State: Vermont
Volume: 203
Term: None-None
Jurisdiction(s): Vermont
Source: https://static.case.law/vt/203.pdf

2016 VT 92

State of Vermont v. Kerri Nicholas
[151 A.3d 799)
No. 15-010
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed August 19, 2016

we

Kerry A. McDonald-Cady, Windham County Deputy State’s
Attorney, Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles S. Martin and Stacey Knight, Law Clerk (On the
Brief) of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Dooley, J. Defendant was convicted of one count of
domestic assault, in violation of 18 V.S.A. § 1042, and one count of
cruelty to a child, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1304. On appeal, he
argues that the child-cruelty conviction should be reversed because
the trial court’s jury instructions allowed for a nonunanimous
verdict, and that the State’s conduct during the trial created a
risk of undue prejudice with respect to both counts. We affirm.

12. The evidence presented at trial involved multiple injuries to
E.P., the victim, over a few weeks between early September and
mid-October of 2012. E.P’s nursery school teacher testified that
E.P. arrived at school on September 7 of that year with two black
eyes, after having missed the first day of school. The teacher
asked the child’s mother what had happened, and the mother
reported that the child had fallen on a metal bedframe.

13. The next incident occurred on September 18, 2012. The
child’s teacher testified that E.P. had been absent the previous
day, and when the child returned to school on the eighteenth she
had a bruise on her face. Neither the mother nor defendant, who
had a romantic relationship with the mother and had moved in
with her in April 2012, called the school or provided a note
explaining the bruise.

14. The teacher next observed an injury to the child a few
weeks later on October 10, 2012. E.P. was again absent from

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school, and when she arrived the following day, she had “a huge
black eye.” The child’s left eye was “very swollen” and it appeared
to the teacher that the injury “had happened recently.” That
morning, the teacher made a report to the Department for
Children and Families (DCF).

15. E.P’s mother testified that on the morning she saw E.P’s
black-and-blue left eye, defendant explained that the injury had
occurred the night before when he was heading to the bathroom
at the same time as the child. According to the mother’s testi-
mony, defendant told her that he and E.P. had bumped into each
other, and the child hit the doorknob. In his interview with police,
however, parts of which were admitted at trial, defendant stated
that he had been in bed when E.P. hit her face on the bathroom
doorknob.

16. On October 15, 2012, the DCF worker assigned to the case
went to the mother’s home with Detective Jonathan Griffus. When
they arrived at the home, E.P.’s mother, E.P., and defendant were
all present. Detective Griffus took a photograph of E.P’s left eye
showing a dark bruise.

17. The next day, a pediatric nurse practitioner at Dartmouth-
Hitchcock’s Child Advocacy and Protection Program conducted a
head-to-toe examination of E.P. During that examination, she
observed the following: (1) bruising on E.P.’s upper and lower
eyelid, (2) a small bruise on her forearm; (8) two clusters of
petechial bruising (tiny burst blood vessels) on one side of her
neck,! (4) bruising on the left side of E.P’s ribs, and (5) a bruise
near E.P’s bellybutton.

18. Detective Griffus testified about his investigation, including
his interview of defendant. As noted, the jury watched several
segments of that interview in which defendant made statements
that were: (1) in conflict with other evidence, such as his
statement that he and his mother had taken the child to the
doctor after one of the injuries, and (2) inconsistent with other
statements he and E.P’s mother made about the circumstances
surrounding the left-eye injury to the child.

* According to the nurse, petechial bruising generally occurs from back pressure,
which may happen, for example, when a woman is in labor or during forceful fits
of conghing. Another way for petechial bruising to oceur is when blood flow has
been oceluded or blocked. For example, if clothing were pulled with enough force
around the neck, it could cut off blood flow and cause petechial bruising.

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19. Based on this and other evidence, the State brought four
charges against defendant? Count I charged defendant with
domestic assault, and was predicated on the two black eyes
sustained by E.P. Count II was a second charge of domestic
assault, this time predicated on the single black eye sustained by
E.P. Finally, Count III was a charge of cruelty to a child between
August 1, 2012 and October 16, 2012. The trial court granted
defendant a directed verdict on a fourth charge, a charge of
domestic assault tied to bruises on E.P’s face and abdomen.*

110. Prior to excusing the jury for their deliberations, the trial
court instructed the jury on the law governing the case. In
particular, as to Count III, the trial court gave the following
instruction:

{In Count II, [defendant] is charged with the offense of
cruelty to a child. The following are the elements of this
offense which must be proven by the State beyond a
reasonable doubt: that between August 1 and October 16
of 2012, the defendant: (1) was over the age of sixteen
years; (2) had the care of a child under ten years of age
alleged to be E.P., date of birth May 31, 2008; (8) caused
such child to be ill-treated in a manner to cause such
child unnecessary suffering; and (4) defendant did so
willfully.

The third element is that [defendant] caused [E.P.] to
be ill-treated in a manner to cause [her] unnecessary
suffering. For this third element the terms are self-
explanatory, except for the phrase “unnecessary suffer-
ing.” That phrase means physical pain or injury caused to
the child that was not inflicted by reasonable corporal
punishment.

And the fourth element is that the defendant did so
willfully. For this fourth element, the State must prove

2 The State initially also charged defendant with domestic assault for causing a
bruise on E.P’s buttocks, but voluntarily dismissed that claim before trial because
its witness on that count had relocated and was unavailable for the week of trial.
* Because the court dismissed a charge at the close of evidence, the court
renumbered the counts for the purpose of submitting them to the jury. We use the
numbering the court ultimately adopted in its instructions,

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that defendant caused E.P. to be ill-treated in a manner
to cause her unneci ‘y suffering willfully, that is
consciously and intentionally, as opposed to accidentally
or by mistake.

Your verdicts must represent the considered judgment,
of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary
that each jur[or] agree thereto. Your verdicts must be
unanimous.

V11. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on Count I,
arising from the two-black-eyes incident, and guilty verdicts on
Counts I and II.

112. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the jury instruction
regarding the child-cruelty count was plain error because the
instruction did not make clear that the jury had to be unanimous
as to which injury defendant caused to E.P.; and (2) multiple
incidents throughout the trial collectively created an undue risk of
prejudice warranting a reversal.

I. Jury Instructions and Risk of Non-Unanimity

113. IH Because defendant did not object to the jury instruc-
tion he now challenges on appeal, we review for plain error. When
reviewing alleged plain error in a jury instruction, we determine
whether there was obvious error affecting the defendant’s sub-
stantial rights, thereby resulting in prejudice to the defendant and
seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of the judicial pro-
ceedings. See State v Buckley, 2016 VT 59, 115, 202 Vt. 371, 149
A3d 928. “[Wle examine the instructions in light of the record
evidence as a whole and determine if any error would result in a
miscarriage of justice.” State uv Herrick, 2011 VT 94, 118, 190 Vt.
292, 30 A3d 1285. “This is a very high bar — we find plain error
only in rare and extraordinary cases.” /d.

114. Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain
error by failing to instruct the jury as to which of the injuries it
could consider for purposes of making a child-cruelty determina-
tion. According to defendant, the court’s jury instructions failed to
assure unanimity among the jurors as to whether some or all of
the alleged acts occurred in finding him guilty of the child-cruelty
charge.

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115. HM In so arguing, defendant relies primarily on State uv
Couture, 146 Vt. 268, 502 A.2d 846 (1985), overruled in part by
State vu Holcomb, 156 Vt. 251, 590 A.2d 894 (1991), and State uv
Goyette, 166 Vt. 299, 691 A.2d 1064 (1997). In Couture, the
defendant was charged with a single count of kidnapping even
though there were five separate alleged victims. The trial court
instructed the jury that they could find him guilty if they
concluded that he kidnapped any one of the five possible victims.
It did not instruct, however, that the jury had to be unanimous in
its decision as to which alleged victim or victims were kidnapped.
We found plain error because the charge gave the jury multiple
ways to convict the defendant without ensuring unanimity as to
the victim or victims kidnapped. Coutwre, 146 Vt. at 272, 502 A.2d
at 849. As discussed more fully below, however: “[t]o the extent
that Couture is read to hold that the mere possibility that the
jury was not unanimous on an element of the offense because of
the instructions is plain error, its holding did not survive
Holcomb” In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, 126, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A2d
281 (“Indeed, Holcomb intentionally rejected interpreting our
prior decisions suggesting that jury instruction errors that caused
the possibility that the jurors were not unanimous on an element
was plain error per se.”). Thus, in addition to the fact that
Couture involved five distinct acts — kidnapping five different
individuals — it cannot support a plain-error claim that a jury
instruction resulted in the mere possibility of a nonunanimous
verdict.

116. In Goyette, a case in which the defendant was charged
with one count of violating a relief-from-abuse order, the trial
court defined the word “harass” as engaging in repeated acts that
trouble or torment another but then instructed the jurors that
they could find the defendant guilty if they unanimously agreed
that he committed at least one of the six separate acts alleged by
the State. We noted that “the court’s charge did not assure
unanimity among the jurors as to whether some or all of the
other acts occurred,” but reversed at least in part because “the
court’s broad definition of harassment permitted defendant to be
convicted on the basis of virtually any behavior that bothered the
complainant.” Goyette, 166 Vt. at 303-04, 691 A.2d at 1067.

117. Hf On multiple occasions, this Court has emphasized that
a claim of error alleging the failure of the State to make an
election or the trial court to give a specific unanimity charge in a

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be

multiple-acts case is waived on appeal unless the defendant can
demonstrate plain error. The most important precedent is
Holcomb, noted above, in which the defendant was charged with
and convicted of one count of lewd-and-lascivious conduct with a
child, but the evidence indicated that there were two distinct
alleged lewd acts. We rejected the defendant’s unpreserved argu-
ment that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect
between the two lewd acts disclosed by the evidence. Holcomb,
156 Vt. at 255, 590 A.2d at 896; see 5 W. LaFave et al., Criminal
Procedure § 19.3(d), at 336-38 (4th ed. 2015) (stating that although
charging of separate offenses in single count can prejudice
defendant by producing conviction on less than unanimous verdict
as to each offense, “the duplicity defect is viewed as waived”
where no objection is raised until after jury verdict).

118. In doing so, we explicitly rejected a per se plain-error rule
and instead “adopt[ed] the familiar standard of review for plain
error” in which we reverse “only in rare and extraordinary cases
where we find that the omission in the charge and in the State’s
actions so affects the substantial rights of the defendant that we
will notice the error despite lack of proper objection.” Holcomb,
156 Vt. at 255, 590 A.2d at 896; see also State vu Johnson, 158 Vt.
508, 518, 615 A2d 132, 135 (1992) (“In general, we must examine
the record in each case, and determine whether the error is so pre-
judicial that it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”
(quotation omitted)). Applying that standard, we found no plain
error, in part, because the “[dJefendant’s defense did not distin-
guish between the two acts, and he was not hampered in preparing
a defense.” Holcomb, 156 Vt. at 255, 590 A.2d at 896 (concluding
also that “the acts were so closely related in time and circum-
stances as to constitute one continuous offense or transaction”).

119. In two more recent cases involving unpreserved challenges
to the absence of a specific unanimity instruction, we reiterated
this standard and emphasized its rigorous nature. In Carter, we
determined that the petitioner, who was convicted of aggravated
sexual assault and claimed plain error based on the trial court
failing to require unanimity as to whom a threat of serious bodily
injury was directed, had “shown a possibility of error, but little
likelihood of prejudice.” 2004 VT 21, 124 (emphasis added). We
stated that to prevail on his plain-error argument, the petitioner
would have to demonstrate “that it was likely that some jurors
found that there were threats to the victim but not to her family

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while other jurors found just the opposite.” Jd. (emphasis added).
We concluded that the petitioner had failed to do so, given that
the “evidence on both threats was inextricably intertwined” and
“the victim often described both threats within the same state-
ment.” Id.; see also United States u Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262-63
(2010) (rejecting plain-error standard that would set aside convic-
tion based on any possibility of different verdict and holding that
for prejudice component of plain-error standard to be satisfied,
“there must be a reasonable probability that the error affected
the outcome of the trial” (emphasis added)); ef. State x Wright,
154 Vt. 512, 520, 581 A.2d 720, 726 (1989) (concluding that even
where court could have given instruction on diminished capacity
and such instruction might have affected jury’s deliberations,
there was no plain error where defendant did not request
instruction, did not object to its omission, did not argue it to jury,
and trial did not revolve around defense theory of diminished
capacity).

120. Similarly, in State u Prior, where the trial court instructed
the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of violating a
relief-from-abuse order by “following or stalking” the victim but
gave no specific unanimity instruction, we found no plain error
because the defendant’s consistent position throughout his trial
was that he neither stalked nor followed the victim. 2007 VT 1,
15, 181 Vt. 564, 917 A.2d 466 (mem.). We concluded that where
“evidence relating to alternative theories under which a jury could
convict is intertwined throughout the trial and defendant’s defense
did not distinguish between the theories, we will not find plain
error.” Id. 1 8.

121. Given this case law and the rigorous standard of review,
we conclude that this is not one of those rare and extraordinary
cases where the interests of justice compel finding plain error.
Whether error exists at all may be a close question in this case,
but whether plain error exists under the correct standard is not.

122. Jury unanimity is an issue in multiple-acts cases, often
child sex-abuse cases, where “evidence is presented of a greater
number of separate criminal offenses than the defendant is
charged with.” Baker vu. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1175 (Ind. 2011);
see People u Cooks, 521 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Mich. 1994) (noting that
“United States x Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (C.A. 5, 1977), is consid-
ered a seminal ruling regarding the need for a specific unanimity
instruction when evidence of multiple acts by a defendant are

a ‘
placed before a jury to support a single charged offense”). Courts
in different jurisdictions have approached the problem in different
ways, but the most commonly followed procedure, often described
as the either/or rule, requires either the election of a single act as
a basis for the charged offense or an instruction requiring the
jury to be unanimous in determining which act supports a
conviction. Baker, 948 N.E.2d at 1175-76.

123. Most courts that have addressed the issue, however, have
held “that a specific unanimity instruction is not required in all
cases in which more than one act is presented as evidence of the
actus reus of a single criminal offense.” Cooks, 521 N.W.2d at 279.
“The critical inquiry is whether either party has presented
evidence that materially distinguishes any of the alleged multiple
acts from the others.” Id.; see State x Lomagro, 335 N.W.2d 583,
589 (Wis. 1983) (holding that where multiple criminal acts are
conceptually similar, unanimity instruction is not required); see
also State u Hill, 26 P.3d 1267, 1275 (Kan. 2001) (“In many
multiple acts cases, the acts will be materially distinct and will be
associated with different defenses, so a specific unanimity instruc-
tion will be required.”). “[W]here the government has presented
evidence of a series of materially indistinguishable acts, each of
which would factually satisfy the actus reus element of the alleged
criminal offense, numerous federal courts have declined to require
a specific unanimity instruction.” Cooks, 521 N.W.2d at 281. Thus,
in cases involving generic evidence of repeated sex acts, “neither
an election nor a unanimity instruction is very helpful where the
victim is unable to distinguish between a series of acts, any one
of which could constitute the charged offense.” People uv Jones,
792 P2d 643, 650 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); see also State u Arceo,
928 P.2d 843, 855 (Haw. 1996) (recognizing “that, in cases involving
sexual abuse of minors, it is sufficient, in the indictment, to allege
that the offense occurred over a particular time span” (quotation
omitted).

124. In Cooks, a case involving three separate acts of sexual
penetration of a child on consecutive days, the Supreme Court of
Michigan upheld the trial court’s refusal to give a specific
unanimity instruction, despite the defendant’s request that it do
so, because “materially iden evidence was offered with respect
to each of the alleged acts of penetration and there is no reason
to believe the jury was confused or disagreed about the basis of
defendant’s guilt.” 521 N.W.2d at 276, 284 (holding that general

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unanimity instruction is sufficient in multiple acts cases unless “1)
the alternative acts are materially distinct (where the acts them-
selves are conceptually distinct or where either party has offered
materially distinct proofs regarding one of the alternatives), or 2)
there is reason to believe the jurors might be confused or
disagree about the factual basis of defendant’s guilt”).

125. Many other courts have not found plain error for a failure
to give a specific unanimity instruction in multiple-acts cases
where the evide cerning the alleged acts was not materially
or conceptually distinct or the same blanket or generic defense
was proffered with respect to all of the acts. For example, in a
case involving charges of sexual abuse of minors, the Court of
Appeals of Alaska found no plain error in the trial court failing to
give a specific unanimity instruction where the defendant pre-
sented “one blanket defense” claiming that all of the charges were
false and that he was innocent of any wrongdoing. Anderson v
State, 337 P.3d 534, 543 (Alaska Ct. App. 2014).

126. In finding no plain error, the court recognized that the
charges were based on factually distinct acts of sexual contact and
that “[t]he State’s evidence concerning these acts varied somewhat
in content and probative strength”; nonetheless, given the defend-
ant’s blanket defense, the court concluded that a different outcome
was, even if a “logical possibility,’ not a “reasonable possibility”*
Id.; see also Baker, 948 N.E.2d at 1179 (finding no plain error
where “only issue was the credibility of the alleged victims” and
“only defense was to undermine the young women’s credibility”);
Hill, 26 P.3d at 1275 (“By the jury’s rejection of [the defendant’s]
general denial, we can unequivocally say there was no rational
basis by which the jury could have found that [the defendant]
committed one rape but did not commit the other.”); People x Van
Dorsten, 494 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Mich. 1993) (concluding that failure
to give unanimity instruction was not plain error because case
turned on whether or not sexual assault occurred and thus there
was no reason “to focus on the specifics of individual penetra-
tions”); People uv Rao, No. 289343, 2012 WL 5233608, at *10
(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2012) (finding no plain error where
multiple acts of abuse resulting in various injuries of differing

*The court also noted the danger of attorneys “sandbagging” the trial court by
making a tactical decision to not request a specific unanimity instruction and then
claiming error on appeal; however, the court ultimately did not consider whether
that occurred in that case. Anderson, 337 P.3d at 536, 543-44.

a "

ages “were not materially distinct and all involved child physical
abuse perpetrated on [the child]”); ef. Arceo, 928 P.2d at 875
(finding plain error where victim testified as to at least nine
sexual assaults which could not be considered continuing offense
and trial court failed to give specific unanimity instruction as to
two distinct sexual assault charges against defendant); State v
Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 159 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (finding
plain error where defendant “relied on evidentiary inconsistencies
and factual improbabilities respecting each specific allegation of
hand-to-genital contact”).

127. In this case, although the State also charged defendant
with multiple counts of domestic assault based on specific bruises
first noticed on specific dates, it charged defendant with cruelty to
a child based on a myriad of bruises all over her body within a
relatively short period of time — a little over a month. At trial the
State’s principal argument — supported by medical evidence and
testimony — was that the number and nature of the bruises on
the child within a relatively short period of time pointed to child
abuse and not accidental injury.

128. Defendant neither testified at trial nor presented wit-
nesses, but his defense through his attorney’s cross-examination of
witnesses and arguments to the jury was that the alleged victim
was “an active girl” with a “depth perception” problem who
incurred accidental injuries easily and that no evidence connected
him to any of the child’s injuries. To be sure, through cross-
examination, defendant suggested alternative reasons for some of
the bruises — the child hitting her head on a bedframe to explain
the two black eyes, hitting her head on a doorknob to explain the
single black eye, and flea bites to explain the marks around the
child’s neck — but his generic defense was simply: I played no
role in causing any of the child’s bruises, and you have no
evidence to show that I did.’ Given that the child’s various bruises
could be considered neither materially nor conceptually distinct

® The dissent insists that this is a clear case of “distinct instances,” post, 157, and
that, as the deputy state’s attorney asserted at oral argument before this Court,
the child-eruelty charge was premised primarily on the petechial bruising around
the child’s neck. Irrespeetive of what the deputy state’s attorney may have stated
to this Court at oral argument, the trial record does not show that the
child-cruelty charge was based primarily on petechial bruising. The record,
including the closing arguments by both the deputy state’s attorney and defense
counsel, shows that defendant’s principal defense was that the child’s multiple
bruises were the result of accidents by an aetive child with depth pereeption

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with respect to the child-cruelty charge, it is at least questionable
whether the trial court committed any error at all in not giving a
specific unanimity instruction on that charge.®

129. HB In any event, in light of defendant’s blanket defense to
the charges against him, he was not prejudiced by the omission of
a specific unanimity instruction, and thus there is no plain error.
As noted, defendant consistently argued that there was no evi-
dence connecting him to the child’s injuries. Specifically, in
arguing for a directed verdict with respect to the child-cruelty
count, defense counsel stated that “with every other injury
alleged, there’s nothing that connects [defendant] to any of the
other bruises on [the child’s] body.”

130. The absence of prejudice is particularly true in this case
because the jury found defendant guilty of domestic assault with
respect to the single black eye, and that is a sufficient basis to
support the child-cruelty conviction. Defendant argues that the
domestic-assault conviction is not dispositive as to the child-cruelty
conviction because of the differing mens rea elements of the two
offenses, with domestic assault requiring only recklessness but
child cruelty requiring willfulness. We disagree.

131. The trial court instructed the jury that “recklessly” means
defendant “was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that, by acting as alleged, he would cause”
pain or injury to the child. The court further instructed the jury

problems, and the State’s principal response was that the number and nature of
the multiple bruises ruled out the accident defense. Right at the start of her
closing argument, the deputy state’s attorney told the jury that the “case is not
about accidents” or a child who is “exceptionally clumsy” or “prone to accidents”
or “unlucky,” but rather about multiple unexplained injuries in a short span of
time. Specifically, in addressing the child-cruelty count, the deputy state’s attorney
did not focus exclusively on the petechial bruising, but rather on the number of
injuries, many of which the evidence indieated were not the type of injuries that
would be caused by aceidents. For his part, defense counsel emphasized in his
closing argument that the victim was “a very active girl” with a depth-perception
problem who galloped rather than walked around the rocky brook near her home.
Other than the separately charged facial braises, the State made no attempt to tie
the multiple bruises to a specific day or instance; rather, it relied upon the fact
that defendant's accident defense to the child-cruelty charge was not credible,
given the number and nature of the bruises occurring within a relatively short time
frame

® Whether or not it goes over the line to constitute error, we encourage the trial
courts to give a unanimity instruction in close cases to ensure defendants are not
prejudiced.

as 13
be

that “willfully’ means “consciously and intentionally.” Regarding
the single-black-eye injury, as with all of the other injuries,
defendant did not contend that although he played a role in
causing the injury, his conduct was not reckless. Rather, he
contended that he played no role in causing the injury period.
Although the victim’s mother testified that defendant told her that
he and the child had bumped into each other in the dark, causing
the child to hit her head on a bathroom doorknob, defendant told
police that he heard the child hit her head on the doorknob while
he was in bed. Portions of that interview, including his explanation
of the alleged doorknob incident, were admitted into evidence and
played to the jury. In moving for a directed verdict and later
making his closing argument, defense counsel focused on defend-
ant’s version — that defendant was in bed when he heard the
child hit her head in the bathroom. Moreover, even if the jury
considered the mother’s testimony regarding what defendant said
to her, defendant’s conduct could not be considered reckless under
the trial court’s definition.

132. In short, defendant could be prejudiced by the absence of
a unanimity instruction only if one or more jurors found, with no
basis in the evidence, that he caused the single black eye injury,
but acted recklessly in doing so, and acted willfully in causing
some other injury. That a juror reached such a conclusion may be
theoretically possible, but it is so highly unlikely that the mere
theoretical possibility does not rise to the level of plain error. The
dissent surmises that it is “highly likely” that one or more jurors
found defendant guilty of child cruelty based exclusively on one or
more injuries other than the single black eye, post, 1 61, but we
know that the jury unanimously convicted defendant on that
charge and that defendant did not dispute the distinguishing
element of intent based on the evidence presented to the jury. At
best, the dissent’s “highly likely” characterization is speculative
and cannot be the basis for a finding of plain error.

133. To sum up, it is questionable whether a specific unanimity
instruction was required at all under the circumstances of this
case with respect to the child-cruelty charge, but even assuming it
was, the trial court’s failure to give such an instruction was not
plain error, considering the nature of the alleged “acts” and the
generic defense offered by defendant. This is not one of those
rare and extraordinary case where the interests of justice compel
a finding of plain error.

14 |

I. Cumulative Prejudice

134. Defendant’s second argument on appeal, applicable with
respect to the remaining conviction for domestic assault in con-
nection with the single black eye, is that various actions by the
State cumulatively created a risk of undue prejudice, and that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
a mistrial on the basis of those actions. Defendant does not
specifically argue that the trial court committed error in connec-
tion with any of these incidents, but instead contends that the
State’s conduct itself created such a risk of unfair prejudice that
we must reverse the conviction. The bases for defendant’s argu-
ment are as follows:

1. During the State’s opening statement, coun-
sel made reference to Emergency Care Or-
der proceedings.

2. After being limited to factual and physical
observations of the child’s play, her teacher
testified that the child played “angrily.”

3. Upon presentation of the photographs she
took when the child came to school with a
black eye, the teacher broke down crying on
the stand.

4. The State solicited from mother that de-
fendant no longer lived with her and the
child after the court ruled that the State
could not ask mother whether she had
ended her relationship with him.

5. The State solicited testimony from its ex-
pert witness, the nurse who examined the
child, that strangulation was among the
possible causes of petechia on the neck.

6. The State elicited testimony that a witness
was concerned about the child.

135. In arguing about the cumulative harm of the enumerated
instances, defendant also suggests that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting testimony about various bruises and inju-
ries to the child that were not linked by any evidence to
defendant. To the extent defendant raises this as a distinct
argument on appeal, the objection was not preserved below, and

defendant’s argument on appeal is not sufficiently developed to
facilitate a plain error review on this point.

136. MPA court “‘may grant a new trial if it believes that
the cumulative effect of numerous concerns, no one of which can
be characterized as reversible error, amounted to a miscarriage of
justice?” State uv Brooks, 2013 VT 27, 138, 193 Vt. 461, 70 A3d
1014 (quoting State u Aiken, 2004 VT 96, 19, 177 Vt. 566, 862
A.2d 285 (mem.)). We conclude that the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. The
State’s reference in opening statements to the fact that DCF had
obtained an emergency care order was fleeting. As soon as
defendant objected, the court ruled that the State could not
further discuss those child protection proceedings. The court
noted that the State’s reference was minor and would be forgotten
by the jury, and defense counsel declined a corrective instruction.
The impact, if any, of the State’s lapse was minimal.

137. Likewise, the State’s questions eliciting testimony by the
teacher that she observed the child playing in an angry manner
had little if any impact on this case. The State did run afoul of
the trial court’s ruling excluding such questions, but the court
immediately stopped the line of questioning and reprimanded the
State. Because the testimony that came out — that this child was
angry when she played — was so fleeting and unconnected to
evidence that defendant committed the charged crimes, it had
very little probative value or prejudicial effect in this case.

138. We acknowledge that the teacher’s crying on the stand,
had it continued unabated, may have aroused the jury’s sympa-
thies. But the second it surfaced, the trial court took a recess.
The court made it clear to the State in no uncertain terms that
it better not happen again, and the State structured its questions
thereafter to ensure that it did not. In short, the impact of the
teacher’s momentary tearfulness during her testimony was minimal.

139. The State’s question eliciting testimony that defendant no
longer lived with mother following the trial court’s ruling that the
State could not ask whether they had ended their relationship was
objectionable, but defendant points to nothing in the record to
support the claim that prejudice flowed from this testimony. For
that reason, we cannot conclude that this errant question and
answer were more than minimally prejudicial, if at all.

140. The testimony by the nurse that strangulation could lead
to petechial bruising “going a large direction around the neck”

16 |

was objectionable and prejudicial. The State had not alleged that
defendant strangled the child, and the court expressed doubt that
testifying about how someone might cause such petechia, rather
than just describing the types of forces necessary, was outside the
witness’s expertise. Again, the trial court immediately cut off the
witness’s testimony, and the State ended the line of questioning.
And the testimony, while potentially relevant to the child-cruelty
charge as argued by the State, was not particularly relevant to
the remaining conviction that we are reviewing: domestic assault
for causing the single black eye. This fact substantially reduces
the prejudice arising from the testimony.

141. Finally, defendant points to a question by the State as to
whether a witness had a “concern” about the child. Although
defendant objected and the court sustained the objection, the
witness answered yes. The court promptly instructed the jury to
ignore the answer. Moreover, in context, it appears that the
question was simply designed to serve as a bridge from the
teacher’s observations of the child’s injury to her act of offering
the child ice for her eye. We discern no prejudice from this
exchange.

142. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court
was well within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial on the basis of the cumulative prejudice from the above
instances, and thus we affirm defendant’s convictions.

Affirmed.

143. Robinson, J., dissenting. I don’t take issue with the legal
standards articulated by the majority, but conclude that those
standards compel reversal in this case. The jury heard evidence of
multiple distinct instances of alleged abuse, with varying defenses
and outcomes. In closing, with respect to the child cruelty charge,
the State invited the jury to convict on the basis of any or all of
them. On appeal, the State suggests with confidence that the jury
was relying on a particular set of evidence in convicting on that
count — completely different evidence from that relied upon by
the majority in concluding that any error was harmless. On this
record, the failure to include a unanimity instruction was error,
and the error was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute plain error.

144. This is not the kind of “multiple-acts” case in which the
evidence points to a multiplicity of relatively undifferentiated
incidents and the defense is a general denial to any and all. The

State presented evidence of several distinct and dissimilar injuries
to the child victim. Some but not all were the basis for separate
domestic assault charges. The jury heard specific and varied
defenses to each. And the strength and quality of the State’s
evidence in support of its respective domestic assault charges
varied widely from charge to charge: one charge never made it to
the jury, the jury acquitted on one, and the jury convicted on one.

145. The incident charged as domestic assault took place
around September 7, 2012. E.P’s nursery school teacher testified
that when E.P. arrived for her first day of school that year she
had two black eyes. The teacher described E.P’s eyes as being
“blackened.” The teacher testified that the eyes were not swollen,
and looked like something had happened a couple days before.
She asked the mother about what had happened, and the mother
reported that the child had fallen on a metal bedframe.

146. In her own testimony, the mother explained that her
boyfriend, defendant, was watching E.P. at the time of this injury.
When the mother arrived at the friend’s apartment, she saw E.P.
lying down with an icepack. The mother removed the icepack and
saw bruising and puffiness. She reported that defendant told her
that when he tried to put E.P. down for a nap, E.P. was “{fllailing
around and hit her head off the metal bedframe.” The mother
took E.P. home and continued to ice the bruised area, but did not
otherwise seek medical attention.

147. The nurse who testified as the State’s medical expert
explained that a blow to the forehead or scalp above the eyes can,
after a period of time, lead to the kind of discoloration of both of
the child’s eyelids observed by the teacher, as the blood drains
down from above the eyes.

148. In closing, defense counsel emphasized that, although the
teacher testified that the child’s eyes were discolored when the
child reported to school, they were not swollen or puffy. He
pointed to the nurse’s testimony that this discoloration of the
eyelids without accompanying swelling is consistent with an im-
pact, some period prior, to the forehead or scalp — an injury
consistent with defendant’s explanation to the child’s mother that
the child had hit her head on the bedframe. Moreover, defense
counsel noted that the testimony reflected that the injury occurred
when the child was with defendant; based on the times defendant
was with the child, it must have happened a few days before
September 7. And he emphasized that between the time the injury

18 |

likely occurred and the child’s first day attending school, the child
had a doctor’s appointment. The doctor did not document any
concerns about the bruising of the child’s eyes. In short, although
defendant generally denied the charges against him, the defense
case in response to the charge relating to the two black eyes was
specific to that incident. The defense argument was not simply
“she must have tripped because she is not very coordinated” and
“T had nothing to do with it.” Rather, the evidence pointed to an
innocent explanation for the specific bruising pattern that gave
rise to one of the domestic assault charges.

149. This incident-specific defense must have been effective; the
jury acquitted defendant of the domestic assault charge relating to
the “two black eyes” claim.

150. The second charged incident led to bruising observed
around September 18. The child’s teacher testified that E.P. had
been absent the prior day, and when E.P. returned to school on
the eighteenth, she had a bruise on her face. On cross-
examination, the teacher testified that at that time the child also
volunteered that she had a bruise somewhere else, although the
teacher did not specify where.’ Concluding that the State had not
presented any evidence placing the child with defendant during
the time period when the bruise appeared, the trial granted
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this count.
Although the court dismissed the specific charge relating to the
bruising observed on September 18, the State’s evidence concern-
ing that bruise was before the jury as it deliberated on the child
cruelty charge.

151. The third charged incident involved an injury the teacher
observed on October 11, 2012. The teacher testified that the child
had missed school the prior day and showed up to school with “a
huge black eye.” E.P’s eye was “very swollen” and it appeared to
the teacher that the injury “had happened recently.” The court
admitted photos taken that morning showing E.P. with a dark
purple and blue bruise over her left eye. That morning, the
teacher made a report to the Department for Children and
Families (DCF).

152. Mother testified that on the morning when she saw E.P’s
eye defendant explained that the injury had occurred the night

“Counsel for both sides seem to assume that the teacher testified that the child
either told her about or showed her bruising on the abdomen at that time; the
record does not support this assumption.

a °

before when he was heading to the bathroom at the same time as
the child. Defendant told her that they bumped into each other,
and the child hit the doorknob. The investigating detective pre-
sented evidence, including a videotape of his interview of defend-
ant, that shows defendant making inconsistent statements about
the circumstances surrounding the left-eye injury, all of which
involved hitting the bathroom doorknob. The nurse described the
mechanism of injury that leads to bruising like that observed to
the child’s left eye: not a flat surface, but direct impact by
something like a ball or body part of a person that hits right in
the right area. Additionally, the jury heard evidence regarding the
layout of the child’s house and, in particular, the bathroom and
bathroom door.

153. In closing, defense counsel reviewed the layout of the
bathroom, including the height of the doorknob as compared to
the child’s height. He argued that E.P’s injury was entirely
consistent with going to the bathroom at night, in the dark, and
hitting her eye against the doorknob on her way out. He bolstered
this theory by noting the child had a visual depth perception
problem. He noted the implausibility of defendant’s hitting E.P. in
the eye in the middle of the night without the mother hearing.
And, he argued that defendant was left handed, and that if a
left-handed person punches another, the black eye would be on
the right. The jury was not persuaded by these arguments,
because it convicted defendant of domestic assault in connection
with the black eye.

154. In addition to these instances that underlay the specific
domestic assault charges, the jury heard extensive evidence about.
the nurse’s observations upon performing a head-to-toe examina-
tion of E.P. on October 16, following the teacher’s report to DCF.
In addition to the bruised eyelids, the nurse noted a bruise about.
a centimeter wide on the child’s cheek, a half centimeter bruise on
the child’s jawline, a small bruise on the child’s forearm, two
clusters of petechial bruising (tiny pinpoint bruises resulting from
burst blood vessels) on one side of her neckline, bruising a couple
centimeters wide on the left side of her ribs, a bruise near her
bellybutton, and bruising on her shin.

155. The State elicited substantial testimony about these other
injuries. The nurse opined that it’s possible to bruise the cheek by
accident, but not as likely as the forehead or chin, and that the
jawline is likewise not a “leading edge” that is more prone to

20 |

injury. She explained that petechial bruising arises from back
pressure, or from occlusion of blood flow. As an example, the
nurse explained that pulling clothing with enough force around the
neck could cut off blood flow and cause petechial bruising. The
nurse testified that the ribs are an area where she doesn’t
commonly see bruises on children. With respect to the abdominal
bruising, the nurse opined that such bruising results from com-
pression of the tissue from two hard objects outside of the body.
The nurse testified that the shin bruising was typical in active
children. The State did not attempt to specifically link these
bruises to specific instances or to defendant in particular, beyond
the broad inference that defendant was one of the adults caring
for the child during the relevant time period.

156. With this understanding of the record, and applying the
standards articulated by the majority, whether the court should
have given a unanimity instruction is not a close call. The majority
acknowledges that generally in multiple-acts cases the State is
either required to elect a single act as a basis for the charged
offense or the instruction requires the jury to be unanimous as to
which act supports a conviction. Ante, 11 22. The majority explains
that exceptions to this general rule apply in cases in which the
evidence does not materially distinguish among the various acts in
question, ante, {| 23, or “the same blanket or generic defense was
proffered with respect to all of the acts.” Ante, 1 25. Neither of
these exceptions applies here.

157. This is not a case in which the evidence does not
materially distinguish among the various acts in question. Perhaps
the subset of the State’s case relating to the assortment of bruises
observed during the nurse’s head-to-toe examination fits this
description; but the State’s case more broadly rested largely,
albeit not exclusively, on very specific allegations of injuries
allegedly inflicted by defendant on specific occasions. Defendant’s
arguments in response were likewise focused on specific and
distinct instances. Although the defense suggested generally that.
this was an active but somewhat uncoordinated child with a visual
impairment who was therefore prone to bruising, the defense
strategy also rested in large part on specific theories as to the
chanism of the two most significant injuries at the center of the
State’s case. The fact that the jury was apparently swayed by
defendant’s argument with respect to one incident, but not
another, highlights the material distinctiveness of the evidence
with respect to the two main instances of alleged assault.

a *

158. Nor can the defense in this case be fairly characterized as
a “blanket” or “generic” defense that boils down to “I played no
role in causing any of the child’s bruises.” Ante, 1 28. As set forth
above, the defense in this case was not “I don’t know what
happened, but I didn’t do it.” With respect to the two most.
significant injuries — and the only ones specifically tied by
timeline and opportunity to defendant — the defense offered
plausible innocent explanations for the injuries that were arguably
consistent with the physical and medical evidence. There was
nothing “generic” about these two theories. Although they were
bolstered by the generalized suggestion that the child had visual
depth perception issues and was not coordinated, the theories did
not depend on this more general theme.

159. In that regard, this case is on all fours with State vu
Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. 2011) (en banc). In that case, a
court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant if it
concluded that she had engaged in hand-to-genital contact with
the child victim during the specified date range. The jury had
heard evidence of several different instances of such conduct at
different locations and different times. The defendant argued on
appeal that because some of the jurors may have convicted her for
one act and some may have convicted for another, the court’s
instructions rose to the level of plain error. The Missouri Supreme
Court agreed that the instructions were error, “[blecause it is
impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously agreed on
any one of these separate incidents.” Jd. at 158. In considering
whether the unpreserved error rose to the level of plain error, the
court noted that the defense in this case did not simply argue that
the victim’s story was fabricated. The court assigned significance
to the fact that the defense identified and relied on distinct
“inconsistencies and factual improbabilities” in the state’s evidence
relating to each of several of the alleged instances rather than
relying on a general denial. /d. at 158-59. Because the defense
offered distinct, incident-specific arguments and defenses, the
court concluded that it was “more likely that individual jurors
convicted [the defendant] on the basis of different acts,” and the
conviction amounted to “manifest injustice.” Id. at 159.

160. Again applying the standards articulated by the majority,
I likewise conclude that the error in this case rises to the level of
plain error. To satisfy plain error defendant must demonstrate
that it is likely that some jurors convicted defendant on the basis

22 Le

of one incident or set of incidents, while other jurors convicted
him on the basis of another. See ante, 1 19 (citing In re Carter,
2004 VT 21, 124, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281).

161. The majority suggests that because the jury could have
found defendant guilty of child cruelty on the basis of the single
black eye in connection with which it convicted defendant of
domestic assault, there is no plain error here. Ante, 1 28. But the
question here is not whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict defendant of child cruelty on that basis; it is whether it is
likely that one or more jurors voted to convict defendant of child
cruelty on the basis of evidence other than the single black eye.
On this record, that is highly likely.

162. The State’s argument to the jury on the child-cruelty
charge did not rely on the single black eye. The deputy state’s
attorney mentioned the single black eye and the two black eyes,
but then focused her argument regarding the child-cruelty count
on all of the other observed injuries. She discussed the petechia in
great detail, identifying possible causes, and ruling out innocent
explanations. She talked about the bruise on the child’s rib and
argued that that was not a common place for a bruise. She
pointed to the bruise on the child’s abdomen and asserted that it
was an intentional injury with force. She pointed to the bruise on
the child’s jaw line. She argued that throughout the time period
in question defendant had repeated access to this child by himself
and the child acquired unexplained bruises. The State’s closing
pointed to the multiplicity of bruises as evidence of willfulness, but
did not key on any specific acts. This is not a case in which we
can infer based on the way the case was argued that the jury was
relying on a particular instance, such as the single black eye, in
convicting defendant of child cruelty.

163. At oral argument on appeal, the deputy state’s attorney,
who was present at trial and had a firsthand sense of how this
case was tried and received by the jury, opined with great
confidence that the jury’s conviction of child cruelty was based on
the evidence of petechial bruising, not on the single black eye. She
pointed to the State’s closing argument below in support of this
understanding.

164. The jury heard evidence of multiple distinct instances of
unexplained or unusual bruising, many observed at different times
and allegedly caused under different circumstances. Counsel’s
arguments did not focus the jury on a particular instance of

a °

alleged abuse. The majority and the State — relying on the same
record — both believe that the jurors all relied on the same
instance of abuse, but their surmise as to which instance of abuse
that is are completely different. Under these circumstances, I
conclude that it is unlikely that all twelve jurors relied on the
same claims of abuse in convicting defendant, and that the error
in this case rises to the level of plain error.

2016 VT 93

Cenlar FSB v. Joseph L. Malenfant, Jr. and Laurie G.
Malenfant

[151 A.Bd 778]
No. 14-441
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed Angust 19, 2016

a |

26 |

es ee
Jeffrey J. Hardiman and Randall Souza of Shechtman

Halperin Savage, LLP, Pawtucket, Rhode Island, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Marc E. Wiener of Mare E. Wiener Law Offices, PLLC,
Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.

11. Robinson, J. This case calls upon us to solve a procedural
puzzle involving successive foreclosure actions on the same note.
In particular, this case raises the question: What is the impact of
a court’s dismissal with prejudice of a lender’s claim on a
promissory note and accompanying foreclosure action with respect
to the lender’s ability to bring a subsequent claim for default on
the note?

12. HM Lender appeals a judgment for borrowers in lender’s
second action for a judgment on the note and foreclosure, after
the first was dismissed with prejudice. Lender argues that the
first dismissal cannot be interpreted as vacating the judgment on
the note and for foreclosure that the trial court had previously
issued in that case. Alternatively, lender contends that its notice of
default in the initial foreclosure action was sufficient to satisfy its
notice obligation in connection with its second foreclosure action.
We conclude that the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the
lender’s first action on the promissory note and complaint for
foreclosure did effectively vacate that court’s prior judgment for
lender on the note and for foreclosure. We conclude that lender
was not on this record entitled to pursue a second action because
it had not taken any steps to reinstate borrowers’ monthly
payment obligations after lender had accelerated the note. Accord-
ingly, we affirm.

13. The facts and procedural background are not in dispute,
except where noted. In 1993, Joseph L. Malenfant, Jr. and Laurie
G. Malenfant (borrowers) executed a promissory note secured by
a mortgage on their property in Colchester to GMAC Mortgage
Corp., the predecessor-in-interest to Cenlar FSB (lender).

a °

14. By May 2008, borrowers had fallen into default on the loan.
Lender filed its first action against borrowers for default on the
note and a foreclosure remedy in December 2008. See Cenlar
FSB wv Malenfant, Docket No. $1664-08 Cne (Vt. Super. Ct.). On
May 22, 2009, the court issued a judgment order finding borrow-
ers to be in default on the note, calculating the amounts due to
lender, and issuing a decree of foreclosure in favor of lender in
that action.’ Borrowers timely filed a “letter of appeal” arguing,
among other things, that they were in the process of consideration
for a loan modification, and that under the applicable regulations
the foreclosure process was to be stopped until complete consid-
eration was offered to them. The court issued an entry order
directing the lender to show cause why the appeal should not be
granted pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 80.1. In
September 2009, following a hearing, the trial court ordered the
lender to provide information to borrowers about the status of
their loan-modification request, and ordered that no certificate of
nonredemption would be issued unless the lender had complied
with all applicable laws relating to the federal Making Home
Affordable Program and explained to the court why borrowers’
application for loan modification was denied?

15. Borrowers and lender entered into a temporary forbearance
and trial payment plan from March to June 2010. During this
period, court proceedings were suspended. At a status conference
following the end of this period, lender indicated that it was
reviewing borrowers’ loan-modification application. Lender repre-
sented without contradiction that it last received payment on the
mortgage in June 2010. Borrowers suggested that from the end of
the forbearance period onward, they repeatedly asked lender for

© As shorthand, we refer to this judgment as the “first foreclosure judgment” and
the action as the “foreclosure action. However, we note that in addition to issuing
a decree of foreclosure, setting a redemption period, and authorizing public sale of
the property upon expiration of the redemption period without redemption, this
first judgment also adjudicated borrowers’ indebtedness to lender on the note and
acknowledged the possibility of a deficiency judgment against borrowers after the
sale. For reasons that should become clear below, that this case is first and
foremost about lender’s attempt to collect in contract on a note, invoking
foreclosure as a remedy, is important to our analysis

2 Tt is not clear from the record whether borrowers’ request for permission to
appeal remained pending following this hearing. Although the court apparently
never ruled on the motion, no party subsequently raised the issue. The court
instead shifted its focus to encouraging resolution through mediation

28 |

information about the balance due to bring their balance current.
The court kept the case on the docket, and held a status
conference on November 1, 2010. Lender failed to appear. On its
own motion, the court issued an order, captioned “Dismissal
Order,” which read in its entirety:

A status conference was held in this case [on October
29, 2010]. Both parties were permitted to call in rather
than appearing in person. Defendants Malenfant called;
Plaintiff did not. This case has been pending since 2008
and despite repeated conferences [in] which it was re-
ported that modification or forbearance agreements were
being discussed, nothing has been resolved.

The court hereby dismisses the case with prejudice for
Plaintiff's failure to prosecute by failing to appear at the
scheduled conference today.

16. Lender did not appeal this order. Neither party filed a
motion for relief from judgment or order, V.R.C.P. 60(b), or a
motion to alter or amend, V.R.C.P. 59(e). The order did not
expressly state whether the judgment order and decree of fore-
closure issued on May 22, 2009 was vacated. The legal effect of
this unappealed order of dismissal with prejudice is one of the
issues in this case.

17. In September 2011, lender filed a second action for default
on the note, and sought foreclosure. The parties engaged in
mediation but did not resolve the case. After the trial court denied
lender’s motion for summary judgment, it held a final hearing on
the merits in June 2014. At that hearing, lender introduced
evidence of the total redemption amount on that date and the
total accelerated balance owed under the mortgage loan, assuming
a default date of September 1, 2008 — a different date from the
default date asserted in the first default action. The court
dismissed this second foreclosure action because lender failed to
send a new default notice prior to filing the second foreclosure
action. As the court explained in its written order, the mortgage
deed required the lender to give the borrowers at least thirty
days’ notice of default and an opportunity to cure. Lender’s
representative testified that the default date upon which this
second foreclosure action was based was different from the first.
Because the filing of thi nd action was based on “a new, and
different set of operative facts,” the court dismissed the claim

a °
based on lender’s failure to “complete the circle [by] . . . sen[ding]
Defendants [a] notice of default and acceleration” based on the
default date alleged in the second foreclosure action.

18. The court made it clear that lender was free to file a new,
third foreclosure action against borrowers, this time complying
with the contractual requirement of notice before acceleration,
with an opportunity to cure. However, argument at the hearing
revealed divergent views by the parties concerning the effect of
both prior dismissals — the court’s dismissal of the first foreclo-
sure action with prejudice and also its dismissal of the second
foreclosure action — on the scope of lender’s potential third claim
on the note and for foreclosure. Moreover, the court wanted to be
clear about the intended preclusive effect of its dismissal of this
second foreclosure action with respect to any future action. After
argument and briefing by the parties, the court issued a written
decision and final judgment order on September 18, 2014, reiter-
ating its dismissal of the second foreclosure action and discussing
the prospective effect of its dismissal, as well as the court’s prior
dismissal of the first foreclosure case.

19. The court rejected lender’s argument that the May 2009
foreclosure judgment for lender was still in effect. It concluded
that the only logical way to construe the court’s November 1, 2010
dismissal of that case was to understand it as vacating the
underlying foreclosure judgment. Moreover, it noted that lender’s
own conduct supported the court’s understanding that the dis-
missal with prejudice required the lender to start over, with a
“clean slate.” Lender did not attempt to enforce the prior
foreclosure decree, or request a certificate of nonredemption, but.
instead filed a new foreclosure action on the same note, using a
later default date than the first action. Finally, the court noted
that the issue was “largely academic,” as the court would be
highly unlikely to allow lender the necessary extension of time to
sell the foreclosed property. The court declined to consider
whether the court in the first foreclosure action had the authority
to dismiss that case with prejudice, noting that lender did not
appeal the dismissal order at the time.

110. Considering the preclusive effect of this second dismissal
with respect to the relief that would be available to lender in a
third action, the court stated that “all foreclosure actions are
fundamentally equitable in nature, and thus the court has some
discretion in adjusting the parties’ respective rights and _liabili-

30 |

ties . . . to achieve a result which is .. . fair and just,” within the
constraints of statute. The court concluded that precluding lender
from recovering any of the amounts it had advanced to pay
borrowers’ real-estate taxes through the course of these proceed-
ings would be “harsh and fundamentally unfair.” But the court
concluded that its final judgment would bar lender from recover-
ing of all of the accrued interest — as well as attorney’s fees, late
fees, filing fees, recording fees, and other costs incurred — from
May 1, 2008 (the default date lender sought to prove in the first
foreclosure action) to September 18, 2014 (the date of the court’s
final order dismissing the second foreclosure action). The court
found that this would “strike the necessary balance between
honoring finality and enforcing the court’s orders, and still allow-
ing [lender] to recover amounts where it is . . . out-of-pocket and
has a more cognizable financial interest and a more compelling
equitable claim.” The court also noted that lender would, in any
event, still have to come up with yet another new, and different
date of default in order to pursue a third foreclosure action.

111. Lender filed this appeal. Lender challenges the trial
court’s ruling that the initial foreclosure judgment was vacated by
implication, both because the dismissal order did not reference the
prior foreclosure judgment or specify that the judgment was
vacated, and because the trial court lacked the authority to vacate
the foreclosure judgment. Lender further challenges the trial
court’s dismissal of the second foreclosure action, arguing that it
satisfied the notice requirement by virtue of its initial notice of
default to borrowers prior to the first action.

I. Impact of the Dismissal of the First Action on the Court’s
Prior Foreclosure Judgment

112. The trial court did not err in concluding that the final
judgment in the first foreclosure action was vacated by implica-
tion, and that the final judgment of dismissal is not now subject.
to collateral attack in this action. Lender contends that the trial
court’s first dismissal did not vacate the prior foreclosure judg-
ment, and that, if it did, the trial court had no authority to, on its
own initiative, vacate the prior judgment without notice to the
parties or legally cognizable grounds. Lender points out that there
was no pending motion to dismi nor any pending Rule 60
motion to vacate or amend the foreclosure judgment order at the
time of the trial court’s dismissal order. The trial court’s dismissal

did not comport with the notice requirements for dismissal on the
court’s own motion pursuant to Rule 41(b), and the case did not
meet the requirements under Rule 41(b) for dismissal on the
court’s motion. And, even if the mediation process for which the
parties had effectively put the post-foreclosure judgment proceed-
ings on hold had been mandatory under the applicable statute,
which lender says it was not, dismissal with prejudice was not a
sanction available under the statute in connection with lender’s
conduct in that mediation process. In sum, lender argues the trial
court had no authority to vacate the final foreclosure judgment.>

113. We begin with the question of whether the court’s
dismissal of the first foreclosure action effectively vacated the
related foreclosure judgment. The interpretation and effect of a
court’s judgment or order is a question of law, which we review
de novo. See TBF Fin, LLC wv Gregoire, 2015 VT 36, 119, 198 Vt.
607, 118 A.Bd 511.

114. I We agree with the trial court that the only reason-
able way to read the court’s November 2010 dismissal of the first
foreclosure action was that it effectively vacated the foreclosure
judgment for lender. The dismissal for failure to prosecute was
issued in response to lender’s failure to appear for a status con-
ference, and to its delay in resolving borrowers’ loan-modification
application. If the order dismissing the first foreclosure action did
not vacate the foreclosure judgment in that case, then it would
have created an irremediable legal limbo. The court had already
issued an order indicating that further judicial proceedings would
be required before a certificate of nonredemption could be issued.
By dismissing the case with prejudice, the court ended all judicial
proceedings. See In re Estate of Benjamin, 2014 MT 241, $11,
339 P.8d 1232 (explaining that dismissal with prejudice “is as
conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been

*We address lender’s argument concerning the status of the first foreclosure
judgment, but note that lender’s assumptions as to the significance of that question
for this appeal are unclear. Lender argues that if the first foreclosure judgment
has not been vacated, then lender was entitled to rely on that judgment when it
filed the second foreclosure action. Lender does not explain this in any more detail,
and it is not entirely clear whether lender is challenging the trial court's
determination that the first foreclosure judgment was vacated: (1) for the purpose
of challenging the trial court’s dismissal of the second action for lack of the
contractually required notice; (2) for the purpose of challenging the trial court’s
ruling about the limits of lender’s potential future remedies; or (3) both.

32 Es

prosecuted to a final adjudication adverse to the plaintiff” (quo-
tation omitted)). Accordingly, if the dismissal order did not vacate
the foreclosure judgment, as lender now argues, then lender
would have been left with a foreclosure judgment authorizing a
judicial sale coupled with a combination of orders ensuring that no
judicial sale could ever occur pursuant to that order. That would
be an unreasonable interpretation. See Poston Feed Mill Co. v
Leyva, 438 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (holding that if
trial court’s order contradicts or is materially inconsistent with
earlier order dealing with same subject matter, latter order
operates to implicitly vacate prior order, even if latter order does
not so expressly provide).

115. Moreover, as the trial court noted, lender’s post-dismissal
actions confirm that it understood the dismissal on the merits to
essentially vacate the first foreclosure judgment. In fact, in the
hearing below in connection with this second foreclosure action,
the lender stated that the first foreclosure judgment had been
vacated to allow parties to try to settle, and emphasized that it
had chosen a new default in connection with the second foreclo-
sure action.

116. Hl We do not reach lender’s argument that the trial court
in November 2010 had no authority to vacate the May 2009
foreclosure judgment because this argument is an impermissible
collateral challenge to the first unappealed dismissal order. Lender
makes potentially persuasive arguments that the trial court did
not have the authority under the circumstances to vacate the final
judgment of foreclosure. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n v Kimball,
2011 VT 81, 122, 190 Vt. 210, 27 A.3d 1087 (“Nevertheless, and
despite the court’s invocation of ‘with prejudice’ in its dismissal
order, U.S. Bank cannot be precluded from pursuing foreclosure
on the merits should it be prepared to prove the necessary
elements.”). But at this point, lender is essentially mounting a
collateral attack on a final judgment. We thus do not reach
lender’s argument that the trial court had no authority to vacate
the foreclosure judgment in its dismissal order. Lender did not
timely appeal the dismissal order, and we cannot now revisit the
issue. Miller vu A.N. Deringer, Inc., 146 Vt. 59, 60, 498 A.2d 501,
502 (1985) (“Judgments from which timely appeals are not taken
are conclusive upon the parties.”).

117. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the
May 2009 foreclosure judgment was effectively vacated by the

trial court’s November 2010 dismissal of the first foreclosure
action.

IL. Effect of Dismissal of the First Action “With Prejudice”

118. The remaining issues in this case all turn on the central
question in this case: What is the effect of a court’s dismissal on
the merits of a foreclosure action, including a contractual claim on
the promissory note, on the lender’s ability to pursue a later claim
for default on the note and foreclosure as a remedy? There is no
perfect answer to this question. Although this Court has not
previously considered the question,’ other courts have taken a
range of approaches — from concluding that where a lender seeks
to accelerate the borrower’s repayment obligation on account of a
default, a dismissal with prejudice forever precludes a subsequent
claim for default on that note, to concluding that the dismissal
does not preclude the lender from bringing a subsequent action
based on a subsequent default. Each of these approaches is
problematic for different reasons, and we adopt a middle path.

1119. I The preclusive effect of a judgment is a question of law
that we review without deference. Breslin uv Synnott, 2012 VT 57,
18, 192 Vt. 79, 54 A3Bd 525.2

4In US. Bank National Ass'n x Kimball we did state that “{aJbsent adjudication
on the underlying indebtedness, the dismissal eannot eaneel [the borrower's]
obligation arising from an authenticated note, or insulate her from foreclosure
proceedings based on proven delinquency” 2011 VT 81, 123, However, the
controversy in Kimball was whether the bank seeking to collect on the mortgage
had standing for jurisdictional purposes. The court’s dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds was not an adjudication upon the merits. Id. 1 22; VR.C.P. 41(b)(3)
(stating that involuntary dismissal, other than one for lack of jurisdiction, operates
as adjudication upon the merits). For that reason, Kimball provides little pertinent
guidance with respeet to the issue before us here.

This issue was also raised in Deutsche Bank u Pinette, 2016 VT 71, 202 Vt. 328,
149 A3d 479, but we declined to reach it because it had not been properly
preserved.
®We note that the trial court invoked equitable considerations in its ruling,
reasoning that foreclosure is an equitable remedy. Although we review a court’s
exercise of its equitable authority deferentially, Currie x Jané, 2014 VT 106, 119,
197 Vt. 599, 109 A.3d 876, a court’s conclusion that equitable prineiples may apply
is a legal determination that we review without deference. Cf. In re Lyon, 2005 VT
63, 115, 178 Vt. 232, 882 A2d 1143. In this case, lender secks foreclosure as a
remedy for borrowers’ default on the underlying note. “{FJoreclosure actions are
equitable in nature and therefore it is proper for the court to weigh the equities
of the situation.” Merchs. Bank u Lambert, 151 Vt. 204, 206, 559 A.2d 665, 666

34 |

120. Hf Dismissal of a claim “with prejudice” operates as an
adjudication “on the merits.” Littlefield vu Town of Colchester, 150
Vt. 249, 251, 552 A.2d 785, 786 (1988); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary 1837 (10th ed. 2014) (defining the term “with prejudice”
to mean “[w]ith loss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of
a party's claim and bars any future action on that claim”).
Determining the preclusive effect of the dismissal with prejudice
of the first action, and the trial court’s ruling in this second
action, requires application of the principles of claim preclusion.
“The rule of claim preclusion applies when the parties, subject
matter, and causes of action in a previous litigation, where the
court has issued a final judgment, and in a subsequent litigation
are the same or substantially identical.” Alden x Alden, 2010 VT
3, 19, 187 Vt. 591, 992 A.2d 298 (mem.). “It precludes the parties
from relitigating not only those claims that were previously
litigated, but also those that should have been raised in previous
litigation.” Id. (quotation omitted).° The trial court’s dismissal of
lender’s first foreclosure action thus operates as an adjudication
for borrowers on the merits of the claims that were litigated or
should have been raised in that action.

121. This statement of black-letter law does little to advance
the analysis. What, exactly, was adjudicated in the first foreclosure
action? Whether borrowers were in default on the note on the
date of the notice of default that preceded that suit? Whether
lender is forever barred from collecting on the note, having
accelerated the principal due on the basis of its claim of default?

(1989) (citing Merchs. Bank x Thibodeau, 143 Vt. 132, 133, 465 A2d 258, 259
(1983)). But, the court’s ability to wield the tools of equity is limited to that aspect
of the case that is equitable in nature — lender’s claim for relief through
foreclosure. To the extent that lender has sought a judgment on the note, the trial
court cannot rely on principles of equity to alter borrowers’ obligation. Gerety u
Poitras, 126 Vt. 158, 155, 224 A2d 919, 921 (1966) (“Equity will not afford relief
where there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. And if the
complainant does have such remedy, and the main cause of action is of a legal
nature, equity has no jurisdiction” (citation omitted)). Because our analysis turns
on the enforceability of the note, which is a legal question, we do not consider the
trial court’s equitable analysis as it relates to the availability and terms of the
foreclosure remedy.

© By contrast, issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was
actually litigated and decided in a prior action. Alden, 2010 VT 3, 111. Given the
nature of the trial court’s dismissal of the first action, no specific issues were
litigated and decided in borrowers’ favor. Accordingly, issue preclusion does not
apply in this case,

Courts have taken divergent approaches to these questions —
none of which is entirely satisfactory.

122. In one line of cases, courts have held that the dismissal
with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits with
respect to the underlying debt in its entirety. The earliest of these
cases is Johnson u Samson Construction Corp., where the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a mortgagee “cannot.
avoid the consequences of [its] procedural default” by attempting
to relitigate nonpayments on a note the debt of which had been
accelerated in a previous lawsuit dismissed with prejudice. 1997
ME 220, 118, 704 A.2d 866. After the borrower defaulted on a May
1990 payment, the lender initiated a foreclosure action in August
for the full amount due under the note, as permitted by the
acceleration clause of the note. In December 1994, the court
dismissed the action with prejudice because the mortgagee failed
to file a Report of Conference of Counsel. Jd. {1 3. In August 1995,
the mortgagee filed a second suit, alleging failure to make
payments from September 1990 onwards and seeking judgment
for the “amount due under the Note.” Jd. 1 4. The trial court
granted summary judgment to the borrower on the grounds of res
judicata. Id. The Maine high court affirmed:

The promissory note between [the parties] required
240 equal monthly payments of principal and interest.
However, the note’s acceleration clause provided that “[i]f
any default be made in any payment under this Note,
and if such default is not made good within thirty (80)
days after written notice of same, the entire unpaid
principal and accrued interest shall become immediately
due and payable without further demand.” [The lender's]
first cause of action alleged that [borrower] “defaulted on
its obligations to the [lender] under the Note” and
demanded payment of the entire unpaid principal bal-
ance. This suit was an action for the accelerated debt.
Once [borrower] triggered the acceleration clause of the
note and the entire debt became due, the contract
became indivisible. The obligations to pay each install-
ment merged into one obligation to pay the entire
balance on the note. The court’s dismissal with prejudice
of the first action operated as an adjudication on the
merits. That judgment bars the complaint in this action
which alleges precisely what the complaint in the first

action alleged: that [the borrower] defaulted on the note
and that [the lender] is entitled to a judgment for the
amount due under the note.

Id. 1 8 (quotations and citations omitted).

123. More recently, the Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass’n vw Gullotta, 2008-Ohio-6268,
899 N.E.2d 987. In Gullotta the borrower filed a motion to dismiss
the lender’s third action for money judgment, foreclosure, and
relief — which declared the entire debt was due under an
acceleration clause — on the ground that the lender’s second suit
against him, like the first, had been voluntarily dismissed. Under
an Ohio rule, a second voluntary dismissal constitutes an adjudi-
cation on the merits. Jd. 1 6. The trial court found that because
the lender’s amended complaint included defaults after the second
dismissal, res judicata did not apply, as the borrower's obligation
to continue making payments would “begin again” in the month
following the second dismissal. /d. {1 10. The intermediate appeals
court affirmed, agreeing claim preclusion did not bar the new
complaint because it pled dates of default not litigated in the prior
two actions. Id. 1 11.

124. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed. The court explained
that the fact that the third complaint listed a default date
subsequent to the dismissal of the second complaint was not
critical; instead, it emphasized that the underlying note and
mortgage “never changed,” that in the first action, the bank
“accelerated the payments owed and demanded the same principal
payment that it demanded in every complaint,” that the borrower
never made an additional payment after his first default, and that.
the lender never attempted to reinstate the loan. Id. 1 19. The
court noted that it was irrelevant that interest was sought only
from the period after the second dismissal because from the time
of the original breach, the borrower had “owed the entire amount
of the principal” the same amount of which was alleged in all
three complaints. Jd. 1 28. The court explained that while gener-
ally each missed payment in an installment loan does give rise to
a separate cause of action, that rule does not apply where the
loan agreement contains an acceleration clause and the lender had
invoked that provision to accelerate the borrower’s obligation to
pay. Id. 11 29-81.

125. Although the reasoning of the Ohio and Maine high courts
makes some sense, there are at least two significant downsides to
this approach: one logical and one practical.

126. The logical tension in these courts’ analyses is that they
rely on the fact that lender accelerated the entire debt, even
though the court's necessary ruling on the merits — that there
has been no default at all — essentially invalidates the lender’s
acceleration. The mortgage notes in the above cases, like the
mortgage note here, afford the lender a right to accelerate the
entire principal debt upon default by the borrower. The breach of
a covenant, or default, by the borrower is a condition precedent to
the acceleration. If the lender brings an action alleging default by
the borrower, and the court determines that the borrower is not,
in fact, in default — whether after actual adjudication on the
merits or by dismissal with prejudice — then the acceleration is
invalid. In other words, the adjudication against lender with
prejudice, or “on the merits,” requires us to treat the first
judgment as essentially determining that lender did not establish
a default on the note by borrowers as of the date alleged. Under
these circumstances, the result of a court’s judgment on the
merits seems to invalidate the attempted acceleration, not to
preserve it as an element of a final judgment that precludes
future attempts to collect on the note.

127. The practical downside is that this approach deprives the
lender of any repayment of principal or interest on a significant
loan, while yielding the borrowers a free, or deeply discounted,
house. By insulating the borrowers from any legally enforceable
obligation to make future payments to lender, this approach
imposes on lender a cost for its procedural default that may be
wholly disproportionate to the lender’s infraction.’ In fact, the
consequences of such a rule might be to discourage lenders from
engaging in the kind of forbearance and negotiation that preceded
the trial court’s dismissal of the first foreclosure action in this
case. Nonetheless, if these perceived inequities necessarily flowed
from the parties’ contractual arrangement, we would impose them.
Arnold v Cantini, 154 Vt. 142, 145, 573 A2d 1198, 1195 (1990)
(explaining that where contract language is clear parties are
bound by the language and “{e]xtraneous imstances do not

Tt also puts the defaulting borrower in a better position than the borrower who
pays a note to its maturity.

38 |

alter that meaning”). But, here there is no such contractual
provision and, as explained, the logic of the approach is question-
able.’

128. For these reasons, several courts have taken a contrary
approach, concluding that claim preclusion does not bar a subse-
quent foreclosure action following the dismissal on the merits of a
first foreclosure action if the second action is predicated on a new
and independent default. The Florida Supreme Court reached this
conclusion in Singleton wv Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla.
2004). In that case, the mortgagee had brought a foreclosure
action against the mortgagor predicated on an alleged default
arising from a failure to make payments due from September 1,
1999 to February 1, 2000. After the mortgagee failed to appear at
a case-management conference, the trial court dismissed the
foreclosure action with prejudice. The mortgagee then filed a
second foreclosure action, alleging a default arising from the
mortgagor’s failure to make payments from April 1, 2000 onward.
The question before the Florida Supreme Court was whether the
dismissal of the first foreclosure action with prejudice barred the
second action. The court quoted approvingly from a lower court's
discussion of the question:

“{I]f the plaintiff in a foreclosure action goes to trial and
loses on the merits, we do not believe such plaintiff would
be barred from filing a subsequent foreclosure action
based upon a subsequent default. The adjudication
merely bars a second action relitigating the same alleged
default. A dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosure
action is tantamount to a judgment against the mort-
gagee. That judgment means that the mortgagee is not
entitled to foreclose the mortgage. Such a ruling moots
any prayer for a deficiency, since a necessary predicate
for a deficiency is an adjudication of foreclosure.”

® We note that borrowers in this case did not take the position reflected in the
Maine and Ohio decisions that a dismissal with prejudice in a case in which the
lender has accelerated the principal due on the loan precludes the lender from
foreclosing on a mortgage in the future. Instead, they argued only that lender
cannot seek in a future action whatever relief the lender sought in the first
foreclosure case — whether attorney’s fees or back taxes or interest.

Id. at 1007 (quoting Capital Bank u Needle, 596 So. 2d 1134, 1138
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). The Florida Supreme Court explained
its rationale:

While it is true that a foreclosure action and an
acceleration of the balance due based upon the same
default may bar a subsequent action on that default, an
acceleration and foreclosure predicated upon subsequent
and different defaults present a separate and distinct
issue. . . . For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a
foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in
default on the payments alleged to be in default, or that
the mortgagee had waived reliance on the defaults. In
those instances, the mortgagor and mortgagee are simply
placed back in the same contractual relationship with the
same continuing obligations. Hence, an adjudication de-
nying acceleration and foreclosure under those circum-
stances should not bar a subsequent action a year later
if the mortgagor ignores her obligations on the mortgage
and a valid default can be proven.

This seeming variance from the traditional law of res
judicata rests upon a recognition of the unique nature of
the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of
the parties in that relationship. For example, we can
envision many instances in which the application of the
[contrary view] would result in unjust enrichment or
other inequitable results. If res judicata prevented a
mortgagee from acting on a subsequent default even
after an earlier claimed default could not be established,
the mortgagor would have no incentive to make future
timely payments on the note. The adjudication of the
earlier default would essentially insulate [the mortgagor]
from future foreclosure actions on the note — merely
because [the mortgagor] prevailed in the first action.
Clearly, justice would not be served if the mortgagee was
barred from challenging the subsequent default payment
solely because [the mortgagee] failed to prove the earlier
alleged default.

Id. at 1007-08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Finding “no
valid basis for barring mortgagees from challenging subsequent
defaults on a mortgage and note solely because they did not

40 |

prevail in a previous attempted foreclosure based upon a separate
alleged default,” the court concluded that claim preclusion does
not bar a successive foreclosure suit based on a subsequent and
separate alleged default. Jd. at 1008.

