State: Iowa
Volume: 261
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): Iowa
Source: https://static.case.law/iowa/261.pdf

Cxara C, Azet, administrator of estate of Raymond Arthur Abel,
deceased, appellee, cross-appellant, v. Ronatp D. Dover
et al. defendants; Dopez Masonry Construction
Company, appellant, cross-appellee.

Leuanp E. Kouirr, appellee, cross-appellant, v. Ronatp D. Dover
et al., defendants ; Dopcz Masonry Construction Company,
appellant, cross-appellee.

No. 52035.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 823)

HHH

I
i)

Srpremper 19, 1967.

R. N. Johnson, of Fort Madison, and James W. Crawford
and Gene V. Kellenberger, both of Cedar Rapids, for appellant,
Dodge Masonry Construction Company.

Wm. H. Napier, of Fort Madison, for appellees, cross-
appellants.

James A. Lorentzen, of Des Moines, for defendant Ronald
D. Dodge.

Garrimip, C. J—These two law actions against Dodge
Masonry Construction Company, owner of a pickup truck, and
Ronald D. Dodge, driver, asked damages resulting from a
collision between the truck and an automobile owned and
driven by plaintiff Koller in which plaintiff Abel’s decedent,
Raymond Arthur Abel, was a passenger. The cases were con-
solidated for trial, resulting in a jury verdict and judgment
for each plaintiff against both defendants. Defendant Masonry
Company appeals.

The principal point urged upon us is that the inference or

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presumption Ronald was driving the pickup with the owner’s
consent was conclusively rebutted and the trial court ‘should
have so ruled as a matter of law.

The evidence is that Floyd R. Dodge, president and, with
his wife, sole owner of the Masonry.Company, gave his consent
to his twin brother Lloyd to drive the pickup, loaded with
cement blocks, to a cabin about 50 miles south of Burlington
where Lloyd was to build a wall as an accommodation to a
friend. After obtaining such consent Lloyd, without Floyd’s
knowledge, asked his son Ronald if he wanted to go with him
for company. Near the start of the trip Lloyd permitted the
son to drive.

When the truck reached U.S. Highway 218, on which it
was to be turned from west to south, Ronald failed to stop for
the stop sign facing him and drove into the path of the Koller
car, proceeding north on 218. There is ample evidence the
collision was caused by Ronald’s negligence.

I. The trial court instructed the jury (instruction
19) that where as here ownership of the vehicle is admitted,
a rebuttable inference is created that it was being driven with
consent of the owner; the inference does not change the burden
of proof on the issue of consent which remains with plaintiffs.
Also, there is an implication that if the person permitted by
the owner to use the vehicle is present at the time in the ve-
hicle, and is still the director of the enterprise, the operation
of the vehicle is still his operation although the hands on the
wheel are those of ‘a substitute and the negligence, if any, in
driving will bind the owner. The instruction then proceeds to
apply this abstract rule to this particular case.

The Masonry Company’s first assigned error is that the
inference Ronald was driving with its consent was conclusively
rebutted. Its second assignment is that it was error to include
in the instruction the last two sentences in the preceding
paragraph,

We think this second assignment presents the vital ques-
tion for our decision. We may assume, without so deciding,
that if it were not for the rule’ stated in the second sentence
of the instruction, supra, and its application to this case in
the final sentence, the Masonry Company would’ have been en-

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titled to a directed verdict on the issue of consent and to a
reversal here.

The language of the instruction to which objection is made
was obviously taken from language Tuttle v. Longnecker, 258
Towa 393, 400, 188 N..W.2d 851, 855, quotes with approval from
8 Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 610,
page 161. What is there quoted from the cited text is pre-
ceded by this:

“8610.—Third person operating vehicle with permittee’s
consent. Under statutes making the owner of a motor vehicle
liable for injuries resulting from its negligent operation while
it is being used or operated by another with his permission, it
has been held that the owner is liable for the negligent acts of
a third person operating the vehicle with the permittee’s con-
sent, where the permittee accompanies such driver. The owner
is not relieved from liability under such circumstances even
though he did not know that a third pergon was driving his
vehicle and did not consent thereto, and even though he had
instructed his permittee not to allow another to drive.”

HI The evidence is that the permittee (Lloyd) was accom-
panying his driver son; as stated, the owner, for whom Floyd
acted in granting permission to his brother, did not know the
son was driving and, of course, did not consent thereto. Indeed
Lloyd did not know -his:son would accompany him when he
obtained Floyd’s permission to take the pickup.

There is no evidence Floyd instructed Lloyd not to allow
another to drive the pickup. Floyd did instruct his brother
to put “gas” in it—no other condition was imposed at the time
consent was given. Thus we have no occasion to consider, and
expressly refrain from doing so, whether the rule referred to
in the instruction here. would apply where the owner instructs
his permittee not to allow another to drive.

The language Tuttle ‘v. Longnecker, supra, approves adds
this to what the court told the jury here: “These rules apply
in particular where the permittee granting consent to a third
person to drive is a memher of the owner’s family.” In Tuttle
the owner granted permission to drive to his daughter, a mem-
ber of his family, who in turn entrusted the driving to a young
man in the car. Here Lloyd was not a member of the family

6 | 7
of his twin brother. However, the rule our Tuttle opinion
approves is not limited to situations where the permittee is a
member of the owner’s family although particularly applicable
thereto.

We have carefully considered whether the jury could
properly find Lloyd was “still the director of the enterprise”
after turning the steering wheel over to his son. We think it
could so find although a contrary finding on this point would
also have evidential support. Lloyd remained in the same seat
with his son, warned him a loaded truck could not be stopped
as quickly as an empty one “and we tried it at two or three
other stop signs,” when they approached the intersection where
the crash occurred Lloyd called Ronald’s attention to the fact
the sign said the town of Donnellson (toward which they evi-
dently intended to go) was to the left and Ronald replied
“Yes, I see it.”

Unless we are to repudiate what we so recently approved.
in Tuttle v. Longnecker, supra, we must hold the language
of instruction 19 of which the Masonry Company complains
was proper and the second assigned error should be overruled.
We are not persuaded we should thus reverse ourselves.

IL. We are not content to rest our decision on what is
said in the preceding division.

The pertinent part of our consent statute ‘(section 321.493,
Codes 1962, 1966) provides: “In all eases where damage is done
by any motor vehicle by reason of negligence of the driver, and
driven with consent of the owner, the owner of the motor ve-
hicle shall be liable for such damage.”

In addition to Tuttle v. Longnecker, supra, Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Combes; 257 Iowa 185, 181 N.W.2d 751, and Me-
Kirchy v. Ness, 256 Iowa 744, 128 N.W.2d 910, deal at some
length with the question of liability under this statute. Both
quote from Bridges v. Welzien, 231 Iowa 6, 300 N.W. 659,
which reviews our decisions up to then involving the consent
statute. 1

An annotation to Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454, 139 P.2d
645, 147 A.L.R. 861, at 875, 876, states the purpose of such
statutes as ours “is the protection of the public. In harmony
with that purpose it would seem that an owner of a motor

; [| T

vehicle should be held liable for injuries or damages which
occur while his car is being driven by a third person allowed
by owner’s permittee to drive or use the car, since the power
to prevent injury to the public by the negligent use of his car
is vested in the owner. The cases on the question are not,
however, altogether in harmony.”

An annotation to Krebsbach v. Miller, 22 Wis.2d 171, 125
N.W.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.3d 1, at 10-183, deals at length with this
question, closely related to ours: “Omnibus clause of automo-
bile liability policy as covering accidents caused by third per-
son who is using car with consent of permittee of named in-
sured.” What is commonly called the “omnibus clause” usual-
ly found in automobile liability policies extends protection of
the policy to one using the insured vehicle provided such use
is with the consent or permission of the named insured. The
analogy between such a provision and consent statutes like
ours is clear.

The last cited annotation states at page 19: “Where the
use to which the automobile was being put was within the
scope of the initial permission and the original permittee was a
passenger, or the operation of the car by the second permittee
was for the original permittee’s benefit or advantage, the courts
have usually held the second permittee to be within the cover-
age of the omnibus clause on the ground that the named in-
sured’s unrestricted permission to another to use the vehicle
includes the permittee’s use of it for permitted purposes
through its operation by a third person, or on the ground that
the policy requires only permission to the ‘use’ of the car,
rather than to the identity of the driver.”

To the foregoing the annotation adds that a few courts
have held to the contrary. Substantially the same statement
quoted above appears elsewhere in the annotation. (See, e.g.,
page 58.)

An earlier annotation in 160 A.L.R. 1195, at 1218, says:
“Tt has been held in the great majority of cases that the initial
permission given by the named assured to the original per-
mittee includes, by implication, authority to delegate the oper-
ation of the automobile to an agent or servant where the orig-
inal permittee is riding with the agent or servant in the ear.”

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To like effect is 45 C.J.S., Insurance, section 829c(b), ce.,
page 902. . .

Decisions which allow recovery under an omnibus clause
in a liability policy where the facts are generally similar to
those here include Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. New Am-
sterdam Cas. Co., 7 Cir., IL, 249 F.2d 847, and citations; Na-
tional Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Lukins, 8 Cir., N.D.,
329 F.2d 564; Butterfield v. Western Cas. & Surety Co., 83
Idaho 79, 357 P.2d 944; Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co. v. Free-
port Ins. Co., 30 Ill. App.2d 69, 173 N.H.2d 548; Costanzo v.
Pennsylvania Threshermen ete. Ins. Co., 30 N.J..262, 152 A.2d
589; Krebsbach v. Miller, supra, 22 Wis.2d 171, 125 N.W.2d
408, 411, 4 A.L.R.3d 1, 5; Maurer v. Fesing, 233 Wis. 565, 290
N.W. 191.

Konrad v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 11 Il. App.2d 503, 514,
187 N.E.2d 855, 860, states in effect that the view expressed in
these and like precedents is the weight of authority.

See also in support of our holding, although not involving
an omnibus clause in a liability policy, Webb v. Moreno, 8 Cir.,
Towa, 363 F.2d 97, 100, 101, which cites Tuttle v. Longnecker,
supra, 258 Iowa 393, 138 N.W.2d 851.

It should be added there was no deviation here from the
purpose or route of the trip for which consent of the owner
was given the first permittee.

II. Instruction 19 also told the jury a general cus-
tom or practice in a business (with reference to use of its
trucks) may be considered; the Masonry Company contends
it was its custom that minors were prohibited from operating
its trucks and Lloyd knew of this custom; if the jury finds the
claimed custom existed it may take this into consideration in
determining whether Ronald was operating the truck with the
consent of the Masonry Company.

The company objected to this portion of the instruction
(it would seem prior to its being in final form) on the ground
it should state that if the jury finds the claimed custom ex-
isted that fact should be considered in connection with whether
the Masonry Company has carried the burden of sustaining
its denial of consent to show Lloyd did not have authority of
the company to permit Ronald to operate the truck.

a a 9

The instruction appears to state substantially what the
Masonry Company’s objection contended it should state. In
so far as the instruction differs from the language of the
objection, the instruction seems: to be more favorable to the
company than the language found in the objection. The ob-
jection does not assert a finding the claimed custom existed
would be fatal to plaintiff’s right to recover or that proof of
the custom was conclusive.

HE (Of course the Masonry Company may not assert ob-
jections here to any part of instruction 19, or grounds thereof,
not timely made upon the trial. Rule 196, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; Wagaman v. Ryan, 258 Iowa 1852, 142 N.W.2d 413,
417, and citations. No prejudicial error under this record
appears in giving the part of instruction 19 relating to custom.

‘We will say the evidence of custom is inconclusive both as
to whether it existed and as to what the claimed custom was.
It is argued here the custom was that one permitted to drive
a company truck was not to allow another to drive and also
that no one like Ronald, under 21, was to drive at all.

Floyd (owner of the Masonry Company) testified in part
“Other than word of mouth I can’t say we had a strict policy.”
Asked on cross-examination what his company policy was,
Floyd replied “They don’t drive until they are over 21. I am
not saying this is absolutely it because I might have to send
someone across town to get something.” Also, when asked if
this policy was indefinite, Floyd answered “You fluctuate in
any business.”

On redirect examination this witness testified “I have
told these people (employees) repeatedly when they borrow
these trucks for personal use they are to drive them themselves
and no minors.” The jury could properly find Floyd never
made such a statement to Lloyd at anytime and, as stated,
no such condition was attached to the consent granted him at
the time it was given. Although Floyd testified Lloyd knew
of the claimed custom, Lloyd insisted he was not aware of any
policy limiting use of company trucks to persons over 21.
Lloyd had worked for the company over extended periods as a
supervisor and had authority to delegate other drivers to use
company pickups.

40 a —

There can be no question that if Lloyd (first permittee)
had not turned over the steering wheel to his son a jury ques-
tion would be presented on whether he was driving with
consent of the owner. We have tried to make it clear that the
fact the son was driving, under the circumstances here, does
not relieve the owner, as a matter of law, from liability to
these plaintiffs for the damage done by the negligence of the
driver.

IV. Each plaintiff has cross-appealed on a question of
allowance of interest on the amount recovered. Plaintiff
Abel asked the trial court to allow interest at 5 percent on, the
amount of the verdict in her case from the date of death (on
the day of the accident) until the date of the judgment. Her
cross-appeal is from the court’s overruling of her motion. We
affirm the ruling.

The instruction to the jury on the measure of recovery for
Mr. Abel’s death was taken from Iowa Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions published by the state bar association. (No. 3.10) The
pertinent part is: “The measure of damages for the death of
Raymond Abel will be the present worth or value of the estate
which he would reasonably be expected to have saved and
accumulated as a result of his own efforts from the date of
his death if he had lived out the term of his natural life, This
is * * * that amount which estimated at its present worth * * *
would have come to his estate from the date of his death to
the end of his natural life.”

Hl Incidentally, neither plaintiff objected to the instruc-
tion. We must assume the jury followed it. Interstate Fi-
nance Co. v. Iowa City, 260 Iowa 270, 149 N.W.2d 308, 318;
Beal v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 209 Iowa 1308, 1811, 280
N.W. 302, and citations; 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error,
section 890.

In the quoted instruction the jury was plainly told in
effect to allow, in the event of recovery, the present worth
or value of the pecuniary loss to decedent’s estate. This
fairly means that such worth or value was to be computed as
of the time of verdict rather than the earlier time of death,

“Tt is obvious the present worth of a sum payable in the
future becomes greater as the time for payment grows nearer.

[| it

So the present worth of the pecuniary loss to this estate was
greater at the time of the verdict than at the time of deced-
ent’s death—and by approximately the amount of interest on
the present worth at time of death, if computed from that
time, to time of verdict. So the effect of the instructions,
which it is presumed the jury followed, was to give plaintiff
the benefit of approximately the amount of interest on the
present worth of the pecuniary loss to the estate as of the time
of death. * * *

HE [10] We affirm the ruling of the trial court that in-
terest should not be allowed until after the date of the ver-
dict.” Sisson v. Weathermon, 252 Iowa 786, 800, 108 N.W.2d
585, 592, 593.

See also note 48 Iowa Law Review 666, 690, 691; 254
CJ.S., Death (1966), section 109, page 952, note 18; Annota-
tion, 96 A.L.R.2d 1104, 1122-1124.

Hi As in our Sisson opinion, we do not question prior
Towa decisions that where recovery for wrongful death is
computed as of the time of death, rather than time of verdict,
interest is allowable from time of death. Bridenstine v. Iowa
City Elee. Ry. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 1185-1187, 165 N.W. 435;
General Mills, Inc. v. Prall, 244 Iowa 218, 221-223, 56 N.W.2d
596, 598, 599. These decisions are recognized in Hurtig v.
Bjork, 258 Iowa 155, 163, 138 N.W.2d 62, 67.

V. The cross-appeal of plaintiff Koller is also from
the court’s refusal to add to the verdict in his favor interest
thereon from the date of the accident to the date of verdict
but presents a somewhat different question from the one just
considered.

Koller claimed damages for personal injuries, pain and
suffering, both past and future, medical and hospital expenses,
loss of time from his activities as a farmer, medical and hos-
pital expense for his injured minor sons and destruction of
his automobile. The verdict for Koller was for $2446, with
no finding as to the amount allowed for any item claimed.

The trial court held that, except for damage to the auto-
mobile, the damages claimed were not complete at the time
of the accident, there was no way to determine how much, if
anything, was allowed for any item claimed, including loss

2 |

of the automobile, and interest was therefore not allowable
from the time of the accident.

On this appeal Koller asserts only that interest should
have been allowed on $1200 he says was agreed upon as the
damage to the automobile although such agreement does not
appear in the record.

Weare not persuaded the trial court’s ruling was error.
The court was not justified in holding that the verdict neces-
sarily includes $1200 or any other definite sum for loss of the
automobile. The other items claimed were clearly incomplete
and unliquidated until the verdict was returned. As plaintiff
seems to concede, he is not entitled to interest on such items.
Mallory v. Jurgena, 250 Iowa 16, 22, 23, 92 N.W.2d 387, 391,
and citations; Lawson v. Fordyce, 2387 Iowa 28, 67, 68, 21
N.W.2d 69, 89, 90; Bridenstine v. Iowa City Elec. Ry. Co.,
supra, 181 Iowa 1124, 1135, 165 N.W. 435. See also 22 Am.
Jur.2d, Damages, section 191.

Costs in this court are taxed three fourths to defendant
Dodge Masonry Construction Company and one fourth to
plaintiff administrator and plaintiff Koller in equal parts.—
Affirmed on all appeals.

All Justices concur except Justice LeGranp, who takes
no part.

es
In re Estate or Ray C. Ronrexpt, deceased.
ARLENE IrLBecKk, administrator of estate of Orville Irlbeck,
deceased, appellee, v. Suirtmzy RonFevp7, executor of estate .
of Ray C. Ronfeldt, deceased, appellant.
No, 52611.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 887)

Po

Sepremper 19, 1967.

Ross, Johnson, Stuart, Tinley & Peters, of Council Bluffs,
and Fred Louis, Jr., of Harlan, for appellant.

David Green, of Carroll, for appellee.

Mason, J—This is a negligence action brought by admin-
istrator to recover for the death of her decedent, Orville Irl-
beck, as a result of an accident which occurred when he was
viding in a truck owned and being operated by defendant’s
decedent, Ray C. Ronfeldt. Trial to a Shelby County jury
resulted in a favorable verdict for administrator. After over-
ruling defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the

16. Le |

verdict and in the alternative.for new trial, judgment was
entered against defendant on the verdict. Defendant appeals.

The issues on appeal relate to the status of plaintiff’s de-
cedent as a passenger in the truck at the time of the accident,
the court’s instruction on that issue, rulings on evidence and
excessiveness of the verdict.

Where appropriate, plaintiff’s decedent will be herein re-
ferred to as plaintiff and defendant’s decedent as defendant.

I. The accident from which this action arose occurred
about 1:30 p.m. January 8, 1964, on a county road near Exira,
Audubon County, when defendant’s truck left the road and
went into a ditch. Plaintiff and defendant were killed.

The parties were returning to Irwin from Adair where
defendant had gone to pick up a supply of water pipe. Plain-
tiff, 31 at the time of his death, and defendant both lived in
Irwin. Plaintiff and his family had moved from a farm to
Irwin in 1962 and lived there until his death. During that
time, he worked as a laborer on tiling crews, on bridge con-
struction and part time for defendant whose business was drill-
ing wells and installing pipe in farm and city wells.

On January 8 a Mr. Schwenneker, the operator of a whole-
sale plumbing and heating business in Adair, called defendant
to advise him that his order of pipe had arrived. After receiv-
ing this call, defendant had a conversation with his wife, called
a friend, Dean Henry, and asked if he wanted to ride along to
keep him company. Henry was unable to make the trip. De-
fendant then went to plaintiff’s house and asked Mrs. Irlbeck
to see her husband. Plaintiff was still in bed, but after his
wife called, got up, put on his work clothes and went out to
talk to defendant. Defendant told plaintiff that he was going
to Adair for pipe and asked, “You want to ride down there
with me? If you do, I will buy your dinner.” Plaintiff re-
plied, “I ain’t working today, so I might as well.” After talk-
ing to defendant plaintiff returned to his house and shortly
thereafter left with defendant.

Defendant had ordered a quantity of 1-inch steel water
pipe. -It comes in 21-foot lengths, banded five lengths to a
bundle, weighing approximately 176 pounds. The banding
at, each end causes the pipe to lose some flexibility. The pipe

ee 1

had been delivered to the wholesaler by truck at a point a few
blocks from the wholesaler’s place of business. The total ship-
ment weighed approximately 7200 pounds and was transferred
by sliding the bundles from that truck to defendant’s. The
wholesaler, one or two of his employees, the other truck driver,
plaintiff and defendant all helped load the pipe onto defend-
ant’s truck.

After the truck was loaded defendant drove to the whole-
saler’s place of business, picked up a box of fittings and started
toward Exira, a distance of 20 miles. Defendant was proceed-
ing in a westerly direction on a county highway, down a rather
long hill, not too severe a grade but with a fairly good descent,
to a bridge at the bottom. Defendant’s truck went off the
south side of the road and was found on the south side of the
bridge, tipped over in the ditch about two miles west of Exira.

II. The administrator alleged in her amended claim filed
in decedent’s estate that plaintiff was accompanying defendant
for the tangible benefit of defendant, plaintiff and defendant
were engaged in hauling pipe for the mutual and tangible bene-
fit of both and defendant was negligent in the operation of his
truck. Defendant in answer denied these allegations and as-
serted plaintiff was riding as a guest and at his invitation.

In motions for directed verdict made at the close of plain-
tiff’s evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence, defend-
ant asserted plaintiff had failed to establish by any competent
proof plaintiff’s decedent was engaged in any operation for the
mutual and tangible benefit of both at the time of the accident
or that plaintifi’s decedent had accompanied: defendant’s de-
cedent for the owner and operator’s tangible benefit.

The trial court withdrew the allegation of tangible and
mutual benefit, overruled defendant’s motion in other respects
and submitted to the jury the issue as to plaintiff’s status as
an occupant of the truck. This ruling, in effect, held it was
for the jury to decide whether plaintiff was accompanying
defendant for the definite and tangible benefit of the owner
or operator of the truck. Failure to have his vehicle under
control was the only specification of negligence submitted.

Defendant asserted in her motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict that she was entitled to a directed verdict

18 =Ss

at the close of all evidence, had moved therefor, and the jury
did not return such a verdict. In the motion for a new trial
defendant again asserted the court had erred in overruling her
motion for directed verdict.

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in (1) overruling
her motion for diregted verdict and for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, (2) refusing to give her requested instruc-
tion 1 and overruling objections to court’s instruction 4, (3)
permitting the introduction of opinion testimony over defend-
ant’s objection and (4) failing to grant a new trial because of
excessiveness of the verdict.

III. Under her first assignment.of error defendant ar-
gues plaintiff's failure to establish her decedent was other than
a guest while riding in Ronfeldt’s truck barred recovery for
ordinary negligence under the guest statute.

Code section 321.494 provides:

“Guest statute. The owner or operator of a motor vehicle
shall not be liable for any damages to any passenger or person
riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not
for hire unless damage is caused as a result of the driver of
said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or because of the reckless operation by him of such
motor vehicle.”

No contention is made that Ronfeldt was under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor when the accident happened, no
recovery is sought under the statute on that basis.

In Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 195-197, 251 N.W.
147, 149, we held the occupant of an automobile driven by
another is neither a guest nor mere invitee when he is riding
therein (1) when performing his duties as a servant of the
owner or operator of the car; or (2) for the definite and tangi-
ble benefit of the owner or operator; or (8) for the mutual,
definite and tangible benefit of the owner or operator on the
one hand, and of the occupant on the other. It has been cited
many times upon this proposition. Thuente v. Hart Motors,
234 Iowa 1294, 1802, 15 N.W.2d 622, 627; Stenberg v. Buckley,
245 Towa 622, 630, 681, 61 N.W.2d 452, 456, 457, and citations;
McBride v. Dexter, 250 Iowa 7, 9, 92 N.W.2d 448, 444; Murray
v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 267, 106 N.W.2d 643, 647; Nielsen v.

Se 19

Kohlstedt, 254 Iowa 470, 474, 117 N.W.2d 900, 908. This enum-
eration is not exclusive, and setting it out is not meant to so
indicate. Powers v. Hatcher, 257 Iowa 833, 836, 185 N.W.2d
114, 116.

That case recognizes a fourth category, ic. where the
relationship between operator and passenger is that of co-
employees in furtherance of their employment in transporta-
tion as directed by their employer, they are not guest and host.

One who rides in a motor vehicle for the definite and tangi-
ble benefit of the owner or operator is not a guest within the
meaning of the guest statute and recovery for injuries suffered
by such rider may be based on the negligence of the operator.
Morrow v. Redd, 257 Iowa 151, 181 N.W.2d 761, 763, and
citations.

Of course, one who claims the guest statute is not ap-
plicable has the burden to prove his status was other than a
guest. Vipond v. Jergensen, 260 Iowa 646, 659, 148 N.W.2d
598, 606. Not only does plaintiff have the burden to establish
his status, the action being predicated upon negligence of the
operator or owner, but there is a presumption, rebuttable, that
he was a guest within the meaning of section 321.494. Murray
v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 266, 267, 106 N.W.2d 643, 647; Delay v.
Kudart, 256 Iowa 5238, 525, 128 N.W.2d 201, 202.

When benefits are to be considered, we have said such
benefits to the operator or owner as are incidental to hospital-
ity, social relations, companionship or the like are not definite
and tangible benefits as are contemplated by the rule. Nielsen
v. Kohlstedt, supra; Powers v. Hatcher, supra, 257 Iowa at 837.

| | It is true the benefit to be received by the owner or
operator need not be the only purpose or sole motivating
factor in furnishing transportation, it need only be a sub-
stantial factor. Delay v. Kudart, supra, 256 Iowa at 528, 128
N.W.2d at 204.

With reference to the benefit required, in Ritter v. Dexter,
infra, 250 Iowa at 836, 95 N.W.2d at 283, we quoted from
McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wash.2d 65, 253 P.2d 682, 636. There it is
stated:

“This requirement does not mean that the taking of the trip
must be motivated by the expectation of receiving the benefit.

20 Pe 7

It need only be ‘shown that the furnishing of transportation to
the passenger was motivated by such expectation. Nor does it
mean that the expectation of receiving the benefit must be the
sole motivating factor in furnishing transportation to the pas-
senger. It is sufficient, we believe, if such expectation is
shown to be a substantial factor.”

“Whether a person riding with another was a passenger or a
guest is to be determined on the basis of the answer to the
factual question: Did the rider confer a benefit on the driver
for the ride? * * * Once the trier of fact has determined the
fact of benefit, the province of the reviewing court is simply to
examine the record to determine whether this factual finding is
substantially supported.” Ritter v. Dexter, 250 Iowa 830, 835,
836, 95 N.W.2d 280, 283, quoting from Martinez v. Southern
Pacific Co., 45 Cal.2d 244, 250, 288 P.2d 868, 871. In making
this inquiry we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. Amended rule 344(f)(2), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hl In determining whether plaintiff has carried the burden
of proving his status as-other than a guest it is important to
ascertain, if possible, what it was that primarily motivated the
undertaking. The intention of the parties in entering on it,
their relationship and all circumstances surrounding the trans-
action are material. Livingston v. Schreckengost, 255 Iowa
1102, 1105, 125 N.W.2d 126, 128, and citations.

The motivation must be examined in connection with the
purpose of plaintiff’s presence in the vehicle at the time the
trip commences, McUne v. Fuqua, supra; Bateman v. Ursich,
36, Wash.2d 729, 220 P.2d 314, 315, 18 A.L.R.2d 1440; 8 Am.
Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 476. Under
the issue submitted, tangible benefit to the owner or operator,
the object of the trip is an important circumstance for con-
sideration in determining purpose of plaintifi’s presence.

That the primary purpose of the trip was for defendant’s
benefit and in furtherance of something in the nature of a
business or commercial interest rather than social is without
dispute. As stated, defendant was in the well drilling business,
water pipe was needed in connection with its operation, pipe
awas available but had to be transported from Adair to Irwin
in his truck. Defendant instigated the trip to accomplish this.

SS 21

There were 40 bundles, each 21 feet long and weighing 176
pounds. These had to be reloaded to defendant’s truck. De-
fendant’s wife testified that previous to the accident defendant
had gone after pipe frequently, “maybe three times a month.”
It would appear he was acquainted with the work involved in
loading and reloading pipe.

After receiving the wholesaler’s telephone call and the con-
versation with his wife, defendant made the telephone call to
Henry, his former employee during the winter months, who had
made previous trips with him for pipe. Henry testified the
trips he made with defendant were primarily for companion-
ship although he had helped defendant on those occasions. In
describing his relationship with defendant Henry said, “I would
help this man do anything. He would help me do anything. I
would help Ray load the iron on a trip to Omaha. I wasn’t
going to stand around like a dummy and let him do all the
work. I am not that lazy that I couldn’t help somebody.”

When Henry was unable to go defendant went to plaintiff’s
house. After being called by his wife, plaintiff dressed in a
flannel shirt, blue jeans, hooded sweat shirt, coveralls, work
shoes and heavy stockings which she described as “his work
clothes.” It was then he left the house and had the conversa-
tion with defendant. Defendant’s father testified he had heard
his son asking plaintiff to accompany him to Adair, and de-
tailed this conversation. Defendant contends the nature of the
invitation can only be classified as a social one motivated by
defendant’s desire for companionship during the trip.

Mr. Schwenneker, the wholesaler, testified:

“I was present when this pipe was being transferred from
the company truck onto Mr. Ronfeldt’s truck. I assisted with
it. I observed Mr. Ronfeldt and Mr. Irlbeck working. They
were just sliding the pipe from one truck onto another. As far
as I know Mr. Irlbeck was helping them. We were all help-
ing. * * * There were five or six of us there. We were all there
on one truck or the other and we were doing all these things.”
This testimony and the invitation constitute the only direct
evidence surrounding the transaction.

Hl However, plaintiff may rely upon circumstantial evi-
dence to aid in carrying his burden, but the evidence must be

22 | 7

such as to make plaintiff’s theory reasonably probable, not
merely possible, and more probable than any other theory
based on such evidence. Generally, it will be for the jury or
other trier of the facts to say whether the circumstantial:
evidence meets this test. Rule 344(f) (16), R.C.P.

There are circumstances upon which plaintiff could rely
for this purpose. Although no contention is made plaintiff
was a servant or employee of Ronfeldt at the time of the
accident, however, he had worked for Ronfeldt whenever the
latter had any well digging or shopwork and was planning to
work for him in the spring. Plaintiff also had been to Adair
after pipe on occasion before the accident. As a former em-
ployee it would be fair to assume Ronfeldt was aware of plain-
tiff’s capacity to work.

There is also the fact that with approximately 7200 pounds
of steel pipe to be handled and defendant’s appreciation of the
task, he first called Henry who had always been a willing helper
on previous trips for pipe. When he was unable to go this
particular day, defendant called another former employee
experienced in handling pipe who expected to be reemployed
by defendant in the spring and suggested that if he would ride
along defendant would buy his dinner. Plaintiff had not asked
to be taken to Adair. He was not going on a pleasure trip.

Hl it is not for us to say whether the evidence proves that
the expectation of receiving a benefit in the way of assistance
in reloading the pipe at Adair was a factor motivating defend-
ant in the furnishing of transportation to plaintiff, but whether
the foregoing facts and circumstances make a sufficient showing
so that the trial court was warranted in submitting the question
to the jury and the jury in the exercise of its function as the
trier of the fact was justified in finding such expectation was a
substantial factor in furnishing the transportation.

If the expectation of receiving a benefit in the way of
assistance in reloading the pipe was a substantial factor moti-
vating defendant in furnishing the transportation to plaintiff
and the desire to have company on the trips to Adair and back
was incidental, the guest statute would not apply. If a pri-
mary motivation was the desire to have company and the as-

| Le 23

sistance in reloading the pipe was incidental and not a sub-
stantial factor, the guest-host relationship would still exist.

‘We cannot say under this record the arrangement was
purely social and the assistance in reloading incidental, as a
matter of law, which we would be required to do to sustain de-
fendant under this assignment. Livingston v. Schreckengost,
supra, 255 Iowa at 1108, 125 N.W.2d at 129.

We conclude that there is substantial evidence from which
a jury might reasonably draw an inference that defendant’s
motivation in furnishing plaintiff transportation was the ex-
pectation of a benefit to defendant. The jury could properly
find that the attainment of some objective or purpose of the
operator was a substantial factor for plaintiff's carriage. Bodaken
v. Logan, 254 Iowa 230, 283, 117 N.W.2d 470, 472. Citing 4
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.
Ed., section 2292, now 5 Blashfield Automobile Law and
Practice, Third Ed., section 212.13.

The status situation of plaintiff’s decedent should be sub-
mitted to the jury, as it was in the instant case.

IV. In his second assignment of error defendant com-
plains of the trial court’s refusal to give his requested instruc-
tion one and overruling his objections to instruction four.

Plaintiff contends defendant took no proper and timely
objection as required by rule 196, R.C.P., to the refusal of his
requested instruction and the giving of instruction four. We
agree objection was not taken to the refusal of the request in
the manner required by rule 196, which provides that all ob-
jections to giving or failing to give any instruction must be
made specifying the matter objected to and on what grounds.
No other grounds or objections shall be asserted thereafter, or
considered on appeal. We are satisfied, however, defendant’s
objection to the giving of instruction four was a sufficient eom-
pliance with the rule. In view of the reference in the objection
to the language of the request, it may properly be considered
in passing on the challenged part of instruction four.

| | Both the requested instruction and instruction four as
given were obviously designed to guide the jury in determining
the vital question whether plaintiff was a guest in defendant’s

24 Le |

vehicle at the time of the tragedy, a question we have just
held was for the jury.

The requested instruction contained this:

“A passenger in the car of another person is a guest if he
is in the car because of hospitality, companionship, or society
without making any return therefor or conferring any benefit
on the driver other than the mere pleasure of his company. He
is still regarded as a guest even though he may voluntarily
render assistance to the driver at some time during the trip.”

Instruction four as given concludes: “* * * if you find * * *
defendant’s decedent received a definite benefit therefrom
(ie., plaintiff’s ride in the truck) more than social hospitality
or companionship which directly related to defendant’s de-
cedent’s business or his purpose of the trip then plaintiff’s
decedent was not a guest * * * and his right of recovery can-
not be denied on this account.”

Defendant’s objection to instruction four includes: “De-
fendant objects to instruction four * * * for the reasons that it
does not incorporate the law contained in defendant’s re-
quested instructions as set out in Powers. v. Hatcher [257
Towa 833], 185 N.W.2d 114, * * * particularly with respect to
the principle that plaintiff’s decedent was a guest notwithstand-
ing the fact that at some time during his trip * * * he may
have voluntarily rendered assistance to defendant’s decedent,
and because such instruction does not properly instruct with
respect to the matter of companionship, hospitality and society
as set out in defendant’s requested instructions and the case
herein referred to; instruction four permits the jury to find
that any conduct or act of plaintiff’s decedent, whether volun-
tarily performed or not, would transform his status from that
of a, guest to a passenger * * * .”.

HH The concluding statement quoted supra from instrue-
tion four would permit a finding that even though the only sub-
stantial motivation for plaintiff's presence in the -truck -was
companionship rather than to confer a definite and tangible
benefit upon defendant, and hence plaintiff was a guest, his
status as such would be changed by voluntarily performing
some act of definite benefit to defendant which related to the
latter’s business or the purpose of the trip.

ee 25

- We do not think the motivation for a rider’s presence in
the vehicle can be thus changed. His rendering assistance to
the operator, like helping change a flat tire or drive, would not
affect the intention of the parties in furnishing the transporta-
tion. No authority to support such a proposition has come to
our attention. The authorities are to the contrary and support
defendant’s objection to the instruction.

8 Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, supra,
states: “The relationship of host and guest is determined as of
the time of the beginning of the transportation; if at that time
a rider is a guest within the meaning of the guest statute, his
status ordinarily remains unchanged throughout the journey.” ”
Cited as supporting this rule is Bateman v. Ursich, supra. At
page 315 of 220 P.2d, the court stated: “The nature of the rela-
tionship between the operator of a motor vehicle and a rider
therein is to be determined as of the time of the beginning of
the transportation.”

In Lines v. Teachenor (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 300, 8038, it is
stated that gencrally the status of a rider is determined at the
outset of the trip. In 5 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice,
Third Ed., section 212.17, the author states: “The nature of the
relationship [guest host] has been held determinable as of the
beginning of the ride, * * * ” citing cases.

In Hessler v. Ford, 255 Iowa 1055, 1057, 125 N.W.2d 132,
133, 98 A.L.R.2d 539, we said: “‘“The intention of the parties
in entering, on the undertaking is a prime consideration in re-
solving the question of benefits and the direction in which they
flow; as well as their character and significance.”’” (Emphasis
supplied.) Citing Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, supra, 254 Iowa at 475,
117 N.W.2d at 903. :

- As stated in Division III, supra, it is always important to
ascertain, if possible, what it was that primarily motivated the
undertaking. Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, supra, 254 Iowa at 476, 117
N.W22d at 904; Livingston v. Schreckengost, supra, 255 Iowa at
1105, 125 N.W.2d at 128; Zwanziger v. Chicago &'N.W.Ry.
Co., 259 Towa 14, 20, 141 N.W.2d 568, 571, 572.

Tuivingston v. Schreckengost definitely supports the con-
clusion herein reached. Sce also Delay v. Kudart, supra, 256
Tewa at 528, 128 N.W.2d at 204, holding there must be some

26 a |

evidence the benefit to be received by the owner or operator
must be a substantial motivating factor in furnishing the
transportation, and Cappellano v. Pane, 178 Neb. 498, 184
N.W.2d 76, 80-82, applying the Iowa guest statute to an acci-
dent in this state.

60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, section 399(5)b, states: “ * * *
the mere fact that a rider actually assists in the driving does
not make him a passenger rather than a guest where such as-
sistance was not made a condition of the transportation.”

The jury should have been informed of the bearing motiva-
tion had upon the status of the rider and that motivation
should be determined as of the time the trip commenced. Fail-
ure to do so was prejudicial error.

V. Since the case must be retried other assigned errors
should be considered. .
WHEE Defendant complains in his third assignment of the
trial court’s rulings on his objections to opinion testimony.

William Springer, a member of the highway patrol, who
investigated the accident in which the parties were killed was
ealled as plaintiff’s witness. In a hypothetical question, the
witness was asked if he had “an opinion as to how this acci-
dent occurred or how this vehicle and its occupants were in-
jured.” Defendant’s objection asserted that the question as-
sumed facts not in evidence, was not a proper hypothetical
question, called for an unwarranted conclusion and opinion of
the witness, invaded the province of the jury and was a matter
not a subject for expert testimony. The objection being over-
ruled, the witness testified as to the length of the truck box,
the overhang of the pipe as related to the rear axle and in his
opinion this would cause the truck to be heavy in the rear and
very light in the front, the wheels would lose contact with the
ground and the driver would be unable to control the truck
with that type of load distributed as it was on this vehicle.
The vehicle then, the driver unable to control it, went off the
road, hit the bridge abutment and went into the ditch.

Plaintiff’s witness, Jack Hilsabeck, Audubon County
sheriff, was asked in a hypothetical question if he had an
opinion as to the cause of the truck going off the road. Over
defendant’s objection that this was an improper hypothetical

SS ——i 27

question, leading, assumed facts not in evidence, invaded the
province of the jury and was incompetent, immaterial and
irrelevant, the witness was permitted to testify that in his
opinion the pipe as loaded would tend to make the front end of
the truck light and at times raise the front wheels off the
ground, making it difficult or impossible to guide. The witness
also expressed the opinion that when a vehicle goes off the
road the driver does not have control of it.

HEME.««‘Defendant’s objection was general. It is not
sufficiently specific. It is the duty of counsel to point out the
particular defect or defects in such a question so the state-
ments objected to may be corrected or eliminated. In re
Estate of Telsrow, 237 Iowa 672, 681, 22 N.W.2d 792, 798, and
citations. Crozier v. Lenox Mutual Insurance Association, 252
Iowa 1176, 1183, 110 N.W.2d 403, 407. We have also said that
counsel who objects to a hypothetical question on the ground
that it contains statements not shown in the record should ad-
vise the court in what respect it fails to state the record
properly and may not rely upon a general objection. Kunz-
man v. Cherokee Silo Co., 253 Iowa 885, 893, 114 N.W.2d 534,
539, 95 A.L.R.2d 673. Reversible error may not be predicated
upon an objection which does not tell the court the ground
upon which it is based. Ferris v. Riley, 251 Iowa 400, 408, 101
N.W. 2d 176, 182, and citations. See Daniels v. Bloomquist,
258 Iowa 301, 309, 310, 138 N.W.2d 868, 873, 874; Englund v.
Younker Brothers, Inc., 259 Iowa 48, 142 N.W.2d 580, 533.

HE “‘['T)be objection that the question invades the prov-
ince of the jury is generally not available in Iowa, since the
decision in Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa
328, 348-362 inclusive, 5 N.W.2d 646, 656-663 inclusive.” State
v. Hodge, 252 Iowa 449, 460, 105 N.W.2d 618, 619.

Defendant’s contention under this assignment cannot be
sustained as to the foregoing grounds. In Henneman v. Mc-
Calla, 260 Iowa 60, 78, 148 N.W.2d 447, 458, we quoted the
following from Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., supra:

“It is true generally that an opinion is not to be received
upon an ultimate issue of fact if the jury is itself equally
qualified to pass upon such an issue. McKeever v. Batcheler,
219 Towa 93, 97, 257 N.W. 567; Danner v. Walters, 154 Neb.

28 Le _

506, 48 N.W.2d 635. However, considerable leeway is allowed
in this field of evidence for the reason that no matter how the
opinion question is phrased or formulated, it remains an opinion
which the jury is at liberty to reject. Therefore, only in clear
cases of abuse would an admission of such evidence be found
prejudicial. Such does not appear in the case before us.” This
quotation is followed in Henneman v. McCalla, supra, with
further citations.

Defendant’s second contention under this assignment is
without merit.

VI. Defendant asserts in his fourth assignment the ver-
dict was so excessive as to entitle defendant to a new trial, it
was unconscionable, unwarranted by the evidence and the
amount failed to administer justice under the record. He does
not maintain that passion and prejudice intruded but argues
the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.

Hs Passion, prejudice or undue influence is not ‘the only"
ground upon which we interfere with the verdict by reason of
its amount. We will also interfere with the verdict because of
its size, where it is lacking in evidential support although there
may be no passion or prejudice. Mazur v. Grantham, 255 Iowa
1292, 1803, 125 N.W.2d 807, 813, 814; Allen v. Lindeman, 259
Towa 1884, 1899, 148 N.W.2d 610, 620 (special concurring
opinion).

Henneman v. MecCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 80, 148 N.W.2d 447,
459, accurately states the rule to which we are firmly com-
mitted:

HE ‘We will not alter a verdict unless it is (1) flagrantly
excessive, or inadequate; or (2) so out of reason as to shock the
conscience or sense of justice; or (3) raises a presumption it is
the result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motive; or (4)
is lacking in evidential support.”

“Tt seems fundamental the most important of these is sup-
port in the evidence. If the verdict has support-in the evi-
dence the others will hardly arise, if it lacks support they may
all arise. The real question in most cases, and here, is the
amount and sufficiency of evidence to support the award
made.” Mazur v. Grantham, supra.

SE 29

HMMM The fair and reasonable value of the funeral ex-
penses was $1202.99. Deducting from the amount of the
award interest on the reasonable funeral expense for such time
as it was prematurely incurred, not to exceed the cost as an al-
lowable item the verdict awarded for the present value of
damages to the decedent’s estate would be $34,797.01.

Orville Irlbeck’s life expectancy at the time of his death
was 40.34 years. He had finished tenth grade and attended
barber college. He was in good health, a devoted father and
husband, a willing and energetic worker.

At the time of his marriage in 1959 he had no assets. Later
he farmed for two years in Carroll County. At the end of the
first year he was $20,000 in debt. This had been reduced to
$12,000 in March of 1962 when he moved from the farm and
completely paid off in October. According to his income tax
returns, plaintiff’s income after deductions for 1962 was $4118;
and for 1968, $3574.43, The total income on a joint retwin
with his wife on the 1964 return was $822. There is evidence
from which a jury could find that at the time of his death
decedent had assets between $9000 and $10,000.

The record fairly discloses that from March 1961 to Octo-
ber 1962 plaintiff had accumulated sufficient assets to pay off
an indebtedness of $20,000, support his wife and three children
and still accumulate approximately $10,000.

The verdict does not come within any of the four cate-
gories specified in Henneman v. MeCalla, supra, and we would
not interfere by altering it or granting a new trial.

The error pointed out in Division IV necessitates a new
trial—_Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur except LeGranp, J., who iakces no part,
and Snr and Becxur, JJ., who dissent.

Syett, J—I respectfully dissent. I agree with the prin-
ciples of law appearing in the majority opinion. I agree that a
rider’s status is not changed from that of a guest by voluntarily
performing some act of benefit to the driver during the trip.
Motivation for the trip should be determined as of the time the
trip was commenced. I agree that im the interest of clarity an
instruction such as required by the last paragraph in Division

30 a 7

IV should be recommended. I do not; agree that the’ court’s
instructions were so lacking in this particular as to mislead the
jury.

In Division III the majority concludes, “that there is sub-
stantial evidence from which a jury might reasonably draw an
inference that defendant’s motivation in furnishing plaintiff
transportation was the expectation of a benefit to defendant.”
I agree with that conclusion. The issue was submitted to the
jury in exactly that form. The first matter the jury was required
to find was: “1. That the plaintiff’s decedent was not riding in
said vehicle as a guest of the defendant’s decedent but was a
passenger therein under such circumstances as to render or
furnish a tangible benefit to the defendant’s decedent, Ray C.
Ronfeldt.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Instruction No, 4 as given includes these words: “ * * * the
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in this case to show that
her decedent, Orville Irlbeck, was a passenger in the defendant’s
decedent’s motor truck for the definite benefit or advantage to
said Ray C. Ronfeldt. * * * if you find that the plaintiff’s
decedent’s presence as a passenger therein was for the definite or
tangible benefit or advantage of the defendant’s decedent, then
you should consider the question of the defendant’s decedent’s
negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.)

‘The only issue as to the rider’s status submitted to the jury
was whether he was there for the benefit of defendant’s decedent,
Under the issue as submitted, the evidence and the instructions
read as a whole, the only basis upon, which the jury could haye
based a verdict was a conclusion that the majority in Division
III says has support. I do not think the jury was misled. I
would affirm,

Brcxzr, J., joins in this dissent,

ee 3

a

In re Lvrerest or Caartes CHampers, a child,

Barpara Cuampers, appellant, v. Districr Court or Dusuqur
County, Iowa, appellee.

No. 52683.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 818)

32 EE

Szpremper 19, 1967.

Carl V. Riley, of Dubuque, for appellant.

Michael S. McCauley, County Attorney, and Clifford S.
Less, Assistant County Attorney, both of Dubuque, for appellee.

Lorna L. Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General, of
Des Moines, appears amicus curiae,

LeGranp, J—On November 18, 1966, the district court of
Dubuque County, sitting as a juvenile court, entered a decree
severing the parental rights of both Virgil Chambers and
Barbara Chambers with reference to their minor son, Charles
Chambers.

This decree was based upon evidence taken at a hearing
under chapter 232, Code of Iowa. Chapter 232 was enacted in
its present form in 1965, at which time the former juvenile Act
was repealed. Much of the present Act is the same as the old,
but some substantial changes were made. The particular
sections important to this action will be discussed later.

Prior to the hearing above referred to, plaintiff was found

38

to be an indigent person and Carl V. Riley, an attorney of
Dubuque, was appointed to represent her at the hearing under
the authority of section 232.28, Iowa Code 1966. The hearing
was officially reported as required by section 232.32, Iowa
Code 1966.

Plaintiff, having determined to appeal from the decree by
which her parental relationship with her son was terminated,
filed a motion asking that Dubuque County be ordered to
furnish her, without cost, a transcript of the evidence taken at
the hearing and that the county also be ordered to pay her
attorney fees on the appeal. Her motion was denied, and she
has been granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal
testing the legality of that order.

‘We must determine here whether an indigent parent is
entitled, at public expense, to the assistance of counsel and to
a transcript of the evidence to prosecute an appeal from a
juvenile court decree when such an appeal is specifically
authorized by statute.

HE The right to appeal was unknown at common law. It
may be granted or denied by the legislature. In re Durant
Community School District, 252 Iowa 287, 245, 106 N.W.2d
670; Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 821, 227 N.W. 136,
188. The right to appeal from juvenile court decrees has long
been recognized in Iowa under our Rules of Civil Procedure.
Savery v. Eddy, 242 Iowa 822, 837, 45 N.W.2d 872, 880. The
Sixty-first General Assembly in 1965 gave specific statutory
authorization to such an appeal in section 232.58, Code 1966.

Once the right to appeal has been granted, however, it
must apply equally to all. It may not be extended to some and
denied to others. Waldon v. District Court, 256 Iowa 1311,
1316, 130 N.W.2d 728, 731. Plaintiff complains here that she is
deprived of her statutory right of appeal solely because she is
unable to hire a lawyer or buy a transcript.

If this were a criminal appeal, it is beyond argument
that plaintiff would be entitled to the relief she seeks. Weaver
v. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796, 140 N.W.2d 178, 181, 182; Schmidt v.
Uhlenhopp, 258 Iowa 771, 140 N.W.2d 118, 120. But it is
urged upon us that there is no authority permitting the ap-
pointment of counsel nor to order payment of transcript costs

34 a 7

because this isa civil case. It might be more nearly accurate
so contend that plaintiff is not entitled to this help because it
is not a criminal appeal. Under'section 611.2, Code of Iowa,
this is not’a civil action, but rather.a special proceeding.
Ethridge v. Hildreth, 253 Iowa 855, 859, 114 N.W.2d 311, 313.
In any event the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, In re Gault, 887 U.S.-1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L.
Ed.2d 527, which will be discussed later in this opinion, holds
that constitutional rights should not depend on the type of
action involved. At page 558 of 18 L. Ed.2d the court said:
« ® ® # juvenile proceedings to determine ‘delinquency,’ which
may lead to commitment to a state institution; must be re-
garded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-
inerimination: To hold otherwise would be to disregard sub-
stance because of the feeble enticement of the ‘civil’ label-of-
convenience which has- been attached to juvenile proceedings.”

I. Before considering the effect of In re-Gault, supra, on
the matter now before us, we discuss our own statutory pro-
vision in chapter 232, Code of Iowa 1966..

Plaintiff’s right of appeal is guaranteed under section
232.58, which permits an interested party aggrieved: by any
order or decree of the court to appeal to us for review of
questions of law and fact. Once indigency is established, as it
was in this case, she is given the right to counsel under the
provisions of section 232.28, and section, 232.32 requires that all
hearings shall be reported by stenographie notes or mechanical
recordings unless the parties waive their right to such record.

Sections 232.58 and 232.52 are new to our law. Section
232.28 is new as it applies to plaintiff. The statute prior to the
adoption of section 232.28 in 1965 provided for the appointment
of counsel to represent a child who was required to appear in
juvenile court but there was no -provision until now for the
appointment of counsel to represent parents, guardian or
custodian. As far as we are concerned, therefore, all of the
provisions important'to a determination of this case are new
and are before us for the first time.

Hl The conclusion is inescapable that the legislature in-
tended to afford all persons coming before the juvenile court a
full and complete review on appeal. This is particularly true

es 35

in view of section 232.1, which provides that the chapter shall
be liberally construed so that each child coming within the
jurisdiction of the court will receive care and guidance that
will conduce to his welfare and the best interests of the state.
It must be assumed ‘that this right of appeal, particularly in
view of section 232.1, was not intended to be limited to those
eases in which the minor child or his parents were financially
able to afford such appeal. Certainly the legislature intended
that the indigent child or the indigent parent should receive
an appeal equal to that of the affluent one.

Plaintiff here asks for two separate things. She asks to
have counsel for purposes of appeal just as she had counsel at
the time of the hearing before the juvenile court. She also
asks for a transcript of the evidence introduced at the hearing
before the juvenile court.

HE We consider each of these requests separately, al-
though we may state hefore doing so that the right of appeal
without both of.them is a mere sham and fails to meet con-
stitutional requirements. Weaver vy. Herrick, 258 Iowa 796,
140 N.W.2d 178, 181, 182; Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 258 Iowa 771,
140 N.W.2d 118, 121. We recognize that these are cases in-
volving appeals in criminal cases, as are most of the decisions
involving appointment of counsel and related matters, but they
nevertheless show. if any showing is necessary, that the as-
sistance of counsel and the furnishing of a transcript are
essential to a fair appeal.

HI We see no reason why the appointment of counsel for
plaintiff under section 232.28 should be construed to terminate
when the hearing before the juvenile court was concluded.
That section does not so provide; and when plaintiff was given
the statutory vight to appeal, it must have been contemplated
that such an appeal would require the services of counsel. We
hold therefore that the appointment of counsel to represent
plaintiff should continue through all stages of the proceedings
including an appeal as authorized by statute.

| | The question involved in whether plaintiff is entitled
to a transcript is not exactly on the same footing as her request
for counsel. Chapter 232 contains no provisions concerning a
transcript of the proceedings before the juvenile court. It

36 Le a

does require however, as noted above, that all proceedings be-
fore the juvenile court be reported. Furthermore the appeal to
which plaintiff is entitled in this cause is de novo, In re Mor-
rison, 259 Iowa 3801, 144 N.W.2d 97, 100. It requires no
authority to demonstrate that an appeal de novo without a
transcript of the evidence upon which that appeal is based is,
in effect, no right of appeal at all. It would be a strange in-
terpretation of chapter 232 indeed if we should find that the
legislature specifically gave plaintiff the right to appeal; that
it specifically provided that all proceedings in juvenile court
should be reported; that it specifically provided for the ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent persons, but that it never-
theless refused to permit plaintiff to pursue her statutory right
of appeal solely because she was unable to afford a transcript.
We are unwilling to so hold.

We find therefore that plaintiff is entitled to a transcript
of the hearing held in juvenile court, and that the county must
provide such a transeript without cost to plaintiff.

Il. Perhaps some further brief mention should be made
of In re Gault, supra, although we do not feel that that deci-
sion is determinative in this case since it does not deal with
rights on appeal and since by its specific language its effect
is limited to cases in which a juvenile might be committed to a
state institution. In other words that case deals entirely with
delinquency matters while we have before us here a matter
involving a dependent and neglected child. However, our
chapter 282 is one of general application, and the rules which
we adopt will be used in all proceedings in the juvenile court.
The procedure which we approve today in a dependency matter
must be used tomorrow to govern the conduct of a delinquency
hearing. We take it, therefore, that the Gault decision, as ap-
plied to our law, clearly warns us to be wary of taking con-
stitutional shortcuts which would result in any substantially
different, treatment of a juvenile from that which would be
accorded an adult charged with the commission of a crime.

As above stated, the Gault case does not deal with rights
on appeal, but the following language on page 563 of 18 L.
Eid. 2d is significant: “As the present case illustrates, the con-
sequences of failure to provide an appeal, to record the pro-

ee 31

ceedings, or to make findings or state the grounds for the
juvenile court’s conclusion may be to throw a burden upon
the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle the reviewing pro-
cess with the burden of attempting to reconstruct a record,
and * * #,”

We feel that the Gault decision adds strength to the con-
clusions reached by us in Division I of this opinion.

Hl IIL Several other matters should be mentioned. It
is claimed plaintiff is not entitled to relief because she made
no showing of indigency at the hearing on her motion, and
also because her motion was signed by her counsel rather than
by her individually. We find no merit in either of these con-
tentions. There had been one finding of indigency, and, in
the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is fair to assume
that this condition continued to exist. No such showing was
made or attempted at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion. No
authority has been cited to us which would require the plain-
tiff to personally sign her motion and under the circumstances
existing here we find that signature by her counsel is sufficient.

It is also claimed that section 232.52, Code of Iowa 1966,
is conelusive authority for denying plaintiff’s motion. That
section sets out certain charges which may be made against
the county in juvenile proceedings. It makes no mention of the
cost of providing a transcript. It provides that there shall be
paid reasonable compensation for an attorney appointed by the
court to serve as counsel or guardian ad litem. What we have
already said concerning the appointment of counsel carrying
over into the appellate stage justifies the interpretation here
that the provision for reasonable compensation includes com-
pensation for services rendered on appeal.

| | This of course does not apply to the question of the
cost of a transcript, concerning which there is no statutory pro-
vision whatever. In arriving at a proper interpretation of
chapter 232, the entire Act should be considered and construed
as a whole without undue emphasis or importance being placed
upon any one section. Manilla Community School District v.
Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 501, 502, 101 N.W.2d 705, 708, and
eases therein cited. We cannot escape the conclusion, from an
interpretation of chapter 232 taken in its entirety, that the

38 bell

legislature intended to afford a fuill-and complete review on
appeal from juvenile court proceedings to indigents as -well as
those able to pay for their appeal. Since such an appeal in a
de novo review is not possible without a transcript of the evi-
dence, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to such a transcript
at county expense.

This case is reversed and remanded for entry of an order
not inconsistent with this opinion.—Reversed.

All Jussices concur except Justice Buoxur, who takes no
part.

Canon L, Jensen, appellant, y. Epwin R. Jensen, appellee.

No. 52007.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 829)

Sepremper 19, 1967.

James W. Hall and Robert D. Hall, both of Des Moines,
for appellant. .

Harold G. DeKay, of Atlantic, for appellee.

Becker, J.—This ease was started by defendant Edwin R.
Jensen filing suit for divorce. After his wife answered and
eross-petitioned, Mr. Jensen dismissed his action. The wife
was then designated as plaintiff and the husband as defendant
on the basis of the cross-petition and answer thereto.

Defendant, then 19, and plaintiff, 18, were married Sep-
tember 16, 1956. Four children were born of the marriage.
Their ages ranged from 2 years to 7 years at time of trial.

Defendant has been a carpenter all his married life. Plain-
tiff worked as a secretary the first year of married life but
stopped because of pregnancy. She supplemented their income
to some extent by giving piano lessons. Defendant’s income
varied from $4500 to $5900 per annum. He added to the fam-
ily’s net worth by first repairing old‘houses the parties bought
and later building a new home, .

The first overt incident portending the present litigation
occurred in 1960. At that time plaintiff left defendant but the
couple were reconciled within a few days. Plaintiff’s second
departure occurred in the fall of 1964. ; The parties’ stories of

40 Le 7

marital discord leading to the second separation are widely
divergent. We shall note them as briefly as possible.

Plaintiff contends defendant has an ungovernable temper,
curses and swears at her very frequently, has several times
physically abused her by striking her, choking her, throwing
her to the floor. She also related threats made by defendant.
Detailed incidents of such treatment were provided. One such
incident occurred in August 1964 and occasioned the latest
separation. Plaintiff returned from a short vacation with some
friends. She asked defendant for grocery money. After she
had followed Mr. Jensen to the new home where he was work-
ing and asked for money a second time, defendant cursed her
and called her vile names in front of the children. She took
the children to Des Moines for about a month but returned to
Atlantic and occupied the new house. By this time defendant
had started this divorce proceeding. In November defendant
visited her there late at night. She had the door secured by
a chain. Defendant broke the door open, the chain pulled the
door casing off the wall. At that time plaintiff claims defend-
ant jerked her around, twisted her arms, threw her to the
floor and called her a slut and other names. He went out to
the car, obtained a hammer and replaced the door casing, then
left.

Plaintiff detailed other incidents of violence and spoke
generally of defendant’s cursing her and her fear of him, her
extreme nervous condition and consultation with her physician.

One other incident will be particularly noted. On March
18, 1965, while plaintiff was living in Des Moines, defendant
came to pick up the children for a visit. The couple got into
an argument, plaintiff accuses defendant of tearing the tele-
phone book from her hand when she went to call the police.
He then grabbed her and started to choke her, threw her down
and banged her head against the floor. He finally stopped and
left. She called the police.

The police officer testified that when he arrived he saw red
marks on plaintiff’s throat but nothing of the direct action.
Testimony by Mrs. Northup, plaintift’s sister, was in the same
vein. At a contempt hearing before a different judge Jo Beth
Jensen, the couple’s oldest child, age seven at the time of trial,

| [| 41

testified in detail as to this March 18th incident, this testimony
was in chambers with only the judge, court reporter and at-
torneys present. The child’s account fully corroborated her
mother.

Enough has been said to outline the main burden of plain-
tiff’s case. Defendant categorically denies nearly all of the
damaging testimony above noted. He states he struck his wife
only once in November when he spanked her. His version of
the March 13th incident is that Mrs. Jensen choked herself
and beat her own head against the floor.

As to breaking down the door, he states he did not push
hard but the door casing came out by itself. Defendant in-
dicates most of the trouble occurred over money. He states
firmly he did not curse at his wife at anytime. He is corroborated
im a measure by a married couple who were friends of the
parties and said they got along fairly well.

Another area of testimony should be mentioned. Plain-
tiff told of the parties having consulted a marriage counselor,
Doctor Sjogren, a psychiatrist. She said they visited the doc-
tor four times but her husband then refused to go anymore
and stated he wanted to get the divorce, and get it over with.
This testimony is not referred to in defendant’s evidence.

I. The foregoing brief résumé indicates the problem pre-
sented to the trial court and to us. If the testimony of plain-
tiff is to be accepted there is little question that sufficient evi-
dence of cruel and inhuman treatment to require a divorce has
been developed. Hand v. Hand, 257 Iowa 648, 183 N.W.2d 63;
Raushenberger v. Raushenberger, 258 Iowa 366, 1838 N.W.2d
879. If defendant’s version is accepted, the evidence is insut-
ficient to justify a change in the legal status of the parties.

The trial court rejected plaintiff’s evidence and denied a
divorce. Among other findings the trial decree specifically
holds the March 18th incident did not occur as plaintiff said
it did and that plaintiff’s claims in this regard are untrue. The
remaining findings indicate the trial court simply did not be-
lieve plaintiff or her main corroborating witnesses.

HM Il. Rule 344(f)(7) reads: “In equity cases, especially
when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives
weight to the fact findings of the trial court; but is not bound

42 | |

by them.” We have frequently indicated that where much
depends on the credibility of witnesses we are reluctant to in-
terfere with the: trial court’s findings of fact. Lehmkuhl v.
Lehmkuhl, 259 Iowa 686, 145 N.W.2d 456. Yet in a review
de novo the ultimate responsibility to make an independent
assessment of the entire record lies with this court. Cole v.
Cole, 259 Iowa 58, 148 N.W.2d 850, 352." In this ease we must
disagree with the experienced trial court’s factual findings and
thus with its legal conclusions.

We are impressed with the cireurastanee this action
was actually commenced by defendant, that he broke off mar-
riage counseling with the statement he wanted the -divorce
and to get it over with; and that he had refused marriage
counseling at other times. None of these matters are challenged
by defendant.

Failure to accept plaintitt’s ‘version of the March 18th in-
cident constitutes rejection of the minor daughter’s testimony
as well. The testimony of the other two corroborating witnesses
in relation to this incident developed “after the fact” evidence.
But Jo Beth’s testimony was as an eyewitness to the event.
In this area plaintiff was fully corroborated unless the daugh-
ter was lying. If the child was: truthful, then defendant was
not telling the truth.

Plaintiff was not impeached in any manner in this case
and we find nothing to detract from: the credibility of the
seven-year-old corroborating witness.: The possibility of such
a witness being coached is, of course, always present. We have
no evidence or circumstance indicating such a possibility oc-
curred here, or even that it is probable it occurred. The evi-
dence was not given at the main héaring but at an interlocutory
hearing before the main case of either side was presented. Thus
there can be no question of matching testimony at least as to the
main trial, We note that as to Jo Beth’s testimony the trial
judge has no peculiar advantage sincé the matter was considered
by him, as well as by us, on a printed transcript.

If plaintiff’s version of the March 18th incident is not re-
jected, then her testimony relating to numerous other incidents
of cursing and physical violence ‘is believable. : As to sub-

et Es 43

stantial portions of those incidents she has corroboration from
her mother and others. .On the basis of the entire record we
hold plaintiff has proved grounds for a divoree by a prepond-
erance of evidence and a decree should be entered in her favor
on that issue. , ‘

| | III. As to the issues of visitation rights, support and
alimony, we consider the record insufficient for an intelligent
judgment by this court. Since the trial court refused the di-
vorce it properly did not concern itself with such matters,
Hand v. Hand, supra. . ,

The record contains some evidence upon which we could
base a judgment. Defendant’s income from his job averaged
about $5500 during the lest three years. The trial court found
at time of trial the parties had accumulated a net worth of
$12,500. However, the mortgage on at least one house had been
foreclosed by defendant’s uncle.

More than two years have passed since the trial decree
was entered. Many motions before this court in relation to
child support and suit nioney pending trial indicate the finan-
cial condition of the parties may well have changed substanti-
ally during that time. Rather than attémpt to fix the financial
and visitation rights of the parties at this time on inadequate
information, we return the matter with instructions to enter a
deeree consistent with this opinion.

HM Custody of the four minor children shall be awarded to
plaintiff. Visitation tights of defendant, alimony questions,
child support questions and any other collateral issues properly
raised by the parties should be determined by the trial court
upon an adequate record. Temporary alimony provisions now
in effect shall remain in effect until further action by the trial
court. .

Hl All costs, including preparation of transcript and print-
ing costs, are assessed against defendant with credit for ad-
vancements previously made.’ Attorney fees in the sum of $600
are hereby allowed in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
and taxed as part of the costs of this action. As in Hand v.
Hand, supra, we do not decide whether a larger amount has
been earned in connection with this appeal. . “[W]e hold only

44 Le 7

that in view of the financial condition of the parties and the
outcome of the appeal the sum allowed is all that plaintiff
should be required to pay.”—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur except Justice LeGranp, who takes no
part.

Joun H. Lessennop, administrator of estate of Lyle M. Ford,
deceased, appellant, v. Opau EH. Norron, administrator
of estate of Donald Walter Norton, deceased,
et al., appellees.

No. 52190.
(Reported in 153 N.W.24 107)

46

=

iii

PT

ee

a
‘Supremper 19, 1967.

John D. Randall and Fisher & Pickens, both of Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.

Tom Riley, of Cedar Rapids, and William Klotzbach, of
Independence, for appellees Norton.

| De 41

James W. Crawford, of Cedar Rapids, and Wirt P. Hoxie,
of Waterloo, for appellee Hopson.

Larson, J.—In an action for damages by decedent’s admin-
istrator for defendants’ alleged negligence in the operation’ of
their automobiles, a eross-petition for damages by one defendant,
and a counterclaim by another, the jury returned a verdict for
all defendants. Only plaintiff appeals.

This accident ocenrred on Highway No. 150 approximately
three miles north of Midway in T.inn County, Iowa, on May 21,
1964, shortly after 10 p.m. ‘The asphalt covered conerete
pavement, 24 feet 3 inches wide at this point, runs approx-
imately novth and south. The weather was clear and the
pavement dry. It appears that plaintiff’s decedent, Lyle M.
Ford, killed in the accident, was driving a 1954 Tudor Mercury
sedan northward, followed by defendant Walter B. Hopson in
a 1959 Pontiac sedan. Defendant Donald Walter Norton, also
killed in this accident, was driving a 1962 Ford Galaxie sedan
southward when the Ford and Norton ears collided head on.
Hopson, unable to stop, crashed into Ford’s car, upsetting it
and knocking it from the pavement. .

Plaintiff’s petition, in three divisions, sets out a claim
against Norton in Division J, a claim against Hopson in Division
HT, and a claim against Norton and Hopson jointly in Division
Ti.

Subsequent to the verdict, ‘the trial court overruled plain-
tiff’s motion for a new trial, and this appeal followed.

Assigned as error are (1) the trial court’s failure to compel
Norton’s counsel to refrain from courtroom references to
“hlood alcohol” tests as requested in plaintifi’s Motion in
Limine (2) its acceptance of testimony by defendant’s expert,
L. J. Burianek, who had insufficient basis for the opinion ex-
pressed, and (3) its requirement that the jury consider the
ease beyond the normal working hours required of jurors in
Linn County, Iowa. A more detailed statement of the relevant
facts as they bear upon the respective assigned errors will be
made hereinafter.

I. Having been informed during a pretrial conference
that the issue of driver consumption of alcoholic liquor would
be injected into the case, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion in

48 a |

limine premised on the ground that such evidence would be
immaterial and any references thereto before the jury would be
highly prejudicial to plaintiff's case. In this motion plaintiff
alleged the only basis upon which such an issue (driver-drink-
ing) could be raised was the fact that there is a statement on
the certificate of death which read “Blood Aleohol Value 82.5
mg percent”, signed by Percy G. Harris, M.D., Linn County
Medical Examiner; that said certificate is inadmissible to show
blood alcohol value or cause of death and that “there is no
basis upon which there can be any proof of blood alcohol
value”, it being hearsay, and that “there has been an absolute
failure to comply with the provisions of Sections 321B.4 and
821B.5 of the Iowa Code Annotated.” It further alleged such
prohibition was necessary to protect plaintiff “from the prej-
udicial conduct and the effect of the suggestions, inuendoes,
whether by statements made to the jury, questions to the jury
during voir dire, or questions to any witnesses containing such
suggestions * * *.” In his prayer plaintiff asked that any
references be prohibited as to driving impairment or the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverage “based upon the certificate of
death hereinabove referred to or based upon any matter re-
lated to blood aleohol value of the decedent Lyle M. Ford.”
(Emphasis added.)

Pursuant to a hearing on this motion, the court ordered
defendant “in examining the jury and in making opening state-
ments shall not make any reference to what a death certificate
may show in this respect (blood alcohol level). But if Mr.
Riley has independent evidence of 80 point 2 or whatever it
may be, he’s entitled to show it and I cannot restrict him from
telling on opening statement in effect what he thinks the de-
fendant Norton’s evidence is going to prove in this respect.”

At that time plaintiff’s counsel called the court’s attention
to the provisions of chapter 321B of the Code and made ref-
erence to certain requirements to be met before reference may
be made in a trial to a blood alcohol sample taken from a dead
person. At that time plaintiff did not press for a broader order.

The court then clarified its ruling, saying to defendant
Norton’s counsel: “If you know in your mind that you have
evidence which you believe to be admissible, independent of

; Le 49

the death certificate that will establish that fact (blood aleohol
level), you are free to make reference to the amount of alcoholic
content in the blood of the deceased Ford.” The court, how-
ever, said it would keep the order open for amendment “if by
any chance counsel for plaintiff convinces me that my order
should be broader, before such time as Mr. Riley does address
the jury.”

Apparently Mr. Riley was of the opinion that the report of
the county medical examiner, which is not the same as a death
certificate, was admissible evidence in a civil case and, knowing
that there was a notation on the back of the executed form
pertaining to Lyle Ford’s death, reciting among other things,
“Ford blood alcohol was 82.5 mg. percent”, proceeded to refer
to Ford’s use of alcoholic beverages in voir dire examination
and in his opening statement to the jury.

The court was not sure of appellees’ conclusion as to the
admissibility of this evidence, but indicated much depended
upon the proof submitted. When defendants’ counsel sought
to introduce testimony of the medical examiner and the county
attorney and to introduce the “Report of Investigation by
Medical Examiner” executed by Doctor Harris, the vital issue
of this controversy became evident, i.e., what, if any, matter
appearing on such a report must be excluded on objection under
the provisions of section 339.9?

II. Chapter 339 of the 1966 Code relates to the appoint-
ment, qualifications, jurisdiction, and duties of a county medical
examiner. Section 339.4 provides he shall be notified of the
death of a person who died “a. From violence. *** g. Ina
suspicious, unusual or unnatural manner.” Although no issue
is raised herein as to whether the county medical examiner
had jurisdiction of this matter where it clearly appeared the
plaintiff died from injuries resulting from an automobile col-
lision, the trial court had some doubts that it extends beyond a
determination of the cause of death.

HM Section 339.5 makes it clear the examiner's duties are
to inquire as to “the cause and manner of death” and file his
findings with the county attorney and the criminal investiga-
tion division of the public safety department. It would seem
his investigation is directed toward evidence of a crime and is

50° Le a

not the same as an ‘acciderit report filed by an investigation
officer with the public safety department under section 321.266
of the Code. “Did this investigation’ or report disclose any
evidence of a crime? We do not believe it’ did, although, as
appellant concedes, this was-not & natural death. Neverthe-
less; it is appellant’s principal contention that, because of the
statement of alcohol analysis on the back of the report, it could
not be received in- evidence, and that witnesses could not be
interrogated as to this report until it-was shown that the re-
port contained no hearsay evidence barred by the provisions of
section 339.9 of the Code.

| | Section 839.9 provides: “Reports of investigations
made by the county medical examiner or his assistants, and
records and reports of autopsies made under the authority of
this chapter, shall be received as evidence in any court or other
proceedings, except that statements by witnesses or other persons
and conclusions upon extraneous matters are not hereby made
admissible. * * * .” (Hmphasis added.) It further provides
that the person preparing a report or record may be sub-
poenaed as a witness in a civil case by any party to the cause.
It does not attempt to pass on the admissibility of reports
containing extrancous matters or define extraneous matters.
Obviously, then, that admissibility is to be governed by other
well-established rules of evidence -which the court must apply
when timely and proper objections are made.

The trial court recognized this rule when he advised
counsel in chambers that “before any results of a blood test
analysis can be admitted in this case, * * * the party seeking to
introduce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation.”
It further suggested some of the foundation requirements the
party seeking to introduce such evidence must meet. However,
as we understand it, it did not limit the requirements to those
enumerated. ‘There may be others.

At this point we are faced with two questions of major
importance to this decision: (1) Did appellees lay a proper
foundation for the admission of evidence of blood alcohol
tests, and (2) was a timely and proper objection made to the
introduction of this evidence?

| Le 51

[| III. Before any result: of a blood test analysis can be
admitted in any civil or criminal case, the party seeking to
introduce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation for
its admission. Unless waived, this foundation must show that
the specimen was taken by a duly authorized person using
proper sterile equipment, that it was properly labeled and pre-
served, that its‘care and transportation were proper, and also
the identity of persons processing it so as to give the opposing
party the opportunity to cross-examine as to the care and
procedure used in the test: See State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519,
292 N. W. 148; Bruyere v. Castellucci (R.I.), 200 A.2d 226;
Apodaca v. Baca, 73 N. M. 104, 885 P.2d 968; Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co, v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 899, 315 P.2d 277; 51
Michigan Law Review 72, 79.

In State v. Weltha, supra, this court rejected evidence of
a blood analysis because the specimen passed through the hands
of several unidentified persons, was improperly kept in places
available to the public, and because the one taking the speci-
men was without authority to take the specimen from the un-
conscious patient. There we held that the trial court erred in
receiving in evidence, over timely objection, the blood sample
and the testimony of alleged experts based thereon.

Hl In the case at bar appellant did not seriously con-
tend that the medical examiner had no authority to take a
blood sample from persons killed in accidents, but predicated
his objection on the inadmissibility of this report containing
the findings and conclusions thereon. Appellant asserts, al-
though there was testimony that the examiner labeled the
specimen and placed it in the hospital refrigerator with general
instructions to analyze, there is no showing as to who made the
analysis and the report. Thus, he contends there could be no
eross-examination to verify the certainty or correctness of this
report, and it was inadmissible.

We are not satisfied the foundation laid was sufficient to
permit the acceptance of this report. The examiner did not
find Ford’s death resulted from driving while intoxicated or
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. His findings
and conclusions as to any blood test did not appear relevant
or material to his report. If not material, any such reference

52 De |

was extraneous to the report and the injection of evidence as
to blood alcohol through the medium of this report was prej-
udicial and should have been rejected. Apparently there was
no showing as to who received, tested or reported the findings
on the sample of blood taken from plaintiff, and in this regard
the results of the test could not be admitted into evidence. The
proper foundation had not been laid, and there is no contention
it had been waived.

In Apodaca v. Baca, supra, in holding a proper foundation
had not been laid for the admission of a blood’ analysis, the
court observed the failure to show who had possession from
May 23 to May 27, and in what manner or condition the
specimen was delivered to the laboratory, was a vital defect.

In Bruyere v. Castellucci, supra, which also involved an
automobile accident, the court held it was error to permit the
state toxicologist to testify as to the results of his analysis of
a blood specimen purportedly taken from the body of the
defendant’s decedent. In that case there was a failure to
trace the specimen from the time of taking until the time of
trial, failure to identify some of the persons involved therein,
and no evidence produced outside the test that decedent had
consumed any alcohol at all. The court, in rendering its de-
cision, cited our Weltha case with approval.

Appellees contend section 321B.4 applies here and that its
requirements were met and shown by the examination of
Doctor Harris. Chapter 321B clearly relates to the authority
to take blood tests when a person is suspected of driving while
intoxicated, and provides no rules for admission of these tests
into evidence in cases such as we have here. In any event,
upon challenge the results of such tests must be shown compe-
tent, relevant and material by the party making the offer.

| | Before blood test analysis may be introduced into
evidence, it would appear that the party seeking introduction
must show (1) that the blood was timely taken (2) from a
particular identified body (3) by an authorized licensed
physician, medical technologist or registered nurse designated
by a licensed physician (4) that the instruments used were
sterile (5) that the blood taken was properly preserved or
kept (6) labeled (7) if transported or sent, the method and

i — 5B

procedures used therein (8) the method and procedures used
in conducting the test, and (9) that the identity of the person
or persons under whose supervision the tests were conducted
be established. Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 apparently were
shown. Items 7, 8 and 9 were not.

It is our conclusion here that appellees failed to disclose
who made the analysis and the report to the examiner, and
that a proper foundation had not been laid for the introduction
of this blood test analysis. The court was fully aware of this
objection and should have sustained it.

HEE LV. Objections to the introduction of evidence are
addressed to the court and are not addressed to the jury.
Metropolitan National Bank v. Commercial State Bank, 104
Towa 682, 74 N. W. 26. See also 22 Iowa Law Review 609. It
is said therein at page 610 that the function of the objection
“Gs first to signify that there is an issue of law, and, secondly,
to give notice of the terms of the issue.’” It is sufficient if it
ealls to the court’s attention the element of inadmissibility or
incompetency involved. An objection may be, and indeed
often should be, made in chambers to avoid prejudice. It may
be reversible error to compel an attorney to make his objection
in the presence of the jury. Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Iowa
1016, 1023, 1024, 7 N. W.2d 188, 144 A.L.R. 997. Under such
circumstances, unless the objection is made and decided out-
side the jury’s presence, there could be reversible error, for
the jury would then be made aware of the alleged confession.
State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1062, 185 N. W.2d 518; State
v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 834, 113 N. W.2d 303; State v. Holland,
258 Iowa 206, 188 N. W.2d 86, 90. In the interest of procedural
convenience objections are not usually made outside the
presence of the jury, but obviously those made in chambers of
which a record is made are as valid and proper as those made
in open court.

The record before us discloses that during recess and in
chambers the court heard arguments on the admissibility of the
results of Ford’s blood test analysis. This was prior to any
attempt made to introduce the medical examiner’s report,
Exhibit H. At that time the court recognized the “crucial
question in this lawsuit” and ruled that plaintiff should have

54 Le |

complete freedom to make proper. voir dire examination of
witnesses at.anytime in order to try.to establish, if he could,
“that proper procedures were not followed, that an insufficient
foundation exists.” At that.time the’ court was fully advised
that any attempt to introduce such evidence or. produce .wit-
nesses before the jury who would attempt to prove the blood
alcohol content of Ford’s blood would prejudice plaintifi’s
case. : : :
HEE Plaintiff requested the opportunity to examine Doctor
Harris and the county attorney, whom defendant intended to
call as witnesses, outside the presence of the jury. Plaintiff
advised the court as.to his objection when he stated “that any
matter relating to blood alcohol is extraneous matter and there-
fore not admissible under any circumstances * * *” (emphasis
added), that “the same is entirely incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial.” This objection, it seems, was overlooked by the
court or was considered insufficient. In any event, it was not
sustained. .

At the conclusion of the conference in chambers, the court
said, “if you want me to exclude any evidence or rule that a
witness is not to answer a question, you are going to have
to *:* * lodge proper objection when the question is asked.”
Plaintiff’s request for an examination of Doctor Harris out of
the jury’s presence, to determine whether his testimony was
admissible, was also overruled by the court, with an announce-
ment that the request was too late, that it had discretion in
this area, and that this issue should have been resolved in
connection with the motion in limine. It ruled plaintiff had
waived his right to do that-by not seeking to establish the in-
competency of the examiner’s report. along with his other
motion before trial commenced. We cannot agree with either
ruling. The limine motion related to a death certificate and,
until defendants attempted to use the examiner’s report to
prove alcohol consumption, plaintiff did not anticipate that
issue. In any event, he sufficiently objected to that evidence
before it was offered and asked for an examination out of the
jury presence as soon as it became evident how defendant
planned to produce evidence, other than the death certificate,
of plaintiff's recent use of alcoholic beverages.

— ee 56

We conclude the trial court was well and timely advised
of the objection and improperly refused to permit that ‘re-
quested examination. When it permitted the examination be-
fore’ the jury, prejudicial error occurred. : It was also error to
require plaintiff to repeat his objections in open court. Re-
peated objections need not be made to questions calling for the
same type bf proof if a proper objection had been made when
the adverse party first made the offer. Metropolitan National
Bank v. Commercial State Bank, supra; 22 Iowa Law Review
618, and cases cited therein.

V. Appellant, in ‘his second assigriment, contends the
court erred in permitting L. J. Burianek to testify as to the
location of the point of impact between the Ford and Norton
automobiles because he did not arrive at the scene until the
car driven by one of the parties had been moved, and the other
had been struck by a third car and had landed on its side a
considerable distance from the area of impact. He contends
this testimony by an alleged expert’ was based upon obscure
and unidentifiable skid marks, gouges and other observations
made after traffic had passed over the ‘area for about an hour
and a great share of the debris had been cleaned up and re-
moved.

HB (No serious contention is made as to the qualifications
of Burianek as an expert, but appellant’ maintains correctly
that the admissibility of expert opinion evidence is dependent
on the factual foundation laid. An expert opinion lacking a
proper foundation is, of course, of no value and is not admis-
sible. Sufficient and timely acquired data must appear upon
which a judgment can be made, and, if that is not shown, the
opinion is usually designated as incompetent. 32 0. J. S.,
Evidence, section 546(63), page 267. Also see 66 A. L. R.2d
1051 for the statement that it must appear that the expert
giving the opinion had an opportunity to investigate the scene
reasonably soon after the accident and had sufficient evidence
to form a reasonable opinion based on his observations.

Appellant cites three casey in support of his contention
that Burianek’s observations were too late ‘and inadequate.
Hackman v. Beckwith, 245 Iowa 791, 805, 64 N.W.2d 275, 283,
284; Ficke v. Gibson, 153 Neb. 478, 45 N. W.2d 436; and Arnett

56 Le |

vy. Dalton, 257 S.W.2d 585 (Ky.). Also 8 Am. Jur.2d, Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic, section 958, page 505.

HMM Here Burianek testified his hour or hour-and-a-half
examination at the scene, within an hour after the accident,
disclosed certain skid marks, “brights” and gouges, and located
them by measurements. The trial court ruled these examina-
tions were a sufficient basis for his opinion. In Hackman v.
Beckwith, supra, we considered testimony of a witness who
examined the marks on the pavement after an accident and
opined as to the point of collision, and held the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in accepting that opinion.

In Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 577, 88 N. W.2d 120, we
stated the rule applicable here. We said the general rule “is
that testimony or evidence as to tire or skid marks in the
vicinity of the accident is admissible, that is, to the extent of
allowing the witness to describe the marks and the circum-
stances under which he observed them, leaving it to the jury
to draw its own opinion and conclusion as to what, if anything,
the evidence indicates or tends to prove.” (Citations)

HH We also said there: “The receipt of opinion evidence,
lay or expert, rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial
court.” (Citations) We pointed out considerable leeway is
allowed in this field of evidence for the reason that no matter
how the opinion question is phrased or formulated, it remains
an opinion which the jury is at liberty to reject.

In the case at bar there was evidence that Norton came
over the center line and hit Ford, which contradicts Burianck’s
opinion that the point of impact occurred in the southbound
lane. Hopson, the only eyewitness, first said Norton appeared
to come into the northbound lane and strike the Ford car, and
later said he could not be sure due to the explosion, dust and
flying debris when these cars came together. There was
evidence the Norton car came to rest in the southbound lane
facing east about 3 or 4 feet from the pavement center line, and
certain scratch marks on the pavement were made when it was
pulled apart and removed from the traveled portion of the
highway. We have carefully reviewed this testimony and find
no abuse of the court’s discretion in admitting this testimony.

a |] ST

HI sVI. Im his final assignment appellant contends the
trial court erred in requiring the jury to consider the case
beyond normal working hours, and requiring the jury to re-
turn to a closed courthouse on a Saturday to have the case
finally submitted. We find no merit in this assignment and, in
view of the fact that it is not likely to occur in the retrial of
this matter, will give it only passing attention.

After a trial lasting from Tuesday through Friday, the
jury was required to return to the courtroom on Saturday al-
though the courthouse had been closed on that day by action of
the board of supervisors on the mistaken idea that it could do
so under the law at that time. While there were no jury af-
fidavits filed herein, it appears there were some complaints by
a juror or two because they were required to deliberate into
Sunday before being discharged. While we do not recommend
Sunday deliberation as a rule, there is no law known to us, or
cited, which prohibits Sunday deliberation by a jury. Section
605.18, Code 1966, seems to permit it, saying a court may give
instructions to a jury then deliberating on Sunday, may receive
a jury verdict on Sunday etc. Also see 83 C. J. S., Sunday,
section 51, page 878, reciting deliberation by a jury on Sunday
is not illegal.

The court believed both it and some of the jurors had
previous assignments requiring their presence in court on Mon-
day and, under the circumstances, felt this case should be
pursued to its conclusion without a weekend delay. We can-
not say, under these circumstances, any abuse of its discretion
to do so was shown.

VIL. Having found reversible error in Divisions III and
IV, this cause must be reversed and it is remanded for a new
trial—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur except Justice LuGranp, who takes no
part.

on
io}

State or Iowa, plaintiff, v. EacLe Perronzum Company, a
corporation, et al., defendants; Carrro. Inpemniry
Corporation, cross-petitioner, appellee; Marsmaun
Smrru et al., cross-defendants, appellants.

No. 52518

(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 115)

ee 59

SeptemBer 19, 1967.

60 I

Ronald L. Saylor and Betty, Neuman, McMahon, Hellstrom
& Bittner, of Davenport, for cross-defendants, appellants.

A. Fred Berger and A. Fred Berger, Jr., of Davenport, for
eross-petitioner, appellee.

Mason, J.—This is an action for state motor fuel taxes due
from Eagle Petroleum Company. Eagle had experienced finan-
cial difficulties and failed to pay the gasoline tax collected from
its customers in December 1962 and January 1963. Capitol
Indemnity Corporation, surety on Eagle Petroleum’s bond
guaranteeing payment of these taxes, was subrogated to the
State’s claim when it paid a default judgment entered in the
State’s favor against Hagle.

Capitol now seeks to recover the amount paid by it from
Marshall Smith and Omni Corporation because of their failure
to comply with the Iowa Bulk Sales Act in taking over the
assets of the Eagle Petroleum Company. It is conceded there
was no compliance with the provisions of this Act.

The trial court found it unnecessary to determine whether
the transfer from Eagle to Smith and Omni was a sale within
the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act and stated the issue to be
determined was whether payments made from the property in
question were entitled to a priority over the motor fuel tax
lien.

It is undisputed that Eagle owed the State, including
penalty and interest, $10,947.66 for motor vehicle tax under
chapter 324, Code, 1962, $6490.02 for December and $4457.64
for January.

The court held only the taxes incurred in December were
prior to all other claims and gave Capitol judgment for $6490.02
against Omni, denying its claim of priority for the January
taxes.

Omni appeals and Capitol cross-appeals.

I. Eagle Petroleum, organized as an Jowa corporation
March 18, 1961, commenced business in June. On April 24
Omni had entered into a conditional sales contract with Eagle
and on the same day leased it five filling stations. Omni and
Eagle also entered into a third written contract labeled “Agree-

es 6

ment” which incorporated the lease and conditional sales con-
tract. Each of the instruments had been executed by Marshall
Smith as president of Omni. None was recorded.

The conditional sales contract was for $18,446.50 and re-
quired payments by Eagle of $261 per month commencing
June 1, 1961. The lease provided for a minimum monthly
rental of $1875 plus a gallonage rental which applied when it
exceeded this minimum. In addition, Eagle as lessee was to
pay all utility bills and taxes which became a lien on the
premises. As security for these obligations the lease established
a contractual landlord’s lien on all property placed on the
premises for any and all sums due under the lease.

In June 1962 Eagle made application to Capitol for a
surety bond to be posted with the State to secure payment of
gasoline taxes collected. Capitol posted its bond.

Sometime late in 1962 or early 1963 Hagle’s operation be-
came unsuccessful. An attempt to sell the company failed.
Because of Hagle’s financial difficulties, Omni served notice on
January 25 by certified mail terminating the lease and can-
celling the conditional sales contract for failure to pay rent
due January 20, 1963, and the installment due under the con-
ditional sales agreement.

Pursuant to an agreement with Eagle Omni took posses-
sion of the stations January 28 and 29, including all mer-
chandise, fixtures, equipment and assets of Hagle located on
the various premises, cancelled the lease and assumed the
operation. At the same time Omni also repossessed all equip-
ment originally sold under the conditional sales contract, in-
eluding all replacements.

On March 15, 1963, the state treasurer filed a lien for
motor fuel taxes in the clerk’s office of the Scott County district
court certifying that Hagle Petroleum Company owed fuel taxes
for December 1962 in the amount of $6490.02 and for January
1963 in the sum of $4457.64. Immediately thereafter the State
filed suit against Eagle Petroleum and Capitol Indemnity, its
surety, for collection of this tax.

As stated, there was no disputed issue between these
parties and default judgment was obtained by the State for the
amount claimed. When Capitol paid the judgment it received

62 Ln |

an assignment of’ the State’s judgment and was subrogated to
the State’s claim against Eaglé.. With court approval Capitol
Indemnity Corporation filed a cross: ‘petition against Marshall
Smith and Onini Corporation.

Il: The issues between Capitol and Marshall Smith were
the status of Marshall Smith as nominee, the extent of his
receipt or control of the assets of Eagle and the priority of in-
terest between Capitol, Assignee of the State and Marshall
Smith.

‘ The trial court found that Capitol Indemnity Corporation
had no right to personal judgment against Marshall Smith and
dismissed the action against him.

“TIL: The issues between Capitol and Omni were the status
and ‘relationship between Omni and Eagle, the manner,
character and method of transferring the assets'from Eagle
Petroleum to Omni, ‘the legal effectiveness of the transaction
and: ‘the priority resulting therefrom “as between’ Omni and
Capitol. -

When Onini repossessed the equipment under-the sales
contract there was a balance due of $9440.23. Smith’ asserted
that the value of the equipment at the time * ‘was less than
$9400.

An inventory of Hagle’s merchandise and assets was taken
(not including the equipment repossessed under the sales con-
tract) and an‘“Bstimated-Guess” of Hagle’s assets and liabil-
ities was prepared February 5. However, it was later deter-
mined that:one bank account listed was nonexistent, another
account was garnished and ortly $941.25 ‘was collected from the
credit card receivables. Funds obtained by Smith from the
credit card accounts were either garnished or' attached by the
Scott County sheriff for taxes due from Eagle: sales tax,
$122.22; personal property tax, $693. 835" and city personal
property taxes, $125.20."

June 7 a final accounting between Eagle ‘and Omni was
completed without reférence to the repossessed equipment.
Otherwise this indicated that Smith’ or Omni received in in-
ventory or'moneys a total of $9375. 87 which the court found to
be the value of these assets. '

eS 8

There is no dispute as to how the proceeds from these
assets were applied. Records of all payments made from the
property were received in evidence.

Omni credited itself with $1061.48, the total amount paid
to Eagle’s employees under wage assignments; $1376.33 in
payment of property taxes against the station properties;
$1415.02 rental for all stations for December as computed by
gallonage and the minimum; $1375 for January rent on all
stations; $104.72 for delinquent water bills against the various
stations; and $141.47 a credit card payment deposited in error
to Eagle’s account.

Omni asserted a lien priority with reference to the above
items leaving a credit balance of $3901.94 which was paid to
Eagle’s attorneys. The attorneys made disbursements from
these funds for nonresident income taxes, withholding and
state and federal unemployment taxes totaling $2208.59. The
attorneys also received a refund on insurance premiums. This
amount plus the retained balance after the above disburse-
ments amounted to $1873. The attorneys are asserting a lien
in the amount of $519.01 against the funds in their hands.

As stated it is payment of the foregoing claims that pre-
sented the issue to be determined in the trial court.

In its appeal from the court’s determination of that issue
Omni asserts as propositions relied on for reversal (1) The
Bulk Sales Act does not apply and does not void the transfer
from Eagle to Omni, the remaining creditors may look to the
surplus in the hands of Eagle’s attorneys over Omni’s debts,
(2) In the alternative if the Act does apply, thereby voiding
the transfer, the creditors and their claims are returned to the
status quo, (3) The surplus over the sums retained by Omni,
now in Hagle’s hands, is subject to those creditors’ claims who
are entitled to priority over the fuel taxing and (4) Sums col-
lected by Smith and garnished in his hands are prior to the
fuel tax lien.

IV... In determining it unnecessary to decide whether the
transfer from Hagle was a sale under the provisions of the Act
the trial court reasoned that if the transaction were such sale,
all Capitol would be entitled to is a right to be restored to the
position it would have occupied if the provisions of the Act

64 Ee _

had been complied with. This would necessitate a determina-
tion of priority of liens and the court would be confronted with
the same problem whether the transfer was a sale or not.

HI Im considering Omni’s first and second propositions
relied on, we examine the transaction as related to the re-
possession under the conditional sales contract. This presents
the question whether repossession by the vendor upon vendee’s
default under such contract is to be considered a sale or trans-
fer by the vendee-merchant within the purview of the Bulk
Sales Act. Section 555.1, Code, 1962, provides in part: “The
sale, transfer, or assignment, in bulk, of any part or the whole
of a stock of merchandise and the fixtures pertaining to the
conducting of said business, otherwise than in the ordinary
course of trade * * * shall be void as against the creditors
of the seller, transferor, or assignor: * * *” unless certain
conditions are met which the parties to this litigation admit
were not complied with.

The only property which Hagle had’ in the equipment
covered by the conditional sales contract was the right to
acquire title thereto by performing the conditions ‘provided for
in the sales contract. Universal Credit Co. v. Mamminga, 214
Towa 1185, 1138, 1189, 243 N.W. 513, 514. Omni had a con-
tractual right upon Eagle’s default in payment of the purchase
price to repossess with or without legal process as provided in
paragraph 9 of exhibit A, the conditional sales contract.

“The rule is quite generally recognized that under a con-
ditional sale contract the seller, upon default in payment of the
purchase price by the conditional buyer, has three well-defined
remedies: (1) He may sue for and recover the purchase price;

(2) recover possession of the property; or (3) foreclose’ the
buyer’s right in an equitable action. * * *.” Short v. Martin,
255 Iowa 189, 194, 121 N.W.2d 154, 157, and citations. Omni
elected to pursue the second remedy. Before Eagle performed
the terms of said contract and acquired title to the equipment,
Omni repossessed the same under the contract as it had a right
to do. Eagle, by allowing repossession without a court con-
test, was only doing that which it was obligated to do under the
contract and was not making a transfer or assignment ag con-

eS 6

templated by section 555.1, Code, 1962, by allowing Omni
peaceful possession. The repossession by Omni under the con-
ditional sales contract did not contravene the Act.

We next consider the possession acquired under the con-
tractual lien given by the lease, exhibit B. Omni was given a
lien in paragraph 11 to secure payment and performance of all
obligations by the lessee to be performed under the lease on all
property, including merchandise dealt in, which was or might
thereafter be placed by the lessee on the demised premises.
Paragraph 18 provided that in the event of default in any
provisions thereof the lessor might at anytime terminate the
same and take the property upon v which the lien was given in
paragraph 11.

HI A lease which in addition | to the statutory lien makes
the rent charge a lien upon the property of the tenant on the
premises whether exempt from execution or not constitutes, in
effect, a chattel mortgage or equitable lien. Beh v. Tilk, 222
Towa 729, 731, 269 N.W. 751, 752, and citations.

When the lease was terminated Eagle owed rent as well as
certain utility bills and taxes. It was indebted to Omni. Omni
was not only a creditor it had a lien upon the stock for rent
and performance by Hagle of other obligations under the lease.
In an effort to collect this indebtedness Omni had the right to
enforce its contractual lien as it would a chattel mortgage by
an action in equity. It could have levied execution or attach-
ment on the stock. Why should Eagle be precluded from com-
plying voluntarily with the obligation imposed upon it by the
contractual lien?

Hi The Bulk Sales Act does not operate to prevent a
ereditor from taking a transfer of stock from his debtor in
payment of a debt. Gorman y. Hellberg, 190 Iowa 728, 729,
180 N.W. 732, 738, citing Des Moines Packing Company v.
Uneaphor, 174 Iowa 39, 156 N.W.171. “This is not saying that
a creditor may not be found guilty of fraud in fact in a given
ease. Nor is it saying that he may not be deemed a volunteer
as to any surplus coming into his hands over and above his
debt.” Gorman vy. Hellberg, supra, 190 Iowa at 730.

We agree with Omni’s contention asserted in propositions

66 |

one and two that the Bulk Sales Act does not apply to these
transfers. .

As stated, when the stations were taken over there was a
surplus over Hagle’s indebtedness to Omni. This was the sum
paid to Eagle’s attorneys.

HV. The issue remains whether payments made from
the property in question were on claims entitled to a priority
over the motor fuel tax lien or were they inferior to such liens.

Capitol by assignment succeeded to the State’s right to
assert a lien for motor fuel tax against Eagle. Omni was for all
practical purposes Eagle’s assignee.

Section 324.65, Code, 1962, establishes the lien for motor
fuel tax and provides in part:

“Lamy or Fusn Taxes—Pnrioriry,

“(1) The amount of fuel taxes imposed by this chapter,
including interest and penalty and costs that may accrue, shall
be a lien in favor of the state upon franchises, property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, then belonging to
or thereafter acquired by a person liable for the payment of
the fuel taxes from the date the taxes are due and payable as
provided in this chapter and until the amount of the lien is
paid or the property sold in payment thereof. Fuel tax liens
shall have priority over any lien or. encumbrance whatsoever
except the lien of other state taxes having priority by law, and
except that a fuel tax lien shall not have priority over any
bona fide mortgagee, pledgee, attaching creditor or purchaser
whose right shall have attached prior to the time the treasurer
shall have filed his certificate in the office of the clerk of the
court. * * #.”

Section 324.88, Code, 1962, 1966, relating to motor vehicle
taxes provides, in substance, that for the purpose of determin-
ing the amount of his liability for the tax imposed, each dealer
shall not later than the last day of each calendar month file
with the treasurer a monthly return, showing certain pre-
seribed data for the next preceding calendar month. The re-
turn shall be accompanied by remittance in the amount of tax
due for the month.

The statute gives the State a lien for the tax imposed in-

es 6

eluding interest, penalty and costs that accrue. It provides
that the lien shall have priority over any lien or encumbrance
whatsoever except the lien of other state taxes having priority
by law. In addition to this exception, the lien has no priority
over “any bona fide mortgagee, pledgee, attaching creditor or
purchaser whose right shall have attached prior to the time the
treasurer shall have filed his certificate in the office of the clerk
of the court.” Section 324.65, supra.

March 15, 1963, when the treasurer filed his certificate
giving the State’s lien priority as provided by this section,
Omni had acquired status as an attaching creditor both to the
equipment covered by the conditional sales contract and the
merchandise and inventory covered by its contractual lien.
These rights had attached January 28 and 29. As to the
equipment covered in the sales contract Omni exercised its
remedy of recovering possession upon Tagle’s default. See
Division IV, supra. Thereafter Eagle had no property what-
ever in the equipment. It had been lost in a legal manner.
Universal Credit Co. v. Mamminga, supra.

As to the property covered by the contractual lien the
provision in Omni’s lease had created a valid chattel mortgage
lien as between it and Eagle for rent and Hagle’s performance
of the obligations imposed on it under the lease. Evans v.
Stewart, 245 Iowa 1268, 1280, 66 N.W.2d 442, 449; Mason City
and Clear Lake R. Co. v. Imperial Seed Co. (N.D. Iowa C.D.),
152 F. Supp. 145, 151. To this extent the lien could have been
enforced by levying execution or attachment on Hagle’s de-
fault. The fact Hagle voluntarily turned the property over to
Omni without the necessity of legal process does not affect
Omni’s status as an attaching creditor to the merchandise and
inventory encumbered by its lease. Gorman v. Hellberg, supra.

It is true neither the conditional sales contract nor the
lease was recorded.

Section 556.8, Code, 1962, provides: “No sale or mortgage
of personal property where the vendor or mortgagor retains
actual possession thereof is valid against existing creditors or
subsequent purchasers without notice, * * *” unless the in-
strument is recorded as provided in this section.

68 SE

[| Recording is not a part of the execution, and an un-
recorded instrument is valid as between the parties to it. In re
Estate of Lewis, 230 Iowa 694, 700, 298 N.W. 842, 845, 187
A.L.R. 562. However, this is not determinative of its status as
a valid lien with respect to third parties nor as to its priority
in the case of conflicting claims to the property involved. Mason
City and Clear Lake R. Co. v. Imperial Seed Co., supra. Being
unrecorded, the chattel mortgage is invalid as to “existing
ereditors or subsequent purchasers without notice.” Of course
the State does not have the status of a subsequent purchaser
nor is it an “existing creditor” under the provisions of this
Code section.

We said in In re Estate of Lewis, supra: “This court has
uniformly held that the term ‘existing creditors’, as used in
the statute, means general creditors, who have, by execution or
attachment, levied upon the mortgaged property, or otherwise
acquired a lien thereon, without notice of the mortgage on the
part of the creditor, or of the levying officer.”

The State was not of the classes protected by the recording
statute. “* * * [T]he general statutory prescription is that an
unrecorded mortgage is void as against creditors of the
mortgagor, or his subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good
faith, and the courts construe creditors in this connection to
mean those who have acquired some specific interest in the
chattels, by seizure under levy or otherwise, prior to the re-
cording of the mortgage and without notice of it.” 1 Jones,
Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, Bowers Hdition,
section 247b.

| | Where the term “creditors” is not limited or qualified,
by statute, the general principle adhered to is that only credi-
tors who have acquired or fastened a lien upon the property,
as by execution, attachment, or judgment, can challenge the
validity of a contract of conditional sale because it is not re-
corded. 3 Jones, Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales,
section 1112. Citing Warner v. Jameson, 52 Iowa 70, 72, 73,
2 N.W. 951, 953.

Hl [t would follow under the circumstances here, failure
to record the lease as a chattel mortgage does not. affect Omni’s

eS 69

status as an attaching creditor nor its claim to priority for
those obligations secured by its lease as against the fuel tax
lien, Therefore, Omni’s claim for rent of $2790.02, the water
pill of $104.72 received sometime prior to February 5 for three
different stations for a three-month period preceding that date
and the real property taxes of $1376.33 for 1962 payable in
1968, all totaling $4271.07, were a proper credit against the
assets acquired by Omni under its contractual lien.

The claim for credit of $141.40, a credit card payment, had
been deposited by error in Hagle’s account. It was actually
due Omni and would be a proper deduction.

VI. From the surplus of these asscts Omni paid cer-
tain wages of Hagle’s employees. Hagle had issued checks
totaling $1061.48 for the payroll period of January 15 to 28.
This was Hagle’s obligation. When the checks were returned
for insufficient funds Omni took assignments and paid the em-
ployees. As each of these wage claims was limited to $100 Omni
asserts a total eredit of $877.23. Although this item was paid
by Omni as a mere volunteer, if the wage claim was entitled
to priority over the fuel tax lien, Omni should be credited with
$877.23. Section 324.65 does not specifically give such claims
priority. However, section 626.69 provides:

“Labor claims preferred. When the property of any com-
pany * * * or person shall * * * be seized by the action of cred-
itors, for the purpose of paying or securing the payment of the
debts of such company * * * or person, the debts owing to em-
ployees for labor performed within the ninety days next pre-
ceding the seizure or transfer of such property, to an amount
not exceeding one hundred dollars to each person, shall he a
preferred debt and paid in full * * *.”

Section 626.73 which’ sets up the priority to be given
provides:

“Priority. Claims of employees for labor, if not contested,
or if allowed after contest, shall have priority over all claims
against or liens upon such property, except prior mechanics’
liens for labor in opening or developing coal mines as allowed
by law.”

When Omni acquired possession of the merchandise and
inventory under its contractual lien it was a creditor. It had

70 a _

“seized” the property for the payment of Hagle’s debt just as
effectively as if execution had issued. Hagle’s business was
suspended by the action of its creditor and its assets transfer-
red toa nominee. The fact that Hagle voluntarily surrendered
possession which it could have been required to do should not
operate to defeat the wage claims. As tending to support our
position see Heessel v. Creston National Bank, 205 Iowa 508,
218 N.W. 298.

We do not believe it was the intent of the legislature in
enacting section $24.65 to nullify the priority given by the
above statutes and we now hold that the wage claims to the
extent of $877.23 were entitled to priority over the motor fuel
tax lien.

VII. The items thus allowed Omni as credited against
the assets in question total $5289.70. So far as we are able to
determine from the record and exhibits the surplus was paid
to Eagle’s attorneys who made various disbursements for taxes.

In its third proposition relied on, Omni contends that funds
in Eagle’s hands are subject to those creditors’ claims who are
entitled to priority over the fuel tax lien. If it is so deter-
mined, credit should be allowed, although in doing so Omni
was acting as a volunteer.

Omni argues the amount paid for nonresident withholding
tax and federal withholding taxes has priority and money in
the hands of Eagle’s attorneys was subject to the fuel tax lien
and has priority over the attorneys’ lien asserted by Hagle’s
attorneys. At trial the parties stipulated as to the dates of
assessments and filing of the tax lien for each of these taxes
as well as those due for state and federal unemployment tax.

The 1962 federal withholding and social security tax for
the last quarter amounted to $193.89 and for the first quarter
of 1963, $1134.78, a total of $1328.67. The 1962 Iowa nonresi-
dent income tax withheld was $226.06. The total disburse-
ment for these taxes was $1554.73.

HM 31 US.C.A., section 191, provides: “Whenever any per-
son indebted to the United States is insolvent, * * * the debts
due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority
established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor,

eS 1

not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a
voluntary assignment thereof * * *.”

We are satisfied that the expenditures for the 1962 and
1968 federal withholding and social security taxes were en-
titled to priority.

Section 422.26, Code, 1962, provides in part:

“Whenever any taxpayer liable to pay a tax * * * neglects
to pay same, * * * such tax, together with the costs that may
accrue * * * shall be a lien in favor of the state * * *.

“The lien aforesaid shall attach at the time the tax be-
comes due and payable and shall continue until * * * satisfied.

“Tn order to preserve the aforesaid lien again subsequent
mortgagees, purchasers or judgment creditors, * * * the com-
mission shall file with the recorder of the county * * * a notice
of said lien.”

The nonresident income tax was due and owing not later
than January 31, 1968. Under the quoted Code section the
lien did not have to be filed in order to be preserved against
the fuel tax lien.

In written argument Omni does not contend the state and
federal unemployment taxes were prior claims.

Eagle’s attorneys received money belonging to Eagle June
10, 1963. Their lien then attached. However, the fuel tax
lien had established priority before this date.

VIII. In support of its remaining proposition assigned
Omni contends the sums collected by Smith and garnished by
the sheriff have priority. The sales tax was due and payable
in quarterly installments on the last day of the month next
succeeding each quarterly period. The lien here attached De-
eember 31, 1962, and under the provisions of section 324.65
was prior. The Scott County personal property tax for 1962
became a lien on January 1, 1963, and was also prior to the
fuel tax lien. The city personal property taxes for 1962 be-
came a lien on the date of levy, July 1962, and are prior.

We agree with Omni’s contention as asserted in this
proposition. . .

TX. After allowing credit for disbursements made in pay-
ment of taxes from the surplus, but adding thereto $179.65

2

received as-an insurance premium refund, we conclude Capi-
tol is entitled to judgment against Omni in the sum of $2711.09
with interest as provided in the trial court’s decree of October
22, 1965.

X. In view of our holding as announced in Division IX,
supra, we find Capitol’s appeal which asserts the trial court
erred in failing to award it judgment in the sum of $10,947.66,
being the amount of fuel tax, interest and penalty due for the
months of December and January, is without merit.

For decree in favor of Capitol in accordance with this
opinion the cause is—Modified and affirmed on appeal of Omni,
affirmed on cross-appeal of Capitol, and remanded.

All Justices concur except Justice LuGranp, who takes
no part.

Inn Operations, Inc., appellee, v. River Hmrs Motor Inn
Company, a partnership, et al., appellants.

No. 52490.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 808)

Py
Pg

Sepremper 22, 1967.

Philip T, Riley and M. A. Iverson, of Des Moines, for ap-
pellants City of Des Moines, Charles Iles, George Whitmer,
Jens Grothe, Wallace Buss and George Nahas, as members of
City, Council and Urban Renewal Board.

Thoma, Schoenthal, Davis, Hockenberg & Wine, of Des
Moines, for appellants River Hills Motor Inn Company and
F. W. Weitz.

Connolly, O'Malley & Conley, of Des Moines, for appellee.

Mason, J.—Inm Operations, Inc., a Kansas corporation,
brought this equity action to restrain defendant city of Des

SS

Moines and members of its council and urban renewal board
(herein referred to as “city”), defendant River Hills Motor Inn
Company, a limited partnership of Des Moines, and F. W.
Weitz, a general partner therein, individually, (both herein
referred to as Motor Inn) from consummating sales of urban
renewal land. The city acquired the land in question, Parcel
T-3, as a part of River Hills Urban Renewal area.

The urban renewal plan for River Hills Project had been
approved pursuant to the Federal Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat.
418, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. section 1441 et seq., and chapter
408, Code, 1962, by the federal agency and the city, local public
agency and its urban renewal board March 28, 1960. It was
revised February 5, 1962, and again January 21, 1963. Under
the Federal Housing Act the local program is administered by
a local public agency, here the city. Defendant city appointed an
urban renewal board as an advisory board to make recommen-
dations to the council, acting itself as the local governing body,
and reserved to itself the exercise of the urban renewal powers
as specified in section 403.14, paragraphs (1) and (2), chapter
403.

The plan provided that recommended zoning districts with-
in the renewal area “were established as most closely approach-
ing regulations and controls for the area. Wherever these
regulations and controls are at variance with the provisions
of the Des Moines zoning ordinance, the most restrictive reg-
ulations shall take precedence.”

Sale of Parcels T-1 and T-3 in this renewal area was pre-
viously before us in Boss Hotels Company v. City of Des
Moines, 258 Iowa 1872, 141 N.W.2d 541.

Plaintiff alleged some of the city’s procedures in connec-
tion with disposition of urban renewal property were illegal
and asked that defendants be permanently enjoined from en-
tering into any contract with other than plaintiff for the sale
and development of Parcel T-8 in River Hills Urban Renewal
area; the city be enjoined from taking any steps to perform
any contract for the sale thereof to other than plaintiff and be
directed to sell and contract with plaintiff for the sale and pur-
chase of Parcel T-3.

After trial the district court permanently enjoined de-

CS

fendants from entering into any contract for the sale and dis-
posal of Parcel T-3, pursuant to Motor Inn’s proposal under the
disposal procedures used by the city and held any contracts
already entered into illegal and void. Defendants moved to
vacate the decision, for a new trial and to enlarge and amend
the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and to modify
judgment. The motion was overruled with the exception of
certain changes in the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
summary and direction.

I.. Under the Des Moines zoning ordinance adopted as part
of the plan, Parcel T-3 is zoned for tourist-commercial use and
might be sold for such use to redevelopers under restrictions
which required a minimum lot area of 750 square feet per unit,
off-street parking requirements, a floor area ratio of .5 and
landscaping. Under the restrictions the height of a motel to
be erected on the parcel was limited to three stories or 45 feet;
sign restrictions included a provision no sign shall be greater
than 30 feet above curb level..

The urban renewal board’s recommendation to proceed
with the disposition of the land in the River Hills area under
negotiated open competitive conditions method set forth in
the urban renewal manual (exhibit 2) entitled “Fixed Price
with Bidding on Other-Than-Price Basis” was adopted by the
council January 15, 1962.

- Proposals to purchase various tracts in River Hills were
solicited. The disposition parcels, including T-3, were adver-
tised and a cutoff date for proposals of August 16, 1963, was
set. When no bids were received the federal agency and the
city agreed the latter would proceed as permitted by the manual
under type B for a negotiated disposal of Parcels T-1 and T-3.

May 12, 1964, the board received the first submission by
Downtowner for a five-story motel with 148 units on Parcel T-1.
Plaintifi’s president, Mr. Brock, attended the meeting while
this proposal was-being made or reviewed.

Plaintiff submitted a proposal on T-3 for two 2-story build-
ings containing 120 units at an amount substantially under
that then asked which was discussed at the August 25 board
meeting. Plaintiff negotiated with the board at this meeting

7

and was told: “We are not in a position to take your offer
where the price is concerned. We think it requires further
negotiating between our staff and your company to see if an
actually agreeable proposal can be made.”

Parcels T-1 and T-3 were reappraised and a reuse study
was reported at the September 1 board meeting. During the
summer and fall many board meetings were concerned with the
use of these parcels and the minimum price for which they
could be sold.

After reappraisal the board decided to readvertise because
of new lower prices, time for receiving proposals was extended
to October 30 and the staff was advised to notify all concerned
“that alternate uses for the property would also be considered.”

At an October 27 board meeting the cutoff date for receiv-
ing proposals on the disposition parcels was extended to No-
vember 2, 1964,

On the latter date Motor Inn submitted a proposal for an
eight-story structure and the purchase of T-3. The bid was
expressly subject to rezoning or modification to permit thereon
the erection of a motel in conformance with the plan attached.

Boss Hotels submitted a proposal for a six-story structure
and plaintiff an amended proposal for a three-story structure
and purchase of T-3. No proposal met all building restrictions
applicable to the area, each required some modification of the
renewal plan.

At a November 10 meeting the renewal board permitted
those making proposals to make oral presentations.

Motor Inn described in some detail to the board the make-
up and structure of its partnership and financial responsibility.
The board then voted to recommend to the City Council a con-
tract be awarded to Motor Inn.

November 16 the city conditionally accepted Motor Inn’s
proposal subject to final approval by the federal agency and
authorized and directed the renewal board to negotiate a
formal written contract with Motor Inn and present it to the
council for approval and execution.

That day the city also adopted a modification of the River
Hills Urban. Renewal plan, as revised, amended and modified,

CS

by removing the height restrictions and modifying floor area
and sign restrictions on both T-1 and T-3 so the proposal was
not at variance with the plan or zoning ordinance. In other
words, after the proposal was in, after the cutoff date for
filing proposals, and after the proposal of Motor Inn had been
accepted, the city council modified the urban renewal plan so
the proposal conformed thereto. March 15, 1965, the city
approved this modified urban renewal plan.

The formal written contract resulting from negotiations
between the board and Motor Inn was submitted to the federal
agency for approval and concurrence. The federal agency
concurred in the offering and the contract between the city
and Motor Inn was signed.

The validity and procedure of the revisions and modifi-
cations of November 16 and March 15, 1965, constitute one of
the issues in this litigation.

Motor Inn’s proposal, accepted by the City, exceeded the
restrictions of the plan and the zoning ordinance in these par-
ticulars: the floor area ratio of the proposal was .78, approx-
imately 55 percent in excess of the permitted ratio; the building
structure 85 feet high, 35 feet in excess of the height restric-
tions; the building structure eight stories in height, five stories
in excess of the restriction; and the sign was 90 feet above curb
level, 60 feet in excess of the restriction.

The city’s modification of the urban renewal plan was
adopted without notice and public hearing and without ob-
serving the requirements and procedures by which the plan
was originally adopted. It eliminated the restriction regarding
use and development of tourist-commercial areas, including
Parcel T-3, as to the maximum floor area ratio: .5, the height
restriction building and structure of 45 feet or three stories
and the specific restriction as to signs, while retaining floor
area ratios and height restrictions in other districts.

Plaintiff’s proposal complied with the urban renewal plan
except in the matter of floor area ratio. This was computed by
the city plan and zoning staff and reported to the board as .53.

Il. ‘The trial court found the city failed to comply with
Code section 403.8 and procedures used to dispose of the parcel

Ss

did not comply with the statutory requirement that sale be héld
under reasonable competitive bidding procedures. This failure
resulted in every qualified developer not having a fair op-
portunity to submit a bid or proposal. Although plaintiff was
specifically advised it should observe the plan and zoning
ordinances, Motor Inn was encouraged by the urban renewal
director to submit a proposal on T-3 higher than three stories
and 45 feet. Plaintiff relied on the representations this re-
striction would be enforced and eomplied with it in making its
proposal,

The court further found the fair value of the parcel was
affected by the restrictions on height of structure and maximum
floor area set forth in the plan and zoning ordinance and the
city’s failure to notify qualified developers these restrictions
would not be enforced may have prevented greater return to
the city and the United States upon sale of the property.

It appeared to the trial court that the city’s adoption of
modification of the plan was an endeavor to qualify the pro-
posal of Motor Inn otherwise, in substantial violation of the
plan and zoning ordinance.

The court held Motor Inn’s proposal did not comply with
the plan and zoning ordinance; modification of the plan after
the date for receiving proposals and approval of Motor Inn’s
proposal could not be retroactive to November 2, 1964; modifi-
eations of the plan were illegal, inequitable and void and, as
stated, directed that a permanent injunction issue.

III. Defendants appeal, assigning ten propositions relied
on for reversal. Our review is de novo. Rule 334, Rules of
Civil Procedure. Consideration of defendants’ propositions will
not necessarily follow the order of assignment. Those not
dealt with in this opinion have been deemed to be without
merit.

Defendants contend plaintiff, a foreign corporation doing
business in Iowa without a certificate of authority to do so,
has no capacity or right to maintain this action, relying on Code
sections 4964.108 and 496A.120.

Section 496A.103 provides in part:

“No foreign corporation shall have the right to transact

0

business in this state until it shall have procured a certificate
of authority so to do from the secretary of state. * * *.”

Section 4964.120 provides in part:

“No foreign corporation transacting business in this state
without a certificate of authority shall be permitted to main-
tain any action, suit or proceeding in any court of this state,
until such corporation shall have obtained a certificate of
authority, * * *, .

“The failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate
of authority to transact business in this state shall not impair
the validity of any contract or act of such corporation, and
shall not prevent such corporation from defending any action,
suit or proceeding in any court of this state.”

These sections are based on sections 99 and 117 of the
Model Business Corporation Act.

Plaintiff filed its petition February 15, 1965, and service
was immediately had on defendants. Motions to dismiss, as-
serting plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish
its standing to maintain the action in that it had neither al-
leged it was a domestic corporation nor pleaded facts showing
compliance with section 496A.120 were filed by Motor Inn
March 19 and by the city March 23. Plaintiff filed amended
petition March 29 alleging it was authorized to do business
in Iowa and that a certificate of authority therefor had been
issued. The certificate was issued March 26. Both motions
were overruled July 14.

Defendants’ proposition presents the question whether a
foreign corporation not eligible to sue under the statute at the
time the action is instituted can, after bringing it, maintain the
action by complying with the terms of the statute.

HH The State has filed brief as amicus curiae in support of
defendants’ position and argues the word “maintain” implies a
prohibition against beginning the action, that maintaining an
action is itself commencement and quotes the following from
17 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, 1960 Revised Volume,
section 8538 :

“Tt is the majority rule that the prohibition in the statute
against maintaining. an action implies a prohibition against

Ss

beginning it, for the beginning of the action is one of the
necessary steps in maintaining it, and-the word ‘maintain’ as
used in the statute is construed to be practically synonymous
with ‘bring’ or ‘begin’.” Citing G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Peimeisl (1901), 85 Minn. 121, 88 N.W. 441, and citations.

However, the above quotation is immediately followed in
the text by this:

“But in a well-considered Massachusetts case under a
statute providing that no action shall be maintained or re-
covery had in any of the courts of the state by any foreign
corporation so long as it fails to comply with the statutory
conditions precedent to its right-to do business in the state,
and also providing that failure of foreign corporations to com-
ply with such conditions shall not affect the validity of con-
tracts made by or with such corporation, it is held that the
word ‘maintain’ carries a different meaning from ‘institute’ or
‘begin,’ and implies that an action must be begun before it
can be maintained; and that the effect of the statute is, there-
fore, when noncompliance with its terms is seasonably and
properly pleaded, to stay proceedings until the temporary dis-
ability is removed, which can be done at any time after as well
as before resort to the courts.” Citing National Fertilizer Co.
v. Fall River Five Cents Sav. Bank (1907), 196 Mass. 458, 82
NE. 671, 672, 673, 14 L.R.A., N.S., 561, 564.

An annotation in 6 A.L.R. 3d 326, 331, states:

“Under statutes which merely provide that a noncomply-
ing corporation shall not maintain or prosecute or defend any
suit in the courts of the state until compliance is made with
the statutory requirements, it is generally held that a com-
pliance after an action has been begun is sufficient to enable
the corporation to maintain the action. However, there are
some cases to the contrary.” Cases from many state and federal
jurisdictions are cited in support.

‘We know of no prior decisions of this court on the precise
issue presented. However, in his comment at page 111, 28B
LC.A. Mr. Clarence Cosson states:

“Under the Iowa Business Corporation Act contracts made
by a foreign corporation improperly transacting business in
Iowa without authority are not permanently unenforceable.

SS

They are merely unenforceable until the corporation secures a
certificate of authority, after which they are fully enforceable.”

In Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., section 117, paragraph 4,
it is stated:

“Tf suit has been instituted prior to qualification, the cor-
poration may then qualify and continue its litigation without
the necessity of refiling suit after qualification, * * *.”

We now hold the word “maintain” in the statute does not
inhibit the institution of the action and that a foreign corpora-
tion may at anytime after the action is brought maintain and
prosecute it by first complying with the terms of the statute.
As further support for this conclusion see Commercial Credit
Corporation v. Boyko, 103 N.J.L. 620, 187 A. 584, 536.

Defendants’ contention under this assignment cannot be
sustained.

IV. Under another assignment defendants contend plain-
tiff is not a taxpayer and citizen of the city or state and may
not question the city’s procedure in this matter; that as a dis-
appointed bidder plaintiff has no standing to sue. Motor Inn
had asserted this contention as an affirmative defense.

In Boss Hotels Company v. City of Des Moines, supra, the
question of that plaintiff’s standing to sue was raised but not
reached.

HEME Hauity has jurisdiction to prevent public officers and
boards from letting or carrying out unauthorized and illegal
contracts for public improvements. 43 C.J.S., Injunctions,
section 120. Ordinarily a disappointed bidder for a contract,
unless he is also a taxpayer, is not a proper party to sue for an
injunction in a representative action. Day v. City of Beatrice,
169 Neb. 858, 101 N.W.2d 481, 486, citing 43 C.J.S., Injunctions,
supra; State ex rel. Helena Allied Printing Council v. Mitchell,
105 Mont. 326, 74 P.2d 417, 420; Malan Constr. Corp. v. Board
of County Road Commrs. (E.D. Mich. S8.D.), 187 F. Supp. 987,
939; Fetters v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 31 Del. Ch.
338; 73 A.2d 644, 647; Waszen v. Atlantic City, 1 N.J. 272, 63
A.2d 255, 256,

In the Fetters and Waszen cases the courts distinguished
between the status of the litigant taxpayer. and that of the

EE:

unsuccessful bidders in resolving issues as to standing. .In
both decisions taxpayer-litigants were held to have standing
while mere unsuccessful bidders were held to lack standing.

In its amended petition plaintiff alleged it was a taxpayer
within the state and entitled to pursue the pending litigation.
To support this allegation plaintiff asserts its ownership of all
stock of Des Moines Hotels, Inc., and Iowa Super Hotels, Inc.,
qualified it as a taxpayer for purposes of this suit. Both are
Iowa corporations.

Des Moines Hotels is the owner of Holiday Inn North and
Iowa Super Hotels owns Holiday Inn South, both in Des
Moines. Brock and Linguist are the sole stockholders of
plaintiff corporation. The two Iowa corporations paid sub-
stantial real-estate taxes on property in the city in excess of
$70,000 per year. Plaintiff’s predecessor, Linquist Construc-
tion Company, became a division of plaintiff in March 1963.
Since becoming such division the construction company had
paid use taxes, sales taxes and payroll taxes of several kinds.
Plaintiff filed a consolidated federal income tax return includ-
ing Iowa Super Hotels and Des Moines Hotels for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1965.

The trial court found plaintiff’s ownership of all stock in
the two Iowa corporations paying substantial real-estate taxes
in the city at all times pertinent thereto qualified it as a tax-
payer for the purpose of this litigation. Plaintiff argues in
support of this finding that if it should be determined being a
taxpayer is of importance, then in equity the corporate entity
should be disregarded to give plaintiff a standing as a Des
Moines taxpayer.

To sustain plaintiff’s argument we would be required to
disregard the separate entity of the three corporations and
treat the parent corporation and the subsidiaries as one, for the
parent’s benefit.

HH Generally one who has created a corporate entity will
not be permitted to disregard it to gain an advantage, which
under it would be lost. Harp v. Schmitz, 334 Ill. App. 382, 79
N.E.2d 687, 639.

HM“ ‘That one * * * corporation may own * * * all the
stock of a corporation does not establish a legal [identity] * * *

eS

so as to render acts by one the acts of the other.’ 1 Fletcher
Cyclopedia Corporations, section 28, page 104. See also section
25, page 90 et seq. [now 1963 Revised Volume 1, pages 124
and 96].” Wescott & Winks Hatcheries v. F. M. Stamper Co.,
249 Towa 30, 36, 37, 85 N.W.2d 603, 607.

In Rexall Drug Co. v. Peterson, 118 Cal. App.2d 528, 530,
248 P.2d 433, 434, the court stated: “Ownership of capital
stock in one corporation by another does not itself create
identity of corporate interest as between the two.” See also
Schwob Mtg. Co. v. Huiet, 69 Ga. App. 285, 25 8.H.2d 149, and
citations.

“Ownership of capital stock in one corporation by another
does not, itself, create an identity of corporate interest between
the two companies, nor render the stockholding company the
owner of the property of the other, * * *, Nor does the identity
of officers of two corporations establish identity of the cor-
porations.” Diveo-Wayne Sales Financial Corp. v.- Martin
Vehicle Sales, 45 IH. App. 2d 192, 195 N.B.2d 287, 289. Quoting
from Superior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377 mL. 282,
289, 36 N.B.2d.354, 358,

P| A stockholder in a corporation paying taxes i is not by
that: reason a taxpayer: Price v. Flannery, 225 yy. 186, 7
S.W.2d 1067, 1068.

Hi. The mere fact that the shares of ‘stock of corporation
became merged in one owner did not destroy thé identity -of
the company as a corporation. Voll. v. Zelch, 198 Iowa 1333,
1835, 201 N.W. 38, 34.

The" corporate entity has been disregarded where the
parent corporation was asserting its independence of its sub-
sidiary to protect the parent from a third party. When the
‘court has held the parent: was not independent of its subsidiary
it has done so to-prevent the parent from perpetrating a fraud
or injustice, evading just responsibility or defeating public
convenience,

“A corporation is treated as an entity separate from its
stockholder or stockholders under all ordinary circumstances.
Although courts have made exceptions under some circum-

Dn

stances, this has been done where applying the corporate
fiction ‘would accomplish some fraudulent purpose, operate as
a constructive fraud, or defeat some strong equitable claim
* * *> Those who are responsible for the existence of the
corporation are, in those situations, prevented from using its
separate existence to accomplish an unconscionable result.
In the present case, those who created the corporation in order
to enjoy advantages flowing from its existence as a separate
entity are asking that such existence be disregarded where it
works a disadvantage to them. We do not consider it good
policy to do so.” Stebane Nash Co. v. Campbellsport Mutual
Ins. Co., 27 Wis.2d 112, 121, 122, 183 N.W.2d 787, 748. Quoting
from Jonas v. State (1963), 19 Wis.2d 638, 644, 121 N.W.2d
235, 238, 95 A.L.R.2d 880.

In Wescott & Winks Hatcheries v. F. M. Stamper Co.,
supra, 249 Iowa at 35, 85 N.W.2d at 606, we determined:

HI “(The correct rule to be that the separate corporate
existence of the subsidiary may be ignored (at least by equity)
in order to circumvent fraud, restraint of trade, creation of
monopolistic combination or other violation of law by the
parent company or by an individual in control of both corpora-
tions.” (Citing cases) See also Washington & O. D. U. Assn. v.
Washington & Old Dom. R., 208 Va. 120, 155 $.H.2d 322, 326.

Hi In this instance, it is the parent corporation, not in-
nocent or deserving third parties, who ask us to disregard the
corporate entity to give it status as a taxpayer for the purpose
of pursuing this litigation, if taxpayer status be required. We
are not persuaded to do so.

YV. Although we agree with defendants’ contention urged
under this assignment that plaintiff does not have either de-
fendant city or Iowa taxpayer status, this does not completely
answer the question. This requires a determination whether,
under the circumstances here, such taxpayer status is essential
to plaintiff’s standing to question the city’s procedures in this
matter.

Initial funds for the urban renewal program are furnished
by the United States for acquisition of sites and operation of
the program with an ultimate division of the costs to be paid,

0

after sale of the parcels of land, two thirds by the Federal
Government and one third by the city. Because federal and
city funds were involved in the renewal project the court
found plaintiff need not be a taxpayer of defendant city to
seek relief in state courts.

Plaintiff contends the city violated both procedures re-
quired to grant it a fair opportunity to submit a proposal and
requirements of Code section 403.8 in failing to make the sale
under reasonable competitive bidding procedures. This re-
sulted in the sale to Motor Inn being void.

The trial court found the March 1 modification of the plan.
eliminating maximum floor area, height and sign restrictions in
Parcel T-3 while retaining these restrictions in other districts
constituted a major and significant amendment to the plan
requiring defendant city to observe the same requirements and
procedures by which the plan was originally adopted.

From this finding the court concluded: (1) The city failed
to comply with the requirements of Code section 403.8; (2) The
procedures used by the city to dispose of Parcel T-3 did not
comply with the statutory requirement that the sale be held
under reasonable competitive bidding procedure; (8) The fair
value of the parcel was affected by the restrictions set forth
in the urban renewal plan and zoning ordinance and (4) The
city’s failure to notify qualified developers that restrictions
contained in the plan and ordinance were not to be enforced
affected the market value of the parcel and may have pre-
vented greater return to the city and Federal Government
upon sale of the property.

From our de novo review we are satisfied there is sub-
stantial evidence supporting these conclusions.

Section 403.8(2) provides a municipality may dispose of
real property in an urban renewal area to private persons, but
“only under such reasonable competitive bidding procedures
as it shall prescribe * * * .”

Public policy underlies the requirements of com-
petitive bidding. The purpose of the statute is that each bid-
der, actual or possible, shall be put upon the same footing.
Interested purchasers should be given equal opportunity to

CC

bid on-the land bearing the same restrictions.. The municipal
authorities should not be permitted to waive any substantial
variance between the conditions under which the bids are in-
vited and.the proposals submitted. If any bidder is relieved
from conforming to the conditions which impose some duty
upon him, or from strict performance of the terms of the in-
vitation to bid, such bidder is not contracting in fair com-
petition with those bidders who propose to be bound by all
conditions. An indispensable element of such sale is the exis-
tence of a definite common standard to which all competitive
proposals alike relate. A common pattern is the foundation
of just competition. Iowa-Nebraska L. & P. Co. v. City of
Villisca, 220 Iowa 238, 248, 249, 261 N.W. 423, 429; Tufano v.
Borough of Cliffside Park in Bergen County, 110 N.J.L. 370,
165 A. 628, 629, 630; Juice Bar Corp. v. Township Committee,
36 NJ. Super. 164, 115 A.2d 181, 133,

This policy prevents the modification of specifications after
bids have been presented, and awarding the contract to one
of the bidders based upon such revised specifications.

HH The rule is familiar that one cannot take advantage
of the opportunity to achieve a contract under invalid con-
ditions and specifications and then, when unsuccessful, seek by
the prosecution of a civil action to have the award annulled.

Although plaintiff alleges it is a taxpayer and as such is
entitled to pursue this litigation, it does not allege or contend
it brings this action as a city or state taxpayer or as a class
action in behalf of taxpayers. Plaintiff is not suing as an un-
successful bidder toward whom the doctrine of estoppel is
invoked, but in its individual capacity as one who was pre-
cluded from bidding—prevented from participating in the sale.

HE Where plaintiff is arbitrarily and unreasonably de-
prived of its right to bid at a public sale, it has standing to
maintain an action to challenge the sale to another bidder as
one adversely affected even though it is not a taxpayer.

Plaintiff had been invited to submit proposals on the de-
velopment of this parcel (T-3). It, along with others, had
gone to expense and trouble to do so. It could expect fair
treatment and an opportunity to bid with the others, when the

88 | —

city had decided what restrictions would be acceptable to it
and adopted them.

The determination of plaintiff’s standing must therefore
depend on whether the condition by which it was prevented
from participating in the sale was proper and valid.

VI. Under the circumstances here, defendant city’s
failure to comply with the requirements of section 403.8(2) and
its procedures used to dispose of Parcel T-8 resulted in the
lack of a definite common standard on which to submit com-
petitive proposals. The advantage of competition was lost.
Failure to notify plaintiff and other qualified developers the
restrictions were not to be enforced denied plaintiff and such
others who might have been interested an equal opportunity
to compete in acquiring the parcel by participating in the sale.
This fact distinguishes the present case from Boss Hotels Com-
pany v. City of Des Moines, 258 Iowa 1872, 141 N.W.2d 541.

The procedures by which plaintiff was precluded from par-
ticipating are contrary to the statute, improper and void.
Plaintiff was arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived of its
right to bid and adversely affected thereby. i therefore has
standing to maintain this action.

Other propositions have been considered but determined | to
be without merit.

For these reasons the'sale to River Hills is void. The trial
court was correct in so holding.—Affrmed.

All Justices concur except LeGranp, J., who takes no part.
Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. Wmttam Parker, a/k/a WittiaM
ALEXANDER, appellant.

No, 51940
(Reported in 151 .N.W.2d 505)

©
Ss

June 6, 1967,
Researine Denrep Sepremper 22, 1967.

William C. Ball, of Waterloo, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Stephen C.
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Srvarr, J.—A Black Hawk County jury convicted defendant
of second-degree murder in violation of section 690.1, Code of
Towa. He and Herbert Roby had quarrelled at a teen-age party
in Waterloo. They confronted each other outside the home
after the party. Roby was shot in the abdomen and chest with
a .22-calibre pistol. The chest wound was fatal. Defendant
admitted the shooting but claimed it was in self-defense. He
testified he knew deceased had, on prior occasions, carried a
razor and thought he was reaching for a razor when he shot
him. He appealed from the judgment on the jury verdict and
has assigned six errors.

| | I. Parker claims the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence certain exhibits purporting to be some of the
items of clothing worn by deceased at the time of the shooting
and certain personal effects removed from the body at the
autopsy. His objection was directed toward the foundation
testimony relating to the identification and condition of the
exhibits and was primarily based on an alleged failure to prove
proper chain of custody.

«# % * it must appear that a continuous chain of control
was exercised over any such exhibit which is offered into
evidence, and that the exhibit was in substantially the same
condition when offered as when seized. If there is sufficient
proof that the exhibits offered were the same as those taken,
and their contents were in the same condition when analyzed
and introduced as when taken, they are admissible. The pre-
liminary proof in this respect is for the court.” (Citing cases)
State v. Perry, 246 Iowa 861, 869, 870, 69 N.W. 2d 412, 417.

The exhibits in question are exhibit 6, a polo shirt; exhibit
T, a “T” shirt; exhibit 11, man’s boxer shorts; exhibit 12,

92 Le 7

trousers; exhibit. 15, two black sox; exhibit 16, a billfold; and
exhibit 17, a hairbrush and a medallion on a chain. There is
evidence the deceased was wearing a black banlon polo shirt,
a white “T” shirt and dark trousers at the time he was shot.
A nurse who was present when deceased was brought to the
hospital testified he was wearing a jacket (exhibit 5, not in-
volved here), a short sleeved polo shirt type of sweater with a
“T” shirt underneath. She identified exhibit 7 as the “T” shirt
they cut away from deceased’s injury. The supervising nurse
testified no items of clothing other than shoes and a jacket
were removed from’ deceased’s body in her presence.

Deceased died in the hospital between 11:20 and 11:30.
Dr. Paul O'Keefe, Black Hawk County medical examiner, ar-
rived about 12:10. He found the body clothed in a dark blue
heavy sport shirt, white undershirt, printed shorts and dark
trousers. “The only items of personal property found on the
body were a purse or billfold and a driver’s license. * * * The
clothing at that time was left on the body and the witness
directed that the body be placed in the morgue of the hospital.
At approximately 8:30 on the morning of the Tth of March,
1967, an autopsy was performed on the body and the clothing
removed” under the supervision of the witness and given to the
police. He identified the dark trousers by the penetrating hole
in them. He did not attempt to identify any of the other
exhibits further.

Officer Dirksen testified he was present at the autopsy. He
took charge of the clothing and personal effects as the doctors
removed them from the body, initialed each item and sealed it
in an airtight bag. He saw the medallion around the neck of
the deceased in the autopsy room. It was removed in his
presence. He first saw the hairbrush on a small table in the
autopsy room with the objects of clothing he was wrapping up.
He identified each exhibit as the item received by him from
one or the other of the two doctors conducting the autopsy and
testified they were in substantially the same condition at the
trial as when he received them.

There does not appear to be any question raised about the
chain of control after these exhibits came into the hands of the

— a 98

police. The break in the chain of custody about which de-
fendant complains occurred between the time the medical
examiner observed the body shortly after midnight and the
time of the autopsy at 8:30 in the morning.

There is no testimony explaining how the body reached the
morgue or what security measures were taken to prevent any-
one from molesting it in the eight-hour interval. However,
under all the circumstances here, we are not prepared to say
this fact rendered the evidence inadmissible. The clothing
removed from the body answered the description and con-
dition of that observed on the deceased the night before. The
bullet holes corresponded with the wounds on the body. It
would be highly unlikely that anyone would have the desire
or opportunity to come into the hospital morgue and change
the clothing on the corpse. It would be hypertechnical to
exclude the exhibits offered here under these circumstances.
The body remained in the control of the hospital and would
not have been readily accessible to outside personnel.

HI Defendant contends the introduction of the billfold,
hairbrush and medallion tends to prove deceased was not
carrying a razor at the time of the shooting. No razor was
ever found. While the defendant could argue it would have
been possible for someone to remove the razor from the de-
ceased’s body during this eight-hour period, we do not believe
this amounts to such lack of control or custody as to make the
exhibits inadmissible. Possession of the body, clothing and
personal effects thereon “was sufficiently accounted for by
witnesses testifying on the trial to negative any reasonable
claim that they had been changed or tampered with”. State
v. Whitbeck, 145 Iowa 29, 35, 128 N.W. 982, 984. The follow-
ing cases are not factually similar, but in each instance we
held there was a sufficient showing of a chain of custody and
control. State v. Jones, 233 Iowa 848, 849, 10 N.W.2d 526;
State v. Hodge, 252 Iowa 449, 463, 105 N.W.2d 618; State v.
Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 1161, 114 N.W.2d 526; State v. Post, 255
Iowa 578, 581, 123 N.W.2d 11; State v. Perry, 246 Iowa 861,
869, 870, 69 N.W.2d 412.

In State v. Hossack, 116 Iowa 194, 202, 89 N.W. 1077, and

94 [| 7

State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 524, 292 N.W. 148, the chain of
custody was not sufficiently established. They are also fac-
tually dissimilar. See also 22A C.J.S. 946 et seq., Criminal
Law, section 709.

Il. Defendant claims his written statement exhibit 1
should not have been received in evidence because it was “un-
reliable, untrustworthy and not the true, accurate and com-
plete substance of defendant’s statements to Detectives Kane
and Murray.” He challenged the statement by a motion to
suppress, objections to its admissibility and exceptions to in-
structions.

‘We do not understand he claims the statement was in-
voluntary or that he was not adequately advised of his con-
stitutional rights. The record would not support such claim.
Defendant signed a “waiver” which informed him in writing
of his rights and in which he acknowledged having been so
advised orally. Officers Kane and Murray interviewed him
for about one hour and forty-five minutes. His mother was
present during the interview except for a brief period when
she left the room after becoming ill. Murray took notes in
longhand from which he typed the statement. It was intended
to include: “* * * the basic facts of what happened, as to what
the defendant said had happened, his version of what hap-
pened, is—actually in short form, is not our entire conversa-
tion. This is what he said to be true, what we took to be true
from him.” Before the statement was signed copies were
given defendant and his mother. It was read to him and he
had the opportunity to read it himself.

Parker claims exhibit 1 does not contain material state-
ments favorable to him which he made during the interview.
Two instances are called to our attention relating to cireum-
stances supporting his claim of self-defense.

Exhibit 1 contained the statement that prior to the shoot-
ing deceased started walking toward defendant with his right
hand in his pocket and “although Roby had his hand in his
pocket, I never did see him with a gun or kmife or any other
weapon.”

On direct examination Murray testified Parker first told

a Le 95

them: “deceased had a razor in his hand and after talking to
him about the razor the defendant then said the deceased did
not have a razor and did not see him with a weapon of any
kind although the defendant did state that he had known the
deceased to carry a razor.”

On eross-examination Murray testified: “At no time during
the evening did he ask the defendant whether he thought the
deceased had a razor nor did he ask the defendant whether he
thought the deceased had a razor because of the deceased’s
actions. * * * The witness did not ask the defendant whether
he was suffering under the apprehension that the deceased had
a razor that evening.”

Officer Kane’s testimony was substantially the same.
Parker testified: “The police did not ask him why he shot the
deceased. He told the police that he had known the deceased
to carry a knife or razor. They asked him if he had seen a
knife or razor that night and he told them, no, he had seen no
weapon. He did tell them about the deceased putting his right
hand in his pocket. The police did not ask him what he was
thinking about or why he pulled the gun. * * * He actually told
the police he had seen the deceased with a razor before but did
not see him with a weapon on that night. The police did not ask
him whether or where he had seen the deceased with a weapon
before.”

There is little dispute in the foregoing testimony. De-
fendant does not claim he told the officers he thought at the
time of the shooting that deceased had a knife or razor. His
complaint seems to be that the officers should have asked
questions to elicit such answers. We know of no authorities
which require statements to be complete in all details in order
to be admissible.

HM The statement made by defendant that he saw a
knife or gun was not included in the written statement because
he changed his story and it had no part in his final version of
the incident. Had this been included, he might well have
objected to its presence as an attempt to discredit him by
showing his first inclination was to lie. Defendant told them
everything included in exhibit 1 even if it does not include all
defendant told them.

96 [| |

He also claims exhibit 1 is unreliable because it contains
only the statement that defendant stepped on deceased’s feet
while he was dancing, rather than saying he “accidentally”
stepped on deceased’s feet. Both officers readily admitted on
the stand that defendant had said he accidentally stepped on
deceased’s feet.

A statement does not have to be all-inclusive or without
error or oversight in order to be admissible. “The manner in
which a confession or admission of facts may be made is im-
material. It may be oral and partly written, or in narrative
form or by questions and answers.” (Citing cases) State v.
Baker, 246 Iowa 215, 233, 66 N.W.2d 303, 313. Fragmentary
admissions are common, Statements given by the same de-
fendant may vary. Credibility, rather than admissibility, is
involved.

Here Parker voluntarily signed this statement. It contains
only information received from him. It may not be as com-
plete as it could have been, but this does not make it inad-
missible. He is free to point out any deficiencies and their
effect upon its weight. Here, there is an unusual agreement
among all the witnesses as to what was said. The statement
was more nearly accurate than defendants are ordinarily will-
ing to concede. . .

Jackson v. Denno, 878 U.S. 368, 84 8. Ct. 1774, 12 L.Hd.2d
908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205, and Rochin v. People of California, 342
US. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L, Hd, 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396, cited
by defendant are concerned with involuntary confessions
which were unreliable because they were coerced. There is no
claim of coercion here and these cases are not applicable.

‘What -we have said above applies with equal force to
defendant’s argument that the admission of exhibit 1 deprived
him of constitutional due process of law. We do not agree
that due process requires a full recording of all interviews.
As stated above, there is less conflict about this interview than
appears in most cases.

The trial court did not err in admitting defendant’s state-
ment into evidence.

| Le 97

HM Ill. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the
statement, Kane was asked if there was any threat of the use
of physical force. He answered: “No, sir; there wasn’t needed
any. I’d like to retract that. There’s never been any physical
force used while I’m around.”

At the trial Kane testified on direct examination that there
were no threats, promises or physical molestation of defendant.
Defendant sought to introduce the answer given at the hearing
for impeachment purposes. State’s objection was sustained,
This ruling is alleged to have been erroneous. We do not
agree,

It is not impeaching in nature. In neither instance does
Kane say force or threats were used. Defendant does not so
claim. The only purpose of such testimony could be to use
witness’s “slip of the tongue” to cause the jurors to believe that
on other occasions the Waterloo police department had used
force and create a prejudice in their minds. Even if it were
impeaching in nature, it would be an attempt to impeach on a
collateral matter. “To impeach a witness by proof of incon-
sistent statements they must be material to the issue * * *;
and at least inconsistent.” French v. Universal C. L. T. Credit
Corp., 254 Iowa 1044, 1048, 120 N.W.2d 476, 480; Hildenbrand
v. Stinson, 241 Iowa 500, 41 N.W.2d 698, 701.

IV. The pertinent part of the trial court’s instruction on
self-defense is as follows:

“On the matter of self-defense you are instructed that
where one ig assaulted by another in such manner as to induce
him to reasonably believe that he is at the time in either actual
danger of death or of receiving great bodily harm, he is justi-
fied in defending himself against such assault although the
danger may not be real but only apparent; and he may use
such force and means to defend his person as may, in good
faith, appear necessary to him as an ordinarily prudent person
under all the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the
time.

HE “Under the law of Iowa, in order to justify a killing
on the ground of self-defense, four elements must be present:

“1, The defendant must not be the aggressor in provoking

98 [| |

the difficulty that results in the killing, or continuing the diffi-
culty that results in the killing.

“2. He must retreat as far as he reasonably and safely
ean before taking his adversary’s life.

“3. He must actually and honestly believe either that he
is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that
the action he takes is necessary to save himself. This danger
need not be real, but only thought to be real in the defendant’s
mind, acting as a reasonable and prudent person under the cir-
cumstances.

“4, He must have reasonable grounds for such belief.”

This is a proper instruction. State v. Johnson, 223 Iowa
962, 967, 274 N.W. 41; State v. Sedig, 285 Iowa 609, 614, 16
N.W.2d 247; State v. Emery, 236 Iowa 60, 66, 17 N.W.2d 854;
State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1289, 71 N.W.2d 35. .

However, defendant claims he was entitled to a further
instruction that he had no duty to retreat if the jury should
find he was assaulted by the deceased by surprise or violence.
He cites State v. Collins, 32 Iowa 36; State v. Linhoff, 121 Iowa
632, 97 N.W. 77;-State v. Borwick, 193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460.
The Linhoff case held there was no duty to retreat from an
assault within one’s own dwelling. The Collins case was de-
cided when the general rule required defendant to “retreat to
the wall”. The Borwick case involved an actual and violent
assault on defendant while he was driving an automobile along
a dangerous dropoff “without even the preliminary of a threat
or challenge”.

-We need not decide what, if any, effect the modern rule,
requiring defendant to retreat only so far as he reasonably
and safely can, has on this exception to the duty to retreat as
the present case is distinguishable on the facts.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to de-
fendant, it discloses that he knew deceased on prior occasions
had carried and “pulled” a razor when in an altercation. He
had been told deceased had beaten and raped a girl. He testi-
fied almost everyone at a party like this one had a knife or a
razor of some sort.

He and deceased were attending an invitation party in the
basement of the Chuck Pearson home. He accidently stepped

a Le 99

on deceased’s feet while he was dancing. A confrontation de-
veloped which was broken up without any blows being struck.
Defendant heard deceased say words to the effect that, “We
eould go outside.” Shortly thereafter Mr. Pearson came into
the basement and told everyone to leave.

Defendant “went upstairs and out the side door of the
house. He was walking down a walkway beside the house and
saw cars parked in the driveway. As he was walking by, he
looked to his right side and saw the deceased halfway in a car
with the back seat pulled over. There was a light on the other
people in the car. As he walked past, he watched out of the
corner of his eye and kept walking. He remembered the state-
ment that the deceased had made downstairs. He walked
along the sidewalk which is alongside the house until he got
to the front of the house and turned around to face the de-
ceased who had started following him as he walked alongside
of the house. He remembered the statement the deceased had
made and didn’t want to be jumped from the back and said
to the deceased, ‘Punk, do you want some parts of me?’ He
wanted to know what the deceased was going to do. The de-
ceased started to walk to the deceased’s right in a circle around
the defendant. The defendant started to turn in order to re-
main facing the deccased because he did not want the deceased
to get him from the back. While they were circling, they were
approximately three feet apart and the defendant could see the
deceased’s hands at his sides. When the deceased started to
cirele him, he had been standing up on the walk and when the
deceased finished circling him, the defendant was standing in
the drive and the deceased was standing up on the lawn, The
defendant at this time was facing the house after they got
through circling. The deceased took a half a step toward him
and indicated how the deceased at this time was holding his
hands. He pushed the deceased in the chest area and back up
on the lawn and then stepped back himself into the driveway
at which point they were about five or six feet apart. At this
point there were cars parked behind him and people around.
There was a light on at the side door of the house. After he
pushed the deceased, the deceased stuck his right hand into his

100 [| |

right pants pocket and started coming towards the defendant.
The defendant reached for the gun in his right coat pocket. At
this point he-thought the deceased had a razor and was afraid
of getting cut, having been cut before when he was down south
at the age of seven on the left leg.”

The circumstances satisfy the requirements for the self-
defense instruction, State v. Brooks, 192 Towa 1107, 1117, 186
N.W. 46; State v. Marish, 198 Iowa 602, 607, 200 N.W. 5; State
v. Davis, 209 Iowa 524, 528, 529, 228 N.W. 37. We do not be-
lieve they disclose a situation requiring the instruction request-
ed by the defendant. The elements of a sudden and violent as-
sault by deceased are lacking. At no time did deceased commit
any acts of violence against defendant. He did not even touch
him after they had gone into the yard. Defendant’s testimony
negatives any element of surprise. The jury must, of course,
consider the circumstances in determining how far defendant
eould reasonably and safely retreat before taking deceased’s
life and under the instruction must view the danger as it would
have appeared to an ordinarily prudent person at the time.
The instruction given adequately presented defendant’s theory
of the case to the jury. The requested instruction was not
justified under the facts and circumstances here. See State
vy. Shannon, 214 Iowa 1093, 1099, 1100, 248 N.W. 507; State v.
Borwick, 193 Iowa 639, 647, 187 N.W. 460.

V. The trial court instructed the jury: “The law does not
require the State of Iowa to call every witness listed in the
‘minutes of testimony’ which is part of the county attorney’s
irue information, and the fact that any witness was not called
creates no inference or presumption as to what the testimony
of such witness might or might not be.”

Defendant objected to the last clause of this instruction
claiming that failure to produce testimony of a witness within
the control of the State raises a presumption that such testi-
mony, if produced, would be adverse to it.

The instruction given is too broad as a general state-
ment of the law. Under some circumstances the jury may
properly draw an inference that the testimony of an uncalled
witness would have been adverse to one of the parties. Lauer

— a 101

v. Banning, 152 Iowa 99, 103, 181 N.W. 783; State v. Cotton,
240 Iowa 609, 33 N.W.2d 880, 889, 890; Miller v. Miller, 242
Towa 706, 46 N.W.2d 732, 735; Paulsen v. Paulsen, 243 Iowa
51, 50 N.W.2d 567, 572; State v. Bolds, 244 Iowa 278, 55 N.W.2d
534, 588; In re Estate of Burrell, 251 Iowa 185, 100 N.W.2d
177, 184; In re Estate of Olson, 252 Iowa 471, 106 N.W.2d 345,
350; Hart v. Lundby, 258 Iowa 46, 137 N.W. 2d 642, 647; Grady
v. Collins Transportation Co., 341 Mass. 502, 170 N.E. 2d 725,
726; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L.
Ed. 210; 31A CJ.S. 403, Evidence, section 156(3); 29 Am.
Jur.2d 224, Evidence, section 180.

However, we agree with the Highth Cireuit Court of Ap-
peals: “That any rule creating a presumption of this kind is
to be applied with caution, * * * ‘there must be a reason for
such a supposition, and a factual area within which it may
logically operate. The supposition must rise above the level of
a mere possibility, * * *.’” Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d
421, 425.

HN No presumption arises when it is shown that the
witness is equally available to either party or when the testi-
mony that could be elicited from such witness would merely
be cumulative. Grady v. Collins Transportation Co., 341 Mass.
502, 170 N.E.2d 725, 726-728; Richards v. United States, 107
US. App. D.C. 197, 275 F.2d 655, 656-658; Papalia v. United
States, 243 F.2d 487; 81A C.J.S. 412, 415, Evidence, section
156(3); 29 Am. Jur.2d 226, Evidence, section 180; page 234,
section 186; see annotation 185 A.L.R. 1875, 1876.

Defendant bases his argument on the failure of the State
to call Walter Sykes, also known as Walter Williams. A sum-
mary of his testimony was attached to the information. De-
fendant points out that Sykes left the party at the same time
deceased left and called deceased as he was getting into a
car when defendant appeared. Deceased turned around and
came back to Sykes.

An examination of the minutes of his testimony reveals
that it would only have been cumulative to that of the other
witnesses to the shooting. There was a large crowd of young-
sters there and general agreement among all witnesses includ-

102 be ‘7

ing defendant as to how the shooting occurred. There is noth-
ing in the record to indicate Sykes could have testified any
differently from the other witnesses.

Even if we assume he might have had some knowledge
helpful to defendant not possessed by any other witness, he
was as available to defendant as he was to the State. Defend-
ant had the minutes of his testimony, he knew him personally
and had heard testimony about his presence at the shooting.
He saw him in the courtroom during the trial. The mere fact
that his testimony was attached to the information does not
make him more available to the State. The defendant or his
counsel was free to interview him and call him as a witness,
There was no showing Sykes refused to talk to defendant’s
counsel.

Under these circumstances, we hold it was not error for
the court to give the instruction set out above. No unfavorable
presumption or inference should have been drawn against the
State for failure to call Walter Sykes.

HN sVI. On two separate occasions in his argument de-
fendant’s counsel started to draw inferences as to what Walter
Sykes’ testimony might have been. The court sustained ob-
jections by the State. As we have approved the instruction
which told the jury the failure to call a witness raised no pre-
sumption or inference as to what his testimony might be, it
follows that the court did not err in stopping defense counsel
from drawing such inferences.

Counsel for defendant has given him exceptionally good
representation both in the trial and on this appeal, however,
we find no reversible error.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Raw ines and Broxer, JJ., who
dissent from Divisions V and VI and the result.

Rawuines, J—Being unable to agree with the conclusion
reached in Divisions V and VI of the majority opinion or the
reasons given for it, I respectfully dissent.

Here the trial court gave an instruction to the effect failure
by the State to call a witness listed as such on the information
(indictment) creates no inference or presumption as to what
the testimony of the absent witness might or might not be.

ee) 108

The majority concedes this is too broad as a general state-
ment of the law. :

In State v. Cotton, 240 Iowa 609, 625, 33 N.W.2d 880, this
court specifically adopted the principle that where evidence
which would properly be a part of a case is within the control
of the party whose interest it would naturally -be to produce
it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to so do, the
jury may draw an ‘inference that, it would be unfavorable to-
him.

As best I have been able to determine we have never since,
until now, abandoned the application of the foregoing rule in
eriminal cases. In that regard most of the cases and authorities
cited by the majority relate to civil not criminal actions, and
the rule in one is not necessarily applicable to the other.

Here the State gave no apparent explanation for its failure
to call a named witness to testify.

I submit that under these circumstances there is a pre-
sumption, or at least an inference, the silent witness would
have testified unfavorably to the prosecution. See State v.
Cotton, supra; Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 274,
184 F.2d 394, 398, 899; and Underhill’s Criminal Evidence,
Fifth Ed., section 45, page 91.

Furthermore to say, as does the majority, a named State’s
witness is as available to defendant as to the prosecution serves
to place an accused in an anomalous position.

Under the prior holdings of this court a defendant cannot
determine in advance, by discovery procedure, the full sub-
stance or nature of the evidence which might be given by an
identified witness for the prosecution. State v. Gates, 260 Iowa
772, 150 N.W.2d 617, and State v. District Court, 253 Iowa
908, 907-912, 114 N.W.2d 817.

The only possible relief available to a defendant in this
direction is by use of statutory procedures allowed for the
securing of a bill of particulars (Code section 773.6), or the
taking of depositions (Code section 781.10). |

But these are at best uncertain and restricted avenues of
approach usually of little or no value to an accused. See State
v. Schreck, 258 Iowa 218, 187 N.W.2d 914, 916, 917, and State

104 Le 7

v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 180-182, 125 N.W.2d 764,

And any attempt by defendant to unofficially question the
State’s witnesses would undoubtedly be characterized during
trial as witness tampering or intimidation.

The majority cannot mean counsel for an accused should
blindly call a person identified by an indictment or information
as a witness for the accused. This would normally be classified
as nothing short of sheer stupidity and an indicia of incompe-
tency.

Conceding the instruction given was too broad, I would
reverse and remand for a new trial.

Brcxer, J., joins in this dissent.

Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. June Wauiace, appellant.

No. 52363.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 266)

105

Juny 11, 1967.
Resrarine Denmp Srpremper 22, 1967.

Robert E. Konchar, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and William Faches, Linn County
Attorney, for appellee.

Rawirines, J—Charged by county attorney’s information
with the crime of shoplifting goods having a value of more

106 | 7

than $20, defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced. She
appéals. .

Trial commenced July 25, 1966. At 3:30 p.m., the jury
having been selected, the statutory oath administered and open-
ing statements by counsel presented, the court declared a 15
minute recess.

The jury was not then admonished as directed by Code
sections 780.21 and 780.22. Upon that basis defendant, in
chambers, promptly moved for a mistrial. The motion was
overruled.

About 4 p.m. all members of the jury returned into open
court and the trial judge then gave the statutory admonition.

Defendant did not testify. At close of all the evidence
the jury was advised by instruction 9 as follows: “In this case
the defendant has failed to take the witness stand in her own
behalf. The defendant is not required to testify in her own
behalf and no inference should be drawn from the fact that
she fails to testify as to her guilt or innocence, as the burden
is upon the State to prove the guilt of the defendant, as defined
in these instructions.”

Defendant’s appeal presents two errors: (1) Failure to
admonish the jury before the recess, declared after presentation
of opening statements by counsel, and (2) giving instruction 9
relative to her failure to testify.

We find no merit in either of these assigned errors.

HI 1. Prior to any progress-of-trial separation a jury
should always be admonished as required by law. See Code
sections 780.21, 780.22, and rule 199, Rules of Civil Procedure.

However this court has previously held, failure to so ad-
monish the jury is a technical defect in procedure which does
not call for a reversal unless it appears prejudice has in some
way resulted to the complaining party. State v. Jensen, 245
Towa 1363, 1869, 1370, 66 N.W.2d 480.

HI Then in State v. Allison, 260 Iowa 176, 181, 147 N.W.2d
910, 918, citing State v. Jensen, supra, we held, in order to
justify the grant of a new trial for failure of the court to give
the prescribed admonition we must know, or be able.to strongly
presume, prejudice occurred.

Ln Le 107

HI The record in the case at hand fails to disclose that
during the short recess period any member of the jury engaged
in eonduct which could in any sense be said to be prohibited
by law.

Furthermore, though counsel for defendant moved for mis-
trial promptly after the subject recess had been declared, he
voiced no in-court objection to the procedure and afforded
the trial judge no opportunity to correct the error of omission
with the jury still present.

Without determining whether, under a showing of mate-
vially different circumstances, this silence would or would not
constitute a waiver of objection, we conclude: (1) The error
here involved is not so fundamental it could not be waived,
and (2) defendant did waive the error of which she now com-
plains by failure to make timely and appropriate objection.

In support of the foregoing see State v. Thompson, 254
Towa 881, 337, 338, 117 N.W.2d 514; Lancaster v. State, 226
Ark. 820, 294 §.W.2d 348, 349, 350; Brown v. State, 245 Ind.
604, 201 N.E.2d 281, 283; Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282, 164
A.2d 526, 532-535; State v. Alton, 189 Mont. 479, 365 P.2d 527,
540; 89 O.J.S., Trial, section 454, page 78; and 53 Am.Jur.,
Trial, section 890, page 641.

Confining ourselves to the factual situation here disclosed
we find no reversible error in the trial court’s failure to give
the statutory pre-recess admonition.

Il. Defendant now challenges instruction 9, supra, having
asserted no objection to it either in course of trial or by motion
for a new trial.

HM Ordinarily we do not consider an assignment of error
first urged on appeal as to a given instruction. State v. Ford,
259 Towa 744, 751, 145 N.W.2d 638, 642, and authorities cited.

WI In addition defendant, by her assignment on this point,
again for the first time, invokes Amendments 5 and 14, Con-
stitution of the United States. In that regard we have also
held constitutional questions cannot be effectively raised initi-
ally on appeal. State v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 834, 118 N.W.2d
303.

| | On the other hand Code section 793.18 requires that we
examine the record, without regard to technical errors or de-

108 Le |

fects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties,
to the end there may be such judgment on the record as law
and justice demand. See State v. Kelley, 253 Iowa 1314, 1318,
115 N.W.2d 184.

Furthermore this court may review an alleged error raised
here for the first time, as a matter of grace. 41 Iowa Law
Review 451.

In the instant case defendant’s claim that instruction
9 violated her constitutional privilege to remain silent unques-
tionably involves a fundamental right. It will be accordingly
considered.’ See Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S, 18, 87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, and Bruno v. United States, 308
US. 287, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L. Ed. 257,

Ill. Defendant contends Griffin v. State of California, 380
US. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Hd.2d 106, supports her claim to
the effect the giving of the subject instruction violated her
constitutional privileges and immunities.

This court has not heretofore been called upon to deter-
mine the propriety of an instruction such as is now before us.

In State v. Barton, 258 Iowa 924, 927, 140 N.W.2d 886,
888-891, we condemned an instruction which stated as follows:

“The defendant did not testify before you as a witness.
He has a legal right to testify or not as he chooses. The burden
rests upon the State to prove all the material allegations of the
indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.

“The fact that defendant did not testify in his own behalf
may be considered by you together with all the evidence in the
case bearing upon this subject in determining the question of
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.’”

And the giving of an instruction which told the jury de-
fendant’s failure to testify could be considered “an inference
of guilt” was disapproved in State v. Raymond, 258 Iowa 1389,
1343, 142 N.W.2d 444, 447,

It also appears the question here posed has never been
specifically passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States.

In Bruno v. United States, supra, the court held when a
defendant so requests he is entitled to an instruction to the effect

a Pe 109

his failure to testify creates no presumption against him. See
also State v. Osborne, 258 Iowa 390, 1389 N.W.2d 177.

The problem we must here resolve is whether, in the ab-
sence of a request by the accused, an instruction to the effect
no inference shall be drawn from defendant’s failure to testify,
is constitutionally prohibited.

Referring again to Griffin v. State of California, supra,
loe. cit., 880 U.S. 614, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1232, 1233, the court there
said, “* * * comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of
the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice,’ Murphy v. Water-
front Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596, 12 L.Ed2d 678,
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It is
said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify
as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any
event natural and irresistible, and that comment on the failure
does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a
constitutional privilege. [Authorities cited.] What the jury
may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it
may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another, * * *

“We said in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 878 U.S. p. 11, 84
S.Ct. p. 1495, that ‘the same standards must determine whether
an accused’s silence in either a federal or state proceeding is
justified.’ We * * * hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct
application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the aecused’s silence or instruc-
tions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.’ (Em-
phasis supplied.)

From this it is to us crystal clear the court there went not
one step beyond the point of condemning an instruction which
serves to give the silence of an accused any coloration of evi-
dence against him.

However various federal courts have dealt with the specific
problem here‘presented. :

In Franano v. United States, 243 F.Supp. 709, 711, an in-
struction similar to that involved in the instant case was given

110 es —

over defendant’s objection, and the court said: “Petitioner, of
course, contends that unless a defendant requests such an in-
struction it is error. Petitioner argues that such an instruction
highlights and emphasizes the fact that the accused did not take
the stand and therefore was an improper comment; which tended
to create an adverse presumption against him. The authority is
all the other way. Kreuzer v. United States (8th Cir. 1918),
254 F. 34 at 38, cert. den. 249 U.S. 603, 39 S.Ct. 260, 68
L.Ed. 798; United States v. Garguilo (2nd Cir. 1962), 310 F.2d
249 at 252; Windisch v. United States (5th Cir. 1961), 295 F.2d
581 at 583; Chadwick v. United States (5th Cir. 1941), 117 F.2d
902 at 904-905 ; Smith v. United States (1940), 72 App. D.C. 187,
112 F.2d 217 at 219; Hanish v. United States (7th Cir. 1915),
227 FB 584. at 587.”

United States v. Garguilo, supra, dealt with the same prob-.
lem now confronting us, and the court, in that case, made the
following pertinent observations: “It is far from clear that such
an instruction is prejudicial to a defendant; the chances are
rather that it is helpful. The jurors have observed the de-
fendant’s failure to take the stand ; in the absence of instruction,
nothing could be more natural than for them to draw an ad-
verse inference from the lack of testimony by the very person
who should know the facts best. And ‘despite the vast aceumula-
tion of psychological data, we have not yet attained that certi-
tude about the human mind which would justify * * * a dog-
matic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither
could nor would heed the instructions of the trial court that the
failure of an accused to be a witness in his own cause “shall not
create any presumption against him.”’ Bruno v. United States,
supra, 308 U.S. at 294, 60 S.Ct. at 200.”

Added to this is the following pointed statement in Becher
v. United States (2 Cir.), 5 F.2d 45, 49: “In his charge the
learned trial judge without request from the defendants men-
tioned the fact that they had not taken the stand. With some
elaboration he instructed the jury that no inference of guilt
could be drawn from this. Becher now urges that any allusion
to the fact was reversible error. It is no doubt better if a defend-
ant requests no charge upon the subject, for the trial judge to
say nothing about it; but to say that when he does, tt is error,

es m1

carries the doctrine of self-incrimination to an absurdity.” (Em-
phasis supplied.) See also 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, section
598, page 364, and 21 Am.Jur.2d,. Criminal Law, section 356,
page 383,

HE We now hold, when a defendant objects it is the better
practice to give no instruction whatsoever relative to his failure
to testify, but the giving of an instruction, absent objection by
defendant, to the effect no inference of guilt or innocence be
drawn by the jury from his failure to testify, does not constitute
prejudicial error.

IV. No reversible error being found judgment of the trial
court is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Mason, J., who concurs in the
result, and Becxsr, J., who dissents.

Mason, J. (concurring specially in result)—I concur in the
result on the ground defendant and his counsel made no objection
on the trial or in the motion for new trial to the giving of in-
struction 9, apparently as a matter of trial strategy, and are
therefore not in a position to complain of the instruction on this
appeal.

Brcxer, J—I dissent. We now say that despite Griffin v.
California it is permissible to comment on the failure of the de-
fendant to take the stand as long as it is a friendly comment.
Judge Friendly’s speculation in United States v. Garguilo, 310
F.2d 249, may be right but the choice should be made by
defendant and his lawyer, not by the court. I would reverse
and remand for a new trial.

112 [|

Howarp L. Sawyer et ux., individually and as assignee for their
children, appellants, v. Mery R, Sawyer et al.; Srannzy L.
Davis, executor and trustee of estate of Doil S. Hunter,
appellees.

No. 52553.
(Reported in 152 N.W.2d 605)

=) | . LY :

Avaust 31, 1967:

| Le 115

Researine Deniep Octozer 16, 1967.

John D. Randall, of Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

D. M. Elderkin, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee Stanley L.
Davis as executor and trustee of the estate of Doil S. Hunter.

Garrimip, C, J—Howard L. Sawyer, oldest of four issue to
survive his mother Doil 8S. Hunter, and his wife Hulda, brought
this action in equity in four counts seeking, in effect, to set
aside a trust created by the mother’s will in the share be-
queathed to Howard (to whom we refer as plaintiff). De-
fendants are Howard’s two brothers, a sister and the sister’s
husband as executor and trustee under the will. Following trial
relief was denied and plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the
decision.

Briefly, count 1 of plaintiff’s petition alleges his mother’s
will, made November 2, 1961, creating the trust, violated an
oral agreement between her and her second husband Sam
Hunter (plaintiff’s stepfather) under which reciprocal wills
made by them January 15, 1959, were also mutual and became
irrevocable upon Sam’s death February 11, 1960, The bequests
to plaintiff under the earlier wills were outright, not in trust.

Count 2 alleges the trust provisions of the mother’s 1961
will are so unreasonable as to be void.

Count 3 alleges the oral agreement referred to in count 1
and the earlier wills made pursuant thereto were for the benefit
of plaintiff, his brothers and sister and their rights thereunder
vested upon Sam’s death in 1960. It is obvious that if plaintiff
could not recover under count 1 no recovery may be had under
eount 3 since both are based on the alleged oral agreement to
make the 1959 wills irrevocable upon the death of the first to
die.

_ Finally, count 4 of the petition alleges the four children
of plaintiff (all adults) have assigned to him their remainder

116 || |

interest in the trust property; in the event the court should
hold such assignment did not merge in plaintiff all interests in
the trust, plaintiff and his wife will waive the assignment and
tender into court an assignment from them to their children
of the formers’ interest in the trust property so title thereto
will vest in the children; in the event neither of such assign-
ments is recognized as valid, plaintiff and his wife refuse to
take under the will and consent that the interest of plaintiff
may vest in the children.

* The trial court held proof of the oral agreement declared

upon in counts 1 and 8 was wholly insufficient; the alleged
unreasonableness of the trust provisions of the mother’s 1961
will affords no basis for setting them aside; the trust is a
spendthrift one which the beneficiaries may not terminate as
attempted here.
- I. We first consider a preliminary question. Two weeks
‘after the petition was filed in November 1964 Attorney Keith
Mossmani entered his appearance and filed answer for all de-
fendants except one brother, Merl Sawyer. Four days before
trial was to start in May 1966 Mr. Mossman withdrew his ap-
pearance but there was no withdrawal of the answer he had
filed which denied the allegations of the original petition eon-
sisting only of the first two counts above summarized. Two
days before trial Attorney D. M. Elderkin entered his ap-
pearance for the estate of Doil S. Hunter and the executor and
trustee thereof. Thereafter plaintiff amended his petition by
adding counts 8 and 4 and defendants Raymond Sawyer and
his sister, as well as the executor-trustee, filed answers to the
petition as amended. .

At commencement of the trial plaintiff’s counsel asked that
since Mr. Elderkin represented only the estate and the ex-
ecutor-trustee, judgment be entered as against the individual
defendants (two brothers and the sister) for specific perform-
ance of the alleged oral agreement for the making of mutual
and irrevocable wills. Defendants were all present in court
for the trial and all had answers on file. The court reserved
ruling on the request of plaintiff’s counsel but denied it at the
outset of the final decision. Plaintiff contends the ruling was
‘error. We hold it was correct.

| | 117

Hl The withdrawal of appearance by an attorney does not
have the effect of withdrawing his client’s appearance or plead-
ings filed in the latter’s behalf. Baker v. Baker, 248 Iowa 361,
865, 81 N.W.2d 1, 3, 64 AU.R.2d 1421, 1424 and annotation,
1424, 1434-1435, 1443-1444 and citations, note 20; Harris v.
Juenger, 367 Il. 478, 11 N.H.2d 929, 930; 6 C.J.S., Appearances,
section 30a, page 70; 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appearance, section 87,
page 510.

HI However, an authorized or otherwise rightful with-
drawal of the appearance of a party defendant leaves the case
in the same condition as if the appearance had never been en-
tered and operates as a withdrawal of defendant’s pleadings.
Annotation, 64 A.L.R.2d 1424, 1451 and citations, notes 9 and
10; 6 C.J.S., Appearances, section 80b, page 70; 5 Am. Jur.2d,
Appearance, section 39, page 512. See also rule 230(c), Rules
of Civil Procedure. There was no such withdrawal here.

HM (Of some application is the rule that trials upon the
merits are favored and defaults avoided if fairly possible.
Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1177, 152 N.W.2d 281, 286
and citations.

IL. Considering now plaintiffs claim in counts 1 and
38 that the 1959 wills were made pursuant to an oral agreement
they were mutual and would be irrevocable upon the death of
the first to die (Sam Hunter), we find no substantial evidence
to support such claim. Indeed the evidence is these wills were
not made in pursuance of such an agreement.

The earlier wills and Doil S. Hunter’s 1961 will were all
prepared by Attorney Mossman. Plaintiff called him as his
first witness. He testified on direct examination Doil and Sam
came to his office together the day the 1959 wills were prepared
and discussed with him the terms of the two wills each desired
to make.

On cross-examination Mr. Mossman said he explained to
them that if they drew a joint and mutual will the survivor
could not change it after the death of the other; they both
stated they did not want such a will, they wanted the right to
make a new will after the death of the first to die and asked
him to prepare separate wills without any agreement or pro-

1s Le |

vision the wills could not be so changed; accordingly such
separate wills were prepared and executed; if the will were
intended to be mutual and irrevocable upon the death of the
first to die he would have prepared only one joint will for both
to execute, reciting therein the agreement under which it was
made, as was his custom where irrevocable provisions were
desired:

On redirect examination by plaintiff's counsel Mr. Moss-
man testified: “I recall they came to my office and wanted
separate wills prepared. They did not want a joint and mutual
will. I prepared separate wills that could be changed after the
death of either party as it was their intention expressed to me
at that time that is what they wanted.”

| | The term “mutual” is properly applied to wills in this
class of cases only where there is sufficient evidence to show a
binding agreement to dispose of property of the makers in a
certain way. Without such evidence the wills may be re-
ciprocal but they are not mutual, Fr, Flanagan’s Boys’ Home
v. Turpin, 252 Towa 603, 608, 106 N.W.2d 637, 640 and citations;
In re Estate of Croulek, 252 Iowa 700, 704, 107 N.W.2d 77, 79;
In re Estate of Logan, 253 Iowa 1211, 1215, 115 N.W.2d 701, 704.

HJ Plaintiff had the burden to prove by clear and satis-
factory evidence the alleged oral agreement declared upon in
counts 1 and 3. In re Estate of Lenders, 247 Iowa 1205, 1218,
78 N.W.2d 536, 541 and citations; Vilter v. Myers, 255 Iowa
818, 820, 123 N.W.2d 334, 336, 337 and citations.

Hl Prior to our Lenders decision we had said several times
the existence of such an agreement might be inferred from the
execution of reciprocal wills by a husband and wife, at sub-
stantially the same time, each with knowledge of the other.
However in Lenders we said: “According to the great weight
of authority there must be other evidence of a contract be-
tween the testators. 7 (Page 1214 of 247 Iowa, page 541 of 78
N.W.2d.) .

We have followed the statement just quoted in many sub-
sequent decisions, including In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa
790, 802, 89 N.W.2d 337, 344; Allinson v. Horn, 249 Iowa 1351,
1856, 1357, 92 N.W.2d 645, 648; Barron v. Pigman, 250 Iowa
968, 972, 95 N.W.2d 726, 729; Fr. Flanagan’s Boys’ Home v.

a | ug

Turpin, supra, 252 Iowa 603, 609, 106 N.W.2d 637, 640; Vilter
v. Myers, supra, 255 Iowa 818, 820, 123 N.W.2d 334, 337.

HI We find no substantial evidence of the claimed oral
agreement here in addition to the inference that might arise
under our earlier decisions from the simultaneous execution of
reciprocal wills, each with knowledge of the other maker.
Even under such decisions certainly the inference referred to
could not prevail over the positive testimony of the scrivener,
a reputable attorney, that the makers instructed him they did
not want a mutual will or mutual wills. Under our cases com~
mencing with In re Estate of Lenders, supra, it is clear plain-
tiff is not entitled to the relief asked in counts 1 and 3.

Ill. Reference should be made to the new Iowa Probate
Code, now chapter 633, Code 1966, enacted in 1963. By its
terms it took effect January 1, 1964. Code section 638.2, sub-
section 1. However, section 633.2, subsection 2 in part pro-
vides “no acerued or vested right shall be impaired by its
provisions.”

HM This action was commenced in May 1964. However, as
stated, Sam Hunter died February 11, 1960. If the 1959 wills
were mutual as plaintiff claims, his rights thereunder accrued
and vested upon Sam’s death. This is the plain effect of our
decision in Floerchinger v. Williams, 260 Iowa 53, 148 N.W.2d
410, 418, 414. See also In re Estate of Croulek, supra, 252
Iowa 700, 708, 107 N.W.2d 77, 79 and citations. Until then
either Sam or Doil could have changed his or her will by
giving notice thereof to the other. Citations last above.

HH Section 633.270 of the Probate Code provides: “No
will shall be construed to be contractual or mutual, unless in
such will the testator shall expressly state his intent that such
will shall be so construed.” See comment concerning this pro-
vision quoted in Floerchinger v. Williams, supra, of the com-
mittee of the State Bar Association which formulated the
Probate Code.

If the quoted provision were applicable here, the 1959 wills
could not be construed to be contractual or mutual since they
contain no statement of intent they should be so construed.
However, since, as stated, plaintiff’s rights under the 1959

120 Le a

wills, if they were mutual, accrued or vested in 1960 and would
be impaired by application of 633.270, supra, the section, by the
express terms of section 633.2, subsection 2, supra, does not
apply to this case.

In this respect there is a vital distinction between the facts
here and those in Floerchinger v. Williams, supra. There the
death of the first spouse to die did not occur until December
1964 and no rights vested under his will alleged to be mutual
until then—nearly a year after the effective date of the Pro-
bate Code.

IV. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief on the ground
stated in count 2 that the trust provisions in his mother’s 1961
will are so unreasonable as to be void. The will directs that
the maker’s property be converted into cash and divided into
four equal parts; plaintiff’s share to be held in trust for his
benefit ; $500 thereof paid to him as soon as practical; $30 per
month shall be paid to plaintiff during his life from the income
and principal of his share; at plaintiff’s death the monthly
payments shall go to plaintiff’s wife; upon her death the
balance shall be divided equally among the surviving children
of plaintiff and his wife and the trust terminated ; if no.children
survive plaintiff and wife such balance will be divided equally
among plaintiff’s surviving brothers and. sister.

The 1961 will also provides that the right of any benefi-
ciary to receive the income from the trust shall be free from
interference or control of his or her ereditors and shall not be
anticipated by assignment or applicable to payment of his or
her debts.

‘We would be justified in ignoring plaintiff’s count 2 on the
ground no proposition is stated or argued to the effect relief
should have been granted under this count. Hence the prop-
osition is deemed waived. Rule 344(a)(4)(Third), Rules of
Civil Procedure. However since a large part of the evidence
plaintiff offered was an attempt to show the trust provisions
were unreasonable we will say no relief could properly be
granted under count.2..

It is elementary a will must be given effect unless
it contravenes some positive rule of law or public policy. No

a as 121

such contravention appears here. The property bequeathed
was that of plaintiff’s mother and she had a sacred right to
dispose of it as she saw fit subject only to the qualification
just stated. Courts may not make a will for a testator nor
impose upon it a forced or unnatural construction to accom-
plish what may seem a more just or appropriate distribution
of the estate. Guilford v. Gardner, 180 Iowa 1210, 1224, 162
N.W.. 261; In re Estate of Heller, 283 Iowa 1356, 1365, 11
N.W.2d 586, 591; In re Estate of Logan, supra, 253 Iowa 1211,
1217, 115 N.W.2d 701, 705; 95 O.3.S., Wills, section 590.

V. Plaintiff claims there was a merger of all interests in
the trust property by the assignment to him from his adult
children (remaindermen) or by his assignment to them.

HM This trust is a spendthrift trust at least as to the
income payable to plaintiff, the life beneficiary, in that by the
terms of the trust a valid restraint is imposed on the voluntary
and involuntary transfer of the beneficiary’s interest. In re
Estate of Tone, 240 Iowa 1315, 1824, 1825, 39 N.W.2d 401, 407
and authorities cited; Gunn v. Wagner, 242 Iowa 1001, 1009, 48
N.W.2d 292, 296, 297; In re Estate of Bucklin, 248 Iowa 312,
51 N.W.2d 412, 34 A.L.R.2d 1327; 89 C.J.S., Trusts, section 21,
pages 733, 734. Of course, without the corpus or principal of
the trust estate it would yield no interest.

We are satisfied this trust cannot be terminated by the
court in the manner attempted here. In the first place, there
are contingent interests in the trust which are not represented
in the case and those where the holders do not consent to
termination of the trust. The trust, supra (division IV), pro-
vides that upon the death of plaintiff and his wife the balance
shall be divided among their children who then survive, and if
there are none, among plaintiff’s brothers and sister who then
survive. It is entirely possible issue, yet unborn, of plaintiff
and his wife may survive them. Obviously, consent of such
issue to terminate the trust cannot be had. “Equity will not
terminate a trust under which after-born children may take
an interest.” 89 C.J.S., Trusts, section 93d, page 930. See
also 54 Am. Jur., Trusts, section 76, page 78.

122 Le 7

HMMM The tendency of American decisions is to treat the
possibility of issue as one which prevents the distribution of
trust property and American courts generally refuse to ter-
minate a trust which would be affected by the birth of issue.
54 Am. Jur., Trusts, section 71; Annotations, 67 A.L.R. 538,
548, 146 A.L.R. 794, 799; In re Bosler’s Estate, 378 Pa. 333, 107
A.2d 443, 444 and citations note 1.

It is also possible, although unlikely, no issue may survive
plaintiff and his wife. As stated, plaintiff’s surviving brothers
and sister would then become beneficiaries. One brother and
the sister object to termination of the trust and want the
mother’s will carried out. Thus, not all beneficiaries of the
trust consent to its termination.

HEE Moreover, a spendthrift trust created by will cannot
be terminated by a court if contrary ‘to the express wish of the
settlor even though all beneficiaries desire that it should be.
Of course Doil 8. Hunter is incapable of consenting to termina-
tion of the trust.

“The cases are adamant in holding that where the life
interest is limited by a spendthrift provision the trust cannot
be terminated by the court. [citations] * * *

«ce #* The law’s only concern is to give effect to the will
of the donor as he has expressed it.’ * * *

“But if * * * the settlor be deceased and therefore in-
capable of consenting, such a [spendthrift] trust cannot be
terminated even though all the beneficiaries desire that it
should be.” In re Bosler’s Estate, supra, 378 Pa. 333, 337, 338,
107 A.2d 448, 445,

“Also, a spendthrift trust is not terminable by the consent
of those whom it is designed to protect. Furthermore, a trust
ordinarily cannot be terminated by the consent, contract, con-
veyance, or transfer of a beneficiary unless the object of the
trust has been attained, or at least practically accom-
plished, * * *.” 54 Am.Jur., Trusts, section 75, page 77.

HE “‘Spendthrift trust. If by the terms of the trust * * *
the interest of one or more of the beneficiaries is made inalien-
able by him * * * the trust will not be terminated while such
inalienable interest still exists, although all of the beneficiaries
desire to terminate it or one beneficiary acquires the whole

a7 a 128

beneficial interest and desires to terminate it.” Restatement,
Trusts, Second, section 387(2), Comment 1. See also id., sec-
tion 338, Comment a.

As stated at the outset, plaintiff's count 4 alleges that if
neither the assignment from his children to him nor the one
from him and his wife to the children is recognized as valid
then plaintiff and wife refuse to take under the will and con-
sent that the court make such orders as vest their one-fourth
share in their children.

HMM The share left in trust for plaintiff cannot be trans-
ferred to the living children in this manner anymore than by
the attempted assignment to them from plaintiff and his wife.
If plaintiff and his wife desire to renounce all interest under
the will, of course they may do so, but refusal to take under the
will upon condition such interest be held to vest in the children
now living is not such a renunciation. Plaintiff is attempting
to acquire outright for either him and his wife or for their
living children the share the mother left in trust. This they
may not do under the circumstances here.

HN VI. One contention of plaintiff is that the trial
court prejudged the case by expressing an opinion as to its
merits after hearing Mr. Mossman’s testimony and part of the
testimony of the second witness. The court indicated some
impatience at the offer of evidence he felt, not without reason,
was immaterial under the issues. In any event, we do not
reverse an equity case upon a complaint such as this. Our
review of both the facts and the law is de novo and we draw
such conclusions therefrom as we deem proper. Rule 334, Rules
of Civil Procedure; Arnold v. Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 433, 183
N.W.2d 58, 56 and citation. We are unwilling to admit we
have prejudged the case.

Upon consideration of all propositions presented the decree
is—Affirmed.

All Jusriczs concur except LeGrann, J., who takes no part.

a

24,

American Stave Banx, appellee, vy. Taxopore H. Leaver, Jr,
appellant.
No. 52609.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 348)

NN

eS 125
Ocroser 17, 1967.
es ee

Levinson, Bryant & Enabnit, of Mason City, for appellant.
William Pappas, of Mason City, for appellee.

Larson, J.—This appeal from a district court ruling sus-
taining plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in an action
to recover from defendant, as a cosigner or accommodation
maker of a promissory note, involves the requirements and in-
terpretation of rules 237 and 288, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff contends that rule 238 required a literal interpreta-
tion and that the papers filed in resistance to the motion, show-
ing facts which the court deems sufficient to permit him to
defend, must be in affidavit form and must be filed with the
resistance. We cannot agree.

From the record it appears one Michael J. Thompson ex-
ecuted a note to plaintiff-bank on May 14, 1965, in the sum of
$2248.75, to secure the payment of a loan for the purchase of
an automobile, and defendant signed the note as a comaker.
After default, plaintiff by petition brought suit against de-
fendant on the note and, after appearance by defendant, filed
its motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, within ten
days defendant filed his verified answer in two divisions, the
first amounting to a general denial and the second raising
affirmative defenses. Simultaneously, defendant filed a resis-
tance to plaintiff’s motion which alleged that he had a good

126 Ce)

defense to plaintift’s, claim “as evidericed by Division II of
defendant’s Answer filed herein, which Answer ig verified by
the defendant.”

Appellant asserts’ that the trial court erred in- sustaining
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment’ without giving con-
sideration to defendant’s resistance filed simultaneously with
defendant’s verified Answer containing affirmative defenses,
and which verified Answer was referred to in the resistance;
that the trial court erred in granting judgment based upon
plaintiff's affidavit which failed to controvert the affirmative
defenses raised in defendant’s verified Answer, and that it
erroneously disregarded the pleadings wherein defendant’s
verified Answer contained affirmative defenses which raised
substantial issues of fact, there being no reply on file contro-
verting those affirmative defenses. Only the first assignment
need be considered herein.

The trial court, in a written ruling, held that rule 238,
R. C. P., required that a sworn affidavit be attached to de
fendant’s resistance, which affidavit stated issuable facts which
would constitute a good defense to the action and was ex-
ecuted by a person having knowledge thereof, and that de-
fendant failed to comply with those specific requirements of
the rule. It referred to our recent case of Eaton v. Downey,
254 Iowa 573, 578, 118 N.W.2d 583, and others, as well as to
Cook, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Volume 2, pages 695 and
696.

Both parties cite and rely upon Eaton v. Downey and state-
ments in Cook. Both parties cite cases from foreign jurisdic-
tions, which in most instances are in accord with our holdings
or are clearly distinguishable. Although we are respectful of
the reasoning in cases from other jurisdictions, it is our re-
sponsibility to decide the meaning and requirements of rules
287 and 238 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 238 provides: “Plaintiff making a claim described in
rule 237 may file a motion for summary judgment thereon at
anytime after defendant. appears, before or after answer. * * *
Judgment shall be entered as prayed in the motion unless
within ten days after-it is filed, or such other time as the

es a

court may, for good cause, allow, the defendant resists it with
affidavits showing facts which the court deems sufficient to
permit him to defend. Hearing on the motion, if thus resisted,
shall be as provided in rule 117. The court may, on plaintiff’s
motion, strike any affidavits filed by defendant which it finds
insufficient, frivolous or made only for delay.”

HEM |. [It has often been said that the purpose of sum-
mary judgments and the affidavits connected therewith is to
enable a party with a just cause of action to obtain judgment
promptly and without delay and expense of trial, where there
is no substantial or relevant issue to try. Bjornsen Construc-
tion Co. v. Whitmer & Sons, 254 Iowa 888, 892, 119 N.W.2d 801;
Eaton v. Downey, supra; Cook, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure,
Volume 2, page 695. Rules 237 and 238, R. ©. P., were pre-
scribed to implement this right and prescribe or approve a
procedure to be followed. However, it seems quite clear the
intention of the rule is that no such judgment should be granted
if the defense affidavit shows a substantial issue of fact exists
and the matter is properly brought to the court’s attention
within the time prescribed.

Hl IL. Defendant’s resistance to a motion for summary
judgment must be timely filed and be supported by sworm
statements of a person having knowledge of facts which are
sufficient to sustain a valid defense to the action. The im-
portant factor to be shown, of course, is that the fact issue be
such that, if decided in defendant’s favor, it would be a good
defense to the action. Eaton v. Downey and Bjornsen Con-
struction Co. v. Whitmer & Sons, both supra; Petit v. Ervin
Clark Construction, Inc., 243 Iowa 118, 49 N.W.2d 508; Credit
Industrial Co. v. Happel, Inc., 252 Iowa 218, 106 N.W.2d 667.
Of course, just any irrelevant or immaterial factual issue would
not suffice, and could be rejected by the court or be stricken on
motion. See article entitled “Trial and Judgment” by Alan
Loth, 29 Iowa Law Review 35, 44, and an article by Charles
W. Joiner entitled “Determination of Controversies Without
a Factual Trial”, 32 lowa Law Review 417, 426,

Il. The sufficiency of a defense, as revealed by the
sworn factual statements or the affidavits provided in rule 238,
R. C. P., is tested by the rules of pleading. Bjornsen Con-

2s ee)

struction Co. v. Whitmer & Sons and Eaton v. Downey, both
supra. As pointed out therein, a sufficient affidavit may con-
sist of ultimate or evidentiary facts, and when so stated the
affiant has the right to also state his conclusion on those facts.

In the case at bar Division II of defendant’s Answer al-
leged under oath:

“Par. 1, That the defendant in May, 1965, sign as an ac-
commodation a document similar to Exhibit ‘A’ attached to
plaintiff's petition at the request of the American State Bank
and Michael J. Thompson and at that time the representation
was made by the American State Bank and the said Michael J.
Thompson that a loan was being made to him which was fully
secured by a chattel mortgage and that defendant further
alleges that the plaintiff has not protected the defendant as
accommodation maker of said instrument with respect to the
security and that the said security was not repossessed until
considerable time had passed after default by the said Michael
J. Thompson on the obligation and that the security was al-
lowed to depreciate without being applied to the obligation
and when ultimately it was sold and applied to the obligation
full value was not received for it.

“Par. 2. That the plaintiff extended time for payment of
the said obligation by the said Michael J. Thompson without
first obtaining the consent of the defendant and thereby had
worked a forfeiture of their right to the defendant as surety or
accommodation maker with respect to the obligation.”

Defendant's verification to his Answer stated: “I, Theodore
H. Leaver, Jr., being first duly sworn on oath depose and state
that I am the defendant named in the foregoing cause of action;
that I have read the Answer, know the contents thereof and
that the statements and allegations therein contained are true
as I verily believe.”

Although appellee contends this statement of facts does not
meet the above requirements, we must disagree.

It is not clear from the cases we have examined whether a
passive failure or delay on the part of the payee to enforce
collateral security available will result in discharge of a co-
maker, and we were given no aid by counsel on this proposition.
But see Federal Land Bank vy. Christiansen, 230 Iowa 537, 298

129

N. W. 641. It is clear that the second allegation, if sustained,
is sufficient to discharge the defendant from liability.

We are satisfied the sworn affirmative allegations in
defendant’s Answer do state a good defense to this action. A
valid agreement between the payee and maker of a note to
extend time for payment discharges any comaker who has not
consented to the extension. Cambria Savings Bank v. La
Nier, 135 Iowa 280, 112 N. W. 774; Hilers v. Frieling, 211 Iowa
841, 234 N. W. 275; section 541.121 of 1962 Code. While the
Uniform Commercial Code was not in effect when this note
was executed, the result thereunder would have been the same.
See section 554.3606 (paragraph 1a) of the 1966 Code.

IV. As heretofore stated, the underlying purpose of
the affidavit required by rule 238 is to apprise the court of the
existence of a substantial issue of fact made in good faith. As
pointed out herein, if a substantial factual issue exists which
might well determine the rights of the parties to the action, and
this issue is brought to the court’s attention within the pre-
seribed time by a sworn allegation of the defendant or a person
who knows the facts, the court should not grant a summary
judgment. The rule that a trial on the merits is preferred
could not find a better application. Rule 238, even in the
1962 Code, did not contemplate any technical requirements or
specific procedure, and for us to so hold, we think, would be
hypertechnical. The specific requirements, with sound basis
therefor, are timeliness and a disclosure to the court of a vital
factual issue in the action as shown by sworn-to factual allega-
tions. We do not believe this disclosure can only be made in
affidavit form. If, as here, that information is placed before
the court by a resistance, which in turn makes reference to a
sworn-to pleading disclosing ultimate or evidentiary facts
which would constitute a good defense, plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment could not be sustained.

While we have not previously had occasion to pass directly
on this question, and the rule has now been broadened, we did
say in State v. One Certain Automobile, 237 Iowa 1024, 1030,
23 N.W.2d 847, which considered the requirements of section
127.11(3), Code 1946, calling for an affidavit, that a verified

130

pleading which meets the legal requirements for’ an affidavit
may be held to be an affidavit, citing 2 C. J. S. 924, section
1b(2); 41 Am. Jur. 288, section 2, and several cases in support
of the holding. .

Here we find a timely resistance to the plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment and a clear reference therein to a suf-
ficient defendant’s verified Answer on file. There was no reply
filed, verified or not verified, and no motion to strike the de-
fensive allegations in the Answer. The trial court’s attention
was duly called thereto and we see-no sound basis for granting
asummary judgment under these conditions. Issues so.raised
by defendant here were for the jury, not the court. It is our
conclusion that a verified pleading which meets the legal re-
quirements of the affidavit mentioned.in rule 238,.which is re-
ferred to in a timely-filed resistance to a motion for summary
judgment, fulfills the requirements of rule 238, R. C. P.

We have considered the cited cases by appellee of Killian
v. Welfare Engineering Co., 328 Ill. App. 875, 66 N.E.2d 305,
where the pleadings were not verified, Eden v. Klaas, 165.Neb.
323, 85 N. W.2d 643, and Weber v. City of Hurley, 13 Wis.2d
560, 109 N. W.2d 65, which consider what is sufficient to ap-
prise the court of a valid defense, and Breitenbach v. Gerlach,-
27 Wis. 2d 358, 184 N. W.2d 400, and do not find them adverse
to our holdings. Although in Breitenbach v. Gerlach, supra,
the court did hold that a sufficient affidavit was the only proper
way to defeat a motion for a summary judgment, it did-not
reach the question of whether a: verified pleading referred to
in the defendant's resistance might be considered.an. affidavit.
In Townsend v. Milwaukee Insurance Co., 15 Wis. 2d 464, 113
N. W.2d 126, the problem dealt with the sufficiency of a coun-
ter-affidavit that merely recited what was in the complaint and
did not, reach the problem herein presented. In State v. Le-
Blane, Inc., Tex. Civ. App., 399 S. W.2d 919, the court, faced
with the question of whether an answer acknowledgment be-
fore a notary public, which was referred to in a resistance to
a motion for summary judgment, constituted an affidavit under
a like rule, held that it did not. However, we note there the
party acknowledging the pleading did not swear that the facts

181

stated therein were true, which we believe is a vital distinction.
Tf not, with due respect for the Texas court, we simply do not
agree with that holding.

Here we hold the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
should have been overruled and that defendant is entitled to
a trial on the issues presented by this resistance and answer.
In view of this holding, we do not find it necessary to con-
sider appellant’s other assignments of error. For trial on the
merits this matter is remanded.—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices coneur.

Ciry or Drs Mores, appellant, v. Tep’s Auto Parts, INc.,
appellee.

No. 52481,
(Reported in 153 N.W.2a 494)

Ocroser 17, 1967.

2
Ce
PS

Philip T. Riley, Anthony T. Renda, John F. McKinney,
Jr., Gary H. Swanson and Robert D. McAllister, all of Des
Moines, for appellant.

Joseph Z. Marks, of Des Moines, for appellee.

Sruart, J—The sole question before us here is whether a
city can appeal a municipal court decision in a class “D” erim-
inal case to the district court for determination of a point of
law.

Defendant was charged with violating section 30-295 of
the Des Moines Municipal Code relating to the parking of ve-
hicles in the city streets. The defendant is engaged in the auto
salvage business and left partially dismantled vehicles in an
unopened but platted city street. The municipal court judge
ruled the dismantled car was not a vehicle within the meaning
of the ordinance. .

The City appealed to the district court. The district court
sustained defendant’s motion to quash the appeal on the ground
that the district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no
statutory basis for the appeal by the City. The City has ap-
pealed from that ruling.

It is conceded by the City that a reversal on appeal would
in no way affect the dismissal of the information in municipal
court insofar as defendant is concerned. However, counsel for
the City argues it has a right to appeal adverse rulings on
points of law in class “D” actions for the future guidance of
the court.

Class ““D” actions include all criminal actions for the viola-
tion of city ordinances. Section 602.25, Code of Iowa. Appeals
are taken to the district court in the same manner as appeals
from justice courts. Scction 602.44. The statute providing
for appeals from the justice court in criminal actions has re-
mained unchanged since at least 1873. It provides:

“The justice rendering a judgment against the defendant
must inform him of his right to an appeal therefrom, and make

Ss |

an entry on the docket of the giving of such information, and
the defendant may thereupon take an appeal, by giving notice
orally to the justice that he appeals, or by delivering to the
justice, not later than twenty days thereafter, a written notice
of his appeal, and in either case the justice must make an entry
on his docket of the giving of such notice.”

In spite of the City’s efforts to discount State v. Ford
(1913) 161 Iowa 323, 142 N.W. 984, we believe it to be directly
in point. There defendant was acquitted in the police court
which is governed by the same appeal statute. Jurisdiction of
the district court to hear the appeal was challenged. We said
on pages 325, 326 of 161 Iowa:

“In trials before a justice of peace, the right of appeal is
expressly conferred on the defendant both by the statute and
the Constitution (section 11, art. 1, Constitution; section 5612,
Code), and an appeal from the judgment of the district court
by the state to the Supreme Court is expressly authorized by
section 5620 of the Code. No appeal, however, is authorized
from a judgment in favor of the defendant in the justice court
or police court.

HE “Nor do we think that jurisdiction is conferred on the
district court. Section 6 of article 5 of the Constitution de-
clares that ‘The district court shall be a court of law and
equity, which shall be distinct and separate jurisdictions, and
have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their
respective districts, in such manner as shall be prescribed by
law.’ No statute has undertaken to confer jurisdiction of ap-
peals by the state from judgments for the defendants in either
the police or justice court. It is well settled in this state that,
in the absence of a statute authorizing an appeal by the state,
an appellate court cannot acquire jurisdiction to review the
proceedings below. State v. Johnson, 2 Iowa 549; State v. Van
Horton, 26 Iowa 402; State v. Tait, 22 Iowa 140. And it is
adjudicated elsewhere, by the overwhelming weight of author-
ity, that the state may not sue out a writ of error or take
an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
eriminal case, whether rendered upon a verdict of acquittal
or upon a question of law determined by the court, unless

2

authorized by statute: People v. Miner, 144 Ill: 308 (33 NE.
40, 19 L.R.A. 342) and note; United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310 (12 Sup.. Ct. 609, 36 Lu. Ed. 445); People v. Raymond, 18
Colo. 242 (32 Pac. 429, 19 L.R.A. 649); City of Milwaukee v
Weiss, 93 Wis. 653 (68 N.W. 390).

“While the cases generally deal with the matter of appeal
from courts of record, the principle applies in a case like this.
An appeal‘by the prosecutor was not permitted at the common
law, and there is no tenable ground for allowing it, in the
absence of statute, where the judgment is of acquittal or dis-
charges defendant in justice or police court.” -

See also State v. Olsen, 180 Iowa 97, 99, 162 N.W. 781.

As early as State v. Flinn, 51 Iowa 133, 134, 50 N.W. 495,
we said the foregoing statute was the “only mode provided by
statute for review in the District Court of a criminal case tried
in an inferior court.” We held defendant had no right to ap-
peal on a writ of error but that his constitutional rights were
protected by the appeal de novo.

We adopt the language of State v..Ford, supra, and believe
the reason and logic stated therein apply to the present-day
situation. We do not share the City’s alarm over a holding
that no right of appeal is available to it on law points. The
best argument would appear to be the fact that they have not
had the right of appeal for nearly one hundred years without
dire consequences. If it appears to be so essential, the legis-
lature could be urged to enact a statute giving the right to
appeal.

= [HM We believe there are many sound reasons why the legis-
lature would feel it unnecessary to give either party the right
to appeal a decision of an inferior court on a point of law. As
stated before, the appeal de novo fully protects defendant’s
constitutional rights. On such appeal the point of law in ques-
tion might not arise. There is no provision for the making of
a transcript of the evidence in a class “D” action. There .is
no incentive for a defendant who has been discharged to be
concerned with the results on appeal and in many instances
the adversary nature of appellate proceedings would be lacking.
We therefore hold, the City has no right of appeal to the

SS 3:5

district court from an adverse ruling on a point of law in a
class “D” action in a municipal court.—Affirmed,

All Justices coneur.

Vern 8. Goopseiy et al., appellees, v. Stars AUTOMOBILE AND
Casuayty UNDERWRITERS, appellant.

No. 52398.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 458)

16

Ocroper 17, 1967.

Gene V. Kellenberger and Keyes, Crawford & Bradley, all
of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Englebrecht & Ackerman, of Waverly, for appellees.

LeGranp, J—On September 21, 1964, Sandra Goodsell, one
of the plaintiffs, was involved in an automobile accident in
Detroit, Michigan. The accident resulted in damage to Miss
Goodsell’s Volkswagen automobile in the amount of $900.12
and caused injury to her for which she incurred medical and
hospital expense of $62.

Some time prior to this accident the plaintiff, Vern 8S.
Goodsell, father of Sandra Goodsell, had purchased a family
automobile insurance policy from defendant. This policy was
in full force and effect on the date of the accident, and it listed
the Volkswagen as one of the cars covered by its terms, even
though the policy was issued to Vern 8. Goodsell and the
Volkswagen was owned by Sandra Goodsell. The defendant
admits in his argument that the Volkswagen is an “owned car”
as defined in the policy.

Plaintiffs made claim for the amount of the repairs to the
car and for reimbursement of the medical and hospital expense
above referred to. Defendants denied coverage and refused
payment of plaintiffs’ claim. This suit was then started to
compel payment by defendant.

After trial to the court, judgment was entered for plain-

SS 2:

tiffs in the amount of $962.12, from which defendant appeals.
Defendant assigns four errors for our consideration. Since
all raise but a single issue, we will discuss and dispose of them
as one. Defendant strenuously urges that Sandra Goodsell’s
operation of the Volkswagen was not covered by the policy
unless she was, at the time of the accident, a resident of Vern
S. Goodsell’s household. Defendant alleges that the trial court
erred in its findings of fact and its conclusions of law which
resulted in the determination that she was such a resident and
that she was therefore entitled to recover under the terms of
the policy. If the trial court properly held that Sandra Good-
sell was a resident of her father’s household, then the judg-
ment must be affirmed; if she was not such a resident at that
time, then it must be reversed.

This is a law action and we are limited to considering the
errors assigned on appeal. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure;
Farm Service Co. v. Tobin, 254 Iowa 1828, 1882, 121 N.W.2d
128, 180, and citations; Phoenix v. Stevens, 256 Iowa 432, 435,
127 N.W.2d 640, 642. We might say, however, that certain
definitions in the policy, particularly those in Parts II and III
which deal with coverage for collision loss and for medical
payment benefits, are ambiguous and might justify extension
of coverage to Sandra Goodsell regardless of her status in the
Vern S. Goodsell household. Under Part II defendant agrees
to pay for medical, hospital and other expenses incurred for
injuries sustained by any person “while occupying the owned
automobile, while being used by the named assured, by any
resident of the same household or by any other person with
the permission of the named insured.” Under Part III dealing
with collision coverage the policy states that “insured means
(a) with respect to the owned automobile (1) the named in-
sured and (2) any person * * * using or having custody of
said automobile with the permission of the named insured.”
Since the claims at issue arise under Parts II and III of the
policy and since the record shows that Sandra Goodsell was
operating the car with the consent of her father, it is difficult
to see why these specific policy provisions do not extend pro-
tection to Sandra Goodsell. However, since the case was

os

neithe tried nor decided on this theory, we disregard it in
our determination of the matter.
The facts giving rise to this litigation are: Sandra Good-
‘sell, asingle girl, approximately 20 years of age, resided with
her mother and father in ‘Denver, Iowa. In March of 1963 she
purchased a Volkswagen automobile, although title was put in
her father’s name because he had supplied the purchase price
and desired to retain title until his daughter had repaid the
amount advanced. Title was transferred to the name of Sandra
Goodsell in May of 1964. In July of 1964 Sandra Goodsell
began a training course with Northwest Airlines in Minne-
apolis, Minnesota. After attending school there for some time,
she was sent to Detroit, Michigan, for additional training. The
Volkswagen was left with Mr. Goodsell in Denver, Iowa, until
about the middle of August, when Sandra Goodsell drove it to
Detroit, where she kept it until the accident one month later.
The policy of insurance designated Vern S. Goodsell as
the only named assured. The Volkswagen, however, was de-
scribed therein as an “owned automobile”. It remained so de-
scribed even after title was transferred from Vern 8. Goodsell
to Sandra Goodsell. Defendant concedes that the Volkswagen
is an owned automobile within the terms of the policy.
Defendant’s appeal is based solely upon the proposition
that there can be no recovery unless Sandra Goodsell was a
resident in the household of Vern 8. Goodsell on September
21, 1964. It is, of course, admitted that Sandra Goodsell was
attending a job training course in Detroit, Michigan, when
the accident occurred. Did this prevent her from being a resi-
dent of her father’s household within the policy provisions?
Evidence was introduced to show that when she went to
Detroit, her future plans were uncertain. A fair interpretation
of the evidence sustains the conclusion neither she nor the com-
pany knew if she would be employed when her training was
completed. She did not know if she would desire such employ-
‘ment. She testified that “she had not made up her mind.”
She did not know if the company would accept her as an em-
ployée. If shé were employed, she did not Know where she
would be assigned for duty. The most that cah be said when

EE

Sandra Goodsell went to Detroit is that she was hopeful of
securing employment with the company upon completion of
her training and was willing to locate where the company as-
signed her, but the events which would decide this had not
yet occurred when she was involved in the accident.

Defendant claims Sandra Goodsell ceased to be a resident
in her father’s household for the purposes of coverage under
the policy when she went to Detroit. Thereafter, according
to defendant, she operated her automobile without insurance
protection under the policy issued to her father.

We are unable to agree with defendant and find there
was ample evidence in the record to justify the conelusion
reached by the trial court. The narrow and dogmatic definition
of residence for which appellant contends ignores the long
history of litigation over the meaning of this word. “Resi-
dent” has many meanings and has been defined in many ways.
The term may mean different things for different purposes. It
has been interpreted, under various statutes and in various
factual situations, in cases involving taxation; venue; poor
relief; voting rights; attachment proceedings; school attend-
ance; military service; unemployment compensation benefits;
jurisdiction for divorce purposes; and presumption of death
resulting from unexplained absence. This list is illustrative,
but by no means exhaustive, of the confusion and uncertainty
over the term. No purpose would be served here in detailing
the facts surrounding these various decisions. For a further
discussion see 4 Iowa Law Bulletin 3; 87 Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, 317-451; In re Seidel, 204-Minn, 357, 283
N.W. 742, 743; State v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122, 124, 105 N.W.
387, 3 L.R.A., N.S., 455, 118 Am. St. Rep. 452; Harris v. Harris,
205 Iowa 108, 112, 215 N.W. 661, 663.

In view of the many meanings which the word “resi-
dent” may have and in view of the various interpretations
which have been placed upon the term both by this court and
by courts of other jurisdictions, it would be unreasonable to
expect plaintiffs to understand precisely which meaning was
intended by defendant. Certainly it is susceptible of the mean-

0

ing for which the plaintiffs now contend, although that may
not be what defendant had in mind.

HEME In these circumstances the established rules for the
interpretation of insurance contracts become important. One
of these rules is that the court should ascertain what the in-
sured, as a reasonable person, understood the policy to mean,
not what the insurer actually intended. Umbarger v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 218 Iowa 203, 206,
254 N.W. 87, 88. We have said on several occasions a contract
of insurance should not be construed through the magnifying
eye of the technical lawyer but rather from the standpoint of
what an ordinary man would believe it to mean. Murphy v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 219 Iowa 609, 613, 258 N.W.
749, 751; Aeroline Flight Service, Inc. v. Insurance: Company
of North America, 257 Iowa 409, 417, 183 N.W.2d 80, 85. As ap-
plied to this case the trial court was justified in concluding
that Vern S. Goodsell, as a reasonable person, did not under-
stand his policy would extend no protection to an: automobile
which was covered by its terms while that automobile was be-
ing driven by his daughter in Detroit, Michigan.

HEN Another rule of construction in insurance cases re-
quires doubt or ambiguity to be construed strictly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. This rule is pe-
culiarly applicable here. Struble v. Square Deal Insurance Co.,
287 Towa 1155, 1159, 24 N.W.2d 441, 442, and citations; West
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 248-Iowa 9938, 998, 83 N.W.2d
465, 468; Rogers v. Maryland Casualty Co., 252 Iowa 1096,
1099, 109 N.W.2d 435, 487, and citations. Under these authori-
ties we cannot limit the meaning of the word resident as used
in this policy as strictly as defendant would like. We hold that
there is substantial evidence in the record justifying the trial
court’s conclusion that Sandra Goodsell was a resident of her
father’s household within the terms of the policy at the time in
question.

We have not overlooked the testimony of Sandra Goodsell
upon which defendant so strongly relies. It is set out in full as
follows: .

“Q. Would it be fair to say, Sandra, that when you moved

EE

to Detroit or went to Detroit it was with the intention of stay-
ing there permanently subject to changing your mind if the air-
line job didn’t turn out? In other words, maybe I can rephrase
it a little, did you go to Detroit with the intention of going there
and staying there with the intention if things didn’t work out
you would come back? A. I went there with the intention of
working out my three months probationary period to see if I
did like it. They stipulate when they hire you that this is not a
definite job. You are not hired forever and ever. That they have
the right to get rid of you in three months or sooner if you
don’t work out.

“Q. And I suppose by the same token they could assign you
at a Northwest Terminal other than Detroit? A. Yes.

“Q. This may be a fine distinction, but you went to Detroit
with the idea of staying there and living there permanently un-
less you decided it wasn’t going to work out or something else
happened that changed your mind, that’s true, isn’t it? A. Yes.

“Q. You understand what I mean by that? A. Yes.

“Q. If you don’t understand, say so? A. I do.”

Defendant contends this testimony conclusively bars re-
covery by plaintiffs. Defendant contends further it conclusively
shows that Sandra Goodsell changed her residence when she
went to Detroit and had no intention of returning to her fa-
ther’s home in Denver, Iowa. The trial court placed far less im-
portance on this testimony than does defendant. When related
to Sandra Goodsell’s testimony as a whole, this evidence is con-
sistent with the finding that she went to Detroit willing to take
a job if one were offered, ready to change her residence if that
were necessary, but with no idea as to what the ultimate out-
come of her training would be.

Hl in its reply brief and argument defendant raises
the question of Sandra Goodsell’s failure to comply with the
Financial Responsibility Act of the State of Iowa. We do not
see how this failure could in any event be material to a deter-
mination of this case. However, we find that this issue was
not before the trial court, and was not raised on this appeal un-
til the filing of the reply brief and argument. Under these cir-
cumstances it cannot be considered here. Verschoor v. Miller,
259 Iowa 170, 143 N.W.2d 385, 389, and citations.

P|

We find that there is substantial evidence to support the
findings of fact made by the trial court. Since this is a law ac-
tion, these findings are therefore binding upon us. Rule 344(f)
(1), Rules of Civil Procedure.

We find no error and the judgment is, therefore,—Affirmed.

All Jusrices coneur except Mason, J., and Garren, C. J.,
who dissent.

Mason, J.—I dissent.. Defendant’s appeal presents the issue
whether Sandra Fae Goodsell was an insured under an automo-
bile insurance policy issued by defendant to her father.

The policy defines insured as including the named insured
and any resident of the same household. The majority holds
there is substantial evidence in the record justifying the trial
court’s conclusion that Sandra was a resident of her father’s
household within the terms of the policy at the time in question.
I disagree.

The question of who are members of the same household in
eases involving insurance coverage has been before the Wiscon-
sin court on at least four occasions that I find,

In Raymond v. Century Indemnity Co., 264 Wis. 429, 431, 59
N.W.2d 459, 460, the provision for interpretation was “with
the permission of an adult member of such assured’s house-
hold.” The issue was whether the person operating an automo-
bile insured by defendant company at time of accident was
driving it “with the permission of an adult member of such as-
sured’s household.” The policy had been issued to a Mrs. Has-
seler whose 22-year-old son was in the armed forces stationed at
Camp McCoy. It was he who had granted permission to drive
the insured vehicle to the person operating it at the time of the
accident. The son had lived with his mother at Green Bay prior
to entering the army. The court held the son’s absence in the
army did not destroy his. status as an adult member of his mo-
ther’s household.

The trial court was reversed for excluding facts bearing upon
the son’s right under the policy of the named insured to per-
mit the driver to use the car and having t that right relate back
to his mother.

SS 1:

In Lontkowski v. Ignarski, 6 Wis.2d 561, 564, 565, 95 N.W.
2d 230, 232, the policy before the court excluded coverage with re-
spect to any car “furnished for regular use to the named i in-
sured or a member of his household.”

The court said:

“‘Flousehold’ is defined by Webster as ‘those who dwell un-
der the same roof and constitute a family.’ That definition cor-
responds with the common and approved usage of the term and
is supported by judicial authority. ‘Persons who dwell together
as a family constitute a household.’ Arthur v. Morgan, 1884,
112 US. 495, 499, 5 S. Ct. 241, 243, 28 L. Ed. 825.”

The trial court’s finding that the driver of the insured vehicle
was a member of the owner’s household was affirmed.

The third case, National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co.
vy. Maca, 26 Wis.2d 399, 403, 407, 182 N.W.2d 517, 519, 521, 522,
involved a liability policy covering farm accidents subject to
the exclusion that coverage was not extended to bodily injury
to the named insured and his spouse and “the relatives of ei-
ther * * * if such * * * relative is a resident of the household of
the insured * * *.” The policyholder’s 32-year-old son was in-
jured while operating a corn picker on his father’s farm approxi-
mately five months after he came to live with his parents. He
had accepted a job which he could have retained on a per-
manent basis, but claimed he was only living with his parents
until he could find a better job.

Plaintiff insurance company claimed the son was a resident
of the father’s household, and, being his son, would therefore
have the protection of being an insured under the policy but
that any liability to him for bodily injury was excluded. The
son contended he was not “resident,” because he did not intend
to remain permanently, arguing that the word “resident” must
be construed with the connotation of “domicile,” and cannot
apply to one who does not have the present intention to remain.
The court said: “We have so construed the word ‘resident’
where used in certain statutes. The word, however, ‘is an elas-
tic term which may refer to a temporary sojourner as well as to
one possessing a legal domicile.’ ”

In affirming the trial court’s granting of a summary judg-

ee

ment on the basis that the son was a member of the father’s
household as a matter of law within the wording of the policy,
the court said:

“We think that one is not a resident of the household or
member of the family if, even though he has no other place of
abode, he comes under the family roof for a definite short pe-
riod or for an indefinite period under such circumstances that
an early termination is highly probable. If, however, the cir-
cumstances of his stay are otherwise consistent with a family or
household relationship, and his stay is likely to be of substantial
duration, the fact that he attempts to find employment, gain-
ing which he would live elsewhere, would not, in our opinion,
prevent his being a resident of the household or a member of
the family.”

The remaining case referred to, Doern v. Crawford, 30
Wis.2d 206, 140 N.W.2d 193, 196, involved a policy issued to
a Mr. Paulson which extended coverage to non-owned automo-
biles when operated by the named insured or a relative resid-
ing in the same household. Paulson’s wife was also a “named
insured” under the policy definitions. For some time before the
accident Paulson, his wife and her son by a prior marriage re-
sided together in the same home. Six days before the accident
Paulson instituted divorce proceedings and removed from the
home. At the time of the accident the stepson was driving a
“loaner” automobile,

The insurance company denied coverage and moved for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to it. Its ap-
peal from the court’s order denying the motion presonts the
question whether Paulson, the policyholder, on the date of the
accident was residing in the same household with his wife and
stepson.

In affirming the action of the trial court in denying the in-
surance company’s motion for summary judgment the court
said, after referring to the above cases:

“The holdings of these three cases demonstrate that the
controlling test of whether persons are members of a household
at a particular time is not solely whether they are then re-
siding together under one roof. Living together under one roof

EE

is a factor to be considered and must have occtrred at some
time. When not occurring at the time in question, the absence
from the family roof must be of a temporary nature with intent
on the part of the absent person to return thereto, There is a close
analogy between the concepts of household and domicile because
intent of the person involved plays such a significant part.
The one material difference between the two is that a domicile
once acquired is not lost when a person leaves it, even though
intending never to return, until he establishes a domicile else-
where. We determine that this is not true with respect to a
household, and, therefore, physical absence coupled with in-
tent not to return is sufficient to sever the absent person’s mem-
bership in the household. Every person has a domicile but not
every person is a member of a household.

“Whether the absence from the household is of long or
short duration is immaterial except as it may give rise to an
inference of intent to remain away permariently or only tem-
porarily * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)

This controlling test is repeated with approval in Giese v.
Karstedt, 30 Wis.2d 630, 141 N.W.2d 886, 889.

From the foregoing pronouncements, it logically follows that
the question is not whether Sandra intended to establish a
domicile in Detroit, rather whether it was her intent to return
to Denver after she left for training in Detroit.

I think this is where the trial court erred in its conclusions
of law.

The trial court determined Sandra was a resident of her
father’s household based upon his fact finding that “Sandra
Fae Goodsell did not have at the specific time that she went to
Detroit, Michigan, an intention to reside there permanently
and with no present intention of moving back to Dénver, Iowa,
or to any other place * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The trial court seemed to be under the impression that his
finding that “she was there only on a probationary basis and
on a training basis and would be transferred somewhere in
North America that Northwest Airlines decided upon in the
event her training was successful * * * ” vitiates any idea that
Sandra intended to reside permanently in Detroit. It does ne-
gate the idea that Detroit may have been her domicile at the

146

time of the accident, however, it doés not negate, rather tends to
substantiate plaintiff’s failure to meet the crucial standard,
Le.; she would ‘not be coming back to Denver.

T fail to find substantial evidence that would support a find-
ing that Sandra intended to return to Denver. In fact, I believe
the record establishes that she was going to take up a per-
manent residence elsewhere but did not know where. It de-
pended upon whether the company was satisfied with her work
and where, if anyplace, it wished to send her.

I would reverse.

GarFIELp, C. J., joins in this dissent.

In Re ConpEMNATION or Lanps.

Fuorence H. Sranury et al., appellants, v. Crry or Inpranova,
appellee.

No. 52652.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 706)

a
| = = = = = 1 | |_| | |

148

Ocroper 17, 1967.

M. G. Ouderkirk, of Indianola, and Hansen, Wheateraft &
McClintock, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Watson, Elgin & Hoyman and Wilson & Goodhue, all of In-
dianola, for appellee.

Brcxer, J.—Appeal by plaintiff from allowance of attorney
fees under section 472.33, Code, 1966. The issue to be decided is
whether the attorney fees awarded by the trial court are reason-
able. We modify and affirm.

Defendant City of Indianola initiated condemnation pro-
ceedings to acquire seven and one-half acres of land to expand the
existing city dump. On July 8, 1964, the condemnation commis-
sion assessed the damages to plaintiff property owner at $3400.
On appeal the district court jury awarded $15,000 as damages.
This verdict has not been appealed nor has the City elected not
to take the property.

Plabnusts tiled application for allowance of attorney “fees
pursuant to section 472.33 which provides in part: “The appli-
eant shall also pay all costs occasioned by the appeal, including
reasonable attorney fees to be taxed by the court, unless on the
trial thereof the same or a less amount of damages is awarded
than was allowed by the tribunal from which the appeal was ta-
ken.”

. Plaintiff was represented by John A. McClintock of the firm
of Hansen, Wheatcraft & McClintock of Des Moines and by

es 49

M.G. Ouderkirk of Indianola. Application for attorney fees
shows services commencing July 8, 1964. No claim is made for
services prior to the commission award. On the ninth day of
July, 1964, notice of appeal was prepared and filed. In due
course a petition was filed. The matter did not come on for trial
until May 16, 1966, The trial took two and one-half days.

The application includes an exhibit showing the efforts of
the attorneys during the 22-month period between the date of
the commissioner’s award and the date the verdict of the dis-
trict court jury was rendered. Mr. McClintock, who acted as
chief trial attorney, shows work done on the case on 15 differ-
ent days during trial preparation. He states that this work con-
sumed 48 charge hours.

Mr. Ouderkirk, who acted as cocounsel at the trial but who
apparently took the heavier burden in preparing the case,
shows work done on 86 different days. His application first
showed 14514 hours of trial preparation time. By amendment
Mr. Ouderkirk reduced the claimed charge hours to 721%.
Claimants’ attorneys stated that there was some duplication and
some overlapping of effort, thus accounting for the reduction.

Both lists of work performed give actual dates for all
work and fair detail as to just what was done on each date.
Specific hours spent on each effort on each date were not pro-
vided.

Until just before trial Mr. McClintock’s time was nearly all
taken in conferences with his cocounsel who was preparing the
ease and some legal research. Just prior to trial additional time
was taken for a deposition and for conferences with witnesses.

By contrast Mr. Ouderkirk shows substantial additional
entries for preparation of petition, visits to premises, review of
comparable property listings, conferences with appraisers (at
one of which he supplied the appraiser with 151 pages of re-
ports and photostats), arrangements for aerial photographs,
conferences with engineering firms and similar pretrial work.

The application as amended requested total fee allowance
of $4950. Time was charged at $30 per hour for Mr. McClintock
and $20 for Mr. Ouderkirk. Trial was charged at $200 and $100
per day respectively. An additional $1160 was charged for re-
sults achieved for the dient.

150 es

The application was resisted and hearing was had. Appli-
eants produced attorneys Ralph R. Randall, former judge of
the ninth Judicial District, Ben Webster, Jr. and Kent Forney,
all of Des Moines. All qualified as experts on attorney fees. All
agreed the charges suggested by the application were reasonable
assuming the pretrial hours shown by the attorneys were rea-
sonable. None felt competent to pass on the question whether 48
and 721% hours respectively were reasonable showings for pre-
trial preparation for this particular lawsuit,

Both attorneys for condemnees made professional state-
ments and submitted themselves to cross-examination. Each
said the hours spent were, in their judgment, reasonably nec-
essary, and the charges were reasonable. Mr. McClintock’s
statement also noted preparation of engineering materials that
were not used because certain points he thought would be
raised by condemnor were not in fact raised. Each stressed
the fact that condemnation for a dump (more euphemistically
referred to as sanitary landfill) raised novel questions, new to
them.

Condemnors called Mr. Dale Ewalt, a practicing attorney in
Indianola since 1937, who was also qualified as an expert on the
subject. He put the reasonable hourly pretrial rate at $15 be-
cause the work was not complicated. The daily charge for trial
work was not substantially different from that suggested by
condemnees’ attorneys. In Mr. Ewalt’s opinion the amount of
time spent on pretrial preparation was unreasonable. He did not
think charges for preparation of a case of this kind could be
justified in an amount greater than the per diem charge for the
trial.

The trial court allowed $750 for trial fees al the rate of
$300 per day for both attorneys for two and one-half days. The
case was submitted to the jury at 11:25 a.m. of the third day of
trial. After discussing some of the time spent in pretrial skir-
mishing, particularly in relation to one deposition and in get-
ting a jury trial, the court noted that an additional allowance
for a fee for pretrial preparation should not in this case exceed
the allowance for time spent in court and should.in fact be less
than that sum. It thereupon allowed the sum of $650 for pre-
trial preparation, making a total fee allowance of $1400 which

es 161

the court directed be paid at the rate of $700 for each partici-
pating lawyer. .

Hi I. 1% may be we have set out the factual background
for this decision in more detail than necessary. We have repeat-
edly held that we will not interfere with the trial court’s discre-
tionary action ina matter of this kind unless there has been
an abuse of discretion resulting in a manifestly incorrect al-
lowance of fees. Tilton v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 250 Iowa
583, 590, 94 N.W.2d 782.

But we have also said where the action of the trial court is
arbitrary it becomes our duty to act, Nelson v. Iowa State High-
way Commission, 253 Iowa 1248, 1256, 115 N.W.2d 695: “Where
the service performed reasonably supports a larger allowance
and the allowance made is manifestly inadequate when the evi-
dence and all matters necessarily involved are considered, the
trial court has abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily, and
it becomes our duty to make a proper allowance.” (Cases cited.)

Our review of this matter therefore requires careful atten-
tion to all the significant evidence bearing on the reasonable-
ness of the fee allowance.

[| II. The action of the court in limiting the allowance
for trial compensation to one-half day for the third day of trial
time is unrealistic in this case. This action must be predicated
on the thought that the attorneys could and should have returned
to their offices to accomplish an afternoon’s work on other mat-
ters while the jury deliberated the fate of their clients’ cause.

Some trials important enough to require a jury trial are
important enough to require the undivided attention and efforts
of the trial lawyer. While modern man has great ability to shift
attention from one complicated duty to another, this trait has
its limitations. Of course if a jury returns its verdict early in
the day and the attorney simply appears to take a verdict in a
case that was submitted the day before or if the case does not
involve a jury matter, fractional treatment is justified, But such
is not the case here.

HI The recommendations of the Iowa State Bar Association
Advisory Schedule of Minimum Fees are not binding on the

152 Ce)

parties or on this court, but we note these schedules speak of
trial days, or any part thereof.

| | III. We also think limitation of compensation for pre-
trial preparation to no more than that allowed for trial is arbi-
trary. No doubt there are cases where successful attorneys spend
as little or less time, in preparation for trial than they spend in
trial. But these cases will be found to be the exception rather
than the rule. In such cases it will usually be found that some-
one else has done a great amount of preliminary work to prepare
a file for the trial attorney. Preparation is indispensable to
adequate presentation.

| | Each case has its own problems; its own peculiar ‘dan-
gers. Only counsel can determine how much preparation is war-
ranted. We do not think it can be said the hours logged were
unreasonable, nor do we think it reasonable to say the time con-
sumed in the abortive attempt to take the deposition of witness
Richard I. Currier and the successful attempt to get a jury trial
were wasted. Such holding necessarily rejects the statements
and the good faith of the lawyers involved. .

Hl IV. We have an adequate record to allow reasonable
attorney fees. The factors to be considered are well set out in
Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra, at 1257 of 253
Towa: “In determining a reasonable attorney fee to be taxed as
costs in this type of case a number of matters should be consid-
ered. They include the time spent, the nature and extent of the
service, the amount involved, the difficulty of handling and im-
portance of issues, responsibility assumed, and the results ob-
tained. See annotations, 143 A.L.R. 669 and 56 A.L.R.2d 31,
and authorities cited above in this division. Im addition, the
recovery of a fee in this type of action is wholly contingent upon
plaintiff recovering damages in a larger amount than awarded
by the condemnation commission.”

‘We have also given consideration to the ability and
standing of the attorney, State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa
785, 56 N.W.2d 173; Gabel v. Gabel, 254 Iowa 248, 117 N.W.2d
501, and to the place of residence or where the services were per-
formed, Stanberry v. Dickerson, 35 Iowa 493.

This appeal resulted in an $11,600 increase in the award,
The damages allowed by the jury and accepted by the condemnor

es 153

were 441 percent of the damages awarded by the commission.
The entire responsibility for the trial rested on the two attorneys
involved. We agree condemnation of land for use as a dump
could well raise problems of damage to the remaining property
not found in other condemnation cases.

HI But counsels’ estimate of the reasonable number of hours
necessary for preparation to satisfy their own professional ethics,
however commendable, cannot bind the court. The determination
of reasonable attorney fees must be made within the context of
the whole case including: the entire amount of money involved,
the principles at stake and other matters noted. In Tilton v.
Towa Power and Light Co., 250 Iowa 583, 590, 94 N.W.2d 782,
we said: “The effect of plaintiff’s argument is that the allowance
of attorney fees should be based entirely on the hours spent in
preparing for trial and the opinions of the attorney-witnesses as
to a reasonable charge for such services. However, we think the
court was also entitled to consider other matters, such as the
amount involved and the result obtained.”

HI Put differently the amount of the fees allowed must be
rationally related to the whole case. While we agree with
condemnees that the amount awarded by the trial court is
manifestly unfair, we do not agree that within the context of
this entire case the full amount of fees claimed should be al-
lowed. On the whole record we find that $3600 constitutes a
reasonable fee to be-allowed here under section 472.33 and so
order.

The manner of allocation of such funds can best
be determined by the attorneys themselves. We do not know
what agreements, if any, they had before associating them-
selves together for this case. Unless they seek legal determina-
tion of the manner of distribution the matter should be left in
their hands. Allowance of fees is in favor of the client, not
the attorneys, and their charges to the client are not decided
here. In Nelson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra, at
page 1257 we say: “Plaintiff's are entitled to reasonable fees for
the necessary and reasonable services performed in preparation
and trial in the district court.” [Emphasis supplied.]

HN OV. We note the attorneys have stated they have no
contract to charge their client and do not intend to do so. They

164 eS

contend that under our constitution and statutes their client
should not have to pay any attorney fees in excess of those
allowed by the court. Such holding is neither necessary nor
desirable. The attorney. and client should be free to contract
in order that both parties are adequately protected. Litigation
of this sort has many pitfalls. The jury can and sometimes
does award less than the commission. In that event no attor-
ney fees are allowable and fees are purely a matter of contract
between attorney and client. The court may award attorney
fees it deems reasonable under all the circumstances but which
the lawyer does not deem reasonable in terms of effort in-
volved, time spent, result achieved and other factors. Indeed,
the effort may be entirely disproportionate to the size of the
ease but such effort may have been dictated by the clients’
demands. In all cases the parties should be free to contract,
or, in the absence of express contract, to seek fair settlement
of their problems by such action as is available under quantum
meruit.

We remand for modification of judgment in accordance
with this opinion —Modified and affirmed.

All Justices concur except Stuart, J., who coneurs in the
result,

» GaRriELp, C, J,, dissents in part.

Garrisip, C. J—I am willing to concur in the holding the
award of attorney fees was manifestly inadequate but would
not allow more than $3000.

“Our review of the allowance of fees is not de novo.
The trial court has considerable discretion in fixing attorney
fees although the exercise thereof must be reasonable, not arbi.
trary. Tilton v. lowa Power and Light Co., supra, page 590 of’
250 Iowa, and page 786 of 94 N.W.2d.” Nelson v. Iowa State
Highway Comm., 253 Iowa 1248, 1256, 115 N.W.2d 695, 700
(1962).

In the Nelson case trial of a condemnation appeal resulted
in an increase of $15,000 in the award. A trial judge of long
experience allowed a fee of $2000 to two prominent firms of
attorneys (not to each), opposed by two firms equally promi-
nent in a trial lasting three days. We held the allowance of

ee

EE

fees was within the reasonable discretion of the trial court.
There was no dissent.

It is scarcely conceivable we would have held an award
by the trial court here of considerably less than the $3600
allowed by the majority was an arbitrary exercise of discretion.
Certainly the trial court knew considerably more about the
case than we do.

Insurance Managers, Inc., appellee, v. Canvert Finn
Insurance Company, appellant.

No. 52649,
(Reported in 153 N.W.24 480)

156

Ocroser 17, 1967.

John N. Moreland and Wilbur R, Dull, of Dull & Keith,
both of Ottumwa, for appellant.

Bannister & Bell, of Ottumwa, for appellee.

Snewv, J.—This is an action at law tried to the court without
the aid of a jury and upon stipulated facts except as to the
admissibility of certain exhibits offered in evidence.

HM The trial court’s findings of fact as supported by the
stipulation are binding on us but the court’s conclusions based
thereon unless supported are not so binding. We agree with
most of the evidentiary matters as found by the trial court but
not with the conclusion drawn therefrom.

Was the evidence sufficient to generate a factual issue for
determination by the trier of the facts? We think not.

Plaintiff is the assignee of Weston M. Cain who is also the

SS 2:7

principal owner of the plaintiff-corporation. Mr. Cain has been
continuously employed in the insurance business since 1927.

Defendant, Calvert Fire Insurance Company, a Pennsyl-
vania Corporation, is wholly owned by Commercial Credit Cor-
poration, a Delaware Corporation, a part of what plaintiff’s
brief describes as the Commercial Credit Empire. The various
companies comprising this financial structure are owned by
Commercial Credit Company. At all times pertinent hereto
defendant insurance company has been authorized to do busi-
ness in Iowa as a foreign corporation.

From January 1, 1946, to June 30, 1960, Commercial Credit
Corporation, a Maryland corporation, was authorized to do
business in Iowa as a foreign corporation. It maintained offices
in Towa. Allits capital stock was owned by Commercial Credit
Corporation of Delaware.

The Maryland corporation on June 30, 1960, surrendered
its qualifications to do business in Iowa and on the same date
there was incorporated an Iowa corporation under the same
name. All of the stock was owned by Commercial Credit Cor-
poration of Delaware. The payrolls of these several corpora-
tions, as well as the payroll of the defendant insurance com-
pany, were paid by Statistical and Service Corporation, a
Maryland corporation also owned by Commercial Credit Com-
pany. It is apparent that the several corporations formed a
financial structure to finance installment buying and related
activities.

The transactions involved herein related to the buying of
security instruments on chattel property located in Iowa under
installment purchase contracts requiring certain insurance.

The chain of events would begin with a purchase of
chattel property in Iowa to be paid for on an installment basis.
Commercial Credit Corporation was a source of credit for
financing such transactions.

An installment buyer of chattel property in Iowa would
execute a retail installment contract or security instrument
covering the purchased property, usually an automobile. As
a part of his agreement the purchaser agreed to obtain and
keep in force fire, theft and collision insurance as requested by

5S

the seller and subject to his approval as to form, amount and
insurer. The retail installment contract executed by the buyer
included specifications of the types of insurance coverage and
benefits, and the amount included in the obligation for insur-
ance premiums. The agreement also authorized the seller as
the creditor to purchase any and all such insurance at the pur-
chaser’s.expense. The purchaser assigned to the seller the
proceeds of such insurance to the extent of the unpaid portion
of the Total Time Balance. This called for. what is referred to
as dual interest or double interest insurance.

There was appended to such security document a printed
assignment in favor of Commercial Credit Corporation and
when so executed by the seller Commercial Credit Corporation
became the owner of the security interest in the insured prop-
erty.

At the time of the. execution of the security instruments,
Commercial Credit Corporation in or of Iowa, as assignee, made
its own investigation of the purchaser relative to employment,
income, assets, liquor and ‘draft hazards and other matters re-
lating to the desirability of the purchaser as both a credit and
insurance risk. This report was reduced to writing as “Pur-
chaser Investigation Form.” The assignee also prepared a
written requisition for the insurance required by the transac-
tion. The investigation report and requisition for insurance
were prepared in local Commercial Credit Corporation offices
in Iowa and were forwarded by mail to the defendant insurance
company in Baltimore, Maryland. In the Baltimore office the
defendant prepared the insurance policy in accordance with the
requisition and forwarded the policy to Weston M. Cain, the
real plaintiff herein, at Ottumwa, Iowa, for countersignature.
The policy was countersigned by Mr. Cain as agent of the
-defendant in Iowa and delivered by him to the insured named
therein, that is, the purchaser and conditional vendee of the
chattel property.

Under the provisions of the transaction the insurance so
issued attached and became effective as of the time of the exe-
eution of the retail installment contract or security instrument
subject only to cancellation hy appropriate action.

SS 15:

The premium paid by the installment purchaser for the
insurance was included in the amount of his installment pay-
ment obligation to the seller and assigned to Commercial Credit
Corporation or was to be paid by the purchaser to the seller.

In May 1946 effective as of June 1, 1946, Weston M. Cain,
by agreement with Calvert Fire Insurance Company, became
the Iowa countersigning agent for the defendant insurance
company and was licensed as such under the provisions of
chapter 522, Code of Iowa.

Thereafter and until.July 1964 Mr. Cain received from the
defendant’s Baltimore office contracts of insurance and en-
dorsements thereto on risks in Iowa.

Mr. Cain countersigned the instruments and delivered
them to the Iowa insureds. .

Mr. Cain has been at all times a resident of Iowa and the
only licensed countersigning agent for the defendant in Iowa
and all policies of insurance written by defendant on Iowa
risks were countersigned by Mr. Cain. Except for counter-
signing policies forwarded to him there is no showing that Mr.
Cain solicited, obtained or wrote any insurance for defendant
insurance company.

Defendant offered to prove by oral testimony and written
exhibits (letters to and from Mr. Cain) an agreement that Mr.
Cain for his services as countersigning agent was to be paid 1
percent of the gross net premiums (premiums less return pre-
miums),

Plaintiff objected to this testimony and evidence as viola-
tive of a statute primarily in the public interest urging that
any such contract was void as against public policy. The court
sustained the objection and rejected the evidence.

From June 1, 1946, to July 1964 defendant made monthly
reports to Mr. Cain of insurance written and remitted to him
compensation on the basis of 1 percent of the insurance pre-
miums. During this period the net premiums totaled $2,201,303.
There was paid to and accepted by Mr. Cain 1 percent, ie.,
$22,013.03.

Mr. Cain first complained to defendant concerning the
amount of the compensation paid him on or about June 2, 1964.
He claimed that the commissions earned were $110,065.15, that

0 ee

he had received $22,018.03 with a balance due in the sum of
$88,052.12.

Plaintiff claims a right to recover as claimed pursuant to
sections 515.54 and 515.56, Code of Iowa.

Defendant denies that there is anything due plaintiff under
the statute, pleads compliauve with the statute if applicable,
an oral contract for an agreed commission now paid in full.
estoppel, acquiescence, laches, settlement and discharge, accord
and satisfaction and the statute of limitations.

HL. Plaintiff claims a right to recover under the provi.
sions of the statute, section 515.54, Code of Iowa. The burden
of proof is on plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the insurance on which plaintiff claims a com-
mission was contracted for or otherwise originated without
the state as contemplated by the statute. Our first duty in
appellate review is to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
to support an affirmative finding. See rule 344 (f) (1), (5) and
(6), Rules of Civil Procedure.

In construing applicable statutes we search for the
legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said. See
rule 344(#) (18).

II. Applicable statutes are found in chapter 515 of our
Code.

Section 515.51 provides for officers’ signatures on policies.

Section 515.52 requires issuance by or through and coun-
tersignature by a licensed agent residing in Iowa.

Section 515.53 disqualifies salaried representatives as coun-
tersigning agents. .

Section 515.54 provides:

“Agent within state countersigning—commission. In the
event policies, contracts of insurance or indorsements thereto
on risks located within this state as defined in section 515.52
are contracted for or otherwise originate without the state, then
in that event, there shall be payable to the countersigning
agent, resident of the state, a commission which shall be not
less than five percent of the premium charged for such policy,
or contract of insurance or indorsement thereto, provided, how-
ever, said countersigning commission shall not exceed one half

SS 1

of the total commission on any line, form, or type of insurance.
Nothing herein shall prevent the payment of a larger commis-
sion to the resident countersigning agent if agreed to by the
interested parties, as hereinafter provided.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.)

Section 515.55 authorizes a contract for a higher commis-
sion than required by section-515.54.

Section 515.56 gives a countersigning agent a statutory
cause of action for commissions due under sections 515.54 and.
515.55.

Section 515.57 requires the resident countersigning agent
and the insurance company to keep a written record of busi-
ness “originating without this state but covering property or
business transactions within this state, * * *” subject to inspec-
tion of the commissioner of insurance. ° This is for the purpose
of verifying the amount of premium tax.

Sections 515.58, 515.59, 515.60 and 515.61 provide for
exemptions, sanctions, penalties and retaliations not involved
in the problem before us.

We find no other statute. attempting to fix a commission.
The commission fixed by statute applies only to insurance poli-
cies contracted for or originating outside of Iowa.

Hl 101. The first problem is basically factual. Does the
evidence support a finding that the insurance was contracted
for or otherwise originated without the State of Iowa?

It appears without dispute that the risks involved. were
located in Iowa and the policies were delivered to Iowa
insureds.

There is neither showing nor claim that any application
for any insurance involved herein was ever signed or applied
for outside of Iowa.

There is no showing any insurance was ever paid for out-
side of Iowa. The place payable of payments due under the
installment contract does not appear. It affirmatively appears
that the investigation as to the buyers’ insurability was made
in Iowa. The “Purchaser Investigation Form” was completed
and forwarded from Iowa. The requisition for insurance was
prepared in an Iowa office and forwarded from Iowa. The

A

insurance was in force from the time of the execution of the
retail installment contract subject only to cancellation by ap-
propriate action. The insurance policies were countersigned
and delivered in Iowa. .

The only showing of anything ever done outside of Iowa
was the filling in of appropriate insurance forms with necessary
data in Baltimore and return thereafter to Iowa.

The trial court found from the fact that a risk was covered
from the time of the signing of the original security instrument
(the time of the sale of the personal property) that the contract
for insurance.could only arise out of an agreement between
Commercial Credit Corporation of Iowa and defendant entered
into at some date prior to the assignment of the security agree-
ments by the sellers.

The court also found that because, of the common owner-
ship of the Commercial Credit Corporation the coverage arose
from a prior agreement between Commercial Credit Corpora-
tion (the Iowa corporation) and defendant with the consent of
the ‘parent corporation.

From the common ownership of stock in the several « cor-

porations comprising the Commereial Credit Empire it is rea~
sonable to assume that. there were agreements between them.
However, there is nothing in the record relative. thereto or-as
to where or when entered into. Assuming, arguendo, that
there was an agreement to provide insurance coverage there
was no insurance of any kind until, someone in Iowa made a
purchase, signed an installment contract and applied for .or
authorized the purchase of insurance. There is nothing in the
record before us to support a finding that the policies of insur-
ance countersigned by Mr, Cain were contracted for.or other-
wise originated out of the state.

IV. The briefs of the parties state that there are no Iowa
cases construing section 515.54 of the Code. We have .found
none.

What is admittedly dictum in Ragan v. "Provident Life ‘&
Accident Insurance Co., 209 Iowa 1075, 1082, 229 N.W. 702,
gives some indication of what constitutes an Iowa contract,
In that case a Tennessee corporation, licensed to do business in
Towa, issued a policy to an Iowa resident employed in Illinois

SS 1:

with premiums to be paid from payroll deductions in Illinois.
The opinion says: “Though it is perhaps unnecessary, we may
as well say what seems patent to us, that the contract was an
Towa contract, and subject to the provisions of Section 8959”
(now section 515.80, Code of 1966).

In 44 C. J. S., Insurance, section 52, page 504 et seq., these

statements appear:

| | “As a general rule, a contract of insurance is governed,
as to its nature, validity, and construction, by the law of the
place where it was made, unless the parties appear to have
intended the law of a different place to govern.

“As a general rule, a contract of insurance is governed or
controlled, as to its nature, validity, and interpretation or eon-
struction, and, likewise, the contract is governed and controlled
as.to its effect, execution, and enforcement, by the law of the
place where it was made or consummated, unless the parties
clearly appear to have intended the law of a different place, to
govern * * *,

“b. Where Contract Deemed Made

HI “A contract of insurance is deemed to have been made
in the state where the last.act was done’ which was neces-
sary to create the contract. Common views are that the con-
tract was made or completed at the place where the application
was accepted by the insurer, or where the policy was delivered,
or delivered and accepted, or where it was delivered and the
first premium, or the premiums generally, were paid.

“What constitutes the place of contracting, in the particu-
lar case, is determined by the law of.the forum. In legal con-
templation a contract of insurance is made in the state where
the last act is done that is necessary to create the contract and
give it legal effect as such * * #.”

In the case before us the first and last acts were in Iowa.
Insurance coverage came into force with the signing of the
papers in Iowa and each transaction was completed when the
policy was countersigned and delivered in Iowa. There was
a binding contract from the time of the execution of the secur-
ity instrument by the purchaser of the chattel property subject
only to cancellation by appropriate action. Just what acts

1

were necessary to cancel does not appear but there is nothing
in the record to indicate any right of rejection or retroactive
cancellation.

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged,
defines a contract as “an agreement between two or more per-
sons or parties to do or not to do something.” Here there was
an agreement in Iowa for the issuance of an insurance policy.

“Originate” as a transitive verb is defined as follows: “to
cause the beginning of: give rise to: initiate: to start on a
course.” For legal definitions see also Black’s Law Dictionary
and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.

Here the beginning, the initiation and start was when
someone in Iowa bought a chattel and signed a security instru-
ment calling for insurance.

V. We need not determine the admissibility of the oral
testimony and exhibits tendered by defendant. It is obvious
that Mr. Cain and defendant for 18 years operated under a
poliey, agreement or custom that never varied. Neither was
inexperienced in the field of insurance. For 18 years they
placed their own construction on the nature of the business
handled through Mr. Cain. To the extent of their own con-
struction of the amount of commissions due, Mr. Cain and
plaintiff have been paid.

There is nothing in the record before us to support a
finding that for 18 years the parties have been wrong.

There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the
insurance -policies involved were contracted for or otherwise
originated without the state.

Plaintiff’s case fails for lack of evidence to support its
claim.

The evidence in the record before us will not support the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.

VI... Because of our conclusions in preceding divisions we
need not discuss other issues and defenses urged by defendant.

The case is reversed and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment for defendant.—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur,

165

Lepyarp Communrry Scuoor Disrricr et al., appellants, v.
County Boarp or Epucation or Kossutu County et al.,
appellees.

No. 52629.

(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 697)

ll

a
a
a

Ocroprr 17, 1967.

Harold J. MeNertney, of Bancroft, and Elwood & Anderson,
of Cresco, for appellants.

Gordon L. Winkel and Walter B. MacDonald, both of
Algona, for appellees. _

Broxer, J.—Plaintiffs filed petition with the County Board
of Education requesting reorganization of certain school dis-
tricts and territory into a single community school district.
After hearing the board dismissed the petition. On appeal to
the district court the board’s action was affirmed. We agree.

Petitioners seek a reorganized district to be known as the

Cee

Ledyard District which would include all of the present Led-
yard, Bancroft, Ramsey and Greenwood and part of the Grant
school districts. All are contiguous areas -located in the north
central part of Kossuth County.

The proposed district had an estimated 371 students at the
time of the petition, adequate tax base, presently adequate
physical facilities, and included the Ledyard District which
was an approved, accredited district operating a high school.
Petitioners contend the proposed district thus met all of statu-
tory requirements for reorganization. Defendants do not seri-
ously challenge this assertion. Petitioners also allege the pro-
posed district has a comparatively favorable per pupil cost and
a favorable millage rate.

On August 25, 1965, the county board of education met
with all the boards of the above named school districts, plus the
boards of the Lakota and Swea City school districts. The pur-
pose of the meeting was to discuss reorganization of those dis-
tricts. Information was volunteered that a petition for reor-
ganization was being prepared that would cover all the districts
present at the meeting except Grant, Lakota and Swea City
districts. This was substantially the area covered by the peti-
tion as eventually filed.

Petition was filed September 23, 1965. Hearing was sched-
wled for November 16. On November 2 the county board met
and amended the tentative map for reorganization of the
county as follows: “The presently existing school districts of
Swea City, Grant, Ledyard, Lakota, Bancroft, Greenwood and
Ramsey to be included in a single district, the same to become
apart of the amended county plan. Carried.” Another amend-
ment changing the map was offered and carried but did not
affect the area under consideration. The condition of the tenta-
tive reorganization plan before amendment is not shown.

Written objections to the petition were filed. At the No-
vember 16 meeting both proponents and objectors were repre-
sented. Both sides presented their views to the defendant
school board.

The proponents argued the petition met all requirements
ineluding the number of pupils necessary for the reorganiza-
tion, the facilities were adequate, the professional staff was

Ss

competent, the dropout rate was zero, the educational program
was more than meeting state standards, no other plan had been
put forward, the proposed reorganization would serve as a
stopgap for future reorganization of north Kossuth County, it
would give all boards time for future planning, the largest per-
centage of voters in the proposed area have shown their ap-
proval by signing the petition, the proposal would promote
better education of the students in the proposed area.

The opponents argued that the proposal envisioned too
small a district, the present district had high per pupil costs,
reorganization of north Kossuth County would almost immedi-
ately be necessary on a larger basis, such reorganization would
be hampered if this proposal went through, new standards en-
visioned by recent legislation would be difficult to meet with
so small a district, students presently attending Swea City
schools would have to transfer, the proposal splits the north
end of the county and is not in the best interest of all the
péople and students in that area.

After hearing these views the board discussed the matter
but adjourned without vote until November 18, 1965. On that
date a motion to dismiss the petition was filed but failed to
earry. The vote was two-to-two with one abstaining. The
minutes of the meeting read: “The County Board reconvened
* * * and proceeded to evaluate the petition as filed, the objec-
tions as filed, the testimony as presented and with due regard
to future reorganization of the county into sound educational
units, the welfare of children involved and with due regard to
the welfare of adjoining districts now and in the future and
with due regard to the manner in which the proposal fitted
into and affected the county plan as amended.”

Motion to dismiss the petition was then made. The reasons
for dismissal incorporated in the motion were:

“1. The proposed district lacks the pupil resources to
provide an adequate educational program as envisioned in
Senate File 553, Acts of the 61st General Assembly and of
Chapter 275 I.C.A.

“2, The public school patrons of the Bancroft Independ-
ent and the Greenwood Township School District have been

SP — (C

served by the Swea City School District for the past several
years by virtue of the choices made by these patrons and their
respective school district boards.”

On November 18 the original motion was again put. This
time it carried four-to-one. The petition was then dismissed.

On appeal the district court held: “It is the Court’s Conciu-
SION that the County Board recognized the proposed district was
contrary to the County plan and would not provide an ade-
quate educational program for the future; that their action in
denying appellants’ reorganization petition was within their
discretion, was reasonable and proper and is supported by the
record.”

I. Plaintiffs’ first and most serious proposition is that they
have complied with all the statutory essentials in presenting
their petition and are entitled to exercise their electoral rights.
They properly point to Code, 1966, section 275.1 wherein the
legislature said that: “It is further declared to be the policy
of the state that no existing district or part thereof shall be
included in such twelve-grade district prior to April 1, 1966
without the electors of such existing district or part thereof
having an opportunity to vote the proposition to include such
existing district or part thereof in said twelve-grade district.”

Defendants counter with the first paragraph of the same
section which reads: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the state to encourage the reorganization of school districts into
such units as are necessary, economical and efficient and which
will insure an equal opportunity to all children of the state.”

Defendants also cite: “275.6 Progressive program. It is
the intent of this chapter that the county board shall carry on
the program of reorganization progressively and shall, insofar
as is possible, authorize submission of proposals to the electors
as they are developed and approved.” and 275.15 in part “and
the county board of education shall review the matter on its
merits and within five days after the conclusion of any hearing,
shall rule on the objections and shall enter an order fixing such
boundaries for the proposed school corporation as will in its
judgment be for the best interests of all parties concerned, hav-
ing due regard for the welfare of adjoining districts or dismiss
the petition.” (Emphasis supplied.)

ON]

The third ‘pdragraph of section 275.1 also provides that
any area that is not in a district maintaining 12 grades, or in a
reorganization plan to get into sucha district by April 1, 1966,
may be summarily attached to such a district by the county
board with approval of the state board of public instruction.

HE In interpreting the statute we must give meaning to
each section and each word thereof if that is possible. Misbach
v. Civil Service Commission of Cedar Rapids, 230 Iowa 323, 297
N.W, 284. It is clearly the intent of the statute that the people
should have been able to vote on proper reorganization plans
prior to April 1, 1966. But this does not mean that every plan
submitted to the county board for consideration must be sub-
mitted to the electorate. Such holding would eliminate the
county board’s authority to dismiss petitions. We do not
interpret the minimum standards set by the legislature as maxi-
mum standards which would deprive the board of discretion
if the standards are met. The board may properly find that
the plan espoused in a given petition is not to the best interest
of the people affected. What is required is that their action
be within the board’s jurisdiction'and not arbitrary. This is
the sole issue. In re Durant Community School District, 252
Towa 237, 106 N.W.2d 670.

HI Authority of the county boards to submit, amend and
submit, or dismiss reorganization petitions is a discretionary
authority. Unless this discretion is arbitrarily exercised the
eourts will not interfere. In re Lone Tree Community School
District, 260 Iowa 719, 150 N.W.2d 637; Allely v. Board of
Edueation, 252 Iowa 1142, 110 N.W.2d 410.

.The county board must act within the declared purpose of
the statute. The board must consider the needs of the whole
county. We agree with the trial court that “Inherent in the
Board’s decision is ‘a finding that thé proposed reorganization
is not for the best interest of all. districts affected, and the resi-
dents thereof.”

| | The reasons given by the board in dismissing the peti-
tion need not have been all the reasons it had in mind. At the
initial hearing both sides‘agreed that the proposed district was
small, “perhaps too small.” Both sides agreed that the proposal

ae

was “stopgap” at best. Both sides agreed that further reor-
ganization would be necessary within a period variously esti-
mated at from three to ten years. Board of Directors v. County
Board of Education, 257 Iowa 106, 108, 131 N.W.2d 802, con-
tains a somewhat analogous situation (decided by the State
Department of Public Instruction) in that it involved the ad-
ministrative dismissal of a plan because it did not give proper
consideration to the welfare of adjoining districts. This court
upheld such action (reversing the trial court) with the obser-
vation at page 115 “Other adjacent school districts, in need of
help by reorganization, could have been included and some of
the valid objections would have been eliminated.”

Under the circumstances we cannot say that the board’s
action was so arbitrary and capricious as to warrant interfer-
ence. If we cannot so find, we cannot interfere. In re Pro-
posed Community School District of Malvern, 250 Iowa 1240,
98 N.W.2d 787; Board of Directors v. County Board of Educa-
tion, supra.

Hl Il. Plaintiffs argue that no meaningful effort to de-
velop plans for reorganization of the north part of Kossuth
County had been undertaken by the county board from the
time the legislature mandated reorganization into larger dis-
tricts until they filed their petition. The initial legislation
looking to larger districts was passed in 1953. Plaintiffs argue
that meaningful action should have been taken in the 12-year
interim and imply that defendants were simply waiting for the
July 1966 deadline to take arbitrary action without elective
consent of the areas affected.

This argument cuts both ways. No action suggesting a
plan was taken by plaintiffs until the deadline was dangerously
close. Further, no new plan embracing a larger or more ac-
ceptable area was subsequently proposed, although at least four
months remained for action.

But the most serious deficiency in this argument is the
total lack of record evidence as to what the county board did
or did not do prior to August 1965. A tentative reorganization
plan as amended in November 1965 is certified to us. The prior
plan is not in the record nor are its basic provisions supplied in

2 mes

any manner. We presume there was such a plan because the
November action was to amend a then existing plan. But the
contents of the plan are simply not before us.

HI Plaintifis do not attack the original tentative plan as
inadequate or improvidently made. Once a tentative plan is
adopted it may be changed without new studies, surveys and
hearings, Board of Directors v. County Board of Education,
supra, Archer v. Board of Education, 251 Iowa 1077, 104
N.W.2d 621.

Allely v: Board of Education, supra, is cited as authority
for the proposition that when an impasse occurs “‘A solution
[in such circumstances of impasse] lies only in the liberal con-
struction of the statutes as amended with a view to giving
effect to the legislative intent as expressed therein.’” (Page
1149 of 252 Iowa.) The facts are dissimilar, but more impor-
tant, liberal construction in Allely authorized the school board
to act. It did not constrict the discretionary area.

Ill. Plaintiffs argue the totality of the board’s actions
amounts to arbitrary and capricious dismissal of their petition.
The actions criticized are: (1) the resolution of dismissal was
poorly worded, (2) considered objections of persons not living
within the proposed district, (3) ignored the record in finding
that pupil resources were too small to develop an adequate
educational: program as provisioned by Senate File 553, Acts
of the Sixty-first General Assembly, (4) the necessity of re-
quiring some present students to change schools was not an
adequate reason for the decision, (5) changing the county plan
just prior to the hearing and then basing the dismissal on
failure to meet the county plan was an abuse of discretion
under the facts here,.(6) and finally, the plan is a good plan
and should be used until a better plan comes along (setting
forth many reasons for the validity of the plan).

Points three and five have already been discussed.

HI The form of the resolution appears sufficient to advise
the members of the subject of their vote and the public of the
effect of their action. The preamble of the motion stated that
the action of the board was “with due regard to future reor-
ganization of the county into sound educational units, the

So:

welfare of children involved and with due regard to the wel-
fare of adjoining districts now and in the future and with
due regard to the manner in which the proposal fitted into
and affected the county plan as amended.”

Section 275.12(1) states: “School districts affected or por-
tion thereof shall be defined to mean that area to be included in
the plan of the proposed new school district.” We have there-
fore held that a school district not meeting this definition has
no right to appeal, State ex rel. Schilling v. Community School
District, 252 Iowa 491, 106 N.W.2d 80.

HH It does not follow as plaintiffs urge, that the county
school board may not consider the objections or views of per-
sons or districts not within the proposed plan. Indeed, section
275.15 provides that at the county school board hearing that
board shall decide the matter, “having due regard for the wel-
fare of adjoining districts.” This we take it mandates the
board to consider other districts and the welfare of the resi-
dents of those districts.

We do not substitute our judgment for that of the board
on the matters covered by items four and six.

Certainly there is a paucity of record evidence that any
planning was done either by the board or by plaintiffs prior to
August 1965. We can understand plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction at
their failure to get to vote on this plan. Yet we cannot con-
elude that under all the circumstances the board’s action was
arbitrary.— Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

174

Gitsert Merrirr et al., appellants, v. Interstate Powzr
Company, a corporation; appellee.

No. 52606.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 489)

175°

Ocroser 17, 1967.

William T. Connery, of Dubuque, for appellants.

O'Connor, Thomas, Wright, Hammer & Bertsch, of Dubuque,
for appellee.

Mason, J.—In January 1964 Interstate Power Company
condemned an easement across land in Dubuque County owned,
by Gilbert Merritt and tenanted by Gilbert Merritt, Jr., for the
purpose of erecting electric transmission lines and other rée-
lated public utility facilities and purposes. The tract of ap-
proximately 400 acres had been mortgaged November 30, 1954;

176 |

to American Trust & Savings Bank, Dubuque, as shown by the
records in the recorder’s office. February 4, 1964, a condemna-
tion jury made a joint award of $1575 to the landowner, tenant
and mortgagee.

Section 472.21, Code, 1962, requires condemnation appeals
to the district court be docketed showing the condemnee as
plaintiff and condemnor as defendant.

February 29 plaintiffs filed in the Dubuque district court
their petition on appeal from the award and served notice of
appeal upon Interstate Power and the Dubuque sheriff. The
mortgagee did not join in the appeal and was not served with
notice thereof at anytime.

Interstate filed motion to dismiss, asserting the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal since a mortgagee
had not been served with notice thereof as an adverse party
as required by Code section 472.18. After the trial court over-
ruled the motion defendant filed answer and plaintiffs their
reply. Interstate then filed a motion to adjudicate law points
under rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs filed resist-
ance.

The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground
it had no jurisdiction to hear the same because of plaintiffs’
failure to serve the mortgagee with notice as required by the
Code section. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s ruling.

I. In answer Interstate alleged existence of the mortgage
at commencement of condemnation proceedings, that it re-
mained unsatisfied of record when the award for the easement
was made and plaintiffs’ failure to serve notice on the mort-
gagee within a 30-day period from the February 4 award.
Plaintiffs in reply admitted the existence of the mortgage and
their failure to serve notice of appeal on the mortgagee but
contended this had no application or legal significance.

At the hearing under rule 105, R.C.P., it was stipulated
that on February 29 there was an unpaid principal balance and
interest of $2557 owing the mortgagee which was paid off May
14 and released of record May 15. The trial court sustained
defendant’s objection to plaintiffs’ offer of evidence on farm
valuation.

a wr

Plaintiffs’ appeal presents the propriety of the dismissal on
the ground the mortgagee was an adverse party upon whom
notice of appeal was required. Other issues presented are
whether the court erred in rejecting evidence on valuation of
the farm and whether the adverse party issue became moot
when the mortgage was paid off and released May 15.

Plaintiffs assert the court erred (1) in finding the mort-
gagee would be adversely affectéd by reversal or modification
of the condemnation award and was an adverse party upon
whom notice was required, (2) in failing to take into considera-
tion the unpaid mortgage balance and the value of the real
estate where the easement was being procured, (3) in rejecting
evidence of value of the tract to aid in determining whether
the mortgagee was adversely affected, (4) in failing to consider
whether plaintiff’s interest as landowner was fully protected
under eminent domain and our constitution and (5) in not de-
termining whether failure to serve the mortgagee became moot
when the mortgage was satisfied before the hearing on law
points.

II. We think the first three assigned errors are answered by
at least three of our recent decisions.

Section 472.18 provides: “Any party interested may, within
thirty days after the assessment is made, appeal therefrom to
the district court, by giving the adverse party, his agent or
attorney, and the sheriff, written notice that such appeal has
been taken.”

Hl The jurisdiction of the district court in condemnation
cases is appellate only and the notice required by section 472.18
is a notice of appeal. Harrington v. City of Keokuk, 258 Iowa
1043, 1046, 141 N.W.2d 633, 636; Scoular-Bishop Grain Co. v.
Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 1003, 1006, 140 N.W.2d 115,
117; Bisenius v. Palo Alto County, 256 Iowa 196, 198, 127
N.W.2d 128, 130.

HEME The right of appeal is purely a creature of statute.
If an appeal is to be taken notice thereof must be given in
substantial compliance with the statute. Failure to serve an
adverse party within the time provided by section 472.18 is
fatal to the jurisdiction of the district court. Griffel v. North-
ern Natural Gas Co., 257 Iowa 1140, 1145, 136 N.W.2d 265, 268,

178 De

and citations; Scoular-Bishop.Grain Co. v. Highway Commis-
sion, supra.

- Plaintiffs contend Interstate is the only adverse party-since
reversal or modification of the $1575 award could not adversely
affect the holder of a mortgage on a 400-acre farm, with a
balance of $2557, which was paid off before the hearing under
rule 105.

| | The test usually applied in determining who is an ad-
verse party in such matters is whether he will be prejudiced or
adversely affected by a reversal or modification of the judg-
ment appealed from. Bales v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 249
Towa 57, 63, 86 N.W.2d 244, 248; Griffel v. Northern Natural
Gas Co., supra, 257 Iowa at 1144, 1145, and citations; Bisenius
vy. Palo Alto County, supra, and citations.

HH It is settled in Iowa that a mortgagee is an adverse
party upon whom notice of. appeal must be served when a con-
demnation award is appealed to the district court. Scoular-
Bishop Grain Co. v. Highway Commission, supra, 258 Iowa at
1005, 140 N.W.2d at 117, and citations,

Bisenius v. Palo Alto County, supra, 256 Iowa at 200,
notes that except for Lance v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
R. Co. (1882), 57 Iowa 636, 11 NW. 612, and Dixon v. Rock-
well, Sac & Dacota Railway Company (1888), 75 Iowa 367, 39
N.W. 646, no authority was found that a joint award mort-
gagee is not an adverse party. In those two cases the owner
served notice on the mortgagee after the motion to dismiss was
filed. Whether that affected the decision is not clear.

HI Plaintiffs contend this is not always true. They argue
that in determining whether the mortgagee bank was an ad-
verse party the amount of unpaid balance existing on the mort-
gage, the amount of the award, the value of the property and
type of condemnation are all factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a mortgagee is an adverse party and, therefore,
they should have been permitted to offer evidence of the farm
valuation. :

» Asimilar contention was rejected in Bisenius v. Palo Alto
County, supra, 256 Iowa at 198, 127 N.W.2d at 129. There the
landowner argued the mortgagee was not affected because he

De 119

had the remaining security and the personal liability of the
mortgagors. We said, “Of course he [mortgagee] has such
security. But that does not affect the result that the joint
award mortgagee will be prejudiced by an award lower than
the amount of its mortgage. This is not dependent on fact
allegations showing prejudice but appears as a matter of law
from the fact of a joint award to an owner and a mortgagee.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

When the award upon appeal is or can be less than the
amount of the mortgage, its holder is prejudiced or adversely
affected. Of course any lowering of the award to one of two
to whom a joint award is made is prejudicial. Bisenius v. Palo
Alto County, supra, 256 Iowa at 198, 127 N.W.2d at 129.

