's mandamus directives. When’ ques-
tioned during oral argument, the DEP stated that
the agency's position regarding the lack of con-

693

was made “in complete abrogation of all of
the scientific evidence uncovered by the sam-
pling and ‘testing events conducted in the
area,”

The right to institute a citizens suit under
SMCRA for water replacement is premised
upon a finding that the citizens’ water supply
“has been affected by contamination, diminu-
tion or interruption proximately caused by
the surface mining operation.” W.Va. Code
§ 22-8-24(b); see W.Va. Code § 22-8-24(e). In
this case, the predicate finding by the DEP
of contamination specifically linked to the
permitted area is missing. Absent a finding
of contamination by DEP, there is no statuto-
ty basis for the issuance of a notice of viola-
tion. See W.Va. Code § 22-83-17, Only if the
DEP had failed to issue a notice of violation
in the face of unmistakable evidence of water
contamination associated with the Impound-
ment, could the Residents succeed on their
theory that the DEP failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty under SMCRA. See id.
But, a8 the record makes clear, that was not
the case here.

Citing the testimiony of the Residents and
‘their expert witness, the circuit court sup-
planted the DEP’s finding of no contamina~
tion with its diametric conclusion: “In this
case, Petitioners’ [Residents’] evidence of
contamination demonstrates that Easteri’s
permitted mining operations impacted their
sources of water. The contamination emanat-
ing from Hastern’s permitted impoundment.
negatively impacted Petitioners’ ability to use
their well water safely for domestic purpose.”
Sidestepping the issue raised by the DEP at
the mandamus proceeding with regard to the
Residents being unable to demonstrate “a
clear and indisputable right to the issuance
of the writ,” the circuit court simply de-
clared that the Residents’ right to water

tamination from the permitted area has never
changed. Accordingly, we find the DEP's deci-
sion to support the Residents’ position on appeal
rather puzzling. It is one thing to respect a
circuit court's ruling, but quite another to adopt
a Wholly inconsistent position. And, given the
DEP's unwavering position with regard to the
Jack of a SMCRA violation, this course change is
not only baffling but suggests an abrogation of
the agency's duties to enforce the laws of this
state, .

694

replacement is clear under SMORA “if there
is evidence that the permitted mine contami-
nated their groundwater.” And then the cir-
cuit court proceeded to create the predicate
finding of contamination by cherry picking
from the evidence adduced in this case.

HM Our reading of the legislative scheme
at issue makes clear that a finding by the
DEP of contamination, diminution, or inter-
ruption to an owner’s water supply is a pre-
requisite to the issuance of any water re-
placement relief under SMCRA.'§ See W.Va.
Code § 22-38-24. Not only did the circuit
court lack the authority to supply the requi-
site finding of water contamination necessary
to grant any water replacement relief under
SMCRA but it further lacked the authority
to grant relief in mandamus predicated on
the DEP’s failure to perform a non-discre-
tionary duty. As discussed above, the DEP
had a duty to issue a notice of violation only
upon its finding of a specific violation of
SMCRA. See W.Va. Code § 22-83-17. But as
the record reveals, the DEP never found any
evidence that SMCRA had been violated by
Eastern, as alleged in the Residents’ com-
plaint. See supra note 17.

The petitioners have amply demonstrated
that the prerequisites for mandamus relief
are not present in this case. As the submitted
record makes evident, the DEP did not fail
to perform a non-discretionary duty. See
Hanna, 151 W.Va. 479, 153 S.H.2d 284, syl.
pt. 8, Absent that critical element, the circuit
court lacked the authority to direct the DEP
to compel Eastern to supply the Residents
with emergency, temporary, and permanent
water replacement supplies. Given this fatal
impediment to the issuance of a writ of man-
damus, we find no need to address the addi-
tional grounds for relief set forth by ERP.
Furthermore, this Court wishes to make

18. While the enforcement of SMCRA’s water re-
placement rights is permitted in circuit court, we
find no basis for concluding that the Legislature
authorized the circuit court to usurp the DEP’s
authority with regard to making the pivotal find-
ing of “contamination, diminution or interrup-
tion to an owner’s water supply.” W.Va. Code
§ 22-3-24 (b), (c). The integral involvement of the
DEP both with regard to making that necessary
initial finding and then with regard to overseeing
the water replacement supply during the two-
year period prescribed by statute is clear. See,

clear that we are not deciding the issue of
whether the Residents’ water is contaminat-
ed. That issue is not before us. Our limited
inquiry in this case was to determine wheth-
er the circuit court had the necessary
grounds to compel water replacement to the
Residents under the provisions of SMCRA,
See W.Va. Code § 22-83-24. It did not.
IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the writ of prohi-
bition sought by the petitioners is granted to
prevent enforcement of the writ of manda-
mus issued by the Circuit Court of Wyoming
County against the West Virginia Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection on Febru-
ary 25, 2016.

Writ granted.

805 S.B.2d 805

BLUESTEM BRANDS, INC.
d/b/a Fingerhut, Third-Party
Defendant Below, Petitioner

ve

Darlene SHADE, Third-Party Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

No. 16-0793
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 6, 2017

eg., W.Va. Code § 22-3-24(h) (discussing DEP
director's authority regarding discontinuation of
water replacement service).

19. The statute goes so far as to create a rebutta-
ble presumption of causation upon a DEP in-
spector’s finding of contamination in certain in-
stances. See W.Va. Code § 22-3-24(c).

20. See supra note 3.

M. David Griffith, Jr., Esq., Joseph K,
Merical, Esq. Thomas Combs & Spann,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, and, Aar-
on D. Van Oort, Esq., Erin L. Hoffman, Esq.,
Jeffrey P, Justman, Esq. Faegre Baker
Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Pro
Hace Vice, Attorneys for Petitioner

Jonathan R. Marshall, Esq., Bailey & Glas.
ser, LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, and,
Andrew ©, Skinner, Esq., Skinner Law Firm,
Charles Town, West Virginia, Attorneys for
Respondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

This is an appeal from the July 21, 2016,

+ order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley Coun-
ty denying the motion of petitioner Bluestem
Brands, Inc. d/b/a Fingerhut (hereinafter
“Bluestem”) to compel arbitration and dis-
miss the third-party complaint. The circuit
court found that the arbitration agreement,
was not binding on respondent Darlene
Shade (hereinafter “Ms. Shade”), in part,
because 1) Ms, Shade did not assent to arbi-
tration given that she did not receive a copy
of the most recent credit card agreement
containing arbitration language; and 2)
Bluestem’s credit partners—and not Blues-
tem—were party to any potentially applica-
ble credit agreement requiring arbitration.

Upon caveful review of the briefs, the ap-
pendix record, the arguments of the parties,
and the applicable legal authority, we con-
elude that, although the most recent amend-
ments to the credit agreement lack mutual
assent and therefore cannot be utilized to
compel arbitration of this matter, the 2010
version of the credit agreement contains a
properly formed agreement to arbitration
and encompasses the claims asserted by Ms.
Shade. We find further that Bluestem, as a
non-signatory to the agreement, may utilize
the theory of equitable estoppel to compel
arbitration under the agreement. Therefore,
the circuit court erred in denying Bluestem’s
motion to compel arbitration.

1, The Notice is entitled “Important Information
for Valued Customers” and states that as of July
1, 2012, Bluestem had partnered with a’ new
credit issuer, WebBank, and that the customer's
account, had been transferred to WebBank. It
advises that the account number will remain the

697

- I, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

Bluestem, doing” business as “Fingerhut,”
is a retailer of a variety of consumer goods
by way of catalog and internet shopping
channels; Bluestem partners with various
banks to offer credit to its customers’ for
“Fingerhut” purchases. Ms. Shade made her
first “Fingerhut” purchase in 2006, She made
this purchase utilizing the credit offered to
customers through Bluestem’s then-credit
partner; CIT Bank. Ms. Shade applied for
and was approved this credit by phone.
Thereafter, Ms, Shade was sent a welcome
packet which included a written credit agree-
ment entitled “CIT Bank Fingerhut Credit
Account Agreement.” The agreement con-
tained no arbitration provision, but did have
a “change-of-terms” provision allowing for
future amendments," In 2007, the credit
agreement was amended to include an arbi-
tration agreement, along with an “opt-out”
provision, This agreement was sent to her
with her monthly statement and she admits
receiving it, She did not opt out of the arbi-
tration ‘agreement and continued to use the
account to make additional purchases.

In 2010, Bluestem switched credit partners
to MetaBank. Ms. Shade was sent a notifica-
tion of the change, alorig with a new credit
agreement, which contained essentially the
same arbitration agreement and opt-out pro-
vision. Ms, Shade likewise admits receiving
this agreement. The new agreement indicat-
ed it would become effective “from the. first
time a transaction is posted to your account.”
She thereafter made thirty-four purchases.

In 2012, Bluestem changed credit partners
again and sent Ms, Shade a notification that
its credit partner had switched to WebBank;
the notice contained an 800-number to call if
she had any questions about her “Account.”
‘The notice made no mention of a new credit
agreement and no new agreement was in-
cluded with this notice! Ms, Shade claims

same, and will not affect the customer's existing
balance, future purchases or “how you use your
account.” It references the continuing operation
of any account protection plans and notes that
statements will begin to reference WebBank as of
July 1. It concludes by inviting the customer to

698

that she never thereafter received a new
agreement, nor does Bluestem provide any
evidence that she was ever provided with this
agreement, The 2012 credit agreement was
purportedly amended one additional time in
2013 and notice of the amended agreement,
which made no changes to the arbitration
provision, was sent to Ms. Shade. Ms. Shade
likewise denies receiving this agreement in
full and, like the 2012 agreement, Bluestem
provides no proof that it was sent to her. Ms.
Shade made her final purchase, purportedly
subject to the 2013 agreement, on March 20,
2013,

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Shade’s account al-
legedly went delinquent in the amount of
$8,351.52; collection efforts were initiated by
a debt collector, which filed the instant action
against her. Ms. Shade then brought a third-
party complaint against Bluestem, but none
of the credit partners, alleging that the fi-
nance charges and interest rate charged for
her purchases were in violation of the West
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
Act, West Virginia Code §§ 46A-1-101 e¢ seq.
Ms. Shade further alleges that Bluestem—
and not any of the various credit partners—
is actually the entity extending credit and is
therefore participating in a “rent-a-bank
scheme” whereby it evades licensure and
regulation in the State.

Hl Bluestem moved to compel arbitra-
tion and dismiss the third-party complaint,
which motion was denied by the circuit court.
The circuit court found that 1) Ms. Shade
never received the 2012 or 2018 credit card
agreement and therefore could not be com-
pelled to arbitrate pursuant to it; and 2)
Bluestem was not a party to any of the prior
arbitration agreements; therefore, there was
no arbitration agreement with Bluestem to
be enforced.? This appeal followed.

“[cJontact us at 1-800-208-2500 if you have ques-
tions regarding your Account.”

2, The circuit court further addressed at length
Bluestem’s purported contention that the cata~
logs received by Ms. Shade were pertinent to the
formation of a valid arbitration agreement.
Bluestem apparently abandons its argument re-
garding the catalogs, to the extent it was ad-

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW

Wl This Court has held that “{w]hen an
appeal from an order denying a motion to
dismiss and to compel arbitration is properly
before this Court, our review is de novo.”
Syl. Pt. 1, W. Va. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v.
McDowell Pharmacy, Inc. 288 W.Va. 465,
796 S.E.2d 574 (2017). With this standard in
mind, we proceed to the parties’ arguments.

Ill. DISCUSSION

Unlike most arbitration cases recently con-
sidered by this Court, neither the circuit
court nor the parties raise issues of uncon-
scionability. Rather, the challenge to the in-
stant arbitration agreement rests on general
contract formation principles. The circuit
court found, and Ms. Shade argues, that she
never received the 2012 or 2018 agreements;
therefore, she did not assent to arbitration
and cannot be compelled to do so under those
agreements. The circuit court further found,
and Ms. Shade argues, that whatever prior
agreement(s) may have been formed was en-
tered into with the credit partners and not
Bluestem. Therefore, Ms. Shade argues that
she cannot be compelled to arbitrate her
claims in this matter, which were filed exclu-
sively against Bluestem, pursuant to those
agreements,

TM Generally, with respect to a trial
court’s consideration of a motion to’ compel
arbitration, this Court has held:

When a trial court is required to rule
upon a motion to compel arbitration pursu-
ant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-807 (2006), the authority of
the trial court is limited to determining the
threshold issues of (1) whether a valid
arbitration agreement exists between the
parties; and (2) whether the claims averred
by the plaintiff fall within the substantive
scope of that arbitration agreement.

vanced before the circuit court. The circuit court
also engaged in a discussion regarding “browse-
wrap” agreements, “A browsewrap agreement is
a contract arising in the context of Internet com-
merce that is formed when one accepts it merely
by browsing a website." Citizens Telecomms. Co.
of W. Va. v. Sheridan, 239 W. Va. 67, 72, 799
S.E.2d 144, 149 (2017). However, this Court can
discern no “browsewrap” agreements relevant to
the instant proceeding.

Syl. Pt. 2, State ew rel. TD Ameritrade, Inc.
v. Kaufman, 225 W.Va. 250, 692 S.E.2d 293
(2010). With this framework in mind, we
examine the circuit court’s refusal to compel
arbitration.

A, Existence of a Valid Agreement

HI The United States Supreme Court
has explained that “arbitration is simply a
matter of contract between the parties; it is a
way to resolve disputes—but only those dis-
putes—that the parties have agreed to sub-
mit to arbitration.” First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S, 988, 948, 115 S.Ct.
1920, 181 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). Therefore, an
agreement to arbitrate must contain the ele-
ments required for proper formation of any
contract. Inasmuch as our analysis requires
us to first determine if any arbitration agree-
ment which may potentially govern this mat-
ter was legally formed, we will examine each
potentially applicable agreement,

Hl Ms. Shade does not dispute receiving
the 2007 and 2010 credit agreements, both of
which contained an arbitration provision,
along with an “opt-out” provision. Both
agreements contain largely similar language
requiring arbitration. The arbitration provi-
sion in the 2010 agreement provides that

[any claim, dispute or controversy (wheth-

er in contract, regulatory, tort or other-

wise, whether pre-existing, present or fu-
ture and including constitutional, statutory,
common law, intentional tort and equitable
claims) arising from or relating to the
eredit offered or provided to you, the ac-
tions of yourself, us, or third parties; or
the validity of this Arbitration provision
... must, after an election by you or us, be
resolved by binding arbitration[.]
The 2010 agreement further contains a notice
in bold lettering in a box at the beginning of
the agreement stating: “Arbitration notice:
This Agreement provides that all disputes
arising from or related to your Account may
be resolved by arbitration. See ‘Arbitration’

3. Not surprisingly then—albeit belatedly—in a
responsive supplement recently provided to the
Court, Ms. Shade expressly concedes that the
2007 and 2010 agreements were “legally
formed” but merely maintains that such agree-
ments were not entered into with Bluestem. In
this supplement, she also launches several pre-

699

below.” Moreover, the 2010 agreement pro-
vides that it becomes operable upon first use:
“You ... will be bound by this Agreement
from the first time you use the Account.” Ms.
Shade made forty-one purchases following
receipt of the 2010 agreement.

HM Therefore, it appears clear that the
2007 and 2010 credit agreements contained
express arbitration provisions of which Ms.
Shade had notice and an opportunity to de-
cline. Ms. Shade’s continued use of the credit
after receiving the 2007 and 2010 credit
agreements containing the arbitration agree-
ments, per the language of the agreement
and as held by this Court, plainly constitutes
mutual assent. As this Court has explained:

West Virginia contract law requires mutual

assent to form a valid contract.... “In

order for this mutuality to exist, it is nec-
essary that there be a proposal or offer on
the part of one party and an acceptance on
the part of the other. Both the offer and
acceptance may be by word, act or conduct
that evince the intention of the parties to
contract...”

New v. GameStop, Inc., 282 W.Va. 564, 572-

78, 753 S.E.2d 62, 70-71 (2013) (emphasis

. added) (quoting Ways v. Imation Enters.

Corp., 214 W.Va. 805, 318, 589 S.E.2d 36, 44
(2008)); see also Citizens Telecomms., 239 W.
Va, at 72, 799 S.H.2d at 149 (discussing mu-
tual assent and modification of unilateral con-
tracts; noting that acceptance of contractual
terms and conditions occurred through “con-
tinued use” of the service); First Nat. Bank
of Gallipolis v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 151 W.Va.
686, 641-42, 153 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1967) (“That
an acceptance may be effected by silence
accompanied by an act of the offeree which
constitutes a performance of that requested
by the offeror is well established.”). Aecord-
ingly, both agreements were properly formed
and, upon acceptance of the terms of the
2010 agreement, it became the agreement
governing Ms, Shade’s use of the credit pro-
vided thereunder. *

viously undeveloped challenges to the 2010
agreement's applicability to this action, despite
conceding in her initial brief that “there is no
dispute in this case regarding ‘the scope of arbi-
trable issues.’” These newly-formed challenges
to the scope of the arbitration language are ad-
dressed more fully infra,

700

The 2012 and 2013 agreements, however,
present an entirely different factual scenario,
Ms. Shade contends that she never received
either of these agreements and’ Bluestem

" provides no evidence that Ms. Shade was
ever sent a copy of these agreements. In-
stead, Bluestem claims the 2012 and 2018
purported amendments to the 2010 credit
agreement were properly made through pro-
vision of .a “notice” of the change of credit
provider, Citing West Virginia Code § 46A-3-
116(2) (1994), Bluestem maintains that the
credit agreement may be unilaterally amend-
ed with simple written notice and that actual
provision of the agreement is not necessary:

A creditor. may change the terms of a

revolving charge account or revolving loan

account whether or not the change is au-
thorized by prior agreement. The creditor
shall give to the consumer written notice of
such change not less than fifteen days
prior to the effective date of such change,

The circuit court found, and Ms. Shade ar-
gues, that the lack of receipt of this purport-
ed modification in this instance is fatal to
mutual: assent to arbitrate under the 2012
and 2018 agreements.‘ We agree.

Bluestem appears to take the tenuous posi-
tion that insofar as the “notice” provision
contained in West Virginia Code § 46A-3-
116(2) is satisfied, mutual assent is estab-
lished. Bluestem’s argument is unavailing,
While the statute does in fact allow for uni-
lateral modification of a revolving charge ac-
count with written notice to the consumer,
implicit in this notice requirement is the ne-
cessity of providing the consumer with the
modifications, so as to establish mutual as-
sent, The statute cannot be read to obviate
the necessity of this element of contract for-
mation. Bluestem’s notice indicates merely
that there was a change in credit partners. It
makes no reference whatsoever to the exis-
tence of a new credit agreement.

To overcome this inadequacy, Bluestem
cites a litany of cases which it claims stand
for the proposition that its “notice,” along
with the availability of an 800-number for

4, ‘The circuit. court also found that the credit
agreements were illusory simply because they
were unilaterally amended several times. We find
this conclusion erroneous and note the circuit

questions regarding Ms. Shade’s “[a]ecount”
were sufficient to establish mutual assent to
a subséquent amendment to the 2010 agree-
ment, Bluestem argues that had Ms. Shade
desired to obtain the new credit agreement,
she need only have availed herself of the 800-
number to request it. However, in all of the
cases cited by Bluestem, the subsequent
amendment at issue was either provided to
the consumer or was sufficiently described
such as to put the consumer on notice re-
garding the substance of the amendment and
that further information regarding the
amendment could be obtained by following
the instructions given. See, eg. Cicle v.
Chase Bank USA, 588 F.3d 549, 551, 554 (8th
Cir, 2009) (“Chase sent Cicle a new arbitra-
tion agreement that replaced the one previ-
ously in effect” and “[t]he notice [of amend-
ment to cardholder agreement] specifically
stated in the ‘Summary of Changes’ section
that the arbitration agreement was being
amended and suggested that the cardholder
review the changes.”); Ackerberg v. Citicorp
USA, Inc, 898 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (ND.
Cal. 2012) (“Citibank notified plaintiff that it
would be modifying the terms of all former
Sears accounts. The modifications would in-
clude changes to, inter alia, the arbitration
clause and the governing law.” (citations
omitted); Guerrero v. Equifax Credit Info.
Servs, Inc, No. CV 11-6555, 2012 WL
7683512, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012) (“Ci-
tibank mailed its cardmembers, including
Plaintiff, a ‘notice of Change in Terms re-
garding Binding Arbitration to Your Citibank
Card Agreement[,? ... The 2001 Change-
in-Terms was mailed to Plaintiff with his
October 2001 billing statement, along with an
express directive to ‘please see the enclosed
change in terms notice for important infor-
mation about the binding arbitration provi-
sion we are adding to your Citibank card
agreement,’”); Daugherty v. Experian Info.
Sols. Inc. 847 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1191 (N.D,
Cal. 2012) (“Sears changed the terms of
Plaintiff's credit card account by mailing him
new credit card agreements. Each of these
agreements contained a change of terms pro-

court's apparent failure to consider West Virgi-
nia Code § 46A-3-116(2), which expressly per-
mits amendment of revolving charge account
agreements.

vision, an arbitration provision, and an as-
signment provision.” (citations omitted)).

HB (None of the cited cases found that
a subsequent amendment was valid where
the consumer was neither 1) provided with
the amendment, nor 2) provided with suffi-
cient notice of the substance of the amend-
ment and opportunity to obtain additional
information and/or the actual amendment,
Bluestem’s notice that it was changing credit.
partners fails to even suggest that there is a
new agreement to obtain, In fact, Bluestem’s
notice reads in such a way as to reassure the
consumer that nothing has changed despite
the switch in credit partners: “Your account
number will remain the same. In addition,
this change will not affect your existing bal-
ance, future purchases or how you use your
account.” It is self-evident that a party can-
not assent to a change of which it is unaware.
“A meeting of the minds of the parties is a
sine qua non of all contracts.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Martin v. Ewing, 112 W.Va, 882, 164 S.E.
859 (1982),

This precise issue was recently addressed
in a case involving Bluestem and these same
credit agreements in the Minnesota District
Court. In Parm v, Bluestem Brands, Inc.,
Civil Nos. 15-8487 and 16-624, 2017 WL

1198998, at *7 (March 30, 2017, D. Minn.), ©

appeal filed, No, 17-1981 and -1982, (8th Cir,
May 2, 2017), the District Court found that
the lack of adequate notice of the new agree-
ment and arbitration provision made the 2012
agreement invalid: “Parm and Bowers re-
ceived no notice of updates to the 2010
Agreement other than those specifically men-
tioned in mailings. The Banks therefore did
not effectively modify the 2010 Agreement or

5. As previously noted, in a supplement provided
to the Court, Ms. Shade launches a more sub-
stantive defense to the applicability of the 2010
agreement, seemingly recognizing—albeit belat-
edly—the potential to be bound by the 2010
agreement, Therein, Ms, Shade takes the position
that the 2010 agreement “did not apply at the
time the underlying conduct occurred in any
event[.]” (emphasis added). However, the brief-
ing scarcely mentions, much less fully develops,
this issue, “It is ... well settled ... that casual
mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treat-
ment insufficient to preserve the issue on ap-
peal.” State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va, 595, 605 n.16,
461 S.B.2d 101, 111 n,16 (1995) (quoting Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir, 1993). Ms.

701

the arbitration provision therein[.]” We agree
with the Parm court and find that Ms. Shade
cannot be bound by the terms of the 2012 or
2018 arbitration agreements since the at-
tempted amendments of the credit agree-
ment were invalid. 7

However, . notwithstanding the ineffective
modification attempted by the 2012 and 2018
agreements, it is clear that the validly
formed 2010 credit agreement and attendant
arbitration provision continued to be in effect
and governed Ms, Shade’s use of the credit.
Simply because the 2012 and 2018 amend-
ments were ineffective does not render the
‘pre-existing ‘credit agreement nonexistent.
The Parm court came to the same conclu-
sion: “The Banks therefore did not effectively
modify the 2010 Agreement or the arbitra-
tion provision therein, and [t]he arbitration
provision in the 2010 Agreement, as opposed
to a later version of the Credit Agreement, is
binding on Parm and Bowers.” Jd.

. HB Accordingly, Ms. Shade is sub-
ject to the arbitration agreement contained
in the most recent agreement to which she
assented—the 2010 agreement.® Quite sim-
ply, Ms, Shade agreed to arbitrate claims
arising from the use of the credit provided
for “Fingerhut” purchases; a dispute about
which particular agreement is binding does
not extinguish her unequivocal agreement to
arbitrate any such claims. See PEC, Inc. v
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 460
Fed,Appx. 731, 785 (10th Cir, 2012) (finding
that multiple documents “unambiguously re-
flect{ing] the parties’ intent” to arbitrate re-
quired arbitration, irrespective of which par-
ticular agreement controlled).

Shade's defense to the 2007 and 2010 agree-
ments can be fairly said to be limited to the issue
of Bluestem being a non-signatory to the agree-
ment. She did not advance a time-based defense
to applicability of-those agreements.

Nevertheless, we note that Ms: Shade’s com-
plaint itself belies her contention that the com-
plained-of conduct is limited to a particular pe-
riod of time not encompassed by ‘the 2010
agreement, particularly since we have deter-
mined that such agreement. continued in effect
throughout the duration of her relationship with
Bluestem. She alleges that the excessive interest
was levied “every month” and late fees were
charged “after her first and all subsequent late
payments,” respectively.

702

B. Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement
“by Bluestem

HM Having determined that the 2010
credit agreement was validly formed and
continued to govern Ms. Shade’s use of the
eredit, the remaining question is whether
Bluestem may enforce the arbitration provi-
sions contained therein. Ms. Shade argues
that the eredit agreements were with the
credit partners,’ rather than Bluestem.
Therefore, she argues that Bluestem cannot
enforce the arbitration agreement.

However, “{wlell-established common law
principles dictate that in an appropriate case
a nonsignatory can enforce, or be bound by,
an arbitration provision within a contract ex-
ecuted by other parties.” Int'l Paper Co. v.
Schwabedissen Maschinen &  Anlagen
GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 416-17 (4th Cir. 2000).
This Court recently addressed enforcement
of arbitration agreements relative to non-
signatories in Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.
v. Hickman, 236 W.Va. 421, 781 8.E.2d 198
(2015). In Chesapeake Appalachia, however,
the issue involved a signatory’s attempt to
enforce arbitration against a non-signatory
and we therefore issued a syllabus point ar-
ticulating five theories under which a non-
signatory may be so compelled. See Syl. Pt.
10, Id. (“A signatory to an arbitration agree-
ment cannot require a non-signatory to arbi-
trate unless the non-signatory is bound un-
der some traditional theory of contract and
agency law. The five traditional theories un-
der which a signatory to an arbitration
agreement may bind a non-signatory are: (1)
incorporation by reference; (2) assumption;
6, Once again, in a supplement to the Court, Ms.

Shade develops yet another new argument fo-

cused on the 2010 agreement, suggesting that

since that agreement involved a credit partner
other than WebBank—against whom she directs
her “rent-a-bank” allegations—it is inapplicable
to the current dispute. This is but a different
facet of the similarly undeveloped argument de-
scribed in n.5 supra. This Court has made clear
that ‘‘[a] skeletal “argument,” really nothing

more than an assertion, does not preserve a

claim.... Judges are not like pigs, hunting for

truffles buried in briefs.’” State, Dept. of Health

‘v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759, 765, 466

S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995), (quoting United States v.

Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)), Fur-

thermore, “[aJithough we liberally construe

(8) agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5)
estoppel.”).

Although Chesapeake Appalachia dealt
with the converse of the factual scenario in
this case, we nevertheless acknowledged the
estoppel theory of arbitration enforcement
by a non-signatory: “[A] willing non-signato-
ry seeking to arbitrate with a signatory that
is unwilling may do so under what has been
called an alternative estoppel theory, which
takes into consideration the relationships of
persons, wrongs and issues.” Id. at 440, 781
S.E.2d at 217 (quoting Merrill Lynch Inv.
Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 887 F.8d 125,
181 (2d Cir. 2008). See Thomson-CSF, S.A.
v, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 778, 779
(2d Cir. 1995) (observing courts have widely
held “parties [are] estopped from avoiding
arbitration [where] they ha[ve] entered into
written arbitration agreements, albeit with
the affiliates of those parties asserting the
arbitration and not the parties themselves.”).

HMM The Fourth Circuit has elaborated
on the concept, setting forth a test for appli-
cation of the estoppel theory of arbitration
enforcement by a non-signatory, as follows:

[E]stoppel applies when the signatory to
a written agreement containing an arbi-
tration clause must rely on the terms of
the ... agreement in asserting its claims
against the nonsignatory. When each of
a signatory’s claims against a nonsignato-
ry makes reference to or preswmes the
existence of the written agreement, the
signatory’s claims arise out of and relate
directly to the written agreement, and
arbitration is appropriate.

briefs in determining issues presented for review,
issues which are not raised, and those mentioned
only in passing but are not supported with perti-
nent authority, are not considered on. appeal.”
State v, LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d
613, 621 (1996).

Nevertheless, our analysis of the non-signatory
issue effectively resolves this argument. Ms.
Shade unequivocally agreed to arbitrate disputes
arising from her use of the credit provided for
“Fingerhut” purchases and she expressly chose
not to’'name WebBank as a defendant. As dis-
cussed infra, her claims plainly arise from and
relate to the credit agreement she seeks to disa-
vow. Any attempt to engineer her pleadings to
evade that agreement is rendered unsuccessful
by virtue of the estoppel theory.

Am. Bankers Ins. Grp, Inc v.. Long, 458
F.8d 628, 627 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brant-
ley v. Republic Mortg. Ins. Co., 424 F.3d 892,
895-96 (4th Cir, 2005)) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we hold that a non-signatory to
a written agreement requiring arbitration
may utilize the estoppel theory to compel
arbitration against an unwilling signatory
when the signatory’s claims make reference
to, presume the existence of, or otherwise
rely on the written agreement. Such’ claims
sufficiently arise out of and relate to the
written agreement as to require arbitration.

TM Therefore, Ms. Shade’s argument
that she may not be compelled to arbitrate
simply because Bluestem was not a signatory
to the credit agreement necessitates further
analysis, The Court must view Ms. Shade’s
allegations against Bluestem to determine
whether they reference, presume the exis-
tence of, or otherwise rely on the 2010 credit
agreement. In her recent supplement, Ms,
Shade attempts to utilize the Parm case to
argue that the arbitration agreement does
not reach her claims; however, Parm fully
supports a requirement to arbitrate.

Consistent with the estoppel rule articulat-
ed hereinabove, the Parm court found that,
despite the arbitration agreement's language
that “any and all disputes” were subject to
arbitration, only those that “‘aris[e] out of or
relat[e] to’” the agreement or relationship
with WebBank were arbitrable. 2017 WL
1198998 at “11. Accordingly, the Parm court
found that allegations regarding Bluestem’s
pricing of goods were not subject to arbitra-
tion, as such allegations did not pertain or

. relate to the extension of credit. Id. Howev-
er, the court expressly found that allegations
regarding interest rates and finance charges
were specifically governed by the arbitration
agreement. Id, at *11-12. We likewise find
that Ms. Shade’s allegations pursuant to the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protec-
tion Act for unlawful late fees and usurious
interest rates pertain eaclusively to charges
arising pursuant to the credit provided to

7._In view of our resolution of this matter, we find

it umnecessary to address the issues raised by

Bluestem following oral argument regarding the
delegation of issues of arbitrability.

However, we take this opportunity to note that

the parties to this matter collectively provided no

703

her, thereby permitting the use of estoppel
to compel arbitration of these claims,

As to her “rent-a-bank scheme” allega-
tions, Ms. Shade alleges the existence and
operation of a deceptive scheme being perpe-~
trated by Bluestem utilizing WebBank as a
“front” for its own creditor activity. She ar-
gues that because she has leveled these
claims only against Bluestem and contends
that Bluestem is the “real” credit lender—
disavowing any involvement with the credit
partners—such allegations could not possibly
“arise out of? any agreement with the credit
partners. We find this contention to be disin-
genuous.

Although Ms. Shade may not be trying to
“prove” any of the credit agreement’s terms,
the existence of the credit purportedly ex-
tended under the agreement is the necessary
underpinning of her “rent-a-bank” allega-
tions. Without the credit agreement—which
provided for the fees and interest rates she
now complains of and sets the stage for the
relationships and “scheme” she alleges—she
would have no cause of action. See Sherer v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 382
(6th Cir. 2008) (“Sherer has agreed to arbi-
trate any claims arising from ‘the relation-
ships which result from th[e] [algreement.’ A
loan servicer, such as Green Tree, is just
such a ‘relationship.’ Indeed, without the
Loan Agreement, there would be no loan for
Green Tree to service[.] ... Sherer’s
FDCPA and FCRA claims arise from Green
Tree’s conduct as Sherer’s loan servicer and,
therefore, fall within the terms of the Loan
Agreement’s arbitration clause.”).

HM Accordingly, pursuant to the estop-
pel method of arbitration enforcement, be-
cause her claims are necessarily predicated
upon the existence of the credit utilized in
her relationship with Bluestem, Ms. Shade
may be properly compelled to arbitrate her
claims against it, Therefore, we conclude that
the circuit court erred in denying Bluestem’s
motion to compel arbitration.”

Jess than six letters after this appeal was perfect-
ed, ostensibly as “notice of additional authori-
ties” pursuant to Rule 10() of the West Virginia
Rules of Appellate Procedure. While certain of
the communications pertained to cases recently
-issued, we would be remiss if we did not note the

704 |

IV. CONCLUSION order dismissing the action “and compelling

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we arbitration.
reverse the July 21, 2016, order of the Cir- Reversed and remanded with directions,

cuit Court of Berkeley County, West Virgi-
nia, and remand this matter for entry of an

unacceptable use of this procedural mechanism supplementation under Rule 10(i) is not to be
to augment and/or develop arguments inade- utilized for otherwise impermissible responsive
quately presented in the original briefing. See argument or raising and/or developing new argu-
n,3, 5, and 6, supra. We caution counsel that ments or issues.

a
S
Ot

806 S.E.2d 136

WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF EDU-
CATION and Steven L. Paine, Ed.D., in
his capacity as the State Superintendent
of Schools, Respondents Below, Peti-
tioners

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF .T!
COUNTY OF NICHOLAS, West Virgi-
nia, Petitioner Below, Respondent

"No. 17-0767
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: October 8, 2017 .
Filed: October 10, 2017

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Kelli D, Talbott, Esq., Senior Deputy Attor-
ney General, Charleston, West Virginia, At-
torheys for Petitioners

Kenneth E, Webb, Jr., Esq., Rebecca M.
Tinder, Esq,, Bowles Rice, LLP, Charleston,

. West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent

Robert M. Bastress, Esq., Morgantown,
West Virginia, and Jeffrey G, Blaydes, Esq.,
Carbone & Blaydes, P.L.L.C., Charleston,
West Virginia, Attorneys for Amici Curiae,
Richwood High School Alumni, Association,
American Federation of Teachers-West Vir-
ginia, Sharon Glasscock, Michael Fox, and
Jocelyn Swearingen

R. Booth Goodwin II, Esq. W. Jeffrey
Vollmer, Esq., Goodwin &’ Goodwin, LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for
Amicus Curiae West Virginia School Board
Association

‘WORKMAN, Justice:

This is an appeal from the August 18, 2017,
order of the Cireuit Court of Kanawha Coun-
ty, granting a writ of mandamus in favor of
the Nicholas County Board of Education
(“the Board”), requiring the West Virginia
Board of Education and Dr. Steven L. Paine,
in his capacity as State Superintendent’ of
Schools (hereinafter collectively “the
WVBOE”), to approve the Board’s amended
Consolidated Educational Facilities Plan
(“CEFP”), The amendment to the CEFP
constitutes a necessary prerequisite to the
Board’s efforts to consolidate four Nicholas
County schools and its Career and Technical
Edueation Center. The circuit. court found.
that the WVBOE lacks the authority to re-
ject a county board’s CEFP and attendant
consolidation plan if the county complies with
1, The Court wishes to acknowledge and express

its appreciation for the contributions of the amici

curiae, Briefs were submitted on’behalf of Rich-

wood High School Alumni Association, American
Federation of Teachers-West Virginia, Sharon

the requirements of West Virginia Code
§ 18-5-18a (2002) and West Virginia Code of
State Regulations §§ 126-176-1 et seq: (2005).
The circuit court’ further found that the
WVBOE members’ stated reasons for reject- ©
ing the CEFP amendment and consolidation
plan were “arbitrary and capricious” inas-
much as the reasons were not expressly con-
tained in the WVBOE’s promulgated rule
regarding school consolidation and closure.

Upon careful review of the briefs,! the
appendix record, the arguments of thé par-
ties, and the applicable legal authority, we
conclude that the WVBOE is vested with
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory au-

thority to exercise its discretion in accepting

or rejecting an amended CEFP and attend-
ant consolidation plan and that mere proce-
dural compliance with statutory and regula-
tory requirements does not entitle a county
board of education to approval of its pro-
posed plan. We further find that the reasons
formally adopted by the WVBOE for rejec-
tion of the plan were neither arbitrary nor
capricious, Therefore, the circuit court erred
in granting the writ of mandamus.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

On June 23, 2016, Richwood Middle School, .
Richwood High School, and Summersville
Middle School. were seriously damaged by
flood waters. As a.result of the flooding, the
President of the United States issued a natu-
ral disaster declaration, making the schools
eligible for Federal Emergenty Management
Agency (“FEMA”) funds. Following the
flood, the Board discovered that FEMA
funds could not be used to rebuild Richwood
‘Middle School or Richwood High School in
their existing locations because they are lo-
cated in the floodplain. These schools are
therefore’ eligible for “directed relocation
funds” used for’ rebuilding outside of the
floodplain. The Board was further advised
that FEMA “428” funds were available,
which would enable it to consolidate all of the

Glasscock, Michael Fox, and Jocelyn Swearingen
in support of the WVBOE’s position. Briefs were
likewise submitted on behalf of the West Virginia
School Board Association in support. of the
Board's position.

pending FEMA funds and ut
projects other than “one-for-one” replace-
ment.? It is these “428” funds it seeks to use
to build the proposed comprehensive consoli-
dated campus at issue.

Nicholas County School Board Superinten-
dent Donna Burge-Tetrick ‘purportedly con-
sidered numerous alternative site locations
for Richwood Middle School and Richwood
High School, none of which she found suit-
able, After purportedly exploring these alter-
native locations, Ms. Burge-Tetrick recom-
mended to the Board that it consolidate
Richwood Middle and Summersville Middle
Schools and Nicholas County and Richwood
High Schools, along with the Career and
Technical Education Facility, to be located
together on a consolidated campus.

In furtherance of this plan, the Board pre-
pared a written closure and consolidation
plan pursuant to West Virginia Code § 18-5-
18a and West Virginia Code of State Regula-
tions § 126-176-1 et seg., commonly and here-
inafter referred to as “Policy 6204.” The stat-
ute and regulations, in part, require a county
board to collect data and information to be
incorporated into a written consolidation

2. The so-called “428” program pertains to a re-
cent amendment to the Robert T. Stafford Disas-
ter Relief and Emergency Assistance Act:

On January 29, 2013, President Obama
signed into law the Sandy Recovery Improve-
ment Act of 2013, This law amends Title 1V of
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et
seq.). Specifically, the law adds section 428,
which authorizes alternative procedures for
the Public Assistance (PA) program under sec-
tions 403(@)(3)(A), 406, 407 and 502(@)(5) of
the Stafford Act,

hitps://www.fema,gov/elternative-procedures
ast visited October 10, 2017).

The deadline for application for thése 428”
funds was on or about Jume 26, 2017; FEMA
granted a six-month extension. Only FEMA
“428” funds are subject to this deadline; tradi-
tional “one-for-one” replacement funds appar-
ently have no such deadline, In light of this
deadline and to enable the Board to utilize the
428 funds should circumstances warrant, this
Court has acted in an expedited manner through-

_ Out to resolve the issues presented,

3. Ms, Burge-Tetrick expressed during the various
meetings and public hearings that consolidation
‘was justified in varying degrees by some of the
following considerations: declining population in
Nicholas County, an approximate $350,000.00

709

plan. Policy 6204 requires the written consol-
idation plan to include an executive summary
containing information and data, as more
particularly described therein, pertaining to
the following categories: enrollment, facili-
ties, finance, personnel, transportation, and
education programs.?

As further required by the statute and
Policy 6204, five public héarings were held
betwéen February 24 and March’ 6, 2017, at
the affected schools where members of the

public spoke both for and against consolida-

tion. After the required. hearings, the Board
voted unanimously to move forward with con-
solidation. Pursuant to Policy 6204, the next
step was to request amendment of its CEFP
from the WVBOE. —

The Board’s proposed amended CEFP was
placed on the WVBOE’s June 18, 2017, meet-
ing agenda. During the meeting, Ms. Burge-
Tetrick made a presentation on the merits of
the consolidation plan. Additional information
was presetited by State Superintendent Dr.
Steven Paine and Scott Raines, the Director
of School Planing’ from the School Building
Authority.5 Other interested parties spoke in

savings (primarily in personnel and utilities),
lesser duplication of services (ie. the need to
staff low-enrollment classes in both schools), lit-
tle appreciable increase in transportation times,
and increased, classroom time for career and
tech students who would no longer have to travel
to the, Caréer and Technical Education Center.

4, After the Board voted in favor of consolidation
but before the CEFP amendment could be con-
sidered by the WVBOE, a preliminary injunction
seeking to enjoin the Board from pursuing con-
solidation was sought in the Circuit Court of
Nicholas County. The WVBOE held the Board’s
request for CEFP amendment in abeyance pend-
ing the outcome of that litigation. The injunction
was denied in early June, after which the
WVBOE proceeded to place the Board’s CEFP
amendment on the agenda for its June 13, 2017,
meeting.

5. Mr. Raines indicated that Frank Blackwell, Ex-
ecutive Director of tlie School Building Authori-
ty, asked him to develop an altérnative plan; this
plan involves consolidation of Richwood Middle
and High Schools and'a separate consolidation
of Nicholas County High’ School and Summers-

_ville Middle School. The Board maintains that
this option was considered and rejected as not
being in the students’ best interests.

“710

favor of and against the amendment.’ Mem-
bers of the WVBOE questioned the various
speakers regarding a multitude of issues
bearing on the propriety of consolidation.

During his presentation, Dr. Paine stated
that the Board had followed all of the neces-
sary procedures to comply with Policy 6204.
Dr. Paine further offered commentary re-
garding the consolidation, stating that the
Board was the most financially solvent of all
the county systems, with the greatest
amount, of carryover funds annually, and that
the affected schools were performing well
academically. He noted that the June 26,
2017, deadline for application for the FEMA
“428” funds was subject to an extension,
which he was assured would be granted. He
further noted that if the “428” funds were
not pursued, other traditional FEMA funds
would still be available without such time
constraints. Notably, Dr. Paine also noted
that he believed that an alternative plan ex-
isted which had not been considered by the
Board, i.e. consolidation of only the Richwood
schools, to remain in the Richwood attend-
ance area, and consolidation of the Summers-
ville schools, to remain in the Summersville
area.”

At the close of the meeting, WVBOE Vice
President David Perry moved to reject the
CEFP amendment due to his belief that “suf-
ficient alternatives and possibilities have not
been explored to be assured this ‘plan is in
the best interest of the students of Nicholas
County, specifically of those in the current
[Richwood schools] areas.” The CEFP
amendment was then rejected on a vote of 7-
18 °

The Board thereafter filed the instant ac-
tion seeking a writ of mandamus to compel
the WVBOE to accept its proposed CEFP

6. The appendix record reveals that an architec-
tural expert had identified what he believed to be
alternative, feasible properties near the old Rich-
wood schools and prepared a model school.

7. This suggestion was also made multiple times
at the public hearings, but was met with com-
ments by Ms. Burge-Tetrick indicating that such
a configuration did not address certain issues
that wholesale consolidation did.

8, WVBOE member James Wilson was the recur-
rent vote’ against the motion to reject; he ex-

amendment, contending that the WVBOE
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting
the amendment. The circuit court issued a
rule to show cause, which was served upon
the WVBOE along with the petition. The day
before the rule to show cause hearing, the
WVBOE convened an emergency meeting to
reconsider the CEFP amendment. After
presentations and speakers both for and
against consolidation, Mr. Perry again moved
to reject the amendment, stating that he had
“different reasons” for rejection. Mr. Perry
stated that 1) he felt there was a lack of
“meaningful dialogue” between the Board
and the Nicholas County citizens; 2) the
Board did not consider alternatives to consol-
idation including locations in the Richwood
attendance area, rather than simply the
Richwood city limits; 8) there was equivalent
declining population in Nicholas County High
School area, rather than just the Richwood
High area; 4) utilization of technology would
net the same personnel cost savings; and 5)
the Richwood schools were comparably edu-
eating students and out-performing other
schools in the state on most metrics.’ The
WVBOE then again voted 6-1 to reject the
amendment,

The following day, on July 11, 2017, an
evidentiary hearing was held on the rule to
show cause, Each WVBOE member who vot-
ed to reject’ the plan was questioned regard-
ing the basis of his or her vote. WVBOE
President Thomas Campbell testified that he
voted to reject due to several reasons includ-
ing lack of community outreach, poor com-
munication, and financial considerations. He
further expressed concern that consolidation
of two high-performing schools would not
necessarily translate into a singular high-
performing school. President Campbell em-

pressed merely that he was not close to the issues
in Nicholas County and therefore would defer to
its preferences,

9. Richwood High School was recognized in 2014
and 2016 by U.S. News and World Report as one
of the best high schools in the State. It had a
96% graduation rate; Nicholas County High
School had a 90% graduation rate for the 2015-
16 school year. Both have extremely high “highly
qualified” teacher rates.

phasized the WVBOE’s obligation to assess
impact on the system as whole. Vice Presi-
dent Perry testified consistent with the rea-
sons articulated in his formal motion, Mem-
ber Debra Sullivan testified that she did not
believe the Board considered the views of the
citizens, nor the impact of consolidation on
extracurricular activities, and generally fa-
vored smaller community schools which typi-
cally enhance parent involvement, Member
Frank Vitale testified he did not believe the
Board did enough to solicit input from the
community. Member Jeff Flanagan testified
he did not believe the Board provided enough
detail about potential sites or funding. Mem-
ber Miller Hall testified he did not believe
the Board considered the impact of consoli-
dation on student discipline. Member Frank
Rotruck testified he wanted the Board to
consider other community school options. A
recurrent concern throughout the testimony
was the high number of impoverished stu-
dents from the Richwood area and the re-
search supporting the notion that such stu-
dents perform better in smaller, community
schools,!°

The circuit court found that the WVBOE
“did not follow its own rules and procedures
set forth in Policy 6204” by rejecting the plan
based on “factors” not contained in Policy
6204, The circuit court found the WVBOE
members’ reasons for rejection “arbitrary”
and matters which “the Legislature did not
intend them to consider[.]” The circuit court
further found that the WVBOE’s rejection
was “pre-textual and an abuse of power,”
relying on testimony regarding the Gover-
nor’s stated preferences for a school in Rich-
wood during his State of the State address."
The circuit court further found that the
WVBOE’s only role relative to consolidation

10. Seventy percent of Richwood Middle School
students and sixty-eight percent of Richwood
High School students qualify for free or reduced
lunch.

11, The circuit court also referenced brief testi-
mony to the effect that Vice President Perry told
a friend he would vote against consolidation be-
cause “that's what the Governor wants” as well
as President Campbell's testimony that he knew
the Governor's “heart” was in community
schools. There was no additional testimony or
other evidence that the Governor was in any way
involved in the WVBOE’s deliberations,

711

is “to determine whether the county boards
are following the requirements of” and/or
“supervising compliance” with the statute.
Expressing that the county is in a better
position to determine its needs relative to
consolidation, the circuit court found that the
WVBOE “does not have unfettered discre-
tion to simply substitute its judgment for
that of a local county school board[.]”

The circuit court therefore awarded the
writ of mandamus, ordering the WVBOE to
approve the Board’s CEFP amendment.
This appeal followed.

If, STANDARD OF REVIEW

HB “A de novo standard of review ap-
plies to a circuit court’s decision to grant or
deny a writ of mandamus.” Syl. Pt. 1, Harri-
son Cty. Comm’n v. Harrison Cty. Assessor,
222 W.Va. 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008). More-
over, “[ilnterpreting a statute or an adminis-
trative rule or regulation presents a purely
legal question subject to de novo review.”
Syl. Pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v, State
Taw Dep't of W. Va., 195 W.Va. 578, 466
S.H.2d 424 (1995),

Hs Insofar as the underlying standard
for the circuit court’s grant of the writ, we
have held: “To invoke mandamus the relator
must show (1) a clear right to the relief
sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of the
respondent to do the thing relator seeks; and
(8) the absence of another adequate remedy.”
Syl. Pt. 2, Myers v. Barte, 167 W.Va. 194, 279
§.E.2d 406 (1981). However, we are mindful
that “[mJandamus does not lie to control a
board of education in the exercise of its
discretion, in the absence of caprice, passion,
partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ul-
terior motive, or misapprehension of law

12. The WVBOE sought a stay of the order pend-
ing this appeal, but the circuit court refused
unless the WVBOE posted a $130 million bond.
Declining to post the bond, the WVBOE condi-
tionally approved the CEFP pursuant to the cir-
cuit court's order; but moved this Court for a
stay without bond. This Court granted the stay
without bond, which the WVBOE construed as
“invalidating” its conditional approval of the
CEFP.

712

upon the part of such board.” Syl. Pt. 1, State
ex vel. Payne v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson
Cty., 185 W.Va. 849, 68 S.E.2d 579 (1951).
With these considerations in mind, we turn to
the parties’ arguments.

. IL DISCUSSION
Tl The issue presented herein is wheth-
er the WVBOB has authority to reject a
CEFP amendment attendant to a consolida-
tion plan, where the local board has complied
with the requirements contained in West Vir-
ginia Code § 18-5-18a and West Virginia
Code of State Regulations §§ 126-176-1 et
seg. If the Court determines that the
WVBOE has such authority, it must ascer-
tain whether such authority was exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously in this case. We
wish to make plain, however, as this Court
has historically observed in cases of this na-
ture, that the advisability, or lack thereof, of
consolidation is not properly within this
- Court’s purview. The wisdom, efficacy, and
feasibility of school consolidation are matters
reserved to the respective boards of edu-
cation. See City of Benwood v. Bd. of Educ.,
Cty. of Marshall, 212 W.Va. 486, 442, 578
S.H.2d 847, 358 (2002) (“[W]e note that our
focus in this case was not on the merits of:
consolidation or our beliefs as to whether or
not consolidation is advisable for the schools
of Marshall Countyf.]”).!4 This Court’s charge
is solely to ascertain whether the WVBOE’s
rejection of the CEFP amendment was a

proper use of its lawful authority.

A, Authority of WVBOE to Reject CEFP
Amendment

The circuit court found that the WVBOE
has only such authority as is expressly grant-

13, Mandamus, rather than administrative ap-
peal, is the proper vehicle through which to
challenge an adverse outcome regarding school
closing or consolidation. See State ex rel. W. Va.
Bad. of Educ, v, Perry, 189 W.Va. 662, 434 S.E.2d
22 (1993) (Ginding aggrieved parties to closure
had no remedy under Administrative Procedures

_ Act, W. Va. Code § 29A-1-2(b)); see also Syl, Pt.
4, Dillon v. Bd, of Educ. of Cty. of Wyoming, 177
‘W.Va, 145, 351 S,E.2d 58 (1986) (“Mandamus
will lie to control a board of education in the
exercise of its discretion upon a showing of ca-
price, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary con-
duct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension
* of the law.”).

ed by the Legislature and that neither the
statute nor regulations at issue provide for
the WVBOH’s exercise of its discretion to
reject a CEFP amendment and/or consolida-
tion plan which is compliant therewith. The
WVBOE contends that it has both a constitu-
tional grant of supervisory authority over
such matters and that the particular statute
and regulation at issue are further designed
to make such matters subject to its approval.
We therefore begin our analysis by examin-
ing the circuit court’s discussion of the rela-
tive powers and duties of the Legislature, the
‘WVBOE, and local boards of education, inas-
much as it is this construct upon which the
circuit court premised its ultimate conclusion
in this matter,

1. Constitutional Authority of _ the
WVBOE

Article XII, section 2 of the West Virginia
Constitution provides that “[t]he general su-
pervision of the free schools of the State shall
be vested in’ the West Virginia board of
education which shall perform such duties as
may be prescribed by: law.” In reaching its
conclusion that the WVBOE is constrained in
the exercise of its authority relative to con-
solidation, the circuit court began with a
threshold conclusion that Article XII, section
2’s wording that the WVBOE “shall-perform
such duties as may be prescribed by law”
serves to temper the WVBOE’s constitution-
al charge. (Emphasis added). The circuit
court found support for this limitation by
comparing the Legislature’s concomitant con-
stitutional obligation to provide for a “thor-
ough and efficient system of free schools” as
contained in Article XII, section 1 of the

14, See also Bd, of Educ. of Cty. of Kanawha v. W.
Va. Bd. of Educ., 184 W.Va. 1, 5, 399 S.B.2d 31,
35 (1990) (““Indeed, the merits of neither the
County Board’s nor the State Board's decision
are supposed to be in issue in this appeal.”)
(hereinafter “Kanawha County Board’); State ex
tel. Jones v., Bd. of Educ. of Ritchie Cty. 178
W.Va. 378, 380, 359 S,E,2d 606, 608 (1987)
(“{Wle are not concerned with the wisdom of the
Boards decision to reorganize the Ritchie Coun-
ty schools or with the merits of the plan itself.”),

‘West Virginia Constitution. Concluding that
such obligation empowers the Legislature to
statutorily restrict the WVBOH’s exercise of
its powers, the circuit court stated that “the
very text of the Constitution dictates that the
State Board may only perform duties that
are set forth in statute” and that the Consti-
tution “limit[s] [the WVBOE’s] supervision to
that which the Legislature might set forth by
statute.” .

With that backdrop, the circuit court then
found that the Legislature has expressly del-
egated the decision to close or consolidate
schools exclusively to local school boards and
that the WVBOE’s actions are an unautho-
rized attempt to interfere with such exclusivi-
ty. Citing West Virginia Code § 18-5-18(c)
and ‘(d), the circuit court found that these
provisions clearly demonstrate the Legisla-
ture’s intention that closure and consolidation
matters remain at the local level because
county boards “are better able to determine
the specific needs of their individual coun-
ties[.]” See W. Va. Code § 18-5-18(c) and (d)
(2017) (“[E]ach county board may ... [eJlose
any school ... [wJhich is unnecessary ...
[and] [clonsolidate schools[.]” The cireuit
court found that the local board “may make a
final decision consolidating a school” and that
the WVBOE’s role is limited to reviewing or
supervising the county board’s efforts for the
sole purpose of determining whether it is
following the requirements set forth in West
Virginia Code § 18-5-18a, 7

HMMM Before reaching the more precise
issue presented herein, we are compelled by
the foregoing to renounce the lower court’s
deeply misguided construction of the
WVBOE’s constitutional grant of authority
inasmuch as it is wholly at odds with this
Court’s precedent. This Court has held that

[tlhe West Virginia Board of Education
and the State Superintendent of Schools,
pursuant to their general supervisory pow-
ers over education in West Virginia under

W.Va, Const. art. XII, § 2, and their spe-

cific duties to establish, implement and

enforce high quality educational. standards
for all facets’ of education under the provi-

15. See W. Va. Const. art. XII, § 1 (‘The legisla-
ture shall provide, by general law, for a thorough

713

sions of Chapter 18 of the West Virginia
Code, have a duty to ensure the complete
executive delivery and maintenance of a
“thorough and efficient system of free
schools” in West Virginial[.]

Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Pauley v. Bailey, 174
W.Va. 167, 324 S.H.2d 128 (1984). More spe-
cifically, in West Virginia’ Board of Edu-
cation v. Hechler, 180 W.Va. 451, 455, 376
S.E.2d 839, 842-43 (1988), this Court elabo-
rated on the sanctity of the -constitutionally-
granted general supervisory authority of the
WVBOE, explaining that
“{gleneral supervision” is not an axio-
matic blend of words designed to fill the
pages of our State Constitution, but it is a
meaningful concept to the governance of
schools and education in this state, Deci-
sions that pertain to education must be
faced by those who possess expertise in
the educational area. These issues are crit-
ical to the progress of schools in this state,
and, ultimately, the welfare of its citizens,

In 1957, the citizens of this state conferred

general supervisory powers over education

and one need not look further than art.

XII, § 2 of the State Constitution to see

that the “general supervision” of state

schools is vested in the State Board of

Edueation. Unlike most other administra-

tive agencies which are constituents of the

executive branch, the Board enjoys a spe-

cial standing because such a constitutional

provision exists.
(footnote omitted). Broadly stated,’ “[t]he
State Board of Education, charged with the
general supervision of our state’s educational
system, has a duty to ensure that the consti-
tutionally mandated educational goals of
quality and equality are achieved.” Bailey v,
Truby, 174 Wa. 8 16, 821 S,E.2d 802, 810
(1984),

As to the circuit court’s belief that the “as
may be prescribed by law” language of Arti-
cle XII, section 2 renders the WVBOE pow-
erless in absence of enabling législation, this
Court has unequivocally held that legislative
action that impedes the general supervisory

and efficient system of free schools.”).

714

powers of the WVBOE is patently unconsti-
tutional. In Bailey, the Court discussed the
expansiveness of the “general supervision”
power granted under the Constitution, exam-
ining at length the Kansas Supreme Court’s
analysis of the same issue as pertained to
their similarly-worded Constitution. In State
ex rel. Miller v. Board of Education, 212
Kan. 482, 511 P.2d 705 (1978), the Kansas
Supreme Court rejected an argument that
the “as may he provided by law” language of
its Constitution required enabling legislation
to effectuate the general supervisory powers
granted to its state board of education. The
Bailey Court stated that it found this analy-
sis persuasive, citing with approval the Mil-
ler court’s holding that “ ‘the legislature may
enact legislation to facilitate or assist in [the
state board’s constitutional supervisory pow-
ers], but whatever legislation is adopted
must be in harmony with and not in deroga-
tion of the provisions of the constitution.’ ”
Id. at 15-16, 321 S.H.2d at 310 (quoting Mil-
ler, 511° P.2d at 707, syl. pt. 7) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, the Bailey Court like-
wise concluded that “constitutional grants of
authority ... cannot be derogated or elimi-
nated by legislative or executive action.
Therefore, any statutory provision that inter-
feres with the State Board of Education’s
‘general supervision of the free schools of the
State’... is void.” Jd. at 18, 821 S.E.2d at
812. See also Powers v. State, 318 P.38d 300,

* 308 (Wyo. 2014) (“The majority of courts that
have addressed similar language in their con-
stitutions have concluded that the phrase ‘as
prescribed by law’ does not permit the legis-
lature to abolish or transfer, either directly
or indirectly, the inherent powers of a consti-
tutionally created office.”).

TM Similarly, this Court has further
found that the WVBOE’s general supervisory
powers necessarily require rule-making to
govern the day-to-day operation of schools
and that the Legislature’s charge to provide

16. The WVBOE's rule-making authority is now
worded as follows: “Subject to and in conformity
with the Constitution and laws of this state, the
State Board of Education shall exercise general
supervision of the public schools of the state, and
shall promulgate rules ... for carrying into effect
the laws and policies of the state relating to
education,...” W. Va. Code § 18-2-5(a) (2015).

a thorough and efficient system of free
schools “does not entail the exclusive delega-
tion of rule-making functions that are part of
the Board’s general supervisory powers[.]”
Hechler, 180 W.Va, at 455, 876 S.H.2d at 844,
The Hechler Court noted that the WVBOE is
statutorily recognized as having the authority
to “make rules for carrying into effect the
laws and policies of the State relating to
education,” as contained in West Virginia
Code § 18-2-5 and that such rule-making
power was found to be “a provision that has
aided the Board’s general supervisory func-
tions.” 16 Id. at 454-55, 455, 376 S.H.2d at 841,
843 (emphasis added). The Hechler Court
therefore found that any “attempt to impede”
the WVBOE’s supervisory power constitutes
a violation of the separation of powers provi-
sion of the West Virginia Constitution.” Id.
at 454, 456, 376 S.E.2d at 842-43, According-
ly, we held, in part, in syllabus point two that
“(rlule-making by the State Board of Edu-
cation is within the meaning of ‘general su-
pervision’ of state schools pursuant to art.
XII, § 2 of the West Virginia Constitution,
and any statutory provision that interferes
with such rule-making is unconstitutional[.]”
Id. See also Detch v. Bd. of Educ. of Cty. of
Greenbrier, 145 W.Va. 722, 728-29, 117
S.B.2d 188, 142 (1960) (noting that Legisla-
ture’s obligation to provide thorough and effi-
cient system is effectuated through statutory
rule-making provision).

Furthermore, the circuit court’s conclusion
that the Legislature has effectively subordi-
nated the WVBOE’s supervisory powers to
the edict of the local board where consolida-
tion is concerned fully disregards this Court’s
admonition that “[iJn contrast to the] expan-
sive interpretation of the power and authori-
ty of the State Board of Education, this
Court has traditionally construed the power
and authority of the county boards of edu-
cation in a very narrow fashion.” Bazley, 174
W.Va. at 14, 321 S.E.2d at 309, More impor-
tantly, the circuit court’s conclusion ignores

17, Article V, section 1 of the West Virginia Con-
stitution states, in part: ‘The legislative, execu-
tive and judicial departments shall be separate
and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the
powers properly belonging to either of the oth-
ers[.]”

this Court’s prior rejection of an identical
claim that a statutory delegation of authority
to a-local board operates to neutralize any
attempt by the WVBOE to weigh in on and
promulgate rules relative to the “delegated”
matter.

In Bailey, in addition to discussing the
self-executing effect of the WVBOE’s consti-
tutional supervision powers, the Court more
specifically addressed the propriety of a rule
promulgated by the WVBOE requiring a 2.0
grade point average to participate in extra-
curricular activities. The Kanawha County
Board of Education argued that West Virgi-
nia Code § 18-2-25, providing that county
boards “shall exercise the control, supervi-
sion and regulation of all interscholastic
events and other extracurricular activities
...” rendered the WVBOE rule an “invalid
interference with their own exclusive right to
control, supervise, and regulate extracurricu-
lar activities[.!” Jd. at 18-14, 821 S.H.2d at
808. Rejecting this claim of exclusivity, the
Bailey Court observed generally that,
““«sichool districts ... [have] been said to
be corporations of the most limited power
known to the law.”’” Bailey, 174 W.Va. at
15, 321 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting Brown v. Bd,
of Educ., 106 W.Va. 476, 485, 146 S.E. 389,
392 (1929) (Maxwell, J., concurring on re-
hearing)). The Court reasoned that
. [t]he Legislature, in enacting West Virgi-

nia Code § 18-2-25 (1984 Replacement,

Vol.), could not have ignored the pervasive

supervisory authority of the State Board of

Education over county boards of education,

Therefore, it is unlikely that it intended to

vest the exclusive control, supervision, and

regulation of extracurricular activities with
county boards of education. Instead, it is
more likely that, as with other county
board of education activities, the legislative
grant of authority found in West Virginia

Code § 18-2-25 (1984 Replacement Vol.)

was made implicitly subject to the general

supervisory authority of the State Board of

Edueation,

Id, at 18, 821 S.B,2d at 812 (emphasis added).

To whatever extent the foregoing does not
clearly reflect this Court’s veneration of the
extensive sweep of the WVBOE’s constitu-
tional supervisory authority, we have suc-

715.

cinctly stated: “Clearly, then, the State
Board is empowered to take whatever steps
are necessary to fulfill -its obligation to
achieve ‘the constitutionally mandated edu-
eational goals of quality and equality[.) ” Ka-
nawha County Board, 184 W.Va. at 5, 399
S.E.2d at 35 (1990) (quoting Bailey, 174
W.Va. at 16, 821 S.H.2d at 310) (emphasis *
added). .

2,. Statutory Authority of WVBOE Rela-
tive to Consolidation

Having concluded that the WVBOE’s con-
stitutional supervisory powers are both broad
and impervious to legislative impairment, we
turn now to the more specific issue of wheth-
er the school consolidation statute implicated
herein attempts to restrict the WVBOE’s
general supervisory powers or otherwise
speaks to any limitations on the WVBOE’s
role regarding consolidation and/or consider-
ation of a CEFP amendment. As indicated
above, the circuit court found, and the Board
argues, that the WVBOE is obligated to ac-
cept a CEFP amendment which is adminis-
tratively “in compliance” with West Virginia
Code § 18-5-18a and the promulgated regula-
tions known as “Policy 6204.” It is undisput-
ed in this case that the Board complied fully
with the requirements contained in the stat-
ute and Policy 6204 prior to seeking the
WVBOE’s approval of its CEFP amendment
and attendant. consolidation plan.

School closings and consolidations are gov-
erned by West Virginia Code § 18-5-13a.
Subsection (a) of that statute states that
“prior to any final decision of a county board
on any proposal to close or consolidate any
school,” it must perform certain tasks, in
pertinent part as follows:

(1) Prepare and reduce to writing its rea-

sons and supporting data regarding the

school closing or consolidation ...
+2) Provide notice for a public hearing. ...

(8) Conduct a public hearing ... [and]

( Receive findings and recommendations

from any local school improvement council

representing an affected school relating to
the proposed closure or consolidation prior
to or at the public hearing.

716

'W. Va, Code § 18-5-18a(a) (emphasis added).
West Virginia Code § 18-5-18a(a)(1)(C) pro-
vides that-the written reasons must “[clom-
ply with the rule promulgated pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section,” ie Policy
6204, Critically, subsection (b) directs the
WVBOE to
promulgate a rule ... detailing the type of
supporting data a county board shall in-
clude as part of its written statement of
reason required by this section for school
closing or consolidation. The rule shall re-~
quire at least the following data:
(1) The transportation time of the affected
students; and .
(2) Any data required by the state board to
amend a county’s comprehensive edu-
eational facilities plan.

'W. Va. Code § 18-5-18a(b) (emphasis added),
The statute further directs the WVBOE to
promulgate a rule that “establishes the pro-
cedure to be followed by county boards when
conducting a public hearing on the issues of
school consolidation and closing.” ” We Va.
Code § 18-5-18a(¢).18

This Court has had occasion to examine
the operation of West Virginia Code § 18-5-
18a as pertains to the power of the WVBOB
to approve or reject a CEFP amendment.
184 W.Va, 1, 899 S.E.2d 81. In Kanawha
County Board, as in this case, the county
board challenged the WVBOE’s ‘rejection of
its consolidation plan. This Court recognized
the general authority granted under West
Virginia Code § 18-5-18 to county boards to
close or consolidate schools, but noted that
such authority was made subject to “the
rules and regulations of the state board.” Id.
at 2-8, 399 §,H.2d at 82-383 (quoting W. Va.
Code § 18-5-18a). The Court then conelud-
ed—in sharp contrast to the circuit court’s
conclusion herein—that “[c]learly, the county
boards of education do not have unlimited
power to make the final decisions with re-
spect to school closings and consolidation,”
Id, at 8, 399 §.E.2d at 33, -

HE Critical to our analysis, however, is
this Court’s determination in Kanawha

18. See Jones, 178 W.Va. at 381, 359 S.E.2d at
609 (“The obvious intent of the [public hearing
requirements] of the.statute is to insure that the

County Board that county boards’ consolida-
tion decisions are both constitutionally: and
statutorily made subject to the WVBOE’s
approval. Id.:The Court discussed its. hold-
ings in Bailey and Hechler, relative to, at-
tempted legislative interference in the
WVBOE’s constitutional powers, and con-
cluded that our precedent has made plain
that “by virtue of its constitutional grant of
general supervisory powers, the State Board
enjoys a special standing in relation to other
administrative agencies.” Id, at 4, 399 S.H.2d
at 84. The Court then concluded, unequivo-
cally, that “the State Board does have the
authority to review and to approve or disap-
prove a county board’s school closure or con-
solidation plan” in exercise of its “discretion.”
Id, at 5, 399 8,H.2d at 85. See also Perry, 189
W.Va. at 667, 484 S.B.2d at 27 (finding
WVBOE has. authority to modify local board
closure plan “even though the school closure
statutes ... did not expressly so provide.”).

As indicated above, the circuit court found
that the Legislature “saw fit that the State
Board ... should: review, or in other words
supervise, school consolidations to determine
whether the county boards are following the
requirements set forth iri W. Va. Code § 18-
8-18a [sic].” However, we find nothing in
West Virginia Code § 18-5-18a which states
or even suggests that the WVBOE’s role
relative to consolidation is to act as a mere
compliance officer. See Powers, 318 P.8d at
821 (finding legislation unconstitutional
where it “relegates [constitutional officer] to
the role of general observer with limited and
discrete powers and duties”). Rather, we find
that the statute merely sets forth minimum
procedural requirements for the county
board before proceeding with closure or con-
solidation,

To that end, we decline the cireuit court
and Board’s invitation to take’ sides in an
artificial conflict between the Legislature and
‘WVBOBE; in reality no such conflict exists,
The WVBOE’s general supervision powers
are in no way at odds with the closure and
consolidation statute, In fact, the statute ex-
pressly delegates to and empowers the

public is aware of and has an opportunity to

contribute to the county board's decision regard-
ing consolidating or closing schools.”).

‘WVBOE to promulgate a rule to govern this
process. Therefore, far from the fictitious
“stand-off” the circuit court urges as between
the Legislature and WVBOEH’s respective
constitutional charges, the statute itself ap-
pears to acknowledge and pay deference to
the WVBOE’s expansive rule-making author-
ity in exercise of its supervisory powers, This
is undoubtedly because of the Legislature’s
awareness that “[aln attempt to undertake
the Board’s general supervisory powers vio-
lates the [separation of powers] provision of
art. V, § 1 of the state Constitution[.]” He-
chler, 180 W.Va. at 455-56, 876 S.E.2d at 843,

B. Whether Rejection of CEFP Amend-
ment was Arbitrary or Capricious

Having determined that the Constitution
provides general supervisory authority and
the statute itself in no way restricts the
WVBOE’s role relative to consolidation, we
turn then to the ‘regulation promulgated by
the WVBOE for closer examination. To that
end, the circuit court found, and the Board
argues, that the WVBOE failed to restrict its
consideration of the CEFP to the “factors”
and “criteria” contained within Policy 6204;
therefore, its actions were necessarily arbi-
trary and capricious. The Board argues that
none of the reasons for rejection articulated
during the formal motion or in subsequent
member testimony are mentioned specifically
in the six categories of information outlined
in Policy 6204.29 Accordingly, the circuit

19. See Section III(B)(2), infra.

20. As indicated hereinabove, Vice President Per-
ry’s motion to reject the CEFP amendment was
based upon the Board's failure to explore other
alternatives, His motion at the second hearing
was based upon additional factors including lack
of meaningful dialogue with the community, de-
clining population in Nicholas County High
School area, potential utilization of technology,
and -student achievement, These reasons were
officially proffered in support of the WVBOE’s
rejection of the amendment as required by sylla-
bus point 4 of Kanawha County Board:

Where the West Virginia Board of Education
rejects, in whole or in part, a county board
of education’s school closure or consolida-
tion plan, it is required to state its reasons

for doing so. The State Board need not make .

detailed findings of fact or conclusions of
law, but must give some reasons for its ac-
tion so as to enable a reviewing court to
determine if it has abused its discretion.

184 W.Va, 1, 399 S.E.2d 31.

117

court concluded that the WVBOE’s rejection
of the CEFP is therefore arbitrary because it
involves matters “the Legislature did not
intend them to consider[.]”

The WVBOE, however, argues that the
language of Policy 6204 clearly contemplates
submission of the plan for its consideration
on the merits and consequent approval or
rejection. Moréover, the WVBOE argues that
all of the reasons proffered for rejection of
the plan pertain to “educational policy” con-
cerns and therefore relate in some manner to
thé. areas, outlined in Policy 6204, if not ex-

_pressly, at least implicitly. Accordingly, a

closer look at the language of Policy 6204 is
necessary to determine if the WVBOE acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.

1, CEFP Amendment Considerations
pursuant to Policy 6204

_ As indicated above, West Virginia Code
§ 18-5-18a(b) directs the WVBOE to promul-
gate a rule which “detail[s] the type of sup-
porting data a county board shall include as
part of its written statement of reasonf.]”
The rule promulgated by the WVBOE is
contained at West Virginia Code of State
Regulations §§ 126-176-1 et seg. and, as pre-
viously stated, is known as Policy 6204. Poli-
cy 6204 is explicitly designated a “Procedural
Rule” and states that it sets the require-
ments for the loéal board “in proceeding with

The circuit court subsequently took testimony
from each WVBOE member who voted to reject
the amendment, which testimony elaborated on
the reasons each member personally voted to
reject. We question the propriety of the circuit
court's intrusion into the individual members’
deliberative processes and the relevancy of that
testimony to the formally-articulated bases for
the WVBOE's rejection of the amendment as a
body. “It has long been admonished that ‘court's
[sic] may not accept ... post hoc rationalizations
for agency action.'” Webb v. W. Va. Bd. of Med.,
212 W.Va. 149, 158, 569 S.E.2d 225, 234 (2002)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. U. 8., 371
U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Bd.2d 207
(1962). However, given that the members’ testi-
mony was largely concordant with the reasons
provided by the body, we decline to delve deeper
into any restrictions on the evidence which the
circuit court should have considered-in evaluat-
ing whether the WVBOE’s action was arbitrary
and capricious,

718

a potential school closing or consolidation[.]”
W. Va. C.S.R. § 126-176-1.1. Notably, West
Virginia Code § 29A-1-2(h) (2015) defines a
procedural rule as one which “fixes rules of
procedure, practice or evidence for dealings
with or proceedings before an agency, includ-
ing forms preseribed by the agency.” (em-
phasis added),

Section two of Policy 6204 is entitled
“County Procedures” and provides that
“{t}he county board must prepare and reduce
to writing, reasons and supporting data con-
cerning proposed school closings or consoli-
dations to be submitted to the [WVBOH] for
approval in accordance with this policy and
the West Virginia Code.” W. Va. C.S.R.
§ 126-176-2.1 (emphasis added). Section 2.2
further provides that the written consolida-
tion plan must provide an executive summary
including “items” thereafter listed concerning
the following six topics: enrollment, facilities,
finance, personnel, transportation, and edu-
cational program[s]2! W. Va. C.S.R. § 126-
176-2.2. The Policy likewise sets forth the
procedures to be utilized in conducting the
public hearings required. W. Va. C.S.R.
§$ 126-176-23 through 2.4. Following the
hearings, the local board must take a formal
vote on the closure or consolidation. W. Va.
C.S.R. § 126-176-2.4.4.

Critically, after the vote and prior to im-
plementation of any consolidation, section 2.6
states that “the county must file a request
for an amendment of it’s [sie] CEFP with the
WVBE for approval[.!” (emphasis added).
The request must “contain justification for

21, The types of information specifically de-
scribed in the list of six topics include such
matters as: trends in student population and at-
tendance area, enrollment projections, census
data, maps, physical appraisal of targeted
schools, utilization factors, accessibility, antici-
pated costs or savings for the affected schools,
renovation costs, effects on personnel, negative
variances from transportation standards, and
projected educational program improvement for
exceptional students, distance learning, and vo-
cational and special education students. W. Va.
C.S.R. 8§ 126-176-2.2.1 through 2.2.6.

22, Significantly, this provision was contained in
Policy 6200 at the time of this Court’s decision in
Kanawha County Board. In fact, it was the lan-
guage of this provision regarding compliance
with procedural requirements and WVBOE regu-
lations which was mirrored in the Court's hold-
ing. In particular, syllabus point one of Kanawha

the proposed consolidation” which “must be
supported by supplemental data and infor-
mation pertinent to the following subjects:
enrollment, facilities, finance, personnel,
transportation, and educational programs[.]”
W. Va. C.S.R. § 126-176-2.6.3 (emphasis add-
ed). Of no small moment is the fact that a
prior version of Policy 6200 (the Handbook
on Planning School Facilities) expressly
provided that the WVBOE
will not overrule a county board of edu-
eation on a school closing or consolidation
matter, unless the proposal does not com-
ply with the educational and facility stan-
dards established by the State Board or
the county board has not complied with
procedural requirements of 18-5-13, 18-5-
18a, and State Board Policy.

W. Va. C.S.R, § 126-182-1 (1985) (emphasis
in original). That provision was deleted from
Policy 6200 in 1991 and has remained absent
from Policy 6200 and 6204 to date.”

HM Under any reasonable reading of
Policy 6204, it plainly contemplates the
WVBOE’s discretionary approval of a CEFP
amendment and attendant consolidation plan.
First, Policy 6204 expressly provides that
both the written consolidation plan and the
CEFP amendment are subject to approval
by the WVBOE and must contain a “justifi-
cation” for the closure. There is simply noth-
ing in the statute or Policy which suggests
that once a local board jumps through the
hoops of information-gathering for purposes
of the written plan and CEFP amendment,

County Board provides that decisions on closure
or consolidation “may be rejected where they fail
to comply with statutory provisions or West Vir-
ginia Board of Education regulations,” 184
W.Va. 1, 399 8.B.2d 31, syl, pt. 1, The Board
argues that this language indicates that a consoli-
dation plan may therefore only be rejected for
statutory or regulatory non-compliance. As dis-
cussed more fully infra, there is nothing in the
statute or regulations suggesting that the
WVBOE's rejection of a consolidation plan is
limited to only those reasons, nor does the sylla-
bus point itself indicate as much. Focusing pri-
marily on the subordination of the county board
to the WVBOE, the Kanawha County Board case
simply did not explore the parameters of the
WVBOE's discretion relative to Policy 6200 or
6204 because of the existence of the above-quot-
ed, self-limiting language.

the blessing of the WVBOE is guaranteed. In
fact, the WVBOE’s removal of the provision
from the Handbook on Planning School Fa-
cilities stating that it would not overrule a
county board’s closure or consolidation deci-
sion absent procedural irregularities clearly
demonstrates the WVBOE’s intention to uti-
lize its broad discretion in approving or re-
jecting such a plan. Under any common-
sense reading of Policy 6204, subjective as-
sessment of the merits of the plan by the
WVBOE is understood.

HH More importantly, we find the cireuit
court and Board’s characterization of the six
categories enumerated in Policy 6204 as “cri-
teria” or “factors” to be wildly inaccurate.
Section 2.6 of Policy 6204 requires that the
request for CEFP amendment must be ac-
companied by a justification for the proposed
consolidation which “must be supported by
supplemental data and information perti-
nent to the following subjects: enrollment,
facilities, finance, personnel, transportation,
and education programs[.]” W. Va. C.S.R,
§ 126-176-2.6.3 (emphasis added). West Vir-
ginia Code § 18-5-18a(b) similarly states that
the content of a rule promulgated by the
WVBOE must “detaill ] the type of support-
‘img data a county board shall include as part
of its written statement of reason required
by this section for school closing or consolida-
tion.” (emphasis added).

Therefore, the six “criteria” or “factors”
that the circuit court found binding on the
WVBOE are merely categories of “support-
ing data” as per the language of the statute
and Policy 6204. None of these categories or
the specific supporting data described there-
under contains any “criteria” or objective
benchmarks which, once met, would suggest
subsequent approval was implicit. Moreover,
nothing in Policy 6204 so much as suggests
that the WVBOE’s approval or rejection of a
CEFP amendment is limited to issues arising
from these categories of data,

23. Accordingly, the Board’s suggestion that it
was effectively blind-sided by the far afield con-
siderations of the WVBOE is meritless, Removal
of this language signals to even a layperson that
the WVBOE no longer intended to be con-
strained by this provision and could “overrule” a
plan even if it met procedural requirements. Fur-

719

In fact, the entire process effectively re-
quires the WVBOE to engage in a holistic ©
effort to subjectively assess whether the in-
formation collected pursuant to the statute
and Policy 6204 actually justifies consolida-
tion or closure. The vast amount of “support-
ing data” required under Policy 6204 is not
self-justifying; rather, it begs for analysis.
The completion and delivery of the written
plan and supporting data are simply proce-
dural requirements—as per Policy 6204 it-
self—which provide an administrative pro-
cess for submission of a consolidation plan,
which procedure culminates in the WVBOE’s
review necessary for approval of the county
board’s plan. The necessity of detailed proce-
dural requirements to guide county boards
through this important process is obvious.
See Pell v, Bd. of Educ. of Monroe Cty., 188
W.Va. 718, 720 n.2, 426 S.E.2d 510, 518 n.2
(1992) (“[Alpproving a plan of closure or
consolidation is not something that can be
accomplished overnight, but is a protracted
ordeal so as to ensure a more contemplative
analysis before such a major decision is
made.”). Nevertheless, the detail provided in
outlining the process, information, and ad-
ministrative requirements necessary to effec-
tuate consolidation does not serve to extend
Policy 6204 beyond its intended reach of
simply governing procedure,

TH Finally, as a practical matter, this
Court can discern no other reason for sub-
mission of the supporting data to the
WVBOE than for its consideration in approv-
ing or rejecting the plan. Under the circuit
court’s reasoning, a county board could theo-
retically prepare a plan that was neither
fiscally nor educationally sound, yet insofar
as the county board thoroughly and properly
assembled supporting docunientation ‘for
such a plan, the WVBOE would be bound to
approve the consolidation. We are unper-
suaded by the Board’s argument that to the
extent that the reasons for rejection could in
some measure be tied to one of the six

ther, the Board’s dismissive treatment of the
significance of this amendment is particularly
disingenuous given its insistence that only an
amendment of Policy 6204 would enable the
WVBOE to expand the outer perimeter of mat-
ters which it may consider relative to’consolida-
tion.

720

enumerated categories of supporting data
and information, rejection may be proper.
Such a standard is'plainly susceptible to se-
mantical games designed to pigeon-hole the
entire universe of potential reasons for rejec-
tion of very situation-specific plans into blunt.
categories which are by no means intended
to be comprehensive standards for the evalu-
ation of the propriety of school closure or
consolidation, The critically important deci-.
sion-making involved in protecting our chil-
dren’s fundamental right to education is anti-
thetical to such gamesmanship. The
WVBOE’s constitutional duty to the “com-
plete executive delivery and maintenance of a
thorough and efficient” educational. system
demands more. Syl. Pt. 1, Pauley, 174 W. Va.
167, 824 S.H.2d. 128, Therefore, the West
Virginia Board of Education is entitled to
utilize its discretion in approving or rejecting
an amendment to a Comprehensive Edu-
cational Facilities Plan submitted pursuant to
West Virginia Code of State Regulations
§§ 126-176-1 et seg. (2005) in aid of school
closure or consolidation,

2, Arbitrariness or Capriciousness of the
- WVBOE’s Reasons for Rejection

Notwithstanding the constitutional, statu-
tory, and regulatory authority we find here-
inabove, by no means does this Court sug-
gest that the WVBOE’s discretion in this
regard without limitation. As indicated above,
mandamus will lie to “control a board of
education in the exercise of its discretion”
where there is a showing of “caprice, passion,
partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ul-
terior motive, or misapprehension of law
upon the part of such board,” Syl. Pt, 1, State
ex rel. Payne v. Bd, of Educ. of Jefferson
Cty., 185 W.Va. 849, 68 S.H,2d 579 (1951). See
also Syl. Pt, 1, Detch, 145 W. Va, 722, 117
$.H,2d 188 (“The determination of the edu-
cational policies of the public schools of the
State is vested in The West Virginia Board of
Education, and, unless unreasonable or arbi-
trary, its actions relating to such policies will
not be controlled by the courts.” (emphasis

+ 24 As detailed in n11, supra, the circuit court
made passing reference to the Governor's stated
preference for the schools to remain in Rich-
wood which it found “lend[ed] support to the ..,
theory [that] WVBE members constructed arbi-

added)). Therefore, although we reject the
basis for the circuit court’s conclusion that
the WVBOE acted arbitrarily and capricious-
ly, we nonetheless find it prudent to utilize
our plenary powers to examine the reasons
stated.