129. Similarly, in the case of Afolabi u Atlantic Mortgage &
Imestment Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), the
mortgagee’s first foreclosure action against the mortgagor had
been dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute, and several
years later, the mortgagee filed a new foreclosure action against
the mortgagor, who had not made any payments toward the
underlying debt in over ten years. The mortgagor argued that the
mortgagee’s first action was predicated on an acceleration of all
payments due under the note and mortgage and a demand for
payment, necessarily including all future payments. Id. at 1174.
Because the mortgagee’s claim had been dismissed with prejudice,
the mortgagor argued, it was barred from pursuing the second
claim. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
concluding that claim preclusion does not bar successive foreclo-
sure claims, regardless of whether the mortgagee sought to
accelerate payments on the note in the first claim, where subse-
quent and separate alleged defaults under the note create a new
and independent right in the mortgagee to accelerate payment on
the note in a subsequent foreclosure action. Id. at 1175; see also
In ve Rogers Townshend & Thomas, PC, 773 S8.E.2d 101, 104-08
(N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that rule barring third action after
two voluntary dismissals of same claims does not bar third
foreclosure action where periods of claimed default were differ-
ent).

130. In Fairbank’s Capital Corp. w Milligan the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals considered a similar issue, but with a twist. In
that case, the lender and borrower had settled the first foreclosure
case and had, in connection with that settlement, stipulated to
dismissal of that action with prejudice. 234 F. App’x 21 (3d Cir.
2007). The borrower subsequently fell into default again by failing
to pay monthly installments as they came due. The lender gave
notice of the default and its intent to accelerate the payment of
the remaining principal as authorized by the note if the borrower
failed to pay the outstanding amount. When the lender filed an
action for the debt and foreclosure of the mortgage, the borrower
defended that the dismissal with prejudice of the prior foreclosure
action precluded the new one. The Third Circuit found the

a .

reasoning of Singleton and Afolabi persuasive, and concluded that
the parties’ stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the first fore-
closure action could not bar a subsequent mortgage foreclosure
action based on defaults occurring after dismissal of the first
action. Id. at 23. Otherwise, the court reasoned, “it would encour-
age a delinquent mortgagor to come to a settlement with a
mortgagee on a default in order to later insulate the mortgagor
from the consequences of a subsequent default. This is plainly
nonsensical.” Id. at 24.

131. While this reasoning is logical, it also raises significant
practical problems. Logically, a court’s adjudication on the merits
in favor of a borrower after the lender asserts a default: estab-
lishes the absence of any default; invalidates the lender’s at-
tempted acceleration under the note; precludes the lender’s at-
tempted foreclosure; and places the parties “back in the same
contractual relationship with the same continuing obligations.”
Singleton, 882 So. 2d at 1007. But, as a practical matter, if a
court’s dismissal with prejudice against the lender automatically
“unaccelerates” the debt and reinstates the borrower’s monthly
payment obligation by operation of law with no further action by
the lender, unsophisticated borrowers may be inexorably funneled
into a new default. How is the borrower to know what principal
is due, when it is due, or even where to send the check? This case
illustrates these practical problems. Here, borrowers’ counsel
represented that after the first dismissal borrowers tried to
reinstate monthly payments but lender would not confirm the
amount owed and would not accept their payment, essentially
forcing a “new” default. Expecting ordinary borrowers to know of
the opportunity and obligation to reinstate monthly payments
after a dismissal of the lender’s foreclosure action with prejudice,
and to have in hand the information nec ry to do so, would
ignore the significant asymmetry in sophistication and information
intrinsic to most mortgage lender-borrower relationships.

132. Moreover, even if we allow a second action based on a new
default on the note, accompanied by a second foreclosure action,
we still must wrestle with difficult questions. What principal
remains due on the note? What interest and penalties, if any, are
due? Given that significant time passed between lender’s filing of
the first complaint (December 2008) and the trial court’s dismissal
with prejudice (November 2010), how should we account for
principal payments that would have been due during that time, or
interest that accrued?

42 |

1133. I Mindful of the strengths and weaknesses of these two
conflicting approaches, we choose a third path that is both
logically coherent and practically tenable. First, we conclude that
any principal, interest, penalties, or other liabilities from borrow-
ers to lender that accrued before the default and attempted
acceleration on which the first foreclosure action was predicated
have been definitively adjudicated in borrowers’ favor.® No subse-
quent claim by the lender can incorporate claimed arrearages of
any sort that were due from borrowers to lender on or before the
date of default on which the first action was based. This conclu-
sion flows logically from the adjudication of lender’s claim of
default on the merits, and is consistent with both approaches
outlined above.

134. J Second, during the pendency of the first action that
was dismissed with prejudice, no arrearage with respect to
principal or interest, or fees or penalties for nonpayment of
borrowers’ monthly obligation, could have accrued. By attempting
to accelerate the borrowers’ debt on the note, albeit ultimately
unsuccessfully, lender effectively suspended borrowers’ obligation
to make monthly payments of principal and interest such that,
until such monthly obligation was reinstated, borrowers cannot be
found in default or otherwise penalized for failing to make the
payments.

135. EM Third, lender cannot claim that any interest on the
outstanding principal balance accrued during the pendency of the
foreclosure action. That claim effectively extended the term of the
loan by placing borrowers’ obligations into an indefinite legal
limbo; the court’s dismissal with prejudice reflects that the action
was not warranted. If the consequence of the court’s effective
invalidation of lender’s acceleration is to put the parties back in

® During the course of the first action lender invoked a specific date of default of
May 1, 2008, and calculated the interest it claimed with reference to that date.
However, lender’s actual complaint in that first foreclosure, filed December 15,
2008, alleged generally, “Mortgagor(s) has/have failed to make the payments called
for under the Note and Mortgage.” Lender’s complaint in the first foreclosure
action did not specify a date of default, but alleged that borrowers had failed to
make payments due on the note and mortgage. Accordingly, we construe the
dismissal with prejudice as a determination that lender had failed to establish a
default prior to December 15, 2008, the date of the filing of the complaint. An
order dismissing this complaint with prejudice therefore precludes a subsequent
claim that borrowers have defaulted in any way on or before December 15, 2008.

the position they would have been absent the dismissed claim of
default, then the period of liability for subsequent interest pay-
ments faced by borrowers should not be prolonged on account of
lender’s unwarranted foreclosure action.’°

136. EM Fourth, borrowers’ underlying obligation to pay the
balance of principal due (calculated as if all due principal was
timely paid up to the date of default upon which the first action
was predicated), and to make monthly payments for interest on
that outstanding principal, is not extinguished by the judgment
with prejudice in the first >, However, borrowers’ obligations to
pay interest on the outstanding principal and to make monthly
payments toward principal and interest are conditioned on thirty-
days’ notice from lender inviting borrowers to, without penalty,
reinstate borrowers’ monthly payments of principal and interest as
established in the original, preclaimed-default note and instructing
where to send any such payments. In other words, the court’s
dismissal of the first foreclosure action “with prejudice” can
“unaccelerate” the loan and restore borrowers’ obligation to make
monthly payments toward the still-outstanding principal and as-
sociated interest, but lender, having accelerated the loan, must
provide notice to borrowers of the remaining principal amount
due, the monthly payments due, the date payments are due, how
to make those payments, and that failure to make the payments
when due will constitute a default, with the consequences outlined
in the note.

137. EM Fifth, although lender is precluded from claiming
amounts related to the first default — including interest, penalties
and attorney’s fees — lender is not precluded from recovering
real estate taxes it paid to preserve its security interest in the
property. Payment of real estate taxes is not a subject covered in
borrowers’ note, and the default alleged and adjudicated in
borrowers’ favor did not rest on delinquent tax payments. The
mortgage itself provides that payments made by lender to protect.
the value of the property may be added to the security interest.
In addition, under 12 V.S.A. § 4935, if lender, as mortgagee, pays

1°We realize that the foreclosure action was not, at the time, unwarranted, and
that the trial court actually awarded lender a judgment on the note and for
foreclosure. But because we are compelled to treat the trial court’s unappealed
dismissal of lender’s complaint as a final adjudication against lender on the merits,
we must treat lender’s claim as unwarranted.

44 |

the taxes on the mortgaged real estate, the amounts paid are
“added to and become a part of the debt or obligation secured by
[its] mortgage.” Therefore, lender’s ability to recover the amounts
paid in taxes is not affected by the dismissal of the first
foreclosure action on the merits because the court’s ruling that
borrowers were not in default on the note does not affect lender’s
rights arising from the mortgage instrument (as opposed to the
note) as well as from statute.

138. We note that in laying out the above, we are not invoking
equity to abate a contractually valid interest provision in a
defaulted mortgage loan, or to preclude lender from recovering
fees or costs to which it is contractually entitled, as lender
contends the trial court did. Rather, we are considering as a
matter of law lender’s enforceable contractual rights to presuit
arrearages, penalties, and fees, as well as its entitlement to
interest during the period of prolongation wrought by lender’s
ultimately dismissed legal action, given (1) lender’s acceleration of
the loan; (2) the extended legal proceedings resulting from its
actions; and (3) the trial court’s unappealed dismissal of lender’s
first action with prejudice, or on the merits. We also note that this
holding is tied to the specific provisions (and gaps) in the parties’
agreement. If a mortgage note establishes a procedure for dealing
with an attempted acceleration to which a court rules adversely on
the merits, that procedure may govern.

III. Impact on Trial Court’s Dismissal of the Second
Foreclosure Action

139. [BB In light of the above, we do not dispute the trial
court’s conclusion that lender could not pursue a second action on
the note with a claim for foreclosure without a new notice of
default as required by the parties’ agreement as a prerequisite to
acceleration of the note and an action for foreclosure. The trial
court’s dismissal of the first foreclosure action on the merits
means that the claimed default underlying that action was con-
clusively adjudicated against lender. In this second foreclosure
case, lender therefore could not rely on its notice of default and
eration in connection with the first foreclosure case to satisfy
ss contractual notice obligation.

140. But, as set forth above, the impediments to lender’s
second foreclosure action run deeper. Lender may in the future
pursue a claim for default on the note and foreclosure of the

ac

mortgage based upon a new default, but until borrowers are given
notice and an opportunity to reinstate the loan, without penalty,
lender will have no basis for claiming a default in the first place.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the
second foreclosure action — the one here on appeal.'t

IV. Impact of Trial Court’s Dismissal of the Second
Foreclosure Action

141. The trial court spent considerable energy thoughtfully
attempting to address the prospective application of its dismissal
of this second foreclosure action to future actions. Given that the
second suit was dismissed primarily due to lender’s failure to
provide a notice of default, rather than as an adjudication on the
merits, the preclusive effect of the second dismissal may not be
the same as the preclusive effect of the first — the issue before
us in this case. See, e.g., Foster x Chiles, 467 S.W.3d 911, 916
(Tenn. 2015) (dismissal without prejudice is proper sanction for
failure to provide statutory presuit notice requirement); accord
Neal v Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 575 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997); Fowler u White, 85 So. 8d 287, 291 (Miss. 2012). Cf.
Kimball, 2011 VT 81, 1.23 (“Absent adjudication on the underlying
indebtedness, the dismissal [for lack of standing] cannot cancel
[borrower's] obligation arising from an authenticated note, or
insulate [borrower] from foreclosure proceedings based on proven
delinquency.”).

142. HB In general, “a court should not dictate preclusion
consequences at the time of deciding a first action.” Alden, 2010
VT 3, 18. Instead, “the court in the subsequent action is entitled
to make its own determination as to the preclusive effect of the
earlier judgment.” Jd. Although there may be circumstances or
policy considerations that lead a court to address the preclusive
effect of its own decisions, courts should exercise their power to
do so “sparingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). When a court does

‘The dissent asserts that our above analysis is dicta. Post, 150. Our analysis of
the precise question before us — whether the trial court properly dismissed the
second foreclosure action — turns in part on the fact that the lender had not
taken any steps to give notice that its attempt to accelerate the note had failed
and to reestablish a payment plan. Although this analysis may also have
implications for potential future legal proceedings between these parties, it is
directly relevant to our affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the second
action. For that reason, we do not consider it “100% dicta.” Post, 1 44.

46 |

address the preclusive effect of its own decision, its ruling “is
entirely prudential and not compelled by law,’ and it is generally
“the duty of the second trial court — which knows both what the
earlier finding was and how it relates to a later case — to
independently determine what preclusive effect a prior judgment
may be given.” Jd. (quotation omitted). For these reasons, we do
not here attempt to address the impact of the trial court’s
dismissal of the second foreclosure action on future scenarios that
have yet to arise.

143. For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal
of this foreclosure action.

Affirmed.

144. Dooley, J., dissenting. I agree with the majority that the
trial court was correct to conclude that the May 2009 foreclosure
judgment was vacated by the November 2010 dismissal of the first
foreclosure action. However, I cannot agree with their answer to
the “central question” of this case; that is, whether subsequent
claims for default on a note are permissible when a lender has
previously accelerated a borrower’s repayment obligations,
brought suit for the entire amount due on the note, failed to
prosecute the action, and had it dismissed with prejudice. Ante,
1118. Because any answer to the “central question” is 100% dicta,
I would not answer it. If we have to answer it, I would say that.
such claims are not permissible. If we have to rule on the merits,
I would adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Courts of Ohio and
Maine, and hold that no subsequent missed payments under an
accelerated note, regardless of whether they occurred before or
after an action adjudicating foreclosure, can give rise to a new
claim that would save lender’s case from dismissal on res judicata
grounds, absent an indication the parties had modified the terms
of the agreement or the lender had reinstated the loan, neither of
which is present in the instant case. Accordingly, I dissent.

145. At the outset, I view the context of this case very
differently than the majority. The majority states its context as a
practical downside to full application of claim preclusion in this
case:

The practical downside is that this approach deprives

the lender of any repayment of principal or interest on a
significant loan, while yielding the borrowers a free, or

a °

deeply discounted, house. By insulating the borrowers
from any legally enforceable obligation to make future
payments to lender, this approach imposes on lender a
cost for its procedural default that may be wholly
disproportionate to the lender’s infraction. In fact, the
consequences of such a rule might be to discourage
lenders from engaging in the kind of forbearance and
negotiation that preceded the trial court’s dismissal of
the first foreclosure action in this case.

Ante, | 27 (footnote omitted). This “practical downside” analysis is
persuasively critiqued in a comment in the Yale Law Journal:

Eight years after the start of America’s housing crisis,
state courts are increasingly confronting an unanticipated
consequence; what happens when a bank brings a fore-
closure suit and loses? Well-established legal principles
seem to provide a clear answer: the homeowner keeps
her house, and res judicata bars any future suit to
foreclose on the home. Yet state courts around the
country resist this outcome.

When addressing faulty foreclosures, courts are afraid
to bar future attempts to foreclose — that is, afraid of
giving borrowers “free houses.” While courts rarely ex-
plain the reasoning behind this aversion, it seems to arise
from a reflexive belief that such an outcome would be
unjust. Courts are therefore quick to sidestep well-
established principles of res judicata in favor of ad hoc
measures meant to protect banks against the specter of
“free houses.”

This Comment argues that this approach is misguided;
courts should issue final judgments in favor of homeown-
ers in cases where banks fail to prove the elements
required for foreclosure. Furthermore, these judgments
should have res judicata effect — thus giving homeown-
ers “free houses.” This approach has several benefits: it is
consistent with longstanding res judicata principles in
other forms of civil litigation; it provides a necessary
market-correcting incentive to promote greater responsi-

48 |

bility among foreclosure litigators, and it alleviates the
tremendous costs of successive foreclosure proceedings.

M. Wachspress, et al., Comment, In Defense of “Free Houses”, 125
Yale L.J. 1115, 1115-16 (2016) (footnote omitted).

146. The analysis captures exactly what is occurring in this
case. While I acknowledge the majority’s analysis is more creative
than that in other cases rejecting the effect of claim preclusion,
and may be a compromise of sorts, it is not consistent with settled
claim preclusion law, gives the lender a windfall it doesn’t deserve
and, most important, lets lender’s counsel avoid most of the
consequences of the way it practices law in our courts.

147. It is the last reason that particularly motivates this
dissent. I doubt a loss in this case will have much effect on lender,
which, by its own estimation, has serviced approximately 1.65
million loans, totaling $351 billion dollars. Cenlar Ratings: Fitch
Affirms Cenlar FSB’s U.S. RMBs Servicer Ratings, Cenlar (Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.cenlar.com/about/ratings [https://perma.ce/
8GWL-6ZV5]. But the default here was not caused by lender;
instead it was caused by the inaction of lender’s lawyers. Lender’s
counsel, Schechtman Halperin Savage, LLP — who also served as
counsel to lender in Deutsche Bank v Pinette, 2016 VT 71, 202 Vt.
328, 149 A.3d 479, a very similar case — emphasizes that it has
“conducted thousands of foreclosures throughout Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Ver-
mont.” Practice Areas: Foreclosure and Default Servicing,
Shechtman Halperin Savage LLP (2016), http:/Awww.shslawfirm.com/
practice-areas/foreclosure-and-default-servicing [https://perma.ce/
2DSX-R683]. The firm is apparently what has become known as a
foreclosure mill.

148. The modus operandi of the law firm, at least as demon-
strated in this case and Pinette, is to deal with obstacles in its
handling of foreclosure cases by ignoring those obstacles and filing
a new mortgage foreclosure action essentially identical to the one
it had already filed. In Pinette, the firm filed a foreclosure action
which was dismissed because it failed to file for a default
judgment as ordered by the court and responded by filing a new
mortgage foreclosure action. This one was S
ice for failure to prosecute. Instead of seeking relief from the
issal, the firm again filed a new mortgage foreclosure action.
When the mortgagor moved to dismiss claiming the new action

a °

was precluded by res judicata, the firm failed to answer the
motion, and the court dismissed the action. Only then did the firm
come awake and move to reopen. When it lost in the trial court
again, the firm appealed to this Court and attempted to file in this
Court a document critical to its appeal theory even though it had
never been presented to the trial court. Pinette, 2016 VT 71, 115.
The history of this case has fewer twists and turns, but the
conduct is consistent. The first foreclosure action was dismissed
with prejudice when the firm failed to appear in person or by
telephone at a status conference. Jd. {1 4. The firm did not move
to reopen or appeal the dismissal. Jd. 1 5. Instead it filed a new
foreclosure action alleging a new default, but provided defendant
with no new notice of default.

149. Allowing the firm’s modus operandi is inconsistent with
every one of the policy reasons that underlie the doctrine of claim
preclusion: “(1) to conserve the resources of courts and litigants
by protecting them against piecemeal or repetitive litigation; (2) to
prevent vexatious litigation, (8) to promote the finality of judg-
ments and encourage reliance on judicial decisions; and (4) to
decrease the chances of inconsistent adjudication.” Im re Cent. Vt.
Pub. Seru Corp. 172 Vt. 14, 20, 769 A2d 668, 673 (2001).
Fundamentally what the firm’s litigation strategy seeks is incon-
sistent adjudication.

150. The majority argues that fully enforcing claim preclusion
against plaintiff will result in lenders refusing to negotiate settle-
ments. The dismissals in these cases have nothing to do with the
substance of the lenders’ position or actions, and certainly nothing
about whether they should enter into forbearance agreements
with borrowers. Instead, they have everything to do with how
counsel for the lender engages in litigation and fulfills its obliga-
tion to the trial courts. On this basis, any remedy we impose is
not disproportionate to the actions and inaction that caused the
remedy. We need to send a clear message to counsel and its
clients that these methods of conducting litigation are unaccept-
able and will not get them the remedies they seek even in part.
The message should not be that they may file foreclosure action
after foreclosure action until they finally win.

151. Having addressed the difference of perspective of what is
at stake in this litigation, I return to my first point. As the
majority recognizes in its discussion of Alden u Alden, it is
inappropriate to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment in

50 |

a case before the court on a future action. 2010 VT 3, 187 Vt. 591,
992 A.2d 298 (mem.). Even though it affirms the superior court
dismissal in this case, the majority opinion violates the Alden rule
and goes far beyond determining the preclusive effect of the
judgment in this case or in the earlier case with respect to a new
mortgage foreclosure action. It instructs the plaintiff on how to
structure its actions and mortgage foreclosure complaint so it can
prevail in the next mortgage foreclosure action. It is an exercise
in dicta that does not have precedential effect.

152. I join the majority in voting to affirm the decision of the
superior court without that court’s dicta about what it might do if
lender brings another foreclosure action. For the same reason as
I believe the trial court cannot bind a future trial judge on how
to rule on a new foreclosure action, I do not believe it is
appropriate for this Court to do exactly the same thing.” Lender
is not entitled to a lesson in how to get it right. The clear
message should be that counsel must stop the action and inaction
that creates the dismissals in the first instance.

153. Because, consistent with my perspective view, I disagree
with the majority’s dicta on how lender can be successful in the
next mortgage foreclosure action, I will address the merits of the
“central question,” recognizing that my view is also dicta. I have
addressed its “practical downside.” I now address the “logical
tension.” My point here is that the majority’s remedy is inconsis-
tent with settled claim preclusion law.

154. This case is fundamentally an action on a note. If
borrowers owe money under the note, and fail to pay under the
terms of the note, lender can obtain a judgment for that amount.
and can foreclose on the mortgage property to ensure payment of
the money owed. If borrowers owe no money on the note, the
security represented by the mortgage is of no effect and lender
cannot foreclose. In the first action, the complaint alleged “Mort-
gagor(s) has/have failed to make the payments called for under

©The posture of this case explains why I would not hold that borrowers are
prevented from obtaining a full claim preclusion remedy beeause their counsel
stated that he was not arguing that a dismissal with prejudice of a foreclosure
“means you can never foreclose on a mortgage again.” This was a statement about
what should happen in a new future foreclosure action, a subject not before the
court. It was impossible for counsel to predict what the superior court would say
about the availability of a third foreclosure action and certainly was impossible to
predict the majority’s dicta on the subject.

the Note and Mortgage” and “The failure of Mortgagor(s) to
make payments as set forth herein, constitutes a breach of the
subject Note and mortgage held by Plaintiff.” It repeated these
claims in Count II of the complaint. In the remedies section,
lender sought an order that “defendants . .. pay to the Clerk of
the Court for the benefit of plaintiff all amounts due and to
become due on the Note and Mortgage, with interest thereon,
together with sums expended, reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.” It also requested the court to “award deficiency judgment
against defendants for any amounts due and owing under the
Note after disposition of the Mortgaged premises and application
of the proceeds from that disposition to the debt of defendant, if
applicable by law.” There is nothing in the complaint that men-
tions borrowers’ obligation to make monthly payments or de-
scribes acceleration of those payments.

155. The most persuasive of the cases dealing with this issue is
Johnson v Samson Construction Corp., where the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine held that a mortgagee “cannot avoid the
consequences of [its] procedural default” by attempting to
relitigate nonpayments on a note the debt of which had been
accelerated in a previous lawsuit dismissed with prejudice. 1997
ME 220, 118, 704 A.2d 866. The heart of the Maine court’s analysis
was as follows:

[Lender’s] first cause of action alleged that [borrower]
“defaulted on its obligations to the Plaintiff under the
Note” and demanded payment of the entire unpaid
principal balance. This suit was an action for the accel-
erated debt. Once [lender] triggered the acceleration
clause of the note and the entire debt became due, the
contract. became indivisible. The obligations to pay each
installment merged into one obligation to pay the entire
balance on the note. The court’s dismissal with prejudice
of the first action operated “as an adjudication on the
merits.” That judgment bars the complaint in this action
which alleges precisely what the complaint in the first
action alleged: that [borrower] defaulted on the note and
that [lender] is entitled to a judgment for the amount
due under the note.

Id. (citations omitted). The Johnson analysis is explained in more
detail in U.S. National Bank Ass'n uv Gullotta, 2008-Ohio-6268,
899 N.E.2d 987. The analysis in both cases applies here.

Ra
&

156. I recognize there are conflicting decisions, but they are far
less persuasive. They are examples of the Yale Law Review's
article’s description of “Courts [that] are therefore quick to
sidestep well-established principles of res judicata in favor of ad
hoc measures meant to protect banks against the specter of ‘free
houses’ ” Wachspress, supra, 125 Yale L.J. at 1115-16. The leading
case is Singleton uv Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2004),
which acknowledges that it is creating a separate rule of claim
preclusion for mortgage foreclosure cases:

This seeming variance from the traditional law of res
judicata rests upon a recognition of the unique nature of
the mortgage obligation and the continuing obligations of
the parties in that relationship. For example, we can
envision many instances in which the application of the
Stadler decision would result in unjust enrichment or
other inequitable results. If res judicata prevented a
mortgagee from acting on a subsequent default even
after an earlier claimed default could not be established,
the mortgagor would have no incentive to make future
timely payments on the note. The adjudication of the
earlier default would essentially insulate her from future
foreclosure actions on the note — merely because she
prevailed in the first action. Clearly, justice would not be
served if the mortgagee was barred from challenging the
subsequent default payment solely because he failed to
prove the earlier alleged default.

Id. at 1007-08.

157. The decision is explained at least in part because there
was no claim for judgment on the note in the first action, id. at
1007, and the case is analyzed as an equitable mortgage foreclo-
sure case and not, first and foremost, as an action on the note
with the mortgage as security. There is no analysis of how there
can be a new default on an accelerated note. Apparently “new
default” are a form of magic words, and the mortgagee faces no
adverse consequences, either in the availability of foreclosure or in
the sum it can recover, as a result of the dismissal of the first
foreclosure action.

158. This leads me to the majority’s “compromise.” In support
of its position that dismissal of the first complaint with prejudice
did not preclude a second foreclosure action, the majority argues

that when a court delivers judgment in a case where a lender has
sought to accelerate the entire debt, be it through a full adjudi-
cation on the merits or a dismissal for failure to prosecute, the
court has effectively determined that the borrower “is not, in fact,
in default.” Ante, {1 26. It goes on to state that because default by
the borrower is a “condition precedent to the acceleration,” a
judgment for the borrower “seems to invalidate the attempted
acceleration, not [] preserve it as an element of a final judgment
that precludes future attempts to collect on the note.” Ante, 1 26.

159. There is nothing in the complaint that is consistent with
this theory. It does not seek judicial endorsement of its decision
to accelerate that note; instead it seeks a judgment for the entire
unpaid amount of the note, including principal that would come
due in the future if plaintiff never accelerated.'> The majority's
description exactly fits a situation where, after default on one or
more monthly obligations, the plaintiff declares a default but does
not accelerate the payment obligation and sues to collect the
unpaid installments and foreclose the mortgage as security for the
payment of those installments. In such a situation, if the action
were dismissed with prejudice, plaintiff would lose exactly what it
sought — the unpaid installments — and could proceed to declare
a new default if later installments were unpaid and, at its option,
accelerate the payment obligation. In this case, plaintiff sought the
entire amount due under the note, together with interest and fees,
and lost. Having put the entire amount in issue, the dismissal of
the case necessarily precludes recovery of any of that amount and,
therefore, the mortgage foreclosure. As the Ohio Supreme Court
noted, accepting the majority’s position “would be like allowing a
plaintiff in a personal-injury case to save his claim from the
[preclusion] rule by amending his complaint to forgo a couple of
months of lost wages.” Guilotta, 2008-Ohio-6268, 137.

160. In summary, nothing about the facts of this case should
compel us to find an exception to the long established policies
undergirding the doctrine of res judicata. Lender had ample
opportunities to pursue its claims. Lender alone chose to accel-
erate defendants’ payment obligations under the note and claim

Nor does the note in this case contain an authorization for plaintiff to
“onaecelerate” the note without the consent of defendant. This distinguishes this
case from Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas x Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938, 946-49
(Pla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016), which holds that the terms of the note and mortgage
do allow for unilateral unacceleration,

54 |

all amounts due in both complaints, as well as to miss the status
conference that led the trial court to dismiss the initial action.
Borrowers have been subjected to ongoing litigation in this matter
since 2008; our judicial system has borne the burden and costs
associated with lender’s “inadvertence or mistake[s].” Lender and
its counsel are sophisticated entities, well-versed in the Vermont
foreclosure process, and have shown no justification for a deviation
from long-standing principles of claim preclusion, the enforcement.
of which is “essential to the maintenance of social order,’ to
securing the “peace and repose of society,’ and to enhancing
public confidence in judicial tribunals. Nevada v. United States,
463 U.S. 110, 129 (1983). “[P]ublic policy dictates that there be an
end [to this] litigation.” Faulkner uv Caledonia Cty. Fair Ass’n,
2004 VT 123, 110, 178 Vt. 51, 869 A.2d 103 (quotation omitted).

161. I dissent.

2016 VT 83

State of Vermont v. Toby Charbonneau
(152 Aad 462)
No. 15-192
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed August 26, 2016

Ld °
James A. Hughes, Franklin County State’s Attorney, St.
Albans, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Deputy
Defender General, and Ashton Roberts, Law Clerk (On the Brief),
Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Eaton, J. Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of
stolen property in violation of 18 V.S.A. § 2561(b) and misde-
meanor possession of stolen property in violation of the same
statute. He was subsequently ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $35,791. On appeal, he challenges the restitution order.
The issues on appeal are (1) whether an order of restitution must
relate to the damage caused by the criminal conduct for which
defendant pleaded guilty; (2) whether restitution is limited to
items that were not recovered and returned to the victim; and (3)
whether the trial court is required to make findings as to a
defendant’s ability to pay in a restitution order. We reverse on the
first issue.

12. On March 9, 2014, the victims notified the St. Albans City
Police that their private residence had been burgled on March 7
or 8. The victims reported thousands of dollars’ worth of property
as having been stolen and filed claims with two insurance com-
panies for the stolen items: one for $28,274 and one for $23,956.97,
amounting to a total of $52,230.97 in claimed losses. The victims’
insurance providers made payments of $9172.30 and $12,000, for a
total of $21,172.

13. The victims subsequently notified the police that defendant
and his partner had posted some of the items reported as stolen
from their residence on the Franklin County Facebook website,
“Buy, Sell, or Trade.” The police applied for and received a search
warrant for defendant’s residence. During a search, the police
recovered fifteen items identified by the victims as stolen from
their residence during the burglary, and these items were later
returned to the victims.

56 |

14. On March 25, 2014, defendant was charged with felony
possession of stolen property valued in excess of $900 in violation
of 18 V.S.A. § 2561(b). At a change of plea hearing on January 5,
2015, defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of stolen
property in violation of § 2561(b) and to misdemeanor possession
of stolen property in violation of the same statute.' There was no
colloquy as to the specific items defendant admitted to having
possessed, and there was no mention as to specific items that
were recovered from defendant’s residence. The State described
the factual basis for the plea as resulting from a search of
defendant’s residence, where “several items of property that were
identified as belonging to the [victims’] family” were recovered.

15. The trial court subsequently held a restitution hearing,
where neither defendant nor the State objected to the trial court
adopting the findings of fact relative to the loss amount and value
of the items stolen from the victims as derived from testimony
and findings at defendant’s partner’s restitution hearing.” This
included testimony that defendant and his partner had purchased
the items from an individual offering them for sale out of the back
of his car, and that they then advertised the items for sale on the
Franklin County Facebook website “Buy, Sell, or Trade.” At
defendant’s partner’s hearing, the trial court determined that the
recovered and returned items had a collective actual cash value
(ACV) of $6765.70, but that because they had been returned to the
victims, there was no material logs. For this reason, the trial court
did not order defendant’s partner to pay restitution.

16. At defendant’s restitution hearing, the State sought resti-
tution for the victims’ total uninsured loss as a result of the
burglary, which it argued to be $85,791. This figure included the
value of the items that were recovered and returned to the
victims, as well as the value of the remaining items reported as
stolen but not recovered during the search of defendant’s resi-
dence. At the hearing, the trial court considered testimony from
one of the victims. She testified that defendant posted a photo-
graph on Facebook depicting a TV stolen during the burglary, and
that she had seen defendant approximately one week before the

Section 2561(b) provides that the penalty for receiving stolen property is “the
same as for the stealing of such property.” The larceny statutes make stealing
property valued in excess of $900, a felony, 13 VS.A. § 2501, and below that
amount, a misdemeanor, id. § 2502.
2 See State x Shepard, No. 255-3-14 FrCr, at 4 (Vt. Dee. 18, 2014).

burglary parked ac from her home. The court also considered
testimony from Detective Trevor Sergeant, who had investigated
the burglary, that he had observed a shoe print in the snow
outside the victims’ home with a distinctive “x” mark, and that he
had seized a pair of Nike shoes from defendant’s home with an
“x” pattern on the heel. The number of shoes with a similar
pattern was not established.

17. Considering findings from defendant’s partner’s restitution
hearing, as well as the victims’ testimony and that of Detective
Sergeant, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant was seen in some proximity to the victims’
residence a week before the burglary, possessed a shoe with a
similar print left at the scene of the burglary, and possessed and
offered for sale a TV reported as stolen during the burglary but
which was not among the property defendant alleged was pur-
chased out of the back of a car. Based on these findings, the court
concluded that defendant had committed the burglary of the
victims’ home in early March 2014. Based on the findings and
conclusions, and after noting that “no evidence was offered
regarding defendant’s ability to pay” restitution, the trial court
calculated the victims’ material loss as the value of the items
claimed under both insurance policies ($52,230.97), minus the
amount paid by the insurance companies ($21,172), for a total of
$35,791." Defendant appealed.

18. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s restitution
order. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
ordering restitution for losses attributed to an offense other than
the charged offense; that the trial court erred in failing to make
findings as to defendant’s ability to pay; and that the trial court
improperly included in its restitution order items recovered and
returned to the victim, which were not material losses as defined
under the statute. “We review restitution orders for an abuse of
discretion, and interpret controlling statutes de novo.” State v
Gorton, 2014 VT 1, 18, 195 Vt. 460, 90 A.8d 901.

19. We first address defendant’s assertion that the trial court
erred in ordering restitution for losses attributable to the burglary
of the victims’ residence, because the burglary and resulting losses

® The Court is aware that $52,230.97 minus $21,172 does not equal $35,791. In its
brief, the State acknowledges errors in the trial court’s calculation of the vietims?
material loss, Because we reverse on other grounds there is no need to address
these mathematical errors.

58 |

were not directly related to defendant’s offense of possession of
stolen property. It is undisputed that the factual basis for
defendant’s plea was that several items of the victims’ property
were recovered from defendant’s residence; that defendant’s plea
did not include the possession of any items other than those
recovered; and that defendant was not charged with, nor did he
admit to, the underlying burglary of the victims’ residence.
Nonetheless, the trial court’s order included both the value of
those items recovered from defendant’s residence and the value of
the property reported as stolen from the victims’ residence during
the March 2014 burglary but not found at defendant’s residence.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he
had committed the burglary, and moreover, that the absence of a
direct link between his plea and the burglary necessitates the
reversal of the restitution order for losses attributed to the
burglary.

1110. HM Vermont’s restitution statute is intended to compensate
victims for their “material loss,” 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a), which is
defined as an “uninsured property loss, uninsured out-of-pocket.
monetary loss, uninsured lost wages, and uninsured medical
expenses.” Id. § 7043(a)(2). To support a restitution award, the
State must demonstrate “causation between the defendant’s crimi-
nal act and the victim’s loss.” State x Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 222, 719
A2d 399, 403 (1998). We have interpreted the causation element
as requiring that restitution orders “relate directly to the damage
caused by the defendant’s criminal act for which he was con-
victed.” Id. at 222-23, 719 A.2d at 403 (holding that expenses
incurred by domestic-assault victim to change locks and telephone
number were “indirect costs” from crime and therefore “not
recoverable as restitution”). “A restitution order may not include
amounts resulting from conduct on which defendant was acquit-
ted . . . or conduct that was not covered by defendant’s
conviction.” State uv VanDusen, 166 Vt. 240, 244, 691 A.2d 1053,
1054-55 (1997) (citation omitted).

111. In VanDusen, 166 Vt. at 244, 691 A.2d at 1055, this Court
upheld an order of restitution after the State proved that the
defendant had stolen an amount greater than supported by his
conviction for misdemeanor possession of stolen property, which
involved property not exceeding $500 in value. We reasoned that
the value of the stolen property ($4500) was directly related to the
conduct for which the defendant had been convicted — possession

of stolen property — and that the fact that the amount varied
from the conviction was immaterial. Jd. We further noted that the
difference in value need only be established by a preponderance of
the evidence as it pertained to a sentencing matter. Jd. at 245, 691
A.2d at 1055. We cautioned, however, that a restitution order may
not be based on conduct that was not covered by the defendant’s
conviction, citing this Court’s holding in State u Stimpson, 151 Vt.
645, 563 A.2d 1001 (1989) (mem.). Jd. at 244, 691 A.2d at 1055. In
Stimpson the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to several bur-
glary offenses and the court ordered that he pay restitution, a
portion of which corresponded to an incident that was not covered
by the plea agreement and for which defendant was not convicted.
We held that “{aJn order of restitution must relate to the damage
caused by the criminal conduct for which the defendant was
convicted,” and that the link was absent. 151 Vt. at 645-46, 563
A2d at 1001 (quotation omitted).

112. More recently, in State u Rollins, 2007 VT 127, 18, 182
Vt. 644, 944 A.2d 218 (mem.), we vacated a restitution order based
on conduct that was not covered by the defendant’s conviction. In
Rollins the defendant was convicted of attempted assault and
robbery after the State proved that the “defendant was involved
in a scheme to rob the victim” and “took a significant step in that
direction.” Jd. After the victim claimed that he lost $420 and a CD
player during the robbery, the trial court ordered restitution of
$460. Id. 16. On appeal, this Court concluded that “[d]espite the
victim’s testimony that he lost $420 as a result of the robbery, the
conviction was based solely on evidence of the plan to rob and the
identification of [the] defendant as one of the assailants.” Id. 18.
The Court held that a conviction for attempted robbery could not
support a direct link between the defendant and the claimed a
due to robbery, because in order to convict, the jury necesse
found that the defendant had failed in his attempt to rob the
victim. Id.

113. Hl Here, we similarly find that a conviction of po:
of stolen property cannot support a connection between defendant
and the claimed loss due to burglary. Unlike in VanDusen, the
trial court did not simply find that defendant stole property
valued at an amount greater than supported by his conviction —

4 Of course, as part of a plea agreement, a defendant could agree to restitution
related to criminal acts which were either dismissed, amended, or not. charged.

60 Le

it found, to a lesser standard than required for a criminal
conviction, that he had committed the entirely separate criminal
offense of burglary. Defendant was not charged with burglary, and
pleaded only to possession of stolen property, a plea based on the
recovery of some of the victims’ stolen property from his resi-
dence. The restitution order, however, was based on the value of
the property burgled from the victims’ residence.

114. BB In VanDusen we held that the trial court acts within
the scope of § 7043 when it makes findings with respect to the
amount of the victims’ material loss for the purpose of establish-
ing causation between the victims’ loss and the conduct for which
defendant was convicted. This may include findings in addition to
those made at trial in order to establish a direct link between the
charged offense and the victim’s material losses. Here, however,
the trial court exceeded the scope of § 7043 by making findings to
establish causation between the victims’ loss and defendant’s
involvement in the burglary of their home — conduct that was not
covered by defendant’s conviction for possession of stolen prop-
erty. Cf. VanDusen, 166 Vt. at 244, 691 A2d at 1055 (requiring
causation between victim’s loss and conduct for which defendant
was convicted).

115. The trial court’s findings at the restitution hearing sought
to establish causation between the victims’ losses, not only con-
cerning the items found in defendant’s possession, but also for
losses from items reported as stolen during the burglary and not
found in defendant’s possession. Other than the trial court’s own
findings at the restitution hearing, there is no connection between
the crime for which defendant was convicted — possession of
stolen property — and the crime that resulted in the victims’ loss
— burglary. That defendant had in his possession some of the
property stolen from the victims’ home does not mean the
criminal act for which defendant was convicted included the
burglary of the victims’ home. Possession of stolen property and
burglary are entirely separate crimes. Thus, the expenses ordered
as restitution related to the burglary cannot be viewed as the
direct result of defendant’s crime of possession of stolen property,
the criminal act for which he was convicted. Forant and VanDusen
require this conclusion.

116. We need not consider whether the trial court could have
ordered restitution for additional items reported as stolen during

the burglary had it found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that defendant was in possession of such items. Because the trial
court failed to make such findings, defendant cannot now be found
liable for restitution for those items.

117. The only losses directly resulting from the criminal
conduct for which defendant was convicted would necessarily
relate to the items underlying that plea: the fifteen items recov-
ered from the defendant’s residence, valued at $6765.70. Because
it is undisputed that those items were returned to the victims,
there can be no finding of material loss. See 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a)(2)
(defining material loss as “uninsured property loss, uninsured
out-of-pocket monetary loss, uninsured lost wages, and uninsured
medical expenses.”). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order of
restitution in the amount of $35,791. Having found defendant’s
first issue to be dispositive, we decline to address the remaining
two.

Reversed. The restitution order is vacated.

2016 VT 95

In re LG.
[158 A.3d 582)
No. 16-163

Present: Reiber, C.J, Dooley, Robinson and Eaton, JJ, and Hoar, Supr. J,
Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed August 31, 2016

eS
&

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Philip
Back, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Petitioner-
Appellee.

Rebecca T. Plummer, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, for
Respondent-Appellant.

11. Robinson, J. In this case, an involuntarily hospitalized
patient diagnosed with schizophrenia appeals the trial court’s

order allowing for his involuntary medication. Patient argues that
the court erred by (1) incorrectly applying the competency
standard under 18 VS.A. § 7625, and (2) failing to address
whether a previously prepared document reflecting his desire not
to be given psychiatric medication was a “competently expressed
written . . . preference[ ] regarding medication” under 18 V.S.A.
§ 7627(b). We conclude that the trial court’s findings support its
conclusion under § 7625, but agree that the trial court did not
squarely address patient’s argument under § 7627 in its findings.
Accordingly, we reverse on that issue and remand for the trial
court to issue findings addressing the applicability of § 7627(b) to
patient’s prior written expression of his preferences.

12. Patient is thirty-two years old and is from Morrisville. He
was hospitalized at the Vermont Psychiatric Care Hospital
(VPCH) in Berlin on April 15, 2016, pursuant to a court order
stemming from his arrest and criminal prosecution for allegedly
assaulting his girlfriend. Patient had been hospitalized once before
— also at VPCH — from May 5, 2015, to July 28, 2015. During
that previous hospitalization, patient was diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and — in July 2015 — VPCH unsuccessfully sought a
court order to involuntarily medicate him.

13. In the present case, the court noted that it rejected the
State’s prior request to involuntarily medicate patient because the
State did not prove that he was incompetent and the potential
side effects of the medication outweighed its potential benefits.
Shortly after the court in the previous case decided not to
involuntarily medicate him, patient was discharged from VPCH
and began living at Soteria House, a residence for people with
mental illness in Burlington.

14. While there, patient signed a document purporting to be an
advance directive in which he stated that he did not want any
psychiatric medication because such medication caused him anger
and homicidal ideation and inhibits “the limbic system from
powering organs.” By a checkbox on the form, he indicated that
he was aware that his stated preference might result in longer
hospital stays and may result in his being involuntarily committed
or treated, and he prioritized the interventions he prefers by
listing seclusion, then seclusion and physical restraints combined,
then physical restraints first, with medication in pill, liquid, and
injection form as his lowest priorities. Patient concedes that this
document “did not meet the statutory requirements of an advance
directive because it was not signed by two witnesses.”

64 Le

15. Following his current hospitalization, the State filed an
application to involuntarily medicate patient over a ninety-day
period on April 21, 2016. A hearing was held on May 4, 2016, at
which the State presented one witness — patient’s treating
psychiatrist — and patient presented two witnesses — himself
and a staff person from Soteria House.

16. First, patient’s psychiatrist testified that he had treated
patient during both his previous hospitalization and his current
hospitalization. The psychiatrist described a pattern of beliefs and
behaviors starting in 2012 that led him to diagnose patient with
schizophrenia:

[Patient] has shown fixed false beliefs . . . he’s shown
evidence of acting on persecutory delusions in a manner
that seems dangerous at certain points. He also shows
disorganized thought process. His speech wanders from
topic to topic.

He also shows unusual behaviors around clothing and,
let’s say — taking apart the seams in his clothing to
replace the threads with organic material because of a
preoccupation with toxins.

[H]e thinks medications are also toxic. He’s stuck.

Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that patient’s behaviors had
become more dangerous since the last time he had treated him in
the summer of 2015: his “persecutory beliefs became more
explicit . . . [which] led to his showing more dangerous behavior.”
This dangerous behavior included the incident for which patient
was arrested.

17. Finally, the psychiatrist testified that Soteria House is for
patients “who usually would prefer not to take medications” so
their illnesses are managed “mostly with psychosocial interven-
tions.” In the psychiatrist’s opinion this is not the best form of
treatment; medication would be a far more effective solution for
patient because it “would help him sort out where the real
dangers are . . . he’d be safer.” But, as the psychiatrist testified,
this treatment has been impeded because patient’s schizophrenia
affects his “understanding” of the medication’s benefits and risks.

18. Next, patient testified extensively about his concerns re-
garding the side effects of psychiatric medication: Haldol is “a

very light anesthetic”; and there are “some addictive qualities to
it”; “it can make you drowsy”; and it can produce “tardive
diskenesia.” He testified that “one of the warnings is that .. . it
can cause impulsive behavior grouped with homicidal ideation.”
Patient also testified that he does not trust psychiatric medication
because “there’s a lot of kickbacks to psychiatrists from pharma-
ceutical companies.” He summarized that he had weighed the
benefits and risks of being off the medication and would prefer
not taking the medication despite the risk of shortening his life
span: “I see [being off the medication] as better than being on the
medication because it might take years off my life.”

19. Finally, the staff person from Soteria House testified that
patient had expressed his concerns about psychiatric medication
several times. The staff member and patient had discussed
patient’s preferences about medication “on a number of occasions”
and patient “was always clear that he preferred not to utilize
medication.” Discussing whether or not to take medication is “a
very typical conversation at Soteria. . .. Everyone there is...
dealing with issues around medication, whether to use or whether
not to use it.” According to the staff member, patient “did a lot
of research online” about the medication and did not want to take
it because “he was concerned about side effects.” The staff
member did not know which websites patient had been using for
research.

110. The court issued an order on May 6, 2016, authorizing his
involuntary medication for ninety days. Specifically, the court
found that patient was not competent to refuse medication and
that his aversion to medication was a result of his schizophrenia:

[Patient’s] stated reasons for refusing medication are a
product of his mental illness. He is unable to make a
competent, reasoned decision about whether or not medi-
cation is a reasonable form of treatment for his condition.

With respect to the preferences expressed in patient’s purported
advance directive, the trial court said it was “of limited as
court. In particular, the court noted that no witne:
ians signed the directive, and concluded, “At most, the court
accepts the directive as additional evidence that [patient] does not
want to take antipsychotic medications.”

111. Patient filed an appeal that same day, and the court
granted a stay of its order pending appeal.

66 |

I.

112. We reject patient’s argument that the court erred by
incorrectly applying the competency standard under 18 V.S.A.
§ 7625(c). In particular, he contends that the court (1) “applied an
incorrectly high standard of competency,’ (2) “failed to make
certain required findings,” and (8) “ignored or misrepresented
significant testimony supporting defendant’s competency.” We con-
clude that the record supports the trial court’s findings, and its
findings support its conclusions. In re T:C., 2007 VT 115, 112, 182
Vt. 467, 940 A.2d 706 (noting this Court will uphold trial court’s
conclusions if they are not clearly erroneous and are “consistent
with the controlling law and . . . supported by the findings”
(quotation omitted)).

113. The first step in evaluating a petition for involuntary
medication is to evaluate the patient’s competency. See 18 V.S.A.
§ 7627(d) (“As a threshold matter, the Court shall consider the
person’s competency.”). The competency question focuses on the
patient’s decisionmaking abilities:

In determining whether or not the person is competent.

to make a decision regarding the proposed treatment, the

Court shall consider whether the person is able to make

a decision and appreciate the consequences of that

decision.
18 V.S.A. § 7625(c) (emphasis added). The competency determina-
tion cannot be based on the patient’s diagnosis alone or the merits
of a psychiatrist’s medical advice:

The standard is different, and more difficult for the
Commissioner to meet, from the standard for determin-
ing whether a person may be involuntarily committed
because the statute focuses solely on the patient’s decision-
making abilities, as they may or may not be affected by
mental illness — not the fact of the patient’s diagnosis
alone, or the merits of the psychiatrist’s medi advice.
If a mere diagnosis were the end of the analysis, it would
preclude the need for a petition procedure altogether.

In ve L.A., 2006 VT 118, 110, 181 Vt. 34, 912 A2d 977 (emphasis
added). Rather, the court must determine whether the patient
properly understands the actual — not imagined — consequences

of refusing medication. See id. 19112, 15 (“As long as [the] patient
can understand the consequences of refusing medication, the
statute permits him [or her] to do so, even if refusing medication
will be to his [or her] detriment” but “the conseque [the]
patient must be able to appreciate must be real, and not
imaginary or delusional.”). The court must honor this refusal even
if it is not “the best decision in light of those consequences,” id.
115, and “even if refusing medication will be to [the patient’s]
detriment.” Id. 112.

1114. Hl The evidence shows that the court applied the correct
standard for competency and made sufficient findings regarding
whether patient understood the consequences of refusing medica-
tion. See id. 117 (reversing and remanding for new hearing
because “[t]he court made no specific findings about patient’s
ability to make a decision or to appreciate the consequences of
that decision, such as patient’s fear of developing known physical
side effects from the medication.” (emphasis added)). The court
found that patient’s beliefs show that he does not understand
those consequences: (1) patient “fears that medications are poi-
sons”; (2) he will not take “antipsychotic medications in part
because of his understanding that other notorious shootings and
killings were done by people with prescriptions for antipsychotic
medications”; (8) “He believes that Haldol is an anesthetic and
that, like Demerol, it is addictive”; and (4) “He also suspects that
the medications are prescribed because of a kickback scheme
between pharmaceutical companies and psychiatrists.” The court
concluded that these stated reasons for refusing medication are a
product of patient’s mental illness, and that he is unable to make
a competent, reasoned decision about whether or not medication is
a reasonable form of treatment for his addiction.

115. The court’s analysis of these beliefs was bolstered by the
testimony of patient’s psychiatrist. The psychiatrist testified that
“during this hospitalization, [patient] has said that Haldol is
related to Demerol. . . . I don’t know of any connection there.”
The psychiatrist also testified that “his ideas about the medication
and there being some association between Haldol and Demerol”
are not plausible. One of the strongest themes of the psychiatrist’s
testimony was that patient was unable to think clearly and
logically, and medication would help that: “Haldol would help that.
I think it would sort out his thinking.” The psychiatrist testified
that “[i]t seems fairly likely” that “mental illness is playing a role

68 Le

in [patient’s] inability to understand the consequences of his
decisions now about taking the treatment.” And, he agreed that
patient’s mental illness was impacting “his understanding that
there might be improvement as a result of taking the medication
and having a realistic understanding of what the risks are.” Based
on the psychiatrist’s testimony, the court had ample evidence that
patient suffered from “persecutory beliefs” and “delusions,” and
“thle also shows disorganized thought process.”

116. The court’s specific findings in this case contrast with the
lack of specific findings in Im re L.A. In that case, we reversed an
involuntary medication order because the court did not actually
make specific findings regarding the patient’s competency. There,
the trial court determined that “[iJnsofar as he refuses altogether
the medications that might benefit him, [platient is not competent
to make a decision regarding the proposed regimen of treatment.”
Id. 15 (quotation omitted). We faulted this reasoning for failing to
address even the first step of the competency inquiry. The
competency statute only applies to patients who refuse medication,
so the mere fact that patient in Im re L.A. refused medication
could not be a basis for finding that he was incompetent. Rather,
the court was required to determine whether the “patient can
understand the consequences of refusing medication.” Id. 1 12.

117. GE Finally, our holding is not altered by patient’s
arguments that the court “failed to make certain required find-
ings,” and “ignored or misrepresented significant testimony sup-
porting defendant’s competency.” Even assuming there is evidence
supporting a finding that patient is competent under 18 V.S.A.
§ 7625, it is not our place to second-guess the court’s finding; “the
trial court is in the unique position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of all the evidence presented.” Peckham
v. Peckham, 149 Vt. 888, 390, 543 A.2d 267, 269 (1988) (quotation
omitted). The trial court made specific findings based on credible
evidence that are sufficient to support its conclusion that patient
is not competent. The fact that other evidence may contradict
those specific findings is insufficient to overturn the conclusion.
See Bull x Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 454, 752 A.2d 26,
30 (2000) (“Findings are viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, disregarding modifying evidence, and will not be dis-
turbed merely because they are contradicted by substantial evi-
dence; rather, an appellant must show that there is no credible
evidence to support them.” (citation omitted)).

I.

118. J We agree with patient that the trial court did not
provide any findings or conclusions as to whether the purported
advance directive reflecting his desire not to be given psychiatric
medication constituted a “competently expressed written .
preference[ | regarding medication.” 18 V.S.A. § 7627(b).

119. Section 7627(b) lays out the first step in the evaluation of
a request to involuntarily medicate:

If a person who is the subject of an application filed
under section 7625 of this title has not executed an
advance directive, the Court shall follow the person’s
competently expressed written or oral preferences re-
garding medication, if any, unless the Commissioner
demonstrates that the person’s medication preferences
have not led to a significant clinical improvement in the
person’s mental state in the past within an appropriate
period of time.

If the court concludes that there are no medication preferences,
or that the person’s medication preferences have not led to a
significant clinical improvement in the person’s mental state in the
past within an appropriate period of time, the court is required to
consider a host of statutory factors in deciding whether to issue
an involuntary medication order. 18 V.S.A. § 7627(c).

120. Patient argues that his written instructions in the docu-
ment in question were competently expressed written preferences
entitled to deference subject to the exception under 18 V.S.A.
§ 7627(b). He argues that his own testimony about the document
shows that he was competent in completing it, and that testimony
by the Soteria House staff member supports his contention that
he was competent when he signed the document and corroborates
his consistent and considered opposition to psychiatric medication
because of potential side effects.

121. HM Although the trial court concluded that at the time of

the hearing patient was not competent to decide whether to
accept the proposed treatment, the court made no findings as to

* On appeal, patient concedes that this document was not executed in accordance
with the advance directive statute, 18 V.S.A. § 9703. He does not contend that the
document is enforceable as an effective advance directive

70 |

whether patient was competent at the time he wrote down his
preferences.” Instead, the court found, “The directive is of limited
assistance to the court. . . . At most, the court accepts the
directive as additional evidence that [patient] does not want to
take antipsychotic medications.”

122. [HM Although the trial court’s ultimate order may be
premised on the view that patient was not competent to issue the
instructions in the document he filled out in July 2015, the court’s
written decision does not address the issue. For several reasons,
we cannot infer from the trial court’s findings and conclusions the
missing analysis regarding the proffered prior written expression
of patient’s preferences. N. Sec. Ins. Co. x Perron, 172 Vt. 204,
218 n.10, 777 A2d 151, 161 n.10 (2001) (noting this Court will “not
engage in appellate fact finding” to remedy deficiencies in trial
court’s findings). First, the trial court’s findings expressly relate to
patient’s present mental state; they do not purport to be retro-
spective. The court concluded, “He is unable to make a competent,
reasoned decision about whether or not medication is a reasonable
form of treatment for his condition.” The distinction matters here
because patient completed the written document in July 2015,
more than nine months before the hearing on the application for
involuntary medication. Second, and more significantly, the record
reflects that patient was discharged from the VPCH in July 2015,
after a court rejected a petition to involuntarily medicate him. We
do not know the basis for the court’s decision in connection with
that prior petition,? but the fact that the court denied such a
petition and defendant was discharged to Soteria House around
the time he signed this document suggests that we cannot simply
relate back the trial court’s May 2016 findings to patient’s status
in July 2015. Third, the trial court did hear testimony about
patient’s mental state and understanding of the medication issues

2 We note that 18 V.S.A. §7627(b) says that “the Court shall follow the person’s
competently expressed written or oral preferences” This phrase reflects the
requirements that the patient be competent at the time of the expression, and that
the expression itself is a product of competent consideration.

* The court’s prior order was not written, apparently has not been transcribed, and
is not in evidence. During the hearing in connection with this application to
involuntarily medicate, the court affirmed that based on the court’s notes and
recollection, the prior order denying an application to involuntarily medicate
patient was denied based on a combination of failure of proof on the competency
issues and a benefit versus burden analysis.

that was more contemporaneous with his execution of the docu-
ment at issue.

123. Because the trial court did not address a critical issue in
connection with the application for involuntary medication, we
reverse the court’s orders and remand for further findings. Cf. In
re Rumsey, 2012 VT 74, 1913-14, 192 Vt. 290, 59 A3d 730
(reversing and remanding for further findings decision by Vermont
Human Services Board, which failed to make findings regarding
claimant’s argument she was in high need of services for purposes
of Medicaid).

Reversed and remanded.

2016 VT 96

In re Wagner & Guay Permit (Mary Bourassa, Appellant)
[158 A.3d 539)
No. 15-406
Present: Reiber, C.J, Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
16

Opinion Filed September 2

‘The State argues that even if patient’s written preferences were competently
expressed, we should nonetheless uphold the trial court’s decision because the
Commissioner demonstrated that patient’s “medication preferences have not led to
a significant clinical improvement in [patient’s] mental state in the past within an
appropriate period of time.” 18 V.S.A. § 7627(b). As with the requirement that the
preference be “competently expressed,” the trial court did not address this
alternative rationale for granting the State's motion, This may be an alternate
ground upon which the trial court may rest its conclusions, but as with the
question of whether the patient’s prior written preferences were competently
expressed, we look to the trial court to make findings on the question in the first
instance.

David Bond of Strouse & Bond, PLLC, Burlington, for Appel-
lant.

Robert F. O’Neill and Matthew S. Stern of Gravel & Shea PC,
Burlington, for Appellees William and Barbara Wagner.

11. Dooley, J. Neighbor Mary Bourassa appeals the Environ-
mental Division’s affirmance of a zoning permit application by
William and Barbara Wagner and Christopher Guay (collectively,
applicants) seeking to construct a single family residence and
detached garage on two merged lots of a six-lot subdivision in
Grand Isle, Vermont. Neighbor, an owner of another lot in the
subdivision, opposes development, chiefly on the ground that the
proposed house will not be constructed within the “tree line” on
the property, as required by the subdivision plat plan. We affirm.

12. In February 1995, the Grand Isle Planning Commission
approved the Wagners’ six-lot subdivision on Dodge Terrace.
Dodge Terrace is a dead-end road running along the south edge
of a large field. It is bordered by a row of trees, which run
parallel to the south side of Dodge Terrace and denote the
beginning of a wooded area that stretches south from the road
into a wetland. The subdivision’s plat plan, authored by Mr.
Wagner, was approved by the Planning Commission on April 4,
1995, and was recorded two days later. As relevant to this appeal,
the plan contains a scalloped line labelled as “existing edge of the
woods” and defined in the legend as the “tree line boundary.” On
the plan, in-ground septic systems are generally located to the
north of the scalloped line and house sites are located to the south
of the line. The plan contains a note that states that the location
of all houses and drives are for “illustrative purposes only,’ but

74 Le

adds “with provision that the houses for lots 2-6 must be within
the tree line.”

13. The Wagners own lots 3 and 4 of the subdivision. Neighbor
owns and resides at lot 2 of the subdivision. The Wagners seek to
sell their lots to Mr. Guay with the intention of adjusting lot lines,
merging lots 3 and 4 into a single lot, and building a single-family
residence and detached garage on that combined lot. In accor-
dance with that plan, applicants submitted a zoning permit
application to the town in June 2014, with an accompanying
unscaled sketch plan featuring the locations of the proposed
residence and garage. Mr. Wagner testified during the town’s
review of the application that the house’s setback distances from
Dodge Terrace, as depicted on the sketch plan, were “distances
from the front corners of the proposed house to the southern
edge of the traveled way of Dodge Terrace.” The town’s Devel-
opment Review Board (DRB) granted that permit on October 1,
2014.

14. On October 13, 2014, neighbor appealed the town’s decision
to the Superior Court, Environmental Division by filing the
following statement of questions:

1. Should the Application be denied as incon-
sistent with section 2.4 of the Town of
Grand Isle’s Zoning Bylaws and Subdivision
Regulations (the “Zoning Bylaws”) which
provides that “[t]his Bylaw must not repeal,
abrogate, or impair other land use controls
(including . . . easements, deed restrictions,
covenants or similar devices.”)?

2. Should the Application be denied as incon-
sistent with the original approved plat plan
for the development, as set forth on Map
Slide 21 of the Town’s Land Records, which
provides that the locations of houses on lots
2 through 6 of the development “must be
within the tree line”?

3. Should the Application be denied under
section 2.4 of the Zoning Bylaws as abro-
gating or impairing the covenants and re-
strictions in the deeds for lots 2, 5 and 6 of
the development, where each deed expressly

references and incorporates the provisions
of Map Slide 21, and where each deed
provides that all structures shall be within
the tree line, as depicted on Map Slide 21?

4. Should the Application be denied under
section 2.4 of the Zoning Bylaws as abro-
gating or impairing the covenants and re-
strictions in the deeds for lots 2 and 6 of
the development, where each deed expressly
provides that “no pre-fabricated dwellings,
including but not limited, to mobile homes
or double-wide dwellings shall be erected on
the premises”?

5. Should the “tree line” referenced in the plat
plan and above-referenced deeds be defined
as the sketched location of the edge of the
forest canopy shown on Map Slide 21 or as
the actual location, measured from tree
trunk to tree trunk?

6. Should the Application be denied as incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Town Plan
that mandate preservation of open spaces,
views, and vistas, as incorporated by refer-
ence into the Town’s Zoning Bylaws under
section 1.1 of the Bylaws?

7. Should the Application be denied under
section 5.10 of the Bylaws in that it involves
a boundary line adjustment that substan-
tially changes the nature of the develop-
ment?

& Should the Application be denied on account.
of multiple material misrepresentations of
fact made by the Applicants in connection
with their Application?

9. Should [neighbor] be awarded the legal fees,
costs, and expenses they incurred on ac-
count of the multiple material misrepresen-
tation [sic] of fact by the Applicants?

On December 22, 2014, applicants filed a motion to dismiss
neighbor’s questions 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9. The Environmental

6 |

Division granted the motion in part and denied it in part,
di ing questions 1, 3, and 4 on the ground they raised “issues
regarding private property rights, which are outside [the Envi-
ronmental Division’s] jurisdiction” and dismissing question 6 on
the ground that it relied on the town bylaws’ purpose provisions,
which “have no direct regulatory effect.” Following unsuccessful
summary judgment motions from both sides, the Environmental
Division held a trial on September 21-22 of 2015. The court also
visited the site on September 22.

15. On October 1, 2015, the Environmental Division issued its
decision on the merits affirming the grant of applicants’ permit.
The court noted that both sides had provided expert opinions,
which “generally agree[d]” on the location of the scalloped tree
line boundary identified on the 1995 Plat Plan; the experts both
located the trunks of actual mature trees “farther south” from
Dodge Terrace than the line boundary and located the mature
tree dripline as it exists today as “the same distance north” of the
scalloped line. The court thus identified the primary contention
between the parties as whether the “tree line” on the Plat Plan
should be interpreted as the edge of the canopy or “dripline” —
that is, the line between the open meadow and the branches of
the trees in the forested area — or the location of the first
mature tree trunks in the forested area. The court began its
analysis by observing that its principal concern in construing
permit conditions was to implement the intent of the drafters;
thus, it considered testimony from Mr. Wagner, the original
designer of the subdivision, as to the meaning of the phrase
“within the tree line.” Mr. Wagner testified that he intended that
houses “be nestled within the trees” and “have views into the
meadow” and that the purpose of the tree line condition was to
ensure that houses on lots 2 through 6 “not appear to be sitting
within the center of the meadow.” By contrast, neighbor and
another homeowner testified that “they thought Mr. Wagner told
them,” when they were considering purchasing land in the subdi-
vision, that all houses were required to be behind or south of the
mature tree trunks.

T Although there may be differences in the canopy’s extent between the time of
trial and the time of the Plat Plan’s drafting, these differences are not relied upon
by the parties in making arguments to resolve this ease. Thus, we do not consider
the issue.

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16. The Environmental Division credited Mr. Wagner, conclud-
ing that the scalloped line on the Plat Plan is “not intended to
show the location of the trunks of mature trees, but rather the
line between the open meadow area and the forested area.” The
court was particularly persuaded by the testimony of neighbor’s
surveying expert, who stated at trial that a scalloped line on a
plat “typically represents the edge of the open area, or in other
words, the division between woods and a field.”

17. The court relied on this determination in answering ques-
tion 2. It noted that the survey plan created by neighbor’s expert
showed applicants’ proposed house was located 98 to 109 feet from
the center of the traveled way of Dodge Terrace. Although Mr.
Wagner acknowledged that the measurements on the plan accom-
panying his application to the town “could reasonably be inter-
preted” to show setback distances from the center of Dodge
Terrace, the court found that Mr. Wagner “credibly testified
during trial” that he had informed the town that measurements
were intended to be from the edge of the travelled right of way,
as shown on the survey plan created by his retained expert
witness. Because the proposed house is to the south of the
tree-line boundary — “on both experts’ surveys” — when mea-
sured from the southern edge, the court found that the planned
house comported with the 1995 Plat Plan as being within the tree
line. The court also found that the proposed boundary adjustment
would “not substantially change the development or create new
lots,” as it would maintain the subdivision’s “rural nature” and
would involve the construction of only one house where, because
two lots were to be merged, two would have been possible.
Finally, the court dismissed neighbor’s argument that the appli-
cants misrepresented the distance of the house from Dodge
Terrace as being measured from the center of the road, rather
than the edge. The court noted that, because this was a de novo
hearing, alleged inaccuracies in materials presented to the mu-
nicipal panel — which Mr. Wagner testified he had corrected —
were irrelevant, where Mr. Wagner “credibly testified” at trial that
the corners of the house were measured from the edge of the
traveled way. The court found “no statutory authority” for award-
ing legal fees and “no conduct of [applicants] justifying even the
consideration of awarding fees.” The court also concluded its
opinion with the following language: “This decision does not
address compliance with other potentially relevant town and state

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reviews, including, but not limited to, wetland and wastewater
programs.” This timely appeal followed.

18. On appeal, neighbor makes the following arguments: (1)
that the phrase “within the tree line” is inherently ambiguous and
so must be construed against the drafter; (2) that equitable
estoppel should bar consideration of Mr. Wagner’s testimony as to
the meaning of the phrase “the tree line”; (8) that the proposed
house is not within the tree line; (4) that the zoning bylaws and
the permits issued pursuant to the zoning bylaws cannot be
construed to impair private land-use controls; (5) that the failure
to disclose the fact that the proposed structure encroached upon
the wetland setback was a material change warranting denial of
the application and; (6) that the applicants’ misrepresentations
warrant an award of attorney’s fees.

19. Although this Court reviews the Environmental Division’s
legal conclusions under a de novo standard, “we will uphold those
conclusions if they are reasonably supported by the findings. We
will defer to the court’s factual findings and uphold them unless,
taking them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
they are clearly erroneous.” In re Lathrop Ltd. P’ship I, 2015 VT
49, 121, 199 Vt. 19, 121 A3d 630 (quotations and citations
omitted).

110. Neighbor’s first, and central, argument is that the Envi-
ronmental Division’s interpretation of the phrase “within the tree
line” was “clearly erroneous.” Neighbor maintains that because
the phrase is inherently ambiguous, it must, as per the rule of
contra proferentem, be construed against the drafter and proffer-
ing party — here, Mr. Wagner — such that neighbor’s interpre-
tation of the “tree line” as referring to a line drawn along the
trunks of mature trees closest to the road must control. We
disagree.

111. I We begin by noting that neighbor’s assertion that
permit conditions should be interpreted under the same principles
as private contracts has no basis in our law. Instead, as we held
in Agency of Natural Resources vu Weston, permit conditions are
construed according to normal rules of statutory construction.
2003 VT 58, 116, 175 Vt. 573, 880 A.2d 92 (mem.); accord Sec’y uv
Handy Family Enters., 163 Vt. 476, 481, 660 A.2d 309, 312 (1995).
In Weston, a landowner received a 1989 permit allowing him to
subdivide his 146-acre property when he set aside a_ single,

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thirty-three acre parcel for agricultural use. The permit contained
a condition requiring the landowner to maintain the thirty-three
acres as “open, cleared, uncluttered and unencumbered land”; the
landowner was also required to “[a]t a minimum . . . cut the hay
from the Agricultural Area twice each year and . . . fertilize this
area at least once every three years.” 2003 VT 58, 12. The
landowner complied with the permit conditions for approximately
ten years without issue. However, in 2002, following a series of
site visits and notices of violation, the Agency of Natural Re-
sources issued an administrative order finding, in pertinent part,
that by failing to cut hay on the parcel, the landowner had
violated a condition of his permit. Jd. 18. The Environmental
Division affirmed this finding.

1112. IH On appeal to this Court, the landowner argued that the
Environmental Division misinterpreted the condition, suggesting
that the purpose was “simply to assure that the thirty-three-acre
parcel [was] left open and its soil kept arable for agricultural
purposes.” Id. 115. We noted:

In construing permit conditions, we rely upon normal
rules of statutory construction. Our principal concern is
to implement the intent of the draftpersons. Ordinarily,
we do so by pting the plain meaning of the words
because we presume that they express the underlying
intent. We also keep in mind, however, that because
land-use regulations are in derogation of property rights,
any uncertainty in their meaning must be decided in
favor of the property owner. . . . Finally, we must accord
deference to the environmental court’s construction of a
permit condition, particularly when the court’s expertise
will assure consistent interpretations of the law.

Id. 16 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, reading the
condition “in its entirety’ and ensuring uncertainties were “read
in favor” of the landowner, we determined that while the envi-
ronmental court did not err in finding a violation, it had miscon-
strued the condition, which was primarily intended to require the
landowner to keep the property “open and available for agricul-
tural use, so that if it is not being put to any other agricultural
use ... it must, af minimum, be hayed and fertilized” Id. 117
(emphasis added).