The trial court properly held evidence of value of the farm
was immaterial. There is no showing in the record as to the
priority of the bank’s lien nor the value of its security.

To sustain any of the first three assigned errors would
require overruling our holdings in Bisenius, Griffel and Scoular-
Bishop. We are not persuaded to do so.

IIL. Under their fourth assignment plaintiffs contend the
procedure for eminent domain must fully protect the landowner
and the trial court’s decision deprives them of fair compensa-
tion for the easement taken.

Article I, section 18, Iowa Constitution, omitting the 1908
amendment, provides:

“Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation first being made, or secured to be made to
the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be assessed by
a jury, who shall not take into consideration any advantages
that may result to said owner on account of the improvement
for which it is taken.”

In Harrington v. City of Keokuk, supra, 258 Iowa 1043,
1046-1047, 141 N.W.2d 63, 636, in answering a somewhat simi-
lar constitutional argument, we said:

“The right to appeal or to have a judicial determination
of damages, although constitutionally provided in Article I,
Section 18, of the Iowa Constitution, is limited by reasonable
and proper statutory procedure for perfecting an appeal to the
district court. Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines [245 Iowa 571,

180 |

63 N.W.2d 218]; Bisenius v. Palo Alto County, supra. If dis-
trict court review is desired by either party, notice thereof
must be given in substantial compliance with the statutes.
Bales v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 249 Iowa 57, 60, 86
N.W.2d 244, and cases cited. If one fails to follow the legally
prescribed manner and procedure in giving notice, the district
court obtains no jurisdiction, and condemnee can blame only
himself if his damage is not passed upon by a jury. Dunlap
v. Pulley, 28 Iowa 469.

“This does not mean that appellant is not entitled to com-
pensation for his property taken for a public use. That is
guaranteed him by the constitution, but he is only entitled to
it in the manner prescribed by law. Connelly v. Griswold, 7
Towa 416. If an appeal i is not taken, the commissioner’s award
stands.

Hl “Clearly, the legislature has the power to prescribe and
fix the terms and conditions upon which condemnations may
be made, including reasonable terms and conditions upon which
the landowner may perfect his appeal to the district court.
Richardson y. Centerville, 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071.”

Section 472.18 does not deny plaintiffs’ right to appeal the
condemnation award to the district court. It merely prescribes
the time limit and the procedure by which the appeal may be
taken. The legislature properly enacted the procedural sec-
tions in chapter 472 of the Code. They must-be followed by
interested parties in order to claim the constitutional guaran-
tee. It was plaintiffs’ failure to follow the procedural require-
ments of section 472.18 to obtain district court review of the
award that prevented the appeal, not any act of defendant.

Plaintiffs’ fourth assignment of error is without merit.

IV. In their remaining assignment plaintiffs contend
the question whether the mortgagee is an adverse party became
moot when the mortgage was paid off and released on May 15,
more than four months after the award and two and one-half
months after plaintiffs’ attempt to appeal.

As stated, the district court’s jurisdiction depends upon
perfecting the appeal within the time and manner provided by
statute. The award was made February 4, the appeal was at-

Pe Pe 181

tempted February 29. On both dates the mortgagee was an
adverse party entitled to notice of appeal within the 30-day
period provided by statute. This was the time within which
the district court could have acquired jurisdiction of this ap-
peal. Plaintiffs’ failure to substantially comply with the stat-
ute resulted in the absence of a necessary party and was fatal
to the trial court’s jurisdiction.

Paying off the mortgage prior to the hearing under rule
105, R.C.P., on October 11, 1966, did not change the mort-
gagee’s status as an adverse party. The practical effect of this
argument is to extend the time within which an appeal may be
taken.

Finding no error, the case is—Affirmed.

All Juszices concur.

Ciysta ANN RicHarD, plaintiff-petitioner, v. Hon. Grsson C.
Hotiway, Judge, District Court of Polk County,
defendant-respondent.
No. 52519.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 473)

Ocroper 17, 1967.

Gill & Huscher, of Des Moines, for plaintiff-petitioner.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Joseph W. Zeller,
Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-respondent.

184 Le |

Garrip, C, J—Certiorari under rules 306 to 319, Rules of
Civil Procedure, to review order of defendant-court affirming
suspension for 60 days by the state department of public safety
of plaintiff’s license to operate a motor vehicle. We affirm the
order.

The drivers license division of the Iowa department of
public safety gave plaintiff “Official Notice” that effective
December 24, 1965, her privileges to operate motor vehicles
were suspended for 60 days under the provisions of section
321.210, subsection 7, Code 1962, infra, because of a serious
violation. Also that effective at the end of the 60-day period
plaintiff’s privileges to operate motor vehicles were suspended
in accordance with section 321A.17(1) and (2) until she posted
proof of her financial responsibility.

The notice was based on a “Record of Conviction” on No-
vember 5, 1965, of speeding 97 miles per hour on October 30 in
a 75 mile-an-hour zone.

A transcript of the proceedings before the department
commissioner indicates plaintiff requested a hearing upon the
suspension before him or his duly authorized agent, pursuant
to section 321.211, but only plaintiff's attorney appeared and
discussed the matter informally with the officer who submitted
no recommendation. Apparently no further administrative
hearing was requested or held.

Before the suspension was to be effective plaintiff filed in
the district court of Polk County a petition to review the order
under section 321.215. This petition was heard by defendant-
judge and its order denying relief is the one now before us for
review on certiorari.

The petition alleges the order of suspension was arbitrary,
capricious and without sufficient grounds or foundation; section
821.210, subsection 7, asserted basis for the order, is so ambigu-
‘ous and vague it violates sections 9 and 10, Article I, Iowa Con-
stitution and Amendment 14 to the Federal Constitution; the
notice of suspension failed to disclose a serious violation of the
motor vehicle laws, and the department’s acts are contrary to
section 321.212.

At the hearing on the petition the department offered a
transcript of the proceedings before the commissioner and

— | 185

plaintiff testified briefly. The entire hearing lasted only 25
minutes.

Plaintiff’s petition in certiorari alleges defendant’s order
is illegal because the department did not lay a proper founda-
tion for receiving in evidence the transcript of the proceedings
before it; the record of plaintiff’s conviction was inadmissible
under Code section 321.489; parts of the transcript were ir-
relevant and immaterial; the department’s order was not sup-
ported by substantial competent evidence; the department’s
failure to adopt and offer rules or regulations under chapter
17A as to what is a “serious violation”; plaintiff testified she
did not appear before the police court that convicted her of
speeding 97 miles per hour; the only issue in the speeding case
was whether plaintiff exceeded the applicable speed limit.

It will be noticed the issues raised in the petition filed in
district court are not clearly asserted here.

We find most of the claimed grounds of illegality are an-
swered by our statutes or decisions, notably Danner v. Hass,
257 Iowa 654, 184 N.W.2d 534,

Hl I. Plaintiff has the burden to show defendant acted
illegally in one or more of the respects claimed. Rule 306,
Rules of Civil Procedure; Berleen v. Iowa Dept. of Public
Safety, 260 Lowa 699, 150 N.W.2d 593, 594; Mangan v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety, 258 Iowa 359, 188 N.W.2d 922, 925.
There is and can be no claim defendant exceeded its proper
jurisdiction.

II. Section 321.210, subsection 7, under which the depart-
ment acted, provides in pertinent part: “The department is
hereby authorized to suspend the license * * * upon a showing
by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: * * *
committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this
state.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 321.215, under which plaintiff filed her petition in
district court, provides: “* * * thereupon the court shall hear
and determine the matter as an original proceeding upon a
transcript of all the proceedings before the commissioner, and
upon additional evidence and other pleadings as the court may
require. The decision of the court shall be final.”

186 — 7

In view of contentions plaintiff makes, other statutory pro-
visions may be referred to here. Section 321.207 states: “Every
court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under this
chapter, * * * other than parking regulations, regulating the
operation of motor vehicles on highways, shall forward to the
department a record of the conviction of any person in said
court for a violation of any said laws, * * *.”

Section 321.10 provides: “The commissioner and such of-
ficers of.the department as he may designate are hereby author-
ized to prepare under the seal of the department * * * a cer-
tified copy of-any record of the department * * * and every
such certified copy shall be admissible in any proceeding i in
any court in like manner as the original thereof.”

And section 622.48, in the chapter on evidence, states
“Duly certified copies of all records and entries or papers be-
longing to any public office, or by authority of law filed to be
kept therein, shall be evidence in all cases of equal credibility
with the original record or papers so filed.”

Hy Ill. We find no illegality in the court’s receipt in
evidence of the transcript of the proceedings before the com-
missioner, Every paper included therein is duly certified under
the seal of the department, by an officer thereof designated by
the commissioner, as a true and correct copy of an instrument
on file in the department.

Plaintifi’s argument-there is no evidence the instruments
included i in the transcript were on file when the commissioner
suspended her license cannot.be accepted. The “Record of Con-
vietion” filed. pursuant to 321.207, supra, shows the date of
violation by plaintiff was October 30, 1965, and she was con-
vieted on November.5, The notice.of suspension was dated
November 24. Both instruments are included in the transcript.
We cannot assume they are incorrectly dated.

As stated, section 321.210, subsection 7, expressly provides
the. department may suspend a license “upon a showing by its
records * * * that the licensee * * * committed a serious viola
tion * * #7
_ “In the case at bar, the legislature has in effect provided
that the transeript of the administrative proceedings shall be

— ees 187

admissible evidence.” Danner v. Hass, supra, 257 Iowa 654,
667, 184 N.W.2d 534, 548.

Nothing in the testimony plaintiff offered in court shows
any substantial inaccuracy in the contents of the transcript.
Plaintiff testified she was stopped by an Iowa highway patrol-
man on October 30, 1965, on Interstate 80 near Iowa City and
told she had been “clocked” going 97 miles an hour; she did
not look at her speedometer but thought her speed was probably
around 70; the traffic on 80 was the heaviest she had ever seen
it; she went to the Iowa City police station and posted a cash
bond of $26; she did not appear again in the case; the officer
told her the hearing date was November 4; the next time she
“heard anything about this” was when she received the notice
of suspension from the department. .

Hl LV. We find without merit the contention that the
portion of the transcript showing the record of conviction was
inadmissible under section 321.489. This statute provides: “No
record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this
chapter shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil
action.” :

| | It is not claimed this provision prevented the commis-
sioner from considering the record of conviction in suspending
plaintiff’s license. Of course he is not a court and the proceed-
ing before him was not a civil action but an administrative pro-
eceding. Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1178, 1179, 1180, 140
N.W.2d 866, 870 and citations; Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa
1169, 152 N.W.2d 281, 285.

Section 821.207, supra, required the Iowa City police court.
to forward to the department a record of plaintiff’s conviction
and it was received on November 12. If the commissioner may
not consider such a record in deciding whether a license should
be suspended the purpose of the statutory requirement is not
apparent. :

HI The essential issues raised by the petition filed under
section 321.215, supra, and heard by. defendant were whether
the order of suspension was arbitrary and without sufficient
foundation and the claimed unconstitutionality of section 321.-
210, subsection 7, asserted basis for the order. This latter claim

188 a a

is not seriously asserted here. In any event, the constitutional-
ity of this statute is thoroughly considered and fully estab-
lished in Danner v. Hass, supra.

In connection with the first of these stated issues, it would
seem the legislature could not have intended section 321.489,
supra, would prevent the court from considering the part of
the transcript of proceedings before the commissioner contain-
ing the record of conviction. Section 321.215 contains no such
exception. As stated, Danner v, Hass, supra, points out the
legislature has in effect provided that such a transcript shall
be admissible evidence at the hearing on an appeal under 321.-
215, (At page 667 of 257 Iowa, page 543 of 134 N.W.2a)

It is also significant that section 321.491 contains a detailed
requirement that a conviction or forfeiture of bail upon a
charge of violating any provision of chapter 321 be reported
to the department within ten days and the report shall be open
to public inspection.

In the sense that the appeal to the court was not a criminal
action it was of course civil. We think, however, it was a spe-
cial proceeding rather than a civil action to which section
321.489 refers. Code sections 611.1, 611.2.

Proceedings to revoke or suspend a license to practice law
are special proceedings as designated in these Code sections.
Towa State Bar Assn. Committee v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187,
198, 148 N.W.2d 621, 625 and citations; State v. Mosher, 128
Towa 82, 89, 103 N.W. 105, 5 Ann. Cas. 984. Proceedings to
revoke a physician’s license to practice are also special pro-
ceedings. Bold v. Board of Medical Examiners, 133 Cal. App.
23, 23 P.2d 826, 827 and citations. Also proceedings to cancel a
permit to sell liquor. Texas Liquor Control Board v. Jones,
Tex. Civ. App., 112 S.W.2d 227, 229, 230 and citations. See
also Danner v. Hass, supra, at page 658 of 257 Iowa, page 537
of 184 N.W.2d; Chambers v. District Court, 261 Iowa 31, 33,
152 N.W.2d 818, 820,

| | V. The transcript of the records before the commis-
sioner contained a record of two other convictions of plaintiff,
one for speeding 33 miles per hour in a 25-mile zone in 1961
and the other for speeding 34 miles an hour in a like zone in

— | 189

1968. Receipt in evidence of the transcript was not rendered
illegal, nor even prejudicial to plaintiff under the circumstances
here, by the inclusion in it of these two records. See Mangan
v. Department of Public Safety, supra, 258 Iowa 359, 138
N.W.2d 922, 925.

The notice to plaintiff from the department makes it clear
the suspension was based on 321.210, subsection 7, which, as
stated, authorizes such action for a serious violation of the
motor-vehicle laws. The notice also expressly recites there was
such a violation. As previously explained, plaintiff’s petition
alleges section 321.210 (7) was the asserted basis for the order
and her brief here states there is little doubt it was the only
basis therefor. Both the department and defendant-court evi-
dently treated the record of these two lesser convictions as
irrelevant and immaterial.

| VI. The order under review may not be held illegal
as not supported by substantial competent evidence. The
record of plaintiff’s conviction in lowa City was competent evi-
dence of a violation by her. That the department acted within
its power and not in an arbitrary and capricious manner see
Danner v. Hass, supra, at page 665 of 257 Iowa, page 541 of
134 N.W.2d, where plaintiff was speeding 91 miles an hour in a
70-mile zone. This from the opinion is applicable here: “High
speed on the highways, 21 miles beyond the maximum per-
mitted by law, and with several other vehicles on the same
stretch of the road at the time, is in itself evidence of serious-
ness; at least to the point that a finding thereof by the autho-
rized agency of the state cannot be said to be beyond its power,
or to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. * * * A viola-
tion may be serious although it causes no damage; it is its
potentiality for harm by which it must be measured.”

[| Plaintiff’s argument the legislature did not intend any
speed violation to be serious, regardless of the extent thereof,
cannot be accepted. Nor does it follow, as plaintiff asserts, that
if an excess speed of 22 miles per hour in unusually heavy
traffic on an October Saturday afternoon is a serious violation,
all speed violations are necessarily serious,

HM “It is not every violation which empowers the depart-
ment to suspend his license; so far as we are concerned here,

190 [| 7

it. must, be a ‘serious’ one.” Danner y. Hass, supra, at.page 664
:0£,257 Iowa, page 541 of 184.N.W.2d.

As we have indicated, there was competent evidence before
‘the department of plaintiff’s speed at the time in question.
The record of conviction received November 12 shows she-was
charged with violating section 321.285 on October 30 by speed-
ing 97 miles per hour.in a 75-mile zone, convicted upon the
charge, and fined $22. Plaintiff testified: at the court hearing
the arresting officer orally charged her with such a speed.
= EH The court was under no duty. to require the depart-
ment to prove the charge against plaintiff by evidence wholly
outside the transcript of the administrative proceedings. As
pointed out in Division III, supra, the statutes provide in effect
that the transcript of such proceedings shall be admissible .evi-
dence on a hearing under 321.215.

. There'is nothing to show lack of compliance with this re-
quirement of section 321.291: “In every charge of violation of
sections 321,285 to 321.287, inclusive, the information, also the
notice to appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant
is alleged to have driven, also the speed limit applicable *.* *.”

Section 321.491 requires the report: of the conviction or
forfeiture of bail upon a charge of violating chapter 321 to
include the nature of the offense. :

In view of these statutory requirements it cannot be
said, as plaintiff argues, the only issue in the police court was
whether she violated the applicable speed limit and the speed
she was driving, if in excess of the limit, must be disregarded.

VIL. Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing before de-
fendant that her only appearance in police court at Iowa City
was to post cash bail of $26 does not render the order under
review illegal. We need not determine whether the record of
conviction may be impeached in this manner in a hearing on a
petition under section 321.215. If we assume, without so. de-
ciding, there was a forfeiture of bail.rather than a technical
conviction in police court, section 321.208 states: “Also for the
purposes of this chapter a forfeiture of bail or collateral de-
posited to secure a defendant’s appearance in court, which for-

— | 19

feiture has not been vacated, shall be equivalent to a convic-
tion.”

It is not suggested any forfeiture of bail here was vacated.

VIII. There remains plaintiff’s claim of illegality,
on the ground of the department’s alleged failure to promulgate
in advance rules and regulations as to what is a serious viola-
tion under 321.210 (7). We are told 821.210 and chapter 17A
require the department to promulgate such rules and regula-
tions. In this we think plaintiff is mistaken.

Section 321.210 is too long to quote in full here. Division
II, supra, quotes the pertinent part of 321.210 (7) regarding a
serious violation as a ground of license suspension. The only
portion of the entire section bearing on the claim now consid-
ered is this from the unnumbered paragraph following para-
graph 7: “For the purpose of determining when to suspend a
license under this section the commissioner may, in accordance
with the provisions of chapter 17A, promulgate a point system
for the purpose of weighing traffic convictions, or offenses by
their seriousness * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

Section 321.4 contains a somewhat similar provision, Like
the provision just quoted, 321.4 places no mandatory duty upon
the department.

Chapter 17A contains general provisions regarding admin-
istrative rules and regulations. Nothing in it requires the de-
partment of public safety to promulgate rules and regulations
that would be applicable here.

HE sim support of her claim that the suspension of her
license was illegal without the prior promulgation of rules and
regulations by the department, plaintiff argues there must be
definite standards as to what is a serious violation to the end that
arbitrary action may not be permitted. Substantially the same
argument is fully considered and rejected’in Danner v. Hass,
supra, 257 Iowa 654, 661-664, 134 N.W.2d 534, 589-541, The
holding is that the statutory language, “a serious violation”, is
a sufficient standard to permit the department to use its discre-
tion and judgment. “However, the trend of authority is to up-
hold a considerable vesting of discretion.in the department for
the purpose of promoting the public safety.”

State v. Rivera, 260 Iowa 320, 323, 149 N.W.2d 127, 129,

192 Le 7

repeats this quotation with approval, See also Board of Eduea-
tion v. Board of Education, 260 Iowa 217, 149 N.W.2d 187;
Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn, 308, 126
N.W.2d 778, 9 A.L.R.3d 746 and citations and annotation, 756.

After consideration of all contentions presented—The writ
of certiorari is annulled; the order of defendant-court is sus-
tained.

All Justices concur.

Srate or Iowa, appellee, v. Vicxm Ray Jennrnes, appellant.

No. 52564.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 485)

Ooropgr 17, 1967.

Robert G. Riley, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and William A.

Claerhout, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

LzGranp, J—Defendant was convicted of failing to yield
the right-of-way to a pedestrian at the intersection of Merle
Hay Road and University Avenue in the city of Des Moines, in
violation of section 321.257, Code, 1966. She appeals her con-
viction, alleging three errors for our consideration: (1) that
she was denied a jury trial; (2) that the trial court erred in
finding her guilty under the evidence; and (3) that she was
denied a fair trial.

Merle Hay Road, which runs north and south, forms a
T-intersection with University Avenue. Vehicular traffic there
is controlled by electrically operated signal lights for eastbound
and westbound traffic on University Avenue and for south-
bound traffic on Merle Hay Road. There is, of course, no signal
light for northbound vehicular traffic across University Avenue,
since the T-intersection eliminates such traffic. There is, how-
ever, a light for pedestrian traffic crossing University Avenue
in that direction. It is what is commonly described as a

194 | a

“seramble” light and is operated by the pedestrian, who acti-
vates a button turning all lights for vehicular traffic to red and
all lights for pedestrian traffic to “walk”. There is no evidence
in the record, except inferentially, as to the condition of this
“walk” light at the time the alleged offense occurred and im-
mediately prior thereto.

Defendant, proceeding south on Merle Hay Road, entered
the intersection with the signal light green in her favor. She
turned left to proceed east on University Avenue. Before her
turn had been completed, she struck and fatally injured Anna
Hermann, a pedestrian, who was then crossing University Ave-
nue from south to north. There is some uncertainty as to
whether the pedestrian was in the crosswalk. For our purposes
we will assume that she was.

The investigating police officer gave defendant a traffic
ticket, charging her with failure to yield the right-of-way to a
pedestrian and requiring her to appear in Municipal Court on a
date stated therein. The ticket is on a printed form and is a
summons or a notice to appear in Municipal Court. It contains
blanks or boxes for various information which the investigating
officer does not supply, but which is later inserted and which
then converts the ticket into an information upon which the
eriminal prosecution is based. As given to defendant, the ticket
did .not show whether the charge was being brought under
a city ordinance or under section 321.257, Code, 1966, nor did
it. mame either the City of Des Moines or the State of Iowa as
her accuser. The printed form of ticket contains boxes for the
supplying of all of this information and it was, sometime sub-
sequent to the issuance of the ticket and before the time of
trial, supplied on the form. The record does not show when
nor by whom this was done.

I. The first assignment of error is that defendant was
denied a jury trial. The State concedes defendant was entitled
to such a trial under sections 602.28 and 762.15, Code, 1966.
The State claims, however, that defendant waived her right to
a trial by jury by failure to comply with rule 9 of the Municipal
Court which provides that a trial by jury is waived unless a
defendant requests one at least three days prior to the time a

a as 195

ease is originally assigned for trial. This rule, which is appar-
ently based upon the authority given the Municipal Court in
section 602.39, Code, 1966, has been approved by us in State v.
Berg, 237 Iowa 356, 21 N.W.2d 777. The State relies upon that
decision here.

When defendant first appeared in Municipal Court as re-
quired to do by the traffic ticket issued to her, the following
colloquy took place between her counsel and the trial court:

“Mr. Riley: Your Honor, is that a State charge? The
Court: Yes.

“Mr. Riley: It wasn’t so indicated on the tickets that we
had. The Court: It is here on the Information. You mean on
the first summons that you received?

“Mr. Riley: That’s right. The Court: No, there was no
indication there at all, but it’s a State case. It would have to
be; the charge is failure to yield the right-of-way to a pedes-
trian in the crosswalk.

“Mr. Riley: There is a City Ordinance as well, I believe. Is
that not right? The Court: Well, let’s have it a State case. So
start taking testimony.

“Mr, Riley: Well, Your Honor, if it’s a State case, if I
understand correctly, any appeal is directly to the Supreme
Court and not to the District Court. The Court:-That’s right.

“Mr. Riley: I would prefer to enter a plea of not guilty
now and request a— The Court: You are up for trial right
now. .
“Mr. Riley: We were told to appear here, Your Honor, at
nine. The Court: Yes, December the 19th you were given a
notice to appear in court for trial today on January the 5th at
nine o’clock.

“Mr. Riley: If the Court please, at the time she was given
that notice the summons did not indicate the—whether the
filing was under a Municipal Ordinance or under a State Ordi-
nance. I would be willing to proceed under the Municipal
Ordinance if that is satisfactory to the Court. Otherwise, I’d
like to defer at this time and request that we be permitted to
have trial by jury at some later date. The Court: This case is

196 ee

going to be tried right now. Call your witnesses and go to
trial.

“Mr. Riley: We are proceeding under: the State—The
Court: State law.”

Defendant claims, and we feel the record confirms, this
was the first time she knew she was charged with violating a
statute rather than an ordinance. It is, therefore, the first
time the necessity for demanding a jury trial appeared, since
she was entitled to one only if the case were to be tried as a
State offense. Section 602.28, Code, 1966. In refusing defend-
ant’s request for a jury trial, the court apparently relied upon
rule 9 of the Municipal Court and upon our holding in State v.
Berg, supra.

HH We do not feel the Berg case is controlling. There
defendant appeared for arraignment, was advised of the
charge, and had a trial date set approximately two weeks in
advance. No demand for jury trial was made until the day of
trial, and we held that the right to a trial by jury had been
waived. In the instant ease, however, there was no arraign-
ment; there was no trial date set; there was no reason for the
defendant to request a jury trial prior to her first appearance
in Municipal Court. Until then she was without information
which would make such a request necessary.

The State brushes this aside by claiming that defendant
may not have known that she was charged specifically with the
violation of an ordinance or specifically with the violation of
a statute, but she did know she was charged with one or the
other. Therefore, the State argues, defendant was neither sur-
prised nor prejudiced by not knowing the exact offense of
which she was accused prior to her appearance in Municipal
Court. It is true, as State contends, that the elements making
up the offense are substantially the same under either the ordi-
nance or the statute. It is also true that the punishment upon
conviction is the same, but there the similarity ends. If de-
fendant were to be charged with violation of an ordinance, she
is not entitled to a jury trial. If she were to be charged with
violation of a statute, she may demand such a trial. The State
would put upon defendant the burden of ascertaining what the
charge against her was.

| | 197

HE We have never understood this to be a defendant’s
obligation when one is charged with the commission of a crime.
The very least one is entitled to know is the specific provision
of law alleged to have been violated, and the identity of the
accuser. This is the requirement of section 762.8, Code, 1966.
It is also the holding in State v. Bethards, 239 Iowa 899, 903,
82 N.W.2d 769, 771.

HE We hold that defendant made timely demand for jury
trial under rule 9 of the Municipal Court. When such demand
was made, no date for trial had yet been assigned. The traffic
ticket to which defendant responded merely required her to
appear. Neither that ticket nor any other notice advised de-
fendant that a date for trial had been set. Before defendant
may be held to have waived her right to a jury trial under
rule 9, she must be given an opportunity to comply with that
rule. She was given no such opportunity but rather was sum-
marily ordered to trial in violation thereof and in violation also
of sections 602.28 and 762.15, Code, 1966.

Because defendant was improperly denied her right to a
trial by jury, this cause must be reversed.

Hi IL We must still decide if this cause should be re-
manded for a new trial since defendant’s second assignment
of error asserts that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sup-

‘port the conviction. Defendant argues that her only duty
under section 321.257 was to yield the right-of-way to pedes-
trians lawfully within the intersection; that Anna Hermann
under the evidence could not have been lawfully within the
intersection; and that therefore she cannot be guilty of violat-
ing this statutory provision. We cannot agree. Subsection 1
of 321.257 provides:

“1. Green alone or ‘Go’.

“Vehicular traffic facing the signal may proceed straight
through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place pro-
hibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic shall yield the
right of way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully
within the intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.

“Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the
roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.”

When this subsection refers to pedestrians “facing the

198 |

signal” it necessarily means facing the green signal, since’ this
is the only signal referred-to in that subsection. Since Merle
Hay road forms a T-intersection with University Avenue-and
since, no. vehicular traffic. moves in the direction that. Anna
Hermann intended to walk, as heretofore described, there is
no such signal light at this intersection governing south to
north traffic. Obviously the rights of pedestrians intending to
cross University Avenue as Anna Hermann intended to do are
not governed by the provisions of this subsection, but this does
not mean that pedestrians can never lawfully enter this inter-
section. Other. provisions of section 321.257 permit pedestrians
to enter the intersection on the yellow or caution light and even
on the red light. It merely imposes upon them under those cir-
cumstances additional duties of care. Defendant’s obligation
was to yield the right-of-way. to any pedestrian lawfully within
the intersection. She cannot escape this statutory obligation
by requiring Anna Hermann to obey a nonexistent signal light.

We do not hold, of course, that Anna Hermann was law-
fully in the intersection; we merely say that she could have
been. There is no merit in defendant’s second assignment of
error.

Ill. By her third assignment.of error defendant asserts
she was denied a fair trial. Since Divisions I and IT hereof
require a reversal and a new trial, it is unnecessary for us
to consider this assignment...

This cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.—
Reversed and remanded.

All Justices coneur.

| | 199

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. Dennis Ray McEimaney, appellant.

No. 52254,
(Reported in 153 N.W.24 715)

iil

Octoser 17, 1967.

Nielsen, Koons & Condon, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

200 a a

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack M. Fulton, County Attor-
ney, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Larson, J.—By indictment defendant was accused of car-
nally knowing a female by force and against her will, in viola-
tion of section 698.1 of the 1962 Code of Iowa. The defendant
entered a plea of not guilty and, upon trial, the jury returned
a verdict of guilty. The court entered its judgment sentencing
defendant to the State Penitentiary for a term of not to ex-
ceed twenty-five years.

Assigned as errors, upon which the defendant relies for
reversal, are that the trial court erred (1) in overruling de-
fendant’s motion for a directed verdict, for the reason that
there was not sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the
prosecuting witness to identify the defendant as the person
who committed the rape, and (2) in giving Instruction No. 15
to the jury on the issue of corroboration, for the reason that
the court usurped the jury’s function.

It appears from the record that about 9:30 p.m. on Septem-
ber 20, 1965, the prosecuting witness, over the age of 17 years,
finished her work as a sales clerk in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and
took a bus to the neighborhood of her residence. When she got
off the bus it was raining quite hard. Prosecutrix testified that
as she walked toward her residence, the defendant, a Cedar
Rapids service station attendant, drove up in his automobile
and offered her a ride stating that he knew another girl at her
residence. Believing that his face looked familiar, she ac-
cepted.

Instead of taking the prosecuting witness directly home,
the defendant drove around Cedar Rapids even though she
said she asked to be taken home twice. After a short time
defendant drove out on Highway 74 toward Palo, Iowa. Some-
where between Palo and Cedar Rapids defendant turned off
the highway and parked in a secluded spot. She said he began
making advances toward her which she attempted to repel.
However, she testified she was no match for his strength and,

| De 201

after a struggle during which he struck her several times with
a closed fist, she succumbed to penetration.

The defendant then took the prosecutrix home. She im-
mediately related the happenings of the past half hour to a
friend who lived in the same house. She also noted that a gold
“chain type” bracelet and an eyebrow stencil were missing.
She testified she reported the incident in the morning to the
Linn County Sheriff’s Office. She also had a physical examina-
tion by a local gynecologist.

After the prosecuting witness picked the defendant out of
a lineup, a search warrant was issued and the interior of his
automobile examined. Found therein were a portion of the
missing bracelet and the eyebrow stencil. Also found in the
ear were pubic hair fibers which, when compared to those of
the prosecutrix in an FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C.,
were found to have the same characteristics as hers. Robert
Duckett, a special agent for the FBI, stated that the possibility
of the pubic hairs found in defendant’s car being not those of
the prosecuting witness would be unusual. The gynecologist
who examined the prosecutrix stated that, after an examina-
tion of her hymenal ring, it was his opinion that a tear in it
had occurred within the previous 24 hours.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted
having intercourse with the prosecuting witness on the evening
of the alleged rape. However, he testified that he used no
force or threats to obtain penetration.

The trial court was satisfied the evidence was sufficient to
warrant its submission to the jury, both as to the force used
and as to corroboration.

I. Appellant first contends there was insufficient evidence
presented to corroborate the testimony of the prosecuting
witness that defendant committed the offense charged, assert-
ing it is the statutory law of this State that a defendant can-
not be convicted of the crime of rape or its included offenses
upon the testimony of the injured party unless she be cor-
roborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense.

He maintains the State’s “other evidence” was ‘insufficient

202 Le 7

here to sustain the verdict and judgment réndered, and that
his motion for a directed verdict, made at the conclusion of the
State’s evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence,
should have been sustained. We do not agree.

HM {t is true the trial court may sustain a defendant's
motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case,
but it is not required to do so, and no error can be predicated
upon the court’s failure to sustain that motion. State v. Mab-
ditt, 257 Iowa 1063, 1065, 185 N.W.2d 525, and citations; State
v. Stodola, 257 Iowa 863, 865, 184 N.W.2d 920. Unless the
motion is renewed at the close of all evidence, it is deemed
waived. Here the motion was renewed, so we must examine
all the testimony to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix and
connect defendant with the commission of this offense.

Hi It appears an eyebrow stencil and gold chain bracelet

owned by the prosecutrix were found in defendant’s auto-
mobile by the authorities, that the prosecutrix made prompt
complaint of the alleged attack and disclosed body bruises,
torn clothing, and other physical evidence of force and violence,
and that pubic hairs which matched those of prosecutrix, ap-
parently torn out by the roots, were found in defendant’s
automobile. We are satisfied this evidence was sufficient to
justify the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to direct, and
sufficient to permit jury determination that there was adequate
corroboration of the testimony of the prosecuting witness to
connect defendant with the commission of the charged offense.
Tt far exceeded the mere showing that defendant had the op-
portunity to commit the offense complained of, which of course
would not suffice.
’ ZEB OL. I his second assignment appellant maintains the
trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 15, in that the court
usurped the function of the jury to determine the weight and
-sufficiency of the évidence of corroboration.

The difficulty appellant faces here is that this contention
comes too late. It is raised for the first time before us. In
this record we find no objection was ever made to the giving
of Instruction No. 15. In fact, it-appears that at the time the

es 203

instructions were submitted to the jury defendant objected to
Instruction No. 4 and said: “That’s all the objection we have.”
In his motion for a new trial he attacked several of the in-
structions, but made no complaint as to Instruction No. 15.
Thus he waived his right to this exception in his motion for a
new trial as granted by Code section 787.3(5). State v.
Hartung, 239 Iowa 414, 424, 425, 30 N.W.2d 491, 497. He was
represented by able counsel at all times.

HH It is well settled in this jurisdiction that we are not
required to consider an objection first urged in an appeal to
the Supreme Court, and ordinarily we do not do so. State v.
Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 145 N.W.2d 688, 642; State v. Wallace, 261
Towa 104, 152 N.W.2d 266, 268; State v. Post, 255 Iowa 573,
584, 123 N.W.2d 11; State v. Pullen, 252 Iowa 1324, 1827, 110
N.W.2d 828, 381, and citations.

‘We have on occasions, when the whole record showed a
fair trial had not been had, proceeded under section 793.18 of
the Code to reverse a conviction, but those were extreme cases.
See State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 919, 109 N.W.2d 18, 20, and
citations. We find no such situation exists here and, after a
eareful review of the entire record without regard to technical
errors, we are satisfied the defendant was not denied a fair
trial, certainly not by the giving of Instruction No. 15. As
bearing on this matter, see State v. Anderson, 240 Iowa 1090,
1098, 1099, 38 N.W.2d 662, 666, 667, and the recent case of State
vy. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 556, 117 N.W.2d 447.

Having found no reversible error, the judgment of the
trial court must be affirmed.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur,

204 |

Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. Oscar Nexson, appellant.

No, 52538.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 711)

Le 205

Ocrozer 17, 1967.

John N. Moreland, of Ottumwa, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, Samuel Ehrhart, County Attorney,
and Phillip Collett, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

GarrieLp, C. J—Defendant, Oscar Nelson, was indicted for
the crime of uttering a forged instrument (a bank check) in
violation of section 718.2, Code, 1962. Upon trial he was found
guilty and sentenced to the men’s penitentiary. Upon this ap-
peal he assigns two errors for reversal: (1) overruling his
motion for new trial based upon claimed newly discovered
evidence, and (2) receiving testimony in rebuttal which was
not proper for such purpose. We find it necessary to con-
sider only the second of these assignments.

The State’s principal evidence in chief came from Mr.
Bowden, assistant manager of an Ottumwa food store, who
testified defendant and another Negro, Tucker, presented to
him two payroll checks purporting to be issued by Ottumwa
Iron and Metal Company to Wilbert Young and James L.
Hampton respectively; defendant and Tucker each endorsed,
in Bowden’s presence, the payee’s name on one of the checks
and received cash for the amount thereof; the check payable to
Young was for $82.73 and the one to Hampton was for $89.77;
Bowden believed, but was not positive, defendant endorsed
the larger check and received full value therefor; this oc-
eurred about 7:30 on the evening of November 9; on November
16 he identified defendant, in the presence of police officers, as
one of the two men for whom he cashed the checks.

The police officers then corroborated Bowden’s identifica-

206 Po 7

tion. It was shown by an employee of the drawee bank and
the owner of the Iron and Metal Company that the payee of
each check was fictitious and the check a forgery. The State
then rested, defendant moved for a-directed verdict for alleged
failure of proof and the motion was overruled.

The State then moved to reopen its case in chief to permit
additional evidence, assigning as authority Code section 780.5,
subsection 6, which provides that after the parties offer their
evidence in chief they “may then, respectively, offer rebutting
evidence only, unless the court, for good reasons, in furtherance
of justice, permit them to offer evidence upon their original
case.”

The court announced the motion was sustained but asked
the prosecutor whether the names of the proposed witnesses
were endorsed on the indictment (see section 772.3) and was
told they were additional witnesses and no notice of their
testimony, as provided by section 780.10, had been given.

The prosecutor then stated the added witnesses were Des
Moines police officers Parks and Warrick who would testify
that in the early hours of November 10 defendant and another
were riding in a car in Des Moines, the car was stopped and
blank checks with “Ottumwa Iron and Metal Co.” printed
thereon were found in the car; the prosecutor did not give the
notice of additional testimony because he had mistakenly un-
derstood until the preceding day the blank checks were in the
possession of the FBI and he intended to try to offer the evi-
dence as rebuttal.

When the nature of the additional evidence was disclosed,
defendant’s counsel objected to its receipt as unfair, the State
“in fairness to defendant” withdrew its motion to offer ad-
ditional evidence and the court announced the record stood as
it was when the State rested.

Defendant’s evidence consisted of the opinion of a hand-
writing expert that after comparing the writing on the back of
the two forged checks with a known sample of handwriting of
defendant, Tucker and one Russell, defendant wrote no part of
the forged checks, Tucker wrote the endorsement on the smaller
check and Russell the endorsement on the larger one. On
cross-examination the witness said all he knew about the case

| | 207.

came from his examination of the signatures. Defendant then
rested. on , .

The State was then permitted to offer as rebuttal the tésti-
mony of Des Moines police officers Parks and Warrick pre-
viously referred to. They said Tucker was driving the car
they stopped about 2:30 am. November 10, defendant was a
passenger in it, it was owned by Russell, Tucker was arrested
for driving without an operator’s license and defendant for in-
toxication, the officers found in the car some blank checks by
Ottumwa Iron and Metal Co., after defendant was placed in
the squad car he escaped and ran but was soon apprehended
and returned, the checks were offered and received in evidence.

Defendant’s counsel stated he made no objection to the
offer of the blank checks, but the officers’ testimony was ob-
jected to, and there was a motion to strike it, in part as not
proper rebuttal. The court overruled defendant’s objection
to most of the testimony and permitted it to stand. The State
then rested and defendant’s counsel stated he had no surre-
buttal testimony. The claimed error in these rulings was as-
serted in defendant’s motion for new trial along with the
alleged newly discovered evidence.

Although we do not consider the matter we will say the
claimed newly discovered evidence was based on affidavits of
Tucker and Russell that they entered the food store and en-
dorsed and cashed the two forged checks and defendant was
not in the store on the evening in question; also that the af-
fiants pleaded guilty to indictments similar to the one re-
turned against Nelson and were sentenced.

I. We have quoted supra the provision of Code section
780.5, subsection 6, that parties who have offered their evidence
in chief may “offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court,
for good reasons, in furtherance of justice, permit them to
offer evidence upon their original case.”

‘We have also referred to the familiar requirement of
section 772.3 that the names of all witnesses on whose evidence
an indictment is found must be endorsed thereon and the
minutes of such evidence filed therewith. And section 780.10
provides the county attorney shall not introduce upon the trial
any witness the minutes of whose testimony were not so pre-

208 Le 7

sented with the indictment unless, at least four days before
trial, he has given defendant or his attorney, if defendant is
not found within the county, a notice stating the name and
address of such witness and the substance of his testimony.

As previously indicated, the names of the Des Moines
police officers were not endorsed upon the indictment and the
four-day notice of their testimony was not given.

Tl Il. We have held many times the names of witnesses
who testify in rebuttal need not be endorsed on the indictment.
State v. Johnston, 252 Iowa 335, 340, 105 N.W.2d 700, 702, 703,
and citations.

HI It is also thoroughly settled that the fact testimony
used in rebuttal might have been used as part of the State’s
main case does not render it inadmissible in rebuttal if it re-
buts some of the matters testified to by defendant’s witnesses.
State v. Johnston, supra, and citations. We have several cases
of this type approving receipt of testimony in rebuttal to con-
tradict a claim of alibi although it could have been offered as
part of the State’s original case and the names of the witnesses
were not endorsed on the indictment. State v. McCumber, 202
Towa 1382, 1384, 212 N.W. 187, and citations; State v. Gadbois,
89 Iowa 25, 31, 32, 56 N.W. 272.

Hl As the State points out, we have also held several times
the trial court has discretion to admit in rebuttal evidence
which should have been offered in chief that is not strictly
rebuttal. State v. Merrill, 242 Iowa 1156, 1160, 1161, 49 N.W.2d
547, 550, and citations. We do not find a claim of lack of
compliance with sections 772.3 and 780.10 in these precedents.

It is significant that in State v. Slycord, 210 Iowa 1209,
1217, 232 N.W. 636, where the name of the witness used in
rebuttal was not endorsed on the indictment and no notice of
his testimony was given we held the testimony was rebuttal in
character—not that what was not rebuttal could be received as
such. See also in this connection State v. Yarham, 206 Iowa
833, 840, 221 N.W. 493; State v. Graham, 203 Iowa 532, 535,
211 N.W, 244.

Hi We recognize the general rule that the trial court has
a good deal of discretion in determining what is proper re-

| [| 209

buttal testimony. See 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law (1961), section
1050b, pages 1217-1219; 53 Am. Jur., Trial, section 120, page
106. Our problem is whether there was an abuse of such dis-
eretion here. We think there was.

Hl Ill. Rebutting evidence is that which explains, repels,
controverts, or disproves evidence produced by the other side.
State v. Parish, 22 Iowa 284, 286. Many cases adopt sub-
stantially this definition. See 836 Words and Phrases, Perm.
Ed., pages 678, 679; 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 1050a,
page 1208 et seq.

HJ Although the testimony of these police officers was a
circumstance in support of the indictment, it had no tendency
to rebut the opinion evidence of defendant’s handwriting ex-
pert which constituted his case in chief. If such testimony may
be received in rebuttal from witnesses whose names are not
endorsed on the indictment and of whom no notice is given, it
would seem all testimony is rebuttal and there is no distinction
between evidence in chief and that in rebuttal, Such a rule
would render of no practical effect the statutory requirements
of endorsement of the names of witnesses and notice of the
testimony of additional ones.

We think State v. Parish, supra, although an early case, is
sound and supports our holding. See also language in State v.
Rivers, 68 Iowa 611, 614, 615, 27 N.W. 781.

Hin 23 CJ.S., Criminal Law, section 1050a, page 1215,
contains this: “Evidence which has no direct tendency to im-
peach, contradict, explain, or otherwise rebut evidence is not
admissible on rebuttal.”

See also VI Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., section
1878, page 511; Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, Fifth Ed.,
section 547, page 1365,

The error in receiving in rebuttal the testimony of the
police officers necessitates a new trial—Reversed and re-
manded.

All Justices concur,

x
S

Tria AND JOHNSON, a partnership, appellant, v, Don Spreumon
et al., appellees.

No. 52608.
(Reported in 153 N.W.24 818)

a
a

Ocroser 17, 1967.

a12 es
De
a

Donald P. Baird, of Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Miller, Miller & Miller, of Cherokee, for appellees.

Srusrz, J. QM|—Teig and Johnson, a partnership, has
appealed from the dismissal of its amended petition to foreclose
a mechanic’s lien. Such motion to dismiss admits the truth of
all well pleaded, issuable and relevant facts, but not conelu-
sions of fact or law. Doubtful pleadings when so challenged
will be resolved against the pleader. Meester v. Roose, 259 Iowa
857, 144 N.W.2d 274, 275; Habn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27,
80, 126 N.W.2d 350. We will therefore examine the allegations
of plaintiffs’ petition and amendment.

The action is founded upon a written contract between
plaintiff and defendant Don Speelmon, under the terms of
which plaintiff was to provide architectural services in con-
nection with construction of a motel on said defendant’s lot.
The contract was prepared on a printed form issued by the
American Institute of Architects. The copy attached to the
‘petition shows two alterations in the printed form which
concern us here. _

A typewritten provision substituted for printed paragraph
5 stated in part: “In the event the project is abandoned or
terminated, the architect shall not be entitled to any of the
above fees but shall be paid with the rate of seven ($7.00) per
hour for work actually done on the project up until that time
of the termination of the work and not to exceed fifty (50) per-
cent of the basic rate of the architects total fee provided
herein.”

The second alteration in the printed form was the hand-
written word “not” inserted in paragraph 4 making it read in
part as follows: “If any work designed or specified by the
architect is abandoned or suspended, in whole or in part, the
architect is not to be paid for the service rendered on account

of it.”

The architectural services were completed on April 19,

| 218

1964. Defendant accepted the low bid of $126,394 on May 18,
1964. On September 16, 1964, defendant paid plaintiff $200 on
account. Plaintiff filed a mechanic’s lien on the land owned by
Speelmon on March 8, 1965, for $3590.92 plus interest which
represents 50 percent of the basic rate less $200 paid on
account.

In this action to foreclose the mechanic’s lien, plaintiff
further alleged defendant “in violation of the rights of the
plaintiff in said agreement refused to permit plaintiff further
performance and completion under the contract and has
breached the same and declined to permit plaintiff to proceed
further falsely representing to plaintiff that the said improve-
ment had been abandoned.” The action is for the amount to
which plaintiff would have been entitled under substituted
paragraph 5 if the project were “abandoned or terminated.”

On March 29, 1965, defendant Speelmon transferred the
land. As the interest of all other named defendants is derived
through him, he will be referred to as defendant.

The trial court, in ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss,
found “plaintiff's petition claims money due on the basis of an
‘abandonment’ and it must therefore be assumed that the de-
fendants abandoned the project.” He also found it was not
apparent who prepared the typewritten or handwritten altera-
tions. Applying rules of construction, he concluded the hand-
written word “not” in paragraph 4 prevailed over the type-
written provisions of substituted paragraph 5 and “where two
clauses of a contract are so totally repugnant to each other that
they cannot stand together, the first should be received and
the latter rejected.” Therefore, “defendants incurred no obli-
gation to the plaintiff in abandoning said project and plaintiff’s
petition does not state a cause of action against the defend-
ants.”

Plaintiff filed a timely amendment to its petition in which
it alleged defendant or his representative altered paragraph 4
by inserting by hand the word “not” and prepared and sub-
stituted typewritten paragraph 5. It further alleged defendant
told Teig of the typewritten alteration but did not mention the
interlineation of the word “not” and that the purpose of the
change was to limit defendant’s liability in case no motel was

a4 rs

ever built. It also alleged defendant recognized his obligation
to pay plaintiff for his services by making a payment of $200.

The amendment also eliminated any reference to “abandon-
ment” or false representation of abandonment. It alleged de-
fendant had refused to let plaintiff proceed under the terms of
the contract but employed others to finish the project. “Plain-
tiff became entitled under the terms of said agreement and
understandings and interpretation of same placed upon them
by the parties themselves” to 50 percent of the basic rate.

A second motion to dismiss was filed and a different judge
of the trial court found the action was still based on the con-
tract and the contents thereof were not changed. He held the
ruling on the first motion to dismiss (that the word “not” pre-
vailed over the typewritten paragraph 5) was res judicata and
not subject to overthrow except by appeal and dismissed the
petition. Plaintiff appealed from the ruling on the second
motion to dismiss and from each and every other adverse order,
decision and ruling in the case.

HE SsOn this appeal, it relies only upon its petition as
amended to state a cause of action. Defendant claims this
means we must assume the ruling on the motion to dismiss the
original petition to be the law of the case. We do not so in-
terpret the procedures. Plaintiff had a right under these
rules to amend its petition in an attempt to state a cause of
action. The election to do so did not bar it from reserving a
right to appeal from errors in ruling on the original petition.
In view of the right to amend, the ruling on the original
petition was interlocutory only and can now be considered on
plaintiff's appeal from the court’s dismissal of its amended
petition.

| As plaintiff does not claim on appeal the original peti-
tion pleaded a cause of action, we need not decide this question.
However, the ruling that the handwritten “not” prevailed over
the typewritten paragraph controlled the ruling on the amend-
ment as well as the original petition and the election to amend
does not prevent us from considering it on this appeal.

Assuming, for the purpose of this opinion, the trial court
was correct in applying rules of construction to “irreconcilable”

ee 215

provisions of the contract as the action was originally pleaded,
we must determine whether the ultimate facts stated in the
amendment change the cause of action sufficiently to require a
different result. :

HL. Im the original action the contract containing the
irreconcilable provisions appeared without explanation. Re-
covery was sought under typewritten paragraph 5. In the
amendment plaintiff alleged the changes which created the
conflict were made simultaneously by defendant. Parol evi-
dence of the intention of the parties was also set out. All
reference to abandonment was eliminated and it now seeks to
prove plaintiff was discharged and the project completed by
others. This is certainly not the same lawsuit as the one orig-
inally pleaded. It is not for us to determine whether it ean be
proved,

HI The rules of construction applied by the trial court
were not proper under the circumstances. We no longer
recognize the position of totally repugnant clauses in a con-
tract as a proper rule of construction. In Mealey v. Kanealy,
226 Iowa 1266, 1277, 286 N.W. 500, 181 A.L.R. 945, after a full
discussion, we said: “* * * this jurisdiction has adopted the
rule that a contract should be read and interpreted as an en-
tirety rather than seriatim by clauses and that the position of
clauses in such instrument is not material or controlling.” See
also Freese v. Town of Alburnett, 255 Iowa 1264, 1267, 125
N.W.2d 790.

HE The amended petition reveals the error of applying the
rule of construction that writing prevails over printing or type-
writing here. “The reason for this rule would appear to be
that a handwritten provision is a more deliberate and im-
mediate expression of the intention of the parties than is a
typewritten provision.” 17 Am. Jur.2d 680, Contracts, section
271. The reason applies to a situation where an attempt is
made to alter a printed or typewritten instrument and another
printed provision which conflicts with the change is over-
looked. Here the conflict is not between the printed form and
typewritten or handwritten change, but was created by two
changes made at the same time by one of the parties. There is
no reason to believe defendant’s insertion of the handwritten

216 a —

word “not” was a “more deliberate and immediate expression
of the intention of the parties” than the typewritten substituted
paragraph. This rule should be applied only under circum-
stances which support the reason for the rule.

Hs. Defendants alleged alteration of the printed
terms created the conflict between the provisions of the con-
tract and made the meaning of the whole contract ambiguous.
‘We must attempt to arrive at the intention of the parties and
interpret the contract in accordance therewith. Freese v.
Town of Alburnett, 255 Iowa 1264, 1267, 125 N.W.2d 790.
“Proof of the circumstances accompanying the execution of an
ambiguous instrument is always admissible, not to vary its
terms, but to assist in its interpretation.” Mealey v. Kanealy,
supra, loc. cit. 1278 of 226 Iowa. The matters alleged in the
petition surrounding the making and execution of the con-
tract are properly subject to proof.

Hit was also proper to allege the practical construction
placed on the contract by the parties. Fullerton v. United
States Casualty Co., 184 Iowa 219, 227, 167 N.W. 700, 6 A.L.R.
367. oo

It therefore appears the amended petition pleaded a cause
of action upon which plaintiff was entitled to offer proof and
the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss the
amended petition—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur.
Henry Liner et al., appellants, v. Guznn V. Eoxarp et al.,
. , appellees. 7

No. 52662.
(Reported in 152 N.W.24 833)

no
iad
a

Sepremper 19, 1967.
Researine Denrep Ocroper 19, 1967.

Nolan, Lucas & Nolan, of Iowa City, for appellants.
William L. Meardon, of Iowa City, for appellees.

218 Le a

LGranp, J.—Appellants are residents of, and own property
in, Iowa City, Iowa. Sometime in 1966 the City Council of
Towa City had under consideration a plan for urban renewal.
In connection therewith the council directed that certain
property, including that of appellants, be appraised. Written
reports of these appraisals were made, and these reports are
now in the custody of appellees, who are respectively City
Clerk and Director of Urban Renewal for said city.

Appellants requested certified copies of these reports
under the provisions of section 622.46 of the Code. . Their
request was refused, and this action was started to compel
appellees to produce copies of the reports for appellants.

Appellants claim they are entitled to such information by
virtue of section 622.46 of the Code, which provides as follows:

“622.46 Every officer: having the custody of a public
record or writing shall furnish any person, upon demand and
payment of the legal fees therefor, a certified copy thereof.”

“ The issue before us is a very narrow one. We need only
determine if the appraisals in question, under the circum-
stances existing here, are public records or writings. If they
are, then appellants are entitled to copies of them as a matter
of right. We consider the case and reach our conclusion on
that'issue alone.

The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
petition, finding that the appraisals were not public records or
writings within the contemplation .of the statute. We agree,
and we affirm that ruling.

Section 622.46 does not define a public record or writing.
‘We must look to the common law and to the decided cases to
determine what is included within that term. This court has
never passed on the question, and therefore resort must be had
to decisions from other jurisdictions.

There is no single definition of “public record”
which is applicable in all situations and under all cireum-
stances. Perhaps the one most generally used refers to a public
record as one required by law to be kept, or necessary to be
kept, in the discharge of a duty imposed by law, or directed by
law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written,

a a 219

said or done. 45 Am. Jur. 420, Records and Recording Laws,
section 2. A similar, although somewhat more inclusive defini-
tion, is found in 76 O.J.S. 112, Records, section 1. The concept
of public records has now generally been extended to embrace
not only what is required to be kept but also what is convenient
and appropriate to be preserved as evidence of public action.
State ex rel, Beckley Newspapers Corporation v. Hunter, 127
W. Va. 788, 34 8.E.2d 468, 470; Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76,
251 P.2d 893, 895; Conover v. Board of Education, 1 Utah 2d
3875, 267 P.2d 768, 770.

Hi Not every document which comes into the possession or
custody of a public official is a public record, It is the nature
and purpose of the document, not the place where it is kept,
which determines its status. Coldwell v. Board of Public Works,
187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879, 883; Sorley v. Lister, 83 Misce.2d 471,
218 N.Y.S.2d 215; Steiner v. McMillan, 59 Mont. 30, 195 P. 836,
837; People ex rel, Stenstrom v. Hartnett, 181 Misc. 75, 226
N.Y.S. 338, 841, 164 N.E. 602; State ex rel. Romsa v. Grace, 48
Wyo. 454, 5 P.2d 301, 303; Tagliabue v. North Bergen Town-
ship, 9 N.J. 32, 86 A.2d 773, 775; 76 C.J.S. 112, Records, sec-
tion 1.

Hl What, then, about the written appraisals which are the
subject of this controversy? They were not prepared by a
public officer nor by anyone under his control. Although made
at the request of the city council, they are merely opinions of
value which have no binding effect upon either the city or the
property owners. They have not been acted on in anyway at
this time. No plan for urban renewal has been adopted. No
eminent domain proceedings have been instituted.

In this connection it might be said parenthetically that
appellants in their petition express concern over preparing to
defend against condemnation proceedings and over the im-
portance of the appraisals in helping them decide questions
about relocating. But under the record here there are no
eminent domain proceedings to defend against and there is
presently no necessity to relocate. Appellants’ anxiety at this
time seems unjustified and premature.

‘We find that the appraisals are but preliminary matters

220 a —

of investigation to assist the city in deciding whether to adopt
an urban renewal plan. Obviously such a determination is
ordinarily made only after inquiry and investigation concern-
ing its feasibility. This necessarily results in the accumulation
of much tentative and experimental data assembled to assist in
the ultimate decision. Until acted upon, material of this kind
does not assume the status of public record or writing. This
has been the usual holding in other courts.

Coldwell v. Board of Public Works, Steiner v. McMillan,
Sorley v. Lister and People ex rel. Stenstrom v. Hartnett, all
supra, all hold, under varying facts, that material gathered by
way of preliminary investigation does not become a public
record before some official action of approval or disapproval.
These decisions are persuasive under the circumstances exist-
ing here. In this connection see Tingling v. Lang, 39 Misc.2d
338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633.

Appellants cite the Coldwell. case, supra, as authority for
their position, but it is not. Disclosure there was denied on
the claim that the information sought was a public record; it
was allowed on other grounds. .

It must be conceded that the decisions on this question
are not unanimous. Perhaps the most vigorous opinion in
support of appellants’ contention is found in MacEwan v. Holm,
226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 413, 85 A.L.R.2d 1086. In that case a
divided court held that virtually all data gathered by a public
agency in the course of carrying on its duties, regardless of its
tentative or preliminary character, should be available for
public inspection upon proper request under a statute similar
to ours.

We are not inclined to go that far. We prefer the nar-
rower and more prevalent view that a public record or writing
is one which an officer is required by law to keep or which is
intended to serve as a memorial and evidence of something
written, said, or done by the officer or public agency. These
appraisals serve no such purpose.

Appellants place considerable stress upon the well-known
and universally accepted principles that the people have a
right to know and that secrecy is to be avoided in the conduct
of public business. We agree with these pronouncements. But

a ee 221

this does not require, nor does our statute do so, the disclosure
of all records, writings or reports which are in the files of a
public office at anytime to any citizen demanding such informa-
tion, Such a result would impose an intolerable burden on
the public officer, Such an officer must be ever ready to defend
his decisions and justify his judgment, but the rule for which
appellants contend would be an unreasonable and harmful inter-
ference with the day-to-day conduct of public business just when
such officer should, and must, be allowed some discretion in
making those decisions and in exercising that judgment.

[| Under the particular circumstances existing here, we
find that the appraisals in question are not public records or
writings and that appellants are not entitled to certified copies
of them under section 622.46. The ruling of the trial court was
right Affirmed,

Garrietp, C. J., and Swett, Moorr, Sruart, Mason and
Rawiines, JJ., concur,

Larson, J., takes no part.
Becxer, J., dissents.

Broxer, J—I would follow the reasoning of MacEwan v.
Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 359 P.2d 418, 85 A.L.R.2d 1086, which the
majority rejects, I also feel that Coldwell v. Board of Public
Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879, supports plaintiffs’ position
both in reasoning and result (though concerned with a broader
statute). Other cases on the subject might be cited but would
unduly extend this dissent.

No principle is growing in importance so fast as the principle
that the people have a right to free access to government infor-
mation. There may be competing principles which will override
that right. But these must be clearly present and of paramount
importance. The explosion of knowledge, the techniques of
amassing both facts and opinions (expert and otherwise), the
expense involved in gathering the information, the disparity in
financial resources between the government and the individual
members of the public, all point to the continually increasing
need for freedom of access to knowledge. .

222 EE

. The issue is not the beneficence of the urban renewal: con-
-eépt. It is the right of individual’ citizens to have the basic in-
formation upon which they’ can make an informed. citizens’
judgment and, if they desire, an informed citizens’ opposition,
“to a-specifie project if and when proposed. It involves'not only
the-right to information but the right to meaningful dissent.
Fear of dissent is not a legitimate reason for withholding public
vinformation.

- This case comes to us on motion’ to dismiss, We should
reverse and remand. When the petition is reinstated defendants
will still have the right to.plead and prove ultimate facts ‘giving
rise to countervailing considerations of such weight as to justify
nonaceess. If they can do that the information should be denied.
If they cannot, the writ of mandanius should issue in recognition
of a right essential to our form of government.

Loren Barry and Norman Barry, as individuals, d/b/a Barry
Broruers, appellees, v. Stare Surery Company, appellant.

No. 52610,
(Reported in 164 N.W.2a 97)

Novemper 14, 1967.

Stipe, Davidson & Hemphill, of Clarinda, for appellant.
Camp & Harsh, of Creston, for appellees.

LzGranp, J.—On May 28, 1965, Miller-Tomlinson Imple-
ment Company started a replevin action against these plaintiffs
to secure possession of certain property, including a 1955 1-300
International Harvester tractor. The tractor is the only
property involved in the present litigation.

Desiring to obtain possession immediately, Miller-Tomlin-
son Implement Company filed its bond, as required by section
643.5, Code, 1962. This action is against appellant, as surety
on that bond, for damages resulting from the wrongful seizure
and detention of the tractor.

This is the second suit started by plaintiffs to collect
damages. The first was begun on July 7, 1965, and was dis-
missed by the trial court as, premature- because the replevin
action had not yet been tried and the right to claim damages
was dependent upon the result of that action.

Later a judgment was entered determining that the re-
plevin was wrongful and ordering the tractor returned to these
plaintiffs. A notice of appeal from that judgment was filed,
but the appeal was not pursued further.

Ys | 225

Plaintiffs then started this action against defendant, ask-
ing damages for depreciation in the value of the tractor and
for loss of use thereof during the period it was wrongfully
withheld. After trial to the court, plaintiffs were awarded
damages for loss of use at a rental rate of $2.00 per hour,
limited by the actual value of the tractor, which the court
placed at $1500. Judgment was for that amount although the
court found it to be less than the actual loss of use.

HI in ow consideration of this matter we treat defendant
as if it were the obligor on the bond, since its legal position
here is identical with that of its principal, Miller-Tomlinson
Implement Company. As far back as Hershler v. Reynolds,
22 Towa 152, 155, we held the surety on a replevin bond was
considered as being in court in a suit against the principal and
was bound by any judgment on matters covered by the bond.
This is still the law, and defendant cannot impeach the replevin
judgment here. 77 C.J.S., Replevin, section 320, page 230.

Defendant has appealed from the judgment and from
orders overruling its motions for judgment. notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial. Although not presented
exactly as defendant assigned them, nor in the same order, the
main errors presented for our consideration are: (1) the ex-
elusion of evidence challenging plaintiffs’ ownership of the
tractor; (2) the refusal to hold that this suit was barred by
dismissal of the previous action for damages; (3) the refusal
to hold that a surety could in no event be liable for damages
because section 643.20, Code, 1962, limits such liability to a
judgment for the value of the property; and (4) the allowance
of damages for loss of use.

HI. Defendant contends there was error in excluding
evidence offered concerning ownership of the tractor. We find
no place in the record where defendant offered such evidence.
The evidence offered and excluded was evidence concerning
the defendant’s right of possession to, not ownership of, the
tractor. Replevin is principally a possessory action. Its very
purpose is to determine who should have possession. Judg-
ment in the replevin action established that right to be in
plaintiffs. Defendant is bound by that determination. This
question having once been litigated, it was at the time of this

226 De 7

trial res judicata. The trial court was correct in excluding this
evidence. Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 242 Iowa 757, 758, 48
N.W.2d 228, 229; In re Estate of Ramsay, 240 Iowa 50, 59, 60,
35 N.W.2d 651, 656; Jordan v. Stuart Creamery, Inc., 258 Iowa
1, 6, 187 N.W.2d 259, 261.

Hl 11. Defendant next asserts that plaintifis were barred
from bringing this action for damages because their original
suit seeking similar relief had been dismissed by order of court
as premature. Defendant claims this dismissal was a final
adjudication of plaintiffs’ right to claim damages, which fore-
closes the bringing of the present action. Shortly after the
replevin suit was started, but before it was tried, plaintiffs
started an action asking damages for wrongful replevin. Upon
motion, this action was dismissed as premature. The dismissal
was not intended to be an adjudication on the merits. The
reason given for the dismissal was that no action for damages
would lie until the question of right of possession had been first
determined. If the replevin were held to be rightful, then
there could be no claim for damages. This was one of the
grounds upon which the motion was made and this was the
ground upon which the dismissal was based. Under such cir-
cumstances the claim for damages was not res judicata. Al-
though the order of dismissal itself does not so provide, the
record contains a statement of the trial court made during trial
that the dismissal of the earlier suit was not a dismissal on the
merits.

Hl Furthermore the doctrine of res judicata is applicable
only to those issues which were, or could have been, presented
to and determined by the court in the earlier suit. Jordan v.
Stuart Creamery, Inc., supra. Here plaintiffs seek relief for
the state of disrepair in which the tractor was returned. This
matter was unknown to plaintiffs when the first action for
damages was brought. It could not, therefore, have been liti-
gated and decided there. This is also true of part of plaintiffs’
claim for loss of use, which accrued subsequent to the original
action for damages.

‘We agree with the trial court that the dismissal in ques-
tion does not operate as a bar to this suit.

SS 22

II. Defendant next asserts that in no event may a
judgment for damages be awarded against it since its liability
on the bond is limited to assuring payment of a judgment for
the value of the property. Defendant relies on section 643.20,
Code, 1962, which provides: “When property for which a bond
has been given as hereinbefore provided is not forthcoming to
answer the judgment, and the party entitled thereto so elects,
a judgment may be entered against the principal and sureties
in the bond for its value.”

This section merely provides one remedy available against
a surety. It is not exclusive of other remedies. In any event
that section has no application here since plaintiffs did not
make the election provided for therein. Defendant entirely
overlooks section 648.5, Code, 1962, which requires the principal
to pay all costs and damages that may be adjudged against
him. It is the performance of this obligation which the surety
guarantees. Defendant interprets this to mean only such costs
and damages as are allowed in the replevin action itself, but
we hold it to mean any costs and damages assessed against the
principal, whether in the main action or in a separate action,
when a separate action is permissible. 77 C.J.S., Replevin, sec-
tion 320, page 231; Hall v. Smith, 10 Iowa 45; Annotations,
85 ALR. 644.

| | IV. The most strenuous objection made by defendant
is the claim that plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for loss
of use because the evidence did not disclose any actual loss
and because such claim was waived by plaintiffs’ failure to
assert it in the replevin action.

We disagree with defendant’s claim that plaintiffs may
not have damages unless they have rented equipment to replace
that which was taken from them. The basis for allowing dam-
ages in such cases is that a plaintiff has been deprived of his
rightful possession. The fact, if it be a fact, that plaintiffs
here did not hire equipment to replace theirs and that they
would not have used this equipment anyway, even if it had
been in their possession, does not appeal to us. It was their
equipment. They were entitled to its possession and to its use,
and defendant’s interference with that possession entitles plain-
tiffs to damages. 77 C.J.S., Replevin, section 277, page 203;

228 a 7

Ruzanoff v. Retailers Credit Association, 97 Cal. App. 682, 276
P. 156, 158; Consolidated National Bank of Tucson v. Cunning-
ham, 28 Ariz. 518, 238 P. 332, 334; Knaus Truck Lines v. Com-
mercial Freight Lines, 238 Iowa 1356, 1366, 1367, 29 N.W.2d
204, 210; Hoyt v. Fuller, 8 Cir., 104 F. 192, 193.

Hl Defendant-also claims that plaintiffs cannot have dam-
ages for loss of use because this matter was not litigated and
disposed of in the original replevin action. Defendant relies
upon section 643.17, Code, 1962: “The judgment shall deter-
mine which party is entitled to the possession of the property,
and shall designate his rights therein, and if such party have
not the possession thereof, shall also determine the value of
the right of such party, which right shall be absolute as to an
adverse party, and shall also award such damages to either
party as he may be entitled to for the illegal detention there-
of. * ¥ #7

No such finding was made in the replevin-action and no
such damages were awarded. We agree with defendant that
all damages which were then known or ascertainable, and
which were not determined by the replevin action, are waived.
The purpose of section 643.17 is to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
When parties are in court to litigate their differences, it -is
ordinarily required that they dispose of all matters of dispute
between them touching upon the main quarrel. Here Miller-
Tomlinson Implement Company started: a replevin action, the
very purpose of which was to determine the rights of the
parties to the'tractor in question. It is unnecessarily cumber-
some and expensive to permit part of this dispute to be settled
in one action and to require the remainder of it to await the
outcome of another suit. Plaintiffs argue that they could not
ask for damages in the replevin action because their right to
possession had not yet been determined. .This does not im-
press us. In most cases the right to damages is contingent
upon a prior determination of liability; but liability and dam-
ages are determined in one action, not two. This is particularly
true in view of the strong language of our statute which states
that the court shall award such damages to either party as he
may be entitled to for the illegal detention of the property.

SS 229

This leaves little room for any interpretation except that the
award of damages in the replevin action is obligatory, not
discretionary, as to all matters then provable. McCallister v.
M-A-C Finance Co., 10 Cir. 382 F.2d 633, 685; Gust v. Ed-
wards Co., 129 Ore. 409, 274 P. 919; 77 C.J.S., Replevin, section
289, page 209; Annotations, 85 A.L.R. 644; Jordan v. Stuart
Creamery, Ine., 258 Iowa 1, 5, 6, 187 N.W.2d 259, 261, and
citations.

This, however, does not completely resolve the present
problem. What we have said indicates that all damages which
were known or ascertainable at the time the replevin action
was tried must be included in that judgment. It does not
follow that a separate action for damages may never be main-
tained. There are instances in which a litigant cannot deter-
mine his damages until after the replevin action. This is true
when property is returned in such a state of disrepair that a
party might be entitled to recover the cost of restoring it.
Such facet would be unknown at the time the replevih action
was tried. Similarly a party could be entitled to damages for
unreasonable delay in a return of the property, after the court
had ordered its return. Unless a separate suit were maintain-
able, there would be no remedy for this misconduct. Yet it
would be manifestly unfair to deny relief under such circum-
stances.

Here plaintiffs allege that the tractor, when returned to
them, was in such poor condition that its value had been sub-
stantially decreased. They did not know this until after com-
pletion of the replevin suit. Therefore this item of damage
could not have been raised at that time, Furthermore the
record shows that after the judgment ordered a return of the
tractor, possession was still withheld from plaintiffs until
execution issued. While we do not so hold, it may be there
was unreasonable delay in complying with the judgment. If
80, plaintiffs might be entitled to damages which could not
have been proven earlier.

| | We hold that all damage which had accrued at the time
the replevin action was tried was required to be included
therein. Otherwise claim therefor is barred under section
643.17, Code, 1962. This view is supported by the authorities

230 |

previously cited in this division.. We find it was error to allow
damage here for loss of use from the time the property. was
seized until the entry of judgment in the replevin action. That
damage, if' allowable at all, must be included in the ‘replevin
action. For that reason we must reverse.

«MM Plaintiffs may be entitled to damage for loss of use
from the date of the replevin judgment until the tractor was
returned, if the trial court should find the delay an unreason-
able one.

We have previously held that when liability has been
established and when certain issues have been fairly tried and
disposed of, but others require a new trial, it is not necessary
to re-try all the issues. The new trial may be limited to those
issues concerning which there was error. Here all issues have
been correctly settled except what damages, if any, plaintiffs
are entitled to. The case is remanded for a determination of
that alone. Feldhahn v. Van DeVenter, 253 Iowa 1194, 1197,
115 N.W.2d 862, 864, and citations,

HM SOV. Defendant complains because the trial court did
not fix the value of the property in the replevin action as
required by section 643.16, Code, 1962. Since the replevin suit
allowed neither a judgment for the value of the property nor
any damages and since, further, the defendant had full oppor-
tunity to contest the matter of value in this action, we find
no prejudice from the failure to comply with section 643.16.

Defendant also contends the findings of the trial court and
the judgment entered included matters not within the issues.
We find no merit in that claim.

We find no merit either in the claim that plaintiffs had
elected to declare a conversion and are therefore not entitled
to damages. The record discloses no such election.

The cause is reversed and remanded for further proceed-
ings on the sole issue of plaintiffs’ right to damages for loss
of use from the date of the replevin judgment to the date the
tractor was returned. If request is made, either party should
be permitted to amend the pleadings so that this issue may
be fully adjudicated—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices coneur.

| 231

Susme Bruce, a minor, by Donato Bruos, her father and next
friend, appellee, v. Aprian Wooxey, administrator of estate
of Kenneth Wookey, deceased, appellant.

No. 52624. .
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 93)

Novemper 14, 1967.

Roy W. Meadows of Whitfield, Musgrave, Selvy, Kelly
& Eddy, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Edgar EB. Cook, of Glenwood, and Edward E. Eaton of
Eaton & Eaton, of Sidney, for appellee. .

Sruart, J.—The question presented on this appeal is the
interpretation of section 633.442 of the Iowa Probate Code.
It is a case of first impression.

Kenneth Wookey was killed in an automobile April 10,
1965, in which Susie Bruce was permanently injured. On
November 4, 1965, plaintiff, as her next friend, filed a claim
in Wookey’s estate for the injuries she sustained in the ac-
cident. : .

On January 7, 1966, the administrator mailed plaintiff
the following Notice of Disallowance of Claim, which com-
plied with the terms of section 633.440.

“You are hereby advised that the claim which you made
in the above entitled estate in the amount of Ten Thousand
and No/100 — ($10,000.00) and filed the 4th day of Novem-
ber, 1965, has been disallowed by the fiduciary(ies) herein.
You are further notified that said claim will be forever barred
unless within twenty days after the date of mailing this notice

| | a 233

you file a request for hearing on the claim with the Clerk of
the above entitled court and mail a copy of such request for
hearing to the undersigned by certified mail.”

Return receipts show plaintiff received such notice either
on January 8 or 10. (There were four claims filed by the
Bruce family.)

Section 633.442 provides: “Claims barred after twenty
days. Unless the claimant shall within twenty days after the
date of mailing said notice of disallowance, file a request for
hearing with the clerk, and mail a copy thereof to the personal
representative, the claim shall be deemed disallowed, and shall
be forever barred.”

Counsel for plaintiff, other than those now representing
him on this appeal, ignored the notice. Request for Hearing
upon Claim was filed by present counsel March 16, 1966, sixty-
eight days after the notice was mailed.

On March 24, 1966, the administrator filed a Motion to
Dismiss the claim on the ground that it was barred by section
633.442. The next day plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside
Default and for Reinstatement of the Claim setting out equi-
table reasons why the claim should be reinstated and claiming
section 633.442 is intended as a procedural statute rather than
a statute of limitations. No default had been entered.

Upon hearing, the trial court held the claim was not barred
because the statute was procedural and overruled the motion
to dismiss. The administrator was granted an interlocutory
appeal from this ruling.

Hi I. “In construing statutes the courts search for the
legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather
than what it should or might have said.” Rule 344(f) (18),
Rules of Civil Procedure. In seeking the meaning of a law
the entire act should be considered. Each section must be con-
strued with the act as a whole and all parts of the act con-
sidered, compared and construed together. Manilla Commu-
nity School District v. Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 101 N.W.2d
705. The language of section 633.442 is clear and unequivocal.
It is not ambiguous unless it becomes so when it is considered
in connection with the other provisions of the Iowa Probate
Code. We find nothing therein which makes it ambiguous.

Plaintiff states historically the legislature has zealously
protected the rights of claimants whose claims were not filed
for equitable reasons. He points to Iowa Code section 11972-
(1989), section 635.68(1962), and section 688.410(1966), all of
which limit the time for filing claims and provide for equitable
relief if not filed on time because of peculiar circumstances.
Although it seems incongruous to permit an equitable showing
on a six-month limitation and deny it on a 20-day limitation,
these sections demonstrate the legislature knew how to provide
for equitable relief from the running of the limitation, if they
wished it to be available to claimants.

HM Plaintiff claims the default procedure, rules 230-236,
R.C.P., should be applied to his failure to timely file a request
for hearing as required by 633.442 of the Iowa Probate Code.
Thus claimant would be protected if he requested hearing
after the 20-day period following disallowance but before the
personal representative moved to enforce the limitation. How-
ever, section 633.442 is the result of five years study by highly
competent members’ of the legal profession. The statute is
simple and was not subject to misunderstanding by the legis-
lature. They could have used language making the default
procedure applicable to claimant’s failure to timely request
the hearing if they had so desired. Instead they used words
which clearly bar the claim.

Several foreign jurisdictions have statutes similar to sec-
tion 633.442. The foreign nonclaim statutes examined seem
bound by a thread of uniformity both as to word and effect.
Although the time for taking action following rejection of a
claim varies from six months, Maryland Ann. Code, Art. 93,
section 120, to 30 days Washington Rev. Code Ann., section
11.40.060, most of the statutes examined indicate that in the
absence of action within the stated period, the claim shall be
“forever barred”. Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann., section 14-579;
D.C. Code Ann.; section 20-1818 (1967) ; Maryland Ann. Code,
Art. 98, section 120; Ohio Rev. Code Ann., section. 2117.12
(Baldwin 1964); Oklahoma Stat. Ann., Title 58, section 339;
Utah Code Ann., section 75-9-9 (1988); "Washington Rev. Code
Ann., section i .40.060.

| Le 235

Plaintiff, in attempting to distinguish authorities cited
by defendant, states the Supreme Court of Washington waived
the 30-day period provided by the Washington nonelaim stat-
ute because of claimant’s intervening death in White v. Cole-
man, 146 Wash. 148, 153, 262 P. 2382 (1927). We do not so
read the opinion. The 30-day period was not waived but was
held to bar the claim. Claimant there relied on a long-standing
statute of limitation extending the statute of limitations one
year when either the claimant or obligor died. The court at
page 234 of the opinion said: “* * * so far as that section
had any force as a statute of limitation upon an action by any
claimant against an executor or administrator upon a rejected
claim, it has manifestly been superseded by the later probate
limitation here in question.” White v. Coleman, supra.

Plaintiff also states that Ohio has a “savings clause” ap-
plicable to the running of the Ohio two-month nonclaim statute,
citing Parrish v. McKee, 73 Ohio Law Abs. 65, 185 N.E.2d 486
(1956). In the Parrish case, the “savings clause” in no way
relates to the Ohio two-month nonclaim statute but relates to
the tolling of the two-year statute of limitations on tort actions
where the defendant has fled the jurisdiction to avoid service
of process.

In construing a similar statute in Connecticut, one court
said: “Our Statute of Nonclaim, as it is commonly called, pro-
vides that the Probate Court shall limit the time for creditors
to present their claims against a solvent estate and debars a
ereditor of his claim if he does not present it within the time
so limited. General Statutes §45-205. A creditor whose claim
has been presented and disallowed by the executor or admin-
istrator has four months from the date of disallowance in which
to commence suit on his claim. General Statutes §45-210. This
statute supersedes and supplants the ordinary Statute of Limit-
ations.” Cassone v. Coyne, 3 Conn. Cir. 495, 497, 217 A.2d
727 (1965).

Although all of the aforementioned statutes require the
claimant to commence an action within a certain period of
time following disallowance by the personal representative,
they are fully analogous to section 633.442 which requires that
claimant file a request for hearing within 20 days after the

236 Le a

date of mailing said notice of disallowance. The personal
representative is then required to move or plead to said claim
in the same manner as though the claim were a petition filed
in an ordinary action within 20 days from the filing of the
request for hearing. Section 633.444.

HI There are many sound arguments against such a harsh
provision as contained in 633.442 of the Iowa Probate Code.
Were we writing the statute, we would be inclined to subject
the failure to file the request for hearing to the default pro-
cedures. However, to hold the default procedure applies to
this statute, requires us to ignore our primary rule of stat-
utory construction, R.C.P. 844(f) (18), and engage in the most
liberal form of judicial legislation. We therefore are com-
pelled to hold failure to comply with section 633.442 bars
plaintiff’s claim.

HEM il. Plaintiff contends it is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clauses of Amendment 5 to the United States Con-
stitution and section 6, Article I of the Iowa Constitution, to
construe 633.442 as a 20-day statute of limitation. This argu-
ment is without merit. In the instant case, plaintiff elected
to file his claim in the estate rather than to commence a sep-
arate action. He became bound by the rules of procedure he
elected. Prior to filing claim against decedent’s estate under
633.410, plaintiff could have commenced an action against the
estate by serving an original notice on the personal representa-
tive as provided by section 633.415. By commencing a lawsuit,
the Rules of Civil Procedure would have controlled the action.
However, by choosing to file a claim against the estate under
633.410, the claimant bound himself to follow the provisions of
633.442 after the mailing of notification of disallowance and
file a request for hearing within the 20-day period or “be for-
ever barred”. It is conclusively stated in 633.444 that the
Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply after the personal rep-
resentative has responded to the request for hearing on a claim.

The chairman of the bar association committee which
drafted the Iowa Probate Code stated:

“Unless the claimant, within twenty days after the date
of mailing such notice of disallowance, files a request for hear-

a a 287

ing with the clerk, the claim shall be barred. The term ‘re-
quest for hearing’ is a new concept in the Iowa practice and
was adopted by the committee to distinguish it from any con-
cept of an original notice, because, unlike an ordinary action,
the personal representative is an officer of the court and is
already subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The claimant,
by virtue of filing his claim in the probate proceedings, sub-
jects himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Since the claim
ean initially be filed in an informal manner and considered as
denied by operation of law, the ‘request for hearing’ was
adopted as the mechanism to ‘trigger’ the applicability of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.” 49 Iowa Law Review 688, 671
(1964). ~

It cannot be said there is an unreasonable classification
inherent in this court’s construction of 633.442. The claimant
selected one of two available alternative procedures.

Hi Ill. Claimant pleads the trial court is entitled to
affirmance on the basis of its equitable powers to relieve un-
conscionable hardship—there being no prejudice to the adverse
party. This is an action at law, not equity. The legislature
has clearly and unequivocally stated the effect of failure to
request a hearing on time. The forum for correcting this
claimed inequity is the legislature and not the courts—
Reversed.

All Justices concur except Broxrr, J., who dissents.

Maurice S. Darr et ux., appellees, v. Motu I. Tuomrson,
appellant.

No. 52551.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2a 82)

Novenwer. 14, 1967.

Beving & Swanson, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Whitfield, Musgrave, Selvy. & Rely, of Des Moines, for’
appellees.

Rawiines, J- —Plaintiffs, being contract vendees of lot 46,
Grand View Acres, Des Moines, brought action under chapter
650, Code of Iowa, against defendant-owner of adjoining lot
45 to establish a common boundary.

Trial court held the line of demarcation between plain-
tiffs’ property and that owned by defendant was established by
acquiescence on the part of predecessors in interest of both
parties, and plaintiffs were not estopped to have possession of
land accordingly. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

240° Le ,

Involved in the controversy is a strip of land varying in
width from about 0.40’ at the rear to approximately 1.53’ at
the front.

Reference will later be made to other relevant facts,

HE 1. At the outset a procedural question is presented.

An action under chapter 650 is a special proceeding. Sec-
tion 650.4, Code 1962.

On appeal it is reviewed as an ordinary action. Section
650.15, Code 1962.

Unlike Schauland v. Schmaltz, 252 Iowa 426, 107 N.W.2d
68, this case was tried to the court as a special proceeding and
comes to us on assigned errors as in a law action. Rule 344(a)
(8), R.G.P.

This means findings of fact by the trial court are binding
on us if supported by substantial evidence. Rule 344(f)(1),
R.C.P.; Cozad v. Strack, 254 Iowa 734, 736, 119 N.W.2d 266;
DeViney v. Hughes, 248 Iowa 1888, 1392, 55 N.W.2d 478;
Eggers v. Mitchem, 239 Iowa 1211, 1213, 34 N.W.2d 603; and
88 Iowa Law Review 86, 110-115.

Il. Plaintiffs contend the boundary line was established
by acquiescence for a period of more than ten years on the
part of their predecessors in interest and those of defendant.

Hl In this regard it is the law in Iowa that where two
adjoining property owners mutually acquiesce for ten or more
consecutive years in a line definitely marked by a fence or in
some other manner, it then becomes the true boundary although
a survey may show otherwise, and neither party intended to
claim more than called for by their respective deeds. Mahren-
holz v. Alff, 253 Iowa 446, 450, 112 N.W.2d 847; Trimpl v.
Meyer, 246 Iowa 1245, 1248 and 1251, 71 N.W.2d 487; and
DeViney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1388, 1892, 55 N.W.2d 478. See
also Burby on Real Property, Hornbook Series, Third Ed.,
section 124.

On this subject section 650.6, Code of Iowa, provides in
part: “Hither the plaintiff or defendant may, by proper plea,
put in issue the fact that certain alleged boundaries or corners
are the true ones, or that such have been recognized and

a es 241

acquiesced in by the parties or their grantors for a period of ten
consecutive years, * * *,” (Emphasis supplied.)

Hl And in Boyle v. D-X Sunray Oil Co., (N.D. Iowa, E.D.),
191 F. Supp. 263, 271, 272, the court said: “It is well settled
that purchasers of property cannot question a boundary line
acquiesced in by predecessors in title for more than ten years.
Johnson v. Trump, 1913, 161 Iowa 512, 143 N.W. 510.”

Mullahey v. Serra, 220 Iowa 1177, 1180, 264 N.W. 63, and
Thompson on Real Property, 1962 Replacement, section 3035,
page 508, at 520, lend support to the foregoing view. But see
28 Oregon Law Review 362, 366, 367.

HE (Of course the burden is upon plaintiffs to establish the
alleged acquiescence by proof which is clear. Rule 344(£) (5)
(6), R.C.P., and Mahrenholz v. Alff, supra.

HI Ill. Referring again to the case of Mahrenholz v.
Alff, supra, it was there held acquiescence, as the term is here
employed, means recognition of the boundary line contended
for may be by claims asserted or by conduct, but must be by
both parties. It involves a claim by one party, known to the
other, and a failure by the latter to take any steps to the con-
trary for at least the statutory period. See also Kennedy v.
Oleson, 251 Iowa 418, 427, 100 N.W.2d 894.

Iv. A controversy developed between plaintifis and de-
fendant as to the boundary line existing between their re-
spective properties when defendant commenced construction
of a building.

The problems now presented are whether the trial court
erred in- concluding (1) plaintiffs established, by the requisite
degree of proof, existence of a boundary line by acquiescence
which could be now established with sufficient certainty; and
(2) the doctrine of estoppel asserted by defendant is inap-
plicable, and does not bar plaintiffs’ right to the relief re-
quested.

We shall deal with these matters in the order presented.

V. The evidence in this case is in large part undisputed.

Alys G. Haugh and her husband acquired lot 46 in 1934.
He died in 1953 and she, as sole owner, sold to plaintiffs in
1964,

242 | a

Roy D. Taylor purchased lot 45 located immediately east
of lot 46 in 1931. He sold it to Paul D. Smith in 1960, who sold
to defendant in July 1964.

Sometime during the early 1940s and certainly prior to
1950, the Haughs, following a survey, caused a cement block
retaining or restraining wall with an iron fence on top to be
constructed, beginning at the front lot line and extending
back approximately 50 feet from Hubbell Street on which both
lots face.

About the same time Haughs had a wire fence erected
commencing at a point near the south end of the wall, thence
to the rear of the properties pretty much in line with the east
edge of the wall.

Taylor then put a wire fence on his side, attaching it to
the existing wood posts installed by Haughs. He also placed a
few trees in the gap between fence and wall, considering the
line between wall and fence to be a continuation of the lot line.
Some of these trees were later removed.

The Haughs and Taylor at all times accepted the wall,
trees and fence as the partition line or true boundary between
their respective properties, and maintained their lands ac
cordingly.

When Mr. Smith purchased lot 45 from Taylor part of the
wire fence had been removed. He took out the remainder and
proceeded to put up a chain link fence on steel posts. ‘The
boundary so established was never disputed by him, In fact
his only question was as to whether three cedar trees placed in
the area between the wall and fence line were on his or Mrs.
Haugh’s property.

Under this factual situation it is evident a boundary line
between lots 45 and 46, other than the survey or plat line, was
established by mutual acquiescence for the period required,
ie., from sometime before 1950 to 1964.

But defendant contends the claimed aequiescent boundary
may not now be established with the requisite degree of cer-
tainty as to location. In so doing she cites and leans heavily on
DeViney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1888, 55 N.W.2d 478. It was
there held the judgment establishing a boundary under an

Ft Pe 248

action brought pursuant to Code chapter 650 must be suffi-
ciently definite to run a line in accordance therewith, and a
buried drainage tile failed to provide the requisite degree of
linear certainty.

It is thus evident DeViney v. Hughes, supra, is neither
here factually in point nor persuasive.

Hl We find substantial evidence supporting the trial
court’s conclusion a boundary line between lots 45 and 46,
extending along the east side of the cement block wall in a
straight line to front and rear of the lots, was established by
acquiescence on the part of both plaintiffs’ and defendant’s
predecessors in interest, the parties to this action were at all
times here concerned accordingly bound, and the judgment is
sufficiently certain to run a line in accordance therewith.

VI. As an affirmative defense defendant alleges plaintiffs,
by conduct, are estopped to challenge defendant's right to
proceed with construction of a building, the west wall of which
is located beyond the acquiescent boundary and on or near
the original westerly survey or plat line of lot 45.

In O’Dell v. Hanson, 241 Iowa 657, 664, 42 N.W.2d 86,
this court held the burden to prove and establish estoppel is on
the party asserting it, with strict proof of all the elements
being demanded. And see rule 344(f£)(5)(6), R.C.P.; Alcorn
v. Linke, 257 Iowa 680, 640, 183 N.W.2d 89; State v. Raymond,
254 Towa 828, 835, 836, 119 N.W.2d 185; 31 C.J.S., Estoppel,
section 160, page 765; and 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver,
section 146, page 824. -

Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais was explained and
defined in Goodwin Tile and Brick Co. v. DeVries, 2384 Iowa
566, 568, 569, 18 N.W.2d 310, 155 A.L.R. 346, as follows:

HM ‘The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a familiar
one. It is applied to prevent fraud and injustice and exists
wherever a party cannot in good conscience gainsay his own
acts or assertions. Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa
245, 48 N.W. 185. The fraud may’ be either actual or con-
structive. Anfenson v. Banks, 180 Iowa 1066, 163 N.W. 608,
L.B.A. 1918D, 482. A fraudulent intention is not essential. It
is enough if a fraudulent effect would follow, allowing a party

244 Le ,

to set up a claim inconsistent with his former declarations or
conduct. Helwig v. Fogelsong, 166 Iowa 715, 148 N.W. 990;
Browning v. Kannow, 202 Iowa 465, 210 N.W. 596.

“The essential elements of equitable estoppel, or
estoppel in pais, have been listed as false representation or
concealment of material facts, made to one without knowledge
of the real facts, with the intention that it be acted upon; and
reliance thereon by the party to whom made, to his prejudice
and injury. Stookesberry v. Burgher, 220 Iowa 916, 262 N.W.
820. That each element should be proven clearly, convincingly,
and satisfactorily is noted in Smith v. Coutant, 232 Iowa 887,
891, 6 N.W.2d 421, 424, which, after considering many author-
ities, states:

“In general, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is based
upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and
justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own act, representations, or commitments, to the injury of one
to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.
Such a doctrine is neither odious nor in disfavor, in either law
or equity.’”

In connection herewith see also Aleorn v. Linke, supra,
loc. cit., 257 Iowa: 640, 641; Kennedy v. Oleson, 251 Iowa 418,
428, 100 N.W.2d 894; 81 C.J.S., Estoppel, section 67(a), page
402; and 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, section 35, page
640.

VII. Whether the essential elements exist and whether
the doctrine of estoppel may be applied depends, of course, on
the factual situation presented.

HH In the case at hand the testimony discloses Mrs. Dart
first learned of defendant’s plan to erect a building with the
‘east wall on or near the westerly plat or survey line about
June 8, 1966. At that time slie received a call from defendant
who stated she was going to put up a building and was having
a survey effected in order to determine location of the lot line.
She also asked whether Mrs. Dart knew where the line was
located. The answer given was, “I thought it was the east wall,
east side of the wall, * * *”,

About June 15 or 16 the contractor engaged by defendant
knocked down a part of the cement block wall and removed

a es 245

one tree. On the same day he commenced digging trenches for
the footings. Mr. Dart went to the scene of action. He was
shown a string and told by the contractor it was on the survey
line. Mr. Dart then said, “I don’t think we are going to fight
you”, then went immediately into the house to confer with his
wife. He later returned and said to the contractor, “No, you
go ahead. I guess we are not going to fight you.”

About the same time defendant again called Mrs. Dart,
who then asked defendant what she was doing. Defendant re-
plied to the effect she was going to erect a building on a line
indicated by the survey. Mrs. Dart said she was not sure it
was the true line and defendant invited Mrs. Dart to have a
survey run.

The contractor then began digging trenches in which to
place footings for the proposed building.

June 21, trenches having been dug, the contractor had
cement delivered and started putting in cement block footings.

Defendant admits that before placement of the footings
began an attorney for plaintiffs called her and reported plain-
tiffs were not happy about location of the building. However,
she never reported this or her conversations with Mrs. Dart to
the contractor. Neither is any showing made that the con-
tractor ever reported to defendant his conversations with Mr.
Dart. :

Defendant stated no one pointed‘ out any boundary lines
at the time she bought the property from Smith, but admitted
being then aware of the retaining wall.

At all times here concerned defendant was aware of the
fact plaintiffs considered the east side of the cement block wall
as a marker or indicia of the real boundary. In addition she
was told plaintiffs questioned her right to construct a building
in the proposed location before work on the trenches had
started, and in any event prior to placement of any footings.

No showing is made which discloses defendant relied on
any act or conduct on the part of plaintiffs. In fact she knew
nothing of Mr. Dart’s statements to the contractor, and com-
pletely disregarded her conversations with Mrs. Dart.

Furthermore the record does not disclose any structure

246 ee a

contemplated by. defendant was in fact completed. It reveals
nothing more than the digging of some shallow trenches and
placement of some footings.

This alone does not qualify as a substantial and valuable
improvement. Neither would removal be unjust or unduly
burdensome. And, where no permanent or substantial improve-
ments have been made, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be
invoked. Trimpl v. Meyer, 246 Iowa 1245, 1252, 71 N.W.2d 487.

In support of the foregoing see also Mahrenholz v. Alff,
258 Iowa 446, 454, 112 N.W.2d 847, and citations.

Under existing circumstances we find no basis upon which
to conclude the trial court erred in here holding the doctrine of
estoppel inapplicable.

VII. The trial court’s order provides in part: “* * *
the Court retains jurisdiction to rule upon plaintiffs’ request for
an order requiring the defendant to remove the building now
being constructed upon their property, to restore plaintiffs’
property to its prior condition, and for the appointment of a
commissioner to stake the boundary line as here determined by
the court.”

In that regard and to the end plaintiffs may not profit
from defendant’s installation of the footings, defendant must
be granted permission to remove the cement blocks so used
within such reasonable time as the trial court may prescribe.

, Subject to this modification the judgment of the trial court
must be affirmed, and the case remanded.

Affirmed as modified, and remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

All Justices coneur.

&
Bey

Davenport Ostropataic Hosrrrat Association, appellant, cross-
appellee, v. Hosprran Szrvice, Incorroratep, appellee,
eross-appellant,

No, 52620.

(Reported in 154 N.W.24 153)

gD

a : LI LI

Novemper 14, 1967.

Betty, Neuman, McMahon, Hellstrom & Bittner, by R.
Richard Bittner and Ronald L. Saylor, of Davenport, for ap-
pellant, cross-appellee.

Gamble, Riepe, Martin & Webster, by J. G. Fletcher, of Des
Moines, and Cook, Blair, Balluff & Nagle, by David J. Sohr, of
Davenport, for appellee, cross-appellant,

Rawuines, J.—The facts in this case, though somewhat in-
volved, are without substantial dispute.

December 1950, these parties entered into a written con-
tract. Accordingly Hospital agreed to furnish services to
Blue Cross subscribers, which in turn agreed to pay Hospital.
It contained a ten-day cancellation provision exercisable by
either party.

ee EE

Payments by Blue Cross to Hospital were to be in accord
with a stated reimbursement cost formula.

Briefly stated Hospital agreed to accept the lesser of actual
charges for services performed, or 105 percent of its computed
daily cost, multiplied by the number of member care days, less
certain specific noncontractual services performed.

August 1951, the agreement was modified by mutual assent
to provide for termination on 90-day written notice by either
party.

In 1959, Hospital commenced construction of a new build-
ing. It was completed in 1960, This structure was completely
financed through bonded indebtedness with interest varying
from six to seven percent.

July 27, 1961, Blue Cross advisory committee, in substance,
recommended to its board of directors the reimbursement cost
formula be changed to provide interest expense of participat-
ing hospitals be limited to not more than six percent, computed
on the basis of not more than 50 percent of the new capital
improvement.

April 12, 1962, Blue Cross board of directors approved the
revised cost formula. July 11, 1962, the Iowa Insurance Com-
missioner, on application, approved the proposed revision.

August 7, 1962, Blue Cross advised all its participating
hospitals, including plaintiff, the change would be effective
January 1, 1963, later extended to January 1, 1964.

Hospital immediately commenced protesting application
of the new reimbursement formula to it or its 1959-1960 capital
improvements.

Eventually, and more specifically, in March 1964, Hospital
appealed to Blue Cross advisory committee but to no avail.

July 1964, Hospital representatives requested the insurance
commissioner reconsider the approval previously given by him.
October 24, 1964, Blue Cross board of directors reaffirmed its
approval of the proposed change,

February 5, 1965, the insurance commissioner gave notice
to Hospital he elected to stand on his prior decision.

From May 1960, to January 1, 1964, Hospital was paid by

5

Blue Cross in accord with the original cost formula which in-
eluded its total structural indebtedness with interest.

However, Blue Cross commenced paying Hospital in accord
with the modified schedule January 1, 1964, which payments
were accepted by Hospital. But, as one witness for Blue
Cross stated, they were objecting to it.

By stipulation the parties agreed Hospital was paid
$9738.54 less in 1964, and $9123.16 less in 1965, than it would
have received under the original contract, subject to some ad-
justment on accounting procedures with reference to the 1965
figure.

The trial court concluded Hospital, being advised of the
insurance commissioner’s final decision, failed to then declare
the contract terminated; and by continuing to accept com-
pensation computed according to the revised formula impliedly
acquiesced in the modification, as a result of which it was
entitled to benefits after February 5, 1965, only in accord with
the modified reimbursement cost formula,

Hospital was accordingly granted judgment against Blue
Cross in the sum of $9738.54 for the year 1964, and $950.35 for
the period to February 7, 1965, or a total of $10,688.89. Plain-
tiff appeals and defendant cross-appeals.

Propositions asserted by Hospital on appeal are, the trial
court erred in concluding (1) modification of the reimburse-
ment cost formula was not an ineffective effort to unilaterally
change the contract; (2) the contract was modified by implied
mutual consent; and (3) the revised formula applied to
Hospital’s previously effected capital improvements.

Challenging these propositions Blue Cross contends (1) by
electing not to terminate the contract and continuing to accept
payments in accord with the revised formula, Hospital accepted
the modification and is estopped to claim otherwise; (2) the
reimbursement formula was subject to change provided the
statutory and contractual procedures were followed; and (3)
the modification did apply to Hospital.

On cross-appeal Blue Cross claims error on the part of the
trial court in holding (1) the modification was not effective as
to Hospital until final decision of the insurance commissioner ;

Ss:

and (2) Hospital was not estopped to have damages by reason
of laches.

We reverse on both appeals.

I. By its pleadings Hospital sought damages from Blue
Cross for breach of contract, and other relief equitable in
nature.

TI The case was submitted, tried and determined by the
trial court as an action in equity. It is likewise submitted on
appeal,

Under these circumstances it will be considered by us de
novo. Rules 344(a)(3) and 844(f)(7), R.C.P., and Henderson
v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97, 100, 106 N.W.2d 86.

TH While the scope of our review is the entire case it will
be confined to those propositions relied on by each party for
reversal. Steele v. Northup, 259 Iowa 448, 143 N.W.2d 302, 304.

Il. The factual situation presented in this case dis-
closes the original contract between these parties, at time of the
claimed modification, was executory. It had been partly per-
formed by both but not completely performed by either. Sie-
bring Mfg. Co. v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., 246 Iowa 923, 928,
70 N.W.2d 149; Williams v. Cassidy, 237 Iowa 1042, 1050, 23
N.W.2d 423; In re Capital Service, 136 F.Supp. 480, 434; and
17 C.J.S., Contracts, section 7, page 576.

HEM 1l. Without question an executory contract may
‘be effectively modified by one party with the consent of the
other provided it does not violate the law or public policy.
Stated conversely one party to a contract cannot alter its terms
wnilaterally or without assent of the-other party. However
the requisite consent may be either express or implied from
acts and conduct. Collins v. Gard, 224 Iowa 236, 240, 275
N.W. 392; Hueston v. Pointer Brewing Co., 222 Iowa 630, 634,
269 N.W. 754; In re Estate of Newson, 206 Iowa 514, 518, 219
N.W. 305; Sioux City and New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc. v.
Brunson, 243 F.Supp. 198, 202; 17A O.J.S., Contracts, sections
378-375, pages 419-428; 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, section 465,
page 934; and Simpson, Law of Contracts, Hornbook Series,
Second Ed., page 186.

And whether a contract has been modified by the parties
thereto is ordinarily a question of fact. Commercial Sav. Bk.

5

v. Dunning, 202 Iowa 478, 484,.210 N.W.. 599, 59 A.L.R. 983,
and 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, section 465, pages 934-936,

IV. Although there is some degree of confusion as to the
necessity of consideration to support a modification, we are not
here called upon to consider that matter and do not do so. In
this regard however see Siebring Mfg. Co. v. Carlson Hybrid
Corn Co., 246 Iowa 923, 928, 70 N.W.2d 149; Williams v.
Cassidy, 237 Iowa 1042, 1050, 23 N.W.2d 423; 17A C.J.S., con-
tracts, section 876, page 428; 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, section
469,--page. 939; 5 Drake Law Review 3; 47 California Law
Review 74, 92-98; and Simpson, Law of Contracts, Hornbook
Series, Second Ed., pages 187-189.

V. The basic issue involved is whether Hospital at any-
time manifested assent to a modification of the reimbursement
eost forniula. ”

Hl Blue Cross maintains Hospital, by failing to terminate
the agreément and -continuing to accept payments under the
revised formula, acquiesced in and is estopped to now claim
absence of consent.

. With this contention we cannot agree.

As previously disclosed, from time of announcement by
Blue Cross of the proposed modification, Hospital openly and
repeatedly voiced objection to the change and its applicability
to Hospital’s previously effected capital improvements.

It is thus apparent Hospital never expressly agreed or
consented to the revised cost formula,

The question now posed is whether Hospital by acts and
conduct consented to the modification or is estopped to chal-
lenge it.

We are satisfied the mere acceptance by Hospital of a
lesser amount than that prescribed in the original contract did
not of itself disclose or stand as an assent to the modification.
B. C. Truck Lines, Ine. v. Kelley, 93 Ga.App. 529, 92 S.H.2d 309,
310, and 17A C.J.S., Contracts, section 375, pages 425-428.

Hi VI. Furthermore Hospital was not, by any attempted
modification or breach on the part of Blue Cross, compelled to
terminate the contract or lose its right of redress.

Simply stated Hospital elected to stand by the contract

ST
and seek recovery for any claimed breach. This it could do.
Richmond and Jackson v. The Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. and The
IC. RB. Co., 40 Iowa 264, 269, citing Richmond v. The Dubuque
and Sioux City RB. Co., 33 Iowa 422, 495; 17A C.J.S., Contracts,
section 458, page 589; and 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, sections
445-447, pages 903-910.

In other words Hospital, by accepting payments under re-
peated protest, and continued performance on its part, re-
served the right to recover for breach, if any, by Blue Cross.

HM The law does not sanction breach of contract as a
means of escape from its burdensome terms nor will it reward
an offending party.

In support of the previously stated position taken by Blue
Cross it cites and leans rather heavily on Siebring Mfg. Co. v.
Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., 246 Iowa 923, 70 N.W.2d 149, and
Williams vy. Cassidy, 237 Iowa 1042, 23 N.W.2d 423. We find
neither of those cases here applicable nor persuasive.

In Siebring, supra, the parties entered into a contract for
sale by plaintiff to defendant of 2000 cornerib roofs at specified
prices. Subsequently and prior to full performance plaintiff
advised defendant a steel strike prevented the securing of
material other than at an increased price on the black market.
It was then orally agreed steel should be so obtained and de-
fendant would pay the stated price increases. Deliveries and
payments were made on the new basis for a short time until
defendant notified plaintiff it would require subsequent de-
liveries be made on the original contract basis. This court
there held the oral modification bound the defendant to pay
the increases. Stated otherwise it was held a manifestation of
mutual assent to the modification was evident. On this subject
see also 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, section 466, page 936.

Williams v. Cassidy, supra, involved an action by a real-
estate purchaser for specific performance under a new and
substituted agreement. There an executory contract for sale
of real estate, partially performed, was expressly rescinded and
a new contract effected on a lower price basis fully performed
by the purchaser. We held the new agreement was supported
by sufficient consideration and the purchaser was entitled to

0 ee

the remedy sought. This case turned entirely on rescission
and consideration for a new or substituted agreement.

Blue Cross also claims that where a contract is lacking in
mutuality so that one party may terminate it at anytime on
reasonable notice or on the notice specified in the agreement,
such party may impose new terms and conditions.

No authority has been cited and none has been found dis-
closing the principle here urged by Blue Cross has ever been
adopted in this state. And, without here determining its ap-
plicability under other circumstances, we find it inapplicable
under the factual situation presented in the case at bar.

As a result there is no need to extend this opinion by
elaborating upon the foreign authorities cited by Blue Cross in
support of its stand. .

Hi VIL. Im connection with the propositions here being
considered we also find the doctrine of estoppel is not appli-
eable and affords no benefit to Blue Cross.

In Goodwin Tile and Brick Co. v. DeVries, 234 Iowa 566,
568, 13 N.W.2d 310, 155 A.L.R.- 346, this court said:

“The essential elements of equitable estoppel, or estoppel
in pais, have been listed as false representation or concealment
of material facts, made to one without knowledge of the real
facts, with. the intention that it be acted upon; and reliance
thereon by the party to whom made, to his prejudice and in-
jury. Stookesberry v. Burgher, 220 Iowa 916, 262 N.W. 820.
That each element should be proven clearly, convincingly, and
satisfactorily is noted in Smith v. Coutant, 232 Iowa 887, 891,
6 N.W.2d 421, 424, which, after considering many authorities,
states: . a

“In general, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is based
upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and
justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own. act, representations, or commitments, to the injury of one
to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon.
Such a doctrine is neither odious nor in disfavor, in either law
or equity.’” .

Blue Cross knew, or had reasonable cause to know,
Hospital did not give approval to the- proposed cost formula
modification and was in fact vigorously objecting to it.

SS

Under these circumstances it cannot reasonably be said
Hospital misled Blue Cross by any act or conduct on the part
of the former.

There is no evidence disclosing Hospital concealed or
misrepresented material facts not known to Blue Cross, that
Blue Cross relied on any assurances or conduct by Hospital, or
that Blue Cross was in fact deceived. The material facts were
at all times as well known to one party as to the other.

In this case the burden of proof was on Blue Cross to
establish all elements of estoppel which it had asserted. This it
failed to do. See In re Estate of MacVicar, 251 Iowa 1139,
1144, 104 N.W.2d 594, and Atlas Coal Co. v. Jones, 245 Iowa
506, 522, 61 N.W.2d 663.

VIII. Blue Cross also takes the position the reimburse-
ment cost formula was open to change by it provided statutory
and contractual requirements were followed.

As an abstract proposition this may be true. But that
alone does not mean a change so effected can serve ipso facto
to alter the terms of any and all existing contracts, absent
consent or acquiescence by the other contracting party or
termination of the agreement and creation of a new one. We
shall deal first with the statutory phase of the proposition
presented.

HH Laws regulating the insurance business are remedial,
being enacted under the state’s police power, because such
business has been found to be impressed with public interest
and the public is entitled to protection against unscrupulous
and illegal practices. Chapter 505, Code, 1962; Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Alexander, 242 Iowa 364, 378, 45 N.W.2d 258; 44
O.3.8., Insurance, section 55, page 518; and 29 AmJur., In-
surance, section 49, page 464.

HMMM The insurance commissioner is an administrative
officer. As such he may, at times, exercise quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers. See sections 505.8 and 505.9, Code, 1962;
44 O.J.8. Insurance, section 57(b), page 525; and 33 Iowa Law
Review 335, 339.

This does not mean such official has or exercises legislative
or judicial powers in the true. sense.

Se

More specifically, in approving a contract involving modifi-
eation of a reimbursement cost formula, he performs an act
quasi legislative in nature in that it is to be effective in futuro.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct.
67, 69, 58 L.Ed. 150; West Flagler Amusement Co. v. State
Racing Commission, 122 Fla. 222, 165 So. 64, 65; and Hyson v.
Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578, 582,
583.

HH The commissioner may have discretion to act but it
is the ultimate function of the courts to determine whether he
has acted according to law or abused his discretion, and to
construe the legal meaning and effect of his administrative
actions. Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assn. v. Timmons, 252 Iowa
163, 169-174, 105 N.W.2d 209; Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Alexander, supra, 242 Iowa at 371; 44 C.J.S., Insurance, section
58, page 526; and 33 Iowa Law Review 335, 343.

While authority of the commissioner in approving the
formula modification here involved is not questioned, the effect
of this action upon the existing contract between Blue Cross
and Hospital is challenged.

The issue presented goes to the legal effect of the commis-
sioner’s approval upon an existing, valid, executory contract
between an insurer and a servicing agent, not upon a policy
between an insurer and the insured.

HN Presumably the commissioner, in approving a modi-
fication of the reimbursement cost formula, was acting in the
best interests of the public. But his quasi-legislative order, to
the extent it affected the existing contractual obligation be-
tween Blue Cross and Hospital, contravened both the federal
and state constitutional provisions forbidding impairment by
the state of existing contractual rights‘and duties. This means
that as to Hospital, absent an agreement to the modification,
acquiescence or termination of the existing contract and crea-
tion of-a new one, the order issued was constitutionally pro-
seribed. See Constitution of the United States, Article I,
section 10, and Constitution of Iowa, Article I, section 21, both
providing in substance, to the extent here material, no law
shall be passed impairing the obligation of contracts.

SS |:

HM 4x4, if the legislature cannot by statute constitu-
tionally abrogate the terms of an existing contract, neither can
the insurance commissioner do so in the performance of a
quasi-legislative function which has legislative force and effect.
See John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277
U.S. 100, 111-114, 48 8. Ct. 489, 498, 494, 72 L.Ed. 801; Appleby
v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 408, 409, 46 S.Ct. 581, 583, 70 L.Ed. 1009;
16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, section 378, page 50; 12 C.J.,
Constitutional Law, section 725, page 1066; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Ad-
ministrative Law, section 298, page 125; and 16 Am.Jur.2d,
Constitutional Law, section 450, pages 797, 798.

Under the conditions here existing, the action of the com-
missioner in approving the revised cost formula could not be
constitutionally so extended as to impair the obligation of the
contract then existing between Blue Cross and Hospital. See
29 Am.Jur., Insurance, section 50, pages 466, 467, citing British
America Assur. Co. v. Colorado & 8. Ry. Co., 52 Colo. 589, 125
P. 508, 511, 512, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 1202; and Filipkowski v.
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 206 Wis. 39, 238 N.W. 828,
830, 78 A.L.R. 618.

‘We can only conclude the exercise of a power pursuant to
statute authorizing the commissioner to approve contracts be-
tween an insurer and a servicing agency did not serve to make
the subject modification applicable to Hospital.

IX. The contract executed May 12, 1959, provides in
part: “The cost of the Hospital in rendering hospital service
shall be calculated according to a reimbursement cost forinula
to be established by the Hospital Advisory Committee of the
Service Corporation, and approved by the Board of Directors
of the Service Corporation and the Iowa Insurance Com-
missioner. Such formula, as tentatively established by the Hos-
pital Advisory Committee, provides for the calculation of such
cost substantially as follows: * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In this connection Blue Cross contends the word “tenta-
tively” means conditional or provisional, opening tlie door to
periodic modifications. We are not here concerned with the
word “tentatively”, lifted out of context, but rather with the

0

entire contract, and in particular the term “as tentatively
established by the Hospital Advisory Committee”.

HI Where, as in this case, the terminology employed is
uncertain or susceptible to more than one meaning, we may,
under established rules, proceed to effect an interpretation of
the instrument in order to ascertain the meaning and mani-
festation of words used. In so doing we search for intent of
the parties as disclosed by what they said: Rule 344(£) (14),
R.C.P.; Bruhl v. Thul, 257 Iowa 889, 892, 893, 134 N.W.2d 571;
Restatement of Contracts, Iowa Annotations, section 226; Wil-
liston’s Treatise on Law of Contracts, ‘Revised Ed., sections
601-610; Simpson, Law of Contracts, Hornbook Series, Second
Ed., section 102. See also Aultman v. Meyers, 239 Towa 940,
949, 950, 83 N.W.2d 400.

We also look to the matter of intent as it existed at time
the contract was executed. Huntington v. Jacob Haish Co.,
190 Iowa 1197, 1200, 181 N.W. 480; 17A C.J.S., Contracts,
sections 294, page 27; 295, page 63; and 359, page 361.

HEME Clearly the contract does not provide: The cost of
the hospital in rendering hospital service shall be calculated
according to a reimbursement cost formula to be tentatively
established by the Hospital Advisory Committee of the Service
Corporation, and approved by the board-of directors of the
Service Corporation and the Iowa Insurance Commissioner,
it being specifically understood and ‘agreed the formula may
from time to time be revised, altered or modified, to all of which
hospital hereby consents and agrees.

Adoption of the view urged by Blue Cross would require
reading words into the contract which are neither specifically
nor impliedly contained in the instrument, This we cannot do.

Presumably Blue Cross Hospital Advisory Committee
originally recommended the reimbursement cost formula con-
tained in the 1959 contract between Blue Cross and Hospital.

However, its ‘action in so doing was, and could in no event
be of any- force or effect until adoption of the proposal by Blue
Cross board of directors and approval by the insurance com-
missioner.

This means any reimbursement cost formula established

Ss

by the hospital advisory committee is preliminary, tentative
or provisional in that it may only be finalized or become ef-
fective if and when given requisite approval.

We are persuaded (1) it is in this sense the word tenta-
tively is here employed; and (2) the phrase “as tentatively
established by the Hospital Advisory Committee” neither says
nor implies Blue Cross may, by unilateral action, effectively
modify the reimbursement cost formula at anytime or times it
may so elect.

X. Blue Cross also takes the position Hospital is estopped
to have damages by reason of laches.

At this point some repetition of the factual developments
is mavoidable.

Upon receiving notice of the proposed modification, about
August 7, 1962, Hospital began protesting and thereafter re-
peatedly voiced opposition to the revision.

Failing in these efforts it undertook an appeal March 17,
1964, to the Blue Cross Hospital Advisory Committee, which
was denied May 23, 1964.

July 1964, Hospital requested the insurance commissioner
reconsider his prior action in connection with approval of the
revised formula.

October 27, 1964, Blue Cross board of directors reaffirmed
its position on the changes to be made.

February 5, 1965, the commissioner gave notice he elected
to stand on the order previously issued.

June 4, 1965, Hospital commenced the instant action.

HE This court has previously held, laches is an equitable
doctrine based on public policy. It relates to delay in the as-
sertion or prosecution of a claim, working to the disadvantage
or prejudice of another. See In re Estate of Shivvers, 240 Iowa
93, 103, 34 N.W.2d 632. To the same effect is Jennings v.
Schmitz, 237 Iowa 580, 589, 20 N.W.2d 897, where we held the
doctrine applicable only where it would be inequitable to per-
mit recovery or it is clearly demanded in the interests of justice.

HN And in an early case we said: “* * * laches alone is
not in itself a defense to an action on contract, unless of such
duration as to cover the statutory period of limitation; but,

262

if accompanied with other things, it may amount to an estoppel,
* *%” State Savings Bank v. Miller, 146 Iowa. 83, 88, 124
N.W. 878. .

. -See also Boehnke y. Roenfanz, 246 Iowa 240, 248, 249, 67
N.W.2d 585, 54 A.L.R.2d 1, and 17A O.J.8., Contracts, section
581, pages 1025-1027.

HMM Im addition it is generally understood that while
delay in enforcing a right is an element of the doctrine, that
alone does not constitute laches. 30A C.J.S., Equity, section
116, page 45; and 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, sections 152-176, pages
687-723.

HMM Basically there can be no premise upon which the
doctrine of laches may stand absent some wrong, such as a
breach of contract, with a subsequent action for redress.

As heretofore determined the attempt by Blue Cross to
impose its modification proposal on Hospital constituted a
unilateral attempt to modify the existing agreement.

The question now to be resolved is whether the refusal
by Blue Cross to reimburse Hospital pursuant to terms of the
contract was in fact a breach. :

Hs that regard an unjustified failure to perform all
or any part of what is promised in a contract is a breach, for
which the aggrieved party is entitled to be compensated in
damages. Restatement, Contracts, section 314; 17 Am.Jur.2d,
Contracts, section 441, page 897; and Simpson, Law of Con-
tracts, Hornbook Series, Second Ed., page 377.

We are satisfied any failure by Blue Cross to pay in
accord with the reimbursement cost formula contained in the
original contract constituted a breach.

Under the existing factual situation Hospital had the
.elective right to (1) ask damages under the terms of the con-
tract; (2) disaffirm the contract and ask for value of services
performed; or (8) ask specific performance. See Shriver v.
Cook, 256 Iowa 271, 278, 127 N.W.2d 102.

Hospital, as aforesaid, elected to stand on the contract
and seek compensatory damages.

In support of its position to the effect Hospital is estopped
to recover by virtue of the doctrine of laches, Blue Cross cites

Se

and relies in part on Sinclair v. Allender, 238 Iowa 212, 26
N.W.2d 820, but that case is not in point. There an action was
brought more than ten years after delivery of deed to estab-
lish a resulting trust in real estate. In holding the doctrine
of laches applicable this court pointed out that delay or post-
ponement of action had been unfair to the opposing party, he
had been damaged. or prejudiced as a result, and it would be
inequitable to force the claim at such a late date.

Wokoun v. Jameson, 183 Iowa 956, 167 N.W. 676; State
Bank of Iowa Falls v. Brown, 142 Iowa 190, 119 NW. 81, 184
Am. St. Rep. 412; and Moore v. Howe, 115 Iowa 62, 87 N.W.
750, also cited by Blue Cross, all deal with the matter of delay
in attempting to assert rescission based on fraud or misrepre-
sentation, and are therefore inapplicable.

We are here dealing not with rescission, but rather with
a damage action for breach of an executory agreement.

HM In the instant case the contract called for continuing
performance with periodic payments by Blue Cross to Hospital,
and neither party elected to rescind or declare a termination.

This then means, every time Blue Cross failed to remit
the full amount due Hospital under the terms of the existing
contract there was created a distinct and independent breach
upon each of which an action would lie.

But Hospital did not choose to pursue this course. It
elected to continue performance, deferring any action until
there had been several breaches. This it had the right to do.

And in so doing it had not only the privilege but was in
fact required to seek recovery for any and all breaches of the
contract prior to commencement of the action. In support of
the foregoing see 25A C.J.S., Damages, section 193, page 256;
22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section 19, page 35; and Simpson,
Law of Contracts, Hornbook Series, Second Ed., section 188,
page 380.

Under the factual situation here disclosed there is no
rational basis upon which to find the doctrine of laches bars
Hospital’s right of recovery.

XI. We conclude the trial court erred in holding (1)
the contract was modified by mutual assent; and (2) Hospital’s

2 |

right to damages was limited to time of announcement by the
insurance commissioner, he elected to stand on his original
order of approval.
By virtue of the foregoing there is no need to now con-
sider other propositions urged on appeal by either party.
Reversed on both appeals and remanded for further pro-
ceedings and judgment consistent with this opinion.

All Jusrices concur except LeGranp, J., who takes no part.

Mary Jane Ericxson, appellant, v. Wii1am K. Ericson,
appellee,

No. 52100.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 106)

265

ii

Novemper 14, 1967.

Hart & Hart, of Elkader, for appellant.
Donohue, Wilkins & Donohue, of West Union, for appellee.

Garrmip, C. J—Mary Jane Erickson sued William K.
Erickson for divorce on the ground section 598.8, subsection 5,
Codes 1962, 1966, designates “such inhuman treatment as to
endanger the life of his wife.” Following trial the court found
proof of such treatment was insufficient and that plaintiff had
eondoned any mistreatment of her by defendant. Plaintiff

266 | a

has appealed from dismissal’ of her petition based on such
findings. ,

| I. Plaintiff’s first proposition relied on for reversal asserts
error in the overruling of her motion that defendant make his
answer more specific by stating what acts of plaintiff constitu-
ted failure to keep house properly, the facts upon which de-
fendant alleges she was lazy and the times when she refused
to do the customary work of a housewife. Also that defendant
state when and where plaintiff has nagged him about not join-
ing the Catholic Church; that he state the facts showing plain-
tiff had a vile temper and when and where she called defendant
obscene names and threatened suicide.

Basis for the motion is rule 112, Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:

“A party may move for a more specific statement of any
matter not pleaded with sufficient definiteness to enable him
to plead to it and for no other purpose, It shall point out the
insufficiency claimed and particulars desired.”

Cook’s Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Revised Edition,
Volume 1, pages 728, 729, quotes this Comment of our Advisory
Committee and the author under rule 112:

. “Supersedes Code 1939, §§ 11127, 11128. This motion will
no longer lie to obtain evidence or information necessary to
prepare for trial as distinct from preparation to plead. Dis-
covery should be pursued under Rules 135-139, 121-134.

. “By rephrasing the Code sections it is hoped to avoid the
indiscriminate practice of moving for, and ordering, amend-
ments not actually needed but which cause delay and expense.
Rule 112 above was also adopted to correct a peculiarly need-
less abuse of the former practice.

» “Author’s Comment

“The purpose of this Rule sufficiently appears from the
foregoing Comment of the Advisory Committee. It is new.
The former decisions and court practice should not apply to
such motions now.”

".. See-also Whité v: Flood, 258 Towa 402, 404, 405, 188 N.W.2d
863, 865.

| Es 267

HI We are not inclined to hold the court’s ruling was
reversible error. Plaintiff’s counsel seemed to be able to reply
‘to the answer as filed. He did not resort to discovery proceed-
ings to prepare for trial on the issues raised. There was no
evidence plaintiff threatened suicide and she could not have
been prejudiced by this unproved allegation of the answer.
The two precedents plaintiff cites on this proposition antedate
the taking effect of our Rules of Civil Procedure.

Il. Plaintiff and defendant were married July 4, 1959,
after keeping company two years or more. Plaintiff was 18
and had recently graduated from high school. Defendant was
83, They lived on a farm until plaintiff left and went to near-
by Elkader to live November 20, 1964, when her divorce pe-
tition was filed. They had no children.

The marriage proved to be an unhappy one. Plaintiff was
a Catholic and defendant a Protestant. Defendant refused to
be married in a Catholic church and plaintiff consented to be
married in another church. Both before and after the cere-
mony was performed defendant promised plaintiff he would
consent to a second ceremony by a Catholic priest. Defendant
kept putting plaintiff off on this, however, and no such cere-
mony was performed. There is much testimony by plaintiff
that defendant refused to be remarried by a priest or to join
her church unless plaintiff would have herself “fixed” so she
could not bear children. Defendant as a witness admits he
told plaintiff such an operation was a requisite to his joining
her church.

Of course this was too high a price for defendant to impose
as a condition for living up to his promise. If children had
been born to the marriage this action might never have been
brought.

The difference in ages of the two parties and the friends
of each seems to have been another impediment to their hap-
piness. Plaintiff turned for companionship to those she knew
in school and others of their age or younger rather than to those
of defendant’s age.

A third circumstance which may have contributed to their
marital difficulties is that they engaged in prémarital intimacies
rather than to wait for the marriage ceremony.

268 Le a

Except perhaps for the matters just suggested, this long
record follows a familiar pattern, differing only in detail. This
early testimony of plaintiff reveals the general nature of her
complaints:

‘Defendant was rude, mean, argumentative and beat me
up. five or six times. Said I was clumsy on my feet, wasn’t as
good as the neighbors; didn’t work enough around the barn
and house, told me to get my things and get out and get my ass
down the road. At least three times told me to get out.

“Quite often told me I was clumsy on my feet, didn’t use
my head, didn’t think, didn’t cook things right, like his mother
did. * * * His mother lived with us on the farm about a year
and a half to two years. * * * If something did not go right
in the barn he would complain for a long time, continuously,
-and some things he took out on me. Complained about me not
working in the barn enough, and if I did bed down the cows
would say I didn’t do it right, even though I tried.

“Didn’t have running water and he would say I washed
too often, used too much water, should learn how to propor-
tion it, and I should get the water myself. * * * I wasn’t sup-
posed to carry water because of my bad back, and I had to
limit myself to lifting ten pounds.”

Much of the. record is devoted to the details of the six
or more beatings charged against defendant. He admitted he
had resorted to physical violence toward plaintiff on at least
three occasions but asserted, in effect, she had said or done
something to provoke or deserve such treatment. The trial
court thought plaintiff was inclined to exaggerate and that she
held her own in these physical encounters. However, we think
she was usually, if not always, the loser.

‘We are not sure these physical encounters constitute the
strongest part of plaintiff’s case. Defendant said some pretty
mean things to her. In the first six months of the marriage,
when the parties were at the home of defendant’s sister and
husband, the husband said he saw plaintiff’s father with a
woman other than her mother. Defendant joined in teasing
plaintiff about her father’s conduct in this and other respects,
notwithstanding her request that they desist.

— es 269

Plaintiff testified “Defendant told me my father was dying
of cancer, everyone knew it, he wasn’t any good anyway, he
had lost everything he had, and kept up this talk. I asked
him to stop.” When plaintiff cried about the matter defend-
ant laughed. While the version of defendant and his witnesses
differs from plaintiff’s, we think there is corroboration of the
substance of her testimony.

Plaintiff also testified that at another time defendant said
her deceased great uncle was a drunkard, ran around with
women, was not any good and kept repeating these accusations.
On another occasion, according to plaintiff, defendant told her
her dead grandfather had committed murder, disregarding her
request that he desist. Plaintiff said the assertions were untrue.

HI Il. Of course, inhuman treatment does not furnish
cause for divorce unless it endangers life. We have frequently
held life may be endangered by impairment of health. Also
that life may be endangered where such danger is reasonably
to be apprehended and that conduct may amount to such in-
human treatment as to endanger life of the spouse even with-
out physical violence or mistreatment. Any mistreatment which
deprives the spouse of needed rest and peace of mind and
affects the nervous system so health is undermined may en-
danger life as effectively as physical violence. Arnold v.
Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 434, 183 N.W.2d 53, 57, and citations;
Lehmkuhl v. Lehmkuhl, 259 Iowa 686, 145 N.W.2d 456, 460,
and citations.

| | We may as well refer here also to the requirement of
Code section 598.7 that the testimony of plaintiff be corrobo-
rated. Corroboration is required to prevent collusion between
the parties. It is not necessary that every detail of plaintiff’s
testimony be corroborated or that corroboration alone sustain
the decree. Defendant's testimony, his admissions or failure
to deny plaintiffs testimony, may furnish the necessary cor-
roboration. Lehmkuhl case, supra, and citations at page 696
of 259 Iowa, pages 462, 463 of 145 N.W.2d; Hand v. Hand,
257 Iowa 648, 647, 133 N.W.2d 63, 68.

IV. The showing that plaintiff’s life was endangered by
defendant’s treatment of her is not strong but there is some

270 | 7

evidence thereof. She testified: “His cross disposition made
me nervous. I was upset most of the time. Couldn’t stand it
any more. Something was going to happen that might lay me
up for life. Was always worked up inside, nervous, bawling
and scared. Iwas afraid of physical harm, of being paralyzed,
of my husband doing damage to me which would result in
death. * * * Since we separated I am more relaxed, not as
tense, don’t break down and ery except when defendant comes
around, threatens and scares me.”

Like the showing of danger to life, corroboration of plain-
tiff’s testimony is not strong but, considering defendant’ 's testi-
mony, it is not entirely lacking.

V. Except for details of defendant’s physical abuse of
plaintiff we have tried to indicate the evidence favorable to
her case. There is other evidence less favorable to it which
should be mentioned.

_ Plaintiff evidently held her own in name-calling. Defend-
ant testified she called him a s-o-b-a lot. Plaintiff admitted
she sometimes cursed defendant and has called him a s-o-b.
Defendant also said plaintiff called his mother the same name
“and one thing or another.”

Plaintiff’s mother was employed evenings in the theatre
at. Elkader and plaintiff also worked there evenings the last
year or more she lived with defendant. When their work was
finished plaintiff and other young people who helped in the
theatre frequently went to a drive-in before going home.
Sometimes it was midnight or later when she went home.
Sometimes plaintiff bought beer for them to drink. Most of
the others were minors. Plaintiff’s furnishing beer to them
was therefore a crime.

Twice after leaving the theatre in the summer of 1964,
plaintiff and several others younger than she went swimming.
One time they went to Elgin and stayed about three hours
until 11 or 12. Another time they went in the pool at Elkader
after hours. A boy, then about 17, in the party was arrested
for violation of a municipal ordinance. On this occasion plain-
tiff was without a bathing suit and jumped in the pool with
her clothes on.

— | am

In the summer and fall of 1964 a school friend of plaintiff
named Marilyn, a local beauty contest winner, was singing in
so-called nightclubs in and around Dubuque. Plaintiff spent
many evenings with Marilyn, her boyfriend and one of the
young men in the band, a divorcee named Charlie. She also
spent several nights with Marilyn in Dubuque and visited her
at Clear Lake and elsewhere. Plaintiff also went to some near-
by places in Wisconsin with Charlie. Plaintiff and the others
indulged in more or less drinking evenings after Marilyn
finished her nightclub appearances. Plaintiff also talked to
Charlie long distance and wrote some letters to him. Her ex-
planation of these calls and letters was that Marilyn was ill,
had no ’phone and plaintiff wanted to inquire as to her friend’s
condition.

When plaintiff, as stated, left home November 20 she
stayed a month in the hotel at Elkader. Charlie was registered
there one night during the month, There is no evidence of
any immoral conduct of plaintiff with Charlie, Marilyn or any
of plaintiff's young friends.

The trial court thought plaintiff became somewhat infatu-
ated with the kind of life Marilyn and her friends lived, tired
of. life on the farm and this, rather than defendant’s treatment
of her, was a principal cause of her leaving home. This view
finds some support in the fact plaintiff lived in Nashville,
Tennessee, with Marilyn three months starting March 1, 1965.

VI. Defendant seeks to justify the decree by applica-
tion of the doctrine of recrimination. The argument is with-
out merit. The doctrine referred to is that where both spouses
have cause for divorce a divorce will not be granted to either.
Arnold v. Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 438, 183 N.W.2d 53, 56 and
citations.

HM One sufficient reason the doctrine of recrimination is
not applicable is that any misconduct of plaintiff toward de-
fendant did not, as far as shown, endanger his life and he is
therefore without cause for divorce. Arnold case, supra, at
pages 487, 488 of 257 Iowa, pages 56, 59 of 188 N.W.2d, and
citations.

VIL. There remains the issue of condonation, pleaded by
defendant, which the trial court found was established.

272 Lt i

|| Condonation is frequently defined as the forgiveness,
express or implied, by one spouse of another for a breach of
marital duty, with an implied condition the offense will not be
repeated. 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, section 203;
27A C.J.S., Divorce, section 59a, pages 194, 195. See also an-
notation, 82 A.U.R.2d 107, 121-135; Zuerrer v. Zuerrer, 238
Towa 402, 407, 408, 27 N.W.2d 260, 262, 263, and citations.

HI Speaking generally, courts are slow to apply the doc-
trine of condonation where there has been continued cruelty.
Reluctance to seek a divorce because of continuing cruelty
should ordinarily be commended rather than penalized. See
Duwe v. Duwe, 246 Iowa 1336, 1344, 1345, 72 N.W.2d 501, 506,
507; Bouska v. Bouska, 249 Iowa 281, 285, 286, 86 N.W.2d 884,
886, 887; Payton v. Payton, 252 Iowa 772, 779, 108 N.W.2d
358, 362, 86 A.L.R.2d 416, 424; Lane v. Lane, 253 Iowa 92, 96,
111 N.W.2d 286, 288; Hancock v. Hancock, 257 Iowa 119, 131
N.W.2d 757, 759; 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation,
section 216, page 371.

HI Continued cohabitation is not necessarily a condona-
tion of inhuman treatment. Duwe v. Duwe and citations; Pay-
ton and Lane cases, all supra.

The evidence is without dispute that throughout the more
than five years plaintiff and defendant lived together they
regularly engaged in frequent acts of sexual intercourse. Plain-
tiff testified the sex acts occurred very often, seven times a
week; the first part of the year they separated (in November)
they occurred two to four times a week, “maybe” one to three
times a day, “might skip a month, if I had a lot of pain and
eouldn’t aecept him he became mad.” She said they engaged
in marital relations within the week they separated.

Defendant testified that during the last year of marriage
their sex relations were about the same when plaintiff was
home and they occurred a day or two before she left.

As stated, plaintiff left home November 20, 1964, and her
petition was filed that day. Also as stated, she lived the first
month at the hotel in Elkader. She then moved to the Reimer
Building there and from March 1 through May 1965 she lived
in Nashville with her friend Marilyn.

Ye De 2738

Defendant testified that after the separation he and plain-
tiff were “downtown” different times and had a few drinks;
on New Year’s eve they went to a dance in Decorah with
another couple, got home at daylight, plaintiff was then stay-
ing in the Reimer Building where he visited and slept with
her more than once.

On another occasion after the separation the parties had
drinks with Marilyn and her boyfriend in two night spots
(one was in Wisconsin), Marilyn said she was intoxicated and
her boyfriend suggested getting a motel room with two beds.
Plaintiff consented to this but Marilyn refused.

While plaintiff was staying in Nashville she returned to
see defendant and he took her to the train in Wisconsin to
return to Nashville. Defendant testified he “had been with
her when she was at home. I bought her train ticket and we
kissed goodbye. Gave her money when she asked me for it.”

HI The above testimony is without dispute. There is no
substantial evidence defendant abused plaintiff after the sep-
aration. Indeed the evidence is there was less cause for com-
plaint in this regard for at least several months prior to the
separation than formerly. We are persuaded the evidence of
the conduct of the parties, particularly after the separation,
supports the trial court’s finding of condonation and we there-
fore affirm the court’s denial of a divorce.

The extended annotation in 32 A-L.R.2d 107, 184-187,
states: “It has also been said in numerous cases that cruelty,
indignities, and the like are condoned where the parties volun-
tarily resume cohabitation after a separation.”

At page 185 the annotator observes that “the better view
concerning the significance of a resumption of cohabitation
seems to be that such an act is merely evidence and is not of
itself a condonation.”

At page 136 it is said, “And proof of a resumption of
normal marital relations is usually sufficient to permit an in-
ference that prior cruelty has been condoned.”

24. Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, section 216, page
372, contains this: “If the parties have separated, a resumption
of cohabitation is of greater significance than a mere continu-

aTd ee

ance of cohabitation in connéction with the condonation of
éraélty, indignities, and ‘the like. A resumption of cohabita-
tion operates as a condonation of prior eruelty.”

27A C.IS., Divorce, section 61e, page 210, states: “Volun-
tary cohabitation during the pendency of the divorce proceed-
ings ordinarily operates as a bar to divorce and condonation.”
Id., section 61d, page 212, adds: “If the parties occupy the
same room and bed, there is a strong presumption of marital
intercourse and a consequent condonation of the offense, al-
though this presumption may also be rebutted.”

VIII. Early in the pendency of the appeal appellant
filed herein application for alimony, support and suit money,
and attorney fees. Following hearing, appellee was ordered
to pay the cost of the reporter’s transcript of the testimony,
printing the record and appellant’s briefs and to pay $150 to
be applied on appellant’s attorney fees on this appeal. Our
order further provides final disposition of all the above matters
shall be made at the time the appeal is decided.

Appellant has made verified showing appellee has failed
to pay $71.25, cost of printing appellant’s reply brief, as our
order provides. Such cost is to be taxed to appellee. Other
printing costs have been paid by appellee in accordance with
our prior order and are not to be taxed. Any costs of the
appeal other than for printing are to be taxed to appellant.

Appellant’s counsel say a reasonable fee for their services
on this appeal is $1000, of which the $150 above referred to
has been paid.

HM (Notwithstanding .appellant does not obtain a re-
versal of the trial court’s decree, we think an allowance of
fees for her attorneys on this appeal, in addition to the $150
previously allowed, is proper. This is implicit from our holding
in Renze v. Renze, 247 Iowa 25, 31, 72 N.W.2d 490, 493. See
‘also Jackson v. Jackson, 248 Iowa 1365, 1876, 1877, 85 N.W.2d
590, 597; Andreesen v. Andreesen, 252 Iowa 1152, 1160, 1161,
110 N.W.2d 275, 280, and citations; Arnold v. Arnold, 258 Iowa
850, 859, 860, 140 N.W.2d 874, 880 (citing Renze -v. Renze,
supra, with apparent approval) ; 24 Am! Jur: 2d, Divoree and
Separation, section’ 592. .

a a 215

2TA C.J.S., Divorce, section 221h, pages 960, 961, states:
“Usually, the right to counsel fees on appeal does not depend
on the outcome of the appeal, so that the fact that the judg-
ment or order from which the wife appeals is affirmed on ap-
peal * * * does not preclude an allowance to the wife for coun-
sel fees and expenses of suit in prosecuting * * * the appeal.”

We think a total of $750 should be allowed appellant from
appellee as counsel fees on this appeal, on which there should
be credited the $150 previously allowed and paid, leaving a
balance of $600. Judgment shall be entered in the trial court
for such amount.

Except for the allowances herein made the decree is af-
firmed.—Modified, affirmed and remanded.

All Justices concur.

Gzorce GrorcE, appellant, v. Wittiam Gane, appellee.

No. 52543.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 76)

276 a

Novemprr 14, 1967,

Mahoney, Jordan. & Smith, of Boone, for appellant.

Cartwright, Druker, Ryden & Fagg, of Marshalltown, for
appellee. :

Sruarr, J.—The question presented is: Should plaintiff's
petition have been dismissed under R.C.P. 55 when the original
notice states the petition is now on file and it was not filed until
Monday following the service of notice on the preceding Satur-
day?

On Friday, July 29, 1966, plaintiff’s counsel in Boone mailed
a petition seeking damages for personal injury to the Clerk of

| | 277

the District Court in Boone. At the same time the original
notice was mailed to the Guthrie County Sheriff in Guthrie
Center for service on defendant. The notice recited that the
petition “is now on file” and was served on defendant Satur-
day, July 30, 1966. The petition was filed Monday, August 1,
1966.

On August 15 defendant filed a special appearance chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the court. It was amended August
22 to include a claim he was entitled to dismissal under R.C.P.
55 which provides:

“Tf the petition is not filed as stated in the original notice
served, any defendant may have the case dismissed as to him,
without notice, at plaintiff’s cost; and may docket it for this
purpose by filing his copy of the original notice, if need be.”

After hearing in which it was agreed the Office of the
Clerk of the District Court was open on Saturday, July 30, 1966,
the trial court sustained the special appearance. Plaintiff has
appealed. We affirm.

I. Plaintiff claims the petition was timely filed under
a liberal construction of R.C.P. 55 in view of section 4.1,
paragraph 23, 1966 Code of Iowa, which, in its pertinent parts,
‘provides:

«* * * whenever by the provisions of any statute or rule
* ** the last day for the commencement of any action or pro-
ceedings, the filing of any pleading or motion in a pending
action * * * falls on a Saturday * * * the time therefor shall be
extended to include the next day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday * * * [or holiday] * * *.”

We cannot agree section 4.1, paragraph 28, applies to
R.C.P. 55. The rule does not set any date or time by which a
petition must be filed. Plaintiff set his own time in the original
notice. Such time is not prescribed by any statute or rule
applicable here. Plaintiff could have stated in the notice the
petition “will be on file August 1, 1966”. He chose the words
“is now on file”, The petition was not filed “as stated in the
original notice” and under the express provisions of R.C.P. 55,
defendant “may have the case dismissed”.

218° be 7

; | ‘TL. Failure to comply with R.C.P. 55 in no way prej-
udiced defendant,’ Plaintiff claims a showing of prejudice is
required. While the result seems harsh, we have consistently
held R.C.P. 55 and prior statutes mandatory. ‘Credit Industrial
Corporation v. Miller, 255 Iowa 1022, 125 N.W.2d 142; Read v.
Rousch, 189 Iowa 695, 7038, 179 N.W. 84 (petition one day late).

In Conley v. Dugan, 105 Iowa 205, 208, 74 N.W. 774, we
said: “Plaintiff then waited until so late a date that any slight
interruption of the mail service would prevent him from com-
plying with the terms of the notice, and sent the paper by mail
to the clerk. Such interruption occurred, and the petition was
not filed until after the date fixed in the notice. This default
entitled defendant to have the action dismissed.”

In Sioux County v. Kosters, 194 Iowa 1300, 18038, 191 N- W.
815, a default judgment, entered when defendant failed to
appear, was set aside because petition was filed seven days late.
We said:

Hi “The function of an original notice is to bring the
defendant into court to answer to a petition duly filed and in
this particular the language of Section 3515 [now R.C.P. 55]
is imperative and mandatory. Edwards Loan Co. v. Skinner,
127 Iowa 112; Rotch v. Humboldt College, 89 Iowa 480. If the
defendant desires to waive a failure of compliance on the part
of plaintiff, it is his privilege to do so; but unless he volun-
tarily appears and waives defects it is his right to insist upon
the observance of the statute. State v. Knapp, 178 Iowa 25.
A special appearance is not a waiver. Moffitt v. Chicago
Chronicle Co., 107 Iowa 407; Read v. Rousch, 189 Iowa 695.

“A defendant has the right to rely upon the terms of the
notice which is served upon him, and if upon the date desig-
nated in the notice no petition is on file, he is not in default
forsooth he did not make inquiry in the office of the clerk
thereafter. The defendant has the right to demand a dismissal
of the action upon the failure of plaintiff to file the petition:
within the time named in the notice. ‘First Nat. Bank v. Stone,’
122 Iowa 558; Conley v. Dugan, 105 Iowa 205. In the event
that a judgment by default is entered under such, circumstances
it is the right of the defendant to directly attack the judgment

| [| 279

-as a voidable judgment, and it is the duty of the court to order
“it set aside and vacated.”

Hl Ill Plaintiff claims failure to file the petition as
stated in the original notice is not a jurisdictional defect and
defendant by raising the issue in an amendment to his special
appearance waived his rights under R.C.P. 55. He also claims
defendant elected to raise only jurisdictional matters when the
special appearance was filed and he should be bound by that
election.

The contention failure to file a petition at or before the
time stated in the notice is not a jurisdictional defect is cor-
reet under Credit Industrial Corp. v. Miller, 255 Iowa 1022,
1027, 125 N.W.2d 142. It is also true: “Under our statute, a
defendant may make a special appearance to an action against
him, for the sole purpose of attacking the jurisdiction of the
court.” Read vy. Rousch, 189 Iowa 695, 699, 179 N.W. 84.

Defendant’s original special appearance challenged the
jurisdiction only. His amendment set forth the facts surround-
ing the filing of the petition and stated “jurisdiction of this
defendant was not obtained; and moreover, defendant is en-
titled to the dismissal of this cause under R.C.P. 55.

“Wherefore, defendant prays as in his original Special
Appearance; and further that the court dismiss this cause pur-
suant to R.C.P. 55.”

[| Therefore, the “special appearance” as amended raised
matters which did not go to the jurisdiction of the court. This
does not mean, however, that the inclusion of nonjurisdictional
matter in the “special appearance” brings the result suggested
by plaintiff. They are not to be disregarded or waived. If a
paper designated a “special appearance” “pleads matter which,
in fairness, must be deemed purely defensive, or as calling for
the exercise of the court’s judicial authority to pass upon any
question except its own jurisdiction, then the fact that the
paper is entitled a ‘Special Appearance’, instead of an answer
or other pleading, is immaterial, and ordinarily the appearance
will be treated as general.” Read v. Rousch, supra, loc. cit.
699. Raley v. Terrill, 253 Iowa 761, 765, 118 N.W.2d 734; In re
Estate of Ferris, 234 Iowa 960, 971, 14 N.W.2d 889.

280 Le a

The holding in Credit Industrial Corporation v. Miller,
supra, that a dismissal under R.C.P. 55 is on the merits rather
than jurisdictional is material here only as it makes the special
appearance in fact a general appearance. Here the statute of
limitations had run and defendant did not rely on res judicata
ag a defense to a second action, but asked for dismissal under
the rule.

Rule 55 was before the court and the sustaining of the
special appearance had the same effect as an order sustaining a
motion to dismiss.

IV. Plaintiff urges us to apply the rule of liberal con-
struction we have adopted relating to deficiencies in an original
notice to the requirements of R.C.P. 55 “to avoid defeating
action because of technical and formal defects which could not
reasonably have misled defendant.” Jacobson v. Leap, 249
Iowa 1036, 1040, 88 N.W.2d 919; Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa
772, 179, 48 N.W.2d 266; First National Bank v. Stone, 122
Towa 558, 560, 98 N.W. 362.

We have examined R.C.P. 55 with a sympathetic eye be-
cause the result seems harsh. .However, the rule is so clear we
can find no reasonable grounds upon which we can depart from
the construction given it in the cases cited above holding it to
be mandatory. .

For the reasons stated, we hold the trial court was cor-
rect in its ruling —Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except Larson and Brcxer, JJ., who
dissent,

Larson, J.—I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that
a failure to have a petition on file at the time stated in the
original notice is sufficient cause to require a dismissal, on the
merits, of his action under rule 55 of the Iowa Rules of Civil
Procedure. I do not agree.

This troublesome question is not one of recent origin. The
problem arose in the Code of 1851, section 1716, the predecessor
of rule 55, which provided: “If the petition is not filed by the
time thus fixed, or if not filed ten days before the first day of
the next term, the action will be deemed discontinued, unless
good cause be shown for the failure.” Under this Code a party

— as 281

was allowed to show good cause why his petition was not
timely, and, if the court found good cause existed, his action
would not be dismissed. McCaffree v. Guesford, 1 (Cole) Iowa
80; Cheever v. Lane, 3 (Cole) Iowa 296; Sweet v. Porter, 12
(Cole) Iowa 387.

Apparently, due to court holdings that this section related.
to jurisdiction, the 1860 revision, section 2818, the good cause
portion of the corresponding section of the Code of 1851 was
deleted as unnecessary. The provision then read as follows:
“Tf the petition is not filed by the date thus fixed, and ten days
before the term, the action will be deemed discontinued.”
Being then considered only a jurisdictional matter, this good
cause phrase was never restored in the statute or in its suc-
cessor, rule 55, R. C. P.

The case of Hudson v. Blanfus, 22 lowa 323, was the first
case that dealt with this particular problem under the deleted.
language. In that case the petition was not timely filed as
required by the statute. The court there discussed the dp-
plicable provisions of the 1860 Code and noted that, since the
legislature deleted “unless good cause be shown for the failure”,
it had intended that the action be discontinued whether good
cause was shown or not. However, the court stated that if a
party did not timely file -his petition, he may again begin his
action without prejudice from the discontinuance of the first
action. The dismissal in Blanfus was based on jurisdictional
grounds for noncompliance with provisions stated in the
original notice. Even if the dismissal was without prejudice,
the only remaining problem was that of thé Statute of Limita-
tions. This has been the constant interpretation of the rule
until the recent case of Credit Industrial Corp. v. Miller, 255
Iowa 1022, 125 N.W.2d 142. Although we have indicated no
sympathy for a late or negligent filing by plaintiff, the court in
Blanfus foresaw the problem under rule 55 and tried to avoid
a final determination by stating that if good cause could be
shown why the petition was not on file and the plaintiff was
not negligent in its prosecution, the second action would. be
deemed a continuation of the first. It cited section 2749 of the
Code of 1860 for this authority, which is a predecessor of
section 614.10 of the Code of 1966.

282 Le 7

Examination of the later cases of Cibula v. Pitt’s Sons’
Manufacturing Co., 48 Iowa 528; Brown v. Mallory, 26 Iowa
469; Hildreth v. Harney, 62 Iowa 420, 17 N.W. 584; Conley v.
Dugan, 105 Iowa 205, 74 N.W. 774; Paddleford v. Cook, 74
Iowa 483, 38 N.W. 187; Read v. Rousch, 189 Iowa 695, 179
N.W. 84; Sioux County v. Kosters, 194 Iowa 1800, 191 N.W.
815; and Morgan v. Small, 33 Iowa 118, indicates no rejection
of the rationale in Blanfus. The majority believes Conley v.
Dugan and Read v. Rousch, both supra, stand for the proposi-
tion that R. C. P. 55 and its predecessors require a mandatory
dismissal. I do not so read them. In Conley v. Dugan, supra,
plaintiff failed to mail his petition until just before the date
stated on the original notice. When a delay in the mails caused
it to be filed two days after the date stated on the original
notice, the court sustained defendant’s motion under section
2600 of the Code of 1878, now R. C. P. 55, but premised the
affirmance of this dismissal upon the negligence of the plain-
tiff in the prosecution of his action under section 2537 of the
Code of 1873, now 614.10 of the Code of 1966, and did not pass
on the question of whether section 2611 of the Code of 1878
was mandatory. The plaintiff attempted to get back into court
under section 2537, which in substance provides that if the
plaintiff fails in his action through any cause except negligence,
in its prosecution, a new suit, if brought within six months,
shall be deemed a continuation of the first. From this holding,
it would appear that notwithstanding the previous dismissal
under section 2600, except for plaintifi’s negligence he would
have been entitled to continue his action, and a dismissal on
the merits was not proper under section 2600.

In Read v. Rousch, supra, the plaintiff did not comply with
the time stated in the original notice and his petition was not
timely filed. The trial court sustained defendant’s motion to
dismiss under section 3515 of the Code Supplement of 1918,
another predecessor of R. C. P. 55. Even though the court said
that the defendant was entitled to have the action dismissed
under this section, it did not hold that a dismissal under this
section was mandatory upon the merits.

— a 288

The majority also cites Sioux County v. Kosters, supra,
wherein the court did state that the language of section 3515 of
the Code Supplement of 1913 “is imperative and mandatory.”
In any event, even though the language of R. C. P. 55 is con-
sidered mandatory, none of the cases cited by the majority, nor
other cases examined by me until the Credit Industrial Corp. case
in 1968, has held that the dismissal was upon the merits,

In considering rule 55, R. C. P., Alan Loth, in 29 Iowa Law
Review 35, 46, stated: “The dismissal for failure to file a
petition (Rule 55) probably is without prejudice; it is not for
failure to comply with any Rule, but only for noncompliance
with the original notice; and is in the nature of dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.”

Due to an unsupported statement in Credit Industrial
Corp. v. Miller, supra, it is necessary to reconsider the intent
and purpose of rule 55. That case appears to establish for the
first time that (1) a dismissal under rule 55 is not on juris-
dictional grounds but is a mandatory statutory right, and (2)
since the dismissal is not jurisdictional, it will be an adjudica-
tion upon the merits unless otherwise specified. In reaching its
determination as to (1) above, the court reasoned that since it
had been established by the cases that a dismissal under R. C. P.
55 was mandatory and granted by statute, it did not go to a
question of jurisdiction and thus was to be raised by general
appearance. The court, in reaching its conclusion as to (2)
above, reasoned that when R. C. P. 55 is read together with
R. C. P. 217, which states: “All dismissals not governed by rule
215 or not for want of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall
operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify
otherwise”, a dismissal on the merits is required. If that is
true, I believe that Credit Industrial should be overruled, but
I do not believe rule 217 does automatically operate as an
adjudication upon the merits. It states a dismissal shall
operate as an adjudication on the merits unless the dismissal
specifies otherwise. This clause clearly gives the court discre-
tion in matters such as the one in the case at bar to recognize
exceptions to this rule. I feel that failure to file a timely

284 es

petition not due to the negligence of the plaintiff was meant
and intended to be one of these exceptions.

“Section 684.18 of the Code of 1966 states: “The Supreme
court shall have the power to prescribe all rules of pleading,
practice and procedure, and the forms of process, writs and
notices, for all proceedings of a civil nature in all courts of this
state, for the purpose of simplifying the same, and of promoting
the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits.” (Em-
phasis added.) This admonishment should be observed.

All the Rules of Civil Procedure should be read with the
above in mind. The pertinent portion of rule 55 states: “If the
petition is not filed as stated in the original notice served, any
defendant may have the case dismissed as to him, without notice,
at plaintiff’s cost * * *.” (Emphasis added.) The history of
this rule amply points out that it was not intended to preclude
a plaintiff from recommencing his action if the statute of limita-
tions had not run when he originally commenced his action as
long as the plaintiff was not negligent in the prosecution of his
original action. The interpretation placed on this rule by the
majority, I feel, would not only be unduly harsh and unfair, but
would also tend to frustrate the purpose of these rules.

Apparently the majority feels the result reached under the
strict interpretation of this rule is wrong, but it seems to believe
the only way to correct it is by changing the rule to provide re-
instatement for good cause. I do not believe this is necessary or
just as to this litigant. I do not agree that the dismissal on the
merits under rule 217 is automatic and a necessary result. I
would hold a dismissal under rules 55 and 217 is without prej-
udice and the plaintiff is entitled to get back into court, provided
that he can comply with the provisions of 614.10 of the 1966 Code,

In any event, rule 55 should not result in dismissal of a
petition where failure to file the petition has been cured by
actual filing before defendant’s request for dismissal is brought
to the attention of the court.

There is a close analogy between this situation and defaults
for want of pleading. In fact, this is a dismissal for want of
filing a pleading. Where plaintiff seeks a default for want of
pleading, he comes too late if the motion or pleading has been

a [| 285

filed (thus curing the defect) before the default is entered.
Pedersen v. Thorn, 258 Iowa 250, 187 N.W.2d 588. See also
Thews v. Miller, 255 Towa 175, 121 N.W.2d 518. Such inter-
pretation would be entirely consistent with the previously-sug-
gested purposes of rule 55. The only possible prejudice to the
defendant from such an interpretation is the loss of an ad-
vantage that is inherently unfair and unjust where the omission
has been timely cured.

Broxgr, J., joins in this dissent.

Joun Gorvon, administrator of estate of Joan Gordon, deceased,
et al., minors, appellants, v. Marvin Donen, appellee.

No, 52661.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2a 146)

286 De

Novemper 14, 1967.

William F. Sueppel and Gary M. Veldey, both of Iowa City,
for appellants.

Remley & Heiserman, of Anamosa, for appellee.

LzGranp, J.—On November 15, 1966, John Gordon as ad-
ministrator filed a petition asking damages for the. wrongful
death of Joan Gordon, who died following an automobile ac-
cident on November 20, 1964. Other plaintiffs joined in the
suit against defendant for personal injuries arising out of this
accident. They will be jointly referred to herein as plaintiff.

This action challenges the sufficiency of the original notice
served on defendant because of its failure to comply with rule
50, Rules of Civil Procedure. The specifie defect claimed is
that the notice did not name the city or town where the
District Court of Dubuque County convenes. In all other re-
spects the notice was unobjectionable. Defendant filed a
special appearance attacking the jurisdiction of the court on
the ground that the original notice was void because of this
failure to designate the city or town, even though it did notify
defendant “to appear before said court at Dubuque County
courthouse in Dubuque County, Iowa.” Plaintiff appeals from
an order sustaining defendant’s special appearance.

a es 287

As is true in most cases reaching us under circumstances
such as exist here, plaintiff’s failure to comply with rule 50
would be unimportant except for the running of the statute of
limitations. If the notice were held to be fatally defective,
plaintiff would then serve a new original notice which com-
plied with rule 50. Here, however, it is obvious plaintiff’s
action is now barred unless we hold jurisdiction was conferred
by the original notice here under attack. Otherwise plaintiff
will be deprived of an opportunity to try this case upon its
merits. This is a result no court likes to reach. However, we
have said on a number of occasions and in many different ways
that we may not permit ourselves to be influenced by such
considerations. In Krebs v. Town of Manson, 256 Iowa 957,
963, 129 N.W.2d 744, 748, we acknowledged the cause of action
would be barred unless jurisdiction were sustained but said,
“We cannot, however, ignore a clear statutory requirement to
achieve what appears to be the best result in a particular case.
Such action almost always makes bad law.”

The same situation confronted us in Evans v. Ober, 256
Towa 708, 718, 129 N.W.2d 78, 80, where we said, “This is of
course unfortunate, but we must follow the law as prescribed
by rule 50 and applied in our previous decisions * * * the rules
are clear and may not be changed because of hardship or mis-
fortune.” And again in our recent case of Bice v. Incorporated
City of Urbandale, 258 Iowa 1013, 1015, 141 N.W.2d 639, 640,
we reiterated this position in this language, “Furthermore, the
terms and provisions of the subject rule [rule 50] are clear and
unmistakable and may not be changed or altered because of
hardship or misfortune which may at times result from its
application.”

HI Owr previous holdings have firmly established that the
provisions of rule 50 are mandatory ; that the rule has statutory
status; and that compliance with the rule is required in order
to obtain jurisdiction. It is the only method by which a plain-
tiff may compel a defendant to submit to the court for a bind-
ing adjudication of their differences. Summerlott v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 253 Iowa 121, 111 N.W.2d 251, 93 A.L.R.2d
871; Halverson v. Hageman, 249 Iowa 1881, 92 N.W.2d 569;

288 P|

Parkhurst v. White, 254 Iowa 477, 118 N.W.2d 47; Bice v. In-
eorporated City of Urbandale, supra.

HH it is true that not all departures from the literal
language of the rule have been held to be fatal. Appellant
reminds us that in Jacobson v. Leap, 249 Iowa 1036, 88 N.W.2d
919, as well as in State ex rel. Hanrahan v. Miller, 250 Iowa
1858, 96 N.W.2d 474, and Krueger v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 772, 48
N.W.2d 266, we found original notices to be valid even though
there was not a perfect compliance with rule 50. The distine-
tion we have made throughout our decisions is between a mere
irregularity in the original notice and a substantial defect
therein. This is explained in Parkhurst v. White, supra, where
we say that mere irregularities relating principally to the form
of the notice or to technical or clerical errors will not be fatal
to the jurisdiction of the court, but that a substantial departure
from the requirements of the rule will make the notice void.
This is true even though defendant has not been misled and no
prejudice exists.

The question we must answer then is whether the defect
in the case at-bar is a mere irregularity or a substantial de-
parture from the provisions of rule 50. In no case where juris-
diction has been upheld has there been a failure to name the
city or town where the court convened. We have invariably
held that such an omission is fatal to the notice. We consider
this case ruled by Summerlott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
Evans v. Ober and Bice v. Incorporated City of Urbandale, all
supra. Both the Summerlott case and the Evans case dis-
tinguish Jacobson v. Leap, supra, upon which plaintiff relies.

We are confronted here with a situation in which the ir-
regularity complained of appears, at first glance, to be incon-
sequential. We must agree with plaintiff that defendant was
not misled nor deceived in any way. Certainly no prejudice
resulted, but this argument was effectively answered in Bice
v. Incorporated City of Urbandale, supra, at page 1015 of 258
Iowa Reports.

HM Rules, especially those which fix jurisdictional matters,
are not mere technicalities to be observed or ignored as the
particular exigencies dictate. They are vital to the proper

a Le ; 289

conduct of court business. In this regard we repeat what we
said in Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199, 1208, 110 N.W.2d
241, 246:

“The so-called technicalities of the law are not always
what they seem. When they establish an orderly process of
procedure, they serve a definite purpose and are more than
technical; they have substance, in that they lay down definite
rules which are essential in court proceedings so that those
involved may know what may and may not be done, and con-
fusion, even chaos, may be avoided. They are necessary; with-
out them litigants would be adrift without rudder or compass.
We have, and should have, no compunction in following them
when they are clear and definite.”

HI Plaintiff argues, quite ingeniously, that rule 50 is com-
plied with because the word “Dubuque” appears several times
in the original notice. It never appears, however, as a designation
of the city or town where the court convenes, and the fact that
the word itself is used in another context does not satisfy the
rule. Plaintiff also urges us to exercise our editorial license by
placing several strategic commas in the notice, by which device
we could justify the conclusion that-at one place therein the
city of Dubuque was referred to. We find it impossible to
follow this suggestion without completely destroying the mean-
ing of the draftsman. If we are to hold that this is a valid
original notice, we should do so by overruling our previous
decisions to the contrary rather than by resorting to such
sophistry. .

[| We hold, as did the trial court, that the failure to
designate in the original notice the city or town in which the
court convenes is a substantial defect which renders the original
notice void. The order of the trial court sustaining this special
appearance is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Becker, J., who dissents.

290

Hatuerr Construction Company, a Minnesota corporation,
appellee, v. Iowa Starz Highway Commission, appellant.

No. 52622.
(Reported in 154 N,W.2d 71)

Novemper 14, 1967.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Roger H. Ivie, Special
Assistant Attorney General, L. Michael McGrane, Assistant At-
torney General, and Ray Hanrahan, of Des Moines, State
Counsel, for appellant.

J. R. Austin and Ross H. Sidney, of Des Moines, and
Thomas M. Collins, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Moors, J.—This appeal is a sequel to Hallett Construction
Co v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 258 Iowa 520, 139
N.W.2d 421, in which we reversed the trial court’s order setting
aside defaults against the commission in plaintiff’s three similar
law actions for damages for breaches of construction con-
tracts and warranties incident thereto. We ordered the de-
faults reinstated but set aside the default judgments to the
extent they were not for a sum certain.

On remand the trial court reinstated the defaults against
the commission and conducted further proceedings as directed
in our first opinion, .

292

The three actions were fried together to the court and
judgments entered thereafter in favor of plaintiff including
$326,016.77 for contract balances due plaintiff but retained by
defendant commission after completion and final acceptance of
plaintiff's work. This amount was not disputed in the trial
court and its allowance is not challenged here. The judgments
also include damages totaling $646,341.80 for loss caused by
defendant’s negligence and breaches of contract in failing to
properly coordinate work on highway 80 construction projects.
Plaintiff was delayed for over one year in starting performance
of its prime contract.

From judgments in the three cases totaling $972,358.58
plus interest and costs defendant has appealed. By agreement
of counsel and by our order the three cases have been con-
solidated on this appeal.

Defendant contends (1) because of certain provisions in
the specifications it had no liability over and above the con-
tract price regardless of any and all other facts and cireum-
stances and (2) the trial court erred in including as a proper
measure of damage the reasonable rental value of plaintiff's
equipment for loss of its use while sitting idle on the jobsites.

In our prior opinion we make a full statement of the
actions and the allegations of each petition which are essen-
tially similar. Plaintiff’s claims and allegations remain un-
changed. We will therefore not repeat all the details but will
attempt only to summarize.

The first petition filed by plaintiff asks for judgment of
$783,143.18. All three petitions contain essentially the same
allegations except for dates and amounts involved. We there-
fore will refer to the allegations of plaintiff’s first petition
which asks for the largest recovery.

That petition alleges plaintiff was required to and did
agree by letter to have a two paver spread with all necessary
equipment and personnel on the highway 80 project in Cedar
County on the contract date, July 1, 1959, and was ready, will-
ing and able to perform all necessary work for timely com-
pletion of the contracts but was delayed in starting the work
until July 1960 because preliminary preparation of the site for

LE

paving had not been completed. Defendant refused to allow
use of this equipment on a nearby project during this delay.

Plaintiff further alleges defendant warranted and rep-
resented to plaintiff the plans and specifications were com-
plete, accurate and sufficient to enable plaintiff to compute its
costs and that plaintiff would be able to commence work on or
about the contract date and proceed in an orderly fashion. It
alleges breach of contract and warranties incident thereto and
damages resulting therefrom.

That petition further alleges the fair and reasonable
amount of damages totaled $585,731.49 in addition to the re-
tained percentage due for work done in the sum of $197,411.69
and that defendant had acknowledged plaintiff had been
damaged and the amount being retained for work completed.
Itemization of plaintiff’s allegations of damages is set out in
our first opinion and need not be repeated. Plaintiff’s claims
for damages in the other two cases are essentially the same
type but for smaller amounts.

After the petitions were filed defendant, by its counsel at
that time, filed special appearances in each case which were
overruled September 4, 1964, Defendant failed to file anything
further. Attorneys for plaintiff by letter requested an answer
be filed. This was not done. On November 4, 1964, pursuant
to plaintiff’s request and under rules 230 and 281, Rules of
Civil Procedure, the district court clerk entered defaults
against defendant. Counsel’s failure to plead prior to entry of
the defaults is inexcusable.

Without any attempt to show a meritorious defense de-
fendant’s motions to have these defaults set aside necessarily
failed. We so held in our first opinion.

Defendant’s present counsel were thus placed at great
disadvantage at the hearing following remand. They were
permitted to make objections, cross-examine plaintiff's wit-
nesses on damages and to use witnesses in regard thereto.
Over plaintiff’s objections defendant introduced and put in
evidence the plans and specifications made by reference a
part of each of the construction contracts referred to in
plaintiff’s petitions.

20

I. Based on statutory provisions then in force our older
eases hold a party in default could only appear for the purpose
of cross-examining the witnesses of the adverse party. See
Cook & Owsley v. Walters, 4 (Clarke) Iowa 72; Carleton v.
Byington, 17 Iowa 579; Wright v. Lacy, 52 Iowa 248, 3 N.W.
47, In Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Co. v. Shaw, 5
(Clarke) Iowa 463, we hold a default admits the averment of
the cause of action in the petition, and that something is due
and payable.

Rayburn v. Maher, 227 Iowa 274, 285, 288 N.W. 136, 141,
states: “It is true, that when a defendant defaults, the plaintiff
becomes entitled to certain advantages. But such failure by
the defendant does not enlarge his claim nor broaden his rights
under the allegations of his petition. His right of recovery and
the amount and nature thereof is still limited by those aver-
ments. Though a defendant may default, he is still within the
pale of the law and is entitled to just treatment. He has a right
to expect and to demand that plaintiff’s recovery shall be con-
fined, and responsive, to his pleaded demand. The legislature
has assured him of that right, whether he answers or does not
answer, by section 11578, Code 1935.”

These special statutes were repealed upon enactment of
our Rules of Civil Procedure which became effective July 4,
1943.

Rule 102, R.C.P., provides: “Every fact pleaded and not
denied in a subsequent pleading as permitted by these rules
shall be deemed admitted except (1) allegations of value or
amount of damages, * * *.”

Rule 103 provides every defense in plea or abatement shall
be made in the answer or reply with certain exceptions therein
stated which are not pertinent here.

Hn Our earlier cases and our present rules place us
within the general rule that in an inquiry of damages upon
default, all the plaintiff’s material allegations are taken as
true and the determination of the amount of damages to be
awarded is all that remains to be done. In the trial of the
question of damages the defaulting defendant has the right to
be heard and participate. He may cross-examine witnesses

Ee

and may offer proof in mitigation of damages. Defendant may
in effect even defeat the action by showing that no damages
were caused to plaintiff by the matters alleged. 30A Am. Jur.,
Judgments, section 219; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, section 201.

HN The rule is stated thus in 25A C.J.S., Damages, section
172, page 183: “On the hearing of an assessment of damages
after default, defendant may make no defense to the action,
but he has a right to be heard on the matter of damages, and
he may contest the amount.”

HI IL. Defendant argues because plaintiff's petition al-
leges the plans and specifications for each of the projects
covered by the contracts sued on were submitted to plaintiff
and were made a part thereof by reference that they were part
of plaintiff’s petition. Our study of the petition leads us to
agree with this contention.

From this point defendant contends the specifications limit
plaintiff’s recovery to the amount of each contract. We do
not agree.

Specification 1102.03 provides: “Examination of plans,
specifications, special provisions and site of work. It is the
responsibility of the bidder to examine the plans, specifications,
special provisions and the site of the work to make sure that
the requirements are fully understood. Bidders must satisfy
themselves as to the nature of the work and all conditions
affecting the performance of the contract.”

Specification 1109.02 provides: “Scope of payment. The
contractor shall accept the compensation herein provided as
full payment for furnishing all materials, labor, tools and
equipment and for performing all work under the contract;
also for all cost arising from the action of the elements, or from
any unforeseen difficulties which may be encountered during
the prosecution of the work and up to the time of the accep-
tance thereof, except damages to the work due to the acts
of war.”

As we understand defendant’s position, it claims these two
provisions amount to a “no damage” clause and although in
default they should be permitted to defeat allowance of any
amount above the contract price.

296

Plaintiff denies this amounts to a “no damage” clause. It
argues defendant under the guise of attempting to contest the
amount of damages is asserting an unpleaded bar or defense of
its claim and further the default admits the allegations of its
petition that warranties were made, breached and plaintiff
suffered damages as a result thereof. We agree.

In Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. City of Waterloo, 254
Towa 659, 117 N.W.2d 46, we recognize a specific “no damage”
clause in a construction contract for delays is valid, but due to
the harsh results often induced thereby it will be strictly con-
strued.

HM Even a specific “no damage” clause in a construction
contract will not be enforced where the delay is the result of
fraud or active interference upon the part of the party seeking
the benefit thereof. Cunningham Bros,, Ince. v. City of Water-
loo, supra; 13 Am.Jur.2d, Building, Etc. Contracts, section 52;
Annotation, 10 A.L.R.2d 801.

If defendant wanted to rely on the above cited provisions
of the specifications, which seem to amount to much less than
a specific “no damage” clause, they should have before the de-
faults in 1964 pleaded and asserted the same as a bar to plain-
tiff’s recovery. Plaintiff then would have been given an op-
portunity to plead and defend against such an alleged defense.
The recovery allowed by the trial court in each of the three
eases is well within the averments of the petitions each of
which state a cause of action.

| | Il. Defendant’s second assignment as set out in its
brief and as argued on this appeal is the trial court erred in
allowing as part of plaintiff’s damages the rental value of
equipment owned by plaintiff while sitting idle on the jobsites.

More than two years before trial plaintiff at defendant’s
request furnished a written detailed statement of plaintiff's
various items claimed as damages. The proof on trial was sub-
mitted to the trial court exactly as earlier indicated to defend-
ant. The only item or measure of damage which defendant
contested was allowance of the reasonable rental value of the
idle equipment.

Charles Davis, assistant secretary and employee of plain-

SS 2

tiff since 1956, after relating his experience with the company
as a superintendent and estimator of highway paving jobs,
testified in detail concerning each item of plaintifi’s claim for
damages. He stated reasonable rental on the various pieces of
equipment was computed by taking the monthly rental rate
from the American Equipment Dealers Publication of 1959 and
for some not listed therein the 1956 publication was used. He
stated defendant-commission had recognized and used these
publications for the purpose of determining rental value of the
type of equipment involved. As to a few items not in the
A.E.D. publication he testified the reasonable rental value was
determined by taking an amount equal to ten percent of the
total cost of the equipment per month. This he said was the
recognized method of determining rental value of such items.
He estimated reasonable monthly rental value of trucks based
on the rate shown by the Iowa State Highway Commission
Bulletins.

Davis testified he then multiplied the monthly rental of
each unit of equipment sitting idle on the job by 7.3 months.
This was the period the equipment could have been actually
used during the year.

W. W. Wickman, a construction engineer for defendant-
commission for many years, was called as a witness by de-
fendant. His testimony includes: “According to our instrue-
tions and the organization instructions of the Iowa State High-
way Commission, which has been agreed to with the A.G.C.,
we use 80 percent of the A.E.D. rate.”

Otherwise plaintiff’s claim for damages was not attacked
by defendant except its contention rental value was not the
proper measure of damages. Defendant argues loss of profit
was the proper measure. We do not agree. The authorities
are overwhelmingly against defendant’s contentions.

Hl In 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section 152, page 220, the
editor states: “Generally, damages are awarded for inter-
ference—either tortiously or in breach of contract—with the
plaintiff’s right to use the property item. These damages are
usually measured by the rental value’ of the item involved or
by the reasonable cost of hiring a replacement item, although

293

other measures are found in the cases.” For similar state-
ments see also 25 C.J.S., Damages, section 88¢.

In Corbin on Contracts, Volume 5, section 1094, pages 518,
514, this statement is made: “The building contractor’s claim
for damages may be based in part on losses due to the owner’s
causing unreasonable delay in completion. The contractor’s
machinery and labor force may have been kept idle, when but
for the delay they would have been income producing. In such
a case these losses must be estimated. It is proper to admit
expert testimony as to the rental value of machinery, the extra
amounts paid to hold the labor force together, and also a
reasonable proportion of overhead costs fairly chargeable to
this job during the delay.”

In Knaus Truck L. v. Commercial Fret. L., 238 Iowa 1856,
29 N.W.2d 204, we considered the question of the proper
measure for the loss of the use of a tractor-trailer which had
been damaged and which the evidence showed had a recognized
rental value. We held evidence of rental value was proper
and evidence as to profits from use of the equipment was
rightly rejected.

The facts in Garofano Constr. Co. v. State, 183 Misc. 1080,
52 N.Y.S.2d 186, are almost on all fours with those in the case
at bar. At page 1083, 183 Misc., page 188, 52 N.Y.S.2d, the
court states: “It is well established that the State is liable in
damages for its failure to deliver a contract site and provide a
contractor with reasonable opportunity to perform his contract
without interference [citing authorities] and that a contractor
may recover for the fair and reasonable rental value of ma-
chinery held on the site during period of delay.”

Another case with similar facts, Anders v. State, 42 Mise.2d
276, 248 N.Y.S.2d 4, holds the rental value of idle equipment is
a proper element of damages.

IV. The findings of fact in this law action tried to the
court are supported by substantial evidence and are therefore
binding on this court. Rule 344(f) (1), R.C:P.

‘We are well aware of the shocking consequence of defend-
ant-commission’s acts and omissions during 1959-60 and the
fact they result in a needless loss of taxpayers’ money of over

Pe EE 299

three quarters of a million dollars. The damage award of
$646,341.80 bears interest at five percent from September 1961.

Plaintiff in effect had its property appropriated and held
by the highway commission for over a year. Its request to
move some of the equipment to a nearby site where it could be
used and delay damages mitigated was refused by defendant.

The three judgments of the trial court must be and are
affirmed.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur,

V. B. Hamuron, appellant, v. Lyi Wosupxa et al., appellees.

No. 52430.
(Reported in 154 N.W.24 164)

300

Novemmmn 14, 1967

Linnan, Lynch & Straub, of Algona, for appellant.
Hobson, Cady & Drew, of Hampton, for appellees.

Mason, J.—This law action tried to the court arose out of
the purchase of plaintiff Hamilton’s stock in two related com-
panies, Farmers Hybrid Seed Corn Company and Farmers Hy-
brid Hogs, both of Hampton by defendants Wosepka, Pronk
and Chandler. Both companies had the same stock ownership,
directors and officers, On a former appeal we held plaintiff's
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Hamilton
v. Wosepka, 255 Iowa 910, 124 N.W.2d 512.

PS PC 301

Plaintiff Hamilton now seeks to recover from the three
defendants personally additional salary allegedly due under a
written contract dated May 20, 1959. He appeals from dis-
missal of his petition.

Plaintiff had been in the employ of the original company
since August 1, 1944, and president, director and stockholder
in both companies since April 1954 at an annual salary of
$15,000. He had acquired 780 shares of stock in each company.
As of May 20, 1959, Wosepka was in the employ of the com-
panies as secretary and assistant in sales at a salary of $7000;
Pronk was vice-president and sales manager at a salary of
$10,000; and Chandler was assistant treasurer and manager of
sales department at a salary of $10,000.

At this time there were 4177 shares of stock outstanding in
each company. 2455 of these were owned by Mr. and Mrs.
Methfessel.

Defendants were seeking to gain control of the companies
and were negotiating with the Methfessels for the purchase of
their stock. They apparently were desirous of obtaining an
option to purchase plaintiff’s stock until they could make
certain they would be able to acquire the Methfessel stock
and thus the control of both companies.

On April 20, 1959, plaintiff gave defendants a 30-day
written option to purchase 730 of his shares in each company
for $65,000 on certain stated terms and conditions. Defendants
gave written notice of their intention to exercise the option
and on May 20 entered into the written contract for the pur-
chase of plaintiff's stock.

By June 19 defendants had acquired control of both com-
panies and on that date by action of the board of directors of
the two companies Wosepka’s salary was increased from $7000
to $15,000 per year, the salaries of Pronk and Chandler were
each increased from $10,000 to $15,000 effective July 1. These
salaries remained at $15,000 until November 1, 1962. Plaintiff’s
salary was not increased by the companies and he remained
in the employ of the companies as president at the same salary
of $15,000 until September 1, 1962. At that time defendants
paid the balance due on the purchase price of plaintiff’s stock,

302 Le Ve

the stock was transferred and the sale completed. Plaintiff
was compensated at the annual rate of $15,000 until November
1, 1962, when his services were terminated. Defendants had
exercised their option to purchase plaintiff’s remaining 50
shares in each company under the terms of the contract which
expressly provided that if plaintiff’s employment be terminated
defendants were to have the right to purchase his stock at
book value.

Plaintiff then brought this action to recover from de-
fendants personally the sum of $33,333.88, the amount of ad-
ditional salary he asserts defendants had agreed to pay him
under the terms of the contract. The only matter in dispute
is whether plaintiff is entitled to the amount demanded in his
petition as additional compensation.

In deciding the question it must be determined what the
parties meant by what they said in this basic provision con-
tained in paragraph 4 of the agreement:

“The Party of the First Part shall remain a member of
the Board of Directors and President of the above named com-
panies at a guaranteed salary of $15,000.00 per year, said salary
to be increased or decreased in proportion to the increase or de-
crease of the salary or salaries of Lyle Wosepka, Nick Pronk and
Wilbur Chandler, and said employment shall continue at least
as long as any of the indebtedness for the purchase price of
said stock exists.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Defendants admitted the execution of the contract, but
contended it was ambiguous, entered into by mutual mistake
and asserted there was an oral understanding the salaries of
the three defendants were to be all fixed at $15,000, the same
as plaintiff’s and that the provision of the written contract as
to increase of salary was to become effective only after their
salaries had been equalized with plaintiff’s and asked for ref-
ormation, but did not ask that the action be transferred to
equity for equitable relief. Defendants also pleaded waiver
and estoppel.

Evidence was offered by defendants, all over plaintiff's
objection that it was in violation of the parol-evidence rule,

P| — 303

of the negotiations leading up to the execution of the May 20
contract.

Plaintiff contends paragraph 4, set out supra, has but one
unambiguous meaning. He argues the contract, after expressly
providing that plaintiff shall remain in the employ of the com-
panies at an annual salary of $15,000, plainly states “said salary
to be increased or decreased in proportion to the increase or
decrease of the salary or salaries of Lyle Wosepka, Nick Pronk
and Wilbur Chandler”; since their salaries were all raised to
$15,000, plaintiff was entitled to a proportionate increase at
the same time and a personal judgment against defendants for
the amount thereof.

The trial court was not convinced the paragraph has but
one meaning, first because it purports to give plaintiff a “guar-
anteed salary of $15,000 per year;” then in the same sentence
provision is made that such salary may be “increased or de-
ereased.” In addition the contract says, “in proportion to the
increase or decrease of the salary or salaries” of defendants,
and the word “proportion” has many definitions.

The court concluded that under these circumstances the
actual intent of the parties must be determined from the situa-
tion of the parties and the objects they were trying to accom-
plish, that oral evidence was admissible and to be regarded
as relevant in interpreting the writing. Further, the practical
construction placed on the contract by the conduct of the
parties was entitled to great weight. As stated, plaintiff’s
petition was dismissed. No question of reformation or mis-
take is now involved,

Plaintifi’s appeal assigns 11 errors relied upon for reversal.
They all present his contention that the court erred in admit-
ting extrinsic evidence for the purpose of aiding in the inter-
pretation of the written contract.

Hl I. This law action is not reviewable de novo here but
only on errors assigned. The court’s findings of fact have the
effect of a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence to sup-
port them, rule 344(f)(1), Rules of Civil Procedure, unless in
arriving at them the court erred in its rulings on evidence or
in other respects upon questions of law. Ferris v. Employers

304 Le 7

Mutual Cas. Co., 255 Iowa 511, 514, 515,122 N.W.2d 263, 265.
We may also find error if the trial court applied erroneous
rules of law which materially affected the decision. France
v. Benter, 256 Iowa 584, 536, 128 N.W.2d 268, 270.

| | ‘We will not weigh the evidence or the credibility of
the witnesses. Rule 344(f)(1), R.C.P. Further, the evidence
will be construed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. McCune v. Muenich, 255 Iowa 755, 757, 124 N.W.2d
130, 131.

II. Before the execution of the April 20 option plaintiff
and defendants had four meetings at which they discussed the
purchase of plaintiff's stock. The first of these meetings took
place on the preceding Friday in a cafe and was then trans-
ferred to the office of defendants’ attorney. A later meeting
was held at Chandler’s home Friday evening. The fourth, at
which attorneys for both parties were present, took place Sat-
urday evening. The option was prepared the following Monday.

Each defendant was permitted to testify in regard to con-
versations, negotiations and transactions leading up to the
purchase of plaintiff’s stock over timely objection by plaintiff
that it was in violation of the parol-evidence rule.

In substance defendants testified that at the first meeting
on Friday they told plaintiff they would like to purchase 730
shares of his stock and were willing to pay a fair price for it;
they wanted plaintiff to remain with the companies as presi-
dent. They contend plaintiff was told, if the transaction went
through, defendants would have to have their salaries raised
to the point where his was in order to meet the obligations that
they were picking up by reason of their purchasing his and
Methfessels’ stock; the matter of when the scale would be ef-
fective was discussed due to the fact at that point defendants
were not in the position to effect this change immediately and
would not be until they came into control of the company;
that it was stated the salaries of plaintiff and defendants would
all be the same; that plaintiff raised the question about sub-
sequent increases or decreases in salary and was told that
raises or decreases would be the same for everyone. All of this

a Le 305

was assuming that all transactions were completed so that the
stock transfers were made as defendants hoped.

Plaintiff testified:

“Tt is my testimony that preceding the signing of the writ-
ten option, the matter of my salary and payment and raises
were discussed, but not the salaries of the three defendants.
In the negotiations for the sale of my stock, the security for
the payment to me was discussed. The matter of their salaries
and increases in salaries never came up only as they were
written in the contract.”

Plaintiff’s attorney during these negotiations also testified
as to his recollection of the conversations and transactions
during the various meetings. As a result of his and plaintiff’s
testimony there was a sharp conflict in the evidence.

HI It was the function of the trial court to ascertain the
true intent and meaning of the parties to the contract as re-
vealed by the language used there; “#* * * ‘not by showing
that the parties meant something other than what they said,
but by showing what they meant by what they said.’” Cen-
tral Heights Imp. Co. v. Memorial Parks, Inc., 40 Cal. App.2d
591, 608, 105 P.2d 596, 605, and citations. It is not what the
parties meant to say but what they meant by what they did
say. Bankers Trust Co. v. Allen, 257 Iowa 938, 944, 185 N.W.
2d 607, 610, 611.

After having considered the extrinsic evidence of the
antecedent negotiations leading up to the execution of the
option and contract the trial court found the parties meant by
what they said in paragraph 4 of the contract that defendants’
salaries would be raised because of the personal obligations
being assumed by them if the entire transaction went through
(the purchase of plaintiff’s, the Methfessels’ and Dean Ander-
son’s stock) ; July 1 was fixed as the effective date of the salary
adjustment if the Methfessel negotiations were successful; the
salaries of all four would be $15,000 annually and if any of
the salaries were changed, all would be changed; and that
plaintiff after conferring with his counsel announced at the
meeting held on Saturday evening agreement with the proposal
for the terms of the option.

306 a 7

Hl This is not a case where the oral testimony is received
for the purpose of varying the terms of a written instrument.
This is a case where such oral testimony was received for the
purpose of interpreting it.

We believe the fact Pronk and Chandler were each receiv-
ing $10,000 and Wosepka $7000 anuually on the execution of
the option and contract makes the emphasized portion of para-
graph 4, supra, susceptible to more than one meaning. Was
the increase or decrease to be proportionately in amount or
percentage? Was it to be based on an average of the increase
or decrease of all three defendants?

Plaintiff seems to recognize the doubt as to what was
meant and that there are different methods of interpreting the
emphasized phrase for in his own testimony he explains how
he arrived at the amount claimed in the petition. He says,
“T do it by percentage. *** I added them together and took
the percentage of increase. * * * We could have taken the
lower one or average; and we thought it was fair to add them
together. I was going by the contract. In my interpretation
it is percentage. You could take the lowest one or the highest
one.” He further testified that “if Wosepka’s salary had been
reduced to $1000 a year I don’t know what would have hap-
pened to my salary.” If such a thing had happened, under
one clause of paragraph 4 plaintiff’s salary would have been
decreased in some percentage and by some portion in direct
contradiction to his “guaranteed salary of $15,000.” Can a
guaranteed salary be decreased?

The court did not err in ruling on plaintiff’s objections.
This extrinsic evidence, confined as it was to the purpose of
interpretation, was relevant and admissible.

Hl IU. Extrinsic evidence that throws light on the sit-
uation of the parties, the antecedent negotiations, the attendant
circumstances and the objects they were thereby striving to
attain is necessarily to be regarded as relevant to ascertain the
actual significance and proper legal meaning of the agreement.

Professor Corbin in the preface to Volume 3 of his work
on contracts says:

“The purpose of interpretation as justice requires is always

a ee 07

the discovery of actual intention :—the intentions of both par-
ties if they are the same,—the actual intention of one party if
the other knew or had reason to know what it was—but ab-
solutely never to give effect to a meaning of words that neither
party in fact gave them, however many other people might
have given them that meaning.”

4 Williston on Contracts, Third Hd. (by Jaeger), section
602 states:

“The word ‘interpretation’ is used with respect to language
itself; * * *

oe ee

«* * * [Tt] is properly the process of applying the ordi-
nary legal standard to the words or symbols used in order to
determine their meaning or sense and rules of interpretation
are adopted for this purpose.”

“By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas
that language induces in other persons.” 8 Corbin on Con-
tracts, section 534, quoted in Morris Plan Leasing Co. v. Bing-
ham Feed and Grain Oo., 259 Iowa 404, 415, 143 N.W.2d 404,
412,

“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it
is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used.” 4 Williston on Contracts, Third Ed., section
609, quoting Justice Holmes, in Towne v. Bisner, 245 U.S. 418,
425, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159, 62 L. Ed. 872, 376, L.R.A. 1918D 254,
258,

“To say dogmatically that we “know what a word means”
im advance of its utterance is nonsense. All we can know in
advance is approximately what it will mean. After the utterance,
we interpret what has been said in the light of both verbal
and physical contexts, and act according to our interpretation
***? (Emphasis not added). 4 Williston on Contracts, Third
Ed., section 609, quoting from Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Hercules Powder Company, 3 Cir., 224 F.2d 293, 296.”
Rasch Construction Co. v. City of Bloomfield, 261 Iowa 544,
158 N.W.2d 718,

It is sometimes said that if the words of a contract are

308 a

plain and clear, evidence of surrounding circumstances to aid
interpretation is not admissible. “It is true that when a judge
reads the words of a contract he may jump to the instant and
confident opinion that they have but one reasonable meaning
and that he knows what it is. A greater familiarity with
dictionaries and the usages of words, a better understanding
of the uncertainties of language, and a comparative study of
more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one beware
of holding such an opinion so recklessly arrived at.” 3 Corbin
on Contracts, section 585.

“A word is but a symbol which may stand for one of an
innumerable number of objects.” 2 Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction, Third Ed. (by Horack), section 4502.

HH “No parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary
or contradict a writing until by process of interpretation it is
determined what the writing means. The ‘parol evidence rule’
is not, and does not purport to be, a rule of interpretation or
a rule as to the admission of evidence for the purpose of inter-
pretation. Even if a written document has been assented to
as the complete and accurate integration of the terms of a
contract, it must still be interpreted; and all those factors that
are of assistance in this process may be proved by oral testi-
mony.

“Tt is true that the language of some agreements has been
believed to be so plain and clear that the court needs no as-
sistance in interpreting. Even in these cases, however, it will
be found that the court has had the aid of parol evidence of the
surrounding circumstances. The meaning to be discovered and
applied is that which each party had reason to know would be
given to the words by the other party. Antecedent and sur-
rounding factors that throw light upon this question may be
proved by any kind of relevant evidence.

«® * * Such testimony does not vary or contradict the
written words; it determines that which cannot be varied or
contradicted. ***.” 3 Corbin on Contracts, section 579.

In support of the text Corbin quotes extensively from
Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d
652, not only in section 579, supra, but in several other sections,

| Le 309

The case involved the interpretation of a general release plead-
ed as a separate defense in an action for conversion of an air-
plane and for value of its use. Because of the importance given
this case by Professor Corbin, we feel justified in quoting ex-
tensively therefrom commeneing at page 656 of 96 A.2d:

“Evidence of the circumstances is always admissible in
aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. This
is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.
The polestar of construction is the intention of the parties to
the contract as revealed by the language used, taken as an
entirety; and, in the quest for the intention, the situation of
the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the objects they
were thereby striving to attain are necessarily to be regarded.
The admission of evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the pur-
pose of changing the writing, but to secure light by which to
measure its actual significance. Such evidence is adducible
only for the purpose of interpreting the writing—not for the
purpose of modifying or enlarging or curtailing its terms, but
to aid in determining the meaning of what has been said. So
far as the evidence tends to show, not the meaning of the writ-
ing, but an intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, it is
irrelevant. The judicial interpretive function is to consider
what was written in the context of the circumstances under
which it was written, and accord to the language a rational
meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose. Cas-
viel v. King, 2 N.J. 45, 65 A.2d 514, 517 (1949).

“The ‘parol evidence rule’ is a rule of substantive law
not related to interpretation or the admission of evidence for
the purpose of interpretation. Oral testimony of facts relevant
to meaning are not within that principle. Parol evidence can-
not be said ‘to vary or contradict a writing until by process of
interpretation it is determined what the writing means. * * *
Such testimony does not vary or contradict the written words;
it determines that which cannot be varied or contradicted.’
Corbin on Contracts, section 579. The ‘parol evidence rule’
purports to exclude testimony ‘only when it is offered for the
purpose of “varying or contradicting” the terms of an “inte-
grated” contract; it does not purport to exclude evidence of-

310 Le 7

fered for the purpose of interpreting and giving a meaning to
those terms. The terms of any contract must be given a mean-
ing by interpretation before it can be determined whether an
attempt is being made to “vary or contradict” them.’ Ibid.
sections 536, 543.

«* * * the antecedent negotiations and attendant circum-
stances may be shown by parol to make plain’ the meaning
of the written words. Language is only too often an imperfect
and uncertain means of communicating ideas and concepts.
Professor Corbin says that rarely in a litigated case do the
words of a contract convey ‘one identical meaning to the two
contracting parties or to third persons.’ Corbin on Contracts,
sections 536, 560. Litigation proceeding from the poverty of
language is constant.”

At page 657 of 96 A.2d, the court adopts the treatise of
Wigmore regarding parol evidence in contract law:

“Whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied
by the writing depends wholly upon the intent of the parties;
but the intent must be judged by an external standard. The
writing is not ‘wholly and intrinsically self-determinative of
the parties’ intent to make it the sole memorial’ of the subject
of negotiation; this intent ‘must be sought where always intent
must be sought, namely, in the conduct and language of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances. The document
alone will not suffice. What it was intended to cover cannot
be known till we know what there was to cover. The question
being whether certain subjects of negotiation were intended
to be covered, we must compare the writing and the negotia-
tions before we can determine whether they were in fact cover-
ed.’ 9 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., sections 2418, 2480,
2431.” Cited with approval in United States v. Park Side
Court, Inc., (N.J.) 257 F. Supp. 177, 187. For a detailed refer-
ence to this quotation from Wigmore as it is actually applied
in the receipt of evidence see Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wash.2d
691, 328 P.2d 711, 714, 715.

In construing integrated contracts the New Jersey courts
permit introduction of parol evidence as to the relation of the
parties and the circumstances under which the contract was
made, and the objects which the parties were thereby striving

P| Le 811

to accomplish, not for the purpose of changing the writing, but
to secure light by which to ascertain its actual significance.
Gray v. Joseph J. Brunetti Construction Co., 3 Cir., 266 F.2d
809, 814, 815, citing authorities.

In a later New Jersey case, Garden State Plaza Corp. v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 78 NJ. Super. 485, 496, 189 A.2d 448, 454,
petition for certification denied, 40 N.J. 226, 191 A.2d 63, in-
volving construction of a rider to a written lease the trial court
rejected parol evidence offered by lessee. The court in revers-
ing and remanding the cause for a new trial held the interpre-
tation contended for by the lessee was one which the words of
the lease would bear, that extrinsic evidence was therefore
admissible and said:

«“® * ® the parol evidence rule applies only to prevent
the substantive alteration of contractual terms agreed upon
by parties and expressed in an integration of their bargain, by
resort to other prior or contemporaneous agreements or under-
standings, But the parol evidence rule does not even come
into play until it is first determined what the true agreement
of the parties is—i.c., what they meant by what they wrote
down. Only when that is determined is one in an appropriate
position to raise the bar of the parol evidence rule to prevent
alteration or impugnment of the agreement by the asserted
contradictory prior or contemporaneous agreement. In other
words, interpretation and construction must necessarily precede
protection against forbidden contradiction or modification.
And in the process of interpretation and construction of the
integrated agreement all relevant evidence pointing to meaning
is admissible because experience teaches that language is so
poor an instrument for communication or expression of intent
that ordinarily all surrounding circumstances and conditions
must be examined before there is any trustworthy assurance
of derivation of contractual intent, even by reasonable judges
of ordinary intelligence, from any given set of words which
the parties have committed to paper as their contract. Con-
struing a contract of debatable meaning by resort to surround-
ing and antecedent circumstances and negotiations for light as
to the meaning of the words used is never a violation of the

312 Le |

parol evidence rule. And debatability of meaning is not always
discernible at the first reading of a contract by a new. mind.
More often it becomes manifest upon exposure of the specific
disputed interpretations in the light of the attendant circum-
stances.

“The foregoing is fundamental doctrine (citing extensive
authorities) .”

For a collection of authorities supporting the sections of
Corbin cited herein, see United States v. Lennox Metal Manu-
facturing Co., 2 Cir., 225 F.2d 302, 314, 315. See also Asheville
Mica Co. v. Commodity Credit Corporation, 2 Cir., 335 F.2d
768, 769; Olsson v. Nelson, 248 Ala. 441, 28 So.2d 186, 189, and
citations; Coley v. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 251 Ala.
235, 37 So.2d 125, 129, 130, and citations; Templeman vy. Walker,
175 Okla. 366, 52 P.2d 737, 743, 744; Seavey Hop Corporation
v. Pollock, 20 Wash.2d 387, 147 P.2d 310, 316; and Dawson v.
Shearer, 58 Wash.2d 766, 887 P.2d 46, 47, and citations.

Professor Richard S. Hudson has collected, analyzed and
criticized our own cases dealing with the problem since 1931
in articles appearing in 10 Drake Law Review 87 (1961) sup-
plemented in 13 Drake Law Review 181, 151 (1964) and again
in 15 Drake Law Review 61, 90 (1966). He suggests in his first
article at page 89 that a “reconciliation of Iowa cases during
the period under surveillance is not deemed to be worthwhile,
or even possible.”

Inman Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Company, 124 Iowa
787, 100 N.W. 860, cited by plaintiff, was before this court four
times. The reasoning therein is severely criticized in 3 Corbin

* on Contracts, sections 534 and 535.

Proof of the circumstances may make a meaning plain
and clear when in absence of such proof some other meaning
may also have seemed plain and clear. Sometimes the cireum-
stances proof of which is offered do not have any probative
value and do not affect a meaning that is arrived at without
them. When such is the case, such circumstances are imma-
terial. In other cases, the testimony of additional factors may
not be believed by the trial court after it has been admitted,

Ys Le 318

in which case the meaning of words that are otherwise “plain
and clear” will be adopted.

Of course, an otherwise “plain” meaning should not be
disturbed by the proof of irrelevant circumstances or of those
having only a remote bearing or inconsequential weight. But
until a court knows the circumstances it cannot properly say
that they have no probative value. Rasch v. City of Bloomfield,
supra. Citing 3 Corbin on Contracts, section 542.

Some authorities hold such extrinsic evidence may be con-
sidered, only if the language of the contract is ambiguous and
that courts will not disregard the plain language of a contract
or interpolate something not contained in it; also the courts
will not write contracts for the parties to them nor construe
them other than with the plain and literal meaning of the lan-
guage used,

«“* * * The ‘ambiguity-on-its-face’ rule is a vestigial re-
main of a notion prevailing in ‘primitive law.’ ‘The primitive
law,’ says Wigmore, ‘looked only at the expression. * * * The
mark of primitive legal standards, throughout all, is formalism.’
[9 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., pp. 10-37] * * *

ce ee

“Accordingly, it is regarded by many authorities as a fal-
lacy that, in interpreting contractual language, a court may
not consider the surrounding circumstances unless the language
is patently ambiguous. Any such rule, like all rules of inter-
pretation, must be taken as a guide, not a dictator. The text
should always be read in its context.” United States v. Lennox
Metal Manufacturing Co., supra, 225 F.2d at 310, 311.

The existence of so many statements that parol evidence is
not admissible to aid in the interpretation of an integration
unless the words of the writing are ambiguous makes the signi-
ficance of the word “ambiguity” itself important. In view of
what we have said here it is proper to ask, “ambiguous to

whom.” As to “what is ambiguity” see 3 Corbin on Contracts,
section 543A, pocket parts.
We believe there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s doubt that paragraph 4 has but one meaning.
Iv. At the meeting of the board of directors of the two

314 Le 7

corporations, presided over by plaintiff and attended by the
three defendants, without a dissenting vote or protest on the
part of anyone, the salary schedule was adopted effective July
1, 1959, raised the salary of Wosepka to $15,000, the salaries
of Pronk and Chandler to $15,000 and fixing plaintiff’s salary
at $15,000, which was the amount he was receiving prior to
1959.

From July 1, 1959, until September 1962 regular board
meetings were held, presided over by plaintiff. Defendants
made semiannual payments of principal to plaintiff. In the
normal office routine, one or more of defendants was in daily
contact with plaintiff during the more than three years the
agreement was in effect, yet plaintiff never made a demand for
additional salary or any reference thereto until approximately
September 1, 1962, when the final payment was made by de-
fendants on the stock purchase.

HI The practical construction placed upon a contract of
doubtful meaning by the parties themselves will usually be
adopted by the courts. Gilbrech v. Kloberdanz, 252 Iowa 509,
518, 107 N.W.2d 574, 576, 577, and citations; Theobald v.
Weber, 259 Iowa 452, 458, 148 N.W.2d 418, 422, 423, and
citations.

The court found that the parties by their conduct from
May 20, 1959, to September 1, 1962, placed a practical con-
struction upon the contract; that, the four of them were to draw
the same salary; and that this coupled with the fact that such
was their intention does not entitle plaintiff to recover.

There being substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s findings, no error in its rulings on evidence nor any
application of erroneous rules of law, the matter is—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except Larson, J., who concurs in
result.

31

a

Witiiam C. Harney et al., appellants, v. Crear CREeex
Commouniry Scsoo. Disrricr et al., appellees.

No. 52690.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 88)

ee

OO

Novemper 14, 1967.

Messer & Cahill, of Iowa City, for appellants.

Hart, Shulman, Phelan, Tucker & Boyle, of Iowa City, for
appellees. .

Becxsr, J.—Plaintifis, taxpayers and voters of Clear Creek
Community School District of Johnson and Iowa Counties,
asked for a permanent injunction restraining defendants,
school district, board of directors and board members individ-
ually, from selling bonds, entering into contracts for the pur-
chase of school site and construction of school building, claim-
ing bond election was illegal and void because defendants did
not comply with certain statutory provisions.

The question presented is: Were the variances from stat-
utory procedures in this instance material and substantial?
The trial court refused to grant the injunction, holding the
variances were merely technical and inconsequential. We
agree,

On September 1, 1961, pursuant to chapter 275, Code, 1958,
parts of Johnson and Iowa counties were united to form the
school district. Five elections on school bond issues were held
between March 14, 1962, and October 27, 1965. All failed.

The sixth bond election was predicated on a petition sub-
mitted to the board on December 13, 1965. It posed the fol-
lowing proposition:

“Shall the Clear Creek Community School District, in

the Counties of Johnson and Iowa, State of Iowa, issue

bonds in such amount as would be obtainable under

18

the 1965 assessed evaluation of property within the

school district which amount can be determined from

County Auditor records when the same are completed,

for the purpose of building and furnishing a new high

school on approximately 25 acres of land located in the

E % of the SW % of Section 28, Township 80 North,

Range 7 West of the 5th P.M.”

On December 23, 1965, the board adopted a resolution
authorizing a vote on the proposition. It was similar to the
petition except the resolution failed to specify part of the pro-
eeeds would be used to purchase a site for a new high school.
Subsequent to the board’s resolution and prior to the time of
publication of notice of special election, the figures on assessed.
valuation were available from the county auditor’s office. The
percentage of total indebtedness was computed on this valua-
tion and the amount of the bond issue was determined from
these figures to stay within the constitutional five percent lim-
itation. The dollar amount was incorporated into the notice
of the election and placed on the official ballot.

Legal notice of the May 3, 1966, bond election was pub-
lished stating the proposition:

“Shall the Clear Creek Community School District, in

the Counties of Johnson and Iowa, State of Iowa, issue

bonds in the amount of Five hundred sixty-three thou-

sand four hundred seventy-three Dollars ($563,473)

for the purpose of securing the site and building and

furnishing a new high school on approximately 25

acres of land * * *” (location proposed same as in the

petition, supra).

The proposition submitted to the voters on the official
ballot was identical to that set out in the published notice of
election. The election was held on May 8, 1966. A total of
1048 ballots were cast. There was a 62.5 percent majority vote
in favor of the proposition. No ballots were shown to be blank
or defectively marked.

Hi I. Before considering ten propositions relied upon by
plaintiffs we review the general principles of interpretation
governing this type of case. In Honohan v. United Community

3S

School District, 258 Iowa 57, 59, 187 N.W.2d 601, we observed,
“As a general rule mere irregularities in the conduct of a school
election or minor defects in the form of a ballot do not affect
the result of the election, but defects in matters of substance
are fatal.” (Cases cited.)

HMM The result of a school election is presumptively
valid. Irregularities in the procedure must be shown to be
material. In Headington v. North Winneshiek Community
School District, 254 Iowa 430, 438, 117 N.W.2d 831, these
propositions are stated more fully and forcefully including,
“[I]t is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized
by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair
expression of the popular will * * *.”

Plaintiffs rely strongly upon Honohan v. United Com-
munity School District, supra. We note that there the petition,
resolution, notice and preliminary plans and all public debate
referred to a school for eight grades, five through twelve. When
the ballot appeared it referred only to construction of a senior
high school, connoting at most a four grade building, nine
through twelve. Under such circumstances this court held the
voters had in fact been misled and voided the election. We
now examine the irregularities appearing here.

Ti. The petition failed to specify the amount of the
bonds in dollars but substituted therefor the request that the
amount of bonds be determined in such amount as'’would be
obtainable under the 1965 valuation of property within the
district as shown by the auditor’s records when the same were
completed. The auditor’s records for 1965 were not then in
shape to allow accurate determination of the amount of bonded
indebtedness available to the district.

Subsequently, and before the notice of election was pub-
lished, the total amount, $563,473, was determined and included
both in the published notice and the ballot. Defendants cite
State ex rel. Fletcher v. Executive Council, 207 Iowa 923, 223
N.W. 787, where formula type legislation for a highway bond
issue was considered and use of a formula rather than a specific
amount was approved. The case was reversed. One of the
grounds was that the formula was bad. We need not deter-

520

mine whether use of the formula in the notice of election and
subsequent ballots would be sufficient compliance with the
statute here. The amount of the bond issue was determined in
dollars in sufficient time to inform the people adequately by -
those two instruments both before the election and at the polls.
The voters were not misled.

Hl 11. The preamble of the petition contains reference
to the fact that improvements contemplated cannot be made
within the limit of one and one-quarter percent of the assessed
valuation of the taxable school district property. This com-
plies with section 296.2 Code, 1966. No statute requires that
such statement be added to the school board resolution. A
resolution is not specifically required. While orderly procedure
probably dictates such a resolution, it is not a statutory con-
dition precedent.

IV. Plaintiffs next note that the petition for election
was filed less than six months after the last previous election.
Again there is no statute prohibiting such procedure. Section
75.1 requires that a defeated proposal, or part thereof, “shall
not be submitted to the electors for a period of six months from
the date of such regular or special election.” (Emphasis sup-
plied.) It is the actual submission that is prohibited; not the
preparatory petition and administrative work. Plaintiffs con-
eede that the facts and decision in Gibson v. Winterset Com-
munity School District, 258 Iowa 440, 188 N.W.2d 112, are contra
to their position. There new elections were repeatedly prepared
within six months of prior defeat but not submitted until after
six months had elapsed. The issue was between contending
petitions. Implicit in the opinion is that only the actual voting
must be separated by six months, We concur in the controlling
effect of Gibson adverse to plaintiffs’ position.

Hi V. Plaintiffs next lump three objections in one. The
essence of the objections is that both the petition and resolution
failed to specify the proceeds of the bond issue were to be used
to purchase a site for the high school, The notice of election and
the ballots did state that the proceeds would be used “for the
purpose of securing the site and building and furnishing a new
high school.” Thus there was both a failure to inform at the

Ss

petition and resolution level and a variance between the first two
documents and the last two documents. Plaintiffs deem both ir-
regularities (if they be such) substantial. We cannot agree.

Hi The property to be used was described by legal deserip-
tion. Well before the election, ie. at the time the legal notice
was published, it was clearly stated part of the funds would be
used to acquire a site. Ag stated in Honohan v. United Com-
munity School District, supra, “While the public measure need
not always be set forth ‘in haec verba’, there must still be sub-
stantial compliance with the relevant statutes.” Here there was
substantial compliance,

[| VI. Plaintiffs complain that the ballots instructed the
voters to mark the appropriate box with an X. The statute now
allows a mark be either X or a check, section 49.47, The statu-
tory deviation is not commendable but there is no showing that
it affected the election or its results. No ballots are shown to
have been spoiled or rejected. The deviation under the record
here is merely technical.

HE «VII. Plaintiffs argue the proposal to acquire 25 acres
as a site is clearly in violation of section 297.2, Code, 1966, which
limits school property to ten acres for schoolhouses “except as
hereinafter provided.” Section 297.3 provides any district which
ineludes a city, town or village may take and hold an area not
exceeding two blocks and an area not exceeding thirty acres for
school playground, stadium or field house, or other purposes for
each site. Plaintiffs do not argue applicability of section 297.4.

Description of the voting precincts indicates three of the
four precincts include towns; namely the towns of Oxford,
Cosgrove and Tiffin, all in Johnson County. The entire 25-acre
tract is within the town of Tiffin, The district therefore quali-
fied for the application of section 297.3.

HH The details of how the acreage will be used need not be
set forth in the petition, notice or ballot. No statute requires
such detail. There is need to have these instruments short
enough for general understanding of the project proposed but
detailed enough for intelligent exercise of the voter’s franchise.
The statute allows acquisition of more than the proposed 25 acres.
If the board attempts to use the acreage illegally such action can

2

be the subject of other Utigation. It is not germane to this
election contest.

HM VIL The petition was filed December 13, 1965. A
meeting was called and held on December 22 for the purpose of
considering the petition. Action was postponed to check legality
of the petition, On the following day, December 23, at a second
meeting resolution approving the petition was adopted. Section
4.1(23), Code, 1966, provides: “Computing time—legal holidays.
In computing time, the first day shall be excluded and the last
included, * * *.”

St. Paul Mereury Indemnity Co. v. Nyce, 241 Iowa 550, 563,
41 N.W.2d 682, states: “But this court, in computing periods of
time fixed by statute or by proceedings thereunder, has uni-
formly complied with the statutory method, unless contrary to
legislative intent.”

Using these rules the board meeting was timely held. We
need not consider whether the provision was mandatory or direc-
tory. In either event it was met. See State ex rel. Carstens v.
Miskimins, 247 Iowa 39, 72 N.W.2d 571.

HE LX. We are also told that because some nine persons
lived in an area later annexed were unable to vote on issue
resulting in later tax to their property the election was void.
This proposition was, as plaintiffs concede, decided adversely to
them in Peterson v. Swan, 231 Iowa 745, 2 N.W.2d 70. Further
the number of votes affected could not have changed the result
even if they were all negative. See 26 Am. Jur.2d, Elections,
section 277.

HX. Finally, it is said that the bond issue will raise the
total debt to more than five percent constitutional limitation.
The facts indicate the contrary. The computation was made on
the value of the property in Johnson County. Moneys and
eredits were not included. Zobel v. Schau, 260 Iowa 796, 150
N.W.2d 626, would indicate that they could have been included.
The indebtedness was well within the constitutional limit.

The electorate has determined the matter. We find no ir-
regularities such as would justify interference under our well
established rules.—Affirmed,

All Justices concur.

SS 323

Eva Kay et al., appellees, v. Boarp or Epucation in and for
Porrawarramin County, appellant.

No, 52695.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 137)

Novemper 14, 1967.
Porter, Heithoff & Pratt, of Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Hess, Peters, Sulhoff & Walker, of Council Bluffs, for ap-
pellees.

Snei, J—Defendant, Board of Education of Pottawattamie
County, has appealed from the Judgment and Decree of the
District Court directing the County Superintendent of Schools
to withdraw certification to the county auditor attaching plain-
tiffs’ land to the York Township School District.

Plaintiffs are resident taxpayers of Pottawattamie County
and own land in James Township. Defendant is the County

Board of Education of Pottawattamie County.

324 |

On June 1, 1964, plaintiffs’ land was part of a remnant
school district of less than four government sections in James
Township. This area had never been included in any school
reorganization.

On June 1, 1964, defendant County Board of Education
by administrative decision attached plaintiffs’ land and the
other lands to the York Township School District, said attach-
ment to become effective July 1, 1964. York Township School
District is not a part of any reorganized school district and
does not maintain a twelve-grade school,

Plaintiffs’ land is immediately ‘adjacent to Oakland Com-
munity School District on the east. Oakland district does
maintain a twelve-grade school.

On June 26, 1964, plaintiffs filed a Petition for Injunction
alleging the attachment violated the provision of section 275.1,
Code of Iowa (1962), and asked the court to decree the acts of
defendant to be illegal, null and void and contrary to chapter
275, Code of Iowa, 1962. . .

A trial was held, and on August 29, 1964, the trial court
ruled that the action of defendant in attaching plaintiffs’
land to “York Township School District to become effective
July 1, 1964, is illegal, null and void, and contrary to Chapter
275, Code of Iowa, 1962.” The trial court further enjoined
defendant from attaching plaintiffs’ James Township land to
York Township School District. ©

On June 2, 1964, prior to the date of filing plaintiffs’ peti-
tion, defendant had filed a certification with the county auditor
attaching plaintiffs’ James Township land to York Township
School District. This certification was never withdrawn.

Defendant appealed from the court’s decree, but on June
8, 1965, the appeal was dismissed with consent of both parties.

Counsel stated in oral argument that the reason for dis-
missal of the appeal was the discouraging effect of the amend-
ment to section 275.1, Code of Iowa, by the Sixty-first General
Assembly. Regardless of the reason for the dismissal of the
appeal the district court’s order was a final order.

“Defendant has never paid any attention whatsoever to the
court’s ruling of August'29, 1964. .

SS 825

On September 26, 1966, plaintiffs filéd an application for
an order citing defendant in contempt of court for failure to
abide by the court’s decree of August 29, 1964. A hearing was
held on the contempt charges and on December 19, 1966, the
court entered an order which “enlarged and corrected” the
decree of August 29, 1964, by commanding the Pottawattamie
County Superintendent of Schools to withdraw the certifica-
tion from the Pottawattamie County Auditor’s records which
attached plaintiffs’ land to the York Township School District.

The order of December 19, 1966, included the following:

“It appears from the evidence that the certification to the
Pottawattamie County Auditor by the Pottawattamie County
Superintendent of Schools attaching the plaintiffs’ land to the
York Township School District was prior to the entry of the
Order of Court in this case on August 29, 1964. Therefore, the
Order entered in this cause was somewhat vague as to a direc-
tion to the Defendant to remove from the County Auditor’s
records their certification attaching Plaintiffs’ land to the York
Township School District. By virtue thereof, this Court is not
of the opinion that the Defendant should be punished for Con-
tempt of Court, but at the same time, this Court intends to
have its Orders and directives followed and therefore, the
Court on its own motion will enlarge and correct its Order of
August 29, 1964, so as to eliminate any uncertainty as to the
responsibility of the Defendant.

“Tr Is, Taererorz, OrperED, Apsupeep AND DrcruEp that
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of this
Court in the above-entitled cause dated August 29, 1964, shall be
and the same is hereby enlarged and corrected by adding thereto
the following:

“Tn Ig Furraer Orperep, Apsupcep AND DrcreEEp that the
defendant shall immediately cause the Pottawattamie County
Superintendent of Schools to withdraw the certification from the
Pottawattamie County Auditor’s records which attaches the
Plaintiffs’ land to the York Township School District, and that.
said withdrawal shall be accomplished prior to January 1, 1967.’ ”

On December 28, 1966, defendant filed riotice of appeal. By
this notice defendant appealed from the final judgment of Decem-

326 — |

ber 19, 1966, and attempted to appeal from “all rulings and
orders inhering therein, and from the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Decree entered herein on August 31, 1964,
and all rulings and orders inhering therein.”

Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal as it relates to the
decree of August 31, 1964.

On February 8, 1967, there was filed herein the following
order:

“Orper Dismissine ApreaL As Ir Retates To THE
Decree Or Aveusr 31, 1964

“Plaintiff-appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal taken by
defendant-appellant as it relates to the decree of August 31,
1964, together with defendant-appellant’s resistance to said
motion, have been duly considered and said motion is hereby
sustained and said appeal is hereby dismissed insofar as it relates
to claimed error in the entry of the decree of August 31, 1964.

“Done this 7th day of February, 1967.

“Supreme Court Or Iowa
“By, /s/ T. G. GARFIELD
“Chief Justice.”

I. Defendant-appellant’s statement of propositions on
appeal makes no claim of error in the order of December 17,
1966, except as it relates to the 1964 trial, The 1964 proceedings
are not reviewable on appeal at this time. The former appeal
was dismissed and by order of our court quoted, supra, the
present appeal as it relates to questions involved therein has
been dismissed.

II. Appellant argues that the order of December 17, 1966,
modified the former decree of August 29, 1964, in a material
manner so that the entire proceedings may now be reviewed.

We find no merit in this proposition. The judgment of
August 29, 1964, found appellant’s actions illegal, null and void
and enjoined the attachment of plaintiffs’ land to York Town-
ship School District.

Appellant’s officials seem to think that because they had
already done what the court found they could not do they were
under no duty to undo their own illegal act. From that unsound
premise they argue that when the court in December 1966

a Es 827

directed the doing of what should have been done in 1964 there
was such a material modification as to reopen the entire case.
We cannot accept this argument. There was no material modi-
fication of the original findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Appellant’s officials Imew for over two years that they were
wrong. They did nothing to correct their own wrong. The
decree and mandate of December 1966 implemented but did not
modify the 1964 decree. It directed the doing of what should
have been done in 1964. It was in the nature of a nunc pro tune
order and within the power of the court to make. See Hobson
v. Dempsey Construction Co., 232 Iowa 1226, 7 N.W.2d 896; 13
Towa Law Review 255.

Because of our conclusion that there was no material modifi-
cation, discussion of authorities considering the effect of a
material modification is unnecessary.

III. Appellant’s other propositions relied upon for reversal
relate to matters involved in the 1964 submission and are not
germane to this appeal.

IV. The trial court taxed the costs to plaintiffs, Plaintiffs
have not appealed. Costs on appeal are taxed to defendant.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.
Ee

Henry W. Kepune, appellee, v. F. C. Barton et al., trustees
under Barton Profit-Sharing Plan, Bankers Trust Company,
an Iowa Corporation, appellants.

No. 52668.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2a 172)

328 . PC

Novemper 14, 1967.

J. R. Austin, Ross H. Sidney and Marvin F. Peterson of
Austin, Grefe & Sidney, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Curtis Bush of Bush & Evans, of Davenport, for appellee.

- Brcxer,.J.—Plaintiff, a former employee of Barton Naptha
Corporation, terminated his employment with the company.
At the time of termination plaintiff had an interest in the
profit-sharing plan. Funds equal to plaintiff’s interest were
deposited for his benefit in a savings account in lieu of pay-
ment to him. Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to payment of
this money at date of employment termination, rather than at
a future date as provided by amendment to the profit-sharing
plan. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff. We
affirm.

Plaintiff was.a full-time employee of Barton Naptha Cor-

P| Pt 329

poration, Bettendorf, Iowa, from March 1952 until July 30,
1965, when he resigned from the company. ~

On October 31, 1956, Barton Naptha adopted a profit-
sharing plan and trust agreement for the benefit of its em-
ployees. The plan was amended twice, once on January 7,
1959, and again on January 11, 1965.

The plan provides that any employee is eligible to par-
ticipate upon the completion of continuous employment for
one year, provided he is at least 21 years old, a full-time em-
ployee and has signed an application for an insurance contract.
Plaintiff met these requirements.

In this law action defendants rely on but one error for
reversal; ic, that the court “Erred in determining that the
appellee’s right to terminate his employment and receive his
share under the profit-sharing plan was a vested right at the
time the amendment to the profit-sharing plan was adopted on
January 11, 1965.”

Hi. The parties agree that the profit-sharing plan was
a part of the employment contract between plaintiff and Barton
Naptha Corporation. This is consistent with our recent case,
Murphy v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 260 Iowa 422, 148
N.W.2d 400, and the cases cited therein, particularly Cantor
v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 171 N.B.2d 518.

II. The question is one of contract interpretation. The plan
calls for computation of profit shares to be made by the com-
pany at the end of each calendar year. The share of each
participating employee is to be added to his account on an
annual basis. The pertinent parts of Articles VII and XI read:

“If a Participant’s employment is terminated for reasons
other than death, disability or retirement, the amount of bene-
fits payable to him will be determined by the period he has
been a Participant. If such period is less than three full years,
he shall be given the ownership of the Contract on his life and
no more, If the period is at least three years, he shall receive,
in addition to the Contract, a percentage of his total credits on
the last preceding valuation date, less the premiums paid on
the contract, based on the following table:” The percentage
formula is then set forth.

330 Le |

Article XI—Amendments “XI-1. The Employers reserve
the right, through action by their Boards of Directors, to amend
this Plan without the consent of any Participant or death
beneficiary; provided, however, that no amendment to this
Plan shall deprive any Participant or death beneficiary of any
vested equitable interest herein, * * *,”

The amount credited to plaintiff’s account is not in con-
troversy. His account showed $10,090 to his credit on Decem-
ber 31, 1964. A $100 insurance premium was deducted from
that amount. The parties agree that on July 10, 1965, plain-
tiff was entitled to 90 percent of that balance or $8991. The
question remains. When is the sum payable?

The January 1965 amendment added to Paragraph VII the
following: “The amount of money due an Employee under this
paragraph shall be deposited by the Trustee in insured savings
accounts or invested in appropriate obligations of the United
States, and together with the interest thereon, paid to the Em-
ployee on the earliest date on which he could have elected to
retire had his employment continued; provided, however, that
in the sole discretion of thé Trustees, payment to the Employee
may be made at an earlier date; and provided further, that in
the event of the death of the Employee, payment shall be made
forthwith to his beneficiary.”

Plaintiff. contends’ that this amendment could not affect
his right to receive the $8991 when he left the company. He
relies on the prohibition in Paragraph XI: “no amendment to
this Plan shall deprive any Participant or death beneficiary of
any vested equitable interest herein.” He claims the right to
receive the money when he quit was a vested right that could
not be changed by amendment without his consent.

In support of his contention plaintiff introduced an ex-
planatory pamphlet circulated by the company after the amend-
ment of 1965. It purported to explain the plan as amended.
This pamphlet read in part:

“If a participant’s employment is terminated for reasons
other than death; disability or retirement, he will be given the
ownership of his retirement income contract and a percentage
of his portion of the deposit administration account based on

| Le 331

years of participation, namely, 30 percent for three full years

and an additional 10 percent for each additional full year of

participation, with 100 percent for ten full years or more.
“AMENDMENTS

“The plan may be amended but no amendment shall affect
then existing rights of participants.”

The pamphlet ended with the following paragraph: “This
pamphlet is intended only as a brief summary of the plan; and if
more specific information is desired, it may be secured from the
general manager of any of the participating companies.”

Defendant testified that at a meeting with Mr. Powers, who
was secretary-treasurer of the company, during the latter part of
1956, Mr. Powers was asked what. would happen if an employee
would quit. “Mr. Powers stated that we would get our money if
we quit after three years and our percentage of the share for
each year thereafter.”

Hy The trial court held in part: “The Court finds from the
evidence and a proper interpretation of the terms of the plan
that plaintiff was the owner of a vested equitable interest in the
funds in the trustees’ hands to the extent of the percentage
specified in the plan based upon his years of service being 90
percent of $9990.36 or $8991.32, and had the vested right to re-
ceive the same at anytime he quit his job. This was an ‘existing
right’ when the amendment was adopted on January 11, 1965.
The time of payment was a vital part of the right.” There was
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings. Thus
they are binding on us. Rule 344(£)(1), Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.

III. Defendants argue that the term “vested equitable
interest” as used in the plan means that part of the employer
allocations to the trust fund which had accrued could never be
forfeited by the employee but the term does not include rights
to possession ; i.e., the vesting is a vesting in interest; not in en-
joyment. Therefore, the time of enjoyment could be changed
without violating paragraph XI.

Defendant cites several cases dealing with contingent and
vested interests as those subjects are treated in the construction
of wills; and in one case, the effect of a retroactive statute on

382 Le 7

certain moneys collected by a county.’ They are not persuasive,
Here.

The trial court refused to apply a limited and technical
meaning to “vested equitable interest” as it might be construed
in eases involving interpretation of a deed or will. It decided
this case on the meaning to be given the phrase in the context in
which it was used and under the circumstances surrounding the
preparation of the instrument. This solution was correct.

HI IV. We give a contract the practical meaning placed
upon it by the parties. Gilbrech v. Kloberdanz, 252 Iowa 509,
107 N.W.2d 574.

| | “Bividence of the cireumstances [surrounding the making
of the contract] is always admissible in aid of the interpretation
of an integrated agreement. This is so even when the contract
on its face is free from ambiguity.” Atlantic Northern Airlines
vy. Schwimmer, 12 N. J. 293, 801, 96 A.2d 652, 656; Rasch v. City
of Bloomfield, 261 Iowa 544, 153 N.W.2d 718. The matter of
admissibility of extraneous evidence as an aid to the interpreta-
tion of a written instrument is carefully analyzed in Hamilton
v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164.

Defendant urges the rights of the parties are to be de-
termined from the trust instrument and not from the plan,
the verbal exchange of the parties or the fact plaintiff misin-
terpreted the effect of the January 11, 1965, amendment. We
think the trial court did determine the rights of the parties from
the trust instrument, In doing so it used the evidence which was
admissible for the purpose of aiding it in such interpretations,
This was proper under rules recognized in the last two preceding
cited cases.

It should be noted that this case differs from Davenport
Osteopathic Hospital Assn. v. Hospital Service, Inc. 261 Iowa
247, 154 N.W.2d 153; in that the contract here allows amendments
but limits the right to amerid by the language quoted. It is the
effect of that language that is determined. We find that under the
circumstances here presented the amendment did deprive plain-
tiff-of a vested equitable interest which had accrued on the date
of amendment and was therefore ineffective as to this plaintiff

| [| 333

in relation to the funds that had accrued prior to January 11,
1965.

V. Defendants contend the reason for the amendment is

that as the accumulated fund to the credit of each worker grew
employees tended to terminate their employment to get the im-
mediately available cash; just opposite to the effect that was in-
tended. The purpose of the plan was to encourage stability in
the work force and provide accumulated savings at time of
retirement as a basis for the retirement funds for the individual
employee. These purposes were not spelled out in such detail.
Plaintiff, as employee, testified that he did not understand such
purposes in relation to the funds. Plaintiff was asked:
* “Q. Was it your understanding that this profit-sharing
plan and trust was designed from the standpoint of—of more or
less of a retirement type contract; it was geared to provide
money for you at your retirement and so forth? A. No, that it
was—it was a profit-sharing plan and that they would buy you
an insurance policy which was supposed to be—as I understood
it, the retirement end of it was an insurance policy and the rest
of it was a plan—profit-sharing plan.”

Whatever the motivation for the amendment it cannot be
made contra to the authority to amend.

VI. It is not argued, nor do we find, that the time of future
payments could not be changed, or even that accrued payments
could not be postponed as a condition of continued employment.
But we apprehend that such action, if available to defendant,
would have to be taken in such manner as to give the employee
clear notice that the contract was in fact being changed. He
would then have the right to continue his work with the company
or leave, That was not done. Plaintiff contends that he did not
protest because he believed the amendment would not affect his
accrued rights. Under the circumstances that was a reasonable
position. The trial court so found—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except LeGranp, J., who takes no part.

334 Le

Genevirve Kyar, appellant, v. Joan Kaan, appellee.

No. 52598,
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 128)

Novemper 14, 1967.

Ralph L. Powers and Henry Wormley, of Des Moines, for
appellant.

Joe Coppola and William J. Trout, of Des Moines, for
appellee.

Larson, J.—The sole issue presented by this appeal is the
propriety of the award provisions in a decree of divorce in favor

of the plaintiff.

After a marriage lasting approximately one year and three
months, on September 30, 1966, the trial court granted
Genevieve Kjar a divorce from John Kjar on the ground of
eruel and inhuman treatment. Both parties had been pre-
viously married and their respective spouses were deceased.
Plaintiff, 51 years of age, had three children from a previous
marriage, but only a daughter, Jennifer, age 15, lived with these
parties. The defendant, 46 years of age, had four children
from a previous marriage, three being minors. Two of these
children, Brian, age 14, and Nancy, age 11, also resided with
them.

HH No issue was raised as to the correctness of the grant-
ing of a divorce in favor of the plaintiff, and the facts and
circumstances revealed by the record were for the purpose of
showing the alleged injustices done by the defendant to obtain
his freedom from this marriage. Although the conduct of the
offending party is one of the factors to be taken into considera-
tion in fixing a just and fair award to be granted to the
offended party, it is not controlling.

336 Le Ve

In its decree the trial court awarded plaintiff a lump sim
payment of $1500 in full of all of her rights growing out of this
marriage, provided that each party retain the personal property
already divided, and gave the defendant the 1965 Ford reg-
istered in his name that was possessed by plaintiff.

Plaintiff contends this amount was too small and failed to
take into consideration her losses, including her pension rights
valued at about $15,000, forever lost when she married the
defendant. We have carefully examined the record and, after
analysis of plaintiff’s financial situation and-defendant’s earn-
ing power, assets, and existing financial obligations, believe the
trial court’s decree should be affirmed.

Hl 1. It is well established in this jurisdiction that in
determining the amount of alimony to which the wife may be
entitled, it is not only the wife’s necessity, but also the hus-
band’s ability to pay, that the court must consider. In making
this determination we have often said the factors that must be
taken into consideration are the parties’ respective age, health,
future prospects, contributions to joint accumulations, existing
financial obligations, obligation to children, earning capacity,
past conduct, length of the marriage, and other pertinent facts
that might aid the trial court in reaching a just and equitable
result. Lehmkuhl v. Lehmkuhl, 259 Iowa 686, 698, 145 N.W.2d
456, 464; Cole v. Cole, 259 Iowa 58, 60, 143 N.W.2d 350, 351;
Brannen v. Brannen, 237 Iowa 188, 21 N.W.2d 459; Nelson v.
Nelson, 246 Iowa 760, 68 N.W.2d 746,

Although it is not clear from the court decree whether the
award to plaintiff was alimony or a property settlement, we
are satisfied it includes both. We note that plaintiff does not
contend she contributed monetarily to the joint property ac-
cumulation.

HJ Plaintiff testified that when she and defendant were
married, at his suggestion she sold her home in Council Bluffs,
Towa, at a $950 loss, and gave her 1962 Chevrolet, valued at
$1500, to her son Jeff. At that time defendant bought a 1965
Ford for her use.

It appears from the record that plaintiff, in her own right,
owns an apartment house, partly furnished, insured for $10,500

— — 331

and worth about $12,000, on which she owes $4000. The gross
income therefrom is $255 per month. In addition to this, she
had at the time of this marriage about $3500 in cash, $2000 of
which came from IPERS on the decease of her former hus-
band. She also receives approximately $185 per month for her
daughter Jennifer’s support, which commenced with the death
of her former husband, as well as $98 per month from Social
Security effective with this decree of divorce. In addition, she
is capable of doing clerking and some secretarial work.
Defendant’s gross income is $8800 per year, or about $600
per month net take-home pay. He also receives expense al-
lowances from his employer, Interstate Bakery, but this does
not exceed his travel expenses and car maintenance. He still
owes $2600 on the automobile with which he makes his live-
lihood, and his monthly payments on that amount are $72. In
addition, he must support his minor children and he testified
that the actual living expenses for him and his minor children
were $600 over his income from January to June of 1966.
According to the record, five days after their marriage the
parties moved to Des Moines, Iowa, and bought a home for
which the defendant made a $5000 down payment from his
funds. The divorce decree requires him to sell this property
and, from the proceeds, pay $1500 to plaintiff and $500 to
plaintiff’s attorney. The balance, after his costs, is to be re-
tained by him. We are not advised of this amount, but after
paying his counsel and costs, we can assume it left him little
even if he realized all of his original investment from this sale,
obviously much less than the value of plaintiff’s property. It
does not appear that he has any other assets of monetary value.
The trial court found the “defendant’s first obligation is to
support his minor children” and noted at the time of trial he
was paying $50 per week for their board and room out of his
take-home pay of about $125 per week. In addition, the court
recognized that the defendant must furnish clothes, books,
spending money, and other incidental expenses necessary to
their health and comfort. From the remainder he must provide’
for his own food, lodging, clothing ete.
In any event, the trial court felt there was no feasible way

838 [| |

that defendant could pay any substantial sum in excess of that
decreed. We agree. It appears to us that his present salary is
sufficient only to provide for himself and his minor children,
and to require a greater award would endanger his earning
capacity and ability to provide for his children. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, has not used her own funds and is in sub-
stantially the same financial condition as when she married
defendant, with the possible exception of the pension loss.

Hl Il. The right to alimony must be determined in light
of all the facts and circumstances, and of course is not manda-
tory. Section 598.14 of the Code, 1966, authorizes the trial
court in divorce proceedings to “make such order in relation
to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the
parties as shall be right.” What is “right” requires a just de-
termination in the light of the facts disclosed. Pfab v. Pfab,
257 Towa 303, 1832 N.W.2d 483; Blaney v. Blaney, 256 Iowa
1151, 180 N.W.2d 732; Weiland v. Weiland, 255 Iowa 477, 122
N.W.2d 837, 1 A.L.R.3d 877.

In such matters we have said that the trial court has
considerable discretion and its determination will not be dis-
turbed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. Genner
v. Genner, 250 Iowa 121, 92 N.W.2d 926; Call v. Call, 250 Iowa
1175, 98 N.W.2d 335; Freel v. Freel, 253 Iowa 327, 3380, 112
N.W.2d 871. However, this does not mean that this court is
relieved of its duty to try the case de novo. Fritz v. Fritz, 260
Towa 409, 148:N.W.2d 892; Cole v. Cole, supra; Jensen v. Jen-
sen, 237 Iowa 1828, 1834, 25 N.W.2d 316. We have often stated
that this court gives weight to the findings of fact of the trial.
court, but we are not bound by them. Rule 344(£)(7), R. C. P.
We recognize that the trial court saw and heard the parties and
could best weigh the evidence. Hach case, of course, must be
determined upon its own facts. Beno v. Beno, 260 Iowa 442,
149 N.W.2d 778. Although it properly found sufficient evidence
of mental cruelty here to award her a divorce, it did not find
it sufficient to justify the administration of reparations for that
treatment.

HME Il. We do not condone the actions of the defend-
ant toward the plaintiff, but we are constrained to agree with

a [| 339

the trial court’s determination of the award. We are furnished
a record that stresses the injustices done, but it does not dis-
close any physical abuse of plaintiff in this unfortunate matri-
monial venture. It is clear the parties were not compatible
and became fully aware of this fact some six weeks after mar-
riage. It also appears that defendant was the most dissatisfied
with the relationship and in subtle and cutting ways made a
point of disclosing this to plaintiff. He left letters which
seemed to disclose a relationship with another woman and
would not sleep in the same room with plaintiff. It appears
that both failed to communicate with the other, which only
aggravated the differences already existing between them.
Finally, at his request plaintiff commenced this action, but
asked only for separate maintenance. This upset the defendant.
Without counsel, he went to the office of plaintiff’s attorney
and, on the assurance that plaintiff would amend her petition
to ask for a divorce, signed a stipulation which in essence
gave to the plaintiff all their property in addition to $100 per
month alimony for life. After consulting an attorney, defend-
ant renounced the stipulation. We may observe that the
obligations assumed under the stipulation would have been far
beyond the defendant's ability to pay and would have had to
be rejected by the court. Courts are slow to approve a stipula-
tion that impoverishes one spouse, especially when predicated
on spite and revenge by the other. There were two parties to
this marriage and the plaintiff was aware of the choice she had
to make. This choice involved her pension, her property, and
her single status. Marriage to the defendant offered a chance
of creating a happy home and a satisfactory future. Regret-
fully it failed.

Although the parties were acquainted before the death of
their respective spouses, clearly they knew too little of the
personalities and fixed traits of each other. Neither is blame-
less as to this failure, but defendant’s disappointment gave him
no cause to treat plaintiff as he did.

IV. Plaintiff seriously contends that defendant should be
compelled to reimburse her for the loss of her right to a pension
of some $15,000, based on $64 per month over her life ex-

340° be 7

pectancy of some twenty years. Plaintiff cites and relies on
the case of Britven v. Britven, 259 Iowa 650, 145 N.W.2d 450,
to sustain this contention, and calls our attention to the fact
that this decision was rendered after the decree herein. It is
true, in that case in making an award to the injured party we-
considered pension rights surrendered by plaintiff when she
married the defendant. However, there the factual cireum-
stances were quite different. That marriage lasted only 54
days. The defendant was quite wealthy and the plaintiff had
no property, was 60 years of age, had no visible means of
support, and could not return to her former employment.
There was testimony that defendant, in an effort to persuade
her to marry him, said it was unnecessary for her to work, and
that in reliance thereon she gave up a position she had held
for many years. Under those circumstances we held a wrong
was done the wife which deprived her of security at her age
and, because of the husband’s ability to pay, awarded her a
substantial lump sum alimony. The facts here would not sus-
tain a similar result. Here the pension of $64 per month was
not the subject of any prenuptial agreement between the
parties, and her loss cannot be corrected by creating a new in-
justice to innocent parties, ie., defendant’s minor children.

Appellant’s application for attorney fees incurred in con-
nection with this appeal is granted, and appellee is ordered to
pay to appellant’s attorneys the sum of $500 for such services.
—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Garrieip, C. J., and Mason and
Rawines, JJ., who would increase’ the award and therefore
dissent.

Garmzxp, C. J., dissents because he would allow plaintiff at
least $2500 rather than merely $1500.

Mason and Raw.ines, JJ., join in this dissent.

| | sat

Jupirn Exam Larroon, a minor, by Margaret Wearmouth, her
mother and next friend, appellee, v. Dennis McComss,
. appellant.
No, 52613.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 68)

Novemper 14, 1967.

Brierly, McCall & Girdner, of Newton, for appellant.

Lester CO. Johnson, County Attorney, of Newton, for ap-
pellee.

342 |

Sneti, J—This is an interlocutory appeal perfected with
permission.

Defendant appeals from the overruling of his motion to
dismiss filed under rule 215.1, Rules of Civil Procedure.

On December 1, 1964, there was filed in behalf of complain-
ant a petition seeking to establish defendant as the father of
a child born to complainant and for other relief. Complainant
was represented by the then county attorney.

Defendant appeared and denied the allegations of the
petition.

On November 19, 1965, counsel for complainant filed a Cer-
tificate of Readiness for Trial and request for assignment for
trial.

On August 13, 1966, pursuant to rule 215.1, Rules of Civil
Procedure, the clerk gave the “try or dismiss” notice.

Trial to a jury began on October 24, 1966.

On October 25, 1966, the following Calendar Entry was
made by the presiding judge:

“At 10:05 p.m., it is made to appear to Court that jury
cannot agree. Whereupon jury is discharged and the case
continued over the term.”

On October 26, 1966, the following Calendar Entry was
made by the then presiding judge:

“Complainant granted leave to file a substituted Petition.”

On November 23, 1966, an amended and substituted peti-
tion was filed.

‘The November Term of Court began on November 28, 1966.
At that time defendant had not answered the amended and
substituted petition. The issues to be tried under the amended
and substituted petition had not been joined and the case was
not at issue. Answer was filed December 7, 1966. The case
was not tried at the November Term ending January 21, 1967.

On January 3, 1967, complainant’s present counsel assumed
the office of county attorney and as counsel for complainant.

The January 1967 Term of Court began January 23, at
which time defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the case was not tried at the November 1966 Term as contem-
plated by rule 215.1. .

a Le} 348

The motion to dismiss was overruled and this appeal chal-
lenges that ruling.

I. Defendant argues with vigor that the proceedings
during the September 1966 Term (October was a part thereof)
did not constitute a trial and that when the jury failed to
agree on a verdict defendant was entitled to dismissal. We do
not agree. Rule 215.1 contemplates the prompt disposition of
cases and dismissal of stale matters receiving no attention. It
does not require dismissal just because a jury has failed to
agree or because the matter has not been finally determined.

Rule 200, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

“The court may discharge a jury * * * if they have delib-
erated until it satisfactorily appears that they cannot agree.
The case shall then be retried immediately or at a future time,
as the court directs.” (Emphasis added.)

This rule recognizes a judicial examination before a judge
and a jury as a trial and specifically directs retrial at such time
as the court may direct. In this case the court by calendar
entry continued the case over the term. This complied with
rule 200 and defendant was not entitled to a dismissal under
rule 215.1.

Hl IL Under rule 85(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, an
amended and substituted petition having been filed, defendant
had seven days within which to answer. This time had not
expired when the November 1966 Term began. When the trial
assignment for that term was made neither party was in
position to demand a trial date. Complainant had filed her
amended and substituted petition pursuant to leave of court.
Defendant had not answered but was not in default. The
case was under the court’s order for continuance and was not
ready for trial assignment.

Keeping in mind that the court had by order under rule
200 continued the case we cannot say that under the cireum-
stances disclosed here defendant was entitled to dismissal.

As we said in the second Windus case, 255 Iowa 587, 597,
122 N.W.2d 901, the fact that the case is not at issue on all
matters does not necessarily prevent operation of rule 215.1,
but here the case was under a proper order for continuance.

344 ee

Assuming, arguendo, that after the case was at issue on
December 7, 1966, the court might on his own motion and if
requested by either party should have fixed a trial date, until
something was done by someone, the case was subject to rule
200 and not rule 215.1. Rule 200 provides for retrial “as the
court directs.” The court had previously continued the case
but neither the trial term nor a trial. date had been directed.

In McKinney vy. Hirstine, 257 Iowa 395, 181 N.W.2d 823,
“the ease was continued, by proper proceedings and order of
the court, to the November, 1963 term.” The case was not tried
at the November Term. We held that after the “try or dis-
miss” term as extended by the continuance had expired opera-
tion of rule 215.1 was mandatory and automatic and defendants
were entitled to dismissal.

In the case now before us the continuance was not to a
specific term. Dismissal was. not mandatory and automatic.
Under rule 200 the case was to be retried “* * * at a future
time, as the court directs.” There was no failure to try as the
court might direct. .

In Gammel v. Perry, 256 Iowa 1129, 180 N.W.2d 550, we
referred to the second Windus case, supra, and said the alter-
natives under the rule are (1) assignment and trial, (2) dis-
missal without prejudice, and (3) continuance, for satisfactory
reasons, by application and ruling after notice and not ex parte.

In the case at bar the continuance was necessary after a
“hung jury” and was ordered because rule 200 so provides.

In Anderson v. National By-Products, Inc., 257 Iowa 921,
135 N.W.2d 602, an application for continuance was filed dur-
ing the “try or dismiss” term and was ordered submitted on
the second day of the succeeding term. We said:

“We are of the opinion the court was not compelled to enter
its order for continuance at the dismissal term and that since the
mocion for continuance was filed, ordered set for hearing and
notice of the hearing given, all during the dismissal term, the
court retained jurisdiction to hear and rule on the motion
for continuance on the second day of the succeeding term.

“Tt may be physically impossible for a busy trial judge to
hear and finally dispose of all pending matters before the close

a Le 845

of a term. It would seem he should, and we think he does,
have inherent power to defer hearing and finally disposing of
some matters at least until the second day of the immediately
succeeding term. We are not disposed to hold under the cir-
cumstances shown here that the power of the court to continue
‘the case and to decline to dismiss it under rule 215.1 must be
exercised at the dismissal term.” (Loc. cit. 923)

In the case at bar the court in ordering a continuance
under rule 200 retained jurisdiction and jurisdiction to retry
“as the court directs” was not lost.

Ill. We find no error in the trial court’s refusal to dis-
miss complainant’s petition.

The case is affirmed with direction to the trial court to
proceed to final disposition of the case.—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

Myrriz I. Levicx, appellant, v. Howarp M. Levick, appellee.

No. 52689.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 102)

346 Le |

Novemper 14, 1967.

Dayton W. Countryman, of Nevada, for appellant.
Dan W. Woods, of State Center, for appellee.

LzGranp, J—On August 238, 1966, after forty-three years
and four months of marriage, plaintiff filed a petition for di-
voree. She alleged therein that defendant had been guilty of
such inhuman treatment as to endanger her life and that he
had committed adultery.

The trial court found plaintiff had failed to prove these
charges by a preponderance of the evidence and dismissed the
action. She asks us to reverse that decision.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on April 18, 1923.
They had two children, a daughter, Donna Jeanne, and a son,
Louis. Both children are now married and have for some
years lived in their own homes separate from their parents.

ye [| 347

In 1924 defendant struck plaintiff with a broom, for which
misconduct he was convicted of assault and battery and fined
in Municipal Court in Marshalltown, Iowa. In 1925 he threw
a bucket at plaintiff, causing her some slight injury to one foot
and ankle. About that time, too, defendant threw plaintiff's
clothing into the front yard where it remained for two days
and “was rained on” while the parties debated who was to
retrieve it.

In 1931 plaintiff was ill and was hospitalized for a short
period. Apparently defendant was inattentive to her during
this illness. In 1946 plaintiff again was ill and again defendant
was unsympathetic.

Until an event in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1966, which will
be discussed later, these are the only specific instances to
which plaintiff refers as constituting defendant’s cruelty. Her
complaints are general in nature and vague in content, consist-
ing of charges that defendant is ill-tempered, hateful, disagree-
able, irritable and overbearing. Much of the other evidence,
however, particularly that of the son, Louis, tends to dispute
such allegations.

In 1966 plaintiff and defendant visited their married
daughter in Phoenix. They intended to stay three weeks. One
purpose of the visit was to obtain a demonstrator automobile
at reduced cost from the daughter’s employer. There was no
marital trouble at this time. The evidence shows both were
looking forward to the trip. They intended to visit their
daughter, obtain their car, and drive home. The matters of
which plaintiff now complains did not then loom large in her
life. Upon arriving in Phoenix, defendant learned the car
would not be available as soon as promised. He became upset
at the delay. He quarreled with his daughter, but not with
his wife, about the incident. As a result of this unpleasant
situation, defendant returned home after a few days. Plaintiff
stayed with her daughter. At this time there was still no dis-
cussion of divorce. The record, in fact, discloses no conflict
between plaintiff and defendant during defendant’s short stay
in Phoenix.

After returning home defendant did not communicate with

348 PC 7

plaintiff, nor she with him, for several weeks. One apparently
was equally.as stubborn as the other. Ultimately, however,
defendant wrote his daughter apologizing for his: display of
temper. About this same time Louis Levick: telephoned his
mother and suggested that she come home. He also suggested
that she communicate with defendant concerning their differ-
ences. Plaintiff refused to do this. Plaintiff also, on at least
one oceasion, refused to talk to defendant on the telephone.

Somewhat belatedly defendant wrote plaintiff, but this letter,
if anything, merely aggravated the situation. Things went
from bad to worse. Defendant did finally have a telephone
conversation with plaintiff, during which she said she was
never coming home. Shortly thereafter defendant terminated
her right to draw on their joint checking account. Generally
during this period the conduct of neither party commends it-
self. It must be said, however, defendant at least made an
effort at reconciliation. It was perhaps a clumsy one and it
was certainly ineffective; but he tried. Plaintiff did nothing.

It is ironic that this marriage, which had undoubtedly
survived more serious threats, should be here over an incident
so insignificant in itself. After rearing their children and
seeing them settled in their own lives; after accumulating a
substantial estate; after living together for almost half a cen-
tury, these parties reached an impasse over, of all things, the
purchase of an automobile. Now plaintiff insists her marriage
‘has become unbearable. To prove this she places reliance on
‘events of the remote past, most of which, until triggered by the
trivial event in Phoenix, were of small importance and caused
no marital discord.

«HEME 1. With this background we discuss first plaintifi’s
charge of inhuman treatment such as to endanger her life. It
is unnecessary to set out the principles governing this type
of case. They have been considered by us many times, and we
recently recapitulated them in Beno v. Beno, 260 Iowa 442,
149 N.W.2d 778. Among the matters reaffirmed there are
these: (1) Our review is-de novo, but we give considerable
weight to the findings of fact by the trial court; (2) the statute
requires inhuman treatment to be such that it endangers the

a ee 349

plaintiff’s life, which may be shown by impairment of health
or by reasonable apprehension such impairment will occur;
and (3) we should consider the entire history of the marriage,
not merely isolated acts, in determining whether grounds for
divorce exist.

‘We have observed these rules here. We have gone
back to 1923 and have carefully considered plaintiff's charges.
The specific instances to which she refers could perhaps have
been the basis for divorce early in the marriage, but it is dif-
ficult for us to find events occurring more than forty years ago
may be urged now as showing plaintiff’s health has been im-
paired or her life endangered. There must be some limit to
judicial credulity. We think it has been reached here.

Neither can we place much stock in plaintiff’s allegation
concerning this defendant’s unbearable attitude and general
conduct. Her accusations are too hazy and indefinite, and
corroboration is so unconvincing we must hold plaintiff has
failed to prove these allegations. Furthermore, we are con-
siderably impressed by the testimony of Louis Levick, who
exhibited affection for both his parents and showed admirable
fairness toward each. His testimony bolsters defendant’s claim
that plaintiff's accusations are grossly exaggerated.

As far as cruelty is concerned, this leaves for discussion
only the incident in Phoenix in 1966. Defendant’s conduct
there was indeed boorish and inexcusable. We agree with the
trial court in characterizing it as “childish.” However, plain-
tiff’s was little better. Each displayed an amazing tenacity
and determination not to give in, but we find nothing in this
event that would justify a divorce, either alone or considered
with the other testimony produced by the plaintiff. Considering
the whole record and taking into account the entire experience
of this long marriage, we find, as did the trial court, the evi-
dence fails to show any inhuman treatment which would en-
danger plaintiff’s life.

In reaching this conclusion we are influenced by the
length of time this marriage has endured and the fact that no
complaint has been made by plaintiff concerning defendant’s
conduct until now. Although condonation was not pleaded

350 Le |

and is not relied upon as an affirmative defense, nevertheless
we may properly consider it in determining the effect which
the alleged misconduct has had upon the wronged spouse and
in deciding whether such treatment has endangered her life.
Elliott v. Elliott, 259 Iowa 1286, 1291, 147 N.W.2d 907, 909;
Weatherill v. Weatherill, 238 Iowa 169, 185, 25 N.W.2d 336,
345, and citations.

II. Plaintiff also accused defendant of adultery on
two separate occasions which occurred some twenty-five years
apart. Again we go back to 1925 to consider plaintiff's first
allegation. She states defendant spent the night in the bed-
room of a young girl identified only as Gladys. According to
defendant this sounds worse than it really was. Defendant
admits the incident but denies any impropriety. The circum-
stances, as related by him, were that there had been a “home
brew” party at his sister-in-law’s home, attended by several
couples, including plaintiff and defendant. For reasons that
are unexplained in the record all of the group stayed over-
night. Plaintiff slept in one room with her daughter, who was
then a small child. The others, consisting of three or four
couples, all’slept fully clothed in other bedrooms. Defendant
was in the bedroom with Gladys. He categorically denied
sexual intercourse or other misconduct with her. Defendant’s
explanation of this event was not challenged by plaintiff. If
she desired to rely upon this as a ground for divorce, we cannot
understand why she postponed her complaint until now. We
recognize that this is not necessarily fatal to plaintiff's rights
but we take into consideration the fact this alleged misconduct
oceurred in 1925; no complaint was made concerning it until
now; it apparently caused no rift in the married life of these
parties; and defendant’s explanation is not seriously disputed
by plaintiff, who produced no evidence whatever tending to
substantiate her claim of misconduct. When all these factors
are considered, we find plaintiff has failed to sustain her be-
lated accusation.

Plaintiff levels one other specific charge of adultery against
defendant. This involves alleged intimacy between plaintiff’s
stepmother and defendant, occurring sometime in the early

— a 351

1950’s. The exact date is not set out, although the record shows
that the stepmother died in 1958. She was then 73 years old,
fourteen years older than defendant. Plaintiff testified de-
fendant some years later volunteered the information that he
had sexual intercourse with her stepmother. This admission
was allegedly made also to plaintiff’s brother and sister-in-law,
both of whom so testified by deposition. Defendant vigorously
denied both the accusation itself and the statement.

If plaintiff is to be granted a divorce, it must be upon
this ground alone. It is the only allegation for which there is
any substantial support in the record.

Defendant denies having had sexual intercourse with
plaintiff’s stepmother. Defendant testified he “had never
touched or had any physical contact of any kind” with her.
Defendant denied also the statements concerning sexual inter-
course attributed to him by three witnesses.

HH This question must be resolved upon the credibility of
the witnesses. Plaintiff’s version, supported by the depositions
of two witnesses, is irreconcilable with defendant’s testimony,
which is uncorroborated. As previously mentioned we are not
bound by the findings of the trial court, but we place consid-
erable reliance thereon, particularly when the credibility of
witnesses is directly involved, as it is here. We said in Cimi-
jotti v. Cimijotti, 255 Iowa 77, 79, 121 N.W.2d 587, 538: “In
matters of this nature, so much depends upon the credibility of
the witnesses and their attitude, appearance and demeanor
upon the witness stand that we give considerable weight to
the decision of the trial court who had the opportunity to ob-
serve them testify.” See also Klepper v. Klepper, 234 Iowa
1188, 1142, 15 N.W.2d 218, 215; Lemkuhl v. Lemkuhl, 259 Iowa
686, 145 N.W.2d 456, 460; Murray v. Murray, 244 Iowa 548,
558, 57 N.W.2d 284, 237, and citations.

We have also said several times the utter improbability
of many of the charges together with the plaintiff’s attitude,
sincerity and demeanor may be significant. Clough v. Clough,
248 Iowa 1090, 1098, 84 N.W.2d 16, 20; Baker v. Baker, 252
Towa 1161, 1163, 110 N.W.2d 286, 237; Bullocks v. Bullocks,
259 Towa 496, 144 N.W.2d 924, 926; Iowa Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 344(f) (7).

5

The trial court found credibility to be on the side of the
defendant and rejected plaintiff’s version as being unworthy of
belief. In doing so the trial court specifically pointed out the
improbability of plaintifi’s accusation and the evidence sup-
porting it. The trial court further found the testimony of
plaintiff and her corroborating witnesses unsatisfactory and
lacking in persuasion. We recognize, as pointed out in Jensen
v. Jensen, 261 Iowa 38, 152 N.W.2d 829, 832, the trial judge
has no advantage in weighing testimony given by deposition.
But we recognize, too, the principal witnesses here are plaintiff
and defendant. On the whole record we are not inclined to
disagree with the trial court’s findings.

We hold the trial court was right in dismissing plaintiff’s
petition and we affirm. Before leaving this case we repeat the
exhortation we delivered in Elliott v. Elliott and Lemkuhl v.
Lemkuhl, both supra. It is unfortunate the parties have
found it necessary to seek here an answer which can come only
from “a little patience, a spirit of forgiveness and a measure of
tolerance for the frailties of human nature.” It is hoped the
matter of reconciliation will receive further consideration,
terminating in a happy solution of their differences.—Affirmed,

All Justices concur.

Cxom, O. Mussenman, appellant, v. Centra TELEPHONE
Company, employer-appellee, and ZurtoH INsuRANcE
Company, insurance carrier-appellee.

No. 52671.
(Reported in 154 N,W.2d 128)

oO
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oO
= al

&

November 14, 1967.

Ulstad & Guinan, of Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Bastian, Beisser & Carlson, of Fort Dodge, for appellees.

Rawzines, J.—Claimant-employee contends he sustained
personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment with defendant.

3

He appeals from a judgment of the district court affirming
the Iowa Industrial Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

Three errors are assigned as a basis for reversal: (1) There
is no substantial evidence supporting the conclusion claimant
did not receive an injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment; (2) as a matter of law claimant proved an injury
so incurred; and (3) the commissioner and arbitrator did not
make findings of fact which support a denial of benefits.

I. Claimant’s status as an employee of defendant at the
time here concerned is not disputed.

HI The deputy commissioner, and on review the commis-
sioner, both found that at time of the subject incident claimant
was clearly within the course, or scope, of his employment. As
this court explained in Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 280
Towa 108, 116, 296 N.W. 800, “in the course of employment”
means, at a place where it was the duty of an employee to be,
at a time when he was properly doing his work, and while in
the performance thereof.

The sole issue presented is whether the condition upon
which claimant bases right to relief “arose out of his employ-
ment”.

Stated otherwise, did claimant establish, by the necessary
quantum of proof, a causal connection between the conditions
under which work was performed and the resulting injury,
ie, did an injury follow as a natural incident of the work?
Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., supra.

See also Daggett v. Nebraska-Hastern Express, Inc., 252
Towa 841, 346, 107 N.W.2d 102, and 17 Iowa Law Review 355-
364,

HEME 1. Sections 86,29 and 86.30, Code 1962, have been
tepeatedly construed as making the commissioner’s findings of
fact conelusive on appeal where the evidence is in dispute or
reasonable minds may differ on the inferences fairly to be
drawn from the disclosed facts. If the evidence presents a
question which should be submitted to a jury, if trial were to
a jury, then the courts are bound by the commissioner’s find-
ings.

In eases, however, where the facts are not in dispute and

56

different inferences could not be reasonably drawn therefrom,
it becomes a question of law and the court is not bound by the
commissioner’s findings or conclusions.

Hl It is the commissioner, not the court, who weighs the
evidence and his findings will be broadly and liberally con-
strued to uphold, rather than defeat, his decision.

Of course, a claimant has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence, before the commissioner, the
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

HL Our question is not whether there is sufficient evidence
to warrant a decision the commissioner did not make, but rather
whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the decision he
did make.

In support of the foregoing see Bergen v. Waterloo Regis-
ter Co., 260 Iowa 888, 151 N.W.2d 469, 471; Nelson v. Cities
Service Oil Co., 259 Iowa 1209, 146 N.W.2d 261, 263; Crees v.
Sheldahl Telephone Co., 258 Iowa 292, 139 N.W.2d 190, 192,
193; and Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 518, 519, 183
N.W.2d 867.

III. An examination of the testimony is necessary in order
to determine if there is sufficient competent evidence to support
the commissioner’s decision.

At time of hearing before the deputy commissioner claim-
ant was 64 and had been employed by defendant 33 years.

He claims to have been injured January 11, 1963. At that
time he was working as a stockman, ordering stock, putting it
away, taking care of material for installers’ trucks, carrying
mail, and collecting money from pay stations. In carrying out
this work assignment he at times lifted containers weighing up
to approximately 40 pounds. Whenever heavier lifting was
required other employees would assist him. He was doing no
such heavy lifting at the time of the alleged injury.

In fact it is his contention that at the time here concerned
he was leaning against a wall for balance while putting an
overshoe on the left foot with his right hand, gave it a jerk,
then noticed a sharp knifelike pain on the left side of the lower
back. The next day he had difficulty in getting out of bed,

so

eould not sit down, had trouble in walking, and did not go to
work. Two days later he was able to and did resume work.

February 14 he complained of pain to the plant superin-
tendent. With the assistance of this superintendent an injury
report was prepared.

From February 18 to March 18, he was absent, and upon
returning worked again until May, performing the same duties
as before.

The record discloses claimant was treated in 1945 by
Doctor Sehwendemann, a chiropractor, for a sore back. The
same year he was given treatments by Doctor Lungren, an
osteopath, because of the same difficulty. In 1961, Doctor
Holmes, a chiropractor, was called upon to treat him for a
sore back resulting from starting a mower.

Following the overshoe incident, and on January 15, 1963,
claimant again saw Doctor Holmes. He told the doctor that
January 11, 1968, while putting on the overshoe, he felt a pain
in the lower back. The trouble was diagnosed as a lumbosacral
sprain, with pain radiating into hip and down the left leg.
This doctor said the pain, such as related to him by claimant,
could be caused from shoveling snow or any form of twisting if
severe enough. X rays revealed a slight curvature caused by
muscle spasm, but no abnormality in alignment of vertebra. It
was not recommended claimant engage in bowling activities.
Doctor Holmes’ opinion was, claimant would not be able to sit
in one position very long, but could possibly do light work.
He did not know whether claimant had vascular insufficiency
of the lower extremities. As stated by him, a doctor takes the
information given by a patient as to an existing condition and
from that draws his own conclusions.

Doctor Stitt, a physician specializing in orthopedic prob-
lems, saw claimant February 14, 1963. Claimant then said he
had been making a mail delivery, leaned over to put on some
boots, and noticed some discomfort in his back which became
quite severe the next day. Based on history given, this doctor
was under the impression claimant had an acute lumbar muscle
sprain, possibly a dise protrusion producing some radicular
pain in the left leg, but only observation and time would help

SE

decide the matter. The claimant was not examined for any
vascular insufficiency. Doctor Stitt also stated bowling and
twisting would cause a flare-up of back pain and soreness. He
had no knowledge as to claimant's bowling but did advise him
that activity would certainly aggravate the condition. He was
of the opinion claimant could do light work, but could not lift
50- or 60-pound objects. X rays taken disclosed conditions
essentially normal with slight curvature but no disc trouble.
He also said getting in and out of ears and road hunting would
aggravate claimant’s back condition.

Doctor Summers, a practicing physician for 20 years, an
instructor and assistant professor at the University of Iowa,
engaged in practice as an orthopedic surgeon, specializing in
neurology, also testified. He twice examined claimant.

The first time, March 31, 1964, the overshoe incident was
reported to this doctor and he was told that when walking
claimant experienced pain in the left hip, found it necessary to
sit on his right buttock most of the time, and pain in both thighs,
experienced when walking, subsided when he stopped. Claim-
ant also said he had been impotent the last four or five years,
with complete loss of sexual powers. X rays were taken. The
doctor then thought it possible the pain described was of a
radicular type such as that attributed to a herniated dise in
the lower lumbar spine. However, he believed the objective
findings supporting such a diagnosis were minimal, that the
symptoms might in large part be due to poor circulation in
claimant’s lower extremities, and further study should be made.

At time of the second examination by Doctor Summers,
May 25, X rays were again taken. He was then unable to feel
any pulse in either of claimant’s lower extremities. There was
a bruit or abnormal noise in each groin. An oscillometer was
used to measure circulation in the legs. Both limbs were ex-
amined and the excursion was 44 unit to 1 unit where normally
it should be 6 to 7 units. This was deemed compatible with
poor circulation in the lower extremities. He got no. achilles
reflex on either side and elicited no foot reflexes or plantar re-
sponses, The X rays disclosed extensive calcification in the
walls of the abdominal aorta. At time of this second examina-

es !

tion there was an appearance of pain with exercise which was
relieved with rest. Doctor Summers deemed this, and claim-
ant’s history of impotency, as significant.

In addition the X rays showed signs of early arthritis and
narrowing of the vertebral spaces between lumbar 5 and
sacral 1. There was tenderness in the sciatic notch area on the
first examination which has something to do with blood vessels.
This orthopedic neurologist stated, pain in the hip is a very
eommon finding in vascular insufficiency, mimicking a her-
niated disc, and it is often very difficult to differentiate the two.

After the second examination there was no doubt in his mind
claimant’s difficulty was due to vascular insufficiency in the
lower extremities and in no way due to any injury. He found
evidence claimant had suffered a heart attack years before
which is an actual vascular disease. His testimony discloses
this disease does not develop instantaneously, that it had been
progressing for some time and suddenly made its appearance
at the time of the overshoe incident. He said when claimant
was putting on the overshoe he had a stroke in the blood
vessel to the buttock area, one of the branches to the sciatic
nerve, and there comes a time when it is the straw that breaks
the camel’s back; that claimant could have been standing in
chureh holding a heavy Bible and the same thing could have
appeared.

Hl lv. This court has previously held, if a claimant had
a preexisting condition or disability, aggravated, accelerated,
worsened or “lighted up” by an injury which arose out of and
in the course of employment resulting in a disability found to
exist, he would be accordingly entitled to compensation. See
Nicks v. Davenport Produce Co., 254 Iowa 180, 184, 185, 115
N.W.2d 812, and citations.
|_| However, a disease which under any rational work
is likely to progress so as to finally disable an employee does
not become a “personal injury” under our Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act merely because it reaches a point of disablement
while work for an employer is being pursued. It is only when
there is a direct causal connection between exertion of the em-
ployment and the injury that a compensation award can be

360

made. The question is whether the diseased condition was the
cause, or whether the employment was a proximate contri-
buting cause. Littell v. Lagomarcino Grupe Co., 235 Iowa 523,
529, 17 N.W.2d 120, and citations. See also California Notion
& Toy Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 59 Cal. App. 225, 210
P. 524; and annotations, 19 A.L.R. 101; 28 ALR. 206; 80
ALR. 1804,

V. Claimant contends the conclusion he did not receive
an injury as alleged is not supported by substantial evidence.
and as a matter of law he proved otherwise. As previously
stated the burden was upon him to prove his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and we have frequently pointed
out that absent an admission by his adversary it is not often a
party having that burden establishes it as a matter of law.

The commissioner was not compelled to accept the
opinion of any testifying medical expert. The fair inferences
to be drawn from all the medical testimony, the histories re-
lated by claimant to the various doctors, and other evidence
surrounding the alleged injury may well support a finding his
back condition arose independently of any work related in-
cident.

In support of the foregoing see Bodish v. Fischer, Inc.,
supra, loe. cit., 257 Iowa 520.

VI. Furthermore this court has held, in de-
termining whether an injury or disease has a direct causal con-
nection with the employment, or arose independently thereof,
it is essentially within the domain of expert testimony, and the
weight to be given such an opinion is for the finder of the facts.
‘When an expert’s opinion is based upon an incomplete history
it is not necessarily binding on the commissioner or the court.
It is then to be weighed, together with the other facts and cir-
cumstances, the ultimate conclusion being for the finder of the
fact. See Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., supra, loc. cit., 257 Iowa 521,
522.

HM VI. Without repeating the factual situation here
involved we are satisfied it discloses a conflict in the evidence,
or that reasonable minds could differ on the inferences fairly
to be drawn from the facts.

Ss

Even if the testimony of Doctor Summers to the effect he
entertained no doubt but that claimant’s difficulty was due to
vascular insufficiency in the lower extremities in no way due
to an injury be disregarded, it still remains the evidence is
such that reasonable minds could differ on the proper inference
to be given as to causation. The inference of long affliction
with vascular insufficiency is here more than mere speculation,
and a factual question, determinable by the commissioner, was
generated as to whether claimant’s back condition had any
connection with the overshoe incident, His finding on that
issue, adverse to claimant, is fully supported by the evidence
and we have no good cause to disagree.

HN sVIlI. Furthermore there is no merit in claimant’s
contention the commissioner and arbitrator did not make
findings of fact or give rational reasons supporting their re-
spective decisions.

Section 86.25, Code 1962, provides: “The decision of the
industrial commissioner in any case on review before him shall
be in writing, filed in his office, and shall set forth his findings
of fact and conclusions of law.”

As heretofore stated the commissioner, not the court,
weighs the evidence, and his findings are liberally construed to
uphold rather than defeat the decision.

There is no such deficiency in the findings of the commis-
sioner as to nullify his conclusions.

IX. Having determined the commissioner’s findings are
sustained by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, we have no alternative but to uphold the
trial court’s judgment.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

362 Le 7

Svar Reaury, appellant, v. ArtuHur L. Srrawu et ux., appellees.

No. 52643.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 148)

November 14, 1967.

Stewart, Miller, Wimer, Brennan & Joyce, of Des Moines,
for appellant.

Witmer, Needham & Riemenschneider, of Des Moines, for
appellees.

a De 368

Sruart, J—Star Realty brought this action at law in the
Des Moines Municipal Court seeking to recover a real-estate
commission. It claimed defendants failed to perform a con-
tract of sale by refusing to deliver possession to a ready, will-
ing and able purchaser who then rescinded the contract. The
trial court allowed plaintiff its “out of pocket” expenses but
denied recovery of the commission. Plaintiff appealed. De-
fendants did not cross-appeal.

On June 29, 1965, defendants entered into a multiple list-
ing contract for the sale of their home. On August 31, 1965,
the Swansons executed an offer to buy defendants’ property.
The offer was accepted by defendants on September 2, 1965.
Possession date was “on or about October 1.” The contract
was subject to approval for a G. I. loan. Such approval was
obtained on October 10. Defendants refused to sign the deed
or deliver possession of the property until after January 1,
1966. Purchasers refused to wait for possession past October
22, 1965, and rescinded the contract.

A literal reading of the offer to buy indicates plaintiff had
furnished a buyer and would be entitled to its commission. The
controversy centers around an alleged oral understanding of
the purpose of the “possession date” of “on or about October 1.”
Defendants claim the real-estate agent knew Mrs. Strahl was
ill and was to have an operation. He was told they did not
know when they could give possession and that the date of
October 1 was put in the contract so the loan could be ap-
proved. The actual date of possession was to be agreed upon
later.