HH As indicated above, multiple mem-
bers of the WVBOE expressed concern that
the public hearings conducted were perfunc-
tory and failed to address issues and con-
cerns raised. Certain members expressed
their view, with the support of educational
research, that community schools better
serve impoverished students, of which Rich-
wood has a high number. Certain members
expressed concern that the Board had not
adequately addressed or considered the im-
pact of consolidation on discipline and extra-
curricular activities, as pertains to the well-
being of the student body and educational
environment, Nearly all members expressed
concern that alternatives which would better
address the foregoing issues were not suffi-
ciently demonstrated to have been consid-
ered by the Board, Nearly all members ex-
pressed that all of the affected schools were
doing well academically and financially and
that, typically, consolidation is utilized to im-
prove upon either or both, The common
theme in the members’ testimony was that
they were concerned about consolidation giv-
en Richwood’s high number of impoverished
families and the ample research suggesting
that such students do not thrive in a larger
school setting, President Campbell and Mem-
ber Debra Sullivan gave thoughtful and ex-
tensive testimony explaining that educational
research is now trending away from consoli-
dation in favor'of community schools as being
optimal, particularly for impoverished stu-
dents, where the schools at issue are per-
forming so well academically and financially,
as these schools are,

HE Without passing on the relative mer-
its of any of the WVBOE members’ testimo-
ny, we find that the thoughtful and well-
supported rationales offered by the WVBOB

trary and pretextual justifications to deny the ...
CEFP amendment.” However, we find no evi-
dence whatsoever that the Governor interfered in
the WVBOE's deliberate process, such as to ren-
der their reasons for rejection “pretextual.”

members objectively pertain to the feasibili-
ty, desirability, and efficacy of consolidation,
Accordingly, we find no basis upon which to
east their reasoning. as arbitrary or capri-
cious; rather, their reasoning was unified,
well-expressed, and, above all, plainly ger-
mane to the wisdom of consolidation and the
well-being of the student population. We
therefore find that the circuit court erred in
concluding that the WVBOHR’s rejection of
the CEFP amendment was arbitrary and/or
capricious.>

Hs As this Comt aptly stated in
Jones, “neither we nor the circuit court can
substitute our judgment on this issue for that
of the professional educators and administra-
tors charged, with the promulgation and im-
plementation of state educational policy.” 178
W.Va. at 880, 359 S.E.2d at 608, Moreover,

it is not this Court’s duty to legislate; nor

were we elected to make political decisions
based upon what we believe to be the
expedient answer to this situation. Instead,
we are charged with the task of interpret-
ing the Constitution and the laws of this

State a8 they exist. A judicial system that

substitutes its beliefs for the constitutional

principles of its people is a mockery of

justice. .

Meadows on Behalf of Profl Emps, of W. Va.

Educ. Ass'n v. Hey, 184 W.Va. 75, 77, 399
§.E.2d 657, 659 (1990). While this Court is
sensitive to the deeply-held beliefs and diffi-
cult decisions faced by all parties to this
situation, we are duty-bound to faithfully ap-

25. The WVBOE tangentially argues a jurisdic-
tional issue that we may dispense with in short
order. Specifically, the WVBOE maintains ‘that
the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction
over it because it was not properly served with
process. While the WVBOE was served in accor-
dance with the manner provided in West Virginia
Rule of Civil Procedure 4, no summons was
issued; therefore it claims that the circuit court
never obtained jurisdiction over it. It takes the
position that by virtue of the applicability of the
Rules of Civil Procedure to extraordinary writs, a
“rule to show cause” no longer exists and all
extraordinary remedies must be served in accor-
dance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, includ-
ing but hot limited to the issuance of a summons.

While the Rules of Civil Procedure are made
expressly applicable to extraordinary writs by
virtue of the Court's 1998 enactment of Rule
‘7B of the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no

721

ply this Court’s precedent to resolve these
complex issues of constitutional magnitude.

Iv. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we
reverse the August 18, 2017, order of the
Cireuit Court of Kanawha County, West Vir-
Reversed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a concurring

opinion.

LOUGHRY, C. J., coneurring: ~
I concur in the majority’s opinion in its
entirety. It is clear that the West Virginia
Board of Education (“WVBOE”) is vested
with constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
authority to exercise its discretion in accept-
ing or rejecting an amended CEFP and/or
consolidation plan. The West Virginia Con-
stitution and this Court’s precedent make
plain that
{t]he West Virginia Board of Education
and the State Superintendent of Schools,
pursuant to their general supervisory pow-
ers over education in West Virginia under
W.Va. Const. art, XII, § 2, and their spe-
cific duties to establish, implement. and
enforce high quality educational standards
for all facets of education under the provi-
sions of Chapter 18 of the West Virginia
- Code, have a duty to ensure the complete
executive delivery and maintenance of a
“thorough and efficient system of free
schools”-in West Virginiaf.]

merit to the WVBOE’s contention that Rule 4
supplants the statutory procedure for extraor-
dinary writs. The WVBOE apparently over-
looks West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
4.1(a) which was enacted at the same time the
Rules were made applicable to extraordinary
writs. Rule 4.1(a) provides, in part, that
“[wlhenever an order of court provides for
service of a rule, or order in lieu. of summons
or a rule, upon a party, service shall be made
in the manner provided in Rule 4(d), unless the
order prescribes a different mode of service.”
(emphasis added). Rule 4(d) merely outlines
the various methods of service. Therefore, Rule
4,1 was plainly enacted to “fill the gap” for
service of process of an extraordinary writ and
by no means necessitates the issuance of a
summons to properly effect service of a rule to
show cause. As such, WVBOE’s argument in
this regard is entirely without merit,

722

Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Pauley v. Bailey, 174
W.Va. 167, 824 S.H.2d 128 (1984) (emphasis
added). Unquestionably, the “complete exec-
utive delivery and maintenance of a ‘thor-
ough and efficient system of free schools’”
necessarily entails oversight of and ultimate
responsibility for the number, adequacy, and
viability of our schools. The WVBOE?’s consti-
tutional obligation is to all students in the
State of West Virginia. To fulfill that consti-
tutional obligation, it must not be improperly
hamstrung in the exercise of its lawful au-
thority to ensure that individual counties are
both effectively serving its student popula-
tion and operating in accord with the best
interests of the State’s educational system as
a whole.

While this proceeding necessarily required
this Court to examine the WVBOE’s stated
reasons for rejection of the CEFP, our con-
clusion that its reasoning was neither arbi-
trary nor unreasonable should not be con-
strued as a tacit endorsement of any plan or
solution, Although acknowledged in the ma-
jority’s opinion, it warrants reiteration that it
is not the charge of this Court to wade into
the deeply emotional and occasionally politi-
cal issues that understandably surround
school closure and consolidation. Rather,
those issues are left exclusively to the re-
spective county and state boards of education
to utilize their collective wisdom and experi-
ence to determine what best serves their
students’ needs, Only when a board of edu-
cation so wholly abdicates its role such as to
make its rationale arbitrary and unsupport-
able, may a court intervene. No such cireum-
stances exist here.

Nevertheless, the parties to and/or observ-
ers of this case may well declare a “winner”
and “loser.” And while the Nicholas County
Board of Education may understandably
view this decision as defeat, such a viewpoint
is short-sighted. What the decision of the
WVBOE in rejecting the CEFP amendment
suggests, when fairly construed, is simply
that there is more work to be done to deter-
mine the best solutions for these schools.
This is due in no small measure to the com-
mendable success of the Nicholas County
schools. According to information for the
2015-16 school year contained in the appen-
dix record, Richwood Middle School had a
100 percent highly qualified teacher rate;

Summersville Middle School had a 94.1 per-
cent highly qualified teacher rate; and Rich-
wood High School and Nicholas County High
School had a 96.1 percent and 90.1 percent
graduation rate, respectively—higher than
the statewide graduation rate. Moreover,
their dropout rates were considerably lower
than the statewide rate. Because all of the
schools involved—each individually and as
part of the Nicholas County school system—
are so successful, the respective boards must
proceed with all diligence to ensure that such
exemplary success is fostered, rather than
jeopardized, .
This Court has observed that with respect
to school closures and consolidation, “a

. School board is required to investigate, to

inquire, to study, to ponder and to finally
decide the question.” State ew rel. Jones v.
Ba. of Educ. of Ritchie Cty., 178 W.Va. 378,
859 S.E.2d 606 (1987) (quoting Uniontown
Area Sch. Dist. v. Allen, 4 Pa.Cmwith. 183,
285 A.2d 548, 546 (1971)). And while it may
not be “stymied at every turn by the differ-
ences of opinions of others,” a local board
must give careful consideration to the innu-
merable factors bearing on the students’ fun-
damental right to education and the means
by which it delivers that fundamental right.
Id; see also Syl. Pt. 8, Pauley v. Kelly, 162
W.Va. 672, 672, 255 S.B.2d 859, 861 (1979)
(“The mandatory requirements of ‘a thor-
ough and efficient system of free schools’
found in Article XII, Section 1 of the West
Virginia Constitution, make education a fun-
damental, constitutional right in this State.
While the Nicholas County Board of Edu-
cation has undertaken thoughtful analysis
and consideration of the consolidation issue,
these unique circumstances and the com-
mendable success of these schools have been
deemed by the WVBOK, in exercise of its
constitutional authority, to require more.

The WVBOE must likewise give commen-
surate, painstaking deliberation to the issues
touching not only the locally affected stu-
dents, but the system as a whole. The appen-
dix record reflects that its members did pre-
cisely what the West Virginia Constitution
demands of them. Whether the WVBOE’s
conclusion was right or wrong, even a curso-
ry review of its meeting minutes—and partic-
ularly the thorough circuit court testimony—
reveals that the WVBOE members individu-

ally and as a body L eee reviewed the
materials submitted by the Nicholas County
Board of Education. As contemplated. in its
constitutional charge of “general supervision”

over the State’s schools, its members then
applied their collective wisdom and experi-
ence to render thoughtful assessment and
opinions on the plan. See Article XII, section
2 of the West Virginia Constitution (“The
general supervision of the free schools of the
State shall be vested in the West Virginia
Board of Education which shall perform such
duties as may be prescribed by law.”),

As the parties move forward, I trust that
they will work cooperatively, diligently, and
with alacrity to ensure that the students of
Nicholas County receive the educational fa-
cilities, programs, and opportunities they de-
serve and to which they are constitutionally
entitled. As a reminder to all citizens of the
State— inasmuch as each has a role to play
in our educational system—the “thorough
and efficient” education to which our children
are.entitled “develops, as best the state of
education expertise allows, the minds, bodies
and social morality of its charges to prepare
them for useful and happy occupations, re-
creation and citizenship, and does so econom-

ically.” Pandey v.. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 705, es

255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (1979). I am confident SY
that the parties’ ardently expressed concern

for the children’s well-being will lead Nich-
olas County students to precisely that end.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

806 S.E.2d 154
ANCIENT ENERGY, LTD., David
E. Bowyer, and David A.
Dickey, Petitioners
v

Philip @. FERGUSON and John CY
M. Cutright, Respondents

: No. 16-0373
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 18, 2017
Filed: October 10, 2017

724

1

See W.Va. Code § 11A-3-5 (2017) (requiring
sheriff to sell unredeemed delinquent properties

Terri L. Tichenor, Esq., Tichenor Law Of-
fice, Fairmont, West Virginia, Attorney for
Petitioners

Stephen C. Sluss, Esq., Hurricane, West
Virginia, and Jeffrey R. Blair, Esq., Blair
Law Firm, PLLC, Hurricane, West Virginia,
Attorneys for Respondents

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

Ancient Energy, Ltd., David E. Bowyer,
and David A. Dickey (hereinafter collectively
“petitioners”) appeal the February 29, 2016,
final order of the Circuit Court of Barbour
County granting summary judgment to Phil-
ip G. Ferguson, in his official capacity as
Sheriff and Treasurer of Barbour County,
and John M. Cutright, in his official capacity
as Assessor of Barbour County (hereinafter .
collectively “respondents”), The petitioners
purchased a tax lien on certain mineral inter-
ests from the Deputy Commissioner of Delin-
quent and Nonentered Lands of’ Barbour
County on September 19, 2011, and secured a
deed to the property on January 28, 2012. In
this appeal, the petitioners contend that the
circuit court erred by finding them liable for
payment of the property taxes for the years
of 2011 and 2012. Upon consideration of the
parties’ briefs and arguments and the perti-
nent authorities, we find no error and affirm
the circuit court’s order,

I, Factual and Procedural Background

In November 2006, Sheriff Ferguson held
a public auction of properties that were delin-
quent because of unpaid property taxes,!
which included certain mineral interests de-
scribed as “959.69 coal unmineable, in Union
District, Barbour County, West Virginia.”

at public auction on designated date).

Because no bid was received for these miner-
al interests, Sheriff Ferguson certified a lien
on the property to the West Virginia State
Auditor's office pursuant to West Virginia
Code § 11A-8-8 (2017)? The State Auditor is
designated by statute as the “commissioner
of delinquent and nonentered lands” and is
tasked with selling those properties that
sheriffs are unable to sell to recover delixi-

quent taxes. See W.Va. Code § § 11A-3-88.

and 11A-8-42 (2017). To accomplish this task,
the State Auditor appoints a “deputy com-
missioner of delinquent and nonentered lands
for each county” * who holds a second auction
of certified properties if no party steps’ for-
ward to redeem within eighteen months of
the sheriff's certification.*

On September 19, 2011, Ancient Energy, a
West Virginia corporation in the business of
oil and gas development, purchased the tax
lien on the subject property from G. Russell
Rollyson, Jr., Deputy Commissioner of Delin-
quent and Nonentered Lands of. Barbour
County, The lien on the mineral interests
was sold to Ancient Energy for its bid
amount of one hundred dollars ® for the delin-
quent taxes for the years of 2005 through
2010. After the required ‘statutory notices
were given and the redemption period ex-
pired, Ancient Energy requested that the
deputy commissioner prepare a deed trans-
ferring ownership of the mineral interests ®
to petitioners David A.-Dickey 7 and David E.
Bowyer. The deed was executed as requested
and recorded in the Barbour County Clerk’s
Office on March 8, 2012,

2. The language of this statute is set forth in the
discussion section herein.

3. See W.Va. Code § 11A-3-34 (2017).

4. See W.Va. Code § 11A-3-45 (2017) (requiring
deputy commissioner to sell certified properties
at auction to highest bidder).

5. Unlike the sheriff who cannot sell the property
for less than the amount of taxes, fees, and
interest due, the deputy commissioner sells the
property to the highest bidder. See W.Va. Code
§§ 11A-3-5 and 11A-3-45.

6. See W.Va. Code §§ 11A-3-52 (2017) (setting
forth steps required of purchaser to secure a
deed) and 11A-3-54 (2017) (setting forth notice to
redeem form), .

725

In June 2012, Assessor Cutright entered
the property on the county land books in the
names of Dickey and Bowyer. Thereafter,
Dickey and Bowyer received and paid a tax
invoice for the 2013 property taxes on or
about August 19, 2013. Approximately two
months later, the Sheriff's office returned
Dickey and Bowyer’s tender of payment for
the 2018.taxes with a note explaining that the
taxes for the years of 2011 and 2012 re-
mained unpaid, At the same time, Dickey
and Bowyer received separate invoices for
the, 2011 and 2012 taxes in the amounts of
$2,254.08 and $2,248.70, respectively.

The petitioners disputed their liability for
the 2011 and 2012 taxes, arguing that be-
cause the mineral interests had been “sold”
to the State, no taxes were due for that time
period. Unable to resolve the matter with the
respondents, the petitioners filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus in the cireuit court
on September 23, 2014, seeking an ‘order
requiring the respondents to “remove the
back tax assessments and accept payment.
from the Petitioners for the 2013 invoice as
requested.” The respondents filed an answer
and a motion for judgment.on the pleadings

-pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the West Virginia

Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court
heard arguments on the motion on January
9, 2016, and then continued the matter to
allow the parties time to examine the land
books to determine when the 2011-and 2012
tax assessments occurred,’ To clarify the is-
sue, the parties agreed to submit an affidavit,
which the -court. would accept as fact and
stipulation. Thereafter, the respondents sub-

7, The record indicates that David A. Dickey is the
. President of Ancient Energy.

8. West Virginia Code § 11A-1-7 (2017) precludes
the sheriff from accepting payment for the cur-
rent year taxes if the preceding year is delin-
quent,

9, During the hearing, the petitioners asserted
that the 2011 and 2012 assessments were not
made until after they submitted payment for the
2013 taxes. However, the respondents main-
tained that the 2011; 2012, and 2013 assessments
were made at the same time but a clerical error
had resulted in the petitioners only initially re-
ceiving the 2013 tax invoice, °

726

mitted an affidavit from Assessor Cutright
stating that “[t]he Assessments for Tax
Years 2011 and 2012 were entered on the
Barbour County, West Virginia, Land Rec-
ords ... and were available for review by the
taxpayers while the books were before the
Barbour County Commission Sitting as
Board of Equalization and Review in Febru-
ary of 2018.” Upon consideration of the affi-
davit, the circuit court converted the respon-
dents’ Rule 12(c) motion to a motion for
summary judgment! and entered the final
order in favor of the respondents. The circuit
court concluded that “the Petitioners’ title to
the property relates back to July 1, 2004,
which is the first day of July of the year in
which the taxes, for nonpayment of which the
veal estate was sold, were assessed and
therefore the back tax for 2011 and 2012 to
Dickey and Bowyer were appropriate.” This
appeal followed.

IL Standard of Review

HM Although the petitioners sought a
writ of mandamus, the circuit court disposed
of the matter by granting summary judg-
ment to respondents, effectively denying the
requested writ. The circuit court rendered its
decision based upon the statutes that govern
tax sales of delinquent properties. Our re-
view of a circuit court’s decision denying a
writ of mandamus or granting summary
judgment is de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, Harrison
Cnty. Comm'n v. Harrison Cnty. Assessor,
222 W.Va, 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008) (“A de
novo standard of review applies to a circuit
court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of
mandamus.”); Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy,
192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.H.2d 755 (1994) (“A
circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo.”). Likewise, when the is-
sue on appeal involves a question of law or
statutory interpretation, our review is de
novo. See Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
AL, 194 W.Va. 188, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995)
(“Where the issue on an appeal from the
circuit court is clearly a question of law or
involving an interpretation of a statute, we
apply a de novo standard of review.”).

10. Rule 12(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that “{ijf, on a motion for

judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by

Ill. Discussion

HEM Resolution of this matter lies within
the legislatively-prescribed procedure that
regulates the sales of tax liens and allows
those who purchase tax liens to secure deeds
to the properties, When considering any stat-
utory provision, we abide by our well-estab-
lished rules of statutory construction. “As a
rule, when both a specific and a general
statute apply to a given case, the specific
statute governs.” In re Chevie V., 226 W.Va.
368, 371, 700 8.E.2d 815, 828 (2010). In deter-
mining how a specific statute should be ap-
plied, “[wle look first to the statute’s lan-
guage. If the text, given its plain meaning,
answers the interpretive question, the lan-
guage must prevail and further inquiry is
foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State
Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 578,
587, 466 S.E.2d 424, 488 (1995). In other
words, “[wJhere the language of a statute is
free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to
be accepted and applied without resort to
interpretation.” Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v, An-
drews, 158 W.Va. 714, 172 8.H.2d 884 (1970);
see also Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Hpperly, 185
W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory
provision which is clear and unambiguous
and plainly expresses the legislative intent
will not be interpreted by the courts but will
be given full force and effect.”). Therefore,
“{a] statute is open to construction only
where the language used requires interpreta-
tion because of ambiguity which renders it
susceptible of two or more constructions or
of such doubtful or obscure meaning that
reasonable minds might be uncertain or dis-
agree as to its meaning.” Sizemore v. State
Farm Gen. Ins, Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 505
S.E.2d 654, 659 (1998) (internal quotations
and citation omitted), With these fundamen-
tal precepts in mind, we consider whether
the cireuit court erred by granting summary
judgment to the respondents.

Hl The petitioners primarily contend
that they are not liable for the 2011 and 2012
property taxes because they were not owners

the court, the motion shall be treated as one for

summary judgment and disposed of as provided
in Rule 56[,]”

in possession of the property during those
years. They maintain that no taxes can be
collected because the property was held by
the State at that time. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite West Virginia

Code § 11-4-18 (2018) which provides, in per-

tinent part:

Real estate purchased for the State at a
sale for taxes shall not be omitted from the
land books but the officer whose duty it is
to make out the same, shall duly enter,
classify and value annually such real es-
tate, as though no such sale had occurred,
until such real estate is redeemed or other-
wise disposed of by the State, but no taxes
shall be extended thereon while the same
remains the property of the State[.]
Conversely, the respondents assert that

West Virginia Code § 11-4-18 does not apply
in this instance because the property was
never purchased by the State. Noting that
the Legislature made extensive and substan-
tial changes to the specific statutory provi-
sions that govern the sale of property for
delinquent taxes in 1994, the respondents
maintain that property not sold at the Sher-
iffs sale is “certified” to the Auditor but
remains in the name of the owner who failed
to pay the taxes, Relying upon West Virginia
Code § 11A-8-62 (2017), which provides that
the tax lien purchaser obtains title to the
property that relates back to the year of the
assessment for the taxes that became delin-
quent, the respondents reason that the peti-
tioners are liable for the 2011 and 2012 taxes
because their deed specifies that they ac-
quired title in 2004. We agree.

We previously recognized in Mingo Coun-
ty Redevelopment Authority v, Green, 207
‘W.Va, 486, 491, 584 $.E.2d 40, 45 (2000), that:
“this area of the law has undergone signifi-
cant change in the last several years, with
each change increasing the protections af-
forded the delinquent land owner.” The revi-
sion occurred after this Court recognized in
Lilly v, Duke, 180 W.Va. 228, 231, 376 S.E.2d
122, 125 (1988) that the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791,
108 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) and
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct, 1840, 99

727

L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), “prescribed certain con-
stitutional due process requirements for no-
tice of a tax sale of real property.” Accord-
ingly, this Court held in Lilly:

There are certain constitutional due pro-
cess requirements for notice of a tax sale
of real property. Where a party having an
interest in the property can reasonably be
identified from public records or otherwise,
due process requires that such party be
provided notice by mail or other means as
certain to ensure actual notice.

180 W.Va. at 228, 376 S.E.2d at 122, syl. pt.
1. In order to satisfy Lilly and the United
States Supreme Court precedent triggering
that decision, the Legislature amended and
reenacted the statutes concerning the sale of
land for taxes, now codified at West Virginia
Code §§ 11A-3-1 to 11A-8-69. Green, 207
W.Va. at 492, 584 S.E.2d at 46.

Of particular relevance to this case is our
discussion in Green regarding the duties of a
sheriff when he or she is unable to sell
delinquent property at auction to recover the
outstanding taxes. West Virginia Code
§ 114-8-8(a), as enacted in 1994, provides:

If no person present bids the amount of
taxes, interest and charges due on any real
estate offered for sale, the sheriff shall
certify the real estate to the Auditor for
disposition pursuant to section forty-four
[§ 11A-8-44] of this article, subject, howev-
er, to the right of redemption provided by
section thirty-eight [§ 11A-3-38] of this ar-
ticle. The Auditor shall prescribe the form

- by which the sheriff certifies the property.
(Emphasis added). Addressing this statutory
provision in Green, we explained:

If a sheriff is unable to sell the property
at auction to recover the delinquent taxes,
the sheriff “certifies” the property to the
office of the Auditor. In plain language,
this means that the sheriff conveys all of
the pertinent information regarding the
property to the Auditor so that the Auditor
may attempt a second auction sale pursu-
ant to statute. W. Va. Code §§ 11A-3-8,
11A-8-44, et seg. Before the Legislature
revised the statute, the Auditor “took title”
to the property, thus terminating the
rights of the delinquent owner.

728

Green, 207.W.Va. at 489 n.9, 584 S,H.2d at 43
n.9. Explaining further, this Court.-stated:
Prior to the changes made by the Legis-
lature in 1994 the State actually “pur-
chased” the property if-not sold at the tax
sale, and title to the land passed to the
State, essentially stripping the former
owner of his or her interest at that point in
the process. Because. of the due -process
- problems inherent in such a scheme, now a
sheriff is said to “certify” the property to
the Auditor, but title still rests with the
(soon-to-be-former) owner until the deputy
land commissioner conveys a deed at the
end of the tax-sale process. W. Va. Code
§ 114-88 (1994). :
Td, at 494 n,24, 584 S.H.2d at 48 n.24,
TAs we noted at the outset,

«©The general rule of statutory con-
struction requires that: specific statute be
given precedence over a general statute
relating to the same subject matter where
the two cannot be reconciled.” Syllabus
Point 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon,
174 W.Va. 880, 325 S.H.2d 120 (1984)? Syl-
labus point 1, Whitlow v, Board of Edu-
cation of Kanawha County, 190 W.Va. 223,
488 S.H.2d 15 (1998).” Syllabus point 6,
Albright v. White, 202 W.Va. 292, 508
S\E.2d 860 (1998),

Syl. Pt, 6, Carvey v. West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ, 206 W.Va. 720, 527 S.H.2d 881
(1999). West Virginia Code § 11-4-18, which
has not been amended since 1939, is a gener-
al statute addressing the assessment of land
purchased by the State, The statute ‘has no
application in this instance because title to
property certified to the Auditor no longer
passes to the State under West Virginia
Code § 11A-8-8, the specific statutory provi-
sion that instructs sheriffs regarding unsold
property. Pursuant to West Virginia Code
§ 11A-3-8, the sheriff is required to “certify”

the unsold property to the Auditor but title .

yemains with the owner, who still has the
opportunity to redeem the property. See
W.Va. Code § 11A-8-38 (2017) (allowing own-
er of real estate certified to Auditor to re-
deem prior to certification of such real estate
to deputy commissioner).

11. See West Virginia Code § 11A-3-52.

Title to delinquent property that has. been
certified to the. Auditor remains with .the
owner until the tax lien is purchased from
the Auditor’s deputy commissioner of delin-
quent and nonentered lands and the tax lien
purchaser has completed all the steps neces-
sary to secure a deed to the property. At
that juncture, West.Virginia Code § 11A-3-
59 (2017) allows the tax lien purchaser to
request that the deputy commissioner make
and deliver a deed to the property. Critically,
West Virginia Code § 11A-8-62(a), provides,
in relevant part:

Whenever the purchaser of any tax lien
on any real estate sold at a tax sale, his
heirs or assigns, shall have obtained a deed
for such real estate from the deputy com-
missioner or from a commissioner appoint-
ed to make the deed, he or they shall
thereby acquire all such right, title and
interest, in and to the real estate, as was,
at the time of the execution and delivery of
the deed, vested in or held by any person

‘who was entitled to redeem, unless such
person is ‘one who, being required by law ©
to have his interest separately assessed
and taxed, has dorie so and has paid all the
taxes due thereon, or unless the rights of
such person are expressly saved by the
provisions of section forty-nine [§ 11A-3-

49] of this article or section two [§ 11A-4-

2), three [§ 11A-4-8], four [§ 11A-4-4] or

six [§ 11A4-4-6], article four of this chapter.

The tax deed shall be conclusive evi-
dence of the acquisition of such title. If the
property was sold for nonpayment of tax-
es, the title so acquired shall relate back to
the first day of July of the year in which
the tames, for nonpayment of which the
real estate was sold, were assessed,

(Emphasis added). . “

The record in this case shows that after
Assessor Cutright was informed that peti-
tioners Dickey and Bowyer had acquired title
to the subject property, he entered assess-
ments for the 2011, 2012, and 2018 tax years.
According to Assessor Cutright, “[t]he said
land books were certified and true and accu-
rate by the said Barbour County Commission
Sitting as Board of Equalization and Review
in February of 2018.” Because West Virginia

- Code § 11A+3-62 relates the tax lien purchas-

ex's title back to the year of the assessment.
for the property taxes that became delin-
quent, we find no error in the circuit court’s
determination that the petitioners were liable
for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes. As
such, the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment to the respondents was proper.!?
See Syl. Pt. 8, Aetna Casualty’ & Swrety Co.
v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148
‘W.Va. 160, 188 S.E.2d 770 (1963) (“A motion
for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine
issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concern-
ing the facts is not desirable to clarify the
application of the law.”).
* IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
above, the final order of the Cireuit Court of
Barbour County entered on February 29,
2016, is affirmed.

Affirmed.

806 S.E.2d 160

STATE of West Virginia EX REL. STATE
“AUTO PROPERTY INSURANCE COM-
PANIES d/b/a State Auto Property and
Casualty Insurance Company, Petitioner

ve

The Honorable James C. STUCKY, Judge
of the Circuit Court of Kanawha Coun-
ty, West Virginia; a CMD Plus, Inc. Re-
spondent

No. 17-0257
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 10, 2017

12, The petitioners also’ asserted that a genuine
issue of material fact existed regarding when the
2011 and 2012. tax assessments on the property
were made which should have precluded sum-
mary judgment. We find no merit to’ this argu-
ment because this issue was resolved below, with
petitioners’ consent, by Assessor Cutright’s affi-
davit, The petitioners also argued that the prop-
erty should have been classified as “nonentered
land,” ie, property not on the land books for

taxation, in which case title would have only
related back to the date of sale. See W.Va. Code
§ 11A-3-62 (“If the property was sold for nonen-
try ... the title shall relate back to the date of
sale."), We also find this argument unavailing
because the property was sold for nonpayment of
taxes and, therefore, was properly classified as
“delinquent” with no taxes extended until the tax
lien was purchased,

730

era

Trevor K, Taylor, Esq., William P. Margel-
is, Esq., Taylor Law Office, Morgantown,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

Charles M. Johnstone, II, Esq., David A.
Dobson, Esq., Johnstone & Gabhart, LLP
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondent, CMD Plus, Ine.

Justice Ketchum:

This original prohibition proceeding con-
cerns a liability insurance policy. It is a com-
mercial general liability policy issued by the
petitioner, State Auto Property Insurance
Companies (“State Auto”), to its insured, re-
spondent CMD Plus, Inc. (“CMD”).

CMD, a residential construction company,
contracted to build a home for Chandrakant
N. and Kimberly 8, Shah in Charleston,
West Virginia. The construction activities
caused ground slippage resulting in damage
to the house and property of the adjacent,
downhill homeowners, Barry G. Evans and
Ann M. ‘Evans (“Plaintiffs”). The plaintiffs
filed an action in the Cireuit Court of Kana-
wha. County against the Shahs and CMD
seeking recovery for their damage.

CMD filed a third-party complaint against
its insurer State Auto alleging that State
Auto delayed investigating the plaintiffs’
claim, settling the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, and in-
demnifying CMD. CMD asserted that, as a
result, State Auto committed common law
bad faith, violations of the West Virginia
Unfair Trade Practices Act, and breach of
contract, State Auto’s efforts to obtain a
dismissal of CMD’s third-party complaint
were unsuccessful, In the current petition for
a writ of prohibition filed in this Court, State
Auto challenges the circuit court’s March 2,
2017, denial of State Auto’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. State Auto contends there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that it
is entitled to a dismissal of CMD’s third-
party complaint as a matter of law.

The record, including the exhibits filed in
support of State Auto’s motion for summary
judgment, reveals that State Auto defended
and indemnified its insured, CMD, through-
out the lawsuit as required by the commer-
cial general liability policy. We note that,
while the policy was purchased to provide
liability coverage for damage to property
sustained by third parties, such as the plain-
tiffs, the terms of the policy provided no
coverage to CMD for damage to its own
property. .

This Court concludes that relief in prohibi-
tion is warranted and that State Auto is
entitled to a dismissal of CMD’s third-party
complaint as a matter of law.

I, The Underlying Action

CMD contracted to build a custom home
on a parcel in Charleston, West Virginia,
owned by the Shahs. The adjacent, downhill
property owners were the plaintiffs. Con-
struction activities on the Shah parcel result-
ed in surface water, storm water, mud and
debris inundating and damaging the plain-
tiffs’ house and property.

On April 18, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a
lawsuit in the Cireuit Court of Kanawha
County against the Shahs and CMD. Assert-
ing causes of action for nuisance, trespass
and negligence, the plaintiffs sought compen-
satory damages as well as equitable relief to
prevent further interference with the use and
enjoyment of their property.

Il, The Third-Party Complaint
Against State Auto

CMD was insured for the damage to the
plaintiffs’ property under a commercial gen-
eral liability policy issued by -State Auto
which provided coverage up to the policy
limit of $1,000,000. CMD promptly notified
State Auto of the damage to the plaintiffs’

1, The complaint was styled Barry G. Evans and
Ann M. Evans v. CMD Plus, Inc.; C. K. Shah;
Chandrakant N. Shah; and Kimberly S. Shah,
Civil Action No. 11-C-606 (Kanawha Co. 2011).
C. K, Shah, a construction contractor, was a
corporate officer of CMD.

‘The record is unclear regarding ownership of
the Shah property. The complaint alleged that
the Shah property was owned by.Chandrakant
N. Shah and Kimberly S, Shah. The third-party
complaint refers to contractor C. K. Shah as an
owner of the property. For purposes of this Opin-

731

property, and CMD asserts that, at that
time, the damage could have been remedied
quickly and inexpensively. State Auto ad-
vised CMD that it would handle the claim.
CMD states that State Auto then conducted
a series of inspections and investigations,
thereby, delaying a potential settlement of
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, increasing the amount
of the plaintiffs’ property damage, and re-
sulting i in the lawsuit. filed against CMD D by
the plaintiffs,

CMD filed a third-party complaint against
State Auto on March 20, 2012. The third-
party complaint contained three ‘Counts,
Count I alleged that State Auto committed
common law bad faith through its delay in
resolving the property damage claim of the
plaintiffs and through its failure to protect
CMD from litigation. Count II alleged, for
similar reasons, that State Auto violated the
West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act,
W.Va, Code, 88-11-1 [1974], et seg? Count IIT
alleged a breach of State Auto’s contractual
obligation to CMD by failing to make insur-
ance proceeds available where liability re-
garding the plaintiffs’ claim was clear.

State Auto filed a motion to dismiss CMD’s
third-party complaint on the ground that
CMD lacked standing to assert common law
and statutory bad faith or unfair claims set-
tlement practices regarding how State Auto
handled the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. According to
State Auto, its only obligation to its insured,
CMD, was to defend the lawsuit and indem-
nify CMD for any meritorious claims assert-
ed by the plaintiffs, State Auto contends that
it defended CMD and fully settled the plain-
tiffs’ claims. State Auto alleged that CMD’s
breach of contract theory fails for the same
reason, i.¢., CMD lacks standing to assert
any bad faith claim the plaintiffs may have

ion, we will refer to the property as the “Shah
property.”

2. Count Il alleged violations of W.Va. Code, 33-
11-4 [2002], subsections (9)(b), failing to act rea-
sonably promptly regarding a claim arising un-
der an insurance policy; (9)(f), not attempting in
good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equita-
ble settlement of a claim in which liability is
reasonably clear; and (9)(g), causing litigation to
recover amounts due under an insurance policy.

732

‘had regarding how State Auto handled the
lawsuit.

On September 25, 2012, State Auto’s mo-
tion to dismiss was denied in part. The order
entered by the circuit court stated that the
motion was denied “except that the Court
will not allow the Third-Party Plaintiff CMD
Plus, Ine, to assert claims that, in actuality,
are claims of the Plaintiffs, Barry G. Evans
and Ann M, Evans. To the extent any such
claims have been asserted, those claims are
dismissed.”

‘Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ lawsuit fully set-
tled resulting in the plaintiffs receiving
$325,000 paid by State Auto. The plaintiffs
executed an ‘agreement discharging the
Shahs, CMD and State Auto from all claims
arising from CMD’s construction activities.

State Auto then filed a renewed motion to
dismiss CMDs third-party complaint on the
ground that’ State Auto met its obligations
under the commercial general liability policy
to defend and indemnify CMD. State Auto
asserted that

the duty to indemnify has not been breach-

ed because litigation in the underlying

matter was resolved by settlement. Pursu-
ant to the terms of that settlement, State

Auto paid to resolve all claims asserted by

the [plaintiffs] against CMD while securing

a complete release of CMD of and from

any and all liability relating to the allega-

tions contained in the [plaintiffs’] Com-

plaint. In fact, State Auto has secured a

release to make sure that CMD cannot be

sued again in the future. Under these cir-
cumstances, no judgment was entered

»

In Jume 2012, State Auto was granted leave to
file a complaint for declaratory judgment on the
question of whether the commercial general lia-
bility policy covered the plaintiffs’ property dam-
age claim. The circuit court determined that
none of the policy exclusions applied and that
the plaintiffs’ claim encompassed the “exact type
of damage” thé policy was intended to cover, The
circuit court noted that, although State Auto was
providing a.defense to CMD in the underlying
action under a reservation of rights, CMD in-
curred attorney fees as'to the declaratory judg-
ment in asserting that the plaintiffs’ claim was
covered under the policy. Consequently, the cir-
cuit court ordered State Auto to pay CMD attor-
ney fees in the amount of $52,757.54.

against CMD and no settlement was nego-
tiated wherein payment was demanded of
“CMD. Accordingly, as a matter of law,
CMD cannot set forth any set of facts upon
which it may base a claim for bad faith
breach of the insurance contract’ against
State Auto.

On November 10, 2015, the circuit court
denied State Auto’s renewed motion to dis-
miss. In the order, the circuit court simply
restated each Count of CMD’s third-party
complaint and concluded that the allegations
were sufficient to allow the matter to go
forward. State Auto sought relief from the
November 10, 2015, order by filing a petition
for a writ of prohibition in this Court.

In State ex rel. State Auto Property Insur-
ance Companies v. Stucky, 2016 WL 3410852
(W.Va. 2016), a Memorandum Decision is-
sued on June 14, 2016, this Court determined
that under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure our analysis of
State Auto’s requested dismissal was limited
to the allegations within the four corners of
CMD’s third-party complaint. The settlement
of the lawsuit and other matters of evidence
were not to be considered. This Court con-
cluded that CMD’s allegations of common
law and statutory bad faith and breach of
contract were sufficiently pled to withstand
State Auto’s renewed: motion to dismiss.
Therefore, relief in prohibition was denied
with the caveat that State Auto “could file a
motion for summary judgment after the
completion of discovery in order to obtain
relief.” (emphasis added) 4
4 Chief Justice Ketchum and Justice Loughry

filed dissenting Opinions in State ex rel. State

Auto Property Insurance Companies v. Stucky.

Chief Justice Ketchum stated that CMD's pur-

ported first-party claim failed for the following

reasons; (1) CMD could not assert a “loss claim”
because, under the commercial general liability
policy, only damage to the plaintiffs’ property

{and not CMD's own property).was covered, and

(2) CMD could not assert an “excess judgment

claim” because there was no judgment, ie, State

Auto settled all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Similarly,

Justice Loughry noted in his dissenting Opinion:

“Because the CGL policy was not procured for

-the purpose of covering losses directly sustained
by the insured, it stands to reason that there is no
basis for a first-party bad faith claim.”

III. State Auto’s Motion for
Summary Judgment

The parties conducted’ discovery following
the denial of relief in prohibition. In January
2017 State Auto filed a motion for summary
judgment, State Auto asserted that there
‘was no question of fact that it had provided
CMD with a defense in the plaintiffs’ lawsuit
and that a settlement and release of the
plaintiffs’ damage claim was secured at no
cost to CMD and without the entry of an
adverse judgment. CMD filed a response to
the motion, asserting that summary judg-
ment on the third-party complaint was pre-
cluded by questions of fact. A number of
exhibits were filed by the parties in support
of their respective positions.

On March 2, 2017, the circuit court denied
State Auto’s motion for summary judgment
on the basis of unresolved questions of fact
regarding CMD’s allegations of common law
and statutory bad faith and breach of con-
tract. Noting CMD’s assertion that State
Auto’s dilatory handling of the plaintiffs’
damage claim resulted in the filing of. the
lawsuit, the circuit court concluded that
CMD had a first-party claim under West
Virginia law “in that CMD alleged that its
insurer, State Auto, ‘failed’ to use good faith
in settling a claim by someone the insured
allegedly harmed or injured.”

In the current petition for a writ of prohi-
bition, State Auto seeks relief from the cir-
cuit court’s March 2, 2017, order. State Auto
contends that it performed its obligations
under the commercial general liability policy
and that, because there are no genuine issues
of material fact, CMD’s third-party complaint
should be dismissed as a matter of law:

IV. Standard for Relief in Prohibition

This Court has original jurisdiction in pro-
hibition proceedings pursuant to art. VIII,
§ 8, of The Constitution of West Virginia. In
considering whether to grant relief in prohi-
bition, this Court stated in the syllabus point
of State ex rel. Vineyard v, O’Brien, 100
W.Va, 168, 180 S.E, 111 (1925): “The writ of
prohibition will issue only in clear cases
where the inferior tribunal is proceeding
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction.” Accord
syl. pt. 1, State ew rel. Progressive Classic

733

Ins, Co. v. Bedell, 224 W.Va. 458, 686 S.E.2d
598 (2009). "

State Auto contends that the circuit court
exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing CMD’s
third-party complaint to go forward. We
therefore apply the following guidelines set
forth in syllabus point 4 of State ew rel.
Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va, 12, 488 S.H.2d
12 (1996):

* In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
involving an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is claimed that the lower
tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers,
this’ Court -will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in,a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower. tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (5) whether the lower
tribunal’s order raises new and important
problems or issues of law of first impres-
sion. These factors are general guidelines
that’ serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue, Although all
five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
that the third factor, the existence of clear
error as a matter of law, should be given
substantial weight.

Accord State ex rel. Rubenstein v. Bloom,
235 W.Va. 70, 72- 8, 771 S.E.2d 717, 719-20
(2015).

: V. Discussion

HI The dispositive facts with regard to
CMD’s third-party complaint against State
Auto are not in dispute. CMD, a corporate
entity, was issued, and paid the premiums
for, a commercial general liability policy. with
State Auto, As a liability policy, coverage was
provided to CMD for damage to the property
of others, such as for the damage to the
downhill property of the plaintiffs,

State Auto initially contested coverage of
the plaintiffs’ damage in a declaratory judg-

734

ment proceeding, When the circuit court de-
termined that coverage would be afforded,
State Auto was ordered to pay CMD attor-
ney fees and costs in the amount of
$52,757.54. During the declaratory judgment
proceeding, State Auto continued to provide
CMD with a defense in the lawsuit filed by
the plaintiffs. See note 8, supra.

The lawsuit was fully settled by State Auto
resulting in the plaintiffs receiving $825,000.
The settlement amount was paid by State
Auto on CMD’s behalf. CMD was therefore
defended and indemnified by State Auto with
respect to the lawsuit-as required by the
commercial general liability policy. The set-
tlement was obtained at no cost to CMD, and
no adverse judgment was entered in the
circuit court, -

Neither the plaintiffs nor the Shahs filed a
third-party bad faith claim or an unfair claim
settlement action against State Auto, Such an
action would have been barred pursuant to
W.Va, Code, 33-11-4a(a) [2005], which states:
“A third-party claimant may not bring a pri-
vate cause of action or any other action
against any person for an unfair claims set-
tlement practice.”

Prior to the enactment of W.Va. Code, 33-
11-4a(a) [2005], this Court held in the sylla-
bus of Hlmore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 202 W.Va, 430, 504 S.E.2d 893 (1998):

A third party has no cause of action
against an insurance carrier for common
law breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing or for common law
breach of fiduciary duty,

Accord Loudin v. Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins.
Co., 228 W.Va. 34, 39, 716 S.E.2d 696, 701
(2011). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs released
any bad faith claim they may have had
against State Auto pursuant to the settle-
ment of their lawsuit seeking damages
against the Shahs and CMD.

TM In this State, an insured has a right
to bring a first-party common law or statuto-
5. See State ex rel. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.

v, Wilson, 239 W.Va. 338, 801 S.E.2d 216, 223

(2017), wherein we stated: "A prerequisite for

any first-party bad faith action is an underlying

claim for coverage or benefits or an action for

damages which the insured alleges was ‘handled
in bad faith by its insurer.” See also syl. pt. 2 of

ry bad faith action against its insurer. Such
an action is defined in State ex rel. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 203 W.Va. 358, 369, 508
S.E.2d 75, 86 (1998), as follows: “[A] first-
party bad faith action is one wherein the
insured sues his/her own insurer for failing
to use good faith in settling a claim brought
against the insured or a claim filed by the
insured.” >

Tn this proceeding, we are asked to deter-
mine whether CMD’s first-party bad faith
claim should be permitted to go forward. The
record, however, establishes that CMD was
fully defended by its insurer, State Auto,
throughout the lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs.

‘State Auto also reached and paid a settle-

ment of $325,000 to the plaintiffs, an amount
well within the $1,000,000 policy limit. The
defense and indemnification were provided at
no cost to CMD, and no judgment was en-
tered against CMD by the.circuit court. On
this record, we cannot see any evidence that
State Auto failed to exercise good faith in
meeting its obligations under the commercial
general liability insurance policy.

Finally, CMD alleges that State Auto en-
gaged in unfair claim settlement practices
and thereby violated three subsections of the
West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act.
CMD asserts that State Auto, as a general
business practice, failed to act reasonably
promptly on the claim for coverage; failed to
effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable set-
tlement of the plaintiffs’ claim; and forced
the plaintiffs to file a lawsuit against the
Shahs and CMD to resolve the amounts due
under the commercial general liability policy.

Specifically, CMD alleges violations of the
following subsections found in W.Va, Code,
88-11-4 [2002], of the UTPA:

(9) No person shall commit or perform
with such frequency as to indicate a gener-
-al business practice any of the following:

Loudin stating that a first-party bad faith action
“is one wherein the insured sues his/her own
insurer for failing to use good faith in settling a
claim filed by the insured.” Accord syl. pt. 2, Goff
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 229 W.Va. 568, 729

” §.B.2d 890 (2012). ‘

(b) Failing to acknowledge and act rea-
sonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insur-
ance policies; ...

@ Not attempting in good faith to effec-
tuate prompt, fair and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has be-
come reasonably clear;

(g) Compelling insureds to institute liti-
gation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially
Jess than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by the insureds, when
the insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ulti-
mately recovered{,]

CMD has failed to establish genuine issues
of material fact under those subsections of
the UTPA. The first two subsections relied
upon by CMD are subsections (9)(b) and
(9)(f). In the context of a liability policy, such
as the commercial general liability policy
herein, subsections (9)(b) and (9)(f) are de-
signed to protect plaintiffs who seek liability-
related damages from an insured, and are
not designed to protect the insured.

HH Subsection(9)(b) pertains to “com-
munications with respect to claims,” and sub-
section (9)(f) pertains to “settlements of
claims in which liability has become reason-
ably clear.” With regard to a liability insur-
ance policy, the term “claim” is used “in its
common (and common sense) usage: an effort
by a third party to recover money from the
insured.” Evanston Ins, Co. v. Sec, Assur.
Co., 715 F.Supp. 1405, 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitis-
burgh, Pa. v. Cont'l Illinois Corp, 673
F.Supp. 800, 807 n17 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
“‘Claim’ ordinarily means a demand on the
insured for damages resulting from the in-
sured’s alleged negligent act or omission.”
Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 54 Wash.
App. 880, 774 P.2d 80, 88 (1989). “[A] claim
must relate to an assertion of legally cogniza-
ble damage, and must be a type of demand
that can be defended, settled and paid by the
insurer.” Evanston Ins, Co. v. GAB Bus.
Servs, Inc. 182 A.D.2d 180, 521 N.Y.S.2d
692, 695 (1987).

With respect to the State Auto policy is-
sued to CMD, the “claim” at issue in subsec-

735

tions (9)(b) and (9)(f) is the demand upon
CMD by the plaintiffs for compensation for
damages resulting from CMD’s alleged negli-
gent act or omission. To the extent State
Auto failed to “act reasonably promptly upon.
communications with respect to claims,” or
failed to “effectuate prompt, fair and equita-
ble settlements of claims,” in this action, the
UTPA protects only the efforts by the plain-
tiffs to recover legally cognizable damages
from CMD by way of State Auto’s liability
policy. As the insured protected by the com-
mercial general liability policy, CMD itself
can make no demand that can be defended,
settled or paid by State Auto. Therefore,
CMD has no standing to assert a claim under
subsection (9)(b) or subsection (9)(f) of W.Va.
Code, 33-11-4 [2002].

The third subsection of W.Va. Code, 33-11-
4 [2002], relied upon by CMD is subsection
(9)(g). That subsection prohibits an insurer
from “[clompelling insureds to institute liti-
gation to recover amounts due under an in-
surance policy by offering substantially less
than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions brought by the insureds, when the
insureds have made claims for amounts rea-
sonably similar to the amounts ultimately
recovered.” Subsection (9)(g) has no applica-
tion to the circumstances herein.

“Where the language of a statute is
clear and without ambiguity the plain mean-
ing is to be accepted without resorting to the
rules of interpretation.” Syl. pt. 2, State v
Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
Under a typical liability policy, an insured is
not entitled to any “amounts” under the poli-
cy, and an insured can make no “claims for
amounts” that would later be “reasonably
similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.”
Under the terms of the commercial general
liability policy issued by State Auto, the in-
sured, CMD, was entitled to two things: a
defense against the liability claim of the
plaintiffs and indemnification of any damages
within policy limits due to the plaintiffs as a
result of CMD’s alleged negligent act or
omission, CMD cites no authority suggesting
CMD had a right to “recover amounts due”
under the State Auto policy. CMD therefore

736 —— Es

has no standing to assert a claim under
W.Va, Code, 38-11-4(9)(g) [2002].

HE Syllabus point 3 of Aetna Cas. and
‘Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins, Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va.
160, 188 S.E.2d 770 (1968), holds: “A motion
for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine
issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concern-
ing the facts is not desirable to clarify the
application of the law.” Accord syl. pt. 6, Old
Republic Ins, Co. v, O'Neal, 287 W.Va. 512,
788 S.E.2d 40 (2016). Moreover, this Court
recognized in Williams v. Precision Coil,
Ine., 194 W.Va. 52, 58, 459 S.E.2d 829, 885
(1995), that summary judgment “is one of the
few safeguards in existence that prevent friv-
olous lawsuits from being tried which have
survived a motion to dismiss.”

The insured, CMD, was defended and in-
demnified by its insurer, State Auto, with
respect to the lawsuit filed by the ‘plaintiffs
as required by the commercial general liabili-
ty policy. A settlement was obtained at no
cost to CMD, and no adverse judgment was
entered in‘ the circuit court, Consequently,
this Court is of the opinion that, as a matter
of law, CMD cannot maintain a first-party
action against State Auto for common law
and statutory bad faith and breach of con-
tract!

VI, Conclusion

This Court grants State Auto’s requested
relief in prohibition. The March 2, 2017, or-
der of the Cireuit Court of Kanawha County
which denied State Auto's motion for sum-
mary judgment is set aside, and CMD’s
third-party ‘complaint against State Auto is
dismissed as a matter of law.

Writ granted,

6. In addition to the handling of the plaintiffs’
claim, CMD's third-party complaint ‘also alleged

bad faith regarding State Auto’s purported delay-

in resolving the City of Charleston's claim for the
relocation of a sewer line necessitated by the
slippage, The record demonstrates, however, that
State Auto defended CMD against the City’s
claim, provided coverage for the relocation of the
sewer line and secured a release on behalf of
CMD of all liability for damage, The settlement of
the claim was without cost to CMD and no
judgment was entered. We therefore find no mer-

JUSTICE DAVIS and JUSTICE
WORKMAN dissent and reserve the right to
file separate Opinions,

Workman, Justice, dissenting, joined by
Justice Davis:

I respectfully dissent to the majority opin-
ion, not only because the majority. has im-
properly inserted itself into the role of trial
court, but also because it has implicitly al-
tered the law without even enuneiating a 1 anew
syllabus point,

This case has a remarkably tortured histo-
ry, including factual complexities rendering it
particularly unsuitable for disposition by
summary judgment and writ.of prohibition.
To briefly summarize the salient events, a
construction project by CMD resulted in
damage in 2009 to property owned by Mr.
and Mrs. Barry Evans, The Evanses sued
OMD in, 2011; CMD was insured by State
Auto under a commercial general liability
policy, CMD ultimately filed a third-party
complaint against State Auto in March 2012,
alleging bad faith,! violations of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act by failure to attempt a
good faith settlement, and breach of contract.

The cireuit court denied State Auto's mo-
tion to dismiss in 2012, pendirig resolution of
the underlying claim. Subsequent to four
years of litigation, including an unsuccessful
attempt by State Anto to deny coverage,
State Auto finally resolved the Evanses’ un-
derlying claims against CMD in 2015. State
Auto ‘then filed another motion to dismiss
CMD’s action against it, and the circuit court
once again denied the motion.

State Auto then sought relief from this
Court, through a writ of prohibition; this
Court wisely denied that request in State ew
rel. State Auto Prop. Ins. Companies v.
Stucky, No. 15-1178, 2016 WL 3410352

it in CMD’s third-party complaint regarding the
claim: of the City of Charleston,

1. CMD sought, damages for its economic losses,
attorney's fees, annoyance and inconvenience,
mental anguish, and emotional distress under
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 177
W.Va. 323, 352 8.B,2d 73 (1986). CMD did re-
ceive attorney's fees in the amount of $52,757.54
for prevailing in the June 2012 declaratory judg-
ment action filed by State Auto, wherein it
sought to deny coverage.

(W.Va. June 14, 2016) (hereinafter “Stucky
7”), This Court held that CMD had met its
burden of enumerating sufficient claims for
its first-party bad faith, statutory bad faith,
and breach of contract actions, This Court
found: that CMD had ‘sufficiently pled its
allegations and that State Auto’s motion to
dismiss was properly denied by the circuit
court, We observed “CMD’s third-party com-
plaint against State Auto is a first-party bad
faith action because CMD is suing its own
insurer, State Auto, for’ failing to use good
faith in settling a claim brought against
OMD by the Evanses.” Jd. at *3 (emphasis
supplied), We further noted:

CMD alleged, inter alia, “[als a result of

State Auto not properly handling OMD’s

claim, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint

against CMD and the Shahs for the al-
leged property damage to the Evans prop-
erty.” This states a first-party common law
bad faith claim under our law in that CMD
alleged that its insurer, State Auto, failed
to use good faith in settling a claim by
someone the insured allegedly harmed or
Id, at *4,

Chief Justice Ketchum and Justice Lough-
ry dissented to that decision, Chief Justice
Ketchum opined that CMD could not assert a
loss claim because only damage to the plain-
tiffs’ property was covered, and Justice
Loughry opined that there was no basis for a
first-party bad faith claim because the policy
was “not procured for the purpose of cover-
ing losses directly sustained by the insured.”
Id, at *6-9,

State Auto thereafter filed a motion for
summary judgment in the circuit court, and
that request was denied: The circuit court

2, In the oft-quoted syllabus point four of State ex
rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.B.2d
12 (1996), this Court identified the five factors to
be examined in conjunction with a request for a
writ of prohibition: .

In determining whether to entertain and is-
sue the writ of prohibition for cases not involv-
ing an absence of jurisdiction but only where it
is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its
legitimate powers, this Court will examine five
factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ
has no other adequate means, such as direct
appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2). whether
the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in
a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3)

737

held that CMD had alleged dilatory handling
of the claim, resulting in the filing of a
lawsuit, and had further alleged the absence
of good faith in settling the claim. Thus, the
circuit court held that summary judgment
was inappropriate at that juncture.

In response, State Auto once again sought
this Court’s intervention, requesting a writ
of prohibition and arguing that the circuit
court clearly erred in denying its motion for
summary judgment. I believe the majority's
decision to grant a writ of prohibition is er-
yoneous. First, a writ of prohibition is an ex-
traordinary remedy to be utilized in ex-
tremely limited instances? Despite ‘this
Court’s consistent observation that the writ
“does not lie for errors or grievances which
may be redressed in the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings[,)” the majority permits
State Auto to employ an extraordinary writ
as essentially a substitute for appeal in this
case. County Court v. Boreman, 84 W.Va
362, 366, 12 S.E. 490, 492 (1890), A writ of
prohibition is inappropriate in this case, and
courts should be exceedingly wary of overin-
dulgence’ in extraordinary remedies and
“should sparingly use a- writ: to review an
order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment and limit its use to cases where ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons exist to
warrant such relief.” State ex rel. Speer v.
Grimm, 599 S.W.2d -67, 69 (Mo. Ct. App,
1980). As this Court cautioned in pertinent,
part of syllabus point one of State ex rel.
USF&G v, Canady, 194 W.Va, 481, 460
§.E.2d 677 (1995),

[This Court will use prohibition in this
discretionary ‘way to correct only substan-
tial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in con-

whether the lower tribunal’s order is clearly
erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the
lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error
or manifests persistent disregard for either
procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether
the lower tribunal’s order raises new and im-
portant problems or issues of law of first im-
pression. These factors are general guidelines
that serve as a useful starting point for deter-
mining whether a discretionary writ of prohi-
bition should issue, Although all five factors
need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third
factor, the existence of cléar error as a matter
of law, should be given substantial weight.

738

travention of a clear statutory, constitu-
tional, or common law mandate which may
be resolved independently of any disputed
facts and only in cases where there is a
high probability that the trial will be com-
pletely reversed if the error is not correct-
ed in advance. .

Even if the majority somehow finds it ap-
propriate to reach the merits of the summary
judgment issue via an extraordinary writ, I
find its ultimate conclusions improper. The
moving party, State Auto, had the “burden of
showing that there is no genuine issue of fact
and any doubt as to the existence of such
issue is resolved against the movant for such
judgment.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins, Co., 148 W.Va. 160,
188 S.E.2d 770 (1963) (emphasis supplied). In
granting the writ, the majority references
the axiomatic standard for issuance of a writ,
as enumerated in syllabus point four of Hoo-
ver. See Hoover, 199 W.Va. at 14, 488 S.E.2d
at 14, While the majority does not bother to
evaluate each of the five factors, one can
assume it finds the third factor dispositive; it
considers the circuit court’s denial of sum-
mary judgment clearly erroneous as a matter
of law. I believe this is an inaccurate conclu-
sion by the majority. State Auto asked the
circuit court to grant summary judgment.
Thus, State Auto had the burden of showing
the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, and any doubt was to be resolved in
favor of CMD,

In denying the motion for summary judg-
ment, the circuit court found the existence of
genuine issues of material fact and held:
“After a review of the pleadings, the Motion,
the memoranda, and the evidence presented,
as well as oral argument, the Court finds
that State Auto is not able to overcome the
applicable legal standard for a Rule 56 mo-
tion for Summary Judgment.” Further, the
cireuit court found “that there exist genuine
issues of material fact regarding” CMD’s
claims, The circuit court recognized that the
hillside slippage was reported to State Auto
on March 9, 2009,. and that State Auto was
informed that the slippage was causing prop-
erty damage to the Evanses. As early as
March 26, 2009, State Auto was presented
with a repair estimate of $14,563.50. At the

BO

direction of State Auto, the slip was not
repaired and continued to deteriorate.

According to the circuit court’s recitation
of facts in evidence, State Auto subsequently
hired an independent adjuster, Ken Shaffer,
and an engineer, Darren Franck, for the
purpose of proposing a remedy and resolu-
tion. Despite information presented to State
Auto indicating that the slip had continued to
worsen, had damaged a City of Charleston
sewer line, and had jeopardized a pending
sale of the newly-constructed home, no action
was taken. When Mr, Franck advised State
Auto that a submitted repair estimate should
be approved, State Auto fired Mr. Franck.
By October 2009, Mr. Shaffer also recom-
mended that State Auto approve a repair for
$151,000. State Auto refused the recommen-
dation and fired Mr. Shaffer, State Auto was
again advised that the delays were adversely
affecting CMD and causing damage including
the loss of the sale of the newly-constructed
home and additional interest payments. In
May 2011, counsel for the Evanses submitted
a settlement proposal that was allegedly sub-
stantially lower than the ultimate June 2015
settlement of $825,000. CMD asserts that the
matter could have concluded nearly seven
years earlier for $14,568.50,

The circuit court found this evidence suffi-
tient to warrant denial of State Auto’s sum-
mary judgment motion and reasoned as fol-
lows:

CMD has put forth evidence that State
Auto failed to act in good faith and deal
fairly in regards to the claim. CMD’s evi-
dence includes testimony of C.K. Shah that
the claim could have been resolved but-for
the mismanagement and failure of State
Auto. CMD also has put forth expert testi-
mony from James McQueen, who has
opined that State Auto established a
course of conduct that falls far below in
dustry standard for the handling of a com-
plicated construction claim, and that State
Auto put its own interests ahead of the
interests of its insured policyholder from
the fall of 2009 forward by taking a cover-
age position that was untenable, impracti-
cal, and grossly unfair to Evans and to its
insured.

Additionally, CMD has put forth evi-
dence that State Auto failed to properly
defend and indemnify CMD throughout
the claim process. Such evidence includes
that State Auto failed to properly investi-
gate the claim, failed to propose a remedy
to resolve the Evans claim, failed to
promptly and appropriately approve and
resolve the claim, and failed to hire an
independent lawyer to represent CMD’s
interests in the litigation filed by the Ev-
ans. This Court finds that the duty to
defend and indemnify are not met merely
by providing the insured with an attorney
and ultimately obtaining a a release of the
insured.

The cireuit court relied upon this Court's
definition of a first-party bad faith action as
“one wherein the insured sues his/her own
insurer for failing to use good faith in set-
tling a claim brought against the insured or a
claim filed by the insured.” State of West
Virginia ex rel. Alistate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan,
208 W.Va. 858, 369, 508 S.E.2d 75, 86 (1998).
The circuit court concluded that “CMD prop-
erly has asserted and has presented evidence
to prove a first-party bad faith claim against
State Auto” and further found: “There is no
requirement under West Virginia law that
claims falling under the first type of first-
party bad faith action only arise where there
has been an excess judgment.”

The majority is apparently convinced by
State Auto’s argument. The majority holds:
“On this record, we cannot see any evidence
that State Auto failed to exercise good faith
in meeting its obligations under the commer-
cial general liability insurance policy.” ‘The
majority further finds:

The insured, CMD, was defended and
indemnified by its insurer, State Auto, with
respect to the lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs
as required by the commercial general lia-
bility policy. A settlement was obtained at.
no cost to CMD, and no adverse judgment
was entered in the circuit court. Conse-
quently, this Court is of the opinion that,
as a matter of law, CMD cannot maintain a
first-party action against State Auto for
common law and statutory bad faith and
breach of contract.

739

Thus, the majority implicitly alters the law
without even enunciating a new syllabus
point, suggesting that an insurer has only
two duties under the commercial general lia-
bility policy—provision of a defense and in-
demnification—and that eventual satisfaction
of those two duties precludes any recovery in
a bad faith action.

This over-simplified approach is myopic.
As the circuit court astutely observed, “the
duty to defend and indemnify are not met
merely by providing the insured with an
attorney and ultimately obtaining a release of
the insured.” On this matter’s first appear-
ance in this Court, a majority recognized that
CMD is claiming bad faith in the settlement
process, “for failing to use good faith in set-
tling a claim.” Stucky I, 2016 WL 3410352 at
*3, The majority in the present case draws
the line injudiciously by essentially agreeing
with State Auto’s assertion that provision of
a defense and indemnification are sufficient,
regardless of the manner in which such
things are accomplished. However, paying in
the end may not always be sufficient; an
insurer must also adhere to its duty of good
faith and fair dealing throughout the process,
This is particularly imperative where the in-
sured incurs damages of his own, as a result
of any bad faith or unreasonable delay, in
addition to the amount of indemnification,
The allegations made by the insured below
were that the insurer acted in bad faith in
acknowledging and then denying coverage;
by failing to resolve a claim where liability
was clear for seven years; by causing the
insured to lose the sale of a house that was
affected by the slide, as well as to incur
additional mortgage and finance charges, at-
torney’s fees and other out-of-pocket ex-
penses; by causing the insured to be sued
both in a declaratory relief proceeding
wherein the insured denied coverage after
first acknowledging it and the ultimate civil
action; by firing both an independent adjust-
er and an engineer, each of. whom recom-
mended payment of the claim early on; and
by causing the insured to suffer other conse-
quent damages as the result of the long delay
and obstreperousness of the insurer in failing
to meet its obligations under the insurance
contract in a timely manner, .

740

This Court most assuredly should not be in
the business of resolving factual issues, more
properly left to a jury: The circuit court was
justified in denying summary judgment, and,
viewing the evidence in a light most favor-
able to the tion-moving party, it is obvious
that State Auto did not meet its burden of
demonstrating that no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact exists. We have uniformly held that
a common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing is an essential component of every
insurance relationship. Hlmore v, State Farm
“Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 202 W.Va. 480, 434, 504
S.E.2d 898, 897 (1998) (holding a “common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing in
insurance cases ... runs between insurers
and insureds and is based on the existence of
a contractual relationship”); see also Roehl
Transp. Inc. v, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 325
‘Wis.2d. 56, 784 N.W.2d 542, 552 (2010) (“An
insurance company owes a‘duty to its insured
to settle or compromise a claim made against
the insured and to act in good faith in doing
80,”), ‘ :

+ We have also consistently recognized that
“[a] policyholder buys an insurance contract.
for peace of mind and security, not financial
gain, and certainly not to be embroiled in
litigation. The goal is for all policyholders to
get the benefit of their contractual bar-
gain....” Miller v. Fluharty, 201 W.Va. 685,
694, 500 S.E.2d 810, 319 (1997) (footnote
omitted). “[W]hen an insured purchases a
contract of insurance, he buys insurance—
not a lot of vexatious, time-consuming, ex-
pensive litigation with his insurer.” Hay-
seeds, Ine. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 177
W.Va, 323, 829, 352 S,E.2d 78, 79 (1986); see
also Farmers Grp, Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d
1188, 1141 (Colo. 1984) (“The motivation of
the insured when entering into an insurance
contract differs from that of parties entering
into an ordinary commercial contract. By ob-
taining insuirance, an insured seeks to obtain
some measure of financial security and pro-
tection against. calamity, rather than to se-
cure commercial advantage.... Particularly
when handling claims of third persons that
are brought against the insured, an insurance

3. “The relevant inquiry is whether the facts
pleaded show the absence of any reasonable ba-
sis for denying the claim, ‘ie, would a reason-
able insurer under the circumstances have de-

company stands in a position similar to that
of a fiduciary.” (internal citations omitted)).$
Thus, an insurer should not be permitted to
unjustifiably delay or impede resolution of a
claim in a manner that causes additional
damages to its insured.

Critically, the ultimate financial satisfac-
tion is not singularly dispositive in bad faith
eases. The circuit court’s holding in this re-
gard is thus consistent with prior holdings of
this Court, as well as other jurisdictions. See
Stucky I, 2016 WL 8410852 at *4 (“While this
Court has acknowledged that common law
bad faith claims falling under the first type
above may or often arise where there is an
excess judgment against the insured, we
have not held that such claims can only arise
where there has been an excess judgment.”),
In Goodson v. American Standard Insur-
ance Co. of Wisconsin, 89 P.8d 409 (Colo,
2004), the Supreme Court of Colorado ob-
served that the “basis for tort liability is the
insurer’s conduct in unreasonably refusing to
pay a claim and failing to act’ in good faith,
not the insured’s ultimate financial liability.”
Id. at 414 (internal citations omitted), Conse-
quently, “the fact that an insurer eventually
pays an insured’s claims will not prevent the
insured from filing suit against the.insurer
based on its conduct prior to the time of
payment.” Id, Neither the absence of an
excess judgment nor ultimate settlement for
policy limits is necessarily fatal to an in-
sured’s claim for bad faith. Scottsdale Ins.
Co, v, Addison Ins, Co., 448 8.W.3d 818 (Mo.
2014); see also Roehl, 784 N.W.2d at 553
(addressing insurer’s actions ‘exposing in-
sured to liability for sums within deductible
amount and holding “the breach of duty from
which the tort claim follows is not of any
explicit term of the contractual obligations
but of the implicit duty to act in good faith in
carrying out the insurance contract.”); Trim-
ble, 691 P.2d at 1142 (holding that an actual
judgment in excess of policy limits was not a
necessary prerequisite to liability).”

As the Supreme Court of Kansas accurate-
ly summarized in Bollinger v. Nuss, 202 Kan.
826, 449 P.2d 502 (1969): “In the final analy-

nied or delayed payment of the claim under the
facts and circumstances.’ Trimble, 691 P.2d at
1142 (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins, Co.,
271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978).

sis, the question of liability depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case and
must be determined by: taking into account
the various factors present, rather than on
the basis of any general statement or defini-
tion.” Id. at 511-12. In penning this dissent, I
certainly do not profess to know how a jury
would have resolved the present case or what
the ultimate verdict should have entailed.* I
do, however, vehemently oppose a resolution
via summary judgment awarded by this
Court in the form of the majority’s grant of a
writ of prohibition,

T also find it extremely disconcerting that
this Court has demonstrated an increasingly
frequent penchant for rushing to ultimate
judgment without the full benefit of thorough
proceedings and rulings from the -cireuit
court level. Principles of judicial restraint
would obviously advise against such impetu-
ousness, As I emphasized in my separate
opinion in Morrisey v. West Virginia AFL-
CIO, No, 17-0187, 289 W.Va."638, 804 S.E.2d
888, 2017 WL 4103745 (W.Va, Sept. 15, 2017),
an “appellate court must refrain from adopt-
ing a position that has not been tested ‘in the
crucible of the adversary process[.]” Id. at
*8, 239 W.Va. 688, 804 S,E.2d 888 (Workman,
Justice, concurring in part, and dissenting in
part) (quoting Peter J. Rubin, Keynote Ad-
dress: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A
Judge’s Perspective, 70 Ohio St, L.J, 825, 882
(2009), Discussing the emboldening, yet so-
bering, recognition that courts do indeed
“have the last word,” Justice Rehnquist ob-
served as follows in his dissenit in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 288, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 38
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972):

But just because courts in general, and

this Court in particular, do have the last

word, the admonition of Mr. Justice Stone
dissenting in United States v. Butler must
be constantly borne in mind:
[Whhile unconstitutional exercise of pow-
er by the ‘executive and legislative

4. I also recognize another outstanding issue
which would have benefitted from jury resolu-
tion. State Auto had raised a claim of timeliness
of CMD's bad faith claims. When first confronted
with this assertion in State Auto’s attempt to
dismiss the case on a Rule 12(b) motion, this
Court explained that our “examination of the
pleadings indicates that this is not the type of
case from which only one conclusion may be
drawn regarding the timeliness of CMD’s bad

741

branches of the government is subject to
judicial restraint, the only check upon
our own exercise of power is our own
sense of self-restraint,
Id, at 467 (Rehnquist, Justice, dissenting)
(nternal citations omitted), That sense of
self-restraint must be rigorously observed,
and this Court must be vigilant in wielding
its power wisely. We must not ‘impose, by
judicial fiat, a result that is properly achiev-
able only by allowing the cases to play out on
the stages of the lower courts, While the
majority rushes headlong to judgment, such
action contravenes fundamental principles of
judicial review. By deciding this case on a
factual basis without any guidance on the law
relating to the underlying issue, the majority
preserves their freedom to decide yet anoth-
er case on another day with similar issues
differently, if they please, and leaves the law
in this arena very murky,
Based upon the foregoing, T resolutely dis-

sent. I am authorized to state that Justice

Davis joins mé in this separate opinion.

806 S.E.2d 172

STATE of West Virginia EX REL.,
Patrick MORRISEY, Attorney
General, Respondent
ve
COPPER BEECH TOWNHOME
COMMUNITIES TWENTY-SIX, *
LLC, et al., Petitioner .

No. 17-0228

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: October 8, 2017
Filed: October 12, 2017

faith claims. For this reason, we find no merit to
State Auto’s timeliness argument.” Stucky I,
2016 WL. 3410352 at *5, This Court also ob-
served, in Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc., 199
‘W.Va, 706, 487 §.B.2d 901 (1997), that “[iIn the
great majority of cases, the issue of whether a
claim is barrell by the statute of limitations is a
question of fact for the jury.” Id. at 714-15, 487
$.B.2d at 909-10,

M. David Griffith, Jr. Esq., Joseph K.
Merical, Esq. Thomas Combs & Spann,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Thomas M., Johnson, Jr., Esq., Deputy Solici-
tor General, Evica N, Peterson, Esq., Assis-

tant Attorney General, Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, Counsel for the Respondent.

W. Bradley Sorrells, Esq., Robinson &
McElwee, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, The West Virgi-
nia Association of Realtors, Inc,

Samuel H. Simon, Esq., Matthew J. Laut-
man, Esq., Houston Harbaugh, P.C., Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, Counsel for Amicus Cu-
riae, North Central West Virginia Landlords
Association, Inc. d/b/a North Central West
Virginia Business Owners Association

John R. Teare, Jr., Esq., Spilman Thomas
& Battle, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Amicus Curiae, The West Virgi-
nia Housing Institute, Inc.

Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Esq., WVU
Litigation & Advocacy Clinic, Carrie Ann
Showalter, Esq., WVU Student Legal Ser-
vices, Morgantown, West Virginia, Counsel
for Amici Curiae, WVU Litigation & Advoca-
cy Clinie and WVU Student Legal Services

Mare E, Williams, Esq., Randy L. Saun-
ders, Eisq., Alexander L, Turner, Esq., Nel-
son Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP,
Huntington, West Virginia, Counsel for Ami-
cus Curiae, The Defense Trial Counsel of
West Virginia

Matthew A. Jividen, Esq., Paul R. Sheri-
dan, Esq., Legal Aid of West Virginia, Mar-
tinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Amicus
Curiae, Legal Aid of West Virginia

Mark A. Kepple, Esq., Bailey & Wyant,
PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, Counsel for
Amicus Curiae, Metro Property Management

Justice Ketchum:

In this matter we address whether our
consumer credit protection statute applies to
and regulates the relationship between a
landlord and tenant under a lease for resi-
dential real property. The Circuit Court of

1. The Legislature has granted to the Attorney
General the authority to bring civil actions to
enforce our Consumer Credit and Protection Act.
See W.Va. Code § 46A-7-108 [1974] (‘The attor-
ney general may bring a civil action to restrain a
person from violating this chapter and for other
appropriate relief”),

2, The Attorney General's complaint names Cop-
per Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six,

743

Kanawha County certified a question to this
Court to resolve this issue.

After thorough review, we find that our
consumer credit protection statute does not
regulate the residential rental fees a landlord
may charge pursuant to a residential lease.
We therefore answer the certified question in
the negative. .

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this matter are brief
and undisputed. In September 2015, the At-
torney General of West Virginia (“Attorney
General”), acting on behalf of the State,! filed
a civil action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County against a landlord, Copper Beech
Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC
(“Defendant Landlord”)? Defendant Land-
lord is one of the largest residential lessors
in the state. It maintains a number of rental
units in Morgantown, West Virginia.

The Attorney General’s complaint alleged
that Defendant Landlord’s residential leases
included various fees and charges that violat-
ed the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-1-101 e¢
seq. [1974] (“COPA”). According to the Attor-
ney General, the fees contained in Defendant
Landlord's leases that violate the CCPA in-
clude: 1) a non-refundable redecorating fee,
2) debt collection fees, 3) attorney’s fees, 4)
dishonored check fees, 5) multiple check fees
when co-tenants pay rent with more than one
check, 6) a fee for written receipts, and 7) a
fee for late payment of monthly rent, The
Attorney General’s complaint alleged that
these fees violated two main provisions of the
CCPA: 1) the debt collection provisions as
set forth in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -
129a, and 2) the unfair and deceptive acts
and practices provisions contained in W.Va.
Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106. The Attorney

LLC and Copper Beech Townhome Communities
Twenty-Six SPE, LLC as defendants. As noted in
Copper Beech’s brief, these two defendants “are
separate legal entities, [however] this separate
identity is not material for purposes of this certi-
fied question.” For ease of the reader, we refer to
these two named defendants collectively as “De-
fendant Landlord.”

744,

General’s complaint sought an “injunction,
consumer restitution, disgorgement, civil
penalties, and other appropriate relief.” ;
Defendant Landlord filed a motion to dis-
' miss the Attorney General’s complaint, argu-
ing that the CCPA does not apply to residen-
tial leases. After the circuit court denied this
motion, Defendant Landlord moved the.cir-
cuit court to certify a question to this Court
regarding the application of the CCPA to
residential leases of real property. On March
8, 2017, the cireuit court certified the follow-
ing question to this Court: “Does the West
Virginia Consumer Crédit and Protection Act
(including W.Va, Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a
and §§ 46A-6-101 to’-106) apply to the rela~
tionship between a landlord and tenant under
@ lease for residential rental property?” ®
Thereafter, this Court accepted the certified
question.! :

Ii, STANDARD OF REVIEW

I As this Court recognized in Syllabus
Point 1 of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996), “[t]he
appellate standard of review of questions of
law answered and certified by a circuit court
is de novo.” Applying this plenary standard
of review, we proceed to address the certified
question.

Il. ANALYSIS

Before addressing the specific certified
question, we begin with a brief background
discussion of the COPA, It was “enacted in
1974 and is a hybrid of the Uniform Consum-
er Credit Code and the National Consumer
Act and some sections from then-existing
West Virginia law.” “White v. Wyeth, 227
W.Va. 181, 186, 705 S.E.2d 828, 888 (2010)
(internal citation omitted), This Court has
observed that the purpose underlying the
CCPA is as follows: “We have recognized the
dual legislative purposes of protecting con-
sumers and promoting sound and fair busi-
ness practices.” Id., 227 W.Va. at 189, 705

3, The circuit court answered this question “Yes.”

4, We acknowledge the contribution of the nu-
merous amici curiae briefs filed with this Court.
We value their contributions to this case and
have considered their briefs in conjunction with
the parties’ arguments,

ee
'S.E.2d at 836, Further, this Court has stated

that the CCPA “is a comprehensive attempt
on the part of the West Virginia legislature
to extend protection to consumers and per-
sons who obtain credit in state.” Harper v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W.Va, 142, 151, 706
8.B.2d 63, 72 (2010).

Additionally, the purpose of the CCPA was
described in an excellent law review article
by WVU Law School Professor Vincent Car-
di® wherein he stated:

The West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act is intended to: (1) increase
the availability of consumer credit by rais-
ing allowable finance charges (interest .
rates) and move toward equalization of
rates available to consumers whether they
borrow the money from a lender or buy
the goods on credit from a seller; (2) regu-
late the rate of finance charges allowed for
consumer credit transactions by prescrib-
ing rates and rules for computation; (8)
regulate those businesses which make
small consumer loans and which were for-
merly regulated by the small loan act; (4)
protect consumers who purchase goods or
services on credit or through consumer
loans from deceptive selling techniques,
unconscionable contract terms, and unde-
sirable debt recovery and collection prac-
tices; and (5) protect consumers who pur-
chase goods or services for cash or credit
from, and to give them remedies for, defec-
tive or shoddy goods and services and
. unfair and deceptive selling practices.

V. Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Cred-
it and Protection Act, 77 W.Va. L. Rev. 401,
402 (1974-75).

In researching the background and pur-
pose underlying the CCPA, we have found no
reported West Virginia cases, law review ar-
ticles, or secondary sources stating that the
purpose, or even a purpose, of the Act is to
regulate fees that a landlord may charge to a
tenant pursuant to a residential lease. In

5. This Court has noted that Professor Cardi is the
“foremost expert in this area of the law[.]” State
ex rel. McGraw v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 217
W.Va, 573, 577, 618 S.E.2d 582, 586 (2005).

fact, in the forty-three years since the CCPA
was enacted, this case is the first occasion’ in
which any party has asserted before. this
Court that the Act applies to and regulates
the landlord-tenant relationship,

With this background in mind, we turn to
the specific certified question before us:
“Does the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act (including W.Va. Code
§§ 46A-2-122 to -129a and §§ 46A-6-101 to -
106) apply to the relationship between a land-
lord and tenant under a lease for residential
rental property?” As highlighted by the cir-
cuit court in its formulation of the certified
question, our resolution of this matter re-
quires us to examine two statutory sections
contained in the CCPA: the debt collection
provisions contained in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-
2-122 to -129a, and the unfair or deceptive
acts or practices provisions contained ‘in
‘W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106,

The Attorney General asserts that we
should answer the certified question in the
affirmative and conclude that the CCPA ap-
plies to a residential lease entered into by a
landlord and tenant. According to the Attor-
ney General, the CCPA was written to
“broadly [and] unambiguously apply to many
different categories of people ... including
landlords.” Further, regarding the specific
statutory sections at issue, the Attorney Gen-
eral asserts:

* Under the plain meaning of the debt

collection provisions, ‘a tenant is a constim-

er, a landlord is a debt collector, and the
tenant’s obligation to pay charges and fees
to the landlord constitutes a debt. Accord-
ingly, a landlord is prohibited from using
unfair and unconscionable means in order
to collect any debt owed. Under the unfair

or deceptive acts or practices provisions, a

Jandlord engages in a trade or commerce

and is prohibited from using unfair or de-

ceptive acts or practices,

By contrast, Defendant Landlord argues
that neither the debt collection provisions,
nor the deceptive practices provisions of the
Act apply to residential leases. Defendant

6. For ease of the reader, the arguments con-
tained in the numerous amici briefs arguing
against the Attorney General’s position are attrib-
uted to “Defendant Landlord,”

745

Landlord asserts that the COPA is “designed
to prohibit creditors from taking advantage
of consumers in various transactions.”® A
landlord’s business of renting residential
property to a tenant is not the type of con-
duct regulated by the CCPA according to
Defendant Landlord. . Instead, “residential
leases are already subject to extensive statu-
tory and regulatory oversight ... and the
specific fees [the Attorney General] takes
issue with are already addressed by other
statutes.”" Stated simply, Defendant Land-
lord asserts that the CCPA was not written
or designed to apply to the landlord-tenant
relationship. Defendant Landlord notes that
“in the forty-two years since it was adopted,
the [CCPA] has not been treated as applying
to residential-landlord-tenant relationships.”
Finally, Defendant Landlord argues that the
Attorney General’s position, if adopted,
“would inject uncertainty and instability into
the West Virginia residential rental market.”

We begin our analysis of the CCPA with.a
review, of our rules of statutory construction,
This Court has held that in deciding the
meaning of a statutory provision, “[w]e look
first to the statute’s language. If the text,
given its plain meaning, answers the inter-
pretive question, the language must prevail
and further inquiry is foreclosed.” Appala-
chian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't of West
Virginia, 195 W.Va. 578, 587, 466 S.E.2d 424,
488 (1995); see also Syllabus Point 2, Crockett
v Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.H.2d 884
(1970) (“Where the language of a statute is
free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to
be accepted and applied .without resort to
interpretation.”); and Syllabus Point 2, State
v. Epperly, 185 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488
(1951) (‘A statutory provision which is clear
and unambiguous and plainly expresses the
legislative intent will not be interpreted by
the courts but will be given full force and
effect.”),, oe

Additionally, this Court has held that'“[a]
statute is open to construction only where
the language used requires interpretation be-
cause of ambiguity which renders it suscepti-

7, We discuss these statutes later in our analysis.
See infra Til. A.

746

ble of two or more constructions or of such
doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to
its meaning.” Sizemore v, State Farm Gen.
Ins, Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 505 S.H.2d 654,
659 (1998) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). With these rules of statutory con-
struction in mind, we first turn to the debt
collection provisions contained in the CCPA.
A. Debt Collection Provisions

The debt collection provisions are set forth
in article 2 of the CCPA, W.Va. Code
§§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, The debt collection
provisions state that “[nJo debt collector shall
use any fraudulent, deceptive or misleading
representation or means to collect ...
claims[.]” W.Va. Code § 46A-2-127. Addition-
ally, W.Va. Code § 46A-2-128 provides that.
“{nJo debt collector may use unfair or uncon-
Scionable means to collect or attempt to col-
lect any claim.”

While the CCPA contains a “general defi-
nitions” section in article 1, the debt collec-
tion provisions in article 2 contain additional
definitions specifically for the purposes of
debt collection. These specific definitions are
set forth in W. Va. Code § 46A-2-122:

(a) “Consumer” means any natural person
obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any
debt.
(b) “Claim” means any obligation or al-
leged obligation of a consumer to pay mon-
ey arising out of a transaction in which the
money, property, insurance or service
which is the subject of the transaction is
primarily for personal, family or household
purposes, whether or not such obligation
has been reduced to judgment.