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113. EE Applying Weston to the f s case, we note
that the parties’ central dispute is over the phrase “within the
tree line,” which appears in the 1995 Plat Plan drafted by Mr.
Wagner and unchanged in the review process. Because it is “the
function of a subdivision permit. to approve ‘plats of land.
recorded plats necessarily become subdivision permit conditions.
In re Stowe Club Highlands, 164 Vt. 272, 276, 668 A.2d 1271, 1275
(1995) (citing 24 V.S.A. §§ 4401(b)(2), 4415). Although we would
note that even neighbor’s expert stated in his trial testimony that
a scalloped line “generally represents the edge of an open area”
and “typically . .. would demark the limit of an open area and a
treed area” — thereby supporting applicants’ position that the
tree line refers to a line between the open meadow and forested
area and not to the trunks of the trees — we accept for purposes
of analysis neighbor’s contention that the tree line restriction is
ambiguous, as there is “no plain meaning” apparent from its use
in the context of the Plat Plan. Wright x Bradley, 2006 VT 100,
17, 180 Vt. 383, 910 A.2d 893. We agree with applicants, however,
that the phrase could mean the edge of the open area where tree
branches provide shade and start to define the wooded area, as
well as the trunks of the mature trees closest to the road. Our
goal must be to “implement the intent of the draftpersons.”
Weston, 2003 VT 58, 1116 (quotation omitted). Normally, this would
mean the intent of the appropriate municipal panel that imposed
the land-use condition, in this case the Grand Isle Planning
Commission. The evidence showed, however, that the Plat Plan
containing the condition was submitted by Mr. Wagner, and the
condition was not required by Grand Isle zoning or subdivision
regulations and was unchanged in the Planning Commission’s
deliberation.” Accordingly, we agree that Mr. Wagner’s evidence of
intent was relevant and admissible, and the Environmental Divi-
sion properly relied upon it.

114. At trial, Mr. Wagner affirmed that the “tree line concept
was solely [his] own” and was included as a condition because he

2 The Planning Commission approval came at the meeting of February 21, 1995. A
member of the commission amended the approval motion to say: “Phil Wagner
shall have the right to move the houses and driveways on all lots subject to the
Town Bylaw requirements. The houses on lots 2-6 MUST [be] within the tree line”
We read the last sentence to be a restatement of the phrase that was already in
the Plat Plan, and as such, was not an indication of a separate intent in the
Planning Commission,

ae .

wanted houses to be visually screened; in other words, he and his
wife wanted the houses to be “nestled within the treed area such
that they would have a view of the meadow.” He acknowledged in
response to a question from neighbor’s counsel that while he
agrees with the “general proposition” that “if you look up tree
line in a dictionary, you will get different definitions,” he believed
that “generally speaking, the common or ordinary meaning of tree
line [is] the edge of the woods.” Mr. Wagner also testified that he
had surveyed the tree line; he had held the stadia rod to take
survey points of the tree line as it ran parallel to Dodge Terrace
and provided a tabulation of this survey data to the court, which
showed eight survey points taken for the edge of the woods. He
averred that the “sole purpose” of this survey was “to document
the tree line that became depicted on the plat plan.” Mr. Wagner
also stated that he “staked corners of all the properties” so as to
be “very clear” as to where the front of a house could be relative
to the tree line boundary; moreover, in addition to placing and
maintaining those stakes, he “showed” them to every prospective
buyer.

115. Mr. Wagner also responded to questions from neighbor
regarding a 2002 draft purchase and sale agreement made with
neighbor — that was not entered into or signed by either party
— that stated “Approximate tree line: Actual tree line is to be
field located. No house or portion thereof is to extend north of the
tree line.” He indicated that that language was meant to elucidate
that for accurate locations of property and tree lines, reference
should be made to the actual plat plans, rather than to the
accompanying hand-drawn sketch that merely approximated the
tree line. He disagreed with neighbor that the language in the
agreement was confusing to purchasers, noting that potential
purchasers had the Plat Plan in front of them and so could
ascertain what was being referred to and that if the tree trunks
governed the tree line, it would be illogical to have a line on the
map or tell purchasers the line was to be field located, as all they
would have to do was stake the house to identify the required
setback. Finally, Mr. Wagner agreed that the trees as they existed
in the field at the time of the trial were “irrelevant” and that the
line drawn on the Plat Plan is the boundary for construction on
lots 2 through 6.

116. J MM Because discerning the meaning of the ambiguous
phrase “within the tree line” was a matter of identifying intent, as

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revealed through trial testimony, we defer to the Environmental
Division’s decision. See In re Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee Dis-
charge Permit 3-1199, 2009 VT 124, 115, 187 Vt. 142, 989 A.2d 563
(noting that it is role of environmental court to “determine[ ] the
credibility of witnesses and weigh[] the persuasive effect of
evidence”). Here, we believe that ample evidence existed to
support the Environmental Division’s conclusion that the phrase
“within the tree line” and the scalloped line on the 1995 Plat Plan
were intended to reflect the line between the open meadow area
and the forested area, rather than the current location of the
trunks of mature trees. The court repeatedly referred to Mr.
Wagner as a “credible” witness, and noted his testimony accorded
with that of neighbor’s expert with respect to the use of a
scalloped line on plat plans. The court also contrasted Mr.
Wagner’s testimony with that of neighbor and her witness, whose
impressions of the phrase “within the tree line” was “not related”
to the 1995 Plat Plan or the phrase itself, but rather, what they
“thought Mr. Wagner told them when they considered buying
lots.” Because neighbor has not shown that there is “no credible
evidence” to support the Environmental Division’s factual findings,
we decline to disturb them on appeal. Jd. We uphold the Envi-
ronmental Division’s conclusion that the tree line of the Plat Plan
refers to the depicted scalloped line and the scalloped line was
intended to show the edge of the canopy or dripline without
regard to the actual locations of the tree trunks.

117. Having resolved that the Environmental Division did not
err in defining “within the tree line,” the dispute about whether
the proposed house is within the tree line is resolved. The
Environmental Division found that the “uncontroverted and uni-
form testimony of both surveying experts” placed the house a few
feet south of — but nevertheless “within” — the tree line
boundary as shown on the Plat Plan, and neighbor has introduced
no further evidence or argument to disturb this finding on appeal.

118. Neighbor’s second argument is that the Environmental
Division could not rely on Mr. Wagner’s testimony as to the
meaning of the phrase “the tree line” because such testimony
should be barred by equitable estoppel. She claims that “[t]he
homeowners testified unanimously that they were expressly led to
believe that the ‘tree line’ consisted of the tree trunks” and that,
in reliance on his words and actions, these homeowners purchased
lots within the development. She contends that although Mr.

a .

Wagner “never contradicted this testimony,” the court never made
any findings or addressed the issue. We conclude that the
argument was not considered by the Environmental Division
because it was not properly raised. Accordingly, it is not pre-
served for appeal, and neighbor is not entitled to reversal on this
ground.

119. I We have long held that “the trial court may not be put
in error by an appellant advancing a theory on appeal that was
not raised before the trial court.” Labate x Rutland Hosp. Inc.,
2015 VT 128, 125, 200 Vt. 438, 132 A.8d 1083; accord O’Rourke v
Lunde, 2014 VT 88, 117, 197 Vt. 360, 104 A3d 92 (“Generally,
issues that are not presented to the trial court cannot be raised
on appeal.”).

120. Here, neighbor claims that she “expressly argued” that
equitable estoppel should bar inconsistent testimony from Mr.
Wagner, but that nevertheless, the “court did not address the
issue.” However, none of her filings with the trial court — her
initial statement of questions, motion for summary judgment, and
motion for judgment as a matter of law — reference a claim of
equitable estoppel. The only mention of equitable estoppel in the
entire record can be found in the trial transcript, where neighbor
attempted to introduce Exhibit J, a 2002 draft agreement of
purchase and sale between the Wagners and neighbor and her
former husband, and applicants challenged admission on relevance
grounds. Neighbor’s attorney argued that the draft agreement,
which stated that the “alctual tree line is to be field located,”
undermined Mr. Wagner’s credibility and operated to equitably
estop him from “tak[ing] the position that the tree line is as he
claims today.”

121. [HM Setting aside the fact that the writing in question was
an unsigned document created during negotiation, see LeBlanc u
Snelgrove, 2015 VT 112, 144, 200 Vt. 570, 133 A.38d 361 (outlining
elements of equitable estoppel), a passing reference to a legal
theory during trial is not “sufficient proof’ for that theory such
that we can consider it here. Roberts x Chimileski, 2003 VT 10,
114, 175 Vt. 480, 820 A.2d 995 (mem.) (“As is so often the case,
plaintiffs fully stated their [new] theory for the first time only in
this Court, after their initial theory failed in the trial court.
Therefore, we find that plaintiffs failed to raise below and offer
sufficient proof for their [new] theory, and we will not address this

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issue here”). The purpose of our rule on preservation is to
provide the factfinder with the chance “to consider the matter in
the first instance”; neighbor’s passing reference to her theory was
inadequate to afford the trial court the opportunity to reflect and
rule on its merits. Houle x Ethan Allen, Inc., 2011 VT 62, 911,
190 Vt. 536, 24 A.3d 586 (mem.) (quotation omitted). We therefore
decline to consider that argument here.

122. We reach a similar conclusion regarding neighbor’s argu-
ment that applicants’ failure to disclose the fact that the proposed
structure encroached upon the wetland setback constituted a
material change warranting rejection or remand of their zoning
application. Neighbor’s statement of questions to the Environmen-
tal Division made no mention of the wetland requirements, and
she failed to elucidate at trial what bearing the Grand Isle zoning
regulations had on state wetland setback requirements. See
Vermont Rules for Environmental Court Proceedings 5(f) (“The
appellant may not raise any question on the appeal not presented
in the statement as filed, unless otherwise ordered by the court.”).
When neighbor moved for judgment as a matter of law on the
grounds that applicants’ plan was a material change because the
site was “well into the wetland buffer,’ the court denied the
motion, citing Mr. Wagner’s testimony that he provided additional
information to the DRB regarding the location of the house —
discussed infra, {| 28 — as well as the fact that the court “did not
see how wetlands [were] at issue before the court in this matter,”
as the case related only to the DRB’s review of the application.
The court even concluded its decision on the merits by stating
that the opinion “does not address compliance with . . . wetland
and wastewater programs.”

123. To that end, we decline to take up neighbor’s contention
that applicants’ permit failed to comply with wetland setback
requirements. However, we stress that that does not mean we
have found compliance with those requirements in this appeal. We
merely note that, if the house does encroach on the wetland
buffer, it is incumbent upon applicants to seek a state permit.
Neighbor or any other interested party can contest the failure to
seek such a permit or the entitlement to permit if sought.

124. Next, neighbor argues that the Environmental Division
erred in dismissing three of her initial questions, which bore on
whether applicants’ permit application was inconsistent with the
covenants and restrictions in the deeds for lots 2, 5, and 6. The

court ruled on the ground that the questions raised issues
regarding private property rights, thus putting them outside the
scope of the Environmental Division’s jurisdiction. Neighbor cites
§ 2.4, “General Purpose, Interpretation and Applicability,” of the
Grand Isle Zoning Bylaws, which states that the bylaw “must not.
repeal, abrogate, or impair any other land use controls (including
easements, deed restrictions, covenants, or similar devices),’ to
support her claim that the town is barred from issuing zoning
permits that would “run counter to the terms of the covenants
and restrictions in the deeds,” as well as the terms of the
subdivision permit.

125. We recently explained the relationship between deed
covenants and zoning regulations in Blanche S. Marsh Inter Vivos
Trust vu McGillvray, where a plaintiff received a zoning permit,
affirmed by the Environmental Division, to reconfigure lot lines in
her parcel within a subdivision and to construct a home on a
second lot. 2018 VT 6, 11, 193 Vt. 320, 67 A.8d 948. However,
neighbors brought an action in the civil division alleging that the
plaintiff's development plans violated a deed covenant, and the
civil division upheld the neighbors’ position, ruling that the
planned development “violated the applicable restrictive covenants
and deed restrictions.” Jd. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
civil division lacked jurisdiction over the action in light of the
Environmental Division’s ruling affirming the grant of the permit.
Id. §18. We held that the plaintiffs argument rested on a
misunderstanding of the relationship between covenant restrictions
and zoning regulations and the methods of enforcement, which we
described as “distinct.” Id. 119. We explained that the zoning
decision had no claim or issue preclusion effect with respect to the
covenant enforcement action, id. 1122, and added: “Nothing in the
[town’s] Master Plan could or does purport to disrupt established
private property rights or obligations, or to lessen plaintiffs
obligations pursuant to her deed and covenants, and the Environ-
mental Division’s recognition that the Master Plan is the conclu-
sive authority in the event of a conflict with other documents
relates specifically to the zoning context.” Id. 123.

126. EMM In light of McGillvray, we view § 2.4 of the zoning
bylaw a general statement of the legal effect of zoning
regulation rather than a specific zoning restriction. This interpre-
tation is reinforced by its placement among the general purposes
of the bylaws. We have repeatedly held that general statements of

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purpose “{do] not constitute enforceable regulatory language”
binding administrative and judicial bodies. Regan v Pomerleau,
2014 VT 99, 116, 197 Vt. 449, 107 A.3d 327 (quotation omitted);
see also In re Howard Center Renovation Permit, 2014 VT 60,
116, 196 Vt. 542, 99 A.3d 1013 (concluding introductory purpose
statement outlining goals of land development regulations does not
“establish an enforceable standard for evaluating zoning per-
mits . . . much less a standard which provides adequate notice to
property owners and guidance to municipal decisionmakers”); In
re Meaker, 156 Vt. 182, 185, 588 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1991) (holding
that “the purpose statement of the [town’s] bylaws has no direct
regulatory effect”).

127. HM Neighbor argues, however, that the language has a
much greater effect than a statement of the existing law. She
claims that the language requires the town to declare that
violation of a deed covenant is also a violation of the zoning bylaw.
We are unable to find that meaning in the bylaw language. It does
not logically follow, as neighbor argues, that the negative language
of the purpose statement — precluding repealing, abrogation, or
impairment — is simultaneously an affirmative directive that
mandates the town to enforce private contractual land use restric-
tions through the zoning bylaws. Assuming the town could take on
that responsibility as part of its zoning powers, neighbor’s as-
serted interpretation of the language unreasonably stretches its
plain meaning. See Nelson vu Town of St. Johnsbury Selectboard,
2015 VT 5, 112, 198 Vt. 277, 115 A3d 423 (“We start with the
plain language of the statute and will enforce it according to its
terms if the language is clear and unambiguous.”). Nowhere in the
specific restrictions of the bylaws is there support for such an
interpretation. Thus, we affirm the decision of the Environmental
Division to dismiss claims based on the deed covenants.

128. Neighbor’s final argument is that under 24 V.S.A. § 4470a
she should be granted fees and costs incurred based on the
Wagners’ material misrepresentations of fact. Specifically, neighbor
argues that the permit application Mr. Wagner presented to the
DRB “failed to identify the fact that the proposed house intruded
well into the wetland setback”; neighbor contends that had Mr.
Wagner made such a presentation, “it seems likely the DRB
would have denied him a permit,” thus saving neighbor attorney’s
fees. We disagree.

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129. Section 4470a states that:

An administrative officer or appropriate municipal
panel may reject an application under this chapter . . .
that misrepresents any material fact. After notice and
opportunity for hearing in compliance with 3 V.S.A. § 809,
an appropriate municipal panel may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs to any party or person who may
have become a party but for the false or misleading
information or who has incurred attorney’s fees or costs
in connection with the application.

This is a question of first impression; we have never construed
this statute. We have, however, defined “misrepresentation” in the
context of a permit application as requiring “a showing that [an
applicant] knowingly made a false representation of fact, or
knowingly concealed facts, with the intention to mislead or
deceive.” In re Beckstrom (H.A. Manosh), 2004 VT 32, 114, 176
Vt. 622, 852 A.2d 561 (mem.). We have defined an issue as
material if it might affect the legal outcome of a proceeding. N.
Sec. Ins. Co. v Rossitto, 171 Vt. 580, 581, 762 A.2d 861, 868 (2000)
(mem.).

130. This issue has morphed from its presentation in the
Environmental Division to its presentation here. In the Environ-
mental Division, it was about the measurement of the distance
between the road and the house and the garage. The Environ-
mental Division looked at the merits of the claims and ruled that
“there [was] no conduct of [applicants] justifying even the consid-
eration of awarding fees.” Neighbor has apparently abandoned the
arguments on which the court ruled.

131. EB As we held above, we will not consider claims that are
not preserved in the trial court. See supra, 1 18. As we have also
discussed above, neighbor’s claims with respect to the wetland
issue have never been properly presented either to the DRB or to
the Environmental Division. In addition, the court accepted Mr.
Wagner’s explanation of what he presented to the DRB with
respect to the placement of the house in relation to the wetland.
See supra, 1 21. Finally, neighbor still has the opportunity to
contest the issuance of a state wetland permit to applicants. We
cannot consider any claim that Mr. Wagner misrepresented facts
with respect to the wetland boundaries in this appeal.

Affirmed.

88 Le

132. Robinson, J., concurring. I concur with the majority’s
mandate and agree with its opinion except as to one point. I write
separately because I believe that the majority opinion wrongly
suggests that our application of a subdivision permit condition
should be guided by the subjective intention of an individual who
proposes a subdivision permit rather than the government body
that actually issues the permit. See ante, 1%) 13-14.

133. The majority acknowledges that permit conditions are
construed according to normal rules of statutory construction,
with a focus on implementing the intent of the drafters. Ante, 1
12 (citing Agency of Nat. Res. u Weston, 2003 VT 58, 116, 175 Vt.
573, 830 A.2d 92 (mem.)); see also Sec’y u Handy Family Enters.,
163 Vt. 476, 481, 660 A.2d 309, 312 (1995) (“We see no reason to
depart from normal statutory construction techniques in interpret-
ing permit conditions. We strive to implement the intent of the
draftspersons.”). But, then the majority asserts that the intent of
a landowner who drafts a subdivision permit application, rather
than that of the planning commission that actually approves the
permit, is the operative intent of the drafters. See ante, 1 13
(explaining that because goal is to implement intent of
draftspersons, intent of Mr. Wagner, who proposed the tree line
condition as part of his subdivision permit is operative); ante, 1 14
(describing Mr. Wagner’s reasons for including tree line condition).

134. A subdivision permit reflects a governmental act, and the
relevant intent is not that of the applicant for the permit, but
rather the intent of the governmental body that issues the permit.
To suggest otherwise would be like suggesting that the relevant.
legislative intent in construing a statute is the intent of the
lobbyist who first offered the language for consideration, or the
individual legislator who introduced a bill, rather than the legis-
lative body that actually adopted that language. Cf. Graham Cty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280, 297-98 (2010) (concluding that letter written by
primary sponsors of statute thirteen years after its enactment
explaining their intent is of scant or no value); Trudell uw State,
2013 VT 18, 127, 193 Vt. 515, 71 A.3d 1235 (“Courts generally give
little weight to an individual legislator’s interpretation of the law
once enacted because it cannot reflect the thought processes of
the entire Legislature.” (citing Barber v Thomas, 560 U.S. 474,
485 (2010); State x Madison, 163 Vt. 360, 373-74, 658 A.2d 536,
545 (1995) (explaining that comments of individual legislators

a °
regarding their understanding of meaning of statute “are of little
weight in determining legislative intent, unless they also exist in
a written report that was available for review by the full
legislature before passing the bill”).

135. Any purpose or intention that Mr. Wagner actually con-
veyed to the Planning Commission when it reviewed his subdivi-
sion application may be relevant to discerning the Planning
Commission’s understanding and intent with respect to the mean-
ing of the permit, and an assessment of the likely purpose behind
a condition like the one at issue here may be a permissible
consideration to the extent the plain language of the condition is
ambiguous. But, what Mr. Wagner and his wife subjectively sought
to accomplish relative to their view of the meadow, in and of itself,
is not information that in any way advances our understanding of
the meaning of the tree line boundary on the plat plan. I do not
join the majority opinion on these points.

2016 VT 97

Debbie A. (Shattuck) Leitgeb v. Robert Leitgeb
[152 A.3d 1177]
No. 15-414
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 2, 2016

2
és

Debbie A. Shattuck, Pro Se, Springfield, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Leitgeb, Pro Se, Littleton, New Hampshire, Defendant-
Appellant.

11. Robinson, J. This case requires us to consider whether and
under what circumstances a child support order can compel an
obligor parent whose income is below the self-support reserve to
make monthly payments toward outstanding arrearages on a child
support surcharge. Father appeals pro se from a family court
order affirming a magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to
modify a child support order that related solely to outstanding
arrearages owed for surcharges. He argues that because his
limited income from Social Security Disability benefits is below
the self-support reserve, he should not be ordered to make $50
monthly payments toward outstanding surcharges. We reverse and
remand.

a "

12. The facts are largely undisputed. The parties were divorced
in 1989. Father was ordered to pay child support for the parties’
minor child, who turned eighteen in July 1998. Although father
did not thereafter incur any new child support obligations, he
continued to owe a substantial arrearage and surcharges.’ In
January 2005, the child support magistrate issued a child support
order reflecting a judgment of arrears in the amount of
$11,424.01. That judgment reflected past due child support prin-
cipal in the amount of $5627.78 and accumulated surcharges of
$5796.23. The court ordered wage withholding from any employer
in the amount of $50 per month, although the order noted that
father had a pending application for Social Security benefits. The
court further ordered that surcharges would continue to accrue on
the judgment at the statutory rate.

13. In May 2008, father filed a pro se petition to modify his
child support order. By that time, the child support. principal
arrearage was paid, but accrued surcharges remained. Father was
living on Social Security Disability benefits. In January 2009, after
a hearing, the magistrate denied father’s motion to vacate or set
aside the surcharge under 15 V.S.A. § 606(d). The court left in
place the existing child support order requiring father to pay $50
per month toward the outstanding surcharges.

14. In April 2011, father filed another pro se motion seeking
modification. This time rather than requesting termination of his
obligation to pay the arrears altogether, his motion sought a
reduction of his monthly payment toward the outstanding arrearage.
In that motion, he represented that he was unemployed, disabled,
and unable to meet his medical expenses. In an entry order, the
child support magistrate ruled that father had not established a
real, substantial, or unanticipated change of circumstances, nor any
other legal basis for relief. The court noted that in 2005, when it
issued an order requiring him to pay $50 per month toward the
arrearages, father was unemployed and not receiving Social Security
Disability benefits. It further noted that it had denied a similar
motion in January 2009, after a contested hearing.

15. In September 2011, father again filed a pro se motion, this
time seeking discharge of his surcharge arrearage obligation

‘A surcharge is assessed “{iJn lieu of interest on unpaid child support which has
acerued under a child support order,” and is computed at a rate set by statute, 15
VS.A. § 606(d)(1).

92 |

altogether. Father filed this motion after the effective date of 15
VS.A. § 606(d)(2), which provides: “In the interest of justice, the
court may discharge all or part of a surcharge that accrued
subsequent to the date of the last judgment upon a finding that
since that date, the obligated parent became unable to comply
with the underlying support obligation.” In his motion, father cited
a decrease in his Social Security Disability payments and_ his
struggle to pay rent. The magistrate denied father’s motion to
modify because father had not shown an unanticipated change in
circumstances as required by 15 V.S.A. § 660. In particular, the
change in his Social Security Disability payments was not suffi-
cient to trigger a modification. The magistrate further denied
father’s motion under 15 V.S.A. § 606(d)(2) on the ground that
father had not shown that since the last judgment he had become
“unable to comply.” However, in December 2011, the magistrate
did enter a new, modified child support order establishing a
surcharge arrearage balance of $3967.41, maintaining the $50 per
month payment schedule, and reducing the rate of accrual of
continuing surcharges to 0.5% per month, or 6% per year. The
superior court, family division, upheld this order on appeal.

16. In September 2013, father filed another motion seeking
reduction of his monthly obligation to repay arrearages to $0 and
discharge of the surcharges. The magistrate rejected the motion
noting that at that time father had both earned income and Social
Security income and that his total monthly income exceeded his ex-
penses such that he was able to make the $50 per month payment.

17. Finally, in February 2015, father filed another pro se
motion to modify the child support order relating to his outstand-
ing surcharges. This is the motion that led to this appeal. Father
alleged that his income had decreased, he was disabled, and the
child support order in question was issued more than three years
prior. His requested relief was a decrease in his monthly obliga-
tion to $0.

18. The magistrate held a contested hearing. Although father
indicated that the sole relief he was seeking was discharge of the
surcharge arrearage pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 606(d)(2), most of his
testimony was directed at his inability to pay the $50 per month.
It was not clear that he understood that the motion he filed
suggested two alternate forms of relief: one that would discharge
some or all of the surcharge arrearage pursuant to § 606(@)@),
and one that would leave the accrued surcharge judgment intact,
but would reduce or eliminate his monthly payment obligation.

a °

19. At the hearing, the Office of Child Support indicated that
father’s remaining surcharge arrearage was approximately $1917.
Based on father’s testimony, the magistrate found that father had
$976 per month in Social Security Disability benefits, in addition
to fuel assistance and food stamps. His monthly expenses for rent,
utilities, prescription medications, and sundries totaled $935 per
month, leaving him with $41 per month from which he could pay
the $50 arrearage payment. The magistrate noted that $50 of his
monthly expenses was a payment toward past due rent; the
magistrate reasoned that if he reduced this amount by $9 per
month, he would be able to make the arrearage payment.

110. With respect to father’s motion to discharge his remaining
accrued surcharges in the interest of justice pursuant to 15 V.S.A.
§ 606(d), the magistrate concluded that the statute authorizes
discharge of only surcharges that accrued subsequent to the date
of the last judgment, upon a finding that the obligated parent had
become unable to comply with the underlying support obligation
since that date. Noting that father had no outstanding support
obligation or support arrearage (as opposed to surcharge arrear-
age), the magistrate concluded that no surcharges had accrued
since the last judgment, and the court was not authorized to
discharge surcharges that had accrued prior to that time and that
were reduced to judgment in that order. Accordingly, the magis-
trate concluded that § 606(d) did not give the court authority to
reduce father’s arrearage balance.

111. The magistrate went on to consider the possibility of
reducing or eliminating father’s monthly payment obligation, as
opposed to discharging the underlying judgment. The magistrate
noted that father’s living circumstances had changed on account of
a recent divorce and that his income had fallen. However, the
magistrate found that his modest monthly income was. still
sufficient to meet his modest expenses and allow him to continue
paying $50 per month toward his surcharge arrearages. In
addition, the magistrate found that father’s consistent payment of
the $50 per month over the course of years supported the finding
that he was, in fact, able to afford the payment. For these
reasons, the magistrate declined to reduce father’s monthly sur-
charge arrearage payment.

112. On appeal, the family division affirmed. With respect to
father’s request for relief “[iJn the interest of justice” under 15
VS.A. § 606(d)2), the court affirmed the magistrate’s conclusion

4 Le

that the statute did not apply, as none of the remaining obligation
had “accrued subsequent to the date of the last judgment.” As to
the request for modification under 15 V.S.A. § 660, the court
affirmed the magistrate’s finding that father’s circumstances had
changed, and upheld the magistrate’s conclusion that father was
capable of making the payments. Father appealed.

113. On appeal, father challenges the magistrate’s denial of his
request to modify to zero his monthly payment obligation? He
argues that the magistrate’s order requiring him to make monthly
payments toward his arrears despite the fact that his income is
undisputedly below the self-support reserve runs afoul of 15 V.S.A.
§ 656(©), and that the magistrate clearly erred in concluding that
he was able to pay $50 per month?

114. We will neither set aside the magistrate’s findings unless
they are clearly erroneous, nor its conclusions if reasonably
supported by the findings. Tetreault v Coon, 167 Vt. 396, 399-400,
708 A2d 571, 574 (1998). But our review of questions of law is
nondeferential and plenary. Mitchinson uv Mitchinson, 173 Vt. 483,
484, 788 A.2d 23, 24 (2001) (mem.).

115. MM We agree with father that the magistrate failed to
apply the proper standard under 15 V.S.A. § 656(c) in ordering
him to pay $50 per month toward his arrearages. The statute
relating to computation of a parent’s support obligation provides
that if a noncustodial parent’s available income is less than the
self-support reserve, the court shall use its discretion in deter-
mining support and shall require payment of a nominal support

2 Father does not directly challenge the magistrate’s and superior court’s refusal
to discharge the outstanding arrearages pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 606(d)(2). Because
no surcharges have accrued since the prior judgment in December 2011, the
magistrate and superior court concluded that § 606(d)(2) does not offer father any
recourse.

* Father also argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that he had failed to
show a real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances as a prereq-
uisite to modifying the order, noting that 15 V.S.A. § 660(a)(1) authorizes the court
to waive the requirement of a showing of a real, substantial, and unanticipated
change of circumstances if the child support order has not been modified by the
court for at least three years. We do not understand the magistrate to have
concluded that father failed to show a real, substantial, and unanticipated change
of circumstances. Rather, the magistrate identified critical changes in father’s
financial and living cireumstances and evaluated his request to modify his monthly
payment obligation on its merits. For that reason, we need not address father’s
argument on this point.

amount. 15 V.S.A. § 656(b). However, with respect to arrearages,
as opposed to ongoing support, the statute provides:

If the noncustodial parent owes arrears to the custodial
parent, the court shall not order the payment of arrears
in an amount that, by itself or in combination with the
noncustodial parent’s share of the total support obliga-
tion, would reduce the noncustodial parent’s income be-
low the self-support reserve, unless the custodial parent
can show good cause why the payment of arrears should
be ordered despite the fact that such an order would
drop the noncustodial parent’s income below the self-
support reserve. Such arrears shall remain the responsi-
bility of the noncustodial parent and be subject to
repayment at a time when the noncustodial parent’s
income is above the self-support reserve.

15 VS.A. § 656(¢).

116. The self-support reserve is currently defined in statute as
“the needs standard established annually, and calculated at 120
percent of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
poverty guideline per year for a single individual.” 15 V.S.A.
§ 653(7). It was previously defined by statute as “the needs
standard established annually by the commissioner for children
and families which shall be an amount sufficient to provide a
reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.” 15
V.S.A. § 653(7) (2009) (as amended by 2011, No. 119 (Adj. Sess.),
§3). The applicable regulation of the Office of Child Support
continues to define the self-support reserve as an amount intended
to provide a child support payer with reasonable subsistence
compatible with health and decency. Child Support Guidelines § 1,
Code of Vt. Rules 13 161 001, http:/Avww.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/
codeofvtrules. The regulation explains, “The Self-Support Reserve
is deducted from the noncustodial parent’s available income, the
amount remaining is compared to the noncustodial parent’s child
support obligation to determine if he or she has sufficient income
to meet the obligation.” Jd.

117. Hl The statutory scheme reflects a legislative judgment
that an obligor parent should be required to make at least a
nominal payment toward a current parental support obligation,
even when that payment causes that parent’s resources to dip
below the self-support reserve, but a strong presumption against

96 Le

an order requiring current payment toward arrearages to the
extent that payment drops the obligor parent’s resources below
the self-support reserve. The statute does not altogether prohibit
an order requiring the obligor parent to make payments toward
an arrearage that cause that parent’s resources to dip below the
self-support reserve, but puts a burden on the obligee parent to
show good cause. Under this statutory scheme, an order requiring
monthly payments toward an arrearage that reduces an obligor
parent’s resources to less than the self-support reserve is an
exception to the general rule.

118. At the time of the magistrate’s May 2015 order, the
self-support reserve was $1177. The magistrate found that father’s
income from his Social Security Disability benefits was $976 —
$201 below that amount. Neither the magistrate’s order nor the
family division’s order on appeal reflects consideration of the
self-support reserve or 15 V.S.A. § 656(c). The magistrate made no
findings that mother had shown good cause why the payment of
arrears should be ordered notwithstanding father’s monthly in-
come below the self-support reserve. Nor did the magistrate make
any findings from which we might infer a determination of good
cause, such as a finding that, notwithstanding his low monthly
income, father has access to significant assets, or a finding that
for some other reason this case is extraordinary. For that reason,
we remand so that the magistrate can evaluate father’s motion in
light of 15 V.S.A. § 656().

119. Although our conclusion on this point resolves this appeal,
we briefly address father’s challenges to the magistrate’s factual
findings concerning his ability to pay, as those findings may be
relevant to the magistrate’s consideration on remand. Father
argues that the magistrate’s finding that he had an ability to pay
$50 per month was clearly erroneous for two reasons. First, he
notes that his monthly income, as found by the magistrate, was
$976 — $201 less than the statutory self-support reserve. He
argues that this fact is inconsistent with the magistrate’s conclu-
sion that father had an ability to pay the $50 per month. Second,
he argues that the magistrate relied heavily on the fact that
father had consistently paid the $50 per month in concluding that
he had the ability to pay. However, father argues that the funds
were automatically withdrawn from his Social Security Disability
benefits, and he therefore had no choice in the matter — his
consistent payment cannot be viewed vidence of an ability to
pay.

a "

120. [MM Father’s arguments on both points are well-taken.
As noted above, the self-support reserve reflects a legislative
assessment of the resources sufficient to provide a reasonable
subsistence compatible with decency and health. Although the
court may order an obligor parent to make payments toward an
accrued arrearage even though the obligor’s resources fall under
the self-support reserve, any finding of an ability to pay by an
individual who is unemployed, disabled, and has fewer resources
than the self-support reserve protects, requires particular expla-
nation. Father’s uncontroverted testimony in this case is not
inconsistent with this presumption. Although the expenses that he
itemized amounted to slightly less than his Social Security Dis-
ability benefit, he also testified to difficulty paying for his pre-
scription medications, accumulated debts for medical and other
expenses in excess of $1000 due to his inability to pay, his reliance
on the local food pantry in addition to food stamps to meet his
nutritional needs, and his inability to pay for the various sundries
and costs of living.

121. Likewise, the magistrate’s reliance on father’s consistent
payment of the $50 per month as evidence of his ability to pay is
unsupported by the record. The funds were withheld from father’s
Social Security Disability benefit. He had no choice in the matter.
His consistent payment does not necessarily reflect an ability to
pay this sum on top of his most basic living expenses; at most, it
means that some other cost of living has consistently given way.
The fact that father has continued to subsist notwithstanding
these deductions does not demonstrate an ability to pay, especially
when his uncontradicted testimony is that he has accrued sub-
stantial debts to medical providers and others as a result of his
financial constraints.

Reversed and remanded.

2
a

2016 VT 99

In re LaBerge NOV
[152 A.3d 1165)
No. 15-430
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed September 2, 2016

100

Brian P. Hehir, Burlington, for Appellants Matthew and Judy
LaBerge.

E.M. Allen of Stetle; Allen & Kampmann, Burlington, for
Appellee Town of Hinesburg.

Claudine C. Safar of Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC,
Burlington, for Appellees Gary and Fiona Fenwick.

11. Robinson, J. The LaBerges appeal the Environmental
Division’s affirmance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued by the
Town of Hinesburg Zoning Administrator (ZA) for violation of a
Town noise ordinance arising from use of a motocross track on
their property. On appeal, the LaBerges assert that the ordinance
is unconstitutionally vague and that the Environmental Division’s
conclusion that the LaBerges violated the ordinance is clearly
erroneous. We affirm.

412. After a trial and site visit, the Environmental Division made
the following findings. The LaBerges and the Fenwicks own and
live on adjoining parcels of land in the Town of Hinesburg. The
LaBerges maintain a motoct ack on their property, and the
track is situated near the parties’ shared boundary line. The
properties are located in a rural section of town where properties
are mostly wooded, except for the areas surrounding their home.

13. On July 22, 2013, the Zoning Administrator (ZA) visited the
area at the Fenwicks’ request and observed motocross motor-
cycles being ridden on the LaBerge property. At the time, the ZA
and the Fenwicks stood on the Fenwicks’ land near the common
boundary line with the LaBerge property. The ZA and one of the
Fenwicks measured the sound emitted from the motorcycles using
a sound meter purchased by the Fenwicks. For a period in excess
of an hour, the noise levels exceeded 80 dBA for a period of ten
to fifteen seconds every five minutes, during times when the
motorcycles were closest to the common boundary line. Although
the ZA personally observed the motorcycle noises only on July 22,
2013, during conversations that day, Mr. LaBerge confirmed that
his two sons had also ridden their motorcycles with similar noise
levels and for similar duration on June 3 and July 7.

14. The Fenwicks hired a noise expert, who installed noise
meters on their property. That expert confirmed, based on his
testing, that the motorcycles on the LaBerge track resulted in
noise at the Fenwicks’ property in excess of 80 dBA. The trial
court credited the expert’s testimony that in industrial settings
where noise levels exceed 80 dBA, all workers are required to use
ear protection.

15. The LaBerges’ sons ride motorcycles regularly on their
motocross track, although the frequency has diminished over the
last seven years, as their sons are not competing in motocross as
much as they once did. Six years earlier, in 2007, the ZA issued
and the Development Review Board (DRB) upheld a NOV to the
LaBerges for violating the Town’s prior noise-related performance
standards due to motorcycle use. The LaBerges did not appeal
that violation, and they have not received any other Notice of
Violation since that time.

16. The vast majority of property owners in town do not
operate motorcycles or ATVs on their residential property, and the
ZA has not received any other noise complaints concerning
motocross bikes or ATVs ridden on any other residential property
in town.

17. The Town has a noise ordinance that states: “Unreasonable
noises are not permitted. A determination of ‘unreasonable’ shall
include factors such as intensity, duration, and frequency (i.e., how
often it occurs).” The ordinance exempts “usual and customary
residential activities or property maintenance.”

102 Le

18. Based upon his visit on July 22, 2013, and the reports of
two other recent instances in which the LaBerges’ sons rode for
similar durations and generated similar levels of noise, the ZA
issued an NOV to the LaBerges. In his notice to the LaBerges,
the ZA lamented that the noise ordinance “contain[ed] no guide-
lines on what a reasonable duration or frequency might be,” and
said, as a consequence, “I recognize that my application of the
regulations is arbitrary.”

19. The LaBerges timely appealed the ZA’s NOV to the DRB.
After a hearing, the DRB found that: (1) the LaBerges’ motor-
cycle use constituted a “usual and customary residential activity”;
and (2) the noise emitted from the use of the motocross track was
intense, but in light of its limited frequency and duration, it was
not unreasonable. The Fenwicks appealed to the Environmental
Division of the Superior Court.

110. The Fenwicks’ statement of questions to the Environmen-
tal Division identified three questions. First, does the dirt biking
and/or motocross use of the LaBerges’ property violate § 5.12,
specifically § 5.12.1, of the Town’s regulations? Second, does the
LaBerges’ dirt biking and/or motocross use of their property
constitute unreasonable noise as defined in the regulations?
Finally, does the LaBerges’ dirt biking and/or motocross use of
their property constitute a usual and customary residential activ-
ity, particularly in light of the Environmental Division’s decision in
In ve Fowler, No. 159-10-11 Vtee (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Feb.
4, 2013) (Durkin, J.).

111. The Environmental Division addressed each in turn. With
respect to the first two questions, the court rejected the
LaBerges’ argument that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague, concluding that it was not standardless, and that it struck
a reasonable balance between notice to the landowner and flex-
ibility for the municipality. The court further held that the noise
level from the motocross track for ten to fifteen seconds every five
minutes for up to two hours at a time was excessive, especially for
a residential setting, considering such noise level often warrants
hearing protection in a more industrial setting. It noted that 80
dBA was 10 dBA higher than — or twice as loud as — the
highest specific decibel limit the court had seen in any Vermont
zoning regulation. Regarding the third question, the court con-
cluded that dirt biking and motocross riding are not so customary
and incidental to residential use that they can escape the limits of

a noise ordinance specifically designed to regulate the competing
claims of neighbors. The court noted the absence of any evidence
that the repeated riding of motocross motorcycles was a usual and
customary practice in town. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
NOV.

112. On appeal to this Court, the LaBerges make two
overarching arguments. First, they contend that § 5.12.1 of the
Hinesburg Zoning Regulations is so vague and lacking in notice
that it violates due process and equal protection. Second, they
argue that the court’s conclusion that the limited, sporadic,
seasonal use of the LaBerges’ rural property is unreasonable is
clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. In connection
with this argument, the LaBerges specifically challenge several of
the court’s findings. We begin with the constitutional challenge to
the ordinance, then turn to the LaBerges’ objections to the trial
court’s findings and conclusions.

I. Constitutionality of Hinesburg’s Performance Standards

113. The LaBerges argue that the noise restrictions in § 5.12.1
of the Town’s noise ordinance are vague, ambiguous, and
standardless and, accordingly, are void and unenforceable on their
face. The Fenwicks respond on the merits, but also argue that the
constitutional issues were not properly preserved. We reject the
contention that the constitutional issues were not properly pre-
served, but affirm the trial court’s determination that the noise
ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague.

114. On the preservation question, the Fenwicks argue that the
constitutional issue was never properly presented to the Environ-
mental Division because the LaBerges did not cross-appeal the
DRB’s decision in their favor with their own statement of
questions addressing the constitutionality of the Town’s noise
ordinance. The Fenwicks assert that the Environmental Di
was without jurisdiction to consider the constitutional questions,
and we cannot consider them on appeal.

115. Hl The Fenwicks are correct that as a general rule the
statement of questions defines the Environmental Division’s juris-
diction on appeal. See V.R.E.C.P. 5(f) (stating that appellant “may
not raise any question on the appeal not presented in the
statement as filed”); Im re Garen, 174 Vt. 151, 156, 807 A.2d 448,
451 (2002) (noting appeal to Environmental Division is confined to

104 |

issues raised in statement of questions). However, as we recog-
nized in In re Jolly Assocs., the Environmental Division may
consider matters that are intrinsic to the statement of questions,
even if they are not literally stated in the statement of questions.
2006 VT 132, 19, 181 Vt. 190, 915 A.2d 282. The first question
presented in this appeal is whether the dirt biking and/or
motocross use of the LaBerges’ property violates § 5.12.1 of the
Town’s regulations. This question requires the court to consider
the meaning and reach of this ordinance, and that consideration
directly implicates the LaBerges’ argument that the ordinance is
so vague that it has no discernible meaning.

116. I Moreover, the goals of our preservation rules are
satisfied in this case. The purpose of our preservation rule “is to
ensure that the original forum is given an opportunity to rule on
an issue prior to our review.” In re White, 172 Vt. 385, 343, 779
A.2d 1264, 1270-71 (2001). The LaBerges made their constitutional
claims for the first time in a supplemental argument to their
previously filed motion for summary judgment, before the court
held a hearing on the merits. The arguments were before the
court in connection with that hearing, and the court addressed
them in its decision. The Environmental Division had an oppor-
tunity to consider the issue and found the noise ordinance to be
constitutional. See In re Barry, 2011 VT 7, 129, 189 Vt. 183, 16
A38d 613 (rejecting town’s argument that landowner failed to
preserve claim that permit terms were ambiguous where “Envi-
ronmental Court plainly had... an opportunity” to rule on the
issue and “in fact found the critical permit terms to be ambigu-
ous.”). For these reasons, we conclude that the constitutional
question is properly before us.

1117. Hl On the merits of the constitutional claim, the LaBerges
make two related arguments. First, they assert that the noise
ordinance does not contain sufficient guidance as to how the
identified factors — intensity, duration, and frequency — should
be analyzed, measured or weighted, therefore opening the door to
arbitrary enforcement. Second, they argue that because of this
lack of clarity, a landowner of common intelligence has no way of
knowing what conduct is acceptable under the ordinance. Both
arguments rely heavily on our analysis in In re JAM Golf, LLC,
in which we declined to enforce an ordinance that lacked suffi-
ciently specific standards to guide enforcement. 2008 VT 110,

a “

11 12-14, 185 Vt. 201, 969 A.2d 47. Because both of the LaBerges’
arguments hinge on the claim that the Hinesburg noise ordinance
is essentially standardless, we consider them together.’

118. [I Generally, we presume statutes to be constitutional.
Badgley v Walton, 2010 VT 68, 120, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A3d 469.
“(T]he proponent of a constitutional challenge has a very weighty
burden to overcome.” Id. See also State ew rel. City of Providence
uv Auger, 44 ABd 1218, 1226 (R.I. 2012) (“When we review a
challenge to a statute or ordinance, we begin with a presumption
that the enactment is constitutional.”).

119. Bf In JAM Golf, LLC we recognized that a municipal
zoning ordinance that fails to provide sufficient standards to

+A section heading in the LaBerges’ brief suggests that their first argument
springs from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. However, void-for-vagueness challenges are generally
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Grayned
x City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (noting that “(i]t is a basie principle
of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined”); Brody x Barasch, 155 Vt. 108, 110, 582 A.2d 132, 137 (1990)
(explaining that due process requires that “[a] statute must be sufficiently clear to
give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
proscribed”); State x DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237, 271, 577 A.2d 254, 273-74 (1990)
(“In order to withstand a void-for-vagueness attack, a criminal statute must ‘define
a criminal offense with sufficient certainty so as to inform a person of ordinary
intelligence of conduct which is proscribed, and such that arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement is not encouraged? ”) (quoting State x Cantrell, 151 Vt. 130,
133, 558 A.2d 639, 641 (1989)); see also LDS, Inc. v Healy, 589 P.2d 490, 491 (Colo.
1979) (“The vagueness doctrine is grounded upon two closely-related principles of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, a statute is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not sufficiently defined so to as to give fair
warning as to what conduct is prohibited... . Second, a statute is too vague where
it contains no explicit standards for application so that a danger of arbitrary and
capricious enforcement. exists.”

‘The LaBerges did not rely on equal protection principles below, and on appeal
they cite no authority or argument anchoring their claim in equal protection. They
do not claim membership in a class or group, or that the Town has treated them
differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis, See Vill. of
Willowbrook ». Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that plaintiff who does not
allege membership in class or group may pursue equal protection claim brought by
“class of one” where plaintiff alleges that he or she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
difference in treatment). Accordingly, we conclude that both prongs of the
LaBerges’ constitutional argument, as actually briefed, are grounded in due
process

106 Le

adequately guide applicants and decisionmakers violates property
owners’ due process rights. 2008 VT 110, 112-14. That case
involved a dispute between a landowner and the City of South
Burlington. The landowner, which owned a 450-acre planned
residential development (PRD), sought permits for ten additional
lots in a portion of the development known as “the woodland.” The
City of South Burlington denied the permit request, relying on a
zoning ordinance which directed PRDs to “protect important
natural resources including . . . scenic views” and “wildlife
habitats.” Jd. 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Envi-
ronmental Division affirmed the denial, and the landowner ap-
pealed to this Court. We ruled for the landowner on the ground
that the ordinance as written was “essentially standardless.” /d.
113. We explained:

“Protect,” as defined [in the ordinance], cannot be the
equivalent of total preservation, because the same regu-
lations allow for development, which, by necessity, must
reduce wildlife habitat and affect scenic views. How much
Jess than total preservation qualifies as sufficient protec-
tion, however, we cannot know, because the regulations
do not say. Even had the trial court endeavored to apply
a “reasonableness” measure to this term, [the ordinance]
would be unworkable. The language of the regulations
offers no guidance as to what degree of preservation
short of destruction is acceptable under the statute.
From a regulatory standpoint, therefore, [the ordinance]
provides no guidance as to what may fairly be expected
from landowners who own a parcel containing wildlife
habitat or scenic views — both common situations in
Vermont — and who wish to develop their property into
a PRD. Such standardless discretion violates property
owners’ due process rights.

Id. 114.

120. I The critical question in this case is whether the same
critique applies to the ordinance here, which proscribes unreason-
able noise, and identifies the factors — intensity, duration, and
frequency — by which reasonableness should be measured.

121. In the context of a challenge to a municipal noise
ordinance that did not include a numeric decibel standard but

a “

instead referred to “customary or reasonably expected” noise, we
explained:

It is not unreasonable for the Town to establish noise
limit standards that take into account surrounding uses
and the expectations created by those uses. Although we
have applied the constitutional vagueness standard in
regulatory circumstances, we have noted that we are
dealing with an area where some imprecision and gen-
erality is necessary and inevitable and our void-for-
vagueness test is less strict where the regulation is
economic and the landowner can seek clarification of its
meaning or resort to administrative processes.

In ve Ferrera & Fenn Gravel Pit, 2018 VT 97, 116, 195 Vt. 138,
87 A3d 488 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). We
rejected the suggestion that anything other than a numeric
decibel standard was unacceptable, and concluded that the town’s
noise limit standard was not so vague that it was “essentially
without an ascertainable standard.” Id.; see also Grayned, 408
US. at 110 (“Condemned to the use of words, we can never
expect mathematical certainty from our language.”).

1122. Indeed, the standard of reasonableness at the heart of the
Town’s noise ordinance is one that numerous courts have upheld
against void-for-vagueness challenges. See, e.g., Reeves u McConn,
631 F.2d 377, 386 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
noise that is “unreasonably loud, raucous, jarring, disturbing, or a
nuisance to persons within the area of audibility”); Howard Opera
House Assocs. vu Urban Outfitters, Inc., 322 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir.
2003) (upholding Burlington ordinance prohibiting “loud or unrea-
sonable noise” and defining “unreasonable” as noise that “disturbs,
injures or endangers the peace or health of another or...
endangers the health, safety or welfare of the community”); Town
of Baldwin v Carter, 2002 ME 52, 192, 12, 794 A2d 62
(upholding town’s dog bark ordinance after court read objective
reasonableness requirement into ordinance prohibiting dog bark-
ing that “unnecessarily annoy[ed] or disturb[ed] any person”);
State v Holland, 331 A2d 626, 632 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975) (holding that ordinance prohibiting loud and unnecessary
noises, ie. those which are unreasonable in the circumstances,
“fairly apprises the public and the defendant of what it pro-
scribes”); City of Columbus v Kim, 886 N.E.2d 217, 219-20 (Ohio

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2008) (upholding ordinance regulating keeping of animals that are
unreasonably loud or disturbing because ordinance incorporates
objective “reasonableness” standard and provides factors —
namely, “character, intensity and duration” of disturbances by
which reasonableness can be measured); Auger, 44 A.3d at 1235-36
(upholding City of Providence’s ordinance governing volume of
radios, television sets, and similar devices and noting that ordi-
nance’s standard of “reasonableness” is one that a plethora of
courts have upheld as not void for vagueness). Cf. City of Lincolu
Center x Farmway Co-Op, Inc., 316 P.3d 707, 714 (Kan. 2013)
(finding city’s noise ordinance unconstitutionally vague because
reasonableness component was disjunctive, resulting in “no guar-
antee that conduct will only be punished when based exclusively
on the objective standards”). But see Tanner u City of Virginia
Beach, 674 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Va. 2009) (overturning city’s noise
ordinance prohibiting “unreasonably loud, disturbing and unnec-
essary noise” that was “of such character, intensity and duration
as to be detrimental to the life or health of persons of reasonable
sensitivity” or that “disturb[s] or annoy[s] the quiet, comfort or
repose of reasonable persons” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

123. In addition to incorporating an objective “reasonableness”
standard, the ordinance in this case identifies key factors in
assessing reasonableness: intensity, duration, and frequency —
guidance that further focuses the reasonableness inquiry, guards
against arbitrary enforcement, and puts individuals on notice of
the law’s requirements.

124. The ZA’s statement in his NOV letter to the LaBerges
that his application of the ordinance was “arbitrary” does not.
change our assessment. In the same letter, the ZA described and
considered the three listed factors. He stated:

On July 22, 2013, I observed noise measurements in the
high 80 Db range coming from motorbikes ridden on
your property. The duration of this sound was approxi-
mately 10 to 15 seconds, and its frequency was about
every five minutes while I was present. The frequency of
the use of the track, reported to be on or about June 3,
July 7 and July 22. The combination of all of these
factors has created an unreasonable noise.

Moreover, in his testimony at the hearing, the ZA explained that
it would have been difficult to have a conversation during the loud

periods. He described the noise as “startling,” adding “I don’t
startle easily, and . . . even there sort of expecting this to happen
it was a significant impact of noise.” Despite the ZA’s statement
that his application was arbitrary, the record reflects that he made
an objective determination that the LaBerges were in violation of
the ordinance as supported by his observations and consideration
of the three listed factors.

125. [HB For the above reasons, we conclude that the noise
ordinance is not unconstitutional on its face.2 As one court has
explained, “[t]he fact that there may be marginal cases in which
it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a
particular fact situation falls is not a sufficient reason to hold the
language too ambiguous to define a penal offense.” Holland, 331
A.2d at 630.

126. I We also conclude that, as applied in this case, the
ordinance gave the LaBerges fair notice that the noise level,
frequency, and duration at issue would be proscribed. We note at
the outset that 80 dBA at the property line is a very high noise
level. Municipal ordinances and general development standards
frequently identify 70 dBA as a maximum allowable noise level at
a property boundary. See, e.g., In re Fowler, No. 159-10-11 Vtec,
slip op. at 4 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Feb. 4, 2013) (Durkin, J.)
(applying town noise ordinance prohibiting noise above 70 dBA);
In re Champlain Oil Co., No. 89-7-11 Vtec, slip op. at 22 (Vt.
Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Oct. 10, 2012) (Durkin, J.) (granting
conditional use approval where project site would not exceed noise
level of 70 dBA as required by town ordinance); In re Sheldrick
Building Permit, No. 185-9-07 Vtec, slip op. at 10 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Envtl. Div. Apr. 23, 2009) (Durkin, J.) (approving zoning permit
for workshop which would not produce noise above 70 dBA in
compliance with town noise ordinance); In re Penmar Farm, No.
113-7-03 Vtec, slip op. at 8 (Vt. Super. Ct. Envtl. Div. Oct. 17,
2005) (Wright, J.) (approving conditional use permit for gravel pit
where noise generated by project would not exceed 70 dBA at

2 Where a party raises a facial challenge to an ordinance that implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct, that party must show that the ordinance is
“impermissibly vague in all of its applications” Vill. of Hoffman Estates
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US. 489, 495 (1982). It is not entirely clear
whether the LaBerges intended to make a facial or an as-applied challenge in this
case. We consider both.

110 |

property line and would not exceed 50 dBA at any nearby
residences). The noise level at issue in this case, exceeding 80
dBA, was more than twice as loud as this often-used limit. See Jv
re Chaves A250 Permit Reconsider, 2014 VT 5, 131 n4, 195 Vt.
467, 93 A8d 69 (noting expert testimony that decibel scale is
logarithmic so that for every 10 dB increase, loudness appears to
double).

127. Although the focus of the LaBerges’ arguments on appeal
is the decibel measurements described by the trial court, we note
that the trial court did not rely exclusively on decibel measure-
ments in reaching its conclusion. The court specifically credited
Ms. Fenwick’s testimony that the noise was “extremely loud,
irritating, assaultive, and disruptive.” And the duration of the noise
— ten to fifteen seconds every five minutes over the course of two
hours — distinguishes this from a loud but infrequent or short
noise.

128. For the above reasons, we conclude that the Town’s noise
ordinance passes constitutional muster, on its face and as applied
in this case.

II. Trial Court’s Application of the Ordinance

129. The LaBerges argue generally that the trial court’s
conclusion that the noise in question here was unreasonable is not
supported by the evidence. In support of this general argument,
they argue more specifically that the trial court: (1) improperly
admitted and relied upon World Health Organization (WHO)
standards on noise levels; (2) erred in relying on the noise level
data provided by Mr. Fenwick; (3) erroneously relied on expert
testimony regarding noise levels measured on the Fenwick prop-
erty more than a year after the events at issue here, and at a
time when motorcycles were not ridden on the track; (4) erred in
finding that three instances of such noise levels occurred; and (5)
erred in ing the duration of the motorcycle riding events.
We consider each argument in turn.

130. HM First, we conclude that the trial court properly
admitted the WHO noise guidelines considered by the Fenwicks’
expert in reaching his opinion as to the reasonableness of the
noise levels at issue in this case. The Fenwicks’ expert offered
testimony based, in part, on the WHO noise guidelines. The
LaBerges objected to admission of the WHO noise guidelines on

the basis of relevance, arguing that the Town’s noise ordinance did
not include specific decibel limitations, so the limitations in the
WHO guidelines are irrelevant to this case. The trial court
admitted the standards on the basis that the noise expert relied
upon them in order to reach his expert opinion regarding the
reasonableness of the noise in question.

131. II We reverse the Environmental Division’s admission of
evidence only if the court abused its discretion or prejudice
resulted. In re Lathrop Ltd. P’ship I, 2015 VT 49, 190, 199 Vt. 19,
121 A.3d 630. Vermont Rule of Evidence 702 allows admission of
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” if it “assist[s]
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.” Experts may use nonbinding standards to inform their
expert opinion. Lees u Carthage Coll., 714 F.3d 516, 525 (7th Cir.
2013) (reversing district court’s exclusion of expert testimony on
campus safety where expert’s opinion was based upon nonbinding
but widely consulted industry standards); see also Robertson v.
Burlington Northern R.R., 382 F.3d 408, 411 @th Cir. 1994)
(holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting OSHA noise standards to help establish standard of care
even though defendant railroad was not subject to regulations).
The Fenwicks’ sound expert’s testimony was based in part upon
the WHO standards. Vermont Rule of Evidence 703 allows experts
to present their opinions based upon information that may oth-
erwise be inadmissible as long as the information is “of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.” The expert
testified that the WHO standards “are typically used as a
reference level.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the WHO standards. See In re Waterfront Park Act 250
Amendment, 2016 VT 39, 125, 201 Vt. 596, 146 A.8d 334 (recog-
nizing that WHO guidelines “provide a scientific basis for ascer-
taining noise levels that cause serious annoyance and sleep
disturbance” (quotations omitted)).

132. Nor did the trial court import the WHO standards into the
Hinesburg ordinance, as the LaBerges suggest. Although the
court heard expert testimony as to the WHO-recommended noise
limits for residential areas outdoors (55 dBA), its opinion does not
support the LaBerges’ assertion that the court adopted the WHO
guidelines as the standard governing application of the Hinesburg
ordinance.

112 Le

133. IJ Second, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in allowing and considering testimony concerning the July 22, 2013
sound-level measurements taken by Mr. Fenwick. At trial, the
court declined to allow the ZA to testify about the readings he
observed on the Fenwicks’ sound meter at the time that he and
the Fenwicks jointly observed the motorcycle riding. The court
explained that in such cases its practice was to allow a property
owner who had purchased and used a sound meter to explain how
well they know how to operate it, how they operated it during a
time of concern, and what results the meter showed. The court
noted that it would afford the readings the appropriate weight
based upon the credibility of the testimony. Accordingly, later in
the hearing and without objection, Mr. Fenwick testified about his
use of the sound meter and his measurements of the sound level
on the evening of July 22.

134. On appeal, the LaBerges do not challenge the court’s
admission of the testimony but, instead, argue that the court
“erroneously relied” on the data. They point out that the device
Mr. Fenwick used was not authenticated or admitted at trial, that
Mr. Fenwick could not identify where he was standing, and that
the court lacked information about weather conditions, wind
direction and velocity, background noise, the height of the device
while being used, whether or not the device was properly cali-
brated, and if it even functioned at all. In short, the LaBerges
contest the weight they believe the trial court gave the evidence.

135. [BB The trial court “enjoys broad discretion in assessing
the credibility and weight of a witness’ testimony, and we will not
second-guess these determinations on appeal.” In re Hastview at
Middlebury, Inc., 2009 VT 98, 136, 187 Vt. 208, 992 A2d 1014.
The points the LaBerges make on appeal would have been
reasonable fodder for cross-examination, but are not grounds for
reversal of the trial court’s factfinding. Moreover, it is not clear
how much the trial court relied on Mr. Fenwick’s measurements
in isolation. When explaining its inclination to admit Mr. Fenwick’s
testimony about the sound-level readings he took, the trial court
noted that it was uneasy relying solely on such testimony; it later
noted that the anticipated expert testimony might lend credibility
to Mr. Fenwick’s measurements. As described below, Mr.
Fenwick’s 80 dBA reading was subsequently corroborated by an
expert's measurements. Given these considerations, the trial

court’s finding that the sound levels at the property line were 80
dBA was not clearly erroneous.

136. EJ Third, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
admitting and crediting testimony by the Fenwicks’ expert con-
cerning the sound levels at their property line associated with
operation of motorcycles on the LaBerges’ track. At trial, the
Fenwicks sought to introduce testimony from their expert regard-
ing sound levels at various spots on their property as measured
by the expert. The LaBerges objected to the admission of this
evidence on the ground that the sound levels measured were not
necessarily the same as the noise that gave rise to the NOV. In
particular, the Fenwicks’ expert measured the sound levels more
than a year after the events that gave rise to the NOV and was
not personally present to confirm that his tool recorded noise
from motorcycles on the LaBerge property versus other sources.
Because Mr. Fenwick had testified about events that occurred
throughout the measurement period, including the revving of
motorcycle engines on the LaBerge property, the trial court
admitted the testimony. On appeal, the LaBerges argue that the
court erred by assigning weight to the expert’s data because it
had no connection in time to the July 22, 2018 NOV.

137. The LaBerges’ suggestion that there was no link between
the expert’s measurements and the noise that gave rise to this
NOV is not supported by the record. Although the expert was not.
personally present throughout the monitoring period, Mr. Fenwick
was. He testified to the various noises throughout the period, such
as gunshots, and the expert correlated Mr. Fenwick’s various
observations to different readings on his meters. Mr. Fenwick
testified that the sound of revving motorcycle engines (rather than
actual riding around the track) during his expert’s sound-level
testing was identical to the sound he heard when standing by his
property line with the ZA on July 22, 2013. This testimony
connected the expert’s measurements to the noise disturbance that
gave rise to the NOV, and the trial court acted within its
discretion in crediting the testimony.

138. HI Fourth, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that
motorcycles on the LaBerges’ property operated in a_ similar
fashion, with similar noise levels and for similar duration on two
other occasions within two months of the NOV was supported by
substantial evidence in the record. The trial court found that the

114 |

LaBerges used motocross racing motorcycles on June 3, June 22,
and July 7, 2013 — a finding that related to the court’s
consideration of the frequency of the objectionable noise. On
appeal, the LaBerges argue that this finding was clearly errone-
ous. They emphasize that the ZA did not personally witness
motorcycles on their track on June 3 and July 7, 2013, and that
Mr. LaBerge testified unequivocally that on each of those days
there was no riding on the property.

139. “We are deferential to a trial court’s findings of fact, and
will uphold them unless clearly erroneous.” Unifund CCR Part-
ners v Zimmer, 2016 VT 338, 110, 201 Vt. 474, 144 ABd 1045;
V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2). “The findings will stand if there is any reason-
able and credible evidence to support them.” Jarvis uv Gillespie,
155 Vt. 633, 637, 587 A.2d 981, 984 (1991). Mr. Fenwick testified
before the Environmental Division that the alleged riding did
occur on, or approximately on, the dates in question. He explained
that he would call the ZA in the evening when there was riding,
and then would email the ZA the next day if he didn’t hear back.
Because the ZA may have relied on the emails in identifying the
other dates listed in the NOV, there might be a minor discrepancy
in the dates. In his own testimony, although Mr. LaBerge claimed
that a couple of the dates listed in the NOV were one day off, he
did not dispute that the riding occurred and specifically acknowl-
edged, “[wle did some riding around those dates.” Whether the
riding in question occurred on June 2 or June 3 had no impact on
the trial court’s assessment of the frequency of the riding events.
Nor is there any suggestion that the specific date of each episode
of riding was relevant to the LaBerges’ defense. Under these
circumstances, even if the trial court’s findings as to the specific
dates of the two other instances of noisy riding were off by a day,
any error would be harmless. See V.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.”).

140. HM Finally, we reject the LaBerges’ contention that the
trial court erred in finding that the LaBerges rode their motor-
cycles for between one and two hours. Mr. LaBerge testified that
his sons generally rode in two twenty-minute segments, separated
by a break in between, and occasionally there would be one
additional twenty-minute segment. But, Mr. Fenwick testified that
on June 22 the LaBerges rode for an hour and a half to two

a

a = =

hours, and his wife testified that the riding sessions usually lasted
two hours. The trial court’s finding on this point is amply
supported in the record.

Affirmed.

2016 VT 90

Agency of Natural Resources v. Hugh McGee & Eileen McGee
[151 A.Bd 1240]
No. 15-412
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed Angust 19, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied September 7, 2016

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Robert F
McDougall, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Hugh McGee & Kileen McGee, Pro Ses, Brandon, Defendants-
Appellants.

1. Eaton, J. In this environmental enforcement action, the
Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) issued a violation and
imposed a penalty of $10,000 against defendants Hugh McGee and
Eileen McGee for placing unpermitted fill in a Class I] wetland.
Defendants appealed and, following a site visit and evidentiary
hearing, the Environmental Division concluded that the land was
not exempt, upheld the violation, and reduced the penalty to
$3647. On appeal, defendants argue that the land is used for
grazing horses and it therefore meets the requirements of the
farming exemption in the wetlands regulations. We conclude that
the evidence supports the Environmental Division’s finding that
the area had not been used consistently to grow food or crops
since 1990 and therefore any exemption had expired, and affirm.

12. MEA little background regarding the underlying statutes
and regulations is useful to understanding the arguments involved
in this appeal. Pursuant to statute, a permit is generally required
before conducting an activity “in a significant wetland or buffer
zone.” 10 V.S.A. § 913(a). This broad requirement is tempered in
two ways. First, the definition of wetland exempts certain lands.
Wetlands are defined as areas “inundated by surface or ground-
water with a frequency sufficient to support significant vegetation
or aquatic life that depend on saturated or seasonally saturated
soil conditions for growth and reproduction,” but excluding “such
areas as grow food or crops in connection with farming activi-
ties.” 10 V.S.A. § 9025) (emphasis added). ANR’s wetlands regu-
lations contain a parallel “Farming Exemption,” which defines
farming activities as “the cultivation or other use of land for
growing food, fiber, Christmas trees, maple sap, or horticultural
and orchard crops; and the growing of food and crops in
connection with the raising, feeding, or management of livestock,
poultry, equines, fish farms, or bees for profit.” Vermont Wetlands

Rules §38.1(a)(2), Code of Vt. Rules 12 030 026 [hereinafter
Wetlands Rules]. The Wetlands Rules specify that the farming
exemption has a “Limitation on Exemption,” which confines its
application to those areas used for farming activities as of the
rules’ effective date and expires “whenever the area is no longer
used to grow food or crops or in ordinary rotation.” Id. § 3.1(a)@).
Thus, under the statute and applicable regulations, only those
areas that have been used for farming activities continuously since
1990 are exempt from regulation as a wetland.

13. The second way that the general prohibition on activity in
a wetland is narrowed is that the statute authorizes nonpermitted
“allowed uses,” which are set by rule. 10 VS.A. §913(a). The
Wetlands Rules list certain activities that are allowed in Class I or
Class II wetlands without a permit, but emphasize that these may
be conducted only “provided that the configuration of the wet-
land’s outlet or the flow of water into or out of the wetland is not
altered and that no draining, dredging, filling, or grading occurs.”
Wetlands Rules §6. This list includes “[t]he growing of food or
crops in connection with farming activities,’ under certain condi-
tions. Id. § 6.06. Thus, unless an activity takes place in an area
exempt from regulation or is an allowed use, it requires a permit.
Id. $9.1.

14. Here, ANR alleged that defendants violated the Wetlands
Rules by placing fill in a Class II wetland without a permit. The
Environmental Division made the following factual findings. De-
fendant Eileen McGee is the sole owner of the 28.36-acre property
in Brandon, Vermont. Her former husband, Hugh McGee, is
responsible for the daily upkeep of the property. For thirty years,
defendants have conducted various farming activities on areas of
the property including raising and training horses, raising cattle,
haying, and grazing horses. The property spans Smalley Road. On
the south side of the road, there are several paddocks and fields
close to the road where defendants pasture the horses. South of
the paddocks is a pond that provides water for the horses. South
and east of the pond is a large Class II wetland. The land south
of the pond has been used for grazing horses, but, as the trial
court found, only in that the horses were permitted to eat what
was attractive to them for forage and was there growing naturally.
The ANR enforcement officer testified that the area in question
was not being used to grow crops in connection with the
management of horses or livestock. The findings and conclusions

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of the trial court leave no doubt that except for occasional cutting,
there was an absence of any soil management practice for pasture
land intended to cultivate fertile soils consistent with animal
health and water quality.

15. In August 2013, ANR received a citizen complaint about a
possible wetland violation. An ANR enforcement officer visited
defendants’ land on August 26 and observed Hugh McGee using
an excavator to dredge the pond south of the horse paddocks and
placing the dredged material on the southern bank of the pond.
The enforcement officer spoke to Hugh McGee and explained that
it did not appear that his current actions were a violation, but
that it would be a violation to place any dredged material in the
wetland. He advised Hugh McGee to stop dredging until he could
return with a wetlands ecologist. On August 29, the enforcement
officer returned with a wetlands ecologist. They observed that
material had been pushed into the wetland. That area of the
wetland had wild vegetation growing. The brush was chest-high
and thick and did not show signs of being cultivated.

16. In September 2013, ANR issued a notice of alleged
violation. In response, Eileen McGee sent a letter stating that the
property was an agricultural operation and therefore exempt. In
June 2015, ANR issued an administrative order for the violation,
ordering removal of the fill and requiring payment of a $10,000
fine. Defendants requested a hearing, claiming they were exempt
from the Wetlands Rules because the land was used for farming
activities. The matter was heard before the Environmental Divi-
sion. The court conducted a site visit and heard testimony from
the enforcement. officer, the wetlands ecologist, and defendant
Hugh McGee.