HM i. Plaintiff assigns as error the failure of the trial
court to exclude testimony of such oral understanding as an
attempt to vary the terms of a written instrument in violation
of the parol-evidence rule. Defendants claim plaintiff waived
any right to object to certain testimony admitted over the
objection because it had introduced evidence as to the mean-
ing of such “possession date.” As we agree, we need not con-
sider the applicability of the parol-evidence rule.

The testimony in question is that of Mrs. Strahl. It is
certainly not a model of clarity. Plaintiff called her as an

364 Le a

adverse witness, On direct examination she testified: “It is
true that the possession date was obtained on October Ist or
thereabouts in 1965. I accepted that offer, but that isn’t what
Mr. Scott told me, * * *.”

She was later asked by plaintiff:

“Q. Let me ask you, when this provision in the contract
stated that possession was to be given on or about October 1,
and you signed this, what did that mean to you? A. Well, he
told me that it was just a date so that the loan would go
through. It was an agreement between the two people.

" “Q. And had the loan been approved on October 1, you
would have relinquished possession? A. If I was in the hospital
then, we would have discussed it. I was in the hospital the
4th to the 8th.”

On cross-examination she was asked what the discussion
was with Scott about her physical condition at the time the
offer to buy was signed. After the objection was overruled
she proceeded to amplify answers previously given on direct
examination.

On redirect examination she was asked about a telephone
conversation with Mr. Hannam of Star Realty. She testified:
«* * * he called up and said he was going to sue me, and I told
him that Mr. Scott said that he told the other people that I was
going to have surgery, and they would wait. And I understood
they would wait. And when he called and said the Swansons
were coming to look at the house, I said had Scott explained
anything to them, and he said no. I was willing to give them
the house, if they would understand that they had to wait for
it. Like I explained to them, I wanted it sold.”

Later Mrs. Strahl testified in her own behalf without ob-
jection as follows:

“I signed the offer on September 21st, 1965. We discussed
the terms and the conditions of the offer with Mr. Scott. He
wanted me to sign the offer at that time because he told me
the loan company would approve it if I would approve it, and
that a later date, 60 days before I could give possession on the
house, he told me no loan company could approve a loan that
far, and he said October Ist we could put it on and then we

Ye Le 365

and the people, we could. I advised Mr. Scott of my physical
condition. I did and I stipulated that I wanted the people to
understand before I signed that, and he said he would take it
over there right that day, and when I hadn’t heard anything I
assumed that they were waiting. I signed the offer but he was
supposed to ask the people if they would wait. He assured me
that there wasn’t any rush for them to move out.”

Objections were interposed to subsequent questions on the
same proposition which were overruled.

On cross-examination she testified :

“The understanding was, he told me the date didn’t matter.

“Q. Then, why did you say to the Swansons that ideally it
wouldn’t obtain until after January? A. Because Mr. Scott told
me when I went to the hospital nobody could kick me out of
the house. That was his exact words.”

Plaintiff, having itself opened the field of inquiry into the
meaning or intent of the October Ist possession date, is in no
position to object when defendants pursued the same line of
questioning on cross-examination. Also when plaintiff failed
to object to testimony by Mrs. Strahl given in her own behalf,
it waived the right to object to further questions on the same
subject matter propounded to the same witness and the court
did not commit reversible error in overruling such belated ob-
jections. Glatstein v. Grund, 243 Iowa 541, 51 N.W.2d 162,
168, 36 A.L.R.2d 581; Wilson v. Wilson, 192 Iowa 646, 654, 185
N.W. 97; Stutsman v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 180 Iowa 524,
582, 163 N.W. 580; 88 C.J.S. 234, 236, Trial, sections 115(2), 116.

|| Tf there was no agreement on possession date, as the
trial court apparently found, plaintiff did not furnish a buyer
ready, willing and able to purchase on terms acceptable to de-
fendants.

We find no merit in the assigned errors and therefore
affirm the trial court— Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except Rawxmes, J., who concurs in
result.

366 a

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. FLorence Eva Masrurs, appellant.

No. 52719.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 133)

Novemprr 14, 1967.

ee Pe 367

Marlyn S. Jensen, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, William A. Claer-
hout, Assistant Attorney General, and Ron Kuntz, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.

Swe, J—Except for the integrity of the judicial process it
would be difficult to justify this appeal. Involved is a fine of
$25 imposed in municipal court following a finding of guilty of
shoplifting merchandise valued at 54 cents.

The printed record before us includes 65 pages of verbatim
questions and answers with no attempt to abstract. It appears
to be a complete copy of the reporter’s transcript and contains
many pages of matter immaterial to appellate review. We dis-
approve of such procedure.

The record is so replete with repetitious questions that the
impatience of the trial judge can be explained. However, we
cannot approve the way in which cross-examination was sum-
marily curtailed.

Defendant was charged in municipal court with shoplifting
in violation of section 709.20, Code of Iowa. She pleaded not
guilty, was tried before the court without the aid of a jury and
found guilty.

Just before noon on April 10, 1967, defendant was shopping
in the grocery and home center department of Hinky Dinky
Market. She selected and placed in her shopping cart over
$12 worth of merchandise. A clerk who was watching her
testified that he saw her select two “toilet deodorizers and
put them in her purse, and then she went to the checkout and
checked out. She opened her purse and paid for her groceries,
but not what was in there.” After an objection the witness
continued :

“A, And she checked out, and as she walked out the door
the manager and I stopped her and asked her if she had any-

368 | 7

thing in her purse that she hadn’t paid for, and she pulled out
those two items.

“Q. She say anything else? A. She said she didn’t know
why she had taken them, because she said she didn’t do things
like that.”

The items were identified and received in evidence. Their
value was stated to total 54 cents.

The witness who had watched defendant from a lookout
testified at some length and in detail as to defendant’s actions
while shopping. He said defendant closed her purse after
placing the deodorizers therein. The clerk called the store
manager. The manager and clerk stopped defendant as she
was on the electric mat that opens the outside door. The
manager testified:

“Q. (By Mr. Kuntz) What was the conversation you had
with the defendant? A. I asked her if she didn’t have some-
thing that she didn’t pay for.

“Q. What did she reply, if anything? A. She said yes,
and I asked her if she wouldn’t mind stepping to the side and
show me.

“Q. What did she do, if anything? A. At that time she
opened her purse and took the items out of her purse.

oe eH

“Q. What did she do with them ater she took them from
her purse? A. She handed them to me.

“Q. Did you ask for them? A. I didn’t ask for them.
She took them out of her purse and handed them to me.

“Q. Did you have any other conversation with her? A.
Yes, we went over to the side there. We have a room off of our
office there where we store bottles and asked her if she’d like to
step over by this door, and I asked her why she did it, and she
said she didn’t know. She said she didn’t have a reason, and
I told her I just couldn’t understand it. That was about it.”

Defendant, testifying in her own behalf, testified at length
as to her occupation, assets, health, previous surgery, worry
about being chased while going home from work at night, and
her surprise when she realized that she had not paid for the
two small items. She said that she had placed the deodorizers
in her open purse to keep them away from her groceries. She

| | 369

said she forgot them while checking out and that when she
realized her mistake she intended to go back, buy stamps and
then pay for the deodorizers. She denied any intent to steal.

In connection with the cross-examination of the clerk (a
State’s witness) we find no objections by counsel for the State
but this record appears:

“The Court: Just a minute, he’s already went over that.

“Mr. Jensen: I beg your pardon?

“The Court: He’s already went into it a couple of times
what her actions were from start to finish.

“Mr. Jensen: But I want it in detail.

“The Court: You can go all day asking it over and over
again. Is there anything new you want to ask this man about?

“Mr, Jensen: I would like to know in more detail what
happened.—

“The Court: He has already testified to what the defendant
did. Have you anything new?

“Mr. Jensen: Well, I think it is, Your Honor. I think it is,
and that—I’d like to Imow his actions in how he stopped her
and not only—

“The Court: He’s already testified to it.

ch ee

“The Court: You have already asked all the questions you
are going to ask as to the movements of this woman as testified
to by this witness. Is there any new matter that you want to
bring up?

“Mr. Jensen: No further questions pursuant to Your Hon-
or’s indication.

“(Witness excused.)”

I. There was ample evidence to support a finding of guilty
and the sufficiency of the evidence has not been challenged.

I. Because of the small value of the merchandise taken
the offense charged here was a misdemeanor.

Section 709.20, Code of Iowa, makes it a crime to willfully

take possession of merchandise with intention of converting
the same without paying therefor.

HH Intent, which is an element of the offense, is a matter
difficult to prove or disprove by direct’evidence. It is ordinarily
a conclusion drawn from the circumstances surrounding the act.

370 | a

HH In the case before us exploration of the acts and con-
versations when defendant was stopped at the door of the
store should have been permitted. We do not know what fur-
ther questions might have been asked or what answers might
have been given. We are not even suggesting that further
cross-examination of the State’s witness would have helped
defendant. We are saying that neither the trial court nor we
should speculate relative thereto.

HM The scope and extent of cross-examination is subject
to the considerable discretion of the trial court, but that dis-
eretion should only be exercised after the right of cross-exami-
nation has been fully and fairly exercised.

Crogss-examination is a valuable right to be jealously guard-
ed “and a rather wide latitude is usually permitted.” Wheatley
v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 710, 102 N.W.2d 343, 353; Barnard
v. Cedar Rapids City Cab Co., 257 Iowa 784, 759, 183 N.W.2d
884, 900; State v. Myers, 257 Iowa 857, 861, 185 N.W.2d 73.

HH In the case before us defendant’s cross-examination of
the State’s witnesses was repetitious and undoubtedly irritating
to the trial judge but it was also summarily and arbitrarily
terminated. This was error.

II. Defendant urges that she was not afforded a fair and
impartial. trial. Except for the matters considered, supra, in
Division II we find nothing in the record to support this claim.

IV. Relying on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Hd.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, defendant claims
error in that there was no showing that her constitutional
rights had been protected when questioned by the store employ-
ees. There was no police or custodial interrogation. We find
nothing in Miranda applicable to this case. See People v. Frank,
52 Mise.2d 266, 275 N.Y. S.2d 570.

Defendant’s claim is without merit.

V. The value of the merchandise taken was trifling. The
charge against defendant was a misdemeanor with a modest
penalty. The ameunts involved would not justify the time,
effort and expense incident to a trial and appeal. There are,
however, other justifications,

Shoplifting is no trifling matter to merchants and may not

Le 371

properly be ignored. Most people dislike being convicted of
stealing even small amounts.

HI Regardless of the amounts involved the accusers and
the accused are equally entitled to their day in court and a
fair trial.

For the reason stated in Division II, supra, the case is re-
versed and remanded for a new trial—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur.

State or Iowa, appellee, v. FrankuIn Ray Mercer, appellant,

No. 52818,
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 140)

372 Le

Novemper 14, 1967.

Ben BE. Kubby, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and William <A.
Claerhout, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee,

Garrieip, C. J.—Following indictment and trial defendant
was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
third offense, in violation of section 321.281, Code, 1962. There
is ample evidence to support the conviction.

Defendant’s sole contention upon this appeal is that he was
denied a fair trial by claimed misconduct of the State’s attorney
in asking a total of three unanswered questions on cross-exami-
nation of two so-called character witnesses for defendant. The
trial court thought there was no such misconduct as deprived de-
fendant of a fair trial. We hold the court’s ruling was not a clear
abuse of its discretion in such matters and affirm the conviction.

I. Only brief reference to the record is necessary. Be-
fore he was called as a witness and before the State made any
attack on his honesty, defendant attempted to show he was
honest and told the truth.

W. H. Smith, defendant’s first witness, testified that from
his personal knowledge and talks with others he had formed an
opinion as to defendant’s reputation in the community of truth
and veracity. Asked for that opinion, the witness answered: “I
would say he’s honest and tells the truth.” On cross-examina-
tion the witness was asked “Have you heard the rumors and re-

| | [| 378

ports in and about the community that this defendant has been
arrested some 18 times for intoxication?”

Before this question was answered, the court ruled that at
the then stage of the trial defendant’s reputation and character
were irrelevant and immaterial, struck the witness’ testimony
and the question asked by the prosecutor and admonished the
jury to disregard the matter stricken. No complaint is made of
the ruling.

After defendant testified in his own behalf and said on cross-
examination he had been convicted of a felony, defendant re-
called witness Smith who testified “he would say defendant was
honest, tells the truth. As far as conduct while he was around
defendant he was a good citizen.” (Emphasis added.)

The prosecutor asked Mr. Smith on cross-examination
“Do you know anything about this defendant’s reputation in the
community for sobriety?” Objection to the question as incom-
petent, irrelevant, immaterial and highly prejudicial was made
and sustained. The court was not asked to admonish the jury
to disregard the question.

We are not sure the quoted question was improper in view
of testimony on direct examination that defendant was a good
citizen. In any event, we are not justified in holding, contrary
to the view of the trial court, the mere asking of the question was
misconduct of the questioner which was so prejudicial as to deny
defendant a fair trial. The witness was not asked to state what
defendant’s reputation for sobriety in the community was. There
is no way of knowing whether his answer, if permitted, would
have been prejudicial or favorable to defendant.

Walter R. Virden was the second so-called character witness
defendant called. He testified on direct examination: “I never
heard anybody ever say anything against Mr. Mercer. If he told
you he would do something he would do it. The defendant’s
name would just come up when they were talking about this or
that. As far as he is concerned the defendant’s reputation in
this community as far as truth and veracity is good.” (Emphasis
added.)

The cross-examiner asked this one question: “Do you have
an opinion as to this defendant’s reputation for sobriety?” De-

374 Le |

fendant’s objection to the question as incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial, and highly improper was sustained. Again, the
court was not asked to admonish the jury to disregard the ques-
tion. Admonishing the jury might only have emphasized the
matter. State v. Long, 250 Iowa 326-335, 98 N.W.2d 744, 749.
This unanswered question called for an affirmative or negative
answer. As indicated, this witness was also not asked to express
any opinion and there is no way of knowing whether an answer
to the quoted question, if permitted, would have been prejudicial
or favorable to defendant.

A third witness testified that in his opinion defendant was
truthful, whatever he said “that’s it, he isn’t going to deviate
from the truth.” A fourth witness testified he believed defendant
was “quite dependable, quite honest and tells the truth.” No
questions were asked either of these witnesses on cross-examina-
tion.

HI Il. We need not determine whether the prosecutor's
mere asking of the three questions above quoted of witnesses
Smith and Virden was misconduct. If we assume, without so
deciding, it was, we are faced with the firmly established rule
that misconduct of the prosecutor does not require a new trial
unless it appears to have been so prejudicial as to deprive de-
fendant of a fair trial. Some of the precedents supporting the
rule are State v. Olson, 249 Towa 536, 554, 86 N.W.2d 214, 225,
and citations; State v. Slauson, 249 Iowa 755, 759, 88 N.W.2d
806, 808, 809; State v. Hess, 256 Iowa 794, 800, 129 N.W.2d 81,
84, and citations; State v. Barton, 258 Iowa 924, 931, 140 N.W.2d
886, 891.

HI “A fair trial does not necessarily mean an absolutely
perfect trial.” State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1286, 71 N.W.2d
85, 42, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 914, 76 S Ct. 198, 100 L. Ed.
801; State v. Case, 247 Iowa 1019, 1030, 75 N.W.2d 233, 240;
State v. Hess and State v. Barton, both supra.

State v. Barton, supra, at pages 931, 932 of 258 Iowa,
page 891 of 140 N.W.24, states these other rules, equally settled,
applicable to this appeal: “* * * the trial court is in a much
better position than we are to judge whether claimed misconduct
of counsel is prejudicial; considerable discretion is allowed the
trial court in passing on such a matter; we will not interfere

— ee 315

with its determination unless it clearly appears there has been
a manifest abuse of discretion; * * *.” (Citations)

After citing and analyzing several of our precedents, State
v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1868, 1868, 66 N.W.2d 480, 482, continues:
“Tt is the sound reasoning of these and other Iowa cases that the
trial court has before it the whole scene, the action and incidents
of the trial as they occur, and is in a much better position to
judge whether the defendant has been prejudiced by misconduct
of opposing counsel, if there is such. * * * The trial court oc-
eupies a position of vantage and is rightly given a considerable
discretion in determining whether prejudice has resulted.” See
also State v. Ryerson, 247 Iowa 385, 398, 73 N.W.2d 757, 762,
55 A.L.R.2d 1190, and citations.

HI State v. Hess, supra, 256 Lowa 794, 800, 129 N.W.2d 81,
84, quotes this with approval from 24A O.J.S., Criminal Law
(1962), section 1902(1)a, pages 995-1001: “A cause will not
necessarily be reversed because of alleged misconduct of counsel.
On the contrary, appellate courts are strongly inclined against
setting aside convictions because of misconduct of counsel. * * *
[It] is generally regarded as harmless and not cause for reversal
where it * * * hag not resulted in depriving accused of a fair
trial, or * * * in a miscarriage of justice * * *.”

State v. Long, supra, 250 Iowa 326, 335, 93 N.W.2d 744, 749,
approves this same language taken from 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law
(original volume), section 1902a, pages 896-898.

The seven Iowa decisions cited in defendant’s brief have
been carefully considered. The three latest ones which seem to
be most relied on are State v. Tolson, State v. Leuty and State
v. Comes, all infra. Applicable here is this from State v. Long,
supra, 250 Iowa 326, 332, 93 N.W.2d 744, 747, concerning these
three decisions:

“II. The three cases cited by appellant in his brief, State
v. Tolson, 248 Iowa 733, 82 N.W.2d 105, State v. Leuty, 247 Iowa
251, 73 N.W.2d 64, and State v. Comes, 245 Iowa 485, 62 N.W.2d
758, do not support the contention that the defendant did not
receive a fair trial in this case. In each of those cases there were
repeated, persistent and flagrant acts of misconduct by the pros-

376 es

ecuting attorney, sometimes continued after adverse rulings by
the trial court. No such misconduct appears in this case.”

Of course we do not hold it is never a clear abuse of dis-
cretion for a trial court to rule a fair trial was had where there
has been misconduct of the prosecuting attorney. What we do
hold, as indicated at the outset, is that this record does not show
such an abuse of discretion here.

We deem unnecessary any extended discussion of the rules
applicable to character evidence as bearing on the moral char-
acter of a witness for the purpose of testing his credibility or of
the accused as bearing on the probability or lack thereof that he
committed the crime charged. An extended discussion of the
subject by Dean Mason Ladd is contained in 24 Iowa Law Re-
view 498, entitled “Techniques and Theory of Character Testi-
mony.” Many of our decisions cite the article with approval.

State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 1159-1163, 270 N.W. 874,
and State v. Scalf, 254 Iowa 983, 119 N.W.2d 868, are two of our
most important precedents in this area. See also State v. Hall,
259 Iowa 147, 143 N.W.2d 318, 323, 324, and authorities cited,
regarding the requirement that where character of a witness or
of a defendant is sought to be shown by evidence of his reputa-
tion, the question should call for the general reputation of the
person inquired about, not merely his reputation —Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Mason, Rawiines and Brecker,
JJ., who dissent.

Marion VavpEL, appellant, v. Larry BrLLacu, appellee.

No. 52672.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 149)

Novemper 14, 1967.

David F, McGuire, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Dennis D. Damsgaard, of Cedar Falls, for appellee.

Moors, J.—This is an action for contribution following judg-
ment against Marion Vaupel for personal injuries received by

378 De 7

defendant’s mother. She was riding in an automobile, being
operated by defendant Larry Bellach through a smoke-filled
area on the highway, which collided with an opposite direction
vehicle. The smoke was emitting from a fire which the first
trial court found was negligently set along the road by Vaupel.

Plaintiff’s petition in the case at bar alleges nine specifica-
tions charging defendant with negligence which caused the
collision and resulting injuries to his mother.

Defendant’s answer includes affirmative allegations his
mother was a guest, he was an unemancipated minor immune
from suit by his mother, there was no common liability and
therefore plaintiff had no right of contribution. Plaintiff’s
reply denies generally these allegations.

Defendant then filed a motion for adjudication of law
points as provided for by rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure.
He therein states an adjudication of any of these points of law
favorable to defendant would dispose of the whole case.

Rule 105 so far as here applicable provides: “Separate
adjudication of law points. The court may in its discretion,
and must on application of either party, made after issues
joined and before trial, separately hear and determine any
point of law raised in any pleading which goes to the whole
or any material part of the case * * *.”

When this motion came before the trial court it was agreed.
between counsel and approved by the court that the evidence
taken at the earlier trial should be used and considered by the
court without taking new evidence. The same trial court had
tried the first case without a jury.

This resulted in a trial under rule 186, R.C.P., which pro-
vides: “Separate trials. In any action the court may, for con-
venience or to avoid prejudice, order a separate trial of any
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or of any separate issue of
fact, or any number of any of them. Any claim against a party
may be thus severed and proceeded with separately.”

Thereafter the trial court filed extensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law. They include the court’s conclusion
plaintiff was an unemancipated minor at the time of his
mother’s injury and a determination plaintiff was not entitled

— a 379

to recover. From judgment against plaintiff for costs he has
appealed.

Plaintiff-appellant has in his assignment of error, his
printed brief and in oral argument, specifically limited his con-
tention to the proposition the trial court erred in denying con-
tribution on the ground defendant was unemancipated.

Plaintiff-appellant asserts in his brief and stated in oral
argument he was not challenging the claimed rule of family
immunity or common liability. They are therefore not before
this court for consideration. We shall determine only the ques-
tion presented.

The sole question is whether under the record the trial
court erred in finding defendant-appellee was an unemanci-
pated minor.

I. The findings of fact in this action at law are binding
upon this court if supported by substantial evidence. Rule
344(f) (1), R.C.P.

Il. Parents are entitled to the care, custody, control
and services of their children during minority. Code section
599.1 provides the period of minority extends to the age of
twenty-one years but all minors attain their majority by mar-
riage. Defendant-appellee was 19 years of age and unmarried
at the time of the accident.

“Emancipation” as the term is used in the law of par-
ent and child means the freeing of the child from the custody
of the parent and from the obligation to render services to him.
Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa (Clarke) 356, 361, 362; 89 Am.Jur.,
Parent and Child, section 64; 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child, sec-
tion 86. See also Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., Volume 14,
pages 363-366.

In Bristor v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 128 Iowa
479, 482, 104 N.W. 487, 488, we quote this from Porter v.
Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 154, 155, 44 N.W. 295, 296, 7 L.R.A. 176,
18 Am. St. Rep. 353: “To emancipate is to release; to set free.
It need not be evidenced by any formal or required act. It may
be proven by direct proof or by circumstances. To free a child
for all the period of minority, from care, custody, control, and
service, would be a general emancipation; but to free him from

380 Le |

only a part of the period of minority, or from only a part of the
parent’s rights, would be limited. The parent, having the sev-
eral rights of care, custody, control, and service during minor-
ity, may surely release from either without waiving his right
to the other, or for a part of the time without waiving as to the
whole. A father frees his son from services. That does not
waive the right to care, custody, and control, so far as the same
can be exercised consistently with the right waived.”

| | Emancipation is not necessarily a continuing status,
even if once established, it may be terminated at anytime dur-
ing the child’s minority. Everett v. Sherfey and Porter v.
Powell, both supra.

HM The fact alone that a child is outside the home expend-
ing his own money does not demonstrate emancipation, Brand-
horst v. Galloway Company, Inc., 231 Iowa 436, 1 N.W.2d 651.

| Emancipation is not to be presumed. Whether a child
has been emancipated must be determined largely on the par-
ticular facts and circumstances in each case. Ordinarily it is
a question for the fact finder. Kubie v. Zemke, 105 Iowa 269,
271, 74 N.W. 748, 749; Parker v. Parker, 230 8.C. 28, 94 S.H.2d
12, 18, 60 A.L.R.2d 1280; 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, section
64, page 702; 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child, section 90, pages 816,
817.

Hl IL We therefore now turn to the particular facts and
circumstances as disclosed by the record.

Cora Bellach, defendant’s mother, a widow since March
1950, owned and lived on an 80-acre farm in Buchanan County
where she had lived 31 years. After her husband’s death she
did most of the farm work and maintained a home for four
minor children. Two were older and one younger than her son
Larry.

Larry lived in the family home and attended school until
his sophomore year in high school when at the age of 16 or 17
he quit school. Thereafter he continued to live in the home
and did farm work in the community.

In October 1961 Larry obtained a job at Wilson Packing
Company in Cedar Rapids where he lived in an apartment until
February 1962 when he was laid off. He then returned to his
prior farm home where he lived with his mother and sister

a es 38

Linda, age 18, until after the accident on April 19, 1962.
During part of this period he drew unemployment compensa-
tion which he spent as he had done with his wages from Wil-
son. He had an automobile on which he was making payments.
Apparently his mother assisted in making arrangements for
financing its purchase but did not sign the papers.

Following his return to the farm home and until after the
accident Larry’s mother furnished him board and room and did
his washing for which he paid nothing. He did little, if any,
work on the farm. There is no evidence of emancipation by
voluntary act of the mother.

On April 19, 1962, Larry, then age 19, took his mother in
his car to Independence where she signed a consent for his
marriage license. She also bought groceries for the family. On
the return trip at about 2 p.m. the accident involved herein oc-
curred and the mother was seriously injured. As planned
Larry married that evening but changed his plan to move to
Cedar Rapids and remained on the farm for some time as his
mother was unable to work.

The trial court’s findings and conclusions include: “We
find then that at the time when the circumstances must be ex-
amined to determine the issue of emancipation, the son was
living in the home, receiving the care of his mother, dependent
upon her generosity and was what is known in the vernacular a
‘star boarder’. He was not emancipated.”

The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substan-
tial evidence. The applicable legal principles sustain the trial
court’s conclusion that under the facts defendant-appellee was
not emancipated at the time of the accident.

On the issue presented the judgment of the trial court must
be affirmed —Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

382 Le | 7

Starz or Iowa, appellee, v. Wortey Morron Harpzsry,
appellant.

No, 52855.

(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 464)

oO
oO
|
IE | LI

384

Ocrozer 17, 1967.
Researmne Denrep Decempzr 11, 1967.

Alfred M. Pabst, of Albia, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Wm. A. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, and W. K. Cash, County Attomey,
of Albia, for appellee.

Larson, J:—Pursuant to a reported theft of personal prop-
erty from a vacant farmhouse in Monroe County, Iowa, a
search warrant was directed against the defendant Worley
Morton Hardesty on September 1, 1965. On the same date a
search of defendant’s home in Wapello County by a group of
officers and the complainant revealed two articles which had

Pe FP 385

been reported stolen on August 19, 1965. On October 1, 1965,
the defendant was indicted by the Monroe County Grand Jury,
accused of the crime of larceny, in violation of the provisions
of section 709.1 of the 1962 Code, of one Hoover Electric
Vacuum Cleaner and one Stewart Electric Shears, property of
William E. Welsh, Jr., of a value of approximately thirty to
thirty-five dollars, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and
a trial to jury resulted in a verdict of guilty. He was sentenced
to an indeterminate term in the State Penitentiary of not to
exceed five years. He appeals.

Errors assigned upon which defendant relies for reversal
are that the trial court erred (1) in admitting testimony of the
peace officers present, when the search of defendant’s premises
occurred, relative to statements made by the defendant to them,
when it did not appear that he was first warned that such
statements might be used against him; (2) in allowing defend-
ant to be asked if he had been convicted of a felony for im-
peachment purposes; (3) in admitting into evidence an item
seized at the time of the search of his premises which was not
included in the search warrant; (4) in admitting into evidence
an item which was not in the same condition as when seized
under the warrant; (5) in admitting improper evidence of the
value of the clipper; (6) in refusing to reduce the charge to
that of petty larceny; (7) in giving Instruction No. 11 charging
the jury with the duty to determine the aggregate value of the
stolen items rather than the value of each item separately; and
(8) in giving Instruction No. 10 which did not conform to the
period of time set forth in the indictment. He further contends
under the whole record it appears that he failed to receive a
fair and impartial trial.

At the trial Mr. Welsh identified the Hoover cleaner and
the Stewart clipper found at defendant’s residence on Septem-
ber 1, 1965, as the property taken from his locked farmhouse
in Monroe County in August 1965. He testified he had, at the
request of the Wapello County sheriff, met several officers at
defendant’s home on September 1, that he found these items in
plain sight in defendant’s bedroom and claimed them as his
property. He said that he had used the cleaner (Exhibit P-2)
to clean up sawdust and plasterboard in the house he was re-

386 Le 7

modeling, that when he was in the furniture business in Blakes-
burg, Iowa, in 1961 he purchased the cleaner from Baker’s
Music Store in Ottumwa, and that he purchased the clipper
(Exhibit P-1) from Mr. Warner, an auctioneer, in Blakesburg
in 1964.

Russell Watters, sheriff of Wapello, County, had obtained
a search warrant from the Municipal Court at Ottumwa and,
together with his deputies and the sheriff and deputy. of Monroe
County, had entered defendant’s home at about 10 p.m. on
September 1. He testified that defendant did not object to the
search. by the officers and Mr. Welsh, and indeed appeared to
be a gracious host. Defendant did not object to the taking of
these items by the officers at that time. .

Sheriff Watters also testified that at the time of the search
defendant claimed ownership of the property stating that he had
had the sweeper for a long time and had purchased the clipper
at a farm sale. Sheriff Bagley of Monroe County also testified
that defendant said the clipper was his and that he had bought
it at a farm sale sometime in the winter.

Sheriff Watters further testified he and Deputies Bard and
Box examined the vacuum cleaner on September 2, 1965, and
found a bag therein containing dust and wood fibers. They
were placed in envelopes, marked Exhibits P-3 and Pe 4, and
introduced into evidence.

Deputy Bard testified the search warrant called for Ex-
hibit P-2 but not P-1, and that defendant told him he had had
the clipper for some time and had used it.

Russell Warner, a farmer and auctioneer, testified that he
purchased this clipper from one Thompson for $5.00 and had
sold it to Mr. Welsh, and that although he had had no occasion
to sell this type of clipper, he thought he knew its fair market
value and placed it at from $5.00 to $12.

Harold Mick, operator of a furniture and appliance store
in Albia and an authorized Hoover vacuum cleaner dealer,
testified he was familiar with this model of cleaner and knew
its market value in Albia in August 1965. He said it was
worth at least $25.

Defendant testified he bought a clipper similar to Exhibit
P-1 at a Roberts farm sale in early 1965 and paid around $2.00

a a 387

for it and other items in a junk bucket. He said he tried it on
sheep, but it was too dull and worn to use. He denied taking
the Welsh clipper. He also testified the vacuum cleaner found
in his home similar to Exhibit P-2 was bought in Des Moines in
1961 from the Parker Vacuum Cleaner Supply. His Exhibit
D-8 was identified as a sales slip showing this purchase, and he
explained the name difference on the sales slip by a certificate
of the Clerk of Court in Story County (Exhibit D-4), dated in
1960, wherein his former name of McAllen had been changed
to Hardesty. He said when the officers arrived he asked them
to be quiet so as not to disturb the sleeping children and gave
them a free run of the place. He admitted the items P-1 and
P-2 were in full view and that he made no objections to their
removal that night. He explained the cleaner’s contents by
saying he had used it to clean a house he had been remodeling.
During cross-examination he admitted he had been convicted
of a felony.

Mr. Peterson, an auctioneer who ran the Albia Sales Com-
pany, testified he thought the clipper P-1, if working, was
worth $5.00, and if not, it was junk.

Mrs, Lyons, defendant’s mother, testified defendant had
the cleaner since 1961 and that she had seen defendant use this
cleaner in the house he was remodeling. Defendant’s wife tes-
tified she had observed both P-1 and P-2 in their home prior to
going to the hospital in July 1965. She further testified her
trip to a nearby town to get tractor gas for her husband was
interrupted for three hours on the night of September 1 by
highway patrolmen. They would not permit her and her chil-
dren to return home until Sheriff Bagley arrived about 10 p.m.,
but she was present at home when the search warrant was read
to her husband.

Mr. Rinehart, manager of the Gamble-Skogmo Store in
Albia, testified that the fair value of Exhibit P-2, the vacuum
cleaner, was about $10 to $15, and Mr. Klingensmith, an em-
ployee of the hospital at Knoxville who also sells vacuum
cleaners, testified the value of Exhibit P-2 would not exceed
$15.

In rebuttal, Mr. Dereu, manager for the Hoover department
of Baker’s Music Store in Ottumwa, testified that Exhibit P-5

388 | a

was the original record of the sale of this cleaner to the Blakes-
burg Furniture Company in October 1961. Mr. Murray, the
assistant postmaster in Albia, testified the address on Exhibit
D-3 (the sales slip) bearing zip code numbers of the seller in-
dicated it was executed subsequent to July 1, 1963, when these
numbers were. first put into effect.

I. In his first proposition defendant contends that he was
denied his constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution as ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He
maintains that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrim-
ination was violated because he was not advised (1) that he
had a right to remain silent, and (2) that anything he might
say may be held against him. He further contends that his
Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to counsel was violated
because he was not advised (1) as to his right to counsel, and
(2) that if he could not afford counsel he a have counsel
appointed.

HJ These complaints are based upon rules laid down in
Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.
Hd.2d 694, 10 A. L. R.8d 974. However, Miranda does not
apply here because the trial preceded the Miranda decision.
We have no occasion to consider whether any of those conten-
tions in the Miranda decision was applicable.

II. Appellant next asserts it was prejudicial error to per-
mit the county attorney to ask defendant if he had ever been
convicted of a felony, and that permitting him to answer in the
affirmative had the effect of denying him a fair trial and vio-
lated the provisions of Amendment 14, section 1, to the United
States Constitution. He cites O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U. S. 92,
87 S. Ct, 252, 17 L. Hd.2d 189, and 382 U. S. 286, 86 S. Ct. 445,
15 L. Hd.2d 337, Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct.
1229, 14 L. Hd.2d 106, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and Amend-
ment 5 to the United States Constitution, as authority for his
position. .

This assignment raises an interesting constitutional ques-
tion which to our knowledge has not been considered directly
by the United States Supreme Court. In this state we have
often held, in compliance with section 622.17 of the Code, such

a | 389

a question may be asked and answered for impeachment pur-
poses under the rule that the test of admissibility is whether
it has a legitimate bearing on points in issue. State v. Meeks,
245 Iowa 1231, 1248, 65 N.W.2d 76, and cases cited. As bear-
ing on this question, also see State v. Frink, 255 Iowa 59, 68,
120 N.W.2d 482,

In any event, the record here discloses that no objection
was ever made to this interrogation. When defendant was
asked, “Mr. Hardesty, have you ever been convicted of a
felony?” he answered, “Yes.” This question was asked and
answered during cross-examination after defendant’s testimony
concerning his ownership of the cleaner and the clipper. Its
clear purpose was impeachment, and the matter was pursued
no further.

HEME Under the state of this record we must adhere to
the rule in this jurisdiction that objections not made in the
trial court will not ordinarily be considered for the first time
on appeal and the rule that constitutional questions cannot be
considered by this court unless specifically raised in the trial
court. State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 145 N.W.2d 638, 642; State
vy. Wallace, 261 Iowa 104, 152 N.W.2d 266, 268; State v.
Walters, 244 Iowa 1258, 1261, 58 N.W.2d 4. Also see State v.
LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 151 N.W.2d 496, which considers the
eases cited by appellant.

For these reasons we give this assignment no further eon-
sideration here.

II. In his third assignment appellant contends the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence Exhibit P-1 (the Stewart
clipper) over his timely objections, because it was not listed
as a stolen article in the search warrant served upon him. It
is true the record discloses the clipper was not listed in the
search warrant, but it does appear that Welsh listed it in his
complaint to the authorities and that he saw and claimed it
when it was discovered under the bed in defendant’s house the
night of the search.

HM it is well settled in this jurisdiction that officers
looking for certain goods described in a search warrant under
which they are operating are not necessarily limited to a seizure

390 Le |

of goods therein described, and they may, while making a legal
search pursuant to a warrant, seize stolen goods or contraband
found on the premises. State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 781, 150
N.W.2d 284. Therein we recognized the rule widely supported
by authority that if entry of the premises is authorized and the
search is valid, the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit the
seizure of property the possession of which is a crime. Harris
v. United States, 331 U. 8. 145, 155, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed.
1399, 1408. Also see 79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, section
17, pages 792, 793, and Abel v. United States, 362 U. 8, 217,
239, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Hd.2d 668, 686,

HE We have examined the cases cited by appellant, but
find none of them applicable here. In State v. Dwinells, 259
Towa 945, 146 N.W.2d 231, evidence of the search was admitted
at trial without objection, and we held the right later to assert
illegal search and seizure had been waived. In State v. Shep-
hard, 255 Towa 1218, 1226, 124 N.W.2d 712, we discussed the
application of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
searches and seizures and held they prohibited unreasonable
searches and seizures and protected the right of privacy, but
were not designed to help the guilty escape the consequences
of his acts. In that case we found a voluntary consent to a
search and no invasion of privacy.

We find no merit in this assignment.

IV. Appellant next contends the court erred in admitting
Exhibit P-2 (the vacuum cleaner) into evidence, in view of the
fact that the record shows the cleaner bag had been removed
after it had been taken from his premises, and it was therefore
not in the same condition as when taken under the search war-
rant. Appellee asserts a chain of possession of Exhibit P-2 was
established and that it was shown to be in substantially the
same condition as when taken from appellant’s premises. It
further pointed out the contents of the disposable bag were
preserved and introduced as Exhibits P-3 and P-4.

Hl To be admitted in evidence, property legally seized by
police officers must be shown to be in substantially the sae
condition as when taken. State'v. Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 114
N.W.2d 526, and citations. ‘In the first instance, this question
is to be resolved by the trial court. Kunzman v. Cherokee Silo

a Le 391

Co., 253 Iowa 885, 892, 114 N.W.2d 534, 95 A.L.R.2d 673, and
citations.

Here we are satisfied a sufficient chain of possession
was established and that the exhibit was shown to be in sub-
stantially the same condition as when obtained from appellant’s
premises. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ad-
mitting Exhibit P-2 into evidence.

V. Assignments numbered five and six we will consider
together. It is appellant’s contention in No. 5 that the testi-
mony of Russell Warner as to the value of the clipper should
not have been admitted, for the reason that he was not shown
qualified to express an opinion as to its value, and in No. 6
that the court erred by not sustaining defendant’s motion to
reduce the charge from grand larceny to petty larceny, for the
reason that the value of the allegedly-stolen property was not
sufficiently shown to exceed $20. These assignments are pred-
icated on the ground that the verdict is not based on com-
petent evidence and that it is against the weight of the evi-
dence. We think this is merely another case of conflicting evi-
dence and believe the witness Warner was shown qualified to
express an opinion as to the value of the clipper even though
it was obsolete and a market value of it was not readily deter-
minable. State v. Register, 253 Towa 495, 498, 112 N.W.2d
648 ; State v. Lewis, 144 Iowa 483, 123 N.W. 168.

Hi In these cases the rule was recognized that the general
market value of stolen property is to govern in determining
the value in cases of larceny, yet when the property has no
general market value, other testimony by persons familiar with
the property and its condition qualified to express an opinion
ean be received to aid the jury in establishing its true value.

HMMM It appears the clipper was obsolete and a market
value for it was not readily establishable. It also appears that
Mr. Warner had been an auctioneer in that locality for over
25 years, had himself purchased this clipper for $5.00, and had
sold it to Welsh for the same figure. He was aware of its con-
dition and obsolescence, and we are satisfied it was not error
to permit him to express his opinion as to its value.

Hit would serve no useful purpose to review the evi-

392 Le |

dence of the other valuation witnesses. The State’s witnesses
stated the market value of the vacuum cleaner was more than
$20 and the defense witnesses less than $20. We do not weigh
the evidence or decide which of the witnesses had the more
sound basis for his opinion. That is the jury function. We
are satisfied that each valuation witness was shown qualified
to express his opinion, that the issue was properly submitted
to the jury, and that the verdict is not against the clear weight
of the evidence. See State v. Gallagher, 236 Iowa 123, 127, 16
N.W.2d 604. Whether the value of stolen articles upon which
the penalty is based is realistic in recent times is not our prob-
Jem.

HE OVI. In his next assignment appellant contends the
court erred in giving Instruction No. 11 which charged the jury
with the duty to determine the value of the vacuum cleaner
and clipper allegedly stolen, He complains this eliminated the
possibility of the jury’s finding one of the articles was stolen .
but the other was not. There is no merit in this assignment for
it does not appear defendant objected to the instructions given
or requested any instruction other than those given by the
trial court at any time.

HE [+ is well established in this jurisdiction that party
who desires additional or more specific instruction must make
timely request therefor. His failure to do so leaves him with-
out complaint upon appeal. State v. Wessling, 260 Iowa 1244,
150 N.W.2d 301, 309, and cases cited; State v. Russell, 245 Iowa
1190, 1205, 66 N.W.2d 35, 43. Here it is conceded that no addi-
tional instructions were requested, nor was there any objection
as to their sufficiency.

HES: is also well settled that when considering any
instruction given to the jury it must be viewed together with
all other instructions submitted, and they must be considered
as a whole and read in relation to their context, not separated
into parts and treated piecemeal. State v. Katz, 241 Iowa 115,
40 N.W.2d 41; State v. Estrella, 257 Iowa 462, 133 N.W.2d 97.
From a reading of all the instructions given it is clear that if
the jury did not find that both items were stolen, it was in-
structed to acquit. Defendant was not prejudiced by this
instruction.

a Ln 398

HME «VIL. Appellant further contends the trial court
erred in giving Instruction No. 10 in that the period of the
alleged taking was not the same as that set forth in the indict-
ment. He contends the indictment charged him with the taking
between August 10 and August 14, 1965, while Instruction No.
10 covered a period from August 1 to August 15, 1965, thus
placing an unexpected and unfair burden upon him to account
for eleven additional days of time during the trial without ade-
quate warning. This contention, ingenious as it is, cannot be
sustained.

HH It is well settled in this State that the date or dates
fixed in the indictment for the commission of a crime are not
material, and that a conviction can be returned upon any date
within the statute of limitations, if there is no fatal variance
between the allegations of the indictment and the proof offered.
State v. Beltz, 225 Iowa 155, 159, 279 N.W. 386, and cases cited
therein; State v. Russell, supra; section 773.8, Code 1962, now
section 773.9, Code 1966. Section 773.9(2) provides: “The al-
legation in an indictment that the defendant committed the
offense shall in all cases be considered an allegation that the
offense was committed after it became an offense and before
the finding of the indictment and within the period of limita-
tions prescribed by law for the prosecution of the offense.”

We find nothing in this offense which requires the exact
time of the taking be stated or that it should be deemed
material here. Defendant was sufficiently advised of the offense
with which he was charged and was not in a position to claim
the period covered by the instruction was unexpected. There
was ample testimony that the period extended from August 1
to August 15, and no objection was made thereto. In any
event, as we have pointed out in Division VI, failure of de-
fendant to point out this objection in any manner in the trial
court deprives him of a basis for a successful appeal on that
issue now.

HE «VI0l. Finally, appellant maintains that upon the
whole record it appears that he did not receive a fair and im-
partial trial. We do not agree.

It appears he was represented by a most able and con-

394 es a

scientious counsel both in the trial court and here.- In fact, it
appears no stone was left unturned in an effort to acquit de-
fendant or reduce the charge. The issues were clearly presented
to the jury, which found against defendant on both issues, and
there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain those find-
ings. The trial court was in a much better position to’see and
hear the witnesses than are we, and it appears from its com-
ments prior to entering judgment that it fully and fairly con-
sidered the record and found in good conscience that it could
not and should not grant a bench parole or impose a lesser -sen-
tence.

The trial court apparently conducted a presentence inves-
tigation and concluded the defendant should be given correc-
tive treatment as well as custodial care. While it does seem a
penitentiary sentence is severe for a $25 or $80 theft, it seems
wise to place defendant in a place where he can receive correc-
tive treatment and permit the board of parole to determine the
length of time necessary to condition him for a safe return to
society, but not to extend the term imposed.

It is only in an extreme case, where it is apparent to us
that defendant had failed to receive a fair trial, that this court
will interfere with the verdict and judgment of the trial court.
State v. Myers, 257 Iowa 857, 185 N.W.2d 78; State v. Post,
255 Iowa 578, 123 N.W.2d 11; State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916,
109 N.W.2d 18.

In accordance with the admonishment in section 793.18,
Code 1966, we have examined carefully the record and the
transcript furnished us in this matter and, “without regard to
technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties, “have concluded that the defendant had a
fair trial and that the verdict and judgment carefully con-
sidered by the trial court before pronouncement of Judgment
must be affirmed.—Affirmed.

Garrixp, OC. J., and Sexy, Moorz, Sruarr and LeGranp,
JJ., concur.

Rawines, J., coneurs specially.

Mason and Brcxzr, JJ., join in the special concurrence.

a a 395

Rawuines, J. (concurring specially)—I concur in the re-
sult reached in this case but deem some comment appropriate
with reference to Division II, relative to the showing of prior
conviction for a felony as impeachment.

Admittedly the views expressed on this subject in the
opinion are proper under the factual situation disclosed, being
in addition thereto compatible with prior decisions of this
court. But this does not necessarily make them right, reason-
able or realistic.

On the subject at hand, Underhill’s Criminal Evidence,
Fifth Ed., section 244, pages 601, 602, states: “Now that an
ex-convict or a person convicted of a felony is competent as a
witness, it remains to inquire to what extent the conviction
may be shown as impeachment. As a matter of ordinary ob-
servation it is clear to most persons that the mere fact that a
witness has been convicted of an infamous crime, or, in fact,
of any offense, will not prevent him from telling the truth or
from being believed in a case where he has no motive to deceive.
It is not usually the facts of a man’s past which prompt him
to give false testimony, except where the circumstances of the
past create his present motives. * * * The rule that a prior
conviction may be shown to impeach a witness, which is im-
bedded in the statutes of the various states, is a survival of
the rule that a prior conviction was an insurmountable objec-
tion to the competency of the witness.” *

Testimonial impeachment of a witness means the produc-
tion of evidence affecting his credibility. See Gaskill v. Gah-
man, 255 Iowa 891, 896, 124 N.W.2d 533.

Stated otherwise the sole object of impeaching testimony
is to diseredit a witness by showing his character is such as
tends to render what he says unworthy of belief.

In my humble opinion the conviction should be not too
remote in point of time. See 2 Conrad, Trial Evidence, section
1142, page 818.

Under existing circumstances I am satisfied the majority
opinion should stand, but respectfully submit that in the future

396

the applicable rule should be modified in accord, with the views
expressed above.

Mason and Broker, JJ., join in this special concurrence.

Cuarues A. ANTRIM et al., appellants, v. Crviu SERVICE
Commission or Crry or Drs Mornes et al., appellees.

No. 52687.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 711)

DzcemBer 12, 1967.

Stewart, Miller, Wimer, Brennan and Joyce, by Joseph B.
Joyce, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Philip T. Riley, Anthony T. Renda, John F. McKinney, Jr.,
Gary H. Swanson, and Robert D. McAllister, by Gary H. Swan-
son, of Des Moines, for appellees.

Rawtines, J.—At all times here concerned plaintiffs were
detectives in the Des Moines Police Department.

November 30, 1964, the city council adopted an ordinance
effective March 8, 1965, under which the positions held by certain
municipal employees, including plaintiffs, were reclassified with
attendant pay scale revisions.

Plaintiffs were granted a uniform increase in compensation
but not equal to that accorded sergeants in the department. His-
torically they had drawn the same pay.

398 |

September 27, 1965, plaintiffs gave notice of appeal to the
Civil Service Commission contending, as to them, the aforesaid
pay variance constituted a demotion,

October 11, 1965, the city council, by special appearance,
challenged jurisdiction of the commission to entertain the appeal,
claiming absence of timely notice.

After hearing, the commission found it lacked jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs sought review by certiorari, and the district court
concluded the commission’s finding was proper. We agree.

I. As previously disclosed the ordinance involved became
effective March 8, 1965, but notice of appeal was not given until
September 27 or after more than six months had elapsed.

Section 365.20, Code 1962, provides: “If there is an affirm-
ance of the suspension, demotion, or discharge of any person hold-
ing civil service rights, he may, within twenty days thereafter,
appeal therefrom to the civil service commission. If the suspen-
sion, demotion, or discharge is not affirmed within five days the
person who suspended, demoted, or discharged such officer or em-
ployee may in like manner appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Hi Plaintiffs contend this statutory enactment is not ap-
plicable but refer us to no other law under which a municipal
employee may appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

Furthermore, Wilson v. Stipp, 194 Iowa 346, 189 N.W. 665,
resolves the matter adverse to plaintiffs. In that case the em-
ployee was discharged April 20, 1920, but did not give notice
of appeal until the following October. There were no statutory
grounds for his discharge and no charges were filed. Neither
was the employee, a policeman, removed from office by the chief
of police. In fact there was a conceded wrongful termination
of employment by the department superintendent. No notice
of discharge was given to the commission.

Holding the commission was without jurisdiction to act,
this court said at pages 350, 351 of 194 Iowa:

"  “Conceding that the removal of Wilson was unwarranted,
and was not accomplished in the manner provided by statute,
we do not see how these matters can affect the time within
which Wilson should have presented his grievance to the com-
mission. For the legal wrong visited upon him, the statute pro-

P| 399

vided Wilson with a remedy. This remedy must be utilized
within the time provided by the statute. Statutes of limitation
relate to remedy, and not to the manner and essence of the in-
jury. Edwards v. MeCaddon, 20 Iowa 520. The commission
had jurisdiction to consider and pass upon the wrong and in-
jury sustained by Wilson, if presented to it in time. The ir-
regular and illegal manner by which Wilson’s discharge was
effected pertained to the essence of the wrongful act of dis-
charge; while the sole question presented here is as to remedy.
In 25 Cye. 1199, it is said:

“Where, although the cause of action itself has accrued,
some preliminary step is required before a resort can be had to
the remedy, the condition referring merely to the remedy, and
not to the right, the cause will be barred if not brought within
the statutory period; therefore the preliminary step must be
taken within that period,’ ”

Later in Allgood v. Oskaloosa, 231 Iowa 197, 1 N.W.2d 211,
a discharged policeman sought restoration to his position by
mandamus. This action was challenged by a motion to dismiss,
asserting the statutory remedy by appeal to the commission
barred mandamus. The motion was sustained. Plaintiff ap-
pealed and this court affirmed. In so doing we held the statu-
tory remedy by appeal to the Civil Service Commission provides
a clear, speedy, convenient, complete and effective remedy to
one to whom the statute is applicable.

And, as disclosed in Allgood v. Oskaloosa, supra, there
have been no relevant changes effected by statutory revision
since the Wilson case, except that time for appeal to the com-
mission has been extended from five to twenty days, and the
term “demotion” was added to “suspension” and “discharge.”

It is to us evident section 365.20 of the Code, quoted above,
is here applicable and controlling.

Hl il. Plaintiffs also take the position time for appeal
varied as to each of them.

In'so doing they refer to the fact that under the ordinance
the new pay scale took effect on the appointive anniversary
date of each plaintiff individually, and this, not the effective
date of the ordinance, is controlling. We cannot agree.

400 a

Touching on that subject this court said in Wilson v. Stipp,
supra, loc. cit., 194 Iowa 349: “Though it is conceded by all
parties that Wilson was removed from office without cause or
justification, by an officer without authority, yet he was dis-
charged. He was removed from his job. At the moment
when he was removed from his position, his rights were in-
vaded. It was then that he received injury. It was then that
his cause of action and right of appeal accrued. To have his
rights established, Wilson must then apply to the civil service
commission. To regain his position—to be reinstated—he must
present his grievance to the civil service commission, That was
his remedy.”

Referring now to the case at hand, it stands without dis-
pute the ordinance reclassifying positions and revising pay
scales was properly enacted and duly published.

The argument advanced by plaintiffs that the effective date
of the ordinance is not controlling overlooks the fact their at-
tempted appeal to the commission is unavoidably based upon a
claim the ordinance served in effect to demote them. In a legal
sense any pay variance is merely incidental to the ordinance-
created wrong.

Since the premise upon which they sought administrative
review is adoption of the alleged offending ordinance, the effec-
tive date of that municipal enactment is the commencement
point of the statutory period within which their appeals could
be lawfully taken.

Under the circumstances we are satisfied, if there was an
invasion of plaintiffs’ rights, it occurred on the effective date
of the ordinance. Their lawful right of appeal then accrued,
and they ‘manifestly failed to pursue the remedy provided
within the twenty days prescribed by law.

It. However, plaintiffs contend the special appearance
filed by the city was of no legal force or effect.

Here they refer to section 365.22 of the Code which pro-
vides written specifications of charges shall be filed within five
days after notice of appeal has been given.

No such specifications were submitted, and the special ap-
pearance was filed about fourteen days after notice of appeal
had been given.

es 4o-

Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 1235,
271 NW. 204, 110 A.L.R. 1415, discloses it is doubtful whether
a special appearance is applicable to proceedings before an ad-
ministrative body or board. See also 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administra-
tive Law, section 366, page 176.

Be that as it may, plaintiffs do not challenge the special
appearance procedurally. They argue, in effect, where juris-
diction is lacking it may still be conferred by estoppel or con--
sent, ie., by the city’s failure to file specifications it lost all
right to challenge the board’s authority.

Hl Jurisdiction is unquestionably essential to the validity
of any proceeding undertaken by a public administrative tri-
bunal, without which its actions are void. See 73 C.J.8., Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, section 66, page 392, and
2 Am Jur.2d, Administrative Law, sections 321, page 146; 327,
328, pages 149-151; and 489, page 295.

All appeals are pure creatures of statute. Bales v.
Towa State Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 57, 60, 86 N.W.2d
244,

And laws relating to appeals are generally accorded strict
construction. Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Commission,
247 Iowa 736, 742, 76 N.W.2d 187; Civil Service Law, by Oliver
P. Field, page 212; and 2 AmJur.2d, Administrative Law, sec-
tions 354, page 168, and 360, page 172.

HB Furthermore, an appellate tribunal derives its jurisdic
tion from the law. It cannot be acquired by estoppel or con-
sent alone. Turning again to Wilson v. Stipp, supra, loc. cit.,
194 Iowa 351, this court stated:

“As bearing on limitation of time to invoke remedy, see
Prescott v. Gonser, 34 Iowa 175; Lower v. Miller, 66 Iowa 408;
Home Sav. & Tr. Co. v. District Court, 121 Iowa 1; Lougee v.
Reed, 133 Iowa 48; Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145. In Savings &
Trust Co. v. Polk County Dist. Court, supra, we said:

HM“ ‘Our appellate jurisdiction must be exercised accord-
ing to law. Generally speaking, appellate tribunals derive their
jurisdiction over any case from the law, and the parties cannot
by consent confer jurisdiction. Moreover, when the legislature
prescribes the method for the exercise of the right of appeal

2.

or supervision, such method is exclusive, and neither court nor
judge may modify these rules without express statutory author-
ity, and then only to the extent specified.’ ”

See also Springville Community School Dist. v. Iowa De-
partment of Public Instruction, 252 Iowa 907, 914, 109 N.W.2d
213; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure,
section 116, page 485; and 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law,
section 331, page 152.

Plaintiffs, in support of their position, cite and lean rather
heavily on Christensen v. Board of Supervisors, 251 Iowa 1259,
105 N.W.2d 102. We find that case neither here in point nor
controlling.

There the owners of two noncontiguous farms operated as
a unit commenced an action for declaratory judgment, asserting
the supervisors wrongfully denied them an award for damages
resulting from closure of a connecting road. By special appear-
ance the board challenged jurisdiction of the court because of
failure by the farm owners to appeal within the given statutory
period. This court found delay in taking the appeal was ex-
cusable due to evasive and misleading tactics on the part of
public officials, i.e., despite repeated inquiries the farmers were
not timely advised as to determinative actions taken by the
board. :

As previously stated, the ordinance in question was law-
fully enacted and published. Plaintiffs were charged with
knowledge of its enactment and, in fact, make no claim to the
contrary. See 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, section 427 (a),
page 816, at 817, and 87 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, sec-
tion 194, page 832.

In addition there is no evidence of artifice or deception by
anyone which at anytime here concerned served to mislead or
deceive these plaintiffs.

HI We conclude, the Civil Service Commission never ac-
quired jurisdiction and was without authority to act on plain-
tiffs’ attempted appeal.

IV. The foregoing discloses there is no reason to disturb
the decree entered by the trial court.—Affirmed.

rs 403

Garriexp, C. J., and Larson, SNELL and LeGranp, JJ., con-
eur,

Becxsr, Stuart and Mason, JJ., concur specially.
Moorr, J., takes no part.

Broker, J.—I concur in the opinion. Due to failure of the
parties to raise the point, an important facet of this case is not _
treated sufficiently. The opinion states: “Plaintiffs contend
this statutory enactment is not applicable but refer us to no
other law under which a municipal employee may appeal to the
Civil Service Commission.” We should recognize Code, 1966,
sections 365.18, 365.19 and 365.20 do not contemplate jurisdic-
tion in the Civil Service Commission to review actions of the
city council in passing and adopting city ordinances.

If validity of an ordinance is to be challenged, it must be
by direct resort to the courts; not by appeal to a commission
which is the creation of the council from which appeal is at-
tempted. The city council can create and abolish a Civil Serv-
ice Commission. If it dispenses with the services of such com-
mission it exercises the commission’s power itself, Code, 1966,
section 365.3. Under such circumstances the entire legislative
plan as well as the words of the applicable sections indicate
sections 365.18, 365.19 and 365.20 do not contemplate appeal
from council action to the commission, Therefore, even if the
notice of appeal had been timely filed, the commission would be
without jurisdiction in this case.

While this point was not sufficiently raised by the parties
it should not be overlooked. To do so creates the impression the
commission has jurisdiction. This would be a false impression.

Sruarr and Mason, JJ., join in this special concurrence.

04.

aN

Crry or Berrenporr, appellee, v. Ben J. ABELn et al., appellants.

No. 52541,
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 836)

405

DrcemBer 12, 1967.

Doerr, Dower & Rehling, of Davenport, for appellants.

Albert J. Stafne, Jr. and Jack D. Gordon, both of Betten-
dorf, for appellee.

GarriELp, C, J.—This is an action in equity to review pro-

406 Le |

ceedings by the City of Bettendorf to annex 4.26 square miles
of allegedly adjoining territory which was unincorporated, The
petition was filed against the owners of the property to be
annexed, in compliance with section 362.26, subsections 4 and
5, Code 1962. Proceedings required by section 362.26, subsec-
tions 1, 2 and 3, preliminary to filing the petition were duly
earried out. Voters of the city approved the annexation by a
majority of virtually two to one.

Section 362.26, subsection 6, requires a finding by the dis-
trict court of “an affirmative showing that the municipal cor-
poration is capable of extending into such territory substantial
municipal services and benefits not theretofore enjoyed by
such territory, so that the proposed annexation will not result
merely in increasing the revenue from taxation of such munici-
pal corporation;” and a further finding by the court that all
proceedings and conditions precedent to annexation as required
by subsections 1 through 5 have been duly carried out. If these
two findings are made “the court shall decree the annexation.”
City of Cedar Falls v. Sieglaff, 259 Towa 263, 266, 144 N.W.2d
116, 118.

Following trial the court here found the affirmative show-
ing of capability required by section 362.26, subsection 6, was
tnade. No question was raised as to compliance with the other
proceedings and conditions precedent to annexation as.required
by 362.26, subsections 1 through 5. The court therefore decreed
annexation. In doing so, it held without merit defendants’
contention the territory annexed did not adjoin plaintiff-city
as required at the outset of section 362.26.

On this appeal defendants contend the city failed in its
burden to affirmatively show it is capable of furnishing to the
area to be annexed substantial municipal services and benefits
not theretofore enjoyed, so the annexation will not result
merely in increasing revenue from taxation. Defendants also
assert the territory does not adjoin the city.

I. Since this is an equity case our review is de novo.
Code section 624.4; Rules of Civil Procedure 267, 334. Espe-
cially when considering the credibility of witnesses we give
weight to the fact findings of the trial court: but are not bound
by them. Authorities need not be cited for this, Rule 344

407

(£)(7), R.C.P. When we give weight to the trial court’s find-
ings we are not justified in disturbing them.

Il. Each side cites six Iowa cases on the disputed question
whether the city made the affirmative showing it is capable of
furnishing to the area the services and benefits referred to in
362.26, subsection 6. The most recent is City of Cedar Falls v.
Sieglaff, supra, 259 Iowa 263 at page 266, 144 N.W.2d 116. The
others are the five decisions cited, in the order they were filed,
at page 118 of the Cedar Falls opinion.

After citing these five precedents the Cedar Falls case con-
tinues:

[| “These precedents make it clear that annexation is a
legislative function which cannot be delegated to the courts.
The judicial function in cases like this is to make a factual
determination as to whether the conditions prescribed by the
legislature for annexation of territory have been met and, if
it is found they have, to decree annexation, otherwise to deny
it. We have no discretionary power to determine whether the
proposal is good or bad, wise or unwise.

“City of Des Moines v. Lampart, supra, at page 1038 of 248
Towa, page 724 of 82 N.W.2d, contains this statement which
has been repeated several times: ‘The court was not required
to determine how capable plaintiff must be, nor how substantial
must be the municipal services and benefits furnished—only
whether there was an “affirmative showing”’ (emphasis not
added).

“City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, supra, at pages 950, 951 of
252 Iowa, page 255 of 108 N.W.2d, makes this statement which
later decisions repeat with approval: ‘The Legislature has not,
and could not, under thé Constitution delegate to courts the
power to determine whether the proposed annexation is sound
or unsound, good or bad. If the conditions prescribed by the
Legislature have been met, the court must order annexation.
If the conditions so prescribed have not been met, the court
cannot order annexation.’

“The Cox opinion says of the statutory requirement that
property may not be annexed for the sole purpose of increasing
the city’s tax revenue ‘the fact that in the event of annexation
the city’s increased revenue may exceed its increased expense

408 ee

will not alone defeat annexation’ (page 960 of 252 Iowa, page
260 of 108 N.W.2d).

~ “Town of Goraiville vy. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., supra at
page.29 of 253 Iowa, page 379 of 110 N.W.2d observes, ‘The
issue is the capability of the municipal corporation and not the
need of the property owner.’”

«The burden is upon the municipality to prove by a a
preponderance of the evidence it is capable of furnishing to the
area the required services and benefits and this question of
capability is to be determined as of the -time the annexation
proceedings are initiated, here May 28, 1962, not at the time of
trial in the fall of 1965. Cedar Falls case and-citations at page
267 of 259 Iowa, pages 118, 119 of 144 N.W.2d.

III. Bettendorf adjoins the larger city of Davenport on
the east- Approximately the north half of Davenport’s east
city limit also extends north two and a half miles from the
center of Bettendorf’s north line of about two miles. The
Mississippi river flows west-southwest to form the south bound-
ary of both cities and separates them from Rock Island and
Moline, Illinois. Bast Moline adjoins Moline on the east, separ-
ated from. the south-southeasterly line of the annexed area by
the Mississippi. These two Iowa cities and the two in Illinois
are often referred to as the Quad Cities. -

The annexed area adjoins Bettendorf on the east and ex-
tends east approximately three miles. The north line of most
of the area is 440 feet north of the north line of Bettendorf.
The irregular south line of the annexed area is, from the west,
the city of Bettendorf, the town of Riverdale (1960 population
477) and the Mississippi.

“The accompanying plat taken from plaintiffs Exhibit A
may help to visualize the physical situation.

It is apparent from the plat and what has been said
that if Bettendorf is to enlarge it cannot go south because of
the river nor west because of the larger city of Davenport. It
must go either north-northeast, or east as it has done. De-
fendants say it would have been better for plaintiff to go north
rather than east. However, as the trial court correctly ob-
served, if the city is justified in enlarging its limits-it is not

es 409

for the trial court or defendants to say in which direction it
goes. As defendants apparéntly concede, selection of the ad-
joining territory to be annexed is a legislative matter for the
city to determine. .
“* * © neither the trial court nor this court has any dis-
eretion as to what should or should not be annexed.” City of
Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 252 Iowa 948, 950, 108 N.W.2d 253, 255,
certiorari denied 368 U.S. 8, 82 S.Ct. 16, 7 L.Hd.2d 17.

IV. As before indicated, we are satisfied the city has
made the required affirmative showing it was capable as of
May 28, 1962, of extending into the annexed territory substan-
tial municipal services and benefits not theretofore enjoyed.
We will mention the principal ones.

410 eee

The city had a well equipped and trained volunteer fire
department of 20 men, including a chief who had served as
such more than 80 years and three assistant chiefs. The newest
members had served five years. All had received training in
fire fighting at Iowa State University. During working hours
six men were within two blocks of the fire station. The depart-
ment has four motor vehicles, including two “pumpers” de-
signed for use in areas without water mains. Fire calls are
received 24 hours a day and go to both the fire and police per-
sonnel in seconds. The fire chief testified the department was
eapable on May 28, 1962, of extending to the annexed area the
same services the city was then receiving. ,He would, however,
add five or six men to the department, get a smaller, lighter
truck to precede the heavier ones to a fire, and build a fire sta-
tion in the area at an estimated cost of $40,000.

The annexed area had no city fire protection but was
served by the Pleasant Valley Township Fire District which
was capable of handling fires in the area. However it did not
have a round-the-clock alarm system, The area had a Class 10
(the highest) fire insurance premium rate, with no accessible
water mains or fire-hydrants, as compared to the city’s 5 to 6,
and Davenport’s 3 to 4, rate.

Bettendorf’s ordinances required use of the best electrical
wiring and prohibited use of wooden shingles. The. area had
no comparable protection.

On May 28, 1962, the city had a police force of eight
trained men, two of whom were on simultaneous duty on shifts
of eight hours, including a chief and sergeant, and four police-
women who were algo on duty in eight-hour shifts. The women
take all radio and phone calls, operate the radios and phones
and relay the calls to the three fully equipped squad cars.
These cars were in constant contact with each other and police
in the other Quad Cities and surrounding sheriffs’ departments.
The squad cars patrol the city at least several times daily.

All members of the department are examined by the Civil
Service Commission and have the benefit of a retirement system
administered by a city-created board.

Bettendorf also had an auxiliary police foree of ‘5 men
equipped with a late model station wagon, and a boat for river

es an

patrol in the summer, with chief, assistant chief, captain and 12
patrolmen, all under supervision of the chief of the regular
force.

The police chief testified the annexed area could be given
the same service as the city had and which the area had not
theretofore enjoyed, but, to be safe, it would be necessary to
buy another squad car for $2500 and employ two more patrol-
men at a total annual cost of $12,000.

In May 1962 the county sheriff’s office regularly patrolled
the county, including the annexed area, but not more than once
aweek. The area had no other police protection.

The city’s police department was located in its new city
hall. It had two jail cells, four bunks, with a restroom and
washbasin in each cell. If prisoners were kept there longer
than overnight they were transferred to the county jail in
Davenport.

Bettendorf had a board of park commissioners with a
trained superintendent of parks and recreation, seven full-time
employees and about 30 part-time seasonal ones. There were
several parks and playground areas. One park had two tennis
courts, horseshoe court, lighted softball diamond, little league
diamond, shelter house with comfort station, and maintenance
building. One playground area of five acres adjoined the
community center building and had playground equipment and
shelter house. Another park contained a little league baseball
diamond, playground equipment and shelter house with rest-
rooms. Still another park had playground equipment, picnic
tables, fireplaces and grills. There was also a boat dock and
launching area.

In.May 1962 the city held an option on 57 acres for a park
to be extensively improved under supervision of an engineering
consultant who had been engaged, for football, baseball, tennis,
ice skating, swimming and other activities. At the time of trial
the 57 aeres had been purehased and about 60 percent devel-
oped as planned.

Supervised recreation programs ran for eight weeks at
three parks and two school buildings. Winter recreation pro-
grams were operated from October first through May in five
locations. The superintendent of parks testified his staff was

a2

capable of “programming” for residents of the annexed area
and that activities in the present city limits would be available
to them as the area was developed.

The superintendent knew of no municipal parks, recrea-
tion areas or programs in the area annexed. <A county park
about 14 miles from the area was opened in 1965 and the River-
dale school “gym” was open at titnes for adult type recreation
such as basketball and volley ball:

Bettendorf’s then new, modern public library was opened
in 1960. In May 1962 it had a staff of six, plus a custodian and
three pages. It was open 57 hours a week, including evenings
until nine, ‘except Fridays and Saturdays. It had 19,000 to
20,000 volumes, 145 periodicals, 400 to 450 recordings and about
100 reproductions of well-known paintings. Between 1962 and
time of trial 7000 volumes were added. The library was free
to residents of the city, not to nonresidents. The Bettendorf
library is closer to the annexed area than any other city library.

The area had no library, but the county bookmobile made
weekly stops there except in bad weather. Plaintiff’s library
has no bookmobile. The opinion of the president of its library
board was that the annexed area could be served by its then
facilities without a bookmobile.

Bettendorf had engaged an experienced planning consul-
tant firm which prepared its master plan of development, zon-
ing ordinances and revisions. A member of the firm long
familiar with the city and annexed area and subdivision control
testified zoning and other plans for the future adopted by Bet-
tendorf would benefit the annexed area by allowing it to pro-
gress in a like planned manner. At one time the firm recom-
mended expansion to the north but it was ultimately decided
annexation of the area to the east was preferable, partly be-
cause the land adjoining the Mississippi was well suited for in-
dustrial purposes.

As pointed out in Division III, supra, selection of the area
to be annexed was a legislative matter for the city, not the
courts. The planning expert testified the annexed area was an
environ of the city.

In May 1962 the city had electrical, plumbing and building
codes regulating construction of buildings and installation of

es 413

electrical and phimbing facilities, with at least three trained
inspectors to enforce the regulations. According to the building
inspector his department was capable of extending its services
into the annexed area which had no such codes.

Incidentally, in 1962 the city issued building permits for
186 new homes valued at over $2,309,000 and 17 apartments
valued at nearly $363,000. In all, 700 permits were issued with
a total valuation of $4,000,000. In May 1962 the city’s popula-
tion was about 12,000. By October 1965 this increased to 17,241.

Bettendorf had a sanitary sewer system. Its sewage is
treated in Davenport’s treatment plant under a contract be-
tween the two cities by which plaintiff purchased about 15
percent of the plant’s capacity with provisions for it to nego-
tiate for more. Plaintiff has been using about 70 percent of
plant capacity it purchased and the contract has a remaining
life of 15 years. The purchased capacity will treat sewage from
7000 to 8000 additional persons. The annexed area has no
sewer system nor sewage disposal system.

Bettendorf has a department of public works with a regis-
tered engineer as director and five other persons. The street
and sanitation department operates under a street commis-
sioner and 18 employees with several more in the summertime.
It collects and disposes of garbage and trash from each house,
looks after street cleaning and flushing, snow removal, ice
control and numerous related services. The annexed area had
about 2.3 miles of paved street. They were U. 8. primary high-
ways 67 and former 67 which had been renumbered.

The director of public works testified his department was
capable of immediately extending into the annexed area gar-
bage collection from the 500 homes there and commercial and
industrial sites needing it, the same examination and treatment
of streets Bettendorf received, including snow removal, sewer
construction and maintenance. As garbage removal from farm
homes was requested the department would add three em-
ployees. Two more trucks and a cinder spreader would be nec-
essary for the added service to the area. The spreader would
cost about $1400. The added men would cost $15,000 a year
and the two trucks about $4200 each. This witness also tes-
tified in substance the annexed area enjoyed virtually none of

4l4 ES

these services except that the county provided maintenance
and was equipped to remove snow on county roads,

The Davenport Water Company held a franchise under
which it provided purified water to Bettendorf. The manager
of the company testified he knew no reason why it could not
serve the annexation with pure water and fire mains. If in the
future a water tank were required he did not doubt the com-
pany would install it. The witness knew of no water system
or fire hydrants in the annexed area.

There is also evidence the city can provide the annexed
area with electricity and gas at franchise rates substantially
below rates which prevailed in the area in May 1962.

Defendants argue that because the water supply of Betten-
dorf comes from the Mississippi and the river adjoins the an-
nexed area they have the same capability to secure water as
plaintiff does; that because Bettendorf has no sewage disposal
plant but uses Davenport’s, under contract with it, the capabil-
ity to furnish sewers for the area is with Davenport, not plain-
tiff; and because plaintiff would levy a special assessment to
pay for surfacing area streets, the only capability plaintiff has
to surface streets is based on making such a levy.

Hl The argument cannot be accepted and misconceives the
effect of section 362.26, subsection 6. The matters suggested
do not negate plaintiff's capability to extend into the area
water, sewer or street improvements. Nor does the claimed
fact the area might obtain these benefits from other sources or
in a different manner negate the established fact they were not
theretofore enjoyed by the area.

HI Defendants are mistaken in believing, if in fact they
do, plaintiff must affirmatively show it will improve streets ad-
joining their property without cost to them. Cities are not
charitable institutions and much of the cost of furnishing mu-
nicipal services must ultimately be borne by general or special
taxation of those benefited. Defendants are not entitled to
preferential treatment in this respect over plaintiff’s resident
property owners at the time annexation was initiated.

Plaintiff made a detailed showing as to its unused taxing
power in 1962 and its ability to issue bonds for such improve-
ments as a second fire station and a sewage disposal plant if

415

either were found necessary or desirable. In 1962 only about
15 mills were levied for the city’s seven functional funds out of
a then statutory maximum of 30 mills. A mill levy produced
in excess of $20,000. On May 28 the city’s outstanding general
obligation bonds totalled less than half its allowable debt limit.
It had an “A” rating under the Moody rating service for munic-
ipalities and its bonds were readily salable.

V. Defendants assert the city has not affirmatively shown
the “annexation will not result merely in increasing [its] rev-
enue from taxation” as required by Code scction 362.26, sub-
section 6, quoted at the outset hereof.

[| In this connection, we have held this statute “clearly
implies, if it does not directly state, that an affirmative showing
the municipality is capable of furnishing the area substantial
municipal services and benefits not theretofore enjoyed war-
rants a finding the annexation will not result merely in increas-
ing the municipality’s revenue from taxation. [emphasis not
added]

“Of course any annexation of unincorporated territory
will result in an increase of revenue from taxation which may
or may not exceed the increased expense of the services. * * *
the fact the inereased revenue may exceed the increased ex-
pense will not alone defeat annexation.” (Citation) City of
Cedar Falls v. Sieglaff, supra, 259 Iowa 268, 270, 144 N.W.2d
116, 120.

We have tried to point out in Division IV that plaintiff has
shown its capability of furnishing to the area the services and
benefits required by the statute.

Defendant’s argument the annexation results merely in
increasing plaintiff’s tax revenue is largely based on the fact
a generating station of Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company,
with assessed valuation somewhat more than $12,000,000, is
located in the annexed area east of Riverdale. This is some-
what offset by the fact that about 77 percent of the entire area
consists of agricultural tracts of more than 10 acres which may
not be taxed for municipal purposes to cxceed 114 mills. Code
section 404.15.

Hit may be true that in selecting the area to be annexed
the city considered the location of this generating plant and

416 Le |

the tax revenue to be obtained therefrom. Nothing in the stat-
utes prohibits this. The city could not be expected to expand
for the sole purpose of rendering services or benefits to the
area.

In three recent precedents where annexation was ap-
proved a large industrial plant was located in the area. In
City of Cedar Rapids v. Cox, supra, 252 Iowa 948, 961, 108
N.W.2d 258, 261, it was a large electrie generating plant with
estimated assessed valuation of some $5,600,000. In Town of
Coralville v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., supra, 253 Iowa 23, 29,
110 N.W.2d 875, 379, it was a “tank farm” with 17 tanks for
storing liquid petroleum products. In the Cedar Falls case,
supra, a large manufacturer of farm implements maintained
an experiment farm and research center in the area.

Hin the cited cases and here, as in most large indus-
trial plants, some of the services plaintiff was capable of
furnishing the area were furnished by the owner. Our deci-
sions make it clear this is not a defense to a proceeding like
this. “There is nothing in the statute requiring that a need for
municipal services be shown.” Cedar Rapids case. “The issue
is the capability of the municipal corporation and not the need
of the property owner.” Coralville and Cedar Falls cases. It
is significant that Iowa-Illinois Company has not appealed and
apparently does not object, at least at this stage, to the annexa-
tion.

; | VI. Section 362.26 authorizes a city or town to annex
“Unincorporated territory adjoining” it by proceeding as the
statute provides. We find without merit defendants’ conten-
tion the annexed area here does not adjoin the city.

Only factual basis for the contention, as shown by the
accompanying plat, is that roughly the north half of Riverdale
extends up into the west part of the annexed area. The maxi-
mum north-south dimension of this extended area is about one
mile. However, west of this portion of Riverdale is a strip of
annexed area about one mile long, north-south, and a half mile
wide, east-west. Bettendorf and the annexed area have a com-
mon boundary of approximately two and a half miles (two
miles north-south and a half mile east-west). The east end of

417

the east-west common boundary is about one mile north of the
southwest corner of Riverdale.

Defendants concede the parts of the annexed area im-
mediately east of the common boundary adjoin Bettendorf but
argue the relatively smaller part east of the northeast boundary
of Riverdale does not do so.

Where the municipality and the annexed territory have a
common boundary of such length as we have here—more than
two thirds of what it would be if Riverdale were unincorpo-
rated and included in the territory—we think the annexed area
adjoins the municipality within the requirement of section
362.26.

With Davenport adjoining Bettendorf on the west and
also, together with unincorporated territory not sought to be
annexed, on the north, and the Mississippi on the south, it is
obvious the city could adjoin the annexed area only along the
city’s east line.

Requirements that a city and annexed area be adjoining,
contiguous or adjacent are common. The prevailing rule is
that some tracts of the annexed area need not adjoin the city
if some of them do and the tracts adjoin each other. Thus 62
CJS., Municipal Corporations, section 46¢(1)(b), page 185,
states:

HM “lt is sufficient if the territory annexed constitutes
one body of land which as a whole is adjacent or contiguous
to the municipality, even though it is composed of different
tracts owned by different persons and some of such tracts may
not themselves be contiguous to the city. In other words, it is
sufficient if all of the tracts are contiguous to each other and
one of them adjoins or is contiguous to the city.”

This from 87 Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, section 27,
page 645, is to like effect: “While the general rule is that land
cannot be annexed to a city or town unless it is contiguous
thereto, it is not necessary that-each and every tract of land
sought to be annexed shall be contiguous to the municipality.
If all of the tracts are contiguous to each other, and one of
them is contiguous to or adjoins the municipality, that is
sufficient.” To like effect is 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, 1966 Revised Volume, section 7.20, page 365.

418 Le |

Page 39 of the 1967 cumulative supplement to 37 Am.Jur.
contains this qualification of the rule just quoted: “Attempts
to annex outlying territory to a municipality by the device of a
connecting, narrow, shoestring strip of land are looked upon
with disfavor by the courts.” It cannot be claimed this state-
ment applies here. See also 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, 1966 Revised Volume, section 7.20, pages 367, 368.

Unquestionably the contention now considered would not
avail if this proceeding did not involve the territory east of
Riverdale. After annexation of the remaining area the’ city
could certainly maintain a second proceeding to annex the part
now claimed not to adjoin the city. As stated, these two tracts
clearly adjoin each other. There seems to be no good reason
why, under the record here, such an end result may not be at-
tained in a single proceeding.

Somewhat in point is City of Ames y. Olson, 253 Iowa 983,
990-992, 114 N.W.2d 904, 908-910, which upholds jurisdiction
to annex in a single proceeding separate areas not contiguous
to each other but contiguous to the city. To like effect is State
ex rel, Maury, County Farmers Co-op. Corp, v. City of Columbia,
210 Tenn. 657, 362 S.W.2d 219.

Westmoreland, Inc. v. Runyan, 15 Ill. App.2d 51, 145
N.E.2d 257, 258; Spaulding School District No. 58 v. City of
Waukegan, 18 Ill.2d 526, 165 N.E.2d 283; Dabkowski v. Bau-
mann, 175 Ohio St. 89, 191 N.E.2d 809, are among recent deci-
sions which support our holding in this division.

VIL. We are asked to tax costs of appeal to plaintiff, the
successful party. However, we think the general rule that costs
are taxed to the unsuccessful party is applicable—Affirmed.

All Jusrices concur except LeGranp, J., who takes no part.

DD
Humsotpt Livestock Auction, Inc., appellee, v. B & H Carrie
Co., a partnership, et al., appellants.

Nos. 52696
52697.

(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 478)

HER

DecemBer 12, 1967.

Stipe, Davidson & Hemphill; of Clarinda, for appellants.
H. A. Stoebe, of Humboldt, for appellee.

Mason, J.—These two cases, consolidated and argued
together here, involve three dishonored checks written by de-
fendant Paden on behalf of B & H Cattle Company, defendant
partnership, as the purchase price for cattle bought from plain-
tiff Humboldt Livestock Auction, Inc. From an order granting
plaintiff summary judgment against Paden, the partnership
and defendant Rackley, all defendants appeal. .

Plaintiff operates a public auction market at Humboldt.
During the early part of 1965 defendants had been engaged in
several transactions with plaintiff in the purchase and sale of
cattle through its market.

A check dated February 8, 1965, signed “B & H Cattle Co.,

2:

Bill Paden” was mailed to plaintiff from Shenandoah, Paden’s
residence, for the purchase of cattle. Two additional checks
dated February 15 with the same signature, also mailed to
plaintiff from Shenandoah, covered other cattle purchases.
Upon presentment to the drawee bank for payment, the checks
were dishonored.

Plaintiff filed a petition February 19 based upon the two
checks of February 15, another the 23rd on the February 8
check, seeking judgment against defendants and each of them
for the amounts of the checks, alleging in each petition that
defendant B & H Cattle Company was a copartnership com-
posed of defendants William Paden and H. C. Rackley.

On the dates the petitions were filed original notices were
served on Paden individually and upon the partnership by
service on him. Plaintiff filed an affidavit of nonresidence
acknowledging inability to serve defendant Rackley personally
within the state in each case.

March 3 attorney R. G. Davidson filed his appearance in
each cause for Paden individually and for Paden doing business
as B & H Cattle Company and asked for additional time to
plead.

On March 11 and 15 attorney Ivan D. Wilson filed answers
stating, “Come now the defendants and each of them including
the partnership and as individuals and for their answer to
plaintiff’s petition state, * * *.” The answer amounts to a gen-
eral denial.

July 25, 1966, the clerk of court gave notice pursuant to
rule 215.1, Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the cases for dis-
position during the September 1966 term of the Page district
court.

August 25 plaintifi’s counsel resigned and on the 26th new
counsel moved for continuance over the September term with-
out serving notice. The court granted the continuance by cal-
endar entry stating substantially that the motion for continu-
ance was sustained “by agreement of the parties in open court”
and also filed a formal order in which it was stated:

“that counsel for the defendants have been advised of the
intention of the plaintiff to request a continuance of this matter
until the November, 1966, term of court and have raised no

es

objection thereto. It is, therefore, now ordered * * * that the
above entitled matter be continued from the September, 1966,
term of court until the November, 1966, term of court * * *.”

At the assignment for the November term both causes were
set for trial commencing December 27. November 28 plaintiff's
second counsel withdrew and on December 12 plaintiff’s present
counsel moved for summary judgments on the written instru-
ments attached to its pleadings. Hearing was set for 10 a.m.
December 27 and notice was sent to defendants’ attorneys of
record. At approximately 11 am. on that day defendants
Paden and the partnership filed resistance to plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgments and for dismissal under rule 215.1
without leave of court for late filing. .

The matter proceeded to hearing, the court orally stated
that plaintiff's motion for summary judgments was sustained
and directed counsel to prepare and mail the formal orders to
the court for signature. This was done and the orders granting
summary judgments dated December 27 were filed January 5,
1967.

December 31 Paden filed a new motion for dismissal under
rule 215.1, R.C.P., asserting he had not consented to the con-
tinuance of August 26, that the matter had gone beyond the
final day of the November 1966 term and that under the rule he
was entitled to dismissal.

January 4 defendant Rackley filed a special appearance
asserting that at no time had he made any appearance in the
proceedings, the court was without jurisdiction of the causes
as two terms had expired after notice under rule 215.1, R.C.P.,
he was not served with an original notice and his special ap-
pearance was filed before judgment, decree or calendar notice.

The motions for dismissal and the special appearances were
filed in each case.

After plaintiff had filed resistances to the motion to dismiss
and the special appearance, Paden filed separate notices of
appeal from the summary judgments January 30, Rackley on
February 4.

April 27 the motions to dismiss and the special appearances
were overruled.

DD

Since the filing of the record, attorney Davidson has rep-
resented all defendants on appeal.

Attention is called to the provision of rule 344(a)(3),
R.C.P. It requires a statement of errors relied on for reversal
when the appeal presents questions of law.

I. In his appeal Paden contends dismissal for want of
prosecution under 215.1 is automatic and not discretionary,
that a motion for summary judgment is not a motion for con-
tinuance under the meaning of this rule and having asked for
additional time to plead in his appearance, he is entitled to a
ruling thereon prior to any motion for summary judgment.
Paden also asserts his resistance was in proper form.

These contentions are without merit.

Defendants assert there is no evidence in the record of
any notice of date of hearing as required by the clause “after
notice and not ex parte” in rule 215.1. Plaintiff had filed writ-
ten application for continuance setting forth reasons. The
ealendar entry and formal order of the court of January 26
were not ex parte. Mr. Wilson, counsel of record for defend-
ants Paden, Rackley and the partnership, testified concerning a
conversation with Mr. Millhone, at the time plaintiff’s attorney.
Wilson testified, “Well in all fairness I would say that I had
made known to him [Millhone] that I had no objection to what
he might do in these proceedings—to remember the exact date
is impossible. I told him I had no interest in the case. They
could proceed however as they wanted. * * *I don’t remember
being present before the judge himself and saying that, but it
is possible that I did because I had no interest in the thing ex-
cept filing an answer and then washing my hands of it.” Wil-
son had not withdrawn as counsel and it is not contended he
was acting beyond his authority as counsel for Paden and the
partnership.

HI Although no notice was given, the court was justified
under the circumstances in finding counsel had stipulated for
a continuance over the term. Of course, the court may grant
a continuance upon a stipulation of the parties. The prohibi-
tion in the rule is against the parties stipulating to a continu-
ance themselves. The rule provides that if the parties stipulate
between themselves as to a continuance it must be consummated

2

by an order entered by the court, and if possible that continu-
ance be to a certain date. There was no substantial departure
from rule 215.1, R.C.P. The court’s granting the continuance
over the September term was proper. under the circumstances
here.

As to the second motion for dismissal filed December 31,
although we agree that a motion for summary judgment is not
a motion for continuance, the matter had been fully and finally
submitted to the court during the November term on December
27 and rule 215.1(a) does not apply to cases under order of
submission to the court.

HM Paden and the partnership next contend that by adding
a request to their appearance for additional time in which to
plead, all proceedings were stayed until defendants’ request
had been ruled on by the court. This did not amount to secur-
ing additional time in which to plead or file motions under
our rules. In all probability such instrument would not be
called to the court’s attention on motion day under rule 117,
R.C.P., since it was not designated a motion nor did it contain
the essentials thereof.

Hi We do not say that in a proper case defendants may
not move for time to plead or file motions at the time of enter-
ing their written appearance, but do hold that to do so effec-
tively -a motion designated as such in the form of a separate
instrument setting forth sufficient reasons therefor must be
filed, otherwise an appearance with the addition such as filed
here will be governed by the provisions of rule 87, R.C.P.

HM Rule 238, R.C.P., provided in part: “Plaintiff making a
claim described in rule 237 may file a motion for summary judg-
ment thereon at anytime after defendant appears, before or after
answer. * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.) Defendants Paden and
the partnership appeared by Attorney Davidson who filed an
instrument designated “appearance” with the clerk March 8,
1965. Rule 65, R.C.P. In addition answers were filed by
Attorney Wilson March 11 and 15.

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was not prema-
ture as to Paden and the partnership.

Hl IL. In its order granting plaintiff summary judgment
the trial court found plaintiff’s motion based upon a negotiable

SS

instrument in the form of a check was a liquidated claim within
the meaning of rule 237(a), R.C.P., and, there being no resist-
ance conforming to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion
should be sustained.

As stated, after the time set for hearing and during the
course of the proceedings Paden and the partnership filed a
document entitled “Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 215.1 and
Resistance to Motion for Summary Judgment.” Since no leave
of court had been obtained for this late filing, the court found
the resistance was not timely filed in accordance with rule 238
and it did not conform to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Of course, the proceedings for summary judgment were
had under rules 237 and 288, R.C.P., as then in effect. They
have since been amended effective July 1, 1967.

Paden and the partnership contend rule 238 should be lib-
erally construed and not used to strike the resistance which
was filed only four days past the ten-day period.

The trial court’s ruling was based upon that portion of rule
238 which then provided:

«# * ® Judgment shall be entered as prayed in the motion
unless within ten days after it is filed, or such other time as
the court may, for good cause, allow, the defendant resists it
with affidavits showing facts which the court deems sufficient
to permit him to defend.”

Defendant cites Kriv v. Northwestern Securities Co., 237
Towa 1189, 24 N.W.2d 751, as support for this contention. The
ease does not help defendant as the question of late filing was
not raised in the trial court. At page 1195 of 237 Iowa and at
page 754 of 24 N.W.2d, the court said:

“The Northwestern filed its motion for summary judgment
on November 28, 1945. The motion was submitted on December
21, 1945, and the rulings of the court were made on December
29th. Plaintiff filed no resistance to the motion until December
22, 1945. Perhaps the court might have entered judgment as
prayed in the motion because plaintiff failed to file resistance
within ten days. (The court allowed no further time for filing
such resistance.) See Rule 238 from which we have quoted.
However, so far as shown, defendants sought no relief in the
trial court because of delay in filing plaintiff's resistance; the

2

trial court’s ruling was not placed upon such ground and we
do not feel justified in deciding the case on a question appar-
ently not raised in the court below.”

In Mack v. Linge, 254 Iowa 963, 966, 119 N.W.2d 897, 899,
we said, “We have not heretofore been called upon to deter-
mine the force and effect of the clause in rule 238 to the effect
that ‘unless within ten days * * * defendant resists it with
affidavits.’” The question was not reached.

Here, the late filing of the resistance was one of the
grounds upon which plaintiff was granted relief. The rule as
then in force meant what it said. We agree with the trial
court the resistance was not timely filed.

II. Another ground upon which the court granted sum-
mary judgment was that the alleged resistance did not conform
to the Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff argues the court’s
ruling must be sustained because no evidentiary or ultimate
facts sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiff's petition are
alleged. As stated, Paden and the partnership contend the re-
sistance was in proper form. As previously noted, we disagree.

Rule 287, R.C.P., so far as applicable here, then stated:
“Summary Judgment may be entered in an action, upon any
claim * * * (a) To recover a * * * money demand which is
liquidated * * * arising on a negotiable instrument * * * or on
any contract * * *.”

HI The purpose of the summary judgment is to enable a
party with a just cause of action to obtain judgment promptly
and without the delay and expense of a trial, where there is no
fact issue to try. Eaton v. Downey, 254 Iowa 573, 577, 118
N.W.2d 583, 585; Bjornsen Construction Co. v. J. A. Whitmer
& Sons, 254 Towa 888, 892, 119 N.W.2d 801, 803.

HE The debt upon which plaintiff’s cause is based was
liquidated. The amount claimed to be due is a “liquidated de-
mand” within summary-judgment statute if it is susceptible of
being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations
from factors which are or ought to be in possession or knowl-
edge of party to be charged. Petit v. Ervin Clark Constr. Inc.,
243 Towa 118, 126, 49 N.W.2d 508, 512, and citations.

It is clear that plaintiff’s action is one in which summary
judgment may be entered.

SS

HM The judgment entered on such a motion depends on
whether there is any real issue of fact as disclosed by the af-
fidavits of those who have knowledge of the circumstances.
Credit Industrial Co. v. Happel, Inc., 252 Iowa 218, 216, 106
N.W.2d 667, 668, and citations.

HME “The sufficiency of a defense affidavit as provided in
rule 238 is tested by the rules of pleading. As stated in Eaton
v. Downey, supra [254 Iowa at 578, 118 N.W.2d at 586]: ‘To
determine whether the affidavit states facts sufficient to show a
real defense as distinguished from conclusion we may turn to
the rules of pleading. A pleader must plead the ultimate facts
in the case. He cannot plead conclusions by themselves.’ Thus
a good affidavit must consist of the statement of the ultimate or
evidentiary facts in the case and, when so stated, the affiant
has a right to state his conclusion based upon those facts. If
such facts are not stated, a mere conclusion of the affiant will
not be taken as a good faith defense and a summary judg-
ment is required by our rule.” Bjornsen Construction Co. v.
J. A. Whitmer & Sons, supra, 254 Iowa at 893, 119 N.W.2d
at 804,

Tested by that rule, examination reveals nothing stated in
the 18 paragraphs of the resistance filed herein amounts to
ultimate facts which constitute a defense to plaintiff’s action.
No real issue of fact was disclosed,

It necessarily follows the trial court was correct in sus-
taining plaintiff's motion as to Paden and the partnership.

IV. Rackley contends the trial court did not have juris-
diction of him at the time summary judgment was granted. He
was a resident of Sulphur, Oklahoma, when the suits were
commenced and, as stated, no original notice was served on him
within this state.

In granting summary judgment against Rackley the court
found answers filed by attorney Wilson were in compliance
with Paden’s instructions and constituted general appearances
and consent to the court’s jurisdiction by all defendants in this
eause. Rule 65(¢c), R.C.P. The court further found Rackley
had not filed a special appearance before answer and that a
later special appearance cannot be made which will effectively
question the court’s jurisdiction; also the December 27 motion

0s

filed by Attorney Davidson constituted a general appearance
by Rackley and therefore, the court had jurisdiction of all
defendants.

In support of the court’s findings plaintiff argues juris-
diction of a person in a civil ease may be acquired by service
of notice pursuant to statute’ or by defendant’s general ap-
pearance, and that after such appearance no objection can be
raised to jurisdiction, the method of service or lack thereof.

We agree jurisdiction of the person in a civil
ease may be acquired by service of notice pursuant to rule or
by a general appearance by defendant. Emery Transportation
Co. v. Baker, 257 Iowa 1260, 1264, 136 N.W.2d 529, 531, and
citations ; Baker v. Baker, 248 Iowa 361, 364, 81 N.W.2d 1, 3, 64
A.L.B.2d 1421. It is also true that an appearance is a waiver
of notice and if a party appears in person or by attorney he
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A general
appearance prevents the entering ‘of objections to jurisdiction
for nonresidence and is equivalént to personal service. Where
a general appearance has been made a special appearance can-
not be made which will effectively question the court’s juris-
diction’ over defendant’s person. Baker v. Baker, supra, and
citations. :

We do not believe Rackley questions these rules. He
argues although Wilson was following Paden’s. instructions in
filing the answers, Rackley himself had not authorized Wilson
to do so and there was no evidence of any relationship existing
between Paden and him which would make Paden’s acts
chargeable to and binding on him.

Wilson testified he had: been contacted by Paden and told
to take whatever steps were necessary on behalf of all de-
fendants so no defaults would be taken; that in filing the
answers he was following Paden’s instructions. At the time
he filed the answers Wilson had. never met Rackley -nor did he
know him at the time of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment. He was never contacted by Rackley,
never saw nor heard of the man nor did he know he was as-
sociated in any way with the B & H Cattle Company. He did
not know anything about the company or whether it was a
partnership. "

SS

We have no doubt a general appearance had been made
for Rackley. The question is by what authority did Paden
cause it to be made.

HE SsPlaintiff contends a partner clearly has authority to
retain an attorney to defend a suit in the name of and against
a partnership, and has a duty to defend both in the name of the
partnership and the individuals.

This may be true as a general statement, but before ap-
plicable here there first must be some evidence establishing the
existence of a partnership between Paden and Rackley to
serve as a basis of authority for Paden to employ Wilson to
defend for Rackley.

HH Written articles of agreement are not necessary to
prove a partnership, since the relationship may exist under a
verbal agreement or be implied from circumstances. Daniel
v. Best, 224 Iowa 1348, 1358, 279 N.W. 874, 380; Gardenhire v.
Ray, 302 Ill. App. 268, 23 N.H.2d 927, 929; 68 C.J.S., Partner-
ship, section 4.

Here we have only an admission of one of the alleged
partners which plaintiff seeks to assert as a basis for acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the other alleged partner. It is
clear Paden’s contact and instructions to Wilson accounted for
the general appearance being entered for all defendants. It is
not claimed Wilson was acting on Rackley’s instructions.

The admission resulted from failure to plead in accordance
with rule 98, R.C.P., which provides in part:

“Partnership * * * capacity; * * * may be pleaded as legal
conclusions, without averring the facts comprising them. It
shall not be sufficient to deny such averment in terms contra-
dicting it, but the facts relied on must be stated.”

HHH As stated, plaintiff had alleged in paragraph 2 of
each cause that defendant B & H Cattle Company was a co-
partnership composed of Paden and Rackley. In the answers
filed an attempt was made to confute this allegation by plead-
ing “defendants deny paragraph 2 of the petition.” This was
not an effective denial of the existence of the partnership
under the rule and resulted in a judicial admission relieving
plaintiff from the necessity of producing evidence on the

9.

partnership issue as to Paden. See Hanson v. Lassek, 261
Towa 707, 154 N.W.2d 871.

HH However, unless this admission is chargeable to and
binding on Rackley because of authorization, adoption, ac-
quiescence, or other good reason, it is not sufficient to prima
facie establish the existence of a partnership as the basis for
claiming Paden was authorized to employ Wilson to appear for
Rackley under a theory of agency.

HMM = It is clear that before one partner can be charged
with the admission of another, the partnership relation must
be shown, and that proof of the fact must be made by evi-
dence other than the admission itself. The admission, per se,
ean be received only to affect the person making it, unless, of
course, it can be shown that the party against whom it is
offered had consented to or adopted the admission or otherwise
ratified it. It becomes admissible against other partners, only
upon such proof of the relationship as makes plain the pro-
bative connection. Once the existence of the alleged partner-
ship be prima facie established by evidence other than such
admission, then the acts, declarations and admissions of each
may be proved to strengthen such prima facie case. 2 Jones
on Evidence, Fifth Ed., section 351; Hunter v. Croysdill, 169
Cal. App.2d 307, 337 P.2d 174, 180; Pryor v. Kopp, 342 Mo.
887, 119 S.W.2d 228, 234; Van Hoose v. Smith, 355 Mo. 799,
198 S.W.2d 23, 27; Pryor v. Hale-Halsell Grocery Co. (10 Cir.,
Okla.), 80 F.2d 995, 997. This rule applies to judicial, as well as
to extrajudicial, admissions. 31A C.J.S., Evidence, section 318b.

THM Under the circumstances here Paden was without
authority of a partner to retain Wilson to appear for Rackley.

V. Plaintiff further contends that, by his silence and
failure to make any attack on Wilson’s authority, Rackley has
acquiesced in and authorized the general appearance by per-
mitting the answer to remain on file more than 21 months with-
out moving to strike or withdraw it, if it were, in fact, filed in
error.

“Acquiescence” is where a person knows or ought to
know that he is entitled to enforce his right or to impeach a
transaction, and neglects to do so for such a length of time as
would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right.

3:

Olson v. Clark, 252 Iowa 1188, 1188, 109 N.W.2d 441, 444; City
of Rome v. Reese, 19 Ga. App. 559, 91 S.E. 880, 882.

HMM Ordinarily, “acquiescence” is a question of fact.
There cannot be acquiescence without knowledge. The term
imports this foundation for such action, One cannot acquiesce
any wrong while ignorant that it has been committed. Current
suspicion and rumor are not enough; there must be knowledge
of facts which will enable the party to take effectual action.
Nothing short of this will do. Connell v. Clifford, 39 Colo. 121,
88 P. 850, 851, citing cases; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U.S. 578, 581,
25 L. Ed. 420, 421.

We have no indication from the record as to when Rackley
knew or should have known that proceedings were being had,
except an allegation in his special appearance. Plaintiff’s con-
tention is without merit.

VI. In the December 27 motion to dismiss Paden
alleged “that the entire proceedings should be dismissed in full
against H. C. Rackley and B & H Cattle Company under Rule
215.1 * * *, since no notice was ever served upon either of said
partners of any continuance as required by said Rule 215.1 and
no written notice against any of the parties was ever returned
of record in the above case.”

The trial court found that said motion was of itself an
appearance for and on behalf of Rackley.

The court was in error. As stated, Paden did not have
authority to make an appearance for Rackley by retaining
counsel. For the same reasons, he did not have authority to
allege in any motion or pleading any matter that would or-
dinarily confer jurisdiction of the person of Rackley.

HME VIL. We hold that because the court bad not ac-
quired jurisdiction of Rackley at the time the summary judg-
ments were granted against him, they must be set aside.

Upon full consideration of all contentions presented, we
hold the judgments granted against the partnership and Paden
should be and are Affirmed; the judgments against Rackley are
Reversed.

Costs on appeal are taxed one half to plaintiff and one half
to defendants Paden and the partnership.

All Justices concur.

4340 Le Ys

In re Estate or Ruru EH. Freon, deceased.

Grorce D. Fircx, executor, appellee, v. Gzorez D, Fireck
individually, et al. appellants,

No. 52788,
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 865)

Drcemper 12, 1967.

Herrick, Langdon, Belin & Harris, of Des Moines, for
appellants.

Mack, Mack & Hansen, of Storm Lake, for appellee.

Rawtines, J—A deed was executed by Abner J. Bils-
borough and his wife Ellen in January 1900, the material por-
tion of which provided: ‘+

“That we Abner J. Bilsborough and Ellen Bilsborough
his wife, * * * do give and convey to’ Ruth E. Bilsborough and
her heirs the following described premises situated in the
county of Lyon and State of Iowa to wit: the North Hast quart-
er (N.E. %) of Section Twenty-eight (28) in township One
Hundred (100) North of Range forty-three (48) West of the
5th Principal Meridian together with all the privileges and
appurtenances to the same belonging To have and to hold the
same to the said Ruth E. Bilsborough and her heirs forever.
* * © Nevertheless on the following conditions viz: that all of
the rents, issues and profits shall be payable to either of the
surviving grantors up to March 1st 1908 and One Hundred
Dollars each year thereafter during the natural life of either
grantor and that said Ruth EH. Bilsborough shall have no power
or authority to sell, mortgage, or alienate the whole or any
part of the said property or to sell, alienate or anticipate the
whole or any part of the rents, profits, or issues thereof nor
shall the property be liable for any debt or debts contracted
by the said Ruth E. Bilsborough or for any judgments obtained
against her in any Court of Law or Equity, but it shall be kept

436 | 7

free and unincumbered and shall so descend to her children.
And as soon as convenient after her death her said children shall
have lawful authority to sell and convey the property and di-
vide the money equally amongst them share and share alike
Except some one or more of the said children should not have
become of age in which case the property shall not be sold until
such time as the youngest child shall have obtained his or her
majority.

“Nevertheless if the said Ruth E. Bilsborough shall leave
a husband and he and her children should prefer living to-
gether on the property they shall have power to defer the sale
of it until such time as they or a majority of them think fit.
But if it should so happen that the said Ruth E. Bilsborough
should die leaving no children then the said property shall be
sold as soon as convenient after her death and the money aris-
ing from such sale shall be divided equally amongst her
brothers and sisters or their estates share and share alike.”

The grantors and Ruth E. Bilsborough (Fleck), herein-
after sometimes referred to as Ruth, have since died, she
leaving no issue surviving.

By action for declaratory judgment plaintiff-executor of
Ruth’s estate sought an adjudication of rights in the property
here involved.

Defendants claim title vested on Ruth’s death in her
brothers and sisters or their estates, and they are entitled to
any proceeds derived from sale.

The trial court, by application of the repugnaney rule,
found adverse to this contention and defendants appeal. We
reverse.

I. The ultimate question for determination by this court
is whether under the terms of the foregoing deed title passes
to the estate of Ruth, or to her brothers and sisters or their
estates.

Many decisions in this and other states are in varying
degrees of conflict as to the interpretation and construction to
be accorded comparable instruments of conveyance.

The holding in some of these opinions would apparently
lead to the conclusion Ruth was granted a title in fee simple,
with which subsequent provisions of the conveying instrument

437

are so in conflict as to bring the rule of repugnancy into play.
This is the basis upon which the trial court held against de-
fendants.

Undoubtedly the repugnancy doctrine is sound where ap-
plicable. See 26 C.J.S., Deeds, sections 90, page 836, and 129,
page 974, and 41 Iowa Law Review 602, note 5.

But under the factual situation presented in the case at bar
it does not apply.

In fact we are persuaded the deed here involved created
a fee simple estate on executory limitation. See generally 28
Am.Jur.2d, Estates, sections 333-345, pages 538-552.

II. Addressing ourselves now to the matter of apparent
conflict in Iowa case law on the subject at hand, we turn first
to an interesting article written in 1956, wherein the author
stated in part: “* * * ramifications of what may be called the
‘repugnancy rule’ have arisen in at least a hundred Iowa cases.
Three of them were decided within the last year. * ** It is
time for reappraisal.” 41 Iowa Law Review 601.

See also Guilford v. Gardner, 180 Iowa 1210, 1223, 1224,
162 N.W. 261.

We shall therefore adhere, in large part, to relevant deline-
ating case law and text material.

IM. According to the early common Jaw there could
be no limitation of a fee after a fee, nor could there be a fee
in one person with a valid provision that upon the happening
of a specified event the fee should shift to another. The
fee created in the grantee could be defeated only by the
grantor’s taking advantage of the breach of some condition
and making an entry, thus regaining possession in himself;
because the giving effect to a provision that the fee should go
over from the first tenant in fee to another would have in-
volved a transfer of possessory right without the required cere-
mony of actual delivery of possession. But neither under the
modern law, nor in the nature of the thing itself, is there any-
thing which prohibits limitation of a fee after a fee, nor any
reason why that may not be done as well by deed as by will.
Where it is done, the fee in the second taker becomes ef-
fective upon the happening of an event which by the terms of
the instrument displaces the first fee and substitutes another in

438 EE |

its place. See Editorial comment, 17 A.L.R.2d 12, and Harder
v. Matthews, 309 Ill. 548, 141 N.E. 442, 445.

Hl Briefly stated, this court is persuaded the early rule at
common law to the effect a fee could not be limited after a
fee has in modern times been in large part realistically super-
seded by the generally prevailing view that a fee may be
limited by resort to the devise of executory limitation.

IV. One standard, here of special significance, is that a
deed should be construed, if at all possible, to effectuate the
intent of the grantor.

As stated in 23 Am.Jur:2d, Deeds, section 159, pages 205,
206:

“When, and only when, the meaning of a deed is not clear,
or is ambiguous or- uncertain, will a court of law or equity re-
sort to established rules of construction to aid in the ascertain-
ment of the grantor’s-intention by artificial means where such
intention cannot otherwise be ascertained. Unlike a settled
rule of property which has become a rule of law, rules of con-
struction are subordinate and always yield to the intention of
the parties, particularly the intention of the grantor, where
such intention can be ascertained. Since all rules of construe-
tion are in essence but methods of reasoning which experience
has taught are best calculated to lead to the intention of the
parties, generally no rule will be adopted that tends to defeat
that intention.

“The primary rule of construction is that the real intention
of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, is to be sought
and carried out whenever possible, when contrary to no settled
rule of property which specifically ingrafts a particular mean-
ing upon certain language, or when not contrary to, or violative
of, settled principles of law or statutory prohibitions.”

This court has followed and applied the foregoing concept
on several occasions. See Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 797,
798, 23 N.W.2d 837; Iowa Farm Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214
Towa 903, 905-907, 241 N.W. 475; and Shaull v. Shaull, 182
Iowa 770, 773-783, 166 N.W. 301, 11 ALR. 15. See also
Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W.2d 487, 439.

And as stated in 26 O.J.S., Deeds, section 181, pages 981,
982: “* * * if possible, a-clause should not be construed as

ee 439

repugnant to the grant and therefore void so as to defeat the
manifest intention of the parties.”

But see Crecelius v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1249, 1254, 1255, 125
N.W.2d 786; Dolan v. Newberry, 204 Iowa 448, 446-448, 215
N.W. 599; and Prindle v. Iowa Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home, 153
Towa 234, 238, 239, 138 N.W. 106.

VY. In connection with the foregoing this court said in
Husted v. Rollins, 156 Iowa 546, 558, 554, 187 N.W, 462, 465,
42, L.R.A., NS., 878:

“Under the common law, and indeed under all statutes
with which we are familiar, the object of a habendum clause is
to define the grantee’s estate. But it was also true that if the
premises, meaning all that part of the deed which went before
the habendum, granted: an estate in fee simple as ‘to the
grantee and his heirs’ or ‘to the grantee, his heirs and assigns,’
the estate conveyed was in fee simple, although there was no
habendum. Again, under the same law, if the granting clause
was either silent or ambiguous as to the estate intended to be
conveyed, the habendum was resorted to in order to ascertain
the nature of the estate. At common law the rule quite generally
announced was that while the habendum might be resorted to to
explain, enlarge, or qualify the estate granted, it would not be
allowed to contradict or defeat the estate granted in the prem-
ises. At common law, if the word ‘heirs’ or its equivalent was
not used, the grantee took a life estate only by implication; but
here the presumption might be enlarged or qualified by the
habendum clause. But if the premises expressly granted an es-
tate in fee, the conveyance could not be wholly annulled by
anything in the habendum. Kelly v. Hill (Md.) 25 Atl. 919;
Breed v. Osborne, 118 Mass, 318; Faivre v Daley, 98 Cal. 664
(29 Pac. 256) ; Karchner v. Hoy, 151 Pa. 383 (25 Atl, 20).

“Notwithstanding these somewhat arbitrary rules, common-
law courts have almost universally given effect to both the grant-
ing clause and the habendum whenever it was possible to do so
by fair construction. Thompson v. Carl, 51 Vt. 408; Rowland v.
Rowland, 93 N.C. 220; Tyler v. Moore, 42 Pa. 374; Jamaica
Pond v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.) 159. Again, if the estate is
briefly defined in the premises and more specifically in the haben-
dum, the latter will control, for that is its office, Karchner vy.

440 La | |

Hoy, 151 Pa. 383 (25 Atl. 20); Doren v, Gillum, 136 Ind. 134
(35 N.E. 1101).

| | “The modern rule, and the one we have adopted, is to
construe the whole instrument without reference to the formal
divisions in order to effectuate, if possible, the grantor’s intent.
Beedy v. Finney, 118 Iowa 276.”

See also Shultz v. Peters, 223 Iowa 626, 631-633, 273 N.W.
184; Blair v. Kenaston, 223 Iowa 620, 624, 273 N.W. 184; Iowa
Farm Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903, 906, 907, 241
N.W. 475; Harder v. Matthews, 309 Ill. 548, 141 N.E. 442, 444;
Pryor v. Richardson, 162 Tenn. 346, 37 S.W.2d 114, 115, 116;
and annotations, 58 A.L.R.2d 1874.

HI We are satisfied the granting clause and additional
provisions or habendum are to be construed together, to the
end that intention of the parties manifested by the language
employed be given full effect so far as it can be ascertained,
and not in conflict with applicable rules of law.

Hl VI. 1t appears to us the principle to be applied under
the factual situation presented in the case at hand is succinctly
stated in 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estates, section 354, pages 560, 561:
“The rule against remainders after a fee does not prevent the
limitation of an executory interest after a fee already granted.
For a long time it has been well settled both in England and
in this country that a fee may be limited after a fee by a con-
veyance operating under the statute of uses or by way of an
executory devise, provided the contingency operating to defeat
the estate of the first taker is not violative of the rule against
perpetuities. The common-law doctrine of repugnancy between
the two estates, which was perfectly rational on the assump-
tion on which it proceeded, has given way to the more just and
reasonable view, which regards the prior gift, although made
in words which, standing alone, import an absolute estate, as
restrained by the subsequent limitation and as conferring an
estate subject to be cut off by the happening of a stated event.
Such estate is, technically and properly, a defeasible fee simple,
because it is liable to be cut off, but it is none the less a fee
simple. The decisions of a few of the courts have gone further
and have stated that this prior estate, although properly de-
nominated a ‘fee,’ because it may last forever, is nevertheless

a es 441

a base or determinable fee, because it is liable to be defeated
by the happening of the contingency on which it is limited.
In other words, in such a case, as the limitation is construed, an
absolute fee is not given to the first taker; he takes only a
qualified or determinable one.” See also Restatement, Property,
section 46,

Interwoven with the foregoing is the following in 28 Am.-
Jur.2d, Estates, section 368, pages 571, 572: “A common con-
tingency on which an estate in fee is to be defeasible and on
which the estate is to go to another is the failure of issue of
the first taker, and an executory limitation of this nature is
valid where it contemplates the failure of issue during the life
of the first taker, and not an indefinite failure of issue. Such
a limitation is not within the rule against perpetuities. If the
gift over is ever to take effect, it will do so at the expiration
of the life of the first taker; the estate is certain to vest some-
where absolutely at that time. The rule is equally well settled
that an executory limitation which is to take effect on a gen-
eral or indefinite failure of issue is void. It violates the rule
against perpetuities.”

Hi When these basic precepts are applied to the facts in
this case, it becomes evident the grantors created a fee simple
defeasible estate in Ruth, subject to termination if Ruth should
die leaving no children. That in fact is what did here happen.
This means there was a definite failure of issue during the life
of Ruth, the first taker, not an indefinite or general failure of
issue.

Pursuing this matter one more step: “* * * a definite
failure of issue exists where a precise time is fixed for the fail-
ure of issue, not in express terms, but inferable with reference
to any particular time or event, as in the case of a devise to a
designated person, but if he dies without lawful issue living
at the time of his death, then over. An indefinite failure of
issue is the very converse of the other and means a failure of
issue whenever it shall happen, sooner or later, without any
definite period within which it must happen. Such failure
means the period when the issue or descendants of the first
taker become extinct and when there is no longer any issue of
the issue of the grantee, without reference to any particular

449 — |

time or any particular event; and an executory devise to take
effect at such a remote period of time is void, because it might
tie up property for generations.” 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estates, sec-
tion 368, page 572. .

VII. The interest of Ruth’s brothers and sisters or their
estates is well illustrated in 1 American Law of Property, sec-
tion 4.55, page 500: “* * * A may convey to B and his heirs,
but if B die without leaving children him surviving, then to C
and his heirs. C has an executory interest.”

In the instant ease the “C” of which the author speaks is
the brothers and sisters of Ruth or their estates. They, by the
subject deed, were granted an executory interest or a right in
futuro. See also 1 American Law of Property, section 4.53,
pages 497-499.

It is apparent the grantors provided their own unique
method by which to carry out a specific intention. Basically
this deed provides: A to B and her heirs. If B die with issue
then to them. But if B die without issue, then to C, D and E,
or their estates.

Referring again to 41 Iowa Law Review 601, 604, the
author states: “* * * all thoughtful case law upholds an execu-
tory devise contingent upon some specified event which is not
contrary to publie policy or void under the Rule Against Per-
petuities, e.g., to ‘B and his heirs but if B die without issue
surviving him, then to C and his heirs.’ This type of limitation
thay indirectly affect marketability, but it is not regarded as
a direct restraint on alienation. This conclusion is necessary
because the existence of any type of future interest impedes
the ease with which an unencumbered fee may be alienated.
When the above restriction is coupled with an additional con-
tingency—and without having alienated the land,’—it is sur-
prising that courts invalidate the executory devise. This seems
wholly fallacious because the first restriction in itself renders
the land virtually unmarketable, and the additional provision
simply enlarges rather than restricts the privileges of the first
taker, a result which many would regard as wholly desirable.
In this situation, the Restatement [Property, section 406, com-
ment g.] would have us (correctly, it would seem) ignore the

a | 443

usual effect of the without-having-alienated clause, and the gift
over is declared valid.”

VIII. We attach no special significance to use of the
words “and her heirs forever” in the original grant to Ruth.

At common law words of inheritance, such as the word
“heirs”, were required in a deed in order to create an estate
in fee simple. See 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estates, section 14, page 87.

Hl But by statute Iowa has changed that rule, such words
of inheritance being no longer essential to the creation of a
fee. Section 557.2, Code, 1966. In re Estate of Hogan, 259
Towa 887, 890, 146 N.W.2d 257.

IX. Since enactment of the Statute of Uses, executory
interests may be validly created as legal estates by deed.

1 American Law of Property, section 1.82, page 44, deals
with this matter as follows: “Likewise [before the Statute of
Uses], A could enfeoff B in a fee simple to the use of C in fee
simple, but if C should die without surviving children, then to
the use of D in fee simple. On the happening of the condition
——namely, C’s death without surviving children—the use would
shift from C to D. The interest of D was described as a shift-
ing use. When the Statute of Uses was enacted, it operated
to transform the shifting and the springing use into corre-
sponding legal interests. Thus, a unique type of future interest
arose, which was neither reversionary interest nor remainder.
* # © the springing and the shifting use, as well as analogous
types of future interests created by will, came to be called
executory interests.” See also 10 Iowa Law Bulletin 89, 94.

Code section 557.2 has the same net effect as the Statute
of Uses, without the undesirable technicalities which attend the
latter.

As stated in 6 Iowa Law Bulletin 198, 206, 207: “The legal
limitations that became possible under the statute [of uses]
are familiar to us in wills under the name of executory devises.
In deeds certain of them are familiar as conditional limitations.
Had there been some easy name such as executory devises to
designate these executory interests when created by deed it
is probable that we should not have had such dicta as that in
Leaver v. Gauss [62 Iowa 314, 17 N.W. 522]. The terms
‘springing uses’ and ‘shifting uses’ have such a forbidding

444 — |

sound as to check familiarity with the very up to date and
useful interests which they designate.

“In Iowa, the adoption of these executory interests was
not left to speculation. In the Code of 1851 it was provided
that ‘estates may be created to commence at a future day’. This
could mean but one thing, the freehold in futuro. There was no
occasion to say anything about remainders as there was no at-
tempt made to cover the law of estates, and remainders were
too much a part of the common law to need mention. Without
this statute, the freehold in futuro would have been a part of our
law but recourse would then have had to be made to the Statute
of Uses and such technicalities as had grown up in connection
therewith. With this statute in force there has been no need to
inquire whether a conveyance can operate as a bargain and
sale or a covenant to stand seised in order that it should create
a freehold in futuro. Freeholds in futuro ave recognized legal
interests capable of arising by any instrument that answers the
requirements of our statutory deed. Seventy years ago our
legislature took the step, now contemplated in Parliament, of
superseding the Statute of Uses in so far as resort to it had
been necessary to create these executory interests, by a more
modern statute.” See also section 557.6, Code, 1966.

X. Under a factual situation other than that here pre-
sented, some question might be posed by the presence of those
provisions in the deed now before us to the effect, “* * * Ruth
E. Bilsborough shall have no power or authority to sell, mort-
gage, or alienate the whole or any part of the said property
or to sell, alienate or anticipate the whole or any part of the
rents, profits, or issues thereof nor shall the property be liable
for any debt or debts contracted by the said Ruth B. Bils-
borough or for any judgments obtained against her in any
Court of Law or Equity, but it shall be kept free and unin-
eumbered * * *,”

However it is neither necessary nor do we here draw any
conclusion as to the legal effect of this limitation on alienabil-
ity. Ruth died without either an attempt to so alienate, or to
question this provision of the deed. Stated otherwise the issue
is moot, unless its presence would serve to somehow create a

SS 445

repugnancy. And, under existing circumstances we find no ir-
reconcilable conflict by virtue of the restraints here imposed.

On this subject see generally, Swenson, Possessory Estates
and Future Interests in Iowa, 36 I.C.A. 73, 122.

XI. We conclude, since Ruth E. Bilsborough (Fleck),
original taker, died leaving no issue surviving, all rights in the
property here concerned vested, on her death, in her brothers
and sisters or their estates.

Reversed and remanded for entry of decree consistent
with this opinion. .

All Justices concur.

In re Trust or Grorex M. Butier, deceased; Stare Savines
Bank, Council Bluffs, trustee.

No. 52741.
(Reported in 154 N.W.24 705)

aa |

DercemBer 12, 1967.

7 a 4at

Porter, Heithoff & Pratt, of Council Bluffs, for Donald G.
Tomanio, Jr. and Nancy O’Brien, beneficiaries under Will of
George M. Butler, deceased.

Smith, Peterson, Beckman & Willson, of Council Bluffs,
for Finley Frost, executor of Estate of Nancy Butler, deceased.

Proctor R. Perkins, of Council Bluffs, for State Savings
Bank, trustee in re Trust of George M. Butler, deceased.

Larson, J.—This controversy arose as a result of an objec-
tion by remaindermen to a trustee’s application for authority
to dispose of and distribute assets of the George M. Butler
Trust. It is between the executor of the estate of Nancy May
Butler, deceased, who was the life tenant and trustee under
the ‘Will of her deceased husband, appellee herein, and Donald
Gerald Tomanio, Jr. and Nancy Tomanio O’Brien, appellants
herein, who are remaindermen under the Trust, and involves
the ownership of certain corporate stock dividends and other
distributions made during the lifetime of Nancy May Butler.
Simply stated, the question presented is whether under the
facts revealed these dividends and distributions shall be allo-
cated to income or corpus.

George M. Butler died on June 1, 1951. Item II of his will
provided as follows:

“Tt is my will and I do hereby give, devise and bequeath all
the balance, residue and remainder of my property, real, per-
sonal and mixed, of which I may be the owner at my death, to
my beloved wife, Nancy May Butler, as trustee, and in trust for
the following purposes and under the following terms and con-
ditions to-wit:

“Ist. It is my will and I do hereby provide that my wife,
Nancy May Butler, shall have all of the income from any and
all property of which I may be the owner at my death during
her full lifetime. I further provide that if it becomes necessary
or if she should so desire, she shall also have the right to use
such amount or amounts of the principal of my property as she
may need or as she may desire from time to time and for
the purpose of carrying out this provision of the trust, I hereby

448 Le Ye

grant to my wife, Nancy May Butler, as trustee, full and com-
plete power to dispose of any of the property of which I may
be the owner at my death, and to invest same in such other
form as she may desire and to use thereof as she may desire,
and I grant to her such power as such trustee without the
necessity of application to court or report to court with

* reference thereto and without the necessity of her filing bond
in connection with such trusteeship. * * *

“8rd. Subject to the life estate in my wife, Nancy May
Butler, and subject to the conditions of the trusteeship as
hereinbefore provided and subject to the bequests or devises
made to Donald Tomanio and Barbara Tomanio, I do hereby
provide that after the death of my wife, I give, devise and
bequeath unto Jerrey-Tomanio the sum of Fifteen Thousand
($15,000.00) Dollars, and Naney Tomanio the sum of Fifteen
Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars, and I do hereby give and be-
queath unto Jerrey Tomanio and Naney Tomanio in addition
to the bequests as hereinbefore made to them, all my bank
stocks, which I estimate to be of the value of Fifteen Thousand
($15,000.00) Dollars upon this condition, that said bank stocks
shall not be sold until Jerrey Tomanio and Nancy Tomanio
shall each have attained the age of 21 years, it being my in-
tention that during their minority that they only have and
receive the dividends from such bank stocks.”

At the time of his death George M. Butler owned, among
other assets, 50 shares of stock in the State Savings Bank of
Council Bluffs, Iowa. When his estate was closed the stock was
transferred to Nancy May Butler, trustee, as provided under
his will. The income was to go to.her as beneficiary for her
life.

As disclosed by Exhibit 2, State Savings Bank maintained
three general accounts: undivided profits, which reflected the
earnings from the regular bank business and from which cash
dividends could be declared and transfers made to the other
general accounts; surplus, from which transfers could be made
to other accounts; and the capital account, which consisted of
stockholders’ contributions, natural growth, and transfers from
the other accounts, from which stock dividends could be de-

Ye EE 449

clared. Whether the stock dividend is to be considered income
or corpus in Iowa depends upon its source. When this trust
was created, the undivided earnings and profits account dis-
closed a balance of $130,183 and the surplus account $150,000.
At no time during the period of this trust did either account
fall below those amounts. The book value of the stock at that
time was $295.27 per share.

From 1952 to 1963 the total cash dividends paid on this
stock amounted to $5155. Cash dividends were paid in every
year except 1960 and 1961.

On March 2, 1953, a resolution was passed by the State
Savings Bank whereby its officers were authorized and directed
to debit the undivided earnings and profits account and credit
the capital stock account in the amount of $50,000. Then
stock certificates were issued accordingly and Nancy Butler,
trustee, received 17 shares as a result of this resolution. A
similar resolution was passed by State Savings Bank on July
11, 1961, and as a result thereof she received 67 shares of stock
as her proportionate share of the $200,000 of undivided earn-
ings and profits transferred to the capital stock account. Again
on January 8, 1963, a similar resolution was passed and capital
stock was increased $100,000 by debiting the undivided earn-
ings and profits account. As a result of that resolution the
bank issued 33 shares of stock to Nancy Butler, trustee. As of
that date Nancy Butler, trustee, owned 167 shares of State
Savings Bank stock, or 117 shares more than the 50 shares
originally given her as trustee.

In October 1964 State Savings Bank presented the follow-
ing proposal to its stockholders: (1) If 80 percent of the stock-
holders agreed, a new corporation, State Company, would be
formed. (2) Hach agreeing stockholder would surrender his
stock in State Savings Bank and would receive for each share
surrendered (a) one share of stock in State Company having a
par value of $100 and (b) one debenture with a value of $200,
payable on October 15, 1979, with an interest rate of 514 per-
cent. The stockholders agreed to this proposal, and there is
no serious objection to the trial court’s finding that this did not

450 EE 7

amount to an ademption of the legacy, although Nancy Butler,
as trustee, participated therein.

Nancy Butler died on February 20, 1966. At that date as
a result of the reorganization, in addition to the 50 State Com-
pany shares, she owned as trustee: (1) 117 shares of State
Company stock (2) $33,400 State Company debenture note pay-
able October 15, 1979, at 514 percent interest, and (3) Savings
Account No, 30041, in the amount of $33,400 plus accrued in-
terest from date of deposit, representing the cash received at
the time of the reorganization. The ‘percentage of trustee
ownership over these years remained at approximately 3.34
percent:

Stock Shares Shares
Year ~ Dividend Held Outstanding %
1951 None “50° 1500 8.33
1953 17 . 67 2000 3.35
1961 67 184 4000 * 8.85
1963 33 167 5000 3.84

It further appears from Exhibit 2 that on the date of her
death the book value of each share of equivalent stock, after
making a proportionate adjustment for increase in total capital
from December 31, 1965, to February 20, 1966, was approxi-
mately $296.28, indicating that there was no dilution of the
value of the original 50 shares devised to the remaindermen.

On August 11, 1966, the State Savings Bank, as trustee in
the matter of the Trust of George M. Butler, deceased, filed an
Application for Authority to Dispose of and Distribute Assets.
In its application the bank asked that the stock, debenture
note and cash referred to as a return of capital should be dis-
tributed only in such manner as shall be determined by the
court by reasons of the question of whether the gift, by sur-
render of the State Savings Bank stock and issuance of the
new securities in place of the old, had been adeemed, and
whether, if not adeemed, the gift should be limited to the
original 50 shares of State Savings Bank stock inasmuch as
the additional 117 shares were dividends and may have been
income to which the life tenant was entitled.

On September 1, 1966, Donald Gerald Tomanio, Jr. and

ye Le 451

Nancy Tomanio O’Brien, remaindermen, filed an objection to
the application, stating that on the termination of the life estate
of Nancy Butler, the stock, debenture note and return of
capital, became the absolute property of the objectors. They
further asked the court for an order requiring the trustee to
turn over to them the above enumerated items.

On September 15, 1966, Finley Frost, as executor of the
estate of Nancy M. Butler, deceased, filed an application in
behalf of the estate of Nancy M. Butler alleging that the 117
shares of State Company stock, the debenture note in amount
of $23,400, and return of capital in amount of $23,400, were
income acerued to her during her lifetime and should be turned
over to the estate of Nancy M. Butler. The trial court found
no ademption and that the estate of Nancy Butler was en-
titled to stock dividends totaling 117 shares as well as the
rights aceruing therefrom.

There is no issue relative to the ownership of the 50 shares
of State Company stock. This was and is corpus of the trust.
The parties recognized this by consenting to the distribution to
the remaindermen of the 50 shares, together with the $10,000
debenture note of State Company (50 shares x $200) and
$10,000 cash representing a return of capital. The sole issue
presented by this appeal is whether the 117 remaining shares
of State Company stock, and the distributions connected there-
with, should be allocated to corpus or income.

Propositions relied upon by appellants are that (1)
dividends payable in shares of the declaring corporation are
principal (2) a distribution by a corporation, which is return
of capital and not distribution of earnings, is principal, and
(8) the stock dividends, debenture note and return of capital
all represented the natural growth of State Savings Bank and
are the property of the remaindermen. The trial court rejected
each of these propositions, and under the Iowa rule we must
agree.

I. Three basic rules have developed in the United States
for the apportionment of declared dividends, cash or stock,
between life beneficiaries and remaindermen. See 32 Iowa Law
Review 522-526. They are known as the Massachusetts rule,

452 Le a

the Pennsylvania rule and the Kentucky rule. 33 Am. Jur., Life
Estates, Remainders ete., section 381.

The Massachusetts rule awards to corpus or remaindermen
the entire extraordinary distribution or dividend from earnings
if it is essentially a stock dividend, and to income or the life
beneficiaries if it is essentially a cash dividend, without regard
in either case as to the time covered by the accumulation of
earnings. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 96 Am. Dec. 705;
Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 10 S. Ct. 1057, 34 L. Hd. 525.
Thus, the method of transferring funds from one account to
another is not important. If the dividend is made from the
capital account, it is principal.

The Pennsylvania, or American.rule, inquires as to the time
covered by the accumulation of earnings from which the extra-
ordinary dividend is paid and does not concern itself with the
fund from which it is paid. -Kalbach y. Clark, 183 Iowa 215,
110 N. W. 599, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 801, 12 Ann. Cas. 647. If the
earnings were before the commencement of the life estate, they
are allocable to corpus, and, if after, to income. However, if
the dividends were declared from earnings accrued partly
before and partly after the distribution, this rule apportions
each respectively between the life tenant and remainderman.
Earp’s Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; Biddle’s Appeal, 99 Pa. 278.

The Kentucky rule awards declared corporate dividends,
whether in cash or in kind, to income. This rule, arbitrary and
harsh in its application, seems to have been rejected in most
jurisdictions and is no longer the law of Kentucky. Bowles v.
Stilley’s Executors et al., Ky., 267 8. W.2d 707, 44 A. L. R.2d
1278.

Il. Appellants point out that at least twenty-seven states
have adopted the Uniform Principal and Income Act in which
the Massachusetts rule is incorporated, that the United States
Supreme Court has applied this rule since 1890, and that al-
though the first Restatement of Trusts adopted essentially the
Pennsylvania rule, it later chose to adopt the Massachusetts
rule. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, section 236 (1957).
They recognize that we have followed the Iowa rule for the
past sixty years, but due to the trend announced above and

a | 458

other factors, urge us to adopt section 5 of the Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act, and now to hold that stock dividends
and returns of capital are properly allocated to corpus and not
income. We are not persuaded to that view and believe our
rule more nearly reaches the settlor’s intent to provide all in-
come to the beneficiaries of the trust without reducing the
corpus. In 1907 we established a modified version of the Penn-
sylvania rule in Iowa. The legislature over the years has been
aware of this pronouncement and could have either adopted
the Uniform Principal and Income Act or the Massachusetts
rule by statute if it had believed a change was desirable. It did
not do so.

Ill. Although a majority of the courts have adopted the
Massachusetts rule or a modification thereof, some courts, in-
cluding Iowa, have preferred a rule which emphasizes the in-
tention of the settlor rather than the mechanical or simplified
corporate procedure found in the Massachusetts rule. In re
Trusts of Young, 250 Iowa 126, 180, 93 N. W.2d 74, and cita-
tions.

It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that we apply a
modification of the Pennsylvania rule to distributions of stock
dividends. Kalbach v. Clark, supra, 138 Iowa 215, 110 N. W.
599; Lauman vy. Foster, 157 Iowa 275, 185 N. W. 14, 50 L.R.A.,
NS., 581; Sexton v. Percival Company, 189 Iowa 586, 177 N, W.
83; In re Estate of Etzel, 211 Iowa 700, 234 N.W. 210.

We start with the proposition that ordinary or pure
dividends, whether in cash or in kind, that are declared out of
earnings and profits of a corporation during the trust, whether
current or accumulated, are income. Such ordinary dividends
are properly allocated to the life tenant and not to the re-
mainderman. It would seem a corollary to this is that any
return of capital, through reorganization or otherwise, pre-
sumptively comes out of earnings and profits until there are no
earnings and profits remaining. On the other hand, if the “so-
called” dividend is a stock dividend and represents the
corporate capital, ie., represents nothing but the natural
growth or increase in the value of the permanent property so
there is merely a change in form of ownership, the stock is

454 a a

properly allocable to the remainderman. Kalbach v. Clark and
In re Estate of Etzel, both supra. We have also said that the
mere fact that the directors of a corporation choose to call the
distribution as one coming from capital, surplus, or earnings
and profits, is not controlling, as this loses sight of the actual
nature of the transaction. Kalbach v. Clark, supra.

| The burden of showing that the distribution is actually
one of capital is upon the person who claims it was such a
distribution. Sexton v. Percival Company and Kalbach v. Clark,
supra. In this jurisdiction under our rule the problem be-
comes one of tracing the origin of the dividend.

HI IV. Appellants contend that the stock dividends,
debenture note and return of capital, all represented the
natural growth of State Savings Bank. We cannot agree. It
is quite clear the funds did not accrue from any increase in
value of the permanent property of the corporation, the physi-
eal property, goodwill, or other tangible property. On the
other hand, it appears from Exhibit 2 that the funds from
which the stock dividends were declared were all traceable to
the undivided earnings and profits account via transfers duly
made by the directors for various reasons unimportant to this
controversy. By these transfers the directors, of course, re-
jected the idea of declaring cash dividends from the ever-
mounting earnings and profits account. Although under the
Massachusetts rule this action would deny the stockholders a
share in those accrued earnings, we believe it better to trace
the funds and allocate the dividends according to their origin.

HME it would be unrealistic, and appellee does not con-
tend that there has been no aceretion to wealth of the cor-
poration herein involved. The real question is whether the
stock dividends, debenture note and return of capital were
declared out of principal or earnings and profits. From an
accounting aspect, the above were declared out of capital.
However, as pointed out, in this jurisdiction it matters not from
what account a dividend is declared. Where a corporation
having actually made profits and then distributed such profits
to the stockholders, the life tenant is entitled to receive them
without regard to the form of the transaction. This, we believe,

aa 455

best serves the settlor’s purpose and is most fair and equitable.
Lauman. v. Foster, supra, 157 Iowa 275, 185 N.W. 14, and cita-
tions. In other words, just because the directors transfer an
amount of money from earnings and profits to surplus, and
from surplus to capital, and then declare a stock dividend, does
not mean, in and of itself, that the earnings and profits trans-
ferred disappear and the distribution is one of capital. Such a
rule, we think, would be easily administered but could result
in an arbitrary and unfair distribution. It places too much
discretion and authority in the corporate directors. In the
case at bar each time a stock dividend was declared there were
sufficient earnings and profits above the amounts shown in the
undivided earnings and profits, and surplus, accounts at the
inception of the trust, to cover the entire distribution, and they
were transferred to the capital stock account to accomplish
these distributions.

HI Appellants suggest the stock dividends declared, al-
though traceable to earnings, in fact represented growth in
capital and, when declared, resulted in a dilution of the value
of each share of stock, since more outstanding shares would be
represented by the same amount of capital and surplus. This
has not been the result here for, as noted, the book value of the
stock remained approximately the same, $295.27 per share at
the beginning and $296.23 per share at the termination of the
trust. This is the true test as to whether there was any diminu-
tion in value of the shares bequeathed. We are satisfied that
the remaindermen have failed to show the funds from which the
stock dividends were declared came from natural growth of
value of the corporate property, or that the distribution
seriously affected the value of the corpus of the trust, but must
agree with the trial court that the funds from which the stock
dividends were declared came from the earnings and profits of
the corporation during the trust period and should be the
property of the life tenant. As bearing on this matter, see
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Second Hdition, section 845.

As we have noted, after each transfer and dividend trans-
action, the percentage of ownership held by the trustee did not
vary to any material extent. Although it is true the remain-

£0

dermen will not possess the same percentage of ownership of
the corporation as did the settlor, it appears the bequest was
not in percent of ownership in the bank but of 50 shares un-
diminished in book value, which did not include distributions
based upon earnings of the corporation during the trust period.

The remaindermen were thus entitled to the benefit of the
reorganization and were properly allocated 50 shares of stock
in State Company, together with a $10,000 debenture note and
$10,000 in cash, as the corpus of this trust.

The reorganization gave to the trustee 117 shares in State
Company, together with a $23,400 debenture note and $23,400
in ‘cash, all of which was traceable solely to earnings and
profits of the State Savings Bank during the trust period. The
trial court’s decision that the estate of Nancy M. Butler was
entitled thereto as income was correct.—Affirmed.

All Jusriczs concur.

Iowa Stare Boarp or ENGINEERING ExaMINers, appellant, v.
Exxcrronic ENeINeerIne Company et al., appellees.

No, 52708.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 737)

Decemper 12, 1967.

Scalise, Scism, Gentry & Brick, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, of Des Moines, for

appellees.

LeGranp, J—This action, brought under section 114.24,
Code, 1966, seeks to enjoin the use of the corporate name of
defendant, Electronic Engineering Company. The individual
defendants, William R. Clark and John J. Moffet, were made
defendants as the duly elected officers of the corporation. For
convenience the three defendants will be jointly referred to as
defendant.

HI Chapter 114 of the Code was enacted to regulate the
practice of professional engineering in this state. Like all
licensing provisions, it is designed to protect the public by
making certain that one who undertakes to represent himself as
a professional engineer and to offer his services as such will meet
certain minimum standards.

Plaintiff is an administrative body authorized by law to
test by examination the qualifications of those who desire to
practice professional engineering and to certify those who meet

5

the statutory requirements. The chapter does not require all
engineers to comply with its terms, limiting its application to
professional engineers as that term is defined in section 114.2,
Code, 1966. We will refer later to certain specific sections of
the chapter in question, but we are principally concerned with
section 114.24 which provides:

“114.24 Injunetion.. Any person who is not legally author-
ized to practice in this state according to the provisions of this
chapter, and shall practice, or shall in connection with his name
use any designation tending to imply or designate him as a
professional engineer or land surveyor, may be restrained by
permanent injunction.” (Emphasis added.)

The issue here is a very narrow one and is one which has
not previously been considered by us. Plaintiff concedes that
defendant has not practiced professional engineering, as, that
term is defined in the statute, but insists that the corporate
name tends to imply or designate it as rendering professional
engineering services. If this be true, the use of such name
may be enjoined under the section above set out.

- The material facts are undisputed. From 1949 to 1958
William R. Clark and John J. Moffet, together with one other
person, carried on a partnership business under the name of
Electronic Engineering Company. In 1958 the business was
incorporated under the same name. At the time of trial the
business had been operated without interruption under this
name for approximately 17 years, both as-a ‘partnership and
as a corporation. The business of the defendant is principally
that of installing and servicing two-way radios and mobile
telephones. It also services and repairs home laundries, re-
frigerators, television sets, and air conditioning equipment.
Defendant has. never rendered professional engineering serv-
ices, nor has it advertised that it is qualified to do so. Nor,
in 17 years, has anyone requested defendant to render profes-
sional engineering services.

Plaintiff, however, contends what defendant does is unim-
portant and how it advertises is immaterial. The sole issue
raised by the-petition is whether the use of the corporate name,
Electronic Engineering Company, violates.section 114.24 by im:

|:

plying defendant offers professional engineering services or by
designating it as a professional engineering company.

As pointed out in State v. Durham, Del. Super., 191 A.2d
646 at 648, all 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, the
Canal Zone, and Puerto Rico, now have laws for licensing and
registering professional engineers. Most if not all of these
statutes have provisions governing the use of the words “pro-
fessional engineer.” Some specifically prohibit the use of the
term at all in the title. T.V. Engineers, Inc. v. District of Co-
lumbia, 166 A.2d 920, 921. Other statutes, like ours, forbid
the use of any name which designates a person as a professional
engineer or which implies he is one.

HI The latter type affords no fixed standard by which to
decide if an injunction should issue. Whether a particular
name raises the implication which the law forbids is a question
of fact to be determined in each case. State ex rel. Wisconsin
Registration Bd. v. T. V. Engineers of Kenosha, Inc., 30 Wis.2d
434, 141 N.W.2d 235, 239; T. V. Engineers, Ine. v. District of
Columbia, supra, at page 922 of 166 A.2d.

Here the trial court found that the corporate name did not
violate the statute and dismissed the petition seeking to enjoin
its use. Our review is de novo, although we give consideration
to the findings of the trial court. Rule 344(f)(7), R.C.P.

Section 114.2, Code, 1966, defines professional engineer as a
person, who, by reason of his knowledge of mathematics, physical
sciences, and the principles of engineering, acquired by profes-
sional education and/or practical experience, is qualified to
engage in engineering practice.

That section defines the practice of professional engineer-
ing to mean any professional service, such as consultation, in-
vestigation, evaluation, planning, designing, or responsible
supervision of construction in connection with structures, build-
ings, equipment, processes, works, or projects, wherein the
public welfare or the safeguarding of lives, health or property
is.or may be concerned or involved, when such professional
service requires the application of engineering principles and
data.

Neither of the individual defendants is a professional en-
gineer. The corporate defendant does not render, nor does it

$0

hold itself out as rendering, professional engineering services
as defined in the statute.

Our problem is to determine if the corporate name implies
that it does.

The term “engineer” has now lost much of its original
professional significance. The evidence shows that the yellow
pages of the Des Moines telephone directory list engineering
in categories such as architectural, chemical, civil, consulting,
electrical, heating, mechanical, sanitary, structural and traffic.
There is no separate listing for electronic engineers. To these
may be added other definitions from Webster’s International
Dictionary, Second Edition, which include within the term, one
who runs an engine; one who manages a project by artful con-
trivance; and, in military parlance, one engaged as an artillery-
manor gunner. This same dictionary notes there are 41 special
classifications under the definition of engineering and even
then indicates there are still others not listed.

| | We mention this merely to illustrate that “engineer”
no longer necessarily connotes professional competence or skill.
Apparently the legislature recognized this in limiting the ap-
plication of chapter 114 to professional engineers, which section
114.2 defines to exclude many of those who now use that term
to describe their work or occupation. It must be conceded
that “engineer” and “professional engineer” are not synony-
mous. The use of one does not necessarily imply the other.

The sole issue here is whether defendant’s corporate name
implies defendant renders professional engineering services, not
whether it renders any engineering services. In considering that
question, it is important to take into account all the circum-
stances surrounding the use of such name. This is particularly
true since our finding is one of fact and prior decisions from
other jurisdictions are of no help to us.

HH Under the evidence here we agree with the trial court
there is no violation of section 114.24. In reaching this con-
clusion we cannot completely. disregard, as plaintiff would have
us do, the testimony indicating defendant has used this name
for 17 years without receiving a single request to render pro-
fessional engineering services. We consider this quite im-

ee Pe 461

portant in deciding the name does not imply what plaintiff
says it does. The absence, over a long period of time, of a
single request to render the type of service prohibited by
statute overwhelmingly suggests the name raises no implication
in violation of section 114.24. It is the public, not the plaintiff,
which the law seeks to protect. The evidence makes it clear
what plaintiff argues here has occurred to no one except plain-
tiff.

We do not say the use of a name such as defendant uses
could under no circumstances constitute a violation of the sec-
tion in question. As previously determined, this is a fact
question to be determined in each case. We merely hold plain-
tiff has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence a
violation of section 114.24, Code, 1966.

We find defendant’s use of its corporate name, under the
evidence in this case, does not imply that defendant renders
professional engineering services nor does it designate defend-
ant as a professional engineering company. The trial court’s
finding was right—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

H. C. Kusimann, Jr., plaintiff-appellee, v. Miprep Wison
Prrsincer, appellant, and Van W. Hammerstrom, County
Treasurer of Woodbury County, defendant-appellee.

No. 52768.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 860)

[|

DecempBer 12, 1967.

Paul W. Deck and Robert J. Larson, both of Sioux City,
for appellant, Mildred Wilson Persinger.

Ray N. Berry and Neil R. McCluhan, both of Sioux City,
for appellee H. C. Kuhlmann, Jr.

Alvin Hayes, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, of Sioux
City, for appellee Van W. Hammerstrom, County Treasurer.

Larson, J.—Plaintiff is a special assessment (sidewalk) cer-
tificate holder and brings this action for declaratory judgment
against the defendant property holder for an amount claimed
to be owed under the assessment as previously adjudicated by
this court in Persinger v. Sioux City, 257 lowa 727, 183 N. W.2d
110, including interest claimed due and unpaid by the property
owner.

a | 463

Pursuant to the property owner’s application for separate
adjudication of law points raised in her answer to the petition
as provided in rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure, the matter
was submitted to the court on a stipulation of facts. The trial
court’s judgment ordered the defendant county treasurer to
apply the sum of $2070 paid into court by defendant property
owner “to the payment of the principle amount of the special
assessment against the following described real estate, to-wit:
[description] and that said defendant, Van W. Hammerstrom,
as County Treasurer, compute the interest from June 5, 1961,
on said $2070 in conformity with sections 391.91, 391.58, 391.59
and 391.60 of the Code of Iowa, and that if said interest is not
paid prior to the next regular tax sale that the above described
property be sold for the sum of interest due and delinquent as
by law provided, with the property owner having the right of
redemption as provided by law”, and taxed costs to defendant
property owner. When her motion to reconsider and for a new
trial was overruled, she alone appeals. We find no merit in
her appeal and must affirm the trial court’s judgment.

HI 1. This cause was brought and tried in equity, and
our review is de novo. Small v. Ogden, 259 Iowa 1126, 147
N. W.2d 18, 20; Ullmann v. Reed, 258 Iowa 100, 187 N. W.2d
690, 691. Since the property owner alone appeals, we shall
hereinafter refer to her as the defendant.

II, From the stipulation of facts we learn that on October
24, 1960, the City of Sioux City and the plaintiff, a contractor,
entered into a contract for the construction of a sidewalk along
the east side of defendant’s property in Sioux City, Iowa.

On May 8, 1961, the City accepted the sidewalk, and on
June 5, 1961, levied an assessment of $3156.41 against the de-
fendant’s property, payable in ten equal installments, with the
first installment due in July of 1961 and the other nine install-
ments becoming due in March of the years 1962 through 1970.
On or about that date Special Assessment Certificate No, 3864
covering this work was issued to the plaintiff, who is still the
owner and holder thereof.

It also appears that on July 26, 1961, defendant Persinger
appealed this assessment to the district court, and on February

464 a |

19, 1964, the district court entered judgment and decree void-
ing the assessment. The plaintiff herein was not a party to that
action, and when the City appealed to the Supreme Court of
Towa, we, in 257 Iowa 727, 183 N. W2d 110, held that the assess-
ment was excessive but not void, that the assessment should
not exceed $2070, and remanded the case “for a decree in con-
formity herewith.”

On June 9, 1965, pursuant to our remand order, the district
court rendered a “judgment” against Mildred Wilson Persinger
in the sum of $2070 and assessed to her a share of the costs of
the assessment appeal. On August 10, 1965, defendant Per-
singer paid $2070, without interest, to the Clerk of the District
Court and he in turn gave that sum to the county treasurer.
The county treasurer refused to turn this sum over to plaintiff
unless he surrendered the special assessment certificate, and
plaintiff refused to surrender the certificate unless the accrued
interest was included in the payment. Plaintiff Kuhlmann
commenced this action to recover these sums on July 21, 1966,
against both defendant Persinger and county treasurer.

In his pleading plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment
requiring defendant Persinger to pay interest at 6 percent on
each installment under the special assessment and certificate
from the date of levy, June 5, 1961, and that the county treas-
urer be required to sell the Persinger real estate assessed at
the next regular scheduled tax sale if the past-due installment
of the reduced special assessment, plus interest, is not paid.

Defendant Persinger’s answer, filed August 9, 1966, as-
serted that all matters alleged by plaintiff were fully litigated
and settled by the judgment entered by the district court pur-
suant to the remand order of this court, and the payment to the
clerk of the $2070 on August 10, 1965. She further contends
plaintiff is in privity of contract with Sioux City and estopped
from bringing this action against her. In her separate applica-
tion for adjudication of law points, she raised the issues of
privity, res judicata, bar and estoppel.

As we understand it, the issues presented to us by this ap-
peal are: (1) Did the trial court err in holding that interest
at 6 percent should be paid by defendant Persinger from June

PC Le 465

5, 1961, rather than at 5 percent from June 9, 1965, the date of
the district court judgment entered pursuant to remand, and
(2) did the trial court err in holding res judicata was not ap-
plicable here and that the doctrine of estoppel would not apply?

Il. The trial court seemed to attach little significance to
the form or wording of the order rendered by the district
court as a result of our remand in Persinger v. Sioux City
decided February 9, 1965. As urged by plaintiff, it concluded
that, since the matter of interest was not an issue in that case,
the amount and period covered was by statute provided and,
as this was an assessment appeal, the 6 percent interest on the
unpaid reduced assessment must be paid in addition to the
$2070 recited in the court’s order. On the other hand, the de-
fendant contends it is determinative of the plaintiff’s claim
for interest due under the special assessment that since the
order gave a “judgment” against her personally for $2070, the
legal impact of which is well established, it drew interest at
5 percent from date of pronouncement as provided by statute.
She further contends that, since this judgment was promptly
paid, no interest is due on this obligation either to plaintiff or
the city.

IV. The trial court herein reviewed the previous litigation
and the order issued by the district court pursuant to the re-
mand order in that case. It noted that under the district
court’s order a judgment for $2070 was entered in favor of the
City of Sioux City against the defendant and that no mention
was made regarding interest. Its finding that this judgment
did not include interest is not disputed. That judgment order
provided: “Pursuant to the decision of the lowa Supreme Court
in this case, it is ordered that the Judgment heretofore entered
herein be and is hereby reversed in part, and modified in that
Judgment be and is entered in favor of the City of Sioux City,
Iowa, and against Mildred Wilson Persinger in the sum of
$2,070.00 and that the costs of this action be and are taxed one
third to the City of Sioux City, Iowa, and two thirds to Mildred
Wilson Persinger, all as provided by law and the opinion of the
Iowa Supreme Court.”

Sections 391.59 and 391.91 of the Iowa Code make interest

466 a |

from the time of the original-levy to the present at a rate not
exceeding 6 percent per annum mandatory upon special assess-
ment installments. The trial court felt the only complaint that
could be made as.to the former district court’s order was that
the judgment did not specify the interest to be paid. To this
extent the parties are agreed, but plaintiff contends it is fixed
by section 391.59 relating to special assessments, and defend-
ant asserts it is fixed by section 535.3 of the Code relating to
ordinary judgments.

The trial court reviewed several special assessment cases,
including Lightner v. Greene County, 156 Iowa 398, 186 N. W.
761, Rystad v. Buena Vista County Drainage Dist., 170 Iowa
178, 152 N. W. 364, and Barber ‘Asphalt’ Pav. Co. v. District
Court, 181 Iowa 1265, 163 N. W. 214, which cases at the trial
court level did not provide interest in the decrees ordered. The
court noted that on appeal we said on those occasions that
lower courts inust give effect to these interest statutes by either’
(1) ‘making the decree large enough to include the interest or
(2) providing that the sum fixed bear interest from the pre-
vious specified date designated in the: statute.

Hl The trial court concluded that under our cases it was
unnecessary for a lower court to provide for interest in its
decree because the same is specified by statute, and that in
the absence of specific provisions in a decree the interest would
attach by virtue of the statute. It was satisfied such was the
intention of the district court in granting this remand judg-
ment, and held. that, because‘ of the previous litigation, the
judgment granted was not a judgment in the ordinary sense
but amounted to the fixing of the assessment reduction only.
‘We must agree. .

Obviously, the parties knew the issue resolved by the ap-
peal to us was that of fixing a reduced special assessment.
They knew the remand order required the trial court to fix
the assessment as designated, and they were well aware that
interest had not previously been an issue in that case. Both
parties knew, where interest was involved; there were statutory
provisions pertaining thereto. Plaintiff contends it is not rea~
sonable to. say that, because the trial court used the: words

a ee 467

“Judgment * * * in favor of the City of Sioux City, Iowa, and
against Mildred Wilson Persinger” instead of “defendant’s
assessment is reduced”, there should be interest assessed from
the date of the decree at 5 percent per annum rather than in-
terest at 6 percent per annum, the amount contemplated.by the
assessment statutes. We agree with that construction of the
order and do not feel the deeree was so defective as to require
another appeal to obtain the just and intended result of our
remand. Defendant was not misled or deceived to her detri-
ment by this wording of the court’s order.

In Rystad v. Buena Vista County Drainage Dist., supra,
we considered a similar matter and, in holding the ascertained
assessment should “bear interest from the original date pre-
cisely as it would have done if it had been made by the board
in the first instance”, we said (page 182 of 170 Iowa), “In
construing the order of the court * * * on such appeal, we think
it ought to be construed prima facie as a declaration of the
amount which ought to have been assessed originally.”

We are satisfied the “judgment” here only fixed the
amount of the assessment on this property, that the interest
accrued as provided by section 391.59, and that the method of
collection in the statute was available to the plaintiff as the
holder of a valid certificate covering that improvement.

V. If appellant’s contention as to the legal effect of the
use of the term “judgment” instead of “assessment reduction”
is taken as correct, and it is agreed that it did not include
acerued interest, we are faced with the vital question of
whether the district court exceeded its authority and jurisdic-
tion in issuing such an order pursuant to our remand.

After a careful review of the city’s assessment against de-
fendant’s property in Persinger v. Sioux City, supra, we said,
“the actual value of the 300 feet abutting the highway does not
exceed $900 per acre, or $8280. The special assessment should
not exceed 25 percent of $8280, or $2070.” In our remand order
we stated: “The case is reversed in part, modified, and remand-
ed for a decree in conformity herewith. The costs are taxed
one third to the appellant and two thirds to appellee.” By this
order we directed that the special assessment involved herein

468 Le 7

be reduced to $2070 and we remanded the case for that purpose
and for no other. If the district court’s order did not reduce
the special assessment to $2070 as of June 5, 1961, but rendered
a personal judgment against defendant for that sum, and that
judgment, even though erroneous, is to be considered final be-
cause there was no timely appeal, it would appear this order
or decree was not in conformity with our mandate and must
be considered void and of no legal effect. .

HE VI. It is well settled in Iowa that when the Supreme
Court remands for a special purpose, the district court, upon
the remand, is limited to do the special thing authorized by
this court in its opinion, and nothing else. It has no power or
jurisdiction to do anything except to proceed in accordance
with the mandate. Glenn v. Chambers, 244 Iowa 750, 754, 56
N. W.2d 892, and citations; Ronna v. American State Bank,
215 Iowa 806, 810, 813, 816, 246 N. W. 798, 800; Arnold v.
Arnold, 258 Towa 850, 140 N. W.2d 874, 876 (1966); Iowa-
Illinois’ Gas and Electric Co. v. Gaffney, 256 Iowa 1029, 1040,
129 N. W.2d 832, 838; 8 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, section
1234, page 731, and section 1240, page 737; 5B C. J. 8., Appeal
and Error, sections 1965 and 1967, pages 575, 576, 581, 582;
5 Am. Jur.2d, sections 991 and 992.

In Glenn v. Chambers, supra, we quoted with approval
from 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, section 1234, page 781,
as follows: “* * * the trial court, upon remittitur, has no power
but to obey the judgment of the appellate court * * *. Pro-
ceedings contrary to the mandate must be treated as null and
void.” Also in section 1240, page 787, it is stated: “If, how-
ever, in reversing a judgment, the trial court is directed to
hear a new trial upon one issue only, or upon particular issues,
it possesses no jurisdiction to grant a new trial generally, or
to permit evidence upon other issues to go to the jury; it must
obey the mandate of the reviewing court.”

In Ronna v. American State Bank, supra, the procedendo
upon a previous appeal remanded the cause with directions to
take “further proceedings * * * not inconsistent with the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court.” Thereafter, the trial court entered
judgment inconsistent with that opinion. Defendant took no

ee 469

appeal from the judgment but applied for an order directing
the district court to obey the procedendo. This court granted
the relief, holding defendants could have appealed but were
not required to do so, and concluded (page 816 of 215 Iowa):
“Not having the power and jurisdiction to enter the judgment,
the court is hereby ordered and directed to set the same aside,
in harmony with the foregoing opinion.”

In Glenn v. Chambers, supra, we held that the vital ques-
tion involved in the first appeal was settled, that it became
the law of the case, and that the remand allowed the commis-
sion no authority to make a contrary order.

HH iu the case at bar we hold that the district court did
not comply with our directive to reduce the assessment from
$3156.41 to $2070, but attempted to create a new obligation by
rendering a personal judgment for $2070 against defendant.
This judgment and order was, therefore, a nullity and, although
we could order it stricken and a proper order entered, we
prefer to act under the provisions of section 391.90 of the Code
which provides: “The court may make such assessment as
should have been made, or may direct the making of such as-
sessment by the council.” The reduced assessment is fixed at
$2070 with interest at 6 percent from June 5, 1961, as by statute
provided, and the costs in Persinger v. Sioux City, supra, are
taxed one third to the City of Sioux City, Iowa, and two thirds
to Mildred Wilson Persinger, as per our previous order.

The provisions of section 391.86 of the Code shall apply
in the fixing of the property owner’s obligation in this matter.
This section provides: “Such corrected assessments shall be a
lien on the lots the same as the original, and shall be certified
by the clerk to the county auditor in the same manner, and
shall, so far as practicable, be collected in the same install-
ments, draw interest at the same rate, and be enforced in the
same manner as the original assessment.”

We are told the city has paid the balance of the original
assessment plus accrued interest thereon, and that the real
contention here is only the interest upon the reduced assess-
ment to date amounting to less than $500. Since by either ap-
proach to this problem we arrive at the same conclusion as the

470

trial.court, we need not consider the appellant’s second as-
signment, and we affirm the judgment rendered herein —
Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Rawines, J., who takes no part.
Dt

J. Ropert McCarry, appellee, v. W. P. JErrers, appellant.

No. 52784.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 718)

DecemBer 12, 1967.

George L. Norman, of Keokuk, for appellant.
Johnson, Phelan & Tucker, of Fort Madison, for appellee.

a Le an

Buoxer, J.—This is an action for specific performance.
Plaintiff and his father-in-law, the defendant, signed a contract
for the exchange of certain real estate. Specific performance
was decreed by the trial court. We disagree.

The two parcels of land involved are referred to in the
record as the home place and the Meister place.

Defendant Jeffers acquired the home place from his mother
in 1988 and farmed it for a few years. Though larger when
acquired, this tract consisted of about 60 acres at the times
material here, The property had a home and buildings on it.
Plaintiff and his family, at defendant’s request, occupied and
worked this farm in 1942. They remained until the latter part
of May 1966.

Some conveyances occurred between the parties prior to
1947 but these actions do not affect the result here. In that
year the parties had an opportunity to buy a 225-acre farm and
did so. This property was known as the Meister place. It had
no buildings. Title to both places was then placed in joint
tenancy in the names of plaintiff Mé¢Carty and his wife, and de-
fendant Jeffers and his wife. The validity of the precise form of
ownership is not in question here. All four persons had record
title ownership.

Beginning in 1949 the two families farmed the home place
and the Meister place as a partnership, sharing equally the in-
come and expenses. Both families lived in the house on the
home place, which was divided to make separate living
quarters.

The partnership farming arrangement continued, but with
friction, until 1961. In that year the friction had become
serious enough to cause the parties to attempt to change the
situation. . .

On May 24, 1961, plaintiff and defendant talked about
division of the farms and termination of the joint farming
venture. Although both Mrs, McCarty and Mrs. Jeffers were
present, their role in the discussion appears to have been more
passive than active. All four witnesses agree the McCartys
were to get the Meister place and the Jeffers would get the
home place. Defendant stated the agreed additional com-

472 Le |

pensation to be paid by McCarty was $10,000 and this was
changed to $9400 after they left the women and before this
part of the agreement was reduced to writing. Mrs. Jeffers
testified her understanding was the additional cash was to be
$12,000 and she would not have agreed to an exchange for
less. Plaintiff did not state his memory of the amount agreed
on at the oral discussion.

Defendant testified that as a part of this discussion it was
agreed the personal property owned together by the parties
would be sold and McCarty would arrange the auction.
McCarty denies this and states Jeffers was to make any such
arrangements. .

On the same date McCarty and Jeffers went to the offices
of a Keokuk attorney where an agreement was reduced to
writing and signed by the two men. Jt made no mention of a
contemplated sale of personal property. Neither of the wives
was made party to the written contract; neither was present nor
did either ever sign the agreement. Mrs. Jeffers states she had
never given her husband authority to act for her. She did
agree she regularly did what her husband requested in such
matters.

The written agreement provided for Jeffers to have the
home place and McCarty to have the Meister place. McCarty
was to pay Jeffers $9400 within 80 days. The provision for
the termination of the joint farming venture was that any
income or expense “incurred as a result of selling of corn now
on all of said property shall be shared equally.” Each grantee
was to have the growing crops then on the tract to be acquired.
No mention was made of possession date.

McCarty contacted the bank for financing. He received a
eommitment for a $15,000 loan, $9400 of which was to be used
in the real-estate trade. He did not arrange for a farm sale of
the personal property owned by the partnership. He wanted
to keep his half without sale as this would be cheaper than
having a sale and buying it back. Defendant insists plaintiff
was to make sale arrangements and it was the failure to do so
which caused defendant to refuse to complete the trade. Plain-
tiff states he did talk about the auctioneer to be hired but

| Le 473

denies he agreed to a sale at any specific time or as a condition
to completion of the contract.

Plaintiff testified that on the 30th day after execution of
the written contract he stayed home to pay defendant, but the
parties apparently did not discuss the matter (though they
lived in the same house). The sale was not completed.

Defendant contends plaintiff never did tender perform-
ance. Plaintiff states he made several offers of performance.

About six weeks after the date for completion of the con-
tract, both parties and their wives borrowed $15,000 from the
same bank on a joint loan using the jointly owned real property
as collateral, paid off their respective obligations and con-
tinued farming in partnership for the next four or five years.
Of course plaintiff’s solo loan was never processed. The papers
remained with the bank, along with plaintiff’s copy of the
contract until 1966 when plaintiff got the contract from the
banker, consulted a lawyer, moved out of the house and started
this action. Plaintiff said he had tried several times during
the interim to get defendant to change his mind. Defendant
testified no such efforts were made and the first time the
matter was again discussed was in the spring of 1966 just
before suit was filed.

HM I. Action for specific performance of a contract is
cognizable in equity. Baker v. Fowler, 215 Iowa 1157, 247
N.W. 676; Peddicord v. Peddicord, 242 Iowa 555, 47 N.W.2d
264, :
Thus the case is triable de novo on appeal. We give weight
to the trial court’s fact findings but are not bound by them.
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, 344£(7). We do not agree this
is a proper case in which to grant the extraordinary remedy of
specific performance.

HM The general rules governing consideration of this case
with ample citation of authority are found in Incorporated
Town of Wahpeton v. Rocklin, 254 Iowa 948, 953, 119 N.W.2d
880: “A suit for specific performance is not a matter of abso-
lute right but is always addressed to the sound judicial dis-
eretion of the court. * * * The court will not decree specific
performance when the circumstances of the case show it would

AT, Es |

be’ inequitable to do so. * * * And, while the chancellor who
tries the case has a considerable discretion in granting or
withholding the remedy, such discretion is not absolute. We
have on occasion found that it should not have been exercised,
and have reversed decrees granting -performance. * * *,”

The first proposition upon which defendant relies for re-
versal is the contract was rescinded and abandoned by mutual
agreement. He cites Griffey v. Lubben, 196 Iowa 465, 468, 469,
193 N.W. 410: “Specific performance rests, in a large degree,
within the discretion of the court; and if the -proof offered of
a change in or abandonment of the original contract raises a
serious doubt in the mind of the court as to the equity asserted
by the plaintiff, the relief will be denied, and the vendee.will
be remitted to his remedy at law, if any he has.”

He also cites Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352,

354, 107 N.W: 382, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 1127,.14 Ann. Cas..399:-“The
rule is that a contract will be treated as abandoned where the
acts of one party, inconsistent with its existence, are acquiescéd
in by the other.”
« HE In this case MeCarty had all of the. papers prepared at
the bank so that he could borrow sufficient funds to complete
the contract. Yet within six weeks after the time for per-
formance of the contract had expired he joined defendant in
a joint loan from the same‘bank, using the same property as
collateral, placed a mortgage on the property and continued to
work the farm as before for a period of four years.

-, The contract also provided the grantee of each piece of
property would be entitled to all:of the growing crops on the
real estate to be conveyed. This would mean plaintiff was. en-
titled to all crops on the 225-acre tract while defendant was
entitled to all crops on the 60-acre tract. Plaintiff says each
year after the contract was signed he proposed. the crops be
divided on that basis and each year defendant refused. Al-
though defendant denies this, both agree the crops (or the
income therefrom), for both tracts operated as a whole, were
divided each year on a fifty-fifty share basis. The parties made
and filed partnership income tax returns at least until 1962,
continued the partnership farming as to all crops to 1964 and

— es 415

were still in partnership as to wheat, pasture and cattle at time
of trial. The farm was treated as a unit for purposes of par-
ticipating in government programs to date of trial. We find
such action to be inconsistent with continued reliance on the
rights created by the written contract.

The trial court found plaintiff did not acquiesce in the
wrongdoing of defendant. “There was merely an acceptance
on the part of McCarty of a situation which was created by
the wrongdoer which made it necessary for him to enter into
a mortgage with the defendant to the bank for the payment of
the bin notes and for certain working capital” (for the two
farm tracts). We cannot agree. Conceding, arguendo, Jeffers’
acts were wrongful (an assertion denied by Jeffers because of
McCarty’s failure to arrange a sale of the personalty), the
money borrowed was for the purpose of continuing partnership
operation. Neither party had to remain in the partnership
for another four years. The acceptance of partnership division
of crops contrary to the terms of the written contract, negotia-
tion of a new loan, continued occupancy of the home by the
McCartys, signing numerous commitments to the federal gov-
ernment for various crop participation programs, all indicate
a mutual abandonment of the contract.

II. Defendant relies on three further propositions for
reversal: (1) a party is not entitled to specific performance
where he has placed himself in a position where he is not ready,
willing and able to perform (by signing the joint mortgage) ;
(2) specifie performance would not lie when the property is
held by both husband and wife and only the husband signed,
and (3) plaintiff was guilty of laches. Hach of these propo-
sitions is supported by authority but efficacy of the authority
in each case is largely dependent on the factual circumstances
of the cited case.

We need not consider these authorities or the authorities
cited in opposition thereto. We consider our holding in Divi-
sion I to be determinative—Reversed.

All Justices concur.

476 | |

Enver H. Mansen, appellant, v. Mera C. Mansen, appellee.

No. 52778.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 727)

DrcemBer 12, 1967.

Robert L. Rausch, of Waterloo, for appellant.
Charles J. Pickett, of Waterloo, for appellee.

es an

LeGranp, J.—Plaintiff and defendant were married on De-
cember 1, 1947. They had no children. Defendant had two
children by a previous marriage. The parties lived together
until January 1956, when defendant left under circumstances
which later justified entry of a decree of divorce against her
on grounds of desertion. The petition for divorce was filed
January 10, 1966. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim,
asking that she be granted a divorce on grounds of plaintiff’s
eruel and inhuman treatment. The case was tried on October
81, 1966. On the day of trial and before any evidence was
taken, defendant withdrew her answer and dismissed her
counterclaim.

The record shows both parties wanted a divorce. No com-
plaint is made here except plaintiff's assertion that the court
did not make an equitable or fair division of property in ac-
cordance with section 598.14, Code, 1966. This is the only
matter from which an appeal is taken.

Under such circumstances we do not concern ourselves
with fault since the trial court’s decree has established where
the fault lay. Simpson v. Simpson, 247 Iowa 546, 548, 74 N.W.-
2d 582, 584. It is nevertheless incumbent upon us to consider
all the circumstances to determine whether the property settle-
ment decreed by the trial court should stand. We, therefore,
review the facts shown by the record.

After approximately eight years of marriage, defendant
left plaintiff without just cause. Except for one brief attempt
at reconciliation in 1961, which met with quick failure, defend-
ant has never returned home except for a few hours at a time,
usually to pick up some item of personal property she wanted.
Plaintiff made numerous attempts to induce defendant to re-
turn home. He made “dozens of trips to Des Moines” to per-
suade her to come back, After some ten years of this sort of
life, plaintiff, apparently a man of infinite patience, abandoned
hope and filed his petition for divorce.

Trial court found defendant had deserted plaintiff and
awarded plaintiff a divorce on that ground. This appeal is by
plaintiff from the provisions of the decree which settled the
property rights of the parties. Defendant does not appeal.

478 Le |

The only property involved is one parcel of real estate in
Cedar Falls, Iowa, which plaintiff and defendant had purchased
in 1952 and which they had occupied as their homestead until
1956. By written stipulation the parties agreed to most of the
circumstances surrounding the purchase and financing of this
real estate. The property was purchased under contract for
$15,500 of which $3200 was paid down. Of the down payment
$850 was borrowed from plaintiff’s father and was not repaid
during the time the parties lived together. The balance of the
down payment was procured through another loan. Defendant
insists this was all repaid before she left plaintiff. Plaintiff
denies this. The property now has a value of $18,000. The
parties have stipulated that part of this increase results from
improvement of the property through paving at a cost of $700,
which plaintiff paid. Before their separation, the parties also
improved the property by construction of a double garage at
a cost of $1800, all of which was paid during the time they
lived together. Approximately $1200 was paid off on the prin-
cipal of the contract before defendant left her husband. There-
after plaintiff continued to live in the house and continued to
make all payments required under the contract, including
principal, interest, taxes and insurance. These payments up
to the time the case was tried totaled $13,413.42, At that time
also the unpaid balance due on the purchase price was $6443.45.
Based upon an $18,000 valuation, this left an equity of $11,-
557.45 at the time of trial.

Title to this property is held in the names of plaintiff and
defendant as tenants in common. The decree of divorce gave
plaintiff the right to buy defendant's interest therein by paying
her one half of the present value of the equity, upon which
amount plaintiff was to have credit for $3006.71, the net
amount due plaintiff after giving him the benefit of payments
made during the separation and charging him with one half
the rental value during that time. In other words plaintiff
was to become sole owner of this property by paying to de-
fendant $2772.02.

Plaintiff strenuously argues this is not a fair property
settlement. He asserts defendant is entitled to no interest in

a es 419

the real estate. He particularly objects to the maziner in which
her interest was determined, claiming he is not chargeable
with rent for occupying the house while defendant refused to
return home.

If we were to agree with plaintiff and to hold defendant
is entitled to no rental for her one-half interest in the home,
defendant would take nothing by way of property settlement
under the formula used by the trial court. We feel that such
a result would be manifestly unfair. Whether some other
method of computation would have been better—or at least
less objectionable to plaintiff—is of no consequence if the re-
sult obtained is a proper one. We find it is.

HEM Misconduct of the guilty party, it is true, is one of
the factors considered in determining a fair division of prop-
erty, but there are other circumstances to be given weight also.
Some of these are the age and health of the parties, their
present capacity to work, the amount of resources owned by
each, the contributions of each to the joint accumulations
during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, and the
indebtedness of the parties. Murray v. Murray, 244 Iowa 548,
554, 57 N.W.2d 284, 238; Pfab v. Pfab, 257 Iowa 3038, 305, 182
N.W.2d 483, 484; Alberhasky v. Alberhasky, 250 Iowa 986,
1001, 97 N.W.2d 914, 924. What is fair and equitable in any
ease is peculiarly dependent upon the particular facts. Pree-
edent is of little value and general principles, though easy to
announce, are difficult to apply. Pfab v. Pfab, supra; Arnold
v: Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 440, 183 N.W.2d 58, 60; Lesseriger ‘v.
Leéssenger, 258 Iowa 170,172, 188 N.W.2d 58, 59; Bowman v.
Bowman, 259 Iowa 820, 822, 146 N.W.2d 333, 834; Cooper v.
Cooper, 259 Iowa 277, 144 N.W.2d 146.

HM Plaintiff is 60 years of age and is regularly employed.
He earns approximately $7000 per year. Upon‘retirement he
will receive $110 per month from his employer. He has a
pension trust fund with his employer which’ has a present
value of $10,000. There is no showing that plaintiff has any
outstanding ‘debts except the balance’ due on the purchase
price of the property in question. Except for the testimony
that defendant’s conduct has made plaintiff “nervous and fid-

480 Le |

gety” over the years, there is no showing that plaintiff is in
poor health.

The record leaves much to be desired as to defendant’s
earning ability. The evidence shows she worked during most
of the time before she left plaintiff except for a short period
when she stayed home to take care of plaintiff's father. De-
fendant’s earnings during the marriage were approximately $140
per month. There is no showing she is now able to earn sub-
stantially more than that.

Defendant contributed as best she could to the family
finances while she lived with plaintiff. Plaintiff argues she
should have no interest in the home because she made no pay-
ments directly on the real-estate contract, but we see no merit
in this. Whatever defendant earned supplemented plaintiff’s
income. Her money, and his, was used for family expenses.
Tf plaintiff made the contract payments, then defendant’s earn-
ings were available for some other family purpose. When
both husband and wife are employed and contribute to the
family funds, it would be unfortunate if the marriage relation-
ship deteriorated into a bookkeeping exercise to justify a
favorable property settlement should marital discord arise.
When defendant left plaintiff in 1956 the parties already had
an equity of approximately $5000 in the real estate. They
had accumulated personal property valued at $2000 which was
entirely paid for. Certainly plaintiff cannot deny defendant
contributed to this net worth. If the parties had liquidated
their holdings then, defendant would have received at least
as much as—probably more than—the divorce decree awarded
her some ten years later.

Under these circumstances we hold the property settle-
ment made by the trial court is not unfair or inequitable to
plaintiff. It should be affirmed.

Although defendant did not appeal, she claims the trial
court made several errors in computing the amount to which
she was entitled and that these should be corrected by us here.
In the absence of an appeal by her, we do not consider such
alleged errors.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

| i
|

481

Dororuy L. Poois, administratrix of estate of Ralph Morris,
deceased, et al., appellants, v. Hatierr Consrruction Co.
et al. appellees.

No. 52727.

(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 716)

Decemper 12, 1967.

Joseph L, Phelan, of Fort Madison, for appellants.

<r

John ©. Stevens, of Muscatine, for appellees.

Snei, J—This is a Workmen’s Compensation case. Claim-
ants appealed from the judgment of the, district court affirming
the industrial commissioner’s denial of compensation. We
affirm.

On May 1, 1962, Ralph Morris was, and had been for some
time, employed by Hallett Construction Company as a welder.
While so employed he fell against a concrete spreader and hit
his left hip. He testified: “It was just like you stumble and
fall against that. chair. ” He felt pain at the time but kept on
working.

The subsequent and present issue was and is the causal
connection between the injury and his death from cancer
(liposarcoma) on March 8, 1963.

The original Application for Arbitration was filed January
28, 1963, by Ralph Morris as claimant. It became apparent
that Mr. Morris would not live to a time when an.oral hearing
could be held and upon proper application the District Court
of Cedar County ordered that his testimony by deposition be
perpetuated. After Ralph Morris’ death on.March 8, 1963, the
other captioned parties were substituted as. elaimants by order
of the industrial commissioner.

Wwe summarize the medical testimony ag our review is not
de novo.

Some time after his i injury Mr. Morris consulted a doctor.
The doctor testified:

“T did not take any X rays at the time because the nature
of the injury was so mild as to be one that would not require
any special procedure. The immediate results of the injury
consisted of pain, tumor or swelling, discoloration and restric-
tion of motion in the involved area, * * * On May 16 I was
consulted by Mr. Morris and made an examination of him and
there was an area of tenderness and made a discoloration at
the site of the injury described previously. My recommenda-
tion at that time was conservative management of a° bruise
consisting of analgesic medication such as aspirin, and after a
reasonable length of time the application of heat to the affected

es !

part. *** From that date on to the latter part of July, I
saw him at my home or sometimes at the office for just a few
minutes. On July 21 I saw Ralph again. At that time there
was a slight discoloration persistent. The area of the swelling
which previously had largely subsided had increased in size.
ean

Up to July 21, 1962, the diagnosis was hematoma which
is an accumulation of blood under the skin, however, the doctor
had begun to suspect a tumor. On July 21, 1962, Morris was
seen at the hospital in Keosauqua, Iowa, by Doctor Stephen
Fox an orthopedic surgeon from Ottumwa. He testified that
he examined claimant upon Doctor Gustafson’s request and
recommended biopsy which is the removal of a small part of
tissue for the purpose of microscopic examination.

On July 30, 1962, Doctor Gustafson excised the tumor in
his office. At that time, it clearly appeared the entire tumor
was not removed and this was confirmed by the pathology re-
port which diagnosed the liposarcoma. Lyle Adams, M. D.,
of Fort Madison saw Morris on August 28, 1962, and treated
him by. X ray to November 16, 1962. Thereafter’ claimant’s
disease became terminal and he died on March 8, 1963,

Claimants offered medical testimony to support the claim
that there was or could be causal connection between Mr.
Morris’ bruised hip and the development or aggravation’ of
eancer and premature death.

The employer and insurance carrier offered medical testi-
mony to the contrary. One of defendants’ witnesses was a
cancer researcher and surgeon. The doctor testified at length.
He was described by the deputy industrial commissioner who
heard the case as “one of this country’s leading authorities on
eancer.” He testified there was no causal connection between
Mr. Morris’ bruised hip and his cancer and subsequent death.

The deputy commissioner found and held “that Mr. Morris’
falling incident and the cancer subsequently discovered at
the site of the bruise were causally unrelated.”

On Review Decision the commissioner found and held as
a finding of fact:

“That on or about May 1, 1962, Ralph Morris sustained a
personal injury in the nature of a blow to his left hip arising

484 Se)

out of and in the course of his employment by Hallett Con-
struction Co.

“That the claimants have failed to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the subsequently diagnosed con-
dition of liposarcoma and the employee’s death resulting there-
from were related to said personal injury.”

On appeal to the district court the evidence was reviewed
at length and the commissioner’s decision was affirmed.

The law applicable to this case has been frequently re-
viewed and settled. Reference to appropriate authorities
rather than discussion thereof will suffice.

HL. No fraud is claimed. In the absence of fraud and
if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the com-
missioner’s finding it is binding on us. Sections 86.29 and
86.30, Code of Iowa; Sister Mary Benedict v. St. Mary’s Cor-
poration, 255 Iowa 847, 124 N.W.2d 548; Crees v. Sheldahl
Telephone Company, 258 Iowa 292, 139 N.W.2d 190.

In Giere v. Aase Haugen Homes, Inc., 259 Iowa 1065, 1070,
146 N.W.2d 911, we said our “review is not de novo and the
findings of the commissioner have the force and effect of a jury
verdict. This is true even though the court might have ar-
rived at a different conclusion. Olson vy. Goodyear Service
Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 125 N.W.2d 251.

| | “The claimant had the burden to show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the condition complained of was
causally connected to the injury received in the course of em-
ployment. [Citation]

HMM “It is the duty of the commissioner to determine
where the preponderance of evidence lies in compensation pro-
ceedings. [Citations] It is not often a party who had the
burden of proof establishes his claim as a matter of law [cita-
tion].”

In the case before us the commissioner carefully reviewed
the evidence. There was competent evidence to support the
commissioner’s findings. We cannot say that there was re-
versible error in connection therewith.

II. Appellants argue there was error in finding the em-
ployer not negligent in failing to investigate and furnish proper

be 485

treatment and medical care. Appellants cite no authority for
this claim.

In the light of a finding that there was no causal con-
nection between decedent’s injury and his subsequent illness
and death the claim is without factual support. The case is—
Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Mertz W. Sumonsen, appellee, v. Joun Topp, appellant.
No. 52641.

(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 730)

486 Le |

DecemBer 12, 1967.

Crary & Huff, by David R. Crary, and Robert J. Crary,
of Sioux City, for appellant.

Kindig, Beebe, McCluhan & Rawlings, by Robert E. Beebe,
of Sioux City; and MecOulla & Moen, by Harlan T. Moen, of
Cherokee, for appellee.

; be 487

Sruart, J.—Plaintiff brought this action to enjoin defendant
from interfering with his use of a right-of-way across defend-
ant’s land alleged to have been established by prescription.
Defendant counterclaimed seeking to have a fence line estab-
lished as a boundary fence. The trial court held the right-of-
way was established, enjoined defendant from interfering
with its use and awarded plaintiff damages for crops lost in
the years defendant prevented plaintiff from using the right-
of-way. He also held defendant failed to prove the existing
fence line had been acquiesced in as a boundary fence and dis-
missed defendant’s counterclaim. Defendant has appealed.

Doctor Simonsen purchased a farm in Cherokee County
in 1919. In the early 1930s he transferred it to his wife. In
1946 she deeded it to their son, the present owner who is plain-
tiff in this action. Mrs. Ritchie had inherited the adjoining
farm in 1900. It was managed by her husband, Fred. Rock
Creek meandered along the boundary between the two farms.
Between 1938 and 1940 the channel of the creek was straight-
ened and a highway bridge was moved. As a result, the only
access to an eight- or nine-acre tract of the Simonsen farm was
along a fence on land belonging to the Ritchies.

Doctor Simonsen testified: “* * * Ritchie came to me one
day and asked me to come down. Showed me the straighten-
ing of the channel of the creek here. The land over east of it,
that belonged to me, stopped that overflow there, but he says
going to cut off your access to this field down here. He says,
you could use this gate, our gate over here, go around the
turn—way to go into the field, and if you wish, we will make
a memorandum of it and have it filed, put on record. And I
told him I didn’t sce any use for that if we just—if that was
alright with him, we would drive around the gate there and
use it.”

This arrangement persisted until Todd, the. defendant,
bought the Ritchie farm at public auction in 1957. At the sale,
the alleged right-of-way was not mentioned. Plaintifi’s evi-
dence indicated his tenant used the right-of-way from that time
until the gate was closed by Todd in 1963 without seeking
Todd’s permission. Todd testified the tenant’s hired hand asked

488 | |

if he could cross his land every spring and that he gave per-
mission until the spring of 1963.

Plaintiff spent no money to make a roadway or improve
the one that existed. He instituted this action in March 1965.

I. The parties have not agreed on the scope of our re-
view. Plaintiff contends the matter was tried as a law action
and reviewable only on errors. Defendant contends our re-
view is de novo. Although the trial court referred to the action
as one at law in his opinion, the petition was captioned in
equity and sought injunctive relief. Objections were reserved
and never ruled upon. It, therefore, appears the review should
be de novo. However, the manner of review is not determina-
tive of this particular appeal.

IL. Plaintiff pleaded he “and his predecessors have used
this driveway continuously in open and notorious manner, ad-
versely and as a matter of right for a period in excess of twenty
(20) years with the full knowledge of defendant and his
predecessors in title.”

Appellant claimed there was no evidence to establish an
easement by adverse user and that permissive use, no matter
how long, can never ripen into an easement by prescription.

The trial court found: “* * * the original use was with the
consent of the servient owner, but that the use as a right con-
tinued for more than ten years, and the court specifically finds
that the plaintiff and his predecessors in title used the ease-
ment as a matter of right for more than ten years and it
matured into an easement by prescription prior to the time that
Mr. Todd, the defendant herein, acquired title to the property.”
Loughman v. Couchman, 242 Iowa 885, 47 N.W.2d 152, and
McKeon v. Brammer, 2388 Iowa 1118, 29 N.W.2d 518, 174
A.L.R. 1229, were cited ag authorities in support of his conelu-
sions.

We have previously held adverse user and “mutual ac-
quiescence” are not the same. Roberts v. Walker, 238 Iowa
1830, 80 N.W.2d 814, 319; Thompson v. Schappert, 229 Iowa
360, 363, 294 N.W. 580. However, in view of our subsequent
holding we need not determine the effect of the difference be-
tween the pleading and the court’s finding.

a Le 489

| | Preseription is one of the three or four methods by
which an easement may be created. Loughman v. Couchman,
supra, loc. cit. 888 of 242 Towa, 158, 154 of 47 N.W.2d; Phillips
v. Griffin, 250 Iowa 1350, 98 N.W.2d 822, 824; Webb v. Arter-
burn, 246 Iowa 363, 67 N.W.2d 504, 512. None of the other
methods is involved here.

HEM Ax easement by prescription is created “by adverse
possession, under claim of right or color of title, openly,
notoriously, continuously, and hostilely asserted against de-
fendants for ten years or more”. Webb v. Arterburn, supra,
loc. cit. 379; Phillips v. Griffin, supra, loc. cit. 1854. We have
also said under some circumstances “there may be an easement
by preseription where the original use was with consent of the
servient owner and use as of right has continued for more than
ten years.” (Citing cases) Loughman v. Couchman, supra, loc.
cit. 889,

We have examined the line of cases upon which the state-
ment in Loughman is based to ascertain the “circumstances” to
which it has been applied and the type of use which constituted
“use as of right”. We conclude that it has been applied only
in those situations in which the party claiming the easement
has expended substantial amounts of labor or money in reliance
upon the servient owner’s consent or his oral agreement to the
use. Almost all are drainage cases and are determined either
on the theory of a valid executed oral agreement or on the
principle of estoppel. Loughman v. Couchman, 242 Iowa 885,
47 N.W.2d 152, 153; McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1118, 29
N.W.2d 518, 521; Morse v. Rhinehart, 195 Iowa 419, 192 N.W.
142; Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 125, 152 N.W. 26; Hatton
v. Cale, 152 Iowa 485, 493, 494, 182 NW. 1101; Ruthven v.
Farmers Co-operative Creamery Co., 140 Iowa 570, 574, 118
N.W. 915; Dorr v. Simmerson, 127 Iowa 551, 553, 103 N.W. 806;
Vannest v. Fleming, 79 Iowa 688, 644, 44 N.W. 906, 8 L.R.A.
277, 18 Am. St. Rep. 387; Cook v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 40
Towa 451, 455 ; Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa 109, 115, 85 Am. Dee.
546; Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa 2538, 259, 74 Am, Dee. 348,

Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa 253, 260, involved a party wall
built on defendant’s land under a parol license with his prede-

490 a —

cessor in title. Defendant had notice of the agreement. We
held: “* * * when money or labor has been expended, on the
land of another, upon the faith of a promise given by him, the
owner shall not assert his legal right to the soil so as to inter-
fere with that use or enjoyment of the building or structure
erected as a result of such promise, by the money and labor of
the licensee.”

Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa 109, 114, involved a parol
license to mine lead for one sixth of the mineral as rent. We
pointed out the miner expended money and labor sinking shafts
and doing all things necessary to mine upon faith of this per-
mission. We said: “* * * can the owner instantaneously and
absolutely revoke the license, so as, from that moment forward,
treat the miner as a trespasser or intruder? Most clearly not.
It would be.a shame and reproach to-the law, if this could be
done.”

In Cook v. Chicago, B. & Q. RB. Co., 40 Iowa 451, 455, plain-
tiff’s: predecessor in: title gave the railroad informal written
consent to dig a channel across his land straightening a stream.’
We said: “A mere parol license is revocable at common law.
But in-some of the’ states, when the licensee has acted under
the authority conferred and incurred expense in the execution
of it, equity regards it as an executed’ contract, and will not
permit it to be revoked. * * * This seems to be the law in this
state, [Citing Wickersham ‘and Orr] Certainly the rule is
fully in accord with the principles. of an enlightened juris-
prudence. For if a party could grant a license, and stand by
until the licensee had incurred great expense preparing to
enjoy the right’ conferred, and then revoke the license and
deprive the other of all benefits of his labor and expense, it
would, in the language of Beatty v. Gregory, supra, ‘be a shame
and reproach to the law’.”

We held the right to be an easement rather than license
because of the written permission.

In Vannest v.‘Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 648, 44 N.W. 906, we
said: “* * * the ditch referred to in the first count was made
upon defendant's land,. before he owned it, by the farmer who
then owned:-and cultivated-the land. It-seems that defendant’s’

— | 491

grantor, and the plaintiff or his grantor, were in accord in their
views as to the ditch; and its course through the two tracts of
land, and, either by express agreement or by mutual and silent
aequiescence in the manner pursued by each in the improve-
ment, by drains, of their respective lands, agreed upon: the
construction of the ditch, and the line it should pursue. Its
place of crossing the dividing line of the lands, in this manner,
was settled. The law will not permit complaint to be now made
of the location and manner of construction of the ditch, after
it has been acquiesced in by the parties. The rights of the
parties demand that the ditch should remain a settled matter.
Good husbandry forbids the changing of ditches. There per-
manence prevents the washing away of the ‘soil, as well as
avoids expenses in the change.”

In the same case, page 644, with regard to a second ditch
constructed under an oral agreement, we said: “The parties
have recognized the ditch,'have plowed and farmed in accord
with it, and have expended money and labor in the perfor-
mance of the contract. It can be set aside, disregarded and
annulled by neither without the consent of the other. The as-
sent of the defendant to the construction of the ditch on his
land is in the nature of a license, which, having been accepted,
and the rights conferred assumed and. exercised, cannot be set
aside or disregarded.”

Dorr v. Simmerson, 127 Iowa 551, 554, 103 N.W. 806, in-'
volved a drainage ditch. We said: “But in order that all till-
able land: may be reclaimed, it is indispensable that we rec-
ognize the right of the higher proprietor to coristruct drains,
either open or closed, to conduct the water upon his own land
into the natural and usual channels which: nature has pro-
vided, or which have been established by agreement or ac-
quiescence of the parties. This may be a slight step in advance
of any we have heretofore taken, but it is a rule well recognized
by authority, and especially demanded by our circumstances
and conditions.”

‘ In Ruthven v. Farmers Co-operative Creamery 0, 140
Towa 570, 574, 575, 118 N.W. 915, the creamery paid considera-
tion for:permission and a license to-drain. waste. from the

492 Le |

creamery through a tile drain it constructed through plaintiff’s
land into a slough on plaintiff’s land. We said:

“That defendant obtained a license to put in the tile, to
discharge its sewage therein, and that it expended money on
plaintiff’s land on the strength thereof and conferred some
benefit upon plaintiff in draining the slough at the southeast
corner of the land is so well established by the evidence as to
be beyond the realm of dispute.

“But plaintiff contends that the license cannot be proved
by parol testimony, that the work done was of no benefit to him,
and that at any rate the license was revocable at his, plain-
tiff’s, pleasure. None of these propositions can be sustained.
Conceding arguendo that the license claimed by defendant was
such an interest in land as that the statute of frauds applies,
the testimony brings the case within the exception to that
statute, for it shows defendant immediately went into pos-
session, and it also paid the purchase price. The licensee not
only expended money on its own land, but also upon the land
of plaintiff and to some extent, at least, for plaintiff’s benefit
It is this which distinguishes the case from Jones v. Stover,
181 Iowa 119, and other like cases. There no expenditure was
made for the benefit of the licensor or upon his land. That a
parol license based upon a consideration is valid, and not re-
vocable at pleasure, see Cook v. C., B. & Q. B.R., 40 Iowa 451;
Harkness v. Burton, 39 Iowa 104; Vannest v. Fleming, 79
Towa 638; Spencer v. Andrew, 82 Iowa 14; Hensen v. Creamery
Co., 106 Iowa 167. The license in this case was fully executed,
and plaintiff is in no position to revoke it. Where executed it
becomes irrevocable, for the reason that to permit the licensor
to revoke it at pleasure would constitute a fraud upon the
licensee. Wickersham v. Orr, 9 Iowa 253; Upton v. Brazier, 17
Towa 153; Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa 109. * * * Whatever the
rule in other States, we are committed to the doctrine above
announced, and find no reason for departing from it now.”

Hatton v. Cale, 152 Towa 485, 498, 182 N.W. 1101, involved
a drainage ditch constructed with the express oral consent and
agreement of defendant’s remote grantors. We approved the
language. of the Vannest case quoted above and then said:

7 Pe 498

“Again, it is argued for appellant that, at most, plaintiffs
obtained nothing more than a parol license to use the ditch
which was revocable at the instance of defendant or any of his
grantors. Reliance is here placed upon Jones v. Stover, 131
Towa 119; Friday v. Henah, 113 Iowa 425, and other cases. The
difficulty with this proposition is that plaintiffs’ grantors se-
cured something more than a parol license. Under the facts
disclosed, they not only acquired an easement, but went upon
the land now owned by defendant, and there dug a ditch
which was to take care of the water on that land as well as
that coming across their own. The case is not within the stat-
ute of frauds for the reason that the agreement was fully exe-
cuted and plaintiffs and their grantors immediately began to
make use of the easement. The case in this respect is ruled by
Vannest v. Fleming, supra; Cook v. Chicago, B. & Q. RB. R., 40
Towa 451; Decorah Co. v. Greer, 49 Iowa 490; Ruthven v.
Farmers Co., 140 Iowa 570, which clearly points out the dis-
tinction between this case and Jones v. Stover, supra; Wicker-
sham v. Orr, 9 Iowa 258, and other like cases.”

In Pascal v. Hynes, 170 Iowa 121, 125, 152 N.W. 26, we
said: “The tile drain constructed by Martin Hynes in 1893
carried the water from the pond north of the road into the
swale on plaintiffs’ land. The drain was laid with the then
owner’s consent and the surface water carried through it from
defendant’s land, as well as part of the plaintiffs’, with the
acquiescence of the latter, the then owner under whom they
claim, until 1904, more than ten years, by reason of which
defendant has acquired a prescription right to the use of the
drain in plaintiffs’ land.”

In speaking of the 1904 extension of the tile drain we said:
“At great expense to defendant’s husband, the improvement
was made and for the mutual benefit of the parties, and, rest~
ing on these considerations, the license is not revocable.” (Cit-
ing the Ruthven case on page 127 of 170 Iowa)

Morse v. Rhinehart, 195 Iowa 419, 421, 192 N.W. 142, the
controversy was the relative rights of the parties to use a tile
drain and the right of the servient owner to connect a tile drain
into the existing drain constructed by the dominant owner.

494 FP 7

We did however say: “We think it clear; under our prior deci-
sions, that appellants have acquired an interest inthe nature of
an easement across appellee’s land which is not subject to revo-
eation by him” and modify the trial court’s holding to the ex-
tent that it held appellants were mere licensees subject to
revocation.

In McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 1117, 29 N.W.2d
518, 521, 174 A.L.R. 1229, a tile drain was involved. There was
evidence of a gentleman’s agreement between plaintiff and de-
fendant’s predecessor in title whereby said predecessor gave
plaintiff the privilege of attaching a tile line to an existing
drainage district line. We said:

“Defendants argue that the most the record shows is that
McKeon obtained nothing more than a parol license to use the
tile line of their land, which was revocable .at the instance of
Holliday or any of his grantors. The trial court held the testi-
mony sufficient to establish an easement in favor of plaintiffs.
We agree with his conclusion.”

We then cited the Morse and Pascal cases and quoted the
portion of the Pascal case hereinabove set out. We also said,
page 1119 of 238 Iowa: “The trial court holds, and we think
rightfully under the evidence, that an easement existed in
favor of the McKeon farm. This easement was gained by the
prescription before Brammer bought the farm. It was gained
during the twelve or thirteen years after the tile line was con-
structed when the Hollidays, who knew of the existence of the
tile line, owned the farm. [The Hollidays are the ones with
whom the original agreement was made.]”

We there held a prescriptive right could be acquired al-
though the original entry was permissive and at a time when
the parties to the original agreement still owned the land. We
recognized this type of easement is based on the principle of
estoppel. (Page 1121 of 238 Iowa, page 523 of 29 N.W.2d)

This finding is reaffirmed in Loughman v. Couchman, 242
Towa 885, 889, 47 N.W.2d 152, 154, which involved a tile drain
from a septic tank into defendant’s field which he had pur-
chased from.a party who had orally agreed to the construction
of the drain, We state: “We have frequently held under anal-

| De 495

ogous: circumstances there may be an easement-by prescription
where the original use was with consent of the servient owner
and use as of right has continued for more than ten years.”

Many of the cases reviewed above were cited.

It therefore appears we lave modified the requirements to
establish an easement by prescription in those instances in
which the original entry upon the lands of another is under an
oral agreement or express consent of the servient owner and
the party claiming the easement expends substantial money or
labor to promote the claimed use in reliance upon the consent
or as consideration for the agreement. In such situations we do
not apply the strict rules which will hereinafter be set out.

Returning to the case before us, we conclude it does not
come within the cases reviewed above or the rule developed
therefrom. Plaintiff’s own testimony, which is undisputed, dis-
closes he spent no money or labor in making or improving the
roadway. There was no showing of any consideration for an
oral contract or any detrimental conduct in reliance on the
consent.

In our opinion this case is governed by the general require-
ments to establish a prescriptive easement by adverse possession
or user as a matter of right and is controlled by Phillips v.
Griffin, 250 Iowa 1350, 98 N.W.2d 822, 825; Webb v. Arterburn,
246 Iowa 363, 67 N.W.2d 504, 518-515; Roberts v. Walker, 238
Towa 1380, 30 N.W.2d 814, 317-319; Gerdts v. Mulford, 230
Towa 647, 298 N.W. 878, 875; Young v. Ducil, 188 Iowa 410,
416, 176 N.W. 272.

Hs The applicable law is summarized in Roberts v.
Walker, supra, with appropriate authorities including section
564.1, Code of Iowa:

“The doctrine of adverse possession upon which plaintiff
relies is to be taken strictly. There are usually no equities in
favor of one who claims property of another by adverse pos-
session and his acts are to be strictly construed. * * * The
facts relied upon to establish adverse possession must be strictly
proved. They cannot be presumed. The law presumes the
possession of land is under the regular title and will not permit
such presumption to be overcome by another presumption. * * *

496 Le 7

“Mere proof of use of this roadway is not therefore suf-
ficient to establish plaintiff's claim. Such use may have been
permissive only. Plaintiff was required to prove also: (1)
That he claimed an easement over the roadway in question as
his right, and this must be established by evidence independent
of its use; and (2) that defendants or their predecessors in
title had express notice of such claim of right to use the road-
way against their objections. A right that starts permissively
and is not claimed as a right independent of permission does
not start the running of the statute of limitations.” (At pages
1335, 1836 of 238 Iowa, 30 N.W.2d at page 317)

HEME “* * * continuance in a use and possession of land
which were permissive in their origin constitutes no evidence
of gift, nor will such possession, by mere lapse of time, become
hostile or adverse to the person under whom it was taken.”
Casady v. Casady, 184 Iowa 1241, 1249, 169 N.W. 683. 25
Am. Jur.2d 462, Easements and Licenses, sections 54, 55. “But
a user permissive in its inception may subsequently ripen into
an easement by prescription if the user in fact has become ad-
verse.” 25 Am. Jur.2d 463, Hasements and Licenses, section 55.
We have held such permissive use becomes adverse upon trans-
fer of the servient property in the absence of evidence the con-
tinued use was permitted as a mere favor. Loughman v. Couch-
man, 242 Iowa 885, 47 N.W.2d 152, 154,

HH Here there is no evidence the nature of the use, admit-
tedly permissive in its inception, changed while the servient
property was owned by Mrs. Ritchie. There is no evidence
upon which it could be determined plaintiff used the right-of-
way as a matter of right rather than with permission. The
statutory period had not run after the transfer to this defend-
ant. Most of the cases referred to as controlling present a
stronger factual situation than presented by plaintiff here.
We therefore hold plaintiff failed to establish an easement for
right-of-way purposes over defendant’s land by prescription.

Ill. Defendant’s counterclaim sought to have an existing
fence between the farms of the two parties established as a
boundary line.’ The fence deviated from the section line to
follow the meanderings of the creek. There were two counts

a | 497

in the counterclaim. The first was based on acquiescence in
the boundary for a ten-year period as provided in sections
650.1, 650.5, 650.6, and 650.14, of the Code. The second claimed
title by adverse possession. The trial court found against
counterclaimant on the adverse possession count but made no
ruling on the first count. Appellant now relies only on the first
count. As there are no findings on the issue of acquiescence,
there is nothing for us to review, if we treat the appeal on the
counterclaim as an action at law. If we review de novo we,
of course, can make our own findings.

HM This type of action is triable as at law and the judg-
ment of the trial court has the effect of a jury verdict and
will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support it.
Allen v. Melson, 260 Iowa 689, 690, 150 N.W.2d 292, 293. As
it is not clear the parties agreed to try the counterclaim as in
equity and as appellant seems to treat the appeal as one at law,
we reverse and remand Count I of the counterclaim for new
trial. It was error when the trial court did not decide the
issues raised by this count.

HN «We therefore reverse the trial court on appellant’s
appeal on the right-of-way issue and reverse and remand for
new trial on Count I of the counterclaim—Reversed and re-
manded.

All Justices concur except Raw ines, J., who takes no part.

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. Danny Hart CHar.son, appellant.

No. 52721.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 829)

499

Decemper 12, 1967.

John E. Nutty, of Ames, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Charles E. Vanderbur, Story
County Attorney, of Ames, for appellee.

Garriztp, C. J—Defendant was convicted upon trial of
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVI) in viola-
tion of section 321.281, Code, 1966. Upon this appeal he as-
signs error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of
the result of a test of a sample of his blood, taken at his request
and with his consent.

The blood sample was withdrawn in Mary Greeley Hos:
pital in the City of Ames by a registered nurse designated by
a licensed physician. The nurse testified she withdrew it at
the oral request of the defendant and Ames Police Officer Keig-
ley. There was no written request of the officer that the sample
be withdrawn.

500 [| 7

Further, the syringe used was not “new, originally factory
wrapped, [or] disposable.” It was, however, “kept under
strictly sanitary and sterile conditions.” The quoted words
are found in Code section 321B.4, part of chapter 321B, com-
monly called the Implied Consent Law.

‘The nurse testified she was assured the syringe was sterile.
“T opened it myself from the package. It comes from the auto-
elave at central supply and * * * is wrapped in paper, sterilized
and when it reaches the right consistency of steam it indicates
or is marked on the package it would have changed color and it
did change color.” The nurse also said the syringes “we use
are glass. and are resterilized,” she was not sure of the pro-
cedure at central storage “but most of the time they go through
at least two to three solutions before they are sterilized, put
into individual paper containers and autoclaved.”

_ The sample of defendant’s blood was sealed, labeled and de-
livered to an experienced pharmacologist who had tested
several hundred such samples for alcoholic content. The test
revealed 248 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood
or .248 percent. The expert testimony is in substance that
aleoholic content in excess of 150 milligrams of such a sample
of blood is definite proof of intoxication and the committee on
aleoholism of the American Medical Association has recom-
mended that the measure of intoxication be reduced to 100 mil-
ligrams.

Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of alcoholic
content of his blood was based on the facts the syringe used
was not new, originally factory wrapped or disposable and (2)
the blood sample was not withdrawn and the test administered
at the written request of a peace officer. It is said that because
of these two facts the Implied Consent Law, mainly sections
321B.3 and 321B.4, renders inadmissible on the trial of a
charge of OMVI evidence of the result of the blood test.

It is implicit in this argument that strict compliance with
the procedural provisions of these sections for withdrawing and
testing blood, even of one who requests it or consents thereto,
is a condition precedent to the admissibility on trial of the

Pe Pe 501

criminal charge of evidence of the test. The argument cannot
be accepted.

I. No detailed review of the evidence is necessary. We
may observe, however, there is ample evidence of defendant’s
guilt aside from that relating to the blood test.

Defendant was a junior, age 21, at Iowa State University.
About 6:45 p.m. Ames Police Officer Bird came upon him and
his automobile near Sixth Street. The car had left the traveled
way, knocked down a light pole and come to rest, badly dam-
aged and inoperable, on a park road adjacent to the street.
Defendant was kneeling beside a rear tire, attempting to
change it. The hubeap and some or all of the wheel nuts had
been removed but the auto jack was lying two to five feet be-
hind the car. Defendant gave conflicting versions to Officer
Bird and Officer Keigley, who also arrived at the scene, of the
cause of the accident and the tavern where he had been drink-
ing beer. He finally said he had hurriedly consumed a 62-
ounce pitcher of five percent beer at the Sportsmen’s Lounge.
Both Bird and Keigley observed several familiar indications of
‘defendant's intoxication while completing the accident report.

Officer Keigley took defendant to the Ames police station
to be booked for OMVI. Since there were some indications de-
fendant may have been injured in the accident, Keigley and
Lang, a third officer, were ordered to take him to Mary Greeley
Hospital to be examined by a physician. Prior to the examina-
tion he was placed under arrest for OMVI.

At the scene of the accident Officer Keigley asked defend-
ant if he would consent to the taking of a blood test and
defendant replied “Yes.” On the way to the hospital defendant
was told he was not compelled to undergo a blood test. At the
hospital, or perhaps prior thereto (the record is not entirely
clear) the purpose of taking such a test was explained to him.
Before the sample of blood was withdrawn by the nurse, as
previously related, defendant again gave his consent to the
officer and the doctor who examined him to the withdrawal of
a blood sample. And, as before indicated, the nurse testified
the sample was withdrawn at defendant’s request. This was
not disputed.

502 Le |

Mention is later made of some other testimony.

Il. Defendant’s assigned error calls for an interpretation
of our Implied Consent Law, chapter 321B, Code 1966. Defend-
ant’s main reliance is upon sections 321B.3 and 321B.4 thereof.

| | However, it is fundamental that in arriving at the cor-
rect interpretation of any particular provisions of the Act and
the intention of the legislature as expressed therein courts
should consider the entire Act and, so far as possible, interpret
its various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole.
Abrweiler v. Board of Supvrs., 226: Iowa 229, 231, 283 N.W.
889; Everding v. Board of Education, 247 Iowa 743, 747, 76
N.W.2d 205, 208 and citations; Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257
Towa 1277, 1284, 1285, 186 N.W.2d 410, 414.

Manilla Community School District v. Halverson, 251 Iowa
496, 501, 502, 101 N.W.2d 705, 708, points out it is not permis-
sible to rest the interpretation of a legislative Act upon any one
part or to give undue effect thereto.

Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 1174, 152 N.W.2d 281,
284, involves the interpretation of the Implied Consent Law,
particularly the definition in section 321B.2(4) of “peace officer”
as including “Regular deputy sheriffs who have had formal
police training.” In rejecting a rather narrow construction of
this language, the opinion states:

MM “In interpreting a statute we look to the object to
be accomplished, the evils sought to be remedied, or the purpose
to be subserved and place on it a reasonable or liberal construe-
tion which will best effect its purpose rather than one which
will defeat it. [citations] It is obvious the purpose of the Im-
plied Consent Law is to reduce the holocaust on our highways
part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of in-
toxicating liquor.”

Bowman v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 656, 661, 112 S.E.2d
887, 891 points out that procedural Provisions of a somewhat
similar statute are remedial in nature and “are to be construed
liberally so as to avoid the mischief and advance the remedy of
the evils sought to be suppressed.” (citation)

See also Iowa-Code section 4.2.

III. Going now to the provisions of chapter 321B properly

fe Pe 508

to be considered on this appeal, section 321B.1 states: “Declara-
tion of policy. The general assembly hereby determines and de-
elares that the provisions of this chapter are necessary in order to
eontrol alcoholic beverages and aid the enforcement of laws pro-
hibiting operation of a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated con-
dition.”

To interpret the provisions of the chapter as limitations on
the admissibility of evidence in a prosecution for OMVI, as de-
fendant would have us, would create a new handicap to the law
enforcement the chapter was designed to aid. It is clear the evi-
dence relating to the test of defendant’s blood taken voluntarily
and at his request, would have been admissible at the time the
law took effect. We find no provision in it which renders the evi-
dence inadmissible now. It is fair to assume the Act would have
so provided if the legislature intended such a vital change in pro-
cedure. Of course it is not our province to write such a provision
into the statute. See Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1178, 1183,
140 N.W. 2d 866, 872.

The pertinent provisions of sections 8218.3, .4 and .6 follow:

“3918.3 Implied consent to test, Any person who operates a
motor vehicle in this state * * * under such circumstances as to
give reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been oper-
ating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, shall be
deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal from his body of
specimens of his blood * * * and to a chemical test or tests there-
of, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood, subject to the provisions hereinafter set out. The withdraw-
al of such body substances, and the test or tests thereof, shall be
administered at the written request of a peace officer having rea-
sonable grounds to believe the person to have been operating a
motor vehicle * * * while in an intoxicated condition, and only af-
ter the peace officer has placed such person under arrest for the
offense of [OMVI]. If such person requests that a specimen of
his blood not be withdrawn, then a specimen of his breath,
saliva, or urine shall be withdrawn at the written request of
such peace officer; provided, however, that if such person
refuses to submit to any chemical testing, no test shall be
given, and the provisions of section 321B.7 shall apply. * * *-

“321B.4 Taking sample for test. Only a licensed physician,

504 Le 7

or a medical technologist or registered nurse designated by a li-
eensed physician as his representative, acting at the written re-
quest of a peace officer may withdraw such body substances for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person’s
blood. Only new, originally factory wrapped, disposable syringes
and needles, kept under strictly sanitary and sterile conditions
shall be used for drawing blood. Such person may have an in-
dependent chemical test or tests administered in addition to any
administered at the direction of a peace officer. * * *.” (Hmphasis
added.)

“321B.6 Statement of officer. A peace officer shall advise
any person who is requested to take any chemical test that a re-
fusal to submit to such test will result in revocation of the
person’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle; * * *.”

There is substantial, although not conclusive, evidence of
compliance with this last provision. Indeed, as before indicated,
the only asserted lack of strict compliance with the entire Act
is that the officer’s request to defendant to undergo a blood test
was oral rather than written and the syringe used was not new,
factory wrapped or disposable, although kept under strictly sani-
tary and sterile conditions.

Section 321B.7 provides that if a motorist under arrest re-
fuses to submit to the chemical testing, no test shall be given but
the commissioner of public safety shall revoke his operator’s li-
cense. Section 321B.8 authorizes an administrative hearing upon
such revocation and 321B.9 provides for court appeals from the
administrative orders.

We deem sections 321B.10, .11 and, especially, .12 to have
an important bearing upon this appeal and set them out:

“321B.10 Evidence in any action. Upon the trial of any
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed by any person while operating a motor ve-
hicle * * * in an intoxicated condition, evidence of the amount
of alcohol in the person’s blood at the time of the act alleged as
shown by a chemical analysis of his blood * * * is admissible.”

The section just quoted does not state the result of a test
of blood taken with the consent and at the request of an accused.
is not receivable in evidence upon trial for OMVI unless the sam-
ple is withdrawn in strict compliance with the procedural pro-

| Le 505

visions of 321B.3 and .4. We note too the entire chapter 321B
contains no requirement as to how or by whom “a chemical anal-
ysis of his blood” is to be performed. Nor does our law provide
that a designated percentage of alcohol in the blood is presump-
tive evidence of intoxication, thus, in effect, under the view of
some courts, redefining the offense of OMVI. In these respects our
Implied Consent Law differs from those of some other states.

Section “821B.11 Proof of refusal admissible. If the per-
son under arrest refuses to submit to the test or tests, proof of re-
fusal shall be admissible in any civil or criminal action or pro-
ceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while
the person was operating a motor vehicle * * * while in an intox-
ieated condition.”

Section “321B.12 Other evidence. The provisions of this
chapter shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any
other competent evidence bearing on the question of whether the
person was in an intowicated condition.” (Emphasis added.)

HH The evidence sought to be suppressed here fairly falls
within the term “any other competent evidence”, ete. to which
821B.12 refers. Further, this section expresses a legislative in-
tent the chapter is not to be construed as limiting the introduc-
tion of competent evidence bearing on whether an accused was
intoxicated.

IV. We have referred herein to the provisions of sec-
tions 321B.3 and .4 defendant contends were not complied with
as procedural, rather than substantive in character. We have pre-
viously referred to them in this manner. State v. Findlay, 259
Towa 738, 145 N.W.2d 650. For a like designation of somewhat
similar provisions see Bowman v. Commonwealth, supra, 201 Va.
656, 112 8.H.2d 887, 891.

It is not claimed the sample of defendant’s blood was not
withdrawn or tested in a reasonable manner, in hospital environ-
ment, according to accepted medical practices. Reliability of a
test so taken is not open to question. Such tests are now com-
monplace, the quantity of blood withdrawn is minimal and for
most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or
pain, State v. Findlay, supra, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650,
654; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 485, 436, 7 S.Ct. 408, 1

506 ee _

LHd.2d 448; Schmerber v. California, 384 US. 157, 86 8.0.
1826, 16 L:Ed.2d 908.

V. There is good reason to hold defendant is not in position
to'contend the evidence of the test should have been suppressed
on the ground his blood was not withdrawn or tested at the writ-
ten request of a peace officer. When defendant saw fit to consent
to the officer’s oral request and himself request withdrawal of the
sample by the nurse for the purpose of testing, he should not
complain that:his request was granted without the delay incident
to making a written request. Applicable here, by analogy, are
the many precedents holding no. constitutional right is violated
by a search without“a warrant to which the owner consents.

By his actual consent to the withdrawal and test of his
blood defendant avoided revocation of his: driver’s license un-
der the procedure prescribed by chapter 321B. Further and per-
haps more important, he set in motion procedure to obtain per-
suasive proof (the result of the test) he was innocent of the
-eriminal charge, if such were the fact as he doubtless hoped it
Quite in point is State v. Auger, 124 V+. 50, 55; 196 A.2d
562, 565, 566, where -it was claimed blood test evidence was in-
admissible upon trial for OMVI because the blood was withdrawn
when defendant was not under arrest as said to be required by
the Implied Consent Law, and for other reasons. In rejecting
this claim'the opinion states:

“Tt is undisputed that-the respondent in this case was not
under arrest at the time the blood sample was taken. It is also
undisputed that the respondent consented to the taking. The
ease of State v. Ball, supra, 123 Vt. 26 [179 A.2d 466]
turned on the failure of the State to obtain the consent of the
vespondent before taking the blood sample. As was there pointed
out, the statutory design is such that a blood sample, involuntar-
ily given, cannot be used against a respondent over his- objection.

“However, where, as here, the respondent consents to the
testing of her blood without arrest, the statutory requirements
speaking of ‘arrest or otherwise taken into custody’ lose their
binding significance. -A respondent cannot have tt both ways by
consenting to the taking of the blood test to avoid the license sus-
pension provision of 23 V.S.A, $1191, and yet have the admission

a a 507

of that very test barred because the State failed to carry out the
arrest provisions which consent made superfluous. The statute is
looking in the direction of a lack of actual consent, as is suggested
by its reference to implied consent.” (Emphasis added.)

State v. Brown, 125 Vt, 58, 209 A.2d 324, 326, follows State
y. Auger, supra. Bowman v. Commonwealth, supra, 201 Va. 656,
661, 112 $.H.2d 887, 891, is a similar holding where the blood
sample was not taken while the accused was under arrest as pro-
vided by statute. This is from the opinion:

“Bowman, having exercised his right to have a determination
of the amount of alcohol in his blood at the time of the alleged
offense as shown by a chemical analysis, in effect, demanded such
a determination under the statute, and thereby waived any neces-
sity that he be first arrested and the request for such determina-
tion be made within two hours of his arrest, Any other conclusion
is, we think, contrary to reason and inconsistent with both the
action of the defendant and the plain intent of the statute to
make available as evidence the ascertainment of the amount of
alcohol in the blood of a person at the time of his offense, and
would defeat the purposes for which the statute was enacted.”

Hl V1. Our Implied Consent Law does not provide the
written request of the officer for a chemical test be handed to the
motorist for him to read. Gottschalk v. Sueppel, supra, 258 Iowa
1178, 1182, 1183, 140 N.W.2d 866, 871, 872. In view of this and
upon the considerations stated in previous divisions hereof, we
hold the fact defendant’s blood was not withdrawn or the test ad-
ministered. at a peace officer’s written request was not a substan-
tial departure from the terms of sections 321B.3 and .4, assuming
these sections are applicable to such a proceeding as this. We fur-
ther hold substantial compliance with the procedural provisions
of 321B.3 and .4 in such a proceeding is sufficient. Nor do we
see how defendant could have been prejudiced, under the facts
here, by lack of a written request from the officer.

HE VIL. We also hold that under this record the use of a
glass syringe, sterilized and wrapped in paper, customarily used
by registered nurses under the direction of surgeons in the hos-
pital was not a substantial departure from the procedural pro-
visions of chapter 321B and suppression of evidence of the test

508 Le i

based on this fact was not required in this case. Nor was de-
fendant prejudiced by lack of strict compliance with the
provision that the syringe used be “new, originally factory
wrapped, [and] disposable.”

Hl It is obvious the purpose of the quoted provision, to-
gether with the further language of 321B.4, “kept under strict-
ly sanitary and sterile conditions”, is to assure, so far as reason-
ably possible, accuracy and reliability of the test and minimize
danger of infection to the person undergoing it. Where, as here,
there is undisputed proof the syringe used is sterile this purpose
seems to be served as fully as if the equipment were new and
factory wrapped, perhaps even more so.

It is common knowledge numerous delicate surgical oper-
ations are performed with instruments previously used and ster-
jlized for future use in hospitals, It would seem hospitals should
.be fully as able to supply sterile syringes as the factory does.

VIII. Lessenhop v. Norton, 261 Iowa 44, 51, 153 N.W.2d
107, 111, 112, fully considers admissibility of blood test evidence
in a civil case. Nothing said herein conflicts with anything in
the cited opinion. The evidence received here complies with
this pronouncement in Lessenhop:

| | “Before any result of a blood test analysis can be ad-
mitted in any civil or criminal case, the party seeking to intro-
duce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation for its ad-
mission, Unless waived, this foundation must show that the
specimen was taken by a duly authorized person using proper
sterile equipment, that it was properly labeled and preserved, that
its care and transportation were proper, and also the identity of
persons processing it so as to give the opposing party the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine as to the care and procedure used in the
test.” (Citations)

Upon full consideration of all contentions presented we
hold the judgment should be and is—Affirmed.

Larson, SNELL, Moore, Sruarr and Mason, JJ., concur.
LzGranp, J., concurs in result,
Raw.ines and Brecxsr, JJ., dissent.

Rawiines, J.— I respectfully dissent. There is no need to

a ee 509

repeat all of Code section 821B.4. The pertinent portion of that
statute provides: “Only new, originally factory wrapped, dis-
posable syringes and needles, kept under strictly sanitary and
sterile conditions shall be used for drawing blood.”

In my humble opinion this statutory mandate has a self-
evident purpose with a meaning clearly expressed.

If the General Assembly had intended to make reusable glass
syringes and needles legally acceptable for the taking of blood to
test aleoholie content, it could easily have so declared. That it
did not do. See in this regard rule 344(f) (18), R.C.P. Also Suep-
pel v. City Council of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 1850, 1354, 136
N.W.2d 528, and citations.

It would appear the maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio al-
terius” has some degree of relevancy in this case. See State v.
Flack, 251 Iowa 529, 588, 584, 101 N.W.2d 535, and citations.

In addition it is impossible for me to agree the evidence here
challenged falls within the category of “other competent evi-
dence”, to which reference is made in Code section 321B.12.

Furthermore the fact defendant may have consented to or
even requested a blood test should not be deemed a waiver of
the specific statutory protection afforded by section 321B.4 of
the Code. See Grandon v. Ellingson, 259 Iowa 514, 144 N.W.2d
898, 903, and citations, and State v. Karston, 247 Iowa 32, 38, 72
N.W.2d 463,

I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

Broxer, J., joins in this dissent.

Srare or Towa, appellee, v. Joun Comprano, appellant.

No. 52508
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 845)

a

iB - Ca = i - | | tl |

512 Es

Decemper 12, 1967.

Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, of Des Moines, for
appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A, Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Ronald Kunz, Assistant Polk
County Attorney, for appellee.

Larson, J—In a jury trial on November 16, 1966, in the
Municipal Court of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, the defendant,
John Compiano, was found guilty of the crime of assault and
battery committed on the 12th day of May, 1966. Defendant’s
motion for a new trial, which alleged that he failed to receive a

| || 518

fair and impartial trial due to mistaken testimony by a police
officer, was overruled and he appeals. We affirm.

Assigned as error was the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
motion for a new trial on the ground that new material evidence
had been discovered. He contends that, although in determining
whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial a large
amount of discretion is vested in the trial court, under the par-
ticular circumstances of this case the trial court abused its dis-
cretion, that it had a duty to grant him a new trial because a wit-
ness on a material matter admitted under oath that he was mis-
taken in his testimony, and that defendant had shown due dil-
igence to discover new evidence which would probably pro-
duce a different result in another trial. “

It appears from the record that defendant, owner and oper-
ator of a restaurant and motor hotel in Des Moines, learned that
one of his employees, James Palmas, was intending to quit that
night without giving a customary notice. Palmas was summoned
to defendant’s office, admitted his intention to quit, and after a
heated exchange.of words was immediately ordered off defend-
ant’s premises. Not being satisfied with compliance efforts on the
part of Palmas, defendant, followed by his manager, Gary Fatino,
started to chase Palmas down a hallway and out the back door of
the kitchen. Defendant caught up with Palmas in the adjoining
parking lot, and there the alleged battery took place.

Palmas testified that after Compiano caught up with him, de-
fendant pushed him down, kicked him.and hit him in the mouth
with his fist. He further stated that Compiano called him a no-
good s.0.b., a dirty Greek, and threatened to kill him, He said he
did not strike back.

Carolyn Terry, an employee of the defendant, said that she
saw Palmas running out the back door with Compiano chasing
him, and that by the time she got to the back door Palmas was on
the ground and Compiano was kicking him and calling him dirty
words.

Officer Lonnie Losee testified that he was called to the scene
to talk to a party about an assault and battery and, when he ar-
rived, he was met by Palmas, who then related what had hap-
pened and asked him to get his (Palmas’) clothes from the res-

Bld Le 7

taurant. He further testified that he went into the restaurant to
get the clothes and was met by a man who identified himself as
John Compiano. When he asked Compiano what had happened,
Compiano told him there had been a disagreement and that he
had struck Palmas a few times, but made no mention of kicking
him.

Hubert Schuman, manager of the defendant’s kitchen, testi-
fied that he saw Compiano kick Palmas but did not know whether
he had hit him, He also stated that about twenty or thirty min-
utes after the incident in question Palmas and the officer came for
Palmas’ clothes. He stated that he got the clothes for them and
told the officer to take Palmas’ work clothes to Compiano, but he
did not observe the officer with Compiano.

Evelyn Gillespie, a waitress for the defendant, said she
saw Palmas run out the back door with Compiano in pursuit and
then Palmas fell on the curb. However, she stated that Compiano
‘was not close enough to Palmas to push or knock him down and
that she did not see him strike or kick Palmas. She further sta-
ted that, after the alleged incident, Compiano went back into the
coffee shop and remained there the rest of the evening, and that
she did not observe a policeman talk to him during this time.

The defendant testified that on the night of the alleged
incident, after being advised: by Palmas that he was quitting, an
exchange of words followed and he ordered Palmas off the prem-
ises. He stated that he chased after Palmas, but did not hit or
kick him. He further stated that at no time did he talk to any
policeman and had never seen Officer Losee until he testified at
the trial.

Gary Fatino, manager of defendant’s restaurant, testified
that, although Compiano became irritated and chased Palmas in-
to the parking lot, he did not strike or kick him and that Palmas
fell over an island in the parking lot. He also stated that he
(Fatino) had often been mistaken for Compiano.

Hl This case was tried before a six-man jury approximately
six months after the information had been filed by Palmas. Al-
though misdemeanor charges do not require a four-day notice
toopposing counsel of witnesses to be called, counsel for the
State did furnish the names of all witnesses except that of Off-
cer Losee. Apparently the county attorney had not contempla-

; Pe 515

ted calling the officer, for he was not questioned or notified of
that fact until the day before the trial. Appellant complains of
this action and contends he was surprised and not prepared to
rebut the testimony of the officer. However, after hearing the
officer testify and identify defendant early in the proceedings
before cross-examination, defendant advised his counsel that the
officer was mistaken. Cross-examination did not indicate any
mistake, and at the noon recess counsel for defendant tried to
locate and question Officer Losee as to his testimony. ILosee had
left the building and his whereabouts were unknown to the
police department.

Appellant maintains he wanted to confront Officer Losee
with Mr. Fatino, defendant’s manager, to see if he still believed
his identification and testimony regarding defendant were cor-
rect, Fatino testified in the afternoon that it was he to whom Lo-
see talked on the night of May 12, 1966, and that, because of his
position and certain physical features, he had-often been mis-
taken for the defendant.

In any event, Officer Losee was not located, the court was not
advised of defendant’s suspicions, and no continuance was asked
as permitted under rule 183, Rules of Civil Procedure. The case
‘was submitted to the jury at 4:18 p.m., and at 9:45 pm., after
receiving a “get-together” instruction, it returned a sealed ver-
dict of guilty. The next day Losee was found, confronted by Fa-
tino, and recanted his testimony in an affidavit filed with the mo-
tion for a new trial. When defendant’s motion was denied on
November 80, 1966, he appealed.

HL. In passing on motions for a new trial based upon
evidence newly discovered, the trial court is vested with wide
discretion. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Moores, 247 Iowa
1181, 1186, 78 N.W.2d 518; Torrence v. Sharp, 246 Iowa 460,
464, 68 N.W.2d 85; Tedrow v: Fort Des Moines Com. Servs.,
254 Towa 198, 200, 117 N.W.2d 62; Rule 344(f) (3), R. C. P.

Hit is “important for the orderly administration of erimi-
nal justice that findings on conflicting evidence by trial courts
on motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence re-
main undisturbed except for most extraordinary circumstances

516 as —

** #2 United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111, 66 S. Ct.
464, 466, 90 L. Ed. 562, 565.

HE The trial court is generally in a better position than we
to determine whether evidence, newly discovered, would probably
lead to a different verdict upon retrial, and we have often said
we will not interfere with its ruling unless it is reasonably clear
that such discretion was abused. Farmers Insurance Exchange v.
Moores, supra; Loughman v. Couchman, 243 Iowa 718, 720, 53
N.W.2d 286; State v. Olson, 260 Iowa 311, 317, 149 N.W.2d 182,
185, and citations; Larson v. Meyer & Meyer, 227 Iowa 512, 519,
288 N.W. 663.

Tn State v. Addison, 250 Iowa 712, 719, 95 N.W.2d 744, 748,
it was specifically pointed out that the trial court was in a better
position than the appellate court to determine whether diligence,
one of the necessary elements to be shown, was used to discover
and produce the alleged new evidence relied upon by movant,
and whether it would have probably led to a different result upon
a retrial.

Hi 11. Motions for new trials based upon newly discovered
evidence are not favored in the law and should be closely seru-
tinized and granted sparingly. Westergard v. Des Moines Ry. Co.,
243 Iowa 495, 499, 52 N.W.2d 39; Tedrow v. Fort Des Moines
Com. Servs., and Loughman v. Couchman, both supra; Weiss v.
United States, 5 Cir., 122 F.2d 675, 691.

Hl A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence goes to the statutory ground of whether there was
a fair and impartial trial. State v. Sims, 241 Iowa 641, 648, 40
N.W.2d 463; State v. Burgess, 237 Iowa 162, 164, 21 N.W.2d
3809.

Hl Ordinarily, on motions for new trials based on a claim
of newly discovered evidence, one convicted of a crime should not
be granted a new trial unless the trial court is satisfied that the
testimony of a material witness was false or mistaken, and un-
less a jury might reach a different conclusion without such testi-
mony. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82; United States v.
Johnson, supra. .

| | | A witness’ recantation of his testimony is looked up-
on with utmost suspicion. Harrison v. United States (2 Cir.),

a a siT

7 F.2d 259, 262; Newman v. United States (5 Cir.), 238 F.2d
861. Such newly discovered evidence, of course, is not new evi-
dence in the real sense. On the contrary, it is but an assertion by
affidavit that the former testimony given by the witness was false.
The trial court is not required to believe the recantation, but
must make its decision on the basis of the whole trial and the
matters presented on the hearing on the motion. Premised there-
on, if it believes the statements in the affidavit of recantation are
false, and is not reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given
by the witness on the trial was false, it should deny the motion,
and it is not at liberty to shift upon the shoulders of another
jury the responsibility to seck out the truth of that matter. Gor-
don v. United States (6 Cir.), 178 F.2d 896, 900, certiorari
denied 339 U.S. 935, 70 S. Ct. 664, 94 L. Hd. 1353,

We ourselves said in State v. Thompson, 241 Iowa 16, 29,
89 N.W.2d 637, that although the authorities are not in accord
on this issue, the majority rule appears to be that ordinarily re-
cantation by a witness is not an absolute ground for a new trial,
that there is considerable discretion lodged in the trial court,
citing 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, section 169, page 175, and 158
A.L.R. 1062. We noted that each case must, of necessity, depend
upon its own peculiar facts and, although usually the question
which is raised by recantation goes to the credibility of the wit-
ness, we recognized the discretion lodged in the trial court to re-
solve this truth issue itself.

True, where a material witness admits under oath that his
testimony was mistaken or false, a new trial has sometimes been
granted, especially where the testimony was such that, if believed,
defendant could not have been guilty of the crime charged. As
bearing on its materiality, see State v. Burgess, supra. In other
eases where the crime was established independent of the retrac-
ted testimony, the attempted retraction has been held insufficient
to justify the conclusion that the original evidence given by the
witness on the trial was false. People v. Tallmadge, 114 Cal. 427,
46 P, 282; People v. Shilitano, 218 N. Y. 161, 112 N. E. 733,
L. RB. A. 1916F 1044. Also see Note 51 L. R. A., N.S., 298, and
citations.

518 es a

HH & any event, a new trial is usually denied, where the
party could have shown the perjured or mistaken character of
the adversary’s testimony at the trial, on the ground that there
must be an end of litigation. Mere recantation of a witness on
any material matter should not necessitate a new trial if, elim-
inating such evidence, there is still substantial evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. Larrison v. United States, supra.

HMB - Even where adequate grounds appear for granting a
new trial, the general rule requires movant to show (1) that
the evidence, was discovered following trial and before judg-
ment, (2) that it was not such as could have been discovered
before the conclusion of the trial in the exercise of due dili-
gence, (3) that it must be material to the issue, not merely
cumulative or impeaching, and (4) that such evidence will
probably change the result if a new trial is granted. Farmers
Insurance Exchange v. Moores, supra, 247 Iowa 1181, 1187, 78
N.W.2d 518; Ledet v. United States, 297 F.2d 737, 739; Roth-
stein v. Rothstein, 109 Ohio App. 234, 164 N.E.2d 768, 772.° Ap-
pellee contends appellant failed to carry his burden as to items
(1), (2) and (4), that the trial court’s discretion was properly
exercised, and that defendant had received a fair and impartial
trial.

Til. Courts are aware that, unless a movant is required
to show timely due diligence in the discovery of new evidence,
his newly discovered evidence might be withheld as trial strat-
egy to obtain a second trial if needed. As a result, these rules
have been broadened in some jurisdictions, particularly with
respect to knowledge acquired during the actual trial.

. In Domanski v. Woda, 182 Ohio St. 208, 6 N.H.2d 601,
the Ohio Supreme Court held inter alia that “Newly discovered
evidence is other than that which might have been known
before the termination of a trial had due diligence been used,”
and said, “Where during the trial of a case a party is given
reasonable cause to believe that favorable and available evi-
dence of a material nature exists; it is his duty, in the exercise
of due diligence, to ask for a continuance, if necessary, to in-
vestigate, and to produce such evidence, if found. Having
finally submitted the case without doing so, and having
searched for and found the evidence after verdict, he may not

— | 19

then successfully claim the right to a new trial on the basis that
such evidence is newly discovered.”

Although we have had no previous occasion to consider
this rule extension, we believe it sound and hold it applicable
to the facts revealed in the case at bar. On the matter of due
diligence we did have this to say in Westergard v. Des Moines
Ry. Co., supra, 243 Iowa 495, 508, 52 N.W.2d 39: “The showing
of diligence required is that a reasonable effort was made. The
applicant is not called upon to prove he sought evidence where
he had no reason to apprehend any existed. He must exhaust
the probable sources of information concerning his case; he must
use that of which he knows, and he must follow all clues which
would fairly advise a diligent man that something bearing on
his litigation might be discovered or developed.” (Emphasis
added.)

HE At the outset we note defendant became aware of the
possibility of mistake by the officer during his testimony at the
trial before the noon recess and, although he made an effort to
check on it during the recess, he did not ask for a continuance
to do so when his efforts to locate the officer that afternoon
failed. Instead, he elected to submit the matter without further
challenge of the officer’s testimony as to indentity and his con-
versation with the defendant. Under these circumstances we
cannot hold due diligence was shown as a matter of law, and
must hold under this record the trial court could find due dili-
gence had not been shown.

IV. Appellant contends the recantation evidence given by
Officer Losee was so vital and material that without it the jury
verdict could not be permitted to stand. He maintains it was
more than merely cumulative, that it tended to impeach the
testimony of his witnesses and was the only testimony of an
admission that defendant struck Palmas at anytime. He argues
that the length of time the jury deliberated indicates the influ-
ence the officer’s testimony had, and contends that without it
a different result would have been reached. The State contends
the new evidence was merely cumulative.

HE We considered a similar disagreement in Westergard
v. Des Moines Ry. Co., supra, 243 Iowa 495, 500, 52 N.W.2d 39,

520 Lt 7

and said that sometimes the newly discovered evidence is not
entirely or strictly cumulative, but whether it is or not is not a
question of great importance. “The test is not whether the
offered newly discovered evidence is cumulative, but whether
* * * it is sufficient to justify the trial court, in the exercise of
a legal discretion, in concluding there is a reasonable probabil-
ity of a different result upon another trial.”

We are inclined to agree here that the testimony given by the
officer was not merely cumulative, although it must be said that
as to the issue of whether defendant struck and kicked Palmas
it is cumulative. In Utseth v. Pratt-Mallory Co., 208 Iowa 1324,
1825, 1826, 227 N.W. 115, 116, we said: “No definite rule can be
laid down, differentiating evidence that is cumulative from evi-
dence which is not. We have held that that question also rests
largely in the discretion of the trial court.” In Westergard,
supra, we recognized that the modern trend places the em-
phasis, not on the cumulative or noncumulative nature of the
evidence, but on whether a different result is probable. Also
see 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, section 171, page 177.

HEM (Determination of this issue, of course, must be made
from a consideration of the entire record and originally by the
trial court. Appellant cites and relies upon State v. Burgess,
supra, 237 Iowa 162, 21 N.W.2d 309. That is an alibi case, not
a recantation case, and there if the newly discovered evidence
was taken as true, the defendant could not have committed the
erime charged. He would have been on a train that had de-
parted from Des Moines an hour before the crime occurred.
In the interest of justice a new trial was granted. This is not
so in the case at bar. If the recanting evidence is accepted as
true, the defendant could still be guilty of the offense charged,
for there was sufficient evidence without the alleged admission
to sustain the verdict.

The trial court that saw and heard the witnesses did not
consider the veracity of the alleged newly discovered evidence
was sufficiently established. Apparently it did not believe the
statements in the Losee affidavit and based its ruling largely
thereon. Although defendant’s counsel attacked the court’s
stated reasons for this disbelief, and it seems some of those
reasons would not be proper, we are bound by the rule that if

a | 521

the court could properly find as it did, its ruling must stand.
Houlahan v. Brockmeier, 258 Iowa 1197, 141 N.W.2d 545, 549.
The evidence submitted by the officer’s affidavit did not compel
the trial court to grant the new trial. The issue before the
court was simply whether, on the affidavit submitted, the trial
eourt was compelled to grant the new trial, not whether the
affidavit would have supported an order granting a new trial.
Wilson v. Kopp, 114 Cal. App.2d 198, 250 P.2d 166, 170.

Nothing appears in the affidavit which compelled
the trial court to find the trial testimony of the officer was not
true, or to accept the recantation as true. To approve such a
rule would, of course, open the door to endless litigation where
a material witness chooses, for reasons of his own, to change
his testimony on any relevant matter. Everyone is entitled to
one fair trial, but only one.

HSV. The rule is firmly established that to be entitled
to a new trial as a matter of law, the rulings of the trial court
must appear to have been so prejudicial as to deprive defendant
of a fair trial. However, a fair trial does not necessarily mean
a perfect trial. State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1286, 71 N.W.2d
35, certiorari denied 350 U. 8. 914, 76 S. Ct. 198, 100 L. Hd. 801;
State v. Mercer, 261 Iowa 871, 154 N.W.2d 140, and citations.
We may disagree with the trial court on close questions of this
nature, but must uphold its ruling if not clearly erroneous.

It seems possible that the officer could make a mistake in
visual identity because of the dark hallway in which the alleged
conversation with defendant took place, but his affidavit also
attempted to change the substance of the conversation. It
changed the positive statement made at the trial that the per-
son he talked to “identified himself as Mr. Compiano” to “that
the man identified himself either as Mr. Compiano or as the man-
ager and I assumed that they were one and the same,” and also
the positive assertion that the defendant said, “I struck him a
few times” to “I was not sure that the man stated that either he
had struck Mr. Palmas or that Mr, Palmas had been struck a few
times, or that he struck any blows on Mr. Palmas.”

HMM There are sufficient discrepancies, unusual departures
and changes of testimony in the officer’s affidavit from which the

522 Pe

trial court could conclude that the testimony at the time of trial,
and: not the affidavit, was a true statement of the events that
transpired.

* We conclude the trial court did not abuse its legal discretion
in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, and are satisfied
defendant received a fair and impartial trial. The judgment
aust be affirmed.—Affirmed. :

All Jusmions concur except Becker, J., who dissents.

_ Stare oF Towa, appellee, v. Eva June Giix, appellant.

No. 52638.
(Reported in 154 N.W.24 722)

Decemper 12, 1967.

Henry T. McKnight, of Des Moines, for appellant.

* Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Wm. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, and Ray Fenton, County Attorney,
of Des Moines, for appellee.

Larson, J- —A county attorney’ 's information was filed Octo-
ber 21, 1964, charging the defendant Eva June Gill with the
erime of robbery, contrary to the provisions of ‘sections 711.1
and 711.3 of the 1962 Code of Iowa. Subsequent to a plea of
not guilty, trial to a jury resulted in a verdict of guilty. Judg-
ment was entered on May 3, 1965, but on appeal to this court
the cause was reversed and remanded. State v. Gill, 259 Iowa
142, 143 N.W.2d 331 (1966).

"The case was retried and again resulted in defendant’s con-
viction. On March 6, 1967, the court sentenced her for a term
not to exceed ten (10) years in the Women’s Reformatory at
Rockwell City, Iowa, and she appeals. We affirm.

Assigned as error are the trial court’s refusal to direct a
verdict for defendant and its denial of her motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, but. her principal contention is
that, since Vickie Ann Myers was an accomplice within the
meaning of the law, the State failed to corroborate her testi-
mony by other evidence which tends to connect this defendant
with the commission of the offense, and that the corroboration
submitted was insufficient to meet the requirements of seetion
782.5 of the 1966 Code.

From the record we learn that on June 4, 1964, about 4
p.m., a woman later identified as Vickie Ann Myers, wearing a
black raincoat, entered the Dairy Queen store at 2225 Ingersoll,
Des Moines, Iowa, produced a Dairy Queen bag and a gun, and

524 Le a

demanded money. After obtaining money from an employee,
she made her escape in an automobile, with an accomplice doing
the driving. The employee testified that the robber placed the
money in a Dairy Queen bag and ran from the store, and that
she shouted to two men in the parking lot to stop the fleeing
woman. One of those men said that he saw the robber leave
the Dairy Queen and run to a 1954 Ford automobile in the alley
bearing license number 6200, and that he ran to the end of the
lot to get a better look but could not state whether an accom-
plice in the getaway car was a boy or a girl. The license num-
ber was given to the police. when they arrived shortly there-
after.

Officer Edward J. Rand testified that while on routine pa-
trol in the vicinity of Sixth and School Streets, he received
information of the Dairy Queen robbery and was told to be on
the lookout for a blue 1954 Ford with license number 6200. He
spotted a car matching this description in the 900 block of
Sixth Street just south of School. As he was looking at the
car, a lady approached, claimed ownership of the car, and iden-
tified herself as Eva June Gill. Upon his request she gave him
the keys to the car and permitted him to search it. This search,
among other things, revealed a Dairy Queen bag resembling the
one used in the robbery and an ashtray in the glove compart- _
ment which contained $45.60 in bills and change. He said Mrs.
Gill was then placed under arrest and her car impounded.

Officer James Moran and another policeman arrived at this
location about the same time as Detective Daniel L. Kauzlarich.
Moran stated that, while he and Mrs. Gill were standing beside
the open door of the car, Officer Rand found the money in the
ear and showed it to them. He explained that a Dairy Queen
bag was found under the front seat of the Gill car.

Detective Kauzlarich testified that he found a box of blank
eartridges in Mrs. Gill’s car, the kind that are designed to fit
a .22 caliber starter pistol similar to the gun that had been used
in the robbery. He said that, among other articles in the car,
was a black raincoat that resembled the coat worn by the rob-
ber of the Dairy Queen store.

Frank Weideman, another police officer, testified that, after
defendant had been arrested and taken to the police station, he

a a 525

had a conversation with her, and that as a result thereof he
and Detective McCarthy arrested Vickie Ann Myers. Pursuant
to information given by her on the way to the police station,
they stopped at a tavern at Seventh and Center Streets and
McCarthy went into the tavern. He returned with a small gun
later identified as a .22 caliber starter pistol. He further stated
that on this occasion Vickie Ann Myers admitted the robbery
and asserted that the defendant did not have anything to do
with it.

James P. McCarthy testified that as a result of information
given them by Vickie Myers he went into the ladies restroom
in the tavern on Seventh and Center and found a hidden gun.
He also stated that when they arrived at the police station he
took a statement from Vickie Myers, which was introduced as
Exhibit “F”, This statement, later repudiated, in essence con-
fessed the crime and exculpated the defendant Gill.

Janet Williams, a bartender at the Dilly Dally tavern, tes-
tified that on the day of the robbery Eva Gill and Vickie Myers
came in the tavern about 2 p.m. and remained there until about
three o’elock or 3:15 when they left, and that they returned
together about 4:30 or 4:45 p.m.

Vickie Myers testified that when she and the appellant left
the Dilly Dally tavern they went directly to the Dairy Queen,
with Eva Gill driving. She said that they had with them the
small gun used in the robbery, which defendant had bought
that day for the purpose of using it to hold up the Dairy Queen,
and that while defendant waited at the rear of the store in her
ear, She committed the robbery and placed the money in a
Dairy Queen bag. She further related that after the robbery
she and defendant Gill visited a couple of taverns and that she
left the gun in the ladies room of one of them. She also stated
that the defendant’s car was parked in front of the Sixth Ave-
nue Tap and was there when the investigating officer arrived.

Appellant maintains this evidence is not direct, and circum-
stantially is not sufficient to meet statutory requirements as
construed by our past decisions. Although it may be that some
of the circumstances revealed by this testimony, standing alone,
might not be sufficient under some of our pronouncements, the

526 [| |

trial court was satisfied this evidence, when viewed i in toto, met
the legal requirements of our laws.

I. The general propositions of law involved herein are
not in dispute. Section 782.5 of the Code, 1966, provides: “A
conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice,
unless corroborated by other evidence which shall tend to con-
nect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely show the commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof.”

HI Whether there is corroborating evidence such as is re-
quired by the provisions of section 782.5 is a question for the
court, but the sufficiency of that evidence is a question for the
jury. State v. Weaver, 259 Iowa 1369, 147 N.W.2d 47, 49;
State v. Gates, 246 Iowa 344, 351, 67 N.W.2d 579; State v. Cot-
ton, 240 Iowa 609, 33 N.W.2d 880; State v. Williams, 218 Iowa
780, 254 N.W., 42; State v. Christie, 193 Iowa 482, 187 N.W. 15;
State v. Patten, 191 Iowa 639, 644, 182 N.W. 788; State v.
Kurtz, 183 Iowa 480, 482, 165 N.W. 355; State v. Clay, 222 Iowa
1142, 271 N.W. 212.

HH In the latter case, cited with approval in State v.
Weaver, supra, we specifically considered the quantum of evi-
dence required and said: “The evidence adduced to corroborate
an accomplice need not be strong, and any corroborative evi-
dence legitimately tending to connect the accused with the
commission of the crime and thereby lend support to the credi-
bility of the accomplice is sufficient.”

In State v. Cotton, supra, involving a crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses, the court reviewed the applicable
legal principles and, in holding under the evidence presented
that there was corroborative evidence giving rise to a jury
question, said at page 641 of 240 Iowa: “Whether there is such
corroboration depends much upon the circumstances of the
particular case. * * * Whether there is any corroborating tes-
timony is a question of law, but its sufficiency is a question of
fact for the jury.” It also said:

“The corroborating evidence may be either cireum-
stantial or direct” and that it “need not be of every material
fact testified to by the accomplice.”

| Le 527

In State v. Weaver, supra, we again reviewed these legal
principles and upheld the conviction of defendant charged with
breaking and entering, although based primarily on the testi-
mony of three accomplices. After a review of the evidence
showing the boat in which the stolen goods were found be-
longed to defendant, gloves used in the break-in were paid for
by defendant, and defendant was seen by independent wit-
nesses with two others in his car the evening of the robbery,
and his arrest followed shortly after the crime in the vicinity
of the stolen goods, we held this was sufficient to furnish cor-
roborating evidence required by section 782.5 of the Code. The
corroborating evidence in the instant case is at least as strong
as that in the Weaver case.

The quantum of evidence required to corroborate the tes-
timony of an accomplice need not be strong, nor does it need
to corroborate every material matter. Corroborative evidence
that legitimately tends to connect the accused with the com-
mission of the crime and lend support to the testimony of the
accomplice is sufficient. State v. Weaver, State v. Gates, State
v. Cotton and State v. Clay, all supra. Also see 23 ©. J. S.,
Criminal Law, section 812(1).

II. The sole issue before us in this appeal is whether
under the evidence, circumstantial or direct, as a matter of law,
there was such corroborative evidence as would permit the sub-
mission of the question of its sufficiency to the jury. The trial
court thought so and we must agree.

As to whether there is such corroborating evidence, each
ease must be judged on its own facts. State v. Weaver, supra;
State v. Ladehoff, 255 Iowa 659, 668, 122 N.W.2d 829. In
‘Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., Volume VII, section 2059(e),
page 334, it is stated: “The requirement of corroboration leads
to many rulings as to sufficiency, based wholly upon the evi-
dence in each case.” We are satisfied the evidence and testi-
mony of independent witnesses here tend both to connect the
defendant with the crime of robbery and to support the testi-
mony of the accomplice, Vickie Myers.

The Dairy Queen employee said the person who robbed
her wore a black raincoat, and a similar coat was found in de-

528 be a

fendant’s locked car a short time later. She also said a small
gun used in the robbery resembled the one found in the tavern
restroom which the accomplice said defendant bought for this
job, that the Dairy Queen bag used in the robbery resembled
the bag found in defendant’s car when searched by the officers,
and that the money taken in the robbery did not include pen-
nies. No pennies were found in the glove compartment ashtray
of defendant’s car. Defendant denied ownership of this money.

An independent witness at the scene of the robbery iden-
tified defendant’s car, although he could not say that she was
then the driver. The car was found by the police in defendant's
possession not far from the scene of the crime shortly there-
after.

Defendant and the accomplice were seen together at a
tavern for over an hour prior to the time of the robbery. They
left together and returned together an hour or hour and a half
later. This period of time coincided with the time of the rob-
bery. The accomplice testified they spent some time after the
robbery driving around and visiting other taverns, ‘nelnding
the one where she left the gun.

There is also evidence that blank shells for such a gun were
found in defendant's car, and officer testimony that he found
the gun where the accomplice said she put it. That this evi-
dence relates to material matters cannot be denied, and clearly
it tends to support the testimony of Vickie Myers at this trial.

True, defendant's alibi evidence tended to explain all these
circumstances and refute the inference of defendant’s participa-
tion in the crime, but this evidence relates primarily to credi-
bility and not the sufficiency of the circumstances tending to
connect this defendant with the crime.

Although we could see why a jury might choose to disbe-
lieve the story of the accomplice, it did not do so, and we can-
not interfere with its determination of credibility sufficiency.
The material circumstances shown did tend to connect the de-
fendant with the crime charged and corroborate the Myers tes-
timony.

III. We have examined all of the cases cited by appellant
and do not find them helpful to her. State v. Winters, 209 Iowa
565, 228 N.W. 286, State v. Mikesell, 70 lowa 176, 30 N.W. 474,

a a 529

and State v. Cowell, 149 Iowa 460, 128 N.W. 886, are not in
point. In each of these cases the court found that there was
no testimony other than that of the confessed accomplices
which tended in the slightest degree to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense charged.

The case of State v. Gill, 202 Iowa 242, 210 N.W. 120,
involved the crime of larceny, and the court held under ques-
tionable circumstances that the taking and transporting of
stolen eggs, testified to by the accomplice, were properly cor-
roborated, and affirmed a jury conviction therein.

In State v. Pauley, 210 Iowa 192, 280 N.W. 555, the only
evidence corroborating a material matter in the controversy
was that of an independent witness who stated that he observed
a person whom he believed to be the defendant drive past his
home. This statement tended to support the credibility of a
similar statement made by the accomplice. Since this was the
only corroboration of the accomplice’s statements, the court
properly held it insufficient to comply with the statute.

In State v. Duncan, 158 Towa 652, 188 N.W. 918, the only
corroborative evidence was the testimony of two witnesses that
they saw defendant near the scene of the crime on various
occasions and the finding of a gun in a place where the accom-
plice said defendant had placed the gun, The court felt the
circumstances were insufficient. The record revealed that the
defendant's place of business was only 100 feet from the scene
of the crime and that he frequently had been at that place to
meet incoming trains. It also appeared the accomplice could
have placed the gun in its hiding spot himself, and that this
was not sufficiently connected to justify its use as corroborative
evidence. .

Although some testimony and circumstantial evidence
which tended to connect defendant with the alleged crime, stand-
ing alone, would be insufficient to satisfy the statutory require-
ments for corroboration, we find herein sufficient other cireum-
stantial evidence, independently shown, to comply with the re-
quirements of our statutes.

IV. We are impressed by defendant’s argument attacking
the credibility of certain witnesses, but as it was the jury
function to weigh the testimony of the accomplice and the

580" Le |

alibi witness, we cannot interfere with its determination in this
ease. It apparently believed the testimony given by the ac-
eomplice in this trial and, since this story related to material
matters properly corroborated by both circumstantial and
direct evidence, we must affirm the conviction and judgment
rendered herein. Affirmed.

All JUSTICES concur.

Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. Kenners Haverson, appellant. :

No. 52623.
(Reported .in 155 N.W.2d arty

on
oa
eB

Drcemper 12, 1967.

Sheridan & Sheridan, of Waukon, for appellant.
Richard C, Turner, Attorney General, James C, Sell, Assist-

532 Le 7

ant Attorney General, and John W. Shafer, County Attorney,
for appellee.

Moors, J.—Defendant, Kenneth Halverson, was charged,
tried and convicted of the crime of hunting by artificial light
in violation of Code section 109.93 and ordered to pay a $300
fine. He has appealed. We affirm.

Gerald Ira Hoilien, a state conservation officer, testified
that while on duty the night of December 5, 1965, he observed
lights flashing in a field east from his location at the Helen
Hirth farm and called Iowa Highway Patrol Officer Gary Soper
for assistance. After both officers observed the lights they
separated. Hoilien took a closer position where, by the use of
United States Navy binoculars, he observed for about five or
ten minutes an automobile being driven in slow circles with its
lights on in a cornfield north of Jim Scholtes’ farmhouse.
From the style and particularly the taillights he determined
the automobile was a 1958 Chevrolet.

When the car appeared to head in the direction of the
Scholtes’ farm buildings, Hoilien drove to the Scholtes’ farm-
stead where he observed the car coming from the field into the
area of the buildings. He then stopped his car blocking the
driveway and turned on his headlights and red light. The
other car, a 1958 Chevrolet owned and driven by defendant,
stopped about ten feet from the officer’s vehicle. The officer
observed cornstalks sticking out from the radiator and from
underneath the car.

The testimony regarding the events which followed is in
dispute. Hoilien testified, both at the hearing of defendant’s
motion to suppress certain evidence and at the trial, that when
he approached defendant’s automobile he identified himself and
asked defendant, who was then outside his car, whether he had
been hunting and defendant replied “Yes, a little.”

Officer Hoilien further testified he then asked defendant if
he could open the door of defendant’s automobile and he said
“Yes”. The officer then removed a gun that was lying on the
rear floorboard. Defendant was then asked if any other guns
were in the car to which he answered “No”. Hoilien then asked
defendant if he minded if he looked and defendant stated “No,

| Le 533

go ahead”. The officer then found a rifle protruding from
under the front seat with three shells in the magazine which he
removed. They were expanding shells which when fired ex-
pand and make a large hole when hitting an animal.

Hoilien testified: “After I looked in the car I asked Ken-
neth Halverson to step over to my car, and he did. I asked
him if he was aware of this shining law or hunting with an
artificial light, and he said ‘No’. I asked him if that was the
first time he had gone hunting, and he replied it was the first
time he had gone deer hunting and he wasn’t going to go any-
more. Those were his words. I believe I asked him if he got
talked into going hunting, and he said, ‘No, it’s just as much
my fault as it is anybody’s.’ I asked him if they had killed a
deer, and he said they hadn’t killed a deer that night or any
other night.”

Hoilien further testified he asked defendant how long they
had been out in the fields and defendant shrugged his shoulders
and said, “I don’t know. Probably about 45 minutes or so.”

After being retained approximately 45 minutes defendant
and the occupants of his automobile were released by the
officer to permit defendant to take his wife and son home.
They had been visiting in the Scholtes’ home. As instructed
defendant and the other men in his car when it was stopped
by Hoilien met the officers at the Waukon City Hall where
formal charges were filed against them.

Defendant and the occupants of his car, except one who
had died before trial time, testified they had been pheasant
hunting during the day of December 5, after eating, cleaning
game and delivering some toys to another farm they then drove
to the Scholtes’ farm to leave defendant’s minor son with his
mother who was there visiting and they were just leaving when
stopped by the officer. Each denied they had been in the
Scholtes’ farm field and that they had been hunting that night.
They stated the guns had been left in the car after pheasant
hunting that day.

Thoy testified when stopped by Hoilien he rushed to the
ear, jerked open the doors and seized the two guns,

Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress evidence of the

534. Le 7

seizure of the two guns and asked the court to direct the State
not to offer or attempt to offer any proof of defendant having
possession thereof. On hearing of this motion Hoilien, defend-
ant and occupants of his ear, except the one who had died,
testified regarding seizure of the guns. We have set out above
the substance of their testimony.

The trial court overruled defendant’s motion to suppress
this evidence. No reasons were then stated.

At the close of the State’s case in chief defendant again
raised the question of the admissibility in evidence of the two
guns, Exhibits A and B. The trial court’s ruling includes: “I
feel, on the basis of the record as it stands, the defendant con-
sented to have the search of his car by Officer Hoilien; and
that in the absence of a search warrant that the evidence was
legally obtained.”

I. Defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling

his motion to suppress and allowing evidence on trial regarding
seizure of the two guns. We do not agree.
. I Llegally seized evidence, of course, is inadmissible, and
if the guns were illegally taken or obtained by illegal search
or seizure under the well-known cage of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
648, 81S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, admission
of evidence thereof would be reversible error. State v. Post,
255 Iowa 578, 581, 123 N.W.2d 11, 16; State v. Hall, 259 Iowa
147, 143 N.W.2d 318, 320; State v. Anderson, 260 Iowa 122, 148
N.W.2d 414, 416.

Hl It is undisputed no search warrant had been obtained
by Officer Hoilien. Based on this fact defendant argues his
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and sei-
gure as guaranteed by Amendment 4 to the Constitution of
the United States and also Article I, section 8, of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Iowa was violated. Not all searches or sei-
zares undertaken without a warrant, however, are unreason-
able, A search and seizure predicated on voluntary consent or
one conducted as an incident of a lawful arrest are exceptions
to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Hd.2d
717; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Hd.2d

| | 585

856; State v. Post, 255 Iowa 573, 582, 128 N.W.2d 11, 16, 17;
State v. Raymond, 258 Iowa 1339, 1344, 142 N.W.2d 444, 447;
State v. Anderson, 260 Iowa 122, 148 N.W.2d 414, 416; State
v. Gates, 260 Iowa 772, 150 N.W.2d 617, 618; State v. Brant,
260 Iowa 758, 150 N.W.2d 621, 624.

Defendant admits a lawful arrest was made by Officer
Hoilien. Code section 755.4 provides a peace officer may make
an arrest without a warrant for a public offense committed in
his presence or where a public offense has in fact been commit-
ted and he has reasonable ground for believing that the person
to be arrested has committed it.

In our recent case of State v. Anderson, supra, we re-
view our holdings and those from other jurisdictions regarding
an officer’s right to conduct a search of an automobile incident
to a lawful arrest and need not repeat here the applicable
principles of law. We hold the search and seizure of the two
guns was incident to defendant's lawful arrest.

The trial court’s finding defendant had consented to the
search of his automobile is amply supported by the record. The
principles of law applicable thereto are analyzed in State v.
Gates, supra, 260 Iowa 772, 150 N.W.2d 617. To repeat them
here would unduly lengthen this opinion.

Il. Based upon rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Hd.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974,
defendant asserts his constitutional right against self-incrimi-
nation was violated by admission of Officer Hoilien’s testimony
regarding claimed statements made by defendant. No claim
is made by the State that any warning of constitutional rights
was given by the officer. Miranda, however, does not apply
here because the trial preceded the Miranda decision. Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Hd.2d 882;
State v. Rye, 260 Iowa 146, 156, 157, 148 N.W.2d 632, 638, 639.

Hi Assuming, arguendo, defendant had a valid objection
to the testimony regarding claimed admissions by defendant,
we find no objection to Hoilien’s testimony in regard thereto
was made during the entire trial of the case. Defendant’s ex-
perienced and able counscl had heard substantially the same
testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. No motion

536 Le |

to strike said testimony was made in the trial court. We have
repeatedly said under such circumstances no appealable ques-
tion is presented to this court. State v. Post, 255 Iowa 573, 580,
123 N.W.2d 11, 15; State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 145 N.W.2d
638, 642; State v. Olson, 260 Iowa 311, 149 N.W.2d 182, 136.
Failure to object to the admissibility of evidence in the trial
court waives any error therein and its admissibility is not re-
viewable here. State v. Jones, 253 Iowa 829, 834, 118 N.W.2d
303, 306, and citations.

Ordinarily constitutional questions cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. State v. Jones, supra; State v.
LaMar, 260 Iowa 957, 151 N.W.2d 496, 502, 503; State v. Wal-
lace, 261 Towa 104, 152 N.W.2d 266, 268; State v. Hardesty,
261 Towa 382, 153 N.W.2d 464, 469.

Therefore, defendant’s assignment of violation of his con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination cannot be considered
here.

Ill. Defendant’s next assigned error is based on receipt
of testimony of Officer Hoilien as to his observations of the
Scholtes’ farm field the morning after defendant’s arrest.

HI Hoilien testified he returned to the Scholtes’ farm the
next morning and after getting permission drove in the ap-
proximate path he had observed defendant's car coming from
the field. He there found fresh automobile tire tracks over the
contours in the area where he observed the 1958 Chevrolet the
night before. He identified a map, Exhibit E, which he had pre-
pared and stated it fairly and accurately portrayed the course
of the tire marks which he had observed in the field. Defend-
ant’s objection to this testimony as incompetent, irrelevant,
immaterial and without foundation was overruled. Later when
Exhibit E was offered defendant’s objection to it was sustained.

Hoilien’s description of the location and path of these tire
marks is consistent with his testimony of the automobile’s
course on the previous night. We are not persuaded receipt
of this evidence was reversible error. See Davidson v. Cooney,
259 Iowa 1278, 1285, 147 N.W.2d 819, 823, 824, and citations.

IV. Code section 109.93 under which defendant was
charged, tried, convicted and fined provides:

a Es 587

“Hunting by artificial light. It shall be unlawful to throw
or cast the rays of a spotlight, headlight or other artificial light
on any highway, or in any field, woodland or forest for the
purpose of spotting, locating or taking or attempting to take
or hunt any animal, except raccoons or other fur-bearing ani-
mals when treed with the aid of dogs, while having in posses-
sion or control, either singly or as one of a group of persons,
any firearm, bow or other implement whereby game could be
killed.

“Any person violating this section shall be punished by a
fine of not more than three hundred dollars or imprisonment
in the county jail for a period not to exceed thirty days.”

Code section 109.119 provides: “Penalties. Whoever shall
violate any. of the provisions of the foregoing sections num-
bered 109.38 to 109.118, inclusive, shall be punished as is pro-
vided in section 109.82.”

The penalty provided in section 109.82 is a fine of not less
than ten dollars or more than one hundred dollars or imprison-
ment in the county: jail not more than thirty days.

Defendant points out the obvious conflict of penalty under
section 109.93 and sections 109.119 and 109.32, He contends if
he is to be punished at all it must be under the provisions of
109.32 and asserts because of the contradiction section 109.93
is unconstitutional and unenforceable. Defendant cites no au-
thorities to support this argument. The trial court was correct
in rejecting these contentions.

HJ Scctions 109.119 and 109.82 are general statutes pro-
viding penalty for violation of several sections of chapter 109.
Section 109.93 is a special statute covering a specific offense and
prescribing the penalty for violation thereof. This would ap-
pear particularly true since section 109.98 is the later enact-
ment. , State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 231
Towa 784, 830, 2 N.W.2d 372, 396; Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins.
Assn. v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 954, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; 82
C.J.S., Statutes, section 369. oS

| | It is a fundamental rule that where a general statute,
if standing alone, would include the same matter as a special
statute and thus conflict with it, the special Act will be consid-

588 ee —

ered an exception to or qualification of the general statute and
will prevail over it, whether it was passed before or after such
general enactment. Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991,
998, 54 N.W.2d 439, 443; Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assn, v.
Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 955, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; Liberty Consol.
Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544,
547; Gade v. City of Waverly, 251 Iowa 473, 477, 101 N.W.2d
525, 527; Smith v. Newell, 254 Iowa 496, 501, 117 N.W.2d 883,
886; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 564; 82 O.J.S., Statutes, sec-
tion 369. Therefore, sections 109.119 and 109.32, the general
statutes, should not be interpreted as limiting the sentence pro-
vided by section 109.93, the special statute.

HN SV. «= ‘There is no presumption against the constitu-
tional validity of a statute. Every reasonable presumption
must be called to support the Act. A challenging party must
overcome these presumptions and negative every reasonable
basis which will sustain the statute.. Graham v. Worthington,
259 Iowa 845, 851, 146 N.W.2d 626, 631, and citations. De-
fendant’s assertion of unconstitutionality against section 109.93
falls far short of the burden resting on him.

HE VI. Ib his motion for new trial. defendant claimed
‘one of the jurors failed to disclose the fact the county attorney
had represented the juror’s wife in a divorce action a short
time before the trial of this case. The trial court found the
juror had not made a false answer. The record supports this
finding. Assuming, arguendo, the juror failed to make such a
disclosure, we are unable to understand how defendant could
thereby be prejudiced. In support of this conclusion see State
v. Wilcoxen, 200 Iowa 1250, 206 N.W. 260.

_ VIL We have carefully considered defendant’s many
claimed grounds for reversal and find none is shown. Our
review of the entire record leads us to conclude defendant was
afforded a fair trial—Affirmed,

All Jusziczs coneur.

ee EE

Tue 1967 Senior Ciass or Pexin Hie Scuoor et al., appellants,
v. C. Evpon THarp et al., appellees,

No. 52607.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2a 874)

DecemBer 12, 1967.

0

Rowe & Rowe, of Fairfield, and Life, Davis & Life, of Oska-
loosa, for appellants.

Bailey C. Webber, of Ottumwa, for appellees.

Moorz, J.—This is a replevin action brought by five mem-
bers of the senior class of Pekin High School against the school
board and certain school officials claiming the right of im-
mediate possession to funds held by defendants in the amount
of $729.22. The caption of the petition indicates the 1967 Sen-
ior Class of Pekin High School is a plaintiff. The allegations
of the petition, however, clearly state the plaintiffs are five
members of the class and ask they be given immediate posses-
sion of the funds involved. Our reference to plaintiffs is there-
fore to the five individuals named in the caption who being
minors brought this action by their next friends.

Plaintiffs’ original petition alleges they are members of the
1967 Senior Class of Pekin High School; they are entitled, as
absolute owners, to the immediate possession of the senior class
funds in the amount of $729.22; demand therefor had been
made upon defendants who had refused to turn over said funds
to plaintiffs; said funds had been acquired by payment of dues
into the class fund and profits from sale of magazines by the
class and that defendants retain said property under a claim
they have a right to state how said property should be disposed
of although defendants claimed no ownership.

The prayer asks that a writ of replevin issue and said prop-
erty be immediately seized and delivered to plaintiffs and for
judgment confirming their right to possession.

Defendants’ attack included a motion to dismiss the peti-
tion at plaintiffs’ costs for the following reasons:

“1. No affidavit is filed in support of the purported class
action as required by R.C.P. 44.

“2. The petition states no ultimate fact, but only a legal
conclusion: as to immediate right of possession to the claimed
assets described in Paragraph 2, and rather alleges in Para-

So

graph 7 that said funds were paid into a class fund by dues and
funds derived from sale of magazines by the class of 1967, and
said petition states no ultimate facts entitling plaintiffs or any
of them to immediate possession of said fund, or any portion
thereof.