(c) “Debt collection” means any action,

conduct or practice of soliciting claims for

collection or in the collection of claims
owed or due or alleged to be owed or due
by a consumer,

(d) “Debt collector” means any person or

organization engaging directly or indirectly

in debt collection. The term includes any
person or organization who sells or offers
to sell forms which are, or are represented
to be, a collection system, device or
scheme, and are intended or calculated to
be used to collect claims. The term ex-
eludes attorneys representing creditors

provided the attorneys are licensed in
West Virginia or otherwise authorized to
practice law in the State of West Virginia
and handling claims and collections in their
own name as an employee, partner, mem-
ber, shareholder or owner of a law firm
and not operating a collection agency un-
der the management of a person who is not
a licensed attorney.

The issue we must resolve is whether a
residential rental fee charged by a landlord,
such as a fee for late payment of rent, may
be properly characterized as a “claim” under
W.Va, Code § 46A-2-122(b).

The Attorney General argues that the
broad language used in the foregoing defini-
tions signals the legislature’s intent that
these debt collection provisions apply to any-
one, including a landlord, who attempts to
collect a “claim” from a consumer. Further,
the Attorney General asserts that “the
charges and fees a tenant owes to a landlord
constitute claims” under the foregoing defini-
tion because a claim is “any obligation or
alleged obligation of a consumer to pay mon-
ey arising out of a transaction.” The Attorney
General asserts that a tenant is a consumer
and that the broad meaning of the word
“transaction” extends to residential leases.

Conversely, Defendant Landlord argues
that the debt collection provisions do not
apply to landiord-tenant relationships. Defen-
dant Landlord emphasizes that residential
lease agreements are not specifically ad-
dressed in the debt collection provisions. If,
as the Attorney General claims, the legisla-
ture intended these provisions to apply to
residential leases of real property, it would
have done so explicitly.

Upon. our review, we find that the debt
collection provisions in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-
2-122 to -129a are reasonably susceptible to
differing constructions and that “reasonable
minds might be uncertain or disagree as to
its intended meaning.” Sizemore, 202 W.Va. -
at 596, 505 S.H.2d at 659, As the Attorney
General points out, the definition of “claims”
is written in a broad manner and includes
“any obligation or alleged obligation of a
consumer to pay money arising out of a
transaction in which the money, property,

insurance or service which is the subject of
the transaction is primarily for personal,
family or household purposes.” W.Va. Code
§ 46A-2-122(b). On the other hand, the debt
collection provisions make no mention of resi-
dential leases, landlords, tenants, or include
any language signaling that these provisions,
though broadly drafted, were intended to
cover residential rental fees a landlord may
charge. Therefore, we conclude that these
provisions are ambiguous.

MN When faced with an ambiguous
statute, this Court has observed “[a] statute
that is ambiguous must be construed before
it can be applied.” Syllabus Point 1, Farley v.
Buckalew, 186 W.Va, 698, 414 S.H.2d 454
(1992). “The primary object in construing a
statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus Point 1,
Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r,
159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 861 (1975). “A
statute is ambiguous when the statute’s lan-
guage connotes doubtfulness, doubleness of
meaning or indistinctness or uncertainty of

an expression[.]” United Services Auto. Ass’n -

v. Lucas, 233 W.Va. 68, 78, 754 S.B.2d 754,
759 (2014) (internal citation and quotation
omitted), Similarly, this Court has held that
“the initial step in such interpretative inquiry
[of a statute] is to ascertain legislative in-
tent.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Ohio County
Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 301
S.E.2d 183 (1988). Also, “[w]hen a statute’s
language is ambiguous, a court often must
venture into extratextual territory in order to
distill an appropriate construction. Absent
explicatory legislative history for an ambigu-
ous statute ... this Court is obligated to
consider the ... overarching design of the
statute.” State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Run-
yan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 777,
461 'S.H.2d 516, 528 (1995).

In attempting to ascertain the legislative
intent behind the debt collection provisions,

8. “Statutes which relate to the same subject mat-
ter should be read and applied together so that
the Legislature’s intention can be gathered from
the whole of the enactments,” Syllabus Point 3,
Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Com’,
159 W.Va, 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

9. We note that the definition of a “consumer
credit sale” includes a “sale of ... an interest in
land.” “Consumer credit sale” is defined in

TAT

we note that the CCPA is made up of eight
distinct articles.’ We place particular reliance
on article 1 of the CCPA which includes a
statement setting forth the Act’s general “ap-
plication” anda series of general definitions.
Thus, in order to understand the legislative
intent of the debt collection provisions con-
tained in the CCPA, we begin by examining
article 1, West Virginia Code § 46A-1-104
[1996], entitled “Application,” provides as fol-
lows:

(1) This chapter applies if a consumer,
who is a resident of this state, is induced to
enter into a consumer credit sale made
pursuant to a revolving charge account, to
enter into a revolving.charge account, to
enter into a consumer loan made pursuant
to a revolving loan account, or to enter into
a consumer lease, by personal or mail so-
licitation, and the goods, services or pro-
ceeds are delivered to the consumer in this
state, and payment on such account is to
be made from this state.

(2) With respect to consumer credit sales
or consumer loans consummated in anoth-
er state; a creditor may not collect in an
action brought in this state a sales finance
charge or loan finance charge in excess of
that permitted by this chapter.

Under this general statement of applicabil-
ity, three elements need to be satisfied for
the CCPA to apply: 1) a creditor-2) induces a,
consumer 8) to enter into a consumer credit
sale, a consumer loan, or a consumer lease.
Under article 1’s general definitions, a con-
sumer is defined as “a natural person who
incurs debt pursuant to a consumer credit
sale or a consumer loan, or debt or other
obligations pursuant to a consumer’ lease.”
W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(12). A general lease
of residential real property could not proper-
ly be characterized as either a “consumer
credit sale” ® or as a “consumer loan.” (Em-

W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(13), in relevant part, as
follows: “ ‘[Clonsumer credit sale’ is a sale of
goods, ‘services or an interest in land in which:
++ (ii) The goods, services or interest in land
are purchased primarily for a personal, family,
household or agricultural purpose[,]” While the
definition of “consumer credit sale” includes a
sale of an interest in land, it does not apply to a
general residential lease agreement. According to
W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(42), a “sale of an inter-

748

phasis added), The only potential category a
residential lease of real property could fit
. into is‘a “consumer lease.” However, W.Va.
Code § 46A-1-102(14)(a) provides that a
“consumer lease means a lease of goods{.]”
(Emphasis added.) Clearly, a residential
lease of real property made between a land-
lord and a tenant is not “a lease of goods.” 19

‘We emphasize that neither the CCPA’s
general “application” and defitlitions con-
tained in article 1, nor the debt collection
provisions at’ issue in article 2, include any
indication that the CCPA applies to a resi-
dential lease of real property. By contrast,
our legislature has enacted extensive, de-
tailed statutory law regulating the landlord-
tenant relationship, West Virginia Code
§§ 37-6-1 to -30 [1928] provides eaplicit stat-
utory direction on our landlord-tenant law.
The title of this section is “Landlord and
Tenant.” The “Landlord and Tenant” section
is contained in the “Real Property” chapter
of the West Virginia Code, See W.Va. Code
§§ 87-1-1 e& seq. [2008]. Additionally, W.Va.
Code §§ 87-6A-1 to -6 [2011], entitled “Resi-
dential Rental Security Deposits,” which is
also included in the “Real Property” chapter
of the West Virginia Code, provides the fol-
lowing ewplicit direction: “The provisions of
this article shall apply to all residential rental
premises or units used for dwelling pur-
poses.” W.Va. Code § 37-6A-6, Other statuto-
ry sections that explicitly apply to and regu-
late the landlord-tenant relationship include
W.Va. Code §§ 55-8-1 et seq. [1928] (unlawful
entry); W.Va. Code §§ 55-4-1 et seg. [1923]
(concerning the procedure for ejectment of a
tenant); W.Va. Code §§ 55-BA-1 et seg. [1983]
(concerning remedies for wrongful occupa-

est in land” is defined as applying to “a lease in
which the lessee has an option to purchase the
interest and all or a substantial part of the rental
or other payments previously made by him are
applied to the purchase price.” The issue in the
present case does not involve leases in which the
lessee had an option to. purchase the “interest.”

10.' ‘Goods’ includes goods not in existence at

, the time the transaction is entered into and gift
and merchandise certificates, but excludes mon-
ey, chattel paper, documents of title and instru-
ments.” W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(21).

11, West Virginia Code § 46A-6-109(a) is as fol-
lows:

tion of residential property); and W.Va. Code
§§ 87-15-1 et seg. [1998] (concerning “facto-
ry-built homes ... which are held as person-
al property situated on real property owned
by another in conjunction with a land-
lord/tenant relationship.”).

Because the landlord-tenant relationship is
so pervasively regulated in these numerous
statutory sections outside of the CCPA, we
are compelled to conclude that the legislature
did not intend to further regulate the land-
lord-tenant relationship in an ambiguous pro-
vision of our COPA, Instead, based on the
foregoing statutory sections, it is clear that
when the legislature intends to address the
relationship between a landlord and tenant in
a particular statute, it does so explicitly.

Further illustrating this point is the fact
that the CCPA includes one explicit refer-
ence to “the rental of space to be occupied
for residential purposes.” West Virginia Code
§ 46A-6-109 [1981] provides that a written
agreement a consumer enters into must be
written in plain language. This section explic-
itly includes written agreements concerning
“the rental of spacé to be occupied for resi-
dential purposes.” This inclusion of “rental
space to be occupied for residential pur-
poses” in one subsection of the CCPA dem-
onstrates that when the legislature intends
residential leases to be included into a partic-
ular section of the CCPA, it does so explicit-
ly. Critically, the debt collection provisions at
issue, as well as the CCPA’s statement of
general applicability contained in article 1, do
not include any similar language covering
“the rental of space to be occupied for resi-
dential purposes.”

(a) Every written agreement entered into by a
consumer after the first day of April, one thou-
sand nine hundred eighty-two, for the pur-
chase or lease of goods ot services in consum-
er transactions, whether for the rental of space
to be occupied for residential purposes or for
the sale of goods or services for personal, fami-
ly, household or agricultural purposes, must:
(1) Be written in a clear and coherent manner,
using words with common and everyday mean-
ings; (2) use type of an easily readable size and
ink which adequately contrasts with the paper;
and (3) be appropriately organized and cap-
tioned by its various sections to be easily un-
derstood,

HM If the legislature intends for the
CCPA to generally regulate fées a landlord
may charge pursuant to a lease of residential
property, it is free to do so by means of the
full legislative process, However, this Court
may not read into the CCPA that which it
does not say.” “It is not for this Court
arbitrarily to read into a statute that which it
does not say. Just as courts are not to elimi-
nate through judicial interpretation words
that were purposely included, we are obliged
not to add to statutes something the Legisla-
ture purposely omitted.” Syllabus Point 11,
Brooke B. v. Ray, 230 W.Va. 855, 788 S.E.2d
21 (2018).

Moreover, a number of states outside of
our jurisdiction have. determined that their
consumer credit protection statutes are not
applicable to residential leases, concluding
that such residential leases are within the
purview of their specific landlord-tenant acts
which ewplicitly regulate and apply to land-
lord-tenant relationships. For instance, in
finding that its consumer credit protection
act did not regulate and apply to residential
leases of real property, the Supreme Court of
Washington noted the harm that could occur
if the court, rather than the legislature, were
to extend the act to cover the landlord-tenant.
relationship:

There is a marked difference between
the judicial and legislative processes of
inclusion and exclusion of activities under
the Consumer Protection Act. In the legis-
lative process, the people engaged in the
activity sought to be specifically included

12. We agree with the Attorney General that the
CCPA “is a remedial statute intended to protect
consumers from unfair, illégal and deceptive
business practices, and must be liberally con-
strued to accomplish that purpose.” Harper v.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 WNa. 142, 151, 706
S.E.2d 63, 72 (2010). However, we may not read
into the statute that which it does not say—that
the CCPA generally applies to and regulates resi-
dential leases of real property entered into by a
landlord and tenant. Similarly, we find the Attor-
ney General's reliance on Fleet v. Webber Springs
Owners Ass’n, Inc., 235 W.Va. 184, 772 S.E.2d
369 (2015), to be misplaced. In Fleet this Court
determined that “[h]omeowners association as-
sessments that are to be used for improving
and/or maintaining. commoh areas of a planned
community ... are an obligation primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, and,
therefore, such assessments are ‘claims’ pursuant

749

. within the act have the full opportunity to
be heard and to have their particular prob-
lems considered at legislative hearings.
Furthermore, the merits of any such pro-
posed inclusion are subject to debate and
amendment in legislative committees and
on the floor of the respective houses of the
Legislature.

The judicial process, onthe other hand,
does not always provide equivalent oppor-
tunities. In the present case, for example,
the State Attorney General’s Office repre-
sents the interests of the public (and indi-
rectly the rights of the individual tenants),
whereas the landlord appearing pro se rep-
resents himself in a case which potentially
affects every person in the state who rents
out or ever will rent out one or more
dwelling units.

State v. Schwab, 108 Wash.2d 542, 547-48,
698 P.2d 108, 111 (1985),

We agree with this reasoning and analysis.
In fact, in Syllabus Point 2 of Huffman v.
Goals Coal Co., 223 W.Va. 724, 679 S.H.2d
828 (2009), this Court held:

This Court does not sit as a superlegisla-
ture, commissioned to pass upon the politi-
eal, social, economic or scientific merits of
statutes pertaining to proper subjects of
legislation. It is the duty of the Legislature
to consider facts, establish policy, and em-
body that policy in legislation. It is the
duty of this Court to enforce legislation
unless it runs afoul of the State or Federal
Constitutions.

to W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b) (1996).” Syllabus
Point 2, in part. The Court in Fleet only ad-
dressed homeowners association assessment
fees, it did not address whether the debt collec-
tion provisions of the CCPA apply to landlord-
tenant relationships. Further, unlike our land-
Jord-tenant law, homeowners association assess-
ment fees are not pervasively regulated in nu-
merous statutory sections outside of the CCPA.

13, See Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates,
LLC, 249 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2011); Childs v.
Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 237-39 (D.C. 2005); Webb v.
Theriot, 704 So.2d 1211 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1997); Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1 (Utah 1996);
Heritage Hills, Ltd. v Deacon, 49 Ohio St.3d 80,
551 N.E,2d 125 (1990); Chelsea Plaza Homes,
Ino. v, Moore, 226 Kan. 430, 601 P.2d 1100
(1979),

750

Therefore, we find that if our CCPA is
extended to apply to the landlord-tenant re-
lationship, it should be accomplished through
the legislative process, which entails that all
interested parties, including ail landlords and
tenants who wish to be heard, be given the
right to have their concerns addressed and
considered. .

Finally, in construing the debt collection
provisions, we are mindful that the overall

purpose of the CCPA, as articulated by Pro- *

fessor Cardi, supports the conclusion that the
Act was not intended to apply to residential
leases of real property. As noted, the CCPA
has been in effect since 1974 and this Court
has not considered a single case during the
intervening forty-three years in which a par-
ty has claimed that fees charged pursuant to
a lease of residential real property violated
the CCPA.

Hl Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that the debt collection provisions contained
in article 2 of the CCPA, W.Va. Code
§§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, do not apply to and
regulate the fees a landlord may charge a
tenant pursuant to a lease of residential real
property.

B. Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices Provisions

We now address the unfair or deceptive
acts or practices provisions (“deceptive prac-
tices provisions”) contained in article 6 of the
CCPA, W.Va, Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106,
Relevant to our inquiry, W.Va. Code § 46A-
6-104 provides: “Unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby declared unlawful.” As with the debt
collection provisions contained in article 2,
article 6 contains a set of definitions specifi-
cally applicable to the deceptive practices
provisions. West Virginia Code § 46A-6-
102(6) sets forth the following definition:
“‘Tyade’ or ‘commerce’ means the advertis-
ing, offering for sale, sale or distribution of
any goods or services and shall include any
tradé or commerce, directly or indirectly,
affecting the people of this state.” (Emphasis
added). The key inquiry is whether a residen-
tial lease of real property made’ between a
landlord and tenant can be characterized as a

“good or service” under the definition con-
tained in W.Va. Code § 46A-6-102(6).

While article 6 does not contain specific
definitions of “goods” or “services,” those
terms are defined in article 1 in the CCPA’s
general definitions section. “ ‘Goods’ includes
goods not in existence at the time the trans-
action is entered into and gift and merchan-
dise certificates, but excludes money, chattel
paper, documents of title and instruments.”
W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(21). “ ‘Services’ in-
eludes: (a) Work, labor and other personal
services; (b) privileges with respect to trans-
portation, use of vehicles, hotel and restau-
rant accommodations, education, entertain-
ment, recreation, physical culture, hospital
accommodations, funerals, cemetery accom-
modations, and the like; and (c) insurance.”
W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(47).

The Attorney General argues that a resi-
dential lease of real property is a package of
“goods or services” and that it therefore is
included in the deceptive practices provisions
of the CCPA. In support of this argument,
the Attorney General cites this Court’s ruling
in Teller v. McCoy, 162 W.Va. 367, 258
S.H.2d 114 (1978), arguing that the Court
concluded that a residential lease is a con-
tract for a bundle of goods and services. By
contrast, Defendant Landlord asserts that
the legislature chose to define “trade” and
“commerce” narrowly and that it limited ap-
plication of the deceptive practices provisions
to transactions involving goods and services.
Defendant Landlord further argues that had
the legislature intended to include residential
leases in the deceptive practices provisions of
the CCPA, it would have done so explicitly.

This Court has previously construed the
deceptive practices provisions contained in
the CCPA. In State ex rel. McGraw v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., Inc., 217 W.Va. 578, 576-77,
618 S.E.2d 582, 585-86 (2005), this Court
noted:

We are guided herein by our previous
recognition that W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104
is among the most ambiguous provisions of
the consumer protection act. See McFoy v.
Amerigas, Inc., 170 W.Va. 526, 529, 295
S.E.2d 16, 19 (1982) (stating that “Code,
46A-6-104 [1974] is among the most broad-

ly drawn provisions contained in the Con-

sumer Credit and Protection Act and it is

also among the most ambiguous”).

I Having previously determined that
W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104 is ambiguous, we
again recognize that “[a] statute that is am-
biguous must be construed before it ean be
applied.” Farley, Syllabus Point 1. As with
our analysis of the debt collection provisions
of the CCPA, we find that an examination of
the Act as a whole reveals that the deceptive
practices provisions do not apply to and reg-
ulate residential leases of real property en-
tered into by a landlord and tenant.

In concluding that the deceptive practices
provisions do not apply to and regulate resi-
dential leases of real property, we are guided
by five main points, many of which are simi-
Jar to our debt collection analysis in the
previous section. While we need not repeat,
that analysis at length, the reasons underly-
ing our conclusion are as follows. First,
W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106 does not
include any ewplicit direction stating that the
deceptive practices provisions apply to the
landlord-tenant relationship. Second, it is
clear that when the legislature intends for a
particular statute to apply to the landlord-
tenant relationship, it does so explicitly. See
W.Va. Code §§ 87-6-1 to -80; W.Va. Code
§§ 37-6A-1 to -6, W.Va. Code §§ 55-3-1 et
seq.; W.Va. Code §§° 55-4-1 et seq; W.Va.
Code §§ 55-3A-1 e¢ seg.; and W.Va. Code
§§ 87-15-1 et seq. Third, the origin, history,
and purposes of the CCPA, previously dis-
cussed, indicate that it was not intended to
generally apply to and regulate residential
leases of real property entered into by a
landlord and tenant. Indeed, in the forty-
three years since the CCPA was enacted,
there have been no cases before this Court in
which a party has asserted that the deceptive
practices provisions regulate and apply to
residential leases of real property. Next, we
find that the legislature may amend the de-
ceptive practices provisions and decide to
explicitly include residential leases in this
section. However, it is not for this Court to
arbitrarily read into the deceptive practices
provisions that which it does not say.

Finally, we find that the Attorney Gener-
al’s reliance on our ruling in Teller is mis-

751

placed. In Teller, the Court found that a
residential lease is a contract and that, as a
matter of contract law, there is an implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases.
To that end, the Court held in Syllabus Point
1 of Teller that “[t]here is, in a written or
oral lease of residential premises, an implied
warranty that the landlord shall at the com-
mencement of a tenancy deliver the dwelling
unit and surrounding premises in a fit and
habitable condition and shall thereafter main-
tain the leased property in such condition.”
The implied warranty of habitability is set
forth by statute in the “Landlord and Ten-
ant” section of our law concerning “Real
Property.” See W.Va, Code § 37-6-30. The
Court in Teller made clear that a residential
lease is “both a conveyance and a contract.”
162 W.Va. at 383, 253 S.E.2d at 124. The
Court did not hold that a residential lease
was a “good” or a “service.” In fact, the
Court noted that in implying a warranty of
habitability into a residential lease, “[w]e in-
tend in no way to change statutory, common
law, or case law definitions of ‘real property,’
nor are we today altering the law on recorda-
tion, descent, conveyancing, creditors’ rights,
ete.” 162 W.Va, at 384 n.18, 253 S.E.2d at 125
n13.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the deceptive practices provisions contained
in article 6 of the ‘CCPA, W.Va. Code
§§ 46A-6-101 to -106, do not apply to and
regulate the fees a landlord may charge a
tenant pursuant to a lease of residential real
property.

C. Certified Question Answered.

Finally, we return to the certified question:
“Does the West Virginia Consumer Credit
and Protection Act (including W.Va. Code
§§ 46A-2-122 to -129a and §§ 46A-6-101 to -
106) apply to the relationship between a land-
lord and tenant under a lease for residential
rental property?” Based on all of the forego-
ing, we answer this question in the negative
and conclude that the CCPA does not apply
to the relationship between a landlord and
tenant under a lease for residential real
property. We therefore hold that the debt
collection provisions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-
122 to -129a, and deceptive practices provi-
sions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106, both

152

contained: in the West Virginia Consumer
Credit and Protection Act, do not apply to
and regulate the fees a landlord may charge
to a tenant pursuant to a lease of residential
real property.!4

IV. CONCLUSION
We answer the certified question in the
negative. .
Certified Question Answered.

806 S.E.2d 183

Patricia S. REED, Commissioner,
Division of Motor Vehicles,
Petitioner

ve
George ZIPF, Respondent «
No. 16-0132
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
Submitted: October 4, 2017
Filed: October 12, 2017

14. Our answer to the certified question includes
the following caveat—the CCPA does not gener-
ally apply to the relationship between a landlord
and ‘tenant under a lease for residential’ real
“property, However, according to the explicit lan-

guage contained in W.Va. Code § 46A-6-109(a),
written lease agreements “for the rental of space
to be occupied for residential purposes,” are
required to be written according to the plain
language requirements of that statute.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Janet E, James, Esq., Senior Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner

William O. Merriman, Jr., Esq., Parkers-
burg, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respon-
dent

753
Justice Ketchum:

George Zipf was arrested ‘at a sobriety
cheékpoint for driving under the influence of
alcohol. Based on his arrest, the Department.
of Motor Vehicles [DMV] revoked his driv-
er’s license, Mr, Zipf objected to his driver’s
license revocation, and he requested a hear-
ing before the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings [OAH].

The OAH rescinded Mr. Zipfs driver's
license revocation because it found insuffi-
cient evidence that his DUI arrest was ‘law-
ful. After the DMV petitioned the circuit
court for an appeal, the circuit court upheld
the OAH’s order,

We find that the circuit court erred in
upholding the OAH’s order because there
was sufficient evidence that Mr. Zipf's DUI
arrest was lawful, Therefore, we reverse the
circuit court and remand this case to the
circuit court for reinstatement of the DMV’s
order, revoking Mr, Zipf’s driver’s license,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
: BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2012, Mr. Zipf was stopped at.
a sobriety checkpoint: conducted by the Vien-
na Police Department. According to Mr,
Zipfs DUI Information Sheet, the officer
who stopped him, Officer D.W. Lindsey, ob-
served an odor of an alcoholic beverage and
that Mr, Zipfs speech was slurred. Mr. Zipf
was directed to exit his vehicle and walk to a
separate area designated for field sobriety
testing, which was conducted by another offi-
cer, J.A. Cole.

Officer Cole administered a series of field
sobriety tests and’ a preliminary breath test
on Mr. Zipf. After Mr. Zipf failed all of these
tests, Officer Cole arrested him for DUI and
transported him to the Vienna Police Depart-
ment. At the police department, Mr. Zipf
failed a. breath test administered to him al-
most two hours after he-was stopped at the
cheekpoint,

Based on his arrest, the DMV revoked Mr,
Zipfs driver’s license. He objected to the
revocation and requested a hearing before

754

the OAH. On his hearing request form, he
marked that he wished to challenge the “Sec-
ondary chemical test of the blood, breath, or
urine” and the “Sobriety checkpoint opera-
tional guidelines.”

Two members of the Vienna Police Depart-
ment testified at Mr. Zipfs OAH hearing:
Sergeant K.L, Parrish, who supervised the
sobriety checkpoint; and Officer Cole, who
conducted the field sobriety tests on Mr. Zipf
and arrested him. Officer Lindsey, who
stopped Mr. Zipf at the sobriety checkpoint,
was absent from the OAH hearing,

Sergeant Parrish testified as to the man-
ner in which the Vienna Police Department
conducted the sobriety checkpoint, For ex-
ample, the location of the checkpoint was
selected on the basis of traffie volume, acci-
dent data, alcohol-related arrests, and visibil-
ity to drivers and officers, Sergeant Parrish
stated that the Vienna Police Department
erected signs notifying drivers of the check-
point, and if a driver did not wish to proceed
through the checkpoint, he or she had oppor-
tunities to turn around and avoid the check-
point without being pursued by an officer. As
to drivers who proceeded through the check-
point, officers were directed to stop every car
to check for signs of impairment. Drivers
who exhibited signs of impairment were to be
detained for further investigation; everyone
else was to be released as soon as possible.

Finally, Sergeant Parrish testified that he
had a written copy of the sobriety checkpoint
guidelines on his person while he was on the
witness stand. Mr. Zipf never contested the
correctness of Sergeant Parrish’s testimony
that the Vienna Police Department complied
with its guidelines, presented evidence or
argued that the guidelines were not followed
in any way, or requested that he be allowed
to review the guidelines.

Officer Cole testified regarding his interac-
tion with Mr. Zipf leading up to the DUI
arrest, He conducted a series of field sobri-
ety tests after Officer Lindsey detected signs
that Mr. Zipf may have been driving im-
paired, After Mr, Zipf failed all of these
tests, Officer Cole arrested him for DUI,
transported him to the Vienna Police Depart-

1, Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v, Cline, 196 W.Va. 588,

ment, and at the police department, he ad-
ministered a breath test. Mr. Zipf also failed
the breath test.

In addition, Mr. Zips DUI Information

- Sheet was submitted into evidence. The DUI

Information Sheet lists Officer Lindsey as a
witness to Mr. Zipf’s driving under the influ-
ence, and it states that Officer Lindsey ob-
served “slurred speech” and “an odor of alco-
holic beverages” coming from Mr. Zipf.

After the hearing, the OAH rescinded Mr.
Zipfs driver’s license revocation because it
found insufficient evidence that his DUI ar-
rest was lawful. The OAH based its decision
on two grounds: (1) the sobriety checkpoint
guidelines were not submitted into evidence;
and (2) the officer who stopped Mr. Zipf did
not testify at the OAH hearing on why he
suspected Mr. Zipf drove under the influence
of aleohol.

The DMV filed a petition with the circuit
court to appeal the OAH order. The circuit
court denied the DMV’s petition, upheld the
OAH’s order, and adopted the OAH’s reason-
ing on whether there was sufficient evidence
that Mr, Zipf’s arrest was lawful. The DMV
now appeals the-cireuit court’s order denying
its petition for appeal.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We are asked to review a circuit court
order affirming an administrative decision by
the OAH. We have held:

On appeal of an administrative order
from a circuit court, this Court is bound by
the statutory standards contained in W.Va.
Code § 29A-5-4(a) and review questions of
law presented de novo; findings of fact by
the administrative officer are accorded def-
erence unless the reviewing court believes
the findings to be clearly wrong

IL

ANALYSIS

The circuit court found insufficient evi-
dence that Mr. Zipfs DUI arrest was lawful
because: (a) the sobriety checkpoint guide-

474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

lines were not submitted into evidence; and
(b) the officer who stopped Mr. Zipf did not
testify on why he suspected Mr. Zipf had
been driving under the influence.

A. The sobriety checkpoint guidelines

HM The DMV argues that the circuit
court erred by finding that it was required to
submit the sobriety checkpoint guidelines
into evidence in order to show that Mr. Zipf's
arrest was lawful. In its-order, the circuit
court stated, “in a case where the validity of
a sobriety checkpoint has been challenged,
the written regulations themselves should be
submitted into evidence.” The circuit court
did not address Mr. Zipf’s failure to chal-
lenge the validity of the sobriety checkpoint.

The DMV acknowledges that Mr. Zipf pro-
vided the DMV with prehearing, written no-
tice that he intended to challenge the sobri-
ety checkpoint guidelines, but it asserts he
did not follow through on his stated intent by
making this challenge at his OAH hearing.
The DMV presented testimony by Sergeant
Parrish, who supervised the checkpoint at
which Mr. Zip? was arrested. Sergeant Parr-
ish testified in detail regarding Vienna Police
Department’s compliance with its sobriety
checkpoint guidelines, including the selection
of its location, advance notice of the check-
point to the public, and how officers were
instructed to interact with drivers. Mr. Zipf
did not contest the correctness of Sergeant
Parrish’s testimony that the Vienna Police
Department complied with its guidelines,
present argument or argue that the guide-
lines were not complied with in any way, or
request that he be allowed to review the
guidelines. Because of Mr. Zipf’s silence on
this subject, the DMV argues that the guide-
lines were not necessary to resolve any issue
that Mr. Zipf disputed at his hearing, and
they were not required to be submitted into
evidence.

HM The DMV was not required to submit
the sobriety checkpoint guidelines into eévi-

2, 194 W.Va. 233, 460 S.E.2d 48 (1995),

3. Carte, 194 W.Va. at 239, 460 S.E.2d at 48
(emphasis and footnote added). In accordance
with our Carte Opinion, the OAH promulgated an
administrative rule requiring drivers who intend
to challenge compliance with sobriety checkpoint

755

dence merely because Mr. Zipf provided pre-
hearing notice that he intended to challenge
the guidelines. In Carte v, Cline,? we ad-
dressed how notice of a driver’s intent to
challenge sobriety checkpoint guidelines af-
fects the DMV’s burden at a driver's license
revocation hearing: .

[A] more viable and preferable alterna-
"tive is to require a person who wishes to
challenge official compliance with and
adherence to sobriety checkpoint opera-
tional guidelines to give written notice of
that intent to the commissioner of motor
vehicles prior to the administrative revoca-
“tion hearing[.] ... The State is thereby
afforded an opportunity to have the appro-
priate law enforcement officers present tes-
timony or other evidence of compliance
with standard operating procedures when
noncompliance’ is alleged by the person

‘whose license has been revoked,?

In Carte, where the driver asserted that
officers did not comply with sobriety check-
point guidelines, we found insufficient evi-
dence of compliance because no officer at the
OAH hearing was able to fully testify on that
subject, and the DMV presented no other
evidence on that issue.

Clearly then, the DMV must be prepared
to present testimony or other evidence of
compliance with sobriety checkpoint guide-
lines when a driver provides the DMV with
timely, written and otherwise proper notice
that he or she intends to challenge the sobri-
ety checkpoint guidelines. But we have never
said that the DMV is required to present
both testimony and documentary evidence,
such as the written guidelines, merely be-
cause a driver notifies the DMV he or she
may challenge the sobriety checkpoint guide-
lines at the OAH hearing,

Here, the DMV presented testimony by
Sergeant Parrish, who oversaw the sobriety
checkpoint at which Mr. Zipf was arrested.
Sergeant Parrish testified in detail regarding

guidelines to provide the DMV notice of his or

her intent, or else the challenge is waived. W.Va.
Code R. § 105-1-10.2(c) «

4, Carte, 194 W.Va. at 238-39, 460 S.B.2d at 53-
54,

756

his police department’s compliance with its
sobriety checkpoint guidelines, including the
location of the checkpoint, advance notice to
the public, and how officers were to interact.
with drivers. Therefore, the DMV satisfied
its burden under Carte to be prepared .to
submit testimony or other evidence on Vien-
na Police Department’s compliance with its
sobriety checkpoint guidelines on the night of
Mr. Zipfs arrest,

” ‘The only case, revealed by this Court’s
research, wherein we required that the sobri-
ety checkpoint guidelines be submitted into
evidence at a driver’s license revocation hear-
ing is White v. Miller® In that case, the
driver repeatedly requested the sobriety
checkpoint guidelines for his review, ‘and he
disputed the correctness of the officer’s testi-
mony that his police department conducted
its sobriety checkpoint in compliance with the
guidelines. As we observed:

One matter in controversy during the
admiistrative hearing, for example, was
whether Sergeant Williams’ email to the
media concerning the MacCorkle Avenue
elieckpoint sufficiently alerted motorists in
eompliance with police guidelines, that the
designated alternative route would be
along Kanawha Boulevard. Without the
standardized, predetermined guidelines,
such issues cannot be resolved. Therefore,
the finding of the Commissioner that Ser-
geant Williams set up the checkpoint in
accordance with the standardized guide-
lines is clearly wrong.’ ,

Thus, our holding in White hinged on the fact.

that the sobriety checkpoint guidelines were
necessary to resolve issues that the driver
disputed at his OAH hearing. .

We decline to extend our holding in White
to this case, where Mr. Zipf did not contest
the correctness of Sergeant Parrish’s testi-
mony that the Vienna Police Department
complied with its guidelines, present evi-
dence or argue that the guidelines were not
followed in any way, or request that he be
allowed to review the guidelines. Simply, the

5, 228 W.Va, 797, 724 S.B.2d 768 (2012).
“6, White, 228 W.Va. at 807-08, 724 S.B.2d at 778-
79.

7. White, 228 W.Va. at 808, 724 8.B.2d at 779.

sobriety checkpoint guidelines were not nec-
essary to resolve any issue that Mr. Zipf put
into issue at his OAH hearing. Therefore, the
sobriety checkpoint guidelines were not re-
quired to be submitted into evidence to show
that Mr, Zipfs DUI arrest was lawful. The
circuit court erred by finding otherwise.

B. The testimony of the officer

who stopped Mr. Zipf

Hl The circuit court also found insuffi-
cient. evidence that Mr. Zipf's arrest was
lawful because there was “an absence of any
information as to what criteria Officer Lind-
sey [the stopping officer] utilized in deter-
mining that [Mr. Zipf] should be detained for
further investigation.”

I Despite the circuit court’s assertion,
Mr, Zipfs DUI Information Sheet was part
of ‘the record before the OAH, and it re-
vealed ‘that Officer Lindsey ‘observed
“slurred speech” and an “odor of alcoholic
beverages” coming from Mr. Zipf. On the
admission of a DUI Information Sheet as
evidence in a driver's license revocation hear-
ing, we have held: .

In an administrative hearing conducted
by the Division of Motor Vehicles, a state~
ment of an arresting officer as described in

W.Va, Code § 17C-5A-1(b) (2004) (Repl.

Vol. 2004), that is in the possession of the

Division and is offered into evidence on

behalf of the Division, is admissible pursu-

ant to W.Va. Code § 29A-5-2(b) (1964)

(Repl. Vol. 2002).

In a similar case, Dale v. Odum, the driv-
er argued that the stopping: officer was re-
quired to testify at his OAH hearing, even
though the stopping officer’s observations
were recorded on the DUI Information
Sheet. We rejected this argument, stating:

Although there was no testimonial evi-
dence [by the stopping officer] ... our
review of the record shows that documen-
tary evidence was submitted during the ~
hearing that established that the stop of

8. Syl. Pt. 3, Crouch v. W.Va. Div. of Motor Vehi-
cles, 219 W.Va. 70, 631 S.E.2d 628 (2006).

9. 233 W.Va. 601, 760 S.E.2d 415 (2014).

Mr. Doyle’s. vehicle by Officer Anderson.
was valid. In that regard, the statement of
the arresting officer/DUI Information
Sheet, which was made part of the record,
indicated that Mr: Doyle’s vehicle was
stopped because of “Failure to Obey Traf-
fie Control Device.”... .Consequently,
there was unrebutted evidence admitting
during the administrative hearing that es-
tablished a valid stop of Mr. Doyle’s vehi-
cle, and the hearing examiner's finding to
the contrary was clearly wrong.!?

We find no meaningful distinction between
this case and Dale. Therefore, it was error to
rescind the revocation of Mr, Zipf’s driver’s
license because the officer who stopped him
did not testify at the OAH hearing.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court erred by finding that the
sobriety checkpoint guidelines and the stop-
ping officer's testimony were required to
show that Mr. Zipf's DUI arrest was lawful.
Mr. Zipf did not contest the correctness of
Sergeant Parrish’s testimony that the Vienna
Police Department complied with its sobriety
checkpoint guidelines, present evidence or

argue that the guidelines were not followed ,

in. any way, or request that he be allowed to
review the guidelines, In addition, the rea-
sons the stopping officer suspected that Mr.
Zipt drove under the influence were in Mr.
Zipfs DUI Information Sheet, which was in
the record before the OAH. We reverse the
cireuit court and remand this case to the
circuit court to reinstate the DMV order
vevoking Mr, Zipf’s driver's license.

Reversed and Remanded.

10, Dale, 233 W.Va. at 608, 760 S.E.2d at 422,

757

806 S.E,2d 188

KOURT SECURITY PARTNERS, LLC,
d/b/a Select Security, Petitioner

v

JUDY'S LOCKSMITHS, INC, and Judith
J. Ransom, d/b/a Judy Alarm Masters
Respondents

No. 16-0553
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 18, 2017

Charles J. Kaiser, Jr., Esq., Jeffery D.
Kaiser, Esq., Phillips, Gardill, Kaiser & Alt-
meyer, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner

Charles E, Hurt, Esq., The Law Offices of
Charles E, Hurt, Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for Respondents

Workman, Justice:

This is an appeal by Kourt Security Part-
ners, LLC, d/b/a Select Security (hereinafter
“the Petitioner”) from a March 18, 2016,
order granting summary judgment in favor
of Judy’s Locksmiths, Inc, and Judith J.
Ransom, d/b/a Judy’s Alarm Masters, (here-
inafter “the Respondents”). The Petitioner
contends the cireuit court erred in granting
summary judgment where genuine issues of
material fact exist. Based upon this Court's

759

review, we reverse the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment and remand this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On April 1, 2008, the Respondents entered
into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Se-
eure US, Ine. (hereinafter “Secure US”) and
Serbian Fonz, LLC (hereinafter “Serbian”),
companies owned by Mr.- Mitchell Brozik
(hereinafter collectively referenced as “the
Brozik companies” or individually as “Mr.
Brozik”). Pursuant to that agreement, the
Respondents agreed to sell the assets of its
business in Charleston, West Virginia, to the
Brozik companies for the purchase price of
$420,992.

The Brozik companies made installment
payments under the terms of the agreement
until sometime in early 2009, The Respon-
dents thereafter initiated a lawsuit against
the Brozik companies in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County, West Virginia, on Septem-
ber 1, 2009, Due to significant financial diffi-
culties experienced by Secure US, Mr. Bro-
zik ultimately received assistance from his
personal friend, Mr. Mylan Puskar. On De-
cember 26, 2009, the Mylan Puskar Amended
and Restated Revocable Trust purchased the
outstanding debt of Secure US in the amount
of $8,500,000 and extended an additional line
of credit in the amount of $900,000.

On October 6, 2011, the Respondents set-
tled their civil action with the Brozik compa-
nies, and the companies agreed to pay the
Respondents $191,000 over thirty-six months.
The companies made those required pay-
ments until approximately March 2014,

In 2012, Mr. Brozik’s aunt, Ms, Betty
Parmer, agreed to assist Mr. Brozik with his
companies’ financial challenges by purchas-
ing the debt of Secure US which had been
held by the Milan Puskar trust for
$2,500,000. Ms. Parmer thereafter claimed
default against Secure US and moved to have
its assets sold at auction. On May 5, 2012,
Ms. Parmer purchased the assets in a se-
cured party sale. Ms. Parmer thereafter re-
tained another company owned by Mr. Bro-
zik, MB Security, to manage the assets she
had purchased. In May 2014, Ms. Parmer

760

removed MB Security as manager of the
former Secure US assets and instead re-
tained the Petitioner to manage the assets.

On June 19, 2014, based upon the cessation
of payments pursuant to the settlement be-
tween the Respondents and the Brozik com-
panies, the circuit court awarded the Respon-
dents $47,184.24 to be paid by the Brozik
companies. This judgment became a lien on
July 25, 2014, In November 2014, Ms, Parm-
er sold the assets of Secure US to the Peti-
tioner, Thereafter, in July 2015, the Respon-
dents amended their complaint to add the
Petitioner as a defendant.

The Respondents moved for summary
judgment against the Petitioner on January
26, 2016. On March 1, 2016, the circuit’ court
entered an order granting summary judg-
ment to the Respondents in the amount of
$48,780.97. The circuit court based its deci-
sion upon its finding that Ms, Parmer was
aware of the Respondénts’ judgment against
Secure US when the assets of that company
were purchased by Ms. Parmer, even though
the Respondents did not record an abstract,
of the judgment until a month after the
Petitioner purchased Ms, Parmer’s Secure
US assets,

* In granting summary judgment to the Re-

spondents, the circuit court found “Defen-
dant, Kourt Security ‘Partners, cannot be
considered as a bona fide purchaser for val-
ue, since it was well aware of all of the
aforesaid actions, and participated in such
actions.” The circuit court further held:

’ Betty Parmer transferred all of the assets
of Secure US to Kourt Security Partners
with the view of going out of business, and
.+. nothing was left in Secure US to pay
[the Respondents], Certainly Kourt Securi-
ty took the assets of Secure US “cum
onere,” which means that something is tak-

_ en subject to a charge or burden,

The Petitioner, now appeals, contending
summary judgment was improper because
(1) the judgment was entered against it with-
out consideration of whether Ms, Parmer had
knowledge and/or notice of the Respondents’
lien or judgment encumbering the assets
when she purchased them in May 2012; (2)
the circuit court -failed to consider statutes
regarding writs of execution; (8) the -cireuit

court failed to recognize that the May 2012
sale was commercially reasonable and ‘extin-
guished all subordinate debt: interests, in-
cluding those of the Respondents; and (4) the
circuit court made erroneous factual findings,

TI. Standard of Review

HM As this Court explained in syllabus
point one of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189,
451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), “[a] circuit court’s
entry of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo.” Pursuant to Rule 56 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, “{a] motion
for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine
issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concern-
ing the facts is not desirable to clarify the
application of the law.” Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Cas,
& Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148
W.Va, 160, 183 S.E.2d 770 (1968). This Court,
has also specified: “Summary judgment is
appropriate if, from the totality of the evi-
dence presented, the record could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoy-
ing party, such as where the nonmoving par-
ty has failed to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of the case that it has
the burden to prove.” Syl. Pt. 2, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc, 194 W.Va. 52, 459
S.B.2d 829 (1995). Utilizing these standards
as guidance, this Court addresses the propri-
ety of summary judgment in this matter,

TIL Discussion

HH The Petitioner contends there: are
genuine issues of material fact which should
have precluded summary judgment in .this
ease. As this Court expressed in syllabus
point six of Aetna Casualty, “{a] party who
moves for summary judgment has the bur-
den of showing that there is no genuine issue
of fact and any doubt as to the existence of
such issue is resolved against the movant for
such judgment.” 148 W.Va. at 162, 188 S.H.2d
at 772, syl. pt. 6, Thus, it is apparent that the
Respondents had the burden of showing that
there was no genuine issue of material fact,
Doubt will be resolved against the Respon-
dents, as the party moving for summary
judgment.

TH The status of Ms. Parmer as a bona
fide purchaser is the primary -controversy

underlying the Petitioner’s arguments. This

Court has explained that a bona fide: pur-

chaser is:
“‘one who purchases for a valuable consid-
eration, paid or parted with, without notice
of any suspicious circumstances to put him
upon inquiry”” Stickley v. Thorn, 87
W.Va. 678, 678, 106 S.E. 240, 242 (1921)
(quoting Carpenter Paper Co. v. Wilcow, 50
Neb. 659, 70 N.W. 228 (1897). See also
Simpson v. Edmiston, 23 W.Va. 675, 680
(1884) (“[A] bona fide purchaser is one who
buys an apparently good title without no-
tice of anything calculated to impair or
affect it.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1249
(7th ed. 1999) (defining a bona fide pur-
chaser as “[o]ne who buys something for
value without notice of another's claim to

the item or of any. defects in the seller’s |

title; one who has in good faith paid valu-
able consideration for property without no-
tice of prior adverse claims.”),
Subcarrier Comme’ns, Inc. v. Nield, 218
W.Va. 292, 800, 624 S.H.2d 729,.787 (2005),
Hs As this Court succinctly explained
in syllabus point one of Kyger v. Depue, 6
W.Va. 288 (1878): “A bona fide purchaser is
one who actually purchases in good faith.”
See also Wolfe v. Alpizar, 219 W.Va. 525, 530,
687 S.E.2d 628, 628 (2006) (finding status as
bona fide purchaser for value without notice
where “innocent purchaser” bought land in
absence of “documentation of which [pur-
chaser] could have or should have been
aware that would have alerted her to the
appellants’ claims....”). In syllabus point
one of Pocahontas Tanning Co, v. St. Law-
rence Boom & Manufacturing Co,, 68 W.Va.
685, 60 S.E. 890 (1908), this Court held:
“Whatever is sufficient to direct the attention
of a purchaser to prior rights and equities of
third parties, so as to put him on inquiry into
ascertaining their nature, will operate as no-
tice.” This Court continued in syllabus point
three of Pocahontas: “That which fairly puts

1, The Petitioner also contends that the Respon-
dents failed to submit evidence indicating that
the sale to Ms. Parmer was in any manner com-
mercially unreasonable. Thus, the Petitioner con-
tends that the circuit court must address the
issue of a commercially reasonable sale and the
consequent extinguishment of all subordinate
debt interests,

761

a party on inquiry is regarded as sufficient
notice, if the means of knowledge are at
hand; and a purchaser, having sufficient
knowledge to put him on inquiry, or being
informed of circumstances which ought to
lead to such inquiry, is deemed to be suffi-
ciently notified to deprive him of the charac-
ter of an innocent purchaser.” Id. at ——, 60
S.E. at 890, syl. pt. 8. In syllabus point four
of Clark ». Lambert, 55 W.Va. 512, 47 S.E.
812 (1904), this Court also addressed this
issue of notice and held: “One who'claims the
protection of a court of equity as a bona fide
purchaser must’ show that he had acquired
the legal title before riotice or knowledge of
facts equivalent to noticd.”

HH Although the circuit court based its
summary judgment order in this case upon
the premise that Ms. Parmer had knowledge
and appreciation of the circumstances’ under
which she purchased the’ assets of Secure US
aid was’ consequently “ot a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice of an adverse claim
against the company, the Petitioner contends
genuine issues of material fact exist on that
issue! For instance,'a judgment was not
obtained by the Respondents against the
Brozik companies until June 19, 2014, and a
writ of execution was not obtained until July
25, 2014, almost two years after Ms, Parmer
purchased the assets of Secure US2 In their
summary judgment motion, the Respondents
asserted, in conclusory fashion, that Ms.
Parmer had actual or constructive knowledge
of the Respondents’ judgment against Secure
US prior to the recording of the lien; they
did not, however, present evidence establish-
ing such knowledge or notice.

Moreover, this Court issued a memoran-
dum decision in. Brozik v. Parmer, No. 16-
0238, 2017. WL 65475 (W.Va, Jan. 6, 2017)
(memorandum decision), affirming a jury
verdict in a civil action brought by Ms. Parm-
er against Mr. Brozik on the issue of Mr.

2. As the Petitioner contends, the judgment lien
had not attached to the assets Ms. Parmer pur-
chased that were eventually purchased by the
Petitioner. As stated in syllabus point four of
Hartman v. Corpening, 116 W.Va. 31, 178 S.E.
430 (1935), “[t]he lien of a perfected execution is
both immediate and progressive, but not retroac-
tive.”

762

Brozik’s fraudulent activity and Ms, Parmer’s
Jack of awareness of all circumstances sur-
rounding her financial assistance to Mr. Bro-
zik in connection with the purchase of the
assets of Secure US, In that case, the jury
returned a verdict finding that Mr. Brozik
and MB Security breached contractual and
fiduciary duties owed to Ms. Parmer. Id. at
*4, Critical to the application of those find-
ings to the present case, this Court affirmed
the jury’s finding that Mr. Brozik and MB
Security “made false representations, untrue
statements, failed to provide Ms. Parmer
necessary and important information, and
fraudulently induced Ms. Parmer into a ser-
ies of transactions that made her the owner
of Secure US's assets....” Id. We also ob-
served that the “evidence revealed that Mr.
Brozik caused his aunt to become the owner
of his company’s assets as part of a scheme
to avoid paying a lawful judgment obtained
by” another “competing security compa-
ny....” Id, at *9. Thus, the Petitioner in the
present case argues that whether Ms. Parm-
er was aware of the business circumstances
surrounding the indebtedness of Secure US
to the Respondents was a question of fact
rendering summary judgment inappropriate.

The sole question currently before this
Court is whether this matter should have
been decided through the procedural vehicle
of summary judgment, Courts have broadly
recognized that issues surrounding an enti-
ty’s status as a bona fide purchaser may not
be appropriate for resolution by summary
judgment. In Hanlon v. Bowman, 169 W.Va.
405, 287 S.H.2d 519 (1982), this Court en-
countered a question of whether a defendant
knew of a fiduciary relationship between the
original grantor and grantees and whether
summary judgment was appropriate. Id. at
408, 287 S.E.2d at 520. Knowledge of that
relationship was deemed “material to the ap-
pellant’s right to recover,” and the evidence
“suggested that [the original grantee and
third parties]* were involved in something
other than an arm’s length transaction.” Id.

3. Like the present case, the Hanlon matter in-
volved a complex set of relationships among the
parties and an allegation that Ms. Dorothy Bow-
man “had failed to transfer the stock as prom-
ised in consideration of” a transfer of property to
her by James and Nellie Hanlon and “had subse-
quently, in breach of her trust and without au-

In reversing the circuit court’s summary
judgment order, this Court observed the in-
effectiveness of summary judgement where
unresolved factual issues predominate. We
held that the case “involves knowledge of a
fiduciary relationship, establishment of which
is similar to establishment of motive or in-
tent.” Id. This Court also addressed that
concept in Masinter v. WEBCO Co, 164
W.Va. 241, 262 S.E.2d 488 (1980), recognizing
that summary judgment is often unwarrant-
ed “where issues involving motive and intent
are present.” Id. at 248, 262 S.H.2d at 486.

Emphasizing the imprudence of summary
judgment in complex factual matters involv-
ing bona fide purchaser status, the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota reasoned as follows in
Behr v, EverBank, No. A13-1556, 2014 WL
1272390 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014):

A bona-fide purchaser “is one who gives
valuable consideration without actual, im-
plied or constructive notice of inconsistent
outstanding rights of others.” Miller v.
Hennen, 438 N.W.2d 866, 369 (Minn, 1989),
“Whether one is a good-faith purchaser is
a factual determination.” Stone v. Jetmar
Props., LLC, 733 N.W.2d 480, 488 (Minn,
App. 2007). Thus, the propriety of deciding
the question at summary judgment is sus-
pect. We therefore conclude that summary
judgment is not appropriate on that
ground.

Id. at *6; see also Dollar v. Dollar, 214 Ga.
499, 105 S.E.2d 736, 740 (1958) (“The ques-
tion as to whether the defendant ... had
actual notice, or as to whether the cireum-
stances were sufficient to put him on notice
of the state of the title, were questions to be
determined by the jury.”); R.W. Holdco, Inc.
v. SCI/RW Holdco, Inc., 250 Ga.App. 414, 551
S.E.2d 825 (2001) (whether circumstances
were sufficient to put purchaser on notice of
appellants’ interest in property was question
of fact to be determined by trier of fact);
Green v. Tanner, 49 Mass. 411, 422 (1844)

thority, conveyed the property to Earl L. Corbin
and H. Louise Corbin, the other appellees.” 169
W.Va. at 406-07, 287 S.B.2d at 519-20, Thus, the
question became whether the Corbins were bona
fide purchasers or knew or should have known of
the arrangement between the Hanlons and Ms.
Bowman.

(whether defendants are bona fide purchas-
ers is question of fact); Proteon, Inc, v. Digi-
tal Equip. Corp., No. CV981533F, 2000 WL
1298180, *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2000)
(“As there are genuine issues of material fact
on the legal issue of whether or not Cable-
tron was a bona fide purchaser, this matter is
not appropriate for summary judgment.”).

HH The dispositive “question of notice
often requires a factual determination that is
not appropriate for summary judgment.” An-
thony Marano Co. v. J & S Produce Corp.,
No. 12 C 1906, 2014 WL 4922824, *8 (N.D.
IIL. Sept. 80, 2014); see also Gargiulo v. G.M.
Sales, Inc., 181 F.8d 995, 1000 (11th Cir.
1997) (eversing summary judgment because
“genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether the bank was a bona fide purchaser
and whether the bank was without notice of
[a breach of trust.]”); Albee Tomato, Inc. v.
A.B. Shalom Produce Corp. 155 F.3d 612,
617 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judg-
ment based upon existence of factual ques-
tions regarding defendant’s notice); Hahn v.
Love, 821 S.W.8d 517, 527 (Tex. App. 2009)
(“The evidence shows, that this case is no
exception to the rule that fraudulent transfer
and bona fide purchaser status are generally

4, Finding reversal necessary based upon the gen-
uine issues of material fact surrounding the bona

763

questions for the trier of fact that are inap-
propriate for summary judgment.”),

In the case sub judice, the Respondents
did not satisfy their burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issues of material
fact regarding whether Ms. Parmer was a
bona fide purchaser. Having recognized the
admonition of syllabus point six of Aetna
Casualty, requiring doubts as to the exis-
tence of material issues to be construed
against the movant, this Court finds that
summary judgment should not have been
granted in this case.4

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth
above, the final order of the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County entered on March 1, 2016,
is reversed, and this case is remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

fide purchaser issue, we do not address the Peti-
tioner’s other assertions of error.

764

806 S.E.2d 420
STATE of West Virginia EX REL.
STATE of West Virginia,
Petitioner
v
Honorable David J. SIMS, Judge of the
Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Vir-
.ginia and Robert W. McFarland, Re-
spondents

and
State of West Virginia ex rel. State
of West Virginia, Petitioner
v.

Honorable David J. Sims, Judge of the
Cireuit Court of Ohio County, West Vir-
ginia and James Wilkerson, Respon-
dents

No, 17-0214, No, 17-0275
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 6, 2017

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Rob-
ert L, Hogan, Charleston, West Virginia, At-
torneys for Petitioner

Matthew Brummond, Public Defender Ser-
vices, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney
for Respondent, Robert W. McFarland

John M. Jurco, St. Clairsville, Ohio, Attor-
ney for Respondent, James Wilkerson

Davis, Justice:

This matter involves two consolidated peti-
tions for writs of prohibition. In petition No,
17-0275, the State seeks to prohibit enforce-
‘ment of an order of the Circuit Court of Ohio
County that reduced the criminal sentence of
James Wilkerson. In petition No. 17-0214,
the State seeks to prohibit enforcement of an
order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County
that reduced the criminal sentence of Robert
W. McFarland. After carefully reviewing the
briefs, the arguments of the parties, the legal
authority cited, and the record presented for
consideration, we grant the writs.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
: HISTORY

The two consolidated petitions in this mat-
ter involve different underlying cireum-
stances. Therefore, we will present separate
factual and procedural histories.

A. Petition No. 17-0275

Petition No. 17-0275 involves the criminal
prosecution of James Wilkerson. In Novem-
ber 2008, Mr. Wilkerson and a co-defendant,
Brandon Myers, robbed and physically as-
saulted two thirteen-year-old boys. Mr. Wilk-
erson and Mr. Myers were jointly indicted on
two counts of robbery in the first degree, two
counts of assault during the commission of a
felony, and one count ‘of conspiracy to com-
mit first degree robbery. Mr. Myers eventu-
ally pled guilty to lesser offenses and re-
ceived an effective sentence of ten to thirty-
six years confinement! The case against Mr,
Wilkerson was tried before a jury in July
2011. The jury convicted him of two counts of
first degree robbery, one count of assault
during the commission of a felony, and one
count of conspiracy to commit first degree
robbery. The trial court sentenced Mr. Wilk-
erson to forty years incarceration for each of
1. Mr. Wilkerson was offered the same plea deal

that Mr. Myers was given. Mr, Wilkerson rejected
the offer.

2. The State indicates that it did not receive no-
tice of the Rule 35(b) motion, and only learned of
the matter after the trial court denied the motion.

3. The denial of habeas relief is the subject of a
~ pending appeal, No. 16-0689, .

165°

the robbery convictions and ordered the sen-
tences to be served consecutively—for an
effective sentence of eighty years. The sen-
tences for the remaining convictions were
ordered to be served concurrent to each oth-
er and concurrent to the eighty-year robbery
sentence,

Mr. Wilkerson appealed his conviction.
This Court affirmed the judgment in State v.
Wilkerson, 230 W. Va. 866, 788 S.E.2d 32
(2018), In January 2014, Mr. Wilkerson filed
a pro se motion under Rule 35(b) of the West.
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure seeking
to have his sentence reduced. The trial court
denied the motion as untimely? In April
2014, Mr. Wilkerson filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in.the circuit court. The
circuit court denied the habeas petition in
June .2016.? On July 7, 2016, Mr. Wilkerson
filed another Rule 35(b) motion seeking to
have his sentence reduced. The State was not
given-notice of the motion, nor was the state
given an opportunity: to be heard, On July 12,
2016, the circuit’ court granted the motion
and ordered Mr, Wilkerson’s two forty-year
sentences for first degree robbery be served
concurrently, The State filed an appeal of the
order and argued that the Rule 35(b) motion
‘was untimely and that the State was not
afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Mr, Wilkerson filed a motion to dis-
miss the appeal on the grounds that no legal
authority existed for the State to file an
appeal. This Court granted the motion to
dismiss the appeal on January 25, 2017. Sub-
sequently, the State filed the instant petition
for a writ of prohibition on March 28, 2017.

B. Petition No. 17-0214

Petition No. 17-0214 involves the criminal
prosecution of- Robert W. McFarland. The
record indicates that in October 2008, Mr.
McFarland and a co-defendant, Eric Holmes,
broke into the home of Jonathan Ward and
Kelly Mitchell.5 Mr. Ward was beaten with

4. Before the State filed the instant petition for a
writ of prohibition, the circuit court amended the
order and indicated that the reduction of the
sentence was under Rule 35(a), not Rule 35(b).

5. Two children were also in the home at the
time. *-

766

the butt of a shotgun and the home was
robbed. The police captured Mr. McFarland
and Mr, Holmes shortly after the robbery.
Mr. McFarland was indicted on one count of
robbery in the first degree, one count of
assault during the commission of a felony,
malicious assault, and one count of conspira-
cy.6 Mr. McFarland eventually entered a
guilty plea to attempted robbery in the first
degree, and agreed not to challenge the sen-
tence that was imposed. The circuit court
accepted the plea and on July 10, 2009, sen-
tenced Mr. McFarland to 70 years imprison-
ment.

Even though the plea agreement prohibit-
ed Mr, McFarland from challenging the sen-
tence, he filed a petition for appeal with this
Court. The petition was refused on January
28, 2010. On May 19, 2010, Mr. McFarland
filed a motion to reduce his sentence under
Rule 35(b). In an order entered on June 8,
2010, the circuit court denied the motion
under Rule 35(a) and Rule 35().7 Mr.
McFarland thereafter filed a petition for ha-
beas corpus relief in the circuit court. The
cireuit court denied habeas relief by orders
entered on September 9, 2011, and on August
8, 2012. Mr. McFarland appealed the denial

6. Mr. Holmes was charged separately and even-
tually convicted and sentenced to 75 years im-
prisonment.

7, The motion was denied by Judge Recht.

8 The motion was denied by the respondent,
Judge Sims. :

9. The order was entered by the respondent,
Judge Sims. The order contained no findings of
fact and failed to cite any specific legal reason
for granting the relief.

10. In a supplemental response to the petition,
Mr. McFarland informed this Court that, while
the petition was pending, he asked the Parole
Board to place him on parole based upon the
circuit court’s order reducing his sentence. Mr.
McFarland has indicated that the Parole Board
granted him parole. Mr. McFarland now asks
this Court to prohibit the State from challenging
his release on parole in this proceeding. The
State has responded that it is not raising the
issue of Mr. McFarland’s release on parole in
this proceeding. However, the State notes, and
we agree, that Mr. McFarland’s release on parole
does not moot our resolution of the validity-of the
sentence reduction order. In view of our ultimate
resolution of the sentence reduction issue, the

of habeas relief. This Court affirmed the
denial in McFarland v. Ballard, No. 12-1105,
2013 WL 3184657 (W. Va. June 24, 2013).

In August 2018, Mr. McFarland filed a pro
se motion in circuit court for a reduction of
his sentence. The circuit court treated the
motion as a Rule 35(b) motion and denied the
same on October 1, 2013.8 On December 17,
2014, Mr. McFarland filed another Rule 35(b)
motion with the circuit court. The State con-
tends that it did not receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the motion. On
February 2, 2017, the circuit court entered
an order reducing Mr. McFarland’s sentence
to 85 years” This order purportedly was
based upon Mr. McFarland’s Rule 35(b) mo-
tion that was filed on May 19, 2010, and
resolved by Judge Recht on June 8, 2010.
The State subsequently challenged the order
reducing the sentence though the instant pe-
tition for a writ of prohibition.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both of the consolidated cases in this mat-
ter seek a writ of prohibition to prevent
enforcement of resentencing orders by the

Parole Board may seek to rescind its order plac-
ing Mr. McFarland on parole. See W. Va. C.S.R.
§ 92-2-4.1 (“The Board may rescind and issue a
Notice of Temporary Rescission of any grant of
parole, ... [iJ any information becomes avail-
able to the Board which contravenes the evi-
dence the Panel used to reach the parole deci-
sion.”). See also Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d
732 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding no due process viola-
tion in revoking defendant's parole solely on the
basis that he was erroneously released on pa-
role); Geer v, Riley, No. 8:09-1769-CMC-BHH,
2009 WL 3571541 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2009) (revok-
ing defendant's parole two years after learning
that he was erroneously placed on parole); Unit-
ed States ex rel. Claybourn v. Illinois Dep’t of
Corr., No, 00 C 7896, 2000 WL 1889679 (N.D. Ill.
Dec, 28, 2000) (revoking defendant's parole four
months after learning that he was erroneously
placed on parole). We wish to make clear that we
take no position on the merits of any action by
the Parole Board to rescind the parole order. See
Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th
Cir, 1984) (recognizing “that the government has
waived the right to reincarcerate when its agents’
actions are so affirmatively improper or grossly
negligent that it would be unequivocally inconsis-
tent with fundamental principles of liberty and
justice to require a legal sentence to be served in
its aftermath.”).

circuit court. There are limited circumstances
in which the State may request a writ of
prohibition in a criminal matter, We have
held that

The State may seek a writ of prohibition
in this Court in a criminal case where the
trial court has exceeded or acted outside of
its jurisdiction. Where the State claims
that the trial court abused its legitimate
powers, the State must demonstrate that
the court’s action was so flagrant that it
was deprived of its right to prosecute the
ease or deprived of a valid conviction. In
any event, the prohibition proceeding must,
offend neither the Double Jeopardy Clause
nor the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Furthermore, the application for a writ of
prohibition must be promptly presented,

Syl. pt. 5, State v, Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422
§.E.2d 807 (1992), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized by State v. But-
ler, 239 W. Va. 168, 799 S.H.2d 718 (2017). In
Syllabus point 4 of State ew rel, Hoover v,
Berger, 199 W. Va, 12, 488 S.H.2d 12 (1996),
we set forth the following standard for issu-
ance of a writ of prohibition:

In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
involving an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is claimed that the lower
tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers,
this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of

11, The State’s petition presented several addi-
tional arguments that attacked the reasons given
by the circuit court for reducing Mr. Wilkerson’s
sentence. We will not address those additional
arguments on the merits in this proceeding. The
additional arguments made by the State should
be considered and ruled upon in the first in-
stance by the circuit court, particularly when, as
here, the State has presented four affidavits in
support of its arguments against the sentence
reduction. Upon remand, the State will have an
opportunity to present to the circuit court its
reasons for opposing the motion. See Skaggs v.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 212 W. Va. 248,
256 n.3, 569 S.E.2d 769, 777 n.3 (2002) (“Be-
cause the circuit court did not reach the merits
of these [contentions] ..., we decline to address

767

Jaw; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (5) whether the lower
tribunal's order raises new and important
problems or issues of law of first impres-
sion. These factors are general guidelines
that serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue, Although all
five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
that the third factor, the existence of clear
error as a matter of law, should be given
substantial weight.

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the

issues presented.

Im.

DISCUSSION

In order to resolve the petitions presented
in this matter we need only address the
merits of two issues. First, in the case of Mr.
Wilkerson the dispositive issue is whether
the State was entitled to notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before the circuit court
ruled upon his Rule 35 motion.!+ The second
issue that we will address’ concerns the
State’s contention that the cireuit court did
not have jurisdiction over Mr. McFarland’s
Rule 35(b) motion.

A. The State’s Right to Notice and
an Opportunity to Be Heard on
a Rule 35(a) Motion

Hl As previously noted, Mr. Wilkerson
filed a Rule 35(b) motion, which the circuit
court converted into a Rule 35(a) motion in
its second order.!8 Consequently, our analysis

them, and leave them for the circuit court to
address on remand.”),

12, The State also argued that it did not have
notice and an opportunity to be heard on Mr.
McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion. Insofar as the
dispositive’ issue presented by Mr. McFarland’s
motion involves the jurisdiction of the circuit
court, we need not address the notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard argument as it relates to Mr.
McFarland’s motion.

13. The State contends, and we agree, that the
circuit court converted the motion from Rule
35(b) to Rule 35(a), because the motion was
untimely under Rule 35(b).

768

is under Rule 35(a). The State contends that.
this Court should prohibit enforcement of the
order reducing Mr, Wilkerson’s sentence, be-
cause it did not have notice that Mr, Wilker-
son filed the motion for sentence reduction,
nor was it afforded an opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the motion.4 Mr. Wilk-
erson contends that the State is not entitled
to relief for three reasons. First, Mr. Wilker-
son argues’ that he filed the motion pro se
and innocently and unknowingly failed to
serve a copy on the State, Second, he argues
that “Rule 85(a) does not set forth any re-
quirement that a trial court give the State
the opportunity to defend an illegal sen-
tence,” Third, Mr. Wilkerson contends that,
the State could have filed a motion for recon-
sideration once it received the order reducing
his sentence. For the reasons to follow, we
reject Mr. Wilkerson’s arguments,
The text of Rule 35(a) provides as follows:
‘(@) Correction of Sentence. The court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time and
may correct a sentence imposed in’ an ille-
gal manner within the time period provid-
ed herein for the reduction of sentence.
It is quite clear that Rule 85(a) does not
expressly require that the State be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. How-

ever, the absence of explicit language in Rule

35(a) affording the State the right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard is not con-
trolling. We resolved a similar issue in State
ew rel. Reed v. Douglass, 189 W. Va. 56, 427
S.E.2d 751 (1998).

14, Mr, Wilkerson has argued that the petition in
this dase should be dismissed as untimely, be-
cause it was not filed until’ more than. eight
months after the circuit court's initial order. In-
sofar as the delay was attributed to the State’s
erroneous, but good faith belief that it could
appeal that order, we decline to dismiss the
petition. The State promptly filed the petition
after our dismissal of the erroneous appeal. We
addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Smith v.
Sims, 235 W. Va. 124, 772 S.E.2d 309 (2015), as
follows:

LY. urges this Court to dismiss this petition
seeking a writ of prohibition as untimely. We
decline to do so because the petitioner did in

fact immediately file an appeal of the March 6,

2014, dismissal order with this Court on
March 19, 2014, However, by order dated Sep-
tember 17, 2014, this Court dismissed the ap-
peal.... Following entry of our order, the peti-

In Reed, the defendant filed a motion un-
der Rule 32,1(b) of the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure seeking early release
from probation. The defendant served a copy
of the motion, which included a date that the
motion would be heard by the circuit court,
on the State. However, before the date of the
hearing the circuit court entered an order
releasing the defendant from probation, The
State subsequently filed a petition for writ of
prohibition with this Court seeking to pre-
clude enforcement of the order. In that pro-
ceeding, the State argued that it was entitled
to both notice and an opportunity to be heard.
before the circuit court resolved the motion.
This Court initially. observed that Rule
82.1(o) did not expressly provide for the
State to be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard.!® However, the Court found that,
in light of other rules, it was clear that notice
and an opportunity to be heard was required.
The opinion addressed the matter as follows:

[U]nder Rule 49(a) of the West Virginia

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the parties in

a criminal proceeding are required to serve

written motions on each other. Under Rule

82(a)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of

Criminal Procedure, when sentencing is

initially considered by the court, “[t]he at-

torney for the state shall have an equiva-
lent opportunity [as the defendant and
counsel] to speak to the court.”

Moreover, Rule 82(c)(8)(C) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which relates to the presentence investiga-
tion and report to the court, provides that

tioner promptly filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition,
Id. at 132 n.5, 772 S.E.2d at 317 n.5. See also
State ex rel. David Allen B, v. Sommerville, 194
W. Va. 86, 89 n.6, 459 S.E,2d 363, 366 n.7
(1995) (“So long as the act sought to be prohibit-
ed has not occurred, the relief sought in this case
will not be considered to be time barred."”); State
* ex rel, W. Virginia Truck Stops, Inc. v. McHugh,
160 W. Va. 294, 299, 233 8,E.2d 729, 732 (1977)
(‘The mere expiration of time is not the control-
“ling factor in determining whether the petitioner
proceeded in prohibition in a timely mannér.
There must be an intervening change of position
of the respondent induced by the inaction of the
petitioner.”),

15. The rule was subsequently amended to ex-
pressly provide for notice and an opportunity to
be heard. .

any material in the report “which [is] dis-
closed to the defendant and his counsel
shall be disclosed to the attorney for the
state.” ...

Under the provisions of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Criminal Procedure, we con-
clude that Rule 49(a), which requires no-
tice to be served on the other party, Rule
82(©)(8)(C), which grants to the prosecut-
ing attorney the right to review presen-
tence information, and Rule 82(a)(1), which
grants to the prosecuting attorney the
right to address the court regarding sen-
tencing, carry the implied right on the part
of the prosecuting attorney to be heard
where a defendant seeks a favorable modi-
fication of the terms of probation.

Consequently, we hold that when a de-
fendant moves to obtain a favorable modifi-
cation of the terms of probation under
Rule 82.1(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the prosecuting attor-
ney is entitled to reasonable notice’ of the
motion for modification and an opportunity
to be heard.

The respondent judge’s failure to accord
an opportunity to the prosecuting attorney
to be heard and entry of the order without
a hearing were acts beyond his legitimate

16, Rule 49(a) provides as follows:

(a) Service: When Required—Written motions
other than those which are heard ex parte,
written notices, designations of record on ap-
peal, and similar papers shall be served upon
each of the parties,

17, See also United States v, Esekhigbe, Crim. No.
H-05-0354-1, 2012 WL 2361733, at *1 nl (S.D.
Tex. June 20, 2012) (“Defendant filed a subse-
quent pro se amended motion, but failed to serve
the Government, Consequently, the amended mo-
tion is not before the Court.'); Morgan v. State,
359 Ark. 168, 177, 195 S.W.3d 889, 895 (2004)
(“The record reveals that Appellant attempted to
file several pro se motions, but was not allowed.
to do so because of his failure to serve the State
with copies of the motions.”); State v. Bohanna,
No, 16-CA-81, 2017 WL 3207976 at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 27, 2017) (‘‘[T]he trial court ... denied
Appellant’s motion for leave, as a blanket mo-
tion, finding Appellant had not served the mo-
tion(s) upon any other party in the case, pursuant
to Criminal Rule 49.”).

18, Rule 32(c)(3) provides as follows:
(3) Imposition of Sentence—Before impos-
ing sentence, the court must:

769

powers and are, therefore, subject t to > Pror
hibition...

Reed, 189 W. Va. at 57-59, 427 S.H.2d at 152.
54 (footnote omitted), The decision in Reed
controls our resolution ‘of whether notice and
opportunity to be heard is required under
Rule 35(a).

As previously noted, Rule 35(a) does not
expressly provide for the State to receive
notice and have an opportunity to be heard,
However, as Reed pointed out, Rule 49(a) of
the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure requires written motions. be served on
all parties." See also State v. Dorisio, 189 W.
Va. 788, 795, 484 S.E.2d 707, 714 (1998). (not-
ing that Rule 49(a) requires that “[w]ritten

motions shall be served upon each of the
parties[.]”).” Further, as noted in Reed, Rule

82(c)(8) requires the court to give the State
an opportunity to be heard before a defen-
dant is sentenced.!8 See also Seward v. Hane,
882 N.W.2d 874, at *4 (lowa Ct. App, 2016)
{T]he State ... was entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard.”); State v. Heinz,
146 Ohio St. 8d 374, 880, 56 N.H.38d 965, 972
(2016) (“[A]s the state’s legal representative,
the prosecuting attorney is entitled to proper
notice and an opportunity to appear and be
heard at proceedings in which the state is a

(A) verify that thé defendant and defendant's
counsel have read and discussed the presen-
tence report made available under subdivision
(©)(6)(A), Ifthe court has received information
excluded from the presentence report under
subdivision (b)(5) the court int lieu of making
that information available must summarize it
in writing, if the information will be relied on.

‘in determining sentence, ‘The court must also
give the defendant and the defendant’s counsel
a reasonable opportunity ‘to comment on that
information;

(B) afford defendant's counsel.an opportumi-
ty to speak on behalf of the defendant;

(C) address the defendant personally and
determine whether the defendant wishes’ to
make a statement and to present.any informa-
tion in mitigation of sentence;

(D) afford the attorney for the state an op-
portunity equivalent to that of the defendant's
counsel to speak to the court; and

() if.sentence is to be imposed for a crime
of violence or sexual abuse, address the victim
personally if the'victim is present at the sen-
tencing hearing and determine if the victim
wishes to make a statement or present any
information in relation to the sentence.

770

party[J"). In light of our decision in Reed
and the requirements of Rule 32(c)(8) and
Rule 49(a), we now hold that when a defen-
dant files a motion to correct a sentence
under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the prosecuting attor-
ney is entitled to reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the motion.

The record is quite clear in showing that
the State did not receive notice and an op-
portunity to be heard on Mr. Wilkerson’s
motion to reduce his sentence. Consequently,
prohibition is appropriate to preclude en~
forcement of the circuit court’s order reduc-
ing Mr. Wilkerson’s sentence. On remand,
the circuit court must afford the State an
opportunity to be heard on the merits of Mr.
Wilkerson’s converted Rule 35(a) motion.

B. Jurisdictional Time Limitation
in Rule 35(b)

TM The State contends that Mr. McFar-
Jand’s Rule 35(b) motion was untimely; there-
fore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
reduce his sentence. Mr. McFarland argues
that the time limitation in Rule 35(b) is not
jurisdictional; therefore, the cireuit court had

19. Mr. McFarland filed his Rule 35(b) motion on
December 17, 2014. However, the circuit court’s
order erroneously stated that it was granting
relief based upon a Rule 35 motion filed by Mr.
McFarland on May 19, 2010. The record clearly
shows that Judge Recht entered a final order on
June 7, 2010, that denied Mr. McFarland relief
under Rule 35(a) and Rule 35(b). Therefore, the
circuit court could not base its ruling on the May
19, 2010, motion, because it was previously re-
solved on the merits by Judge Recht. In fact, in
this proceeding Mr. McFarland has not argued
that he sought relief under the May 19, 2010,
motion, It is obvious to this Court that the circuit
court was attempting to circumvent the time
limitation set out under Rule 35(b) by reviving a
motion that already had been resolved and final.
Consequently, our analysis of Mr. McFarland’s
Rule 35(b) motion will be based upon the motion.
he filed on December 17, 2014.

20. Mr. McFarland has also argued that this
Court does not have authority to create proce-
dural rules that are jurisdictional. According to
Mr. McFarland, only the legislature can enact
procedural rules that are jurisdictional. Mr.
McFarland has not cited to any authority holding
that this Court's constitutional rule-making au-
thority is limited to creating non-jurisdictional
rules, See Syl. pt. 5, State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va.
155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999) (‘The West Virginia
Rules of Criminal Procedure are the paramount

authority to grant him relief under the rule.2?
We disagree with Mr. McFarland.

We begin by examining the text of the
relevant rules. Rule 35(b) provides in part as
follows:

(b) Reduction of sentence.—A motion to
reduce a sentence may be made, or the
court may reduce a sentence without mo-
tion within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed or probation is revoked, or within
120 days after the entry of a mandate by
the supreme court of appeals upon affir-
mance of a judgment of a conviction or
probation revocation or the entry of an
order by the supreme court of appeals
dismissing or rejecting a petition for ap-
peal of a judgment of a conviction or pro-
bation revocation, The court shall deter-
mine the motion within a reasonable
time....

The 120-day limitation on filing a motion
under Rule 35(b) is addressed in Rule
45(b)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure as follows:

(b) Enlargement.—When an act is re-
quired or allowed to be done at or within a

authority controlling criminal proceedings before
the circuit courts of this jurisdiction; any statuto-
ry or common-law procedural rule that conflicts
with these Rules is presumptively without force
or effect.”); Syl. pt. 1, Stern Brothers, Inc. v.
McClure, 160 W.Va, 567, 236 S.E.2d 222 (1977)
(“Under Article VII, Section 8 [and Section 3] of
the Constitution of West Virginia (commonly
known as the Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment), administrative rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have
the force and effect of statutory law and operate
to supersede any law that is in conflict with
them.”), It is true that many of the time periods
in rules promulgated by this Court are not juris-
dictional. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 3, Crea v. Crea, 222 W.
Va. 388, 664 S.E.2d 729 (2008) (“Rule 28(a) of
the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure for Family Court is not jurisdictional and
may be extended for good cause.”). However,
this does not mean that we do not have authority
to promulgate rules with time periods that are
jurisdictional. See, e,g., Syl. pt. 3, Roberts v. Con-
solidation Coal Co., 208 W. Va. 218, 539 S.E.2d
478 (2000) (“ ‘The requirement of Rule 59(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure that a motion for a
new trial shall be served not later than ten days
after entry of the judgment is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The time required for service of
such a motion cannot be extended by the court
or by the parties,’ Syllabus point i, Boggs v.
Settle, 150 W. Va. 330, 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965).”).

specified time, the court for cause shown
may at any time in its discretion:

(2) Upon motion made after the expira-
tion of the specified period, permit the act
to be done if the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but the court
may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35,
except to the extent and under the condi-
tions stated in them.

(Emphasis added).

It is clear that Rule 35(b) imposes a 120-
day limitation on filing a motion under it, and
Rule 45(b)(2) prohibits enlargement of that
time period. We have previously upheld cir-
euit court rulings denying motions under
Rule 35(b) as being untimely filed. See Bar-
vitt v. Pointer, 215 W. Va. 120, 122, 595
S.E.2d 62, 64 (2004) (“[Tyhe Appellant’s [Rule
35(b)] motion was untimely and properly
denied by the lower court.”); See also State v.
Stephens, No. 15-0291, 2016 WL 765746, at
¥2 (W. Va. Feb. 26, 2016) (mem. dec.) (“[Ple-
titioner’s January 27, 2015, motion was un-
timely filed under Rule 35(b), which requires
that a motion for a reduction of sentence be
filed within 120 days after imposition of the
same.”); State v. Cline, No, 14-1098, 2015 WL.
8694312, at *2 (W. Va. June 15, 2015) (mem.
dec.) (“Petitioner missed the deadline to file
a motion for reduction of sentence by approx-
imately ninety days.”); State v. Harris, No.
13-1078, 2014 WL 4693602, at *2 (W. Va.
Sept. 22, 2014) (mem. dec.) (“Further, it is
clear that petitioner’s motion for reduction of
sentence was untimely.”); State v. Redman,
No. 13-0225, 2014 WL 1272558, at *8 (W. Va.
Mar. 28, 2014) (mem. dec.) (“Petitioner's at-
tempt to reduce his sentence based on these
factors failed to meet the time limits found in
Rule 35(b) and the cireuit court was correct
in failing to consider them.”); Cook v. Plum-
ley, No. 12-1848, 2013 WL 6184030, at *2 (W.
Va. Nov. 26, 2018) (mem. dee.) (“[Pletitioner’s
probation was revoked in April of 2005, but
his Rule 35(b) motion to reduce his sentence
that is the subject of the present appeal was
not filed until September of 2011, well be-
21, The current version of federal Rule 35(b) is

now substantively different from our rule. The
current version of federal Rule 45(b), while

771

yond the 120-day limitation required by the
statute and our case law.”); State v. Brooks,
No. 12-0454, 2018 WL 2300978, at *2 (W. Va.
May 24, 2018) (mem, dec.) (“Rule 85(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
clearly states that a motion for reduction of
sentence must be made within 120 days after
sentence is imposed. It is undisputed that
petitioner failed to meet this deadline, and
the circuit court was correct to deny the
motion as untimely, to the extent petitioner
sought a reduction of sentence.”); Mugnano
v. Ballard, No. 11-0464, 2012 WL 3030871, at
*2 (W. Va. June 29, 2012) (mem. dec.) (“this
Court concludes that the cireuit court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Mugna-
no’s Rule 35(b) motion as untimely filed[,]”).
However, we have not been previously called

‘upon to decide whether the time period in

Rule 35(b), read in conjunction with Rule
45(b)(2), is a jurisdictional limitation. As an
issue of first impression, we turn to federal
decisions that have squarely addressed the
issue.