17. The court concluded that defendants’ activities of intermit-
tently cutting the brush and allowing horses to graze in the area
did not meet the definition of farming in the statute or the
Wetlands Rules. 10 V.S.A. § 902(5) (exempting from definition of
wetland “such areas as grow food or crops in connection with
farming activities”); Wetlands Rules §3.1(a)(2) (defining farming
activities as “cultivation or other use of land for growing food”).
The court explained that the definition of farming entailed some
type of cultivation — physical measures applied directly to the soil
— and did not include land where vegetation was merely allowed
to grow in a random fashion and animals were permitted to graze.

18. The court further concluded that even if periodic cutting of
vegetation and grazing of livestock fit within the meaning of
“farming activities” and “cultivation,” the evidence failed to show
that the activity had been continuous since 1990 when the
Wetlands Rules went into effect. See Wetlands Rules § 3.1@)@)
(limiting farming exemption to those areas used to grow food or
crops as of the rules’ effective date and explaining that exemption
expires “whenever the area is no longer used to grow food or
crops or in ordinary rotation”). The court explained that the
credible evidence showed that to the extent the area had been
managed — by cutting with a brush hog — this was on an
intermittent and inconsistent basis. The court cited defendant
Hugh McGee’s testimony that he intermittently brush-hogged and
hayed the land south of the pond, and that at times the area was
reclaimed by brush. In addition, the court credited the testimony
of the wetlands ecologist that when she inspected the area in
August 2013 the brush was chest high and thick and showed no
signs of cultivation. Therefore, the court concluded that whatever
exemption the land may have had, it was abandoned by the
inconsistent nature of the use.

19. The court additionally held that the activity of putting fill in
the wetland was not an allowed use under the Wetlands Rules,
which specifically disallowed any use which entailed “draining,
dredging, filling or grading.” Wetlands Rules § 6. Finally, the court
considered various factors and decreased the penalty to $3647.

110. On appeal, defendants argue that their land has been used
continuously since 1976 as a farming operation and it is therefore
exempt from regulation under the Wetlands Rules. Defendants list
various types of activities they allege amount to farming, including
raising and training horses, growing Christmas trees, caring for
stray animals, and haying, and assert that at the evidentiary
hearing the court agreed that the land was used as a farm. It is
important to distinguish, however, between the defendants’ prop-
erty generally and the area of the wetland where the alleged
violation took place. While defendants may engage in other
activities on the property, the sole use on the area in question
was, as defendants testified, that the land was used as pastureland
to graze horses. According to defendants, the land was cultivated
because it was brush-hogged to keep it open for pasturing horses.

111. There are essentially two main questions presented by this
appeal. The first one is legal — whether defendants’ activities of

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brush-hogging and grazing horses on open land not managed for
pasture other than mere intermittent and occasional cutting,
satisfied the farming exemption as an area that was used to “grow
food or crops in connection with farming activities,’ 10 V.S.A.
§ 9025), or used for the “cultivation or other use of land for
growing food,” Wetlands Rules § 3.1(a)(2). The second question is
factual — whether defendants’ “no longer used [the area] to grow
food or corps or in ordinary rotation” at a time after 1990 and
therefore any exemption expired. Wetlands Rules § 3.1(a)(8).

112. This Court applies a deferential standard of review to the
findings made by the Environmental Division. Im re Carrigan
Conditional Use & Certificate of Compliance, 2014 VT 125, 19,
198 Vt. 438, 117 A.38d 788. Factual findings will not be reversed
“unless, taking them in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, they are clearly erroneous.” In re Goddard Coll. Condi-
tional Use, 2014 VT 124, 14, 198 Vt. 85, 111 A3d 1285 (quotation
omitted).

1113. Jl Defendants bear the burden of proving that their land
is exempt from the wetlands regulations. See In re Ochs, 2006 VT
122, 112, 181 Vt. 541, 915 A2d 780 (mem.) (stating that landown-
ers bore burden of demonstrating that their operation fit within
farming exemption and was exempt from Act 250 regulation). “The
farming exemption, like all exemptions, is to be read narrowly and
only applied when the facts support the exemption’s application.”
Id. (discussing farming exemption in Act 250).

1114. I We do not reach the former legal question of whether
defendants’ activities amounted to farming as defined in the
statute and the rule because we conclude that the evidence
supports the court’s finding that defendants did not consistently
use the area “to grow food or crops in ordinary rotation” since
1990.

115. The evidence concerning the extent to which the area
south of the pond had been used was as follows. The wetlands
ecologist testified that the area of the wetland where fill was
placed was thickly forested. She testified that she did not observe
any cultivation of the area for growing food or crops. She stated
that there was no indication that the area had been used in a
continuous or ordinary rotation for cultivating or maintaining
crops because the area was shrubby, very wet, mucky, and thickly
forested. Upon being shown a recent photograph of the property,

the ecologist explained that the area looked very different in the
photograph because the vegetation had been cut back and was no
longer the shrub swamp that she had observed.

116. Defendant Hugh McGee testified that the area to the
south and east of the pond had been hayed without much
specification as to when that had occurred. He testified that areas
of the farm are brush-hogged every year. He also stated that the
horses will eat items growing in the wetland including cattails,
crabgrass, and trees. He acknowledged that he did not regularly
brush hog the entire farm and that the horses would nonetheless
graze in the wooded areas. He testified that the area where fill
was placed was a location that needed to be taken care of. He
admitted there were trees growing in that area and that all he
had done in that area was clean some brush. He stated that in
that particular area he did not brush hog it every year and that.
“when it gets too big for using, then when you get around to it,
you clean it up.” He stated that the horses will still wander in the
area and “pick and eat some of it.” He acknowledged that the
growth of brush does prevent the horses from using the area as
pastureland and that is why he needs to go in and clean it out.

1117. Hl Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the
court’s finding that defendants’ management of the property in
the area of the alleged violation — brush-hogging only — was
intermittent and not consistent since 1990. It was up to the trial
judge to determine the weight to assign to particular evidence.
See In re Eastview at Middlebury, Inc., 2009 VT 98, 110, 187 Vt.
208, 992 A2d 1014 (explaining that environmental court as
factfinder determines credibility of witnesses and weighs persua-
siveness of evidence). Here, it was within the court’s discretion as
factfinder to credit the testimony of the wetlands ecologist that
the brush was overgrown and did not display signs of cultivation.

118. Defendants assert that the ecologist did not have knowl-
edge of how long the land had been used for farming and that
ANR did not do any background checks to determine whether the
farm had operated consistently. The ecologist’s testimony regard-
ing her observations of the area combined with the testimony of
Hugh McGee was sufficient for the court to find that activities in
that area were not consistent. The ecologist testified that she was
not aware of how long the property had been used for farming
and agriculture. She also testified that this portion of the land

122 |

displayed signs that it had not recently been managed in any way.
In addition, defendant Hugh McGee testified that he had not done
any cutting or brush-hogging of that area for several years and
sometimes let the area get overgrown. His testimony was consis-
tent with photographs of the area which depicted significant
overgrowth. This evidence supported the court’s finding the area
had not been consistently “used to grow food or crops or in
ordinary rotation” since 1990. Wetlands Rules § 3.1(a)(3). This
finding in turn supports the court’s conclusion that whatever
exemption may have applied had expired and therefore that
defendants’ property did not qualify for the farming exemption.

119. JHB Even for land that does not qualify for the farming
exemption, some uses are allowed. Wetlands Rules § 6.06 provides
an allowed use for “[t]he growing of food or crops in connection
with farming activities,” with certain restrictions. See Sec’y Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. uv Irish, 169 Vt. 407, 412, 738 A.2d 571, 578
(1999) (explaining that allowed uses are separate from farming
exemption, which requires current and ongoing use of land for
growing crops). Defendants assert that their activity of grazing
was an allowed use. Here, however, the grazing is not the activity
for which the defendants were penalized. It was the act of placing
fill in the wetland. This activity of placing fill in the wetland is
prohibited under §6, which explicitly states that allowed uses
must not include “draining, dredging, filling, or grading.” Wetlands
Rules §6. Therefore, defendants’ activity, for which the penalty
was assessed, was not an allowed use.

120. Because defendants do not qualify for the farming exemp-
tion and their activity was not an allowed use, the violation was
proper. On appeal, defendants do not challenge the amount of the
penalty imposed and therefore we do not address the issue.

Affirmed.

&

|

2016 VT 98

State of Vermont v. Allen Prue

[158 A.3d 551]
No, 15-002
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 9, 2016

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Lisa A. Warren, Caledonia County State’s Attorney, and Kirk
L. Williams, Deputy State’s Attorney, St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-
Appellant.

11. Robinson, J. Defendant was convicted of first-degree mur-
der, conspiracy to commit murder, and attempted kidnapping
following a jury trial. On appeal, he makes four claims. First, he
argues that his confession on March 27, 2012, should be sup-
pressed because his waiver of his Miranda rights and ensuing
confession were not voluntary. Second, he argues the trial court
committed reversible error when it excluded evidence of his wife’s
psychiatric diagnosis. Third, he contends that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence of his wife’s internet search history. Finally,
defendant argues his sentence should be reversed and remanded
because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to continue his sentencing so that certain witnesses could testify.
We find no error and affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence.

12. We address each argument in turn, providing the salient
facts as relevant to each of defendant’s arguments.

I. Motion to Suppress Defendant’s Statements

13. In considering defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial
court made the following findings, which are supported by sub-
stantial evidence.

14. On March 25, 2012, the victim, Melissa Jenkins, phoned a
friend and reported that a woman had called asking her to help
a person who used to plow her driveway because his car had
broken down. The victim told her friend that she was going to
help, but felt uneasy and wanted someone to know. She gave her
friend the phone number from defendant’s business card.

15. After a period of time, the friend became concerned when
he had not heard back from the victim. He went to look for her
and found her car running on the side of the road with her
two-year old son sitting in the back, and no sign of the victim.
The friend then phoned the Vermont State Police. When the police
arrived at the scene of the crime, they found a hat and identified
the phone number and plow busin to be defendant’s. In
addition, they found defendant’s business card on a table in the
victim’s home.

128 |

16. As a result of this evidence, defendant became a potential
witness to what was at that point a missing person case.
Accordingly, the police went to defendant’s home in the early
morning hours of March 26, 2012. Defendant and his wife were up
and about when the police arrived because his job as a paper-
delivery person required an early start. The police interviewed
both defendant and his wife about where they had been that day
and whether either of them had had contact with the victim. With
the consent of defendant and his wife, the police searched
defendant’s home, outbuildings, and motor vehicles. The trial court
found this first contact to be significant because it was through
this initial contact that defendant and his wife became aware that
they were in police focus concerning the victim’s disappearance.
The next day, the victim’s body was discovered.

17. Coincidentally, several weeks earlier, defendant’s wife had
reported to the police concerns about unauthorized use of her
credit card. She suspected that her ex-husband was involved.
Around 3:00 p.m. on March 26 — the afternoon following the
victim’s disappearance — defendant and his wife appeared unan-
nounced at the Vermont State Police barracks to speak with
someone further about this “identity theft” issue. The trial court
found that defendant later admitted that the purpose of him
visiting the barracks was to “find out what the police knew”
regarding the victim’s homicide. Police officers offered defendant
and his wife water and then kept the cups they used for DNA
testing. In addition, with defendant’s wife’s consent, they down-
loaded the contents of her cell phone. Unbeknownst to defendant
and his wife, this interaction was recorded through a hidden
camera and microphone.

18. The next day, March 27, the police invited defendant and
his wife back to the station to further discuss their identity theft
case. This was actually a ruse to get the two back in the station
so they could be questioned about the victim’s death. Defendant
and his wife arrived around 5:30 p.m., and they were separated.
Defendant met with Lieutenant Matthew Nally, who started the
interview by telling defendant that he wanted more information
about the identity theft case.

19. About fifteen minutes into the interview, Detective Todd
Baxter knocked on the door and falsely indicated that he was
surprised to see defendant at the station because he, Detective
Baxter, had just been to defendant’s home in order to speak with

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him further about the victim’s death. Detective Baxter told
defendant that he was free to go, as had Lieutenant Nally
previously. For roughly the next hour and a half, the troopers
asked about defendant’s and his wife’s whereabouts on March 25,
2012. Both troopers were dressed in plain clothes and were
armed. They were in a room of about 100 square feet located in
the secure area of the barracks. The door was closed for privacy,
and the barracks was busy with officers working on the homicide
investigation. On and off throughout the interview, defendant was
offered bathroom breaks and water or soda, and was reminded
that he was free to leave at any time. He kept possession of his
cell phone throughout the interview.

110. The interview lasted a total of seven hours, including
travel to various sites. The trial court listened to the audio
recording of the interview and found that defendant demonstrated
solid general knowledge. For example, the trial court found that.
defendant spoke clearly about auto mechanics and welding, un-
derstood military time, and was aware that the Burger King he
and his wife visited the day before the homicide had cameras that
the police could use to cross-check his statements. In addition, the
trial court found that defendant’s overall speech pattern was good,
his language was detailed, and he was generally forthcoming with
information, except for instances where defendant struggled out of
an apparent attempt to avoid incriminating himself or his wife.

111. The two troopers used a number of interview techniques
with defendant, including rapport-building, minimizing and maxi-
mizing the severity of the offense, and victim blaming. The trial
court found that as the officers worked through defendant’s
timeline, a fair amount of banter took place between the officers
and defendant. Defendant remained engaged in the conversation
and on multiple occasions when asked if he wanted to continue
talking, defendant said he was happy to do so. This rapport-
building had some effect on defendant, as evidenced by his
willingness to share ever more intimate details about his life,
including his sexual relations with his wife.

112. Although defendant expressed anxiety about being ques-
tioned as to the victim’s homicide, he understood the overall
dynamic of the interview and that the officers were investigating
him. The trial court cited one example from the interview where
defendant “mentioned that he knew [the police] would have done
a background check on him” before their conversation. In addition,

130 Le

defendant told the officers he was aware of their techniques,
stating, for example, “this little technique right here, you guys
saying your wife has already given up... That’s you guys’
technique.” One final example the trial court gave regarding
defendant’s overall understanding of the dynamic of the interview
was his reaction to being charged with penetrating the victim.
When confronted, defendant said “I mean, the autopsy should
have proved that.”

113. Approximately two hours into the interview, after review-
ing defendant’s activities of March 25, the officers gave defendant
Miranda warnings. The trial court excerpted the relevant dialogue
from the transcript of the interview:

N = Lieutenant Nally

B = Detective Baxter
D = Defendant

B: All right. So what we have to do is I just have to
transition from . . .

N: Finish that up?

B: . . . from this to getting you to say that this is the
truth. Is there anything that you want to change in this?
D: No.

B: Okay. There are some formalities that for documen-
tation purposes before that we swear to anything. And I
have to swear to it, and he [Lieutenant Nally] has to
swear to it, ... and you have to swear to it. There is
what’s called, for purpose of documentation . . .

: Yeah, this is the standard .. .

: It basically says that you don’t...

: It’s the standard...

... you don’t have to talk to us.

Right.

: So before we ask you to swear to anything we want
make sure that you don’t have to talk to us.

Right.

: So that’s it. And because, I mean, you’ve watched all
the cop shows, you've watched everything. You're not
under arrest or any of the above.

D: Right.

B: But we want to make sure that you understand fully
that you don’t have to talk to us.

SUS PUPzrs

7
D: Right.

B: And some people think, you know, there are so many
times, I mean, we have to read this. You watch all — do
you watch cop shows at all?

D: Yeah.

B: We have to, we have to read them every single time.
N: Okay. It’s 1919. Do you want me to go through this,
Todd?

B: Yeah.

N: Do you want me to do it or?

B: I mean, I don’t care. He can read them, too, or you
can read them to him.

N: All right, we'll just do it together, how does that
sound? Just move your phone and water, please, for me.
D: I suck at reading, so.

N: All right, well Pll read it aloud to you and you can
follow me along.

B: Yeah. Do you write?

D: What do I need to write?

B: If I were to write, do you want me to transcribe and
write this statement that you've given me later?

D: Yeah.

B: Okay, all right.

N: Perfect. Okay, number 1: You have the right to remain
silent. Do you understand?

D: Yeah.

N: Okay. Anything you say, anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. Understand?
D: Yeah.

N: I’m just going to put a check that I’ve done that. You
have the right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and
to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. Do
you understand?

D: Yeah.

N: Okay. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will
be appointed to represent you at public expense before
any questioning if you wish. In Vermont that is called a
Public Defender.

D: Okay.

N: If you decide to answer questions, you may stop the
questioning at any time.

131

132 |

D: Okay.

N: All right? Do you understand each of the rights I’ve
explained to you?

D: Yeah.

N: Okay. Okay, do you want to talk to me now? Yes or
no.

D: Yeah.

N: Yes? Okay, all right. And then it just says waiver. I’ve
been advised that I have the right to remain silent, to be
represented by a lawyer, to talk with one prior to
questioning and to have one present during questioning.
Knowing my rights, I agree to waive them and talk to
you now. No threats or promises have been made to me.
Understand?

D: Yeah.

N: Okay. You can sign right there for me, please. Did you
finish high school?

D: No, I didn’t.

N: What grade did you get to?

D: I went partway through 9th.

N: Okay, all right. Did you get your GED or anything
like that? T’ll just get the time here. 19:21 and 3/26/12.
D: Is that the new Blackberry?

N: It’s actually pretty old.

D: I thought the bold was new.

B: No, the Curve is new now. It’s Flip. It’s not a Flip-it.
D: Well, that’s what this one is. The Blackberry Curve
and I’ve had it for a couple of years.

B: No, that’s the Bold. They have a new Curve now
that...

N: This is Bold. This is the Bold.

B: Right, that rises up. The front face flips. It doesn’t flip
up but it slides up. It’s a slide.

N: What do you have?

D: This is the Blackberry Curve.

N: Okay, so that’s newer than mine.

B: And you're going to sign too?

N: Yeah, yeah.

* As the trial court noted, at the hearing held on April 18, 2014, “Detective Nally
testified that the correct date was in fact the 27th, not 26th as he erroneously
entered at the time.”

T[sic]: All right.

D: Hey, hey, so what’s next?

B: Well, we’re going to — here’s what’s next. What I
plan on doing is we're basically going to swear you.

D: Okay.

B: We're all going to raise our right hands. I mean, and
we're going to tell the truth here. So as soon as
[Lieutenant Nally] is done...

N: I'll just set this over here.

B: I’m going to go over this time line. So let’s raise our
right hand. Do you, [defendant], swear to tell the truth
and nothing but the truth?

D: I do.

N: I do.

B: Sgt. Nally?

N: I do.

B: And you have to ask me.

N: Do you swear to tell the truth, [Detective] Baxter?
D: I do.

B: All right. So let’s go over this statement.

During this exchange, defendant executed a written waiver of his
Miranda warnings.

114. The trial court found, after having listened to the entirety
of the audio recording and reading the transcripts, that the
recording documented “a sufficient pause immediately before the
warnings, as well as between each one, to give more emphasis
[regarding the warnings]” than the transcript reflects when re-
duced to writing. In addition, the court found that defendant was
“quite observant and responsive to the conversational flow and had
a better grasp of police procedures than might be expected.”

115. The trial court acknowledged the peculiar circumstances
surrounding defendant’s Miranda. waiver. In particular, the trial
court noted that:

There is little question that the troopers’ interview
structure just prior to the administration of the warning
was awkward and did not make for a smooth transition
to the warnings, as [the officers] were telling [defendant]
that everyone would be swearing to the truth of things
said in the preceding hour and fifty minutes or so, which
was dedicated predominately to the preliminary timeline
given by [defendant].

134 |

However, the trial court found that this peculiarity did not
undermine its conclusion that defendant generally understood
what was happening during the Miranda waiver.

116. About an hour after these Miranda warnings, the officers
began pressing defendant harder with respect to his truthfulness.
In the course of that discussion, defendant mentioned that he
used to “spit shake” on a promise to tell the truth. Detective
Baxter followed up on that statement and engaged in a “spit-
shake” in which defendant affirmed his commitment to tell the
truth. The trial court found that Detective Baxter “did not use the
opportunity to physically intimidate or overpower” defendant.

117. The officers then began to confront defendant with infor-
mation they had that connected him to the victim’s murder. As he
was confronted with the evidence against him, he admitted to
strangling the victim. After this initial confession, defendant took
the officers to the site where the victim’s body was found, then to
New Hampshire where defendant and his wife burned their
clothes and other items, and then to where defendant discarded
the cell phone he had used to contact the victim. When they
returned to the barracks, defendant gave a complete statement.
Miranda warnings were not readministered.

118. The trial court found that throughout the interview the
troopers offered defendant water or soda on multiple o ions,
and offered him the chance to use the bathroom and smoke
cigarettes. In addition, the officers asked defendant several times
whether they had treated him fairly, to which defendant answered
in the affirmative. After the interview, defendant was taken to jail.

119. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his March 27
statement. At the suppression hearing, defendant’s expert, a
psychologist, opined that defendant did not adequately understand
his Miranda rights in relationship to the investigation of the
homicide. The expert determined that defendant’s IQ was 75. As
the trial court noted, the expert seemed to conclude that the
identity theft investigation was the topic under discussion at the
time the troopers administered the Miranda warnings. In addi-
tion, the expert suggested that the “swearing ceremony” that
accompanied the Miranda warnings was designed to disguise the
purpose of the rights. The trial court denied the motion to
suppress.

120. On appeal, defendant seeks reversal of the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress on three bases. First, defendant

argues the State failed to prove that defendant validly waived his
Miranda rights when the troopers first administered them about
two hours into the interview. Second, defendant argues that even
assuming he validly waived his Miranda rights after the initial
warnings were given, a second set of warnings should have been
given closer to the time of the spit-shake and the more intense
questioning that began about an hour after the initial warnings.
Third, defendant argues that his confession was not voluntary
because, under the totality of the circumstances, his will was
overborne, therefore rendering the confession involuntary.

A. Initial Miranda Waiver

121. Hl The Fifth Amendment provides every citizen with the
right not to be “compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness
against himself [or herself].” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v.
Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless . . . the
person [has been] warned that he [or she] has a right to remain
silent, that any statements he [or she] does make may be used as
evidence against him [or her], and that he [or she] has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384
US. 436, 444 (1966). The “main purpose of Miranda is to ensure
that an accused is advised of and understands the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 383 (2010). However, a suspect may waive his or her Miranda
rights, “‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently?” Treesh vu Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 433 (th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); see State vu Brooks, 2013 VT
27, 110, 193 Vt. 461, 70 A.Bd 1014.

122. JM In order to determine whether a suspect has validly
waived his or her Miranda rights, we employ a “totality of the
circumstances” test. Brooks, 2013 VT 27, 122-23. The waiver
inquiry has “two distinct dimensions.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382
(quotation omitted).

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been
voluntary in the se that it was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,
or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right

136 |

being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a
court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have
been waived.

Moran v Burbine, 475 US. 412, 421 (1986) (quotation omitted).
This overall question of waiver must be assessed in light of the
“particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, includ-
ing the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”
United States u Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation
omitted). The State bears “the heavy burden” of showing a waiver.
State wu Malinowski, 148 Vt. 517, 520, 586 A.2d 921, 923 (1987).
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, this Court ac-
cords “great deference to the trial court’s findings,” and these
findings must stand if they “are not clearly erroneous.” Id.

123. J Under the U.S. Constitution, whether defendant's
waiver and confession were voluntary are ultimately legal conclu-
sions that we review without deference.? See State u Reynolds,
2016 VT 43, 9114, 201 Vt. 574, 145 A8d 1256 (iting Miller wv
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (“Without exception, the Court’s
confession cases hold that the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ is a
legal question.”)); see also State u Weisler, 2011 VT 96, 112, 190
Vt. 344, 35 A.3d 970 (recognizing that standard of review govern-
ing voluntariness of confessions is “generally de novo” and citing
cases).> For that reason, we defer to the historical facts as found
by the trial court, but review without deference “the ultimate

*Defendant’s arguments and the trial court’s decision were based on the federal
constitution. Defendant has not made any distinct arguments based on the Vermont
Constitution,

° Our statements on this question have not always been consistent, and we have
held open the possibility that a different standard may apply under the Vermont
Constitution. Compare State x Sullivan, 2013 VT 71, 138, 194 Vt. 361, 80 A.3d 67
(recognizing that this Court has “previonsly suggested that the voluntariness of a
statement for the purposes of the Vermont Constitution is a question of fact,” but
has also recognized that “voluntariness of confessions under the U.S. Constitution
is generally de novo” (emphasis omitted)), with Weisler, 2011 VT 96, 112 n4
(recognizing erratic standards of review for voluntariness of confessions), In re
Robinson, 161 Vt. 550, 554, 641 A.2d 779, 781 (1994) (While this Court on
appeal... will defer to the district court’s findings of fact that have support in
the record, [we] need [not] defer to a determination of voluntariness in which the
district court incorrectly applied the law to the facts”), and State x Beckley, 157

issue” of “whether the State has obtained the confession in a
manner that comports with due process.” Reynolds, 2016 VT 43,
114 (quotation omitted).

124. The standard of review is less clear with respect to the
subsidiary question whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent —
the central issue in connection with this first strand of defendant’s
argument. Some courts have held that the trial court’s findings
regarding whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his or her rights are reviewed for clear error but the question of
voluntariness is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., United States u Doe,
155 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that
whether waiver was knowing and intelligent is question of fact
reviewed for clear error, but voluntariness is mixed question of
fact and law reviewed without deference); People u Aguilar-
Ramos, 86 P.3d 397, 400-01 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (stating that
question whether defendant was aware of nature of right and
consequences of decision to waive it such that waiver may be
deemed knowing and intelligent involves resolution of disputed
facts subject to deferential review, but that ultimate determination
of whether defendant validly waived Miranda rights requires
application of law to historical facts and is reviewed nondeferenti-
ally); People x Goins, 999 N.E.2d 18, 30 (Ill App. Ct. 2013) (noting
ultimate question of voluntariness subject to de novo review, but
knowing and intelligent waiver is “factual in nature” and subject
to clear error analysis). We need not resolve the standard of
review for determining a knowing and intelligent waiver in this
case because we would affirm the trial court’s determination under
either standard. Cf. Sullivan, 20138 VT 71, 189 (declining to
address divergent holdings regarding whether voluntariness is
question of fact or law under Article 10 of the Vermont Consti-
tution because Court would affirm trial court’s decision under
either standard).

125. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that
defendant’s initial waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination
was knowing and voluntary. Relying heavily on his expert’s
testimony below, defendant points to his below-average mental
capacity, the fact that he was summoned to the police barracks
through a ruse, the unorthodox swearing ceremony that accom-

Ve. 446, 450, 600 A.2d 294, 296 (1991) (“We will uphold a trial court’s ruling on the
voluntariness of a confession unless that conclusion is unsupported by the evidence
or is clearly erroneous”).

138 |

panied the warnings, the trooper’s description of the warnings as
“formalities,” and the casual conversation about smartphones that
immediately followed the warnings to argue that the State failed
to prove that he validly waived his Miranda rights. Among other
things, defendant asserts that there is nothing in the record to
support a finding that he knew that the warnings were given
because he was about to be asked questions about the murder.

126. As to the circumstances surrounding the warnings, the
trial court made extensive findings that are supported by the
evidence to support its conclusion that defendant understood the
warnings. The court found that defendant was “quite observant
and responsive to the conversational flow and had a better grasp
of police procedure than might be expected”; that defendant had
a pragmatic understanding of the legal implications of speaking
with the police; that the troopers paused immediately before the
warnings and between each one to give more emphasis; that upon
learning that defendant did not read well they read the warnings
aloud while defendant read along. The court noted that defend-
ant’s comments regarding the Blackberry resulted from Detective
Baxter taking out his cell phone to note the time. The trial court
acknowledged that some of the troopers’ actions were “more than
a little strange” in relation to expected police practice, but
concluded that there was nothing actually misleading in the
exchange in light of the very clear and unequivocal language of
the warnings themselves, which were very deliberately read to
defendant. With respect. to defendant’s intelligence and capacity to
understand, the trial court found:

[Defendant’s] demonstration of general knowledge quite
solid. He spoke clearly about auto mechanics and weld-
ing. He understood military time, he was aware that the
Burger King [he and his wife] drove through would have
cameras with which police could cross-check his state-
ments, and said he did watch police shows. His prosody
was good, his language was quite detailed, and he was
generally forthcoming with information, except where he
was apparently struggling to avoid incriminating himself
or his wife.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court adequately
reviewed the record to ensure defendant understood his rights.
127. The court rejected defendant’s expert’s opinion that, at
least up until the time of the Miranda warning, defendant

believed he was at the station to talk about the identity theft
issue. The court noted that Detective Baxter told defendant what
he wanted to talk about, defendant was acutely aware from his
interaction with the police the preceding day why they were
interested in him, and that the questioning immediately prior to
and following the warnings and “swearing ceremony” related to
defendant’s whereabouts during the time frame of the homicide.
128. The court also concluded that the trooper’s use of the
term “formalities” to describe defendant’s constitutional rights was
not proper, but did not render the warnings invalid in light of the
trooper’s clear statement of defendant’s rights and defendant’s
indications that he understood and waived those rights.

129. I We conclude that the trial court’s findings are well
supported by the record. The interview transcript and audio
recording support the trial court’s findings that defendant followed
the conversation, understood the nature of the interview, and
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Defendant’s argu-
ment that there is no evidence that he knew the warnings were
given because the troopers were going to question him about the
homicide is not supported by the record. By the time the troopers
administered the Miranda warnings, they had been questioning
defendant for well over an hour about his whereabouts on the day
and night that the victim went missing, and the “swearing
ceremony” that accompanied the warnings was clearly focused on
defendant’s statement about that timeline. The troopers’ questions
following this warning likewise focused on the same subject. This
evidence is more than sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion.

130. Finally, like the trial court, we do not approve of describ-
ing the constitutional requirement embodied in Miranda as a
“formality.” But the trial court’s conclusion that the trooper’s word
choice did not undermine the validity of defendant’s waiver is
supported by the record. We have so held in a very similar
circumstance. See State u Bacon, 163 Vt. 279, 295, 658 A.2d 54, 65
(1995) (disapproving of officer’s description of Miranda. rights as
“technicalities,” but finding this term did not render reading of
rights “equivocal” where rights were read to defendant and were
stated in plain language); see also United States u Syslo, 303 F.3d
860, 866 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that officers’ description of
warnings as “a formality” did not render Miranda waivers

140 Le

invalid); Commonwealth vu Gaboriault, 785 N.E.2d 691, 696-97
(Mass. 2003) (holding that officers’ description of Miranda, warn-
ings as “a formality” did not render defendant’s waiver invalid
where defendant “was read his Miranda warnings three times,
and after all three readings, indicated a willingness to speak with
the officers”).

B. Failure to Renew Miranda Warnings

131. Defendant next contends that the time lapse between his
initial Miranda warnings and the more pointed questioning that
led to his confession was so long as to render the initial warnings
stale, therefore requiring the officers to readminister them.

132. I The U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that in
deciding whether fresh Miranda warnings are required after a
period of time has elapsed between the initial warning and an
inculpatory statement, a court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. Wyrick uv Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1982) (per
curiam) (rejecting per se rule requiring police to readvise suspect
of his rights before questioning him about results of polygraph
examination and emphasizing whether fresh warnings are needed
depends upon totality of circumstances); see also Ew parte
Landrum, 57 So. 3d 77, 82 (Ala. 2010) (“Whether Miranda
warnings should be given before each interrogation must depend
upon the circumstances of each case.” (quotation omitted)),; In re
Interest of Miah S., 861 N.W.2d 406, 413 (Neb. 2015) (in reviewing
whether fresh Miranda warnings are needed, court considers “the
totality of the circumstances”); State u DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d 786,
798-99 (W. Va. 2003) (same). An initial warning and waiver remains
valid, “unless the circumstances change[] so seriously that [the
suspect’s] answers no longer were voluntary, or unless [the
suspect] no longer was making a knowing and intelligent relin-
quishment or abandonment of his [or her] rights.” Wyrick, 459
U.S. at 47 (quotation omitted).

133. In considering the totality of the circumstances, courts
have identified a number of nonexclusive factors. For example, in
United States v Pruden, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit stated as follows:

“(T]he question of whether a time lapse renders Miranda
warnings ‘stale’ may be reduced to answering two ques-
tions: (1) At the time the Miranda warnings were

provided, did the defendant know and understand his [or
her] rights? (2) Did anything occur between the warnings
and the statement, whether the passage of time or other
intervening event, which rendered the defendant unable
to consider fully and properly the effect of an exercise or
waiver of those rights before making a statement to law
enforcement officers?”

398 F.3d 241, 246-47 (8d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v
Vasquez, 889 F. Supp. 171, 177 (MLD. Pa. 1995)). Other courts
have followed the North Carolina Supreme Court in advising trial
courts to consider five nonexclusive factors:

(1) the length of time between the giving of the first
warnings and the subsequent interrogation; (2) whether
the warnings and the subsequent interrogation were
given in the same or different places; (8) whether the
warnings were given and the subsequent interrogation
conducted by the same or different officers; (4) the extent
to which the subsequent statement differed from any
previous statements; (5) the apparent intellectual and
emotional state of the suspect.

State wv McZorn, 219 S.E.2d 201, 212 (N.C. 1975) (citations
omitted), vacated in part on separate ground by McZorn uv North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); see In re Interest of Miah S., 861
N.W.2d at 413 (adopting North Carolina approach); In re Kevin
K., 7 A3d 898, 908 (Conn. 2010) (same). We find these two
approaches helpful, though emphasize that whether fresh Miranda
warnings are required depends on the totality of the circum-
stances and that these approaches are used simply to provide
some guidance in conducting that analysis.*

134. Looking to the totality of the circumstances, the trial court
concluded that the initial Miranda warnings were not stale by the
time defendant confessed. As the trial court found, although the

“Our standard of review on the issue of staleness has not been established. Some
courts appear to employ a deferential standard of review to the factual findings of
the trial court, but plenary review as to whether those findings support the
conelusion that the Miranda warnings had grown stale. See United States x
Ferrer-Montoya, 483 F.3d 565, 569-70 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying clear-error review
to trial court’s factual findings, but reviewing issue of staleness de novo); People x
Degorski, 886 N.E.2d 1070, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), Because we would affirm
under either standard, we need not determine which applies. See supra, 1 23 n.2.

142 Le

interview lasted several hours and included a trip to various areas
where different criminal acts occurred, overall, it found that the
interrogation was “a cohesive whole.” Indeed, there was no
“intervening event . . . , [and] the interview did not cease until the
point [defendant] was arrested and formally taken into custody at
the very conclusion of the seven-hour interview.” As the trial court
explained, “{a]t all relevant times during the questioning immedi-
ately before and after the Miranda warnings, excepting the very
initial period when Lieutenant Nally feigned interest in [defend-
ant’s] statements regarding the identity theft issue, the topic
never wavered from the troopers’ interest in [defendant’s] infor-
mation regarding the [victim’s] murder investigation.”

135. [EP The trial court’s factual findings on this point are
supported by the record, and its conclusion comports with the law.
See Commonwealth v. Scott, 752 A2d 871, 876 (Pa. 2000)
(“(W]here there is a time lapse of several hours, the accused is
not moved, and there is a clear continuity of interrogation inter-
rupted only by a lapse of time, there is no need for repeated
warnings before the second interrogation.” (quotation and empha-
sis omitted)); State vu Frazier, 622 N.W.2d 246, 254-55 (S.D. 2001)
(holding defendant not entitled to fresh Miranda warnings where,
under totality of circumstances, “there was a clear continuity of
interrogation”); People u Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 108 (Ill. 1995)
(holding fresh Miranda warnings not required after passage of
several hours, and reasoning “[t]his commonsense approach avoids
the otherwise ridiculous situation of police officers having to issue
Miranda warnings prior to each question or after every break in
the questioning”). On this record, the one-hour delay between
when the Miranda warnings were administered and the more
pointed questions leading to defendant’s confession did not require
fresh Miranda warnings. See In re Interest of Miah S., 861
N.W.2d at 412-13 (noting other courts holding readvisement of
Miranda warnings not necessary after “5 hours, 17 hours, 2 days,
3 days, and all the way up to a week or more if law enforcement
asks if the suspect remembers his or her rights”). But see id. at
412 (noting other courts have required readvisement after “4
hours, 18 hours, 2 days, and 3 days”). In this case, not only was
the subject of the interview ¢ tent between the time of the
warnings and defendant’s confession, but the warnings were given
in the same room as the subsequent interrogation, by the same
officers who had been and were continuing to interview defendant.

136. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that
based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not
entitled to fresh Miranda warnings prior to his confession.

C. Voluntariness of Confession

137. Defendant’s final argument is that the trial court improp-
erly found his confession was voluntary. He argues that the ruse
used to get him to come to the police barracks, interview
techniques such as implied promises of leniency, and his own low
1Q and lack of prior experience with police led to an involuntary
confession. We disagree.

138. I Generally, in order for a confession to be admissible, it
must be voluntarily given by defendant. See State u Zehner, 142
Vt. 251, 253, 453 A.2d 1126, 1127 (1982) (“A criminal defendant is
denied due process of law if [a] conviction is founded in whole or
in part upon an involuntary confession regardless of its truth or
falsity.” (quotation omitted)).

1.39. EA confession is voluntary if it is “the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than coercion or improper induce-
ment.” Brooks, 2013 VT 27, 123 (quotation omitted). While “it is
generally recognized that the police may use some psychological
tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect,” Bacon, 163 Vt. at
298, 658 A.2d at 64 (quotation omitted), the critical inquiry is
“whether the interrogation was so coercive as to undermine
defendant’s ability to voluntarily waive his [or her] rights.” Brooks,
2013 VT 27, 123 (quotation omitted). To determine the voluntari-
ness of defendant’s confession, the trial court is required to ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances. State vu Roberts, 160 Vt.
385, 388, 631 A.2d 835, 837 (1993). We recently concluded that a
confession was involuntary where police made inappropriate prom-
ises of leniency, coupled with a misrepresentation of their author-
ity to bring about that lenient treatment. Reynolds, 2016 VT 43,
115. Although the State’s compliance with Miranda does not
conclusively establish the voluntariness of a subsequent confession,
cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that
a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that

144 |

the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda
are rare.” Berkemer vu McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)2

140. HI Here, the trial court’s findings of fact, which are
supported by substantial evidence, support the conclusion that.
defendant gave a voluntary confession. First and foremost, defend-
ant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent
after the troopers read him the Miranda warnings. As noted
above, it is a rare case in which a defendant can make a colorable
claim that an incriminating statement was compelled notwithstand-
ing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda
rights. Second, defendant’s statements throughout the interview
reflect his understanding of his situation. See supra, 1 26. Third,
the record does not reflect any improper promises like those in
Reynolds. Fourth, defendant was resistant to some of the inter-
rogation tactics, undermining defendant’s claim that his confe:
was involuntary. For example, the trial court noted an instance in
which defendant pushed back against the troopers’ attempt to
shift blame to the victim by suggesting that she had treated
defendant badly. Defendant reacted by bluntly asserting that the
victim was “not demeaning toward[s] [defendant] but rather was
nice.” Fifth, defendant made repeated demands for additional
evidence to inform his calculus of his own self-interest. Sixth, the
officers did not attempt to “sweat” out defendant, but rather
provided him with “water, soda, bathroom breaks, and on multiple
occasions [ ] asked if he wanted to continue, to which [defendant]
responded he would.” Finally, the trial court held that the
troopers never cro: the line from “being confrontational into
being coercive.” In, fact, as defendant was drawing nearer to
confession, his “analysis of his self-interest became evident in his
language.”

141. The fact that defendant was initially lured to the barracks
through a ruse does not undermine our conclusion that his
confession was voluntary. He had multiple opportunities after
Detective Baxter arrived and asked to speak to him in connection
with the homicide investigation to terminate the interview, and the
troopers gave him Miranda warnings, emphasizing his right to
not speak, during that time. For these reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s conclusion that defendant’s confession was voluntary.

* As noted above, although we defer to the trial court’s findings of historical fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, our review of the legal question of voluntariness
is plenary. See supra, 1 23.

II. Exclusion of Dr. Kinsler’s Testimony

142. During his interview, defendant stated that he and his
wife, Patricia Prue, had in the past engaged in three-way sex, that
on the night of the homicide they wanted to find a girl to “play
with” sexually, that his wife had made the phone call that lured
the victim to a deserted area, that his wife was present when the
victim arrived and defendant strangled her, and that he and his
wife had taken various steps together to conceal the victim’s
remains. The State charged defendant’s wife separately with
various crimes as a result of her role in the kidnapping and
murder. Because the discovery schedule in her case was extended
to allow her to explore an insanity defense, defendant’s case
approached trial first.

143. The expert disclosure deadline in defendant’s case was
April 1, 2014. In June 2014, in defendant’s wife’s case, counsel
disclosed to the State a report generated by Dr. Philip Kinsler, a
psychiatrist who had been reviewing voluminous material concern-
ing defendant’s wife for months and had interviewed her for more
than thirty hours. Upon receiving a copy of the report in
defendant’s wife’s case, the State forwarded the report to defend-
ant’s attorney as part of what it considered its ongoing obligation
to provide discovery. In July 2014, defense counsel noticed the
State that he might call Dr. Kinsler as an expert witness in
defendant’s case. The trial in defendant’s case was scheduled for
October.

144. Defendant sought to elicit from Dr. Kinsler his diagnosis
about Mrs. Prue and the information he reviewed in order to
reach that diagnosis, including her extensive mental health history,
exclusive of any discussion of the events underlying the charges.
Dr. Kinsler’s opinion was that defendant’s wife suffered from
dissociative identity disorder (DID) and that one of her alters is
homicidal. The defense theory was that defendant’s wife commit-
ted the murder in a violent and explosive way, and that this
expert testimony would provide the jury insight to support this
view. Defendant’s theory was bolstered by a defense witness who
testified that she met defendant’s wife while they were both
incarcerated, that defendant’s wife sometimes acted very giggly
and silly and other times very aggressive, and that during an
aggressive moment defendant’s wife told her that she, and not
defendant, killed the victim. In particular, defendant’s wife claims

146 Le

to have grabbed the victim by the hair, pulled her into the car,
and strangled her, all the while shouting to her husband, “You
want to fuck her now?”

145. The State moved to exclude Dr. Kinsler’s testimony on the
grounds that defendant’s wife’s mental state was not relevant to
the question of whether defendant committed the acts alleged.
Moreover, the State argued that allowing Dr. Kinsler to te:
would be prejudi because the defense’s disclosure of its
intention to call Dr. Kinsler was late, and the State’s own expert
had conducted only part of his own evaluation in response to Dr.
Kinsler’s report. As a result, the State did not have a fair
opportunity to challenge Dr. Kinsler’s testimony. Defendant’s wife
also filed a motion to quash his subpoena of Dr. Kinsler, arguing
primarily that Dr. Kinsler was an expert retained by wife, and his
opinions were protected by the attorney-client privilege.

146. The trial court granted the State’s motion to exclude. The
court noted the late disclosure and discussed the prejudice to the
State that admission of the testimony would cause. Because the
State had not yet completed its own exam in connection with
defendant’s wife’s insanity defense, and given the controversial
nature of the DID diagnosis, allowing Dr. Kinsler to express an
opinion that could not be tested would be unfair and prejudicial to
the State, and disruptive of the orderly process of the trial. In
addition, given the subject matter of Dr. Kinsler’s opinion and the
general inability to test his opinions regarding the applicability of
DID to a specific factual scenario, there was a distinct possibility
that introduction of Dr. Kinsler’s testimony would create a collat-
eral issue that would confuse the jury.

147. The trial court further noted that the prejudice to
defendant from disallowing Dr. Kinsler’s testimony would be
minimal — or even the opposite. Dr. Kinsler’s diagnosis of
defendant’s wife’s mental condition would be relevant only if Dr.
Kinsler related her mental state to the time of the murder; such
testimony would likely lead to admission, on direct or cross-
examination, of information in the report that was unfavorable to
defendant. If the defense could pick and choose — relying on the
testimony from a fellow inmate that defendant’s wife confessed to
the killing along with a portion of Dr. Kinsler’s testimony — some
other story could be woven. But the factual evidence underlying
Dr. Kinsler’s opinion was “damning to [defendant].”

148. On appeal, defendant argues that he was not seeking to
have Dr. Kinsler testify about his wife’s insanity defense but,
rather, was seeking to elicit testimony solely concerning defend-
ant’s wife’s diagnosis. Because the court misconstrued defendant’s
argument, it wrongly determined that the State would be preju-
diced because it had not completed its examination of defendant’s
wife’s sanity in the context of her case. Defendant argues that the
fact that his wife suffers from DID and has an alter that is
domineering and homicidal was relevant to his defense.

149. We see no evidence that the trial court misunderstood
defendant’s argument below and conclude that the trial court’s
determination that the substantial danger of unfair prejudice
outweighed the probative value of this evidence was within its
discretion.

1150. J MM In all cases involving evidentiary decisions, “[{t]rial
courts have great latitude in deciding whether to admit or exclude
evidence.” State uv Little, 167 Vt. 577, 579, 705 A.2d 177, 180 (1997)
(mem.). Vermont Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant
evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Generally, the trial court’s Rule 403 balancing is not disturbed
“absent a showing of an abuse of . . . discretion.” State x Webster,
165 Vt. 54, 56, 675 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1996). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court “either totally withholds or exercises
its discretion on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.” State
v. Russell, 2011 VT 36, 19, 189 Vt. 632, 22 A3d 455 (mem.)
(quotation omitted).

151. I On the probative value side of the calculus, the trial
court’s reasoning was well within its discretion. The court cor-
rectly noted that defendant’s wife’s DID diagnosis was relevant
only if linked to her mental state at the time of the murder, and
it would accordingly lead to further testimony about Dr. Kinsler’s
basis for connecting the DID diagnosis to the events at issue in
this case. The trial court was well within its discretion in
concluding that Dr. Kinsler’s basis for making this link, as
reflected in his written report, included highly prejudicial and
damning evidence against defendant. As the trial court explained,
“{w]ithout the ability to relate Dr. Kinsler’s version of [defendant’s

148 |

wife’s] mental state to the time of the murder, it would not be
relevant. If it is related to the time of the murder it is harmful
to [defendant].”

152. With respect to the prejudicial effect of the testimony, the
trial court’s analysis is likewise sound. The trial court noted that.
Dr. Kinsler’s opinion relied on a controversial diagnosis.’ The
State had not had an opportunity to complete its own extensive
evaluation, so the soundness of Dr. Kinsler’s opinion could not be
tested. Moreover, the court’s projection that the testimony would
create a collateral issue that would confuse the jury was reason-
able under the circumstances. For these reasons, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Dr. Kinsler’s testimony.

IIL. Introduction of Defendant’s Wife’s Internet Searches

153. On day eight of the trial, the State called Peter Garivaltis,
a sergeant in the Computer Crimes Unit of the Vermont State
Police, to testify to the results of an evaluation he performed on
a laptop owned by defendant’s wife. That evaluation uncovered
various searches conducted from the computer in July 2011,
including: (1) “xxx how to kidnap a girl”; (2) “ways to kidnap a
girl”; (8) “how to kidnap a girl”; (4) “how o [sic] kidnap a girl’ ”;
(5) “how to love”; and (6) “how to rape a girl and not get caught.”
The State sought to introduce this evidence to provide background
concerning defendant and his wife’s plan to kidnap and murder
the victim. Defendant objected, arguing that defendant’s wife’s
internet searches in the summer of 2011 were not relevant to the
charges against defendant because it was defendant’s wife, and
not defendant, who conducted the searches, and the State could
not establish the existence of any conspiracy or plan between the
parties when these searches were conducted.
154. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection and allowed
Garivaltis to testify, reasoning:
This was a — the fact that it was seven months prior
to the event, has relevance, but in this case it’s over-
shadowed by the — by the parallelism between the act,

©The trial court noted some cases from sister states addressing whether a DID
diagnosis can support an insanity defense — an issue not directly relevant. to
defendant’s theory of relevance with respect to the disputed testimony. But the
court noted that those cases also demonstrate “the controversial nature of the
diagnosis.”

that is the — what the question was — what the criminal
act was that was actually alleged to have been committed
— as — as alleged to be committed. They’re virtually
synonymous.

This is not a situation where one actor is being tagged
with the — with some other act of an another individual,
which is kind of unrelated. This is very, very similar and
parallel. I think it’s a reasonable inference that the
conspiracy was afoot at [the time of the searches].

Can the government prove the exact moment between
husband and wife, where the germ of an idea gets
discussed? I don’t think the government can do it, but I
think it’s reasonable in this case that whether [defendant]
was home or not makes little difference. This is — these
are two people who live in the same household, are
inseparable, by all evidence, and although this was while
[defendant] was still working, so there’s a little separa-
tion, it’s a reasonable inference that this is all part of a
conspiracy.

155. On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) because there was
no evidence that the specific plan to kidnap the victim in this case
was afoot in the summer of 2011, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that defendant’s wife’s internet searches were relevant;
and (2) the probative value of the internet searches was substan-
tially outweighed by the prejudicial effect they would have on the
jury. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

156. HM Generally, we apply a deferential standard of review
to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and will reverse its decision
“only when there has been an abuse of discretion that resulted in
prejudice.” State x Desautels, 2006 VT 84, 112, 180 Vt. 189, 908
A.2d 463. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” V.R.E. 401. When determining relevancy, we
allow “‘great latitude’” in the admission of “ ‘circumstantial
evidentiary facts’” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 401 (quoting State uv
Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 426, 68 A. 652, 654 (1908).

157. MM In concluding that the jury could infer that the
couple’s conspiracy to kidnap and sexually assault a woman was

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underway by the summer of 2011, the trial court considered
evidence that defendant and his wife were very close and spent
almost all of their time together throughout their marriage, as
well as the uncanny resonance between the internet searches and
defendant’s and his wife’s ultimate actions. The trial court’s
assessment was supported by the evidence and within its broad
discretion.

158. J MM With respect to defendant’s argument that admis-
sion of the internet search evidence was unduly prejudicial, we
note that defendant failed to object to the searches on Rule 403
grounds. “An objection on one ground does not preserve an appeal
on other grounds.” State vu Bubar, 146 Vt. 398, 400, 505 A.2d 1197,
1199 (1985). In addition, where a defendant fails to ask the trial
court to balance the probative value of the evidence against
prejudicial effect, we need not consider it, see Desautels, 2006 VT
84, 114, “in the absence of plain error,” Bubar, 146 Vt. at 400, 505
A2d at 1199. Plain error exists “only where a failure to recognize
error would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where there is
glaring error so grave and serious that it strikes at the very heart
of the defendant’s constitutional rights.” State uv Viens, 2009 VT
64, 111, 186 Vt. 138, 978 A.2d 37 (quotation omitted). When the
error involves prejudicial evidence, “the [defendant] must demon-
strate that the judgment was substantially affected by admission
of” the prejudicial evidence. Bubar, 146 Vt. at 401, 505 A2d at
1199. Defendant has not made such a showing in this case,
because, as the record reflects, there is substantial independent
evidence that defendant and his wife conspired to abduct a
woman, including cell phone records, photographs, articles of
clothing belonging to defendant found at the crime scene, surveil-
lance recordings of defendant and his wife purchasing the
TracFone used to phone the victim, defendant’s wife’s role in
placing the call to lure the victim on the night of the murder, and
defendant’s own statements to the police. Even if evidence of the
internet searches was more prejudicial than probative, its admis-
sion did not constitute plain error.

IV. Defendant’s Request to Continue his Sentencing

159. In December 2014, defendant made several motions to
continue the sentencing hearing scheduled for December 17, 2014
so that he could call two witnesses. First, he sought to call Dr.

Kinsler as a witness. He argued that for sentencing purposes,
evidence about defendant’s marriage and his wife’s behavior and
mental health would be relevant insofar as these facts affected
defendant. Defendant did not initially specify why a continuance
was required to enable Dr. Kinsler to testify. The State did not
object to defendant’s calling Dr. Kinsler, but opposed a continu-
ance given the extensive delays throughout the case. The State
took the position that Dr. Kinsler could testify at the December
17 hearing, and it would call its own expert, Dr. Linder, who had
just completed a report for the State. Defense counsel then
argued that he needed more time to fully review the State’s own
expert’s newly released 150-page report to decide whether to
press forward with his intention to call Dr. Kinsler. Second,
defendant sought to call his wife as a witness. He had just
learned that, subject to a competency evaluation, she planned to
drop her insanity defense and plead guilty to first-degree murder,
kidnapping, and conspiracy. That would make her available to
testify about her role in the offense and her effect on defendant’s
life in general.

160. The trial court denied the motions before the sentencing
hearing, and in response to renewed motions at the hearing. With
respect to the requested continuance to allow defense counsel
more time to review Dr. Linder’s report, the court noted that the
case was about three years old and declined to change the
schedule. The court indicated that if the parties needed more
time, he would then schedule another day for the hearing. When
defendant renewed the motion at the sentencing hearing, the
court questioned the value of the competing expert reports that
were primarily focused on sanity, and noted that there were other
mechanisms for getting most of the information the experts would
offer in front of the court. The court acknowledged the gravity of
the sentence, but concluded that given the age of the case, the
court needed to move forward.

161. As to defendant’s wife, the court balanced the competing
considerations and ultimately denied defendant’s request. The
court explained that defendant’s wife’s availability to testify would
be contingent on the results of a competency evaluation, as well as
her waiver of her right to automatic appeal. The court could not
predict when she would become available to testify. The court also
noted that defendant was unable to identify what his wife would
say, so the court was not sure that she would actually help

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defendant. And the court pointed to the substantial amount of
evidence already in the presentence investigation report concern-
ing defendant’s wife’s influence on him and involvement in the
events leading to the murder, as well as potential testimony from
defendant’s mother, who lived with the couple and had much to
offer. Although the court acknowledged the gravity of the pro-
posed sentence, in light of the above factors, as well as the age
of the case — just short of three years, the court denied the
motion.

162. Defendant challenges these rulings on appeal, arguing that
given the gravity of the sentence and the possibility that Dr.
Kinsler’s or defendant’s wife’s testimony might have led the court
to impose a lesser sentence, the court erred in denying the
continuance, and defendant’s sentence should be vacated. We
affirm the trial court’s discretionary ruling.

163. HJ Rulings on motions to continue are entrusted to the
sound discretion of the trial court in light of the surrounding
circumstances, and this Court will not interfere with the trial
court’s decision if there is a reasonable basis to support it. See
State u Schreiner, 2007 VT 138, 114, 183 Vt. 42, 944 A.2d 250.

164. J With respect to Dr. Kinsler’s testimony, we note that
the court did not preclude defendant from calling this expert.
Defendant elected not to call Dr. Kinsler because defense counsel
concluded that the one-week period between the State’s disclosure
of its own expert’s newly completed report and the sentencing
hearing did not leave sufficient time to prepare to cross-examine
the State’s expert. In declining to continue the hearing to enable
defense counsel to review Dr. Linder’s report more thoroughly,
the trial court expressed skepticism about the value of dueling
expert testimony that would implicate issues collateral to defend-
ant’s sentence when much of the information concerning defend-
ant’s relationship with his wife, her influence on him, and her
involvement in the crimes was already available through other
sources. These observations were supported by the record, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that,
notwithstanding the gravity of defendant’s potential sentence, the
value of this testimony did not warrant prolonging an already
extremely old case.

165. Likewise, the trial court’s recognition that defendant’s
wife’s plea was still subject to multiple contingencies such that its

timing remained unpredictable; that defendant did not know what
wife would actually say and whether it would be helpful; and that
the presentence investigation report contained the same type of
information defendant sought to develop through his wife’s testi-
mony was supported by the record. With these considerations in
mind, the trial court thoughtfully balanced the gravity of the
proceedings and the age of the case in declining to continue the
sentencing. Given our standard of review and the facts relied upon
by the trial court, we cannot find the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion to continue his sentenc-
ing.
Affirmed.

2016 VT 105

State of Vermont v. Lenore Hayes

[154 Ad 964]
No. 15-420
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed September 9, 2016

g

Franklin L. Paulino, Chittenden County Deputy State’s Attor-
ney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

BL

sica Burke of Burke Law P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-
Appellant.

maz ”

11. Skoglund, J. Following her conditional plea of guilty to a
charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), second offense, defend-
ant appeals the superior court’s denial of her motions to suppress
evidence from the vehicle stop and dismiss the case. She argues
that there was no reasonable basis for the stop and that, in any
event, all evidence should have been suppressed due to the
arresting officer’s failure to produce a complete video recording of
the stop. We affirm.

12. Shortly before midnight on January 17, 2015, a Town of
Richmond police officer stopped defendant’s vehicle. The officer
eventually had defendant exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety
tests and provide a preliminary breath test sample, which revealed
a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.135%. The officer then
arrested defendant and transported her to the Richmond police
station, where she was proc d for DWI. After consulting with
an attorney, defendant agreed to provide a breath sample, which
the Datamaster infrared device analyzed as containing a BAC of
0.127%. Defendant exercised her right to a second test, which
revealed a BAC of 0.133%. Defendant also obtained a test kit for
an independent blood test.

13. Defendant was charged with DWI, second offense. She filed
a motion to suppress and dismiss, arguing that the stop of her
vehicle was unconstitutional because the arresting officer lacked
any reasonable suspicion of her having committed a crime or
violated any tra law. Later, she filed a second motion to
suppress and dis! this time arguing that the State failed to
provide her with an uncorrupted video recording of the stop. See
23 V.S.A. § 1203(k) (“A copy of a videotape made of the alleged
offense shall be provided to the defendant within ten days after
the defendant requests the copy and pays a $45.00 fee for its
reproduction.”), see also V.R.C.P. 80.5(e) (“A copy of a videotape
made of the alleged offense and subsequent processing shall be
available for purchase by the defendant directly from the law
enforcement agency responsible for initiating the action... .”);
V.R.Cr.P. 16(e) (same). At an April 8, 2015 hearing on the latter
motion, the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court’s Criminal
Division dismissed the civil suspension of defendant’s driver’s
license based on a standing order in that court with respect to the
government’s failure to produce a requested copy of a video
recording. The court ruled, however, that whether the criminal
case should be dismissed warranted further review under the

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factors set forth in State u Bailey, 144 Vt. 86, 94-95, 475 A2d
1045, 1050 (1984), for cases involving lost or undisclosed evidence.

14. At a later status conference it was revealed that only
approximately seven minutes of the recording of the stop could be
viewed because the arresting officer had not flipped a toggle
switch that would have continued the recording after his cruiser’s
blue lights were turned off.

15. A hearing in the criminal matter was held on June 25, 2015.
Following the hearing, defendant renewed her motion to dismis
arguing that if the court concluded that the arresting officer was
negligent in not preserving a recording of the stop, it must
undertake a Bailey analysis. See State x Porter, 2014 VT 89, 129,
197 Vt. 330, 103 A.3d 916 (stating that although “police do not
have a duty to collect all evidence that could potentially favor the
defense,” there could be situations where negligent conduct by
police was sufficiently prejudicial to defendant to warrant sanc-
tions, in which case, “the Bailey test is an adequately flexible
method to determine the appropriate sanction”).

16. On July 28, 2015, the superior court denied defendant’s
renewed motion to dismiss, ruling that while the arresting officer
was negligent in not preserving a complete video recording of the
stop, the Bailey factors did not favor defendant because the
recording would most likely not have revealed exculpatory evi-
dence. See Bailey, 144 Vt. at 94-95, 475 A.2d at 1050 (stating that
if defendant shows reasonable possibility that missing evidence
would have been favorable to defendant, court must balance (1)
degree of negligence or bad faith by government, (2) importance
of lost evidence, and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial).
Moreover, the court noted that although defendant provided a
breath sample within two hours of operation that revealed a BAC
well in excess of the legal limit, because she later obtained a test
kit for an independent blood test she would have an opportunity
at trial to challenge the breath test result.

17. On September 21, 2015, the superior court held a hearing
to consider both defendant’s original motion to suppress and
dismiss, in which she argued that there was no reasonable basis
for the stop of her vehicle, as well as her motion to reconsider the
court’s July 28 decision. Once again, the arresting officer was the
sole witness at the hearing. Two days after the hearing, the
superior court issued a ruling denying defendant’s motions. The
court ruled that none of the “three missteps” by defendant while

operating her vehicle individually constituted a traffic violation,
but that the combination of those actions indicated defendant was
not driving attentively and thus justified the officer stopping her
vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that she might be
intoxicated. Further, the court denied defendant’s motion to
reconsider its July 28 order in light of its conclusion that the stop
had in fact been lawful.

18. On appeal, defendant argues that, pursuant to the criteria
set forth in Bailey, evidence from the stop should be suppressed
and the case dismissed. She also argues that there was no
reasonable basis for the stop. In reviewing a denial of a motion to
suppress, we will uphold the trial court’s findings as long as they
are supported by evidence, but we review de novo whether the
facts meet the proper standard to justify a stop. State u Rutter,
2011 VT 18, 16, 189 Vt. 574, 15 A8d 1382 (mem.).

19. I “A legal investigatory stop is justified if a police officer
has a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”
State uv Pratt, 2007 VT 68, 15, 182 Vt. 165, 932 A.2d 1039 (citation
omitted). Reasonable and articulable suspicion requires “more
than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity,
but . . . considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Jd. (quotation omitted). “Reason-
able suspicion is assessed by examining the totality of the
circumstances” while “balancing the public’s interest in safety
against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investi-
gative detention.” Jd. (quotation omitted). We have held that
“{rleasonable and articulable suspicions of motor-vehicle violations
are sufficient to justify traffic stops.” State x Harris, 2009 VT 73,
13, 186 Vt. 225, 980 A2d 785. “As such, we have upheld
investigatory stops for suspicion of DUI based on erratic driving.”
Pratt, 2007 VT 68, 115. The relevant question is not whether a
motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only “whether
the officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle
violation was taking place.” Rutter, 2011 VT 13, 110.

110. Hf Defendant asserts that the stop here could not have
been supported by reasonable suspicion because the superior
court found no traffic violations and the arresting officer did not
allege in his affidavit that he stopped her vehicle based on his
mn of a possible DWI. As noted above, however, the
question is not whether there was actually a traffic violation but

158 |

rather whether the arresting officer had an objectively reasonable
belief that there was a traffic violation. Moreover, we have
reiterated “that an officer’s subjective intent for stopping a
defendant’s car is not relevant as long as there is an objectively
reasonable basis for the stop.” Id. 115. Id. 116 (concluding “that
the protections of Article 11 do not extend to prohibiting law
enforcement officers from stopping motor vehicles where there is
an objectively reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation
has occurred, even if in a particular situation these infractions
may appear ‘trivial’ or the officer’s motivation is suspect”); see also
State vu Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 23-24, 757 A.2d 1017, 1020 (2000) (“In
determining the legality of a stop, courts do not attempt to divine
the arresting officer’s actual subjective motivation for making the
stop; rather, they consider from an objective standpoint whether,
given all of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.”).

111. [HB In this case, the arresting officer testified that he
observed defendant nearly hit another car while exiting a store
parking lot when she failed to yield the right of way to the other
car pulling into the parking lot. He stated that the operator's lack
of attention or due regard aroused his suspicion as to her
condition, so he followed the vehicle after it left the parking lot.
He testified further that, in following the vehicle, he observed that
at one point during a left-hand turn the vehicle crossed over the
fog line and kicked up dirt along the shoulder of the road, and at
another point during a right hand turn the headlights were turned
off for a couple of seconds.

112. Taken together, defendant’s actions were sufficient to
create a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant may
have been driving impaired. Cf. State uv Bruno, 157 Vt. 6, 11, 595
A2d 272, 275 (1991) (concluding that arresting officer’s observa-
tions of defendant swerving and drifting in his lane before briefly
parking and then operating his vehicle without headlights were
sufficient to raise officer’s reasonable and articulable suspicion
that defendant was driving impaired). In a relatively short period
of time, the officer observed multiple indications of defendant’s
lack of attention while operating her vehicle. Thus, the officer had
more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of impaired
driving. Regardless of whether any one of defendant’s “missteps”
actually amounted to a motor vehicle violation, the officer could
have reasonably believed that there was a traffic violation or that

defendant was driving impaired. See 23 V.8.A. § 1243(b) (providing
that vehicles operating on state highways between thirty minutes
after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise must display
lights).

113. Defendant argues, however, that the stop should be
suppressed and the case dismissed under a Bailey analysis.
According to defendant, the stop should be suppressed because of
the arresting officer's “active failure to preserve evidence that
likely would have been favorable to her.” In support of her claim
that a complete video recording may have produced exculpatory
evidence, defendant contends that the arresting officer claimed in
his affidavit that defendant’s speech was “confused” but then
conceded in his testimony at the September 21 hearing that the
word “excited” would be more appropriate — which defendant
contends is not a cue for intoxication, Examining the three Bailey
factors, defendant further asserts that: (1) as the trial court found,
the arresting officer was grossly negligent because on prior
occasions unrelated to this case he had failed to flip the toggle
switch; (2) a complete video recording was important because she
produced evidence demonstrating that the officer’s prior recollec-
tions were not accurate; and (8) the only other evidence of guilt
was the officer’s other questionable observations and the
evidentiary test administrations.

114. We discern no basis to overturn the superior court’s denial
of defendant’s motion to dismiss due to the limited video record-
ing. As an initial matter, it is questionable whether Bailey is even
applicable under the circumstances of this case, as Justice Dooley
explains in his concurrence. In any event, in State u Dimick, 173
Vt. 547, 548-49, 790 A.2d 435, 436-37 (2001) (mem.), we reversed
the trial court’s exclusion of all evidence derived from a stop
where the court accepted the defendant’s claim that the police had
a legal duty to create a video recording of all roadside stops and
ensuing field sobriety tests. We concluded that neither the statute
requiring police to provide defendants with a copy of a video
recording made of the alleged offense, see 23 V.S.A. § 1203(k), nor
any police rules or regulations compelled the police to record
stops. Dimick, 173 Vt. at 549-50, 790 A.2d at 437. We stated that
“[blecause the Legislature has chosen not to require officers to
tape all major roadside stops, this Court will not create such a
requirement by ‘judicial fiat?” Id. at 550, 790 A.2d at 438. The
same situation exists in this case. The Legislature has not enacted

160 Le

such a requirement, and the arresting officer testified that no such
policy exists within his department.

115. Hl Defendant’s reliance on Porter does not help her. In
that case, the defendant, who was convicted of attempted kidnap-
ping, argued that the State’s failure to collect or preserve four
specific items of potentially exculpatory evidence should have
resulted in dismissal of the charges pursuant to Bailey. We
rejected the defendant’s argument “that the failure to collect
evidence in the first place is equivalent to destroying, losing, or
failing to preserve exculpatory evidence” because “[t]he police do
not have a duty to collect all evidence that could potentially favor
the defense.” Porter, 2014 VT 89, 129. We stated, however, that
“the Bailey test is an adequately flexible method to determine the
appropriate sanction” in situations where the “negligent conduct of
police is sufficiently prejudicial to the defense to warrant sanc-
tions.” Id. Thus, even though police do not have a duty to collect
all potentially exculpatory evidence, the Bailey factors apply in
situations where the State’s failure to procure potentially excul-
patory evidence results in prejudice — for example, failing to
procure a bloody knife lying next to a body in a murder case, see
State u Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 312, 609 A.2d 972, 978 (1992).

1116. [I Because we have explicitly held that, absent a require-
ment in a statute or written police policy, there is no legal duty
to record roadside stops, here the officer’s failure to record the
stop was not negligent, despite the superior court’s finding to the
contrary. See Dinvick, 173 Vt. at 549-50, 790 A.2d at 437.

117. HM In any event, this is not a case where failure to
preserve/produce evidence would warrant sanctions. Defendant
cannot show prejudice here. First, the alleged negligence was
failing to flip the toggle switch, but that did not occur until after
the stop and the cruiser’s blue lights were turned off. Thus, the
alleged negligence had no impact on the lack of a preserved
recording of all of the incidents that led to the stop. Second, in
his affidavit and at the June 25 hearing, the arresting officer
testified that when he approached defendant’s car after the stop
he smelled a very slight odor of intoxicants and observed that
defendant’s eyes were slightly bloodshot. A video recording would
not have picked up these observations. Third, the officer further
testified that defendant admitted to recently consuming alcohol,
that she willingly agreed to perform field dexterity tests, and that

the officer observed multiple cues of intoxication based on her
performance of those tests. While a video recording could con-
ceivably have undercut the officer’s observations of impairment
cues with respect to balance on two of the three tests, there were
impairment cues on one of the tests related to eye movement that
the recording would not have picked up. Fourth, defendant agreed
to submit to a preliminary breath test, which indicated a BAC
well over the legal limit, as did the two evidentiary tests taken at
the police station.

118. Nor could defendant demonstrate a reasonable possibility
that a video recording would have produced evidence in her favor.
See Commonwealth vu Olszewski, 625 N.B.2d 529, 535 (Mass.
1993) (emphasizing that “reasonable possibility” must be “based
on concrete evidence and not on mere speculation, that the
[government’s] actions deprived [the defendant] of evidence that
would have been favorable to his case”). The record does not
support the principal basis for defendant’s argument — that a
complete video recording of the roadside stop would have pro-
duced evidence contradicting the arresting officer’s account of
what happened. She argues that the officer stated in his affidavit
that her speech was “confused” — a cue for impairment — but
that he conceded at the September 21 hearing that he should have
described her speech as “excited” rather than “confused.” Her
point is that since we know the officer inaccurately described a
cue for impairment in this instance, there is a reasonable possi-
bility that he also inaccurately described other alleged impairment
cues, including those associated with the field dexterity tests. The
problem with this argument is that in his affidavit the officer did
not describe defendant’s speech as confused; rather, he stated that.
defendant “appeared confused, unable to locate the registration.”
Thus, at the hearing when the officer described her speech as
“excited” rather than “confused,” he was not contradicting the
statement in his affidavit. In short, even if we were to assume
negligent conduct on the part of the officer based on some
unexplained duty, defendant cannot demonstrate sufficient preju-
dice to warrant sanctions per Porter.