“3. The petition is for a fund of money, but alleges no
fact showing segregation and identification of said fund suffi-
cient to support a petition for replevin of the money, specif-
ically segregated and set aside or specially identified; and by
reason of which, an action of replevin does not lie.

“4, That said petition, and ultimate facts stated therein,
do not plead a cause of action against the defendants or any of
them.”

Plaintiffs then filed an amendment to their petition alleging
the funds had been turned over to the school superintendent
and remained as particularly identifiable in a special account
used in normal accounting procedures. They made a part of
this amendment copies of the Pekin Community School District
accounting sheets. One showed how different amounts had
been raised and spent by the class over a period of three school
years. Another showed the class money was carried on a gen-
eral account record with hot lunch and many other activities
funds. The total was deposited in three banks in the area in
different amounts but no attempt was made to designate any
deposit as that held in any particular fund. In other words
the senior class money was commingled with hot lunch and
other activities money and deposited in the banks. The class
money was not held and deposited as a separate fund.

| | I. The trial court overruled grounds 1, 2 and 4 of
defendants’ motion to dismiss but sustained the motion on
ground 3 thereof. Plaintiffs failed to plead further within
seven days and dismissal of their petition became a final ad-
judication in the trial court. Rule 86, Rules of Civil Procedure ;
Winneshiek Mutual Ins. Assn. v. Roach, 257 Towa 354, 359, 360,
182 N.W.2d 436, 439, 440; Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 257
Towa 453, 456, 183 N.W.2d 282, 233.

Il. Plaintiffs have appealed from dismissal of their peti-
tion. Defendants have cross-appealed. Defendants assert

Fe

grounds 1, 2 and 4 as well as ground 3 were valid grounds for
sustaining their motion. to dismiss..

HI Taking of a cross-appeal by defendants was unneces-
sary and we decline to consider it as such. We are firmly com-
mitted to the view the successful party may, without appealing,
save the judgment if error was committed against him which,
if corrected, will make the result reached in the trial court a
right result. Brandt v. Schucha, 250 Iowa 679, 682, 96 N.W.2d
179, 181; Kroblin Refrigerated X Press Inc. v. Ledvina, 256
Towa 229, 233, 127 N.W.2d 133, 186; Re Condemnation of Land
(Carroll County), 256 Iowa 380, 885, 127 N.W.2d 566, 569.

; | Ill. The immediate right to possession is the gist of
a replevin action and whatever be the right or want of right of
defendants, if plaintiffs be not entitled to present possession
they cannot prevail. Ritchie v. Hilmer, 251. Iowa 1002, 1004,
103 N.W.2d 858, 859, and citations.

HH. Plaintiffs were required to plead the necessary ele-
ments of their claim-of right to immediate possession of the
property sought. Section 643.1, Code 1966, provides that, in
an action for replevin, the petition must state, “A particular
description of the property claimed.” As asserted in ground 3
of the motion to dismiss, the trial court held plaintiffs failed
to comply with this statutory requirement. We agree. 7

HM The general rule is that money is not the subject of an
action of replevin unless it is so marked or labeled as to be
capable of identification. It must be specific identifiable money.
Eller v. Myers, 229 Iowa 114, 119, 294 N.W. 282, 233, 284; 77
OJ.S., Replevin, section 12, page 19; 46 AmJur., Replevin,
section 18, page 13. In Spear v. Arkansas National Bank, 111
Ark. 29, 31, 163 S.W. 508, 509, it is stated: “Replevin is not an
action. for the cdllection of debt, but upon the contrary is a
possessory action for the recovery of specific personal property.
*®* The rule is well settled that replevin will not lie for money
ineapable of specific identification. * * * ‘Money is not the
subject of an ‘action of replevin, unless it is marked or des-
ignated in some manner so as to become specific as regards the
power of identification, such as being in a bag or package.’”

The facts in the case at bar are analogous to those in Eller

Se

v. Myers, supra, in which plaintiff sought possession of the
funds of a judgment in his favor which had been paid to the
clerk of court and held in a general fund. We there held the
allegations did not meet the requirement of description of
specific identifiable money and affirmed dismissal of the peti-
tion. Our holding in Eller requires affirmance of the trial
court’s ruling based on ground 3 of the motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on Haton v. Blood, 201 Iowa 834, 208
N.W. 508, 44 A.L.R. 1516, in which plaintiff was allowed in a
replevin action to obtain possession of a promissory note, mort-
gage, four Liberty bonds, a passbook and a savings account.
It was admitted in the answer defendant received and. had in
his possession the property described in the petition. The de-
fense was a denial plaintiff was entitled to possession of the
property. This case is readily distinguishable from the case at
bar on the issues raised and submitted to the trial court.

IV. Our affirmance on plaintiffs’.appeal makes considera-
tion of defendants’ other contentions unnecessary.

Dismissal of plaintiffs’ replevin action by the trial court
is affirmed without prejudice to any right they may have to
bring some other action.

Affirmed on plaintiffs’ appeal. Defendants’ cross-appeal
dismissed. .

All ‘Tusrices concur.

Kennetu M. Rasce, d/b/a Rasc# Construction Company,
appellee, cross-appellant, v. Crry or BLoomrrenp, appellant,
eross-appellee.

No. 52592.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 718)

Ocroser 17, 1967,

Renearwe Denmep January 8, 1968,

D. W. Harris, of Bloomfield, for appellant, cross-appellee.

McCarville & Bennett, of Fort Dodge, for appellee, cross-
appellant.

“Mason, J.—Kenneth M. Rasch, doing business as Rasch
Construction Company, brings this law action against the City
of Bloomfield to recover for extra labor performed and materials
furnished in the desilting of the silting basin of the city’s
municipal water reservoir. .

A contract, with general and detailed specifications, was
prepared by the consulting engineers but not signed by the
parties. However, both plaintiff and defendant rely on and

546 LE

consider the contract as binding on them. It was so considered
by the trial-court.

Defendant admitted owing plaintiff $4247, subject to
two small claims and offered to confess judgment in that
amount. Plaintiff claimed in excess of $15,000 for additional
work and services.

Trial to the court without a-jury resulted in judgment for
plaintiff for only.a portion of his claim, but in excess of the
amount defendant admitted owing.

_ I. Defendant appeals ftom the court’s allowaneg for ad-
ditional ‘work for clay removed from the banks of the silting
basin, contending the contract provided for the removal of silt
from the basin. Defendant maintains the removal of clay from
the banks of the silting basin was done by plaintiff in order
to provide roads into the bottom.of the basin by which he
could haul out the silt, this area was not a part of the silting
basin and the removal of the clay did not coristitute the re-
moval of silt.

*Plainitiff has éross-appealed by reason of the court’s denial
of thé full amount of his claim.

Il. “Bloomfield receives its water supply from Lake
Fisher. “During the runoff silt is cartied down to the lake. In
an effort to prevent the deposit of silt which would reduce the
lake’s capacity a basin had been constructed at the extreme
south end to drop’ the silt from the water and there store it.
The silting basin, separated from the main body of the lake by
a county road, is connected by four pipes which run through
the road. Over the years the silt deposited in the basin up to
the flow-pipes, causing silt to drift through to the main body
of the lake.

A removal project to renew the capacity of the silting
basin became necessary. The purpose was to create a basin
ahead of the main body of the.lake with capacity to trap addi-
tional silt and keep it from carrying over into the.lake. Con-
sulting engineers were employed to propose specifications for
the project.

A “Notice of Hearing: and Letting Invitation to Bidders”
was given, sealed bids were received and plaintiff’s proposal
was accepted.

eS sa

Defendant’s engineer realized that 20, 30 or possibly 40
thousand cubic yards of silt were present in the basin. Be-
eause of the city’s budget limitations, it was decided to take
bids on the removal of 10,000 cubie yards. Defendant hoped
to remove more, with the total quantity to be removed deter-
mined by cross sections, one after dewatering and another
after completion, As an estimate, for the purpose of bidding,
the approximate amount of 10,000 cubic yards was employed.
Plaintiff’s bid on the estimate of 10,000 yards called for a
gross payment of $24,000. He was to be permitted to remove
the silt by any method he chose except hydraulic dredging.

Item 1 of the detailed specifications provides for installing
temporary overflow pipes, isolating silting area from the main
body of the lake and dewatering for a lump sum of $5000. We
are told “dewatering” means pumping out the water and thus
isolating the basin area from the main body of the lake. This
process was a necessary and separate unit of operation in con-
nection with thé number of yards to be removed.

With refererize-to this item, the contract provides: “It will
be the responsibility of the eontractor to place temporary over-
flow tubes as indicated in the plans to protect the county road
during the time the existing corrugated metal pipes are closed
and the work area is dewatered.”

Item 2 provides for removal of approximately 10,000
cubic yards of silt from the silting basin and hauling to the des-
ignated area at a price of $1.65 per cubie yard; a total of
$16,500.

The contract’ provides: “Silt removal and disposal. * * *
Adequate pumping facilities shall be maintained to keep the
area dewatered during the progress of the work and protect
the completed work prior to acceptance by the city. * * *
It shall be the responsibility of the Contractor to maintain
portions of the route which are not permanent roads during
prosecution of the work. Upon completion of the work tem-
porary routes shall be returned to original condition.” The
silt was to be hauled to 4 specified dump area and deposited
in layers not to exceed seven inches in depth on agricultural
land. Uniformity of deposit was not required. However, the
contractor was to level the area.

548 Ln |

“Item 3 provides for all other miscellaneous work required
to complete the job, including removal of temporary structures
and pipes and cleanup of the jobsite for a lump sum of $2500.

September 28 plaintiff proceeded to remove the silt from
the basin. October 30 the city engineer requested the consult-
ing engineer and two city councilmen to visit the construction
site because a preliminary cross section had indicated 10,000
cubic-yards of material had been removed. As a result plain-
tiff was orally instructed to continue the project. The con-
sulting engineer gave no written directions as required by
item 18 of the general specifications for the removal of silt
over the approximately 10,000 yards referred to in plaintiff’s
proposal. Plaintiff did not give the engineer written notice of
extra cost of additional work as required by item 10 of these
specifications.

Plaintiff continued on the project until November 12 when
he was instructed by the consulting engineer to stop.

The city engineer made three estimates during the prog-
ress of the work. The first, on November 2 when he deter-
mined 9400 cubic yards had been removed and approved pay-
ment to plaintiff for. this amount. At the same time the
engineer approved item 1 of the contract as satisfactorily
completed. The second estimate was made December 7 when
he approved payment for additional silt removed. The engi-
neer determined that 28,000 cubic yards had been removed.
Plaintiff said he had removed 3491.4 yards more than the en-
gineer estimated.

In a third estimate the engineer determined that a total
of 28,018 cubie yards of silt had been removed. The total
amount of material removed exceeded this somewhat. The
determination of silt removed was made by taking cross sec-
tions of the excavation, a standard procedure provided by the
contract to determine quantities.

In his final estimate the engineer approved payment to
plaintiff of $53,721.45. This was computed on the basis of
$5000 for 100 percent completion of item 1, $46,221.45 under
item 2 for removal of 28,013 yards at $1.65 and $2500 for 100
percent completion of item 3.-

Previously approved payments totaled $49,174.45, leaving

es s49

a balance owing subject to the allowance of a $300 offset of
$4247, the amount for which defendant offered to confess
judgment.

II. Plaintiff claims he should be allowed additional com-
pensation for: (1) dewatering during the time he was re-
moving silt over the approximately 10,000 cubic yards referred
to in his proposal (an additional 20 days), (2) silt displaced
by the clay roadbeds placed by him in the bottom of the silt
basin and for additional storage area provided by the removal
of clay from the side of the silt basin, and (8) leveling of all
silt over 10,000 cubic yards.

The court denied that portion of plaintiffs claim based
on items 1 and 3 of the detailed specifications. Plaintiff makes
no complaint of this ruling in his cross-appeal.

The controversy in both appeals is the recovery allowed
plaintiff for extra work under item 2. Plaintiff had claimed
$33,212.85 for extra labor under this item. The city had ap-
proved additional payments of $29,721.45 based on 18,018 eubie
yards at $1.65.

IV. Plaintiff contends his proof entitled him to extra
compensation for all silt displaced by clay in the basin and
this amounted to 2800 cubic yards at $1.65 per yard for a
total of $4620.

In performing the work on the project the silt basin was
isolated from Lake Fisher and dewatered. Silt was then re-
moved from the basin bed by trucks. As a layer of silt was
removed, seepage from the new silt face continually provided
water which had to be removed. This dewatering process oc-
eurred daily. As the silt removal process proceeded into the
silt face plaintiff encountered difficulty because this soft area
would not support the trucks and heavy equipment essential
in removing the silt.

It became necessary to build roads in the lake bottom to
get the trucks in to load and haul the silt. Clay placed on top
of the silt would not support the equipment so it became neces-
sary to remove silt and put clay in its place’for a usable road-
bed.

For every load of clay put in the bottom of the area for
road purposes, a load of silt had to be removed. However,

550 Pe ll

plaintiff did not remove this clay before the project was
stopped. As a result, a volume of silt removed and displaced
with clay would not show on the cross section. Some of the
clay used for road purposes was removed from the side slopes
of the basin and pushed by a bulldozer into the basin bed
where silt had been removed. Other clay was taken from
across the road with defendant’s approval.

The court concluded a total of 1799.2 cubie yards of clay
had been removed from the bank of the silt basin, both above
and below the waterline, which was excluded by defendant’s
engineer in computing quantity of silt removed from the basin.
Of this, 1425.28 cubic yards had been removed from the banks
of the silt basin below the waterline as shown by cross sections.
The court concluded the capacity of the silt basin had been
inereased by the removal of clay from the bank or side slope
below the waterline and allowed plaintiff recovery for this
yardage at $1.65. per yard for a total of $2351.71. No extra
compensation-was allowed from silt removed that was replaced
by clay from across the road. As stated, no extra computation
was allowed for additional dewatering.

Plaintiff contends he actually removed 2800 cubic yards
of silt which had’ been replaced by clay; that when the en-
gineer stopped the project plaintiff was not permitted to re-
move this clay and a substantial quantity of removed silt was
not computed in fixing his compensation. Defendant, on the
other hand, contends as stated in Division I, supra, its contract
was for the removal of silt, that the clay left in the bottom of
the basin was of no benefit to the city,

V. This case is not reviewable de novo here but only on
errors assigned. The court’s findings of fact have the effect
of a jury verdict and are binding upon us if supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Rule 344(f)(1), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant asserts the court erred in admitting testimony
of plaintiff and his witness, John Peed, as to their under-
standing of the meaning of the contract and allowing them to
interpret the contract when there was no allegation of ambigu-
ity.

Defendant contends under this. assignment although the
court in its opinion seems to adopt thé view the evidence com-

i 551

plained of is inadmissible, even though admitted over defend-
ant’s objection, then relies upon it in interpreting the contract.

Defendant has set forth in two divisions of his brief the
specific part of the record upon which error is predicated in
connection with this assignment. Division (a) relates to plain-
tiff’s testimony. Inquiry was made as to how plaintiff arrived
at the total contract price, his study of the plans and specifica-
tions, inspection of the jobsite, conversations had with the
consulting engineer and the method employed in arriving at
the charge for work called for under items 1 and 3 in the
original bid. All this occurred before plaintiff submitted his
proposal.

Peed’s testimony is considered in the other division. In-
quiry was made as to what was entailed in the continued per-
formance of the contract, ie., removal of silt in excess of the
10,000 cubic yards, the method employed in arriving at the
original proposed price, the fair and reasonable value of the
extra work performed under items 1 and 8 and facts concern-
ing removal of the temporary haulroads.

Practically the entire testimony of both witnesses related
to plaintiff's claims under items 1 and 8. The court’s judgment
was favorable to defendant on these items.

“Tt is sometimes said that if the words of a contract are
plain and clear, evidence of surrounding circumstances to aid
interpretation is not admissible. But some of the surrounding
circumstances always must be known before the meaning of
the words can be plain and clear; and proof of the cireum-
stances may make a meaning plain and clear when in the ab-
sence of such proof some other meaning may also have seemed
plain and clear. Sometimes the circumstances proof of which
is offered do not have any probative value and do not affect a
meaning that is arrived at without them. When such is the
ease, such circumstances are immaterial. In other cases, the
testimony of additional factors may not be believed by the
trial court after it has been admitted, in which case the mean-
ing of words that is otherwise ‘plain and clear’ will be adopted.

«} # * Of course, an otherwise ‘plain’ meaning should not
be disturbed by the proof of irrelevant circumstances or of
those having only a remote bearing or inconsequential weight.

552 eee

But until a court knows the circumstances it cannot properly
say that they have no probative value.” 8 Corbin on Con-
tracts, section 542.

We believe the court instead of adopting the view the
evidence was inadmissible, as suggested by defendant, found
after consideration the evidence admitted lacked probative
value. The court did not err in admitting the evidence in con-
sidering plaintiff’s claims under items 1 and 3.

HM As to any evidence given by either witness as it related
to the claim under item 2 it was not received for the purpose
of contradicting or varying the terms of the written contract,
but for the purpose of aiding the court in ascertaining the true
intent and meaning of the parties to the contract as revealed
by the language used there; “* * * ‘not by showing that the
parties meant something other than what they said, but by
showing what they meant by what they said.’ ” Central Heights
Imp. Co. v. Memorial Parks, Inc., 40 Cal. App.2d 591, 608, 105
P.2d 596, 605, and citations. The court did not err in ruling o
defendant’s objection.

VI. Defendant combines its remaining assignments of
error in argument, asserting the court erred in failing to sus-
tain (1) defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition made
at the close of plaintiff’s evidence and (2) its motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding and for new trial.

Defendant contends since there was no claimed ambiguity
in the contract all.of plaintiff's evidence was improper and he,
therefore, failed under the contract to establish his right to
any additional compensation over and above that which de-
fendant, admitted and had offered to pay. We do not agree.

| | «* * * [T]n a strict sense, every contract needs inter-
pretation * * *,

“ ‘To say dogmatically that we “know what a word
means” im advance of its utterance is nonsense. All we can
know in advance is approximately what it will mean. After
the utterance, we interpret what has been said in the light of
both verbal and physical contexts, and act according to our
interpretation * * *’” (Emphasis appears in original). 4 Wil-
liston on Contracts, Third Ed. (Jaeger), section 609, quoting

es 558

from Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hercules Powder Oo., 3
Cir., 224 F.2d 293, 296.

HI “fividence of the circumstances is always admissible
in aid of the interpretation of an integrated agreement. This
is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambigu-
ity.” Atlantic Northern Airlines v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293,
801, 96 A.2d 652, 656.

HI Although we do not agree with defendant’s contention
the court erred in failing to sustain its motion to dismiss plain-
tiff’s petition, we do not find substantial evidence in the record
which would support the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was
entitled to extra compensation for 1799.2 cubic yards of clay
removed from the side slope or bank of the silt basin. To the
extent the trial court allowed recovery for this item it was in
error. .
VII. In considering plaintiff's contention as asserted in
his cross-appeal we believe an issue was presented as to
whether plaintiff was prevented from removing the clay used
as foundation for haulroads from the pit which was evidently
neither decided nor mentioned by the court in its judgment.
Of course, if this issue had been decided favorably for plaintiff
he would be entitled to compensation for the amount of silt
removed that was replaced by clay.

HI “It is elementary that where a contract has been sub-
stantially performed, and an attempt to complete, performance
is made, the party attempting to perform may recover as ef-
fectually as though performance had been completed. The
refusal to accept performance of a part of a contract is a
waiver of any further effort, on the part of the party offering
the performance, to carry out the part of the contract on his
part; and, the contract not being rescinded but remaining in
full force, he may recover for a breach the same as if full per-
formance had been made.” Brown v. Needles, 186 Iowa 878,
884, 170 N.W. 804, 806.

HI Defendant in maintaining the basin was engaged in a
proprietary rather than a governmental function. Code sec-
tion 368.27 ; Lubin v. Iowa City, 257 Lowa 383, 390, 181 N.W.2d
765, 770; Leighton Supply Co. v. Fort Dodge, 228 Iowa 995,
999, 292 N.W. 848, 850.

554
HH We believe plaintiff is entitled to have this issue de-
termined.

VIII. On defendant’s appeal the trial court is reversed
for error in allowing plaintiff the additional recovery of
$2351.71. On plaintiff’s appeal the cause is reversed and
remanded for determination of the single issue considered in
Division VIL, supra—Reversed on both appeals and remanded.

All Juszices concur.
a
Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. Jack G. SLATER, appellant. °

No, 52659.
(Reported in 153 N.W.2d 702)

555

Ocrozzr 17, 1967.

Renearine Denmp January 8, 1968,

P. F. Elgin, of Indianola, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Blderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Darrell Goodhue, of Indianola,
County Attorney, for appellee.

- Moorz, J—Defendant, Jack G. Slater, was charged by a
county attorney’s information with the. crime of uttering a
forged instrument in violation of section 718.2, Code, 1966, and
following conviction was sentenced not to exceed ten years im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary.

On this appeal defendant asserts the trial court erred in
(1) failing to remove Exhibit 4 from the consideration of the
jury and (2) giving instruction 10.

Donald Forret, a check-out counter cashier at the Indianola
Hy Vee Food Store, testified defendant endorsed in his presence
and cashed a check in the sum of $41.60 at the store on October
11, 1966. The check, Exhibit 1, was made payable to “Jack
Slater” on a printed form bearing, the name of “Bates Miles”
and purported to be signed by Miles. .

The store manager testified defendant had been in the store

556 Le |

on October 11, 1966, and that the check was endorsed and put
through regular channels but was later returned for want of
proper signature. It remained unpaid.

Bates Miles of Des Moines testified he did not make out or
sign the form check bearing his name which had been prepared
for him by the Capital City State Bank of Des Moines. He
stated he had not authorized anyone to write the check, he had
not employed defendant, did not owe him any money and that
he did not know Exhibit 1 had been written until so notified by
the bank. Miles had shared an apartment from August 14 to
22, 1966, with John Slater, a relative of defendant.

Duane Barton, a questioned document examiner for the
Towa Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified he had com-
pared known specimen of the writing of defendant and a James
Roland, alias James LaFrance, with the endorsement and the
writing on the face of Exhibit 1, He opined Roland had written
the check and defendant the endorsement.

A Capital City Bank teller testified payment of Exhibit 1
was refused because the signature was not genuine. The Warren
County sheriff related he had arrested defendant in Portland,
Oregon, December 12, 1966, on a warrant for the charge being
tried.

Defendant, following denial of his motion for a directed
verdict, testified he had been reared in the Des Moines area but
for several months in 1966 was a construction worker in New
Orleans, Louisiana, where he became acquainted with a man
known to him as James LaFrance who also worked on con-
struction. Defendant stated that in late September 1966, he,
his family and LaFrance decided to go to Portland, Oregon,
to seek work. Defendant and his family traveled in one auto-
mobile and LaFrance traveled alone in another. They arrived
in Des Moines on or about October 10 to visit defendant’s mother-
in-law. The group at first stayed at the farm of defendant’s
father.

Defendant related that while driving around Des Moines
with LaFrance he saw his uncle, John Slater, at which time he
introduced LaFrance and the three men went to the uncle’s
apartment. Defendant and his family stayed at the uncle’s

a a 567

apartment the night before they and LaFrance left Des Moines
on October 18 or 14.

On October 11 LaFrance borrowed defendant’s automobile
and approximately three hours later returned and told defend-
ant he had “found a job doing upholstery” but could not cash
the check as “he was from Louisiana and he didn’t have any
identification or anything of local.” Defendant further testified
LaFrance asked him if he would cash it if he obtained another
check made payable to defendant. Defendant answered in the
affirmative. LaFrance then left.

Within a half hour, according to defendant, LaFrance re-
turned with the check, now Exhibit 1, which defendant stated he
endorsed and cashed at the Indianola Hy Vee store. He received
groceries and cash. The face of Exhibit 1 bears the notation
“Const. Labor”. Defendant’s position was that he did not utter
the check with intent to defraud as required by the statute, sec-
tion 718.2.

Defendant further testified that during the few days they
were in the Des Moines area LaFrance had other checks purport-
edly signed by Bates Miles and defendant cashed two in Des
Moines and two or three in Indianola. One day defendant
eashed two checks. All were in the same form as Exhibit 1.

On cross-examination defendant identified Exhibit 3 as a
check in the same form as Exhibit 1 and admitted he cashed it,
in the sum of $45.20 at the Indianola Hy Vee store on October
10. Exhibit 1 was cashed October 11.

Cross-examination of defendant includes:

“Q. Thand you what the court reporter has marked Exhibit
4, and ask you to state what that is, if you know? A. A check.

“Q. What is the date of that? A. October 10th,

“Q. That is another check on October 10? A. Yes.

“Q. Who is that made payable to? A. Jim LaFrance.

“Q. Whose signature is purported to appear on that check?
A. Bates Miles,

“Q. The same check as Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 1, the same
type of printed check, isn’t it? A. Yes,

“Q. You indicated that Jim LaFrance said to you he
couldn’t get a check cashed? A. Yes, sir: that’s right.

“Q. Is that right. That is dated October 10? <A. Yes.

558 ee)

“Q. That same day you arrived back from Louisiana? A.
Yes, sir; somewhere right in there.”
Exhibits 3 and 4 were then offered by the State and received.
without any objection made thereto and cross-examination con-
tinued. It included defendant’s admission he had no money due
him for any work performed as indicated .on the checks.
Defendant’s redirect examination includes:
“Q. On cross-examination you were asked about a check
that has been marked Exhibit 4, payable to Jim LaFrance and
apparently endorsed by Jim LaFrance. Do you know anything
about that check? A. No, sir: I don’t.
“Q. Have you ever seen it before today? A. No.
“Q. The only checks of which you had knowledge were Ex-
hibits 1 and 8: is that correct? A. Yes.”
On rebuttal Bates Miles testified he had not seen LaFrance
or defendant during October 1966, he had not made out or
signed Exhibits 3 and 4 and neither defendant nor LaFrance had
ever performed any labor for him.
On eross-examination Miles stated the bank had furnished
him two or three books of printed checks some of which he lost
while staying with John Slater.
Upon completion of the evidence defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict was renewed and again denied. Thereafter
defendant’s counsel moved Exhibit 4 be withdrawn from the con-
sideration of: the jury and stated he had negligently failed to
examine it when offered. This motion was denied by the trial
court and forms the basis for defendant’s first assigned error.
- I. Assuming arguendo defendant had some valid objection

to Exhibit 4, his attempt to assert an objection came too late.
HI An objection, to be timely, must ordinarily be made at
the earliest opportunity after the-ground of the objection be-
comes apparent. State v. Woodmansee, 212 Iowa 596, 614, 233
N.W, 725, 784; Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251 Iowa 1011, 1017, 103
N.W.2d 718, 722; Mathews v. Beyer, 254 Iowa 52, 60, 116
N.W.2d 477, 482; Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 652, 127
N.W.2d 583, 591; 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, section 290b(1).
«MM I: A motion to strike or withdraw evidence is not
timely where it came in- without objection and the grounds of the
motion should: have been apparent before it was made. State

a a 569

v. Woodmansee and Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, both supra; State v.
Johnson, 260 Towa 1207, 1218, 152 N.W.2d 426, 482, and cita-
tions; Linge v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa 1226,
1232, 150 N.W.2d 642, 646, and citations.

HI Here Exhibit 4 was identified not only on cross and
redirect examination of defendant but also later on rebuttal.
Defendant’s objection and motion to withdraw the exhibit came
long after any claimed grounds were apparent. They were
therefore waived.

Hl ll Our statutory duty, under section 793.18, to
review the record without regard to technical errors or defects
does not apply where proper objections are not made. State v.
Ostby, 203 Iowa 383, 342, 348, 210 N.W. 934, 987, and citations;
State v. Jones, 253 Towa 829, 834, 113 N.W.2d 303, 307; State
vy. Torrence, 257 Iowa 182, 192, 181 N.W.2d 808, 814.

IV. Instruction 10 of which defendant now complains and
to which he’ objected after the verdict as authorized by section
787.3, Code, 1966, states: “There has been admitied in evidence
Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4, which are checks other than the check
upon which the charge in this case is based, These exhibits are
admitted only for the purpose of showing the intent, if any, of
the defendant in connection with the check presented by him
October 11, 1966, to the Hy Vee Food Store at Indianola, Jowa,
and for no other purpose.”

HI Defendant’s objection to instruction 10 asserted Exhibit
4 was not in his handwriting and defendant had no. connection
with it and therefore it could not be considered as a similar act in
determining defendant’s intent when Exhibit 1 was presented by
him to the Indianola Hy Vee Food Store on October 11, 1966.
We do not agree.

Under the record the jury could have found writing and
uttering of Exhibit 4 was part of a.general plan or conspiracy
between defendant and LaFrance to obtain money and as such
was admissible on the question of defendant’s intent. State v.
Flood, 148 Iowa 146, 127 N.W. 48.

In 11 Am.Jur., Conspiracy, section 37, page 568, the editor
states: “The rule seems to be well established that, upon the
trial of an indictment for a crime, evidence is admissible to
prove a conspiracy to commit the crime charged, although the

560 Le 7

conspiracy is not charged in the indictment. This is permitted
not for the ‘purpose of allowing a conviction for a crime not
specifically charged, but merely to show the intent with which
the parties acted.” See also 16 Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, sections
37 and 38.

Hi Exhibit 4 wag in the record without objection and not
for any limited purpose. The court’s limitation of its consider-
ation by the jury was without prejudice to defendant.

Having found no reversible error, the judgment and sen-
tence of the trial court must be affirmed —Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Jzrry SANDMAN, appellant, v. Wiwiam V. Hagan and CHartEes
A, Srrmcet, d/b/a Beanz PLumaine anp Heatine Co. et al.
appellees; ANDREW Monraang, cross-appellant.

No. 52709.

(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 113)

Novemenr 14, 1967.

Refearme Denmp January 8, 1968.

Runge & Runge, of Sioux City, for appellant.

BE. L. Moran and Shull, Marshall, Marks & Vizintos, all of
Sioux City, for appellees William V..Hagan and Charles A.
Striegel, d/b/a Beane Plumbing and Heating Co.

Harry H. Smith, of Sioux City, for appellee and cross-
appellant Andrew Montagne.

Larson, J.—It appears from the record that on November
7, 1968, the plaintiff, Jerry Sandman, employed by the Sioux
City Sewer Department, was directed to inspect a job at 2213
Pierce Street in Sioux City, Iowa, and arrived on the job between
8 and 9am. His duty that particular morning was to inspect
the installation, the hookup, and the backfill of a connection to
the city water system being done by Beane Plumbing and Heat-
ing Co., hereinafter referred to as the employer. The defendant
Montagne and two other employees of Beane Plumbing and
Heating Co., Lloyd Brunssen and Martin Wilde, were doing the
actual work. A hole had been dug in the street approximately
three to four feet wide, five feet long and six feet deep. The
installation and hookup had been completed and the backfill
operation involving the refilling of the hole was awaiting the
arrival of Sandman. In this operation a small quantity of dirt
is first dumped into the excavation and then this dirt must be
firmly tamped beneath the water pipe and main. This process
is repeated until there is sufficient dirt under the pipe and main
so that there is no gap between the dirt and the main, If a gap
is present, in time this could cause the water main to come apart
and undermine and wash out the pavement. Inspector Sandman
was there to see that the dirt was properly compacted under the
main by the installing workmen. At the time of this incident
defendant Montagne was on the street helping scoop dirt into
the hole with a hand shovel. Lloyd Brunssen was in the hole

564 | a

spreading the dirt and tamping it under the pipes, and Martin
Wilde was on the street near the hole attending his front-end
loader tractor. An air compressor nearby that powered a
pneumatic tamper was running during this time, which made
it difficult to hear conversations in the area.

Sandman testified he was observing the backfill operation
from above when he noticed that dirt had not been properly
compacted under the main, and he brought this to the attention
of Brunssen. Not being satisfied with the results of his diree-
tions, he jumped down in the hole to show Brunssen that there
was a void under the main.

Brunssen testified: that Sandman had said nothing to him
about improper backfilling, but rather jumped into the hole with
him and began shoving dirt into a gap under the main. Both
testified that no altercation or abusive language occurred until
Sandman had demonstrated to Brunssen that there was indeed
a gap between the main and the ground. At this point Sandman
testified that Brunssen called him a s.o.b, and other derogatory
names, told him to get out of the hole, and said he had no
business down there. Brunssen admitted that he reprimanded
Sandman for using the employer’s tools and testified that Sand-
man said he could use them anytime he wanted to and that if
Brunssen did not like it he could take it up with the labor union
at the city hall.

Immediately following this name-calling, a fight took place
between Sandman and Brunssen. Sandman testified that to
the best of his recollection he struck Brunssen only once and that
the fight lasted about two minutes. Brunssen testified that he
did not strike Sandman, but doubled up to protect himself and
that Sandman struck him several times on the face and body,
and that the fight lasted about 15 to 30 seconds.

Montagne testified that he did not hear the conversation be-
tween Sandman and Brunssen prior to the fight because the noisy
air compressor was running at the time, that the first thing he
knew Sandman was pounding on Brunssen and he yelled at
Sandman to stop but that he did not stop, and that he (Mon-
tagne) became scared that Brunssen might be hurt. Montagne
then struck Sandman on the back of the head with a shovel,
Although Sandman testified he saw Montagne swing the shovel

a 565

at him, he did not hear Montagne say anything to him before
he got hit with the shovel.

Martin Wilde testified that he saw Sandman striking Brun-
ssen about the head and neck, that this lasted about 10 or 15
seconds, and that while Sandman was striking Brunssen he heard
Montagne yell at Sandman to stop. He also said Sandman then
looked up at Montagne and called him a s.o.b, and asked him
if he wanted some too. It was then that Montagne struck Sand-
man with the shovel. Both Montagne and Wilde testified that
Sandman was bleeding immediately after the blow. Wilde de-
scribed the blow that struck Sandman as not a sideswipe but
said the shovel came straight down a distance of two and a
half to three feet and struck Sandman, whose head was a few
inches below the pavement level. Montagne, however, said the
blow came from the side and that the shovel could have been
raised above his shoulder.

Brunssen testified that he was not aware until later that
Montagne had struck Sandman with the shovel and, when he
noticed that Sandman was bleeding, he thought it was because
Sandman had struck his head on the concrete around the hole,

After he was struck with the shovel, Sandman climbed out
of the hole and said he asked for help and that the employees
told him there was a phone booth on Twentieth and Pierce.
Brunssen testified that Sandman did not ask for help, but
walked off down the street without saying a word to anyone.

It further appears there was a dispute between Sandman
and Montagne over another backfill job two weeks before, in the
presence of the employer’s foreman. At that time Sandman said
Montagne picked up a shovel and gave it a toss and it careened
off the tires of a machine some distance away. The alarmed
foreman asked what was the matter, retrieved the shovel, and
proceeded to do the work of tamping himself.

At the close of plaintiff's evidence the trial court denied mo-
tions for a directed verdict by both defendants. The jury re-
turned a verdict for Sandman against all defendants. On motion
by the employer, the trial court granted judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict for it, concluding there was insufficient evidence
to sustain a finding that Montagne was acting within the scope

566 | |

of his employment. The trial court denied Montagne’s motion
for a new trial based upon his claim of insufficient evidence to
sustain a verdict in the sum allowed and prejudicial errors in
trial procedure, Plaintiff appeals from the granting of the
employer’s motion, and the employee cross-appeals.

The sole issue presented on appeal by appellant Sandman
is whether at the time in question employee Montagne was acting
within the scope of his apparent authority so as to make the
defendant employer liable and sustain the jury determination
on that issue.

The trial court concluded there was no evidence to sustain
a finding that Montagne’s authority extended beyond that of
putting in waterlines and refilling excavations, or that his duties
contemplated conflict with others, or that the assault was done
in the furtherance of the employer’s business or interests within
the scope of his employment. We must agree.

Hl 1. It is well established in Iowa that under the common
law the master and servant may each and both be liable for a
servant's torts committed within the course of employment.
Graham ve Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 866, 146 N.W.2d 626,
640; Montanick v. McMillin, 225 Iowa 442, 452-459, 280 N.W.
608 ; Hobbs v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 171 Iowa 624, 152 NW. 40,
L.R.A. 1917E 1023.

The difficulty encountered by various courts in cases of
willful torts conimitted by servants has resulted in irreconcilable
decisions, and, unless carefully scrutinized, the authorities seem
to be in hopeless confusion. See 34 A.L.R.2d 367 for list of
many cases. The difficulty is in defining and applying the con-
cept of acts within the course of employment or the scope of
the servant’s authority. These terms are: often used loosely
and not carefully analyzed. Even the text writers seem to have
trouble relating the servant’s duty and authority to scope of
employment and, due to various decisions, use the words, “im-
plied,” “apparent” and “actual authority” to expand or dimin-
ish the duty of the servant upon which liability rests when
courts seek evidence as to whether the tort was committed in
the furtherance of the employer’s business or interests.

It has been said an act is “within the scope of the servant’s
employment” where such act is necessary to accomplish the

a a 567

purpose of the employment and is intended for such purpose, al-
though in excess of the powers actually conferred on the servant
by the master. Wood v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 302
Ky. 110, 194 S.W.2d 81. As bearing thereon see Dougherty v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 187 Towa 257, 114 N.W. 902, 14
L.RB.A., N.S., 590, 126 Am. St. Rep. 282. Also, for other defini-
tions, see Words and. Phrases, Permanent Edition, and 34
A.LR.2d 367.

HMM It is safe to say that “within the scope of the em-
ployment” requires that the conduct complained of must be of
the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the
conduct authorized. Maddex v. Ricea, 258 F. Supp. 352; Plotkin
v. Northland Transp. Co., 204 Minn, 422, 283 N.W. 758. The
facts in the Kentucky Wood case and the Minnesota Plotkin
ease are not greatly different. Both result in no employer lia-
bility. In each case, after an altercation with another vehicle
on the highway, the bus company driver stopped his bus and
assaulted the operator of the other vehicle. Both courts recog-
nize the rule that to determine whether an agent’s act is within
the scope of employment so as to make the master liable therefor,
the question is whether the agent’s conduct is so unlike that
authorized that it is “substantially different.” Both state that,
to render a master liable for a servant’s battery, it is not suffi-
cient that the battery is due to anger arising from the perform-
ance of the servant’s duties. Consideration was also given there-
in to the claim that such driver action was employment-related
because the employer’s business was to keep the bus on schedule,
but this was not deemed sufficient.

Hl 11. Generally speaking, an employer is responsible to
third persons for his servants’ tortious: acts if committed while
the servant is engaged in furthering the employer's business or
interests within the scope of his employment, but absent non-
delegable duty, such as that imposed by the relationship of
earrier and passenger or hotel and guest, the servant’s battery
does not make the employer liable unless the employment is of
such nature'that it is likely to bring the servant into conflict
with others. Wood v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines and Plot-
kin v. Northland Transp. Co., both supra; Annotation, 34 A.L.R.
2d 367; Restatement of Agency, § 245, Comment a, page 548.

568 Le |

The case at bar obviously does not fall within the class of
carrier and passengers or hotels and guests. There is no dispute
as to the duties of the employee Montagne or his authority over
others. He testified his duties were to “put in waterlines, dig
and fill ditches.” He worked on the outside crew as a laborer
and was under the supervision of a foreman. He had done this
work for about seven years. There was no evidence that he
exercised any authority over others, and there was nothing
shown to indicate that the nature of this employment was likely
to bring him into conflict with others.

HMM The facts as to the assault are not in substantial dis-
pute. Montagne struck Sandman on the head with his shovel
and pleaded guilty to an assault charge. Although the assault
was made on the jobsite while the employee was employed at a
task for his employer, this is not enough to make a master liable
for a battery by his servant, nor is it sufficient to show the bat-
tery would not have occurred except for the employment. The
employment must be something more than the mere occasion for
the fracas. Plotkin v. Northland Transp. Co., supra; 2 Mechem,
Agency (Second Ed., 1914), Section 1978; 85 Am, Jur., Master
and Servant, Section 55.

As we have pointed out, a deviation from the em-
ployer’s business or interest to pursue the employee’s own bus-
iness or interest must be substantial in nature to relieve the
employer from liability. Hoblit v. Schnepf, 229 Iowa 1085, 296
N.W. 210; Orris v. Tolerton & Warfield Co., 201 Towa 1844, 207
N.W. 365 ; Wood v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, supra, Here,
the employer contends the assault was clearly a deviation sub-
stantial in nature, for under no theory advanced would the duty
of installing waterlines and digging ditches include the exercise
of force upon others. It is difficult to see how his employer’s
business or interest would ever be furthered by such an employee
attack, especially on an inspector. The trial court found nothing
was shown to sustain a finding that the act of defendant Mon-
tagne was anything his employment contemplated or was
something which, if he would do lawfully, he might do in his
employer’s name. We agree. Of course, a deviation need not
be of long duration in order to relieve the employer of liability
if the deviation is substantial in nature. Seybold v. Hisle, 154

a a 569

Towa 128, 184 N.W. 578, Ann, Cas. 1914A 1097; Morier v. St.
Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 351, 17 N.W. 952, 47 Am. Rep.
798; Maddex v. Ricca, supra, 258 F. Supp. 352 (1966), and
citations.

HMMM Although the question of whether an act is within the
scope of employment is ordinarily a jury question, depending on
the surrounding facts and circumstances, the question as to
whether the act which departs markedly from the employer's
business is still within the scope of employment may well be for
the court. State ex rel. Gosselin v. Trimble, 828 Mo. 760, 41
§.W.2d 801; Novick v. Gouldsberry, 9 Cir., 12 Alaska 267, 173
F.2d 496. This is such a case.

III. We are aware of the so-called modern trend to find
liability in this class of cases on the basis that such wrongs are
committed by the employee only because of the employment sit-
uation, and that since the employer has the benefit of the enter-
prise as between two innocent third parties, he is better able to
bear the risk of loss. If he cannot altogether avoid such wrongs,
he can at least minimize them. In those cases it is argued that
a general sense of fairness requires that the employer, as the
person interested and benefited by the business, rather than the
persons who have no concern in or control over it, should bear
the burden of such wrongs as incidental to such business. See
Penas v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N.W.
926, 80 L.R.A, N.S., 627, 140 Am. St. Rep. 470; Harper, Torts,
Section 291, page 640; 45 Harvard Law Review 342. If em-
ployer liability is to be extended this far, we believe it should
eome from the legislature, and do not find that this concept has
substantial support in judicial decisions.

IV. We are satisfied here that the employee Montagne’s
assault on Inspector Sandman was a substantial deviation from
his duties, that his act was substantially different in nature from
that authorized by the employer, and that at the time thereof
he was acting outside the scope of his employment. The trial
court was correct in granting the employer’s motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and must be affirmed on
appellant Sandman’s appeal.

V. On cross-appeal defendant Montagne contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and his

570 Le |

motion for a new trial. He relies on the following propositions
for reversal: (1) that he was privileged to use reasonable force
to come to the defense-of Brunssen as a matter of law; (2) that
counsel for the plaintiff ignored admonitions of the trial court
placing before the jury prejudicial evidence of a compromised
offer of settlement; (3) that the trial court permitted jury
consideration of medical expenses for which there was no evi-
dence of materiality or necessity. We find no merit in any of
these contentions.

HHI is well established in Towa that a person is privi-
leged'to come to the defense of another about to be injured.
Section 691.3 of the Code states: “Any other person, in, aid: or
defense of the person, about to be ‘injured, may make resistance
sufficient to prevent the same.” However, this section must be
read in connection with section 691.1, which states: “Lawful
resistance to the commission of a public offense may be made by.
the party, about to be injured, or -by others.” .The import of
these two, sections-is to give a third party the right to come to
the aid of another, but.in doing so he must use lawful resistance,
Lawful resistance, or self-defense, is tested. by whether the force
used to repel the attack was reasonable. Once the force, used
becomes unreasonable, the privilege ceases. _Moran v. Martin-
son, 164 Iowa 712, 146 N.W. 841; Ward v. Marks, 193 Iowa 171,
185 N.W. 87; Main: v. Ellsworth, 237 Iowa 970, 23 N.W.2d 429.

HH . In coming to the defense of another, a person may do
only what the person attacked may have done to protect himself.
People y. Forte, 269 Ill. 505, 110 N.B. 47, L.R.A. 1916B, 924;
Prosser, Law of Torts, Third Ed. page 114; 6 Am. Jur.2d,
Assault and Battery, section 152; _ Restatement of Torts 2d,
section 76,

Whether the force sed was reasonable: is generally a jury
question, and the jury’s conclusion will be sustained if there is
any substantial evidence to support it. Wessman v. Sundholm,
228 Iowa 344, 291 N.W. 187; Lawyer v. Stansell, 217 Iowa 111,
250 N.W. 887.

Hs In the case at bar we are faced with the question of
whether defendant Montagne was privileged to strike Sandman
with a shovel to protect Brunssen under the circumstances.
Cross-appellant argues that he did not use excessive force. He

a |) BT

contends that as he was a man of 63 years he was no match for
29-year-old Sandman in a fistfight, and further, that because he
was above the hole he could not intervene using only his hands,
and that hitting Sandman with the shovel was the only reason-
able alternative remaining. The jury did so find. Although the
relative age and strength of the parties is recognized under some
circumstances as a justification for using force that might not
ordinarily be used, under the facts disclosed here we cannot as
a matter of law so hold in this case.

There is no evidence in the record that Montagne was physi-
eally disabled in any way. On the contrary, it appears that for
a man of 63 years he was in excellent condition. He had been
working for quite some time for his employer, and his work
would be considered physically strenuous. It appears that he
was performing the same tasks as Brunssen, i.e., climbing in and
out: of ditches and holes, tamping and digging. It does .not
appear the shovel was the only reasonable method to stop the
fight. The jury so found, and there was no objection to the
court’s instruction on this issue.

In any event,.we conclude that the reasonableness of the
force used here was a jury question and the evidence is sufficient
to sustain its finding that the force used was unreasonable under
the circumstances.

HE OVI. Cross-appellant Montagne contends the court
should have granted a mistrial when plaintiff’s counsel asked the
following question: “And, Mr. Striegel, did you make an offer
to pay the expenses, hospital expenses of Mr. Sandman and
wages of Mr. Sandman while he was in the hospital?” He argues
his motion for a new trial should have been sustained because
eounsel for plaintiff ignored admonitions of the trial court and
prejudicially placed before the jury a compromise offer of
settlement. This, he says, prevented him from having a fair
trial.

The trial court recognized the rule that an offer of com-
promise is inadmissible, citing Lynch v. Egypt Coal Co., 190
Towa 1272, 181 N.W, 385, and Miller v. Iowa Electric Light &
Power Co., 239 Iowa 1257, 34 N.W.2d 627, but in its conclusions
said that, although the question was objectionable and prejudicial

572 Le |

to the employer’s defense, it did not require a new trial as to
defendant Montagne.

HE The trial court has considerable discretion in determin-
ing whether the alleged misconduct of counsel was so prejudicial
as to require a new trial, Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246
Towa 318, 829, 67 N.W.2d 533, and citation, In Hammer v.
Janowitz, 181 Iowa 20, 25, 26, 108 N.W. 109, a case in point,
this court said: “It was his right to offer the testimony, if he be-
lieved it admissible, and to preserve a record of his offer and
exception. Had he contumaciously persisted in trying to get
the matter before the jury, and thus override the ruling against
him, we might well feel justified in regarding it as prejudicial
misconduct. . State v. Roseum, 119 Iowa 330. But we see nothing
in the record to indicate that the offer was not made in good
faith, nor can we presume that appellant was or could have been
prejudiced thereby.” It further observed, “if the fact of offering
incompetent or immaterial testimony, which is excluded, is to be
held a cause for granting a new trial, few, if any, verdicts
could stand the test of such rule.” Reference was also made to
the case of Maland v...Tesdall, 282 Iowa 959, 5 N.W.2d 827,
which considered a like contention. However, there it clearly
appeared a prejudicial course of examination was pursued. In-
competent questions which assumed the existence of damaging
facts were frequently asked, in spite of repeated objections.
Nevertheless, this court concluded the conduct of counsel for
appellee was the result of zeal for his client’s cause and not any
intentional wrong. Also see Tilghman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Co., 258 Iowa 1839, 115 N.W.2d 165, which held the trial court’s
discretion on such matters will not-be disturbed unless it appears
a different result could have been reasonably possible but for
such counsel conduct.

HH sim the instant case, as the court said, there was no
indication the verdict was excessive in view of the injuries
shown, and we are satisfied the verdict reflected no prejudice
due to the question regarding an offer by Striegel to pay Sand-
man’s hospital expenses and wages resulting from the assault.

The record discloses that Mr. Striegel, one of the owners of
the Beane Plumbing and Heating Co., was asked a question
regarding a visit at the hospital where the matter “regarding

| Le 573

wages and hospital expenses for Mr. Sandman” was discussed.
An objection to that question as being “leading and suggestive”
was sustained. After being asked if he attended a meeting
where a Mr. Samore, Mr. Soper of the city, and Mr. Bodine, were
present, the witness said he talked with Mr. Soper quite often
about the Sandman incident. Thereafter, the objected-to ques-
tion, as to whether he had offered to pay expenses, was asked and
the court sustained the objection as incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial. At that time defendant-employer’s counsel, outside
the presence of the jury, moved the court for a mistrial, contend-
ing plaintiff’s counsel deliberately tried to present evidence of an
offer of compromise to the jury. The defendant-employee’s
counsel joined in this motion and, after oral arguments, the trial
court overruled the motion. It found there was no repetition of
the objectionable question, held the answer was inadmissible,
and admonished counsel not to ask any further questions regard-
ing the matter. Thereafter an offer outside the jury’s presence
was made by plaintiff as to the answer. This was refused, and
no further reference was made thereto.

We find no fault with these rulings by the court and con-
elude this record does not disclose prejudicial conduct on the
part of plaintiff’s counsel as to require a new trial or prevent
defendant Montagne from receiving a fair trial.

HN sOVIL. In his final assignment cross-appellant contends
the court erred in giving Instruction No. 15 in that it included
as damages expenses other than Doctor Blume’s bill of $365,
Doctor Erickson’s bill of $260, the first St. Joseph Merey Hospital
bill of $217.20, and the Mayo Clinic bill of $329. He points out
that proper and timely objection was made to the court in this
regard, and asserts the only stipulation as to the medical bills
was as follows: “That if competent witnesses were called to
testify in this case that they would testify that the following
doctor bills, hospital bills, ambulance bills and drug bills in-
eurred by the plaintiff herein, Mr. Jerry Sandman, from Novem-
ber 7, 1963, were reasonable charges for the services rendered in
this community: [bills listed].” He further asserts there was no
stipulation as to the materiality and necessity of these expenses,
and contends the plaintiff failed to show the necessary causal

574 Le a

connection between the injury and the damages and expenses
incurred as a result thereof.

It is true the evidence must sufficiently establish the causal
connection: between the injury and the medical expenses claimed
as a result of the injury. Specifically, he seems to argue that
plaintiff's alleged serious and disabling headaches, for which he
received subsequent medical and hospital treatment, were not
sufficiently connected to the injury to establish defendant liabil-
ity beyond the items above conceded: He relies upon the testi-
mony of Doctor Brannick, of the Mayo Clinic, and Doctor
Thomas, who he says testified that any three causal factors could
have produced Sandman’s problems. In an attempt to get
Doctor Brannick to attribute plaintiff’s headaches and related
ailments to the fight in the ditch, being called bad names, as well
as to the blow on his head with the shovel, the doctor said: “My
opinion is that getting hit on the head was the thing that did it
to him, but I can’t state with certainty this is the case.” He
admitted the other causes were possible. Doctor Thomas testified
headaches such as plaintiff complains of could have been caused
by a blow on the head, and it is not possible to say how much
was due to.the trauma and how much was emotional. He did
say -there-was a probability of damage to the olfactory nerve
and that the headaches resulted from the blow on his head.
Sandman contends the additional hospital and medical expenses
were incurred in an effort to get relief from these alleged
ailments. . 7

We have carefully reviewed the testimony of these doctors
and are satisfied the trial court correctly submitted this question
to the jury. The probability of the relationship was adequately
established. It is the generally accepted rule that where it is
certain damage has resulted, uncertainty as to the extent or to
the amount will not preclude recovery. There must be some
evidence from-which a jury may make its determination, but this
need not be so definite as to be capable of exact computation,
Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, supra, 246 Iowa 318, 327, 67
N.W.2d 533. We believe the testimony of the doctors was suf-
ficient to sustain a jury finding that the medical care furnished
was necessary. and proper and a: result of the assault by de-
fendant Montagne.

a a B15

Having found no basis for reversal, the judgment of the
trial court must be affirmed —Affirmed.

SneLy, Moors, Sruarr and LeGranp, JJ., concur.
Broxer, J., Garriexp, OC, J., and Mason, J., dissent.
Rawiines, J., takes no part.

Brcxer, J.—I dissent as to plaintiff’s appeal from judgment
in favor of defendant employer.

Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Heinold (1932, C.A. 8d Pa.) 60
F.2d 360, involves a situation where an employee hit the em-
ployee of a subcontractor with a lead pipe when the plaintiff
did not move his equipment as ordered. “It is undisputed that
in the early cases a master was held not liable for the tortious
act of his servant, when the act was wanton and malicious. In
later cases, the master is held liable for the wrongful act of the
servant, notwithstanding its wanton and malicious character, if
the act was done in the course and within the scope of his em-
ployment, and the determination of the question whether the
tort was committed while the servant was acting in the course
and within the scope of his employment is for the jury.”

The foregoing statement is a short summation of the law as
it has developed in the past thirty years. Standing alone the
case would not necessarily persuade. But a careful reading of
the very authorities cited by the majority, ic. Restatement,
Second, Ageney, section 245, Comment a (as amended by the
Appendix, Restatement, Second, Agency, section 245) and an-
notation 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 396, indicates the rule stated in
Thompson-Starrett Co. v, Heinold, supra, is the majority view.
It should be followed by this court. See also annotation 20
ALRB2d 868, 911, 912.

The change in Restatement, Second, Agency, section 245, as
indicated in the Appendix written twenty-three years later
should be especially noted because the change is substantial and
weakens the authority upon which the majority relies. At page
389 the author of the Appendix states: “It is believed that it is
now desirable to state a rule invoking a somewhat greater liabil-
ity because of the cases in the intervening years. The courts of
some states are more conservative in subjecting the master to

576 Le Ve

liability than those of other states, but the tendency of the courts
is to broaden the area within which the principal is found
liable.” The author then carefully reviews the history of the
development of the doctrine and cites numerous cases supporting
his conclusion.

There are so many cases reaching divergent results that this
matter should be determined by the broad general principles as
they have developed in this field. In Carr v. William C. Crowell
Co. (1946), 28 Cal.2d 652, 655, 656, 171 P.2d 5, 7, 8, Traynor,
J., analyzes the problem in a closely analogous case and sets
forth several principles that should govern our consideration
here:

“The employer’s responsibility for the tortious conduct of
his employee ‘extends far beyond his actual or possible control
over the conduct of the servant. It rests on the broader ground
that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others,
remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not in-
jured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others’
while acting in the scope of their employment. (Cases cited)
In the present case, defendant’s enterprise required an associa-
tion of employees with third parties, attended by the risk that
someone might be injured. ‘The risks of such associations and
conditions were risks of the employment.’ Cardozo, J., in
Leonbruno v, Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 472, 128 N.E.
711, 18 A.L.R. 522. Such associations ‘include the faults and
derelictions of human beings as well as their virtues and
obediences. Men do not discard their personal qualities when
they go to work. Into the job they carry their intelligence,
skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take
along also their tendencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as
well as emotional makeup. In bringing men together, work
brings these qualities together, causes frictions between them,
ereates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making
and emotional flareup. Work could not go on if men became
automatons repressed in every natural expression * * *, These
expressions of human nature are incidents inseparable from
working together. They involve risks of injury and these risks
are inherent in the working environment.’ (Cases cited.) * * *

“If an employee inflicts an injury out of personal malice,

a es smT

not engendered by the employment, the employer is not liable.”

It is recognized that plaintiff relies heavily on the foregoing
case. It appears to be worthy of his trust—and ours.

The Cardozo citation is borrowed from a case involving
workmen’s compensation but is applicable to this problem. In
fact it underlines the need for growth in the law in concomitant
fields.

These principles are in harmony with what has been said in
such Iowa cases as St. Peter v. Iowa Telephone Co., 151 Iowa
294, 181 N.W. 2; Nesbit v. Chicago, R.I, & P. Ry. Co., 163 Iowa
39, 148 N.W. 1114; Fage v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 175
Towa 459, 157 N.W, 148.

Such views are also in harmony with what is said in Prosser,
Law of Torts, Third Ed., section 69, page 476: “It may be said,
in general, that the master is held liable for any intentional tort
committed by the servant where its purpose, however misguided,
is wholly or in part to further the master’s business.”

Here the employees’ duties regularly brought them in con-
tact with the inspector. The inspector and Montagne had had
previous altereations. This fight developed over the method of
performing the employer’s business of laying the pipe. Montagne
entered the fray on the side of the fellow employee, if not on his
behalf. It is for the jury to decide whether this employee was
acting within the scope of his employment or on a venture of his
own, I would affirm as to defendant Montagne but would
reverse and reinstate the verdict as to employer-defendants.

Garrieip, O.J., and Mason, J., join in this dissent.

Luiv Baysinerr, appellant, v. Benne Haney, appellee.

No. 52781.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 496)

January 9, 1968,

7 Le 579

Richard L, Pinegar, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Whitfield, Musgrave, Selvy & Kelly by Roy W. Meadows, of
Des Moines, for appellee.

GarrmeLp, C.J—Lulu Baysinger brought this law action
against Bennie Haney to recover for personal injuries sustained
when she was struck by defendant’s automobile while walking
across University Avenue in Des Moines on the west side of Hast
29th Street. Trial resulted in judgment on jury verdict for
defendant. Plaintiff’s appeal is based 6n claimed misconduct of
defendant’s counsel in asking a Des Moines police officer im-
proper questions as a witness.

I. Plaintiff testified she was in the crosswalk when she was
struck, However, she admitted she entered University Avenue
three to five feet west of the crosswalk. A witness’ for her said
he. went to the scene right after the collision and saw plaintiff
on the street within the crosswalk,

After plaintiff rested her case she made a motion in liming,
ealling attention to testimony. of Police Officer Fogle on a prior
trial of the case that he could not establish the point of impact
without relying on statements of plaintiff and defendant in con-
nection with preparation of an accident report, and requesting
that defense counsel be directed not to ask the officer about the
point of impact. The court sustained the motion and granted
the request. _

_ Then immediately before defendant placed Officer Fogle on
the witness stand plaintiff requested the court to order defense
counsel not to ask the witness about the point of impact without
first taking the matter up with the court outside the jury’s
presence. This request was also granted. .

During direct examination of Officer Fogle defense counsel
stated he was ready to ask the foundation questions the court
wanted to hear in the jury’s absence. Thereupon, outside the
jury’s presence, counsel stated in effect he proposed to ask the
witness whether, based on his experience and training as a police
officer in accident investigation, and assuming plaintiff had
testified she fell immediately to the ground by turning and. fall-
ing. to the north and defendant had testified he was stopped or

580 Le 7

practically so at the time of impact, the witness had an opinion
as to the point of impact.

Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the proposed question as
ealling for an incompetent opinion and conclusion, a misstate-
ment of the record, not the subject of expert testimony, the jury
can draw its own conclusion without the aid of an expert. The
objection, filling nearly a page in the record, did not assert nor
did the court rule that asking the question in the jury’s presence
would violate the prior ruling on the motion in limine.

The court ruled that in view of the testimony of plaintiff
and defendant as to the point of impact “we don’t need an
expert.” Defense counsel said he had no further questions and
plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to cross-examine the officer, calling
his attention to his accident report “you used before to refresh
your memory with”, asking him to “look at it as to the kind of
locality” and tell whether it refreshed his memory.

The witness answered “I knew I marked this on here this
way”, evidently referring to the accident report shown him,
adding that there were both houses and businesses along there
and he did not know how the location was zoned, The witness
was then shown a transcript of part of his testimony at the
former trial to the effect “this is a residential district” and ad-
mitted he so testified before.

During defendant’s redirect examination the witness was
asked: “I think Mr. Pinegar has referred to your report where
you checked ‘residential district.’ I notice you have a check ‘out
of crosswalk’.” Plaintiff's counsel objected as highly improper
and leading, moved it be stricken, that counsel be admonished
and the jury admonished not to consider the statement. The
court ruled “Yes, it may go out and the jury will pay no at-
tention to the statement.”

Asked whether there were any checks under “Driver Viola-
tions” on the report, the witness answered “No sir.” Plaintiff's
counsel moved that this be stricken, defense counsel admonished
it was improper and the jury instructed not to consider it,

The court ruled “It may go out and the jury will be admon-
ished to pay no attention to it. Ask the questions directly Mr.
Meadows.”

Defense counsel then asked “Do you have any checks?”

a a 581

Plaintiff’s counsel said he had “no objection to opposing counsel
asking the witness questions but what he has checked is irrele-
vant and immaterial. If he wants to testify as to what the facts
are that’s one thing, but what he has checked is improper and
incompetent.” The court again stated defense counsel could ask
the witness direct questions. Counsel stated he had no further
questions and the witness was excused.

Thereupon plaintiff moved for a mistrial on the ground of
improper and prejudicial conduct of defense counsel in examin-
ing the police officer. The motion was overruled.

During plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence defendant was called
as plaintiff's witness and asked “This isn’t the first time you’ve
been in an accident where you failed to yield the right-of-way is
it?” Defendant’s objection to the question as improper was
sustained,

There was no direct testimony for defendant that plaintiff
was out of the crosswalk at the time of impact. Defendant
asserts this appears from skid marks and physical facts. And, as
stated, plaintiff admitted she entered the street outside the cross-
walk.

As before indicated, the jury returned a verdict for defend-
ant. In answer to special interrogatories it found plaintiff was
not in the crosswalk when the accident occurred and such failure
constituted a proximate cause of her injury.

Plaintiff’s motion for new trial, based on the same alleged
improper and prejudicial conduct of defense counsel in exam-
ining Officer Fogle, was overruled.

Hl Il. Certain fundamental rules apply to such an ap-
peal as this based on claimed misconduct of counsel for the
prevailing party. We have held many times the trial court
has considerable discretion in determining whether alleged
misconduct, if there was such, was prejudicial. Certainly he
is better able to appraise the situation than we are. We will
not interfere with the court’s determination of such a question
unless it is reasonably clear discretion has been abused. Cast-
ner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 652, 127 N.W.2d 583, 591, 128
N.W.2d 885, and citations; Mead v. Scott, 256 Iowa 1285,
1290, 180 N.W.2d 641, 644, and citations.

582 a 7

Hl ‘Further, instructing the jury to disregard the asking
of a question claimed to be misconduct ordinarily leaves no
ground for complaint except in extreme instances where it is
manifest the prejudicial effect remained and influenced the
verdict despite the instruction. See Castner v. Wright, supra,
and citations.

“Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Lowa 114, 180, 21 N.W.2d 311, 319,
cites many precedents for the proposition that unless it appears
probable a different result would have been reached but for
claimed misconduct of counsel for the prevailing party we are
not warranted in interfering with such a ruling. To like ef-
fect is Corkery v. Greenberg, 253-Iowa 846, 853, 854, 114
N.W.2d 827, 331, and citations. ‘ Christianson v. Kramer, 257
Towa, 974, 980, 185 N.W.2d 644, 647-648.

Connelly v. Nolte, supra, considers claims of misconduct of
counsel perhaps more fully and cites more authority on the point
than any other Iowa decision. It has been cited with approval
many times.

The rules above summarized have frequently been applied
in appeals from convictions in criminal cases. State v. Mercer,
261 Iowa 371, 375, 154 N.W.2d 140, 142, and citations. This
is from the cited opinion:

“After citing and analyzing several of our precedents,
State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1368, 66 N.W.2d 480, 482, con-
tinues: ‘It is the sound reasoning of these and other Iowa cases
that the trial court has before it the whole scene, the action
and incidents of the trial as they occur, and is in a much better
position to judge whether the defendant has been prejudiced
by misconduct of opposing counsel, if there is such. * * *
The trial court occupies a position of vantage and is rightly
given a considerable discretion in determining whether prej:
udice has resulted.’ ”

This quotation seems to have more than ordinary applica-
tion to an appeal such as this submitted upon only a skeleton
record of the trial.

The Mercer case also quotes what State v. Long, 250 Iowa
326, 332, 93 N.W.2d 744, 747, says in distinguishing State v.
Tolson, 248 Iowa 733, 82 N.W.2d 105, cited by plaintiff here,
and two other decisions.

De 583

- Aside from State v. Tolson, plaintiff cites one other recent
precedent in support of her claim based on misconduct of
counsel—Brooks v. Gilbert, 250 Iowa 1164, 98 N.W.2d 309.
It presents a much stronger claim of misconduct than we have
here, together with erroneous rulings of the trial court. (See
Long y. Gilchrist, 251 Towa 1294, 1298, 105 N.W.2d 82, 84.)
In Brooks improper questions designed for the same ultimate
purpose were asked 13 times notwithstanding proper objections
to them were sustained.

HH The fact the present case has been twice tried to dif-
ferent juries without a verdict for plaintiff has some bearing
on what our decision should be. Where each of two trials has
resulted in a verdict for the same party, the error which will
justify reversal and a third trial must be such as to demon-
strate a failure of justice will occur if we do not again inter-
fere, McKlveen v. Townley, 2383 Iowa 328, 331, 7 N.W.2d 186,
187, and citations. We think this principle has at least some
application although the first trial resulted in “a hung jury.”

HI A judgment should not be reversed and litigation pro-
Jonged unless error appears which we may reasonably sup-
pose affected the result to the prejudice of the losing party.
McKlveen-v. Townley, supra, and citations.

| | On the question whether the alleged misconduct of
defendant’s counsel prevented plaintiff from receiving a fair
trial, the court may have considered the conduct of plaintiff’s
eounsel in calling defendant in rebuttal as plaintiff’s witness
to ask him about one or more other claimed accidents which
had no bearing upon the present case. This seems to have
been a clear attempt to prejudice defendant with the jury.
Connelly v. Nolte, supra, 237 Iowa 114, 181-132, 21 N.W.2d
811, 319-820, and Johnson v. Kinney, 282 Iowa 1016, 1025-
1027, 7 N.W.2d 188, 1938-194, 144 A.L.R. 997, 1005-1006 con-
sider related questions.

Under all circumstances we are not persuaded it was a
clear abuse of the considerable discretion the trial court has
in such matters to overrule plaintiff’s motions for a mistrial
and a new (third) trial.

Il. No definite pronouncement is necessary as to the

584 |

propriety of the court’s rulings other than those denying a
mistrial and a new trial.

‘We may say, however, that all written accident reports of
an officer are without prejudice to the individual so reporting
and are for the confidential use of the motor vehicle depart-
ment. “A written report filed with the department shall not
be admissible in or used in evidence in any civil case arising
out of the facts on which the report is based.” Section 321.271,
Code, 1966.

Hl “This statutory exclusion does not extend to what is
observed nor to statements ‘not intended as a report or as
information given for such a report.’ Pinckney v. Watkinson,
supra [254 Iowa 144, 155, 116 N.W.2d 258, 264], and Goodman
v. Gonse, 247 Iowa 1091, 1104, 76 N.W.2d 873 [880].” Curry
vy. Jones, 258 Iowa 129, 183, 188 N.W.2d 101, 104,

The Curry opinion goes on to hold “There was no error
in admitting the patrolman’s testimony. There is nothing to
indicate from whom he obtained the information, The statute
[821.271] protects the informant who is required to make a
report but does not extend to other sources of information.”
See also Note 53 Iowa Law Review 427-428.

Curry v. Jones further holds: “The patrolman testified
that his investigation revealed no evidence of excessive speed
on the part of anyone. A statement that he found nothing is
a statement of fact. He also testified as to what he could see.
His answers were statements of fact and there was no error
incident to his testimony.” (Page 134 of 258 Iowa, page 105
of 188 N.W.2d)

Defendant thus had a right to ask Officer Fogle as to his
observations at the scene of the accident. We have also ap-
proved asking an officer experienced in motor-vehicle accident
investigation his opinion as to the point of impact based on
skid marks and other facts observed by him. See Dougherty
v. Boyken, 261 Iowa 602, 155 N.W.2d 488, and authorities
cited; 53 Iowa Law Review 431-432.

The record reveals no evidence at the trial from which
this appeal was taken that Officer Fogle could not locate the
point of impact without resort to statements made to him in
the preparation of his report. Although not shown by evi-

— ees 585

dence introduced at the trial, he seems to have testified at the
former trial, apparently on cross-examination, he could not
establish the point of impact without relying on such state-
ments. Of course he was not compelled to so testify on the
second trial and should not do so if he concluded he was mis-
taken on this point before. We mention this not to demon-
strate the court’s ruling on plaintiff’s motion in limine was
wrong but to indicate the ground of the motion was not en-
tirely clear and as bearing on the question of defense counsel’s
good faith in questioning the officer.

Further, the request made by plaintiff's counsel immed-
iately before defendant placed Officer Fogle on the witness stand
was more limited than the motion in limine. The request was
merely that defense counsel not ask the witness about the
point of impact without first taking the matter up with the
court. This request, which was granted, was complied with
and may have afforded reasonable basis for an honest belief
it superseded the prior ruling on the motion in limine.

The officer’s written report was first used in the second
trial when he was cross-examined by plaintiff’s counsel re-
garding certain check marks on the report although it was not
then introduced in evidence.

The pertinent part of Code section 622.19 is “when part of
[a] * * * writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole
on the same subject may be inquired into by the other. * * *.”
We have held the interrogation by one party of the officer
concerning the accident report prepared by him is a waiver by
such party of section 321.271, supra, to the extent permitted
by 622.19 just quoted. Martin v. Cafer, 258 Iowa 176, 184,
138 N.W.2d 71, 76.

The use by plaintiff’s counsel of the accident report in
eross-examining Officer Fogle, subsequent to the ruling on the
motion in limine and to counsel’s request when Fogle was
called as a witness, may have afforded some basis for a good
faith belief by defense counsel that the door had been opened
and he was entitled to ask the questions he did on redirect
examination of the officer. 7

Upon the above considerations and perhaps others, it is
reasonable to assume the trial court felt defendant’s counsel

586 De

did not act in bad. faith in asking the few questions now com-
plained of. In any event the court concluded plaintiff was not
entitled to ah order for mistrial or a new trial and, as stated,
we are not persuaded these rulings present a clear abuse of
discretion —Affirmed.

All. Justices concur except Rawiines and Becxsr, JJ.,
who dissent.

Rawuies, J.—I respectfully dissent.

I, By timely motion plaintiff’s counsel sought to limit
eertain evidence which might be presented by defendant. A
court order was accordingly entered.

.. Basically a motion to limit evidence is a recognized method
by which to suppress, in advance of trial, any reference to
possible evidence,.the mere mention of which would for some
reason bé prejudicial to the moving party. See address by Ross
H. Sidney, Motion “In Limine”, Workshop Outlines, Ninety-
Second Annual Meeting of the Iowa State Bar Association,
June 23, 24, 25, 1965, arid 5 Washburn Law Journal 232.-

The self-evident motivating purpose of plaintiff’s counsel
in seeking the limiting order was to prevent defense counsel
from questioning the police officer, who had arrived at the
scene of the accident after its occurrence, concerning point of
impact of car with pedestrian... Basis of the motion was the
fact the officer had previously admitted he could not answer
such a question without relying on in-process-of-investigation
statements given by plaintiff and defendant. See section
321.271, Code, 1962,.and Pinckney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa
144, 154, 116 N.W.2d 258, and citations.

Discussion by the majority as to what transpired during
direct, cross and redirect examinations, up to the point at
which the allegedly prejudicial question was asked by de-
fense counsel, while essential to an understanding of the case,
should not be allowed to control or materially influence its
disposition.

Rather it would appear attention should focus on the
following portion of the record. During redirect examination,
defense counsel asked the officer, “I think Mr. Pinegar has
made reference to your report where you checked, ‘residential

, Pe 587

district’. I notice you have a check ‘out of crosswalk’.” Plain-
tiff’s counsel promptly objected as highly improper and lead-
ing, moved it be stricken, counsel be admonished and the jury
cautioned to give no consideration to the statement. The trial
court then said, “Yes, it may go out and the jury will pay
no attention to the statement.”

This comment by defense counsel was in direct violation
of the court order limiting evidence to be offered during trial.
As the author of one article explains, the motion to limit evi-
dence should stand, “* * * unless and until permission of the
court is first obtained outside the presence and hearing of the
jury”, to disregard it. 5 Washburn Law Journal 282.

In my humble opinion an order in limine means what it
says, or it means nothing at all.

In this case defense counsel did not ask a question, but
rather made a statement. In any event he had not then ob-
tained and in fact never did secure permission of the trial
court to make that statement or ask any such question.

I submit defense counsel’s violation of the order limiting
evidence, in and of itself, constituted a compelling cause @ tor
a mistrial in this case.

Il. Regardless of the foregoing it is submitted that at the
moment defense counsel made reference to a check-out of cross-
walk, all possible damage had been done. Plaintiff’s case was
then prejudiced beyond any power of the trial court to remedy
it by a simple jury caution. In this regard 39 AmJur., New
Trial, section 65, page 81, states the general rule as follows:
«# # # in many instances of misconduct in propounding ques-
tions concerning matters which counsel has no right to inquire
into, the opposing counsel, if he makes objection, is necessarily
placed in the false light of suppressing significant evidence
and attempting to deceive the jury into rendering an unjust
verdict. The good or bad faith of counsel, and the extent of
his bad faith where it exists, are elements to be taken into con-
sideration, but are not necessarily controlling; good faith is
not a shield to a litigant whose counsel seriously errs in the
matter under consideration.” ~

See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kelley, 74 F.2d 80, 86,
and annotations, 109 A.L.R. 1089, 1093-1094,

588 ee a

" Although there was no competent direct evidence intro-
duced to the effect plaintiff was out of the crosswalk at time
of impact the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, found
plaintiff was not in the crosswalk when the accident occurred,
which was a proximate cause of her injury. The jury’s con-
clusion in this regard must have rested, either entirely or in
substantial degree, on defense counsel’s statement as to what
the officer’s report showed concerning plaintiff’s location with
respect to the crosswalk at time of the accident. To me this
discloses prejudice of the most obvious kind, upon which a new
trial should have been granted.

In addition I do not believe the fact that this case has
twice been tried to different juries without a verdict for plain-
tiff should here be controlling.

The first trial resulted in a hung jury.

On the second trial defendant obtained a verdict sub-
stantially on the basis of introduction of prejudicial testimony
Known to have been proscribed by order of court.

“I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

Becxer, J., joins in this dissent.

Nanoy Arice Buasco, appellee, v. Rupotre T. Buasco, appellant.

No. 52761.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 542)

589

January 9, 1968.

Stewart, Miller, Wimer, Brennan & Joyce, of Des Moines,
for appellant.

Bump, Jordan & Holmes, of Des Moines, for appellee.

Sruarr, J—Mrs. Blasco, being dissatisfied with her lot in
married life, brought this action for divorce. It was granted
by the trial court. The result reached there was probably a
practical one. However, as our opinions become precedents,
we are not as free as the trial court to resolve the individual
marital disputes. The rules of law applicable to this type of
ease have been set out fully in Beno v. Beno, 260 Iowa 442, 445,
149 N.W.2d 778, 780, and Sigler v. Sigler, 260 Iowa 748, 749,
150 N.W.2d 287, 288. It would serve no useful purpose to
repeat them here.

The parties to this action were married in 1954 when plain-
tiff was 19 and defendant was 23. They have three children,
a boy 11 and twin girls, 8. The husband has changed jobs
many times during the marriage for various reasons, including
his wife’s request. There was one period of unemployment of
several months duration. They had problems meeting their
basic financial needs. Plaintiff's health was poor, particularly
after the birth of the twins, and these medical expenses coupled
with those incurred for medication to control her epileptic
condition added to the financial problems. They did not have
a car after 1959 until defendant’s present job made transpor-
tation necessary. His family frequently came to their aid,
Plaintiff did not work after the marriage except for a few
weeks after they separated.

In June 1959 plaintiff went to California with the chil-
dren and stayed with relatives until November of the same
year. She returned to reestablish the home. Her half brother

590 Le 7

eame to Iowa from California about the same time and except
for the first few months has lived with these parties. He paid
rent and worked around the home and furnished transporta-
tion for plaintiff and her children. In spite of the financial
help the situation was not designed to promote marital har-
mony. When plaintiff moved from the home the parties were
purchasing, her half brother moved too and has continued to
live with her and the children. She does not want him to leave
because of the help he is giving her.

We have searched the record for evidence of cruel and in-
human treatment as we. have interpreted it and fail to find
enough to justify a decree of divorce. There are no charges
of abusive, threatening, insulting, nagging or demeaning lan-
guage or conduct on the part of defendant toward plaintiff.
She does not cite a single instance of the slightest physical
abuse. Plaintiff does not include drunkenness, philandering
or self-indulgence among defendant’s faults.

_ Plaintiff’s own analysis of their marital problems points
to financial insecurity and lack of communication as the main
sources of irritation. These coupled with claimed inconsistent
disciplining of the children, failing to furnish transportation
and turning to his family for advice rather than plaintiff are
the sum total of her complaints. While not conducive to a
happy home, these difficulties have not yet been held grounds
for divorce. It is not suggested the sources of conflict were
instigated maliciously by defendant to harass plaintiff.

Only one instance in the record takes on the color of cruel
and inhuman treatment. During the last trial separation when
plaintiff, her children and her half brother were living in the
family home and defendant was living with his parents, it
became necessary for plaintiff to go into a hospital for a few
days. Considering the children his responsibility during this
period, defendant stayed in the house at night. He visited
plaintiff in the hospital every evening and told her what he
was domg. This was disturbing to her and when she came
home from the hospital at 1 p.m. on a Saturday, she called him
at work. She was very “mad” and told him, screaming and
erying, to come get his clothes or she would throw them out
in the yard.

PC a 591

He finished his day’s work and, being disturbed himself,
consulted the county attorney’s office rather than going
after his clothes. A member of the staff prepared an informa-
tion charging her with mental illness for his signature. She
was picked up at 11 that night and taken to Broadlawn’s
Hospital where she remained until she was examined and re-
leased Monday morning. Defendant appears to have taken
this action in good faith upon the advice of counsel for what
he thought to be her best interest. Such action, though mis-
guided, would not under these circumstances constitute
grounds for divorce as cruel and inhuman treatment.

There is probably no chance the family relationship will
be reestablished, but we cannot approve a divorce granted
upon the wife’s complaints here—Reversed.

- ‘All Justices concur except Rawiines and Becker, JJ.,
who dissent.

Cyntara J. Brown, appellee,-v. Freperick E. Brown, Jr.,
appellant,

No. 52558,
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 426)

592 Le)

January 9, 1968,

Eckhardt, Goedken & Burns, of Muscatine, for appellant.

Cynthia J. Brown, pro se.

LeGranp, J—On February 3, 1966, a decree was entered
granting plaintiff a divorce and awarding her custody of two
minor children, Shelle Faith, 44% and Douglas Dean, 24%. The
decree provided defendant should have visitation rights with
his two children each weekend from 9 am. on Saturday to 7
pon. on Sunday and for two weeks each year during his vaca-
tion. He was ordered to pay $25 each week for the support
of these children. . .

Six months later plaintiff filed an application for modi-
fication of the decree, asking that she be given permission to
take the children to the State of Oregon, where she intended
to reside permanently. This application was resisted by de-
fendant. After a hearing at which both parties introduced

| Le 593

evidence, the trial court authorized the permanent removal of
the children from this state to Oregon. Visitation rights were
also modified by providing the children should return to Iowa
each summer to stay with defendant for a period to be deter-
mined by him, but not in any event to exceed three months.
The trial court abated support payments during these summer
visitation periods.

HM Defendant has appealed from this order, claiming
plaintiff showed no change of circumstances since the original
decree to justify the modification. It is, of course, well settled
that a divorce decree is final as to circumstances then existing.
It can be modified only if the moving party has carried the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a
substantial subsequent change in circumstances. When child
eustody is affected by the modification, the change relied upon
must concern the welfare of the children. Jensen v. Jensen,
237 Towa 1823, 1824, 25 N.W.2d 316, 317; York v. York, 246
Towa 132, 185, 136, 67 N.W.2d 28, 33; Smith v. Smith, 257 Iowa
584, 589, 183 N.W.2d 677, 680.

The record shows plaintiff was employed in a manufac-
turing plant in Muscatine, Iowa, and was earning approxi-
mately $200 a month. She was also receiving $25 a week as
child support payments from defendant. His payments were
eurrent at the time of hearing on the application to modify.
Plaintiff admitted defendant was a devoted father and availed
himself regularly of the visitation rights granted under the
decree of divorce. Plaintiff complained there was no oppor-
tunity for advancement in her employment. She professed a
great distaste for life in Muscatine, and this emerges as the
real reason for the move to Oregon, where she had spent some
of her early life. She stated she would live there with her
mother and would operate her mother’s antique shop. She
produced no evidence as to the size of the business, its income,
nor its financial possibilities for her except to say she would
be able to do better things for her children. Plaintiff’s step-
mother testified the new home in Oregon would help plaintiff’s
morale. She expressed no opinion concerning its effect on the
children. .

Defendant testified to his affection for his children. Ac-

594 Le a

cording to him both he and they looked forward to, and en-
joyed, the weekly visitations. Certainly he was faithful to
the terms of the decree as to support. In fact he provided more
financial help than required of him. He testified he would
“be lost” without his children. He objected to the modification
principally because it eliminated his opportunity for regular
contact and association with them, which he described as far
more desirable than a once-a-year relationship.

Hl 1+ will be noted plaintiff’s evidence makes no reference
to the welfare of the children, except the one unsupported
statement of plaintiff that she would be able to do better things
for them. The testimony related entirely to the effect which
the move would have upon plaintiff. To justify a modification
here, the change of circumstances must relate to the welfare -
of the children and plaintiff.has shown none. York v. York,
supra. Blundi v. Blundi, 243 Iowa 1219, 1226,.55 N.W.2d 239,
241; Bennett v. Bennett, 200 Iowa 415, 417, 203 N.W. 26.

Plaintift’s story as to what awaited her and her children
in Oregon was at best uncertain and indefinite. She knew
nothing about her mother’s business; she did not know what
income she would receive from it; she was unable to state any-
thing about the living conditions which would confront her
there except to say her mother had “a nice house.” -Plaintiff’s:
evidence established simply that it was her desire to move to
Oregon; the welfare of the children was almost entitely ig-
nored. In many respects this case bears close resemblance to
Jensen v. Jensen, supra. There we said’ at page-1327 of 237.
Towa, page 318 of 25 N.W.2d:

“The desired modification of the divorce decree would
mean a change from known conditions that have proven con-
ducive to the child’s welfare to surroundings of which we know
little and that may well prove not for her best interests. It
would be in the nature of an experiment which should not be
made.” In that case, also, at pages 1329, 1830, we approved a
statement from 27 C.J.S. 1179, section 313, “It is against the
policy of the law to permit removal of the child from the juris-
diction unless its welfare would be better subserved thereby,
and ordinarily custody should not be awarded to a nonresi-

mz Pe 595

dent or to one contemplating immediate removal from the
state.”

HM The original decree in this case contained no prohibi-
tion against removing the children from the state, and perhaps
plaintiff needed no permission to do so. Smith v. Smith, 257
Towa 584, 590, 183 N.W.2d 677, 680. We are fully aware that
a reversal of the trial court’s order will be-of small comfort to
defendant. He is presented with serious obstacles to the en-
forcement of the original decree. The record shows plaintiff
and the children have already been out of the state for more
than a year. Incidentally it also shows, although this is not
important to our consideration of the case, plaintiff has now
remarried and resides with the children in California. For all
practical purposes his right to visit regularly with his children ,
has been taken from him. As the trial court remarked, this is
One of the unfortunate by-products of divorce.

However, this does not mean we should approve the modi-
fication if no justification for it appears. This appeal is de
novo. We give considerable weight to the findings of the
trial-court but are not bound by them. We find nothing in the
record permitting the order to.stand.. Therefore’ we must
reverse. :
rp Hn We have said several times a divorce decree will
not -be modified unless its-enforcement will be attended by
positive wrong or injustice as a result of changed conditions.
Welch v. Welch, 256 Iowa 1020, 1024, 129 N.W.2d 642, 644;
Smith v. Smith, 257 Iowa 584, 589, 183 N.W.2d 677, 680, and
citations. There is no such change of circumstances here. °

The ruling of the trial court modifying the decree is
reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of an order dis-
missing plaintiff's application for modification.—Reversed and
remanded.

All Justices coneur.

596

a

Castana Community ScHoon Disrricr or Monona County et
al. appellants, v. Starz Boarp or Pusiic Instruction
(members) et al., appellees.

No. 52567.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 522)

597

January 9, 1968,

Patrick J. Morrow, of Onawa, for appellants.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Prichard &
Prichard, of Onawa, for appellees.

Moorz, J—{§ This is an appeal from a final judgment
following the trial court’s sustaining a motion to dismiss plain-
tiffs’ petition alleging illegal acts by defendants in rejecting a
proposal for a new school district in Monona and Harrison
Counties. The well-pleaded facts in the petition must therefore
be considered as established for the purpose of this appeal.

On March 28, 1966, the Castana Community School District
of Monona County, a non-high school district, and the West
Monona Community School District of Monona and Harrison
Counties, a high school district, filed a concurrent action agree-
ment under Code section 274.37 with the county boards of
education involved. The agreement provided for the adjusting
of the boundary lines of Castana District leaving more than
eight sections on the north end and providing for the balance
to become a part of the West Monona District.

The Castana School District residents had been in various
reorganization proceedings since 1961 including an appeal to
this court in 1965. See Davies v. Monona County Board of
Education, 257 Iowa 985, 185 N.W.2d 663. In February 1966
the Joint County Boards of Education of Monona and Harrison
Counties disapproved a proposed agreement for concurrent
action between these same two school districts which would
have adjusted the boundary line of the Castana District leaving
more than four sections on the south and provided the remain-
der become a part of West Monona.

The two districts were advised the Joint County Boards of
Education would meet April 2, 1966, to consider the March 23
agreement.

50

On March 31, 1966, a petition was offered for filing in the
office of the Monona County Superintendent of Schools propos-
ing the formation of a new district to be known as the West
Monona Community School District. Formation of a new
school district by petition is authorized under Code chapter
275. The petition referred to exactly the same territory as
described in the March 23 concurrent agreement.

The Monona County Superintendent refused to accept this
petition on the ground the concurrent action agreement was
still pending.

On April 1, 1966, the Castana Board filed with the County
Board its rescission of the March 23 concurrent agreement and
on the same day refiled the petition proposing the formation of
a community school district. "The West Monona Board did not
join in the rescission.

The concurrent action agreement was disapproved at a
meeting of the joint boards on April 7, 1966. No appeal was
taken from that action.

On May 2, 1966, pursuant to proper notice, the joint
county boards conducted a hearing on the petition for re-
organization. Plaintiffs’ attorney presented argument in favor
of the proposed plan. Many objectors appeared in opposition
thereto. May 12 a notice the joint boards had dismissed the
petition was published. The reasons for the dismissal were
not stated. An appeal was then taken by plaintifis to the
State Department of Public Instruction.

After hearing, the appeal was dismissed by the state de-
partment. A copy of the ruling was made a part of plaintiffs’
petition filed thereafter in the district court.

Plaintiffs’ petition in the district court prayed the order
of the joint boards dismissing the petition for the proposed
West Monona School District be set aside and the matter be
remanded to the joint boards with instructions for reasonable
consideration of all facts pertinent thereto; the order of the
state department be set aside with instructions its jurisdiction
ineluded authority to’ modify the action of the joint boards
although the petition had been dismissed; the order of the
state department be vacated and the Monona County Super-
intendent be ordered to call a special election in the proposed

Ps

school district and that plaintiffs be granted just and equitable
relief.

Hl I. Plaintiffs included the State Board of Public In-
struction, the individual members thereof and the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction as defendants in the district
court action. These defendants then filed a motion to be
dropped from the case under rule 27, Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court properly sustained the motion and said de-
fendants are not parties to this case on appeal. Board of
Directors v. Board of Education, 251 Iowa 589, 593, 102 N.W.2d
159, 161; Board of Education v. Bremen Township Rural Ind.
Sch. Dist., 260 Iowa 400, 408, 148 N.W.2d 419, 421.

Il. Defendants, the Joint Boards of Education of Monona
and Harrison Counties, the individual members thereof and the
Monona County Superintendent of Schools filed a- motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ petition. Defendants asserted the facts
alleged in the plaintiffs’ petition did not entitle plaintiffs to the
relief demanded and stated several grounds in support thereof.
Defendants specifically raised the question of jurisdiction of
the joint boards.to consider the petition for organization of the
proposed new school district.

Thereafter plaintiffs amended their petition alleging the
Monona Superintendent had acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in refusing to file the petition when offered for filing on March
31 and the joint boards also so acted in the manner in which
the hearing on the petition was conducted. Plaintiffs alleged
the joint boards listened to objectors who were not properly
identified and the hearing over a period of only two hours was
too brief on which to base a proper decision.

December 9, 1966, the trial court signed and filed this
order: “The Motion to Dismiss petition filed on August 30,
1966, and heretofore submitted and taken under advisement
comes on at this time for ruling. After an examination of the
pleadings motion and briefs and arguments submitted by
counsel of the parties, and after hearing the oral arguments of
counsel for plaintiffs and counsel of the defendants, the court
is of the opinion the motion to dismiss filed on August 30, 1966,
in this action should be and is hereby sustained in its entirety
and the petition is dismissed at the plaintiffs’ cost.”

600 ee

Plaintiffs did not plead further and have appealed. The
parties and this court must assume the trial court based his
ruling on one or more of the grounds for dismissal asserted by
defendants.

Plaintiffs-appellants charge the trial court erred in holding
(1) the Joint Board was without jurisdiction to consider the
petition for the proposed new school district, (2) the State
Department of Publie Instruction was not authorized by Code
section 275.16 to vacate or modify the Joint Board’s decision
dismissing the reorganization petition and (3) plaintiffs’ al-
legations of facts did not support the pleaded conelusion the
Monona County Superintendent or the Joint Board had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously.

Section 275.1, Code 1962, as amended by chapter 240,
sections 1 and 2, Acts of the Sixty-first General Assembly, pro-
vides that any area in the state not a part of a high school
district by April 1, 1966, or not included in a reorganization
petition filed in accordance with section 275.12 on or before
April 1, 1966, shall be attached by the county board of educa-
tion to a district or districts maintaining 12 grades, effective
July 1, 1966. It further provides such attachment must have
the approval of the State Board of Publie Instruction and
grants a right of appeal to a court of record.

Code sections 275.9 to 275.24 inclusive provide a method of
school district reorganization by petition of residents of the
area, study and approval or disapproval by the local board of
education and if approved then a vote of the people. It may be
referred to as the long form for school district reorganization.
Section 274.37 provides an alternative and simpler method of
boundary changes. These statutes are thoroughly reviewed
and analyzed in Davies v. Monona County Board of Education,
257 Iowa 985, 992, 993, 185 N.W.2d 663, 666, 667.

As pertinent here, section 274.37 provides: “The boundary
lines of contiguous school corporations may be changed by the
concurrent action of the respective boards of directors at their
regular meetings in July, or at special meetings called for that
purpose. Such concurrent action shall be subject to the ap-
proval of the county board or boards of education involved but
such concurrent action shall stand approved if the county

(fl

board or boards of education do not disapprove such concur-
rent action within thirty days following receipt of notice
thereof.* * #,””

Apparently plaintiffs concluded the March 23 concurrent
action agreement would not be approved and were confronted
with the problem of filing a petition for reorganization on or
before April 1 or have the Castana District attached to one or
more other districts under the provisions of section 275.1. Their
attempt to change procedure established the question of juris-
diction as raised in the first assigned proposition of error.

HME The rule is well established that the same land can-
not be within the same jurisdiction of two pending reorganiza-
tion proceedings at the same time. Subsequent-acting school
authorities can acquire no jurisdiction of an area included in a
prior-pending reorganization, Independent District of Sheldon
v. Board of Supervisors, 51 Iowa 658, 660, 2 N.W. 590, 591;
Bohrofen v. Dallas Center Ind. Sch. Dist., 242 Iowa 1070, 1074,
49 N.W.2d 514. 516; State ex rel. Harberts v. Klemme Com-
munity Sch. Dist. 247 Iowa 48, 51, 72 N.W.2d 512, 514;
Davies v. Monona County Board of Education, 257 Iowa 985,
989, 990, 185 N.W.2d 663, 665.

In Davies v. Monona County Board of Education, supra,
we recognize these legal principles but hold that when the first
proceeding is abandoned and is no longer pending then a new
proceeding may be commenced. The Davies case involves the
same two school districts as in the case at bar but a different
area. In Davies a petition for merger of certain areas of the
two districts was filed and later approved by both districts.
Monona County Board of Education, however, disapproved
the proposal and its ruling was affirmed on Castana’s appeal to
the State Department of Public Instruction.

| | Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Davies case and argue the
March 23 concurrent agreement had been abandoned and was
not pending when the petition for reorganization was filed on
April 1, 1966. We believe the two cases are readily distinguish-
able on the facts.

In the case at bar only Castana had attempted to rescind
the concurrent agreement. The joint board had taken no
action on the proposal. Under section 274.37 in the absence of

602

a disapproval within 30 days the agreement could have been
considered as approved. The appeal procedure to the State
Department of Public Instruction, of course, had not been ex-
hausted. Under'these facts we are not persuaded the con-
eurrent agreement had been abandoned and that nothing
further was pending in relation thereto on April 1. There was
no jurisdiction for filing the petition on that date. The ruling
of the trial court must be affirmed on that ground. .

Under the pleaded facts the provisions of section 275.1 as
amended controlled the method by which Castana, the non-
high school district, was to be attached to one or more high
school districts after April 1, 1966,

Our holding. adversely to plaintiffs’ contention under the
first assigned proposition for reversal is determinative of- this
case and makes consideration of the other two assigned Proposi-
tions unnecessary. — Affirmed. ot

All Justices concur.
Le
Roger Doverzrty, appellant, vy. EpwArp BovKen, administrator
of estate of Gerhard Bruns, deceased, appellee.

No. 52442,
(Reported in 155-N.W.2d 488)

) g

604

January 9, 1968,

Hansen, Wheatcraft & McClintock, of Des Moines, and
Westfall, Laird & Burington, of Mason City, for appellant.

Linnan, Lynch & Straub, of Algona, and Alan Loth, of Fort
Dodge, for appellee.

LeGranp, J.—This is the aftermath of an automobile acci-
dent which occurred on Highway 18 in Hancock County, near
Garner, Iowa, on July 7, 1964. Plaintiff sustained serious
personal injuries and instituted this action for damages against
Edward Boyken, administrator of the estate of Gerhard Bruns,
owner and driver of the other vehicle, who was fatally hurt in
the collision. The administrator in turn counterclaimed for the
wrongful death of his decedent. For convenience the decedent,
Gerhard Bruns, will be referred to herein as defendant,

A jury denied recovery on both claims, finding against
plaintiff on his petition and against defendant on the counter-
claim. Only plaintiff appeals to us.

a a 605

The facts upon which this appeal depends may be stated
very briefly. Plaintiff and defendant were driving in opposite
directions on Highway 18, plaintiff proceeding west and de-
fendant east. As they were about to pass each other, they col-
lided almost head on. Both cars were extensively damaged at
the left front and along the left side. The pleadings level
several allegations of negligence against each driver, but it is
undisputed that the vital question is the charge of failure to
yield one half the traveled way, as required by section 321.298,
Code, 1962. Hach party accuses the other of having violated
this statutory provision.

No one saw the accident, nor were those directly involved
of any help in establishing the circumstances immediately pre-
eeding it. Defendant made only fragmentary statements before
he died. His brother, Henry, who was a passenger in the car,
was killed instantly. Plaintiff’s recollection was so hazy and
undependable that his testimony is of no value.

Both sides necessarily relied heavily on the physical facts,
including damage to the vehicles; where they finally came to
rest and their relative positions; debris on the highway;
gouges and marks on the pavement; and stains from radiator
fluids. Each sought to fix the point of impact by the use of
expert testimony and to thereby establish responsibility for
the accident.

The pivotal issue before us is the propriety of the trial
court’s rulings on the admission and exclusion of certain
opinion evidence as to the course of the vehicles, both before
and after their collision, and the point at which, and manner
in which, they collided. Except for claimed misconduct on the
part of the jury, all of the assignments of error deal with this
matter in one way or another.

HI An expert has been defined as one who is qualified by
study, training, or experience in a particular subject or field of
endeavor which gives him special knowledge and permits him
to form a definite opinion of his own on matters persons lack-
ing such knowledge or training cannot correctly decide. 31 Am.
Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, section 26, page 523;
82 C.J.S., Evidence, section 457, page 98.

606 De a

Hi The use of expert testimony is not new, but the con-
ditions under which it may be used are the subject of endless
litigation. This whole subject is exhaustively discussed in
Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d
646. As pointed out there, all expert opinion testimony is
admitted as a matter of necessity; it must first appear that a
jury needs assistance on issues ‘it’ is unable to intelligently and
correctly determine alone. Once this is shown, expert opinions
may be admitted to help the jury reach a true determination.

In the present controversy each party (exclusive of medical
testimony with which we are not concerned) called one witness
upon whom he relied as an expert to sustain his theory of the
ease. Plaintiff used Sergeant Elmer Angle, a member of the
Towa Highway Patrol for some 14 years; defendant produced
Dr. Ronald Nelson, professor in physics and engineering at
Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.

Since this appeal revolves almost entirely around the
testimony of these two men, we outline in detail their back-
ground and qualifications before discussing the problem now
confronting’ us. . : .

Sergeant Angle during his 14 years of service had in-
vestigated approximately 750 accidents of which three fourths
had involved collisions between two vehicles. He had training
in accident investigation at Northwestern University and
Cornell Research Institute. He also received training from the
Highway Patrol before being assigned to a territory and he
had taken refresher courses each year since joining the patrol.
These courses included study to determine point of impact in
two-vehicle accidents.

Sergeant Angle arrived at the scene of this accident before
the cars or victims had been moved. He testified to his obser-
vations, including position of the vehicles, debris on the high-
way, marks on the surface of the road, distances separating
the vehicles, damage to the cars, and then stated he had an
opinion as to the point of impact. He was not permitted to
give that opinion. The question was posed in several ways
aimed at disclosing “what side of the center line” the impact
occurred and “whether the impact occurred on the north or

— ae or

south side of the highway.” Each time the opinion was ex-
eluded by rulings sustaining objections thereto.

An offer of proof was made and the officer’s answer, if
allowed, would have placed the point of impact on the north
side of the highway, the side on which plaintiff was traveling as
he proceeded west toward defendant’s eastbound vehicle.

Defendant’s expert, Dr. Ronald Nelson, is head of the
Physics Department, at Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South
Dakota. He is also head of a testing and investigation labora-
tory at the college. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree
from Augustana College and his Master’s and Doctor’s degrees
from the University of Colorado. Subsequently he did further
study at the University of Iowa, Princeton University, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Colorado and
Michigan College of Engineering. He now works largely in the
field of physics and engineering as well as in the investigation of
accidents of all types. He also teaches subjects dealing with
these matters. Doctor Nelson has had considerable experience
in the field of accident reconstruction, which he says is now a
generally recognized and accepted area of scientific study and
work. After testifying to these qualifications, Doctor Nelson
was permitted to express his opinion to various matters which
we discuss in detail later.

. The exclusion of Sergeant Angle’s opinion testimony and
the admission of Doctor Nelson’s are assigned as error,

HL. The admission or exclusion of expert opinion testi-
mony rests largely in the judgment of the trial court. Its ruling
will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.
McCormick on Evidence, page 28; 31 Am. Jur.2d, Expert and
Opinion Evidence, section 8, page 497; 82 O.J.S., Evidence,
section 449, page 85; Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co.,
supra; Marean v. Peterson, 259 Iowa 557, 563-564, 144 N.W.2d
906, 910; Long v. Gilchrist, 251 Iowa 1294, 1297, 105 N.W.2d 82,
84; Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 577, 88 N.W.2d 120, 125.

However, despite Professor Wigmore’s argument that the
trial court’s ruling should not be subject to review, such dis-
eretion is not unlimited. 2 Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed.,
section 561, page 641; Hardwick v, Bublitz, 254 Iowa 1258, 1259,
119 N.W.2d 886, 890; Jacobsen v. Gamber, 249 Iowa 99, 102, 86

608 a 7

N.W.2d 147, 149; Luse v. Sioux City, 253 Iowa 350, 112 N.W.2d
814; Jones v. O’Bryon, 254 Iowa 31, 116 N.W.2d 461; Carbone
v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680,

The discretion exercised by the trial court must be a
legal one based on sound judicial reasons. “Abuse of discretion”
means simply no discretion to do what was done. Jacobsen v.
Gamber, supra; State v. Koeppel, 250 Iowa 1052, 1054, 97
N.W.2d 926, 927; Hardwick v. Bublitz, supra; 32 C.J.S., Evi-
dence, section 449, pages 85-87; 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error,
section 774, pages 216-217.

For reasons hereinafter set out we conclude there was an
abuse of discretion here in the trial court’s ruling, both in re-
jecting the opinion testimony of Sergeant Angle and in ad-
mitting that of Doctor Nelson.

II. We discuss first the exclusion of Sergeant Angle’s
opinion that the impact occurred on plaintiff’s side of the road.
Defendant objected to this testimony on grounds that there was
no proper qualification of foundation shown for the witness to
give such opinion; that the matter inquired into was not a
proper subject of expert testimony on the record made because
the jury was able to pass upon the matter themselves; and that
the opinion of the officer “in his official regalia proclaimed as his
official opinion, backed by his position with the State, is not
sufficiently important to outweigh the likelihood that the jury
would exaggerate or blindly follow it” and be misled, rather
than led, by it.

Defendant’s objection was sustained generally. We
disagree with this ruling. Under our holdings, it is indisputable
both the qualifications and the foundation were sufficient to
permit Sergeant Angle to give his opinion as to the point of
impact, Hamdorf v. Corrie, 251 Iowa 896, 903, 101 N.W.2d
836, 840; Nielsen v. Wessels, 247 Iowa 213, 229, 73 N.W.2d 83,
92; Lueas v. Duccini, 258 Iowa 77, 82, 187 N.W.2d 634, 637;
Mickelson v. Forney, 259 Iowa 91, 98, 148 N.W.2d 390, 395. In
all of these cases the qualifications of the police officer were sub-
stantially the same as those of Sergeant Angle, the foundation
upon which the opinion was based was not materially different
from the foundation in this case, and in each instance we held
the opinion of the investigating officer to be admissible. In each

— | 609

of these cases, it is true, we merely affirmed an exercise of
discretion by the trial court in admitting expert opinion testi-
mony. We did not decide that its exclusion would have been an
abuse of discretion.

HMM However, we have consistently held an investigating
officer may give his opinion as to the point of impact. 53 Iowa
Law Review, page 481. This is true even though the officer’s
qualifications are slight for, as we said in Marean v. Peterson,
supra, qualification goes to the weight of the opinion rather than
to its admissibility. We recognize too, of course, that under some
circumstances different trial courts may reach different results
as to admissibility of evidence based upon questionable founda-
tion or qualifications. Nevertheless where, as here, the cireum-
stances are not fairly debatable and are overwhelmingly in
favor of admission, a ruling to the contrary is not a “legal dis-
eretion” nor one based on “sound judicial reasons.” Jacobsen v.
Gamber, 249 Towa 99, 102, 86 N.W.2d 147, 149, and citations.

[| Defendant also urges Sergeant Angle’s opinion testi-
mony was unnecessary because the jury was just as able to draw
conclusions from the physical facts as was the officer. Again we
disagree. There was no direct testimony concerning the circum-
stances of this accident. The jury was almost entirely depen-
dent upon the physical facts. Certainly a trained investigator,
skilled and experienced in gathering and interpreting data, is
better able to draw proper conclusions from such information
than is a group of untrained jurors. This is particularly true
here because both plaintiff and defendant argued vigorously from
the same physical facts to reach directly opposite conclusions.

The ease of Hen v. Consolidated Freightways, U.S. Dist.Ct.,
N.D., S.E. Div., 120 F. Supp. 289, 293, is particularly in point.
There, under facts quite similar to these, the court held the
opinion of the investigating officer was admissible, particularly
since “counsel are ably urging completely opposite inferences
from the same physical facts found to exist immediately follow-
ing the accident.”

In answer to the argument that a jury was well able to
conclude the side of the road upon which the impact occurred,
the court there said, “It would seem, therefore, that this is not
a case where the conclusion as to where the ¢ollision occurred is

610 Pe)

so obvious that any reasonable person, trained or not,.could
easily draw the inference. Rather, it would seem to be a case
where trained experts.in the field would be of considerable
assistance to the jurors in arriving at their conclusions.” This
language is equally appropriate here, and it summarizes our own
conclusions concerning the necessity for expert testimony in
this instance.

HI As his final reason for excluding Sergeant Angle’s
testimony, defendant urged that any insignificant help the officer
could give the jury would be outweighed by the likelihood they
would blindly follow his opinion because of the prestige of his
office as a representative of the State. Defendant vigorously
argues it would have been improper and prejudicial to -permit
Sergeant Angle, bedecked in his official regalia, to give his
opinion based upon an investigation carried on by him as a
member of the highway patrol. According to the defendant, the
danger that the jury. would blindly follow this opinion and
accord to it greater veracity than it deserved is disproportionate
to any incidental benefit the jury might gain-from such opinion.
Defendant supports-this argument by citing cases from a number
of other jurisdictions, Wade v. Wolf, Okla., 312 P.2d 498, 495;
Beckman v. Schroeder, 224 Minn. 370, 28 N.W.2d 629; Jackson
v. Brown, Okla., 361 P.2d 270, 272; Chester v. Shockley, Mo.,
804 S.W.2d 831; Bogard GMC Company v. Henley, 92 Ariz. 107,
374 P.2d 660; Maben vy. Lee, Okla., 260 P.2d.1064.

All of these cases, however, : deal only with the question of
prejudice resulting from the improper admission of opinions. by
police officers. They do not hold, as defendant claims, the opin-
ion should be. excluded because the witness holds an official
police position. They hold simply that such an opinion, when
improperly admitted on other grounds, resulted in prejudice
because: of the danger the jury was unduly impressed by the
.official who gave it. In each of those cases the court held the
evidence was erroneously admitted on: other grounds, either
because the witness was permitted to determine directly the
question of liability; or the foundation upon which -his opinion
was based was insufficient; or the matter: testified to was not a
proper. subject for expert testimony. The “official regalia”
argument, was used only in deciding-if prejudice: resulted -from

Fe PC 611

such error. Since we hold the opinion was admissible, we need
not consider the soundness of this theory now.

HE We have reviewed the record carefully and can find no
ground upon which the trial court could have properly excluded
the opinion testimony of Sergeant Angle. For the reasons above
set out we hold that such exclusion was an abuse of discretion.

HOLL. We now consider plaintif’s assignments of error
dealing with Doctor Nelson’s opinion testimony and the ad-
mission of Exhibit AB, a chart prepared by him. We have
already indicated we feel Doctor Nelson was well qualified to
testify as an expert, but we must hold the foundation for his
opinions was inadeqtiate and was founded partially on hearsay.
Doctor Nelson’s educational background and experience easily
qualify him as an expert within our definition of the term, He
represents that relatively new type of witness rapidly becoming
important in the trial of accident cases, They have been
variously described as “super-experts”, “scientific experts”, and,
somewhat disdainfully, “accidentologists.” We have never had
occasion to pass upon the use of such an expert. Other juris-
dictions are by no means unanimous in approving them. Some
have frowned upon such testimony; others have accepted it
reluctantly. See Carmody v: Aho, 251 Minn, 19, 86 N.W.2d
692; Hagan Storm Fence Co. v. Edwards, 245 Miss. 487, 148
S0.2d 693; Kleinsasser v. Gross, 80 S. D. 631, 129 N.W.2d 717.
In still other eases such witnesses have been readily accepted.
Rhynard v. Filori, 8 Cir. 815 F.2d 176; City of Phoenix v.
Schroeder, 1 Ariz. App. 510, 405 P.2d 301; Caves v. Barnes,
178 Neb. 108, 182 N.W.2d 310. For a discussion of this subject
see 47 Marquette Law Review 491; 10 S. Dak. Law Review 161
and 48 Iowa Law Review 1055. . .

"We see no reason why such a person, eminently qualified by
study, education and experience; should not be added to the
galaxy of those who, along with mechanics, garagemen, engineers,
insurance adjusters, and law enforcement officers, may express
opinions in matters of this kind.

HH (Nevertheless we find it was error to admit Doctor
Nelson’s opinion evidence under the cireumstances existing here.

Doctor Nelson’s first contact with this matter was eleven
months after it had occurred.- His preparatory work consisted

612 Le i

of visiting the scene of the accident on June 17, 1965; taking one
picture of an intersection located some distance from the site of
the accident; examining various photographs taken by others
showing the location of the cars, the damage to them, and
certain marks on the highway; preparing certain diagrams of
his own from this information; and conferring with Sergeant
Angle concerning his investigation of the accident. This was his
total investigatory effort prior to testifying.

Based on this sketchy factual information, he was per-
mitted to express his opinion as to the courses of the two
vehicles immediately before impact; the identity of tracks and
marks on the pavement; the angle at which the cars collided;
their line of travel after impact; the manner of their travel; and
how certain debris on plaintiff’s side of the road got there.

Several times during his testimony, Doctor Nelson stated he
was basing his opinion partially on a conversation he had with
Sergeant Angle on June 17, 1965. He stated the officer fur-
nished him with measurements he had made at the scene of the
accident and “told me what the results of his investigation
were.” In connection with the introduction of Exhibit AB, he
again stated he relied on measurements from Sergeant Angle,
which he said were the same as the officer had testified to.
Doctor Nelson was not present when the patrolman testified,
although he says the testimony was made available to him.

To illustrate that this foundation for Doctor Nelson’s opin-
ions was unreliable and inadequate, we call attention to Sergeant
Angle’s testimony regarding the location of the vehicles after
they came to rest. In attempting to relate the patrolman’s
testimony, Doctor Nelson actually reversed the distances at
which the officer had put them from the debris. Yet this is the
testimony upon which Doctor Nelson says he relied in forming
his opinion and in preparing Exhibit AB.

We quote from Sergeant Angle’s testimony:

. “It was 30 feet from the area of the debris on the north
half of the pavement to the Dougherty car. (Chevrolet) From
the area of this debris to the Bruns vehicle (Ford) the dis-
tance was 39 feet and 4 inches.”

Later Doctor Nelson testified as follows:

“Q. Doctor, Patrolman Angle testified that the Chevrolet

— a 613

car was located five and one-half feet north of the south edge
of the pavement. Is that where it is shown on your diagram
‘AB? A. That is correct.

“Q. He also testified that the Ford car was located right
at the edge of the pavement. Have you so shown it on your
diagram? A. That is correct.

“Q. Patrolman Angle also testified that the Chevrolet
ear was thirty-nine feet four inches from the point which he
ealls debris. Is that where you have shown it? A. There is
debris at a point thirty-nine feet from the Chevrolet.

“Q. You have shown that on it? A. I have.

“Q. The Ford is thirty feet from that point. Is that the
way you have shown it? A. That is correct. Which makes
the two ears sixty-nine feet apart, which is the way my dia-
gram shows it.”

We concede this matter may be of no consequence. But
it nevertheless allows an opinion relating to a vital matter to
be based on a completely erroneous premise. Furthermore,
we should not speculate on the importance of these measure-
ments, particularly in view of Doctor Nelson’s avowed ability
to draw precise conclusions from seemingly insignificant details.

We also find that Doctor Nelson’s opinions were based
partially on hearsay information obtained from Sergeant
Angle. It is error to allow such testimony. Stanley Co. of
America v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 108 A.2d 616,
621, 45 A.L.R.2d 1106; Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines Inc.,
1 Utah 2d 299, 265 P.2d 1007, 1010; Day v. Lorenzo Smith &
Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408 P.2d 186, 189; Brooks v. Gilbert,
250 Iowa 1164, 1169, 98 N.W.2d 309, 312; Switzer v. Baker,
178 Iowa 1063, 1078, 160 N.W. 872, 376; 31 Am. Jur.2d, Expert
and Opinion Evidence, section 42, page 546.

Appellee argues vigorously Sergeant Angle told Doctor
Nelson nothing more than the measurements taken at the
scene. These, he says, were not in dispute and therefore
Doctor Nelson was entitled to use them. We have no way of
knowing this is what Doctor Nelson meant when he said Ser-
geant Angle told him “the results of his investigation.” We
consider it unlikely that these two men, both professionally
interested in accident investigation, limited their discussion

614 Le 7

to distances and measurements. It is much more probable that
each had a theory about the accident and an opinion as to its
cause, and that these matters, too, were included in their dis-
cussion. Perhaps defendant is correct in. his version of this
conference, but we should not be required to resort to surmise
as to what information was given and relied on; nor, more
importantly, should the jury. 31. Am. Jur.2d, Expert: and
Opinion Evidence, section 37, page 540; section 39, page 543;
section 42, page 546. .

Before it can evaluate an- expert’s opinion, the jury
must know what it is founded on. This may be done:by having
the witness state what facts he relies on and their source or
by having facts assumed to be true by way of hypothetical
question. Neither was done here... Rather the witness stated
he had obtained from Sergeant Angle in an out-of-court dis-
cussion the results of an investigation carried on by the officer.
He did not say what those results were. Under such circum-
stances Doctor Nelson’s opinions were no, more than conjecture,
speculation and surmise. Under somewhat similar cireum-
stances involving a police officer’s testimony as to the point
of impact, which was based upon hearsay information, we said
in Brooks y. Gilbert, 250 Iowa 1164, 1169, 98 N:W.2d 309, 312,
“This fundamental fact should not be permitted to rest on
opinions, conclusions and hearsay evidence.” Here, too, we
are, unwilling to let such vital testimony rest upon such tenu-
ous foundation. . . .

This situation is not at all similar to Kastner v. Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority, 68 Cal.2d 52, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 403 P.2d 385, where an expert was permitted to
base his opinion on a hearsay conversation with a witness be-
cause that witness had testified to those identical facts during
the trial. The foundation for the opinion therefore was not
the hearsay but the evidentiary statements. Our difficulty
here is we have.no way of determining what Sergeant Angle
told Doctor Nelson. Doctor Nelson’s statement that the officer
gave him the results of his investigation without detailing
what those, results were falls far short of establishing that Ser-
geant Angle’s disclosures and his testimony were the same.

We hold the foundation evidence, both for Doctor Nelson’s

, Po 615

opinions and for the admission of Exhibit AB, was fatally de-
fective as a matter of law. It failed to set forth sufficiently
the facts upon which it was based so that the jury could prop-
erly evaluate it. It was based partially on information ob-
tained from Sergeant Angle, which was clearly hearsay. The
admission of this evidence was error.

HE IV. We must now consider whether the error dis-
eussed in Divisions II and III was so prejudicial as to require
a new trial. We find it was. Doctor Nelson’s testimony was
vital to defendant. Its importance was emphasized by the
exclusion of Sergeant Angle’s: opinion ‘as to the point of im:
pact, which was equally important to plaintiff’s case. We do
not say, of course, if the opinion evidence of one expert is
received, that of his counterpart must also be admitted. The ad-
missibility of evidence must be decided independently as to
each witness. However we are now considering only the ques-
tion of prejudice, not admissibility.

A reading of the record leads inevitably to the conclusion
that Doctor Nelson’s testimony could well have been decisive
with the jury. Without Sergeant Angle’s conflicting opinion,
it stood virtually unchallenged.. Under such circumstances the
erroneous rulings with respect to these two witnesses were
highly prejudicial to plaintiff.

We reverse and remand for a new trial. Under the cir:
cumstances here we direct that such new trial be of all issues,
including defendant’s counterclaim. We, therefore, find it
unnecessary to review plaintiff’s remaining two assignments
of error relating to the trial court’s instruction on expert wit-
nesses and claiming misconduct on the part of the jury—Re-
versed and remanded.

All Jusricrs concur exoent Raw.ines, J., who coneurs in
the result.

616 Ce

AxreLt Forp, individually, and as representing all persons
composing class of members of IADA Workmen’s
Compensation Group, appellees, v. DonaLp
‘Wayne Baxcus, appellant.

No. 52507.
(Reported in 155 N.W.24 507)

, Po 617

January 9, 1968,

Davis, Huebner, Johnson & Burt, of Des Moines, for ap-
pellant.

Korf, Diehl, Clayton & Cleverley, of Newton, for appellees.

Moors, J.—This is an action commenced in equity by an
employer and his workmen’s compensation insurance carrier
against a former employee to set aside a memorandum of agree-
ment as to workmen’s compensation and for restitution of
funds paid thereunder on the ground they were fraudulently
procured. Defendant’s special appearance asserting the trial
court was without jurisdiction and the controversy belonged
exclusively before the industrial commissioner was overruled.
Following trial, judgment was entered for plaintiffs. De-
fendant has appealed. We affirm.

Defendant relies on three propositions for reversal, (1)
the trial court erred in overruling his special appearance, (2)
having set aside the memorandum of agreement the trial court
should have remanded further proceedings to the industrial
commissioner for his determination and (8) the evidence was
insufficient to establish certain essential elements of the charge
of fraud.

I. Our review of this equity case is de novo. Rule 334,
Rules of Civil Procedure. In such a case, especially when con-
sidering the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to fact

618 | 7

findings of the trial court but are not bound by them. Author-
ities need not be cited. Rule 344(f)(7), R.O.P.

We have earefully read and considered the testimony of
the witnesses before the trial court together with the written
statements given the insurance carrier by defendant and his
fellow employee Robert Perry. These statements fail to reveal
and carefully conceal the cause of defendant’s injury as estab-
lished by the great weight of the other evidence.

Our study of the entire record causes us to agree with
these findings of fact by the trial court: .

“On December 11, 1962, the defendant, Donald Wayne
Barcus, a young man by the name of Louis Saak and one
niamed Robert Perry were employed by Axtell Ford body shop
in. Newton, Iowa. About 11 a.m., on that day, defendant Bar-
cus came to the car that Perry was working on and made some
suggestions as to the work Perry was engaged in. Saak, who
was putting glass in a car window near the place where Petry
was working, made a comment to the effect that he could paint
better than Perry. At this point the testimony is in sharp dis-
pute as to what next happened. The Court, however, finds-that
Barcus then suggested that Saak be ‘taken down’ and his ‘pri-
vates greased; that Barcus placed his hands on Saak and in
the scuffle Barcus was knocked to the floor and seriously in-
jured; that Barcus told Saak and Perry to tell the employer.
that he, Barcus, had become entangled in an air hose and had
fallen ona 2x4, Axtell was called to the shop where Barcus,
Saak: and Perry were, was told’ by Perry in the presence of
Bareus what (as he put it) ‘we had agreed on’. Barcus did
not at that time or later, as far as the record shows, disclose
that he had been knocked to the floor by Saak nor the true
situation leading up to the accident. As a result of the state-
ments made to Axtell and in reliance thereon, a Memorandum
Agreement as to Compensation was filed with the Iowa Indus-
trial Commissioner about August 12, 1963, and Workmen’s
Compensation payments..were made to defendant in the total
amount of $1087.08. The Court further finds that defendant’s
injuries did not arise out of, nor were they received in the
course of, his employment and that said injuries were suffered

| | | 619

and sustained as the direct result of ‘horseplay’ in which de-
fendant was then engaged.”

Il. On April 8, 1964, which was several months after the
last compensation payment, Barcus filed a petition with the
industrial commissioner for review-reopening against Axtell
Ford and its insurer alleging his condition was such as would
warrant additional compensation.

" April 17, 1964, plaintiffs filed an answer denying the claim.
for additional compensation and affirmatively alleged the mem-
orandum of agreement was fraudulently procured, was void
and that Barcus was the aggressor in horseplay which made
his injury noncompensable. Barcus’ reply denied these affirma-
tive allegations.

- Plaintiffs’ petition in equity was filed in May 1964 in the:
district court alleging the memorandum of agreemént of Au-
gust 12, 1963, was procured by fraud and was therefore void.
Plaintiffs alleged substantially the same facts regarding horse-
play as stated in the answer filed with the commissioner and
further alleged Barcus’ injury did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment.

The prayer of plaintiffs’ petition asked the memorandum
of agreement dnd the industrial commissioner’s approval theré-
of be declared null and void and that they be vacated and set
aside. It further asked the payments made thereunder be
cancelled, set aside and plaintiffs have judgment ‘for: the
amount thereof.

Defendant, Barcus, filed a special appearance challenging
jurisdiction of the district court to hear’ plaintiffs’ petition.
He therein asserted, (1) the industrial commissioner had juris-
diction. of all matters arising out of injuries sustained during
employment, including equitable matters, (2) if jurisdiction is
found concurrent, the commissioner had already taken juris-
diction and the district court should not intervene and (3)
where remedy before an administrative agency is provided,
relief’ must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the
courts will act.

The trial court, then, Judge Harold I: Fleck, overruled
defendant’s special appearance. His conclusions of law include:

“1.- Doyle. vs. Dugan, 229 Iowa 724, 295 NW 128 holds:

620 | 7

Hl ‘‘The Industrial Commissioner does not have juris-
diction to entertain an action to set aside a fraudulently in-
duced compensation agreement approved by him, such matter
lies within the realm of the equity jurisdiction of the District
Court.’ This case still stands as the law of Iowa.

Hl “2. The Industrial Commissioner is not a court in the
true sense, but an administrative agency which derives its
power and duty from the statutes of the State of Iowa, which
have been construed by the Courts as granting power to de-
termine the facts and questions of law, not equitable matters.”

In Comingore v. Shenandoah Artificial Ice, ete., Co., 208
Towa 480, 226 N.W.124, where a widow, after her undisclosed
remarriage, continued to take weekly compensation to which
she was not entitled under the statute, we held on the em-
ployer’s application before the commissioner he could correct
any mistake in his order approving a memorandum of agree-
ment of settlement which was contrary to statute. At pages
441, 442, 208 Iowa, pages 129, 130, 226 N.W. we say: “As to
the restitution of the moneys theretofore paid, the commis-
sioner acted without jurisdiction in the premises. An action
in assumpsit for money had and received by the claimant be-
yond the statutory period is for another tribunal to determine
and decide.”

In Doyle v. Dugan, 229 Iowa 724, 295 N.W. 128, an action
for damages was brought for injuries received by plaintiff’s
ward arising out of and in the course of his employment with
defendant. The answer alleged the ward had elected to accept
workmen’s compensation and the payment thereof constituted
an accord and satisfaction. In reply plaintiff asserted the
agreement in reference to workmen’s compensation was void
because procured by fraud. Plaintiff alleged the employer had
fraudulently represented he had complied with the require-
ments for coverage under the workmen’s compensation statutes.

Like the case at bar the first assignment of error in Doyle
vy. Dugan raises the question of the district court’s jurisdiction
to determine the question of fraud practiced in securing the
memorandum of agreement and the industrial commissioner’s
approval thereof.

After recognizing the well established principles that

| [| 621

equity always stands ready to defeat fraudulent purposes, and
to restore claimants to rights of which they have been deprived
through fraud and that courts of equity have jurisdiction to
grant such relief we say in Doyle v. Dugan, at pages 731, 782,
229 Iowa, pages 181, 182, 295 N.W.:

“The fraud here practiced upon plaintiff’s ward was ex-
trinsic and collateral to the matter directly decided by the
industrial commissioner when he approved the agreement for
compensation. It consisted of false statements which led the
plaintiff to believe that the only recourse open to him was
under the workmen’s compensation act. This prevented him
from making an election and pursuing the remedy at common
law to which he was entitled had he known the true facts. The
industrial commissioner does not have jurisdiction to entertain
such a bill in equity. The district court was the only tribunal
having such jurisdiction.

“As above pointed out, the relief here sought, insofar as
the avoidance of the agreement for workmen’s compensation
is concerned, was equitable relief.”

In Scheel v. Superior Mfg. Co., 249 Iowa 873, 89 N.W.2d
377, an injured employee brought an action in equity to set
aside, as fraudulently procured, an application for commuta-
tion of compensation payments filed with the industrial ecom-
missioner, together with his approval thereof and the order
for lump sum payment. The trial court entered a decree for
plaintiff which was affirmed on appeal.

In Scheel we state Doyle v. Dugan is closely in point and
apply the same legal principles to the attack on the district
eourt’s jurisdiction. In Scheel like the case at bar defendant
relied heavily on Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sneddon, 249 Iowa 393,
86 N.W.2d 870. In Scheel at page 880, 249 Iowa, page 381, 89
N.W.2d, we say: “The issue of jurisdiction presented in Trav-
elers Insurance Co. v. Sneddon, 249 Iowa 393, 86 N.W.2d 870,
is not involved here. That is quite a different case. A court
of equity clearly has jurisdiction of the subject matter of such
asuit as this. Doyle v. Dugan, 229 lowa 724, 729-32, 295 N.W.
128, 131, 132, and citations; Foote v. State Savings Bank, 201
Towa 174, 178, 206 N.W. 819, and citations; Rathbun v. Baumel,
196 Towa 1233, 1243, 191 N.W. 297, 30 A. L. R. 216.” For a

622 ee

later ‘such holding see Harrison v. Keller, 254 Iowa 267, 117
N.W.2d 477.

Defendant argues the industrial commissioner should have
jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity and to order restitu-
tion if found necessary. Our cited cases, particularly Doyle
v. Dugan, supra, hold to the contrary and defeat defendant’s
contentions asserted under his first assigned proposition.
Doyle was decided in 1940. The legislature has not seen fit
to enlarge the commissioner’s jurisdiction in this area. We are
not persuaded our holding in Doyle should be changed.

II. Defendant’s second proposition relied on for re-
versal would require the trial court after setting aside the
memorandum of agreement because of fraud in its procure-
ment to then remand the controversy to the industrial com-
missioner. We are not cited any authority for such an order
and have found none.

HH To “remand” a case means to send it back to the tri-
bunal from which it was appealed ‘or moved. 76 C.J.S., page
902; 386A Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., pages 522, 523;
Black’s Law Dictionary, Third Ed., page 1525.

This is-an original fraud case commenced in the district
court over which, as we have already pointed: out, the indus-
trial commissioner has no jurisdiction. Defendant’s second
proposition is untenable.

IV. The essential elements of actionable fraud are:
(1) representation, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) scienter,
(5) intent to deceive, (6) reliance, (7) resulting injury and
damage. Gipp v. Lynch, 226 Iowa 1020, 1027, 285 N.W. 659,
662;, Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benevolent Assn., 254 Iowa 653,
658, 119 N.W.2d 126, 129, and citations; Phoenix v. Stevens,
256 Iowa 432, 436, 127 N.W.2d 640, 642; Syester v. Banta, 257
Towa 613, 625, 183 N.W.2d 666, 674.

Hl Fraud cannot be presumed but must be affirmatively
proved by the one who relies on it. It must be established by
a: preponderance of evidence that is clear, satisfactory and
convincing—such as to overcome the presumption in favor of
fair dealing. Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benevolent Assn., supra,
254 Towa 653, 657, 658, 119 N.W.2d 126, 128, 129, and citations;
Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 623, 183 N.W.2d 666, 673.: ~

PC Es 628

| | Fraud is of various kinds and may be committed by
a suppression of the truth as well as by suggestion of falsehood.
Popejoy v. Eastburn, 241 Iowa 747, 759, 41 N.W.2d 764, 770;
Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benevolent Assn., 254 Iowa 653, 658,
119 N.W.2d 126, 129; 37 O.S., Fraud, section 1, page 204;
23 Am.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, section 76, page 850.

HM The evidence in this case clearly establishes the neces-
sary elements of fraud by defendant. The testimony of de-
fendant’s two fellow employees, Perry and Saak, establishes
he was injured while engaged in horseplay. Defendant knew
he had been injured while. scuffling with a fellow employee
and arranged a false report he had been injured while walking
and tripped over an air hose. This false report was made by
one of the fellow employees to the employer in defendant’s
presence and defendant remained silent. Defendant later
signed’a report stating he was injured “walking in shop to see
how work was progressing.” These statements’ were made
Imowing they would be believed by the employer and his com-
pensation insurance carrier. The approval of the memorandum
of agreement by the industrial commissioner was, obtained
based on the reports made by Perry and.defendant. The
employer.and the insurance adjustor testified they relied on
said representations.

The manner in which defendant was injured was very
material to the question of whether compensation was to be
paid. Horseplay which an employee voluntarily instigates and
aggressively participates in does not ‘arise out of-and in the
course of his employment and’ therefore is not compensable.
Wittmer v. Dexter Mfg. Co., 204 Iowa 180, 214 N.W. 700; 58
Am.Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, section 268, pages 769,
710; 99 O.J.S.; Workmen’s Compensation, section 225, pages
158, 154. . .

‘We have considered the many points argued by defend-
ant. We agree with the holding and judgment of the trial
court,—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

624 Le 7

Myrriz Sopuia Hovpen, appellant, cross-appellee, v. Crry or
Drcoran, appellee, cross-appellant; THuRSTEN and Martaa
L, Ksome (not appearing).

No. 52588.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 534)

62

a

January 9, 1968,

Strand & Kiener, of Decorah, for appellant, eross-appellee.

Miller, Pearson & Gloe, of Decorah, for appellee, cross-
appéllant.

Sruart, J.—Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages

626 ee |

from the City of Decorah for injuries resulting from a fall on a
public sidewalk on March 5, 1966. She alleged defendant was
negligent in allowing ice, snow and slush to accumulate for an
unreasonable period of time on a public sidewalk contrary to
389.12 of the Iowa Code. The jury, after deliberating twenty-
three minutes, returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the full
amount asked, $10,000. Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and, in the alternative, a Motion for
a New Trial. The trial court overruled defendant’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding but granted a new trial. Plaintiff
appealed from the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new
trial and defendant eross-appealed from the ruling on the Motion
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

We shall discuss only defendant’s cross-appeal as our deter-
mination of this issue disposes of the entire case.

HMM I. There does not seem to be any serious dispute
between the parties as to-the applicable law. The city has a duty
under section 389.12 of the Code to exercise reasonable care to
keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. Allen v. City
of Fort Dodge, 183 Iowa 818, 821, 167 N.W. 577; Tillotson v.
City of Davenport, 232 Iowa 44, 49, 4 N.W.2d 365. Mere slip-
periness caused. by ice or snow remaining in its natural con-
dition is not ordinarily a defect in a sidewalk for which a
municipality may be held liable. Staples v. City of Spencer, 222
Towa 1241, 1245, 1246, 271 N.W. 200; Tollackson v. City of Eagle
Grove, 203 Iowa 696, 698, 2138 N.W. 222; Parks v. City of Des
Moines, 195 Iowa 972, 977, 191 N.W..728; Ray v. City of Council
Bluffs, 193. Iowa 620, 628, 187 N.W. 447; Gregg v. Town of
Springville, 188 Iowa 289, 242, 174 N.W. 23; Evans v.. City of
Council Bluffs, 187 Iowa 369, 375, 174 N.W. 288; Allen v. City
of Fort Dodge, 183 Iowa 818, 821, 167 N.W. 577; Tobin v. City
of Waterloo, 131 Iowa 75, 76-77, 107 N-W. 1081.

However, if the municipality has permitted snow or ice to
remain on a sidewalk until it has become so ridged, rough and
uneven that it is dangerous for a pedestrian to walk on exercising
ordinary care, liability may be imposed ; provided the municipal-
ity has actual or constructive notice of the condition of the walk
and has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy such condition.
Anderson vy. City. of Sioux City, 242 Iowa 139, 143, 45 N.W.2d

oar

845; Gates v. City of Des Moines, 240 Iowa 775, 780, 88 N.W.2d
96; Geagley v. City of Bedford, 235 Iowa 555, 560, 16 N.W.2d
252; Franks v. City of Sioux City, 229 Iowa 1097, 1099, 1100,
296 N.W. 224; Staples v. City of Spencer, supra; Wilson v. City
of Clinton, 204 Iowa 1183, 1185, 216 N.W. 698; Tollackson v.
City of Eagle Grove, Parks v. City of Des Moines, Ray v, City of
Council Bluffs, Gregg v. Town of Springville, Evans v. City of
Council Bluffs, Allen v. City of Fort Dodge and Tobin v. City
of Waterloo, all supra. See also 8 Drake Law Review 149.

Hi The length of time sufficient to constitute constructive
notice of the condition and a reasonable opportunity to remedy it
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and is
generally a question for the jury. Parks v. City of Des Moines
and Tillotson v. City of Davenport, both supra. We therefore
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff to
determine if it was sufficient, to create a jury issue on the ques-
tions of constructive notice of and reasonable opportunity to
remedy the defect. .

Plaintiff left her home at 11:45 a.m. on Saturday, March 5,
1966, and was hurrying to the bank to pay her rent before it
closed at 12 noon. She drove to an area known as the city park-
ing: lot. This aréa is directly east of a building housing the
Kephart: Music -Center.. State Street extends through this
parking area joining North Alley on the north and Water Street
on the south. A public sidewalk adjoins the east side of the
Kephart Music Center and the west side of State Street which,
at the time of the accident, had metered diagonal parking spaces
abutting the sidewalk. Plaintiff parked her car in the fifth
parking place from the south end of the parking area facing the
sidewalk on which the accident-occurred. She got out on the
driver's side of her car and proceeded along the sidewalk, which
was covered with about an inch of slush, to some ice where she
fell and was injured, Plaintiff stated the cause of her fall was
the rough and uneven ice,

It was agreed by all concerned that the City of Decorah had
no actual notice of the condition of the sidewalk at the time of
the fall. The city had received no complaints about snow removal
on March 4 or 5. It had no prior difficulty with dangerous snow
or ice accumulations in this area, . There was no evidence that

628 | a

any portion of the three-inch snow on February 21 remained.
Plaintiff does not so argue. There was an unusually warm period
between February 19, 1966, and March 4, 1966,

Snow began falling during the late afternoon of March 4,
1966, and .81 of an inch precipitation was recorded by the
weather bureau for that date. On March 5 a trace of snow was
recorded. The owner and manager of the music center adjoining
the walk where plaintiff fell had shoveled the walk in front of
his store on the morning of March 5, 1966, but did not shovel the
sidewalk in question along the east side of his store because the
city had always done it and he assumed it was their responsi-
bility. The city records show that the only work done on Satur-
day, March 5, 1966, was two hours, sanding intersections at stop
signs. The sidewalk and parking lot were slushy immediately
before plaintiff fell and the snow was melting at the time of the
accident. It had been snowing off and on all morning of March
5, 1966, and it was still snowing when Mr. Kephart took Mrs.
Hovden to the hospital immediately after her fall.

There seems to be an almost unlimited number of cases
against municipalities for injuries sustained in falls on icy side-
walks,

The closest case on the facts is Batie v. City of Humboldt,
228 Towa, 528, 532-533, 292 N.W. 857. There snow began falling
at 3.a.m. on January 18th. It stopped about noon. Plaintiff fell
on icy footprints made from slush about 3 p.m. on the same day.
There was no claim of actual knowledge of the condition. We
said:

“Under the factual situation shown, in order that con-
structive notice to the city could be imputed, it was necessary to
prove that the alleged defective street condition existed for such
length of time that the city, in the exercise of reasonable care,
would have discovered and would have had reasonable op-
portunity to remedy it. Spiker v. City of Ottumwa, 193 Iowa
844, 186 N.W. 465. Appellant contends that the jury could
have found that the city must have known or anticipated danger
not later than the cessation of snowfall at noon, and that this
afforded over three hours in which to ameliorate the icy con-
dition by sanding the crossing. One difficulty with this fixing of
a stated period is that to adopt it one must assume what is not

SS 629

shown, that is, must take it for granted that a freezing tempera-
ture ensued immediately upon cessation at noon of the period of
wet snowfall and slush. There is no suggestion that the snowy
slush created a dangerous condition. The claim is that when it
became the rough and ridged ice which plaintiff claims she ob-
served, then affirmative action for safety of pedestrians became
the city’s duty. There is such want of showing and indefiniteness
as to when was that transformation, that we find no sound basis
in the record on which to hold that imputed knowledge of and
reasonable opportunity to remedy the alleged defect, could
properly have been imputed by the jury to defendant, city.”

; | | Plaintiff claims this case is stronger than Batie be-
cause the city assumed the obligation of an adjoining property
owner to keep the sidewalk clean. Such contention is not helpful
to plaintiff. The city has the primary responsibility for all
sidewalks. The duty placed on the city by section 389.12 is
greater than the common-law duty imposed on the adjoining
property owner. There is no common-law duty on the owner to
remove a natural accumulation of snow from a walk. Franzen v.
Dimock Gould & Co., 251 Iowa 742, 101 N.W.2d 4, 8; Breuer v.
Mataloni, 257 Iowa 445, 183 N.W.2d 114, 115, 116; Mutzel v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 247 Iowa 14, 72 N.W.2d 487;
8 Drake Law Review 153-155.

HEM Evidence the city was sanding intersections the morn-
ing of plaintiff’s fall is no proof the sidewalk in question was in
a dangerous condition because of ice and snow made rough and
uneven through artificial means. Nor does it prove actual knowl-
edge on the part of the city. In fact, the court instructed the
jury defendant had no actual knowledge of the alleged condition
and plaintiff necessarily relied on constructive notice. No ob-
jection was taken and this instruction is now the law of the case.
_ Had there been proof the icy condition existed from the time
the snow began to fall, the municipality would not have had a
reasonable time within which to remedy the defect. The snow
continued until after the accident.

Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 244 Iowa 939, 948, 57
N.W.2d 225, involved the duty of a landlord to remove snow and
ice from an outside entrance. The situations are analogous as
the duty there, as here, is to use reasonable care to keep the

630 Es Ys

premises (sidewalks) in a reasonably safe condition: We quoted
with approval from Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va.-5, 18,
45 S.E.2d 898, 902, where it was said:

Hi “The authorities are in substantial accord in support of
the rule that a business establishment, landlord, carrier, or other
inviter, in the absence of unusual circumstances, is permitted to
await the end of the storm and a reasonable time thereafter: to
remove ice and snow from an outdoor entrance walk, platform or
steps. The general controlling principle is that changing condi-
tions due to the pending storm render it inexpedient and im-
practicable to take earlier effective action, and that ordinary care
does not require it.”

We think this is a reasonable rule which is applicable here.

Hl We therefore hold the trial court erred in not sustaining
defendant’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
as the evidence was insufficient to-raise a jury question as to
defendants’ negligence (1) because there was no showing how
long the dangerous condition of rough, uneven ice had existed,
and (2) because under the evidence here the city would not have
had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition even if it
had existed from the prior evening. :

We reverse the decision of the trial court on the cross-appeal.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider plaintiff’s appeal—aAf-
firmed on plaintiff's appeal; reversed on defendant’s cross-appeal.

* All Jusric#s concur except Broxer, J., who dissents,
—
In. Re Estate or Wituiam F. Marri, deceased.

Joun W. Martin et al., objectors-appellants, v. Eummr Murrz,
‘ executor, and Isa Barser et al., claimants-appellees,

_ _ No, 52792.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 401)

632 EE

January 9, 1968,

Jack W. Rogers, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Glenn M. Bradley, of Sigourney, for appellees Isal Barber
and Guy A. Barber.

Harry L. Snakenberg, of Sigourney, for appellee Elmer
Mertz.

Rawiines, J.—A niece and nephew of William F. Martin,
deceased, filed objections to executor’s final report. Trial court
held adverse to objectors and they appeal. We affirm in part,
reverse in part.

April 10, 1965, William F. Martin, sometimes hereinafter
referred to as decedent or Martin, then 83, died testate in Keokuk
County. His will was admitted to probate April 29, 1965. The
same day Elmer H. Mertz qualified as executor.

John W. Martin and Colleen McCreery, niece and nephew
respectively of decedent, challenged the executor’s final report.

In so doing they protested, (1) the right of Isal Barber,
joint surviving payee, to proceeds of a bank deposit; (2) allow-

SS 33

ance of claim filed by Guy A. Barber; and (8) grant of a fee to
the executor.

From February 18, to March 5, 1965, decedent lived in the
home of his niece Isal Barber and her husband Guy, at Hayes-
ville.

Except for this three-week period decedent lived in a nearby
one-room frame building. He had there only the barest of necessi-
ties, being frugal to the point of miserliness. The Barbers often
provided him meals and transportation. He seldom had enough
food in his living quarters. They usually did his laundering.

At one time, about 1962, some friction developed between
Martin and the Barbers but this was apparently forgotten before
decedent started living in the Barber home as aforesaid.

The trial court found there was competent evidence dis-
closing Mertz received from Martin the key to his bank box
sometime prior to March 5, 1965, with instructions to issue the
certificate here in question.

The record discloses that on March 9, 1965, maturity date of
certificate No. 26302 payable to Martin alone, the bank issued
renewal certificate No. 27691 payable to W. F. Martin or Isal
Barber.

After Mertz had qualified as executor, Isal was paid $4500
on the joint certificate, with balance withheld for inheritance
tax. See section 528.64, Code, 1962.

To the extent here material decedent’s will, prepared in
1960 by Mertz, provided the corpus of his estate go ultimately to
Colleen MeCreery, Fort Morgan, Colorado, and John W. Martin,
Des Moines, Iowa. Gross value of the estate is $28,863,

The claim of Guy A. Barber in the sum of $561.25 is for
meals, laundry services and transportation provided decedent
from April 1958 until March 1965,

Trial court ordered, (1) Isal Barber is entitled to retain
proceeds of the certificate of deposit; (2) Guy A. Barber’s claim
be allowed in the sum of $300; and (3) the executor be granted a
fee of $697.26.

Hl 1. All matters here involved were submitted, tried arid
determined by the trial court as a proceeding entirely in equity.
The appeal is likewise presented.

Under these circumstances it will be considered by us de

634 a a

novo. See rules 344(a)(3) and 344(£)(7), Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and Henderson v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa
97, 100; 106 N.W.2d'86. But see section 633.33, Code, 1966.

In that regard a statement contained in Luse v. Grenko, 251
Towa 211, 214, 100 N.W.2d 170, is here appropriate: “Although
our review is de novo we give weight to the trial court’s findings.
Groves v. Groves, 248 Iowa 682, 692, 82.N.W.2d 124, 130, and
citations. Indeed, where similar issues were involved we have
said, ‘We deem this a proper case for us to lean heavily on the
judgment of the trial court, even though we try it on appeal de
novo.’ Luebke v: Freimuth, 248 Iowa 58, 67, 78 N.W.2d 413,
479.”

At the same time our review is confined fo those propositions
asserted and argued in support of a reversal. Steele v: Northup,
259 Iowa 443, 448, 143 N.W.2d 302, 304-805, and citations.

II. ’ All evidence presented as to ‘conversations and transac-
tions between Martin and Mertz, executor, with ruling reserved
on objections, was ultimately excluded by thé court under our
dead man statute. Sections 622.4 and 622.5, Code, 1962; In re
Estate of Leriders, 247 Iowa 1205, 1214-1212, 78-N.W.2d 536; In
re Estate of Conner, 240 Iowa 479, 488-492, 36 N.W.2d 8838; 97
C.J:S., Witnesses, section 155, -page 596; and 58 Am.Jur., Wit-
nesses, sections 299-303, pages 185-187,

II. However the record discloses ‘competent evidence’ to
the: effect-that sometime just prior to March 5,-as Mertz was
passing the Barber home one noon, Martin rapped.on the window
and motioned forMertz to come in. Martin was then alone and
the two men talked.. In: this regard see O'Dell v. ODell, 238
Towa’ 434, 447-448, 26.N.W.2d 401,

* Also, Martin’s box was opened on or about March. 9, single
payee certificate No. 26302 removed, and -alternate payee cer-
tificate No. 27691 -then placed in the depository, There were
other certificates in-the box payable to Martin alone.

‘In..addition the bank reéords, properly-identified and’ ad-
mitted in evidence, disclose certificate No. 27691 was issued by the
bank in the regular course of businiess. See Section 622: 28, Code,
1962,

[| Furthermore, no showing whatsosver “made: upon
which to base a finding there existed any confidential or fiduciary

ee 635

relationship between Martin on one hand, and the Barbers or
Mertz on the other. Neither is there any basis upon which to
conclude Mertz acted other than in good faith, or that he or the
bank stood to profit in any degree by virtue of possible benefits
conferred upon Barbers by the decedent. See Knigge v. Dencker,
246 Towa 1887, 1892-1893, 72 N.W.2d 494; Menary v. Whitney,
244 Iowa 759, 764-765, 56 N.W.2d 70; and 24 AmJur., Fraud
and Deceit, section 256, page 88. The trial court found no
indicia of fraud or overreaching by Mertz or Isal Barber. We
are satisfied that finding is factually consistent with the record.

From the foregoing it may reasonably be inferred: Martin
delivered -his bank box key to Mertz, the box was ‘opened, and
certificate No. 26302 being removed was replaced by certificate
No. 27691, all in accord with Martin’s knowingly express intent
and desire. See Stenberg v. Buckley, 245 Iowa 622, 626-627, 61
N.W.2d 452. >

IV. The trial court determined issuance of certificate of
deposit No. 27691 constituted a valid gift to Isal Barber, vesting
in her all right to the proceeds.

In view of our more recent pronouneements, it is evident
this result is correct though based upon an erroneous premisé.

In that regard we said in McCoy v. Martin, 257 Iowa
146, 148, 131 N.W.2d 783: “If it is a case in which the learned
court was right for a wrong reason, it was ‘nevertheless right.”
See also Houlahan v. Brockmeier, 258 Iowa 1197, 1208, 141
N.W.2d 545,

V. Referring now ‘to the matter of rights under a "hank
deposit certificate,‘ or book, payable to-one named -party: or
another, our early cases were determined upon the: relatively
rigid and unrealistic gift or trust theory.

However, O’Brien :v, Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d
412, in adopting a. tripartite contract approach, held either the
gift or joint tenancy concept could be employed to support the
survivor’s claim in a joint bank account; an account contributor
may retain control of the indicia of deposit; and a noncontri-
buting party need sign no agreement.

Later, in the case of In re Estate of Murdoch, 238 Towa
898, 901-902, 29 N.W.2d 177, this court upheld right. of survivor-
ship in a joint bank account solely on the contract basis, See also

636 [| |

In re Estate of Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 934, 5 N.W.2d 153.

Our more recent decisions have consistently approved the
views expressed in O’Brien and Murdoch, both supra. See In re
Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148 N.W.2d 468, and citations.

VI. Here the renewal certificate, placed by Mertz in dece-
dent’s bank box, designated the depositors, “W. F. Martin or
Isal Barber * * * payable to the order of self”.

We dealt with a comparable situation in Andrew v. Citizens
State Bank, 205 Iowa 237, 216 N.W. 12. There a mother de-
posited funds in a bank evidenced by a certificate of deposit
“payable to the order of self or Hazel Pent, daughter”.

Referring only to joint tenancy, this court held Hazel Pent
entitled to the proceeds upon death of the mother.

In so holding we said, loc. cit. 205 Iowa 243: “Appellant also
insists that the burden was upon Hazel Pent to allege and prove
that a gift of the certificate was intended and made to her by her
mother. While no evidence was offered for that purpose, we
think the necessary inference from matters appearing in the
record is that * * *. The certificate was lawfully payable to her
{Hazel Pent] after her mother’s death, upon the surrender
thereof to the bank issuing it. Section 9267, Code of 1924. [Sec-
tion 528.64, Code, 1962] No other reason for the mother’s making
the certificate payable to herself or daughter than that she in-
tended her to receive the money, unless paid out on her own
order, is suggested. The fact that the certificate remained un-
paid and unchanged is some evidence of the mother’s intention.
The record discloses neither pleading nor proof in any way deny-
ing or explaining the purpose and intention of the mother.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

And, if funds are payable to an “or” survivor pursuant to a
bank deposit certificate under the joint tenancy doctrine, the
same result will surely obtain with as much if not greater force
and effect by application of the tripartite contract or third
party beneficiary concept. A statement in 37 Iowa Law Review
293, amply supported by respectable authorities, sets forth both
the rationale and demonstrates the ultimate efficacy of this ap-
proach:

“The development of the contract theory may be said to
have begun in Massachusetts in 1916. [Chippendale v. North

ae 687

Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N.E. 871.] It was
fostered by the statutes protecting the bank from liability in
payment to either party, and was instrumental in resolving the
doctrinal confusion of the other theories. The piimary doctrinal
innovation brought about by the contract theory is that the in-
terest of the court is directed solely at the bank-depositor rela-
tionship, rather than the relationship between the co-depositors.
The gift, trust or joint tenancy theories, on the other hand, are
concerned solely with this latter relationship. By stating the
mutual rights and obligations of the co-depositors in terms of
the bank’s duties, the formal requirements of a gift, trust or
joint tenancy are finessed, but the relationship between the
parties is nevertheless fixed and certain. Actually, this rela-
tionship most nearly approximates that of joint tenancy, but
differs materially in the immediate right of either depositor to
withdraw the entire amount.

“The contract theory is not without its doctrinal difficulties.
The problem of consideration, espe ially with regard to a non-
contributing depositor, has been diXcussed by the courts, but the
consideration between the bank and the contributing depositor
has been held sufficient to support the contract. The transaction
has been viewed as a tripartite or third party beneficiary con-
tract, and as @ contract creating. the rights of the parties against
the bank, with no specific name being attached to the source of
these rights.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Our most recent pronouncements are not in conflict with the
foregoing views. See In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 98-
101, 148 N.W.2d 468, 471-478, and citations.

We hold the gift theory so strenuously urged and argued by
objectors is not here controlling.

VII. The question next presented, heretofore briefly
touched upon, is whether the certificate of deposit before us
served to vest in Isal Barber a contractual or joint right to the
funds deposited.

Again we refer to Andrew y. Citizens State Bank, supra,
where, under an indicia of deposit in form comparable to that
here disclosed, this court held a survivor entitled to the res.

In so doing we took the position, the fact that the certificate
remained unpaid evidenced an intent on the part of the sole

638 EE |

contributor to vest in the named joint payee a right to the pro-
ceeds. In this regard see also Nelson v. Olympia Federal Savings
& Loan Assn., 193 Wash. 222, 74 P.2d 1019.

Dealing with rights of alternate payees to a deposit
evidenced by a bankbook, this court has said: “* * * possession
of one would be the possession of both, it would seem unimpor-
tant that the book remained in the safe-deposit box. The ad-
ministrator urges in support of his views the facts of delivery
and possession. We do not think any manual delivery neces:
sary, and, in many instances, it would hardly be possible, or at
least not practicable. If the instrument executed was. valid,
then the possession of the deposit or the book evidencing the
deposit of either * * * was the possession of the other, and it
would be immaterial as to who held the actual manual custody.”
(Authorities cited.) In re Estate of Winkler, 232 Towa 930;
934, 5 N.W.2d 158.

VIII. In line with the foregoing, use of the sword “or” here
attains some measure. of significance.

Ordinarily its usage means, in the alternative.. This court
has so held. Ness v. H. M. Iltis Lumber Co., 256 Iowa 588, 593,
128 N.W.2d 237, and Holmes v. Gross, 250 Iowa 238, 250, 98
N.W.2d 714. See also section 528.64, Code, 1962.

- It was evidently in that sense the word was employed in
the instant case. ton

In support of the foregoing, 10 Am.Jur.2d, Banks, section
369, page 332, states: :

“Generally, where a bank acéount of two depositors is ex-
pressly made payable to either or to the survivor, the right of
survivorship exists. The contract of deposit need not be in any
particular form to create a joint account; any instrument in
writing, properly: executed, which evidences a meeting of the
minds of the parties thereto is sufficient. In creating a joint
bank account with right of survivorship, it is a matter of no im-
portance that the particular terms ‘joint ownership’ and ‘joint
account’ are not used; the controlling question is whether the
person opening the account intentionally and intelligently
ereated a condition’ embracing the essential elements of joint
ownership and survivorship. No particular formula is required ;
courts are controlled by the substance of the transaction rather

a 639

than by the name given it. This rule has been held to apply to
the creation of a joint and survivorship account in savings and
loan or building and loan share accounts.

“While it is not essential to the creation of a joint bank
account with right of survivorship that the beneficiary depositor
have knowledge of the account or have possession of the passbook
or sign a signature card or make withdrawals therefrom, these
are all important factors and competent evidence bearing on the
question of intention.

“The creation of a technical joint tenancy effects a survi-
vorship except where the doctrine of survivorship as an incident
of joint tenancy has been abrogated by statute.”

IX. The trial court’ found in effect, if not in fact,
Martin’s intent was to vest in Isal Barber, as third-party benefi-
ciary, an alternate right of ownership in the deposit, which in-
tent is controlling. With this finding we agree. See Williams
v. Williams, 251 Iowa 260, 264-265, 100 N.W.2d 185, and In re
Estate of Murdoch, 238 Iowa 898, 902, 904, 29 N.W.2d 177.

X. It is also claimed by these objectors ‘the trial court
erred in allowing Guy A. Barber any sum for services rendered
by him for the benefit of decedent.

Hi "The burden imposed upon Barber was that he establish
his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of
Stratman, 231 Iowa 480, 487-488, 1 N.W.2d 636, and Roth v.
Headlee, 288 Iowa 1340, 1343, 29 N.W.2d 923,

Of course, he was aided.in this by the inference that
where one ordinarily performs services for another which are
known to and accepted by him, the law implies a promise to pay
for such services. Sce In re Estate of Talty, 232 Iowa 280, 283,
5 N.W.2d 584, 144 A.L.R, 859, On the other hand this implica-
tion does not usually apply where there exists between the parties
a husband and wife, or parent and child, relationship. Ferris v.
Barrett, 250 Iowa 646, 652, 95 N.W.2d 527.

But in the case now before us the relationship between
Martin and claimant was that of uncle and nephew by marriage,
as a result of which any inference of gratuitous-assistance would
at most be relatively slight. Ferris v. Barrett, supra.

Hl In addition, while a claim in probate stands denied, the

640 Pe a

defense of gratuity is a special one not raised by general denial.
Ferris v. Barrett, supra, loc. cit. 250 Iowa 650.

And in the instant case no such special defense was asserted
according to the record.

THEM So the matter of gratuitous service as a defense is not
here involved, leaving to be determined only two questions, (1)
whether an implied agreement arose under the facts and cir-
cumstances disclosed, by virtue of which it can be said decedent
intended to pay for services rendered; and (2) whether claimant
expected to be compensated for any benefits conferred on dece-
dent. 7

We are persuaded Guy A. Barber failed to establish his
claim by the requisite degree of proof.

Even aided by the foregoing inference or implication against
any gratuity he was still required to establish his claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Maasdam v. Estate of
Maasdam, 237 Iowa 877, 889, 24 N.W.2d 316, and Roth v.
Headlee, supra.

In that regard the record discloses claimant, as a witness in
his own behalf, testified as follows: (1) he kept no record of
services allegedly performed; (2) he never expected to be paid
for transportation, food, laundry and care supplied to Martin;
(8) neither he nor his wife ever told Martin they wanted pay
for these services; (4) there was never any understanding with
Martin as to payment; (5) he did not decide to file a claim until
the summer after Martin’s death; and (6) he, Barber, derived a
benefit from some of the things done for Martin.

Touching on the foregoing this court said in Bartholomew
v. Adams, 143 Iowa 354, 358, 121 N.W. 1026: “* * * in order to
recover upon an alleged implied contract with a person since
deceased, it is the only just and safe rule to require that facts
justifying the implication be well established, and nothing be
left to mere conjecture. Without in any manner disparaging
the present case, it is nevertheless unfortunately true that not
infrequently claims which would never have been made against
a party living are asserted against his estate when death has
closed his mouth to speak in his own defense, and services for
which a modest compensation would have been perfectly satis-
factory if paid in his lifetime suddenly acquire added value to

a ee 641

the mind of the creditor when payment is to be made by an
administrator ; and, in view of this tendency, and of the difficulty
under which the representative of the estate must labor to defend
against such demands, it is proper for the courts to require the
showing for their allowance to be at least reasonably satisfactory.
The case before us does not present such a record.”

Under existing circumstances we conclude the trial court
erred in granting to Guy A. Barber any recovery on the claim
filed by him.

HME XI. Objections made relative to payment of com-
pensation to Mertz, the executor, are without substance.

As heretofore disclosed no disqualifying conduct on his part
appears, and he is entitled to the fee prescribed by law for serv-

« iees rendered. See generally In re Estate of Rorem, 245 Iowa
1125, 66 N.W. 2d 292, 47 A.L.R, 2d 1089; 34 C.J.S., Executors
and Administrators, section 852, page 1008, section 876, page
1045; 31 AmJur.2d, Executors and Administrators, sections
501-508, pages 226-228; and 83 A.L.R. 728.

XII. For all the reasons aforesaid the judgment of the
trial court must be affirmed as to the right of Isal Barber to
proceeds of bank deposit certificate No. 27691, and payment of a
fee to Elmer H. Mertz, executor, but reversed on allowance of
any part of the claim filed by Guy A. Barber.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry
of decree consistent with this opinion. .

All Justices concur except LuGranp, J., who concurs in the
result.

Paut Luppineron, appellee, v. Mary E. Moorx, appellant.

No. 52692.
(Reported in 155 N.W.24 428)

g

January 9, 1968,

Tom Hyland of Wilson, Hyland & Brick, of Des Moines,
for appellant. so . os
RB: L. Morgan, of Des Moines, for appellee.

— | 643

Mason, J.—This.is a law action tried in the Des Moines
Municipal Court without a jury seeking damages for alleged
fraud in the sale of a hearing aid. Plaintiff recovered judgment
for $346.29 and costs.

Defendant’s appeal assigns as the sole error relied on the
failure to sustain her motion for directed verdict made at the
close of plaintiff’s evidence but not renewed at the close of all
evidence.

Defendant Mary E, Moore maintained a booth for hearing
tests at the 1964 State Fair. Plaintiff Paul Luddington stopped
at her booth because he felt he had a hearing deficiency. Defend-
ant gave plaintiff a test and said he was hard of hearing in his
right ear, Plaintiff did not tall: to Mrs. Moore again ‘until May
1965. In June she again called plaintiff and said she would like
to send Mr, Ferguson, the factory representative, out to plain-
tiff’s home. Ferguson went’ there, gave plaintiff a test, told him
he définitely needed a hearing aid, it would help him and that
the equipment Ferguson had with him would allow the factory
to devise an aid specially for plaintiff's deficiencies.’ Ferguson
then fitted plaintiff with a hearing aid and: collected ‘a down
payment of $100 on the total purchase price of $346.29. Shortly
Ferguson delivered: the hearing aid and collected the balance.
Plaintiff tried it on for about five minutes and was satisfied. *
When plaintiff later attempted to use the hearing aid he
could not hear parties‘on television or telephone and: the’ noises
during his employment at the Firestone Tire’ & Rubber’ Plant
bothered‘him. Accordizig to plaintiff, Ferguson had told him the
noises would not bother him.

Plaintiff told Mrs. Moore he was not satisfied with the hear-
ing aid and demanded his money back.:' She told him to return
the aid, which he did by mail within two weeks from: receiving it.
‘Later: plaintiff had a' hearing’ tést at Des Moines Hearing
and Speech Center upon the advice of the attorney‘ general’s
office.

Neil Verhoef, executive director at the Center, after testify:
ing as to his qualifications ‘and familiarity with all commercial
types of hearing aids: available,’ “explained the audiometric
evaluation given: plaintiff. He did not reéommend a hearing aid
because of the nature of plaintifi’s hearing loss, He ‘said

644 |

generally he would not recommend a hearing aid for plaintiff
because, as built today, they are not capable of allowing him to
hear better than without one.

I. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the ground plaintiff had alleged fraud only
in general and abstract terms without enumerating any specific
acts of fraud on defendant’s part. and plaintiff’s evidence failed
to show fraud.

HI As stated, defendant’s motion for directed verdict was
not renewed at the close of all the evidence. Hence, any error in
the ruling was waived by failure to renew the motion at the close
of all the evidence. Olson v. Barnick, 245 Iowa 217, 222, 61
N.W.2d 733, 736; Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 251 Iowa 1011, 1020,
103 N.W.2d 718, 724, and citations; Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa
557, 562, 189 N.W.2d 453, 457, and citations.

II. We prefer not to rest our decision on defendant’s
failure to renew her motion. Had it been renewed, it would
have been properly overruled.

In paragraph 8 of his petition plaintiff alleged:

“That said hearing aid was purchased upon false misrepre-
sentation and statements made by Defendant or her agents and
through the fraudulent misrepresentation of Defendant or her
agents, which this Plaintiff relied upon, and was not in a position
to discover the falsity of prior to the purchase of this hearing
aid, and: which representations were misleading to this Plaintiff
and were made by Defendant with the knowledge of their falsity
or under conditions where they should have known of the falsity
of said representations.”

Defendant’s answer amounted to a general denial and she
made no attack on plaintiff's petition until her motion to direct.

Defendant asserts as her second brief point in support of her
assigned error that in pleading fraud the specific facts relied
upon should be alleged.

THM She relies on New York Life Ins. Co. v. Clemens, 230
Iowa 279, 286-287, 297 N.W. 253, 257, and Lynch vy, Kerslake,
186 Iowa 983, 987, 173 N.W. 147, 149. In New York Life Ins.
Co., we said it is also the general rule in pleading fraud that the
specific acts relied upon should be alleged and whoever sets up a
fraud must do more than allege fraud in general and abstract

a a 645

terms, he must set out the specific acts of which the fraud con-
sists. However, the statement was made in considering com-
plaint of the trial court’s overruling defendant’s motion for more
specific statement.

In the Lynch case, supra, the court was referring to an
alleged defense of fraud in an action on a promissory note.
Neither case helps defendant here.

Hl The petition, although vulnerable to a motion for more
specific statement, rule 112, Rules of Civil Procedure, was not so
fatally defective as to require a directed verdict.

HI Where a doubtful pleading is directly attacked by
motion before issue is joined or in the answer as permitted by
rule 72, R.C.P., it will be resolved against the pleader. Reed v.
Harvey, 253 Iowa 10, 18, 110 N.W.2d 442, 443-444; Winneshick
Mutual Insurance Association v. Roach, 257 Iowa 354, 366, 132
N.W.2d 436, 444; Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256 Iowa 27, 29, 126
N.W.2d 350, 352.

HH If, however, the petition does allege ultimate facts upon.
which plaintiff might recover and states a claim under which
evidence may be introduced in support thereof, or if attack is
delayed, the petition should be construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, with doubts resolved in his favor and the
allegations accepted as true. Anthes v. Anthes, 255 Iowa 497,
508, 122 N.W.2d 255, 258; Newton v. City of Grundy Center,
246 Towa 916, 921, 70 N.W.2d 162. Halvorson v. City of
Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 319, 188 N.W.2d 856, 860.

HM Ill. We think there is sufficient evidence of fraud.
Marvin Ferguson, called as defendant’s witness, testified he was
employed by defendant, was not a factory representative and
had gone to plaintiff’s home to evaluate his hearing loss and pro-
vide him with a hearing amplifier that would help him. Although
admitting he advised plaintiff a hearing aid could be built to
help him, he denied making any representation to plaintiff that
he actually needed a hearing aid.

Defendant did not see fit to take the witness stand to con-
tradict plaintiff’s evidence.

| This being a law action tried to the court, it is reviewable
on errors assigned and is not triable de novo here. Rule 334,
R.C.P. Thus, the findings of fact by the trial court have the

$5 es

effect of a special verdict and are equivalent to a jury verdict.
If supported by substantial evidence and justified as a matter of
law, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. Further, we
must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
eourt’s judgment, and this court will not weigh the evidence or
pass on the credibility of witnesses,

The real test is the sufficiency of the evidencé to support the
conclusion of the fact finder. Clark v. Marietta, 258 Iowa 106,
109-111, 188 N.W.2d 107, 109-110. .

The essential elements of fraud.are set forth in Syestor ve
Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 618-619, 183 N.W.2d 666, 674. We hold
there is substantial evidence to support a finding they have been
established by.the necessary.quantum of Proof.

The causé is—Afiirmied.

All J USTICES concur, |
Arnotp J. Somadp, administrator of estate of Margery Schaap,
. deceased, appellee, v. Cuicaco anp Norra Western

Rawwax Company, appellarit (three cases consolidated).

No. 52786.
. (Reported in 155 N.W.2d 5)

January 9, 1968.

Frank W. Davis, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Hobson, Cady & Drew, of Hampton, and Van Eman, Mulder,
Klinkenborg & Rolfs, of Parkersburg, for appellees.

LeGranp, J—This is an interlocutory appeal under rule
332, Rules of Civil Procedure, involving three consolidated cases
arising out of a fatal accident on July 20, 1966. The sole issue
before us challenges the sufficiency of answers to interrogatories
made by plaintiff.. We limit our discussion to the questions and
answers in one of the actions, although the conclusion we reach
applies equally to all.

Plaintiff alleges Margery Schaap, Carol Schaap and Peter
Schaap were the only occupants of a 1960 Ford automobile
owned by Peter Schaap when it was struek by one of defendant’s
trains at-the intersection of a gravel road and defendant’s rail-
Toad tracks in Franklin County. All three were killed, Plaintiff
js administrator of the estate of each. Plaintiff pleads negligence

6S

by defendant in the operation of the train and asks damages for
the wrongful death of each decedent.

After answer was filed, defendant submitted interrogatories
to be answered by plaintiff under rule 121, R.C.P. We set out in
full the two interrogatories and answers which are in dispute
here:

“Interrogatory: State whether you, your attorney, your in-
surance carrier or anyone acting on your or their behalf obtained
statements in any form regarding any of the events or happen-
ings referred to in the petition filed herein.

“Answer: I have not obtained any statements in any form
from anyone regarding any of the events or happenings con-
cerning this accident, and I do not know whether my attorney or
insurance carrier obtained any statements.

“Interrogatory: State the name and ‘address of all persons
known to you or your attorney having any knowledge of the
relevant facts of the accident in which plaintiff's decedent was
Killed. .

“Answer: I do not know the names or addresses of persons
having knowledge of the facts of this accident, and I do not
know whether my attorney has the names and addresses of
persons having knowledge of the facts of this accident.”

The interrogatories and answers are identical in the cases of
Margery Schaap and Carol Schaap. Only the first interrogatory
and answer apply to the case of Peter Schaap.

We are asked to decide if these answers comply with rule
124(a), R.C.P. which provides: “Duplicate sworn answers shall
be filed, separately answering each interrogatory responsively,
and as fully as may be.” In short, must a party supply by way
of answer to interrogatory information solely within the knowl-
edge of his attorney? Defendant contends plaintiff is obligated
to do so. Plaintiff insists he has answered the interrogatories as
fully as he can from his own information, which is all the law
requires of him. .

I. We point out this matter does not reach us on objections
to the interrogatories as propounded. Rule 123, R.C.P., permits
such objections to test the propriety of the interrogatories before
answer. Plaintiff, however, elected to answer the interrogatories
without objection and we are concerned solely with the sufficiency

SS

of such answers under rule 124(a) above set out. Failure to
object is usually considered to be a waiver of the objection. 23
Am. Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, section 289, page 687;
McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 107,
U. S. Dist. Ct., Delaware, 28 F.R.D. 592; Smith v. Danvir
Corp., Del. Super., 188 A.2d 118, 96 A.L.R.2d 594,

HE We agree that a party who might have objected to
interrogatories, but failed to do so, waives such objection and is
required to make full answer under rule 124(a). We hold
plaintiff cannot now, belatedly, use rule 123 to avoid the pro-
visions of rule 124(a). Our consideration of this matter is
limited to deciding if plaintiff has answered “responsively, and as
fully as may be.”

HI Il. It is generally held that the discovery rules are to
be liberally construed. We have said this on a number of oc-
easions. The tendency is to broaden the scope of discovery to
permit litigants access to as much material information as pos-
sible before trial. Hardenbergh v. Both, 247 Iowa 153, 161, 73
N.W.2d 103, 107, and citations; Wheatley v. Heideman, 251 Iowa
695, 702, 102 N.W.2d 348, 348; Crist v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 623, 123 N.W.2d 424, 431; 23 Am.
Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, section 144, page 475; 27
C.J.S., Discovery, section 20, page 44.

To hold plaintiff’s answer to these interrogatories sufficient
would be to subvert this principle of liberal construction. It
would permit easy violation of rule 124(a), R.C.P., and encour-
age, in many cases, concealment rather than disclosure of mate-
rial facts,

Hl We disagree, therefore, with the trial court’s ruling that
the answers given by plaintiff are sufficient. It is generally held
that information within the knowledge of a litigant’s attorney
must be supplied in answer to a proper interrogatory. Privileged
information is, of course, protected as is the attorney’s work
product. Neither matter is involved here, since no such objection
was made by plaintiff before answering.

In 23 Am. Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, section 188,
page 539, appears the following:

“A party may not refuse to disclose the identity and loca-
tion of witnesses on the ground that the information sought is

50

solely within his attorney’s knowledge, but names and addresses
of witnesses known only to a party’s attorneys must be disclosed
on a proper interrogatory addressed to the party. An order
requiring a party to answer an interrogatory as to the names
and addresses of all persons known to his attorneys who have
any knowledge concerning the facts of the accident in question
is not objectionable on the ground that the information is both
privileged and the ‘work product’ of attorneys. * * *.”

- We have already held that disclosure of the names of per-

sons having information concerning an event does not violate
rule 148, R.C.P., which prohibits requirmg a party to list the
witnesses. he expects to call at trial. Wheatley v. Heideman, 251
Towa 695, 102 N.W.2d 348; Hitchcock v. Ginsberg, 240 Iowa
678, 37-N.W.2d 302,
. | | Plaintiff's answer to the interrogatory asking if state-
ments had been taken. from ‘persons having knowledge of the
accident. is also insufficient in view of what we have already said.
It might be noted this interrogatory does not seek to discover the
contents of. such statements but asks only if any ‘were obtained.

We hold the trial court erred in ruling the answers as given
by plaintiff are sufficient. Plaintiff'should be required to include
in such answers any information available either to him or to his
attorney. Battershell v. Bowman Dairy Company, 87 Ill. App.2d
193, 185 N.E.2d 340, 344; Dritt v. Morris, 235 Ark. 40, 357
S.W,2d 18, 17; Hickman vy. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385,
91 L, Ed. 451. This matter is remanded for entry of an order
directing plaintiff in all three cases to answer these interroga-
tories as required by rule 124 (a), R.C.P., based upon informa-
tion not only within -his own personal knowledge but also in
possession of his attorney.—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices coneur.

| | 651

State or Iowa, appellee, v. Davy Laz Anperson, appellant.

No. 52771.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 539)

January 9, 1968.

Stamatelos & Glenn, of West Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and David A, Elder-
kin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Moorz, J.—Defendant, David Lee Anderson, was charged,
tried and convicted in Hancock County of the crime of breaking
and entering in violation of Code section 708.8. He was sen-
tenced to imprisonment in the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort
Madison for a period not to exceed ten years. From this judg-
ment and sentence defendant appeals.

Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to suppress all evi-
dence regarding certain tools taken from defendant’s automobile
following his arrest in Polk County on July 27, 1966, by members
of the West Des Moines police department. He alleged an un-
reasonable search and seizure of said tools.

Defendant further alleged after he pleaded guilty to a

652 [| 7

charge of breaking and entering in Dickinson County his at-
torney attempted to retrieve the tools but was requested by
Detective Duane Terpenning of the West Des Moines police
department that he be permitted and allowed to keep said items
until the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation had an op-
portunity to examine them in an effort to clear up other break-
ing and enterings. Defendant alleged his attorney had willingly
agreed to cooperate after he had been assured by Terpenning
and Frank Comito, assistant Polk County attorney, these items
or any evidence regarding them would not be used against
Anderson.

This motion to suppress was submitted to the trial court,
then Judge John F. Stone, on the testimony of the West Des
Moines arresting officers, Terpenning and Comito, all of whom
were called by defendant. Thereafter the trial court prepared
and filed well prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law.

After reviewing many authorities the trial court concluded
the search and seizure of the tools was made substantially con-
temporaneously with defendant’s arrest and his automobile was
an instrumentality used in the transportation of burglar tools.

The court’s findings and conclusions include: “As to the
agreement between defendant’s counsel and the Assistant Polk
County Attorney, such agreement was not intended to bind any-
one except Polk County. The Court entertains great doubt as
to the efficacy of such an agreement. However, if such agree-
ment had any force or effect in Polk County, it has absolutely
no validity as to any prosecution in Hancock County, Iowa.”

The court overruled defendant’s motion to suppress as to
the hammer or mall, two pry bars and a screwdriver, which had
been taken from defendant’s automobile.

On trial, which had been delayed at defendant’s request,
evidence connecting the use of these tools in the breaking and
entering herein involved was received over defendant’s objection.

Defendant’s sole assigned error on this appeal is: “That the
Court erred in not suppressing all the evidence, in light of the
agreement between defendant and the State of Iowa.”

Defendant argues the agreement with the assistant Polk
eounty attorney covered any charge in Iowa, a promise of im-
munity by a prosecutor is the same as a pledge of public faith

_ ee 658

and should be honored and that breach of the agreement
amounted to denial of due process.

The State argues the agreement was limited to Polk County,
the tools were burglar tools and therefore contraband to which
defendant had no right of possession, the authority of a county
attorney is limited to his own county and he possessed no right
to grant immunity as claimed by defendant.

Our study of the abstract of record, the clerk’s transcript
and a transcript of the evidence submitted on hearing of the
motion to suppress, leads us to conclude application of the agree-
ment between defendant’s attorney and the assistant Polk
county attorney was limited to Polk County. We agree with the
quoted statement of the trial court in this regard.

About 3 a.m. July 27, 1966, Raymond D. Fidler, a West Des
Moines police officer, observed a 1965 blue and white convertible
Thunderbird automobile bearing Colorado license plates being
driven in an erratic manner. As he approached the vehicle he
observed the passenger drinking beer while the car was in motion.
Fidler then stopped the Thunderbird which he learned was being
operated by one Collins. Defendant was the passenger. It was
later learned defendant and his wife owned said vehicle.

As Fidler was stopping the Thunderbird, Sergeant Victor
Joseph Munoz, of the West Des Moines police force, arrived at
the scene. Fidler arrested Collins for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, Soon thereafter Fidler took Collins to Still
Hospital in Des Moines for a blood test and then returned to the
‘West Des Moines police station.

Sergeant Munoz went to the passenger side of the Thunder-
bird and asked defendant to step out. Defendant did so and
Munoz observed defendant was intoxicated. He placed defend-
ant under arrest for intoxication and for consuming beer on a
public highway. As defendant stepped out of the automobile,
Sergeant Munoz observed a can of beer in the front seat and
also a pry bar with a prong missing, a screwdriver, a suitcase,
binoculars and a First National Bank money pouch. These items
were readily visible, due in part to the lighted street and to the
inside lights of the automobile. Officer Munoz did not use a
flashlight in making this observation either as to the beer cans or
as to the tools. Sergeant Munoz placed defendant in Munoz’

654 [| |

patrol car and went back to the Thunderbird. - A partially filled
can of beer was in the front seat and an empty beer can on the
right side front seat on the floor. When Munoz reached down to
pick the beer can from the floor of the automobilé, he observed a
pry bar and a hammer or mall under the front dashboard.

Sergeant Munoz took the beer cans, placed them in the
patrol car, called for a tow truck and notified Detective Sergeant
Duane Terpenning. After the tow truck arrived, Sergeant
Munoz took the defendant to the West Des Moines police station
and placed him in jail. The tow truck arrived with the Thunder-
bird shortly thereafter as did Detective Sergeant Terpenning.
Officer Munoz'remained on guard over the Thunderbird.

After receiving information from-Colorado authorities re-
garding ownership of the vehicle, a search warrant-was obtained
and the officers removed the tools from the Thunderbird. The
State claims nothing under the search warrant as it appears
without dispute no sworn oath or affirmation was made by any
of the officers-as required by Code section 751.4. No issue, how-
ever; is raised on this appeal challenging the trial court’s holding
the tools were taken substantially contemporaneously with: de-
fendant’s arrest and his vehicle was being used to transport
burglar tools,

A charge of possession of ‘burglar tools was filed in Polk
County against defendant. Thereafter he entered a plea of
guilty in Dickinson County to a charge of breaking and entering
and was sentenced thereunder. The charge against him in Polk
County was then dismissed at the instance of the Polk county
attorney.

Thereafter defendant’s attorney on several occasions
requested the tools be ‘returned--to defendant by Sergeant
Terpenning but willingly agreed the Bureau of Criminal In-
vestigation could use the tools in an effort to clear up other
breaking and enterings. Terpenning testified he had the impres-
sion defendant’s attorney (a former assistant Polk county at:
torney) felt that by so doing no further prosecutions would be
had of the defendant. Terpenning emphatically denied he had
ever made such a promise to defendant’s attorney and the trial
court so: found. .

Frank Comito, an assistant Polk county attorney, testified

a ee 656

he had a conversation with defendant’s attorney, subsequent to
the plea to breaking and entering in Dickinson County and sub-
sequent to dismissal of the possession of burglar tools charge in
Polk County. Attorney Glenn wished to have the tools back.
Comito asked if he could send the tools to the Bureau of Criminal
Investigation to have the tools checked. Defendant’s attorney
gave permission on all except one tool, a wrench. Comito testi-
fied a stipulation was entered into, apparently oral, that the
Bureau of Criminal Investigation would not use the tools in
evidence against the defendant. Comito further testified that
by this stipulation he meant the Polk county attorney’s office
would not file any further charges against this defendant in
Polk County. He further testified he was acting onlyon behalf
of Polk County and was not attempting to bind any authorities
in Haneock County. No ¢laim is made the Bureaw of Criminal
Investigation or anyone actitig for the Bureau ever made any
agreement relative to the return of the burglar tools to defendant
or his counsel. .

The trial court’s finding the ‘agreement was not intended to
bind anyone except Polk County is supported by substantial
evidence and we agree therewith. State v. Gates, 260 Iowa 772,
150 N.W.2d 617, and citations; State v. Brant, 260 Iowa 758,
150 N.W.2d 621.

This holding is determinative of defendant’s only assigned
error. We need not and do not-decide any of the other conten-
tions made by the parties. o

Having found no reversible error, the judgment and sentence
of the trial court must be affirmed. —Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except Mason, J., who takes no part,

a
a
a

Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. Jamzs Brown and Bunny Earn
Hopson, appellants.

No. 52523.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 416)

JaNuARyY 9, 1968,

a De 657

John P. Roehrick, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Ray A Fenton, of Des Moines,
County Attorney, for appellee.

Broxer, J—Defendants were indicted for robbery with
aggravation, tried by a jury and convicted. They appeal on
several grounds. We affirm.

There is little factual dispute in this record. Defendants
took the stand and admitted their participation in the robbery.
They stated the guns they used were not loaded, they did not
display them, and they intended no violence. This appears to
have been a calculated effort to secure conviction for robbery, a
ten-year offense, in lieu of robbery with aggravation, a twenty-
five year offense. Defendants were found guilty of the more
serious charge.

The robbery occurred at the Hy-Vee food store at Johnston,
Iowa, at about 9 p.m. on August 19, 1966, Defendants entered
the store unmasked. When an employee attempted to help de-
fendant Brown at one of the counters, he told her to pick up a
sack and empty the money from the cash register into it. She
looked down and saw the barrel of a gun. Brown then took her
over to the next register and repeated the process. The safe was
opened by one of the employees and the contents taken. Defend-
ant Hudson stood along the wall. He also hada gun. The men
ordered the three employees and one customer to lie down on
the floor and left. All four witnesses related the same story.
All four identified both defendants. The money taken amounted
to just over $5000 plus checks.

I. Defendants first assign error for admission of evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure incident to an illegal arrest.
made without probable cause and without warrant. Therefore
defendants’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States were violated.

In several recent cases we have considered the rules in-
volving probable cause for arrest without warrant, and searches
incident thereto. State v. Anderson, 260 Iowa 122, 148 N.W.2d
414; State v. Rye, 260 Iowa 146, 148 N.W.2d 632; State v.

658 Le 7

Polton, 259 Iowa 435, 148 N.W.2d 307; State v. Raymond, 258
Towa 1339, 142 N.W.2d 444. We shall not again review the
numerous state and federal authorities on the subject. We
review this matter with those cases in mind and under the
general statement in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223,
13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (October 15, 1964) :

“‘The rule. of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical

conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating * * * often opposing interests. Requiring more
would unduly hamper law enforcement.’ To allow less would be
to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whini
or caprice.’ Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. at 176,
69 8. Ct. at 1811.”
"The facts concerning the arrest are simple. Three officers
each in a separate radio equipped patrol car participated. Each
heard the dispatch telling of an armed robbery near their area
at Johnston, and the announcement that a white Buick bearing
Texas licence plates FDB760 was a wanted car.

: Patrolman Brown, going north on Interstate 35, saw a car

going south he thought worth investigating. He followed it and
radioed the other two officers he was following a white Buick
bearing the indicated license plates, A roadblock was arranged,
: The actual stopping involved what the officers interpreted
as an effort to get around the block but the patrol cars were so
maneuvered as to. thwart any stich effort. When the car was
stopped the officers had’ ‘to. shout several times before the oc-
cupants got out of the car. At this point all three patrolmen
qere covering the car with shotguns.
“When the four oecupants, defendants and two women, got
out of the car Patrolman Aringdale immediately went to the
vehicle, put his hand under the front seat and felt what he
thought was a revolver butt. He told the occupants they were
under arrest. Patrolman Petersen went over to the car as officer
Aringdale left it, directed his light through the window onto the
floor in back and saw a Remington automatic pistol and a money
bag. He removed the articles and was told there was a revolver
under the, front seat. He removed, that too. Both guns were
loaded.

The car was more thoroughly searched after a search war-

, Po 659

rant was‘obtained: A woman’s handbag containing approxi-
mately $5000 and checks identified as connected with the robbed
store were found.in the Buick,

HMM Defendants argue a search does not change character
from its suecess. State v. Hagan, 258 Iowa 196, 1387 N.W.2d 895.
The State does not attempt to justify this stopping, search and
subsequent formal arrest by the fruits of the search. The officers
stopped a well identified “wanted” car shortly after hearing the
radioed information concerning the car and an armed robbery:
in the near vicinity. The officers acted on probable cause. Both
the arrest and search. were reasonable. The circumstances are
not unlike those in State v. Dwinells, 259 Iowa 945, 146 N.W.2d.
231, where we said it is probable the facts. would justify the
search but decided the case on the question of waiver.

* Defendants cite Patenotte v. United States, 266 F.2d 647
(5th Cir.), where five factors were listed as relevant to determine
probable cause to stop an automobile. We do not find the listing
of. five factors persuasive here. The test is more ‘accurately
stated in State v. Anderson, 260 Towa 122, 127, 148 N.W.2d
414, 417:

P| “It has been repeatedly held that what is a reasonable
search depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case,
[Cases cited.] The test of reasonableness is not’ to be stated in
rigid and absolute terms nor by any fixed formula. Arwine v.
Bannan, supra.”

II. Defendants have formally waived their second assign-
ment of error. Their present attorney was appointed to ‘pros-
ecute this appeal. The transcript and the record were silent on
the availability of a lawyer for defendants from August 19 to
September 22 (the date of arraignment). Newly appointed
appellate counsel included this lack of representation as an im-
portant point on appeal. Subsequently by affidavit, Martin R.
Dunn, the attorney who tried the case, certified he had been
representing defendants since August 22, The point has there-
fore heen abandoned.

III. Defendants also contend they were interrogated with-
out counsel ahd without adequate warning on the night of the
arrest. on

660 Pe az

HI Patrolman Petersen stated that defendant Hudson was
placed in his patrol car to be taken to the courthouse at Osceola.
On the way Hudson asked: “How did you all get onto us so
quick?” Petersen said that he had not even asked Hudson his
name at that point and had replied, “Look, I’m not asking you
any questions. You don’t ask me any.” Hudson then said,
“Well, I know all about that, but how did you all get onto us so
quickly?” Petersen testified he then renewed the warning given
out on the highway that anything Hudson said could be used
against him. About that time they got to the courthouse.

Hudson’s statements were clearly volunteered and do not
éome within the prohibitions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Hd.2d 694,

HH The other area of admissions concerned the testimony
of Deputy Sheriff Tharp who was present the night of the
arrest when defendants were being questioned by the county
attorney. Tharp stated: “They (defendants) were advised
that they had a right to remain silent, that anything they said
could and would be used against them in court, that they had
a right to counsel, and that if they were without funds, and
so forth, that the county would provide them with counsel.
* ® * He advised them they could have an attorney present at
this time of questioning.” Tharp also testified Hudson ad-
mitted being involved in a robbery and said the women were
not involved. Brown made no statement at all. Deputy Sheriff
Lewis testified to like effect but was not asked whether the
Miranda type warnings had been given.

We have no doubt that defendants were properly apprised
of their rights. In addition defendants made no objection to
any of testimony noted in this section, Hach defendant took
the stand and admitted his participation in the robbery. The
only portion of the State’s case they denied was that the guns
were loaded or that they had an intent to use them. This was
a definite, reasonable trial plan to avoid the extra punishment
associated with robbery with aggravation. Defendants cannot
complain of the evidence of Hudson’s statements to which no
objection was made. Failure to object was clearly part of the
trial tactics. This procedure constituted a waiver. State v.
Dwinells, 259 Iowa 945, 146 N.W.2d 281.

| | 661

Hl IV. Defendants also assert delay of warning from
time of arrest to time of county attorney’s warning later the
same night bars all prosecution. “Any statements made could
not have but enabled the State to insure a conviction and a more
adequately prepared case, at the expense of the appellants’
right to remain silent.” If evidence has been illegally obtained
the remedy is the exclusion of such evidence, ordinarily it does
not result in barring the prosecution altogether. United States
v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510.

Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

Srars or Iowa, appellee, v. DonatD Eucene Jonson, appellant.

No. 52516.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 512)

662 Le |
ee

January 9, 1968,

Jesse, LeTourneau & Johnston, by Norman G. Jesse, of
Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, James C. Sell, As-
sistant Attorney General, Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney,
and Donald Starr, Assistant County Attorney,. for appellee. -

Sruarz, J—A Polk County jury found defendant guilty
of the crime of drawing and uttering a false check over $20
contrary to section 713.3, Code of Towa. He has assigned two
errors.on appeal: (1) In permitting. the State to ask questions
on. eross-examination beyond the scope of the direct examination
in violation of sections 781.12 and 781.138, Code of Iowa, ‘and
his privilege against’ self-incrimination under “Amendment 5
to the Constitution of the United States, (2) In overruling
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence_as to signatures for
the reason that a signature used as an ‘exemplar was taken
from a fingerprint card signed by defendant before he was
advised of his constitutional rights tinder Amendments 5 and 6.

On July 22, 1966, a man entered Dahl’s Food Mart at 48th
and University, went to the courtesy counter and wrote a
check which he asked to have cashed. The check was drawn
on Capital City State Bank, payable to Dahl’s in the amount
of $30 and signed “D. H, Johnson, 1232 8th Street.” The clerk
took the check and-asked the man ‘for identification. He
showed her his‘driver’s license and she gave him $30 cash. She
latér became Suspicious.

‘When the man left the store a carry out boy followed him
to the car and got the license number. It was recorded on the

66s

cheek. The bank returned the check marked “No account”.
Prosecution followed. At the trial the clerk and other store
employees identified defendant as the party in question.

I. Defendant was called as a witness in his own behalf.
After giving his name he was asked the following questions
on direct examination:

“Q. Were you, on thé 22nd day of July, 1966, in posses-
sion of a driver’s license? A. No, sir.

“Q. You don’t have one? A. No, sir.

“Q. What is your normal procedure in writing your name
relative to the letter ‘S’ in Johnson? ~ A. This one here, the
small capital letter ‘S’.

“Q. You don’t make this kind of an ‘8S’? A. No, sir.”

On ecross-examination he was asked:

“Q. Mr. Johnson, I call your attention to State’s Exhibit
‘BE’. Do you always make your ‘S’ that way? A. Yes, sir.”

“Q. Have you always—A. Well, I couldn’ really—

“Q. Have you always in the past made it that way? A.
I don’t know. It’s like in grade school, you know, you have
like Greg (sic) Shorthand, that’s the typ¢é I came up under. I
guess you get personal writing traits or something. I couldn't
say I have always done it that way.

“Q. Did you ever make it like that one (indicating)?
A. Whether I have or haven't, I don’t know. I suppose I have
made one’ that way, yes, sir.

“Q. I want you to take a look: at State’s Exhibit ‘A’,
Have you ever seen that before? A. I can’t say that I have.

“Q. Isn't it a fact that you wrote that check, Mr. John-
son?” Over objection that it was not proper cross- examination
he answered “Yes, sir.”

’ After further questions he was asked what he did with
the check after he wrote it. Objection that it was not proper
‘eross-examination was overruled and he answered that he left
it in a room in the Randolph Hotel'and did not pass it at
Dahl’s.

Defendant claims the trial-court erred in permitting these
questions on cross- -examination under sections 781.12 and
781.18 which provide:

781.12 “Defendants in all criminal proceedings shall be

664 | a

competent witnesses in their own behalf, but cannot be called
as witnesses by the state.”

781.18 “When the defendant testifies in his own behalf,
he shall be subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness,
but the state shall be strictly confined therein to the matters
testified to in the examination in chief.”

These Code sections have been substantially the same since
1873 and there are many cases on point.

The State relies primarily upon State v. Shepard, 247 Iowa
258, 265, 73 N.W.2d 69, in which we say:

“It will be observed that in terms this section [781.13]
limits the cross-examination of a defendant somewhat nar-
rowly, and it is sometimes contended the cross-examination
must be confined to subjects already dealt with on direct ex-
amination, We think, however, this argument, properly ana-
lyzed, does not have the restrictive and limiting effect which
its proponents claim for it. The broad subject of the direct
examination, if material at all, is the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.”

Wigmore on Evidence, Third Hd., Volume VIII, section
2276(d), page 448, is cited in support of this view. We re-
peated this language in State v. Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 1161,
114 N.W.2d 526, 531.

Defendant argues at length that we should not follow
State v. Shepard, supra, as it renders sterile the intent of the
legislature as embodied in section 781.18 and frustrates the
manifest purpose of the statute and subjects defendant to a
much broader and more searching cross-examination than per-
mitted of an ordinary witness.

Although there appears to be much merit in defendant’s
argument, we do not need to follow the broad language of
Shepard to affirm the trial court here. In our opinion, the two
questions asked on direct examination opened the field of inquiry
to the extent that the cross-examination was proper as it dealt
with matters testified to on direct examination.

‘We assume the questions asked on direct examination were
relevant and material to the case. If so, how were they relevant?
Why was defendant asked how he made the “S” in his name,
Johnson? Obviously because the “S” on the check was made

a | 665

differently. From this he could then argue he did not sign the
check because it was not the way he wrote his name. The question
on direct therefore dealt with the matter of the making of the
check and it was proper on cross-examination to ask defendant
directly if he wrote the check.

The cross-examination was also proper because an admission
that he wrote the check in question with a different “S” than
he said he used on direct, would tend to impeach his testimony.

‘Why was he asked on direct examination if he had a driver’s
license on the day of the crime? The clerk had testified the man
who cashed the check produced a driver’s license for identifica-
tion. With his testimony he could argue there was a case of
mistaken identity as he had no license and therefore was not the
person who cashed the check. The question on direct examina-
tion was directed to the matter of the uttering of the check by
defendant. It was proper to ask defendant what he did with the
check after having written it.

We believe the cross-examination here is well within the
permissible limits established by Iowa authorities other than
State v. Shepard, supra. State v. Brown, 253 Iowa 658, 113
N.W.2d 286, 293; State v. Ragona, 232 Iowa 700, 704, 5 N.W.2d
907; State v. Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 481-482, 276 N.W. 207;
State v. Friend, 210 Iowa 980, 990, 230 N.W. 425; State v.
Brandenberger, 151 Iowa 197, 204-205, 180 N.W. 1065; State v.
Kuhn, 117 Iowa 216, 229-230, 90 N.W. 733; State v. Chingren,
105 Iowa 169, 172-173, 74 N.W. 946; State v. Watson, 102 Iowa
651, 654, 72 N.W. 283; State v. Hifert, 102 Iowa 188, 195, 65
N.W. 309, 38 L.R.A. 485, 68 Am. St. Rep. 483; State v. O’Brien,
81 Towa 98, 95, 46 N.W. 861; State v. Red, 53 Iowa 69, 70, 4
N.W. 831.

In State v. Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 481-482, 276 N.W. 207
defendant took the witness stand in her own defense. Direct
examination consisted of the following two questions:

“Q. You are the defendant in the case? A. Yes, sir,

“Q. Mrs. Hathaway, did you operate during the spring and
summer of 1935 a house of ill fame at 634 Walnut Street in
Waterloo? A. No, sir. * * *

“The State then subjected her to a cross-examination cover-
ing the period of time set out in the information and concerning

666 ee

what happened at 634 Walnut Street in Waterloo, Iowa, It will
be noted that the question and answer propounded to the accused
by her ‘own counsel on direct examination was the ultimate
question ‘which the jury itself was to decide. This question and
answer threw wide open the gates for the exploration of whether
or not Anna Hathaway did in fact operate a house of ill fame at
the place designated and during the said period of time.

“It would, indeed, be .a strange doctrine if the appellant
were allowed to deny her. guilt categorically, and then would be
permitted to preclude the State from inquiring into her conduct
with reference to-the very matter in issue. She took the witness
stand of her own free will, as she had a right to do, and by
answering one question she denied her guilt. . That question
covered the time,. the spring and summer of 1935; also, whether
she was operating .a house of ill fame during that period of time.
- The-State-had a right to ascertain.from-her what happened ‘dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1935 'at-the residence described,
It:had a right to ascertain from her what connection she had
with the operation of: the house at’ 634 Walnut. Street, Waterloo,
‘Towa;-and whether she knew what: was going on in that house, ag
testified to by-the girls who. lived there.” - .

» It would be an equally strange doctrine if.a defendant ecula
answer questions on direct examination which indirectly
amounted to-a denial of his participation in certain acts involved
and thereby preclude the State from’i ‘inquiring directly into the
Yery same. matters. .

“y A similar attempt to evade eross- -exarhination in the manner
suggested above was made,in Staté v.. Hifert, 102 Iowa’ 188, -195,
65 NW. 309, 38 L.R.A; 485, 63 Am. St. Rep. 483. .We said:

“Tt is strenuously urged that the court erred in permitting
éertain questions to be asked the defendant on cross-examina-
tion. It appeared from the direct.examination that the defénd-
ant undertook to state ‘his connedtion, or rather want of con-
nection, with the making of:the alleged-deposit. .He testified that
he. left town that. morning early, and went ‘to’ Waverly; that,
prior to going, he had:a conversation with his son about receiving
deposits on that day; that he told lim he was going to Waverly
to look the. ground over; and that, if-things: did not look favor-
able, he-would send the son:a. telephone message, through a: party

a a 667

who was with him, not to receive any more deposits, and to stop
doing business; that he sent the message to his son to stop doing
business, and not to receive any more deposits. On cross-exami-
nation, over the defendant’s objection, he was required to testify
when he returned from Waverly to Tripoli, and how long he
remained in Tripoli, and as to whether he found any deposits
had been made after two o’clock that day. The law, undoubtedly,
is that the eross-examination must be confined to the matters
about which the direct testimony is given. It is contended that
on cross-examination the State was limited to what the defendant
did at Waverly. We do not think so. The defendant was put
upon the stand to show that Mohling’s deposit was received
without his knowledge and against his instructions; and to
show such facts, he testified as we have stated. The defendant
having undertaken to explain his connection, or want of con-
nection, with this deposit, and to show that it was received
without his knowledge and against his will, any line of cross-
examination which tended to contradict his testimony in chief,
or which more fully disclosed his connection with this deposit,
‘was proper.”

Here defendant was put on the stand to indirectly deny the
signature and the uttering. This examination gave the State the
right to ask him directly about these two matters,

In eases in which we have held the permitted cross-examina-
tion was beyond the scope of the direct examination to the extent
that the trial court’s discretion was exceeded and the cross-
examination constituted reversible error; the matters inquired
into were in no way related to the direct examination.

In State v. Frese, 256 Iowa 289, 127 N.W.2d 83, defendant
in a rape ease admitted his presence at the scene but denied
having intercourse with the prosecuting witness and claimed she
consented to intercourse with others, The cross-examination was
directed to the present whereabouts of the others who had been
imprisoned after convictions growing out of this incident.

In State v. Leuty, 247 Iowa 251, 73 N.W.2d 64, defendant,
charged with incest with his daughter, testified on direct of her
hostility toward him because of his separation from her mother.
He was cross-examined as to an illicit. relationship with another

woman,

668 Pe ,

In State v. Yarham, 206 Iowa 833, 837-838, 221 N.W. 493,
defendant was charged with obtaining a note by false pretenses.
On cross-examination he was required to answer whether the
U.S. Post Office Department had denied him the use of the mails
in his rug business. The matter “did not tend in any manner to
prove the charge in the instant indictment.”

In State v. Burris, 194 Iowa 628, 634-636, 190 N.W. 38, a
Negro charged with murder was asked questions on cross-ex-
amination which intimated he had associated with white girls on
past occasions not related to the charge for which he was on
trial.

In State v. Campbell, 129 Iowa 154, 155, 105 N.W. 395, the
defendant charged with bootlegging on direct examination denied
selling to some named persons and said he prescribed whiskey
as medication for others. On eross-examination he was asked if
there was a civil suit against him by the wife of a man who she
claimed was injured while intoxicated by liquor purchased from
this defendant. He was also asked if the suit had been settled.

See also State v. Scott, 194 Iowa 777, 782-783, 190 N.W. 370.

We therefore hold the court did not err here in permitting
the eross-examination complained of as defendant had opened
inquiry into these fields by his questions on direct examination.

HE Il. We need not consider at length defendant’s con-
stitutional argument in view of our holding above. As we have
held the cross-examination was within the scope of the direct
examination, defendant, to that extent, waived his privilege
against self-incrimination under the cases cited by defendant.
Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305, 15 S. Ct. 610, 611,
39 L, Ed. 709; Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155, 78 8,
Ct. 622, 626, 2 L Ed:2d 589, 72 A.L.R.2d 818; United States ex
rel, Irwin v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911; Fitzpatrick v. United States,
178 U.S. 304, 315, 20 S. Ct. 944, 44 L. Ed. 1078,

Hi III. Following defendant’s arrest, Lieutenant Carroll
Dawson, who is in charge of the Des Moines Police Department’s
Identification Bureau, took his fingerprints and observed him
place his signature on the fingerprint cards. Lieutenant Dawson
testified he compared that signature with the one on the check
and concluded the check was written by defendant. Mr, Duane
L, Barton, assistant director and document examiner of the Iowa

a Pe 669

Bureau of Criminal Investigation, also testified that in his
opinion the two handwriting specimens were “authored” by the
same person,

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of these two
witnesses because the signature on the handwriting exemplar
was obtained without informing defendant of his right to protec-
tion against self-incrimination under Amendment 5 and his right
to counsel under Amendment 6 to the United States Constitution.

These specific matters have been decided adverse to de-
fendant’s contentions in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266,
87 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (1967), where the Supreme Court held
“the taking of the exemplars did not violate petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination” and “the taking
of the exemplars was not a ‘critical’ stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel.”

See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926,
18 L, Ed.2d 1149; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.
Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908.

For the reasons stated the trial court is affirmed —Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Srarz or Iowa, appellee, v. RayMonp Du Wayne Prrerson,
appellant.

No. 52591.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 412)

I

JANUARY 9, 1968,

James F, Fowler, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, William A. Claer-
hout, Assistant Attorney.General, Ray A.. Fenton, County. At-
torney, and Vincent M. Hanrahan, Assistant County Attorney,
for appellee.

Larson, J—The. defendant Raymond DuWayne Peterson
was convicted of the crime of breaking and entering a tavern
in Des Moines,-Iowa, known as Peggy’s Lounge, contrary: to.
the provisions of section 708.8 of the 1966 Code. He has ap-
pealed and assigns as error (1) the court’s denial of his written
motion to suppress evidence, to reconsider, for a mistrial,-and
for a new trial, because’ the evidence used against him was
obtained by illegal and unreasonable search and seizure, (2) the
overruling of defendant’s objections to testimony and exhibits
used against him, because ‘they were obtained by illegal’ search
and seizure, (3) thé refusal of the court to give defendant’s

a a ert

requested instructions and the overruling of his objections to
the instructions given, and (4) the admittance over defendant’s
objections of statements and admissions made by him to the
arrésting officer when the officer had not fully advised him of
his constitutional rights.

HJ Assignments 8 and 4 are not argued and are deemed
waived. State v. Mead, 237 Iowa 475, 22 N.W.2d 222. In any
event, we find no merit in any of these contentions and affirm
the trial court’s judgment sentencing defendant to the State
Penitentiary for a term of not to exceed ten years. The facts
will be stated as they become pertinent. a

I. Prior to trial defendant filed a motion to suppress evi-
dence, including statements obtained from him as a result of
an entry to'an apartment where he was found, his arrest, the
seizure of certain items of property found on him, and the
extent of the officer’s advice as to defendant’s constitutional
rights, for the reasons that (1) the officer’s entry into an apart-
ment occupied by defendant. was unlawful and unreasonable,
(2) the arrest was unlawful, (3) the seizure of defendant and
certain items found in the apartment was unlawful and un-
reasonable, and (4) damaging statements were elicited from
him by the arresting officer without first advising him of his
constitutional rights or allowing him the opportunity to
exercise them.

A hearing on this motion washad and the trial court over-
ruled the motion. Thereafter defendant’s motion to reconsider
the ruling was also considered and rejected. Defendant cor-
rectly maintains that evidence obtained during an illegal
search is not admissible at the time of trial, particularly where
a timely motion to suppress-the evidence has been filed. He
cites Amendments 4 and 14 to the United States Constitution,
and Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Hd.2d 1081, 84 AL.R.2d
933; State v. Post, 255 Iowa 578, 123 N.W.2d 11; and several
other federal and Iowa cases. We have considered these cases
and their basic holdings, ic, that the due process clause of
Amendment 14 precludes the admission of unconstitutionally-
seized evidence in a State proceeding. See State v. Shephard,

672 Le 7

255 Towa 1218, 1222, 124 N.W.2d 712. Also see 49 Iowa Law
Review 14.

|| However, we have also held, if there is a search, that
an accused may waive the protection afforded by the constitu-
tions and may freely consent to a search which might otherwise
be illegal. State v. Post, supra; Foley v. Utterback, 196 Iowa
956, 195 N.W. 721.

The State contends under the facts disclosed in this case
there was no search, legal or otherwise, but if there was a
search, permission for the search was freely and voluntarily
given. We agree and hold this record reveals no search was
made at the apartment where defendant was placed under
arrest.

HI Il. At the hearing on the motion to suppress it ap-
pears Mrs. Sample, a tenant on the lower floor of an apartment
building, heard an unusual noise coming from the adjoining
furnace room about 1:30 p.m. on Sunday, December 4, 1966.
She thought it was the landlord working on the furnace, and a
short time later when she opened her door to the furnace room
to talk with him, she observed the defendant standing at the
rear door leading into Peggy’s Lounge. It appeared he was
trying to put the door back together. The defendant first
looked at Mrs. Sample and then ran up a stairway leading to
apartments on the floor above. There was no other exit avail-
able to him. Mrs. Sample observed that defendant was wear-
ing a dark hat and brown suede jacket. Her suspicions being
aroused, she examined the front door of the Lounge and found
it locked. She then advised the landlord and together they ex-
amined the furnace room, determined a break-in had occurred,
and ealled the police. Officer Gillespie, in uniform, arrived
about 2:40 p.m., saw that the rear door to the tavern had been
pried open, that beer containers were lying around on the floor,
that the cash register drawer was open, and concluded there
had been a breaking and entering of the premises.

Upon being advised of Mrs. Sample’s observations, the
officer, the landlord and Mrs. Sample ascended the stairs to the
floor above and, hearing voices in Apartment 5, the officer
knocked on the door. He said nothing until the door was
opened by a man, later identified as a neighboring tenant. The

— a 63

officer asked if he could come in, was told “Yes, come right in,”
and he did, followed by Mrs. Sample and the landlord. In the
apartment they observed three men and many empty cans of
beer on the floor. Defendant was sitting or lying on the bed,
and his hat and jacket were on a chair or stand nearby. Mrs.
Sample immediately identified him as the person she had seen
running from the rear door of the tavern and pointed out the
hat and jacket he had been wearing. Officer Gillespie said he
then advised defendant of his constitutional rights to an at-
torney and that anything he said could be used against him,
and placed him under arrest for the Lounge break-in. There-
after, the defendant first denied that he knew anything about
the tavern entry and asked “What break-in?” When advised
that it was the Lounge downstairs, he said, “Well, I might as
well admit it, you have got me.” While no search of defendant
was made at that time, the officer took him and his hat and
jacket to the police station.

It appears that the person who leased Apartment 5, Mr.
Ayers, had gone on an errand and intended to be back shortly,
that he had told his three guests “he would be right back, stick
around”. It also appears no one in particular was left in
charge, although defendant had been an overnight guest. In
any event, when the officer asked to come in, no one including
defendant voiced any objections to his entry. No force or
deceit was used to gain admission to this apartment, and the
trial court found there was no evidence of an illegal entry.
Clearly then, unless the entry was unlawful, the defendant’s
arrest was lawful. The officer was aware that a crime had
been committed and the suspect had been pointed out to him.
State v. Raymond, 258 Iowa 1339, 142 N.W.2d 444, 447; State
vy. Brant, 260 Iowa 758, 150 N.W.2d 621.

HJ [Il 1t is reasonable to believe that when guests are
left in charge of one’s private premises, they possess the author-
ity to grant or deny admission thereto to visitors, It must be
remembered that the request here was for admission only, not
for a right to search. This is a vital distinction, A granted
request for admission is not the same as leave to search one’s
private premises. We would hesitate to say these guests could
authorize a search of the Ayers apartment, but that was not the

614 ee a

request, nor was any effort made to conduct a search. No
complaint was made by Ayers, who would be the proper party
to complain if a search of his premises had been made. We are
satisfied the officer, the landlord and Mrs. Sample were not
illegally upon the private premises where defendant was seen.

HH It is well settled that when peace officers are lawfully
admitted to private premises, what they see once they are in,
that is, what is in plain view, is not a search. United States v.
Barone (1964), 2 Cir., N.Y., 3380 F.2d 548, 544, and citations;
State v. Brant, supra; State v. Polton, 259 Iowa 435, 143
N.W.2d 307, and citations. We find no better statement as to
our view here than that found in the Brant case. There we
said at page 763 of 260 Iowa: “Whether it might be determined
that: the situation here constituted a search incident to arrest
or with defendant’s voluntary consent is immaterial. There
was no search in the constitutional sense under the cireum-
stances here.” There the officer’s entrance into the hotel room
of the suspect was permitted and, as here, the articles con-
necting the defendant with the crime were in plain view.

We find no merit in appellant’s contention that a search
warrant was necessary under these circumstances. The officer
here was merely conducting an investigation of the Lounge
break-in and information as to the flight of.a suspect. He had
no probable cause to believe the suspect was then in that
apartment. .

HM The only evidence of a search found in this record
refers to the taking of certain items at the police station. In
this regard attention is called to well-recognized exceptions to
the rule requiring a warrant, ie., those searches and seizures
made with voluntary consent and when made incident to a law-
ful arrest. See State v. Raymond, State v. Polton and State v.
Shephard, all supra. No complaint is made as to that search,
and only the properly identified hat, coat, and dollar bill found
in the jacket were admitted for jury consideration.

In State v. Polton, supra, 259 Iowa 435, 488-439, 143
N.W.2d 307, 309, we held the evidence obtained when boy-
invitees in the suspect’s apartment admitted officers, who then
legally arrested the suspect, was not rendered inadmissible by
the manner of their admission to the apartment. In consider-

a | 675

jng similar constitutional contentions on appeal, we had this to
say: “Without stopping to consider now whether there was
any search here we think the vital question in the case is
whether the arrest of defendant without a warrant was legal.
If so there was no violation of the constitutional provisions he
invokes. Defendant admits a search may be made without a
warrant therefor if it is incidental to a legal arrest. State v.
Raymond, 258 Iowa 1339, 1844, 142 N.W.2d 444, 447, so holds.
‘We are.clear the arrest was pursuant to statutory authority
and entirely legal.” Consideration there was given the author-
ity relied on in the case at bar and need not be repeated here.

In State v. Brant, supra, 260 Iowa 758, 150 N.W.2d 621,
we fully considered the contentions advanced herein as they
relate to Amendment 4 to the United States Constitution. Al-
though in Brant the accused granted admission to his hotel
room, and the object of the officer’s visit was to investigate a
restaurant robbery, .the discovery and taking of a coat and
gun which matched the description given by the victim of the
robbery was held not to be the product of an unreasonable and
unlawful search and seizure.

IV. At the trial Mrs. Sample and the landlord, Mr.
Goebel, testified basically the same as at the hearing on the
motion to suppress, except Mrs. Sample was not able to
identify the hat defendant was wearing when she first saw him.
She recalled hearing the officer advise defendant at the apart-
ment that he did not have to admit anything and that he would
be charged with breaking and entering. Mr. Goebel identified
the hat as the one that was lying on top of the jacket when
seen and identified by Mrs. Sample in the apartment.

Pauline Taylor, the owner of Peggy’s Lounge, testified
that she locked both front and back doors of the tavern the
morning of December 4, 1966, that she left small change, in-
cluding six and a half dollars in Kennedy half dollars, a
Canadian dollar bill, a two-dollar bill, and two keys, in the
eash register, that there was money in the jukebox, and that
the beer cooler had been filled. She further testified, after
being called at 5 p.m., she checked the tavern and found the
rear door torn loose, the money and keys gone from the cash

676 | 7

register, the jukebox broken into, and seventeen six-packs of
beer gone from the cooler.

It appeared the Canadian dollar bill was similar to the one
taken from the tavern cash register and had a similar tear in it.
The keys were identified as the missing keys from the tavern
cash register. Although defendant alleges these items were
taken at the apartment after he was placed under arrest, the
jury could have found they were taken from him in the book-
ing room at the police station. In either event the seizure was
proper.

At no place in this record does it appear any objection
was made to the search at the police station or to the con-
temporaneous seizure of the items listed, including hat, jacket,
and Canadian dollar bill. The trial court submitted only
Exhibits 1 and 2 (the hat and jacket) and Exhibit 5 (the
Canadian dollar bill) to the jury. On other grounds the court
did not permit jury consideration of Exhibits 3, 4 and 6, the
latter being the bag of coins and keys. We find no error in
these rulings.

Although there were exceptions made to the instructions
given by the court, and the court’s rulings upon defendant’s
motions for a new trial were assigned as error, counsel did not
argue them here and under the rule those assignments are
deemed waived. State v. Mead, supra, 237 Iowa 475, 22
N.W.2d 222,

In addition to the assignments listed, we have examined
the record for errors which would affect defendant’s right to a
fair trial and find no grounds for reversal. See State v. Gates,
260 Iowa 772, 150 N.W.2d 617, and citations—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

SE ———EEE 677

Juu1a M, Tort, appellee, v. Crry or Sioux Crry, appellant.

No. 52781.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 502)

678

January 9, 1968,

Ernest Turek and Donald ‘W. Sylvester, both of Sioux
City, for appellant.

William A. Shuminsky, of Sioux City, for appellee.

Sruart, J—Plaintiff, Julia M. Tott, brought this action in
equity to compel the City of Sioux City to open and improve a
dedicated street abutting plaintiff’s lots which had been ac-
cepted by the city. The question on appeal is whether
mandamus will lie to compel a city council to open such street.
The district court imposed a mandatory duty upon the defend-
ant-city to open, improve, grade, and make a roadway of an
established public street. A writ of mandamus was issued
commanding the city to perform this “ministerial” duty. The
city has appealed.

Schulein and Peters’ Morningside Addition to Sioux City,
was surveyed and platted into lots, blocks, streets and alleys,
was dedicated to the public and accepted for public-use by the
defendant-city. - Said plat was filed for record in. the office of
the Recorder of Woodbury County on June 18, 1887. The plat
included a public street identified.as Mulberry Avenue, but
which was changed by ordinance on March 23, 1911, to “South
Mulberry Street”. Plaintiff has owned Lots 11-16, Block 18,

ee or

in said Addition since November 20, 1957. South Mulberry
Street runs in a north-south direction and abuts the west side
of plaintiff’s lots.

Plaintiff’s lots are bounded on the north by a railroad
right-of-way which constitutes an impassable barrier, on the
south by defendant’s property known as Lot 10, Block 13, of
Schulein and Peters’ Morningside Addition and on the east
by other property owned by defendant.

A concrete street, Hast Gordon Drive, is just south of Lot
10, Block 18. It extends generally northwest and southeast
and is a main thoroughfare in Sioux City. South of East
Gordon Drive, Mulberry Street is a paved street 66 feet wide
which has been used for many years by the public as a public
highway for vehicular and pedestrian use. The portion of
Mulberry Street involved herein, which is approximately 250
feet long, north of East Gordon Drive has never been opened,
graded, improved or used by the public as a street. Plaintiff
and her predecessors in title have on numerous occasions ap-
peared before the city council and demanded that defendant
open, grade and improve this portion of South Mulberry Street.
The city council on all occasions has refused to do so.

Plaintiff claims she would like to improve said premises
by building thereon but cannot do so until the defendant city
provides access to the lots as there is no other means of ingress
or egress to her property. The topography of South Mulberry
Street north of East Gordon Drive is such that it cannot be
used for travel by either vehicles or pedestrians without being
graded and improved.

[| I. Does a city have a mandatory duty to open and
improve a street, dedicated and accepted as a public street,
when requested to do so by the owner of lots abutting such
unopened strect if the owner has no other access to his lots?
‘We hold the city has a discretionary power in the matter
rather than a mandatory duty to do so.

HJ The State, having full authority and power over public
highways, can delegate control of those within a municipality
to the municipal authorities. Central Life Assurance Society
vy. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 578, 578, 171 N.W. 31. It has
done so by section 389.1, Code of Iowa, which provides:

680 — 7

“Cities and towns shall have power to establish, lay off,
open, widen, straighten, narrow, vacate, extend, improve, and
repair streets, highways, avenues, alleys * * * within their
limits.”

Although we have found no Iowa cases in which the power
to open a street has been directly involved, other powers con-
ferred by this section have been considered.

HI “The powers thus conferred are legislative in char-
acter, and within the limits prescribed by statute are plenary.
The only limit upon them which the courts have been inclined
to recognize is that they shall not be exercised unreasonably.”
Lacy v. City of Oskaloosa, 143 Iowa 704, 708, 121 N.W. 542,
31 L.RB.A., NS., 853.

HH Under section 389.1, “a wide discretion is vested in
cities and towns in the opening, control and vacation of streets
and alleys. While the exercise of this power is not unlimited,
yet where it is exercised in good faith, and for what it believes
to be the public good, the courts will not interfere in the action
of the municipality. Such interference is justified only in a
clear case of arbitrary and unjust exercise of the power. (Cit-
ing cases) Stoessel v. Ottumwa, 227 Iowa 1021, 1022-1028, 289
N.W. 718; Des Moines City Ry. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa
495, 503, 216 N.W. 284; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271, 276.

The listed powers are separate and distinct. The invoking
of any one power does not make it mandatory for the city to
exercise one or more of the others. A city may “establish” or
“lay off” streets or accept a dedication of streets to the public
without being required to open them to the public upon re-
quest. Cities must be able to intelligently plan their streets
for future needs. Plats may be necessary long before public
need demands the opening of a street. “We have said repeat-
edly that many streets in new plats were dedicated with no
serious thought of their immediate improvement or extensive
use, but largely to accomodate future needs.” (Citing cases)
Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 173, 5 N.W.2d 12,
19. The city council has just as much diseretion in determin-
ing whether public necessity requires that a street be opened
as it does in exercising any of the other enumerated powers.

This conclusion is in accord with the overwhelming weight

SE 681

of authority. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Third Ed.,
Volume 10, section 30.31; 63 C.J.S. 638, Municipal Corpora-
tions, section 1043; DeVille v. City of Oakdale, La. App., 180
So. 2d 556; People ex rel. Lyddy v. City of Rock Island, 45 DL.
App. 2d 76, 194 N.H.2d 647; Aro Investment Co. v. City of
Omaha, 179 Neb. 569, 189 N.W.2d 849, 352; State ex rel. Town-
send v, Board of Park Commrs., 100 Minn. 150, 110 N.W. 1121,
9 L.RB.A., NS., 1045; City of Norton v. Lowden, 84 F.2d 663;
Hoglund v. City of Summit, 28 N.J. 540, 147 A.2d 521, 528;
Appeal of Bender, 106 Pa. Super. 376, 163 A. 47, 49; Town of
Chouteau v. Blankenship, 194 Okla. 401, 152 P.2d 379, 384,
171 A.L.R. 87; Parker v. City of Philadelphia, 391 Pa. 242, 187
A.2d 348, 349; Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d
848, 845; City of Jefferson v. Hiffler, 16 Wis.2d 123, 1138 N.W.2d
834.

Hl Il. Plaintiff argues “the transaction, whereby a pri-
vate owner of land plats the same and dedicates a part thereof
to the public for use as a street or other public purpose, is in
the nature of a contract, is binding upon both parties and con-
fers rights and creates obligations”, including the burden of
opening and improving the streets within a reasonable time.
She relies on Warren v. The Mayor of Lyons City, 22 Iowa 351.
‘We do not find it controlling here. Section 409.13 of the Code
was in effect when the plat involved here was acknowledged
and recorded: It provides: “Such acknowledgment and record-
ing shall be equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion
of the premises platted as is set apart for streets or other public
use * * *,”

There was no specific reservation of any rights. The grant
must be considered to have been made with the statutory
authority of municipalities to control its streets in view.

In Warren v. The Mayor of Lyons City, supra, the dedica-
tion of the land for a public square took place prior to the
enactment of the statute under which defendant claimed the
right to dispose of the property. We held it would impair the
obligation of contract if it were applied retroactively.

Shortly after Warren v. The Mayor of Lyons City we held
“when land has been dedicated under the statute, without res-
ervation, and the plat has been recorded and accepted * * *

682 De |

the dedicator or his grantee has no special proprietary rights
in the soil composing the streets, but the dominion of the
streets passes to the public authorities.” City of Des Moines
v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234, 245. We also said therein: “At common
law, the dedication of land for streets was of the use simply.
The statute changes this, makes the dedication extend to the
soil, and the soil includes of course, the minerals therein.”

It would be highly impractical to make a distinction be-
tween the power of a city to control streets dedicated by pri-
vate individuals and those established in some other manner.
Most streets are now dedicated and in the absence of accept-
ance under some specific reservation, the city has and must
have plenary authority to control them,

Hl 101. Plaintiff also argues owners of property abutting
a street have special right in the street as distinguished from
the general public. This is true where a‘street has been opened
and used. Long v. Wilson, 119 Iowa 267, 272, 93 N.W. 282, 60
LRB.A. 720, 97 Am. St. Rep. 315; Liddick y. City of Council:
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361: No special rights are
acquired until the street lias been opened and used by the
property owner. In Aro Investment Co. v. City of Omaha, 179
Neb. 569, 575, 189 N.W.2d 349, 352, plaintiff sought to contest
the vacation of a section of a street abutting its property which
had never been opened. The Nebraska Court said: “There
was no public use. Consequently, the plaintiff and its pred-
ecessors in interest could not aequire any interest therein
which would force the city to use said street or permit plain-
tiff to contest its vacation.” °

Hl lV. Plaintiff also argues that if the opening and im-
provement of a street is discretionary with the city, it abused
its discretion in failing to open the street under the cireum-
stances here. We do not agree. Abuse of discretion in refus-
ing to open the street is determined by the need of the general
public, not the plaintiff. Call Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 227 Iowa 142, 144, 287 N.W. 832; Aro Invest-
ment Co. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 569, 189 N.W.2d 349, 352;
City of Jefferson v. Hiffler, 16 Wis.2d 123, 118 N.W.2d 834,
839. Her particular situation may be considered as it affects
the public good. . mo

PC = 683

| This would be a dead-end street 250 feet long. Except
for a narrow frontage owned by the city, all lots on one side
are owned by the plaintiff. The owner of the lots on the other
side of the street is not involved. The terrain is such that it is
impassable without grading and improvement. We are not
told what this might cost. We are not told how crowded the
area is or what public necessity demands this street be opened.
Under this record it was not an abuse of discretion for the city
to refuse to open it.

While we realize plaintiff's property would have much
greater value if the street were opened, there was no street or
access when she purchased the lots. Her predecessors in title
had been unsuccessful in getting the street opened. She is not
injured as the price she paid for the lots would reflect their
value with the street unopened. She cannot compel the city
council to open the street to give her access at the expense of
the general taxpayers, in the absence of a showing of public
necessity. There was no attempt to make such showing.

For the reasons stated, we reverse—Reversed,

All Jusrices concur.

Donna Urrer, appellant, v. Richarp Urtsre, appellee.

No. 52793.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 419)

a
ied
rg

January 9, 1968.

Bernard L. Willis, of Lake City, for appellant.
Pendleton & Pendleton, of Storm Lake, for appellee.

Mason, J.—Plaintiff Donna Utter filed petition for divorce
against defendant Richard Utter, alleging cruel and inhuman
treatment such as to endanger her health and life. She asked
custody of the three minor children, two of whom were born
to this marriage and the older daughter born to a previous
marriage of plaintiff and later adopted by defendant, child
support, award of property, suit money, attorney fees and

| | | 685

other relief. When the petition was filed plaintiff secured an
injunction restraining defendant from coming on or about the
family residence at Storm Lake and from threatening, striking
or otherwise interfering with plaintiff or her minor children
during the pendency of the suit.

Defendant filed answer and cross-petition denying plain-
tiff’s right to a divorce and himself asking a divoree, alleging
eruel and inhuman treatment toward him and that Donna has
been openly keeping company with Eldon Lenox, frequenting
bars and taverns, going to his apartment and conducting her-
self in an improper manner.

The contested issues in the case involved the grounds for
divorce, custody of the children, property rights and alimony.

Following trial, defendant was granted a divorce and cus-
tody of the two youngest children subject to certain visitation
rights to the mother. Plaintiff was awarded custody of the
older daughter, $85 per month child support and permanent
alimony of $7500.

Plaintiff appeals, assigning as the proposition relied on
for reversal error in awarding defendant custody of the two
youngest children, Ronda, 8 and Randy, 11, and making an
unfair award of property and alimony. No attack is made on
the granting of a divorce to defendant on his eross-petition.

HI. The trial court’s decree was filed February 2, 1967.
On February 6 defendant paid the $7500 into court, and it was
forthwith paid over and accepted by plaintiff. Having ac-
cepted the financial benefits incident to the decree she may not
now raise questions of property settlement or alimony. Jensen
v. Jensen, 260 Iowa 371, 379, 147 N.W.2d 612, 617, and cita-
tions. Of course, this does not estop plaintiff from appealing
and securing our consideration of the child custody question.
Jackson v. Jackson, 248 Iowa 1365, 1876, 85 N.W.2d 590, 597.

IL. The remaining issue is thus whether custody of Ronda
and Randy should go to defendant.

Hl The best interest of the child is the first and govern-
ing consideration in determining who is entitled to custody
of niinor children of divorced parents, all other considerations
such as parental rights and desires must yield readily to such
determination and the court’s decision must be based upon

686 co |

what will be the most conducive to the general welfare of the
children. Authorities need not be cited for this. Rule 344(f)-
(15), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hi There is a presumption that generally it is best for
small children to be in the care of their mother but this is not
strong, and yields readily to other considerations. Harwell
v. Harwell, 253 Towa 418, 418, 112 N.W.2d 868, 872, and
citations.

Although we review the evidence de novo we give weight
to the trial court’s decision, especially in the matter of eredi-
bility of witnesses, because of his superior position to deter-
mine the real truth. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 252 Iowa 414,
419, 107 N.W.2d 114, 117, and citations.

HM IIL. The trial court found defendant fit and suitable
to have custody of Ronda and Randy and it was in their best
interest that he be awarded their care, custody and control
subject to visitation rights given plaintiff.

After graduating from Storm Lake high school plaintiff
attended Buena Vista College one semester. Her first mar-
riage ended in divorce four years before this marriage. She
had been working in the telephone office at $75 a week before
marrying defendant June 6, 1954, in Storm Lake. They lived
together until approximately June 28, 1966.

Defendant, 39 at trial time, had graduated from Buena
Vista, worked five years as a high school athletic coach -and
teacher and was so employed at Newell at.the time of his mar-
riage to plaintiff. Later he spent a year as a Farm Bureau
fieldman at Red Oak. He next became district manager for
Hillard Chemical Company at Storm Lake. He continued in
this employment about ten years before terminating his rela-
tionship with them September 1, 1966. In September 1965 he
started work for Mutual of Omaha.

As bearing on what appears to be for the best interest and
welfare of these children we turn to the trial court’s decree.

The court. found that since early April 1966 plaintiff had
been associating with Eldon Lenox who resides in an apart-
ment in Storm Lake; she had been alone with him on numerous
occasions in April through November 1966. They had kissed
and embraced in his car, her car, various bars, and public

a a 68

amusement places. July 9, 1966, while with Lenox plaintiff
was intoxicated at the Powder Puff. Several times plaintiff
has been with Lenox in his apartment late at night. Several
other specific times when plaintiff had been with Lenox she
came home at hours between 12:30 and 5 a.m.

In April, while defendant and Randy were away at the
Drake Relays in Des Moines, plaintiff was with Lenox in his
apartment and walked home in early morning. On a night in
early May, about 11:15, Mrs. Scott, living in another unit of
the same apartment house, saw plaintiff walk from the apart-
ment house with Lenox to her car parked in the alley behind
the apartment house, get in the car and drive away. Lenox re-
turned to his apartment. Mrs. Scott saw this same car parked
in the alley behind this apartment house on numerous occasions
that spring. On another night last spring before this action
was instituted, while defendant and Randy were at Lake Oko-
boji, plaintiff called Lenox from her home and Lenox and his
brother then came to the Utter house. Plaintiff has indicated
her desire for Lenox, stating she would give up anything for
him.

In cross-examination of plaintiff, defendant laid the
grounds for impeachment by asking her about her association
with Lenox. The substance of her answers was that she knew
Lenox, had been with him only in the presence of others and
a denial of everything else. Her testimony on these points
was totally impeached by defendant’s witnesses who clearly
established the extent of plaintiff's relationship with Lenox.

From our review of the record we agree with these find-
ings of the trial court although defendant’s conduct especially
on one occasion was not beyond censorship.

Hi In all cases motherhood is a factor to be given weight
in deciding questions of child custody and not every act of in-
discretion or immorality should deprive a mother of the cus-
tody of her children because we recognize that a parent who
has been guilty of some indiscretion or even immorality may
reform and be capable of making a proper home for children.
However, moral transgressions of the mother must be consid-
ered together with other relevant factors including the habits
and propensities of the parties desiring custody of children

688 || |

in determining what is best for the child. Wendel v. Wendel,
252 Iowa 1122, 1125-1126, 109 N.W.2d 482, 434, and citations;
Fritz v. Fritz, 260 Iowa 409, 148 N.W.2d 392, 397.

Hl Plaintiff's contention that the trial court deprived her
of custody as punishment for improper conduct and ill-advised
denial of her associations with Lenox is without merit. This
court has neither the right nor the inclination to punish or re-
ward either parent in matters of this kind. Dean v. Dean, 244
Towa 1297, 1818, 60 N.W.2d 551, 560; Wendel v. Wendel,
supra; Harwell v. Harwell, supra, 253 Iowa at 420, 112 N.W.2d
at 873; Fritz v. Fritz, supra.

There is in addition to evidence showing plaintiff’s con-
tinued affair with another man her apparent disregard for
truthfulness and the sanctity of an oath as demonstrated by
her testimony on cross-examination where she repeatedly de-
nied facts relevant to her conduct with Lenox.

The children had been living with plaintiff in the home
of the parties during pendency of this action. Plaintiff is a
good housekeeper and keeps the home and the children orderly
and clean. Defendant in seeking custody of the children pro-
posed to live in the home of the parties and have his mother,
69 or 70, assist in their care. The home was described as
average and completely furnished.

We realize the assistance of defendant’s mother in rearing
these young children does not present the ideal situation.
However, seldom if ever do we find an ideal situation for
children from a broken home.

On the whole we are satisfied with the trial court’s dispo-
sition of the question of child custody.

The cause is—Affirmed.

All Jusrices concur.

SS

B. L. Wass and Cuas, E. Hien, conservators of property of
H. D. Mone, appellants, v. Farmers Stare Bank oF
Lake View et al., appellees.

No. 52770.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 407) -

620

January 9, 1968.

B, L. Willis, of Lake City, and Charles E. Hird, of Jeffer-
son, for appellants.

Thomas L. McCullough, of Sac City, for appellees.

Snewzt, J—This is an action for declaratory judgment at-
tacking an executor’s sale and to establish homestead rights.

When parents cooperate or acquiesce in the waste of their
substance by a son there is little that courts can do to restore
their former status. “As the trial court commented the mis-
fortune apparent here resulted solely and only from the con-
duct and failure of a son.

On October 21, 1966, H. D. Mohr filed in the Sac District
Court his voluntary petition for appointment of conservator
stating that he was not-a mental retardate, a mentally ill
person or a minor and had property in the state requiring
management attention.: This application was several years
after he had disposed of his property. On his recommendation
plaintiffs herein were appointed and have brought this action
in their fiduciary capacity. They make no claim that H. D.
Mohr has at anytime been mentally incbmpetent.

The chronology of events discloses the situation.

For mary years prior to April 16, 1959, plaintiffs’ ward,
H. D. Mohr, was the owner of the 280-acre tract of land, part
of which is involved herein.

On April 16, 1959, H. D. Mohr and Sophia Mohr, husband
and wife, by warranty deed conveyed the land to Arnold Mohr,
son of H. D. Mohr. Arnold Mohr testified that, it was to re-
finance the farm.

Nowhere in the deed was there any reservation of any
homestead right to plaintiffs’ ward, nor a reservation of any

SS 6

other rights. The grantee, Arnold Mohr, assumed the existing:

mortgages. Shown on the deed were revenue stamps in the
amount of $55.

Subsequent deeds to the premises were for security pur-
poses and in legal effect mortgages.

On September 8, 1959, Arnold Mohr, single, deeded the
land in question to R. 8. Dickey. The deed was a warranty
deed with $22 revenue stamps affixed. Nowhere in the deed
was there any mention of any homestead rights or any other
rights of H. D. Mohr.

On March 18, 1963, R. S. Dickey and wife deeded the land
in question to E. H. Lougee, Incorporated. The deed was a
special warranty deed.

.On June 24, 1963, there was a corporate deed from E. H.
Lougec, Incorporated, to Arnold Mohr, for the land in ques-
tion and an additional 120 acres. The deed was recorded July
8; 1963, . nt

On June 19, 1968, there was a deed from Arnold Mohr to
E. P. Kettering for the land in question and the additional 120
acres. The deed was recorded July 8, 1963. No reservation
of any rights of H. D. Mohr was made in this deed.

The claim of the plaintiffs’ ward is limited. It is claimed
that by oral agreement between Arnold and H. D. Mohr plain-
tiffs’ ward was to live in one of the houses on the 280 acres.
The ward and his wife were to have the use of the chicken
house and one barn and space for two birdhouses and a garden
plot, together with access to the buildings as long as H. D.
Mohr and his wife lived.

There is no claim that plaintiffs’ ward has any interest in
the remaining 280 acres nor any interest in the 120 acres,

Sometime before June 19, 1968, when Arnold Mohr deeded
the farms to E. P. Kettering as security, Arnold Mohr and
H. D. Mohr had become indebted to the Farmers State Bank at
Lake View. Additional funds were loaned to Arnold Mohr
in June of 1963. The money was used to complete the purchase
of the 120 acres of land.

As security for the loan to purchase the 120 acres of land,
and as security for other loans to Arnold Mohr and H. D. Mohr

Fe

which were in default, Arnold Mohr executed the deeds in
favor of E. P. Kettering.

Kettering as an officer of the Farmers State Bank had
handled financial transactions for both H. D, Mobr and Arnold
Mohr before the deeds in question to E. P. Kettering. Ketter-
ing: obtained financial statements from both H. D. Mobr and
Arnold Mohr. At no time, neither verbally nor in financial
statements, did H. D. Mohr ever claim any interest, homestead
or other right in the farmland after he had deeded the 280 acres
to Arnold Mohr in 1959. The debts to the bank became delin-
quent and were in default and on the 28th day of April, 1965,
the bank and Kettering commenced an action of foreclosure
of the deeds. This action joined Arnold Mohr and H. D. Mohr
as parties and notice was served on H. D. Mohr along with
Arnold Mohr. Counsel appeared for both Arnold Mohr and
H. D. Mohr.

A written stipulation was filed and Arnold Mohr and-H. D.
Mobr stipulated as to the amount of the indebtedness owing
by both parties and authorizing the court to enter judgment
against the defendants for the amounts and to enter a decree
of foreclosure. Pursuant to this stipulation, judgment was
entered against the defendants by order of the Sae County
District Court.

On October 30, 1965, final judgment and decree was signed.
and filed. Execution was issued. Sheriff’s notice of sale was
given pursuant to statute including notice to Arnold Mohr
and H. D. Mohr. There is no attack on the sufficiency of the
notices, Neither Arnold Mohr nor H. D. Mohr filed or re-
quested anything. There is no showing that either attended
the execution sale.

On March 11, 1966, the real estate was sold at sheriff's
sale and was sold to Mr. Kettering and the bank.

On December 2, 1966, Edna Garrison as a junior lienholder
on the land in question, redeemed from the foreclosure sale
and paid to the Farmers State Bank and Kettering the sum of
$88,372.32.

I. There are two houses on the 280-acre farm. In
behalf of their ward plaintiffs claim that H. D. Mohr and Mrs,
Mohr have the right to occupy one of the houses for life.

CC

There is no claim that there is anything of record to support
any claim of a homestead. H. D. Mohr has not been the record
owner since 1959. There is no claim of any oral claim or notice
to anyone.

The claim is based solely on the testimony of Arnold
Mohr and H. D. Mohr. Each testified what was agreed between
them. H. D. Mohr testified:

“I recall back a number of years ago, about 1959, I and
my wife giving a deed to the 280-acre farm to my son Arnold
Mohr. I think it was in the spring of the year. I think it was
in April. * * * We had a verbal agreement that we can live in
there as long as we live. That was I and Mrs. Mohr for the life
of both of us, and that would be to live in the house. We
could have a little livestock, we could have one barn and the
garden and the house yard and access to road. Since that time
I have been using that house and those buildings and yard I
have referred to and I am still using them at this time.”

Arnold Mohr’s testimony was essentially the same.

HI The continued occupancy of one of the houses after the
deed was not notice of any claim to homestead rights.

Holm Clark v. Chapman, 213 Iowa 787, 746, 239 N.W.
797, this appears:

«“@ ®* 4 grantor in a warranty deed who continues to hold
possession after the delivery of his deed is presumptively
deemed to hold the same in subordination to the deed, and not
in hostility thereto. The alleged possession, in order to con-
stitute notice, must be in fact an adverse possession and hostile
to the holder of the record title. In the McClenahan case [page
112 of 118 Iowa] we said:

“In such eases a grantor in possession is presumed, in the
absence of a contrary showing, to be holding in subordination
to the title of his grantee. [Citation] Of course, such a grantor
may acquire title by adverse possession, even as against his
warranty deed; but he must explicitly disclaim holding under
his grantee, and openly assert his title in hostility to the title
claimed under his own previous deed. [Citations] But the
mere fact that the grantor and his heirs remain in possession,
enjoying the property in the same manner as they did before
the conveyance was made, does not bind the grantee with notice

6,

of an adverse claim. [Citations] * * *””

See also McClenahan -v. Stevenson, 118 Iowa 106, 91 N.W.
925, and McCormick v. Anderson, 227 Iowa 888, 289 N.W. 440.

In the ease before us there was nothing to indicate to a
grantee, mortgagee or creditor that H. D. Mohr had any right
to a homestead in the premises.

After deeding the premises to his son his continued oc-
eupancy of one of the houses on the farm would indicate
nothing more than tenancy or sufferance.

There is no merit in plaintiffs’ claim that defendants had
any notice of any homestead claim H. D. Mohr might have had
against Arnold.

Arnold Mohr makes no claim to anything herein. We
have no question before us as to any rights between H. D.
Mohr.and Arnold Mohr, but we note from the abstract of title
a judgment in favor of H: D. Mohr and against Arnold Mohr
et al. in an amount in excess of $106,000. This judgment was
entered February 16, 1967, and subsequent to all other pro-
ceedings mentioned, supra.

IL Plaintiffs attack the method of the sale on execution.
The sheriff testified that after levy and notice and pursuant
thereto he held the sale at the west door of the courthouse.
He said:

. “When I offered this« for sale I made 0 one offer to sell -the
whole 400 acres, one piece, at one time, and that was the only
offer I made. E. P. Kettering, representing Farmers State
Bank, was there. There were other people present. but no
other bidders. E. P. Kettering was the only one that made a
bid. The only bid I received was just this one bid. This bid
was made by Farmers State Bank of Lake View and HE. P.
Kettering and their bid for the whole of the 400 acres was
$36,564.60. As a result of the bid money came into my hands
for the Sheriff's cost and the Court costs. He receipted for the
balance. The bid was the full amount of the judgment plus all
costs, so when I was through, then the judgment was marked
satisfied in full.”

He also testified:

“T published notice of the sale of the farmland in the
paper as required by law and in addition to that I served notice

SS ©

on H. D. Mohr and Arnold Mohr of the facts of the sale. Not
at anytime prior to the sale of the farmland did I have any
objections by H. D. Mohr to the manner in which I sold the
land. I did not at anytime prior to 9 a.m. of the day of the sale
receive in writing from either H. D. Mobr or Arnold Mohr a
request that I sell the land any differently than in which I did
sell it.”

Section 626.84, Code of Iowa, provides:

“Plan of division of land, At any time before nine o’clock
am. of the day of the sale, the debtor may deliver to the
officer a plan of division of the land levied on, subseribed by
him, and in that case the officer shall sell, according to said
plan, so much of the land as may be necessary to satisfy the
debt and costs, and no more. If no such plan is furnished, the
officer may sell without any division.”

There was no request for sale or offering for sale of the
land in any manner other than en masse. Under the statute
the sheriff was authorized to proceed as he did. The debtors
having remained silent objections now will not lie.

HEME 111. Section 626.81, Code of Iowa, provides that
when there are no bidders, or when the amount offered is
“grossly inadequate” the officer may -postpone the sale for a
time limited by the statute. It is well settled that a sale for a
“grossly inadequate” price may be attacked. It is the purpose
of the law on execution sales that no more be sold than neces-
sary. That is why the statute gives the debtor the right to
submit a plan of division.

Plaintiffs argue that the sheriff in the case at bar sold the
land en masse for an inadequate price.

Assuming, arguendo, but not deciding, that plaintiffs have
standing to raise the issue, they are without factual support in
the record.

Hi Plaintiffs offered testimony as to the value of the land.
The highest estimate was $179,000. The lowest was $162,000.
There was a first mortgage on the land of about $95,000. The
land was sold subject thereto for $36,564. A judgment creditor
with a claim of about $59,000 now holds the certificate of
purchase through redemption. It thus appears that the land
has now brought about $190,000. The abstracts also show over

696 |

$50,000 in unsatisfied judgments held by other creditors.

IV. As held by the trial court, “The tragic circumstances
in the case result not from any action or failure on the part of
judgment creditors or the sheriff or court officers, but solely
and only from the conduct and the failure of the plaintiffs’
ward’s son after the ward had given him the farm in question.”

Plaintiffs’ ward gave away his property. He did nothing
whatsoever to protect himself. His son spent far more than his
assets would support.

The trial court was right.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Jamus L. Bares et ux., appellees, v. Quanity Reapy-Mrx Co.,
et al., appellants,

No. 52653.
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 852)

698

DecempBer 12, 1967,

Researmne Denmep Frsruary 5, 1968,

Mosier, Mosier, Thomas, Beatty & Dutton, of Waterloo,
for appellants.

Swift & Swift, of Manchester, for appellees.

Moors, J.—This is a law action, as authorized by Code sec-
tion 657.1, to enjoin the operation of defendant’s ready-mix plant
and for damages based on plaintiffs’ claim its creation and
maintenance near their residence constituted a nuisance. Fol-
lowing trial to the court judgment for damages and an in-
junction was entered against defendant, The Quality Ready-
Mix Co. Plaintiffs had previously voluntarily dismissed their
action against certain officers and employees of the company.
The company has appealed and will be referred to as de-
fendant.

I. Defendant’s first assigned error, the trial court’s find-
ing and judgment the operation of its ready-mix plant con-
stituted a nuisance as to plaintiffs, is not sustained by sufficient
evidence.

ee 699

HM This action was filed and tried at law. Our review is
not de novo but only on errors assigned. The trial court’s
findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial
evidence. Citation of authority is unnecessary. Rule 344(f) (1),
Rules of Civil Procedure. We will not weigh the evidence or
the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the evidence will be
construed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judg-
ment. Staley v. Fazel Bros. Co., 247 Iowa 644, 648, 75 N.W.2d
258, 255; McCune v. Muenich, 255 Iowa 755, 757, 124 N.W.2d
180, 181; Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164.

IL. Plaintiffs in 1952 acquired a two-acre tract on the
north side of highway 20 a short distance east of the city limits
of Independence. Situated thereon is their home, a double
garage anda small utility building. Plaintiffs have lived
there continuously since 1952. One side of the double garage is
used by Mr. Bates to make minor repairs on his truck which
he uses as an over-the-road driver.

In 1962 defendant corporation bought a 42-acre tract
adjacent to the east edge of plaintiffs’ property. Some of the
land lies north of that of plaintiffs. In the spring of 1962
defendant erected a ready-mix plant 72 feet east of plaintiffs’
fence line and approximately 270 feet northeast of their house.
The plant was immediately put into operation and continued
at trial time in January 1966. It was enlarged and enclosed as
business increased, This photograph, Exhibit A, seems to
clearly show the appearance and location of the properties at
trial time.

The primary purpose of the plant is to deliver ingredients
for concrete into “batch trucks” which then mix and deliver
the concrete to customers. The ingredients are delivered to
the plant by dump trucks which empty their loads of sand and
gravel before the material is elevated into overhead storage
bins by means of an elevator and conveyor system. Huge bulk
cement tanker trucks bring the dry cement to the plant where
a blower mechanism forces the cement from the truck to an
overhead bin.

The plant is approximately 300 feet north of the north edge
of highway 20 and is served by a dusty gravel road leading
from the highway to the plant and then circling up an incline

700 eS

Exhibit A

es 701

around the east side to service stockpile areas to the north and
northwest of the plant. Defendant’s road is 80 feet east of
plaintiffs’ east fence line.

Plaintiff, James L. Bates, testified in detail concerning the
loud disturbing noises made by the operation of the plant at all
hours of the day including very early morning and late even-
ing hours. His many complaints to officers of defendant
company met with agreement something would be done about
the noise but resulted in no material improvement. In fact
the noise and disturbance became worse with defendant’s in-
erease in business.

Mr. Bates testified: when sand stuck to the metal truck
boxes during unloading the metal endgate was banged against
the box creating an annoying loud noise; when the motor on a
tanker truck was revved up for the purpose of blowing the dry
cement to the bins at the top of the plant it created a real loud
whining noise which lasted from 20 to 45 minutes during each
delivery ; dry cement deliveries were made as often as four or
five times a day and as early as four or five a.m. and as late as
midnight; when the dry cement was blown to the top of the
plant it created cement dust and when the wind was in the east
the dust was so bad in plaintiffs’ yard it got into his eyes
compelling him to go inside; when rock was elevated to the top
of the plant it created a loud clanging noise and when the
rocks dropped into the metal bin it made a terrible racket and
would awaken him if asleep; when sand was elevated an
agitator was used to keep it from sticking which sounded like
an air hammer banging against the metal chute; this noise
continued for periods as long as 15 to 20 minutes; when the
batch trucks were loaded they pulled just outside the plant and
revved up the motor to mix the cement, water, rock and sand
before leaving; this extended from one to five minutes and
made a terribly loud noise and would awaken a person; some-
times conerete remained in the batch trucks after deliveries
and when this occurred a sledge hammer or air gun was used
to knock the conerete loose from the metal; this cleaning
process often took place early in the morning and made a very
loud noise; on cold mornings some truck motors would not
start which necessitated pulling by another truck; this resulted

702 |

in racing of motors when they started and more-loud noises
which sounded like the mufflers had holes in them and the
batch trucks were equipped with air horns which were blown
often early in the morning and “would raise me right out
of bed.”

He further testified dust also came from defendant's
road leading from highway 20 and when the wind was from
the east it was necessary to close windows and doors of the
house in an effort to keep it out but in spite of plaintiffs’
efforts the cement and réad dust settled all over the house,
rugs, curtains and household furniture.

Bates further stated the various noises which he described
necessitated closing windows ‘and doors but even then a con-
versation could ‘not be carried on without raising voices or
waiting for the noise to stop.

Plaintiff, Carrie Bates, testified substantially the same as
her husband, James, about the noises and dust from defend-
ant’s‘plant. She further testified the cement dust from the
plant settled on the leaves of trees along plaintiffs’ east line
and that they dried up and were “killed off.” She stated her
garden was adversely affected by the white dust amd described
her efforts in trying to combat it inside the house,

Mrs. Bates also testified concerning the use of a mega-
phone by defendant’s manager and use of profane and vile
language at the plant and the disturbance resulting to her and
her visiting friends.

Both plaintiffs testified there was no such dust and noise
as described by them prior to the establishment and operation
of defendant’s plant.

Other witnesses living in the vicinity testified to the noises
and being disturbed by operation of the plant.

Some of defendant’s witnesses admitted the emission of
cement dust and making of described noises. Defendant’s
manager stated it was necessary to use the megaphone so the
employees could hear his voice.

Til. This action was brought and prosecuted under Code
sections 657.1 and 657.2(1).

Section 657.1 provides: “Whatever is * * * offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as

es 708

essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property, is a nuisance, and a civil action by ordinary pro-
ceedings may be brought to enjoin and abate the same and to
recover damages sustained on account thereof.”

Code section 657.2 states: “The following are nuisances:
1. * * * using any building or other place for the exercise of
any trade,.* * * which, by occasioning noxious exhalations,
offensive smells, or other annoyances, becomes injurious and
dangerous to the health, comfort, or. property of individ-
uals * * #”

Certain principles of law applicable to nuisances claimed
to exist here are well settled.

| The above statutory enumerations do not modify the
common-law. application to nuisances. The term “private
nuisance” refers to an actionable interference with a person’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of his land. Riter v.
Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710, 721, 82 N.W.2d 151,
157; Kellerhals v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 979, 108 N.W.2d
691, 695; Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., 252 Iowa
1102, 1107, 109 N.W.2d 695, 698. .

[| One must use his own property so that his neighbor’s
comfortable and reasonable use and enjoyment of his estate will
not be unreasonably interfered with or disturbed. Amdor v.
Cooney, 241 Iowa 777, 788, 43 N.W.2d 186, 141; Schlotfelt v.
Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., supra, pages 1107, 1108, 252 Iowa,
page 698, 109 N.W.2d, and citations.

Noises may be of such a character and intensity a8 to
so unreasonably interfere with the comfort and enjoyment of
private property as to constitute a nuisance, and, in such
cases, injury to health of the complaining party need not be
shown. Higgins v. Decorah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 282,
242 N.W. 109, 112, 81 A.L.R. 1199, 1205, and citations; Keller-
hals v. Kallenberger, supra.

HSA fair test of whether the operation of a lawful
trade or industry constitutes a nuisance has been said to be
the reasonableness of conducting it in the manner, at the place
and under the circumstances in question. Riter v. Keokuk
Electro-Metals Co., supra, 248 Iowa 710, 722, 82 N.W.2d 151,
158; Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., supra. Thus

04 |

the question whether a nuisance has been created and main-
tained is ordinarily one of fact, and not of law, depending on
all the attending or surrounding circumstances. Each case of
this nature must depend on its own facts. Casteel v. Town of
Afton, 227 Iowa 61, 65, 287 N.W. 245, 247; Amdor v. Cooney,
supra, 241 Iowa 777, 780, 43 N.W.2d 186, 139; Kellerhals v.
Kallenberger, supra, 251 Iowa 974, 980, 103 N.W.2d 691, 695.
See also 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, section 22, page 774; 39 Am.Jur.,
Nuisances, section 47, page 332. .

IV. Defendant puts great stress on the fact the area
along highway 20 near plaintiffs’ residence was not entirely
residential. It is undisputed that before defendant erected its
ready-mix plant the area was occupied by some commercial
enterprises as well as other residences. Across the highway
south of plaintiffs’ home a quarry has operated for several
years. At first it was approximately 800 feet south of the
highway. At trial time it was operating 2000 feet from the
highway. The evidence shows clearly it or other commercial
enterprises in the area created no excessive noise or dust. The
noise and dust complained of by plaintiffs and neighbors came
from defendant’s plant.

Hl It is uncontradicted plaintiffs “were there first.” Pri-
ority of occupation is a circumstance of considerable weight
and it militates strongly in favor of plaintiffs here. Mahlstadt-
v. City of Indianola, 251 Iowa 222, 231, 100 N.W.2d 189, 194;
Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., supra, 252 Iowa 1102,
1109, 109 N.W.2d 695, 699; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, section 8¢,
page 746; 39 Am.Jur., Nuisances, section 197, page 472.

[| The trial court’s judgment defendant’s plant as created.
and maintained constituted a nuisance as to plaintiffs is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and therefore must be affirmed.

HV. Defendant contends the trial court erred in grant-
ing an injunction which would result in closing down the
plant at its present location. Defendant argues the injunction
is too broad and is not supported by sufficient evidence. We do
not agree.

The trial court gave this problem careful consideration.
The findings and conclusions include:

es 105

“The remaining item to be determined is the question of
the nature and extent of injunctive relief to be given plaintiffs
in order to abate the nuisance created by operation of the
defendant’s plant. The court is satisfied that substantial
abatement of the dust problem might be made by proper sur-
facing or treatment of the 300-foot driveway running north
from U.S. 20 to the plant, although this would not entirely
alleviate the dust problem and the. periodic collection of fine
cement dust on the land of the plaintiffs.

“After careful consideration, however, the court has
reached the conclusion that there is no appropriate order
which this court could enter which would abate the nuisance
ereated hy the noise of the operation of this plant as set forth
in this decision and yet permit the plant to continue in opera-
tion. Accordingly the court has concluded that the only course
which it may adopt which will properly safeguard the rights
of the plaintiffs is to enjoin the operation of the cement plant
in its present location.”

In Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., supra, an
equity action, we affirmed granting of injunctive relief against
the operation of a feed grinding and mixing business in the city
of Vinton. Many of the facts are similar to those in the case
at bar. There defendant also made the complaint the injunc-
tion meant closing of its business at the location involved.

In the Schlotfelt case at page 1111, 252 Iowa, pages 699,
700, 109 N.W.2d, we say: “The defendant must have known of
the character of the area and of its duty not to create or
maintain a nuisance there, when it built its plant; and the
record shows that there were numerous complaints from time
to time from householders in the vicinity both before and after
the erection of the additions in later years. It must abate the
nuisance it has created, even if unfortunately it means it can
no longer operate its plant.”

The evidence clearly shows operation of defendant’s plant
results in many disturbing noises to those in close proximity
like plaintiffs and that some cement dust. when blown to the
bin necessarily escapes. Under the record the trial court’s
order granting the injunction must be approved.

706 ee

HN OVI. Im its motion for new trial defendant raised the
question of sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s al-
lowance of damages. The trial court allowed $1530 for diminu-
tion of reasonable rental value of plaintiffs’ property and
$3800 for special damages. In a case of continuing nuisance,
subject to abatement, the measure of damages is diminution in
rental value of property caused by nuisance, plus any special
damages. Kellerhals v. Kallenberger and Schlotfelt v. Vinton
Farmers’ Supply Co., both supra.

The trial court’s finding there was diminution of
the reasonable rental value of plaintiffs’ property of $30 per
month is amply supported by the evidence. The trial court’s
finding this loss extended over a period of 51 months is not
supported by the record. Operation of defendant’s plant com-
menced in June 1962. This case was tried and submitted to
the court in January 1966. The evidence does not extend
beyond January 1966. Thus the record covers a period of 43
months. The trial court apparently allowed this loss to the
time the findings and conclusions were filed. Allowance for
more than 48 months is not supported by the record before us.
In other words the trial court’s allowance for loss of rental
value is excessive to the extent of $240.

Our reading of the trial court’s findings and conclusions
leads us to conclude a 5l-month rather than a 43-month
period was considered in the allowance of special damages.
Apparently the allowance for special damages was for ap-
proximately $75 per month. We believe allowance of special
damages is excessive to the extent of $600.

HH One of the grounds for allowing a new trial is that
the amount allowed is lacking in evidentiary support. Miller v-
Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 1063, 114 N.W.2d 910, 915;
Beyer v. City of Dubuque, 258 Iowa 476, 489, 189 N.W.2d
428, 436, and citations.

We hold defendant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of
damages unless plaintiffs file a remittitur of $840 within 30
days from the filing of this opinion. If such remittitur is so
filed this case shall stand affirmed. If not so filed the case is
remanded only upon the issue of the amount of damages to be
awarded. Feldhahn v. Van DeVenter, 253 Iowa 1194, 1197,

rT es 107

115 N.W.2d 862, 864, and citations; Barry v. State Surety Co.,
261 Towa 222, 154 N.W.2d 97.

HE (VIi. Following entry of judgment defendant asked
for a stay of the enforcement of the injunction. The trial
court, apparently acting under rule 246, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, stayed imposition of the injunction on condition de-
fendant be assessed an additional $25 per day for operation
of the plant. Later this court granted a stay order during
this appeal.

The record does not disclose any judgment entered for any
days defendant may have operated its plant while the $25 per
day order was in effect. So far as the record discloses de-
fendant may not have operated its plant at anytime during
this period.

Without a final judgment or order permitting an appeal
from interlocutory order defendant’s assigned error regarding
the order above referred to is not properly before us. Rules
831, 382, R.C.P. Defendant’s complaint against this order is not
properly before us.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed on the condi-
tion stated in Division VI. _

Costs on appeal are taxed one fourth to plaintiffs and
three fourths to defendant, The Quality Ready-Mix Co.

Affirmed on condition.

All Juszices concur,

New. H. Hanson, d/b/a The H. P. Sales Company, appellee, v.
Bast, R. “Pere” Lassex, d/b/a Mechanical Products
Company, appellant.

No. 52621,
(Reported in 154 N.W.2d 871)

| a = 3
;

Decemser 12, 1967.

Researine Dentep Frsruary 5, 1968.

| | 709

Richard L. Rick, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Stewart, Miller, Wimer, Brennan & Joyce, by Joseph B.
Joyce, of Des Moines, for appellee.

Rawuines, J.—By his petition in an action at law, plaintiff
asserted a partnership between himself and defendant, sub-
sequently terminated, and an uncompensated expenditure of
funds in connection with the venture, for which he asked
judgment.

On defendant’s motion, with no resistance by plaintiff, the
ease was transferred to equity and so tried.

Defendant’s answer, as amended, admitted the partner-
ship, then by counterclaim reasserted the relationship and
requested an accounting.

As best we can determine, plaintiff’s amendment to his
petition alleged, in substance, the partnership was to be on a
eash basis; profits evenly divided, apparently in proportion to
earnings expected to be nearly equal; and operating expenses
shared.

The pleadings disclose both parties asserted not less than
eleven times the existence of a partnership, and that neither
party at anytime denied it, either generally or otherwise.

The trial court found no partnership existed, denied right
to an accounting, held defendant indebted to plaintiff, and en-
tered judgment accordingly.

Defendant appeals. We reverse.

HI 1. This court was called upon to consider a similar
situation in Grantham v. Potthoff-Rosene Co., 257 Iowa 224,
230-232, 181 N.W.2d 256, and in reviewing the matter stated:

“Averments in a pleading * * * not withdrawn or super-
seded are conclusive admissions of the facts pleaded. In Shipley
v. Reasoner, 87 Iowa 555, 557, 558, 54 N.W. 470, 471, we said:
‘As to such admissions, there is no issue; no proof is required ;
and the party making them is bound thereby. * * * It will be
observed that the following distinctions exist between the
pleadings upon which the case is tried and those that have been
superseded, The former are before the court and jury of
necessity, without offer, not as evidence, but to show the issues to
be tried; and admissions made therein are taken as true, and

710 a a

conclusive against the party making them. The latter are not
necessarily before the court and jury and, if before them, are
only as evidence, are not conclusive, and may be shown to have
been made inadvertently, or by mistake, or, as stated in the in-
struction, may be contradicted or explained.’

“We have followed and applied this rule in a considerable
line of cases.

“In Lauman v. Dearmin, 246 Iowa 697, 706, 69 N.W.2d 49,
54, is this: ‘It is a recognized rule that an allegation binds the
one who makes it. When its truth militates against the party
who pleads it, it must be taken as true against him.’ See also
Reynolds v, Aller, 226 Iowa 642, 648, 284 N.W. 825, 828: ‘An
allegation binds the one who makes it.’; Tischer v. Council Bluffs,
231 Iowa 1184, 1145, 3 N.W.2d 166, 172: ‘When such admissions
are made no proof is required, and the person who makes such
an admission is bound thereby.’ In Wilson v. Oxborrow, 220
Towa 1185, 1142, 264 N.W. 1, 5, we stated the rule thus: ‘Al-
though on the question now being considered the plaintifi’s,
evidence should be considered in a light as favorable to plaintiff
as is reasonably possible, yet under the well-established prece-
denis of this court specific admissions made ii the pleadings
forming the issues being tried are binding on the party making
them, and as to such admissions there is no issue.’ Whelton v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & Saint Paul Railway Co., 189 Iowa 918,
920, 921, 179 N.W. 140, 141, 142, says: ‘It may be conceded there
is a conflict on whether these allegations are true, But, be that
as it may, these allegations bind the one who makes them. When
their truth militates against the one who pleads them, they
must be taken to be true as against him.’

“It is said in 71 O.J.S., Pleading, section 59, pages 150 to
152 inclusive: ‘It follows that a party cannot subsequently take
a position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his pleadings,
and that the facts which are admitted by the pleadings are to be
taken as true against the pleader * * *, whether or not they are
offered as evidence, So admissions in the pleadings may render
proof of the admitted facts unnecessary or render proof contra-
dicting them inadmissible, and if countervailing evidence, either
through inadvertence or the tacit consent of the parties, is ad-
mitted it is entitled to no consideration * * *.’ 41 Am, Jur., °

i Pe 711

Pleading, section 201, page 485, states: ‘It is an elementary rule
that a litigant is not required to prove the allegations or facts
admitted by his adversary to be true. A party is generally
bound by allegations or admissions in his own pleadings.’ See
also Turner v. MeCready, 190 Ore. 28, 222 P.2d 1010, 1018, and
Ogden v. Rabinowitz, 86 R.1. 294, 300, 134 A.2d 416, 419. It is
also said in the latter case: ‘This rule applies to all pleadings in
the ease, whether a declaration, complaint or petition, bill of
particulars, plea or answer, or other pleading.’” (Emphasis
supplied.)

See also rule 102, R.C.P.; Hofer v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.,
260 Iowa 81, 148 N.W.2d 485, 486; In re Estate of Stonebrook,
258 Towa 1062, 1073, 141 N.W.2d 581; Leo v. Leo, 289 Iowa 873,
876, 877, 832 N.W.2d 777; Massey v. City Council of City of Des
Moines, 239 Iowa 527, 534, 31 N.W.2d 875; 68 C.J.S., Partner-
ship, section 129(e), page 566; and 40 Am. Jur., Partnership,
section 84, pages 187, 188.

II. Added to the foregoing, the functions of a pleading
are to put the other party on notice of what the pleader intends
to prove at trial and to define the issues. In re Condemnation of
Certain Land, 253 Iowa 1180, 1134, 114 N.W.2d 290.

HM Also, any relief granted must be consistent with the
ease made by the pleading and such as will not take an ad-
versary by surprise. Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co.,
252 Towa 1102, 1112, 109 N.W.2d 695, and Nitta v. Kuda, 249
Towa 858, 858, 89 N.W.2d 149,

Apparently these” fundamental principles were here dis-
regarded.

Hi Ill. Im the instant case the existence of a partnership
was resolved by the pleadings. As a result the sole issue before
the court was the matter of accounting to be had.

However, with no apparent legal cause or justification the
trial court erroncously converted a post-partnership accounting
action, standing in equity, to one at law for reimbursement.

HM On that point we said in Johanik v. Des Moines Drug
Oo., 235 Iowa 679, 686, 17 N.W.2d 385:

“Jt is almost universally held, subject to certain exceptions
which we need not mention, that a law action is not maintainable
between partners with respect to partnership transactions unless

712 Let |

there has been an accounting or settlement of the partnership
affairs, McAnulty v. Peisen, supra, 208 Iowa 625, 634, 226
N.W. 144; Ristine v. Ruml, 197 Iowa 1193, 1197, 197 N.W. 27,
and authorities cited; annotation 21, A.L.R. 21, 34; 47 C.J. 802,
section 250; id., 1198, section 900.

“Accordingly, one partner cannot sue another at law to re-
cover contributions to the partnership capital, a share of the
‘profits, or the proceeds of the sale of partnership property until
there has been an accounting.of partnership affairs. Equity has
exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters between partners.
And this is true even though there has been a termination or dis-
solution of the partnership.”

IV. Despite the foregoing, plaintiff says the result would
be the same in an action at law based on contract, express or
implied, as in one for accounting. This may or may not be true.

But that we are not now in a position to determine. And
that we are not now called upon to decide.

It is to us evident the trial court erred in not determining
rights, if any, of these parties under an accounting.

Defendant’s motion for a new trial should have been
sustained.

HEV. ‘The record and appellant’s brief are not in print
size prescribed by rule'345, R.C.P,

Furthermore the print is confined to one side of each page.

Under the circumstances only half the certified cost for
printing each of these documents shall be taxed as costs.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accord with this
opinion.

All Justices concur.

| Pe 113

Cuartms Baruow, next friend of Danny Iblings, a minor,
appellee, v. Guenn Istines, appellant.

No. 52664,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 105)

ill

Fepruary 6, 1968,

m4 es

Whitfield, Musgrave, Selvy, Kelly & Eddy, of Des Moines,
for appellant.

L. E, Linnan, of Algona, and Hamilton & Connell, of
Storm Lake, for appellee.

Larson, J.—This appeal presents but one question—can an
unemancipated minor child maintain a cause of action against
his father for personal injuries proximately caused by the
father’s ordinary negligence? ‘This action. involves only a
parent-and-child relationship and does not involve any willful.
or malicious conduct. There is little or, no dispute | as to the
relevant facts.

From the pleadings it appears that Glenn ‘Thtings, the
defendant, operated a café in Algona, Iowa. In the kitchen
of the café was an electric meat grinder which could be ac-
tivated by a switch so located-on the grinder that a child: of
six years could reach it.

In this action for damages brought by. his next friend,
defendant’s son Danny Iblings, six years of age, alleged that
he was in the café kitchen with his father, as he had been on
previous occasions, that although the father knew he was in
the kitchen and knew of his interest and curiosity about the
grinder, he was left alone in that area,-and that when he turned
on the meat grinder and inserted his hand therein, he lost all.
of the fingers and a portion of one hand. In Count I the child
alleged his father’s negligence was the. proximate cause of these
injuries, and in Count IT alleged insurance coverage of the
hazard.

The trial court sustained “Aoténdant’ s motion to dismiss
Count IT relating to insurance and overruled his motion to
dismiss based upon a failure “to state a claim upon which any
relief” could be granted in Iowa. On application defendant
was granted permission to take this interlocutory appeal.
Plaintiff did not appeal the ruling on Count II.

I,. Although the question as to whether an unemancipated
child can maintain an action against his parent to recover
damages for negligence has been presented to. this court pre-
viously, we have not given it serious consideration in the past
nor have we found it necessary to rule thereon. In Cody v.

é

a | 715

J. A. Dodds & Sons, 252. Towa 1394, 1396, 110 N.W.2d 255,
disposed of on other grounds, we said: “While there is respect-
able and substantial authority in other jurisdictions sustaining
[defendant’s position] * * * we do not find that the question
has been determined in Iowa.” Also see 47 Iowa Law Review
1159 (1962).

In 39 AmJur., Parent and Child, section 90, it is stated:
“Although there is nothing in the English decisions to suggest
that under the early common law a child could not sue its
parent for a personal tort, it has become established by the
weight of authority in this country that no such action can be
maintained by the child.” Also see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.
352, 150 A, 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055, and 43 Harvard L, Rev.
1058, for extended discussions, Our own research of the ques-
tion leads us to conclude that the English decisions are of no
aid. We find no decision, dictum, or text writing that men-
tioned the subject as late as the 18th century. It would be
pure speculation and conjecture to state categorically that a
child could sue to enforce personal rights under common law.
See annotation, 19 A.L.R.2d. 428. All. that can be gleaned
from the early common law is that: there were parental rights
and duties which may have been superior to the independent
personal rights and duties of the child. Although the unique.
relationship of parent and child was recognized, the only. early-
development in this area was that of property rights. Dunlap
v. Dunlap, supra, and citations,

| It is abundantly clear, however, that the doctrine of

parental or family immunity in tort matters originated as a
court-made doctrine and did not arise from code edicts or as a
result of legislative enactments. ©

Il. The doctrine of parental immunity had its beginning
in the United States in the landmark case of Hewellette v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887, 18 L.R.A. 682 (1891).
In that case an unemancipated minor daughter sued her
mother for damages resulting from the alleged willful, illegal
and malicious imprisonment of the daughter in an asylum for
the insane. It was the mother’s claim that this restraint was
necessary to protect the daughter and the family from the

716 Le 7

daughter’s loose and unchaste habits. In reversing the judg-
ment for the child, the court said in part:

“So long as the parent is under obligation to care for,
guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation
to aid and comfort and ‘obey, no such action as this may be
maintained. * * * The state, through its criminal laws, will
give the minor child protection from parental violence and
wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand.”