Federal courts have addressed the juris-
diction issue in the context of similar prior
versions of federal Rule 35(b) and federal
Rule 45(b)4 In United States v. Hill, 826
F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit
succinctly addressed the issue as follows:

Rule 35(b) grants only 120 days in which to

file, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b) forbids the

enlargement of this period. The 120-day
period is jurisdictional... Under a former

version of Rule 85(b), the 120 days was a

limit on the judge’s power to reduce the

sentence.... Now only the filing deadline

is jurisdictional. Either way, Rule 45(b)

establishes that the deadline is inflexi-

ble.... Hill missed the deadline, and miss-

ing a jurisdictional deadline deprives the

court of power to act...
Id. 826 F.2d at 508 Gnternal citations omit-
ted). It has been said that “the 120-day limit
for filing a Rule 35(b) motion is jurisdictional
and cannot be waived or extended.” Stlano v.
United States, 621 F.Supp. 1108, 1105
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also United States v.
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 99 S.Ct. 2285,

worded differently, is substantively the same as
our rule,

772

2242-48, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (“Federal
Rule Crim, Proc. 35 now authorizes district
courts to reduce a sentence within 120 days
after it is imposed or after it has been af-
firmed on appeal. The time period, however,
is jurisdictional and may not be extended.”);
United States v. Hudson, 9 F.3d 104 (6th Cir,
1993) (‘As Hudson does not allege that his
sentence was illegal, Rule 85(b)’s jurisdiction-
al time limit on such claims bars them.”);

United States v, Jay, 979 F.2d 849 (4th Cir, -

1992) (“The 120-day limit of Rule 35(b) is
jurisdictional.”); United States v. Foley, 988
F.2d 1078 (7th Cir, 1992) (“The limit estab-
lished by Rule 35(b) was jurisdictional.”);
United States v. Stwmp, 914 F.2d 170, 172
(9th Cir. 1990) (“The time limit prescribed by
Rule 35 is jurisdictional, and unless the 120
day requirement is met, the court has no
jurisdiction or power to alter sentence,” (in-
ternal quotations and citation omitted)); In re
United States, 898 F.2d 1485, 1486 (11th Cir,
1990) (“The.time period is jurisdictional; con-
sequently, a court may not extend the 120-
day period and is without jurisdiction to en-
tertain a Rule 35(b) motion filed after the
period expires.”), superseded by rule on oth-
er grounds as recognized by United States v.
Orozco, 160 F.8d 1809, 1818 (1998); United
States v. Smith, 889 F.2d 175, 182 @d Cir,
1988) (“[Wle do not consider whether Smith
failed to meet. the 120-day requirement of
Rule-35(b), which is jurisdictional and cannot,
under any circumstances, be extended by
order of the court.”); United States v. Go-
mez-Soto, No. CR-82-0561-SC, 1994 WL
507719, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1994).(“The
time limit prescribed by Rule 35(b) is juris-
dictional, and unless-the 120 day requirement
is satisfied, the court has no jurisdiction or
power to alter the sentence.”), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 68 F.8d 481 (9th Cir, 1995);
United States v. Howard, No. Crim, 92-
00074-01-SD, 1994 WL 258630, at *2 n4
(D.N.H. Jan, 20, 1994) (“The 120-day time
limitation of former Rule 35(b) is jurisdiction-
al and may not he extended.”); United States
v. Urdaneta, 771 F.Supp. 28, 35 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (“Under Rule 35(b) as it provided prior
to November 1, 1987, a motion to reduce a
sentence could be made within 120 days after

22, We have previously declined to follow federal
courts in resolving a different issue under Rule

the sentence was imposed or. probation was
revoked, a time period which is jurisdictional,
and may not be extended.”); Sparks v. Unit-
ed States, Nos. 91 C 851, 89 CR 149-5, 1991
WL 88562, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 1991) (“In
its letter this Court told Sparks accurately
that it had no jurisdiction under Fed.
R.Crim.P. (Rule) 35(b) to grant such relief
because his request had come far outside of
the jurisdictional 120-day time. limit[.]”);
United States v. Young, No. 86-886, 1991 WL
55819, at “6 (H.D. La. Apr. 8, 1991) (“It is
well established that [t]he 120-day time limit
stated in Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional and can-
not under any circumstances be extended by
the court.” (internal quotations and citation
omitted); United States v. Sinclair, 702
F.Supp. 477, 479 (D. Del. 1989) “A Rule
85(b) motion must be made within 120 days
from the imposition of sentence or its affir-
mance on appeal. The 120-day time period is
jurisdictional and cannot be extended by or-
der of a court.”); United States v. Williams,
No. 79-18, 1988 WL 2146, at *1 (H.D, Pa.
Jan. 12, 1988) (“The time limits of Rule 35(b)
aré jurisdictional. If the motion is untimely
under the rule and the sentence is a lawful
one, the court is powerless to act.”); United
States v, Dickenson, 673 F.Supp. 2, 8 (D. Me.
1987) (“The import of the jurisdictional con-
tent of the Rule 85 requirement is that the
Court loses jurisdiction over the sentence for
purposes of modification pursuant to the
Rule if a timely motion for modification of
the sentence is not filed within the 120-day
period specified.”); United States v. Nevarez-
Diaé, 648 F.Supp, 1226, 1229 (N.D. “Ind.
1986) (“It is well settled that the 120-day
time limit of Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional in
nature and, as such, cannot be extended by
the sentencing court.”); United States v. Lee,
882 F.Supp. 292, 295 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (“The
120-day time limitation stated in Rule 85 is
jurisdictional and cannot, under any circum-
stances, be extended by order of the court.”),

H Although we are not bound by the

.interpretation federal courts placed on a for-

mer version of its Rule 35(b), we find the
decisions’ of those .courts persuasive on the
question of jurisdiction. See State v. Sut-

35(b). See State v. Head, 198 W. Va. 298, 304,
480 S.E.2d 507, 513 (1996) (‘Given the history

. phin, 195 W.Va. 551, 568, 466 S.B.2d 402, 414
(1995) (“[Wle have repeatedly recognized
that when codified procedural rules ... of
‘West Virginia are patterned after the corre-
sponding federal rules, federal decisions in-
terpreting those rules are persuasive guides
in the interpretation of our rules.” (citations
omitted)). Consequently, we hold that a cir-
cuit court does not have jurisdiction to rule
upon the merits of a motion for reduction of
a sentence under Rule 35(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure when
the motion is filed outside the 120-day filing
period set out under that rule,

In the instant proceeding, the record
shows that Mr. McFarland’s petition for ap-
peal of his original sentencing order was
refused by this Court on January 28, 2010,
Under the terms of Rule 35(b), Mr. MeFar-
land had 120 days from the date of the denial
of his petition for appeal to file a motion for
reduction of his sentence. However, the Rule
85(b) motion that Mr, McFarland relied upon
to obtain relief was filed on December 17,
2014, nearly four years after his petition for
appeal was denied. This motion clearly was
untimely. Therefore, the circuit court was
without jurisdiction to rule on the merits of
the motion. Consequently, prohibition is ap-
propriate to prevent enforcement of the cir-
cuit court’s order reducing Mr. MeFarland’s
original sentence.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of prohibition in
case No. 17-0275 is granted. The circuit court
is prohibited from enforcing its order reduc-
ing the criminal sentence of Mr. Wilkerson.
This case is remanded for the circuit court to
give the State notice of a hearing and an
opportunity to be heard on the motion to
correct Mr, Wilkerson’s sentence, In case
No, 17-0214, the petition for a writ of prohibi-
tion is granted. The cireuit court is prohibit-
ed from enforcing its order reducing the
criminal sentence of Mr. McFarland. Finally,
this case is remanded with instructions to

of federal Rule 35(b), we find the federal 'inter-
pretations of their former Rule 35(b) have limited

773

dismiss Mr, McFarland’s Rule 35(b) motion
as untimely filed.

Writs granted.

806 S.E.2d 429

FIRST MERCURY INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., Defendant
Below, Petitioner

ve

Jeffrey RUSSELL and Anita Russell,
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents,

and

Kimes Steel, Inc., Defendant
Below, Respondent

No, 16-0596
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 12, 2017
Filed: October 19, 2017

persuasive value in determining a ‘reasonable
period’ under our Rule 35(b).”).

Don C. A. Parker, Charity K. Lawrence,
Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Charles-
ton, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Peti-
tioner, First Mercury Insurance Company

Brent K. Kesner, Ernest G. Hentschel, II,
Kesner & Kesner, PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, Attorneys for the Respondents, Jef-
frey and Anita Russell, Kevin A. Nelson,
Ashley W. French, Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the
Respondent, Kimes Steel, Inc.

1, James River Coal also required workers’ com-
pensation coverage. Kimes Steel previously

Davis, Justi

This appeal was brought by the Petitioner,
First Mercury Insurance Company, Ine.
(“First Mercury”), defendant below, from an
order of the Circuit Court of Mason County
that denied First Mereury’s motion for par-
tial summary judgment and, in turn, granted
partial summary judgment as to coverage to
Respondents Jeffrey Russell and Anita Rus-
sell (“Mr. Russell” or “the Russells”), plain-
tiffs below, and Respondent Kimes Steel, Ine,
(‘Kimes Steel”), defendant below. The dis-
positive issue herein is whether coverage ex-
ists for a statutory deliberate intent action
when the employer’s commercial general lia~
bility policy is amended by an endorsement
that includes a “Stop Gap—Employers Lia-
bility Coverage Endorsement—West Virgi-
nia” that expressly provides coverage for
bodily injury to employees, as well as an
exclusion for statutory deliberate intent
claims. After careful review of the cireuit
court’s order, the briefs, the record submit-
ted on appeal, and the oral arguments of the
parties, we find the policy at issue in this
ease to be internally inconsistent and there-
fore ambiguous. Accordingly, we interpret
the policy in favor of the insured and affirm
the circuit court’s partial summary judgment
rulings.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

In 2012, Kimes Steel sought to purchase
various types of insurance coverage in order
to meet the insurance requirements for a
potential client contract with James River
Coal. Specifically, among other things, James
River Coal required $1,000,000.00 of coverage
for commercial general liability (“CGL”)
(combined single limit) and employer’s liabili-
ty (per accident), and $5,000,000.00 of excess
liability coverage. Mr. Shannon Kimes, the
principal of Kimes Steel, worked with an
independent insurance agent who solicited
quotes for the required insurance coverage
based upon a list provided by James River
Coal. Ultimately, First Mercury, a surplus

maintained a basic workers’ compensation and
employer's liability insurance policy with Brick-

776

lines carrier? responded to the solicitation by
submitting a bid to provide the coverage
required by James River Coal,

Thereafter, Kimes Steel purchased two. in-
surance policies from First Mercury. The
first policy purchased from First Mercury
provides primary CGL coverage. The second
policy purchased provides excess coverage.
The First Mercury CGL policy contains a
standard exclusion for employer's liability for
injuries to employees. However, the standard
exclusion is modified by an endorsement
identified as “Stop Gap—Employers Liability
Coverage Endorsement—West Virginia”
(“Stop Gap”)? The First Mercury excess pol-
icy includes a standard “follow form” provi-
sion, which incorporates the terms of the
underlying policy,

The two First Mercury policies were in
place when Mr. Russell was involved in a
workplace accident at Kimes Steel on May 8,
2018, The accident resulted in severe injuries
to Mr, Russell’s dominant hand and the am-
putation of a finger, On February 4, 2014, the
Russells filed their complaint alleging that
Kimes Steel acted with “deliberate intention”
as defined in W, Va, Code § 28-4-2 (2005)
(Repl, Vol. 2010), The Russells alleged that.
Kimes Steel required its employee, Jeffrey
Russell, to perform his job duties without
required safety equipment, instructions, and
precautions for working with table saws, and
subjected him to a specific unsafe working
condition that presented a high degree of
visk and strong probability of serious injury
or death,

First Mercury issued a denial of coverage
letter to Kimes Steel on May 5, 2014, The
letter informed Kimes Steel that First Mer-
ecury would “not provide ... a legal defense

Street Mutual Insurance Company (‘‘Brick-
Street"). In order to comply with James River
Coal’s liability requirements as to workers’ com-
pensation, Kimes Steel incredsed its limits of
liability with BrickStreet.

2, A surplus lines carrier is an insurance compa-
ny that is not admitted or not licensed to engage
in insurance business in West Virginia. See W.
Va. Code §§ 33-12C-3(e), (p), and (w) (2011)
(Repl. Vol. 2017), .

3. In fact, the Kimes Steel application for the
CGL policy specifically requested stop gap cover-
age.

to the lawsuit, nor [would] it: indemnify
Kimes Steel as to any damages for which
Kimes Steel may be liable to Jeffrey or Anita
Russell.” First Mercury also filed a declara-
tory judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia seeking a declaration that the
policies provide no coverage for the Russells’
claims, The declaratory judgment action was
dismissed by the district court. Thereafter, in
June 2014, the Russells amended their com-
plaint by adding a declaratory judgment
claim against First Mercury alleging that
First Mercury is obligated to provide a de-
fense and indemnification to Kimes Steel un-
der the subject insurance policies. In October
2014, Kimes Steel filed a cross-claim against
First Mercury asserting breach of contract
and bad faith arising from First Mercury’s
denial of coverage to Kimes Steel with re-
spect to the Russells’ claims.

On March 18, 2015, the circuit court en-
tered an agreed order vacating a previously
entered scheduling order and staying discov-
ery of the underlying Russell tort claim alle-
gations pending resolution of the coverage
issues. Subsequently, First Mercury moved
for partial summary judgment on the cover-
age issues, Kimes Steel and the Russells
responded by also filing separate motions for
partial summary judgment as to the coverage
issues.

Following briefing and arguments, the cir-
cuit court entered its May 18, 2016, “Order
Denying Defendant First Mereury Insurance
Company’s .Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs’ Cross-Mo-
tion and Defendant Kimes Steel’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Coverage Is-

4. Pursuant to W. Va, Code § 23-4-2(c) (2005)
(Repl. Vol. 2010), a cause of action may be had
against an employer “[ijf injury or death result to
any employee from the deliberate intention of his
or her employer to produce the injury or
death...."" The statutory‘elements required to
prevail in a claim for deliberate intent are set out
in W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). This statute
was amended effective June 12, 2015. Thus, we
cite to the statute in effect at the time of Mr.
Russell’s injury in 2013.

sues.” The circuit court's order can be sum-
marized as finding coverage based upon its
conclusion that the Stop Gap endorsement
language is ambiguous with respect to cover-
ing the Russells’ deliberate intent action, Ad-
ditionally, the circuit court concluded that
Kimes Steel had a reasonable expectation of
coverage -for the Russells’ claims, that the
policy language rendered the stop gap cover-
age illusory, that First Mercury was es-
topped from denying coverage, and, further,
that First Mercury owed a duty to defend
Kimes Steel. It is from this order that First
Mercury now appeals.

0.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Hs First Mercury appeals the order of
the circuit court granting partial summary
judgment in favor of the Russells and Kimes
Steel and denying First Mercury’s motion for
partial summary judgment. It is well settled
that “[a] circuit court’s entry of summary
judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1,
Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d
755 (1994), In undertaking our de novo re-
view, we apply the same standard for grant-

ing summary judgment that is applied by the .

circuit court:

“‘A motion for summary judgment
should be granted only when it is clear
that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
tried and inquiry concerning the facts is
not desirable to clarify the application of
the law Syllabus Point 8, Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co, v. Federal Insurance Co. of
New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 183 8.B.2d 770

First Mercury raises additional assignments
challenging the circuit court’s rulings pertaining
to the doctrine of reasonable expectations, illuso-
ry coverage, estoppel, and First Mercury's duty
to defend, Because this appeal is resolved by the
policy language, it is unnecessary to address
these i issues. See infra note 8.

bal

6. “Section I” of the First Mercury CGL potey,
under the heading “Coverage A Bodily Injury
and Property Damage Liability,” provides:

1, Insuring Agreement
a, We will pay those sums that the insured
becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of “bodily injury” o1 perty dam-
age” to which this insurance applies. We will
have the right and duty to defend the insured
against any “suit” seeking those damages.

717

(1968),” Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v, Town
of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va, 706, 421 §,E.2d
247 (1992),

Syl: pt. 2, Painter, 192 W. Va. 189, 451
S.E.2d 755.

Additionally, it is well recognized that.
“{t]he interpretation of an insurance contract,
including the question of whether the con-
tract is ambiguous, is a legal determination
that, like a lower court’s grant of summary
judgment, shall be reviewed de novo on ap-
peal.” Syl. pt. 2, Rijffe v, Home Finders As-
socs. Inc., 205 W. Va. 216, 517 S.E.2d 813
(1999). Mindful.of'the de novo standard gov-
erning our review, we proceed to consider
the substantive issues raised.

I.

DISCUSSION

First Mercury advances four assignments
of error challenging the circuit court’s con-
clusion that the Stop Gap endorsement and
related exclusion weré ambiguous. On the
other hand, the Russells and Kimes Steel
assert that the circuit court properly found
First Mercury’s policy to be inherently am-
biguous. Accordingly, this appeal is resolved
by considering the policy language -

The First Mercury CGL policy issued to
Kimes Steel contains a typical insuring
agreement accompanied’ by an exclusion of
coverage for bodily injury to an employee.’
Neither of these’ provisions is disputed in this
appeal. This case turns on a stop gap én-
dorsement appended to the CGL policy and
titled “Stop Gap—Employers Liability Cov-

However, we will have no duty to defend the
insured against any “suit” seeking damages
for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to
which this insurance does not apply. .
The policy goes on to set out. the following exclu
sion:
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:

e. Employer's Liability

“Bodily injury” to:

(1) An “employee” of the insured arising out
of and in the course of: .
(a) Employment by the insured; or

(b) Performing duties related to the conduct
of the insured’s business[.]

778

erage Endorsement—West Virginia.” The
Stop Gap endorsement modifies the exclusion
of bodily injury coverage to an employee that
is contained in the First Mercury CGL poli-
ey. The Stop Gap endorsement provides, in
relevant part:

A. The following is added to Section I—
Coverages:
COVERAGE—STOP
PLOYERS LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement

a. We will pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated by
West Virginia Law to pay as damages
because of “bodily injury by accident”
or “bodily injury by disease” to your
“employee” to which this insurance
applies... .

Hl To put into perspective the Stop Gap
endorsement set out above, it is important
to first understand the meaning this Court
has ascribed to the term “stop gap” cover-
age. This Court addressed that term in Brie
Insurance Property & Casualty Co. v. Stage
Show Pizza, JTS, Inc., 210 W. Va. 68, 553
§.H.2d 257 (2001), wherein the Court ob-
served that, “[iIn many states, insurance
companies offer businesses three types of
insurance coverage: commercial general lia-
bility coverage; workers’ compensation cov-
erage; and ‘stop gap’ employers’ liability
coverage.” Id, at 67, 553 S.H.2d at 261. In
explaining the three coverage types, the
Court noted that a CGL policy protects a
business against a variety of liability claims
but typically does not provide coverage for
employee bodily injury arising out of em-
ployment. Id. As to workers’ compensation
coverage, the Court observed that “[w]Jork-
ers’ compensation coverage is designed to
release both an employer and its employees
from common-law rules of liability and dam-
age, protect an employer from expensive
and unpredictable litigation, and provide
compensation for injuries to employees with-
out the burdensome requirements of proving
common-law negligence.” Jd. at 68, 553
S.E.2d at 262 (citing Jones v. Laird Found.
Inc., 156 W. Va. 479, 489, 195 S.E.2d 821,
827 (1973) (Sprouse, J., concurring)). Finally,
the Court in Stage Show Pizza recognized
that “[bletween these two types of protec-

GAP—EM-

tion lies a ‘gap’ in coverage. In this gap are
claims made against a business by injured
employees whose claims are not generally
compensable under the workers’ compensa-
tion system.” 210 W. Va. at 68, 553 S.H.2d at
262. Significantly, the Court described em-
ployers’ liability stop gap coverage as the
gap filler intended for the purpose of provid-
ing coverage for employers when employees
are able to bring an action for injury despite
workers’ compensation immunity, Id. Perti-
nent to the instant case, the Court expressly
held:

Employers’ liability insurance applies to
actions brought by an employee against an
employer, when the employer and the em-
ployee are not entitled to the benefits and
protections under any workers’ compensa-
tion law, or when, even though covered by
a workers’ compensation law, the employee
has a right to bring an action for common
law damages against the employer.

Syl. pt. 8, Stage Show Pizza, 210 W. Va. 68,
558 S.H.2d 257. See also Luikart v. Valley
Brook Concrete & Supply, Inc. 216 W. Va.
748, 754, 613 S.H.2d 896, 902 (2005) (per
curiam) (recognizing “stop gap employers’
liability policy exists to cover ‘claims made
against a business by injured employees
whose claims are not generally compensable
under the workers’ compensation system’”
(quoting Stage Show Pizza, 210 W. Va. at 68,
558 8.H.2d at 262).

Hl With this understanding of the mean-
ing of stop gap coverage, we consider the
language of the First Mercury Stop Gap
endorsement. We first note that the coverage
endorsement, which undisputedly modifies
the insuring agreement in the First Mercury
CGL policy, expressly utilizes the term “Stop
Gap” in its heading: “Coverage—Stop Gap—
Employers Liability.” Pursuant to West Vir-
ginia law as described above, the utilization
of the term “Stop Gap” in this heading plain-
ly indicates that the policy provides Kimes
Steel with coverage for a deliberate intent
action brought by an employee. However, the
language that follows attempts to limit cover-
age to “ ‘bodily injury by accident’ or ‘bodily
injury by disease’ to your ‘employee’ to which
this insurance applies....” (Emphasis add-
ed). Thus, the more prominently displayed

heading to this provision conveys a clear, yet
different, message than the policy language
that follows.

HH The heading indicates that the policy

provides stop gap coverage, which, under ©

West Virginia law, plainly means coverage
for “claims made against a business by in-
jured employees whose claims are not gener-
ally compensable under the workers’ com-
pensation system.” Stage Show Pizza, 210 Ww.
Va. at 68, 558 S.H.2d at 262, Nevertheless,
the policy language purports to limit employ-
ee claims to only those arising “by accident”
or “disease.” Under these circumstances, we
find this portion of the Stop Gap endorse-
ment to be ambiguous, Accordingly, this pro-
vision must be interpreted in favor of Kimes
Steel, and we find that it provides coverage
for the Russells’ deliberate intent claims. “It
is well settled law in West Virginia that
ambiguous terms in insurance contracts are
to be strictly construed against the insurance
company and in favor of the insured.” Syl. pt.
4, National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon &
Sons, Inc, 177 W. Va. 784, 856 S.E.2d 488
(1987), overruled on other grownds by Par-
sons v. Halliburton Energy Servs. Inc., 237
W. Va. 188, 785 S.H.2d 844 (2016). Accord
Riffe v. Home Finders Assoes., Inc., 205 W.
Va. 216, 221, 517 S.E.2d 318, 318 (1999).
However, our analysis does not end here.

The Stop Gap endorsement in the First
Mercury policy also contains its own exclu-
sionary language providing, in relevant part
in Exclusion 1, as follows:

2. Exclusions

This insurance does not apply to:

1. West Virginia Workers Compensa-
tion Law, Sect. 23-4-2
“Bodily injury by accident” or “bodily
injury by disease” caused by any ac-
tion determined to be of deliberate
intention as specified under West Vir-
ginia Workers Compensation Law,
Sect. 23-4-2,

As First Mercury correctly notes, the case
of West Virginia Employers’ Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Summit Point Raceway Associ-
ates, Inc., 228 W. Va. 360, 719 S.B.2d 830
(2011), is directly on point with a similar

779

exclusion and unquestionably controls our
analysis of this language. In Summit Point,
this Court considered the following exclusion-
ary language:
C. Exclusions
‘This insurance does not cover
5. Bodily injury caused’ by your inten-
tional, malicious or deliberate ‘act,
whether or not the act was intended to
cause injury to the employee injured, or
whether or not you had actual knowl-
edge that an injury was certain to occur,
or any bodily injury for which you are
liable arising out of West Virginia Anno-
tated Code § 23-4-2,
Id., 228 W. Va, at 872, 719 8.H.2d at 842. The
Summit Point Court first acknowledged
West Virginia law pertaining to exclusionary
clauses. In this regard, it has been estab-
lished that
[a]n insurer wishing to avoid liability on
a policy purporting to give general or com-
prehensive coverage must make exclusion-
ary clauses conspicuous, plain, and clear,
placing them in such a fashion as to make
obvious their relationship to other policy
terms, and must bring such provisions | to"
the attention of the insured.
Syl. pt.-6, id. Gnternal quotations and cita-
tions omitted). With respect to the exclusion-
ary language at issue therein, the Court in
Summit Point then concluded that the
exclusion was conspicuous, plain, clear, and
obvious in excluding coverage for deliber-
* ate intent actions. By stating that the in-
surance did not cover “any bodily injury
for which you are liable arising out of West
Virginia Annotated Code § 28-4-2,” it is
clear that there was no coverage for delib-
erate intent liability... .
228 W. Va. at 378, 719 S.E.2d at 848, Our
examination of the similarly worded language’
used in First Mercury's exclusion compels
the same conclusion. The language used in
First Mercury's Exclusion 1, which expressly
excludes coverage for “any action determined
to be of deliberate intention as specified un-
der West Virginia Workers Compensation
Law, Sect, 28-4-2,” is “plain, clear, and obvi-
ous in excluding coverage for deliberate in-
tent actions.” Swmmit Point, 228 W. Va. at
378, 719 S.E.2d at 848.

780

HM Thus, our analysis of the First
Mercury policy issued to Kimes Steel reveals
that it contains a Stop Gap endorsement.that
provides coverage for deliberate intent ac-
tions, and an accompanying plain and clear
exclusion denying the very same coverage.
The inclusion of both the Stop Gap endorse-
ment and Exclusion 1 in the First Mercury
policy creates an additional ambiguity.’ As
noted above, “ambiguous terms in insurance
contracts are to be strictly construed against
the insurance company and in favor of the
insured.” Syl, pt. 4, in part, McMahon &
Sons, Inc, 177 W. Va. 784, 356 S.E.2d 488.
Indeed, in McMahon & Sons, we concluded
that “[w]here ambiguous policy provisions
would largely’ nullify the purpose of indemni-
fying the insured, the application of those
provisions will be severely restricted.” Syl.
pt. 9, id. Moreover, this Court specifically
held that “[wJhere the policy language ‘in-
volved is exclusionary, it will be strictly con-
strued against the insurer in order that the
purpose of providing indemnity not be de-
feated.”. Syl. pt. 5, id. This circumstance com-
pels the conclusion that the exclusionary lan-
guage is inherently inconsistent with the
“Stop Gap endorsement providing coverage
such that it nullifies the purpose of the policy
endorsement and operates so as to defeat
indemnification. See, e.g., Cramer v. National
Cas, Co., 690 Fed.Appx. 185, 188 (4th Cir.
2017) (“[Almbiguous or conflicting terms in
an insurance policy must be construed lib-
erally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer.” (internal quotations and

7. Thus, this case differs substantially from Sum-
mit Point to the extent that there was no ambigu-
ity in the Summit Point policy. See West Virginia
Emp'rs’ Mut. Ins, Co. v. Summit Point Raceway
Assocs., Inc., 228 W. Va. 360, 372, 719 S.B.2d
830, 842 (2011) (“Nothing in the plain language
quoted above leads to a reasonable conclusion
that deliberate intent coverage is included in this
policy.”). Furthermore, the language of the poli-
cy in Summit Point did not include any reference
to stop gap coverage. It was made clear that the
employer in Summit Point did not pay a premi-
um to obtain deliberate intent coverage and,
therefore, did not have such coverage. Id. at 371
n.l4, 719 S.E.2d at 841 n.14 (stating “Lilt is
undisputed that Summit Point did not have [de-
liberate intent] coverage, and Summit Point nev.
er paid any premiums to obtain such coverage”
(emphasis added)),

Here, Kimes Steel sought coverage through an
agent; First Mercury made an offer of CGL cov-
erage with a Stop Gap endorsement; an applica-

citation omitted)); Diamond State Ins, Co. v.
Homestead Indus, Inc., 318 S.C. 281, 236,
456 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1995) (same).

By purporting to exclude deliberate intent
actions from the Stop Gap endorsement, the
First Mercury policy largely nullifies the
purpose of the coverage, which is to fill the
gap in the CGL policy and proyide protection
for employees’ bodily injury claims. Such am-
biguous policy language must be construed
‘against the insurance company and in favor
of the insured so as to support the purpose of
indemnity. Syl. pts, 4 & 9, McMahon & Sons,
Inc, 177 W. Va. 784, 356 S.H.2d 488. Thus,
we find that the First Mercury explicitly.
titled Stop Gap endorsement operates to pro-
vide coverage for the deliberate intent claims
of the Russells against Kimes Steel, and’ the
conflicting exclusion may not be enforced?

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the cir-
cuit court’s “Order Denying Defendant First
Mercury Insurance Company’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Granting
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion, and Defendant
Kimes Steel’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Coverage Issues,”

Affirmed.

tion specifying stop gap coverage was completed;
Kimes Steel paid the premium; and First Mercu-
ry accepted the premium. Thus, it is clear from
the parties’ own actions that the terms of the
policy were conflicting and ambiguous.

8. Because our analysis of the policy language
compels us to affirm the circuit court's finding of
coverage, it is unnecessary for us to address First
Mercury's challenges to the circuit coutt’s find-
ings as to Kimes Steel's reasonable expectations
of coverage, illusory coverage, or estoppel. Addi-
tionally, because we have found the subject poli-
cy provides coverage, there necessarily is a duty
to defend on the part of First Mercury. See State
ex rel, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 236 W.
Va. 228, 234, 778 S.E.2d 677, 683 (2015) (“[AIn
insurer's duty to indemnify its insured under a
CGL policy is narrower than its duty to Provide a
defense.”).

-E.2d 437
. STATE of West Virginia, EX REL.
Matthew HARVEY, Prosecuting
Attorney, Petitioner

v

Honorable John C. YODER, Circuit Judge,
Twenty-third Judicial Circuit, and Ger-
ald G. Rankin, Jr., Respondents

No. 17-0419
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
_ Submitted: October 4, 2017
Filed: October 19, 2017

Concurring Opinion of Justice Workman
. November 2, 2017

782

1, The trial judge that entered the order, the Hon-
orabile John C. Yoder, died while this case was
pending. The issue presented in this case is not
mooted by the death of Judge Yoder. See Syl. pt.
4, in part, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found,
Inc., 194 W. Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995)
(“Once a trial judge rules on a motion in limine,
that ruling becomes the law of the case, unless
modified by a subsequent ruling of the court.”).
Governor Jim Justice has appointed the Honor-

Timothy D, Helman, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, Charles Town, West Virginia, At-
torney for Petitioner

J. Daniel Kirkland, Arnold & Bailey,
PLLC, Charles Town, West Virginia, Attor-
ney for Gerald G, Rankin

Davis, Justice:
This matter was filed as a petition for a

- writ of prohibition, under the original juris-

diction of this Court, by the Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney of Jefferson County
(hereinafter “the State”), In this proceeding,
the State seeks to have this Court prohibit
enforcement of an order of the Cireuit Court
of Jefferson County ! that allows the Respon-
dent, Gerald G. Rankin, Jr. (hereinafter “Mr.
Rankin”), to testify at his criminal trial about
the sexual history of his adolescent victim,
MY? After carefully reviewing the briefs,
the arguments of the parties, the legal au-
thority cited, and the record presented for
consideration, the writ is granted, in part,
and denied, in part.

1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In the 2016 April term of court, a grand
jury indicted Mr, Rankin on eight felony

able Debra MH McLaughlin to replace Judge
Yoder. ;

2. We follow our traditional practice in cases in-
volving children and sensitive facts and do not
use the name of the victim. See State v. Roy, 194
W. Va. 276, 280 n,2, 460 S.E.2d 277, 281 n.2
(1995).

counts of sexual assault in the third degree,
and eight felony counts of sexual abuse by a
parent, guardian, or person in position of
trust to a child. The crimes allegedly took
place between June 12, 2015, and July 17,
2015. The victim, M-Y., was fourteen years
old at the time. Mr. Rankin was about fifty
years old. M.Y.’s mother and Mr. Rankin had
a romantic relationship for an undisclosed
period of time. At some point after that
relationship ended, Mr. Rankin expressed an
interest in renewing his friendship with MY.
and her mother.} It was after this overture
that M.-Y. was permitted to stay at Mr, Ran-
kin’s residence on several occasions between
June 12, 2015, and July 17, 2015.

MY. first disclosed the sexual relationship
with Mr. Rankin to a family friend with
whom she was staying while her mother was
on her honeymoon. The family friend report-
ed the matter to M.Y.’s mother. The mother
promptly reported the matter to the police.
The police launched an investigation that in-
eluded an interview of M.Y. During the inter-
view, M.-Y. stated that she had engaged in
consensual sex with Mr, Rankin between
eight and twelve times. MY. also informed
the police that, because the first encounter
had been unprotected sex, Mr. Rankin pur-
chased her a “Plan B” emergency contracep-
tive pill to prevent her from getting preg-
nant.4 The police obtained cell phone records
of M-Y. and Mr. Rankin. Those records re-
vealed conversations between them on a so-
cial media messenger app called “KiK.” The
messenger app disclosed M.Y. and Mr. Ran-
kin texting numerous times that they loved
each other. The messenger app also revealed
them making remarks about their anatomy.
In one conversation, M.Y. stated to Mr, Ran-
kin “I think my mother would be okay with
me exploring my sexual desires with you to
be honest.”

3. At the time, M-Y.’s mother was seeing another
man. She married the man on or about July 24,
2015.

4, See State v. Bledsoe, No. W2012-01643-CCA-
R3-CD, 2013 WL 3968780, at *1 n.3 (Tenn, Crim.
App. July 31, 2013) (“A Plan B pill is used to
prevent pregnancy following unprotected inter-
course or contraceptive failure.” (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted)).

783

After Mr. Rankin was arrested, he was
interviewed by the police, During that inter-.
view, he admitted to spending time with MY.
but denied ever having a sexual relationship
with her, Mr. Rankin admitted to purchasing
the Plan B pill for M.Y., explaining that she
asked him to purchase it because she had
had unprotected sex with someone else, Mr,
Rankin provided no explanation when asked
why M.Y. would accuse him of engaging in
sex with her on numerous occasions.

Subsequent to Mr. Rankin’s indictment, he
filed two motions seeking to introduce evi-
dence of M.Y,’s sexual history. In the first
motion, Mr, Rankin sought to introduce evi-
dence that MY. accused another man of
sexual assault when she was eleven years
old.5 Mr. Rankin contended in the first mo-
tion that this evidence was critical because
MLY. had asked him to physically harm that
defendant if his prosecution did not go her
way. Mr. Rankin asserted further that he
refused to agree to the request and that, as a
result of his refusal, M.Y. retaliated by false-
ly accusing him of sexual assault.

In the second motion, Mr. Rankin sought
to introduce evidence of M.Y.’s sexual history
as it related to the Plan B pill. The State
opposed both motions on the ground that
Rule 412 of the West Virginia Rules of Evi-
dence prohibited the introduction of such evi-
dence, The trial court ruled, as to the first
motion; that if Mr. Rankin took the stand to
testify he could introduce evidence involving
M.Y.’s sexual assault claims when she was
eleven years old. As to the second motion,
the trial court ruled that Mr. Rankin could
cross-examine M.Y. about whether she told
him she had engaged in sex with anyone
during the seventy-two hour period prior to
the purchase of the Plan B pill.

The State filed the instant proceeding to
prohibit enforcement of the circuit court’s

3. The defendant in that case was indicted on
several sexual assault and abuse charges. The
defendant ultimately entered a plea of no contest
to sexual assault in the third degree on July 12,
2016. The defendant was sentenced to one to five
years in prison for sexually assaulting M.Y.

784

order permitting Mr, Rankin to introduce of
evidence MLY’s sexual history.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, the State ‘seeks a writ of
prohibition to prevent enforcement of a pre-
trial order of the circuit court. There are
limited instancés in which the State may seek
a writ of prohibition in a criminal matter. We
have held that .

[t]he State may seek a writ of prohibi-
tion in this Court in a criminal case where
the trial court: has exceeded or acted out-
side of its jurisdiction. Where the State
claims that the trial court abused its legiti-
mate powers, the State must demonstrate
that the court’s action was so flagrant that
it was deprived of its right to prosecute the
ease or deprived of a valid conviction. In
any event, the prohibition proceeding must.

. offend neither the Double Jeopardy Clause
nor the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

Furthermore, the application for a writ of

prohibition must be promptly presented.
Syl. pt, 5, State v, Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422
§.E.2d 807 (1992), superseded by statute on
other grounds as recognized im State v, But-
ler, 289 W. Va. 168, 799 S,H.2d 718 (2017), In
Syllabus point 4 of State ew rel, Hoover v.
Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 488 S.E.2d 12 (1996),
we set forth the following standard for issu-
ance of a writ of prohibition;

In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
‘involvirig an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is:claimed that the lower
tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers,
this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order

6. See Syl. pt, 3, State v, Varlas, 237 W. Va. 399,
787 S.B.2d 670 (2016) (“Rule 412 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence provides the standard
for the introduction at trial of a victim’s sexual

is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (5) whether the lower
tribunal’s order raises new and important
- problems.or issues of law of first impres-
sion, These factors are general guidelines
that serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue. Although all
five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
that the third factor, the existence of clear
error as a matter of law, should be given
substantial weight. © .
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the
issues presented. ,

I.

DISCUSSION

In this proceeding we are called upon to
address two issues. First, we are asked to
decide if the circuit court properly ruled that.
Mr. Rankin could testify about M.Y.’s sexual
assault claims against another defendant
when she was eleven years old. Second, we
have been asked to determine whether the
circuit court correctly found that Mr. Rankin
could cross-examine MY, about her sexual
history seventy-two hours before the pur-
chase of the Plan B pill. We will address each
issue separately below.

A. Evidence about a Prior Sexual
Assault of the Victim

Il The first issue presented involves the
ceireuit court’s ruling that Mr. Rankin could
testify about M.Y.’s sexual history with an-
other person when she was eleven years old.
The State argues that admission of this evi-
dence violates the rape shield law as set
fourth under Rule 412 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence.’ Mr, Rankin contends,
and the circuit court found, that the evidence

- was necessary for him to present a defense,

We disagree,

Rule 412(a) sets out a general prohibition
on introducing the sexual history of a victim
of sexual crimes. Rule 412(a) provides as
follows:

history, and it supersedes W. Va. Code § 61-8B-

11 [1986] to the extent that the statute is in
conflict with the rule,”),

. (a) Prohibited Uses.—The following evi-
dence shall not be admissible in a civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexu-
al misconduct:

(1) evidence offered to prove that a vic-
tim engaged in other sexual behavior;

(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s
sexual predisposition; or

(8) evidence of specific instances of the
victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of
the victim’s sexual conduct and reputation
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct in
any prosecution in which the victim’s lack
of consent is based solely on the incapacity
to consent because such victim was below a
critical age, mentally defective, or mentally
incapacitated.

‘The function of the Rule has been stated as
follows: .

Rule 412 has two primary underlying
functions. The first function is to promote
the reporting of sexual assaults and other
sexual misconduct by victims, by vitiating
their fear that in reporting the incident
they will be opening up their private life to
be put on display through the course of
discovery and at trial. The rule’s second
function seeks to combat the sexual stereo-
typing of victims, ie¢., to prevent the jury
from subverting the substantive law of
yape by making the guilt of the defendant
turn on the jury’s assessment of the moral
worth of the victim,

1 Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Robin Jean Davis, and
Franklin D, Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence
for West Virginia Lawyers, § 412.02[1], at
548 (6! ed. 2015) (internal citations and quo-
tations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Seé also
State v. Varlas, 287 W. Va. 899, 407, 787
§.H.2d 670, 678 (2016) (“The primary purpose
of Rule 412 is to safeguard the alleged victim
against the invasion of privacy, potential em-
barrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innu-
endo into the factfinding process.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted))..

Here, the State has specifically relied upon
Rule 412(a)(1) and 412(a)(8), That is, the
State argues that Mr. Rankin’s proposed tes-
timony is prohibited by Rule 412(a)(1) be-
cause it would constitute evidence offered to

785

prove that the victim engaged in other sexual
behavior, and by Rule 412(a)(8)(2) because it
would constitute evidence of a specific in-
stance of the victim’s sexual conduct when
she was below the age of consent. The circuit
court's order summarily cited to all of the
provisions under Rule 412(a), We must inter-
pret the cireuit court’s treatment of Rule
412(a) as an implicit finding that’ testimony
by Mr. Rankin, regarding M.Y.’s sexual his-
tory when she was eleven, was prohibited
under the rule.

We agree’ with the State that Rule
412(a)(1) and Rule 412(a)(8) prohibit ‘the tes-
timony Mr, Rankin seeks to introduce. Mr.
Rankin seeks to inform the jury that MY.
had a sexual relation with’ a man when she
was eleven years old, This evidence strikes at
the heart of what Rule 412(a)(1) and Rule
412(a)(8) are designed to prevent from being
introduced ata trial. See United States »,
Bordeaus, 400 F.8d 548, 558 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting that “the purpose of [Rule 412(a) ] is
to protect the alleged victims of sexual as-
sault from harassment or embarrassment”);
United States v. Gardner, No. 16-cr-20185,
2016 WL 5404207, at *2 (E.D, Mich, Sept, 28,
2016) (“MV-1 was under 18 in October 2015,
and thus qualifies as an underage victim to
whom Rule 412’s protections are especially
important.”); People v. Arenda, 416 Mich, 1,
18, 880 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1982) (“These chil-
dren and others are the ones who are most
likely to be adversely affected by unwarrant-
ed and unreasonable cross-examination into
these areas. They ‘are among the’ persons
whom the [rape shield] statute was designed
to protect.”), Indeed, in the context of this
case “[tJhere is nothing more intimate than
childhood sexual abuse, and nothing as po-
tentially devastating to a [victim] than to
have that abuse publicly exposed.” Andrea A.
Curcio, Rule -412 Laid Bare: A Procedwral
Rule That Cannot Adequately Protect Seau-
al Harassment Plaintiffs from Embarrass-
ing Beposure, 67 U. Cin. L, Rev. 125, 155-56
(1998). .

In this proceeding, Mr. Rankin relied upon
an exception to the prohibitions of Rule
412(a), Rule 412(b)(1) delineates the excep-
tions to the prohibitions contained in Rule

786

412(a). It is provided under Rule 412(b)(1)
that:

The court may admit the following evi-
deince in a criminal case: :

(A) eviderice of specific instances of a
victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to prove
that someone other than the defendant was
the source of semen, injury, or other physi-
cal evidence;

(B) except as provided in (a)(3), evidence
of specific instances of a victim’s sexual
behavior with respect to the person ac-
cused of the sexual misconduct, if offered
by the defendant to prove consent or if
offered by the prosecutor;

(C) evidence of specific instances of the
victim’s sexual conduct with persons other
than the defendant, opinion evidence of the
victim’s sexual conduct and reputation evi-
dence of the victim’s sexual conduct solely
for the purpose of impeaching credibility, if
the victim first makes his or her previous
sexual conduct an issue in the trial by
introducing evidence with respect thereto;
and

(D) evidence whose exclusion would vio-
late the defendant’s constitutional rights.

The circuit court’s order did not cite to any
specific provision under Rule 412(b)(1) as the
basis for admitting evidence that M.-Y. was
sexually assaulted at age eleven. However,
the record clearly shows that Mr. Rankin
argued below the constitutional exception
contained in Rule 412(b)(1)(D).” Insofar as
Mr. Rankin and the State addressed Rule
412(b)(1)(D) below and in this proceeding, we

7. Mr, Rankin's pleadings below, and his argu-
ment during the hearing, indicated that he was
relying on the exception contained in Rule
412(b)(1)(D). The State correctly summarized the
matter during the hearing as follows: "Now,
there’ is a potential exception if you read down
further under Rule 412(b)(1) Subsection D,
which [Defense counsel] cited, there's an excep-
tion where evidence [excluded] would violate the
defendant's constitutional righis[.]”

8. The circuit court’s order cited only to the
“manifest injustice” provision contained in Rule
412(c)(2)(B). We interpret the circuit court's or-
der, based upon arguments made by the parties
below, as applying the “manifest injustice” stan-
dard once it determined that a constitutional
violation occurred under Rule 412(b)(1)(D). Be-
cause of our ultimate ruling under Rule

will address the matter as the basis for the
circuit court ruling admitting evidence of the
prior sexual assault of M-Y8

Hl Under Rule 412(b)(1)), a criminal
defendant may introduce evidence prohibited
under Rule 412(a) if the exclusion would vio-
Jate the defendant's constitutional rights. See
Syl. pt. 8, in part, State v. Jenkins, 195 W.
Va. 620, 466 S.E.2d 471 (1995) (holding that
“a trial judge may not make an evidentiary
ruling which deprives a criminal defendant of
certain rights, such as the right ... to offer -
testimony in support of his or her defense
.++, Which [is] essential for a fair trial pursu-
ant to the due-process clause found in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and article ITI, § 14 of
the West Virginia Constitution.”), Our test
for determining whether a defendant has a
constitutional right to admit evidence that is
not permitted under the rape shield law was
set out in Syllabus point 6 of State v. Guth-
rie, 205 W. Va. 826, 518 S.E.2d 83 (1999), in
part, as follows:

The test used to determine whether a
trial court’s exclusion of proffered evidence
under our rape shield law violated a defen-
dant’s due process right to a fair trial is (1)
whether that testimony was relevant; (2)
whether the probative value of the evi-
dence outweighed its prejudicial effect; and
(8) whether the State’s compelling inter-
ests in excluding the evidence outweighed
the defendant’s right to present relevant
evidence supportive of his or her defense,
1 :

412()(1)@), we need not reach the circuit
court’s application of the “manifest injustice”
provision contained in Rule 412(c)(2)(B). See 1
Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Robin Jean Davis, and
Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for
West Virginia Lawyers § 412.05(3)[c], at 577 (6th
ed. 2015) (discussing the possible problems in
applying the “manifest injustice” standard under
Rule 412(c)(2)(B) in conjunction with the excep-
tions in Rule 412(b)(1)).

9. The Guthrie test was developed under the rape
shield law that existed prior to the adoption of
Rule 412 in 2014, The test, however, still is
workable for a constitutional challenge under
Rule 412(b)(1)(D). See State v, Timothy C., 237
W. Va. 435, 444, 787 S.E.2d 888, 897 (2016)
(applying the Guthrie test). Mr. Rankin contends
that Guthrie is inapplicable because it applies

(Footnote added). The State has argued that
Mr. Rankin’s proposed testimony should not
be admitted based upon the second and third
factors under the Guthrie test. In our review
of the evidence, we find it was not relevant
and therefore fails to satisfy the first factor
under the Guthrie test.

HE Rule 402 of the West Virginia Rules
of Evidence expressly states that “(iJrrele-
vant evidence is not admissible.” 1° “This ceil-
ing on admissibility is not to be taken lightly,
Evidence that is not relevant, by definition,
cannot be offered for a proper purpose[.]” 1
Palmer, Davis, & Cleckley, Handbook on Ev-
idence, § 402,04, at 274. For this reason, it is
generally recognized that “[a] defendant’s
constitutional right to present a defense does
not extend to irrelevant ... evidence.” State
v. Gipson, 191 Wash. App. 780, 786, 364 P.3d
850, 858 (2015). See also United States v.
Perez, 662 Fed.Appx. 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he Constitution does not require the ad-
mission of the victim’s sexual history, which
would serve no purpose other than to play on
social prejudices surrounding sexual activi-
tyL]”); Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.8d 928, 926
(8th Cir. 2011) (“Jackson’s constitutional
right to present a defense was not impaired,
because that right does not extend to the
introduction of irrelevant evidence.”); United
States v. Thompson, 178 F.Supp.3d 86, 91
(W.D.NLY. 2016) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
does not give a criminal defendant the right
to introduce irrelevant evidence.”); State v.
Calderon, 220 So,3d 880, 887 (La. Ct. App.
2017) (holding “a defendant's right to present
a defense does not require a trial court to
permit the introduction of evidence that is
irrelevant”). Consequently, Guthrie requires
a threshold showing that evidence contraven-

only when a trial court excludes, not admits,
evidence a defendant seeks to introduce. We dis-
agree. The wording of the test under Guthrie
simply acknowledges that the issue generally is
brought by defendants. However, this recogni-
tion by the test does not preclude its use in the
rare case when the State seeks a writ to prevent
admission of evidence in violation of the rape
shield law.

10. See W. Va. R. Evid. Rule 401 (‘‘Evidence is
relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence
in determining the action.”),

787

ing the rape shield law must be relevant. See
2 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin,
and Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evi-
dence Manual, § 412.02[8], at 412-6 (11. ed.
2015) {The constitutional right to an effec-
tive defense does not guarantee that defen-
dants can introduce whatever evidence they
might desire.”).

In the instant case, Mr. Rankin contends
that MY. falsely accused him of the sexual
crimes of which he was charged. In order to
establish the falsity of the allegations, Mr.
Rankin seeks to show that M-Y. had a motive
to falsely accuse him. To do this, Mr. Rankin
seeks to show that he had a conversation
with MLY. concerning the defendant who sex-
ually assaulted her when she was eleven
years old. At the time of this purported
conversation, the defendant in that case was
indicted, but not yet tried. Mr. Rankin as-
serts that M.Y. asked him to physically harm
the defendant if things did not go her way at
the defendant’s trial. Mr. Rankin claims that,
he refused to agree to harm the defendant.
Mr. Rankin now argues that MY. falsely
accused him of sexual assault in retaliation
for his refusal to agree to harm the defen-
dant." Consequently, Mr. Rankin further as-
serts that the trial court was correct in find-
ing this evidence could be presented during
his direct testimony.” We disagree.

The record is clear. M-Y. was previously
sexually assaulted when she was eleven years
old. The perpetrator was convicted and sen-
tenced to prison. The facts of that crime have
no relevancy in the prosecution of Mr. Ran-
kin. See United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d
‘771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that because
minor victims could not legally consent to sex

11, Mr, Rankin also argued below that MY. reta-
liated against him because he rebuffed her sexual

~ advances toward him. The circuit court’s order
did not permit testimony on this issue.

12. Mr. Rankin also argued below that he had a
constitutional right to cross-examine M.Y. about
her sexual history. The circuit court's order re-
jected this argument in part. The circuit court's
order indicated that if M.-Y. introduced eviderice
about her sexual history when she was eleven
years old during her direct testimony, Mr. Ran-
kin would then be allowed to cross-examine her
on the matter. This ruling is not before us in this
proceeding.

788

trafficking, evidence of their prior sexual be-
havior was irrelevant and its exclusion did
not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment,
due process rights); State v. Breauw, No.
2011 KA 0015, 2011 WL 6141636, at *11 (La.
Ct, App. Dee. 8, 2011) (Hughes, J., dissent-
ing) (“It makes no sense to think-of a five
year old as having ‘past sexual behavior,’
Anything that occurs with a five-year old

_ would obviously not be consensual and would
constitute a crime.”); State v. Mercado-Vas-
quez, 166 Or. App. 15, 28, 998 P.2d 748, 7477
(2000) (“A conclusion that a child victim has
had ‘sexual relationships’ ... amounts to
nothing more than a conclusion that the child
has been a victim of sex crimes in the past.”).
It has been correctly noted that a “larger
purpose [of rape shield laws] is to protect
rape victims from the trauma caused by the
review of past sexual experiences, and this
protection is especially needed in cases in-
volving minor victims.” State v. Townsend,
866 Ark, 152, 159-60, 283 S.W.8d 680, 686
(2006). See also 2 Saltzbw'g, Martin & Capra,
Evidence Manual, § 412.02[8], at 412-9
(“There is clearly a legitimate interest in
protecting the victim from the trauma of
having to relate or address prior sexual activ-
ity during the trial.”).

In an effort to try to make the irrelevant
facts of the prior sexual assault of M.Y.
relevant, Mr. Rankin has made an uncorrob-
orated assertion that MLY. falsely accused
him because he refused to physically harm
the person who sexually assaulted her when
she was eleven years old, The facts of how
the prosecution of Mr, Rankin began clearly
reveal that his uncorroborated assertion
lacks merit.

The record indicates that MY. did not
initiate the investigation of Mr. Rankin by
the’ police. M.Y. revealed to a family friend
that she was having a relationship with Mr,
Rankin, According to the State’s brief, M-Y.
informed the family friend that Mr. Rankin
was “like a father to her, and that their
sexual relationship was something she want-
ed and desired.” The family friend informed
MYs mother of the conversation she had

13, During MLY.'s interview with the police, she
characterized her sexual encounter with Mr,

with M.Y. Thereafter, it was M.Y/’s mother
who reported the matter to the police and
caused the investigation to occur, This uncon-
tested chain of events simply does not reveal
a retaliatory motive by M.Y.—it reveals a
mother reporting her adolescent daughter
was the victim of sexual assault once again.
In view of these facts, we find that Rule
412(b)(1)(D) did not allow Mr.. Rankin to
present irrelevant evidence as a defense to
the jury. See Varlas, 237 W. Va. at 409, 787
S.E.2d at 680 (Benjamin, J., dissenting)
(“The rule ensures that juries hear a legiti-
mate defense, rather than a defense of dis-
traction.”),

‘A case that supports our conclusion is
United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458 (th
Cir. 1991). In Payne, the defendant was con-
victed of sexually assaulting a twelve year old
victim—his foster daughter. One of the is-
sues raised on appeal concerned the district
court’s ruling that the defendant could not
introduce evidence that he had previously
caught the victiin engaged in sexual conduct
with another child. The defendant allegedly
punished the victim for this conduct. The
defendant wanted to introduce evidence of
the victim’s prior sexual conduct and ‘the
punishment he inflicted upon her in order to
show that the victim was motivated to falsely
accuse him in retaliation for the punishment.
The district court ruled that the defendant
could inform the jury that he once punished
the child, but that he could not inform the
jury of the reason for the punishment. The
appellate court agreed with the district court
as follows: :

We find that evidence of the trailer inci-

dent [where the victim was alleged to have

engaged in sexual conduct] is minimally (if
at all) probative of Payne’s claim of bias.

[The victim's] first reporting that Payne

had molested her occurred more than sev-

en months after the trailer incident and
resulting discipline, and almost as long: af-
ter [the victim] had left the Paynes’ home.

Moreover, to the extent that the trailer

incident had probative value on the ques-

tion of [the victim’s] bias, that value was

Rankin as consensual.

protected by the trial court’s permitting
Payne to conduct a “sanitized cross-exami-
nation” about the trailer incident, which
apprised the jury that [the victim] had
been disciplined by Payne as a result of
the incident, but did not reveal the nature
of the incident. The underlying facts of the
incident simply were not relevant to [the
victim’s] purported motivation to fabricate
the charges. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the evi-
dence and the exclusion did not violate the
_ confrontation clause.
Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469 (emphasis added).!
Mr. Rankin has also argued that the rape
shield law does not apply, because he “is not
seeking to introduce evidence of M.Y.’s prior
incident of sexual abuse to imply promiscui-
tyL]” Mr. Rankin relies upon the decision in
State v. Jonathan B., 230 W. Va. 229, 737
§.E.2d 257 (2012), to support his contention
that the rape shield law does not apply to the
evidence he seeks to introduce. The defen-
dant in Jonathan B. was convicted of second
degree sexual assault, incest, and other of-
fenses. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the trial court erred in applying the rape
shield law to preclude evidence found in a
notebook purportedly created by the victim
after the rape, in which she described her
only sexual encounters as being with a per-
son other than defendant. We agreed with
the defendant that the evidence was not pro-
hibited by the rapé shield law.’
We find that the notebook is relevant evi-
dence for the purpose of evaluating M.B.’s
credibility. In the notebook, which Jona-
than B. asserts was written after the al-
leged rape, M.B. stated that she had only
ever had sexual intercourse with one per-
son: “Chris.” As noted supra, in this case,
where the State’s case telies almost com-
pletely on the testimony of M.B., the-evi-
dence is highly probative for Jonathan B,’s
defense because the notebook was suppos-
edly. created after the alleged rape oc-
14, We note that, unlike the facts in Payne, Mr.
Rankin has not asked to simply inform the jury

that M.Y. was retaliating against him for refusing
to physically harm someone.

15, The decision in the case was decided under
the rape shield statute, W. Va, Code.§ 61-8B-11.

789

curred. The prejudicial value of the evi-

dence is low, as the purpose of admitting

the evidence is not to imply promiscuity,
but to attack M.B’s credibility. In this
way, the evidence is not of the type the

Rape Shield statute was intended to ex-

elude. In sum, we find that: the balance of

interests in this case weighs in favor of

Jonathan B., and therefore, the evidence is

admissible, subject to proper authentica-

tion. . .
Jonathan B., 230 W. Va, at 240-41, 787
§.H.2d at 268-69. One simple fact distin-
guishes the evidentiary issue resolved in
Jonathan B, from the evidentiary issue pre-
sented by Mr. Rankin. In Jonathan B. we
determined that the evidence sought to be
admitted was relevant. In the instant pro-
ceeding, we have determined that the evi-
dence Mr, Rankin seeks to introduce is not
relevant. Consequently, Mr, Rankin cannot
rely upon Jonathan B. , .

In view of the foregoing, the State is enti-
tled to the writ of prohibition as it relates to
the issue of MY. being a victim of sexual
assault at the age of eleven.

B. Evidence about the Vietim’s Sexual
History Seventy-Two Hours Before
the Purchase of a Plan B Pill

HM The next issue raised involyes the
State’s intent to introduce a statement made
by Mr. Rankin concerning his purchase of
the Plan B pill for M.Y. As a result of this,
the cireuit court ruled that during Mr, Ran-
kin’s cross-examination of M.Y., he would be
permitted to ask her whether she told him
she had engaged in sex with anyone else
within the seventy-two hour period prior to
his purchase of the Plan B pill for her.!6 The
State contends that this evidence-is prohibit-
ed by Rule 412(a)(8). Mr. Rankin argues that
this evidence is permitted under the excep-
tion contained in Rule 412(o)(1)(C).

The State is correct in arguing that, under
Rule 421(a)(), evidence of specific instances
16. The ruling did not permit Mr. Rankin to “‘pur-

_ sue the matter any further or offer extrinsic evi-
dence of her sexual conduct.”

790

of a victim’s sexual conduct ‘is prohibited. Mr.
Rankin is also correct in pointing out that
Rule.412(b)(1)(C) permits evidence of specific
instances of a victim's’ sexual conduct when
the victim is the first to introduce evidence
regarding the.same.!” The question we must
resolve is whether Rule 412(b)(1)(C) supports
the circuit court’s ruling.!8

As previously stated, Rule 412(b)(1)(C) is
an exception under the rape shield law which
permits a defendant to introduce “evidence of
specific instances of the victim’s sexual con-
duct with persons other than the defendant
++) if the victim first makes. his or her
_ previous sexual conduct an issue in the trial
by introducing evidence with respect there-
to.” This is the first opportunity we have
had to determine how this rule should be
applied. . .

HE The purpose of Rule 412(b)(1)(C) is to
prevent the State from selectively introduc-
ing evidence of a victim’s sexual history, and
denying the defendant the right to rebut
such evidence, The rule appears to express
the concern -that is found in the curative
admissibility rule. See United States v. Ruck-
er, 188 Fed.Appx. 772, 778 (10th Cir. 2006)
* (‘Opening the door’ is also referred to as
the doctrine of ‘curative admissibility’ ”). We
have noted that “the curative admissibility
rule comes into play when irrelevant evi-
dence is introduced without objection and the
opponent seeks to introduce rebuttal evi-
dence that is also irrelevant.” State v.
McKinley, 234 W. Va, 148, 157, 764 S.H.2d
308, 317 (2014) (internal quotations and cita-
tion omitted). It has been said that the rule
“does not permit a party to introduce inad-
thissible evidence merely -because the oppo-
nent brought out some evidence on the same
subject. The rule is merely protective and
goes only as far as is necessary to shield a
party from adverse inferences.” People v.
Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 198, 216-17, 280 Ill.Dee.

17. Rule 412(b)(1)(C) specifically references to ev-
idence introduced by the “victim,” It has been
noted that the term ‘victim’ under the rule
should be construed “to mean the ‘prosecution,’
and that any relevant rebuttal evidence is admis-
sible despite the manner in which it was opened
up by state witnesses.” 1 Palmer, Davis, & Cleck-
ley, Handbook on Evidence, § 412.04[2][c], at
563.

988, 695 N.E.2d 423, 438-34 (1998). This
Court set out guidelines for the application of
the ‘curative admissibility rule. in Syllabus
point 10 of State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657,
461 S.E.2d 168 (1995): .

The curative ‘admissibility rule allows a
party to present otherwise inadmissible ev-
idence on an evidentiary point where an
opponent has “opened the door” by intro-
ducing similarly inadmissible evidence on
the same point. Under this rule, in order to
be entitled as a matter of right to present
rebutting evidence on an evidentiary fact:
(a) The original evidence must be inadmis-
sible and prejudicial, (b) the rebuttal evi-
dence must be similarly inadmissible, and
(© the rebuttal evidence must be limited to
the same evidentiary fact as the original
inadmissible evidence.

I Wé believe that the purpose of Rule
412(b)(1)(C) is consistent with the curative
admissibility rule. Therefore, we hold that, in
order to rebut evidence on an evidentiary
fact under Rule 412(b)(1)(C) of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence, (1) the original
evidence must be inadmissible under Rule
412; (2) the rebuttal evidence must be simi-
larly inadmissible; and (8) the rebuttal evi-
dence must be limited to the same evidentia-
ry fact as the original inadmissible evidence.
We now apply this test’ to the facts under
consideration.

Mr. Rankin gave a recorded statement to
the police wherein he stated that he pur-
chased a Plan B pill for M.-Y. because she
informed him that she had unprotected sex
with someone else. The State informed the
circuit court that it was going to, introduce
the recorded statement in full at trial. Al-
though the State was only interested in let-
ting the jury know that Mr. Rankin pur-
chased the Plan B pill for M.Y., it was also
willing to have the jury hear Mr. Rankin

18. The circuit court's order did not expressly cite
to Rule 412(b)(1)(C). However, its ruling is im-
plicitly based upon this rule.

19. “This provision is not contained in the federal
counterpart. Rule 412(b)(1)(C) was taken from
the rape shield statute, W. Va. Code § 61-8B-11.”
Palmer, Davis, & Cleckley, Handbook on Evi-
dence, § 412.04[2][c], at 562.

allege that M.Y. had unprotected sex with
someone else.” As a result of the State’s
decision to introduce the full statement, the
circuit court permitted Mr. Rankin to ask
MLY. whether she told him she had sex with
someone else during the seventy-two hour
period before he purchased the Plan B pill.
This question was deemed necessary and
permissible because the jury could infer that
the State only introduced the statement be-
cause it was false. Consequently, the circuit
court determined that Mr. Rankin had a
right to rebut this adverse inference by ask-
ing MY., in essence, to affirm or deny the
truth of his statement.

Applying the above facts to the test we
have developed, we find that, under the first
factor of our test, it is clear that the State’s
introduction of part of Mr. Rankin’s state-
ment, that M.-Y. had unprotected sex with
someone else, is inadmissible under Rule
412(a)(8). See State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d
298, 306-07 (Minn. 2015) (“The rape-shield
law applies equally to evidence offered by the
prosecution and the defense.”), As to the
second factor, it is equally clear that Rule
412(a)(8) prohibits Mr. Rankin from asking
MY. whether she told him she had sex with
someone else within the seventy-two hour
period prior to his purchase of the Plan B pill
for her. Finally, under the third factor of the
test, the single question that Mr. Rankin is
permitted to ask is limited to the inadmissi-
ble evidence the State seeks to introduce.

As a result of our analysis, it is clear that
the State seeks to introduce inadmissible evi-
dence and that Mr. Rankin should be permit-
ted to rebut that evidence with inadmissible
evidence as authorized by the circuit court.
See Docekal v, State, 929 So.2d 1139, 1148
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that it is
reversible error to prohibit a defendant from
eross-examining a victim regarding her past
sexual history when she presented state-
ments that opened the door to this evidence).
Consequently, we deny the State’s request to

20. We have found nothing in the record to show
that the State attempted to have the trial court
permit it to redact that part of Mr, Rankin’s
‘statement that alleged M.Y. stated she needed the
Plan B pill because of sexual conduct with some-
one else, See State v. Marenkovic, No. 11-1764,
2013 WL 1501426 (W. Va. April 12, 2013) (where

791

prohibit enforcement of that part of the cir-
cuit court’s order that permitted Mr. Rankin
to ask MLY., on cross-examination, whether
she told him she had sex with someone else
during the seventy-two hour period before he
purchased the Plan B pill for her. Under the
circuit court’s ruling, Mr, Rankin is required
to accept M.Y.’s response of “yes” or “no”
without further questioning in this area.

Iv.

‘CONCLUSION

We prohibit enforcement of that part of
the circuit court’s order allowing Mr. Rankin
to introduce evidence that MY. accused an-
other man of sexual assault when she was
eleven years old, Furthermore, we deny the
State’s request to prohibit enforcement of
that part of the circuit court’s order permit-
ting Mr. Rankin to cross-examine MLY, about
whether she told him she had sex with any-
one else during the seventy-two hour period
prior to his purchase of the Plan B pill.

Writ granted in part and denied in part.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY concurs
and reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion,

JUSTICE KETCHUM concurs and
reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion,

Justice Ketchum concurring:

T agree with the result in this case on both
issues. On the first issue, I agree that the
State is entitled to relief prohibiting evidence
that MY. accused another man of sexual
assault when she was eleven years old. On
the second issue, I agree that Mr. Rankin
should be allowed to cross-examine M.Y. on
whether she stated that she had sex with

the State avoided the statutory version of Rule
412(6)(1)(C) by redacting a statement that would
have opened the door for the defendant to pres-
ent evidence of the sexual history of the victim).
We make no ruling on whether such a redaction
would be proper.

792

someone else during the seventy-two hour
period prior to Mr, Rankin’s purchase of the
Plan B pill. I concur to offer further discus-
sion regarding the second issue.

In authorizing cross-examination by the
defense to determine whether M.Y. said she
had sex with someone else during the seven-
ty-two hour period, the Majority points out
that the circuit court ruled that Mr, Rankin
would be required to accept M.Y,’s response
of “yes” or “no” without further questioning.
However, the circuit court’s ruling that her

“yes” or “no” response has to be accepted -

without further questioning is not before this
Court, We were not asked to address wheth-
er Mr, Rankin must accept her “yes” or “no”
answer.

“Nevertheless, it is clear that the defense
should not be bound by M.Y’s one-word
answer. Rule 611 of the West Virginia Rules

of Evidence allows a witness to be cross- _

examined to test the credibility of the wit-
ness’s responses made during direct exami-
nation, A more expansive cross-examination
is also consistent with Rule 412(b)(1)(@)
where the victim, i¢, the prosecution, first
makes the victim’s previous sexual conduct.
an issue at trial. Moreover, if the defense
herein is required to accept a response of
“no” without further cross-examination, Mr.
Rankin would need to decide whether to
compromise his right to remain silent and
take the stand to refute M.Y’s response.

Workman, Justice, joined by Chief Justice
Loughry, concurring,

(Filed November 2, 2017)

I concur with the majority opinion and
write separately to emphasize the potential
quagmire the State may create in introducing
the evidence relating to the Plan B birth
control pill. It’s somewhat ‘curious that the
State is even considering introducing evi-
dence of the defendant’s purchase of a Plan
B birth control pill for the alleged victim—on
the day after he is alleged to have assaulted
her—because (according to the defendant)
she told him she had engaged in sexual rela-
tions with another man in the prior seventy-
two hours: I perceive rather limited potential
probative value in that evidence in light of
the other evidence the State apparently has

against this defendant when considered in
the context of the defendant’s consequent
right to at least tangentially erode the rape
shield protection. Thus, introduction of that.
element of evidence appears to constitute the
proverbial opening of the can of worms and
an unnecessary risk of violating the rape
shield rule.

If the State decides to embark on this very
risky undertaking, the lower court must be
very firm in not permitting the defendant to
testify in a manner that invades the protec-
tions of the rape shield rule. The wiser
course for the State, especially in light of all
the other evidence, would be not to introduce
anything relating to the conversation the de-
fendant alleges occurred concerning the Plan
B purchase, As stated by the majority, if the
State does, then the defendant is only

permitted ... to ask MLY., on cross-exami-

nation, whether she told him she had sex
with someone else during the seventy-two
hour period before he purchased the Plan

B pill for her. Under the circuit court’s

ruling, Mr. Rankin is required to accept

M.Y’s response of “yes” or “no” without

further questioning in this area.

T am authorized to state that Chief Justice
Loughry joins me in this opinion.

806 S.E.2d 448

GASTAR EXPLORATION INC. and Rona
Lee McCardle, Defendants Below,
Petitioners

ve

Gary RINE, as the Administrator of the
Estate of Okey Franklin Yoho, et al.
Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No, 16-0962
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 4, 2017
Filed: October 19,2017

William M. Herlihy, Esq., Spilman Thomas
& Battle, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Matthew P. Heiskell, Esq., Spilman Thomas
& Battle, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for Petitioner Gastar Explora-
tion Inc. .

Jeffrey A. Kimble, Esq., Robinson &
McElwee, PLLC, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
Counsel for Petitioner Rona Lee McCardle

Jeffrey V. Kessler, Esq., Berry, Kessler,
Crutchfield, Taylor & Gordon, Moundsville,
West Virginia, Counsel for Respondents
Gary Rine, individually and as the Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Okey Franklin Yoho;
Dinah A. Gray; and Carl Smith

Teresa C. Toriseva, Esq., Joshua D. Miller,
Esq., Toriseva Law, Wheeling, West Virgi-
nia, Counsel for Respondents Betty Pyzell;
Norma Ash; Debbie Rine; LeRoy Yoho; Kim
Yoho; Ron Yoho; Jodi Yoho; Vicki Williams;
Connie Streight; Nancy Brown; Mark Camp-
bell; and Harold Yoho

Justice Ketchum:

HH This case concerns a 1977 deed and
its effect on the ownership of a one-half
interest in oil and gas beneath a tract of land
in Marshall County, West Virginia. When a
deed is ambiguous, a court must weigh extra-
neous evidence like thé conduct of the grant-
or and grantee to determine. the parties’
intent. A court must also adopt any reason-
able interpretation of the deed most favor-
able to the grantee.

796

As we diseuss below, we find the 1977 deed
is ambiguous and of such doubtful meaning
that reasonable minds disagrée as to the
deed’s intent, The Cireuit Court of Marshall
County incorrectly found the deed was clear,
and incorrectly found that the grantors did
not convey the one-half interest in oil and gas
to the grantee. Because the deed was ambig-
uous, the cireuit court should have consid-
ered the parties’ conduct after delivery of the
deed—namely that the grantors to the deed
stopped paying taxes on the oil and gas
interest while the grantee started paying tax-
-es, We reverse the circuit court’s decision,
and remand the case for entry of a jndgment
in favor of the grantee.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Before 1957, Clifford and Beulah Franklin
owned the entire tract of land in dispute in
this case, Then, by a deed dated January 30,
1957, the Franklins conveyed the tract to
Okey and Frances Yoho in fee simple, with
one important reservation: the Franklins “ex-
cepted and reserved” for themselves an undi-
vided one-half interest in the oil and gas
underlying the tract. They conveyed the oth-
er one-half interest to the Yohos. The 1957
deed provided:

There is further excepted and reserved

from this conveyance an undivided one-half

(1/2) interest in the oil and gas, including

gas storage rights, within and underlying

the land hereby conveyed, together with
such mining rights and privileges as may
be necessary and convenient to the opera-
tion thereof for production, storage or ob-
.Servation of said oil and gas and the strata
containing the same.
Henee, the parties agree that, under the 1957
deed, the Yohos owned the surface of the
tract and owned a one-half undivided interest,
in the oil and gas.

Over the next 20 years, tax documents in
the record indicate that the Yohos paid real
1. A 2016 affidavit in the record suggests that Ms.

McCardle is now Rona Rice. However, the par-

ties, pleadings, tax records, and 1977 deed all
use Ms, Rice’s name as it was in 1977. Hence,

estate taxes on that one-half oil and gas
interest. For instance, tax records for 1976
show that the Yohos were assessed taxes on
the tract and the one-half oil and gas inter-
est, described in the tax records as “102,080
[acres] Long Run &% O&G.” The tax records
also show the Franklins were assessed taxes
on the other: one-half interest, described as, “
% Interest] 102.08 [acres] O&G Long Run.”

In a deed dated April 5, 1977, the Yohos
conveyed the tract to defendant Rona Lee
McCardle The 1977 deed conveyed to Ms.
McCardle “the same property conveyed to
Okey F. Yoho and Frances A. Yoho, his wife,
by Clifford E. Franklin and Beulah Franklin,
his wife, by deed dated the 80 day of Janu-
ary, 1957L.]”

However, the parties dispute the meaning
of language in the 1977 deed regarding the
one-half interest in the oil and gas. The
serivener of the 1977 deed included an “ex-
cepted and reserved” paragraph identical,
word-for-word, to that contained in the
Franklins’ 1957 deed, which provided:

There is further excepted and reserved
from this conveyance an undivided one-half
(1/2) interest in the oil and gas, inéluding
gas storage rights, within and underlying
the land hereby conveyed, together with
such mining rights and privileges as may
be necessary and convenient to the opera-"
tion thereof for production storage or ob-
servation of said oil and gas and the strata
containing the same,

In an affidavit, Ms. McCardle stated that it
was her “understanding and intention” that
she purchased one-half of the oil and gas
beneath the tract. Over the next 30-plus
years after 1977, tax documents indicate that
Ms. McCardle' paid real estate‘taxes on the
one-half oil and gas interest. For instance,
tax-records from 1978 show Ms. McCardle
was assessed taxes on land described as
“102.080 [acres] Long Run & 1/2'0&G.” In
her affidavit, Ms. McCardle stated that since
1977 she has paid all of the real estate taxes
due on the surface estate and on the one-half
oil and gas interest.

for purposes of clarity and simplicity, throughout

this opinion we refer to the defendant as Ms.
McCardle.

The same tax documents show that, after
conveying the property to Ms. McCardle in
1977, the Yohos did not pay real estate taxes
on the oil and gas interest. An entry in the
1977 tax records indicates that the Yohos
were initially assessed taxes on the tract,
However, the tax entry for the Yohos has a
line scrawled through with the handwritten
notation, “to Rona Lee McCardle .DB 465 p.
256 4-5-77 Pd$39500,” The 1977 deed from
the Yohos to Ms. McCardle is on record in
the Marshall County Clerk’s Office in Deed
Book 4665 at page 256, There are no entries in
the tax records suggesting that the Yohos
paid taxes on the tract or the one-half oil and
gas interest after 1977.

In 2008, Ms. McCardle entered into an oil
and gas lease with defendant Gastar Explo-
vation, Ine, The lease’ covers the Marshall
County tract described in the 1977 deed be-
tween Ms, McCardle and the Yohos. Gastar
subsequently drilled a well and began ex-
tracting oil and gas from beneath the tract,

Litigation over the 1977 Deed

Mrs, Yoho died in 1979; Mr. Yoho died
intestate in 1997, Then, in 2018, sixteen years
after Mr. Yoho's death, plaintiff Gary Rine
‘was appointed administrator of the estate of
Mr. Yoho, to act on behalf of Mr. Yoho’s
heirs (a group we hereafter call “the Yoho
heirs”),

On October 15, 2018, plaintiff Rine and the
Yoho heirs filed a complaint? against defen-
dants Gastar and Ms. McCardle. The Yoho
heirs asserted that, in the 1977 deed, the
Yohos retained ownership of the one-half un-
divided interest in the oil and gas. In other
words, the heirs contend that the Yohos did
not convey their one-half interest to Ms.
McCardle, and that the interest eventually
passed on to the Yoho heirs. The Yoho heirs
alleged that the defendants have trespassed
on their oil and gas interest and, by taking
oil and gas from the ground, engaged in
conversion. As relief, the Yoho heirs sought

2. Mr. Rine was the husband of one of Mr. Yoho's
daughters, Linda Rine, who died after the com:
plaint was filed. Mr. Rie asserts he is acting as a
direct heir of Mr. Yoho as well as the administra-
tor of his estate. Amendments to the original
complaint added other heirs of Mr. Yoho to this
suit. Additionally, the circuit court appdinted an

797

compensatory damages, an injunction, and an
order creating a lease between, the heirs and
Gastar. :

The Yoho heirs later amended the corn-
plaint to request a declaratory judgment in-
terpreting the 1977 deed. In December 2015,

‘the parties informed the circuit court that

they had agreed to dispose of the declaratory
judgment action while staying the remainder
of the case. Based upon the parties’ agree-
ment, the ‘circuit court stayed discovery on.

‘all claims except the declaratory judgment

dlaim.

In April 2016, the Yoho heirs filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment on the declara-
tory judgment claim and stated’ that no
genuine question of material fact existed re-

. garding ownership of the disputed oil. and

gas vights.? The Yoho heirs argued that the
1977 deed conveyed only the surface of the
tract to Ms. McCardle and unambiguously
reserved to the Yohos ownership in the one-
half interest in the oil and gas. The defen- -
dants opposed the motion and asked the
circuit court to enter judgment in the ‘de-
fendarits’ favor. The defendants argued that
the 1977 deed was ambiguous, and argued
that the parties’ actions in the decades after
delivery of the deed left no question that
the Yohos believed Ms. McCardle was the
sole owner of the one-half interest after
1977,

In an order dated September 18, 2016, the
circuit court: decided that the 1977 deed was
clear and unambiguous. The circuit court de-
clared that the Yohos kept for themselves
the one-half interest in the oil and gas and
that the deed “did not convey any mineral
interest” to Ms, McCardle. Defendants Gas-
tar and Ms, McCardle now appeal the circuit
court’s declaratory judgment order.

“IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM The salutary purpose of a declara-
tory judgment action is to resolve legal ques-

attomey as guardian ad, litem for any unknown
heirs to Mr. Yoho's estate.

3. The plaintiffs’ motion actually provided that
“the Defendants are’ entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” We presume this was a drafting
error by plaintiffs’ counsel.

798

tions. Hence, “{a] circuit court’s entry of a
declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.” *
Further, the parties agreed below that no
genuine questions of material fact existed
and that the circuit court’s summary judg-
ment ruling centered upon the legal interpre-
tation of the 1977 deed. We likewise review a
circuit court’s summary judgment order de
novo.®

TN The term “de novo” means “Anew;
afresh; a second time.” ° “We have often used
the term ‘de novo’ in connection with the
term ‘plenary.’... Perhaps more instructive
for our present purposes is the definition of
the term ‘plenary, which means ‘[flull, entire,
complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified’ ”7
“We therefore give a new, complete and un-
qualified review to the parties’ arguments
and the record before the circuit court.”

HMM sBecause the purpose of a sum-
mary judgment proceeding is to expedite the
disposition of a case and avoid unnecessary
litigation and trials, we proceed with the
well-established rule in mind that a summary
judgment may be rendered against the party
moving for judgment and in favor of the
opposing party even though the opposing
party has made no motion for summary judg-
ment, As this Court once stated,

When it is found from the pleadings, depo-

sitions and admissions on file, and the affi-

4, Syllabus Point 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608,
466 S.E.2d 459 (1995).

5, Syllabus Point 1, Painter v, Peavy, 192 W.Va.
189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s
entry of summary judgment is reviewed de
novo.”),

6. Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 193 W.Va. 687, 693,
458 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1995) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 435 (6th ed. 1990)).

7. State ex rel. Clark v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
W.Va., Inc., 203 W.Va. 690, 701, 510 S.E.2d 764,
775 (1998) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1154
(6th ed. 1990)).

8. Blackrock Capital Inv. Corp. v. Fish, 239 WNa.
89, 799 S.B.2d 520, 526 (2017).

9. Syllabus Point 6, Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp.
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 151 W.Va. 1062,
158 S.E.2d 212 (1967), Accord, Syl. pt. 2, Arnold
v, Palmer, 224 W.Va. 495, 686 S.E.2d 725 (2009);

davits of any party, in a summary judg-
ment proceeding under Rule 56 of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
that a party who has moved for summary
judgment in his favor is not entitled to
such judgment and that there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact, a sum-
mary judgment may be rendered against
[the moving] party in such proceeding?

Il.

ANALYSIS

TN The parties agree that, in 1957, the
Yohos purchased a one-half undivided inter-
est in oil and gas. The parties’ arguments
center upon the interpretation of the 1977
deed, and whether the oil and gas interest
‘was conveyed by the Yohos to Ms. McCardle.

“Deeds are subject to the princi-
ples of interpretation and construction that
govern contracts generally.” 1 “[TJhe polar
star that should guide us in the construction
of deeds as of all other contracts is, what was
the intention of the party or parties making
the instrument, and when this is determined,.
to give effect thereto, unless to do so would
violate some rule of property.” #

Ws When a deed expresses the in-
tent of the parties in clear and unambiguous
language, a court will apply that language

Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Miller,
228 W. Va. 739, 742, 724 S.B.2d 343, 346 (2012).
See also, Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Olga Coal Co.,
159 W.Va. 385, 393-94, 223 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1976)
(Under Rule 56(c) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, “the authorities agree that a
court may enter judgment for a party opposing a
summary judgment motion even though no
cross-motion has been made.”); Fed.R.Civ.Pro.
Rule 56(f) [2010] (“After giving notice and a
reasonable time to respond, the court may: (1)
grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; (2)
grant the motion on grounds not raised by a
party; or (3) consider summary judgment on its
own after identifying for the parties material
facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”’). See
generally, Charles Alan Wright, et al., 10A Feder-
al Practice & Procedure § 2720.1 (4th Ed. 2017).

10, Syllabus Point 3, Faith United Methodist
Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan, 231
W.Va. 423, 745 S.B.2d 461 (2013).

11. Syllabus, Totten v. Pocahontas Coal & Coke
Co., 67 W.Va, 639, 642, 68 S.E. 373, 374 (1910).

without resort to rules of interpretation or
extrinsic evidence. “In construing a deed,
will, or other written instrument, it is the
duty of the court to construe it as. a whole,
taking and considering all the parts together,
and giving effect to the intention of the par-
ties wherever that is reasonably clear and
free from doubt, unless to do so will violate
some principle of law inconsistent there-
with.” “A valid written instrument which
expresses the intent of the parties in plain
and unambiguous language is not subject to
judicial construction or interpretation but will
be applied and enforced according to such
intent.” 8

Hs However, when a deed is incon-
sistent, confusing or ambiguous on its face, a
court must look to extrinsic evidence of the
parties’ intent to construe the deed. It has
been a longstanding rule that, “For ascer-
tainment of the intent of the parties to a
deed in which the description of the subject
matter is inconsistent, contradictory and am-
biguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible.” 1
A trial court may look to a variety of evi-
dence, including the parties’ conduct before
and after delivery of the deed, to discern the
parties’ intent:

12, Syllabus Point 1, Maddy v. Maddy, 87 Wa.
581, 105 S.E. 803 (1921).

13. Syllabus Point 1, Cotiga Development Co. v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d
626 (1962). See also, Syllabus Point 3 of Cotiga
Development (“It is not the right or province of a
court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear mean-
ing and intent of the parties as expressed in
unambiguous language in their written contract
or to make a new or different contract for
them.”); Pocahontas Land Corp. v. Evans, 175
W.Va. 304, 308, 332 S.E.2d 604, 609 (1985)
(“Where the intent of the parties is clearly ex-
pressed in definite and unambiguous language
‘on the face of the deed itself, the court is re-
quired to give effect to such language and, ordi-
narily, will not resort to parole or extrinsic evi-
dence.”).

14, Syllabus Point 1, State v. Herold, 76 W.Va.
537, 85 S.E. 733 (1915),

15. Syllabus Point 2, Snider v. Robinett, 78 W.Va.
88, 88 S.B, 599 (1916). See also Syllabus Point
10, Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 80 W.Va.
187, 94 S.B. 472 (1917) ("Proper parol evidence
is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a
written contract, and a latent ambiguity is one
which arises not upon the words of the instru-

799

To enable the court to construe a deed or
other writing, ambiguous on its face, it is
always permissible to prove the situation
of the parties, the circumstances surround-
ing them when the contract was entered
into and their subsequent conduet giving it
a practical construction, but not their ver-
bal declarations. But, if a latent ambiguity
is disclosed by such evidence, such for
instance as that the terms of the writing
are equally applicable to two or more ob-
jects, when only a certain one of them was
meant, then prior and contemporaneous
transactions and collocutions of the parties
are admissible, for the purpose of identify-
ing the particular object intended.*

Hs The parties dispute whether the
1977 deed is ambiguous. The mere fact that
parties do not agree to the construction of a
deed does not alone render it ambiguous.
“The term ‘ambiguity’ is defined as language
reasonably susceptible of two different mean-
ings or language of such doubtful meaning
that reasonable minds might be uncertain or
disagree as to its meaning.” © Whether a
deed is ambiguous is a question of law to be
determined by the court.’ “Where there is

ment, as looked at in themselves, but upon those
words when applied to the object sought to be
accomplished by the contract or the subject
which they describe,”); Syllabus Points 2 and 3,
Bank v. Catzen, 63 W.Va. 535, 60 S.E. 499 (1908)
(When, in attempting to apply a deed to its
subject matter or the parties thereto, a latent
ambiguity of any kind is disclosed, parol evi-
dence is admissible to a limited extent, to show
what was intended, not only by the instrument
considered as a whole, but also by particular
words or clauses thereof.” And, “Parol evidence,
admissible for such purpose, is generally limited
to the subject-matter, the relation of the parties
thereto, their prior and subsequent conduct, their
situation, and all the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the execution of the instru-
ment.”),

16. Syllabus Point 4, Estate of Tawney v. Colum-
bia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 219 W.Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d
22 (2006).

17. See Syllabus Point 1, Berkeley Cty. Pub. Serv.
Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of Am., 152 WWa. 252, 162
S.E.2d 189 (1968) (‘“The mere fact that parties do
not agree to the construction of a contract does
not render it ambiguous. The question as to
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
law to be determined by the court.”).