Affirmed.
119. Dooley, J., concurring. I agree that this case should be

affirmed on the ground that under State u Dimick there is no
obligation to tape major roadside stops; thus, I agree fully with

162 |

the majority decision. 173 Vt. 547, 550, 790 A.2d 435, 438 (2001)
(mem.). I write separately to express my belief that the test
introduced in State uw Bailey is generally inapplicable in cases
where the lost, destroyed, or undisclosed evidence does not involve
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, but instead, bears on
the constitutionality of how that evidence was acquired. 144 Vt. 86,
94-95, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (1984). This is an additional reason why
we should affirm in this case.

120. There are three factors suggesting Bailey is limited in its
application. First, the third element of the Bailey test is the
weight of “other evidence of guilt adduced at trial,” id. at 95, 475
A.2d at 1050, and this element makes sense only if the
unpreserved evidence relates only to guilt or innocence. See State
v. Porter, 2014 VT 89, 130, 197 Vt. 330, 103 A.3d 916 (noting that
“the Bailey test depends on the evidence of guilt produced at
trial”). Second, in the federal case underlying Bailey, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that the Supreme
Court of the United States “ha[d] not yet attempted to define” the
standard of constitutional coverage of favorable evidence with
precision, but nonetheless noted it was the law of the circuit that
due process “applies to all evidence which might have led the jury
to entertain a reasonable doubt about [the] defendants’ guilt,” and
conducted its analysis accordingly. United States vx. Bryant, 439
F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citation and alterations omitted);
see also State v Gentes, 2013 VT 14, 15, 193 Vt. 669, 70 A.3d 967
(mem.) (observing that lost-or-destroyed-evidence framework ex-
plicated in Bailey was “based on the analysis set forth in the
leading federal case” of Bryant).

121. Third, a review of our case law reveals Bailey has
exclusively been utilized in instances where undisclosed evidence
directly bore on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. See,
e.g, Porter, 2014 VT 89, 1127, 30 (concluding trial court “appro-
priately applied the Bailey test” in case where potentially excul-
patory evidence was blood from victim’s face, victim’s fingernail
clippings, clothes and scrapings, and hair found in her clothing,
which went to identity of attacker); State u Gibney, 2003 VT 26,
142, 175 Vt. 180, 825 A2d 32 (affirming trial court’s “pragmatic
balancing of the Batley factors” finding there was no violation of
Article 10 in police officers’ destruction of their investigatory
notes); State u Devine, 168 Vt. 566, 568, 719 A.2d 861, 864 (1998)
(mem.) (finding State’s destruction of vehicle did not preclude

defendant charged with negligent operation of vehicle from con-
testing State’s estimate of his speed at impact); State x Delisle,
162 Vt. 298, 311-12, 648 A2d 632, 643-44 (1994) (concluding
balancing test favored State in case involving loss of victim’s hyoid
bone, which defendant wanted to use to show victim was not.
strangled as State claimed, and tarp on which body was found,
which defendant wanted to use to show witness who testified
defendant had similar tarp had incorrectly described it, as de-
fendant had other means of making his defense).
122. In cases such as this, where the missing evidence bears on

a collateral or pretrial issue, I would advocate for a return to the
federal standard expressed in Arizona uv Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51
(1988). In Youngblood, the Supreme Court established two stan-
dards: one for a failure to preserve “material exculpatory evi-
dence,” where, as per Brady u Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the
good or bad faith of the State is irrelevant, and one for
“potentially useful evidence,’ wherein a denial of due process is
only found if a criminal defendant can show “bad faith on the part
of the police.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 58. Bailey preceded
Youngblood by four years; accordingly, we concluded it repre-
sented the controlling federal standard in State w Seifert, 151 Vt.
66, 70, 557 A.2d 494, 497 (1989). However, in Delisle, we noted
that:

We believe, however, that Youngblood is both too broad

and too narrow. It is too broad because it would require

the imposition of sanctions even though a defendant has

demonstrated no prejudice from the lost evidence. It is

too narrow because it limits due process violations to

only those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate

bad faith, even though the negligent loss of evidence may

critically prejudice a defendant. Because the Bailey test

balances the culpability of the government’s actions and

the prejudice to a defendant, we adopt it as the state

constitutional standard.

162 Vt. at 310, 648 A.2d at 643.

128. Although I remain in accord with the reasoning of Delisle,
and believe Bailey is the preferable standard for state cons
tional claims, I maintain the narrowness of its scope limi
application to those cases where the missing evidence per'
directly to a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence, such that its

164 |

absence makes the presentation of a defense more difficult. To
that end, I believe that in its extension beyond exculpatory
evidence, to all “potentially useful evidence,” Youngblood can fill
the gap. 488 U.S. at 58.

124. Youngblood has been used in this manner in other
jurisdictions. For example, in State x Geeslin, the Ohio Supreme
Court considered a case where a trooper accidentally recorded
over patrol car footage of a defendant’s stop, such that the “only
relevant events remaining on the videotape relating to [the
defendant’s] arrest are those that occurred after [the defendant]
was stopped.” 2007-Ohio-5239, 878 N.E.2d 1, at 14. The court
recognized that the missing evidence “would not have been used
for the purpose of establishing [the defendant’s] guilt or inno-
cence,” but instead, would serve to “challenge or corroborate the
justification for the stop.” Jd. 112. Because the missing footage
was relevant “only with regard to the validity of the stop that led
to [the defendant’s] arrest,’ the court concluded it was not
materially exculpatory evidence under Brady, but instead, fell into
the category of potentially useful evidence. /d. 113. Accordingly,
the Ohio high court applied the second Youngblood test to
determine whether the trooper acted in bad faith in recording
over the footage. Jd. 114; see also United States x Houston, 548
F.3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Youngblood test where
officers failed to preserve video evidence of traffic stop); Ellis v
State, T7 So. 3d 1119, 1124 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (applying bad
faith test to erasure of memory card of defendant’s traffic stop);
Higginbotham uv State, 416 S.W.8d 921, 926 n.1 (Tex. App. 2013)
(observing if defendant could argue State failed to preserve in-car
camera recording showing what transpired at arrest in bad faith,
he could prevail on claim under Youngblood).

125. I agree that defendants like the one in the instant case
should not be without recourse when seeking to challenge undis-
closed, unpreserved, or even “noncreated” evidence that bears on
suppression of evidence because of the possibility of a constitu-
tional violation. On the other hand, a rule created to implement
fully the State’s duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and fairly disclose exculpatory evidence does not neatly apply in
connection with factfinding where the defendant has the burden of
proof and guilt is not being determined. Indeed, the real issue is
the scope of the exclusionary rule.

126. I recognize that Vermont has diverged from the federal
courts in its development of a broad exclusionary rule. In State uv

Oakes, we noted that the United States Supreme Court treats the
federal exclusionary rule as “a judicially created remedy rather
than a constitutional right,” and as such, focuses on weighing the
costs and benefits associated with applying the rule in particular
circumstances. 157 Vt. 171, 174, 598 A.2d 119, 122 (1991). Instead,
we recognized that our state exclusionary rule “effectuates Article
11 rights” and that reliance on an empirical assessment would
“disserve those rights.” Jd. at 174, 175, 598 A.2d at 121, 122; see
also State u Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 453, 450 A.2d 336, 349 (1982)
(concluding introduction of ill-gotten evidence at trial “eviscerates
our most sacred rights, impinges on individual privacy, perverts
our judicial process, distorts any notion of fairness, and encour-
ages official misconduct”).

127. However, application of the exclusionary rule as_ the
appropriate remedy requires “demonstrating a connection between
the constitutional violation and the physical evidence seized.” State
v. Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, 115, 189 Vt. 385, 22 A.8d 388, superseded
by statute on other grounds (noting also that exclusionary rule
applies only where challenged evidence “discovered through ex-
ploitation of an illegality” and that defendant must show causal
relationship between unlawful conduct and discovery of evidence).
Accordingly, for a claim based only on a police officer’s negligence,
with no proof there was actually a constitutional violation, I see no
reason to expand the exclusionary rule here. See also State v
Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 30, 757 A.2d 1017, 1025 (2000) (emphasizing
focus of analysis of scope of exclusionary rule “should be on the
individual constitutional rights at stake”). I believe Youngblood
affords defendant sufficient recourse in the situation present here.

128. Under the Youngblood standard, defendant in this case
must prove that the officer acted in bad faith in failing to turn on
the video system. There is no evidence of bad faith and defendant.
has not claimed it. For that reason, and the reasoning of the
majority, I would affirm.

129. Robinson, J., concurring. The majority acknowledges our
holding in State u Porter that even in the absence of a duty to
collect evidence, the negligent conduct of police may be sufficiently
prejudicial to the defense to warrant sanctions, 2014 VT 89, {1 29,
197 Vt. 330, 103 A.3d 916, but then without analysis or explanation
either implicitly overrules that holding or carves out an exception
for videotape evidence — in an era when the significance of such

166 |

evidence is growing. This case does not require us to address this
question, and, although I concur in the mandate, I cannot join the
majority’s reasoning.

130. This Court has long recognized that even though police do
not have a duty to collect particular evidence (as opposed to
preserving evidence already collected), “‘there could arise situa-
tions in which negligent conduct of the police is sufficiently
prejudicial to the defense to warrant’ sanctions.” Id. 129 (altera-
tion omitted) (quoting State u Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 312, 609 A.2d
972, 978 (1992)). Whether the conduct of police is “negligent” is
presumably assessed with reference to the norms of reasonable
police investigation, since we have repeatedly recognized that
there is no general statutory or constitutional duty to collect
particular evidence at a crime scene. See id. (“The police do not
have a duty to collect all evidence that could potentially favor the
defense.”) (citing State u Ware, 881 P.2d 679, 683 (N.M. 1994)
(stating rule that prosecution “generally has no duty to collect
particular evidence at the crime scene”)).

131. In Porter we concluded that the Bailey test — developed
to address claims of lost, destroyed, or unpreserved exculpatory
evidence — was “an adequately flexible method to determine the
appropriate sanction” in the class of cases in which the failure to
collect evidence in the first place was sufficiently negligent to
warrant consideration of sanctions. Id.

132. In this case, the majority acknowledges Porter, but then
holds that because we have held that “there is no legal duty to
record roadside stops, here the officer’s failure to record the stop
was not negligent, despite the superior court’s finding to the
contrary.” Ante, 1 16. The Court’s reasoning that because there is
no statutory or constitutional duty to record roadside stops, the
failure to do so here could not be deemed negligent and the
Bailey analysis is inapplicable is squarely at odds with our
reasoning in Porter that even though police have no duty to collect
evidence, the failure to do so in a particular case may be so
negligent and prejudicial as to warrant consideration of sanctions.
It isn’t clear whether the majority is implicitly overruling Porter,
limiting its reach to the extraordinary circumstance of failure to
procure a bloody knife lying next to the body in a murder case,
or merely carving out an exception to the Porter analysis for a
kind of evidence — namely, videotaped evidence of
ide stops. The majority does not offer a rationale for any of
these approaches.

133. I am not warring with our holding in State wu Dimick, 173
Vt. 547, 790 A.2d 435 (2001) (mem.). In that case, we rejected the
argument that the Vermont State Police Rules & Regulations,
Operational Policies & Procedures created a statutory duty to
videotape all roadside stops and DUI sobriety tests. /d. at 549-50,
790 A.2d at 437-38. We noted that the rules merely required
officers to tape “whenever possible.” Jd. at 550, 790 A.2d at 437.
I am merely arguing that in this day and age, when dashcam and
bodycam videos are becoming such a standard part of policing in
many departments, we should not, without far more consideration
and analysis, carve this one category of evidence out from the
general rule articulated in Porter, which recognizes that in some
cases a failure to collect evidence (that officers have no statutory
or constitutional duty to collect) may be so negligent with
reference to reasonable policing norms and so prejudicial as to
warrant further consideration by the Court. Without more infor-
mation than we have here, I cannot agree that turning off a
dashcam or bodycam at a critical moment can never constitute as
serious a departure from accepted police practices, and one that is
just as prejudicial to a defendant, as failing to collect a critical
piece of tangible evidence.

134. We don’t have to take such an extreme step to resolve this
case. After concluding, based on the testimony concerning this
particular case, that the officer’s failure amounted to gross
negligence, the trial court applied the Bailey test and concluded
that “it would be inequitable to suppress evidence or to dismiss
the State’s case,” but that a corrective instruction to the jury at
trial would be appropriate. As the analysis in the last two
paragraphs of the majority’s opinion reflects, the trial court’s
conclusion was well supported. The majority could have declined
to reach the question of whether dashcam video evidence of a
roadside stop is subject to a blanket exemption from the scrutiny
called for in State v Porter on the basis that even if the trial
court properly applied the Bailey test, its conclusion that Bailey
does not afford defendant the relief she seeks is affirmable. That
would have left to another day, and perhaps a case in which we
are presented with a record that more thoroughly elucidates the

* On a national basis, in 2018, 68% of local police departments used in-car cameras,
up from 61% in 2007, and 32% used body-worn cameras. B. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Local Police Departments, 2013: Equipment and Technology 3 (2015),
http;//bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pfd [https://perma.ce/Q8HS-GBAS].

168 |

role of dashcam videos in contemporary policing in Vermont, the
question of whether an across-the-board exception for videotape
evidence is appropriate.

135. For the above reasons, I concur in the majority’s affir-
mance of defendant’s conviction, but do not join the reasoning in
1 13-16 of the majority opinion.

2016 VT 106

Charles Groves v. Tasaday Green
[154 A.3d 507]
No. 15-444
Present: Reiber, C.J, Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 9, 2016

James A, Valente of Costello, Valente & Gentry P.C.,
Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jean Anne Kiewel of Jean Anne Kiewel, PC, Brattleboro, for
Defendant-Appellee.

11. Dooley, J. Father appeals an order from the family division
that awarded mother sole legal and physical parental rights and
responsibilities but did not award father any parent-child contact
at the time. The order contained a provision permitting father to
file a motion for parent-child contact, even without any change in
circumstances, within forty-five days after the pending criminal
charges against him had been resolved. On appeal, father con-

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tends that: (1) the court effectively terminated his parental rights
without finding by clear and convincing evidence that doing so was
in the best interests of the children; and (2) that the court erred
in creating a prerequisite to the resumption of contact — that is,
the resolution of the criminal charges — beyond his control. We
affirm.

12. Father filed a parentage action on March 19, 2015. On April
8, 2015, mother filed a stipulation of parentage and a motion that
she be granted sole parental rights and responsibilities for the
children and that father be denied any right to parent-child
contact pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 665(f). A hearing on the parties’
parental rights and responsibilities was held in June and August
2015. Both parties were present and represented by counsel.
Because of the allegations made by the mother in her motion,
both parties agreed that the mother should present her evidence
first, and father would present his evidence second.

13. According to the testimony of both parties, they met in the
fall of 2005 and moved into an apartment together in January
2006, remaining together until February 28, 2015. Both parties
stipulated that they were the biological parents of L.G., born in
October 2008, and C.G., born in November 2006.

14. Mother testified that she continued in the relationship
because she was physically and psychologically coerced to do so
and that she felt she had “no choice.” Mother testified that father
repeatedly forced her to overconsume alcohol and attempted to
force her to use marijuana, contrary to mother’s wishes. Mother
stated that she was intimidated by father’s statement that he was
mentally disabled and living in a halfway house. After father was
forced to leave his place of residence, mother said she felt that.
she had to let him move into her apartment in Saratoga Springs.
In testimony that the trial court characterized as credible, mother
stated that father was often drunk during the first years of their
acquaintance. According to mother, she repeatedly told father that
she did not want a relationship with him, but he did not desist
from his advances. When mother attempted to call the police,
father took the phone away from her. Mother further stated that
father boasted of assaulting his stepfather and of his status as a
registered sex offender, which he received after having sex with a
sixteen-year-old girl.

15. Mother testified that her sexual relationship with father was
wholly coerced and that father physically abused her from the

beginning of their relationship, with a succession of assaults
occurring between November 2005 and January 2006. Mother
described an instance where she ran away from father, who
caught her and knocked her down in the street, resulting in a
large abrasion and scab. On one occasion, mother succeeded in
fleeing to a friend’s apartment, but did not seek help from the
police. On another occasion, father reportedly dragged mother
across a parking lot by her backpack. Finally, father once
assaulted mother and locked her in a closet, where her screams
were overheard by a neighbor who called the police. The trial
court supplemented this testimony with its own observations,
noting that father is physically much larger than mother, whom
the court characterized as “slender and . . . frail,” while describing
father as “muscular and strong.”

16. Father pled guilty and was convicted of third-degree assault
with intent to cause physical injury to mother on February 3,
2006. He was placed on probation for three years as a result of
his conviction. C.G. was conceived at some point around the time
of the conviction.

17. Mother also outlined the high degree of control father
exercised over her life: father would walk her to work every day,
spend time at the Saratoga Springs Starbucks coffee shop where
she worked (until barred from doing so by coffee-shop manage-
ment), and meet her there after work. Father rarely left mother
alone, and mother did not go to the police or tell others about her
physical abuse, testifying that she felt trapped. Mother was afraid
that father might injure their children, and she stayed with him
to protect the children. Mother also stated that she feared that
father’s mother would take custody of the children, though she did
not explain this sentiment. The court found that mother was the
primary caregiver for the children, and had homeschooled them
for their entire lives.

18. In the spring of 2008, the parties moved to Brattleboro to
be closer to mother’s family. Prior to the move, mother wrote a
supportive letter about father addressed to father’s probation
officer. Mother also met with the probation officer, because father
needed the officer’s permission to leave New York State. Mother
stated that her letter was not truthful and that she had written
it only out of a desire to move to Vermont, where she had friends
and family and believed she had a better chance of exiting the
relationship. After the move, father began working at the

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Brattleboro Food Co-op, where he has worked consistently since.
The court found father to be the primary breadwinner for the
family since the move, noting that his earnings were put in a bank
account to which mother did not have access, limiting her options
for leaving the relationship. Mother also began attending classes
at Greenfield Community College for the 2010 academic year,
despite father’s disapproval. She attended classes for approxi-
mately three hours a day for three days a week, leaving the
children in father’s care during this time. Mother testified that in
the months before their separation, father was often too rough
with C.G. when they played, hurting him when they wrestled and
throwing him over his shoulder. Mother also began working as a
tutor for up to 10 hours per week beginning in the spring of 2014.
While not commuting, attending class, or tutoring, she spent all of
her time with the children. This pattern continued until the
parties separated in February 2015.

19. Mother testified that on February 28, 2015, she was
studying in her room when father attempted to coerce her into
smoking marijuana. Mother resisted, and father became angry,
yelling and throwing mother’s books against the wall, damaging it.
Mother testified that L.G. was standing nearby when this hap-
pened and could have been injured. Mother attempted to call 911,
but father took the phone away from her. L.G. attempted to call
from another phone downstairs, but father followed and took that.
phone away, throwing it down on the floor and breaking it. Mother
testified that both children shouted at father to leave. Father
eventually did leave, staying for several days with a friend, and
then returned, after which mother and children went to stay with
the children’s maternal grandmother.

110. After leaving the home, mother obtained a temporary
relief-from-abuse (RFA) order against father, and the parties
agreed to a “no findings” final RFA order on March 18, 2015.
That order gave mother parental rights and responsibilities and
barred father from having contact with the children, pending a
subsequent parentage action.

111. As a result of mother’s allegations of abuse arising from
the incident on February 28, father was arraigned on April 8,
2015, on charges of domestic assault and interference with emer-
gency services. Father was barred from having any contact with
mother or children as part of the conditions of rel in that
criminal case. Due to father’s prior conviction for assault in New

York, the first count of domestic assault was amended to a felony
charge of aggravated domestic assault, second degree. On August
24, 2015, the State filed additional charges in the same case alleging
aggravated sexual assault, based on repeated, nonconsensual acts
between 2011 and 2015 and a violation of an abuse prevention
order on July 21, 2015. Father was arraigned on the new charges
on September 17, 2015. At the time of the family division hearings
in this matter, father’s criminal charges were still pending with a
hearing set for January 21, 2016, and conditions of relief in the
RFA order remained in effect. In order to preserve his Fifth
Amendment rights in his criminal case, father ended testimony in
the family division after hearing of the new felony charges, and
his testimony was struck from the record and not considered in
the family division’s findings.

112. According to the docket entries in the criminal case,
father’s criminal charges were resolved on May 12, 2016.’ He pled
guilty to one misdemeanor count of domestic assault, one misde-
meanor count of interference with access to emergency services,
and one felony count of second or subsequent violation of an
abuse prevention order. The State dismissed the felony charge of
aggravated, repeated sexual assault. Father was sentenced to
serve zero to twelve months all suspended on the misdemeanors
and one to three years suspended for the felony and was placed
on probation under standard and special conditions, with the
probation warrant set to expire on May 20, 2020.

113. Photographic evidence entered in the superior court shows
father, mother, and the children appearing “happy, comfortable
and contented.” Mother acknowledged that over the ten years of
their relationship, she had repeatedly told father that she loved
him and had given him notes with loving statements, but testified
that these instances were all lies told only to protect herself and
the children.

114. Neither child was in counseling at the time of the final
family division hearing, although mother testified that she had
intended to get both children into counseling after the separation.
At the time of the family division hearings, both children were on
the waiting list for counselors at the local community mental

‘The events recorded in this paragraph occurred after the order on appeal in this
case, We have not considered the outeome of the criminal ease in resolving the
issues before us.

174 |

health provider, and mother had also contacted a private therapist
recommended by the children’s attorney.

115. The court began its analysis by noting that in 2014 the
Legislature added subsection (f) to 15 V.S.A. § 665, which high-
lights the factors a court must consider in crafting a parental
rights and responsibilities order. Subsection (f) was intended to
address the state’s “compelling interest in not forcing a victim of
sexual assault or sexual exploitation to continue an ongoing
relationship with the perpetrator of the abuse” and permits a
court to bar a parent from having any contact with his or her
children if it finds: by clear and convincing evidence, that the child
was conceived through sexual assault and by a preponderance of
the evidence, that such an order is in the best interests of the
child. 15 VS.A. § 665(f)(2). The court acknowledged mother’s
request that the court apply this standard to preclude father from
having any contact with the children. However, the court ulti-
mately concluded that although mother had provided significant
evidence that “most, if not all, of the sexual acts engaged in
between these parties were probably non-consensual,” the court
was nevertheless “unable to find that [mother] ha[d] proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the children were conceived as
a result of sexual assault.”

116. Consequently, the court turned to the best interests of the
child factors itemized by § 665(b). The court determined that:
mother is better able to meet the children’s physical, emotional,
and developmental needs; the children are well-adjusted to their
home and community; mother has been and continues to be the
children’s primary caregiver; and there was no evidence of other
close relationships that needed to be considered. The court also
found that while mother did not wish to foster a positive
relationship between the children and father, her opposition was
based on “legitimate concerns” stemming from father’s history of
alcohol and drug abuse; his physical, emotional, and sexual abuse
of mother; and his violent threats in the children’s presence.
Accordingly, the court found that the parties could not share legal
or physical rights as they were unable to communicate effectively
with one another. Finally, because father was convicted of domes-
tic assault against mother less than ten years prior to the hearing,
the court considered 15 V.S.A. § 665a(a), which allows for the
perpetrator of domestic violence to have parent-child contact “if
the court finds that adequate provision can be made for the safety
of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic violence.”

117. Recognizing that the court had “heard only [mother’s] side
of the history of the relationship,” as father’s pending felony
charges meant he was unable to testify without waiving his rights
against self-incrimination, the court declined to make a_ final,
unmodifiable order. The court issued a temporary parental rights
order awarding mother sole legal and physical parental rights and
responsibilities with no provision for parent-child contact with
father. The court’s reasons for denying parent-child contact. were
as follows:

[T]he court is persuaded that the existing limitations on
[father’s] contact with the children, barring him from all
contact with them, are in the children’s best interests, at
least until the felony charges of aggravated domestic
assault and sexual assault against [father] have been
resolved. The nature of the charges themselves supports
the continuation of a requirement that [father] have no
contact with the children. Also, [L.G.] is an eye witness
in the domestic assault case, and it would potentially
create significant emotional distress for her if she were
regularly communicating with [father] and also being
forced to testify about his abuse in court. [C.G.] was also
present in the home at the time of the domestic assault,
and may be a witness. [Father] likely faces potentially
long periods of incarceration and extensive programming
and rehabilitation requirements if convicted of either of
the felony offenses. If [father] is convicted, the court
concludes that it will make more sense for the children’s
relationship with [father] to be reestablished, if it can be,
with the assistance of such programming and rehabilita-
tion efforts, in order to improve the chances of safe,
appropriate resumption of contact, after [father] has been
screened and assessed, and if necessary, has accepted
responsibility for his actions, and gotten substance abuse
treatment and counseling about how to avoid further
violence and controlling behavior. If [father] is not con-
victed of any criminal conduct, the court may still order
him to complete counseling to protect the children, under
15 VS.A. §665a(b), as noted above. The court believes
that although [father] and the children might benefit
emotionally in the short term from reestablishing a
connection now, and that it might be possible for limited,

176 |

safe, supervised contact to occur through the local su-
pervised parent-child contact program, nonetheless the
risk that this relationship will be cut off by the criminal
process is very significant, and the harm that would
cause to the children after renewing the relationship
outweighs its benefit.

We note that at the time of this decision, parent-child contact was
also prohibited by the abuse prevention order and by the condi-
tions of defendant’s release imposed in the criminal

118. The court order provided that within forty-five days of the
resolution of his criminal charges and imposition of his sentence,
father could file a motion for contact and could seek an additional
hearing to demonstrate contact is in the best interests of the
children. It also provided that if father did not file such a motion,
he would have no right to parent-child contact except after a
motion to modify and a showing of real, substantial, and unan-
ticipated change in circumstances and that such contact would be
in the best interests of the children. This appeal followed.

119. On appeal, father raises two issues? for review: whether
the court erred in terminating his parental rights without finding
by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the
children required termination, and whether the court erred in
requiring resolution of his pending criminal charges and institut-
ing future conditions father needed to meet in order to resume
contact. We affirm.

120. Father relies for his first point on Mullin u Phelps, in
which we held that a court may not terminate parent-child contact
“absent clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of
the child require such action.” 162 Vt. 250, 267, 647 A.2d 714, 724
(1994); see also Knutsen x Cegalis, 2016 VT 2, 138, 201 Vt. 138,
187 A3d 374 (same). Father argues that the court acted on
allegations that he had abused mother almost ten years prior as
well as a “single incident wherein he yelled, had thrown some
books into a wall, then taken a phone held by his daughter and
broken it” despite making no finding as to whether these allega-
tions had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Father
contends that the record evidence of writings, photographs, and

2 Father has not challenged the court order granting mother sole physical and
legal rights and responsibilities for the children, and we do not consider that part
of the decision and order.

testimony from other parties showing a “healthy and constructive
relationship” between father and his children was “merely dis-
cussed” in the court’s findings of fact with no indication of how it
was weighed in relation to mother’s testimony. He maintains that
the trial court disregarded evidence from his witnesses and from
the guardian ad litem and attorney that supervised contact would
not harm the children, that he had been a good father, and that.
he had been the primary caregiver for three days a week before
the parties ended their relationship and provided “minimal expla-
nation” as to why termination was in the children’s best interests.

121. HM Father’s arguments would have more force if the court
order he appealed was a final order — the situation in both
Mullin and Knutsen. Instead, the order was temporarily put in
place, as the court explained, until the resolution of defendant’s
criminal case.? Temporary orders in divorce and parentage actions
are specifically authorized by 15 V.S.A. § 594a.* A temporary order

*We acknowledge that the trial court described the order in question as a final
order, However, because the trial court provided that the parent-child contact
provision in the order could be modified without a showing of a real, substantial,
and unanticipated change of circumstances up to forty-five days after resolution of
the criminal charges, it was functionally a temporary order until expiration of the
forty-five day period after resolution of the criminal charges. At that time, in the
absence of a motion by father, and without further hearing, the order would
become final. For that reason, we have determined father may appeal this case.
See Iannarone x Limoggio, 2011 VT 91, 117, 190 Vt. 272, 30 A.3d 655 (noting
liberality of finality standard in family cases, as “we have routinely allowed appeals
from the disposition of post-judgment motions in family cases,’ and practice is
“consistent with the law from other jurisdictions,’ where exception to rules on
appealable judgments have been recognized with regard to “ongoing family court
cases” (citing Carlisle x One (1) Boat, 195 P.3d 1177, 1186 (Haw. 2008); see also
Boisvert w Harrington, 173 Vt. 285, 287, 796 A.2d 1102, 1105 (2002) (addressing
appeal from superior court order denying motion to terminate guardianship even
though “there is no final judgment in the case” as Court has discretion to consider
cases where “dismissal would most likely result in another appeal after remand,
the merits of the question of law were fully briefed and argued, and the Court has
expended valuable time on the case” (quotation omitted); Matthews » Riley, 162
Vi. 401, 404 n.2, 649 A.2d 231, 234 n.2 (1994) (allowing appeal from interim order
rather than awaiting issuance of final order as further proceedings “would not
develop controlling questions of law, further delay might prove detrimental to the
child’s best interest, and judicial economy would best be served by hearing the
appeal”)

4 Section 59a applies specifically to divorce proceedings. We have applied divoree
provisions with respect to rights to children to parentage actions. See Heffernan
1 Harbeson, 2004 VT 98, I9-11, 177 Vt. 239, 861 A2d 1149,

178 Le

“is designed to provide quick, temporary relief to the parties in
between the initiation of the divorce proceeding and the final
decree.” Frazer v Olson, 2015 VT 84, 116, 200 Vt. 13, 127 A.3d 86.

122. Mullin established the clear and convincing evidence
standard because the award of custody to the mother, with no
right of parent-child contact in the father, “effectively terminated
the father’s parental rights.” 162 Vt. at 263, 647 A.2d at 722. Thus,
we applied the due process analysis in Santosky u Kramer, 455
US. 745, 747-48 (1982), where the United States Supreme Court.
held a state could not obtain an order terminating parental rights
unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence that such
termination was in the best interest of the child. Mullin, 162 Vt.
at 265-67, 647 A.2d at 723-24. In reaching this decision, we
recognized that we had held in Jn re A.D., 143 Vt. 432, 435-36, 467
A.2d 121, 123-24 (1983), that due process as found in Santosky did
not require an elevated proof standard in child-in-need-of-care-or-
supervision CHINS cases because “parental rights are only tem-
porarily curtailed.” Jd. at 265, 647 A2d at 723. Recently, we
applied AD. in In re B.C. in which a parent challenged the
suspension of parent-child contact with a child who had been
adjudicated CHINS under a statute that allowed such a suspen-
sion where necessary for the protection of the physical safety or
emotional well-being of the child. 2018 VT 58, 1% 16-17, 194 Vt.
391, 81 A.8d 1152. Based on A.D., we held that this provision
“clearly contemplates a temporary deprivation of rights, and
therefore may be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
showing that a suspension of contact is necessary for the protec-
tion of the child’s physical or emotional safety.” Id. 116. We
distinguished Mullin because the suspension was temporary and
did not “permanently cut off [the parent’s] parental rights.” Id.
117. For the same reason that the holding of Mullin did not
apply to B.C., it does not apply here.

123. JB In answer to father’s second claim on appeal, we
conclude that the reasons for which the court temporarily cut off
father’s parent-child contact fully supported the decision, including
the provision delaying resolution of father’s parent-child contact
until after the criminal proceeding was resolved. On this point, we
are applying a deferential standard of review. Because of “its
unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh
the evidence, we will not set le the [family] court’s findings if
supported by the evidence, nor its conclusions if supported by the

findings.” Begins vu. Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 301, 721 A.2d 469, 471
(1998) (citations omitted). Granting, modifying or denying parent-
child contact lies “within the discretion of the family court, and we
will not reverse the court’s decision unless its discretion was
exercised upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly
unreasonable upon the facts presented.” DeSantis x Pegues, 2011
VT 114, 126, 190 Vt. 457, 35 A.8d 152 (quotation omitted).

124. J The reasons given by the trial court, quoted above,
supported the court’s parent-child contact decision. The court
could not receive a full evidentiary presentation on which to make
a fully informed decision until the criminal case was resolved. We
particularly note the court’s concern about the interrelationship of
this case and the criminal proceeding and the presence of an
order from the criminal division prohibiting father from contacting
mother and the children.

125. This case also raised a unique situation because of the
nature of the charges against father. Under 15 V.S.A. § 665a(a),
enacted in 2008, the allowance of parent-child contact to a parent
may be specially regulated if “within the prior ten years” the
parent is convicted of domestic assault or aggravated domestic
assault against the other parent or found to have committed abuse
against a family or household member if “adequate provision can
be made for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim
of abuse.” Seven specific conditions are authorized including
ordering the perpetrator of domestic violence to participate in a
program for perpetrators or other counseling as a condition of
visitation; ordering where drugs or alcohol are involved in the
abuse the perpetrator not to be under the influence during the
visitation or during the preceding 24 hours; and imposing any
other condition appropriate to provide for the safety of the child,
the victim of domestic violence, or another family or household
member. Id. § 665a(b)(3), (4) & (6). The statute would apply if
father was convicted of the charges against him.> The trial court

® The court found that the statute applied at the time of its decision because the
2006 New York assault conviction was a “domestic assault” conviction under
§ 665a(a) and oceurred within ten years of the decision. We infer from the court’s
observations about restrictive conditions in a final parent-child contact order after
the resolution of the criminal case that the court believed that § 665a(a) was
unlikely to apply because the passage of time put the New York conviction beyond
the ten-year trigger from the date of the final order. There is an open question
whether the statute applied as a result of the abuse prevention order because the

180 |

was rightly concerned that the application of the statute would
change the nature and content of any parent-child contact order
and would not be known until the criminal case reached its
conclusion.

126. Hf In affirming the temporary order despite the absence
of a right for father to have parent-child contact, we recognize
that this is not the only way the court might have proceeded to
protect father’s right of self-incrimination in the criminal case but
obtain the needed evidence to fully resolve the parentage pro-
ceeding. Father could have sought Begins immunity. In State u
Begins we held that when a defendant is charged with misconduct
that constitutes the basis for both revocation of probation and an
independent criminal charge, a trial court has two options. 147 Vt.
295, 514 Ad 719 (1986). The court can either continue the
probation hearing until after the trial, or if it must hold the
hearing before the trial, thereby forcing a defendant to choose
between testifying at the hearing and remaining silent so as to
avoid self-incrimination, a defendant’s testimony at the revocation
hearing will be “subject to an exclusionary rule” modeled on the
federal use and fruits immunity rule. Id. at 299, 514 A2d at 722;
see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (requiring
grant of amnesty where government “coerces a defendant into
incriminating himself”). Begins thus provides that when a witness
in a proceeding asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, the
witness may be compelled to testify but “will be protected by use
and fruits immunity”; to that end, the State “may not use such
testimony as a springboard to a future criminal proceeding” and
the witness “may object to the introduction of any evidence taken
or derived from his or her testimony.” Im re Hill, 149 Vt. 431,
439-40, 545 A.2d 1019, 1025 (1988). We have since applied Begins
at sentencing hearings to admissions of uncharged crimes and
acknowledgements of culpability when mandated as a condition of
a probation. See State u Drake, 150 Vt. 235, 237, 552 A.2d 780,
781 (1988) (uncharged crimes); State vu Loveland, 165 Vt. 418, 427,

order made no finding of abuse, instead providing that “findings waived by
stipulation of the parties.”

The parties have not briefed or argued the interpretation of § 665a in this case.
Thus, we accept for purposes of this opinion the implied conelusion that the statute
would apply to the final parent-child contact order only if father were convicted of
domestic assault from the charges pending against him.

684 A2d 272, 278 (1996) (sex offender acknowledgements of
culpability).

127. While we have never explicitly extended Begins to testi-
mony proffered in family division proceedings, such a procedure
could be well-suited to cases like the present one. As in Begins,
and the subsequent cases, the State’s ability to use father’s
testimony in the family division created an “inevitable tension”
between two fundamental rights: the right to remain silent at trial
and the right to contact with one’s child. Begins, 147 Vt. at 298,
514 A2d at 722; see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (noting that
natural parents have a “fundamental liberty interest” in custody of
their children). A lesser burden of proof is required by family
courts to revoke or limit parental rights. Moreover, we believe
that the first solution proposed in Begins — that of postponing
the noncriminal hearing until the criminal trial — is undesirable
for family proceedings involving parental rights and responsibili-
ties and parent-child contact, as we favor the resolution of custody
cases as quickly as possible in order to provide children with
stability and security. See, e.g., J.D.S. vu Franks, 893 P.2d 732, 735
(Ariz. 1995) (noting “need for a quick resolution” in cases involv-
ing custody and placement of young children). Similarly, a family
proceedings judicial system wherein parents are afraid to testify
out of fear of criminal charges will preclude courts from gathering
the evidence ne ‘y to make informed child custody determi-
nations.

128. [HB In affirming the order here, we recognize that immu-
nity is not an acceptable answer in all cases. For reasons
discussed above, the court found it important to know the
resolution of the criminal case in crafting a final order with
respect to parent-child contact so the issuance of a temporary
order, to be followed by a permanent order after the criminal case
was resolved, was appropriate. While Begins immunity might have
allowed for more evidence in this proceeding, it may have had no
effect on the outcome given the presence of the no-contact order
from the criminal division and concerns about the children as
witnesses. Thus, while use immunity may be a tool for a parent
or the court, we see it only as an option to be considered, not a
requirement.

129. [I We find no error in requiring father to make a
separate motion for parent-child contact and discussing some of

182 |

the provisions that may be in a parent-child contact order if such
contact were authorized after the resolution of the criminal case.
Because father had the information to determine that the criminal
case was resolved, and the consequences of that resolution, it was
reasonable for him to have the burden of filing a motion to bring
parent-child contact again before the court. In seeking a perma-
nent order on parent-child contact, he did not have to show a
change of circumstances and was not bound by the findings that
supported the temporary order.® Frazer, 2015 VT 84, 916.

130. HI Nor do we find error in the court’s observations on
what may be included in a parent-child contact order depending
upon whether father was convicted of the charges against him. As
we stated in DeSantis, 2011 VT 114, 137, “the passage of time
without any contact, coupled with the allegations of abuse, and the
effect such allegations had on [a child’s] wellbeing, required the
court to reexamine what level of parent-child contact would most
benefit [the child].” We view the court's words as observations
rather than a binding future order. The observations noted that if
father was convicted, parent-child contact could be restricted “to
improve the chances of a safe, appropriate resumption of contact”
and suggested some of the possible restrictions consistent with 15
V.S.A. § 665a. They also noted the court’s power even if father was
not convicted. These observations were made without knowledge
of the evidence and circumstances that would be before it at a
hearing on the final order with respect to parent-child contact. We
do not view the observations as binding the court to any
parent-child contact order, including binding it to allowing parent-
child contact, based on the evidence and arguments at the final
hearing, and the findings based on the evidence and findings. Nor
do we view the court’s observations as restricting the evidence
either party could present, or the arguments they could make, at
the hearing.

Affirmed.

® We recognize that if father did nothing at the conclusion of the eriminal case the
temporary order denying parent-child contact would become permanent even
though there was no finding by clear and convineing evidence that the denial of
such contact was in the best interest of the children. This would, however, be
equivalent to the situation where he never sought parent-child contaet at all. If his
failure to seek parent-child contact was as a result of a prohibition of such contact
in his sentence in the criminal case, he would have grounds to show change of
cireumstances once the legal prohibition expired

&

2016 VT 77A

C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Department of Taxes

[155 A.3d 169]
No, 15-282

Present: Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ., and Kupersmith, Supr.
J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed September 16, 2016

Fy
&

Jon R. Eggleston and Malory S. Lea of Primmer Piper
Eggleston & Cramer PC, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Will S. Baker, Assistant
Attorney General, and Bridget C. Asay, Solicitor General, Mont-
pelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

11. Eaton, J. Taxpayer C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., a whole-
sale grocery distributor, disputes sales tax assessed by the
Vermont Department of Taxes on the purchase of reusable
fiberglass freezer tubs used in the transport of perishable items,
as well as the Department’s refusal to refund sales tax paid on
diesel fuel used to power refrigeration systems mounted on
taxpayer’s tractor trailers. Taxpayer also contests the penalty
assessed by the Commissioner of the Department of Taxes,
arguing that it is unreasonable. We affirm.

12. Taxpayer is a Vermont corporation, headquartered in Keene,
New Hampshire. As the nation’s largest wholesale grocer, tax-
payer purchases inventory from manufacturers and other suppliers
before reselling it to national supermarket chains and _ local
independent grocers. Since 1981, taxpayer has maintained a
warehouse in Vermont that supplies its New England and New
York State customers. Serving as a middleman between manufac-
turers and grocery stores, taxpayer’s inventory includes products
requiring refrigeration for freshness and safety reasons. To main-
tain the temperature of the product requiring refrigeration, tax-
payer transports perishable products in large rectangular fiber-
glass tubs, referred to as “freezer tubs,” which are packed with
dry ice and loaded into refrigerated tractor-trailers. The tractor-
trailers, or “reefers,” are insulated and mounted with a refrigera-
tion system that runs on diesel fuel, or “reefer fuel.”

13. The freezer tubs, which vary in size, are insulated with
fiberglass or foam and have a hard plastic outer shell. Boxes of
frozen food are stacked on a wooden pallet and covered with dry
ice, which is then wrapped in a large plastic bag, or shroud. The
shrouded package is then placed in the freezer tubs, which are
then loaded onto taxpayer’s tractor-trailer delivery trucks, which
typically make between two and seven stops to various grocer
customers. During delivery, the freezer tubs are unloaded and the
plastic shrouds are cut off the pallets before the boxes of frozen
food are removed and taken into the store. Empty freezer tubs
are not given or transferred to the grocer customer, and are not
used by the customer in any way; they are taken back by
taxpayer for reuse.

14. Taxpayer typically uses each freezer tub for a period of
three to five years. Despite this lifespan, some of the freezer tubs
may be damaged by heavy warehouse equipment or lost and last
less than three years, and still others may last longer.

186 Le

15. Each of taxpayer’s reefers has a fuel tank, separate from
the tractor-trailer’s fuel tank. The fuel tank is used only to power
the tractor-trailer’s refrigeration unit, which in turn keeps the
tractor-trailer cool. Unlike the diesel fuel for the tractor-trailers
themselves, the reefer fuel is dyed red and held in tanks marked
“for off-road use only.” It is illegal to use reefer fuel to propel the
tractor-trailers on public roads and highways.

16. During an audit, the Department identified that no sales or
use tax was paid on the thousands of freezer tubs owned by
taxpayer, which it found were not exempted as packaging under
32 V.S.A. §9741(16), which exempts “{mlJaterials, containers, labels,
s, boxes, drums, or bags and other packing, packaging,
or ‘shipping materials for use in packing, packaging, or shipping
tangible personal property by a manufacturer or distributor” The
Department assessed sales and use tax of $30,562 for these
freezer tubs for the period from October 1, 2009, through
September 30, 2012, as well as a penalty under 32 V.S.A.
§ 3202(b)(3). Also during the audit, when asked by the Department
whether they had paid sales tax on the reefer fuel, taxpayer
answered in the affirmative.

17. On March 26, 2014, the Department held an administrative
hearing regarding taxpayer’s protest of that tax assessment for
the freezer tubs and denial of taxpayer’s request for a sales
tax refund for the reefer fuel. The Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Taxes considered whether freezer tubs and reefer fuel
were exempt from the Vermont sales and use tax under the
packing and shipping materials exemption in 32 V.S.A. § 9741(16).
The Department found that taxpayer’s freezer tubs did not qualify
as shipping materials exempt from sales and use tax under 32
VS.A. § 9741(16). Considering the freezer tubs in the context of its
regulations, which define “packing, packaging or shipping materi-
als” as “the articles and devices used in packing, packaging or
shipping tangible personal property such as containers, bags,
labels, gummed tapes, bottles, drums, cartons, bubble wrap and
sacks,” and exempt “[iltems of returnable and reusable packaging
as long as the packaging has a limited life expectancy (not more
than three years),” Sales and Use Tax Regulations § 1.9741(16)-2,
Code of Vt. Rules 10 060 033 [hereinafter Tax Dept. Reg.], the
Commissioner found that the freezer tubs are not exempt as they
“are returned to the taxpayer and reused, and have an expected
life greater than three years, and so, under the regulations, are

a

not exempt.” As to the reefer fuel, the Commissioner found that
it “is not a container or packing material, is not a component of
the parcel which conveys to the customer, and is not exempt.”

18. After the hearing, taxpayer filed a written request for a
refund of the sales tax paid on the reefer fuel. The Department
formally denied the request. Taxpayer appealed both determina-
tions, and the parties stipulated to a consolidation of the appeals.
Thereafter, taxpayer appealed the Department’s adverse determi-
nation regarding the freezer tubs and reefer fuel to the trial
court. Following the trial court’s decision affirming the Commis-
sioner’s determination, taxpayer appealed to this Court.

19. On appeal, taxpayer challenges both the Commissioner’s
interpretation of the exemption in 32 V.S.A. § 974116), arguing
that the statute does not limit the type of materials or containers
used to pack or ship, and her decision upholding the penalty
assessed against taxpayer. The State disagrees with these argu-
ments, asserting that the Commissioner correctly construed the
packaging exemption to the sales and use tax when it found that
the statute does not exempt all materials used to transport goods,
but only that packaging which stays with the customer. Although
the State acknowledges that the exemption includes some return-
able and reusable packaging, such packaging must have a life
expectancy of less than three years.

110. Hl We review the Commissioner’s decision directly, inde-
pendent of the superior court’s conclusions. In re Williston Inn
Grp., 2008 VT 47, (11, 183 Vt. 621, 949 A2d 1073 (mem.).
Moreover, because we are “traditionally reluctant to substitute our
judgment for the experience and expertise of an agency,” Lemieux
v. Tri-State Lotto Comm’n, 164 Vt. 110, 112, 666 A.2d 1170, 1172
(1995), we apply a deferential standard of review to agency
decisions, see, e.g., Gasoline Marketers of Vt, Inc. vu Agency of
Natural Res, 169 Vt. 504, 508, 739 A2d 1230, 1233 (1999)
(‘{A]bsent a clear and convincing showing to the contrary, deci-
sions made within the expertise of administrative agencies are
presumed to be correct, valid, and reasonable.” (citation omitted)).
We therefore uphold the Commissioner’s interpretation of tax
statutes absent “compelling indication of error” Williston Inn
Grp., 2008 VT 47, 112. This deference extends to the Commis-
sioner’s interpretation of Department regulations, “as much out of
a concern for the proper separation of powers as in consideration
of agency expertise.” Id. 113 (quotation omitted).

188 Le

V11. HM This Court recognizes the general rule that tax
exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer, but “the
construction must not defeat the purposes of the statute.” Tarrant
v. Dep't of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 197, 733 A.2d 733, 739 (1999) (citing
Stephens v Dep't of Taxes, 134 Vt. 178, 180, 353 A.2d 355, 356
(1976)). Although it is the taxpayer’s burden to “ ‘clearly estab-
lish[ ] the exemption beyond a reasonable doubt, ” World Publ’ns,
Inc. v Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 2012 VT 78, 18, 192 Vt. 547, 60
A3d 942 (quoting Ragland v K-Mart Corp., 624 S.W.2d 430, 432
(Ark. 1981)), we will resolve any ambiguities in favor of the
taxpayer. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v Vt. Dep't of Taxes, 133 Vt.
269, 277, 836 A2d 158, 163 (1975).

112. We begin by addressing taxpayer’s challenges to the
Commissioner’s interpretation of §9741(16): (1) that under the
plain language of the statute, the freezer tubs are exempt as
“containers”; (2) that the Department’s inconsistent interpretation
of the exemption should not be entitled to deference by this
Court; and (8) that the Department’s regulation limiting the
exemption to include materials with a life span of less than three
years is arbitrary and capricious.

113. [Il The issue before the Court is whether the freezer tubs
used by taxpayer in distributing perishable groceries qualify as
containers, packaging, or shipping materials under the meaning of
the statute. The resolution of whether taxpayer’s freezer tubs are
exempt as packaging and shipping materials turns on the con-
struction of 32 V.S.A. § 9741(16). We defer to agency interpreta-
tions of statutes the Legislature has entrusted to their adminis-
tration, and absent compelling indication of error, we uphold the
Commissioner’s interpretation of tax statutes. See, e.g. Town of
Killington v State, 172 Vt. 182, 192, 776 A2d 395, 403 (2001);
Tarrant v Dep't of Taxes, 169 Vt. at 195, 733 A.2d at 738; In re
Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. 68, 74, 444 A2d 1349, 1351 (1982).
When construing a statute, our primary objective is to effectuate
the intent of the Legislature. Spears x Town of Enosburg, 153 Vt.
259, 261, 571 A.2d 604, 605 (1989). We begin with the presumption
that the Legislature intended the statutory language to carry its
plain, ordinary meaning. State u Harty, 147 Vt. 400, 402, 518 A.2d
30, 31 (1986). Where the meaning of the statute is plain on its
face, this Court will enforce the statute according to its terms.
See Hill x Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 98, 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983)
(noting that where statute’s meaning is plain on its face, “there is

a

no need for construction; the legislative intent is to be ascertained
from the act itself”).

114. Generally, Vermont imposes a sales tax on retail sales
within the state. 32 V.S.A. § 9771. Certain items, however, are
exempt from sales tax, including:

Materials, containers, labels, sacks, cans, boxes, drums,
or bags and other packing, packaging, or shipping ma-
terials for use in packing, packaging, or shipping tangible
personal property by a manufacturer or distributor.

32 V.S.A. §9741(16). In considering this exemption, which is
potentially extremely broad if it applies to anything involved in
packing, packaging, or shipping, we are aided by reference to the
Department’s regulations, adopted in accordance with chapter 25
of Title 8, the Administrative Procedure Act. See 3 VS.A.
§§ 836-844. These regulations are “valid and binding” with “the
force of law.” 3 V.S.A. § 845(a). Regulations constitute “ ‘prima
facie evidence of the proper interpretation of the matter that they
refer to?” Wetterau, Inc. w Dep't of Taxes, 141 Vt. 324, 328, 449
A.2d 896, 898 (1982) (quoting 3 V.S.A. § 845(a)).

115. The Department’s regulations define “packing, packaging
or shipping materials” as “the articles and devices used in
packing, packaging or shipping tangible personal property such as
containers, bags, labels, gummed tapes, bottles, drums, cartons,
bubble wrap and sacks.” Tax Dept. Reg. § 1.9741(16)-2. In addition
to providing a definition of packing, packaging, or shipping
materials, the regulation establishes an exemption from the sales
tax for “[i]tems of returnable and reusable packaging . . . as long
as the packaging has a limited life expectancy (not more than
three years).” Jd. Items of returnable and reusable packaging
includes packaging that “may be returned to and reused by the
manufacturer or distributor,” such as “pallets, reels and skids used
for holding tangible personal property during shipment, beer kegs,
and water containers.” Id.

116. We are further aided by the Department’s 1998 Technical
Bulletin, TB-11, which explains the scope of the exemption and the
Board’s longstanding “position that returnable and reusable pack-
aging is not exempt from the sales and use tax.” Vermont
Department of Taxes, Technical Bulletin 11, 1 (1998), http://
tax.vermont.gov/sites/tax/files/documents/TB11.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SAG5-HHH3] [hereinafter TB-11]. Packing, packaging,

190 |

and shipping materials that will continue down the stream of
commerce are not taxed, while durable equipment that has come
to rest in the stream of commerce can be taxed to the manufac-
turer or distributor without the risk of double taxation. The
Department further provided that this exclusion is supported by
the purpose of the exemption, which is to prevent double taxation:

The rationale for the exemption is that packaging is
ordinarily transferred to the retail customer as part of
the sale and it is part of the taxable base. There the
same packaging should be exempt at the manufacturing
or distributor level to avoid taxing it twice. In contrast,
returnable or reusable returnable or reusable packaging
which is not permanently transferred to a retail customer
does not become part of the taxable base. Therefore, the
exemption has extended only to materials that were
transferred to the buyer with the product; and returnable
or reusable materials used by the manufacturers or
distributors in getting their product to the market have
not been exempt.

TB-11 at 1 (footnote omitted).

117. By its plain language, the exemption contains extremely
broad and generalized language. To interpret the exemption as
applying to all things that ultimately enclose tangible personal
property in shipping, however, would create unintended results —
the exception would literally swallow the rule if §9741(16) was
construed to exempt every material used in any way in packing,
packaging, or shipping. See In re Middlebury Coll. Sales & Use
Tax, 137 Vt. 28, 31, 400 A.2d 965, 967 (1979) (“Exemptions from
taxation are to be strictly construed”). Considering the structure
of the exemption, however, with support from the regulation, it is
clear that the Legislature did not intend the terms to be
interpreted in their broadest possible sense. This is evidenced by
the manner in which the Legislature structured the exemption,
the regulation’s definitions and exclusions, and by practical con-
siderations.

118. PME First, the exemption is structured such that par-
ticular terms — materials, containers, labels, sacks, cans, boxes,
drums, or bags — precede more general terms — packing,
packaging, or shipping materials. Although the statute fails to
define these crucial terms, the Department’s regulations provide

Ss ((
||

some clarification, defining “packing, packaging or shipping mate-
rials” as “the articles and devices used in packing, packaging or
shipping tangible personal property such as containers, bags,
labels, gummed tapes, bottles, drums, cartons, bubble wrap and
sacks.” Tax Dept. Reg. § 1.9741(16)-2. To exempt all containers, as
urged by taxpayer, is not within the necessary scope of the
statute. See In re Middlebury Coll., 137 Vt. at 31, 400 A.2d at 967.
The sales tax is designed to be imposed on the ultimate user. See
Hadwen, Inc. w Dep't of Taxes, 139 Vt. 87, 43, 422 A.2d 255, 259
(1980) (explaining that provisions of § 9741 are intended to prevent
multiple taxation during manufacture and production of goods and
that “[t]he sale to the ultimate user is used as the measuring
point for the imposition of the tax”). Narrowly construing the
statute, as we must, the exemption is thus limited to components
of the parcel being shipped. The freezer tubs do not move through
the stream of commerce; they are returned to taxpayer to be used
again. If the exemption applies to the freezer tubs they will not
be taxed at any point in the distribution process.

119. Second, practically speaking, a limited reading of the scope
of the statute prevents an overly broad construction of the
exemption. An overly broad construction would bring within its
scope all materials, containers, labels, sacks, cans, boxes, drums,
or bags, as well as all packing, packaging, or shipping materials,
regardless of whether they were components of the parcel to be
shipped. This would have the potential to include under its
purview all objects used to transport or hold something, such as
the tractor-trailer trucks transporting taxpayer’s goods across
New England, the freezer units and storage racks at the ware-
house used to hold the goods until loaded, and the warehouse
itself, which is, in the broadest sense, a “container” when it holds
goods for shipment. The Legislature clearly did not intend to
include anything that could be envisioned as a container—a nearly
limitless set of items — in the exemption. This would result in an
exemption that allows words “to prevail over common sense.”
McClure Newspapers, Inc. u Vt. Dep't of Taxes, 132 Vt. 169, 173,
315 A.2d 452, 454 (1974) (“{wle [do not] allow words . . . to prevail
over common sense.”); see also TD Banknorth, N.A. x Dep't of
Taxes, 2008 VT 120, 132, 185 Vt. 45, 967 A.2d 1148 (noting the
general “presumption . . . against a statutory construction that
would lead to . . . absurd results” (quotation omitted)).

192 |

120. HM Finally, not only would an overly inclusive and broad
reading of the exemption have widespread application, it would
also contravene the purpose of the statute. As stated above, in
TB-11 the Department explained that it is the purpose of the
exemption to prevent double taxation. See 67B Am. Jur. 2d Sales
and Use Taxes § 104 (2016) (“The purpose of exempting from the
sales tax such intermediate sales of containers and packaging
materials is to avoid double taxation and to prevent the increase
of the ultimate sales price to the consumer, for the consumer pays
the whole tax reflected in the price which he or she pays for the
finished product.”). It is not the purpose of the exemption that
certain materials used in packing, packaging, or shipping be
exempt from tax altogether. TB-11 at 1 (footnote omitted); see
also Wetterau, 141 Vt. at 330, 449 A.2d at 899 (“The sales tax is
designed to be imposed on the ultimate user.” (citation omitted)).
For this reason, returnable and reusable packaging materials that
have come to rest in the stream of commerce should be taxed to
the distributor or manufacturer, lest they avoid taxation altogether,
whereas packing, packaging, and shipping materials that will
continue down the stream of commerce are not taxed to the
manufacturer or transporter and are instead taxed where they
come to rest in the stream of commerce as part of the taxable
base of the product.

121. [HM Applying this interpretation to taxpayer’s appeal, we
do not find the freezer tubs to be within the scope of the
exemption. Although the freezer tubs are “containers,” this is so
under only the broadest sense of the words.' The tubs are not a
component of the parcel to be shipped any more than the
tractor-trailer itself; rather, they are a component wsed in ship-
ping and then reused again by taxpayer? If taxed to taxpayer,

+The American Heritage Dictionary defines “container” as “a receptacle in which
material is held or carried.” American Heritage Dictionary 330 (2000),

? Section 9741(16) was amended in 1974, See 1973, No. 270 (Adj. Sess.), § 4. Prior
to this amendment, the statute exempted: “Materials, containers, labels, sacks,
cans, boxes, drums, or bags and other packing, packaging, or shipping materials
for use in packing, packaging, or shipping tangible personal property for resale”
See 32 V.S.A. §9741(16) (1981) (emphasis added). The deletion of the words “for
resale” neither precludes nor mandates that items that do not continue down the
stream of commerce fall within the exemption; the amendment clarifies that some
items which do not pass down the stream of commerce may nonetheless be
exempt, See Standard Register Co. x Comm’r of Taxes, 135 Vt. 271, 274, 376 A2d

Ss (
||

there is no risk of double taxation — if taxpayer does not pay tax

on the freezer tubs, however, they will go completely untaxed.

122. HI In reaching her conclusion, the Commissioner looked to
the language of the exemption, considering the context provided
by the Department’s regulations, for resolution, and we cannot
now find her conclusion to be incorrect, invalid, or unreasonable.
The Commissioner considered whether taxpayer’s freezer tubs are
containers within the meaning of the plain language of statute
with guidance from the regulation.* More specifically, she consid-
ered the scope of the packaging exemption in that context, and
whether it applies to all containers, irrespective of their function
or use. The Commissioner’s construction of § 9741(16) is neither
inherently unreasonable nor arbitrary. For these reasons, we
cannot find that taxpayer has met its burden of showing why the
freezer tubs should be exempt from sales tax with evidence that.
the Commissioner’s decision was incorrect, invalid, or unreason-
able. See Gasoline Marketers of Vt., 169 Vt. at 508, 739 A.2d at
1233 (“[A]bsent a clear and convincing showing to the contrary,
decisions made within the expertise of administrative agencies are
presumed to be correct, valid, and reasonable.” (citation omitted)).
Even resolving ambiguities in the taxpayer’s favor, we cannot find
that taxpayer met the burden of establishing the exemption
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” World Publ’ns, 2012 VT 78, 18.

123. Taxpayer also argues that the Department’s “three-year
rule” is invalid.‘ The three-year rule was adopted in response to

41, 43 (1977) (stating that “materials sold to a manufacturer and used for shipping
[its] product [after 1974] are exempt from tax, as fully as materials sold [to it] for
incorporation into the product itself”). This does not mean, however, that we
cannot consider the items themselves, whether or not they continue on in the
stream of commerce, to determine whether they are materials or containers used
for shipping

* As stated in supra, n.2, Standard Register does not stand for the proposition that
any item used in the shipment of goods is exempt under §9741(16). Such broad
terms require some limitation, lest the exemption swallow the rule. Further, we
note that because the sales at issue in Standard Register fell under the statute’s
original language, and not under the amended language, our discussion of the
effect of the statutory amendment in that case was dicta. See Standard Register,
135 Vt. at 274, 376 A.2d at 43 (“A result contrary to the one we have here reached
is, however, dictated by a 1973 amendment of the exemption in question, as to
sales after its effective date.”).

‘Consistent with supra, n.2, the Department would have had no reason to
establish the three-year rule if all reusable items were exempt from the tax. The

194 |

an increase in the use of disposable materials, an unintended
consequence of the exclusion of returnable and reusable packaging
in Regulation § 1.9741(16). See TB-11 at 2. The Department ad-
opted the position exempting returnable and reusable packaging
with a life expectancy of less than three years to incentivize the
use of recyclable materials “while still giving effect to the
apparent intent of the exemption, i.e., to exempt packaging not
equipment.” Id. As under Regulation § 1.9741(16)-2, the Depart-
ment considered items with a life expectancy greater than three
years to be “equipment which is used and consumed by the
manufacturer or distributor and is therefore properly taxed to
that party” TB-11 at 2.

124. Taxpayer argues that not only is the three-year rule
without statutory basis, but that the Department lacked the
authority to adopt the exception in the first place. In 1974, the
Department adopted a version of the regulation that limited the
exemption to “{i]tems of returnable and reusable packaging as
long as the packaging has a limited life expectancy (not more than
three years).” Tax Dept. Reg. § 1.9741(16)-2. In its 1998 Technical
Bulletin, the Department explained that it had adopted the
three-year rule to “accommodate [the exclusion for returnable and
reusable items] while still giving effect to the apparent effect of
the exemption, i.e., to exempt packaging not equipment.” TB-11 at.
2. The Department lamented that although that approach “affords
a bright line for administering the exemption, an unintended
consequence . . . is to favor the use of disposable materials over
recyclable materials.” Jd. To incentivize the use of recyclable
materials “while still giving effect to the apparent intent of the
exemption, i.e., to exempt packaging not equipment,” the Depart-
ment adopted a position exempting returnable and reusable pack-
aging with a life expectancy of less than three years. Id. As under
the 1974 regulation, the Department considered items with a life
expectancy greater than three years to be “equipment which is
used and consumed by the manufacturer or distributor and is
therefore properly taxed to that party.” Id.

125. [I Because the three-year rule affects only those return-
able items with a life expectancy of three years or less, Regula-

existence of the regulation demonstrates that the Department did not interpret the
1974 amendment as exempting all items used in shipping. TB-11 also supports this
position.

Ss ((
||

tion § 1.9741(16)-2’s longstanding exclusion of other returnable and
reusable packaging remains unchanged. The Court declines to
address taxpayer’s challenge to the three-year rule because it has
no effect on this case: the freezer tubs have a life expectancy of
more than three years and are thus excluded regardless of the
rule. The Department’s application of the rule, whether it has
been consistent or inconsistent, is therefore irrelevant to the facts
of this case, and we decline to address its validity. See Fuller v
Watkins, 117 Vt. 257, 262, 90 A.2d 444, 447 (1952) (providing that
the Court does not “comment upon abstract principles of law in
the absence of some showing of facts to which they might apply.”).
That the Commissioner may not have had the authority to exempt
returnables having a useful life of three years or less from
taxation does not mean the regulation is invalid as to those items
having a useful life of greater than three years.

126. J) MMM Having addressed taxpayer’s challenge to the
Commissioner’s interpretation of the exemption in § 9741(16) as it
applies to the freezer tubs, we consider taxpayer’s challenge to
the Commissioner’s interpretation of the exemption as it applies to
reefer fuel. Taxpayer argues that under the plain language of the
statute, the reefer fuel is exempt as “shipping material.” As stated
above, the exemption does not apply to unlimited types of
shipping materials. Although the reefer fuel is a “material,” this is
so only under the broadest sense of the word.® Rather than being
a component of the parcel to be shipped, it is a component used
in shipping — one that does not transfer to the grocery stores
and has come to rest with taxpayer in the stream of commerce.
Because it does not continue down the stream of commerce, the
reefer fuel can be taxed to taxpayer without the risk of double
taxation. We hold that reefer fuel is not exempt from sales tax
under 32 V.S.A. § 9741(16).

127. Finally, taxpayer challenges the Commissioner’s decision
upholding the penalty assessed against it, arguing that the
Commissioner abused her discretion by upholding an unreasonable
penalty where taxpayer acted in good faith. Citing its full
cooperation with the audit process and its record of positive
voluntary compliance with the State, taxpayer contends that the

*The American Heritage Dictionary defines “material” as “composed of or
pertaining to physical substances; relating to matter” American Heritage Diction-
ary 316, 72 2d ed. 1982).

196 Le

liability arising from the audit is based on a misunderstanding as
to the scope of the exemption — specifically, a misunderstanding
caused by the lack of clarity in the exemption’s language. The
State disagrees and argues that because taxpayer first contested
the penalties in its reply brief before the superior court, the
argument was not properly preserved for review.

128. [I Preservation requires a party to “present the issue
with specificity and clarity” to give the original forum “a fair
opportunity to rule on it.” State u Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 583, 61,
652 A.2d 1004, 1009 (1994). Issues raised for the first time in a
reply brief are not preserved for review. Agency of Nat. Res. uv
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 169 Vt. 426, 435, 736 A.2d 768, 74 (1999)
(holding additional claim raised in reply brief not preserved for
appellate review). Taxpayer did not raise this argument in its
memorandum to the Commissioner, and it was not addressed in
the Commissioner’s determination. The issue is thus not appro-
priate for our review.®

Affirmed.

© Although taxpayer attempts to justify its failure to meet its tax obligation by
arguing that its nonpayment was in “good faith? this is not a defense to the
penalty assessed. The penalty was assessed pursuant to the “failure to pay”
provision in 32 VS.A. § 3202(b)(8). Thus, the failure to pay is itself the basis for
the imposition of the penalty. See TD Banknorth, N.A. x Dep't of Taxes, 2008 VT
120, 1.37 (stating that plain meaning authorizes the penalty “on a taxpayer who
has not paid his or her ‘tax liability’ in full, imposing no restrictions on the
application of the penalty for particular types of tax avoidance or underpayment.”
It is the purpose of this penalty “to enable the Commissioner to penalize taxpayers
when they have not properly discharged their tax burden. Id. Even if taxpayer’s
argument was properly preserved, because taxpayer failed to pay the tax,
regardless of its acting in good faith in doing so, the imposition of the penalty was
not error.

CU

2016 VT 103

Plum Creek Maine Timberlands, LLC v. Vermont Department
of Forests, Parks and Recreation and Vermont Department of
Taxes
[155 A.3d 694)

No. 14-063
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 16, 2016

ee

David L. Grayck of Cheney Saudek & Grayck P.C., Montpelier,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Bridget C. Asay and
Kyle H. Landis-Marinello, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier,
for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert E. Woolmington of Witten, Woolmington, Campbell &
Bernal, P-C., Manchester Center, for Amicus Curiae Vermont
Land Trust, Inc.

C. Daniel Hershenson of Hershenson Carter Scott & McGee,
PC., Norwich, for Amici Curiae Vermont Forest Products Asso-
ciation and the Vermont Forestry Foundation.

11. Reiber, C.J. This appeal concerns a timber harvest by
landowner Plum Creek Maine Timberlands, LLC in forestland
enrolled in the current-use, tax-incentive program. The Vermont
Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation (FPR) issued an
adverse inspection report, concluding that Plum Creek violated its
forest-management plan and failed to comply with minimum
acceptable standards during the harvest. Consequently, the De-
partment of Taxes removed the land from the current-use pro-
gram and levied a tax assessment. Following Plum Creek’s appeal,
the superior court reversed those administrative decisions. FPR
now appeals, arguing that the superior court failed to give appro-
priate deference to FPR’s determination of the proper methodology
for measuring compliance with the forest-management plan. We
reverse the court’s decision, and remand.

12. The property in question consists of approximately 56,600
acres in northeastern Vermont. Formerly part of the Champion
International Corporation holdings, the land was sold in 1998 to
the Essex Timber Company. Essex Timber enrolled it in the Use
Value Appraisal (UVA), or current-use, program. This tax-incentive
program was designed to “encourage and assist the maintenance
of Vermont’s productive agricultural and forestland” by taxing
property enrolled in the program at its “current use” value rather
than its fair market value. 32 V.S.A. §§ 3751, 3756(a). To be eligible
for the program, forestland must be “under active long-term
forest management . . . in accordance with minimum acceptable

200 |

standards for forest management.” Id. § 3752(9)(A). “Minimum
acceptable standards for forest management” are defined as
standards set by FPR. Jd. §3752(18). Eligibility also generally
requires compliance with “the regulations adopted by the [Current
Use Advisory] Board.” Id. § 3755(a). The UVA Program Manual
adopted by the Board’ sets forth minimum standards for forest-
management plans, minimum standards for forest management
and regeneration, standard forms for use by landowners enrolled
in the program, and appendices containing additional guidance for
foresters and landowners.

13. To enroll in the UVA program, a landowner must file a
“forest management plan” and obtain the approval of FPR, which
is tasked with periodically reviewing the plan and inspecting each
enrolled parcel. Id. § 3755(c). If upon inspection FPR “finds that
the management of the tract is contrary to the . . . forest
management plan, or contrary to the minimum acceptable stan-
dards for . . . forest management,” it is required to file an
“adverse inspection report” with the landowner and the PVR
Director. Jd. When a report is filed, the PVR Director, in turn, is
required to “remove from use value appraisal an entire parcel of
managed forestland and notify the owner.” Id. § 3756(i)(1). This
appeal involves FPR’s issuance of such an adverse-inspection
report to Plum Creek.