This decision was followed in 1903 by McKelvey v. Mc-
Kelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991, and later
by Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L.R.A. 893, 107
Am.St.Rep. 805, 3 Ann. Cas. 1. All of these were extreme cases
and the rule propounded therein has been modified by recent
cases. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149.

At least seven reasons have been advanced in the opinions
from various jurisdictions in support of the proposition that
an unemancipated minor may not sue his parent for personal
injuries arising from the parent’s ordinary negligence. Briefly,
they are: (1) danger of fraud, (2) possibility of succession,
(8) family exchequer, (4) analogy to denial of a cause of action
between husband and wife, (5) domestic tranquillity, (6)
domestic government, and (7) parental discipline and control.
5 Vill.L.Rev. 521, 529; 43 Harvard L. Rev. 1030, 1072-1077;
36 Iowa L. Rev. 384. Those efforts to justify the doctrine’s
underlying public policy have resulted in considerable criticism
by text and editorial writers and some judges, some with merit
and some without. See Harper and James, Law of Torts, see-
tions 8.11, 18.4 (1956); Prosser, Law of Torts, section 101
(Second Ed. 1955) ; McCurdy, “Torts between Persons in Do-
mestic Relation”, 43 Harvard L. Rev. 1030 (1930); Seavey,
“Torts”, 1958 Annual Survey of American Law, page 487; 26
Tenn.L.Rev. 561 (1959); 58 Colum.L.Rev. 576 (1958); 19
U.Pitt.L.Rev. 681 (1958) ; 88 Cornell L.Q. 462 (1958) ; 10 Wash.
& Lee L.Rev. 121 (1953); 89 Va.L.Rev. 389 (1953); 7 Wyo.
LJ. 199 (1958) ; 2 De Paul L.Rev. 119 (1952) ; 64 Harv.L.Rev.
1208 (1951) ; 4 Vand.L.Rev. 377 (1951) ; 7 Fordham L.Rev. 459
(1938) ; 79 U.Pa.L.Rev. 80 (1980); ef. 28 U.Cine.L.Rev. 540
(1959) ; 33 St. John’s L.Rev. 310 (1959); 31 Temp. L.Q. 233
(1958) ; 3 Vill.L.Rev. 577 (1958) ; 9 Syracuse L.Rev. 346 (1958) ;

7 es TT

55 Mich.L.Rev. 463 (1957); 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. 368 (1957); 34
ChiKent L.Rev. 333 (1956); 51 N.W.U.L.Rev. 610 (1956) ; 35
B.U.L.Rey. 205 (1955); 7 Okla.L.Rev. 238 (1954); 2 Buffalo
L.Rev. 166 (1952); 5 S.C.L.Q. 294 (1952); 5 Ala.L.Rev. 173
(1952) ; 6 U.Miami L.Q. 617 (1952) ; 1 Catholic Univ.L.Rev. 161
(1951) ; 26 Ind.L.J. 465 (1951); 22 Miss.L.J. 174 (1951); 28
Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 225 (1951); 80 Ore.L.Rev. 86 (1950); 32
Margq.L.Rev. 289 (1948) ; 28 Geo.L.J. 480 (1989) ; 86 U.Pa.L.Rev.
909 (19388); 14 Tenn.L.Rev. 294 (1936); 11 N.C.L.Rev. 352
(1988) ; 83 Colum.L.Rev. 360 (1933) ; 20 Cal.L.Rev. 342 (1982) ;
7 Notre Dame Law. 259 (1932) ; 16 Cornell L.Q. 886 (1931) ; 15
Minn. L.Rev. 126 (1930); 16 Catholic Univ.L.Rev. 484; 12
§.D.L.Rev. 364. These criticisms are largely predicated upon
the alleged unfairness and discrimination against an individual
because he is an unemancipated minor in the family unit. The
right of the minor to collect damages for every breach of his
parents’ legal duty, they contend, is sufficient to overcome the
evil which could result by such actions between parent and
child. See Hastings v. Hastings, 83 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147,
149. We are unable to agree with that conclusion.

Appellee concedes the public policy upon which this doe-
trine was first announced was sound, but contends, due to
many changes in our social and economic life today, the
doctrine of parental immunity is obsolete and should be re-
nounced by the courts. For that view he cites and relies upon
the cases of Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743;
Borst v. Borst, supra; Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50
§.B.2d 540; Lusk v. Lusk, 118 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 588; Balts v.
Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66; Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H, 482, 224 A.2d 588; Ertl v. Ertl, 30 Wis.2d 372, 141 N.W.2d
208, and citations; Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp.,
111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107, 68 A.L.R. 1497; Maine v. Maine &
Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20. He urges us to adopt
the position of numerous text and law review articles and the
New Hampshire, Wisconsin and Minnesota opinions applying
them.

HE We cannot concede that the sound public policy upon
which this doctrine was predicated has changed, that it should
be changed, or that we should lend our aid to its rejection or

718 Le Ve

dissipation in Iowa. It is our feeling that the basic reasons
for the doctrine have remained the same over the years. Do-
mestie tranquillity, proper parental discipline and control,
family unity, and social responsibility are ample grounds to
sustain the policy and the doctrine. Nahas v. Noble, 77 N.M.
139, 420 P.2d 127, and citations. Other reasons advanced are
invariably premised upon the promulgation and promotion of
the family as a unit and a steadfast belief that such actions
would upset and tend to destroy this vital relationship. Most of
the confusion as to this doctrine, we think, has developed as a
result of some courts’ efforts to expand exceptions to it without
a sound or substantial basis therefor. Only one of these needs
consideration in this case, and it will be considered in a later
division.

IM. It will be remembered that here we are dealing with
a situation where the parents and-child are living together
under harmonious: conditions and the charge is one of simple
negligence against the father. . Nothing in the record discloses
or implies intentional or even thoughtless disregard of intra-
familial responsibilities and duties.. These responsibilities
fundamentally do not rest on any hard-set rule of law or
statute, but derive mainly.from. the mutual love and affection
that exists in the home. In terms of a legal duty, defendant’s
negligence here amounts to no more than a minute breach of
duty. ‘To attach thereto the financial liability due a stranger,
we :think, involves even greater inequities and devastating
consequences to family.life. Hastings v. Hastings, supra, 33
NJ. 247, 250, 163 A.2d 147, 149°(1960). In Hastings it is stated:
“The question is not one of the absence of a duty of reasonable
care owed by the father ‘to his child, but rather of immunity
from suit thereon. Matters of immunity must be determined;
in the absence of specific legislation, on the basis of policy or,
perhaps more accurately, on the’ weighing of competing
policies.” Obviously, then, the developed public policy upon
which the family immunity doctrine is based is the. proper
balance of these legally recognized duties and responsibilities
within the family. .

- In Nahas v.. Noble, supra, 77 N. M. 189, 140, 420°P.2d 127,
198 (1966); the court said: “Encouragement of family unity

PS Es 719

and the maintenance of family discipline being sound public
policy, we hold that a parent cannot maintain an action in
negligence against an unemancipated minor child.” Similarly,
in Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 224, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25, the
court stated: “We find that generally an unemancipated minor
cannot maintain an action against his parents, * * * to recover
damages for ordinary negligence.” In 31 Tex.Jur., section 6,
page 1281, it is stated: “The relationship of parent and child
precludes the maintenance of an action by the child against the
parent for a personal tort. This rule is founded upon a sound
public policy—upon the interest that society has in preserving
harmony in the domestic relations. * * *.”

The leading case and the one most often cited on this issue
is Hewellette v. George, supra, 68 Miss. 708, 711, 9 So. 885, 887,
13 L.R.A. 682, where it is stated: “The peace of society, and of
the families composing society, and a sound publie policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best in-
terests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress-for personal
injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.” Similarly, in the
early North Carolina case of Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E, 12, 18, 31 A.L.R. 1185, cited with approval in Aboussie
v. Aboussie, Tex. Civ. App., 270 $.W.2d 636, 639, it is said:
«* ® * From the very beginning the family in its integrity has
been the foundation of American institutions, and we are not
now disposed to depart from this basic principle. * * * Hence,
in a democracy or polity like ours, the government of a well-
ordered home is one of the surest bulwarks against the forces
that make for social disorder and civie decay * * *.” Aboussie
went on to hold: “We believe that the peace and tranquility of
the home and the best interest of minor children will be sub-
served by following the general rule that an unemancipated
minor child cannot sue its parent for damages based on acts
of ordinary negligence.”

The case of Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, “300 P.7, 8,
established the law on this question in California. The case
dealt with a tort action by a child against its parent for simple
negligence. In holding that the child could not maintain the
suit, the Supreme Court of California gave the same reasons

720 Le a

as those first announced in Hewellette v. George, supra. This
pronouncement was also cited with approval in Perkins v.
Robertson, 140 Cal. App.2d 536, 295 P.2d 972.

In Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 305, 218 P.2d 445, 455,
19 A.L.R.2d 405, 417, Justice Rossman in a concurring opinion
appropriately stated: “Immunity is accorded the parent, not
because he is a parent, but because, as a parent, he pursues a
course within his household which society exacts of hira and
which is beneficial to the state. Society expects parents to
keep the home in order, to preserve within it domestic tran-
quillity, to see to it that the children go to school and that they
deport themselves properly in the neighborhood. The parental
nonliability is not granted as a reward, but as a means of en-
abling the parents to discharge the duties which society
exacts.”

Finally, in Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 428, 40 N.H.2d
236, 237, the court stated of the parents’ duties and respons-
ibilities: “As to the parents—the law which imposes upon
them the duty to support and discipline a minor child, and to
prescribe a course of conduct designed to promote his health,
education and recreation, accords to the parents a wide dis-
eretion. * * * Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily expe-
riences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be
subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise
care commensurate with the risk—for each injury caused by
inattention, unwise choice or even selfishness—a new and heavy
burden will be added to parenthood.” The court declined to
implement such a burden,

The views presented above are by no means exclusive, but
are presented to establish a brief cross section of judicial pro-
nouncements in this area. We do not hesitate to add that we
are in accord and wholly endorse these views as solid funda-
mental policy and reasoning supporting the basic foundations
of family life. We believe that the family unit, which is basic
to all cultures and societies, and vitally important to ours,
should not include in its internal structure a concept of re-
compensable fault in cases of ordinary negligence involving
the family relationship. Moreover, we are satisfied that the
arguments advanced for the rejection of the family immunity

a ee 721

doctrine are fundamentally unsound, are utterly and com-
pletely repugnant and foreign to a harmonious family relation-
ship, and feel they erroneously attempt to equate all human
behavior in mere monetary values.

IV. Our research has revealed only one state which ap-
pears to have completely abrogated the family immunity
doctrine. See Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d
695, cited with approval in Briere v. Briere, supra, 107 N.H.,
432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966). Other cases, including Goller v.
White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, cited with approval in
Ertl v. Ertl, supra, 30 Wis.2d 372, 141 N.W.2d 208, and Balts
y. Balts, supra, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966), have
merely carved out new exceptions to the doctrine. On the
other hand, we find at least three State Supreme Courts
recently have refused to follow their lead in restricting or
abrogating the doctrine. See Downs v. Poulin, Maine, 216 A.2d
29 (1966), and many citations; Nahas v. Noble, supra, 77 N.M.
189, 420 P.2d 127 (1966) ; Rickard v. Rickard (Fla. App.), 208
So.2d 7 (1967).

The logic and reasoning in the Wisconsin, Minnesota and
New Hampshire opinions are somewhat persuasive, but we
believe they miss the true basis and need for the doctrine and
are not convinced that an unemancipated minor should be al-
lowed to sue its parent for ordinary negligence, especially as
here where the alleged negligence involves their personal rela-
tionship. Extreme cases such as Roller v. Roller, supra, 87
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788, 68 L.R.A. 893, Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.App.
566, 142 N.E. 128, and Richardson v. State Board of Control,
98 N.J.L, 690, 121 A. 457, do cite supplementary reasons for the
doctrine, and these are often the targets of the critics. We do
not attempt to justify those reasons.

The concept that the family is a quasi-governmental unit
and that the head of the family enjoys sort of a primitive
sovereign immunity is advanced in Matarese v. Matarese, 47
RL. 181, 181 A. 198, 42 A.L.R. 1360. It is often stated that in
Roman law and in the early common law the family was re-
garded a unit of government. Although this may be an obso-
lete concept, we note that the beneficial effects of it could be
found in the obvious need for proper parental control and dis-

722. | a

cipline. We are often reminded that the failure to perform
this function has weakened our social order today.

One of the vulnerable reasons for the doctrine attacked by
the critics is that if the parent is compelled to pay damages to
his child, there is the possibility that the money will-return to
the parent in the event of the child’s death during minority.
Roller v. Roller, supra; Eversley, Domestic Relations; Prosser,
Law ‘of Torts (Third Ed.), Domestic Relations, section 116.
Since this theory was not a bar to recovery’ in the case of
property rights at common law, erities could not see why it
should apply to personal torts. We, like-most courts, do see a
distinct difference in these actions. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra,
84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055.

Another reason advanced may be referred to as family
exchequer.” It is premised on the presumption that if a parent
is compelled to pay damages to a child, it would deplete the
family’s resources to the detriment of the other children. See
Roller y. Roller, supra. Critics say this is unsound because
imsurance can prevent such a drain and also justly reimburse
the injured child for damages suffered. The better decisions,
we think, hold the matter of insurance is irrelevant. Signs v.
Signs, supra, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.B.2d 748, 747.

We also find a line of cases denying suits between spouses
despite the existence of a married women’s statute. Koenigs v.
Travis, 246.Minn. 466, 75 N.W.2d 478, denying recovery for
ordinary negligence. Critics say this concept. is inapplicable
to the parent-child relationship since it cannot be seriously
contended that the common-law conception of unity and legal
identity of spouses extended to the children. Prosser, supra.

HI Another reason given is the danger of fraud and col-
lusion, and is usually advanced in suits ‘brought by a child after
being emancipated. Treschman.v. Treschman, 28 Ind.App. 206,
61 N.E. 961. This reason may-have merit. The danger of
fraud and collusion today seems. to center around the posses-
sion-of liability, insurance by the parent. Hastings v. Hastings,
supra, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147, 150. Critics say this is not too
persuasive, for courts are well equipped to handle such matters,
and do so in guest cases without difficulty. It appears to us
that this is another reason the existence or nonexistence: of

| Ce 7123

insurance must be considered irrelevant in these actions. See
48 Iowa L.Rev. 748, 752.

Most of the cases cited by appellee are readily distinguish-
able from the case at bar. They are also cases where courts
have attempted to modify the general parental iamanity
doctrine.

In Lusk v. Lusk, supra, 118 W.Va. 17, 19, 166 S.H. 538, a
child was injured while a passenger on a bus owned and
operated by his father, who was under a contract with the
board of education to transport children to and from school.
Under the law of West Virginia the father was required to’
earry liability insurance and this appears to be the reason for
allowing recovery. This was not a familial sort-of relationship
and, although the court acknowledged the parental immunity
doctrine with general approval, it stated, “* * * a different
situation arises where the parent is protected by insurance in
his vocational capacity.”

Similarly, in Wright v.. Wright, supra, 229 N.C. 503, 50
§.H.2d 540, and Chase v. New Haven Waste Material ‘Corp.,
supra,-111 Conn. 377, 150 A.107,.68 A.L.R. 1497, the tort arose
out of an employment context. Therein the courts of North
Carolina and Connecticut reiterated their adherence to the
rule of immunity: of the parent from a tort action by his un-
emancipated child, but carved out an exception to the rule
where. the child was injured by the negligence of his father
while acting. within the scope of his employment or a respon-
deat. superior exception. -Although the North Carolina court
allowed suit by the child, it did not allow maintenance of the
suit directly against the father, but rather it was against the
employer.

In Signs v. Signs, supra, the injury sustained by the child
was due to the negligence of the father in his vocational
capacity. In essence, the suit-was brought against the partner-
ship and the court again merely made an exception to the
general rule. The court held at page 577 of 156 Ohio St.:
«# # * an unemancipated child should have as clear a right to
maintain an action in tort against his parent in the latter’s
business or vocational capacity as such child would have to.

124 | az

maintain’ an action in relation to his property rights.” This is
discussed further in Division V.

Borst v. Borst, supra, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, also
allowed recovery, but once again as the exception, not the rule.
In that case the father was a partner in a trucking firm, and a
truck driven by him and owned by the partnership injured his
child due to his negligence. The court held the minor child
could maintain suit against his father when the latter was’
acting within the scope of his business or vocational authority.

Other exceptions to the parental immunity doctrine appear
in various situations. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289
P.2d 218, which reaffirmed the family immunity doctrine in
ordinary negligence cases but allowed recovery for malicious
and willful tort; Cowgill v. Boock, supra, 189 Ore. 282, 218
P.2d 445, and Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 928, also
willful tort cases; Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254,
123 A.L.R. 1015, which allowed a minor child to recover from
his minor sister for tortious injuries; Foy v. Foy Elee. Co., 231
N.C. 161, 56 S.H.2d 418, which allowed a suit by unemancipated
child against a corporation in which his parents owned half the
stock.

After extensive review of case law and authorities in this
area, it is our conclusion that generally, in absence of statute,
an unemancipated minor child may not maintain suit against
its parent for injuries caused to the child by the ordinary
negligence of the parent. Rickard v. Rickard, supra; Brown
v. Parker (Mo.App.), 875 S.W.2d 594 (1964) ; Nahas v, Noble
and Hastings v. Hastings, both supra; Bricault v. Deveau, 21
Conn.Sup. 486, 157 A.2d 604 (1960); Downs v. Poulin, supra;
Pullen v. Novak, supra, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959);
Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App.2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956) ;
Aboussie v. Aboussie, supra, Tex. Civ. App., 270 S.W.2d 636
(1954) ; Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438; Oliveria
vy. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 298, 25 N.E.2d 766; Norfolk Southern
Railroad Co. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 8.H. 841; Matarese-
v. Matarese, supra, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198, 42 A.L.R. 1360;
Castellucci v. Castellucci (R.I.), 188 A.2d 467; Sorrentino v.
Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.H. 551; Cannon v. Camion,
supra, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.B.2d 236; Reingold v. Reingold, 115

| | | 125

N.J.L, 582, 181 A. 153; McKelvey v. McKelvey, supra, 111 Tenn.
388, 77 S.W. 664, 64 L.R.A. 991; Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269
P.2d 302; Villaret v. Villaret, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 169 F.2d
677; Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 72 A.L.R.
449; Roller v. Roller and Smith v. Smith, both supra; Turner
v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751; Smith v. Henson, 214
Tenn. 541, 381 S.W.2d 892; Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d
472, 215 N.Y.S.2d 85, 174 N.E.2d 718; Small v. Morrison, supra,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.H. 12, 31 A.L.R. 1135; Mesite v. Kirchstein,
109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753; Traczyk v. Connecticut Company et
al., 24 Conn.Sup. 382, 190 A.2d 922; Shaker v. Shaker, 129
Conn, 518, 29 A.2d 765; Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.B.
888; Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 180 S.H.2d 570; Brumfield
y. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.H.2d 170; Redding v. Redding,
235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676; Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn.
109, 250 S.W.2d 37; Baker-v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d
29; Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572; Tucker v.
Tucker, Okla., 395 P.2d 67; Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Ore. 874, 397
P.2d 771; Trundell v. Leatherby, supra; 39 Am.Jur., Parent and
Child, section 90, footnote 13; Cowgill v. Boock, supra; 67
CJ.S., Parent and Child, section 61b(2), page 787.

Vv. Finally, appellee contends the immunity doctrine should
not extend to the business or vocational establishment of the
father, and cites and relies upon Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, 84
N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055, Signs v. Signs, supra,
156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 748, Borst v. Borst, supra, 41
Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, Lusk v. Lusk, supra, 118 W.Va.
17, 166 S.E. 588. In the Dunlap case it was held that action
was maintainable where the master and servant relation was
alleged and assumed, because the parent intended that rela-
tionship change by taking out insurance to permit his child to
sue for injuries received in the employment through negligence
of the parent as employer. In the Lusk case the relationship
assumed was that of a school bus driver and student for which
imsurance was carried as required under contract with the
school board. The Signs and Borst cases seem to sustain the
appellee’s position, holding flatly that the unemancipated child
should have the right to maintain an action for tort against his
parent in the latter’s business or vocational capacity.

7126 | Ve

These cases were carefully considered by the Texas court
in Aboussie v. Aboussie, supra, Tex.Civ.App., 270 8.W.2d 636,
at 638 (1954), and it was the opinion of that court that the
Signs and Borst cases represented the minority rule. In the
Aboussie case the child of one of the partners operating a store
injured her hand in an electric fan placed on the floor by one
of the partners. The court reasoned, because of her father’s
liability as a partner, the unemancipated child was suing her
father individually for damages based upon ordinary, unin-
tentional negligence; and upheld the’ defendant’s motion for
judgment based on the family immunity doctrine. In acknowl-
edging the general rule applicable, the court said: “The rela-
tionship of parent and child precludes the maintenance of an
action by the child against the parent for a personal tort.. This
rule is founded upon a sound public policy—upon the interest
that society has in preserving harmony in the: domestic rela-
tions.” See 31 Tex.Jur. 1281, section 6, supra. .

After a review of several cases from other jurisdictions,
the Texas ‘court concluded “that the peace and tranquility of
the home and the best interest of minor children will be sub-
served by following the general rule,” and under the facts of
that case rejected the appellant’s contention that-she was
entitled to bring suit in the nature of a business-customer rela-
tionship. In‘other words, the court found no change in the
parent-child relationship sufficient to permit the child to sue the
father. We agree.

Unless we are to restrict the family immunity doctrine to
parent and child relationship in the home, a modification of
the doctrine which seems untenable and‘for which no authority
is cited and none discovered in our search, we must predicate
the change in relationship on a more sound basis than the
place where the tort is committed.

+H Since we recognize and adopt the family immunity
doctrine, we prefer to place it on the parent:and-child relation-
‘ship as it exists when the-tort occurs, whether it be in the
home, in.the family vehicle, on a hunting or fishing trip or at
the father’s shop. See Borst v: Borst, supra, 41 Wash.2d 642,
251-P.2d 149, 152, and-citations. ‘We are not required liere to
pass on the situation where the child becomes a passenger on

a | 127

a public conveyance his father operates. Authorities differ as
to whether under those circumstances a child can maintain an
action against the father for negligent operation of the vehicle.
Borst v. Borst, supra, and citations. Some courts seem to
predicate the right to sue upon an evident change of relation-
ship from parent and child to driver, and passenger or pro-
prietor and customer. The distinction appears to be in the
capacity in which the parent acts in directing the child.

Here, the injury occurred at the parents’ café where
the father had often taken his small son while he performed
some task at the establishment. There is no contention the
son was an employee or had come to the café by himself. He
was under the care and direction of his father at all times
material to this action, and at no time could it be said the
relationship of parent and child had changed to some other
recognized relationship. Theirs was personal in nature. It is
not alleged that this relationship had changed in any way
from that existing in the home.

Having recognized and adopted the family immunity doe-
trine in Iowa, we are satisfied it should not be restricted to
the parent and child relationship in the home, but must extend
to other places where that personal relationship exists and is
maintained, such as that which appears in the case at. bar.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition
should have been sustained. The ruling is reversed and the
eause remanded-for order in compliance with this opinion.—
Reversed and remanded.

GarrieLp, C.J., and Snevt, Moors, Sruarr, Rawzines and
LeGranp, JJ., concur.

Broker and Mason, JJ., dissent.

Bucxur, J.—I dissent. I would adopt the rule recently
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Goller v. White, 20
Wis.2d 402, 418, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198: “After a careful review
of the arguments for and against the parental-immunity rule
in negligence cases, we are of the opinion that it ought to be
abrogated except in these two situations: (1) Where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the
child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an ex-

728 a 7

ercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the pro-
vision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care. Accordingly, the rule is abolished in personal-
injury actions subject to these noted exceptions.”

Balts v. Balts, 278 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66, and Hebel v.
Hebel (Alaska), 485 P.2d 8, also examine all of policy con-
siderations involved in this decision and reach a far more per-
suasive result than that reached by the majority here.

II. We need not overrule any prior Iowa law to reach this
thoroughly acceptable rule which seems consistent with the facts
of modern life. In Cody v. J. A. Dodds & Sons, 252 Iowa 1394,
110 N.W.2d 255, we took a long step in this direction. We now
practically repudiate Cody v. Dodds by citing Aboussie v.
Aboussie, Tex.Civ.App., 270 S.W.2d 636, with approval. The
two cases are flatly contradictory.

III. The injured child, age six, was injured while at his
father’s place of business. This is one of the exceptions to the
general rule most often recognized by the courts. These cases
are considered and rejected at Divisions IV and V of the major-
ity opinion. It would serve no useful purpose to extend this
opinion by detailed analysis of each of those cases. But the
conclusion stated’ by the Ohio court, Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio
St. 566, 577, 103 N.H.2d 748, 748, seems so reasonable that it is
hard to see why it is rejected out of hand. “* * * an unemanci-
pated child should have as clear a right to maintain an action in
tort against his parent in the latter’s business or vocational
capacity as such child would have to maintain an action in
relation to his property rights.”

That is the result reached in Cody v. Dodds, supra. We
should not turn this case on the fact that this is a sole proprietor-
ship while Cody v. Dodds involved a partnership. The distine-
tion is too artificial.

IV. We are really considering more than one public
policy. Our Iowa Constitution, Article I, section 6, notes the
first policy to be considered. “All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation ;”

It is not suggested recognition of the doctrine of parental
immunity would be unconstitutional. What is suggested is the

es 29

existence of a public policy which has the force of constitutional
recognition,

In Frost v. Des Moines Still College, 248 Iowa 294, 306, 79
N.W.2d 306, 314, we put the matter in stronger language:
“Justice Rutledge, in President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 76 U.S. App. D. ©, 123, 180 F.2d 810, 827,
pointed out that ‘the law’s emphasis ordinarily is on liability,
not immunity, for wrongdoing’, and we may also observe that
publie policy abhors the classification and inference brought
about by so-called ‘protected negligence.’ We strive to elimi-
hate it—not foster and encourage it.”

We should strive to make justice evenhanded. This goal
would be legitimate even without constitutional sanction. When
we deny a litigant access to our courts because of his status, or
his relationship to his adversary, or because of the adversary’s
special status, to some degree we violate the spirit, if not the
letter, of that ideal.

Whenever we set a class of people apart, tell them they are
unlike other people and deny to them the process of the law we
violate a strongly felt need for equal treatment. We immediately
search for exceptions, create legal fictions and try in one way or
another to do justice. We try to achieve a just result which
would otherwise be summarily denied. As often as not, in the
end, we abolish the special rule. Such will probably be the fate of
the strong pronouncement made by the majority today.

This prediction seems reasonable in view of the demise of
the doctrine of charitable immunity. Compare Mikota v. Sisters
of Mercy, 1918, 183 Iowa 1878, 168 N.W. 219 with Andrews v.
Y.M.C.A., 1939, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186, and Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Assn., 1950, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d
151, The doctrine of governmental immunity received rough
handling before it was finally laid to rest by the 62d General
Assembly of the State of Iowa, Senate File 710, approved July
20, 1967. The many exceptions to the Iowa Guest Statute
would indicate an effort to do justice despite “protected negli-
gence.” .

I respectfully submit the history of the development of the
law favors the result reached by the Minnesota and Wisconsin
courts and suggest that we should not reject such development.

730

‘We can recognize the realities of modern life in this first clear
consideration of the subject. Stare decisis presents no problem
now. In this day in this factual.situation the need to deny this
child the use of the courts is not demonstrated,

Mason, J., joins in this dissent.

Gian H. Brown, appellant, v. Lester L, McoDanrmt, appellee.

No, 52838.
(Reported in 156 N.W.24, 349)

731

Fepruary 6, 1968.

John R. DeWitt, of Griswold, for appellant.
Savery & Yarham, of Atlantic, for appellee.

Larson, J.—The plaintiff, Glen H. Brown, purchased Lots
7 and 8 in Block 3 in McDowell’s First Addition to the City
of Atlantic, Iowa, in 1949 and oceupied the premises in 1952,
The defendant, Lester L. McDaniel, purchased Lots 9 and 10
in Block 8 in that Addition on December 1, 1961, and it ap-
peared he had rented these lots for several years prior thereto.

On June 24, 1966, plaintiff filed a petition under the pro-
visions of chapter 650 of the 1966 Code alleging that a dispute
exists between the parties as to the boundary line between
Lots 8 and 9, that since August of 1961 plaintiff has been
denied the use of six feet or more of his land by defendant’s
piling large quantities of various materials on plaintiff’s Lot
8, and alleging that the true boundary as shown by a tree line
was established by acquiescence. Injunctive relief and damages
were asked. :

In his answer defendant denied plaintiff’s claims and
alleged the true boundary line between these lots appears on
a plat prepared by a registered land surveyor in October 1961
and the line marked by iron pins on the east and west line
of Lots 8 and 9, Block 3, in McDowell’s First Addition to the
City of Atlantic, Iowa. He further alleged plaintiff had asked
him to clean up Lot 9 and remove some trees and shrubs that
had sprouted thereon and agreed to pay half the cost thereof.
Plaintiff denied these affirmative allegations and trial was had.

732 a |

It appears from Exhibit 1, a plat of Block 3, MeDowell’s
First Addition to the City of Atlantic, Iowa, that the original
lot line ran between points on the east and west line of Lots
8 and 9, 94 feet from Eighth Street on the south. Lots 6 and 7
in this block were each 44 feet wide and the remaining 10 lots
in the block were each 50 feet wide. Appellant contends the
evidence supports his allegation that a new true line between
Lots 8 and 9 had been established by acquiescence for a period
in excess of ten’ consecutive years six feet north of the line
shown on Exhibit 1, but the trial court failed to so find. The
sole question presented by this appeal is whether there is com-
petent substantial evidence to support its finding and decree.
We hold there is. .

Hi I. Although in its findings the trial court said this
was an action in equity, we ‘note that it was brought under
chapter 650 of the 1966 Code, which provides that such actions
are special actions and on appeal are to be heard as ordinary
actions. Sections 650.4 and 650.15, Code 1966. Also see Dart
v. Thompson, 261 Iowa 287, 154 N.W.2d 82; Pruhis v. Stanlake,
253 Iowa 642, 1138 N.W.2d 300. It appears that this case was
tried as a special proceeding and it comes to us on assigned
érrots as‘in' a law action. Rule 344(a) (3), Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; Dart v. Thompson, supra; Allen v. Melson, 260 Iowa
689, 150 N.W.2d 292.

The issue of acquiescence presents mostly fact questions,
and the judgment in such a case has the effect of a jury
verdict. Mahrenholz v. Alf; 253 Iowa 446, 451, 112 N.W.2d
847. Thus, the findings of fact by the trial court are binding
upon us if supported by substantial evidence. Rule 344(£)(1),
R.C.P.; Eggers v. Mitchem, 239 Iowa 1211, 1213, 34 N.W.2d
603; DeViney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1888, 1392, 55 N.W.2d 478;
Cozad v. Strack, 254 Iowa 734, 736, 119 N.W.2d 266; Mahren-
holz v. Alff, Dart v. Thompson and Allen v. Melson, all supra;
38 Iowa Law Review 86, 110-115.

HI II. We are satisfied there is no merit in appellant’s
contention that his evidence conclusively shows a boundary
line between Lots 8 and 9 was established by acquiescence. It
is true in this jurisdiction that where two adjoining property
owners acquiesce for ten or more consecutive years in a boundary

a Es 138

line definitely marked by a fence, wall, or other markers, it then
becomes the true boundary although a survey may show other-
wise and neither party had intended to claim more than the
property described in their respective deeds. Dart v. Thomp-
son, supra, 261 Iowa 237, 240, 154 N.W.2d 82, 84; Mahrenholz
v. Alff, supra, 253 Iowa 446, 450, 112 N.W.2d 847; Trimpl v.
Meyer, 246 Iowa 1245, 1248, 71 N.W.2d 487; DeViney v.
Hughes, supra, 243 Iowa 1888, 1892, 55 N.W.2d 478; Boyle v.
D-X Sunray Oil Co., 191 F.Supp. 263 (1961). See also Burby
on Real Property, Hornbook Series, Third Ed., section 124,

Section 650.6 of the 1966 Code provides: “Hither the plain-
tiff or defendant may, by proper plea, put in issue the fact that
certain alleged boundaries or corners are the true ones, or that
such have been recognized and acquiesced in by the parties or
their grantors for a period of ten consecutive years, * * *.”

HH It is well settled that the burden is upon the party
claiming a boundary line different from that disclosed by the
survey to establish the alleged acquiescence by clear proof.
Rule 344(f) (6), R.C.P.; Dart v. Thompson, supra; Allen v.
Melson, supra, 260 Iowa 689, 150 N.W.2d 292; Mahrenholz v.
Alff, supra; Kennedy v. Oleson, 251 Iowa 418, 100 N.W.2d 894;
Cozad v. Strack, supra, 254 Iowa 784, 119 N.W.2d 266.

III. We shall refer to the acts and conduct of plain-
tiff and defendant, as well as defendant’s predecessor in owner-
ship, which might be evidence that they acquiesced in a fence line
mutually recognized as a boundary between these properties,
but in view of all the testimony we are not persuaded the trial
court should be reversed.

After noting that all of these lots were 140 feet deep, and
that under the survey Lot 7 was 44 feet wide and Lots 8, 9
and 10 were each 50 feet wide, the trial court observed that
plaintiff contended the true boundary between Lots 8 and 9
was about six feet north of the survey line and had been for
many years marked by a wire fence and a row of trees recog-
nized as the boundary line by the former owners of these lots.
However, after a review of the evidence submitted, it found
there was not a sufficient showing that this line was ever
recognized as the true boundary line between those lots, nor was
it mutually agreed thereto by the adjoining owners for a period

734 es a

of ten years before the defendant acquired the property in
1961. It noted that defendant’s actions thereafter clearly
establish that he recognized no such contention, but claimed
the six-foot strip in controversy was his property. The trial
court then concluded the evidence “falls far short of estab-
lishing a boundary by acquiescence with the clarity . and
strength required,” and-we must agree.

Not only is there substantial evidence to support the trial
eourt’s findings herein, but we are convinced the evidence
would require the conclusion reached by that court. Plaintiff
testified there was a woven wire fence along the north line of
Lot 8 and five or seven trees on that line when he acquired
these premises in 1949. He said there was a gate tied to this
fence at the southwest corner of Lot 9 opening on Pine Street
to the west from Lot 9. At that time Lot 9 belonged to the
Whitney Estate and was under the care of Oscar Otto, acting
for the trustee under the Whitney Will. The record is silent
as to when Whitney acquired Lots 9 and 10 or who the previous
owners were. Otto testified the true lot line was supposed to
be south of the tree line, which at the time of trial was all
that remained of the line plaintiff contends was the true bound-
ary line established by acquiescence.

Although there is some evidence of the erection of ‘this
fence, there is little as to its maintenance. and: no direct evi-
dence as to its purpose. The trial court found there was little
or no proof that this fence line existed or-was maintained after
the year 1952. An employee of the Whitney Estate observed
no wire at that location from 1957 to 1963 and said he burned
leaves and brush from the Whitney residence across the street
on this space, but an old lady who used to live there recalled
a fence along that line in 1919 and said it was there prior to
that time. She testified she saw remains of it about four
months prior to this trial. She did not state the use made of
the fence or its purpose. Another neighbor who lived on Lot
6 recalled a wire fence in that vicinity in 1950 and said when
he plowed Lot 9 for the Whitneys he stayed north of it, but he
did not testify as to any instruction regarding that line.

There was no. evidence, except that given by plaintiff, to
show any use or occupation of the six feet north of the survey

— | 735

line by plaintiff and his predecessors in title. Plaintiff had
gathered peaches for about three years from some trees four
or five feet south of the old fence line, but said he did not
know when they were planted. He thought defendant cut
them down or ordered it done. The court did not consider that
showing sufficient to permit an inference of acquiescence. by
silence alone, and we must agree.

It is true that recognition may be by. conduct or claim
asserted, but it must be by both parties. It involves a claim
by one party, known to the other, and failure by him to take
any step to the contrary for the statutory period. Mahrenholz
vy. Alff, supra, 253-Iowa 446, 112 N.W.2d 847,-and citations.

It appears the property known as Liot 9 was in a trust.
The beneficial owners of this trust are not revealed and nothing
appears to indicate they were aware of the fence or its purpose
on Lot 9, to say nothing of plaintiff’s boundary line claim.
There is no showing the trustee knew of plaintiffs claim or
adverse conduct toward the Whitneys’ title. Thus, even if it
be conceded the evidence would support a finding that a fence
line existed some six feet north of the survey line, there is no
showing as to its use or purpose by those holding title thereto.
It may have been to fence in stock by the owners of Lot 9, or
to fence out animals from a’garden maintained thereon by the
Whitney family.

HM Acquiescence in the existence of a fence as a barrier,
not as a boundary, is not such recognition as will establish it
as the true line. Petrus v. Chicago, R.I.& P.R.Co.,-245 Iowa
222, 228, 61 N.W.2d 439, 442, and citations. For this and other
reasons the trial court justly felt the plaintiff had failed to
earry his burden of proving the establishment of a boundary
line by acquiescence, relying upon the cases of Olson v. Clark,
252 Iowa 1133, 109 N.W.2d 441; Mahrenholz v. Alff, supra;
Pruhs v. Stanlake, supra, 253 Iowa 642, 113 N.W.2d 300;
Trimpl v. Meyer, supra, 246 Iowa 1245, 71 N.W.2d 487. It held
the evidence here fell far short of establishing by clear evi-
dence any boundary line between Lots 8 and 9 by acquiescence
and, having found its decision is supported by substantial evi-
dence, we must affirm.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

7236

Crry or Drs Mores, appellee, v. CLaupe F, Peterson, appellant.

No. 52682.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 126)

Fesruary 6, 1968,

Theodore F. Mantz, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Philip T. Riley, Anthony T. Renda, John F. McKinney, Jr.,
Gary H. Swanson, Robert D. McAllister, Gerald R. Ralph and
James F. Fowler, all of Des Moines, for appellee.

Garriztp, C. J.—Following trial in the municipal court of
the City of Des Moines defendant Peterson was convicted of
violating section 2A-10 of the city’s Zoning Ordinance by keep-
ing a junkyard on two partial lots owned by him in an R-2
Residence District. He appealed to the district court where
he was again found guilty. From judgment there imposing a
fine of $100 and costs defendant has appealed to us.

eS m1

The appeal is entirely lacking in merit. It is regrettable
defendant has been put to the expense of an unwarranted
appeal to this: court.

Defendant's brief states the sole question presented here
is whether the court erred in its charge to the jury in failing
to define a junkyard. A complete answer to the question is
that the charge does define a junkyard—and properly.

We will elaborate briefly upon what has been said. Jury
instruction 5 enumerates the four essential propositions the
city must establish beyond a reasonable doubt before defendant
could be found guilty. The first of these is that on the date
charged in the information he did keep a junkyard.

Hi ‘The record shows the only objection defendant took
at the trial to any instruction or to the charge as a whole was
to No. 5, “as he wanted the court to define a junkyard and the
court refused.” Substantially this same objection is the only
one the motion for new trial asserts to any instruction or to
the instructions as a whole. (In a criminal case objections to
jury instructions may be made in the motion for new trial.
Section 787.3, subsections 5, 7, Code 1966; State v. Faught,
254 Iowa 1124, 1131, 120 N.W.2d 426, 480, and citations. Of
course in civil cases objections to instructions must be made
before they are read to the jury. Rule 196, Rules of Civil
Procedure; State v. Faught, supra.) No requested instruction
was submitted here.

Although instruction 5 does.not define a junkyard, instruc-
tion 7 contains the precise definition found in section 2A-3 of
the Zoning Ordinance. No objection was taken at the trial
or in the motion’ for new trial to the definition found in in-
struction 7. None is suggested—belatedly—here.

Defendant's brief proceeds on one of two erroneous as-
sumptions: (1) that the instructions do not define junkyard,
or (2) that the definition must appear in instruction 5, not in
a separate instruction. As pointed out, the record does not
support the first assumption; the second is based on a mis-
taken view of the law.

HI We have held time and again the instructions must be
taken and construed as a whole and if the point raised by
objection or requested instruction is substantially covered by

738

the instructions given, there is no ground for complaint. State
v. Shipley, 259 Iowa 952, 957, 146 N.W.2d 266, 269, and cita-
tions; State v. Stout, 247 Iowa 453, 455, 74 N.W.2d 208, 209,
and citations.

“The court properly gave a familiar stock instruction, sim-
ilar to Instruction 1.4 of Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions pub-
lished by the Iowa State Bar Association, that the court had
not attempted to embody in any one instruction all the law
applicable to the case. “You are to consider and construe all
the instructions together and apply them as a whole to the
evidence in the case.”

| | Only ten instructions were given: Most of them are
short; two fill only five lines each of the record. The only error
elaimed -by defendant does not appear. Hence the judgment
is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

GENERAL CasuALTy ‘Company oF Wisconsin, appellant, v. _
Dowatp R. Hives et al., appellees.

No. 52778. ;
. Reported in 156 N.W.24 118)

Fesruary 6, 1968.

2
oO
| - = Ce -_ = .

140 eS

Mosier, Mosier, Thomas, Beatty & Dutton, of Waterloo,
for appellant.

Kildee, Keith, Gallagher, Lybbert & Martin, of Waterloo,
for appellee Jessie B. Ellison. -

K. L. Kober, of Waterloo, for appellees Donald R. Hines
and James E. Hines.

Evans & Hinton, of Waterloo, for appellees John Davis
and Linda Davis.

Rawuines, J.—By petition for declaratory judgment plain-
tiff-insurer sought to avoid liability with regard to a particular
automobile-pedestrian accident. Defendants resisted.

Trial court held adverse to plaintiff and it appeals. We
Defendant James E. Hines, operating an automobile owned
by John and Linda Davis, struck and injured .defendant-
pedestrian: Jessie B. Ellison. At time of the accident defendant
Donald R. Hines, father of James, held a policy of insurance
issued by plaintiff.

Among other things the omnibus clause of this policy pro-
vided: liability coverage with respect to a non-owned automobile
operated by a relative of the named insured. Without question
James was such a relative.

Specifically, coverage provided is as follows:

“Persons Insurep: The following are insureds under

Part 1:

“(q) #8

“(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile,

(1) the named insured,

(2) any relative, but only with respect to a private
passenger automobile or trailer, provided his actual
operation or (if he is not operating) the other actual
use thereof is with the permission, or reasonably be-

es a

lieved to be with the permission, of the owner and is
within the scope of such permission, and

(3) tee

“Derinirions: Under Part 1:

eee

“ ‘relative’ means a relative of the named insured who
is a resident of the same household;

ee

“non-owned automobile’ means an automobile or
trailer not owned by or furnished for the regular use
of either the named insured or any relative, other
than a temporary substitute automobile ;”

Factually, the record discloses, without dispute, John Davis
took the 1956 Mercury convertible here concerned to the Hines
residence in Waterloo for the express purpose of there display-
ing it for sale and attracting possible buyers. The keys were
left with the car. From this point on the evidence is in conflict.

The basic issues presented on this appeal are, (1) whether
the accident-involved vehicle, at time here concerned, was being
operated with permission or reasonably believed permissive use
of the owner, and (2) whether it was furnished for regular use
by either the named insured or any relative.

Hi I. Extent of coverage of an insurance policy is a proper
subject for a declaratory judgment action. Rules 261-269,
Rules of Civil Procedure; Merchants and Farmers State Bank v.
Rosdail, 257 Lowa 1288, 1243-1244, 131 N.W.2d 786; Hartford
Ace. & Ind. Co. v. O’Connor-Regenwether Post No. 3633, -V.F.W.,
247 Towa 168, 171-172, 73 N.W.2d 12; and 22 AmJur.2d,
Declaratory Judgments, section 41, page 896. See also Katz
Investment Co. v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 640, 647-648, 47 N.W.2d 800.

It is evident a justiciable controversy was here presented.

IL. Regardless of the fact it brought the action for de-
claratory relief, and in so doing made certain affirmative alle-
gations, plaintiff contends the burden was upon defendants to
prove coverage under the policy.

The petition filed by it alleges, inter alia, “* * * the-policy
was violated and not in effect at the time of said accident * * *.”

Rule 344(f) (5), R.C.P., provides: “Ordinarily the burden
of proof follows the pleading; that is, he who pleads and relies

742 ee

upon the affirmative ofan issue must carry the burden of proving
it.”

More specifically, 2 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory
Judgments, Second Ed., section 375; pages 881-883, states:

“What is meant by the ‘burden of proof’ is reflected by the
Wigmoréan ‘characteristic expression of, ‘the risk of non per-
suasion’ and the concomitant obligation to go forward with the
proof, when it might result in a failure to convince the trier of
facts.”

HM ‘* * * the burden of ‘proof in a-declaratity judgment
action is the same as in ordinary actions at Jaw or suits in equity,
and the plaintiff bringing a declaratory judgment action must,
in order to succeed, prove his case in accordance with and. within
the meaning of such rules, and ‘this rule ‘is not affected by thé
fact that a negative declaration ‘is sought—of- nonliability. It
may be stated as a general rule, that the burden of proof is upon
the plaintiff to show that: conditions exist to justify the court in
exercising its discretionary powers to grant declaratory relief
pursuant to-the declaratory judgment statute. It seems that an
applicant for a declaratory judgment has the burden of showing
that present justiciable controversy exists, and if this fact is not
shown then a.cause of action for declaratory relief is not éstab-
lished. So, also, where the plaintiff makes allegations which are
deriied by the defendant, then thé onus is thrown on the plaintiff
to prove the allegations charged in his pleading.

“To ascertain on which party the burden of proof lies the
pleadings should be-consulted, ‘and the question is which of the
parties would suffer an- adverse judgment if no evidence was
received and when that matter is determined, that party has the
burden of proof.” -

See also Sanborn v. “Maryland Cas. Co, 255 Iowa 1319,
1821, 125 N.W.2d 758; Pacific Ins, Co. v. Christianson, 253 Iowa
241, 243,.111 N.W.2d 679; Fortgang Brother's, Inc. v. Cowles;
249 Towa 73, 76, 85 N.W.2d 916; 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judg-
ments, section 148, page 351; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Declaratory Judg-
ments, sections 97, 98, pages 963-966; and annotations, 23
A.L.R.2d 1243.

Plaintiff cites and leans rather heavily.on Western Mutual
Ins. Co. v: Baldwin, 258 Iowa 460, 187 N.W.2d 918. We do not

8

find it applicable. That case involved the cooperation clause of
an insurance policy. The real issue was not whether the insured.
had ior ‘had not cooperated with the company. - Rather, the
question presented was whether failure on the part of insured
to cooperate was prejudicial to the insurer. Actually burden of
proof, as presented in the case at bar, was not there involved.

Other cases cited by plaintiff on this issue are likewise
deemed inapplicable.

Authorities on the subject at hand have admittedly adopted
views which are in varying degrees of conflict. However, under
the factual situation peculiar to the case now before us, we find
no compelling cause to disagree with the principles expressed by
Anderson, supra. i

III. In any event plaintiff is hardly in a-position to here
effectively assert an issue as to burden of proof.

This case was tried to the court. On this subject generally

see Wright v. Thompson, 254 Iowa 342, 353, 117 N.W.2d 520.
« EBB- And plaintiff, without challenge, objection: or resistance
at anytime or in any manner, prior to trial, proceeded with
presentation of evidence as is usual on the part of one having
the burden of proof.

Dealing: with a-similar situation the court said in Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sweeney, 3 Cir., 216 F.2d 209, 211:
“This question of what happens inva declaratory judgment suit
when the plaintiff has undertaken the ordinary burden which 4
plaintiff has in bringing an action has been dealt with.admirably
in' the Ninth Circuit’ in Pacific. Portland’ Cement Co. -v. Food
Mavhinery & Chemical Corp., 9 Cir, 1949, 178 F.2d 541. Here
was a case in which the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment suit
had gone ahead and offered. its testimony in- full. Under these
circumstances the Court said: 178 F.2d at page 547 ‘it is idle to
insist that the burden of proof was not upon-the appellant. If it
was not, the appellant certainly spent many days proving a
negative. "We must assume that experienced counsel will not
adopt such trial tactics unless they are of the view, and desire
to give the-impression to their opponent and to the court, that
they are going forward: with evidence which it is their duty to
produce. And, having done so, they cannot very well insist
that, in‘reality, they assumed a burden which was not theirs.’

744 |

See also Bauer v. Clark, 7 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 397, 401. The
New Hampshire rule announced in Greenough supra [88 N.H.
391, 190.4.129, 109 A.L.R. 1096] has likewise been qualified. In
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Lougee, 1938, 89 N.H.
222, 196 A. 267, 269, the court said: ‘It [Plaintiff] voluntarily
assumed the ordinary position of a plaintiff in opening the
case and accepted the order for its closing. It thereby assumed
the burden of proving it had not insured the defendant instead
of requiring that action be taken in assertion of the claim of
insurance:, * * * It would be unfairly inconsistent for the ©
plaintiff to take the advantages of the order of proceeding in
the trial ‘without submitting to the normally attendant
burdens.’ ”

Under. existing circumstances we find no reversible error
on the part of the trial court in concluding, at close of hearing;
the burden of proof was upon plaintiff. .

IV. The record fails to disclose whether the action brought
by plaintiff was in equity or law. And the trial court gave no
consideration to that phase of the case. However, we deem this
to here be of-little or no significance.

HE Generally, in an action for declaratory judgment,
findings of the trial court, as to conflicting evidence, are con-
elusive on an appellate court if supported by substantial evi-
dence. Hertmann v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 127
Cal.App.2d 560, 274 P.2d 501, 506-508; Decter v. Stevenson ~
Properties, 39 Cal.2d 407, 247 P.2a 11; 18; 26 C.J.S., Declaratory
Judgments, section 164, page 385; and 2 Anderson, Actions for
Declaratory Judgments, Second Hd., section’ 462, page ‘1103.
See also rules 344(f)(1), (17), R.C.P.; and Hamilton -v:
Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164, 166.

But if the case stands in equity, our review is de novo.
Small v. Ogden, 259 Iowa 1126, 1129, 147 N.W.2d 18,20; State
Board of Social Welfare v. Teeters, 258 Iowa 1113, 1114, 141
N.W.2d 581; and Davenport Bank & Trust Co. v. Krenz, 256
Iowa 1171, 1172, 1178, 180 N.W.2d 698.

V. In the same vein, when terms of an insurance -
contract are ambiguous, they will be accorded that construction
most favorable to the insured. Mallinger v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 253 Iowa 222, 226-232, 111 N.W.2d 647, and---

eS Ms

citations. See also Morris Plan Leasing Co. v. Bingham Feed
and Grain Co., 259 Iowa 404, 415, 143 N.W.2d 404, 412.

VI. At this point some distinctions are appropriate as to
questions of law or of fact where construction or interpreta-
tion of a contract is involved.

A policy of automobile liability insurance is a contract,
therefore generally governed by those accepted rules applicable
to contracts. 44 O.J.S., Insurance, section 1, page 471, and 29
Am.Jur., Insurance, section 4, page 434.

Hy The meaning or legal effect of that portion of am: in-
surance contract dealing with coverage as to a “non-owned
automobile” is usually a question of law. Rowe v. United
Commercial Trav. Assn., 186 Iowa 454, 469, 172 N.W. 454, 4
ALR, 1235, and 17A C.J.S., Contracts, section 616, page 1240.

As we said in Rapp v. H. Linebarger. & Son, 149 Iowa
429, 438, 128 N. W. 555: “While, generally speaking, the con-
struction of a contract is for the court alone, the rule is not
without its exceptions. One of these exceptions is recognized
in certain cases where resort is had to extrinsic circumstances
for aid in the construction of a contract otherwise doubtful or
ambiguous. If the extrinsic evidence is undisputed, the con-
struction falls within the general rule, and the court must con-
strue. the contract; but if the evidence be controverted, or
different inference may be drawn therefrom; then’ its con-
struction becomes a jury question. [Authorities cited.]”

See also Morris Plan Leasing Co. v. Bingham Feed and
Grain Co., supra, loc.cit., 259 Iowa 415, 416,143 N.W:.2d 412,
and 17A C.J.S., section 617, page 1250.

This means if terms of a contract do not-involve. disputed
fact issues, its meaning is determinable by the court. However,
if a factual dispute does exist it must be resolved by the trier
of the fact before the court may determine its legal meaning.
On the other hand, application of particular facts to a given
case normally rests with the trier of the facts,.unless they are
such no reasonable man could dispute them, in which case a
question for the court alone is presented.

HHI Without question there is a conflict in the evidence as
to existence of permission to drive the car, or its extent if

given.

746 P|

Davis, in testifying, denies having given James any- such
right. Specifically this witness first said he did not recall
having instructed James’not to drive the automobile. After his
recollection had béen refreshed he stated that-at one time or
another specific instructions had been given that James was
not to operate it.

This testimony is pointedly disputed by both father and
son. A deposition given by: James, introduced in evidence,
discloses Davis did not tell him whether he was or was not.to
drive the- vehicle. However, during trial, James testified
Davis told him it was: all right to drive the car in order to
promote a sale; and he could do so anytime for that purpose:
Also, when Davis turned over keys to the automobile, at time
it was delivered’ to the Hines residence, the only instruction
given was that the car be driven by'-James in order to show
it to his friends. This testimony is corroborated by that of
Donald Hines,

In addition, Richard ‘Andveasen’s testiniony revéals that
sometime after the accident Davis told“him the autotiobile
had been-left at the'Hines home so James’ could drive and show
it to his friends for-sale purposes.

The foregoing serves to disclose substantial evidence sup-
porting the trial court’s finding permission had béen given for
James-to drive the automobile, and scope of stich Peritissive
use was not exceeded at time of the ‘accident. :

VIE; The question now presénted is whether the” autto-
mobile being driven by Jaies at time of the accident was “one
not owned by or furnished for’ the. regular use of either the
named insured or any relative”.

Absent. evidence so clear ag to preclude doubt by reason:
able.men this is essentially-a question of fact. It is not unlike
the problem presented as to ‘existence of: permission and
whether the scope thereof has been exceeded. *

The trial.court, by amplified findings of fact labeled con:
clusions of law, determined that under existing circumstances
the accident-involved vehicle was “non-owned” within the
meaning of thé policy, not furnished for the ¢ fegular use of
James E. Hines. .

Faced with the same problem as that now before us, the

es vt

court said in American Casualty Co. v. Lattanzio, 78 N.J.Super.
404, 411, 412, 188 A.2d 637, 640, 641:

“Obviously, the determination in a particular case of
whether the insured was driving a non-owned automobile
which had been furnished for his regular use, and thus was
excluded from the coverage afforded by his insurance policy,
must be controlled by the factual situation presented. * * * In
Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.-v. Marr,'supra (128
F.Supp. p. 70), the court while acknowledging the impractic-.
ability of a hard and fast rule, found the following questions,
among others, to be of assistance in determining the ultimate
issue: : . :

“1. Was the use of the car in question made available

most of the time to the insured?

“2, Did the insured make more than mere occasional usé

of the car?

“3,-Did the insured need to obtain permission to use the

car or had that been- granted by blanket authority?”

“Having in mind the intent and purpose of the clause in’
question, the issue to be determined is (1) whether the use of
the car which the insured [or his relative] was driving was
furnished to him, and (2) if so, whether it was furnished for
his regular use. The frequency of the use made of the vehicle
by the insured [orhis relative] does not necessarily govern:
The question is not whether he frequently used the vehicle but
whether it was‘furnished’ for his regular use. Implicit in the
use of the quoted word is the necessity for some prior arrange-
ment or understanding concerning the use of the vehicle. Such
an arrangement could be in the form of a blanket permission to
use the vehicle generally or to use it for a specific purpose.
Evidence as to the past history of the use of the automobile is
of assistance in determining whether there was such an ar-
rangement, but it is the condition which obtained at the time
of the accident which governs, and evidence of the past use of
the automobile must be related to this date. A requirement
that specific authorization be obtained as a prerequisite to the
use of the vehicle would sustain a finding that it was not
‘furnished’ for his regular use. * * * If the use for which the
vehicle was furnished was an irregular, infrequent or casual

148 es

one, it would not come within the exclusionary clause and
hence would be covered by the policy.” [Addenda supplied.]

At the time here concerned James had deliberately driven
the Davis car through a Waterloo area thought by him to be
then most attractive to young people. It is his claim that in so
doing he stopped at a bank in order to effect a personal mis-
sion or purpose. But this does not mean operation of the auto-
mobile on that occasion was in conflict with the owner’s intent
and purpose—exposure to the greatest number of prospective
buyers. The trial court found it was within the scope of per-
mission given and-we agree.

In support of the foregoing see also State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bates, 107 Ga.App. 449, 130 S.B.2d 514,
516-518 ; Lincombe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
La.App., 166 So.2d 920, 923-924; George B. Wallace Co. v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 220 Ore. 520, 349 P.2d 789, 791-
792; State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co, v. Smith, 206 Va. 280,
142 S.H.2d 562, 566-568; 18 Federation of Insurance Counsel
65;-and annotations, 86 A.L.R.2d 987.

The trial court’s finding that the vehicle in question was a
non-owned automobile not furnished for regular use is sup~
ported by substantial evidence.

VIII. Plaintiff also asserts on appeal, if the Davis car
was not furnished for regular use then the insured did not and
cannot prove James had permission to operate it, or that its
operation at the time here concerned was within the scope of
the owner’s permission.

This argument is defeated by our prior determination, (1)
James had permission to operate the Davis car; (2) it was not
furnished for his regular use; and (3) it was being operated at
the time here concerned within the scope of permission given.

Furthermore, this contention falls of its own weight. It
presupposes that if permission given by Davis was not for
regular use it could then be for no other purpose.

As heretofore disclosed, Davis gave James permission to
drive the car where young people, interested in buying, would
be most likely to see it. Stated otherwise he was to expose it
as much as possible to the view of prospective purchasers.

Some confusion on this subject is possibly created by a

ee 49

seeming conflict in the trial court’s findings. However, any
such appearance of inconsistency is without substance or
effect.

At one point the court found consent given by Davis was
not limited in any particular way, followed immediately by a
finding James was given permission to operate the car to the
end it would come to attention of young persons interested in
buying it. There is then a finding James was operating the
vehicle, at time of the accident, within the scope of permission
given by Davis.

| | Touching on this subject we have held, a correct con-
clusion will not be cast aside because of error in reasoning on
the part of the trial court. In re Estate of Martin, 261 Iowa
630, 155 N.W.2d 401; Binkholder v. Carpenter, 260 Iowa 1297,
152 N.W.2d 598, 596; and Houlahan v. Brockmeier, 258 Iowa
1197, 1203, 141 N.W.2d 545.

More specifically, 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, section
844, page 288, citing Rank v. Kuhn, 236 Iowa 854, 20 N.W.2d
72, states the applicable rule to be:

“Tn reviewing the findings of fact of the trial judge, an
appellate court must give them a liberal construction so as to
uphold rather than defeat the decision appealed from; doubtful
or ambiguous findings of the trial judge will, wherever this is
reasonably possible, be construed so as to support the decision
appealed from. This applies not only to the specifie facts
found by the trial judge, but also to the inferences of fact
which he made from the facts specifically found. A general
finding of the trial court is to be given the effect of a finding of
every special fact necessary to be found to sustain the decision.
appealed from. However, findings of fact by the court below
cannot on appeal be given an unnatural meaning. The appel-
late court may disturb findings of fact that are contrary toe a
conclusion of law resulting from other facts found.

“The appellate court will attempt to reconcile or harmonize
apparently inconsistent findings of the trial judge and will not
read into them an unwarranted inconsistency. Even if the
findings of the court below are actually irreconcilable, the
appellate court may sustain the decision appealed from on the
basis of those findings which allow the conclusion reached by

750 a

the court below, if they are supported by the evidence.”

IX. Under the factual situation presented in this case we
find no reversible error on the part of the trial court in con-
cluding the Family Combination Automobile Policy, No. 4FA
21 87 32, issued. by plaintiff, General Casualty Company of
Wisconsin, to defendant Donald R. Hines, affords: liability
coverage with respect to the accident which occurred June 27,
1964, wherein defendant Jessie B. Ellison was struck and in-
jured by the 1956 Mercury automobile owned by defendants
John and Linda Davis, being at that time driven by defendant
James E. Hines.—Affirmed.

All Jusrices concur,

Brvian M. Guanpon et al., appellees, v. Marearer Fraua et al.,
“ appellants, .

‘No. °52803,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 327)

[| 751

Fesruary 6, 1968.

James W. Crawford and Gene V. Kellenberger, of Cedar
Rapids, for appellants.

John B. Reilly and William G. Faches, of Cedar Rapids,
for appellees.

Moorz, J.—The accident out of which this case arises oc-
curred at the intersection of Thirteenth Avenue Southwest and
First Street Southwest in Cedar Rapids at approximately 1 p.m.
December 31, 1964. Plaintiff, Beulah M. Glandon, was a pas-
senger in a 1959 Chevrolet being driven in an easterly direction
on Thirteenth Avenue by its owner Wayne Charles Foster.

752 Le |

Defendant, Margaret Fiala, was operating an automobile in a
northerly direction on First Street. The front of the Fiala
ear came into contact with the right rear of Foster’s car.

Division I of plaintiffs’ petition claimed damages for per-
sonal injuries received by Mrs. Glandon‘in the accident. Di-
vision II asserted the claim of her husband T: A. Glandon for
loss of services, society and consortium. The petition alleged
the accident and resulting damages were caused by the negli-
gence of defendant Margaret Fiala, in the operation of a 1958
Chevrolet owned by her and defendant Vincent Fiala.

On trial of the issues the court directed a verdict in favor
of Vincent Fiala for want of any proof of ownership of the
1958 Chevrolet. A jury verdict was returned for Beulah M.
Glandon against Margaret Fiala for $2500. Another verdict
awarded T. A. Glandon $500. From judgments on each of
these verdicts defendant, Margaret Fiala, has appealed.

T. A. Glandon’s derivative claim presents no separate
issues on this appeal. For clarity we will refer to Beulah M.
Glandon as plaintiff and Margaret Fiala as defendant.

Defendant asserts the trial court erred in, (1) not direct-
ing a verdict in her favor, (2) refusing to submit defendant’s
requested instruction as to lookout of plaintiff’s driver, and
(8) submitting to the jury plaintiffs third specification of
negligence.

Plaintiff has failed to file a brief as required by rule 343,
Rules of Civil Procedure, and her counsel made no oral argu-
ment before us. We cannot approve such failure. It deprives
us of appellee’s views of the issues and applicable legal prin-
ciples.

I. Defendant’s first assigned error involves the sufficiency
of the evidence. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendant
moved for a directed verdict which the trial court denied.
Without offering any evidence defendant then rested and re-
newed her motion which was again denied. In considering
the propriety of a motion for directed verdict we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against. whom
the motion was made. Rule 344(f)(2), R.C.P. We therefore
set forth the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

A short time before the accident Foster went to the home

a a 168

of Suzanne Bradish to see for the first time her five-month-old
child. While there he met plaintiff, a neighbor of Mrs. Brad-
ish. Thereafter plaintiff asked Foster to take her to LeMar
Beauty Salon where she was to have her hair done. At first
Foster declined but later consented and asked Mrs. Bradish
to go along. Foster was unaware of the beauty shop location
and was advised thereof by plaintiff. Plaintiff’s husband was
to pick her up when she finished at the beauty shop.

As they left the Bradish home Foster was driving. Mrs.
Bradish who was holding her baby was seated to his right.
Plaintiff was to the right of Mrs. Bradish, next to the right
door. The intersection where the accident happened was three
blocks from the Bradish home.

As they approached the intersection headed easterly on
Thirteenth Avenue Foster stopped the car five feet west of the
west curbline of First Street. There were no stop signs at the
intersection. While stopped he looked to his left (north) and
saw no vehicle approaching. He then looked to his right
(south) where he observed several automobiles parked along
the west curb of First Street. To some extent they obstructed
the view to the south. Some cars were also parked along the
east curb. Foster could see six or eight car lengths south down
the street between the lines of parked cars. Mrs. Bradish
made similar observations while the Foster car was stopped.
Neither saw any moving vehicle to the south. Foster then
started into the intersection and traveled between 5 and 10
miles per hour. When he was three fourths through the inter-
section, about 35 feet, his vehicle was struck on the right side
toward the rear by the front of defendant’s northbound car.
No sereeching of brakes or tires was heard before the impact.
Investigation thereafter showed no skid marks.

Foster testified that after starting he did not again look
to his right until he saw defendant’s vehicle about 20 feet away
just before the collision. Mrs. Bradish did not see the defend-
ant’s car until immediately before the collision. The Fiala
car was going considerably faster than Foster’s and did not
slow down. Foster’s car was shoved across the intersection
and against the curb and telephone pole on the northeast

154 Le Ln

corner where it veered off and stopped. It was badly damaged
as was the front end of defendant’s vehicle.

Plaintiff testified Foster stopped at the intersection, she
relied on his skill as a driver as she did not drive and it was
the first time she had traveled through that intersection. She
did not look to her right‘and did not see defendant’s vehicle
until it struck the car in which she was riding.. While the
Foster car was stopped and as it moved into the intersection
plaintiff was looking ahead or talking to Mrs. Bradish. . She
received considerable personal injury as a result of the acci-
dent. The extent thereof is not an issue on this appeal.

Defendant argues she was entitled-to a directed verdict as
Foster was guilty of negligence as.a matter of law which-was
a proximate cause of the- accident, that negligence was im-
putable to plaintiff and also that plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law. We do not agree.

| | ‘The established rule in this state is the negligence of a
driver of an automobile cannot be imputed to the passenger
or guest who-has no right to control-the car-or its driver.. If
the passenger does not bear such a relationship to thé driver
that he.has a right of control in some manner over the means
of locomotion then the negligence of the driver is not imputed
to the passenger. Carpenter v. Wolfe, 223 Iowa 417; 426, 273
N.W., 169,-174; Lockwood v. Wiltgen, 251 Iowa 484, 489, 101
N.W.2d 724, 727; Russell v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.Co., 251 Iowa
839, 845, 102 N.W.2d 881, 886; Mathews v. Beyer, 254 Towa’
52, 59,-116 N.W.2d 477, 481;-Sayre v. Andrews, 259 Iowa’ 930;
146 N.W.2d 336, 344; Davidson v. Cooney, 259 Iowa 1278, 147
N.W.2d 819, 823; Case Note, 9 Drake Law Review, 48, 49, 50,
and citations in footnotes. See also 654 C.J.S., Negligence,
section 168(4) ; 8 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile and Highway Traffic,
section 668.

Hl The relationship between plaintiff and Foster was not
one of agency as-claimed by defendant, with a right to control
the mearis of locomotion. Plaintiff was not the owner of the
vehicle and was lacking in any ability to exercise any control
over the operation thereof. The most that may be said is that
she gave directions regarding location ‘of the beauty shop.
This is not enough to establish any right of control.

i Pe 155

In Stoker v. Tri-City R:Co., 182 Iowa 1090, 165 N.W. 30,
L.RB.A. 1918 F 515, fellow employees were engaged in delivering
ice cream for their employer. Plaintiff rode in the truck and
advised the driver upon what streets the customers were loca-
ted and suggested the route to travel thereto. He exercised
no other control of the driver. We held the alleged negligence
of the driver. could not be imputed to plaintiff-passenger.

In Hickman v. Parag, 538 Del. (3 Storey) 217, 167 A.2d
225, the Delaware court held the occupant of an automobile
who told the driver where but not how to drive did not exer-
cise control of the automobile and the driver’s alleged negli-
gence was not imputed to the occupant in an action for injuries
resulting from a collision with a. tractor-trailer. For a. like
holding where destination only .was controlled in an agency
relationship see Baber v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.,; 94 US.. App.
D.C. 211, 215 F.2d 843.

We hold that as a matter of law Foster’s negligence, if
any, was not imputable to plaintiff. No claim is made the
alleged negligence of Foster was the sole proximate cause of
the accident. Defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict
on the grounds of negligence.of Foster.

Il. Defendant next argues plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence such as to bar recovery as a matter of law.
We do not agree. :

‘HE Plaintiff's duty as a passenger was to.exercise reason-
able care for her own safety under the circumstances. It is
only in the plainest case where reasonable minds-eould come
to no other conclusion that contributory negligence will be
found as a matter of law. Carpenter v. Wolfe, 223 Iowa aut,
424, 425, 273 N.W. 169, 178, and citations.

Hl A passenger in an automobile is not under an absolute
duty to see an impending danger in time to interfere and
prevent it, Within reasonable limits plaintiff had a right to
rely upon the skill and judgment of the driver. She was not
required td exercise the same degree of vigilance in looking
and listening required of the driver. Frideres v. Lowden,
235. Iowa 640, 648, 17 N.W.2d 396, 400, and citations; Plumb
y. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 249 Towa 1187, 1198, 91
N.W.2d 880, .385, and citations.

158 [| 7

In Mathews v. Beyer, supra, 254 Iowa 52, 116 N.W.2d 477,
plaintiff was riding in the front seat beside her driver-hus-
band. She had her eyes closed but was not asleep. The car
ahead stopped to make a left turn without giving a proper
signal and with a defective taillight. Plaintiff’s husband at-
tempted to avoid the stopped car but in doing so collided with
an oncoming car, We held the question of the passenger’s
freedom from contributory negligence was for the jury.

- In Puhrmann v. Lund, 254 Iowa 304, 308, 117 N.W.2d 495,
497, we held the trial court erred in directing a verdict against
plaintiff, a front seat passenger, who gave no warning to the
driver before the accident, on the grounds of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. We said: “Generally the ques-
tion of contributory negligence is for the jury, it is only in
exceptional cases that it may be decided as a matter of law.”
See also rule 344(f) (10), R.C.P.

The trial court was correct in submitting the question
of plaintiff’s contributory negligence to the jury.

Il. The trial court gave defendant’s requested instruc-

tion submitting to the jury the question of whether under the
facts Foster’s negligence, if any, was imputable to plaintiff.
The court refused to give defendant’s requested instruction
regarding Foster’s duty to keep a proper lookout. No prej-
udice to defendant could result therefrom. We have already
pointed out Foster’s negligence, if any, was not imputable to
plaintiff under the record. The trial court should not have
submitted defendant’s requested instruction on imputed negli-
gence, :
. HJ Iv. Paragraph 4(3) of plaintiff’s petition alleged
defendant was negligent “In entering and driving her said
automobile into said intersection after the said Wayne Foster,
the operator of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding,
had entered said intersection.”

At the close-of the evidence defendant moved to withdraw
the above specification from plaintiff’s petition. The grounds
stated were: “There is no competent, credible evidence to sup-
port the submission of. said specification in view of the direc-
tional right-of-way statute, and in view of the express holding
in Jacobson v. Aldrich, 246 Iowa 1160, 68 N.W.2d°733, 735,

a a 157

and for the further reason the mere fact an automobile enters
an intersection before another automobile does not alter the
effect of the right-of-way statute in any manner or degree.”

The trial court overruled defendant’s motion to withdraw
this specification and it was set out in the exact language
pleaded as the second of two specifications of negligence in
the statement of issues to the jury. The first specification of
negligence submitted had to do with defendant’s control of
her vehicle. .

Our holding in Jacobson v. Aldrich, 246 Iowa 1160, 68
N.W.2d 788, clearly demonstrates the trial court committed
prejudicial error in overruling defendant’s motion to with-
draw the quoted specification and submitting it to the jury.

Code section 321.319, as material here, provides: “Where
two vehicles are approaching on any public street or highway
so that their paths will intersect and there is danger of colli-
sion, the vehicle approaching the other from the right shall
have the right of way. * * *.”

HI The undisputed facts establish defendant had the di-
rectional right-of-way but this is not an absolute right, but a
relative one. Otherwise the driver of any vehicle struck from
the right at an intersection would be guilty of negligence for
failure to yield the right-of-way. The directional right-of-way
is qualified by Code section 321.288 which requires a person
operating a motor vehicle to have it under control and reduce
its speed to a reasonable and proper rate when approaching
and traversing an intersection.

In Jacobson v. Aldrich, supra, we say: “Nevertheless, the
directional right-of-way statute has meaning. It does not
depend for its effect upon which car first entered the inter-
section, nor upon which car struck the other, nor at what point
upon the car or in the intersection. The statute is intended to
promote safety, to give motorists a guiding rule by which
rights at intersections may be determined. It does not con-
template a race for the intersection; if at their respective
distances and speeds the two cars approaching at right angles
will collide it is the duty of the one on the left to give way.”
(Page 1164, 246-Iowa, pages 735, 736, 68 N.W.2d)

The specification of negligence defendant sought to have

7158

withdrawn contemplated a race for the intersection in violation
of the provisions of section 321.319. The erroneous ruling of
the trial court requires a reversal and a new trial—Reversed.

‘” All Justices concur,

Gerrrupe I, Hauw, appellee, v. Roserr A. Wricut et al.,
appellants.

No, 52569.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 661)

8
e
ol - -_ - CT "i | :

Fesruary 6, 1968,

Richard L. Pinegar, Duffield, Pinegar & Tapscott, of Des
Moines, for appellant Robert A. Wright.

Henry T. McKnight, of Des Moines, for appellee.

Mason, J.—As a result of transactions hereinafter detailed,
plaintiff Gertrude Hall lost her home in Des Moines. She
brought this law action in three counts against. those involved.
Here we are concerned only with the charge of fraud against
her attorney Robert A. Wright. The jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff of $10,000 actual damages and $15,000 exemplary
damages. The trial court overruled Wright’s motion for new
trial on condition plaintiff file a remittitur to $17,400, which
she did. Wright has appealed from judgment on the reduced
amount. He will be referred to as defendant.

Plaintiff owned a home at 1808 Keo Way. Defendant
Haskins owned a lot on 15th Street Place on which he was
building two houses. In February 1961, following several
months’ discussion, Mrs. Hall agreed to exchange her home for
one of the new houses at 1223 15th Street Place and $1500
cash. She called defendant Wright whom she had known since
he was a child and who had previously acted as her attorney.
He wrote up the agreement in the form of an offer.to buy.
It was subject to zoning the Keo Way property commercial.

At that time there was a discussion as to the deeds and
abstracts of title. Mr. Wright told Mrs. Hall a new abstract
would have to be drawn up for the Haskins property and that
Haskins had clear title. On April 3 Wright wrote Haskins,
advising him the Keo Way property was properly zoned and
asking for an abstract of title to be examined to ascertain
whether he had merchantable title.

On June 13 Haskins brought a blank piece of paper to Mrs.
Hall for her signature. She called Wright. He said: “Go
ahead and sign the papers, Gertrude. I wish you would stop
questioning what I tell you to do because I won’t tell you

a a T6L

anything wrong.” She asked about the deed and abstract.
Mr. Wright said it had not been made up yet “but not to worry
about it, he would see that.I got my deed and abstract with
clear title to 1223 15th Street Place.”

She testified: “On about February 1, 1961, when Mr.
Wright told me that Haskins could produce clear title and he
would see I got it, I believed him. Relying on that I deeded
my property.” The deed was taken to Wright who notarized
her signature and delivered it to Haskins who took the deed to |
Stoner-McCray System the same day. Wright had Haskins
execute the following statement:

“TI am receiving a warranty deed of Lot 73 Keo Way, Plat
No. 3 for the purpose of securing a loan to pay off Mrs. Hall in
accordance with an offer to buy ex. Feb. 6, 1961.

“Tt is understood that this warranty deed is null-and void
unless said agreement with purchase(r) is completed, which
includes the transfer of title to 1223 15th Street Place and
payment of fifteen hundred dollars in cash. John L. Haskins.”

Wright kept the original statement and gave Haskins a
copy to take with the deed. The deed of the Keo Way property
from Mrs. Hall to Haskins was recorded ‘June 14 without
recording the conditions under which it was given. Wright at
no time examined an abstract but testified he checked the
records and found title in Haskins subject to a mortgage. Asa
matter of fact, Haskins and his wife had deeded 1223 15th
Street Place to Grandquist Construction Company on May 27,
1961. They claim the deed was to serve as security. Grand-
quist was to get a new mortgage and finish the houses which
Haskins was financially unable to complete. This deed was
recorded June 20, 1961.

On June 18, 1961, Haskins gave Mrs. Hall the key to the
15th Street Place house and she moved in.

By a deed dated June 21, 1961, Haskins transferred the
Keo Way property to Stoner-McCray System. It was recorded
June 28, 1961. Although the record is not clear as to the
exact date, sometime between June 14 and 28, Mr. Wright
checked the deed from Hall to Haskins with the attorney for
Stoner-McCray. He, therefore, knew at that time Haskins was
assuming ownership of the Keo Way property contrary to the

162 Pt 7

conditions under which the deed was delivered to him. There
is no evidence-he did anything to try to stop the conveyance
or whether the transfer had been completed at the time of the
conference.

On June 23 he received a check from Haskins for the
balance due Mrs. Hall out of the $1500 difference between the
agreed value of the properties after her mortgage on the Keo
Way property and other expenses were paid. Wright gave
Mrs. Hall $392.41 cash after deducting his fees'of $150. Also
on June 23 Haskins executed a deed to the 15th Street Place
property to Mrs. Hall. This deed was kept by Wright and
never recorded. Haskins’ wife had refused to sign the deed
presumably because she had previously signed a deed convey-
ing this property to Grandquist Construction Company. The
deed to Grandquist had been recorded June 20.

On the 30th Grandquist mortgaged this property to -Polk
County Federal Savings & Loan Association.

On July 15 Grandquist contracted to sell the 15th Street
Place property to Haskins. By agreement dated. August 1
Grandquist and Haskins agreed the property should be con-
veyed ‘to Mrs. Hall-when-fully paid for.

Mrs. Hall talked to Mr. Wright in August about the deed
and abstract. “He said that he had just found out Haskins
had a mortgage on 1223 15th St. Place * * * that his father-in-
law is going to give him the money to pay it off,” and we will
just have to wait.

“IT continued to call ‘Attorney Wright constantly, every
day. And I called until he told me again that I was a damn
nuisance, that I was in the house and’ what was I worrying
about.

“T never knew anything about a Mr. Grandquist:”

On September 15, 1961, Wright obtained a Confession of
Judgment ‘from Haskins to Gertrude Hall in the amount of
$14,500: In response to her written request on October 31,
1961, he delivered to her copies of this judgment, the real
estate contract between Haskins and Grandquist and their
August 1 agreement.

“In 1962 I talked to Mr. Wright and he told me he had
been trying to catch Haskins. He told me to call him if I saw

— a 768

Haskins drive up in his car and that Mr. Wright would come
over and we would get this thing straightened out about my
deed and abstract.

“When I saw Mr: Haskins come home I ealled Attorney
Wright and he came to my home. He went over to Mr.
Haskins’ and then they came over to my home and they as-
sured me that the mortgage would be clear and I would get a
deed and abstract and clear title to the place.”

She saw no more of Wright or Haskins in 1962. By the
summer of 1963 Haskins had paid only $450 on the contract
with Grandquist. Plaintiff as party in possession was served
with two. notices of forfeiture during 1963. She gave them to
Wright. She testified: “He told me not to worry, ‘If I have to,
I will pay for it my ownself, because I feel morally re-
sponsible’.”

Defendant apparently was trying to negotiate some ar-
rangement: by which Mrs. Hall could stay in the property.
Commencing in February 1964 he tried to get a contract be-
tween Grandquist and Mrs. Hall. She testified: “* * * he came
to my home February, 1964 and rang the doorbell between
7:30 or 8 o’clock in the morning and I was thinking it was
Toy, a lady I used to baby-sit for, and I told him to come in
and he said this isn’t Joy, this is your attorney, Bob Wright.
I said, ‘Oh, Bob, come on in.’ Then I said, ‘I'll get up and get
some clothes on and I'll be out there.” And he said, ‘Oh, I
know where the bedroom is.’ And he came into my bedroom.

“Q. What did he say? A. He said, TI ‘have some papers
I want you to sign.’

“He said, ‘I want to get your name on this paper to ‘show
that you are the rightful, lawful one to have your name on the
abstract.’

“And I have a pookease bed, and he took a book and put
it down there and laid this paper on it like that (indicating),
and he said, ‘Sign here.’

“I said, ‘Well, Bob, wait until I get up and get my eye-
glasses so I can read it.’ He says, ‘You don’t have to read
behind me.’ He said, ‘I’m your attorney, Just sign this.’ So,
I signed it.” .

“My bedroom door was setting like this (indicating), and

164 Le 7

right here is the door going out into a little hallway I had, and
Attorney Wright left out of my bedroom and he went down the
hall, and I guess about three or four steps, then he whirled
around and came back in. He said, ‘Oh Gertrude,’ he said
‘Here’s a piece of paper that went with that. I forgot to have
you sign it.’

“And I said, ‘you better let me read that paper’. He said,
‘Oh,’ he said, ‘it just goes with that.’ I said, ‘Okay’. So, I
signed the paper. Well, something kept, I don’t know, worry-
ing me, and that paper looked like something was wrong with
the paper, so the next day I called Attorney. Wright and I
said, ‘Attorney Wright, what was that little paper you brought
back in and had me sign?’ He said, ‘Oh, that was just a piece
that went onto that other paper.’ He said, ‘It wasn’t nothing
to it”

The second paper she signed was a promissory note, She
testified: “Q. Did you know at that time that Exhibit ‘N’ was
a promissory note for $850.00? A. No, sir. I didn’t have no
$850.00, so it wouldn’t have been signed, because I didn't
have any.”.

By October 22, 1964, a real estate contract between
Grandquist and Mrs. Hall was fully executed. It was dated
May 30, 1964, and provided for her to purchase the 15th Street
Place property from Grandquist for $13,500, $1850 down and
the $12,000 balance at $100 per month with 614 percent interest
commencing July 1. The down payment consisted of Mrs.
Hall’s $850 promissory note and $500 eash paid by Wright.

Wright admitted Mrs. Hall could not make the monthly
payments at the time the contract was executed and expected
to make the payments himself. By October 1964, when the
contract was finally executed, payments were in default for
July, August, September and October. Mrs. Hall made no
payments on the contract.

In December 1964, plaintiff received notice she was in
default $600. Although the record is not too clear, the jury
could find this was the first time she realized she was obligated
on a contract to buy the place for which she had traded her
home. She could not find Mr. Wright and took her problem to
Polk County Legal Aid. When a notice of hearing on the

a es 165

forfeiture was served February 1 for a hearing February 8,
she contacted her present attorney who paid the rent so she
could stay in the home during the remainder of that month.
This action was filed shortly thereafter.

I. In motions for directed verdict made at the close’ of
plaintiff’s evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence,
defendant asserted plaintiff had failed to establish the essential
elements of fraud by the quality and quantum of proof re-
quired.

The trial court overruled the motions and submitted the
ease to the jury on the issue of actual fraud.

Plaintifi’s claim was that Wright represented to her
Haskins had clear title and she would receive a deed, abstract
of title and a title opinion showing Haskins had merchantable
title to the 15th Street Place property; the representations
were false, Wright knew them to be false and made the
representations with intent to deceive and defraud plaintiff;
that in reliance on such false representations she made, ex-
ecuted and delivered the warranty deed to her Keo Way
property; as a result she lost her home and did not receive the
15th Street Place property.

Defendant asserted in his motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict that he was entitled to a directed verdict
at the close of all evidence, had moved therefor, and the jury
did not retumn such a verdict. In the motion for new trial
defendant again asserted the court had erred in overruling
his motion for a directed verdict and in’ overruling timely
objections to instructions 4 and 5.

Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding was
overruled and as stated his motion for new trial was overruled
on condition plaintiff accept a remittitur of her judgment down
to $17,400. Plaintiff filed acceptance of, the court’s order for
remittitur and judgment for that amount was entered against
defendant. . :

II. In his appeal defendant contends the court erred in
overruling his motion for judgment notwithstanding and
motion for new trial. He argues plaintiff had failed to
establish defendant had made any false representations to
plaintiff with intent to deceive her; that the award of ex-

766 a

emplary damages is without support; and the award for actual
damages is contrary to the evidence and the court’s instruc-
tions: .

The jury did not have before it an issue as to whether
Wright, in his fiduciary capacity, fraudulently concealed. facts
from Mrs. Hall to delay action on her part in order to eséape
liability until-any claim against him was barred by-the statute
of limitations. Plaintiff argues this here but it is not directly
before us. Nor do we have before us at this time the issue of
Wright’s contractual obligation to pay ‘off the real estate’ con-
tract made in Mrs. Hall’s name.

HM We are here concerned with the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a plaintiff’s verdict on the issue of action:
able fraud. This cannot be presumed but the essential elements
thereof must.be affirmatively proved by the one who relies on
it either for the purpose of defense or attack. Wyckoff v. A &
J Home Benevolent: Assn.,:254 Iowa 653, 657, 658, 119 N.W.2d
126, 128, 129, and citations. Each and every one of the follow-
ing elements must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing—such as to
overcome the presumption in favor of fair dealing: (1) repre-
sentation, (2) falsity, (8) materiality, (4) scienter, (5) intent
to deceive, (6) reliance, (7) resulting injury and damage.
Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benevolent Assn., supra; Phoenix v:
Stevens, 256 Towa 432, 436, 127 N.W.2d 640, 642, and citations;
Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 618, 625, 183 N.W.2d 666, 674; Ford
v. Barcus, 261-Iowa 616, 155 N.W.2d 507, and citations.

Defendant contends plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to
establish either the fourth or fifth of these essentials. Plaintiff
had made two allegations of fraud. One, defendant told her
in-February 1961 Haskins could produce clear title. Plaintiff’s
testimony was somewhat stronger. She testified defendant had
said; “Yes, Mr. Haskins has clear title to that [15th Street
Place].” The other, on June 13, 1961, Wright promised he
would see she got her deed, abstract and clear title to the 15th
Street Place property. Defendant argues plaintiff’s proof was
not clear, satisfactory and convincing that defendant knew the
representations were false or either was made with a real

a | 767

existing intent to defraud plaintiff; a mere preponderance of
the evidence is not sufficient, ,

The jury was given the correct rule concerning plaintiff's
burden of proof.

In instruction 4 the jury was told that to recover the
burden of proof was upon plaintiff to establish by a prepon-
derance or greater weight of the evidence each element we
have set out, supra; that in the event of her failure to establish
any one or more of them, their verdict would be for defendant.
In instruction 5 the jury was advised that fraud is never pre-
sumed but must be proved by evidence that is clear, satis-
factory and convincing.

In Bixby v. Carskaddon, 55 Iowa 533, 535-536,8 N:W.
354-355, we upheld the trial court’s rejection of a requested
instruction that the presumption of honesty and fairness must
be overcome by clear and satisfactory evidence, in favor of its
instruction that proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.
«* # ® Fraud must- be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence. * * * But the quantity of evidence required is no
more than will outweigh the evidence on the other side; that is,
a preponderance of proof, and. no more, is demanded. * * * The
evidence must be clear and satisfactory in character. * * *.”

“# © # TW]hile the evidence must be clear and convincing,
such clear and convincing proof may be met by a ‘prepon-
derance of the evidence. * * *.” 37 C.J.S., Fraud, section 114.

As explained in Frederick v. Shorman, 259 Iowa 1050,
1056, 147 N.W.2d 478, 482, a preponderance of the evidence is
not a fixed or unvarying standard. What would be sufficient
to constitute a- preponderance of the evidence and ‘to sustain a
judgment in one case might not suffice in another, where, in
addition to the burden resting upon plaintiff in any case, par-
ticular presumptions are to be overcome. .

Hl Here the presumption in favor of fair dealing requires
evidence that is clear and satisfactory i int character to prepon-
derate against it. :

Stated otherwise the quantity of evidenée required ‘of a
party having the -burden of proof’ in-a civil law action is no
more than will outweigh the evidence ‘of the other side; that is,
a preponderance of: proof. But in cases such’as here where

768 Le |

particular presumptions are to be overcome, the quality of
evidence must be clear, convincing and satisfactory in
character. In support see In re Estates of Koch, 258 Iowa
1251, 1255, 142 N.W.2d 541, 544.

HH Ill. We do not agree with defendant’s contention
that there is insufficient evidence he knew the representations
claimed by plaintiff were false. Bearing on the issue of knowl-
edge of falsity or representations relied upon we said in Tott
v. Duggan, 199 Lowa 238, 242, 200 N.W. 411, 413:

“Tn Davis vy. Central Land Co., 162 Iowa 269 [143 N.W.
1078, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 1219], the rule announced in the Boddy
ease [Boddy v. Henry, 113 Iowa 462, 85 N.W. 771] was said to
be undoubtedly correct in cases where the representation was
more or less a matter of opinion or deduction from other
facts, but that it was manifest that the writer of the opinion
had also in mind the rule cited with approval from MeKown v.
Furgason, 47 Iowa 636, ‘that the representation of a matter as
true as of personal knowledge of which the person making the
representation had no knowledge whatever is a false represen-
tation.’ And, after an extensive review of authorities, it was
further said that it was well established doctrine that scienter
might be proved by showing (1) actual knowledge of the
falsity of the representation; (2) that the statement was made
as of the knowledge of the party, or in such absolute, un-
qualified, and positive terms as to imply his personal knowl-
edge of the fact, when in truth he had no knowledge whether
the statement was true or false; or (3) that the party’s special
situation or means of knowledge were such as to make it his
duty to know as to the truth or falsity of the representation.”

The Davis case is cited and quoted in American Universal
Ins. Co. v. Scherfe Ins. Agency (8.D. Iowa, B.D.), 185 F. Supp.
407, 412-413, where a number of Iowa cases bearing on this
proposition are cited.

In Riley v. Bell, 120 Iowa 618, 624-625, 95 N.W. 170, 172,
where a purchaser of realty brought an action against a broker
for damages resulting from a broker’s alleged fraud, misrepre-
sentation and concealment regarding the property purchased,
it’ was claimed that during the negotiation, in response to
plaintiff's inquiry, defendant represented that to his personal

a a 769

knowledge the condition of the title of the land was perfect
in all respects, when in fact he had no knowledge concerning
the condition. The evidence showed a mortgage existed on
the land, as the result of which plaintiff was required to pay
a judgment on foreclosure to protect his title. We said:

«* * * Tt may be conceded that, in an ordinary action for
deceit by means of false and fraudulent representations, proof
of scienter is essential. This is the general rule, * * *. But we
think such rule cannot be accepted as controlling in a case
such as we now have before us. Where the wrong complained
of is that the defendant has induced the plaintiff to act by
falsely and fraudulently representing that a certain material
fact is true, within his personal knowledge, and injury and
damage result therefrom, both reason and authority unite in
dictating the wholesome doctrine that he shall not be heard
thereafter to assert that in fact he had no knowledge upon the
subject * * *.”

See also Dimond v. Peace River Land & Development Co.,
182 Towa 400, 408, 165 N.W. 1032, 1035, where we said:

“When one falsely states that to be true which he does not
know to be true, for the purpose of inducing another to rely
upon it and act upon it, he is just as guilty of actionable fraud,
in the event he is accepted at his word, as if he knew at the
time it was not true. One cannot falsely state a fact to be true
as of his own knowledge, about which he has no knowledge,
for the purpose of inducing another to act, and then, when
action follows, escape liability on the mere showing that he
did not know the fact to be untrue at the time he made the
statement. * * *,”

Later in Baker v. Bockelman, 208 Iowa 254, 258, 225 N.W.
411, 412, we said:

«* * * Tt is the settled law in Iowa that one who asserts, as
a fact, without qualification, something that he does not know
to be true, asserts, by implication at least, that the thing as-
serted is of his own knowledge, and true; and he is not per-
mitted, as against one to whom the representation is made, as
an inducement to act, and who is thereby induced to act, to
thereafter assert that he did not know his statement to be

770 Le 7

false.” Cited. in International Milling Co. v. Gisch, 258 Iowa
63, 73, 187 N.W.2d 625, 632.

‘In Tone v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 286 Ill. App. 169, 180,.3
N.E.2d 142, 147, cited in Prosser on Torts, Third Ed., section
101, it is said:

“Tt is well settled that it is immaterial whether a party
misrepresenting a material fact knows it to be false or makes
the assertion of fact without knowing it to be true, for the
affirmation of what one does not know to be true is unjustifi-
able, and if another act upon the faith of it, he who induced
the action must suffer, and not the other.

«# * ® Scienter (intentional wrongdoing) is an “essential
element of every action at law for fraud and deceit. ..* * * How-
ever, knowledge of wrongdoing is not absent where representa-
tions, in fact false, are made in reckless disregard of whether
the same are true or false. Where one of the parties asserts
that he had knowledge which he does not have, this is-a- false
representation, to which a plea of-ignorance is‘no reply.”

Our ‘function. in review is to examine the evidence to
determine whether: it makes a sufficient showing so that the
trial court was warranted in submitting the question to the
jury and the jury in the exercise of its function as the trier.of
the facts was justified in finding.defendant had knowledge of
the falsity of the representations relied upon. by- plaintiff.
Kregel v. Kann, 260 Iowa 1880, 1836, 152 N.W.2d-534, 538, and
citations:
af In considering the propriety of a, motion for ‘directed
verdict the court views the evidence in the light-most favoi-
able to the party against whom the motion was made. Rule
344(f) (2), Rules of Civil Procedure as amended. It is: like-
wise viewed when appeal is taken from judgment-on verdict
for plaintiff. Denison v. Wiese, 251 Iowa 770; 773, 102 N.W.2d
671, 673; Van Patten.v. Chicago, BR. I. & P. RB. Co.; 251 Iowa
1221, 1229, 102 N.W.2d 898, 903. We neéd consider only the
evidence :favorable to plaintiff, whether or not it was con-
tradicted. Martin v. Cafer, 258 Iowa 176, 179, 188 N.W.2d
71, 78, and citation; Tuttle v. Longnecker, 258 Iowa 393, 396,
188 N.W.2d 851, 853.

— a 71

We conclude there is substantial evidence from which a
jury might reasonably draw an inference that defendant in
making the representations or either of them knew they were
false, or made them recklessly, without any knowledge of their
truth, and as a positive assertion.

Even if plaintiff were not to be believed in her assertion
that defendant did represent title was clear, there is still his
undisputed. assertion that Haskins could produce good title,
the theory on which the case was submitted to the jury. -

Conceding the. fact that defendant was not aware of
Haskins’ lack of title, his wife having deeded the property to
Grandquist Construction Company at or before the time de-
fendant’s representation was made, his assertion that Haskins
eould produce good title is tantamount to representing that
Haskins, then had title free and clear, or at least if any en-
cumbrance existed-it could be readily removed. Obviously
neither was true as Haskins was no longer possessed of title.

HE it must be remembered that knowledge, like other
material-facts, may ordinarily be established by circumstantial,
aswell as by direct, evidence. Boddy v. Henry, 126 Iowa 31,
35, 101 N.W. 447, 448 (Second appeal). Of course the evidence
must be such as to make plaintiff!s theory reasonably probable,
not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory
based on such evidence.. Generally, it-will be for the jury or
other trier of the facts to say whether the circumstantial
evidence. meets this test. Rule 344(£) (16), R.C.P.

a | IV. Defendant’s contention that the evidence wag not
sufficient to establish. the fifth element, an’ intent to-deceive, is
without.merit. : : :

“Intent to deceive is necessarily the gist of an action for
deceit. The: burden of proving it is necessarily upon the plain-
tiff. .The method of proving it is quite another question
[thing]. It is always an element of plaintiff's case, necessary
to be alleged, and therefore necessary to be established.

“However, the same evidence that proves that a defendant
made representations known by ‘him to- be false, upon which
plaintiff relied to his injury, is ordinarily sufficient, also, to
establish the intent to deceive. The intent, being a mere act

772 Pe _

of the mind of the defendant, is usually established by appro-
priate inference and presumptions from the overt acts proved.
In such a case the deceit consists in inducing the action of the
plaintiff by representations known by the defendant to be
false.” Smith v. Packard & Co., 152 Iowa 1, 6, 130 N.W. 1076,
1077.

The actual deceit practiced by defendant was in leading
plaintiff to believe that all aspects of the transaction were in
order, that Haskins had clear title and could produce clear
‘title at the time when the property was to be exchanged. This,
at a time when he had no idea what the actual state of the
title was, was nothing but deceit.

HA false statement innocently but mistakenly. made will
not afford a cause of action; but, where recklessly asserted, it
will imply.a fraudulent intent. Smithpeter v. Mid-State
Motor Co. (Mo., K.C. Court of Appeals), 74 S.W.2d 47, 50.

HN We believe a person is as guilty of actual fraud when
in conscious disregard of the truth or falsity of facts his: repre-
sentations are predicated upon he makes such representations
to induce action and the party to whom they are made suffers
damage by taking the action sought to be induced in reliance
upon those representations as surely as if he had intended that
very result. :

In Boddy v. Henry, supra, 126 Iowa at 37, 101 N.W. at
449, this court said:

“The true rule, as we interpret the law, is that when the
party charging false and fraudulent representations has shown
that the representations were made, and that they were false,
and known to be false by the party making them, the intent to
deceive is implied or presumed.”

In Mitchell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (S.D. Cal. C.D.),
188 F. Supp. 869, 872, where defendant had made a similar
contention that the evidence did not support a finding of fraud
because there was no evidence of fraudulent intent to cheat
or be dishonest, the court in rejecting the contention quoted
from Prosser, Torts (Second Ed.), 537-538 (now page 715,
Third Ed.), and said:

“The intent which underlies an intentional misrepresenta-

a a 713

tion * * * involves the intent that a misrepresentation shall be
made, that it shall be directed to a particular person * * *,
that it shall convey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed,
and that it shall be acted upon in a certain way ** *. [T]he
fact that the defendant was disinterested, that he had the best
of motives, and that he thought he was doing the plaintiff a
kindness, will not absolve him from liability, so long as he
did in fact intend to mislead.” See also 37 O.J.S., Fraud, sec-
tions 21 and 22.

There can be no doubt defendant knew from plaintiff’s
telephone call before she executed the deed to the Keo Way
property that his assurances plaintiff would receive a clear title
to the 15th Street Place property would be a material factor
in inducing plaintiff to act. He must have been conscious of
the fact that he had no personal knowledge of Haskins’ ability
to deliver merchantable title. Even then he stated to plaintiff
as of his own knowledge that Haskins could produce clear title.

A jury would be justified in finding that so advising her
without knowing that what he said was true constituted a
reckless claim of knowledge upon material matters implying
a fraudulent intent. Whether, in fact, he intended to deceive
and defraud plaintiff was a matter for the jury under all the
circumstances in evidence.

HM SOV. Defendant asserts under his second assigned
error that the jury award of exemplary damages is not sup-
ported by the evidence. A similar contention was made and
rejected in Syester v, Banta, supra, 257 Iowa at 627-628, 133
N.W.2d at 675-676. The assignment is without merit.

His second contention that the amount of the jury award
for actual damages is contrary to the evidence and the in-
struction of the court is disposed of by our holding in Division
VI, infra.

HME VI. Although she filed remittitur of $7600, plaintiff
contends the original verdict of $25,000 must be deemed rein-
stated upon defendant’s appeal. Basis for plaintiff’s claim is
the second paragraph of rule 250, R.C.P., added by the amend-
ment to the rule in 1953.

Rule 250 as amended provides:

74 as —

“Conditional new trial. The court may permit a party
to avoid a new trial under rule 248 or 244 by agreeing to
such terms or conditions as it may impose, which shall then
be shown of record and a judgment entered accordingly.

“Any such term or condition or judgment entered pursu-
ant thereto shall be deemed of no force and effect and the
original judgment entered pursuant to rule 223 shall be deemed
reinstated in the event of an appeal.”

It is clear that under the second paragraph of the rule
the original judgment for $25,000 entered upon the verdict
as directed by rule 223 is to be deemed reinstated upon de-
fendant’s appeal. Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 658-659,
128 N.W.2d:885. .

In Castner we said, “* * * We have the inherent: right to
order a remittitur and modify the award to such sum as we
deem just.” Accordingly it is ordered that if plaintiff files in
the office of the clerk of this court within 30 days from and
after the filing hereof, a remittitur of so much of the judgment
entered in the trial court for $25,000 as exceeds $17,400 with
interest from the date said judgment was originally entered
at five percent per annum, and costs, the judgments shall stand
affirmed as so modified. If such remittitur is not so’ filed, a
new trial is hereby ordered. The cause is remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion —Modified and
affirmed on condition, and remanded.

All Justices coneur except Moore, J., who takes no part.

115

In Re Estate or AnpREw M. Sueio, deceased.
Pum R. Saumo, administrator, appellee, v. Martyn Saurmo
et al., appellants.

No. 52640.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 681)

716

Fepruary 6, 1968,

John H. Greve, of Northwood, for appellants.

Floyd Ensign, of Northwood, for appellee.

Rawiines, J.—Asserting ownership in estate represented,
plaintiff-administrator filed application in probate for deter-
mination of rights in two bank certificates of deposit, each in
the name of a single designated defendant-payee, found in de-
eedent’s safe-deposit box. Defendant-payees both appeared
and answered resisting the claim made by plaintiff. After
hearing, trial court adjudged these certificates to be property
of decedent’s estate. Defendants appeal. We reverse.

Plaintiff is administrator of estate of Andrew M. Sheimo,
deceased. Evidence produced by him discloses two time cer-
tificates of deposit were found in decedent’s bank box, No. 3160
for $6000 payable to Richard Sheimo, and No. 3161 for $2000
payable to Marlyn Sheimo.

Defendants’ evidence reveals decedent originally held an
$8000 certificate issued by Citizens Savings Bank of Hanlon-
town, on which he had written with pencil, $2000 to go to
Marlyn Sheimo, $6000 to go to Richard Sheimo.

August 7, 1964, Marion O. Hall, president of the bank,
talked to Andrew Sheimo and told him if anybody should die

a Po TT

the bank could not go by the penciled writing. In the words
of this banker he said to decedent: “The only way you could
do it if you wanted that—want six thousand to go to Richard
and two thousand to Marlyn—is to fix out separate certificates
of deposit for them and you do—you don’t want your name on
them. They get the interest.” Decedent replied, “no, they
are to be theirs. I don’t want my name on them at all.”

Hall then told Aridrew to have Richard or Marlyn come
in and endorse the original certificate. Richard did so and the
new ones, here in question, were issued. The banker was told
by Andrew he would deliver them to Richard and Marlyn at
a later date.

These new certificates were then placed in decedent’s
lockbox, all interest on them being subsequently paid to and
retained by each of above named payees.

I. Defendants assert plaintiff-administrator had the bur-
den of proof and failed to meet it, With this we are inclined
to agree although the matter of burden of proof is here of
little or no significance. See rule 344(f)(5), Rules of Civil
Procedure.

At commencement of hearing to the court, plaintiff pro-
eeeded with introduction of evidence which consisted of this
stipulation: “That Phil R. Sheimo is the Administrator of the
A. M. Sheimo estate. That A. M. Sheimo for approximately
a year before his death was unable to attend to his business
affairs and was confined to a nursing home. That Phil Sheimo,
as Administrator of this Estate, found the certificates involved,
being Numbers 3160 and 3161, issued on August 7, 1964, by
the Citizens Savings Bank of Hanlontown, Iowa. The certificate
numbered 3160 shows the name of Richard Sheimo, and the
Certificate numbered 3161 shows the name of Marlyn Sheimo.
These certificates of deposit were found in the decedent’s
safety deposit box and had been placed there by the decedent.
The Administrator of the estate had no instructions concerning
them. It was further stipulated that the certificates herein
referred to were received into evidence.”

Defendants then proceeded with introduction of evidence
to which reference will later be made.

118 | 7

It would thus appear plaintiff had and assumed the burden
of proof. In this regard see Liberty Mutual Thsurance Co. v.
Sweeney, 8 Cir., 216 F.2d 209, 211.

IL. Neither trial court nor the parties refer to nature of
original proceeding, or our review.

. MJ In this regard it appears the matter was triable as: in
equity. Section 633.33, Code,-1966. That means we consider
it de novo. Rule 344(£)(7), R.C.P., and Hendersor v. Hawk-
eye-Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97, 100, 106 N.W.2d: 86.°

- III. It is to us apparent the trial court reached an erro-
neous conclusion as the result of a sincere but. nevertheless
faulty application of the gift doctrine. See Hamilton v. Wo-
sépka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164, 166, and citations.

Where appropriate, the gift or trust. concept may serve a

just purpose. However, in recent times they have, per se, often
been found to be too rigid and unrealistic when. applied to
vesting of rights in a bank deposit. They frequently-serve to
defeat rather than effectuate an evident intent and purpose.
*. In re Estate of Martin, 261 Iowa 630, 155 N.W.2d 401,
reviews development of the relatively new contract theory in
Towa and its application to bank deposits, citing among others,
In re Estate of Stamets, 260 Iowa 98, 148 N.W.2d 468; In re
Estate of Murdoch, 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177; O’Brien v.
Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412; and In re Estate of
Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 5 N.W.2d 153.

Reference is also there made to Andrew vy. Citizens: St.
Bank, 205 Iowa 237, 216 N.W. 12, involving a mother or
daughter joint tenancy bank deposit. Quoting from the cited
ease, loc. cit., 205 Iowa: 248, we said: “Appellant also insists
that the burden was upon Hazel Pent to allege and prove that
a gift of the certificate was intended and made to her by her
mother. While no evidence was offered for that purpose, we
think the necessary inference from matters appearing in’ the
record is that * * *, The certificate was lawfully payable to
her [Hazel Pent] after her mother’s death, upon the surrender
thereof to the bank issuing it. Section 9267, Code of 1924.
[Section 528.64, Code, 1962] No other reason for the mother’s
making the certificate payable to herself or daughter than that

, ee 779

she intended her to receive the money, unless paid out on her
own order, is suggested. The fact that the certificate remained
unpaid and unchanged is some evidence of the mother’s intention:
The record discloses neither pleading nor proof in any way deny-
ing or explaining the purpose and intention of the mother.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

Continuing, this court stated in the Martin Estate case,
supra: “And, if funds are payable to an ‘or’ survivor pursuant
to.a bank deposit certificate under the joint tenancy doctrine,
the same result will surely obtain with as much if not greater
force and effect by application of the tripartite contract or
third party beneficiary concept. A statement in 37 Iowa L.
Rev. 293, amply supported by respectable authorities, sets
forth both the rationale and demonstrates the ultimate efficacy
of this approach. ‘The development of the contract theory
may be said to have begun in Massachusetts in 1916. (Chip:
pendale'v, ‘North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass.” 499, 111
NE. 871) It was fostered by the statutes protecting the bank
from liability in payment to either party, and was-instrumental
in resolving the doctrinal confusion of the other theories. The
primary doctrinal innovation brought about by the contract
theory-is' that the interest of the court is directed solely at the
bank-depositor relationship, rather than- the relationship be-
tween the co-depositors. The gift, trust or joint tenancy theo-
ries, on’ the other hand, are concerned solely with this latter
relationship. By stating the mutual rights and obligations of
the co-depositors in terms of the bank’s duties, the formal re-
quirements of a gift, trust or joint tenancy are finessed, but
the relationship between the parties is nevertheless fixed and
certain. Actually, this relationship most nearly approximates
that of joint tenancy, but differs materially in the immediate
right of either depositor to withdraw the entire amount.

“‘The contract theory is not without its doctrinal difficul-
ties. The problem of consideration, especially with regard to
a noncontributing depositor, has been discussed by the courts,
but the consideration between the bank and the contributing
depositor has been held sufficient to support the contract. The
transaction -has been viewed. as a tripartite or third party bene+

780 Ee a

ficiary contract, and as a contract creating the rights of the
parties against the bank, with no specific name being attached
to the source of these rights.’ (Emphasis supplied.)”

IV. The question now to be resolved is whether the con-
troverted certificates of deposit serve to vest in each of the
named payees respectively, or to estate of decedent, all right
to the funds on deposit.

HH We are persuaded the evident intent of the parties
may be best determined and effectuated in this case by ap-
plication of the previously mentioned tripartite or third-party
beneficiary doctrine.

Dealing with this subject, Simpson on Contracts, Second
Ed., Hornbook Series, pages 242, 248, states:

“There are only two types of third parties who are per-
mitted under American law to enforce a promise. There are
(1) the donee beneficiary, and (2) the creditor beneficiary.
If A for a consideration exacts a promise from B to render a
stated performance to C, intending thereby to confer a gift
upon ©, C is a donee beneficiary entitled to sue B on the
promise. It is the intent or purpose of the promisee, A, to
exact a promise and ultimate performance as a gift to C that
controls, not the purpose of the promisor, B. B’s purpose in
promising is to obtain the consideration furnished by the
promisee, A, as the agreed exchange. The promisee’s intent
to obtain a gift promise for C’s benefit will appear from the
terms of the promise which he exacted. If by that promise the
performance is to be rendered directly to and for the third
person, ©, he alone will be benefitted, not A. * * *

“The strongest reason exists for permitting enforcement
of the promise by the donee beneficiary, since if he cannot
enforce it no one can.”

And, Williston on Contracts, Single Volume, Revised Edi-
tion, section 357, pages 332-333, in explaining and justifying
application of the third-party beneficiary concept, says: “The
Restatement of Contracts [section 133(1)(a)] declares a per-
son is a donee beneficiary when ‘it appears from the terms of
the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that
the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or

, | 781

part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the bene-
ficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to
some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be
due from the promisee to the beneficiary.’ * * * The donee,
or as it is sometimes called, the ‘sole,’ beneficiary type, of which
the ordinary life insurance contract payable to another than
the insured is typical, was the earlier to receive recognition.
The technical difficulty of permitting a third person who was
neither in privity with the promise, since he was not the prom-
isee, nor in privity with the consideration, since that moved
from the promisee, to enforce a promise made for his benefit was
counterbalanced by the fact that since the promisee himself
had no pecuniary interest in the performance of the contract,
he could recover only nominal damages for its breach, thus
defeating the purpose of the parties and the value of the prom-
ise. Whatever the apparent technical difficulties, it was ob-
vious that justice required some remedy to be given the bene-
ficiary. The original bargain was convenient and proper, and
the law should find a means to enforce it according to its terms.
Some jurisdictions resorted to the trust theory in equity, but
it was no easier to find a principle requiring the promisee to
hold as trustee for the beneficiary what he recovered, and for
which he had paid the consideration, than to find a principle
allowing a direct recovery by the beneficiary against the prom-
isor. Even less defensible is the close relationship doctrine,
still widely prevalent in America, with its erude fiction of
merging the legal personality of a child, niece, wife, or even
affianced wife, or other close relative of the promisee, into the
promisee’s legal personality, so that in the eyes of the law the
real donee beneficiary becomes the promisee with full power
to sue and recover on the promise.”
In line with the foregoing this court stated in the case, In
re Estate of Lindsey, 254 Iowa 699, 710, 118 N.W.2d 598:
“We have held repeatedly a contract between two persons
for the benefit of a third person is valid as to such beneficiary
and enforceable by him. Meyer v. Stortenbecker, 184 Iowa
441, 165 N.W. 456; In re Estate of Walker, 234 Iowa 1126, 15
N.W.2d 260; In re Disinterment of Tow, 243 Iowa 695, 53

782 Le |

N.W.2d. 283; Reeves v. Better Taste Popcorn Co., 246 Iowa
508, 66 N.W.2d 853; 12 AmJur., Contracts, section 288.

“In In re Disinterment of Tow, supra, at pages 698, 699
of 243 Iowa, page 285 of 53 N.W.2d, it is said:

““‘One for whose benefit a contract is entered into may
maintain action to enforce his rights under it. Venz v. State
Auto. Ins. Assn., 217. Iowa 662, 666, 251 N.W. 27. ‘The rule is
unquestioned in this state. It is unnecessary that the beneficiary
assent to the contract or even that he have knowledge of: it.
Rodgers v. Reinking, 205 Iowa 1811, 1319,:217 N:W.. 411.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

On this subject see also Peoples Bank ¥. Baxter, 41 Tenn.
App. 710, 298 S.W.2d 732, 738, and 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts,
section 314, page 741.

This in turn: points up the fact, as disclosed by In re
Estate of Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 934, 5 N.W.2d 153, that where
the contract approach is employed, as in the ease at bar, de-
livery need not be shown, either actual or symbolical.

| | = V. Each of the two certificates here involved is spe-
cifically payable to a single named depositor, Richard in one
instance, Marlyn in the other. It is also provided they are,
«“# * * transferable only on the-books of this bank, * * *.”
This means they are nonnegotiable instruments. 9 OW.S.,
Banks and Banking, section 316(b), page 642, and 10 Am.Jur.-
2d,-Banks, section 458, page 480. Incidentally see section
554.3104, Code, 1966.

HE Under these circumstances it is evident Richard and
Marlyn, as sole named payees, have a concomitant right as
donee. third-party beneficiaries to enforce their rights under
the certificates here involved. See In re Estate of Lindsey,
supra, and 10 Am.Jur.2d, Banks, section 461, page 482.

- VI. Unquestionably the certificates before us are con-
tracts and must be accordingly considered.

In that regard it is our duty to ascertain and give effect
to-their terms and provisions which are plain and unambiguous.
Bruhl v. Thul, 257 Iowa 889, 892, 134 N.W.2d 571. See also
Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164, 167-172.

Intent of the parties is not in doubt. As heretofore dis-

783

closed each: of these certificates provides for payment to a
designated payee. Admittedly Andrew M. Sheimo was the
contributor, but his contracts with the bank were, in substance,
that it pay the amounts specified in the certificates to Richard,
and Marlyn as third-party beneficiaries. . .

Lawfully issued in each instance, these certificates are
made payable to named persons, the defendants in, this case.
That was the apparent intent and purpose of the contracting
parties, ie, decedent and the bank.. Above all else it was the
evident. aim and, desire. of the depositor. No other reason
appears for making the certificates payable as they are, and
the record discloses nothing which can be said to refute this
clearly expressed objective.

VII. ‘We conclude the evidence preponderates in favor
of defendants and the trial court erred in holding otherwise.
This means certificate No. 3160 is the property of Richard
Sheimo, and certificate No. 3161 is the property of Marlyn
Sheimo,

Reversed and remanded for entry of order and decree
consistent with this opinion.

Garrimip, 0. J., and Snett, Moorr, Stuart and Mason,
JJ., concur.

Larson, J., concurs in result.
Brower and LeGranp, JJ., dissent.

Becker, J.—I dissent. The majority opinion omits some
facts of importance: Prior to August 7, 1964, decedent had a
certificate of deposit for $8000 on which he had written that
$2000. was to go to Marlyn Sheimo and $6000 to Richard Shei-
mo. The record is not clear to whom this earlier certificate
was made payable. We were told in oral argument this first
certificate named both defendants as payees (an unsatisfactory
way to come by needed information).

_ On August 7, 1964, the banker talked to decedent about
this certificate. The record on the point is short. We shall
quote most of it:

784 Le a

“T told the decedent that if anybody should die, that the
certificate of deposit would not be divided into two thousand
and six thousand because the bank could not go by this writing
on: the certificate of deposit. That the decedent would have
to either separate the certificate of deposit if he wanted to
divide it out that way.

“The decedent said to make out two certificates of deposit,
one for six thousand dollars to Richard Sheimo and one for
two thousand dollars to Marlyn.

“T then prepared these two certificates of deposit and told
him we would have to have either Richard or Marlyn’s endorse-
iment on the old certificate of deposit before we could malxe
out this new one. Richard came and endorsed the old $8000
certificate of deposit. I had the certificate of deposit endorsed
so we could make out these two new ones. * * *

“Q. And did you help him put—? <A. I helped him put
them in the safety deposit box.

“Q. Was there any further discussion between you and
the decedent at this time concerning this transaction? A.
Just that he was going to deliver them some time but he didn’t
know when.”

The face of the certificate has the following written on it:
“Payable to said depositor, or, if more than one, to either nr
any of said depositors or the survivor or survivors, wpon presen-
tation and surrender of this certificate on a maturity date.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

‘With these facts added there can be no doubt the elements
of a gift were not shown. At least one of the claimed donevs,
Richard, was present when the new certificates were made out
but no-delivery was made. Delivery was neither impractical nor
inconvenient. Instead, decedent returned the certificates to his
lockbox with the statement that “he was going to deliver thom
some time but he didn’t know when.” See Gray v. Watters, 243
Towa 430, 51 N.W.2d 885.

Decedent’s treatment of the prior $8000 certificate establishes
the pattern of his action and is relied upon by the trial court.
We are told the prior certificate also was not in decedent’s name
but in the names of Richard and Marlyn. But decedent ve-

es 785

tained control of the certificate and subsequently exercised
dominion over it by having it substantially changed. He had it
reissued in the form of the two present certificates, changing the
presumptive equal ownership (if we are to rely on the face of
the certificate alone) to unequal designation—$6000 for Richard
and $2000 for Marlyn. The trial court felt these actions
negatived any intent to part with dominion and control over the
first certificate and thus negatived a gift of the second certificates,
The trial court was right.

II. The majority applies the theory of contract to establish
ownership to assets held individually in the name of a person
other than the person who furnished the consideration for the
asset. This theory is now the law of Iowa where the assets are
held in joint tenancy. It has never been applied to the situation
we have here. There are vital differences in fact and in theory.

Before extending the contract theory of ownership to areas
where the purchaser is not a joint owner we should look at the
development of that doctrine in the joint tenancy field.

Up to and including Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 293 N.W.
841, the rule as to joint tenancy set out in Taylor v. Grimes, 223
Towa 821, 826, 273 N.W. 898, was the law of Iowa.

Taylor v. Grimes states: “The mere opening of a joint ac-
count each having an equal right to draw does not in and of
itself establish a gift, 28 C.J. 664; 48 A.L.R. 191. There must be
an intention to make a gift; a present intent to part with the
title and to transfer all right to and dominion over the subject
of the gift to the donee without power of revocation followed by
delivery of the subject matter of the gift.”

Following the Sinift case establishment of survivor’s owner-
ship of personal property on the theory of a contractual right
was again urged on this court. In re Estate of Winkler, .232
Towa 930, 937, 5 N.W.2d 153, established joint tenancy on the
basis of the evidence which showed mutual possession of the bank-
book and relied heavily on the contract theory. “Here we have
the instrument creating the joint tenancy declaring in express
terms the rights of the parties, The card, which we regard as a
contract, shows all the essential features of joint tenancy. It so
declares and so designates the joint deposit.”

786 | 7

The court did not specifically find there was a gift under the
facts of the Winkler case. A similar result was reached in
O’Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412, where the
court first reached its conclusion on the contract theory but also
found a gift inter vivos had’ been completed. The intention of
the parties was held to be controlling.

In re Estate’ of Murdoch, 238 Iowa 898, 29 N.W.2d 177;
MeManis v. Keokuk Savings Bank & Trust Co., 239 Iowa 1165,
33 N.W.2d 410; Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa-920, 48 N.W.2d 870;
In re Estate of Miller, 248 Towa 19, 79 N.W.2d 315; Burns v.
Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 105 N.W.2d 217;-and In re Estate of
Stamets, 260 Iowa 93, 148 N.W.2d 468; all deal with situations
where there is a cléar contractual base. .

In re Estate of Murray, 236 Iowa 807, 20 N.W.2d 49, estab-
lishes the same principle for creation of joint tenancy in United
States Government Bonds. In this field the federal regulations
are explicit and controlling as part of the contract of purchase
of the bond.

Many of the above cited cases quote signature cards ex-
pressly providing that the parties agree to the form of- ownership.
Of course we have no such signature card or otlier evidence of
agreement here. Each of the above cases is finally’decided on the
presence or absence of a contract between the parties themselves
or as between one or more of the parties and the bank.’ In
Stamets, supra, at page 98 of 260 Iowa, page 471 of 148 N.W.2d,
we said: “It is plain a deposit in an ordinary bank creates a
valid contract between the bank and depositor under which the
former agrees to repay the funds subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the bank.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The importance of the phrase “subject to the rules and
regulations of the bank” becomes apparent when a situation like
that considered in Keokuk Savings Bank & Trust Co, v. Desvaux;
259 Towa 387, 143 N.W.2d 296, develops. In that case decedent
eaused a joint tenancy account to be opened. Subsequently, all
of the funds in the account were withdrawn at decedent’s written
order but no passbook was presented. We held that failure to
present the passbook was fatal to the transfer. True, either joint
owner could withdraw all of the funds if the passbook -were pre

a Le 187

sented.’ But without the passbook neither could make with-
drawals. The parties have a right to rely on the bank rules.

Here we have no bank rules of record. We do have the
recitation on the face of the certificate that it is payable “upon
presentation and surrender of this certificate on maturity date.”
Keokuk Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Desvaux, supra, settles the
proposition that people have a right to rely on the rules of the
bank. People also have a right to rely upon what is written on
the face of the certificate. This being the case the decedent
could rely on the fact that he still retained an important measure
of control. Retention of this control is fatal. . Without the well
established principles of joint tenancy any other result would be
contrary to the law relating to wills. Code, 1966, section 633.279.

The foregoing discussion would seem to agree with Restate-
ment of the Law, Contract, Volume I, section 158, page 193,
which states in part: °

“(1) The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous
assignment is terminated by the assignor’s death, by a subsequent
assignment by the assignor, or by notification from the assignor
received by the assignee or by the obligor, unless, * * *

“(b) the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible-token or
writing, the surrender of which is required. by thei obligor’s con-
tract for its enforcement, and this token or writing is delivered
to the assignee; or” (emphasis supplied).

III. -Another cogent reason for adhering to our former
rules relating to transfer of ownership appears when the fields
of inheritance tax, estate tax and gift tax laws are considered.
Section 450.3(3) Code, 1966, includes, for inheritance tax pur-
poses, property “intended to take effect,.in possession or enjoy-
ment after the death of the grantor or donor.” How is this type
situation to be discovered? We say a donor may place an asset
in the donee’s name but continue in control of the disposition by
control of the physical evidence of the asset. He can continue
such control to time of death but we treat the gift as complete
in all respects ‘at the time the fictional contract is made, The
State will no doubt develop a theory to handle such’ situations
when. they come to its attention. Many such situations will not
come to the State’s attention for there will be nothing to alert

788

the department of revenue. The tax revenue will be lost either
through deliberate evasion or innocent failure to report. The
result will be the same.

InGranp, J,, joins in this dissent.

Joan A, JunicH Kiernan, appellant, cross-appellee, v.
GreyHounD Lins, INc., et al., appellees, eross-
appellants.

No. 52748.

(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 310)

Py
2
So

Fesruary 6, 1968,

790 A

Herrick, Langdon, Belin & Harris, of Des Moines, for ap-
pellant, eross-appellee, *

Davis, Huebner, Johnson & Burt, of Des Moines, for ap-
pellees, cross-appellants.

Broxer, J.—Plaintiff filed action against defendants for
negligent loss of two pieces of luggage. Defendant Oran E.
Lang is Greyhound’s agent in Des Moines. In presenting this
case the parties make no distinction as to. the relative posture
of the two defendants. Nor do we. For the purposes of this
ease we treat the legal. principles as applicable both to de-
fendant Greyhound and to its agent Lang.

Defendants denied the allegations; they affirmatively de-
fended on grounds under applicable statutes, regulations and
filed tariffs their liability was limited to-$25. Plaintiff’s reply
denied the affirmative allegations. ‘She also pleaded estoppel
and waiver of right to rely ‘on the tariffs. At the close of all
evidence the-court directed a verdict for plaintiff for $25. Both
sides appealed but defendants here abandoned their appeal.’

Plaintiff had resided in: Phoenix, Arizona, for about two
years. She decided to return to Des Moines for permanent resi-
dence and had 4 large amount of personal property to bring
back to her former home. Her baggage consisted of eight
pieces of luggage. She checked the various common carriers
to determine the best way to go to Des Moines and to ship her
luggage. She inquired about rates from Railway Express,
American Express, Continental, and the airlines. She chose
Greyhound because she could carry 100 pounds free.

When plaintiff brought her packages to the bus terminal
on October 15 the terminal’ was crowded. She: first purchased
her ticket. At that time she tried to discuss a few matters
about her baggage but was told the baggage clerk would
answer all questions. After purchasing her ticket she went to
the baggage counter where there were three or four persons in
front of her and several behind her. One man-was behind the
éounter. Plaintiff states she asked the attendant if her luggage
was insured. “He told me that I was covered by insurance, and
I asked him, I said, ‘Are you sure?’ and he said ‘Yes’, and T

794

said ‘My luggage is worth approximately $2,000.00’, and I said
‘You're sure? Because,’ I said, ‘If you’re not’, I said ‘I'll make
other arrangements, or I'll ship them package express’, and he
said ‘Don’t worry about it, honey. ‘They’re going to get there
okay.”

On. cross-examination plaintiff was asked if she had seen
any signs limiting baggage liability to $25. She stated she
saw no such signs. She received eight baggage checks each
bore the legend on the face of the check “Baggage liability
limited to $25. ‘See over.’” The reverse side of the ticket was
printed:

“Contract notice to passengers. (1) The party accepting
this check hereby agrees that no claim in excess of $25.00 for
all baggage checked on one full fare ticket and in excess of
$12.50 on one-half fare ticket shall be made against the issuing
company for loss or damage to property covered by this and/or
other baggage checks issued to the same passenger unless a
greater amount is declared in writing at time of checking, in
which -ease-charges for excess value will be collected and an
excess valuation receipt will be issued.

“(2) This check is accepted subject + to all conditions of
published tariffs.”

Mrs. Kiernan’s baggage was weighed and she received an
excess baggage declaration. She was charged and paid $8.00
for excess weight. The baggage clerk filled in the declaration.
At this time she told him the value of her luggage was well in
excess of $2000, but’ he entered no value on the excess weight
declaration. Mrs. Kiernan signed the declaration.

Upon arrival in Des Moines plaintiff found all eight bags
present. She delivered the checks to defendant Lang, the Des
Moines baggage clerk, and picked up one of the bags. At this
point she and her mother decided there was too much to
handle. She thereupon left the baggage at the terminal. Mr.
Lang assured her they would take care of her property.: When
she returned the next day the two largest bags were missing.
The two bags and contents are stipulated to ‘be worth
$1722.88,

Plaintiff also testified at no time did she consult a time-

192 Ce

table or any other written material put out by the company but
relied on oral inquiry to company officials for all information.
She was an experienced traveler by rail, air and bus. She
assumed she was entitled to a free weight allowance but knew
nothing of a free value allowance.

The pertinent portions of defendants’ tariff (except as
otherwise quoted in the body of this opinion) are:

“Liability: (a) Carriers, parties to this Tariff, will not be
responsible for loss of or damage to Baggage in excess of the
amounts shown below, and then only to the extent of the actual
loss or damage sustained computed on the basis of the actual
value of the Baggage at the place and time of checking.

“(1) The Maximum Free Value Allowance, as authorized in
Rule No. 5 herein, in the event no Excess Value has been
declared and Excess Charges paid thereon.

“(2) The Declared Value of the Baggage at the time of
checking and upon which Excess Value Charges as shown
herein have been paid. (See also Paragraph (b))

“(b) Carriers, parties to this Tariff, will NOT accept liabil-
ity for a greater value than two hundred and twenty-five
($225.00) dollars on any single piece of Baggage, nor for a
greater value than two hundred and twenty-five ($225.00)
dollars for each full fare ticket or one hundred and twelve
dollars and fifty cents ($112.50) for each half-fare ticket
presented, regardless of the number of pieces of Baggage, and
in no event shall the liability exceed the actual value of the
Baggage, at the place and time of checking. * * *

“Charges for Baggage of Excess Value:

“(a) Charges for Excess Value must be prepaid and are
separate and distinct from the charges for Excess Weight.

“(b) Collections for Excess Value will not be made for
movements to any stations beyond that to which the Baggage
is checked.

“(e) When collection is made for Excess Value, an ‘Excess
Check’ or ‘Excess Receipt’ will be issued. * * *

“(e) Unless a greater value is declared by a passenger, and
charges paid for Excess Value at time of checking, it shall be
considered that the value.of Baggage, belonging to, or checked

a 798

for, a passenger, is not in excess of the Free Value Allowance
specified in Rule No. 5, and Carriers, parties to this Tariff, will
not accept liability for a greater sum in case of loss or damage.

“(f) If a passenger declares a greater value than that
specified in Rule No. 5, Section C, a charge, at the rate of ten
(10¢) cents for each additional one hundred ($100.00) dollars
valuation or fraction thereof, shall be assessed, but the total
valuation may not exceed the limitations in Rule No. 4, Section
C (See Exception). The Minimum Charge for Excess Value
will be ten (10¢) cents.

“(g) The Declaration of Value in excess of the Free Value
Allowance shall be on a form prescribed by the checking Car-
rier.”

HI. The loss sustained by plaintiff occurred while the
goods were in interstate commerce. The rights of the parties
are determined by federal law. Fay v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co., 186 Iowa 573, 173 N.W. 69; Neece v. Richmond Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 §.B.2d 756, 68 A.L.R.2d 1841,

Il. We believe this case is controlled by what has been
said by the United States Supreme Court in New York, N. H.
& Hartford R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 1953, 346 U.S. 128, 129, 78 S.
Ct. 986, 987, 97 L.Ed. 1500, 1504, (hereinafter referred to as
Nothnagle).

In Nothnagle a woman passenger delivered her suitcase
(which she had carried with her on the train) to a Redeap in
New Haven when she was changing trains. No baggage check
had been issued. “The suitcase vanished and respondent sued.
At trial in the Meriden City Court the parties stipulated that
the baggage and contents actually worth $615 were lost due to
petitioner’s negligence. Petitioner insisted, however, that its
liability as an interstate carrier was governed by a tariff
schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission which
limited a recovery for baggage loss to $25 unless the passenger
had in writing declared a higher valuation.”

In deciding this case Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for a
unanimous court concluded the opinion with the following
recognition of policy. “cf. Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. Feinberg
Kosher Sausage Co., 8 Cir., 1951, 193 F.2d 283, 286. ‘The great

794 ee

object of ‘the law governing common carriers was to.secure the
utmost care in the rendering of a service of the highest im-
portance to the community. A carrier who stipulates not to -be
bound to the exercise of care and diligence “seeks to put off the
essential duties of his employment.” It is recognized that the
earrier and the individual customer are not ‘on an equal footing.
“The latter * * * cannot afford to higgle or stand out and seek
redress in the courts.”’ Sante Fe, P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant Bros.
Construction Co., 1918, 228 U.S. 177, 184-185, 88 S. Ct. 474, 477,
57 L. Ed. 787. In sum, respondent cannot be held bound by
petitioner’s limitation,”

«MM The Interstate Commerce Act, ‘specifically Title .49,
United States Code, section 20(11), provides the carrier shall
issue a receipt or bill of lading, shall be liable for any loss,
damage.or injury: to property, prohibits limitations on liability
for such loss hut excepts baggage carried on passenger trains or
boats .and'excepts property permitted to be carried at rates which
are dependent on value declared in writing by the shipper ‘or
agreed upon in writing as the release value of the property: The
Supreme Court held that: “The excepted ‘baggage carried on
passenger trains’ refers solely to free baggage checked through
on @ passenger fare.” (Emphasis supplied.) . New York, N. H.
& H.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 184. The court held
attempted limitation .of liability clearly void unless it came
within the above exception.

We assume federal law applies Title 49, section 20(41), to
motor carriers. Patton v. Pennsylvania ‘Greyhound Lines, 75
Ohio App. 100, 60 N.E.2d 945; Contra, Cray v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound. Lines, 177 Pa. Super. 275,-110 A.2d 892; Contra,
Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Ine., supra.

The law relating to limitation of liability for lost baggage as
it.existed before Nothnagle should be examined. .

III. The leading case is Boston & M. BR. R. v. Hooker
(1914), 288 U.S, 97, 34 8, Ct. 526, 58 L.Ed. 868, L.R.A. 1915B
450. Hooker held where a tariff is filed it is. binding on the
-earrier and the passenger. The effect given to Hooker is well
-set out in Argo v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Ine. (1945),
72 Ga. App. 309, 314, 33 S.E.2d 730, 732. “The United States

195

Supreme Court in the Hooker case dealt with this subject at
length, and one of the principles there ruled is to the effect that,
a regulation contained in the published tariffs of an interstate
carrier by rail on file with the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, limiting its baggage liability to a certain amount, unless a
greater value is declared by the owner and the excess charges
paid, is binding upon the passenger in ease of loss of the baggage
through the carrier’s negligence, regardless of the passenger’s
Jack of knowledge or assent to such regulation.”

With few exceptions this rule has resulted in limitation of
liability to the posted rate, Green Bay Lumber Oo. v. Chicago,
B. & QR. Co., 284 N.W. 369; Herminghausen v. Adams Express
Co., 167 Iowa 230, 149 'N.W. 234; Kellett v. Alaga Coach Lines,
Ine, 34 Ala, App. 152, 87 So.2d 187; Argo v. Southeastern
Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, and Cray v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, 177 Pa. Super. 275, 110 A.2d-892.

Hooker and the cases decided in reliance on that case do not
apply here. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S.
128, 186, footnote 12 states: “Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker,
1914, 233 U.S. 97, 34 8, Ct. 526, 58 L. Ed. 868, and New York
Central & H. R. R. Co, v. Beaham,'1916, 242 U.S. 148, 87 8. Ct.
43, 61 L.Ed. 210, cannot control this case. Neither decision in-
volved the Act as amended by the 1915 and 1916 legislation ; both
dealt with free baggage checked through on a passenger ticket ;
the carrier in both cases had supplied some notice of its limita-
tion of liability.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Of three exceptions noted two are present here. The first
applies by virtue of the amendments since Hooker was decided.
The second applies because plaintiff’s baggage was excess weight
baggage with a partial credit for free baggage. There was no
indication as to what was carried as free baggage and what was
carried under the $8 charge. The luggage was not free baggage
under Title 20(11) but excess weight baggage for which a
charge was made.

HJ This case should therefore be considered under the
rule applied in Nothnagle at page 185 of 346 U.S.: “But only
by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between
higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater

796 re

or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an
amount less than the actual loss sustained. Boston & Maine
R. Co. v. Piper, 1918, 246 U.S. 439, 444-445, 38 8. Ct. 354, 355,
62 L. Ed. 820; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 1921, 255 U.S. 317,
321-328, 41 8. Ct. 283, 284-285, 65 L. Ed. 656; ef. The Steamship
Ansaldo San Giorgio I v. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 1935, 294 U.S.
494, 497-498, 55 S. Ot. 483, 484-485, 79 L. Hd. 1016. Binding
respondent by a limitation which she had no reasonable op-
portunity to discover would effectively deprive her of the
requisite choice; such an arrangement would amount to a for-
bidden attempt to exonerate a carrier from the consequences of
its own negligent acts.”

As generally in accord with our view of the effect to be
given the Nothnagle rules see: Neece v. Richmond Greyhound
Lines, supra; Mitchell v. Union Pacific R. Co. (9 Cir.), 242 F.2d
598 (opinion on remand 188 F.Supp. 869); Odom v, Pacific
Northern Airlines, Inc., Alaska, 393 P.2d 112.

The following cases have construed the effect of Nothnagle
more narrowly: Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 177
Pa. Super. 275, 110 A.2d 892; Shirazi v. Greyhound Corpora-
tion, 145 Mont. 421, 401 P.2d 559; Zeidenberg v. Greyhound
Lines, Ine., 8 Conn. Cir. 176, 209 A.2d 697; Greyhound Cor-
poration v. Stevens, Tex. Civ. App., 413 S. W.2d 439; Mustard
v, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 388 Mass. 674, 156 N.E.2d 696.

Hl Beaumont v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 127 N.Y. 216, modi-
fied and affirmed 284 App.Div. 354, 181 N.Y.S.2d 652, affirmed
308 N. Y. 920, 127 N.H.2d 80, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 888, 76
S.Ct. 75, 100 L.Bd. 747, was a case where excess weight was
charged and paid. But there no excess valuation was declared
and a valuation slip was signed on behalf of plaintiff with
declared valuation of $400 for baggage later claimed to be
worth $55,839. Valuation up to $10,000 could have been
declared for extra charge. Because plaintiff voluntarily saw
fit to choose the minimum valuation of $400, instead of the
highest of $10,000, recovery over $400 was denied. This case
is opposite. A jury could find the true value was declared but
plaintiff was denied the opportunity to make the declaration
effective or to learn that there was a $225 valuation limit on
baggage accepted.

| 798

IV. The facts in this case underline the validity of the
United States Supreme Court’s insistence that liability limita-
tion should apply only to free baggage checked through on a
passenger ticket. The excess valuation declaration must be in
writing (by statute) and on a form prepared by the carrier
(by tariff). The form preseribed by defendant for excess
weight declaration and charges also provides for excess valua-
tion declaration and charges. The baggage agent had the
form but elected to fill it out himself. We reproduce it here,

GREYHOUND LINES K
EXCESS BAGGAGE DECLARATION 1 5 4 6 Ql
nUGICCT To TARIFF REGULATIONS.

BAGGAGE CEO NO. Wert

TOTAL MUMRER OF
‘Hransroetation

!

Extess
WEIGHT

TOTAL CHARGES
‘Agent, Bate

lo isles

idk is void untess properly signed. by ay/Aospe of this evmpany oad mask
He prttented with passenger's baggage checks’ wfep-laiming byppige liste! above,
arsise — MICHOLS BUSINESS FORMS COL, CINCINNATI, © a8i06

798 |

HI While the agent was filling out the above form he was
told the valuation of the baggage was in excess of $2000 and
was specifically asked if it was fully insured. He left all valua-
tion spaces blank.

Here a quotation from our own Bergstrom v. Chicago,
R. 1. & P. Ry. Co., 184 Iowa 228, 225, 111 N.W. 818, 10 L.R.A.,
NS., 1119, 18 Ann. Cas. 239, is in order:

“The company as’ a common carrier was bound to receive
the trunk for transportation, and whether it should be carried
as freight, express, or as baggage was for it to decide. It was
not unlawful for the company to carry it.as baggage, and, as
plaintiff desired it to be shipped as such, he must of necessity
apply to someone representing the company ‘to ascertain
whether it would be so carried. To whom shall a passenger
apply in such a case? There can be but one answer to this
inquiry, and it is that he may rely upon the agent charged
with the duty of receiving and checking baggage for trans-
portation. The company by placing a baggageman in a room,
appropriate for receiving trunks and other receptacles for
carriage on passenger trains, supplying him with checks to
attach, indicating their destination, and allowing him the sole
control of checking and determining what shall be loaded on
the baggage cars, necessarily holds him out to the public as
having authority to decide what will be so checked, loaded and
carried as baggage.” .

The ticket issued to plaintiff limited liability to $25. The
excess value and weight slip limited liability to $200; the
tariff to $225. If plaintiff had read: the various written
notices, on which should she rely? To whom should she
turn for information? Defendant offered in evidence two
notiees, Exhibits A and B, which it claimed (but did not prove)
were posted in the bus terminal. These notices were received
in evidence over plaintiff’s objection. Exhibit A had the
following notice to the public. “The agent or other repre-
sentative on duty will lend assistance, if requested, in securing
information from such tariffs.” The tariff itself requires
excess valuation information be supplied on the form pre-
seribed by the carrier. The baggage agent elected to fill the

es 199

form out himself. The jury could find plaintiff did all she
reasonably could to comply with the requirement that excess
value be declared in writing on a form supplied by the carrier
and this requirement had been met under the cireumstances
here.

The tariff provides defendant will not knowingly accept

prohibited ‘articles. Prohibited articles include articles of
extraordinary value. The tariff also provides: “Baggage for
one passenger declared to exceed two hundred and twenty-five
($225.00) dollars in value for one or more pieces will not be
aecepted for checking or transportation;”. Again the jury
could find defendant had actual knowledge of the value of the
baggage accepted and, through its agent, deliberately violated
its‘own tariff.
"HM “The tariff is not-a cloak to be worn or discarded as
earrier may elect. Both carrier and passenger are bound by its
terms.” Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C.
547, 555, 99 S.H.2d'756, 762.

V. The rationale for the rigid rules restricting liability
is divided ‘into two general categories. Neither is applicable
here.

First, the purpose of strict adherence to o the limitation of
liability is to insure uniform operation ‘of the published tariff
and to absolutely prohibit preferences directly or indirectly,
by subterfuge or otherwise. This is the principal basis for the
Hooker case and is based on analogous holdings growing out of
fréight cases. But Congress amended the interstate commerce
act within a year after Hooker was decided. In the amending
process it was made clear that passenger baggage was not to
receive the same treatment as ordinary freight and thus
baggage was treated separately. See discussion in footnotes
6 and 7 to Nothnagle case at 346 U.S. 181, 182.

HM Sccond, since the contents and value of passenger
baggage is unknown to the earrier, it may prescribe reasonable
rates based on declared value and receive compensation com-
mensurate with the risk taken by atcepting the cargo for
transportation. Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp.
691, 695. The passenger gave the carrier actual knowledge of

800 Le 7

the claimed value of the shipment, offered to ship it by other
means if it were not insured and was told it was insured.
Defendant had ample opportunity to exact its quid pro quo
but failed to do so, It cannot now rely on lack of declared
valuation as a limiting defense.

HI VI. Plaintiff also claims the baggage had been de-
livered to her and redelivered-to defendant who then became
a warehouseman. This theory is untenable. The tariff pro-
vides for free storage up to 72 hours as part of the baggage
service. The consideration for such service flows from purchase
of the ticket. There was no transfer of possession of the eight
bags such as would constitute a delivery and redelivery here.
Plaintiff alleges defendant was a bailee for hire. Her theory
would make defendant a gratuitous bailee. If defendant is a
bailee for hire it must necessarily be such as a common carrier
under the facts in this case. No other consideration is shown.

HH Vil. Plaintiff also contends defendants tariff does not
apply because one of the two lost bags measured 27 inches by 24
inches (the tariff limits size to 24 by 24). Neece v.. Richmond
Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, gave similar small variation as
reason for defendant taking control of the passenger’s bags.
The situation here is not the same. We are not prepared to hold
a deviation in size of the luggage of this magnitude vitiates the
tariff.

For the reasons noted in divisions II through V the case is
reversed and remanded for trial.

All Justices concur except Larson, J., who concurs in the
result, :

Sanpra Kuun, appellee, v. Curis ‘Tanx, appellant.

No. 52831,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 127)

801

Fepruary 6, 1968.

A. Fred Berger, of Davenport, for appellant.

Stafne & Lewis and Albert J. Stafne, Jr., of Bettendorf, for
appellee.

Garrimp, C.J.—This is a law action tried to the court with-
out a jury to recover for personal injury and damage to plain-
tiff’s automobile from a collision with defendant’s car at a
“five point” intersection in the City of Davenport. Defendant
has appealed from judgment against him based on findings he
was negligent in failing to have his car under control, such
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and plain-
tiff was free from contributory negligence.

Defendant asserts error in finding (1) he was negligent,

802 Le |

and (2) plaintiff was free from contributory negligence for
the reason she failed to obey the traffic-control signal. .

Defendant’s brief cites only section 321.256, Code, 1966,
which provides: “Obedience to official traffic-control devices.
No driver of a vehicle * * * shall disobey the instructions of
any official traffic-control device placed in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter, unless at the time otherwise
directed by a police officer.” No other authority of any kind
is cited.

I. Of course the trial court’s findings of fact in this law
action are binding upon us if supported by substantial evi-
dence. Rule 344(f)(1), Rules of Civil Procedure. Also, since
defendant contends plaintiff as a matter of law was not entitled
to prevail upon either the issue of defendant’s negligence or
plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Rule: 344-

- (£)(2), R.C.P. Further, it is only in exceptional cases that
questions of negligence, contributory negligence or proximate
cause may be decided as matters of law. Rule 344(f) (10),
RCP.

IL. Plaintiff Sandra Kuhn and defendant Chris Tank were
both driving west ‘on Locust Street.- It was divided into three
marked lanes for westbound traffic and, on the south, two
lanes for eastbound vehicles. At the intersection in question
Division Street intersects Locust at right angles. Hickory
Grove Road runs northwest from the northwest quadrant of
the intersection formed by Locust and Division Streets. Both
plaintiff and defendant intended to turn northwest at the in-
tersection onto Hickory Grove Road.

As they came to the intersection plaintiff was in the right-
hand (north—or outside) lane for westbound traffic, and .de-
fendant was in the center lane for such traffic, on plaintiff's
left, Both came to a stop because they faced a red light. The
trial court found from substantial evidence the two vehicles
started into the intersection side by side when the light turned
green, continued in such position until defendant’s car veered
to its right (north) into plaintiff’s path, striking the left side
of plaintiff's car and, as indicated, in doing so defendant failed
to have his vehicle under control.

| Le 803

Ill. Defendant’s entire argument here is based on the
contention plaintiff violated section 321.256, supra, in not
turning right (north) onto Division Street rather than north-
west onto Hickory Grove Road. We might affirm on the
ground the issue raised here was not pleaded in the trial court.

The allegations of plaintiff’s petition need not be sum-
marized except to point out that one specification of negligence
charged against defendant was that he failed to keep his car
under control, as the trial court found. A familiar statutory
provision is that a motorist shall have his vehicle under control
when approaching and traversing an intersection of public
highways. Section 321.288, subsection 3, Code, 1966.

This collision occurred November 9, 1965, after the ef-
fective date of section 1, chapter 430, Laws Sixty-first General
Assembly, now Code section 619.17. Since the statute is im-
portant here we set out the pertinent part:

“Contributory negligence—burden. In all actions * * *
to recover damages of a defendant in which contributory
negligence of the plaintiff * * * was heretofore a complete de-
fense or bar to recovery, the plaintiff shall not hereafter, have
the burden of pleading and proving his freedom from contrib-
utory negligence, and if the defendant relies upon negligence
of the plaintiff as a complete defense or bar to plaintiff's
recovery, the defendant shall have the burden of pleading and
proving negligence of the plaintiff, if any, and that it was a
proximate cause of the injury or damage. * * *.”

In apparent recognition of this: recent statute defendant
pleaded plaintiff was guilty of negligence directly contributing
to the collision and the proximate cause thereof in five enum-
erated respects. They were: (1) failure to maintain proper
outlook; (2) failure to stop within the assured clear. distance
ahead in violation of section 321.285; (3) failure to have her
ear under control when approaching and traversing the inter-
section in violation of section 321.288, summarized supra; (4)
overtaking and attempting to pass defendant’s car on its right
in violation of section 821.299 and (5) attempting to pass
defendant’s car in the intersection of Locust and Division
Streets in violation of section 321.304(2).

804 a |

(This last statute prohibits driving to the left side of the
roadway when approaching and traversing any intersection.
It is difficult to see its applicability here.)

HM It is noted that four of these five specifications of
plaintiff’s negligence defendant alleged were the proximate
cause of the collision are claimed. violations of specific statutes.
It is not argued here that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of
law in any of the respects defendant pleaded. Defendant is
not entitled to urge here as a basis for reversal an issue not
pleaded in the trial court. Hilliard v. Hilliard, 240 Iowa 1394,
1401, 39 N.W.2d 624, 627, and citations; Tacke v. Hauser, 247
Towa 465, 470-471, 74 N.W.2d 219, 222-223; Weik v. Ace Rents,
Ine., 249 Towa 510, 516, 87 N.W.2d 314, 318.

HI IV. We have no difficulty in holding substantial evi-
dence supports the trial court’s finding defendant was negligent
in not having his vehicle under control. Defendant is there-
fore not entitled to a reversal on the first of his two assigned
errors.

HIV. Although we might do so, we are reluctant to base
our decision as to the second assigned error on defendant’s
failure to plead a violation by plaintiff of section 321.256,
quoted supra, without further consideration of the point. We
do not think it appears as a matter of law plaintiff was guilty
of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision by
disobeying instructions of a traffie-control device, in violation
of section 321.256.

The only disinterested witness at the trial was a motorist
who followed plaintiff's car as she proceeded into the inter-
section when the light turned green. He testified her vehicle
headed northwest toward Hickory Grove Road and defendant’s
car headed west and pulled into the left side of plaintiff's car.
Of course the trial court was justified in accepting this testi-
mony.

There is evidence the traffic signal pole was located at the
northwest corner of the intersection with an extension arm
over the entrance to Hickory Grove Road on which signal
lights were placed, and between the pole and the nearest light
were the words “Right lane must turn right.” It is this in-
struction defendant now says plaintiff disobeyed.

| Le 805

It is true, as stated, plaintiff did not make a complete
right turn north onto Division Street. However, she did turn
partially to the right to go northwest onto Hickory Grove. It
is not claimed westbound motorists on Locust could not prop-
erly proceed from this intersection onto Hickory Grove. As
indicated, both plaintiff and defendant intended to do so. It is
not suggested the partial turn from Locust onto Hickory Grove
should be made from the south westbound lane on Locust.
Defendant testified this lane was for left turns only. We are
not persuaded that under the circumstances here plaintiff
could clear herself of the charge now made against her only
by proceeding from the middle westbound lane rather than the
north lane, assuming of course she “had” a green light. De-
fendant testified the middle lane was for westbound traffic.

If, as defendant testified, the south lane was for left turns
only, the middle lane for westbound traffic only and the north
jane only for traffic turning right onto Division Street, neither
plaintiff nor defendant could lawfully proceed from the inter-
section onto Hickory Grove. This could hardly have been
intended by the officials who erected the traffic-control device.
A more reasonable conclusion seems to be that, so far as shown,
no clear instructions had been provided as to just how and
when westbound motorists on Locust were to proceed northwest
onto Hickory Grove. If this be true, it does not appear as a
matter of law plaintiff violated section 321.256.

Further, violation of 321.256, if pleaded, would not be a
defense under section 619.17, quoted in Division III supra,
unless “it was-a proximate cause of the injury or damage.”
Defendant pleaded plaintiff’s negligence was at least a proxi-
mate cause if not in fact the proximate cause. We are not
prepared to hold this causal relation appears as a matter of law.
As stated, plaintiff was at defendant’s right as the two were
stopped at the intersection waiting for a green light in order to
make a partial right turn onto Hickory Grove. It appears
plaintiff could proceed with greater safety from the right lane
than defendant could—or at least did—from the middle lane.

‘We have held ‘substantial evidence supports the finding de-
fendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

806
We could properly hold it does not appear as a matter of law
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause
of the collision by violating Code section 321.256. Plaintifi’s
second assigned error should not be sustained. .

The judgment is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

Berry Moreno, petitioner, v. Hon, Hazowp D. Vitor, Judge of
18th (now 8th) Judicial District, respondent.

No. 52819,. °
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 305)

807

Fepruary 6, 1968.

David M. Elderkin, of Barnes, Wadsworth, Elderkin, Locher
& Pirnie, of Cedar Rapids, for petitioner.

©. W. Garbergon and James Carter, of Shuttleworth &
Ingersoll, of Cedar Rapids, for respondent.

Srusrr, J.—Plaintiff by certiorari challenges the legality of
the respondent’s action in recalling an. execution issued: in

808 Le 7

Moreno v. Priester. Respondent held the execution was pre-
mature because no judgment had been entered upon the jury
verdict. The question before us is whether the procedure in
Linn County following a jury verdict satisfied the requirements
of rules 223 and 227, R.C.P., for the entry of a judgment.

We will refer to the parties as follows: Betty Moreno,
plaintiff; Priester, defendant ; and the trial court as respondent.

On July 12, 1964, plaintiff was injured while riding as a
passenger in a vehicle which was struck from the rear by
another vehicle owned by William H. Webb, Sr, and driven by
defendant. At and prior to the date of the accident Webb was
insured by Vigilant Insurance Company.

Following the accident, plaintiff commenced this action
and Priester, through his attorney, John McCracken, made
demand upon Vigilant Insurance Company to defend him in
said action. Vigilant Insurance Company denied coverage
under its policy and refused to defend. He thereupon defended
by his own attorney, John B. McCracken.

On July 27, 1965, the jury in this cause returned a verdict
against defendant and in favor of plaintiff for $20,505.55.
The same day, the trial court, Judge B. J. Maxwell, following
the usual and customary practice of the Eighteenth Judicial
District, made a handwritten calendar entry as follows:

“The jury returned a sealed verdict at 9:30 P.M., July 27,
1965, which verdict was as follows: ‘We, the jury find in favor
of the Plaintiff, Betty Moreno, and against the Defendant and
fix the amount of her recovery at $20,505.55. Signed by Alvin
A. Christensen, Foreman.’ ” .

On July 28, 1965, the clerk made the following entry under
this case in the Linn County District Court Record at page 230
of volume 229, .

“Now, to wit on this 28th day of July, 1965, this cause
comes on for hearing before the court, Hon. B. J. Maxwell,
Judge presiding: Barnes, Wadsworth, Elderkin, Locher and
Pirnie, appearing as attorneys for the plaintiff, and McCracken
& Carlin, and Shuttleworth & Ingersoll appearing as attorneys
for the defendants. The jury returned a sealed verdict at 9:30
P.M. July 27, 1965 which verdict was as follows: ‘We, the jury,

a a 809

find in favor of the plaintiff, Betty Moreno, and against the
deféndant, and fix the amount of her recovery at $20,505.55.’
Signed by Alvin R. Christensen, Foreman.

“We, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff, Betty Moreno,
and against the defendant and fix the amount of her recovery
at $20,505.55. Alvin R. Christensen, Foreman.”

Defendant, by answer, had alleged a covenant not to sue
between plaintiff and the owner of the car, Webb, and claimed
an offset or credit against any judgment that might be entered
against him in the amount of the consideration paid therefor.
On the 9th day of September, 1965, the trial court ruled on this
division of the answer as follows:

“It is the judgment of the Court that the issue raised by
defendant Priester in his Division III is denied and that the
judgment entered against the defendant Priester in favor of
the plaintiff upon the jury’s verdict herein shall be in full force
and effect as to the full amount thereof and shall not be re-
duced in any part by the consideration paid for the Covenant
not to Sue executed in favor of the defendant Webb.

“All of which is found, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed.
B. J. Maxwell, Judge of the 18th Judicial District of Iowa.”

On October 21, 1965, all the judges of the district including
respondent signed the following entry in the district court
record.

“The foregoing Miscellaneous Law Record of the District
Court of the State of Iowa in and for Linn County, made by
the clerk and all prepared and signed and enrolled entries
made by the court and recorded by the clerk in this volume
of the record, and all records made by the clerk in all
other volumes of the Court’s records, including Law, Equity,
Criminal, Probate and Inebriate records at the July, 1965,
Term all made, entered and recorded by the Clerk of Court are
approved in open court by the Judges of the said court presid-
ing; at the said July term.”

Execution against Priester was returned unsatisfied and
plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly postponed a debtor’s examina-
tion of defendant at his request.

Defendant brought a separate action in the United States

si ee

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the
Vigilant Insurance Company which on May 8, 1967, resulted in
a judgment against the company requiring it to hold defendant
Priester harmless from any liability for injuries arising out of
the accident.

On July 5, 1967, prior to a hearing against Priester as a
judgment debtor set for the next day, a motion was filed -
entitled Motion’for Order Recalling Execution and Cancelling
Debtor's Examination. . ‘

On July 28, 1967, after hearing, respondent entered a.
ruling and order holding that. the plaintiff had no judgment
against the defendant and recalled the execution issued on May
2, 1967, and-cancélled the debtor’s examination ordered. pur-
suant to said execution. The respondent on July 31,-1967;
ordered the clerk of the court to enter judgment upon the
jury verdict. Attorneys for Vigilant Insurance Company,
having entered their Appearance for ‘and on behalf of the
defendant in this cause, purported to file, as of aly 31, 1967,
Notice of Appeal from this judgment. °

‘ Plaintiff-petitioner thereafter. filed her Petition tor Writ
of Certiorari in this cause.

HI In Iowa, a judgment has‘ no effect until it has been
entered of record by: the clerk.. Street v. Stewart, .226-Iowa
960, 963, 285 N.W. 204, 205; Case v. Plato, 54 Iowa 64, 66;.6
N.W. 128, 129; Lotz v. United Food Markets, Inc., 225 Iowa
1897, 1400, 283 N.W. 99, 101; Rudolph Hardwaré‘ Co. v. Price,
164 Towa’ 353, 358-359, 145 N.W. 910, Ann. Cas, 1916D 850;
State v. Wieland, 217 Iowa 887, 890-891, 251 N.W. 757, 758.
“FEB Although some of our cases say there is no judgment
until it has been eitered of record, we believe the more nearly
accurate analysis of the cases is that'a judgment is rendered
when it is announced, or when the judge writes in his calendar
a statement of his.decision or a jury returns a verdict but that
there is no competent evidence of such rendition until the
entry is made on the court record. Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa
960, 968, 285 N.W. 204, 205; 18 LL.R. 242-248, This view is
supported by the fact that for some purposes a judgment re-
lates back to the date ordered. Street v. Stewart, supra;

i, FC sil

Hoffman-Bruner Granite Co. v. Stark, 182 Iowa 100, 103, 108
NW. 329, 380; Coffey v. Gamble, 117 Iowa 545, 549, 91 N.W.
818, 814.

In some instances books. other than the Miscellaneous Law
Record may constitute a proper record book, Carr v. Bosworth
& Sons, 72 Iowa 580, 582, 84 N.W. 317, 318 (book of decrees of
foreclosure of mortgages) ; Brown v. Barngrover, 82 Iowa 204,
207-208, 47 N.W. 1082, 1083 (record of judgments by confes-
sion), but the record book is involved here. Case v. Plato,
Lotz v. United Food Markets, Inc., Rudolph Hardware Co. v.
Price and State v. Wieland, all supra.

Hl An entry in either or both the judgment index or
eombination docket which refers to a judgment is not sufficient
to comply with the requirement that’a judgment be entered’ of
record. Kennedy v. Citizens National Bank, 119 Iowa 123,
124-125, 93 N/W. 71; Lotz v. United Food Markets, Inc.,
Rudolph Hardware Co: v. Price and State v. Wieland, all supra.

H. The recording of a jury verdict by the clerk.as re-
quired ‘by rule 204, R.C.P., does not constitute the entry of a
judgment. Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 226, 228, 40 N.W.2d
472, 474; Scott v. Manley, 240 Iowa 722, 725, 36 N.W.2d 474,
476. (Thé"cited cases do not involve jury verdicts, but the
analogy of a directed verdict and an opinion of the court ap-
pears to be sound.)

"THE No execution may validly issue until judgment ‘has
been entered in the record book. Winter v. Coulthard, 94 Iowa
312, 315, 62 N-W. 782, 733-734.

An appeal will not lie from the judgment of the district
court until that judgment has been entered of record. Hoff-
man-Bruner Granite Co. v. Stark, 182 Iowa 100, 103, 108 N.W.
829, 330; Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa 960, 965, 285 N.W. 204,
206; Wilson v. Corbin, 241 Iowa 226, 228, 40 N.W.2d 472, 474.
The date of entry of the judgment is, therefore, of utmost im-
portance to the parties in the original suit. If judgment was
not entered until July 31, 1967, Priester filed a timely notice
of appeal.

-Our determination here depends upon whether the clerk’s
entry in: the-Miscellaneous Liaw Record on July 28, 1965, was

812 PC ;

sufficient to constitute a judgment entry. The jury verdict is
recorded twice. Plaintiff claims this entry thus satisfies both
rule 204 which requires the clerk to enter the jury verdict of
record and R.C.P. 223 which states: “The clerk must forthwith
enter judgment upon a verdict when filed, * * *.” Defendant
claims, and the respondent held, this notation did not constitute
a judgment entry and as no judgment entry appeared, the fore-
going rules governed.

‘We would be less than candid if we failed to acknowledge
our approach to this case has been influenced by the 15,000
similar entries in Linn County. When faced with a situation
in which hundreds of mortgage foreclosures would be rendered
invalid if the court held the clerk was not permitted to keep a
separate record book for “Decrees of the Foreclosure of
Mortgages”, we said: “It would be, indeed, a bold court which,
following the language of the statute rather than its spirit,
would hold the decree upon which plaintiff’s title is based void,
on the ground that it is not recorded in a book which contains
all the proceedings of the court rendering it.” Carr v. Bos-
worth & Sons, 72 Iowa 530, 532, 34 N.W. 317, 319.

We would be acting with equal boldness here if we did not
minimize the importance of form and search for an entry which
meets the requirements of a judgment entry. We would not be
serving the cause of justice if we unnecessarily cast doubt upon.
the proceedings in all these other cases. At the same time we
cannot ignore the established law which holds a judgment must
be entered of record before it is effective. With this approach
in mind, we turn to the specifie question before us.

Is the clerk’s entry of July 28, 1965, in the Miscellaneous
Law Record sufficient to constitute the entry of the judgment
on the verdict? We hold that it is,

A judgment is a final adjudication of the rights of the
parties. R.C.P. 219; Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 661-
662, 23 N.W.2d 435, 440.

HE “The use of particular forms of words is not es-
sential to a judgment. The sufficiency of a writing claimed to
be-a judgment is to be tested by its substance rather than its
form. If it corresponds with the definition of a judgment and

a Le 813

appears to have been intended by the court as the determina-
tion of the rights of the parties, and shows in intelligible
language the relief granted, the absence of language commonly
deemed especially appropriate to formal judgments is not
fatal.” Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Towa 655, 662, 23 N.W.2d
435, 440; Batliner v. Sallee, 254 Iowa 561, 564, 118 N.W.2d
552, 554; Barrett v. Garragan, 16 Iowa 47, 48-49. “It need
not be in any particular form, provided the result, time, place,
parties ete., are so stated as to be unmistakable.” Coffey v.
Gamble, 117 Iowa 545, 549, 91 N.W. 818, 814.

The entry clearly shows in intelligible language the relief
granted. It was a final adjudication of the rights of the
parties. The clerk in entering judgment could not alter its
legal effect in any way. All that remained to be done was the
ministerial act of entering judgment of record. Such act
should not be given any greater importance than necessary to
accomplish the objectives of R.C.P. 223 which are to put “in
enduring form, what has been done” and to fix a definite date
from which to base further proceedings including the attach-
ment of a lien. Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa 960, 966, 285 N.W.
204, 207; State ex rel. Brown v. Beaton, 190 Iowa 216, 236, 180
N.W. 166.

HH This ministerial act has been given unusual im-
portance already by the Iowa cases which require a judgment
to be recorded as well as rendered in order to be effective.
18 LL.B, 242-243, 2 Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 621 by Cook.
We should liberally interpret the acts of the clerk in light of
the presumption that he has performed his duty, State ex rel.
Brown v. Beaton, 190 Iowa 216, 236, 180 N.W. 166; Halverson
y. Hageman, 249 Iowa 1881, 1392, 92 N.W.2d 569, 576, and
under the circumstances surrounding the entry of judgment.
Tf he intended his acts to be the entry of a judgment, we
should, if at all possible, avoid impairing its operation and
-validity when the rights of third parties are not affected be-
cause it is lacking in form. See 49 O.J.S. 235, Judgments,
section 110; State ex rel. Walls v. District Court, 38 Wyo. 427,
267 P. 1060; Livermore Sanitarium v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.
App.2d 569, 108 P.2d 1022, 1023.

814 | a

‘We minimized the importance of this act required of the
clerk-by relating the effectiveness of the judgment back to the
time of the decision. Coffey v. Gamble, 117 Iowa 545, 550, 91
N.W. 818, 814. There we held an injunction was dissolved as
of the date of the decision-and that the enjoined party was
not.in contempt for doing what had been prohibited between
the.date of the decision and the entry of judgment, We said:
“Any other rule would be disastrous, for it would permit a
mere ministerial officer to continue an injunction in force by
simply neglecting to enter of record an order dissolving the
same.” See also; Street v. Stewart, 226 Iowa 960, 965, 285
N.W. 204, 206, .

Although the foregoing citations which tend to minimize
the importance.of the clerk’s ministerial act are not directly in
point, they serve to illustrate the principle that failure to prop-
erly perform an act of this nature should not interfere with the
goal of the judicial process which is to decide controversies
promptly and with justice.

+ MM Substance, not form, has governed our efforts to
determine whether the decisions of the trial court are or are
not judgments. We have attempted to determine their inten-
tion therefrom. Batliner v. Sallee, 254 Iowa 561, 564, 118
NW.2d 552, 554; Whittier v. Whittier, 2837 Iowa 655, 662, 23
N.W.2d 435, 440; In re Estate of. Dodge, 194 Iowa 572, 578-
579, 189 N.W. 759. We must remember we are dealing with
the acts of a layman ‘untrained in the language of the law.
‘We must expect less adherence to judicial form. Rule 223,
R.C.P., places the burden of making the judgment entry on
the clerk. In the case of a jury verdict, neither statute nor
rule gives him any guidance as to form. It is therefore natural
that he would accept the calendar entry of the judge as the
form by which he could perform this duty.

Had the jury verdict appeared in the record only onee,
there obviously would have been nothing to interpret as a
judgment entry. Such recording would have been in com-
pliance with R.C.P. 204. The clerk attempted to do something
_when the verdict was repeated by copying the calendar entry.
He testified he was following the custom and practice in Lirm

a es 815

County. He thought the entry was a judgment entry. His
testimony and the entries on the combination docket and lien-
book so show.

Until this case, the Linn County lawyers have not chal-
lenged this procedure. The judges, including respondent,
have term after term approved record books in which judg-
ments on jury verdicts have been entered in this form. The
judge who tried the case thought judgment had been entered
‘here as he referred to it when ruling on the effect of the
covenant not-to sue. Defendant, Priester, through his original
attorneys, who still represent him, does not question the ex-
istence of a judgment.

Respondent’s decision was based on a conclusion of law
not a determination of fact. He did not question the clerk’s
testimony indicating he intended by his acts to enter judgment
against defendant. He reached the conclusion that what was
done did not constitute a judgment entry. Although we can-
not and do not approve of the form in which the Linn County
Clerks have for years attempted to comply with R.C.P. 228,
we believe the entry made, under all the circumstances, was
sufficient to show an intention to enter judgment and accom-
plishes the purposes of the rule. We therefore hold the re-
spondent’s conclusion of law was erroneous.

The Writ of Certiorari is—Sustained.

All Jusrices concur except Rawines, J., who dissents.

Gene L, Nexpies, Commissioner of Public Safety of State of
Towa, et al., appellants, v. Ep J. Kurimy, Judge, appellee.

No. 52744,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 276)

¢
a | | = i |

| 817

Fesruary 6, 1968,

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Joseph W.
Zeller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.

William D. Guthrie, of Webster City, for appellee.

Broxer, J—On August 31, 1966, the Commissioner of Pub-
lic Safety suspended the driver’s license of Wayne Francis
Kern effective September 30, 1966. Mr. Kern appealed. After
trial on appeal defendant Ed J. Kelley, Judge of the Hamilton
County District Court, vacated the suspension. Upon proper
application writ of certiorari issued from this court ordering
defendant judge to make return thereto. The pleadings, exhibits
and decision of the district court were duly filed here. Petitioner
alleges the trial court’s action in vacating suspension of the

818 Le 7

driver’s license was illegal and void. We are asked to annul
trial court’s order. Under the evidence and’ the applicable
law we hold the writ ‘should be quashed.

‘The trial court does not formally appear here. The real
controversy is between the department of public safety and
Mr. Kern, hereinafter referred to as defendant, who was in-
volved in a fatal accident on a paved county road about 7
p.m. July 31, 1966. The department records contained a hear-.
ing officer’s report although both parties agree no hearing was
actually held. This report contained information that patrol-
man Sturges advised the subject was very cooperative, the
accident was uncalled for hdd‘ subject been taking his time
‘instead of being in a hurry, they (apparently the participants)
were lucky not to have more than one person killed and the
sheriff felt the accident was a result of negligence. The hear-
ing officer concluded the violation was serious and recom-
mended suspension of license.

The records include certificates showing two previous con-
victions for speeding: sixty-five miles per hour in a fifty-mile
zone in Albert Lea, Minnesota, in February 1962 and seventy-
seven miles per hour in a seventy-mile zone in September 1968.
The record also showed an August 17, 1966, conviction for i in-
proper passing. This charge involved the July 31st violation.
for which the license was suspended. ,

. These documents, together with copies of notice of suspen-
sion, and notice that suspension was lifted pending appeal, con-
stituted the essential part of the department’s transcript.

Defendant perfected his appeal in form of a petition filed

- in the district court stating he appealed the action of the de-
partment. ‘The commissioner filed answer-and transcript of
the records upon which the suspension was predicated. °

- The.transeript was the only-evidence produced by the ‘de-
partment. Mr. Kern’s evidence consisted of his own testimony:
concerning the accident. He told of proceeding with his three
children as passengers along: White Fox Road at about sixty
miles per hour. He overtook a car going in the same direction
at’ about the same speed: There was a yellow line prohibiting
passing. -He was beyond this yellow line before he attempted

a [| 819

to pass. There was a dip in the road ahead. A car was down in
that dip. Mr. Kern did not see it. He said, “I would like to
think I did [look]. I know that I looked ahead through the—
how you can look through another car that is in front of you,
you can look right through, I thought I did.” As he got into
the left-hand side of the road, Kern looked ahead but did not
see the oncoming car until he was alongside the car he was
passing. He tried to get on by but failed. He sideswiped the
oncoming car (later identified as the Schwandt car) as he
timed back to the right.

The driver testified the Schwandt car was six to seven
hundred feet ahead when he first saw it. At the point of
passing the road was 20 feet wide with no shoulders. Defend-
ant did not think he could have slowed down and dropped
back behind the car ahead and he could not take the shoulder.

The Schwandt car had six people in it. A 19-month-old
baby was thrown clear of that car and died as a result of
injuries. ©

Defendant’s appeal petition charged the commissioner’
acted illegally because there was no hearing on the suspension,
the suspension was ex parte and arbitrary, a “serious violation”
did not in fact occur, and the effective date was not set’ by
an authorized -person. In a brief order the court sustained
plaintiffs’ position on all four grounds and vacated the suspen:
sion.

“I. This application for writ of certiorari, adiveotea against
the district court of Hamilton County, alleges defendant judge
acted: illegally. We determine the scope of the trial court’s-
function before passing on the validity of its acts. The perti-
nent statutes are Code, 1966, sections 321.210: -

“Authority to suspend—point system. The department is
hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or
chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a.showing by its
records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: * * *

“7, Has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle
laws of this state.”

Section: 321.211 provides for procedures for hearing by
the department: “Notice and hearing. Upon suspending. the

820 Le 7

license of any person as hereinbefore authorized the depart-
ment shall immediately notify the licensee in writing and upon
his request shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing be-
fore the commissioner or his duly authorized agent as early as
practical within not to exceed twenty days after receipt of
such request in the county wherein the licensee resides unless
the department and the licensee agree that such hearing may
be held in some other county. Upon such hearing the com-
missioner or his duly authorized agent may administer oaths
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and
the production of relevant books and papers and may require
a re-examination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the de-
partment shall either rescind its order of suspension or, good
cause appearing therefor, may extend the suspension of such
license or revoke such license.”

Section 321.215 provides: “Appeal. Any person denied
a license or whose license has been canceled, suspended, or re-
voked by the department except where such cancellation or
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this chapter
shall have the right to file a petition within thirty days there-
after for a hearing in the matter in a court of record in the
county wherein such person shall reside and such court is
hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to set
the matter for hearing upon thirty days written notice to the
commissioner, and thereupon the court shall hear and deter-
mine the matter as an original proceeding upon a transcript
of all the proceedings before the commissioner, and upon ad-
ditional evidence and other pleadings as the court may require.
The decision of the court shall be final.”

HE Danner v. Hass, 257 Iowa 654, 184 N.W.2d 534, deter-
mined the constitutionality of the statutes in question. We
recognized the appeal to the district court is to be tried as an
original proceeding. The aggrieved party is given an oppor-
tunity to try his case fully, except that the administrative
record (at least in the absence of objection as to hearsay or
other proper objection) is admissible in evidence before the
district court. See Richard v. Holliday, 261 Iowa 181, 153
N.W.2d 473.

— ee 821

In Danner vy. Hass, supra, on page 668, we also said: “We
do not imply that the court may overrule the factual determin-
ations of the administrative officer or board. In the original
proceeding provided for by the statute, the court’s function
is to determine the legality of the administrative proceedings,
and whether there is substantial material and competent evi-
dence to support the findings of fact therein made. It may
not substitute its judgment on the facts for that of the admin-
istrative body.” The commissioner relies strongly on this
dictum and argues: “* * * the court erred in substituting its
own judgment to overrule the factual determination of the
Department of Public Safety as to whether there was a ‘serious
violation’. This was illegal. The only question to be decided
by the Court is whether there is ‘substantial, material and com-
petent evidence’ before the Department which would support
its findings of fact as to a ‘serious violation’.”

The driver’s position is: “We urge seriously that if this
dictum is the law, then the legislative provision of Section 321,
215 has been rendered meaningless. This rule would restrict
the ‘appeal’ to the function of certiorari. This rule would ren-
der meaningless the provision that additional evidence could
be heard by the court and that the appeal should be heard as
an ‘original proceeding’, and that the ‘decision of the court
shall be final.’ Further, such rule would effectively prevent
the accused under Section 210 from any more review than is
available under Section 209.”

Our most recent opinion on the nature of appeal from de-
partmental action to the district court under section 321.210
is Richard v. Holliday, 261 Iowa 181, 187, 153 N.W.2d 473.
In that unanimous opinion we also said: “The essential issues
raised by the petition filed under section 321.215, supra, and
heard by defendant were whether the order of suspension was
arbitrary and without sufficient foundation and the claimed
unconstitutionality of section 821.210, subsection 7, asserted
basis for the order.” This was said in connection with con-
sideration of the transcript of proceedings before the depart-
ment. The nature of the appeal was not raised nor was it
-considered. Our designation of the essential issues was under-

822 Le 7

standable in view of what had been asserted in Danner v.-Hass.
In view of the failure to reargue we. did not reexamine the
point. Defendant driver’s argument here requires reexamina-
tion.

This problem has confronted many ‘courts. The statutory
language varies from. state to state but substantially all of the
statutes provide for appeal to the trial court and the court may
take additional testimony. A majority of courts that have
passed on the matter hold statutes substantially similar to ours
require a‘complete ‘trial de novo in-the hearing court and not
merely a review of the action of the administrative body. Con-
away v. Thompson (N:D.; 1956) 78 N.W.2d-400;.Stehle v. De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, 229 Ore. 543, 368. P.2d 386, 97
A.L.B.2d 1859, 1368; 46.Iowa Law Review 862, 867.

HI When the court determines “the matter as an original
proceeding” it determines it anew and is not bound .by the
action of the:commissioner. It does not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the commissioner. Initially the decision :is
in the administrative body acting both as prosecutor and judge
but if appealed the authority rests in the district court. If the
court is restricted to determination of the legality-of the de-
partment’s action its function as a’ reviewing court determining
the matter as an original proceeding is lost.

The legislature put the ultimate decision making authority
in the court.. It must remain there. The court makes a new
independent judicial determination on the evidence and the
law. So much of Danner v. Hass and Richard v. Holliday as
are inconsistent with this division are no longer to be deemed
controlling.

HH IL. Section 321.215 provides no appeal from the trial
court to this court. Its final sentence reads, “The decision of
the court shall be final.” The only court referred to in the
section is the court of record of the county of driver’s residence.
‘We therefore act only by application for writ of certiorari.

The rules covering us in certiorari are clearly set out in
Lineberger v: Bagley, 231 Iowa 937, 940, 941, 2 N.W.2d 305:

“This court held in the early case of Tiedt v. Carstensen,
61 Iowa 334,.16 N.W. 214, which has been repeatedly followed,

a ae 328

that where the law clothes an inferior tribunal with authority
to decide upon facts submitted to it, its decision is not illegal,
whatever it may be, if the subject matter and the parties are
within its jurisdiction, and there is evidence to support the
finding. The scope of certiorari under our statutes and at
common law is very similar. 10 Am. Jur. 524, section 3, page
527 et seq., section 5.

HI “We have recognized that where there is no evidence
to support the finding under review, a question of law is pre-
sented and the writ will lie. Des Moines v. Board, 227 Iowa
66, 69, 70, 287 N.W. 288. Accordingly, while it is not permis-
sible to review disputed questions of fact, yet the court will
inquire whether there is any competent evidence in support
of the finding. Luke -v. Civil Service Com., 225 Iowa 189, 194,
279 N.W. 443, If there is substantial evidence to support the
order under review, the court will not interfere. Home Sav.
& Trust Co. v. District Court, 121 Iowa 1, 11, 95 N.W. 522.
It is not sufficient to justify relief in certiorari that the con-
clusion reached by the lower tribunal ‘may have been ever so
erroneous,’ if within its jurisdiction and not otherwise illegal.
Adams v. Smith, 216 Iowa 1365, 1369, 250 N.W. 466, 468:
Relief by certiorari has been denied where the showing in sup-
port of the order under review was ‘weak and inconclusive.’
Riley v. Crawford, 181 Iowa 1219, 1223, 165 N.W. 3845.”

It. The trial court was clearly clothed with juris-
diction. It did not act illegally unless we can say there is no
evidence to support the finding under review. The court held
a serious violation did not in fact occur and vacated the order
suspending defendant’s driver’s license.

The facts before the court indicated a fatal accident hap-
pened during daylight hours while appellant driver was in
the act of passing another vehicle. There was a dip in the
road ahead. There. was no yellow line prohibiting passing.
There was no showing that vision was obseured so that the
driver could not see a sufficient distance ahead. The 700-foot
rule was not shown to have been violated. The oncoming car
was first seen about 600 to 700 feet ahead while the defendant’s
car was opposite the car it was passing, the driver attempted

824. | |

unsucéessfully to complete the pass. The speed limit at the
time and place was not shown to have been exceeded. The
speed of the oncoming ear is not shown. The collision occurred
and plaintiff pled guilty. The question is not whether de-
fendant was guilty of a violation but whether it was such a
serious violation as to result in suspension of driver’s privi-
leges. The department held it was. The district court which
by statute has the last word held it was not.

IV. The department argues, “He crossed the center line
of the highway and at a place where he could not clearly view
the road ahead. If a driver cannot see the highway ahead,
he is required to stay in line.”

Hl No such requirement is found in Iowa law. “No passing
zones” and yellow center lines indicate visibility is restricted.
Drivers normally have a right to presume absence of “no pass-
ing zones” or yellow lines on a marked highway normally
means visibility is sufficient for passing even though the driver
cannot actually see the roadbed itself. We are not aware of
a rule that the roadbed itself must be visible. The driver
must always pass with caution but this does not mean he must

" always wait until he can see the concrete slab.

Hl In a very real sense every moving traffic violation is a
serious violation. But every moving traffic violation does not
result in a suspension of driver’s license. The question of
whether a moving traffic violation is “serious” in the sense
used in section 321.210 is a judicial question to be determined
under all of the facts in each case. The court determined a
serious violation within the meaning of the statute did not
occur. The evidence to the contrary was not so clear as to
justify a finding by this court that the ruling was arbitrary
or capricious.

Hi V. The department also argues: “How could his vio-
lation be more serious, when it resulted in the death of a 19-
month-old child and injuries to the other occupants of the on-
coming car, which was being driven on its own side of the
road.” The seriousness of the violation cannot be judged
alone by the seriousness of the results. A violation may be
serious although it causes no damage. Danner v. Hass, supra.

| [| 825

Conversely a serious accident with tragic results may occur
without a serious violation. We have no rule that every fatal
aceident accompanied by violation of a law of the road will
automatically result in a suspension of the violator’s license.
Absent such legislative policy the trial court must consider
the entire event as presented to it. This the court has done.
Whether we agree or disagree, we are not to substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court. To hold otherwise is to
assume appellate jurisdiction not provided by statute.

Hl VI. Defendant claims the department’s action notify-
ing him of license suspension prior to hearing was ex parte
and arbitrary. The statute contemplates a judgment in the
first instance by the department. This judgment is followed
by peremptory action suspending the license. But this action
is not arbitrary where the driver has a right to ask for a hear-
ing or to appeal for judicial determination anew before the
license must actually be surrendered. This was the method
chosen by the legislature to protect the individual’s rights.
It comports with due process.

The matter of the effective date of the suspension is not
seriously argued by defendant. It would appear that the
effective date was properly set.

HME «VII. Defendant argues the depariment’s application
for writ of certiorari should be dismissed because the question of
validity of suspension of driver’s license effective September 30,
1966, is moot; the time for suspension being past.

In Berleen v. Iowa Department of Public Safety, 260 Iowa
699, 150 N.W.2d 593, we note that where the revocation was on
mandatory grounds and the time had run we could make dis-
position by declaring the question moot. The situation is other-
wise ‘where, as here, the suspension is discretionary. ‘ Section
821.210(7) states in part “and an appeal under the provisions of

1. When notice of suspension, of, Heense is. given by the department the, driver
may sppeal under section, 221,215 or ‘Proceed by way of certiorari. Hitchcock
ariment of Public Safety, 250 lowa oe 8 NWed tie that case we
specifically refused to decide ‘the contention that before ap ‘under
ia ‘appellant must asst exhaust his administrative ‘Temedies by requesting
‘administrative heari ion. is not raised here

Mangan v. Dep: setment ef Public Siew: 258 Iowa 359, 138 N.W.2d 922, is a
ease involving revocation under 321.210,’ ‘That case noted petitioners ¢ elected
to proceed by certiorari and were held to the rules governing that form of
action.

826 Le 7

section 821.215 shall operate to stay the suspension pending the
determination by the district court.” If the finding is adverse to
the driver the suspension ordered by the court will take effect
at a date provided in the court’s order. This delay does not make
the question moot. The issues remain alive and of importance to
both the driver and the department.

Defendant’s license has never actually been taken from him.
A “lift notice” was issued by the department in compliance with
the statute which automatically stays the suspension pending
appeal. This compliance was not voluntary. It does not con-
stitute a waiver of the department's rights. Read vy. Schul-
meister, 229 Towa 844, 295 N.W, 169.

VIII. In Houlahan v. Brockmeier, 258 Iowa 1197, 1203,
141 N-W.2d 545, 549, we state: “We have repeatedly held a
decision which is proper on any ground shown by the record will
not be disturbed on appeal.” As stated in 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal
and Error, section:785, page 227: “The judgment or order need
not be sustained for the same reasons or for all the reasons
relied upon by the trial court.” Here we have concluded the
court did not act arbitrarily in finding a serious accident i in the
statutory sense did not occur.

It is therefore our Judgment that the writ of certiorari is
griashed.

Moore, Sruarr, Mason and TaGran, J JJ., concur.
Rawutnes, J., concurs specially.
Swe; J., Garrreip, C. J., and Larson, J., dissent.

Rawiines, J. (concurring specially) —Code section 321.210,
gives Department of Public Safety authority, “* * * to suspend
the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary
hearing upon a showing by its records or other. sufficient
evidence that the licensee: * * *

“1, Has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle
laws of this state.”

Upon i issuance of a suspension order notice the alléged of.

— a 2

fender is granted permissive hearing before the commissioner
or his agent. Section 821.211, Code, 1966.

Then Code section 321.215 permits an appeal, except where
eancellation or revocation is mandatory. Incidentally, we are
not here dealing with a chapter 321B proceeding.

If the licensee elects to appeal it shall be to a court of
record in the county in which the person resides. In that
regard section 321.215 provides, inter alia, “* * * the court shall
hear and determine the matter as an original proceeding upon
a transcript of all the proceedings before the commissioner, and
upon additional evidence and other pleadings as the court may
require. The decision of the court shall be final.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

As to construction of this statutory provision, rule 344(f)
(18), R.C.P., states: “In construing statutes the courts search
for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said,
rather than what it should or might have said.” In this con-
nection, the word “determine”, as here used, means to bring a
question or controversy to a final conclusion. People v. Kuduk,
388 Til, 248, 57 N.E.2d 755. More specifically, “to determine” is
to decide, adjudge, adjudicate an issue presented, come to a
decision, perform a judicial act, settle by judicial sentence.
People v. Escobar, 122 Cal. App.2d 15, 264 P.2d 571, 573, and
Wood v. Department of Publie Safety, Tex.Civ. APP., ., 811
S.W.2d 274, 276.

It thus appears the commissioner has full and complete
primary authority to act, and a licensee is allowed permissive
hearing, yet the district court, in appellate proceedings, may
completely ignore the reasoning upon which the administrative
officer acted, or his conclusion.

II. Although the foregoing may serve to create something
of an incongruous situation, it appears to be unavoidable in
light of the statutory language employed in Code section
821.215, supra.

Tn other words, appellate determination under that
statute, as above construed, negates entirely the effectiveness of
administrative action, and is contrary to accepted standards
in administrative proceedings, leaving ultimate determination

828 a 7

not only to district courts on-appeal, but also this court on
certiorari.

In effect, that construction serves to subvert normal ad-
ministrative processes. As stated in 2 AmJur.2d, Adminis-
trative Law, section 612, pages 452-453:

“The cases are legion which stress the fact that the fune-
tion of the court, or judicial review of the action of administra-
tive agencies, is limited in scope and the range of issues open
to review is narrow, being limited to judicial questions, even
though the statute provides for review on the law and the facts
‘or a trial de novo, or for a suit to test the validity of rules,
vegulations, or orders. The scope of review is not the same as
upon review by an appellate court of a judgment of a lower
eourt. The boundaries of judicial review, however, are stated
in varying standards which themselves are subject to varia-
tion in particular situations.

“Judicial review.is ordinarily limited or confined to the
record of the proceedings before the agency and to the coni-
sideration of questions of law or to questions of law and the
sufficiency of the evidence, or to determining whether the
action of the agency. is legal or in accordance with the law or
whether errors of law have been committed.”

And Davis, Administrative Law Text, Hornbook Series,
section 29.07, page 531, says:

“When an administrative record has been made, taking
testimony from the same witnesses a second time is wasteful,
and even when statutes explicitly provide for de novo review,
courts strive to prevent a duplication of the evidence-taking
process. Although over the last few decades the movement
away from use of juries on judicial review is perceptible, jury
review is still common in some states. A test which is between
the substantial-evidence test and substitution of judgment is
the test of whether the finding is ‘against the manifest weight
of the evidence.’

“Scope of review in state courts varies not only from
state to state but often from agency to agency within the same
state. Although the scope of review of the multifarious state
and local agencies remains exceedingly diverse, the federal

fe Po 829

system is providing an effective leadership which the states are
increasingly following.”

However, for reasons previously set forth, this appears to
be a matter resting entirely in the hands of the legislature.
See Kruck v. Needles, 259 Iowa 470, 476, 144 N.W.2d 296, 300;
Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Board, 253 Iowa 517, 529, 111
N.W.2d 817; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 380, page 391.

I find no alternative but to concur in the result reached
by the majority.

Swe, J—I dissent. I think the majority opinion is based
on a proposition not involved in the case before us and results
in abdication of our duty to review the legality of the trial
court’s ruling and overemphasis on what is required to estab-
lish a “serious violation.”

Much of Division I of the majority opinion is directed at
one paragraph in Danner v. Hass cited by the majority and
quoted from page 668 of 257 Iowa, as follows:

“We do not imply that the court may overrule the factual
determinations of the administrative officer or board. In the
original proceeding provided for by the statute, the court’s
function is to determine the legality of the administrative
proceedings, and whether there is substantial material and
competent evidence to support the findings of fact therein
made. It may not substitute its judgment on the facts for that
of the administrative body.”

The quoted statements were dicta. They go too far and
I have no objection to their disapproval as general principles
of law.

An. appeal to the district court from the commissioner’s
ruling is a special proceeding. Richard v. Holliday, 261 Iowa
181, 188, 153 N.W.2d 473, 477. It is heard as an original pro-
ceeding upon a transcript of all the proceedings before the
commissioner and upon additional evidence and other pleadings
as the court may require, Section 321.215, Code of Iowa.
Under this statute and with authority to hear additional
evidence the court might reach a conclusion different from that
of the commissioner. It is in the nature of a de novo review

830 Le 7

by the district court wherein the court should give weight to
the findings of the commissioner but is not bound thereby to
the extent required by an appeal in a law action.

To the extent that dictum in Danner v. Hass indicates or
holds to the contrary I have no objection to disapproval.

That problem, however, has nothing whatsoever to do with
the case before us. The instant case was heard de novo and
determined on the record before the commissioner and oral
testimony received in district court. .

I think the record so made and the licensee’s own testi-
mony require the sustaining of the writ of certiorari now
before us.

Section 321.215 of the Code concludes with this sentence,
“The decision of the court shall be final.” This provision
limits our review to certiorari and the legality of the trial
court’s ruling. We may not substitute our judgment ori the
facts for that of the trial court. This does not mean, however,
that we must abdicate our duty to determine the existence of
any facts to support the court’s decision. I do not think the
legislature ever intended or that we should so construe the
statute as to grant the trial court omnipotence, infallibility or
arbitrary power.

Certiorari will not lie for-the purposes of reviewing facts
that have support in the record. Bump v. District Court, 232
Towa 628, 629, 680, 5 N.W.2d 914. It will lie to determine the
existence of facts to support the finding under review. We
said:

“This is true, of proceedings.in certiorari in general, where
there are questions of fact to be determined. The writ lies
where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial
functions, exceeds. its proper jurisdiction or. otherwise acts
illegally, and there is no plain, adequate, or speedy remedy at
law. Code of 1939, section 12456. But we have also recognized
that where there is no evidence.to support the finding under
review, a question of law is presented and certiorari will lie.

“The evidence in this case is undisputed and we are of the
opinion that it is our duty to review and determine the finding
as a matter of law.”.

a es 831

Tn State ex rel. Rankin v. Peisen, 233 Iowa 865, 868, 869,
10 N.W.2d 645, we said: “* * * certiorari lies to review a
decision on fact questions where there is no competent evidence
to support the finding and there is no other adequate remedy.
In such event, the question becomes one of law.”

In City of Sioux City v. Civil Service Commission, 247
Towa 1254, 1258, 78 N.W.2d 838, we said:

“However, where there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port the findings upon which are based its conclusions of law,
the inferior tribunal, in making its determination, acts illegally,
within the meaning of R. C. P. 306. [Citations]”

See also Powers v. McCullough, 258 Iowa 738, 741, 140
N.W.2d 378.

In Hohl v. Board of Education, 250 Iowa 502, 508, 94
N.W.2d 787, we said:

“Certiorari is the method of bringing the record of an in-
ferior tribunal before the court for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the inferior tribunal or body had jurisdiction and
whether its proceedings were authorized. See 19 Iowa Law
Review 467. Clearly it comes within the supervisory functions
of the appellate courts and is necessary to keep all-such bodies
within their proper functions and to prevent them from acting
in an illegal manner. It is an extraordinary remedy, and thé
courts may make it available to all persons who may show a
substantial interest in the matter challenged.”

Was there any support in the record for the trial court’s
ruling? I think not. If not, the ruling was illegal.

The Commissioner of Public Safety, the Department of
Public Safety and the Drivers License Division are the peti-
tioners in certiorari and the trial judge is the respondent. ‘The
person whose license is involved is the licensee.

For convenience, though not technically correct, the com-
missioner will be referred to as plaintiff and Wayne Francis
Kern, the licensee, as defendant.

On July 31, 1966, Mr. Kern (the real defendant herein)
was driving his car south on an improved but unnumbered
highway. It was known as White Fox Road. He was traveling
about 60 miles per hour and had been following another car.

832 a 7

He attempted to pass and collided with an oncoming car. As
a result of the collision a young child in the approaching car
was killed.

Defendant was arrested by a highway patrolman and on
August 17, 1966, defendant was convicted in justice court in
Webster City of improper passing (section 321.803).

The record of this conviction was received by the Depart-
ment of Public Safety on August 26, 1966. Although not the
basis of suspension here the records in the Department of
Public Safety show that defendant forfeited bail on a charge
of speeding in Albert Lea, Minnesota, on February 9, 1962, and
that on September 2, 1963, he was convicted of speeding in
justice court in Hampton, Iowa.

On September 1, 1966, defendant was notified by certified
mail from the Department of Public Safety that effective
September 30, 1966, his privileges to operate a motor vehicle
were suspended under the provisions of section 321.210, para-
graph 7, Code of Iowa (serious violation), until November 29,
1966.

Pursuant to the provisions of section 321.215, Code of Iowa,
defendant appealed to the district court. Issue was joined,
trial was had and records and testimony were introduced.
Under the provisions of section 321.210, Code of Iowa, suspen-
sion was stayed pending determination by the court. The
suspension was terminated by “Lift Notice” dated September
30, 1966.

On the district court appeal Mr. Kern, referred to by us
herein as defendant, was the plaintiff. The trial court made no
detailed finding of fact but sustained the appeal on four
grounds urged by defendant herein. They were:

1. That he has had no hearing on said suspension.

2. That the claimed suspension was ex parte and arbi-
trary.

8. That the claimed basis of the suspension “serious vio-
lation” as provided under Code section 321.210(7) did not in
fact occur.

4. That the claimed suspension order was not made in
accordance with law for the reason that the effective date

— a 888

thereof was not set by the Department, nor any authorized
person.

The following is from defendant’s testimony in district
court.

He was involved in a motor-vehicle collision on July 31,
1966. It was still daylight and he was traveling about 60 miles
an hour. There was traffic ahead of him. He attempted to
pass a car:

“Q. At the time you attempted to pass was there any
other traffic in sight? A. I didn’t see the other car.

“Q. When you started to pass were there any other cars
in sight? A. Not that I could see.

“Q. Is it a fact that south of this location there is a dip
in the road? A. Yes,

“Q. As a matter of fact, was there a car that was down in
that dip? A. Yes.

“Q. And at the time you pulled out to pass that car was
not in sight? ** * <A. I didn’t see it.

“Q. Well, did you look ahead of you as you pulled out to
pass? A.I would like to think I did. I know that I looked
ahead through the—how you can look through another car that
is in front of you, you can look right through, I thought I did.

“Q. When was it you first observed the other car? A. I
suppose when I was about even with the car I was passing. * * *

“Q. Did you see any other vehicles approaching you at
that time as you just pulled out? A. Not just as I pulled out,
but it must have been shortly after because I seen the car after
T got out. * * * .

“Q. Well, you knew the condition of this White Fox
Road, didn’t you? You had been over it a number of times
before. A. Yes.

“Q. You knew about this dip in the road? A. Yes.”

The majority opinion does not try to support the legality
of grounds numbered 1, 2 and 4 of the trial court’s ruling.
Brief mention as to illegality will suffice.

The trial court found that defendant “has had no hearing
on said suspension.” No such hearing is required.

Section 321.210.of the Code specifically authorizes suspen-

34 ee —

sion without preliminary hearing. ‘Provisions. for notice and
hearing before the effective date of the suspension are in the
statute and in section 321.211.

The trial court found “that the claimed suspension. .was
ex parte and arbitrary” and “that the effective date thereof has
not been set * * *.” Division VI of the majority opinion dis-
poses of these findings. The constitutionality of section 321.210
and suspension thereunder has been upheld. Danner v. Hass
and Richard y. Holliday, both supra.

The real thrust of the majority opinion is S found at the
end of Division VIII wherein it is concluded “the court did not
act arbitrarily in finding a serious accident in the statutory
sense did not occur.” I ‘think this conclusion is demonstrably
wrong, contrary to the intent of the law and without support
in logic or common. experience.

The statute says “serious violation” not “serious accident.”

The second paragraph’ of Division Ww of the majority
opinion says:

“Drivers normally have a right to presume absence of ‘no
passing’zones’ or yellow lines on a marked highway normally
means visibility is sufficient for passing even though the driver
eannot, actually see the roadbed itself. We are not aware of
a rule that the roadbed itself must be visible. The driver must
always pass with caution but this does not mean he must al-
ways wait until he can see the concrete slab.”

Except for the reference to the concrete slab I disagree.
The statement is not in accord with section 321.303 of the Code.
This section says:

“Limitations on overtaking on the left. No vehicle shall
be driven to the left'side of the center of the roadway in over-
taking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking and passing to be completely made without inter-
fering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every
event the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side
of the roadway before coming within one hundred feet of any
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.”

— a 885

Intent to violate the law is. not an element in proof of
violation of the statute. Here the violation had been estab-
lished. Defendant had been convicted of improper passing in
violation of the statute.

I agree with the majority that “In a very real sense every
moving traffic violation is a serious violation. But every
moving traffic violation does not result in a suspension of
driver’s license.” Of course that is true. Undoubtedly hun-
dreds of traffic violations occur that are either unnoticed or
overlooked. That does not mean that the violation here can
be said to be other than serious. .

I agree that the seriousness of a crime cannot in all cases
be judged by the result but the result certainly cannot be
ignored. To shoot at a person is a serious crime even though
the aim is poor and the intended victim is unharmed. To burn
a building may be arson but if someone is in the building and
is burned to death the act is murder in the first degree and is
punishable by life imprisonment. As said in Danner v. Hass,
supra, loc. cit. 665 of 257 Iowa (a point to which the majority
has indicated no disagreement), “A violation may be serious
although it causes no damage; it is its potentiality for harm
by which it must be measured.”

One of the definitions of “serious” is “attended with
danger.”’ See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.

Defendant argues that he did not in passing cross a yellow
line; that the accident arose from an error of judgment rather
than an intentional and calculating violation. He says “Al-
though the consequence was serious, the violation wag inad-
vertent and not intended.”

Intent is not a necessary element in determining serious-
ness. An act may be serious even though inadvertent. In
the case at bar defendant was familiar with the highway; he
knew there was a dip in the road ahead; he attempted to pass
on the left side of the road after mevely looking through the
windows of the car ahead; the road ahead was not clearly
visible and free from oncoming traffic. He violated the law.
A collision resulted and a child was killed.

The majority says that in a yery real sense every moving

836 Ee —

traffic violation is a serious violation and then holds that the
trial court did not act arbitrarily in finding that there was no
serious violation here. I cannot reconcile these statements.
It is hard to think of anything more serious than a violation
of the law resulting in the death of a child.

I find nothing in the record to support the trial court’s
findings of fact. If without support it was illegal. I fear that
the holding of the majority may lead to a serious breakdown
in the enforcement of our motor-vehicle statutes.

I would sustain the writ.

Garrmtp, C. J., and Larson, J., join in this dissent.

Gunnar A. OsteRLine, appellant, v. Date Srurczon, appellee.

No. 52760.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 344)

food
iy
a

Frpruary 6, 1968.

838 ee
ee
| .

McDonald, Sayre & McDonald, of Cherokee, for appellant.
Miller, Miller & Miller, of Cherokee, for appellee.

GarrieLp, C. J.—This is an action in equity by Gunnar A.
Osterling, landlord, to collect rent on the west half of the first
floor and basement of a business building in Cherokee and
foreclose the contractual lien therefor. ‘Defense of the tenant,
Dale Sturgeon, was that a flood of the Little Sioux River in
April 1965 in effect destroyed the building, rendered it unfit
for the use contemplated by the parties and relieved defendant
from paying rent. Following trial’ to the court this defense
was sustained and plaintiff appeals from the adverse decree.

‘Unless we are to disregard the applicable law we must
reverse.

I On July 6, 1956, plaintiff-owner leased the premises to
defendant for ten years commencing September 1, 1956. The
entire building was 120 feet wide, facing Main Street, by 121
feet deep. Incidentally the building, built in 1952, cost, about
$80,000, the land on which it is located $10,000 and an addition
built at the time.the lease was made cost about $22,000.

The lease provides: “these premises are to be used. for a
bowling alley, with a bar, refreshment and lunchroom in. con-
nection: therewith. * * * The Tenant agrees to use the said
premises for no other purposes * * * and activities related to
bowling and not to underlet the same * * * nor assign this lease
without the written consent of the Landlord * * *.”

- The lease contains no covenant by the lessor to repair nor
for abatement of rent in the event of casualty to the premises.
It is not claimed any statute so provides.

There was some delay in defendant’s occupancy of the
premises for which an agreed adjustment in the rent was made,
Defendant first oceupied them-with his bowling alley in opera-
tion in October 1956 and paid the agreed rent up to and in-
cluding April 1965. The monthly rent was $430 and the total
unpaid rent at the end of the term of the lease was $6880.

Ye es 839

The Little Sioux River flows through Cherokee a little
more than a quarter mile east of the building. In early April
1965 the river rose to an unprecedented height of 27.2 feet,
causing the worst flood in the city’s history. Nearly 350 resi-
dents were forced from their homes, 250 national guardsmen
from four cities were called out, and boats were used for travel
in the flooded area.

For the first time since the leased premises were built
water covered the floor on which defendant installed his bowl-
ing lanes. The basement, under the front 40 feet of the build-
ing, was filled and the water was three feet deep on the bowl-
ing alleys. It was five to seven days before it receded and
the alleys were damaged beyond repair. They were defend-
ant’s property, installed by him. The building itself was not
damaged except for the paint and could have been occupied
in about a week after the flood.

There had also been a lesser flood in 1962 when water
entered the basement of the premises but none entered the
bowling alley part. Still lesser floods occurred in 1960 and
1961 but none in 1963, 1964 or 1966.

Defendant testified he was unable to obtain a loan from
the Small Business Administration with which to install new
bowling lanes in the leased premises and in any event deemed
it unwise to do so for fear of future flood damage. He then
constructed a new building where he was operating a bowling
alley at the time of trial in October 1966. Efforts by both
parties to find a renter for the leased premises proved unsuc-
cessful although the east half of the building remained oe-
eupied by a tenant.

We deem it unnecessary to set out facts bearing on issues
no longer in the case as the appeal stands.

| II. At common law injury to or deterioration of the
leasehold or building thereon by flood, fire or other casualty,
under such a lease as we have here, did not relieve the tenant
from his obligation to pay rent. Harris v. Heackman, 62 Iowa
411, 17 N.W. 592, 593; The Woodbury Co. v. Tackaberry Co.,
166 Iowa 642, 645, 148 N.W. 639; Gamble-Robinson Co. v.
Buzzard, 8 Cir., Iowa, 65 F.2d 950, 952, and citations; Standard

840 Ee —

Industries, Inc. v. Alexander Smith, Inc. 214 Md. 214, 183
A.2d 460, .61 A.L.R.2d 1433, 1441, and citations; 1 Tiffany,
Landlord and Tenant, page 1191.

Defendant contends, and ‘it may be coneeded,: where the
lease is for only a portion of a building its destruction termi-
nates the tenant’s obligation to pay rent. Gamble-Robinson
Co. v. Buzzard, supra, at page 953, and citations; 1 Tiffany,
Landlord and Tenant, pages 1196-1197; 82 Am. Jur., Landlord
and Tenant, sections 494, 495.

HH This exception, just referred to, to the rule has been
applied and the tenant relieved from paying rent only where
it appears the leasehold was totally destroyed, not where it
was merely injured or damaged. “Total destruction, perhaps,
does not mean such a destruction as does not leave one stone
lying upon another, but it must be such as destroys the leased
property in its character as a room or a building.” Humiston,
Keeling & Co. v. Wheeler, 175 Ill. 514, 520, 51 NE. 893, 894;
Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, ,supra, and citations at page
958 of 65 F.2d. See also Standard Industries, Inc. v. Alexander
Smith, Inc, supra, 214 Md. 214, 183 A.2d 460, 61 A.L.R.2d
1438, 1441, and citations; Scharbauer v. Cobean, 42 N.M. 427,
80 P.2d 785, 118 A.L.R. 102, and citations; Chase & Co. v:
Fleming, 143 Iowa 452, 455, 121 N.W. 1055.

“In order that the liability for rent thus cease by reason
of the destruction of the building or of the apartment leased,
it is necessary, that-the premises leased be entirely destroyed,
and the liability for rent continues as before, if the building
or apartment leased still. exists, although it be necessary to
repair it in order that it be tenantable.” 1 Tiffany, Landlord
and Tenant, page 1197. See also 52 CJ.S., Landlord and
Tenant, section 486b, page 256.

"ML The slight damage caused by this flood to the portion
of the building leased to defendant here falls far short of such
destruction of the leasehold as relieves him from his obligation
to pay the rent stipulated in the lease. No authority has come
to our attention which sustains such a result.

As indicated, the. building was not damaged. structurally
and the only damage to it of. any kind, as we understand the

7

Se sa

record, was to the paint on the lower portion of the inside
walls. The floor of the building was concrete, joists were steel
and the walls were of clay and cement block and brick. Physi-
eal damage from the flood was almost all confined to defend-
ant’s own property. Plaintiff, of course, was in no way at
fault or responsible for this unprecedented flood.

Towa decisions which lend support to the conclusion just
stated include Benson v. Iowa Bake-Rite Co., 207 Iowa 410,
412-416, 221 N.W. 464, which approves what Chase & Co. v.
Fleming, supra, holds is meant by “total or partial destruction”
of the leasehold; The Woodbury Co. v. Tackaberry Co., supra,
166 Iowa 642, 647, 148 N.W. 639; Healey v. Tyler, 150 Towa
169, 129 N.W. 802.

The instant case is considerably stronger for plaintiff
than O’Neal v. Hawkeye Lbr. Co., 185 Iowa 452, 170 N.W. 792,
where the leased premises were to be used only for operating
a garage and amusement park. By implication the lessee was
authorized to erect such buildings as in its judgment were re-
quired to carry on such business. When the lease was executed
the lessee- owned such buildings. They were burned without
lessee’s fault and the burning made the premises untenantable
as a garage and amusement park.’ The lessee resisted payment
of rent because the lease provided it should stop if “said prem-
ises are untenantable by reason of fire, through no fault of the
tenant.” We upheld the landlord’s right to collect rent on
the ground the buildings owned by the tenant were not part
of “said premises.” : .

So here it cannot be said defendant’s separate ‘property
was part of the leasehold. In all probability he would have
strenuously resisted such a claim if asserted against him.

Il. The trial court placed considerable reliance upon
Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W.
785, 86 L.R.A. 424, 61 Am. St. Rep. 554 (1897), which defend-
ant says is a leading case. The chief justice and two of the
other five members ‘of the Nebraska. court dissented from the
portion of the opinion here relied on which expresses a definite
minority view. In any event we do not find the facts of the
case make it applicable here.”

842 Le |

Wattles as landlord leased 20 acres of ground, part of
which was covered by water, together with the buildings there-
on, for. harvesting ice formed on the water and storing it in
the buildings. During the term of the lease, in August, the
buildings on the leased premises were completely destroyed
and rendered entirely valueless by a hurricane. Conceding
that under the common law the tenant would not be relieved
from paying the entire rent reserved, the opinion formulates
the rule that where a substantial portion of leased premises is
destroyed without the lessee’s fault he is entitled to an .ap-
portionment of the rent thereafter, in the absence of an ex-
press assumption by him of the risk of such destruction.

As we have tried to point out, the slight damage from the
flood to the leased premises here falls considerably short of
destruction of even a portion thereof. The cited Wattles case
is not this case.

HI LV. Defendant argues and the trial court felt it would
be inequitable and indeed unconscionable to require defendant
to pay the agreed rent for the comparatively small portion of
the term remaining after occurrence of the flood. We find no.
inequitable conduct on plaintiffs part and insufficient basis
for relieving defendant from his obligation to pay rent.

_ | As stated, the lease provides in substance that defend-
ant use the premises only for a bowling alley and related pur-
poses unless the plaintiff gave written consent to their use for
other purposes. From this defendant pleaded plaintiff im-
pliedly and expressly warranted the premises were not subject
to flooding from the Little Sioux River and these warranties
were breached. The trial court held defendant failed to estab-
lish that plaintiff breached any implied or express warranty.
Defendant does not attempt to sustain the result reached by
the trial court by urging there was such breach.

Although the warranty issues are not now before us we
may observe, in view of the argument on the equities: of the
case, “The fact that the lease designates the use to which the
premises are to be put does not imply a warranty that they
are or will continue to; be fit for such-use.” 51 C.J.S., Landlord
and Tenant, section 304, page 965. To like effect are Rogers

SE 843

v. Rob Roy Plantation Co., 208 Ark. 429, 186 S.W.2d 661; 140
West Thirty-fourth Street Corp. v. Davis, 158 Mise. 470, 285
N-Y.S, 957, 960; Girard Trust Co. v, Tremblay Motor Co., 291
Pa, 507, 140 A.506, 511. See also Boyer v. Commercial Bldg.
Inv. Co., 110 Iowa 491, 498, 81 N.W. 720; Kutchera v. Graft,
191 Iowa 1200, 1209, 184 N.W. 297, 26 A.L.R. 1257, 1264-1265,
and citations.

Hl No claim of fraud on plaintiff's part was pleaded nor
is there evidence thereof. Before the lease was executed the
parties considered and discussed the possibility the premises
might be flooded. Plaintiff. told: defendant there had never
been water on the first floor of the building. The evidence
is the statement was true when made. Defendant had resided
in the immediate vicinity of Cherokee most of the time for 25
years and was familiar with the Little Sioux River during that
time. He was born and reared in-a small town-eight miles east
of Cherokee on the same primary highway the leased building
faces and knew water from the river had once run over the
highway. As indicated, the lease contains no provision for its
termination nor for abatement—or apportionment—of the rent
in the event of flooding.

| There was nothing inequitable or unconscionable about
this lease when made. However it is argued it became such
by the damage to the bowling alley from the flood. The argu-
ment is sufficiently answered by this from 17A OJ.S., Con-
tracts, 1963, section 296(3), pages 97-98: “Likewise, the court
may not alter a contract for the benefit of one party and to
the detriment of the other or others, or make a new contract
at the instance of one of the parties, or, by a process-of inter-
pretation, relieve one of the parties from the terms to which
he voluntarily consented, or, because of equitable consider-
ations, obviate objections which might have been foreseen and
guarded against, * * *.” . .

Smith v. Stowell, 256 Iowa 165, 172, 125 N.W.2d 795, 799,
and B-W Acceptance Corp.-v. Saluri, 258 Iowa 489, 496, 139
N.W.2d 399, 408, quote the foregoing language with approval.
See-also 17A C.J.S., Contracts, section 296(4), pages 98-105.

a

Plaintiff is entitled to decree as prayed. For entry thereof
the cause is—Reversed and remanded.
All Jusrices coneur except Brcxmr, J., who concurs in

result.

Powessiex County Nationan Bank, Grinnell, Iowa, et al.,
executors of estate of Ross V. Coutts, appellees, v.
Navionwpe Morvan Insurance Company,
appellant,

No. 52717.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2a 671)

Fesruary 6, 1968.

96

Ross H. Sidney of Austin, Grefe & Sidney, of Des Moines,
and Roger W. Sunleaf of McNeil & Bechly, of Montezuma, for
appellant.

John F. Bierman and C. M. Manly, both of Grinnell, for
appellees.

Swext, J—This is an action at law to recover on an ac-
cident insurance policy issued by defendant. The executors
of the estate of Ross V. Coutts, deceased, brought the action
as plaintiffs. From judgment following a jury verdict for
plaintiffs the defendant has appealed.

Mr. Coutts, a widower about 80 years old, held a member-
ship in National Travel Club through which he held insurance
providing certain accidental and death benefits. The insurance
provided for medical benefits if the insured sustained a bodily
injury caused by accident and a death benefit if the insured
sustained a bodily injury caused by accident which resulted
directly and independently of all other causes in his death.

On February 4, 1965, Mr. Coutts was a passenger on the
eruise ship S. S. Oslofjord, a ship of the Norwegian American
Lines, headed for the Mediterranean.

In the early evening he was present at the captain’s wel-
coming cocktail party. There was some hearsay evidence and
differenée of opinion as to how much, if anything, he had to
drink. The matter is of no importance because there is neither
claim nor evidence of intoxication. There is evidence. that he
was not intoxicated.

At about 7:45 p.m. he left’ the cocktail party in company
with several ladies and proceeded down the corridor toward a
stairway heading to the deck below where the evening meal
was to be served. While standing near the top of the stairs he
suddenly and without warning pitched forward, face down-
ward and fell to a landing halfway between decks.. He made

Ee

no outery but grasped the sweater of one of his companions
and it went down the stairwell with him. He was a large
man. His head struck the bulkhead on the landing. One
witness said: “It sounded almost like a watermelon when his
head hit the bulkhead below.” The sea was calm and the ship
steady. The stair and landing were unoccupied at the time.

Witnesses said he appeared to be unconscious. The ship’s
doctor and stewards were called.

The doctor’s report said: “On the deck was a man lying in
an unconscious state. His pulse was normal. He was bleeding
from his mouth and had a huge abrasion on the right side of
his forehead, but it wasn’t bleeding. He was brought to the
ship’s hospital immediately and put to bed.” .

The doctor examined him and -he was still unconscious.
Within 15 minutes he regained consciousness and responded
verbally to questions. He remained a patient in the ship’s
hospital until the ship reached Casablanca. He was under the
care of the ship’s doctor and nurses. Mr. Coutts’ nurse in at-
tendance was referred to as “his sister” in the ship doctor’s
reports. A daily hospital record showing temperature and
medication was kept. In addition thereto the doctor made a
written “Report from Ship’s Doctor to the Captain”, signed at
sea about two hours after the accident. He made an additional
report signed at sea February 14, 1965, two days after Mr.
Coutts left the ship. These reports were written in Norwegian
and were identified in this case as plaintiffs’ Exhibits 2 and 3.
They were translated into English and identified in this record
as plaintiffs’ Exhibit 7. They were written in narrative form
setting forth statistical information and the doctor’s observa-
tions of the patient. The admissibility of these reports con-
stitute one of the principal fighting points in this case. This
problem will be considered infra. This appears as a part of the
report of February 14.

“As time went on he was getting better and it was possible
.to have him out of bed, but he was as helpless as a small child.
We could expect him to be in this condition two or three
weeks in the future.

“He needed constant attention and his sister was with him

eee]

both night and day. Under these circumstances I decided it
would be best for him not to continue on his cruise.

“With all his’ multiple injuries, I felt it would be wise for
him to return home. Something more serious could develop. I
made arrangements for him to go home.

“He went by plane from Casablanca on the morning of
February 13. He left the ship February 12. He was looked
after by the plane’s skipper and he went via Paris.

“He was in quite good condition when he left the ship.
He still had his bandages on but was up and about and was
able to care for himself with a little assistance from the
stewardess on the plane.

“A report was sent with him as to what had happened to
him and what care he had received. He was going directly to
the hospital in his home town.

“Signed: At Sea February 14, 1965.

“Holge Norbye
“Ship’s Doctor” .

Mr. Coutts returned to Grinnell. He entered St. Francis
Hospital on February 14. He remained a patient there until
April 10 when he died. Regular hospital records were kept.
He was attended by Doctor Brobyn and for short periods when
Doctor Brobyn was absent by Doctor Light.

Both Doctor Norbye, the ship’s doctor, and Doctor Brobyn,
the attending physician in the Grinnell Hospital, died before
the trial of this case. Hence, the diffeulty i in connecting Mn
Coutts’ death with his fall.

HH 1. One of the objections to the receipt of the ship's
doctor’s report was that it was written in narrative form. No
authority has been cited to us on this point. Such a report
might be objectionable because of its contents or other reasons
but not because its contents or chronology appear in narrative
form. This is illustrated by the Minnesota case, Brown v.
Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688, 44
AL.R.2d 535. In that case plaintiff was injured while, at-
tempting to. board a streetcar. There was a direct conflict in
the evidence as to what happened. The doctor’s report .con-
tained’a narrative report of plaintiff’s statement as to how the

3°

accident happened. The report was held inadmissible because
of the hearsay and self-serving statements contained therein,
but the narrative form of the report received no attention. We
will refer to the rule as to content of a report in subsequent
divisions.

Hl il. When properly identified hospital records made
by authorized professional personnel (doctors and nurses) are
admissible in evidence to show the condition and treatment of
the patient. This problem was considered and authorities
reviewed in Gearhart v. Des Moines Railway Co., 237 Iowa 218,
21 N.W.2d 569. The statements appearing in Wigmore on
Evidence were quoted with approval. There is a cireumstan-
tial guarantee of trustworthiness “for the records are made and
relied upon in affairs of life and death.” (Loe. cit. 218)

To paraphrase what writers have said, courts should not
reject as unreliable information that is accepted and relied
upon in matters as important as life itself.

The rule is succinctly stated in Brown v. Saint Paul City
Ry. Co., supra, loc. cit. 26 of 241 Minn., 696 of 62 N.W.2d:

“We believe the better rule is that * * * hospital records
and charts, properly identified, are admissible when not privi-
leged to prove diagnosis, treatment, or medical history of the
patient pertinent to the medical and surgical aspects of the
ease but that hearsay and self-serving statements contained
therein are not admissible to prove how an injury occurred, at
least when offered by the patient. Whether they are admissible
for impeachment purposes or for some other purpose not here
involved we need, not now determine.”

HH im the case at bar the records were properly identified
and were admissible. The ship’s nurse in attendance testified:

“Dr. Norbye attended Mr. Coutts but he is now dead. He
was the ship’s doctor at the time and he képt some records of
Mr, Coutts’ condition, I saw him write it. They were kept in
the ship’s hospital. He typed his reportg and put them in the
archives in the hospital. He signed the reports and I saw him
sigh reports as to Mr. Coutts. Dr. Norbye is in charge of these
records. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3 were marked for identi-
fication), Exhibit 2 is the doctor’s record about Mr. Coutts’

$0,

time in the hospital on board and Exhibit 8 is the record that
the doctor wrote after he went home, that is a record for his
time on board, I mean a summary. Exhibit 3 is the summary.
These exhibits were typed by Dr. Norbye and signed in my
presence. Dr. Norbye did not keep any other records as to
Mr. Coutts’ condition. At the time Mr. Coutts became hospital-
ized, the ship was in the South Atlantic and we were going to
Casablanca to the Mediterranean Coast. I think we were four
days-out of New York. Mr. Coutts left the Oslofjord at
Casablanea. Exhibits 2 and 3 are written in Norwegian.
Exhibit 1 is for all the time that Mr. Coutts stayed on board
ship. Exhibit 2 covers Mr. Coutts’ condition while on board
ship. Exhibit 3 is a summary of Mr. Coutts’ injury while on
board ship.” . ,

The statement that “Exhibit 3 is the record that the
doctor wrote after he went home * * *” obviously refers to the
time Mr. Coutts went home. Mr. Coutts left the ship February
12-at Casablanea. Exhibit 3 was dated “At Sea February 14,
1965.” :

In the Gearhart case, supra, loc. cit. 218, we rejected the
suggestion that hospital records were admissible under the
statute relating to books of account (section 622.28). How-
ever, we think Doctor Norbye’s “reports” identified by the
nurse as his records, timely made, signed and kept in the
hospital archives, were within the provisions of section 622.27,
Code of Iowa. This statute provides:

“Entries and writings of deceased person. The entries and
other writings of a person deceased, who was in a position to
know -the facts therein stated, made at or near the time of the
transaction, are presumptive evidence of such facts, when the
entry was made against the interest of the person so making it, or
when made in a professional capacity or in the ordinary course of
professional conduct, or when made in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law.” (Emphasis added.)

+ We considered this statute in Kennedy v. Oleson, 251 Iowa
418, 100 N.W.2d. 894. A survey had been made by a profes-
sional land ‘surveyor. - He was deceased at the time of trial.
His notes had been made at'the'time and incident to his survey.

ee °°)

They were part of his permanent records. They were in his
own handwriting. We said:

“Clearly the writings come within section 622.27 and we
hold they are admissible in evidence under such section. They
are presumptive evidence subject to contradiction by any
proper method.” (Loe. eit. 423)

In the case at bar the reports were typed by and signed by
the doctor. The facts are comparable to the cited case. We
hold that Doctor Norbye’s reports were admissible in evidence
under section 622.27.

HI Assuming, as we have held, that doctors’ and hospital
records may be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule, they
may not be used to establish disputed issues not germane to
physical condition or medical treatment. See authorities cited
in Division I. For example: A doctor might testify or put in
his record that his patient told him that he was hit by a car
while crossing the street but the doctor may not testify as to
charges of negligence made by his patient against the driver of
the car. Conversely the inclusion of nonprejudicial hearsay
may not be of such consequence as to prevent admission. The
old maxim “De minimis non curat lex” might apply.

Doctor Norbye’s report was admissible. He was the at-
tending physician and had the special knowledge permitting
him to voice “his true state of mind on the matter, whether it
be possibility, probability, or actuality.” Grismore vy. Con-
solidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 348, 5 N.W.2d 646.

We find no reversible error in the admission of the ship’s
hospital records and Doctor Norbye’s reports.

II. Mr. Coutts entered the Grinnell hospital on February
14 and was.a patient there until he died on April 10. Medical
history was noted, and complete records and progress reports
were kept. These reports, including the death certificate,
were signed by Doctor Brobyn, the attending physician.
Doctor Brobyn was dead at the time of trial. His notes were
read and studied by other medical witnesses. Certain parts
were rather hard to decipher.

“Q. What was the reason for this? A. Medical illegibility.

“Q. Handwriting in other words? <A. Yes.”

52

The doctors, however, found them sufficient for the
purpose.

The admissibility of the Grinnell hospital records has not
been questioned.

Based on what plaintiffs claim was shown by admissible
evidence including the records of the ship’s doctor and the
Grinnell hospital records long and detailed hypothetical
questions were asked and answered by three medical witnesses.
Each was highly qualified to testify. Doctor Light, a general
practitioner, was chief of staff in the Grinnell hospital and had
been called to take care of Mr. Coutts for four days while
Doctor Brobyn was away. Doctor From was a certified
specialist and a diplomate of the Board of Internal Medicine.
Doctor Bakody was a certified specialist and a diplomate of
the American Board of Neurological Surgery. Each witness
had, prior to testifying, studied the records in detail and at
length and gave the reasons for his conclusion. Comprehensive
objections were made by defendant to each hypothetical
question and were overruled. Assuming the validity of the in-
formation provided in the hypothetical question and applying
it to an analysis of these facts, the doctors’ own knowledge
and experience in caring for patients, opinions were expressed
and answers given. The substance of the answers was that Mr.
Coutts did not have a stroke at the time of his fall; that if he
had not had the accident he would have been alive at the time
of the trial and would not have died when he did; that there
was a cause and effect relationship between the accident and
death and that “within the realm of reasonable medical cer-
tainty, it is my opinion that this man could not be reasonably
assumed to have died on the date of 4-10-65 were it not for the
accident of 2-4-65.”

If the questions were proper the testimony was sufficient
to generate a jury question as to cause of death.

+ The certificate of death signed by Doctor Brobyn listed
immediate cause of death as “cerebral arthiosclerosis with
thrombosis.” The spaces on the death certificate calling for
“conditions, if any, which gave rise to above cause” or “under-
lying cause” were blank.. There. was nothing in the death

3:

certificate attributing death to accidental means. The doctors
who testified reconciled this record with their conclusions so as
to present a jury question.

IV. In Ipsen v. Ruess, 239 Iowa 1876, 1388, 35 N.W.2d
82, we said: “It is firmly established that an expert witness
may not base an opinion in whole or in part upon opinions of
others, whether lay or expert, even though such opinions
appear in evidence.”

We recently considered .the question of foundation for
opinion testimony based on hearsay, i.e. multiple hearsay in
Dougherty v. Boyken, 261 Iowa 602, 155 N.W.2d 488. In that
case we rejected the foundation for the opinion of an eminently
qualified expert. He based his opinion in part on what a mem-
ber of the highway patrol told him in a conversation as to
“what the results of his investigation were”. and also on
demonstrably unreliable and inadequate information. The
matters related to the vital issue in the case. We said:

“Before it can evaluate an expert’s opinion, the jury
must know what it is founded on. This may be done by having
the witness state what facts he relies on and their source or
by having facts assumed to be true by way of hypothetical
question. Neither was done here. Rather the witness stated
he had obtained from Sergeant Angle in an out-of-court dis-
cussion the results of an investigation carried on by the officer.
He did not say what those results were.” (Loc. cit. page 614)

In the case before us we have a different situation. The
experts here were not basing their opinions on other opinions
relating to a vital issue. They were basing their opinions on
information, as distinguished from opinions, drawn from in-
formation contained in reports that we have said, supra, were
admissible. The opinions here proceeded from a different
foundation and were not vulnerable to the same objection as in
the Dougherty and Ipsen cases, supra.

The hypothetical questions were not based on any hearsay
contained in Doctor Norbye’s report. Some of the immaterial
information that would appear to be hearsay in Doctor
Norbye’s report also appears in- the Grinnell hospital report to
which no objection appears.

|

HEME OV. Facts stated in a hypothetical question must
have support in the evidence but the question need not contain
all the facts shown by the evidence. Litigants are “entitled to
frame the question according to their theory of the case, as
their construction of the evidence showed the facts to be or as
the jury would have a right to find them.” In re Estate of
Telsrow, 237 Iowa 672, 682, 22 N.W.2d 792, and Boegel v.
Morse, 251 Iowa 1258, 1257, 104 N.W.2d 826.

VI. Appellant particularizes wherein it is claimed
the hypothetical questions were without support in the record.
We will consider them in order.

Defendant objected to the assumption “that on December
23, 1964, an EKG was taken and found essentially normal.”
Included in the hospital records received in evidence were
seven EKG reports taken for Doctor Brobyn by cardiologists
and covering a period from October 18, 1962, to March 8, 1965.
The December 28, 1964, report said “Essentially normal EKG
without significant change since 1/3/64.” The January 3,
1964, report to which reference was made, said “Essentially
normal EKG.”

The objection was without merit:

Defendant complains because of the assumption “that he
was a well developed white male who was apparently in good
health.” This complaint is directed at a small part of the
question and is lifted out of context. The. assumption in the
part objected to was as follows:

“Now, Doctor From, I-ask you to assume that the deceased
is-a man of 80 years old with some known arteriosclerosis,
having previously sustained a coronary infarction in October
1962 and with it had phlebitis of the right leg that took a
month or more to heal. To assume further that on December
23, 1964, an EKG was taken and found essentially normal.
That he had previously been treated for prostate trouble and
had had a stricture of the urethra. That he previously had a
fracture of the right clavicle and an appendectomy. That you
are to further assume that he was a well developed white male
who was apparently in good health and was on a cruise in the
Atlantic Ocean aboard the M/S Oslofjord.” :

ES °:;

With such a full disclosure of Mr. Coutts’ past medical
history the reference to apparent good health was in no way
misleading.

While we might assume that reference to “good healt
a man 80 years old with previous ailments was a relative term
and did not imply the vigor of youth there was plenty of
evidence to support the assumption.

Four witnesses testified as to their observations. Two
testified that they observed nothing wrong and two said he
“was in perfect shape to start, * * * perfectly all right,” or “he
looked real well.”

There was nothing in the History and Physical Examina-
tion report contained in the Grinnell hospital records to refute
the assumption. Under “past illnesses” there was nothing
within two years. We find no error in this assumption.

It was well within plaintiffs’ “theory of the case as their
construction of the evidence showed the facts to be.”

Defendant objects to the words “while in conversation
with other individuals.” The record shows a clear basis for
the assumption. Mr. Coutts and several ladies had been to-
gether in the cocktail lounge. They proceeded down the
corridor toward the stairway to the deck below. Mrs. Lovell,
one of the ladies, testified:

“We stopped at the head of the stairs. The reason for the
stop there as I remember it was I was waiting for Mrs. Foster
to catch up. Mr. Coutts and Mrs. Spaulding had stopped to
talk over whether they wanted to go to dinner or whether they
did not, There were hors d’oeuvres and things like that and
we were talking about what we were going to do next. * * *.”

The hypothetical question assumed “that this man had at
least a cerebral concussion from the fall.” Adequate support
is found in the record. Doctor Norbye’s report written a few
hours after Mr. Coutts’ admission to the ship’s hospital con-
tained the following notations:

“He is suffering from a severe blow to his head, which he
undoubtedly received from his fall down a flight of steps at
19:45 today. I cannot say at this time if his skull j is fractured,
until K-rays are taken.

5

“He is on complete bedrest in the ship’s hospital and pre-
cautions are being taken for possible skull fracture.

“He acts like a man that is drunk, but this is often a
symptom of a concussion or skull fracture.

“His present condition isn’t very good, but we have to
take into consideration that he is a man of 87 and has had
considerable trauma to his head and body.”

(Mr. Coutts was actually 80 and not 87)

The Grinnell hospital record shows admission diagnosis in
Doctor Brobyn’s handwriting “Fracture of ribs, moderate con-
cussion.”

The hypothetical question said: “That an EKG was taken
on March 8, 1965, and found essentially normal with no
significant change since December 23, 1964.”

As noted, supra, the hospital records included EKG re-
ports. These appear in folders containing the cardiologist’s
report and mounted electrocardiogram tracings.

The fact assumed in the question was supported by the
record.

Defendant complains that the hypothetical question was
misleading in that it involves both an inclusion and an ex-
elusion. The complaint is hypercritical.

We have noted, supra, and appellant concedes that such a
question need not contain all the facts.. It must, of course,
contain sufficient of the facts to give some weight or credi-
bility to the opinion expressed. Counsel in preparing a hypo-
thetical question naturally paints as favorable word-picture as
his evidence permits. The hypothetical questions here were
within permissible limits. We-find neither improper inclusions
nor such exclusions as to so destroy their weight and credi-
bility as a jury question.

VIL. Defendant’s motions for directed verdict and not-
withstanding the verdict were properly overruled. Plaintiffs
had the burden of proving their case by a preponderance of
the ‘evidence, but were entitled to a view in the light most
favorable. If supported by substantial evidence the jury’s
findings of fact are binding on us. Citation of authority is
unnecessary. Rule 344(f) (1), (2) (5) and (6), Rules of Civil
Procedure.

PE

It is not for us to pass on the weight and credit of the
evidence. That is what juries are for.

As we have indicated in Division III, supra, there was a
jury question.

In a case such as this it is not necessary that there be
evidence of absolute certainty as to cause of death. Evidence
as to “reasonable medical certainty” is sufficient.

It should be kept in mind that the question was not what
eaused Mr. Coutts to fall. The question was what caused his
death.

We will refer to this proposition in the next division.

VIII. Instruction No. 4 as given by the trial court re-
quired plaintiffs to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence two propositions :

“J, That plaintiffs’ decedent sustained an accidental fall
on February 4, 1965, and;

“2. That said accidental fall caused bodily injuries which
resulted directly and independently of all other causes, in his
death on April 10, 1965.”

Instruction No. 6 which is attacked by defendant was as
follows: .

“You have previously been instructed that one of the
propositions that plaintiff has to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence is that plaintiff’s decedent had an accident.

“You are instructed that the term accident as used in said
policy is to be given its ordinary, usual, and popular meaning.
Basically accident means happening by chance, unexpectedly,
taking place not according to the usual course of things or not
as expected. .

“Tf, after a careful consideration of all the evidence you
find. that the plaintiff has not established that the plaintiffs’
decedent sustained an accidental fall on February 4, 1965, then
in such an event it being a material allegation of the plaintiffs’
petition, you should find for the defendant.

“Tf, however, after a careful consideration of all the evi-
dence you find that the plaintiffs’ decedent did sustain an
accidental fall on February 4, 1965, then in such an event the
first material allegation of the plaintiffs’ petition, will be

5

established and then you will proceed to determine the second
material allegation of the plaintiffs’ petition that the said
accidental fall caused bodily injuries which resulted directly
and independently of all other causes in his death on April 10,
1965.”

Defendant's requested instruction No. 2 (not given by the
court) included considerable elaboration on what is an accident
and the following statement:

“Tt-appears without dispute in this case that the plaintiffs’
decedent was suffering from an advanced disease known as
‘arteriosclerosis’ or, .in. laymen’s terms, ‘hardening of the
arteries’ and that said disease was diagnosed some two years
prior to February 4,.1965, and that plaintiffs’ decedent had
knowledge of said disease. Thus, if you find that the fall of
plaintiffs’ decedent was the result of some symptom or mani-
festation of that disease which rendered him unconscious re-
sulting in.a fall; then the fall would not be accidental and you
should so find.” .

Defendant tacitly admits that the definition of
the word “accident” in the court’s instruction was correct but
argues that the instruction as given should have pointed out
preexisting diseases and physical conditions resulting in the
fall.

The trial court was alerted to defendant’s claim and error
may appear from failure to adequately instruct. Oltmanns v.
Driver, 252 Iowa 1066, 1070, 109 N.W.2d 446.

Many definitions of the word “accident” appear in Feder
v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 107 Iowa 538, 78
N.W, 252, 43 L.R.A.693, 70 Am.St.Rep. 212, cited by appellant.
They are not in conflict with the definition used here.

In the cited case decedent “was suffering from consump-
tion.” He reached to close some window shutters and “as he
did so, blood began to flow from his mouth. He was placed on
a lounge, and died within a few minutes.” Death was caused
by hemorrhage from a ruptured artery and there was evidence
that the rupture was not due to the disease from which he
was suffering. There was no evidence that he fell, slipped or
lost his balance. He just suffered a hemorrhage and died.

«2

In the ease before us decedent fell, struck his head in the
fall, was unconscious and doctors attributed his subsequent
death to his fall.

Appellant cites, relies upon and quotes from Meyer v.
Fidelity arid Casualty Co., 96 Iowa 378, 65 N.W. 328, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 374. We do not think this case gives to appellant the
comfort claimed for it. The facts in that case are interesting
in relation to the case before us.

Decedent was insured under an accident insurance policy.
The policy provided “that the insurance should not cover ‘in-
juries, fatal or otherwise, * * * resulting directly or indirectly
from intoxicants, anaesthetics, narcotics, sunstroke, freezing,
vertigo, sleepwalking, fits, hernia, or any disease or bodily
infirmity.’” (Loc. cit. 379)

He was in good health, temperate and industrious. While
on, the street he was seen close to an electric light pole with his
right arm about the pole. His left hand was raised. His body
had a wavering or staggering motion. He fell and his head
struck the pavement: resulting in a skull fracture and subse-
quent death. .

The insurance carrier denied liability claiming death was
not due to an accident but to one of the conditions excluded
from coverage. The jury was instructed that if death was due
to an attack of vertigo or fits plaintiff could not recover. This
was followed by explanatory instructions as to what would be
“disease” within the exclusionary provisions of the policy.

. In the opinion affirming judgment for plaintiff this appears:

“The language used is made up of words framed by the
company or its legal advisers in an attempt to limit as narrowly
as possible the scope of the insurance; and it is a universal, as
well as a fair, rule,.adopted by the courts everywhere, to
construe the terms of the policy most strongly against the
assurer, and to resolve every doubt or ambiguity in favor of
the assured and against the assurer. * * *,” (Loc. cit. 385)

“Tt is also said in argument that the policy covers death
from violent, external, and accidental means, and that the
proximate cause of death in this case was not the fall, but
some disorder with which the deceased was afflicted. It is

50

quite clear, both on principle and authority, that, if the dis-
order which caused the fall was temporary and unexpected, the
injury was violent, external, and accidental, and the whole
matter was properly left to the jury for them to determine
whether the disorder was of a temporary character.” (Loe. cit.
387)

In the case before us it was not necessary for the court to
analyze the evidence supporting divergent theories of the
ease. The evidence was all before the jury. “Accident” was
defined. The issue was, did decedent have an accident “re-
sulting directly and independently of all other causes” in his
death? This was in accord with the insurance policy which
provided: .

«ce * ® indemnity for loss of life, limbs or sight and other
specified losses resulting directly and independently of all
other causes from injury sustained by any Insured Member.

“‘Tnjury’ as used in this Policy means bodily injury caused
by accident occurring anywhere in the world while this Policy
is in force with respect to the Insured Member whose injury is
the basis of claim and sustained by the Insured Member.”

The only exclusions mentioned in the policy were suicide
and war. There were no specific exclusions in the policy
covering disease that constituted the issue in the Meyer case.

We think the instructions as given in the case at bar were
adequate.

IX. This was a case difficult for plaintiffs to prove. The
insured was dead. The two doctors under whose care he was
treated were dead. Other witnesses were scattered. The case
was defended with professional skill and vigor. Nothing was
overlooked.

Death comes to old men from different and multiple causes
constituting a syndrome, There is difficulty in pinpointing a
specific cause of death. Here there was expert opinion testi-
mony within the limits of “reasonable medical certainty.” We
think it was sufficient to generate a jury question.

We find no reversible error.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

861

Rancwo ‘Granve, Inc., an Iowa corporation, appellant, v. Iowa
Srarz Hiesway Commission et al., appellees.

No. 52785,
(Reported in 156 N.W.24 293)

Fesrvary 6, 1968.

62

Abramson, Myers, Myers & Anderson, of Des Moines, for
appellant.

Richard C. Turher, Attorney General, L, Michael McGrane,
Assistant Attorney General, and Arthur C. Hedberg, Jr. of
Des Moines, for appellee, Iowa State Highway Commission.

Moors, J.—This case involves an appeal to the district court
from a condemnation commission award, of $22,500 for the
partial taking of plaintiff's land for Primary. Road 1-235.
Plaintiff's petition alleged damages of $126,000. On trial the
jury awarded $20,400. Thereafter plaintiff filed a motion for
new trial and related motions based primarily on a claim of
misconduct by the jury. Plaintiff has appealed following
adverse rulings on said motions. . :

Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in (1) denying plain-
tiff’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of jury misconduct
(a) for failure to follow the court’s instructions with respect
to the measure of damages (b) giving consideration in its
award to benefits accruing to plaintiff, (2) denying plaintift’s
application for examination of jurors and (3) denying its offer
of proof of the claimed misconduct.

It is undisputed plaintiff on February 21, 1966, was the
owner of Lot 19, in Ashworth, an official plat in the town of
Windsor Heights, It is near the west city limits of Des Moines.
It consists of a triangular tract of 14.1 acres with access to
sewer and water. The C.M. & St. Paul Railroad is contiguous
with the southwest boundary of the plat. Access to the prop-
erty was from Seventy-third Street over the railroad tracks or
from Center Street by road.

Walnut Creek runs south across the northeast corner of
the plat. The question of flooding and the extent thereof was
a point of sharp disagreement between the several witnesses
called by the. parties. Plaintiff’s witnesses testified there. was
no or very little flooding from the creek. Defendant’s witnesses

3:

testified there was considerable flooding which adversely affected
the value of the tract.

The land appropriated by condemnation consists of a fee
to the south 3.7 acres of Lot 19 and an easement along the
ereek bed of 1.4 acres. The perpetual easement is for the
purpose of straightening, relocation and maintenance of the
creek.

The description and the extent of the portions of Lot 19
taken by condemnation are not in dispute. They were not
matters of disagreement between the witnesses on trial of the
issues.

Mrs. Billie Velma Van Dyck, a majority stockholder in
plaintiff-corporation, testified she bought the property in 1941
and was living thereon in a trailer at trial time. She testified
the fair market value of Lot 19 before condemnation was
“around $12,500 per acre” and after condemnation, “I would
say it wouldn’t leave me anything to do anything with”.

Plaintiff called several witnesses each of whom after
stating his experience and qualifications as an appraiser and
relating his study of the subject property gave his opinion of
the value of the land involved.

Harold E. Anderson expressed the opinion the value before
condemnation was $119,000, after condemnation $45,000, a
difference of $74,000. He stated “It represents a.taking of
$8500 per acre. Damage to the remainder of the land of
$3500 an acre’, He further testified this represents a value of
the remaining land of $5000 per acre.

Donald Usher testified the value before condemnation was
$9000 per acre and the after value and damage to the remain-
ing land was reduced to $4500. He stated the remaining
land was reduced $40,500 to which he added the taking of five
acres at $9000 per acre or $45,000 and therefore the resulting
damage was $85,500.

Lew Clarkson fixed the value of Lot 19 at $140,000 before
condemnation. He assessed $10,000 an acre for the five acres
taken and $8000 an acre for two acres he considered isolated
by the creek and opined the resulting damage was $65,000.

Donald Jefferson estimated the value before condemnation

56,

as $189,000 and after $90,000 for a difference of $99,000. He
testified he figured the before value on the basis of $3.00 per
square foot or around $13,500 per acre.

Defendant, Iowa State Highway Commission, called three
appraisers each of whom after stating his experience and
qualifications and relating his study of the property gave
estimates of before and after condemnation value thereof.

W. W. Burns estimated the value before condemnation at
$67,500 and after $46,700 for a difference of $20,800. He was
not asked on direct examination to estimate per acre value.

His crogs-examination includes:

“Q. What is the average per acre? All we have to do,
wouldn’t we, is to divide $67,500 by 14 acres, the size of the
tract; wouldn’t that give us a value per acre that you put on
that tract? A. If you deducted the improvements which I
figured in there, yes,"you are correct.

“Q. What would that resultant figure be then? A. I
would average, including the creek and all the land, it would
average, if you wanted to do it that way which we do not. do,
it would be about $3812 an acre if I am correct in my mathe-
matics.” .

Harry Winegar estimated the before value at $20,500,
after value at $10,500 for a difference of $10,000.

. Harold Calkins estimated the before value at $67,250, after
value at $47,250 for a difference of $20,000.

Calkins’ cross-examination by plaintiff’s counsel includes:

“Q. Well, do you consider the portion in the small triangle
here that is going to be used for the relocation of the creek as
having any utility value, or any value to a property owner?
A, Well, it is my opinion it had very little value to start with.

“Q.- Well, of course, I didn’t ask you that question. What
I would like to know, after the creék is relocated through this
portion of the property shown in this small triangle, will that
portion of the property have any value to a property owner?
A. Very little. . .

“Q. So that for all intents and purposes would:it be a fair
statement to make that the property shown in the small triangle
is being lost to the property owner by the condemnation? A. I

ES

think that this parcel in here by the straightening of the
channel is going to enhance the value of this property over
here more than it was previously; it can be sold to an adjoining
property owner and be usable.”

The court’s instructions to the jury, to which neither party
took any exception or made objection, include:

“Instruction No. 5. The burden of proof is upon the plain-
tiff to establish by ‘a preponderance of the evidence, the ‘fair
and just compensation’ to which it is entitled, which, under
the law, is the difference in the fair and reasonable market
value of its property as a whole immediately before, and the
fair and reasonable market value of that portion of said
property remaining in the plaintiff, immediately after the
appropriation and condemnation as made by the defendant on
February 21, 1966.

“In making the allowance referred to, the law provides
that you disregard entirely and exclude from your caleula-
tions any and all benefits to the remaining part of plaintiff’s
property, which have resulted or may result in the future from
the improvements of said highway, it there are any such
benefits.

“Instruction No.17. The plaintiff in its petition has asked
for damages because of the condemnation of a portion of its
land in the sum. of $126,000, and in no event can your verdict
exceed that amount. - This limitation as to the amount is not
stated as an indication that such an amount is proper to. be
allowed by the jury, but as being the amount claimed in
plaintiff’s petition and which, therefore, limits the amount of
your verdict.

“In the verdict, the form of which is submitted herewith,
you will insert the amount which you find to be the difference
between the fair and reasonable market value of the property
in question before the condemnation on February 21, 1966, and
the fair and reasonable market value of the portion remaining
in the plaintiff after the taking by the Iowa State Highway
Commission of the portion so taken.by it, sign the same by one
of your number as foreman and return with it into open court.”

Using the form submitted the jury inserted $20,400 as the

* 56

amount of plaintiff’s award and returned a verdict for plaintiff
for that amount. Thereafter a proper judgment in such a
proceeding was entered.

Plaintiff's motion for new trial, as: amended, included. the
assertions the jury had not followed the court’s instructions to
make the award based’.on the difference of the reasonable
market value of the property before and after condemnation
but found. per acre value and then multiplied by 5.1 acres to
‘arrive at plaintiff’s damages.

Plaintiff further alleged the jury in their deliberation con-
sidered the relocation’ of Walnut Creek would inure to plain-
tiff’s benefit. -

As a-part of:said motion for new trial this affidavit of

’ Frank D. Anderson, one of plaintifi’s attorneys, was attached
thereto:

“J, Frank D. Anderson, being finst duly sworn on oath,
depose and state that subsequent to the return of: verdict by
the jury herein on May 27, 1966, I personally interrogated
various members. of said jury. Some of said jurors advised
me: that the jury did-not arrive at the amount of plaintiff’s
damage by taking the difference between the fair and reason-
able market value of plaintiff’s ‘entire property before the
taking. and the fair and reasonable market value of the plain-
tiff’s -property. immediately after the taking, as instructed by
the Court, but on the contrary the jury arrived at the amount
of plaintiffs damage by taking a value, of $4,000.00 per acre
for the 5.1 acres taken by the. condemnation.

“Various members of the jury also informed. me that in
arriving at the amount of plaintiff’s damage, they’ considered
in their ‘deliberations the fact that the relocation of Walnut

-- Creek through plaintiff’s land as a result of this condemnation
would benefit the’ plaintiff in that more land would be avail-
able on the east side of the-relocated creek than was available
prior thereto. a

“I endeavored to obtain- Affidavits from various of the
jurors with whom I conferred but they refused todo so:be-
cause they felt they were not required under the law to sign
such Affidavit and did-not want to.become involved with re-
spect thereto.”

eS °°

Plaintiff also filed an application for an order for the
examination of various jurors and attached a copy of Mr.
Anderson’s affidavit thereto.

Defendant’s resistance to plaintiff’s motion for new trial
asserted the verdict was within the evidence, the deliberations
of the jury inhere in the verdict, the presumption is the jury
followed the instructions of the court and there was no in-
dication passion or prejudice entered into the jury’s delibera-
tion. .
On submission of the application and motion the trial court
following some statements by Mr. Myers, one of plaintifi’s

attorneys, stated: “In connection -with this matter, I think 1
told you previously that after this-verdict was brought in a
number of the jurors—I wouldn’t say exactly what number,
but I think at least five—came to me and wanted to know if
they had to answer. questions and be interrogated by your
office. Some of them even had the impression that they were
being directed to go to your office, and I, of course, told them
that it’s up to them, if they wanted to talk with anybody or
not. It was purely a matter of their own desires in the matter.”

It thus appeared the jurors had expressed resentment to
interrogation by plaintiff’s counsel which .may have been .one
of the reasons for the trial court’s denial of an order they be
subpoenaed and brought before the court for questioning.

Mr. Myers then made an offer of proof wherein he stated
that if certain four named jurors were ‘called to testify they
would state the jury arrived at. their verdict by taking the
fair and reasonable per acre value at $4000 and considered the

* land taken as 5.1 acres and the amount of $20,400 was based on
those computations and not on before and after fair market
value and the difference thereof. He further stated they
-would testify the jury took into consideration the fact plaintiff
would receive some benefits: by reason of the relocation, of
Walnut Creek.

This offer of proof was refused. Later Plaintif's motion
for new trial was denied. :

“I, ‘Rule 116, Rules of ‘Civil Procedure, provides:
“Proof of facts in motions. Evidence to sustain or. resist a

68

motion may be by affidavit or in any other form to which the
parties agree or the court directs. The court may require any
affiant to appear for cross-examination.” This gives the trial
court discretion in determining whether it will direct the
taking of evidence to sustain a motion for new trial. In
Skinner v. Cron, 206 Iowa 838, 220 N.W. 841, written before
the adoption of rule 116, we recognize the trial court has such
discretion.

In Jurgens v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry. Co., 249
Iowa 711, 88 N.W.2d 797, we affirm the trial court’s refusal to
call jurors for oral examination based on an attorney’s affidavit
of misconduct of the jury. We therein say: “* * * we think the
court should not be required, upon a hearsay affidavit, to order
the jurors to appear for such examination unless, at least, the
affidavit itself makes a clear showing of some misconduct
sufficient to vitiate the verdict if the testimony adduced on
hearing substantiates it.” Loc. cit. page 722, 249 Iowa, page
804, 88 N.W.2d. o

We are not persuaded the trial court abused his discretion
in refusing to have the jurors subpoenaed and examined.

Il. The grounds upon which the jurors assent to the
verdict, where there has been: no misconduct in bringing ex-
traneous matters to the jurors’ attention cannot be shown. to
impeach it, nor is it competent in this way to show the jury
misunderstood the law which was correctly stated in the in-
structions. Gregory v. Kirkman Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist., 193
Towa 579, 582, 187 N.W. 558, 554; Doyle v. Dugan, 229 Iowa
724, 734, 295 N.W. 128, 183; Nicholson v. City of Des Moines,
246 Towa 318, 332, 67 N.W.2d 538, 541.

In Long v. Gilchrist, 251 Iowa 1294, 1800, 105 N.W.2d 82,
86, we quote this from. Wright v. Illinois and Mississippi Tele-
graph Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210: “That affidavits of jurors may be
received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any
matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which
does not essentially inhere in.the verdict itself, as that.a jury
was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney;
that witnesses.or others conversed as to the facts. or merits of
the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the

ee Ee

verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot,
or by game of chance or other artifice or improper manner;
but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received
to show any matter which does essentially inhere in the verdict
itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict; that he
misunderstood the instructions of the court; the statements of
the witnesses or the pleadings in the ease; that he was unduly
influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors,
or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other matter
resting alone in the juror’s breast.”

The mass of back-and-forth arguments which no doubt
oceur in the jury room prior to the verdict are matters which
inhere in the verdict although they oftentimes roam far afield.
If we were to analyze and review and sometimes. reject as
misconduct all arguments and discussions in a jury room,‘there
would never be a finality as to jury verdicts. Long v. Gilchrist,
supra. coo : . re
HI. Plaintiff: relies heavily on Skinner’ v. Cron,
supra, 206 Iowa 338, 220 N.W.-341, in which -we reversed the
trial court for refusing to take testimony of jurors where an
attorney’s affidavit was made a part of a motion for new trial.
The jurors were in the courtroom when the motion was pre:
sented. It is distinguishable on the facts, particularly the type
of jury misconduct charged. In Skinner the affidavit charged
some of the jurors went to tle intersection where the accident
involved occurred and made observations for the purpose of
considering the credibility of a certain witness, At pages 343,
344, 206 Iowa, page 343, 220 N.W., we say: “We have held that,
where jurors consider matters not in evidence, and not pro-
duced on the trial, which it is reasonably probable influenced
the verdict, it is such misconduct as to require a new trial.”

In.the case at bar ng claim is made the jury.considered ex-
traneous matters. Plaintiff by ‘its ‘several witnesses and on
eross-examination of a witness for defendant stressed the im-
portance of per acre value and its consideration as bearing on
plaintiff’s damages. It necessarily follows the jury considered
and discussed this approach to determine the award to be
made. , The only evidence of no, damage becaus aighten-.

0

ing the creek was brought out by plaintiff’s cross-examination
of the witness Calkins. It was the jury’s duty to consider all
the evidence within the limitations set out in the instructions. ”
Hl IV. The trial court in instruction 5 specifically directed
the jury to “disregard entirely and exclude from its calcula-
tions any and all benefits to the remaining part of plaintiff's
property * * *.” Instruction 17 required the jury to insert in
the form of verdict submitted the amount found to be the
difference between the before and after reasonable market
value of plaintiff’s property. It is presumed the jury obeyed
the instructions. Beal v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 209
Towa 1308, 1311, 230 N.W. 302, 303, and citations.
"EE OV. The trial court has wide discretion in determining
whether alleged misconduct of the jurors is prejudicial. Un-
less abuse of this discretion. is shown his decision should not
be reversed. Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318,
329, 67 N.W.2d 583, 589; Turner v. Hansen, 247 Iowa 669, 674,:
75 N.W.2d.341, 343; 89 AmJur., New Trial, section 73. The
award made by. the'jury was within the estimates of the wit-
nesses and was substantially just.

We are not persuaded the trial court t erred i in overruling
plaintiff's motion for new trial.

We find no reversible error. Plaintiff’s request that part:
of appeal costs be taxed against Iowa State Highway Com-
mission, the only defendant participating in- this ease, is denied:
—Affirmed. - oa

.All Juszices coneur, *
Camu Coney Rirrer, appellant, v. Roger Daczx et al.,
. appellees. .

* No. 52787.
Reported in 156 N-W.2a 318)

Fupruary 6, 1968.

Lawyer, Lawyer, Ray & Crouch, of Des Moines, for ap-
pellant.

Joy, Witvat &.Poffenberger, of Perry, for appellees.

Garrmip, C. J.—[) This appeal involves an important
question as to the time within which a law action to set aside
probate of a will under Iowa Probate Code, chapter 633, Code
1966, must be commenced and the manner of commencing it.

* More particularly, the question is whether the statute of
limitations for the commencement of such an action is tolled
by the filing of the petition or is plaintiff also required to
deliver an original notice thereof to the sheriff of the proper
county with intent that it be served immediately.

The trial court held merely filing the petition is insufficient.
We affirm the decision.

I. On September 7, 1965, Arthur T. Conley, a brother,
filed with the clerk ‘of the district court of Dallas County the
will of R. M. Conley, deceased, together with his petition for
probate thereof and appointment of petitioner and Roger Dagel
as executors. On the next day the will was admitted to probate
and Arthur. T. Conley and Roger Dagel were appointed ex-
ectitors by the clerk of the court. No notice of filing the
petition or hearing thereon was given prior to making the
order.

The appointees filed their oaths as executors, letters of
appointment issued and notice of probate, dated September 8,
was published on September 10 and’ 17, 1965, in strict com-
pliance with Code. section 633.304. (References, unless other-
wise indicated, are to Towa Code 1966.) _-.

| | Le 873

The notice, addressed to all persons interested in the
estate, recited: “any action to set aside said will must be brought
in the district court of said county within one year from the
date of the second publication of this notice, or thereafter be
forever barred.” (Emphasis added.) This is the exact language
of the form for such notice found in section 633.304 and re-
quired thereby.

Plaintiff, a daughter, on September 10, 1966, filed her
petition at law to set aside probate of the will as not properly
executed and the result of undue influence. On the same date
an original notice of the filing of the petition was delivered to
the sheriff of Dallas County. However, the notice recited the
petition was on file with the clerk of the district court of Polk
County and required appearance “before said Court at Des
Moines, Polk County.”

On September 20, 1966, a year and three days after the
date of the second publication of the notice of probate of will
and appointment of executors above referred to, a proper
original notice of the filing of plaintiff's petition to set aside
probate of.the will was delivered to the sheriff of Dallas County
to be served on Roger Dagel, a coexecutor, only defendant to
the action residing in Dallas County. This notice was served
on Dagel September 22, 1966.

On September 29, 1966, defendants to plaintiff's: action
filed their special appearance thereto challenging the court’s
jurisdiction on the ground the first original notice, requiring
appearance at Des Moines, county seat of Polk County, was
void. In her resistance to this special appearance plaintiff
asserted that merely filing her petition to set aside probate of
the will within one year after the date of the second publica-
tion of the executors’ notice thereof conferred jurisdiction on
the Dallas County court to determine the matter, irrespective
of the contents of the first original notice.

Defendants’ special appearanée was sustained as to the
original notice first served upon them. No complaint has been
made of this ruling nor is it here contended, as it was in the
resistance to the special appearance just referred to, it was
unnecessary to serve, or deliver to the sheriff for service, an
original notice of plaintiff’s action.

874 Le 7

Thereafter defendants filed answer to plaintiff's petition
alleging it was barred by. limitations because no valid original,
notice thereof was served or placed for service until more than
a year from the date of the second publication of the notice of
probate. .

In her reply to defendants’ answer plaintiff alleged the
order admitting the will to probate was entered without notive
or appearance by anyone, her petition to set aside probate was
filed before entry of an order approving the final report and
therefore the order for probate was reviewable by the court. |
Also that filing plaintiff’s petition on September 10, 1966, met. .
the requirement of Code section 633.309.

On defendants’ motion for adjudication of.law points under:
rules 105, and 176, Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court held,
as indicated at the outset hereof, that merely filing plaintiff's
petition to set-aside probate of the will within a year after the
date of the second publication of notice. of probate of the will,
without at least delivering original notice thereof to the
sheriff of-the proper county with intent that it be served im- _
mediately, was insufficient to toll the statute of limitations for.
the commencement of such an-action as plaintiff's.

- IL. . Plaintiff relies upon: two Code sections, principally _
633.37: “All orders entered without notice or appearance are
reviewable by the court at any time prior to the entry of the
order approving the final report.”

The quoted section codifies the -rule - “applied by many,
decisions of ours under sections 638.9, 638.10, Iowa Code, 1962,
and earlier Codes prior to the adoption of our present Probate
Code by the Sixtieth General Assembly in 1963. In re Estate
of; Swanson, 239 Iowa 294, 305-307, 31 N.W.2d 385, 392, and
citations ; In re Estate of Jenkins, 245 Iowa 939, 941, 65 N.W.2d
92, 98, and citations. .

The other section on which plaintiff relies, although ap-
parently less strongly, is 633.309: “Time within which petition
must be filed. A petition to contest or set aside the probate of
a will must be filed in the court in which the.will was admitted
to probate within one year from the date of second publication
of: notice of admission of such will to probate and not there-
after.” : :

— es 815

From this it is argued in effect the statute of limitations
for bringing such an action as plaintiff’s is tolled by merely
filing the petition in the proper court within the year even
though original notice thereof is not served or delivered for
service to the sheriff of the proper county within such time.

Hl Ill. In seeking the meaning of the Code sections
plaintiff relies on and others, the entire Probate Code of which
they are part should be considered. “Hach section must be
construed with the act as a whole and all parts of the act con-
sidered, compared and construed together.” Bruce v. Wookey,
261 Iowa 231, 233, 154 N.W.2d 938, 94, citing Manilla Com-
munity School District v. Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 101 N.W.2d
705. See also Ahrweiler v. Board of Supervisors, 226 Iowa 229,
231, 283 N.W.889; Everding v. Board of Education, 247 Iowa
748, 747, 76 N.W.2d 205, 208, and citations; Rath v. Rath Pack-
ing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1284-1285, 136 N.W.2d 410, 414.

Bruce v. Wookey holds a claim against a decedent’s estate
was barred under our Probate Code for failure of claimant to
file request for hearing within 20 days after the claim was dis-
allowed. Sections 633.440, 633.442.

Hl The Manilla School District opinion, supra, points out
it is not permissible to rest the interpretation of a legislative
Act upon any one part or to give undue effect thereto. (Pages
501-502 of 251 Iowa, page 708 of 101 N.W.2d)

We think the rule expressed in Bruce v. Wookey and
many other Iowa precedents leads to an affirmance of the trial
court’s decision here.

IV. Section 633.304 provides in part: “Notice of probate
of will with administration. On admission of a will to probate,
the executor shall, as soon as letters are issued, cause to be
published once each week for two consecutive weeks in a daily
or weekly newspaper of general circulation published in the
county in which the estate is pending, a notice of admission of
the will to probate and of the appointment of the executor,
in which shall be included a notice that any action to set aside
the probate of said will must be brought within one year from the
date of the second publication of said notice or thereafter be
forever barred, and there shall also be included therein a notice

876 Po 7

to debtors to make payment, and to .creditors having claims
against said estate to file them with the clerk within six months
from the second publication of said notice, or thereafter be for-
ever barred [emphasis added].

“Such notice shall be substantially in the following form:”

This statute proceeds to set out in detail the form of notice
which shall be published. It designates the court and county in
which the will was probated, gives testator’s name, is addressed
to all persons interested in his estate, gives the date on which
the will was admitted to probate and the name of the executor
appointed. This recital is included in the statutory notice:
“Any action to set aside said will must be brought in the district
court of said county within one year from the date of the second
publication of this notice, or thereafter be forever barred.”
(Emphasis added.)

Following the recital just quoted, the statutory form further
provides for notice that all persons. indebted to the estate are
requested to make immediate payment to the executor and all
ereditors shall file their claims “within six months from the
second publication of this notice (unless otherwise: allowed or
paid)” or “such claim shall thereafter be forever barred.”

It is significant that the provision we have italicized in the
first paragraph of 633.304 and the language similar thereto
quoted from the statutory form for notice were not included in
the Probate Code enacted by the Sixtieth G.A. in 1963. Both
the italicized provision in the first paragraph and the language
similar thereto in the form for notice were added by section 22,
chapter 432, pages 816, 817, Laws of the Sixty-first G.A. in 1965
and are included in section 638.304 of the 1966 Code.

Prior to adoption of the Probate Code, the applicable part
of section 614.1, subsection 8, Code 1962, in the chapter on
Limitations of Actions, stated, subject to a proviso we need not
consider at this point, that actions to set aside a will may be
brought within two years from the time the will is filed in the
clerk’s office for probate and notice thereof given “and not after-
wards.” This provision of 614.1(3) was deleted by the Probate
Code (section 707, chapter 326, page 508 Laws Sixtieth G.A.)
and 614.1, subsection 3 so appears in the 1966 Iowa Code.

Te Po 877

It thus seems clear it was the purpose of the legislature to
shorten the time for commencing actions to set aside probate of
a will from the two years specified in section 614.1(3), Code 1962
to one year from the date of second publication of the notice of
probate and appointment of executor as required by section
633.304, Code 1966, supra.

So far as now pertinent, section 683.311 provides: “An
action * * * to set aside a will, is triable in the probate court as
an action at law, and the Rules of Civil Procedure governing
law actions, including demand for jury trial, shall be applicable
thereto.” Incidentally, the purpose of the reference to demand
for jury trial was doubtless to change the rule adopted by
Division I of our opinion in In re Estate of Hermence, 235 Towa
745, 747, 15 N.W.2d 905, 906.

Sections 633.33 and 633.34 also contain provisions similar to
633.311, supra. Section 633.33 provides actions to set aside or
contest wills and certain others “shall be triable in probate as
law actions * * *.” And 633.34 states “All actions triable in
probate shall be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, ex-
cept as provided otherwise in this [Probate] Code.”

Section 633:312 is also important: “Joinder of parties. In
all actions to contest or set aside a will, all known interested
parties who have not joined with the contestants as plaintiffs
in the action, shall be joined with proponents as defendants.
When additional interested parties become known, the court
shall order them brought in as party defendants, All such de-
fendants shall be brought in by serving them with notice pur-
suant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.”

This last section points up the fallacy of the assertion,
previously referred to, in plaintiff's resistance to defendants’
special appearance that merely filing her petition to set aside
probate of the will within the year from the second publication
‘of the notice of probate conferred jurisdiction on the court to
determine validity of the will, irrespective of an original notice.
As before indicated, we do not understand plaintiff makes such a
contention here although she maintains, as she must, service of
original notice or its delivery to the sheriff for service need not
be made within the year.

878 Po |

It-is plain the Rules of Civil Procedure, by express pro-
visions of our Probate Code, apply to such actions as plaintiff's,
‘We do not understand this is disputed.

Rule 48 states: “Commencing actions. A civil action is com-
menced by serving the defendant with an original notice.” Rule
49 broadens 48 on the question here involved. It provides:
“Tolling. limitations. For the purpose of determining whether
an action has been commenced within the time allowed by statutes
for limitation of actions, whether the limitation inheres in the
statutes creating the remedy or not, the delivery of the original
notice to the sheriff of the proper county with the intent that it
be served immediately * * * shall also be deemed a commence-
ment of the action.” (Emphasis added.)

In determining whether plaintiff’s action was “brought”
-within the year from the second publication of notice of probate
.as section 633.304 requires, rules 48 and 49 cannot be ignored.
They state when such an action is “commenced.” The two terms
“brought” and “commenced”, as here used, are synonymous.
No provision of the Probate Code nor Rule of Civil Procedure
called to our attention would support a holding this action was
brought prior to service or delivery to the sheriff for service of
the original notice on at least one defendant.

The requirement of section 633.309, quoted in Division II,
supra, on which plaintiff relies, that the petition must be filed
within the year may not fairly be construed as a provision that
the action is brought by merely filing the petition when rules 48
and 49, R.C.P., which the Probate Code makes applicable thereto,
expressly state the action is commenced by serving the original
notice or delivering it to the sheriff for service, A mere im-
plication which might be drawn from 633.309, standing alone,
-eannot prevail over express provisions contrary thereto. Neither
service nor delivery therefor was made here within the year.

Rules 48 and 49 supersede statutes to like effect of long
standing, as far back as sections 1714-1715 and 1663, Code
1851. The legislature could hardly. have intended by the enact-
ment of section 633.309 to overturn rules of such long: standing,
This from 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 340, page 838, is

. applicable: ©

7 Le 879

Hi “Courts, do not, however, favor repeals of settled
principles by implication, and the legislature in the enactment
of a statute will not be presumed to intend to overturn long-
established legal principles, unless such intention is made clearly
to appear by express declarations or by necessary implication.
To the contrary, the legislature will be presumed not to intend to
overturn long-established principles of law, and the statute will
be so construed, unless an intention to do so plainly appears by
express declaration or necessary or unmistakable implication, and
the language employed admits of no other reasonable con-
struction. * * *.”

In connection with this quotation it is noted we have re-
peatedly held our Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect since 1948,
have the force and effect of statute. We have also held many
times that for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations an
action is commenced by service of original notice or delivery
thereof to the proper sheriff with intent it be served immediately.
Several of our precedents to such effect are cited in annotations
27 A.L.R.2d 236, 285-286. One is Fernekes v. Case, 75 Iowa 152,
39 N.W. 238, where a fatally defective notice was served during
the statutory period and a valid notice was not served or de-
livered for service until after the limitation period expired. It
was held the action was barred. Pendy v. Cole, 211 Iowa 199,
201, 283 N.W. 47, 48, approves Fernekes v. Case. Another
similar precedent is Jones & Magee Lbr. Co. v. Boggs, 63 Iowa
589, 591, 19 N.W. 678.

‘We are not to be understood as holding service or de-
livery for service of the original notice of such an action must be
made upon all defendants within the year. Additional in-
terested parties may be added when they become mown. Section
633,312, supra (section 311 of the original Probate Code enacted
in 1963), so provides and In re Estate of Ditz, 255 Iowa 1272,
1279-1280, 125 N.W.2d 814, 818-819, so holds. The Ditz opinion
takes note of the provisions of the Probate Code although it was
not there applicable.

In Ditz the executors served notice on the other interested
parties of the probate of the will, thus shortening to one year
the period for bringing. action to set aside probate under section

880 | a

“614.1, subsection 8, Code 1962. Five interested parties brought
such action in time by filing their petition and serving original
notice on some of the defendants within the year but others were
brought in later, This from the Ditz opinion accords with our
holding here: “* * * when any interested person * * * institutes
an action by filing his petition and serving any other interested
person within the year’s period of limitation, the running of the
statute as to all other interested parties is tolled and they may
be added later with the same effect as though timely action was
commenced against all.” (Emphasis added.)

V. Section 633.37, quoted in Division II, supra, does not
afford plaintiff an avoidance of the bar of the statute of limita-
tions.

Section 633.293 expressly provides that when a petition for
probate of a will is filed the court or clerk may, in its or his
discretion, hear it forthwith, with or without requiring notice,
and upon proof of due execution admit it to probate.