800

ambiguity in a deed, or where it admits of
two -constructions, that one will be adopted
which is most favorable to the grantee.” 8

The Yoho heirs assert that the 1977 deed
is clear and unambiguous, and that the deed
conveyed only the surface to defendant
McCardle. The Yoho heirs argue ‘the 1977
deed “excepted and reserved from this con-
veyance” the one-half interest in oil and gas,
They argue that the phrase “this convey-
ance” can only mean the 1977 conveyance,
and can only be interpreted to mean that the
Yohos (and now their heirs) retained owner-
ship of the one-half oil and gas interest.

Defendants Gastar and Ms. McCardle as-
sert that the 1977 deed is ambiguous and is
reasonably susceptible to several interpreta-
tions. In the opening paragraphs of the deed,
the Yohos conveyed to Ms. McCardle “the
same property” they bought in 1957, The
opening paragraphs are in harmony with
West Virginia law, which presumes grantors
in a deed intend to convey ownership of the
whole interest that the grantors had power
to dispose of.!9 Yet, in a later paragraph, the
Yohos “further excepted and reserved” an
undivided one-half inteyest in the oil and gas.
Because the later paragraph is ideritical to
the oil-and-gas paragraph in the Franklins’

18, Syllabus Point 6, Paxton v. Benedunt-Trees Oil
Co., 80 W.Va. 187, 94 S.E, 472 (1917). See also
Syllabus Point 3, W.Va. Dep't of Highways v.
Farmer, 159 W.Va. 823, 226 §.B.2d 717 (1976)
(“Where an ambiguity exists in a deed, the lan-
guage of such deed will be construed most
strongly against the grantor.”’); Sally-Mike Prop-
erties v. Yokum, 175 W.Va. 296, 300, 332 S.E.2d
597, 601 (1985) (“[I]n cases involving reserva-
tions and exceptions, any remaining doubt as to
intent should be resolved in the grantee’s fa-
vor.”’).

19. See W.Va. Code § 36-1-11 [1923] (‘When any
real property is conveyed or devised to any per-
son, and no words of limitation are used in the
conveyance or devise, such conveyance or devise
shall be construed to pass the fee simple, or the
whole estate or interest, legal or equitable, which
the testator or grantor had power to dispose of,
in such real property, unless a contrary intention
shall appear in the conveyance or will.”’),

20. The defendants also assert that the words
““excepted” and “reserved” were used inter-
changeably by the Yohos in the 1977 deed, there-
by creating farther ambiguity. At common law,
an “exception” was defined as the “retention of
an existing right or interest, by'and for the grant-

1957 deed, the defendants argue that the
intent of the ‘Yohos is ambiguous: they might
have been referring to the one-half interest
already reserved by the Franklins in 1957, or
they might haye meant to keep for them-
selves the one-half interest,

As further support for their assertion that
the deed is ambiguous, the defendants point
out that the 1977 deed makes reference to
two different “out-parcel” transactions. In
both out-parcel references, the Yohos used.
the words “excepted and reserved” in a con-
fusing manner. First, in 1905, a predecessor
deeded 22.4 acres from the original tract to
another individual. The 1977 deed says that
the Yohos were “[elxcepting and reserving
.+. and not intending hereby to convey” that
same 22.4 acres. Second, the 1977 deed “ex-
cepted and reserved a parcel of .800 acres”
that the Yohos conveyed to other individuals
in 1970, The defendants argue that the Yohos
could not “except and reserve” to themselves
these two out-parcels already owned by oth-
ers. Hence, when the Yohos said they “fur-
ther excepted and reserved” from the 1977
deed a one-half interest in the oil and gas,
the defendants contend the Yohos might
have been referring to the one-half interest
already owned by the Franklins since 1957.20

or, in real property being granted to another.”
Black's Law Dictionary 683 (10th Bd. 2014). See
also, Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W.Va,
900, 915, 62 S.B.2d 337, 346 (1950) (An excep-
tion exists when the grantor “withdraws from
the operation of the conveyance some part of the
thing granted, which but for the exception would
have passed to the grantee under the general
description{.]”), A. “reservation” is “[tJhe cre-
ation of a new right or interest ... by and for the
grantor[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 1500 (10th
Ed, 2014), See also, Erwin, 134 W.Va. at 915, 62
S.B,2d at 346 (A reservation is made when the
grantor creates ‘some new thing to himself issu-
ing out of the thing granted, and not [before] in
esse[.]”) “Though technically there is a distinc-
tion between an exception and a reservation,
they are often regarded as synonymous.” Erwin,
134 W.Va. at 914, 62 S.E.2d at 345, We therefore
decline to consider this assertion by the defen-
dants. :

As to the portion of the defendants’ appeal in
which they support their argument regarding the
ambiguity created by the interchangeable use of
the words “exception” and “reservation,” the
defendants cite as authority a 2012 order from
the circuit court in a different case. The defen-
dants contend the circuit court violated princi-

The defendants also offered the opinion of
an expert on deeds, This expert noted that
the 1977 deed was a general warranty deed.
Under West Virginia law, a grantor who
delivers a general warranty deed provides an
actual warranty of the title and has an obli-
gation to defend the grantee against any
claims regarding the property.2! Because of
the obligations attending a general warranty
deed, the expert said it is extremely impor-
tant for a grantor to delineate with specificity
what land interest is, and what is not, being
transferred by the deed. The defendant’s ex-
pert was of the opinion that the exception
and reservation of the one-half interest in oil
and gas in the 1977 deed referred solely to
the interest owned by the Franklins, The
expert concluded that the Yohos included the
exception and reservation as a way to :limit
their general warranty. In other words, the
Janguage used by the Yohos established they
were not giving a warranty of title. to the
one-half interest owned by the Franklins, but
that they otherwise were conveying their
own one-half interest to Ms. McCardle.

After reviewing the parties’ arguments, we
find that the 1977 deed is ambiguous. The
deed was ‘poorly drafted, the language of the
document is uncertain, and reasonable minds
may disagree as to just what was conveyed.
The deed does not express the precise inten-
tions of the Yohos regarding the one-half
interest in the oil and gas underlying the
tract. The Yohos may have intended to retain
ownership of the one-half interest, as ‘the
Yoho heirs assert, The Yohos may have in-
tended to convey ownership of the one-half
interest, as the defendants assert. Or, this
Court discerns a‘third interpretation that
neither party advanced: the Yohos may have
intended to convey ownership of only a one-
quarter interest. Specifically, since the Yohos
received a: one-half interest from the Frank-
lins in 1957, when the Yohos stated that they
“excepted and reserved” a one-half interest
from their 1977 conveyance, an accurate ac-
counting might be that they retained a half of

ples of stare decisis when it failed to apply hold-

ing in the 2012 order in its 2016 order in this
case. We see no merit in the defendants’ position.

21, See W.Va, Code § 36-4-2 [1923]. -

801

a half, or a one-quarter interest in the oil and
gas,

HM oOnr ultimate conclusion, then, is that
the 1977 deed is ambiguous. We must there-
fore look to extrinsic evidence to understand
the parties’ intent. Further, because of the
ambiguity introduced into the deed by the
Yohos, our law compels us to adopt the deed
interpretation that is most favorable to the
grantee, Ms. McCardle.

To ‘divirie the intent of the parties to an
ambiguous deed, and to give the deed a
practical construction, a court may consider
the circumstances surrounding the parties
when the deed was negotiated and delivered,
and may consider their subsequent conduct,”
The record contains sixty-two pages of land
tax records showing the parties’ conduct be-
fore and after delivery of the 1977 deed.
These tax records show that, before the Yo-
hos conveyed the property in 1977, the Yohos
paid taxes on the one-half oil.and gas inter-
est.3 After the Yohos conveyed the property
to Ms. McCardle in 1977, Ms. McCardle paid
the taxes on the same one-half oil and gas
interest while the Yohos stopped paying the
taxes altogether.

The parties agreed before the circuit court
that no questions of material fact existed on
the declaratory judgment issue, and both
parties asked for a declaratory judgment as a
matter of law in their favor, On its face and
within its four corners, a reasonable person’
can interpret the 1977 deed provision regard-
ing ownership of the one-half oil and gas
interest in several’ diametrically opposed
ways. We therefore find the 1977 deed provi-
sion to be ambiguous as a matter of law. We
must construe’ that provision in favor of the
grantee (Ms. McCardle), against the grantors
(the Yohos), and in light of the parties’ con-
duet, in paying taxes before and after delivery
of the deed in April 1977. In sum, on the
record presented by the parties, there is no
doubt that the Yohos intended to convey the
oil and gas interest to Ms, McCardle in 1977,

22. Syllabus Point 2, Snider v, Robinett, 78 W:Va.
88, 88 S.E, 599 (1916).

23, The record suggests that, at the same time,
the Franklins also paid taxes on the other one-
-half oil and gas interest. -

802

The circuit court therefore erred in grant-
ing a declaratory judgment in favor of the
heirs of Mr. Yoho. On this record, the circuit
court should have entered judgment in favor
of the defendants, Gastar and Ms. McCar-
dle

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court erred in finding that the
1977 deed was unambiguous and in granting
“a declaratory judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs, Mr. Rine and the other Yoho heirs. We
therefore reverse the circuit court’s Septem-
ber 18, 2016, order, and remand the case for
entry of judgment in favor of the defendants,

Gastar and Ms. McCardle.

Reversed and remanded.

806 S.E.2d 458
STATE EX REL. STATE of West.
Virginia, Petitioner
ve
The Honorable Ronald E. WILSON, Judge

_of the Cireuit Court of Brooke County;
and Floyd Ference, Respondents

No. 17-0449
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: October 11, 2017
Filed: October 19, 2017
24, The defendants also asserted on appeal that
the circuit court should have ruled in their favor
on grounds of laches, estoppel, or adverse pos-

session. Alternatively, the defendants contend the
circuit court should have dismissed the Yoho

heirs’ action for failure to join all individuals
who may have had an interest in the oil and gas
interest. Our ruling makes these issues moot, and
we decline to consider them.

Joseph E. Barki, III, Esq., Brooke County
Prosecuting Attorney, Office of the Brooke

804

Justice Ketchum:

. In this original proceeding in prohibition,
the State of West Virginia, through the
Brooke County Prosecuting Attorney, chal-

"lenges the Circuit Court of Brooke County’s
sua sponte dismissal, with prejudice, of an
indictment. The indictment charged the re-
spondent, Floyd Ference (“defendant”), un-
der W.Va. Code, 61-6-24(b) [2009], with the
felony offense of threatening to commit a
terrorist act.

‘This Court concludes that the circuit court
exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the
indictment and that relief in prohibition is
warranted. We, therefore, prohibit enforce-
ment of the April 17, 2017, order which dis-
missed the indictment. The indictment is re-
instated, and this matter is remanded to the
‘ireuit ‘court for further proceedings!

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

On September 8, 2016, Lieutenant L. G.
Skinner, Jr., of the Wellsburg Police Depart-
ment, filed a criminal complaint against the
defendant in the Brooke County Magistrate
Court, The complaint stated that on Septem-
ber 1, 2016, the defendant, a custodian at
Wellsburg Middle School, was dissatisfied
with his list of assigned duties and work
schedule and told two other custodians that,
if more work were placed on him, he would
“get a gun and start taking people out.” The
complaint further stated that the defendant
asked one of the other custodians “what kind
of handgun was the best.”? The magistrate
found probable cause to issue a warrant for
the defendant’s arrest, charging him with the

1, In addition to challenging the dismhissal of the
indictment, the State asks in ifs petition for a
writ of prohibition that the Judge be disqualified
from presiding over any remand proceedings in
the defendant’s case. However, this Court has
already ruled that, insofar as the Stafe’s petition
secks the disqualification of the Judge, relief is
refused,

|
County Prosecuting Attorney, Wellsburg,
West Virginia, Counsel for -the Petitioner

Robert G. MeCoid, Esq., MeCamic, Sacco

& McCoid, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia,
Counsel for Respondent Floyd Ference

felony offense of threatening’ to commit a

terrorist act under W.Va. Code, 61-6-24.

A preliminary heating was later conducted
in magistrate court during which witnesses
testified and arguments by the State and the
defense were heard. As recounted by the
State, both custodians provided substantially
similar testimony at the preliminary hearing,
maintaining that the defendant stated: “If
they give me any more work to do and I can’t
do it, I am going to get a gun and I’m going
to come in here and shoot people and their
friends and their family.” Probable cause was
found, and the defendant was bound over to
the circuit court.

In November 2016, the Brooke County
grand jury returned a single Count indict-
ment, no, 16-F-72, charging that on or about,
September 1, 2016, the defendant

did commit the felony offense of “Threats

to Commit a Terrorist Act” when he did

unlawfully, knowingly and willfully threat-

en to commit a terrorist act, with or with-
out the intent to commit the act, to wit:

Floyd Ference, an employee of the Brooke

County School System, while at Wellsburg

Middle School, did threaten to get a: gun

and start shooting people at the school, in

‘violation of Chapter 61, Article 6, Section
- 24() of the West Virginia Code and
” against the peace and dignity of the State.

The charging language of the indictment
substantially followed the provisions of W.Va.
Code, 61-6-24(b) [2009], which states:"

(b) Any person who knowingly and will-
fully threatens to commit a terrorist act,
with or without the intent to commit the
act, is: guilty of a‘felony and, upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be fined not less than
$5,000 nor more than $25,000 or confined
in a state correctional facility for not less
than one year nor more than three years,
or both?

2. According to the complaint, the defendant had
been told by his supervisor in August 2016 that
his work was unsatisfactory and that he was not
to leave early from work. The defendant also
worked as a custodian at Franklin Primary
School.

3, The 2009 version of W.Va. Code, 61-6-24(b),
applicable here, constitutes an expansion by the
West Virginia Legislature of the original statute.

Although no motion to dismiss the indict-
ment was filed by defense counsel, the circuit
court entered an order, sua sponte, on April
17, 2017, dismissing the indictment with prej-
udice, The order was entered shortly before
the defendant's trial which was scheduled to
begin on April 24, 2017. The circuit court
concluded:

[T]he alleged terrorist activity stated in

the indictment was aimed at shooting indi-

viduals at the school, instead of conduct
aimed at the civilian population as a whole

and not conduct that was directed at a

branch or level of government as a whole,

Therefore the court concludes that [a]

threat to individual persons at the school

does not constitute a terrorist act within
" the meaning of West Virginia Code § 61-6-

24 because the threatened action was not

directed at intimidating or coercing the

conduct of a branch or level of govern-

ment, .

The State filed a petition for a writ -of
prohibition in this Court seeking to prohibit
enforcement of the April 17, 2017, order. The
defendant filed a response, and on August 80,
2017, this Court issued a rule to show cause
why the relief requested by the State should
not be granted.

IL Standard for Relief in Prohibition

HM This Court has original jurisdiction in
prohibition proceedings pursuant to art,
VIII, § 3, of The Constitution of West Virgi-
nia, In considering whether to grant relief in
prohibition, this Court stated in the syllabus
point of State ew rel, Vineyard v. O'Brien,
100 W.Va. 168, 180 S.E. 111 (1925): “The writ,
of prohibition will issue only in clear cases
where the inferior tribunal is proceeding
without, or in. excess of, jurisdiction.” Accord
State ex rel. Rubenstein v. Bloom, 235 W.Va.
70, 72, 771 S.H.2d 717, 719 (2015).

HMMM Here, the State contends that the
circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in dis-
missing the indictment, We therefore look to
the following guidelines set forth in syllabus

Under the original statute, W.Va, Code, 61-6-
24(b) [2001], the offense of threatening to com-
mit a terrorist act could be established “without
the intent to commit the act.” Under the 2009
version, the offense can be established “with or

805

point 4 of State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199
W.Va. 12, 488 S.E.2d 12 (1996):

In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition.for cases not
involving an. absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is-claimed that the lower
tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers,
this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (6) whether the lower
tribunal’s order raises new and important
problems or issues of law of first impres-
sion. These factors are general guidelines
that serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether’ a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue, Although all
five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
that the third factor, the existence of clear
error as a matter of law, should be given
substantial weight. .

Accord State ex rel. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
McGraw, 234 W.Va. 687, 691-92, 769 S.B.2d
476, 480-81 (2015); State ex rel. Fillinger v,
Rhodes, 230 W.Va. 560, 564, 741 S.E.2d is,
122 (2013). ~

IM. Discussion

TM Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 58-5-30
[1998], the State, on the application of the
Attorney General or the prosecuting attor-
ney, is afforded a direct appeal to this Court
from an order dismissing an indictment. A
direct appeal, however, pertains to instances
where the indictment was dismissed for spe-
cifie deficiencies, such as the failure to put
the defendant on fair notice of the offense
charged and the elements. thereof, or the
failure to enable the defendant to later assert
a plea of acquittal or conviction. See State ew

without the intent to commit the act.” (emphasis
added), Neither version of the statute alters the
element of a criminal defendant's intent to make
the threat itself.

806

rel. Lorenaetti v. Sanders, 285 W.Va. 358,
867, 774 S.E.2d 19, 38 (2015). Here, the in-
dictment charging the defendant with threat-
ening to commit a terrorist act complied with
those requirements.‘ Nevertheless, the cir-
euit court dismissed the indictment, with
prejudice, for other reasons, i.¢., the nature
of the defendant's alleged threat as described
to the grand jury. Consequently, the State’s
petition for a writ of prohibition is the appro-
priate method to challenge the circuit court’s
ruling. See State ex rel. State of W.Va. v.
Gustke, 205 W.Va. 72, 76, 516 S.B.2d 288, 287
(1999) (The writ of prohibition “is an appro-
priate method for the State to challenge the
dismissal of an indictment.”).

During a pretrial hearing conducted in
January 2017, the circuit court noted that the
defendant’s statement apparently fit the ele-
ments of W.Va. Code, 61-6-24(b) [2009],
which the circuit court stated are straightfor-
ward. Those elements are set forth in subsec-
tion (a)(8) of the statute as follows:

(a)(8) “Terrorist act” means an act that
Ist
(A) Likely to result in serious bodily

injury or damage to property or the envi-

ronment; and

(B) Intended to:

(i) Intimidate or coerce the civilian popu-
lation;

i) Influence the policy of a branch or
level of government by intimidation or
coercion;

ii) Affect the conduct of a branch or
level of government by intimidation or
coercion; or

(iv) Retaliate against a branch or level of
government for a policy or conduct of the
government,

The defendant raised no constitutional is-
sue before the circuit court or any alleged
impropriety in the grand jury proceedings.
There was no motion to dismiss the indict-
ment. The circuit court dismissed the indict-
ment, sua sponte, solely on the basis of the
4. The indictment tracked the language of W.Va.

Code, 61-6-24(b) [2009]. Syllabus point 3 of State

v. Hall, 172 W.Va. 138, 304 S.E.2d 43 (1983),
holds: “An indictment for a statutory offense is

sufficient if, in charging the offense, it substan-
tially follows the language of the statute, fully

indictment in relation to the grand jury tran-
script. The transcript reveals that only one
witness testified, Lieutenant L. G. Skinner,
Jv., who filed the criminal complaint which
set forth the alleged threat made by the
defendant, The circuit court concluded, with-
out taking evidence, that the offense could
not have occurred because the alleged terror-
ist activity stated in the indictment “was
aimed at shooting individuals at the school
instead of conduct aimed at the civilian popu-
Jation as a whole and not conduct that was
directed at a branch or level of government
as a whole.”

Manifestly, the State did not present its
entire case against the defendant before the
grand jury. The State insists that the grand
jury testimony the circuit court reviewed was
only presented to the extent necessary to
satisfy the probable cause standard. See
State ex rel. Pinson v. Maynard, 181 W.Va.
662, 665, 3838 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1989) (The
funetion of the grand jury “is not to deter-
mine the truth of the charges against the
defendant, but to determine whether there is
sufficient probable cause to require the de-
fendant to stand trial.”). In fact, the record
reveals a number of potential witnesses avail-
able to either the State or the defense who
later could have shed light on the defendant’s
work history and the alleged threat. Those
witnesses include the Wellsburg Middle
School principal; officials at Franklin Pri-
mary School where the defendant also
worked as a custodian; Lieutenant Skinner;
other investigating or arresting officers; and
the two custodians at Wellsburg Middle
School.

Moreover, prior to the circuit court’s sua
sponte dismissal, the defendant filed a num-
ber of pretrial motions, including a motion
for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence
and a motion for notice of the State’s intent
to use evidence under Rule 404(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence. The mo-
tions sought information to which the defen-

informs the accused of the particular offense
with which he is charged and enables the court
to determine the statute on which the charge is
based.” Accord syllabus point 3, Ballard v. Dil-
worth, 230 W.Va, 449, 739 S.E.2d 643 (2013).

dant claimed entitlement. The information
sought potentially could have been made
available to the cireuit court regarding its
consideration of the indictment and the na-
ture of the State’s case against the defen-
dant. That opportunity was lost, however,
when the circuit court preemptively dis-
missed the indictment,®

IM Nevertheless, the defendant asserts
that, in dismissing the indictment, the circuit
court fulfilled its role as gatekeeper,
“charged with ensuring that any indictment
returned by the grand jury is based upon a
valid quantum of proof.” However, this Court
held in the syllabus of Barker v. Fox, 160
‘W.Va. 749, 238 S.H.2d 235 (1977): “Except,
for willful, intentional fraud the law of this
State does not permit the court to go behind
an indictment io inquire into the evidence
considered by the grand jury, either to deter-
mine its legality or its sufficiency.” (emphasis
added) Accord syl. pt. 2, State ea rel. Pinson
v. Maynard, 181 W.Va. 662, 383 S.B.2d 844
(1989). See Howard B. Lee, The Criminal
Trial in the Virginias, § 19 24 ed. Michie
1940) (citing West Virginia cases for the prin-
ciple that, when an indictment is returned by
a grand jury, “the presumption is that it was
found upon sufficient and proper evidence”
and that, if there was any legal evidence
before the grand jury, “the court will not
inquire into its sufficiency; nor will it quash
the indictment in such a case because some
illegal evidence was also received.”),

In State v. Yocum, 288 W.Va. 439, 759
§.E.2d 182 (2014), this Court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to the terrorism-threat
statute but reversed the defendant's convic-
tion on the basis of insufficiency of the evi-
dence at trial. Yocum involved a domestic
violence incident after which the defendant
threatened to sexually assault the daughter

5. In addition, Rule 7 of the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure entitled “‘The indictment
and the information” provides in subsection (f)
that a circuit court “may direct the filing of a bill
of particulars.” In State v. Counts, 90 W.Va. 338,
342, 110 S.E. 812, 814 (1922), this Court not.
“A bill of particulars is for the purpose of fu
nishing details omitted from the accusation or
indictment, to which the defendant is entitled
before trial.” Here, that option was not pursued
prior to the dismissal of the indictment.

807

of the arresting police officer. Based on the
comment, the defendant was tried and con-
vieted of threatening to commit a terrorist
act. In Yoowm, this Court found no merit in
the defendant’s claim that the statute was
void-for-vagueness and unconstitutional.
However, because the defendant’s threat was
directed at a single individual, the arresting
officer, this Court concluded that the State
failed to prove, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 61-6-
24, that the defendant’s threat was directed
at intimidating or coercing a branch or level
of government. This Court noted, in Yocwm,
that the defendant made the comment while
“under arrest, handeuffed, and in the patrol
car.” 238 W.Va, at 447, 759 S.E.2d at 190,
Yoewm, which concerned a conviction follow-
ing a jury trial and not a challenge to the
indictment, is dissimilar to the current mat-
ter.6

A sufficiency of the evidence challenge re-
garding a jury trial was rejected by this
Court in State v, Randles, 2015 WL 5125780
(Memorandum Decision, W.Va. Aug. 31,
2015). In Randles, this Court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction of threatening to com-
mit a terrorist act where the defendant stat-
ed that she would bomb the Town of Sutton,
West Virginia, if the juvenile proceedings
against her granddaughter were not dis-
missed. We stated in Randles:

[T]he jury could have reasonably conclud-
ed that petitioner’s statement was intended
to affect the judicial branch of government
by intimidation or coercion because peti-
tioner specifically stated that she would
bomb the town of Sutton if her grand-
daughter’s case was not dismissed. * * *
The statute under which petitioner was
convicted does not require petitioner to
specifically intend to commit the act or
that someone perceive the threat as real.

6. Syllabus point 2 of State v. Yocum holds:

A threat to sexually assault the child of an
individual police officer by a person who is
under arrest, handcuffed, and in the patrol car,
does not constitute a terrorist act within the
meaning of West Virginia Code § 61-6-
24(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2010) because the threatened
action was not directed at intimidating or
coercing the conduct of a branch or level of
government.

808

HMM Here, the defendant is charged with
threatening that, if more work were placed
on him, he would “get a gun and start taking
people out.” Any variation of the alleged
statement, eg., that he threatened to get a
gun “and start shooting people at the school,”
isa matter of proof which would have fol-
lowed had the case proceeded in due course.”
The circuit court's determination that the
defendant’s threat “to individual persons at
the school” was not directed at a branch or
level of government is simply not accurate.
Wellsburg Middle School, Franklin Primary
School, and the defendant’s employer, the
Brooke County Board of Education, are gov-
ernment entities. Moreover, unlike Yocum,
the defendant's threat was not directed at a
specific individual. Instead, the defendant,
made the alleged threat to unspecified others
in response to his duties being changed and
also in an attempt to influence future
changes, The government entity which made
the changes and which would make any fu-
ture changes was the Brooke County school
system.8 .

This Court observed in State ew rel. Miller
v, Smith, 168 W.Va. 745, 751, 285 S.E.2d 500,
504 (1981), that “historically the grand jury
serves a dual function: it is intended to oper-
ate both as a sword, investigating cases to
bring to trial persons accused on just
grounds, and as a shield, protecting citizens
against, unfounded ‘malicious or frivolous
prosecutions.” Accord State ew rel. Starr v.
Halbritter, 183 W.Va. 350, 358-54, 895 S.H.2d
778, 776-77 (1990). In the current matter, the
cireuit court improperly interceded and sup-

7. Another variation of the defendant's alleged
threat is to the effect that: “If they give me any
more work to do and I can’t do it, I am going to
get a gun and I’m going to come in here and
shoot people and their friends and their family.”

8, W.Va, Code, 62-2-8 [1923], provides:

Where an intent to injure, defraud, or cheat
is required to constitute an offense, it shall be
sufficient, in an indictment or accusation
therefor, to allege generally an intent to injure,
defraud, or cheat, without naming the person
intended to be injured, defrauded, or cheated,

* and it shall be sufficient, and not deemed a
variance, if there appear to be any intent to
injure, defraud, or cheat the United States, or
any state, or any county, corporation, officer or

person,
(emphasis added)

planted the function of the grand jury by
dismissing the indictment, swa sponte, with
prejudice. Consequently, the State was de-
prived of its right to prosecute the case and
seek a valid conviction.

IV. Conclusion

Hs The State may seek relief in prohibi-
tion in this Court where the circuit court's
action has deprived the State of its right to
prosecute a criminal case or deprived the
State of a valid conviction. Syl. pt. 1, State ew
vel. Games-Neely v. Yoder, 287 W.Va. 801,
787 S.E.2d 572 (2016); syl. pt. 1, State ex rel,
Sorsaia v. Stowers, 286 W.Va. 747, 783
§.B.2d 867 (2016); syl. pt. 5, State v, Lewis,
188 W.Va, 85, 422 S.H.2d 807 (1992). The
State has shown deprivation in that context,
and relief in prohibition is warranted,

We, therefore, prohibit enforcement of the
April 17, 2017, order pursuant to which the
circuit court dismissed the indictment against
the defendant. The indictment is reinstated,
and this matter is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings.

Writ granted.

9. We note one instance, not applicable here,
where a circuit court is authorized to sua sponte
dismiss an indictment. Rule 48(b) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure states in
part: :

If there is unnecessary delay of more than
‘one year in presenting the charge to a grand
jury or in filing an information against a defen-
dant who has been held to answer to the
circuit court, that court shall, on its own mo-
tion, dismiss the indictment, information or
complaint, without prejudice.

In the present case, no delay occurred. The
defendant’s alleged threat occurred in September
2016, and the indictment was returned in No-
veniber 2016, Moreover, Rule 48(b) requires a
dismissal without prejudice, unlike the dismissal
of the indictment “with prejudice” in this matter,

806 S.E.2d 465

Sergeant Robert E. FRUTH, I,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

vw

Greg A. POWERS, Sheriff of Mason Coun-
ty, and Mason County Deputy Sheriff's
Civil Service Commission, Defendants
Below, Respondents

No, 16-0797
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 19, 2017
Filed: October 28, 2017

Michael N, Eachus, Esq., Eachus & Fin-
ley, Esq., Gallipolis, Ohio, and Mark L.
MeMillian, Esq., Mark McMillian, Attorney

812
at Law, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Petitioner

Karen H. Miller, Esq., Joseph L. Amos,
Jr., Esq., Miller & Amos, Attorneys at Law,
Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondent.

“Walker, Justice:

Sergeant Robert E. Fruth, II, was dis-
charged from employment with the Mason
County Sheriffs Department based on two
separate incidents—he engaged in a verbal
altercation with his spouse in public while on
duty and he intentionally wrecked his police
erviser. He challenges the finding of just
cause for the discharge made by the Mason
County Civil Service Commission for Deputy
Sheriffs (“the Commission”) that was upheld
by the Cireuit Court of Mason County by
order entered on July 29, 2016. Sgt. Fruth
also claims he was denied procedural due
process and that the Commission's practices
and procedures were flawed. We find no
error and affirm the decision of the circuit,
court,

IL FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND *

The incidents resulting in disciplinary ac-
tion against Sgt. Fruth took place shortly
after his then-wife, Melissa Searls (formerly
Melissa Fruth), informed him that she want-
ed a divorce, At the time, Ms. Searls was
employed with the. Mason County Office of
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as an
Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). On
February 10, 2011, Sgt. Fruth, while on duty
with the Sheriffs Department, contacted an
EMS dispatcher to ask where he could find
Ms. Searls, He also inquired as to the make
and model of the personal vehicle of her
coworker, Trey Anderson, Sgt. Fruth be-
lieved his wife was involved romantically with
Mr, Anderson,

Later that day, while still on duty, Sgt,
Fruth confronted Ms. Searls and Mr.
Anderson in a restaurant -parking lot. Ms.

1, .Concerned for Sgt, Fruth’s mental health, Dep-
uty Wilson subsequently sought the help of the
Sheriff's Department and filed a mental hygiene
petition concerning Sgt. Fruth because Sgt.
Fruth expressed suicidal thoughts, showed Depu-

Searls'was on duty and her.assigned ambu-
lance was in the parking lot, as was Mr.
Anderson’s personal vehicle, While armed
and in uniform, Sgt. Fruth reportedly
blocked Mr. Anderson’s personal vehicle with
his police erviser and engaged in a loud,
verbal altercation with Ms. Searls and Mr,
Anderson. Ms. Searls and Mr. Anderson
claimed that Sgt. Fruth made threats toward
them, including “I'll blow your F-ing head
off? and “You will get yours. I promise.”

According to Deputy Robert, Wilson, Sgt.
Fruth’s former co-worker, Sgt. Fruth came
to his home later that day and said that he
“had to do something to get [his wife’s] at-
tention.” ! The next day, in the early morning
hours, Sgt. Fruth again contacted the EMS
dispatcher and learned that Ms, Searls’s am-
bulance -would be dispatched on the next
emergency call, Shortly thereafter, Sgt,
Fruth was involved in a single car accident in
his police cruiser. Sgt. Fruth later claimed he
was attempting to avoid a deer in the road.
According to Sgt, Clifford Varian, one of Sgt,
Fruth’s co-workers and the first to arrive on
the scene, Sgt. Fruth told him that his wife
was going to be the EMS responding to the
scene and requested that Sgt, Varian relay to
Ms. Searls that “everything will be okay” and
to ask “if they could work things. out.” Sgt.
Fruth was hospitalized following the acci-
dent,

Later that day, Ms. Searls filed a Domestic
Violence Petition (DVP) against Sgt. Fruth,
Sgt. Fruth was immediately suspended with
pay, pending the disposition of the DVP.
Soon after, Sgt. Fruth was charged with two
criminal violations of the DVP for attempting
to contact Ms. Searls through other persons
and for possession of ammunition..On Febru-
ary 24, 2011, the Sheriff suspended Sgt.
Fruth without pay pending disposition of the
criminal charges.

The DVP was dismissed on June 22, 2011,
by the Family Court of Mason County. After
a hearing on the merits, the family court
coneluded that Ms. Searls had failed to prove

ty Wilson a “suicide note,” and appeared to be
consuming alcohol while also abusing prescrip-
tion drugs. The petition was later withdrawn to
allow Sgt. Fruth to seek treatment voluntarily,

her allegations of domestic violence or abuse
by a preponderance of evidence. The criminal
charges relating to alleged violations of the
DVP, however, were still pending at that
time. Accordingly, Sgt. Fruth remained on
suspension without pay.

On January 4, 2012, Sgt. Fruth’was indict-
ed for reckless driving and felony destruction
of property based on the allegation that he
had intentionally wrecked his police cruiser.
On May 8, 2012, the Sheriff instructed Cpl.
Forrest Terry with the Sheriff's Department
to conduct an internal investigation of Sgt.
Fruth’s conduct as a law enforcement officer
and to determine whether or not he should
continue to séive in that capacity. At that
time, Sgt. Fruth remained on unpaid suspen-
sion.

Immediately following a pretrial hearing
on the criminal charges against him, Sgt.
Fruth requested reinstatement on May 29,
2012, In support of the request, Sgt, Fruth
claimed that his “court cases” had been dis-
missed—ostensibly referencing that he had
agreed to plead no contest to a misdemeanor
charge of failure to maintain control of a
vehicle in exchange for the dismissal of the
felony destruction of property and reckless
driving charges. This was the first request

for reinstatement made by Sgt. Fruth in the

fifteen months since his suspension. The
Sheriff denied the request and explained that
the decision was based on (1) the February
11, 2011 vehicle accident, which the depart-
ment, after investigation, deemed intentional;
(2) the anticipated plea to the misdemeanor
offense of failure to maintain control; and (8)
the pending criminal charges for violation of
the DVP, Sgt. Fruth then filed a motion for
immediate reinstatement with the Commis-
sion.

On June 6, 2012, Sgt. Fruth’s plea of no
contest to failure to maintain control of a

vehicle was accepted by the circuit court and .

the felony charges were dismissed. In the
same Motion and Order [for] Dismissal, the
pending criminal charges for violation of the
DVP also were dismissed.

On June 12, 2012, the Sheriff continued
Sgt. Fruth’s suspension pending further in-
vestigation of the events on February 10 and
11, 2011. Although notified of his right to

813

have the matter heard by the Commission,
Sgt. Fruth did not request. and was not af-
forded a predisciplinary hearing for his con-

tinued suspension. On September 7, 2012,

Cpl. Terry issued his investigative report,
recommending termination based on Sgt.
Fruth’s on-duty conduct.

In the meantime, the Commission held a
hearing on Sgt. Fruth’s motion for immediate
reinstatement on September’ 18, 2012. The
Commission limited its inquiry to the Febru-
ary 11 and 24, 2011 suspensions, which spe-
cifically concerned only the filing of the DVP
and the’ associated criminal charges, all of
which had ‘been dismissed. Accordingly, the
Commission ordered Sgt. Fruth’s reinstate-
ment and back pay from June 5, 2012, the
date the plea deal was entered.

On September 14, 2012, the investigative
report recommending termination was for-
warded to the Sheriff who agreed with Cpl.
Terry’s conclusion, The Sheriff notified Sgt,
Fruth and his legal counsel that he was
recommending that Sgt. Fruth be discharged
and informed them of his right to a predisci-
plinary hearing following an investigation
pursuant to West Virginia Code .§ 17-14C-3,
Sgt. Fruth exercised that right and on Octo-
ber 10, 2012, the Deputy Sheriffs’ Hearing
Board (“Hearing Board”) conducted a hear-
ing and unanimously agreed with the dis-
charge of Sgt. Fruth. Sgt. Fruth appealed to
the Commission claiming, among other
things, that his procedural due process rights
were violated because he was. not afforded
predisciplinary hearings prior to his suspen-
sions. He also asserted that thé Sheriff had
merely “re-packaged” the ‘allegations the
Commission had already dismissed. The
Commission overturned the discharge and
ordered that Sgt. Fruth be reinstated with
back pay, finding that there were procedural
infirmities and that the Sheriff's investigation
did not contain any new grounds warranting
discharge.

The Sheriffs Department appealed the
Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of
Mason County. Sgt. Fruth likewise appealed,
arguing that his back pay award should date
from February 24, 2011, when he was sus-
pended without a predisciplinary hearing, as

814

opposed to the date his plea of no contest
was entered. The circuit court remanded the
case to the Commission for a full evidentiary
hearing to cure any procedural due process
violations and to allow evidence on all allega-
tions stemming from the Sheriff's investiga-
tion.

The Commission held a full evidentiary
hearing in January 2014 and concluded,
unanimously, that just cause existed for Sgt.
Fruth’s discharge. However, the initial deci-
sion lacked findings of fact or conclusions of
law. Sgt. Fruth appealed to the Circuit Court,
of Mason County, asserting various assign-
ments of error, including the failure to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
circuit court again remanded the case to the
Commission, ordering it to make sufficient
findings to allow for meaningful appellate
review. Both parties submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
Commission entered an order with findings
and again concluded that Sgt. Fruth’s termi-
nation was supported by just cause. Specifi-
cally, the Commission found that either the
public altercation in the restaurant parking
lot while on duty or the intentional wreck of
his police cruiser alone provided just cause
for termination.

Upon review of the Commission’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit
court affirmed the Commission's decision on
July 29, 2016. Sgt. Fruth then appealed to
this court.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
HM Sct. Fruth appeals the order of the
Circuit Court of Mason County affirming the

2, Syl. Pt. 1, Mangum v. Lambert, 183 W.Va. 184,
394 S,B.2d 879 (1990).

3. Syl. Pt. 3, Messer v. Hannah, 222 W. Va. 553,
668 S.E.2d 182 (2008).

4, Specifically, Sgt. Fruth’s eleven assignments of
error are as follows: (1) the disciplinary action
included allegations and proceedings too remote
in time in violation of the principles in State ex
rel Fillinger v. Rhodes, 230 W. Va. 560, 741
S.E.2d 118 (2013); (2) the Commission errone-
ously admitted the expert testimony of Stephen
Cogar, Esq.; (3) the Commission erroneously ad-
mitted Cpl. Terry's investigative report as sub-
stantive evidence; (4) the Commission erroneous-
ly admitted Ms. Searls’s prior testimony before

Commission’s decision to uphold his dis-
charge from employment. We have held that
“{a] final order of a deputy sheriffs’ civil
service commission, based upon findings not
supported by the evidence, upon findings
contrary to the evidence, or upon a mistake
of law, will be reversed and set aside by this
Court upon review.” Further, the findings
of the Civil Service Commission are governed
by the following deferential standard:

An appellate court may reverse a deci-
sion of the Civil Service Commission for
Deputy Sheriffs, W. Va. Code § 7-14-1
(1991), et seg. as clearly wrong or arbi-
trary or capricious only if the Commission
used a misapplication of the law, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation that
ran counter to the evidence before the
Commission, or offered an explanation that
was so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of Commission expertise?

Ill. ANALYSIS

While Sgt. Fruth identifies eleven separate
assignments of error, in essence they pres-
ent the following bases for appeal: (1) he was
denied procedural due process; (2) the Com-
mission’s practices and procedures were
flawed; and (8) the Commission’s finding of
just cause was “clearly wrong, arbitrary and
capricious, misapplied the law, and [was] con-
trary to the evidence.” We address each of
these issues in turn.

A. Procedural Due Process

Sgt. Fruth alleges that his procedural due
process rights were violated. First, Sgt.

the Hearing Board; (5) the Commission arbi-
trarily applied the Rules of Evidence to the bene-
fit of the Sheriff; (6) his right to procedural
process due under W. Va. Code § 7-14C-3 was
violated; (7) the Commission erred by adopting
the Sheriff's proposed order verbatim; (8) the
circuit court abused its discretion when it re-
manded the matter for a full evidentiary hearing;
(9) the Commission’s finding of just cause for his
termination was clearly wrong, arbitrary and ca-
pricious, was a misapplication of the law, and
contrary to the evidence; (10); the Commission
admitted evidence relating to a domestic vio-
lence action and the motor vehicle accident in
violation of the principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel; and (11) cumulative error.

Fruth contends that he was denied predisci-
plinary hearings and thus, the Commission
failed to resolve the allegations against him
within the statutory time frames he contends
are required under SER Fillinger v.
Rhodes.® We assume that Sgt. Fruth is refer-
encing Rhodes for its reliance on language
from State ew vel. Sheppe v. West Virginia
Bad. of Dental Examiners.6 In Sheppe, this
Court held that “[ijn the absence of a specific
time limit, the failure of a state board or
agency to take decisive action within a rea-
sonable time, upon a matter properly before
it, will be assumed to be a refusal of the
action sought.”? In Rhodes, we employed
that language when examining the failure of
the West Virginia Board of Examiners for
Registered Professional Nurses to conduct a
hearing to resolve complaints within a rea-
sonable time, We ultimately determined that
the nursing board effectively had denied the
petitioner an opportunity to be heard in op-
position to the allegations against her by
repeatedly continuing scheduled hearings.$

Hon appeal to this Court, Sgt. Fruth
contends that because he was not provided
predisciplinary hearings, the Commission
failed to take decisive action within its statu-
tory time frame® and therefore lacked the
authority to subject him to discipline. Al-
though Sgt. Fruth arguably set out this issue

5. 230 W. Va. 560, 741 S.B.2d 118 (2013).

6. 147 W. Va. 473, 128 8.B.2d 620 (1962)

1. Id, at syl, pt. 2.

8. Rhodes, 230 W. Va. at 567, 741 S.B.2d at 125.

9. As discussed below, West Virginia Code § 7-14-
7(a) provides that when a sheriff's deputy de-
mands it, the Commission [must hold a public
hearing] ‘within a period of ten days from the
filing of the charges in writing or the written
answer thereto, whichever shall last occur.”

10. In his Petition for Appeal to the circuit court,
Sgt. Fruth raised as an assignment of error that:

The multiple and duplicitous proceedings
held against the Petitioner relating to identi-
cal charges of misconduct, conduct which
was remote in time (and even preceded the
Petitioner’s employment by the Mason County
Sheriff's Department) combined with the pro-
cedural delays occasioned by Respondent
Sheriff, effectively bar the action at issue as
being in violation of the principles announced

815

generally as an assignment of error to the
circuit court below, Sgt. Fruth did not argue
or discuss it in his petition for appeal to the
circuit court. Thus, the circuit court neither
considered this assignment of error, nor
made any conclusions or findings relating to
it. We deem errors waived where they are
not argued in the briefs, but are merely
mentioned in passing.’ Moreover, “[ojur
general rule is that nonjurisdictional ques-
tions ... raised for the first time on appeal,
will not be considered.” ? Because this issue
is raised for the first time on appeal to this
Court, we deem it waived.

I Second, Sgt. Fruth raises the lack of
predisciplinary hearings to challenge not only
his discharge, but also the circuit court’s
authority to remand for a full evidentiary
hearing. Below, Sgt. Fruth raised violations
of the process he alleges he was due under
West Virginia Code § 7-14C-3. This statutory
provision addresses the hearing board proce-
dure, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) If the investigation or interrogation
of a deputy sheriff results in the recom-
mendation of some punitive action, then,
before taking punitive action the sheriff
shall give notice to the deputy sheriff that
he or she is entitled to a hearing on the
issues by a hearing board. The notice shall

by our Supreme Court in State ex. rel. Filling-

er v. Rhodes, 230 W.Va. 560, 741 8.E.2d 118

(2013).
However, Sgt. Fruth made no indication as to
which Rhodes principles he was referring, or
why he believed proceedings against him were in
violation of Rhodes despite being factually inap-
posite to the circumstances in that case. Indeed,
Sgt. Fruth made no further mention of Rhodes
whatsoever beyond the assignment of error at the
beginning of his petition to the circuit court.

11. See Syl, Pt. 6, Addair v. Bryant, 168 W. Va.
306, 284 S.E.2d 374 (1981) (“Assignments of
error that are not argued in the briefs on appeal
may be deemed by this Court to be waived.”); In
re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 625 n.2, 558
S.E.2d 620, 624 n.2 (2001) (“Because the errors,

* as assigned in the Appellant's petition for appeal,
were neither assigned nor argued in the Appel-
lant’s brief, they are hereby waived.").

12. Hoover v. W. Va. Bd, of Med., 216 W. Va. 23,
26, 602 S.E.2d 466, 469 (2004) (quoting Shaffer
v. Acme Limestone Co., Inc., 206 W. Va. 333, 349
1.20, 524 S.E.2d 688, 704 n.20 (1999).

816

state the time and place of the hearing and
the issues involved and be delivered to the
deputy sheriff not less than ten days prior
to the hearing, An official record, including
testimony and exhibits, shall be kept of the
hearing.
(b) The hearing shall be conducted by
the hearing board of the deputy sheriff
except that in the event the recommended
punitive action is discharge, suspension or
reduction in rank or pay, and the action
has been taken, the hearing shall be pursu-
ant to the provision of section. seventeen
[§ 7-14-17], article fourteen of this chapter,
if applicable, Both the sheriff and the dep-
uty sheriff shall be given ample opportuni-
ty to present evidence and argument with
- respect to the issues involved.!8
Conversely, the Sheriff argues that West Vir-
ginia Code § 7-14C-8 directs that the hearing
in this case be conducted in accordance with
West Virginia Code § 7-14-17, West Virginia
Code § 7-14-17 addresses hearings before
the commission:
In every case of such removal, discharge,
suspension or reduction, a copy of the
statement and the reasons therefor and of
the written answer thereto, if the deputy
desires to file such written answer, shall be
furnished to the civil service commission
and entered upon its records. If the deputy
demands it, the civil service commission
shall grant a public hearing, which hearing
shall be held within a period of ten days
from the filing of the charges in writing or
the written answer thereto, whichever
shall last occur,

Thus, the Sheriff argues that because Sgt.

Fruth failed to request a hearing after his
February 2011 suspensions, he was not enti-
tled to a hearing before the Commission until
his discharge was recommended as a result
of the investigation, However, an analysis of
Sgt. Fruth’s right to a hearing under either,
or both, of these statutes is moot in light of
the circuit court’s remand for a full evidentia-
ry hearing, As recognized by the circuit court

13, W. Va, Code § 17-14C-3.

14, Ashley v. McMillian, 184 W. Va, 590, 593, 402
S.E.2d 259, 262 (1991) (citing Clarke v. W. Va.
Ba, of Reeents 166 W. y. Va. 702, 279 S.B.2d 169
(1981), .

below, we have held that “[t]he appropriate
remedy for procedural due process errors in
an administrative hearing is to remand the
case with directions to remedy the defect.”
The circuit court remanded the case for a full
evidentiary hearing in order to cure the er-
rors raised by both parties. Through this
remand to the Commission, any defects in
procedural due process were cured and Sgt.
Fruth has now been afforded the full extent
of the ‘process he was due, Sgt. Fruth did not
raise any further procedural due process er-
rors after the circuit court's remand and has
not argued or demonstrated that the remand
was insufficient to cure the defects in proce-
dural due process. Accordingly, we find that
Sgt. Fruth’s assignments of error relating to
the predisciplinary hearings are now moot.

B. Commission Practices and Procedures

Several of Sgt, Fruth’s assignments of er-
ror relate to the Commission’s practices and
procedures, Specifically, Sgt. Fruth chal-
lenges (1) the Commission’s wholesale adop-
tion of the Sheriff's proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law; (2) the Commission’s
failure to abide by the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence; and (8) the Commission’s failure to
apply the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel. We address these assignments
of error in turn,

HM On remand to the Commission to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
both parties were provided the opportunity
to propose such findings and conclusions for
the Commission’s review and adoption. Al-
though it invites criticism to adopt one par-
ty’s proposal verbatim, it is not error unless
the law or facts are inaccurate. We have held
that “[als an appellate court, we concern
ourselves not with who prepared the findings
for the circuit court, but with whether the
findings adopted by the circuit court accu-
rately reflect the existing law and the trial
vecord.” ® Further, as we have explained,
“{the court’s] action in adopting the findings
15. State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W. Va,

208, 214, 470 S.E.2d 162, 168 (1996).

of facts prepared by counsel for [one party]
operate[s] to make such findings the formal
findings of the court.... and such findings of
facts, as so found by the court, should not be
rejected, vacated or disturbed for ‘that rea-
son.” 16 We find these standards applicable in
Commission proceedings, but do not find any
errors of law or inaccurate factual findings
on the record before us,

Sgt. Fruth’s specific issues with the order
are stylistic rather than substantive—Sgt.
Fruth disagrees with the inferences that may
be made from the order’s wording. Specifical-
ly, Sgt. Fruth contends that the order as
drafted by the Sheriff insinuates that Sgt.
Fruth was uncooperative. with the investiga-
tion by refusing to meet with those investi-
gating his conduct. Sgt. Fruth takes issue
with that insinuation because he believes it
raises the inference that refusing to meet
with investigators was misconduct, Sgt.
Fruth also takes issue with the order gener-
alizing that Sgt. Fruth was offered a hearing
“pursuant to W. Va. Code” rather than refer-
encing a specific code section. He contends
that this is one of several procedural aspects
that were generalized in the order in an

effort to sweep the due process violations

under the rug.

We neither find that the Commission’s
findings in this regard are contrary to the
evidence presented nor that the findings re-
flect patently inaccurate facts or law. Rather,
the Commission’s findings reflect its view of
the evidence presented, regardless of Sgt.
Fruth’s disagreement with whatever infer-
ences may be drawn from those findings. The
Commniission was free to adopt portions’ of
Sgt. Fruth’s proposed order and declined to
do*so. As noted above, we apply a highly
deferential standard of review to the factual
findings of the Commission, and the law as
stated is correct.17 Therefore, it is not revers-
ible error for the Commission to have
adopted the Sheriff's proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law.as its own.

Hl Next, we consider whether it was im-
proper for the Commission to have admitted
evidence allegedly in violation of the West

16, South Side Lumber Co. v. Stone Constr. Co.,
151 W. Va. 439, 442, 152 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1967).

817

Virginia Rules of Evidence. Sgt, Fruth raises
three distinct admissions that he claims run
afoul of our Rules of Evidence: (1) the “ex-
pert” testimony of Steven Cogar, Esq., who
‘was permitted to testify as to police investi-
gation procedures and the propriety of Sgt.
Fruth’s discharge; (2) Ms. Searls’s prior

“ statements in violation of the hearsay rule;

and (8) the investigative report of Cpl. Terry
in violation of the hearsay rule.

West Virginia Code § 7-14-6(1) provides
that the civil service commission for deputy
sheriffs in each county “shall preseribe and
enforce rules and regulations for carrying
into effect the provisions of this article.” Ac-
cordingly, the Commission in this case opted
to use the West Virginia-Rules of Evidence
“as a guide only.” While Sgt. Fruth argues
that admission of these items of evidence did
not comport with our Rules of, Evidence, he
has not cited any authority obligating the
Commission to have strictly followed those
rules. Our review of the record does not
indicate that the Commission's application of
its rules was arbitrary or wholly benefitted
one party. Because the Commission was enti-
tled to apply. its own rules as necessary to
conduct its investigation into whether just
cause existed for Sgt. Fruth’s termination,
we do not find that the Commission erred in
admitting this evidence and therefore need
not analyze whether the evidence would be
admissible under the Rules of Evidence,

HE Finally, Sgt. Froth argues that
the Commission violated the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel by admitting
evidence related to the DVP, his criminal
charges for violation of the DVP, and his
indictment for wrecking the police cruiser.
He ‘alleges that res judicata and collateral
estoppel operate to preclude the Commission
from considering these criminal charges be-
eause: they were previously dismissed or
were resolved by a plea deal. Res judicata
and collateral estoppel both preclude relitiga-
tion of matters that have previously been
decided, As to the applicability of res judica- °
ta, we have explained that _

17. Sée Syl. Pt. 3, Messer, 222 W. Va. at 558, 668

S.E.2d at 187.

818

[blefore the prosecution of a lawsuit may
be barred on the basis of res judicata,
three elements must be satisfied. First,
there must have been a final adjudication
on the merits in the prior action by a court
having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Sec-
ond, the two actions must involve either
the same parties or persons in privity with
those same parties, Third, the cause of
action identified for resolution in the sub-
sequent proceeding either must be identi-
cal to the cause of action determined in the
prior action or must be such that it could
have been resolved, had it been presented,
in the prior action.

Similarly, as to collateral estoppel, we have
found:

Collateral estoppel will bar a claim if
four conditions are met: (1) The issue pre-
viously decided is identical to the one pre-
sented in the action in question; (2) there
is final adjudication on the merits of the
prior action; (8) the party against whom
the doctrine is invoked was a party or in
privity with a party to a prior action; and
(4) the party against whom the doctrine is
raised had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior action.!®

Generally res judicata applies in a subse-
quent action between the same parties while
collateral estoppel more broadly applies to
issues. As we have explained this distinction:

Res judicata generally applies when
there is a final judgment on the merits
which precludes the parties or their privies
from relitigating the issues that were de-
cided or the issues that could have been
decided in the earlier action. A claim is
barred by res judicata when the prior
action involves identical claims and the

18, Syl. Pt. 4, Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 498 S.E.2d 41 (1997),

19, Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459
S.E.2d 114 (1995).

20. Id. at 9, 459 S.E.2d at 120 (citations omitted),

21. See syl. pt. 3, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459
S.E.2d 114 (1995) (“[Flor purposes of [collateral
estoppel], issues and procedures are not identical
or similar if the second action involves applica-
tion of a different legal standard or substantially
different procedural rules, even though the factu-
al settings of both suits may be the same.”).

same parties or their privies. Collateral
estoppel, however, does not always require
that the parties be the same. Instead, col-
lateral estoppel requires identical issues
raised in successive proceedings and re-
quires a determination of the issues by a
valid judgment to which such determina-
tion was essential to the judgment.”

HE Here, Sgt. Fruth contends that
either res judicata or collateral estoppel
would operate to prevent the Commission
from approving his discharge because a cir-
euit court has already addressed his criminal
charges on the merits through dismissal or
acceptance of his plea of no contest. Howev-
er, Sgt. Fruth’s argument misses several im-
portant aspects that would preclude the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
First, the criminal justice system is an entity
and jurisdiction that is separate and distinct
from the Commission with notably different
standards of proof. Second, the Sheriff was
not a party to any of the proceedings relating
to his criminal convictions.” Finally, the dis-
missal of or plea to the criminal charges has
no bearing on employment. Speaking to this
exact issue, we have concluded that “[t]he
dismissal of criminal charges that prompted
initial disciplinary action against a public em-
ployee does not preclude a public official
from administering further disciplinary ac-
tion, including discharge.” Further, we
have held that “[sleriously wrongful conduct
by a civil service employee can lead to dis-
missal even if it is not a technical violation of
any statute. The test is not whether the
conduct breaks a specific law, but rather
whether it is potentially damaging to the
22. See id. at 13, 459 S.E.2d at 124 (holding that

there was no privity so as to apply res judicata

because the Department of Health and Human

Resources is granted statutory authority to inves-

tigate complaints and take action against its per-

sonnel, while the prosecuting attorney's interest
is in having guilt or innocence determined under
the applicable criminal law and the prosecuting

attorney has no control over the litigation of
charges made by the Department).

23. Syl. Pt. 2, Neely v. Mangum, 183 W. Va. 393,
396 S.E.2d 160 (1990).

rights and interests of the public.” * Based
on this precedent, it would have been im-
proper under these circumstances for the
Commission to apply res judicata or collater-
al estoppel to preclude evidence of the DVP,
the criminal charges for violation of the DVP,
and the criminal charges that arose from
wrecking his police cruiser.

C. Just Cause
As to the merits of his discharge
from employment, Sgt. Fruth contends that
the Sheriff failed to prove just cause for the
termination. In considering the propriety of a
discharge of a deputy sheriff, we have held:
W. Va. Code, 7-14-7 (1981), requires that
dismissal of a deputy sheriff covered by
civil service be for just cause, which means
misconduct of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the
public, rather than upon trivial or inconse-
quential matters, or mere technical viola-

tions of statute or official duty without a

wrongful intention.

In examining the decision of the Commission,
we may only set aside that finding as “arbi-
trary or capricious” if “the Commission used
a misapplication of the law, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation that ran counter to
the evidence before the Commission, or of-
fered an explanation that was so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of Commission exper-
tise.” 25 While the procedural aspects of this
case are complex, the facts surrounding the
two incidents on which the discharge was
based are more straightforward.

The record demonstrates that ample evi-
dence was presented to the Commission to
support a finding of just cause for Sgt.
Fruth’s discharge. The Commission found
that either the public argument in the restau-
rant parking lot or the intentional wrecking
of his police cruiser would have been suffi-
cient to discharge Sgt. Fruth for just cause.
Sgt. Fruth did not contest that he and Ms,

24. Syl. Pt. 5, Mangum v. Lambert, 183 W. Va.
184, 394 S.E,2d 879 (1990),

25. Id. at syl. pt. 2.
26. Messer, 222 W. Va. at 558, 668 S.E.2d at 187.

819

Searls were both on duty and in a public
parking lot at the time of their altercation.
The Commission heard evidence of threats
made to Ms. Searls and Mr. Anderson. The
Commission heard the testimony of the EMS
dispatcher who confirmed that Sgt. Fruth
had contacted him while on duty as a means
to locate Ms. Searls and to ascertain the
make and model of Mr. Anderson’s vehicle.
Taken together, it was not against the weight
of the evidence that the Commission found
Sgt. Fruth’s conduct in the restaurant park-
ing lot sufficient to discharge him from em-
ployment.

Alternatively, the Commission determined
that the intentional wrecking of the police
quiser also provided sufficient grounds for
Sgt. Fruth’s discharge. The EMS dispatcher
testified that Sgt. Fruth again used him as a
resource to establish which ambulance would
be called out to the next emergency scene.
Considered in totality, Sgt. Fruth’s state-
ments to Deputy Wilson on his need to “get
[his wife’s] attention,” Deputy Wilson’s testi-
mony as to Sgt. Fruth’s emotional issues and
potential substance abuse, the “suicide note,”
and testimony that the skid marks in the
road could be consistent with either an inten-
tional or unintentional wreck, it is not con-
trary to the evidence for the Commission to
have concluded that Sgt. Fruth intentionally
wrecked his cruiser. There was abundant
evidence heard by the Commission to sup-
port its finding that Sgt. Fruth was not fit to
continue as a law enforcement officer. Sgt.
Fruth’s disagreement with the conclusions
drawn from the evidence presented does not
render them arbitrary, capricious, or clearly
wrong. We find no grounds on which to
overturn the Commission’s findings.”

Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find no re-
versible error and affirm the circuit court’s
decision to uphold the Commission’s decision
27, Because we find no error with the circuit

court’s order, we find no cumulative error exists
upon which to base a reversal of such order.

pO

820

to discharge Sgt, Fruth from employment as
a Mason County deputy sheriff.

* Affirmed.

806 S.E.2d 476

IPACESETTERS, LLC, Garnishee
Below, Petitioner

v

Kace DOUGLAS and Randi Dampha, et
al. Plaintiffs Below, Respondents

No. 16-0844
Supreme Court of ‘Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: October 8, 2017
Filed: October 27, 2017

daa

Ancil G. Ramey, Esq., Hannah, C. Ramey,
Esq., Stacey L, Richards-Minigh, Esq., Step-
toe & Johnson PLLC, Huntington, West Vir-
ginia Counsel for the Petitioner

James F, Companion,. Hsq., Yolanda G.
Lambert, Esq., Schrader, Byrd & Compan-
ion, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia and
Brent W. Wolfinbarger, Esq,, Charles Town,
West Virginia Counsel for the Respondents

-LOUGHRY, Chief Justice:

The petitioner, iPacesetters, LLC (“peti-
tioner”), seeks relief from the circuit court's
August 11, 2016, order through which it de-
nied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and
awarded summary judgment in favor of the
respondents, Kace Douglas and.Randi Dam-
pha, individually and on behalf of others (“re-
spondents”), in this ancillary statutory pro-
ceeding in aid of collection on a judgment.
Asserting it was statutorily entitled to a jury
trial and that summary judgment was in
error due to a material issue of fact, the
petitioner seeks a reversal and either entry
of judgment in its favor or a remand for
further proceedings before the cireuit court.
Upon our review of the parties’ briefs, the
arguments of counsel, the appendix record
submitted, and the applicable law, we affirm
the circuit court’s summary judgment ruling.

L Facts and Procedural Background
This appeal arises out of a proceeding in

aid of execution against the petitioner
brought by the respondents under West Vir-

822

ginia Code § 88-5-10 (2011 & Supp. 2017).
The respondents were previously awarded a
judgment against’ their employer, Tele-Re-
sponse Center, Inc. (“Tele-Response”), on
September 7, 2011, in a class action alleging
violations of the West Virginia Wage Pay-
ment and Collection Act.? Tele-Response’s
appeal of that judgment was ultimately dis-
missed in January 2018 due to its inability to
post an appeal bond.

A little more than two months after judg-
ment was entered in favor of the respon-
dents on their underlying claim, the petition-
er entered into a series of agreements with
Tele-Response, TRC Acquisitions Corp.
TRC”), and Telestar Marketing, Inc.
(“Telestar”) on November 30, 2011.3 Through
an Asset Purchase Agreement, the petitioner
acquired substantially all of Telestar’s as-
sets! Under a Services Agreement,> Tele-
Response provided services to the petitioner
for which it invoiced the petitioner at least
once each month for the costs it incurred in
providing those services. During the August
19, 2013, hearing held below, Gerald DeBiasi,

1, West Virginia Code § 38-5-10 provides, in part,
as follows:

(a) Upon a suggestion by the judgment creditor
that a person is indebted or liable to the judg-
ment debtor or has in the person's possession
or control personal property belonging to the
judgment debtor, which debt or liability could
be enforced when due, or which property
could be recovered when it became returnable
by the judgment debtor in a court of law and
which debt ‘or liability or property is subject to
the judgment creditor’s writ of fieri facias, a
summons against such person may be issued
. requiring such person to answer the sug-
gestion in writing and under oath.
The 2017 amendments to this statute did not
substantively alter subsection (a),

2. See W.Va. Code §§ 21-5-1 to -18 (2013 & Supp.
2016). The judgment consisted of liquidated dam-
ages in the amount of $213,310.38; prejudgment
interest in the amount of $22,932.79; litigation
costs in the amount of $6,992.27; attorney fees in
the amount of $92,740; and post-judgment inter-
est that now exceeds $100,000.

3. TRC is the parent company of Telestar and
Tele-Response. Jason Fine, the sole shareholder
of TRC, became the petitioner's chief operating
officer after entering into these agreements.

4. As part of its acquisition of Telestar, the peti-
tioner paid $800,000 to TRC for distribution to

the petitioner’s executive chairman, testi-
fied,® describing these services as Tele-Re-
sponse giving the petitioner the “use of the
facilities, use of the systems, use of the
equipment, use of the furnishings, the work
stations, et cetera. That is the services they
[Tele-Response] are providing in the Ser-
vices Agreement.” The petitioner had the
option to acquire the assets of Tele-Response
“free and clear of all Liens” at the end of the
term of the Services Agreement.”

The Services Agreement also required the
petitioner to make scheduled payments to
Tele-Response, as set forth in paragraphs
1(0)@), Gi), and (ii), over a two-year period
totaling $1,250,000, These payments were de-
scribed as a “mark-up” or “cost plus” on the
services being provided by Tele-Response’
The paragraph 1(b)(i) payment was made by
the petitioner prior to its receipt of the re-
spondents’ suggestion and is not in conten-
tion in this proceeding. The petitioner’s
$500,000 payment to Tele-Response under
paragraph 1(b)(i), which was to be made on

its shareholders. TRC’s sole shareholder was Mr.
Fine.

5. The Services Agreement states, in part, that “to
induce iPacesetters to enter into the [Asset] Pur-
chase Agreement, [Tele-Response], which has
heretofore provided services to Telestar, has
agreed to provide to iPacesetters certain services
during the period specified herein following the
date hereof.”

6. All references herein to Mr. DeBiasi’s testimo-
ny are to his testimony given during this August
19, 2013, hearing, which was an interrogatory
proceeding in aid of execution. In addition to Mr.
DeBiasi, the petitioner's chief financial officer,
Michael Kennedy, also appeared on behalf of the
petitioner during this hearing. No one appeared
on behalf of Tele-Response, nor did any other
lien holders appear.

7. The Services Agreement provides that it was to
remain in effect until November 30, 2013, unless
there was a default or the parties agreed in
writing to extend the agreement,

8. Mr. DeBiasi testified below that

in a typical cost-plus arrangement the buyer of
services pays the seller of services, or the pro-
vider of services, their cost plus some sort of
marginal markup on those services. And so we
came up with ... over the course of two years
a markup or margin of 1 million 250 [$1,250,-
000).

November 30, 2012, or within thirty days
thereafter, was restricted by paragraph 1(c)
of the agreement in that it would “only be
made if and at such time as all outstanding
liabilities (fixed, contingent, liquidated, unliq-
uidated or otherwise) and other obligations of
[Tele-Response] ... including, but not limit-
ed to, all federal and state tax claims, litiga-
tion claims and all claims of others have been
fully and finally discharged...” Mr. DeBiasi
testified that this particular payment was
never remitted by the petitioner because
Tele-Response did not meet the require-
ments of paragraph 1(c).

Regarding the $250,000 payment under
paragraph 1(b)dii) of the Services Agree-
ment, Mr. DeBiasi testified that this payment
was remitted to Tele-Response early ® “[ble-
cause of the difficult financial straights of
Tele-Response” and “to provide for more
cash flow for their operations.” In his affida-
vit signed three years later, Mr. DeBiasi
stated that this $250,000 was to be forwarded
to entities with superior liens whom he iden-
tified as the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) and Joseph Dresnok. There is no
provision in the Services Agreement obligat-
ing the petitioner to pay either the IRS, Mr.
Dresnok, or any of Tele-Response’s lien hold-
ers, creditors, or vendors.

A Proceeds Agreement was also entered
into on November 380, 2011, “{aJs a condition
to and in order to induce iPacesetters to
enter into each of the above agreements[.]”
This particular agreement contains additional
covenants and agreements between these en-
tities and provides that

TRC is advancing to Tele-Response, its

wholly-owned subsidiary, (or Telestar is

loaning to Tele-Response) the sum of mo-
nies for the purpose of settling all out-
standing obligations of Tele-Response to
the creditors set forth on Exhibit 1 here-
to.... Each of Telestar, Tele-Response,

TRC and [Jason] Fine represent and war-
9. It appears from the appendix record that the

petitioner remitted the $250,000 to Tele-Re-

sponse in a series of payments of varying
amounts between July 2012 and March 2013.

10. The Proceeds Agreement provides that at the
time the parties closed on the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the petitioner would pay $1,750,000

823

rant that Exhibit 1 includes all existing
ereditors and claimants of any kind of
Tele-Response (fixed, contingent, liqui-
dated, unliquidated or otherwise) except
for those creditors and claimants set forth
on Exhibit 2 hereto.

Although not reflected on the face of Exhibit
1 to the Proceeds Agreement, Mr. DeBiasi
stated in his affidavit, which was attached to
the petitioner’s memorandum in opposition to
the respondents’ motion for summary judg-
ment, that the amount of $988,661 listed on
Exhibit 1 as “Federal Payroll Taxes—Valid
Through Nov[.]” was an IRS lien, and that.
the “Contingent Liabilities” in the amount of
$1,070.000 on this exhibit “are believed to be
in reference to the claim of Joseph Dresnok,
which claim was actually reduced to a judg-
ment against Tele-Response Center on April
5, 2011 in the amount of $1,101,624.87.” © No
explanation is offered as to why a judgment
lien would be listed as a “contingent liabili-
ty,” nor why the amounts would be different.
This same Exhibit 1 states “[t]he following
table represents the complete Creditor and
Contingent liabilities of Tele-Response and
Telestar as [olf October 31, 2011[,]” but it
does not indicate which obligations belonged
to Tele-Response and which were those of
Telestar. Although page two of the exhibit
reflects that the federal taxes listed in the
table were owed by Tele-Response, there is
no further mention of the “Contingent Liabil-
ities.”

The respondents’ judgment entered
against Tele-Response more than two
months earlier does not appear on any exhib-
it to any of these November 80, 2011, agree-
ments. The parties appear to have contem-
plated such an omission by including in the
Proceeds Agreement an indemnification pro-
vision that states that if Tele-Response failed
to list an obligation, Tele-Response, Telestar,
TRC Acquisitions, and Mr. Fine would be

to Telestar under the Asset Purchase Agreement
and $500,000 to Tele-Response under the Ser-
vices Agreement, after which Telestar would ad-
vance to its wholly owned subsidiary, Tele-Re-
sponse, “the sum of monies for the purpose of
settling all outstanding obligations of Tele-Re-
sponse to the creditors set forth on Exhibit 1.”

824 Ee

required to indemnify the. petitioner for satis-
fying the debt obligation.

In June 2012, the respondents served the
petitioner with writs of execution on personal
property in seeking to satisfy the judgment
they had obtained against Tele-Response. On
October 11, 2012, the respondents caused a
suggestion of personal property to be served
upon the petitioner in which they sought:

Amounts and/or monies and/or debts

and/or obligations and/or things of value

owed and/or to be owed and/or due and/or
to be due to Tele-Response Center, Ine.,
including, but not limited to, those de-
scribed in the various agreements dated

November 80, 2011 and/or as of November

30, 2012 where iPacesetters, LLC, and/or

Tele-Response Center, Ine. and/or Teles-

tar Marketing, Inc., and/or TRC Acquisi-

tion Corp,, and/or Jason Fine and/or Tel-
eservices Solutions Holdings, LLC, are
parties such as the SERVICES AGREE-

MENT between Tele-Response Center,

Inc. and iPacesetters, LLC, dated as of

November 80, 2011.

The petitioner filed its verified answer to
the suggestion on October 30, 2012, denying
that it either owed. any “amounts, monies or
other things of value” to Tele-Response or
had “debts and/or obligations due” to Tele-
Response “[a]s of the date of the filing of this
Answer[.]” The petitioner characterized the
payments it owed to Tele-Response under
the Services Agreement as a “contingent con-
tractual obligation.” Documents produced
by the petitioner show that several invoices
were due around the time that the petitioner
received the suggestion and filed its answer
to the same. The petitioner’s chief financial
officer, Michael Kennedy, testified below that
there were no outstanding invoices “due” on
the date the answer was filed, although he
acknowledged that the petitioner had a con-
tractual obligation to make payments to Tele-

11. Mr. DeBiasi testified that Tele-Response “in-
voice[s] us for the Services Agreement typically
on a monthly basis. It may .,. turn out to be a
couple times a month, but we prefer monthly
invoices,”

12. In this regard, the circuit court further found
in this order that

Response. On November 2, 2012, just a few
days after the petitioner filed its answer to
the suggestion, the petitioner remitted a pay-
ment of $51,000 to Tele-Response followed by
another payment on November 18, 2012, in
the amount of $154,263.31, .

The appendix record contains a document
produced by the petitioner, which is titled
“Cost Plus Payments paid to Tele-Response
Center, Inc. Per Services Agreenient dated
11/30/11.” This document reflects that after
the suggestion was received, the petitioner
made monthly payments to Tele-Response in
varying amounts between November 2012
and July 2018, which totaled more than
$2,000.000. .

During the course of this proceeding, the
respondents filed miotions seeking to join the
petitioner as a defendant, to make the peti-
tioner liable for the respondents’ judgment,
and for sanctions. In its order entered on
October 21, 2018, the circuit court denied the
motion to join the petitioner as a defendant;
granted the motion for sanctions; and grant-
ed, in part, the motion to make the petitioner
liable for the respondents’ judgment. The
court found that, the respondents’ evidence
was insufficient to demonstrate that the vari-
ous agreements discussed above were fraud-
ulent, but it also found that the conduct. of
the parties reminded the court of a “‘shell
game’” ® Moreover, it was “disturbed by
the conduct of both iPacesetters, LLC and
Tele-Response in this case[,]” noting that it
had “directed the W.Va. R. Civ. P. 80(b)(7)
designated representative(s) of Tele-Re-
sponse to appear at the August 19, 2013”
hearing, yet no representative appeared, and
that notwithstanding the respondents’ sug-
gestion, the petitioner continued to pay mo-
nies to Tele-Response, Although the cireuit
court ordered the petitioner to cease pay-
ments to Tele-Response, it appears from an
exhibit attached to Mr. Debiasi’s affidavit

there is an inference that on July 27, 2012, a
representative of iPacesetters, LLC at its Wes-
ton, West Virginia location, advised law en-
forcement during the execution of the Writ for
Suggestion that there was no property owned
by Tele-Response at that facility. But according
to the testimony elicited from Mr. Kennedy, to
his knowledge, the property located at .that
facility was owned by Tele-Response.

ne

that the petitioner may have continued to
make payments to Tele-Response through. at
least July 2014.

Following discovery in aid of execution,
multiple dispositive motions, and various trial
dates, the respondents filed a third motion
for summary judgment on June 24, 2016,
addressing the legal issues that had beer
previously identified by the parties and as-
serting there were no factual issues for a
jury to resolve. On July 11, 2016, the peti-
tioner filed a motion to dismiss and response
to the motion for summary judgment. By
order entered August 11, 2016, the circuit
court denied the petitioner's motion to dis-
miss and awarded summary judgment in fa-
vor of the respondents, directing the petition-
er to pay to the respondents the amount of
their judgment against Tele-Response.!8 The
court found that the facts regarding the
debts, liability, and payments of the petition-
er to Tele-Response had been developed
through discovery, making trial unnecessary;
that whether the petitioner’s payments to
Tele-Response were fixed or contingent was
a question of law for the court to decide; and
that West Virginia Code § 88-5-18 (2011)
did not supersede the court’s “role and duty
under Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure to decide questions of
law...” The cireuit court concluded that
the petitioner’s obligation to make the pay-
ments to Tele-Response was fixed and the
fact that the petitioner did not know the
specific amount of the monthly obligation in
advance did not maké the contractual obli-
gation contingent. The cireuit court further
ruled that even if the sums the petitioner
owed to Tele-Response were for debts that
‘Tele-Response owed to third-party vendors,
those payments were not insulated from the

13. See supra note 2.

14, West Virginia Code § 38-5-18 provides, in
part, that
{wihen it is suggested by the judgment creditor
in any case of suggestion that the person sug-
gested has not fully disclosed the debts or
Habilities due by the person to, or personal
property in the person's possession or under
the person's control of, the judgment debtor at
the time of service of the summons, or has not
delivered to the officer the property, or paid
the money, for which the person was liable,
the court shall cause a’ jury to be impaneled,

825

suggestion proceedings; that the petitioner’s
obligation was to Tele-Response—not to
Tele-Response’s lien holders or other credi-
tors; and that because there was no evidence
that any of Tele-Response’s other creditors
had attempted garnishment proceedings
against the petitioner, the petitioner was not
a “party” to any other such lien, This appeal
followed,
Il, Standard of Review

HH oOur review of the circuit court’s sum-
mary judgment order is plenary. See Syl. Pt.
1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451
8.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A cireuit court’s entry of
summary judgment is reviewed. de novo.”).
Against this.standard, the parties’ arguments
will be considered.

IIL. Discussion

The petitioner asserts that the circuit
court erred: in awarding summary judgment
in favor of the respondents because its con-.
tractual obligations to Tele-Response were
not subject to the respondents’ suggestion
and because there were liens against Tele-
Response that were superior to the respon-
dents’ judgment lien, The petitioner further
argues that summary judgment was improp-
er because it was entitled to a jury trial
under West Virginia Code.§ 88-5-18. We ad-
dress these issues below. .

A. Whether the contractual obligations
between the petitioner and Tele-Re-
sponse were “fixed” or “contingent”
and whether there were superior liens

The petitioner argues that the circuit court
erred in ruling that the payments it made to
Tele-Response under the Services Agree-
ment were “reachable” by the respondents’
suggestion: Asserting that all of its payments

without any formal pleadings, to inquire as to
the debis of liabilities or property, or as to the
payment or delivery[.] .

18. See W.Va. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing, in part,
that “[tJhe judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, togeth-
er with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”).

826

to Tele-Response were contingent upon Tele-
Response providing services and submitting
invoices with supporting documentation, the
petitioner adds that if third-party vendors
provided no services to Tele-Response, there
was no obligation for any payment and the
petitioner “bore no liability.” The petitioner
further argues that these contingent pay-
ments were not property to which Tele-Re-
sponse had a present interest, but were pay-
ments for Tele-Response to pass on to third-
party vendors.'6 Lastly, the petitioner asserts
that it was obligated under the various
agreements discussed above to make pay-
ments to satisfy certain tax and judgment
liens against Tele-Response’ that had’ superi-
or priority over the respondents’ subsequent
judgment against Tele-Response.

Conversely, the respondents argue the pe-
titioner’s obligation to remit monthly pay-
ments to Tele-Response was fixed because
while the amount of monthly invoices
changed, the petitioner’s obligation to remit
those amounts did not. Regarding superior
lien holders, the respondents assert that the
petitioner never stated in its answer to the
suggestion that the garnishment was unen-
forcéable due to the existence of superior tax
or judgment liens against Tele-Response
and, if other liens against Tele-Response ex-

ist, payment of those liens was the sole re-,

sponsibility of Tele-Response, Telestar, and
TRC.

We begin by observing that “(glar-
nislment is an ancillary statutory proceeding
which has long been resorted to in aid of the
collection of judgments. Its purpose is to
divert to the judgment creditor a payment
due the judgment debtor by a third. person.”
Emmons-Hawkins Hardware Co... Size-
more, 106 W.Va. 259, 261, 145 S.E. 488, 489
(1928). Further, “ [ijt is the general rule that
a plaintiff can recover on a suggestion only
when the garnishee is liable to the defendant
[debtor]. Syl. pt. 1, in part, Hmmons-Haw-
kins Hardware Company v. Sizemore, 106
W.Va. 259, 145 S.E. 488 (1928).” Syl. Pt. 1,

16. The petitioner argues, in part, that it properly
denied owing any money to Tele-Response in its
answer to fhe suggestion because a third-party
looks t6 what is due to the judgment debtor at
the time the suggestion is served. Mr. Kennedy
testified that he looked to whether any invoices

Waco Equip. Co. v. B.C. Hale Const. Co.
Inc., 182 W.Va. 381, 887 S.E.2d 848 (1989).
There is no question that the petitioner was
contractually liable to Tele-Response, but our
inquiry does not end there. We must deter-
mine whether the circuit court was correct in
its determination that the petitioner’s con-
tractual obligations to Tele-Response were
fixed because “[a] contingent liability, ew con-
tractu, is not subject to an order of attach-
ment and garnishment.” Syl. Pt. 4, MW.
Kellogg Co. v. Concrete Accessories Corp.,
157 W.Va. 763, 204 8.B.2d 61 (1974). Further,
the “debt from the garnishee to the defen-
dant, in respect of which it is sought to
charge the former, must ... be absolutely
payable, at present, or in future and not
dependent on any contingency.” Strauss v.
Railroad Co., 7 W.Va. 368, 374 (1874).

I We have previously addressed the
question of whether a debt or claim is fixed
or contingent. As we explained in Commer-
cial Bank of Bluefield v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Co., 175 W.Va. 588, 336
§.E.2d 552 (1985),

{iin general, a debt or claim which is
uncertain or contingent, in the sense that it
may never become due and payable, is not
garnishable.... A contingent interest is
one in which liability is not certain and
absolute, but depends upon some indepen-
dent event... . co,

The split of authorities is on the question
of whether debts for which liability is fixed
but for which payment is not yet due (un-
matured debts) or the amount owed is not
yet determined (unliquidated debts) are
subject to post-judgment garnishment un-
der the language of the statute in the
jurisdiction, The weight of, and, in our
opinion, the better reasoned, authorities
view such debts as not being “contingent,”
and as being subject to garnishment be-
cause a “contingency” which will render a
debt or claim not subject to garnishment is
one that affects the debt itself, as distin-

from Tele-Response were due on the date he filed
the petitioner's answer to the suggestion. The ap-
pendix record contains copies of invoices to the
petitioner from Tele-Response which. were due
around the time the petitioner received the sug-
gestion and when it filed its answer to the same.

guished from one that affects only its
amount or the time or manner of its pay-
ment. 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment And Gar-
nishment § 126 (1968). This distinction
was stated in the following manner in
Johnson v, Johnson, 111 R.1. 183, 188, 300
A2d 642, 645 (1973) (collecting cases at n.
D:
Garnishment is allowed on an unliquidat-
ed claim where there is a certainty as to
liability but a contingency as to amount.
Where an obligation to pay exists, even
though the amount of that obligation is
undetermined, garnishment will lie
where the amount is capable of definite
ascertainment by the contract, or by the
facts then known, or by testimony to be
taken,

W.Va. Code, 38-5-10 [1981] clearly provides
for the garnishment of unmatured debts:
“.., which debt or liability could be en-
forced, when due, dr which property could
be recovered, when it became returna-
ble[.)”

Commercial Bank of Bluefield, 175 W.Va. at
594, 386 S.E.2d at 557-58, We continue to be
of the opinion that this is the better-reasoned
approach.!7

HE We agree with the circuit court’s con-
clusion that the only ‘contingent obligation
under the Services Agreement was the
$500,000 payment under paragraph 1(b)(i)
and that there were no other contingencies
either in that agreement, the - Proceeds
Agreement, or the Letter Agreement. This
particular payment would only be made if
Tele-Response provided proof to the petition-
er that it had fully and finally discharged all
of its outstanding liabilities, obligations,
debts, and claims. There was no such contin-

17. The cases relied upon by the petitioner in-
volved contingent obligations. For example, in
Waco Equipment Company v. Hale Construction
Company, Inc., 182 W.Va. 381, 387 S.B.2d 848
(1989), several creditors of a construction sub-
contractor sought to suggest the retainage being
held by the general contractor. This Court af-
firmed the circuit court's ruling that the retain-
age had been appropriately used to release liens
filed by materialmen who had not been paid by
the subcontractor. Because the subcontractor left
the project with outstanding debts and liens asso-

827

gency attached to the $250,000 payment un-
der paragraph 1(b)(iii).

HMMM Tuning to the petitioner’s other
obligations to Tele-Response under the Ser-
vices Agreement, “‘[iIn order to attach a
debt due in the future it must be a certain
debt which will become payable upon the
lapse of time and not a contingent liabili-
tyL?” M. W. Kellogg Co., 157 W.Va. at 770,
204 S.B.2d at 66 (quoting Minotti v. Brune
and Dunbar Land Co., 94 W.Va. 181, 188,
118 S.E. 149, 151 (1928) (citation omitted)). It
is clear from the record that the petitioner
remitted monthly payments to Tele-Re-
sponse from the inception of the Services
Agreement entered into nearly a year before
it received the respondents’ suggestion. The
expected and routine aspect of these monthly
payments is reflected in Mr. DeBiasi’s testi-
mony below, when he explained that Tele-
Response “invoice[s] us for the Services
Agreement typically on a monthly basis. It
may ... turn out to be a couple times a
month, but we prefer monthly invoices.”
Thus, while the amounts of these invoices
changed monthly, the obligation ‘did not.
Therefore, we agree with the circuit court
that under the reasoning expressed in Com-
mercial Bank of Bluefield, these monthly
payments were fixed,

The petitioner also asserts that these
monthly payments could not be reached by
the respondents’ suggestion because they
were to be passed on by Tele-Response to
third-party vendors. A similar argument was
raised and rejected in Rice v. American
Communications Consultants of North
America, Inc., 81 P.8d 1075 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001).