I. Facts

14. Essex Timber prepared a forest-management plan, which
FPR approved in 2007. See 32 V.S.A. § 3755(b), (b)(1) (providing
that “[mJanaged forestland” must be “subject to a forest manage-
ment plan” to be eligible for enrollment in UVA program). The
following year, Essex Timber sold its holdings to Plum Creek,
which formally adopted the existing management plan.

15. Under a strategy developed by FPR to accommodate large
landowners, Plum Creek’s forest-management plan provided more
conceptual, and less stand-specific, information than is generally

1 Comprised of the Commissioner of Taxes, the FPR Commissioner, the Director
of the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR),
members of the private agricultural and forestry sectors, and local government
representatives, 32 V.S.A. § 3753(b), the Board’s legislatively defined duties are to
periodically review the criteria for enrollment in the UVA program, recommend
changes and improvements, and adopt rules to carry ont its statutory goals. Id.
§ 3754(a), (©).

required by FPR for participation in the UVA program. When an
actual timber harvest is planned, however, the landowner must
submit a “harvest prescription amendment” to the management.
plan containing more detailed information, and obtain the approval
of the county forester for this amendment.

16. In 2009, Plum Creek sought to harvest timber for six
stands in its managed forestland and worked with the county
forester for Caledonia and Essex Counties to adopt a prescription
amendment to its management plan. The plan set both numerical
and qualitative goals for each stand to be harvested. Those goals
were memorialized in a prescription amendment. For the three
stands at issue in this appeal, the prescription provided the
following. Stand 34 was to receive a two-staged shelterwood? and
the target residual basal area (RBA) — the amount of tree stock
left after cutting — was set at 30-40 ft, Stand 43 also was to
receive a two-staged shelterwood cut and some overstory removal
and the target RBA was 60 ft. Stand 44 was to receive
intermediate thinning with a target RBA of 60 ft?.

17. In late January 2010, after cutting had begun, the county
forester visited the site with several other individuals including
Plum Creek’s forester, an FPR forester, and a forester from the
Vermont Land Trust to review the harvest’s progress. The county
forester expressed concern about the level of cutting in Stand 34.
Trees, which had been marked for retention, had been cut, and this
sight “raised alarm with everyone as it suggested excessive cutting
in disregard of the prescription.” Based on the observations of
cutting, all, including Plum Creek’s forester, were concerned about
the level of cutting and whether the proper outcome could be met
if logging continued. The county forester also observed several
violations of the Acceptable Management Practices (AMPs), which
are designed to protect water quality during logging operations.
The AMPs violations included the siting of equipment too close to
water, improper stream crossings, and mud and sediment where
equipment had crossed a stream. In response, Plum Creek’s
forester went to the home of the contracted logger and stopped all
cutting in Stand 34. Subsequently, Plum Creek worked to correct
the AMPs violations by removing the crossings and remediating the
sites deemed to be contrary to the AMPs.

2A shelterwood cut reduces the basal area to create the particular microclimate
conditions necessary to regenerate certain species within the stand.

202 |

18. In early February 2010, Plum Creek suspended the entire
harvest pending further investigation. Later that month, the
county forester visited the site again with two other state officials:
FPR’s forester in charge of AMPs compliance and the Agency of
Natural Resources (ANR) officer for AMPs enforcement. In a
letter to Plum Creek written shortly thereafter, the FPR forester
identified several additional AMPs violations involving erosion
controls, logging debris, stream crossings, seeding and mulching,
and protective strips along streams. The letter detailed the
necessary remediation measures and closed with the observation
that FPR’s intentions were to ensure remediation in a timely
manner and to educate Plum Creek’s logging operators so that
they could “implement proper practices in the future.”

19. In the course of additional site visits in March and April
2010, the county forester measured the RBA in the harvested
portions of the stands. The county forester issued an adverse-
inspection report identifying violations in Stands 34, 43, and 44
consisting of “cutting contrary to the approved forest management
plan,” as well as practices contrary to the AMPs. His cut contrary
finding was based on the following measurements. The county
forester calculated that the RBA for 91 harvested acres of the 137
acres in Stand 34 was 19.7 ft®, well below the prescription level of
30 to 40 ft®. He determined that the RBA for 40 harvested acres
in Stand 43 was 23.3 ft?, below the prescription target RBA of 60
ft®, and that the regeneration goal was not met with only 15% of
the plots stocked. In Stand 43, the county forester also found that.
the harvest had failed to meet the prescription’s tree-regeneration
goal, which called for a “Two Staged Shelterwood . . . and
Overstory Removal (OSR)” with the goal of “releas[ing] quality
growing stock and provid[ing] gaps to promote regeneration.” The
county forester determined that the RBA for the 8 harvested
acres in Stand 44 (out of a total of 37) was 16.3 ft®, again below
the prescription’s target level of 60 ft?.

110. Related to the AMPs violations, FPR’s forester for AMPs
compliance sent a letter to Plum Creek confirming that he had
inspected the sites of the previously identified AMPs violations
and had “observed that all of the major remedial actions relating
to the AMPs violations have been accomplished” and that Plum
Creek was now in compliance with the AMPs.

111. In May 2010, FPR informed Plum Creek that it had
forwarded the county forester’s report to PVR, see 3 VS.A.

§ 2289(a), with the recommendation “that the property be removed
from UVA for harvesting contrary to the management plan.” In
July 2010, PVR notified Plum Creek that, based on the adverse-
inspection report, its “entire parcel” had been removed from the
UVA program. Plum Creek appealed that decision to the PVR
Director pursuant to 32 V.S.A. §3758(a),? contesting removal of
the entire 56,604-acre tract from the program rather than the 470
acres that comprised the harvest area. Plum Creek also appealed
the adverse-inspection report to the Commissioner of FPR pur-
suant to 32 V.S.A. § 8758(d).

112. The FPR Commissioner provided an informal hearing at
which no evidence was taken and of which there is no transcript
or audio recording.* Plum Creek provided “remarks” by its lawyer
and two employees and also sent a written argument. Apparently,
the county forester also was present, although it is not clear that.
he provided any information in the presence of the Plum Creek
representatives.

113. The FPR Commissioner upheld the adverse-inspection re-
port, concluding that the cutting was contrary to the forest-
management plan. The Commissioner examined the evidence sup-
plied by the county forester and concluded that both the evidence
and the methodology were sound. The Commissioner found that the
data were collected appropriately and compliance was measured
according to the correct methodology. Plum Creek argued that
there were no grounds for the violation because harvesting was
suspended before the entire stand was cut. Plum Creek proffered
that if cutting had continued, then the final RBA for the entire
stand could have been in compliance. In the alternative, Plum

EAs the statute existed in 2010 when the appeal was taken, the aggrieved party
appealed from the PVR Director, who formally removed the property from the
UVA program, to the same Director, See 2007, No. 190 (Adj. Sess.), §4. The
statute now states that the appeal goes from the PVR Director to the Commis-
sioner of Taxes.

‘The statute provides no specificity on how the appeal is to be conducted. While
the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (APA) specifies procedures for many
types of administrative proceedings, its regulation is generally applicable only to
contested cases, see 3 V.S.A. $§ 809-813, which are defined as proceedings in which
“legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined
by an agency after an opportunity for hearing? id. §801(a)(2). There is no
requirement that the appeal to the Commissioner provided in $3758(d) be
determined after an opportunity for a hearing. Thus, the APA does not apply to
the appeal to the Commissioner, and this was an informal adjudication.

204 |

Creek asserted that if RBA was measured by averaging the treated
and untreated areas of the stands, it would meet the plan goals.

114. The Commissioner re, d these arguments. The Com-
missioner explained that it was not necessary to wait for the
entire stand to be cut before bringing a violation and that if only
a portion of the stand was cut, then compliance should be
measured by focusing on the harvested area. The Commissioner
acknowledged that the stand is the typical unit for measuring
RBA, but explained that focusing on the cut area of the stand was
in keeping with forestry practices. After a portion of the stand
was cut, this effectively created a new stand because the treated
and untreated portions had different distribution, composition, and
structure, and therefore the Commissioner concluded that it was
appropriate to evaluate them separately. The Commissioner clari-
fied that compliance with the prescription amendment was as-
sessed by looking at the qualitative attributes of the parcel and
not just by measuring stocking levels. Therefore, it would make no
sense to include the uncut portions of the stand in measuring
compliance because the goals of the prescription could not be met
in the untreated portion of the stand. For example, in Stand 34, a
shelterwood cut was prescribed. This was obviously not achieved in
the uncut area where no harvesting occurred. Further, the Com-
missioner found that the goal was not achieved in the cut area
where the RBA of 19.7 was essentially a commercial clear cut. The
Commissioner rejected Plum Creek’s assertion that these two could
be averaged to achieve a numerical RBA that would be within the
prescription goal. The Commissioner also upheld the AMPs viola-
tions, noting that they were observed in the field by all parties.

115. The FPR decision was reported to the Department of
Taxes. In March 2011, the PVR Director issued a decision on
Plum Creek’s appeal, upholding the decision to remove Plum
Creek’s entire parcel of 56,604 acres from the UVA program, and
levying an assessment of a land-use change tax in the amount of
$7,860.80.

116. Pursuant to 32 V.S.A. §3758(a) and (d), Plum Creek
appealed both administrative rulings to the superior court, which
consolidated them for review.’ Following pretrial briefing, the

® Because the Plum Greek tract lies in both Essex and Orleans counties, there
were actually four administrative rulings, two from each county. All of these
rulings were consolidated on appeal.

court held an evidentiary hearing over the course of several days
in May and June 2013.

117. Plum Creek presented testimony from a forestry expert,
Mr. Holleran, who testified that the cutting was in compliance
with the prescription amendment. Mr. Holleran is a forester, who
had assisted landowners in managing land that is in the UVA
program, but who had no prior involvement in the management of
Plum Creek’s land and acknowledged at trial that he had never
prepared a forest-management plan for a large landowner similar
to the type of plan used by Plum Creek. Mr. Holleran presented
evidence to advance the same argument Plum Creek made before
the Commissioner — that RBA targets were achieved if the RBA
was measured across both the treated and untreated portions of
each stand. He testified that this was the appropriate calculation
because the stand was the accepted unit of measure for RBA
compliance. He submitted four written analyses of the harvest
based upon several site visits in the fall of 2011 and 2012, and also
testified at length in support of his conclusion that the harvest.
was in compliance with the amended management plan and
forest-management standards.

118. The county forester also testified and described his
sampling method. He explained that the cut areas were not in
compliance with the forest-management plan either quantitatively
— because the measurements of RBA were well below the targets
set, or qualitatively — because the observation of the regrowth
and condition of the stand did not meet the expectations in the
prescription.

119. The court issued a written decision in January 2014. As to
the compliance with the forest-management plan, the trial court
framed the issue as an evidentiary question. The court explained
that measuring RBA was not within the exclusive expertise of
FPR because it is something that foresters do all the time;
therefore, the court determined it was free to decide the relative
credibility of each expert's method for how to measure RBA when
only part of the stand had been harvested. The court stated that
the county forester’s methodology “was not incorrect” and was
consistent with “manual standards.” Nonetheless, the court found
that Plum Creek’s expert provided superior evidence, which was
more credible than the state forester’s. The court thus adopted
Plum Creek’s expert’s view that RBA should be measured across
the entire stand and found, based on that expert’s calculations of

206 |

RBA in those areas, that the harvest was in compliance with the
forest-management plan. Consequently, the court concluded that.
the adverse-inspection report was not justified on this basis.

120. The court further found that, although several AMPs
violations were identified immediately after the harvest, they were
promptly remediated to the satisfaction of the FPR forester
responsible for AMPs compliance, and that there was no evidence
of any residual harmful effect on water quality. The court noted,
“There is no evidence that there was anything more than a few
temporary violations of the sort not uncommon in logging opera-
tions.” The court concluded that the adverse-inspection report was
not warranted based on these AMPs violations.

121. Because the decision by PVR to remove the tract from the
UVA program was predicated on the adverse-inspection report,
the court concluded that the Tax Department’s ruling must be
reversed as well. This appeal by the State followed.

II. Standard of Review

122. Hf The State first contends the superior court erred by
failing to accord sufficient deference to the methodology adopted
by FPR to determine compliance with the forest-management
plan. As a threshold matter, therefore, we consider whether the
court applied the correct standard of review. The question of the
appropriate standard of review is a legal one that we consider de
novo. In ve Soon Kwon, 2011 VT 26, 15, 189 Vt. 598, 19 Abd 139
(mem.).

Ml 123. The UVA statute provides that an appeal from FPR’s
decision to the superior court is to be in “the same manner and
under the same procedures” as a property tax appeal. 32 V.S.A.
§3758(d). Those appeals are filed pursuant to Rule of Civil
Procedure 74,° and are de novo. 32 V.S.A. §§ 4461(a), 4467.7

Rule 74 also specifically provides that the rules of civil procedure “shall govern
proceedings” in the superior court. VIR.CP. 74(g). In a departure from Rule 74(e),
however, which anthorizes trial by jury on “falny question as to which there is a
right to trial by jury,” the statute provides that tax appeals to the superior court
“shall be heard without a jury” 32 VS.A. § 4461(a).

7 The dissent claims that the standard of review is misidentified, but the dissent
largely agrees with the standard articulated here. Review is de novo in the trial
court. We emphasize, as we have done in the past in the context of property tax
appeals, that although the appeal is de novo this does not mean that the trial court
“ultimately owes no deference to the decision of the administrative agency.”

124. I This Court established the proper standard of review for
appeals to the superior court from an FPR current-use decision in
Jones x Department of Forest, Parks & Recreation, 2004 VT 49,
177 Vt. 81, 857 A2d 271. In that case, we explained that factual
findings are reviewed for “clear error,’ but “substantial deference”
is given to FPR’s determinations within its “area of expertise.” Id.
17. Thus, FPR’s decision as to a violation should be upheld unless
“the Department’s finding of a violation . . . was standardless,
unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to law.” Id. 114.

125. The basic framework for the standard of review is not
altered simply because in this case there was a de novo
evidentiary hearing in the superior court. Because the superior
court has conducted a de novo hearing, as factfinder, the court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. As to questions of
policy, however, agency determinations regarding the proper inter-
pretation of policy or methodology within the agency’s expertise are
entitled to deference, even where there is a de novo hearing in
the superior court. ANR Permits, 2014 VT 50, 191 15-16. “[D]eci-
sions made within the expertise of such agencies are presumed
correct, valid and reasonable.” Jd. 1115 (quotation omitted).

126. The critical inquiry is in determining whether an issue
involves a question of fact, subject to the superior court’s discre-
tion as factfinder, or whether it is a matter of policy or method-
ology within the agency’s area of expertise. Four major issues
with respect to timber harvesting were contested before the
superior court: (1) whether compliance should be measured across
the stand as a whole or over only the cut-specific areas; (2) the
numerical RBA measurements in the substand areas; (8) whether

Mollica x Div: of Prop. Valuation & Review, 2008 VT 60, 18, 184 Vt. 88, 955 A2d
L171; see In re ANR Permits in Lowell Mountain Wind Project, 2014 VT 50,
$1.9-17, 196 Vt. 467, 98 Ad 16 (explaining that even though review was de novo
to public service board, board was still required to defer to agency's interpretation
of matters within its area of expertise). Even in the context of de novo review, a
court must still defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a matter
within its “legislatively delegated expertise” Mollica, 2008 VT 60, 19.

‘The true point of divergence between this decision and the dissent is whether
the critical question on appeal is an area within the agency’s expertise to which the
trial court must defer or a factual determination for the trial court to decide.
Because the key inquiry depends on the “proper methodology for implementing a
statute” within the purview of FPR, the agency’s interpretation is accorded
deference. See Town of Killington x Dep't of Taxes, 2003 VT 88, 115, 176 Vt. 70,
838 A.2d 91

208 |

tree-regeneration measurements should be taken three years after
the harvest or immediately after the harvest; and (4) whether a
box on a map of Stand 43, labeled “OSR” for overstory removal,
meant that OSR could occur only in the box area.

127. We need not go beyond the first issue to resolve this
appeal because although the experts’ calculations of RBA in the
harvested portions of the stands differed, both measured the RBA
in those areas below the target levels. The measurements of the
two experts are summarized in the following chart:

Stand [Area |Area [Basal ]Tar- | State Plum Plum

Number | of Cut |Area ]get | Forester | Creek Creek
Stand |Con- |Prior }RBA |Calcula- }Calcula- |Calcula-
(acres)| trary | to (ft?) |tion of |tion of tion of

(acres) | Log- RBA in |RBA in ]RBA
ging Cut Cut Area} Across
(f) Area | (f°) Entire
(f°) Stand
(ft?)
34 137 [90.91 [82 [30-40[19.7 28.5 474
43 115 | 40.15 [88 60 23.3 53.1 73.5

44 37 8.47 197 60 16.3 36 107

Thus, the main difference in their opinions of whether a violation
occurred was the proper methodology for calculating RBA. Plum
Creek’s expert testified that the stand was the unit of measure-
ment and therefore RBA should be measured across the entire
stand, regardless of whether the entire stand had been harvested.
In keeping with the methodology adopted by the FPR Commis-
sioner, the county forester measured RBA by looking solely at the
harvested area of each stand.

128. J The superior court viewed the question of how RBA
should be measured for purposes of determining compliance with
the forest-management plan as a question of fact, not an area of
agency expertise entitled to deference, and compared the relative
credibility of the experts to determine how to measure compliance.
As explained more fully below, this was error. FPR’s decision on
the methodology for determining compliance was entitled to
deference, and Plum Creek had the burden to show it was
“‘vholly irrational and unreasonable in relation to its intended
purpose?” ANR Permits, 2014 VT 50, 117 (quoting Town of
Killington, 2003 VT 88, 16).

129. JEP Like other cases where this Court has applied a
deferential standard of review to an agency decision, in this case,
deference is due because the methodology for determining com-
pliance is an area over which FPR has broad statutory authority
and the relevant expertise. See id. 1 16 (explaining that agency is
entitled to deference where decision is within agency’s area of
expertise and within statutory authorization); In re Williston Inn
Grp., 2008 VT 47, 913, 183 Vt. 621, 949 A2d 1073 (mem.)
(explaining that where Legislature entrusts implementation of
statute to agency, this Court gives deference to agency’s inter-
pretation of those laws). The statutory scheme underpinning the
current-use program contains the standards to be applied to all
UV<A-enrolled land and highlights the importance of oversight by
FPR. FPR is entrusted with the authority both to set standards
for acceptable forest management and to enforce compliance with
those standards. See 32 V.S.A. § 3752(9)(B)(iii) (defining “managed
forestland” as property that is managed in accordance with
standards established by FPR); id. § 3755(¢) (entrusting FPR with
power to determine if “management of the tract is contrary to the
conservation or forest management plan” and to issue inspection
report if it so finds). Consequently, FPR is entitled to deference
in determining how to measure compliance. This is exactly what
this Court recognized in Jones, 2004 VT 49, 114 (giving deference
to FPR on decision regarding violation of forest-management
plan).

130. IH The superior court in essence determined that Plum
Creek’s methodology was better than FPR’s. This is not the role
of the court. “We have cautioned that courts are not ‘a higher
environmental agency entrusted with the power to make environ-
mental law and policy, but rather exercise a ‘narrow role in
ensuring that the decisions of ANR are made in accordance with
law?” Id. 1 14. Where there are questions about “complicated
methodologies within an agency’s expertise” a reviewing court,
even in the context of a de novo hearing, must give deference to
the agency’s decision. ANR Permits, 2014 VT 50, 116.

131. HM In assessing the validity of FPR’s violation, the trial
court and this Court on appeal must give deference to FPR’s
methodology. This does not mean that FPR’s decisions will be
rubber-stamped, but deference is accorded. “Absent a clear and
convincing showing to the contrary, decisions made within the

210 |

expertise of such agencies are presumed correct, valid and rea-
sonable.” In re Johnston, 145 Vt. 318, 322, 488 A.2d 750, 752
(1985). Review is limited to whether there was a “reasonable
basis” for the agency action. Id.; see In re DeCato Bros. Inc., 149
Vt. 493, 496, 546 A.2d 1354, 1356 (1988) (explaining that agency
decision must meet minimum standard of reasonableness).

III. Measurement of Compliance

132. In light of this standard of review, we turn to the question
of whether the Commissioner’s decision on methodology had a
reasonable basis sufficient to satisfy review.

133. The Commissioner provided the following reasons for
adopting a policy of determining compliance by limiting the
calculation of RBA to the area that had been harvested.* The
Commissioner acknowledged that the typical unit for forest man-
agement is the stand, but concluded that where areas of the stand
receive different treatment a new stand may be created. The
Commissioner explained:

Although the unit of measure for forest management
purposes and UVA is the “stand,” management can alter
the unit enough to create different stands. As a “stand”
is a contiguous group of trees sufficiently uniform in
age-class distribution, composition and structure, and
growing on a site of sufficiently uniform quality, to be a
distinguishable unit, the harvesting in stand 34 has

®The dissent repeatedly comes back to the fact that cutting was halted partway
through and laments that there would be no conflict about how to measure RBA
“if the timber harvesting was completed in the three stands” Post, 1 125,
Obviously, if entting had been completed, then the issue of whether to measure
RBA in the entire stand or just in the cut portion would not exist. The fact is that
cutting did cease. The dissent sees this as an injustice to Plum Creek, and places
blame on the State for declaring a violation before the harvest was completed. The
dissent accuses the majority of appellate factfinding on the issue. There is no need
to engage in appellate faetfinding. To the extent that it is relevant, the court made
sufficient findings on the issue. The trial court found, based on the evidence
presented, that it was Plum Creek’s forester that initially told the logger to cease
cutting based on the forester’s own concern about the level of cutting he observed
during the site visit in late January. Whether Plum Creek then continued to
suspend cutting voluntarily or felt compelled by concerns expressed by ANR and
FPR is not relevant. Plum Creek did not claim compliance based on future cutting;
rather, it based compliance with the prescription on the fact that the RBA, if
averaged between the eut and uncut portions of the stand, was within the goals
set,

created two separate stands as that area harvested has a
very different age-class distribution, composition and
structure now compared to that area left untreated. They
are no longer the same stand; therefore, they should be
sampled and evaluated separately.

In other words, because part of the stand had been cut while the
remaining acres were left untouched after cutting was halted, the
Commissioner determined that the cut areas should no longer be
considered part of the existing larger stand and should be
evaluated separately from the uncut areas.

134. Moreover, the Commissioner explained that averaging the
basal area of the logged and unlogged portions did not portray an
accurate picture of whether the goals and objectives of the
prescription were met. This assessment is well illustrated by
Stand 34, for which the prescription called for a shelterwood cut
to target sugar maple and yellow birch with large crowns for
retention, and set a target RBA of thirty to forty. The Commis-
sioner explained that the purpose of the cut was to create the
correct light levels and soil moisture on the ground to promote
seed germination and seedling establishment. The Commissioner
explained just looking at an average of the stocking level across
the untreated and treated portions of the stand produced an
inaccurate picture of whether this goal was met. As the Commis-
sioner stated, “The notion that the goals and objectives of the
shelterwood treatment were met by considering shade from trees
over a kilometer away (in the uncut portion of the stand) as
providing the necessary microenvironmental condition is a misap-
plication and a complete misunderstanding of the principle of the

silvicultural practice.”®

° The dissent dismisses this concern and asserts that Plum Creek never intended
to harvest only part of the stand and its position “has always been that the harvest
could not be judged in midstream and should have continued to its end.” Post,
41 126. It has not “always” been Plum Creek’s position that the harvest should
continue; Plum Creek voluntarily chose to stop the harvest based on an assessment
by its own forester that the logger was not following its directions. Further, Plum
Greek did not base its alleged compliance with the prescription goals on a
continued cutting plan but alleged it complied with the preseription goals if the
RBA was calculated by averaging the cut and uncut portions of the stand. Plum
Creek’s own expert in the superior court testified that if the entire stand had been
cut in the same manner as the already harvested portion, it would have been out
of compliance.

212 |

135. [We conclude that the Commissioner’s decision to
determine violations by measuring compliance, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, solely in the cut area of the stand was reason-
able, and not “standardless, unsupported by the evidence, or
contrary to law.” Jones, 2004 VT 49, 1114.

136. First, it is a method that promotes the overall policy of
the UVA program, which is to maintain productive forestland and
to prevent accelerated use. 32 V.S.A. § 3751. If RBA for purposes
of compliance could be measured by averaging harvested and
unharvested portions of a stand, then cutting, which offends the
protection and proper use purposes, could not be prevented
because it could still technically comply with numerical prescribed
RBA targets. For example, if a prescription provides for a
shelterwood cut and sets a moderate RBA target, then the target.
RBA could be met by clear cutting half of the stand and leaving
the other half fully forested and untreated. While numerically this
would meet the prescribed RBA under Plum Creek’s methodology,
it certainly would not protect forestland or prevent accelerated
use. Id. It also would not achieve the qualitative goals of the
shelterwood prescription necessary for the desired tree growth.

137. Second, restricting measurement to areas already har-
vested is logical. RBA is a measure of the residual basal area in
a stand, which by definition refers to the basal area left after
harvest. It is simply not logical to purport to measure RBA in an
untreated, unharvested area.

138. Third, measuring compliance in the cut areas allows for
more effective oversight by FPR. If a violation cannot be based
solely on observations and measurements taken in the portion of
the stand already harvested, then FPR will have to wait for an
entire stand to be cut contrary before bringing a violation. For
large stands, this could have drastic consequences. Plum Creek’s
expert recognized in this case that if the harvest in Stand 34 had
continued in the rest of the stand in the same manner, the entire
stand would have been out of compliance. Surely, FPR was not
required to wait for those additional forty acres to be clear cut
before bringing a violation.’

139. Fourth, it is a method consistently used. As the Commis-
sioner noted, this is how other violations have been calculated.

1 Especially in a situation like this where Plum Creek voluntarily ceased cutting,
FPR should not have to wait indefinitely to see if and when the landowner will
continue cutting before bringing a violation

Indeed, it is wholly in keeping with our decision in Jones, in
which this Court determined that FPR acted within its discretion
in limiting its analysis of whether a violation occurred to the
portion of the stand that was cut. 2004 VT 49, 1118.

140. There is no merit to the trial court’s concern that because
basal area is generally measured across a stand, a landowner
would not be on notice that a violation could be brought for
overcutting in one area of the stand. The landowner is on notice
that the harvest prescription must be met — both qualitatively
and quantitatively — ac the entire stand. Further, as demon-
strated by Jones and the record in this case, FPR has previously
determined compliance by measuring RBA solely in cut portions
of the stand.

141. Plum Creek failed to demonstrate that the Commissioner’s
methodology was “wholly irrational and unreasonable in relation
to [the UVA statute’s] intended purpose.” ANR Permits, 2014 VT
50, 117 (quotation omitted). Plum Creek’s expert’s explanation for
why he took the measurement across the entire stand was simply
that “the stand is the unit of measure for forest management.” He
did not provide an explanation of why this was appropriate for a
stand that had been only partially treated. He did not provide a
clear answer as to whether a landowner could be in compliance
with a forest-management plan by clearcutting half of a stand and
leaving half of the stand untouched to reach a particular numeri-
cal RBA average. In fact, he failed to explain how he could be
assured that once cutting was resumed in the areas not yet cut
that the stand would still be in compliance with the prescription.

142. For example, he testified that if the remaining uncut
portion of Stand 34 was harvested to a density of 60, then even
taking the county forester’s measurement of 19.7 for the cut
portion, the entire stand would still be within the prescription of
30 to 40 RBA. There was no assurance, however, that such density
would be achieved in the remaining portion and there was no
evidence that cutting the remaining portion of Stand 34 to a
density of 60 would achieve the goals of the prescription by
creating the necessary microclimate conditions on the ground. In
response to the question of whether two stands had been created
by the cutting, Plum Creek’s expert answered “that’s a compli-
cated question.” He acknowledged that that could happen, but felt
that for evaluating the prescription, the measurement should be
made for the entire stand. While this may be true if the entire

214 Le

stand had received the same treatment, FPR provided reasonable
and logical reasons why RBA should be calculated based solely on
the part of the stand that had already been cut.

143. Further, that FPR’s methodology in limiting its assess-
ment to the cut area was a logical and reasonable measurement.
of whether the prescription plan had been followed was acknowl-
edged by Plum Creek’s expert to some degree. In response to the
question of whether the goal of treatment for Stand 44 was met
qualitatively, he answered that the prescription was met only in
the harvested area. This is logical because obviously the conditions
in the uncut areas were unchanged and therefore could not have
met the goals of the cut. It also creates, however, an inconsistency
in the evaluation method used by Plum Creek’s expert. If the
qualitative assessment of whether the forest-management plan was
met must be limited to the area cut, then how can the quantitative
assessment include the entire stand? FPR’s decision to limit both
its qualitative and quantitative assessments to the cut areas was
both consistent and reasonable.

144. Given that both experts calculated the RBA in the cut
areas of Stands 34, 43, and 44 below the targets set in the
forest-management plan, we conclude that this failure to meet the
targets was an adequate basis for issuing the adverse-inspection
report, and therefore that the trial court erred in reversing it.

IV. AMPs Violations

145. In addition to a finding that the stands were cut contrary
to the forest-management plan, the adverse-inspection report was
also based on findings that Plum Creek failed to implement
AMPs. The Commissioner upheld the adverse-inspection report in
both respects. The trial court concluded that there was no
violation of the forest-management plan and that the AMPs
violations were insufficient on their own to justify an adverse-
inspection report. The court found that — although “there were
[AMPs] violations” — there was “no evidence that [they were]
anything more than a few temporary violations of the sort not
uncommon in logging operations”; that there was “no evidence” of
any residual “detrimental impact on water quality of the type the
AMPs are designed to prevent, despite the violatio and that
there was also no evidence of residual “harm to . . . wildlife or soil
erosion.” The court noted, in this regard, that the FPR forester
overseeing AMPs compliance determined that Plum Creek had

ee "

remediated the violations within a few months of their discovery,
and that the ANR official in charge of AMPs enforcement
undertook no enforcement action.

146. On appeal, the State argues that the superior court’s
finding that Plum Creek violated several of the AMPs protecting
water quality compelled affirmance of the Commissioner’s dec
upholding the adverse-inspection report. Having concluded that.
the adverse-inspection report was warranted based on Plum
Creek’s violations of the forest-management plan, we need not and
do not reach the question of whether the AMPs violations would
have provided a sufficient independent basis to issue an adverse-
inspection report.

V. Conclusion

147. In sum, we reverse the superior court and reinstate the
adverse-inspection report as upheld by the FPR Commissioner.
We remand to the superior court to consider the questions raised
in Plum Creek’s appeal of the PVR Director’s decision removing
land from the UVA program and leveling a tax assessment against
Plum Creek.

Reversed and remanded.

148. Dooley, J., dissenting. On January 15, 2010, the Vermont
Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation (FPR) approved
logging on land owned by Plum Creek pursuant to a plan drafted
and submitted by Plum Creek. Logging apparently proceeded
quickly because on January 26, 2010, the staff forester of Plum
Creek, the FPR county forester, along with others, visited a
harvest of trees on part of Plum Creek’s forestland. The date of
the visit was apparently arranged so that all could attend and the
logging would be in progress; there was no significance to how
much of the harvest had been completed, how much was left to
complete or where in the forest the contract loggers were
working. The site visit was to three “stands,” defined and mapped
out areas of the forest. A majority of the harvest had already
occurred on two stands, while only 20% of the area in the third
stand had been logged, although tl ind was much smaller than
the other two. During the site visit the FPR county forester
indicated that he believed that the areas he saw were being “cut
contrary,” that is, contrary to the plan Plum Creek submitted and
FPR approved.

216 |

149. At that point, all logging work stopped. The forestland in
the three stands became the equivalent of a “crime scene.” Over
time, the county forester went back and took measurements of
what had been cut in relation to the specifications in the plan. On
April 26, he issued an adverse-inspection report recommending that
Plum Creek be terminated from the current-use program. The FPR
Commissioner accepted the recommendation, and this controversy
unfolded. Plum Creek hired a professional forester to independently
evaluate the state of the forest and the allegations of the county
forester. Part of the evaluation was to measure regeneration three
years after the harvest was terminated. The case proceeded to trial
in the superior court, and the court took a view of the stands in the
condition they were when logging stopped. Plum Creek took many
pictures of the forest at that time, many of which were introduced
into evidence. As far as the record before us discloses, the land and
forest in controversy is in exactly the same state today as when the
site visit occurred over six years ago.

150. I start with this short story to make three points to which
I will return. First, the amount of the land that had been logged
has no significance, other than that it was frozen at the time of
the site visit. The timeline shows, however, that the entire harvest.
would have been over in a matter of days if it had been allowed
to run its course. Second, no one has claimed that Plum Creek did
anything illegal, whoever one might believe in this controversy, so
my comparison to a “crime scene” is a purely hypothetical one.‘t
The sole issue is whether Plum Creek complied with its plan and
whether, as a result, it can receive the substantial monetary
benefit of the enrollment of 56,604 acres of forestland in the
current-use program.” Third, Plum Creek’s decision to stop the

“The State alleged that Plum Creek had violated the Acceptable Management
Practices (AMPs) for Maintaining Water Quality on Logging Jobs by a number of
actions. The alleged violations were corrected shortly after they were identified.
The AMPs violations were one of the grounds for the termination of Plum Creek
from the current-use program and could have been grounds for the State to seek
civil penalties in an enforcement action. It did not do so and, in fact, certified that
Plum Creek was in compliance with the AMPs. Neither the majority nor this
dissent has considered the AMPs compliance issue, except as stated in infra,
‘1 126-132, to explain why Plum Creek was prevented by FPR from finishing the
harvest.

1 Although the alleged improper conduet affected only a few hundred acres of
land, all contiguous land owned by Plum Creek was removed from the current-use

harvest was required by the county forester’s declaration that
Plum Creek had violated its plan and the AMPs requirements, the
prospect. of civil penalties and criminal liability for violating the
AMPs requirements, the prospect that all its land would be
removed from the current-use program, and most important a
subsequent specific direction of FPR. The majority disagrees with
this point, as shown by its three footnotes on the issue — ante,
nn. 8, 9 and 10 — and is acknowledging through these footnotes
that the point is central to its rationale. Accordingly, I have added
a separate section at the end of the dissent summarizing the facts
that show why the majority’s conclusion is wrong. See infra,
4 121-134. If Plum Creek had completed the harvest it would
have had no evidence of the state of the harvest at the time of the
forester’s declaration, evidence that became critical in the defense
of this case.

151. My disagreements with the majority are deep and exten-
sive and take many pages to fully explain. There are, however,
three other points to which I will return on numerous occasions,
and I summarize them here as a road map through this dissent.
First, by statute, the standard for judicial review in this case is de
novo, a standard that by definition provides the broadest and most.
extensive judicial review of administrative action. While the ma-
jority has paid lip service to that standard, it has actually
employed the narrowest and most agency-deferential standard of
review possible, turning the statutory standard into its opposite. If
the standard of review were applied the way it is written, the
superior court decision would be affirmed. In In re Town of
Sherburne, we recognized in regard to the standard for review of

administrative action that courts have a tendency to recite “‘a

program. Although the exact financial impact of the decision is not of record, it is
alleged to be well in excess of one million dollars

18 The majority finds significant that Plum Creek “voluntarily ceased entting” when
concerns were raised. Ante, 1 38 n.10. I find significant that the county forester
never stated that Plum Creek should complete its harvest and the forester would
jndge compliance based on the completed harvest. Also important is that FPR
withdrew its approval for the harvest and only accepted that Plum Creek had
resolved the AMPs issues after the termination decision was made. Despite Plum
Creek’s immediate letter indicating how it would proceed forward in compliance
with the plan and to resolve the AMPs issues, the forester went forward with the
termination action in this case and never answered the letter. If there was an
attempt to settle this controversy, the evidence lies in the administrative record
that was never disclosed.

218 |

batch of verbiage and then pay[ | no attention to what it has said
in determining what to do?” 154 Vt. 596, 607, 581 A.2d 274, 280
(1990) (quoting 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29:27, at
456-57 (2d ed. 1984)). This is exactly what the majority has done
here.

152. Second, the majority has reversed the decision of the trial
court, without a remand, holding that as a matter of law the
agency must prevail. At best, this would be an unusual and
exceptional action, particularly after four days of trial and exten-
sive evidence and findings of fact, none of which are found to be
erroneous. If the trial court employed the wrong standard of
review, the remedy is to remand the matter to the trial court to
apply the right standard in light of the evidence and findings of
fact. After reading the majority opinion, it is difficult to see what
the purpose of the trial was or whether Plum Creek’s extensive
evidence could even be considered. Indeed, it is hard to under-
stand the purpose of judicial review at all.

153. Third, the sole question on which this case turns is
whether Plum Creek violated a timber-harvesting plan that it
drafted and the agency approved. I have attached the plan to this
dissent. The superior court found that Plum Creek did not violate
the plan. The State claims it did but does not identify the
language in the plan it says was violated. The majority adopts the
theory of the State because the State’s interpretation of the plan
is entitled to deference, again with no specific identification of the
requirement in the plan that was violated. The result is that the
State is entitled to create plan requirements as it goes along, with
no advance notice to a landowner and no inclusion of the
requirement in the plan document.

154. Having identified these recurring points, I agree with the
majority that proper identification of the standard of review that
governs the superior court’s review of the decision of FPR to
terminate Plum Creek from the current-use program is important,
and much of this dissent is about the proper standard of review.

155. For an instant in its opinion, the majority acknowledges
that the Legislature has established the standard of review of the
administrative decision for this case as de novo. The leading
treatise on administrative law states the “meaning of the de novo
standard” as follows:

This standard tells a court to affirm the agency only if
it agrees with the administrative conclusion either as to

the entire administrative decision or some part of it. If
the court does not agree, the court is instructed to
substitute its own judgment.

C. Koch & R. Murphy, Administrative Law and Practice § 9.22[1]
(3d ed. 2016).

156. This is exactly the meaning of de novo review that our
decisions reflect. For example, in Town of Victory uv State, we
rejected the application of de novo review in the absence of a
legislative direction to use it because “[d]e novo review, whereby
the superior court would simply substitute its judgment for that
of the director, necessarily usurps power delegated to the execu-
tive branch; therefore that standard is inappropriate unless the
statute expressly so provides.” 2004 VT 110, 1116, 177 Vt. 383, 865
A.2d 373 (emphasis added). As I discuss below, de novo review
here means that judicial review is not based on the agency record;
indeed, it could not be here because there is virtually no record.
I recognize that we have adopted a presumption against de novo
review when the review statute does not provide for it. Where, as
here, the Legislature expressly provides for it, we must follow the
legislative direction.

157. Instead of implementing this standard of review, the
majority has adopted its own standard, unsupported by the
governing statute, which is exactly the standard of review that we
would adopt if de novo review was not commanded by the
Legislature. Indeed, it is exactly the opposite standard of review,
as narrow and limited as exists anywhere in our law. In doing so,
it has emasculated judicial review, overturning a trial decision
based on four days of trial without deciding that any of the
findings of fact of the trial court are erroneous and without a
remand for factfinding under what it views is the correct standard
of review.

158. This is a case where under neutral standards, de novo
review would be appropriate even if the Legislature was silent on
the nature of review. There is no factual development in the
administrative agency: Plum Creek was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing before the FPR Commissioner; the Commis-
sioner did not offer an evidentiary hearing; and, most importantly,
this is not a decision where agency expertise is central. The
administrative record is virtually nonexistent, consisting of the
county forester’s violation determination, the Commissioner’s de-

220 Le

cision, and Plum Creek’s filings in opposition to the termination
decision. This is a pure adjudicatory case with little or no policy
issues. The fundamental issue in this case is what the plan drafted
by Plum Creek means — the agency was not interpreting and
applying a statute, regulation, or even a policy. Plum Creek is
essentially charged with breaching its permit application; in
comparable situations, the agency does not get particular defer-
ence in that decision.

159. The majority has adopted a standard of extreme deference
that makes the administrative decision controlling with no mean-
ingful opportunity to contest it. Even if such deference were ever
appropriate where the Legislature adopts de novo review, it is
totally inappropriate in the case before us. As the trial court
concluded, this level of deference allows the agency to create new
rules as it goes along where the rules should be set in the
controlling documents.

160. Finally, it is clear from the way that the majority has
written its decision that it believes that the only right answer to
the circumstances before the court is that provided by the State
and that Plum Creek is relying on a technicality to avoid its just
consequences. In fact, the evidence before the trial court showed
many possible rationales, not built on technicalities, on which to
resolve the conflict, and Plum Creek’s explanation for what it did,
as accepted by the trial court, was reasonable. The short answer
to the majority’s factual assertions is that the case was tried by
a very experienced trial judge who made detailed and thorough
findings of fact and conclusions based on them, which should be
respected rather than rejected out of hand. I will address each of
these points below.

I. This Was a Pure Adjudicatory Proceeding Based on
Whether or Not Plum Creek Complied with Requirements
Contained in Two Documents, and the Evidence and Findings
Show It Did Comply

161. To be eligible for the current-use or Use Value Appraisal
(UVA) program, forestland must be “under active long-term forest
management . . . in accordance with minimum ptable stan-
dards for forest management.” 32 V.S.A. §3752(9)(A). “Minimum
acceptable standards for forest management” are defined, in turn,
as “refer[ring] to certain standards established by the Commis-

sioner of Forests, Parks and Recreation.” Jd. § 3752(13). Eligibility
also generally requires compliance with “the regulations adopted
by the [Current Use Advisory] Board.” Id. § 3755(a); see id. § 3753
(establishing Current Use Advisory Board). Comprised of the
Commissioner of Taxes, the FPR Commissioner, the Director of
the Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR), members of
the private agricultural and forestry sectors, and local government.
representatives, id. § 3753(b), the Board has several legislatively
defined duties: to periodically review the criteria for enrollment in
the UVA program, recommend changes and improvements, and
adopt rules to carry out its statutory goals. Id. § 3754(a), (©). The
UVA Program Manual adopted by the Board sets forth minimum
standards for forest-management plans, minimum standards for
forest management and regeneration, standard forms for use by
landowners enrolled in the program, and appendices containing
additional guidance for foresters and landowners.

162. If any of the above statutes, rules, or policies were
involved in this case, the FPR Commissioner would be entitled to
substantial deference in interpreting them, a point discussed
below. The Commissioner did not conclude, however, that Plum
Creek violated any of those statutes, rules, or policies. Instead,
the FPR Commissioner concluded that Plum Creek violated a
timber-harvesting plan that Plum Creek itself drafted. No policy
is involved in determining whether the plan was violated. I would
accept that a decision to reject a plan would involve policy, and
that decision would be based on agency expertise. But once the
plan is accepted, the only relevant determination is whether the
plan was violated.

163. Forestland is eligible for the UVA program if the land-
owner prepares and submits a ten-year forest-management. plan
and it is approved by FPR. Id. § 3755(b)(1)(C). In this case, Plum
Creek had such a plan prepared by the company that owned the
land before Plum Creek. The plan specified that when Plum
Creek was to engage in timber harvesting, it was required by the
plan to seek and have approved a plan amendment for each
“stand” in which the harvesting would occur. These amendments
are known as prescriptions, and Plum Creek prepared one and
had it approved for each of the three stands involved in this case.
The prescriptions are prepared on forms supplied by FPR and
are very short documents. I have attached the relevant content of

222 |

these documents to this dissent in an appendix; the content takes
up less than two pages. Thus, the decision to remove the land had
to be based on a conclusion that Plum Creek’s timber harvesting
violated either the ten-year management plan or the relevant
prescription; in this case it was based entirely on the prescrip-
tions. These documents were drafted by the landowner, not the
agency. See Vt. Dep’t of Forests, Parks and Recreation, Use Value
of Forestland in Vermont at 2 (Feb. 1, 2006) (“County foresters
who are employed by the State do not write use value plans.
Their role is to advise landowners and consulting foresters, review
and approve management plans . . . and to conduct on-site
monitoring.”). They are essentially applications for a permit, and
the controlling question is whether Plum Creek did what it said
it would do in its application.

164. To a great degree the dispute has centered on cutting in
Stand 34 and a rationale that pervades the decisions with respect
to each of the stands — that the extent of cutting had to be even
across the stand so the remaining forest after cutting would be
the same throughout the stand. The Commissioner’s decision
focused on this stand and this rationale, and the majority decision
has almost exclusively focused on it. The trial court found that the
residual basal area (RBA) in the cut portion of Stand 34 was 28.5,
only a small amount below the lower specification in the minimum
prescription RBA of 30 to 40, and that the RBA for the whole
stand was 47.4.'4 In his two-page adverse-inspection report, the
county forester included three short sentences describing the
violation in Stand 34:

Stand has been cut contrary to prescribed silvaculture.
Stand inventoried on 2/10/2010 and 2/12/2010. Residual
basal area across 90.91 acres of the stand reduced to 19.7
square feet (86 inventory points with 2.63 standard
error).

165. The Commissioner gave three reasons why Plum Creek
had violated its Forest Management Plan for this stand:

[1] There was no indication that the cutting plan would
have been modified had the sale reached completion. In

“Basal Area (BA) “is a measure of forest density based on the square footage of
trees per acre” Jones u Dept of Forests, Parks & Recreation, 2004 VT 49, 110,
177 Vt. 81, 857 A2d 271

fact, Plum Creek’s forester stated that the logger was
not following their directions. The determination of “cut
contrary” was based upon those acres cut to date,
similar to any other violation that the state has pursued
in the past.

[2] Although the unit of measure for forest management.
purposes and UVA is the “stand,” management can alter
the unit enough to create different stands. As a “stand”
is a contiguous group of trees sufficiently uniform in
age-class distribution, composition and structure, and
growing on a site of sufficiently uniform quality, to be a
distinguishable unit, the harvesting in stand 34 has
created two separate stands as that area harvested has a
very different age-class distribution, composition and
structure now compared to that area left untreated. They
are no longer the same stand; therefore, they should be
sampled and evaluated separately.

[3] The basis for the shelterwood method as a method of
regeneration is that it creates a moderated microenviron-
ment that promotes seed germination and seeding estab-
lishment as it elevates light levels near the ground and
red the withdrawal of soil moisture. To create this
icroenvironment, the application of the method involves
leaving a residual overstory of large crowned, seed
bearing trees that are uniformly distributed over the area
of the new stand. The notion that the goals and objec-
tives of the shelterwood treatment were met by consid-
ering shade from trees over a kilometer away (in the
uncut portion of the stand) as providing the necessary
microenvironmental condition is a misapplication and a
complete misunderstanding of the principle of the silvi-
culture practice. The residual basal area of 19.7 square
feet is considered a commercial clear cut. Additionally,
the residual trees comprising this basal area are at best
intermediate stems in the 10 to 12 inch diameter class
that lack the crown size necessary to provide the shading
conditions even if the desired residual basal area target
was met. Plum Creek’s prescription should not be nar-
rowly interpreted to just stocking levels. Recommenda-

224 |

tions were presented relating to what would be removed
(at-risk mature stems) and what would remain (sugar
maples and yellow birch with large crowns, quality grow-
ing stock).

(Emphasis added.) E: t for the one reference to the plan in the
third reason, the decision makes no reference to the content of
Plum Creek’s plan. Thus, to determine whether Plum Creek
violated the plan, the superior court and this Court have to
independently examine the plan language in comparison to the
rationale.

166. The Plum Creek plan is contained in the appendix to this
opinion. The plan says Stand 34 has 137 acres. There is no
mention in the plan of an even distribution of trees. Indeed, it
says “(t]he understory varies greatly in stocking of acceptable
regeneration.” It says that “the majority of the overstory is
unacceptable growing stock.” It says “the shelterwood will be
irregular in distribution.”

167. The first and second grounds for the decision to terminate
Plum Creek from the current-use program are inconsistent and
unsupported by any record evidence that the Commissioner had
even at the time of rendering the decision.’® Under any standard
of review, termination based on these rationales could not be
sustained.

168. The first rationale states that “[t]here was no indication
that the cutting plan would have been modified had the sale
reached completion.” In fact, the Plum Creek manager responsible
for the tract sent a letter to the FPR county forester explaining
that the timber harvesting contractor had violated Plum Creek’s
instruction in a number of respects and outlining how the
harvesting would be done in the rest of the stand to stay within
the prescription overall. The letter was admitted into evidence as
exhibit 27. It is uncontroverted and directly contradicts the
Commissioner’s assertions.

169. Even if the contrary evidence did not exist, it is important
to state that there is nothing in Plum Creek’s plan to suggest that
the RBA measurement was to be made in the part of the stand
that happened to have been “treated” when the county forester

3 As I discuss infra, 19 91-93, we have no way of knowing what information the
Commissioner actually had because there is no record of the inputs to the
Commissioner’s decision except for the county forester’s determination.

appeared for an observation visit. Thus, there was no obligation
for Plum Creek staff to give an “indication” they would proceed
differently in the remainder of the harvest as long as they met.
the RBA requirement at the end. Finally, it was irrelevant how
FPR had pursued alleged violations in the past. If it wanted the
timber harvesting to meet the minimum RBA requirements at all
times during the harvest, it should have directed Plum Creek to
put that standard in the plan.

170. The second rationale is even weaker. It is based on the
premise that Plum Creek — “management” in the Commissioner’s
phrasing — had no intention of finishing its harvesting in the
stand and was comparing the situation in the treated area with
the situation in the untreated area. Thus, both the State and the
majority have emphasized the Commissioner’s language that Plum
Creek asserted that “the goals and objectives of the shelterwood
treatment were met by considering shade from trees over a
kilometer away (in the uncut portion of the stand).” The statement
is entirely disingenuous because the evidence was undisputed that
Plum Creek intended that there would be no untreated area and
there would be harvesting in all parts of the stand. Plum Creek
never argued that a shade tree one kilometer away would make
up for the lack of a shade tree in another area. The reality is that
there never would be a comparison between treated and untreated
parts of the stand if the State had not declared a violation before
the harvest was completed and prevented harvesting in the
remainder of the stands.

171. Although this rationale is poorly stated in the Commis-
sioner’s decision, it is argued by the State and accepted by the
majority as a statement that the cutting that occurred on Stand
34 went beyond a RBA of 30 ft? and, therefore, could be grounds
for termination of Plum Creek from the current-use program. The
State’s position is that whenever in the course of a timber
harvesting FPR staff measure the RBA of the area in which
harvesting has occurred the RBA cannot go below the minimum
specified in the plan. Stated differently, the State’s position is that
all cutting must be even across the stand with no part more cut
than another. FPR points to no language in the Plum Creek plan
that actually states this requirement, and there is no such
language. To the extent that the plan addresses the issue, it is
directly contrary to the State’s position. The plan says: “The
shelterwood will be irregular in distribution.” Uneven distribution

226 |

of shade trees was part of the plan and could be accomplished
only by uneven cutting. There is no support for the State’s
position that uneven cutting within a stand violates Plum Creek’s
plan.

172. It is no answer to the absence of the requirement in the
plan that FPR is simply enforcing its consistent policy. Whatever
may have been FPR’s policy, we are necessarily dealing here with
legal requirements. FPR’s policy is not stated in the plan or in
legally adopted regulations. The most important function of judi-
cial review is to prevent an agency from acting outside the legal
system in which it operates.

173. The trial court concluded that this is exactly what occurred
here. It found: “In this case, the State’s evidence showed that it
had relied heavily on RBA measurements . . . taken from plots in
just a portion of each stand and rejected RBA evidence pertaining
to the stands as a whole. In doing so, it imposed a standard that.
is not in the UVA manual, is not a norm in forestry practice, and
was not included in the prescription.” It added “Without any rule
in the UVA manual or specification in the prescription, an owner
would not be on notice that RBA would be measured other than
by the stand as a whole, particularly where the particular
prescription calls for a result of 30-40 ‘overall stand residual basal
area”

174. The majority has added a new and different rationale for
the Commissioner’s decision — that Plum Creek is responsible for
the measurement of only part of the stand, and must accept it,
because it suspended the harvest and never restarted it. This
rationale is not in the Commissioner’s decision or in the superior
court decision. It is legally and factually erroneous.

175. It is factually erroneous because Plum Creek could not
proceed due to the fact that FPR withdrew approval of the
harvest based on the April 26 adverse-inspection report of the
county forester. In the period between the end of January, when
the inspection occurred that led to the termination, and the date
ction report, Plum Creek could not proceed
ies and possible criminal liability as a
result of the AMPs compliance issues until it resolved those issues
to the satisfaction of FPR and ANR. These facts are set out in
detail in 1 128-134 of this dissent.

176. It is legally erroneous because nothing in the plan or the
statute or regulations require that a harvest proceed continuously

without interruption. Not even FPR has argued that there is such
a requirement. The majority’s position that Plum Creek violated
such a requirement, and thus brought on RBA measurements of
only part of the stand, has no support in the law.

177. Unlike the first two rationales, the third rationale purports
to address language in the plan. It says “Plum Creek’s prescrip-
tion should not be narrowly interpreted to just stocking levels.” In
fact, there are no stocking levels in the plan so the Commission-
er’s statement is curious at best. Nor does the plan state that the
RBA minimum must be met by trees that are greater than 12
inches in diameter. Again, if FPR wants such a requirement it
must insist that Plum Creek put it in the plan. Like the first
rationale of the Commissioner, this rationale was not testified to
by the county forester who testified for FPR in the trial.

178. The most important point about the Commissioner’s ratio-
nale is that it is based on the Commissioner’s determination that
the RBA in the cut area of the stand was 19.7 ft?. In fact, as the
superior court found, the RBA was 28.5 ft?, a finding of fact that
even the majority accepts, as I discuss later in this dissent. The
actual RBA is 50% above the RBA adopted by the Commissioner
and close to the minimum RBA for the stand as a whole. It is
impossible to know what the Commissioner would have decided if
she had to apply the right RBA in rendering her decision and
could not rely on a conclusion that Plum Creek had actually
performed a commercial clear cut.

179. The majority has largely ignored the glaring holes in the
Commissioner’s decision because of its holding that deference
controls everything. Thus, for the majority, the Commissioner's
decision is right because it is not “standardless, unsupported by
the evidence, or contrary to law,” the standard of review it finds
applicable. Ante, 1 35. I will address later my differences on
standard of review, but the point here is different — that
deference has no application where the only question is whether
Plum Creek complied with its plan and the Commissioner has
made fundamental errors in her analysis. While the majority
addresses a part of the Commissioner’s decision, it never explains
how Plum Creek violated any provision of its plan. The majority
decision relies on the Commissioner’s decision because it “pro-
motes the overall policy of the UVA program,” “is logical,” “allows

228 Le

for more effective oversight by FPR,” and “it is a method
consistently used.” Ante, 11 36-39. As the above discussion states,
I disagree with many of these reasons, but that is entirely beside
the point. Nowhere does the majority say that the forester’s
opinion is required by the plan, the central question that was
before the superior court and before us. All of the majority’s
points are reasons why FPR might have acted to insert the
forester’s opinion into the plan that Plum Creek submitted, but
they are irrelevant to this case because FPR accepted the plan
without this language, and the superior court found that the
opinion was not contained in or supported by the plan. That is all
that should count in this decision.

180. The majority's decision in this case is entirely different
from that in Jones, 2004 VT 49, 110, the decision on which the
majority most relies. In Jones, this Court quotes exactly the plan
provisions it found were violated and why there was a violation.
There were two such provisions. One provided that there would be
“selection cuts approximately 40 feet in diameter.” Jd. 1 5. The
evidence showed “a series of clear cuts in Stand 3 well in excess
of the ‘approximately 40 feet in diameter’ prescribed in the plan.
Evidence of the extensive cuts — ranging in size from one to two
acres — was uncontroverted.” Id. 1 8. The second part of the plan
that was violated allowed “ ‘limited single tree and group selection
cuts’ of overstocked areas of hardwoods.” Id. 1 10. The evidence
showed that the cutting in a part of the stand that the landowner
identified was “overstocked” and went well beyond the limited
single-tree and group-selection cuts specified in the plan. Jd. 1] 14.
The difference between the analysis in Jones and the analysis
here is glaring.

181. There are three other points about Jones that are
important for comparison in this case. First, Jones involved a
completed harvest that the forester inspected during a regular
five-year inspection. Id. 15. It did not involve the interruption of
a partially completed harvest with comparisons between harvested
and unharvested areas. Second, to the extent that the forester
acted based on part of a stand, it was because the prescription
authorized cutting only in “overstocked areas” and the landowner
had designated the 15.8-acre area involved as overstocked. Id.
1 13. There is no such designation in this case. The latter point
is important because the majority asserts that Plum Creek should
have known after Jones that its compliance could be judged based

on cutting in only part of a stand. Even assuming that Jones gave
a different landowner of different land with a different plan
proper notice of an unwritten FPR policy, Plum Creek would
learn from Jones only that if the landowner specifically designated
a part of a stand for a specific different treatment, and violated
the requirements of the designation, it could be terminated from
the current-use program. The third point is that the trial court
was reversed in Jones because its findings and conclusions were
“clearly erroneous.” Id. {1 7. The majority found no findings or
conclusions clearly erroneous in this case.

182. Finally, it is important to reemphasize that the failure to
find an inconsistency with the plan is not fixed by the choice of
standard of review.'° Under any standard of review, the superior
court found that FPR’s decision is based on a requirement that is
not in the Plum Creek plan, and the majority has not, and cannot,
respond to this conclusion that is determinative of the proper
outcome of this case.

*®T do not think the standard of review is determinative here for the reason stated
in the text. If it were relevant, I would apply the standard of review for
determinations of whether a permittee has complied with conditions of a permit.
In Agency of Natural Resources x Weston, we held

In construing permit conditions, we rely upon normal rales of
statutory construction. Our principal concern is to implement the intent
of the draftpersons. Ordinarily, we do so by accepting the plain
meaning of the words because we presume that they express the
underlying intent. We also keep in mind, however, that because land-use
regulations are in derogation of property rights, any uncertainty in
their meaning must be decided in favor of the property owner. We must
be particularly careful that the conduet complained of falls within the
clear prohibition of a permit condition before requiring the landowner
to pay a large monetary penalty. Finally, we must accord deference to
the environmental court’s construction of a permit condition, particu-
larly when the court's expertise will assure consistent interpretations of
the law.

2003 VT 58, 1116, 175 Vi. 573, 830 A2d 92 (mem.) (quotations and citations
omitted); accord In rw Barry, 2011 VT 7, 119, 189 Vt. 183, 16 A.3d 613. The
lessons of these cases are that permit conditions are construed under normal rules
of statutory construction and are construed to implement the intent of the
draftsperson, who in this case was Plum Creek. The deference we give is to the
trial court, not the administrative agency. Finally, a prohibition must be clear if, as
is the case here, it will be the grounds for a large monetary penalty.

230 |

II. Standard of Review is De Novo

183. Having covered the first reason why the majority decision
is wrong, I turn to the second — that the majority has used a
standard of review inconsistent with the governing statute.

184. I started this dissent with the meaning of de novo review.
While the majority admits that de novo review applies, it is
helpful to explain why de novo review is the governing standard.
The short answer is because that is what the governing statute
says: “An appeal of this decision of the Commissioner may be
taken to the Superior Court in the same manner and under the
same procedures as an appeal from a decision of a Board of Civil
Authority, as set forth in chapter 131, subchapter 2 of this title.”
32 V.S.A. §3758(d). The cross-reference is to the subchapter on
property tax valuation appeals to the superior court or to the
PVR Director. We explained the effect of this cross-reference in
Mollica v Division of Property Valuation & Review, 2008 VT 60,
184 Vt. 88, 955 A.2d 1171, in the context of an appeal from PVR.
Although Mollica was controlled by §3758(a), rather than
§ 3758(d), the language governing the appeal was identical in those
subsections.‘7 Thus, we recognize Mollica. as a binding precedent
of the interpretation of both subsections. As Mollica holds, the
effect of the cross-reference is that appeals to superior court from
a decision of the FPR Commissioner is de novo. Mollica, 2008 VT
60, 18; see 32 V.S.A. § 4467 (stating that superior court on appeal
“shall proceed de novo and determine the correct valuation of the
property as promptly as possible”).

185. I recognize that it is possible that review can be de novo
and on the record generated in the administrative agency at the
same time. The appeal process under 32 V.S.A. § 4467 is not
on-the-record review. As explained in Shaffer vu Town of Waitsfield,
2008 VT 44, 183 Vt. 428, 956 A.2d 520:

17 Mollica was decided under 32 V.S.A. § 3758(a) because it involved an appeal from
the PVR Director, not an appeal from the FPR Commissioner. At the time of the
decision, the judicial review statute for such an appeal was identical to § 3758(d),
the statute involved here. In 2013, §3758(a) was amended to delete the cross-
reference to the procedure in chapter 131, subchapter 2 of Title 32 and substitute
“from there to Superior Court in the county in which the property is located.”
2013, No. 73, §13. Section 3758(d) was not similarly amended. Because the
amendment in §3758(a) came after Mollica was decided, that decision is still
controlling precedent on the meaning of §3758(d).

The proceeding before the appraiser was a de novo
hearing, 32 V.S.A. § 4467, which we have consistently held
requires the appraiser to try the dispute anew, as though
it had never been heard before. This means that the
Town was not limited to proffering — and the appraiser
was not limited to considering — only such evidence as
was presented below, and that the appeal presented
taxpayers with the risk of increase as well as the chance
of decrease.

Id. 10 (quotation omitted).

186. Mollica recognized this. 2008 VT 60, 18. The trial court
here proceeded exactly as specified in Shaffer. Although the
majority has reversed the court, there is no suggestion that it
proceeded improperly.

187. Property valuation appeals regularly become battles of
expert witnesses, with the municipality’s expert witness having no
special status greater than the expert witness supplied by the
taxpayer, and the court or hearing officer ultimately resolving the
matter. A good example of the process is contained in our recent.
decision on property valuation, Vermont Transco LLC vx Town of
Vernon, which involved a utility transmission property valued by
the Town at $92 million. 2014 VT 983A, 197 Vt. 585, 109 A.8d 423.
The decision turned on whether the Town used the proper
methodology for valuing this unique property. The evidence came
largely from two expert witnesses who presented different valua-
tion methodologies.

188. I believe we should apply de novo review in this case even
if the Legislature had not directed it. Although we have applied a
strong presumption against the availability of de novo review of
the decision of an administrative agency, we have generally relied
on the analysis of the federal courts under the Federal Adminis-
trative Procedures Act (APA). See State Dep't of Taxes v Tri-State
Indus. Laundries, Inc., 138 Vt. 292, 298, 415 A.2d 216, 218 (1980).
The Federal APA provides a number of options from which
reviewing courts choose the proper standard of review of admin-
istrative action. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Among the grounds for reversal
is that the administrative decision is “unwarranted by the facts to
the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.” Id. § 706(2)(F).

232 Le

189. De novo review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(@2)(F) plays a very
limited role in judicial review of administrative proceedings. In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415
(1971), abrogated by Califano v Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the
US. Supreme Court ruled that § 706(2)(F) is applicable in only
two instances, one of which would govern this case: “(Such de
novo review is authorized when the action is adjudicatory in
nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate.” Id.
This case is an adjudicatory proceeding specifically authorized by
statute. The agency “factfinding procedures” are inadequate; in
fact, they are nonexistent. If § 706(2)(F) were applicable here, it
would require de novo review.

190. My conclusion that the factfinding procedures are inad-
equate requires explanation. The vast majority of administrative
decisions are reviewable within the agency under the extensive
procedures contained in the Vermont Administrative Procedure
Act (Vermont APA), 3 V.S.A. § 800 et seq. For proceedings subject
to it, the Vermont APA requires a hearing at which a party can
present evidence, id. § 809(c), and cross-examine witnesses,
§810(8), and on which the decisionmaker renders findings of fact
based on the evidence, id. § 812(a). These requirements, however,
are applicable only in a “contested case,” defined as a proceeding
“in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are
required by law to be determined by an agency after an oppor-
tunity for hearing.” Id. § 801(b)(2); see also id. §§ 809(a), 810,
812(a).

191. The administrative review statute applicable in this case
provides that an “owner who is aggrieved by . . . the filing of an
adverse inspection report . . . may appeal to the Commissioner”
within sixty days of the filing of the report. 32 V.S.A. § 3758(d).
There is no requirement of a hearing before the Commissioner.
Although there was a face-to-face meeting between the Commis-
sioner and representatives of Plum Creek, no evidence was taken,
and there is no transcript of what transpired. There are no
findings of fact. The decision of the Commissioner is apparently
based primarily on the decision of the FPR county forester, even
though there is no indication the forester was present at the
meeting. The record as transmitted by the Commissioner to the
superior court pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 74
consists of the decision, the letters and documents filed by Plum
Creek, and the written decision of the county forester.

192. The point is that there are no factfinding procedures
applicable in this case. The majority states that:

The Commissioner examined the evidence supplied by the
county forester and concluded that both the evidence and
the methodology were sound. The Commissioner found
that the data were collected appropriately and compliance
was measured according to the correct methodology.

Ante, 1 13. While it would have improved the Commissioner’s
decision if she had done and said what the majority attributes to
her, her decision does not contain what the majority claims. The
Commissioner’s decision does say, “The violation is clear and
undisputed by information provided by Plum Creek.” Even the
short description of the process before the Commissioner included
in the majority decision shows the latter part of this statement is
erroneous.

193. There is an obvious reason why the majority’s statement
is unsupported by the record — there is almost no record. As I
described above, the record consists of the violation decision of
the county forester, the filings of Plum Creek, and the decision of
the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s decision contains findings
and conclusions that are not in the forester’s letter or the filings
of Plum Creek. The record does not include any information on
which the forester relied, any information on the action of
middle-management of FPR between the forester and the Com-
missioner,!* or the source of many findings and conclusions of the
Commissioner. The situation here is essentially identical to that in
Conservation Law Foundation x Burke, 162 Vt. 115, 645 A.2d 495
(1993):

In order for judicial review to proceed on the record,
it is critical that the court have before it the full agency
record that was before the Secretary at the time he

38The county forester’s adverse-inspection report was sent to the Chief of Forest
Management, and thereafter to Plum Creek, By letter of May 20, 2010, the
Director of Forests of FPR notified Plum Creek that the investigation was
complete and “was forwarded to the Waterbury Office for review” and sent to
PVR, “recommending that the property be removed from UVA for harvesting
contrary to the management plan.” Even this letter was not part of the record.
The record did not include any information about the review in the Waterbury
Office or any other action between the county forester’s report and the Commis-
sioner’s decision.

234 |

made his decision. . . . Thus, if the agency decision-
maker’s decision is based on the work and recommenda-
tions of subordinates, the record should include all docu-
ments considered by the agency employees whose input
reached the decisionmaker.

Id. at 127, 645 A.2d at 502 (quotations omitted).

194. Burke was not a de novo review proceeding. Id. at 126, 645
A.2d at 502. The record in that case was as incomplete as that in
this case. We held in that case that the superior court must
remand the case to the agency to obtain a proper record before
proceeding. Id. at 127-28, 645 A.2d at 503. Here, the inadequacy
of the supplied record supports the de novo evidentiary hearing
held by the trial court to establish a record.

195. I recognize that Burke held that de novo review was not
available even in a case where there is no administrative
factfinding and no record on which effective judicial review could
have gone forward. As in Burke, the reviewing court in this case
could have required the production of a complete record of the
administrative action, the proper remedy if de novo review were
not statutorily required. In my view, the difference lies in the
nature of the administrative decision. In Burke, the decision
involved the evaluation of the public health and safety effects of
emission of toxic substances from a solid waste incinerator as part
of a complex regulatory process. In that circumstance, agency
expertise was critical and the need for deference to the agency
decision was high. This case, by comparison, essentially comes
down to counting trees where agency expertise is relatively
unimportant. I will explain the need for expertise in this case
below. I emphasize that the above discussion is about how judicial
review should have proceeded had there been no legislative
requirement of judicial review. In this case, the Legislature has
required de novo review, and we are required to follow that
direction.

196. Finally, on this point, it is important to recognize that the
Commissioner could have chosen to hold an evidentiary hearing
but did not. An evidentiary hearing would have prevented, at least
in part, the difference between the information on which the
Commissioner rendered her decision and the testimony and evi-
dence on which the superior court rendered its decision. In fi
under the nonprocess employed, there were no_ self-imposed

restrictions on how the Commissioner chose to find the relevant
facts, and her decisionmaking process is opaque apart from her
reliance on the FPR forester.

III. The Majority’s Standard of Review is Wrong and
Inconsistent with the Legislature’s Direction

197. In Town of Victory uv State, 2004 VT 110, 114-24, we
were required to determine the standard of judicial review of a
decision of a state agency in valuing state-owned real property in
a town under the state PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) program.
Unlike in this case, the Legislature had provided the right of
appeal of a PILOT determination but did not specify the standard
of review. We posited three possible choices: de novo review;
review under chapter 131 of subchapter 2 of Title 32, specifically
32 V.S.A. § 4467; or traditional deferential on-the-record judicial
review. We essentially found that choices one and two were the
same, using the analysis discussed above. Jd. 11 14-21. We defined
the third possibility as follows: “The third possibility is that the
Legislature intended the superior court to treat § 3708 appeals
just as it treats appeals from other administrative actions — that
is, it should review the record and overturn the agency’s deter-
mination only if it finds it arbitrary and capricious.” Jd. 1 22. In
the absence of a legislative directive to the contrary, we chose the
third possibility.

198. Although there are slight differences in the language, the
majority has chosen the third possibility in this case. The deci-
sions which it states have the proper standard of review, In re
Johnston, 145 Vt. 318, 488 A.2d 750 (1985), and In re DeCato
Bros. Inc., 149 Vt. 493, 546 A.2d 1354 (1988), are unremarkable
examples of “arbitrary and capricious” review based on the
administrative record, exactly the standard of review we would
have chosen under Town of Victory in the absence of legislative
direction to the contrary. In each of these cases there was an
evidentiary hearing at the administrative level and findings of fact
and conclusions of law. In Johnston, the appeal came directly to
the Supreme Court so there could be no independent fact-finding.
In DeCato, the judicial appeal went first to the superior court but
again it was on the administrative record and the evidence in the
administrative hearing. Thus, judicial review in each pro-
ceeded under the Vermont APA, and the standard of review was
that routinely applied in APA review.