Section 633.22 confers upon the clerk within his county all
powers of the court and judge in the admission of wills to pro-
bate, when not contested (par. 3), and in other matters.

And the next section provides: “633.23 Clerk’s action re-
viewed. Any person aggrieved by any order made or entered
by the clerk under the powers conferred in section 633.22 may
have the same reviewed in court upon motion filed within six
months or before the hearing on the final report of the fiduciary,
whichever is the earlier, and upon such notice as the court may
prescribe.” .

Sections 633.22 and 633.23 are quite similar to sections 632.1
and 682.3 respectively, Code 1962 and earlier Codes. Section
633.22 deals specifically with admission of wills to probate by the
clerk and 633.23 provides a specific remedy for review of such
orders. These two sections, together with 633.293, must be
deemed specific statutory provisions dealing with the admission of
wills to probate by the clerk without prior notice and to provide
a remedy therefor. Section 633.37, however, which plaintiff
seeks to invoke, purports to be a general provision dealing with
all probate orders entered without notice.

We think this from 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 367, pages

| Es 881

871-372, has application here: “It is an old and familiar
principle * * * that where there is in the same statute a specific
provision, and also a general one which in its most compre-
hensive sense would include matters embraced in the former,
the particular provision must control, and the general provision
must be taken to affect only such cases within its general
language as are not within the provisions of the particular pro-
vision. Additional words of qualification needed to harmonize
a general and a prior special provision in the same statute
should be added to the general provision, rather than to the
special one.”

The United States Supreme Court has frequently used the
language just quoted and we have approved it at least three
times. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S. Ct.
322, 76 L. Ed. 704, 708, and citations; Crawford v. Iowa State
Highway Comm., 247 Iowa 736, 740, 76 N.W.2d 187, 189-190;
State v. Flack, 251 Iowa 529, 535, 101 N.W.2d 535, 539; Rath v.
Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288, 186 N.W.2d 410, 416.

The above rule is no less applicable here even though section
633.293 was enacted in 1965 by the Sixty-first G.A. in lieu of
the former section 293 enacted in 1963 by the Sixtieth G.A. It
provided for notice of the time fixed for probate by one publica-
tion at least seven days prior to such time. Sections 633.22,
633.23 and. 633.37 were all enacted as part of the same Act by the
Sixtieth G.A.

A rule many times applied by us, closely related to the one
quoted above, “is that where a general statute, if standing alone,
would include the same matter as a special statute and thus
conflict with it, the latter will prevail and the former must give
way. The special provision will be considered an exception to
or qualification of the general one.” (Citations) Rath v. Rath
Packing Co., supra; State v. Halverson, 261 Iowa 530, 155
N.W.2d 177, 181.

[| Kruse v. Gaines, 258 Iowa 983, 986, 139 N.W.2d 535,
586, cites nine Iowa decisions and other authority for “the basic
principle that when a general statute is in conflict with a specific
statute, the latter ordinarily prevails, whether enacted before or
after the general statute.” (Emphasis added.)

882 Le |

‘If section 633.37 has the effect plaintiff contends for, it
conflicts with section 633.23 both quoted supra. Section 633.23
allows only up to six months to file motion for review of the
elerk’s admission of this will to probate. Section 633.37 permits
review of orders entered without notice or appearance at anytime
prior to the approval of the final report.

Our eénelusion on the point now considered finds support in
Hoover v. Hoover, 238 Iowa 88, 92-93, 26 N.W.2d 98, 100, under
somewhat different facts. There the clerk admitted a will to
probate on notice published only once on the second day before
the date of the hearing. It is apparent such a notice would not
be likely to reach interested parties and would be little better
than no prior notice. In a law action to set aside probate of the
will on grounds of lack of due exectition, mental incompetence
and undue influence we held coritestants who did not proceed
under section 632.3, Code 1946, to review the clerk’s' order for
notice could not attack it “when the statutes provide an ample
remedy for review. in the court below.”

In lieu of proceeding under section 633.28 of course plaintiff
could bring the action she brought provided: she did so within
the period of limitation. She did neither but, as stated, claims
the right to contest the will at anytime before the executors’
final report is approved. The legislature could hardly have
intended 633.87 as a method of avoiding the bar of the statute.
See In re Estate of Huston, 238 Iowa 297, 304-306, 27 N.W.2d
26, 30-31, which rejects a contention somewhat like the one
plaintiff makes here. See also In re Estate of Price, 230 Iowa
1228, 800 N.W..542; In re Will of McKinstry, 204 Iowa 487, 215
NW. 497. vo

‘In re Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 25-28, 60 N.W.2d 894,
896-898, heirs objected to the -executor’s final report on the
ground the clerk’s order for notice of hearing on probate of the
will violated due process by providing for only one publication
in a newspaper and posting in three public ‘places when the
addresses of the objectors were known or easily discoverable.
Reliance was on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S, 306, 70 8, Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865,

The Pierce opinion rejects the contention, holds the probate

; Ce 883.

of the will was valid and the heirs were not thereby deprived of
the right to contest the will in an original action brought within,
the statutory period of limitation (then two years from the time
the will was filed for probate and notice.thereof given). The
opinion also reviews our prior decisions on the effect of original
admission of a will to probate without contest and holds it estab-
lishes nothing but its due execution and publication and author-
izes the executor to proceed with administration of the estate.

In re Estate of Marty, 256 Iowa 74, 78, 126 N.W.2d 303,
805, cites In re Estate of Pierce; Kelly v. Kelly, 158 Iowa 56,
56-61, 188 N.W. 851, 852-853, and section 633.38, Code 1962,
for this: “In Iowa, admission of a will to probate is evidence of
its due execution, and no more, in the .absence of a contest.”.
Section 633.298, Code, 1966, requires only proof of due execution
of the will.

| | Further, we think the fact the clerk’s order admitting
the will to probate was made without notice given prior thereto,
as 633.298 permits, does rot mean it was entered without notice,
within the meaning of section 633.37, in view of the notice given
pursuant to section 633.304 on admission of the will to probate
as soon. as letters appointing the executors issued. As stated, this
notice was dated the very day the clerk’s order was made, first
published two days later, and plainly stated an action to set
aside the will might be brought within one year from the date
of the second publication. As having some bearing, see In re
Estate of Price, supra, 230 Iowa 1228, 1236, 300 N.W. 542, 546.

Not until plaintiff failed to bring her action within the year,
after having failed to proceed under section 633.28, supra, was
her right to bring it cut off.

While the appeal mainly involves. questions of statutory
construction, we may observe that no claim of violation of due
process or other constitutional right is asserted, “And it is
important to observe that due process does not require, as to
all proceedings, that notice be given prior to the initiation of
the proceedings.” 16 Am. Jur.2d., Constitutional Law, section
564, page 969. Precedents cited in the footnote, including
Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192, 22 S.Ct.
857, 46 L.Ed. 1118, 1120-1121, support the text.

884 bn a

Similarly, 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, section 619¢,
pages 811-812, states notice “need not be given in all cases at
the very inception of the proceedings.”

Hi Generally in many proceedings the requirement of due
process for notice is met where, as here, there is a proper notice
and opportunity for a de novo hearing on review of the initial
order. Id. at page 801.. See also Hansen v. Haugh, 260 Iowa
236, 246-247, 149 N.W.2d 169, 174-175, and citations.

Although section 633.37 is new, as stated in Division II,
supra, it codifies the rule applied by many decisions of ours
under sections 638.9, 638.10, Code 1962 and prior Codes. No
decision has come to our attention in which the rule referred té
has been held to permit bringing a will contest after the statute
of limitations has run. Orders which have been reviewed under
the rule plaintiff relies on are those made without any notice
during administration, mostly allowing or disallowing claims of
ereditors or fees for the personal representative or his attorney.
See In re Estate. of Swanson, supra, 239 Iowa 294, 805-307, 31
N.W.2d 385, 392, and citatioris; In re Estate of. Huston, supra,
238 Iowa 297, 304-306, 27 N.W.2d 26, 80, 31.

The judgment is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except LeGranp and Brcxsr, JJ., who
dissent. .

LeGranp, J.—I respectfully dissent. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Iowa Probate Code in ‘1963, a proceeding to set
aside a will was an independent action which was required to be
brought within the period set out in what was then subsection 3
of section 614.1 of the Code of Iowa.

That subsection was repealed at the time the Probate Code
was adopted, and we now have a new procedure by which one
may challenge the validity of a will. The Probate Code did not,
as the majority suggests, merely shorten the period for filing a
will contest from two years to one, which could have been accom-
plished by a simple amendment to section 614.1(3); on the
contrary it effected basic changes in the procedure itself.

Part 5 of the Probate Code deals with “Actions to Set Aside
or Contest of Wills.” It covers three possible methods of attack.

PC Pe 885

One may ask to have a will set aside by filing a petition in the
probate proceedings within one year from the executor’s second
publication of notice of admission of the will to probate (sections
633.308, 633.309) ; one may file objections to the probate of the
will (section 633.310) ; or one may seek a declaratory judgment
to establish a will (section 683.320). As inthe majority opinion,
all references to the Probate Code are to the 1966 Code of Iowa.

I find it significant that only in section 683.320 authorizing
suit for declaratory judgment, which is a separate action not part
of the probate proceedings, is there language that a party “may
bring an action.”

Elsewhere in Part 5 of the Probate Code, and specifically in
sections 633.308 and 633.309, the legislature says a petition may
be filed in the probate procéedings. This, it seems to me, in-
dicates an intention to distinguish between the filing of a petition,
on the one hand, and the bringing of an action, on the other.

If what was done here is “bringing an action” to contest a
will, then I concede the majority is right. However, all the
provisions of Part 5 make such a conclusion untenable. Why,
for instance, if that is the case, should the legislature talk at all
about notice? Rules 48 and 49, Rules of Civil Procedure, would,
of course, apply as they do in all such cases,

Yet here there is a special provision as to serving a notice
(section 633.312). Again it should be noted the section does not
state an original notice should be served; it merely refers to a
notice, which shall be served “pursuant” to the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under the circumstances here I take this to mean
the manner, not the time, of service. There is no language
justifying the implication, especially in view of the express
provisions of sections 633.308, 633.309, that this requires the
notice to be served within the one-year period.

To hold with the majority it must be assumed the legislature
used the term “file a petition” interchangeably with “bring an
action” and used “notice” interchangeably with “original notice.”
I have been able to find no previous occasion when it has done
so. “Original notice” has always had a precise meaning under
our rules and it has been used in that technical sense; it im-
mediately suggests jurisdiction is involved. Wliy was its use
avoided here? co

886 Le 7

I cannot believe the legislature inadvertently used “file a
petition” to mean “bring an action” nor that “notice” was in-
tended to mean “original notice.” I find this particularly true
because section 633.320, ‘dealing with the same subject and
authorizing a separate declaratory judgment action, expressly
provides such action may be brought. Incidentally I might add,
too, this section omits any mention of notice for the obvious
reason this matter is covered, as always when suit is brought,
by rules 48 and 49, R.C.P.

I would hold the statutory procedure here is not the bring-
ing of an action and that the filing of the petition alone is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. To the extent that section
633.304 conflicts with this—and that is the only section which
lends support to the majority—I simply say such conflict should
be resolved for, not against, a litigant who has complied with
the exact terms of sections 633.308 and 633.309 and who now
finds himself dismissed out of court because of it.

I would reverse and remand for trial.

Becker, J., joins in this dissent,

Epwarp A. Scumipt, appellant, v. Rex L, Assort, appellee.

No. 52586,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 649)

887

Fesruary 6, 1968.

Wilson, Zohn. & Yost, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, of Des Moines,
for appellee. : .

Rawiines, J—Plaintifi’s petition pursuant to rules 252-
258, R.C.P., for reinstatement of his law action, previously
dismissed under rule 215. 1, R.C.P., was heard and relief denied.
by the trial court. He appeals. We reverse.

'’. January 17, 1963, plaintiff filed’a petition in Polk District

Court ‘seeking damages‘from defendant as result of an auto-
mobile collision. From that month through’ December of the
same year he was intermittently hospitalized or confined to
home because of heart ailment and amputation of a leg.

August 17, 1964, the clerk of Polk District Court mailed
what has come to be known as “try or. dismiss” notices to
attorneys of record. See rule 215.1,R.C.P)  ~

888 | |

Counsel for plaintiff contend such notice as to plaintiff’s
case was never received, that had it been delivered a motion
for continuance was in order and would have been timely filed.

November 4, 1964, the clerk dismissed plaintiff’s case.
Judgment for costs was accordingly entered. January 23,
1965, he received a communication from the clerk advising
him as to entry of judgment. That information was imme-
diately communicated to plaintiff’s attorneys. They state this
was the first notice received relative to dismissal of the action.

October 28, 1965, a petition was filed on plaintiff’s behalf
(rules 252-253, R.C.P.), to vacate the dismissal order and judg-
ment. Defendant resisted. Trial to the court resulted in an
order dismissing the petition.

The appeal presents one broad question: Did the trial
court err in dismissing plaintiff's petition to vacate the order
and judgment entered in his case?

I. We deem it unnecessary to unduly belabor the issue
presented.

| | Dealing with those portions of rule 215.1 here material,
this court said in Talbot v. Talbot, 255 Iowa 337, 339-340, 2
N.W.2d 456:

“When a cause has been noted for trial pursuant to rule
215.1 and due notice is served by the clerk, the trial court has
no power to grant a continuance of the matter, except on ap-
plication, notice and hearing to all parties, unless ‘the same is
by stipulation, and then only by an order made of record’in the
cause. [Authorities cited] ** * .

“The rule then is applied to all cases at law or in equity,
and places upon the clerk a duty as follows: ‘All cases at law
or in equity where ¢he petition has been filed more than one year
prior to July 15 of any year shall be for trial at the next term
commencing after August 15 of said year. The-clerk shall
prior to August 15 give notice to counsel of record as provided
in rule 82 of: (a) the docket number, (b) the names of parties,
(e) counsel appearing, (d) date of filing petition, and the
notice shall. state that such case will be for trial and subject to
dismissal if not tried in the next ‘succeeding term pursuant
to this rule.” “(Emphasis supplied.) .

a a 889

“Tt them goes on to provide: ‘All such cases shall be assigned
and tried or dismissed without -prejudice at plaintiff’s costs
unless satisfactory reasons for want of prosecution or grounds
for continuance be shown by application and ruling thereon after
notice and not ex parte’ (Emphasis supplied.)

“The rule is then made inapplicable to certain matters not
relative to the case at bar and concludes: ‘No continuance under
this rule shall be by stipulation of parties alone but must be by
order of court. Where appropriate the order of continuance
shall be to a date or term certain.’ (Emphasis supplied.)

HI “As stated in the recent case of Windus v. Great Plains
Gas, these terms. are positive and definite and the rule clearly
mandatory. ‘No substantial departure therefrom can be per-
mitted and have the rule effective.. ‘The operation of the rule
is not discretionary with the trial court.’ Windus v. Great
Plains Gas, supra, 254 Iowa 114, 123, 116 N.W.2d 410, 415, and
authorities cited.”

See also Baty v. City of West Des Moines, 259 Iowa 1017,
147 N.W.2d 204, 208, and Seela v. Haye, 256 Iowa 606, 610, 128
N.W.2d 279.

From the foregoing it is self-evident we have held the
provisions of rule 215.1 are mandatory as to trial courts and
strictly construed in their application to litigants.

| | Reduced to bare essentials the question now posed is
whether duties imposed by the rule upon clerks of trial courts
relative to time of notice to be given aré equally mandatory.

In this regard we are satisfied it would be less than logical
or just to hold as we have in connection with duties and rights
of courts and litigants, then apply a different rule with refer-
ence to responsibilities imposed upon clerks of the same courts
relative to mailing or delivery of “try or dismiss” notices.

It is our conclusion rule 215.1 imposes a mandatory duty
upon clerks of trial courts to give notice by mail or delivery
as rule 82 provides prior to August 14.

II. But this conclusion need not rest upon abstract. loge
and justice alone.

As previously disclosed, . rule 215.1. specifically provides :.
“The clerk shall prior to August 15 give notice to counsel of
record * * *,”

890 |

The-salient term employed in the quoted portion of rule
215.1 is that the clerk shall prior to August 15 give the required
notice.

When addressed to a public official the word “shall” is
ordinarily mandatory, excluding the idea of permissiveness or
discretion. Hansen v. Henderson, 244 Iowa 650, 665, 56 N.W.2d
59. Surely it is as mandatorily positive and definite when ap-
plied to court clerks as when used with reference to all others
designated.

This view-is accorded additional support by the fact court.
clerks are required to give the specified notice “prior to August
15”. And the term “prior to”, as here employed, means
earlier in time, before or preceding. It is the opposite of on
or after, later than, or subsequent to. See Black’s Law Diec-
tionary, Fourth Ed., pages 1357 and 83.

Incidently, should August 15 fall on a Sunday or holiday,
the notices are to be issued before that date precluding any
possible application of Code section 4:1(23) or rule 366, R.C.P.
. Ill. Pursuing the matter one more step, rule 252 provides,

‘inter alia:

“Upon timely petition and 1 notice under rule 253 the court
may correct, vacate or modify a final judgment or order, or
grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

“(a) Mistake, neglect or omission of the Clerk ;”

With little.or no question any “try: or dismiss” notice
issued by the clerk of Polk District Court relative to plaintift’ s
ease was not mailed prior to August 15, .

Furthermore, timeliness of filing the petition to vacate is not
here ‘questioned.

Hi Under these circumstances we conclude: (1) In the
matter of giving timely notice the clerk of Polk District Court
did not comply. with: the mandatory provisions of rule 215.1,
R.C.P.; (2) failure on the part of this official to act in accord
with that requirement stands as a mistake, neglect or. omission
under rule 252(a) ; (3) the trial court erred, as a matter of law,
in not vacating the order dismissing plaintiffs case, and not
setting aside the judgment for costs entered against him.

891

Reversed and remanded for entry of order and decree con-
sistent with this opinion.

All Jusrices coneur.

Sorensen Hearru Srupio No. II, Ino., appellant, v. Harotp E.
McCoy et ux., appellees.

No. 52644.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 341)

89 ee
Fesruary 6, 1968.

Lindgren & Davis, by John F. Davis, of Des Moines, for
appellant.

George E. Flagg, of Des Moines, for appellees.

Sweuu, J—This is an action on a promissory note. Plaintiff,
payee and holder of the note, sued defendant makers. From a
municipal court judgment for defendants plaintiff has ap-
pealed.

Assuming, arguendo, that defendants made a “bad, deal”
our sympathies as well as the sympathies of the trial court and
jury are with defendants. Courts, however, do not have the
omnipotent power to rescue from the results of hasty, impulsive
or bad judgment in the absence of evidence upon which to
base such reseue. ;

The evidence in this case was without material dispute.

Ben F. Sorensen, president of plaintiff-corporation, -called
by appointment on defendants, husband and wife, in their
home. The purpose was to discuss the purchase by defendants
of membership in plaintiff’s health studio. In ruling on plain-
tiff’s motion notwithstanding the verdict the trial court com-
mented “The three apparently had a fine, friendly visit.” Mr.
Sorensen described and illustrated the facilities of his health
studio, the privileges and advantages of membership, the cost
of membership, and the methods of payment therefor. Again
quoting from the trial court’s comments: “The defendants,
quite naturally, could hardly restrain their immediate desire
to use these marvelous facilities, so that they could attain
abundant health.” Defendants chose the rate they desired and
elected to pay $17.50 per month for 24 consecutive months. -

Defendant, Harold E. McCoy, signed an application for

Ss «

membership, an acknowledgment of a binding noncancelable
contract and a credit statement.

Defendants Harold E. MeCoy and Linda F. McCoy signed
a promissory note providing for the payments to be made.

In consideration for the promissory note Mr. Sorensen
gave defendants a card certifying membership in the Health
Studios.

Plaintiff sold and endorsed the note with recourse to Con-
sumer Finance Company. The finance company gave notice to
defendants and requests for payments as the installments came
due. Defendants paid nothing, said they could not afford the
membership and requested cancellation. Defendants were
advised that the membership was noncancelable. Some time
after defendants’ default the finance company transferred the
note back to plaintiff. This action by plaintiff to collect
followed.

I. Execution, delivery and nonpayment of the note and
receipt of the membership card was admitted. Mr. McCoy also
testified:

“My wife signed the note at the same time. I read and
signed Exhibit ‘B’, the acknowledgment, at the same time the
note was signed. Mr. Sorensen delivered a copy of the note
and the credit statement, Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘P’ on that same
evening. I read the back of Exhibit ‘B’, which is entitled
‘acknowledgment.’ The back of the acknowledgment says that
I signed a binding, noncancelable contract.

“On that day I received nothing. I never received any
written contract setting out the terms and considerations of
any contract. Mr. Sorensen also delivered a membership card
similar to Exhibit 1.

“My wife and I have made no payments on the note, Ex-
hibit ‘P’.

“I received and signed a membership card similar to Ex-
hibit 1, on July 6, 1965. Mr. Sorensen explained that included
in our rights under the membership were massages, and the
use of the swimming pool and use of the other facilities of the
studio. The membership card received from Mr, Sorensen en-
titled us to go to the studio and use the facilities.

8 ee

“I gave Mr. Sorensen the information for the credit state-
ment and he filled in the statement.

“During our conversation with Mr. Sorensen, the figure of
$25 per year for annual dues was discussed, We were to pay
$420 for the lifetime membership and $25 a year in dues com-
mencing with the third year.

“I bought a lifetime membership, but it was only good for
two years and then I had to pay annual dues of $25.”

In addition to formal general denial defendants pleaded as
an affirmative defense want of consideration. The case was
submitted to a jury. The jury found for defendants. Plain-
tiff’s timely ‘motions for directed verdict, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for new trial were overruled. The
motions were detailed and complete and tendered the issues
now argued:

On appeal plaintiff alleges error in refusing to grant plain-
tiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in
Division II the alleged error in overruling plaintiff’s alternative
motion for new trial.

For affirmance defendants argue only that there was want
of consideration for the note as a part of a contract.

. Our problem is the sufficiency of the evidence to generate
or. support a jury verdict.

IL. In this case we need not discuss the question of burden
of proof. Plaintifi’s evidence was sufficient legally and fac-
tually to support recovery. It was uncontradicted. Unfortu-
nately for defendants they had no evidence of anything help-
ful. Their position was factually and legally without support.

- Defendants argue that this is a contract involving the
entire transaction rather than just a note. It makes little if
any difference here which it is called. The result is the same.

This case was tried prior to the effective date of our
Uniform Commercial Code. It is governed by the law appear-
ing iri the Code of 1962. Section 587.2, Code of 1962, provides:

“Consideration implied. All contracts in writing, signed
by the party to be bound or by his authorized agent or attorney,
shall import a consideration.”

Section 587.3 -provides:

SS

“Failure of consideration. The want or failure, in whole
or in part, of the consideration of a written contract may be
shown as a defense, total or partial, except as provided in the
negotiable instruments law.”

The note signed by defendants was a negotiable instru-
ment. Section 541.24, Code of 1962, provides:

“Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable instru-
ment is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration, and every person whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party thereto for value.”

Seetion 541.25 provides:

“Consideration—what constitutes. Value is any considera-
tion sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or
preexisting debt constitutes value, and is deemed such, whether
the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.”

If the written instrument should be. treated as a contract
as defendants argue the statute imports a consideration. If it
is a negotiable instrument, as it is without question, it is under
the statute “deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration * * *” and the defendants have become
parties thereto for value.

It was argued that defendants never attempted to use
their membership in the health studio. Although it makes
little difference here it should be kept in mind that the defense
was want of consideration rather than failure of consideration.

Defendants bought and received a membership in the
health studio. Mr. McCoy’s statement that he received nothing
was his own conclusion refuted by his own testimony as to
what he received and what was included in his membership.

There is no claim that the facilities of the health studio
were ever unavailable to defendants or that they were ever
denied whatever privileges or benefits were incident thereto.

Neither want nor failure of consideration is established by
failure to use what was purchased.

There has been no claim, evidence or issue as to what the
veal value of a membership in the health studio might be.
Defendants bought and agreed to pay for a membership. They
received a membership. They have not paid as they agreed.

596

The real reason was probably expressed in their reply to the
demand of the finance company, ie., they could not afford it.
That would have been an excellent reason for not signing the
note but it is not a legal defense to an obligation voluntarily
assumed.

III. It would be easy to assume that defendants were the
victims of high-powered salesmanship in which there was at
least some puffing. When they realized that they might have
ventured beyond financial discretion it was too late.

There was neither claim nor evidence of any actual fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, misunderstanding, coercion or duress,

To defend against a written obligation there must be some-
thing. Here the defendants had no ammunition.

Iv. It rarely happens that a plaintiff is entitled to a
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict but
when a case is clearly established and not refuted and the
tendered defense is without support such a motion should be
sustained.

| When the court instructs the jury upon a certain
question there must be some evidence upon which to base such
instruction. It is reversible error to submit an issue having no
support in the record. Schneider v. Swaney Motor Car Co.,
257 Iowa 1177, 1182, 186 N.W.2d 338, and Clubb vy. Osborn,
256 Iowa 1154, 1160, 180 N.W.2d 648.

There were no issues in the case at bar for submission to
a jury.

HV. Appellant persuasively argues that there was error
in the instructions misleading the jury. There is merit in
appellant’s argument. The instructions as to demand for pay-
ment were not in accord with section 541.70, Code of Iowa.
This statute provides:

“Effect of want of demand on principal debtor. Present-
ment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the per-
son primarily on the instrument * * *.”

Even though demand was pleaded and was supported by
the evidence, the court placed an improper burden on plaintiff.
“The issue thus presented was an immaterial one. The plain-
tiff had a right to recover without any such allegation in his

Le 897

petition, or if so made it was not necessary for him to support
the same by evidence.” Billingham v. Bryan, 10 Iowa 317,'318.
Hl Because of our conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment notwithstanding the verdict further discussion of
this problem is unnecessary. Ruling on plaintiff’s motion for
new trial is not required.
The case is reversed and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict.—
Reversed and remanded.

All Justicus concur.

Stars or Iowa, appellee, v. Cuartes Epwarp ALLNUTT,
appellant.

No. 52063.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 266)

Fepruary 6, 1968, -

| Pe 899

L. M. Hullinger and Margaret L. Beckley, of Cedar Rapids,
for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A, Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and William G. Faches, of Cedar
Rapids, County Attorney, for appellee.

LeGranp, J.—-At approximately three o’clock a.m. on Janu-
ary 14, 1965, while making a routine check of the area, Detective
Raymond K: Baker came upon defendant and another man
attempting to break into the Hide-A-Way Tavern in Cedar
Rapids, Iowa. The detective drew his gun, ordered the men
not to move, and radioed for assistance. Defendant, who was
armed with a crowbar, advanced toward Detective Baker,
despite an order to stop. Defying a second command to stop,
defendant struck the officer and knocked him to the ground.
As he fell, Detective Baker fired one shot which struck de-
fendant in the chest.

Further police investigation revealed two other crowbars
and a screwdriver near the door of the tavern. ‘The door it-
self was not opened but had been tampered with and showed
gouge and splinter marks. Directly beneath the door were
wood chips which matched the damaged portions of the door
frame. The manager of the tavern testified he had locked the
premises shortly before the time in question. Both the door
and the door jamb were then undamaged. He also testified
that he kept both merchandise—principally liquor, beer and
cigarettes—and money in the tavern.

The above recitation, although not without dispute, is the
version of the evidence most favorable to the State, and we
are obliged to view it in this light in considering defendant’s
appeal. State v. Harless, 249 Iowa 580, 86 N.W.2d 210; State
v. Poffenbarger, 247 Iowa 552, 74 N.W.2d 585, and citations;
State v. Wimbush, 260 Iowa 1262, 1264, 150 N.W.2d 653, 654.

As a result of this incident defendant was charged by
county attorney’s information with attempting to break and

900 PC i

enter with intent to commit larceny in violation of section
708.10, Code of Iowa. He.was subsequently tried and con-
victed of this crime, and he appeals, relying on four errors
which he claims require reversal: (1) That he was denied a
speedy trial in violation of section 795.2, Code of Iowa; (2)
that he was entitled to a directed verdict for the State’s failure
to prove intent to commit larceny; (3) that it was prejudicial
error to specially instruct the jury on his credibility as a wit-
ness; and (4) that it was prejudicial error to ‘permit thé
County Attorney to cross-examine him concerning previous
felony convictions.

I. In his first assignment of error > defendant asserts his
conviction cannot stand because the State failed to give him
a speedy trial, as required under section 795.2, Code of Towa,
which provides:

“Delay in trial. If a defendant indicted for a public of-
fense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application,
be not, brought to trial at the next regular term of the court
in which the indictment is triable or within sixty days, which-
ever first occurs, after the same is found, the court must order
it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
An accused not admitted to bail and unrepresented by legal
counsel shall not be déemed to have waived his privilege of
dismissal or be held to make demand or request to enforce a
guarantee of speedy trial, and the court on its own motion
shall carry out the provisions of this section as to dismissal.”

The indictment (in this case, a county attomey’s informa-
tion) against deféndant was filed January 20, 1965. He was
not brought to trial until, June 14, 1965, almost five months
later. Defendant claims the 60-day limitation is applicable
here and that he should have been tried within 60 days from
January 20; that he demanded a speedy trial; and that his
motion for dismissal made after trial should have been, sustained,

“Hi Section 795.2, Code of Iowa, implements Article I,
section 10, of the Constitution of Iowa. State v. Gebhart, 257
Towa 843, 847, 184 N.W.2d 906, 908. Defendant’s right to a
speedy trial is also, guaranteed by Amendment 6 to the Con-
stitution’ of the’ United Statés, which was recently made ap-

PS Pe 901

plicable to the trial of criminal charges in state courts, Klopfer
vy. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 218, 87 8. Ct. 988, 18 L.
Ed.2d 1.

The purpose of these protections, both constitutional and
statutory, is to relieve one accused of a crime of the hardship
of indefinite incarceration awaiting trial or the anxiety of
suspended prosecution, if at liberty on bail, and to require
courts and peace officers to proceed with the trial of criminal
charges with such reasonable promptness as proper adminis-
tration of justice demands. 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law,
section 242, page 279; McCandless v. District Court, 245 Iowa
599, 607, 61 N.W.2d 674, 679. An extended discussion of the
history and purpose of the rule appears in Pines v. District
Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574.

Hl it has long been held, both in this State and elsewhere,
that a defendant, unless he is neither admitted to bail nor
represented by counsel, may waive the constitutional and
statutory provisions assuring him a speedy trial. 21 Am.
Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 253, page 289; State v. Rowley,
198 Iowa 618, 615, 198 N.W. 37, 38; McCandless y. District
Court, 245 Iowa 599, 604, 61 N.W.2d 674, 677; Pines v. District
Court, 288 Iowa 1284, 1802, 10 N.W.2d 574, 583; State v. Long,
256 Iowa 1804, 1807, 130 N.W.2d 663, 665. Defendant here was
at all times represented by counsel and the exception in the
statute therefore has no application.

Since it is undisputed defendant was not brought to
trial within 60 days from the filing of the county attorney’s
information, he is entitled to a dismissal under section 795.2
unless he has waived his right to a speedy trial or unless good
cause for postponing the trial beyond that time is shown. De-
fendant argues that only the question of good cause is before
us because he made a demand for a speedy trial at the time of
arraignment, which negates any question of waiver. For
reasons stated later we do not agree. We hold both waiver
and “good cause” under the statute are presented for deter-
mination, although our conclusion as to the former makes it
unnecessary to discuss “good cause.”

Defendant, having admittedly made a request for a speedy

902 |

trial at the time of arraignment, claims he has done all he was
required to do and the court must, under the language of the
statute, dismiss the charge unless the State shows good cause
why trial was delayed beyond 60 days from the filing of the
information. The State, on the other hand, asserts it is not
enough for defendant merely to request a speedy trial. He
must also, the State argues, demand dismissal of the charge by
timely motion before trial or he waives his rights under the
statute. A discussion of this matter necessitates a brief recita-
tion of the factual background.

AS already mentioned defendant suffered a gunshot wound
at the time of his arrest. He was present in court when ar-
raigned but was taken directly from arraignment to the hos-
pital at the Men’s Reformatory, Anamosa, Iowa, where he was
serving a term on another conviction. Defendant was hospi-
talized from January 20 to February 22. Thereafter from time
to time until April 5 he returned to the hospital for periods of
treatment or examination. Neither defendant nor his attorney
notified the court or the county attorney when defendant was
released from the hospital, although the county attorney and
defendant’s. counsel had several conferences concerning the
case during this.period. On June 8, 1965, the county attorney
filed an application stating the deferidant was able to stand
trial and asking his return from the Men’s Reformatory for that
purpose. This application was granted and trial was set for
June 14, 1965, just one week later. On June 14, prior to the
start of the trial, defendant filed.a motion to quash on other
grounds and made no mention then of his right to dismissal
under section 795.2. The case proceeded to trial, and no request
for a dismissal under that statute was made until defendant
filed his motion for new trial after the jury returned a guilty
verdict against him.

We have already pointed out when a defendant may waive
the constitutional and statutory provisions which assure him a
speedy trial. However, we have never been asked to decide
the precise issue now presented. May a defendant postpone
his motion under section 795.2, Code of Iowa, until after ‘trial
and then secure a dismissal of the offense for which he has
been convicted? . ,

a es 908

A somewhat similar matter was presented but not deter-
mined in State v. Jackson, 252 Iowa 671, 108 N.W.2d 62, where
the decision was based on other grounds. In those states
where this problem has arisen, it is almost universally held a
defendant who has been denied a speedy trial must move for
dismissal before going to trial. Failure to do so constitutes a
waiver of his rights. 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 253,
page 290; 224A C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 470, page 41;
Randolph v. State, 234 Ind. 57, 62, 122 N.H.2d 860, 864; People
v. Stahl, 26 I11.2d 408, 186 N.H.2d 349, 350; People v. White, 2
N.Y.2d 220, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168, 140 N.E.2d 258, 260; People v.
Wilson, 60 Cal.2d 189, 146, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 49, 383 P.2d 452,
457; annotations, 57 A-L.R.2d 802, 836.

In Randolph v. State, supra, the court said, “It has gen-
erally been held that the right to a discharge for delay in
bringing a defendant to trial is waived if the proper motion is
not made before the trial begins. [citations] * * *. In this
ease appellant participated in the trial without objection. By
his acquiescence and participation in the trial appellant con-
clusively waived his rights under the statute. By such act he
aided in the consummation of the very act which the statute,
if timely invoked, might have prevented. The motion for dis-
charge was not filed until after (1) the trial of defendant-
appellant had been completed (2) the verdict of the jury re-
turned and the jury discharged, and (3) the court had denied
his motion to dismiss because of alleged irregularities in the
verdict and judgment.”

In People v. Wilson, supra, the California Supreme Court
put it this way, “The right to a speedy trial must therefore be
asserted, if at all, in the court where the prosecution is pending,
and prior to the commencement of trial. * * *.” Similar lan-
guage, with some variations, may be found in People v.
Piscitello, 7 N.Y.2d 387, 198 N.Y.S.2d 273, 165 N.E.2d 849;
Commonwealth v. Smihal, 182 Pa. Super. 232, 126 A.2d 523.

We find these authorities persuasive. Any other holding
would subvert the purpose of the statute itself, which is to
protect the defendant from undue delay. It is not intended to
be a device by which, through technicalities, he can obtain

904 a a

immunity from prosecution. State v. Gebhart, supra, and
citations.

In several of our decisions we have used language which
indicates agreement with the authorities already cited. For
instance in McCandless v. District Court, supra, at page 606 of
245 Iowa, we said, “It has been well said that the rights given
the accused by the Constitution and our statutes are shields,
not weapons, and being so intended by the legislature, we must
give meaning to that intent. If this is true, what must one do
in order to use the shield? Must the State carry it for him?
We think not.”

In Pines v. District Court, supra, at page 1297 of 233 Iowa,
we quoted with approval this language from State v. McTague,
173 Minn, 158, 216 N.W. 787: “‘The right to a speedy trial is
valuable, and it will be zealously guarded by the courts with
resolute courage. It is for the protection of personal rights,
not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law nor
to defeat public justice. It is a privilege to the aceused. If he
does not claim it, he should not complain. It may be waived.
The statute is a means of enforcing the constitutional pro-
vision. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on
record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay.
If he does not do this he must be held, in law, to have waived
the privilege.’ * * *.”

We realize these quotations do not deal with the exact
point now before us, but. they are helpful in pointing out a
defendant may not fail to declare himself until it is too late
and then take advantage of a protective statute, not to insure
a speedy trial, but rather to set aside a conviction after trial
has been had. Our language in State v. Gebhart, supra, at
page 851 of 257 Iowa, appears to be particularly appropriate
here, “Every accused should be given the fullest protection in
having a fair trial under these provisions of the law (protection
accorded by Bill of Rights of the Federal or State Constitu-
tion),-and any statutory protections that may be afforded him.
‘But the interest of society also demands that these protections
be only those to which he is.entitled under a fair and reason-
able construction of the applicable. constitutional and statutory
provisions.”

a a 905

We hold defendant waived his right to a speedy trial under
section 795.2 by failing to move for a dismissal until after trial
had been completed and a jury verdict returned. There is no
rule, constitutional or statutory, which permits a defendant to
use this cherished right simply to challenge an adverse verdict.

It is a travesty to require the State to call a jury, produce
witnesses, provide court personnel, present its evidence, and
secure a conviction while defendant sits silently by with an
ace-in-the-hole which renders this entire judicial exercise a
nullity. Ifa defendant should not be tried, let him say so
before, not after, he is subjected to that ordeal.

We cannot believe our statute, or the constitutional safe-
guards defendant relies on, requires the result he seeks. There
is no merit in defendant’s claim he was denied a speedy trial. -

In view of this holding it is not necessary for us to con-
Sider the State’s claim there was good cause for failing to try
this case within 60 days from the filing of the county attorney’ S
information.

ul I. As an essential element of this offense, the State
hus : prove defendant’s intent was to commit larceny when the
attempt to'break and enter occurred. Defendant insists there
was no evidence from which the jury could find such intent.
If this is true, defendant was entitled to the directed verdict
which he sought by timely: motion.

HE Intent is a state of mind difficult of proof by direct
evidence. It may, however, be established by circumstantial
evidence and by inferences reasonably to be drawn from the
conduet of the defendant and from all the attendant cireum-
stances in the light of human behavior and experience. It is
almost uniformly held that where one breaks and enters the
property of another in the nighttime an inference may be
drawn that he did so to commit larceny. People v. Horace,
157-Cal. App. 2d 395, 321 P.2d 64; State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d
363, 359 P.2d 486; People v. Nichols, 196 Cal.App.2d 223, 16
Cal. Rptr. 328; People v. Lyles, 156 Cal.App.2d 482, 319 P.2d
745; State v. Woodruff, 208 Iowa 286, 225 N.W. 254, and
citations; 13 Am. Jur.2d, Burglary, section 52, page 352.

Defendant relies heavily upon the case of State v. Cook,

906 PC i

188 Iowa 655, 176 N.W. 674, but we find neither that case nor
State v. Farrand, 192 Iowa 809, 185 N.W. 586, persuasive here.
Rather we’ find State v. Woodruff, supra, to be more in point:
There we held the unexplained breaking and entering of a
dwelling house in the nighttime sufficient to sustain a verdict
that the breaking and entering was done with intent to commit
larceny. Further authority for this conclusion is found in
State v. Worthen, 111 Iowa 267, 269, 82 N.W. 910, where we
said:

“Some presumptions are to be indulged in against one who
enters a building unbidden, at a late hour of night, else the
burglar caught without booty might escape the penalties of
the law. * * * People are not accustomed, in the nighttime, to
enter: the homes of others, when asleep, with innocent purposes.
The usual object is theft, and this is the inferénce ordinarily to
be drawn, in the absence of explanation, from breaking and
entering at night, accompanied by flight upon discovery, even
though nothing has been taken.”

The same’ presumption should apply when, as here, one
attempts to break and enter a business establishment, rather
than a ‘welling and when violence, rather than flight, is used
to eseapé arrest.

-As pointed out in State v. Woodruff, supra, this presump-
tion, or inference, exists only when the charge -alleges an in-
tent to commit larceny. At page 244 of 208 Iowa in the Wood-
ruff decision we said, “It is only when thé charge is breaking
and entering with intent to commit. larceny that the intent may
be-inferred from the. unexplained ‘breaking and entering. The
reason for this rule is that experience teaches that, in the great
majority of cases of unlawful breaking and entering, the act
done is with intent to steal. * * *.” Again at page 245 we
said, “It is uncontroverted that the defendant broke and
entered the Tellin home; there is no explanation of his break-
ing and entering said home. * * * The indictment charged the
defendant with the breaking and entering of the home in the
nighttime, with intent to commit larceny.‘ Under the aforesaid
well established rule of law, supported by the great weight of
authority, the jury—the triers of the facts—are privileged to
infer that his intent was to commit larceny.”

a a 907

HI Applying these rules to defendant’s conduct, we find
the building in question was a tavern closed and locked for
the night; it housed merchandise of substantial value and
money; defendant had been there earlier in the evening; when
accosted defendant and an associate were in the process of
attempting to gain entry by the use of crowbars; and at the
time of his arrest defendant assaulted the officer with a crow-
bar. No explanation as to defendant’s possible legitimate
purpose for desiring entry into the tavern was offered.

Under these circumstances there was ample evidence to
permit the jury to determine defendant’s intent at the time in
question. State v. Worthen and State v. Woodruff, both supra,
and citations.

Defendant attempts to make some , distinction i in the proof
tequired and the inferences to be drawn between an actual break-
ing and entering and an attempt to break and enter. There is
language by way of dictum in State v. Woodruff, supra, which
lends him superficial support. There is no reason for such dis-
tinction here. Defendant’s overt act had virtually succeeded
when the fortuitous arrival of the police prevented its com-
pletion. The door to the tavern was literally hanging by a
thread, This, together with the other circumstances, heretofore
related, justifies inferences as to his intent which are just as
permissible as if entry had been accomplished.

We hold the question of defendant’s intent was properly -
submitted to the jury.

II. Defendant’s third assignment of error deals with the
trial court’s instruction concerning his credibility as a witness.
By one instruction, which is not complained of here, the trial
court properly explained to the jury the standard by which the
eredibility of all witnesses should be tested. The trial court
also gave the following instruction by which it called specific
attention to the credibility of defendant’s testimony:

[| “The defendant is a competent witness in his own be-
half, and in determining the weight and credit to be given to
his testimony you are to be governed by the same rule as is
given you in these instructions for determining the weight and
eredit to be given by you to the testimony of each and every

908 | 7

other-witness before you. You are not required to receive
blindly the testimony of such accused person as true, but you
are to consider whether it is true and made in good faith, or
only for the purpose of avoiding conviction. You should take
into consideration his interest in the result of the case, the cir-
eumstances under which the testimony was given, and all of
the circumstances connected therewith. If you believe that his
testimony is given in good faith, you should give it the same
consideration which you give the testimony of other witnesses
believed. by you to be given in good faith.”

"This is our fourth recent encounter with this type of in-
struction. State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 145.N.W.2d 638; State
v. Shipley, 259 Iowa 952, 146 N.W.2d 266; State v. Alford, 260.
Towa 939, 151 N.W.2d 578: Incidentally all of these decisions
were handed down subsequent: to the trial of this case and
therefore were not available to the trial judge here.

The objection to this type of instruction, of course, is that
it tells ‘the jury again with reference to the defendant what
has already been told them once with reference to all witnesses.
It singles out the defendant who elects to testify and cautions
the. jury ‘that’ such testimony should be subjected ‘to special
sevutiny. Prior to the decision in Griffin v. State of California,
380'U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed.2d -106, this court had
consistently held in a long line of cases that it Was not revers-
ible-error to give such an instruction.’ These authorities are
set out and discussed in State v. Ford, supra. However, Griffin
vy. State of California, supra, holding that: comment on a de-
fendant’s failure to testify violates the protection accorded him
under Amendment 5 to the Constitution of the United States,
has initiated new attacks on the type of instruction set out
above. In other words if the defendant’s failure to take the
stand may not be called to the attention of the jury, is it
permissible, when he does testify, to call this fact to the at-
tention of the jury by special instruction? We have not been
able to reach unanimity on this matter, but we have three times
held since the Griffin case, each time with increased reluctance,
that stich an instruction is not grounds for reversal. In State
y, Alford, supra, we suggest it would be advisable to omit such
instruction. We repeat that admonition.

a es 909

We hold defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the
ground urged in this division.

Iv. Finally defendant claims he was denied a fair » trial
because the county attorney was permitted to ask him about
prior felony convictions as part of his cross-examination. After
objections to such questions had been overruled, defendant
admitted he had twice been convicted of a felony. Defendant
claims this violated his constitutional rights under Amendment
5 and Amendment 14, Constitution of the United States.

HE When a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own be-
half, he submits himself to cross-examination as an ordinary
witness with the restriction that cross-examination shall be
confined strictly to matters testified to on direct examination.
Section 781.18, Code of Iowa.

Seetion 622.17, Code of Iowa, provides:

“Previous conviction, A witness may be interrogated as
to his previous conviction for a felony. No other proof is com-
petent, except the record thereof.”

HR Wee:—have recently held this section to apply to

any witness, including the defendant in a criminal case. Gas-
kill v. Gahman, 255 Towa 891, 896, 124 N.W.2d 533. When
defendant elected to testify, his credibility as a witness became
important. He cannot escape cross- examination to. test that
eredibility. State v. Haffa, 246 Towa 1275, 1283, 71 N.W.2a 85,
40. A previous felony conviction may be shown only to im-
peach the witness and for no other purpose. State v. Under-
wood, 248 Iowa 443, 80 N.W.2d 730; State v. Frink, 255 Iowa
59, 68, 120 N.W.2d 482, 438; State v. Van Voltenburg, 260
Towa 200, 209, 147 N.W.2d 869, 874, 875.
7 Defendant claims Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
4 Cir., 820 F.2d 179, supports his view. On the contrary we
find that case furnishes additional authority for the State’s
position here... .

In State v. Hardesty, 261 Iowa 382, 153 N.W.2d 464, we
expressed some misgivings, both in the opinion of the court
and in a specially concurring opinion, about the future of such
an instruction in its conflict, real or fancied, with Amendment
14 to the Constitution of the United States. Those misgivings

910 Le 7

have not yet been resolved, but we adhere to our firmly estab-
lished rule that such cross-examination is permissible.

‘The trial court properly instructed the jury to consider
the testimony concerning his previous felony convictions for
the purpose of impeachment only. We hold it was admissible
for this-purpose and we approve the trial court’s ruling.

‘We have carefully reviewed the whole record and have
considered all matters raised by defendant. We find no re-
versible error. The judgment of the trial court is therefore
affirmed —Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Rawines and Becxsr, JJ., who
dissent.

Rawuines, J.—Being unable to agree with conclusions set
forth in Division III of the majority opinion, I respectfully dis-
sent. See dissent in State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 755, 145 N.W.2d
638, 644.

Broxer, J., joins in this dissent.

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v, Caartus Epwarp ALLNUTT,
appellant,

No. 52056,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 274)

Fersruary 6, 1968.

911

Margaret L. Beckley and L. M. Hullinger, of Cedar Rapids,
for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and William G. Faches, of Cedar
Rapids, County Attorney, for appellee.

Mason, J—January 19, 1965, defendant Charles Edward
Allnutt was charged by county attorney’s information with
assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury contrary to
section 694.6, Codes, 1962, 1966. At arraignment January 20
he entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a speedy trial.
Trial to a Linn County jury which commenced July 26 resulted
in a verdict of guilty. Defendant’s motion for new trial was
overruled and on September 30 he was sentenced to imprison-
ment in the state penitentiary at Fort Madison not to exceed
one year.

I, From this final judgment defendant appeals assigning
as errors the trial court’s failure to sustain (1) his motion to
dismiss, (2) his motion for directed verdict made at the close of
the State’s evidence and renewed at the close of all evidence
and (3) his motion for new trial. All included the motion to
dismiss by reference and constitute his sole contention that
the conviction cannot stand because the State failed to give him
a speedy trial as required under Code section 795.2 which then
provided:

“Delay in trial. If a defendant indicted for a public
offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his applica-
tion, be not brought to trial at the next regular term of the
eourt in which the indictment is triable or within sixty days,
‘whichever first oceurs, after the same is found, the court must
‘order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be
shown. An accused not admitted to bail and unrepresented by
legal counsel shall not be deetned to have waived his privilege
of dismissal or be held to make demand or request to enforce a

912 | |

guarantee of speedy trial, and the court on its own motion
shall carry out the provisions of this section as to dismissal.”

Of course, defendant was not brought to trial within 60
days from the filing of the county attorney’s information.

Saturday, July 24 defendant filed his motion to dismiss the
information asserting as a ground failure to afford him a
speedy trial as required by Code section 795.2, supra. Copy of
the motion was delivered to the county attorney 8:30 a.m.
July 26, approximately 30 minutes before trial was to com-
menee. After argument the motion was overruled and the
matter proceeded to trial.

The present case results from a factual situation which
gave rise to two criminal charges being filed against this de-
fendant: the assault case which we now have under considera-
tion and a charge of breaking and entering with intent to
commit larceny contrary to Code section 708.10, for which
defendant was previously convicted following jury trial.

During the early morning of January 14 defendant and
another man, attempting to break into the Hide-A~Way Tavern
in Cedar Rapids, were apprehended by detective Raymond EB.
Baker. The detective drew his gun, ordered the men not to
move and radioed for assistance. Defendant armed with a
crowbar advanced toward detective Baker despite an order to
stop. Defying a second command to stop defendant struck
the officer and knocked him to the ground. As he fell, detective
Baker fired one shot which struck defendant in the chest.

IL. Defendant previously appealed after conviction on the
breaking and entering charge referred to and the case was
affirmed in State v. Charles Edward Allnutt, No. 52068, 261
Towa 897, 156 N.W.2d 266. A more detailed narration of the
facts is included in that opinion. They will not be repeated
here.

In that appeal defendant made the same contention under
his first assignment of error as he makes in the assignments
here, that he was not afforded a speedy trial. There defend-
ant’s motion to dismiss was first made after trial, and his
appeal presented as the precise issue the question, “May a
defendant postpone his motion under section 795.2, Code of

7 be 918

Towa, until after trial and then secure a dismissal of the offense
for which he has been convicted?”

Here the motion was submitted for the first time im-
mediately prior to the commencement of trial. In our opinion
this fact does not constitute a vital distinction.

Washington has a statute similar to our section 795.2
which requires defendants be brought to trial within 60 days
after indictment, RCW 10.46.010. In State v. Keller (1965), 65
Wash.2d 907, 909, 400 P.2d 370, 371, defendant was tried 68
days after the information was filed. The morning of trial
defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground that the State had
failed to bring the case on for trial within 60 days as required
by statute. In rejecting this contention the court said, “When
trial has begun, or is about to take place, it is then too late to
move for dismissal” (citing cases).

In an earlier Washington case, State v. Alexander (1911),
65 Wash. 488, 490, 118 P. 645, 646, defendant, brought to trial
more than 60 days after the information was filed, made a
motion for dismissal under the statute after trial had actually
begun. In rejecting defendant’s contention on appeal that the
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the action before
any evidence was offered, the court said:

“After the trial has begun, or when it is about to take.

place, it is too late for the defendant to move for a dismissal.
The statute provides a remedy for the defendant when the
prosecutor without cause does not bring the case to trial. It
was not intended as a means to escape or a method of delay
when the trial is at hand. If the motion had been made prior
to the time of trial, the court, for good cause shown would
refuse a dismissal. When the trial is at hand, the defendant
will be held to have waived his right under ‘the statute. There
was, therefore, no error in the refusal of the court to dismiss
the action when it was on trial.” Cited with approval in State
v. Thomas, 1 Wash.2d 298, 95 P.2d 1036, 1087.
_ ending to support our position see Svehla v. State, 168
Neb. 553, 96 N.W.2d 649, 659; People v. Contrerai, 172 Cal.
App.2d 369, 341 P.2d 849, 851; State v. Fogg, 79 S.D. 576, 115
N.W.2d 889, 894; and State v. Shaw, 69 Idaho 365, 207 P.2d
540, 548-544.

914

Ill. This appeal is governed by Division I of our opinion
in State v. Charles Edward Allnutt, No. 52063, supra. For
the reasons stated therem and based upon the authorities
cited, we hold defendant has waived his right to a speedy trial.

The judgment of the trial court is—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

Soars or Iowa, appellant, v. Soctan Hyemne, Inc., appellee.

No. 52715.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 288)

re a5

en!
__
—

Fuervary 6, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, Roger F. Peterson, County At-
torney, for appellant.

Reed, Merner, Sindlinger, Baker & Sabbath, of Cedar
Falls, for appellee.

Syet1, J—The State has appealed from the judgment of
the municipal court of Cedar Falls sustaining defendant’s demur-
rer and motion to quash an information charging violation of
section 725.5, Code of Iowa, by “offering for sale by vending
machine articles or things designed or intended to prevent
conception.” .

916 |

Neither the wisdom of the statute nor thé authority of the
legislature to proscribe by constitutionally enacted legislation
is involved. The challenge is to the method of original en-
actment and the form of the statute.

Section 725.5 of our Code provides:

“Obscene literature—articles for immoral use. Whoever
sells, or offers for sale, or gives away, or has in his possession
with intent to sell, loan, or give away any obscene, lewd, in-
decent, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, paper, drawing,
lithograph, engraving, picture, photograph, writing, card,
postal card, model, cast, or any instrument or article of in-
decent or immoral use, or any medicine, article, or thing de-
signéd or intended for procuring abortion or preventing con-
ception, or advertises the same for sale, or writes or prints any
letter, cireular, handbill, card, book, pamphlet, advertisement,
or notice of any. kind, giving information, directly or indi:
rectly, when, where, how, or by what means any of the articles
or things hereinbefore mentioned can be purchased, or other-
wise obtained or made, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
be fined not more than one thousand nor less than fifty dollars,
or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than one. year,
or both.”

Defendant’s attack and the trial court's ruling were
limited to the constitutional question under Article II, see;
tion 29, Constitution of Iowa. This section provides:

-“Eivery act shall embrace but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith ; which subject shall be expressed
in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act
which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void
only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.”

The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer and motion
to,.quash on three grounds. They will be separately considered.
“I: The statute now under attack was originally enacted
in 1886-and appears in chapter 177, Laws of the Twenty-first
General Assembly.’

The title to the original Act is as follows:

“Aw Act t6 Suppress the circulation, advertising, and vend-
ing of Obscene and Immoral Literature and articles of In-
decent and Immoral use, and to confiscate such property.”

Pe) a7

The several sections of the original Act have been divided
by the Code editor pursuant to section 14.18, Code of Iowa, and
have been amended by subsequent legislatures but the sub-
stance of what is material to this case appears in all Codes
since the original enactment including the enacted Code of 1897.

With this historical background it would appear obvious
that the statute is a legislative enactment of public policy.
Tt could hardly be argued with any plausibility that the statute
as it appears is the result of any legislative logrolling or
surprise.

HEM ‘In passing upon the constitutionality of acts of
the legislature such acts are given the benefit of a presumption
in favor of constitutionality. An act of the legislature will
be declared unconstitutional by the courts only when it is
clearly, plainly and palpably so, and it is the duty of the courts
to give such a construction to an act, if possible, as will avoid
this necessity and uphold the law.” (Citations) State v. Talerico,
227 Iowa 1315, 1322, 290 N.W. 660.

This has been the rule since as early as 1856, see State
ex rel. Weir v. The County Judge, 2 (Clarke) Iowa 280, 282,
and remains the law. See Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa
845, 146 N.W.2d 626.

HN soIL. The trial court held and appellee argues that
the original Act was not enacted pursuant to the constitution
in that it was duplicitous and embodied more than one subject
matter. We do not agree.

Our court, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, has
considered this problem many times.

We recently reviewed the problem in depth in Long v.
Board of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 142 N.W.2d 378. We
said:

“It has been uniformly held that section 29, Article IH,
of the Iowa Constitution, should be liberally construed so
one Act may embrace all matters reasonably connected with
the subject expressed in the title and not utterly incongruous
thereto. * * * to constitute duplicity of subject, an Act must
embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that
by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legiti-

as ee

mate connection with or relation to each other. All that is
necessary is that the Act should embrace some one general
subject, and by that is meant, merely, that all matters treated
therein should fall under some one general idea and be so
connected with or related to each other, either logically or in
popular understanding, as to be part of or germane to one
general subject.” (Loe. cit. 1282 and 1283)

We referred to the landmark case of State v. Talerico,
supra, noting that “this constitutional provision was designed
to prevent surprise in legislation, to prevent the union in one
bill of matters having no fair relation to each other.” In the
Talerico case this appears:

“However, the title need not be an index or epitome of
the act or its details. The subject of the bill need not be
specifically and exactly expressed in the title. It is sufficient
if all the provisions relate to the one subject indicated in the
title and are parts of it or incidental to it or reasonably con-
nected with it or in some reasonable sense auxiliary to the
subject of the statute. It is unnecessary that each thought or
step toward the accomplishment of an end or object should
be embodied in a separate act. Nor is it important that a
law contain matters which might be and usually are contained
in separate acts or would be more logically classified as be-
longing to different subjects provided only they are germane
to the general subject of the act in which they are put.” (Loe.
cit. 1822 of 227 Iowa)

The title to the Act now under attack referzed to the
circulation, advertising and vending of obscene and immoral
literature and articles of indecent and immoral use. The Act
then set forth, what the legislature intended to include within
the proscription of the statute including any article or thing
designed or intended for prevention of conception. When the
legislature thus set forth what was within the purview of its
act we cannot say that the acts so set forth were so unrelated
as to contravene the provisions of the constitution. They were
reasonably connected with the title and “not utterly incon-
gruous thereto.”

An interesting article appears in.42 Minnesota’ Law Re-
view 389, 391, cited by appellant.

a9

A one-subject rule for laws has found its way, in one
form or another, into the constitutions of forty-one of our
states. This provision is frequently invoked by litigants to
question the validity of a statute.

“The primary and universally recognized purpose of the
one-subject rule is to prevent log-rolling in enactment of laws
—the practice of several minorities combining their several pro-
posals as different provisions of a single bill and thus con-
solidating their votes so that a majority is obtained for the
omnibus bill where perhaps no single proposal of each minority
could have obtained majority approval separately.

“Another stated purpose for the provision is to prevent
‘riders’ from being attached to bills that are popular and so
certain of adoption that the rider will secure adoption not
on its own merits, but on the merits of the measure to which
it is attached. * * *

“Another purpose served by the one- “subject rule is to
facilitate orderly legislative procedure. * * *

“The constitutional provision embodying the one-subject
rule also contains an independent requirement: that each bill
contain a title and that that title express the subject or object
of the bill. * * * The primary purpose of the title require-
ment is to prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the
legislature.”

I. The trial court held and appellee argues that the
title of the Act creating what is now section 725.5 of the Code
contains no expression of the subject matter, ie, articles de-
signed or intended for preventing conception and thus con-
travenes the constitution. We do not agree.

Much that we have said in preceding divisions is appli-
cable here and need not be repeated.

In Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 158, 46 N.W.2d 52, there was
a constitutional attack on the Motor Vehicle Financial Re-
sponsibility Act. On page 157 of 242 Iowa this appears: “* * #
an examination of the entire Act shows that all matters em-
braced therein’ are germane to the general subject as set forth
in the title. An-Act need not in its title be an abstract, analy-
sis, synopsis, catalogue, summary or index of the Act itself.

920 Oe)

It may embrace all matters reasonably connected with the
subject expressed in the title and not incongruous thereto.
Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 23 N.W.2d 883; Knorr v.
Beardsley, 240 Lowa 828, 38 N.W.2d 286. In determining this
question a liberal construction should be given to Article III,
section 29, of the Constitution. * * *.”

See also Independent School District of Cedar Rapids v.
Towa Employment Security Commission, 237 Iowa 1801, 1312,
1818, 25 N.W.2d 491, and cases cited therein, and 82 C. J. S.
Statutes, section 219.

Neither the authority of the legislature to enact statutes
relating to “acts that are indecent and immoral” nor the legis-
lature’s power to say what is indecent and immoral is involved
here, The question is whether the title, under the liberal rules
of statutory construction, is sufficiently broad to encompass
the matters included in the Act. We think it is.

HI When the title of the Act says that its purpose is to
suppress the vending of articles of indecent and immoral use
the listing by the legislature of what it considers indecent and
immoral is within the limitations of the Constitution. The
legislature may be its own lexicographer. Graham vy. Worth-
ington, supra, loc. cit. 853 of 259 Iowa, 632 of 146 N.W.2d.

; | IV. The trial court held and appellee argues that
the title of the Act creating section 725.5 does not indicate
that the Act creates or defines a crime and therefore contravenes
the Constitution. We disagree. .

The trial court, although recognizing the statements
quoted as dicta, relied on State v. Chenoweth, 226 Iowa 217,
220, 221, 284 N.W. 110. In that case a per curiam opinion
adopted by the court after the retirement of the author stated
but found it unnecessary to hold that the title failed to sup-
port a criminal penalty. A demurrer to the information was
sustained on other grounds.

The language directed at the title is forceful and the
statements are unequivocal but they are pure dicta and un-
supported by citation of authority. The case has been cited
and distinguished twice but has never been cited by our court
for the proposition involved here. We do not think the state-

eS v2

ments are in accord with other and later pronouncements
furnishing guidelines for statutory construction and are ac-
cordingly disapproved.

No authority has been cited to us saying that there must
be reference to a penalty in the title to an Act of the legis-
lature.

In Long v. Board of Supervisors, supra, the title to the
Act under attack was “Aw Acr relating to the compensation of
county officers, deputies and clerks.” We rejected a con-
stitutional attack based on the inclusion by amendment of a
provision that courthouses shall be open for the transaction
of business five and one-half days per week. This requirement
appearing as section 340.6, Code of 1966, has since been re-
pealed by the Sixty-second General Assembly (Senate File 12)
but not because of any constitutional defects.

Nowhere in our eases do we find any holding that a
penalty must be mentioned in the title as an incident to an
Act that is suppressed. It is a natural corollary that a penalty
follow the doing of an illegal act. It is a reasonable “auxiliary
to the subject of the statute”. State v. Talerico, supra.

+ In State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3 N.W.2d 176, these
statements appear:

“Tt has been so many times held in this state that where
no penalty is expressed, either in the title or in the act itself,
it comes within the general law relating to misdemeanors, that
no citation of authorities would seem necessary. But see,
Bopp v. Clark, 165 Iowa 697, 147 N.W. 172, 52L. B. A. N.S.,
493, Ann. Cas. 1916E 417, supra; State v. Shea, 106 Iowa 735,
72 N.W. 300, supra; State v. York, 131 Iowa 635, 109 N.W.
122, supra. The cases cited by defendant all show, and it has
been the holding of this court many times, that when an act
is prohibited and no penalty is imposed, such act is a mis-
demeanor, * * *

“Tt ig not necessary that the title shall contain a detailed
recital of all of the provisions of the act, nor is it required to
be an index or an epitome thereof. All of the provisions
thereof must relate to the act as a whole, without incongruity
or want of unity.’

922 Pn

«* * * All that the Constitution requires is that the subject
embraced in the act shall be reasonably connected with the
title and germane to it, and that the title shall be calculated
to give notice of the statute. [Citations] * * *

“It would, of course, be unnecessary and improper to
express in the title what does not appear in the act itself;
in other words, in this case the title states the subject of the
act, and further reference to it in such title need not be made.”
(Loe. eit. 1180, 1181, 1182) :

A section of the Code containing prohibitive language
need not expressly declare that a, violation thereof is a crime.
State v. York, 181 Iowa 635, 638,.109 N.W. 122: We-see no
reason why the same rule should not apply to the title to an
act if the title is otherwise sufficient.

V. In Graham v.- Worthington, supra, loc. cit. 850, 851
of 259 Iowa, 146 N.W.2d 631, we repeated .and reaffirmed
certain well established principles: ©

«# * * the legislature may enact any law desired provided
it is not clearly.prohibited by some provision of the Federal
or State Constitution. * * *

. “The judicial branch of the government has no power to
determine whether legislative Acts are wise or unwise, nor
has it the power to declare an Act void.unless it is plainly and
without doubt-repugnant to some provision of the Constitution.
There is no presumption against constitutional validity of a
statute. Every reasonable presumption must be called to sup-
port the Act. A challenging party must overcome these pre-
‘sumptions and negative every reasonablé basis which will
sustain the statute. * **

“Tf the constitutionality of an Act is merely doubtful or
fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere.” ,

‘When two constructions are possible, the one will be
-adopted which does not lead to consequences making the Act
unconstitutional. (Loe. cit.'855 of 259 Iowa, 633 of 146 N.W.2d)

In the light of our many pronouncements relative to statu-
tory construction we conclude that the statute under which
-defendant was charged meets constitutional requirements.

* BEB VI. The ruling of the trial court on defendant’s de-

Le 923

amurrer was a final judgment and was appealable as such.
For the reasons indicated in preceding divisions we conclude
that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the
information.

The ruling is reversed but under the statute the case may
not be remanded. The costs will be taxed to appellant. State
v. Talerico, supra, loe. cit. 1824 of 227 Iowa—Reversed.

All Justices concur.

Wiutam F. Suzprer, Commissioner of Public Safety of -Iowa,
and Department or Pusiic Sarery, appellants-petitioners,
v. Hon. Witiiam R. Eaps, Judge, in and for Linn
County District Court, appellee-respondent.

No. 52777.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 115)

Fesruary 6, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Joseph W.
Zeller, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants-petitioners.

Robert ©. Nelson, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee-respondent.

Rawiines, J.—Original certiorari to review judgment of
defendant court setting aside and vacating orders by state de-

a a 925

partment of public safety suspending three separate licenses to
operate a motor vehicle.

The cases here involved, consolidated for purpose of hear-
ing on appeal, are in like manner presented for review.

Plaintiff commissioner, finding Thomas Ray Cowell, LeRoy
Charles Mann and Myrle Joseph Dietzenbach, hereinafter some-
times referred to as offenders, to be “habitual violators” caused
orders to issue suspending operator’s license of each for a
period of 30 days.

None of these offenders requested hearing before the com-
missioner or his agent. (Code section 321.211) But each ap-
pealed to the trial court. (Code section 321.215) Plaintiffs
answered and resisted.

Prior to hearing on appeal counsel for offenders attempted
presentation of a stipulation to which there was in large part
no agreement. None of them testified or presented any evi-
dence on their behalf.

To all intents and purposes each case was presented and
appears to have been determined on the basis of a transcript
of proceedings before the commissioner. (Code section 821,215)

The record discloses, without dispute, the following con-.
victions for violation of motor-vehicle traffic laws by each of-
fender prior to issuance of license suspension orders here in
question.

Tuomas Ray CowsE.: June 30, 1963, speeding; October 18,
1964, speeding; May 21, 1965, disobeying traffic signal; June 17,
1965, night speeding. (License suspension notice issued June 30,
1965.)

LeRoy Cartes Mann: July 1963, speeding; March 12,
1965, speeding; April 29, 1965, failure to stop for stop sign;
October 9, 1965, disobeying traffic signal. (License suspension
notice issued November 19, 1965.)

Myriz JosepH Dimtzenpacu: November 14, 1964, speeding;
July 27, 1965, speeding; October 5, 1965, speeding. (License
suspension notice issued November 23, 1965.)

In setting aside and vacating the challenged suspension
orders trial court, finding the term “habitual violator” not de-
fined and too indefinite, concluded the administrative proceed-
ings were illegal. We do not agree.

926 De Ve

I. Certiorari is appropriate where an inferior tribunal
is alleged to have exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise
acted illegally. Rule 306, R.C.P., and Butler v. Pension Board
of Police Dept., 259 Iowa 1028, 1034-35, 147 N.W. 2d 27, 30.

HI And where, as in the case at hand, material facts are
undisputed, it is for us to review and determine the finding as
a matter of law. Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 630,
5 N.W.2d 914. See also Powers v. McCullough, 258 Iowa 738,
741, 140 N.W.2d 378.

HH Im that same vein, if there is no substantial evidence
to support findings wpon which a lower tribunal arrives at a
challengéd conclusion of law, it acts illegally. City of Sioux City
v. Civil Service Commission, 247 Iowa 1254, 1258, 78 N.W.2d
833. - 7 .

HM Although Code section 321.215 says, in part, a deci~
sion of the court on appeal shall be final, certiorari still lies to
review it. As we said in Hohl v. Board of Education, 250 Iowa
502, 508-509, 94 N.W.2d 787: “Certiorari is the method of bring-
ing the record of an-inferior tribunal before the court for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether the inferior tribunal or body had
jurisdiction and whether its proceedings were authorized: See
19 Iowa Law Review 467. Clearly it comes within the supervisory’
functions of the appellate courts and is necessary to keep all
such bodies within their proper functions and to prevent them
from acting in an illegal manner. It is an extraordinary
remedy, and the courts may make it ‘available to all persons
who may show a substantial interest in the matter challenged.”
(Authorities cited.)

Hl LL. The basic question presented, common to all three
eases, is whether trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or other-
wise acted illegally.

On that issue plaintiffs have the burden of proof. Richard-
v. Holliday, 261. Iowa 181, 185, 153 N.W.2d 478, 476, and
Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1336, 147 N.W.2d
886, 890. : uo

II. Although. plaintiffs assert four errors relied upon
for reversal, they may be consolidated for brevity into one
broad assignment: Trial court erred in holding the term “habit--

— | oar

ual violator”,. without statutory standards or departmental
definition, too vague and uncertain to stand as a lawful basis
for suspension of an operator’s licénse by an administrative
officer. . of

In Richard y. Holliday, supra, this court was confronted
with substantially the same problem as here posed with refer-
ence to license suspension because of a “serious violation” of
motor vehicle laws.. We there held the quoted term suffi-
ciently certain to permit exercise of administrative sanction by
the public safety commissioner. See-also Danner v. Hass, 257
Towa 654, 661-664, 1384 N.W.2d 534,

The same question here involved was recently presented
in Anderson v. Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 126
N.W.2d 778, 9 A.L.R.3d 746. Resolving the matter contrary to
conclusion reached by trial court in the cases at bar, the Minne-
sota court reasoned, loc.cit., 312 of 267 Minn., 126 N.W.2d
781-784: :

“With respect to the standard expressed by the words
‘habitual violator,’ it may.be said that there is a division among
the courts of the various’states as to the validity of traffic
and license laws using that term. In Harvell v. Scheidt, 249
N.C. 699, 706, 107 8.H.2d 549, 554, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina considered a statute identical to ours so far as the
relevant subclause is concerned. The court held that such a
statute ‘does not contain any fixed standard or guide to which
the Department must conform in order to determine whether
or not a driver is a habitual violator of the traffic laws.’ The
Supreme Court of South Caroling * * * also held, with rea-
soning and authority similar to that of the North Carolina
eourt, ‘that the term ‘habitual’ is an inadequate standard.
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Harbin, 226
S.C. 585, 86 S.H.2d 446. It may also be noted that the legis-
Jatures of other states have, by statute, enacted a more specific
rule. The states of Texas, Missouri, and-Florida have by legis-
lative. specification defined a habitual violator by the number
of his offenses, and the legislatures of North and South Caro-
lina, following the decisions above referred to, have by legis-
lative enactment established 'a point system for guidance of

928 a |

the commissioner in determining the status of a licensee as a
habitual violator.

“The sufficiency of the standard expressed by the term
‘habitual violator’ must be viewed in light of the purpose for
which the statute was enacted. It should be realistically con-
ceded that in carrying out the objects of the statute the com-
missioner is required to make judgments based upon many
and varied factors involving a great amount of detail. It is
not unreasonable to assume that the legislature may well have
considered that to prescribe a more specific standard would
only place the commissioner in a straitjacket and interfere
with the fair and efficient administration of his duties. * * *
In dealing with this vast area of administrative action, a flex-
ible and practical guide is necessary.”

Continuing, the court said: “Permission to operate a
motor vehicle upon the public highways is not embraced within
the term ‘civil rights’ and is in the nature of a license or privi-
lege. While the privilege is a valuable one, and may not be
unreasonably or arbitrarily taken away, its enjoyment depends
upon compliance with conditions prescribed by law and is always
subject to such regulation and control as public authority may
see fit to impose under the police power in the interest of
public safety and welfare.”

The rationalization above set forth is here equally appli-
eable and persuasive.

In support of the foregoing see also Spurbeck v. Statton,
252 Iowa 279, 290, 106 N.W.2d 660; 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles
and Highway Traffic, section 97, page 668; 109, page 675; 112,
page 677; and annotations, 9 A.L.R.3d 756.

IV. Of considerable significance is the fact a habitual
offender act under which punishment for crime may be imposed
is not here involved. This being a matter standing in the field
of administrative law, we confine ourselves accordingly.

Our duty is to determine whether trial court’s conclusion
in the instant cases squares with applicable law. Sincerity of
that tribunal is not questioned. However, the decision reached
by it is so infected with fatal irregularity as to be illegal. See
Anderson y. Hadley, 245 Iowa 550, 563, 63 N.W.2d 284,

| Pc 929

HMM it is to us evident the orders by plaintiff commis-
sioner suspending operator’s license of Thomas Ray Cowell,
LeRoy Charles Mann and Myrle Joseph Dietzenbach were in
each instance lawfully issued. .

We hold trial court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding
the term “habitual violator”, not being statutorily or adminis-
tratively defined, is too uncertain and indefinite to permit law-
ful exercise of administrative sanction by state department of
public safety.

Each of these cases must be remanded to trial court with
direction to set aside any judgment vacating plaintiff commis-
sioner’s license suspension orders, and for entry of judgment in
harmony herewith.

Writ sustained and each case remanded for entry of an
order and judgment consistent with this opinion.

All Jusrices concur.

Russe. M. Knuprson, appellee, v. Gorvon Swenson et al.,
appellants,

No. 52581.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 756)

930

January 9, 1968.

Renearine Denmep Marca 5, 1968.

Floyd E. Ensign, of Northwood, for Gordon Swenson, ap-
pellant.

Weible & Stipp, of Forest City, for Melvin Juveland, ap-
pellant,

Linnan, Lynch & Straub, of Algona, for Harlan Evenson,
appellant.

Westfall, Laird, Burington, Bovard & Heiny, of Mason City,
and Eugene Sarno, of Lake Mills, for appellee.

Swe, J. = | This is a farm accident case. It presents a
vivid illustration in support of legislation in the field of work-
men’s compensation for farm labor. That is a problem for the
legislature. We have no authority to legislate. Until we have such
legislation there must be more than evidence of an on-the-job
injury to support recovery of damages. In this case a sym-
pathetic trial judge made an award to plaintiff. If supported by
substantial evidence the findings are binding on us, However,
we fail to find factual support, i.e, evidence, for his findings as
to actionable negligence, proximate cause and freedom from
contributory negligence, More than usual quotation from the
record seems necessary. .

Plaintiff herein was injured on September 19, 1964, in a silo
filling operation. He lost a hand in moving machinery. Plaintiff
was an employee of defendant Gordon Swenson. .

Defendant Gordon Swenson was the owner and operator of
silo-filling equipment. He did custom .work for, farmers. He
furnished a tractor and field cutter, three unloading (chop)
wagons, the silage blower and tractor, and the labor of two men.
He operated the field cutter, and his employee, plaintiff herein,
operated the blower at the silo and the machinery unloading the
silage from the wagons to the blower. Swenson was an indepen-
dent contractor and was paid $10 or $11 a foot for filling the silo.

932 a 7

Defendant Melvin Juveland was a farmer and had a silo
holding about 70 tons. By oral contract he employed Swenson to
fill his silo. Juveland was to furnish three men and three
tractors to pull the wagons. His men were his two sons and
Harlan Evenson, a neighbor.

Harlan Evenson was a farmer who exchanged work with
Juveland. He was helping on an exchange of work basis -with
no cash pay involved. He operated one of the tractors and
hauled wagons from the field to the blower. At least part of the
time he helped plaintiff in the unloading of the wagons, i.e., the
wagons he brought in. The wagons furnished by defendant
Swenson included two John Deere Chuck Wagons Model 110.
One of the chuck wagons was being unloaded, when plaintiff was
injured,

The trial court in Findings of Fact described the operation
of the chuck wagon as follows:

“The John Deere Model 110 Chuek Wagon owned by the
defendant Swenson * * * was a wagon among other things de-
signed for hauling cut silage from the field to the silo for un-
loading into a blower’ and eventually the silage would be blown
into the silo; that said wagon is equipped with an apron belt on
the bottom part of the body of the wagon box for moving the
silage forward; that’on the front end of the box there are three
sets of beaters which pull the silage from the box to the conveyer
at the front end of the box; that there are about 48 spokes on
each of the three beatérs and the beaters are about three inches
in length and one-half inch in diameter; that as the apron at the
bottom of the box moves forward the silage is moved forward
toward the beaters which break up the silage so that it becomes
loose and goes into the conveyer on the front of the wagon which
in turn conveys the silage from the wagon into the blower which
eventually. elevatés the silage into the silo. (Exhibits DA and
DD show the type of wagon.)

[We' reprodtice. these exhibits from the record,] |

Exhibit DA

934

Exhibit DD

| PC 935

«# * * the mechanism of the conveyer on the front end of the
wagon and particularly the beaters when in operation is a very
dangerous piece of equipment as evidenced by the warning sign
on the front of the machine. (See Exhibits DA and 1 and 3.)

[Exhibit 1 is reproduced from the record. Exhibit 3 is an
operator’s manual from which we reproduce pictures of the
wagon.]

LEMENT UNLESS Stat Ly
a im ay o

Defendants’ Exhibit 1

936

“The Court finds from the evidence that a portion of the
shield or guard covering the area where the silage comes out of
the hopper or that portion which protects the area when the
beaters are in operation has been cut out or enlarged by the
defendant Swenson. (See ragged edge as shown in Exhibit DB
and Exhibit DC.) [Reproduced from the record.]

ee 937

Exhibit DB

Exhibit DC

“The Court finds that the enlarging of the opening by
the defendant Swenson increased the hazard to the operator of
the chuck wagon and in this case to the plaintiff, Russell M.
Kauudison.

“The Court finds from the evidence that the defendant
Swenson had made a forklike rake for the purpose of raking off
the silage from the top of the wagon thus making the entry of
the silage into the hopper on the conveyer in the front of the
wagon in a uniform manner.”

The court’s findings as to the cutting out of the shield are
without support in the record. We quote from plaintiff’s testi-
mony:

SS 939

“I was familiar with the chuck wagon known as 110; I knew
how to operate it; I learned this from. observation and watching
it operate; I knew it was equipped with beaters. I know that
when the beaters are in operation they go at a high raté of speed;
that in connection with the accident load they were not going
rapidly or slowly and were going at about the same speed.on all
of the loads. I lmew that the beaters generated a great deal of
power; I knew that it would be dangerous to touch them with
any part of my hand or body, and I found out that it would be
dangerous to touch these beaters and I knew this before the
accident happened.

“Q. Now was there anything mechanically wrong with the
wagon which carried the accident load? A. Just the cut out.

“Tn connection with the cut out of the wagon as shown in
Exhibit DB, if I faced the cut out portion the part which was cut
out was at the upper left-hand part of the opening. The cutting
angled up to the upper left-hand corner of the opening. The
tooth on the bottom beater is visible at the lower right-hand
eorner and the cutting is away from the place where the tooth is
shown in Exhibit DB as we are viewing it here.

“The wagon carrying the accident load was in the same
condition when I first came to work for Swenson as it was when
I was injured,

“Q. And you have no knowledge how the cutting was ac-
complished or who cut it? A. No. I don’t.

“Q. You don’t claim Mr. Swenson did it? A. No.

“In the silo-filling operations of 1963 and 1964 the blower
clogged twice in 1963; it would take a large chunk of silage to
clog the blower; when it clogs up it sometimes kills the tractor
motor; when the blower clogs up I disengage the power take-off
by getting on the tractor and pulling the clutch clear down and
shutting the tractor off.

“Q. Why do you do that? A. You can’t stick your hands in
there without taking that off.

“Q. Could you take it apart with the power take-off running?
A. No. You could but it wouldn’t be safe.

“Q. So whenever it plugs up, you knew it wasn’t safe to be
fooling around in there so you would shut off the power take-off,
is that correct? A. That’s right.

940 Pe 7

“Q. Now when the silage came into the conveyer on the
accident load, you knew it was dangerous to put your hand in
there too, didn’t you? A. I didn’t put my hand in there.

“Q. You knew it would be dangerous if you did put your
hand in there? A. Yes.

“Q. You knew if you put your hand in there you were apt
to have it badly injured, didn’t you? A. That’s right.

ce ee

“Q. Now were all of the guards in place and all the shields
in place on this wagon? A. Except that one place where it had
been cut.

“Q. There was no shield for that as far as you know? A.
No.

“Q. Is it a fact the enlarging of the opening there would
permit the silage to come out more freely? A. Yes, I reckon it
would.”

Defendant Swenson testified without objection or contradic-
tion in the record:

“Q. Now, Mr. Swenson, there has been some talk here about
cutting away of the opening out of which the silage exits as it
goes into the chute and then into the blower, were you present
when that testimony was introduced? A. Yes.

“Q. I direct your attention to this drawing and you will
observe that it indicates that starting at the right-hand corner of
the opening as you face the side of the chuck wagon, that it
extends out for a distance and then it goes up into the left-hand
corner. Now do you have any notion how far it is from the
right-hand corner to the point where it starts to go upward? A.
I wouldn’t know exactly, I would judge somewhere between six
and eight inches I believe.

“Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the approximate size
of this opening out of which the silage exits? A. No, I never
measured it.

“When I bought the chuck wagon the opening was not as
shown in the illustration. The opening was straight across in-
stead of the diagonal cut. A change was made on this opening.

“Q. And by whom was that made? A. By the John Deere
Company.

| Le 941

“Q. Will you tell me the circumstances surrounding that
change? A. Well, I used this wagon the first year without this
modification and in the winter the dealer told me that he would
have—the dealer told me he would have to pick the wagon up
and put a modification on it and this was done, the web in the
bottom of the wagon or the apron also was reinforced at that
time, ** *

“Q. Did you make this modification? A. No I didn’t.

“Q. What did you do? A. I didn’t do anything, I didn’t
even know that the modification was out until they told me that
they were going to come and pick the wagon up.

“Q. What is the fact as to whether or not someone came and.
took the wagon? A. Yes, they did.

“Q. And who was that? A. Erlinson Implement at Albert
Lea.

“Q. And is Erlinson Implement Company a John Deere
dealer? A. Yes.

“Q. And is this where you bought this wagon? A. Yes,
that’s right.

“Q. And do I understand that they came and took thé
wagon? A. Yes,

“Q. And did they bring it back? A. Yes.

“Q. And was the wagon in the same condition when they
brought it back as when they took it? A. No, these changes
were made,

“Q. And what was the change? A. Well this modification
of enlarging the opening on the front conveyer and reinforcing
the slats on the bottom conveyer of the main wagon. * * *

“Q. And was it in the condition, in that condition the first
time Russell Knudtson operated the wagon? <A. Yes.”

At the time of the accident the extensions or side boards
were on the chuck wagon. See Exhibits DA and DD, supra.
This was in accord with the operator’s manual. See picture from
Exhibit 8, supra. Throughout the day the wagons had been
fully loaded.

To aid in an even flow of silage through the beaters and to
the conveyer and blower defendant Swenson had furnished a
long handled rake or three-tined fork. Plaintiff testified:

942 Es a

“When, a load was brought up, I would pick up the rake
and give it to whoever brought that load. The person that
brought the load in would use the rake on the silage at the top
to keep it even flowing. In connection with each operation the
driver of the tractor pulling the chuck wagon would pull it up,
or in other words, pull it into the blower and then I would lower
the conveyer that sticks out a couple feet or so. This is the
conveyer in the front end. I would lower the conveyer because
it would be right up against the chuck wagon. The driver would
stop where I would want him and I would take the power take-off.
As he drove up and stopped, I would lower the conveyer. This
is the conveyer on the front end; When the driver stopped, the
motor on his tractor would still be running and he either would
have the clutch in or the tractor would be out of gear. It had to
be one of the two when he stopped. I would then pull the
power take-off shaft out of the chain, bring it over to the tractor
and hook it up for them and then the driver would start his
power take-off. * * * After I have attached the power take-off
from the wagon to the tractor and the operator of the tractor
pushes down the clutch with his foot to engage the power take-
off. Next I would start the big apron that pushes the silage
ahead by raising the lever up. The conveyer in the front end of
the chuck wagon gets its power from the power take-off and the
conveyer is not controlled by the lever. It is connected with the
beaters which are also powered by the power take-off, the power
take-off of the tractor that is pulling- the wagon. The power
take-off runs the three beaters along with the front conveyer.
* * * after the operator of the tractor has engaged the power
take-off, he then gets off of the tractor and grabs the fork. He
uses the fork to scrape the high silage down. He does this by
pulling the fork down and towards him. In doing this he can
stand on- either side of the power take-off. After the load is
emptied, he would stop the power take-off and he would then
take off for the field. * * *

“When the accident happened it was Harlan Evenson’s
load. After he brought the load up and stopped the tractor, I
let, the conveyer down which was on the side. I then hooked up
the powér take-off for him. He then started. the power take-off
and engaged the clutch and then he walked around his tractor

ee 4s

and wagon and went on the other side. I did not know what he
was going to do. I did not hear him say anything about going
any place. After a while I saw that he had a tractor and wagon
and was headed for the field.

eee

“While I was in the process of unloading it, the silage came
down over the front end, some went in the conveyer, some went
on the ground and just as the silage came over the top and went
down, I hit the lever and put it in neutral. In other words I
put the apron in neutral, and it no longer moved. I am talking
about the big apron that moves the silage up. As I mentioned,
some of the silage went down in front of the chuck wagon and
what did not go down in front of the chuck wagon went in the
conveyer in the front end. Insofar as the conveyer in the front
end was concerned, the silage came out and stuck out 8 to 10
inches and the conveyer chain in the front went in under. The
silage that stuck out I just pushed down. In other words, after
this silage had fallen over the front of the wagon, some of the
silage continued to come out on the front conveyer. This caused
trouble in that so much came that it filled the hole clear up and
the beater and it stuck out about 10 inches. I pressed down on
it and my hand went like that. When I say it filled the hole, I
am. referring to the hole that is shown on this Exhibit DC. This
hole is the opening above the conveyer and it was plumb full.
The silage stuck out beyond about 8 or 10 inches. During this
time the conveyer that is shown in this Exhibit, in other words,
the front end conveyer continued to run.

“Q. And while it was running, was it continuing to take the
fodder out or not? A. Not when the big chunk came in there.
I stood right there.

“Q. After that big chunk came in there, was the fodder
coming out of the conveyer or was it running empty? A. The
conveyer chain was running empty. The silage was there. That’s
when I pushed down on it and my hand went in. * * *

“T pressed down with my right hand and I did not have to
move any place to do that. At the time I pushed down on this
silage, I could not see any of the beaters, This was because they
were full of silage. In pushing down I did not attempt to dig
it out, * * *

944 Le 7

“Q. You just tell us in your own words how you endeavored
to get that clogged silage to move on? A. Well, it stuck out 8,
10 inches and I pushed down and it took my hand at the same
time.

“Q. And in pushing down what were you endeavoring to do?
sae

“TI was trying to get the silage to move out. The reason I
pushed down in trying to get the silage to move out was so the
conveyor in the bottom would take it out. After Harlan Evenson
got off his tractor and left, there was no one helping me. I saw
the beater in there but at no time after it got clogged up before
my arm got caught in there did I see the beater itself. After it
had gotten clogged and I pushed down, I did not see the beater
at any time.”

Plaintiff's hand was caught in the beaters and he lost his
hand and part of his forearm.

Plaintiff testified that he was standing on level ground and
that it was a safe place to work. He also testified:

“Q. Were any of the tools with which you were supplied
mechanically wrong in any respect? A. No.

“Q. And you knew the operation of all the tools? A. Yes.

“Q, And you knew the function of each tool? A. Yes.

“Q. And what it was to be used for? A. Yes.”

’ Plaintiff was 59 years old. He was an experienced farm
worker. He testified: “I haven’t done much of anything other
than farming and working in a lumberyard. * * * I have-worked
around farm machinery ever since I was big enough and I am
thoroughly acquainted with power machinery.”

He had worked for Mr. Swenson filling silos in the fall
seasons of 1963 and 1964. He had done the same kind of work
with the same equipment in the same condition as on the day he
was injured. There was nothing new, unknown or unexpected
about the situation except putting his hand too close to the silage
beaters. He was within three or four steps of where he could
have shut off the power. He also testified:

“A part of the chunk came out of the hole and it stuck out
about 8 or ten inches.

“Q. How long was it there before you did anything?: A:

SO 945

Well, I don’t—I don’t think it was there very long sticking out
there and I pushed down on it and my hand was gone. .

“Q. When this thing came out about eight or ten inches,
where was the fork? A. The fork was hanging on the front end
of the wagon.

“Q. Could you have reached it with your left hand? A. Yes,
Teould.

“Q. Could you have taken the fork and pulled out the chunk
of silage out of the opening? A. Yes, I could.

“Q. You could have? A. Yes.

“Q. Did you do this? A. No,

nb

“Q. As the chunk was stuck in the opening the conveyer was
working against it trying to push it out, is that correct? A.
That’s right.

“The chunk of silage filled the opening; the beater is on the
right-hand side of the opening close to the edge of the opening.

“The beater is inside the wagon and the first tooth was about
a half inch inside the wagon.

“TI put my hand right up on top of the silage and pushed
down on it; I reached across the silage.

“Q. And pushed into it? A. No, I didn’t push into it, I
pushed down on the silage.

“Q. But you claim your hand did get inside the wagon?
A. The beater hit it.

“Q. Was it the beater inside the wagon? A. Yes.

“Q. Then can you tell me how the beater struck your arm
without getting it inside the wagon? A, I can’t tell you that.”

Hl As quoted, supra, plaintiff said “I didn’t put my hand in
there.” Of course, he did not intend to put his hand in machin-
ery where it would be cut off. However, the evidence is without
dispute that plaintiff voluntarily and without shutting off the
power put his hand into an accumulation of clogged silage in too
close proximity to moving and dangerous machinery.

There was no machinery moving toward the beaters from
where plaintiff stood. He neither fell nor was pulled into the
machinery. The only possible way for plaintiff to get his hand
in the machinery was.to put it there.

946 Le |

There was no showing of anything wrong.with the place to
work, There was no showing of anything wrong with the
machinery attributable to any of the defendants. There. was no
showing that, what plaintiff did was at the suggestion of anyone
or necessarily incident to his work. What he did was in direct
violation of the sign facing him from the end of the wagon.

Plaintiff claims that the chuck wagon was overloaded. He
said that he had mentioned the size of the loads to Swenson but
he does not mention any comment as to danger incident thereto,
On. cross-examination he said that his complaint was in 1963;
that nothing was done about it; that-he did- not complain in 1964
and that there was nothing unusual about the way the wagons
were loaded on the. day of the accident. He also. testified that
the accident load was about .one fourth unloaded when ‘the
accident occurred. If so, the wagon was not overloaded at the
time of the accident. There was no evidence that the wagons
had ever been loaded above the sideboards recommended in the
operator’s manual for use-in hauling fodder or that: clogging or
matting ordinarily resulted when the wagons were so loaded. The
silage that caused the clogging came from inside the wagon.
Plaintiff said he pushed down on the part that stuck out. The
beaters were inside the wagon. The only other moving parts
were moving out and not in. The conveyer was attempting to
move the silage away. If plaintiff pushed down on the silage in
the conveyer his hand would have been pulled away from the
beaters. The only way plaintiffs hand could have come in con-
tact with the beaters was for plaintiff to stick his hand inside the
wagon.

: Plaintiff also testified that after the accident Swenson said
it was his (Swenson’s) fault, he had overloaded the wagon.

Swenson denied ever admitting it was his fault. He did
testify that he told plaintiff “that if he felt they were overloaded
and had a case, I felt that he should go ahead and file.”

His sympathy for his injured workman is commendable but
it is far short of establishing actionable negligence proximately
causing plaintifi’s injury.

Plaintiff claims that defendant Evenson was negligent in
returning to the field rather than staying and helping plaintiff,
There is no claim of any act of misfeasance on his part.

a Le 947

‘There was no evidence of actionable negligence on the part
of any defendant, There was no evidence that anything any
defendant did or failed to do proximately caused plaintiff to
stick his hand in the machinery. The evidence is conclusive that
plaintiff's injury came about as a result of his.own voluntary act.

1. We have had many farm accident cases before us. We
have gone far in upholding awards where there was any evidence
to support a‘finding of liability. We have never gone so far as
to uphold an award so lacking in support as here. We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff but there must
be some evidence.

Our most recent review was ‘in Kregel v. Kann, 260 Iowa
1380, 152 N.W.2d 534. We said-at pages 1383, 1335:

“Tt is a settled rule that an employer must use reasonable
care to provide and maintain for his employees reasonably suit-
able and safe appliances, machinery and tools with which to
work.’ [Citations]

“However, the employer is not an insurer of the safety of the
tools, machinery or appliances, nor of the safety of the employee
in using the instrumentalities furnished but is only liable for
negligence. [Citations]

“The employer must exercise reasonable care to eliminate
dangers which are not the usual or ordinary incidents of the
service when he has exercised such care. [Citations] * * *

“While the duty of the employer to provide his employee
with reasonably safe tools with which to work is owed alike to
the young and old, skilled and unskilled, whether the employer
has performed such duty depends in some degree on the ex-
perience, maturity, intelligence and discretion of the employee.
[Citations] * * *

HI “The ground of defendant’s liability is not danger, but
negligence. Until we have a law such as Workmen’s Compensa-
tion applicable to farm employment there is no absolute liability
of the employer for injuries to his employee. Wagner y. Larson,
257 Towa 1202, 1211, 136 N.W.2d 312, 318.”

IL In Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 100 N.W.2d 624,
plaintiff was injured in a silo-filling operation. He was at-
tempting to reconnect parts that had come apart. The parts
were worn, did not fit properly and had become disconnected on

948 — 7

several prior occasions, including three or four times while the
same load was being unloaded that morning. Defendant was
fully aware of the condition. We held. there was substantial
evidence to support a finding of providing defective equipment
for plaintiff to work with. Neither the factual background nor
the holding supports plaintiff's position in the case before us
here.

III. In Von Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 99 N.W.2d
287, 79 A.L.R.2d 267, we upheld an award following a farm
machinery injury.’ Plaintiff had no prior experience with power
take-off machinery. Defendants had previously purchased and
installed a power take-off assembly for their tractor but had
never attached the shield that was furnished. They had neither
warned nor instructed plaintiff, Plaintiff slipped on muddy
ground, His sleeve was caught by a protruding fitting and his
arm was pulled into the machinery. There was substantial
evidence defendants were negligent in not furnishing plaintiff
reasonably safe machinery. They failed to install safety equip-
ment furnished them.

Such is not the case here.

IV. In Calkins v. Sandven, 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d 1,
plaintiff was injured when he tripped on rough ground or eorn-
eobs and his arm was caught in the moving parts of a self-unload-
ing farm wagon.’ Defendants were the manufacturer and owner
of the wagon. There was evidence of inadequate shielding of the
moving parts and of danger not open and obvious. In the case
at bar we have no claim against the manufacturer. In the cited
ease plaintiff had no previous experience with the equipment.
He had no warning as to hazards incident thereto. Defendant
owner had owned the equipment for two and one-half years and
“was much more familiar with the machine than plaintiff was.”

We held there was a:jury question as to negligence in failing
to provide a safe instrument with which to work and failing to
warn of danger. Neither situation is the issue here.

In the case at bar according to plaintiff’s own testimony we
have no comparable situation. Plaintiff was experienced, knew
all about the operation of the equipment and needed no-special
warning from his employer. He said he had a safe place to

ae o49

work. There was no claim of inadequate shielding. There was
nothing wrong with the machinery.

V. In Livingston v. Morarend, 260 Iowa 530, 149 N.W.2d
850, plaintiff was injured in a silo-filling accident. While a
hopper was being raised plaintiff was struck by the hitch ex-
tending from the end of the hopper. There was a conflict in the
evidence as to plaintiff's experience and familiarity with the
operation of the equipment. There was testimony that there
was an accumulation of hay and debris covering the protruding
hitch. Plaintiff testified that he was not aware of the protruding
hitch. Defendants had given no instruction or warning.

‘We described the evidence as thin but concluded that it was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that defendants failed in proper
precautions for the safety of the workers, The case at bar has
even less factual support.

We cannot let our sympathy for an injured worker or imagi-
nation in searching for evidence of negligence go beyond our
previous holdings.

VI. Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 186 N.W.2d 312,
involved injuries suffered in a silo unloader. We reviewed the
evidence and the authorities and set aside a judgment against
the employer for lack of evidence of negligence. We refused to
hold the farm employer negligent in failing to exercise the
judgment that might be expected of a mechanical or safety
engineer. Loe. cit. 1218. That case affords no help for plaintiff
herein.

VIL. In Lockwood v. Wiltgen, 251 Iowa 484, 101 N.W.2d
724, we considered causal connection between negligence and
plaintiffs injury. The two incidents were only seconds apart.
We said: “The evidence was sufficient to support a finding by
the jury that these two incidents were so connected that the
first was a proximate cause of the second.” (Loe. cit. 492)

HH In the case at bar defendant Swenson’s custom in load-
ing wagons in the field, not. even established as negligence, was
too remote to be a proximate cause of plaintiff putting his hand
in the moving parts of the machinery when a wagon was being
unloaded.

| | VIII. Plaintiff claims defendant Evenson was negligent
in returning to the field instead of remaining to help unload the

950 De az

silage. At the most Evenson’s departure was an act of non-
feasance. There is no evidence that he was ignoring any in-
structions from Juveland for whom he was working or Swenson,
who, as contractor, was in charge: He was not derelict in the
performance of any duty assigned to him by anyone in authority.

It appeared without controversy that as the loads were
brought in: from the field the drivers would ordinarily help un-
load and that Evenson did so. The first day plaintiff told Bven-
son to be there and rake, Evenson was not there all the time
and there is no evidence that plaintiff had any authority to direct
the duties of the several workers or that Evenson by helping
fork silage assumed any continuing duty relative thereto. When
Evenson left for the field before the-accident plaintiff saw him
go. Plaintiff made no complaint but continued his work alone.

HI in Wendland v. Berg, 188 Iowa 202, 174 N.W. 410, this
appears: “It is a general rule, recognized in this state, that an
agent is not personally liable to a third party for mere non-
feasance.” (Loe. cit. 204)

_In Emery & Company v. American Refrigerator Transit
Co., 193. Iowa 93, 184 N.W. 750, 20 A.L.R, 86, nonfeasance is
distinguished from misfeasance and malfeasance, and this ap-
pears: “The courts recognizing this distinction hold, as a gen-
eral rule, that the agent is liable to his principal for nonfeasance
—that is, for an entire failure to perform his contract with his
principal; but that for such nonfeasance a third party cannot
recover from the agent.” (Loe. cit. 98)

. There is nothing in this record to support an award against
Evenson. Juveland, the farm owner, had nothing to do with the
accident except through his helper Evenson.

. | IX. Generally questions of negligence, contributory
negligence and proximate cause are for the jury; it is only in
exceptional cases that they. may be decided as matters of law.
Rule 344(f) (10), Rules of Civil Procedure. This does not mean
that evidence is unnecessary or that uncontradicted facts to the
eontrary may be ignored. The trier of the facts may choose to
disbelieve testimony but that does not bolster a requirement that
is nonexistent.

The record before us is insufficient to support a finding, of

See 951

actionable negligence or proximate cause. Defendants’ motions
for directed verdict should have been sustained.

The trial court found that there was no merit in defendants’
claim that plaintiff was contributorially negligent. Because of
our other conclusions we need not discuss this issue,

X. Judicial sympathy is a commendable quality but in an
action founded in tort we do not believe it has ever stood so
alone in support of recovery of damages.

In Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, 147° Towa’ 640, 644, 126
N.W. 779, 781, 80 L.R.A.; N.S., 517, 140 Am: St. Rep. 336, this
appears : “* * * To so hold would be to open the door to a ruinous
flood of litigation. Occasions will arise when it would seem that
such a recovery is demanded in the interests of justice, but it is
better that the exceptional wrong should sometimes go un-
requited ‘than to abrogate a rule which in the vast majority of
cases has a salutary effect. * * *.”

As Harvard Law Dean Griswold has said, “The law and the
publie are poorly served when the Court judges a case to bring
on a result it seeks.”

The case is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter
judgment for defendants.—Reversed and remanded.

Larson; Mooke, Sruarr and LuGranp, JJ., concur.

Rawuines, J., Garvieip, C.J., and Mason and Bzcxsr, JJ.,
dissent,

Rawiines, J.—It is impossible for me to agree with the
reasoning set forth or conclusions reached by the majority in this
case, particularly with reference to the matter of liability on the
part of defendant Swenson. I therefore have no choice but to
dissent,

Certain established principles which should govern appellate
review in.cases of this nature are:

(1) The trial court’s findings of fact have the standing of a
spécial verdict equivalent to that of a jury and, will not be dis-
turbed if supported by substantial evidence. Also, we view all
evidence presented in that light most favorable to the judgment
of the trial court, in this case most favorably to plaintiff. Rule
344(f) (1), R.C.P.; Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corporation,

952 Es a

260 Iowa 859, 866, 151 N.W.2d 477, 483; and Marean v. Peter-
sen, 259 Iowa 557, 144 N.W.2d 906, 909.

(2) Generally, questions of negligence, contributory negli-
gence and proximate cause are for the jury (trier of the facts) ;
it is only in exceptional cases that they may be decided as matters
of law, Rule 344(£) (10), R.C.P.

(8) Credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given
their testimony should here rest with the trial court, not with us.
Verschoor v. Miller, 259 Iowa 170, 143 N.W.2d 385, 389.

The factual situation as described by the majority is sub-
stantially correct, but the findings based on those facts, adverse
to plaintiff, are for the most part, in my humble opinion, either
without foundation or a de novo substitute for those reached by
the trier of the facts.

Illustrative is the statement made in the majority opinion
to the effect that at time of accident the wagon was about one
fourth unloaded, and if so it was not overloaded at time of the
accident. I submit this is a suppositional conclusion not borne
out by the record.

Actually the evidence discloses the wagons here concerned
are equipped with a steel cleated belt-like apron at the bottom
which moves the load of silage forward to where it is engaged by
the beaters.

This factually means the load normally moves forward en
masse, neither feeding off the top nor the bottom. As a result,
an overloaded wagon remains so from start to finish.

Also, on this matter of overloading, the record reveals
plaintiff testified defendant Swenson, after the accident, twice
admitted it was his fault because he had overloaded the wagons.
The trier of the facts apparently accepted that statement as true.

Throwing some additional light on this subject, the discovery
deposition of defendant Evenson, received in evidence, discloses
that in his opinion the size of the loads would be called over-
loading. He also said overloading has a tendency to throw excess
silage down on the conveyer or over the outside of the box, excess
silage thrown on the conveyer can plug up the conveyer belt, and
under these circumstances the conveyer belt would still operate
but the silage would just stick in there.

Pe Pe 958

The record also reveals defendant Swenson, working in the
field, decided when the wagons were filled. However, as a witness
he denies the wagons were overloaded, could not recall any com-
plaints made by plaintiff, and does not believe he ever said the
accident was his fault.

The trial court found plaintiff to be a truthful person, one
who would not deviate from the truth in the slightest degree to
serve his own purpose, and accorded a great deal of weight and
eredence to his testimony. Apparently the majority does not
entirely agree.

I. One of the real issues presented in plaintiff’s action
against Swenson, his employer, is whether overloading the
wagons was a proximate cause of the accident.

By his answer Swenson denies any overloading. As affirma-
tive defenses he asserts plaintiff assumed risk of danger in at-
tempting to clean silage from the conveyer mechanism while in
operation, and was contributorially negligent. The burden of
proof was upon Swenson to prove these defenses by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. See rule 344(f)(5), (6), R.C.P., and
Erickson v. Erickson, 250 Iowa 491,-495-499, 94 N.W.2d 728,

The trial court found Swenson failed to meet this burden.
The majority now holds otherwise.

. Although the case of Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 100
N.W.2d 624, involved defective machinery, the principles of law
there expressed are here applicable and in large part deter-
minative. For that reason I shall quote extensively from the
cited case, referring to it occasionally as Frederick,

II. Dealing with the matter of assumption of risk this
court said in Frederick, supra, loc. cit., 251 Iowa 296: “* * * we
think assumption of risk does not appear as a matter of law and
it was proper to submit this issue to the jury. It is an affirmative
defense and the burden to prove it rested upon defendant.
Brickson v. Hrickson, 250 Iowa 491, 498,-94 N.W.2d 728, 732, and
citations; Jackson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 238 Iowa
1258, 1261, 30 N.W.2d 97, 102, and citations. It is seldom a
party who has the burden on such an issue establishes it as a
matter of law. Jackson case and citations; Ruble v. Carr, 244
Towa 990, 993, 994, 59 N.W.2d 228, 230, 231, and ‘citations:

954 es —

“Tf defendant was negligent in the respect: alleged plaintiff
did not assume the risk of injury therefrom by continuing in the
work unless in the usual and ordinary course of his employment
it ‘was his duty to repair the equipment or remedy the defect

. therein, and even if such were his duty, he assumed no risk
therefrom unless the-danger from its use was imminent so a
reasonably: prudent person would not continue in the work.
Section 88.14, Code, 1958, quoted in. Hrickson v. Hrickson, supra,
at page 501 .of 250 Iowa, page 733 of 94 N.W.2d, as construed
by the Erickson decision and others therein cited, so provides:
Johnson vy. Kinney, 232 Iowa 1016, 1020,-7 N.W.2d 188, 191, 144
A.L.R..997, 1001, and citations. This statute states it is not to be
construed to include risks incident to the employment.” .

Assumption :of tisk not only presupposes some danger but a
reasonable opportunity to ascertain the nature of the risk and
anh appreciation of that risk. See Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa
557, 144 N.W.2d 906, 912-913; Pierce -v. United States, 142
F.Supp. 721, 727, affirmed 235. F.2d 466; Restatement, Second,
Torts, section 496D; and- Prosser, Law of Torts, Hombook
Series, Third Iid., pages 461-468.

Factually the record discloses that when plaintiff first re-
alized Evenson was not going to help unload, the latter was 20-30
rods away, the machinery was making considerable noise, and
neither Swenson nor anyone else was available to whom he could
report or turn for help. «Furthermore, Evenson had been gone
only about three minutes before the accident occurred.

I am satisfied assumption of: risk is not shown here as a
matter of law. By the same token it cannot logically be said the
trial court erred in concluding, as trier of the facts, this defense
was not established: by the requisite degree of proof. See rule
344(f) (5), (6), (10), R.C.P., and Oltmanns v. Driver, 252 Iowa
1066, 1074, 109 .N.W.2d: 446.

° III. Neither is it apparent to me, as a matter of law,
plaintiff was contributorially negligent or that the trial court
erred in concluding the evidence failed to support this affirmative
defense. Reference i is again made to rule 344(f) (5), (6), (20),
RCP. :

Section 463, Restatement, Second, Torts, defines contributory

negligence as, “* * * conduct on the part of the plaintiff which

Pe Le 955

falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own
protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating
with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plain-
tiff’s harm.” See also Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa 557, 144
N_W.2d 906, 912, and Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 258 Iowa
608, 614, 188 N.W.2d 843.

Of course, since we are here dealing with an action by an
employee against his employer, contributory negligence, if estab-
lished, goes only to mitigation of damages and would in no event
bar the employee's right of recovery. Rule 97, R.C.P.

On that point, Frederick, supra, loc. cit., 251 Iowa 297, 298
states: “Since this is an action by an employee against an em-
ployer to recover for negligence plaintiff was not required to
plead or prove his freedom from contributory negligence but de-
fendant might plead and prove contributory negligence in
mitigation of damages. Rule 97, Rules of Civil Procedure;
Erickson. v. Erickson, supra, 250 Iowa 491, 495, 496, 94 N.W.2d
728, 730, and citations. Defendant’s answer alleges the injury
was caused, or contributed to, by plaintiff’s negligence. The trial
court submitted to the jury the issue of plaintiff's contributory
negligence in mitigation of damages. This was proper. Johnson
vy. Kinney, supra, 232 Iowa 1016, 1020, 7 N.W.2d 188, 191, 144
A.LR. 997, 1002, and citations.”

The trial court found, as a fact, plaintiff was not contrib-
utorially negligent. With this finding we should not interfere.

IV. In so determining the issue of contributory negligence
I am not unmindful of the fact a relatively small metal plate
affixed to the subject chuck wagon provided in part:

“BE CAREFUL

1 ee
Qe #*
8. When mechanism becomes clogged

disconnect power before cleaning.
4 **#

5, # # HD
. But this alone should not serve to preclude recovery in the
instant case.
Ordinarily, in order to be sufficient, a warning or instruction
should be so plain or explicit the servant will understand and

956 — 7

appreciate the danger, know how to avoid it by the exercise of
reasonable care, and where extraordinary risks may be en-
countered the servant should be warned of their character and
extent as soon as possible. A mere general warning of dangers to
be encountered by the servant is not sufficient, and an insufficient
warning is in legal effect no warning at all, A warning or in-
struction as to certain dangers is not sufficient to put the servant
on notice as to other danger or varying perils. See Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Walker, Okla., 269 P.2d 327, 331-332;
Beaumont, S. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Schmidt, 128 Tex. 580, 72
8.W.2d 899, 902; Sadler v. Lynch, 192 Va. 344, 64 S.H.2d 664,
666; and 56 O.J.S., Master and Servant, section 290, page 1052.
And see Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59
N.W.2d 907, 917-918, and Blue v. Drackett Products Co., Fla.
App., 143 So.2d 897, 899.

The record affirmatively reveals plaintiff did not attempt to
physically clean the mechanism. As disclosed, infra, he reacted
to the stimulus of the moment and rather than attempt to clean
out material clogged in the mechanism or box, pushed down on
the protruding fodder under an apparent impression the machine
itself would then start movement of the silage and effect a self-
cleaning process, This it did with the result plaintiff's right
hand was caught in the machinery.

Admittedly an employer is under no duty to warn an em-
ployee of obvious dangers, hazards which should be reasonably
appreciated, miatters of common knowledge, or. operation of
natural forces in the performance of simple tasks. See Anderson
v. Sheuerman, 232 Iowa 705, 710, 6 N.W.2d 125.

But here it cannot be said, as a matter of law, the danger
was obvious, and in any event any peril existing was not at-
tendant upon performance of a simple task.

A warning must be fair and adequate to the end a user, by
exercise of reasonable care, is fairly and adequately notified of
possible consequences attending the use of a given product or
instrumentality.

Furthermore, ‘presence of an ambiguous or uncertain warn-
ing by master to servant, like negligence, proximate cause and
contributory negligence, is ordinarily an issue determinable by

a | 957

the trier of the facts. See rule 344(f)(10), R.C.P.; McGee v.
Clearwater Mfg. Co., 214 S.C. 495, 58 S.H.2d 393, 395; and
Hyland Hall & Co. v. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Wis.2d 238,
105 N.W.2d 305, 310.

In the instant case the warning plate affixed to the wagon
by the manufacturer, upon which Swenson apparently relies, was
not as a matter of law so clear and certain as to include the
danger consequent upon mere pressure on silage protruding from
the conveyer box. Under these conditions the matter of notice or
warning was a matter determinable by the trial court. It should
not. be factually resolved by us on appeal.

Implied in the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial
court is a finding the warning by the manufacturer, relied on by
Swenson as aforesaid, was not so reasonably plain and explicit as
to put plaintiff on notice of any danger attendant upon pressing
down on the silage which protruded from the cloggéd conveyer
box.

I submit, under the circumstances we are bound by this
inherent finding.

V. Also, in my opinion, the trial court’s conclusion, that
negligence of Swenson in overloading the wagons was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident and plaintiff's resultant injury, is both
legally proper and supported by substantial evidence,

Of course, negligence itself is irrelevant in the absence of
some causal connection between it and the injury.

In Frederick, supra, loc. cit., 251 Iowa 298-299, we stated on
the matter of proximate cause:

“In considering the causal relation necessary to respons-
ibility for negligence the general rules are set out in Restate-
ment, Torts, sections 480 to 435. Christensen v. Sheldon, 245
Towa 674, 682, 63 N.W.2d 892, 897, 48 A.L.R.2d 522,

“Section 431 of the Restatement says: ‘The actor’s negligent
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the
manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.’

“We have used this language quite similar to that just
quoted: ‘Nor will the fact that some other cause operates with
the defendant’s negligence to produce the injury relieve the

958 Le a

defendant if the, injurious result is traceable in some material
degree to his want of due care [citations].’ (Emphasis added.)
Swaim v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., supra, 187 Iowa 466, 471,
174 N.W. 384, 386 (certiorari denied 252 U.S. 577, 40 S.Ct. 344,
64 L.Ed. 725). In considering the issue of proximate cause we
have frequently cited the Swaim case with approval.

“Section 485, Restatement, Torts, provides: ‘If the actor’s
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another,
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable.’ [Emphasis supplied.]

“Much the same thought.is expressed in many of our opin-
ions. Priebe v. Kossuth County Agricultural Assn., Inc., 251 Iowa
93, 100, 99 N.W.2d 292, 296, in referring to actionable negligence,
states ‘it is not necessary that defendant could have foreseen the
particular injury that resulted provided it should have foreseen
its omission to act would probably result in injury of some kind
to some person [citations].’ To like effect is Chenoweth v.
Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 16, 99 N.W.2d 810, 818; Gray v. City of Des
Moines, 221 Iowa 596, 599, 265 N.W. 612, 618, 104 A.L.R. 1228,
1230 ; Godbey v. Grinnell Electric & Heating Co., 190 Iowa 1068,
1076, 181 N.W. 498, and citations. * * *

“Section 443 of the Restatement expresses the rule on which
plaintiff places special reliance:

“‘An intervening act of a human being or animal which is a
normal response to the stimulus of a situation created by the
actor’s negligent conduct, is not a superseding cause of harm to
another.which the actor’s conduct is a substantial Factor in bring-
ing about, [Emphasis supplied.]

. “Comment: a. The rule stated in this Section applies tlie
to acts done by the person who is harmed * * *. It is not neces-
sary that an act which is done by the person harmed or by a
third person should be “reasonable”; that is, that the act should
be one which:a reasonable man would regard as not involving an
unreasonable risk to himself or others. * * * If it be done by the
person who is harmed and is unreasonable in the sense above
stated, it may amount to contributory negligence which as such
prevents him from recovering (see section 467), but the actor’s

a 959

negligent conduct is none the less the legal cause of the
harm, * * *?

“Comment b under section 443 further clarifies what has
just been quoted. To like effect are section 447(c) and Comment
h thereunder.

“We find little dissent from recognition by the courts of the
rule expressed in section 448, Restatement, Torts. We are not
persuaded we should disagree with it. The rule appears to be
applicable here and to support submission to the jury of the issue
of proximate cause.”

See also Restatement, Second, Torts, sections 440-443
and 447.

In the ease at- hand Swenson alone determined when the
wagons were ready to be hauled to the silo, And reasonable
minds could conclude clogging of the conveyer box was traceable
in some material degree and attendant to lack of due care by this
defendant in overloading.

As previously indicated, the fact that Swenson may not have
foreseen the specific harm which could and did result does not
negate the fact that overloading was a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury which ultimately resulted to plaintiff.

And, as heretofore disclosed, the consequence of a negligent
act need not be foreseen, it being sufficient if the injuries re-
sulting are the natural, though not a necessary or inevitable
result of the wrong.

In the instant case the evidence created a jury issue as to
proximate cause which was resolved adverse to defendant
Swenson by the trier of the facts. Under the circumstances this
determination should be binding upon us. See rule 344(f) (10),
R.C.P.; Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., supra, loc. cit., 258
Towa 613; Lockwood v, Wiltgen, 251 Iowa 484, 489-491, 101
N.W.2d 724; Chenoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 16-18, 99 N.W.2d
310; Bell v. Brown, 214 Iowa 3870, 377, 239 N.W. 785; and
Prosser, Law of Torts, Hornbook Series, Third Ed., pages 290-
291,

VI. The majority, as heretofore stated, factually deter-
mines plaintiff put his arm in the beater area. This view ap-
parently stems from Swenson’s claim the plaintiff was injured

960 Le a

in a manner physically impossible under the evidence. In taking
that position he attempts to invoke the physical fact rule.

This contention appears to be based on the theory the trial
court inferentially found plaintiff did not voluntarily place his
hand and arm into the conveyer box where the beaters are
located. Seemingly Swenson argues the physical facts disclose
otherwise.

At the outset I am persuaded the physical fact rule, even if
applicable, is of no benefit to this defendant,

In Stevens v. Gear, 240 Iowa 1348, 1353, 39 N.W.2d 408,
this court said: “The ‘physical fact rule’ is well-established and
sound, But it applies ‘only where the existence of such facts and
their connection with the question at issue is established or ad-
mitted; and proof of such nature cannot be construed to estab-
lish a particular conclusion as a matter of law unless the facts
and circumstances lead to but one conclusion to the exclusion of
all others.’ 32 C.J.S., Evidence, section 1031, page 1074.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

Repetition of the evidence as to plaintiff's actions imme-
diately prior to the accident is unnecessary, Briefly stated it
does not disclose, as a matter of law, plaintiff did anything other
than as he testified, and the facts do not unavoidably lead to a
conclusion, to the exclusion of all others, he © placed his hand in
the.mechanism or conveyer box.

It is just as reasonable to assume his pressing down on the
protruding silage caused that located inside the enclosure to be
loosened thereby freeing the beaters which then, pushing down-
ward, created a pulling force on the protruding material akin to
a suction action, which in turn caused the silage plaintiff was
pressing upon to be pulled momentarily inward, taking with it
plaintiff’s hand and arm.

Nothing disclosed in the record makes plaintiff's version of
the accident. impossible or improbable. Neither does it serve to
make the trial court’s conclusions on this subject erroneous.

VII. No apparent useful purpose will be served by engag-
ing in an extended discussion of the majority opinion holding
defendants Juveland and Evenson not liable as a matter of law.

SS °°:

I would affirm, at least as to the judgment entered against
defendant Swenson.

Garrmip, C.J., and Mason and Becker, JJ., join in this
dissent.

La Morte InpePenpent Scuoou District ; ZwIncLE INDEPENDENT
Scroor Disrricr; and Orrer Crezx TowNnsuie ScHoon
District, appellants, v. Jackson County Boarp
or Epvucation et al., appellees (three
eases consolidated).

No, 52688.
(Reported in, 155 N.W.2d 423)

January 9, 1968.
-Revxrarine Deniep Marcx 5, 1968.

Gilloon, Klauer, Stapleton & Ernst, by Michael A. Stapleton,
of Dubuque, for appellants.

Schoenthaler, Schoenthaler & Roberg, by LaVern Roberg, of
Maquoketa, for appellee Jackson County, Iowa, Board of Educa-
tion.

Rawuines, J.—We are here confronted with another, and
this time three-in-one, controversy involving reorganization of
school districts,

Trial court sustained motions to dismiss three identical peti-
tions challenging attachment orders by the Jackson County
Board of Education, affirmed by State Board of Public In-
struction, and plaintiff districts appeal, all cases being con-
solidated for that purpose. We affirm.

Ss

April 1, 1966, the three plaintiff school districts, La Motte,
Zwingle and Otter Creek, were not in a district having a school
with twelve grades. See section 275.1, Code of Iowa.

April 2, defendant board of education, entered orders at-
taching each plaintiff district to a designated community school
district. These orders were filed April 18 with the State Board
of Public Instruction. June 16 these actions were approved by
the State Board, effective July 1.

Each plaintiff school district appealed to the district court
challenging attachment orders entered by the county board.

The petition in each case is identical, Count I challenges
attachment actions taken on various alleged grounds. Count II
assails constitutionality of the board actions and basis upon
which taken.

By identical motions to dismiss defendant county board
contended the petitions in each ease failed to state any claim for
which relief could be granted. All three motions were sustained,
plaintiff districts elected to stand on their pleadings, and appeals
followed.

I. The sole error relied on for reversal by plaintiff districts
is, “The Court erred in sustaining the Motion to Dismiss”. This
is followed by no divisions or specific brief points. Standing
alone it is no more than an omnibus or catchall assignment
followed by a limited brief and argument relating only to Count
I of the motions to dismiss.

Under existing cireumstances our review is granted as a
matter of grace, and will be confined to the matter assigned and
argued. See rule 344(a)(4) (Third), R.C.P.; Quint-Cities
Petroleum Co. v. Maas, 259 Iowa 122, 143 N.W.2d 345, 347; and
Steele v. Northup, 259 Iowa 448, 143 N.W.2d 302, 304-305,

Hl Il. Where, as in this case, a doubtful pleading is chal-
lenged before issues are. joined, it will be resolved against the
pleader. Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 260 Iowa
1145, 1128, 152 N.W.2d 248, 256; Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 256
Towa 27, 29, 126 N.W.2d 350; Anthes v. Anthes, 255 Iowa 497,
508, 122 N.W.2d 255; and Eaton v. Downey, 254 Iowa 573, 579,
118 N.W.2d 583.

III. Also, a timely motion to dismiss should be sustained
where the challenged pleading fails to state a claim on which any

6

relief asked can be allowed, Rule 104, R.C.P., and Hinrichs v.
Iowa State Highway Commission, supra.

TV. As heretofore revealed, the only question presented on
this appeal is whether Count I of each petition states a cause of
action on which any relief can be accorded.

No useful purpose will be served by setting forth the grounds
alleged by plaintiff districts upon which relief is requested. ~

Each petition consists of nothing more nor less than bare
legal conclusions which individually and collectively culminate
in the assertion defendant county board either acted unwisely or
failed to exercise sound judgment.

The prayer, ultimately asserted by each plaintiff district, is
that, (1) attachment to either the Andrew Community School
District or Maquoketa Community School District be disap-
proved; and (2) they be ordered attached to the Dubuque Com-
munity School District.

HH It is of course understood a party must plead ultimate

facts, not mere legal conclusions alone. See Winneshiek Mutual
Ins. Assn. v. Roach, 257 Iowa 354, 367-368, 182 N.W.2d 436, and
citations.
* EE" Furthermore, we have repeatedly taken the position it is
not within the province of our courts to-weigh the wisdom of
legislative action by school boards acting pursuant to proper
statutory authority. Davies vy. Monona County Bd. of Ed., 257
Towa 985, 995-996, 185 N.W.2d 663; Green v. Webster County
Bd. of Ed.; 253 Towa 1198, 1200-1201, 115 N.W.2d 856; and In
re Community Sch. Dist. of Malvern, 250 Towa 1240, 1243-1246,
98 N.W.2d 737.

| | And, as this court has consistently ‘held, we can inter-
fere in these local legislative matters only where it is alleged and
appears a school board has exceeded its jurisdiction, or any chal-
lenged action taken by it is arbitrary, unreasonable and without
support in the record. See In re Lone Tree Community School
District, 260 Iowa 719, 724, 150 N.W.2d 687, 640, and Board of
Directors v. County Bd, of. Hd. 257 Iowa 106, 113-114, 131
N.W.2d 802.

HV. The prayer of a petition must always be examined
to determine what constitutes the subject matter of litigation for
judicial purposes, and generally the relief to be afforded is ac-

ee 965

cordingly limited. Rauch v. Senecal, 253 Iowa 487, 490, 112
N.W.2d 886; In re Estate of Hoelscher, 249 Iowa 444, 449, 87
N.W.2d 446; and Federal Land Bank v. Jefferson, 229 Iowa 1054,
1057, 295 N.W. 855, 182 A.L.R. 1282. Incidentally, see also
Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 1112,
109 N.W.2d 695; Ashby v. School ‘Township of Liberty, 250 Iowa
1201, 1206, 98 N.W.2d 848; and Henry Walker Park Assn. v.
Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246, 1257-1259, 91 N.W.2d 703.

HM sVI. In praying, (1) the orders, legislative in nature,
entered by defendant county board be set aside, absent some
declared action in excess of jurisdiction or which is arbitrary,
unreasonable and without support in the record, plaintiffs ask a
remedy which cannot be accorded by the courts of this state; and
(2) that a court attach them to some district other than that
determined upon by proper authority, they seek relief legislative
in nature which we cannot grant. .

In support of the foregoing see In re Lone Tree Community
School District, supra, loc. cit., 260 Iowa 725-726, 150 N.W.2d
641, and citations.

VII. Plaintiffs allege no ultimate facts upon which any
relief prayed could be granted.

Affirmed on all appeals.

All Justices coneur except Broxer, J., who takes no part.

Srare or Iowa, ex rel. Ray A. Fenton, Polk County Attorney,
appellee, v. ARTHUR Downtne and State Boarp or Socran
‘WeELraRE (members), appellants.

No. 52817.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 517)

$
& | . : -_ bd ay [|
re

January 9, 1968,
Researme Denmep, Maron 5, 1968.

Richard OC. Turner, Attorney General, and Lorna Lawhead
Williams, Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.

968 es

Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney, and C. L. Becker, Assis-
tant County Attorney, for appellee.

SNELL, J.—This is an appeal in a civil action in the nature
of Quo Warranito challenging the authority of the State Board of
Social Welfare to discharge the Polk County Welfare Diréctor
for refusing to accept a transfer to a position with the State
Board.

There is no conflict in the evidence, There was evidence in
connection with preliminary matters but the issues were decided.
on adjudication of law points. From an adverse determination
the State Board and the members thereof have appealed.

Leland Ahern has been Polk County Director of Social Wel-
fare for about 20 years. His qualifications for the position are
not challenged. There has been no criticism of his administration
nor complaint about the administration of the office. In the
opinion of members of the county board satisfactory replacement.
would be difficult. .

The funds for the various welfare programs administered in
Polk County by and through the county board under the super-
vision of the State Board in 1966 were derived from the following
sources : :

Federal contribution  $4,511,645.71
State contribution $2,461,277.97
County contribution — $1,126,337.96

While not the major contributor the county has a substantial
interest therein.

The Polk County Board has 140 employees supervised by
the county director.

Sometime prior to March 15, 1967, the State Board at-
tempted to assign Mr. Ahern to another position. He did not
accept the reassignment. Thereupon the State Board gave notice
that he was discharged effective March 15, 1967.

Within a few days this'action on the relation of the county
attorney of Polk County was brought.

The trial court held that the members of the State Board
exeéeded their authority in attempting to discharge Mr. Ahern.
Relief implementing this conclusion was granted.

es 969

The State Board and the members thereof will be referred to
as appellant.

Appellant attacked and now attacks plaintiff’s position and
the trial court’s ruling from many angles and separate premises,
including what the law should be for efficient administration.
Many authorities are cited.

‘We commend the resourcefulness, diligence and research of
appellant’s counsel, but this cannot overcome what the legislature
has said.

| | In the field of legislative interpretation it is not for us
to rule according to what the legislature might have said. We
must rule according to the meaning of what the legislature has
said and done.

Defendant-appellant in the motion for adjudication of law
points raised many propositions and asserted that a ruling on the
motion would dispose of the entire proceedings. The trial court
agreed but did not consider it necessary .to rule on all of the
many points of law raised.

The ruling was confined to the points essential to disposition,

We agree with the trial court and affirm,

The basic and ultimate question is-the power of the State
Board to remove a county director, -by transfer or otherwise, at
the diseretion of the board.

The trial court in a written opinion ably and extensively
considered the issues, statutes and appropriate authorities. We
adopt much therefrom.

I. As an agency of the State, appellant claims im-
munity from suit. Where the purpose of the suit is to require
the officers and agents of the State to perform their duties, there
ig no immunity recognized, Collins v. State Board of Social
Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 373, 81 N.W.2d 4. An agency of the
State is not immune from a suit seeking to require the members
1o perform their duties according to law. Collins v. Board,
supra; Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 287, 181 A.L.R.
335. In Pierce v. Green, supra, at page 33 of the Iowa Reports,
the court said, quoting from Hoover v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 207 Iowa 56, 61, 222 N.W. 488: “Clearly, the power
of the courts to restrain state officials from violating plain pro-
visions of the statute and Constitution is in no way derogatory

970 a

to the géneral and well recognized rule that the state cannot be
sued without its consent.” This principle applies squarely to the
case before us. If the statute does not empower the State Board
to remove a-County Director, then doing so or attempting to do
so is a violation of the statute.

HI Il. Appellant contends that this action is barred by

estoppel, waiver and laches. The necessary elements for the ap-
plication of these doctrines: are wholly lacking. There was not
even any delay in starting this action. It was started within a
few days after the attempted discharge by the State Board.
III. It is argued by appellant that without the
power to discharge, the State Board may fail to comply with
Federal requirements for participation in Federal funds; Theré
is nothing in the record before us to so indicate and the question
is not before us. In any event that is‘a matter for the considera-
tion of the legislature with which this court cannot interfere.
“This court has no power to write into the statute words which
are not there.” Iowa Public Service Co, v. Rhode, 230 Iowa 751,
754, 298 N.W. 794. °

HE IV. Appellant argues that the court has no authority
to-interfere with a discretionary act of an administrative board.
That is true as a general proposition but it does not follow that
the court may not interfere when an administrative board at-
tempts to act beyond its power. ©

V. . Appellant’s- counsel has ably and éxhaustively
briefed and argued the principles and incidents of the common
Jaw relationship of employer and employee: But neither the
State Board nor the County Board are persons, either private o
corporate. They are creatures of statute. They owe their ex-
istence to the statute, and have those powers and duties, and only
those powers and duties, given them by the language of the
statute. Therefore, rules of statutory construction must be
applied, and the common law rules of agency, master and servant,
ete., are not controlling. .

In determining the meaning of a word in a statute,
the statute should be considered as a whole. ‘State v. Bauer, 236
Iowa 1020, 20 N.W.2d' 431. In determining the meaning of
“employ” as used’ in section 284.12 it is helpful to consider the
language of ‘section 234.6: “Section 234.12 provides that: “The

eS ott

county board shall employ a county director and such other
personnel * * *.” Section 234.6 provides: “It [the State Board]
may employ necessary personnel.” Thus, two separate employers
are created by the statute, the state board and the county board,
and two classes of employees, state board employees and county
board employees. Persons employed under the authority of
section 234.6 are employees of the state board. It must follow
that those employed under the authority of section 234.12 are
employees of the county board.

VI. The statutory law involved is found in chapter 234,
Code of Iowa.

Section 234.2 provides:

“State department of social welfare. There is hereby
ereated a state department of social welfare which shall consist
of a state board of social welfare, and such other officers and
employees as may be hereafter provided.”

Section 234.6 outlines the power and duties of the state board
and provides, among other things, “The state board shall * * *
exercise general supervision over the county boards of social wel-
fare and their employees.”

Section 234.9 provides that the board of supervisors of each
county shall appoint a county board of social welfare, The
statute provides for the membership of the board.

Section 234.12 provides:

“County board employees. The county board shall employ
a county director and such other personnel as is necessary for
the performance of its duties. The number of employees shall be
subject to the approval of the state board. The county director
and all employees shall be selected solely on the basis of the fit-
ness for the work to be performed, with due regard to experience
and training. * * * ”

Prior to July 4, 1959, section 284.12 also provided procedure
by which the state board might direct the discharge of a county
board appointee. Chapter 172, Laws of the Fifty-eighth General
Assembly, struck that part of the statute with the result that the
chapter is now silent as to who may discharge the county director.

Appellant relies heavily upon our holding in Hjerleid v.
State, 229 Iowa 818, 295 N.W. 189, decided in 1940. In that

972 ee

ease the only question was whether claimant was an employee of
the county or of the state.

The factual situation, the statutes and authorities were ex-
tensively reviewed and it was held that claimant was an employee
of the State.

The reasoning in the case is persuasive and might ‘well be
controlling except for the fact that since then the legislature has
changed the statute.

HMM sIt is presumed that a change in the language of a
statute indicates a legislative intent to change the law. In Craw-
ford v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 742, 16
N.W.2d 187, this appears:

“On this question 50 Am, Jur., Statutes, section 357, states
as follows: ‘In the construction of statutes, the courts start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute.’

“In 82 C. J. S., Statutes, section 384, page 904, we find the
following general statement: ‘It will be presumed that the legis-
lature, in adopting an amendment, intended to make some change
in the-existing law, and therefore the courts will endeavor to
give some effect to the amendment.’ ”

HMM The elimination by the Fifty-cighth General ‘Assembly
of that portion of section 234.12 which gave the state board
spécific authority to review appointments and direct the dis-
charge ‘of employees appears to be a clear expression of the
legislative intent to overrule Hjerleid insofar as it applies to the
facts in this case, and to return the power of discharge to the
county board, where it clearly. lies under the plain language of
chapter 234 as amended. Chapter 172, Laws of the Fifty-eighth
General Assembly, deleted the power of the state board to dis-
charge, but left intact the language of section 234.12 which gives
the county board power to employ.

It will not be presumed that useless and meaning-
less words are used in a legislative enactment, and a construction
holding that the legislature enacted a meaningless provision
should be avoided if possible. Holzhauser v. Iowa State Tax
Conimission, 245 Towa 525, 585, 62-N.W.2d 229; State ex rel,

es 73

Board of Pharmacy Examiners v. McEwen, 250 Iowa 721, 728,
96 N.W.2d 189. By leaving the county board the power to
“employ”, the legislature is presumed to have intended that this
be a meaningful, usable power. If the state board can dismiss
eounty ‘directors at will, the power of the county board to em-
ploy becomes a meaningless, empty form, since the state board,
through its power to discharge, could in fact name the county
director. Had the legislature intended to give the state depart-
ment this power it could have easily done so. Since it did not,
and since the power of the state board to discharge as formerly
contained in: section 234.12 has been repealed, leaving intact in
the same section the power of the county board to employ, it
follows that the power to discharge lies with the county depart-
ment and not with the state department.
The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Brecker, J., who takes no part.

Anniz A. Brapen, appellee, v. Boarp or SupERvisors or
Porrawatramiz County, appellant.

‘Laura A. RusH, appellee, v. Boarp or Supervisors or
PorrawaTramis Country, appellant.

No. 52881.
_ (Reported in 157 N.W.2d 123)

Marcu 5, 1968.

Hess, Peters, Sulhoff & Walker, of Council Bluffs, for ap-

pellant. 7 .

Smith, Peterson, Beckman & Willson, of Council Bluffs, for
appéllees. . oo .

915

Rawiines, J—LHach plaintiff appealed to district court from
denial of damages allegedly resulting from defendant-board’s
Code chapter 306 order vacating bridge portion of local second-
ary road. Both cases were consolidated for purpose of sub-
mission. Defendant filed motions to dismiss and for adjudication
of law points. Trial court overruled motions to dismiss. With
leave granted (rule 332, R.C.P.), defendant takes unchallenged
appeal. We affirm.

Although the record fails to so disclose, it is assumed plain-
tiffs’ petitions and defendant’s motions, on appeal to district
court, are identical in each of the cases presented.

March 1960, Bridge No. 2801, crossing Walnut Creek, in
Pottawattamie County, located on a local secondary unimproved
road, was destroyed by ice and never replaced.

April 8, 1966, county board of supervisors published notice
of hearing on proposed vacation of that part of the roadway
lying between the creek banks. Section 306.6, Code, 1966.

Plaintiffs, Annie A. Braden and Laura A, Rush, owners of
land adjoining either side of the roadway and both sides of the
ereek, filed objections to the proposal, also claiming damages,

After hearing on objections and claims, the board entered
an order of vacation as proposed and denied damages sought by
plaintiffs.

Braden and Rush both appealed to district court. Section
306.11, Code, 1966.

The sole proposition urged by defendant in .support of
reversal is that plaintiffs’ petitions failed to state a- cause of
action because (1) the respective properties do not abut that
portion of the roadway being vacated so as to affect rights of
access to highways generally, and (2) plaintiffs’ individual
rights of access to abutting roadway are not substantially in-
terfered with or cut off,

HEMEL. Trial court’s rulings on motions for adjudication
of law points are neither challenged nor argued on appeal. In
that regard this court has repeatedly held a proposition neither
assigned nor argued presents no question and need not be con-
sidered by us on review. See Associates Discount Corp. v. Held,
255 Towa 680, 683-684, 123 N.W.2d 869.

76 ee)

However, as counsel undoubtedly realized, law points un-
avoidably involved in the motions to dismiss must be accordingly
considered.

Il. The first question posed is whether plaintiffs’ properties
abut that portion of the road vacated by defendant-board.

Walnut Creek is a nonnavigable waterway running generally
north and south.

Braden owned land north of the subject road, the material
portion here concerned consisting of a 240-foot tract dissected
by the creek.

The Rush land consists of 40 acres south of the roadway, also
divided by the stream.

HI Ordinarily the boundary line between lands of separate
owners, bordering on a nonnavigable waterway, is the middle
thread of the channel. But where, as in the case at hand, such
a watercourse flows over the land of a singular owner, he gen-
erally has title to the whole of the stream bed within the bound-
aries of his property. “Holmes v. Haines, 231 Iowa 634, 639, 1
N.W.2d 746. See also Patton on Titles, section 81, page 287;
Tiffany on Real Property, Abridged Ed., section 674, page 689;
11 O.S.S., Boundaries, section 27(b)(2), page 571; 98 C.J.S.,
Waters, section 71, page 745; and 12 Am.Jur.2d, Boundaries,
section 22, page 564.

TII. However, defendant argues plaintiffs’ lands do not
abut the bridgeway itself by reason of which there is no abut-
ment with that part of the road vacated, This argument is with-
out substance.

The order entered by defendant-board is not before us. But
plaintiffs’ petitions alleged the area vacated is the public road
66 feet wide between the banks of Walnut Creek. For our
purpose this factual allegation must be accepted as true. See
Burd v. Board of Education of Audubon County, 260 Iowa 846,
151 N.W.2d 457, 463, and Harvey v. Iowa State Highway Com-
mission, 256 Iowa 1229, 1230, 180 N.W.2d 725.

With regard to the foregoing, section 306.8, Code, 1966,
provides in part: “Any person owning land abutting on a road
which it is proposed to vacate and close, shall have the right to
file, in writing, a claim for damages at anytime on or before the
date fixed for hearing.”

es ov7

And section 306.10, states, inter alia: “Said commission or
board may dismiss the proceedings, or it may vacate and close
such road, part thereof, or crossing, in which event it shall
determine and state in the order the amount of the damages
allowed to each claimant. Said order thus entered shall be final
except as to the amount of the damages.”

HAs employed in section 306.8, supra, the term “land
abutting on a road” means lands adjoining, coming together with,
contiguous to, meeting or touching a roadway. See section
4.1, paragraph 2, Code, 1966; Wormley v. Board of Supervisors,
108 Iowa 232, 234, 78 N.W. 824; State v. Fuller, Tex., 407 S.W.2d
215, 220-221; State ex rel. Badtke v. School Board of Joint
Common School Dist., 1 Wis.2d 208, 83 N.W.2d 724, 726-727;
105.8. “Abut”, page 406; 25 Am.Jur., Highways, section 153,
page 448; and Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., pages 25-26.

Hi Since each of these plaintiffs owned land, including the
creek bed, adjoining the right-of-way vacated, they were owners
of lands abutting the road vacated or closed.

IV. As aforesaid it is also urged by defendant-board, plain-
tiffs have the same rights of access to their lands as they had
prior to the vacation of a part of the secondary road. Stated
otherwise, it is argued plaintiffs can recover no damages because
their rights of access have not been substantially interfered with
or cut off, .

However, that argument presupposes we are here dealing
only with rights of access to and from a given point on the road-
way and a given point on plaintiffs’ lands, which is not our
problem.

Neither are we here confronted with a question as to whether
an owner of a single unit tract of land adjacent to a highway
may recover damages allegedly sustained by virtue of the vaca-
tion of a remote part of it, as in Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 260 Towa 1115, 152 N.W.2d 248; Brady v. Shinkle,
40 Iowa 576; and other interim factually comparable cases.

HH In fact, the issue presented in the case at bar is whether
an owner of land abutting an access free county road, part of
which is vacated in such manner as to eliminate an only existing
direct means of access between two portions of his land, operated

8 Ce)

as a single unit, may be resultantly damaged within’ the purview
of chapter 306, Code, 1966. .

* Touching on that subject we said, in Lehman vy. Iowa State
Highway Comm., 251 Iowa 77, 83-84, 99 N.W.2d 404: “It is of
course true that where, as here, a new highway is put through
land its controlled-access character is relevant on the issue of
damages to the property resulting from the severance. If the
highway is of the controlled-access kind the severance is more
complete and the diminution in value of the land because of the
inereased inconvenience in going from one tract to the other is
properly to be considered in making the award. Clevenger (365
Mo. 970, 291 §.W.2d 57), Burk (200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783),
and Calkins (50 Wash.2d 710, 314 P.2d 449), supra; Note 43
Towa Law Review, 258, 267, 268, * * * But we see a ‘clear dis-
tinction between denial of access to the highway itself and a
severance of the land which results in inconvenience in going
from one tract to the other.”

And Magdefrau v. Washington County, 228 Iowa 853, 859,
293 N.W. 574, contains this quote from Heery v. Roberts, 186
Iowa 61, 73, 170 N.W. 405: “* * * ‘there may be a claim for dam-
ages on account of the vacation of a highway, if that highway be
adjacent to a tract of land to which the owner- has no other con-
venient means of access; because, in such case, the owner of the
land suffers a special damage, separate and distinet from that
suffered by the general public.’ ”

Continuing, this court’said: “The olaim for damages in the
ease at bar, filed with the board, brings it within the rule an-
nounced in the above case of Heery v. Roberts. Claimants own
land in the quarter section east of and abutting upon the road
proposed to be vacated. Their claim states that Williams Creek,
which euts such road, cannot be crossed with farm implements or
vehicles except over the bridge on said road, and access to their
land south of the creek will be prevented, except by a long detour
or heavy expense, It is apparent that the allegations of their
claim state damages peculiar to themselves and not to the general
public.”

“And Hultman, Eminent Domain in Iowa, Revised Ed.
(1962), page 22, states: “* * * once a'right of access vests in the
landowner, it is regarded as one of the rights appurtenant to

o9

ownership which may not be appropriated * * * without com-
pensation. This is the case where access to a road is cut off, a
road is vacated or abandoned, * * * a viaduct is erected, or a bus
stop is created, so long as access to the property by means of a
road, street, or other publicly owned property is cut of or sub-
stantially impaired.”

As a basis for this statement, he refers to Iowa State High:
way Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 874-875, 82 N.W.2d 755,
73 A.L.R, 2d 680; Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Commission,
240 Iowa 919, 924-925, 88 N.W.2d 605; Prymek v. Washington
County, 229 Iowa 1249, 1252-1254, 296 N.W. 467; Nalon v. City
of Sioux City, 216 Iowa 1041, 1043-1046, 250 N.W. 166; Hubbell
v. City of Des Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 60-64, 154 N.W. 337; and
Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 Iowa 590, 593, 117 N.W. 974.

See also Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 249
Iowa 994, 1004, 90 N.W.2d 161, and Liddick v. City of Council
Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361.

In support of its position defendant cites and leans heavily
on Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 473,
93 N.W.2d 60, and Christensen v. Board of Supervisors of Wood-
bury County, 253 Iowa 978, 114 N.W.2d 897. We find these cases
not here controlling.

Warren, supra, involved a chapter 306A police power pro-
ceeding, where property owner’s access by direct route over an
established secondary roadway between two noncontiguous single
unit operated tracts of land, neither of which abutted the vacated
portion of a road, was cut off by vacation of a part of that road
in connection with construction of an access controlled highway.
Without reference to the matter of severance, this court’ held the
owner suffered no compensable injury since he still had access,
though circuitous, to and from the two tracts via the existing
general highway system, his inconvenience being no different
from that suffered by the public generally.

And in Christensen v. Board of Supervisors of Woodbury
County, supra, loc. cit., 253 Iowa 981, is the statement: “This
case is identical with ‘Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commis-
sion, supra.”

We conclude where, a as in the instant case, two Portions of

980 Ce)

a given tract of land employed as a single unit are operatively
inaccessible one to the other, except by passage over an adjacent
access free road, and an abutting part ofthat roadway is vacated,
pursuant to chapter 306, Code, 1966, in such manner as to sub-
stantially interfere with or cut off existing access from one
portion to the other by means of such road, then there has been,
in effect if not in fact, a severance of the two portions for which
damages may be recovered under the provisions of that law above
cited.

In addition to authorities already adduced, the following
lend general support to the views expressed above. Jones v. Iowa
State Highway Commission, 259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277, 281,
282; Johnson County Broadcasting Corp. v. State Highway
Comm., 256 Towa 1251, 1254-1256, 180 N.W.2d 707; Storten-
becker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 1073, 1075-1076,
96 N.W.2d 468; Paulson v. State Highway Commission, 210 Iowa
651, 655-656, 231 N.W. 296; State v. Williams, La.App., 131
So.2d 600, 603-604; Wolfe v. City of Providence, 77 R.I, 192,
74 A.2d 848, 850-851; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Ed.,
section 14.31(1); 39 O.J.S., Highways, section 139, page 1077;
43 Towa Law Review 258, 267-268 ; and 70 Dickinson Law Review
189.

V. It is to us evident plaintiffs alleged a cause of action and
trial court correctly overruled defendant’s motions to dismiss.

Affirmed as to each case.

Garren, Od, and Larson, Moors, Mason, Broker and
LrGranp, JJ., concur.

SNELL, J., coneurs in the result.
Sruart, J., dissents.

Sruart, J—I respectfully dissent. If recovery is to be
allowed here, Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250
Towa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60, and Christensen v. Board of Super-
visors, 253 Iowa 978, 114 N.W. 2d 897, should be. overruled.
Factual differences are inconsequential and immaterial. We
should not deny recovery to persons situated as Warren was
situated and permit this plaintiff to recover. The inconvenience
in the Warren case was greater than the inconvenience suffered

| 981

by plaintiff. If the reasons for denying recovery stated in
Warren are valid, they apply here. If we now feel this type of
injury should be compensated, we should overrule Warren and
Christensen.

Rocco Satvarare Bupa, Jr., appellee, v. Jack M. Fuuron,
Commissioner of Iowa Department of Public Safety,
appellant.

No. 52853,

(Reported in 157 N.W.24 336)

982

Maron 5, 1968,

be 983

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Joseph W. Zeller,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Gilloon, Klauer, Stapleton & Ernst, of Dubuque, for ap-
pellee.

Rawiues, J.—This case comes to us on appeal from judg-
ment of trial court vacating operator’s license revocation order
issued by State Department of Public Safety.

Understanding the matter presented stands solely in the
field of administrative law, under chapter 321B, Code, 1966, we
confine ourselves accordingly.

Defendant-commissioner caused an order to issue revoking,
for 120 days, operator’s license held by plaintiff, Rocco Salvatare
Buda, Jr.

A post-order requested hearing was held before commis-
sioner’s agent with Buda represented by counsel. (Code section
821B.8). The previously issued order of revocation was sus-
tained. Plaintiff appealed to trial court. (Code section 321B.9)

Early morning, March 10, 1967, plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident. He telephoned the police. Officer Schneider
soon arrived. Buda was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
while intoxicated and taken to the Dubuque Police Station.
Within ten minutes after arrival, repeated requests were made
that Buda submit to a blood test. He refused.

Plaintiff’s petition, on original appeal, alleges generally the
defendant, through his agent, erred in sustaining order of rev-
ocation, asserting four specific errors. Defendant answered
denying all affirmative allegations.

On hearing to trial court, transcript of proceedings before
defendant-commissioner was first presented in evidence. Sub-
sequently Officer Schneider and plaintiff testified,

In vacating the challenged license revocation order trial
court found, inter alia, burden of proof was on defendant-
commissioner, arresting officer’s failure to comply with the law
vitiated any subsequent right or authority toe impose. an ad-
ministrative sanction, and plaintiff did not understand effect of
refusal to provide specimen for chemical analysis.

Under existing circumstances we cannot agree.

984 [| i

I. Referring first to the matter of statutory appeal from
commissioner’s administrative order to trial court, Code section
321B.9 provides: “If the revocation or denial is sustained the
person whose license, permit to drive, or nonresident operating
privilege has been revoked or denied, may file a petition within
thirty days after the determination by the commissioner of
public safety or his authorized agent for a hearing of the matter
in the district court in the county wherein the alleged events
occurred for which he was arrested or in the county in which the
administrative hearing was held. It shall be the duty of the
court to set the matter for hearing, and the petitioner shall give
twenty days notice thereof to the commissioner. Within fifteen
days after receipt of the notice, the commissioner shall file in the
office of the clerk of the district court to which the appeal is
taken a certified transcript of the testimony and all other pro-
ceedings. It shall constitute the record on which the commis-
sioner made his determination. The court thereafter shall hear
the matter de novo and shall affirm or vacate the decision of the
commissioner or his authorized agent. The person or the com-
missioner may appeal to the supreme court in accordance with the
Towa Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Hi Relatively few jurisdictions hold statutory “hearing de
novo”, when applied to judicial review of an administrative
adjudication, means a limited examination of proceedings by a
lower board, commission or officer without leave to, introduce ad-
ditional evidence. See Allen v. Herrera, Tex.Civ.App., 257
8.W.2d 758, 754-755. However, according to the greater weight
of apparent authority that term or its equivalent, when so em-
ployed, has been given a more realistic liberal interpretation.

In Mason v. World War II Service Compensation Board,
243 Iowa 341, 344, 51 N.W.2d 482, we held a legislative grant of
hearing de novo on appeal from official administrative order
ordinarily signifies the case is heard anew, afresh, a second time,
as in equity; a trial in the commonly accepted sense of that term
in a court of general jurisdiction, including the right to produce
evidence in the same manner as though the action had originated
in the district court.

See also In re Betts’ Estate, 2 Dl.App.2d 453, 119 N.B.2d

a a 985

801, 805; Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm. v. Grady, Ky., 278 S.W.2d 563, 565; Hiner v. Wenger, 197
Va. 869, 91 S.H.2d 637, 639; Foster v. Carson School Dist., 63
Wash.2d 29, 885 P.2d 367, 369; 73 C.J.S., Public Administrative
Bodies and Procedure, sections 203-204, pages 552-556; 2
Am.Jur, 2d, Administrative Law, sections 612-618, pages 452—
457, sections 698-701, pages 597-603, sections 747-754, pages
646-655; annotations, 97 A.L.R.2d 1367; and 46 Iowa Law
Review 862.

Upon this basis it appears trial court was correct in holding
presentation of evidence by plaintiff, in addition to that disclosed
by transcript of proceedings before commissioner, be permitted.

II. By the same token our review is de novo, Stated
otherwise, as a case is heard in the trial court it is generally so
considered on appeal. See Henderson v. Hawkeye-Security Ins.
Co., 252 Iowa 97, 100, 106 N.W.2d 86, and State ex rel. Mc-
Pherson v. Rakey, 236 Iowa 876, 879, 885, 20 N.W.2d 43,

Hl 111. Though not here of special significance, it is to us
evident trial court erred in holding the burden of proof, on ap-
peal by Buda, was upon defendant-commissioner.

It was plaintiff’s privilege to appeal from commissioner’s
administrative order. In so doing he necessarily made certain
affirmative allegations which, as heretofore disclosed, were denied
by defendant.

Rule 344(f) (5), R.C.P., states: “Ordinarily the burden of
proof follows the pleading ; that is, he who pleads and relies upon
the affirmative of an issue must carry the burden of proving it.”

As we said in Fortgang Brothers, Ine. v. Cowles, 249 Iowa
78, 76, 85 N.W.2d 916: “It is true generally that the burden of
pleading and proving an issue go together. The party who is
required-to plead an issue has the burden of proving that issue,
In re Estate of Ewing, 234 Iowa 950, 955, 14 N.W.2d 688. The
true test to determine where is the burden is to consider which
party would be entitled to the verdict if no evidence were offered
on either side. Veiths v. Hagge, 8 (Clarke) Iowa 163.”

Since a licensee’s statutory appeal is heard de novo, with
right to present evidence as in an ordinary action commenced
originally in the district court, we find no legally reasonable basis

986 Le |

upon-which to hold other than that rule 344(f) (5), quoted supra,
applies, even though the appeal be classified as a special pro-
ceeding.

In connection with the foregoing see Richard v. Holliday,
261 Iowa 181, 153 N.W.2d 478, 477; Burkholder v. State In-
dustrial Accident Commission, 242 Ore. 276, 409 P.2d 342, 345-
346 ; Dimitroff v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 209 Ore.
816, 306 P.2d 398, 401-402; 31A C.J.S., Evidence, sections 103-
104, pages 164-181; 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, sections 127, 128,
pages 159-162; and McCormick-on Evidence, Hornbook Series,
section 306, page 635.

IV. Closely related to burden of ‘proof is the matter of
quantum of evidence required-on the part of an appealing party
in order to prevail.

By virtue of the provisions of section 622. 56, Code, 1966,
official proceedings of the department of public safety are re-
buttably presumed to be regular. See State ex rel. Howson v.
Consolidated Sch. Dist., 245 Iowa 1244, 1249, 65 N.W.2d 168.
With regard to the foregoing see generally 73 C.J.S., Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, section 205, page 556, and
2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 748, page 647.

TH Bui where, as in the case now before us, the appeal is
heard.as an original proceeding, this presumption of regularity
does not extend to factual determinations by an officer, board,
agency or commission. See United States v. Maxwell, 8 Cir., 278
F.2d 206, 209, and Hiner v. Wenger, supra, loc, cit., 91 S.E.2d
639. See generally, 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, Section
758, page 654,

T And, since statutory appeal to the trial court is heard as
an original proceeding, quantum of proof required as to fact
issues is that a licensee establish the allegations of his petition
by a preponderance of the evidence. See rule 344(f) (6), B.C.P.,
and Jones on Evidence, Fourth Ed., section 193, page 368.

V. Trial court’s judgment in the matter now before us is
based in large part upon the premise plaintiff's constitutional
‘rights were not accorded proper recognition, which in turn served
to nullify any right or authority on the part of state department
of public safety to revoke the operator's license held by plaintiff.

In arriving at this conclusion trial court explores the field

a Le 987

of constitutional law and some relatively recent United States
Supreme Court decisions. :

Among others, reference is made to Miranda v. State of
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10
A.L.R.3d 974; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S. Ct. 625, 17
L.Hd.2d 574; Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87
S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Hd.2d 562; and Rochin v. People of California,
342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct, 205, 96 L.Ed, 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Here again we refer to the fact the case at bar is strictly
limited to administrative procedures and sanctions, the matter of
eriminal punishment not being involved.

Neither does this ease involve a Code chapter 321 proceeding
as in Needles v. Kelley, 261 Iowa 815, 156 N.W.2d 276,

Miranda deals with warnings required on criminal arrest,
prior to in-custody-interrogation, and right to counsel. In the
instant matter there was no such interrogation, Buda was asked
to provide a blood or urine specimen and refused.

Spevack and Garrity, both supra, focus upon the matter of
coercive self-incrimination. For reasons disclosed infra that
subject is not here involved.

And Rochin, supra, dealt with stomach pumping to induce
vomiting in a search for narcotics, As revealed by authorities
hereinafter cited, neither search and. seizure nor unconscionable
invasion of the person in the constitutional sense is an element
in the case at bar,

‘We turn now to Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S.
‘757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Hd.2d 908, That case involved an ar-
rest for driving an automobile while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor. During hospitalization of the subject, blood
was withdrawn from his body and analysis indicated he was
intoxicated.

On trial for crime charged, Schmerber vigorously objected
to receipt of test results in evidence, claiming the specimen used
was taken despite his counsel-advised refusal to submit. It was
contended he had been denied due process of law under Amend-
ment 14, as well as specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
secured against the states by that amendment; his privilege
against self-incrimination under Amendment 5; right to counsel

988 | |

under Amendment 6; and right not to be subjected to unreason-
able search and seizure in violation of Amendment 4. These
claims were rejected and conviction affirmed. See also Gilbert
v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18
L.Ed.2d 1178,

To the extent here material, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, TT S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Hd.2d 448, holds, chemical analysis of
blood specimen taken by a physician while the person is un-
conscious may be introduced in evidence on prosecution for com-
mission of crime. Specifically the court said, loc. cit., 352 U.S.
434, 77 S.Ct. 410: “* * * there is nothing ‘brutal’ or ‘offensive’ in
the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under
the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here
was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of
conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the
taking a violation of a constitutional right; and certainly the
test as administered here would not be considered offensive by
‘even the most delicate. Furthermore, due process is not measured
by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the
most sensitive person, but by that whole community sense of
‘decency and fairness’ that has been woven by common experience
into the fabric of acceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock that
this Court has established the concept of due process.”

We are satisfied recent decisions of this court, dealing with
the subject at hand, are in harmony with Schmerber and Breit-
haupt, both supra. See Severson v. Sueppel, 260 Iowa 1169, 152
N.W.2d 281; State v. Findlay, 259 Towa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650,
654; and Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1178, 140 N.W.2d 866.

The cases cited by trial court dealing with search and sei-
gure, self-incrimination, custodial preinterrogation warnings, and
right to counsel are neither controlling nor persuasive in this
administrative matter. In support of that conclusion see Spur-
beck v. Statton, 252 Iowa 279, 106 N.W.2d 660; People v.
Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 260 P.2d 8; People v. Bustos, 247 Cal.
App. 422, 55 Cal.Rptr. 603; Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d
765; State v. Oleson, 180 Neb. 546, 143 N.W.2d 917; State v.
Fields, 74 N.M. 559, 395 P.2d 908; Beare v. Smith, S.D., 140
N.W.2d 603; Hearn v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 411 8.W.2d 543; 52
Towa Law Review 344; and 14 Drake Law Review 73.

Pe Pt 989

For reasons hereinafter disclosed there is no need to further
belabor the matter of constitutional rights.

HE VI. This court has consistently held a constitutional
challenge must specify the provisions invoked and state with
particularity the details of any claimed transgression. Dickinson
v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 398, 85 N.W.2d 66, and Fort Dodge,
D. M. & So. Ry. v. American ete. Corp., 256 Iowa 1344, 1851, 131
N.W.2d 515.

HI Generally a court will not inquire into constitutional
issues on its own motion. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, section
96(a), page 331, and 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Taw, sections
115-116, pages 304-308,

Pursuing the matter one more step, an issue should not
ordinarily be considered in a noncriminal proceeding unless
fairly raised by the pleadings. Henry Walker Park Assn. v.
Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246, 1257, 91 N.W.2d 703.

«MMI Of course, where parties proceed, without objection, to
try an issue not so presented it is then usually deemed to be in
the case. Morris Plan Leasing Co, v. Bingham Feed and Grain
Co., 259 Iowa 404, 424, 143 N.W.2d 404, 417. :

a But there is no mention in. the pleadings of any claimed
invasion of Buda’s constitutional rights, nor does the record dis-
close any such issue presented, mentioned or referred to during
trial.

His petition on appeal asserts, (1) the arresting officer had
no reasonable cause to then believe Buda was intoxicated; (2)
arrest was not effected in accord with Code section 821B.3; (3)
he did not refuse an intoxication test; and (4) no advice was
given that refusal to provide a specimen would result in revoca-
tion of his operator’s license.

These allegations are a far cry from a claimed invasion of
specifically designated constitutional rights.

We are satisfied trial court erred to the extent its conelusion
is based upon a theoretical violation of any constitutional
mandate.

HE Vil. Another question to be resolved centers upon the
matter of statutory right to make or have a telephone call made
upon arrest or restraint of liberty.

990 Le |

Section 755.17, Code, 1966, provides in part: “Any peace
officer or other person having custody of any person arrested
or restrained of his liberty for any reason whatever, shall, before
preliminary hearing and arraignment, except in cases of im-
minent danger of escape, permit that person, without unneces-
sary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, con-
sult, and see a member of his or her family or an attorney of his
or her choice.”

Briefly, the record fails to disclose Buda was at anytime
denied permission to make or have a phone call made for him.
In fact that subject was not at anytime mentioned by him on
arrest, or at the police station.

On this subject see State v. Shephard, 255 Iowa 1218, 1229,
124 N.W.2d 712; State v. Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 1149-1152,
120 N.W.2d 483; and State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 509-511,
117 N.W.2d 816.

‘We now conclude trial court erred in holding there was
here a violation of Code section 755.17, or of any existing related
constitutional standards, which could effectively nullify the pre-
viously issued license revocation order.

HM (VII. Finally, plaintiff claims he did not understand
refusal to: permit taking of a specimen for chemical analysis
would result in revocation of his operator’s license. We find this
contention to be without substance or merit.

Any holding to the contrary would, in ‘effect, serve to de-
feat the self-evident intent, purpose and policy of chapter 321B,
Code of Iowa.

On this subject Buda testified, on appeal to trial court:

“Q. Do you recall at anytime being told by Officer Schneider
or the other officer in the event you refused to give his blood test
or the urine test that was requested your license would be sus-
pended or that you would lose it for at least 120 days? A. 1
didn’t understand nothing about that. I was humiliated by
those two officers and I just didn’t know that it would make any
difference really because they said I was drunk and if I am drunk
I don’t have to give any blood test or anything.

“Q. You. had no understanding this refusal meant your
license would be taken? A. No, sir.”

a [| 991

However, on cross-examination plaintiff admitted he at one
time held a California driver’s license and secured one on arrival
in Iowa; that a written examination was probably taken relative
to both licenses, the words “suspension” or “revocation” having
been most likely used in connection with each test taken.

And Officer Schneider’s undisputed testimony discloses Buda
was told four or five times if he refused to give a blood or urine
specimen he would lose his driver’s license for 120 days, the
words “suspension” or “revocation” not having been used.

Actually plaintiff failed to establish his claimed lack of
undérstanding by the requisite degree of proof.

Furthermore, it is to us evident plaintiff did refuse to allow
any such specimen to be taken. On this point the record discloses
Buda testified in part:

“T recall being asked to take a blood and urine test.

“Q. And what did you say when they asked? A. They said

I was drunk. I said if I am drunk what do you want my test
for? . :
“Q. What did you mean by that, Mr. Buda? A. I meant
they accused me of being drunk, so if I am drunk what is the use
of taking a blood test? That is all I meant. If you know I am
drunk you don’t need my blood test.”

We deem these statements the equivalent of a refusal. In
other words, total failure on the part of Buda to cooperate in the
matter was, under the circumstances, tantamount to a declina-
tion.

To the extent trial court relied on plaintiff's claimed igno-
vance of results attendant upon refusal to permit the taking of
a specimen for chemical analysis, error is apparent.

IX. Trial court’s sincerity is not questioned. However, the
judgment vacating commissioner’s order revoking Buda’s license
to operate a motor vehicle is so tainted with error it cannot stand.

There is no alternative but to reverse and remand this case
to trial court with direction to set aside judgment entered, and
to enter judgment in harmony herewith—Reversed and re-
manded for order and judgment consistent with this opinion.

All Justices concur except Brcxer, J., who takes no part.

992 fe

Curtis Davis, appellant, v. W. E. Davis, appellee.

No. 52631.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 870)

3
8 :
= = | |

: Marca 5, 1968.

994 | 7

Life, Davis & Life, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.
Johnson & Jordan, of Knoxville, for appellee.

Mason, J.—This is an equitable action to enforce an alleged
1958 oral agreement that if plaintiff, Curtis Davis, 42, would con-
tribute his work as a farmer and assist his defendant-father,
W. E. Davis, 72, in paying all defendant’s debts he would make
a will giving plaintiff half his estate. Plaintiff alleged defendant
had made such a will but cancelled it and made other wills in
violation of the contract. Plaintiff seeks to restrain his father
from making a will contrary to the alleged oral contract.

At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court stated
plaintiff had failed to carry the burden to prove the terms and
provisions of the contract or’ that there was such part perform-
ance as to remove the bar of the statute of frauds.

Plaintiff contends he agreed to and did convey a life estate
in one farm to his father, remain upon and operate the father’s
other farm and thereby help pay some indebtedness.

In answer defendant asserted no such agreement was en-
tered into, the alleged contract is within the statute of frauds
and is too vague and indefinite to constitute an enforceable con-
tract.

The court found plaintiff did work defendant’s farms but as
a tenant sharing the income—a customary stock and grain share
lease arrangement, and a transfer by plaintiff and his wife of a
life estate in a tract of land was part of a settlement of the
divorce action filed by defendant’s wife, plaintiff's mother,
wherein defendant agreed to transfer his interest in this farm
with the understanding plaintiff and his wife would reconvey to
him a life interest therein, and not in part performance of the
alleged oral contract. . . .

I. From the decree dismissing plaintiffs petition he ap-
peals, assigning as propositions for reversal error in (1) holding
plaintiff had failed to prove the oral contract by clear and con-
vineing evidence, (2) holding plaintiff had failed to remove the
oral contract from the statute of frauds by part performance,
(8) finding that exhibit 3, a reconveyance of the life estate to
defendant, was not part performance of an alleged oral contract,

a a 995

(4) not giving consideration and effect to all exhibits supporting
the oral contract showing part performance thereof by plaintiff
and (5) refusing to permit plaintiff to introduce as rebuttal the
evidence of H. E. deReus.

II. Defendant W. E. Davis and his first wife, Maude, were
divorced May 11, 1958. This marriage had produced two sons,
W. E. Davis, Jr., and plaintiff, and six daughters. W. E, Davis,
Jr., died in 1942 leaving no wife or children. After the divorce
W. E. Davis married Lucille Davis who remains his wife. They
have one son, Walter Howard Davis, usually called Howard.

HM Plaintiff intervened in the divorce action, claiming an
interest in the farmland of his parents based on an alleged oral
agreement in 1940 between him and his brother, W. E. Davis,
Jr., on the one hand and their parents, W. E. and Maude Davis
on the other, that if the boys stayed on the farm and helped the
parents get out of debt the boys would get “what the parents
had when they were done.” This procedure is permissible. In
Wharff v. Wharff, 244 Towa 496, 501, 56 N.W.2d 1, 4, we said:
“Where property rights are involved in divorce proceedings, it
is generally held, * * *, that a third person, whose interests may
be adversely affected, may intervene * * *.” Citing 27 C.J.S.,
Divoree, section 91.

In 1940, the date of this alleged agreement, plaintiff was
16, had two years of high school left and W. E., Jr., was 20.
Both boys stayed on the farm until 1942 when W. E., Jr., died.
Plaintiff remained on the farm, graduated from high school in
1942 and married in 1947. Thereafter he continued to live with
his wife in one of the two sets of buildings on the farm.

At the time the divorce action was pending defendant
owned approximately 745 acres of farmland in Marion County,
all in his name except 147 acres owned by defendant and his then
wife Maude as tenants in common, and except the “Wallace
Farm” of 187 acres (part of the 745 acres) which was of record
in the names of Curtis Davis and Walter Howard Davis as
tenants in common. In addition defendant and Maude owned as
tenants in common a 240-acre farm in Monroe County commonly
called the “May Place.” All the land was then unencumbered.
Defendant had purchased the “Wallace Farm” of 137 acres from
his son-in-law prior to the divorce and had received a deed

996 Le |

running to W. E. Davis. Before the deed was recorded de-
fendant decided to put the land in Curtis’ name, and with the
latter’s assistance deleted the “W. E.” and inserted “Curtis” in
the deed. Apparently the name Walter Howard Davis was also
added as a co-grantee before the deed was recorded. In 1957
defendant quieted title in himself to this 137-acre farm against
his sons Curtis and Howard, without contest.

In the divorce action there was difficulty in effecting a
property settlement. In general, Curtis was aligned with his
father and the daughters with their mother in the divorce
action. After it had been pending over a year plaintiff worked
out a proposition of settlement with his mother which his father
approved, it was embodied in written stipulation and the divorce
obtained.

The stipulation provided in substance that Curtis should get
the 240-acre “May Farm”, except for life estates in the mineral
rights reserved to W. E. and Maude; defendant should have the
745-acre farm; Curtis should pay his mother and father $1500
each on or before December 1, 1953, evidenced by his promissory
notes; and defendant should pay Maude $10,000 cash, execute
and deliver to her his promissory note for $14,420 payable in
five years, with five percent interest, secured by a mortgage on
defendant’s real estate.

Following the stipulation of May 8, 1958, defendant de-
cided that instead of executing-a note and mortgage to Maude
for $14,420 as provided in the stipulation, he would borrow
money from a Knoxville bank and pay Maude off in full follow-
ing the divorce and this was done. At this time Curtis executed
and delivered to each of his parents his promissory note for
$1500 as called for in the stipulation. Curtis paid his note to
bis mother but the note to his father was never paid. It was not
a part. of the sum defendant paid Maude.

In the property settlement of the divorce action Maude
executed and delivered to, defendant’a deed of any interest she
might have in the 745-acre Marion County farm; defendant and
Maude Davis executed a deed to plaintiff conveying the 240-acre
Monroe County farm, reserving a life estate in the minerals; and
plaintiff and his. wife executed and delivered to defendant a deed
for a life estate in this Monroe County farm. This latter ex-

; a 997

change was made May 12, 1953, in the office of H. E. deReus,
Curtis’ attorney, in the presence of Mr. deReus, Curtis, defendant
and defendant’s attorney. Maude Davis was not present or
aware that Curtis and his wife were conveying this farm back to
defendant for life and there was no reference to the reconveyance
in the divorce stipulation.

IIL, Plaintiff contends the 240-acre “May Place” was con-
veyed to him in settlement of the alleged 1940 agreement with his
parents but does not explain why he executed and later paid the
promissory note to his mother. His explanation of the $1500
note to his father was, “He told me that this note would help him
out, he would give it to me if I would help him out.” Plaintiff
further contends conveyance of the life estate to W. E. Davis
was not part of the divorce settlement but based on a new
agreement made in Mr. deReus’ office when “my father told me
if I would give him a life estate in the 240 acres and stay on
that big farm in Marysville [the Marion County farm] and farm
it and help him get out of debt one more time I would get half
of what he had when he was through.” Plaintiff testified he
accepted this proposition by his father. It was not reduced to
writing. Plaintiff does not contend there had been any dis-
eussion of the matter before going to deReus’ office.

Defendant, on the other hand, contends there was no such
agreement in 1940; the reason Curtis intervened in the divorce
action was because the rest of the relatives were “making a
grab” so he might just as well “make a grab,” too, and defendant
agreed with him. Some six months after Maude commenced the
divorce a number of defendant’s relatives sued him for $75,000.
The case was tried and decided favorably to defendant. The
basis of the suit does not appear in the record. Defendant's
explanation for Curtis’ giving the two $1500 notes was that
originally Curtis wanted the 137-acre “Wallace Farm” but
changed his mind and wanted the “May Place” instead, figured it
was worth $3000 more, so he agreed to pay each of his parents
$1500. As a result of the trade Curtis did not defend against
defendant’s 1957 quieting title action to the 187-acre “Wallace
Farm.”

Defendant further contends the reconveyance to him of a
life estate in the Monroe County farm was a part of the package

998 PF |

presented to him by Curtis in the divorce settlement. .He tes--
tified he wanted the income of approximately $4000 from this
farm. 7

Both parties agree plaintiff remained and worked on the
farm after his father’s divorce until March 1, 1966, three months
after this action was commenced. Plaintiff contends he stayed
pursuant to the alleged oral agreement. Defendant says plain-
tiff stayed as a tenant or partner in a livestock farming operation
on a 50-50 basis and received his full half of the income each
year from and including 1953. Plaintiff admits he received the
income every year except 1958, when he says he received only
farm expenses, food and clothing out of $12,000 income.

To secure the loan from the Knoxville bank defendant gave
a chattel mortgage. covering livestock, machinery and grain.
Curtis owned an interest: in most of this property and at the
banker’s request-he and his wife joined in the mortgage. Over a
period of about 18 months ending November 10, 1954, defendant
paid off this note. Curtis admits he paid no interest or principal
on this indebtedness but contends he did the bailing and com-
bining for a few years without charging his father and, there--
fore, helped indirectly. While the divorce action was pending
defendant was being audited on his 1951 federal income tax
return. An assessment had been made which was settled by
defendant’s paying $3092.94 in 1954 or 1955, Curtis concedes
he did not share in paying this indebtedness,

IV. It is our duty to consider this appeal de novo. Rule
334, Rules of Civil Procedure.

As indicated, plaintiff’s action is based on an alleged oral
contract pleaded in paragraph 1 of his petition stating in sub-
stance that during 1958, the exact date not being known to him,
an oral agreement was made whereby plaintiff agreed to work
“with defendant and render his services as a farmer to the
achievement of a common purpose of plaintiff and defendant,
* * * the payment of debits * * * owed by defendant,” and
defendant agreed to make a will giving plaintiff half interest in
both 745 acres of land and all personal property owned by de-
fendant at his death.

V. As plaintiff concedes, he had the burden to prove by
clear and satisfactory evidence the terms of the contract de-

; Pe 999

clared upon in his pleadings. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 261 Iowa 112,
118, 152 N.W.2d 605, 609; James v. James, 252 Iowa 326, 329,
105 N.W.2d 498, 500; and In re Estate of Lenders, 247 Iowa
1205, 1218, 78 N.W.2d 536, 541, and authorities cited in these
eases. Upon this appeal it may therefore be assumed such is the
requisite quality of proof. This requirement of a more exacting
measure of persuasion in Iowa is limited to cases in equity and
‘generally does not apply where a question of fact in a law action
tried to a jury or to the court without a jury is to be determined
by but one quantum of proof and that is by a preponderance of
‘the evidence. Lungren v. Lamoni Provision Co., Inc., 248 Iowa
887, 898, 82 N.W.2d 749, 755; Carlson v. Bankers Trust Co., 242
Towa 1207, 1214, 50 N.W.2d 1, 6; Roth v. Headlee, 238 Iowa
-1340, 1843, 29 N.W.2d 928, 924, and citations; Provident Mutual
Life Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Bennett (N.D. Iowa C.D.),
58 F. Supp. 72, 78; and Crandall v. Bankers Life Co., 245 Iowa
540, 549-550, 62 N.W.2d 169, 174.

| | We disagree with plaintiff’s contention he has established
the existence of an oral agreement with the degree of proof
required in this equitable action.

Plaintiff started thé introduction of his evidence by calling
defendant as an adverse witness. Plaintiff also testified and the
only other witnesses were his wife, Frieda, and his mother.
Neither gave any testimony as to the making of the alleged
agreement. Neither of the attorneys present at the May 12
meeting in deReus’ office was called. More about this later.

To corroborate his own testimony that an oral agreement
was in fact made, one of the matters plaintiff relies upon is
defendant’s execution of a will in June 1953, one month after the
May 12 meeting in deReus’ office.

HE “A will made in conformity with an alleged contract is
strong confirmatory proof that such an agreement was entered
into; where there is evidence tending to show the existence of
a contract, the proof of the execution of a will in favor of the
promisee is corroborative proof of the contract, even though the
will is invalid, and even where the will is subsequently revoked,
it is considered by the court as evidence in support of the agree-
ment, but the subsequent execution of another will, not in con-

1000 es —

formity with the alleged contract, is strong evidence of the
absence of such an agreement.” 94 C.J.S., Wills, section 113(2).

Here defendant’s first will after his divorcee from Maude
was executed in June 1953, the exact date not being shown in the
record. An unsigned office carbon copy identified as exhibit 8
was produced by defendant’s attorney. By the terms of this will
defendant gave the whole interest in over 240 acres of the 745-
acre Marion County farm, a half interest in his remaining real
estate plus 60 percent in value of all his personal property in
trust for his son Howard. He gave the remainder of his real
estate and the remaining 40 percent in value of his personal
property to plaintiff,

In our opinion defendant’s execution of the original of ex-
hibit 8 does not tend to support plaintiffs position. In his
pleadings and testimony he asserts the agreement was that he was
to have half of defendant’s property at his father’s death. This
will gives him considerably less.

In addition to the June 1953 will, the reconveyance of the
life estate to his father as evidenced by exhibit 3 and the execu-
tion of the $1500 notes, other matters relied on as corroborating
plaintiff's testimony include the signing by him and his wife of
the chattel mortgage as security for the bank loan, his continued
operation of the 745-acre farm and the fact his father did get
out of debt.

Plaintiff asserts nothing had been said in deReus’ office
about making a chattel mortgage. He testified his father had
arranged for the loan at the bank; after they left deReus’ office
his father told him a bank officer wanted to see him and his wife,
and they went to the bank and executed the mortgage. It is
eonceded plaintiff had an interest in property covered by the
mortgage.

Plaintiff contends the signing of the chattel mortgage tends
to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreement. Although
not inconsistent with the alleged oral agreement, we do not
believe it is proof of it. It certainly was not part of the agree-
ment claimed to have been made in.deReus’ office upon which
plaintiff bases this suit. He does not claim to have agreed to
pledge his own assets to secure his father’s indebtedness or. to
assist in shifting indebtedness from Maude to the bank. It must

a a 1001

be remembered defendant could have complied with the divorce
stipulation by giving Maude a note and mortgage.

Although the chattel mortgage and the bank ledger sheet
indicate the loan was for $12,500, plaintiff testified it was for
$27,500, all or a portion of which went to his mother. The
record does not support plaintiff’s contention as to the amount
of the bank loan.

It is true defendant did get out of debt. As stated, he made
the final payment on the bank loan November 10, 1954, and paid
his tax liability of approximately $3100 in 1954 or 1955. During
this period defendant had substantial income from the Monroe
County farm operated on a 50-50 basis on both livestock and
erops. Royalties from coal mined on the two farms were sub-
stantial and, in addition, there was his share of the income from
the 745-acre farm where he and Curtis raised 300-400 hogs a year
as well as cattle. There is no evidence of any other indebtedness
of defendant at the time of the alleged oral agreement.

We do not believe the fact defendant did get out of debt is
proof of the alleged oral agreement.

. Curtis continued to farm the Monroe County farm after his
father and mother were divorced. Although he moved from the
farm March 1, 1966, he returned later that spring at the sug-
gestion of his sister. He testified, “There is no agreement yet
as to farming the land. I am farming 50-50 like it has always
been.” His father admits that Curtis has been‘of help in the
operation of the farm but points out that from 1953 to the time
of trial Curtis received real estate, livestock, machinery and
grain valued at about:$140,000, not an unprofitable operation for
him.

‘We have only the direct testimony of the two parties, plain-
tiff saying the agreement was made and defendant saying it was
not. .

HE A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can de-
termine what it is. In order to be binding, an agreement must
be definite and certain as to its terms to enable the court to give
it an exact meaning. Although vagueness, indefiniteness and
uncertainty are matters of degree, their existence as to any of
the essential terms of an agreement is adequate reason for re-
fusal to direct specific performance. In support see Decker v.

1002 fC |

Tuzwik, 255 Iowa 358, 368-872, 121 N.W.2d 652, 657-660; 1
Corbin on Contracts, section.95 ; 1 Williston on Contracts, Third
Ed. (Jaeger), section 87; and 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, section
.

Plaintiff's evidence leaves too much to speculation, partic-
ularly as to what his obligations were under the terms of the
alleged agreement to hold he had established an enforceable
contract by the required quality of evidence.

HE VI. The performance plaintiff contends defendant
promised required an act that would create or transfer an in-
terest in land. The statute of frauds applies. .

We quote the pertinent part of Iowa Codes, 1962, 1966,
section 622.32:

“Statute of frauds. Except when otherwise specifically pro-
vided, no evidence of the following enumerated contracts is
competent, unless it be in writing and signed by the party
charged or by his authorized agent: * * *

“3. Those for the creation or transfer of any interest in
lands * * *.”

Section 622.33: “Exception. The provisions of subsection
8 of section 622.32 do not apply where the purchase money, or
any portion thereof, has been received by the vendor, or when
the vendee, with the actual or implied consent of the vendor, -has.
taken and held possession of the premises under and by virtue of
the contract, or when there is any other circumstance which, by
the law heretofore in force, would have taken the case out of the
statute of frauds.”

Plaintiff concedes the statute is applicable but contends he
successfully removed the bar thereof by part performance.

Hl ‘The true basis of the doctrine of part performance,
according to the overwhelming weight of authority, lies in the
principles of equitable estoppel and fraud; it would be a fraud
upon the plaintiff if the defendant were permitted to escape
performance of his part of the oral agreement after he has per-
mitted the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the agreement”
(citing cases). Fairall v. Arnold, 226 Iowa 977, 986, 285 N.W.
664, 669, quoting from annotation in 101 A.L.R. 935.

HM “It has been a long-recognized rule of this court that
any conduct, acts or circumstances offered to show ‘part per-

Pe as 1008

formance’ in order to bring a case within the exception of the
statute of frauds must be referable exclusively and unequivocally
to the contract” (citing cases). In re Estate of Lindsey, 254
Towa 699, 711, 118 N.W.2d 598, 605.

Although the various acts relied upon by plaintiff are not
necessarily inconsistent with his contention that an oral contract
existed, we believe that taken separately or collectively they:
admit of explanation without reference to the alleged oral con-
tract. . .

“To establish a contract indirectly and by extrinsic acts or
circumstances it should fairly and definitely appear that these
acts or circumstances were pursuant to the contract, or in
performance thereof in whole or in part, or otherwise referable
thereto, It has been a long-recognized rule of this court that
any conduct, acts or cireumstances offered to- show ‘part per-
formance’ in order to bring a case within the exceptions to the
Statute of Frauds * * * must be referable exclusively and un-
equivocally to the contract, and if they admit of explanation
without reference to the contract they do not constitute part
performance” (citing cases). In re Estate of Karr, 235 Iowa
351, 368, 16 N.W.2d 684, 642.

. “*** But this does not mean that there should be an entire

absence of conflict in the testimony. If this were so, the party
against whom the specific performance is sought could almost
always defeat the plaintiff by setting up some other contract, to
which the acts of part performance might be referred, and by
producing some evidence * * * to support such contract.”
Sweeney v. O’Hora, 48 Iowa 34, 87. Cited in Peddicord v.
Peddicord, 242 Towa, 555, 559-560, 47 N.W.2d 264, 267.
» ME “Our statute does not forbid oral contracts or render
them invalid. It relates merely to the manner of proof.” In re.
Estate of Lindsey, supra, 254 Iowa at 710-711, 118 N.W.2d
at 605, and citations.

We agree with the trial court’s findings the transfer of the
life estate from plaintiff and his wife to defendant was in fact a
part of the settlement in the divorce action; that plaintiff has
not proven any facts fairly and reasonably accounted for in no
other way than by the existence of this alleged oral agreement,

1004 a Pe

and plaintiff thus failed to remove the case from the statute
of frauds. .

VII. What we have said in Divisions V and VI, supra,
disposes of plaintiff’s first four propositions.

HME (VIL Under his remaining proposition plaintiff
argues the trial court’s refusal to hear the evidence of H. E.
deReus, his attorney at the time of the alleged oral agreement,
was arbitrary.

During his case in chief plaintiffs counsel announced he
would like to call Mr. deReus as his witness; he requested de-
fendant’s counsel to go with him to deReus’ home to determine
if he was able to testify; counsel expressed agreement and the
court announced “if Mr. deReus isn’t able to get up here we
eould go down there and take his testimony.” After plaintiff
rested, counsel was permitted to make this statement in the
record: .

“Yesterday I stated it was the desire of the plaintiff to take
the testimony of Mr. deReus. Last evening Mr. Johnson and I
went to the home of Mr. deReus and there in the presence of all
of us we interviewed Mr. deReus who has been ill something like
three or four years. He stated that by virtue of his infirmities
his mind was very hazy and he did not feel that in his present
state he should testify in this matter; that some of it would be
merely his hazy memory of which he would not be certain. Am
I correct, Mr. Johnson?

“Mr. Johnson: Yes; that’s correct.”

It would appear plaintiff’s counsel announced of his own
choice he was not calling Mr. deReus as a witness,

However, after the close of deferidant’s evidence plaintiff's
counsel announced that as a product of defendant’s testimony
given that morning, plaintiff desired to take as rebuttal just
one phase of testimony from Mr. deReus as to whether he re-
membered defendant, plaintiff and defendant’s counsel being in
the office. Defendant’s counsel offered to stipulate that on at
least one occasion the four people mentioned were in deReus’
office but refused to stipulate the exact date.

The court observed defendant had admitted in his testimony
he was probably there and in view of the stipulation the parties

a ee 1005

were there on one occasion the court deemed the matter was not
sufficiently material to grant the request.

Plaintiff’s contention this ruling was an abuse of discretion
is without merit. .

Finding the propositions relied upon by plaintiff for re-
versal are without merit, the cause is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur,

Bernarp Fuake et al., for themselves and as representatives of
classes with like interests, appellees, v. Cumrrorp BENNETT
et al., appellants; Wiu1am J. Swassine et al., inter-
venors-appellants.

No. 52795.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 849)

1006 |

Marcs 5, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Robert, B: Jehring,
City Attorney of Muscatine, and William F. Sueppel, of Iowa
City, for appellants and intervenors-appellants.

Stanley, Bloom, Mealy & Lande, of Muscatine, for appellees.

Becker, J.—Plaintiffs in this class action seek declaratory
judgments declaring that certain upward pension adjustments
are to be made promptly after July 4, 1965, and pensioners are
entitled to such adjusted pension amounts for.all periods on and
after July 4, 1965, less any amount previously paid. Defendants

i Le 1007

and intervenors contend the pensions are to be adjusted effective
July 1, 1966. The trial court held the Act took effect in its
entirety on July 4, 1965; the pension adjustments provided in
each amendment are required to be computed and made promptly
after July 4, 1965, using a computation date as of July 1, 1965;
plaintiffs and all in like class are entitled to be paid on such basis
for all periods beginning on or after July 1, 1965, minus any
part which has already been paid. We disagree.

The pension systems involved are found in Iowa Code, 1962;
chapter 97A, involving retirement compensation for peace officers
and their beneficiaries; chapter 410, involving retirement com-
pensation for policemen and firemen appointed on or before
March 2, 1934; and chapter 411, involving retirement compensa-
tion for policemen and firemen appointed after March 2, 1934.
The three chapters were amended by Acts of the Sixty-first
General Assembly, chapters 112, 840 and 341 respectively.

None of these three laws specifies an effective date or con-
tains a publication clause. They were signed by the Governor
on the following dates: chapter 341, March 9, 1965; chapter 112,
June 30, 1965; chapter 340, May 3, 1965. They all became
effective July 4, 1965. Constitution of the State of Iowa, Article
III, section 26; Iowa Code, 1962, section 3.7.

The parties agree the three statutes are substantially iden-
tical. We will note significant differences as necessary. At
‘present we consider chapter 411, Code, 1962, as amended by Acts
of Sixty-first General Assembly, Regular Session (1965), chapter
341.

I. The effect of the amendatory Act cannot be determined
without a review of the purpose and structure of chapter 411,
‘Retirement Systems for Policemen and Firemen, as it existed
prior to July 4, 1965. The chapter provides for retirement al-
lowance to beneficiaries who may be members; ie. retired or
disabled firemen or policemen; or a member’s designated bene-
ficiaries.1 Retired policemen and firemen with 22 years service
and attained age of 55 may receive a retirement allowance which

1 The compligating death benefits, widows, and orphans, benefits and like
provisions are eliminsted a unnecestary to this opinion. The principles de-
Yeloped are applicable to those benefits as well as to the retirement allowance.
Ail felate fo Similar actuarial and funding problems.

1008 ee —

shall be 50 percent of their average income during the last five
years of service before retirement. This retirement income is
composed of the sum of the member’s annuity (from accumulated
contributions of a member) and a pension (from tax appropria-
tions provided by the cities), Payments are payable on a
monthly basis. .

Since annuity funds come from withholding from the mem-
ber’s wages they are fixed.at time of retirement. Pension sums
come from tax sources under statutory formula and must absorb
the impact of any unplanned or unexpected raise in benefits.

The annuity funds and pension funds are handled separately
throughout. The statutes provide for two separate accounts for
each, plus a separate account for expense of administration.

Thus before the 1965 amendment the retiree or his bene-
ficiaries received annuities and pensions both of which were fixed
by formula predicated on amounts fixed at time of retirement
which did not change. No relief was afforded for the inflationary
trend of modern life.

II. In 1965 the legislature provided an escalation clause
which we now consider. Under this amendment a computation
is to be made as of July 1 of each year for each retired person
or beneficiary on the basis of what an equivalent worker now
receives, This new computation is not the new pension. One
half the difference between the result of new formula and the
old pension shall be added to the old pension. This shall be the
new, presumably higher pension. In no event will the new result
be allowed to go below the old pension. The explanation provided
with House File 7 reads:

“Hach year the cost-of-living index rises. The income of the
working man is generally adjusted to the price-cost squeeze
because he is in a bargaining position. The same cannot be said
of the retired person on pension whose source of income is fixed
and does not adjust to the rise in cost-of-living.

“This bill provides that pensions payable to retired members
of the state’s police, fire, and public safety departments, or
their beneficiaries, will be adjusted according to salaries paid to
active members of these departments, and would go far toward
eliminating the hardships attendant to the fixed-pension buying
power.”

a a 1009

The recomputation is made each year as of July 1. As to
payment chapter 341, section 2(c) provides, “All monthly pen-
sions adjusted as provided in this subsection shall be payable
beginning on July 1 of the year in which the adjustment is made
and shall continue in effect until the next following July 1 at
which time the monthly pensions shall again be recomputed and
all monthly pensions shall be adjusted in accordance with the
recomputations.”

The legislature did not specify the year in which the new
payments would start. Plaintiffs contend they should start with
the first pay period from and after July 1, 1965. Defendants
and intervenors contend the starting date should be July 1, 1966.

As part of the amendment the legislature provided a new
raised schedule for contributions from working members to be
paid into the annuity fund. The parties agree the new annuity
contribution section became effective for all pay periods be-
ginning on or after July 4, 1965.

III. Since the annuity portion of the retirement allowance
is already fixed, all of the addition due to the use of the new
formula must come from the pension fund which is dependent
on tax sources. In order to provide tax moneys the 1962 (and
present) statute provides:

“411.11 Contributions by the city. 1. On or before the first
day of July in each year the respective boards of trustees shall
certify to the superintendent of public safety the amounts which
will become due and payable during the year next following to
the pension accumulation fund and the expense fund, The
amounts so certified shall be included by the superintendent of
public safety in his annual budget estimate. The amounts so
certified shall be appropriated by the said cities and transferred
to the retirement system for the ensuing year. Said cities shall
annually levy a tax sufficient in amount to cover such appropria-
tions [emphasis supplied].

“2, To cover the requirements of the respective retirement
systems for the period prior to the date when the first regular
appropriation is due as provided in subsection 1 of this section,
such amounts as shall be necessary to cover the needs of the re-
tirement system shall be paid into the pension accumulation fund

1010

and expense fund by special appropriations to the retirement
system.”

Section 411.11 indicates the funding of the pension portion
of the system, which is tax supported and absorbs the impact of
any raises in benefits, is in futuro on an annual basis. Applied to
our problem, the trustees are presumed to have estimated their
needs and reported to the superintendent of public safety by
July 1, 1965. The cities then appropriate the money and levy
the tax. The legislature did not provide a method whereby the
deficiencies created by the new formula could be taken care of
by special appropriation. It did supply such a method in the
original Act for the first year of operation of the system by.
providing for a special appropriation in section 411.11(2). The
failure to act. similarly would indicate an intention to have the
new formula take effect in 1966 rather than 1965.

IV. Chapter 341, Acts of the Sixty-first General Assembly,
provides: “Pensions payable under this section shall be adjusted
as follows: °

“a. As of the first of July of each year, the monthly pen-
sions authorized in this section payable to each retired member
and to each beneficiary, except children, of a deceased member
shall be recomputed, * * * :

“b. As of the first, of July of each year, the monthly pension
payable to each surviving child in accordance with subsections
eight (8), nine (9), and thirteen (13) of this section shall be
adjusted to equal six percent of the monthly salary payable on
such July first to an active member having the rank of first-class
fireman, in the case of a child of a deceased member of the fire
department, or of a first-class patrolman, in the case of a child of
a deceased member of the police department. * * *

“e, All- monthly pensions adjusted as provided in this sub-
section shall be payable beginning on July 1 of the year in which
the adjustment is made and shall continue in effect until the next
following July 1 at which time the monthly pensions shall again
be recomputed and all monthly pensions shall be adjusted in
accordance with the recomputations.” -(Emphasis added.)

. Plaintiffs argue that the above dates only make the funds
payable as of July 1. Therefore application would not give the

[| 1011

statute a retrospective effect if applied to the year 1965. Actual
payment is to come after July 4. We cannot agree. Not only
would such construction be retrospective in that it would re-
quire payment of amounts newly accrued for three days prior
to the effective date of the Act, it would also require reestimation
of funds needed to make the new payments for the coming year.
This computation had already been made by the trustees on or
before July 1, 1965, for the ensuing year and transmitted to the
superintendent of public safety.

In Krueger v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 260 Iowa 678, 680,
681, 149 N.W.2d 142, 148, 144, we said:

Hi “J, Whether a statute operates retrospectively or pros-
pectively is a matter of legislative intent. Within constitutional
limits, the legislature may by clear and express language state
its intention. Manilla Community School District v. Halverson,
251 Towa 496, 501, 101 N.W.2d 705, 708, * * *

HI “Il. ‘As a rule all statutes are to be construed as pros-
pective in operation unless the contrary is expressed or clearly
implied, The rule is subject to an exception where the statute
relates solely to remedies or procedure.’ Hill v. Electronics
Corp. of America, 253 Iowa 581, 590, 118 N.W.2d 313, 318;
Bascom v. District Court of Cerro Gordo County, 231 Iowa 360,
1 N.W.2d 220; Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.W.2d 6, 8;
Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W.2d 484, 1967.”

We do not believe these amendments were procedural in the
sense referred to in the Krueger case, The foregoing rules mili-
tate against a retrospective application of the statute.

Here we should note a difference between chapter 411 and
chapter 97A, The latter chapter provides a retirement, accident
and disability system for highway patrol and bureau of criminal
investigation officers. The two laws are very similar but section
9TA.11 provides: “Contributions by the state. On or before the
first day of November in each year, the board of trustees shall
eertify to the state comptroller the amounts which will become
due and payable during the year next following to the pension
accumulation fund and the expense fund. The amounts so
certified shall be paid by the state comptroller out of the funds
appropriated for the Iowa department of public safety, to the

1012 ee

treasurer of state, the same to be credited to the system for the
ensuing year.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The plan is apparently to fund the system on a calendar
rather than a fiscal year basis. Funds for the last half of 1965
had been planned as early as the prior November. Funds for
1966, one half under the old formula and one half under the new
formula could be planned as of November 1965. The prior date
for planning for the last half of 1965 was long past when the Act
became effective. New funding by special appropriation would
be indicated for any result other than that reached here. No
new appropriation, or equivalent, was provided.

V. The trial court held and plaintiffs argue: “It would
be a strained and unreasonable interpretation to contend that the
pension increases began in July 1966, but the increased contri-
butions to pay for these pension increases began in July 1965.”

This view misconceives the purposes of the two amendments.
The more attractive pensions for present recipients must come
entirely from tax funds. Additional withholding from present
workers’ salaries will not alleviate this situation in any way.
The withheld amounts are the property of the donors and cannot
be used for payment to present recipients. That is why the funds
are separated into two different systems consisting of two ac-
counts each, The workers’ annuity funds are even protected
from administrative expenses by creation of a separate fund for
that purpose,

The increased withholding will help the cities in the future
when present workers are retired. It cannot help them in meet-
ing obligations payable currently. We need not strain for such
construction. The result is compelled by the whole plan.

VI. Plaintiffs argue: “When a statute provides for a com-
putation date earlier than the effective date of the statute, the
entire statute becomes effective and operative on the effective
date, usirig new computations made as of the earlier computation
date.”, citing Gulf Shipside Storage Corp. v. Thames, 217 La.
128, 46 So.2d 62 (1950).

‘We do not consider the case applicable. No effort was made
to apply new computations to dates before the Act became effec-
tive. Further the case involved computations imposed under the

Pe Es 1018

Employment Compensation Law. It did not deal with the type
of obligation we have here.

HI VII. We are reminded that Iowa Code, 1966, section
4.2 provides a statute is to be liberally construed to promote its
ubjects and to assist the parties in obtaining justice. Rocken-
field v. Kuhl, 242 Iowa 218, 217, 46 N.W.2d 17, states: “It is
elementary that laws creating pension rights are to be liberally
construed with the view of promoting the objects of the legisla-
ture. 48 C.J., Pensions, section 8B, page 787; 40 Am. Jur.
Pensions, section 4, page 963, This of course means strict con-
struction against the authority.”

We do not believe this to be a narrow construction, nor does
it defeat the object of the statutes, or justice. The question is
not whether the recipients get the improved pension. The
question is, when does the improved pension start? Before
money can be paid out of a pension fund money must be paid
into that same fund. A construction that makes the new pen-
sions effective and payable July 1, 1966, allows the mechanics of
funding the plan to be fully operative. A construction making
the new pensions payable July 1, 1965, omits an essential feature
of all pension plans; i.e. provision for funding. We must there-
fore conclude there was no intent to provide for payments with-
out providing for a source of funds.

Evidence was offered tending to show that the annual ad-
ditional cost if the amendments became effective July 1, 1965,
would be $161,228 for the Des Moines retirement system. Plain-
tiffs objected to this evidence because the increased collections
were not shown. Division V indicates the presence or absence of
increased annuity collections is immaterial, The increased costs
cannot be reduced by collections that must be held to fund future
obligations under the annuity portion of the plan.

Additional cost to the Des Moines system is, of course, much
higher than to other smaller systems. However, smaller systems
do not have as large a tax base for funding. We cite these
figures to indicate the problem of funding involves substantial
sums and is a real problem for the pension trustees. It must be
presumed the legislature intended such funding to be accom-
plished in an orderly manner. It set up the mechanics for

1014 ee —

orderly funding. If we construe the statute in such manner as
10 interrupt the legislative time table we defeat, rather than
promote, the objects of the statute.

VII. Defendants offered evidence by Mr. John Connors,
President of the Des Moines Fire Fighters Association Local
and Mr, Park Rinard, Executive Director of the Iowa League of
Municipalities. Hach is a registered lobbyist for his respective
organization. Hach testified generally as to his knowledge of
the background and legislative maneuvering preceding passage
of the Act. The evidence was admitted subject to objection. The
court was never asked to rule on the reserved rulings.

|| Defendants contend plaintiffs waived their objections by
failure to require the court to rule. In Reed v. Bunger, 255
Towa 322, 834, 122 N.W.2d 290, we said: “Ruling on defendant’s
ebjection was reserved, apparently with defendant’s consent. No
request or demand for a ruling was made. The objection is
therefore deemed waived. Error does not appear. Shover v.
Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 252 Iowa 706, 721, 107 N.W.2d 85, 93,
94, and citations; Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, 252 Iowa 978, 984, 108 N.W.2d 487, 491.” The
evidence is therefore properly before us. .

| | The trial court obviously gave little, if any, weight to
that testimony for it was contra to its holding. We give no
weight to such testimony as it was presented in this case since it
amounted to no more than the understanding of the two lobbyists
of the intent of those members of the legislature to whom they
talked.

We do not decide the matter of admissibility of like evidence
in eases that may arise under differing factual situations involv-
ing differing statutory construction problems. The general rules
governing the admissibility of such testimony are found at 2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, chapter 50, Legislative
History of Enactment, pages 481 to 507. The bewildering array
of judicial pronouncements on the subject are exhaustively col-
lected. The only conclusion that can be reached from a study of
the cited material is that the problem must be faced in each case
in light of its own peculiar facts.

a es 1015

We conclude the effective date for payment of retirement
benefits under the new formulae was July 1, 1966.—Reversed
and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

Larson, SNELL, Stuart and Raw1ines, JJ., concur. _
Garvep, C.J., Moorz and Mason, JJ., dissent.
LeGranp, J., takes no part.

Dartens Luci Gress; Loy Gress and Pamena Gisss, by her
father and next friend, Loy Gisss, appellants, v. Caron J.
Witmern and Harrrorpv Accent & Inpemniry

. Company, appellees,

No. 52582.
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 93)

P| | 1017

Marcu 5, 1968.

Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, of Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Silliman, Gray & Stapleton, of Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

LrGranp, J—On Christmas Day of 1962 this unfortunate
head-on collision resulted in one death and personal injury to all
other occupants of both cars. Three personal injury claims are
involved in this appeal from judgment for defendants, following
a jury trial and verdict in their favor. .

Plaintiffs Loy Gibbs and Darlene Lucille Gibbs are husband
and wife. The other plaintiff, Pamela Gibbs, is their daughter
who was then three years old. Loy Gibbs was the owner and
driver of one of the vehicles in this accident. Since their in-

‘1018 es 7

téerests on this appeal’ are identical, ali references here to Loy
- Gibbs apply equally to all three plaintiffs.

Carol J, Wilmeth was the driver of the other car, which was
owned by Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, by whom
her husband, Oren J. Wilmeth, was employed. For convenience
Carol J. Wilmeth is referred to herein as defendant and Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Company as Hartford.

The accident occurred on U.S. Highway No. 6 about 15 miles
west of Marengo, Iowa. Plaintiff was proceeding west and de-
fendant:east. A Christmas Eve snow had left the highway in an
uncertain state. Portions were dry and clear; others were snow-
packed and icy. Both drivers were admittedly aware of this.
When the Hartford car was so close to plaintiffs that evasive
action was impossible, it suddenly and without warning spun
across the center line directly into plaintiffs’ path. The result
has already been mentioned. Further testimony will be referred
to in our later discussion.

Plaintiff claims he is entitled to a new trial on each of six
grounds. They are: (1) that the court erred in submitting to
the jury defendant’s affirmative defense of legal excuse; (2) that
instruction nine on legal excuse was erroneous as applied to the
facts of this case; (3) that the court erred in admitting the testi-
mony of Reverend Burton C. Collier as part of the res gestae;
(4) that the court erred in failing to submit to the jury the
question of separate liability on the part of-Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Company; (5) that the court erred in permitting
the jury to deliberate continuously for 20 hours and in giving a
coercive verdict-urging instruction; (6) that the court erred in
giving a verdict-urging instruction without notice to counsel
and in the absence of counsel.

I. We discuss assignments one and two together. Plaintiff
claims, first, legal excuse should have been withdrawn from the
jury because the evidence shows any emergency which existed
arose out of defendant’s negligence and therefore she is not en-
titled to rely on that doctrine; and, second, even if proper to
submit the issue, the instruction by which the trial court did so
was fatally defective and requires a new trial. The factual
situation which will determine the answer to this problem is as

a a 1019

follows: Defendant and her husband, Oren J. Wilmeth, who was
fatally injured in this accident, had left Des Moines bound for
their home in Milwaukee. They traveled Interstate 80 out of
Des Moines and when they reached Grinnell, where the interstate
then ended, they took U. 8S. Highway 6 in an easterly direction.
Here, too, they switched drivers, defendant taking over the
operation of the car from her husband, who had driven from Des
Moines to Grinnell.

All witnesses, including defendant, agree that the road was
sometimes clear, sometimes snowpacked and icy. Although it
was cold, a bright sun had melted the snow and ice in the well-
traveled areas but in sheltered spots the witnesses variously de-
seribed conditions as “slick”, “icy”, and “very slippery.” De-
fendant was driving between 55 and 60 miles an hour, which was
under the posted speed limit. She testified she had no trouble
maneuvering the car or keeping it under control. This testimony
was substantiated by other witnesses, some for plaintiff and some
for defendant, who stated they saw nothing untoward about
the movement of defendant’s car until immediately before the
accident, and who stated also they had no difficulty in control-
ling their own cars, which were traveling at approximately the
same speed.

At approximately 200 to 300 feet before the point of impact.
the road was snowpacked and icy over its entire surface. Here,
too, defendant entered a slight right curve on a gradual down-
grade. Defendant reduced the speed of her ear but does not
know to what extent. She testified at this time she had no trouble
with the control of her car. At one time defendant testified the
control did not change at anytime for 500 feet prior to the im-
pact; at another time she stated that her car “gave” or “swayed
a little” but she steadfastly denied this movement was a skid of
any kind. During these few critical moments before the ac-
cident defendant’s husband was asleep. Apparently he was
awakened suddenly by the slight movement of the car just
mentioned. Defendant testified he grabbed the steering wheel
from her and caused the car to spin out of control across the
center line directly into the path of plaintiff. This, and only this,
she says caused the car to veer over onto the other side of the
voad where it is conceded the impact occurred. Defendant insists

1020 be 7

that before her husband grabbed the steering wheel from her she
was at all times in complete control of the operation and move-
ment of the Hartford car.

HM Legal excuse is a doctrine by which one secks to avoid
the consequences of his own conduct by showing justification for
acts which would otherwise be considered negligent. This
doctrine has been before us many times and has been defined to
mean: (1) anything that would make it impossible to comply
with the statute or ordinance; (2) anything over which the driver
has no control which places his car in a position contrary to the
provisions of the statute or ordinance; (3) where the driver of
the car is confronted by an emergency not of his own making,
and by reason thereof he fails to obey the statute; (4) where a
statute specifically provides an excuse or exception.

Hs it is, of course, well settled that one whose own
negligence has caused or contributed to a situation which makes
it impossible for him to obey the law may not rely upon such
conduct as a basis for invoking the doctrine. Kisling v. Thier-
man, 214 Iowa 911, 916, 243 N.W. 552; Wachter v. MeCuen, 250
Towa 820, 827, 96 N.W.2d 597, 600; Winter v. Moore, 255 Iowa 1,
4, 121 N.W.2d 82, 83, and citations; Mass v. Mesic, 256 Iowa 252,
255, 127 N.W.2d 99, 101; 7 Am, Jur.2d, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic, sections 359-360, page 905. Whether. one has
established a legal excuse is usually, but not invariably, a jury
question. In considering this matter the evidence is to be viewed
in the light most favorable to the one asserting the existence of
legal excuse. Winter v. Moore and Mass v. Mesic, both supra,
and citations.

HI We are convinced the issue was properly submitted
under the circumstances existing here. Plaintiff's argument to
the contrary entirely disregards the requirement that we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. We agree
there is ample evidence from which the jury might have found
defendant’s own negligence triggered the crisis and the act. of
defendant’s husband in grabbing the steering wheel was a last
desperate attempt to bring the car back on its own side of the
road, but there is also evidence from which the jury might have
found defendant had control of her car until her hushand awoke

a a 1021

and inexplicably grabbed the steering wheel from her, causing
the car to spin out of control.

We are not unmindful of the fact that defendant’s testi-
mony is in some vital respects inconsistent with and contradicted
by her pretrial deposition, which was introduced into evidence.
However, it is the jury’s duty, not ours, to put credibility where
it belongs. Under the facts existing here we find it was proper
to permit the jury to determine if defendant had carried her
burden of proving legal excuse.

We now consider instruction nine under which this issue
was submitted to the jury. It provides:

“The defendants claim that if it is found that Carol J.
Wilmeth violated a statute in the operation of the Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Company owned vehicle, that she had a
legal exeuse for doing so, in that Oren Wilmeth had grabbed the
steering wheel and changed the course of said vehicle, and that
she was therefore not negligent. You are instructed that the
burden of proof is upon the defendants to establish such legal
excuse by a preponderance of the evidence.

“By the term ‘legal excuse’ as applied to this case, is meant:

“1, Anything that would make it impossible to comply with
the statute.

“2. Anything over which the driver has no control which
places his car in a position contrary to the provisions of the
statute.

“3. When a driver is confronted by an emergency not of
his own making, and by reason thereof fails to obey the statute.

“If you find that defendant Carol J. Wilmeth has violated a
statute as submitted to you in other instructions, and that she
has established the grabbing of the steering wheel and changing
of course by Oren Wilmeth as a legal excuse for such violation,
under the above definition, then you should find the defendant
Carol J. Wilmeth not negligent in violating the particular
statute involved.”

HEM Plaintiff claims this instruction is fatally defective
because it permitted the jury to find defendant had established
legal excuse if she proved her husband grabbed the steering
wheel from her, even if the jury also found her negligence caused

1022 be 7

him to do so, and because.it failed to advise the jury as to defend-
ant’s speed and the condition of the highway as bearing on this
matter. We must agree that this instruction is erroneous. We
have frequently held it is the trial court’s duty to see that the
jury is fully and fairly instructed on the issues,. Hartford Fire
Insurance Oo. v. Lefler, 257 Iowa 796, 803, 185 N.W.2d 88, 91;
Overturf v. Bertrand, 256 Iowa 596, 604, 128 N.W.2d 182, 186;
Law v. Hemmingsen, 249. Iowa 820, 826, 89 N:W.2d 386, 391;
Gardner v. Johnson, 231 Iowa 1233, 1235, 3 N.W.2d 606, 607,
and citations.

Beyond the abstract definition in instruction nine, the jury
remained entirely ignorant of what elements would justify them
in finding defendant had established legal excuse. Important to
their decision were, among other things, the condition of the
highway, the presence or absence of snow and ice, whether .de-
fendant’s car was skidding across the center of the road before:
defendant’s husband -grabbed the steering wheel, whether de-
fendant’s speed under the circumstances then existing was proper,
and the effect of defendant’s knowledge concerning the condition
of the road on her duty to reduce her speed. It might almost be
said that these circumstances were determinative in this case;
yet none of them was called to the attention of the jury, either in
this instruction or elsewhere. The'instruction was incomplete
and could be nothing except confusing to the jury.

HH We have said it is the trial court’s duty to see that the
jury has a clear and intelligent understanding of what it is to
decide. Overturf v. Bertrand, supra. We have also said it is the
trial court’s duty to instruct with reasonable fullness on the
issues, and a mere abstract definition of a-term, having no appli-
eation to the particular controversy, is insufficient. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. Lefler, supra. In Law v. Hemmingsen,
supra, at page 826 of 249 Iowa Reports we said, “The instructions
afford the only guide the jury has for correct application of the
law to the facts.”

Here the jury got nothing beyond a bare definition of legal
excuse. The, instruction as given would justify the conclusion
that defendant’s negligence -was excused if she established her
husband grabbed the steering wheel and changed the course of

a a 1028

the car without pointing out it was important to decide why he
did so. The instruction did not adequately advise the jury as to
one of the essential elements necessary to establish sudden
emergency as a legal excuse; absence of fault on the one who
invokes it.

Under the circumstances existing here we find the instruc-
tion was highly prejudicial and entitles plaintiff to a new trial.

II. Since our holding in Division I means this case must
be retried, we should decide several other matters assigned as
errors which are likely to arise again at that time.

One of these concerns the testimony of Reverend Burton C.
Collier, who was permitted to relate a conversation with defend-
ant at the hospital on the day of the accident.

This witness had arrived at the scene of the accident several
minutes after it occurred. After the injured parties had been
removed by ambulance, he continued on his way and, as he
neared Marengo, decided to stop and inquire about the condition
of Mr, and Mrs. Wilmeth. When he arrived there, Oren -Wilmeth
was in the emergeney room; the defendant was seated just out-
side that room. ‘This was approximately one hour after the
accident.

This is the testimony to which objection is made:

“Q. And did you then talk to Mrs. Wilmeth? A. Yes I ‘aia,

“Q. And do you recall what it was you talked to her about?
A. Yes,

“Q. And what was that?

“Mr. Wilmarth: That is objected to as calling for hearsay ;
not part of the res gestae; calling for self-serving declarations ;
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.

“The Court: Overruled, you may answer, ©

eee

“A. As I recall, 'see, I think we did have a brief prayer after
some other discussion which I do not recall exactly concerning
her concern and his condition, then I did ask her if she wanted
to talk about it, and ag I recall she said it was awful. She re-
counted, I think, their having been in Des Moines, their traveling
eastward, the condition of the roads, the car had swerved some
end he had been sleeping and roused to grab the wheel, and that
subsequently it had swerved into the path of this other car.”

1024 Le Le

The witness also stated defendant was crying and was “very
frantic and distraught, obviously concerned about his condition
end what was going on in the emergency room.”

HE The only objection now before us is that this was hearsay
and not part of the res gestae, A statement is said to be part of
the res gestae when it is a spontaneous exclamation so closely
related to the transaction or occurrence in question as reason-
ably to appear to be prompted by it. 29 Am, Jur.2d, Evidence,
section 708, page 769.

Various jurisdictions have established different rules by
which to test the admissibility of res gestae statements. We have
adopted two standards as controlling. They are: (1) sponta-
neity, and (2) such closeness of connection with the transaction
as to exclude any presumption of fabrication. State v. Berry,
241 Iowa 211, 215, 40 N.W.2d 480, 483; Bass v. Muenchow, 259
Towa 1010, 1014, 146 N.W.2d 923, 926, and citations.

Plaintiff claims the statement here was too far removed in
time to meet the requirement of spontaneity and also that it was
not prompted by the event itself but was rather elicited by in-
quiry from Reverend Collier. Both these considerations are
important as bearing on the defendant’s state of mind. However,
whether certain testimony is or is. not a part of the res gestae
cannot be determined by any hard-and-fast rule. Each case must
be decided on its own facts, We.cannot say, under the cireum-
stances existing here, the lapse of an hour robbed defendant’s
statement of that spontaneity which the law requires. Nor is all
information given in response to questioning rendered inadmis-
sible, even if we assume what Reverend Collier said here
amounted to an inquiry.

HEME (We have several times held a statement in answer to
a question does not necessarily violate the res gestae rule. The
important consideration is the spontaneity of the statement, how-
ever elicited: State v. Berry, 241 Iowa 211, 216, 217, 40 N.W.2d
480; State v. Stafford, 287 Iowa 780, 785, 28 N.W.2d 832; Clark
v. Van Vleck, 135 Iowa 194, 197, 198, 112 N.W. 648, 650; Dedman
v. McKinley, 238 Iowa 886, 893, 29 N.W.2d 337. This was at
most a nonleading inquiry not calculated to obtain an answer
favorable to defendant nor to cause that degree of deliberation

a es 1025

which would rob the statement of its spontaneity. In this con-
nection see also Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 420 S.W.2d 408, 410.

HH The admissibility of statements as being part of the
res gestae is largely within the discretion of the trial court. 8
Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 970, page
520; Dohse v. Market Mens Mutual Insurance Co., 253 Iowa
1186, 1191, 115 N.W.2d 844, 847; Bass v. Muenchow, supra.
Furthermore as we said in Roushar v. Dixon, 231 Iowa 993, 997,
2 N.W.2d 660, 662, the tendency is to extend, rather than to
narrow, the res gestae doctrine. See also Bass v. Muenchow,
supra.

HMM Although there are many instances in which we have
reversed the trial court’s ruling admitting res gestae statements,
we hold there is no basis for doing so here.

The statement was made within an hour after an accident
to which defendant had been a party. Her husband then lay in
the emergency room with injuries she must have known were
serious, although she may not have realized they were fatal,
She was upset and distraught. There is ample support in the
record to justify the trial court in finding she was still under the
influence of events, which just. an hour before, had turned her
Christmas into a day of horror and tragedy. We find no re-
versible error in the court’s ruling admitting this testimony.

III. Plaintiff alleges-error for the trial court’s failure to
submit to the’ jury the issue of Hartford’s separate liability,
should the jury find defendant guilty. of no negligence, but
should also find Oren Wilmeth’s action in grabbing the steering
wheel from defendant was both negligent and the Proximate
cause of the accident.

HE This theory is based | on the premise Oren Wilmeth,
upon grabbing the steering wheel, became the driver of the
Hartford car. Despite plaintiffs’ protestations to the contrary,
we doubt if the pleadings fairly present this issue. Oren Wil-
meth was fatally injured in this accident. His personal repre-
sentative was not made a defendant. The issue’ of his grabbing
the steering wheel was brought into the case by way of affirma-
tive defense, not as an allegation.of negligence in plaintiff's
petition, The petition, it is true, alleges that either Carol J.
Wilmeth or Oren Wilmeth was the driver of the Hartford car.

1026 | a

However, no specification of negligence, except by a strained
construction, could be said to refer to the conduct of Oren
‘Wilmeth. Nevertheless we do not base our conclusion on the
‘pleadings, and we assume for our purposes the petition was
sufficient to rély on the alleged negligence of Oren Wilmeth.

The only witness who testified concerning his conduct im-
mediately prior to the impact was the defendant. She states he
grabbed the steering wheel from her without cause at a time
when the car was within her complete control and there was no
danger ‘ -of an accident, although she concedes “he was trying to
help.” The impact instantaneously followed.

It is this action which: plaintiff asserts made Oren Wilmeth
the driver of ‘the car at the time the accident occurred. No
authority has been cited by plaintiff to justify this conclusion,
although she claims section 321.1(44), Code of Iowa, is broad
enough to inelude him within its terms. We disagree.

The mere fact that one, with or without justification, grabs
from another the! steering niechanism of a car a split second
‘before an accident occurred cannot be held to constitute such
person a driver, We have found no case which so holds under
‘facts similar to those present here. In Twogood v. American
Farmers’-Mutual Automobile Insurance Association, 229 Iowa
1183, .296 N.W. 239, we held there was more to driving an auto-
mobile than putting one’s hand on the steering wheel. In that
case, too, we quoted approvingly from State v. Myers, 207 Iowa
555, 556, 223 N.W. 166, where we held only one person ean be
‘engaged in’ the physical operation of’a motor vehicle at one time.

:- Several cases cited in the Twogood decision have held a
person who seizes the steering wheel from another may be held
to be in control of the car or-to be its driver under certain cir-
cumstances; These cases, however, all involve facts which are
not shown here. In each case the person. undertaking to assume
control. either took over the operation of more than merely the
‘steering wheel or guided anid steered the vehicle for some distance
before’the accident occurred, or both. Williams v. Nelson, 228
Mass. 191, 117 N.E. 189, Ann.Cas. 1918D 588; O’Connell v. New
Jersey Fidelity and Plate Glass Insurance Co., 201 App. Div.
117, 198 N.Y.S, 911, affirmed 235 N.Y. 583, 189 N.E. 744; Lum-
bermens Mutual Casualty Co..v. MeIver, 110 F.2d 323.

es 1027

. EB Under -the circumstances existing here we hold the trial
court was correct in refusing to submit to the jury the question
of separate liability on the part of Hartford based on the conduct
of Oren Wilmeth.

‘We do not say Hartford could have no separate liability for
Oren Wilmeth’s negligence under any circumstances. However
plaintiff's theory concerning such liability is based upon the
claim that he was the driver of the car at the time of the ac-
cident, The case was tried on this theory; an instruction sub-
mitting this theory to the jury was requested; and the motion
for new trial included this theory as one of its grounds. Our
holding under this division is limited to a finding that the trial
court was correct in refusing to submit to the jury the issue of
Hartford’s separate liability on this theory.

IV. In view of the foregoing we find it unnecessary to
determine if the trial court committed reversible error in requir-
ing the jury to deliberate overnight for a total of 20 hours with-
out rest, and in then giving a verdict-urging instruction without
notice to, or presence of, counsel which resulted in a verdict
within an hour and a half thereafter. In this regard we refer
to what we have recently said in Coulthard v. Keenan, 256 Iowa
890,-129 N.W.2d 597, and Kracht vy. Hoeppner, 258 Iowa 912,
140 N.W.2d 913. In both cases we expressed ‘disapproval of
prolonged jury deliberation without providing adequate rest for
the jurors, . .

‘We have many times considered the propriety of a verdict-
urging instruction and the circumstances under which one may
be given without coercing the jury. Hach case is dependent
upon its own circumstances. For a discussion of our previous
holdings we refer to Coulthard v. Keenan, supra, and the cita-
tions referred to there at page 898' of 256 Iowa Reports.

For the reasons expressed in Division I hereof this cause is
reversed and remanded for a new trial as to all plaintiffs against
both defendants.—Reversed and remanded.

All Jusrices concur.
Sweit, Rawzines and Broxsr, JJ., coneur specially.

Swewx, J. (concurring specially)—I concur in the reversal

1028 FP |

and remand in this case. As held by the majority in Division I,
the instruction on legal excuse as applied to this case was in-
adequate and prejudicial. In addition thereto there are what I
think are further errors that should be considered.

The majority opinion says it is conceded the collision oc-
eurred on plaintiffs’ side of the road. Why was defendant’s car
there? It was there because of something incident to its opera-
tion. Defendant's car was either out of control or the driver
failed to yield one half the travelled way.

The car was owned by Hartford. Oren Wilmeth was an
employee of Hartford and the car had been furnished to him for
his use. There was no issue as to his right to use the car for
personal use nor as to his wife’s right to drive it.

At the time of the accident Mrs. Wilmeth was behind the
wheel and had been driving. She testified: “After the ‘give’ in
the car occurred it startled my husband and he moved over and
grabbed the wheel. My control of the car definitely changed. It
swerved over into the other lane. My husband had the steering
wheel at this time. After my husband grabbed the wheel I don’t
remember anything more.”

Mr. Wilmeth died as a result of the accident. The only de-
fendants in the case at bar. are Mrs, Wilmeth and Hartford, the
owner of the car.

In the trial. court there v was teridered an issue as to who was
the driver of the car, In the light of Mrs, Wilmeth’s testimony
I think there was such an issue. However, I think there is in-
volved a more troublesome legal problem not dependent ‘on. the
question of who was the driver.

’ By statute (section 321.493) civil liability is imposed upon
the owner when damage is caused by reason of negligence of the
driver, the car being driven with the consent of the owner.

Here defendants pleaded as an excuse for the car being in
the wrong lane of traffic a sudden emergency not of the driver’s
own making.

Legal excuse was pleaded as an affirmative defense available
to escape liability for what otherwise would be a basis for liabil-
ity. It does not depend upon pleading by plaintiffs. The burden
of establishing legal excuse is on defendants, McMaster v.
Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 120 N.W.2d 509. © *

a Es 1029

The doctrine of legal excuse is based on principles set forth
in Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 916, 243 N.W. 552. In
that case four situations are listed that would serve as a legal
excuse. In the case before us defendant relied on No. 3, ie.,
“Where the driver of the ear is confronted by an emergency not
of his own making, and by reason thereof he fails to obey the
statute.”

In Winter v. Moore, 255 Iowa 1, 4, 121 N.W.2d 82, we said:

“For a sudden emergency confronting a motorist to be an
excuse for violation of a statutory rule of the road it must not
have been of his own making.” (Citations)

It is so well settled as to need no citation of authority here
that concurring tort-feasors may be jointly or separately liable
if proximate cause is shown. Here plaintiffs have not pleaded
negligence on the part of Oren Wilmeth as a basis for recovery
and his estate is not named as a defendant. Under the pleadings
plaintiffs may not recover here on an original claim based on
what he did. . .

I think grabbing control of the steering. wheel away from the
driver might be held to be an act of negligence, but that is not
the point here. Defendants injected into the pleadings and
evidence the act of Oren Wilmeth, husband of defendant Carol
J, Wilmeth, and agent and employee of defendant Hartford, as
an excuse for what- would otherwise be clearly a case of actionable
negligence against both defendants.

A vital element in establishing emergency as a legal excuse
is that what is claimed as the excuse was not attributable to the
one urging the defense. The words in Kisling v, Thierman,
supra, were used in applying the rule to the driver by saying,
“not of his own making.”

If the emergency was caused by Hartford’s agent I do not
think that Hartford can claim the emergency was not of its own
making. I do not think Hartford should be permitted to hide
behind an act of its own employee and agent as a legal excuse
from liability.

For the purpose of our appellate review on this question we
are not discussing other elements necessary for recovery such as
proximate cause. Our question is, what may be used as an
excuse for defendant’s car being on the wrong side of the road?

1030 [| a

Mrs. Wilmeth offered as her excuse the claim that her hus-
band grabbed the steering wheel and turned it counterclockwise
into the path of plaintiffs’ car, Admitting, arguendo, that this
might be used as a legal excuse by Mrs. Wilmeth, it does not
follow that the same act may excuse the one who caused the
emergency.

Assume, for the purpose of illustration, the driver of a car
is driving for the convenience and at the request of the owner
with the owner riding in the right front seat. By his affirmative
act the owner causes the driver to lose control with resulting
damage to an innocent third person. The driver might have
Jegal excuse from liability but it would be manifestly unsound
to say that the owner. could create the emergency and then
escape liability by hiding behind his own act. That is exactly
what Hartford is doing here except for the fact that the owner
was acting through an agent: and not in person.

It-is true that plaintiffs did not base their cause of action
on allegations of negligence against Oren Wilmeth, but that is
unimportant. The issue was raised by the affirmative defense
pleaded by defendants and that tendered the legal issue as to
who may rely on legal excuse.

Ordinarily, relief from liability. of a driver relieves tlie
owner. An owner’s or employer’s liability is statutory or’on the
theory of respondeat superior. Here we have a unique and most
unusual situation. Avoidance of what would be liability on the
part of Hartford is sought because of what Hartford’s agent and
employee did. Hartford should not be permitted to say that its
agent caused the accident and because Mrs, ‘Wilmeth might’ be
excused Hartford is also excused.

In my opinion such a holding would. be an erroneous ‘dis-
tortion of the theory of-legal excuse and would. stretch a sound
doctrine beyond the limits of plausibility.. It would be mani-
festly unfair to the plaintiffs here. °

. Hartford was the owner of the car and the employer of Oren
Wilmeth. Ordinarily Hartford would be liable for the tort of its
agent and. employee inthe operation of ‘its car. Hven though
neither Oren.-Wilmeth nor his estate is a party. defendant I do
not think. Hartford should escape responsibility because of what
he did under the doctrine of legal excuse.

a a 1081

If the same defense is not available to both defendants then
séparate verdict forms should be submitted to the jury so that
the evidence might be considered in the light of sound law.
Superficially it might seem anomalous to say that a driver may
be relieved from liability and the owner held liable, but not so
when the doctrine of legal excuse is properly applied.

On retrial of this case the jury should be properly instructed.

Rawuines and Brcxer, JJ., join in this special concurrence.

Cares E. Harais et al., plaintiffs-petitioners, v. Hon. Haroup
J. Furcx, District Judge, defendant-respondent.

No... 52850.
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 103)

1032

1083

Marca 5, 1968.

McGrane & Haugen, of Des Moines, Life, Davis & Life, of
Oskaloosa, and Vincent E, Johnson, of Montezuma, for plaintiffs.

Heslinga & Heslinga, of Oskaloosa, for defendant.

Garrretp, C.J.—We granted a writ of certiorari under rules
306-319, Rules of Civil Procedure, to review an order of defend-
ant-judge of the district court of Mahaska County to punish the
three plaintiffs for.contempt in refusing to comply with a writ of
mandamus to enforce orders-of the county superintendent of
schools and state board of public instruction that elementary
schools at Barnes City and Lacey be closed. -Plaintiffs are three
of the five members of the board of directors of North Mahaska
Community School District,

Defendant-judge acted under chapter 665, Code 1966, in

making the order. Section 665.11 provides: “No appeal lies from
an order to punish for a contempt, but the proceedings may, in
proper cases, be taken to a higher, court for revision by cer-
tiorari.”.
: I. Controversy arose over action of a majority of the school
board on July 18, 1966, that elementary students should attend
the schools in Lacey and Barnes City. Persons claiming to be
aggrieved by the board’s decision appealed therefrom to the
county. superintendent of schools who, on August 8 (1966),
reversed it and ordered the students to attend the school at New
Sharon in the same district, rather than at Lacey and.Barnes
City. . 7

The persons who opposed the board’s decision of July 18

1084 a |

brought action in mandamus to compel it to ‘carry out the revers-
ing order ‘of the couiitty superintendent. “ Evidence was taken in
this action on September 1 and ‘the court’s decision was filed
September 6, holding the action was brought prematurely be-
cause the 30 days for appeal to the state board of’ public’ in-
struction from the’ order of the county stiperintendent would
not expire before September 7 and, since a complete record had
been made and in the interests of justice, the court on its own
motion continued the case until after September 7.

The same day, this decision was filed plaintiffs in the action
filed an application for supplemental order providing that a
final decision be withheld until the appeal of the present plaintiffs
to the state board (taken after evidence was heard in the man-
damus action) is decided and the local school board acts in rela-
tion thereto. ©

Ten days later the present plaintifis (defendants in the
mandamus action) also filed application for supplemental order
stating. their appeal to the state department from the county
superintendent's order had been completed and set for hearing’
September 28, no reason’ remains for the mandamus action to
continue and it should be dismissed. :

Plaintiffs in the mandamus action made the next move, They
filed application for supplemental hearing and order on Novem-
ber 2 (1966) reciting that the appeal to the state department had
resulted in affirmance of the county superintendent’s order of
August 8; defendants continue to maintain the Barnes City and
Lacey schools in violation of the orders of both the county super-
intendent and state department; the cause should be set for
final hearing and defendants (in mandamus) be ordered to obey
these two orders. On the day set for hearing of this application
defendants (plaintiffs here) moved to dismiss. it on various
grounds. .

The court, acting through defendant: judge, heard arguments
on the various applications and defendant’s motion to dismiss the
one last filed, considered the evidence, reviewed the briefs and’
found defendants (plaintiffs here) had not complied with the
order of the county superintendent, affirmed by the state depart-
ment. The court held (November 22) it had jurisdiction of the
parties and subject matter, the decision of the state board was

— as 1035

final (Code section 290.5) and the order of the county: superin-
tendent should be enforced. It sustained. the application filed
September 6 of plaintiffs in the mandamus action, overruled the
motion of defendants to. dismiss the application filed after the
state board’s decision was made and ordered a writ of mandamus
to issue forthwith.

The writ so issued and provided defendants were under @ a
legal duty to follow and obey the order of August 8 of the county
superintendent requiring the elementary schools at Barnes City
and Lacey to. be closed and “you have refused to close (them).

“Now, therefore, you are commanded that upon receipt of
this order you will do those things necessary to follow and obey
the said order and decision of the county superintendent and will
forthwith close the elementary (schools) at Barnes City and
Lacey and will accomplish this before Monday, December 5,
1966.”

It is the claimed disobedience to this writ for which plain-
tiffs here were held in contempt and ordered to be punished.

The writ was served November 22 and 23. Time for com-
pliance was later extended to January 2, 1967. Plaintiffs here
appealed to us from the court’s final order of November 22 but
we dismissed the appeal July 10, 1967, for want of prosecution.

In the meantime, on January 26, 1967, the order of Novem-
ber 22 not having been effectively stayed, a plaintiff in the man-
damus action filed affidavit that the school board decided on
January 23 not to abide such order and the writ of mandamus,
plaintiffs here continue to refuse to obey them and should be
served with a rule to show cause why they should not be punished
for contempt. The rule issued and plaintiffs filed a long written
explanation of the action of the school board, largely defending
its original decision that elementary students attend school at
Lacey and Barnes City and the lack of wisdom of the reversing.
order of the county superintendent.

The above explanation says in part: “the undersigned wish
the record to show they reluctantly relinquish their responsibility-
to the elementary students in the district in favor of the orders
of the county superintendent, the state board and the district
court of Mahaska County.”

1086 PC a

On January 28 plaintiffs here were found in contempt and
ordered to be imprisoned in the county jail until such time as
they obey the writ of mandamus and pursuant thereto close the
elementary schools at Barnes City and Lacey and cause the
students to attend the school at New Sharon, commitment to
commence February 13 if the required acts are not sooner per-
formed, This time limit was later extended to February 15.

On March 7 Mr. Heslinga, attorney for plaintiffs in the
mandamus action, filed affidavit that these three plaintiffs were
again in contempt for failure to comply with the writ of man-
damus, Once again plaintiffs here were ordered to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt. Hearing was
had on March 15 and 16 in which plaintiffs here contended they
had purged themselves of contempt. The court held against this
contention, that they still remained in contempt and the order
and previous warrant of commitment to jail should be enforced
unless plaintiffs join in action of other board members in closing
the Lacey and Barnes City schools and moving the desks and
teaching equipment there to the school at New Sharon,

On April 5 (1967) the court found these plaintiffs had com-
plied with the last order of March.17 by board action’ and by
causing the desks and teaching equipment to be moved to the
New Sharon school, quashed the previous warrant of commit-
ment and held plaintiffs had purged themselves of contempt.

Regrettably the controversy flared anew when a majority of
the school board on July 6 passed a motion providing for use of
the Barnes City and Lacey schools for elementary pupils for the
1967-68 school year and ordering the school buildings there pre-
pared for such use. Plaintiffs voted for the motion. The matter
again came to the attention of the court with the filing of another
affidavit by Mr. Heslinga on August 8, setting out the facts just
stated and others herein summarized and suggesting that another
rule be served upon plaintiffs to show cause why they should not
be punished for contempt. Once again such a rule was issued
and served. . .

Hearing pursuant to the rule was held August 15-18, Plain-
tiffs Hargis and Vanderwilt filed written explanation of their
conduct. Rice did not appear. The written explanation of
Hargis and Vanderwilt, in effect, repeats several of the state-

| | Le 1037

ments in the explanation filed in January, previously referred to.
In addition, it says that at the time the board action of July 6
was taken they felt a new school year had started and it was the
hoard’s duty to determine which schools were to be used for such
year and they believed the mandamus order issued in November
was meant to cover only that school year.

After an extended hearing the court on August 29 again
found the three plaintiffs in contempt for voting to open the
Barnes City and Lacey schools for the fall, 1967 term, directing
the superintendent to prepare the schools for attendance of
students then, and for releasing publicity to the effect these
school buildings would be used for students commencing with
the term referred to, all in defiance of the writ of mandamus to
enforce the orders of the county superintendent and state de-
partment. Each plaintiff was fined $500 and, in event of non-
payment on or before September 5, was to be confined in the
county jail not to exceed one day for each $3.33 of the fine. One
third the court costs was to be taxed against each plaintiff. It is
this last order of August 29 which is now under review by
certiorari.

Plaintiffs contend defendant erred in these five respects:
In enforcing a writ of mandamus (1) allegedly based on a void
county superintendent’s order; (2) allegedly void as made in an
action prematurely brought and never abated; (3) which was no
longer effective; (4) which was so vague and uncertain by its
terms as to be void. The fifth claim of error is that defendant
assumed jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties in a con-
tempt action prosecuted by one (Heslinga) not authorized to
represent the state.

II. The ultimate question is whether defendant-judge acted
without jurisdiction or, otherwise illegally in ordering issuance
of the writ of mandamus on November 22, 1966, Rule 306, Rules
of Civil Procedure. Terms of the order were embodied in the
writ.

HE Whether defendant decided the mandamus action cor-
rectly upon the merits may not be considered in this proceeding.
If the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter
of the action, the order of November 22 and the writ issued
pursuant thereto were valid even though erroneous or improv-

1038 Fe Pe

idently granted. Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49,:56, 202 N.W.
542, 544, 39 A.L.R, 1849, 1354; Larsen v. District Court, 230
Towa 1100, 1102, 300 N.W. 297, 298; Critelli v. Tidrick, 244 Iowa
462, 468, 56 N.W.2d 159, 164, and citations; Harvey v. Prall, 250
Towa 1111, 1116, 97 N.W.2d 306, 309, and citations. Note 42
Towa Law Review 265, 280; 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contempt, section 47,
page 51. (“The proper manner for-challenging the correctness
of an adverse ruling is by appeal and not by disobedience.”)

In 17 OJ.S., Contempt, section 124(1), page 382, states:
“Tt is generally held that, on review of an order or judgment
‘punishing for contempt for disobeying’ an order or decree of
court, the propriety of the order or decree disobeyed cannot be
questioned, except in so far as it can be shown absolutely to be
void.” . .

An extended annotation in 12 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1107, cites
numerous decisions, including six from Iowa in support of this
general rule:

“Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties and has the authority or power to render the
particular order or decree, the fact that such order or decree,
violation or disobedience of which is made the basis of the con-
tempt charge, is erroneous or irregular or improvidently ren-
dered, does not justify the defendant in failing to abide by its
terms, and his conduct in failing to do so may be punished as for
‘contempt despite the error or irregularity. It is almost unani-
mously agreed that if the defendant desires to attack the order
or the decree as erroneous, he must do so, not by disregarding or
violating it and then setting the error up as a defense to a
charge of contempt, but by a direct attack thereon by appeal or
‘a motion to set it-aside. He cannot attack it collaterally upon
an appeal from the judgment of contempt * * * .”

IIL. We find no want of jurisdiction over these plaintiffs
or the subject matter of the mandamus action which renders the
order for the writ or the writ of mandamus void. Nor is the
order to ‘punish for contempt now under review -void because of
the claimed lack of authority of Mr. Heslinga to take part in the
‘hearing which resulted in the order. The contentions plaintiffs
raise here all go to the question whether defendant acted er-
roneously, not whether he acted without jurisdiction,

a a 1089

Hl Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
belong. State ex rel. Cairy v. Iowa Co-op. Assn., 248 Iowa 167,
169-171, 79 N.W.2d 775, 776-177, and citations; The J. RB.
Watkins Co. v. Kramer, 250 Iowa 947, 950, 97 N.W.2d 303, 305;
Harvey v. Prall, supra, 250 Iowa 1111, 1116, 97 N.W.2d 306,
309.

The district court of Mahaska County, presided over by
defendant, has jurisdiction to hear and determine mandamus
actions (chapter 661, Code 1966) as well as proceedings for
contempt (Code chapter 665).

HH Section 665.2 defines the acts which constitute con-
tempt of court. They include: “8. Illegal resistance to any
order or process made or issued by it.” There is ample evi-
dence to support defendant’s finding that these plaintiffs
illegally resisted the writ of mandamus.

It cannot be doubted the court had jurisdiction over the
persons of plaintiffs.

All the contentions raised here were presented to the
trial court, some of them two or more times, and determined
adversely to plaintiffs. Jurisdiction to determine such conten-
tions did not depend on whether they were correctly decided.
Courtright v. Consolidated Independent School Dist., 203 Iowa
26, 82, 212 N.W. 368. Matters not going to the court’s juris-
diction should have been raised on appeal from the order of
November 22, 1966, not in a collateral attack such as this. Ex
parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, 98-100, 4 Am. Rep. 159 (Dillon,
C.J.). As stated, an appeal was taken from the order but was
dismissed for lack of prosecution.

IV. Since this controversy has led to such turmoil
locally we will comment on the contentions which seem to be
most relied on. The first is that the county superintendent’s
order to close the elementary schools at Barnes City and Lacey
was made without statutory authority. This is a matter which
went to the merits of the mandamus action, not to the court’s
jurisdiction to consider and decide it.

‘We may observe, however, Code section 290.1 provides:

“Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
board of directors of any school corporation in a matter of law

1040 [| a

or fact may, within thirty days after the rendition of such
decision or the making of such order, appeal therefrom to the
county superintendent * * * .” The decision of the superin-
tendent may, in like manner, be appealed to the state depart-
ment and, as stated, its decision shall be final. Code section
290.5. It is not suggested the persons who appealed to the
county superintendent here were not persons aggrieved by the
school board’s decision to keep open the Barnes City and Lacey
schools.

HMM The county superintendent and state department
had no power to enforce their orders and they must, therefore,
be enforced by the courts. Refusal of the board and these
plaintiffs, constituting a majority thereof, to perform the or-
ders brought the case within the provisions of Code section
661.1 defining mandamus. See also séction 661.4. Atkinson
v. Hutchinson, 68 Iowa 161, 163, 164, 26 N.W. 54; Newby v.
Free, 72 Iowa 379, 34 N.W. 168; State ex rel. Arnold v. Thomas,
152 Towa 500, 502-504, 182 NW. 842.

HV. Under the circumstances here the order of Novem-
ber 22 and the writ of mandamus were not issued without ju-
visdiction of the subject matter because the action was brought
before expiration of the 30 days for appeal to the state depart-
ment from the county superintendent’s order.

When the action was brought and the evidence heard no
appeal from the county superintendent’s order had been taken.
His order was final unless appealed from. Section 290.3. The
court’s decision was filed the day before the time for appeal
expired. As stated, the day it was filed plaintiffs in the action
made application for supplemental order reciting that notice
of appeal had been filed since the evidence was heard and final
adjudication of the action should be withheld until the appeal
was decided and the school board acted in relation thereto.

Also ag stated, ten days later defendants in the action
(plaintiffs here) filed. application for supplemental order stat-
ing their appeal had been set for hearing twelve days still later,
no reason remained for the action to continue and it should be
dismissed. Later yet plaintiffs in the action filed a second ap-
plication for supplemental hearing and order reciting affirm-
aneé of the county superintendent’s order, refusal of defendant

Pe PC 1041

in the action to abide by it and asking that they be ordered
to obey it. After due consideration the court granted this
last application. The final order of November 22 and issuance
of the writ of mandamus followed.

It is probably true the court in its original decision could
have dismissed the action as prematurely brought, without
prejudice to the bringing of another action. Decisions cited
by plaintiffs here hold no more than this. This is what plain-
tiffs contend should have been done. But it does not follow
the court lost jurisdiction of the subject matter by continuing
the cause until time for appeal to the state department ex-
pired. No authority has been cited which supports such con-
tention. The court acted sensibly and in the interest of justice
by not dismissing the case as prematurely brought.

We think the court acquired jurisdiction of the subject
matter when the mandamus action was.commenced and prop-
erly retained it until final disposition of the cause. Jensen v.
Jensen, 260 Iowa 371, 377, 147 N.W.2d 612, 616; Hobson v.
Dempsey Constr. Co., 232 Iowa 1226, 1233, 7 N.W.2d 896, 900;
21 C.J.8., Courts, section 94, page 147; 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts,
section 148, page 496. .

HI VI. The contention the writ of mandamus was no
longer effective at the time the order now under review was
entered is based on the thought the school board’s original or-
der of July 18, 1966, the reversing orders of the county super-
intendent and state department and writ were all in effect only
for the school year which expired July 1, 1967. Nothing in
the return to the writ of certiorari now before us or the tran-
seript of the evidence in the contempt proceeding supports
this premise.

It was not until April 5, 1967, when defendant held these
plaintiffs had purged themselves of contempt for prior viola-
tions of the writ of mandamus, that the validity of the order
of November 22, 1966, and the writ seemed to be settled. Under
the view of these plaintiffs the matter was settled only for the
rest of that school year, reserving to them the right. to renew
the controversy three months later. The effect of this is that
the county superintendent and state department can order ele-
mentary schools closed but such an order must be made each

1042 | Ye

year. We deem this an unreasonable interpretation of the ap-
plicable statute: :

«In any. event, this dlaith. obviously-. goes to the merits of.
the controversy, not to the court’s Jurisdiction over. the sub-
ject matter. =

HE oVIi. It is true: the order of November 22, 1966, and
the.writ of mandamus issued pursuant thereto must. have been
so définite and certain in terms as to be readily understood,
We have said an order, to serve as-a basis for a contempt pro-.
ceeding, must meet this test: and failure to do so renders the.
order void and unenforceable. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa
68, 72-75, 78 N.W.2d 491, 494-495 (a 5 to 4 decision) ; 17 Am.
Jur.2d, Contempt, section 52, page 55.

As set out in Division I, supra, the writ provided that de-
fendants to the action were under a legal duty to obey the
order of August 8 of the county superintendent requiring the
schools at Barnes City and Lacey to be closed, “you have re-
fused to close (them)” and “upon receipt of this order you will
do those things necessary to follow and obey the said order.
* * * and will forthwith close the elementary (schools) at
Barnes City and Lacey * * * .”

These plaintiffs say the writ was void and. unenforceable:
beeause it did not say “close the schools and keep them closed,”.
or “close the schools. permanently” or the equivalent. Indeed
they maintain the writ would be obeyed by closing the schools
temporarily even though they were reopened anytime after
the closing. .

HE We think these plaintiffs were fully aware the writ
of mandamus required them to close the Barnes City and Lacey
schools. This was the order of the county superintendent to
which the writ of mandamus expressly ordered obedience. It
is not contended this order was so vague and uncertain as not
to be understood. In the.absence of qualifying words we think
the court’s order of November 22, 1966, to close the two named
schools and the writ were not so vague and uncertain as to be
void and unenforceable,

» MB sVIUl. We find no merit in plaintiffs’ final contention
that the court was without jurisdiction to punish them: for
contempt because, it is said,.Mr. Hesliriga was without author-

CU - 104s

ity to take part in the hearing on the rule to show cause. As
stated, Heslinga filed the affidavit charging these plaintiffs
with contempt.: Their'‘thought seems to be that-only the county:
attorney or the ‘attorney -general. could prosecute the action
which was properly captioned in the name ot the State of
Towa, as plaintiff.

We find no statute or decision which supports the conten-
tion that failure of one of these named officials to prosecute
the proceeding went to the jurisdiction of the court to punish
plaintiffs for contempt. Brauer v. J. C. White Conerete Co.,
253 Iowa 1304, 1310, 115 N.W.2d 202, 205, cites several Iowa.
decisions for this:

“We are firmly committed to the rule that the question of
the right of a plaintiff to maintain an action in court does not
go to the court’s jurisdiction to afford relief but only to the
ynerits of the controversy. Jurisdiction of the subject matter
is not dependent on who institutes the action. It may be shown
in defense that a plaintiff has no right to bring the suit but
this is not a defect of jurisdiction. It is a defect of title. De-
termination of the question involves an exercise of jurisdiction.
If it be resolved against the plaintiff the appropriate decree is
a dismissal for want of merits, not of jurisdiction.” (Citations)

The quoted statement goes considerably further in sus-
taining the jurisdiction of trial courts than we go here.

After considering all questions presented we order the
writ of certiorari annulled and the order under review sus-
tained—Writ annulled; order sustained.

All Jusrices concur.

10

Harrison-Porrawartamig Drarmace District No. 1 by E. M.
Oszorn et al., trustees, appellees, v. Srare or Iowa, Iowa
State Hicuway Commission and Caprron
Construction Company, appellants.

No. 52706.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 835)

Marce 5, 1968.

eS 10:5

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, L. Michael McGrane,
Assistant Attorney General, and Leo Ballard, of Des Moines, f for
appellants.

Acrea & Pearson, of Missouri Valley, for appellees.

Mason, J.—The State Highway Commission appeals from
a decree enjoining it from proceeding with construction of a
bridge on U.S. Highway 30 where it crosses Allen Creek drain-
age ditch, and ordering removal of piers from the creek.

Plaintiff drainage district consists of certain districts in
Harrison and Pottawattamie Counties, including Allen Creek
drainage ditch. The Allen ditch consists of several tributaries
with sources near the north Harrison County line running in a
southwesterly direction out of the hills to the Missouri river
floodplains. At this point the Steer Creek and Little Allen
join and, with other ditches, drain tubes and lateral tiles which
empty into the Allen Creek, constitute the Allen ditch.

The portion which has been constructed and maintained by
plaintiff for many years is approximately 18 miles long, runs in
a general southerly direction to the Missouri river with a fall
of slightly more than one foot per mile. The fall from the
source of the contributing ditches to the point where the foot-
hills meet the floodplains, a distance from five to seven miles, is
about 325 feet.

A number of bridges cross the ditch to accommodate roads
along the course of the floodplain, Over the years these had
been a source of great trouble, catching trees, ice and other
debris. At time of trial every bridge had been either raised,
widened or both, or after having been torn out by floods, not
replaced. Every span crossing the ditch was then a clear span
bridge from 50 to 80 feet without piers or other obstructions in
the channel.

The bridge formerly accommodating Highway 30 was a
710-foot pony truss type bridge with no piers or obstructions in

16

the channel. Its replacement, being built at time of trial, pro-
vided for two rows of concrete piers, each 16 inches in diameter,
with five piers in each row. The rows were to be approxi-
mately 26 feet apart, center to center, in the channel of the
Allen ditch with the bridge floor to be raised 2% feet.

I. The construction of the bridge to accommodate High-
way 30 had been commenced when plaintiff brought this action
against the State, the Highway Commission and Capitol Con-
struction Company seeking’ to enjoin them from proceeding
with its construction. By amendment plaintiff sought to en-
join the highway commission from proceeding with letting of
contracts for construction of twin bridges at a future date
aeross Allen Creek to accommodate Interstate Highway I-29.

In both the original petition and amendment, seeking
temporary and permanent injunctions, plaintiff alleged the
construction in progress and proposed construction of the twin
bridges would constitute obstructions of the drainage ditch
which would cause ice, trees and other debris to become lodged
in the ditch, cause silt to be deposited there, all of which would
be detrimental to the district and cause the channel to become
filled with silt, creating danger of serious damage to the im:
provements ‘as well as a threat of substantial damage to the
surrounding farmland in the event the obstructions complained
of caused or contributed to floods.

In its separate answer defendant highway commission
admitted the type of construction, but denied it was improper,
illegal or would constitute a hazard to the drainage ditch and
surrounding land or create a danger of serious injury to plain-
tiff’s improvement. It affirmatively alleged plaintiff had a
speedy and adequate remedy at law and so could not maintain
this action unless fraud or mistake on the part of defendant
was shown. This defendant further alleged it had secured a
permit to establish the bridge from the Iowa Natural Re-
sources Council and the law does not require submission of
proposed improvements to this plaintiff.

After hearing on the temporary injunction it was agreed
by all parties that the hearing be adjourned and the matter set
for trial on the merits October 18, 1966. It was stipulated all
évidence previously taken on the matter of the temporary in-

eS 0:7

junction, including exhibits, should be considered in connection
with the trial on the merits with leave to call any witness for
direct or cross-examination. No temporary injunction was
issued.

IL. The issues presented to the trial court were whether
plaintiff could enjoin further construction by the highway
commission of the bridge according to the plans and specifica-
tions set out in the contract awarded to Capitol Construction
Company and whether plaintiff could compel, by mandatory
injunction, removal of the bridge as constructed.

At the trial after the parties had rested, defendant com-
mission moved for dismissal of the action. The court sustained
the motion as to the relief sought in the amendment relative to
the granting of an injunction preventing the highway commis-
sion from proceeding’ with the letting of contracts for the con-
struction of the I-29 twin bridges, but overruled the rest of the
motion.

The trial court was of the opinion plaintiff should -be
granted no relief against defendant Capitol Construction Com-
pany which had been awarded the contract by the commission
for construction of the bridge, it being merely an agent carry-
ing out the contract with the commission.

At the point where Highway 30 crosses it, Allen Creek has
a width at the bottom of the channel of approximately 25 feet
with a slope on the west bank of approximately 2:1 and on the
east bank of approximately 1:1. The width of the channel at
the top of the dike is approximately 70 feet.

The soil in the upper reaches where the slope is greatest is
very porous and subject to washing, resulting in a great deal
of silt, as well as many trees and other debris, being washed
into the stream and brought down at great speed from the hills,
causing the stream to choke and overflow in the more level
portions of the ditch.

Witnesses for both sides testified the construction of the
bridge with piers in the channel would create an obstruction
and hazard to the operation and maintenance of Allen ditch,
even though the new bridge floor was to be raised. Defendant’s
engineers freely admitted the piers would catch trees and other
Aohvig when the ditch was up, and would tend to slow the flow

5

of water, which would cause silt to be deposited in the stream,
all of which would be an obstruction and a hazard.

The evidence is undisputed that during the times of spring
runoffs, or heavy rains, a great amount of trash, including
trees with a width or span of more than 26 feet, frequently
washes down the ditch and in many instances trees and debris
became lodged at bridges which were larger and wider and
with greater capacity than the bridge being constructed at the
Highway 30 crossing,

It was also established that approximately 28,500 acres
were drained by the Steer and Allen Creek ditches and their
tributaries above the floodplain and approximately 20,000 aeres
of level, flat floodplain land were drained by the ditch between
Highway 30 and the foothills.

Because the land in the floodplain through which the ditch
flows is low and flat, the depositing of silt in the -channel
would clog and cover the drainage tubes and lateral tile drains
emptying into the ditch, destroying the drainage provided by the
ditch.

IM. The trial court concluded the building of the bridge
in question with pilings placed in the channel constituted an
obstruction and would cause a grave danger of floods.and other
hazards to plaintiff district and the surrounding Jands; defend-
ant’s acts constituted a violation of chapter 455, Code, 1966;
that defendant’s securing a permit from the Natural Resources
Council before commencement of construction of the bridge did
not constitute a defense to plaintiff’s action.

The trial court enjoined the commission and all persons
acting through or under it from proceeding with the construc-
tion of a bridge at this point across Allen Creek with concrete
piers or pilings located in the channel of the ditch or which
would in any manner obstruct it; that if construction had been
completed at the date of the decree defendant commission was
ordered to remove the piers constructed in the ditch which the
court had found to be illegal.

The highway commission had issued the construction com-
pany a “Stop Order” October 3; a résumé order dated October
12. At time of trial the construction company had run the

10:

cement floor and the bridge was 60-65 percent completed; at
the time of the decree on December 15 the bridge was actually
completed.

IV. Defendant commission, only defendant appealing, as-
serts as propositions relied upon for reversal: (1) its action was
not fraudulent, illegal, or in derogation of statutory authority,
and cannot be enjoined, (2) injunction will not lie for acts
already done, (3) mandatory injunction will not issue unless
facts are clear, free from reasonable doubt, and there is a
showing of irreparable injury and (4) assuming arguendo the
commission acted illegally, plaintifi’s remedy is mandamus.

Plaintiff does not appeal from that portion of the decree
which applies to Capitol Construction Company nor from the
ruling on the motion to strike that portion of the amendment
which refers to the bridges to be built for Highway I-29 across
Allen Creek. .

We prefer to consider defendant’s propositions other than
in the order assigned. Under its fourth proposition the com-
mission asserts plaintiff’s proper remedy is by mandamus to
compel the. commission to institute condemnation proceedings.
It contends that if the bridge as newly constructed in fact
obstructs water flowing in the drainage ditch, the act of stopping
the normal flow is a taking of private property for public use.

Hi ‘We agree mandamus will lie to compel institution of
condemnation proceedings where there has been a taking of
private property for public use without’ compensating the
owner. Mapes v. Madison County, 252 Iowa 395, 398, 107
N.W.2d 62, 64, 91 A.L.R.2d 984; Anderlik v. Iowa State High-
way Commission, 240° Iowa 919, 925-926, 88 N.W.2d 605, 609;
Baird v. Johnston, 230 Iowa 161, 164, 297 N.W. 315, 316 ; Dawson
v. McKinnon, 226 Iowa 756, 770, 285 N.W. 258, 265. -

In addition to Anderlik, supra, defendant relies primarily
on Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361.

In Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra,
240 Iowa at 924, 38 N.W.2d at 608, we said:

“The basis of the Liddick decision is that real property
consists not alone of the tangible thing but also of certain rights
therein sanctioned by law, such as rights to access (ingress and
egress), light, air and view, and when such rights are destroyed

105

or substantially impaired by such a structure in the highway
as was here made, there is at least a partial taking of the
property in the constitutional sense.”

In Liddick v. Council Bluffs, supra, 232 Iowa at 217, 5
N.W.2d at 872, in discussing what meaning property has in
the constitutional sense, this court quoted from 1 Lewis, Emi-
nent Domain, Third Ed., section 68:

“TT}he author, in answer to what ‘property really is’,
says: ‘The term is applied with many different meanings.
“Sometimes,” says Austin (2 Jurisprudence, section 1051), “it
is taken in the loose and vulgar acceptation to denote not, the
right of property or dominium, but the subject of such a right;
as where a horse or piece of land is called my property.” A
little reflection, however, will suffice to convince anyone that
property is not the corporeal thing itself. of which it is pred-
ieated, but certain rights in or over the thing. * * * We must,
therefore, look beyond the thing itself, beyond the-mere. corpo-
real object, for the true idea of property. Property may be
defined as certain: rights in things which pertain to persons
and which are created and sanctioned by law. These rights are
the right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of dis-
position.’ After mentioning: the rights of lateral support,
access, light, air, flowing water, ete., the author, referring to
them, says: ‘These rights, wherever they. exist, and to the
extent to which they are secured by law, are part and Pareel
of the owner’s property in land.’ (Section 63.)”

|_| With the quoted statement as support, deferidant com-
mission argues that if there is a property right in air, light,
ingress and egress, and flowing water, there would also be a
property right in having a stream flow without the interference

» of piers causing additional silt. The argument has merit.

We are of the opinion that under the circumstances here
construction of a bridge with piers in the creek channel would
be a taking of property in the constitutional sense and. man-
damus will lie to compel institution of condemnation proceed-
-ings by the highway commission so plaintiff may be compen-
sated for the additional taking of its property for this public
use. There is a presumption that in the trial of such issue
adequate damages for the property taken will be awarded.

2°:

Browneller v. Natural Ges Pipeline Company, 233 Iowa 686,
700, 8 N.W.2d 474, 481. Mandamus accompanied by con-
demnation proceedings thus affords plaintiff an appropriate
and efficient remedy.

The improvement here was such as was never contemplated
at the time the right-of-way for Highway 30 was acquired.
Where through prior condemnation the rights as to property
taken later were not acquired, the proper remedy also is man-
damus to compel further condemnation. Mapes v. Madison
County, supra, 252 Iowa at 398, 107 N.W.2d at 64.

V. Plaintiff contends the trial court’s decree granting
mandatory injunction should be affirmed. The drainage district
argues it is entitled to injunction to prevent inadequacy of
compensation, multiplicity of suits and restraint of irreparable
injury in the form of repeated and continued trespasses or en-
croachments. .

HE We do not agree. As stated in Division IV, supra,
mandamus will lie to compel institution of condemnation pro-
ceedings where there has been a taking of private property for
public use without compensating the owner. The effect of thus
providing condemnation proceedings, with the right to trial by
jury on appeal from the condemnation award, is to furnish
plaintiff with the full and complete relief to which it is entitled
and excludes plaintiff's right to mandatory injunction.

Although mandamus is triable as an equitable action under
our practice, Code section 661.8, its process leads to an adequate
remedy at law in the form of condemnation proceedings where
plaintiff is given opportunity to redress the wrong.

One of the chief causes of the inadequacy of the remedies
at law lies in the fact the injury is irreparable.

“As ordinarily understood, an injury is irreparable, within
the law of injunctions, where it is of such a character that a
fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law,
so that to refuse the injunction would be a denial of justice—
in other words, where from the nature of the act, or from the
civeumstances surrounding the person injured, * * * , it cannot
he readily, adequately, and completely compensated for with
money.” 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, section 48.

“Upon the principle that equity will not grant an injunc-

Lo

1052 ee —

tion, where there is a remedy at law which is full, adequate,
and complete, it is fairly well settled that where there is an
adequate remedy by mandamus a suit for injunction cannot be
successfully maintained. According to the weight of authority
this rule applies where injunctive relief of a mandatory
character is sought, as well as where the relief sought is merely
preventive.” Backus v. Abbot, 186 W. Va. 891, 902, 69 S.H.2d
48, 54. Quoting from 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, section 42.
See also Harley v. Lindemann, 129 Wis. 514, 109 N.W. 570, 573,
8 LBA, NS. 124; Annotation in 98 A.L.R, 1495. Although
the distinction between law and equity is recognized and ob-
served in West Virginia, under their procedure mandamus is a
remedy at law. We do not believe this detracts from its sup-
port for our position here.

“VI. Our favorable decision on defendant’s fourth assign-
ment of error makes consideration of its other contentions un-
necessary.

With directions to dissolve the injunction as issued and
dismiss plaintiff’s action without prejudice to its right to bring
mandamus, the cause is—Reversed and remanded.

All Jusrices coneur.

W. B. Jevrruy, appellee, v. Ray L. Grosvenor et ux., appellants;
Woopsury County and all unknown claimants and persons
claiming any right, title or interest, in described real
estate, defendants.

No. 52875.
(Reported in 157 N,W.2d 114)

1054

Maron 5, 1968,

Prichard & Prichard, of Onawa, for appellants Ray L. Gros-
yenor and Grace H. Grosvenor.

Richard W. Beebe and Edward F. Samore, both of Sioux
City, for appellee.

7 J—This is am action to quiet title to Lot 1 of Section
34, Township 86,.Range 47, Woodbury County, Iowa. The
tract contains 37.55 acres and is what is commonly called Mis-
souri River bottomland. We have had many cases involving
such land.

‘We hope that ultimate victory of the Corps of Army
Engirieers' over a stubborn and powerful antagonist, ie., the
Missouri River, will make possible the stabilizing of titles and
the diminution of such controversies.

In Sieck v. Godsey, 254 Iowa 624, 625, 118 N.W.2d 555, Mr.
Justice Thompson commented:

“This case comes to us by courtesy, of.the Missouri River
and the United States Corps of-Army Engineers, The engineers
have been for many years engaged in an attempt to enforce
some measure of law and order upon this most wandering and
capricious of. rivers; and in the course of their activities has
arisen the situation which, gives rise to the present lawsuit.”

- In State v, Raymond; 254 Iowa 828, 829, 119 N.W.2d 135,
we said:

“Stabilization of the Missouri River channel between Sioux
City and Omaha by the United States Corps of Engineers has
caused many legal Problems to be brought to our attention.
This i is another sich case.”. © .

SS 1055

In Dartmouth College v. Rose, 257 Iowa 533, 535, 133
N.W.2d 687, we said:

“The rules applicable to questions of aceretion and title to
land so formed have frequently been analyzed by us and need
little review here. The parties are not in disagreement over the
legal propositions involved. We state some of them briefly.”

‘ The case now before us arose because of a change and
stabilization of the river channel to the west with the result
‘that what was formerly of little or no value may now be made
useful and valuable.

The trial court commented:

“This is another of many cases reaching the Iowa courts in-
volving the title and rights of owners to land in what is com-
monly referred to as the ‘Missouri river bottoms.’ These dis-
putes have arisen due to the former proclivity of the river to
‘wander back and forth in a generally easterly and westerly
direction, forming new channels and leaving in its wake an
assortment of quarrels as to the ownership of land adjacent to
it.’ Because of the number of these disputes which have reached
our Supreme Court, the law applicable to them is well settled.
Asis so often the case, it is the application of this law to the
facts involved which raises the more difficult problems here.”
| There is one plaintiff and many defendants, known and
unknown. The real defendant is Ray L. Grosvenor who claims
ownership. Reference will be to him as the defendant.

‘I, We have had before us maps, survey records and de-
terminations showing the meandering of the river in this ter-
ritory since 1852.

- In 1987 land located south and west of the tract here in-
-volved, but within the same river loops, was the subject of
litigation in the United States Courts. See United States v.
Flower et al., District Court of the United States, District of
Nebraska, Omaha Division, No. 1832 Equity, transferred to
Law Docket, affirmed on appeal in 108 F.2d 298.

“While the case did not involve the same land as here many
of the same maps, exhibits, witnesses and river changes appear.

Lot 1, the tract involved here, is adjacent to Lot A owned
hy plaintiff. The trial court found that Lot 1 formed by acere-
tion to Lot A and quieted title in plaintiff. We affirm.

To show the location of the tracts we reproduce Exhibit 29.

1056

SEC34-I86-R.47

1057

PLAT Nt 4, INVESTIGATION OF WINNEBAGO INDIAN LANDS, GROUP N?56, NEBRASKA
COMPOSITE MAP OF PLATS Nt 12,23, SHOWING CHANNELS .OF NISSOURt TER Ag ‘OF Lesh TO 187s, 1000 A T9E7, AS AFFEOTING STATUS OF LANDS IN

T.26 NRO E, 6 P.M, NEBRASKA,

XS SSNs
S

SAR Qyy

curving around to

ANS
WO.
ANN

Ny
LIS
VY

now dry,

The river channel is now about two miles west with an
w

inside chute and an outside chute,
the east and then southwest. To illustrate the location of these

1058 ees a

chutes-we reproduce a portion of Exhibit 39. This exhibit is a
composite map prepared by the United States Surveyors show-
ing river channels as of 1852 to 1875 and 1890 to 1927.

The evidence shows and other decisions have found that at
sometime in the past the river by its meandering eroded away
Lot 1. Sometime between 1870 and 1879 and again in 1916 the
river moved by avulsion to the west. The remaining chutes
carried some water particularly during high-water periods but
gradually filled in.

Until a few years ago when a drainage ditch was com-
pleted Lot 1 was too wet to cultivate. It was covered with
willows, small trees and coarse grass. It was not fenced. No
one apparently knew where the lines were. When drained it
could be cleared-and farmed.

Defendant owned land to the south and west. His tenant,
M, A. Small, farmed about 400 acres for defendant. He in-
eluded part of Lot 1 in his operation, but testified he did not
know what constituted Lot 1. Since 1961 it has been included
in the A.S.C, Program as idle acres ‘with payments collected
by Small and defendant as a part of their whole program, Mr.
Small also has had a written lease with plaintiff but has paid
him no rent.

In 1954 Mr. Thomas Flewelling began clearing timber for
defendant. He has cleared about 150 to 200 acres for defend-
ant, including some work on Lot 1, but he did not know where
the lot line was.

The following tabulation shows how plaintiff and defend-
ant have exerted ownership over the land.

Plaintiff Defendant
1. Plaintiff purchased Lot 1 from 1. Defendant purchased “Flower Is-
the devisees of one McAllister in land” from Wilbert Flower and
1941 when the land was thought to -_— claims that the land in dispute is

be of little value for $300. an aceretion or an avulsion to
Plaintiff holds record title to the Flower Island.

land in dispute. (There is a strong 2, Defendant paid the real estate
Bresumption in Iowa that owner- tax in 1964,

a is presumed from record 3. Defendant claims to have leased
title.) the land continuously since 1941.
3. Plaintiff has paid the taxes on the 4. Lot 1 was in the soil bank with

land for years, except in 1964 other land for 4 or 5 years under

when the defendant paid the real: name of defendant and M. A.
estate tax, : Small,

RP
p

a 1059

4, Plaintiff has leases for the land
for the years 1941-42; 1944-45;
and a written lease to M. A. Small
beginning in January 1964 and
extending to the time of trial.

. Plaintiff has never collected rent,

« but made unsuccessful efforts in

1952 to collect. There was doubt
as to the souree of the grain being
sold,

6. A fecd grain application dated

February 17, 1966, has the names

a

5. Defendant has a written’ title
opinion showing that defendant
has marketable title to the ad-
joining land where comm was

stored.
6. The defendant has collected rent
from tenants.
7. Defendant’s tenants have rarely
‘been disturbed in operating the

Jand.

8 Flower, predecessor in interest to
defendant, leased Lot 1 from
1936-1939.

of Jeffrey and Small on it.
. 9. Defendant cleared part of the
. tract at his expense but no one

- knew where the line was.