In Rice, the judgment debtor, Tele-Solu-
tions, Inc., resisted a suggestion brought by
its judgment creditor, Costwatch Consulting

ciated with the subcontract, there was no debt
owed by the general contractor to the subcon-
tractor that a judgment creditor could suggest.
While this reasoning would apply to the payment
under paragraph 1(b)(ii) of the Services Agree-
ment, it would not apply to the payment under
paragraph 1(b)(tii) nor to the monthly obligations
between the petitioner and Tele-Response, which
were routine and on-going both before and after
the suggestion was served with only the monthly
amounts varying.

828

Group, against a third-party, Hertz Technol-
ogies, Inc., which owed monéy to Tele-Solu-
tions, Like the argument advanced by the
petitioner in the case at bar, Tele-Solutions
asserted that .
it was an agent of certain other third par-
ties, and the money Tele-Solutions was
owed by Hertz represented the commis-
sions owed to those third parties, and did
not. belong to Tele-Solutions. In other
words, Tele-Solutions claimed that the
moneys owed to it by Hertz belonged not
to Tele-Solutions, but to the principals that
Tele-Solutions represented. Therefore
Tele-Solutions claimed the money owed to
it was exempt from Costwatch’s garnish-
ment action, .
Id; at 1076. In determining that the sums
held by Hertz were not-exempt from garnish-
ment, the court observed that there was “no
evidence that Hertz owed money to any of
Tele-Solutions’s subagents directly.” Id. at
1076, Similarly, in the case at bar, there is no
evidence that the petitioner owed money di-
rectly to any of Tele-Response’s vendors,
The petitioner also points out that the
respondents have no greater rights against it
than does Tele-Response. Indeed, as we ex-
plained in Strauss, “[a] fundamental principle
is, that an attaching creditor can acquire no
greater right in attached property than the
defendant had at the time of the attach-
ment.” Strauss, 7 W.Va, at 874, In Rice, the
court likewise observed that the judgment
creditor, Costwateh, had
the same, but no greater, rights to collect
the money held by Hertz than Tele-Solu-
tions: ha[d] to collect the money from Hertz
. Costwatch may take whatever action is
necessary to require Hertz to pay Cost-
watch instead of Tele-Solutions. What ...
Tele-Solutions has failed to show by any
authority, is that. Costwatch is obligated to
18, A document produced by the petitioner below
reflects that the petitioner remitted this $250,000

through a series of nine payments made between
July 2012 anid March 2013.

19, The petitioner relies upon Little Audrey's
Transportation Company, Inc. v. Beverly Bank,
236 F.Supp. 352 (S.D. Ill. 1964), In that case, a
notice of tax lien was filed against James Wester-
field on July 26, 1961, and again on May 1, 1962,
‘The bank obtained a judgment against Mr. Wes-
terfield on March 6, 1962, and served a sum-

assume the liabilities that Tele-Solutions
may have to other, third parties.

Id. at 1077, Here, the petitioner has not
shown that either it, or the respondents, had
any obligation to Tele-Response’s 's vendors or
lien holders.

We now turn to the petitioner’s argument
that the payment it made to Tele-Response
under 1(b)(iii) of the Services Agreement was
to be used by Tele-Response to pay superior
lien holders, namely the IRS and Mr. Dres-
nok. Mr. DeBiasi testified below that the
petitioner made the paragraph 1(b)(iii) pay-
ment early because of Tele-Response’s
cash flow issues without any mention of supe-
rior lien holders. Nearly three years later, he
stated’ in his affidavit that this particular
money was to be used by Tele-Response to
pay the IRS and Mr. Dresnok. The Services
Agreement, however, is silent in that regard,

In Rice, the court also addressed an argu-
ment regarding superior liens, The court not-
ed the absence of evidence that the sub-
agents possessed ariy’ superior liens that
would give them priority to any of the money
obligations between Hertz and Tele-Solu-
tions, emphasizing that “[nJone of the ...
subagents who were allegedly owed the mon-
ey filed any objection or appearance in the
case.” Id, at 1076 n.3. In the current matter,
after nearly four years of litigation in this
suggestion proceeding, neither the IRS nor
Mr, Dresnok have appeared to either oppose
the suggestion or to seek that any garnished
funds be paid to them rather than to the
respondents. .

HH The petitioner argues that a proper-
ly filed federal tax lien attaches to all proper-
ty or rights to property of the taxpayer and
has priority over other lien holders under 26
ULS.C.A. § 6828," Its evidence of this prop-"

mons of garnishment on Little Audrey’s on May
8, 1962. The court found that the notice of tax
lien had priority over the judgment lien, explain-
ing that “[t]he federal tax liens attached to the
property ... when the notices of liens [were] filed
in Rock Island County” and that “the notices of
liens filed in that County were effective notice to
third parties.” Id, at 353 (emphasis added). In the
instant matter, there is no evidence of when, or
even if, a notice of an IRS tax lien against Tele-
Response was filed or recorded.anywhere.

erly filed federal tax lien against Tele-Re-
sponse includes an exhibit to Mr. DeBiasi’s
affidavit, which is a list of monthly payments
that he avers were made by Tele-Response
to the IRS between December 2012 and July
201429 as well as exhibits to the various
agreements discussed above, which show an
indebtedness owed to the IRS by. Tele-Re-
sponse. Critically, however, under. 26
US.C.A, § 6328(a), a federal tax lien “shall
not be valid as against any ... judgment lien
creditor until notice thereof which meets the
requirements of subsection (f) has been filed
by the Secretary.” *! Subsection (f) provides
for the manner by which “{t]he notice re-
ferred to in subsection (a) shall be filed[,]”
including that the notice of lien be recorded
in accordance with state law. As the respon-
dents aptly observe, the materials produced
by the petitioner below do not include a copy
of a recorded notice of an IRS lien against
Tele-Response that would meet the require-
ments of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6328, let alone a
certified copy of such notice that would meet.
the requirements of West Virginia Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e). See W.Va. R.Civ.P,
66(e) (“Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served there-
with.”) 2

HM Turning to the alleged Dresnok
judgnient lien, attached to Mr. DeBiasi’s affi-
davit are various materials, including a coin-
plaint that seeks'a confession of judgment
against Tele-Response. There is no indication
on the complaint that it was actually:filed' in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania, nor is there a term of
court or an action number on the complaint,
although there is a space provided for both.
These materials also include a document ti-
tled “Notice” that is on the letterhead of the

20. Mr, DeBiasi stated in his affidavit that the
money Tele-Response used to make these pay-
ments’ to the IRS, as well as the monthly pay-
ments to Mr. Dresnok over the same time period,
was paid to Tele-Response by the petitioner un-
der paragraph 1(b)(iii) of the Services Agree-
ment. The total sum of these payments exceeds
$600,000, whereas the payment required under
paragraph 1(b)(ii) was in the amount of
$250,000,

21, The cases cited by the petitioner to argue the
superiority of the IRS lien are distinguishable as

829

Office of Prothonotary. of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in Pennsylvania, which is ad-
dressed to Tele-Response, advising that a

.judgment by confession had been entered

against it and in favor of Joseph Dresnok.
This notice is unsigned and similarly fails to
include a term of court or case number in'the
space provided for such information, Absent
from these materials is an dctual judgment
order from the Pennsylvania court, although
entry of judgment is contemplated under
court rules. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 2956 (“The
prothonotary ‘shall enter judgment in con-

“formity with the confession.”) (emphasis add-

ed). If the unsigned notice is a “judgment”
under Pennsylvania law, the petitioner has
not asserted as much. Further, even if there
were a valid Pennsylvania judgment, there is
no evidence in the record that Mr, Dresnok
vecorded his judgment anywhere. See 42 Pa,
Stat, and Cons, Stat, Arin. § 4808(a) (2004)
(“Any judgment or other order of a court of
common pleas for the payment of money
shall bé a lien upon real property.... when
it is entered of record in the office of the
clerk of the court of common pleas of the
county where the real property is situated, or
in the office of the clerk of the branch of the
court of common pleas embracing such coun-
ty”). .

Neither the IRS nor Mr. Dresnok opposed
the respondents’ suggestion or attempted to
enforce their liens by garnishing or levying
against the amounts the petitioner owed to
Tele-Response. Although the petitioner .con-
tends there was no.reason for either the IRS
or Dresnok to attempt to execute on their
liens because Tele-Response was paying on
those liens, as the court stated in Little Au-
drey’s, the bank’s “judgment was not a lien
upon Westerfield’s personal property in the

those cases involved recorded notices of federal
tax liens, There is no evidence in the record
before us of a recorded notice of IRS lien against.
Tele-Response such that it would be superior to
the respondents’ judgment lien under 26
U.S.C.A. § 6323.

22, Regardless of whether the respondents raised
this precise issue below, it was the petitioner’s
responsibility to meet the requirements of Rule
56.

830

hands of plaintiff until the garnishment sum-
mons was served.” 236 F.Supp. at 353. Had
these other lien holders served suggestions
upon the petitioner around the same time as
the respondents, then the priority of those
competing suggestions would have been an
issue. See 38°C.J.S. Garnishment § 233
(“Several garnishments issued against the
same garnishee on behalf of different credi-
tors to reach the same property or fund have
priority according to time, determined by the
time of service of the writ or summons on the
garnishee.”). Further, if the instant proceed-
ing had been a creditors’ suit brought under
Chapter 38, Article 3 of the West Virginia
Code, a commissioner would have been
charged with marshaling and determining
the priorities of all lien holders of record. See
W.Va. Code § 88-8-12 (2011) (“The commis-
sioner ... shall ... proceed to ascertain and
report all the liens, on the real estate or any
part thereof of the judgment. debtor, the
holders of such liens, the amount due to each,
and the priorities thereof[.]”). The petitioner
has not cited any West Virginia law that
requires a similar marshaling or prioritizing
of liens in a suggestion proceeding,

In summary, West Virginia Code § 38-5-10
provides for suggestion upon unmatured
debts. See Commercial Bank of Bluefield,
175 W.Va. at 594, 336 S.H.2d at 558 “W.Va.
Code, 38-5-10 [1981] clearly provides for the
garnishment of unmatured debts: ‘... which
debt or liability could be enforced, when due,
or which property could be recovered, when
it became returnable[.) ”). We agree with the
circuit court that the petitioner’s payment to

23, We previously explained that “[a] summons of
gamishment ... is a warning to the garnishee
not ‘to pay the money’ or deliver the property of
the judgment debtor in his hands, upon penalty
that if he does he may subject himself to personal
judgment.” Commercial Bank of Bluefield, 175
‘W.Va. at 592, 336 8.B.2d at 555 (1985) (quoting

_ Lynch v. Johnson, 196 Va, 516, 84 $.E.2d 419,
421 (1954). It appears the petitioner did not take

. any steps to protect itself from paying both Tele-
Response and the respondents, such as seeking
to deposit the disputed funds with the circuit
court, See, eg., Radiotelephone Co. of Indiana,
Ine. v. Ford, 531 N.B.2d 238, 243-44 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988) (“Wilgro [garnishee] could easily
have protected itself against the threat of a dou-
ble payment by depositing the disputed funds
with the court."”), Instead, the petitioner resisted
the respondents’ suggestion for years while si-

Tele-Response under paragraph 1(b)(iii) was
fixed and not contingent. We also agree that
the evidence demonstrates that the petition-
ex’s monthly obligations to Tele-Response
were fixed with only the amounts being un-
known. See Commercial Bank of Bluefield,
175 W.Va. at 594, 336 S.E.2d at 557-58 (quot-
ing ‘Johnson v. Johnson, 111 R.I. 183,300
A.2d 642, 645 (1978)) (“Where an obligation
to pay exists, even though the amount of that
obligation is undetermined, garnishment will
lie where the amount is capable of definite
ascertainment by the contract, or by the
facts then known, or by testimony to be
taken’ ”). Further, it is clear from ‘the appen-
dix record that the monies the petitioner paid
to Tele-Response after the petitioner was
served with the respondents’ suggestion *
greatly exceed the amount of the respon-
dents’ judgment lien. Accordingly, under
these particular facts, we affirm the cireuit
court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of
the respondents.

B. Whether the petitioner was
entitled to a jury trial

HM The petitioner asserts that summary
judgment was improper because it was enti-
tled to a jury trial under West Virginia Code
§ 88-5-18, Under this statute, if disputes ex-
ist as to the disclosure of debts or liabilities
due, such issues must be determined by a
jury. Because the petitioner answered the
respondents’ suggestion by denying that it
owed any debt or obligation under the sug-
gestion, the petitioner contends that it was
for a jury to determine whether the pay-

multaneously paying millions of dollars to Tele-
Response.

24. The circuit court observed in its summary
judgment order that the Proceeds Agreement
contained an indemnification clause through
which Telestar, Tele-Response, TRC, and Jason
Fine agreed to indemnify the petitioner for satis-
fying any debt obligation owed by Tele-Response
that it had failed to disclose. Because the respon-
dents’ judgment lien was not disclosed by Tele- .
Response, the circuit court stated that the “in-
demnification provision was put into place to
protect iPacesetters from just such a situation.”
Whether the petitioner can or has sought indem-
nification under the Proceeds Agreement is not
an issue in this appeal.

28. See supra note 14,

ments it made to Tele-Response for services
provided by third-party vendors were fixed
obligations such that they would be subject
to suggestion,

Voicing a countervailing position, the re-
spondents assert that the right to a trial in
suggestion proceedings under West Virginia
Code § 88-5-18 is not absolute. Maintaining
the petitioner failed to demonstrate the exis-
tence of any genuine issue of material fact to
be determined by a jury, the respondents
argue that the only issues in dispute were
legal in nature. They further assert that nei-
ther West Virginia Code § 38-5-18 nor, Rule
56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Proce-
dure change the basic legal tenant that con-
tract interpretation is reserved to a court,
making the nature of the petitioner’s obli-
gations to Tele-Response a question of law.

Hs The provision for a jury trial un-
der West Virginia Code § 38-5-18 contem-
plates an insufficient factual development or
a dispute involving the facts surrounding the
suggestee’s failure to honor a suggestion of
personal property. In such instances, the
statute requires a jury to make such determi-
nations of fact. In the case at bar, however,
the parties developed a significant and undis-
puted record regarding those factual issues,
leaving no issues of material fact for jury
determination. Moreover, “judicially-created
rules relating to the function of the judicial
branch of government, such as the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence, will always
trump any legislatively-created statutes.”
State ex rel, Marshall Cty. Comm'n v. Car-
ter, 225 W.Va. 68, 78, 689 S.E.2d 796, 806
(2010) (Workman, J., concurring), Further,

[i]t has long been well-settled that this

Court “shall have power to promulgate

rules for all cases and proceedings, civil

and criminal, for all of the courts of the

State relating to writs, warrants, process

practice and procedure, which shall have

the force and effect of law.” W.Va. Const.
art. 8, § 8, Likewise, “[u]nder article eight,
section three of our Constitution, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals shall have the
power to promulgate rules for all of the
courts of the State, related to process,
practice, and procedure, which shall have
the force and effect of law.” Syllabus Point,

831

1, Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va, 742, 372
$.E.2d 920 (1988).

Carter, 225 W.Va. at 78, 689 S.E.2d at 806;
see also W.Va.R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules gov-
ern the procedure in all trial courts of record
in all actions, suits, or other judicial proceed-
ings of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity.... They shall be
construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination.
of every action.”). Consequently, while West
Virginia Code § 88-5-18 provides for a jury
trial when there is a question as to whether
the party being suggested has fully disclosed
its debts or liabilities to the judgment debtor,
here, the circuit court correctly determined
that

the facts surround the debts or liabilities,
or as to the payment or delivery, have
been sufficiently developed and the ques-
tion as to whether such payments were
“fixed” or “contingent” is a question of law
for the Court.

The jury is a fact finder. This Court
does not believe that W.Va. Code § 38-5-18
supersedes, or was meant to supersede,
this Court’s role and duty under Rule 56 of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
to decide questions of law ... when there
is no genuine issue of material fact.

Although the petitioner contends that wheth-
er the petitioner’s contractual obligations to
Tele-Response under the Services Agree-
ment were “fixed” or “contingent” is a ques-
tion of material fact for a jury’s determina-
tion, we disagree. Answering that question
was not a factual determination but an appli-
cation of the law to the undisputed facts. See
Syl. Pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon,
187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.H.2d 247 (1992) (“‘A.
motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to clari-
fy the application of the law,’ Syllabus Point
8, Aetna Casualty & Swrety Co. v. Federal
Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160,
183 S.E.2d 770 (1963).”), And, as we have
long held, “{i]t is the province of the court,
and not of the jury, to interpret a written -
contract.” Syl. Pt. 1, Stephens v. Bartlett, 118

832

W.Va. 421, 191 S.B. 550 (1987). Consequent-
ly, we find no error in thé circuit court’s

employment of West Virginia Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 for resolution of this legal is-
sue.?6,

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit
court’s August 11, 2016, order awarding sum-

26, To the extent any of our reasoning herein
differs from that set forth in the circuit court's
summary judgment order, as we have long held,

“ “(his Court may, on appeal, affirm the judg-
ment of the lower court when.it appears that

mary judgment i in favor of the respondents j is
hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

such judgment is correct on any legal ground
disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground,
reason or theory assigned by the lower court as
the basis for its judgment,” Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v.
Wolfolk, 149 W.Va. 246, 140 S.B.2d 466 (1965).

. 806 S,E.2d 757
PRATT & WHITNEY ENGINE
SERVICES, Petitioner ,
ve

Dale W. STEAGER, State Tax
Commissioner of West
Virginia, Respondent

No. 16-0903

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 18, 2017
Filed: November 1, 2017

g

. We pause briefly to discuss Pratt's argument
regarding the percentage of its répair parts that
should be exempt from ad valorem taxation.
Pratt's total worldwide sales for the period’end-
ing July 1, 2014, was $277,692,708. Only 1.696%
($4,709,280) of these sales were made to West
Virginia customers. The circuit court described
Pratt's argument as follows: “Using the alloca-
tion of 1,696% sales to West Virginia customers,
(Pratt] argues that the inventory of spare parts
valued at $7,438,639 by [the Harrison County
Assessor] should be valued at $126,148 for ad

Herschel H. Rose, III, Esq., Rose Law
Office, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Sean Whelan, Esq., Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, L. Wayne Williams, Esq., Assistant At-
torney General, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for the Respondent.

Justice Ketchum:

In this case we consider whether a large
inventory of jet engine repair parts are ex-
empt from ad valorem property taxation.
The county assessor, state tax commissioner,
and circuit court all considered this question
and concluded that the repair parts are not
exempt from ad valorem property taxation.
After review, we agree with the circuit
court’s conclusion and, accordingly, affirm its
order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

Petitioner Pratt & Whitney Engine Ser-
vices (“Pratt”) repairs jet engines at its facili-
ty in Bridgeport, West Virginia. It maintains
a vast inventory of jet engine repair parts at
its West Virginia facility—the parts at issue
are listed on a 39-page single-spaced docu-
ment and are valued at $7,488,639.52,

Hs In January 2015, Pratt requested
that the Harrison County Assessor conduct a
review of whether the majority of its repair
parts were exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion. Pratt argued that the repair parts were
exempt from ad valorem taxation? pursuant

valorem tax purposes for the 2015 TY.” In es-
sence, Pratt argued that because approximately
98.3% of its repair parts are used in jet engines
that are shipped to customers outside of West
Virginia, 98.3% of the value of its repair parts
inventory should be exempt from ad valorem
taxation.

2, The phrase “ad valorem” means, literally, “ac-
cording to the value” and is used in taxation to
designate an assessment of taxes against proper-
ty, real or personal, at a certain rate upon its

to the Freeport Amendment contained in the
West Virginia Constitution. The Freeport
Amendment exempts certain personal prop-
erty of inventory and warehouse goods from
ad valorem taxation. It provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this Constitution, tangible personal proper-
ty which is moving in interstate commerce
through or over the territory of the State
of West Virginia, or which was consigned
from a point of origin outside the State to

a warehouse, publie or private, within the

State for storage in transit to a final desti-

nation outside the State, whether specified

when transportation begins or afterward,
but in any case specified timely for exempt
status determination purposes, shall not be
deemed to have acquired a tax situs in
West Virginia for purposes of ad valorem
taxation and shall be exempt from such
taxation, except as otherwise provided in
this section. Such property shall not be
deprived of such exemption because while
in the warehouse the personal property is
assembled, bound, joined, processed, disas-
sembled, divided, eut, broken in bulk, rela-
beled, or repackaged for delivery out of
state, wnless such activity results in a new
or different product, article, substance or
commodity, or one of different utility.
‘W.Va. Const. art. X, § le [1986] (emphasis
added).

After conducting its review, the county
assessor determined that the repair parts
were not exempt from ad valorem taxation.
The assessor explained its finding as follows:

[Olur review indicates that the parts in

inventory are used in a manufacturing pro-

cess that renders them an integral part of -

a jet engine, Clearly, the parts in a fune-
tioning jet engine have a different utility
than the parts that are stocked on shelves
and used in the repairs process. Given our
review, we are of the opinion that the parts

value. Smith v, American Airlines, Inc., 606 So.2d
618, 620 (Fla, 1992). The essential characteristic
of an ad valorem tax is that the tax is levied
according to the value of property as determined
by an assessment or appraisal. American Airlines,
Inc. v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal.4th 1110, 51
Cal.Rptr.2d 251, 912 P.2d 1198 (1996).

835

inventory located in Bridgeport and used
by [Pratt] in its jet engine repairs process
are not eligible for the Freeport exemption
. as the use of such parts by [Pratt] ...
results in a product’of different utility.
At Pratt’s request, the county assessor
certified Pratt’s question to the Respondent
State Tax Commissioner (“tax commission-
ex”) for “review and issuance of a taxability
ruling.” The tax commissioner issued a de-
tailed, seven-page decision which concluded
that Prati’s repair parts were not exempt
from ad valorem taxation. Pratt appealed the
tax commissioner's administrative decision to
the circuit court.

The cireuit court held a bench trial on
April 29, 2016.5 The sole witness at the bench
trial was Pratt's manager of supply chain
logistics, Timothy H. Tucker. Mr. Tucker
testified that Pratt buys the repair parts
from its parent company, Pratt Whitney
Canada. He stated that Pratt uses the repair
parts when manufacturing, overhauling, and
repairing jet engines, All of the repair parts
are shipped to the Bridgeport facility from
locations outside of West Virginia. The ma-
jority of the repair parts stay in the Bridge-
port facility from “zero to three months.” Mr.
Tucker testified that the repair parts that
are used retain their characteristics and
identity during their installation into a jet
engine. For example, Mr. Tucker was asked
about one particular repair part, a counter-
weight, and had the following exchange with
counsel for Pratt:

Q. So from the inception of manufacture, to

the time it takes off and flying people

hither and yon, it is a counterweight com-
ing in, it’s a counterweight going out?

A. That’s correct.

During cross-examination, Mr. Tucker dis-
cussed the purpose and utility of a jet engine,
and the purpose and utility of the individual
repair parts:

3. Prior to the bench trial, the parties and the
circuit court took part in a “site walk’ at Pratt's
Bridgeport facility. During the site walk, the par-
ties observed 1) several jet engines that were
being repaired, which were approximately six to
seven feet in length; 2) a jet engine being tested
in a wind tunnel; and 3) the storage space where

“several grommets” and other repair parts were
maintained.

836

Q, What's the purpose of a jet engine?
A, It is to provide thrust,
Q. To fly an airplane?
A To fly an airplane, a helicopter, any-
thing that you want to put it on, whether
it’s a jet engine, in general, would have
many uses, .
Q..And then you install all of these parts as
_ needed in the repair of jet engines?

A, That’s correct. .
Q. Could you tell me what is the—is-a
grommet vein retaining ‘ the same product,

* + as a jet engine?
A, It is a component of a jet engine,

* Q, But the jet engine, is that the same as a
grommet?
A, It would not be the same, as far as a
part number goes, no.
Q, But it’s a different product?
A. It is—it’s a piece of that product, yes.
It’s used in building that product. You
can’t have the jet engine without it.
Q. Does the jet engine have the same
utility as a grommet?.

” A, The jet engine itself would not have the
same utility as the grommet, but the jet
engine wouldn’t exist without what the
grommet does, if that makes sense.

Q..It does, Is a compressor the same prod-
uet as a jet engine?

A. It’s a—it would not be the same product
itself. It would have a different part num-
ber, but it is a—you can’t have a jet engine
without it. . .

Q, And all of these parts on this 39-page
list [of Pratt repair parts] would be compo-
nents of a jet engine, correct?

A. That’s correct,

Q, At some point?

A, Correct,

Q. But the jet engine is a different product.
than all these items on the 89-page list?
A, Yes, The items on the 39-page list, you
couldn’t necessarily make a jet engine out.
of even the sum of those yet.

4. The circuit court’s order notes that a “grom-
met” is ‘‘a reinforced eyelet ... through which a

Q. So a jet engine is different ‘than a
collection of grommets, and flywheels, and
compressor blades?
A, In their individual states, yes.
Following the bench trial, the circuit court
issued a fifteen-page order affirming the tax

‘commissioner's ruling that Pratt's inventory

of repair ‘parts was not exempt from ad
valorem taxation pursuant to the Freeport
Amendment. In so ruling, the circuit court
noted that Mr. Tucker testified that “a jet
engine is a new and different product than
the sum of the component parts installed in
the jet engine. Since the activities of [Pratt]
result in a fully operational jet engine which
is a new and different product than the indi-
vidual repair parts, [Pratt] falls outside the
parameters of the Freeport Amendment.”
The circuit court's order also noted that Mr.
Tucker testified that a jet engine has a dif-
ferent utility than the individual repair parts.
Following entry of the circuit court’s order
on August 24, 2016, Pratt filed the present
appeal with this Court,

I, STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hs Pratt appeals the circuit court’s or-
der affirming the tax commissioner’s ruling
which concluded that the repair parts were
not exempt from ad valorem taxation pursu-
ant to the Freeport Amendment, “In ‘cases
where a taxpayer challenges an ad valorem
tax assessment, a circuit court’s conclusions
of law are reviewed by this Court de novo.”
Syllabus Point 8, Pope Properties/Charleston
Lid. Liability Co, v. Robinson, 230 W.Va.
882, 788 S.E.2d 546 (2018). To the extent
Pratt challenges the cireuit court's factual
findings, our review is set forth in Syllabus
Point 2 of Walker v. W.Va. Ethics Comm'n,
201 W.Va. 108, 492 8.B.2d 167 (1997):
* Tn reviewing challenges to the findings
~and conclusions of the circuit court ... we
review the circuit court’s underlying factu-
al findings under a clearly erroneous stan-
dard, Questions of law are subject to a de
novo review.

‘We now turn to the parties’ arguments,

fastener may be-passed.”

IIL ANALYSIS

HM There are three main arguments
raised in this appeal.® First, Pratt argues the
repair parts are exempt from ad valorem
taxation under the Freeport Amendment be-
cause the repair parts do not become a new
product, or a product with a different utility
during the repair process. Next, it asserts
that the inventory of repair parts are exempt
from ad valorem taxation because they are
“at all times moving in interstate commerce
through or over ... West Virginia.” Finally,
Pratt maintains the circuit court erred by
failing to liberally construe the Freeport
Amendment in its favor.

A. New Product/Different Utility
We begin with an examination of the Free-
port Amendment. In addition to the constitu-
tional amendment contained in W.Va. Const.
art. X, § le; the Freeport Amendment is
codified in W.Va. Code § 11-5-18 [1987],
which provides, in part:
(a) Tangible personal property which is
moving in interstate commerce through or
over the territory of the state of West
Virginia, or which was consigned from a
point of origin outside the state to a ware-
house, public or private, within the state
for storage in transit to a final destination
outside the state, whether specified when
transportation begins or afterward, but in
any case specified timely for exempt status
determination purposes, shall not be
deemed to have acquired a tax situs in
West Virginia for purposes of ad valorem
taxation and shall be exempt from such
taxation, except as otherwise provided
(b) Such property shall not be deprived of
. such exemption because while in the ware-
house the personal property is assembled,

¥

Pratt’s brief to this Court begins with a list of
ten assignments of error. However, the brief does
not address each of these assignments of error
individually .under separate headings. Instead,
the discussion section of the brief is only orga-
nized under the generic heading “Argument.”
For purposes of our discussion, we group Pratt's
arguments into the three main categories set
forth in our “Analysis,” Pursuant to Rule 10 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a brief to this
Court must contain “an argument exhibiting
clearly the points of fact and law presented, the

837

bound, joined, processed, disassembled, di-
vided, gut, broken in bulk, relabeled, or
repackaged for: delivery out of state, unless
such activity results in a new or different
product, article, substance or commodity,
or one of different utility.

Further, W.Va. Code § 11-5-18a [1997] ad-
dresses the purpose of the tax exemption
contained in the Freeport Amendment’ as
follows:

(a) This section is intended to clarify the

intent of the Legislature and the citizens in

establishing the exemption from ad valo-
rem property taxation granted by section
one-e, article ten of the West Virginia con-
stitution and section thirteen of this article
as it pertains to goods held in warehouse
facilities in this state awaiting shipment to

a destination outside this state. This sec-

tion codifies policies applied by agencies

and departments of this state upon which
persons have relied. It is the intent of the

Legislature that the provisions of this sec-

tion are to be liberally construed in favor

of a person claiming exemption from tax
pursuant to section one-e, article ten of the

West Virginia constitution, this section and

section thirteen of this article,

() Goods which have been moved to a
warehouse or storage facility, at which no
substantial alteration takes place, to await.
shipment to a destination outside this state
are deemed to be moving in interstate
commerce over.the territory of the state
and therefore are exempt from ad valorem
property tax and do not have a tax situs in
West Virginia for purposes of ad valorem
taxation,

The main issue in this appeal concerns the
following language contained in the Freeport
Amendment:

standard of review applicable, ‘and citing the
authorities relied on, under headings that corré-
spond with the assignments of error.” (Emphasis
added). “This Court has previously adhered to
the rule that although we liberally construe briefs
in determining issues presented for review, is-
sues which are ... mentioned only in passing but
are not supported with pertinent authority, are
not considered oni appeal.” State v. Gray, 217
W.Va. 591, 600, 619 S.B.2d 104, 113 (2005)
(citation and internal quotation omitted).

838

Such property shall not be deprived of
such exemption because while in the ware-
house the personal property is assembled,
bound, joined, processed, disassembled, di-
vided, cut, broken in bulk, relabeled, or
repackaged for delivery out of state, unless
such activity results in a new or different
product, article, substance or commodity,
or one of different utility. ..

(Emphasis added).

The issue is whether Pratt’s repair parts
are used to create a new product or a prod-
uet with a different utility. The county asses-
sor,. tax commissioner, and circuit court all
analyzed this issue and concluded that Pratt
‘was not entitled to the Freeport exemption
because its inventory of repair parts are used
to create a product with a different utility,
i.e., a functioning jet engine,

On appeal, Pratt argues that its inventory
of repair parts should be exempt from ad
valorem taxation under the Freeport Amend-
ment, It argues that these repair parts do
not “change their character in the course of
being assembled at Bridgeport, become a
new or different product while in the [Pratt]
facility or beeome a product with a different
utility.” Instead, according to Pratt, its repair
parts are individual components of a jet en-
gine prior to being installed, and they contin-
ue to be individual components of a jet en-
gine after being installed.

Conversely, the tax commissioner argues
that the Freeport Amendment does not apply
to Pratt’s inventory of repair parts. Accord-
ing to the tax commissioner, “the act of
installing a repair part, such as a compres-
sor, into a broken jet engine results in a new
or different product and in a product with a
different utility.” The tax commissioner em-
phasizes that the lone witness before the
circuit court, a Pratt employee, testified that
a jet engine is a different product and has a
different utility than the individual repair
parts,

HEB (Our resolution of this issue requires
us to examine the Freeport Amendment con-
tained in the West Virginia Constitution.
“Questions of constitutional construction are
in the main governed by the same general
rules applied in statutory construction.” Syl-

labus Point 1, Winkler v. State School Bldg.
Auth,, 189 W.Va. 748, 434 S.E.2d 420 (1998).
This Court has held that in deciding the
meaning of a statutory provision, “[wle look
first to the statute’s language. If the text,
given its plain meaning, answers the inter-
pretive, question, the language must prevail
and further inquiry. is foreclosed.” Appala-
chian Power Co. v, State Taw Dep’t of West
Virginia, 195 W.Va, 573, 587,466 S.E.2d 424,
438 (1995); see also Syllabus Point 2, Crockett
v. Andrews, 158 W.Va. 714, 172 S.H.2d 384
(1970) (“Where the language of a statute is
free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to
be accepted and applied without resort to
interpretation.”); and Syllabus Point 2, State
v. Epperly, 185 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488
(1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear
and unambiguous and plainly expresses the
legislative intent. will not be interpreted by
the courts but will be given full force and
effect.”),

Hy Additionally, this Court has held that
“[a] statute is open to construction only
where the language used requires interpreta-
tion because of ambiguity which renders it
susceptible of two or more constructions or
of such doubtful or obscure meaning that
reasonable minds might be uncertain or dis-
agree as to its meaning.” Sizemore v. State
Farm Gen, Ins. Co., 202 W.Va, 591, 596, 505
S.E.2d 654, 659 (1998) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). With these rules of
construction in mind, we turn to the Freeport
Amendment. .

I As an initial matter, we conclude that
the Freeport Amendment is unambiguous.
Based on the plain language of the Freeport.
Amendment, and its enacting statutes, the
tax exemption does not apply if Pratt’s instal-
lation of its repair parts into a jet engine
“results in a new or different product, article,
substance or commodity, or one of different
utility.” The undisputed facts of this matter
are that Pratt stores a large number of re-
pair parts at its Bridgeport facility. It installs
these parts into malfunctioning jet engines at
the Bridgeport facility. The end result of this
process is a fully functional jet engine.

As noted by the circuit court, Mr. Tucker,
a Pratt employee who was the lone witness

at the bench trial, stated that a jet engine is
a different product than the individual repair
parts. In fact, Mr. Tucker testified that all of
the repair parts “on the 39-page list, you
couldn’t necessarily make a jet engine out of
even the sum of those yet.” Further, Mr.
Tucker testified that a jet engine does not
have the same utility as an individual repair
part. Because Mr. Tucker testified that a
repaired, functional jet engine is a different
product with a different utility than the indi-
vidual repair parts, we agree with the circuit
eourt’s conclusion that the repair parts are
not exempt from ad valorem taxation pursu-
ant to the Freeport Amendment,

The only previous case from this Court
analyzing the Freeport Amendment supports
our conclusion. In Feroleto Steel Co. v. Ough-
ton, 230 W.Va. 5, 7, 736 S.E.2d 5, 7 (2012),
this Court considered whether a business
that cut “steel coils into narrower steel coils
... transforms the steel coils into products
of new or different utility so that the steel
coils are not exempt from ad valorem prop-
erty taxation.” The Court determined that
the taxpayer was entitled to the Freeport
exemption in Feroleto because the cutting of
the steel coils into narrower steel coils did
not create a new product or a product with a
different utility. In so ruling the Court relied
on the fact that “the steel coils arrive at the
petitioner's plant as steel coils, and they
leave the plant as steel coils, only of a nar-
rower size. While at the petitioner’s plant,
the composition of the steel is not changed.”
230 W.Va. at 8, 736 S.E.2d at 8. In the
present case, the repair parts arrive at
Pratt’s facility as individual parts. The indi-
vidual repair parts are stored in Pratt’s facili-
ty for an average of “zero to three months.”
Finally, the parts are used in a manufactur-
ing process to overhaul or repair a jet en-
gine, The individual repair parts leave the
facility as components of a functional jet
engine—a new product with a different utili-
ty than the individual repair parts.

HMM The Legislature has made it clear
that the purpose of the Freeport Amendment
is to exempt “[g]oods which have been moved
to a warehouse or storage facility, at which
no substantial alteration takes place, to await
shipment to a destination outside this state”

839

from ad valorem property tax. See W.Va.
Code § 11-5-18a, Thus, one of the purposes
of the Freeport Amendment is to promote
the warehousing industry in West Virginia. It
is clear that Pratt is not engaged in the
warehousing business, Pratt buys the repair
parts from an out-of-state vendor. It stores
these parts until they are needed in its en-
gine repair process. Finally, it installs these
repair parts into a malfunctioning jet engine,
producing a new product, a functioning jet
engine, which has a separate and distinct
utility from. the individual repair parts.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
the circuit court did not err by affirming the
tax commissioner’s order. We agree with the
circuit court’s conclusion that the repair
parts are not exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion under the Freeport Amendment because
they are used in the repair process at Pratt’s
facility to create a product with a different
utility.

B. Interstate Commerce

Pratt next argues that its repair parts are
goods moving through interstate commerce
and should be exempt from ad valorem taxa-
tion pursuant to the first sentence of the
Freeport Amendment, which provides;

Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this Constitution, tangible personal proper-
ty which is moving in interstate commerce
through or over the territory of the State
of West Virginia, or which was consigned
from a point of origin outside the State to
a warehouse, public or private, within the
State for storage in transit to a final desti-
nation outside the State, whether specified
when transportation begins or afterward,
but in any case specified timely for exempt
status determination purposes, shall not be
deemed to have acquired a tax situs in
West Virginia for purposes of ad valorem
taxation and shall be exempt from such
taxation, except as otherwise provided in
this section.

Both the circuit court and the state tax
commissioner rejected Pratt’s argument that
its inventory of repair parts should be ex-
empt from ad valorem taxation under the
first sentence of the Freeport Amendment.

840

The circuit court explained its rationale for
rejecting this argument as follows:

The 89-page list of inventory repair
parts does not represent goods moving in
‘interstate commerce. The situs of the
transaction is West Virginia under the
facts of this case. Pratt purchased an in-
ventory of repair parts foi use in [its] jet
engine repair business in Bridgeport, West
Virginia. A customer will ship a jet engine
in need of repairs to Bridgeport for Pratt
to repair and recondition as necessary. Ac-
cording to Mr. Tucker's testimony, the re-
pair parts are used by Pratt in Bridgeport
to repair jet engines, After a grommet or
compressor is installed on the engine and
the jet engine once again becomes opera-
tional, the jet engine is returned to the
customer for use in the field, The 89-page
list of repair parts is not moving in inter-
state commerce any more than the tires
held in inventory by Firestone or Good-
year would be moving in interstate com-
merce, .

Similarly, in the tax commissioner's ruling
denying Pratt's request for an exemption
under the Freeport Amendment, it noted:

The inventories maintained by Pratt
consist of parts to be used or consumed in
the provision of its aircraft engine repair
service, not of goods or merchandise that
merely reside here temporarily while in
transit, The Freeport Amendment was
never intended to exempt the ordinary in-
ventories of tangible personal property
kept on hand for such purposes. The goods
in question are not in transit—they are

used or consumed in the provision of a

service which is performed entirely with

the State of West Virginia.

We agree with the rationale set forth by
the citeuit court and the tax commissioner.
The plain language of the Freeport Amend-
ment and its enacting statutes provide a
straightforward statement of its application:

6. Pratt's argument that its repair parts are ex-
empt under the first sentence of the Freeport
Amendment also includes an. assertion that its
repair parts are exempt from taxation under the
Commerce Clause. U.S. Const, art, 1, § 8, cl. 3
(Congress’ shall have the power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
_several States.”), We disagree. We need not lin-

the tax exemption applies to property or
goods delivered “from a point of origin out-
side the State to a warehouse, public or
private, within the State for storage in tran-
sit to a final destination outside the State,”
(Emphasis added), 7

Pratt’s inventory of repair parts are pur-
chased from: out-of-state and stored in its
West Virginia facility until needed to over-
haul o¥ repair a malfunctioning jet engine,
Once a customer sends a malfunctioning jet
engine to the West Virginia facility, the re-
pair parts are used in-the manufacturing
process that occurs in West Virginia, result-
ing in the repair parts becoming an integral
part of a functioning jet engine. Pratt’s argu-
ment that its inventory of parts are simply
moving through interstate commerce
stretches the Freeport Amendment far be-
yond its plain language. If this Court adopted
Pratt’s argument, we would. potentially be
extending the Freeport Amendment to all
manufacturing businesses that purchase
goods from outside of the state for use in a
manufacturing process that occurs in West.
Virginia, and results in a finished product

* being delivered to an out-of-state customer.

This expansion of the Freeport Amendment
is not supported by its plain language or by
its enacting statutes, In fact, the second sen-
tence of the Freeport. Amendment makes it
abundantly clear that goods which are stored
in West Virginia and used to create a new
product or a product with a different utility
do not qualify for the ad valorem tax exemp-
tion. Plainly, Pratt’s repair parts were not
brought into West Virginia simply “for stor-
age in transit to a final destination outside
the State.”

Based on the foregoing, we con-
clude that the cireuit court did not err by
rejecting Pratt's argument that its repair
goods were exempt from ad valorem taxation
pursuant to the first sentence of the Free-
port Amendment.’

ger on this issue because of our determination
that the repair parts at issue are not merely
moving through interstate commerce, rather, the
inventory of repair parts are purchased by a
. West Virginia company and stored at its West
“Virginia facility for eventual use in its manufac-
turing process that occurs in West Virginia, As-
suming arguendo that the repair paris were sim-

C. Liberal Construction

Finally, Pratt argues that the circuit court
“erred in failing to effectively construe the
Freeport [A]mendment liberally in favor of
the taxpayer seeking the exemption, in viola-
tion of the specifie mandate of the West
Virginia legislature” and in violation of this
Court’s ruling in Feroleto Steel. The tax com-
missioner agrees with Pratt that the Free-
port Amendment is to be liberally. construed
in favor of the taxpayer seeking the exemp-
tion. However, the tax commissioner dis-
agrees with Pratt’s assertion that the circuit
court failed to liberally construe the Freeport
Amendment in Pratt's favor.

West Virginia Code § 11-5-18a(a) provides,
in part, “[i]t is the intent. of the Legislature
that the provisions-of this section are to be
Hberally construed in favor of a person claim-
ing exemption from tax.” Similarly, in Sylla-
bus Point 2 of Feroleto Steel, this Court held:
“Pursuant to W.Va. Code § 11-5-18a(a), it is
the intent of the Legislature that the exemp-
tion from ad valorem taxation of certain per-
sonal property of inventory and warehouse
goods provided for in W.Va. Const. art, X,
§ 1e; W.Va. Code § 11-5-18; and W.Va. Code
§ 11-5-18a(b); is to be liberally construed in
favor of a person claiming the exemption.”

The cireuit court’s order affirming the tax
commissioner’s ruling recognizes that the
Freeport Amendment is to be liberally con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer. In fact, the
circuit court’s order discusses W.Va. Code
§ 11-5-18a numerous times, including the fol-
lowing statement contained under its “conclu-
sions of law” heading: “According to W.Va.
Code § 11-5-18a(a), the Freeport Exemption
is to be liberally construed.”

ply passing through West Virginia in interstate
commerce, our analysis would focus on the Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97
S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977), four-part test.
Under Complete Auto, a state tax imposed on
interstate commerce is constitutional if it “is
applied to an activity with substantial nexus with
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided.” Id, at
279, 97 S.Ct. 1076. There has been no showing
that the tax on Pratt's inventory of repair parts
violates any of these factors. As the tax commis-
sioner notes, “property physically present in

841

Additionally, after recognizing that it-was
required to liberally construe the Freeport
Amendment in Pratt’s favor, the cireuit court
explained why it nevertheless determined
that the repair parts were not exempt from
ad valorem taxation under the Freeport
Amendment. The circuit court’s order pro-
vides:

[Pratt] argues that the Freeport Amend-
ment should be liberally construed by the
- Courts. [Pratt] is correct as an abstract
statement of law. See W.Va. Code § 11-5-
18a(a). However, Mr. Tucker’s testimony
was clear and consistent. A jet engine is a
new and different product than a grommét
‘or a counterweight, A jet’ engine has a
different utility than a compressor, Liberal
construction should not be cited as a basis
to ignore the undisputed testimony of
Pratt's own witness. If the activities of any
taxpayer results in a new or different
product or a product with a different utili-
ty, then the tangible personal property at
issue does not meet the language of the
Freeport Amendment. In the case before
the Circuit Court today, it is clear that
[Pratt's] activities do not fall within the
parameters of the Freeport Amendment,

(Emphasis added),

Based on this clear statement, the circuit
court recognized that the Freeport Amend-
ment is to be liberally construed and it con-
sidered Pratt’s argument .under this stan-
dard, The circuit court reasoned that, despite
the liberal construction standard, Pratt’s ar-
gument failed based on the undisputed testi-
mony of the only witness who testified during
the bench trial. This witness, a Pratt employ-
ee, testified that the manufacturing process
in which the repair parts are used results in

West Virginia [such as Pratt's inventory of repair
parts] has a sufficient nexus for ad valorem prop-
erty tax purposes,” The tax commissioner also
asserts that the taxes assessed by the county
assessor are used to provide edsential county
services, Further, the tax commissioner argues
that there has been no showing that the taxes are
assessed in a discriminatory mamner. Finally, the
tax commissioner states that there has been no
showing that the county assessor has failed to
properly apportion the ad valorem taxes. .We
agree with the tax commissioner and find Pratt
has failed to satisfy the four-factor Complete Auto
test.

842

a new product with a different utility—a
functional jet engine.

We agree with the circuit court’s reasoning
and conclusion. The circuit court recognized
that the Freeport Amendment is to be lib-
erally construed, considered Pratt’s argu-
ment under this standard, and explained its
reasons for ruling against Pratt despite this
standard. The testimony of the sole witness
demonstrated clearly and unequivocally that
the inventory of repair parts do not fall
within the Freeport Amendment exemption.

HH Based on the foregoing, we find that
the circuit court did not err “in failing to
effectively construe the Freeport [A]mend-
ment liberally” in Pratt's favor.”

IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit court’s August 24, 2016, order
is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
Opinion.

JUSTICE WORKMAN dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting
Opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, joined by
‘WORKMAN, Justice, dissenting:

The Freeport Amendment to the West Vir-
ginia Constitution, both in its language and
intent, plainly provides an exemption from
taxation for personal property which is
stored or maintained for a period of time
within the State insofar as it substantially
maintains its character upon departing the
State. The majority disregards the plain lan-
guage of the Amendment and its analysis is
devoid of even the most rudimentary exercise
in logic. Most importantly, however, the ma-
jority disregards fully the Legislature’s edict
that the Amendment is to be liberally con-
strued in favor of exemption. Therefore, I

7. Pratt also argues that the circuit court failed to
apply the proper standard of proof in this case.
Pratt asserts that the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard should be applied to taxpayer's
seeking an exemption under the Freeport
Amendment. We disagree. In Syllabus Point 5, in

dissent to the majority’s conclusion that the
component engine parts housed by the peti-
tioner Pratt & Whitney Engine Services
(hereinafter “Pratt”) in aid of their repair
services are subject to ad valorem tax.

It is undisputed herein that Pratt operates
a jet engine repair and service facility; to
conduct this business it is necessary that it
maintain an inventory of replacement parts,
Jet engines needing repair are shipped to
Pratt and these same engines leave repaired.
Pratt engages in absolutely no manufactur-
ing of jet engines or any other product. The
repair parts it maintains are used solely to
affix or utilize in servicing jet engines in need
of repair.

The Freeport Amendment provides that
tangible personal property which is either 1)
moving in interstate commerce through or
over the territory of the State of West Virgi-
nia; or 2) consigned from outside the State to
a warehouse within the State for storage in
transit to a destination outside the State, is
exempt from ad valorem tax. W. Va. Const.
Art. 10, § 1c; see also W. Va. Code § 11-5-18.
Critically, the Amendment expressly states
that such property remains exempt even if
“while in the warehouse the personal proper-
ty is assembled, bownd, joined, processed,
disassembled, divided, cut, broken in bulk,
relabeled, or repackaged for delivery, unless
such activity results in a new or different
product, article, substance or commodity, or
one of different utility.” (emphasis added);
see also W. Va. Code § 11-5-13(b). West Vir-
ginia Code § 11-5-13a(b) further clarifies that
such warehoused goods are exempt from tax-
ation provided “no substantial alteration
takes place” at the place of holding (emphasis
added).

Clearly, the repair parts housed by Pratt
can be fairly characterized as having been
“assembled, bound, [or] joined” inasmuch as
they are affixed to or integrated into a jet
engine for purposes of repairing it. Jd. The
question then becomes—did such assembly,
binding, or joining, of the repair parts create

part, of In re Tax Assessment of Foster Founda-

tion’s Woodlands Retirement Community, 223

W.Va, 14, 672 8.E.2d 150 (2008), this Court held:

“A taxpayer challenging an assessor's tax assess-

ment must prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that such tax assessment is erroneous.”

a “new” or “different” product? In a true
manufacturing plant, the answer would be
unquestionably “yes”: the assembly of a vari-
ety of components ordinarily creates a new
product, article, substance or commodity as
such is the very nature of manufacturing.
However, in Pratt’s repair facility, the com-
ponent parts are merely “assembled, bound,
[or] joined,” to an existing product of discrete
and unaltered utility: a jet engine. Replacing
or otherwise utilizing a grommet or counter-
weight in a jet engine to repair it substantial-
ly alters neither the engine nor the compo-
nent part itself. Neither the jet engine nor
the component part has a differing utility
upon leaving the facility: the jet engine
serves the same function, as do its compo-
nent parts. At best, it can be said that the
component parts have now fully realized
their intended utility, rather than sitting un-
used in a box. Therefore, they are exempt
from ad valorem tax pursuarit to the Free-
port Amendment. .

Despite this relatively effortless reasoning,
the majority concludes that the inoperable
jet engine and the warehoused component.
parts magically transform in character upon
leaving Pratt’s facility. In an exchange that
the majority and the circuit court inexplica-
bly deemed critical, Pratt’s supply chain lo-
gistics manager agreed during his testimony
with the profoundly obvious conclusion that a
jet engine is a different product and has a
different utility than an individual repair part
such as a grommet or counterweight. Based
upon this comically self-evident testimony
alone, the majority concludes that the prop-
erty is not exempt from taxation. (“Because
Mr. Tucker testified that a repaired, func-
tional jet engine is a different product with a
different utility than the individual repair
parts, we agree ... that the repair parts are
not exempt[.]”). .

The logical fallacy in this analysis, howev-
er, is that it presupposes that the component
part—the personal property at issue—“be-
comes” the jet engine when it leaves the
Pratt facility and therefore is a “different”
product, having a “different” utility. A com-
1, In fact, the majority blithely refers to the repair

of the engines on miltiple occasions as a “manu-

facturing process .... [that] results in a finished
product” as though such a characterization is

843

ponent part; of course, does not transform
into a jet engine upon leaving Pratt’s facility;
it remains the same component part. Nor
does the jet engine which enters Pratt’s facil-
ity leave a “new” or “different” product with
differing utility—it is still a jet engine and in
fact the same jet engine which entered the
facility, maintaining the same use and pur-
pose.

In scraping to reach its ultimate condlu-
sion, the majority alternatively suggests that
because a jét engine arrives inoperable and
leaves functional, it therefore becomes a “dif-
ferent” product with a “different” utility in
the process. This obtuse reasoning perhaps
best reveals the majority’s result-oriented
handling. A broken jet engine is still a jet
engine. A-jet engine—operable or inopera-
ble—has the same utility or purpose: to pro-
vide thrust for an airplane. The majority’s
desperate attempt to liken the limited manip-
ulation of the personal property at issue—
which is expressly permitted under the stat-
ute—to something tantamount to full-scale
manufacturing fails under the weight of its
own strained semantical logic.

Perhaps the majority’s most fundamental
misunderstanding of the scope of the Free-
port Amendment is its apparent belief that
nothing short of pure, “hands-off” warehous-
ing qualifies for the tax exemption. (“{O]ne of
the purposes of the Freeport Amendment is
to promote the warehousing industry in West.
Virginia. It is clear that Pratt is not engaged
in the warehousing business.”) However, the
language of the Amendment itself belies this
conclusion. Providing tax exemption to goods
temporarily ‘housed in the State which are
not “substantial[ly] alterfed]” during that
time is the intended goal of the Amendment
as per West Virginia Code § 11-5-13a(b).
Nevertheless, it delineates a list of activities
which presumptively do not substantially al-
ter the goods and therefore does not destroy
the exemption: assembly, binding, joining,
processing, disassembling, dividing, cutting,
breaking in bulk, relabeling, or repackaging
for delivery. W. Va. Const. art. 10, § 1c; W.

remotely accurate. This mischaracterization is a

poorly disguised attempt to render its ultimate
conclusion unassailable.

844

Va. Code § 11-5-18(b). Certainly these activi-
ties go well beyond passive storage, It is only
# this activity. has a transformative effect on
the stored components or their purpose that
the exemption is lost. As explained above,
there is nothing transformative about replac-
ing or using a grommet or counterweight in
an effort to make repairs to a discrete, singu-
larly-purposed product such that the product
may actually be used for its intended pur-
pose, To say this minimal utilization of the
personal property at issue creates no “sub-
stantial alteration” of the personal property
itself is an understatement.

In fact, the lone case to uphold this exemp-
tion is frankly even further removed from
exemption than the instant case because the
property therein was in fact altered in some
fashion. In Feroleto Steel Co, Inc. v. Ough-
ton, 280 W.Va, 5, 786 S.E.2d 5 (2012), this
Court upheld a tax exemption for steel coils
which were cut into narrower steel coils
while being housed in a West Virginia facili-
ty. Finding that “the composition of the steel
is not changed” simply by cutting it, the
Court upheld the exemption and found such
exemption consistent with the intent .of the
Amendment, Jd. at 8-9, 786 S.E.2d at 8-9. In
the, instant case, however, the component.
parts at issue themselves are altered in no
way—they are merely integrated into or af-
fixed to the engine. If the modified steel coils
in Feroleto are entitled to tax exemption,
there can be little question that the wholly
unaltered repair parts herein likewise quali-
ty.

Finally, with scarcely a sentence of its own
analysis, the majority brushes aside the stat-
utory requirement that the Freeport Amend-
ment be liberally construed in favor of the
taxpayer with its conclusory statement that
the inventory of repair parts simply does not
fall within the exemption, West Virginia
Code § 11-5-18a(a) expressly provides that
“Cilt is the intent of the Legislature that the
provisions of this section are to be liberally
construed in favor of-a person claiming ex-
emption from tax [pursuant to the Freeport
Amendment.}” Accordingly, even if one were
to dignify the majority's dubious assessment
that the personal property takes on a differ-
ing character once integrated into the re-

paired engines, liberal construction would de-
’ mand that the countervailing conclusion (that
the property has in no way been “substantial-
ly altered” merely because it was affixed to
the éngines) must prevail to afford Pratt the
tax exemption. Only by completely ignoring
this countervailing argument—which, in fact,
it does—can the majority reach a result
against the exemption.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth here-
inaboye, I respectfully dissent.

806 S.E.2d 768
Jerry S. STRAUB, Petitioner
y.

Pat S. REED, Commissioner, West
Virginia Division of Motor
Vehicles, Respondent

No. 16-0996,

Supreme Court of Appeals of West’ Virginia.

Subrhitted: October 11, 2017
Filed: November 1, 2017

R. Lee Booten, II, Esq., Huntington, West
Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General,
Janet E. James, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attor-
neys for Respondent.

WORKMAN, Justice:

Nearly two years after Petitioner Jerry 8.
Straub was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol (“DUI”), Respondent Pat
S, Reed, Commissioner of the West Virginia
Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the
“DMV”), issued an order revoking his driv-
er’s license, On appeal, the Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings (the “OAH”), affirmed the
license revocation, The circuit court upheld
that decision.

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Straub’s pri-
mary contention is that the procedural delays
were so unreasonably excessive they violated
his constitutional due process rights. Based
upon our review of the briefs, legal authori-
ties, appendix record, and upon consideration
of arguments of counsel, this Court finds no
merit to his arguments. Therefore, we affirm
the order of the circuit court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

A police officer with the Ceredo, West
Virginia, Police Department arrested Mr.
Straub for DUI on January 9, 2011. The
officer initiated the traffic stop at approxi-
mately 8:00 am., after he observed Mr.
Straub backing his vehicle into oncoming
traffic and almost striking another vehicle.
The officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Straub’s
breath and noticed his eyes were glassy and
bloodshot, Mr. Straub admitted to drinking;
he told the officer that he had consumed six
to eight beers that evening. Mr, Straub failed
a preliminary breath test, and the results of
the secondary chemical test showed his blood
aleohol concentration level was 0.107%.

Mr. Straub appeared, pro se, before the
City of Ceredo Municipal Court on March 10,
1. During that time, four hearings were scheduled

and continued: the first upon Mr. Straub’s mo-
tion for continuance, the second for failure of the

847

2011, and his misdemeanor DUI charge was
dismissed.

For reasons not explained in the record,
the DMV maintains that it did not receive
the DUI Information Sheet from the arrest-
ing officer until November 27, 2012. The
DMV issued an order revoking Mr. Straub’s
driving privileges on December 18, 2012.
Thereafter, Mr. Straub requested a hearing
with the OAH to challenge the revocation.

Following several continuances for various
reasons, the administrative hearing eventual-
ly took place before a hearing examiner on
March 10, 2015.1 The police officer testified
about the events surrounding the arrest.
When he testified, Mr. Straub did not dispute
the fact that he was driving while intoxicated,
Rather, Mr. Straub testified that he felt prej-
udiced by the delay of the revocation order
being issued over twenty-three months from
the time of his arrest, and the incident then
being over four years old. Mr. Straub testi-
fied that he was employed as a pharmaceuti-
eal sales representative, and his employer
issued notices of potential layoffs regularly.
He further testified that during the time
frame between his arrest for DUI and the
administrative hearing, he attempted to se-
eure other employment. Mr. Straub claimed
that he was interviewed by recruiters, but
once they learned that his driver’s license
could possibly be revoked, the recruiters
would no longer continue his job search, For-
tunately, Mr. Straub’s employer did not lay
him off and he continued working while the
matter was pending. At the administrative
hearing, Mr. Straub’s counsel moved to dis-
miss the case based on the procedural delays.

On February 22, 2016, the OAH issued the
decision of the hearing examiner which was
adopted by the final order of the chief hear-
ing examiner. The OAH found that Mr.
Straub drove a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol on January 9, 2011. It
ordered Mr, Straub’s driver's license revoked
under West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(j)
(2018). The OAH did not address Mr.
Straub’s arguments regarding procedural de-
lays; it noted the OAH “does not have juris-

officer to appear, the third on the hearing exam-

iner’s sua sponte motion, and the fourth due to
Mr. Straub’s motion for continuance.

848

diction to deal with issues of timing and
+ delay.” .

Mr. Straub appealed the’OAH order to the
cireuit court and requested a stay of the
revocation order pending that appeal pursu-
ant to West Virginia Code § 170-5A-2(s)
(2018). The circuit court held a hearing on
the matter and granted Mr. Strauh’s motion
for stay By order entered October 21, 2016,
the circuit court affirmed the OAH order,
finding no merit to Mr, Straub’s arguments.

Mr. Straub filed this appeal, and presented
a motion to stay the circuit court’s order
pending our appeal. On November 1, 2016,
this Court granted this motion,

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW
MME This Court has held that

foJn appeal of an administrative order
from a circuit court, this Court is bound by
the statutory standards contained in W.Va.
Code, § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions
of law presented de novo; findings of fact
by the administrative officer are accorded
deference unless the reviewing court be-
lieves the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v, Cline, 196 W.Va. 588,
474 8,E.2d 618 (1996). With these standards
in mind, we proceed to the merits of this
appeal. .

IIL DISCUSSION

Mr. Straub raises four separate, but large-
ly interconnected, assignments of error on
the subject of procedural delays. In the inter-
est of brevity, we address the related issues
in the context of his core argument. Mr.
Straub asserts that the delays in the admin-
istrative proceedings violated his constitu-
tional rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment to-the United States Constitution and.

2, At this hearing, the DMV moved to dismiss the
matter on jurisdictional grounds, and argued
that it was not an appeal: of a “contested case”
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 29A-5-4
(2015), because Mr, Straub did not contest the
fact he was driving under the influence. The
DMV asserted that Mr. Straub’s appeal was akin
to a request for the extraordinary relief of rescis-
sion of a license revocation. based upon delay in
the administrative proceedings. The circuit court

Article III, section 10 and section 17 of the
West Virginia Constitution?

Delays and Procedural Due Process

HM The Legislature has imposed no
time limitations on the DMV’s statutory au-
thority to issue a revocation order following a
driver's DUI arrest.‘ Similarly, the OAH has
no statutory or regulatory time limitations
within which to issue its decision following an
administrativé hearing’ Nevertheless, this
Court has recognized that “{a] driver’s li-
cense is a property interest and such interest
is’ entitled to protection under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the West Virginia Constitu-
tion.” Syl. Pt. 1, Abshire v. Cline, 198 W.Va.
180, 455 S.E.2d 649 (1995). Thus, “due’ pro-
cess concerns are raised when there are ex-
cessive and unieasonable delays in [driver's]
license suspension cases.” Holland v, Miller,
280 W.Va. 35, 89, 786 S.E.2d 85, 89 (2012).

“[TJhis Court has long recognized the con-

stitutional mandate that “ ‘justice shall be
administered without ... delay,’ W.Va.
Const, Art, III, § 17.” Frantz v. Palmer,
211 W.Va, 188, 192, 564 S.H.2d 898, 402
(2001), See Petry v, Stwmp, 219 W.Va. 197,
200, 632 S.H.2d 358, 856 (2006); and Allen
», State, Human Ris. Comm'n, 174 W.Va.
189, 157, 824 S.E.2d 99, 118 (1984). We
have further declared that “[jjust as circuit
court judges ‘have an affirmative duty to
render timely decisions on matters proper-
ly submitted within a reasonable time fol-
lowing their submission, Syl. Pt. 1, in part,
State ex vel. Patterson v. Aldredge, 178
W.Va. 446, 317 S.E.2d 805 (1984), the obli-
gation to act in a timely fashion is similarly
imposed upon administrative bodies{.]”
Frantz, 211 W.Va, at 192, 564 S.E.2d at
402. Indeed, as we held in.syllabus point 2
of Franta, “‘[Aldministrative agencies per-
forming quasi-judicial functions haye an
affirmative duty to dispose promptly of
denied the DMV’s motion. This issue is not
squarely before the Court.

3, This is Mr. Straub’s second assignment of er-
ror, .

4, See W.Va, Code § 17C-5A-1(c).

5. See Wa, Code § 17C-5C-1 et seq. and 105
W.Va, CSR§ 1-1 et seq.

matters properly submitted. Syl. Pt. 7, in
part, Allen v. State, Human Rights
Comm'n, 174 W.Va. 189, 324 S.E.2d 99
(1984),”

Miller v. Moredock, 229 W.Va. 66, 70, 726
S.B.2d 84,88 (2011)8

In the present case, Mr. Straub complains
about two delays. First, the DMV issued its
order revoking his driver’s license twenty-
three months after his arrest for DUI. And
second, the OAH issued its decision affirming
that revocation eleven months following the
administrative hearing. Mr. Straub asserts
these delays were grossly excessive, unrea-
sonable, and violated his procedural due pro-
cess rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and
Article ITI, see. 10 and sec. 17 of the West
Virginia Constitution.

HE With regard to the first.delay, the
DMV counters that the lag in receipt of the
arresting officer's DUI Information Sheet
following the arrest did not relieve the DMV
of its statutory duty to revoke Mr. Straub’s
driver's license, We agree. As this Court held
in syllabus point three of Carpenter v. Cic-
chirillo, 222 W.Va. 66, 662 S.E.2d 508 (2008):

“A law enforcement officer’s failure to
strictly comply with the DUI arrest re-
porting time requirements of W.Va. Code,
170-5A-1(b) [1994] is not a bar or impedi-
ment to the commissioner of the Division
of Motor Vehicles taking administrative ac-
tion based on the arrest report, unless
there is actual prejudice to the driver as a
result of such failure.” Syllabus point 1, In
re Burks, 206 W.Va. 429, 525 S.H.2d 310
(1999),

Mr. Straub's fourth assignment of error is that
the OAH and the DMV’s failure to establish inter-
nal procedural time limits violated his “constitu-
tional and statutory due process rights.” This
contention is premised on West Virginia Code
§ 29A-5-1(a), which provides that “[eJach agency
shall adopt appropriate rules of procedure for
hearing and contested cases{.]” However, we re-
ject the argument that this language creates a
statutory mandate for the DMV and the OAH to
establish strict internal procedural time limits.
‘The gist of his argument is that it is unfair to
drivers that the DMV and the OAH are not held
to clearly established deadlines, especially since
they are so lackadaisical in performing their re-

a

849

HE When a driver asserts constitutional
error due to a substantial delay in holding
the administrative license revocation hearing,
the pivotal issue is whether he or she can
demonstrate prejudice. That is, whether the

. driver’s ability to present, his or her defense

was affected by the delay. In Meadows v
Reed, No, 14-0188, 2015 WL 1588462 (W.Va.
Mar. 16, 2015) (memorandum decision), this
Court granted the driver relief after we de-
termined that the four-year delay before the
matter went to administrative hearing was
prejudicial to the driver's ability to defend
himself. Significantly, that delay encom-
passed the death of the investigating officer,
whose conclusions in the DUI information
sheet were hotly contested by the driver, In
contrast, we declined to grant the driver
relief in Reed v. Conniff, 236 W.Va, 800, 779
§.H.2d 568 (2015), when there was a four-
year delay before the matter went to admin-
istrative hearing; in Coniff, the delay did not
prejudice the driver's ability to mount a de-
fense to the charge,

Hl Turning to the instant case, we agree
with Mr, Straub’s general contention that a
driver should not be forced to live under the
cloud of a pending revocation for nearly two
years. Nevertheless, Mr, Straub fails to raise
any. serious argument that he was actually *
prejudiced or unable to adequately present
his case when it did go to hearing before the
OAH. In fact, Mr, Straub presented no evi-
dence at the OAH hearing in defense of the
DMV’s assertion that he was driving under
the influence.

Instead, by way of analogy, Mr, Straub
asserts as his third assignment of error that
the one-year statute of limitations for misde-
meanors” should bar the DMV’s administra-

spective administrative duties. However, this. is
an argument best made to the Legislature, not
this Court. See Syl. Pt, 2, Huffman v. Goals Coal
Co., 223 W.Va, 724, 725, 679 S.E.2d 323, 324
(2009) (““This Court does not sit as a superlegisla-
ture, commissioned to pass upon the political,
social, economic or scientific merits of statutes
pertaining to proper subjects of legislation. It, is
the duty of the Legislature to consider facts,
establish policy, and embody that policy in legis-
lation. It is the duty of this Court to enforce
legislation unless it runs afoul of the State or
Federal Constitutions.”),

7. See W.Va. Code § 61-11-9 (2014).

850

tive action, considering the fact his arrest
was for misdemeanor DUI. This analogy is
misplaced on its face and ignores our case
Jaw regarding the “clear statutory demarca-
tion between the administrative issue on a
suspension and the criminal issue on a
charge of driving while under the influence.”
Jordan v. Roberts, 161 W.Va. 750, 757, 246
§.E.2d 259, 263 (1978). Accordingly, we find
the statute of limitations for Mr. Straub’s
DUI criminal charge is in no way germane to
his procedural due process challenge to the
administrative revocation proceeding.®

The instant case is factually similar to In
re Petition of Donley, 217 W.Va. 449, 618
§.E.2d 458 (2005), wherein the driver con-
tended that the delay of almost three years
between his guilty plea to second offense
DUI and the driver's license revocation order
violated his constitutional due process rights.
In Donley, this Court found such delay pat-
ently unreasonable. Id. at 452, 618 S.H.2d at
461. Nevertheless, we held that the driver

8. See Syl. Pt. 3, Carroll v. Stump, 217 W.Va. 748,
619 S.B.2d 261 (2005) (“Administrative license
revocation proceedings for driving a motor vehi-
cle under the influence of alcohol, controlled
substances or drugs which are initiated pursuant
to Chapter 17C of the West Virginia Code are
proceedings separate and distinct from criminal
proceedings arising from driving a motor vehicle
under the influence of alcohol, controlled sub-
stances or drugs. The presentation of a sworn
complaint before a magistrate and the magis-
trate’s finding of probable cause and issuance of
a warrant are not jurisdictional prerequisites to
the commencement of administrative license rev-
ocation proceedings pursuant to Chapter 17C of
the West Virginia Code.”); see eg. Alvarez v.
State, Dep't of DMV, 249 P.3d 286, 291-92 (Alas-
ka 2011) (rejecting argument that speedy trial
limits apply to driver's license suspension pro-
ceedings because “both the Alaska and United
States Constitutions grant the right to a speedy
trial only with regard to criminal proceedings,
and a license revocation proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding."’) (footnote omitted).

9, For this reason, the correlated first assignment
of error lacks merit. Mr. Straub argues that the
OAH's hearing officer’s failure to rule upon the
procedural delay issue was a violation of his
“due process rights, in addition to those viola-
tions arising from pre-issuance and post-issuance
unreasonable delays[.]” However, Mr. Straub
does not cite any authority for the proposition
that he would be entitled to relief simply due to
the OAH’s failure to rule on his constitutional
arguments. In Matter of Callaghan, 238 W.Va.

was not entitled to relief “because no preju-
dice flowed from the delay.” Id.

WM Likewise, the twenty-three
month delay between the DUI arrest and the
DMV’s issuance of the revocation order in
the instant matter was excessive and unrea-
sonable. However, Mr. Straub is still not
entitled to relief because he can show no
actual prejudice that flowed from this delay.
As mentioned above, at the administrative
hearing Mr. Straub did not dispute the fact
that he was driving while intoxicated. There-
fore, the delay did not hamper Mr. Straub’s
defense of the charge; he advanced none.*

HH We turn now to the second delay,
Mr. Straub complains that it took the OAH
eleven months to issue its final order follow-
ing the hearing. On this issue, the DMV
counters that it cannot defend the OAH’s
delay because the DMV “has no control over”
the OAH. Nevertheless, the DMV states that
Mr. Straub’s argument regarding this delay
Jacks merit because he can demonstrate no
actual prejudice.” We agree.

495, 796 S.B.2d 604 (2017), cert. denied sub
nom. Callaghan v. W. Virginia Judicial Investiga-
tion Comm'n, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 211, 199
LEd.2d 118, 2017 WL 2972601 (U.S Oct. 2,
2017), this Court briefly discussed the issue.
Looking to other jurisdictions, we noted that an
agency before which constitutional challenges
are raised generally acts with the “presumption
that its rules and actions were constitutional and
reserve[s] to the appropriate judicial forum the
final resolution of constitutionality.” Id. at 510
n15, 796 S.E.2d at 619 n.15. “[Allthough the
general rule is that agencies do not have the
authority to decide constitutional issues, agencies
must consider and apply constitutional principles
in determining procedures and rendering deci-
sions in contested cases.” Richardson v. Tenn.
Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S,W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn.
1995). More specifically, “when the focus of an
aggrieved party’s claim is an ‘as applied’ chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a statute or any
challenge to the constitutionality of an agency
rule, the agency may initially rule on the chal-
lenge.” Id. at 455 (emphasis added). Here, Mr.
Straub does not articulate any real prejudice
flowing from the OAH’s failure to address his
constitutional arguments.

10. The DMV also asserts that Mr. Straub’s failure
to bring an action for extraordinary relief against
the OAH to issue its decision in a timely fashion
renders moot his complaint about the delay. We
disagree, This Court rejected similar arguments
in Miller v. Moredock, and stated that despite the
availability of extraordinary relief as a means of

‘When evaluating a procedural due process
challenge regarding the OAH’s delay in issu-
ing its order after the administrative hearing,
‘we again focus on whether the driver demon-
strates actual prejudice, And in this circum-
stance, “the issue of prejudice necessarily
involves prejudice to a party that occurred
after the hearing was held.” Reed v. Staffile-
no, 239 W.Va. 588, 542, 803 S.E.2d 508, 513
(2017) (emphasis added),

In Staffileno, the driver put forth compel-
ling evidence of prejudice because he made a
eareer change during the thirty-nine month
period between the OAH administrative
hearing and its final order, 239 W.Va, at 542,
808 S.H.2d at 518, We affirmed the circuit
court’s finding that Mr. Staffileno was preju-
diced by this delay because he would not
have retired from his desk job when he did
and changed his employment to that of a
school bus driver, if the OAH had issued a
timely decision. Id,

HH soOur holding in syllabus point two of
Staffileno is dispositive of this issue: .

On appeal to the circuit court from an
order of the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings affirming the revocation of a party’s
license to operate a motor vehicle in this
State, when the party asserts that his or
her constitutional right to due process has
been violated by a delay in the issuance of

the order by the Office of Administrative:

Hearings, the party must demonstrate that
he or she has suffered actual and substan-
tial prejudice as a result of the delay. Once
actual and substantial prejudice from the
delay has been proven, the circuit court

seeking issuance of delayed decisions, a party
whose driver's license has been revoked: should
not have to resort to such relief to obtain a
decision within a reasonable period of time fol-
lowing an administrative hearing. 229 W.Va. at
72 n.7, 726 S.E.2d at 40 n.7

11, As his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Straub
challenges West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(s)—
the procedure for obtaining a stay from the cir-
cuit court pending appeal—and claims the stat-
ute violates “the United States and West Virginia
constitutional guarantees of due process of law,
and their concepts of procedural due process,
substantive due process, and equal protection of
law.

Straub would assign this error considering the

This Court is at a loss to comprehend why Mr.

851

must then balance the resulting prejudice
against the reasons for the delay.

239 W.Va, at 540, 808 S.H.2d at 510.

Accordingly, we find the OAH’s eleven-
month delay in issuing its final order in this
matter egregious. A driver should not have
to wait this long to receive an order following
an administrative hearing, and these delays
cannot be condoned: Nevertheless, we de-
cline to grant Mr. Straub relief. because he
ean identify no actual and substantial preju-
dice, e.g., some type of detrimental change in
his cireumstances, related to the delay in
OAH issuing its final order.

The circuit court was correct in finding
that Mr. Straub demonstrated no prejudice
by either the delay of the DMV in issuing the
revocation order, or the delay in the OAH’s
issuing its final order. Thus, we find Mr.
Straub’s related assignments of error regard-
ing procedural delays lack merit.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the October 21, 2016, order of
the Circuit Court of Cabell County.

Affirmed. ,

JUSTICE KETCHUM dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

Justice Ketchum dissenting:

“Justice shall be administered without ...
delay.” W.Va, Const. art, III, § 17. That
commendable constitutional mandate was
heinously ignored in this case. It took the
DMV almost two years after the defendant

fact the circuit court granted his request to stay
the revocation order pending appeal, “It is an
established principle of law that one may not
urge the unconstitutionality of a statute if he is
not harmfully affected by the particular feature
of the statute alleged to be in conflict with the
Constitution.” Wilson v. State, 264 A.2d 510, 511
(el. 1970). “A closely related principle is that
constitutional rights are personal and may not be
asserted vicariously.” Broadrick v, Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Bd.2d 830
(1973). These principles “'reflect the conviction
that under our constitutional system courts are
not roving commissions assigned to pass judg-
ment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.” Id. at
610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Accordingly, we decline to
address this assignment of error.

852

was arrested and charged with DUI to enter
its administrative revocation. Thereafter, it
took the Office of Administrative Hearings
(“OAH”) nearly one year to affirm the ad-
ministrative revocation. All of these delays
have caused this defendant, who was arrest-
ed in 2011, to live with the specter of a
pending driver's license revocation for the
better part of a decade. This is completely
unreasonable and at odds with our constitu-
tional mandate that justice be administered
without delay,
. A. Unreasonable Delay

“A driver’s license is a property interest
and such interest is entitled to protection
under the Due Process Clause of the West
Virginia Constitution.” Syllabus Point 1, Ab-
shire v. Cline, 193 W.Va. 180, 455 S.H.2d 549
(1995), Similarly, this Court stated in Jordan
v, Roberts, 161 W.Va. 750, 756, 246 S.H.2d
259, 262 (1978), “There is not much question
that in our mobile society the suspension of a
driver's license ... constitutes a serious de-
privation.” Further, in Petry v. Stump, 219
W.Va. 197, 200, 632 S.E.2d 358, 856 (2006),
we observed, “[d]ue process rights must be
considered under our general rules concern-
ing unreasonable delay.” In sum, this Court
has left no doubt that “due process concerns
are raised when there are excessive and un-
yeasonable delays in license suspension
eases,” Holland v. Miller, 230 W.Va. 35, 89,
736 S,H.2d 35, 39 (2012).

This Court discussed unreasonable delay
in the context of an administrative’ proceed-
ing in Frantz v. Palmer, 211 W.Va. 188, 192,
564 §.H.2d 898, 402 (2001):

Among the list of guarantees set forth in
article-IIT, section 17 of our state constitu-
tion is the laudatory mandate that “justice
shall be administered without ... de-
lay.” W.Va, Const. art. III, § 17. Just as
civeuit court judges “have an affirmative
duty to render timely decisions on matters

1, Similarly, in the criminal context, the. state
may not deprive a person of their liberty for
more than two terms of court without presenting
the case to the grand jury. See Syllabus Point 5,
State ex rel. Shifflet v. Rudloff, 213 W.Va. 404,
582 S.E.2d 851 (2003) (‘A person who has been
committed to jail on a criminal offense, to an-
swer an indictment which. may be returned
against him by the court, to which he is held, will

properly submitted within a reasonable

time following their submission,” Syl. Pt. 1,

in part, State ew rel. Patterson v. Aldredge,

178 W.Va. 446, 317 S.H.2d 805 (1984), the

obligation to act in a timely fashion is

similarly imposed upon administrative bod-
ies, as we recognized in syllabus’ point
seven of Allen v. State Human Righis

Commission, 174 W.Va. 189, 824 S.E.2d 99

(1984); “[A]dministrative agencies perform-

ing quasi-judicial functions have an affir-

mative duty to dispose promptly of matters
properly submitted.”
(Emphasis added),

The defendant was arrested on January 9,
2011. The DMV’s revocation order was en-
tered on December 18, 2012, about two years
later, This near two-year delay in entering
the revocation order violates this Court’s
long recognized constitutional mandate that
“justice shall be administered without .,.
delay.” Id. As Frantz makes clear, adminis-
trative bodies performing quasi-judicial fune-
tions have a’ duty to promptly dispose of
these matters.! My review of the record re-
veals no logical. reason justifying the two-
year delay, nor can I find a reason explaining
why it thereafter took the OAH yet another
whole year to affirm the administrative revo-
cation order,

B. Prejudice

The defendant offered unrebutted testimo-
ny that the unreasonable delay in this matter
caused him to suffer prejudice. The defen-
dant is a pharmaceutical salesperson. After

his employer announced a series of layoffs,

he sought other employment opportunities
and contacted various reeruiters in his indus-
try. However, once he informed these re-
eruiters about the uncertainty regarding his
driver’s license revocation, the recruiters
would not assist him and, in one instance,
stated that they would never work with him

again.

be discharged by writ of habeas corpus from

. further imprisonment on that charge, if he be not
indicted before the end of the second term of
court, unless it appear that material witnesses for
the state have been enticed or kept away, or are
prevented from attendance by sickness or inevit-
able accident.” Syllabus, Ex parte Blankenship,
93 W.Va, 408, 116 S.B. 751 (1923).).

In Syllabus Point 2 of Reed v. Staffileno,
239 W.Va. 588, 803 S.H.2d 508 (2017), this
Court held: .

On appeal to the circuit court from an

order of the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings affirming the revocation of a party’s
license to operate a motor vehicle in this
State, when the party asserts that his or
her constitutional right to due process has
been violated by a delay in the issuance of
the order by the Office of Administrative
Hearings, the party must demonstrate that
he or she has suffered actual and substan-
tial prejudice as a result of the delay. Once
actual and substantial prejudice from the
delay has been proven, the circuit court
must then balance the resulting prejudice
against the reasons for the delay.

The defendant offered unrebutted testimo-
ny that he suffered real and significant prej-
udice as a result of the DMV’s delay. The
DMV failed to offer any logical réason ex-
plaining why this delay occurred, Thus, when
balancing the defendant’s prejudice against
the reason for the substantial delay under
Syllabus Point 2 of Reed, the result is clear—
the defendant should have prevailed. ©”

Based on alll of the foregoing, I dissent.

806 S.E.2d 777
STATE of West Virginia, Respondent
vo
Orville M. HUTTON, Petitioner.
No. 16-1069

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 18, 2017
Filed; November 1, 2017

853

Ned
Yn
«

Wiley W. Newbold, Morgantown, West
Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, El-
bert Lin, Solicitor General, Thomas M. John-
son, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Gilbert Dickey, Assistant Attorney General,
Zachary Viglianco, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys
for Respondent

1, The test is set out infra in the Discussion Sec-
tion of this opinion, -

2, The punishment for malicious assault under
the statute in effect at the time of Mr. Hutton’s
indictment was not less than two nor more than
ten years imprisonment, See W. Va. Code § 61-2-
9(a) (2004) (Repl. Vol. 2610). Accord W, Va. Code
§ 61-2-9 (a) (2017) (Supp. 2017).

3. The punishment for each sexual assault count

was not less than ten nor more than twenty-five
years imprisonment. See W. Va. Code § 61-8B-
‘4(b) (1991) (Repl, Vol. 2014).

4. Under a Kennedy plea, a defendant enters a
guilty plea without admitting guilt. See Syl. pt. 1,
Kennedy v. Frazier, 178 W. Va. 10, 357 S.E.2d 43

Davis, Justice:

Petitioner, Orville M. Hutton (“Mr. Hut-
ton”), appeals from an order of the Circuit
Court of Harrison County that denied him
relief in his petition for a writ of error coram
nobis. In this appeal, Mr, Hutton contends
that he satisfied the four-part test for coram
nobis relief! After carefully reviewing the
_ briefs, the arguments of the parties, the legal
authority cited, and the record presented for
consideration, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion,

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

Hl In 2010, a Harrison County grand
jury indicted My. Hutton for malicious as-
sault® and three counts of sexual assault in
the second degree, The victim of the crimes
was Mr, Hutton’s girlfriend, who also was the
mother of their four-year-old son. In May of
2010, shortly after the indictment, Mr. Hut-
ton entered a Kennedy plea of guilty to the
felony crime of unlawful assault, in exchange
for the charges set out in the indictment
being dropped.t In July of 2010, Mr, Hutton
was sentenced to a term of one to five years,
At some point, Mr. Hutton was released on
parole, However, his parole was revoked, and
he was required to serve the full term of his
sentence,

HE On May 15, 2013, a few days- before
Mr. Hutton was set to be released from
prison, he was notified by the Department of
Homeland Security that, as a result of his

(1987) (“An accused may voluntarily, knowingly
and understandingly consent to the imposition of
a prison sentence even though he is unwilling to
admit participation in the crime, if he intelligent-
ly concludes that his interests require a guilty
plea and the record supports the conclusion that
a jury could convict him."), See also Nerth Car-
olina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38, 91 S.Ct, 160,
168, 27 L.Bd.2d 162 (1970) (“In view of the
strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by

. the State and Alford’s clearly expressed desire to
enter it despite his professed belief in his inno-
cence, we hold that the trial judge did not com-
miiit constitutional error in accepting it.”),

felony conviction, he would be held by the
federal government under a detainer and
processed for deportation to the place of his
birth, Jamaica.’ Upon being discharged from
his State sentence, on May 25, 2018, Mr,
Hutton was turned over to the federal gov-
ermment for deportation proceedings. During
the pendency of the deportation proceedings,
Mr. Hutton filed a petition for writ of error
eoram nobis with the circuit court. Mr. Hut-
ton alleged in the petition that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to’ inform him that his
guilty plea to the felony crime of unlawful
assault would result in his being deported
from the United States. By order entered
April 28, 2014, the circuit court denied relief
to Mr. Hutton on the ground that the writ of
error coram nobis was abolished in West
Virginia. Mr. Hutton appealed that ruling. In
the appeal to this Court, we reversed the
circuit court’s order ‘and held in Syllabus
point 8 of State v. Hutton, 285 W. Va. 724,
776 §.H.2d 621 (2015) (“Hutton 1”), that “[ijn
West Virginia, the common law writ of error
coram nobis is available only in criminal pro-
ceedings.” The case was remanded for the
cireuit court to hold a hearing on the merits
of Mr. Hutton’s petition.