236 Le

199. The problem with deriving the standard of review from
these cases is obvious. In this case, the Legislature has specified
a standard of review, and it is not the third possibility specified in
Town of Victory, highly deferential on-the-record review. Instead,
it is a form of de novo review used in property tax appeals. The
majority has turned the statutory standard of review into its polar
opposite. How it has done so is a fascinating process that reminds
me of the child's game of broken telephone where “a child
whispers a phrase into the ear of a second child, who whispers it
into the ear of a third child, and so on. Distortions accumulate,
and when the last child announces the phrase, it is comically
different from the original.” S. Pinker, Words and Rules: The
Ingredients of Language 47 (1999).

1100. The starting point in the majority anal: is two
sentences from Jones, 2004 VT 49. Jones was a case similar to
this one, but the statutory standard of review statute is not
reflected anywhere in the decision; apparently neither party
recognized its substance and application. The two sentences are:
“We discern no basis to conclude that the Department’s finding of
a violation in this case was standardless, unsupported by the
evidence, or contrary to law. Accordingly, we conclude that the
court’s findings were clearly erroneous and must be reversed.” Id.
1 14. The majority finds the first sentence to contain the
applicable standard of review.

1101. Even if we assume that the Court was aware of the
statutory standard of review, I would not find that the language
in Jones on which the majority relies was intended as a statement
of the standard of review for that and following cases. The first
sentence is not followed by a citation to any authority, and the
words do not appear in any earlier case, or in any statute, as a
standard of review. Certainly, if we were announcing some wholly
new standard of review for current-use decisions by FPR, we
would explain why we were doing that and how we had the power
to do so. In fact, the words have never been cited since as a
standard of review, and the development of the correct standard
of review occurs in Mollica, a later decision, without relying upon
the Jones language. Moreover, as the second sentence explains,
the actual standard of review that decides the Jones case i
different — that findings of fact cannot stand if so la
support in the evidence that they are clearly erroneous — is
familiar and totally consistent with de novo review.

1102. Even if we intended some new and different standard of
review, the majority has turned it into something more than it
says. It does not say the agency will prevail if its decision is based
on a standard, is consistent with the evidence, and is consistent
with law. At best, it says instead that the agency decision will
prevail if those things are true and the decision against it is based
on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. This is a very important
point because in this case, unlike Jones, the majority finds no
instance where the trial court made a clearly erroneous finding of
fact.

1103. I would distinguish the Jones language based on the
discussion in the two paragraphs above, but I believe that the
likely explanation for its presence in the opinion is that the Court,
including I, was unaware of the statutory standard of review. The
Jones language is fundamentally at odds with de novo review as
required by the statute because under de novo review the court is
expected to substitute its judgment for that of the agency when
it thinks the agency is wrong. The language has no place in a
decision made under a de novo standard of review. If the majority
believes it does, it should explain how.

1104. The next step in the majority’s analysis is to rely on In
re ANR Permits in Lowell Mountain Wind Project, 2014 VT 50,
1915-16, 196 Vt. 467, 98 A8d 16, for the proposition that
“decisions made within the expertise of such agencies are pre-
sumed correct, valid and reasonable.” As the majority states, ANR
Permits is a de novo review case, but the quote is taken out of
context and, as a result, the meaning is changed. The relevant
paragraph of ANR Permits states:

In commencing our own review, we must first deter-
mine the standard of review that applies in appeals from
the PSB sitting in its appellate capacity. As all parties
noted, we generally give substantial deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations — in this
case, ANR’s interpretation of the VSMM. Absent a clear
and convincing showing to the contrary, decisions made
within the expertise of such agencies are presumed
correct, valid and reasonable. Interpretation of the
VSMM is squarely within ANR’s expertis its author-
ing agency. This deferential standard rem: on appeal,
even after the PSB holds a de novo hearing on the
matter.

238 |

Id. 1 15 (footnote omitted) (quotation omitted).

1105. The paragraph is solely about the deference accorded an
agency in interpreting its own regulations, deference that is
entirely consistent with de novo review. See Letourneau u AN.
Deringer/Wausau Ins. Co., 2008 VT 106, 18, 184 Vt. 422, 966 A.2d
133. Thus, it was appropriate to cite and rely upon Johnston,
which is not a de novo review case. To show the limit of the
deference ruling, the Court added: “In keeping with the statutory
standard of review, [the PSB] gave no deference to ANR’s permit
decision.” ANR Permits, 2014 VT 50, 1111. Thus, the decision does
not give general deference to the factfinding, methodology, or
conclusions of an agency, the deference involved in this case. This
case does not involve the interpretation of regulations by the
agency that adopted them.

1106. The majority cites another part of the ANR Permits
decision that it finds supports its deferential standard of review.
The decision in that case involved the validity of the stormwater
discharge permit for a mountain top wind electric generation
project. The agency allowed the project to employ an alternative
stormwater treatment practice that opponents argued was not
authorized by governing regulations. As noted above, the decision
turned entirely on whether the design was consistent with the
regulations as interpreted by ANR and the Public Service Board
(PSB). In reaching our decision that ANR and the PSB properly
interpreted the regulations we noted that the Legislature explic-
itly gave statutory discretion to ANR in determining whether to
issue a stormwater discharge permit and that the PSB had to
respect that discretion even within the context of de novo review.
Id. 1 16.

1107. The ANR Permits analysis cannot change the standard of
review in this case. In the context of renewable energy projects,
a large number of types of ANR permits are reviewable de novo
by the PSB under 10 V.S.A. § 8506. Some of these give specific
discretion to ANR in deciding whether to issue a permit; others
do not. See 10 V.S.A. § 8503(a). Despite the presence of de novo
review, the PSB is required to apply the “substantive standards”
applicable to ANR, including any discretion ANR has in deter-
mining whether to issue a permit. Id. § 8506(d); ANR Permits,
2014 VT 50, 116. This is the context of ANR Permits.

1108. Here the standard of review is imposed by statute, 32
VS.A. § 3758(d), for only two administrative actions by FPR: filing

LS —CtwsCSsi‘CS:sC‘(‘CCR®
an adverse-inspection report that results in termination from the
current-use program or refusal to approve a forest-management
plan. Under the majority’s standard-of-review theory, because
either of these actions lie in the discretion of FPR, the statutory
standard of review is cancelled and replaced by deferential review.
To state the theory is to expose how illogical it is. ANR Permits
does not create a way for a court to refuse to apply the standard
of review specified by the Legislature.’ FPR is entitled to no
deference under ANR Permits.

1109. Finally, the majority pivots to a case involving an APA
contested case appeal, after an agency hearing, where the stan-
dard of review is explicitly deferential and not de novo, In re
Williston Inn Grp., 2008 VT 47, 113, 188 Vt. 621, 949 A.2d 1073
(mem.), demonstrating it has reached the point where there is no
difference between a de novo standard and a deferential, on-the-
record standard.

1110. The ultimate test of the holding on standard of review
has to be whether we have complied with the governing judicial
review statute. Whatever the logical twists and turns in analyzing
the standard of review, and even if each step of the way appears
to be consistent with and controlled by precedent, the result. must.
be consistent with the statute. In the terms of “broken telephone,”
the result of the majority’s analysis is “comically different” from
the statutory standard. The majority has turned the statutory
standard of review into its polar opposite and found against Plum
Creek as a matter of law on the polar opposite standard of review.

IV. The Decision Does Not Involve Policy

1111. The majority decision states and reiterates the need to
protect and rely on agency expertise in numerous places in
support of its deferential standard of review. In citing and
discussing ANR Permits, it describes the agency decisions here as
“complicated methodologies within an agency’s expertise.” Ante,
1 30, citing ANR Permits, 2014 VT 50, 116. There are three
issues on which methodology was disputed: (1) whether even
cutting was required so that the area cut never fell below the

1° Bven if there might be a case for discretion with respect to plan approval, there
is none for filing an adverse-inspection report. FPR is required to file an
adverse-inspection report if it “finds that the management of the tract is contrary
to the .. . forest management plan.” 32 V.S.A. § 3755(e).

240 Le

minimum; (2) the actual RBA in the cut area; and (3) when tree
regeneration measurements should be taken to determine whether
the goals of the harvest were achieved.

1112. Whether even cutting was a proper requirement was the
subject of expert dispute, and under the statutory standard of
review, the superior court could substitute its judgment for that of
the Commissioner as I explain above. The superior court believed
the expert witness for Plum Creek and not the FPR expert
witness, the county forester, and should be affirmed on that basis.

1113. My main view on even cutting, however, is different. If
even cutting was a plan requirement, it had to be explicitly stated
in the plan. The wording of the plan is actually contrary to a
requirement of even cutting — it indicates that the shelterwood is
irregularly distributed and the “overall stand” RBA must be 30 to
AO ft?. FPR’s expertise may be appropriate to determine whether
even cutting should be required, but if it decides even cutting is
required it must put it in the plan or a separate regulation. In
this case, it did not, and Plum Creek cannot be terminated based
on the nonexistent requirement.

1114. The second point of dispute is actually relied upon in the
Commissioner's decision. The decision states that the RBA for the
cut area in Stand 34 was 19.7 ft, just above 60% of the required
minimum RBA. The superior court found the RBA of the cut area
was actually 28.5 ft?, only 5% below the required minimum RBA.
Again, the superior court’s conclusion was based on the testimony
of Plum Creek’s expert witness who testified that he measured
more trees than the county forester so that the extent he had to
extrapolate to reach the estimated RBA was less. The court found:

Apart from whether RBA is measured across a stand
as a whole, the Court finds that Mr. Holleran’s method-
ology for measuring RBA produced a more reliable
result, as it was based on measurements taken from a
significantly greater number of sample plots. His addi-
tional explanation of the difference between his figures
and Mr. Langlais’s is credible: that it was likely attrib-
utable in part to Mr. Langlais not counting all the trees
in the sample plots, thereby producing a lower RBA
measurement. While Mr. Langlais testified generally that
his measurements were taken in a manner consistent
with the UVA manual, the Court finds the quality and
reliability of Mr. Holleran’s measurements to be superior.

The majority states that the trial court could make this factual
determination, apparently because, despite the disagreement with
the county forester’s methodology, and the Commissioner’s finding
based on that methodology, the disagreement is over the relatively
simple matter of counting trees. Ante, 1 23 n.7.

1115. The majority answers, however, that the RBA calculation
difference is irrelevant because it came out under a 30 ft? RBA,
no matter how slightly. Even under the majority’s rationale I find
that explanation insufficient. The Commissioner’s decision relied
upon the fact that the RBA was 19.7 ft, which would indicate
there had been a commercial clear cut. In fact, the RBA was very
close to the minimum. The Commissioner was concerned about
whether a part of the stand would have “a very different age-class
distribution, composition and structure” from the rest of the
stand. In fact, if the harvest were completed within the RBA
minimum, as intended, it is not clear there would be a “very
different” remaining growth anywhere in the stand. The problem,
of course, is that the FPR policy that it is implementing is written
down nowhere so it is impossible to know what it actually is, a
large deficiency when FPR claims it can come in at any time
during the harvest of an irregular shelterwood to measure com-
pliance. At a minimum, the Commissioner should be required to
explain why an RBA of 28.5 ft? is inadequate in these cireum-
stances.

1116. The third issue in dispute was joined particularly with
respect to Stand 43, a different stand from that considered by the
majority, but I will consider it here because it is mentioned in the
Commissioner’s decision with respect to Stand 34. As I excerpted
above, the Commissioner’s decision states: “the residual trees
comprising this basal area are at best intermediate stems in the
10 to 12 inch diameter class that lack the crown size necessary to
provide the shading conditions even if the desired residual basal
area target was met. Plum Creek’s prescription should not be
narrowly interpreted to just stocking levels.” Putting aside
whether a landowner can be terminated from the UVA program
based on noncompliance with a “broad” interpretation of the plan
based on a plan requirement that is not actually in it, the facts as
found by the superior court are contrary to the Commissioner’s
apparent conclusion.

1117. The county forester criticized the harvest because it did
not produce the promised regeneration of new trees — he found

242 |

“there was regeneration in only 15% of the plots examined.” This
opinion was based on a standard of regeneration of 350 stems per
acre immediately after the harvest. Plum Creek’s expert witness,
by comparison, did a regeneration study three growing seasons
after the harvest, also against a standard of 350 stems per acre.
He found a regeneration rate of 12,000 seedlings per acre, far
exceeding the minimum requirement. The superior court accepted
the conclusion of Plum Creek’s expert witness because the UVA
manual standard is measured three years after the regeneration
harvest and the witness’s measurements were more reliable.

1118. Although the majority has not responded to the superior
court’s analysis and conclusion, it essentially involved the same
level of competency as the counting of trees to measure the RBA.
It was also the counting of trees, in this case small ones, to
measure regeneration. The main difference between the superior
court’s conclusion and that of the Commissioner involved when the
measurements were taken; the superior court’s measurement time
was in compliance with the governing UVA manual; the Commis-
sioner’s conclusion was not.

1119. Again, the superior court conclusion does not involve
policy for the same reason that the resolution of the RBA issue
does not involve policy. While it does not address a requirement
that is stated in the plan, the conclusion of the superior court is
nevertheless important for an understanding of the Commission-
er’s decision. Reduced to its main point, the decision here is about
regeneration of a healthy and productive forest. The Commis-
sioner concluded that the cutting level was too great to allow
regeneration. Plum Creek proved that regeneration, orders of
magnitude above what was required, were occurring and thus the
harvest cutting rate was a success. The superior court agreed with
Plum Creek.

1120. Because of the regeneration result, this dispute is largely
about a technicality. That is my last point in the following section.

V. The Facts Support Plum Creek’s Position

1121. There are some important facts not contained in the
majority’s recitation that bear on whether Plum Creek’s position
was reasonable and the trial court acted within its discretion in
accepting it. One group is laid out in the opening two paragraphs
of this dissent, and I will return to these facts below. Another
group relates to the present condition of the forest over which

this controversy arises and the goals of the logging activities that
FPR approved.

1122. The overall forest in this case was in poor condition to
support commercial forestry. The prescription for each of the
stands in controversy states that the stand “has high residual
stand damage” and the beech trees are diseased. See Appendix.
The trial court described the situation and the goals of the timber
harvest as follows:

[T]he general goals were to cut in a manner to change a
poor quality old forest into a new forest through the
creation of new growth. This would be accomplished by
harvesting damaged trees and large trees that would
inhibit the growth of desirable young trees, promoting
the growth of desirable young trees, retaining trees that
could provide seeds and shade for new growth in a
desirable growth pattern, establishing even age manage-
ment on the stands with both existing young trees and
new growth, and optimizing conditions for growth for the
future.

If this had been a forest in which 100% of the trees were valuable
and desirable for sale and the goal was to maximize return on
these trees, the requirement that logging occur evenly over a
stand would be reasonable and understandable such that excessive
harvesting in one part of the stand would be a clear indication
that excessive harvesting overall was intended.

1123. The situation in this case was very different. Thus, the
prescription for Stand 34, the stand in which this conflict. primar-
ily developed, stated: “The shelterwood will be irregular in
distribution and will target Sugar Maple and Yellow Birch with
large crowns to provide shade and seed distribution.” It added,
“the portions of the stand will also receive 1-2 acre patches where
quality and stocking are not sufficient for shelterwood.” See
Appendix. Given the “irregular distribution” of logging activity, the
presence of an arbitrary area in the stand with a lower RBA than
contemplated overall was entirely expectable. Put another way,
even cutting was highly unlikely because the trees that needed to
be cut were not evenly distributed over the stand. The cutting
could not occur pursuant to some artificial standard of equal
harvesting per acre.

244 |

1124. Finally, it is important to understand that the measure of
success for Plum Creek was whether regeneration occurred as a
result of the harvesting, the exact goal that the Commissioner
stated she was enforcing. The evaluation of the partial harvest
three years later shows that it was an overwhelming success —
the regeneration levels are orders of magnitude in excess of what
was required. Thus, Plum Creek is being heavily penalized for a
success.

1125. This, and the facts in the opening paragraphs, brings me
to the heart of my disagreement with the majority’s character-
ization of the facts and Plum Creek’s perspective on the facts.
This conflict would likely never have arisen in the courts if the
timber harvesting was completed in the three stands, and that.
completion was only days away when the site visit occurred. Plum
Creek never intended to harvest only part of the stand and
certainly not only the part of the stand that had been logged to
that point. The fact that only part of the stands were harvested,
and harvest measurements are available only on a part of the
stands, was a direct result of the FPR forester’s conclusion based
on the site visit that the stands were being “cut contrary.” While
there is no indication that the FPR forester could or did order
the logging stopped, Plum Creek was put in a position of stopping
logging operations to protect itself from a FPR decision to
terminate it from the UVA program.”

1126. The majority has fixed on its view that it makes no sense
to average between the logged area of a stand and the unlogged
area, relying particularly on the Commissioner’s statement that
considering a tree a kilometer away in the uncut portion to
determine compliance for a tree in the cut portion was a
“misapplication and a complete misunderstanding of the principal
of the silviculture practice.” Everyone agrees with the Commis-
sioner’s statement, including Plum Creek’s expert, but it does not
answer the basic problem with the State’s position. Plum Creek
never intended to harvest only part of a stand and did not claim
so here. This is an example of attributing a position to a party to
tear it down — a strawman position. The Plum Creek position has

2°Tts decision was also based in part on the AMPs violations, and Plum Creek’s
decision not to move forward until these were corrected. They were, however,
corrected.

ee “

always been that the harvest could not be judged in midstream
and should have continued to its end, and then it could be judged
on whether it violated the plan. The cause of this controversy is
the stopping of the timber harvest days away from its completion
and the required determination of whether the plan was violated
by a timber harvest that was never completed. Plum Creek’s
expert testified that Plum Creek could complete the harvest fully
compliant with the provisions of the plans, particularly the mini-
mum basal area requirements and the use of appropriate treat-
ments in each part of the stands. He noted particularly about
Stand 34 that the area that had been logged had been extensively
damaged by the 1998 ice storm.

1127. By footnotes 8, 9 and 10 the majority has added to its
position that it was fair to consider only part of the stands by
stating that if Plum Creek intended that the RBA be judged on
the stands as a whole, it should not have shut down the harvest
at the time of the initial inspection on January 26, 2010 and
should have completed it at some time thereafter. The majority
asserts that stopping the harvesting was wholly a decision of Plum
Creek and not a decision of FPR. Even the limited facts in the
record show that this position is wrong.

1128. There were two adverse consequences of the January 26,
2010 site visit during the harvesting. First, as discussed above, the
FPR county forester decided that Plum Creek had “cut contrary”
to its plan. Second, the county forester decided that Plum Creek
had violated the AMPs in a number of respects. Later that day,
the Plum Creek forester sent the FPR county forester an email
expressing an intent to comply with program requirements and
thanking the forester for cooperation in meeting those standards.
The next day, the Plum Creek forester sent the county forester a
formal letter describing the situation observed on January 26 and
specifying steps Plum Creek would take in the future to comply
with the requirements that bound it. It specifically described the
steps it would take to correct the AMPs violations alleged by the
forester and prevent AMPs violations in the future.

1129. It is important to understand that the consequences for
an AMPs violation and a violation of the harvest plan are
different. Both can result in termination from the UVA program,
but AMPs violations that result in unpermitted discharges of

246 |

waste into the waters of the state in violation of 10 V.S.A.
§ 1263(a) can result in civil penalties up to $10,000 per day for
each day of violation. See 10 V.S.A. § 1274(a)(6). Such a discharge
is also a crime that can result in imprisonment for up to six
months. Id. § 1275(a). The FPR county forester found that the
AMPs violations were “discharge resulting” such that the civil
penalties and possible criminal liability were applicable. When
charged with an AMPs violation, Plum Creek was forced to
suspend the harvest in order to correct any AMPs violations.

1130. The county forester never responded to the communica-
tions from the Plum Creek forester, but another site visit on
AMPs compliance was planned with ANR staff responsible for
AMPs enforcement. That occurred on February 9 but did not
resolve the issues because snow had fallen on the site making it
impossible to observe the alleged violations. In a February 18
letter, FPR outlined the steps needed for Plum Creek to come
into compliance with the AMPs. Plum Creek hired a contractor to
do the remedial work, and the ANR and FPR staff revisited the
site on April 19, 2010. On April 27, FPR sent a letter to Plum
Creek saying that Plum Creek was now in compliance with the
AMPs. Plum Creek could not have moved forward with the
harvest until all the AMPs issues were corrected; that is, when it
received the April 27 letter.

1131. Meanwhile the parties had a meeting with respect to
compliance with the plan on February 18. The Plum Creek
representatives hoped to learn at that meeting that there would
be no further actions that would prevent it from moving forward
with the harvest. Instead, they learned that the county forester
was working on an adverse-inspection report which would lead to
termination of Plum Creek from the current-use program. During
March and April, the county forester continued to take measure-
ments at the stands to complete the adverse-inspection report.

1132. The adverse-inspection report was issued on April 26,
2010, a day before the AMPs compliance letter that would allow
Plum Creek to move forward. If there was any question about the
continuation of the harvest after the adverse-inspection report, on
May 20, 2010, the Director of Forests for FPR sent a letter to
Plum Creek saying that a draft of the adverse-inspection report
was being reviewed in the “Waterbury office” and had been sent
to the Tax Department recommending that all Plum Creek
property be removed from the UVA program. The letter stated,

“Until all actions related to the potential UVA violation are
completed, FPR will not be in a position to approve any new
activities in the area referred to as Clough Brook North.” This
was a statement that no further harvesting in the relevant area
would be allowed pending resolution of this case. Plum Creek
interpreted it as such an order and did no further harvesting in
the stands involved. That order has been in effect since May 20
and up to today. It was in effect in November 30, 2010 when the
Commissioner claimed in her letter that Plum Creek was using
the unharvested part of the stands to claim compliance, the
rationale endorsed by the majority.

1133. The majority states that this dissent wanted FPR “to
wait indefinitely to see if and when the landowner will continue
cutting before bringing a violation.” Ante, 1 38 n.10. That is a
mischaracterization of the facts and Plum Creek’s position, as well
as that of this dissent. The FPR county forester began work on
the adverse-inspection report immediately after the January 26
inspection. Plum Creek never could move forward after the
January 26 inspection to complete the harvest either because of
the AMPs issues or because of the adverse-inspection report and
subsequent order denying approval for any further harvest activi-
ties. It is FPR, and not Plum Creek, that stopped harvesting
activities to this day2*

1134. In summary, the facts — if we decide it on the facts —
support Plum Creek’s position, not that of FPR. In the end,
however, facts are for the trial court and not this Court, and the
trial court considered every one of the factual assertions of the
majority and either rejected them or concluded that they did not
support the Commissioner’s decision. We should affirm the trial
court’s decision.

VI. Conclusion

1135. In conclusion, I believe that this decision is wrong on
multiple levels. It is wrong in determining whether FPR or Plum

21'The back and forth on this issue is a clear example why appellate factfinding is
improper. There has never been factfinding on the question of whether Plum Creek
could have completed the harvest because it was never an issue in the trial court
or raised by the parties on appeal. For the reasons stated in the text, I believe
that the majority’s characterization of the record on this point is clearly wrong.
‘The alternative, if there is one, is to remand to the trial court to determine the
facts.

248 |

Creek should prevail, and is wrong in ruling as a matter of law.
The superior court correctly ruled that Plum Creek never violated
its plan, the standard for determining whether it should be
terminated from the UVA program, and should be affirmed on
that basis. It is wrong by adopting a standard of judicial review
that turns a governing statute into its exact opposite. It is wrong
in rewarding an administrative process that is opaque and does
not contain the minimum standards of fairness. Finally, it is
wrong in misusing extreme deference to emasculate judicial
review. The majority's holding on standard of review has emas-
culated judicial review in this case.

1136. I dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund
joins this dissent.

Appendix to Dissent

Relevant Content of Plum Creek Prescriptions

area (ft/
acre)
Acceptable
growing

area (ft/

acre)
Manage- | Shelterwood cut | Shelterwood cut | Intermediate thin-
ment ac- Overstory re- ning
tivities moval cut

Forest The stand has The stand has The stand has
health high residual high residual high residual
conditions | stand damage. stand damage stand damage.
Beech bark Beech bark Beech bark

Nectria complex. | Nectria complex. | Nectria complex.

Stand #
Description
of stand
conditions

LM-03-34
Stand 34 is a
well stocked
Northern hard-

wood type with
a total basal area
of 82. f, of that
35 ft? is accept-
able growing
stock. The stand
is dominated by
Sugar maple,
Yellow birch,
Beech, Balsam
fir, Red Spruce.
The mean stand
diameter is 8.4
inches. The stand
is weighted to-
wards the me-
dium saw timber
size class. The
current stand has
a high level of
residual stand
damage and a
fair amount of
crown die-back.
The understory
varies greatly in
stocking of ac-
ceptable regen-
eration, with
small pockets of
Sugar maple
seedling and sap-
lings in a patchy
distribution about
the stand.

LM-03-43
Stand 43 is a
well stocked

Hardwood domi-
nated mixed
wood type with
a total basal area
of 88 fi’, of that
38 f is accept-
able growing
stock. The stand
is dominated by
Yellow birch,
Balsam fir, White
birch, Red
spruce, Red
maple. The mean
stand diameter is
8.2 inches. The
stand is weighted
towards the me-
dium saw timber
size class. The
White birch in
the stand is in
severe decline
and the majority
of Balsam fir is
mature. The ma-
jority of the
stand has good
stocking in Red
spruce seedlings
and saplings in
the understory.

LM-03-44
Stand 44 is a
well stocked
Northern hard-

wood type with
a basal area of
97 fC, of that
42 £0 is accept-
able growing
stock. The stand
is dominated by
Sugar maple,
Yellow birch,
Beech, Balsam
fir, Red spruce.
The mean stand
diameter is 7.6
inches. The stand]
is weighted to-
wards the small
saw timber size
class. The stand
has a fair
amount of ac-
ceptable stocking
in the small saw
timber size class,

250 |
Stand # LM-03-34 LM-03-43 LM-03-44
Manage- Stand 34 will Stand 43 will Stand 44 will
ment prac-| receive a Two receive a Two | receive an Inter-
tices to be Staged Staged mediate Thinning
Shelterwood
accom- (28S) (even age Shelterwood (ITH) (even age
ed UVA code 3). | (25S) (even age | UVA code 2).
during The stand lacks UVA code 3) The stand is
next 10 an acceptable and Overstory | well stocked with]
year plan | amount of regen-/ Removal (OSR) | small saw timber]

eration and the
majority of the
overstory is un-
acceptable grow-
ing stock. A low
density
shelterwood with
a residual basal
area of 30-40 f?
will be utilized
to discourage the
establishment of
beech in the un-
derstory. The
shelterwood will
be irregular in
distribution and
will target Sugar
maple and Yel-
low birch with
large crowns to
provide shade
and seed distri-
bution. The por-
tions of the
stand will also
receive 1-2 acre
patches where
quality and
stocking are not
sufficient for a
Shelterwood. The
patches will not
affect the overall
stand residual
basal area of
30-40 fr.

(even age UVA
code 4). 30-40%
of the stand will
receive an
Overstory Re-
moval where the
overstory is in
severe decline
and the under-
story is well
stocked with
seedling and sap-
ling sized Red
Spruce. The re-
maining portion
of the stand will
receive a
Shelterwood. The
harvest will tar-
get the at-risk
and mature
stems. The target
residual basal
area is 60 ft.
The harvest will
release quality
growing stock
and provide gaps
to promote re-
generation.

however many 0!
the medium and
large saw timber
stems are in de-
cline. The thin-
ning will target
the at-risk and
mature stems andj
leave a target
residual basal
area of 60 ft.
This will release
the small saw
timber size class
and open up
gaps for regen-
eration.

2016 VT 101

Sarita and Nafis Khan, Eric and Katherine Gadpaille, Judith
LaPointe & Robert Earley v. Alpine Haven Property Owners’
Association, Inc.

(153 A.3d 1218]

No. 15-303
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 2, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied September 23, 2016.

252

Barry Kade, Montgomery, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Robert A. Gensburg, St. Johnsbury, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Reiber, C.J. Both sides appeal in this long-running dispute
involving Alpine Haven, a sprawling subdivision located along
Vermont Route 242 in the Towns of Montgomery and Westfield.
The dispositive question for this Court is whether the undisputed
facts support the trial court’s conclusion that the “chalets” within
Alpine Haven constitute a preexisting common interest community
(CIC) governed by Title 27A of the Vermont Statutes Annotated.
The trial court found a “series of deeds” sufficient to constitute a
“declaration” of a CIC under the Vermont Common Interest
Ownership Act (VCIOA). Plaintiffs, who own chalets/undeveloped
lots in Alpine Haven, argue that the court erred in reaching this
conclusion. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for
additional proceedings. Given our conclusion, we need not reach
the majority of the parties’ remaining arguments.

12. This is the latest in a series of lawsuits, spanning more
than thirty years, between defendant Alpine Haven Property
Owners’ Association, Inc. (AHPOA) and certain home/lot owners.
Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint against AHPOA in May 2011.
Plaintiffs asserted that their property is not part of a CIC and
that they were not required by their deeds to be AHPOA
members. Plaintiffs acknowledged an obligation to pay the rea-
sonable costs of services provided and accepted, including main-
taining the right-of-way, snowplowing, street lighting, and garbage
collection. They argued, however, that they should not have to pay
AHPOA for special assessments, annual meeting costs, insurance,

254 |

road expansion or improvements, or any other AHPOA expenses
not specified in their deeds. Plaintiffs also argued that a 2011
“Amended and Restated” declaration was not validly adopted.

13. AHPOA counterclaimed, asserting that Alpine Haven was a
preexisting CIC. It sought a declaratory judgment regarding a
member's right to “resign” from AHPOA and rescind obligations
as a unit owner, including the obligation to pay assessed fees.
AHPOA maintained that plaintiffs were obligated, and failed, to
pay properly assessed fees. AHPOA also argued that plaintiffs had
knowingly received benefits at AHPOA’s expense, including road
maintenance, snow plowing, lighting, garbage collection, and the
administration of such services and amenities, and that it would
be inequitable for plaintiffs not to compensate and reimburse
AHPOA for their value.

14. HI We begin with an overview of the law governing this
dispute. The VCIOA is based on the Uniform Common Interest.
Ownership Act (UCIOA) and it became effective on January 1,
1999. This Act “combined, in a single comprehensive law, prior
uniform laws in this area (the Uniform Condominium Act (1980),
the Uniform Planned Community Act (1980) and the Model Real
Estate Cooperative Act (1981)).” UCIOA, Pref. Note (1994). The
term “common interest community” is defined for the first time in
the UCIOA, drawing on the definition of “planned community” in
the Uniform Planned Community Act. 27A V.S.A. § 1-103, emt. 8.
This term is “used through the [UCIOA] to refer collectively to
the three particular forms of common interest community: condo-
miniums, cooperatives, and planned communities.” Jd. Because the
terms condominium and cooperative are precisely defined, a
planned community is a catch-all for “everything else” that
satisfies the general definition of a CIC. Id.

15. MA CIC is broadly defined as “real estate described in a
declaration with respect to which a person, by virtue of the
person’s ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for a share of
real estate taxes on, insurance premiums, maintenance, or im-
provement of, or services or other expenses related to common
elements, other units, or other real estate other than that unit
described in the declaration.” Id. § 1-103(7).' Compare UPCA

1 “Real estate” is defined as “any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over or
under land, ineluding structures, fixtures, and other improvements and interests

§ 1-103(21) (defining “planned community” as “real estate with
respect to which any person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit,
is obligated to pay for real property taxes, insurance, premiums,
maintenance or improvement of other real estate described in a
declaration”).

16. A “declaration” means “any instruments, however denomi-
nated, that create a common interest community and any amend-
ments to those instruments.” 27A VS.A. § 1-103(13). For CICs
created after January 1, 1999, declarations must contain very
specific information set forth by statute, including the name of the
CIC and the association; the name of each municipality in which
any part of the CIC is located; a legally sufficient description of
the real estate included in the CIC; a statement of the maximum
number of units that the declarant reserves the right to create; a
description of the boundaries of each unit created by the decla-
ration, including the identifying number of the unit; a description
of any limited common elements and, with respect to planned
communities, any real estate which is or will be common elements;
and numerous other items. See id. § 2-105(a)(1)-(15).

17. Certain provisions of the VCIOA apply to CICs that existed
prior to its enactment, even though these CICs may not have a
declaration that strictly complies with the statute. Jd. § 1-204, emt.
3. In taking this approach, the Act aims to “measurably increase
the ability of the unit owners to effectively manage the associa-
tion, and . . . help to encourage the marketability of common
interest communities created under early condominium statutes,
or under common law.” Id.

18. Presumably because the VCIOA encompasses CICs created
under common law, the definition of “declaration” includes not.
only “the traditional condominium declaration with which most
practitioners are familiar,’ and “the declaration of covenants,
conditions, and restrictions (CC & R’s) so common in planned unit

which by custom, usage, or law pass with a conveyance of land though not
described in the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance.” 27A V.S.A.
§ 1-103(25). The term “common elements” means “any real estate within a planned
community owned or leased by the [unit owners’) association, other than a unit.”
Id, § 1-103(4)(B).

2 This definition also appears to have been drawn from the Uniform Planned
Community Act. See UPCA §1-103(11) (“‘Declaration’ means any instruments,
however denominated, that ereate a planned community, and any arnendments to
those instruments.”).

256 |

developments,” but also “a series of deeds to units with common
mutually beneficial restrictions, or to any other instruments which
create the relationship which constitutes a common interest com-
munity.” Jd. § 1-103, emt. 14; see Restatement (Third) of Prop.
(Servitudes), § 6.2 emt. e (2000) (explaining that “[blefore decla-
rations came into common use, the servitudes that created a
common-interest community were usually set forth in the deeds to
the individual lots, or shown on the face of the recorded plat.”).

I. Undisputed Facts

19. With this legal background in mind, we turn to the
undisputed facts. In the 1960s, Hubert and Caroline Daberer
assembled approximately 500 acres of land to create what has
become known as Alpine Haven. There was no “master plan,” site
survey, or contemporaneous subdivision plat, and no overall series
of permit applications or approvals. There was no “declaration” of,
or bylaws for, any planned community filed or recorded at the
outset of the project.

110. The Daberers sold some lots personally, but relatively
early on, they transferred their land to two corporations that they
controlled: Alpine Haven, Inc. for the Westfield portion (as of May
10, 1963) and Leisure Properties, Inc. for the Montgomery portion
of the land (as of November 29, 1967). Currently, Alpine Haven
contains more than eighty-five lots with homes, several undevel-
oped or “large lots,” several lots with some commercial activity,
and three lots that AHPOA owns and maintains as common land
for various purposes. AHPOA owns and maintains 4.5 miles of
roads within the development, including the streetlights and
snowplowing. Almost all of the lots owners depend on the private
roads to access their property.

A. Westfield Conveyances

111. Between 1963 and 1965, sixteen lots and/or chalets were
sold in Westfield. The first deed, from the Daberers personally to
the Bretons in January 1968, gave the grantees a “right-of-way
leading from the main road,” and the Daberers promised to “pipe
water to such construction site on said premises as may be
indicated by the grantees.” The deed prohibited commercial use of
the property, and limited use to a home with a garage. The
second deed, from the Daberers to the Racines in March 1963,
contained the same right-of-way grant, the same covenant regard-

Pl “

ing use of the property, as well as a promise by the Daberers “to
keep and maintain said right-of-way in good reasonable state of
repair,” “supply water to said premises as now piped,” “provide
garbage removal for said premises,” and maintain the existing
“street lights in the area of said premises.” For these services, the
Racines agreed to pay the Daberers (or assigns) $100 per year.

112. Alpine Haven, Inc. conveyed most of the remaining lots in
Westfield. The next fourteen deeds (through 1965) were similar,
and all contained language similar to the Racine deed with respect
to the services and facilities to be provided and maintained by the
grantor, and the restrictive covenant regarding use of the prop-
erty. These deeds did not, however, contain any obligation by the
grantees to pay for any services.

113. There were twenty-five additional conveyances between
1966 and 1969. These deeds contained language similar to the
Racine deed with respect to services and facilities provided and
maintained by the grantor, and the restrictive covenant regarding
use of the property. Beginning with the second deed in 1966,
however, some of the deeds began to include an express payment.
obligation. The first stated: “These services to be at a fee to be
determined by the grantor.” By 1969, the payment language
required grantees to pay grantors “a reasonable annual fee” for
“these services.” This deed, however, was from the Daberers
personally, not from Alpine Haven, Inc. Sixteen of the twenty-five
deeds during this period contained some form of a payment.
obligation.

114. Ten additional lots were sold in the 1970s. These deeds
continued essentially the same road, water supply, garbage dis-
posal, and streetlight obligations on grantor’s part, and the same
restrictive covenants on property use. All but one of the deeds
(the last one that decade) contained the “reasonable annual fee”
language (or equivalent) requiring the grantee to contribute to the
operating and upkeep costs of the basic services and facilities.

115. In the 1980s and to date, the deed provisions again
became somewhat more sporadic. A June 1981 deed contained the
property-use covenant, but did not include the grantor’s obligation
to provide any services or facilities, or the grantee’s obligation to
pay for them. The next three deeds, two in 1982 and the next in
1997, contained all three “standard” deed terms, which the court
considered as the use-restriction, the obligation to provide ser-
vices, and the obligation to pay for services. The three subsequent

258 |

deeds, in 2004 (an unimproved lot), 2005, and 2007, contained none
of those provisions. The last original deed in Westfield, in Sep-
tember 2010, contained all three “standard” deed terms.

116. Plaintiff Gadpailles own a lot/chalet on the Westfield side,
and their deed contains all three standard deed terms described
above. They also own a chalet on the Montgomery side of Alpine
Haven. All of the remaining plaintiffs own lots and property in
Montgomery, where development began a few years later than in
Westfield.

B. Montgomery Conveyances

117. Leisure Properties, Inc. executed all of the deeds for the
Montgomery land. The first individual lot/chalet deed was ex-
ecuted in January 1968. This deed contained the property-use
covenant, a right-of-way, and the grantor promised to maintain the
right-of-way, continue to supply water, maintain the existing
streetlights, and provide garbage removal. This deed did not
include an obligation to pay for any services. There were ten
additional deeds in the 1960s. A payment obligation appeared in
the third deed (“grantee . . . shall pay a reasonable fee therefor”),
becoming the standardized “shall pay . . . a reasonable annual fee”
with the fifth deed.

118. The majority of the lots/chalets in Montgomery were
conveyed in the 1970s. Of twenty-two deeds issued in the 1970s,
five did not include any or at least most of the typical provisions
already discussed: no services obligation of any kind, no use
restrictions, and/or no payment obligation. The remaining seven-
teen deeds included the typical deed language regarding the road
network and other services and the obligation to pay for those
items, as well as the covenant regarding property use.

119. In the 1980s and thereafter, there were five more convey-
ances, which essentially completed the transfer of all the land on
the Montgomery side. None of these deeds contained any of the
standardized deed language that restricted the use of the property
to a single-family home with a garage, obligated the grantor to
provide services, or obligated the grantee to pay for these
services. One contained a provision that expressly allowed com-
mercial use. The fifth deed in 1988 conveyed most (if not all) of
the remaining undeveloped land in Montgomery, in bulk, to the
Northeast Land & Trading Company, and then subsequently to
plaintiffs Gadpaille, Earley, and Khan. This land is the subject of
the “large lots” dispute, not at issue in this appeal.

120. The court found that these last five transactions did not
appear to be representative, and that the overall pattern and
model for conveyances of the individual chalet lots in Montgomery
was established in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, with respect
to plaintiffs Khan, Gadpaille, and LaPointe, each of whom owned
an individual lot and chalet home on the Montgomery side, their
source deeds for those “chalet” lots all came with the standardized
language discussed above. The court noted that the “reasonable
annual fee” language did not contain, or reference, any actual
formula for calculating those expenses.

C. Creation of AHPOA

121. In 1972, Hubert Daberer first organized a nonprofit
corporation called Alpine Haven Property Owner’s Association,
Inc., although the record suggested that this entity became
dormant. Another homeowners’ association was apparently set up
by some lot owners and became active in the mid-1980s, but it
was apparently not legally organized. These two organizations
appeared to have essentially “merged” in the early to mid-1990s
into the current AHPOA.

122. The Daberers and/or their companies collected all of the
“reasonable fees” paid for services and facilities as compensation
for the same and to the former’s own benefit until 1998. At that
time, by deed, AHPOA assumed ownership of, and all of the
maintenance and service-provision responsibilities for, the road
network, snowplowing, street lights and garbage disposal, appar-
ently paying $120,000 to the Daberers and/or their corporate
entities. The purchase expense was then apparently included in
the pro rata charges to all Alpine Haven lot owners. AHPOA now
maintains and operates recreational facilities as well — a swim-
ming pool, tennis courts, and trails — which were originally
constructed primarily by the Daberers and/or their corporate
entities. These are nominally distinct from other basic facilities,
and homeowners must voluntarily sign up and are supposedly
billed separately. Individual driveway plowing and garbage dis-
posal have effectively become voluntary as well over time, and
only lot owners who accept those services must pay for them.

123. Several years after AHPOA med the maintenance and
operation of the basic common facilities in Alpine Haven, it sought
to take advantage of the VCIOA, which became effective January
1, 1999. In August 2002, AHPOA held an “annual meeting” and

260 |

adopted, for the first time, a formal “Declaration” in which it
unilaterally declared that Alpine Haven was a “common interest
community” subject to, and capable of, invoking the provisions of
the Act. This declaration was recorded. In July 2011, AHPOA held
another “special meeting” of its membership, and purportedly
adopted an “Amended and Restated Declaration,’ which was also
recorded.

IL. Trial Court Rulings

124. Based on these facts, the trial court found “a series of
deeds” beginning in the mid-1960s that, taken together, consis-
tently and repeatedly “create[d] the relationship which constitutes
a common interest community.” 27A V.S.A. § 1-103, emt. 14. It
determined that the CIC consisted of all the “chalet” lots in
Alpine Haven, but not the “large lots.”* The common interest, the
court explained, was to have a functioning community restricted to
residential single-family homes and garages, with necessary roads
and street lights, water supply, and garbage pick-up, and the
common burden was for each lot owner to pay a “reasonable fee
therefor.” From the outset, the court concluded, each purchaser
entered into this basic relationship with all of the other (and
subsequent) Alpine Haven property owners, as defined and pro-
vided by those common deed terms. The court determined that
each purchaser had sufficient notice of this relationship from the
“series of deeds” already of record to satisfy due process con-
cerns.

125. The court found it of no moment that some of the earliest
deeds omitted any express payment term, or that the payment.
language used did not become uniform until several deeds had
passed. Citing the definition of a CIC, the court found it sufficient
if the “obligatfion] to pay” exists “by virtue of the person’s
ownership” of the unit and concomitant use of shared services and

EAs to these lots, the court concluded that none of the source deeds contained the
standardized terms and provisions that would pat a buyer on notice that the land
came with common burdens, exeept for an equitable road upkeep requirement
imposed in any event under Hubbard x Bolieau, 144 Vt. 373, 375-76, 477 A.2d 972,
973 (1984), and now by statute. See 19 V.S.A. § 2702 (“In the absence of an express
agreement or requirement governing maintenance of a private road, when more
than one person enjoys a common benefit from a private road, each person shall
contribute rateably to the cost of maintaining the private road, and shall have the
right to bring a civil action to enforce the requirement of this section.”),

facilities, regardless of how that obligation arises or is imposed.
27A VS.A. § 1-103(7). It could occur by express deed language, as
in all but a handful of the deeds here, but it could also occur as
a matter of fundamental equity. See Hubbard, 144 Vt. at 375-76,
477 A.2d at 973 (explaining that Supreme Court has long recog-
nized equitable principle that when several persons enjoy a
common benefit, all must contribute ratably to discharge of
burdens incident to existence of benefit, and obligation to contrib-
ute applies in absence of express agreement). The court distin-
guished Patch uv Springfield School Dis , 2009 VT 117, 187 Vt.
21, 989 A.2d 500, the case on which plaintiffs primarily relied. It
left open the question of whether the 2002 and 2011 Declarations
adopted by AHPOA were valid and enforceable and whether
applicable procedural requirements of VCIOA had been observed.

126. The trial court, with a new presiding judge, issued a
second decision in July 2015. It affirmed the prior ruling that the
chalets in Alpine Haven were a preexisting CIC. It determined
that subsequent amendments to Alpine Haven’s declaration and
bylaws were procedurally defective, and thus void. It found a
material dispute of fact as to whether AHPOA charged reasonable
fees for services rendered, necessitating a trial. This interlocutory
appeal, based on stipulated questions, followed.

III. Arguments on Appeal

127. Plaintiffs challenge the court’s conclusion that a CIC
exists. They argue that to constitute a “declaration” under VCIOA,
a deed must contain the elements of a declaration and put all
purchasers on notice that a planned development is being created
from the very first deed and all that follow. Plaintiffs rely on
Patch, and assert that, as in that case, “[t]he missing ingredient
is a declaration of covenants imposed before the first lot was sold,
or a subsequent agreement among all lot owners to impose a set
of covenants on the involved land.” 2009 VT 117, 915. Plaintiffs
contend that there is no language in any of the deeds at issue
indicating that the grantee has any relationship to anyone other
than the grantor, nor is there language indicating that the
covenants run with the land. Plaintiffs maintain that the covenants
were written for the Daberers’ personal benefit.

128. We review the court’s summary judgment de novo, apply-
ing the same standard as the trial court. Sabia u Neville, 165 Vt.
515, 523, 687 A2d 469, 474 (1996). “Summary judgment is

262 |

appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after
giving the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences to the
nonmoving party.” Id. We conclude that the deeds here did not
suffice to create a CIC.

129. As previously indicated, the term CIC is newly defined in
the UCIOA, based largely on the prior definition of “planned
community” in the Uniform Planned Community Act. While the
comments to the UCIOA indicate that a declaration may be
established through “a series of deeds to units with common
mutually beneficial restrictions,” we have found no case that
squarely addresses this language.* As previously indicated, this
language apparently seeks to encompass CICs or planned com-
munities created at common law. See Wise x Harrington Grove
Cmty. Ass’n, 584 8.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. 2008) (observing that prior
to enactment of Planned Communities Act, creation and enforce-
ment of residential development plans “were largely accomplished
through the use of common law restrictive real estate covenants”);
Roper x Camuso, 829 A.2d 589, 602-03 (Md. 2003) (discussing
origin of doctrine of implied negative reciprocal covenants, and
explaining that in early days, it was uncommon for developer to
evidence development or impose uniform restrictions through
recorded declaration; instead, developer commonly placed restric-
tions in deeds to individual lots and, sometimes, represented to
purchasers that same restrictions would be placed in subsequent
deeds to other lots).

130. HI In applying this language, we find it useful to consider
other types of planned developments that, like CICs, rely on
servitudes for their creation. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.
(Servitudes), ch. 6, intro. note (recognizing that “[slervitudes
underlie all common-interest communities, regardless of the own-
ership and organizational forms used”). This includes “general
plan developments,” defined by the Restatement as a “real-estate
development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or
units are burdened by a servitude imposed to effectuate a plan of

*The trial court cited Evergreen Highlands Ass'n x West, 73 P.3d 1, 8-9 Colo
2003), but acknowledged that in that case, there was a declaration and a recorded
subdivision plat in addition to covenants contained in various deeds within a
subdivision, The court did not refer to the “series of deeds” language in the
UCIOA, and we do not find this case useful here.

land-use controls for the benefit of the property owners in the
development or neighborhood.” Id. § 1.7(1). A servitude may be
implied in a particular deed if a “general plan” exists, and
generally speaking, “the doctrine is applied when: (1) a common
owner subdivides property into a number of lots for sale; (2) the
common owner has a general scheme of development for the
property as a whole, in which the use of the property will be
restricted; (3) the vast majority of subdivided lots contain restric-
tive covenants which reflect the general scheme[ | ; (4) the property
against which application of an implied covenant is sought is part
of the general scheme of development; and (5) the purchaser of
the lot in question has notice, actual or constructive, of the
restriction.” Patch, 2009 VT 117, 119 (citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted).

131. HB CICs “are usually also general-plan developments . . .
because they are usually developed according [to] a general plan
of land-use restrictions.” Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes)
§1.8 emt. a. To be a CIC, however, a general-plan development
must “also include common property that all lot owners are
required to support.” Id. In other words, as set forth in VCTOA,
there must be “real estate described in a declaration with respect
to which a person, by virtue of the person’s ownership of a unit,
is obligated to pay for a share of real estate taxes on, insurance
premiums, maintenance, or improvement of, or services or other
expenses related to common elements, other units, or other real
estate other than that unit described in the declaration.” 27A
VS.A. § 1-103(7).

132. Given the overlap between these two types of development,
we find our decision in Patch, which discussed general plan
developments, instructive here. In Patch, the parties were adjacent
landowners. The plaintiff sought to prohibit her neighbor, a school
district, from constructing a parking lot, arguing that restrictive
covenants in the district’s chain of title limited use of the land to
dwelling purposes. The adjoining lots had a common owner and
the land had been included in the common owner’s 1928 plan for
a residential subdivision containing over 100 lots. A 1928 plat map,

* Significantly, as discussed in greater detail below, we have rejected this “more
relaxed” requirement found in other jurisdictions, and instead require a declaration
of covenants prior to the sale of the first lot or an agreement of all landowners.
Patch, 2009 VT 117, 120.

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which was recorded, showed the land divided into lots. The first
lot, sold in 1929, contained no reference to restrictive covenants.
The next sixteen deeds did, as did ten of the eleven subsequent.
conveyances. The school district’s chain-of-title did not contain any
restrictive covenants as to use of the property.

133. The question before us in Patch was whether the district
was subject to the restrictive covenants that were explicit in the
deeds of most of the properties conveyed by the prior common
grantor. The plaintiff argued that the owner had created a
general-plan development on the land as described in the recorded
plat map, and that the development was governed by the set of
restrictive covenants contained in most of the deeds to the first
seventeen purchasers. We rejected this argument, relying on the
Restatement’s definition of a general-plan development. We ex-
plained that “[cJovenants in individual deeds cannot constitute a
‘declaration’ of covenants,” and even more importantly, the first lot
sold in the subdivision contained no covenants at all. Patch, 2009
VT 17, 112. The recorded plat map did not suffice, we continued,
because it gave no indication of any restrictions that might govern
the identified lots. /d. Taking these factors together, we deter-
mined that the subdivision was not a general-plan development.
Id.

134. In reaching our conclusion, we emphasized that the
“intent” to create a general-plan development, standing alone,
does not suffice. We reasoned:

Here, . . . the filing of a subdivision plat map in the land
records, inclusion of the same restrictive covenants in
many of the deeds to the subdivision lots, and evidence of
intent to create a common-plan development — derived
from the fact that all but a handful of the lots were
expressly subject to the covenants — does not compel us
to conclude a general-plan development exists. The miss-
ing ingredient is a declaration of covenants imposed
before the first lot was sold, or a subsequent agreement
among all lot owners to impose a set of covenants on the
involved land.

Id. 115. We declined to follow the out-of-state cases cited by the
plaintiff, which recognized common plans based on covenants
contained in most but not all of the deeds to lots in a subdivision.
Instead, we emphasized that “[p]urchasers interested in a general-

plan development may either establish such a plan in the common
declaration of covenants or seek out the agreement of their
neighbors.” Id. {1 20.

135. [EE I We reach a similar conclusion here. Just as
covenants must be included in all deeds to create a general-plan
development, so too must all of the deeds include a “common
burden” imposed on all lot owners in order to establish a CIC. In
other words, for a “series of deeds” to constitute a declaration of
a CIC, all of the deeds must describe “the real estate . . . with
respect to which a person, by virtue of the person’s ownership of
a unit, is obligated to pay for a share of real estate taxes on,
insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement of, or services
or other expenses related to common elements, other units, or
other real estate other than that unit described in the declara-
tion.” 27A V.S.A. § 1-103(7). That critical component is missing
here. Numerous deeds, including the first deed, did not include
any obligation for the grantee, by virtue of their ownership of a
lot, to pay for maintenance or improvement of the road, or any
services or other expenses related to common units or other
expenses. In the first deed, the Daberers simply provided the
grantees a right-of-way and the Daberers promised to pipe water
to the construction site on the premises as the grantees may
indicate. Some later deeds included the grantor’s promise to
maintain the right-of-way, supply water, provide for garbage
removal, and maintain the streetlights, with an obligation to pay
for these services, but some deeds did not. Of the 59 original
deeds on the Westfield side, 29 deeds did not contain an express
obligation to pay for any services. Of the 28 original deeds on the
Montgomery side, 11 did not contain any payment obligation, and
10 of these did not include any obligation on the grantor’s part to
provide services. This inconsistent deed history does not suffice to
show a declaration that identifies common property in “Alpine
Haven” that all lot owners were required to support by virtue of
their ownership of a lot.

136. HI We note that an equitable obligation to contribute
based on use of the road, or use of certain services, is not the
same as a servitude that obligates a homeowner to pay regardless
of use. Only the latter obligation will create a CIC. As the
Restatement explains, “[wJhen several landowners share a common
easement, or similar easement rights over a servient estate, they

266 |

may all be required to contribute to maintenance of the ease-
ment,” but “they are not a common-interest-community because
the extent of their duty is determined by the extent of their
actual use of the easement, and they may escape any obligation
by abandoning the easement.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.
(Servitudes) §1.8 emt. ¢. The distinctive feature of a CIC, by
contrast, is an obligation by virtue of a servitude “that binds
owners of individual lots or units to contribute to the support of
common property, or other facilities, or to support the activities of
an association, whether or not the owner uses the common
property or facilities, or agrees to join the association.” Id.
(emphasis added).

137. While it might seem apparent in hindsight that Alpine
Haven “has become” a CIC, we cannot see how it would have
been apparent to certain early buyers, at the time of their
purchase, that their lots were part of a CIC. The scope of the
CIC was never defined. Deeds issued for lots in Westfield did not
reference any deeds in Montgomery. Thus, purchasers in Westfield
would not know about the lot sales in Montgomery, unless they
searched the Montgomery land records. Some of the land origi-
nally owned by the Daberers can be used for commercial pur-
poses, and not all lots are limited to a single-family home with a
garage. It would be unfair to prior purchasers to retroactively
declare this development a CIC. Analogous to our decision in
Patch, moreover, any intent to create a CIC, standing alone, is not
enough.

138. I The purpose of the VCIOA is to promote uniformity
but also to protect residential purchasers. See UCIOA, Pref. Note
(stating that UCIOA’s “thrust in the area of consumer protection
is to protect residential purchasers”). “A fundamental precept of
UCIOA is that full and adequate disclosure to purchasers is a
viable alternative to governmental registration and supervision.”
Id. To this end, “[dJeclarants are bound by representations made
in the declaration, by the models or samples they use, and by the
public offering statements, and are held to statutory limitations
and standards to protect consumers. Among the basic represen-
tations made by declarants are those which describe the scope of
development rights and their duration.” Jd. While preexisting
CICs are not required to have a declaration that satisfies the
requirements for newly created CICs, it is worth noting that the
purported declaration here did not include any of these basic

representations, or other very basic requirements such as “[t]he
name of each municipality in which any part of the common
interest community is located,” “[a] legally sufficient description of
the real estate included in the common interest. community,” and
“(al statement of the maximum number of units which the
declarant reserves the right to create.” 27A V.S.A. § 2-105(a)(2)-(4);
see also Nahrstedt w Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275,
1281 (Cal. 1994) (explaining that “the declaration, which is the
operative document for the creation of any common interest
development, is a collection of covenants, conditions and servitudes
that govern the project,’ and typically “describes the real prop-
erty and any structures on the property, delineates the common
areas within the project as well as the individually held lots or
units, and sets forth restrictions pertaining to the use of the
property”).

139. The trial court emphasized that the VCIOA seeks to
satisfy basic elements of due process, with the “notice” part
satisfied by some “declaration” of record that lets the homeowner
know prior to purchase that her or his or their property is in fact
part of a “common interest community” such that common
interests and common burdens exist. Unlike the trial court, we do
not find here a “series of deeds” that “create[d] the relationship
which constitutes a common interest community,’ nor can we
conclude that each purchaser had sufficient notice of this relation-
ship from the “series of deeds” to satisfy procedural fairness
concerns.°

® We did not hold otherwise in Alpine Haven Property Owners Ass'n x Deptula,
2003 VT 51, 175 Vt. 559, 830 A.2d 78 (mem.). In that ease, AHPOA sued certain
property owners in Alpine Haven to collect unpaid fees, plus interest and costs, for
road maintenance and other services rendered. We did not consider whether Alpine
Haven was a CIC, but rather noted that the VCIOA did not apply because the
collection action related to events and circumstances that occurred before the Act’s
effective date. Id. 19 (citing 27A V.S.A. § 1-204(a)). Our decision focused on deeds
that required the lot owner to pay a “reasonable annual fee” for the services
specified in the deed — maintenance of roads, snow removal from the roads, street
lighting, and water service — and we rejected the assertion that the fees must be
calculated on a cost basis. Id. M1 12-17. We found that the deeds “require the
payment of a reasonable annual fee, not a pro rata share of actual costs,” and thus,
AHPOA was “not limited to charging only costs, but may assess a reasonable fee
for its services” Id 1 17. We affirmed the trial court’s decision that the
homeowners failed to show that the rate structure or fees, which included a special
assessment to repair the roadways, were unreasonable. Id. 26

268 |

140. Because we conclude that there was no preexisting CIC
here, we need not address the parties’ arguments about AHPOA’s
attempts to adopt an amended declaration. These arguments
depend on the trial court’s finding that Alpine Haven was a
preexisting CIC. The only questions left for our consideration are:
“on what basis may [AHPOA] calculate the fees for deeded
services it has provided to each of the plaintiffs’ properties,” and
“(how much of a fee, if any, for their rights of way may the
Association charge the owners of the three parcels of land in
Montgomery that were conveyed by Northeast Land and Trading
Co., Ltd. to (i) Eric Gadpaille on July 3, 2000; (ii) Nafis Khan and
Sarita Kahn on March 30, 2001; and (iii) to Robert Earley on
April 6, 2001.”

141. The trial court did not address either of these questions.
It did not reach the first question because it determined that
Alpine Haven was a CIC. It deferred judgment on the second
question until a trial could be held. We decline to decide either of
these questions in the first instance and leave these questions for
the trial court to resolve on remand.

Reversed and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

2016 VT 108

Melissa Solomon y. Jane Guidry
(155 Ad 1218)
No. 16-004
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 23, 2016

Amy K. Butler of Law Office of Amy K. Butler, PLLC,
Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jane Guidry, Pro Se, Garner, North Carolina, Defendant-
Appellee.

11. Skoglund, J. Plaintiff Melissa Solomon appeals the dis-
missal, without consideration of the merits, of her petition for
dissolution of a nonresident civil union.’ We reverse and remand.

12. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a civil union on July 24,
2001, in Brattleboro, Vermont, but both currently reside in Wake
County, North Carolina. The parties were separated by May 2014.
The parties have no children. In 2015, they decided to dissolve
their civil union and filed an uncontested complaint in Vermont,
accompanied by a final stipulation, as dictated by 15 VS.A.
§ 1206(b).

13. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that
the parties failed to produce evidence that they attempted to
obtain a dissolution of the civil union in North Carolina. The court

1 We note that defendant Jane Guidry also asked this Court to grant the relief
requested by plaintiff on appeal

270 Le

went on to state that, if the parties attempted to file for
dissolution in North Carolina and if a North Carolina court
refused to address the matter, then “the proper appeal should be
taken there.” The court expressed concern that if Vermont courts
“continue[d] to accept these filings and allow courts in other states
to ignore precedent [set by Obergefell uv Hodges, _ US. __,
, 185 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)], the situation [would] never be
resolved.” This appeal followed.

14. Plaintiff argues that (1) the court erred as a matter of law
in applying the Obergefell decision; (2) the court exceeded its
constitutional authority by imposing requirements not included in
15 V.S.A. § 1206(b), constituting reversible error; and (8) the trial
court controverted both the plain language and the legislative
intent of § 1206(b) in its dismissal, producing the exact result the
statute was enacted to remedy. We reverse and remand.

15. In order to address these issues properly, we must conduct
a brief survey of the legislative history of § 1206(b). In 2000,
responding to this Court’s decision in Baker u State, 170 Vt. 194,
744 A.2d 864 (1999), the Vermont Legislature created a new legal
entity, the civil union, which “[e]xtend[ed] the benefits and pro-
tections of marriage to same-sex couples” through a system
entirely separate from civil marriages. 1999, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.),
§ 1. “While a system of civil unions [did] not bestow the status of
civil marriage, it [did] satisfy the legal relationships of the
Common Benefits Clause.” Id.

16. Then in 2009, Vermont became the first state to legislatively
recognize same-sex marriage by redefining civil marriage from
“the legally recognized union of one man and one woman” to “the
legally recognized union of two people.” 15 V.S.A. § 8. Although not
explicitly codified, the Legislature’s view of the relationship be-
tween civil unions and civil marriages is clear from the extensive
act summary and legislative history:

When the act takes effect on September 1, 2009,
same-sex couples will have access to the civil marriage
laws but may no longer establish a civil union. Couples
with existing civil unions will be permitted to marry one
another. The civil marriage does not dissolve the civil
union. Civil unions established before September 1, 2009
will continue to be recognized in Vermont, regardless of
whether the couple chooses to marry.

Act No. 3 Summary, Vermont Legislature, http://legislature.vermont.
s/Documents/2010/Docs/AC TS/ACT003/ACT003%20
‘y.htm [https://perma.cc/P9T2-R4ZY]. Thus, it was
the Legislature’s intent to maintain civil unions and civil mar-
riages as separate legally recognized entities governed by differ-
ent chapters of Title 15 — civil unions under chapter 23 and civil
marriages under chapter 1 — as long as the civil union occurred
prior to September 1, 2009.

17. Next, in 2012, the Legislature amended both chapter 11,
which governs divorce and annulment, and chapter 23 to address
the “patchwork of laws regarding the recognition of legally joined
same-sex couples.” 2011, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), §1. The purpose of
the amendments was “to provide access to a civil union dissolution
or a divorce to nonresident couples joined in a Vermont civil union
or Vermont marriage who are legally barred from dissolving the
union in their state of residence.” Jd. (emphasis added). The
Legislature noted that “while an opposite-sex out-of-state couple
who marries in Vermont can get divorced in the state of residence
of either party, most same-sex out-of-state couples joined in a
Vermont civil union or marriage do not have this option” because
their state of residence does not recognize their Vermont civil
union or marriage. Jd. (emphasis added).

18. To solve this pressing issue, the Legislature enacted two
new sections outlining the requirements for nonresident divorces
and civil union dissolutions. Under 15 V.S.A. § 1206(b), a nonresi-
dent civil union may be dissolved by the family court in the
county in which the civil union certificate was filed if the following
criteria are met:”

(1) The civil union of the parties was established in
Vermont.

(2) Neither party’s state of legal residence recognizes
the couple’s Vermont civil union for purposes of dissolu-
tion.

(3) There are no minor children who were born or
adopted during the civil union.

(4) The parties file a stipulation together with a
complaint that resolves all issues in the dissolution action.

2 The criteria for dissolving a nonresident civil union essentially mirrors the
criteria for nonresident divorces. See 15 V.S.A. § 592(b).

272 |

The stipulation shall be signed by both parties and shall
include the following terms:

(A) An agreement that the terms and conditions of
the stipulation may be incorporated into a final order
of dissolution.

(B) The facts upon which the Court may base a
decree of dissolution of a civil union and that bring
the matter before the Court’s jurisdiction.

(C) An acknowledgment that:

(i) Each party understands that if he or she
wishes to litigate any issue related to the dis-
solution before a Vermont court, one of the
parties must meet the residency requirement set
forth in section 592 of this title.

(ii) Neither party is the subject of an abuse
prevention order in a proceeding between the
parties.

(iii) There are no minor children who were
born or adopted during the civil union.

(iv) Neither party’s state of legal residence
recognizes the couple’s Vermont civil union for
purposes of dissolution.

(v) Each party has entered into the stipulation
freely and voluntarily.

(vi) The parties have exchanged all financial
information, including income, assets, and
liabilities.

19. Then, in 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held “that there is
no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of
its same-sex character.” Obergefell, - ~ US. at __, 185 S. Ct. at
2608 (emphasis added).

110. HI However, beca ivil marriage and civil unions
remain legally distinct entities in Vermont and because Oberg
mandated that states recognize only same-sex nuarriage, uncer-
tainty remains as to whether Obergefell requires other states to
recognize and dissolve civil unions established in Vermont. For
that reason, § 1206(b) is still necessary to remedy the issue

originally addressed by the Legislature in 2012 — that “there are
many same-sex couples who established a civil union . . . in
Vermont who are no longer together, yet they continue to be
legally bound with no recourse other than moving to Vermont and
becoming residents.” 2011, No. 92 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. Thus, nonresi-
dent couples who wish to dissolve their Vermont civil unions may
do so in Vermont courts, as long as they follow the requirements
of § 1206(b).

111. The parties here followed the § 1206(b) mandates. First,
while the couple originally filed their complaint in an incorrect
county, it was promptly transferred to the proper county, where
the license was issued. Second, the civil union was established in
Vermont, per § 1206(b)(1). Third, § 1206(b)(3) was satisfied because
there are no minor children who were born or adopted during the
civil union. Fourth, the parties filed a stipulation including all of
the terms under § 1206(b)(4), listed above.

112. Finally, the law requires an acknowledgment that “{nJeither
party’s state of legal residence recognizes the couple’s Vermont civil
union for purposes of dissolution.” Jd. § 1206(b)(4)(C)(iv). To satisfy
this element, the parties produced an affidavit from a North
Carolina attorney whose practice is “dedicated to providing services
to the lesbian, gay and transgender ((LQBTQ’) community, includ-
ing domestic relations, estate planning, and life planning.” This
attorney, from research and years of practice, concluded that while
North Carolina “grudgingly” follows Obergefell and recognizes
same-sex marriages for divorce proceedings, “it will accord no
recognition to a ‘civil union’ or ‘domestic partnership’ for [dissolu-
tion] purpose[s].”

1113. JM Plaintiff contends that the provided affidavit satisfied
the “acknowledgment” required by § 1206(b), and thus the court
erred when it refused to consider the issue and held that North
Carolina was the proper venue for all filings and appeals. We
agree with plaintiff. The principal purpose “of statutory construc-
tion is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legisla-
ture,” which we have determined above. In re C.S., 158 Vt. 339,
343, 609 A2d 641, 643 (1992). “Where the statute does not
specifically define a term, courts resort to the common under-
standing of a term.” State u Amsden, 2013 VT 51, 119, 194 Vt.
128, 75 A3d 612. The noun “acknowledgment” is defined as “{a]
recognition of something as being factual.” Black’s Law Dictionary

6

74 |

27 (10th ed. 2014). It would reach beyond both the written letter
and the Legislature’s intent to hold that the “acknowledgment”
must also include actual showing of an attempt to file in the other
state. For this reason, we reverse and remand to the lower court.
to follow the dictates of § 1206(b).

Reversed and remanded.

2016 VT 111

In re MVP Health Insurance Company
[155 A.3d 1207)
No. 16-044

Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund and Eaton, JJ., and Teachout, Supr.
J, Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed September 23, 2016

Gary F. Karnedy and Kevin M. Henry of Primmer Piper
Eggleston & Cramer PC, Burlington, for Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Bridget Asay, Solicitor
General, and Elizabeth M. Tisher, Assistant Attorney General,
Montpelier, for Appellee Green Mountain Care Board.

Lila Richardson and Kaili Kuiper, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc.,
Montpelier, for Appellee Office of the Health Care Advocate.

11. Dooley, J. This case arises out of the rate filing submitted
to the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB) by MVP Health
Insurance Company (MVP) with respect to the Agri-Services
health insurance plan. Acting through its authority to review and
approve or deny health insurance rates in the State of Vermont,
GMCB found that the 2015 Agri-Services rate filing would not
promote access to quality health care and denied it on that basis.
MVP appeals, arguing that GMCB’s disapproval was an arbitrary
use of discretion based on vague standards that unconstitutionally
delegated authority to GMCB, that GMCB’s decision is not
supported by the record, and that GMCB’s statutory interpreta-
tion of its authority is compelling error. We hold that 8 V.S.A.
§ 4062 is constitutional but find that GMCB’s conclusions were not
supported by specific findings on the statutory criteria required
for approval of health insurance rates and, accordingly, reverse
and remand for new findings consistent with this opinion.

12. Agri-Services is an association for farmers that provides a
health insurance plan to its members. This plan is provided
through MVP, a New York corporation that provides health
insurance in Vermont and New York. Agri-Services has a minimum
premium plan, under which Agri-Services pays its own claims up
to 115% of expected claim liability, and MVP provides adminis-

276 |

trative services and stop-loss coverage at a pooling level of
$200,000. At the time of GMCB’s review, Agri-Services offered five
health plans that covered 1220 of its members for one full year
beginning December 2015.

13. As per 8 V.S.A. § 4062(a)(1), an insurer may not deliver or
issue for delivery a health insurance policy in Vermont until a
copy of the policy’s premium rates is filed with GMCB and GMCB
has issued a decision approving, modifying, or disapproving the
proposed rate. GMCB “shall determine whether a rate is afford-
able, promotes quality care, promotes access to health care,
protects insurer solvency, and is not unjust, unfair, inequitable,
misleading or contrary to the laws of this State.” Id. § 4062(a)(8).
In rendering its decision, GMCB “shall consider the analysis and
opinion provided by the Department of Financial Regulation”
regarding the impact of the proposed rate on the insurer’s
solvency and reserves. Id. § 4062(a)(2)-(3).