Il. The trial court made a careful analysis of the evidence
from which we excerpt and adopt the following:

“Tt is undisputed in this case that the -plaintiff has held
record title to Lot-1 since receiving a warranty deed in 1942,
from the heirs of J. H. McAllister, whose predecessors’ in turn
held from government patent. A présumption of ownership
follows the legal title and this is such a strong one that it can
only be overcome by evidence which is clear, satisfactory and
convincing. A preponderance of evidence is not sufficient. * * *
The plaintiff therefore makes 4 prima facie case justifying the
relief which he seeks by showing such legal title:

on ae

“In order to reach the matters presented on this ‘record it
is necessary ‘to briefly review the movemeiits of the river in this
locality over an extended period. * * * Many maps are in
evidence * * *, The left bank of the river, as referred to on
the maps and in the testimony, is that which is to the left of
the observer looking downstream and, therefore, generally
speaking, the left bank is the east side of the river and the right
bank the west. In surveys made in 1852 and in 1875, the river
was shown to be a considerable distance west of the land in
controversy. By 1890, however, it had shifted to the east in a
broad are or loop so that its left or eastern bank had cut off the
southwesterly corner of Lot 1. Thereafter, and sometime be-
tween 1890 and 1916, it moved’ somewhat farther to the east
and north, forming what is referred to as a eutbank two to
fifteen feet high * * *. This cutbank was east of Lot 1 and the

1060 | |

main channel of the river in 1916, was flowing against that
bank, thus showing that all of Lot 1 had by this time been
completely eroded and cut away. This cutbank marked the
most easterly point to which the river progressed.

“In 1916 the main channel of the river started to move
westward. * * * Eventually, * * * the river moved approxi-
mately two miles to the west of the land in controversy and its
channel in 1927 is shown on Exhibit ‘39.’. [reproduced supra]
The exact nature of the movement of the river westward and
just when it finally reached its 1927 channel is not shown by
the record, probably because there were no surveys between
1890 and 1923.

“Tn its western progression after 1916, the river character.
istically left what are described as the inside chute, which in
1927, was designated on Exhibit ‘39’ as a high water channel,
and the outside chute which ran in a southwesterly direction
near the west line of Lot A. This chute carried some water for
some time. * * * By 1928, the outside chute * * * had fairly well
filled with sand, and willows had grown up on a large portion
of Lot 1 west of the chute, and willows and timbers had grown
up on its east side, extending approximately halfway into Lot
1. * * * By 1930 the outside chute was completely filled * * *,
But’ * * * in the spring and at floodtime, the river would come
through this area, * * *,

“What was the most easterly progression of the river up to
1916, as shown by the-cutbank on the exhibits, and did this
bank abut on or extend into Lot A? * * * The court concludes,
* * * that the river did in fact progress to the westerly bound-
ary of or into Lot A.”

Ill. Defendant contends that ‘the westerly movement of
the river between 1916 and 1927 left a body of land or island
between the two chutes and the 1927 bank of the river and
that the accretion was to this land and not to the cutbank of the
river on the east. .

The trial court said:

“An island in a river is a body of land emerging from the
bed of the stream and completely surrounded by channels of
the river. (Holman v.-Hodges, 112 Iowa 74; State v. Raymond,

— 1061

254 Towa 828.) When such an island emerges from the bed of
the river it becomes the property of the state. The area re-
ferred to does not in any way conform to the legal concept of
an island so that claim can be made that the re-emergence of
Lot 1 was by accretion to such an island. The chutes were not
normal channels of the river but were just what they were
termed by the witnesses, chutes.

“There was testimony in the record that the 1916 move-
ment of the river was an avulsion and the defendants in their
brief claim that this avulsion formed the area between the two
chutes and the 1927 east or left bank of the river as an island,
referred to as ‘Flowers Island,’ and that the land encompassed
within the platted boundaries of Lot 1 accreted to such island.”

To review all the evidence would unduly extend this
opinion. .

The trial court reviewed the evidence and then said:

“Under this record, therefore, we have no way of ascer-
taining what land is claimed to have existed prior to the 1916
shift which was cut off by the avulsion and remained identi-
fiable thereafter. In order to permit the application of the
principles of avulsion, two conditions must exist: (1) There
must be a sudden shifting of the channel of the river, and (2)
A body of land must be cut off so that after the shift it re-
mains identifiable as land which existed before the change of
the channel and which never became a part of the riverbed.
The second requirement is more important than the first. There
can be a rapid change of the river channel with no cutoff of
land and the principles of erosion and accretion may still apply.
It is only when land is cut off. by such rapid change and re-
mains identifiable that the principles of avulsion come into
play. As has been pointed out, there is nothing in this record
from which it can be determined that part of ‘Flowers Island’
to which it is claimed Lot 1 accreted, was identifiable land
which was cut off by the sudden movement of the river so that
the principles of avulsion would apply to it. No surveys were
taken and no witness testified to facts which would justify a
finding with respect thereto, and any such finding could only
rest upon speculation on the court’s part.”

1062 Po Pe

The trial court’s findings of fact said:

“1, The plaintiff is the owner of record title to Lot 1."

“2. Lot 1 was completely eroded by the action of the Mis-
souri River so that in 1916, it was in the bed of the river.

“3, In 1916; the river commenced a movement towards the
west of Lot 1.

“4, As the river retreated to the west and through subse-
quent action of the waters contiguous to Lot A, the area within
the platted boundaries-of Lot 1 re-formed as accretion to Lot AP

“5, The plaintiff was the owner of Lot A.

“6, The plaintiff is the owner of Lot 1.”

IV. Defendant raised the issue of adverse possession,
EE For many years Lot 1 was of little value. It was’ too
wet to-farm. Both parties made claim thereto. Plaintiff had
record title since 1941 and paid the taxes each year except in
1964. ..In that year plaintiff sent the money to pay but was
told that the taxes had been paid.

The west line of Lot 1 was first established when surveyed
in 1965. Defendant’s tenant used part of the land in connec-
tion with defendant’s adjoining land but did not know where
the line was. -The tenant had written leases from Plaintiff and.
an oral'lease from defendant. ‘

There has been no such hostile, actual, open, exclusive and
continuous possession, under claim of right or color of title,
for at least ten years necessary to establish ownership in de--
fendant by adverse possession. See Lawse v. Glaha, 253 Iowa
1040, 1046, 114 N.W.2d 900. .

Defendant claims that plaintit?’s right to -quiet ‘ttle | is
barred by laches. ‘This claim was neither pleaded nor proved.
and need not be discussed. .

V. The law relative to riparian rights acquired through
aceretion, reliction or avulsion is well settled. There’is no need
for extensive-discussion. Brief mention will suffice.

Hl Plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own title, and
not upon a weakness of the defendants. City of Dubuque -v.
Fischer & Co., 215 Iowa 438, 438, 245 N.W.. 758; Reuter v.
Middlebrook, 257 Iowa’ 158, 162, 181 N.W.2d 817.

VI. The presumption of ownership which follows the
Jegal title can be overcome only by evidence that is clear and

ee 1068

convincing. A preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient.
Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1878, 1881, 98 N.W.2d 720. The
land involved in the cited case as shown on page 1382 of the
Iowa report is north and west of the land now involved. The
chutes shown are not the chutes involved in the case before us.

HI VIL To constitute an: accretion there must be a
gradual and imperceptible addition of soil to the shoreline or
adjoining land by the action of the water to which the land is
vontiguous. Wileox v. Pinney, supra, loc. cit. 1883; Dart-
mouth College v. Rose, 257 Iowa 533, 536, 183 N.W.2d 687.

VOI. In Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 783, 185 N.W. 912,
this appears:

Hl “Meander lines are not boundary lines, but are only
lines of survey, to determine the area included in irregular
tracts bordering on navigable streams or lakes. Riparian
owners along the banks of the Missouri River in Iowa hold
title to the land to high-water mark, regardless of whether or
not the same coincides with the meander line. McManus v.
Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1; Houghton v. C. D. & M. R. Co., 47 Iowa
870; Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa 714.

HEE “Che state of Iowa owns the title to the bed of the
Missouri River from high-water mark to the center or thread
of the stream. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. 8. 1; Hardin v. Jordan,
140 U. S. 8371; Holman v. Hodges, supra. If, by a slow and
gradual process of erosion, the river washes away its banks and
changes its course, the title of the state to the bed of the stream
follows the course of the river in forming the new channel. If
there is some avulsion of the stream, whereby it suddenly
changes its channel in such a way as to cut off a body of land
which still remains in such a condition that it can be identified,
then the boundary lines of riparian property owners are not
ehanged by such sudden avulsion or cut-off. Kitteridge v.
Ritter, 172 Iowa 55.

“Where lands are overflowed and submerged, and with-
in a reasonable time the waters retire and the land reappears,
the title of the owner is not disturbed, and the proprietorship
remains in the original owner. Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y.
424 (3 N.E. 581) ; St. Louis v. Rutz, 188 U. 8. 226; Ocean City
Assn. v. Shriver, 64 N. J. L. 550 (46 Atl. 690).

106,

“This rule has also been recognized where lands are re-
moved by erosion, and are restored by accretion after the river
recedes. Allard v. Curran, 41 8. D. 73 (168 N. W. 761.)”

See also Dartmouth College v. Rose, supra, loc. cit. 535.

IX. There is no issue of reliction before us.

This is an action in equity and as such it is triable de novo
in this court. However, we give weight to the findings of the
trial court. See rule 344(£)(7), Rules of Civil Procedure.

HE Although not set forth herein we have given careful
consideration to the entire record and the exhibits.

We are in accord with the findings and conclusions of the
trial court.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Raw.ines, J., who takes no part.

FRANK D, Jonus et ux., appellants, v. Iowa: Stars Hienway
Commission, acting for and in behalf of the State of Iowa,
appellee.

No. 52694.
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 86)

Marca 5, 1968,

So

John D. Randall, ‘of Cedar Rapids, for appellants

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Robert N. Merillat,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for Iowa State Highway
Commission, of Ames, and Fisher & Piekens, of Cedar Rapids, for
appellee. .

Rawunwes,, Je —Tnterlocutory appedl by plaintiffs from ad-
verse rulings by trial court, prior to second trial of land con-
demnation case, relative to request for admissions and applica-
tion for production of books or documents,

First trial resulted in judgment for plaintiffs. ‘On defend-
ant’s appeal we reversed, holding challenged presentation of
evidence as to price paid-by econdemnor or value determined by
its appraisers for other land in the same project: constituted
prejudicial.error. Jones v. lowa State Highway Commission,
259 Iowa 616, 144 N.W.2d 277.:

* Subsequently, plaintiffs filed application for production of
files and records in possession of defendant regarding entire
condemnation program embracing: plaintiffs’ land, with request |
for admissions directed primarily to all other property pur- .
chases and transactions by condemnor in the same undertaking,
with names and entire work ‘product, of professional appraisers
and engineers: employed or engaged by defendant on the whole
condemnation project. -

Trial court overruled both demands. With leave granted, .
plaintiffs appeal. Rule 332(a), R.C.P. We'affirm.

I. Theoretically a party seeks to examine records in
possession of an adversary in order to prepare ‘for trial, while
admissions are sought as a means of eliminating ‘time-consum-
ing proof of pertinent facts or establishment of foundation for
introduction of relevant documentary material, See 27 CIS.,
Discovery, section 69, page 203, and section 97, page 278. .

Of course, both stand in the field of discovery, are more or
less interrelated, and will’be hére dealt with accordingly.

EE

| | Il. This court has repeatedly held rules relative to
discovery are to be interpreted liberally. Cave v. Fountain,
258 Iowa 1232, 1235, 142 N.W.2d 436.

Hi Ill. However, trial courts are vested with discretion
measurably to control, limit and even prevent discovery in any
form where, for good: cause shown or evident, it will not in the
opinion of the court promote the administration of justice in a
particular case. See Cook v. Cook, 259 Iowa 825, 836, 146
N.W.2d 278, 279; Kaltenheuser v. Sesker, 255 Iowa 110, 115,
121 N.W.2d 672; Hot Spot Detector, Inc. v. Rolfes Electronics
Corp., 251 Iowa 647, 656, 102 N.W.2d 354; and 23 Am.Jur.2d,
Depositions and Discovery, section 149, page 482.

HM As disclosed in Cook v. Cook, supra, this discretion is
not unlimited. We have said it is a power to be utilized fairly
and impartially by the application of relevant, legal and equi-
table principles to all the known or readily available facts of a
given issue or cause, to the end justice may more nearly be
effectuated. English v. Seberg, 260 Iowa 708, 716, 150 N.W.2d
295, 300-801, and Cogley v. Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc., 257 Iowa
1381, 1385-1886, 187 N.W.2d 310. See also Smith v. Smith, 17
N.J.Super, 128, 85 A.2d 523, 524.

So the basic problem to be resolved is whether there was
abuse of discretion on the part of trial court in overruling
plaintiffs’ discovery demands.

IV. In connection with denial of plaintiffs’ application
for production of documents (rule 129, R.C.P.), they contend
trial court erred since no objections were filed by defendant,
the matters involved being both relevant and within the scope
of discovery. We shall deal with these claims in the order
presented.

Plaintiffs cite no. authority and none has been found re-
quiring objections be asserted in response to a document pro-
duction demand.

While presentment of written resistance may usually be
deemed preferable in such instances, to aid the court if for no
other reason, the. rule contains no such requirement, either
specifically or by inference.

Touching on this subject we held in Roberts v. DeKalb
Agricultural Association, Inc., 259 Iowa 181, 187, 148 N.W.2d

1068

838, 342, the necessity for answers to interrogatories (rule 121,
R.C.P.) may appear from the petition, answer, and questions
propounded, in which event showing by affidavit or evidence
(rules 80 and 116, R.C.P.) is not a prerequisite to an order
directing answers be given.

Conversely, the same documents, in fact the entire record
before the court, may well disclose there exists no cause to
compel discovery by answer to interrogatories, admissions or
production of books and papers.

The challenge by plaintiffs based on absence of objection to
request for production of documents is without merit.

V. Turning now to plaintiffs’ claimed right of inspection,
the record reveals, prior to first trial, they filed interrogatories
seeking substantially the same information now sought by their
application to produce records. Objections by defendant wer
overruled and answers given in detail. .

Furthermore, during first trial counsel for plaintiffs, on.
eross-examination, elicited from defendant’s witnesses, .more
particularly appraisers, engineers and other experts, most if
not all the information here solicited..

As stated in 27 C.J.S., Discovery, section 30(3), page 89:
“The purpose of pretrial examination is to discover evidential
matter which is not known to the one seeking the examination;
but merely because the party seeking examination has knowl-
edge of the matters sought to be elicited, or can obtain from
other sources the information sought, does not necessarily. de-
prive him of the right to an examination as to those matters.
However, an examination may be refused as to facts which are,
or should be known to applicant, or which, by reasonable dili-
gence, are easily capable of ascertainment; and a pretrial ex-
amination may properly be denied with respect to matters as to
which the applicant would have more knowledge than the party
sought to be interrogated.”

| | Although knowledge as to factual information sought
may not always afford sufficient basis upon which to deny right
of inspection, it does, under conditions peculiar to the case at
bar, lend more than a modicum of support to the order over-
ruling plaintiffs’ application for production of books and
records. In other words, there existed a reasonable basis upon

OO

which trial court could logically conclude plaintiffs were ad-
equately informed relative to material matters sought to be
disclosed.

VI. It is also apparent plaintiffs, for the most part, are
here seeking to obtain not facts alone, but also unavoidably
interwoven conclusions of experts employed or engaged by
defendant.

Rule 140, R.C.P., provides, inter alia: “Subject to the re-
strictions in rule 141, a party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination
or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for
use as evidence in the action, or for both purposes.”

And, rule 141(a) provides in material part: “The deponent
shall not be required and the court shall not order a deponent
or party to produce or submit for inspection any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety,
indemnitor or agent, in anticipation of litigation or preparation
for trial unless satisfied that the denial of production or inspec-
tion will result in an injustice or undue hardship; nor shall the
deponent be required or the court order a deponent or party to
produce or submit for inspection any part of a writing which
reflects * * * the conclusions of an expert.” (Emphasis supplied.)

T. M. Ingersoll, attorney and chairman of Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules, in explaining the purpose and
intent of that portion of rule 141(a), quoted supra, stated:
“There was a great debate in the federal courts whether or not
if you had employed an expert, the expert had made an in-
vestigation, and you had the expert ready for the witness stand,
the adverse party could avoid expense by simply deposing your
expert. It wasn’t the intention of the committee in recom-
mending these rules that they were intended to be an aid in
the encouragement of indolence on the part of the bar, but
rather they were to aid the vigilant. So an absolute protection
was thrown around the testimony of a witness who is an expert.
If you have prepared an expert witness to aid you in your
ease or consulted an expert witness, his opinion is absolutely
protected except in the case of the doctor.” 7 Drake Law
Review 3, 13.

010

United States v. 900.57 Acres of Land, Ete., 30 F.R.D. 512,
involved a factual situation comparable to that presented in
the case at bar, with no rule existing which barred discovery
of an expert’s conclusions. There the court held a property
owner not entitled to obtain in advance of trial opinions of con-
demnor’s expert appraisers. In so holding the court said, loc.
cit., 30 F.R.D, 519: “# * * the mere fact that interrogatories
are submitted for answer and a motion for production of
documents is served and filed does not determine whether the
interrogatories should be answered or the documents should be
presented for inspection and copying. It depends upon the in-
formation sought to be discovered. In the instant case the
landowners are seeking to obtain in most instances informa-
tion which is available to them, and they are not entitled to
obtain in advance of a trial the opinion of the condemnor’s
expert appraisers, nor are they entitled to see and copy the
appraisal reports. In fact, there is nothing to distinguish these
cases from the ordinary condemnation case. The burden of
proof is upon the defendant landowners to establish the market
value of the land on the date it was acquired by the condemnor.
Many factors enter into what may be considered and are ad-
missible in evidence to establish just compensation, not only for
the estate taken but for severance damage if any has occurred
by reason of the taking.”

Contained in the same case, ‘Toe. eit., 30 FROD. 521, is this
pertinent statement: “* * * the landowners are entitled to
recover the market value of the estates taken as of the date of
the taking. The defendants are the owners of the lands. They
and their neighbors are entirely familiar with the lands and
are and will be able to testify as to the location, means of in-
gress and egress, kind and value of improvements which en-
hance the value of the lands, availability of utilities such as
telephone, electricity and gas, the state of the highways, rural
mail routes, location of churches, schools, the fertility and pro-
ductiveness of the lands, and the highest uses to which the
land may be put by an owner, along with any other facts which
a prospective buyer would be apt to consider in determining
the market value.

«ot # % Tn practically every controversy between the Govern-

Pn

ment and the landowner as to just compensation, both sides
have adduced testimony to establish any and all facts which
might be relevant in ascertaining just compensation. Almost
without exception, a witness testifying to such facts concludes
his testimony by stating his opinion as to the market value, and
in that manner justice is done to the Government and to the
landowner. It would be an innovation and greatly prolong the
tzial at the expense of the parties were the court to fail to
sustain the objections of the plaintiff to the interrogatories and
to the motion for production of documents. In fact, as sug-
gested by Judge Sanborn, such a holding would entirely divorce
practical common sense from the trial and lead to rank in-
justice to either the Government or the landowner.

“Therefore the court in the exercise of its discretion (Jay-
son v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 294 F.2d 808, 811) feels that
justice requires that the objections to the interrogatories and
to the motions for production, inspection and copying of
documents should be sustained, * * *,”

Relative to the foregoing see also Edwards v. State High-
way Commissioner, 205 Va. 734, 139 S.B.2d 845, 847-848 ; Horn-
back v. State Highway Commissioner, 205 Va, 50, 185 S.H.2d
186, 188-140; 41 Tulane Law Review 678; 38 F.R.D. 111, 114~
119; and annotations, 97 A.L.R.2d 770.

We turn now to Bryan v. Iowa State Highway Commis-
sion, 251 Iowa 1093, 104 N.W.2d 562, but find it neither in point
nor controlling. There the trial court ordered production for
inspection the original papers and notes prepared by con-
demnor’s appraisers. On appeal by defendant commission we
affirmed because the issue as to discovery, barred under rule
141(a), supra, at no time asserted by defendant in trial court,
could not be raised by it first time on appeal. But in the in-
stant case appeal is by plaintiff landowners and they specif-
ically raise the issue as having been considered and determined
adverse to them by trial court.

Plaintiffs also cite and lean rather heavily on Crist v. Iowa
State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424,
contending it supports the view blanket discovery may be had
as ‘to defendant highway commission’s records and expert
witnesses.

02

In the cited case defendant highway commission was re-
quired to answer certain plaintiff propounded interrogatories
(rule 121), by which defendant condemnor was asked to state
number of appraisers employed to evaluate plaintiffs’ property
alone; names and addresses of all participating in that ap-
praisal; whether written appraisal reports had been filed; the
names of those so reporting; and identity of persons engaged
by defendant commission having possession of the reports, et
cetera.

Basing our decision on absence of disclosed prejudicial
error in ordering answers be given to the questions asked, with-
out resolving the matter’ of facts versus conclusions, we affirmed
trial court’s order.

It is now evident plaintiffs, in the Crist case, for the most
part if not entirely, were seeking facts not conclusions of ex-
perts, a subject discussed more in detail infra.

“In any event, Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission,
supra, is no longer controlling to the extent it may be in con-
flict with this opinion.

Trial court, in the case at bar, had ample reason to con-
elude plaintiffs’ motion to produce books and records, as
phrased, sought inextricable facts and opinions of experts.
Their application discloses they sought all files and records
relative to the entire condemnation project, named appraisers’
reports, details of their appraisals and file of correspondence
with respect to those reports.

Limiting ourselves to the matter of pretrial discovery, we
are satisfied “fact” as opposed to “conclusion”, while not easily
distinguished can and should be differentiated. We recognized
a distinction in Beardsley v. Ostrander, 254 Iowa 356, 358-360,
118 N.W.2d 61; Cody v. Toller Drug Co., 232 Iowa 475, 482, 5
N.W.2d 824; and Westman v. Bingham, 230 Iowa 1298, 1303,
800 N.W. 525. See also section 4.1(2), Code, 1966, and annota-
tions, 97 A.L.R.2d 770, 779.

As here employed the word “fact” denotes a thing done,
an action performed, that which has taken place, a known
actual occurrence or event, things that in very truth have oc-
curred or exist, an actuality. See City of South Euclid v.

EE

Clapacs, 6 Ohio Misc. 101, 213 N.H.2d 828, 832, and Black’s
Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., page 706.

HM On the other hand “conclusion”, as used in rule 141(a),
signifies a result, mental deduction, inference or opinion drawn
trom known subordinate or evidentiary facts. Bates v. Old
Mac Coal Co., Okla., 271 P.2d 315, 317; Hornback v. State High-
way Commissioner, supra; and Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth
Ed., page 362,

By way of illustration only, information obtained by an
expert as to observed physical conditions of comparable prop-
erties and their known sales prices may constitute facts.

However, property valuation deduced by an expert, based
in whole or in part upon training, experience, comparable sales
and other factual criteria, falls within the sphere of a conclu-
sion or opinion.

HI We now hold rule 141(a) does not preclude the obtain-
ing of relevant factual information obtained and used by ex-
perts employed or engaged by an adverse party. But, it does’
specifically prohibit the securing by discovery procedures of
conclusions or personal opinions arrived at or drawn by such
experts.

Although this concept has admittedly been criticized gen-
erally (41 Ind. L. J. 509, and 13 So.Dak. L. Rev. 63), rule
141(a) is clear, specific and certain. If a change is to be ef-
fected in this state it must be by revision of the rule rather than
judicial fiat.

Under existing conditions it is to us evident there is no-
reasonable cause to conclude trial court abused its discretion in
overruling plaintiffs’ application for production of books or
documents,

HMM VIL Regarding trial court’s refusal to order com-
pliance with request for admissions (rule 127, R.C.P.), plain-
tiffs claim error in that this is a part of discovery procedure,
their demand was directed to relevant matters, some objections
asserted by defendant were too general, and the court’s adverse
ruling was insufficiently detailed.

We are satisfied the reasoning and conclusions set forth in
the foregoing divisions of this opinion are here applicable and

0

serve to dispose of the matter at hand favorably to trial court’s
order.

In fairness to all concerned, however, a 2 brief analysis of
the subject is in order.

The record reveals most if not. all information sought
through this discovery approach was obtained by plaintiffs via
answers to interrogatories prior to, and on cross-examination
of defendant’s witnesses during, first trial.

Furthermore, the requests as made were generally in form
and content incompatible with the intent and purpose of rule
127, which incidentally is patterned after Federal rule 36. See
43 Iowa L. Rev. 8, 28.

As previously noted the basic objective of rule 127 is to
induce admissions as a means of obviating additional proof
during trial with regard to any particular relevant matter.

In United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 35, the
court held requests for admissions ‘should be simple and.
direct, limited to singular relevant facts, and not so framed as
to permit insertion of voluntary statements or unresponsive
matter, They should contain statements of fact which may be
specifically and clearly admitted or denied.

The following will serve to illustrate plaintiffs recognized
no limitations in their quest for admissions:

“35. That on the project which included the Jones’ ‘prop-
erty, Mr. Wright worked alone. That Mr. Wright’ considered
all of the sales which have been referred to herein as being
sufficiently similar to aid Mr. Wright in his determination of
the value of the Jones’ property.

“36. ‘That Mr. Wright considered the foregoing sales in
putting a value on the Jones’ farm,

“37, That as to every property which was purchased by
the Defendant Commission on the project which included the
Jones’ property there was a deed with a stated consideration
recorded in the office of the County Recorder and as to each of
such properties there was a plat filed in the office of the County
Auditor which likewise stated a consideration,

“38. That on the project which included the Jones’ prop-
erty the total consideration paid as to each of the properties
purchased was shown on the plat and that the amounts on the

Ee

plat of each of such properties showed the total amount paid
for the purchase of such property.

“39. That the deeds recorded in the office of the County
Recorder in connection with the project which included the
Jones’ property showed a consideration which was not neces-
sarily what the Defendant paid for such property and showed.
on the plat.”

There is no apparent or compelling cause to hold trial court
abused its discretion in overruling plaintiffs’ request for ad-
missions.

HE OVI. Finally, plaintiffs claim, as aforesaid, defend-
ant’s objections to their admission request were in some in-
stances too general, and trial court’s order was not in sufficient:
detail.

According to the record plaintiffs’ contention relative to
generality of defendant’s objections is asserted the first time
on appeal and need not be considered by us. See in this regard
Verschoor v. Miller, : 259 Iowa 170, 143 N.W.2d 385, 389, and
citations.

As to plaintiffs’ assertion trial court erred in summarily
overruling the request for admissions, rule 118, R.C.P., pro-
vides: “A motion, or other matter involving separate grounds
or parts, shall be disposed of by separate ruling on each and
not sustained generally.”

In Tice v. Wilmington Chemical Corporation, 259 Iowa 27,
33, 141 N.W.2d 616, 620, 143 N.W.2d 86, this court said:

“For good and self-evident reasons a ruling on each ground
or part of a motion is looked upon with favor.

“However, we have held a violation of this rule does not
constitute prejudicial error absent some’ compelling cause to
hold otherwise.” (Authorities cited.)

In the instant case there is no evident reason to hold failure
on the part of trial court to rule separately on each matter
involved in the subject motion constitutes reversible error.

TX. The order of trial court overruling plaintiffs’ ap-
plication for production of books and documents, and request
for admissions, must be and is—Affirmed,

All Justices concur except Larson, J., who concurs in result,

1076 Le Ve

Auprey J. Lessencrr, appellee, v. Rate U. Lessenemr,
appellant.

No. 52845,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2a 845)

Marcu 5, 1968.

Morrison, Morrison & Morrison, of Washington, for ap-
pellant. .

Bailey C. Webber, of Ottumwa, for appellee,

Garriztp, C. J—Defendant Ralph U. Lessenger has ap-
pealed from decree granting plaintiff Audrey J. Lessenger a

a Es 1077

divorce, custody of the daughter (seven at time of trial in May
1966), with reasonable visitation right to defendant, $80 a
month child support until she graduates from high school or
sooner marries, awarding each party an automobile subject to
the indebtedness thereon and the household goods in the pos-
session of each, also subject to indebtedness.

No complaint is made as to any of the above provisions
and the decree, as to them, is affirmed.

The decree also provides that a farm of 397 acres, a
dwelling in Wapello, all farm machinery, crops, stored grain
and hay be sold under the court’s supervision by plaintiff’s
attorney and defendant’s then attorney, appointed commis-
sioners for such purpose. From the sale proceeds the secured
obligations are first to be paid, then costs of sale including real-
estate broker’s commissions allowed by the court and expenses
and charges of the commissioners for their services, then un-
secured obligations, and from the net remaining proceeds pay
plaintiff one third as lump sum alimony and the remaining two
thirds to defendant.

The trial court retained jurisdiction over the commissioners
and parties for making additional orders or directions to carry
out the decree. Partial distribution of lump sum alimony, as it
could be determined and available, might be made under the
court’s supervision and direction. Costs of the trial were
divided equally between the parties.

This is the second appeal of this case. From the decree
following the first trial plaintiff-wife appealed, contending the
allowances of lump sum alimony of $6000 and child support of
$50 per month were inadequate and not based on sufficient
evidence. We held the evidence was inadequate as to the
essentials to be considered in determining the amounts of
‘alimony and child support which were “right”, as the term is
used in section 598.14 Codes 1962, 1966. Accordingly we
decided “The decree must be set aside and the cause remanded
with directions that the trial court permit a reopening for
further evidence on the issues of the amount of child support
and a proper property division or lump sum alimony.” Les-
senger v. Lessenger, 258 Iowa 170, 176, 188 N.W.2d 58, 61.

1078 ce ;

- Pursuant to our mandate, further evidence was taken be-
fore a different trial judge, largely as to the financial con-
dition of the parties. Since, as stated, defendant-appellant
makes no complaint as to the allowance for child support, we
have to consider only the provisions of the second decree for
the benefit of the wife. We shall try to avoid needlessly repeat-
ing what is said in our former opinion but suggest it be read.

HI. Defendant assigns error in several findings of fact
by the trial court. Since this is an equity case in which our
review of both facts and law is de novo (rule 334, Rules of
Civil Procedure) we.need not separately consider these assign-
ments. We do not reverse an equity case upon such com-
plaints as these but draw such conclusions from our review as
we deem proper. Arnold v. Arnold, 257 Iowa 429, 483, 133
N.W.2d 58, 56, and citation; Sawyer v. Sawyer, 261 Iowa 112,
128, 152 N.W.2d 605, 612.
= TE IL. The principal questions we have for decision are
whether plaintiff-wife is entitled to a third interest in the net
proceeds of substantially all assets of the parties and whether
they should all, especially the 397-acre farm, be sold by the
attorney-commissioners appointed by the court, under the lat-
ter’s supervision and direction.

The equity in the farm is much the most valuable asset of
the parties. Defendant contends in effect its net value would
be greatly reduced by carrying out the terms of the decree
because of broker’s commissions, fees and expenses of ap-
praisers and the commissioners and, above all, capital gain-tax.
Defendant also calls attention to the fact he acquired the farm
five years before his marriage to plaintiff and its sale, along
with the farm machinery and equipment, would take from. him
his chosen means of earning a livelihood.

At the hearing after the remand a real-estate broker called
by plaintiff expressed the opinion the value of the 397 acres
was then (May 1966) $300 per acre. Plaintiff gave her opinion
the value was then $120,000 to $125,000. In a deposition taken
by plaintiff two months before the hearing defendant said he
had no idea of the value of the farm, “it is not for sale.” A
farmer-real-estate broker who owned an interest in six farms
in the same county, some by vendor’s lien or purchase money

ee 1079

mortgage, testified for defendant the value of the farm was
$75,000. The trial court made no finding as to its value.

As stated in our former opinion (258 Iowa 170, 172, 138
N.W.2d 58, 59), defendant purchased the farm for $30,000; at
the time the parties were married it was mortgaged for $18,000.
This mortgage was later replaced by one to Prudential In-
surance Company for $30,000. At the time of the second hear-
ing $21,300 was owing Prudential. Also as stated in our former
opinion, an additional mortgage was given to Farmers Home
Administration (FHA) for $17,000. About $15,000 was owing
on this mortgage together with interest from January 6, 1966.
Taxes for 1965 of about $1550 plus penalty and interest re-
mained unpaid.

Regrettably it was more than 17 months after the second
decree was entered before the appeal was submitted to us. We
have no way of knowing to a certainty whether taxes for 1966
have been paid nor the exact amount of secured indebtedness
against the farm at anytime subséquent to the hearing after
the remand. It is probable, however, such indebtedness has
substantially increased in amount from “accumulated interest
before now.

There is little doubt sale of the farm under the decree
would result in substantial reductions from the gross sdle price
before the net balance could be ‘arrived at and distributed to
the parties. And we do riot think it is best for either party to
settle the matter of property division or lump sum alimony i in
the manner provided by the decree.

The commissioners are both busy lawyers, located some
distance from the farm in another county. The then attorney
for defendant, named one commissioner, has not represented
defendant in taking or prosecuting the. appeal. The attorney
who succeeded him is located in. a different county from both
the farm and the home of plaintiff’s attorney, the other com-
missioner. It would be inconvenient and expensive for the
farm to be sold in this manner.

It is probable there would be a broker’s commission. We
may take judicial notice such commissions have increased to as
much as five or six percent of the gross sale price, including
the amount of incumbrances—not merely the balance of the sale

1080 Le |

price after paying the secured obligations, or the value of the
owner’s “equity.”

On the question of liability for capital gain tax from sale
of the farm, it was suggested in oral argument this might be
avoided by replacing the farm with other property of similar
or related use, thus amounting to an involuntary conversion.
A classic example is where an owner of property condemned
for public. use or destroyed by a fire covered by insurance buys
ather property of similar cr related use or service. However,
no authority has been cited in support of the suggestion.

The only authority called to our attention is 34 Am. Jur.2d,
Federal Taxation (1968), section 4221, page 51, which state:
“The following sales do not qualify as involuntary conversions :
Sales * * * under court order in private suits, * * *. Though
the sales are not-‘voluntary’ in the regular sense of the term,
they aren’t caused wholly by acts beyond the taxpayer’s control
and therefore aren’t involuntary for tax purposes.”

We conclude there is a good chance claim would be made
for a large capital gain tax if the farm .were sold under the
decree. : .

This action was commenced July 1, 1964. It should be
concluded without the delay and inconvenience reasonably to
be expected from carrying out the provisions of the decree. In
our view plaintiff should be awarded lump sum alimony to be
paid by defendant, he should be permitted to keep: his farm,
farm machinery and equipment and continue in his chosen
ealling. .

Little need be added to our former opinion as to the con-
tribution plaintiff made toward improving the farm. The
parties moved onto it January 2, 1953, and lived there together
until this action was commenced. During the first five years
plaintiff worked in the fields and helped improve the farm in
various ways. In 1961 she began selling Avon products and
contributed her earnings toward family expenses. Plaintiff
has continued on as an Avon representative. Her net income
was $781 in 1963, $584 in 1964 and $953 in 1965.

Each party had been previously married and had one or
more children from such marriage. Defendant is 14 years older
than plaintiff.

ee 1081

Three assets other than the farm should be mentioned. The
farm machinery was valued at $6900 to $7900. At least one
tractor was subject to a chattel mortgage on which some $1400
was owing.

About 31,600 bushels of sealed corn and 1260 bushels of
sealed beans, produced in 1961 through 1965, were stored on
the farm. Nearly $37,000 had been borrowed on this grain
from Commodity Credit Corporation on which interest was
accruing. It had been resealed from year to year under an al-
‘lowance to the producer of 14c a bushel storage for each year
following the first year after the grain was produced. At
present prices of corn and beans there appears to be little net
value in the sealed grain.

The third asset is a dwelling formerly owned by plaintiff

’s

father in the town of Wapello, purchased by the parties on
eontract. Plaintiff’s brief fixes its value at $4250, about $900
more than the amount unpaid on the loan against it at the
time of the hearing. Monthly rents of $50 on it have been
applied on the loan. If the rents have been paid and so ap-
plied until now the amount unpaid on the loan should be

reduced to about $2700.

As before indicated, the decree provides the Wapello
property is to be appraised and sold by the commissioners
under the direction of the court. Incidentally, Wapello is
more than twice as far from the location of the commissioners
as the farm is. We think the property should be awarded to
plaintiff subject to the indebtedness against it. It may well
have a sentimental value to her in addition to its market value.
If she wants to sell it of course she may do so without further
court proceedings or expense relating thereto.

In addition to the secured debts above referred to there
was much other indebtedness to many other creditors. The
trial court found the unsecured indebtedness totaled $19,726.
This figure is not too high.

During pendency of this appeal it was stipulated defendant
had deposited with the clerk of the trial court the $6000 ali-
mony pursuant to the original decree under review on the
former appeal; $2000 of this was paid plaintiff September 16,
1966, before notice of this appeal was filed four days later;

1082 es a

from.the balance of this fund plaintiff was to be paid temporary
alimony of $150 per month commencing November 15, 1966,
until procedendo issue from.this court following this decision.
We approved this stipulation without prejudice to the rights of
either party upon this appeal. .

Presumably plaintiff has received the $2000 of this $6000
paid in by defendant as well as $150 per month temporary
alimony. Her brief in effect so concedes. It is possible the
clerk has also paid the.$80 monthly child ‘support payments
from this fund, although neither the stipulation nor our order
provides therefor. If the child support payments have .also
been: paid in this manner defendant should be eredited with
the amounts so paid as well as with the $2000-paid plaintiff
September 16,1966. Defendant is not entitled to be credited
with the amount of temporary alimony the clerk paid from this
fund. These payments of temporary alimony should total
$2400 or $2550, :

. Th -On the whole case, in addition to the award to plain-
tiff of $80 pér month for child support from the time of the
decree appealed from until the daughter graduates from high
school or sooner marries, the $2000 paid- plaintiff from funds
furnished by defendant as just-explained, the Wapello dwelling,
the-1964 Ford car and the household furniture and goods in her
Possession, all subject to the indebtédness thereon, we award
plaintiff the additional sums of $16,500 and'$1500 for the services
of her attornéy on this appeal, together with interest thereon
at five-percent per annum from the daté decree is entéred in
the trial court pursuant to this opinion.

$2000 of this $16,500, plus’ the $1500 allowed plaintiff for
attorney fees, shall become due and payable 60 days after judg-
ment therefor with interest is entered in the trial court, the
balance shall become due and payable March 1, 1969. ‘These
amounts shall be secured by a-lien in plaintiff’s favor on the
397-acre farm in defendant’s name and special execution shall
issue for the sale thereof to satisfy any amount unpaid after
it becomes due and payable.

The clerk of the district court of Jefferson County shall pay
over to plaintiff any balance remaining -in her hands from the

eS ‘1088

fund of $3502.21 paid to the clerk pursuant to order of this
court dated January 10, 1967, plaintiff to give credit for any
such balance she receives on the amount to become first due and
payable. .

All payments by defendant on the amounts awarded plain-
tiff are to be made into the office of the clerk of the district
court of Jefferson County.

All property not awarded plaintiff is to be defendant’s,
subject to the indebtedness thereon.

Each party shall hold the other harmless from liability for
any secured indebtedness against any property awarded such
party. In addition defendant is to hold plaintiff harmless from
liability for any debts incurred by either or both prior to com-
mencement of this action July 1, 1964.

Court costs on this appeal as well as those incident to the
second hearing in the trial court are to be divided equally
between the parties.

For judgment and decree in harmony with this opinion, the
eause is—Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

All Jusrices concur except Broxer, J., who dissents,

Raymonp L. SNAKENBURG, appellant, v. Jason Mre., Inc, and
Hacxrensack Caste Corroration, appellees.

No. 52872.
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 110)

1084

Marcu 5, 1968,

Barnes & Schlegel, of Ottumwa, for appellant.
Sifford, Wadden & Davis, of Sioux City, for appellee.

LeGranp, J—This appeal from a ruling of the trial court
sustaining the special appearance of defendant Hackensack
Cable Corporation, a New Jersey corporation, requires another
review of our “long arm” statute, section 617.3, Code, 1966.
Defendant Jason Mfg., Ine. is not a party to this appeal.

This section, which became effective July 4, 1963, provides
generally for a method of acquiring jurisdiction over non-
residents who commit a tort, either in whole or in part, within
this state. We must decide if this provision is procedural only
or if it affects substantive rights, and, dependent upon that
answer, whether the statute may be applied retrospectively or
is limited’ to prospective application. The trial court held its
application i is prospective only.

The facts are very brief and, of course, in an appeal
from a ruling on a special appearance we take the facts as
pleaded to be true. In support of its special appearance, de-
fendant filed certain affidavits which were not controverted,
and we consider as true also the facts set out in such affidavits.

1085

Tice v. Wilmington Chemical Corporation, 259 Iowa 27, 141
N.W.2d 616.

In 1962 defendant manufactured and sold one of its cables
to Jason Mfg., Inc. Later this cable was installed in a truck
which was ultimately purchased by Brown Transfer Company
of LaPorte City, Iowa. The cable was part of the machinery
by which a portable platform within the truck could be raised
or lowered to a desired height. On May 22, 1965, the plaintiff,
while an employee of Brown Transfer Company, was injured
under circumstances which he claims resulted from the negli-
gent manufacture of the cable. On July 4, 1963, between the
date of the alleged 1962 negligence and the 1965 injury,
section 617.3 became effective.

Section 617.3 has had a brief but stormy career. We have
had occasion to consider it in Andersen v. National Presto
Industries, Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 185 N.W.2d 639; Tice v. Wil-
mington Chemical Corporation, 259 Iowa 27, 141 N.W.2d 616;
Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 260 Iowa 678, 149 N.W.2d 142, and
Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94. The
parties contend these decisions are not entirely harmonious.
The trial court, too, found them irreconcilable and used the
Chrischilles case as authority for its ruling here.

It should be noted the Andersen ease, decided in 1965, did
not involve either the procedural-substantive problem or pros-
pective-retrospective application. There we simply held that if
injury or damage occurs in this state, our courts may obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant under the long arm statute. At
page 916 of 257 Iowa, page 641 of 185 N.W.2d, we said, “We
must assume that the legislature, in wording section 617.3 as it
has now done, had in mind an actionable tort, rather than an
act which by itself, without resulting injury, would not give a
basis for recovery.” Or to put it another way, the occurrence
of injury within this state, without more, is sufficient happening
of a tort “in part” to bring the defendant within the operation
of the statute. °

In the later Tice case, upon which plaintiff strongly relies,
we held section 617.3 was procedural only. At'page 41 of 259
Towa, page 625 of 141 N.W.2d, we said, “It is to us evident Code
section 617.3 does nothing more than provide a plaintiff claim-

1086 |

ing some right of action in contract or in tort with an Iowa forum
for enforcement of an existing substantive right.” (Emphasis
added.) In the Tice case, as in the one now before us, the
negligence occurred before, and the damage after, the enactment
of section 617.3.

While identical on the factual situation, Tice is nevertheless
of little help to plaintiff because in both Krueger and Chrischilles
we abandoned the theory of that decision and adopted instead
the consent concept of jurisdiction under section 617.3. At page
43 of Tice we said, “Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by
service of process upon a defendant or by his consent, * * *
Since consent is admittedly nonexistent in the case now before
us, our question is whether jurisdiction was acquired by requisite
process.”

But in Krueger we decided our statute was dependent on
consent for its extraterritorial effect. At page 687 of 260 Iowa,
page 147 of 149 N.W.2d, we used this language, “We must look
to the statute which the legislature has seen fit to enact. It
chose to adopt a substituted service statute. Its theory of due
process is clearly based om the fiction of implied consent and
goes further than most in providing ‘the committing of the tort
shall be deemed to be the agreement of such corporation * *.*
that any process or original notice so served [substituted serv-
ice on the Secretary of State] shall be of the same legal force
and effect as if served personally upon such defendant within
the state of Iowa.’”

As pointed out in Krueger, a long a arm statute may be
either procedural or substantive, depending upon the intent of
the legislature in the enactment of such a law.- We said that
invariably where jurisdiction is based upon substituted service,
as in our Act, it has been held such laws are substantive; and,
conversely, when service may be made by registered mail or by
personal service outside the state, they have been held to be
procedural. Following this general rule, we held section 617.3
to be substantive; to be based on implied consent to the .ap-
pointment of the secretary of state as agent for the service of
original notice; and to be limited to prospective application.
The fact that both the negligence and the injury in Krueger oc-

a ((

curred prior to the effective date of section 617.3 might be
urged against its use as authority here were it not for’ the
Chrischilles opinion handed down shortly after Krueger. In
Chrischilles—as in both Tice and the case now before us—the
alleged negligence occurred before July 4, 1963, and the injury
or damage occurred after that date.

Hl In Chrischilles we again approved the consent theory
first announced in Krueger and then declared such consent
must be implied from and based upon affirmative acts of
negligence, not on injury or damage which might later result
therefrom.

At page 463 of 260 Iowa, page 101 of 150 N.W.2d of the
Chrischilles, opinion appears this statement, “Based on our
holding in Krueger v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., supra, con-
struing section 617.3 to operate prospectively only ‘and classify-
ing this section as a consent statute, plaintiff is not aided by
the fact his action accrued subsequent to enactment of this
section. Here all affirmative acts of negligence on defendant’s
part, occurred in the fall of 1960. Defendant cannot be deemed
to have consented to the appointment of the secretary of state
to be his true, and lawful attorney upon whom may be served.
an original notice by an act.done prior to.enactment. of the
statute. To hold the trial court had jurisdiction of defendant
in. this case would require retroactive application.”

‘This, conclusion, it is true, was reached by a sharply
divided court, However, unless we overrule both Krueger and
Chrischilles, we are obliged to hold. the consent required,
fictional though it be, is related to the act of negligence, not to
its consequences.

To hold defendant impliedly consented to become subject
to the jurisdiction of our courts because of alleged negligent
conduct which occurred long before the law upon which such
presumption is based would indeed require retrospective ap-
plication of section 617.3.

_ We are convinced this result. is prohibited under our most
recent cases interpreting this statute and we are ‘convineed too
those decisions announce the better rule.

The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.—Affirmed.

1088

GarrieLp, C.J., Larson, SNELL, Moore and Mason, JJ.,
concur.

Sruarr, J., dissents.
Rawines and Broxer, JJ., dissent.

Sruarr, J. (dissenting)—I agree this case is controlled by
Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 101,
but take issue with the majority here for the reasons expressed
in the dissent.

The majority’s position is based on the premise that de-
fendant’s consent to jurisdiction must be implied from some
negligent act on his part and that jurisdiction cannot be ob-
tained under a statute enacted after the negligent acts had
occurred, This would have been true when the Supreme Court
of the United States held the fiction of consent necessary to
confer jurisdiction. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 224, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201-202, 2 L. Ed.2d 223, the
U.S. Supreme court abandoned the contract theory. Consent
may be raised by statutory enactment and need not be implied:
in fact to make it constitutionally acceptable.

In section 617.3 the legislature provided consent was im-
plied from the commission of a tort in whole or in part in Iowa.
The resulting injury is part of the tort. Andersen vy. National
Presto Industries, Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 916, 185 N.W.2d 639, 642.
As that part of the tort took place after the effective date of
the statute there is no question of retrospective application.
Nothing in the statute makes the consent dependent upon the
negligent act as distinguished from the resulting injury.

Support for this position is found in Aftanase v. Economy
Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187, 190, in which the Court of
Appeals of the Eighth Circuit considered a Minnesota statute
similar to ours. The court said: “* * * the baler was sold by
Economy to Eastern in 1953. The statute was born in 1957.
The plaintiff’s injury was in 1962. * * * Economy’s negligence,
if there was any, existed at the time of manufacture and sale
in 1953. But any effect of that negligence upon the plaintiff
took place in 1962. Certainly it was then, not before, that his
cause of action acerued. And at that time the statute was in

|
{
i

| tC be 1089

existence. This is not retroactive application. It is prospective
application, is within the language of the statute, and invokes
no problem of retroactivity.”

The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa reached the same result under Iowa law in Pingel v.
Coleman Company, 250 F. Supp. 521, 523. There a trailer was
purchased in 1959, Section 617.3 became effective in 1961 and
an explosion, fire and resulting deaths occurred in 1963. Judge
Hanson quoted from Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company and
concluded : .

“The statute applies if it is in effect at the time of the
accident. * * *

“The court concludes that Section 617.3 is applicable to
the present case and. this construction does not require any
invalid retroactive application of the statute. Clearly, the tort,
if any, was committed in part in Iowa.”

The majority opinion unnecessarily imposes upon plaintiff
the heavy burden of proving some affirmative act by defendant
after the effective date of the act. In my opinion such burden
was neither contemplated by the legislature nor required by
the statute.

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. Haronp Wayne Hort, appellant.

No. 52784,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 884)

ee
eo
S
3

Marcx 5, 1968,

Life, Davis & Life, by Patrick J. Life, of Oskaloosa, and
Rowe & Rowe, by John A. Rowe, of Fairfield, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, Wm. A. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, and James L. Morrison, County
Attorney, for appellee.

a Le 1091

Snewx, J—Defendant was arrested, indicted, tried, con-
victed and sentenced for operating a motor vehicle while in-
toxicated, He has appealed.

Defendant filed a demurrer, application to take depositions
of the State’s witnesses, motion in limine, motion to suppress,
motions for directed verdict, motion for new trial and motion
in arrest of judgment. They were respectively: overruled.

During the evening of December 14, 1966, defendant was
driving his car on the public highway in Henry County. He
was observed and followed by a highway patrolman. Accord-
ing to the.patrolman defendant’s car was weaving all over the
road. The officer stopped defendant's car, asked the defendant
how much he had had to drink and asked him to get out ‘of his
car. The officer testified that defendant was unstable and did
poorly walking toe to heel.

Defendant was arrested, advised of his constitutional
rights and taken to the Mount Pleasant police station.. Defend-
ant was: again advised’ of his constitutional rights. He was
asked.to. and undertook certain coordination tests. Several
witnesses. testified that he*did poorly.’ There was testimony
that his eyes were bloodshot, his movements uncoordinated, his
speech slurred and that he answered questions ambiguously.
Several witnesses testified that in their opinion he was: intoxi-
cated. -

The: provisions of the Iowa Implied: Consent Law were
read to defendant in the police station: Defendant refused to
take either the blood test or give a urine specimen and refused
to sign the Implied Consent Waiver.

There was testimony by a doctor who had been called to
take a blood specimen, if one was to be taken, and a city
policeman that they overheard defendant tell the lady who was
with him why he would not take a blood test. The doctor
testified :

“A. At any rate, he stated he did not take a blood test
hecause he drank enough everyday so that he couldn’t pass a
blood test anyway.

“Q. Was this said in your presence? A. This was said in
my presence. I was rather surprised because I wasn’t question-
ing him ; I was getting ready to leave.

1092 Le |

“Q. Did you observe to whom he was addressing his re-
marks? A. Yes, it was to this lady who came down to either
take him home or provide bail—he was giving her instructions,
also, as to whom to contact for bail, and so forth.”

The testimony relative to a blood test was brought out by
the State’s witness and by defendant’s own testimony. Defend-
ant testified in his own behalf. Relative to the blood test he
said:

“The officer offered me a blood test. I hate needles and I
have been stuck with them on many occasions. When I was in
the hospital they gave me hypos. Blood was all they give me.
They asked me to take a urine test. I couldn’t urinate at that
time. * * *

“I did refuse to take either the blood test or urine test at
the station. I never was asked if I was intoxicated. Certainly
I knew I was suspected of being intoxicated.”

Defendant denied intoxication, denied making the state-
ments claimed to have been overheard, and offered evidence
that his uncoordinated walk was due to a previous leg injuty.
He offered evidence that the weaving motion of his car on the
road was due to a defective steering mechanism.

I. The evidence of intoxication was in conflict.

It is not for us to pass on the weight and eredit of the
testimony nor to say which versions and stories should be
believed. These matters were for the jury. There was ample
evidence in behalf of the State to present a jury question and
ample evidence to support the jury verdict. Further discussion
of the evidence is unnecessary.

: II. The real issues here relate to admission of testimony
as to defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for in-
toxication and the court’s instructions relative thereto. De-
fendant objected throughout the trial and now argues that any
mention of his refusal to submit to a chemical test for intoxica-
tion violated his rights under Amendment 5 to the United
States Constitution providing that no person “shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. 8. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Hd.2d

a a 1098

658, holds that Amendment 14 makes Amendment 5 applicable
to state court procedures,

Defendant’s claims of error were made at every oppor-
tunity and are now argued in several divisions but they all
relate to the same general proposition,

There’ is no claim in this case that defendant was not
promptly and fully advised of his constitutional rights. He
was not subjected to any interrogation. He testified, “I never
was asked if I was intoxicated.” He was asked if he would
take certain tests. Some he did and some he refused. The
provisions of the Iowa Implied Consent Law were called to his
attention. There is no claim that he was uninformed or failed
to understand.

| For over 100 years it has been the law of Iowa that it
is proper to show a defendant’s conduct, demeanor, voluntary
statements and attitude toward the crime, if there was one.
See cases reviewed in State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300
N.W. 275.

There have been times in our law when it was permissible
for a prosecutor to comment to the jury on a defendant’s
failure to testify. In earlier periods, and now, such is not the
case.

In State v. Benson, supra, defendant was. accused of

operating a motor-vehicle while intoxicated. It was suggested
that he go to the hospital and take physical treatment and a
blood test. He reftised. The question on appeal was whether
the admission of evidence relative thereto constituted a denial
of a constitutional protection against self-incrimination. The
evidence was held admissible.
* TE When the Benson case was decided it was permissible
for a prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s failure to
testify. Such is no longer the law. See Griffin v. State of
California, infra. However, the comment in Benson, loc. cit.
230 Iowa 1171, is pertinent:

“Of course, when one is accused of a crime, he does not
have to reply to the accusation. But if he declines to reply, his
act of silence may he shown to the jury. We are of the opinion
that the situation now before us is analogous. The request for

1094 a a

a blood test did no.more'than inferentially accuse the defendant
of intoxication. His refusal to submit is similar to a refusal to
speak. The jury was.told that he did not have to submit. The
refusal was merely a circumstancé to be considered. The court
was right.”

Where . constitutional requirements as to warning, ete.
have been-met-as in the case before us there is a difference
between showing what defendant did and said when arrested
and comment to a trial. jury on failure to testify.”

Hin 1963. our legislature in a declaration of public
policy enacted what is named therein as the “Uniform -Chemical
Test for Intoxication Act.” : See Laws of the Sixtieth General
Assembly, chapter 114. This law commonly referred to as. our
“Tmplied. Consent Law” ow appears as chapter 321B of our
Code: :

While some provisions ‘of this- ‘Act. are made applicable to
eviminal procedure as: pointed out, infra, it-is: basically an’
administrative Act. No criminal penalties are provided,
nothing is prohibited, and-no act is required. ‘The State, acting
through the legislature, has said in substance, “If you want to
exercise the privilege of. operating a motor vehicle on our high-
ways you agree to the administrative and evidentiary pro:
cedure we. have outlined.” -

=H There is no absolute right to ‘drive on the highway
under any..and all conditions. It is a privilege, not aright.
Spurbeck: v..Statton, 252:lowa 279,289, 106 N.W-.2d 660. It is
a privilege enjoyed under the conditions imposed ‘by. the legis-
lature,, We.:know.of no reason why the State may. not impose
such reasonable conditions as the legislature prescribes. No
one has to accept the conditions imposed and thus make himself
subject thereto. ‘No one is required to have a driver’s. license
except, as a precedent to driving. It is a condition imposed by
the State... We. know-of no reason why a.‘person in order to
enjoy the privilege so granted may not waive such “rights” as
he might otherwise have.

. IIL. Section 321B.1 of. our Code. provides: .

“Declaration of ‘policy, ‘ The. general assembly hereby de:
termines.and declares that the provisions of this chapter are
necessary in order to control alcoholic beverages and aid the

a ee 1095

enforcement of laws prohibiting operation of a-‘motor vehicle
while in an intoxicated condition.”

Section 321B.3 provides in part:

“Implied consent to test. Any person who operates a
motor vehicle in this state upon a public highway, under such
circumstances as to give reasonable grounds to believe the
person to have been operating a motor vehicle while in an
intoxicated condition, shall be deemed to have given consent
to the withdrawal from his body of specimens of his blood,
breath, saliva, or urine, and to a chemical test or tests thereof,
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his
blood, subject to the provisions hereinafter set out. * * * ”

Other sections provide procedure for taking of a blood
sample and administrative procedures. Section 821B.10 makes
the results of tests admissible in evidence.

. Section 821B.11 provides:

“Proof of refusal admissible. If the person under arrest
refuses to submit:to the test or tests, proof of refusal shall be
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising
out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person
was operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this
state while in an intoxicated condition.”

The issue before us is the constitutionality of this section,
The procedure in the trial court was in accord with our
statutes.

It should be noted that defendant’s refusal to submit to a
blood test was not on constitutional grounds. He testified that
he did not like to be stuck with a needle: If that is a sound
constitutional reason millions of men and women in our armed
services have been constitutionally abused.

IV. In Griffin v. State of California, 380 U. 8. 609, 610, 85
S.Ct. 1229, 1230,-14 L. Hd.2d 106, the defendant, charged with
murder, did not testify in his own behalf. The California Con-
stitution provided: ““* * * in any criminal case, whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may
be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be
considered by the court or the jury.’”

1096 Le |

The California trial court’s instructions said:

“*¢As to any evidence or facts against him which the de-
fendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because
of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if,
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evi-
dence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as
tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating
that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn
therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more
probable.’ ” .

The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
California comment rule violated Amendment 5. .

HHI It should be noted that the instructions in Griffin em-
phasized the unfavorable inferences that-may be drawn from
failure to testify. No such instruction was given in the ease
before us, Here defendant did testify and explain his position.
Here the court told the jury:

“Tt is shown by the testimony, and undisputed in the
record, that at the time the defendant was being held at the
police station in Mount Pleasant on the charge for which he is
now on trial, he was requested by Patrolman Wiele and also by
Doctor Couchman to have blood or urine tests to determine
alcoholic content, which requests were refused. * * *

“You are instructed that in this case defendant’s refusal to
submit to any test is a circumstance to be considered by the
jury, together with all other facts and circumstances shown
by the evidence, in determining the question as to whether the
defendant was or was not intoxicated at the time involved in
this case.”

Admission of evidence and telling the jury that it may be
considered is not the same as emphasizing that unfavorable
inferences may be drawn from failure to testify. Also evi-
dence as to what a defendant did or refused to do or said, in-
cident to arrest after constitutional warning, is not the same
as comment on failure to testify at the trial.

The nub of the holding in Griffin appears in the last
sentence in the majority opinion. The Fifth Amendment “for-
bids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence

a | 1097

or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt.” (Page 615 of 380 U.S.)

Unless the holding in Griffin is to be extended beyond
what is said therein and applied to factual situations that are
not comparable we do not believe that the evidentiary rulings
and the instructions here should be held violative of constitu-
tional protections.

To paraphrase from Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissenting
opinion in Griffin we do not think our statute “is hardly an
idiosyneratic aberration.”

V. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L, Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, outlined the constitutional safe-
guards surrounding an aceused but did not present a situation
comparable to the one here. Here there is no claim that
incident to arrest there was any infringement of constitutional
rights or any improper custodial interrogation.

Except as Amendment 14 to the United States Constitution
makes Amendment 5 applicable to State procedures, there is
no claim here as to due process. The issue is under Amend-
ment 5. .

“VI. A little more than a year after the decision in Griffin
and one week after the decision in Miranda, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided Schmerber v. California, 384 U. 8.
757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L, Ed.2d 908.

In Schmerber defendant had been arrested for driving
while intoxicated. At the direction of a police officer a blood
sample was withdrawn from his body by a physician. Chemical
analysis indicated intoxication and the report of this analysis
was admitted in evidence at the trial. Receipt of this evidence
was objected to on the ground that the blood had been with-
drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. “He contended
that in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the
admission of the analysis in evidence denied him due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights secured against the States by
that Amendment: his privilege against self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment; his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment; and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable
searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”

1098 Le 7

His several objections, were rejected by the Supreme Court.

Hl In disposing of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion claim the court said:

“We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the
analysis in question in this case did not ‘involve compulsion to
these ends. :

“Tt could not be denied that in requiring petitioner to
submit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of ‘his blood
the State compelled him to submit to an attempt to discover
evidence that might be used to prosecute -him for a criminal
offense.. He submitted only after the: police officer rejected his
objection and directed the physician to proceed. The officer’s
direction to the physician to. administer the test over peti-
tioner’s objection constituted compulsion for the purposes of
the privilege. The critical question, then, is whether petitioner
was thus compelled ‘to.be a witness against himself.’ ” .

Later in the opinion these statements appear:

+ «# * * both federal and state courts have usually hela 1 that
it [the Fifth Amendment] offers no protection against compul-
sion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or. measure-
ments, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court,
to stand, to assume a stance,.to walk, or.to make a particular
gesture. The distinction which has emerged, often expressed
in different ways, is that the privilege is a bar against com-
pelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or phys-
ical evidence’ does not violate it. * * *

“Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating
produet of compulsion, was neither petitioner’s testimony nor
evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the
petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds.” .

If evidence as to refusal, the taking of a. blood specimen
over objection, and the result of the test is. admissible it should
follow that evidence of refusal after warning is admissible.

VII. During the last several years decisions throughout
the country have clearly demonstrated that the provisions in

— a 1099

the Bill of Rights are to be more liberally construed in favor of
an accused than formerly. This does not mean that well estab-
lished rules of construction are to be abandoned. It. does not
mean that statutory declarations of public policy enacted for
the protection of the people should -be lightly cast aside.
Neither does it mean that an accused should have any greater
rights than the people a statute is designed to protect.

We have held on many occasions that one challenging
a statute has the-burden to overcome the presumption it is
constitutional and to negative every reasonable basis upon
which it may be sustained. State v. Di Paglia, 247 Iowa 79,
85, TL N.W.2d 601, 49 A.L.R.2d 1223; State v. Stump, 254 Iowa
1181, 1197, 119 N.W.2d 210; Zilm v. Zoning Board of Adjust-
ment, 260 Iowa 787, 792, 150 N.W.2d 606, 610; State v. Halver-
son, 261 Iowa 530, 588, 155 N.W.2d 177, 182. .

VIII. We have not previously: considered the precise point
involved here but have had the Implied Consent Law and
license suspension cases before us on several occasions.

In Spurbeck: v. Statton, supra, loc. cit. 252 Iowa 287, we
said the danger to be apprehended from driving upon the public
highways by one under the influence of intoxicating liquor is
such a hazard that summary action by the State. is within the
proper limits of ‘its police power.

Gottschalk -v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 Nwea “866,
involved an administrative proceeding and not a criminal trial.
The accused refused to submit to chemical tests. We upheld
the applicable statutes.

In Severson vy. Sueppel, 260 Lowa 1169, ‘1174, 152 N.W.2d
281, 284, we said:

“In interpreting a statute we look to the object to be ac-
complished, the evils sought to be remedied, or the purpose to
be subserved and place on it a reasonable or liberal construc-
tion which will best effect its purpose rather. than: one which
will defeat it. [Citation] It is obvious the purpose of the
Implied Consent Law is to reduce the holocaust on our high-
ways part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely
of intoxicating liquor.”

In State v. Charlson, 261 Iowa 497, 502, 154 N,W.2d 829,

1100 as —

we quoted the above statement and quoted several sections from
the Implied Consent Law.
In the ease before us we do not find that defendant’s con-
stitutional rights have been violated. He has had a fair trial.
The case is—Affirmed.

Garriep, C. J., Larson, Moors, Sruarr and LeGranp, JJ.,
concur.

Mason, Rawiines and Brecker, JJ., dissent.

Scare or Iowa, appellee, v. Wit1am Jory Moore, appellant.

No, 52651.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 890)

a Le 1101

Marcu 5, 1968.

Ben F. Kubby and John P. Roehrick, both of Des Moines,
for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Ray Fenton, County Attorney,
for appellee.

Snetu, J—Defendant has appealed from the judgment fol-
lowing a jury verdict of guilty of robbery as defined in sections
711.1 and 711.8, Code of Iowa. :

Other than the identity of defendant as the man who com-
mitted the robbery much of the evidence appears without sub-
stantial controversy.

On January 21, 1967, the Adams Pharmacy in Des Moines
was robbed. At the time Mr. Rex W. Kepford, an assistant
manager, was in charge. He noticed a man near the candy
counter. Mr. Kepford asked the supposed customer if he could
help him. The customer said, “No, he was just looking.” Mz.
Kepford went to check out others at the cash register.

After the others had left the man approached Mr. Kepford
at the cash register and asked for a small sack which was given
to him, The man then told Mr. Kepford to fill the sack with
the money from the cash register. Mr. Kepford complied. The
man took the sack of money and left. The police were called
and arrived in a short time.

Mr. Kepford testified that the man had one hand in his
jacket pocket and Mr. Kepford thought he was armed. The
point is of no importance here as there is no issue relative
thereto and defendant was not charged with armed robbery.

‘Within a few minutes the police brought a man (not the
defendant) into the pharmacy and asked Kepford to identify
him, but “it wasn’t the fellow.” He was released.

1102 Po az

Shortly after receiving the police report police officer
Duquette saw defendant, who answered the description of the
robber, walking along the street. The officer drove alongside
defendant, stopped his car and got out. He asked defendant to
identify himself. Defendant had no identification. He was
asked to write his name which he did. Defendant was then
asked to sit in the back seat of the patrol car.

Officer Duquette called for assistance and when it arrived
he stated to the other officers that he felt that this man was
the holdup man. The officers asked defendant if he would be
willing to go back to the drugstore and talk to the store man-
ager. Defendant agreed to do so and went willingly. _

“On the way to the drugstore defendant was not placed
under arrest and rode in the back seat. Officer Duquette testi-
fied that when they were driving to the drugstore he heard
what ‘reminded him of paper being rustled around in the de-
fendant’s boot and ‘he thought that the defendant had placed
something in his boot. Officer Duquette further testified that
when the defendant stepped out of the car he could see down
the boot and saw a large roll of money.

The officers and the defendant went into the drugstore.
Kepford was asked if defendant was the robber.” He said he
“didn’t think so.”

Defendant was asked about a wad of money the officers
saw in his boot. Defendant said he did not know how much
money was ‘in the wad. He said, “A good friend of. his had
given him the money”, but he “didn’t remember who it was.”

Defendant was asked to count the money and began doing
so. Dtiring the counting of the money Mr. Kepford noticed a
dollar bill with a corner torn out that appeared to be similar to
one he had received from a customer shortly before the robbery.
Defendant was placed under arrest, informed of his constitu-
tional rights, taken to the police station and booked. He was
again informed of his constitutional rights.

Following the arrest, two police officers went to an apart-
ment near Fifth and Locust to verify defendant’s story that he
was staying there and had been to that apartment. When they
‘arrived they were unable to locate anyone and so left and
passed this information on to the detectives.

a es 1108

Two detectives who apparently knew who to look for from
the names given them located Donna Reed in a nearby tavern.
As a result of a conversation with her she accompanied the
detectives to the apartment where she unlocked the door and
allowed them to enter. While in the apartment with Donna
Reed’s permission the detectives picked up a small paper sack
out of the wastepaper basket in the kitchen and observed and
took possession of a gray jacket and a dark colored pair of
pants in the bedroom on top of several boxes of clothes.

No search warrant had been issued for the apartment.
There was no consent to enter except from Donna Reed.

Prior to trial the defendant moved to suppress all evi-
dence incident to the defendant’s arrest and all evidence rela-
tive to the search of the apartment of Mrs. Jenkins and Donna
Reed. we .

The nub of defendant’s complaint involves his standing to
object to a search of an apartment room that he was not
actually occupying when consent to enter was given by a tenant
in possession. - The factual situation is important.

A Mrs. Doris Jenkins and a Donna Reed were occupying
an apartment rented in the name of Mrs. Jenkins, but with both
tenants’ names appearing on the door and the tenants sharing
equally in the payment of the rent. It appears without question
these two ladies were the rightful occupants of the apartment
and in possession thereof. Each had a key.

Donna Reed had moved out before trial herein and was not
available as a witness.

Mrs. Jenkins testified that on January 21, 1967, she ar-
rived back at her apartment at about 11 a.m. and found the
defendant, whom she had known for several months, a suitcase
and several boxes of clothes that she recognized as belonging
to defendant. The defendant had been living at the North-
western Hotel. She asked him what the clothes were doing in
her apartment and defendant told her he had lost his room and
did not have any place else-to put them. She informed him “he
eouldn’t stay there.” She told him to have his clothes out that
day. She testified that defendant left about 1 p.m. but came
back at about three o’clock and asked “if he could get his
jacket out of his stuff as it was getting cold.” He then left

1104 Le 7

wearing the jacket and a pair of jeans. Mrs. Jenkins stated at
about 3:30 defendant returned and asked her if he could clean
up and change his clothes, He did so and left about 20 minutes
later, At defendant’s trial Mrs. Jenkins identified the clothes
taken by the officers as defendant's.

Later in the evening of January 21 Mr. Kepford was taken
to the police station and with no formal lineup, the defendant
was brought in and identified by Mr. Kepford. Defendant was
asked if he would put on the clothes which had been seized
from the apartment; he did so without objection; he was not
asked any questions.

The defendant was then indicted and tried. During the
trial the evidence taken from the apartment was admitted into
evidence over the objection of the defendant. The case was
submitted to the jury. A verdict of guilty was returned. It is
from this conviction that the appeal is taken.

I. At the close of the State’s case and again at the close
of all the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict be-
cause of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict of
guilty.

Defendant testified in his own behalf. -He denied having
been in the drugstore. He denied having any part in the
robbery. His timing of his visits to the ladies’ apartment
varied somewhat from that of Mrs. Jenkins. He told of coming
back to the apartment, changing clothes and leaving again. He
said he had taken his clothing to the apartment to get them
laundered at the laundromat. He said, “I thought it would be
all right.” He said the money found in his boot had been given
him by a friend. His testimony as to what happened and was
said on the street and at the store did not vary materially from
that of the police officers,

There is no claim that defendant at anytime ever admitted
guilt.

If the evidence offered by the State was admissible de-
fendant’s motions for a directed verdict were without merit.

II. As we said in State v. Brant, 260 Iowa 758,
762, 763, 150 N.W.2d 621, 624, generally searches are proper
when made under the authority of a validly-issued search war-
rant or when incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures

PF Po 1105

made with voluntary consent constitute an exception to the
rule that search and seizure must rest on a warrant. See case
cited. “* * * if peace officers are lawfully admitted to private
premises, what they see once they are in, that is, what is in
plain view, is not a search.” Loe. cit. 625 of 150 N.W.2d If
without a search warrant and without an unlawful entry,
officers are not required to close their eyes and need not walk
out and leave articles seen. Loe. cit, 625. See State v. Peter-
son, 261 Iowa 669, 155 N.W.2d 412.

In the case before us there was no search warrant. The
search was subsequent to and not incident to the arrest.

The burden of demonstrating that evidence has been
Wegally procured normally devolves upon the accused in a
motion to suppress such evidence but where the prosecution
relies upon consent to an otherwise illegal search and seizure
it has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
that the consent was voluntary. State v. Shephard, 255 Iowa
1218, 1222, 124 N.W.2d 712, and State v. Polton, 259 Iowa 435,
148 N.W.2d 307.

The question is one of fact to be decided upon its own

cireumstances. State v. Shephard, supra, loc, cit. 1223. See
also State v. Collins,.260 Iowa 1366, 152 N.W.2d 612, 615.
« I In the case before us, as in State v. Shephard, supra,
there are two questions. Was there consent to enter the apart-
ment and, if so, may someone other than defendant give con-
sent? .

The evidence is undisputed that Donna Reed, who lived in
the apartment and paid half the rent, unlocked the door and
admitted the officers. There was no forcible entry and no claim
of- coercion or even subterfuge. We think Donna Reed was
authorized to admit the officers. As bearing on the question of
consent see State v. Peterson, supra.

In State v. Shephard, supra, we said: “ * * * if the party
who has possession or control of the premises and property
voluntarily consents to a search, the right of privacy is not
invaded and the fact the search may disclose evidence tending
to incriminate an absent party who may have an equal right to
possession or control does not affect the reasonableness or
legality of the search. For a full discussion of the authority

1106 | |

for another ‘to consent to a search and seizure see annotation,
31 A.L.R.2d 1078.” (Loe. eit. 1227)

In the case at bar the officers went to the apartment to
verify the story told by defendant. They were lawfully on the
ptemises with permission of a person authorized to admit them.
There was no illegal search and seizure. They did nothing
prohibited by the constitution. . -

* TH. Most of the cases involving alleged illegal search
and seizure do not present factual situations such as.we have
here.

There is a difference between having standing'to challenge
the admissibility of evidence seized and the merit in the ob-
jection.

Standing to object is not limited to an owner or tenant.

In Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 877 (8 Cir. 1967),
the court analyzed the Federal Court decisions under rule
41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The fighting issue involved in the Spinelli éase was the
sufficiency of the information as to probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant. The court said:

“A large number ‘of questions on ‘this’ appeal revolve
around the search warrant used to uncover the incriminating
evidence of gambling: Among these questions are: appellant’s
standing to question its validity, the sufficiency of the informa-
tion before the issuing magistrate, the propriety of its execu-
tion, the failure to specify some of the evidence that was
seized.”

The defendant was not an owner nor the lessee of the
apartment but had been using it as a base for his bookmaking.
and gambling activities. The factual situation was not com:
parable to the case before us and there was no question of
consent to search. However, as to the right to object the court
said:

“We believe Jones, Miguel, and Foster, clearly indicate
that it is the right to use the premises that is a factor determi-
native of standing. If the defendant is legally occupying, or
has been granted a right to occupy the premises, even though
he is not physically present at the time of the search, then his
privacy has been invaded by a search-of these premises. As a

a | 107

person so aggrieved by the search he has a right to object, and
to do so he need not allege his specifie proprietary interest, i. ¢.,
owner, lessee, business invitee, ete. Nor is he required to, take
the stand to establish his particular interest.”

In the case before us defendant cannot prevail because of
what is said in Spinelli.

IV. The: court’s instructions to the jury are not chal-
lenged. We have reviewed the entire record including the
transcript of the testimony. We find no reversible error.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justicus concur except RawLines and Bors, JJ., who
concur in the result.

Sravz or Iowa, appellee, v, James Nexty, appellant.

No. 52645.
(Reported in 156 N-W.24 840)

1108 PF i,

Maron 5, 1968,

Norman G. Jesse, of Des Moines, for appellant,

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David S, Sather,
Assistant Attorney’ General, Arlen F. Hughes, of Mount Ayr,
County Attorney, for appellee,

Moore, J.—Defendant James Neely was charged, tried and
convicted of breaking and entering in violation of section 708.8,
Codes 1962, 1966, and has appealed. We affirm.

Defendant’s two assigned errors are that his motion to sup-

Pt Pe 1109

press and objections to testimony based on an alleged unreason-
able search and seizure should have been sustained and the
evidence was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice as required by Code section 782.5,

About 10 p.m., January 21, 1966, Mr. and Mrs. Homer
Shaw discovered the front door of Barton Abarr’s Phillips 66
service station in the town of Redding, Ringgold County, was
standing open. They so notified Abarr at his nearby residence
and returned to the station with him.

They discovered the lower pane of glass was broken out
of the door, the pop machine pried open, the cigarette display
disarranged and the cash register open. The frame which had
enclosed the safe in the wall had been pried away and the safe
taken. Abarr had closed and locked the station at 8:20 p.m.

About 8:30 p.m., Alta Jeanes, a local resident, drove by
the station and observed an automobile parked in the station
driveway with three persons sitting in it. She described it as
a blue Ford with a white top, in the 50’s.

A 1955 Ford, white over green, license 21-859, occupied by
Tom Pinegar, Ronald Johnston, Barbara Nelson and defendant
James Neely had been stopped by the highway patrol in Adair
or Adel the day before. The local law enforcement officers had
seen the vehicle in Leon and Lamoni the night before the break-
in. They had also seen it in that area the day of the break-in.

Abarr upon discovering the break-in notified Sheriff
Strange who came to the scene. The sheriff immediately put
out a radio call to all police officers to be on the lookout for
a white over green 1955 or 1956 Ford, license number 21-859.
A Missouri trooper reported the car had been observed in Hat-
field, Missouri, earlier that evening.

In response to the radio dispatch Patrolman Wignall and
Sergeant Grotewold of the Iowa Highway Patrol drove to
Lamoni where they observed the described Ford parked in the
driveway next to the apartment occupied by Mr. and Mrs.
Alfred Pinegar. They later learned it was registered to Al-
fred’s brother, Tom Pinegar of Des Moines. They then notified
other officers by radio the car had been located.

Other officers, including Deputy Sheriff Houck and Officer
Peel soon arrived. They remained in the road and while dis-

1110 as ;

cussing what should-be done observed a young man, later
identified as Ronald Johnston, come up the road and enter the
Pinegar residence. Johnston then came out with a girl and
started toward the Ford. Officers Wignall and Houck ap-
proached them, inquired where they. were going and were told
they were going for a ride. Wignall told them not to leave
because the officers wanted to look inside the house. Johnston
stated they better get a search warrant. The,two young
people went back into the Pinegar apartment. Houck left for
the purpose of getting a search warrant. Wignall returned to
the patrol car and reported to. Sergeant Grotewold.

The officers became suspicious of what had or could happen
and decided to go around and observe the opposite side of the
apartment building. As officers Wignall and Peel went around
the building they saw a window screen from the Alfred Pinegar
apartment on the ground. They also observed many foot-
prints in the snow leading south from the window.

The officers followed these footprints three-to four hundred
feet south and while searching around a large woodpile. near
another house they heard a noise which: caused them to throw
the light from their flashlights toward an outhouse. They there
saw defendant Neely who, in response to their inquiry of what
he was doing there, stated he was urinating. The fly of his
trousers was unzipped. Wignall then took defendant to his
patrol car where he was retained. He refused to answer any
question other than give his name,

Soon after Neely was placed in the patrol car Mr. and Mrs.
George Black drove up, parked and started toward the Alfred
Pinegar‘residence. They were known by some of the officers
as parents of Mrs. Pinegar. The Blacks were told if they
entered.the apartment they would not be permitted to leave
until after a search under a warrant was made. Mrs. Black
stated it would be all right for the officers to enter but they did
not do so until Mrs. Pinegar came to the door and specifically
consented to the officers’ entry. Mrs. Pinegar then turned on
the lights in her home and the officers entered.

On entering the Pinegar home the officers observed the
stolen safe near the door sitting on its top. A hole had been
broken through the bottom and cement fragments were on top

a a wt

of the safe and on the floor around it. There was an open tool
chest on the floor and a hammer on the safe. A fruit can full
of pennies was found on the davenport.

The two Pinegar brothers were later found hiding in
another house in Lamoni and a large amount of paper money
recovered. .

I. Defendant’s motion to suppress made before trial al-
leged the search of the Pinegar premises both in and outside of
the apartment was an illegal search and seizure and sought to
suppress all evidence related thereto. After an evidentiary
hearing the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. De-
fendant’s contentions were reasserted during the trial and in
his motion for new trial.

Hi On this appeal defendant makes no attack on the
evidence discovered by the officers following. Mrs. Pinegar’s
consent that they enter her apartment home. This is under-
standable as the rule is now well established that not all
searches and seizures undertaken without a warrant are un-
reasonable. The search and seizure of the apartment predi-
cated on the undisputed voluntary consent of Mrs. Pinegar
brings it under. an exception to the rule a search must rest
upon a search warrant. Our review of these principles and
supporting authority are set out in our recent-case of State v.
Halverson, 261 Iowa 530, 534, 155 N.W.2d 177, 179, 180, and
need not be repeated here.

IL. Defendant asserts the evidence discovered when the
officers went around to the opposite side of the apartment
building was obtained by. illegal search and seizure and there-
fore inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 648, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933. We. do not agree.

Cross-examination of Wignall by defendant’s counsel (noi
his present counsel) includes: “Q. Now; this would be a house
with a lot, would it be? Is there a lot and some outbuildings
that belong with the premises? This home of Alfred’s in
Lamoni, is it a house? Is there a lot that goés with it? A. -I
don’t know if the lot goes with it or not. Q. You don’t know
what part of it would be contiguous with the house or ‘not,
would you? A. No, I don’t know how it is laid out as‘property.

1112 es —

There is this building. It is a long, narrow one. I do know the
building is divided into two apartments, the one Al lives in,
and one right next to him east is vacant and I believe there is
two more. I am not positive of that, and then there is two or
three house trailers around there. Q. Did you search the out-
side of the house before you went in the house? A. Did I
search the inside of the house? Q. The outside. A. The out-
side of the house. I went around the house; yes. Q. Before
you went in? A. Oh, yes. Q. Did you ask Donna Pinegar if
you had a right to do that, if you had permission to do this?
A. No, I did not. Q. You didn’t know whether you were on
her house lot or not? A. I don’t know whose land it is. Q.
Did you see any activity or anything that might have led you
to believe somebody was trying to get away when you began
this search? A. As soon as Ronnie Johnston came walking up
and went into the house, we knew there was something up. I
figured that.” This is the extent of the proof of the officers’
location when they observed the window screen on the ground
and the footprints leading therefrom.

Thus it appears the evidence fails to establish the officers
were on the Pinegar premises when they went around the apart-
ment building in their effort to keep the rear aswell as the
front under surveillance until a search warrant was obtained.
They were aware Johnston, a suspect who knew a search of the
premises was to be made, had returned to the Pinegar apart-
ment. Good police work required his escape and disposition of
stolen property be prevented if possible.

HEM Protection accorded people by the Fourth Amend-
ment in their persons, houses and effects does not extend to
observations of open fields or grounds around a residence from
property not shown to be a part thereof. Monnette v. United
States, Cir. 5, 299 F.2d 847; United States v. Young, Cir. 4, 322
F.2d 448; United States v. Sorce, Cir. 7, 325 F.2d 84; United
States v. Romano, Cir. 2, 330 F.2d 566; United States v.
Sterling, 244 F.Supp. 534, affirmed, Cir. 3, 369 F.2d 799. The
observations made by officers Wignall and Peel did not con-
stitute an illegal search.

TI. If we were to assume arguendo the officers’ con-
duct constituted an unreasonable search and seizure, we are

a a 1118

not persuaded defendant Neely had standing to invoke the
claim. Defendant Neely, Johnston, Tom Pinegar and Barbara
Nelson went to the Alfred Pinegar apartment about 5 a.m.,
January 21, 1966, where they remained most of the day. While
there they were engaged in drinking and some of them, in-
cluding Neely, used drugs. That evening Neely, Johnston and
the Pinegar brothers left the apartment in Tom’s Ford, drove
around southern Iowa and northern Missouri, then returned to
Lamoni. Johnston as a witness for the State and Neely so
testified.

Johnston said the four then went to Redding where the
ear was parked in the Abarr station driveway, Tom broke the
door window and went inside while the other three remained
in the car; Johnston, with Neely, later entered the station while
Alfred stood guard. He described how the safe was torn from
the wall, loaded in the car, hauled by the four to the Alfred
Pinegar apartment in Lamoni where it was broken open.

Neely testified he and Alfred got out of the car in Lamoni
when the four returned to the town and he was trying to find
his way back to the Pinegar apartment when he was found at
the outhouse of the dwelling south of the Pinegar apartment.
Neither of the Pinegars testified.

Neely was not present on the premises at the time of the
claimed search outside the Pinegar apartment. His residence
was in Des Moines. He had-no interest in or right to use the
premises. He claimed no title or possessory right to any
property located thereon. Under these facts defendant Neely
had no standing to claim illegal search and seizure. See
Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194 A.2d 150, 153;
Diaz-Rosendo v, United States, Cir. 9, 357 F.2d 124, 181; United
States v. Bozza, Cir, 2, 365 F.2d 206, 223; United States v.
Beigel, Cir. 2, 370 F.2d 751, 756; Robinson v. State, Fla. App.,
194 So.2d 29, 31; Spinelli v. United States, Cir. 8, 382 F.2d 871,
879; Annotation, 78 A.L.R.2d 246,

IV. Defendant argues his motion for directed verdict at
the close of all the evidence and reasserted in his motion for
new trial should have been sustained since there was insufficient
evidence to connect him with the crime charged or to cor-
roborate the testimony of Ronald Johnston, an accomplice.

114 | |

Code section 782.5 provides: “A conviction cannot be had upon
the testimony of ani accomplice, unless corroborated by other
evidence which shall tend:to connect the defendant with the
commission. of the offense; and the corroboration is not suf-
ficient if it merely show the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.”

Application of this section and the general principles relat-
ing thereto. are reviewed in two recent cases, State v. Weaver,
259 Iowa 1369, 147 N.W.2d 47, 49, 50, and State v. Gill, 261
Towa 522, 526, 154 N.W.2d 722, 724, 725. We briefly note there-
from these applicable rules.

. Hi Whether there is corroborative evidence is a question
of law, but its sufficiency i is for the jury.
« [BM . The corroborating evidence may be either cireumstan-
tial or “Greet and.need not be of every material fact- testified
to by the accomplice.

HM The evidence adduced to corroborate an accompli¢e
need not be strong, and any evidence legitimately tending to
connect the accused with.the commission.of the crime and
thereby lend support to the credibility ‘of the. accomplice is
sufficient.

There may be a combination of circumstances which entitle
the jury. to reach the conclusion they: corroborate the accom-
plice’s testimony.

‘When considering the: sufficiency of the evidence to meet
the requirements of section. 782.5 each dase must be judged on
its own facts.

El. As before pointed out, the evidence is undisputed de
fendant was an occupant of Tom-Pinegar’s 1955 Ford from Des
Moines to the apartment and: later in southern Iowa, northern
Missouri and back in Lamoni a very short time before ‘the
break-in. The witness who saw the car in ‘Abarr’s driveway
testified there were three persons in it. This is consistent with
Jobnston’s testimony Tom Pinegar went in first while the other
three remained in the car. Shortly thereafter that car was
parked near the Pinegar apartment where defendant had
earlier entered it. Defendant was found within three to four
hundred feet from the car and the stolen safe.

SS 1115

We must agree with the trial court’s conclusion the cor-
roborative evidence was such to require submission of the
question of its sufficiency to the jury.

We find no reversible error and are convinced defendant had
a fair trial —Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Raw.ines, J., who concurs in
the result.

Gary VAN AzRNAM, appellant, v. Cart NIELSEN, appellee.

No. 52794,
(Reported in 157 N.W.24 188)

Maron 5, 1968,

David E, Green and James Furey, both of Carroll, for ap-
pellant.

Taylor & Taylor, of Guthrie Center, for appellee.

Mason, J.—The accident out of which this law action arose
occurred about 5:30 p.m. November 16, 1964, on defendant
Carl Nielsen’s farm in Audubon County wheri plaintiff Gary
Van Aernam’s left hand and leg became caught in the rollers
of defendant’s mounted corn picking unit. Plaintiff was de-
fendant’s employee at the time of his injuries for which he
séeks damages.

Plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent in failing to have

ee 17

mud scrapers on the corn picking unit; failing to maintain
safe machinery and appliances for plaintiff; failing to furnish
plaintiff a safe place to work or safe premises to work on;
allowing plaintiff to operate the corn picker when defendant
knew the area where he had ordered plaintiff to pick corn was
wet, muddy and hazardous and the picking unit was not
operating properly; furnishing plaintiff with old, obsolete and
dangerous machinery which was not suitable for picking corn;
and failing to advise or warn plaintiff that the contoured field
was too wet to pick corn.

By these specifications of negligence plaintiff in effect
asserts defendant’s conduct constituted a breach of his duty to
(1) provide plaintiff with a safe place to work and (2) use
reasonable care to provide and maintain for plaintiff reasonably
suitable and safe appliances, machinery and tools with which
to work.

At the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence to the jury, de-
fendant’s motion for a directed verdict on all grounds urged
was sustained and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment
entered on the verdict.

I, He assigns as error relied upon for reversal (1) sus-
taining of defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the
ground that (a) plaintiff failed to show a breach of duty owed
by defendant, (b) plaintiff failed to show defendant’s conduct
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and (ce) as a
matter of law plaintiff assumed the risk which caused his in-
juries; and (2) error in ruling on objections to plaintiff’s
evidence.

IL. In Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 295, 100 N.W.2d
624, 627, in referring to the extent of defendant’s duty in such
cases we said:

Hi “Tt is a settled rule that an employer must use reason-
able care to provide and maintain for his employees reasonably
suitable and safe appliances, machinery and tools with which
to work.” See also Kregel v. Kann, 260 Iowa 1330, 1888, 152
N.W.2d 534, 586, and citations, where we said:

“However, the employer is not an insurer of the safety of
the tools, machinery or appliances, nor of the safety of the

1118 es —

employee in using the instrumentalities furnished but is only
liable for negligence [citing authorities].

“The employer must exercise reasonable care to climinate
dangers which are not the usual or ordinary incidents of the
service when he has exercised such care” (citing authorities).
"In determining whether the employer exercised reason-
able care there is no absolute standard to which his conduct
must conform. The law requires the employer in the per-
formance -of his duty to exercise that degree of care which a
person of ordinary care and prudence would use under the
same or similar circumstances. Although the employer's: duty
is to exercise reasonable care: whether the work is compara-
tively safe or extremely dangerous, the duty becomes more im-
perative as the risk increases. Kregel v. Kann, supra, 260 Iowa
at: 1837, 152 N.W.2d at 587-538,

III. With these principles in mind we consider the pro-
priety of defendant’s motion for directed verdict, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable'to the party against whom:
the motion was made. ° Rule 844(£) (2), Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.

The day before the accident it had rained, it was wet’ and
foggy that-night and muddy the next morning. The farm lot
yards and the field where the accident oceurred were wet and
muddy. Plaintiff and defendant spent the morning working
around ‘the farmyard. After dinner defendant told plaintiff
to start picking corn. The area in which he was to pick was
on a contoured hillside, mostly clay. Plaintiff started picking
corn about 2 p.m. using defendant’s two-row corn picker which
was about a,1950 model mounted on a later model diesel
tractor, although the tractor itself was approximately 10 years
old. The tractor did not have wheel cleaners on it. We are
told wheel scrapers or mud cleaners are piéces of iron that sit
flat between the front wheels, come out, split and go aiound
the front: wheels. Their purpose is to scrape the mud off the
wheels so they do not slide, enabling you to guide ‘the tractor. -

In the fall and winter of 1963 and spring, summer and fall
of 1964, plaintiff and defendant discussed the need for mud
scrapers. < ~ ah

ee nis

The front wheels of this model tractor were.set closely to-
gether. When used in mud without scrapers, these wheels had
a tendency to clog and slide, making it difficult to steer, con-
trol and operate the unit on the corn rows. The center divider
of the picker which hooked on the hubs of the front wheels was
off. As a result, mud from the wheels was pushed up against
and filled the picker snoots. These were pushed down and had
to be cleaned.

As the wheels became clogged, the operator, in an effort
to dislodge the mud, would reverse the tractor, back up and
then go forward. If not successful, this maneuver had to be
repeated. Then if this failed it was necessary for the operator
to get off the machine and dig the mud from the, front wheels
with his hands. Of course, this required him to stop the tractor,
get off, walk around the picker, unhook the chain that raised
the snoot, pinch two clips if they were not bound tight and
remove the snoot. Otherwise, a flap had to be pulled out and
the mud dug from the clips so they. could be squeezed together,
the snoot removed and the mud pulled out. The operator would
then replace the snoots; walk-around the machine, put every-
thing in gear and attempt to go forward again for a short time.

The morning of the accident plaintiff and defendant talked
about the need for. mud scrapers, at dinner they talked about
the matter again. Defendant said-they were needed. Plain-
tiff says he got the impression defendant might get mud
scrapers after dinner when he took a load of hogs. into town.
After defendant returned from town, the parties again talked
about ‘the need for the scrapers at -the midafternoon lunch
period. Plaintiff explained to defendant that he had been .going
backwards: and forwards, getting off:and cleaning out the mud.
and getting back on and repeating the same thing over and
over all afternoon. |

About 4:30 defendant came to the field where plaintiff was
picking, mentioned observing the spots where plaintiff had
stopped to dig out-mud and the: areas where the wheels had
been sliding... He said if they had mud scrapers, they would
not be having. the trouble experienced. Defendant, called as
plaintiff’s witness, testified he recalled plaintiff mentioned

1120 es

three times on the day of the accident the difficulty he was
having picking corn.

Plaintiff says from the time he started picking until the
accident, he had gotten off the tractor 12-14 times, maybe more,
to clean the wheels. Five or six of those times occurred during
the hour before the accident.

Plaintiff had had trouble with mud balling up on the front
wheels in the spring of 1964.

Defendant had purchased the picker in September or
October of 1964 from a neighbor. At the time it was located
by the side of the neighbor’s driveway and had not been used
for five or six years. As it was being mounted on the tractor,
plaintiff observed some chains, sprockets and bolts were miss-
ing. It was badly rusted and described as an old, obsolete unit.
The chains that were there were thickly rusted, had to be
soaked in oil and kerosine to free them so they would work. It
was necessary to weld the picker in several cracked spots,
bearings had to be freed and bolts ‘replaced.

After defendant got the picker and started picking corn,
they had mechanical troubles almost everyday which required
making repairs. Defendant bought another picker of the same
model from another neighbor’s junk pile, taking parts off this
picker to repair the mounted picker. Most of the time defend~-
ant helped make the repairs. .

The shut-off unit which controls the movement of the pick-
ing rollers on this model picker was described as the “meanest
one there ever was to shut off.” As we understand the record,
there are two switches on this mounted unit. One, similar to
that of an automobile, starts and stops the diesel engine, the
other is a power take-off type for control of the picking rollers,
This shut-off lever was homemade by plaintiff and defendant
consisting of a rod running from back by the clutch under the
steering wheel through a plate to a lever located farther for-
ward that hooks on to the belt pulley and operates the power
for the picking rollers. Its purpose is to enable the operator to
shut off the picking unit separately from the tractor. One
witness testified it was not a good practice to turn the diesel
engine on and off.

Plaintiff testified he told defendant both at the lunch

SS 1121

period and when defendant came to the field about an hour
before the accident that he was having trouble with the shut-
off lever on the picker. It would stick, bind and hold and
would not push off like it should. Plaintiff said defendant did
not tell him to quit picking corn.

Immediately before getting caught in the picker, plaintiff
was going around the field when the wheels started balling up.
He backed up and went ahead but did not free the wheels of
mud. He attempted to disengage the rollers but could not get
the rod pushed through the plate to the shut-off lever. He got
off the tractor; walked around to the front, as it was the snoot,
not the rollers, that was causing the trouble. He pulled the
flap out, being unable to squeeze the clips, and with his left
hand took ahold of a handful of mud which was packed tightly
with cornstalks and foxtail, gave it a tug, the mud came loose
suddenly and his hand went into the picker, jerking off his left
arm. After plaintiff had been caught in the picker, he reached
up with his right hand where the rod runs from the tractor to
the belt pulley, got ahold of a lever which sticks up and pulled
it forward to stop the power unit, something | he was unable to
do from his seat on the tractor.

The substance of defendant’s contention seems to be that
no liability attaches from any remission of duty on his part
because plaintiff’s injuries did not stem therefrom but from
plaintiff's own conduct in dismounting from the tractor and
attempting to clean the mud from between the wheels without
shutting off the machinery.

It was, of course, plaintift’s burden to establish that defend-
ant failed to exercise the care imposed upon him. The ground
of defendant’s liability is not danger but negligence.

HI IV. Our function in review is to examine the evidence
to determine, not whether it proves defendant guilty of negli-
gence in failing to exercise reasonable care to provide and
maintain for-his employee reasonably suitable and safe ap-
pliances, machinery and tools with which to work, but whether
it makes a sufficient showing so that the trial court would be
warranted in submitting the question to the jury and the jury
in the exercise of its function as the-trier of the facts be

1122 Le a

justified in finding defendant negligent. Kregel v. Kann, supra,
260 Iowa at 1836, 152 N.W.2d at 538, and citations.

In his motion for directed verdict defendant asserts
the record has no reference to any defective equipment which
was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries but only a lack
of equipment, to wit: mud scrapers. We do not agree with
defendant’s contention. There is evidence in. the record that
the shut-off lever for shutting off the corn picker was. homé-
made and would not disengage properly at the time of plain-
tiff’s injuries and would not allow the operator of the tractor
to shut off the picker from the tractor seat. We believe this
would be material and relevant for a jury to consider in de-
termining whether defendant failed to exercise the care im-
posed upon him. This contention of plaintiff assumes ad-
ditional.importance in view of defendant’s knowledge of the
frequency with which plaintiff was required-to stop the machine
because of the lack of mud scrapers while the unit was being
operated in the.field described. ote

- There was sufficient. evidence to generate a jury question
on the i issue whether defendant breached a duty owed plaintiff.

V. The same conclusion is true_as to plaintiff’s contention
defendant owed. him a duty. to provide a safe place to work.
This is an obligation on the master to furnish the servant with
a safe place to work. It is both statutory and by judicial
pronouncement. Erickson v. Erickson, 250 Iowa 491, 498, 94
N.W.2d 728, 732. ‘See algo section 88.14, Iowa Codes, 1962 and
1966.

In O’Reagan v. Daniels, 241 Iowa 1199, 1205-1206, 44
N.W.2d 666, 669, we said:

“Tt is a rule of common law and has been the settled rule
of this court that the master or employer must use reasonable
eare and diligence to provide and maintain a reasonably safe
place for his employees to work * * * .”

The issue should have been submitted to the jury for its
determination.

VI. In Frederick v. Goff, 251 Towa 290, 298-299, 100
N.W.2d 624, 629, in defining proximate cause, we quoted the
following from Restatement, Second, Torts, section 431:

SC 1128

“The actor’s negligent-eonduet is a legal cause of harm to
another if

“(a) his conduet isa substantial factor in briiging about
the harm, and

“(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from lia-
bility because of the manner in which his negligence has re-
sulted in the harm.”

‘We have repeated this definition in several recent cases.

_., Generally questions of negligence, contributory negligence,

and proximate cause are for the jury; it is only in exceptional
eases that they may be decided as matters of law. Rule
844(f£)(10), R.C.P. This is not the exceptional case.

Without repeating, we’ refer ‘to what was said on the
subject of proximate ¢dtise in Frederick v. Goff, supra, 251
Towa commencing at 297, 100 N.W.2d commencing at 628,

Hi VIL. Assumption ‘of risk is an affirmative defense and
the burden to prove it rested upon defendant. .We do not
believe assumption of risk appears as a matter.of law. It is
seldom a party who has the burden on such issue establishes it
as a matter of law. - The issue should have been’ submitted to
the jury. Frederick v. Goff, supra.

: "Vill. In view of the necessity of a new trial in this
matter we call attention-to the court’s ruling on the hypo-
thetical question asked Clarence Van Aefnam. Counsel who
objects to a hypothetical question should advise the court in
what respect it fails to state the record properly and may not
rely ‘upon a general objection. ‘Kunzman y. Cherokee Silo Co.,
253 Iowa 885, 898, 114 N.W.2d 534, 539, 95 AL.R2d 673;
Crozier v. Lenox Mutual Ins. Assn., 252 Iowa 1176, 1183, 110
N.W.2d 403, 407.

The trial court in sustaining defendant’s motion for
directed verdict put great reliance upon Wagner v. . Larson,
257 Towa 1202, 186 N.W.2d°312. We believe the court mis-
interpreted our holding in that case. A defect in design of
farm implements was there involved. Here the issue was
whether defendant exercised reasonable care to provide and
maintain for his employee reasonably suitable and safe ap-
pliances with which to work. In view of this distinction
Wagner v. Larson is not in point.

1124 — a

TX. With directions to the trial court to set aside the
judgment entered on the directed verdict and grant plaintiff a
new trial, the case is—Reversed and remanded.

All Justices concur,

Marianne Van Camp, plaintiff-appellant, v. Mark MoAroos
et al., defendants-appellees.

No. 52841,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 878)

Marcu 5, 1968,

Carl W. Schultz, of Davenport, for appellant.

Lane & Waterman, of Davenport, for appellees,

Brcxer, J.—This' case comes to us on appeal from trial
eourt’s action in sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss. We
are therefore limited to what can be gleaned from the plead-
ings. .

In Division I of her petition plaintiff sues Mark MeAfoos
alleging in pertinent part, “That at said time and place defend-
ant Mark MecAfoos was operating a tricycle on said public
sidewalk, and drove the tricycle into the rear of the plaintiff
without warning, striking the right leg of the plaintiff thereby
causing an injury to the Achilles’ tendon of that leg.

““That as a direct and proximate cause of this defendant’s
action, plaintiffs tendon was injured and subsequently re-
quired surgery * * * .” .

Division I does not reveal Mark’s age but Division II
alleges he was three years one month old at the time of the
incident. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition urging it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, fails to
allege negligence and because of the Division II allegation that
defendant is only three years one month old he is non sui juris
as a matter of law.

Division II is directed against Patricia R. MeAfoos and

1126 ee a

William C. MeAfoos, Mark’s parents. — The pertinent allega-
tions are:

“That the defendants William ©. McAfoos and Patricia R.
McAfoos are the parents of Mark McAfoos, who was at’ all
times material a minor, age three years and one month. That,
the said Mark McAfoos was in the custody of his parents. That
at the time complained of, the parties had given control of
Mark ‘to ‘a baby-sitter: “The defendants William C. MeAfoos
and Patricia R: MeAfoos furnished a tricycle to Mark McAfoos
for play‘purposes and knew or should have known that Mark
had a propensity for riding the same upon or near the public
sidewalk so- as to create an unreasonable risk of harin to the
users of the sidewalk.

“That the defendants knew or should have known of the
risk of harm to others arid had a duty to warn the baby-sitter
and diréct her to exercise proper control of. the-child during
the play with the tricycle.

“That the defendants failed to instruct the baby-sitter in
violation, of the duty aforesaid and that such failure and breach
of duty is negligence.

“That the negligence of the defendants was the proximate
cause of the injury and damage to the Plaintiff.” .

Defendants-parents:‘moved to dismiss Division II on assert-
ing the division fails to state a claim upon which relief can-be
granted and: “Defendants, William C. MeAfoos and Patricia R.
McAfoos, cannot be held liable to plaintiff as a matter of law
because of any alleged propensity on the part of their.three-
year-old child to ride a tricycle.upon or near a public sidewalk.
A tricycle is not in and of itself a, dangerous: instrumentality
and the conduct of the minor defendant was not of such stature
as to impose a duty on the.part of the defendants-parents to
warn a baby-sitter to direct and exercise proper control over
the child while playing with the tricycle.”

The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss as to
Division I stating in part, “It is not alleged that the defendant
was negligent. It is not alleged that the action of the defend-
ant was willful or wrongful in any manner. Under these cir-
cumstances it is difficult to see how the Division as now set out
states any basis. upon which the plaintiff could recover.”

27

’ The court’ sustained the motion to dismiss as to Division II
stating in-essence that the allegation of negligence in failing to
warn the baby-sitter of their minor son’s propensity to ride his
tricycle at or near the public sidewalk and to direct her to ex-
ercise proper control over him is not sufficient, standing alone,
to charge actionable négligence. The court noted plaintiff’s
allegation that the parents knew or should have known the
propensity involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others.

The question presented is, did plaintiff plead a cause of
action in either division? We first address ourselves to plaintiff’s
right to remain.in court under the allegations in Division I in
absence of alleged facts from which the inference of wrongful
action of some kind ean be drawn, 3.

I. Plaintiffs sole assignment of error as to Division Lis
“The trial court erred in failing to:récognize categories of tort
liability other than negligence, in evaluating the pleading in
plaintiff's first division.”

[EB Plaintiff states her petition contains the following ‘ulti
mate facts (1) she was rightfully using the publie sidewalk
(and thus had a right to the reasonably free use thereof and'to
remain uninjured during such use); (2) defendant used his
tricycle on the public sidewalk (and thus had a duty to use the
same without injurious interference-with others), (3) surprise
intrusion of the tricycle into.the right rear ankle of plaintiff
(thus interfering with plaintiff’s-right .and stating defendant
activated the mechanism causing the injury) and (4) damage
resulted from thé intrusion. ‘She stands firmly on the proposi-
tion that ‘invasion of her person is in’ itself a ‘wrong and: she
need pledd:no.more. We do not-agree.

The extent. of plaintiff’s .allegations -were: deliberately
limited to those heretofore set forth and she so-states. She
therefore poses ‘our problem independent of Mark’s age. “The
trial court responded in kind and :entered judgment on the
pleadings without regard to the known allegation in. Division
w that Mark was three years one month-old. .

-In‘essence‘plaintiff urges a person has a right not 1 to be
injuriously touched or struck as she lawfully uses a public
sidewalk. She was injuriously struck by Mark..: ‘Therefore
Mark is liable. She argues that no more need be pleaded. It

1128 Ee a

follows that no more need be.proved in order to justify sub-
mission of-the case. Plaintiff’s posture satisfies us she would
have us impose liability without fault. We are not prepared to
extend this concept to childish acts (by children).

IL. Plaintiff's reply brief states: “If the absence of a
single’ word or conclusory label remains the sine qua non of plead-
ing a valid cause of action, we have restored today’s juris-
prudence to the specious procedural formalism of the 18th
Century common courts.”

: We are aware of the general rules of pleading summarized
in Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 319, 188 N.W.2d
856, 860: .

“Where a doubtful pleading is directly attacked by motion

before issue is joined or in the answer as permitted by rule 72,
Rules of Civil Procedure, it will be resolved against the pleader.
[Cases cited.] If, however, the petition does allege ultimate
facts upon which plaintiff might recover and states a claim
under which evidence may be introduced in support thereof, or
if attack is delayed, the petition should be construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff with doubts resolved in his
favor and the allegations accepted as true. [Cases cited.]
. [| “A motion to dismiss is sustainable only where it ap-
pears to a certainty a plaintiff would not be entitled to any
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claims asserted by him. Newton v. City of Grundy
Center, supra.”

To these rules we would add a quotation from Cuthbertson
v. Harter Post No. 889, 245 Iowa 922, 929, 65 N.W.2d 83: “The
issue of a lawsuit should be presented in an open and forthright
manner. There is no justification for a pleading by innuendo
in our procedure.”

The trial court’s ruling was not a return to legal for-
malism. Plaintiff makes it abundantly clear she insists on a right
to recovery by proof of an accident caused by another, in-
dependent of fault or wrongdoing. Where an essential ele-
ment of the cause of action is missing, the question is not what
may be shown under the pleading but whether a cause of action
has been pled.

Pe Le 1129

HE Rule of Civil Procedure No. 70 provides: “The petition
shall state whether it is at law or in equity, the facts con-
stituting the cause or causes of action asserted, the relief de-
manded, and, if for money, the amount thereof.” In order to
plead a cause of action the pleader must allege ultimate facts
from which the fact finder can conelude the essential elements
of the cause are present. We agree the conclusion itself need
not necessarily be pled if the ultimate facts are contained in
the pleading

Here no ultimate facts giving rise to the concept of wrongful
action are pled. Plaintiff insists they need not be set forth. In
her reply she poses the question in stark terms. “Any social or
public policy decision involves a collision of rights. Which
right merits judicial recognition? The right of a pedestrian
to walk uninjured upon a public sidewalk, or the right of a
child to propel a tricycle upon that public sidewalk to the in-
jury of that pedestrian? As.a matter of public policy, which
right is more valuable?” .

-Faced with this choice of social policy, we hold liability
will not be imposed for use of a tricycle on a publie sidewalk
without a showing (and thus a pleading) of some fault: Unless
and until we are ready to recognize liability without fault for
otherwise innocent childish actions, fault must be discernible
in, the pleading and in proof. No statute or ordinance. is cited
prohibiting use of a tricycle on a publie sidewalk.. Inten-
tionally wrongful or-negligently wrongful use of the tricycle is
neither pled nor can it be made out from the bare allegation
defendant “operated a tricycle on said public sidewalk and
drove the tricycle into the rear of the plaintiff without warn-
ing.” That some fault element is necessary would seem clear
from the cases collected at 67 A.L.R.2d 570 et seq.

., IIL. Plaintiff cites many cases from other jurisdictions
holding a child of tender years may be liable in tort for in-
jurious conduct resulting in trespass to the person. Keel v,
Hainline, Okla., 331 P.2d 397; Baldinger v. Banks, 26 Mise.2d
1086, 201 N.Y.S.2d 629; Zuckerbrod v. Burch, 88 N. J. Super,

1 For early discussion of need for pleading sufficient facts showing the pleader

is entitled to’ relief under federal rules (which appear broader than ours) see:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Pleadings, Motions, Parties and Pre-trial Pro-
cedure, 1 Federal Rules Decisions, $15; Simplified Pleading, 2 Federal Rules De-
cisions,

1180 |

1, 210 A.2d 425; Brown v. Dellinger, Tex. Civ. App., 355 8.W:2d
7142; Jorgensen v..Nudelman, 45 Ill. App.2d 350, 195 N.H.2d 422;
Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App.2d 687, 301 P.2d 440; Ellis v.
D’Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 810, 253 P.2d 675; Garratt v. Dailey,
46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091.2 All of the foregoing cases
involve the fault concept. Many turn on the question of
whether the child could be guilty of the fault charged but each
case has fault as one of the essential elements of liability. We
need not disagree with those authorities. Whatever her motive,
plaintiff has chosen to plead in such a way as to avoid bringing
herself-within the scope of those cases,

52 Am. Jur., Torts, section 2, page 362, defines tort as
follows: “Definitions and Distinctions—A tort is sometimes de:
fined as a wrong independent of contract, or as a breach of
duty which the law, as distinguished from a mere contract, has
imposed. Generally speaking, a tort is a wrong, and a tortious .
act is a wrongful act. -A tortious act has also been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
person, property, or ‘Teputation. ”” See 86 C.J.S., Torts, section
1, page 922,

Restatement, Second, Torts, does not attempt to. define a
tort but gives'a broad and useful definition of tortious conduct
at section 6. “The word ‘tortious’ is used throughout the Re-
statement of this Subject. to denote the fact- that conduct
whether of act or omission is of such a character as to subject
the-actor. to liability under ‘the principles of the law of Torts.”

The Restatement ‘definition is broad’ enough to include
strict liability without fault. Absent ultimate fact allegations
bringing plaintiff’s case within that exception a cause of action
in tort is not stated in the pleadings, .

- IV. Much of what has been said in Division I is applicable
to Division II.
Restatement, Second, | Bont section 316, provides: “A

Rev, Vel, XXVUL, No. 2,

‘Negligent in ¥: to Restrain ‘Case
Comments, 64, Wl. Va. 1. Rev. 354. No. 3 ApH T96as Tests ot iopiity of Parent for
the Tortious: Acts of Minor Children—Amount of Control required to Support the
Parent's Hiapiliy, 16 Ala, be Revs Fall 1968.

Pe Pe 1131

parent is-under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has
reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising-such control.”

| The litigants seem to’ agree the above section from
Restatement, Torts, states the applicable law. - We have not
passed on the matter. Cases from other jurisdiction will be
noted, infra. They disagree on the applicability of the pleaded
facts to thelaw. Again, defendant points to petitioner’s failure
to allege any facts indicating the parents knew or should have
known theii child was prone to use his tricycle in an unusual,
intentionally harmful or other wrongful manner. Defendant
argues this failure leaves the proposition that normal use of a
tricycle is so apt to cause an unreasonable danger of harm to
others that defendants-parents-had a duty to especially caution
the baby-sitter to watch and control the child while he rode
his tricycle. We agree this is the effect of plaintiff’s plea. We
also agree this does not state a-cause of action.
‘Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal.App.2d 687, 644, 301 P.2d 440, 444,
considers a case where a nine-year-old boy threw a rock at one
companion but struck another ‘companion unintentionally. The
Galifornia court said:

“The propriety of the like ruling in favor of the parents
turns upon whether there was substantial proof of negligence on
their part in failing to perform the duty of exercising reason-
able control over a child known to possess-and exercise dangerous
proclivities toward other people. Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., page
681, states the matter thus: ‘But beyond this, the parent has a
special power of control over the conduct of the child, which he
is under a duty to exercise reasonably for the protection of
others. He may thus be liable for a failure to take the gun
away from the child when he finds him with it, or to make
reasonable efforts to restrain and correct him when he manifests
a tendency to beat other children with a stick, or to shoot at
horses in the street. Probably, however, the effect of the decided
eases is that there is no liability upon the parent unless he has

1182 Ee —

had an opportunity to correct a specific propensity on the part of
the child, and that it is too much to hold the parent responsible
for general incorrigibility and a bad disposition. He may, how-
ever, be under a duty to warn others who may suffer from such
characteristics.’” (Emphasis added.)

We have carefully considered all of the cases cited by plain-
tiff as well as those cited by defendants. The universal rule
seems to require a propensity on the part of the child to act
wrongfully and facts indicating the parents knew or should have
known of such propensity.

Neither essential element is pleaded by plaintiff. She does,
not aver that Mark’s tricycle riding was wrongful in any way;
only that tricycle riding on the sidewalk creates an unreasonable
risk of harm to other users of the sidewalk. We are unwilling
to say a three-year-old child’s propensity for riding a tricycle on
a public sidewalk creates, without more, such an unreasonable
risk of harm to others as to require reasonable parents to take
special precautions, such as special warnings to a baby-sitter.

The parents’ knowledge that Mark rode his trike on the
sidewalk, would not help plaintiff unless the parents-knew or
should have known of some unusually dangerous. activities or
propensities of the child while engaged in such activity, Of
course, if abnormal use of the tricycle constituting unreasonable
risk of harm to others is involved, we have a different question,
We need not consider that question because plaintiff did not
plead facts giving rise to it. _

We cannot equate a three-year-old tricyelist on a public
sidewalk with. a six-year-old child shooting at a target in the
street with a .22 caliber rifle, example used in Restatement,
Second, Torts, section 816, page 124; or with a nine-year-old boy
throwing a rock at another, Singer v. Marx, supra (and had been
known for his rock throwing activities with proven complaints to
the mother) ; or with bow and arrow in the hands of a three-year-
old boy, Connor v. Houtman, Okla., 350 P.2d 311 (where liability
was denied) ; or with an air rifle in the hands of a nine-year-old
boy who had previously shot at other people, Lane v. Chatham,
251 N. C. 400, 111 S, E.2d 598; or with those cases where the
child had a known propensity to hit, shove or fight with others

1183

and finally caused an injury resulting in a lawsuit; Ellis v.
D’ Angelo, 253 P.2d 675, and cases cited therein at 679.— Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except LeGranp, J., who takes no part.

State or Iowa, appellee, v. Auviy Leon Witiiams, appellant.

No. 52489.
(Reported in 155 N.W.2d 526)

11s a
ee ©
© Tawvany 9, 1968.

Reprarine DENrED Apem, 8, 1968,

Anthony M. Critelli, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A, Elderkin,
Assistant- Attorney General, and Ray A. Fenton, Polk County
Attorney, of Des Moines, for appellee. ~

Garvmip, C.J.—Defendant Alvin Leoti Williams was in-
dicted for robbery with aggravation as defined in sections 711.1
and 711.2, Code 1962, in that he robbed Leonard Walvatne, with
confederates aiding and abetting him in such robbery who were
armed with a dangerous weapon with intent, if resisted, to kill
or maim .Walvatne. Trial resulted in jury.: verdict of guilty.
From judgment thereon defendant -has appealed, assigning as
error the refusal of two jury instructions requestéd by him, °

The first request stated a verdict of guilty as charged re-
quired a'finding defendant knew of ‘his principals’ intent to use
a dangerous ‘weapon and their intent to kill or maim Walvatne, if
resisted. Under the ‘request, “failure to so find would prevent a
verdict. of guilty. of more than robbery without. aggravation
under section 711.1.

-Defendant’s second request was that the State’s failure to
call as witnesses three police officers, the minutes of whose testi-
mony before the grand jury’ were attached to the indictment,
justified an inference their testimony, it given, would have ‘been
detrimental tothe State.

We find ‘no teversible™ error in the tefusal of either or both
requests.

I. No extended review v of the evidence is necessary. it was
not claimed or shown defendant committed the robbery alone or

Ye a 135

unassisted. The State’s claim was, and there was substantial
evidence thereof, defendant “set up” or “master-minded” the
robbery, actually perpetrated by one or more occupants of an
automobile with whom defendant arranged to follow the car
driven by him, in which the victim was a passenger, to the place
where the crime was committed. We refer to the evidence as the
jury could have found the facts,

Defendant was an acquaintance and supposedly a friend
of the victim. July 12, 1966, was payday for Walvatne. He
chose to spend the late afternoon and late evening at different
taverns consuming an indiscreet quantity of beer. About ten
he left home, filled his car with gas, and went to a tavern at
East Seventeenth and University in Des Moines where he met
defendant. They had about five beers there and around twelve
Walvatne drove defendant in the former's car to another drink-
ing place on Center Street on Des Moines’ west side.

Around one, or later, at defendant’s suggestion, the two
left the Center Street tavern to return to the one ‘on East
‘Seventeenth where defendant’s car was parked. At his request
he drove ‘Walvatne’s car on this return trip, followed by the
automobile occupied by the four actual perpetrators of ‘the
robbery. Defendant stopped Walvatne’s car a few minutes soon
after leaving Center Street, told-Walvatne he wanted to see
someone, and went back to-caution the-perpetrators against
following defendant and the intended victim too closely and
not to rob him until defendant had gotten his car and dis-
appeared.

The two acquaintances then resumed their trip to the
parking lot near the Seventeenth Street tavern where ‘de-
fendant stopped Walvatne’s car, went to his own and drove
away.: Soon after Walvatne moved over into the driver's side
of the séat to drive home, one of the four pursuers thrust a 32
ealiber pistol in his face with the evident intent of robbing him
of his money. (He had about $70 in his billfold.) When
Walvatne asked “What’s going on ?”, thinking it was all a joke,
one of his assailants opened the car door; another grabbed him
by theshoulder and, with the gun, beat him over the‘head into
unconsciousness. When he “came to” in a ‘hospital ‘he -was
badly beaten up and his billfold and contents were gone.

1136 es

Later that same night the automobile containing the four
men who trailed Walvatne to the scene of the robbery was
stopped by police officers and the four were taken into custody.
With the consent of the owner-driver of the car it was searched
and Walvatne’s billfold, the .32 caliber pistol, a bloodstained
pair of white “levis” worn by Clement, who administered the
beating and robbed the victim, and nine dollar bills were found.
About 6 a.m. defendant was arrested at his home for his part
in the robbery.

As the only defense witness he denied complicity in the
robbery but admitted beg with Walvatne at the east side
tavern, going with him to the one on Center Street, talking to
Clement there, in answer to Clement’s question, telling him
where his (defendant’s) ear was parked, driving Walvatne in
his car back to the east side tavern, getting in his (defend-
ant’s) car and driving off about 2 a.m.

TI. We consider now the refusal of the first requested
instruction mentioned at the outset. Paragraph four of In-
struction 8 to the jury required a finding that defendant, or
those aided and abetted by him, in stealing the money were
armed with a revolver with intent to kill or maim Walvatne if
he resisted the stealing. As stated, the request was that de-
fendant must have known of his principals’ intent to use a
dangerous weapon and their intent to kill or maim Walvatne,
if resisted. .

Instruction 7 contained the provisions of section 688.1,
Codes 1962, 1966, abrogating the distinction between an acces-
sory before the fact and a principal and requiring that all
persons concerned in committing an offense, whether they
directly commit the act or aid and abet its commission, though
not present, be indicted, tried and convicted as principals. The
instruction went on to state that guilt of one who aids and
abets commission of a crime must be determined upon the
facts showing the part he had in it and not upon the degree of
another’s guilt.

One sufficient answer to the complaint over refusal of
defendant’s first request is found in the terms of section 711.2
he was charged with violating. Under this statute robbery with

| Pe 1137

aggravation may be committed in any of three ways: (1) by
being “armed with a dangerous weapon, with intent, if resisted,
to kill or maim the person robbed; or (2) if, being so armed,
he wound or strike the person robbed; or (8) if he has any con-
federate aiding or abetting him in such robbery, present and so
armed, * * *,” (Emphasis added.)

| | As indicated at the outset, the indictment charges
defendant committed the crime in the third of these ways.
There is no claim this portion of section 711.2 violates any con-
stitutional provision or is otherwise invalid. There is sub-
stantial evidence defendant violated the part of the statute we
have italicized. The court thus properly instructed the jury to
return a guilty verdict if it found the persons he was aiding and
abetting in stealing the money from Walvatne, by force and
violence or by putting him in fear, were armed with a revolver
with intent, if resisted, to kill or maim him.

Ill. We have considered the authorities defendant cites
to support this claim of error and are not persuaded by them or
by the applicable authorities generally.

77 C.J.S., Robbery, section 32b, page 471, states “Under
statutes classifying robbery in accordance with its commission
with a dangerous weapon with intent to kill or maim, if
resisted, an absent person may be liable for robbery of such
classification without proof that he participated in the intent
to kill or maim.”

Killingsworth v. State, 90 Fla. 299, 311-312, 105 So. 834,
838-839, is directly in point as shown by these excerpts from
the opinion:

“The information charges that the principals, when com-
mitting the robbery, were armed with pistols with intent, if
resisted, to kill and maim Alonzo C. Clewis. Counsel contend
that before the defendant, who was charged as accessory before
the fact, could be convicted as charged, the State should prove
that he had a like intent. A charge to that effect was requested
and denied. The ruling is the basis for the twentieth assign-
ment of error. * * *,

« * ® to render one guilty as an accessory before the fact,
he must have had the requisite criminal intent, but he need not
necessarily have intended the particular crime committed by

1198: es

the principal. An accessory is liable for any criminal act
which, in the ordinary course of things, was the natural or
probable consequence of the crime he advised or commarided,
although such consequence may not have been intended by him.
But for crimes which are the outcome of a total or substantial
departure from his directions -or instructions he is not
liable. * * *

“The use of deadly weapons or the use of force or putting
the victim in fear is a natural or probable consequence’ of the
erime of robbery. The requisite criminal intent is.the felonious
taking from another of his money or property. * * *

“The accessory before the fact is necessarily a conspirator
with the actual perpetrators of the offense because he dis:
eusses the commission of the offense with them, helps in their
plans, counsels and procures its commission; he is, therefore,
equally liable for the acts of his associates.”.

As said in State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630, 635, 118 New.2d
548, 551, “Robbery is an offense involving violence or the
threat of violence.” And as Killingsworth indicates, use of.a
dangerous weapon is a natural or Probable consequence of the
exime of robbery.

State v..Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 30, 3 Nowa 611, 616, cites
many authorities for this: “Where two or more persons com-
bine to accomplish an unlawful purpose, each is responsible for
the act of another which is a probable consequence of carrying
out the unlawful design even though the particular crime com-
mitted was not a part of that design.”

See also 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law (1961 volume), section
87a, pages 256-258 ; Annotation, 16 A.L:R. 1043, 1047.

‘We do not find State v. King, 198 Iowa 325, 338, 197
N.W. 981, cited by defendant, in point or contrary to our hold-
ing here. . In fact the. opinion approves a jury instruction
stating in part that an aider and abetter may be guilty of
murder although he contemplated only that some great bodily
harm be inflicted on the person slain by the principal. This was
said to be in accord with the rule given the jury by Instruction
7 here that guilt of one. who aids or abets commission of a
crime must-be determined upon the facts showing the part he
had in it and not upon the degree of another’s guilt.

| | 1139

IV. As stated, defendant’s second claim of error is in
the refusal of his requested instruction that the State’s failure
to call as witnesses three police officers who testified before the
grand jury, and the minutes of such testimony were attached
to the indictment, justified an inference their testimony, if
given at the trial, would have been detrimental to the State. -

Five police officers testified at the trial, together with the
victim of the robbery, the driver of the car containing the
principals and a man who lived near the scene of the crime. A
good deal of the testimony of these five officers was cumulative
to that of one or more of their number. The minutes of the
testimony before the grand jury of those not called at the
trial indicate they could have added little, if anything, to the
trial testimony of their five fellow officers.

Further, it was shown at the trial the three officers not then
called as witnesses were all on vacation. (Defendant is mistaken
in asserting such.showing was made only as to two of them.)

HI Under these circumstances we hold it was not error to
refuse-the requested instruction. Under some circumstances a
jury may properly infer the testimony of a witness not called
would have been unfavorable to one of the parties. However,
such inference does not arise where absence of the testimony is
explained. State v. Cotton, 240 Iowa 609, 625-626, 83 N.W.2d
880, 889-891, and State v. Hild, 240 Iowa 1119, 1135, 39 N.W.2a
189, 148, citing Cotton, the two principal precedents defendant
cites, recognize this exception to the claimed rule defendant
relies on here.

Both Cotton and Hild were members of a county board of
supervisors charged with obtaining money by false pretenses
from the county. The principal actor in the transactions testi-
fied at length in both trials but no attempt was made to show
by him or other witnesses the falsity of claims against the county
allowed by the board. The inference defendant seeks to invoke
here was referred to in support of our holding it was error to
receive the claims in evidence without such showing.

‘ The showing that the three officers not called at’ the trial
were on vacation, together with the fact their testimony would
have been only cumulative, furnished a plausible explanation for
absence of their testimony.

1140 |

State v. Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 100-102, 151 N.W.2d 505,
512-518, fully supports our holding on this assigned error.
There the jury was instructed that the fact any witness was not
called creates no inference or presumption as to what his testi-
mony might or might not be, Defendant’s objection to the in-
struction raised the same contention defendant made here by his
requested instruction. We held, two Justices dissenting, the
instruction was not reversible error.

It would seem this defendant was considerably better off here
with no instruction on the subject than Parker was with an in-
struction expressing a view contrary to that stated in the request
of this defendant. It would seem further that the grounds for
the dissent in Parker are not present here,

The Parker opinion cites several authorities for the proposi-
tion that no presumption arises from the failure to call a witness
when it is shown he is equally available to either party or the
testimony he could give would be merely cumulative. .

The judgment is—Affirmed..

All: Justices concur except Rawiines and Brecker, JJ.,
who.concur in the result.

Srare or Iowa, appellee, v. ANTHONY F. Oxivert, appellant.

No. 52800.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 688)

Frpruary 6, 1968.

1142 Le 7

Renearine: Denmp Aprin 8, 1968,

Austin J. Rashid, of Fort Madison, for appellant.

Richard C0. Turner, Attorney General, James C. Sell, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Michael M. Phelan, of Fort Madi-
son, Deputy County Attorney, for appellee.

‘Larson, J- —The sole issue presented by this appeal ‘is
whether the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s motion
+o suppress evidence seized under a search warrant.

- On March 28, 1967, a county attorney’s information was
filed in the District Court of Lee County, Iowa, charging the
defendant, Anthony F’ Oliveri; with possession of burglar’s tools
‘and other implements, contrary to section 708.7 of the Code of
1966. Subsequent to a plea of not guilty, the cage came to trial
on June.22, 1967, the termination of which resulted in the jury
returning a verdict of guilty. The.same day the court entered
its judgment sentencing defendant to the Iowa State.-Peniten-
tiary fora term not to exceed fifteen years. . . >
On. the evening of February 26, 1967, pursuant to informa.
tion received from the Rochester Police Department’ of New
‘York, several officérs of the Fort Madison police department
‘arrested the defendant and Dewey Ayers at’ the Madison Inn
Motel in Fort Madison, Iowa. Pursuant to and eontempora-
neous with the arrest, the officers made a preliminary search for
weaporis ‘and’ found two pistols under ‘the mattress of the de-
fendant’s bed. After discovering the pistols under. the mat-
tress, Captain -E. R. Rainey, the officer in -charge, :delegated
Officer William F. Hayes to obtain search warrants for the
rooms occupied by: the defendant, his wife and Ayers, and the
1965 Cadillac owned by the defendant. Hayes then obtained
the necessary warrants from the police judge of Fort Madison,
Chauncy F. Schultz. The subsequent search of the defendant’s
room divulged work clothing, shoes and a dirty jacket, in ad-

| Po 1148

dition to the two pistols already found. A search of Ayers’
room revealed, among other things, a quantity of loose coins in
a paper sack. Items found in the defendant's car included a
flashlight, a three-pound hammer, a tire bar, nail bar, a box of
cartridges, and rolls of coins of assorted denominations. It is
the search and seizure of the items under these warrants that
gave rise to the questions raised in this appeal.

On June 19, 1967, an evidential hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence was heard and overruled. It is this ruling
that the defendant assigns as error. He contends that the trial
court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence
seized under a search warrant on the grounds that the evidence
was illegally obtained, contrary to the provisions of Amend-
ments 4 and 14 to the United States Constitution and Article I,
section 8, of the Iowa Constitution, and for the further reason
that there was no compliance with the provisions of chapter
‘751 of the 1966 Code. We find no merit in this coritention.

I. -It is rudimentary that a search warrant cannot be
issued unless upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly deseribing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. Amendment 4, United
States Constitution; Article I, section 8, Iowa Constitution.
Defendant basically contends that there was no ‘probable cause
shown upon which a warrant could have been issued because
the warrant was issued upon the strength of the applicant’s
belief alone. We have had occasion to consider similar conten-
tions in the.two recent cases of State v. Lampson, 260 Iowa
806, 149 N.W.2d.116 (1967), and State v. Hall, 259 Iowa 147,
148 N.W.2d 318:(1966). :

In those cases we discussed the guidelines which
govern probable cause. Probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances within
the affiant’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trust-
worthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been
or-is being committed. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87
&: Ct. 1873, 1881, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967); Brinegar v. United
States, 388 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S.- 132, 162;.45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69

1144 Le |

L.Ed.2d 548, 39 A.L.R. 790; for extended discussion, see Carl-
son, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure in Iowa (1967).

In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-108, 85
S.Ct. 741, 745-746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 688-689, the court states as
to the existence of probable cause:

HEME “While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of
‘probable cause’, this Court has long held that ‘the term “prob-
able cause” * * * means less than evidence which would justify
condemnation,’ Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 [8
L.Ed. 364, 867], and that a finding of ‘probable cause’ may rest
upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal
trial. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 [79 S.Ct. 329,
332, 8 L.Ed.2d 827, 331]. As the Court stated in Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 [69 S.Ct. 1802, 1309, 93 L.Ed.
1879, 1889], ‘There is a large difference between the two things
to be proved [guilt and probable cause], as well as between the
tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference
in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.’
Thus hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant ‘so
long as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’
Joues v. United States, supra [862 U.S. 257], at 272 [80 S.Ct.
725, at 736, 4 L.Ba.2d 697, at 708, 78 A.L.R2d 233]. -And, in
Aguilar we recognized that ‘an affidavit may be based on hear-
say information and need not reflect the direct personal obser-
vations of the affiant,’ so long as the magistrate is ‘informed of
some of the underlying circumstances’ supporting the affiant’s
conclusions and his belief that any informant involved ‘whose
identity need not be disclosed *-* * was “credible” or his in-
formation “reliable.”’ Aguilar v. Texas, supra [378 U.S.-108],
at 114 [84 9.Ct. 1509, at 1514, 12 L.Bd.2d 728, at 729].

“These decisions reflect the recognition that the Fourth
Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements,
are practical.and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court’s
cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served,
affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here,
must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a
common-sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted
by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted

; Po 1145

under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.
A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting
their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.”

HHI It is also well established that issuance of search war-
rants by a disinterested magistrate empowered to issue war-
rants, who can evaluate the existence or nonexistence of prob-
able cause, is to be preferred over the hurried action of peace
officers who may happen to make arrests. United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.: 452, 464, 52 S.Ct. 420, 428, 76 L.Ed. 877;
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 18-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369,
92 L.Ed. 486; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct.
776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828.

In the case of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270, 80
S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L..Hd.2d 697, the United States Supreme Court
voiced the opinion that it strongly supported the preference for
searches with, a warrant and indicated in a doubtful or mar-
ginal case-a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
one without it would fail.

In the case at bar it is not seriously contended, nor can it
be, that the officers involved were not possessed of information
which would constitute probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant. In the hearing on the motion to suppress,
Officer Frost said he and the other officers were present when
the word came over the teletype via radio that these men were
dangerous and had records in the State of New York involving
robbery and burglary.

Captain Rainey testified inter alia that, prior to the is-
suance of the search warrants and pursuant to his request, a
communication was received from the Rochester Police Depart-
ment which stated that the defendant had a record of robberies,
burglaries and assault, and that Mr, Ayers had a record of
robbery, burglary, assaults and narcotics. The New York
police also informed the Fort Madison police and Captain
Rainey that the defendant had jumped a $7500 -bond on a
charge of possession of burglary tools, and .to use extreme
eaution in:the apprehension of these men.

TE. It has been well established by our court that the
probable cause required by the constitution and statute does

1146 ees .

not have to be shown in the information for search warrant
itself, but may be shown in an affidavit attached thereto or by
Sworn testimony taken before the magistrate prior to the is-
suance of the warrant. State v. Lampson, supra, 260 Iowa 806,
149 N.W.2d 116, 119; State v. Doe, 227 Iowa 1215, 1221, 290
N.W. ‘518; 522; Krueger v. Municipal Court, 223 Iowa 1363,
1867, 275 N.W. 122, 125; Burtch*v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 54, 202
NW. 542; 544, 39 A.L.R. 1849. Defendant specifically contends
the evidence here compels a finding that the search warrants
were issued without probable cause because the magistrate
testified he only considered the written matter in the informa-
tion and. the belief of the officer. We cannot agree, although
it may be that here the written sworn information was not
sufficient.

Appellant contends that the magistrate’s conclusions as to
what constituted “official information” to support, issuance -of
the search warrants should be deemed controlling. Were this
the-case, strong support would appear for the proposition: that
these warrants were improvidently issued. The magistrate
chose to characterize the written information as the “official
information” in the hearing below. However, it is reasonable
to believe that the-magistrate heard testimony in addition to
the written inforniation in arriving at his decision that prob-
able cause existed. Such taking of oral testimony is specifically
authorized by Iowa law, and evidence under oath so received is
equally “official” as that contained in the written information.
The inappropriate characterization of only the written infor-
mation as “official” by the magistrate is not controlling here,
and it is especially significant that there was other testimony
by the magistrate which revealed that he was aware of proof
of probable cause other than that found in the written infor-
mation. A conclusion that such proof was produced is sup-
ported by the testimony of other witnesses as well.

An ancillary question involves the controlling effect of any
witness’ testimony at a hearing to test the legality of searches
and seizures. Were an issuing magistrate alone the controlling
witness in respect to the nature of evidence which was re-
veived in connection with issuance of a search warrant, there
would be no need to call any other witness: at such hearing.

a a nar

This is not the case inasmuch as a suppression hearing might
well include the testimony of other witnesses whose testimony
bears on the point, including police officers with relevant evi-
dence to offer. These witnesses may add to the testimony of
the magistrate where his recollection is hazy, and may even
contradict his recollection where that of the officer differs. In
the instant case it appears that the suppression hearing was
properly held. The magistrate testified that he was in com-
mand of information sufficient to supply probable cause, and
other witnesses whose testimony supported that conclusion
were heard. It is not fatal to the prosecution that the magis-
trate may have characterized some of the evidence supporting
probable cause as “conversation”, nor do such characteriza-
tions control our decision here. Probable cause may’ be sup-
plied by information contained in the written information or
stated to the magistrate.under oath. It appears from the testi-
mony of the magistrate and another officer that this procedure
was followed.
| | At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial
court felt.there was an adequate showing that the search war-
rants were issued pursuant to a revelation of the circumstances
and source of information by Officer Hayes. As we have
pointed out, when a magistrate has found probable cause, re-
viewing courts are slow to invalidate the warrant by inter-
preting an affidavit or other information under oath furnished
the magistrate in a hypertechnical rather than a realistic and
common-sense.manner. Doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by preference to be accorded
warrants. Jones v. United States, supra, at 270 of 362 U.S. A
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war-
rants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting
their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. United States
v. Ventresea, supra, at 108 of 380 U.S. The evidence here,
liberally construed, revealed Officer Hayes advised the magis-
trate, while under oath, of the circumstances upon which he
relied to show probable cause.
Leonard Carter, a captain on the Fort Madison police
force, testified that he was present when the search warrants

1148 [| a

were procured by Officer William Hayes and that “Officer Hayes
filled out the affidavits and signed it and was sworn, took the
oath administered by the Judge.”

Although he could not recall the details and events on this
occasion, Chauncy F. Schultz, the police judge who issued the
search warrants, testified as to the procedure he used in issuing
search warrants in the following manner:

“Mr. Phelan: And an officer then fills out an information for
a search warrant, is that right? Mr, Schultz: Yes.

“Mr. Phelan: And he brings the same to you, is that right?
Mr. Schultz: Yes.

“Mr. Phelan: And then you swear him in, is this correct?
Mr. Schultz: That’s right.

“Mr. Phelan: He swears to the information? Mr, Schultz:
That’s right.

“Mr. Phelan: And in addition to the swearing he also gives
you what he knows about the case, is that correct? Mr.
Schultz: Yes.

“Mr. Phelan: And it is upon that information and sworn
testimony that you issue search warrants? Mr. Schultz: That’s
correct.

“Mr, Phelan: To the best of your knowledge is that what
occurred on the evening of February 26, 1967? Mr. Schultz:
Yes.” (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Schuliz recalled that Officer William F. Hayes had
sworn to the information, for search warrants and that he was
informed of a radio communication the officer had received from
the Burlington Police Department, from the Rochester Police
Department, that one of these men was wanted by the State of
New York, and that both were considered bad actors, although
he could not swear they were alleged convicted criminals. He
said, “It’s been too long ago.”

In an. obvious attempt to get the magistrate to testify the
only information under oath presented to him was that in the
written affidavits, appellant’s counsel did get a statement from
the magistrate that “The official information is on the papers”
and a “yes” answer from him to the question, “That is the only
information you received officially. for the issuance of these
search warrants, is that right?” However, on cross-examination

a Es 1149

it clearly appears the magistrate believed only information in
writing was “official information” and appeared unaware that
the other information given to him by an officer under oath was
also information upon which he could issue the warrants. Thus,
the nub of appellant’s contention here is that under the testimony
insufficient evidence of probable cause was submitted to the
magistrate under oath to justify the warrants issued, and that
the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress was erroneous.

HI Ill. Unfortunately, additional information given by
an officer under oath. is usually not recorded and, after a lapse
of time, memory often dims. When these circumstances are
coupled with some confusion in the mind of a magistrate as to
what the law considered adequate or “official information” under
oath sufficient to permit the issuance of a search warrant, we are
not surprised at appellant’s contention. As pointed out, we, as
other courts, must indulge in the presumption that the magis-
trate did perform his functions as required by law and, in the
absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, must conclude
from the sworn affidavits and. the testimony of the officers that
probable cause existed and was properly communicated to the
magistrate. The learned trial court evidently felt the appellant
failed to overcome this presumption and considered the evidence
obtained by these warrants was admissible. We agree.

It is clear to us the magistrate was given sufficient additional
information by the officer’s testimony before issuance of the
search warrants to justify their issuance. Although it is not so
clear that the officer furnishing that testimony was then under
oath, and unfortunately Officer Hayes did not appear or testify
at this hearing due to other evidence previously set out, we find
no reversible error in the trial court’s ruling. The law requites
that the information given the magistrate to obtain these war-
rants be on oath. The question as to whether that was done here
is a fact question resolved by the trial court after seeing and
hearing the witnesses called in the motion to suppress. We are,
of course, slow to overturn the trial court’s conclusions under
these circumstances and find nothing in this record which com-
pels us to do so,

{V. Although there is some question raised as to the right

1150 es a

of the officers to search defendant and his immediate surround-
ings at the time of his arrest, it is clear only a contemporaneous
search justified for officer protection was made. Two guns were
found under the bed mattress, but no serious complaint is made
that this was an unreasonable search, and we do not find it so
here.

THM Being satisfied that the evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause was given the magistrate under oath, that the
warrants were properly issued, and that the trial court did not
err in overruling defendant’s motion to suppress, the case must
be affirmed.—A ffirmed.

Garrimp, C.J., and Snuiu, Moors, Stuart and Mason, JJ.,
concur. 7
Rawunes, Becker and LeGxanp, JJ., dissent.

Rawuines, J.—I am unable to agree with the reasoning set
forth or conclusions: reached by the majority in this case and
respectfully dissent. In my humble opinion information .es-
sential to issuance of a valid search warrant was not given the
magistrate under essential oath or affirmation.

In support hereof see sections 751.3 and 751.4, Code, 1966;

Ker y. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1628, 10
L.Hd.2d 726 ; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct.
1245, 2 L.Hd.2d 1503; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 9.Ct.
1509; United States v. Ventresca, 380°U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741;
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 18 L.Ed.2d 142; Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229; Gillespie v. United
States (8 Cir.), 368 F.2d 1; United States v. Rollins (E.D.
Tenn.), 271 F.Supp. 18; Mc@urry v. State, Ind., 231 N.E.2d 227;
Bruce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 645; State v. Kasa-
bueki, 96 N.J.Super. 173, 232 A.2d 687; and Murphy v. State,
Miss., 195 S0.2d 519. See also 18 Drake Law Review 73.

Brcxer and LnGranp, JJ., join in this dissent.

es 51

Srarz or Iowa, appellee, v. Oris C. (only) Wess, appellant.

No, 52289.
(Reported in 156 N.W.2d 299)

.
ee
Fersruary 6, 1968, .
Reaearme Dentep, Apri 8, 1968,

"in R. Dunn, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, William A. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, Ray A. Fenton, County Attorney,
and Vincent M. Hanrahan, Assistant County Attorney, for
appellee.

Sneut, J Defendant h has ‘appealed following conviction and

1152 | a

judgment under “Chapter 169, Section 7, Subsection 2, of the
Acts of the 61st General Assembly of the State of Iowa, 1965”
now appearing as part of chapter 155 of our Code relating to
pharmacists and wholesale druggists.

Defendant is a licensed pharmacist in the State of Iowa.
At the time of the alleged offense he was employed at Strait
Pharmacy in Des Moines.

There was uncontradicted testimony that on .or about
February 2, 1966, defendant sold a quantity of amphetamine
sulfate pills, a prescription drug, to Bill Griffiths without a
prescription. Bill Griffiths, describing himself as a “bad guy”,
was a former “dope addict” and a longtime customer of de-
fendant. The purchase was made with $50 in marked $10 bills
furnished by the police. Defendant was arrested within a few
minutes after the sale. The pills and money were traced and
identified. Further review of the evidence is unnecessary.
There is no issue before us as to the sufficiency of the evidence
of an act illegal under some statute. The issue is the avail-
ability of the cited statute to support a conviction. here. We
think it is not.

I. Chapter 155, Code of Iowa, is headed and relates to
Pharmacists and Wholesale Druggists. Section 155.20 provides:

“Restricted prescription drugs. No prescription drug may
be sold at wholesale or brokerage for resale to other than
licensed pharmacies nor shall any person licensed under this
chapter sell or dispense any prescription diug to any person
other than a licensed pharmacy or a physician without pre-
seription.”

Defendant is a licensed pharmacist and subject to the pro-
visions of this section. None of the exceptions or exemptions
appearing in sections 155.22, 155.23 and 155.25 would appear
applicable to defendant.

In 1965 the Sixty-first General Assembly enacted Senate
File 285 amending and adding to chapter 155, Code of 1962.
The law under which defendant was prosecuted was an ad-
dition to the chapter. It appears as chapter 169, section 7,
subsection 2, Laws of the Sixty-first General Assembly. With
authorized editorial changes it now appears, as section 155.30,
1966 Code of Iowa. The pertinent parts are as follows:

a ee 1158

“Penalties. Any person who sells or offers for sale, gives
away, or administers to another person any prescription drug
shall be deemed guilty of violating the provisions of this section
or any person who violates any provisions of section 155.29 and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars or be imprisoned in the county jail for not
more than one year, or both. * * *

“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a
licensed practitioner of medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary
medicine, or pharmacy from such acts necessary in the ethical
and legal performance of his profession.”

Subsection 1 of section 7 of the Act, now section 155.29 of
the Code, lists acts that are proscribed. They all relate to a
person attempting to obtain drugs. None relates to defendant
and he is not charged with violation thereof.

Nowhere in the statute under which defendant was prose-
cuted is there any specific reference to pharmacists except to
exempt them from its operation when performing “acts neces-
sary in the ethical and legal performance of his profession.”

Without this exception a licensed practitioner would be in
the same position as a dope peddler.:

Neither.need nor logical reason for a new statute to cover
pharmacists. appears. Their acts were covered by existing
statutes.

No explanation as to the purpose or intended scope of the
Act appears in connection with the “Bill for an Act” as intro-
duced, the Act as passed or the Senate Journal. However, it
does appear from a study of chapter 169, Laws of the Sixty-first
General Assembly that the purpose was to make illegal in-
dividual acts not otherwise proscribed, make unlicensed persons
subject thereto and provide penalties therefor. -

We note that the penalty for violation of section 155.20 of
the Code is covered by section 155.27. The penalties set forth
in the statute involved here are more severe, cover second and
subsequent offenses, and the unauthorized sale, gift or adminis-
tering of a prescription drug to a minor. We also note that the
first part of the law, quoted, supra, refers to a violation of
“this section” .while the part referring to minors is more in-
clusive by using the words “this chapter.”

1154 | a

Il. While not strictly limited to prescribing penalties
section 155.30 is basically and essentially a penalty statute. .

Chapter 169, Laws of the Sixty-first General Assembly as
enacted, contained 10 sections and numerous subsections.

Pursuant to section 14.13, Code of Iowa, the Code editor in
preparation of the Code divided the sections “so as to give to
distinct subject matters a section number but without changing
the meaning.” Descriptive headings were also provided for
each section. :

Although the headings are not a part of the law as enacted
(see section 3.3, Code of Iowa) it is interesting to note that the
statute involved here is entitled:“Penalties.”

If the statute’ before us is construed as applicable to all
persons except those properly licensed and as providing penal-
ties it is not vulnerable to defendant’s attack. That it has a
proper purpose, eloses a loophole in the law and is workable
appears without:serious question. When applied to a situation
such as we have here an entirely different problem is presented.

Ill. The last paragraph of section 155.30 exempts from its
operation a licensed pharmacist when performing “acts neces-
sary in the ethical and legal performance of his profession.” -

While we view the sale of a large quantity of amphetamine
sulfate pills without a prescription with a very jaundiced eye
and certainly do not approve of what defendant is alleged to
have done, we must consider the statute in its application to
licensed practitioners generally rather than to defendant and
the simple facts before us..

There is nothing in the record before us to indicate what
is or is not- necessary and both, ethical and legal. Judges and
courts.should not be so naive as to pretend they do not know
what everyone else knows. We are not suggesting that selling
preseription drugs without a prescription is ethical. We are
saying that as applied to licensed persons there is nothing in
the record before us to indicate what is or is not ethical and
legal. We do not know whether there is such a thing as a code
of ethics for pharmacists. If there is such a code we do not
know what it provides. If applied: to licensed persons: the
statute is too vague to be enforced... There is no ascertainable

a a 1155

standard of guilt. We do not believe that the legislature in-
tended the enactment of an unnecessary and useless law.

IV. There have been a host of court decisions involving
the sufficiency of statutory definitions or designations and they
are far from harmonious.

We exhaustively reviewed the authorities in State v.
Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 N.W.2d 10. Repetition here is un-
necessary. A few statements therefrom and from International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed.
1284, and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385,
46 8. Ct. 126, will suffice.

The International Harvester Company case involved a
price fixing statute and a charge of selling above real value
pursuant to agreement. The statute was held invalid. Mr.
Justice Holmes, in concluding his opinion, said:

“To compel them to guess on peril of indictment what the
community would have given for them if the continually
changing conditions were other than they are, to an uncertain
extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only
partially determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and
desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not
possess.”

The Connally case involved a statute ‘requiring payment of
wages “‘not less than the current rate of per diem wages in
the locality where the work is performed.’” The court re-
viewed the various uncertainties and concluded:

“The result is that the application of the law depends not
upon a word of fixed meaning in itself, or one made definite by
statutory or judicial definition, or by the context or other
legitimate aid to its construction, but upon the probably vary-
ing impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are
not to be included within particular localities. The constitu-
tional guaranty of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon
a support so equivocal.”

Our opinion in State v. Coppes, supra, involved the “reason-
able and proper” speed restrictions in section 321.285, Code of
Iowa. The statute was upheld against a constitutional attack.
After extensive analysis this conclusion appears:

1156 Pe P|

“The words of it are simple and their meaning well known
to anyone having, or qualified to have, a motor-vehicle opera-
ting license. The section is sufficiently clear and specific to in-
form all motorists of what conduct on their part will subject
them to the penalties of section 321.482 of the Iowa Code of
1954.”

Preceding this conclusion these statements appear:

“The general rule respecting the sufficiency of the state-
ment of statutory crimes—and there are no others in lowa—is
well expressed in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269
U. S. 385, 391, 392, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Hd. 322, to wit:
‘That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike
with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law.
And a statute. which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law. International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58
L. Ed. 1284, 1287.’

«s # * Tt is axiomatic that statutes creating and defining
erimes cannot be extended by intendment. Purely statutory
offenses cannot be established by implication.- There can be no
constructive offenses. Before a man can be punished, his case
must be plainly and unmistakably within a statute.’” (Loc.
cit. 1061 and 1062.)

On page 1081 of State v. Coppes, supra, it is noted that the
statute being considered was directed primarily to operators of
motor vehicles on public highways. The statute had general
application to all and operators “know or should know what
speed is proper and reasonable under different traffic con-
ditions.”

With that statement we agree but it does not follow. that it
ean be determined with reasonable certainty what is ethical in
the practice of “medicine, dentistry, nursing, veterinary
medicine or pharmacy” in the absence of some standard or
guide,

a a 1187

We repeat that we do not suggest what defendant is
charged with doing could by any stretch of imagination be
considered necessary, ethical and legal. However, we must
construe the statute as it is written and not according to our
reaction to the present situation.

We hold that the statute relied upon by the State is not a
proper vehicle to support the charge made here. It is void for
unworkability.

In our opinion it was never intended to cover the factual
situation disclosed here.

V. Our conclusion that the statute is unworkable for the
purpose sought by the State does not vitiate the statute when
used where applicable. In Davidson Building Company v.
Mulock, 212 Iowa 730, 756, 285 N.W.45, this appears:

“Our holding that the aforesaid sections of Chapter 205,
Acts 43 G. A., are void for unworkability, shall not be con-
strued as affecting the validity of the remainder of said
chapter, which is not under attack. It is a rule of universal
application that a statute may be valid in part, and invalid in
another part, and if the invalid part is severable from the re-
mainder, the portion which is valid may stand while that which
is void may be stricken out and rejected, if after the elimina-
tion of the void portion, the remaining provisions are sufficient
to be effective and accomplish their purpose in accordance with
the legislative intent deducible from the act construed in the
light of contemporary events.”

VI. Discussion of other points raised by appellant is un-
necessary.

Defendant was prosecuted and convicted under the wrong
statute and the judgment entered cannot stand.

Defendant ‘raised the issue at every possible opportunity
by demurrer, motion to dismiss, timely renewal of the motion,
and motion notwithstanding the verdict.

The case is réversed and remanded with instructions to
enter an order of dismissal notwithstanding the verdict.—
Reversed for entry of order of dismissal.

Larson, Moors, Stuart, Becker and LeGranp, JJ., concur,
Mason, J., Garrreip, C.J., and Raw ines, J., dissent.

1158 es —

Mason, J—I. dissent. The parties make opposite conten-
tions that the phrase, “legal and ethical performance of his
profession” is and is fot so vague that due process of law- is
violated. .

In People v. Nunn, 46 Cal. 2d 460, 461, 296 P.2d 813, 817—
818,- certiorari deni¢d-and appeal dismissed, 852 U.S. 883, 77
S. Ct. 126, 1 L. Ed.2d 82, the defendant, a physician, was con-
victed of prescribing narcotics for a person not under his treat-
ment;for @ pathology and prescribing a narcotic for a person who
represented himself to be an addict. The statute prohibited
prescribing narcotics to or for a person not under treatment for
& pathology. or ‘condition other than a narcotic condition—“ex-
cept,.in- the regular practice of his professidn.”

On appeal defendant contended: “That section 11168 of the
Health-.and Safety, Code is unconstitutional because the term.
‘except in the regular practice of -his profession’: is too vague,
indefinite, and_uncertain to give notice of what constitutes the
act sought. to. be prohibited.”

In holding the contention | to be without merit the court said,
“#8 eM) comply with the constitutional requirement of due
‘process of law, the crime for which defendant is being’ prosecuted
must be clearly defined, but it-is only necessary that the words
used in the statute-be well enough known to enable those within
its purview to understand, and. correctly apply them. * * *

MO

«@ * * Thus, the “regular practice of his profession’ is'a
term clearly to be’understood from the statutes, and it is well
enough known to enable a person practicing as a physician and
surgeon to understand and apply it. * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

In McKenzie v, State (Tex. Crim.), 383 S.W.2d 177, 180,
the court: upheld a statute proscribing delivery of dangerous
drugs by a practitioner except “in the course of his practice.”
Defendant insisted the section was so indefinite as to render the
statute void and wholly inoperative because it did not define the
phrase,“‘in the course of his-practice.”

Relying on the earlier Texas case of King v. State, 166 "Tex.
Or. R. 281, 812 8,W.2d 501, the court held the statute was not
subject to ithe objection’ ‘of indefniteness as urged by. defendant.

es 1159

* In Marks ‘v. Frantz; 179 Kan. 638, 298 P.2d 316, 322, a
statute proseribing practice of optometry “in any unethical
manner” was upheld as against the contention that the statute
was unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to fix any
standard or define with any clarity and exactness the term

“unethical manner.” .

Looking at section 155.30, everyone is prohibited ‘trom selling
prescription drugs but the general proscription is later made
inapplicable to certain professional people, one of whom is a
pharmacist. They are exempted from proseription only for sale
of preseription drugs. when such sale is necessary in the ethical
and legal performance of their profession,.they should be held
accountable for knowledge of the ethics of their own profession.
‘As to what he may legally do in the performance of his profes-
sion may nat be.completely known to him, but by virtue of Code
section 155.20’s long standing he knew or should have known he
is not to sell prescription drugs to persons not bearing a / Pre-
scription.

“A statute is passed as-a whole and not in parts or sections
and is animated by one general purposé and intent. Conse-
quently, each part or section should. be construed in connection:
with every other part or section so as-to produce a harmonious
whole. Thus it isnot proper to confiné interpretation to the one
section to be construed.” ‘Sutherland, -Third Ed. (by: Horack);
Statutory Construction, section’ 4708. : -°  *

See also 16A C.J.S., Constitutional “Law, section 580, and
Connally v. General Construction’ Co., 269.U.S, 385, 391-392,
46S, Ct. 126, 127, 70 L. Ed, 392:

*- “I would affirm. i

Garren, C. J. and Rawuinos, J. join in this dissent.

Srare or Iowa, sppelie, v. Epward Louis Surcaecx, appellant.

cot . “No. 52729. . i. . i —
_:Beported in 157 N.W.2d 128). .

Marcu 5; 1968.
Rengarine Denrep Apriy 8, 1968,

Pasley, Singer & Seiser, of Ames, for appellant..

_Richard ©. Turner, Attorhey General, Wm. A. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, ‘of Des Moines, and Charles E.
Vanderbur; County Attorney; of Ames, for appellee.

LxGranp, J—Defendant appeals from judgment ‘following
his conviction of uttering a. forged instrument in violation of
section 718.2, Code, 1966. Before considering his assigned
errors, -an extended discussion of the unusual: ‘circumstances
which bring him here is necessary. .

On May 23, 1966,. defendant bought several ‘small items of
merchandise from Hanson’s Mobilgas Service Station in Ames,
Iowa. In payment he presented a check which he sigried in
the name of W. C. Tully. Defendant’s trud name is Edward
Louis Sefcheck. ‘The amount of the purchases was deducted
from the check, and the balance was given defendant in cash.
Because of-the unusual ideritification numbers on the:check, Mr.
Hanson almost immediately became suspicious of its validity
and called the police. .An officer of the Ames Police Department
and Mr, Hansén together located defendant at a local tavern,
where he -vas questioned concerning the event. Although deny-

a Es 1168

ing the ‘check was worthless, defendant retuned the $50 to Mr.
Hanson. At the same time he was arrested for intoxication,
held for investigation, and ultimately charged with uttering a
forged check in violation of section 713.3, Code of Iowa.-

On June-2, 1966, defendant appeared with his attorney in
the District Court of Story County. A plea of guilty was then
entered and defendant was sentenced to a term of not more
than seven years in the penitentiary at Fort Madison. De-
fendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District
Court of Lee County on October 29, 1966, seeking his release on
eight separate grounds. The only one important here is. that
his plea and the subsequent judgment pronouncing sentence
thereon were void as being in violation of section 17. 12, Code,
1966, which provides:

“The plea of guilty ‘can only be made in open court and
by the defendant himself, and in the presence of legal counsel
acting on behalf of the defendant if the defendant is charged
with a felony in substantially the following form: ‘The de-
fendant pleads that he is guilty of the offense charged in the
indictment’, and shall. be entered-of record. * * *.” (Emphasis
added.)

The Lee District Court, by an order dated December 20,
1966, found defendant's plea had been made for him by ‘his
attorney. The séction above set out requires a guilty plea to be
made by: the defendant personally, and the Lee District Court
found the failure to observe that statute rendered the, pro-
ceedings void. The order of December 20, 1966, included this
provision:

“Under sections 663.37 and 663.38 of the 1966 Code of
Towa, the court finds he is required * * * to. determine whether
an unconditional release is warranted or whether the petitioner
should be held for the proper authorities. Under the record in
this case, the court finds that the petitioner should be held for
proper authorities and returned to the Story County District
Court for sentencing. Birk v. Bennett, 141 N.W.2d°576. ©

’ “Tt is therefore hereby orderéd that the petitioner Edward
L. Sefcheck be returned to the Story County District Court for
sentencing in. accordance with the requirements of 777.12 of
the 1966 Code of Iowa.”

164 es

Despite the provisions of this order defendant was not
returned to Story County until January 30, 1967, approxi-
mately 40 days thereafter. From June 2, 1966, the date he was
sentenced under section 713.3, until February 6, 1967, when his
present counsel was appointed to represent him, he was without
counsel and was at all times in custody. On February 14, 1967,
after defendant asked leave to withdraw his plea, the county
attorney dismissed the pending information under section 713.3
and filed a new information alleging violation of section 718.2,
Code, 1966. The one charges uttering of a false check and the
other uttering a forged instrument. The new information was
based on the same check and the same conduct as the original
charge. : .
Defendant was tried on this latter charge beginning March
27,1967. Upon a jury verdict of guilty, judgment was entered
sentencing defendant to a term of not more than ten years in
the penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, and he now appeals
therefrom. i.

In addition to the general claim there had been -such
procedural unfairness and lack of due process that the charge
should have been dismissed or a new trial granted, defendant
assigns these six specifie errors: (1) That the Story District
Court failed to comply with the habeas corpus order of the’ Lee
District Court. (2) That by the dismissal of the charge under
section 713.8 and the filing of one under section 718.2 he was
subjected to double jeopardy. (3) That he was denied a speedy
trial in violation of section 795.2, Code, 1966. (4) That certain
evidence illegally seized and obtained in violation of his con-
stitutional rights was improperly admitted and that he was not
properly arraigned. (5) That the State failed to prove one of
the essential elements of the charge against him. (6) That he
was deprived of a fair trial because of prejudicial newspaper
publicity.

It will be noted the first three assignments relate to the
dismissal of the original information under section 713.3 and
the filing of a new one alleging violation of section 718.2 while
the last three’ are concerned with alleged errors in the trial
itself. We discuss them in the order listed.

a Es 1165

Hl. Defendant asserts the State’s right is limited to
prosecuting him for the original offense because the Lee Dis-
trict Court order so provided. Defendant leans heavily on the
language in the order returning defendant to Story County for
“sentencing.” Although this term inaccurately describes what
the order provided, the intent and purpose are clear. The Lee
District Court found section 777.12 had not been complied with
and voided defendant’s sentence on that sole ground. Section
777.12 deals exclusively with entry of a plea. This is the defect
in the original proceedings which the court found to be fatal.
It was only because the plea had been improperly entered that
the subsequent sentence was set aside. Therefore returning the
defendant to Story County simply for resentencing would have
accomplished nothing.

We do not understand the Lee District Court order pur-
ported, as defendant claims, to limit the Story District Court to
proceeding on the information under section 713.3, nor could it.
All that was before the Lee District Court was defendant’s
petitiori for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his deten-
tion was illegal, The court found it was and ordered defend-
ant’s return to Story County under the authority of Birk v.
Bennett, 258 Iowa 1016, 141 N.W.2d 576.

We hold the Lee District Court could only sustain the
writ or quash it. If sustained, the Lee District Court could
either order his release or return him to Story County for
further proceedings there. It could not determine what those
proceedings should be.

Birk v. Bennett, supra, offers no support for defendant’s
position. That decision went no further than to say one whose
conviction is set aside on constitutional grounds need not be
unconditionally released but may be held for further proceed-
ings which meet constitutional requirements. The fact that
there such proceedings involved retrial on the original charge
does not imply no other course is permissible.

As part of this assignment defendant asserts the trial
court should not have permitted the county attorney to dismiss
the original information and file a new one alleging violation
of section 718.2. We include this matter in our discussion in
Division IZ.

1166 De

=] 1. Defendant next claims he was subjected to double
jeopardy because: the charge under section 713.8, Code, 1966,
was dismissed and a new information was filed alleging viola-
tion of section 718.2, Code, 1966, when in fact both were, based
on the same check and the same facts, The simple answer to
defendant’s claim is that this cannot be double jeopardy be-
cause the proceedings under section 713.3, having later been
set aside as void, did not place him in jeopardy in the first
place.

HH We strongly suspect that defendant, who spent. some
eight. months in the penitentiary'on a sentence ultimately set
aside upon his petition, will vigorously dissent from our finding
that he was not,thereby placed in jeopardy. However, jeopardy
has a well-established and universally adopted meaning. One
cannot be in jeopardy: by:reason of proceedings before a court
which has no jurisdiction. to convict or sentence him. A plea of
former jeopardy cannot be based on a void sentence.. 21.Am.
Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 167, page 232. This is generally
true, although there is some authority to the contrary, even if
part of the illegal sentence has been served. 22 CJS.,
Criminal Law, section 266, page 687. It is also the, general
rule that one who procures, his own release under habeas
corpus because ofan invalid sentence cannot rely on former
jeopardy and further proceedings against him are permissible.
21 Am, Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 210, page 254;-22 C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, section 245, page 647; Birk v. Bennett, 258. lowa
1016, 1022, 141 N.W.2d 576; United States v: Ewell, 383.U.S,
116, 86 S. Ct. 773,15 L. Hd2d 627; State v. Dehler, 257 Minn.
549, 102 N.W.2d 696, 80. A.L.R.2d 496; Annotations, 97 A.L.R,
160.

Our recent decision i in State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 184
N.W.2d 906, lends. further.support to what we have said. There
an information charging’ murder -was dismissed and .another
information charging the same offense .was-filed. .To a claim
that: this constituted double jeopardy, we observed at page 849
of the Iowa Reports, “* * * the dismissal of the prior charge, did
not-prevent. the State from filing a second, Within the limits of
the. statute of limitations; * *.*.”

es uur

United States v. Ewell, supra, also confirms this view.
There the court said, in approving prosecutions under different.
charges following vacation of a prior conviction for defects in
the indictment, “It has long been the rule that when a defend-
ant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may
be retried in the normal course of events. * * * The rule of
these cases, which dealt with the Double Jeopardy Clause, has
been thought wise because it protects the societal interest in
trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them im-
munization because of legal error at a. previous trial, and be-
cause it enhances the probability that appellate courts will be
vigilant to strike down previous convictions that are tainted
with reversible error.” (Page 121 of 383 US., page 777 of
86S. Ct.)

Even if we were to accept defendant’s argument that the
information charging him witha violation of section 718.2
accuses him of the same offense as the information charging a
violation of section 713.3 (which we do not do), there would be
no double jeopardy under the circumstances existing here. As
we pointed out in State v. Gebhart, supra, section 795.5, Code,
1966, specifically permits a second prosecution after dismissal
of a pending criminal charge if the offense is a felony.

Defendant alleges, too, that this second charge against him
was filed by. the county attorney to punish him for having
suecessfully challenged the original sentence by his habeas
corpus action or to circumvent the provisions of section 795.2,
Code, 1966, guaranteeing defendant a speedy trial. .

« BB We agree the county attorney should not use the
considerable powers of his office. to punish a defendant who
avails himself of any procedural right he has, nor should he
use it for vindictive purposes. However, there is nothing in
the record to suggest that he did so except defendant’s un-
supported claim to that effect. We assume the regularity of
official acts in the absence of a showing to the contrary. Sewell
v. Lainson, 244 Lowa 555, 560, 57 N.W.2d 556; State v. Bastedo,
253 Iowa 108, 110, 111 N.W.2d 255; ‘State v. "Meyers, 256 Iowa
801, 803, 129 N.W.2d 88.

Once the original plea and sentence under section
713.3 had been set aside upon defendant's petition for habeas

1168 Le |

corpus, defendant was restored to his previous status as one
accused, but not convicted, of a crime. It was then as though
no plea had ever been entered. He is entitled to that but to no
more. By setting aside his former plea and sentence as having
been void, defendant cannot improve his lot. If there had been
no prior proceedings, the county attorney in the proper ex-
ercise of his discretion could have dismissed the pending charge
under section 795.5, Code, 1966, and could have then filed a new
charge, either alleging the same violation or accusing defendant
of any other offense justified by the evidence available.

If the county attorney could have done that then, why
should he be precluded from doing it now? We reiterate that
such power and discretion may not be exercised to harass a
defendant nor to subject him to repeated and unwarranted
prosecution. However, as we said in State v. Bastedo, supra,
at page 110 of 253 Iowa Reports, “We know of no rule or
statute, and none was cited to us, that would require a State’s
attorney to file all or any charges that may lie as a result of a
given offense, at the time one is chosen. Such a requirement
would indeed hamper law-enforcement efforts of the authorities
and be most unreasonable.”

This matter was submitted to the trial court on motion
prior to trial and the court found nothing improper in the
State’s action herein described. We agree with that conclusion,

We have no hesitancy in concluding that defendant was
not subjected to double jeopardy under the circumstances ex-
isting here.

If. Defendant also contends he was deprived of a speedy
trial, which is not only guaranteed to him by the provisions of
section 795.2, Code of Iowa, but is also constitutionally re-
quired both by Amendment 6 to the Constitution of the United
States and section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Iowa.

Defendant’s objection obviously is directed against the
State’s failure to try him for violation of section 713.3, Code,
1966. However, that charge was dismissed, although not upon
defendant’s motion under section 795.2.

Defendant was only tried on one charge, a violation of
section 718.2. : .

a es 1169

HH If the State was justified in dismissing the original
information and in filing a new one, and we have already held
it was, then defendant was brought to trial well within the
period of limitation provided for in section 795.2, and we find
no merit in his claim that he was denied a speedy trial.

IV. We now consider defendant’s complaints arising out
of the trial itself. Defendant combines in one assignment the
claim that his constitutional rights were violated by permitting
the introduction of evidence obtained by unreasonable search
and seizure; that certain statements, admissions and writings
obtained without first giving him the Miranda warning were
wrongfully admitted ; and, that he was not promptly arraigned.

When defendant refers to evidence obtained by unreason-
able search and seizure, he is apparently talking about the
check upon which this prosecution is based and a credit card
issued to W. C. Tully, by which name defendant falsely identi-
fied himself both to the attendant at the service station and to
the officer. The trial court found both were admissible, and we
agree.

HE There can be little question about the credit card,
which was voluntarily delivered to the arresting officer by
defendant when he was asked for identification. Nor can there
be any serious dispute about the circumstances under which the
officer took possession of the check. The record amply sup-
ports the trial court’s finding that the check, once it had been
given to the attendant at Hanson’s Mobilgas Service. Station,
never again came into defendant’s hands, The trial court
found it was delivered by Mr. Hanson to the officer. Under the
facts disclosed and under the findings of the trial court on the
motion to suppress, there was no search, either reasonable or
unreasonable, conducted by the officer.

In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary for us to
consider defendant’s claim that he was arrested without prob-
able cause, since his objection goes only to the question of un-
reasonable search and seizure. Otherwise the circumstances of
the arrest are immaterial to this appeal.

Defendant claims error in the admission of a certain oral
statement he made during his interrogation by one of the

1170 Pe a

officers; and in the’ admission’ also of certain handwriting
exemplars which he had been compelled to submit for éompari-
son purposes. He says that this interrogation took place and
the handwriting exemplars were furnished without his first
having been warned that he ¢ould remain silent; that he was
entitled to an attorney; that an attorney: would be appointed
for him if he could not afford one; and that whatever he said
would be used against him. These are the Miranda warnings
as first set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ot.
1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694.‘:Under the Miranda decision. defendant
was entitled to’ those warnings and any statement obtained
from him in violation thereof would be inadmissible. ~

HM After o hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress,
the trial court found that the warnings had been given. De-
fendant denies this. Ordinarily when there is a claim of denial
of constitutional rights we will accept and give effect to the
trial court’s determination of disputed facts if there is‘ sub-
stantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding. State v.
Brant, 260 Iowa 758, 764, 150 N.W.2d 621, 625; State v. Gates,
260 Iowa 772, 775, 150 N.W.2d 617, 619, and citations, We find
such substantial evidence here.

HE What we have already said would permit the admis.
sion of the disputed evidence, but we mention too that the only
statement admitted into evidence was that testified to by
Officer Flora in which defendant acknowledged he had cashed
the check. If we were to hold this error, it would probably be
without prejudice since defendant, as part of his cross-examina-
tion of Officer Flora, offered and had admitted -defendant’s
written statement in which 'he made the same admission. We
Yecognize defendant had good reason for’seeking the admission
of this exhibit, but nevertheless he cannot ask its benefits while
at the same time attempt to avoid whatever disadvantages
might be involved.

HH As to defendant's objection to the use of handwriting
samples, we agree with the trial court that they were properly
admissible. The constitutional safeguards upon which defend-
ant relies’ do not extend to nontestimonial evidence. The
privilege against: self-incrimination, both under federal and
state rules, is limited to evidence by communication in whatever

ae ut

form that communication might take. It does not protect a
defendant, by the taking of blood or other bodily fluid, by the
use of fingerprints, or by the showing some physical trait or
characteristic, from becoming the source of real or physical
evidence against himself. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908. This rule was applied to
voice identification in a lineup in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Hd.2d 1149. Tt was also applied |
to handwriting exemplars in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
87S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed.2d 1178. |
HE We find no merit either in defendant’s assertion that \
he was not promptly arraigned. He was arrested on the evening
of May 23, 1966. He was arraigned at approximately 1:30 p.m.
on May 24, 1966. Defendant says it was somewhat later than
that, but in any event it was that same afternoon. Defendant
further claims that he should have been arraigned in the
morning, and that his arraignment was postponed in order to
allow the police to make some further investigation to secure
evidence against him. There is nothing in the record to justify
this conclusion. We find there was no undue delay in defend-
ant’s arraignment under the circumstances existing here.
V. Defendant also seeks reversal on the ground the
State failed to prove one of the essential elements of the crime
with which he was charged. He argues that one cannot utter
a forged instrument unless it is shown the instrument itself is
actually a forgery. This, he says, the State failed to do.

In this assignment defendant relies upon a statement made
by the trial court to counsel before trial that the State would
be required to prove defendant had no arrangement with the
bank for payment of the check. The lack of such an arrange-
ment is an essential element of the offense defined in section
713.3, but it is not an element of the offense for which. defend-
ant was tried. We do not construe the trial court’s remark the
same as defendant does; but, if we did, it would still afford no
basis for reversal. The issues were correctly presented to the
jury by proper instructions and defendant’s counsel certainly
knew what.the elements of the offense were, regardless of what
might have been said.in a pretrial discussion. Defendant shows
no prejudice by this remark. There is nothing to this claim.

1172 | 7

HM (We find there was ample evidence on all elements of
the offense to submit the case to the jury. Defendant identified
himself by a false name both at the time he cashed the check
and later. He had identification for the person whose identity
he assumed. He used a check imprinted with identification
numbers different from those of the drawee bank. Defendant
falsely pretended to know both Mr. Hanson and his wife in
order to induce the attendant to cash the check. There was
evidence he actually wrote the check in question, using the
name of W. C. Tully.

We find there was sufficient evidence to take this ease to
the jury. .

HN sOVI. On March 27, 1967, the day defendant’s trial
started, the Nevada Journal,.a newspaper published at the
place of trial, carried the following news story concerning the
selection of a jury:

“Jury Selection Is Underway Today In Ed Sefcheck Case

» “Selection of a jury to retry the case of Edward Sefcheck,
44, on a charge of uttering a forged instrument was begun
Monday morning in district court, beginning the jury trial
portion of the March term.

Selfcheck, who hails from Pennsylvania, was brought back
to Story County from Fort Madison for the new trial recently
when the Supreme court ruled that Sefcheck had not been given
a fair trial last June when he pleaded guilty to a false check
charge and was sentenced to seven years at the Fort Madison
penitentiary.

Selfcheck appealed the case on the grounds that no record.
was made of whether he had personally pleaded guilty at first
trial. Milton Seiser was appointed by the court as the county-
expense lawyer.

The charge of uttering a forged instrument carries a max-
imum sentence of 10 years. The sentence he is appealing on the
false check charge is seven years.”

. Defendant contends this story was so prejudicial it de-
prived him of a fair trial.

It is unnecessary for us to discuss the well-debated question
of fair trial—free press. Each is based upon a constitutional

| es 1173

right of equal dignity. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed
by Amendment 6 to the.Constitution of the United States and
Amendment 1 proseribes any interference with freedom of the
press. From time to time these two come into conflict, either
apparent or real.

The job of the courts is to maintain a reasonable balance
between the two so that each may be protected without in-
fringement upon the basie principles of the other. Difficulty
arises perhaps because the proponents of each ascribe to one or
the other an absolutism which does not and cannot exist. See
17 Drake Law Review, page 1, “A Constitutional Balance Be-
tween Fair Trials and Free Press.”

Under the circumstances existing here we find the article
in question did not interfere with defendant’s right to a fair.
trial. He.complains the story contained some misstatements
and we agree. However, defendant has no constitutional right
to factual accuracy. The question is whether the story was so
prejudicial that it deprived him of a fair trial. We hold it was
not. In Mares v. United States of America, 10 Cir., 383 F.2d
805, 808, it was held that each case relating to a claim of jury
prejudice because of newspaper articles appearing during a
trial must turn on its special facts. In that case, too, with
reference to these apparently conflicting constitutional rights
the court. had this to say, “The problem presented is incapable
of a satisfactory solution. Media of publicity have the right to
report what happens in open court. An accused has a right to
a trial by an impartial jury on evidence which is legally ad-
missible, The public has a right to demand and expect ‘fair
trials designed to end in just judgments.’ These rights must be
accommodated in the best possible manner.” (Emphasis added.)

We agree that each case must stand on its own facts.
Prejudice should not be presumed from the mere publication of
a news article during trial. Here no prejudice is proved al-
though defendant claims it existed. It is not shown that any
juror read the article. The court was careful throughout the
trial to admonish the jury not to read any newspaper articles
concerning the case. There is nothing to indicate this admoni-
tion was disregarded. The story itself is not inflammatory. nor
is it the type to necessarily cause prejudice, even if read.

74 es

= HE. We mention, too, that defendant did not call this
matter to the trial court’s attention until.after the trial when.
it was included as a ground for a new trial. -As suggested in
the Mares case, from which quotation has already been made, if
a claimed prejudicial error is brought to the trial court’s at-
tention immediately upon its appearance, proper steps may
then be taken to determine if harm has resulted and to act:
accordingly to protect a defendant in those instances when
prejudice exists.

Having failed to. follow ‘that course here, defendant now
asks that we preswme.prejudice because of his inability to show
prejudice. There may, of course, be situations in which the very
publication of an article may justify an inference of prejudice.
Such circumstances are not shown here. We. discussed this
matter to some extent in State v. Clough, 259. lowa 1851, 1361,
147 N.W.2d 847, 853. .

We find no reversible error in the trial court's ruling on
this matter:

We have considered the whole record and all of defendant’s
claimed errors, particularly with reference to his contention’
that his rights under the Constitution ‘of the United States have
been violated as tc Amendments 4 (unreasonable search and
séizure),. 5' (privilege -against self-incrimination and double
jeopardy),.6 (speedy..and impartial trial), and 14 (due process
of law). We find no basis for reversal. Defendant was vig-
orously: and ‘diligently defended. The-evidence was amply. suffi-
cient-to justify the ‘jury’s verdict. ™

VII. We feel-impelled to make one more comment. : De
fendant has spent-nine months in the penitentiary-on a sentencé
which was.ultimately.set aside because of procedural. imper-
fections having nothing to do with his guilt.or innocence. While
how long defendant should-serve is not within. our..control, we
recommend the Board of Parole take this. into account :when ‘in
due time defendant’ 's file comes up for parole:considerdtion.

The judgment, of the trial court i is affirmed. —Affirmed,

“AL JUSTICES concur except Rawunes and. Broker, JJ. veho
dissent to Division VIL. ” :

a a 1175

Raw1ines, J—I am unable to agree with the “comment” in
Division VII of the majority opinion relative to time spent in
confinement by defendant with regard to the void judgment
originally entered, and respectfully dissent.

I. I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority to
the effect this defendant has not been subjected to double jeop-
ardy. Since the initial judgment of conviction under section
713.3, Code, 1966, must be deemed null and void, defendant has
actually been placed in jeopardy only once. See 2 Underhill’s
Criminal Evidence, Fifth Ed., section 480, page 1168.

On the other hand, while the majority discusses and resolves
the “double jeopardy” issue, it does not fully reach the matter
.of “double punishment”, here unavoidably involved. In this
respect the record discloses defendant was incarcerated at least
nine months in connection with the void judgment for which no
eredit was allowed him under the sentence imposed on the subse-
quent forgery charge. And the token recognition of the matter
by a recommendation the Board of Parole take it into account
when in due time defendant’s file comes up for parole considera-
tion is totally insufficient. Stated otherwise, it appears to me the
cursory treatment accorded by the majority to the matter of
double punishment is constitutionally inadequate,

Touching on the subject at hand chapter 422, Acts of the
Sixty-second General Assembly, amends chapter 791, Code, 1966,
by adding thereto the following: “Whenever any person who has
been confined to jail at any time prior to sentencing because of
failure to furnish bail, is sentenced to the county jail, the court
shall backdate the execution of judgment or mittimus a sufficient
number of days to give such person eredit upon any sentence
imposed for the time already spent in jail.” .

By the same legislative Act, Code section 246.38 was amended.
-by striking the period in line eleven of that section and in-
serting in lieu thereof the following: “; provided, howéver, if a
convict had been confined to a county jail or other correctional
or mental institution at any time prior to sentencing, or after
sentencing but prior to his case having been decided on appeal,
because of failure to furnish bail or because of being charged
with a nonbailable offense, he shall be given credit for such days

1176 Le Pe

already served in jail upon the term of his sentence. The clerk
of the district court of the county from which the convict was
sentenced, shall certify to the warden the number of days so
served.”

Admittedly these amendments do not go directly to the
factual situation presented in the instant case. On the other
hand they do demonstrate awareness on the part of the legisla-
ture of the problem here presented. Stated otherwise, it is now
clear the declared public policy of the State of Iowa is to avoid
the anathema of double punishment.

Dealing with this matter, 24B C.J.S., Criminal Law, section
1990, page 603, states: “The constitutional principle that no one
shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense, * * * is broad
enough to mean that no one can lawfully be punished twice for
the same offense; the one follows from the other, and the con-
stitutional provisions are designed to protect accused from a
double punishment as much as to protect him from two trials.”

From the foregoing it appears to me the majority ap-
proaches, if it does not reach, a conclusion violative of Amend-
-ment 5 to the United States Constitution.

Surely it is our function to recognize such important ques-
tions and not leave them to the discretion of the Board of Parole
whieh may or may not accord recognition to any judicial recom-
mendations.

I respectfully submit the trial judge, in sentencing defend.
ant on the forgery charge, had not only the authority but was
constitutionally required, notwithstanding our indeterminate
sentence law, to accord defendant credit for time confined in
lieu of bail prior to sentencing under the voided judgment, plus
total time incarcerated pursuant to original sentence imposed,
with full credit for earned good behavior, if any, while so in-
earcerated. In support hereof see Short v. United States, 120
U.S. App. D.C. 165, 344 F.2d 550, 553, and Rice v. Simpson, 274
F.Supp. 116, 119-123,

I would reverse and remand for entry or correction of
judgement in accord with the views expressed above.

Broxer, J., joins in this dissent.

ES

Anpre J, LaFontame et ux., appellees, v. DrveLorrrs &
Bumoers, Inc., et al., appellants,

No, 52843,
(Reported in 156 N.W.2a 651)

ee

Fepruary 6, 1968.
Renearine DENIED wits Moprrication -APriL 9, 1968,

- Kennedy, Kepford, Kelsen & White, of Waterloo, for ap-
pellants,

Fulton, Frerichs & Nutting, of Waterloo, for appellees.

Larson, J—In early 1960 Raymond R. DuPre became in-
terested in buying Unique Cleaners, Inc. of Waterloo, Iowa, and
obtained an option to purchase seventy-five percent of Unique’s
outstanding stock. He approached Andre J. LaFontaine in June
of 1960 and offered to exercise this option, employ him as plant
manager, and sell him 60 shares of Unique stock.

Upon LaFontaine’s acceptance, DuPre exercised his option
and on or about June 20, 1960, LaFontaine commenced his
employment and signed an agreement to purchase 60 shares of
Unique stock, which agreement was later revised and superseded
to provide for the purchase of DuPre’s entire interest of 120
shares of Unique stock, This agreement, attached to plaintiffs’
petition and marked Exhibit “A”, provided as follows:

“The following Agreement executed this 16 day of June,
1961, by and between Developers & Builders, Inc., an Iowa Cor-
poration with its principal place of business in Waterloo, Black
Hawk County, Iowa, Party of the First Part, and Andre J.

115)

LaFontaine and DeLioma LaFontaine as joint tenants with full
right of survivorship, of Waterloo, Black Hawk County, Iowa,
Parties of the Second Part, this Agreement abrogating and
superseding the Agreements of the parties hereto made on June
15, 1960, and on November 28, 1960, Wirnessera Tar FoLLow-
ING:

“Tat Wuureas, Party of the First Part is the owner of
One Hundred Twenty (120) shares of the stock of Unique
Cleaners, Incorporated, an Iowa Corporation with principal place
of business in Waterloo, Black Hawk County, Iowa, and

“Wauuruas, Party of the First Part desires to sell said stock
unto Parties of the Second Part, and Parties of the Second Part
desire to purchase said stock from Party of the First Part, at
the price and in the manner and form hereinafter set forth,

“Now, Turrerors, THis AGREEMENT:

“Party of the First Part does herewith sell unto Parties ot
the Second Part the said One Hundred Twenty (120) shares of
stock of Unique Cleaners, Incorporated, and as payment therefor,
Second Parties covenant and agree to pay therefor the sum of
Eighty-one and 42/100 Dollars ($81.42) each and every week
hereafter until June 15, 1970, and the sum of Sixty Dollars
$60.00) per week for a fifteen (15) year period thereafter, or
until the death of the survivor of Raymond R. DuPre and Marie
A. DuPre, whichever event (the expiration of said additional
fifteen (15) year period or the death of the survivor of the said
DuPres) shall last occur.

“All voting rights of said shares shall remain in Party of
the First Part until fulfillment of the purchase terms as herein-
above specified.

“Tt is understood and agreed that a transfer of said shares
has beer executed in blank by Party of the First Part, to be
delivered to Parties of the Second Part upon fulfillment of the
terms hereof, or cancelled by Party of the First Part upon de-
fault in performance of any of the terms herein by Parties of
the Second Part:

* “Time is made of the essence of this Agreement, and failure
on the part of Parties of the Second Part to strictly and pune-
tually make payment as specified herein or make performance of

EE

any requirement herein to be made, shall at the option of Party
of the First Part render this Agreement at such time null and
void, and the rights of said Parties of the Second Part shall at
such time cease and desist.

“This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, executors
and assigns, as the case may be, of all of the parties hereto.

“In Witness Waereor, the said parties have subscribed
their names on this 16th day of June, 1961.

“Devetoprers & Buripers, Inc.
By /s/ Raymond R. DuPre, President.
Party of the First Part

“/s/ Andre J, LaFontaine
/s/ DeLoma LaFontaine
Parties of the Second Part.”

In this suit, brought in equity, the trial court found an
oral agreement of employment had been breached without just
cause by the defendant DuPre, who was fully authorized and
did speak for all defendants, and granted judgment to plain-
tiffs, Andre J. and DeLoma LaFontaine, in the sum of
$22,064.82, denied defendants’ prayer for foreclosure, and dis-
missed plaintiffs’ claim based on unjust enrichment. Both

parties appealed.

I. Our review is de novo. As the appellate court, we give
weight to the fact findings of the trial court but are not bound
by them. Rule 344(f)(7), Rules of Civil Procedure.

We are not sure, after a careful reading of the pleadings,
the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, whether the involved contract
was considered a partially-integrated agreement or two in-
dependent agreements, one written and one oral. We suspect
the former, and will so consider it in this appeal. No com-
plaint is made of the finding that DuPre was fully authorized
to act and speak for all defendants and we concur in that
finding.

In their first proposition defendant-appellants contend the
court erred in overruling their motion to dismiss filed at the
close of all evidence. The correctness of this ruling, they con-

2
‘cede, depends upon the validity of their propositions 2, 3 and 4,
next considered. :

II. In their second proposition defendant-appellants argue
the trial court erred in holding that an implied contract of
employment existed between LaFontaine and any of the de-
fendant-appellants. They contend the court did not construe
an existing agreement but created a new one, that the claimed
agreement of employment was too vague, inexact, indefinite
and nebulous as to the working hours of the employee to be
legally enforceable, and that the claimed agreement of employ-
ment is entirely unilateral in that the plaintiff was in no respect
bound to perform thereunder. We find no merit in these
contentions. :

The plaintiffs’ original petition filed September 7, 1965,
named Developers & Builders, Inc. and Raymond R. DuPre as
defendants and prayed for certain relief including. an injunc-
tion to restrain the defendants from terminating LaFontaine’s
employment. A temporary injunction was granted ex parte
and: then dissolved on September 27, 1965.

,On December 28, 1965, after being granted leave to ‘amend
their petition, the plaintiffs filed a substituted petition in three
divisions, and included Unique Cleaners, Inc. as a defendant.
Division I alleged, in substance, that the defendants breached
an employment agreement with LaFontaine by discharging him
without .justifiable cause and praying damages therefor.
Division II alleged that the employment agreement was omitted
from the written agreement between Developers and La-
Fontaine by mistake or by the misrepresentation of DuPre, and
prayed for damages.. Division III alleged a breach of an.em-
ployment, agreement and damages therefor and included an
additional -$15,000 damages for loss allegedly occasioned by
plaintiff due to the fact that he relinquished his position in the
competitive market. At the close of plaintiffs’ case they asked
and received leave of the court to add a fourth division. wherein
a count for unjust enrichment was alleged.

. EBB The parties are entitled to the benefit of that in-
terpretation. of, their evidence, and of all reasonable inferences
most. favorable to their case, in.an effort to prove the real in-
tent of the parties to an agreement, and if reasonable minds

EE

may differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence,
a question of fact exists. . “The existence of a contract, ‘meet-
ing of the minds,’ intention to assume an obligation, the under-
standing, are to be determined not alone from words used, but
in the situation, acts, and conduct of the parties, and from their
situation and the attending circumstances, and by the in-
ferences which mankind would ordinarily and reasonably draw
therefrom.”. Kladivo v. Melberg, 210 Iowa 306, 313, 227 N.W.
838, 837, and citations. Also see Storck v. Pascoe, 247 Iowa 54,
62, 72 N.W.2d 467; In re Estate of Lindsey, 254 Iowa 699, 708,
118 N.W.2d 598; Port Huron Mach. Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa
826, 221 N.W. 843; In re Estate of Newson, 206 Iowa 514, 219
N.W. 305. .

As pointed out in Smith. v. Stowell, 256 Iowa. 165,
174, 125 N.W.2d 795, there may be 4 contract implied in law on
a point not covered by an express contract, but no such im-
plied contract on a point fully covered by an express agree-
ment. Clearly, the express agreement here did not cover. the
point as to employment or the term thereof, and parol testi-
mony for the purpose of interpreting the full agreement was
permissible. Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d
164, Of course, the rule is well established that where there is
an express contract covering the subject matter, the. law: will
not imply a quasi or constructive contract.. Smith v. Stowell,
supra, and citations. Here, however, we find the ‘express agree-
ment did not fully cover the subject matter of the agreement
between the parties and the evidence was competent to establish
the intent of the full agreement.

Appellees contend and the.trial court. found that the plain-
tiff LaFontaine and the defendant DuPre, who was then the
holder of an option to purchase the controlling interest in
Unique, entered into an oral agreement on June 15, 1960, and,
contemporaneous with the written agreement to purchase
Unique stock, agreed that LaFontaine was to work for Unique
ag its general manager at a salary which was tobe large enough
to permit him to take home $100 a week plus an amount suffi-
cient to pay Developers $81.42 per week on a contract for the
purchase of 60 shares of stock in Unique. It was understood
that DuPre, on behalf of Developers, would exercise. the option.

118,

to purchase the 120 shares of stock in Unique, and in turn
Developers was to enter into an agreement with LaFontaine
whereby he would pay $81.42 per week for five years for 60
shares of stock. There is little or no dispute as to the evidence
of these transactions and we agree with this determination of
those transactions. Each of those proposals was carried out.

It was the trial court’s conclusion that the facts and cir-
cumstances revealed an implied term provision in the oral em-
ployment agreement between LaFontaine and Unique that
LaFontaine was to be employed as above set out and that his
employment would not be terminated during the life of the
agreement with Developers, except for justifiable cause. We
too find compelling reasons for this conclusion.

DuPre said he could not operate this business unless plain-
tiff or someone with experience in the management of such a
plant was employed, and he sought plaintiff's services with in-
ducements before he exercised his option to buy Unique
Cleaners. It also appears from the evidence presented that
LaFontaine was employed at Deluxe Cleaners when he was
approached by DuPre, that he and one Lemmon were buying an
interest in Deluxe, and that his take-home pay there was $100
per week plus an interest in profits. By way of inducement
DuPre offered to match his present take-home pay and an
amount sufficient to purchase 60 shares of stock in Unique.

DuPre said he did not remember the exact date of the
Unique takeover and, when asked if LaFontaine was working
for him on that date, DuPre replied: “Well, he might have * * *,
He would have done the decent thing with his ex-partner. You
know what I mean. He wouldn’t leave him flat-footed. But on
the other hand J would not go in there without him. So we had
arranged some day that would be fair to his ex-pariner, I’m sure.”
It is also evident that DuPre did not exercise his option to
purchase Unique until he was assured of LaFontaine’s employ-
ment,

HH It is defendant-appellants’ position that the court below
did not construe the existing agreement, but created a new oral
agreement of employment which included an implied term to
correspond to the written portion of the agreement. He cites
and relies upon the cases of Mallinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

ES 2:

Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 222, 111 N.W.2d 647, Smith v. Stowell, supra,
and Carter v, Certain-Teed Products Corp., 102 F.Supp. 280,
which among other things hold that an ambiguous contract may
be construed but a new contract may not be made for the parties
by arbitrary judicial construction. Although we adhere to this
doctrine, we do not find it applicable here. Clearly, plaintiffs’
position is that this agreement was only partially integrated
and the construction sought was as to the oral provisions
thereof. Obviously, the parties’ agreement contemplated more
than a mere sale of Unique stock to LaFontaine. As hereto-
fore indicated, we are satisfied this was sufficient evidence
upon which an oral agreement of employment could be main-
tained as well as support the implication as to its term.

In June 1961 the parties substantially changed the written
portion of the original agreement to include the purchase of
DuPre’s entire interest, at a rate of $81.42 per week until 1970
and then $60 per week for an additional 15 years or until the
death of both him and his wife, whichever event occurred last.
Although there is nothing to indicate any change in the oral
provisions of the agreement, it is reasonable to believe, under
this extension beneficial to DuPres, the parties contemplated no
change in the implied term provision and that LaFontaine was
to continue in the employment for the additional period. As to
this matter DuPre stated: “I paid him enough so he could
{afford to pay $81.42 per week]. It didn’t cost him anything.
The business, had he stayed there until 1985 or longer, if my
wife lived longer, wouldn’t have cost him anything.”

HEME Equity courts will not hesitate to indulge in in-
ferences which will avoid unfair or inequitable results. On this
matter we have stated, “* * * that an agreement will not be
construed so as to give one party an unfair, oppressive or in-
equitable advantage over the other, that unless the terms of the
contract clearly require it, an interpretation will not be given
which places one party at the mercy of the other, that courts
will endeavor to give the contract that interpretation most
equitable to the parties, * * *.” Freese v. Town of Alburnett,
255 Towa 1264, 1268, 1269, 125 N.W.2d 790, and citations.

Bearing this rule in mind, after careful analysis of the
record, it is:our considered opinion that the agreement sued

186

upon was a partially-integrated contract and that the interpre-
tation given the oral provisions of the agreement by the trial
court was correct...

Even if there was an oral agreement of employment, de-
fendant-appellants contend it was too vague, inexact, indefinite
and nebulous as to hours per day and days per week to be
performed, and rely upon the cases of Drake v. Block, 247 Iowa
517, 74 N.W.2d 577, and Lewis v. Minnesota Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
240 Towa 1249, 37 N.W.2d 316. We do not agree.

The Drake case dealt with a unilateral contract of employ-
ment. It was held therein that where an employment contract
is indefinite as to time and the same lacks mutuality, it may be
terminated at will by either party without incurring liability.
In the case at bar there was no indefiniteness as to time and we
hold the agreement here was bilateral. There was a promise
for a promise, and both parties were under a duty to perform
their promises. A breach by either would give rise to a cause
of action for the other. The Lewis case dealt with a contract
of employment for life and the court, recognizing that the
standard of definiteness required for a contract of employment
for life is higher than in an ordinary contract of employment
for a period of time, held the evidence there 5 was insufficient,
This is not our situation. .

LaFontaine was not an ordinary employee. He was skilled
in the operation of dry cleaning plants, with many years of ex-
perience, and could run every phase of the dry cleaning opera-
tion if need be. He was hired.as the plant manager and elected
as president of the board of Unique. His responsibilities and
duties could not be-considered those of an ordinary employee.
He was not required to work a standard eight-hour day, but,
like most employees in the management spectrum, he had no
set hours and worked until his tasks were completed. His em-
ployment in that capacity was to continue until 1985 or until
the DuPres’ interest was satisfied.

If. As their third proposition defendant-appellants con-
tend the court erred in failing to hold that LaFontaine violated
and breached the employment provisions in the agreement and
that his subsequent dismissal by defendant was justified. Per-
haps the nub of this controversy is whether, the defendant-

EE

appellants had good cause to dismiss LaFontaine from his em-
ployment with Unique Cleaners on or about September 29, 1965.
Having decided LaFontaine was employed under oral pro-
visions of their agreement, and that the implied term of employ-
ment coincided with the stock purchase part of the agreement,
obviously his employment could not be terminated before the
end of the term except for cause or by mutual agreement.
Westerfield v. Liberty Oil Co., 208 Iowa 912, 223 N.W. 894; 56
CJS., Master and Servant, section 29.

HE Usually, what constituted good and sufficient
grounds for discharge is a question for the court under the
facts and circumstances revealed.. In an action for damages
for an alleged wrongful discharge, the burden rests with the
employer to prove such disobedience, misconduct, incompe-
tence, or other justification for the dismissal. Miller v. Jones,
178 Iowa. 168, 159 N.W. 671; 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant,
section 36. -

It is defendant-appellants’ position that when plaintiffs
demanded the conveyance of 120 shares of stock in Unique
Cleaners upon the tender of a sum equal to $81.42 per week
until June 15, 1970, or the conveyance of 60 shares which
represented the amount already paid to date, and brought
suit to secure an interpretation of the parties’ agreement, this
conduct clearly indicated that LaFontaine’s interest was suffi-
eiently hostile to that of-his employer that it gave DuPre the
right to discharge him.

It is well settled that a servant must do nothing in
hostility to his master’s interests. Miller v. Jones, supra, 178
Towa 168, 172, 159 N.W. 671. Although it is not clear when
Mr. LaFontaine first became concerned about his employment
and the status of his payments on the stock purchase contract,
it does appear that on August 23, 1965, he was, by the action of
Mr. and Mrs. DuPre, relieved as president and manager of
Unique Cleaners. Thereafter he consulted a lawyer for an
interpretation of his status under the parties’ agreement and,
upon the attorney’s suggestion, he arranged to borrow sufficient
money to prepay the ten-year payments on the stock. Defend-
ants refused his tender and demand, suit was commenced to
ascertain and establish rights under the agreement, and an ex

188

parte order was obtained to prevent LaFontaine’s discharge as
an employee of Unique Cleaners. There was some testimony by
Mr. Lemmon that in the summer of 1964 DuPre approached him
about the possibility of his coming to work for Unique Cleaners,
and that when asked what would become of LaFontaine, DuPre
said, “We will kick him downstairs.” This testimony was
denied, but if believed this would indicate an attitude respon-
sible for LaFontaine’s apprehension. In any event, after the
temporary injunction barring his dismissal was lifted, La-
Fontaine was promptly discharged.

The record disclosed no evidence of open conflict
between these men. Mr. DuPre himself said, “* * * this man
(Mr. LaFontaine) and I never had a cross word between us.”
There is no charge or evidence of dishonesty, absenteeism, in-
competency, insolence, or willful destruction of the business by
either party. In fact, the business prospered. LaFontaine had
never expressed dissatisfaction with their arrangement and
agreement as he understood it, and his suit to secure immediate
stock transfers would not amount to attempted extortion. It is
reasonable to believe LaFontaine became concerned about their
entire agreement. Since it was not all integrated, LaFontaine
rightfully desired his status as an employee to be legally estab-
lished. Under the circumstances, this suit was a reasonable
means to determine the legal effect of their entire agreement,
both in regard to employment and delivery of stock fully paid
for. Did this suit indicate that his interests were sufficiently
hostile to those of his master to justify his dismissal? We
think not, We are satisfied that LaFontaine intended no harm
to Unique or to the DuPres. Understandably, DuPre did not
desire the money in a lump sum for tax reasons, the loss of
corporate control, or the surrender of the life annuity it pro-
vided. He believed those items were adequately covered in the
agreement. Understandably, LaFontaine desired security for
his past payments and assurance that his employment would
provide sufficient income to meet the agreed payments on the
stock. Hach thought their agreement so provided. The court
cannot remake agreements for the parties, but it can and
should, after hearing, interpret and declare rights under the

SS 22°

entire agreement. To seek such relief is not necessarily a
hostile maneuver, and we do not find it was here.

HMM Defendant-appellants argue some of plaintiffs’ orig-
inal allegations referred to fraud and mistake in the execution
of the final stock purchase agreement, but they did not charge
defendants intended to alter the employment agreement by any
changes in the written agreement. Plaintiffs merely alleged
that if it be claimed the revised written portion of the agree-
ment did alter the oral employment provisions, the execution
thereof would have been obtained by fraud or mistake. In
any event, we find no evidence to support a charge of fraud by
either party in this suit and no grounds which would justify
LaFontaine’s discharge as an employee of Unique Cleaners at
that time. We are satisfied that defendants breached the
agreement without just cause and became liable for damages
to plaintiffs.

IV. Plaintiffs, of course, had the duty to show by proper
measure of damage their loss due to the breach. The trial court
eorrectly held that LaFontaine was entitled to the present value
of the difference between the minimum salary he received under
the agreement, which was shown to be $201.42 per week, and
the amount he was able to earn in like employment thereafter,
shown to be $127.50 per week, for the period from September
29, 1965, to June 15, 1985, but in no event to exceed the damages
alleged and prayed in plaintiffs’ petition. There was no evi-
dence tending to prove the proper measure of damages for the
breach of the stock sales agreement, but it is obvious the dif-
ference of $73.94 per week for almost twenty years alone ex-
ceeds the amount of damages asked, and the judgment for
$22,064.82 from Unique Cleaners, Inc., should therefore be
affirmed.

V. In their fourth proposition defendant-appel-
lants contend the court erred in denying their prayer for can-
cellation or forfeiture of the stock purchase agreement. It is
the general rule in this and in most jurisdictions that a man is
permitted to make a contract which will result in a forfeiture,
and when it is clear from the terms of the contract that the
parties have so agreed, a court of equity, as well as a court of
law, will enforce the forfeiture. 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, section

190

435, If one contracts for a forfeiture, while the law will scan
it closely and will look upon it with disfavor, yet as a part of
the contract it must be enforced. Cowan v. Cowan, 247 Iowa
729, 736, 75 N.W.2d 920. While it is true forfeitures are not
favored in the law, they are not outlaws. In Fairgrave v.
Illinois Bankers Life Association, 211 Iowa 329, 334, 283 N.W.
714, 716, we said: “If the parties have, by the terms of their
agreement, fixed the consequences of a forfeiture on the viola-
tion.of it, this becomes the law of their contract, and by it they
are to be governed.” Also see 17A O.J.S., Contracts, section
407, page 497. . .

It is undenied that plaintiffs had made no payment on the
contract to purchase this stock since the third week in Septem-
ber 1965, and under the agreement plaintiffs were in default
unless excused by defendants’ breach. After noting that the
remedies prayed for by defendants in asking a decree of fore-
closure are equitable in nature, the trial court concluded under
the ciretmstances and facts in this case it would: deny the for-
feiture. It did not, however, afford plaintiffs any relief on the
“written contract that they voluntarily entered into with the
defendant corporation, Developers & Builders, Inc.” and ob-
viously felt they could have elected to continue to make those
payments and-eventually secure the stock in Unique. .

«HJ Although it may be that plaintiffs could have waived
defendant’s breach of: the sales provision of this agreement,
and we find nothing in the agreement which prevented plain-
tiffs from making the payments set forth therein from sources
other than LaFontaine’s salary from Unique, or nothing which
indicated that he had to be an employee of Unique Cleaners: to
make them, it appears plaintiffs elected to consider the entire
agreement breached and sued for all damages, including their
loss of payments already made. In any event, it is clear that
plaintiffs’ claim for damages for a total breach of this agree-
ment has: been fully litigated. and that they: have no further
claim to any shares of stock in Unique Cleaners. To deny de-
fendants a clear title to these shares, we think, would not be
equitable under these circumstances, and we liold the trial
court should have entered-a decree terminating the rights of

eS

plaintiffs in and to these stocks. To that extent the trial court’s
judgment and decree is now so modified.

VI. Having decided plaintiffs were allowed full
damages as prayed for the breach of the entire agreement, and
that they have no further right or interest in the involved 120
shares of Unique Cleaners stock, we need give little attention
to plaintiffs’ assignment of error for the dismissal of their
elaim for “unjust enrichment.” Clearly, they elected their
remedy and have been. granted the relief they asked for the
breach of the agreement. Under these circumstances a claim
for unjust enrichment will not be granted: See Restatement of
the Law of Contracts, Volume II, chapter 12, section 384(1) ;
Miller-Piehl Equipment Co. v. Gibson Comm. Co., 244 Iowa 103,
110, 56 N.W.2d 25; Granette Products Co. v. Neumann & Co.,
200 Iowa 572, 579, 203 N.W. 935, 987, 205 N.W. 205.

We conclude the trial court was correct in dismissing
plaintiffs’ Division IV alleging unjust enrichment and, with the
modification required in Division V of this opinion, the judg-
ment of the trial.court is affirmed. Costs are to be assessed
three fourths to defendants and one fourth to plaintiffs—Modi-
fied and affirmed.

All Justices coneur.
Appanoose County Rurat Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al.,

appellants, v. Iowa Starz Tax Commission (members),
appellees.

No. 52836,
(Reported in 158 N.W.24 176)

Apru. 9, 1968.

McGrane & Haugan, of Des Moines, Life, Davis & Life, of
Oskaloosa, and Hugh W. Lundy, of Albia, all for appellants.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, George W. Murray,
Special Assistant Attorney General, and Harry Griger, Assistant
Attorney General, of Des Moines, for appellees.

Brcxrr, J.—Plaintiffs are an incorporated taxpayer’s as-
sociation and four individual taxpayers of Appanoose County.
They seek declaratory and injunctive relief alleging the defend-
ant Iowa State Tax Commission and its members, as such, acted
arbitrarily and illegally in ordering the county board of review

119

to adjust the assessed value of the real estate in Appanoose
County by increasing the valuations of all agricultural land 20
percent and decréasing the valuations of all agricultural build-
ings 25 percent, Defendants.filed motion to dismiss and motion
to strike. The trial court sustained their motion to dismiss on
all grounds and passed the motion to strike as moot under the cix-
cumstances. :

I. A brief review of the assessment procedures in Iowa is
provided in Hougen v. George, 254 Iowa 1055, 1058, 120 N.W.2d
497. Rather than repeat the summary here we will note plain-
tiffs allege the county assessor and county board of review pre-
pared and transmitted to the state tax commission an abstract
of the real and personal property in the county ‘containing the
items required by Iowa Code, 1966, section 441.45.

Towa Code, 1966, provides for state action after county
officials have performed their statutory duties:

“441.46 State board of review. The state tax commission
shall constitute the state board of review, and shall meet at the
seat of government on the second Monday of July in each year.

“441.47 Adjusted valuations. The state board of review
shall adjust the valuation of property in the several counties
adding to or deducting from the valuation of each kind or class
of property such percentage in each ease as will bring the same
to its taxable value as fixed in this chapter and chapters 427 to
443 inclusive, It shall also adjust.the valuations as between each
kind or class of property in any city assessed by a city assessor
and each kind or class of property in the same county assessed
by the county assessor.”

Section 421.17, dealing with the powers and duties of the
state tax commission, gives it supervisory powers over local tax-
ing bodies to the end that all assessments of property and taxes
levied thereon be made relatively just and uniform in substantial
compliance with the law. :

In Des Moines Gas Co. v. Saverude, 190 Iowa 165, 170, 180
N.W. 193, we said: “The duty of the state board of equalization
is to adjust the value of property of the several kinds, adding to
or deducting from the valuation of each kind or claim such per-
centage, in each case, ag will bring the same to its reasonable
value. Its function ts to equalize the value of property between

ES 13°5

the several counties, not to review the action of the assessor or of
the local board of review, or of the district court on appeal.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

Il. Plaintiffs allege Appanoose County hired the J. M.
Cleminshaw Company, a professional property appraisal firm,
to reappraise and revalue all taxable real property in the
eounty. This was done pursuant to order of the state tax com-
mission. The professional appraisement was completed in ac-
cordance with the law and regulations of the commission. The
results (with certain irrelevant exceptions) were approved by
the county assessor and county board of review. The abstract
as furnished contained assessed valuations. of all real property
based on 27 percent of fair market value as thus determined.

Plaintiffs also allege the commission sitting as a board of
review then notified the auditor of Appanoose County of pro-
posed adjustments including a 20 percent increase on all agri-
cultural land and a 20 percent decrease on all mercantile land.
On hearing the 20 percent decrease in mercantile property was
withdrawn but the increase on agricultural land was effectual
for 1966, 1967 and 1968.

Thereafter the state tax commission sitting as such ordered
a 25 percent decrease in the value of all agricultural buildings.
This order was entered February 22, 1966. When the Ap-
panoose County board did not comply; another order to the
same effect was formally issued May 24, 1966, and this time the
county did comply.

Plaintiffs state the alleged purpose of the commission
orders was to adjust the valuations of those classes of property
in the several counties to bring the valuations of those classes
of property in Appanoose County to their taxable value as
fixed in chapters 427 through 448, Code of Iowa, -1962; the
commission refused to disclose the data, computations and in-
formation used as a basis for the orders. The sole reasons given
for the orders were the county valuations were in error and
not in line with those established in other counties for similar
classes of property. Plaintiffs then alleged as conclusion that
the actions of defendants were arbitrary, capricious, illegal
and discriminatory for the following reasons:

1196

“(a) The increase ordered in agricultural land places a
discriminatory rate of 72% of actual value on agricultural land
while other property in Appanoose County bears the legal rate
of 60% of actual value.

“(b) The decrease ordered in agricultural buildings
places a discriminatory rate of 45% of actual value on agri-
eultural buildings while other property in Appanoose County
bears the legal rate of 60% of actual value.

“(e) The adjustments created an inequalization of the
property tax burden of Appanoose County, Iowa.

“(d) The Commission’s order of adjustment of May 24,
1966, relative to agricultural buildings was issued without
authority, the Commission having no statutory authority to
order such adjustments.

“(e) The December 29, 1965, order of the Board of Re-
view is void for the reason that Section 441.47, Code of Iowa,
1962, is unconstitutional and void in that said Section fails to
establish standards for adjustments and further constitutes an
unlawful delegation of power in that same attempts to give the
Board of Review authority to assess property in excess of 60%
of actual value as limited in Section 421.21, Code of Iowa,
1962.”

Defendants’ motion to dismiss was “sustained on all
grounds”, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Plaintiffs have no standing to sue.

2. Plaintiffs have failed to allege wherein the commis-
sion’s actions were illegal, void, arbitrary or otherwise
eapricious.

8. There is no appeal from the commission’s exclusive
jurisdiction to enter the order of which plaintiffs

complain.

4, The petition asks for relief that neither the commission
nor this court can grant.

5. A final order of equalization by the board of review is
not appealable.

6. The May 24th order of the commission was carried out
by the local board of review and failure to appeal that
order as by statute provided is fatal.

MI 110. Defendants assert a voluntary taxpayer's as-
sociation has no standing to bring an action of this type on
behalf of its members. The cases cited involve unincorporated
associations. One plaintiff is a corporation. A corporation is
treated as an entity separate from its stockholder or stock-
holders under all ordinary cireumstances. Inn Operations, Inc. v.
River Hills Motor Inn Co., 261 Iowa 72, 84, 152 N.W.2d 808, 815.
The corporation does not claim to be a taxpayer. The other four
plaintiffs allege they are taxpayers. If the individuals have
standing to sue, the corporation would be subject to motion to
dismiss as an improper party under rule 27, R.C.P., but the cause
as to the individual taxpayers would remain. Misjoinder of
parties is not ground for dismissal of action under rule 27. See
Comment in Cook, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, page 186,

| The individual plaintiffs argue they have a right to
maintain this action as taxpayers, their action being in form
and effect a class action. It is alleged they are residents, free-
holders and taxpayers of Appanoose County whose situation
is similar and interest identical to that of many other resi-
dents, freeholders and taxpayers of the county. In Pierce v.
Green, 229 Iowa 22, 44, 294 N.W. 287, 250, 181 A.L.R. 335, we
said: “There are a great many decisions in which disecrimina-
tion against a taxpayer, or a class, or large numbers of tax-
payers caused them to pay a disproportionate share of the tax
burden, either because of the law itself, or because of the ar-
bitrary, systematic and intentional administration of the law.
In these cases, because there was no plain, speedy, and ade-
quate remedy at law, relief was granted in equity. In many of
these cases relief was granted because the due process or equal
protection of the law clauses of the fourteenth amendment were
violated.” :

The four individual taxpayer plaintiffs have standing to
bring action under the principles set forth in Pierce v. Green,
supra, and this is a class action under rule 42, R.C.P.

IV. Defendant’s second ground for motion to dismiss is
essentially failure to state a cause of action. They assert plain-
tiffs have failed to allege by well pleaded ultimate facts wherein
the commission’s action was illegal, void, arbitrary or otherwise
capricious.

9S

Hl “A motion to dismiss is sustainable only where it ap-
pears to a certainty a plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the
claims asserted by him.” Newton v. City of Grundy Center, 246
Towa 916, 920, 70°N.W.2d 162.

Plaintiffs have alleged the assessment was completed by
the county assessor and county board of review with the help of
the Cleminshaw Company in accordance with valuation
standards prescribed by law and approved by the commission
and as a result the burden of property taxes was equal and
uniform in the county. They further assert the two orders
referred to resultéd in a discriminatory rate of 72 percent of
agricultural land and. 45 percent on agricultural buildings
while all other property in the county bears the legal 60 per-
cent rate. They contend the changes were made without ex-
planation other than that the valuations changed were in error
and not in line with the valuations on the same classes of
property in other districts.

" [EB] It is the duty of.the commission to equalize the various
classes of property. of each county with all the-other counties
and to equalize all the counties with each other. It is also the
duty of the commission to see-that all property in each’ county
is as reasonably uniformly and equally appraised and taxed as
is possible. Plaintiffs assert the noted deviation in equal per-
centage rates results from a commission order: having no
factual basis or reason of any. kind. They contend the actions
of the.assessor and county board of review carry a strong pre-
sumption of correctness.

HV. Defendants argue the appraisals contain no pre-
sumption of correctness at all until the tax commission has
acted. The proper rule as applied to this case would appear to
lie somewhere between. the extremes. Certainly the presump-
tion of correctness is not as strong before the commission’s
action as after it has been confirmed. But we have little doubt
the action of the county assessor and the .county board of
review is entitled to some presumptive validity. The work of
the regular officials is strengthened by the help of an indepen-
dent firm of valuation experts. See Brennan v. Black, 34 Del.
Ch. 880, 104 A.2d 777, 794. Since the state commission is en-

Ee

joined by law to review such work, this presumption is prob-
ably not as strong here as it is against a taxpayer challenging
the validity of an assessment. But we have held where valua-
tions were made by county officers and challenged by taxpayers
there is a presumption assessing authorities have performed
their duties and the assessments are correct. Deere Mfg. Co.
vy. Zeiner, 247 Iowa 1364, 1370, 78 N.W.2d 527, 79 N.W.2d 403;
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Iowa State Tax Comm., 257 Iowa
1359, 187 N.W.2d 246, 253. To set such assessments aside with-
out reason would constitute arbitrary action. Plaintiffs allege
the expert appraisers were hired pursuant to order of the com-
mission and at substantial cost to the county.

HI VI. All of the foregoing observations are made pur-
suant to the rule set forth in Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258
Towa 314, 188 N.W.2d 856, 860; the well pleaded ultimate
facts are taken as true. Under such rules the petition pleads a
cause of: action. We do not intimate the tax commission did
in fact act arbitrarily, but hold only that under the facts al-
leged a motion to dismiss should have been denied.. The entire
nature of the action and the burden of plaintiffs is similar to
that noted in Brennan v. Black, supra, where at page 408 of
34 Del.Ch., 792 of 104 A.2d, the Delaware Court said: “What the
taxpayer is seeking here is to set aside the entire assessment on
the ground that the Board has completely disregarded the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions in the per-
formance of its duty. In such a case the burden resting upon
the taxpayer is a very heavy one.” In Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.
v. Iowa State Tax Comm., 257 Iowa 1359, 1871, 187 N.W.2d 246,
we said: “Unless the assessment is so out of line with other
actual values as to give rise to the inference the authority has
not properly discharged its duty, the assessment should not be
disturbed.”

VII. Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutionality of the
procedure and the statutory validity of the commission’s acts.
The question is not whether they can successfully carry their
burdens in relation to such assertions, but whether they have
alleged enough to remain in court to try to do so.

Defendants cite People ex rel. State Board of Equalization
vy. Pitcher, 61 Colo, 149, 174, 156 P. 812, 820, “Throughout the

120

states of the Union, boards of equalization are not generally re-
quired to examine witnesses or to base their action on any
particular kind or quantum of evidence, but may proceed in their
own way and act on any information which is satisfactory to
them.” (Emphasis supplied by defendants.) This statement
must be interpreted within the context of the constitutional due
process clauses. The discretion of the commission is a legal dis-
eretion.

Defendants cite Hacker v. Howe, 72 Neb. 385, 390, 101 N.W.
255, 257, as follows: “The question, therefore, of fraud, arbitrary
or capricious action, or other alleged improper motive or con-
duct on the part of the different members of the board in enter-
ing the order complained of, must be eliminated in the considera-
tion of all further questions arising in the case.” But that
observation came after approval of the lower court's finding the
board of equalization acted in good faith and without fraud.

HI The better rule of that case on that point is found in the
opinion at page 394 of 72 Neb., page 259 of 101 N.W.: “In the
absence of fraud, or other misconduct, or arbitrary exercise of
power equivalent thereto, the rule is universal to the effect that
the discretion of assessing officers and boards of equalization
cannot be controlled by the courts in collateral proceedings, nor
ean errors of judgment and overvaluation in the assessment of
property be rightfully reviewed by them in the absence of
statutes authorizing such proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This rule is similar to our pronouncements in Pierce v. Green,
supra (where arbitrary action was alleged), and Hougen v.
George, supra (where arbitrary action was not alleged).

VUI. Defendants base their third ground for dismissal on
lack of statutory authority to appeal.

HH It is clear there is no statutory appeal from the state
board of review’s equalization action taken pursuant to the
mandate in Iowa Code, 1966, section 441.47. This action is not
an appeal. In 2 Am, Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 707
page 606, we find the following: “The fact that a statute does
not provide for judicial review of action of an administrative
agency does not preclude the courts from providing such re-
view as is necessary or required, and the courts will, in some

ES 20:

appropriate proceeding, provide such review.” See Pierce v.
Green and Hougen v. George, both supra.

In Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 207 Iowa
56, 60, 222 N.W. 488, where after a careful review of the rights
of the individual vis-a-vis the state where such a defense is
asserted, this court concluded: “So, where the individuals com-
posing a commission or board or other arm of the state violate
the clear provisions of the state Constitution or statute, and
attempt to appropriate private property for public use without
authority, the rights of the owner may be protected by the
courts through the agency of an injunction or some other suit-
able means.”

We hold a suit of this nature is maintainable under proper
allegations. .

IX. Defendants’ next point would deny the jurisdiction of
this court to allow any of the relief asked by plaintiffs; that is,
by declaratory judgment or injunction. Where there is a
justiciable controversy relief by way of declaratory judgment
has frequently been afforded. Annotations, 182 A.L.R. 1108;
11 A.L.R.2d 359, A cautionary note is sounded at 11 A.L.R.2d
359: “The courts will frequently refuse to enter declaratory
judgments in controversies concerning: taxes even though the
statutes are broad enough to authorize the entry of a judgment.
The courts have a discretion as to whether they will enter a
declaratory judgment; they should proceed cautiously in tax
eases to avoid interfering with the collection of revenues; and
the cases are often such that the court ought to deny declara-
tory relief.”

HN We have not passed on the declaratory judgment
question in this field. Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, Nos. 261
to 269, authorize declaratory judgments in very broad terms
and we have often said such rules are to be liberally ‘construed
to carry out their purpose. Lewis Consolidated School District
of Cass County v. Johnston, 256 Iowa 236, 127 N.W.2d 118;
Wright v. Thompson, 254 Iowa 342, 117 N.W.2d 520.

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief. Rule 266 provides:
“Supplemental relief based on a declaratory judgment may be
granted wherever necessary or proper. * * *,”

202

HH lt is true, as defendants assert, the courts are re-
luctant to interfere with the tax process and will not substitute
their own judgment for the judgment of the state tax com-
mission exercised pursuant to statutory authority. It does
not follow that the taxpayer is totally without relief if the tax
commission has acted illegally, arbitrarily or beyond its statu-
tory authority. Plaintiffs-do not ask the court to substitute
its judgment for that of the commission. They ask for dee-
laration the commission acted illegally. If their allegations
and proof are sufficient Pierce v. Green, supra, affords basis for
relief. Declaratory judgment and injunction may be appro-
priate if plaintifis sustain their burden at trial.

-X. Defendants’ fifth ground also involves denial of plain-
tiffs’ right to “appeal.” As noted in Division VIII this is not
an appeal. ‘What was said in that division is determinative
here.

XI. Defendants’ last position is plaintiffs seek relief
that. should have been sought as to their individual assess-
ments. In addition to our approval of class actions we note
defendants’ own assertion for a different purpose. “[W]here a
taxpayer, contesting an ad valorem tax, alleges that his prop-
erty is valued at a higher percentage of actual value than
other property his comparison must be between similar and like
property ; comparison with dissimilar property or property of a
different class ig not sufficient. Clark v. Board of Review of
Lucas County, 242 Iowa 80, 44 NW: 2d 748.” (Emphasis supplied
by defendants.)

It is the very fact that this is, as defendants contend, an
equalization problem, and not an individual assessment problem
which precludes the taxpayers from attacking the matter piece-
meal as individual taxpayers. Plaintiffs claim the equalization
by class was arbitrary and discriminatory, hence the approach
by class action would seem not only proper but necessary.

HME (XII. Since we remand this case for further proceed-
ings one more matter should be noted. Plaintiffs argue the tax
commission’s action ordering changes in valuation without an
appraisal of its own is, in itself, arbitrariness. We cannot agree.
The tax commission’s methods of arriving at its determination

ES 320:

are not to be dictated by any such holding. Hougen v, George,
supra, lists some ten factors used by the commission in its
equalization process. The use of part or all of these factors are
matters for determination by the commission, not the courts.

But the record is as yet silent as to what, if any, factors
the commission considered. The May 24th order does not give
any reason for the commission’s action. It simply orders the
changes made. The commission has a right to so act. But having
so acted, it leaves the courts with no information contra to the
allegations of fact resulting in plaintiffs’ charge of arbitrary
action.

‘We may appropriately close this opinion with the concluding
lines of Pierce v. Green, supra, at page 55 of 229 Iowa: “By our
decision we are merely holding that the motion to dismiss should
have been overruled, The judgment dismissing plaintiff’s action
is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to the district court
for such further disposition, not inconsistent herewith, as the
action of the parties may properly require. Any relief which
that court may grant must depend upon the record then made
and the facts and conditions as they then exist.”—Reversed and
remanded.

All Justices concur,

Boarp or Epucation or Green Mountain Inprenpent ScHoon
District et al., appellants, v. lowa Srarz Boarp or Pusuic
Instruction, appellee.

No. 52870,
(Reuorted in 157 N.W.2d 919)

0

een

ES 205

re
Apri. 9, 1968.

Haupert, Robertson & Johnson and Mote, Wilson & Welp, all
of Marshalltown, for appellants. .

David B. Hendrickson and Elizabeth Nolan, Assistant At-
torneys General, of Des Moines, for appellee.

LeGranp, J.—We are required by this appeal to determine
the propriety of certain acts of defendant. in connection with
proceedings affecting Marion Independent School District No.
4, Green Mountain Independent School District and Marshall-
town Independent School District, all in Marshall County,
Towa. The governing statute is 275.1, Code, 1966, the per-
tinent part of which provides, “ * * * It is further declared to
be the policy of the state that all the area of the state shall be
in a district maintaining twelve grades by July 1, 1966. If any
area of the state is not a part of such a district by April 1,
1966, or is not included in a reorganization petition filed in ac-
cordance with section 275.12 on or before April 1, 1966, the
area shall be attached by the county board of education to a
district, or districts maintaining twelve grades, such attach-
ment to become effective July 1, 1966, and provided such at-
tachment has the approval of the state board of public instrue-
tion. Any such district or part thereof attached by the county
board of education, with the approval of the state board of
public instruction, shall have the right to appeal this attach-
ment to a court of record in the county in which said district or

1206

part thereof is located within twenty days after the date of the
approval by the state board of public instruction.”

Prior to April 1, 1966, an attempt to merge the Marion
district with the Marshalltown district as provided i in chapter
275 had failed,-and on that date the Marion district neither
maintained twelve grades, nor was it included as part of any
reorganization petition filed under section 275.12, Code, 1966.
It was therefore within the statutory directive requiring the
Marshall County Board of Education to attach it to a twelve-
grade district by July 1, 1966. The parties have been unable
to agree which district that shall be, Green Mountain Inde-
pendent School District or Marshalltown Independent School
District, Pending the outcome of this appeal, it stands at-
tached to Marshalltown Independent School District.

For convenience the school districts involved are herein-
after referred to simply as Marion, Green Mountain and
Marshalltown.

I. Plaintiffs brought this district court action in cer-
tiorari to challenge the legality of defendant’s order of June
28, 1966, rescinding its previous order of June 16, 1966. The
June 16th order approved attachment of Marion to Green
Mountain ; the June 28th, order withdrew that approval. Plain-
tiffs attack both the authority of defendant to take this action
and the manner in which it did so. The district court found
against, plaintiffs and dismissed their petition. If defendant
had jurisdiction and did not exceed its statutory power, the
trial court must be affirmed.

HME The function of certiorari is to test the authority of
an, inferior tribunal, not the correctness of its findings. Rule
306, Rules of Civil Procedure; Hohl v. Board of Education, 250
Towa 502, 508, 94 N.W.2d 787; Iowa-Illinois Gas-& Electric
Company v. Gaffney, 256 Iowa 1029, 1041, 129 N.W.2d 832.
Certiorari is a law action and this appeal is not de novo. We
are bound by the trial court’s findings if they have substantial
support in the evidence. Rule 318, Rules of Civil Procedure;
14 C.IS.S., Certiorari, section 172, page 311; Grant v. Norris, 249
Towa 286, 253, 85 N.W.2d 261; Hubka vy. County Board of
Edneation, 251 Iowa 659, 664, 102 N.W.2d 167; Iowa-Illinois
Gas & Electric Company v. Gaffney, supra.

eS 2

Plaintiffs allege two assignments of error: (1) The de-
fendant’s order of June 16, 1966, approving the attachment of
Marion to Green Mountain was a finality and defendant had no
authority thereafter to rescind it; (2) Even if such authority
did exist, defendant acted in such a capricious, arbitrary and
illegal manner that its subsequent order of June 28, 1966, is
void and cannot stand.

IL. Before discussing plaintiffs’ first assignment of error,
we briefly outline the background of this dispute. Prior to
April 1, 1966, a merger of Marion and Marshalltown was at-
tempted under section 275.40, Code, 1966. This merger failed.
On April 11, 1966, the.Marshall County Board of Education
voted to attach part of Marion to Marshalltown, and part to
Green Mountain. The defendant, whose approval to any -at-
tachment between districts is required by section 275.1, re-
fused to sanction this split plan. Therefore it too failed. .On
June 14, 1966, the Marshall County Board considered a motion
to attach Marion to Marshalltown. This proposal was defeated
by a three-to-two vote. It next considered attaching. Marion
to Green Mountain; this was adopted by..a three-to-two vote.
On June 16, acting under the authority of 275.1, defendant
approved the attachment of Marion to Green Mountain. How-
ever, this by no means ended the matter. Almost immediately
defendant had misgivings about its approval. On the, very
next day a proposal to reconsider barely failed by a four-to-
four vote. Then on June 28, perilously close to the July. Ist
date upon which the attachment of Marion to Green Mountain
would have become effective under section 275.1, defendant
rescinded its approval of June 16 and returned the problem to
the Marshall County Board of Education “to re-evaluate, re-
affirm * * * or re-assign.” On June 30 the Marshall County
Board. of Education, reversing its own June 14th decision,
voted unanimously to attach Marion to Marshalltown. There
the dispute rests. Pending outcome of this appeal, defendant
has neither approved nor disapproved this last attachment
resolution. :

The parties agree our determination is not controlled by
the statutory provisions relating to mergers or reorganizations.

1208

This is a proceeding contesting the attachment of one district
to another as provided for under section 275.1. As we point
out in Division III, infra, the statutory requirements for at-
tachment are entirely different from those by which mergers
and reorganizations are effected.

Although we have considered a seemingly endless stream
of eases dealing with school districts, the present cause is
unique. We have not heretofore been called upon to decide
the precise question it raises.

It is this: Once the defendant approved the attachment of
Marion to Green Mountain, on June 16, 1966, did it thereby
lose jurisdiction to later withdraw that approval and rescind
that order? If so, the subsequent order of June 28, 1966, is a
nullity and Marion stands attached to Green Mountain. There
is authority permitting either an affirmative or negative answer
to this inquiry. An annotation on the subject appears at 73
A.L.B.2d, page 939.

|| Defendant is an administrative body created by statute
and enjoys only such powers as the legislature has given it.
Brighton Independent School District v. County Board of Ed-
ucation, 252 Iowa 734, 737, 108 N.W.2d 510; Springville Com-
munity School District v. Iowa Department of Public Instruc-
tion, 252 Iowa 907, 914, 109 N.W.2d 218, and citations.

Those jurisdictions which hold an administrative decision.
once made, is final usually do so on the ground there should be
an end to controversy and interested parties, subject only to
whatever right of appeal the statute grants, should be able to
rely upon the certainty of a formal determination by such
body. Annotation, 73 A.L.R.2d 939, 943; Murdock v. Perkins,
219 Ga. 756, 185 S.H.2d 869. However, attention is also called
to the dissenting opinion in that case. The opposite view holds
the purposes for which the administrative body was created
should be protected by the courts, and reconsideration of prior
decisions should be permitted to serve the ends of essential
justice and the policy of the law. 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administra-
tive Law, sections 520-523, page 329; Anchor Casualty Com-
pany v. Bongards Cooperative Creamery Asseciation, 253 Minn.
101, 91 N.W.2d 122, 73 A.L.R.2d 933,

2200

Even when a redetermination is permitted, courts usually
require that certain cireumstances be first shown. A review of
authorities assembled in the annotation in 73 A.L.R.2d, supra,
discloses one or more of the following are most generally relied
on: (1) The original order must not have become final; (2)
Rights of interested persons must not have become vested;
(8) There must be no statutory prohibition against such re-
consideration; and (4) The board making the order must not
have lost jurisdiction by reason of appeal from its finding. See
also 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, sections 520-523,
page 329.

It is significant here that all these are present. When de-
fendant acted on June 28, the original order had not yet become
effective; no right had become vested and no change of position
in reliance thereon is shown; our statute does not prohibit re-
consideration of a prior decision; and, the limited right of appeal
granted by section 275.1 had not been exercised.

We might mention, too, what little language there is in
section 275.1 relative to defendant’s approval of attachment
proceedings favors the right to reconsider. The statute declared
a proposed attachment would become effective July 1, 1966,
“provided such attachment has the approval of the state board of
public instruction.” (Emphasis added.) We take this to mean
such approval must exist on the date the attachment takes effect.
If this be true, it must necessarily follow that approval -pre-
viously given could be withdrawn prior to July 1, This conclu-
sion is strengthened by Davies v. Monona County Board of Ed-
ueation, 257 Iowa 985, 991, 185 N.W.2d 663, 666, where we
tacitly recognized the right of an administrative body to change
its mind when we said, “Nor are we cited to any authority which
prevents the board of the high school district involved—in this
case Monona—from changing its acceptance of the school district
not operating a high school—Castana—at anytime before the
merger is approved by the county board.” (Emphasis added.)
In other words, absent statutory interdiction, the Monona Board
could reverse its decision until the matter moved up the next
rung on the administrative ladder. As applied to the facts
here under consideration that statement suggests defendant was

210

justified in altering its position before the controversy passed.
beyond its control either by appeal, which would deprive it of
jurisdiction, or by its failure to act before the effective date
of the original order, which would then be a finality except
for the right of appeal.

HEME Although not factually in point we repeat what we
said in Turnis v. Board of Education, 252 Iowa 922, 938, 109
N.W.2d 198, 208, “We are inclined to again express the position
of this court * * * we believe it our duty to liberally construe
the law [chapter 275] with a view to promoting the reorganiza-
tion of school districts in the state as expressed in the statutes.
Technical or fine lines will not be drawn or inferences in-
dulged which would invalidate a reorganized and operating
school district such as we have here.- On the other hand, all
inferences in favor of the legality of official steps will be ob-
‘served, and only where it clearly appears there was a failure
to substantially comply with the statutory requirements will
there be found jurisdictional violations.” *

HE We reaffirm that statement and find it particularly ap-
plicable here. Under the circumstances shown here, we hold
defendant had authority to rescind its order of June 16, 1966,
and to withdraw its approval of the proposed attachment of
Marion to Green Mountain.

. [HB UL. Having determined that defendant had authority
to rescind its order of June 16, 1966, we now consider plain-
tiffs’ second objection attacking the manner in which this was
done. Plaintiffs criticize the action of defendant as being
arbitrary and capricious. They claim such action is void be-
cause defendant based its decision on new facts and evidence
heard ex parte and without notice to plaintiffs, who were
afforded no‘ opportunity to explain, rebut, or cross-examine in
regard to such new evidence. Plaintiffs rely strongly upon In
re Lone Tree Community School District, 260 Iowa 719, 150
N.W-2d 687. We agree with the views expressed there, but we
do not consider them controlling here. As plaintiffs themselves
have been eareful to point out, we are dealing with a school
attachment under the authority of section 275.1. The Lone
‘Tree case was a reorganization matter involving merger. The

SS 2

difference lies in the statutory procedure which distinguishes
one from the other.

Attachment under 275.1 was a last-ditch method of com-
plying with the legislative mandate that every area of the
state be included within a twelve-grade district by July 1,
1966. It was resorted to only after all else had failed to ac-
complish that end. Certainly it must be conceded the in-
terested parties had tried diligently to find some other way to
resolve their differences. Agreement was impossible; ap-
parently it still is. Only by exercising the broad power which
275.1 vested in the County Board of Education did Marion
become part of a twelve-grade district before the statutory
deadline.

In Lone Tree we held the State Board of Publie Instruction
had acted illegally, capriciously and unreasonably in conducting
its own out-of-court survey subsequent to a public hearing in
connection with a reorganization petition. We held this action
deprived the parties of the fundamental right to present their
views and to make objection to evidence offered in opposition
thereto. We reversed on this basis. We reiterate when a
hearing is provided for, it must be conducted in a way to safe-
guard the rights of those parties who have an interest therein.
2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 398, page 203. The
difficulty confronting plaintiffs, however, is that section 275.1
permits attachment to be accomplished without notice or hearing.

HI Although various sections of chapter 275 provide for
notice, hearings, elections and filing of objections with ref-
erence to reorganizations and mergers, none of these pro-
ecedural safeguards is provided in section 275.1 dealing with
attachments by the County Board of Education. If the legisla-
ture had the power to authorize such action without notice of
hearing, decisions dealing with the manner in which hearings,
if required, must be conducted have no application. The ques-
tion before us, therefore, is not whether this case follows the
rules set out in the Lone Tree decision, but rather whether the
legislature could properly dispense with such requirements. We
hold it could.

Unless a statute requires it or unless some con-
stitutional right is transgressed, it is well established adminis-

12

trative bodies may act within the limits of their legislative
authority without giving notice or providing a hearing. 2 Am.
Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 403, page 210, We have
already mentioned the statute does not require notice or hear-
ing as a condition to approval of an attachment under 275.1,
and we have several times held proceedings under chapter 275
involve no constitutional questions which would make notice
and hearing mandatory. Wall v. County Board of Education,
249 Iowa 209, 227, 86 N.W.2d 231, 242; Davies v. Monona
County Board of Education, 257 Iowa 985, 994, 185 N.W.2d 663,
668, and citations.

It is somewhat ironic that plaintiffs bitterly assail the
manner in which the defendant’s decision of June 28 was
reached while at the same time relying strongly upon the
validity of defendant’s order of June 16, which was arrived at
by the same method plaintiffs here criticize. Each was made
without notice or hearing. As the trial court pointed out, if
defendant could reach its original determination without notice
or hearing, then it could likewise rescind its finding without
those formalities.

We find no merit in plaintiffs’ claim that defendant
based its order of June 28 on “new evidence.” True, defend-
ant received complaints from some of those who were ‘dis-
appointed by the attachment of Marion to Green Mountain.
However, it also heard from some of those who approved of
this action, including at least one of the plaintiffs. We venture
the opinion it is not unusual, particularly in school contro-
versies, for interested persons to communicate to administrative
bodies dissatisfaction over decisions reached. We fear plain-
tiffs place unwarranted emphasis on this practice.

We have not overlooked plaintiffs’ argument that defend-
ant’s action in reality is the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
when none in fact exists. We do not.so consider it. It was,
purely and simply, a change of heart exercised promptly in
substantial compliance with its statutory authority and before
the rights of any interested party had been adversely affected.
Perhaps the necessity for such reconsideration is more readily
apparent when one considers the harassed defendant was re-

a 1218

quired, between April 29, 1966 and July 15, 1966, to consider
and act upon 683 attachment proceedings. To require that
each should immediately become a final and conclusive deter-
mination under all circumstances would be to impose upon de-
fendant a burden which is both unwarranted and unnecessary.

‘We find ample evidence to support the findings of the trial
court. The judgment should be affirmed.—Affirmed.

All Jusrices concur.

Harotp Brooks, appellant, v. Donap Dickey, appellee.

No. 52883,
(Reported in 158 N.W.24 11)

Apmm. 9, 1968,

Eckhardt, Goedken & Burns, of Muscatine, for appellant.

Seymore M, Raben, of Davenport, for appellee.

Moors, J.—This is a law action tried to the court for dam-
ages to automobiles resulting from collision on a narrow bridge.
Plaintiff Harold Brooks appeals from denial of his claim and
judgment for defendant Donald Dickey on his counterclaim.
We affirm.

About 9:30 am. March 7, 1966, plaintiff was driving his
1962 Ford in a southerly direction on County Road W in
Muscatine County. Located thereon approximately ten miles
west of Muscatine is a bridge 300 feet long, 1514 feet wide,
commonly known as Salisbury Bridge. We take judicial notice
this is a relatively narrow bridge by modern standards. In any
event, several witnesses so described it. The approach to the
bridge from the west curves over a distance of approximately
300 feet resulting in a ninety-degree directional change so that
the road actually runs east and west across the bridge.

Defendant’s wife, accompanied by two of ‘her minor
children, was then driving defendant’s 1964 Oldsmobile in a
westerly direction across the bridge. A collision of the left
front corners of the two vehicles occurred about six feet east
of the west end of the bridge. On trial the parties stipulated
the amount of damages to each Vehicle.

Each driver had traveled the road on several prior oc.
casions and was familiar with the width and flow of traffic
across the bridge.

Plaintiff testified he saw deferidant’s car midway on the
bridgé as he was ‘negotiating the curve leading to it from the
west, Defendant’s ‘wife observed plaintiff's vehicle about the
same time. Both estimated their respective speeds as 15 to 20
miles per hour when each first saw the other.

Plaintiff further testified that upon seeing defendant’s car
he began decelerating on the somewhat slick gravel road and

a a 1215

eventually came to a complete stop with the front eight feet of
his car on the bridge and the rear remaining on the gravel road.
His vehicle was stopped within three inches from the south
guardrail of the bridge.

The record supports the conclusion plaintiff accomplished
this stop when defendant’s car was approximately 15 feet to
the east. Defendant's vehicle continued, was not turned to the
right (north) and the collision resulted. No personal injuries
resulted. :

On the day of the mishap the visibility was clear although
snow had fallen the previous day, resulting in a one-inch snow
cover. Plaintiff stated the approach to the bridge was some-
what slippery, causing him to pump his brakes to avoid sliding
while stopping his car. Only one set of tire tracks led across
the bridge and these had been caused by ears following the
same path. These tracks proceeded down the center of the
bridge and were being followed by Mrs. Dickey.

The impact thrust plaintiffs car directly rearward ap-
proximately three feet. Mrs. Dickey testified she turned to
the right in an attempt to avoid the collision but the physical
facts do not support this contention and the trial court refused
to so find. Plaintiff testified he saw Mrs. Dickey “let loose of
the steering wheel and reach for—I couldn’t tell for sure, but
her body moved to the right-hand ‘side of the car.’ Mrs.
Diekey’s baby boy was riding next to her in the.front seat. She
stated she did not have “any recollection of letting loose of the
wheel before the accident.” .

Mrs. Dickey testified it was common practice for a car
approaching the bridge to stop in the road and wait for another
if it had already commenced to cross. She said she thought
plaintiff would do so. The gravel road was several feet wider
than the bridge.

Another witness testified he always waited for other cars
before he crossed over, adding that he did not know the
practice of other people in this regard. A different witness
stated “to some extent” a custom had arisen whereby people
would wait for an approaching car to complete the crossover,
at least when the road was very wet or slick. An investigating
officer testified he was not aware of such custom in the com-

1216 | 7

munity although he had observed vehicles waiting for other
cars to cross. He stated he would not pull onto the bridge in
the face of an oncoming car if the surface of the bridge was
slippery or the sun were in his eyes. Defendant testified he
had regularly passed cars on the bridge and that this in fact
often happened.

I. The trial court found Mrs. Dickey negligent in failing
to have her car under control. Plaintiff was found negligent
for failing to exercise reasonable care in driving upon the
bridge knowing as he rounded the curve defendant’s car. was
then halfway across and that the bridge was narrow and snow
covered except for one set of tracks. Defendant-owner was
allowed .to recover against plaintiff under the doctrine of
Stuart v.-Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212, wherein we
held the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to the
owner on his:claim for damages.

II. Plaintiff-appellant asserts the trial court erred in find-
ing him guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of
the ‘accident.. Defendant as an affirmative defense. so alleged.
That he was required to so plead, see Schultz v. Gosselink, 260
Towa’ 115, 148 N.W.2d 434; Kuhn v. Tank, 261 Iowa 800, 156
N.W.2d, 127, 129; section 619.17, Code 1966.

IIL The trial court’s findings of fact in this law action are
binding upon us if supported by substantial evidence. Cita-
tion of authorities is unnecessary. Rule 344(f)(1), Rules of
Civil Procedure. This case is not reviewable here de novo.
The trial court’s decision on the facts has the-effect of a jury
verdict. It was for the trial court to determine the eredibility of
the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Ver-
schoor v. Miller, 259 Iowa 170, 175, 143 N.W.2d 385, 389; Cronk
v. Iowa Power. and Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 606, 188 N.W.2d
848, 844; McCune v. Muenich, 255 Iowa 755, 757, 124 N.W.2d
130, 131. Further, the evidence will be construed in’ the light
most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Thompson Whole-
sale Co. v. Frink, 257 Iowa 193, 198, 131 N.W.2d 779, 182;
Phoenix. v.. Stevens,. 256 Iowa 432, 486, 127 N.W.2d 640, 642;
Staley v. Fazel Bros. Co., 247 Iowa 644, 648, 75 N.W.2d 253, 255,

HE IV. Two other well-recognized rules of law, favor-
able to defendant, are here applicable. First, where two vehicles

so

are approaching from opposite directions a narrow bridge or
other place in the roadway, the vehicle reaching the bridge or
place first is, in the absénce of statutory provision, generally
accorded the right-of-way across it. Worthington v. McDonald,
246 Iowa 466, 475, 68 N.W.2d 89, 94, 47 A.L.R.2d 135, and cita:
tions;'7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section
205. Second, noncompliance with custom is some proof of lack
of due care on.the issue of negligence if it is shown the party
charged knew or should-have known of such custom. Langner
v. Caviness, 238 Iowa 774, 778, 28 N.W.2d 421,.423, 172 A.L.R,
1185; Jesse v. Wemer & Wemer Company, 248 Iowa 1002, 1016,
82 NiW.2d 82, 89; Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist - “Hospital, 251
Towa 375, 385, 101 N,W.2d 167, 178; Barnes v- Bovenmyer,
255 Towa 220, 227, 122° N.W.2a 312, 316; 65A C.I.S., Negligence,
section 232; Annotation, 172 A.L.R. 1141. . .
“TE That we might reach a different ‘conclusion were we
trier of the facts is of no consequence under the rules applicable
to the appeal of this case. Our review of the record convinces
us the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence and the judgment must be—Affirmed, °

- All JUSTICES concur. °

Luoxp E. Crarxe, INc., et al., appellees, v. Ciry oF BErrEenporr,
a municipal corporation, et al., appellants. ©

No. 52848,
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 125)

1218

ApriL 9, 1968.

Albert J. Stafne, Jr., of Bettendorf, for appellants.

Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, of Des’ Moines,
Hoersch & Werner and Peart, Lincoln & Wells, all of Daven-
port, for appellees.

Bucxer, J.—This case comes to us after ruling on motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judg-
ment decreeing invalid and void an ordinance of the City of
Bettendorf providing charges for connection to the city sanitary
sewer system. The trial court held the ordinance illegal and
void but granted defendants time to amend their answer. De-
fendants by amendment alleged plaintiffs were estopped from
challenging the validity of the ordinance. Thereupon defendants
amended and renewed their motion for judgment on the plead-

sl!

ings. Again, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. As to
the plea of estoppel the court held a power which a city does not
have by statute cannot be created by estoppel. Plaintiffs also
moved to strike portions of defendants’ amended answer but the
court found no need to rule on that motion.

HM The factual background comes from the pleadings. De-
fendants admit in their answer all the factual allegations of
plaintiffs’ petition. They deny. only two paragraphs containing
plaintiffs’ conclusions. Since plaintiffs filed the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and no reply has been filed to any of the
facts pleaded as an affirmative defense, the well pleaded factual
allegations in defendants’ answer are taken as true. Nall v. Iowa
Electrie Company, 246 Iowa 832, 885, 69 N.W.2d 529.

We therefore recite the facts chronologically for easier
understanding and without regard to the source of the allega-
tions. . mo
Plaintiffs are corporate real estate subdividers and de-
velopers. Prior to April 12, 1966, the date the ordinance in
question was adopted, plaintiffs requested the city extend sani-
tary trunk sewers to their respective subdivisions. The de-
velopers and the city held meetings to discuss financing new
sewer extensions through large underdeveloped areas to reach
plaintiffs’ land and the necessary enlargement of present equip-
ment occasioned by such developments.

On February 9 the parties orally’ agreed the city at its
initial expense would extend the sewers as requested to serve
plaintiffs’ properties. This would include necessary additions
to the existing system. The improvements were to be financed
by the city’s issuing general obligation bonds to be retired
partially by a connection charge of $125 for each house con-
nection in the subdivision. An ordinance to that effect was
contemplated. Without such an agreement the city would not
construct the sewer.

The city went ahead with the planned extensions and con-
currently passed the ordinance in question regulating con-
nection methods and providing in pertinent part as follows:

“(1) The basic connection fee for each connection made
to the sanitary sewer system of the City of Bettendorf, Iowa,

2s

shall be as hereinafter stated and shall be based upon the fol-
lowing three classes of building sewer permits:

“(I) Residential properties—connection fee shall be One

Hundred Twenty-five Dollars ($125.00),

“(II) Commercial or business properties—connection fee

shall be Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00).

.“(III) Establishments producing industrial wastes—con-

nection fee shall.be Three Hundred Dollars ($800.00).”

Plaintiffs made application to connect.their various new
houses to the sewer. They tendered a $5.00 inspection fee and
$1.00 digging fee but refused to pay the $125 connection fee.
The city denied the application for failure to pay the latter
sum. Plaintiffs paid the full fee under protest and started this
action seeking. to have the pertinent parts of the’ ordinance
declared-illégal and void. They. allege the city.intends to con:
tinue to collect the fees in question under what they contend is
an illegal ordinance. nae

The trial court held. the ‘city had no statutory or other
authority to levy the connection fees provided in the new
ordinance and could not gain that authority by estoppel. ‘We
agree.

[| I. Code of Iowa, 1966, sections 8368.26 and 3891.11
authorize a city to construct, repair:‘and-regulate connections,
The first issue here is whether the city can finance such con:
struction in whole or in part by charging connection charges
in excess of the normal and nominal inspection fee; the excess
to be used to finance initial construction.

Section 391.138 empowers the city to finance the construc-
tion of any main sewer or system of main sewers. by assessing
the cost to the respectivé lots as adjacent property. Sections
391.18 to 391.91 regulate the powers and procedures of the city
in levying such assessments. These regulations are specific
and detailed. This assessment power is one method of financing
sewer construction.

A second method of financing construction, ‘reconstruction
or repair of main sewers and sewage purifying plants is by
issuance of general obligation bonds as provided in section
396.2 and section.404.9, The latter section also allows for use
of a combination of the first and second methods.

so

It. No other provision is provided for payment for sewer
construction unless section 391.8 is broad enough to allow for
connection fees or hook-on charges to be used as a method of
financing. Section 391.8 provides: “Gas, water, and other con-
nections. They shall have power to require the connections
from gas, water, and steam-heating pipes, sewers, and under-
ground electric construction, to the curbline of adjacent
property, to be made before the permanent improvement of
the street and, if such improvements have already been made,
to regulate the making of such connections, fix the charges
therefor, and make all needful rules in relation thereto, and
the use thereof.”

The trial court carefully analyzed section.391.8 and prop-
erly concluded it authorizes charges by the city for the cost of
administration of the hook-up regulations; such as issuance of
permit, inspection fees and ‘cost of keeping records. It con-
eluded the section did not authorize hook-up or connection fees
to be used as a method of financing to retire the cost of con-
struction,

-H We need not extend this opinion by a long analysis of
the section or an extended set of definitions of the words em-
ployed by ‘the legislature. We think a fair reading of the
statute impels the conclusion the section deals only with costs
and regulations incident to a line running from the middle of
the street to the curbline so that a newly laid street will not be
unnecessarily disturbed, and if it is disturbed, so that it will be
properly. repaired. It has nothing to do with and cannot be
used as a basis for financing-the overall project. Factual situa-
tions relevant to section 391.8 are found in such cases as Sey-
mour v. City of Ames, 218 Iowa 615, 255 N.W. 874, and Toben
v. Town of Manson, 192 Iowa 1127, 185 N.W. 984.

The definitions contained in section 391.14 do not affect
our interpretation of 391.8. Section 391.14 provides:

“Adjacent property and main sewer. All such lots which
may be furnished with sewer connections or drained. by such
main sewer or sewer system, shall be considered as adjacent
property.

“A main sewer ‘shall be held to mean any sewer that is

122

commonly referred to by any one of the following terms; ‘in-
tercepting sewer’, ‘outfall sewer’, or ‘trunk sewer’.”

That definition is made in connection with assessment pro-
cedures. But even if it is applied to 391.8 it does not change
what we deem the obvious purpose of the latter section; i.e., to
control the physical and limited act of street sewer connections
for regulatory, not cost retirement, purposes.

Ill. Defendant argues strenuously the trial court’s
opinion and the reasoning we use here is a return to the old
“Dillon Rule” of strict construction of powers granted by the
legislature to municipalities, see Richardson v. City of Jeffer-
son, 257 Iowa 709, 713, 184 N.W.2d 528, and this is contra to
chapter 235, Laws of the Sixtieth General Assembly (now the
second paragraph of Iowa Code, 1966, section 368.2). The
amendment specifically mandates liberal construction of such
statutes in favor of the municipality. We set forth the first
section of the amendment with the sentences numbered for
convenient reference. .

“[1] It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of
Iowa that the provisions of the Code relating to the powers,
privileges, and immunities of cities and towns are intended to
confer broad powers of self-determination as to strictly local
and internal affairs upon such municipal corporations and
should be liberally construed in favor of such corporations.
Hl The rule that cities and town'have only those powers ex-
pressly conferred by statute has no application to this Code.
Hits provisions shall be construed to confer upon such cor-
porations broad and implied power over all local and internal
affairs which may exist within constitutional limits. [4] No
section of the Code which grants a specific power to cities and
towns, or any reasonable class thereof, shall be construed as
narrowing or restricting the general grant of powers herein-
above conferred unless such restriction is expressly set forth in
such statute or unless the terms of such statute are so com-
prehensive as to have entirely occupied the field of its subject.
[5] However, statutes which provide'a manner or procedure
for carrying out their provisions or exercising a given power
shall be interpreted as providing the exclusive manner of pro-
cedure and shall be given substantial compliance, but legisla-

a

tive failure to provide an express manner or procedure for ex-
ercising a conferred power shall not prevent its exercise. [6]
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this section, cities
and towns shall not have power to levy any tax, assessment,
excise, fee, charge or other exaction except as expressly autho-
rized by statute.”

Richardson v. City of Jefferson, supra, considered the im-
port of the foregoing amendment at length. We there held the
amendment is a rule of construction and as such it is con-
stitutional. As to sentences five and six which are particularly
applicable here we said at pages 715, 716 of 257 Iowa:

“The fifth sentence does no more than provide that the
manner or procedure where provided shall be substantially
followed and that a granted power shall not fail because of the
lack of an express manner or procedure for its exercise. This
is declaratory of existing law. Baird v. Webster City, 256 Iowa
1097, 1103, 180 N.W.2d 432, 486; Incorporated City of Hum-
boldt v. Knight, 255 Iowa 22, 120 N.W. 2d 457; and City of
Des Moines v, Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 1212, 102 N.W.2d 363, 367.

“The sixth sentence, for the purposes of this case, means
exactly what it says, ‘cities and towns shall not have power to
levy any tax, assessment, excise, fee, charge or other exaction
except as expressly authorized’, it is a limitation, neither a
grant of power nor a rule of construction.”

Both sentences five and six require the result reached by
the trial court. They do not necessarily reinvoke the former
rules of construction prevalent before adoption of the amend-
ment. They provide their own rules of construction which for
the areas mentioned require narrower interpretation than that
mandated by the first three sentences of the amendment.

Here two methods of financing are supplied. They must be
held to be exclusive. Here a fee, charge or other exaction is
being levied without express authorization. Under either
sentence five or six the levy is illegal.

a We are, aware of. the amendment to chapter, 393 passed in 1967, Acts of
Regular’ Session, 62d General “Assembly, chapter’ 892," which, with ecxtain re
girletions, allows sewer connection charges very, much ‘as contemplated by the
instant ordinance. Howev: endment was passed after ‘ordinance
End defendant does not argue itis applicable here.

1228

At 18 Drake Law Review 53, 57, an extensive andlysis of
the amendment to section 368.2 appears under title “Home Rule”
For Iowa Cities And Towns?. In discussing the fifth sentence
quoted above the author uses a factual situation identical to this
cease :..“The quoted sentence [5]. is a definite limitation upon any
proposed construction that would declare House File 380 a
‘home rule’ act. Consider a few. of the more familiar fields of
local endeavor. Municipalities cannot devise a new way of as-
sessing public improvements because the ‘manner of procedure’
is spelled out in great detail in Chapters 391, 391A and 417 of
the Code and, therefore, falls within the quoted exception.”

Hl IV. Defendants’ affirmative defense cannot avail them
here. The city says in effect that.even: though the ordinance is
invalid plaintiffs are estopped from challenging its validity.

In O’Brien’ v.- Wheelock, 184 U.S. 450, 489. (1901), the
United States Supreme Court said: “We are unwilling to assent
to the doctrine of legislation by estoppel.” The Florida Supreme
Court in Miami Beach v. E. J. Smith Co., 90 So.2d 312, 318, said:
“[W]e do not think this principle [estoppel] should be applied
where to do so would extend the power and authority of a city
beyond that lawfully granted to it.by.the Legislature.” .

See also Eastern Illinois State Normal School v. Charleston,
271 Ill. 602, 111 N.E. 578, L.R.A. 1916 D 991; Ladnier v. Mollere,
230 La. 784, 89 So.2d 301; 838 Am. Jury Municipal Corporations,
section 668, page 374..

Defendants rely on St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v.
George C. Prendergast Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 469, 472, where
plaintiff connected to a sewer and then challenged the assessment
procedures alleging violation of due process. The United States
Supreme Court held plaintiff estopped from.challenging the con-
stitutional validity of the proceedings where it had accepted the
benefits.of the project. But the court distinguished O’Brien v.
Wheelock, supra, with the following comment, “It is not at-
tempted here, as there [in O’Brien], to enforce a law as of valid-
ity by estoppel to particular persons, though invalid, under the
Constitution of the State, to all of the world, besides.”

As we interpret St. Louis Malleable Casting Co. v. George O,
Prendergast Constr. Co., supra, it would not allow an invalid
ordinance to be held valid by estoppel. The case was concerned

|

with the due process validity of the assessment proceedings. Not
with the statute or ordinance itself. The distinction involves the
power to act at all (which cannot be created by estoppel, O’Brien
v. Wheelock, supra) and an illegal exercise of power with which
the city has been clothed (which can be defended by claim of
estoppel where factually justified, St. Louis Malleable Casting Co.
v. George C. Prendergast Constr. Co., supra).

Here the ordinance clearly. exceeds the city’s statutory
authority. Whatever may be its rights against plaintiffs based
on contracted theories it cannot sustain its ordinances by estoppel.
—Affirmed. .

\ ‘All Justices coneur.

Gea L. Chae et ux, ‘appellees, v. | Weaver Construction
. ; Company,’ appellant.

; ‘No. 52890.
. (Reported in 158 N-W.2a 189)

a

APRIL 9, 1968.

Oppen & Wessels, of Iowa Falls, and Lundy, Butler, Wilson
& Hall, of Eldora, for appellant.

Whitesell Law Firm, of Iowa Falls, for appellees,

Rawuines, J.—Action at law by homeowner plaintiffs for
damages resulting from private nuisance created by defendant
operated asphalt plant resulted in judgment on verdict adverse
to defendant, and it appeals. We affirm.

Defendant is a closely held family type corporation, Wood
Weaver, sometimes hereinafter referred to as Weaver, being
the president.

About 1945, defendant acquired by lease a relatively small
limestone quarry located east of property later purchased by
plaintiffs, the two tracts being separated by a county road.
Size of the quarry has since been substantially increased.

November 4, 1957, plaintiffs purchased and commenced
occupancy of a house located on land situated at the easterly
edge of the town of Alden.

April 1966, an oil burning auxiliary asphalt plant or pug

_ mill was set up in the quarry at direction of defendant to assist

1228 |

it in a highway 69 resurfacing project. This plant was located
on the west side of the quarry about one or two city blocks
from the Claude home.

Plaintiffs:cldim offensive dust and smoke from the subject
mill caused injury to them and their property.

" Trial to jury resulted in an award of damages to plaintifis,
$500 compensatory and $1100 exemplary.

The sole issue presented on appeal is whether evidence pre-
sented was sufficient to generate a jury issue as to punitive
damages.

I. This being an action at law it is reviewable only on
errors assigned. Rule 344(a)(3), R.C.P., and Henneman v.
McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 65, 148 N.W.2d 447, 450.

Hl Errors-neither assigned nor argued on appeal present
no question for review. Associates Discount Corp. v. Held, 255
Towa, 680, 683, 684, 123 N.W.2d 869.

Hi Il. While there must be some substantial evidence on.
which to base an instruction, all relative and material evidence,
ineltiding justifiable-inferences, favorable to plaintiff, must be
accepted at face value in determining whether a jury issue is
ereated, Nizzi v. Laverty Sprayers, Inc., 259 Iowa 112, 143
N.W.2d 312,317; Kiger v. Meehan, 253 Iowa 746, 748, 113
N.W.2d 743; Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251 Iowa 718, 724, 100 N.W.2d
610; McGrea Bos Freight Lines, 240 Iowa 318, ‘828, 36
N.W.2d 374; and Sanderson v. Chicago, M. & St. PR. Co, 167
Towa 90, 101,149 N.W. 188.

Our function is not to. weigh the testimony, but to de
termine whethér there was substantial eviderice presented upon
which a jury could find for plaintiffs on’ their claim for punitive
damages. In that regard we view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the party prevailing in the trial court. Rule 344(£)
(1); (2), R.C.P., and Jennings v. Farmers Mutual Insurance
Association, 260 Iowa 279, 281, 149 N.W.2d 298, 300.

It. As previously stated, plaintiffs were awarded actual
damages resulting from presence of the private ‘nuisance
created by defendant operated asphalt plant.

With reference to the foregoing, this court said in
Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co.,'261 Iowa 696, 703, 154 N.W.2d
852,857: “"The’ term ‘private nuisance’ refers to an actionable

eee

interference with a person’s interest in the private use and
enjoyment of his land.” See also Jones v. Rumford, 64 Wash.2d
559, 392 P.2d 808, 809-810; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, section 2, page
730; 39 Am.Jur., Nuisances, section 9, page 287; 12 Drake Lu.
Rev. 107; and annotations, 47 A.L.R.2d 490. See generally
Kellerhals v. Kallenberger, 251 Iowa 974, 979-982, 108 N.W.2d
691, and Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co. 248 Towa 710,
720-725, 82 N.W.2d 151.

HI Touching on the matter at hand we held,.in Iverson v.
Vint, 243 Iowa 949, 952, 54 N.W.2d 494, an action for damages
from nuisance is not predicated on negligence.’ It is a condi-
tion, not an act or failure to act. If the wrongful condition
exists, the person responsible for its existence is liable-for re-
sulting damage to others. See also 12-Drake.L. Rev. 108.

HI Since judgment entered on the compensatory award is
not challenged, it stands as a finality from which it follows
existence of a nuisance as alleged was here established. See
Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257-Iowa 810; 812,
184 N.W.2d 916, and 5 C.JS., Appeal & Error, section 1272,
pages 163, 168-169. .

Furthermore, actual compensation allowed. must, under
the circumstances, be accepted as reasonable and proper.

Hl Iv. This brings us to. the matter of.exemplary or
punitive damages.

Dealing with that subject we said in Sebastian v. Wood,
246 Iowa 94, 100-101, 66 N.W.2d 841: “A reference to the
nature of exemplary or punitive damages, sometimes designated
as ‘smart money’, and the purposes of their allowance may be
helpful. Their main purpose as indicated in their designation
is that they are awarded under proper circumstances and con-
ditions as a punishment for the particular party involved and
as a warning and an example to him in the future, and to all
others who may offend in like manner. The award ‘of such
damages constitutes an effective deterrent to such offenders,
and a salutary protection to society and the public in general.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right and are only
incidental to the main cause of action, and ean be awarded only
when actual and substantial damages are allowed. They are in

20

no way compensatory, and while they have a secondary purpose
in adding to the complainarit’s award because injury to him
may well have been aggravated by its malicious, oppressive,
willful, wanton, or reckless causation, yet, whatever benefit he
so receives comes to him not as compensation for the wrong
done him but as purely incidental and by the grace and
gratuity of the law, as punishment of the wrongdoer, and as an
example and deterrent to others.”

With regard to the foregoing see also Legal Seminar, Iowa
Academy of Trial Lawyers, October 1963, page 71; Prosser,
Law of Torts, Third Ed., Hornbook Series, page 9; 25 C.J.S.,
Damages, section 117(1), page 1107; and 22 Am.Jur.2d, Dam-
ages, sections 236-237, pages 322-325.

Vv. Always troublesome is that element essential to an
award of punitive damages commonly referred to as “malice”.
In fact, some authorities look upon its usage in connection with
the subject here presented as a misnomer.

This was demonstrated in Amos v. Prom, Ine., 115 F.Supp.
127, 185-136; where the court said: “There has been some con-
fusion in the discussion of this term [malice] in the Jowa cases,
but basically Iowa law has recognized three terms for malice.
First there-is malice in the popular sense of ill will or hatred,
sometimes termed ‘express malice.’ Second there is ‘malice in
fact.’ Third there is ‘malice in law.’ The confusion arises pri-
marily because the latter two terms are both characterized as
‘legal.malice’ as distinguished from ‘express’ or ‘lay’ malice:
The distinction has been stated by the Iowa Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice McClain, as ‘Malice in law is where
malice is established by legal presumption from proof of certain
facts, as in actions for libel * * *. Malice in fact is to be found
by the jury from the evidence in the case. They may infer it
from want of probable cause. But it is well established that the
plaintiff is not required to prove express malice, in the popular
signification of the term, as that defendant was prompted by
malevolence, or acted from motives of-ill will, resentment, or
hatred toward the plaintiff. It is sufficient if he prove it in its
enlarged legal sense.’ Connelly v. White, supra [122 Iowa 391,
98 N.W. 145]... co

Ss

“The Iowa Supreme Court recently referred to the cate-
gories of malice in the case of Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., Iowa 1953, 59 N.W.2d 776. The Court in that case held
that slander was not proved where the speaker had a qualified
privilege unless the words were spoken with actual malice. At
page 782 of 59 N.W.2d, the Court said, ‘Actual malice—tfre-
quently called express malice or malice in fact—means personal
spite, hatred or ill-will. It is not merely malice in law—the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse.’

Hl “While it is not entirely clear whether the Iowa de-
cisions regard ‘malice in fact’ as a descriptive term for ‘legal
malice’ or as a synonym for ‘express malice,’ it is apparent, that
the ‘malice’ required to permit an award of exemplary damages
is something less than actual ill-will or express malice and may
be termed ‘legal malice’ for want of a better expression.”

Continuing the court said, loc. cit. 136-187: “* * * the in-
tentional doing of a ‘wrongful act’ without justification will
permit an inference of the wicked state of mind. Yet it is ap-
parent that many wrongful or illegal acts may be intentionally
committed from motives wholly apart from any malice or evil
intent directed toward the person who happens to suffer by the
action, as where defendant is motivated by a desire for gain and
has no feeling at all for those injured by him.

“Therefore, when the law reaches this last stage, as it has
in Iowa, it is no longer ‘malice’ which is required but the
‘something else’ from which malice is said to be presumed. See
Schnathorst v. Williams, 1949, 240 Iowa 561, 36 N.W.2d 739,
10 A.L.R.2d 1199; Wilson v. Lapham, 1923, 196 Iowa 745, 195
N.W. 235; Jenkins v. Gilligan, 1906,'131 Iowa 176, 108 N.W.
287, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 1087. ‘It is enough (for legal malice) if it
be the result of any improper or sinister motive and in disre-
gard of the rights of others.’ 108 N.W. at page 238. The rule
would scem to be: exemplary damages may be awarded where
defendant acts maliciously, but malice may be inferred where
defendant’s act is illegal or improper; where the nature of the
illegal act is such as to negative any inference of feeling toward
the person injured, and is in fact consistent with a complete
indifference on the part of defendant, liability for exemplary

1282 re

damages is not based upon the maliciousness of the defendant
but is based, rather, upon the separate substantive principle
that illegal or improper acts ought to be deterred by the
exaction from the defendant of sums over and above the actual
damage he has caused. See Mendenhall v. Struck, 1929, 207
Towa 1094, 224 N.W. 95, 97, ‘Malice does not necessarily mean
spite or hatred, but it means the doing of an actual wrong in
itself without just cause or excuse.’ ”

HM. And in Newman v. ‘Nelson (10 Cir.), 350 F.2d 602,
604-605, is this apt statement: “* * * the mere commission of a
nuisance justifying an award of actual damages would be in-
sufficient to justify the assessment of punitive damages as a
penalty. In other words, to be liable for actual’ damages one
need only create or commit a nuisance, but to be punished for
it he must create and persistently maintain it with a reckless
disregard for the rights of others.”