On’ December 16, 2015, the cireuit court
held an evidentiary hearing on Mr, Hutton’s
petition, Testimony was taken from four wit-
nesses at the hearing: Mr. Hutton,’ Thomas
G. Dyer,’ A. Courtenay Craig,8 and Michael
Blumenthal,® At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the circuit court entered an order on
October 18, 2016, that denied relief to Mr.
Hutton. This appeal followed.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hs In this proceeding, the cireuit court
entered an order denying Mr. Hutton coram

5, Under the federal Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C, § 1227(a)(2)(A)Giii) (2008) (2012
ed.), “[aln alien who has been convicted of an
‘aggravated felony’ ... is removable from the
United States.” Rodriguez-Contreras v. Sessions,
873 F.3d 579, 579-80 (2017).

6, Mr. Hutton testified via video conferencing.
7. Mr. Dyer was the attorney who represented

Mr. Hutton when he entered his plea of guilty to
unlawful assault,

857

nobis relief. In our consideration of that or-

der, we apply the following standard of re-

view:
We review the final order and the ultimate
disposition under an abuse of discretion
standard, and we review’the circuit court’s
underlying factual findings under a clearly _
erroneous standard, Questions of law are
subject to a de novo review.

Syl. pt. 2, in part, Walker v. West Virginia
Ethics Comm'n, 201 W. Va, 108, 492 S.H.2d
167 (1997). Accord State v. Murray, 235 W.
Va. 312, 819, 778 S.E.2d 656, 668 (2015),

I.

DISCUSSION |

Hs» order to understand the posture
of the issues presented in this appeal, a.
review of a few legal principles set out in our
opinion in Hutton I is required. To begin, in
the decision in Hutton I we recognized that
the opinion by the United States Supreme
Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
130 S.Ct. 1478, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), re-
quired attorneys to advise immigrant crimi-
nal defendants of the deportation’ conse-
quences of a guilty plea. We addressed the
issue in Syllabus point 4 of Hutton I as

follows:

Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 659 U.S.
856, 180 S.Ct. 1478, 176 L.Ed2d 284
(2010), the Sixth Amendment requires de-

. fense counsel to warn an immigrant client
of the deportation consequences of a guilty
plea. When the deportation consequence is
succinct, clear, and explicit under the ap-
plicable law, counsel must provide correct
advice to the client. When the law is not

8. Mr. Craig represented Mr. Hutton for post-trial

motions after he entered his plea of guilty to
unlawful assault,

9. Mr, Blumenthal was one of the attorneys who
represented Mr. Hutton during the appeal in
Hutton I. Mr. Blumenthal testified via telephone.

858

succinct or straightforward, counsel is re-
quired only to advise the client that the
criminal charges may carry a risk of ad-
verse immigration consequences,
235 W. Va, 724, 776 S.H.2d 621. In order to
obtain relief for a Padilla violation a defen-
dant must show prejudice. See Padilla, 559
US. at 374, 180 S.Ct, at 1487, 176 L.Ed. 2d.
284 “Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will
depend on whether he can demonstrate prej-
udice as a result thereof, a question we do
not reach because it was not passed on be-
low.”). In light of Padilla, we adopted a test
in Hution I for a determination of whether a
defendant in a coram nobis proceeding may
have a plea set aside as a result of a Padilla
violation. The test was set out in syllabus
point 5 of Hutton I as follows:
A daim of legal error may be brought in
a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
only in extraordinary circumstances and if
the petitioner shows that (1) a more usual
remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons
exist for not attacking the conviction earli-
er; (8) there exists a substantial adverse
consequence from the conviction; and (4)
the error presents a denial of a fundamen-
tal constitutional right.
It has been recognized that “[fJailure to es-
tablish any of the above elements will defeat
a petition for coram nobis relief.” Borelli v.
United States, No. 17-2814 (JLL), 2017 WL
4074027, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2017),

HE We remanded the case in Hutton I
so that the circuit court could afford Mr.
Hutton an opportunity to present evidence
on each of the four elements of the above
test. At the conclusion of the hearing on the
matter, the circuit court denied relief after
determining that Mr. Hutton’s evidence sat-
isfied only the third element of the four-part
test.!° In this appeal, the State has conceded

10. The circuit court's order concluded that “fald-
verse consequences may presently exist for [Mr.
Hutton] as a result of his deportation{,]””

11, The State indirectly conceded the issue by
failing to brief the matter.

12, The circuit court determined that Mr. Hutton
had a federal remedy through an appeal of the
deportation order. The record does not support
such a finding. The State’s brief correctly pointed
out that “[t]o the extent Mr. Hutton seeks to have

that Mr. Hutton also satisfied the first ele-
ment of the test! See Bereano v. United
States, 706 F.8d 568, 576 (4th Cir. 2013)
(“The Government does not contest the prop-
osition that Bereano has satisfied the first
three of the foregoing prerequisites for co-
ram nobis relief.”); United States v. Verrusio,
No. 09-er-00064 (BAH), 2017 WL 1487055, at
*8 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2017) (“The government.
also does not quarrel with the defendant’s
claim that the first and second factors have
been met. Instead, the government argues
that the defendant cannot satisfy the third or
the fourth factor.”). As a general rule, we are
not obligated to accept the State’s concession
of error by the cireuit court on an issue. See
Syl. pt. 8, in part, State v. Julius, 185 W. Va.
422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991) (“This Court is not
obligated to accept the State’s confession of
error in a criminal case.”). However, the
record shows quite clearly that Mr. Hutton
established the first element of the test by
showing that a more usual remedy was not
available. Consequently, we summarily reject
the circuit court’s finding on this issue.!2 We
will confine our analysis to the second and
fourth elements of the Hutton I test: valid
reasons exist for not attacking the conviction
earlier and the error presents a denial of a
fundamental constitutional right. We will ad-
dress each issue separately,

A. A Valid Reason Exists for Not At-
tacking the Conviction Earlier

HM Mr. Hutton argues that the circuit
court erred in finding that no valid reason
existed for his failure to challenge the unlaw-
ful assault conviction earlier in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding. In this appeal, the State also
has argued that “Mr. Hutton failed to exer-
cise reasonable diligence in asserting his
aim.”

his conviction vacated and not merely to avoid
the deportation consequences of his conviction,
his federal appeal does not provide a more usual
remedy.” See Drakes v. ILN.S., 330 F.3d 600, 603
(3d Cir, 2003) (holding “that a petitioner could
not challenge {in federal court] his underlying
[state] conviction even though it was the basis for
the BIA’s order of deportation.”). In fact, the
record shows that Mr. Hutton’s appeal of the
deportation order has been stayed pending the
outcome of this proceeding.

As previously mentioned, the decision in
Hutton I required Mr. Hutton show that a
valid reason existed for not attacking his
conviction earlier. The opinion in Colon uv
United States, No: 1:12-er-204 (JCC), 2016
WL 7210350 (E.D, Va. Dec. 12, 2016) illus-
tvates the meaning of attacking a conviction
earlier. The defendant in Colon was an immi-
grant who pled guilty to a drug charge in
federal court. After the defendant served her
prison sentence, she was turned over to im-
migration officials for deportation. The de-
fendant thereafter filed a petition for a writ
of coram nobis on the grounds that her coun-
sel failed to inform her of the deportation
consequences of the guilty plea. The district
court rejected the petition. In doing so, the
court addressed the issue of attacking the
conviction timely as follows:

In its opposition, the Government con-
cedes that Colon’s plea agreement, as well
as the plea hearing, did not include a dis-
cussion of immigration consequences that
might result from Colon’s guilty plea....
The Government argues, however, that at
least by the time Colon was sentenced—on
August 24, 2012—she had been informed
that her conviction would result in a depor-
tation review.... In fact, the Judgment
entered on that date included the ‘special
conditions that Colon be surrendered to
ICE for deportation review and that, if
deported, Colon remain outside the United
States. ... Precisely due to this evidence
of Colon’s knowledge of the risk of depor-
tation, the Government claims that she has
provided no justification for waiting to at-
tack her conviction in the intervening three
years and seven months... .

Colon’s reply to the Government's oppo-
sition argues that she was unable to attack
her conviction earlier because she was un-
aware that her conviction would result in
“an automatic mandatory deportation.”
.... She asserts that she first realized
that she would be deported on December
16, 2015.... Before that time, she thought
that the language in her special conditions
meant only that “[deportation] may or may
not happen.” ..: In’ other words, Colon
appears to be claiming that she had no

13. The decision in United States v. Akinsade is

859

reason to attack her conviction before
April 2016.
Unfortunately, Colon’s relative uncer-
tainty about the possibility of deportation,
and her possible hope that she would not
be deported at all, do not provide a legiti-
mate justification for her delay. Colon has
failed to establish a valid reason for not
attacking her conviction earlier. Thus, the
Court will deny her motion.
Colon, 2016 WL 7210850, at *2. See also
Eastwood v. United States, No. 3-16-ev-
00536-JAG, 2017 WL 462635, at *8 (E.D; Va.
February 8, 2017) (“She claims that she could
not bring this attack earlier because she ‘was
unaware of the near-mandatory effect of:her
plea until deportation proceedings were initi-
ated against her,’ This completely ignores the
fact that the presiding judge at sentencing
required Eastwood to surrender to immigra-
tion officials after she completed her term of
imprisonment. Thus, no valid reason exists
why Eastwood did not challenge her convic-
tion earlier, rendering relief through writ of
error coram nobis unavailable.”); Kokoski v.
United States, No. 5:12-2150, 2018 WL
1837408, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2013)
(“While the test above does not present a set
time limit for filing coram nobis petitions ...,
it would be unfair, to allow Petitioner to seek
coram nobis relief at this time when such
relief could have been pursued years ago.”).

The decision in United States v. Akinsade,
686 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2012), illustrates a
timely attack of a conviction. The defendant
in Akinsade was born in Nigeria and came to
the United States in 1988, at the age of
seven. In 2000, the federal government
charged the defendant with embezzlement
from a bank. During plea bargaining negotia-
tions, the defendant’s attorney informed him
twice that he could not be deported based on
a single offense. The defendant was told that
he could be deported only if he had two
felony convictions. Relying on this legal ad-
vice, the defendant pled guilty. Prior to ac-
cepting the plea, the district judge warned
the defendant that if he was not a citizen he
could be deported. After accepting the plea,
the district court sentenced the defendant to
one month of imprisonment, and a three-year

more fully discussed in Hutton I.

860

term of supervised release. Approximately
nine years after the defendant was convicted
and sentenced, he was arrested by immigra-
tion authorities and charged with deportation
as an aggravated felon based upon the em-
bezzlement conviction. The defendant filed a
coram nobis petition in federal court, alleging
a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance: of counsel because of the
wrong advice given to him by his trial coun-
sel. The district court rejected the argument.
on the ground that the defendant was not
prejudiced, because the trial judge had
warned him of the potential for deportation
during the plea hearing. The Fourth Circuit
disagreed and vacated the defendant’s plea.
In doing so, the opinion addressed the timeli-
ness of the coram nobis attack on the convic-
tion as follows:

Second, valid reasons exist for Akinsade
not attacking the conviction earlier. Until
‘ physically detained by immigration author-
ities in 2009, Akinsade had’ no reason to
challenge the conviction as his attorney’s
advice, up to that’ point in time, appeared
accurate....

.. [Thhe district court warned that Ak-
insade’s plea could lead to deportation.
This general and equivocal admonishment
is insufficient to correct counsel’s affirma-
tive misadvice that Akinsade’s crime was
not categorically a deportable offense,
More importantly, the admonishment did
not “properly inform” Akinsade of the con-
sequence he faced by pleading guilty: man-
datory deportation. Thus, Akinsade could
not‘have known that deportation was a
legally mandated consequence :of his plea,

Altinsade, 686 F. “3d at 252-54.

Hs The decisions in Colon and Abinscde
help illustrate that attacking a conviction for

a Padilla violation is not foreclosed because

of a failure to timely attack a conviction on
some other basis. That is, for purposes of
asserting a Padilla claim in a coram nobis
proceeding, the issue of timely attacking the
conviction is limited to showing a timely as-
sertion of the Padilla immigration violation.

14, The circuit court also made this determina-

In the instant proceeding, the State con-
tends: that Mr. Hutton could have attacked
his conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding
Jong before he filed the Padilla coram nobis
petition.“ The State relies upon evidence
presented below that Mr. Hutton’s attorney
for post-trial motions, A. Courtenay Craig,
had advised him that he may have had a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
against his trial lawyer. The State’s reliance
on a habeas attack is meritless because of the
reason given by Mr. Craig when he informed
Mr. Hutton of the potential for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Mr. Craig testi-
fied that he believed Mr. Hutton’s trial coun-
sel did not adequately prepare for trial and
that, as a result of this inadequacy, he might
have a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel. Mr. Craig testified to this issue dur-
ing direct examination by counsel for Mr.
Hutton:

Q —you didn’t realize he had immigration
consequences through IRAIRA, and you
didn’t realize he had a defense and a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel based
on Padilla, do you feel that you were, in
fact, ineffective by failing to bring that to
his attention at that point?

A. Okay. I can say this, at the time that I

became aware of Padilla and this termi-

nated, he’d already pled. It doesn’t change

his situation one way or another because I

told him I think you have an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, but we need to
hold on to that because— :

. Q, And that was based on the failure to
properly prepare for trial, that wasn’t even
-based on Padilla was it?

A, Right, exactly. I had that discussion

with him about a habeas corpus down the

way, but also discussed at length I was
doing it the way I was doing it, because

that’s what I—

Q, But the fact that you didn’t know the
consequences, you didn’t know that Padil-
la existed, and you didn’t tell him that he
had that ineffective assistance claim based
on Padilla, do you now, in retrospect, look
at that and say, well, that was probably
ineffective assistance?

tion.

A. If you put it like that, I guess so.

It is clear from the above testimony that
Mr. Craig did not inform Mr. Hutton that he
had a habeas claim based upon a Padilla
violation. In fact, Mr. Craig did not know
about Padilla when he represented Mr. Hut-
ton. The fact that Mr. Hutton was informed
that he may have had an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim based on his trial
attorney’s failure to adequately prepare for
trial is irrelevant for purposes of timely as-
serting a Padilla claim. As illustrated in
Colon and Akinsade, the point at which a
defendant has knowledge of a Padilla claim
determines whether’ the related attack of a
conviction was timely made. In this case, the
record shows that Mr. Hutton learned that
he would be deported when he was served
with a deportation warrant on May 28, 2013,
Mr. Hutton testified below that it was after
he was served with deportation papers that

he first learned about a Padilla claim. Mr. —

Hutton indicated that he learned of a Padilla
claim from another inmate who also was
facing deportation. Thereafter, on September
4, 2018, Mr. Hutton filed this petition for a
writ of coram nobis asserting a Padilla viola-
tion. Under these facts, it is clear that a valid
reason existed for Mr, Hutton’s failure to
attack his conviction for a Padilla violation
prior to 2013, é.¢., he was never aware of his
rights under Padilla until an inmate told him
in 2018. Consequently, we find the circuit
court erred in finding Mr. Hutton did not
have a valid reason for failing to assert his
Padilla claim earlier,

" B. The Error Presents a Denial of a Fun-
damental Constitutional Right

Under the fourth element of the Hutton I
test, we must determine whether the failure
of Mr. Hutton’s trial counsel to inform him of
the deportation consequences of his guilty
plea denied him a fundamental constitutional
right. Mr. Hutton argues that his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel was violated as a result of his trial
counsel’s failure to inform him that he would
be deported if he pled guilty to the felony
15. During the examination of trial counsel at the

hearing he stated the following: “But, you know,

there were no—I didn’t—in fairness to Mr. Hut-
ton, when it came to this plea I didn’t sit down

861

offense.of unlawful assault, The State argues,
and the circuit court concluded, that no Sixth
Amendment violation occurred, We disagree.

HM In determining whether a criminal
defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel, we apply the following test:

In the West Virginia courts, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are to be
governed by the two-pronged test estab-
lished in Strickland v. Washington, 466
US. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.d.2d 674
(1984): (1) Counsel’s performance was defi-
cient under an objective standard of rea-
sonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for-counsel’s unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different.

Syl. pt. 5, State ». Miller, 194 W. Va. 8, 459
S.H.2d 114 (1996). .

HMM The first prong of the Strickland
test, deficient performance,, can be disposed
of summarily. As we have previously men-
tioned, under Padilla the Sixth Amendment
requires defense counsel to warn an immi-
grant client of the deportation consequences
of a guilty plea. The State asserts, and the
cireuit court so found, that defense counsel
made “a reasonable investigation of Mr. Hut-
ton’s immigration status and reasonably con-
cluded that he should not worry about Mr.
Hutton’s immigration status.” The record
does not support this conclusion, The vague
and inconsistent testimony of defense counsel
reveals that he made no immigration investi-
gation, See Lindsay C. Nash, Considering
the Scope of Advisal Duties Under Padilla,
88 Cardozo L. Rey. 549, 576 (2011) (“{D]e-
fense attorneys must investigate and re-
search the law using available resources and
then advise noncitizen defendants about im-
migration consequences at thie level of speci-
ficity that research permits.”), Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that such an investiga-
tion was made, Padilla required defense
counsel to inform Mr. Hutton that, if he was
an immigrant, his guilty plea would subject
him to deportation, This was not done. 35 Con-

and say, listen, let's make sure this is not going
to have an effect on your citizenship or immigra-
tion status. I did not do that.” See Diaz v. State,
896 N.W.2d 723, 732 (lowa 2017) (‘‘Certainly,

862

sequently, Mr, Hutton’s trial counsel’s per-
formance was deficient. See United States v.
Swaby, 855 F.8d 288, 240 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“Counsel’s failure to advise a client about
‘suecinet, clear, and explicit’ immigration con-
sequences for a conviction is constitutionally
deficient performance under the Sixth
Amendment.”); Commonwealth v. Lavrinen-
ko, 473 Mass, 42, 88 N.E.3d 278, 290 (2015)
(“(Tyhe failure of a criminal defense attorney
to make a reasonable inquiry of the client
regarding his or her citizenship and immi-
gration status is sufficient to satisfy the defi-
cient performance prong of the ineffective
assistance analysis.”); State v. Favela, 343
P.8d 178, 182 (N.M. 2015) (“A defense attor-
ney’s failure to advise a client of the specific
immigration consequences of pleading guilty,
including whether deportation would be vir-
tually certain[,] renders that attorney’s per-
formance deficient, which satisfies the first
prong of the Strickland test.”),

HMM «(Under the second prong of the
Strickland test, Mr. Hutton has to show that
he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s defi-
cient performance, That is, “in order to satis-
fy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have in-
sisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474
US. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 866, 870, 88 L.Ed.2d
208 (1985). Under the prejudice prong of
Strickland, “[t]he potential strength of the
state’s case must inform our analysis, inas-
much as a reasonable defendant would surely
take it into account.” Ostrander v. Green, 46
F.8d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995), overruled on
other grownds by, O’Dell v Netherland, 95
F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). However,
Padilla does not require a showing that Mr.
Hutton would have prevailed if the case went
to trial. Padilla made clear that, “to obtain
relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject
the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances.” Padilla, 559 U.S.
at 372, 180 S.Ct. at 1485. This issue was
succinctly articulated in Swaby, 855 F.3d at
243-44:

any person contemplating a plea of guilty to a
crime that could lead to deportation would want

[T]he prejudice prong does not require a
defendant to show that going to trial would
have been the best objective strategy or
even an attractive option. It merely re-
quires the defendant to show a reasonable
likelihood that a person in the defendant’s
shoes would have chosen to go to trial, The
decision does not need to be optimal and
does not need to ensure acquittal; it only
needs to be rational.

The decision in Akinsade, supra, helps il-
lustrate a showing of prejudice. As previous-
ly noted, the defendant in Akinsade pled
guilty to a charge of embezzlement. This
conviction was a deportable offense because
the amount of money involved exceeded
$10,000. In evaluating the defendant’s claim
of prejudice due to a Padilla violation, the
Fourth Circuit ruled as follows:

Akinsade pleaded guilty to a deportable

offense that involve[d] fraud or deceit in

which the loss to the victim or victims
exceed[ed] $10,000.... Before the district
court, Akinsade’s counsel asserted that if

Akinsade had gone to trial, he would have

argued that the amount of loss was $8,000.

His counsel noted that Akinsade was or-

dered to pay restitution in the amount of

$8,000, which he had paid in full, and fur-
ther that Akinsade would have disputed his
involvement with a third check that placed
him over the $10,000 amount. Consequent-
ly, the choice to go to trial is rational and
we cannot conclude that a reasonable de-
fendant in [Akinsade’s] shoes, having
asked for, received, and relied upon en-
couraging advice’ about the risks of depor-
tation, would have pled guilty anyway had
he known that his attorney was mistak-
en.... Thus, we find that counsel’s affir-
mative misrepresentations that the crime
at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Ak-
insade. Akinsade has met his burden under
prong two of Strickland. In doing so, he
has also demonstrated that hé has suffered

a fundamental error necessitating coram

nobis relief... .

Akinsade, 686 F.8d at 256 (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted). What is clear
from the discussion in Alinsade is that a

to know the full meaning and consequences of
deportation.”).

focus on the strength of the government’s
case is not controlling.

In the instant proceeding, the State argues
that it had a strong case against Mr. Sutton
for all four charges: malicious assault and
three counts of sexual assault in the second
degree, The State’s evidence included testi-
mony by the victim alleging that Mr. Hutton
beat her and that several days after the
beating he sexually assaulted her, The State
also was prepared to introduce medical rec-
ords to corroborate the beating, as well as
testimony by persons who allegedly saw the
victim after the physical assault. Further, the
State alleged that it had a statement made
by Mr, Hutton admitting to some of the
allegations of beating the victim.

Mr. Hutton presented testimony that he
would have gone to trial if he had known that,
his guilty plea would result in his deporta-
tion. Mr. Hutton contended that he would
challenge the severity of the physical assault,
because the medical records showed only “in-
juries that are in all cases self-reported pain
with no visible injuries[.J” There also was
evidence below that Mr, Hutton was pre-
pared to introduce “impeachment evidence
regarding telephone calls from the alleged
victim’s phone, and admissions under oath by
the alleged victim of meretricious sex with
{him].” The record in this case also indicated
that Mr. Hutton entered a Kennedy plea of
guilty, wherein he protested that he was
actually innocent. The evidence also shows
that Mr. Hutton was born in Jamaica, in
1962, and was brought to the United States
at about the age of nine years old. He has
never returned to Jamaica since immigrating
to this country as a child. Mr. Hutton’s im-
mediate family, including his son,* mother,
and siblings live in the United States.!7 We
believe that under the facts of this case, if
Mr. Hutton’s trial counsel had informed him
that he would be deported if he pled guilty, a
rejection of the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances. See Diaz v.
State, 896 N.W.2d 728, 784 (lowa 2017) (“We

16, As previously indicated, the mother of Mr,
Hutton’s son is the alleged victim in the case.

17. The record indicates that Mr. Hutton’s father
immigrated to the United States, but died in
2004.

863

conclude Morales Diaz would not have ac-
cepted this plea agreement if he had been
provided the effective assistance of counsel to
which he was entitled under the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”); Mat-
ter of Petition of Isidro-Soto, No. 46678-2-II,
198 Wash.App. 1070, 2017 WL 1907740, at 5*
(Wash. Ct. App. May 9, 2017) (“While Isidro-
Soto would have faced a longer sentence had
he lost at trial, deportation is also a particu-
larly severe penalty. Consequently, it would
have been rational for Isidro—Soto to take his
chances at trial. Accordingly, Isidro-Soto
shows that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for defense counsel’s failure to ad-
vise, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.”),

Our conclusion in this matter is supported
by the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Lee v. United States, —
US. —, 187 S.Ct. 1958, 198 L.Ed.2d 476
(2017). The defendant in Lee was arrested in
2009 by the federal government and charged
with possession of drugs with intent to sell.
The defendant eventually pled guilty to the
charge with the understanding that he would
receive a lighter sentence by avoiding a jury
trial. Prior to entering the plea, the defen-
dant was assured by his attorney that he
would not face deportation proceedings by
pleading guilty.18 Subsequent to being sen-
tenced, the defendant learned that he would
be deported as a result of his conviction. The
defendant thereafter filed a motion to set
aside the plea on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The district court
found that trial counsel’s performance was °
deficient under Strickland, but that because
the government’s case was strong, the defen-
dant failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of
Strickland. The court of appeals agreed with
the decision of the district court. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court found in Lee that the
defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of
Strickland as follows:

18. The defendant was born in South Korea and

was brought to this country by his parents at the
age of thirteen, in 1982.

864

Here Lee knew, correctly, that his pros-
pects of acquittal at trial were grim, and
his attorney’s error had nothing to do with
that. The error was instead one that affect-
ed Lee’s understanding of the conse-
quences of pleading guilty....

Lee ... argues he can establish preju-
‘dice ... because he never would have ac-
cepted’ a guilty plea had he known that he
would be deported as a result, Lee insists
he would have gambled’ on trial, risking
more jail time for whatever small chance
there might be of an acquittal that would
let him remain inthe United States, The
Government responds that, since Lee had
no viable defense at trial, he would almost
certainly -have lost and found himself still
subject to deportation, with a lengthier
prison sentence to boot. Lee, the Govérn-
ment contends, cannot show prejudice
from accepting a plea where his only hope
at trial was that something unexpected and
unpredictable might occur that would lead
to an acquittal.

But common sense (not to, mention our
“ precedent) recognizes that there is more to
consider than simply the likelihood of sue-
cess at trial. The decision whether to plead.
guilty also involves assessing the respec-
tive consequences of a conviction after trial
and by plea.... When those consequences
are, from the defendant’s perspective, simi-
larly dire, even the smallest chance of suc-
cess at trial may look attractive... Here
Lee alleges that avoiding deportation was
the determinative factor for him; deporta-
tion after some time in prison was not
meaningfully different from deportation af-
ter somewhat less time. He says he accord-
ingly would have rejected any plea leading
to deportation—even if it shaved off prison
time—in favor of throwing a “Hail Mary”
at trial, "

There is no reason to doubt the para-
mount importance Lee placed on avoiding
deportation, Deportation is always a par-
ticularly severe penalty, ... and we have
recognized that preserving the’ client’s
right to remain in the United States may
be more important to the client than any

potential jail sentence.... At the time of
his plea, Lee had lived in the United States
for nearly three decades, had established
two businesses in Tennessee, and.was the
conly family member in the United States
. who ‘could care for his elderly parents—
both naturalized American citizens. In con-
trast to these strong connections to the
United States, there is no indication that
he had any ties-to South Korea; he had
never returned there since leaving as a
child.

Lee’s claim that he would not have ac-
eepted a plea had he known it would lead
to deportation is backed by substantial and
uncontroverted evidence. Accordingly we
conclude Lee has demonstrated a reason-
able probability that, but for [his] counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to tri-
Lee, 137 S.Ct. at 1965-69 (internal quotations,
citations, and footnotes omitted). See alsé
Tzen v. United States, No. 16-0784-DRH,
2017 WL 4283077, at “4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22,
2017) (“Based on the record arid the cireum-
stances of this‘ case, the Court finds ‘that
Tzen did not make a rational decision to
plead guilty and that counsels were ineffec-
tive pursuant to'Lee and the Sixth Amend-
ment.”),

In light of the evidence in the instant case
and the guidance of Lee, we reverse the
circuit court's order and grant Mr. Hutton
coram nobis relief, On remand Mr. Hutton
will be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
and stand trial for the offenses for which he
was indicted, See Grooms v. United States,
No, 8:09-1174-CMC, 2018 WL 5771180, at *4
(S.C. Oct. 28, 2018) (“where the plea was
accepted due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, the proper remedy is to vacate the
conviction (that is, allow petitioner to with-
draw his plea).”). |

Iv.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit
court’s order denying Mr. Hutton coram no-
bis relief is reversed, and this case is re-

manded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion,
Reversed and Remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE LOUGHRY dissents
and reserves the right to file a dissenting
opinion.

JUSTICE WALKER dissents and
reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice, dissenting:

In State v. Hutton, 285 W.Va. 724, 776
S.E.2d 621 (2015) (“Hutton I”), I concurred
in the majority's historical analysis of the
common Jaw writ of error coram nobis, as
well as its ultimate conclusion that the writ
remains available only in extraordinary cii-
cumstances in criminal proceedings in West
Virginia. I also concurred in the majority's
new syllabus point four to the extent it re-
flected the holding of the United States Su-
preme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 856, 180 S.Ct. 1478, 176 L.Ed.2d 284
(2010)! However, I strongly disagreed with
the majority’s implication that Padilla impos-
es a duty on lawyers to explore the immigra-
tion status of all criminal defense clients,”
and I expressed my opinion that Padilla has
no application under the facts and circum-
stances of the case at bar. In the instant
appeal, Orville Hutton® returns to this

1, See Hutton I, 235 W.Va. at 725, 776 S.E.2d at
623, syl. pt. 4 (“Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559

U.S, 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Bd.2d 284°

(2010), the Sixth Amendment requires defense
counsel to warn an immigrant client of the de-
portation consequences of a guilty plea, When
the deportation consequence is succinct, clear,
and explicit under the applicable law, counsel
must provide correct advice to the client. When
the law is not succinct or straightforward, coun-
sel is required only to advise the client that the
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse
immigration consequences.”).

2, As I explained in my separate opinion in Hut
ton I,

In footnote eighteen, the majority excuses Mr.
Huiton's admitted failure to advise his counsel
of his immigration status by stating that the
Padilla Court did not place a burden on crimi-
nal defendants to advise their lawyers of their
immigration.status, While that statement may
be correct, I am concerned that the inverse
implication of footnote eighteen is that the
burden is on lawyers to explore the immigra-

865

Court, seeking relief from the circuit court’s
order denying relief in coram nobis, which
was entered on remand. from Hutton I. Be-
cause the majority erroneously reverses the
eireuit court's decision, I am compelled to
dissent,

On remand, the circuit court held an evi-
dentiary hearing to determine-whether Mr,
Hutton was entitled to relief in coram nobis
from his conviction based on his claim of
ineffective assistance’ of .counsel, Thomas
Dyer. In addressing that question, the circuit,
court was: guided by syllabus point five of
Hutton I wherein this Court held that

[a] claim’ of legal error may be brought
in a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
only in extraordinary circumstances and if
the petitioner shows that (1) a more usual
remedy is not available; (2) valid reasons
exist for not attacking the conviction earli-
er; (8) there exists a substantial adverse

consequence from the conviction; and (4)

the error presents a denial of a fundamen-

tal constitutional right,

235 W.Va. at 726, 776 S.E.2d at 628, This
four-part test was taken from the test set
forth in United States v, Akinsade, 686 F.8d
248 (4th Cir. 2012), which this Court found
“provide[d] a good framework for limiting
the use of the writ of error coram nobis to
assert a constitutional legal error.” Following
its consideration of the evidence presented at

tion status of every criminal defense client,
notwithstanding the fact’ that Padilla did not
expressly impose such a duty, Because the
focus of Padilla was on the importance of a
lawyer giving his or her client accurate advice
regarding the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea, the Court simply never addressed
precisely how immigration status was to be
discerned. See [State v.] Stephens, 265 P,3d
[574,] at 577 (‘The only issue the United States
Supreme Court decided was whether defense
counsel had a duty to inform his client, known,
to be a resident alien, of the effect of a guilty
plea on the client's immigration status.”),
“Hutton I, 235 W.Va. at 744-45, 776 S,B.2d at
641-42 (Loughry, J., concurring, in part, and
dissenting, in part).

3. “Mr. Hutton was born in Jamaica in 1962, He
ame to the United States in 1971, at.the age of
nine, Mr. Hutton has resided in this country
since that time. He is classified as a permanent
resident of this country, but he is not an Ameri-
can citizen.” Hutton I, 235 W.Va, at 726, 776
S.E.2d at 623,

866

the hearing below, the circuit court entered
an order on October 18, 2016, finding that
Mr. Hutton failed to meet three of the four
factors set forth above.*.

Regarding the first factor, the circuit court
found that Mr, Hutton has a more usual
remedy through his federal appeal that is
pending in the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, And, because that appeal involves a
split among the federal circuit courts, the
circuit court further observed that Mr. Hut-
ton could pursue a petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. The ma-
jority does not address this factor and, in-
stead, finds that the State had “indirectly
conceded the issue” when it stated that “[t]o
the extent Mr, Hutton seeks to have his
conviction vacated and not merely to avoid
the deportation consequences of his convic-
tion, his federal appeal does not provide a
more usual remedy.” The majority ignores
the State’s further argument that “a remedy
yemains available so long as jurisdiction
would be proper in some other court even if
relief is foreclosed.” 5 In other words, even if
Mr. Hutton cannot collaterally attack his
state conviction through his deportation ap-
peal pending in federal court, he is pursuing
the relief that he seeks in the instant mat-
ter—avoiding deportation—through a more
usual remedy in the federal court, and his

4. Regarding the third factor, the circuit court
stated in order, as follows:

Adverse consequences may presently exist for
Petitioner/Defendant as a result of his deporta-
tion (removal) proceedings, regardless of being
deemed either direct or collateral. However,
such further developed evidentiary record
herein ... does not establish the threshold
requirement of his having been denied a funda-
mental constitutional right established pursu-
ant to Padilla.

5. In support of its argument, the State cites Unit-
ed States'v. Payne, 644 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir.
2011), wherein the court denied the defendant's
request for a writ of error coram nobis, finding
“Gilt [was] irrelevant that a § 2255 motion would
have been untimely by the time he filed his
petition for a writ of coram nobis.” Id. at 1113.
‘The State also relies upon Matus-Leva v. United
States, 287 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2002), in which the
court found that a writ of error coram nobis
requires that other remedies be unavailable, stat-
ing that “Matus-Leva’s argument that a § 2255
petition is not really available to him because it is
time barred under the Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act, is unavailing. A petitioner

likelihood of success in his federal case is
irrelevant to whether that avenue is “an
available more usual remedy.” ®

In addressing the second factor, the cireuit
court concluded that Mr. Hutton had not
demonstrated a valid reason for failing to
attack his conviction earlier through a habeas
corpus petition, particularly where the evi-
dence showed that his post-conviction counsel
advised him of the possibility of filing a habe-
as petition alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, even if not on the same basis that
Mr. Hutton currently asserts. While Mr.
Hutton was serving his sentence, he pursued
numerous post-conviction challenges.’ Had
he brought an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim in a habeas proceeding, as his post-
conviction counsel suggested, he might have
achieved the relief from his conviction that
he currently seeks through a writ of error
eoram nobis, which is only available in ex-
traordinary circumstances.

Although the majority attempts to qualify,
through dicta, the second factor in syllabus
point five of Hutton I, by restricting it to
whether Mr. Hutton’s Padilla claim was
timely, such was not the intent in Akinsade
upon which this Court based the four-part
test for a writ of error coram nobis adopted

may not resort to coram nobis merely because he
has failed to meet the AEDPA’s gatekeeping re-
quirements.” Id. at 761 (footnote omitted).

6. The circuit court recounted in its order testi-
mony given by Mr. Hutton’s immigration expert
during the evidentiary hearing below: “[G]ener-
ally ... the basic law suggests ... that if you are
convicted of an aggravated felony you are, as a
matter of law, deportable[,]” but that ‘‘as with all
immigration cases, the government has a great
deal of discretion as to enforcement, and usually
the cases ... of undue hardship to family, exten-
uating circumstances, time in the country, time
since the crime was committed, etc., etc., which
the courts can take into consideration.”

7. In August 2010, Mr. Hutton filed a notice of
appeal with the assistance of his post-conviction
counsel in which he identified two issues: (1)
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) any oth-
er grounds that may be discovered during the
investigation of this case. In a motion for post-
conviction bond, Mr. Hutton stated that he might
waive his right to appeal and “prosecute a Writ
of Habeas Corpus for ineffective assistance of
counsel.”

in Hutton I. In Akinsade, the defendant pled
guilty to embezzlement after his attorney
incorrectly told him that it was not a deport-
able offense. Akinsade, 686 F.8d at 250.
‘When the defendant later sought relief from
his conviction through coram nobis, the
Fourth Circuit found that the defendant had
no basis to challenge his conviction prior to
being detained by immigration authorities
because “his attorney’s advice, up to that
point in time, appeared accurate.” Id. at 252,
In the instant matter, Mr. Hutton’s post-
conviction counsel had identified a basis for
Mr, Hutton to challenge his conviction—inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel—but it was
not pursued. Accordingly, I agree with the
cireuit court's conclusion that Mr. “Hutton
failed to meet the second coram nobis factor
because he “was aware of his ability to file a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus attack-
ing his conviction for ineffective assistance of
counsel during his initial period of incarcera-
tion following his sentencing in the underly-
ing criminal matter’ and that he had “not
demonstrated the existence of any valid rea-
son for having not attacked his underlying
conviction earlier upon claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel towards Mr. Dyer.”

Turning to the fourth coram nobis factor—
whether the legal error asserted presents a
denial of a fundamental constitutional right—
Mr. Hutton alleges an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on Padilla. In West
Virginia,

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are to be governed by the two-pronged

test established in Strickland v. Washing-

ton, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): (1) Counsel’s perform-

ance was deficient under an objective stan-

dard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that, but for coun-

sel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different.

Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v, Miller, 194 W.Va.
8, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

8, The majority disagrees with the circuit court
and finds, instead, that Mr. Dyer’s testimony was
vague and inconsistent. However, what is clear
from Mr. Dyer’s testimony is that he did not have
any conversations with Mr. Hutton about the

867

In addressing Mr. Dyer’s performance
with regard to Padilla, the circuit court
found that Mr. Dyer’s testimony was credible
and demonstrated that Mr. Hutton was alert-
ed to potential immigration issues dependent
upon his actual citizenship status in the con-
versations he had with Mr. Dyer. The circuit
court further found that Mr. Hutton “chose

.. to not directly disclose ... the exact
nature of [his] status” to Mr. Dyer and that
his evasive responses caused Mr. Dyer to
infer that Mr. Hutton was not an immigrant
This inference was reasonable and certainly
not indicative of deficient performance. In
fact, under Strickland, “[t]he reasonableness
of counsel’s actions may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant’s
own statements or actions[,]” particularly
since counsel’s actions “are usually based,
quite properly ... on information supplied
by-the defendant.” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct.
2052. Further, “what investigation decisions
are reasonable depends critically on such in-
formation.” Id, Moreover, the circuit court
found. that Mr, Hutton’s contrary testimony
was not credible. See Anderson v. City of
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504,
84 L.Bd.2d 518 (1985) (finding that credibili-
ty determinations are due deference because
“only the trial judge can be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that
bear so heavily on the listener’s understand-
ing of’ and belief in what is said.”), As the
circuit court aptly observed,

[alny constitutional right infirmity’ al-
leged for post-conviction extraordinary re-
lief cannot be prefaced upon Petitioner/De-
fendant’s selective memory, his voluntary
failure to adequately apprise his legal
counsel of pertinent personal information
which may significantly impact the result-
ing legal representation and/or his subjec-
tive hindsight upon discovering adverse
consequences to his criminal conviction and
resulting incarceration.

In evaluating Mr. Hutton’s ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim, “[jludicial scrutiny
of counsel’s performance must be highly def-

immigration consequences of pleading guilty be-
cause when he asked Mr. Hutton whether this
was an issue we should be concerned with, Mr.
Hutton responded, “no, don’t worry about it.””

868

erential[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104
S.Ct, 2052. Although the circuit court found
that Mr. Hutton had not demonstrated that
his counsel was ineffective, rather than ap-
plying deference to that conclusion, the ma-
jority “summarily” disposes of the first prong
of Strickland, finding that Mr. Dyer’s per-
formance was deficient because “Padilla re-
quired defense counsel to inform Mr. Hutton
that, if he was an immigrant, his guilty plea
would subject him to deportation.”® Of
course, one could read this statement as
somehow imposing a broad duty upon coun-
sel to investigate the immigration status of
criminal clients. If that is the majority’s in-
tent, I strongly disagree.

First, as I explained in my, separate opin-
ion in Hutton I; Padilla does not provide Mr.
Hutton the relief that he seeks. I observed
that 7

[the sole similarity between Mr. Hutton
in the instant matter, and the petitioner in

Padilla, Jose Padilla, is that both were

longtime, lawful permanent residents of

this country, but not American citizens,
“when they became subject to deportation

‘as a direct consequence of their guilty

pleas to criminal charges. What remains

are two factually significant differences
that render Padilla inapplicable to Mr,

Hutton’s situation, ; —
Hutton I, 285 W.Va, at 748, 176 8.B.2d at 640
(Loughry, J., concurring, in part, and dis-
senting, in part). In Padilla, Mr. Padilla told
his counsel that he was not a United States
citizen and asked counsel whether a guilty
plea would have adverse immigration conse-
quences. After being assured by his counsel
that he “‘did not have to’ worry about immi-
gratiori status since he had been in the coun-
try so longi,!’” Mr, Padilla pled guilty. Padil-
la, 559 U.S, at 359, 180 S.Ct. 1478 (internal
citation omitted). That legal advice was incor-
9, The cases relied upon by the majority for this

conclusion are factually distinguishable. For ex-

ample, in United States v. Swaby, 855 F.3d 233

(4th Cir. 2017), counsel “immediately recognized

that ‘immigration status would be a significant

consideration’ for Swaby, who had a green card
and intended to apply for U.S. citizenship” and
that “from the beginning of the representation,

Swaby ‘{wa]s concerned and ha[d] always been

concerned about his immigration status.’” Id. at

236, Similarly, in State v. Favela, 343 P.3d 178

rect because Mr. Padilla’s conviction made

“deportation virtually mandatory.” Id. Con-
trasting those facts with the instant matter,
during Mx, Hutton’s first coram nobis hear-
ing, he testified that he never told his counsel
of his immigration status, a fact that was
confirmed by Mr, Dyer’s testimony during
the evidentiary hearing held on remand,
Moreover, unlike Mr. Padilla, Mr. Hutton
does not assert that his trial counsel gave
him incorrect immigration advice. To the con-
trary, the evidence presented during the evi-
dentiary hearing below demonstrates that
rather than advising his counsel of his immi-
gration status and/or expressing concern re-
garding what his guilty plea would mean for
him immigration-wise, Mr, Hutton was eva-
sive, assuring counsel that it was nothing to
worry about, . .
Second, it is “clear from Padilla that the
Supreme Court-did not expressly impose a
blanket duty upon lawyers to ask every client
charged with a crime whether they are
American citizens.” Hutton I, 285 W.Va. at
744, 776 S.H.2d at 641. Further,
[t]he Supreme Court's silence in this re-
gard has been recognized by other courts.
For example, in Clarke v, State, 974
N.E.2d 562 (Ind, Ct. App. 2012), the court
commented on the issue of whether crimi-
nal defense lawyers must “ascertain the
citizenship of their clients[,]” observing
that “this issue is percolating in other
states[.]” Id. at 568. The Indiana court
then cited State v Stephens, 46 Kan,
App.2d 858, 265 P.8d 574, 577 (2011), re-
view denied, wherein the Kansas court
stated that “[t]he Padilla Court did not
.-. impose upon counsel the duty to inves-
tigate the citizenship or immigration status
of every client in a criminal case.”
Hutton I, 285 W.Va. at 744, 776 S.E.2d at
641.1 In the more recent decision of “State v.

(N.M, 2015), counsel was aware prior to the plea
hearing that his client was not a United States
citizen. Unlike these cases, Mr. Dyer testified
below that when he asked Mr, Hutton whether
this was an issue that they should be concerned
about, Mr. Hutton told him, “no, don’t worry
about it,”

10, Regarding Padilla, the Stephens court further
-observed that “[t]he only issue the United States
Supreme Court decided was whether defense

’

Rodriguez, No. 108, 505, 820 P.8d 449 (Table)
(Kan. App. Mar. 14, 2014) ... the Kansas
court relied upon Stephens, again noting that
‘(tlhe Padilla majority did-not impose a duty
to investigate the citizenship or immigration
status of every client in a criminal case.”
Hutton I, 285 Wa, at 744, 776 S.H.2d at
641. I agree that if a client informs his or her
lawyer that he or she is an immigrant, then
Padilla imposes a duty on counsel to advise
that client of the deportation consequences
arising out of a guilty plea. However, because
the United States Supreme Court has not
imposed a duty on counsel to investigate the
citizenship or immigration status of every
client in a criminal case, I believe that any
effort by the majority to impose such a duty
is unfounded.

Regarding the second prong of Strickland,
Myr. Hutton had to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient perform-
ance. Not only do I agree with the circuit
court’s conclusion that Mr. Hutton failed to
show that his counsel had performed defi-
ciently, I also agree with the court’s conclu-
sion that he could not show prejudice, The
seriousness of the charges in the underlying
criminal proceeding—one count of malicious
assault and three counts of second degree
sexual assault—and the strength of the evi-
dence against him™ made it unreasonable
for Mr, Hutton to reject the plea agreement,
which allowed him to plead guilty to one
count of unlawful assault (a lessor included
offense of malicious assault) with a dismissal
of the other charges, Indeed, Mr. Hutton was
facing overwhelming evidence, including the
testimony of his victim, corroborating wit-
nesses, and his own admissions.

counsel had a duty to inform his client, known to
be a resident alien, of the effect of a guilty plea
on the client’s immiigration status.” Stephens,
265 P.3d at 577.

11, The State represents that during Mr. Hutton’s
plea hearing, the State proffered that “the victim
{Mr. Hutton's girlfriend and the mother of his
child] was prepared to testify that Hutton had hit
her with his fists, choked her until she almost
passed out, threw her into a wall, and continued
to beat her with his fists and hands{;)” that “nine
days after the battery, the victim needed assis-
tance to get out of the house and could not walk
on her own{;]” and that “[hJospital records from
nine days after the battery showed multiple con-

869

Although the majority states that Lee v.
United States, 582 U.S. —, 187 S.Ct. 1958,
198 L.Hd.2d 476 (2017), supports its conclu-
sion that under the facts of this case, Mr.
Hutton would.not have pled guilty had his
counsel advised him, that he would be deport-
ed if he did so, Lee does not help Mr, Hut-
ton’s cause, Unlike Mr, Hutton, who was
evasive with his counsel concerning his sta-
tus, Mr, Lee “informed his attorney of his
noncitizen status and repeatedly asked him
whether he would face deportation as a re-
sult of the criminal proceedings.” Id, at ——,
187 S.Ct. at 1968, In response, Mr, Lee’s
attorney incorrectly advised him that “he
would not be deported as a result of pleading
guilty.” Id,

In addressing Mr. Lee’s ineffective assis-
tance of counsel challenge, the Supreme
Court noted that the Court of Appeals had
recalled the holding in Hill v. Lockhart, 474
USS, 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Hd.2d 208 (1985),
stating that “when a defendant claims that
his counsel’s deficient performance deprived
him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea,
the defendant can show prejudice by demon-
strating a ‘reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have plead-
ed guilty and would have‘insisted on going to
twial’” Lee, 582 U.S. at ——, 187 S.Ct. at
1964, The Supreme Court further reasoned,
however, that

common sense (not to mention our -prece-

dent) recognizes that there is more to con-

sider than simply the likelihood of success
at trial. The decision whether to plead
guilty also involves assessing ‘the respec-

- tive consequences of a conviction after trial

and by plea, See INS v. St. Cyr, 588 U.S.

289, 322-823, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d

tusions to the back, chest, abdomen, shoulders,
and sides, and a chest wall contusion,” The State
further represents that during the hearing on the

- motion for a protective order arising’ out of the
underlying criminal matter, the victim testified
that Mr. Hutton sexually assaulted her while she
was recuperating from the injuries she sustained
in his physical attack upon her.

12. Lee had not yet issued at the time of the
circuit court’s decision on remand. Mr. Hutton’s
counsel apprised this Court of the Lee opinion in
" his notice of additional authority filed under Rule
of Appellate Procedure 10(i).

870

847 (2001). When those consequences are,
from the defendant’s perspective, similarly
dire, even the smallest chance of success at
trial may look attractive. For example, a
defendant with no realistic defense to a
charge carrying a 20-year sentence may
nevertheless choose trial, if the prosecu-
tion’s plea offer is 18 years,

Lee, 582 U.S. at ——, 187 S.Ct. at 1966-67.
Regarding Mr. Lee’s circumstances, the Su-
preme Court stated:

‘We cannot agree that it would be irra-
tional for a defendant in Lee’s position to
reject the plea offer in favor of trial. But
for his attorney's incompetence, Lee would
have known that accepting the plea agree-
ment would certainly lead to deportation.
Going to trial? Almost certainly. If depor-
tation were the “determinative issue” for
an individual in plea discussions, as it was
for Lee; if that individual had strong con-
nections to this country and no other, as
did Lee; and if the consequences of taking
a chance at trial were not markedly harsh-
er than pleading, as in this case, that “al-
most” could make all the difference. Bal-
anced against holding on to some chance of
avoiding deportation was a year or two
more of prison time.... Not everyone in
Lee’s position would make the choice to
reject the plea. But we cannot say it would
be irrational to do so.
Lee, 582 U.S. at ——, 187 S.Ct. at 1968-69.

As the majority observes, similar to Mr.
Lee, Mr. Hutton has lived in the United
States for the majority of his life and has
family members who live here, including his
son. Critically, however, unlike Mr. Lee, the
prison time to which Mr. Hutton was exposed
by pleading guilty, contrasted with his expo-
sure had he gone to trial and been convicted,
were not “similarly dire.” Lee, 582 U.S. at
——,, 137 S.Ct. at 1966-67. In fact, dissimilar
to the Supreme Court’s hypothetical of going
to trial on a charge that carries a 20-year
sentence where the prosecution’s plea offer
was 18 years,” here, if convicted on all
13. See W.Va. Code § 61-8B-4 (2014) (providing

for penalty of ten to twenty-five years for second

degree sexual assault); W.Va. Code § 61-2-9(a)

(2014) (providing for penalty of two to ten years
imprisonment for malicious assault).

counts, Mr. Hutton’s potential consecutive
sentence was thirty-two to eighty-five years
in prison," whereas his plea bargain resulted
in a one to five-year prison term. Conse-
quently, for Mr, Hutton, “[bJalanced against
holding on to some chance of avoiding depor-
tation was [ ] [decades] of prison time.” Id. at
——,, 187 S.Ct. at 1969, Because “the conse-
quences of taking a chance at trial were []
markedly harsher than pleading[,]” a rejec-
tion of the plea bargain would have been
irrational under the circumstances. Jd. Ac-
cordingly, I would affirm the circuit court's
conclusion that Mr, Hutton failed to demon-
strate ineffective assistance of counsel and its
decision to deny the writ of error coram
nobis.

For these reasons expressed above, I re-
spectfully dissent.

806 S.E.2d 794

STATE of West Virginia EX REL. FAIR-

MONT STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD
OF GOVERNORS, Petitioner
ve

The Honorable Patrick N. WILSON, Galen
Hansen, Albert Magro, and West Virgi-
nia Higher Education Policy Commis-
sion, Respondents

No. 17-0630
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 17, 2017
Filed: November 1, 2017

14, Mr. Hutton’s plea bargain allowed him to
plead guilty to unlawful assault. See W.Va. Code
§ 61-2-9(a) (providing for penalty of one to five
years imprisonment for unlawful assault).

loa)

il

Patrick Morrissey, Esq., Attorney General,
Dawn E, George, Esq,, Assistant Attorney

72 a

General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel
for the Petitioner

Jerry A. Carbo, Esq., Shippensburg, Penn-
sylvania, Counsel for the Respondents, Galen
Hanson and Albert Magro

Candace Kraus, Esq., West Virginia High-
er Education Policy Commission, Charleston,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent,
West Virginia Higher Education Policy Com-
mission

Justice Ketchum:

The Fairmont State University Board of
Governors (“Fairmont State”) and the West
Virginia Higher Education Policy Commis-
sion (“HEPC”) were sued in the. Cireuit
Court of Marion County by some faculty
members of Fairmont State. Fairmont State
and the HEPC filed identical motions to
dismiss the lawsuit based on, among other
things, improper venue. The circuit court
denied both motions to dismiss,

Fairmont ‘State requests that we issue a
writ prohibiting the circuit court from hear-
ing the lawsuit against it and the HEPC.
West Virginia’s venue statutes require that
the lawsuit against Fairmont State and the
HEPC be’ filed in Kanawha County. The
circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers
by holding otherwise. Therefore, we issue the
requested writ of prohibition.

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
. BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2017, some faculty members
at Fairmont State sued their university’s
Board of Governors and the HEPC in Mar-
ion County Circuit Court, The lawsuit alleges
that Fairmont State deliberated and decided
on public matters in private meetings in vio-
lation .of the West Virginia Open Meetings
Act (West Virginia Code §§ 6-9A-1 to -12
[1975] ) and that it did not fully comply with
the plaintiffs’ Freedom of Information Act
request. In addition, the lawsuit alleges that
the HEPC failed to exercise its oversight
responsibility over Fairmont State to prevent.
it from acting illegally. The faculty members

sought injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus,
and a declaratory judgment.

Fairmont State and the HEPC filed identi-
cal motions to dismiss the lawsuit based on,
among other things, improper venue. They
asserted that, subject to exceptions which do
not apply in this case, lawsuits against state
agencies must be filed in Kanawha County,
The cireuit court denied Fairmont State's
and the HEPC’s motions to dismiss and held
that Marion County was a proper venue to
hear the lawsuit. In response, Fairmont
State filed its petition for a writ of of probibi-
tion with this Court.

I

STANDARD OF REVIEW
HEME We use the following factors to de-
cide whether to grant Fairmont State’s re-
quested writ of prohibition: .

In determining whether to entertain and
issue the writ of prohibition for cases not
involving an absence of jurisdiction but
only where it is claimed that the lower
tribunal. exceeded -its legitimate powers,
this Court will examine five factors: (1)
whether the party seeking the writ has no
other adequate ‘means, such as direct ap-
peal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) wheth-
er the petitioner will be damaged or preju-
diced in a way that is not correctable on
appeal; (8) whether the lower tribunal’s
order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order
is an oft repeated error or manifests per-
sistent disregard for either procedural or
substantive law; and (5) whether the lower
tribunal’s order raises new and important,
problems or issues of law of first impres-

1. Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199
W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996) (footnote added).

2. See, e.g., State ex rel. W.Va. Real Estate Apprais-
er Licensing & Cert. Bd. v. Chiles, 234.W.Va. 125,
128, 763 S.E.2d 663, 666 (2014) (granting state
agency's writ of prohibition on ground that Ka-
nawha County was only proper venue for plain-
tiff's lawsuit against it); State ex rel. Stewart v.
Alsop, 207 W.Va. 430, 435, 533 S.E.2d 362, 367
(2000) (‘‘This Court has previously utilized a writ
of prohibition to preclude a trial court from
proceeding to hear a case where venue was im-
proper under [West Virginia's state agency venue
statutes].”); State ex rel. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.

873

-sion, These factors are general guidelines
that serve as a useful starting point for
determining whether’ a discretionary writ
of prohibition should issue. Although all
five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear
‘that the third factor, the existence of clear
error as a matter of law, should be given
substantial weight.

Furthermore, we have noted that a writ of
prohibition may be used to preclude a circuit
court from hearing a lawsuit against a state
agency when it does not have venue.”

ml.

ANALYSIS,

Hl Fairmont State and the HEPC argue
that Marion County is not a proper venue for
the lawsuit filed against them. Venue for
lawsuits against state agencies is controlled
by West Virginia Code § 14-2-2 [1976],
which, in pertinent part and with emphasis
added, provides: “(a) The following -proceed-
ings shall be brought and prosecuted only in
the cirewit court of Kanawha County: (1) .
Any suit in which ... a-state agency is made
a party defendant.” Likewise, this Court has
held; “Actions' wherein a state agency or
official is named, whether as a principal par-
ty or third-party defendant may be brought
only in the Cirewit Court of Kanawha Cown-
ty.” ® Syl. Pt. 2, Thomas v. Bd. of Hduc., 167
W.Va. 911, 280 S.H.2d 816 (1981) (emphasis
added), disapproved on other grounds by
Hansbarger v. Cook, 177 W.Va. 152, 157 1.5,
351, S.E.2d.65, 70 n.5 (1986). Indeed: “We
have consistently held that the provisions of
W.Va. Code § 14-2-2, as amended, are exclu-
sive to other venue provisions,” *

Perry, 189 W.Va. 662, 669, 434°S.E.2d 22, 29
(1993) (same).

3. See also, Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin Jean
Davis, & Louis J. Palmer, Litigation Handbook on
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure § 12(b)(3)
at 370 (4th ed. 2012) (‘Pursuant to W.Va. Code
§ 14-2-2, actions wherein a state agency or offi-
cial is named, whether as a principal party or
third-party defendant, may be brought only in
the circuit court of Kanawha County.”),

4. Vance v. Ritchie, 178 W.Va. 155, 157, 358
S.E,2d 239, 241 (1987). .

874

HM Both Fairmont State and the HEPC
fall within the Legislature’s definition of a
state agency, which is, “a state department,
board, commission, institution, or other ad-
ministrative agency of state government.” >
More importantly, the parties do not dispute
that Fairmont State and the HEPC are state
agencies. Therefore, unless an exception to
the venue statute applies, West Virginia
Code § 14-2-2 requires that the lawsuit filed
against Fairmont State and the HEPC be
brought in Kanawha County.

Despite the clear directive of West Virgi-
nia Code § 14-2-2, the cireuit court found
that venue was proper in Marion County
under West Virginia Code § 14-2-2a [2004].
Section 14-2-2a is limited to lawsuits against
West Virginia University and Marshall Uni-
versity; it provides, with emphasis added,
that:

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of
section two of this article [Section 14-2-2],
any civil action in which ... West Virginia
University ... is made a party defendant,
shall be brought in the circuit court of any
county wherein the cause of action arose,
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.

(b) Notwithstanding the provision of sec-
tion two of this article [Section 14-2-2], any
civil action in which Marshall University

. is made a party defendant, shall be
brought in the circuit court of any county
wherein the cause of action arose, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties.

The circuit court conceded in its order that
the plain language of Section 14-2-2a men-
tions only West Virginia University and Mar-
shall University. However, the circuit court’s
order continued: “It logically follows that ac-
tions against other universities not specifical-
ly named in the statute should also be tried
in the county in which the action occurred.

5. W.Va. Code § 14-2-3 [1967] (emphasis added).
In 2017, the Legislature amended this statute in
ways which do not affect this appeal.

6. Syl. Pt. 11, in part, Brooke B. v. Ray, 230 W.Va.
355, 738 S.E.2d 21 (2013), See also, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng’rs v, L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co.,
237 W.Va. 261, 266, 786 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2016);
W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236 W.Va. 654,
662, 783 S.E.2d 75, 83 (2015); Young v. Apogee
Coal Co., LLC., 232 W.Va. 554, 561, 753 S.E.2d
52, 59 (2013); Phillips v. Larry's Drive-In Phar-

This argument is the most compelling and
the one on which this Court’s decision as to
venue primarily turns.” In short, the circuit
court extended Section 14-2-2a to Fairmont
State because it could think of no reason why
the Legislature would treat Fairmont State
differently than West Virginia University or
Marshall University.

We have repeatedly held that courts must
not “arbitrarily ... read into a statute that
which it does not say. Just as courts are not
to eliminate through judicial interpretation
words that were purposely included, we are
obliged not to add to statutes something the
Legislature purposely omitted.”® And be-
cause “the express mention of one thing im-
plies the exclusion of another[,)” we must
presume that the Legislature purposely omit-
ted Fairmont State from Section 14-2-2a
based on its express mention of West Virgi-
nia University and Marshall University.” In-
deed, Section 14-2-2a is plain and unambigu-
ous, so it must be applied, not interpreted or
construed.’

HM We hold that under West Virginia
Code § 14-2-2a [2004], a lawsuit in which
West Virginia University or Marshall Uni-
versity is made a party defendant shall be
brought in the circuit court of any county in
which the cause of action arose, unless other-
wise agreed by the parties, This statutory
exception to the general rule that an action
against a state agency may be brought only
in Kanawha County applies exclusively to
lawsuits against West Virginia University or
Marshall University. Neither West Virginia
University nor Marshall University were
made parties to this lawsuit. Therefore, Sec-
tion 14-2-2a does not apply to this case.

Having established that West Virginia
Code § 14-2-2a does not apply to this lawsuit,

macy, Inc., 220 W.Va. 484, 491, 647 S.E.2d 920,
927 (2007).

7. Syl. Pt, 3, in part, Manchin v. Dunfee, 174
W.Va. 532, 327 S.B.2d 710 (1984).

8. See Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va.
714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (‘Where the lan-
guage of a statute is free from ambiguity, its
plain meaning is to be accepted and applied
without resort to interpretation.”’).

we address another statute the circuit court
relied on to conclude that Marion County was
a proper venue. The faculty members’ law-
suit alleges, in part, that Fairmont State
violated West Virginia’s Open Meetings Act
set out in West Virginia Code § 6-9A-1 to -12
[1975]. Under West Virginia Code § 6-9A-6
[1999], “[t]he circuit court in the county
where the public agency regularly meets has
jurisdiction to enforce [the West Virginia
Open Meetings Act] upon civil action[.]”®
The circuit court incorrectly presumed that,
because it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the lawsuit, it had venue as well.

HM It is well-established that: “The
terms ‘venue’ and ‘jurisdiction’ are not synon-
ymous.” © “Jurisdiction is a court’s inherent
power to decide a case; venue, however, des-
ignates the particular county in which a court
having jurisdiction may properly hear and
determine the case”! Because “[cJourts
must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means what it says
there[,]” we decline to insert “venue” into
Section 6-9A-6 when the Legislature clearly
limited the statute to “jurisdiction.” The Leg-
islature designated Kanawha County as the
proper venue for suits against state agencies.

However, that is not to say that a circuit
court outside of Kanawha County is always
barred from hearing a lawsuit against a state
agency for lack of venue. For example, the
Legislature has enacted exceptions to its rule
that state agencies may be sued only in
Kanawha County, none of which apply here.!?

9. Emphasis added.

10, Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin Jean Davis, &
Louis J. Palmer, supra, § 12(b)(3) at 363 (citing
W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n v. Wag-
ner, 143 W.Va. 508, 520, 102 S.E.2d 901, 909
(1958) (‘There is a distinction between jurisdic-
tion and venue and the two terms are not synon-
ymous.”)).

11. Syl. Pt. 8, Brooke B,, 230 W.Va. at 363, 738
S.E.2d at 29,

12. See, e.g., W.Va. Code § 14-2-2a (pertaining to
lawsuits in which West Virginia University or
Marshall University are made party defendants);
‘W.Va. Code § 14-2-2(b) (pertaining to lawsuits
seeking injunctive relief for government taking of
real property),

875

HE Furthermore, objections to venue
may be waived by the defendant.’ Under
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(1) [1998], “A defense of ... improper
venue is waived (A) if omitted from a motion
in the circumstances described in subdivision
(g) [Consolidation of Defenses in Motion], or
(B) if it is neither made by motion under this
rule nor included in a responsive pleading or
an amendment thereof[.]” Put simply, “[olrdi-
narily, [a defendant's] failure to object specif-
ically to venue before pleading to the merits
constitutes waiver of the objection.” #

HN When a state agency that is made a
defendant in a lawsuit filed outside of Kana-
wha County fails to object to venue, and
thereby waives its objection to venue, the
cireuit court in which the lawsuit was filed
has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the
West Virginia Open Meetings Act under Sec-
tion 6-94-6. Because Fairmont State and the
HEPC raised improper venue in their mo-
tions to dismiss, it is undisputed that they
did not waive their objection to venue. There-
fore, the circuit court erred by relying upon
Section 6-9A-6 to find that Marion County
‘was a proper venue for this lawsuit.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

The lawsuit filed against Fairmont State
and the HEPC must be filed in the Cireuit
Court of Kanawha County. Therefore, the
cireuit court exceeded its legitimate powers

13. See State ex rel. Kenamond v. Warmuth, 179
W.Va. 230, 233, 366 S.E.2d 738, 741 (1988)
(‘Unlike jurisdiction, .,. venue may be con-
ferred by consent or waivert.J”).

14, Hansbarger, 177 W.Va. at 157, 351 S.E.2d at
71.

15. Before we dispose of this case, we note that
Fairmont State and the HEPC asserted an addi-
tional ground for its requested writ of prohibi-
tion. They claim that West Virginia Code § 55-
17-3(a)(1) [2008] required the plaintiffs to give
them thirty days presuit notice before filing their
complaint, and that the Plaintiffs failed to do so.
Because we grant Fairmont State’s requested
writ of prohibition on grounds of venue, we
decline to address the issue of presuit notice.

876 ee

by holding that’ venue for this lawsuit is
proper in Marion County.

Writ Granted.

806 S.E.2d 800

MM,., a Minor, BY AND THROUGH Her
Mother and Next Friend JEANETTE
M,, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v

PFIZER, INC,; Roerig, a Division of
Pfizer, Inc.; and Greenstone, LLC,
Defendants Below, Respondents

No, 16-0927
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

" Submitted: October 17, 2017
Filed: November 1, 2017

See also 235 W.Va. 151, 772 S.H.2d 836 and
283 W.Va. 457, 759 S.E.2d 200.

6S .
>
wa

878

Benjamin L, Bailey, Ryan: McCune Dono-
van, J. Zak Ritchie, Bailey & Glasser LLP,
Charleston, West Virginia, Bert Ketchum,
Greene Ketchum, Huntington, West Virginia,
Attorneys for the Petitioner

Michael J. Farrell, Erik W. Legg, Megan
Farrell Woodyard, Farrell, White & Legg
PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia, Mark S.
Cheffo, pro hae vice, Quinn Emanuel Urqu-
hart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New York,
Attorneys for the Respondents

Davis, Justice:

The petitioner herein and plaintiff below,
“MM! (“M.M.” or “the Petitioner”), a minor,
by and through her ‘mother and next friend
Jeanette M., appeals from an order entered
August 30, 2016, by the Mass Litigation Pan-
el (“the Panel”). By its order, the Panel
granted summary judgment to the respon-
dents herein and defendants below, Pfizer,
Ine; Roerig, a division of Pfizer, Inc; and
Greenstone, LLC (collectively “Pfizer” or
“the Respondents”) upon its conelusion that
there existed no genuine issue of material
fact and that Pfizer was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. On appeal to this Court,
MM. assigns error to the Panel’s order and
contends that disputed issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment, the Panel ap-
plied the wrong-state’s law under its choice
of law analysis, and the asserted claims are
not preempted by federal law. Upon our
review of the parties’ arguments, the perti-
nent authorities, and the record designated
for consideration on appeal, we conclude that
the Panel correctly determined that the Re-
spondents are entitled to summary judg-
ment. Accordingly, we affirm the August 30,
2016; order of the Mass Litigation Panel.
1. Given that the instant proceeding involves an

infant plaintiff, we will refer to her, and her
mother, by their initials rather than by their full

L

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

M.LM., an infant, by her mother, is one of
nineteen minor plaintiffs who have alleged
that they sustained birth defects as a result
of their mothers’ use of the prescription med-
ication Zoloft, In the case sub judice, MM.
alleges that she sustained in utero injuries
and resultant birth defects when her mother
ingested sertraline hydrochloride while she
was pregnant with M.M. Respondent Pfizer
manufactures and markets sertraline hydro-
chloride as the antidepressant drug, Zoloft;
Respondent Roerig is a former division of
Pfizer, while Respondent Greenstone is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer that sells
an authorized generic version of this medi-
cation. More specifically, M.M., who, through
her mother, filed her complaint in the Circuit
Court of Wayne County in 2012, contends
that the 2009 labeling information for Zoloft
did not warn prescribing physicians that the
use of Zoloft in pregnancy was linked to an
increased risk of birth defects and that wom-
en should use contraceptives while taking
Zoloft.

Since the action’s filing, the Respondents
repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, have attempt-
ed to remove the subject litigation to federal
court; the case has been referred to the Mass
Litigation Panel; and this Court has decided
several procedural issues in the ongoing liti-
gation. See State ex rel. J.C. ex rel. Michelle
C. v. Mazzone, 235 W. Va. 151, 772 S.E.2d
836 (2015) (forum non conveniens); State ex
rel. J.C. v. Mazzone, 288 W. Va. 457, 759
S.E.2d 200 (2014) (assigning matter consoli-
dated case number instead of individual case
numbers). In 2015, M.M. filed an amended
complaint asserting specific claims for strict
liability, failure to warn, and negligence.
Thereafter, the Respondents filed a motion
for summary judgment, which the Panel
granted by order entered August 30, 2016. In
short, the Panel concluded that Michigan law
governs M.M.’s claims; federal law operates
to preempt the exception to Michigan’s fail-
ure to warn immunity where the subject

names. See State ex rel. J.C. ex rel. Michelle C. v.

Mazzone, 235 W. Va. 151, 153 n.1, 772 S.E.2d
336, 338 n.1 (2015).

drug has received FDA approval; no genuine
issues of material fact remained in the case;
and the Respondents are entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. From this adverse
ruling, M.M. now appeals to this Court.

IL

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HH The case sub judice comes to this
Court on appeal from the, Panel’s order
granting summary judgment to'the Respon-
dents. We previously have held that this
Court will apply a plenary review to a sum-
mary judgment ruling. See Syl. pt. 1, Painter
v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755
(1994) A cireuit court’s entry of summary
judgment is reviewed de novo.”), In deter-
mining whether a moving party is entitled to
summary judgment, we have held that “[a]
motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to ‘clari-
fy the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 8,
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, v. Federal Ins, Co. of
New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 183 S.E.2d 770
(1963). Accord W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(¢) (direct-
ing that summary judgment is proper when
“there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ... the moving party is éntitled to a
judgment as a matter of law”). Thus, “filf
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact summary judgment should be grant-
ed[.]” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Aetna, 148 W. Va.
160, 188 S.H.2d 770. See also Syl. pt. 5, id.
(“The question to be decided on a motion for
summary judgment is whether there is a
genuine issue of fact and not how that issue
should be determined.”), Mindful of these
standards, we proceed to consider the par-
ties’ arguments.

TL

DISCUSSION
On appeal to this Court, M.M. assigns
error to the circuit court’s ruling and con-
tends that genuine issues of material fact
preclude summary judgment; West Virginia,
2. W. Va. Code § 55-8-16(a) (2011) (Supp. 2011)

was amended in 2015, but we apply the version
of the statute that was in effect at the time of the

879

not Michigan, law applies to M.M.’s claims;
and, even if Michigan law applies, such law is
not preempted by federal law. More specifi-
cally, M.M. argues that the Panel erred by
granting summary judgment to Pfizer be-
cause there remain genuine issues of materi-
al fact so as to preclude summary judgment
because, counsel contends, Pfizer new of the
dangers of Zoloft use during pregnancy, gen-
erated reports suggesting contraceptive use
while taking the medication, and realized the
import of the possibility of birth defects by
specifically including contraceptive warnings
on its European packaging for the drug.
Based on these facts, M.M. contends that a
jury should be allowed to determine whether
Pfizer was negligent or strictly liable for its
failure to adequately warn of the possibility
of birth defects linked to Zoloft usage by
women of childbearing age.

Pfizer responds that the Panel correctly
determined that, while worded as three sepa-
rate and distinct claims for relief, i¢., strict
liability, failure to warn, and negligence,
MMs claims essentially all seek to impose
liability for the same alleged shortcoming of
Pfizer: failure to warn. Moreover, Pfizer ar-
gues that, under either Michigan or West.
Virginia law, M.M. cannot prevail because
Michigan statutory law expressly forecloses a
failure to warn claim where the medication in
question has been approved by the FDA and
the exception thereto is preempted by feder-
al law. Furthermore, even if West Virginia

“law governs M.M.’s claims, the infant still is

not entitled to relief insofar as there is no
alleged duty with which Pfizer has failed to
comply (negligence claim) and failure to warn
is the only theory of strict liability advanced
by M.M.,, which is foreclosed by Michigan
statutory law. Accordingly, Pfizer contends
that the Panel’s order granting summary
judgment in its favor should be affirmed.

Hl In the infant’s amended complaint,
MLM. has asserted three causes of action
against Pfizer: strict liability, failure to warn,
and negligence. Pursuant to W. Va. Code
§ 55-8-16(a) (2011) (Supp. 2011),

events giving rise to the case sub judice. See W.

Va, Code § 55-8-16(b) (2011) (“This section shall
be applicable prospectively to all civil actions
’

880 |

[ilt is public policy of this state that, in
determining the law’ applicable to a prod-
uct liability claim brought by a nonresident
of this state against the manufacturer or
distributor of a prescription drug for fail-
ure to warn, the duty -to warn shall be
governed solely by the product liability
law of the place of injury (“lex loci de-
licti”).

(Emphasis added). Here, there is no dispute
that the injuries alleged by M.M. and the
infant’s mother all occurred in the State ‘of
Michigan, Thus, M.M.’s failure to warn claim
is governed by Michigan law, which fore-
closes such a claim if the drug was approved
by the FDA and the manufacturer complied
with the FDA’s labeling requirements;

- 6) In a product liability action against a
manufacturer or seller, a product that is a
drug is not defective or unreasonably dan-
gerous, and the manufacturer or seller is
not liable, if the drug was approved for
safety and efficacy by the United States
food and drug administration, and the
drug and its labeling were in compliance
with the United States food and drug ad-
ministration’s approval at the time the
drug left the control of the manufacturer
or seller, However, this subsection does
not apply to a drug that is sold in the
United States after the effective date of an
order of the United States food and drug
administration to remove the drug from
the market or to withdraw its approval.
This subsection does not apply if the de-
fendant at any time before the event that
“allegedly caused the injury does any of the
following:

(a) Intentionally withholds from or mis-
represents to the United States food and
drug administration information concern-
ing the drug that is required to be submit-
ted under the federal food, drug, and cos-
metic act, chapter 675, 52 Stat, 1040, 21
U.S.C. 801 to 321, 331 to 843-2, 344 to
346a, 347, 848 to 358, 355 to 360, 360b to
876, and 378 to 395, and the drug would
not have been approved, or the United

commenced on or after July 1,’2011."). Cf. W.
Va. Code § 55-8-16(a) (2015) (Repl. Vol. 2016)
(‘It is public policy of this state that, in deter-
mining the law applicable to a product liability
claim brought by a nonresident of this state

States food and drug administration would
have withdrawn approval for the drug if
the information were accurately submitted.
(b) Makes an illegal payment to an offi-
cial or employee of the United States food
and drug administration for the purpose of
securing or maintaining approval of the
drug. .
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2946(5)(a-b)
(West 1995) (emphasis added). While M.M.
attempts to rely upon the fraud on the FDA
exception set forth in subsection (b), such an
exception is valid only if the FDA, itself,
acknowledges the perpetration of such fraud,
which M.M. has not alleged here. See Lofton
v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms.,
672 F.8d 872, 881 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
that “a fraud-on-the-FDA provision ... is
preempted by the FDCA unless the FDA
itself finds fraud”);.Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., 385, F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (con-
cluding that fraud on the FDA exception is
not preempted where “the FDA itself deter-
mines that a fraud has been committed on
the agency during the regulatory-approval
process” (emphasis in original; citation omit-
ted)). In all other respects, operation of this
exception is preempted by federal law. See,
generally Buckman Co, v, Plaintiffs’ Legal

Comm., 581 US. 841, 848, 121 S.Ct. 1012, .

1017, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (“hold[ing] that,
... state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims con-
flict with, and are therefore impliedly pre-
empted by, federal law” (footnote omitted)).
Thus, Michigan law forecloses M.M.’s failure
to warn claim.

M.M’s remaining claims also are
thwarted, whether they are’ governed by
Michigan law or West Virginia law. Ordinari-
ly, M.M/’s strict liability and negligence
claims would be governed by Michigan law
insofar as the alleged injuries occurred in
Michigan. That is so because, “[iJn general,
this State adheres to the conflicts of law
doctrine of lea loci delicti.” Syl. pt. 1, Paul v.
National Life, 177 W. Va: 427, 352 8.H.2d
550 (1986). Accord: McKinney v. Fairchild

against the manufacturer or distributor of a pre-
scription drug or other product, all liability
claims at issue shall be governed solely by the
product liability law of the place of injury (lex
loci delicti).” (emphasis added).

Int’, Inc., 199 W. Va. 718, 727, 487 S.E.2d
918, 922 (1997) (“Traditionally, West Virginia
courts apply the lew loci delicti choice-of-law
rule; that is, the substantive rights between
the parties are determined by the law of the
place of injury.” (citations omitted). Under
this standard, M.M.’s claims fail because both
the strict liability and negligence claims. al-
lege that Pfizer improperly failed to include
contraceptive and/or birth defect warnings on
its labeling, which, again, constitute allega-
tions that Pfizer failed to warn of the dan-
gers of Zoloft, Such a claim is foreclosed by
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2946(5)(a-b).

HE However, assuming arguendo that
West Virginia law governs M.M.’s claims giv-
en that the Panel denied Pfizer's forwm non
conveniens motion because no other available
forum existed in which to try M.M.’s substan-
tive claims,’ M.M. still cannot prevail on the
additional claims of strict liability and negli-
gence set forth in the infant’s amended com-
plaint under West Virginia substantive law.
See Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc.,
208 W. Va. 621, 624, 510 S.H.2d 280, 288
(1998) (“We .., adhere to the rule that the
doctrine of lex loci delicti will not be invoked
where ‘the application of the substantive law
of a foreign state ... contravenes the public
policy of this State.” (quoting Paul, 177 W.
Va, at 438, 852 S.H.2d at 556).

Hl This Court préviously has held that,
in West Virginia, .

[p]roduet liability actions may be prem-
ised on three independent theories—strict
liability, negligence, and warranty. Each
theory contains different elements which
plaintiffs must prove in order to recover.
No rational reason exists to require plain-
tiffs in product liability actions to elect
which theory to submit to the jury after
the evidence has, been presented when
they may elect to bring suit on one or all of
the theories.

See generally W. Va. Code § 56-1-1a(a)(1)
(2008) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (including, within forum
non conveniens analysis, consideration "of
“(whether an alternate forum exists in which the
claim or action may be tried”); Syl. pt. 9, Mace v.
Mylan Pharms., Inc., 227 W. Va. 666, 714 8.E.2d
223 (2011) (‘In considering ‘whether an alter-
nate forum exists in which the claim or action
may be tried’ pursuant to West Virginia Code

y

881

Syl. pt. 6, Ilosky v, Michelin Tire Corp., 172
W. Va. 435, 307 S.H.2d 608 (1983), In the
case sub judice, M.M. alleges all three of
these theories of product liability: strict lia-
bility; negligence, and failure to warn. As
noted above, M.M.’s failure to warn claim is
governed by the law of the place of injury,
4.¢., Michigan, and is foreclosed thereby. See
W. Va. Code-§ 55-8-16(a); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann, §§ 600.2946(5)(a-b),

With respect to claims alleging strict liabil-
ity, we have recognized that “a defective
product may fall into three broad, and not
necessarily mutually exclusive, categories:
design defectiveness; structural defective-
ness; and use defectiveness arising out of the
lack of, or the inadequacy of, warnings, in-
structions and labels.” Morningstar ». Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 888, 258
S.E.2d 666, 682 (1979), Counsel for M.M.
concedes that, with regard to strict Hability,
he is not alleging that the Zoloft in question
was, itself, defective but rather that Pfizer
inadequately warned of the potential harm
when used by pregnant women, However,
this is merely a restatement of M.M.’s failure
to warn claim which, as noted above, is gov-
eined, and foreclosed, by Michigan law, See
W. Va. Code § 55-8-16(a); Mich, Comp, Laws
Ann, §§ 600,2946(5)(a-b),

Hl Finally, with respect to M.M.’s negli-
gence claim, we have held that there first
must exist a duty, and a breach of that duty,
to hold a defendant liable for negligence. “In
order to establish a prima fudie case of negli-
gence in West Virginia, it must be shown
that the defendant has been guilty of-some
act or omission in violation of a duty owed to
the plaintiff. No action for negligence will lie
without a duty broken.” Syl. pt. 1, Parsley v.
General Motors Acceptance: Corp., 167 W.
Va, 866, 280 S.H.2d 708 (1981). See also Syl.
pt. 2, Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W. Va, 585, 871
S.E.2d 82 (1988) (“In the matters of negli-

§ 56-1-1a(a)(1) (Supp. 2010), an alternate forum
is presumed to ‘exist’ where the defendant is
amenable t6 process, Such presumption: may be
defeated, however, if the remedy provided by the
alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or un-
satisfactory that it is no remedy at all, In such
cases, the alternate, forum ceases to ‘exist’ for
purposes of forum non conveniens, and dismissal
in favor of that forum would constitute error,"),

882

gence, liability attaches to a wrongdoer, not
because of a breach of a contractual relation-
ship, but because of a breach of duty which
results in an injury to others.”). Again,
though, the duty M.M. alleges that Pfizer
breached is the duty to provide adequate
warnings about the potentially harmful ef-
fects of Zoloft if used by pregnant women,
which is merely a reiteration of M.M.’s fail-
ure to warn claim. See Syl. pt. 8, Ilosky, 172
W. Va. 435, 307 S.E.2d 603 (“For the duty to
warn to exist, the use of the product must be
foreseeable to the manufacturer or seller.”).
To recognize such a claim under West Virgi-
nia law where the same already is foreclosed
im the same case by the law of another
jurisdiction, however, would contradict the
full faith and credit due our sister jurisdic-
tions. See, eg., Syl. pt. 1, Johnson v. Hunt-
ington Moving & Storage, Inc., 160 W. Va.
796, 239 S.E.2d 128 (1977) (“Under Section 1,
Article IV of the Constitution of the United
States, the judgment or decree of a court of
record of another state will be given full faith
and credit in the courts of this State, unless
it be clearly shown by pleading and proof
that the court of such other state was without
jurisdiction to render the same, or that it was
procured through fraud.”); Syl. pt. 2, Inter-
national Harvester Co. of America v. Solazo,
116 W. Va. 84, 178 S.E. 429 (1985) (“Under
the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution, the courts of this state may not
refuse to enforce a judgment of another state
because it involves some contravention of the
public policy of this state.”).

Thus, while M.M. may have established a
question of fact sufficient to overcome sum-
mary judgment as to the asserted claim of
negligence,‘ because the failure to warn claim
is subject to and precluded by Michigan law,
Pfizer, and not M.M., is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law as to the negligence claim.
See W. Va. Code § 55-8-16(a); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 600.2946(6)(a-b), In other
words, because M.M.’s failure to warn claim
is governed by Michigan law, and the govern-
ing Michigan statutes provide that a manu-
facturer cannot be held liable where it has
complied with the FDA reporting, disclosure,
4, See Syl. pt. 4, Hosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172

W. Va. 435, 307 S.E.2d 603 (1983) (“The deter-
mination of whether a defendant's efforts to

and labeling requirements, there exists no
duty that could have been breached so as to
establish a claim for negligence.

Accordingly, the August 30, 2016, order of
the Mass Litigation Panel granting Pfizer’s
motion for summary judgment as to M.M.’s
claims of strict liability, failure to warn, and
negligence is affirmed because no genuine
issues of material fact require resolution and
Pfizer, and the remaining Respondents, are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
W. Va. R. Civ, P. 56(¢); Syl. pt. 8, Aetna, 148
W. Va. 160, 183 S.E.2d 770.

Iv.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Mass Liti-
gation Panel’s August 30, 2016, order grant-
ing summary judgment to Pfizer and the
remaining Respondents is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

806 S.E.2d 806

Larry D, PYLES, Jr. and Pamela
Pyles, Petitioners

v

MASON COUNTY FAIR, INC. and The
County Commission of Mason
County, Respondents

No. 17-0300
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: September 20, 2017
Filed: November 1, 2017

warn of a product's dangers are adequate is a
jury question.”).

QO
e
~

ie

1, See W.Va, Code §§ 29-12A-1 to -18 (2013).