In addition to authorities heretofore cited, see Charles v.
Epperson & Co., Inc., 258 Iowa 409, 431-432; 187 N.W.2d 605;
Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 628-629, 133 N.W.2d 666; Rusch
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 163 Kan. 11, 180 P.2d 270, 276; 25
C.J.S., Damages, section 123(4), page 1141; 22 Am.Jur.2d,
Damages, sections 249-253, pages 340-346; and 8 Drake L. Rev.
36, 44, : :

VI. As heretofore indicated, it is well established in this
jurisdiction, punitive damages cannot be allowed in the absence
of an actual damage award. This court has consistently ad-
hered to that principle. See Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613,
627, 183 N.W.2d 666; Clark Bros. v. Anderson & Perry, 211
Towa 920, 924, 234 N.W. 844; 25 C.J.S., Damages, section 118,
page 1121; 22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages, section 241, page 328; and
Legal Seminar, Iowa Academy of Trial Lawyers, October 1963,
page 73; and annotations, 17 A.L.R.2d 527, 530.

VII. An allowance of exemplary damages turns
more or less on the facts peculiar to any case, and rests largely
in the discretion of the jury, but the amount allowed must
generally be proportionate to actual damages granted.

This court so held in Hartman v. Peterson, 246 Iowa 41,
46-47, 66 N.W.2d 849. See also Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Kirtley (8 Cir.), 8307 F.2d 418, 424; 25 C.J.S., Damages, section

|

126(1), page 1159; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section 265, page
359; and annotations, 17 A.L.R.2d 527, 548.

HE Incidentally, no remittitur is permitted in this state
if punitive damages awarded are found to be excessive. The
only remedy in that event is to set aside the recovery therefor.
Mallinger v. Brussow, 252 Iowa 54, 64, 105 N.W.2d 626; Hart-
man v. Peterson, supra, and citations. See also Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. v. Kirtley, supra.

But, as previously stated, defendant is content to stand
upon the premise no fact issue as to exemplary damages was
established by plaintiffs, which means we are not here con-
cerned with amount awarded by way of punishment.

HM (VILL. Error asserted in the case at bar is broad, but
liability of a corporate entity, for punitive damages, is neither
urged nor discussed by defendant. As a result we are not here
ealled upon to consider or resolve that issue and do not do so.
Stated otherwise, the question as to liability of a corporation
for exemplary damages is not involved in this appeal. How-
ever, with regard to the foregoing see Baltimore & P. RB. Co.
v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 2 S.Ct. 719, 726-727, 27
L.Ed. 739 ; Kelite Products v, Binzel (5 Cir.), 224 F.2d 181, 144;
Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F.Supp. 127, 187; Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr.398, 414-415; Algozino. v. Welch
Fruit Products Co., 345 Il. App. 185, 102 N.B.2d 555, 560; 25
OJ.S., Damages, section 125(4), page 1153; 19 C.J.S., Corpora-
tions, section 1263, page 948; 39 Am.Jur., Nuisances, section
82, page 318; 18 Am.Jur., Corporations, section 1180, page
1056; and Prosser, Law of Torts, Third Ed., Hornbook Series,
page 12. | . :

IX. The determinative issue before us is whether,
under the circumstances revealed by the record, “malice” or
reckless disregard for the rights of others is disclosed.

Prior: to placement and operation of the pug mill here
involved, an asphalt plant had been operated in the quarry area,
On, that. occasion a civil action for nuisance resulted in an
award of damages. This was at all times here concerned known
to Weaver. . :

Nevertheless, defendant claims asphalt plants have since
been improved, the one involved in the case at bar being-equip-

i

ped with a dust collector, washer, and adapted to use with
higher type fuel which produces a cleaner smoke than before.

At time the subject plant was erected, plaintiffs and other
nearby residents manifested concern. Weaver assured them
the mill would be shut down whenever the presence of offend-
ing dust and smoke was reported. The machinery was placed
on high ground because of the smoke hazard resulting from use
of a short smokestack, and at a point more readily accessible
to trucks used in the hauling process.

Weaver indicated interest in publie relations but refused
to relocate the mill because of cost involved. It functioned
about one month and operations were finally discontinued only
when the highway project was completed.

‘The Claudes were not affected by smoke and dust every-
day, but it was quite bad two days, and offendingly present
five or six other days.

April 29, 1966, smoke and dust from ‘the plant covered
plaintiffs’ property, similar to a dust storm but coarser-and
five times worse. Complaint was made to Weaver but: the mill
eontinued operating.

The next day plaintiffs and some neighbors met to discuss
the problem. Weaver, though not invited, attended the meet-
ing and again promised corrective action whenever notified.

May 27th, complaints were made but plant work con-
tinued intermittently.

May 28th, Mrs. Claude and two neighbor ladies complained.
There is some dispute as to conditions existing that day, but the
plant foreman offered money to one of these women because of
the plant created mess. In any event mill operations con-
tinued.

Early forenoon, May 31st, presence of offensive dust and
smoke was reported. This time Weaver was not present but
the plant was closed for a short time. On returning he drove
past the Claude home where people were gathered, went on to
the millsite, and ordered it again placed in operation. Plain-
tiff’s called their attorney who in turn talked to Weaver, but he
refused to then close down and did not do so until about noon.

On several occasions the mill was not operated due to rain,
breakdowns or unavailability of trucks.

se

Defendant generally contends manifestation of solicitude,
use of modern equipment, and efforts to eliminate or reduce of-
fensive dust and smoke bar plaintiffs’ right to recover punitive
damages. This is to us a novel but nonpersuasive approach.
Stated otherwise, we do not believe full play of the facts allow
defendant to hide behind any such ineffective barricade.

That which an offending party says or professes may be
important, but is quickly obliterated by counterprevailing
conduct of. such nature as to disclose the declarations made
were in fact meaningless. In a case such as that here pre-
sented, it is actual conduct which controls, not statements of
interest, sympathy or concern,

What is termed reasonable use of one’s property cannot be
so extended as to include emission of noxious smoke and dust
resulting in material damage to a neighboring property owner.
And when, as in the case at hand, the evidence discloses con-
tinued contamination of the atmosphere by an offender, despite
repeated complaints on the part of those resultantly injured,
there exists a manifestation of disregard for rights of others,

HE Furthermore, we are satisfied it is no defense to show
the nuisance causing instrumentality is built in accord with
latest approved methods or operated skillfully. Conceding for
our purpose the most modern machinery was used in a claimed
effort to alleviate a potentially offensive situation, it still re-
mains a condition amounting to nuisance, was in fact created
and maintained, as disclosed by the evidence, including ex-
hibits presented. See Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co.,
Mo. App., 89 S.W.2d 699, 702, and Jones v. Rumford, 64
Wash.2d 559, 392 P.2d 808, 809-810,

X. Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, it is to
us evident some substantial evidence was presented disclosing
defendant knowingly and intentionally, without just cause, per-
sisted in the maintenance of a private nuisance despite re-
peated protests and complaints of its harmful consequences,
thereby disclosing such willful disregard for plaintiffs’ rights
as to create a jury issue relative to punitive damages.—
Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Larson, J., who concurs in the
result,

1286 es a

Epwarp W. Conus et ux., appellants, v. Dename P. Isaacson,
appellee. :

No. 52846.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 14)

_Aprit 9, 1968,

John K. Petersen, of Red Oak, and Getscher & Getscher, of

Hamburg, for appellants,

Genung & Rogers, of Glenwood, for appellee.

Garris, C.J. —Raward w. and Winifred L. Collins, hus-
band and wife, brought this action, tried in equity, to recover
possession of an 80-acre farm occupied by defendant Delaine P.
Isaacson and damages for withholding it following plaintiffs’
attempt to forfeit a lease and option to purchase held by de-
fendant. There was a decree for defendant on the grounds
plaintiffs’ title was for security only and good cause to forfeit
defendant’s rights was not shown. On plaintiffs’ appeal we
affirm. .

. LL. .On September 20, 1963, Donald Isaacson purchased the
land on contract from one Bergstrom for the agreed price of

1238 Dn ‘7

$17,000. $1700 was paid on the execution of the contract, the
balance of $15,300 was to be paid March 1, 1964, on delivery of
déed and abstract of title. The purchaser became ill prior to
March 1 and was unable to complete the purchase. Edward W.
Collins, whom we call plaintiff, unless otherwise indicated, was
a livestock buyer who had dealt with Donald and lmew his son
Delaine, the defendant. Collins told, defendant “If you’re in
any trouble with that farm, I have money.”

In late February 1964 defendant and his father asked
plaintiff if he still -had the money available to “rent” on the
farm and he said he did “and we said we couldn’t get it any
other place and would lose our $1700 if we didn’t have it by
March 1. Mr. Collins said he could get the money but he would
have an option on the farm and it was to me (defendant) only
and if Don entered it in any way through controversy, calling
on the telephone, or raising cain, the thing was void, so he had
Mr, Hilton draw this option up and it was signed,”

” Pursuant to this agreement Donald and his wife (defend-
ant’ ’s parents) executed and delivered to plaintiff on February
24, 1964, a quitclaim deed to the farm and’ assignment of the
real estate contract. Plaintiff completed the purchase of the
farm from Bergstrom, the vendor, and took title thereto by
warranty deed from him. On February 28 plaintiff made and
delivered to defendant a written lease to the farm for three
years commencing March 1, 1964, at an “annual rent of $1480
evidenced by three promissory notes payable November 1 of
each of the three years.-

Also on February 28 plaintiff gave defendant a written
option to purchase the 80 acres during the term of the lease for
$15,300 plus all costs and expense of plaintiff in consummating
the sale under the-option if exercised. The written option also
provides that if it is exercised the rent is to be prorated to the
time of the purchase. It will be recalled $15,300 is the amount
plaintiff paid Bergstrom as the balance of the purchase price.

The lease contains these provisions: “ * * * any controversy
eaused by one Donald HE. Isaacson by and between him and
Edward W. Collins on any subject concerning this lease shall
automatically cancel and forfeit said ledse. Further, the party

— 1289

of the second part (defendant) agrees to negotiate and confer
with the party of the first part solely and alone, without inter-
ference by said Donald E. Isaacson.

“In the event the second party shall fail to make the pay-
ments contemplated’in this contract, or perform any of the
covenants herein, at the times hereinabove specified, the first
party, may, at their option, declare this contract forfeited by
serving 80 days notice of forfeiture as provided for by the laws
of Iowa, and if the seeond party shall fail to pay said sum or
sums, or perform said conditions, in default within said 30-day
period, this contract shall stand forfeited and all payments
made hereunder shall become the property of the first party as
liquidated damages for the breach of contract.”

The trial court held and plaintiff virtually conceded in
argument the quitclaim deed, assignment of the land contract,
plaintiff's advancement of the balance of the purchase price and
the lease-option agreements were all parts of the same trans-
action which took place during the last week in February.

In late October 1964 plaintiff accepted a’ check signed by
defendant’s father for the agreed rent for the first year of the
leasehold, About May 1, 1965, plaintiff was displeased because
defendant and his father refused to sell cattle to plaintiff at
the price he offered to pay. It is not claimed the Isaacsons
were under any obligation to’ sell to plaintiff. It also appears
that in February 1965 plaintiff took offense because defendant
and his father attempted to combine the farm in question with
one owned by the father in order to secure a mote favorable
corn base from the county ASC office. The favorable ruling
was not obtained because plaintiff, as landlord of the 80 acres,
refused to consent thereto. We do not understand defendant
or his father acted illegally or improperly in applying for the
favorable ruling.

On September 27, 1965, plaintiff mailed to defendant 2 a
notice of termination of the lease because of claimed violation
by defendant of the condition, quoted supra, that any eon-
troversy caused by his father “on any subject concerning this
lease” should cancel and forfeit it. The notice called upon de-
fendant to return the premises to plaintiff on March 1, 1966.

1240 De 7

On October 18, 1965, defendant paid plaintiff the rent due
November 1, -

On March 3, 1966, plaintiffs caused to be served upon de-
fendant a second notice, entitled “Notice of Forfeiture of Real
Estate”, declaring the lease forfeited for his alleged failure to
comply with certain of its terms and conditions and for per-
mitting waste to be committed. This notice does not assert
any violation of-the condition to which the first notice refers—
that defendant’s father had caused a controversy with plaintiff
on a subject concerning the lease.

The testimony, including that given by plaintiff (Mrs.
Collins did not.testify), makes it clear, and his counsel admitted
in argument, the basis for the attempt to forfeit defendant's
rights was the one referred to in the first notice. Some of
defendant’s acts referred to in the second notice were with
plaintiff’s consent or he testified they were unimportant.

The-trial court found after carefully reviewing the record
there was no breach by defendant at anytime of any material
term or,condition of the lease-option undertaking and plaintiffs
wholly failed to establish they were entitled to exact a for-
feiture thereof.

~ We conclude it is not at all clear that either of the two
principal matters involving defendant’s fathei, plaintiff's un-
successful attempt to purchase cettle from the Isaacsons and
their application to the ASC for‘an enlarged corn base by com-
bining the. 80 acres with another farm, was a controversy
caused by the father on a “subject concerning this lease”, as the
lease provides. We will say more about. this later.

In any event, during the time allowed in the lease (see the
provision quoted supra) and the first notice of forfeiture, de-
fendant made a good aad sufficient tender to plaintiff (see
section 538.6 Codes 1962, 1966) of the purchase price of $15,300,
plus the pro rata rentsl on the land, reasonable legal fees, cost
of revenue stamps for the deed, continuance of the abstract of
title to date and recording fees incurred by plaintiff in convey-
ing the property, all in accordance with terms of the option
agreement. It was stipulated this tender should be deemed a
continuing one.

a a 124

The trial court decreed plaintiffs’ title was in the nature
of an equitable mortgage, defendant had not breached the lease
or option agreement, and that upon payment to plaintiffs of
the sums tendered plus $1480 rent due November 1, 1966, be-
tween the time of trial and entry of the decree, plaintiffs must
convey the land to defendant and deliver to him an abstract
of title showing merchantable title in plaintiffs subject only to
defendant’s interest in the land, _ Plaintiffs’ petition was dis-
missed.

Il. Plaintiffs- appellants assert two propositions relied: on
for reversal: (1) Claimed error in finding defendant did not
breach any material term or condition of the lease-option agree-
ment and plaintiffs have failed to establish their right to ex-
act a forfeiture thereof. (2) The decree is contrary to law in
holding the lease-option agreements constitute a single contract
in the nature of an equitable mortgage.

: In considering thesé propositions, especially the rst; on
this review de novo we give weight to the fact findings of the
trial court but are not bound by them. Rule 34a(t) (7), Rules
of Civil Procedure.

- TI. Plaintiff’s argument under the first of these proposi-
tions refers to three: provisions of the lease, other than the
one about a controversy with defendant’s father, it is claimed
defendant . violated. As previously indicated, it is clear
plaintiff did not regard any of them as important and that
what triggered the attempt to forfeit the lease were the incidents
regarding the cattle purchase and, previously, the application to
the ASC,

-Plaintiff testified: “What I objected'to was Donald Isaac-
son ‘attempting ta change my corn base to his land.” - Again,
“The manure accumulation was not of importance to me‘. Only
one thing was important as I have already mentioned. * * * I
refused to sign it: (consent to the ASC) and prepared notice
that he was meddling. * * * Had Donald Isaacson not been
involved in thé thing, they (defendant and wile) would have
had the land long ago.”

Regarding the Isaacsons’ refusal to sell the cattle to plain-
tiff he testified: “The néxt morning I went out and they had

1242 a az

sold the cattle to someone else. I said ‘Well, if Donald is into
it that is the last dealings we will have. I am going to cancel
the thing.’”

As before indicated, if we give weight to the trial court’s
fact findings, we are not persuaded defendant violated the con-
dition of the lease that his father should not cause any contro-
versy between him and plaintiff on a subject concerning the
lease.

Further, the lease prepared by plaintiff provides, as quoted
supra, that a forfeiture could be declared if defendant failed
to make the payments contemplated therein or to perform any
of its covenants, by serving a 30-day notice of forfeiture, pro-
vided defendant “shall fail to pay said sum or sums, or perform
said conditions, in default within said 30-day period * * *.” It
stands admitted that within the 30-day period defendant made
a good and sufficient tender to plaintiff of all sums due him
under the lease-option agreement in the event the option were
exercised. Plaintiff’s right to declare a forfeiture of the agree-
ment, therefore did not mature.

This from Roshek Realty Co. v. Roshek Bros. Co., 249
Towa 349, 358, 87 N.W.2d 8, 13-14, has some application: here:
“Tt is.a familiar saying that equity abhors a forfeiture. Kil-
patrick v. Smith, 236 Iowa 584, 593, 19 N.W.2d 699, 703 (‘* * *
forfeitures are not favorites of either law or equity, and when
they are enforced, those claiming them. should show that the
equities are clearly on their side.’); 19 Am. Jur., Equity,- sec-
tions 84, 86; 82 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, section 872;
30 C.I.S., Equity, section 56a; 51 C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant,
section 102 (‘Forfeitures * * * are not favored by the courts.’).
See also’Heiple v. Reinhart, 100 Iowa 525, 528, 69 N.W.871:”
See also 27 Am. Jur.2d, Equity, section 74, pages 596-597,
citing the Roshek opinion.

HE We think plaintiff's first proposition relied on for
reversal is without merit. We reach this conclusion somewhat
more readily because of our conclusion as to plaintiff’s second
proposition for reversal about to be considered.

IV. Plaintifi’s argument in support of his second propo-
sition stresses the claim his title could not be in the nature: of

— a 1243

an equitable mortgage because, it is said, defendant owed him
no debt to be secured thereby.

HEM Before considering this specific point we may say
that many Iowa decisions hold it is proper to show by parol a
warranty deed was in fact intended as security only and upon
payment of the debt the debtor is decreed to be the legal, as
well as the equitable, owner of the property. Fort v. Colby,
165 Iowa 95, 141 N.W. 393, is a leading case of this kind. In ar-
riving at the intention of the parties courts look behind the
form of the instruments to the real relationship between the
parties. The instruments will be read in the light of the sur-
rounding circumstances and the practical construction the
parties themselves placed thereon. Guttenfelder v. Iebsen, 280
Towa 1080, 1084, 300 N.W. 299, 301-802, and citations.

HH In order that a deed be held a mortgage the evidence
must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. Brown v. Her-
mance, 283 Iowa 510, 514, 10 N.W.2d 66, 68, and citation;
Greene v. Bride & Son Construction Co., 252 Iowa 220, 227, 106
N.W.2d 603, 607-608, and citations.

HI In connection with what has just been said another
rule has application. Where an absolute deed is accompanied
by a contract to reconvey on specified conditions and under the
evidence a doubt exists as to whether the conveyance was in-
tended to be absolute or as security for a debt, it will be con-
strued to be a mortgage. Brown v. Hermanee, supra, 233 Iowa
510, 514-515, 10 N.W.2d 66, 68, and citations.

HM On facts generally similar to those here the Brown
opinion states: “It is well established that where one party
purchases real estate, and borrows all or a portion of the pur-
chase price from another party, the vendee may have the title
pass direct from the vendor by warranty deed to said third
party, and may establish by parol that the same is, in fact, a
mortgage, and held by the said third party solely as security
for the purchase price so advanced for the vendee. [Citations]”

Davis v. Wilson, 287 Towa 494, 499, 21 N.W.2d 553, 557,
also under a similar factual situation, repeats. the pronounce-
ment just quoted and adds this which is a direct answer to
plaintiff's main argument that defendant was not indebted to
plaintiff :

1244 Le |

“The debt of the real owner to the titleholder need not
exist by covenant but may be implied. Here, if Davis re-
quested Wilson to purchase the two hundred acres for Davis’
benefit and Wilson did so purchase it, an obligation on the part
of Davis to repay Wilson the amount advanced by him with
interest would necessarily be implied. This would establish
the relation of debtor and creditor as fully as if Wilson had
loaned the money direct to Davis and the latter had in turn
paid Breece (the vendor) the purchase price. [Citations]”
“Swartz v. Stone, 243 Lowa 128, 133, 49 N.W.2d 475, at, | is
to the same effect.

It may be well also to repeat this from Davis v. Wilson}
supra: “Under our repeated holdings parol testimony is ad-
missible, notwithstanding sections 11285 (statute of frauds)
and 10049 (éreation of express trust’ in real estate) Code,
1939, to show the two deeds to Wilson were given’ for security
only.” [Citations] ”

The two Code sections just referred to are 622.32 and
557.10, Code of 1966.

Here, defendant was expressly obligated to pay plaintiff
what the lease refers to as rent rather than interest on the sum
plaintiff advanced to Bergstrom (vendor under: the contract)
for defendant’s benefit. A similar situation in Brown v.
Hérmancee,‘supra, 233 Iowa 510, 515, 10 N.W.2d 66, 68, was held
not to disprove the oceupant’s equitable ownership. See also
Jones v. Gillett, 142 Iowa 506, 512, 118 N.W. 314, 316, 121
N.W'5, and citations; Bigler v. Jack, 114 Iowa 667, 673, 87
NW: 700. °°

We have no hesitancy in holding, under the applicable
rules, that the parties intended plaintiff’s title to be security
fot repayment to him by defendarit of the stim plaintiff’ ad-
vanced to Bergstrom for defendant’s benefit. Defendant’s
obligation to pay plaintiff what the lease designates annual rent
furnished ample consideration for plaintiff’s advancement of
the balance of the purchase price. We have frequently pointed
out the vital question in a ¢ase of this kind is the intention of
the’ parties regardless of the form of the instruments.

Hl That the parties originally intended plaintiff was ad-
vancing the balance of the purchase price to enable the Isaac-

= 1245

sons to save their equity in the land, without any thought of
becoming the real purchaser himself, is scarcely open to ques-
tion. Plaintiff suggested he had the money to help the Isaacsons
complete the purchase if they were in trouble. After trying
without success to borrow the money elsewhere the Isaacsons
deemed it necessary to accept plaintiff’s offer of help. There
has never been any conflict of interest between the Isaacsons
over this matter, so far as shown. The lease-option agreement
ran to defendant rather than to his father at plaintiffs wish.
Under the circumstances we view this as an unimportant detail.

The record contains a number of indications both plaintiff
and defendant regarded the relationship between them as that
of creditor and debtor and plaintiff's title as being held for
security. On several occasions during the period of the lease-
option agreement plaintiff informed defendant, his wife or
mother, he would like to have the option exercised then, he
“wanted out”, he “was tired of going on with the thing” and
“they had nothing to lose.” Defendant’s mother testified with-
out denial that twice after the spring of 1965 plaintiff told her
“he just wanted his money”, although the option ran to March
1, 1967, . . .

It is obvious that if plaintiffs claim of forfeiture were
upheld the’ Isaacsons would lose the down payment of $1700 on
the farm and the money and effort defendant put into im-
proving it. It appears without dispute that $900 was spent for
tiling, of which $200 was paid by “the government.” Defend-
ant also spent a total of $2500 to $3000 for conservation dams,
dirt moving, the tiling “and so forth.” In addition to what is
just mentioned, defendant spent $500 or $600 improving the
farm dwelling. . .

It would seem inequitable for plaintiff to reap the benefits
from these improvements by upholding his claim to a forfeiture.
Under our decision he will receive the money he advanced to
“help” the Isaacsons, with a liberal return on his investment in
the nominal form of rent, plus repayment of all expense in-
eurred. We think this is all plaintiff is equitably entitled to
receive. .

The principal precedent plaintiff cites to support his second
proposition is Ross v. Automobile Ins. Co., 228 Iowa 668, 676-

2
677, 292 N.W.813, It involves a quite different factual situation

from the one we have here and does not conflict with our decision
or anything said herein —Affirmed.

All Justices concur,

Harry Derrick et ux., appellants, v. Amrna CasuaLTy AND
Surery Company, an insurance company, et al., appellees.

No. 52882
(Reported in 158 N.W.2a 99)

Aprit 9, 1968.

Lee H. Gaudineer, Jr., of Des Moines, for appellants.
Eugene Davis, of Des Moines, for appellees,

Swart, J—[ This action reviewable de novo on appeal
involves plaintiffs’ claims for benefits under the “Uninsured
Motorist” coverage provided by an automobile liability insurance
policy issued to plaintifis by Aetna Casualty. Defendant Aetna

5268 ee

Casualty declined to pay because the motorist who had caused
the injuries was not “uninsured.”

Plaintiffs’ petition sought a declaratory judgment that they
were entitled to benefits, and a money judgment. Plaintiffs
also sought reformation of the policy, based on alleged mutual
mistake or on the basis of what “public policy” requires. If
the foregoing relief were denied, they sought damages against
Aetna’s agent, Hal Higgs, for allegedly misrepresenting the
coverage.

In the trial court all issues were resolved in favor of the
defendants.

This appeal presents the question of the meaning of the
policy, and the correctness of the trial court’s findirigs that
plaintiffs had not established grounds for reformation or for
damages resulting from misrepresentation.

Plaintiffs are husband and wife.

Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company is an in-

surance company duly licensed to do business in Iowa. Defend-
ant Harold W. Higgs, d/b/a Hal Higgs Insurance, is an in-
dividual residing in Des Moines, Iowa, who at all times material
hereto was engaged in the general insurance agency business,
and sold insurance for several insurance companies, including
Aetna, .
On December 8, 1960, defendant Aetna issued a policy of
insurance to plaintiffs, pursuant to plaintiffs’ written applica-
tion therefor which provided coverage for a 1959 Ford auto-
mobile. This policy was replaced by the policy involved herein
dated September 3, 1963, providing similar coverage. We
reproduce the original application.

eS 22°

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Maevonr oo, wih “Policy ProvsionsSection 1” For 13802, completes tho above Asie Poli.

1250

We reproduce the declaration sheet attached to the re-
placement policy.

‘THE TNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY
Hertford, Connecticut

c04 the policy previoualy isved
Indicated below, provided the premlum therafer hat been pold

ra rom
pens ‘evant uw uicos
bon rer
“8 kL DETAIEK [PEAVE, 20 3630 12-03-60 3116
‘ADDRESS ASG8 £ DAKKOGD OR TFOUGY PERIOD — Gouna annect
2Es MUINES 1UKA WiShicnscrcrers acco cree | O8MU3~65
fences etc sence
‘he loaranceefforded sont with respec to wch ofthe following eran
t apecficpremiom chorge ef charge the lini of Ana Cosseye oened
atin afer to the feemv es polly hovngeferneh thar.
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2 2
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2
‘ee

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expecta t (i) each person ond (each occvence for Badly nury aby, end
‘or Srompl 16/2075 would eons ney by

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LOSS PAYEE Ae sated Ta Condinon 1S, any Tot onder Par Ta payable wi &
Jond Addeos of tinbside) " mr

CAR } CHASE INVESTMENT CO

iT moy appear fo The named insured Gad (Namie |

tho pram therefor,

3 this raplacernentpelicy'and payment of
i Jowleage and blot

the bast of his knowl

SECHON 2—This Decco Pog, with “Poly ProvilnsSuction 1" Form 13202 (Bae. 1/43}, completes the cbove numbered Auo-ite Paley.

e309)

This policy was called an “Auto-Rite” policy. It provided
coverage of $300,000 liability for each occurrence, medical ex-
pense coverage of $5000 to each person, accidental death bene-
fits of $1000 to each named insured, and uninsured motorists

225:

coverage of $20,000 for each accident. The limits of coverage
for liability and uninsured motorists were of the “level” type
imposing a maximum of $300,000 and $20,000 respectively
regardless of whether one person or more than one person is
entitled to receive benefits thereunder.

The coverage provided as protection against uninsured
motorists is stated in part 1 of the policy as follows:

“Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage. Aetna
Casualty will pay all sums which the insured or his legal repre-
sentative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because
of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured highway vehicle * * *.”

The term “uninsured highway vehicle” is defined in the
policy as follows:

“(a) a highway vehicle with respect to the ownership,
maintenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts
specified by the Financial Responsibility Law of the state in
which the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily
injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time
of the accident with respect to any person or organization
legally responsible for the use of such vehicle, or with respect
to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance
policy applicable at the-time of the accident but the company
writing the same denies coverage thereunder, or

“(b) a hit-and-run vehicle.”

On October 5, 1963, Harry Detrick was driving the 1959
Ford insured under the policy when he was involved in an
accident with a vehicle driven by one Mary Sullivan. Harry
Detrick sustained serious injuries, resulting in damages in ex-
cess of $20,000. It is admitted that Mary Sullivan was legally
liable for such accident and the damages sustained by Harry
Detrick.

Mary Sullivan had a policy of automobile liability in-
surance with Employers Mutual Casualty Company. The limit
of liability for bodily injury specified in her policy was equal
to the amount specified by the Iowa Financial Responsibility
Law—$10,000 for injury to one person.

1252

Employers Mutual paid its full policy limits ($10,000) to
Harry Detrick, who executed a covenant ’not to sue Mary Sul-
livan, but retained his rights against Aetna.

Plaintiffs claimed a policy ambiguity by referring to the
“other insurance clause.” The language relied on refers to a
situation where the insured has a second policy and has no
application here.

The trial court found:

“The ‘other insurance’ clause is not applicable under the
facts of this case.”

Plaintiff Nellie ‘Detrick. testified that she wanted and
thought she was buying insurance that would provide up to
$20,000 in event of injury by another motorist.

The trial court found:

“The plaintiff Nellie Detrick and defendant Hal 1 Higgs each
testified that they had a conversation regarding the coverage
provided by the policy before the same was originally pur-
chased by plaintiff. It appears from plaintiff’s testimony, and
the court so finds, that plaintiff Nellie Detrick was primarily
concerned at the. time with securing some sort of insurance
protection in case she or members of her family should be’ in-
volved in an automobile accident with another driver who had
no liability insurance. The court finds that the version of the
conversation testified to by defendant Higgs is credible and
convincing, -and that the uninsured motorists coverage was
fully and correctly explained to plaintiffs by defendant Higgs,
to-wit: That payments would be made thereunder by the Aetna
only if the other driver had no liability insurance, or was a hit-
and-run driver.”

Mrs. Detrick testified that she relied on Mr. Higgs and did
not read her policy. (A not uncommon situation) She may
have not correctly understood what she was buying but she
makes no claim that anything was ever intentionally misrepre-
sented to her. With commendable honesty she testified: “TI
don’t think Hal Higgs would intentionally lie to anybody.”

We continue from the trial court’s findings:

“Plaintiffs have failed to establish by the required degree
of proof that the parties made a mutual mistake as alleged in

ES 2:

Count I of the Petition, that the language of the insurance
contract is ‘against the public policy of this state’ as alleged
in Count ITI, or that defendant Higgs was guilty of false,
reckless or fraudulent statements as alleged in Count IV of
the Petition.”

The trial court also found:

“The policy issued to plaintiffs by Aetna is not ambiguous.
It is clear that Mary Sullivan was not the operator of an ‘unin-
sured highway vehicle.’ Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to
sustain their burden of proving that defendants’ Exhibit 1
provided any coverage to them under the uninsured motorists
coverage or otherwise as a result of this accident.”

We agree with the findings of the trial court.

I. Plaintiffs here are the unfortunate victims of an
anomaly. Whether such a situation has ever been contemplated
in the buying and selling of insurance we do not know. Plain-
tiffs would have been better off financially had the injury been
caused by a motorist with no insurance. This situation, how-
ever, does not authorize us to write into the insurance contract
something that is not there. The policy covers injuries caused
by an uninsured motorist. It does not cover underinsurance.
It is a “level” type policy wherein the maximum liability of
the company is fixed regardless of how many persons might be
entitled to receive benefits.

The terms “automobile liability insurance”, “in-
sured” and “uninsured” are words of common meaning and
understanding in accord with dictionary definitions. ‘“Auto-
mobile liability insurance” is defined in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary as “insurance against loss from or
legal liability for damages arising out of ownership, main-
tenance, or operation of a-motor vehicle.” “Underinsurance”
means “insurance in an amount insufficient to cover the possible
loss or to satisfy the requirements of a coinsurance clause.”
“Insured” means “the owner of a policy of insurance.” “Un”
is a prefix meaning “not.”

Mary Sullivan was the owner of a policy of liability in-
surance. She was insured in the amount required by our
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. (Section 321A.1-
(10), 1966 Code of Iowa)

1255

We find nothing ambiguous in the use of the words in the
policy nor in the provisions thereof. Mary Sullivan was not
uninsured nor underinsured within the requirements of the
statute. We find no authority authorizing us to define the
word “uninsured” to mean underinsured in relation to plain-
tiff’s injury.

In Mallinger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., Ine., 253 Towa 222, 226, 111 N.W.2d 647, we-quoted from
Field v. Southern Surety Co., 211 Towa 1239, 235 N.W. 571,'as
follows:

Hl “The general rule is that a policy of insurance must be
construed most favorably to the insured, but this rule applies
only when there is a real ambiguity in the language of the
policy. If the words used in the policy are plain and unam-
biguous, it is the duty of the court to give effect to such
language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning,
and not make a new contract for the © parties by arbitrary
judicial construction.”

In the special concurrence this appears:

“Policies written -and sold to the public should not require
the services of an expert in semantics.to determine coverage.”

It is well settled and a matter about which there is no
argument here that if an insurance policy is susceptible to two
different constructions or is ambiguous, that construction is to
be placed upon it that will inure to the benefit of the insured.
Before we can apply that rule we must find some ambiguity.

Here, however, we are able to find only one possible con-
struction and we find no ambiguity.

-“Uninsured” in its common meaning means not: insured.
Under our Financial Responsibility Law Mary Sullivan had
financial responsibility (insurance) ‘as required.

HI IL. Matters that are-not germane to the problem.be-
fore us should be kept in mind.

This is not a-case wherein plaintiff seeks double recovery.
It is not a case where defendant company is relying on an
escape’ clause or exclusion provision’ There is:no dispute as
to plaintiffs’ damage. -There are no questions involving the
policy provisions as to “other- insurance”, “reduction of maxi
mum benefits”, “pro rata” or “excess liability”, except ‘for

EE

plaintiffs’ claim that they create ambiguity. We have said in
Division I, supra, that we find no ambiguity.

‘The sole question is whether the situation here is covered
by the insuring provisions of the policy. We agree with the
trial court that there is no coverage here.

While this case is reviewable de novo the findings of the
trial court “especially when considering the credibility of wit-
nesses” are entitled to weight. Rule 344(f)(7), Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Here the trial court in considering the evidence found
“that the version of the conversation testified to by Defendant
Higgs is credible and convincing * * *.”

We find nothing in the record to overcome the trial court’s
findings.

Hl Ill. To entitle plaintiffs to the relief of reformation
of the insurance policy it is necessary to show a mutual mistake
or a mistake on the part of one party and fraud or inequitable
conduct on the part of the other and that the policy as written
does not express the agreement of the parties, Conard v. Auto-
Owners (Mutual) Insurance Con » Rb Towa 157, 161, 117 N.W.2d
53.

The case before us ‘fails to meet the requirements for ref-
ormation.

| | IV. The public policy of our state has been stated by
the legislature in chapter 321A of our Code. Under this law
insurance with a limit of $10,000 liability to one person con-
stitutes compliance, The policy of insurance before us ree-
ognizing, as it does, the statutory provisions, does not violate
the public policy of the state.

:V. Appellants’ alternative cause of action against defend-
ant appellee Harold W. Higgs is based on pronouncements in
Conard v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Insurance Co., supra, cited
by both parties. On pages 161 and 162 of the Iowa Reports
this appears:

Hl “And to entitle plaintiff to damages under the plead-
ings against defendant insurance agents, Forret & Reich, it is
necessary to show in equity, as in law, the elements of fraud,
representation, falsity, scienter, deception, and injury.” (Cita-
tions)

1256

The statement in Conard, just quoted, as to necessary
elements in fraud cases is correct but the means of establishing
them is not the same in’ equity as in law. In equity the rules
are less strict.

In Hall v. Wright, 261 Iowa 758, 766, 156 N.W.2d 661, an
action at law grounded on actual fraud, we said: ©

“Each and every one of the following elements must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence that is clear,
satisfactory and convincing—such as to overcome the presump-
tion in favor of fair dealing: (1) representation, (2) falsity,
(8) materiality, (4) seienter, (5) intent to deceive, (6) reliance,
(7) resulting injury and damage.” (Citations)

The form of remedy as factor affecting essential elements
is stated in 37 C.J.S., Fraud, section 4, as follows:

“The essential elements of fraud are, as a rule, not con-
trolled by the fact that the action is at law or in equity ot by
whether*fraud is asserted .as a cause of action or as 4 defense,
although equity will grant-relief in some instances where it
would ordinarily be refused at law, as, for example, where a
scienter is not presént or there has been no pecuniary damage.

“The same elements are necessary and sufficient to con-
stitute fraud available as the basis of-a suit for damages,
whether the suit is at law or in equity; and the same is true of
fraud as the basis of a suit for damages and of fraud as the
basis of an estoppel. * * *

“However, the converse of the rule-that what amounts to
fraud in law constitutes fraud in equity is not in all instances
true, since the equitable theory of fraud is more comprehensive,
and while an innocent misrepresentation may be insufficient to
sustain a tort action for deceit it may be sufficient to sustain an
action for rescission or for general equitable relief. * * *.”

In 37 Am. Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, section 326, this
appears:

“There is a distinction between relief, either affirmative or
defensive, in a court of equity, on the ground of fraud, and
the remedy for fraud in a court of law. Although the juris.
diction of the two courts is almost equal in their right to try
and determine questions of fraud, their means of proving the
fraud are not equal, and their modes of granting relief are

22"

widely different. It is well settled that in exercising jurisdic-
tion to correct the effects of fraud, a court of equity is not
confined to the rules acted upon by a court of law, but may act
upon rules which go beyond the rules of law. The remedy in
equity is frequently more beneficial than that at law. * * *
Furthermore, although whatever amounts to fraud according to
the legal conception is also fraud in the equitable conception,
the converse of this statement is not true. The equitable theory
of fraud is much more comprehensive than that of the law and
contains elements entirely different from any which enter into
the legal notion. Equity may construct a fraud from the cir-
cumstances, whereas the law must find it as a fact.”

‘In the case before us plaintiffs allege actual fraud on the
part of defendant Higgs in these words:

“That by virtue of the false and reckless statements and
representations of the Defendant, Harold W. Higgs, d/b/a Hal
Higgs Insurance, which he knew or should have known to be
false and upon which he intended. the Plaintifis.to rely or
should have known they would rely, as to the amount and kind
of coverages to be afforded, and. upon which false, reckless and
fraudulent statements and representations Plaintiffs did in fact
rely, the Plaintiff, Harry Detrick, has been. damaged * * *.”

The trial court found that plaintiffs had. failed to establish
false, reckless or fraudulent statements as alleged. We agree
and find nothing in the record before us to bring plaintiffs’
ease within well established rules.,

VI. Plaintiffs have been seriously damaged. It is ad-
mitted that their recovery of damages has been inadequate.
As we commented in Division I, supra, the situation is anoma-
lous. Plaintiffs’ counsel has been skillful and resourceful but we
cannot make a contract and create a liability where none
exists.

The trial court was right,

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur,

1258

Joun M, Haut, administrator with Will Annexed of Estate of
Ceeil R. Hall, a/k/a C. R. Hall, appellant, v. Annmp Muruan
Insurance Company, appellee.

Joun M. Hau, administrator of Estate of Genevieve M. Hall,
_ appellant, v, ALLIED Muruau Insurance Company, appellee. .
No. 52849,
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 107)

ApRIL 9, 1968.

CO

Frank W. Davis, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Kent M. Forney of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave,
of Des Moines, for appellee.

Mason, J.—These two cases, consolidated and argued to-
gether here, involve the uninsured motorist clause of a family
automobile insurance policy issued by defendant Allied Mutual
Insurance Company to Cecil R. Hall. John M. Hall, as the per-
sonal representative of Cecil R. and Genevieve M. Hall, seeks
declaratory judgment in this law action construing the contract
and determining the proper measure of damages to be applied.
The petitions are identical, except in the case involving Mrs.
Hall it is alleged she was a passenger in the automobile operated
by her husband and was within the coverage of his policy.

I. Part IV Coverage J of the insurance contract provides
defendant agrees “to pay all sums which the insured or his
legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as dam-
ages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, hereinafter called ‘bodily injury’, sustained
by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile; pro-
vided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to
whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to
recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be
made by agreement between the insured or such representative
and the company or, if they fail to agree, by arbitration.”

The issue is whether the measure of damages under the
Oklahoma law or the Iowa law is applicable in determining
defendant’s liability under this particular policy provision.

The cases were submitted to the court without a jury upon
a stipulated record. No oral testimony was taken.

As part of this stipulation the parties requested the court
to take judicial notice of the Oklahoma Wrongful Death

260

Statute which provides that the personal representative of a
decedent may institute an action for wrongful death in which
ease the damages must inure to the exclusive benefit of the
surviving spouse and children, if any, or next of kin to be dis-
tributed in the same manner as personal property of the de-
ceased. The action must be commenced within two years.

The parties further stipulated that under Oklahoma law
the measure of damages in a death case is determined by the
extent to which the deceased contributed to the support of a
surviving spouse, child or next of kin, in addition to which the
personal representative is entitled to recover for necessary
medical and funeral expenses.

HE Under Iowa law the measure of damages in a death
case is the present worth or value of the estate decedent would
be reasonably expected to have saved and accumulated as the
result of his own efforts from the date of his death if le had
lived out’ the term of his natural life, plus medical expense and
the lesser of his funeral expense or the ‘intetest thereon over
the remainder of his life expectancy.

Il. The facts of the cases are not in dispute.

At the time of death of plaintiff’s decedents there was in
force a family automébile-insurance policy issued by defendant
to Mr. Hall which by its terms in Part IV thereof afforded con:
tractual coverage to plaintiff’s decedents against injury or
death resulting from the Regligent acts of an uninsured
motorist.

The contract ot insurance was entered into in Iowa and
both parties to it were citizens and residents of Iowa, both at
the time of making the contract and at the time decedents died.

Decedents were killed’in an automobile accident near Me-
Alester, Oklahoma, November 29, 1963; when the automobile
owned by Cecil R. Hall was struck by au automobile driven by
Sybil Roach Shook -and owned by Ivan L. Shook, both of whom
were then residents of Texas.

Sybil Roach Shook was guilty: of negligence which was a
proximate cause of the death of plaintiff’s decedents. The
automobile operated by Sybil was at the time of the accident
an: uninsured automobile. At the time of death neither dece-

2

dent left a surviving spouse, dependent child or next of kin
financially dependent upon them or either of them.

No action has been instituted in Oklahoma against either
Sybil or Ivan L. Shook to recover damages in any amount for
the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedents. There has been
no arbitration of the claims made in behalf of plaintiff’s
decedents and no demand for arbitration has been made in
writing by either party to the other.

HI There is no question concerning the applicability of the
uninsured motorist coverage to this ‘accident. Decedents were
driving or riding in’ an “insured automobile”, were struck by

“aninsured automobile” causing their deaths. Thus plain-
tiff is entitled to recover some amount under the policy in each
case. The extent of that coverage is a proper subject for 4
declaratory judgment action. General Casualty Company of
Wisconsin v. Hines, 261 Iowa 738, 741, 156 N.W.2d 118, 120,
and citations.

If the Oklahoma law is applicable, plaintifi’s recovery
under the facts will be limited to the fair and reasonable value
of the necessary medical and funeral expenses; while if the
Towa law is applicable, the amount of damages would be de-
termined by the law of Iowa as set out, supra, in the stipula-
tion of the parties.

IM. The trial court held plaintiffs claim was governed
by the Oklahoma law and entered judgment accordingly.

The court further held plaintiff’s failure to ask for arbi-
tration of the controversy with defendant did not preclude him
from seeking the declaratory relief sought in the petition, and
plaintiff's failure to institute suit against Sybil R. Shook or
Ivan L. Shook before the expiration of two years from the date
of the accident did not constitute a violation of the insurance
contract which would preclude plaintiff from maintaining this
action.

Although additional relief is prayed for, the stipulations
state that at this time the trial court is not being asked to make
any determination as to the amount of damages, if any, to
which: plaintiff would be entitled.

Only plaintiff appeals, assigning as error the court’s hold-
ing that Oklahoma law determines the applicable measure of

2

damages recoverable under the quoted provisions of the in-
surance contract.

IV. Plaintiff contends that since the insurance contract
was entered into in Iowa, between an Iowa insurer and an
Iowa insured, it is the state most intimately concerned with the
outcome of this litigation and under the “grouping of contacts”
or “center of gravity” theory the Iowa, rather than the Okla-
homa, measure of damages for wrongful death should be
applied.

HE $= Defendant argues in support of the court’s holding
that plaintiff is entitled to no more from defendant than he
could have recovered in an action against the Shooks. It econ-
tends plaintiff's rights are governed by the contract, and under
the insuring agreement the company does not agree to pay all
damages of plaintiff or any fixed sum of damages but agrees
only “to pay all sums which the insured * * * shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of
an uninsured automobile * * * .” Stated otherwise, the com-
pany agrees to pay to the same extent and for the same amount
as the uninsured motorist. Thus defendant's obligation to pay
must be measured by the damages for which the uninsured
motorist is legally liable since it is his liability that sets the
amount and extent of defendant’s liability.

We believe there is merit in defendant’s argument. It
follows we must determine what sum plaintiff is “legally en-
titled to recover as damages from” the uninsured motorist.

Of course, we assume plaintiff was unable during the period
permitted by the statute of limitations to obtain jurisdiction to
sue the Shooks in Iowa for the tort committed in Oklahoma,
they being neither residents of Iowa nor subject to suit here.
We realize that if the Shooks had voluntarily come within the
jurisdiction of this state during the period of limitations an
original notice could have been served on them. However,
under the pleadings and stipulated facts there is no reasonable
basis for finding an action could have been maintained in Iowa
against Shooks. Unless a lawsuit could have been maintained
in Iowa against them, there would have been no possibility of
recovery under the Iowa measure of damages for wrongful
death.

2

Plaintiff, in seeking recovery from the Shooks, would have
been limited to a choice of two jurisdictions: Texas, the resi-
dence of the wrongdoers, or Oklahoma, under the Non-Resi-
dent Motorist Statute of that state, Title 47, sections 391403,
Oklahoma Statutes 1961.

If plaintiff had brought suit in Texas within the period
permitted by the statutes of that state, Texas would have fol-
lowed the Oklahoma law on measure of damages since Okla-
homa was the situs of the tort. The courts of Texas have con-
sistently held the question of damages is controlled by the law
of the foreign state in which damages arose.

In 1922 in a wrongful death case the Texas Commission of
Appeals, in an opinion adopted by the Supreme Court, held
although their statute, now Article 4678, Vernon’s Ann. Tex.
Civ. Stats., required Texas courts to follow the law of Texas in
all matters pertaining to procedure, the law of the place where
the negligence occurred must be applied as to substantive mat-
ters. Jones v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App. );
243 S.W. 976.

In Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 8.W.2d 58, 63,
decided May 24, 1967, by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
Austin, that court said:

“Without discussing in detail the facts and holdings, we
summarize results in other cases we regard as significant in the
body of case law in this state supporting the rule that the lex
loci delictus will be applied in tort actions.

RRR

“On the strict question of measure, extent, and amount of
damages recoverable in a wrongful death action, the general rule
is that determination is by the law of the place where the wrong
eausing the death occurred, founded on the view that measure,
extent, and amount of damages pertain to the substance of the
right of recovery, governed by the law of the place where the
action arose” (citing cases).

Although a writ of error was granted in Marmon by the
Supreme Court of Texas which has not been determined so far
as our research reveals, the law as announced in that case was
the law during the period plaintiff could have sought recovery
from Shooks in the courts of that state.

2

On September 6, 1967, in Garza v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
Tex. Civ. App., San Antonio, 418 S.W.2d 595, 597-598, it was
said:

“We also decline plaintiff’s invitation to re-examine the
rule, well established in Texas as of this date, that in a tort
action the law of the place of the tort, or the lea loci delicti, must
be looked to in determining the substantive rights of the parties.
* * * We find nothing in the Texas decisions which may be
characterized as a trend away from the lew loci rule in tort
actions, or which has the effect of lessening, in any way, the
precedential weight of the Texas decisions applying that rule.”

The Oklahoma law on measure of damages as set forth in the
stipulation of the parties is set out in Division I, supra.

If plaintiff had pursued his cause of action against the
Shooks in the courts of Oklahoma under its Non-Resident Motor-
ist Statute, the result would have been: the same. Plaintiff would
have been entitled to only medical and funeral expenses since
his decedents left no financial dependents. This result is
reached by Oklahoma and Texas decisions that in tort actions
prosecuted in their courts the law of the place of the tort, the
lex loci delicti, must be looked to in determining the measure of
damages. It is not brought about by our adopting either the
doctrine of lex loci delicti or the “center of gravity” or “group-
ing of contacts” theory in determining whether the substantive
law of Iowa or the foreign state will apply.

The amount plaintiff would have been entitled to recover
from Shook having been determined, as stated, this establishes
the amount of defendant’s liability to plaintiff.

It must be remembered defendant is not liable for its own
tort but because it agreed to reimburse plaintiff for Shook’s
tort. This is not a case of an Iowan’s liability for a tort com-
mitted in Oklahoma, but a case of a Texan’s liability for a tort
committed in Oklahoma for which defendant had contractually
agreed to pay.

V. Plaintifi’s contention presents a conflicts problem
which we do not believe belongs in the present case. Among
the cases cited by plaintiff as authority for his position are
Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410, and Flogel
v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 183 N.W.2d 907. We do not believe

ee 1285

they aid plaintiff. Those actions were against respective al-
leged wrongdoers who were either residents of, or subject to
suit in, the states where the lawsuits were filed, which were
held to have the “most significant contacts” with the disputed
matter.

Nor do we believe the contract cases cited by plaintiff
where the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” theory
was resorted to by the courts sustain plaintiff’s contention. The’
law held to be applicable there related to matters bearing upon
the execution, interpretation, validity or performance of a
contract.

Our present problem is how much defendant is obligated
to pay plaintiff under the insuring agreement. Determination
of this question does not involve a conflicts problem. .

With directions to the trial court to make a determination
of the.amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled in. ac-
cordance with this opinion, the case is—Affirmed and remanded.

All Justices ‘concur. |

Cart Harrwie, administrator of estate of, Perry Hartwig,. de-
ceased, appellee, v. CLareNce OLSON, appellant, Hienway
.. . . Surracers, Inc., defendant on cross-petition.
No. 52802,
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 81)

a
a a ic 2a 2

Apri. 9, 1968,

1268 a |

Westfall, Laird, Burington, Bovard & Heiny, of Mason City,
for appellant.

Miller, Pearson & Gloe, of Decorah, for appellee.

Moors, J.—This is an action for the wrongful death of
Perry Hartwig, a highway resurfacing employee, struck while
working by a car owned and driven by defendant Clarence
Olson. Defendant has appealed from judgment on verdict of
$28,000 for plaintiff. Defendant assigns nineteen errors, two
on rulings on evidence, two on rulings on motions to withdraw
portions of pleadings and fifteen on requested and given jury,
instructions. .

Highway Surfacers, Inc., Hartwig’s employer, was made
defendant on cross-petition. It was granted a continuance and
took-no part in the trial and is not a party to this appeal. For
clarity we will refer to Perry Hartwig as s plaintiff and Olson as
defendant.

On September 4, 1965, about. 6:30 am., plaintiff and two
fellow employees, Lindsay and Grady Walls, brothers,.were
operating a cutting machine on the south half of the highway
at a place about seven miles north and a half mile east of the
town of Thompson in Winnebago County. Defendant ap-
proached from the west, struck the machine and the three men.
Hartwig was' killed instantly and the Walls ‘brothers’ were
seriously injured.

Highway Surfacers, Inc., the employer, had entered into a
contract with the Iowa Highway Commission to blacktop’ ap-
proximately nine miles of the county road running east and
west. On September 8'the south half of the blacktop had been
conipleted for some distance éast and west of the place of the
accident. The north half had been completed from the eastern
limit of the job to a few feet west of the place of the accident.
About 7:30 that evening the crew ceased working and their
equipment was moved to the Bruns farmyard just south of the
scene of the accident.

‘On the morning ‘of the’ accident’ plaintiff and his fellow
workmen arrived at'the Bruns farm about 6 am. They were
instructed by a foreman to cut a header on the north side and

P| es 1269

to take a sample from the south lane of the blacktop which had
been laid the day before.

Plaintiff drove his employer’s 1958 Chevrolet pickup to the
north lane a few feet east.of where resurfacing of that lane had
been completed. The headlights were on. Plaintifi’s witnesses
testified they were on dim. Defendant testified they were on
bright and shining in his eyes as he came from the west.

~ Plaintiff and the Walls brothers then moved the cutter to
a position in front of the parked truck where they cut a header.
The cutting machine is on wheels, pushed by workmen and
weighs about 300 pounds. Its cutting blade is propelled by a
434 horsepower gasoline motor. Cutting a header means saw-
ing off the tapered end of the blacktop preparatory to resuming
blacktopping. After cutting the header the men moved the
machine to the south lane to cut a sample.

As they were cutting the sample, plaintiff was standing on
the west side of the machine looking. down and controlling the
cutting blade. No artificial light was in use. As this was being
done one Walls was at the north and the other at the south end
of the machine, They and the cutter were hit while in said
respective positions. . .

The morning of the accident was overcast and hazy. De-
fendant was driving from his home in Buffalo Center to his
place of employment at Keister, Minnesota. He did not ordi-
narily take this road but had done so several times since the
blacktopping was started in June. He had driven west over
the road the night before and testified no workmen were then
on it. He estimated the time as 7 p.m. He observed some
strings or directional lines and of course was aware of the re-
surfacing.

‘West of the accident scene is a valley with an incline of
approximately 11 feet. Defendant was driving between 50 to
60 miles per hour with his bright lights on. He testified he
lowered them when he observed the lights of the pickup but
those lights remained unchanged. He reduced his speed, looked
ahead and slammed on his brakes when he first saw the men
and the cutting machine. The skid marks from his Oldsmobile
extended 97 feet, 57 feet before the point of impact and 40 feet
beyond it.

1270 | a

* EEL. On cross-examination of a witness for plaintiff and
by an offer of proof by one of his witnesses, defendant at-
tempted to show there were no signs of any kind warning the
public there was construction work ahead, there were no slow
or men-working-ahead signs, barricades, lights, reflectors, flag-
man, flares or warning of any kind of the presence of the cutter
or the three workmen.

Defendant’s offer of proof by the testimony of a highway
patrolman included: “Q. What did you find as to whether or
not there were any fusees or reflectors or lights of any kind in
that area? A. I found nothing in that area. Q. Did you find
any signs in the area warning a motorist to reduce his speed
in that immediate area? A. No, I did not. Q. And what about
barricades, were there any barricades out there? A. Not that I
ean recall.”

Plaintiff’s objections to each of these and all like questions
were: “plaintiff’s decedent was under no duty or obligation im-
posed upon him by law, by any rules, regulations or statutes
with reference thereto, and it is getting into possible negligence,
if any, of someone else, and this decedent had no obligation or
connection with any signs, any possible negligence by. an em-
ployer or fellow employee of decedent Hartwig is not imputed
or chargeable to him or plaintiff in this action, and the decedent
Hartwig was exempt from the provisions of Chapter 821, sec-
tion 321.233. of the Code; it is incompetent,.irrelevant, im-
material.” : :

The trial court sustained these objections and thus de-
fendant was prevented from showing the surrounding cireum-
stances along the highway just west of the place of the ac-
cident. Defendant asserts this consistent ruling of the trial
court was prejudicial error. We must agree.

If this evidence went: only to imputation of negligence of
plaintiff’s employer or a coemployee then the trial court’s ruling
would be correct. Such negligence, if any, would not be im-
puted to plaintiff. Pappas v. Evans, 242 Iowa 804, 48 N.W.2d
298; Stoker v. Tri-City Railway Co., 182 Iowa 1090, 165 N.W.
30, L.R.A. 1918F 515; McBride v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 184
Towa 398, 109 N.W.618; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, section 235;
65A C.J.S., Negligence, section 162.

Pe PC 1271

However, the general surrounding conditions, particularly
along the highway immediately west of the place of the acci-
dent, were material on the question of defendant's negligence,
claimed legal excuse, right to assume and plaintiff’s negligence
which defendant alleged was a proximate cause of the accident.
Plaintiff’s specifications of negligence against defendant in-
eluded allegations he was negligent in driving his car at a
greater speed than was reasonable, having due regard to the
traffic, surface and width of the highway and the conditions
then existing, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to have
his car under control and failing to exercise due care under
the existing circumstances and conditions.. Such questions and
answers as set out above in defendant’s offer of proof should
have been allowed. *

8 Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section
934, page 482, states: “In an action growing out of a motor
vehicle accident, any evidence of the .conditions and cireum-
stances leading up to and surrounding the accident which will
throw light upon the conduct of the parties and the care, or
lack of care, exercised by them, is, as a general proposition,
admissible.”

HM 61 CJS. Motor Vehicles, section 516n, page 260,
states: “Ordinarily, evidence of the condition of the road or
street, the presence and location of directional or warning
signs, signals, markings, or devices, and other physical condi-
tions existing at the scene of the accident or collision is admis-
sible.” See also Blashfield Cyclopedia Automobile Law and
Practice, section 6174. .

HI Whether a particular speed of a motor vehicle is ex-
cessive in violation of Code section 321.285, the reasonable
speed statute, depends entirely on the surrounding circum-
stances. Campbell v. Martin, 257 Iowa 1247, 1252, 186 N.W.2d
508, 511, and citations,

Hl Plaintiff argues defendant’s counsel should have stated
what he expected to prove and made the materiality of the
evidence appear. Perhaps if materiality had been specifically
pointed out we would not have the problem now presented
under this assigned error. Under the record we are not per-
suaded counsel was required to do so. The rule is that when

1272 a mz

it is apparent upon the face of the question what the evidence
sought to be introduced is, and that it is material, this is suf-
ficient. But when this is not apparent, then the party seeking
to introduce the evidence is required to state what he expects
to prove, and thus make its materiality appear. Iowa Power
and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144
N.W.2d 308, 318, and citations. Here defendant’s offer of the
questions and answers was sufficient to indicate the materiality
of the evidence.

II. On September 4, 1966, exactly one year after the ac-
cident, Grady Walls, a photographer, and others went to the
place of the accident, parked an automobile where the pickup
had been standing and several photographs were taken from
the west. One shows a man standing near the south side of
the car holding a card on which appears “6.30.” Witnesses, in-
cluding the photographer, identified this and other photographs
taken before, at and after 6:30 a.m. that morning. Hach was
given thorough cross-examination of all details surrounding
the conditions under which these photographs were taken. All
agreed it was not overcast on this morning. Grady Walls
testified they accurately represented what he saw at the time
they were taken, including the light conditions and that they
fairly and accurately represented the terrain, the roadway and
the area of the scene of the accident with the exception of a few
conditions pointed out:by him.

Defendant contends’ his objections to these photographs
should have been sustained and the trial court erred in ad-
mitting them as exhibits. We do not agree.

HEM The mere fact photographs are taken at a time dif.
ferent from that in question does not render them inadmis-
sible if witnesses are able to verify them as substantial repre-
sentations of the conditions as they existed at the time in
question. As photographs are often unobtainable at the scene
of the accident and at the time thereof the only practical rule
is that changes must not be such as to destroy the substantial
identity and that changes, whatever they may be, should be
pointed out to the jury. Englund v. Younker Brothers, Inc.,
259 Iowa 48, 53, 142 N.W.2d 530, 532; Elkin v. Johnson, 260
Towa 46, 51, 148 N.W.2d 442, 446.

a a 1278

The admissibility of photographs rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court and we will not interfere with the
trial court’s ruling except upon a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. Shover v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 252 Iowa 706,
719, 720, 107 N.W.2d 85, 93, and citations; Englund v. Younker
Brothers, Inc., supra.

Our study of the record and the several photographs ad-
mitted in evidence, including those which were posed, fails to
disclose an abuse of discretion by the trial court. ‘The weight
to be given them was for the jury.

Tl. As required by Code section 619.17 defendant’s
answer, as an affirmative defense, alleged plaintiff was guilty of
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. It
sets out specifications of negligence a through 0. On plaintiff’s
motion the trial court struck specifications f through o. - De-
fendant contends the court erred i in striking: specifications h, j,
I,n and o.

Specifications h and 1 in substance: charged plaintiff with
negligence in working on the south half of the blacktop when
he knew or should have known ‘there were no signs, warnings,
barricades, lights, lanterns, fusees or flagmen warning on-
coming traffic of the presence of the repairmen and canipment
blocking the south half of the‘blacktop.

Code section 321.233 provides: “The ptovisions of this
chapter shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles and
other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the sur-
face of a highway but shall apply to such Persons and Vehicles
when traveling to or from such work.”

Thus road -workers are exempt from the laws. of the-road
as set out under the many sections of chapter 321: - Regarding
what is now section 321.233 we said in Rebmann v. Heesch, 227
Towa 566, 577, 288 N.W. 695, 700: “While said section does
exempt those referred to therein from certain requirements
specified in the chapter, it does not release such persons from
the use of ordinary care nor absolve them from their negligence,
nor was it ever, in our judgment, so intended by the legisla-
ture.” Like statements are made in Wamser v. Bostian, 230
Towa 792, 796, 298 N.W. 860, 862. The North Dakota court in
considering an identical road: workers’ exemption statute in

1274 a iz

Quam v. Wengert, 86 N.W.2d 741, holds the worker’s duty of
care is not the same as that of an ordinary pedestrian but the
worker is required to exercise reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances, including the fact he was required to give at-
tention to his work.

With the duty owed by a road worker in mind we turn to
the question whether the substance of specifications h and 1 was
included in the court’s jury instructions. We believe it was.
As to plaintiff’s negligence, the court submitted failure to keep
a proper lookout, failure to give a proper warning of his
presence and that of the eutter upon the south half of the
blacktop, parking or permitting to be parked a vehicle upon the
north half of the blacktop approximately opposite the place of
work, working on the south half of the blacktop at a place
approximately opposite the parked vehicle and failure to re-
move himself from a place of danger when he knew or should
have known of the presence of defendant’s oncoming car. We
find no prejudicial error in striking specifications h and 1 of
defendant’s answer..

HIV. Specification j charged plaintiff with negligence
in failing to comply with rules and regulations of the highway
commission in connection with erection of signs, warnings,
barricades, lights, lanterns, fusees and flagmen to warn on-
coming traffic of the presence of repairmen and equipment on
the south half of the blacktop.

The record discloses plaintiff was one of several workmen
on the resurfacing job. There is no allegation or evidence he
had been assigned any duty to post signs, warnings or flagmen.
As we have pointed out in Division I, negligence, if any, of
plaintifi’s employer or a coemployee is not imputed to him. The
trial court did not err in striking specification j. This con-
elusion is well supported by Quam v. Wengert, supra, N.D., 86
N.W.2d 741,

HOV. Specification n alleged plaintiff was negligent in
operating a piece of road machinery upon a public highway not
equipped with two red danger signal lanterns or lights as re-
quired by Code section 321.399.

Specification o alleged plaintiff was negligent in operating
a piece of road machinery upon a public highway before sunrise

|; Le 1275

without a signal light on the front and rear as required by
Code section 321.400. Sunrise was at 6:30 am., Central Day-
light Saving Time on the day of the accident.

The requirements of sections 321.399 and 321.400 are
specifically limited to tractors, road graders, road drags and
other road machinery operated by fuel, kerosene or coal. The
cutter used at the time of this accident was nothing more than
a large power saw on wheels. Its blade was propelled by a
small motor but it was moved by workmen pushing it. We are
not persuaded the provisions of sections 321.399 and 321.400
applied to this cutter. It must also be observed plaintiff-was
only a workman and there is no allegation or evidence he was
charged by his employer with maintenance of the cutter. We
hold it was not prejudicial error to strike specifications n and o,

VI. After the evidence was closed and defendant’s motion
for directed verdict was denied he then moved to withdraw
certain specifications of negligence alleged in paragraph 6 of
plaintiff's petition. Subparagraphs e, g and h which the court
refused to withdraw each alleged defendant failed to exercise
due care to avoid colliding with Hartwig. In Sparks v. Long,
234 Iowa 21, 28, 11 N.W.2d 716, 720, we say: “Another pleaded
ground of negligence was that defendant ‘failed to exercise due
eare to avoid colliding with plaintiff.’ This is not a specific
charge of negligence. This is a general charge, and too general
to warrant its submission as a charge of negligence.”

HME The trial court’s instruction 1 included an exact copy
of the nine specifications of negligence alleged in paragraph
6 of plaintiff’s petition, including e, g and h. The trial court
apparently did not intend to submit these three specifications
to the jury as no instructions were given in reference thereto.
Specific instructions regarding the other six specifications were
given. Prejudicial error resulted, however, as this statement
was made in instruction 11: “If you find that the defendant
was guilty of any acts of negligence alleged in plaintiff’s peti-
tion and that said negligence was a proximate cause of the
accident, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the
defendant.”

1276 Le a

HH Specifications of negligence not submitted to the jury
should not be included in the statement of issues unless it is
clearly stated they are withdrawn from jury consideration.

VII. Defendant has assigned separate errors based on the
trial court’s refusal to give his requested instructions 1, 4, 5, 5a,
7, 8 and 13,

Defendant’s requested instruction 1 deals with stopping,
parking and leaving a vehicle upon a highway outside a busi-
‘ness or residence district and the charge of negligence against
plaintiff for violation of his alleged duty. Instruction 10 in-
cluded the substance thereof.

Requested instruction 4 refers to ‘the standard of care

governing the conduct of motor-vehicle operators and others
using the highway. Plaintiff-appellee’s brief refers to it as “a
long abstract dissertation on negligence and an effort to define
‘the standard of care required of the parties.” The substance
thereof was given by the court in instruction 4, the third para-
graph of instruction 10 and the second paragraph of instruction
15.
. THIEN prejudicial error resulted in the trial court’s re-
fusal to give defendant’s requested instructions 1 and 4. It is
sufficient if the substance of requested instructions is included
in those given the jury. Shank v. Wilhite, 256 Iowa 982, 985,
129 N.W.2d 662, 664, and citations."

VIII. Requested instruction 5 embodies both requested in-
‘structions 5 and 5a. It refers to plaintiff’s duty regarding
right-of-way ahd keeping a proper lookout’ and includes:
« @ © * he was bound to yield the right-of-way as that phrase is
defined herein to vehicles upon the highway * * *; He was
bound to keep a lookout to avoid injury and damage to himself
as well as to others who may at the same time be lawfully using
the highway.”

HM As a highway construction worker plaintiff was not
bound to keep a constant lookout or to yield the right-of-way.
A worker on the highways is not charged with the same degree
of care as an ordinary pedestrian. Plaintiff was required to
exercise only such reasonable care and observation for his
safety as was under the circumstances called for. Swan v.
Dailey-Luce Auto Co., 225 Iowa 89, 94, 277 N.W. 580, 583, and

a a 1277

citations; Quam v. Wengert, N. D., 86 N.W.2d 741, 747; 60
OJ.S., Motor Vehicles, section 391, page 956. We recognized
the same rule in Pappas v. Evans, 242 Iowa 804, 48 N.W.2d
298, where a railroad worker was injured by a motor vehicle,

The trial court did not err in refusing requested instruc-
tions 5 and 5a in the form submitted because they did not cor-
rectly state the applicable law. Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Iowa
875, 200 N.W. 821, 824,

IX. Defendant on trial attempted to prove the highway
commission had adopted rules and regulations for posting signs
at and near highway construction projects and that plaintiff's
employer had agreed to comply with the requirements of the
rules. The trial court sustained plaintiff’s objections to such
proof apparently on the theory it was an attempt to impute
negligence to plaintiff.

Requested instruction 7 relates to sign requirements and
defendant’s right to assume they would be posted if construc-
tion workers and equipment were upon the highway until he
knew or should have known of their presence.

Requested instruction 8 relates to plaintiff’s knowledge no
signs were posted as a circumstance to be considered on the
question of plaintiff’s alleged negligence.

Requested instructions 7 and 8 were not supported by the
evidence. We have however held in Division I evidence of the
absence of warning signs should have been admitted. On a
retrial a different record in this regard may be made and an
instruction covering the substance of requested instructions 7
and 8 may be required.

X. Defendant’s requested instruction 13 charged plain-
tiff with negligence for violation of sections 321.399 and
821.400. As we have. pointed out in Division V they have no
application to the cutter used by plaintiff. Refusal of re-
quested instruction 18 was correct.

XI. Defendant objected to instructions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16 and 19 and assigns error as to the giving of each.
Our holdings already stated as to the applicable law answer
most of the questions raised by defendant. We shall discuss
only those instructions which present additional problems.

1278 ee —

It is the trial court’s duty to instruct with
reasonable fullness on the pleaded issues which have evi-
dentiary support. A mere abstract definition of the law having
no application to the facts is insufficient. The giving of in-
structions which are conflicting and confusing is reversible
error. Kuehn v. Jenkins, 251 Iowa 718, 730, 731, 100 N.W.2d
610, 617, 618; Law v. Hemmingsen, 249 Iowa 820, 826, 89
N.W.2d 386, 391. From a study of all the instructions we con-
elude they are not vulnerable to defendant’s attack’ under the
above stated principles.

XII. We are unable to ‘determine whether instruction 16
with reference to legal excuse was given or withdrawn after
objections were made thereto. The evidence on retrial will no
doubt include much regarding surrounding circumstances. For
these reasons we find it unnecessary to diseuss defendant’s coni-
tentions regarding instruction 16.

XII. Instruction 19 includes this: “The measure of dam-
ages for the death of Perry Hartwig will be the present worth
or value of the estate which he would reasonably be expected
to have saved and accumulated as a result of his own efforts
from the date of his death, if he had lived out the term of his
natural life. This is not the sum which, when placed at in-
terest would yield an amount equal to the income of the dece-
dent at the time‘of his death, but as heretofore stated, it is that
amount which estimated at its present value, under all the
circumstances as disclosed by the evidence, would have come to
his estate from the date of his death to the end of his natural
life.”

Defendant argues “would have come”, as found near the
end of the paragraph, would logically be interpreted to mean
plaintiff’s income. We do not-agree. We think this complaint
is hypereritical. It seems clear to us, when read with the entire
instruction, the quoted part means what would have come to
the estate in the way of accumulations if Hartwig had lived.

- -Of course all instructions should be considered together
and interpreted as a whole. Rosin v. Northwestern States
Portland Gement Co.,.252 Iowa 564, 576, 107 N.W.2d 559, 565,
566, and citations.

a 1279

We find no reversible error under defendant’s assignments
of error to the instructions given.

For the reasons stated this case is—Reversed and re-
manded,

All Justices concur.

Water Haynes and Ruta Haynes, appellants, v. EpwArp J.
Rouuorr, appellee.

No. 52852,
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 914)

1280 Le

Aprit 9, 1968,

Miller, Pearson & Gloe, of Decorah, for appellants.

Brown, Dresser, Kinsey & Jolas, of Mason City, for ap-
Pellee.

Larson, J.—When the defendant, Edward J. Ruhoff, a non-
resident of Iowa, failed to appear in response to a proper and
timely service of noticé of an action for damages against him
resulting from an automobile collision in Howard County, Iowa,
the trial court on July 6, 1967, entered an order finding him “in
default for failure to file pleadings as required by law.” De-
fendant’s motion to set aside default filed August 16, after hear-
ing, was sustained on August 24 and, upon application, this
court granted interlocutory appeal.

The issues before us are whether defendant sufficiently met
his burden to show “good cause” as is imposed upon him by rule
236, Rules of Civil Procedure, and whether, as a matter of law
under the showing made, the trial court could set aside a default
duly entered herein. | .

a a 1281

I. Rule 236, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

“On motion and for good cause shown, and upon such terms
as the court prescribes, but not ex parte, the court may set aside
a default or the judgment thereon, for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty. Such motion
must be filed promptly after the discovery of the grounds thereof,
but not more than sixty days after entry of the judgment. * * *,”
(Emphasis added.)

We have had occasion to consider this rule in a number of
recent cases and have announced therein our view as to its ap-
plication and meaning, Hobbs v. Martin Marietta Co., 257 Iowa
124, 131 N.W.2d 772; Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., 256 Iowa
700, 128 N.W.2d 922; Handy v. Handy, 250 Iowa 879, 96 N.W.2d
922; Svoboda v. Svoboda, 245 Iowa 111, 60 N.W.2d 859; Amer-
ican State Bank v. Leaver, 261 Iowa 124, 153 N.W.2d 348, Both
parties here cite and make reference to these pronouncements.

Conclusions reached in these cases have application
here. “A ‘good cause’ is a sound, effective and truthful reason.
It is something more than an excuse, a plea, apology, extenua-
tion, or some justification, for the resulting effect.” Svoboda v.
Svoboda, supra. It is movant’s burden to show “good cause” or
“reasonable excuse.” Booth v. Central States Mut. Ins. Assn.,
235 Iowa 5, 15 N.W.2d 893. He must show his failure to appear
and defend was not due to his negligence or want of ordinary
care or attention, or to his carelessness or inattention. He must
show affirmatively that he “did intend to appear and defend, and
took steps to do so, and because of some misunderstanding, ac-
cident, mistake or excusable neglect he failed to appear.” Hobbs
v. Martin Marietta Co., supra. We also said in Hobbs, in in-
stances where there was a fact question under conflicting evi-
dence, the trial court exercises a broad and wide sound judicial
discretion in passing on good cause shown. Where there is no
factual dispute, if the facts are such that different inferences
may be drawn from them, the findings of the trial court, of
course, are binding on the appellate court. Edgar v. Armored
Carrier Corp., supra, However, where there is no factual issue,
a showing of movant’s lack of knowledge as to the legal effect of
papers duly served upon him will not satisfy the rule. “As pre.

1282 a a7

viously defined by this court, unavoidable casualty or misfor-
tune means some casualty or misfortune growing out of con-
ditions or circumstances that prevented the party or his attorney
from doing something that, except therefor, would have been
done, and does not include mistakes or errors of judgment grow-
ing out of misconstruction or misunderstanding of the law, * * *.”
(Emphasis added.) Claeys v. Moldenschardt, 260 Iowa 36, at
48, 148 N.W.2d 479, at 483 and 484, Although courts favor
trials on the merits (Newell v. Tweed, 241 Iowa 90, 40 N.W.2d
20), this objective must be qualified and cannot be extended to
the point where a default will be vacated when the petitioner has
ignored plain mandates in the rules with ample opportunity -to
abide by them. “To do so would be to abrogate the rule and to
reward negligence or inattention.” Windus vy. Great Plains Gas,
255 Towa 587, 600, 122 N.W.2d 901. The grounds for setting
aside defaults and judgments entered thereon have been liberal-
jzed and we have given liberal interpretations of the require-
ments deemed sufficient to set aside a default (Hobbs v. Martin
Marietta Co., supra), but we have never upheld such a grant
where the movant fails to show any effort to appear in response
to a due and timely notice.

In the case at bar, pursuant to a hearing, the trial court
concluded our decisions trended toward liberalizing rule 236,
R.C.P., and the showing required to set aside a default, Al-
though this is true, it appears, if the rule is to be at all meaning-
ful, this liberality must have some limitations. We have not as
yet concluded that a showing of confusion and uncertainty by
one served with:a proper notice of a civil action is sufficient to
permit or require the granting of a motion to set aside a default
for failure to appear and defend. The trial court thought the
cireumstances revealed “good cause” for defendant’s confusion
and concluded this was sufficient. We must disagree.

II. To determine whether the showing was sufficient to raise
a factual issue or whether it was sufficient to meet the require-
ments of rule 236, we now turn to the record. It discloses that,
after the collision in Howard County, Iowa, defendant had a
conversation with the sheriff of the county concerning the possi-
bility of filing charges against the plaintiff driver, Walter
Haynes, an Iowa resident. The sheriff told the defendant that he

— a 1288

would discuss the matter with the county attorney to see if there
were sufficient facts to warrant a criminal charge.

By ordinary mail on November 26, 1966, the sheriff sent to
defendant for his signature an information charging plaintiff
with a traffic violation. On December 6, 1966, this signed infor-
mation was received by the sheriff. In the meantime on Decem-
ber 21, 1966, an adjuster for plaintiffs’ insurance company
sought and obtained a settlement and release of defendant’s
claims due to this accident. Sometime later the sheriff attempted
to contact the defendant by telephone to arrange a hearing date
in the criminal case, but was unable to do so. He then called de-
fendant’s insurance agent, Al Fuller, and assumed Fuller would
relay the information to defendant,

By registered mail, return receipt requested, on April 6,
1967, the defendant received a letter from the sheriff informing
him of the date of the hearing in the criminal matter and a
subpoena directing him to appear for the hearing on April 8,
1967. He took these papers to his attorney, who advised him not
to return to Iowa unless his expenses were advanced. Evidently
they were not, and defendant did not appear at that trial.

About two weeks later by registered mail, return receipt
requested, defendant received a notice of the civil action against
him for damages brought by plaintiffs. Attached thereto was a
copy of plaintiffs’ petition. Defendant did not take these papers
to his attorney or confer with him about them. He did show
them to Al Fuller, his insurance agent, but nothing more was
done withthem. By affidavit defendant stated he and Mr. Fuller
thought the second registered letter referred to the same matter
as the first, and he said: “Inasmuch as I had been instructed by
Attorney Baguhn to disregard the first I didn’t pay any at-
tention to the second letter.”

When defendant failed to make’ any effort to appear and de-
fend, default was entered against him on July 6, 1967. At the
same time the court set August 23, 1967, as the time for proving
damages and directed that a copy of its order be sent to defend-
ant and to certain imsurance companies presumably involved
herein. The defendant did not ignore this communication, but
took his copy of the order to Mr. Fuller, who sent it to hig in-
surance company. On August 11, 1967, defendant appeared, on

1284 ee)

August 16 he filed his motion to set aside the default, and by
answer on August 29 he alleged he had a good defense to the
action.

III. Plaintiffs maintain the evidence here is not in dispute,
that it gives rise to no inferences which are helpful to defendant
and raises no factual issues to be resolved. It is their position
that the evidence, viewed most favorable to the movant, shows no
more than a false assumption by defendant that the service upon
him in the civil action was only another attempt to get him to
appear in the criminal action against the plaintiff, that he be-
came confused and, after consulting his insurance agent, decided
to ignore this notice. Such a showing, they contend, as a matter
of law, was insufficient. They point out it was defendant’s duty
and obligation to seek legal aid and advice if he did not under-
stand the notice and petition served upon him. They maintain
that he was negligent as a matter of law for not doing so, that he
failed to act as an ordinarily prudent person dealing with his
own business affairs when admittedly he failed to appear or
secure another to do so for him, and that his neglect to seek
legal advice, based upon confusion and uncertainty as to hig

obligation, showed conclusively that his failure to appear was
not excusable or within the statute contemplation.

It is true, defendant showed he did nothing to indicate his
intention to appear after receipt of the notice. As plaintifts
contend, this court has only upheld a grant of such relief when
the movant has shown an intent to appear and defend, but be-
cause of the failure of others to perform their duties by neglect
or other misfeasance, he was prevented from doing so.

Nonfeasance of the movant has not been recognized ag
excusable neglect or ’ unavoidable casualty as ‘contemplated by
rule 236, R.C.P. In other words, in our former cases neglect has
been excused as a result of misfeasance, not nonfeasance, on the
part of the defendant. .

In Handy v. Handy, supra, 250 Iowa 879, 96 N.W.2d 922,
the defendant did employ a lawyer and did file a pleading, It
was his counsel’s neglect that gave rise to the default. In Edgar
vy. Armored Carrier Corp., supra, 256 Iowa 700, 128 N.W.2d 922,
the defendant, served with an original notice, turned it over to
his insurance company, where it was lost during the attempted

ee 1385

process. In Cogley v. Hy Vee Food Stores, Ine., 257 Iowa 1381,
187 N.W.2d 810, the defendant also turned the notice over to his
insurance carrier, entered his appearance pro se, and notified his
own attorney prior to the entry of the default. In Hobbs v.
Martin Marietta Co., supra, 257 Iowa 124, 131 N.W.2d 772, the
evidence showed that the defendant delivered the original notice
served upon him to his insurance company and it was lost in
transmission within that office. As plaintiffs point out, in each of
these cases the defendant did something to show that he intended
to appear and defend. He did not ignore the notice. He showed
the neglect or casualty was not his, but due to the attorney or
agent’s mistake or casualty not attributable to him, the ap-
pearance was not timely made. In the case at bar, as plaintiffs
contend, this element is lacking. There was no showing madé
from which it could even be inferred that defendant intended to
appear. On the contrary, it is clear he did not so intend. We
must agree, and find in this record no evidence tending to show
an undertaking by his insurance agent, lawyer, or anyone else,
which misled defendant or interfered with his duty to appear and
defend. He arrived at this decision himself as a result of his
own thought process. "As we have already pointed out in Hobbs
v. Martin Marietta Co., supra, the reasonableness of this conclu-
sion cannot be judged by a subjective standard.

IV. Defendant admits he did nothing after receiving
the notice of this civil action except talk the matter over with his
insurance agent. He said that they decided this notice and at-
tached petition related to the previous criminal matter and be-
lieved the notice should be ignored. In any event, it clearly
appears he did not seék legal advice thereon and did not request
or expect his insurance company to participate in the matter.

Apparently, then, the problem presented is whether under
the circumstances shown he should be excused for becoming
confused and for disregarding the notice. He argues that, even
though the trial court found he “was neglectful in his handling
of the civil notice of suit”, the court correctly concluded that
defendant’s confusion was “understandable” after all the con-
tacts had with the criminal matter and that this was sufficient
to show good cause under the rule.

86 ee

We are satisfied a showing of confusion by the movant, be-
cause he and his insurance agent were not knowledgeable in the
ways of litigation and did not understand the consequences of a
failure to appear in response to the notice, will not be deemed
sufficient to comply with rule 236, R.C.P. If a showing that one
is not knowledgeable in the law is sufficient, few applications
thereunder could be denied. Further liberalizing of this rule
has been considered by both the rules committee and the courts
and rejected. In Windus v. Great Plains Gas, supra, 255 Iowa
587, 122 N.W.2d 901, we considered those views and held the
rule should not be stretched to a point where a judgment will -be
vacated: when the petitioner has ignored plain mandates of the
rule with ample opportunity to abide by it. Confusion, for one
reason or another, seems to affect everyone these days, but when
confused as to legal notices, reason requires that one seek legal
advice in order not to disrupt court procedure and the expedi-
tious adjudication.of the parties’ rights. In the case at-bar, de-
fendant was afforded sixty days to appear, but chose to ignore the
notice and did not use ordinary: care or, attention required to
establish “good cause” for setting aside the default. The extent
of his showing is that he was mistaken, that his judgment grow-
ing. out of misconstruction or misunderstanding of the law was
erroneous. It may be that defendant did show grounds for con-
fusion, but we cannot hold that a lack of understanding as to the
legal effect of a notice in a civil action will excuse one from taking
affirmative action to-obtain an understanding and an attempt to
appear as required. To permit one to set aside a default when he
admits he-took no reasonable steps‘to appear and defend would
abrogate completely the rules of civil procedure requiring: ap-
pearances within a specified time and reward one’s neglect or
inattention to legal notices properly served upon him.

V. We are satisfied defendant failed to show anything.
more than -an excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or an ex-
planation for his failure to appear as required by the statute. He
failed to show any effort to resolve his confusion or seek legal
advice as he did when he received a subpoena previously. ,In
other words, he chose to-ignore this notice-and decide for him-
self its import. This is not excusable neglect and the trial court
erred in setting aside the default properly entered herein. The

ES 2°:

ease must, therefore, be reversed and the cause remanded for
further proceedings on the matter of plaintiffs’ damages——Re-
versed and remanded,

Garriecp, C.J., and SNELL, Moorz, Mason, Rawnines and
LeGranp, JJ., concur.

Sruarr and Becker, JJ., dissent.

Towa Narurat Resources Counci, appellant, v. ALLEN Van Zen
et al., appellees,

No. 529381.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 111)

| | | a | | . al

a e

Aprin 9, 1968.

Richard C, Turner, Attorney General, and Fred Hendrick-

son and Larry Seckington, Assistant Attorneys General, for ap-
pellant.

Life, Davis & Lite, of Oskaloosa, for appellees.

Larson, J.—Subsequent to the enactment of what is now
chapter 455A of the Code of 1966, one of the defendants, Allen
Van Zee, constructed certain levees and made channel changes
on the land owned by defendants. It is alleged that at least
portions of these structures were within-the floodplain of the
North Skunk River. Chapter 455A of the Code requires the ap-
proval of the plaintiff, Iowa Natural Resources Council, and a
permit from it before such structures are constructed. However,
it appears the existing structures were built without a permit
and without the approval of plaintiff.

Upon written complaint of a third party, the plaintift in-
vestigated the defendants’ structures and construction and then
ordered defendants to cease and desist from further construction.
They refused to.do so, and also refused to make application for a
permit. Plaintiff then instituted an action in equity to enjoin

29,

the defendants from further construction and also praying for
mandatory: injunctive relief as to the already-existing structures.
After answer and reply, a motion for an adjudication of law
points under rule 105, R.C.P., was sustained by the trial court.
Four law points were submitted for the trial court’s determina-
tion. The first of these asked: “In prosecuting this action pur-
suant to the claimed authority vested in it by the provisions of
paragraph 4 of section 455.A.33 of the 1966 Code, must the
plaintiff establish by evidence more than that the defendants’
structures, dams, obstructions, deposits or excavations, if such
there be, are in fact within the floodplains as defined by law, and
that in fact the defendants have failed to file a verified applica.
tion as required by law?”

The trial court concluded the issue was merely one of statu-
tory construction and held that. paragraph 4. of section 455.4.33 is
not applicable to structures existing prior to the time the action
was brought, because there is no authority to seek abatement of
the existing structures by mandatory injunction under that para-
graph. It did not pass on the other law points submitted, but
concluded, in light of its ruling and determination under law
point (1), that adjudication of the remaining law points would
be merely academic in nature. The other questions submitted
were directed to the constitutionality of the statute and the in-
volved constitutional rights of the defendants. On September
27, 1967, this court granted plaintiff-an interlocutory appeal.

. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in ruling that
paragraph 4 of section 455A.33 did not provide relief for already-
existing structures constructed without a permit, and that the
statute is constitutional and a proper exercise of governmental
authority. Defendants argue that all of chapter 455.4 is uncon-
stitutional as an invalid exercise of police power.

Hl I. It is @ cardinal principle of statutory construction
that the intent of the legislature is to be gleaned from the statute
read as a whole, and not from any section or portion thereof
taken piecemeal. City of Vinton v, Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 140
N.W.2d 857; Rath v. Rath Packing Co. 257 Iowa 1277, 136
N.W.2d 410; City of Nevada v. Slemmons, 244 Iowa 1068, 59
N.W.2d 793, 43 A.L.R.2d 693. The problem presented requires
us to examine carefully each of the provisions or paragraphs of

EE

section 4554.83 and to determine from a reading of all of them
the legislative intent and purpose expressed therein.

Chapter 203, Laws of the Fifty-third General Assembly as
amended, now provides in section 4554.33:

“Tt shall be unlawful to suffer or permit any structure, dam,
obstruction, deposit or excavation to be erected, used, or main-
tained in or on any floodway or floodplains, which will adversely
affect the efficiency of or unduly restrict the capacity of the
floodway, adversely affect the control, development, protection,
allocation, or utilization of the water resources of the state, or
adversely affect or interfere with the state comprehensive plan
for water resources, or an approved local water resources plan,
and the same are declared to be and to constitute public nui-
sances, provided, however, that this provision shall not apply to
dams constructed and operated under the authority of chapter
469 as amended.

“The council shall have the power to commence, maintain
and prosecute any appropriate action to enjoin or abate a nui-
sance, including any of the foregoing nuisances and any other
nuisance which adversely affects flood control.

“In the event any person desires to erect or make, or to
suffer or permit, a structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or exca-
vation, other than a dam, constructed and operated under the
authority of chapter 469 as amended, to be erected, made, used or
maintained in or on any floodway or floodplains, such person
shall file a verified written application with the council, setting
forth the material facts, and the council after an investigation
or hearing, shall enter an order, determining the fact and per-
mitting or prohibiting the same, upon such terms and conditions
as it may prescribe.

“The council shall have the authority to maintain an action
in equity to enjoin any such person from erecting or making or
suffering or permitting to be made any structure, dam, obstruc-
tion, deposit, or excavation other than a dam constructed and
operated under the authority of chapter 469, for which a permit
has not been granted,

“The council shall have the power to remove or eliminate
any structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation in any
floodway which adversely affects the efficiency of or unduly re-

1292

stricts the capacity of the floodway, by an action in condemna-
tion, and in assessing the damages in such proceeding, the ap-
praisers and the court shall take into consideration whether the
structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation is lawfully in
or on the floodway.” (Emphasis added.)

The legislature specifically provided and enumerated in this
section the grounds upon which the council could obtain abate-
tment of an existing structure. Specifically, it provided relief by.
way of condemnation in the case of existing objectionable
structures. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that mandatory in-
junctive relief is also inferentially available under paragraph 4
by merely showing that the defendants’ structures were within
the floodplain and built without applying for and obtaining a
permit. The trial court did not agree with this contention, and
neither do we.

HI The granting of injunctive relief in most cases is limited
to the restraining of actual or threatened acts injurious to the
complainant’s rights and: is not to compel the undoing of an in:
jury. Hanna v. Nowell (Mo.App.), 330-S.W.2d 595; 28 Am.Jur.,
Injunctions, sections 8, 17. Such injunctions are commonly
ealled prohibitory injunctions and have the effect of preserving
the status quo and operate to réstrain the commission or con=
tinuance of an act. Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S.W.
1020, 65 L.R.A, 136, 101 Am.St.Rep. 452, writ ‘of error dismissed
in Schubach v. Hough, 196 U.S. 644, 25 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 632.
Apparently this was the type of injunction visualized in para-
gtaph 4 of this section.

, | However, a court’ of equity can and in a proper case will
award mandatory ‘injunctive relief which will compel some af-
firmative act, thus going beyond mere restraint. Falcon. v:
Boyer, 157 Iowa 745, 142 N.W. 427. Although courts look upon
the-latter with disfavor and such injunctions are granted with
caution.in cases of great necessity, they may be proper. Black
vy. Jackson, 177 U.S, 349, 20 S.Ct. 648, 44 L.Ed. 801; Lyle v.
Chiéago; 357 TIL, 41, 191 N.E, 255, 93 A.L.R. 1492; 28 Am.Jur.,
Injunctions, section 20, This type of injunction has réasonable
application under“paragraph 8 of this section.

Hl injunctive relief by abatement is a harsh and severe
remedy and, except in cases of nuisances or other great necessity,

ES 29:

it should not be granted unless that authority is clearly and
specifically provided by the legislature. Paragraph 4 of the
section does not so provide.

HH The legislature here demonstrated it knew how to state
this remedy in paragraphs 1 and 2. It is apparent, if it
wished, it could have provided for abatement as well as restraint
in paragraph 4. It did not choose to do so. Having not done so,
it_is reasonable to believe it did not wish to grant that extreme
relief for the mere failure to obtain a permit. That being the
case, plaintiff’s appeal must be to the legislature, not to the courts,

[| It is well established that it is not the province of the
courts to pass upon the wisdom, policy, or advisability of a
statute. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., supra, 257-Iowa 1277, 1285,
136 N.W.2d 410; Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 399, 35
N.W.2d 66, and citations; Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman,
247 Towa 923, 929; 77 N.W.2d 15, 18; Mechanicsville v. State
Appeal Board, 253 Iowa 517, 529,.530, 111 N.W.2d 317. We con-
clude that the legislature envisioned the problem presented in
the case at bar and selected the remedies it deemed appropriate
in each situation. We should not, by judicial fiat, extend that
authority, but carefully study each remedial measure to see what
recourse was afforded the Natural Resources Council under’ all
adverse circumstances.

II. The remedies the legislature aia provide under section
4554.33 appear clear. Paragraph 2 authorizes mandatory in-
junctive relief for existing structures if they can be shown to be
a nuisance. Paragraph 1 declares structures to be nuisances if
they can be shown to “adversely affect the efficiency of or unduly
restrict the capacity of the floodway, adversely affect the control,
development, protection, allocation, or utilization of the water
resources of the state, or adversely affect or interfere with the
state comprehensive plan for water resources, * * *.” Of course,
the burden of proof is placed upon the Iowa Natural Resources
Council to show that one of the aforementioned conditions exists
before it will be allowed to obtain the injunctive relief authorized.
Paragraph 3 of section 4554.33 requires a person who desires to
erect or maintain a structure in a floodplain to file a verified ap-
plication for a permit, and it does not excuse one from. con-
forming with this requirement by completing such a structure

129,

prior to such application. Relief, by implication at least, is by
court order to comply. Under paragraph 4 the council may
obtain injunctive relief as to construction in progress or future
construction by showing that it was within the floodplain and
proceeding without a permit. Under paragraph 5 the plaintiff
was given the alternative relief of. eminent domain to obtain
and remove objectionable structures, which may or may not
amount to a nuisance. These, we believe, are the optional
remedies presently provided the council to aid in this announced
public purpose. In Division VI, infra, we shall further consider
council recourse when the provisions in paragraph 3 are ignored.

III. In view of the fact that this case will require further
proceedings in the district court; we-should consider the other
law points upon which the trial court did not rule.

Defendants contend chapter 455A of the 1966 Code is uncon-
stitutional and is in violation of Amendment 5 to the United
States Constitution and Article I, section 18, of the Constitution
of Iowa, and that it permits a taking of private property without
due process of law.

In the second of the law points submitted to the trial court
it was asked whether “the authority conferred upon the plaintiff
by the state legislature in sections 4554.2 and 455A.18 of the 1966
Code constitutes a valid exercise of the state’s police power.”

Hl Generally, police power is the exercise of the state’s right
to regulate the use of property to prevent any use thereof which
would:be harmful to the public interest. . State v. United States
Express Co., 164 Iowa 112, 145 N.W. 451; City of Des Moines
v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W.
921, 23 A.L.R. 1822; Davis, Brody, Wisniewski v. Barrett, 253
‘Towa 1178, 115 N.W.2d 839.

« TH. It is also well established that whether legislation is a
lawful exercise of a state’s “police power” depends upon
whether the collective benefit therefrom outweighs the specific
restraint imposed thereby. Benschoter v. Hakes, 282 Iowa 1354,
8 N.W.2d 481. The means used must be rationally related to
the end sought. Pierce v. Incorporated Town of LaPorte City,
259 Iowa 1120, 146 N.W.2d 907.

| | In construing a statute we presume it to be constitu-
tional. Every reasonable presumption. may be called upon to

Ee

support it. It will only be declared unconstitutional if there is
no reasonable basis to sustain it. Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant,
256 Lowa 1184, 1196, 181 N.W.2d 5; Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710,
716, 113 N.W.2d 755; Iowa Hotel Assn. v. State Board of
Regents, 253 Iowa 870, 876, 114 N.W.2d 539; Spurbeck v. Stat-
ton, 252 Iowa 279, 284, 106 N.W.2d 660; Diamond Auto Sales,
Ine. v. Erbe, 251 Iowa 1330, 1835, 105 N.W.2d 650.

Section 455A.2 is a declaration of policy and provides:

“Tt is hereby recognized that the protection of life and.
property from floods, the prevention of damage to lands there-
from and the orderly development, wise use, protection and
conservation of the water resources of the state by the con-
sidered and proper use thereof, is of paramount importance to
the welfare and prosperity of the people of the state, and, to
realize these objectives it is hereby declared to be the policy of
the state to correlate and vest the powers of the state in a
single agency, the Iowa natural resources council, with the duty
and authority to establish and enforce an appropriate com-
prehensive state-wide program for the control, utilization, and
protection of the surface and groundwater resources of the
state. It is hereby declared that the general welfare of the
people of the state of Iowa requires that the water resources of
the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which
they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use, or
unreasonable methods of use, of water be prevented, and that
the conservation of such water be exercised with the view to
the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people, and that the public and private funds for the promo-
tion and expansion of the beneficial use of water resources shall
be invested to the end that the best interests and welfare of
the people are served.

“Water occurring in any basin or in any watercourse, or
other natural body of water of the state, is hereby declared to
be public waters and public wealth of the people of the state of
Towa and subject to use in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter, and the control and development and use of water
for all beneficial purposes shall be in the state, which, in the
exercise of its police powers, shall take such measures as shall

126 ee

effectuate full utilization and protection of the water re-
sources of the state of Iowa.”

Section 4554.18 confers jurisdiction upon and provides for
the duties of the council as follows:

“The council shall have jurisdiction over the public and
private waters in the state and the lands adjacent thereto
necessary for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this
chapter. The council may construct flood control works or any

- part thereof. In the construction of such works or in making
surveys and investigations or in formulating plans and pro;
grams relating to the water resources of the state, the council
may co-operate with other states or any agency thereof or with
the United States or any agency of the United States, or with
any person as defined in this chapter.

“Upon application by any person for permission to divert,
pump, or otherwise take waters from any watercourse, under-
ground basin or watercourse, drainage ditch or settling basin
within the state of Iowa for any purpose other than a non-
regulated use, the council shall cause to be made an investiga-
tion of the effect of such use upon the natural flow of such
watercourse, the effect of any such use upon the owners of any
land which might be affected by such use, and the effect of any
such use upon the state comprehensive plan for water resources,
and shall hold a hearing thereon. Upon application by any per-
son for approval of the construction or maintenance of any
structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation to be erected,
psed, or maintained in or on the floodplains of any river or
stream, the council shall cause an investigation to be.made of
the effect thereof on the efficiency and capacity of the floodway
and on the state comprehensive plan for water resources. In
determining the effect of any such proposal the council shall
eonsider fully its effect on flooding or flood control both to any
proposed works and to adjacent lands and property, on the
wise use and protection of water resources, on the quality of
water, on fish, wildlife and recreational facilities or uses, and
on all other public rights and requirements.”

HH From a close reading of these sections it seems clear
the purposes and the means used to accomplish them are

Ei

rationally related to the welfare and prosperity of the people
of this state, and are a valid exercise of police power.

HE In the absence of a showing by a complaining prop-
erty owner that the restraint imposed upon him outweighs the
collective benefit to the people of the state, it cannot be said
there is an illegal taking. Benschoter v. Hakes, supra. These
sections of chapter 455A authorize no such restraint.

HH IV. A vital resource such as water must be subject
to regulation by thé state’ under the police power. Justice
Holmes stated in a frequently-quoted phrase: “A river is more
than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life
that must be rationed among those who have power over it.”
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342, 51'S. Ct. 478, 479,
75 L.Ed. 1104.

It has been wisely said: “Unquestionably all property in
society is held subject to being affected by the powers of the
sovereign, exercised in the common good. However, it is note-
worthy that the governmental power over watercourses is more
substantial than that relating to property rights in things other
than natural resources. The explanation of this fact lies in the
greater public interest in natural resources.” Lauer; Water
Resources, 131, 223. .

On the other hand, a river uncontrolled may at flood stage
become a devil, a destroyer of life and property, a disrupter of
transportation and commerce vital to the state and its citizens:
Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm., 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d
822. In any event, water and its control are obviously of
paramount importance to the welfare of the people.

Proper control of rivers and streams, of course, involves
the exercise of control of the use of property adjoining these
streams or in the recognized floodway or floodplains. Police
power properly regulates use of that property because uncon-
trolled use would be harmful to the public interest. On the
other hand, eminent domain provides for the taking of privaté
property because it is useful to the public. See Freund, Police
Power, section 511. It may be said that whether the exercise of
one or the other of these great powers of government is re-
quired depends upon the circumstances of the particular casé.
See O’Connell, Iowa’s New Water Statute—The Constitutional-

298

ity of Regulating Existing Uses of Water, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 549;
and Hines, A Decade of Experience under the Iowa Water
Permit System, for a thorough and comprehensive analysis of
this subject matter. We are satisfied, as plaintiff maintains,
that section 4554.33 is a proper exercise of these-great powers
of government,

Analogous situations of interference with other property
rights in and of themselves predict the validity of this legisla-
tion. Numerous times over many years. zoning ordinances
which substantially limit the use of one’s property have been
upheld as a valid exercise of police power. Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303,
54 A.L.R. 1016; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Oo., supra,
193 Iowa 1096, 1103, 184 N.W. 8238, 188 N.W. 921, 23 ALR.
1822; Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 207, 66
N.W.2d 118, 51 A.L.R.2d 251. Zoning ordinances also may
regulate the use of riparian property and. thereby limit or
restrict riparian rights. Beuscher, Appropriation Water -Law
Elements in Riparian Doctrine States, 10 Buffalo L.Rev. 448,
457. However, such regulations may not extend to the destruc-
tion of an urban dweller’s property or to deny a riparian owner,
the right to water, but merely limit its use in the publie in-
terest. O’Byrne, Iowa’s Water Resources, 206, 209.

“With the changing conditions necessarily attendant upon
the growth and density of population, and the ceaseless changes
taking place in method and manner of carrying on the multi-
plying lines of human industry, the demand becomes even
greater upon that reserve element of sovereignty which we call
the police power, for such reasonable supervision and regula-
tion as the state may impose, to insure observance by the in-
dividual citizen of the duty to use his property and exercise
his rights and privileges with due regard to the personal and
property rights and privileges of others.” City of Des Moines
v. Manhattan Oil Co., supra, at page 1103 of 193 Iowa. See
also Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, supra, 247 Iowa
923, 931, 77 N.W.2d 15, 19.

V. In view of our position taken in the foregoing
divisions of this opinion in which we found (1) there was no
authority vested in. the council to obtain abatement of an exist-

ED

ing structure under paragraph 4, section 4554.33, (2) recourse
was directed to removal of designated nuisances or abatement
by eminent domain, and (3) an exercise of the powers con-
ferred upon the council to enjoin and abate were not invalid or
unconstitutional; we need give no further consideration to the
question raised by the third law point. We find no invasion
of private property rights within the contemplation of the state
or federal constitutions in the requirement that a person who
desires to erect or make or suffer or permit a structure, dam,
obstruction, deposit, or excavation to be used or maintained in
or on any floodway or floodplain must file a verified written
application with the plaintiff setting forth the material facts
relative thereto. Obviously, this preliminary requirement is
necessary for a knowledgeable council determination of
whether the proposed structures or property alterations create
a use adverse to the public interest.

VI. Under the provisions of the third paragraph of
section 4554.38 plaintiff claims defendant was required to file
a verified application for a permit before erecting the struc-
tures in question, and that he did not do so. On the contrary,
defendant claims the requirement in said paragraph that an
applicant for a permit file engineering plans certified by a
registered land surveyor or engineering company, together with
a verified written application, constituted an invasion of his
private property rights within the contemplation of the federal
or state constitutions. We do not agree.

The council contends defendant should be required to file
the application for a permit even though the structure has been
completed so that the orderly procedure set out in chapter 455A
can be effectively followed. We agree. Until it appears from
a proper application relating the facts and planned alterations
on one’s land, the question as to its compliance with the state
comprehensive plan for water resources cannot be resolved to
the end that the best interest and welfare of the people be
served. In flood control projects only elevations and slope
determined by a competent engineer are of real value in as-
sessing the effects of structures on the flow in rivers, floodplains,
and floodways. Reasonable requirements of an application are
a part of the use restriction placed on the lands in the public

130

interest. The reasonableness of the restrictions as disclosed by
such an application and certified plans conceivably might de-
termine whether there is a proper exercise of police power. On
the other hand, it might appear there is a taking which is com-
pensable under eminent domain. In the latter case it appears
defendants’ remedy is by mandamus. See Harrison-Potta-
wattamie Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. State of Iowa, 261 Iowa 1044,
156 N.W.2d 835. In the absence of any factual issue as to its
reasonableness, we find no violation of defendants’ constitu-
tional rights in the requirement that they file certified plans
with their verified application.

HME (We are satisfied there is nothing to indicate that the
authority vested in the council under chapter 455A, and specif-
ieally sections 455A.2, 4554.18 and 4554.33, amounts to an
invalid exercise of police power. We believe that section
4554.38 applies to any and all structures erected subsequent to
the effective date of this Act; that in order for the Iowa
Natural Resources Council to be able to pass upon the effect of
such a structure or to sustain its burden to prove already
erected structures are in fact illegal under the provisions of
the second paragraph of this section, the council is authorized
to obtain injunctive relief compelling defendant to file a veri-
fied application for a permit to erect or maintain a structure
described in the Act, and that this matter should be remanded
for an appropriate order granting such relief.

The trial court is therefore directed to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining and requiring the defendants to comply
with section 4554.33 by filing a proper application for a permit
to erect the structures involvéd heréin, within 60 days from the
date of that writ, or within such additional time as the district
court may allow; and for such other and further proceedings as
may be necessary to comply with the provisions of this opinion.
—Modified and remanded.

All Justices coneur except Rawuines, J., and Garrietp,
C.J., who dissent.

Rawiies, J—Being unable to agree with the reasoning
expressed in Divisions I and II of the majority opinion, and
result reached, I respectfully dissent. °

EE

I. The question presented is whether chapter 455A, Code,
1966, permits the natural resources council to compel com-
pliance with the provisions of that Act by injunctive procedure,
more specifically by mandatory injunction as to those struc-
tures, dams, obstructions, deposits or- excavations, hereinafter
sometimes referred to as structures, which have been con-
structed or on which construction has been commenced within
any floodway or floodplain in the state subsequent to effective
date of the Act. In my humble opinion the council does have
such power and authority.

At the outset section 4554.2, Code, 1966, provides:

“It is hereby recognized that the protection of life and
property from floods, the prevention of damage to lands there-
from and the orderly development, wise use, protection and
conservation of the water resources of the state by the con-
sidered and proper use thereof, is of paramount importance to
the welfare and prosperity of the people of the state, and, to
realize these objectives it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the state to correlate and vest the powers of the state in a
single agency, the Iowa natural resources council, with the
duty and authority to establish and enforce an appropriate
comprehensive state-wide program for the control, utilization,
and protection of the surface and groundwater resources of
the state. It is hereby declared that the general welfare of the
people of the state of Iowa requires that the water resources
of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
use, or unreasonable methods of use, of water be prevented,
and that the conservation of such water be exercised with the
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest
of the people, and that the public and private funds for the
promotion and expansion of the beneficial use of water re-
sources shall be invested to the end that the best interests and
welfare of the people are served.

“Water occurring in any basin or in any watercourse, or
other natural body of water of the state, is hereby declared to
be public waters and public wealth of the people of the state of
Iowa and subject to use in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter, and the control and development and use of water

1802 ee

for all beneficial purposes shall be in the state, which, in the
exercise of its police powers, shall take such measures as shall
effectuate full utilization and protection of the water resources
of the state of Iowa,”

With regard to the foregoing it is a well established prin-
ciple of law that where there is a question as to applicability
of a statute to particular circumstances, the purpose of the
statutory enactment may be examined in order to determine its
proper application. State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 340, 132
N.W.2d 455; Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa
1319, 1322-1323, 121 N.W.2d 361; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl
Button Co. (8 Cir.), 113 F.2d 52, 56; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section
349, page 730; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 309, page 297.

And the declared purpose of chapter 455A is to correlate
and vest the powers of the state in the council, with authority to
enforce an appropriate statewide program for control of surface
and groundwaters for benefit and protection’ of the public.

II. Closely related to purpose of legislation is the mis-
chief sought to be remedied by its enactment, which may also
be examined in order to determine the proper ‘construction.
Appleby v. Farmers State Bank of Dows, 244 Iowa 288, 295-
297, 56 N.W.2d 917, and Tallios v. Tallios, 350 Ill. App. 299, 112
N.E.2d 723,.725.

* Clearly the mischief here sought to be remedied is the
ereation by landowners, without a permit by the council, of
structures within established floodways or floodplains for
protection of the public. .The only effective remedy for this
mischief is a mandatory injunction to compel removal of of:
fending unlawful structures.

In addition, if reasonably possible, effect should be given
to every part of a legislative enactment and related- Acts.
Stated otherwise, in seeking the meaning of a law the entire Act
and other related Acts and:statutes should be considered.
Ritter v. Dagel, 261 Iowa 870, 156 N.W.2d 318; State v.
Charlson, 261 Iowa 497, 502, 154 N.W.2d 829, 831; Rath v. Rath
Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288-1289, 186 N.W.2d 410; and
Manilla Community Sch. Dist. v. Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 501,
101 N.W.2d 105..

EE

And if an Act is susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion or application, courts must give to it that interpretation
or application which is logical, rather than one that is illogical
or which will produce illogical results. Severson v. Sueppel,
260 Iowa 1169, 1174, 152 N.W.2d 281, 284; Brandon v. Roy, 259
Jowa 1271, 1275, 147 N.W.24 810, 818; and Hardwick v. Bublitz,
253 Iowa 49, 58, 111 N.W.2d 309.

To hold as does the majority is to me an illogical interpre-
tation of the Act for it denies the council its one effective tool
by which to effectuate and carry out the self-evident intent and
purpose of the Act, placing an insurmountable obstacle in the
path of the council in its efforts to remedy the mischief sought
by the Act itself to be prevented,

Il. It is my understanding plaintiff contends relief by
mandatory injunction is available, by implication if not ex-
pressly, to compel removal of offending structures upon a
showing they were established or created within a floodway or
floodplain after the effective date of chapter 455A, where the
person responsible failed to secure the prerequisite permit.
That contention is to me reasonably proper and correct.

The first paragraph of section 455.4.33, provides in part:
“Tt shall be unlawful to suffer or permit any structure, dam, ob-
struction, deposit or excavation to be erected, used, or maintained
in or on any floodway or floodplains, which will adversely affect
the efficiency of or unduly restrict the capacity of the floodway,
adversely affect the control, development, protection, allocation,
or utilization of the water resources of the state, or adversely
affect or interfere with the state comprehensive plan for water
resources, or an approved local water resources plan, and the
same are declared to be and to constitute public nuisances, pro-
vided, however, that this provision shall not apply to dams con-
structed and operated under the authority of chapter 469 as
amended.” (Emphasis supplied.)

And section 4554.39 makes any violation.of the Act an of-
fense punishable by fine or imprisonment.

From the foregoing-one conclusion is inescapable. The gen-
eral assembly, in the exercise of its police powers, made it
punishably unlawful, after effective date of the Act, to cause or
permit construction -of designated structures in or upon .any

05

floodway or floodplain of this state, at the same time making any
such structures a public nwisance. See section 657.2(1), (3),
(4), Code; 1966; Sparks v. City of Pella, 258 Iowa 187, 190, 187
N.W.2d 909; Gates v. City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 675, 53
N.W.2d 279; State v. Smith, 82 Towa 423, 425, 48 N.W. 727; 66
C.J.S., Nuisances, sections 2-8, pages 730-734; and 39 Am.Jur.,
Nuisances, section 8, page 285. And as to exercisé of police
power see generally Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1361-
1364, 8 N.W.2d 481, and City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil
Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103-1104, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W. 921.

Furthermore, a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a
public nuisance, the creation or maintenance of which is also a
punishable offense. Rule 320, R.C.P.; Harvey v. Prall, 250 Iowa
1111, 1116, 97 N.W.2d 306; 12 Drake L. Rev. 107; and Annota-
tions, 75 A.L.R.1298,

As stated by Beuchert, 4 Natural Resources Journal 486,
497-498: “The general rule is that the legislature may classify
as a nuisance anything which is detrimental to the health, morals,
peace, or welfare of the citizens of the state. It may also enlarge
the category of nuisances by classifying as nuisances acts or
things which were not so at common law. However, the legisla-
ture cannot classify as a nuisance something which is not so in
fact. But this does not mean that the act or thing must actually
be a nuigance at the time it is so classified by the legislature.
Whenever a thing is of such a nature that it may become a
nuisance, it may be regulated or prohibited. And where there is
a substantial difference of opinion as to whether or not there is
a réal danger of a future nuisance, great deference will be given
to the legislature.”

He concludes, loc. cit:, 4 Natural Resources Journal 500:
“Therefore, it would seem quite likely that legislation declaring
that an obstruction of the floodway is a public nuisance would
be upheld. * * * the constriction of the floodway may well affect
the entire community since * * * ponding is generally not limited
to a narrow area. And the entire community will have to bear
the cost of any flood relief program, the burden of which is in-
ereased in proportion to the increased damage caused by floodway
encroachment. Moreover, the remedy in a suit for damages or
for‘ an injunction to abate a private nuisance may often be un-

Ee

available due to the difficulty of proving any particular damage
or causal relationship between any one obstruction and particular
realty.”

IV. The foregoing views find support in the second para-
graph of section 4554.38, which states: “The council shall have
the power to commence, maintain and prosecute any appropriate
action to enjoin or abate a nuisance, including any of the fore-
going nuisances and any other nuisance which adversely affects
flood control.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The words “including any of the foregoing nuisances”
clearly refer to the first paragraph, quoted supra, which relates
exclusively to post-statutory structures, with respect to which the
council has power to commence an action “to enjoin or abate”,
This is demonstrated by, the fact the same paragraph permits
abatement of pre-statutory structures provided the council can
establish they constitute a nuisance,

V. In the same vein the third paragraph provides, inter
alia: “In the event any person desires to erect or make, or to
suffer or permit, a structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or ex-
eavation, * * * to be erected, made, used or maintained in or on
any floodway or floodplains, such person shail file a verified writ-
ten application with the council, setting forth the material facts,
and the council after an investigation or hearing, shall enter an
order, determining the fact and permitting or prohibiting the
same, upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

This mandatory provision can only apply to post-statutory
structures alone. .

. VIL Then the fourth paragraph of section 4554.33 pro:
vides: “The council shall have the authority to maintain an action
in equity to enjoin any such person from erecting or making or
suffering or permitting to be made any structure, dam, obstruc-
tion, deposit, or excavation other than a dam. constructed and
operated under the authority of chapter 469, for which a permit
has not been granted.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Here again reference can only be to structures created or
commenced after effective date of the Act.

- It is to me evident the foregoing clearly discloses the
council’s remedy with respect to a post-statutory structure, is

36

“the authority to maintain an action in equity to enjoin it as a
public nuisance”.

VII. Finally, the fifth paragraph of this statute provides:
“The council shall have the power to remove or eliminate any
structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation in any flood-
way which adversely affects the efficiency of or unduly restricts
the capacity of the floodway, by an action in condemnation, and
in assessing the damages in such proceeding, the appraisers and
the court shall take into consideration whether the structure,
dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation is lawfully in or on the
floodway.”

I submit this paragraph of section 4554.33 has no applica-
tion to post-statutory structures, but applies strictly and ex-
elusively to pre-statutory structures alone.

Stated otherwise, under the language of paragraph five, a
pre-statutory structure which is not a nuisance under the Act is
a “lawful” structure or a structure “lawfully in or on the flood-
way.” Its lawful character must be considered in assessing dam-
ages upon council removal or abatement by action in condemna-
tion. However, a pre-statutory structure, which is a nuisance
under the Act, is neither a “lawful” structure nor a structure
“lawfully in or on the floodway.” While the council muststill
proceed by way of condemnation as to unlawful pre-statutory
structures, the fact it is not one “lawfully in or on the floodway”
may be-considered in determining the measure of damages. In
other words, “unlawful” as used in paragraph one. applying
strietly.to post-statutory structures, and “lawfully” as employed’
in the fifth paragraph applicable exclusively to pre-statutory
structures, have separable meanings attributable to the post-
statutory or pre-statutory character of the structure in question.

VIII: It is to me evident section 4554.33, by implication
if not expressly, creates a certain reasonable scheme of classifica-
tion. On one hand, structures, dams, obstructions or excava-
tions in existence prior to effective date of the Act are not neces-
sarily unlawful. Such structures may or may not constitute a
public nuisance. On the other hand, structures, dams, obstruc-
tions or excavations created without the required permit, after
effective date of the Act, are per se unlawful. With regard to

ES 207

such post-statutory structures, they are statutorily made a
public nuisance,

In Vartelas v. Water Resources Commission, 146 Conn, 650,
655, 153 A.2d 822, 824, a case involving construction of legisla-
tion similar in language and having a purpose identical with
that of the Act here under consideration, the court said:

“In authorizing the exercise of the police power with re-
spect to situations where there are no existing structures or
encroachments within the lines established or to be established,
as in the instant case, and the exercise of the power of eminent
domain where there are structures or encroachments in exis-
tence within the lines established or to be established, the
statute creates a classification within the power of the legisla-
ture to make. Between the two situations there is a natural
and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes
of the legislation. State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 706, 125
A.2d 477; Franklin Furniture Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 142
Conn. 510, 514, 115 A.2d 435; Murphy, Inc. v. Town of West-
port, 131 Conn. 292, 304, 40 A.2d 177, 156 A.L.R. 568; Second
National Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, 121 Conn. 454, 460, 185
A. 423; see Chouinard v. Zoning Commission, 139 Conn. 728;
782, 97 A.2d 562.”

I would hold a similar distinction i is created by the provi-
sions of section 4554.38, the material portions of which are
quoted supra.

IX. As to remedy by injunction relative to post-statutory
structures, compulsion of some positive nature as to existing
conditions is necessary. Stated otherwise, some affirmative act
or acts are essential in order to effect the required results—
protection of the public.

Early restrictions on the form of injunction have given
way to a more liberal construction of the court’s power. It is
now well settled that unless prohibited from so doing by some
constitutional or statutory provision, a court of equity can, and,
in proper cases will, award mandatory, including preliminary
mandatory, relief as well as prohibitive injunctive relief.

In other words the court may by its mandate compel the
undoing of those acts which have been illegally done. See 28
Am.Jur., Injunctions, section 17, page 506.

13S a

The factual circumstances disclosed by the pleadings here
make clear the necessity of construing the word “enjoin” in
the fourth paragraph of section 455A.33, to include the com-
pelling of some active measures to restore the status quo, to
provide preventive relief.

To hold otherwise would emasculate and make operatively
meaningless not only the first four paragraphs of section
455.33, but important provisions of the entire chapter as well.

X. It appears that although plaintiff acted illegally in
erecting a post-statutory structure in a floodway or floodplain,
the majority now proposes to legalize such conduct by requir-
ing the formality of filing an after-the-act “proper applica-
tion”. Stated otherwise, the position taken by the majority
serves, in effect, to make Jawful by an after-the-fact application
that which is by statute expressly made unlawful.

Pursuing this theory to a logical conclusion, if plaintiff
now files an application and the council refuses him a permit,
he may appeal to the district court. But, even though the
court, on appeal, agrees with such decision of the council, the
offending structure remains. Here another problem is pre-
sented. The majority says, at least inferentially, mandatory
injunctive relief is not even then available to compel removal
of the unlawful structure, the remedy being confined to pro-
ceedings in eminent domain.

In fact the majority says, among other things: “The legisla-
ture specifically. provided and enumerated in this. section the
grounds upon which the council could obtain abatement of an
existing structure. Specifically, it provided relief by way of
condemnation in the ease of existing objectionable structures.
Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that mandatory injunctive
relief is also inferentially available under paragraph 4 by
merely showing that the defendants’ structures were within the
floodplain and built without applying for and obtaining a
permit. The trial court did not agrce with this contention, and
neither do we.” With this statement I cannot agree,

The issue before us is whether the Natural Resources
Council has lawful authority to compel removal by mandatory
injunction of a post-statutory structure placed in a floodway or
floodplain where the statutorily required application for per-

ae 1809

mission to so place such structure has not been filed, as a con-
sequence of which no permit has ever issued.

I am satisfied the council not only has that authority but
when it shows to a court having requisite jurisdiction a party
has placed a post-statutory structure in a floodway or floodplain
without having first filed the application required by law, and
of necessity without benefit of permit, a mandatory injunction
not only can but should issue.

XI. It is to me evident the majority opinion opens the door
to a race between landowners and the council. If an individual,
without obtaining the required permit, is successful in creating
that which is punishably unlawful by the provisions of the first
paragraph of section 4554.33, and section 4554.39, before the
Natural Resources Council becomes aware of what has been or
is being done, the council is relatively powerless to remedy
the situation.

Well settled principles of statutory construction do not
permit such a self-defeating result.

I would reverse.

GARFIELD, CS. ., Joins in this dissent.
EvizapstH Krurenter et al., appellants, v. W. BE. McCutzocu,

Auditor of Polk County, Harotp Huenss, Governor, et al.,
appellees.

No. 52012.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 170)

1810 —

Apri 9, 1968.

David Belin, of Des Moines, appears for plaintifis-appellants,
Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, for applicants.

LxGranp, J.—This opinion is supplemental to that filed in
this cause on April 15, 1966, and published in 258 Iowa 1121,
142 N.W.2d 355. There we held the 1965 temporary reapportion-
ment plan was unconstitutional under both the state and federal
constitutions as contravening the requirement for substantially
equal legislative representation for all citizens of the state—the
one-man,. one-vote principle. We also held this temporary plan
should nevertheless be used until the Sixty-second General As-
sembly met in 1967 and had a reasonable opportunity to adopt a
constitutionally acceptable plan.

In our original opinion we specifically retained jurisdiction
to effect a constitutional apportionment plan if the legislature
failed to do so.

The Sixty-second General Assembly enacted an apportion-
ment law designated as House File 736, now chapter 105, Laws
of the Sixty-second General Assembly. The attorney general,
whose predecessor in office was one of the parties to this action
originally, has filed his application asking us to pass upon the
constitutionality of this law as it affects two subdistricts for the
election of representatives from Johnson County. We consider

ee 1811

his application under the retention of jurisdiction above men-
tioned.

At the outset we point out our original opinion dealt only
with representation in Polk County, but we held the result
reached there should apply to all multimember districts in the
state. One of these is Johnson County and our expressions in
that opinion apply to the situation now before us.

The Sixty-second General Assembly, after exhaustive
study, adopted a plan of redistricting which appeared to meet
the requirements of the one-man, one-vote principle. The basic
concept of such rule igs that all citizens of the state shall have
substantially equal legislative representation. We have ree-
ognized, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, that
mathematical equality is neither possible nor required, but sub-
stantial equality is.

I. We find the Sixty-second General Assembly made a dili-
gent and good-faith effort to adopt a constitutionally acceptable
plan. Under chapter 469, Laws of the Sixty-second General As-
sembly, a commission was established to conduct a study of
legislative, subdistricting and to make recommendations to the
legislature. The commission made its report and its recommen-
dations were adopted by the legislature in every instance except
with reference to Johnson County. The commission recom-
mended that Johnson County be subdivided into two districts,
each of which should elect one representative to the general as-
sembly. As proposed by the commission District 1 had a popula-
tion of 26,320. District 2 had a population of 27,343, District
1 represented 48.89 percent of the total county population and
District 2 represented 50.96 percent of that population, The
deviation in population between these districts, which is obtained
by dividing the population of the larger district by that of the
smaller, was 1.0389. This substantially conformed to the devia-
tion in all other multimember districts under the commission
report. Instead of adopting the commission’ report, as it had
done in every other instance, the legislature subdivided Johnson
County into two districts, one of which has. a population of
20,390 and the other 33,273, The smaller district comprises ap-
proximately 38 percent of the total county population and the

1812 Le |

larger approximately 62 percent. The deviation under this sub-
districting is 1.6317.

We are told that this unfortunate result occurred by reason
of a clerical error. The attorney general asks us to transpose in
two places the directional courses in the description of the sub-
districts which, he asserts, were erroneously stated, and as a
result of which the bill as passed does not reflect the intention of
the legislature. From the exhibits submitted to us and from the
evidence introduced by the attorney general with our permission,
it overwhelmingly appears that such a mistake occurred.

Hl Ordinarily legislative mistakes, omissions and errors may
be left to the legislature itself for correction. Not only is this
desirable but in all except rare cases it is required by our tradi-
tional separation of powers. This is probably so well established
that it needs no citation of authority. However, see 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, section 104, page 483; 16 Am. Jur.2d, Con-
stitutional Law, section 210, page 449; Iowa-Illincis Gas &
Electrie Co. v. Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 1216, 85 N.W.2d 28,
87. It is inimical to our system that one independent depart-
ment of government should intermeddle with the affairs of
another. Strangely enough the complaint usually made in this
area is that courts are too ready to undertake such a task. Here,
however, we are being importuned to do so.

Much of what we say here is based on the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533,
84S. Ct. 1862, 12 L. Ed.2d 506, and cases there cited, and on our
own pronouncements in the original opinion in this cause. It is
unnecessary to review again the authorities set out and discussed
there. However, we call attention to several statements, both
from the Sims case and from our opinion of April 15, 1966, as
being particularly important to our conclusion. All references
to the Sims case are from 12 L. Ed.2d and those from our
original Kruidenier opinion are from the Iowa Reports.

In the Sims case at page 527 the Supreme Court said, “ * * *
if a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of
the State should be given two times, or five times, or ten times
the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it
eould hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing
in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.” Or

PC 1818

again, at page 581, “The Equal Protection Clause demands no
less than substantially equal state legislative representation for
all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.” At page 536,
appears this “ * * * we mean that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to con-
struct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of
equal population as'is practicable. We realize that it is a prac-
tical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one
has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters.
Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable con-
stitutional requirement.” (Emphasis added.) As to correction
of such imbalance the court said at page 537, “Lower courts can
and assuredly will work out more concrete and specific standards
for evaluating state legislative apportionment schemes in the con-
text of actual litigation. For the present, we deem it expedient
not to attempt to spell out any precise constitutional tests, * * *
Developing a body of doctrine on a case-by-case basis appears to
us to provide the most satisfactory means of arriving at detailed
constitutional requirements in the area of state: legislative ap-
portionment.” (Emphasis added.) And at page 541, “And it
[the District Court] cortectly recognized that legislative reap-
portionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration
and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate
only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal
constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an
adequate opportunity to do’ so.”

We recognized and adopted many of ‘these statements in our
original Kruidenier opinion, Then, at pages 1144-1145, we said,
“The Iowa legislature must approach their assignment with the
understanding they are’ to create districts for each legislative
branch which are as nearly equal in population as is practicable.
This is the basic concept. * * * We do not attempt to state in
mathematical language the constitutionally permissible bounds
of discretion in deviating from apportionment according to
population. It is neither practicable nor desirable to establish
rigid mathematical standards. Rather, the proper judicial ap-
proach is to ascertain whether thére has been a faithful adherence
to a plan of population-based representation, with such minor

Tad es

deviations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that
are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.”

Although these basie principles must be faithfully adhered
to, both the Supreme Court of the United States and this court
recognize certain practical situations must be met. At page 541
of the Sims case the court held, “It is enough to say now that,
once a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has been found
to be unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case in which a
court would be justified in not taking appropriate action to in-
sure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid
plan. However, under certain circumstances, such as. where an
impending election is imminent and a State’s election machinery
is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a
court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief
in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing. ap-
portionment scheme was found invalid. In awarding or with-
holding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should con-
sider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics
and complexities of state election laws, and. should act and rely
upon general equitable principles. With respect to the timing of
relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of
the election process which might result from requiring precipitate
changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands
on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court’s
decree.” (Emphasis added.)

II. These views are appropriate here. The matter before
us is urgent. The makeup of the Sixty-third General Assembly
will be determined ‘at the general election in November of this
year. The whole election machinery.is immobilized until this
uncertainty is resolved. It cannot await the next legislative
session, without. running the grave risk that the representatives
from Johnson County, certainly, and those of the entire state,
possibly, will later be held to have been improperly elected.

It is suggested we change the wording of section 4, para-
graph 22, chapter 105, Laws of: the Sixty-second General -As-
sembly, by reversing the two directional courses where they are
elaimed to be erroneous. This, we are told, will conform the
plan to the intention of the legislature and will not constitute
judicial legislation. In support thereof we are referred to In re

SS 1815

Will of Petersen, 186 Iowa 75, 172 N.W. 206. There is some
dictum in that decision tending to support the position of the
attorney general, although we find nothing there to persuade us
to honor his request. That case turned on a question of gram-
matical construction rather than substitution of words, It has
no factual similarity to our present problem, There is some
authority, however, from other jurisdictions for what we are
asked to do here. There is also a considerable contrary view.
The matter is by no means one of unanimity. We see no necessity
for discussing it at length, but we refer to Volume 2, Sutherland,
Statutory Construction (Third Ed.) (Horack), sections 4924,
4925, 4926, pages 453-466. Precedent is there listed for judicial
alteration of legislative enactments to remedy such errors as
“mistake, accident or clerical error”; to avoid “absurd, meaning-
less, irrational or unreasonable results”; to accomplish “clear
legislative intent”; to supply “omissions where necessary to
prevent unconstitutionality.” Substitution of one word for
another has been permitted where necessary “to carry out legis-
lative intent” or “to make the act harmonious or to avoid re-
‘pugnancy or inconsistency” or where it is obvious that the word
used is the “result of clerical error or mistake.” On the other
hand some courts have been extremely reluctant to interfere
judicially with legislative pronouncements. They refuse to
“venture upon the dangerous path of judicial legislation to
supply omissions or remedy defects in matters committed to a
coordinate branch of the government. It is far better to wait
for necessary corrections by those authorized to make them, or,
in fact, for them to remain unmade, however desirable they may
be, than for judicial tribunals to transcend the just limits of their
constitutional powers.” Some courts deny the power under any
circumstances because it is the exercise of a purely legislative
authority. .

III. This precise matter has never been decided by us. We
need not determine here whether such authority exists although
we can safely subscribe to the principle that, if it does, it should
be practiced with extreme caution and great reluctance. The
specter of abuses resulting from a judiciary too quick to inter-
vene for the correction of legislative ambiguities, mistakes,
errors and omissions is too obvious to require extended discus-

1816 a |

sion. The evils resulting therefrom would be far greater than
those which such action was designed to prevent.

‘We do not base our decision here upon any such judicial
power nor need we do so. The purpose of retaining jurisdiction
in this cause was to make certain any plan of apportionment
adopted by the Sixty-second General Assembly met the constitu-
tional standards we set out therein. From whatever cause,
chapter 105 fails to do so. We need not be concerned whether
this resulted from mistake or otherwise. As far as the multi-
member district for Johnson County is concerned, section 4,
paragraph 22, is unconstitutional because it does not give to all
citizens equally substantially the same legislative representation,
The formula violates our directive in the first Kruidénier opinion
and falls directly within the purpose for which jurisdiction was
retained.

Although time is running out, we may still remedy this
imbalance without a “disruption of the election process.” There-
fore we should not deprive the voters of Johnson County of their
right to “substantially equal legislative representation.” Unless
we grant equitable relief, no other course is open to these citizens
before the next legislative session. We have the power to pre-
seribe an interim procedure which will be constitutionally corréct
and which will be effective only until the next General Assembly
has had an opportunity to enact legislation concerning the
matter, This is the course recommended in Sims, and it is one
which we adopted by retaining Jurisdiction over this cause when
it was first submitted,

‘Hy We now hold paragraph 22 ot section 4, chapter 105, of
the Laws of the Sixty-second General Assembly is unconstitu-
tional as it applies to Johnson County because the two sib-
districts fail to meet the standards of the one-man, one-vote
principle and because it grants to certain residents of those sub-
districts legislative representation disproportionate to that of
other: residents of the state.

Under the jurisdi¢tion rétained by us, we strike down
paragraph 22 of séction 4, chapter 105, Laws of the Sixty-second
Getieral Assembly, and provide instead:

The county of Johnson’ shall constitute one- (1) representative

eee 1817

district and shall be subdivided into the two (2) following repre-
sentative subdistricts and each subdistrict shall elect one (1)
representative:

a. Subdistrict one (1) shall constitute the following portions
of Johnson county which include the townships of Big Grove,
Cedar, Newport, Graham, East Lucas, Scott, Pleasant Valley,
Lincoln, and Fremont as the townships existed in 1960, and that
part of the city of Iowa City described as follows:

Beginning at the intersection of Iowa avenue and the center line
of the Iowa river; thence east along the center line of Iowa
avenue to the center line of Madison street; thence south along
the center line of Madison street to the center line of Washington
street; thence east along the center line of Washington street to
the center line of South Linn street; thence north along the
center line of South and North Linn street, to the center line of
Bloomington street; thence east along Bloomington street to the
center line of North Van Buren street; thence north along the
center line and the projected center line of North Van Buren
street, to the 1960 corporate limits of the city of Iowa City;
thence easterly, thence southerly, and thence westerly along the
1960 corporate limits of the city of Iowa City to the center line
ofthe Iowa river; thence northerly along the center line of the
Towa river to the center line of Iowa avenue, the point of be-

b. Subdistrict two (2) shall constitute the following portions
of Johnson county which include the townships of Monroe, Jef-
ferson, Oxford, Madison, Penn, Clear Creek, Hardin, Union,
‘West Lucas, Washington, Sharon, and Liberty as the townships
existed in 1960, and that part of the city of Iowa City described
as follows:

Beginning at the intersection of Iowa avenue and the center line
of the Iowa river; thence southerly along the center line of the
Towa river to the 1960 corporate limits of the city of Iowa City;
thence westerly, thence northerly, and thence easterly along the

isis _

1960 corporate limits of the city of Iowa City to the projected
center line of North Van Buren street; thence south along the
projected center line and the center line of North Van Buren
street to the center line of Bloomington street; thence west along
the center line of Bloomington street to the center line of North
Linn street; thence south along the center line of North and
South Linn street to the center line of Washington street; thence
west along Washington street to the center line -of Madison
street; thence north along the center line of Madison. street to
the center line of Iowa avenue; thence west along the center line
of Iowa avenue to the center line of the Iowa river, the point of
beginning.

This is the plan recommended by the legislative subdistrict-
ing commission' and the one which the legislature apparently
thought it was adopting. We find it meets constitutional -one-
man, one-vote requirements, although other plans might also do
so. We-have not meant to fix rigid standards to be used as a
formula in other cases. What we have said here is limited to the
particular facts now before us.’ It is intended, further, to apply
only to the 1968 general election for choosing representatives
to the Sixty-third General Assembly and any special election to
fill vacancies therein.

The: clerk of this’ court is hereby directed to certify and
transmit forthwith a copy of this opinion to the Secretary. of
State who shall immediately take all necessary and proper steps.
to insure the nomination and election of representatives to the
Sixty-third General Assembly from Johnson County as provided
herein.

A J USTICES concur.

Ss lf

Moprrn Hear & Powzr Company, appellant, v. Rosert C. Paun
et al., appellees,

No. 52854,
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 8)

Apri, 9, 1968.

Joseph A. Billings, of Des Moines, for appellant.

1:20

P. F. Elgin, of Indianola, for Robert C. and Dorothy J.
Paul, appellees.

Maynard Hayden, of Indianola, for Merrill D. and Mary
Jane Heavilin and Ralph L. and Ina E. Hughes, appellees.

Moore, J.—The factual circumstances giving rise to this
litigation are similar to countless other cases brought before the
court in which seemingly sound, well-planned business trans-
actions have gradually degenerated to a state necessitating
judicial resolution.

On October 12, 1964, defendant Robert C.-Paul signed a
purchase order for “1 Bishop Steelite Deluxe Pear-Shaped
Swimming Pool with tapered Wall, Knocked-down, unassembled
and ‘uninstalled—t.o.b. Carlisle, Iowa”.

This purchase order listed the items to be furnished by plain-
tiff Modern Heat and Power Company. It also included:
“Turms: The price of the above listed items shown

in the Purchase Order $2495.00

. Plus extra charge for Special Coping as .
Requested & Agreed ; 50.00
$2545.00

Plus 2% ‘ Sales Tax"
The Purchaser shall pay $500 dowai upon signing of this con-
tract, and cash upon delivery. If this pool is delivered on a
partial basis, then 50% of the price of the pool shall be paid
upon partial delivery, and the balance shall be paid on the final
delivery.

“Tf the Customer meets the terms of the contract payment,
then he may take a Cas Discounr of $345.00 at the time pay-
ment is made.”

All negotiations relative to the agreement were conducted
by Mr. Paul and Kenneth M. Bishop who testified he was the
sole manager of plaintiff-company. Paul paid plaintiff $500 on
October 12, 1964, and an additional $1000 on October 18, 1964,
when he picked up materials necessary to commence construction
of the pool. Paul procured no further material from plaintiff-
company until May 6, 1965, when he picked up some minor items.
He made no further payment at that time. The evidence is

a

conflicting concerning whether he had requested delivery of the
balance of materials between October 18, 1964, and May 6, 1965,
but it is undisputed Paul was a frequent visitor on company
premises between December 1964 and May 1965.

On May 22, 1965, Paul picked up 40 pieces of coping from
plaintiff. Coping is a cement item used for trimming and
beautifying swimming pools. On May 27, 1965, Paul had work-
men at the pool site and sent a Mr. Mark to obtain the balance
of the coping. Plaintiff refused to make delivery. Immediately
thereafter Paul went to plaintiff's office in Carlisle and was
successful in acquiring what he thought was enough coping to
finish the trimming. At that time he gave plaintiff a check for
$350 and was required to sign a statement that he had sufficient
funds to cover the check. Paul’s prior checks had cleared the
bank without difficulty. This last check bore a written notation
placed thereon by plaintiff's employee, “Balance $397.56.” This
was not denied by plaintiff.

Paul testified he was shorted seven pieces of coping and was
thereby prevented from completing the trimming. Testimony for
plaintiff-was that it was sufficient to complete that part of the
pool, A point,.of difference was whether the purchase order
impliedly allowed coping to be used on the steps as well as around
the pool’s edge. Paul, when he discovered be had not been sup-
plied sufficient coping, stopped payment on his $350 check.

- On May 29, 1965, Paul purchased a cashier’s check made
payable to plaintiff-company for $747, the amount he considered.
sufficient to fulfill his obligation under the agreement taking into
consideration the $345 cash discount. He then took this.check
to plaintiff’s, office and demanded delivery. of the balance of
materials, Plaintiff, apparently assuming Paul was not entitled
to the discount, refused delivery of the goods and stated the
balance due was $1095. Conflicting testimony of those present
in the office at that time renders it difficult to ascertain whether
the check was actually tendered by Paul but it is reasonably clear
Paul made it known he had such a check.

Later the same day Paul contacted an attorney “who tele:
phoned Bishop advising him of the check and Paul’s request for
delivery. On June 1, 1965, this attorney wrote plaintiff a letter
confirming the existence of the cashier’s check of $747. Plaintiff

Es

did not answer this letter: Bishop on cross-examination stated
he did not remember such call or letter.

On June 9, 1965, Paul through his present attorney wrote
plaintiff again requesting the balance of the material for the
$747, The letter stated Paul would purchase the material else-
where if reply was not had immediately. Plaintiff replied June
11, stating Paul had not performed as promised and called for
payment of the balance; presumably $1095 although this figure
was hot specifically mentioned. Paul subsequently purchased
the remaining materials from other sources at a cost of $900.95.

Plaintiff brought this equity action for foreclosure of its
filed mechanie’s lien for $1095. Paul sold his home on which the
pool has been constructed to defendants, the Heavilins. They
and the mortgagees, the Hughes, were joined with Mr, and Mrs.
Paul as defendants. Paul counterclaimed for damages, As we
point out, infra, denial of his counterclaim is not involved on this
appeal.

The trial court denied foreclosure of the lien on the basis
plaintiff had failed to prove it had furnished material for the
pool which had not been paid for by Paul. Paul’s counterclaim
was also denied. Judgment was entered assessing half the costs
against plaintiff and half against Paul. Plaintiff has appealed.
Paul has not cross-appealed. We, therefore, consider only the
propositions asserted by plaintiff,

I. Code section 572.2 provides in’ part: “Persons ‘entitled
to lien. Every person who shall furnish any- material or labor
for * * * any building or land for improvement * * * thereof * * *
shall have a lien upon such building or improvement, and land
belonging to the owner * * * to secure payment for material or
labor furnished or labor performed.”

HE Plaintiff vigorously argues “furnish” under our mechan-
ie’s lien statute includes not only material actually used in the
construction but also material which had been provided by the
materialman and for which the owner had contracted to purchase.
‘We need not consider the legal principles so asserted. The facts
clearly defeat plaintifi’s attempt to foreclose its claimed me-
chanic’s lien. Paul had paid for all material received from
plaintiff. Plaintiff refused without good cause to deliver the
necessary remaining material to complete the pool. Paul was

SS 1:

compelled to expend more than was owing on his contract with
plaintiff.

II. The purchase order or contract was prepared by
plaintiff, It provides that if delivery is made on a partial basis
50 percent of the purchase price is to be paid on partial de-
livery and the balance paid on the final delivery. It must be
noted no provision is made for delivery and payment on or before
a specific date. The contract is vague and unclear in this respect.
We have often held ambiguities appearing in written contracts
are to be construed against the author of the instrument. Freese
v. Town of Alburnett, 255 Iowa 1264, 1269, 125 N.W.2d 790,
793; Huntsman v. Eldon Miller, Inc., 251 Iowa 478, 481, 101
N.W.2d 581, 538; Wenthe v. Hospital Service, Inc., 251 Iowa
765, 768, 100 N.W.2d 903, 905. See also 17A C.J.S., Contracts,
section 324; 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, section 275. Any un-
certainty as to time for payment for Paul to be allowed the
benefit of the $345 discount must be resolved against plaintiff.

Paul was entitled to the discount -when he offered payment
by the cashier’s check. Plaintiff has been paid for all material
actually delivered to Paul and has retained the remainder.

IIL Our review is de novo. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In equity cases, especially when considering the credi-
bility of witnesses, we give weight to the fact findings of the trial
court, but are not bound by them. Rule 344(f)(7). With.these
rules in mind we have carefully reviewed the record and con-
clude the trial court’s judgment and decree as against plaintiff
is correct.—Affirmed.

"All Justices concur.

1824 be

Rozert J. Myers, Jr., 2 minor, by Roserr J. Mvzrs, Sr., his
father, individually and next friend, appellants, v.
Karuerine P. Vosmex, appellee.

No. 52804.

(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 925)

Aprt, 9, 1968.

a | 1825

Joseph L. Phelan, of Fort Madison, for appellants.
Si ames W. Crawford, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Sruarz, J—Five-year-old Robert J. Myers, Jr. was injured
as he was crossing a residential street when struck by an auto-
mobile driven by Katherine Vosmek. An action was brought in
two counts. In the first count his father, as his next friend,
sought to recover damages for his personal injuries. In the
second count Robert J. Myers, Sr., sued in his own name for
medical expenses, loss of earnings and loss of society and
services during minority. In the second count only medical ex-
penses were submitted to the jury. No exceptions were taken.
It was stipulated “that the medical expenditures by the plain-
tiff, Robert J. Myers, Sr., as a result of the accident including
doctor bills, hospital bills, ete. were in the amount of $904.15.”

In stating the issues under Count II, the trial court told the
jury plaintiff claimed:

“That said Robert J. Myers, Jr., by reason of the aforesaid
acts of the defendant was seriously crippled, requiring exten-
sive hospitalization; because of which this plaintiff was re-
quired to and did spend substantial sums all to his damage. in
the amount of $5000.”

In instruction No. 15, the jury was told it was not to allow
damages for any items not established by a preponderance of
the evidence. In instruction No, 17 it was told in no event
could the total amount awarded for medical expenses exceed.
$904.15, “the maximum permissible under the evidence intro-
duced”.

Defendant objected to the Statement of Issues “for the
reason that the figure of $5000 is set forth therein, and that the
uncontradicted evidence in this case, introduced by the plaintiff
and stipulated to by the defendant, amounted to $904.15, and
that the plaintiff Robert J. Myers, Sr., if entitled to any award
is entitled to no more than $904.15; and the inclusion of the
figure of $5000 in Count II of the Statement of Issues is such

1826 es a

that it may very well prove confusing and misleading to the
jury, and in an attempt to reconcile instruction No. 17 with
Count II of the issues may make'an award in excess of the
figure of $904.15; and the same constitutes prejudicial error to
the defendant”.

The jury returned a verdict in Count I in favor of Robert
J. Myers, Jr. for personal injuries in the amount of $4000. A
verdict of $2000 for medical expenses was returned for Robert
J. Myers, Sr. in Count II.

The trial court sustained defendant’s motion for new trial
on four grounds. (1) The verdict in Count II was contrary to
law as the jury disregarded instruction No. 17 which limited
recovery to $904.15. (2) The jury from some cause failed to
respond to the real merits of the controversy and properly do
its duty. (3) The verdicts are contrary to the.evidence. (4)
The verdicts fail to administer substantial justice. He did not,
amplify his rulings. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

HL. The verdict in Count I was obviously contrary to
the law. Instruction No. 17 limited the recovery to $904.15.
The jury returned a verdict of $2000. Plaintiffs do not dispute
this fact but take the position that the court should have
ordered a remittitur rather than a new trial, They are not
supported by our cases. .

In Larimer v. Platte, 243 Iowa. 1167, 1171, 53 N.W.2d 262,
265, part of counterclaimant’s damages was stipulated and part
was unliquidated. The jury returned a verdict on the counter-
claim for less than the amount claimed as unliquidated damages
and less than the stipulated damages to which he was entitled
if he was entitled to recover. Defendant on the counterclaim
was denied a new trial and appealed. We reversed stating both
parties were entitled to a decision under the law set out in the
court’s instructions and the jury should either have returned a
verdict for counterclaimant for not less than the amount of the
stipulated damages or against him.

“We have repeatedly held it is the jury’s duty to fol-
low the instructions and where it clearly appears this was not
done a new trial should be granted.” Id. at 1178, 58 N.W.2d at
266. See also Mitchell v. Heaton, 227 Iowa 1071, 1074, 290
N.W. 39, 40; Thompson v. National Cable & Manufacturing

P| Pe 1827

Co., 160 Iowa 408, 407, 141 N.W. 912,'914; Reuber v. Negles,
147 Towa 734, 741, 126 N.W. 966, 968; Limburg v. German Fire
Ins. Co., 90 Iowa 709, 721, 57 N.W. 626, 630, 23 L.R.A. 99, 48
Am.St.Rep. 468. The trial court was correct in granting a new
trial because the verdict was contrary to law.

Il. The trial court granted a new trial of the entire case.
Plaintiffs urge the new trial should be limited to the issue of
damages in Count I. We disagree.

As a general rule where a new trial is granted it should
be awarded as to the whole case. Larimer v. Platte, 243 Iowa
1167, 1175, 53 N.W.2d 262, 267, and citations. But see: Guinn
v. Millard Truck Lines, 257 Iowa 671, 684, 184 N.W.2d 549, 558.
In Larimer v. Platte, supra, we reversed and granted a new
trial of the entire case although the verdict which was contrary
to law occurred on the counterclaim.

We said: “It is true the verdict returned was on Platte’s
counterclaim. While the jury should not have considered an
award to Platte on his counterclaim unless it first determined
plaintiff should not recover on his claim, we are not justified in
assuming that a jury which failed to follow part of the instruc-
tions followed them in other respects. It cannot be said with
confidence that the issues raised by plaintiff’s claim were fairly
tried and determined under the instructions when the contrary
appears as to the issues raised by the counterclaim.” Id. at
1177, 58 N.W.2d at 268.

"HE Larimer v. Platte was a reversal. Here we need only
to uphold the trial court. In addition to granting a new trial
because the verdict was contrary to law, the trial court also
sustained the motion for new trial on three grounds which were
directed to the entire case. It has broad, but not unlimited,
discretion to do so, rule 344(f£) (3), Rules of Civil Procedure,
and we are slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial
than with its denial. Rule 344(f)(4). The discretion must, of
course, be founded upon matters which fairly appear in the
record. Lubin v. City of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 383, 385, 181
N.W.2d 765, 767. Recent cases illustrate the latitude given
trial courts in granting new trials in the interest of justice.
Smith v. Ullerich, 259 Iowa 797, 145 N.W.2d 1; Kracht v.
Hoeppner, 258 Iowa 912, 140 N.W.2d 913; McCoy v. Miller, 257

1828 Pe az

Towa 1151, 136 N.W.2d 832; Warrender v. MeMurrin, 256 Iowa
617, 128 N.W.2d 285.

Under this record the trial court did not err in granting
a new trial of the entire case because the verdict was contrary
to law or under its-broad discretionary power.

Hl lil. Although plaintiffs could have helped avoid the
confusion of the jury by accepting the court’s hint and
amended the prayer to the maximum amount proved, much of
the present difficulty is due to the trial court’s belief that he
was required to tell the jury the amount of the prayer. As this
opinion is shated by many judges and as the same situation
may arise on retrial, we believe it necessary to point out our
eases do not support this position.

In Cory v. State of Iowa, 214 Iowa 222, 228, 242 N.W.100,
108, a condemnation matter, the State complained because the
jury was told the amount plaintiff claimed as unliquidated
damages. We said: “The instruction, as’ given, was not er-
roneous, though we are disposed to the view that in cases
claiming unliquidated damages, the ‘plaintiff is not entitled, as
a matter of right, to have the amount of his claim, often ex-
aggerated, stated to the jury, and that an omission of the state-
ment of such amount from the instructions would be quite
appropriate.”

‘The reasons for not stating the amount claimed are even
more compelling here. The amount claimed became liquidated
by the stipulation. The parties would have been entitled to an
instruction stating that plaintiff could recover either $904.15
or nothing. Such instruction was not requested. The amount
of recovery was limited by the stipulation rather than the claim.

For the reasons stated we affirm the granting of a new
trial— Affirmed.

All Justices concur.

EE

Suetgy Communiry Scuoot Disrricr, plaintiff-appellee, v.
Burron Hatverson, Superintendent of Schools of Potta-
wattamie County, defendant; Hancocx-Avoca Com-
munity ScHoon Disrricr et al., intervenors-
appellants.

No. 52907.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 163)

Aprm 9, 1968.

Gamble, Riepe, Martin & Webster, of Des Moines, for inter-
venors-appellants.

Smith, Peterson, Beckman, Willson & Peterson, of Couneil
Bluffs, for plaintiff-appellee.

George Knoke, County Attorney, of Council Bluffs, for de-
fendant.

GarrieLp, C.J.—This is a school reorganization controversy
involving two school districts, each of which maintains a high
school, and three smaller, non-high school districts. It was
sought to merge the smaller districts with plaintiff Shelby Com-
munity School District by petitions for merger, signed by the
requisite number of voters of each of the smaller districts,
under section 275.40, Codes 1962, 1966. It was also sought to
unite the same three smaller districts with Hancock-Avoeca
Community School District into a single district, to be known

ED

as Avoca Community School District, by reorganization under
sections 275.12 to 275.23.

Shelby and Hancock-Avoca are the two larger districts
each of which maintains a high school in the towns of Shelby
and Avoca respectively. The three smaller districts are Minden
Independent, Minden Township and York Township districts.
Only the former maintains even a grade school—in the town of
Minden. All high school pupils and some of grade school age
in these three districts are “tuitioned out” to other districts, a
majority of them to Hancock-Avoca.

Plaintiff Shelby District lies between Hancock-Avoca Dis-
trict on the east and Minden and York Township districts on
the west. Minden Independent District is virtually surrounded
by Minden Township District. .

The accompanying map reproduced from exhibits certified
to us should help visualize the various districts.

The Shelby District brought this action in equity to enjoin
the reorganization proceeding under sections 275.12-275.23 as
illegal on the ground Hancock-Avoca District is not contiguous
to the area with which it was sought to be united. Section
275.11 states: “ * * * contiguous territory located in two or
more school districts may be united into a single district in the
manner provided in sections 275.12 to 275.23 hereof.”

(See Map on next page)

nN

COWIMUNITY

SHELBY

POTTAWATTAMIE ‘counTY

DISTRICT

HANEOGK ~
AVOGA™

COMMUNITY DIST.

. (to be chonged only by.
_, addition of Minden area),

INE ~~

OAKLAND COMMUNITY DIST.

The accompanying map shows the only point of contact
between Hancock-Avoca District and the remaining area
sought to be united with it is at the northeast corner of section
18 on the Kay farm. At this point section 18, which Hancock-
Avoca District claims is part of the York Township District,
corners with a portion of the former district.

The trial court held Hancock-Avoca District was not con-
tiguous to York Township District because the only point of
contact between the two was at this corner of section 18.

Hancock-Avoca and the three smaller districts together
with certain members of the board of directors of each of them,
have appealed to us. They intervened in the action and, to-

EE

gether with defendant superintendent of schools of Pottawat-
tamie County, filed answer to plaintiff’s petition.

Much of appellants’ brief is devoted to the proposition that
the areas sought to be reorganized into a single district are con-
tiguous although they touch only at the corner of section 18.
However, the appeal presents other questions. The most im-
portant of these may as well be stated now.

I. The petition of appellant districts to unite by reorgan-
ization under Code sections 275.12 to 275.23 was filed with
defendant county superintendent of schools on March 15, 1966,
at 5:40 pm. In June 1964 the owners of the Kay land in
section 18 brought action against the Board of Education of
Pottawattamie County to have the attachment by the board of
their land to the York Township District, which was to become
effective July 1, 1964, held to be illegal-and to enjoin carrying
it out on the ground the land was a remnant of the James
District coritaining less than four sections which had never
been included in any school reorganization and the law (section
275.1) required it to be attached to a district maintaining 12
grades. - (As stated, the York district maintained no school.)

Following trial the district court‘on August 29, 1964, up-
held the contention of the Kays, held the attachment of their
land to the York district was illegal and enjoined the county
board from proceeding therewith. The county board appealed
the decision to us but, pursuant to stipulation of thé parties,
we dismissed the appeal on June 8, 1965. - 7

Because the certification to the county auditor of the Kay
land as part of the York district was not withdrawn following
the above decision the Kays sought to have the county board
adjudged in contenipt. Although the court refused to hold the
board in contempt it did order it to cause the above certification
to be withdrawn immediately. Upon the board’s appeal from
this order we affirmed it. Kay v. Board of Education, 261
Towa 323, 154 N.W.2d 187. Referring to our dismissal of the
board’s appeal from the original decree of August 29, 1964, our
opinion states on page 324 of 261 Iowa, 188 of 154 N.W.2d:
“Regardless of the reason for the dismissal of the appeal the
district court’s order was a final order.”

Significance of all this is that under the decision in the

i

suit commenced by the Kays their land, which supplies the sole
point of contact between the districts sought to be united with
Hancock-Avoca District and that district, never legally became
part of York Township District. It remained part of the
remnant (of two sections, including the Kay 480 acres) of
James Township District, This remnant was not properly part
of the attempted reorganization under sections 275.12 to 275.28
since the number of signatures required by 275.12 of voters in
the James remnant was not affixed to the petition..

This statute requires: “Such petition shall be signed by
voters in each existing school district affected or portion thereof
equal in number to at least twenty percent of the number of
eligible voters or four hundred voters, whichever is the smaller
number. School districts-affected or portion thereof shall be
defined to mean that area to be included in the plan of the
proposed new school district.” (Emphasis added.)

Appellants’ excellent brief concedes their petition for re-
organization was one signature short of the required number if
the Kay land was not’part of the York district. Only one of a
total of eight eligible voters in the remnant portion of the
James district signed the petition. This one signer did not
reside on the Kay farm.

In an attempt to avoid the effect of the decree of August
29, 1964, in- the Kay case appellants make substantially the
same argument our opinion in 154 N-W.2d 187, 189, rejected as
unsound when advanced by the Pottawattamie County Board
of Education—that the deeree did not require affirmative action
to undo what had already been done. The cited opinion fully
answers the argument and elaboration is unnecessary.

Hl The disputed issue in Kay v. County Board, decided
August 29, 1964, was whether an attachment by the board un-
der section 275.1, Code 1962, of a remnant district, containing
less than four sections of land, to another district must be to
one which maintains 12 grades or could the board in its dis-
eretion attach such territory to a non-high school district. -(As
before stated, York district to which the board attached the
Kay land maintained no school.) .

We agree with the decision of August 29, 1964, that any
attachment of such territory, if made, must be to a high school

EE

district and that attachment under 275.1 to a non-high school
district was without legal authority. Section 275.1 itself fur-
nishes sufficient support for this view. It provided, at the time
pertinent in the Kay litigation: “If any area of the state is not
in such a district [maintaining twelve grades] by July 1, 1962,
it shall be attached by the county board of education to some
such district * * *.”

Our view also finds support in this from Peterson v. Board
of Education, 251 Iowa 1306, 1809, 104 N.W.2d 821, 822, after
quoting the language just set out, but from Code, 1958: “* * *
the clear intent of the legislature is that where school districts
or parts thereof do not maintain a twelve-grade system, such
district or parts thereof may prior to 1962 be attached to a
district that does maintain a twelve-grade system by the County
Board of Education, and after 1962 must be so attached.”

There is no adequate basis for claiming the Kay land or
any part of the remnant James district became part of the
York district except by action of the county board under 275.1.

We conclude, as before indicated, that appellants’ reorgan-
ization petition did not embrace the only land claimed to be
contiguous to Hancock-Avoca District. This renders unneces-
sary consideration of the question whether the fact the Kay
farm corners with land in Hancock-Avoca District would make
the farm, if it were embraced in the reorganization petition,
contiguous to Hancock-Avoca.

Hi IL. Appellants contend the reorganization proceeding
instituted by them under sections 275.12 to 275.23 has priority
over the merger proceeding instituted under section 275.40 be-
eause their petition for reorganization was filed before the
petitions for merger were filed and much of the area sought to
be merged with plaintiff Shelby district is the same as that
sought to be united with Hancock-Avoca District by the re-
organization proceeding. It is true the reorganization petition
was filed with the county superintendent of Pottawattamie
County a few hours before any of the merger petitions were
filed with the county superintendent of Shelby County.

The rule of law contended for is that jurisdiction over for-
mation of a school district attaches when a petition therefor in
proper form is filed with the proper officials and it continues

336

until the proceeding is completed or abandoned, notwithstand-
ing the later filing of another petition, as to territory included
in both petitions. State ex rel. Harberts v. Klemme Com-
munity School District, 247 Iowa 48, 51-53, 72 N.W.2d 512,
514-515, and citations; Sheridan Rural Independent School
District v. Guernsey Consolidated School District, 251 Iowa
460, 463-464, 100 N.W.2d 418, 420-421; State ex rel. Schilling
v. Community School District, 252 Iowa 491, 499, 106 N.W.2d
80, 85-86.

HE We think appellants are not entitled to the benefit of
this rule since, as stated, the petition filed by them lacked the
minimum number of signatures required by section 275.12(1)
for uniting Hancock-Avoca District with the only part of the
Minden area claimed to be contiguous to it. A petition for re-
organization which fails to comply with such an essential
statutory requirement is not in proper form. See in this con-
nection Zilske v. Albers, 238 Iowa 1050, 1054, 1055, 29 N.W.2d
189, 191; Schilling case, cited last above, at page 500 of 252
Iowa, page 86 of 106 N.W.2d.

III. The final proposition appellants argue is that in any
event the three Shelby merger petitions were void ab initio,
without regard to the reorganization petition, because it was
impossible to complete the mergers by April 1, 1966, as said to
be,required by chapter 240, Acts Sixty-first General Assembly,
now part of section 275.1, Code 1966.

The part of this statute on which appellants rely is:

“Tt is further declared to be the policy of the state that all
the area of the state shall be in a district maintaining twelve
grades. by July 1, 1966. If any area of the state is not a part of
such a district by April 1, 1966, or is not included in a re-
organization petition filed in accordance with section 275.12 on
or before April 1, 1966, the area shall be attached by the county
board of education, to a district, or districts maintaining twelve
grades, such attachment to become effective July 1, 1966, and
provided such, attachment has the approval of the state board
of public instruction.” (Emphasis added.)

We do not understand plaintiff to argue the petitions to
merge the disputed territory with plaintiff under section 275.40
were filed with the county superintendent of Shelby County in

Ee

time to complete the mergers by April 1, 1966. The petitions fo
merge York and Minden Township districts with plaintiff were
filed with the county superintendent and plaintift’s board of
education in the evening of March 15, 1966. March 29 was
fixed as the time for filing objections thereto. Ten days notice
of such time was required and given. Section 275.40(3). The
objections which were filed were not overruled until April 2
and copy of the order was published April 7.

The petition to merge the remnant James district with
plaintiff high school district was filed in the evening of March
18, 1966. April 5 was fixed as the time for filing objections.
The objections which were filed were overruled on April 14 and
the order overruling theni was published April 21. i

Defendant, county superintendent of Pottawattamie
County, and several board members of each of the four inter-
vening ‘districts filéd objections to the mérger proveedings
within the time allowed. Also the Pottawattainie County
Board of Education “appealed” to:the state departineht of
public ‘instruction from the proposed mergers. (See section
275.40, subsection 3). Apparently no election had beer held on
the merger proceedings in any of the non-high’ school districts,

The record indicates the proponents of the reorganization
proposal under 275:12 to 275.23 and: those proceéding under
275.40 by merger moved as fast as reasonably possible ‘to
institute and complete the procedure, after they started. Cause
of the difficulty is that the merger proceedings were: fot com-
nienced in time to-allow coipletion by April 1.

HMMs Since the petition for reorganization‘ under 275.12
was invalid for the reasons explainéd in Divisions I and IT
hereof and the petitions for merger with plaintiff under 275.40
were filed too late to permit the-mergers to be completed by
April 1, 1966, it is obvious the Minden area could not bé‘and
was not part of a district maintaining 12 grades by stich data.
It then became: the niandatory duty of the county board of
education under 275.1 to attach it to such a twelve-grade
district or districts unless the saving clause in 275.1; quoted
supra; with emphasis by us, applicable to areas included in 4
teorganization petition under 275.12 also applies to aréds iti-
cluded in merger petitions wider 275.40.’ See Board of Educa-

1339

tion of Green Mountain District et al. v. Iowa State Board, 261
Towa 1203, 1205-1206, 157 N.W.2d 919.

Plaintiff-appellee’s answer to the contention of appellants
we are now considering is that it was an oversight of the legis-
lature not to extend the saving clause in 275.1 to embrace also
the area included within merger petitions under 275.40 and we
are urged under the doctrine of liberal construction of statutes
to extend such clause to mergers as well as to reorganization
petitions under 275.12.

It is true statutes providing for formation of school dis-
tricts are to be liberally construed. Zilske v. Albers, supra,
238 Iowa 1050, 1056, 29 N.W.2d 189, 192, and citations; Bran-
derhorst v. County Board of Education, 251 Iowa 1, 6, 99
N.W.2d 433, 486; Turnis v. Board of Education, 252 Iowa 922,
938, 109 N.W.2d 198, 208; Board of Education of Green
Mountain District et al. v. Iowa State Board, supra, 261 Iowa
1208, 1210, 157 N.W.2d 919, 923.,

In support of its contention, plaintiff-appellee’s brief called
attention to a letter dated March 28, 1966, from the state at-
torney general to the state superintendent of public instruction
expressing the opinion failure to include merger petitions un-
der 275.40 in the exception found in 275.1 relating to a ‘re-
organization petition under 275.12 was a legislative oversight.
The letter refers to a statement in Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869,
878, 14:N.W.2d 717, 719, that effect will be given to the spirit
of the law rather than the letter where adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity or injustice. However, we note the
same opinion states “The courts confine themselves to the
construction of the law as it is, not to amend or change under
the guise of construction.”

While we give due consideration to the letter of the at-
torney general, we. conclude there are limits beyond which
courts cannot go under the guise of liberal construction of
statutes. We think plaintiff asks us to exceed those limits
here.

Rule 344(£) (13) Rules of Civil Procedure provides this
proposition is so well established that authorities need not be
cited in support of it: “In construing statutes the courts search
for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said,

EE

rather than what it should or might have said.” We will, how-
ever, cite a few pertinent authorities.

Eysink v. Board of Supervisors, 229 Iowa 1240, 1244, 296
N.W. 876, 378, says: “Where the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous and its meaning clear, courts are not per-
mitted to search for its meaning beyond the expressed terms
of the statute. This court has no power to write into the
statute words which are not there.” Several precedents are
cited. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm. v. Marshall County, 242 Iowa
1254, 1257, 49 N.W.2d 829, 831, states: “But there are bounds
beyond which the doctrine of liberal construction cannot lead
us. * * * Tt does not authorize us to read into the statute some-
thing which does not come within the reasonable meaning of
the language used.”

Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227-228, 117 N.W.2d 431,
434, and citations are quite in point on principle. The opinion
contains this: “Courts may not, under the guise of construction,
extend, enlarge or otherwise change the terms of a statute.”
(Citations.)

82 C.J.8., Statutes, section 328, page 635, states this rule:
“Since the court in construing a statute must ascertain and
give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the language
of the statute, as a general rule the court cannot, under its
powers of construction, supply omissions in a statute, especially
where it appears that the matter may have been intentionally
omitted. It has been held to make no difference that the omis-
sion resulted from inadvertence, or because the case in question
was not foreseen or contemplated, * * *,”

This is from 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 387, page 404:
«* * * there has been declared to be a marked distinction be-
tween a liberal construction of statutes * * * and the act of a
court in ingrafting upon a law something that has been omitted,
which the court believes ought to have been embraced.”

IV. The trial court expressed the opinion that since the
reorganization proceeding under sections 275.12 to 275.23 was
invalid because the Minden area was not contiguous to
Haneock-Avoea District, the latter district was without stand-
ing to challenge the proposals to merge the area with plaintiff
Shelby district under 275.40. We agree the reorganization

1)

proceeding was invalid but, as stated in Division J, rest our
conclusion on the ground, also raised in the trial court and
here, the petition therefor lacked the signatures required by
section 275.12 as to the remnant James district which includes
the only part of the Minden area claimed to be contiguous to
Hancock-Avoea.

Hi However, we cannot agree appellants are without
standing to challenge the validity of the merger proceedings
filed under 275.40 which we hold in Division IIT supra were in-
valid because not filed in time to permit completion by April
1, 1966. No reason is apparent why appellants do not have as
much standing to challenge the validity of the merger peti-
tions as plaintiff does to challenge the validity of the reor-
ganization proceedings. Both failed to comply with essential
statutory requirements.

“ On the whole case we affirm the decree insofar as it in-
validates the reotganization petition filed under section 275.12
but’ (as stated, on a different ground from that reached by the
decree), reverse the decree insofar as it holds the merger
petitions were valid and appellants were without standing to
challenge them,'and remand the case for decree consistent
herewith. Costs of appéal to be equally divided between
plaintiff-appellee and intervendr-appellants. *

‘Plaintiff-appellee’s motion that appellants be required to
specify which of them have taken official action to authorize
this appeal is denied— Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
‘remanded. ©

. All Justices coneur except that Larson, J., is unable to
agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached in Division
III of the opinion and therefore dissents from that portion
thereof.

| Le 1841

State or Iowa, appellee, v. Kenr Coox, appellant.

No. 52837.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 26)

a
3
.
ic}

Aprin 9, 1968.

Mahoney, Jordan & Statton, of Boone, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, William A. Claerhout,
Assistant Attorney General, and Stanley R. Simpson, of Boone,
County Attorney, for appellee,

Mason, J.—Defendant Kent Cook was charged by county
attorney’s information with larceny in the nighttime contrary to
section 709.4, Iowa Code, 1966, After pleas of a former judg-

, as 1843

ment of acquittal and not guilty, trial to a Boone County jury
resulted in his conviction. Defendant was sentenced to imprison-
ment in the state penitentiary for a term not to exceed ten
years, From this final judgment he appeals.

I. March 18, 1967, the garage and office of the Boone
Yellow Cab Company was broken and entered between 1 and
2:54 a.m. A Yellow Cab and approximately $118 in cash and
coupons were taken. Shortly after 3 a.m. defendant was ar-
rested near Iowa Falls while riding in the front seat of the
stolen cab driven hy Howard Russell Switzer. At the time of
arrest Switzer had approximately $100 in cash on his person;
defendant, approximately $27.

March 28 four county attorney’s informations were filed;
one charged Switzer with larceny of a motor vehicle contrary
to Code section 321.82; another with larceny in the nighttime
contrary to section 709.4. Identical informations were filed
against defendant. Later Switzer entered a plea of guilty to
the lareeny in the nighttime charge and the other was dis-
missed.

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the larceny of
a motor vehicle charge and would not plead to the information
charging larceny in the nighttime. The court thereupon en-
tered a plea of not guilty. Section 777.14. Trial for larceny
of a motor vehicle resulted in defendant’s acquittal.

Before trial on the larceny in the nighttime charge defend-
ant moved for a bill of particulars, asking that he be informed
how the State expected to prove scienter and requested par-
ticulars with respect to any money taken from the Yellow Cab
building. Section 773.6. This motion was overruled. De-
fendant then moved the. minutes of testimony be enlarged and
on April 5 moved to allow discovery depositions to be taken.
These motions were also overruled.

May 3 defendant moved to quash the information, con-
tending he was formerly tried on the charge of larceny of a
motor vehicle arising out of the same transaction set forth in
the present information; to allow the State to proceed with the
lareeny charge would place him in jeopardy twice for the
same offense contrary to Article I, section 12, Iowa Constitu-
tion, and Amendment 5 to the Federal Constitution, He

1844 | | 7

further asserted the erime of larceny of a motor vehicle
charged in the one information was the same species of offense
as larceny in the nighttime charged in the present informa-
tion; he had been placed in jeopardy on the motor vehicle theft
and such jeopardy was a bar to further proceedings on the
larceny in the nighttime charge; the offense, if any, was com-
mitted at the same time or within a few seconds or minutes of
the event for which he had already stood trial; the minutes of
testimony listed on the two informations are. identical, the
number and identity of witnesses listed, the facts and times of
the transactions, the owner of the goods and place of theft are
the same.

After the court overruled the motion to quash, defendant
entered a plea of former judgment of acquittal, sections 777.11
and 777.18, which stood with the court-entered plea of not
guilty.

The day of trial defendant challenged the jury panel
pursuant to rule 187, Rules of Civil Procedure, as provided in
section 779.3, asserting the voir dire examination of the -first
16 prospective jurors revealed that the panel was made up
entirely of residents of the city of Boone and all other pre-
cinets in Boone County had been. eliminated therefrom in the
selection of prospective jurors; the selection of the panel was
contrary to chapter 609, Code, 1966. The defendant’s chal-
lenge to the jury panel was overruled.

Defendant then moved for separate trial on the issue and
plea of. former acquittal. When this motion was overruled
defendant’s motion that his plea of former judgment of
acquittal should be sustained by the court as a matter of law
was renewed and again overruled.

In a motion for directed verdict at the close of the State’s
evidence defendant renewed his claim that his plea of formet
acquittal was a bar to the prosecution. The motion was over-
ruled. :

Il. Defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) sub-
mitting the issues of jeopardy and guilt to one jury at the same
time; (2) refusing to order all charges against defendant be
brought in one prosecution based on events which occurred at
approximately the same time and place; (3) overruling his

ss a 1845

motion for separate trial ‘on issue of jeopardy; (4) overruling
his motion for new trial, when the jury considered the issue of
guilt before the issue of jeopardy; (5) overruling defendant’s
motion for pretrial discovery; (6) submitting the case to the
jury in a method contrary to the due process, clause of the
United States Constitution; (7) allowing testimony of certain
witnesses which violated defendant’s right to a fair trial; and
(8) overruling his challenge to the jury panel.

We combine defendant’s first, third, fourth and sixth as-

signments of error for determination inasmuch as his conten-
tions in support of these rest primarily on the proposition he
was subjected to double jeopardy.
. I. Article I, section 12, Iowa Constitution, provides i in
part: “No person shall after acquittal, be tried-for the same
offence,” Code section 777.20 similarly provides in part: “A
conviction or acquittal by a judgment upon a verdict shall
bar another prosecution for the same offense,***.” —:

In the one information defendant was charged with will-
fully, unlawfully and feloniously taking, stealing and carrying
away a certain motor vehicle, to-wit: one 1966 Rambler;
license No. 8-2451, the property of Leonard Lycke, contrary to
Gode section 321.82 which provides in part:

“Lharceny of motor vehicle. If any person steal, take and
earry away, irrespective of value, any motor vehicle, he shall
be punished * * *.” This statute first enacted as section 2,
chapter 278, Laws of the. Fortieth, General Assembly has con-
tinued as a part of our Code since 1924,

In the. instant information defendant , was charged with
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in the nighttime com-
mitting larceny in the private building belonging to Leonard
Lycke located in Boone, by taking, stealing and carrying away
from said building approximately $100 in cash contrary to
section 709.4 which provides in part:

“Lareeny in nighttime. If any person in the nighttime
commit larceny in any * * * private building, * * * when the
value of the property stolen exceeds the sum of twenty dollars,
he shall be imprisoned * * *.” Since the Code of 1851, this
section has appeared in various ‘forms.

1846 ee)

The two statutes under which defendant was charged have
different origin both in time and design.

Although the evidence necessary to prove the essential
elements of the crime of larceny of a motor vehicle would be
admissible in a prosecution of larceny in the nighttime under
the circumstances here, the same evidence may not be sufficient
to establish the essential elements of larceny in the nighttime.

HE “The rule now generally recognized is that, in order
that the plea of former jeopardy may be available, it must
appear that the two offenses are in substance the same, or of
the same nature or same species, so that the evidence which
proves the one would prove the other. If, however, an es-
sential element of one offense is not necessarily present in the
other,. then there is no former jeopardy, although the same
evidence may be offered to sustain the indictment in each case.”
State v. Cowman, 239 Iowa 56, 59, 29 N.W.2d 288, 240, quoting
from State v. Jacobson, 197 Iowa'547, 549, 197 N.W. 638, 639.

In determining whether there are separate statutory of-
fenses, “the applicable rule is that where thé same act or trans-
action’ constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory. provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires ‘proof of a fact
which the other does not.” Gore v. United States, 357 U.S, 386,
897, 78 S. Ct. 1280,-1287, 2 L. Hd.2d 1405’ (from Justieé Bren-
nan’s dissent). -

In order for the State to sustain a successful prosecution

under section 709.4 it was necessary that the larceny be in the
nighttime and in this case from the private building mentioned
in the information. State-v. Lawson, 196 Iowa 740, 742-748,
195 N.W. 366, 368. Neither of these facts would be essential
to a prosecution under section 321.82.
"(BB “It is the identity of the offense, and not of the act,
which is referred to in the constitutional guarantee against
putting a person twice in jeopardy.” State v. Melia, 231 Iowa
382, 336, 1 N.W.2d 230, 232, quoting from State v. Fredlund,
200 Minn. 44, 52, 273 N.W. 353, 357, 113 A.L.R, 215.

HM “A single act may be an offense against two statutes;
and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either

a | 1341

statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and
punishment under the other.

Ree

Hl “ * * * the test of identity of offenses is whether the
same evidence is required to sustain them; if not, then the fact
that both charges relate to and grow out of one transaction
does not make a single offense where two are defined by the
statute.” Barnett v. Gladden, 9 Cir., 375 F.2d 235, 238, and
citations. .

The charge in the information of larceny of a motor
vehicle is not the same offense as charged in the information
in the instant case, namely, larceny from a building in the
nighttime. It necessarily follows defendant’s plea of former
acquittal was not available as a‘defense in the instant case and
his contention’ under these assignments of error is without
merit. : .

As further support for our position see Kistner v. United
States , 8 Cir., 382 F.2d 978, 980, where the court said:

«iT The test of identity of offenses is whether the same
evidence is required to sustain them; if not, then the fact that
both. charges relate to and grow out ‘of one transaction does
not make a single offense where two are defined by the statutes.’
Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641, 35 S. Ct. 712, 715, 59
L, Ed. 1153 (1915). Stated differently, but to the same effect:

“ «That, where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not.’ Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1982).”

«** * The decisions of the Supreme Court have made it
abundantly clear that the purpose of the double jeopardy rule
(common. law or constitutional) was to forbid a second trial for
the same offense. * * *.” United States v. H. E. Koontz
Creamery, Ine. (D. Md.), 232 F. Supp. 312, 316.

Having determined that double jeopardy does not exist as
a matter of law, we will not consider these assignments sep-
arately. - .

1348 Pe 7

IV. Under his second assignment defendant contends that
where a continuing set of actions transgresses more than one
statute, the accused must be prosecuted jointly for all phases
or consequences of his actions where such prosecution is reason-
able and the State knows of the actions or is reasonably ex-
pected to discover them.

Code section 773.37 provides: “Charging several offenses.
In case of compound offenses where in the same transaction
more than one offense has been committed, the indictment may
charge the several offenses and the defendant may be convicted
of any offense included therein.”

MJ Although this statute may, permit several offenses
to be. charged in separate counts of the same indictment or in-
formation, we do not. believe the State is always compelled to
adopt such procedure to accord due process. .The question in
any given case is whether such course has led to fundamental
unfairness. There is no constitutional prohibition against the
State’s prosecuting different offenses at consecutive trials even
though they. arose: out of the same occurrence in the absence of
proof establishing that such tactics have entailed fundamental
unfairness. In support see Hoag v. State of. New Jersey, 356
US. 464, 467-468, 78S, Ct. 829, 832, 2 L. Ed.2d 913; Ciueei v.
State of Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 573, 78°S. Ct. 839, 840, 2 L. Ed.2d
983; and People v, Rosoto, 58 Cale 2d 304, 23 Cal. Rptr. 179, 873
P2d 867, 877. 6

| We believe. the State was constitutionally entitled to
prosecute these individual offenses singly at separate trials.

Of course, as suggested in Hoag v. State of New Jersey,
supra, it may. well be preferable for the State in circumstances
such as these normally to try the offenses in a single proseeu-
tion and recent studies of the American Law Institute have
led to such.a proposal.. See Model Penal Code, section 1.08(2)
(tentative draft No.5).

«MV. There is no merit in defendant's contention that
the trial court erred in overruling his motion of April 5 for
pretrial discovery ‘as asserted in his fifth assignment. He
argues that if, he was, to be denied discovery. by deposition, the
eourt’s failure to sustain his motion to quash, followed by a

a a 1349

motion for enlargement of the minutes, violated Code section
781.10 which provides:

‘Depositions. A defendant in a criminal case, either after
preliminary information, indictment, or information, may ex-
amine witnesses conditionally or on notice or commission, in
the same manner and with like effect as in civil actions.”

As stated, the minutes of testimony listed on the two in-
formations are identical, as are the number and identity of
witnesses listed, the facts and times of the transactions, the
owner of the goods and place of theft. The judge, the pros-
ecutor and defense counsel were the same in both trials, only
the offenses charged were different.

The first trial which commenced April 24 and was con-
eluded April 27 afforded defendant opportunity to acquire in-
formation probably sought by his April 5 motion as we view
the record. There is no indication defendant desired to ex-
amine anyone other than those who were witnesses in the first
trial. His argument does not elaborate on why the ruling was
incorrect or how it created harm or prejudice to the defense.

Besides as recent as State v. Gates, 260 Iowa 772, 778, 150
N.W.2d 617, 621, we made reference to State v. District Court
(Delaware County), 253 Iowa 903, 114 N.W.2d 317, where we
analyzed the provisions of section 781.10, supra, and the Rules
of Civil Procedure and approved the holding.that discovery
rules are confined to civil cases.

VI. Defendant’s sixth assignment of error concerns testi:
mony given by the State’s witnesses Wolff, a guard at River-
view Release Center, and Chief Harvey of the Boone police
department. .

After Wolff testified he was an honor farm guard, defend-
ant moved that the matters sought: to be elicited from him
would be highly prejudicial to defendant. The motion is not
set out in the record and we have only a narrative reference
to it. The motion was overruled. The witness then proceeded
to testify without objection concerning defendant’s escape
from the honor farm, identification of honor farm locker keys
taken from him and honor farm inmates had no money.

Harvey testified, without objection, defendant and Switzer
asked to be transferred from the city jail and asked Harvey to

1850 Pe FY

tell the sheriff they would give their word they would not
break out of the county jail.

A motion for mistrial made the day following Harvey’s
being. on the stand was overruled. A motion to strike the
contested portion of Harvey’s testimony was sustained and the
jury was admonished to give it no consideration whatsoever.
It was late.

In his argument defendant concedes no question was raised
in the lower court on any of the exceptions enumerated.

The trial court in ruling on defendant’s motion for a new
trial observed that defendant’s closing jury argument fur-
nished the answer as to why he did not object to Wolft’s testi-
mony and concluded it was a decision of trial tactics. He can-
not complain.

HI We have frequently held an objection-to a question is
not timely unless made before answer. A party cannot or-
dinarily complain of the receipt of evidence to which no timely
objection was made, at least without a reasonable excuse for
not objecting. Where a witness answers a question before
opposing counsel has opportunity to object, counsel should
make a motion to strike the answer asserting he did not have
time to interpose his objection before the answer of the witness.
Defendant cannot be allowed to observe the effects of evidence
and object to its admissibility only after counsel concludes that
on the whole it is more harmful than beneficial. See State v.
Mabrey, 245 Iowa 428, 431, 60 N.W.2d 889, 891; Castner v.
Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 652, 127 N.W.2d 583, 591; and State v.
Dwinells, 259 Iowa 945, 950, 146 N.W.2d. 231, 235.

Defendant’s sixth assignment of error does not entitle him
to a reversal.

HME «Vil. Defendant contends in support of his eighth
assignment that Code-section 609.1 is an infringement of
Amendment 6 to the Federal Constitution.

Because defendant was brought to trial on both informa-
tions before the same jury panel, it became necessary to call
in talesmen from which to select a jury for the second trial.

The gist of defendant’s argument appears to be whether
the talesmen were properly drawn.

Section 609,1(3) provides: “alesmen, A list of the names

a Le 1351

and addresses of electors equal to fifteen percent of the whole
number of qualified electors who voted at the last preceding
general election, as shown by the pollbooks, in the city or town
in which the district court is held and in the township or town-
ships in which such city or town is located (but in no case
exceeding five hundred names) from which to select talesmen.”

Defendant had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that this statute is unconstitutional. In our opinion, he
has not sustained that burden. For a discussion of the
principles which govern our examination of constitutional
questions see Borden v. Selden, 259 Iowa 808, 812, 813, 146
N.W.2d 306, 310. :

The assignment is without merit.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur.

Srate or Iowa, appellee, v. Joan Wayne Davis, appellant.

No. 52763.
(Reported in 157 N.W.2d 907)

1852

Aprit 9, 1968.

Everett HL Albers, of Des Moines, for appellant.

a es 1358

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Ray A. Fenton, County At-
torney, for appellee.

Laxson, J.—On May 23, 1967, the Polk County Grand Jury
returned an indictment charging the defendant, John Wayne
Davis, with the crime of breaking and entering as defined in
section 708.8 of the 1966 Code of Iowa. Subsequent to a plea
of not guilty, trial was had by jury resulting in a verdict of
guilty. The defendant was sentenced to not more than ten
years in prison in the Men’s Reformatory at Anamosa, Iowa.
He appeals.

Acting upon a radio dispatch that a breaking and entering
was in progress at Jay’s Bakery in Des Moines, Iowa, several
Des Moines policemen went to the bakery to investigate. Upon
their arrival about 2:30.a.m. on April 14, 1967, they found one
party in the bakery and the defendant crouched on the roof
near the edge of the skylight on top of the building. Officer
Dickerson told the defendant to stand up with his hands in
the air and to come down off-the building. He and Officer
Warrick then handeuffed him:and took him to the front of the
bakery where “he was advised of his rights” by Lieutenant
Burns in the presence and hearing of several officers.

Officer Warrick testified that “Lieutenant Burns advised
him [the defendant] that he was under arrest and charged
with breaking and entering and that he had a right to remain
silent and also he had a right to counsel and if he did not have
the funds for counsel, the State would provide one.” He was
“further advised that anything he said could be used against
him.”

Officer James Collins corroborated that testimony and
said the defendant had apparently injured his ankle when he
jumped off the roof. Collins was sent to Broadlawns Hospital
to guard him while he was being examined by doctors and,
while there, had a brief conversation with defendant. It is the
admission of this conversational exchange into evidence, over
defendant’s objection, that provoked this appeal.

In his proposition relied upon for reversal defendant con-
tends, “the trial court committed reversible error in permitting

1854 be Ys

the introduction of admissions made by the defendant into
evidence without an affirmative showing that the defendant
waived his right to counsel at the time the admissions were
made.”
_ \I: It is well settled that when a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way, before interrogation he must be advised (1)
that he has a right to remain silent (2) that anything he might
say may be used in evidence against him (3) that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot
afford counsel he, may. have. counsel appointed. . Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 US. 436, 444, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694;
State v. Hardesty, 261 Iowa 382, 153. N.W.2d 464, Defendant
does not contend the warnings listed above were not given ‘to
him after his arrest, but argues that the statement made by him
was not admissible because the State failed to show at the tinie
‘of the statement he was again advised of his rights. or that he
effectively waived his right.to counsel. -

Thus, we are faced with three very interesting questions:
(1) Must a person be advised of his constitutional rights more
thari once? (2) Was defendant’s objection to the admission of
his statement at the time of trial properly overruled? (3) Did
this verbal exchange between the officer and the defendant
amount to actual custodial interrogation?

HI I. An accused need not be advised of his constitu-
tional rights more than once unless the time of warning and
the time of subsequent interrogation are too remote in time
from one another. People v. Perrin, 247 Cal. App.2d 838, 55
Cal.Rptr. 847, 850 (1967); People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 61, 233
N.E.2d 546 (1968). In the Perrin case defendant was advised
of his constitutional rights prior to a morning interrogation by
police, but when interrogation was again resumed in the after-
noon no admonition of his rights was repeated. The court held
there was no evidence that the defendant had wished the in-
terrogation to cease or had indicated so in any manner, and
thus the warning in the morning was held to carry over into
the afternoon. :In the Hill case the defendant was arrested and
brought to the precinct station and advised of his constitutional
rights.” He.iwas. then interrogated. by some officers over a

a es 1855

period of several hours. The court held it was not necessary to
repeat the warnings at the beginning of each successive inter-
view, particularly where the defendant was interrogated for a
relatively short period of time, about three hours in all.

Hl The statement in question was made while defendant
was in custody at a hospital, about one and a half hours after
the time of his arrest. We think this warning was sufficient.

| | II. Defendant’s next contention concerns the over-
ruling of his objection to the testimony of Officer Collins and
his motion to strike the officer’s testimony relative to the con-
versation he had with the defendant at the hospital.

From the transcript furnished, it appears Officer Collins
testified he observed two cans of beer and one tire iron on a
table in the bakery at the time defendant and another were
apprehended. He was then asked, “Now, based upon this ob-
servation, could you relate to the jury the conversation you
had with the defendant at Broadlawns Hospital?” Before
answer, defense counsel said, “The defendant objects, Your
Honor. There has been no direct testimony with this par-
ticular witness that advised him of his rights or if anyone
advised him of his rights or what rights he was advised of
and this testimony should be stricken.” The objection was
overruled and defendant excepted. Counsel then said, “Tell
us what the conversation was”, and when no further objections
or motions were made by defendant the officer said, “Yes, I
made reference to the beer that I had seen in Jay’s Bakery. I
asked him, I said, ‘You guys must have been planning on stay-
ing for awhile.’ I said, ‘You had your cold beer with you.’
And he said, ‘Yes, but we did not have a chance to drink it.’
This is about all.”

No motion to strike was made at the time. However, at
the conclusion of the cross-examination of Officer Collins, de-
fendant’s counsel renewed his “objections to the questions pro-
pounded by counsel and I would like to request the objection
because such questioning was done when the accused was in
great pain and which would constitute a form of duress by the
questioning of the officer”, and asked on those two grounds
that the testimony be stricken. This motion was overruled,
and we find no other motions relative to this statement in the

1356 es

record, no objection to the court’s instructions, and no motion
for a new trial.

HMMM: Under this record the trial court could properly
deny both the objection and the motion to strike. The reasons
advanced by counsel in support of his specific objection and
motion were not sufficient. It is elenientary that an objection
to offered evidence must be sufficiently specific to advise the
trial court why it is inadmissible. Frederick v. Shorman, 259
Iowa 1050, 1060, 147 N.W.2d 478, 485, and citations; State v.
Estrella, 257 Iowa 462, 468, 183 N.W.2d 97. When specific
objections are made and do not include the reasons argued in
appeal, as a general rule the latter will not be considered on
appeal. State v. Mabbitt, 257 Iowa 1063, 1066,185 N.W.2d 525;
Masters v. Hide, 353 F.2d 517, and citations; Chester v. People
of State of California, 355 F.2d‘ 778, and citations.

The record shows defendant had been properly and timely
advised of his rights as announced in Miranda at the time he
was taken into custody, and there was no objection at the time
of defendant’s statement on the basis of duress. In fact, this
belated idea seems to have come to counsel during the cross-
examination when Officer Collins admitted defendant’s foot was
swollen and he was advised of the pain by defendant.

We are not convinced the trial court erred in overruling
defendant’s objection to this testimony. Clearly, it was not
premised on a claimed failure of the State to show he heard
and understood the warnings given. Defendant’s argument
that this reason was included in his objection and motion to
strike has no merit.

| | It is the State’s position that, even if the objection be
considered adequate to raise this latter issue, by failing to file
a motion to suppress, defendant waived his right to object to
the officer’s statement at the trial. It refers to the well estab-
lished rule that, unless a defendant who is forewarned as to the
substance of testimony to be offered makes a proper and timely
motion to suppress such evidence before trial, any objection to
its introduction will be deemed waived. State v. Dwinells, 259
Towa 945, 950, 146 N.W.2d 231, 234; People v. Ferguson, 376
Mich. 90, 185 N.W.2d 357; Dunek v. District Court of Lee
County, 258 Iowa 673, 140 N.W.2d 372.

Le De 1857

It appears here that the testimony of Officer Collins ob-
jected to was almost identical to that appearing in the minutes
of testimony attached to defendant’s grand jury indictment.
Defendant was, or should have ‘been, well aware in advance of
trial of this testimony, made no motion to suppress it, and
failed to make a proper objection to its admission when offered.
We recognized this ground of waiver as valid in the recent case
of State v. Anderson, 260 Iowa 122, 148 N.W.2d 414, but there
we did not ground the decision alone on that somewhat tech-
nical basis, nor need:we do so here.

- IV. - The State argues that Officer Collins’ testimony as
to ‘his statement and defendant’s reply did not violate the
Miranda holdings or any other of the United States Supreme
Court decisions regarding procedural safeguards .against self-
incrimination. It points out that the prohibition most often
quoted from Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Hd.2d 694, states that “the prosecution
may not use statements;-whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial in-
terrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
(Emphasis added.)

[| The emphasized words, it says, indicate that the Supreme
Court did not intend to include all statements made by one
temporarily detained or made in a conversational nature with
an officer when not being interrogated in a purposeful manner,
and we are inclined to agree.

| | Courts of various jurisdictions have pointed out that
Miranda was concerned with police questioning and interroga-
tion of suspects held in isolated police custody, particularly the
incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere.

In Gaudio v. State, 1 Md.App. 455, 280 A.2d 700, the de-
fendant was arrested for a traffic violation. The arresting
officer then observed that the springs of his vehicle were not
down although the cargo appeared to be heavy lumber. ‘He

1358 [| |

then discovered the false back end and concluded in his own
mind that “there was a false load on the truck.” Taking a
fair guess at the contents, he asked defendant if he had
cigarettes on the truck and received an affirmative answer. To
the question as to the quantity, the defendant told him there
were 2000 cartons. Thereafter, defendant consented to a
search and, when the cigarettes were found, he was arrested
for felonious transportation of untaxed cigarettes. There the
above testimony was admitted without objection at the trial,
and the Miranda question was raised on the appeal. In holding
that decision did not apply to the situation, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals said, although it appears that the
procedural safeguards must be employed when (a) an in-
dividual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities, and (b) he is subject to question-
ing, “In the instant case, we feel that the appéllants were not
subjected.to-questioning within the contemplation of Miranda.
We do not think that the evils with which the Court was con-
cerned in Miranda’ were present.” - It then pointed: out that
the defendant was not. held incommunicado in- an isolated
setting in the privacy of an interrogation room in a police
station, and that he was not surrounded by antagonistic forces
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion. He was in the
‘presence of one police officer, standing on a public street, and
he knew if he posted bond for the traffic charge he could pro-
ceed:'on his way. The court ther said at page 468 of 1 Md.
App.: “We see no practice here, such as concerned the Court in
Miranda, requiring assurance that it be eradicated. The com-
pelling atrnosphere inherent in the process of in-custody in-
terrogation was not present. We think that the questions by
the trooper as to the cigarettes and the answers by Gaudio did
not amount to a ‘custodial interrogation’ as contemplated by
Miranda.” The court went on to, say it could not agree that
“ander any. and all circumstances”. Miranda protects the ac-
cused, at least to the extent that no inquiry at all by the author-
ities is permissible without a demonstration by the State that
‘prior warnings were given. We agree. Like the Maryland
court, we too recognize the rationale of Miranda and share
deep concern for justice and desire to render every man,

, a 1859

whether innocent or guilty, what is due him. A balance must
be maintained which does justice, not only to the accused, but
also to society. We subscribe to no interpretation of a rule
which tends to thwart rather than secure justice.

In a similar decision the Washington court in State v.
Persinger (Wash.), 433 P.2d 867, 868, permitted an officer to
testify to a reply he received from a convict accused of at-
tempted escape. To the question as to why he had not followed
Moses down the rope, defendant replied that he “was dis-
couraged by the ululation of the dogs and the weaponry of the
tower guards.” On appeal, defendant contended that the
statement was inadmissible because the guard had not pref-
aced his roof-top inquiry with a Miranda warning. In re-
jecting that contention the Washington court held the state-
ment was not such as that contemplated by Miranda. It said:

“The casual, lone, and conversational inquiry by the captain
of the guards simply did not amount to the type of ‘in-custody
interrogation’ contemplated by the decision in-Miranda * * *
and/or Escobedo * * *, And, appellant’s gratuitous, expletive,
and candid reply to the query cannot be characterized as one
induced by any form of proscribed intimidation. At best the
question and the answer were the products of normal, human,
and spontaneous curiosity on the one hand and chagrin on the
other. The trial court did not err in admitting the brief con-
versation into evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Also see Perry
v. United States (D-C.App.), 280 A.2d 721.

Here too we find the defendant in the hospital for a foot
examination, in the presence of doctors and nurses, not officers
in a police-dominated atmosphere. Defendant was not even
asked a question, but the officer sent to guard him merely ob-
served in a conversational way that they “must have been
planning on staying for awhile. * * * You had your cold beer
with you.” The defendant responded to the jest and said: “Yes,
but we did not have a chance to drink it.” We also conclude
this was not the circumstance nor type of interrogation con-
templated by Miranda, and the statement made by defendant
was not inadmissible because the State failed to demonstrate the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.

1860 Le 7

| | V. In any event; this admission of: defendant’s state-
ment, even if error, was without prejudice to him. In view of
the fact.that he was caught on the premises, the acceptance of
evidence as to his admission that he was there would seem to
amount to harmless error, and the judgment of the trial court
must be affirmed.—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except BECKER, Mason and Raw ies,
JJ., who dissent.

Broxer, J—I dissent. I. From my reading of the printed
record. it appears the evidence to prove defendant received and
understood the Miranda warnings at anytime is wholly in-
adequate.. The testimony of officers Burns, Collins and War-
rick that the warnings were given fails to indicate defendant
heard. the. warnings,,much less understood them. The only
fair reading of the record indicates defendant had just jumped
from the rooftop when the warnings were purportedly given.
Davis was injured at thé time. . Several hours later at the
hospital-the objectionable statement was elicited.

II. In reaching its conclusions the majority considers two
other matters impelling comment.

Despite repeated urgings by the attorney general’s office
in other cases we have, to this point, resisted the temptation
to decide defendant’s constitutional rights on the basis of
failure to file motion to suppress. If this rule is adopted it
should be adopted in‘a’ manner which will assure:

1. A hearing in every case’ where confessions or admis-
sions are to be used.

2. Full notice to defendant as to the details of ‘the evi-
dence to be used so admissibility can be properly evaluated
prior to trial.

8. Adequate procedural safeguards to assure relative in-
vulnerability to eventual direct or collateral attack.

“State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 553-556,
141 N.W.2d 3, 13, provides a rule for Minnesota courts supply-
ing the above requirements. The bulk of that rule is worth
repeating here:

“(1) At the time of arraignment when a defendant pleads
not guilty, or as soon as possible thereafter, the state will ad-

Ye Ln 1861

vise the court as to whether its case against the defendant will
include evidence obtained as the result of a search and seizure;
evidence discovered because of a confession or statements in
the nature of a confession obtained from the defendant; or
confessions or statements in the nature of confessions.

“(2) Upon being so informed, the court will formally
advise the attorney for the defendant (or the defendant him-
self if he refuses legal counsel) that he may, if he chooses,
move the court to suppress the evidence so secured or the
eonfession so obtained if his contention is that such evidence
was secured or confession obtained in violation of defendant’s
constitutional rights. .

“(3) ‘If the defendant elects to contest the admissibility
of the evidence upon Federal constitutional grounds, a pretrial
fact hearing on the admissibility of the evidence will be held
in open court with the defendant present and represented or
advised by counsel. Upon the record of the evidence elicited
at the time of such hearing, a determination by the trial court
as.to whether the receipt of the evidence contested will vitiate
defendant’s constitutional rights will be made. It will be the
obligation of the state to proceed first at such a hearing identi-
fying the evidence which will be offered against the defendant
and showing that the circumstances under which it was ob-
tained were consistent with constitutional requirements. The
defendant in presenting his case in opposition to the claims uf
admissibility may testify without waiver of his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether a confession is valid are as
outlined in State v. Taylor, 270 Minn. 333, 183 N.W.2d 828.

“(4) If the defendant, having been advised before trial
that evidence obtained as the result of search and seizure will
be offered against him or having been informed that a confes-
sion or statements in the nature of a confession will be offered
im evidence at trial, and having been told that he may have a
test of the admissibility of this evidence upon constitutional
grounds before the trial, fails or refuses to request such a
hearing, any objection which he may otherwise make based
upon this ground may be deemed waived.

1362 [| 7

“(5) If the state, having been requested to disclose
whether evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure
will be offered against defendant at the time of the trial and
having been requested to state whether a confession or admis-
sions in the nature of a confession will be a. part of its case,
fails or refuses to make such disclosure, it may be inferred that
any such evidence offered at the time of trial was obtained in
violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.

“The procedure which we have outlined deals only with
evidence obtained as the result of a search and seizure and
evidence consisting of or produced by confessions on the part
of the defendant. However, the steps which have been sug-
gested as a method of dealing with evidence of this type will
indicate to counsel and to the trial courts that the pretrial
consideration of other evidentiary problems, the resolution of
which is needed to assure the integrity of the trial when con-
ducted, will be most useful and that this court encourages the
use of such procedures wherever practical.”

Failure to provide such safeguards will inevitably invite
disposition of these matters on constitutionally indefensible
grounds.

Ill. If we are to recognize the California doctrine of
“harmless error”, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct.
824, 17 L.Hd.2d 705, we should do so only after due delibera-
tion. However, we should recognize the United States Supreme
Court’s admonitions in this regard and analyze the evidence
with those admonitions in mind. This part of the opinion also
appears to be obiter dicta since the majority does not place the
decision on that ground but adds recognition of this doctrine in
one short paragraph at the end of the opinion.

I would reverse and remand for retrial.

Mason and Rawuines, JJ., join in this dissent.

| 1363

Scare or Iowa, appellee, v. Dick Dyxzs, appellant.

No. 52818.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2a 154)

Appin 9, 1968.

1304 ee)

Martin R. Dunn, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, James C. Sell, As-
sistant Attorney General, and John Vasey, of Nevada, County
Attorney, for appellee.

Brcxer, J—Defendant was charged in Story County with
embezzlement by carrier, pleaded not guilty and upon trial to
‘jury: was convicted as charged. His sole assignment of error
charges-the State failed to prove the unlawful taking or con-
version took ‘place in Story County. We affirm judgment on
the verdict.

Defendant's appeal was submitted on clerk’s transcript,
décided and reported at 145 N.W.2d 471. On petition for re-
hearing we granted defendant’s request to resubmit on a
printed record and written briefs. This opinion supersedes the
former opinion in this case.

From the evidence presented by the State the jury could
find the following facts: Defendant truck driver hauled grain
for the Pillsbury Company. .On July 3 he picked up a load of
804 bushels of corn at Collins in Story County for delivery to
the Pillsbury plant in Davenport, Scott County. He took the
corn to Centerville in Appanoose County where he sold it for
$996 to Cargill Mill & Elevator Company. Defendant had not
been authorized to sell the corn or to deliver it anywhere but
to its destination in Davenport. After his arrest defendant
told a special agent of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investiga-
tion he took the load of corn to Centerville and Mr. Birke-
strand, an agent of Pillsbury, told defendant it would be all
right to sell the corn at Centerville. Mr. Birkestrand denied
this conversation.

Defendant was a witness. When he picked up the corn at
Collins it was about 3 p.m. on July 3 and he did not think he
could get the corn to Davenport before Pillsbury closed. He
therefore went to Des Moines and thence to Centerville where

, | 1865

he lived. He had tire trouble at Centerville. On July 6 he
phoned Mr. Birkestrand and asked to sell the corn in Center-
ville since he had tire trouble on his truck. He'said Mr. Birke-
strand agreed, so he sold the grain.’ The record is silent as to
what he did with the proceeds.

I. The sole issue is one of venue. Since we have con.
sidered venue problems in relation to forgery prosecutions in
State v. Wardenburg, 261. Iowa 1895, 1403, 158 N.W.2d 147,
151, 152, we should review certain principles there noted: .-

Hl “tn order to secure ‘a conviction in a criminal ‘prosecu-
tion it.is necessary to.show not only that the act denounced:as
a crime has been committed but that it-has been committed
within the territory where the law invoked for its punishment
prevails.

“We therefore hold venue must be Proved. beyond a reason-
able doubt.

HM ‘vV. Although the burden of proof is to convince
beyond a reasonable doubt, the State can generate-a jury
question on the issue of venue by producing evidence which is
either direct or circumstantial from which it may be inferred.
No positive testimony that the ‘violation occurred at a-specific
place is required, it is sufficient if it can be concluded from the
evidence as a whole that the act was committed in the comity
where the indictment is found. Circumstantial evidence may
be and often is stronger and more convincing than direct
evidence.”

The above principles are general in.nature and applicable
to venue problems in embezzlement cases. The statutes in-
volved are, lowa Code, 1966:

“710.10 Embezzlement by carrier or persons entrusted. If
any carrier or other person to whom any money, goods, or
other property which may be the subject of larceny has been
delivered to be carried for hire, or if any other person en-
trusted with such property, embezzle or fraudulently convert
to his own use any such money, goods, or other property, either
in the mass as the same were delivered or otherwise, and before
the same were delivered at the place or to the person where
and to whom they were to be delivered, he is guilty of larceny.”
and :

1366 Le | 7

“753.4 Offenses partly in county. When a public offense
is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or
when the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the con-
summation of the offense oceur in two or more counties, juris-
diction is in either county except as otherwise provided by
law.”

In accord with the principles set forth in State v. Warden-
burg, supra, and the statutes cited, the trial court correctly in-
structed the jury:

“Before defendant can be convicted of embezzlement, the
State must prove all of the following elements of such offense
by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect to
the incident in question: * * * (6) That the offense was com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of this court.”

Element six was explained in instruction No. 15 as follows:

“Regarding the sixth element, this Court only has juris-
diction within Story County, Iowa.

“One charged with embezzlement may be prosecuted in the
county where the unlawful taking and conversion of the prop-
erty takes place. If the State has proved this contention by
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then it has established
the sixth element; otherwise not.”

«MJ Il. Our most recent case involving venue in an em-
bezzlement case seems to be State v. Bisanti, 233 Iowa 748,
750, 9 N.W.2d 279, where the following rule is repeated: “It
has been the rule in this state for many years that one charged
with embezzlement may be prosecuted either in the county
where the unlawful taking and conversion of his principal’s
money took place or in the county where it was his duty to
make an accounting of the money to his principal. Appellant
does not seriously question that such is the law. The following
decisions fully sustain the rule: State v. Hengen, 106 Iowa 711,
7T N.W. 458, where the matter is fully discussed by Ladd, J.;
State v. Maxwell, 113 Iowa 369, 370, 85 N.W. 613; State v.
Stuart, 190 Iowa 476, 479, 180 N.W. 186.”

Relying on State v. Bisanti, supra, and the cases cited
therein, defendant argues the only. two counties having juris-
diction in this case are Appanoose, where the grain was sold,
and Scott, where there was a duty to account, This assumes

P| PF 1367

elements of the crime could not be shown to have been com-
mitted in any other county.

Concerning this section we said in State v. Hengen, 106
Towa 711, 712, 77 N.W. 453: “The venue can always be laid in
the county where the conversion actually took place, but it is
often as difficult to determine where as it is when that hap-
pened. This is especially true of an agent who travels as sales-
man from town to town through several counties. The author-
ities agree that, if the transaction constituting the offense ex-
tends through different counties, that in which the conversion
took place has not the exclusive jurisdiction. 1 Bishop Crim-
inal Procedure, 61; 7 Ene. Pl. & Prac. 412. . But, unless some
essential element constituting the erime of embezzlement oe-
eurred in Polk county, the venue could not properly be laid
therein.”

Here the jury could find that as soon as defendant got the
corn he went to Des Moines and thence to Centerville, and not
to Davenport, as was his duty. The jury was not required to
believe defendant’s explanation but could find he took the corn
to Centerville to sell it without authority rather than to wait
out the holiday weekend as he testified. Here again what is
said in State v. Wardenburg, supra, at page 1403 of 261 Iowa,
is apropos: “[A]nd State v. Ostby, 203 Iowa 338, 338, 210 N.W.
934, 935, where the court said: ‘We have also determined that
venue may be proved by inference as well as by direct assertion
by the witness [citing cases]. In other words, a sum total of
these holdings is that the witness need not testify in words that
the crime was committed within the county in question, but that
such fact, if fairly inferable from the testimony given, is suf-
ficient to carry the question of venue to the jury.’”

As applied to an embezzlement case the foregoing principles
are well stated by the Court of Appeals in Heughan v. State
(1950), 82 Ga. App. 640, 61 S. H.2d 685, 686, where in the
Syllabus by the Court it is said:

HI “8. Where the defendant receives property in a county
of this State and thereafter fraudulently converts the same to
his own use, the jury may be authorized by the evidence to con-
clude that the intent to convert the same was formed in the
county where the ‘property ‘was entrusted to him, and: venue

1968 es a

under such evidence may properly be laid in that county.”

The New York courts carry the rule one step further and
hold the county where the property is entrusted is proper venue
even though. the intent to convert was not formed in that county.
This result is reached on the grounds that the entrustment is a
necessary act to the consummation of the offense, People v.
Weed (1934), 153 Mise. 404, 406, 274 N.Y.S. 943, 945: “The dis-
tinction between that case and the one at bar is best illustrated
by Mr. Justice McLennan, who wrote the prevailing opinion,
when at page 587 of 49 App. Div., 63 N.Y.S. 522, 525, he makes
the following statement: ‘If A. and B., in the county of New
York, enter into a contract by which B., as the agent of A., is
to collect money belonging to A. in the county of Erie and pay
it over to him, and B. collects such money in thé county of
Erie and there forms the intent to and does actually convert
such money to his own use, it may well be that a prosecution
of B. for the crime of larceny could only be had in the county
of Erie, because no act relating to the subject-matter of the
larceny was done by B., except in said county; but if, on the
other hand, ‘A. should deliver to. B. as his agent $5,000 to take
to the.county of Erie, with which there to pay an indebtedness
of A., and B. should take such sum into the county of Erie,
and in that county, for the first time, form the intent to steal. it,
and actually appropriate it to his own use with such intent, we
think B. might be indicted for the offense in either New York
‘or Brie county; in New York county, because of the fact: that
he did an act in that county in respect to the subject-matter of
the larceny, which was essential and necessary to the consum-
mation of the offense by him in Erie county.’ It is also to be
noted that two of the five judges dissented from the prevailing
opinion in the Appellate Division and that three of the seven’
judges voted for reversal in the Court of Appeals.”

"I We need not go so far as the New York rule just
quoted, Here there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
conclude defendant formed the intent to convert while still in
Story County. .

The State argues defendant waived the right to raise the
question of venue by failing to demur, pleading not guilty and
proceeding to trial. The State should examine the file more

a [| 1369

closely. The Story County district court clerk’s records con-
tain a document signed by defendant’s attorney which states:
“The Defendant demurs to the Information filed in the above
referred to cause on the grounds that the offense charged was
within the exclusive Jurisdiction of another County in this
State.”

The objection here was raised by demurrer, motion to
dismiss at close of the State’s evidence, and at the close of all
the evidence. Lamb v. Davis, 244 Iowa 231, 56 N.W.2d 481,
cited on this proposition is a habeas corpus action involving
the effect of a plea of guilty as a waiver of objection to- venue
where no demurrer has been filed. The case is not in point—
Affirmed. .

All Justices.coneur, -”

Stare or Iowa, appellee, v. Paut-Josepa Houston, appellant.

No.. 52656,
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d' 158)

OS

| i | | | || | Sy P al - | | &

A

_ Le 1871

Apri 9, 1968,

Paul Joseph Houston, of Fort Madison, pro se.

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, James C. Sell, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Edward N. Wehr, Scott County
Attorney, for appellee.

Sruart, J—Defendant was convicted of receiving and con-
cealing stolen property, Iowa Code, section 712.1, in Scott
County District Court on March 8, 1967. In a separate hearing
on March 20, 1967, the jury found defendant was a habitual
eriminal. -He has appealed pro se.
= HB I. Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to
sustain his motion for directed verdict. “In considering a
motion for a directed verdict the evidence, of course, is to be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion is directed.” State v. Estrella, 257 Iowa 462, 465,
133 N.W.2d 97, 99; State v. Frink, 255 Iowa 59, 64, 120 N.W.2d
432, 435.

Gordon Martz noticed six cattle were missing from his
south farm in Seott County on the morning of January 7, 1966,
Four of the missing cattle were black and black white-faced
steers and the other two were Herefords. One of the missing
black white-faced steers was a pet. Mr. Martz called the

1372 PC 7

sheriff. That afternoon, Martz, while looking through the
back pens at the New Liberty Sale Barn found four of his six
missing cattle in one pen including his pet steer and again
notified the sheriff.

Two men from the Scott County sherifi’s office went to the
sale barn. It was determined from the records there that Jon
Kennedy, Route 2, Davenport (Ricker Hill) had consigned the
four cattle identified by Mr. Martz, They proceeded to the
Ricker Hill farm and found the two missing Herefords in a
small enclosure rented by defendant. They were identified by
Martz by his brand. About 5:30 p.m. the officers arrested de-
fendant at his residence, advised him of his constitutional
rights and took him to the Scott County jail.

"| Clara Karns, owner of the Ricker Hill farm, testified she
rented defendant the two acres on which the two Herefords
were found. Jon Kennedy was often seen on the land rented
to defendant. Defendant testified he knew nothing of Ken-
nedy’s business and had let Kennedy use the property for $6.00
per month: Mr: Crees,’a hog buyer-for Oscar Mayer in’ Daven-
port,-‘testified Kennedy ‘and ‘deféndant delivered 3f hogs to
Oscar Mayer on December 7, 1965. Those hogs.-were 31 of 34
which had been stolen from a Seott County farmer December
8; 1965.’ .The three remaining -hogs were found on the same
Ricker Hill acreage rented to defendant. At the time of trial,
the Scott County sheriff's office was still looking for Jon Ken-
nedy concerning larceny of domestic ‘animals. Viewing’ the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State it appears to
be ‘sufficient. The trial court correctly submitted the case to
the jury.

tT. Defendant contends error-and prejudice in that
the defendint was questioned by State’s attorney in ‘the pres-
ence of the-jury with regard to the type arid number of prior
felony convictions after defense attorney during his direct ex-
amination stated: “For the purposes of the record, the defense
will stipulate that if Mr. Houston were asked the question by
the county attorney if hetdie ever committed a felony, his answer
would be yes.” ‘
"1 Emmediately thereater on crogs-examination, the following
tddk place: . :

a es 1878

“Q. More than one? Mr. McGrath: I’ll object to that as
beyond the scope of cross-examination. The Court: Sustained.

“Q. (By Mr. Berger)—Have you ever been convicted of
the crime of larceny? Mr. McGrath: I’m going to object to
that, and the county attorney knows—The Court: Sustained,
Mr. McGrath :—that he’s doing this only to prejudice the jury.
The Court: I might have to call a mistrial if you persist in that.
Let’s not go into that. Go ahead and cross-examine. Mr.
Berger: All right.”

The trial court did not permit cross-examination of de-
fendant on prior convictions of felonies as shown in the portion
of the transcript set forth above. Defense counsel did not re-
quest a mistrial or the admonishment of the jury. Neither de-
fendant nor trial court perceived material prejudice. We find
no abuse of diseretion by the trial court, or such misconduct on
the part of the county attorney to deprive defendant of a fair
trial. :
| | We might observe the question “More than one?” was
entirely proper and it was error to sustain the objection. State
v. Williams, 197 Iowa 813, 819, 197 N.W. 991, 994; State v.
Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1367, 66 N.W.2d 480, 482.

Tl. The State did not call Richard Lee Paulsen, a
witness listed in the iriformation. Defendant claims this to be
reversible error. We do not agree. The law does not require
the State of Iowa to call every witness listed in the minutes
of testimony which is part of the county attorney’s true infor-
mation. We need not determine whether defendant would,
under this record, have been entitled to an instruction on the
inference to be drawn from such failure, see State v. Parker,
261 Iowa 88, 100, 151 N.W.2d 505, 512, as no such instruction
was requested. State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, '66 N.W.2d 480,
484, and citations.

HI IV. Appellant claims he was entitled to dismissal of
his case under Iowa Code sections 795.2 and 795.3 because
three terms of the Scott County District Court expired before
he was brought to trial, without a showing of good cause for
continuance by the State.

HI There is no merit in this contention. Defendant was
represented. by counsel of his own choosing at all times. No

1374 es —

demand for speedy trial was made. We have consistently held
defendant shall be deemed to have waived this right if a speedy
trial is not demanded when counsel has been employed. State v.
Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 847, 184 N.W.2d 906, 908; State v. Long,
256 Iowa 1304, 1308, 130 N.W.2d 663, 665; State v. Jackson, 252
Towa 671, 674, 108 N.W.2d 62, 64; McCandless v. District Court,
245 Towa 599, 604-605, 61 N.W.2d 674, 677; Pines v. District
Court, 233 Towa 1284, 1298, 10 N.W.2d 574, 579.

HV. Defendant claims one juror was not sworn as re-
quired by section 779.17, Iowa Code. The only support for
this contention is found in the affidavit of defendant’s brother
attached to his brief and argument. It is not part of the
record. “Affidavits are insufficient to make such objectionable
matter available on appeal.” State v. LaMar, 260 Iowa 957,
966, 151 N.W.2d 496, 501.

The question was not raised by counsel below and the
record is to the contrary. The following entry appears in the
clerk’s transcript:

“Now on this 6th day of March, A.D., 1967, this cause
comes on for trial by jury. State of Iowa appears by Edward
N. Wehr, County Attorney, and the defendant appears by
James B. McGrath, his attorney.

“And now, the issues being duly joined, there comes a
jury of twelve good and lawful men and women, as follows
(naming them including the one claimed not to have been
sworn in the affidavit) * * * all of whom being elected, tried
and accepted, are thereupon sworn to well and truly try the
issues joined and a true verdict render, according to the
evidence and instructions of the court.”

«* * * we presume the regularity of actions of officials
and courts unless the contrary is made to appear.” Sewell v.
Lainson, 244 Iowa 555, 560, 57 N.W.2d 556, 559; State v. Sef-
check, 261 Iowa 1159, 157 N.W.2d 128; State v. Bastedo, 253
Lowa 108, 110, 111 N.W.2d 255, 259.

VI. There is no merit in defendant’s argument his
right to fair trial was prejudiced because State’s witness Karns
was seen talking with a Scott County deputy sheriff in the
hallway outside the courtroom just prior. to her testimony.
Witness Karns stated on eross-examination she was not talk-

— es 1875

ing about her testimony. In any event, it would not be im-
proper for the witness to discuss her testimony with the deputy
sheriff.

|| VO. Defendant contends “the record does not re-
veal that warrants for arrest and search and seizure issued
according to law.”

We approve of the language in People v. Gologonoff, 6
Mich. App. 332, 149 N.W.2d 201, in which the Michigan
Supreme Court says: “With respect to defendant’s claim that
his arrest was illegal, he pleaded not guilty, stood trial, and was
convicted by a jury. He cannot now be heard to complain of
the alleged illegality of his arrest.”

In any event, a warrant for defendant's arrest was
not necessary under this record. “It is well settled in this state
that a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when he has
reasonable grounds for belief that a felony has been committed
and that the person before him committed it.” State v. Post,
255 Iowa 578, 582, 123 N.W.2d 11, 17; State v. Raymond, 258
Towa 1839, 1845, 142 N.W.2d 444, 448; section 755.4, Code of
Iowa. There were reasonable grounds for such beliefs here.

HE The record does not show whether search war-
rants were obtained. Defendant’s counsel at no time questioned
the legality or constitutionality of any search or seizure that
may have taken place. The State is under no obligation to
anticipate a possible constitutional challenge of its procedures.
It is defendant’s duty to raise the question in some appropriate
manner. Mere reference to the silence of the record on appeal
is not enough. See the general discussion in State v. LaMar,
260 Iowa 957, 151 N.W.2d 496, 502-504.

We again refer to the rule that we will presume the
regularity of actions of officials unless the contrary is made to
appear.

HN sVIUI. Defendant claims the trial court erred in al-
lowing the late filing of an amendment to the information. We
are not certain to which amendment he had reference. On
January 24, 1967, the State filed an amended information
charging defendant as a habitual criminal. The trial was not
commenced until March 6, 1967. This was not improper.

“Defendant complains it was error to allow the county at-

1876 es —

torney’s information to be amended to charge defendant as a
habitual criminal, The county attorney being authorized by
statute to file information in the first instance is, with permis-
sion of court, authorized to amend it either as to matters of
substance or form.” State v. Clark, 258 Iowa 254, 258, 188
N.W.2d 120, 128; State v. Girdler, 251 Iowa 1214, 1217, 102
N.W.2d 872, 874-875; Nelson v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 773, 779,
123 N.W.2d 864, 867. The court’s permission was obtained.

Following defendant’s conviction of receiving or aiding
in concealing stolen property and prior to the commencement
of the habitual criminal proceeding, the information was
amended adding the words “and committed”. This amendment
was served on defendant three days before trial, Iowa Code,
section 773.3. Trial court overruled defendant’s objection to
the amendment, Iowa Code, section 773.44, and the amendment
was filed on March 20, 1967, just before the habitual criminal
proceeding was commenced. This was corrective only and was
permissible. State v. Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 559, 117 N.W.2d
447, 456.

IX. Defendant did not argue but asserted the trial court
failed to rule on defendant's March 14, 1967, motion for a new
trial grounded on (1) insufficient evidence to support the
verdict (2) the jury was prejudiced by county attorney’s
methods and questions, and (3) county attorney failed to call
State’s witness Richard Lee Paulsen. All of these contentions
have been shown to be without merit in prior divisions of this
opinion. As the motion was not good, there was no prejudice
in failing to rule on it.

HEX. Defendant asserts many reasons why his counsel
was inadequate, ineffective and incompetent. The transcript
shows counsel was conscientious and represented defendant
capably. In any event, we know of no rule of law which makes
it possible for defendant to select his own counsel and then
charge reversible error because of the incompetence of his
chosen representative.

XI. The trial court, it is claimed, failed to ascertain
whether defendant had been advised of his right to counsel in
the prior convictions before approving the amended informa.
tion charging appellant as a habitual criminal. He cites

a a 1377

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114, 88 9. Ct. 258, 19 L.Hd.2d
319, 324, in which the U.S. Supreme Court says: “Presuming
waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible.”
(Citations) We need not consider the Burgett case as our
record is not silent. The calendar entries were admitted into
evidence over objection during the trial. They are set out in
defendant’s brief and show he had counsel appointed for him
at the time of his 1953 conviction and he affirmatively waived
counsel at the 1957 conviction.

Defendant’s contentions being without merit, the case is
affirmed.—Affirmed.

All Justices coneur except Brcxrr, J., who concurs in the
result, and Raw1ines, J., who dissents.

Rawuines, J.—Being unable to agree with reasoning and
conclusions set forth in Divisions II and III of the majority
opinion, and-result reached, I respectfully dissent. With regard
hereto see special concurrence in State v. Hardesty, 261 Iowa
382, 895, 153 N.W.2d 464, 472-473, and dissent in State v.
Parker, 261 Iowa 88, 102-104, 151 N.W.2d 505, 5138-514.

I would reverse and remand for new trial.

Srare or Towa, appellee, v. Gzoras (N.) Hypz, appellant.

"No, 52589.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 134y

1378 [|

ApriL 9, 1968.
Pe
ee

Gene L. Needles, of Des Moines, for appellant,

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond A. Fenton, of Des
Moines, County Attorney,’ for appellee.

Brcxer, J.—Deféendant was indicted for. assault with intent
+o commit rape, tried before a jury and convicted. Upon appeal
he assigns five errors. We affirm.

The Stadte’s principal witness was Marilyn Lindholm, a
public health nurse, who had been helping'a Mrs, Harris. De-
fendant had been living at Mrs. Harris’ home. On December 2,

P| Pe 1879

1966, he called Miss Lindholm, and told her that Mrs, Harris
had returned to the hospital leaving a gift of $10 for her. The
nurse said she could not accept the money but would call him
back,

Later in the day when the nurse was in the vicinity of the
Harris residence, she stopped and knocked for some time before
defendant answered the door. While she was explaining that
she could not accept the gift defendant pulled her into the house.
Defendant had a knife which Miss Lindholm grabbed. She was
wearing gloves and was not cut by the knife.

Miss Lindholm described her struggles with defendant which
included defendant trying to force her down on the bed, striking
her on the face, stroking her on the face, touching her legs and
saying “I just want—something.” During this melee Miss Lind-
holm tried to talk to defendant. When she said her face hurt
and she wanted ice, defendant got up and went to the kitchen,
She kept talking. The phone rang and defendant answered it.
Miss Lindholm tried to get out the door but defendant stopped
her. She still kept talking and the phone rang again. This time
she picked it up and said: “Hello, Get the police.” When de-
fendant took the phone Miss Lindholm ran out of the house. A
motorist nearby took her to the police station. She reported the
incident to the police and was taken to the hospital. Examina-
‘tion revealed a dislocated shoulder, facial cuts and bruises.and a
-eut on the left corner of her mouth that required three stitches.
During:the time they were on the floor and on the bed defendant
was on top of her, but, as she said, “He never got me com-
pletely down.” .

Miss Lindholm was corroborated by the doctor and by .Mr.
Zeller, the person who made the two phone calls. He had called
back because defendant was so abrupt. The second time he
heard screaming and seuffling in the background and the
woman’s plea that. he call the police. He did so.

The police responded to the call and found defendant
alone. Defendant told them there was no trouble and allowed
them to look around. They returned a short time later and
arrested him. .

Defendant took the stand. He agreed that he called Mrs.
Harris’ nurse to give her something because she had been good

1880 a —

to Mrs. Harris. He was down in the basement scraping paint
with a putty knife when she came to the door. He still had the
putty knife in his hand when he answered the door. Defend-
ant stated the nurse came into the house of her own accord.
They got into an argument about whether Mrs. Harris should
be in a nursing home. Miss Lindholm raised her purse and he
did not know if she was going to hit him. He raised his arm
and accidently struck her and she started to scream. He took
her arm and told her he was not going to hurt her. She backed
over to the bed and sat down. She saw the putty knife and
reached for it. He took it out of her hand and laid it on the
table. She asked for ice and they went into the kitchen. The
phone rang, he answered it and told the insurance man to come
back tomorrow. It rang again and she asked. who it was. He
told her it was the insurance man. She asked to talk to him
and then asked for the police. He denied intent to hit the
woman, said he-hit her only once and that time accidently, He
denied intending to hurt her or rape her.

Defendant was taken to the police station and questioned
by officers James Thompson and Forrest Speck. He filed a
motion to suppress evidence’ of statements made to the officers
alleging that although the officers state defendant was in-
formed of his constitutional rights he was unable to make an
intelligent and effectual waiver of his rights because he had
only a fourth-grade education, could not read well enough to
understand a newspaper or the minutes of the indictment, and
he was not advised of his constitutional rights until his ap-
pearance before the court after the elicitation of ‘the admis-
sions referred to in the minutes of evidence.

At the hearing on the motion defendant testified first. He
said Officer Thompson got him out of jail and asked him why
he hit the nurse. -Another officer was present. Neither told
him of his right to an attorney or that what-he said would be
held against him. He did not imderstand about self-incrimina-
tion and a8 to an attorney the judge appoints one for you if
you do-not have the moriey to hire one. The. judge first told
him of his right to an attorney. He denied telling the detectives
he aia nét want a 8 lawyer:

a | | 1381

Detective Thompson testified to taking Mr. Hyde from his
cell to an anteroom. He told Mr. Hyde he had a right to an
attorney, he did not have to tell them anything about the in-
cident if he did not want to, he was told if he did not have the
money for an attorney the court would get him one. The
officer said defendant was given these warnings several times
as he told different stories. Each time defendant said he
would just as well tell them about it.

Detective Speck testified to substantially similar facts at
the hearing on motion to suppress. He said the entire question-
ing of Mr. Hyde took about 45 minutes.

The ruling on the motion to dismiss was oral. It con-
eluded:

“While the accused has indicated his educational back-
ground is limited, at the same time he does indicate an under-
standing of his right to counsel.

“Now, the Court is aware of the fact that the burden is
upon the State to furnish the basis for the waiver of any con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination, but the Court feels
in considering all the facts as disclosed here by testimony that
the State has met the burden in this instance and that there is
sufficient evidence of the giving of the warnings and explanation
of the rights and waiver of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion so that the evidence as to statements made by the accused.
at the time referred to by the officers, would be admissible insofar
as the grounds thus far urged to suppress the same are con-
cerned.” (Emphasis supplied.)

At trial before a different judge the officers testified (over
objection) to information elicited from defendant. The ob-
jections went to the same points and were overruled with similar
comments by the trial judge.

The officers said defendant told several stories. They told
him they did not believe his stories because they had other
facts from their investigation. He then told substantially the
same facts related by Miss Lindholm and said he intended to
rape her. At the time of interrogation the officers had not
talked to Miss Lindholm.

" HJ I. Defendant contends the confession was not shown.
to be voluntary. The sole circumstance put forward to support

1382 Pe a7

the argument is the officers’ rejection of defendant’s first story
and their statement to him that it did not square with their
knowledge from independent investigation. Defendant reasons
that since the officers had not talked personally to the com-
plaining witness they misled defendant by such a statement.
The officers did not say what their investigation showed, Nor
did they indicate the source of any other information they
might have had. Such information could, of course, have come
from other members of the police force. There is no showing
the officers made false statements and defendant does not claim
they did. Nor does he claim coercion by physical abuse, long-
continued interrogation or trickery. This case does not fairly
fall within any of the procedures adversely noted in Miranda
y. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10
A.L.R.3d 974.

State v. Clough, 259 Iowa 1351, 1855, 147 N.W.2d 847, 850,
“Before admissions or confessions may be admitted in evidence
as voluntary, pursuant to custodial interrogation, we have said
it must appear the interrogation was free from coercion or
mistreatment of the defendant, that the statements were given
without threats or promises. State v. Mullin, 249 Iowa 10, 14,
85 N.W.2d 598, and citations.” The record fairly complies with
that standard.

The evidence of defendant as well as that of the State in-
dicates an acceptable interrogation after defendant was warned
of his rights. There is little or no evidence to support the
charge that the statements were in fact involuntary. |

Il. Defendant’s next point is that. while the court
ruled that the Miranda warnings had been given, it did not
rule on the voluntariness of the statements. He urges this
failure as reversible error on the grounds that a finding of
voluntariness is essential under Jackson vy. Denno, 378 U.S.
368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L. Hd.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.38d 1205, and State
v. Leiss, 258 Iowa 787, 140 N.W.2d 172.

The State asserts a finding of voluntariness is not re-
quired where the question is not raised. Voluntariness was the
only issue generally recognized at the time Jackson v. Denno
was decided. (Escobedo v. Hlinois, 378 U.S. 478, was decided
the same day. as Jackson v. Denno, and Miranda came much

P| Pe 1883

later.) It argues a defendant may now challenge a confession
either on the grounds of voluntariness, or because of violation
of the right to counsel (Escobedo) or for failure to give the
now famous forewarnings (Miranda). But a defendant is not
entitled to rulings on these matters unless he raises them. De-
fendant did not raise the question of voluntariness and or-
dinarily cannot complain at this stage of the case. State v.
Slater, 261 Iowa 554, 153 N.W.2d 702.

Neither the motion to suppress evidence nor the objections
at trial raised the question of voluntariness of the confession.

In Jackson. v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 at page 374, the United
States Supreme Court noted the trial court’s awareness that
defense counsel was questioning the circumstances under which
Jackson was interrogated. The same cannot be said here. The
question of whether the Miranda warnings were given was
raised and defendant’s capacity to understandably waive his
rights after having received the warning was also brought to
the attention of the court. Coercion, trickery, physical abuse
or long-continued questioning was not claimed.

Numerous cases have recently been before this court in-
volving motions to suppress evidence. In each case we have
noted the trial court’s commendable action in making clear and
detailed findings on the issues raised by the motion. State v.
Holland, 258 Iowa 206, 214, 188 N.W.2d 86, 90; State v. Leiss,
258 Iowa 787, 140 N.W.2d 172, 174, 175; State v. Klinger, 259
Towa 881, 382, 144 N.W.2d 150, 151. Here the court carefully
ruled on every issue raised and specifically noted the ruling was
“on the grounds thus far urged.”

Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 648, states:
“Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or
write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is voluntary
must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity. * * *
Such rule is, as we have said, a constitutional rule binding
upon the States and, under the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI of the Constitution, it must be obeyed.”

HE We do not find reversible error in the court’s failure
to rule on voluntariness. We have examined the record care-
fully as to procedures used by the police and find the question
of voluntariness (as distinguished from compliance with ad-

1384 | 7

monitions contained in Miranda v. Arizona and Escobedo v.
Illinois, both supra) was not raised at trial, Further, from
our own review of the record we have concluded the issue of
voluntariness was met.

HI 10. Defendant’s third and fourth assignments are
treated together. He claims the evidence fails to show he was
properly advised of his constitutional rights and he did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his privilege against self.
incrimination.

The judge at trial made the following ruling:

“This has been ruled on by another. judge in this court,
who overruled a motion to suppress and held by that ruling
that these officers could testify as to any statements which Mr.
Hyde may have given, but even if that is the case, if I felt at
this time he hadn’t been sufficiently warned, I wouldn’t hesitate
to rule otherwise, but this man was told he had a right to re-
main silent, anything he said could be used against him, he was
entitled to a lawyer, and if he couldn’t afford one; one would
be obtained for him anyway, and that that applied to the time
he was then and there under questioning.

“This man, as you say, has a fourth-grade: education and
éan’t read and write, but he is a mature adult; he has been able
to get along in society here, has been before the courts before,
and I don’t believe Miranda goes so far as to say that after a
proper warning such a man still cannot be questioned except
with a ‘lawyer provided.”

Defendant feels the warnings given should have been more
formal and the proof should have been ‘stronger. The record
shows defendant was fully warned and then said he did not
want-an attorney. The trial court twice found such to be the
fact and overruled defendant's objections. We agree. .

HEME lV. Defendant’s final assertion of error is premised
on the claim that a not guilty verdict should have been directed
for failure to prove intent. The factual recitation at the com-
mencement of this opinion would. seem to make detailed con-
sideration of the assignment unnecessary. Intent is seldom
susceptible to direct proof. It may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances. The circumstances shown here are sufficient for
jury submission. State v. Ramsdell, 242 Iowa 62, 45 N.W.2d

P| Pe 1385

503; State v. Williams, 66 Iowa 573, 24 N.W. 52; State v.
Shelledy, 8 (Clarke) Iowa 477, 506.—Affirmed. ~

_ All Justices concur except Rawines and Mason, JJ., who
dissent.

Rawtines, J.—Being unable to agree with the reasoning set
forth in Division II of the majority opinion and ultimate con-
elusion reached, I respectfully dissent.

I. It is to me apparent the issue of voluntariness of ad-
missions was raised in this case but not resolved as required by
Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 588, 87 S.Ct. 639.

It is my understanding trial of defendant commenced Jan-
uary 80, 1967, therefore governed by the principles set forth in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772; and perforce Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774,

However, the majority apparently fails to accord defendant
recognition of this self-evident fact.

In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-517, 83 S.Ct,
1836, 1345, a case decided prior to Miranda or Jackson, both
supra, and even before Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct,
1758, the United States Supreme Court, in a reversing opinion
said: “The jury was instructed, in effect, not to consider as
relevant on the issue of voluntariness of the confession the fact
that a defendant is not reminded that he is under arrest, that
he is not cautioned that he may remain silent, that he is not
warned that his answers may be used against him, or that he is
not advised that he is entitled to counsel. Whatever independent
consequence these factors may otherwise have, they are um-
questionably attendant circumstances which the accused is en-
titled to have appropriately considered in determining volun-
tariness and admissibility of his confession.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

And in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-741, 86
S.Ct. 1761, 1764, opinion issued one week after Miranda, supra;
is this pertinent statement: “The review of voluntariness in
eases in which the trial was held prior to our decisions in
Escobedo and Miranda is not limited in any manner by these
decisions, On the contrary, that a defendant was not advised of

1386 |

his right to remain silerit or of his right respecting counsel at
the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a
significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements
later made. This factor has been’ recognized’ in several of our
prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness, Haynes
v. State of Washington; 373 U.S,.503, 510-511, 83 S.Ct. 1336,
1341-1342, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) ; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
US. 568, 610, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1883, 6 L.Ed.2d 1087 (1961) ;
Turner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64, 69
S.Ct. 1352, 93 L.Ed. 1810 (1949). See also Gallegos v. State of
Colorado, 370 U.S, 49, 54, 55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1212, 1218, 8 L.6d.2d
825 (1962). Thus, the fact that Davis (defendant) was never
effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to the other
circumstances described below which made his confessions in-
voluntary.”

Dealing with the subject at hand one State appellate court,
in a decision issued prior to Miranda, recognized absence of in-
custody pre-interrogation warnings was a significant factor in
testing whether a confession attributed to. an accused was freely
and voluntarily given. ‘State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272
Minn, 539, 141 N.W.2d 3, 10.

By virtue of the’ authorities cited and quoted, supra, I am
unable to agree with majority’s holding to the effect that when,
in a criminal proceeding, absence of Miranda warnings is as-
serted, the issue of voluntariness is not raised. In fact, when-
ever a confession or admission is challenged by reason-of absence
of the warnings required by Miranda, voluntariness is the ulti-
mate issue presented. Stated otherwise, absence of Miranda
warnings, deprivation of right to. counsel, coercive tactics, and
voluntariness cannot be neatly segregated. These elements are
so inextricably interwoven as to-preclude any severance one from
the other.

For further discussion of the subject matter involved see
dissent in Johnson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 390 U.S.
511, 512, 88 $,Ct. 1155, opinion filed April 1, 1968,

On the basis of the foregoing I would reverse and remand
with directions that specific findings be made on the. issue of

| 1887

voluntariness of any confessions or admissions allegedly given or
made by defendant.

Mason, J., joins in this dissent.

Srate or Iowa, appellee, v. Jamzs Evcenz McNzat, appellant.

No. 52782.
(Reported in 158 N.W.2d 129)

ApriL 9, 1968.

John P. Rochrick, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,

1388 De | |

Assistant Attorney General, and Ray A. Fenton, County At-
torney, for appellee.

Snuxt, J—Defendant, James Eugene McNeal, was charged,
pleaded not guilty, tried before a judge and jury and convicted
of Robbery with Aggravation as defined in sections 711.1 and
711.2, Code of Iowa. From judgment of imprisonment based
thereon he has appealed.

Defendant, testifying in his own behalf, denied participa-
tion in the robbery and said he was in Kansas City at the time
thereof. Otherwise there was no conflict in the testimony.

A brief summary of the State’s evidence will suffice.

In the late afternoon of September 27, 1966, Salstrom’s
Jewelry Store in Des Moines was robbed by three men, one
of whom was armed. Money was taken from the safe and
jewelry taken from the display counter. Four people, other
than the robbers, were in the store at the time, Mr. Salstrom,
the owner, two employees and a customer. All four testified at
defendant’s trial and three positively identified defendant.
Mr. Salstrom, the owner, was in the back of the store, held at
gunpoint by one of the other robbers and did not see defendant.

Defendant first entered the store, Patty Nielson, an‘ em-
ployee, went to the front of the store to wait on him. De-
fendant said he wanted to look at a diamond ring for his wife.
At about the same time two more men entered the store. One
forced Mr. Salstrom at gunpoint to open the.safe and give all
the money to the third partner in the robbery.. Defendant told
Patty Nielson to fill two sacks with watches and rings. The
other employee, the watchmaker, was forced to go to the front
of the store with the customer and pretend to be showing gifts.

After the loot was collected by the robbers the victims
were tied up in the back room and the robbers left. Patty
Nielson worked herself loose and untied the others.

Two or three days after the robbery Patty Nielson was
shown a photograph obtained from Kansas City and identified
defendant as one of the robbers. A warrant was issued but
defendant was not apprehended until January 4, 1967, when he
was found in Des Moines while returning (as he said) from a
visit in Minneapolis.

a es 1389

After preliminary proceedings in municipal court an in-
formation was filed in district court. Counsel was appointed
and defendant pleaded not guilty.

On March 17, 1967, the defendant filed a motion for a
continuance stating that on the day of the robbery he was not
in the State of Iowa, and that he intended to prove his absence
from the State by three alibi witnesses who live in Kansas City,
Missouri. In the original motion, the defendant identified his
wife as one of the witnesses and said that she was suffering
complications following a childbirth, but did not name the
other two. The motion was granted and trial was continued
until April 5, 1967.

Section 777.18, Code of Iowa, 1966, provides for notice if
a defendant intends to rely on an alibi at the trial. The notice
must set forth the names of the witnesses, their addresses, and
occupations and a statement of what the defendant intends to
prove. On March 31, 1967, the defendant filed such a notice
naming his wife, his mother and brother as alibi witnesses for
him.

On April 5, 1967, the defendant appeared with a request
that the motion for continuance be renewed “for all the
reasons contained in his original motion and additional reason
that there has been no material change in the physical con-
dition of his wife * * * who is his principal alibi witness * * *.”
The second continuance was granted.

On April 13 a third continuance was requested by the de-
fendant who stated that his wife, mother and brother, who were
his alibi witnesses, still would not be able to attend the trial.
The third request for continuance was denied and trial was
set for April 19, 1967.

‘We quote from the transeript of the evidence at the hear-
ing for the third continuance:

“The Court: In the case of the State of Iowa versus James
Eugene McNeal, Criminal Number 53647; this matter comes on
for continued hearing on the renewed motion of Motion for
Continuance from April 5th, 1967, at which time the hearing
was continued until this date.

“At the time of the continuance it was the understanding
of the Court that the defendant would produce some medical

1390 es —

testimony or affidavits or documents relating to the condition
of the witnesses whom he proposes to call in this case.

“Mr. Morris, are you prepared to go forward with that
evidence?

“Mr. Morris: Your Honor, it is my understanding that no
evidence as such has been produced. I would, however, like
to call the defendant to recite this under oath. I have received
none; let me put it that way.”

Defendant was sworn.

Direct Examination

“By Mr. Morris:

“Q. Will you state your name? A. James Eugene McNeal.

“Q. You are the defendant in an indictment returned by
the Polk County Grand Jury charging you with Robbery with
Aggravation? A. Yes.

“Q. And you are the James Eugene McNeal who was
before this court on the 5th day of April, 1967, on-a renewed
Motion for Continuance of trial? A. Yes.

“Q. Now, Mr. McNeal, at that time I believe you testified
that you had served alibi notice in which you claim that your
mother, wife and brother would appear as alibi witnesses in
your behalf, is this correct? A. That’s correct.

“Q. At that time you also produced some written evidence
and your testimony that your wife had recently been delivered
of a child, that she had, had complications following delivery
and was not able to travel and be here for trial, is that cor-
rect? A, That’s correct.

“Q. You further testified I believe that your mother suf-
fered from a cancerous condition which at this time made it
impossible for her to travel? A. That’s correct.

“Q. And that your brother had: suffered some type of in-
jury, a violent injury in the nature of shooting, I believe, is this
correct? A. April first.

“Q. Now, tell: the Court whether or not. since this last
hearing you have received from Kansas City any written
evidence pertaining to the physical condition of either of these
three persons? A. At the present’ I haven’t, for the simple
reason, mother, she’s been upset and ripping and running back
and forth to the hospital because my brother, they don’t know

— a 1801

if he’s going to live or not because he got shot April first and
he had a severe cut and it busted all his intestines, so she’s been
running back and forth to the hospital.

“Q. Have you been in contact with your wife? A. Mother
said she talked to her Monday; suppose to have the reports
this week. That’s the reason mother’s been upset and ripping
and running back and forth to the hospital.

“Mr. Morris: I have nothing further.

eRe

“The Court: At the hearing on the renewed Motion for
Continuance on April 5th the Court indicated to the defendant
that some medical evidence in the way of an affidavit or letter
or some other communication from medical personnel would
be required if the Motion for Continuance was to be granted.
The evidence has not been produced.

“Therefore the defendant’s renewal of Motion for a Con-
tinuance filed April 5th, 1967, is overruled.”

The trial was short. Five witnesses testified for the prose-
eution, four of whom were victims, and three of whom def-
initely identified James Eugene McNeal as one of the three men
who robbed the jewelry store. The fifth witness was a police
detective. The defense presented only James McNeal as a
witness to testify in his own behalf, saying that he was in
Kansas City all day on the day of the robbery and that three
people, his wife, his mother and his brother, could testify for
him, except that all three were in the hospital or under the
care of a doctor and not able to attend the trial.

Defendant’s present counsel on appeal did not try the
ease in district court.

HI 1. Defendant argues that the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in denying the third requested contin-
uance in that it denied appellant substantial justice and ef-
fectively eliminated his affirmative defense of alibi.

We do not agree.

In his first. motion for continuance defendant stated his
wife had recently delivered a child, but complications followed
and she was not able to travel to Des Moines. Continuance was
granted, At the second hearing the court asked for support-
ing medical testimony, affidavits or documents. On April 18

1892 | 7

when the defendant requested a third continuance it was
denied because nothing in support thereof had been produced.

Defendant claimed his mother was “suffering from’ a
cancerous condition” which made it impossible to travel. Dur-
ing the trial the defendant said that his mother, Dorothy, “is
in the hospital. That is definite.” In the notice of alibi defense
it is stated that the mother is a nurse’s aide. In his testimony
the defendant said his mother works at “Luke’s Hospital.”
Quaere: Is she in the hospital to work or is she there for a
“cancerous condition?” It should also be noted that at the
time of trial his mother was “ripping and running back and
forth” when defendant’s brother was supposedly hospitalized
because of wounds he suffered in some kind of violent affray,
that happened about the time defendant was seeking con:
tinuances. The mother’s cancerous condition did not hinder
her from “ripping and running: back and forth” but we are
asked to hold that it kept her from coming to Des Moines to
be an alibi witness.

The third person who was to serve as an alibi witness was
the brother of the defendant. But on April 1, 1967, the brother
was injured either in a shooting or a knifing in Kansas City.
In his first motion for a continuance defendant indicated there
were two other witnesses other than his wife who were to be
alibi witnesses. This was March 17. On March 31 the defend-
ant filed his notice of alibi defense and revealed that the motlier
and brother were the other two witnesses. But in the record
of the proceeding following the third motion for a continuance
it appears the brother did not suffer his violent shooting or
knifing injury until April 1, which was after the first motion
for continuance.

Sufficient medical documents as to the wife’s condition
were never presented ‘to the court. The mother could not
travel to Des Moines because of her cancerous condition, but
in Kansas City she was “ripping and running back and forth.”
The brother apparently suffered a knife or gun wound at the
time he is needed at trial.

HM The granting or refusing a motion for continuance
rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court. State
v. Myers, 248 Iowa 44, 79 N.W.2d 382; State v. Meeks, 245

a es 1898

Towa 1231, 65 N.W.2d 76; State v. Mauch, 236 Iowa 217, 17
N.W.2d 536. Such discretion as to continuance on the part of
the trial court is very broad. State v. Sieren, 253 Iowa 118,
111 N.W.2d 249.

Section 780.2 of the 1966 Code of Iowa provides:

“Continuances. The provisions of the Code of civil pro-
cedure relative to the continuances of the trial of civil causes
shall apply to the continuance of criminal actions, but no judg-
ment for costs shall be rendered against a defendant on ac-
count thereof, except as in this Code otherwise provided.”

Rule 183, Rules of Civil Procedure, permits a continuance
on motion and provides in pertinent part:

“Causes for continuance.

coos

“(b) All such motions based on absence of evidence must
be supported by affidavit of the party, his agent or attorney,
and must show: (1) The name and residence of the absent
witness, or, if unknown, that affiant has used diligence to ascer-
tain them; (2) what efforts, constituting due diligence, have
been made to obtain such witness or his testimony, and facts
showing reasonable grounds to believe the testimony will be
procured by the next term; (3) what particular facts, distinct,
from legal conclusions, affiant believes the witness will prove;
and that he believes them to be true and knows of no other
witness by whom they can be fully proved. If the court finds
such.motion sufficient, the adverse party may avoid the con-
tinuance by admitting that the witness if present, would testify
to the facts therein stated, as the evidence of such witness.”

The record in the case before us fails to show compliance
with the rules for a continuance. State v. Sieren, supra, after
quoting rule 183(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, states:

“Defendant’s unverified motion did not comply with the
statutory provisions. If there had been a compliance it is
possible the State might have admitted the testimony of the
witness. Not being in compliance the trial court had no other
recourse than to overrule the motion.

“The question is whether or not in making such ruling
the trial court abused its discretion. Such discretion as to

1894 ee)

continuance on the part of the trial court is very broad.”
(Citations) loc. cit. 121 of 253 Iowa.
We find no abusé of discretion.
| Il. Testifying in his own behalf defendant said he was
not in Des Moines at the time of the robbery. The record shows
that no serious attempt to support this claim was ever made.
‘The trial court instructed thereon as follows:

“The defendant’s defense to the charge against him is that
he was not at the scene of the alleged crime and was not in
fact in Des Moines, Iowa, on said day and date, and that the
State’s witnesses who purportedly identified him were, in fact,
mistaken in that identification. The testimony of the defend-
ant in this regard is to be considered by you together with all
the other evidence in the case, and given such weight as you
believe it reasonably entitled to receive.”

No burden of any kind was placed on defendant relative
to his alibi. The defense never rose to the dignity or responsi-
bility of an affirmative defense. The instruction was far more
favorable to defendant than an instruction that might have
been appropriate if alibi witnesses testified.

Defendant on appeal claims the alibi instruction should.have
been amplified but in oral argument counsel admitted that had
a full alibi instruction been given error would have been
claimed.

There was no error in the instruction: It was adequate
under the evidence. In the absence of a request for amplifica-
tion defendant may not now complain. State v. Hardesty,
261 Iowa 382, 392, 153 N.W.2d 464, 471, State v. Wessling, 260
Towa 1244, 1258, 150 N.W.2d 301, 309, State v. Russell, 245 Iowa
1190, 1205, 66 N.W.2d 35.

Ill. The record discloses no reversible error.

The case is—Affirmed.

All Justices concur except Rawuines, J., who concurs in
result,

a es 1395

SravE or Iowa, appellant, v. Roger Warpensure, appellee.

No. 52587. : |
(Reported in 158 N/W.2d 147)

a |) 1397
Aprit 9, 1968,

Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, David A. Elderkin,
Assistant Attorney General, William G. Faches, County At-
torney, and Eugene J. Kopecky; Assistant County Attorney,
both of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Keith E. Stapleton, of Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Mason, J—A Linn County grand jury indicted defendant
Roger Wardenburg for the crime of forgery, contrary to
section 718.1, 1962 Code of Iowa. At arraignment defendant
pleaded not guilty. Some weeks later trial to a jury was com-
menced and, after the State had presented its evidence and
rested, defendant moved to dismiss the charge. He asserted in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of his motion the State had failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) any public offense
had been committed in Linn County and (2) the Linn District
Court had jurisdiction of any public offense alleged to have
been committed by defendant which jurisdiction is contem-
plated by Code section 753.2. The trial court sustained the
motion as to the grounds asserted in these paragraphs.

The State appeals, assigning as the sole error relied upon
the trial court’s sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss at
the close of the State’s evidence for the reason there was in-
sufficient evidence to establish the venue of the offense.

HI I. Section 793.1, Codes, 1962, 1966, gives the State the
right to appeal in a criminal case. It is settled in Iowa that
an appeal by the State will be permitted only if it “involves
questions of law, either substantive or procedural, whose deter-
mination will be beneficial generally, or guide the trial courts
in the future ***.” State v. Kriens, 255 Iowa 1180, 1131, 125
N.W.2d 2638, 264, and citations. But there are statutory limita-
tions upon the effect or results of that appeal. Code section
793,20 provides that if the State appeals, this court cannot

1398 ee a

reverse or modify the judgment in favor of defendant so as to
inerease the punishment, “but may affirm it, and shall point out
any errors in the proceedings or in the measure of punishment,
and its decision shall be obligatory as law.”

In support of its assigned error the State initially argues
that sufficient evidence consisting of a considerable number of
enumerated facts was produced from which “a jury could
decide the issue of venue.”

HI Ordinarily on appeals by the State from a judgment
on directed verdict for defendant, involving sufficiency of the
evidence to establish the charge, we will not review the record
to determine the correctness of the decision. A pronouncement
from us on the fact situation in one case rarely serves any
good purpose in determination of, future cases.. Such appeals
by the State are useless. While the matter of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, this court will
refuse to review the record where it will benefit no one. State
vy. Wickett, 230 Iowa 1182, 1185, 300 N.W. 268, 269-270. In
other words, to review an appeal by the State some general
benefit or guide to the trial courts or profession must be shown.

7 If this contention were the only one raised, we would
be inclined to dismiss the appeal as presenting no question of
law we are required to review. However, the attorney general
requested and was granted permission from us to file supple-
mental brief and argument on appellant’s side. He contends
there is a presumption or inference that an instrument was
forged in the county where its existence was first known or it
was offered in a forged condition which will suffice to sustain
the venue of a forgery prosecution in that county unless there
is other evidence to overcome that conclusion. We believe a
determination of this query is desirable.

Il. Before discussing this contention further, we briefly
narrate the facts. Jack’s Store, a discount department store in
Cedar Rapids, is owned by Walter Fineberg of Minneapolis.
In February 1966 he employed defendant, who resided with his
wife in Cedar Rapids, as manager of this store. Defendant’s
duties included supervision of the help, sales and marketing of
merchandise, making bank deposits and reporting employees’
time.

ee 1399

Store employees were paid weekly through Saturdays.
Each Monday defendant would telephone Mr. Fineberg in Min-
neapolis to advise him how many hours each employee had
worked through the previous Saturday. Fineberg would then
issue and mail individual checks to defendant in Cedar Rapids
to be distributed.

Monday, August 15, defendant reported the times of
various employees including Kathie Welsh, a clerk who had
been employed in the Cedar Rapids store approximately six
months. When defendant reported Mrs. Welsh had 32 hours
coming and that he had discharged her Friday, August 12, Mr.
Fineberg called her to inquire whether she wanted her check
mailed to the store or to her home. He then learned she had
been discharged August 5 and paid August 9; that she did not
have any money coming for the week ending August 13. How-
ever, August 16 Fineberg issued a check in the amount of
$41.05, payable to Kathie Welsh, and mailed it to defendant
along with other checks, including one payable to him, to meet
the Cedar Rapids payroll. All paychecks were signed by Mr.
Fineberg.

Later Fineberg picked up this check at the First Hennepin
State Bank of Minneapolis where his account had been debited
with the amount thereof. At the trial he identified the State’s
exhibit 1 as the check mailed at defendant’s request as Mrs.
Welsh’s final payment. This is the check upon which the in-
dictment is based.

Mrs, Welsh testified her employment at Jack’s Store ter-
minated August 5; she had never received the check identified
as State’s exhibit 1 or any payment therefrom; the endorsement
on the check, “Kathie Welsh,” was not her signature, and she
had not given defendant or anyone else permission to sign her
name.

While employed at Jack’s Store Mrs. Welsh borrowed
$400 from Merchants National Bank in Cedar Rapids plus $200
from defendant to purchase a car. Defendant secured the
money he loaned Mrs. Welsh from the same bank. At the time
of her discharge she had repaid defendant all but $40.

The State introduced a known exemplar of defendant's
handwriting identified as exhibit 2 which was used by the

1400 PC Ys

State’s handwriting expert in forming his opinion that the
same person who had written exhibit 2 wrote the endorsement
on the State’s exhibit 1 and this endorsement was not written
by the same person who had written the State’s exhibit 3, an
exemplar of Mrs. Welsh’s handwriting.

On the back of exhibit 1 was a rubber stamp. Although
all words were not legible, “Pay any Bank, P.E.G., The
Merchants National Bank of Cedar Rapids, Iowa” appeared.
In ruling on defendant’s motion, the trial court emphasized
the fact the State had offered no evidence tending to show the
meaning of the quoted words; no bank officer or employee was
called to testify this was the stamp of the Merchants National
Bank or that it meant in the normal course of business the
check was originally negotiated at this bank in Linn County.
He then determined the rubber stamp alone did not have this
probative value and testimony as to the meaning of the stamp
was essential to support the State’s contention the check had
been uttered in Linn County.

II. Courts have. long recognized the difficulty of proving
by direct evidence the location where a forgery actually oc-
curred, due to-the very nature of the act itself. See annotation
164 A.L.R. 621, 649-660.

Acts of this sort are not usually done i in the presence of
witnesses but in places of concealment, with a view to prevent
detection; and it is rarely that the prosecution can offer any
evidence of the place of forgery, except that which arises from
the utterance of the forged instrument. Because of this ob-
vious difficulty, courts have relied on various presumptions or
inferences to permit a finding of proper jurisdiction and venue,
in order to make prosecution possible. Usually these presump-
tions or inferences result from defendant’s possession or utter-
ing of the forged instrument.

Hl Ordinarily, “jurisdiction, as contrasted with venue,
refers to the power of a court to decide an issue on its merits,
whereas venue refers to the place where the cause sued upon
should be tried.” O’Kelley v. Lochner, 259 Iowa 710, 712, 145
N.W.2d 626, 627; and Hulburd v. Eblen, 289 Iowa 1060, 1064,
33 N.W.2d 825, 827. ..

Ue 1401

HI ‘It is the well-settled law in this State that the juris-
diction of the district court is limited to offenses committed
within the county in which the court is held. Section 13449,
Code, 1935 [now section 753.2, Code, 1966]. This statute pro-
vides that: ‘The local jurisdiction of the district court is of
offenses committed within the county in which it is held.’

HB “Under this statute a conviction cannot be sustained
unless the State proves that the crime was committed within
the county in which the indictment was returned. * * *.” State
v. Brooks, 222 Towa 651, 652, 269 N.W. 875.

State v. Ladd, 252 Iowa 487, 489, 106 N.W.2d 100, 101,
relying on the Brooks case, interprets: this statute as making
venue a jurisdictional fact the State must prove as a vital in-
gredient of any prosecution and, unless the court takes judicial
notice thereof or the accused admits it, the same must be shown
by competent evidence either direct or circumstantial. See also
State v. Stumbo, 253 Iowa 276, 278, 111 N.W.2d 664, 665; and
23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, section 914a.

Venue is put in issue by a plea of not guilty. Sharp v.
Waddill, Ky., 371 S.W.2d 14, and citations.

IV. We believe it would be beneficial as a guide to the
trial courts and the profession for us to determine the degree of
certainty required by law for the State to establish venue in a
criminal prosecution.

In announcing his ruling, the court stated:

“One of the things the State must prove in every criminal
prosecution is that the offense charged took place within the
county of prosecution. In this case they have to prove not only
there was forgery committed and defendant . committed: the
forgery, but must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt this
forgery was committed in Linn County.”

There is a split of authority on whether venue must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
evidence. In State v. Wiedenfeld, 229 Wis. 563, 568, 282 N.W.
621, 623, it is said:

« # * * (T]n twenty-seven jurisdictions, including Wisconsin,
it is held that venue in a criminal case must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The opinion does not list jurisdictions sup-

1402 rs

porting this view but our own research indicates such rule has
been announced in the following cases: Musselwhite v. State, 217
Ga. 755, 125 S.E.2d 46, 47; People v. Church, 366 Ill. 149, 7
N.E.2d 894, 898; State v. International Paper Co., 201 La. 870,
10 So.2d 685, 686; Presley v. State, 217 Miss. 112, 63 So.2d 551,
554-555 ; State v. Elmore, 126 Mont. 232, 247 P.2d 488, 493;
State v. Domer, 1 Ohio App.2d 155, 204 N.E.2d 69, 79; State v.
Cooksey, 242 Ore. 250, 409 P.2d 335, 386; and Smazal v. State,
81 Wis.2d 360, 142 N.W.2d 808, 809.

Among jurisdictions holding only a preponderance of evi-
dence is required are: Nobles v. State, 189 Ark. 472, 74 S.W.2d
247, 248; People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252, 282 P.2d 53, 59;
Chaudoin v, State, Fla. App., 118 So.2d 569, 572; Literal v.
Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 565, 63 S.W.2d 587, 590; State v. Glass-
cock, 76 N.M. 367, 415 P.2d 56, 57; People v. Hetenyi, 304 N.Y.
80, 106 N.H.2d.20, 21-22; Holsonbake v. State (Okla. Cr.), 416
P.2d 178, 179; State v. Brown, 97 R.I. 95, 196 A.2d 138, 141;
Stinson v. State, 181 Tenn. 172, 180 S.W.2d 883, 885; King v.
State, 166 Tex. Cr. R. 231, 312 S.W.2d 501, 505 ; State v. Mitchell,
3 Utah2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 620; and State v. Stafford, 44
Wash.2d 353, 267 P.2d 699, 701. :

We have been unable to find that the “question has been
directly passed on by this court. However, in State v. Brooks,
222 Towa 651, 652-653, 269 N.W. 875, 876, defendant had been
convicted of rape in the Polk District Court, On appeal he
asserted the State had failed to prove by sufficient evidence that
venue of the offense was in Polk County. The court sets out
what is now Code section 753.2 and notes that a conviction under
it cannot be sustained unless the State proves the offense was
committed in Polk County, which is where the indictment was
returned. The trial court instructed the State must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the ‘offense was committed in Polk
County and because the defendant did not except to the instruc-
tion we held on appeal that this instruction was the law of the
ease, The venue question was not further considered.

Difference of position in’ the various jurisdictions passing
‘on the question seems to be based on whether venue. is regarded
jn that jurisdiction as being a material part of the offense or
material allegation of the indictment on the one hand or as not

, De 1408

being an integral part or a material element of the offense on
the other. Others do not specifically state their rationale. See
80 Am, Jur.2d, Evidence, section 1174.

Hi We prefer to continue in our position that venue is a
jurisdictional fact which the State must prove as a vital in-
gredient of any prosecution. In order to secure a conviction in
a criminal prosecution it is necessary to show not only that the
act denounced as a crime has been committed but that it has
been committed within the territory where the law invoked for
its punishment prevails.

- We therefore hold venue must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.

HE-s«SV..:« Although the burden of proof is to convince
beyond a reasonable doubt, the State can generate a jury question
on the issue of venue by producing evidence which is either direct
or circumstantial from which it may be inferred, No positive
testimony that the violation occurred at a specific place is re-
quired, it is sufficient if it can be concluded from the evidence
as a whole that the act was committed in the county where the
indictment is found. Circumstantial evidence may be and often
is stronger and more convincing than direct evidence.

“« # * * Tf from the facts and evidence, the only
rational conclusion which can be drawn is that the crime ‘was
committed in the state and eounty alleged, the proof is suf-
ficient. * * *.” 30 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence, section 1131.

Our own cases support the foregoing statement. State v.
Waterbury, 183 Iowa 135, 139, 110 N.W. 328, 329, quoting 2
Bishop, Criminal Proc., section 483; State v. Meyer, 135 Iowa
507, 511, 118 N.W, 322, 324; State v. Caskey, 200 Iowa 1397,
1898, 206 N.W. 280, 281; and State v. Ostby, 203 Iowa 333, 338,
210 N.W. 934, 935, where the court said: “We have also de-
termined that venue may be proved by inference as well as by
direct assertion by the witness [citing cases]. In other words,
asum total of these holdings is that the witness need not testify
in words that the crime was committed within the county in
question, but that such fact, if fairly inferable from the testi-
mony given, is sufficient to carry the question of venue to the
jury.”

1404 ee —

A summary of approaches to the problem is well stated in
164 A.L.R. 621 at 650:

«# % ® (Tt may be said at the outset that the general im-
port of most of the cases, whether they refer to the mattér as
one of presumption, or prima facie evidence, or inference; is
that evidence showing that the defendant uttered or had pos-
session of the forged instrument in a particular county will
suffice to show that the place of the forging was in that county,
at least in the absence of direct evidence showing the contrary
or circumstances or testimony repelling that conclusion.. In
other words, a showing of defendant’s possession or uttering of
the forged instrument within the county will generally suffice to
earry to the jury. the issue of venue in a forgery case in which
venue is laid in the county of such possession or uttering.

“There is a substantial amount of authority to the general
effect that in a trial for forgery, where it is shown that the
iistrument was a ‘forgery and was first found in its forged con-
dition when it appeared in the possession of the defendant’in a
‘particular county, it may be presumed, in the absence of testi-
mony or circumstances repelling that conclusion, that the forg-
ing was done in the county where the forged instrument was
first uttered by the défendant or found in his possession.” ”
«HJ OVI. When a forged instrument is uttered or .at-
‘tempted to be uttered; in the absence of evidence to the eon-
trary, it may be presumed prima facie to have been forged in
the county -where it is so uttered, or the attempt made, But
such a presumption depends upon proof that the uttering. was
by the same person charged with the alteration, or that the one
so charged had possession of the instrument where the uttering
occurred, Heard v. State, 121 Ga. 138, 48 S.E. 905, 906; Cole
v. State, 282 Md. 111, 194 A.2d 278, 281; State v. Douglas, 312
Mo. 378, 278 S.W. 1016, 1022, and citations; 1 Wharton, Crim-
inal Evidence (Twelfth Ed.), section 92, footnote 5, 1968 pocket
supplement; and 36 Am Jur.2d, Forgery, section 45.

Of course, where thé accused can be positively identified as
having uttered the forged instrument, the prosecution does not
necessarily have the venue problem of forgery as defendant may
there be charged with uttering contrary to Code section 718.2..

| a 1405

VII. Generally courts, when considering the matter of
presumptions, prima facie evidence and inferences in connection
with venue in forgery cases, have combined those involving
uttering or attempts to utter with those involving possession of
a forged instrument. Where the defendant-forger was not him-
self the utterer, a different problem could be presented as “the
making or alteration of any writing with a fraudulent intent,
whereby another may be prejudiced, is forgery. It is not es-
sential that any person should be actually injured.” State v.
‘Wooderd, 20 Iowa 541, 547.

HH We believe possession of a forged instrument is prima
facie proof, in the absence of testimony or circumstances repel-
ling that conclusion, that the forgery was committed where such
possession was first known or found in its forged condition. As
supporting this proposition see State v. Johnson, 189 Kan. 571,
870 P.2d 107, 109; Nix v. State, 20 Okla. Cr. 373, 202 P. 1042,
1045, 26 A.L.R, 1053 (1922); and Spencer v. Commonwealth, 2
Leigh 751 (Va. 1830) ; quoted in Cole v. State, supra.

Prima facie proof has been defined as that which standing
alone unexplained or uncontradicted is sufficient to sustain the
proposition offered and if not rebutted remains sufficient for that
purpose. Allied Beauty Products Mfg. Co. v. Chemical Borings
Co. of America, 331 Ill. App. 112, 72 N.E.2d 451,

VIII. As indicating circumstances which may properly
be considered as bearing on the question of venue in forgery
eases see State v. Gibson, 228 Iowa 748, 751, 292 N.W. 786, 787.
Gibson, a Cedar Rapids resident, identified as the person who
eashed the check, was prosecuted for forgery. in Jones County
of a check drawn on an Anamosa bank. On appeal she contended
that the venue of the crime had not been established in Jones
County. In affirming her conviction the court approved the
following instruction :

“In this connection you may consider the alleged possession
of defendant in Jones County, Iowa, of the check claimed to
have been forged, the bank upon which it was drawn, the place
of the alleged passing of the check, the alleged residence of de-
fendant, and all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the
evidence bearing upon this question, and from it all, it is for

1406 ees —

you to determine whether the alleged offense was committed in
Jones County, Iowa.”

IX. Where the State relies upon circumstantial evi-
dence alone to generate a jury question on the issue of venue, of
course, the trial court will instruct on the jury’s use of such evi-
dence in deciding whether the State has proved venue beyond a
reasonable doubt.

X. While the court in this case based its direction of
a verdict upon the claimed failure of the State to establish
matters of fact, we believe the court erred on a matter of law
by failing to apply a proper rule to the facts before it, namely,
there is a presumption that an instrument was forged in the
county where its existence was first known or it was offered in a
forged condition which will suffice to sustain the venue of a
forgery prosecution in that county unless there is other evidence
to overcome that conclusion.

The facts to which we believe the trial court should have
applied this presumption or inference may be summarized as in-
eluding the mailing of the check to defendant at Cedar Rapids
where he resided and was employed; his forgery of Kathie
‘Welsh’s name as an endorsement; the stamp, “Pay any Bank,
P.E.G., The Merchants National Bank of Cedar Rapids, Iowa”,
which means prior endorsements guaranteed as the only other
endorsement relied on by the drawee bank as a basis for debiting
Fineberg’s account; the check being marked “Paid” by the
drawee bank which necessarily relied on the genuineness of the
endorsement by the Merchants Bank ‘where defendant did busi-
ness or at least obtained money with which to make Mrs. Welsh
a loan. uo

Of course, the judgment of the trial court is a finality with
respect to‘-the discharge of the defendant, but its action in
directing a verdict for defendant is—Reversed, but not -re-
manded.

All Justices concur.