Harvey D, Peyton, Esq., Thomas H. Pey-
ton, Esq., Peyton Law Firm, PLLO, Office of
Legal Services, Nitro, West Virginia, Coun-
sel for Petitioners . :

Wendy 5. Greve, Esq., Drannon L. Ad-
kins, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown
& Poe, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
Counsel for Mason County Commission

LOUGHRY, Chief Justice;

Through three certified questions, the Cir-
euit Court of Mason County seeks clarifica-
tion from this Court regarding the applicabil-
ity of the West Virginia Governmental Tort
Claims and Insurance Reform Act (the
“Act”)! to claims made by an individual in-
jured while attending the Mason County Fair
(“fair”), At the center of each of the inquiries
propounded by the circuit court is the peti-
tioners’ (hereinafter “plaintiffs”) attempt to
assert vicarious liability against the Mason
County Commission (“Commission”) based
on a purported joint venture between the
Commission and the Mason County Fair, Inc.
(“Fair Board”)? After reformulating the
questions submitted to us to conform to the
facts of this case, we determine that either
the immunity: provisions of the Act or the

2, The Fair Board is a domestic, non-profit corpo-
ration.

public duty doctrine operates to prevent the
plaintiffs from seeking liability against the
Commission under the facts of this case.
I, Factual and Procedural Background
On August 9, 2018, the plaintiffs, Larry D.
and Pamela Pyles, were paid admission at-
tendees at: the fair. At approximately 9:45
p.am., Mr, Pyles was savagely beaten by three
teenagers while standing in the midway area
of the fair, As a result of the attack, Mr,
Pyles suffered a traumatic brain injury. Last-
ing effects from that brain injury are alleged
to include post-concussion syndrome and oth-
er non-specified permanent disabilities.

On December 5, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a

complaint against the Fair Board seeking’

damages for negligence and loss of consor-
tium. In answering the complaint, the Fair
Board filed a third-party complaint against
the three individuals who attacked Mr.
Pyles® seeking contribution and indemnity
for any liability assessed against it in connec-
tion with Mr. Pyles’ injuries. Following initial
discovery, the plaintiffs amended their origi-
nal complaint to add the Commission as a
defendant.t The plaintiffs averred that the
Commission was negligent for its alleged fail-
ure to prevent Mr. Pyles from being injured
at the fair,

On January 4, 2017, the plaintiffs sought
leave to file a second amended complaint to
insert an allegation that the Fair Board and
the Commission were engaged in a joint ven-
ture with regard to the staging and operation
of the annual fair. Based on this alleged joint
venture, the plaintiffs asserted that the Com-
mission “owed a duty to, the Plaintiffs that
exceeded any general duty owed by any law
enforcement agency to the public at large.”
The Commission opposed the plaintiffs’ at-
tempt to reamend the complaint, arguing

3, Each of those individuals is a citizen of Pomer-
oy, Ohio,

4, The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion
ta file an amended complaint on June 15, 2015.

5. See infra note 9.

6. See Bowyer v. HI-LAD, Inc. 216 W.Va. 634,
653-54; 609 S.B.2d 895, 914-15 (2004) (uphold-
ing circuit court's decision to grant summary
judgment and denying request to amend plead-
ings on grounds of futility in view of indemnifica-

885

that such amendment would be futile because
the additional theory of recovery “does not.
obviate the public duty doctrine.”® Given
that the plaintiffs second amended complaint
Jacked any allegations that a special relation-
ship existed between the plaintiffs and the
Commission, the Commission reasoned that
the amendment was pointless as the plain-
tiffs’ joint venture theory could not defeat
the public duty doctrine or abrogate the Act’s
provisions of immunity.

The circuit court heard arguments of coun-
sel on the plaintiffs’ motion to reamend the
complaint on February 22, 2017. Finding it
unnecessary to resolve any factual issues re-
garding the alleged joint venture to decide
the motion to amend, the circuit court denied
the motion on the grounds that such amend-
ment would be futile.® The circuit court rea-
soned that, even assuming the existence of a
joint venture for the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the Act affords immunity to the
Commission for the injuries sustained by Mr.
Pyles while at the fair. In addition, the circuit
court ruled that the Commission only owed
Mr. Pyles the general duty of care that any
political subdivision owes to the public at
large. .

As part of its ruling, the circuit court, with
the agreement of counsel, certified the fol-.

lowing three questions to this Court:

1. If a political subdivision enters into a
joint venture with a private entity to
conduct an annual county fair on real

_ property owned by the political subdi-
vision, does the West Virginia Govern-
mental Tort. Claims and Insurance
Reform Act provide the political sub-
division with immunity from vicarious
liability for injuries suffered by a non-
trespassing entrant on the real prop-

tion clause); see qlso Perkins v. U.S., 55 F.3d 910,
917 (4th Cir, 1995) (upholding district court's
denial of widow’s attempt to amend wrongful
death action as proposed amendments could not
survive motion to dismiss); see generally 6
Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed’l Practice and

. Procedure § 1487 (3rd ed, 2010) (recognizing that
numerous courts have denied proposed amend-
ments where such amendments were viewed as
frivolous or advancing claim or defense that is
legally insufficient on its face).

886

erty caused by the negligent acts of
the private entity?

If a political subdivision enters into a
joint venture with a private entity to
conduct an annual county fair on real
property owned by the political subdivi-
sion, does the political subdivision as-
sume the same legal duty to non-tres-
passing entrants on the real property as
that of the private entity?

8. Does the existence of a joint venture
between a political subdivision and a
private entity to conduct an annual
county fair on real property owned by
the political subdivision, void/abrogate
any of the immunities provided by the
West Virginia Governmental Tort
Claims and Insurance Reform Act?

The cireuit court answered the first question
in the affirmative and the second and third
questions in the negative.

po

Tl. Standard of Review

TAs this Court stated in syllabus point
one of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 197
W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996): “The ap-
pellate standard of review of questions of law
answered and certified by a circuit court is
de novo.” We proceed to consider and ad-
dress the questions presented by the circuit
court.

Ii. Discussion

Hl Upon our review of the certified ques-
tions, we conclude that those queries must be
reframed in order that the issues presented
in this case may be fully and properly ad-
dressed, As we recognized in syllabus point
three of Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404,
482 8.H.2d 74 (1998),

When a certified question is not framed
so that this Court is able to fully address
the law which is involved in the question,
then this Court retains the power to refor-
mulate questions certified to it under both
the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act found in W.Va. Code, 51-1A-1, et
seg. and W.Va. Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the

7. _In answering the first amended complaint, the

Commission raised the affirmative defense of im-
munity and specifically averred that the Act

statute relating to certified questions from

a circuit court of this State to this Court.
Accordingly, we will address the following
inquiries:

1. When a county commission enters into a
usage agreement with a private, non-
profit entity pursuant to which the pri-
vate entity conducts an annual county
fair on land owned by the commission
and the county commission has no con-
trol with regard to the operations of the
fair and does not receive any monetary
compensation from the operation of the
fair, does the agreement between the
county commission and the private enti-
ty constitute a joint venture?

Do individuals engaged by a private
entity to work at a county fair on land
owned by a county commission qualify
as “employees” of the county commis-
sion for purposes of the West Virginia
Governmental Tort Claims and Insur-
ance Reform Act?

8.. Where a county fair is operated by a
private entity on property owned by a
county commission, does the commis-
sion owe a special duty of care to indi-
viduals who attend the fair or merely
the same duty of care that is owed to
the public in general?

Each of the reframed questions will be ad-
dressed in turn.

A. Joint Venture

HH At the core of the plaintiffs’ motion to
reamend their complaint at this juncture is
their attempt to inject a new theory upon
which to attach liability to the Commission
for the injuries Mr. Pyles sustained at the
fair.’ Pursuant to that theory, the plaintiffs
aver that

the County Commission, as part of its joint

venture with the County Fair to stage an

annual outdoor festival, voluntarily under-

took to provide for the reasonable safety of

non-trespassing entrants on the premises

of the Mason County Fairgrounds by exer-

cising reasonable care under the cireum-

stances then and there existing to guard

~

barred any claims of the plaintiffs predicated on
simple negligence or vicarious liability.

against and prevent severe injury to the
Plaintiffs ...; [Blecause of this joint ven-
ture between the County Commission and
the County Fair, both of the parties to
their joint venture owed a duty to the
Plaintiffs that exceeded any general duty
owed by any law enforcement agency to
the public at large.

As the basis for its joint venture claim, the
plaintiffs rely on the fact that the Commis-
sion and the Fair Board entered into an
agreement on April 18, 2006, whereby the
Commission granted to the Fair Board “the
right to control, maintain, improve and utilize
the Mason County Fairgrounds for its pur-
poses as set forth in its Charter and By-
laws.” § Pursuant to that agreement the Fair
Board agreed to expend its own funds “to
maintain and improve” the fairgrounds.
While the agreement acknowledges the Com-
mission’s authority “to charge and collect
fees for the use of its property herein grant-
ed,” it further provides that the Commission
“agrees to charge no fee to Fair [Board] in
return for the practice of Fair [Board] in
expending its own funds in the improvement
and maintenance of the Fairgrounds.”

HMM Seeking to circumvent the “public
duty doctrine”? with the aim of imposing
liability against the Commission, the plain-
tiffs argue that the Commission was involved
in a joint venture with the Fair Board. Both
the law and the facts of this case prove
otherwise. A joint venture is defined as “an
association of two or more persons to carry
out a single business enterprise for profit,
for which purpose they combine their proper-
ty, money, effects, skill, and knowledge. It
arises out of a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Price

8. The Commission had purchased the fair-
grounds from the federal government in the mid-
1960s. Prior to that purchase, the Fair Board
had utilized the grounds under a special permit
from the federal government.

9. Pursuant to the public duty doctrine, the “duty
imposed upon a governmental entity is one owed
to the general public, and unless the injured
party can demonstrate that some special relation-
ship existed between the injured person and the
allegedly negligent entity, the claim is barred.”
Jeffrey v. W.Va. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 198 Wa.
609, 614, 482 S.E.2d 226, 231 (1996); see

887

v. Halstead, 177 W.Va. 592, 855 S.E.2d 380
(1987) (emphasis supplied). Borrowing from
language that suits the plaintiffs’ purposes,
they cite our decision in Armor v. Lantz, 207
W.Va. 672, 585 S.E.2d 787 (2000), for the
proposition that “members of a joint venture
are ... jointly and severally liable for all
obligations pertaining to the venture.” What
the plaintiffs omit from that partial quote,
however, is this Court’s prefatory and foun-
dational explanation that “joint ventures and
partnerships are governed generally by the
same basic legal principles.” Id. at 678, 585
S.E.2d at 743. Having initially set forth this
legal tenet, we proceeded to articulate the
critical antecedent omitted by the plaintiffs:
“Thus, since all partners are jointly liable for
all debts and obligations of a partnership, see
W.Va. Code § 47B-8-6(a) (1996), members of
a joint venture are likewise jointly and sever-
ally liable for all obligations pertaining to the
venture.” Id.

Further ignored by the plaintiffs is the fact
that the requisite agreement “to carry out a
single business enterprise for profit” is whol-
ly absent from this case. Price, 177 W.Va, at
598, 355 .E.2d at 882, syl. pt. 2, in part. The
Fair Board is a non-profit organization and
the Commission—a governmental entity—did
not receive, nor did it anticipate receiving,
any financial return in connection with the
holding of the annual fair. According to the
plaintiffs, the benefit that inured to the Com-
mission from the Fair Board’s maintenance
of the property constitutes the obligatory
element of “profit.” Rather than evidencing a
business venture created for commercial pur-
poses, this type of non-cash benefit tends
instead to disprove the existence of such an

Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dep't, 186 W.Va.
336, 346, 412 S.B,2d 737, 747 (1991) (“The pub-
lic duty doctrine is that a local governmental
entity's liability for non-discretionary ... func-
tions may not be predicated upon the breach of a
general duty owed to the public as a whole;
instead only the breach of a duty owed to the
particular person injured is actionable.”); see
also Holsten v. Massey, 200 W.Va. 775, 782, 490
S.E.2d 864, 871 (1997) (explaining that public
duty doctrine “is not based upon immunity from
existing liability [but] ... on the absence of duty
in the first instance”).

888

arrangement.” When discussing the absence
of a litmus test for demonstrating a joint
venture in Armor, we observed the common-
law requirement that “there must be an
agreement to share in both the profits and
the losses.” 207 W.Va. at 678, 585 S.E.2d at,
743 (quoting Pownall v, Cearfoss, 129 W.Va,
487, 497-98, 40 S.E.2d 886, 898-94 (1946)).
That the focus on the “presence or absence
of an agreement to share in the profits and
losses of an enterprise” remains a critical
component of the joint venture analysis today
is clear from our diseussion in Armor. In
reviewing our decisions in this area, we ob-
served that the absence of evidence demon-
strating that two firms performing. mining
operations had “ ‘agreed to share profits and
losses’” was determinative with regard to
the plaintiff's failed attempt to establish a
joint venture, 207 W.Va, at 679, 585 S.E.2d at
744 (analyzing Kerns v, Slider Augering &
Welding, Inc., 202 W.Va, 548, 556, 505 S.E.2d
611, 619 (1997)),

In addition to evidence of a profit-sharing
agreement, this Court recognized in Armor
that courts “have also emphasized the neces-
sity of joint venturers having equal control
over the common commercial pursuit.” 207
W.Va. at 680, 585 S.H.2d at 745. The record
in this case makes clear that the Commission
did not have any control with'regard to the
operations of the fair.!! The Fair Board, not
the Commission, had complete control with
regard to all matters pertinent to the opera-
tions of the fair, See id, (discussing fact that
“‘eontrol required for imputing negligence
10, See Armor, 207 W.Va. at 680, 535 S.E.2d at

745 (“‘[T]he mere fact that one party is to re-

ceive benefits in consideration of services ren-

dered or for capital contribution does not, as a

matter of law, make him a partner or joint ven-

turer,’ ”) (citation omitted).

11. While the Mason County Sheriff's office as-
signed deputies to provide a law enforcement
presence at the fair, the plaintiffs have made
clear that their case against the Commission is
not predicated on a law enforcement efforts. *

12, See supra note 9.
13, See W.Va. Code §§ 29-12A-4(b)(1), -5. -
14, . The plaintiffs argue that a decision to deny a

motion to amend a complaint is subject to the
same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule

under a joint enterprise theory is not actual
physical control, but the legal right to control
the conduct of the other with respect to the
prosecution of the common purpose’ ”) (cita-
tion omitted), As the land usage agreement
makes clear, the Fair Board has the right “to
utilize the Mason County Fairgrounds for its
purposes as set forth in its Charter and By-
Jaws.” Importantly, there are no provisions in
‘the agreement that grant the Commission
coextensive control of the fair operations,
Moreover, as discussed above, the pursuit at
issue—an annual county fair—cannot qualify
as a “commercial pursuit.”

HHH (Upon analysis, there are no facts in
the record of this case that support the
plaintiffs’ joint venture theory. First and
foremost, there was no agreement between
the Commission and the Fair Board to en-
gage in a commercial. enterprise for the pur-
pose of generating profits. And, as discussed,
the Commission lacked any control whatso-
ever with regard to the operations of the
fair. Given the facts of this case, the plain-
tiffs’ attempt to elude the public duty doc-
trine® or specifie provisions of immunity
afforded the Commission under the Act!®
through its assertion of a joint venture theo-
ry was ill-advised. Furthermore, this Court
is not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention
that the joint venture allegations are neces-
sarily unassailable. Based on the record
presented in this case, both the existence of
a joint venture and the applicability of immu-

12()(6) and requires the allegations of the pro-
posed amended pleading to be viewed as vera-
cious, See West Virginia Bd, of Educ. v, Marple,
236 W.Va. 654, 660,783 S.B.2d 75, 81 (2015)
(recognizing that for purposes of motion to dis-
miss, complaint is construed in light most favor-
able to plaintiff and allegations are taken as
true). However, where an amended pleading
would be subject to a motion to dismiss on other
grounds, such as immunity, it should be denied
as futile. See Perkins, 55 F.3d at 917 (“Because
the United States would still be immune and the
suit properly dismissed even if the new claim
were taken as true; the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
amend.”); accord Kirk v. Heppt, 423 F.Supp.2d
147, 149 (S.D. N.Y, 2006) (“A proposed amend-
ment to a pleading is deemed to be futile if the
amended pleading fails to state a claim or would
be subject to a successful motion to dismiss on
some other basis.”),

nity under the Act are legal determinations
capable of and-demanding resolution at this

* juncture of the litigation rather than at the
appellate stage.> Because the principles of
governmental immunity clearly apply to the
facts of this case, we would be violating our
well-established rule of not-requiring parties
who are clearly entitled to statutory immuni-
ty to remain in an action if we required the
Commission to remain in this case based on
unprovable pleadings. See Hutchison v. City
of Huntington, 198 W.Va. 189, 149, n.18, 479
S.E.2d 649, 659, n.18 (1996) (explaining that
“assertion of qualified or absolute immunity
should be heard and resolved prior to any
trial”); see also Robinson v. Pack, 223 W.Va.
828, 881, 679 S.H.2d 660, 663 (2009) (affirm-
ing “need for early resolution of immunity
rulings” and holding that summary judgment
ruling predicated on qualified immunity is
subject to immediate appeal under “collateral
order” doctrine), As recognized in Glick v.
Koenig, 766 F.2d 265, :268-69 (7 Cir, 1985),
“[t}he liberal amendment, rules under Rule
15(a) do not require the courts to indulge in
futile gestures.”

Accordingly, we hold that the agreement of

a county commission to permit. a private,

non-profit entity to hold a county fair on land

owned by the county commission which fails
to provide for the sharing of both profits and
losses and coequal control over the fair oper-
ations does not constitute a joint venture. We
further find that the cireuit court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’
motion to amend their complaint given that
the existence of immunity under the Act or
the public duty doctrine compelled the dis-
missal of the Commission from this case. See

Perkins, 55 F.8d at 917. Accordingly, we

answer the first reframed certified question

in the negative.

18. See Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198
W.Va, 139, 148, 479 S.E.2d 649, 658 (1996)
(observing that “very heart of the immunity de-
fense is that it spares the defendant from having
to go forward with an inquiry into the merits of
the case” and that “[ijmmunities under West
Virginia law are more than a defense to a suit in
that they grant governmental bodies and public

officials the right not to be subject to the burden
of trial at all”).

889

B. Commission Employees

Hl Seeking to avoid the bar of immunity
presented by the Act, the plaintiffs maintain
that the individuals selected by the Fair
Board to work at the fair’s entrance gate
were necessarily employees of the Commis-
sion.!6 While the plaintiffs’ objective in seek-
ing to cast the gate workers as employees of
the Commission is clear, the collection of
admission fares while standing on county- _
owned property did not make them employ-
ees of the Commission. Critical to any at-
tempt to imipose liability premised. on the
actions of the fair workers, is proof by the
plaintiffs that those individuals fall within the
employment-related definition provided by
the Act, An “employee” is defined as “an
officer, agent, employee, or servant, whether
compensated or not, ... who is authorized to
act’ and is-acting- within the scope of his or
her employment for a political subdivision.”
W.Va. Code § 29-12A-8(a).

Implicitly acknowledging their inability to
meet the Act’s description of an employee,
the plaintiffs proceed down a separate path.
They simply announce that anyone selected
by the Fair Board to work at the fair is
necessarily an agent (ie, employee) of the
other joint venturer (ie. Commission) based
on their assumption that the Commission and
the Fair Board are joint venturers. This
premise is wholly untenable given that the
plaintiffs cannot prove that the Commission
and the Fair Board were engaged in a joint
venture.”

Just as there was no basis in the record to
establish the existence of a joint venture,
there is absolutely no basis for the plaintiffs’
claim that the workers chosen by the Fair
Board to work at the fair qualified as em-
ployees of the Commission within the mean-
ing of the Act. See W.Va, Code § 29-12A-
8(a). The Commission did not select, hire, or
16. Under the Act, “[plolitical subdivisions are

liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or

property that is caused by the negligence of their
employees...” W.Va. Code § 29-12A-4(c)(4).

17. See supra Section IILB.

890

have any control whatsoever with regard to
the individuals the Fair Board utilized to
work at the fair. Absent any evidence that
the fair workers came within the Act’s defini-
tion of an “employee,” the plaintiffs cannot
proceed on its theory that the Commission is
liable for Mr, Pyles’ injuries due to the negli-
gence of the fair workers. See W.Va. Code
§§ 29-12A-8(a), -4(c)(4). Accordingly, we an-
swer the second reframed certified question
in the negative,
C. Duty of Care

Hs [n their attempt to attach liabili-
ty to the Commission for the injuries sus-
tained by Mr. Pyles, the plaintiffs sought to
create an elevated duty of care on the part of
the Commission with regard to the fair pa-
trons, Unable to demonstrate that the Com-
mission had a special relationship with Mr.
Pyles that required it to supply him with a
greater duty than that owed to the general
public/8 the plaintiffs sought to sidestep the
effects of the public duty doctrine by impos-
ing vicarious liability against the Commission
under its theory of joint venture.!? As dis-
eussed above, the plaintiffs cannot succeed
against the Commission under a theory of
joint venture,

As the record of this case makes
clear, the only duty owed by the Commission
to the plaintiffs is the general duty that it
owed to the public. The plaintiffs’ own ex-
pert, Dr. R. Paul McCauley, testified that the
Mason County Sheriff's Department, and by
extension the Commission, only owed a gen-
eral duty to the plaintiffs. As this Court
explained in West Virginia State Police v.
Hughes, 288 W.Va. 406, 796 S.E.2d 193
(2017):

Under the public duty doctrine, a govern-
ment entity or officer cannot be held liable
for breaching a general, non-discretionary
duty owed to the public as a whole, “Often
referred to as the ‘duty to all, duty to no
one’ doctrine, the public duty doctrine pro-
vides that since government owes a duty to

18. See supra note 9.

19, While unnecessary to our decision, we agree
with the Commission that the Act does not per-
mit a political subdivision to be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of a non-employee. See
Zirkle v. Elkins Road Pub, Serv, Dist., 221 W.Va.

the public in general, it does not owe a

duty to any individual citizen.”
Id, at 412, 796 S.E.2d at 199 (citation omit-
ted). Because the plaintiffs have failed to
identify any basis for holding the Commis-
sion to any duty other than the general duty
that is owed to the public at large, we are
compelled to answer the third reframed cer-
tified question in the negative.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we answer each of
the reframed certified questions in the nega-
tive.

Questions answered.

806 S.E.2d 814
IN The INTEREST OF Z.D. and D.D.
No. 17-0123

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 8, 2017
Filed: November 2, 2017

409, 414, 655 S.E.2d 155, 160 (2007) (recogniz-
ing that political subdivisions are not liable for
any acts with respect to both governmental and
proprietary functions unless the acts complained
of come within the specific liability provisions of
W.Va. Code § 29-12A-4(c)),

om
wo

Gerald R.. Linkous, Esq., Mercer County
Public Defenders Corporation, * Princeton,
West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner

-David B. Kelley, Esq., The Kelley Law
Firm, Bluefield, West Virginia, Guardian ad
Litem 4

Patrick Morrisey, Esq, Attorney General,
S, L, Evans, Esq,, Assistant Attorney Gener-
al, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Respondent, The Department of Health and
Human Resources -

Workman, Jt justice:

In this appeal, the Court is asked t to deter-
mine whether a parent, who had court-ap-
pointed counsel in an abuse and neglect pro-
ceeding, is entitled to representation by
court-appointed cqunsel once the abuse and
neglect proceeding is dismissed and further
action is brought in a domestic relations case.
The petitioner father, O.D.,' appeals the Cir-
cuit Court of Mercer County’s order, entered
January 18, 2017, determining that once the
abuse and neglect proceeding was dismissed,
the petitioner was no longer entitled to court-
appointed counsel to resolve a custody issue
within the confines of a subsequent domestic
relations case. Upon review of the parties’
briefs? and arguments, the appendix record,
and all other matters submitted before the
Court, we affirm the cireuit court’s ruling on
the court-appointed counsel issue. But we
reverse the circuit court’s decision to contin-
ue the appointment of the guardian ad litem
for the children in the domestic relations
proceeding.

I. Facts and Procedural History -

‘The petitioner and A.D.,} filed for divorce
in the Family Court of Mercer County. In

1, Because this case involves sensitive facts, we
protect the identities of those involved by using
only the parties’ initials, See State ex rel. W. Va.
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cheryl M., 177 W. Va.
688, 689 n.1, 356 S.E.2d 181, 182 n.1 (1987); see
also W, Va. R. App. P, 40.

2. The West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources (""DHHR”) and the children’s
guardian ad litem both filed response briefs. Nei-
ther the DHHR nor the guardian ad litem take a
position on the petitioner’s request that court-
appointed counsel continue. But the guardian ad
litem “contends that it is of the utmost impor-
tance that guardian[s] ad litem[ ] be appointed to
represent minor children in appropriate Rule 6
cases.” See W, Va. R. P, Child Abuse & Neglect
Proc. 6. :

3. A.D. (“the mother”) is the petitioner's former
- wife and the children’s mother. She is not a
party to this appeal.

4. Z.D. and D.D. were ages eight and ten, respec-
tively.

893

2012, as part of the domestic relations pro-
ceeding, the parents entered into a “Mediat-
ed Parenting Plan” concerning their two chil-
dren, Z.D, and D.D.! At the time this plan
was adopted by the family court, the petition-
er was pro se.

On April 26, 2016, the DHHR filed an
abuse and neglect petition against both par-
ents, alleging that the children were neglect-
ed as a result of their excessive absenteeism
from school. The filing of the abuse ‘and
neglect proceeding by the DHHR caused the
matter to be transferred to the jurisdiction of
the circuit court. The circuit court appointed
a guardian ad litem for the children and
counsel for each of the parents.

On July 18, 2016, the cireuit court conduct-
ed an adjudicatory hearing and by order
entered August 2, 2016, the circuit court
accepted the DHHR’s recommendation that
the parents be placed on a preadjudicatory
improvement period. On December 12, 2016,
the circuit court held another hearing on the
DHHR’s motion to dismiss ® the case as the .
parents had successfully completed the pre-
adjudicatory improvement period by: resolv-
ing the truancy concerns involving their chil-
dren, According to the transcript of that
hearing, the circuit court noted at the begin-
ning of the hearing that the mother had just
filed a motion for custody of the children.”
‘The circuit court indicated. that it was grant-
ing DHHR’s motion to dismiss and would

5, See W, Va. R. Prac. & Proc. for Fam. Cf. 48
(‘The family court shall retain full jurisdiction of
proceedings until an abuse or neglect petition is
filed."); see also W. Va. R. P. Child-Abuse &
Neglect Proc. 6 (providing for maintaining an
abuse ‘and neglect proceeding on’ the circuit

‘ court’s docket unless certain limited conditions
occur).

6, The motion to dismiss was not made part of the
record on appeal.

7. The petitioner did not provide the Court with a
copy of the motion filed by the mother, but the
‘Court, on its own motion, obtained a copy from
the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mercer County
and ordered that the record be supplemented
with it, The motion is stamped as being filed
December 12, 2016, the same day as the above-
mentioned hearing.

894

retain jurisdiction over the domestic relations
case. The circuit court, however, stated that
it was giving the parents one shot to resolve
the mother’s motion for custody at a Multi-
Disciplinary Treatment Team (“MDT”) meet-
ing “on the State’s nickel. I’m going to dis-
miss it [referring to the abuse and: neglect
case], hut with one more MDT on the State’s
nickel and the purpose of that is to discuss
this Motion for Custody.” After the MDT
meeting, the circuit court informed the peti-
tioner and the mother that they were no
longer entitled to court-appointed counsel as
the abuse and neglect case was over8

In a- January 18, 2017, order, the circuit
court memorialized what occurred at the De-
eember 12, 2016, hearing. Specifically, the
circuit court found that a motion for custody
had been filed; that the DHHR requested
that the matter be dismissed; that after one
more MDT. meeting, scheduled for January
5, 2017, the circuit court was dismissing and
removing the abuse and neglect case from its
docket; that thereafter the case was a domes-
tic case; that the petitioner and the mother
were “not entitled to counsel dealing with a
custody issue[;]” and that the guardian ad
litem for the infant children “will bill under
the Supreme Court guidelines for domestic
cases.” It is from this order that the petition-
er appeals. °

“’TL Standard of Review

HH This Court has held that

“{w]hen this Court reviews challenges to
. the findings and conclusions of the cireuit

court, a two-prong deferential standard of

8 Further, the circuit court continued the ap-
“pointment of the guardian ad litem for the chil-
dren in the domestic relations proceeding and
instructed him to bill the West Virginia Supreme
Court under its guidelines for domestic cases
after the abuse and neglect case was dismissed.

9, See Syl. Pt. 7, In re Lindsey C., 196 W. Va. 395,
473 S.E.2d 110 (1995) (‘In child neglect pro-
ceedings which may’ result in the termination of
parental rights to the custody of natural children,
indigent parents are entitled to the assistance of
counsel because of the requirements of the Due
Process clauses of the West Virginia and United
States Constitutions.’ Syllabus point 1, State ex
rel. LeMaster v. Oakley, 157 W. Va. 590, 203
S.E.2d 140 (1974)."); Syl. Pt. 8, In re Lindsey C.,
196 W. Va. at 397, 473 S.B.2d at 112 (“Circuit
courts should appoint counsel for parents and
custodians required to be named as respondents

review is applied. We review ‘the final or-
der and the ultimate disposition under an
abuse of discretion standard, and we re-
view the circuit court’s underlying factual
findings under a clearly erroneous stan-
dard.” Syl, McCormick v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 197 W.Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996).

Syl. Pt. 1, Jn re S.W., 236 W. Va. 309, 779
§.E.2d 577 (2015). Further, “{w]here the is-
sue on an appeal from the cireuit court is
clearly a question of law or involving an
interpretation of a statute, we apply a de
novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal .
RM. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 188, 459
S.H.2d 415 (1995). It is under these stan-

‘dards that the Court addresses the issues

before it,
HI. Discussion

A. Court-appointed Counsel

The main issue before the Court is wheth-
er an individual is entitled to court-appointed
counsel in a domestic relations case. The
petitioner argues that the circuit court erred
in ordering that he was no longer entitled to
court-appointed counsel in the domestic rela-
tions proceeding once the abuse and neglect
case was dismissed, We disagree.

Hl In an abuse. and neglect proceeding,
the West Virginia and United States Consti-
tutions require that indigent parents and cus-
todians be represented by court-appointed
counsel.’ The petitioner, therefore, was enti-
tled to (and received) a court-appointed at-
torney during the pendency of the abuse and

in abuse and neglect proceedings incident to the
filing of each abuse and neglect petition. Upon the
appearance of such persons before the court,
évidence should be promptly taken, by affidavit
and otherwise, to ascertain whether the parties
for whorn counsel has been appointed are or are
not able to pay for counsel. In those cases in
which the evidence rebuts the presumption of
inability to pay as to one or more of the parents
or custodians, the appointment of counsel for
any such party should be promptly terminated
upon the substitution of other counsel or the
knowing, intelligent waiver of the right to coun-
sel, Counsel appointed in these circumstances
are entitled to compensation as permitted by
law.”); see also W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(£)(2015)
(providing for appointment of counsel in abuse
and neglect cases),

neglect proceeding that was brought against
him and the children’s mother. But the cir-
cuit court later determined that the abuse
and neglect proceeding ended and dismissed
the action from its docket. The only pending
action that remained on the circuit court’s
docket was a separate domestic relations
case that has never been dismissed; it was
simply transferred to the jurisdiction of the
circuit court due to the filing of the abuse
and neglect petition.

HI Pursuant to Rule 6 of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
Neglect, once a case is transferred from fam-
ily court to cireuit court due to an abuse and
neglect petition being filed, the circuit court
“retains exclusive jurisdiction over placement
of the child while the case is pending, as well
as over any subsequent requests for modifi-
cation, including, but not limited to, changes
in permanent placement or visitation[.]” Id.
There are two exceptions to the rule that
allow the case to be returned to family court:

(1) if the petition is dismissed for failure to

state a claim under Chapter 49 of the W.

Va, Code, or (2) if the petition is dismissed,

and the child is thereby ordered placed in

the legal and physical custody of both of
his/her cohabitating parents without any
visitation or child support provisions, then
any future child custody, visitation, and/or
child support proceedings between the par-
ents may be brought in family court.
W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 6;
see generally In re J.L., 234 W. Va. 116, 763
S.H.2d 654 (2014). Because neither of the
exceptions that would allow the case, or part
of the case, to be returned to family court
had been met in the instant case, the cireuit

10, The Court rejects the petitioner's argument
that ‘“[plrocedurally, A.C.’s Motion for Custody
should have been treated as a Motion to Modify
Disposition{ ” under West Virginia Code § 49-4-
606 (2015) (providing for modification of disposi-
tional orders). A review of the mother’s motion
for custody does not indicate, in any way, that it
is being filed in accordance with the provisions
of West Virginia Code § 49-4-606. Also, there
simply is no basis for the lower court or this
Court to construe the mother’s motion in such a
manner as there had been no disposition or
dispositional order entered at the time the moth-
er’s motion was filed. This case was dismissed
below without any adjudication of abuse or ne-
glect due to the parents’ successful completion of

895

court retained jurisdiction over the domestic
relations proceeding. Contrary to the peti-
tioner’s position, when an abuse and neglect
proceeding is instituted, which results in the
transfer of a domestic relations case to cir-
cuit court, that transfer does not forever
transform a subsequent domestic relations
proceeding to an abuse and neglect proceed-
ing once the abuse and neglect proceeding is
dismissed. Rather, if the abuse and neglect is
dismissed by the circuit court, but it retains
jurisdiction over the case under Rule 6, the
proceeding reverts back to a domestic rela-
tions proceeding. Thus, the circuit court was
correct in deciding that it had continuing
jurisdiction over the case and that the pend-
ing motion for custody would be resolved in
the context of the domestic relations pro-
ceeding,!

Unlike in the abuse and neglect area, an
indigent litigant has no right to counsel in a
domestic relations case! The only case
where this Court touched upon the issue was
in Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 191 W. Va.
65, 443 S.H.2d 222 (1994), a case involving
two consolidated domestic relations proceed-
ings, in which we discussed the circuit court’s
power to appoint attorneys, who were acting
as guardians ad litem, for indigent litigants.”
We noted in Quesinberry that compensation
for court-appointed counsel to represent indi-
gent litigants

is properly provided by the legislature in a

substantial number of cases, specifically,

those involving a potential deprivation of a

substantial liberty interest. These actions

inelude criminal, probation, and parole
charges that may result in incarceration;
juvenile proceedings; contempt of court;
child abuse and neglect proceedings that

a preadjudicatory improvement period. See W.
Va. Code § 49-4-604 (2015 & Supp. 2017) (indi-
cating that court must find child to be abused or
neglected before proceeding to disposition.).

11, But see W. Va. R. Civ. P. 17(¢) (providing for
appointment of guardian ad litem for convict);
W. Va, Trial Ct, R. 21.04 and 21.05 (providing
for @ court-appointed guardian ad litem for in-
carcerated persons who are indigent).

12, See W. Va. Trial Ct. R. 21 (providing for
eligible guardian ad litem appointments in cir-
cuit court, family court and magistrate court),

896

may result in termination of -parental

rights; mental hygiene commitment pro-

ceedings; paternity proceedings; extradi-
tion proceedings; and appeals and post-
conviction challenges to a judgment in any

of these actions. See W. Va. Code 29-211

et seq.8 ’ .
191 W. Va. at 71 'n.8, 443 S.E.2d at 228 n3
(footnote added),

HM «Consequently, an indigent litigant
is not entitled to court-appointed counsel in a
domestic relations proceeding. Further, upon
the filing of an abuse and neglect petition,
which results in appointment of counsel for
an: indigent litigant, once the abuse and ne-
glect proceeding is dismissed, the litigant is
not entitled to court-appointed counsel in
subsequent domestic relations proceedings

In the instant case, the circuit court cor-
rectly determined that because it had dis-
missed the abuse and neglect proceeding, the
petitioner was no longer entitled to court-
appointed counsel in order to resolve the
motion ‘for custody, as the proceeding was a
domestic relations case. We, therefore, affirm
the circuit court's ruling on this issue,

B. Guardian ad Litem

HM As an ancillary matter, the Court
finds it important to address the issue of the
circuit court’s continued appointment of the
guardian ad litem for the custody matter that
remains pending in the domestic relations
proceeding. The guardian ad litem has filed a
brief before the Court wherein he has taken

13: W. Va, Code § 29-21-1 to -21 (2013) (provid-
ing legal assistance to indigent persons who are
litigants in eligible proceedings).

14, Rule 47 was recently amended by the Court
with the amendments effective April 25, 2017.
‘The amendments, for the most part, moved por-
tions of Appendix B into Rule 47 with minor
rewording within the sections of the rule to com-
port with the statutes and the Court's case law.
The instant case was decided under the former
version of rule, W. Va, R, Prac. & P, Fam, Ct, 47
(2012),

Under the newly amended rule, the language

“quoted above in the body of the opinion is set
forth as follows:

(@) Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem.

Courts shall not routinely assign guardians

ad litem for children in a domestic relations

ease, Where, however, the court is presented

the position that his appointment should con-
tinue.

“According to Appendix B to Rule 47 of the
West Virginia Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure for Family Court, “[cJourts shall not
routinely assign guardians ad litem for
children or require court-ordered investi-
gations unless the court has reasonable
cause to suspect the parenting issues in-
volve a child’s safety or the best interest of
the child warrants further investigation by
the court.” Rule 47(b) also required that an
order of appointment shall “specify the terms
of the appointment, including the guardian’s
role, duties and scope of authority, as well as
the specific reasons for the appointment and
the expectations of the court for the guardian
ad litem’s report, including the date by which
the written report is due....” Id. see also
former Appendix B to W. Va. R. Prac. & P.
Fam. Ct. 47 (providing that “The Order ap-
pointing the guardian ad litem shall state the
specific reasons for the appointment; require
the parties to fully cooperate with the guard-
ian ad litem in terms of the investigation; and
the expectations of the court for the guardian
ad litem, including but not limited to the
issues to be investigated and the date by
which the written report is due,”),®

In the case sub judice, there is no indica-
tion in the record before the Court that a
guardian ad litem had been involved in this
action prior. to the abuse and neglect pro-
ceeding. When the abuse and neglect matter
ended and the, case reverted back to one

with substantial allegations of domestic
abuse, serious allegations of abuse and ne-
glect, serious issues relating to the child’s
health and safety, or allegations involving
disproving a child's paternity, a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed by the court for the
child(ren), , :
W. Va. R. Prac. & P, Fam, Ct, 47 (2017),

15. See W. Va. R. Prac, & P. Fam, Ct, 47(b) (2017)
“(providing [t]he order appointing a guardian ad
litem shall specify the terms of the appointment,
including the guardian’s role, duties and scope of
authority, the issues to be investigated, as well as
the specific reasons for the appointment and the
expectations of the court for the guardian ad
litem's report, including the date by which the
written report is due. The order appointing a
guardian ad litem shall also require the parties to
fully cooperate with the guardian ad litem. in
terms of the investigation.)

sounding only in domestic relations, the pro-
visions of Rule 47 governing the appointment.
of guardians ad litem for children controlled.
In the context of the domestic relations case,
there was no evidence before the circuit
court to support the appointment of the
guardian ad litem. See id. At the time of the
appointment, the only issue pending was that
of determining a motion’ for modification of
custody in the context of a routine domestic
relations proceeding. Further, the circuit
court failed to make any findings to support
the need for a guardian ad litem; the cireuit
court: merely found that “David Kelley is
appointed as guardian ad litem for the infant
children, and he will bill under the Supreme
Court guidelines for domestic cases.!° This is
now a domestic relations :case not an abuse
and neglect case under Rule 6.” (Footnote
added). See W. Va. R. Prac. & P. Fam. Ct.
47(b).

HM Given that the Court has seen a rath- .

er haphazard approach taken by both family
and circuit courts in this State concerning
the appointment of guardians ad litem in
domestic relations cases, we are compelled to
now hold that pursuant ‘to Rule 47 of the
West Virginia Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure for Family Court, courts shall not rou-
tinely assign guardians ad litem for children
in a domestic relations case. Where, however,
the ‘court is presented with substantial alle-
gations of domestic abuse, serious allegations
of abuse and neglect, serious issues relating
to the child’s health and safety, or allegations
involving disproving a child’s paternity, a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed, by the
court for the child(ren).

Hl We further hold that under Rule 47 of
the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure for Family Court, the order appoint-
ing a guardian ad litem shall -specify the
terms of the appointment, including the

16.- West Virginia Trial Court Rule 21.05 has also
been amended, effective April 25, 2017, and now
provides that

in a domestic relations case the cost ‘of a
guardian ad litem for a party and/or an in-
fant(s) of the parties may be ordered to be paid
by a non-indigent party or if otherwise quali-
fied, by the Supreme Court when the appoint:
ment is nondiscretionary, provided the order
appointing the guardian ad litem complies
with the requirements of Rule 47 of the Rules
of Practice and Procedure for Family Court.

897

guardian’s role, duties and scope of authority,
the issues to be investigated, as well as the
specific reasons for the appointment and the
expectations of the’court for the guardian ad
litem’s report, including the date by which
the written report is due. The order appoint-
ing a guardian ad litem shall also require the
parties to fully cooperate with the guardian
ad litem in terms of the investigation.

HM. In this case, the cireuit court’s ap-
pointment of the guardian ad litem in the
domestic relations proceeding was in error.
The only issue pending in the domestic rela-
tions proceeding is the mother’s motion for
modification of custody. Child custody issues
in a routine domestic relations case do not
require the appointment of a guardian ad
litem for the child(ren). Moreover, for the
guardian ad litem to have been properly
appointed required the entry of an order that
comports with the requisite findings set forth
in Rule 47, Finally, before a guardian ad
litem may seek payment by this Court, a
proper order that comports with Rule 47 of
the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure for Family Court must be entered
and there must be compliance with the re-
quirements of West, Virginia Trial Court
Rule 21.04 and 21,057 The circuit court
failed to follow the ‘applicable rules of this
Court and the appointment of the guardian
ad litem. by’ the ‘circuit court is reversed.

IV. Conclusion

"Based upon the foregoing, the decision. of
the Cireuit Court. of Mercer County is af-
firmed, in part, and reversed, in part.

Affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part,

The compensation payable by the Supreme

Court is limited to the amounts set forth in

Trial Court Rule 21.06.
A nondiscretionary appointment “means when
substantial allegations of domestic abuse have
been made, when serious allegations of abuse
and neglect have been made, when’ there are
serious. issues relating to the child’s health or
safety, or in cases involving disproving a child's

+ paternity.” W. Va. Trial Ct, R, 21.04(e).

17. See supra note 16.

898

806 S.E.2d 822

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent

v

Ryan L, HENSON, Defendant
Below, Petitioner

and
State of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent.
v

Kerri S. Reigh, Defendant
Below, Petitioner

and
State of West Virginia, Plaintiff
Below, Respondent.
v.

Jonathan W. Physioc, Defendant
Below, Petitioner

No. 16-0914, No. 16-0888, No. 16-0850
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: September 20, 2017
Filed: November 2, 2017

ory
a
ia}

x
=

Michael J. Sharley, Esq., Westover, West
Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner, Ryan L.
Henson

Douglas F. Kobayashi, Esq., KOBY LAW,
Martinsburg, West Virginia, Counsel for the
Petitioner, Kerri 8, Reigh

1. Petitioner Reigh’s conviction was due to the
jury finding that she acted as a principal in the
second degree.

2. Based on the jury convictions, Petitioner Hen-
son was sentenced to one to fifteen years for
burglary; eighty years for each of the three
counts of robbery in the first degree, to run
concurrently with each other; two to ten years
for each count of assault during the commission
of a felony; and one to five years for conspiracy,
with all the counts, other than for the robberies,
to be served consecutively to each other and to

903

Lisa A. Green, Esq., LAW OFFICE OF
LISA A. GREEN, Shepherdstown, West Vir-
ginia, Counsel for the Petitioner, Jonathan
W. Physioc

Patrick Morrisey, Esq, Attorney General,
Robert L. Hogan, Esq., Deputy Attorney
General, Counsel for the Respondent.

Workman, Justice:

Before the Court are the consolidated ap-
peals of the three Petitioners, Ryan L. Hen-
son (“Petitioner Henson”), Kerri 8. Reigh
(“Petitioner Reigh”), and Jonathon W. Phy-
sioe (“Petitioner Physioc”) (also collectively
referred to as “the Petitioners”), who were
tried together before a jury. Each was con-
vieted! on charges of one count of burglary,
three counts of robbery in the first degree,
three counts of assault during the commis-
sion of a felony, and one count of conspiracy
and sentenced.”

Several issues are raised by the Petition-
ers, but the main issue the Court must de-
cide is whether double jeopardy principles
were violated by the Petitioners’ respective
convictions for three counts of robbery in the
first degree® Based upon our review of the
parties’ briefs and arguments, we find that
under our law, the Petitioners should have
been indicted, tried and convicted on only a
single count of robbery in the first degree.
The Court, therefore, reverses the Petition-
ers’ respective sentencing orders on this is-
sue only and the cases are remanded to the
circuit court for entry of new sentencing
orders consistent with this opinion. For rea-
sons set forth more fully below, we find no
other reversible error in connection with the
remainder of the assigned errors raised by

the robbery counts. Petitioners Reigh and Phy-
sioc received the same sentence as Petitioner
Henson except that Petitioner Reigh was sen-
tenced to twenty years for each robbery count, to
run concurrently and Petitioner Physioc was sen-
tenced to sixty years for each count, to run
concurrently,

3. The remaining assigned errors will be dis-
cussed infra in the discussion section of this
opinion in connection with the Petitioner(s) who
raised the assigned error.

904

The charges brought against the Petition-
ers stemmed from the brutal beating of Rob-
ert Basore (“Robert”) and his two adult sons
that occurred during a home invasion in
which only property located in Robert’s bed-
room and belonging to him was taken from
the home. According to the evidence offered
at trial, about two weeks before the home
invasion, in April of 2015, Sherry: Basore,‘
who was Robert’s granddaughter, Petitioner
Henson, and Totianna Etheridge, who was.
Petitioner Henson’s then-girlfriend, visited
Robert’s home so that Sherry could borrow
$20 from her grandfather to buy drugs. Sher-
ry told these individuals that her grandfather
had $80,000 in his home from the sale of
some land. Robert testified that only Peti-
tioner Henson and Sherry came. into his
home on this visit. Robert stated that he had
about $200 in his wallet and that he gave
Sherry money in front of the Petitioner Hen-
son,

Ms, Etheridge,® a key witness for the Re-
spondent (“the State”), also testified that af-
ter the visit to Robert’s home, Sherry told
Ms, Etheridge and Petitioner Henson what
her grandfather kept in his house. According
to Ms, Etheridge, Sherry explained to Peti-
tioner Henson where everything was located
in Robert’s home, Sherry also told Petitioner
Henson that just her father and grandfather
would be in the home. Sherry even suggested
that they should go during the day because
her father and grandfather “would be drunk
and passed out,” Sherry made, such disclo-
sures because she was “dope sick,” or as Ms.
Etheridge explained, Sherry was going
through withdrawal from heroin and needed
to get more drugs. ~
4. According to the record, Sherry entered a

guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge of conspira-

cy to commit petit larceny in exchange for, her
testimony at trial, °

5. Ms, Etheridge testified that she entered into a
plea agreement with the State in exchange for
her trial testimony, :

6, Robert testified that he was beaten about the
head; William, Robert's son, testified that he had

the Petitioners and affirm the circuit court’s
rulings on those issues,

I, Factual and Procedural History

In the early evening on May 7, 2015, two
masked men entered Robert’s home, which
was unlocked at the time. Both of Robert’s
sons were also at home when the invasion
occurred. Robert was in the kitchen and his
two sons were in the living room. The two
intruders used some type of metal bar to
beat all three men about their heads® to
subdue them. One of the intruders demanded
that Robert tell him where his safe was and
Robert refused. Robert was then dragged
into his bedroom, where the intruder told
him to give him his wallet and took the wallet
from Robert’s back pocket. The intruders
also took a toolbox from Robert’s bedroom
containing “some silver, old antique money in
it. Had some $2 bills ... [and] I think my
wife had a necklace and a bracelet. ...” A .22
caliber rifle with a scope was also taken from .
Robert’s bedroom, The intruders then left
the house, taking no personal property from
either of Robert's sons. Robert’s son, Mi-
chael, testified that he had not been robbed
and that the items that had been taken from
his father’s home were not taken in his pres-
ence, There were no fingerprints or DNA
obtained from the home and the victims were
unable to identify the perpetrators because
of the masks,

Ms. Etheridge testified that around 3:00 to
8:80 a.m. the next morning, she received a
phone call from Petitioner Henson while she
was working at the Lust Nightclub. Petition-
er Henson told her that “he needed some
money to get out of town because they just
hit a lick.” Ms. Etheridge testified that “hit-
ting a lick” refers to “something illegal like a
home invasion or some sort like that.” Ac-
cording to Ms. Etheridge, Petitioner Henson,
Petitioner Reigh and Petitioner Physioc” ar-
rived together “around back” of the nightclub
in a large white pickup truck about thirty
minutes later, Ms, Etheridge went “out back

fifty staples in the back of his head and neck due
to being beaten by the intruders; and Michael,
Robert's other son, testified that he received thir-
ty-eight staples in his head and lost a lot of blood
due to the beating he received.

7, According to Ms, Etheridge, Petitioners Reigh
and Physioc were in a relationship at the time of
the crime.

to give them the money and he just told me
that they hit a lick and they needed to get
out of town and they didn’t get anything
because ... [Petitioner Physioc] fucked it
up.” When asked by the prosecutor how that
happened, Ms. Etheridge stated that “[Peti-
tioner Physioc] . ,... grabbed the wrong safe.”
Ms. Etheridge did not testify that either
Petitioner Reigh or Petitioner Physioe made
any statements to her when Petitioner Hen-
son was telling her what had occurred nor
did they attempt to leave the vehicle. The
Petitioners took the money from Ms. Ether-
idge and left.

Ms, Etheridge stated that she did not see
Petitioner Henson again until the next morn-
ing. She and Petitioner Henson were living
together atthe Motel 6 in Hagerstown, Ma-
ryland. Ms, Etheridge testified that Petition-
er Henson told her “[tJhat he tried every-
thing he could to get the safe from the guy,
but they had to beat him to be able to get
anything” and that he had assistance in com-
mitting the crime. Ms. Etheridge then stated
that Petitioner Henson told her that there
were three victims, “the grandfather and the
father and the uncle,” and that it was “Sher-
ry Basore’s family.”

Ms. Etheridge also testified that Petitioner
Physioe had shown her “older, ancient like
coins” that he had from the crime and that
he had asked her if she knew where he could
sell them, Ms. Etheridge also observed some
of the stolen coins in Petitioner Reigh’s hand-

8. See W. Va. Code § 61-2-12(a) (2014).

9. The' State amended the indictment in an-at-
tempt to ameliorate the Petitioners’ challenges to
the robbery counts. Given our holding on this
issue, we find it unnecessary to specifically ad-
dress the language in the indictment or the
amended indictment.

10, The Petitioners also sought the dismissal of
two of the assault during ‘the commission of a
felony counts. The circuit court properly denied
the Petitioners’ motion on this issue. Petitioner
Physioc, however, argues on appeal that if there
is no robbery of William or Michael, “no mali-
cious assault can then flow during the commis-
sion of that alleged felony as charged in Courts 6
[robbery 6f William] and 7 [robbery of Michaél]
of the Indictment.” But this argument is unsup-
ported by our law, West Virginia Code § 61-2-10
(2014) provides that “[i]f any person in the com-
mission of, or attempt to commit a felony, unlaw-
fully .., wound another person, he shall be

905

bag. According to Ms. Etheridge, “[Petition-
er Physioc] ... and [Petitioner Henson] had
went out somewhere, me and her [Petitioner
Reigli] was actually going to shoplift and she
was emptying her purse and a couple of the
coins fell out of her purse.” The stolen items
were not found or offered into evidence.

‘None of the Petitioners testified at trial, At
the conclusion of all'the evidence, the jury
returned a verdict of guilt as to all the
charges against the Petitioners, The circuit
court séntenced the Petitioners and this ap-
peal ensued,

IL Standard of Review

The Petitioners have asserted various as-
signments of error, which require this Court.
to apply different standards of review as we
examine each issue raised, The Court, there-
fore, sets forth each standard of review with-
in the discussion section of each issue,

I.

a. Double Jeopardy

THM The first issue requires the Court
to decide whether the Petitioners were prop-
erly indicted, tried and convicted of three
counts of first degree robbery® instead of
one count. The Petitioners first challenged
the indictment ® arguing that two of the three
robbery counts should be dismissed 1 based
upon their argument that the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause as set forth in article III, section 5
of the West Virginia Constitution would be

guilty of a felony....” Based upon the express
terms of the statute, the evidence supported threé
counts of assault during the commission of a
felony as all three residents of the home were,
intentionally injured during the commission of a
robbery. See State v. Penwell, 199 W. Va, 111,
116, 483 S.B.2d 240, 245 (1996) (“W]e conclude
that by enacting the offense of assault during the
commission of a felony, the legislature clearly
intended to impose punishment in addition to
that specified for the underlying felony, if the
criminal actor shot, cut, stabbed, or wounded
another person during the attempt to commit or
the commission of the underlying felony and to
classify that additional conduct as felonious. In
short, W. Va. Code § 61-2-10 acts as an enhance-
ment statute where conduct otherwise defined as
felonious is executed in such a manner that an-
other person—a victim of the underlying felony
or a witness or other bystander—is shot, cut,
stabbed, or wounded in the process.”).

Discussion

906

violated, as well as decisions issued by this
Court,"! if they were convicted for multiple
counts of first degree robbery. Conversely,
the State contended that the three robbery
counts were proper because there was a tak-
ing of property “from the presence of three
distinct residents of a dwelling house.” The
cireuit court agreed with the State and found
that charging, and ultimately convicting, the
Petitioners with multiple counts of robbery
was proper because “while the $250 in cash,
toolbox, and coins, technically belonged, to
Robert Basore, these items were also in the
presence of Michael and William Basore be-
cause they were taken from their home.”

Hl This Court's review of “a double jeop-
ardy claim [is] ... de novo.” Syl. Pt, 1, in
part, State v. Sears, 196 W. Va. 71, 468
S.E.2d 824 (1996). Utilizing a de novo re-
view standard, we address whether the prop-
er unit of prosecution was applied in this
case,

HE “The purpose of the Double Jeopar-
dy Clause is to ensure that sentencing courts
do not exceed, by the device of multiple
punishments, the limits prescribed by the
legislative branch of government, in which
lies the substantive power to define crimes
and prescribe punishments.” Jd. at 78, 468
S.E.2d at 826, Syl. Pt. 8. Further, “(tlhe
analysis of whether a criminal defendant may
be separately convicted and punished for
multiple violations of a single statutory provi-
sion turns upon the legislatively-intended
unit of prosecution.” Syl. Pt. 4, State vu
Goins, 281 W. Va. 617, 748 S.H.2d 813 (2018).

Hl The Court begins by reviewing the
relevant part of our robbery statute set forth
in West Virginia Code § 61-2-12(a) as fol-
lows:

Any person who commits or attempts to
commit robbery by: (1) Committing vio-
lence to the person, including, but not lim-
ited to, partial strangulation or suffocation
or by striking or beating; or (2) uses the

_ threat of deadly force by the presenting of
11. See State v. Myers, 229 W. Va. 238, 728 S.B.2d.

122 (2012); State v. Collins, 174 W. Va. 767, 329
S.E.2d 839 (1984),

a firearm or other deadly weapon, is guilty

of robbery in the first degree and, upon

conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in a

state correctional facility not less than ten

years.

‘We have previously examined this statute
and recognized it “does not actually define
robbery.” State v. Wilkerson, 230 W. Va. 366,
871, 788 S.E.2d 82, 87 (2018) (citing State v.
Harless, 168 W. Va. 707, 710, 285 8.B.2d 461,
464 (1981); State ew rel. Vandal v. Adams,
145 W. Va. 566, 569, 115 S.E.2d 489, 490
(1960)). “Rather, ‘the elements of robbery,
unaffected by the statute, are derived from
the common law[.] State v. Hngland, 180 W.
Va, 842, 847, 876 S.H.2d 548, 558 (1988).”
Wilkerson, 230 W. Va. at 871, 788 S.B.2d at
87. Thus, under the common law, the ele-
ments of the robbery included the elements
of larceny as follows: “‘At common law, the
definition of robbery was (1) the unlawful
taking and carrying away, (2) of money or
goods, (8) from the person of another or in
his presence, (4) by force or putting him in
fear, (6) with intent to steal the money or
goods,’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Harless, 168
W. Va. 707, 285 S.H.2d 461 (1981).” Syl. Pt. 3,
State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d
902 (1982). We found in Neider that “[ilt is
clear that robbery at common law encom-
passed the same elements as a larceny and
included two additional elements: the taking
has to be from the person of another or in his
presence and such taking has to be by force
or putting the person in fear.” Id. at 667, 295
S.E.2d at 907.

This Court first addressed the unit of pros-
ecution for robbery in State v. Collins, 174
W. Va. 767, 829 S.E.2d 889 (1984). In Collins,
the defendant was convicted of two counts of
attempted aggravated robbery. Two men,
wearing ski masks, entered a convenience
store. One of the store clerks was ordered
onto the floor at gunpoint, while the other
clerk was shot as she came out of the back
stockroom. No property was taken from the
store. The defendant, one of the masked men.
involved in the attempted robbery, argued
12. Accord Syl. Pt. 1, State v. McGilton, 229 W.

Va. 554, 729 S.E.2d 876 (2012); see also Syl. Pt.

1, State v. Grimes, 226 W. Va. 411, 701 S.E.2d

449 (2009) (holding that review of denial of mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment is de novo).

that only one count of attempted aggravated

robbery could be charged because the prop- ©

erty sought to be taken belonged to only one
owner, the convenience store. Id, at 768, 329
§.E.2d at 840.

I After examining the law in other ju-
risdictions, the Court stated:
We have examined cases from other juris-
dictions involving the robbery of stores or
banks where more than one clerk or em-
ployee was present. It is sometimes argued
that since each clerk or employee, through
his employment,’ exercises constructive
possession over his employer’s property, a
separate robbery conviction can be estab-
lished for each employee present in the
store or bank during a robbery. However,
this theory has been rejected by most of
the courts addressing the issue, The ratio-
nale commonly advanced by these courts
is that because the property taken is
owned by only one entity, ie, the store or
bank, there is only one larceny and, there-
Sore, only one robbery.
Id. at 772, 829 8.B.2d at 844 (emphasis add-
ed). We held in Collins that “[i]t is impossible
to conclude from either the common law or
W. Va. Code, 61-2-12, that an attempt to rob
a store by presentig a firearm and leaving
without taking any property can, in light of
double jeopardy principles, result in multiple
convictions of attempted aggravated robbery
for each clerk present in such store.” 174 W.
Va. at 768, 329 S.E.2d at 840, Syl. Pt. 2. But
we expressly limited the application of Col-
Jins in the holding to attempted robbery. Id.
Following Collins, in State ex rel. Lehman
v. Strickler, 174 W. Va, 809, 329 S.E.2d 882
(1985), the Court was again asked whether
the taking of property from two separate
victims at the same time could be charged as
one count of aggravated robbery or two. We
upheld the petitioner’s conviction for two
counts, stating:

Recently in Syllabus Point 2 of State v.
Collins, [174] W. Va. [767], 829 S.E.2d 839
(1984), we held that “an attempt to rob a
store by presenting a firearm and leaving
without taking any property can[not], in
light of double jeopardy principles, result
in multiple convictions of attempted aggra-
vated robbery for each clerk present in

907

such store.” In the course of that opinion,
we were careful not to foreclose the possi-
bility of multiple punishments where there
were several completed robberies, and the
property taken belonged to several differ-
ent victims, instead of a single entity such
as a bank or-store.

174 W. Va. at 811, 829 S.H.2d at 884 (empha-
sis added).

More recently in State v. Myers, 229 W.
Va. 238, 728 S.E.2d 122 (2012), this Court
again was presented with the question of how
many counts were properly charged where
two store clerks and two employees of a
cleaning company were present when the
petitioner robbed a convenience store. Jd. at
248-49, 728 S.H.2d at 182-33. The petitioner
entered the store carrying a firearm. Id. at
242, 728 S.H.2d at 127, There were four
people in the store at the time the petitioner
entered. Id. One of the store employees was
instructed to empty the cash register, while
the two cleaning company employees were
ordered to empty their pockets. The other
store employee was in the office and re-
mained hidden during the crime. Id. The
petitioner was indicted and convicted on
three counts of first degree robbery. Id. at
248-44, 728 S.E.2d at 127-28. Upon appeal,
this Court upheld the conviction on three
counts of robbery, determining that

The facts of the petitioner’s case estab-
lish that he robbed the One Stop store
through its employee, Ms, Bess, who was
the store manager. He then individually
robbed Mr. Price and then Mr. Torres.

Both men were ordered at gunpoint to the

floor and both men were instructed to

empty their pockets, The evidence showed
that the petitioner then took their individ-
ual personal property and fled the premis-
es. Given these facts, this Court finds no
double jeopardy violation. Consequently,
the circuit court did not commit error in
charging, trying, and convicting the peti.
tioner of three counts of robbery.

Id, at. 249-50, 728 8.H.2d at 183-34 (emphasis

added).

Hl Turning to the instant case, the un-
disputed testimony from the victims was that
the property taken belonged solely to Robert

908

and was taken from him while he was in his
bedroom. One of Robert’s sons, Michael, tes-
tified that he had not been robbed, because
nothing had been taken from him and noth-
ing was taken in his presence. Also, the same
son testified that he never went into his
father’s bedroom. Applying the law set for in
Collins and Myers to the facts of this case,"
in order for multiple punishments to be im-
posed for multiple counts of robbery, the
State must show that the property taken
belongs to different victims. Myers, 229 W.
Va. at 249-50, 728 S.H.2d at 188-34, In this
ease, the State only established that one of
the victims had property taken and, there-
fore, the Petitioners should have been
charged (and convicted) of only one count of
first degree robbery. Therefore, we reverse
two of each of the Petitioners’ convictions for
first degree robbery, finding that under the
facts of this case they should have been tried
(and convicted) for only one count of first
degree robbery; we remand this case to the

13. The State attempts to distinguish both Collins
and Myers by arguing that

[tlhe elements of robbery require proof of a
taking of property “from the person of another
or in his presence,” At best, these elements
require only that the person from whose per-
son or presence the property is taken have a
greater possessory right than the offender do-
ing the taking. The ordinary resident or occu-
pant of a dwelling house will always have a
greater possessory right to the home’s contents
than an intruder. .
But the problem with the State’s position is that
it offered no legal authority to support it before
the trial court, nor on appeal. Consequently, we
do not address the issue of whether a person’s
* possessory right to property fulfills the element
of robbery that property must be taken “from the
person of another or in his presence.” Neider,
170 W. Va. at 667, 295 S.B.2d at 907.

14. Petitioner Henson's statements made to Ms.
Etheridge about his participation in the crimes
committed in this case were properly admitted
against Petitioner Henson under the statement
against interest exception to hearsay set forth in
West Virginia Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). *

15. The only objection raised before the trial
court regarding Ms, Etheridge’s statement was
the statement was made after the conspiracy was
complete and, therefore, is inadmissible under
Rule 801(@)(2)(E). There was also a comment
made before the trial court about the statement
violating the Confrontation Clause.

civeuit court for entry of.new sentencing
orders that comport with this decision,

b. Statement of Co-conspirator

Tl Petitioners Physioc and Reigh argue
that the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony of Totianna Etheridge. Collec-
tively, Petitioners Physioc and Reigh argue
that 1) the testimony was improperly admit-
ted under the guise of the co-conspirator
exception to hearsay;!5 and 2) the testimony
violated the Confrontation Clause The
State argues that the admission of the testi-
mony was proper under West Virginia Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as the testimony at
issue concerned a statement of a co-conspira-
tor of the party against whom the evidence
was offered and the statement was made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. .

HH Our review of the circuit court’s de-
cision to admit evidence is set forth in sylla-
bus point ten of State v. Huffman, 141 W.
Va, 55, 87 S.H.2d 541 (1955), overruled on

16. Petitioner Reigh argues that the admission of
Ms. Btheridge’s testimony included improper
“bad acts” evidence purposefully admitted in evi-
dence by the State in violation of West Virginia
Rule of Evidence 404(b) and the law set forth in
State v. McGinnis, 193 W. Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d
516 (1994), for examining the admissibility of
such evidence. Petitioner Reigh’s argument is
unsupported by the record. The “bad acts” evi-
dence referred to was that Ms, Etheridge testified
that she and Petitioner Reigh were going shop-
lifting when Ms. Etheridge noticed the old coins
in Petitioner Reigh’s purse, It appears from our
review of the transcript below that the mention
of going shoplifting was inadvertent and not in-
tentionally sought by the State. Further, Petition-
er Reigh did not raise a Rule 404(b) objection
before the circuit court, nor did she request any
limiting instruction regarding the Rule 404(b)
evidence. Finally, Petitioner Reigh’s counsel pro-
ceeded to ask Ms. Etheridge several questions
about the alleged shoplifting during cross-exami-
nation, Consequently, we agree with the State
that Petitioner Reigh’s claimed error is waived
due to her failure to properly object before the
circuit court. See State v. DeGraw, 196 W. Va.
261, 272, 470 S.E.2d 215, 226 (1996) (finding
that defendant's failure to raise a Rule 404(b)
objection before trial court precluded review by
this Court and that plain error analysis not trig-
gered). We also decline to invoke the plain error
doctrine regarding this alleged error as we have
previously held that “the plain error rule should
be exercised only to avoid a miscarriage of jus-
tice.” Syl. Pt, 7, in part, State v. LaRock, 196 W.
Va, 294, 470 S.B.2d 613 (1996),

other grounds by State ex rel. R.L. v. Bedell,
192 W. Va. 485, 452 S.H,2d 898 (1994), as
follows: “The action of a trial court in -admit-
ting or excluding evidence in the exercise of
its discretion will not be disturbed by the
appellate court unless it appears that such
action amounts to an abuse of discretion.”
We now undertake an examination of wheth-
er the circuit court abused its discretion in
admitting Petitioner Henson’s statements to
Ms, Etheridge.

HI West Virginia Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) provides that; “A statement that
meets the following conditions is not hearsay

. [t]he statement is offered against an
opposing party and ... was made by the
party’s coconspirator during and in further-
ance of the conspiracy.” Further, in syllabus
point three of State v. Helmick, 201 W. Va.
168, 495 S.H.2d 262 (1997), we held that
“Tulnder Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the West Virgi-
nia Rules of Evidence, a declaration of a
conspirator, made subsequent to the actual
commission of the crime, may be admissible
against any co-conspirator if it was made
while the conspirators were still concerned
with the concealment of their criminal con-
duct or their identity.”

HM Petitioners Physioc and Reigh focus
upon Ms. Etheridge’s testimony that Peti-
tioner Henson, her then-boyfriend, told her
in the presence of Petitioners Physioc and
Reigh that “he just told me that they hit a
lick and they needed to get out of town and
they didn’t get anything because ... [Peti-
tioner Physioc] fucked it up.” The statements
made by Petitioner Henson to Ms. Etheridge
were properly admitted by the circuit court
as statements of a co-conspirator. See id.
Specifically, this ‘statement certainly demon-
strates the Petitioners needed financial assis-
tance in an attempt to avoid detection by law
enforcement for the heinous felonies that
they had committed.” There is no question
that this statement was: made in furtherance

17. Further, Petitioners Physioc and Reigh argu-
ably adopted the statement by remaining silent
or not taking action at the time the statement
was made. See Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Browning, 199
W. Va, 417, 485 S.B.2d 1 (1997) (“When a party
adopts a statement by silence, in order’ to be
admissible, the statement does not have to be
accusatory or against the party’s interest at the

909

of the conspiracy as the statement “was
made while the conspirators were still con-
cerned with the concealment of their criminal
conduct or tlieir identity.” Helmick, 201 W.
Va. at 165, 495 S.H.2d at 264, Syl. Pt. 8, in,
part.

Hs Additionally, we find no merit to
the argument that the statement focused
upon by Petitioners Physioc and Reigh, or
other similar statements that Ms. Etheridge
testified to, violated their Confrontation
Clause rights.!8 The Confrontation Clause
only “bars the admission of a testimonial
statement by a witness who does not appear
at trial, unless the witness is unavailable to
testify and the accused had a prior opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness.” Syl. Pt. 6,
in part, State v. Mechling, 219. W. Va. 366,
688 S.E.2d 811 (2006) (emphasis added). Fur-
ther, “{ujnder the Confrontation Clause, ...
a testimonial statement is, generally, a state-
ment that is made under circumstances
which would lead.an objective witness rea-
sonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at
868, 638 S.E.2d at 818, Syl. Pt 8, in part, But
the statements in the instant case were not
testimonial in nature or made as part of a
criminal investigation; instead the. statements
at issue were made by a boyfriend to his
girlfriend in front of, acquaintances. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated in United States v.
Jordon, 509 F.8d 191 (4th Cir, 2007),

[t]o our knowledge, no court has extend-
ed Crawford to statements made by a de-
clarant to friends or associates. See United
States v. Franklin, 415 F.8d 587, 545 (6th
Cir, 2005) (concluding that statements
were non-testimonial where witness “was
privy to [Declarant]’s staternents only as
his friend and confidant”); United States v.
Saget, 877 F.8d 228, 229 (2d Cir, 2004)
(“Thus, we conclude that a declarant’s
statements to a confidential informant,

time it was made, but one that would naturally
call for a reply if the truth of the statement was
not intended to be admitted.”),

18, See U.S. Const. amend. VI; W. Va. Const. art.
IIL, § 14; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541
US. 36, 124 S.Ct, 1354, 158 L.Bd.2d 177 (2004).

910

whose true status is unknown to the de-
clarant, do not constitute testimony within
the meaning of Crawford.”); United States
v. Manfre, 868 F.3d 882, 388 n.1 (8th Cir.
2004) (“[Declarant]’s comments were made
to loved ones or acquaintances and are not
the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-
ereated evidence of which Crawford
speaks.”),
Jordan, 509 F.3d at 201. Based upon our
review of the statements at issue, there is no
implication of the Confrontation Clause as
the statements made to friends or acquain-
tances were non-testimonial as the state-
ments “would [not] lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.”
Mechling, 219 W. Va. at 368, 633 8.E.2d at
818, Syl. Pt 8, in part.

ec. Sufficiency of the Evidence

TM The Petitioners also argue that
there was insufficient evidence introduced
against them to support their respective con-
victions. In a general fashion, the Petitioners
collectively argue that there was no eyewit-
ness identification of the perpetrators in-
volved in the crimes and there was no foren-
sic evidence linking any of them to the
crimes charged. Further, the Petitioners at-
tack the State’s heavy reliance upon the tes-
timony of Totianna Etheridge,!® who alleged-
ly was “an admitted deceivert,]” ® which is
claimed to make the State’s case tenuous.
Conversely, the State argues that the Peti-
tioners focus not on the evidence that was
actually offered against them, but on evi-
dence that was not offered. When the evi-
dence the State offered against the Petition-
ers is reviewed, the State maintains that
sufficient evidence was presented to the jury
to uphold the convictions. We agree with the
State’s position.

19, Petitioner Reigh argues that even Ms.. Ether-
idge’s testimony as to her participation in the
crime was recognized by the State to be “slight.”
In fact, Petitioner Reigh argues that there was no
testimony that she was the driver that night of
the crimes and the victims only testified to two
assailants, not three. While the State did make a
statement about the evidence against Petitioner
Reigh being “slight,” Petitioner Reigh omitted
the remainder of the State’s argument on the
issue, wherein the State stated: “However, I do
think it is sufficient to put it to a jury. I think

HE The Court’s review of a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in
syllabus point one of State v. Guthrie, 194 W.
Va, 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995):

[tlhe function of an appellate court when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine
the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, is suffi-
cient to convince a reasonable person of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is wheth-
er after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any ra-
tional trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.

HE Furthermore,

[a] criminal defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
appellate court must review all the evi-
dence, whether direct or circumstantial, in
the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must credit all inferences and credibil-
ity assessments that the jury might have
drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
evidence need not be inconsistent with ev-
ery conclusion save that of guilt so long as
the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Credibility determinations are for a
jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a
jury verdict should be set aside only when
the record contains no evidence, regardless
of how it is weighed, from which the jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled,

Id, at 668, 461 S.H.2d at 169, Syl. Pt. 8. We
also have held that

there's sufficient circumstantial evidence to dem-
onstrate that she was a principal in the second
degree, an aider and better acting in concerted
action with her co-defendants.”

20. Ms. Etheridge was subject to rigorous cross-
examination directed at impeaching her credibil-
ity including being questioned about her drug
usage, her criminal acts, her making a prior false
statement against Petitioner Henson, and her
plea agreement in exchange for her testimony.

[wjhen a criminal defendant undertakes
a sufficiency challenge, all the evidence,
direct and circumstantial, must be viewed
from the prosecutor's coign of vantage, and
the viewer must accept all reasonable in-
ferences from it that are consistent with
the verdict. This rule requires the trial
court judge to resolve all evidentiary con-
flicts and credibility questions in the prose-
cution’s favor; moreover, as among com-
peting inferences of which two or more are
plausible, the judge must choose the infer-
ence that best fits the prosecution’s theory
of guilt.
LaRock, 196 W. Va. at 299, 470 8.B.2d at 618,
Syl. Pt, 2. The Court now undertakes a re-
view of the Petitioners’ challenges that the
evidence was insufficient to convict them.
HH The Petitioners carry a heavy bur-
den in their challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence used to convict them. Contrary
to the Petitioners’ position that the evidence
was insufficient because there was no eyewit-
ness identification of them and no forensic
evidence that incriminated them, this type of
evidence is simply not required to prove the
elements of any crime. Rather, in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we
are required to examine the evidence that
‘was actually offered during the trial.
Tn this case, the State established that a
week or two before the commission of the
‘erimes charged, Petitioner Henson, Sherry
Basore, and Ms. Etheridge went to the Ba-
sore home. Sherry wanted to borrow money
from her grandfather to purchase drugs. Pe-
titioner Henson went into the home with
Sherry and saw the large number of bills
that her grandfather kept in his wallet. Sher-
ry algo told Petitioner Henson and Ms, Eth-
eridge that her grandfather had $80,000 in
his house from the sale of property. During a
period when Sherry was “dope sick” prior to
the crimes being committed, she gave Peti-
tioner Henson information about her grand-
father’s home and told him he should take
the safe. The State offered the testimony of
the three victims that on the evening of the
crimes, two attackers entered their home and
beat each of them with a metal bar. There
‘was no evidence regarding how the Petition-
ers arrived at the Basore home; however, the

911

State argued based upon the circumstantial
evidence that Petitioner Reigh did not enter
the Basore home, but was waiting in a vehi-
de near the home to assist in picking up the
stolen goods and Petitioner Henson and Phy-
sioe upon leaving the home. The intruders
were looking for a safe and dragged the
father, Robert, into his bedroom. The intrud-
ers took Robert’s wallet containing approxi-
mately $200 in cash from him, as well as a
toolbox containing old coins and a .22 caliber
rifle from Robert’s bedroom. In the early
morning hours after the crimes were commit-
ted, Petitioner Henson called his girlfriend,
Ms, Etheridge, and told her that “they just
hit a lick,” meaning that they had committed
a crime and “needed to get out of town.” The
Petitioners, altogether in a pickup truck,
then met Ms. Etheridge at her workplace
where Petitioner Henson again said in front
of Ms, Etheridge, Petitioner. Reigh and Peti-
tioner Physioc “that they hit a lick and need-
ed:to get out of town and they didn’t get
anything because ... [Petitioner Physioc]
fucked it up,” by taking the wrong safe. The
following day, Petitioner Henson told Ms.
Etheridge that “he tried everything he could
to get the safe from the guy, but they had to
beat him to be able to get anything.” Fur-
ther, Petitioner Henson told Ms. Etheridge
that there were three victims. Several days
later, Ms, Etheridge testified that Petitioner
Physioe had shown her the old coins that
were stolen and asked if she knew where
they could be sold. Ms. Etheridge also testi-
fied to seeing Petitioner Reigh in possession
of the old coins. There was also testimony
from a deputy that when Ms. Etheridge told
the police about what she had learned, she
knew many of the details about the crimes
that were not. known generally like the
amount of money taken from the wallet and
the toolbox being stolen.

Based upon our review, we find that when
all the evidence offered against the Petition-
ers is viewed in the light most favorable to
the State, and when all inferences and credi-
bility determinations are also viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the Petitioners’
respective convictions in this case beyond a
reasonable doubt, See LaRock, 196 W. Va. at
299, 470 S.E.2d at 618, Syl. Pt. 2.

oe

912

d: Failure to Preserve the Gun Scope

Hl Petitioners Henson and Physioc also
argue that the circuit court erred in failing to
instruct the jury as to the State’s failure to
preserve potential ‘exculpatory evidence.*t
This argument is predicated upon Petitioner
Henson’s position that the State had a duty
to conduct both fingerprint and DNA testing
on the gun scope found at the crime scene
and to preserve it for inspection by the de-
fense. Petitioner Physioc argues that if the
gun scope had been preserved by the State,
it “could have been subjected to DNA testing
which would have excluded him as a suspect
in the robbery and the assaults.”

This assigned error arises from the gun
scope found by law enforcement in the drive-
way outside the Basore home during the
investigation of the crimes. Deputy Michael
St. Clair, then employed by the Berkeley
County Sheriff's Department, testified that
the scope was damaged when it was found,
but it was determined that the scope fell off
the .22 caliber rifle that was taken-from the
home. Deputy St, Clair also testified that the
Scope was sent to the lab to ascertain wheth-
er it had fingerprints on it, The deputy testi-
fied that in trying to identify fingerprints on
the scope, he “fumed” the scope, which is a
process that involves placing the scope in an
enclosure with a heating element and a con-
tainer of a Super Glue-type material, The
material is then heated and.observed for
whether -it attached to moisture associated
with fingerprints. There was nothing eviden-
tiary in value or incriminating against Peti-
tioners Henson and Physioe obtained from
this process, After finding no fingerprints,
the deputy testified that he discarded the
scope, because the scope had been damaged,
there were no fingerprints on it, and he did
not believe that DNA testing could have been
performed after the fuming process as that
process would have coated any DNA that.
may have been present on the scope. Based
upon Deputy St, Clair’s testimony, Petition-
ers Henson and Physioc requested that the
jury be instructed in accordance with State v,
Osakalumi, 194 W. Va. 758, 461 S.H.2d 504

21, Petitioners Henson and Physioc apparently
sought an adverse inference instruction regard-
ing the missing evidence, See State v. Osakalumi,

(1995), But the trial court determined that it
would be “unfair to ... draw attention to
something not supported by the evidence and
the issues in the case and this Court does not,
believe the scope is one of the central materi-
al issues in the case as the sofa was in
Osakalumi.” We agree with the trial court's
decision on this issue,

Hs “As 2 general rule, the refusal to
give a requested jury instruction is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the
question of whether a jury was properly in-
structed is a question of law, and the review
is de novo.” Syl. Pt, 1, State v. Hinkle, 200
'W. Va. 280, 489 S,E.2d 257 (1996). Further,
“al trial court’s instructions to the jury
must be a correct statement of the law and
supported by the evidence,” Syl. Pt. 12, in
part, State v, Swrbaugh, 237 W. Va. 242, 786
§,H.2d 601 (2016) (quoting, Syl. Pt. 4, in part,
State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d
163 (1995)), “Instructions must be based
upon the evidence and an instruction which is
not supported by evidence should not be
given.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Collins, 154 W. ‘Va.
‘771, 180 8.H.2d 64 (1971). Finally, as we held
in syllabus point thirteen of Surbaugh:

“A trial court’s refusal to give a requested

instruction is reversible error only if: (1)

the instruction is a correct statement ‘of

the law; (2) it is not substantially covered
in the charge actually given to the jury;
and (8) it concerns an important point in
the trial so that the failure to give it
seriously impairs a defendant’s ability to
effectively present a given defense,” Syl.

Pt, 11, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451

S.E.2d 781 (1994),

287 W. Va. at 247, 786 S.E.2d at 607.

Hs(We enunciated the law necessary
to resolve this issue in Osakalwmi,

[w]hen the State had or should have had
evidence requested by a criminal defen-
dant but the evidence no longer exists
when the defendant seeks its production, a
trial court must determine (1) whether the
requested material, if.in the possession of
the State at the time -of the defendant’s
194 W. Va. 758, 461 S.B.2d 504 (1995). But

neither Petitioner provided the Court with a copy
of this proposed instruction,

request for it, would have been subject to
disclosure under either West Virginia Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16 or case law; (2)
whether the State had a duty to preserve
the material; and (8) if the State did have a
duty to preserve the material, whether the
duty was breached and what consequences
should flow from the breach. In determin-
ing what consequences should flow from
the State’s breach of its duty to preserve
evidence, a trial court should consider (1)
the degree of negligence or bad faith in-
volved; (2) the importance of the missing
evidence considering the probative value
and reliability of secondary or substitute
evidence that remains available; and (8)
the sufficiency of the other evidence pro-
duced at the trial to sustain the conviction.
194 W. Va, at 759, 461 S.H.2d at 505, Syl. Pt.
2.
Applying the holding of Osakalumi to the
case sub judice, the State concedes that the
gun scope was discoverable and “potentially
could have been kept and maintained.” See
id. Thus, in determining the consequences
that should flow from the State’s handling of
the gun scope, the trial court considered the
evidence offered by the deputy who de-
stroyed the scope after it was fumed. The
officer discarded the scope because it was
damaged and, after fuming it, he believed
that it had no evidentiary value, There was
no finding by the circuit court that the officer
acted in bad faith, as the evidence does not
support such finding. Further, the missing
gun scope offered little, in any, probative
value as the officer testified that the fuming
of the scope in his examination of it for

22. We have reviewed the remaining assigned er-
rors, which include 1) Petitioner Reigh’s claim
that the circuit court held proceedings at critical
stages of her case without her being present in
violation of her constitutional right to be present
when the circuit court conducted a pretrial hear-
ing with her counsel present and the only deci-
sion made at the hearing was the circuit court's
dismissal of the attempted murder charge as to
all the Petitioners; 2) Petitioner Henson's claims
that the circuit court erred by not excluding
gruesome photographs of the victims and the
crime scene and that the circuit court erred by
not granting his motion to disqualify the Berke-
ley County assistant prosecutor over remarks the
assistant prosecutor made to a local newspaper
regarding why the State had entered into a plea
agreement with Sherry Basore; and 3) Petitioner

913

fingerprints would have destroyed any DNA.
that might have been on it. Finally, the gun
scope was not needed to convict the Petition-
ers as it offered no real evidentiary value
other than it was found outside the Basore
home and was attached to the .22 rifle that
was stolen. Instead, the primary evidence
against Petitioners was the testimony of Ms,
Etheridge and the scope was not needed to
convict Petitioners.” Given that the lack of
any evidentiary value that the gun scope
offered, the trial court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury concerning adverse infer- .
ences that it could draw from the deputy’s
decision to discard the gun scope. Id.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the respective
convictions and sentencing orders of Petition-
ers Ryan L. Henson, Kerri S. Reigh and
Jonathan W. Physioc are reversed with re-
spect only to the first degree robbery convic-
tions and sentences and the cases are re-
manded to the circuit court for entry of new
sentencing orders for each of the Petitioners
consistent with this opinion, The remainder
of the convictions and sentences for each of
the Petitioners are hereby affirmed,

Reversed, in part, and remanded with in-
structions; Affirmed, in part.

Physioc’s claim that cumulative error requires
reversal of his conviction. Upon close examina-
tion of the alleged errors raised in connection
with the applicable law, we find the circuit court
did not err in its rulings made regarding the
foregoing assigned errors. As to Petitioner Phy-
sioc’s assigned error that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel, this Court has previously
held in syllabus point ten of State v. Hutchinson,
215 W. Va. 313, 599 S.E.2d 736 (2004) (quoting
Syl. Pt. 10, State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760, 421
§.E.2d 511 (1992), this issue is more appropri-
ately raised in a habeas corpus proceeding where
the record can be more fully developed and “ ‘[i]t
is the extremely rare case when this Court will
find ineffective assistance of counsel ...’” on
direct appeal. ‘