14. In July 2014, MVP submitted its 2014 Agri-Services filing,
allowing GMCB to conclude its ninety-day review, and the carrier
to provide at least thirty days’ notice to affected members of an
approved rate change prior to its December 1 effective date. At
the time of its 2014 rate filing, Agri-Services advised GMCB that
it would discontinue its policies in Vermont and that its members
would purchase future coverage through Vermont Health Conne
GMCB maintains that it premised its approval of Agri-Service:
2014 rate filing, including an increase of 14.9%, on MVP’s
confirmation that the filing would be its last and that members
would be notified that they would need to enroll in a plan through
Vermont Health Connect for 2015.

15. In 2015, MVP did not submit its Agri-Services Association
Rate Filing to GMCB until September 9. In its filing, MVP
requested a 26.9% average annual rate increase. GMCB submitted
the filing to its actuaries, who reviewed it. On October 30, 2015,
Agri-Services notified its members of the rate increase, stating
that the increase was “pending approval.” Agri-Services told
members that those who did not terminate coverage would be
billed at the preexisting premium rate until new rates were
determined, and that they would be retroactively billed at the new
premium rates once they were finalized. Subsequently, Agri-
Services advised members that they could terminate their cover-
age and enroll in Vermont Health Connect, but must do so no
later than December 15, 2015, for coverage beginning on January
1, 2016.

16. During the course of actuarial review, an error was
discovered in MVP’s rate calculation, and MVP submitted a
revised filing on November 3, 2015, requesting an average annual
rate increase of 27.4%. MVP used claims made from May 1, 2014,
through April 30, 2015, and paid through June 30, 2015, to develop
its proposed rates. MVP projected the base period claims, minus
claims in excess of $200,000, forward to the ratings period using
an annual effective medical cost increase trend of 6.6% and
prescription drug cost increase trend of 17.5%, and then adjusted
the projected claims to account for a 2.7% stop-loss fee. No
adjustment was made for demographic changes and premium cost
was increased to account for operating expenses of 15.9%, includ-
ing general administrative expenses of 9.75% and a 1% contribu-
tion to surplus. GMCB found that the proposed rate increase of
27.4% resulted from observed claim trends that had “far outpaced
premium increases,” with observed cost increase trends of 30.4%
for medical and 55.8% for prescription drug costs for a total cost
increase of 32.6%. After reviewing the rate filing, GMCB’s actu-
aries recommended that GMCB calculate a single conversion
factor and demographic factor based on Agri-Services’ most recent
enrollment distribution, which would reduce the rates by approxi-
mately 0.9%, and use Agri-Services’ specific experience to calculate
its projected medical and prescription drug trends, reducing the
medical cost increase trend from 6.6% to 6.4% and the pharmacy
cost increase trend from 17.5% to 17.1%. These two adjustments
would decrease the rate increase to 25.9%. While the actuaries
noted that some members would experience “undoubtedly a sig-
nificant increase” if the filing was approved, they concluded that
the proposed rates were not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory. The Office of the Health Care Advocate (HCA), on
the other hand, recommended that GMCB disapprove or modify
the rate request to make it “as affordable as possible.” MVP
requested that GMCB reject the actuaries’ recommendations and
approve the rates as originally filed.

17. The parties waived a hearing pursuant to GMCB Rule 2.000
and filed memoranda arguing their position in lieu of a hearing. In
considering the parties’ requests, GMCB noted that the rate
increases proposed by MVP were higher than any previously
approved by the Board. Furthermore, GMCB noted that it had
premised its approval of Agri-Services’ 14.9% rate increase in 2014
on MVP’s confirmation that the 2014 rate filing would be Agri-

278 |

Services’ last. GMCB criticized the tardiness of MVP's filing,
noting that by filing as late as September 9 it left the Board
insufficient time to complete its ninety-day review before a
December 1 effective date, making it impossible for Agri-Services
to comply with GMCB Rule 2.2405 and notify its members of the
rate increase thirty days or more prior to the increase taking
effect. MVP’s error in filing further compounded the problem by
delaying review even more, meaning that GMCB’s review could
not commence until after its revised filing was submitted in
November. Furthermore, GMCB found that MVP improperly
characterized the Agri-Services plans as “transitional,” a designa-
tion which no longer exists in the State of Vermont. GMCB noted
that no evidence in the record suggested that Agri-Services had
ever notified its members that their plans would no longer be
renewed, as they had represented would happen in their 2014 rate
filing. Taken together, GMCB found that the tardiness of the
filing, and the confusion over whether or not the previous year’s
filing would be the last for this plan, demonstrated a “lack of
accountability,” leading GMCB to conclude that the proposed rates
“did not promote access to quality health care and are unfair,
unjust and inequitable.”

18. MVP filed a motion for reconsideration on January 11, 2016,
which GMCB denied on January 21. MVP appealed.

19. On appeal, MVP makes the following alternative arguments:
(1) GMCB’s disapproval constituted an arbitrary exercise of
discretion based on vague statutory standards that unconstitution-
ally delegated legislative authority to GMCB; (2) GMCB improp-
erly disapproved the rate filing on grounds not supported by the
record; and (3) GMCB’s decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of its statutory grant of authority. We conclude that
. § 4062 is constitutional but agree that GMCB’s conclu-
were not supported by specific findings on the statutory
criteria required for approval of health insurance rates and
reverse and remand for new findings on that ground. Accordingly,
we need not address MVP’s final argument.

110. I The first issue is a question of constitutional law, which
we review de novo.’ Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, 14, 188 Vt.

‘We acknowledge that, as per the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, “[sltatutory
claims are to be considered first, and if dispositive, we will not need to reach the
constitutional issues.” State x Curtis, 157 Vt. 275, 277, 597 A.2d 770, 772 (1991).

367, 10 A3d 469. “Where warranted by the evidence, an admin-
istrative board’s findings of fact are conclusively binding on this
Court.” In re Agency of Admin. State Bldgs. Div, 141 Vt. 68, 74,
444 A2d 1349, 1351 (1982).

111. MVP's first contention is that 8 V.S.A. § 4062 fails to
provide appropriate delegation boundaries to GMCB in violation of
the Vermont and United States Constitutions.? Specifically, MVP
argues that the Legislature failed to provide “sufficient, concrete
guidance” as to the meaning of the terms “affordable,” “promotes
quality care,” and “promotes access to health care,” or direction as
to what evidence GMCB should consider when making these
statutory determinations. MVP imagines at least four possible
definitions for the promotion of quality care and access to
healthcare — ranging from charging high premiums to attract
skilled healthcare workers to Vermont to capping premiums for all
patients — to suggest that the question of what constitutes
quality care or access is a “public policy argument |” that should

However, in this instance “disposition of the case requires” consideration of the
constitutional question, as MVP is requesting different remedies, one bearing on
the jurisdiction of GMCB and one bearing on the decision and order in this case.
Id. First, MVP asks that we declare 8 V.S.A. § 4062(a)(8) and 18 V.S.A. § 9375(b)(6)
unconstitutional and, accordingly, hold that GMCB lacked the authority to regulate
rates in any case. In the alternative, MVP requests that we reverse GMCB’s
decision on the rates it submitted for approval because the Board did not set forth
sufficient specific findings and the decision was not, based on the statutory criteria.
To that end, addressing the second question would not determine whether the
GMCB can regulate rates, the primary issne MVP presents. Thus, it would not
fully resolve the case and we must address the delegation question. Compare
Veasey x Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding that because court
found voter ID law has discriminatory effect under Voting Rights Act, “[pJlaintift's
will be entitled to the same relief they could access if they prevailed on [their]
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims” and as “the rights and remedies are
intertwined,” court need not decide constitutional question), and Ketchum w Byrne,
740 F.2d 1398, 1409-10 (7th Cir, 1984) (“There appears to be no difference in the
practical result or in the available remedy regardless of how the resulting
discrimination is characterized. We therefore shall not explicitly decide the issue of
a fourteenth amendment violation . . . .”), with In ve Sealed Documents, 172 Vt.
152, 156, 772 A.2d 518, 523 (2001) (observing we address constitutional issues
“when the matter is squarely and necessarily presented”). See also Brigham x
State, 2005 VT 105, 110, 179 Vt. 525, 889 A2d 715 (mem.) (“The doctrine of
jndicial restraint does not allow the court to relinquish its duty to interpret the
constitution when judicial intervention may potentially block legislative action.”).
? GMCB has drawn no distinction between the federal and state constitutions with
respect to this claim. We thus have considered precedents under both as well as
precedents from other states

280 |

have been decided by the Legislature, rather than delegated to
GMCB. We disagree.

112. HI We begin by noting that in modern case law we have
found that duly enacted laws represent an improper delegation of
the Legislature’s law-making function only if they are devoid of
any conceivable standard to guide and constrain discretion. For
example, in Hunter uv State, this Court considered whether the
Legislature validly delegated the authority to prepare and imple-
ment a deficit-prevention plan to address a revenue shortfall while
it was not in session to the Secretary of Administration, an
executive branch official, and to the Joint Fiscal Committee (JFC),
a legislative committee. 2004 VT 108, 11, 177 Vt. 339, 865 A.2d
381. In relevant part, the plaintiffs argued that even an otherwise
valid legislative delegation “cannot be made without limiting
standards for the exercise of discretion” and that no standards
existed where the Secretary’s authority to implement a deficit-
reduction plan contained only the following limits:

(1) the official revenue estimate for the general, trans-
portation or federal fund must have declined by 2% or
more from that in effect on January 15, 2002; (2) the
Legislature must not be in session; (8) the plan must be
necessary to ensure a balanced budget in the general or
transportation funds; (4) the plan must be designed to
minimize any negative effects on the delivery of services
and on local budgets . . . ; and (5) the plan must reflect
the priorities established by the general assembly in the
fiscal year 2003 appropriations act.

Id. 126 (quotations omitted). We found that the above limits
provided the needed standards.

113. In reaching our conclusion, we observed that the principal
difference between schemes that have been upheld and those that.
have been struck down is whether there are “any standards” for
the exercise of discretion. /d. 128. We surveyed a series of cases
from our sister states, contrasting those where delegations were
invalidated because the Legislature had “ ‘articulated no principles,
intelligible or otherwise, to guide the executive?” id. (quoting
State x Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Alaska
1987)), with those where delegations were upheld because they
permitted actions only, for example, “to the extent that the
[executive] deems necessary” and as such were deemed sufficient

because “they were as definite as was reasonably practicable
under the circumstances.” Jd. 130 (citing Unin of Conn. Ch.
AAUP w Governor, 512 A.2d 152, 158-59 (Conn. 1986)). Accord-
ingly, mindful of the fact that we “begin with an assumption that
the legislation is constitutional,” we held that the standards
imposed were sufficient for the exercise of the Secretary’s and
JFC’s powers, as they were tailored to the circumstances; in
particular, we noted it “would be difficult here to create more
detailed, narrow or explicit standards” and observed “flexibility is
required” to implement reductions in a way that minimizes public
harm. /d. 131. Compare Vincent uv Vt. State Ret. Bd., 148 Vt. 531,
535-36, 5386 A.2d 925, 928 (1987) (noting that because Legislature
used clear language in determining when Retirement Board
should offset compensation award against pension, fact they were
granted “discretionary authority” in determining how to offset
award is immaterial, as Legislature provided “clear mandatory
guidelines” to follow in arriving at decisions), and Vt. Educ. Bldgs.
Fin. Agency vu Mann, 127 Vt. 262, 268, 247 A.2d 68, 72 (1968)
(concluding agency’s delegated authority to enter contracts to
achieve valid public objective was “neither new nor untried,” such
authority necessarily “involves a wide discretion on the part of the
Agency,” and is legitimate because delegation confines authority
“within ascertainable and reasonable boundaries”), with In re
Handy, 171 Vt. 336, 348-49, 764 A.2d 1226, 1238 (2000) (recogniz-
ing that although “a standard sufficient to save [a] statute can be
general, and can be derived from historical usage or other parts
of the statutory scheme,” statute involved in this case “provides
absolutely no standard or guidance” and “on its face . . . provides
unlimited discretion for a selectboard to grant or deny permis-
sion,” has “no historical usage,” and bears only “general and
inclusive policy statements that do not help provide limits for
administration” (citations omitted)), and Vill. of Waterbury v.
Melendy, 109 Vt. 441, 453, 199 A. 286, 242 (1938) (finding law did
not meet constitutional requirements where Legislature did not
indicate any policy or plan for apportionment of expense of
projects, did not state directly or by implication nature or kind of
benefits to which it referred and gave “no rule or standard by
which those benefits [were] to be determined and the assessments
made,” such that “{t]he commission, in order to act, must say
what the law shall be and not merely exercise discretion as to its
execution”).

282 |

114. Indeed, when our sister states have wrangled with com-
parable cases, they have reached identical conclusions. For ex-
ample, in Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc. u McVey, a Florida
appellate court considered whether a statute governing nursing
home residents’ rights was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority where the statute instructed the Agency for
Health Care Administration that patients had the “right to receive
adequate and appropriate health care,” a right which the plaintiff
argued was not defined by any “discernible standard.” 739 So. 2d
646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The Florida court found that
the statute was not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority,
observing:

The specificity of the standards and guidelines the
legislature provides may depend upon the subject matter
at issue and the degree of difficulty involved in articu-
lating finite standards. It is this principle which we deem
controlling as to [the statute]. The term healthcare is one
which can be easily determined in the community. What
is adequate and appropriate healthcare will change from
day to day based on advancements in medicine and
technology. It is not possible for the legislature to
anticipate what is now unknown and untested and include
it in a finite definition. It is only by placing the authority
in the agency to make this determination and make
appropriate changes in rules and definitions that the
legislative intent can be carried out.

Id. at 649 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Dep't of
Envtl. Prot. v Cumberland Coal Res. LP, 102 A.3d 962, 978 (Pa.
2014) (noting delegation is constitutional where it contains “pri-
mary guidelines” and reflects “basic policy choices”); Kan. One-
Call Sys. Inc. uv State, 274 P.3d 625, 634 (Kan. 2012) (upholding
delegation to administrative body because power was limited to
“adopting necessary rules for carrying out provisions” and body
was “not given free rein to create new rules unrelated to those
specified provisions”); accord Dep't of Transp. u Ass’n of Am.

RR, US. __, , 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1251 (2015) (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (observing that Supreme Court’s intelligible prince
test “requires nothing more than a minimal degree of sp
the instructions Congress gives to the Executive when it autho-
rizes the Executive to make rules having the force and effect of

Jaw” and noting Court “has almost never felt qualified to second-
guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judg-
ment that can be left to those executing or applying the law”
(quotation omitted)).

115. Most persuasive is the line of cases examining legislative
delegations in the context of insurance rate approval. For ex-
ample, in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. v Commissioner of
Insurance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts consid-
ered whether a statute empowering the Commissioner of Insur-
ance to review proposed rates constituted an “unconstitutional
grant of unfettered discretion.” 489 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Mass.
1986). The Commissioner could not approve rates if they were
“excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory”; he was permit-
ted to disallow rates if the benefits provided were “unreasonable
in relation to the rate charged”; and any cost containment
activities had to be “acceptable to him.” Jd. at 1251, 1255
(quotations omitted). The Massachusetts high court noted that
“broad delegations of authority” are not constitutionally violative
and that “[e]lven very general legislative guides are sufficient if
appropriate judicial review procedures are provided.” Jd. at
1255-56 (alterations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the
court concluded that the Commissioner did not have unfettered
discretion and that “no improper delegation [had] been made” as
the Commissioner’s discretion was “modified by the standard of
‘demonstrated impact?” Jd. at 1256. The court observed that the
meaning of the phrase “acceptable to him,” as understood by the
Commissioner, to require judgment on the “soundness, scope, and
adequacy” of the insurer’s review and cost containment activities,
demonstrated his authority was properly construed in light of the
“general, but clear” demonstrated impact standard. Jd. at 1255,
1256; see also Retired Pub. Enups. Ass’n v. Cuomo, 995 N.Y.S.2d
757, 762 (App. Div. 2014) (observing that power given to Civil
Service Commission to modify health insurance contribution rates
permissible where “the basic policy decisions underlying the
actions authorized have been made and articulated by the Legis-
lature,” such that there was no need for “a specific and detailed
legislative expression authorizing a particular executive act” (quo-
tations and alterations omitted)); Blue Cross of Ne. Ohio wv
Ratchford, 416 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980) (validating delegation
of authority to deny rate increases when Superintendent of
Insurance finds proposed rates “lawful, fair, and reasonable” and

284 Le

good faith effort had not been made to contain costs, because
containment of medical costs was permissible delegation of Gen-
eral Assembly’s discretionary functions, judicial review was avail-
able, and “[fJurther guidance would be impractical”).

116. Here, GMCB’s discretion is curtailed by considerations of
affordability, the promotion of quality care and access to care,
insurer solvency, and fairness, as well as by the requirement that
it consider the opinion of the Department of Financial Regulation.
8 VS.A. § 4062(a)(3). That these terms are general and open-ended
reflects the practical difficulty of establishing “more detailed,
narrow or explicit standards” in this field, a difficulty due to the
fluidity inherent in concepts of quality care, access, and
affordability given advancements (and setbacks) in technology,
medicine, employment, and economic well-being. Hunter, 2004 VT
108, 131; Beverly Enters.-Fla., 739 So. 2d at 649. Accordingly,
“flexibility is required,” Hunter, 2004 VT 108, 131, to accomplish
the Legislature’s goals of achieving universal access and coverage;
containing costs; improving the quality of care; maintaining a
transparent, efficient, and accountable healthcare system; and
financing healthcare in a way that is “fair, predictable, transpar-
ent, [and] sustainable.” 18 V.S.A. § 9371(11); see also Blue Cross of
Ne. Ohio, 416 N.E.2d at 617 (“(W]hen the discretion to be
exercised relates to a police regulation for the protection of . . .
health . . . , and it is impossible or impracticable to provide such
standards, and to do so would defeat the legislative object sought
to be accomplished, legislation conferring such discretion may be
valid and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations.”)
(quotation omitted). Finally, “appropriate judicial review proce-
dures are provided” because, as demonstrated here, an insurer
may appeal GMCB’s decisions to our Court. Blue Cross of Mass.,
489 N.E.2d at 1256; 8 VS.A. § 4062(g).

117. IM Consequently, in consideration of the above decisions
of this Court, our sister states, and the United States Supreme
Court, which have observed that there is no delegation if the
legislation in question “provides a general statement of policy,
together with a right to judicial review, of any administrative
action taken,” Blue Cross of Ne. Ohio, 416 N.E.2d at 618, we are
satisfied that the standard governing GMCB’s review contained in
8 VS.A. § 4062(a)(3) provides sufficient guidelines such that the

statute does not constitute an improper delegation of legislative
power.®

118. MVP next argues that even if GMCB’s grant of discretion
is found constitutional, its decision in this case should nonetheless
be reversed because its conclusions “are not supported by specific
findings on the statutory criteria required for approval of health
insurance rates.” MVP alleges that the decision “fails to provide
an adequate basis for review by this Court,” as GMCB both failed
to explain how the proposed rate did not promote access to
quality healthcare and was unfair, unjust, and inequitable to plan
members while simultaneously ignoring the relevant evidence and
basing its decisions on factors “that have no nexus [to] the
proposed rates.” We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand
for GMCB to make specific findings, based on the statutory
factors, to support its conclusions.

119. I We approach this issue deferentially. This Court “will
not interfere with the decision of an administrative board made in
the performance of a discretionary duty in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to one of the
parties.” Vincent, 148 Vt. at 536, 5386 A.2d at 929. Therefore, we

* MVP also argues that other “related constitutional grounds” mandate a finding
that the statute is unconstitutional: the statute “denies MVP equal protection of
the laws,” as the absence of specific criteria “allows the Board to exercise its
unfettered discretion in a discriminatory fashion,” and it is so vague that it
“violates MVP’s due process rights because it fails to give fair notice as to what
is required for approval.” We decline to address these specific claims in full for two
reasons, First, the arguments are referenced only briefly “{aJlong with the
delegation doctrine” in the “standard of review” section of MVP's primary
argument regarding unconstitutional delegation. The brief alludes to broad prin-
ciples in only three cases and fails to elucidate how the actual language of the
statute is insufficiently precise or how GMCB exercised its discretion in a
discriminatory manner in this case. See In re Boardman, 2009 VT 42, 120, 186 Vt.
176, 979 A.2d 1010 (noting that “inadequately briefed” claims “need not be
addressed”), Second, our above analysis — and the cases we rely on — answer
these questions, insofar as we are holding that the statute contains sufficient
specific criteria and precise standards to render it constitutional. See Whitman v
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 581 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (remarking that “even in sweeping
regulatory schemes, [the United States Supreme Court] has never demanded
that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion’ ”); Melendy, 109 Vt. at 451, 199 A.
at 241 (noting that Legislature may delegate the responsibility to “fill up the
details” of statute’s general provisions (quotation omitted)); Beverly Hnters-Fla.,
739 So. 2d at 646 (finding that phrases such as “adequate and appropriate health
care” are “terms of common usage and understanding” and as such statute was
not unconstitutionally vague)

286 |

“will not delve into the reasons for the Board’s actions absent
evidence of an abuse in the exercise of its discretion.” Id. at
536-37, 536 A.2d at 929.

120. HH This Court has consistently affirmed the necessity of
the clear application of applicable standards in both judicial and
administrative decisions. We have emphasized that decisions “ar-
rived at without reference to any standards or principles [are]
arbitrary and capricious; such ad-hoc decision-making denies [an]
applicant due process of law.” In re Miserocchi, 170 Vt. 320, 325,
749 A.2d 607, 611 (2000) (citation omitted). We have also been firm
that “[a]dequate findings of fact are required, so that we may
determine whether the sound discretion implicitly mandated by [a]
statute was in fact exercised.” State x Powers, 136 Vt. 167, 169,
385 A.2d 1067, 1068 (1978); see also Kanaan u Kanaan, 163 Vt.
402, 407, 659 A.2d 128, 132 (1995) (“[W]e will not speculate as to
the basis upon which the court made its findings and reached its
conclusions, where the court’s decision does not spell out. this
basis.”); Richard uw Richard, 146 Vt. 286, 287, 501 A2d 1190,
1190-91 (1985) (“The purpose of findings is to provide a clear
statement as to what was decided and why; where no indication
appears of the method employed and weight accorded various
factors, remand is necessary.”).

121. Here, as MVP has observed, GMCB made seven* num-
bered conclusions of law.’ The first five of these summarize four
circumstances: (1) the rate increase is large and unprecedented;
(2) the rate filing, exacerbated by the mathematical error, was late
and gave inadequate time for GMCB’s review and proper notice to
policyholders; (3) the plan was mislabeled as transitional; and (4)
MVP represented that the 2014 filing was the last for this plan,
and GMCB’s approval of the 2014 rate increase was induced by
this fact and the requirement that MVP notify policyholders of
this fact. The actual holding is in two sentences:

4 The seventh conclusion is simply “{iJn conelusion, we decline to approve the filing
and any requested rate increase and encourage the carrier to evaluate the plan’s
continued viability and affordability prior to any future request for additional rate
increases.”

° We have used the term “conclusions of law” because GMCB labeled them as such.
‘As seen by the descriptions of each “conclusion” in the text, this is a loose
deseription of sueh.

The above-described events, taken together, illustrate a
lack of accountability to the Board as well as to the
Agri-Services membership, and lead us to conclude that
the proposed rates do not promote access to quality
health care and are unfair, unjust, and inequitable to plan
members. In addition, because this filing represents only
a small portion of MVP’s overall business, our decision to
deny the rate increase will have a nominal impact on the
carrier’s solvency.

Its overall conclusion was to “decline to approve the filing and any
requested rate increase.” Its order was to disapprove the filing
“resulting in no increase over Agri-Services’ December 2014 rate
previously approved by the Board.”

122. [HM Although the standard of review precludes reversal
absent a compelling indication of error, in this instance, we must
conclude that GMCB’s explanation of its reasoning is too sparse to
show how the “events” supported its decision and were consistent
with the statutory standards in 8 V.S.A. § 4062(a)(3). Two of the
events appear to support the conclusion that they “illustrate a lack
of accountability to the Board” — the mislabeling of the nature of
the plan and the failure to follow through on the 2014 represen-
tation that MVP would discontinue the plan. It is unclear,
however, how these events relate to the statutory standards and
why the proper remedy for these facts is to deny approval of any
rate increase.

123. The other two “events” appear to better reflect the
statutory standards but are inadequately explained. We under-
stand that high insurance rates that may be unaffordable to some
do not promote access to health care, but we find that obvious
conclusion incomplete without some evaluation of the alternative
methods of obtaining health care coverage that might be more
affordable. We do not find the fact that the rate increase is
substantial or unprecedented alone sufficient reason to deny a rate
increase. Our decision is tempered by the fact that the rates are
driven by claims costs, as the actuaries found, and purchase of a
policy under the plan is voluntary.° Based on the actuarial report,
the likely result of denying any rate increase will be to require

® Indeed, as GMCB noted, Agri-Services decision to continue the plan was
apparently driven by consumer demand. It experienced a 96.7% membership
retention rate as of June 2015.

288 |

MVP to withdraw the plan rather than running it at a substantial
loss. Although GMCB has apparently concluded that this result is
desirable, it has failed to explain why.

124. We have a similar reaction concerning the lateness of the
filing and the errors in the calculation. Although we acknowledge
GMCB’s concern that MVP repeatedly provided late, incomplete,
or incorrect information in making its rate filing, we need a better
understanding of how these actions relate to the statutory stan-
dard and justify a denial of any rate increase.

125. We stress that our holding does not necessarily mean that
the findings relied upon by GMCB are entirely irrelevant. For
example, the 2014 Agri-Services decision and approval of the
approximate 14.9% rate increase was “expressly premised” on
MVP’s confirmation that the filing would be Agri-Services’ last, as
the increase would cover the cost of notifying members that the
plans would no longer be available and that they should enroll in
a Vermont Health Connect plan for 2015.7 As that filing was not
Agri-Services’ last, GMCB could have reasonably concluded that
the current rate — and, consequently, any increases of that rate
— was unfair, unjust, and inequitable, as the 2014 increase did not
reflect an additional cost to the insurer. Similarly, in submitting a
late, erroneous rate filing, MVP delayed GMCB’s_ninety-day
statutory review, such that Agri-Services could not notify members
of the increase at least thirty days prior to the date when the
increase would take effect. GMCB could have concluded that plan
members were thus forced to decide whether to continue their
coverage without any idea of what rates they would be required
to pay, or cancel, research, and purchase another plan, thus
potentially experiencing a gap in coverage. Moreover, if GMCB
had approved the rate increase, members would have been billed
retroactively for additional premiums. Accordingly, GMCB would
have been well within its statutory discretion to conclude that in
creating uncertainty for policy holders and exposing them to the
risk of retroactive charges for premium increases, MVP dissuaded
members from pursuing necessary medical care and in so doing,
failed to promote access to health care.

126. While we can see why the procedure may have prejudiced
policyholders in obtaining alternative health insurance if they

7 Indeed, as GMCB noted, the inverse took place: Agri-Services experienced a
96.7% membership retention rate as of June 2015, prompting it to permit members
to renew their plans in 2015.

chose not to pay the rate increase — indeed the findings with
respect to the ability of policyholders to enroll in Vermont Health
Connect suggested that a transition might be difficult — GMCB’s
decision failed to explain the nature and extent of the prejudice.
To that end, we emphasize again that our conclusion here does not
necessarily mean that the findings relied upon by GMCB are
irrelevant or that it cannot provide a sufficient explanation for its
decision. Nor are we suggesting that a rate increase decision must
be based solely or primarily on traditional public utility rate
regulation concerns and methods. See, e.g., In re Quechee Serv.
Co., 166 Vt. 50, 53, 690 A.2d 354, 359 (1996). We cannot conclude,
based on the record before us, that GMCB has given us an
adequate explanation to determine the reasons for GMCB’s deci-
sion and how they are consistent with the statutory standards.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

2016 VT 100

TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. v. Town of Rockingham
[154 A.3d 486)
No. 15-356
Present: Reiber, C.J, Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 9, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied October 5, 2016

Ey |

292 Le

Robert E. Woolnington of Witten, Woolmington, Campbell &
Bernal, P.C., Manchester Center, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, William E. Griffin, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, and Mary L. Bachman, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee State.

Richard H. Saudek of Diamond & Robinson, P-C., Montpelier,
for Defendant-Appellee Town of Rockingham.

11. Eaton, J. Taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc.
appeals from a Windham County Superior Court order setting the
value of its Bellows Falls hydroelectric facility (the facility) at
$130,000,000, with $108,495,400 taxable by the Town of
Rockingham (Town).’ Taxpayer argues that the superior court
erred when it relied on testimony of the Town’s expert witness.
We correct the trial court’s valuation to read $127,412,212, and
affirm.

+ For the purposes of this tax appeal, the parties stipulated that 85% of the value
of the facility is attributed to the portion in Vermont, with the remainder
attributed to the portion in New Hampshire. Further reference to the value of the
facility in this opinion is with regard to the entire facility, and not solely the
portion attributed to the Town, unless otherwise stated. As noted by the trial
court, a small portion of the facility’s value on the Vermont side of the Connecticut
River is assigned to associated land and land rights in the upstream towns of
Weathersfield, Springfield, and Windsor. The value of the land in those towns is not
disputed and accounts for the mathematical disparity between 85% of the
$130,000,000 and the Town’s proposed value of the facility.

12. The facility, which has been in continuous operation since
1928, is one of five hydropower dams owned by taxpayer situated
along the Connecticut River and is located partly in Vermont and
partly in New Hampshire. It has a nameplate capacity of 40.8
megawatts (mw) and a net peak capacity of 49.5 mw, and
produces, on average, about 258,700 megawatt hours (mwh) of
energy per year. It was first licensed by the Federal Energy and
Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1938. In 1979, the facility was
relicensed for a period of forty years; that license is set to expire
in 2018. Taxpayer acquired the facility and its surrounding prop-
erty from USGen New England, Inc., in 2005.2 Because taxpayer
is an independent wholesale power producer, the electricity gen-
erated by the facility is sold at hourly market rates established by
ISO New England, an independent system operator. This is in
contrast to sales under power purchase agreements (PPA), where
the sale price is contracted at a flat rate.

13. This dispute arose in 2012 when the Town listed the facility
on its grand list at $108,110,000, the same value at which the
facility had been listed the previous two years. Taxpayer did not
challenge the 2010 or 2011 valuations, but appealed the 2012
listing to the board of civil authority, and then to the superior
court pursuant to 32 V.S.A. § 4461(a). The State of Vermont
intervened in the appeal on behalf of the Town.

14. At trial, both taxpayer and the Town presented expert
testimony as to the value of the facility. The experts’ opinions on
value varied substantially, ranging from taxpayer’s estimate of
$84,000,000 to the Town’s estimate of $130,000,000. Taxpayer
offered testimony on value from Daniel Peaco, an engineer and
consultant. Peaco employed an income-based approach to valuation

2 Under the ownership of USGen, the facility was the subject of litigation before
this Court. In USGen New Bngland, Ine. % Town of Rockingham, the Court
discussed the difficulties in valuing a hydroelectric facility in a deregulated
electrical power market. 2003 VP 102, 111, 176 Vt. 104, 838 A2d 927 (USGen D.
‘As we reiterated in that opinion, “the income-production of [the] hydroelectric
facility will be extremely relevant, if not determinative, to its value.” Id. 121 (citing
New England Power Co. x Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. 498, 505-06, 367 A2d 1363,
1368 (1976). The parties agreed that the income capitalization method was the
preferred method of valuing the facility. In USGer New England, Inc. « Town of
Rockingham, the taxpayer disputed the analysis of the Town’s expert witness on
valuation of the facility. 2004 VT 90, 11, 17 Vt. 198, 862 A.2d 269 (USGen ID. In
USGen I, we affirmed the superior court decision establishing the value of the
facility at $102,608,000, of which $90,377,100 was attributable to the Town.

294 |

of the facility using a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis,* and
concluded that on April 1, 2012, the fair market value of the
facility was $84,000,000, of which $67,000,000 was attributable to
the Town. The Town offered expert testimony from George
Sansoucy, a registered professional engineer in New Hampshire
and a certified real estate appraiser in several states, including
Vermont. Sansoucy prepared an appraisal of the facility using both
the DCF analysis and a comparable sales analysis. He concluded
that based on the DCF method, the facility had a value of
$116,417,250, and that based on the comparable sales approach, it
had a value of $142,287,750. After reconciling the income and sales
values, Sansoucy concluded that the fair market value of the
facility on April 1, 2012 was $130,000,000, of which $108,495,400
was attributable to the Town. The difference between the two
appraisals amounts to $41,495,400. The experts’ opinions were
complex, and taxpayer has made several challenges to the court’s
acceptance of the Town’s expert’s opinion. Most of the issues
taxpayer raises on appeal pertain to specific inputs or assumptions
made by Sansoucy in each of the two methods of valuation he
employed. Accordingly, to give context to the challenges raised on
appeal, a detailed discussion of how the experts arrived at their
opinions on value is necessary.

I. Methods of Valuation

A. Income-Based Approach

15. Both experts relied, at least in part, on a DCF analysis, an
income-based approach to valuation. This approach converts the
future benefits of property ownership — that is, the income the
property will generate — into an expression of the property’s
present worth by discounting each future benefit at a rate that
reflects the investment’s income pattern, value change, and yield

5 As discussed in greater detail below, the DCF method is an income-based
approach to valuation that considers future revenues, minus the cost and expenses,
discounted to present. value.

*This calculation again accounts for the mathematical disparity between 85% of
the $84,000,000 and taxpayer’s proposed value of the facility due to the small
portion of the facility's value on the Vermont side of the Connecticut River that is
assigned to associated land and land rights in the upstream towns,

5 As detailed below, a comparable sales analysis relies on the sales of comparable
facilities to determine fair market value.

rate. In Beach Properties, Inc. v Town of Ferrisburg, we ex-
plained this approach as follows:

The income approach is based on the proposition that
a rational investor would pay the fair market value for a
piece of property, which is the price (P) that, when
multiplied by the rate of return available from alternative
investments of comparable risk (the capitalization rate or
R), is equal to the property’s expected net income (I). In
other words, if the known factors are capitalization rate
and net income, the price of the property may be
calculated by dividing the net income by the capitalization
vate: P = I/R.

161 Vt. 368, 372, 640 A.2d 50, 52 (1994) (footnote omitted).

16. Converting periodic income and reversion into present value
is called discounting, and the rate of return is called the discount
rate. In a DCF analysis, a yield rate is applied to a set of
projected income streams and a reversion to determine whether
the investment property will produce a required yield given a
known price of acquisition. The critical elements in the DCF
approach are net income or revenue (I), which can be discounted
back to present value using the predetermined discount rate (R),
to arrive at price (P). Net income is dependent on projected
revenues, including capacity revenue and energy prices, less
expenses. It is then discounted by a discount rate, or rate of
return, which represents the cost of borrowing money to pay for
the purchase of an asset. A lower projected cost of capital
generally results in a higher estimated fair market value. Al-
though both experts’ DCF analyses employed the same general
methods, differences in the inputs and treatment of certain
variables resulted in vastly different opinions on value.

17. Each expert’s revenue projection was derived from annual
generation figures multiplied by the predicted price of electricity
for the particular future year. Both experts made certain assump-
tions about the facility’s generating capacity, using historic data
regarding stream flows and facility operation. The primary differ-
ence in the experts’ calculations stems from differences in the
number of years used to determine the average generation in
megawatt hours. Sansoucy relied on a ten-year average of gen-
eration, for the years 2000 through 2011, a time period he
determined would capture the evolving trends of increased rainfall

296 |

on the Connecticut River and increased efficiency and capacity at
the facility during that time. He predicted that future generation
would be 258,700 mwh per year. Peaco relied on a twenty-year
average of generation, for the years 1991 through 2011, a time
period he determined would account for fluctuations in short term
hydrologic phenomena. He predicted that future generation would
be 242,000 mwh per year, 16,700 mwh less than Sansoucy’s
estimated generation.

18. The experts also differed in their projected expenses, which
accounted for a difference in fair market value of approximately
$8,400,000. Both parties considered two main categories of ex-
penses in their DCF analyses: (1) maintenance costs and capital
expenses; and (2) protection, mitigation, and enhancement ex-
penses (PM&E).°

19. The primary differences in the experts’ calculations were
with regard to their treatment of capital expenses and the
treatment of the projected costs of relicensing. Among mainte-
nance costs and capital expenses, Sansoucy considered the costs of
operation and maintenance (O&M), administrative and general
costs, and capital expenditures. He allocated about $55 per
kilowatt (kw) of capacity, or $2,200,000 per year in the first year,
to O&M, which he considered to include maintenance with a life
of one year or less. He then assigned 1% of the value of the
facility per year to capital improvements with a life longer than
one year — amounting to approximately $1,300,000 in the first
year — which he explained was comparable to what similar
companies were spending on capital projects. He also included
$1,500,000 in expenses associated with the expected costs associ-
ated with FERC relicensing in 2018 and amortized the expenses
over the life of the forty-year license at $38,000 per year.

110. Inherent in Sansoucy’s DCF analysis is the facility’s
remaining value at the end of the term of the DCF, or terminal
value. The inclusion of terminal value in Sansoucy’s DCF has a
significant impact on the present value of the facility and is
intended to reflect the reasonable expectation that after twenty
years, the length of the DCF term, the facility will continue to
operate and produce revenue. Sansoucy estimated that in 2031 the
facility will generate a net operating cash flow of $22,725,000. He

® PM&E expenses are associated with certain requirements imposed by FERC and
which may accompany relicensing.

capitalized the after-tax net operating cash flow at a rate of 9%
and concluded that a reasonable estimate of the facility’s value in
the year 2031 would be about $176,000,000. Discounted back to
2012, the terminal value represented $33,900,000 in 2012 dollars.

111. Rather than assigning a percentage of the facility’s value
to capital improvements over the period of the FERC license,
Peaco identified two categories of capital expenses: baseline capital
expenditures, which taxpayer would incur yearly, and large capital
expenses, which taxpayer would incur on a one-time ba He
arrived at the baseline capital expenses by reference to taxpayer’s
reported capital expenditures for twelve of its hydroelectric facili-
ties over a period of five years, and the one-time capital expenses
by reference to several planned large-scale projects, such as the
overhaul of the facility's turbines at an estimated cost of
$6,976,000. After allocating a dollar amount per kw of capacity for
the baseline capital expenses, Peaco subtracted the cost of the
one-time capital expenses to arrive at a cost of $12 per kwh.
Unlike Sansoucy, Peaco did not account for the return on the
capital expenditures by projecting a corresponding increase in the
value of the facility itself.

112. Rather than amortize the projected cost of relicensing over
the life of the forty-year FERC license, Peaco adjusted his final
DCF analysis downwards by the estimated tiated with
obtaining and complying with a FERC license. These costs
included the actual cost of getting the license and the cost of
complying with the license, or PM&E costs. Relying on an
estimate from taxpayer, Peaco determined that the actual cost of
relicensing would amount to $1,000,000. To determine the PM&E
expenses for the Alternative Licensing Process, Peaco consulted a
2001 FERC study’, which estimated a cost of $58 per kw for
projects ranging in size from 25 mw to 100 mw. Relying on that
study, and assuming a buyer would reduce the value of the facility
by $100 per kw, Peaco determined that PM&E expenses would
amount to $4,700,000. He then subtracted this figure from the
final appraisal value.

1183. Also unlike Sansoucy, Peaco did not include a terminal
value in his DCF analysis because he argued that it inflated the

7 Hydroelectric Licensing Policies, Procedures, and Regulations: Comprehensive
Review and Recommendations, Staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion Report to the United States Congress, May 8, 2001, http:/Avww.fere.gov/legal/
maj-ord-reg/land-does/orte_final.pdf [https://perma.ce/TM4J-VE35].

298 Le

fair market value of the facility, and that the uncertainty related
to potential capital improvement requirements and operating
restrictions in the FERC licensing process render a terminal
value moot.

114. Finally, the experts discounted the projected net income to
determine fair market value. The discount rate depends on two
factors representing the cost of borrowing money to pay for the
purchase of an asset: the rates of return on debt and equity and
the ratio of debt to equity. A lower projected cost of capital
typically results in a higher estimated fair market value. Relevant
to this appeal, the experts relied on different debt rates and debt
to equity ratios — a disagreement resulting in $11,000,000 of the
difference in their valuations.

115. Sansoucy ran his DCF over a period of twenty years,
using a debt rate of 6%, an equity rate of 10.5%, and a 50:50
debt-to-equity ratio. He relied on financial reports from a number
of major energy companies and compared their debt payments to
their overall debt, as well as the debt to equity split reported by
recent purchasers of hydropower facilities. Sansoucy testified that
his debt rate was based on the rate at which a potential purchaser
could borrow capital, and that his equity rate was based on the
returns investors in the market were realizing on similar acqui-
sitions. After investigating the debt-to-equity split reported by
recent purchasers of similar facilities, Sansoucy concluded that an
even split between debt and equity accurately represented the
higher on-peak production over that of a typical hydroelectric
facility as well as the strong financial structure necessary for a
potential purchaser. From these figures, Sansoucy arrived at a 7%
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Adjusted to account for
property taxes, Sansoucy achieved a discount rate of 8.6%. Using
these data points, he then utilized eight different financial sce-
narios to develop a range of DCF values for the facility. These
eight scenarios represented the volatility in the energy market
and the uncertainty of inflation rates. Each scenario applied an
inflation rate of either 2.5% or 3% to an energy escalation rate of
0%, 1%, 1.25%, 1.5%, 2.5%, or 3%. The resulting fair market value
ranged from a low of $98,307,900 to a high of $142,287,750. He
then averaged the eight values to arrive at an estimated fair
market value of $116,417,250.

116. Peaco ran his DCF over thirty-seven years to account for
the entire term of the renewed FERC license, using a debt rate

of 7.3%, an equity rate of 12%, and a 55:45 debt to equity ratio.
He used a WACC developed using the build-up method to
calculate a return of approximately 12% on equity. His debt rate
was based on the Baa bond rate®, which was 5% in 2012, which
he adjusted upwards to 7.3% because of the project’s small size
and because he assumed it would be financed using nonrecourse
debt. He did not attempt to verify his assumptions with financial
data of comparable companies or market analysis. His equity rate
was based on the risk-free Federal Treasury Bond rate of 3%,
which he rounded up to 12% based on his assumption as to what
a buyer would require. After researching publicly available infor-
mation on comparable companies, Peaco arrived at a debt to
equity ratio of 55:45. From these figures, Peaco arrived at a
WACC of 7.8%. Applied to the net income, Peaco estimated a fair
market value of $84,000,000.

B. Comparable Sales Valuation

117. A comparable sales analysis, or cost approach, is used to
develop an indication of the fair market value of a facility, based
on the assumption that a buyer would pay no more for the
property than the cost of producing an equally desirable substi-
tute. This approach considers the prices at which comparable
properties were sold on the open market, divided by either the
rated or nameplate capacity, or by the reported annual generation,
which is then adjusted to extrapolate for the subject property,
taking into account qualitative and quantitative differences be-
tween that property and those selected as comparable. This
method estimates price per capacity (price per kilowatt hour per
year, or kwh-yr), which can be used to estimate the fair market
value based on annual generation.

118. Sansoucy relied on a comparable sales anal; as an
additional metric to help determine the fair market value of the
facility. Peaco did not undertake a comparable sales analysis.

® This table represents the cost of capital and discount rates employed by each
expert in their respective DCF analyses:

"Credit ratings are assigned letters by credit rating agencies. Moody's assigns
bond credit ratings of Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and C.

300 |

Sansoucy noted that although energy and capacity prices have
declined in recent years, comparable sale prices per kwh-yr do not
reflect a corresponding decline. He attributed this price stability
to four things: (1) a proportional decrease in interest and equity
rates in the generating industry, which have resulted in reduced
discount rates used by the industry to value potential hydro
facility purchases; (2) the reliability of hydroelectric properties as
investments; (3) the recent emphasis on renewable energy sources;
and (4) long term energy price forecasts. Sansoucy concluded that
economic conditions affecting discount rates have balanced the
effect of declining energy and capacity prices and ultimately on
the sale price of hydro facilities.

119. Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis arithmetically aver-
aged twelve sales or verified offers to purchase hydroelectric
generating facilities that took place between 2007 and 2011.'° The
twelve sales were chosen for their location, motivation of buyers
and sellers, financial conditions surrounding the sale, supply and
demand in the region, and the physical and economic character-
istics of the assets that comprised the property being sold.
Sansoucy largely considered sales in the northeast region of the
country, where rainfall and river conditions are most similar to
those on which the facility itself is located, although he also

2This table reproduces the relevant portion of Sansoucy’s comparable sales data
used to develop his average and median price per kwh-yr.

le Sal G
( cl (MW)
Ss a I

9/5/2008 , 3.15

12/11/2008 Dail

51,978

* Sale announcement.
** Verified offer, but no final sale.

considered three sales in Wisconsin. Of the twelve sales, two
facilities were located in Vermont, four in New York, one in New
Hampshire, two in Maine, and three in Wisconsin. One facility, the
Stillwater facility in New York, was listed twice: the first time was
a sale announcement at $0.66 per kwh-yr, and the second was an
actual sale at $0.67 per kwh-yr. These were the two highest prices
per kwh-yr in the analysis. A second facility in the analysis, the
Newfound facility in New Hampshire, was listed as an offer and
not a sale.

120. From the twelve sales, Sansoucy derived an average sale
price of $0.51 per kwh-year. He then made three upward adjust-
ments to the average price per kwh-yr based on qualitative and
quantitative factors he felt rendered the Bellows Falls facility
more desirable than many of the comparable facilities. These
adjustments were made because the facility is among the best
hydroelectric facilities in the region as a result of taxpayer’s
recent upgrades and capital investments, ongoing maintenance,
efficiency of operation, automation, and coordinated operation.

121. Sansoucy’s first adjustment was to raise the price per unit
of electricity based on additional revenue he attributed to the
facility’s ratio of on-peak to off-peak generation, which he assumed
was higher than other hydroelectric facilities in New England. He
noted that a typical ratio would be 47% on-peak to 53% off-peak
generation, and that the facility generated 51.3% of its energy
on-peak and 49.8% off-peak. He did not consider the ratio of
on-peak to off-peak generation among those facilities in the
comparable sales analysis, however. His second adjustment was to
raise the price per unit of electricity by half the value of the
facility’s total ancillary revenue. He indicated that although most.
of the individual comparable sales will receive at least some
ancillary revenues, he did not believe any would capture as much
ancillary revenue as the facility itself. Again, he did not consider
the ancillary revenues of the facilities in the comparable sales
analysis. Sansoucy’s third adjustment was to increase the facility’s
sale price by an additional 5% because he believed the facility was
entitled to a premium value compared to the other twelve sales.
He stated that the facility was a “good plant, with a very high
capacity factor, good water, lots of it.” Based on an annual
generation figure of 258,700,000 kwh-yr, at an average price per
kwh-yr of $0.55, Sansoucy thus calculated that, as of April 1, 2012,
the facility had a comparable sales-based fair market value of

302 Le

$142,287,750. He then adjusted his DCF-based value of
$116,000,000 by reference to his comparable sales-based value to
arrive at a fair market value of $130,000,000, of which $108,495,400
was attributable to the Town. Although this figure is, coinciden-
tally, the mid-point between the DCF value and the comparable
sales value, Sansoucy did not average the two to arrive at fair
market value. As he explained, “the sales comparison approach
was 142 million for [the facility], the median of the income
approach was 116 million . . . our middle of the road DCF was
134 million . . . so we reconciled in 2012 Bellows at 130 million”

IL. Trial Court’s Findings

122. The trial court found Peaco’s $84,000,000 appraisal to be
an “incredibly low value” that was “irreconcilable with the great
weight of evidence and testimony.” The court felt that “fi]t strains
reasonableness to insist that the current value is more than
twenty million dollars less than what it was in 2001,” and that.
because Peaco’s appraisal was “well below any listed value of [the
facility] for more than a decade prior to 2012,” it “undermine[d]
the defensibility of [taxpayer’s] position as well as its expert’s
credibility.” It found Sansoucy’s $130,000,000 appraisal, on the
other hand, to be “a supported and reliable estimate of the fair
market value of [the facility] as of April 1, 2012.” Even “[alecept-
ing that any fair market value calculation is at best an exercise it
informed estimation,” the trial court considered “Sansoucy to be,
decidedly, the more credible expert witness.” Finding that tax-
payer “presented no credible alternative to fair market value,” the
trial court held that $130,000,000 was “a supported and reliable
estimate of the fair market value” of the facility.

123. The trial court stated that Peaco’s model was unpersuasive
for several reasons, including (1) that it assumed, without
evidentiary support, that potential purchasers would insist on a
20% pretax (12% after tax) equity return; (2) his financial
assumptions were not verified with the financial data of compa-
rable companies or market analysis; (3) there was no explanation
for the two percentage points added to the debt rate; (4) he fully
deducted the cost of large capital improvements without recogniz-
ing the corresponding increase in value the investment would
return; (5) he deducted $4,700,000 for PM&E expenses without
support for specific expenditures, which overstated the impact of
relicensing on the fair market value; (6) there was no evidentiary

support for the assertion that the facility would have no value at
the end of its license term; and (7) the DCF analysis valued the
facility at less than $0.35 per kwh-yr, which is well below the
price of even inferior facilities. Although the trial court acknowl-
edged that Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis was “susceptible
to critique,” it ultimately found his conclusion that the facility had
a fair market value of $130,000,000 to be accurate and credible.
This appeal followed.

124. Taxpayer raises two issues on appeal. First, taxpayer
raises a number of challenges to the trial court’s acceptance of the
Town’s comparable sales computation, arguing that it was in error
because it: (1) was based on offers rather than completed sales;
(2) was without adjustment for time, location, size, or inclusion of
above-market power contracts; and (3) relied on three upward
adjustments from computed average values without supporting
data. Second, taxpayer challenges the trial court’s acceptance of
Sansoucy’s DCF analysis because (1) the discount rate was based
on below-market debt rates; (2) the estimates of capital costs were
unsupported and inconsistent with actual and (3) the
computations failed to account for costs associated with FERC
licensing. For its part, the Town contends that the trial court’s
decision must be affirmed because taxpayer does not contest the
trial court’s central finding that taxpayer presented no credible
alternative fair market value.

125. [The trial court reviews tax appraisal determinations
from a board of civil authority de novo. 32 V.S.A. § 4467. The trial
court is charged with determining the correct valuation of the
property — the fair market value — and equalizing the fair
market value to ensure that the property is listed comparably to
the value of corresponding properties within the town. /d.; see
also Kachadorian v. Town of Woodstock, 144 Vt. 348, 350, 477 A.2d
965, 967 (1984) (“First, the fair market value of the property must.
be determined. Next, the fair market value must be ‘equalized’ to
ensure that the property is listed comparably to corresponding
properties in town. When comparable properties exist, their
current market value must be compared with their current listed
value to arrive at an equalization rate. This rate must then be
applied to the subject property’s fair market value to produce the
proper listed value.”) (citations omitted). On appeal to this Court,
the trial court’s conclusions will be affirmed “where they are
reasonably drawn from the evidence presented.” Dewey u Town of

304 |

Waitsfield, 2008 VT 41, 13, 184 Vt. 92, 956 A.2d 508. We defer to
the court’s determinations with regard to evidentiary credibility,
weight, and persuasiveness.

126. [I “The burden of persuading the trier of fact that his
property is over-assessed . . . remains with the taxpayer through-
out the entire proceeding.” Kruse x Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368,
372, 488 A.2d 770, 773 (1985); see also New England Power Co. v.
Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. at 508, 367 A.2d at 1369 (“It is to be
emphasized . . . that the burden of persuasion as to the contested
issues in a § 4467 hearing remains at all times with the tax-
payer.”). The taxpayer may burst the bubble and defeat the
presumption in favor of the appraisal by presenting “credible
evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that [the] property
was appraised at more than its fair market value.” Adams u Town
of West Haven, 147 Vt. 618, 619-20, 523 A2d 1244, 1245 (1987)
(quotation omitted); see also Rutland Country Club, Inc. x City of
Rutland, 140 Vt. 142, 145, 486 A2d 730, 732 (1981) (“[T]he
presumption of validity of a city’s evaluation is overcome when
credible evidence is introduced fairly and reasonably indicating
that the property was assessed at more than the fair market
value.” (quotation omitted)).

127. On appeal before this Court, the superior court’s deter-
mination “will be deemed presumptively correct and its findings
will be conclusive if they are supported by the evidence.” Lake
Morey Inn Golf Resort, Lid. P’ship u Town of Fairlee, 167 Vt.
245, 248, 704 A.2d 785, 787 (1997). We will not set aside the trial
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, V.R.C.P.
52(a)(2), and we will affirm its conclusions where they are
reasonably drawn from the evidence presented. See, e.g., Harte v
Town of Bennington, 153 Vt. 256, 258, 571 A2d 58, 54 (1989).

TII(A). Validity of the DCF Analysis

128. Taxpayer's first challenge is to Sansoucy’s income valua-
tion. Taxpayer raises three separate arguments: that (1)
Sansoucy’s discount rate was based on below-market debt interest
rates; (2) his estimates of capital costs were unsupported and
ignored future capital costs; and (8) he failed to account for costs
associated with FERC relicensing. The State disagrees, describing
the trial court’s estimate of fair market value using the DCF
analysis as reliable and adequately supported by market data and

taxpayer’s own records, compared to Peaco’s DCF analysis, which
relied in some ¢ on assumptions unsupported by data or
market evidence.

129. The trial court’s determination of fair market value relied
on Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis and his DCF analysis.
“We have described income capitalization as probably the most.
accurate way to establish value of commercial properties at least
in theory, but have also cautioned about the pitfalls and difficulties
in this approach.” USGen 1, 2003 VT 102, 121 (quotation omitted).
“The key is comparability, and economists and other experts will
frequently differ, at times widely, as to what comparable invest-
ments will yield, even where there is agreement on what consti
tutes comparability.” Beach Props. Inc., 161 Vt. at 378, 640 A.2d
at 52. The trial court’s ability to hear and consider the competing
testimony and give it the weight it feels it deserves is therefore
critical.

1130. [HM It is taxpayer’s burden to persuade this Court that the
facility is over-assessed, and this burden is not met by “simply
impugning the [Town’s] methods or questioning its understanding
of assessment theory or technique.” Sondergeld u Town of
Hubbardton, 150 Vt. 565, 568, 556 A.2d 64, 66 (1998). To prevail,
taxpayer must demonstrate that valuation is arbitrary or unlawful.
Id. The resolution of conflicting evidence is left to the discretion
of the trial court. Rutland Country Club, Inc. v. City of Rutland,
137 Vt. 590, 591, 409 A.2d 591, 592 (1979).

131. Here, the experts’ DCF analyses resulted in a $32,000,000
difference in valuation.'! The difference in the experts’ equity
rates — 1.5% — resulted in a substantial portion of that
$32,000,000, although taxpayer does not dispute the trial court’s
rejection of taxpayer’s assumption that prospective purchasers
would demand a 12% return on investment. While the court
acknowledged that a 12% return on equity may be desirable to a
potential purchaser, it found Sanso1 debt and equity rates to
be more compelling because he s fully demonstrated how
both were supported by a market. ba:

132. Sansoucy’s DCF analysis relied on a 6% debt rate. He
testified that he calculated the debt rate by analyzing financial
reports of a number of major energy companies and comparing

‘Sansoucy’s DCF analysis resulted in a value of $116,417,250, compared to
Peaeo’s $84,000,000.

their reported debt payments to their overall debt. From this
data, he determined that assuming a potential purchaser could
borrow capital at a 6% interest rate on April 1, 2012 was a
conservative estimate. Taxpayer now argues that this rate is, by
Sansoucy’s own admissions, a below-market debt rate. Although
Sansoucy did testify that his debt rate was below what the
Treasury would pay, he explained that it was based on taxpayer’s
own records of what it was able to borrow as a private company.

133. I While we agree with taxpayer that the “selection of
[the] rate is of paramount importance in the capitalization pro-
cess,” because “[rlelatively small variations in the rate will signifi-
cantly change the fair market value,” Beach Props. Inc., 161 Vt.
at 373, 640 A.2d at 52 (quotation omitted), we do not find the trial
court’s acceptance of a 6% debt rate to be invalid. Considering
Sansoucy’s debt rate, the trial court concluded that it was
calculated based on taxpayer’s own reported debt payments as
well as those made by similar corporations. It concluded that
taxpayer’s challenge failed to demonstrate that Sansoucy’s debt
rate was invalid, and that taxpayer failed to produce data to
contradict his calculation, going as far as to state that Peaco’s
discount rate appeared to be “driven less by data with connection
to actual market forces, and more by the impact each choice
makes on suppressing the overall value.” Recognizing that there is
“no exact science informing calculations of the sort attempted
here,” the trial court found that Sansoucy was able to demonstrate
a market basis for his debt rate, which it found to represent
sound estimates and valid inputs.

134. Taxpayer also challenges Sansoucy’s calculation of capital
expenses. It argues that Sansoucy’s estimate of capital costs was
based on an unsubstantiated assumption that capital expenses
would account for 1% of the facility’s value annually and ignored
future capital costs, resulting in the overstatement of net income.
The differences in the parties’ estimates resulted in a difference in
valuation of about $8,400,000.

135. At trial, Sansoucy testified that he calculated the capital
maintenance and capital expenditures necessary to maintain the
facility in the shape or condition it was in on the date of the
valuation, April 1, 2012. He assigned 1% of the value of the facility
per year to long-term capital improvements because allocating a
percentage of the value of the facility to capital expenses allows

for spending on intenance to increase over time relative to the
value of the facility.’* Sansoucy arrived at 1% of the value of the
facility after analyzing the confidential documents of a wide
variety of hydroelectric facilities and determining that 1% of the
value of the facility per year is comparable to what similar
companies were spending on capital improvements.

136. Taxpayer argues that Sansoucy’s treatment of capital
expenditures fails to account for the costs that will be borne by
taxpayer in the upcoming years for necessary and planned capital
improvements. These include baseline capital expenditures, or
recurrent costs that the facility could expect to incur annually, and
one-time capital expenses to be expensed in the year they are
planned, including projects to overhaul the facility’s turbines and
repair portions of the dam. Discussing taxpayer’s treatment of
expenses, Sansoucy explained that some expenditures increase
revenue, decrease operating costs, or increase efficiency, which in
turn creates value, and that to the extent such expenditures add
value to the facility, they should not be expensed from revenue, as
they were in taxpayer’s analysis. In Sansoucy’s opinion, if capital
improvements are written off as expenses without appropriate
consideration of their contribution to value or efficiency, the value
of the facility as a whole may be understated. He explained that
in the appraisal of real estate, “you have to be very cautious with
capital investments and capital improvements, to the extent that
they add value to the property they should not be expensed from
revenue, thereby reducing the property value as a_ result.”
Sansoucy thus concluded that taxpayer’s failure to consider the
contribution of expenditures on value or efficiency resulted in the
lower valuation.

137. The trial court noted that it was “persuaded by
[Sansoucy’s] explanation of the appropriate treatment of capital
expenses,” and found taxpayer’s approach to be “flawed on its
face.” After reciting its understanding of Sansoucy’s approach, the
court adopted his logic, concluding that “fully deducting the cost
of a large capital improvement” without “recognizing the added
value” of those improvements would “artificially devalue” the
facility. For this reason, the trial court found taxpayer's treatment
of capital expenditures to be “flawed on its face.” The trial court

22 Sansoucy calculated that 1% of the value of the facility, which he assumed to be
$130,788,000, was $1,308,000 in the first year of the caleulation,

308 Le

rejected taxpayer’s analysis in favor of Sansoucy’s more credible
approach.

138. EMM Here, the trial court carefully explained its decision
making process and how it was influenced by the experts’
testimony. “If the trial court considered the various approaches
offered, assigned weight to each approach, and provided a thor-
ough explanation for its findings and conclusions we will not
overturn the court if its order ‘appears to be fair, just and
equitable according to the evidence presented?” USGen II, 2004
VT 90, 149 (quoting Town of Barnet, 134 Vt. at 506, 367 A.2d at
1368); see also Barrett u Town of Warren, 2005 VT 107, 15, 179
Vt. 134, 892 A.2d 152 (“We will not disturb a fair market value
determination unless an error of law exists.”). We conclude that
the trial court’s reliance on Sansoucy’s analysis, including the
decision to assign 1% of the value of the facility per year to
long-term capital improvements, and its rejection of taxpayer’s
expert’s approach, was within its discretion.

139. Finally, taxpayer argues that Sansoucy failed to account
for costs associated with FERC relicensing. It is clear from the
record, however, that Sansoucy included $1,500,000 in expenses
associated with the expected costs of relicensing in 2018, and that
he amortized the total cost over the forty-year license at $38,000
per year because he considered the license to be similar to “a
long-term permit.” He did not include a separate estimate of
PM&E expenses for three reasons: first, taxpayer informed him
that all PM&E costs had been incorporated into operations,
maintenance, and capital budgets and were not separately identi-
fied; second, the facility had undergone most upgrades required
for relicensing following the relicensing in 1979; and third, inci-
dental PM&E expenses would be adequately represented in
operations and maintenance. Peaco, on the other hand, relied on
a FERC study outlining the PM&E expenses associated with
relicensing, estimating that it would incur $100 per kw, or
$4,700,000 in PM&E expenses, which it then subtracted from the
value of the facility.

140. HM The trial court considered both parties’ estimates for
the cost of relicensing. It found that Peaco offered little support
for the $4,700,000 in PM&E expenses, that the onetime reduction
in the final value of its DCF overstated the impact of relicensing
on the fair market value, and was unpersuaded that the figure

was a reasonable estimate of relicensing expenses in light of the
FERC report. It also found that in relying on the 2001 FERC
study, Peaco failed to differentiate between the costs incurred by
a facility undergoing its first relicensing compared to a subsequent
relicensing. The trial court found Sansoucy’s modest PM&E
expenses, amortized over the forty-year life of the license, in
conjunction with the sizeable yearly operations and maintenance
allocation, to be a more plausible estimate of the likely costs and
risks associated with relicensing. The court again explained its
decision making process and how it was influenced by the experts’
testimony. For the same reason that we affirm the court’s decision
to accept the capital expenditures in Sansoucy’s analysis, we
affirm the treatment of relicensing costs. We conclude that the
trial court’s reliance on Sansoucy’s estimate of the cost of
relicensing, and its rejection of taxpayer’s expert’s approach, was
within its discretion.

III(B). Validity of the Comparable Sales Valuation

141. I Taxpayer’s second challenge is to Sansoucy’s compa-
rable sales valuation. Taxpayer first argues that Sansoucy failed to
account for necessary adjustments among purported comparable
facilities. Specifically, taxpayer contends that Sansoucy failed to
account for the date of sale, location or size of the comparable
facilities, or the inclusion of above-market power contracts. The
Town disagrees, arguing that Sansoucy did, in fact, account for
these factors in his analysis. Upon review of the record, it is clear
that Sansoucy did account for the date, location and size of the
comparable facilities, and the inclusion of power purchase agree-
ments, in his analysis.’*

142. In his appraisal, Sansoucy explained that the data did not
indicate a need for an adjustment for the date of the sales, stating
that “i]t is clear from the comparable sales data . . . that during
the time period between 2006 and [2012], economic conditions
affecting discount rates have a balancing effect on declining
energy and capacity prices and ultimately on hydro sale prices.”
He testified that “by 2012 in a de-escalating market for electricity,
natural gas, the sale price for hydroelectric plants were holding
up very well at their pre-2010 levels.” Considering this explana-

18 Sansoucy explained at trial that “in appraising, you adjust the comparable

property to be similar to the subject property.”

310 |

tion, the trial court found that the negligible difference in price
per kwh-yr obviated the need for a time adjustment.

143. Sansoucy’s appraisal also demonstrates that he not only
considered the location and size of the comparable facilities, but
that he made corresponding adjustments for those factors. He
adjusted the price per kwh-yr relative to the location of the
facilities and prices in those energy markets. Discussing the sales
of facilities in Tennessee, Sansoucy noted their location and
adjusted the price per kwh-yr upward to reflect the higher prices
in those energy markets. He also included facilities both larger
and smaller than the Bellows Falls facility, variations that neces-
sarily accounted for price differences resulting from size differ-
ences. The trial court acknowledged these adjustments, stating
that Sansoucy “adjusted the price for the [facility] upwards to
$0.55 per kwh-yr based on quantitative and qualitative factors he
felt rendered [the facility] a more desirable facility than many of
the comparables.”

144. Furthermore, despite taxpayer’s contention, Sansoucy did
consider whether to make adjustments to account for the inclusion
of facilities that market production through power purchase
agreements (PPAs). He testified that despite the difference be-
tween such facilities and the Bellows Falls facility, the Bellows
Falls facility remained comparable because it “essentially has a
PPA with its affiliate,” where power is transferred to TransCanada
Power Marketing, repackaged with other power plants, and resold
into the marketplace. Sansoucy testified at length about the
selection and evaluation of comparable sales for his analysis,
testimony the trial court considered. Although taxpayer argues
that Sansoucy failed to account for certain factors, the record
shows otherwise, and we will not disturb the trial court’s findings.

145. Taxpayer also contends that the Town’s comparable sales
analysis incorrectly relied on three upward adjustments from
computed average values without supporting data, and that these
adjustments increased the value of the facility in the comparable
sales analysis by $7,760,000. Specifically, taxpayer argues that
Sansoucy’s upwards adjustment from $0.50 per kwh-yr to $0.55
per kwh-yr was based on the assumptions that none of the
comparable facilities generate more than 47% of the time during
peak hours, that their sale prices did not reflect the potential to
generate as much ancillary revenue as the Bellows Falls facility,
and that the Bellows Falls facility would be entitled to an
additional premium compared to the other sales.

146. HI This Court will uphold an adjustment where the
appraiser’s conclusion that the value of the subject property
should or should not be adjusted was rationally derived from the
evidence. See Garilli x Town of Waitsfield, 2008 VT 91, 118, 184
Vt. 594, 958 A.2d 1188 (mem.). When an expert’s findings are
supported by the evidence, “we must defer” to their valuation,
“even if the record contains contradictory evidence.” In re
Southview Assocs., 153 Vt. 171, 178, 569 A.2d 501, 504 (1989).
“Where the record contains some basis in evidence for [the
appraiser’s] valuation, the appellant bears the burden of demon-
strating that the exercise of discretion was clearly erroneous.”
State Hous, Auth. v Town of Northfield, 2007 VT 63, 15, 182 Vt.
90, 933 A.2d 700 (quotations omitted); see also Vi. Elec. Power Co.
v Town of Vernon, 174 Vt. 471, 472, 807 A.2d 430, 433 (2002)
(mem.) (“We will defer to the state appraiser when the determi-
nation is rationally derived from his findings, even where contra-
dictory evidence exists.”). The central question is whether the
decision “reveals to the parties and this Court how the decision
was reached.” Lake Morey Inn, 167 Vt. at 251, 704 A.2d at 789;
see Beach Props., 161 Vt. at 371, 640 A.2d at 51 (noting findings
“must state clearly what evidence it credits and why, so that the
parties and this Court will know how the decision was reached”).
The rationale underlying this requirement is to assure this Court
and the parties that the trial court’s determination of fair market
value was not a guess. See New England Power Co., 134 Vt. at
503, 867 A.2d at 1367 (“Findings . . . indicate how the ultimate
conclusion is arrived at, and remove from that ultimate conclusion
any suspicion that it is only a guess.”).

147. At trial, Sansoucy testified that his upward adjustments
were based on several primary factors, both quantitative and
qualitative in nature. As he explained, the quantitative factors
accounted for the facility’s on-peak and off-peak generation and its
ancillary revenue, while the qualitative factors accounted for
several of the facility’s attributes, including its location on the
Connecticut River system, taxpayer’s control of the river system,
the general quality and condition of the facility, its relatively high
head," and the facility’s ability to sell into multiple markets.

148. According to the record, Sansoucy testified that the
purpose of the comparable sales analysis is to calculate an average

14 A high head provides more energy for the same expenditures on operations and
maintenance.

312 Le

price per kwh-yr of all of the sales in the analysis and to adjust
that figure to represent the facility itself. To accomplish this, he
considered the difference between the quantitative and qualitative
factors of the facility relative to all twelve market sales and
determined whether the facility itself was better than, equal to, or
worse than the market; whether the facility would be more
desirable, equally as desirable, or less desirable than the market.
He then made a judgment as to what the competition and price
would bring for the facility if offered, in comparison to what other
alternate investments in hydroelectric facilities could buy.

149. He testified that he made quantitative adjustments for the
on-peak to off-peak ratio and ancillary revenue because both
factors created a differential from the average sale in the market
generally. He declined to make adjustments for other quantitative
factors because they did not result in a differential from the
average sale. Essentially, he adjusted the price per kwh-yr
upwards to reflect the fact that the facility’s ratio of on-peak to
off-peak generation and ancillary revenue were higher than those
of the average facility in the market generally: on-peak being
51.3%, compared to the straight run-of-the-river at 47%. He then
monetized the difference between the facility and the straight run
of the river, using the price of on-peak dollars per kilowatt as of
April 1, 2012 and calculating how much more money the facility
would make than the straight run of the river. He went through
the same steps for ancillary revenues, which are services received
for certain attributes. Sansoucy explained that in his experience,
although most individual comparable sales receive at least some
ancillary revenues, few, if any receive such revenue at the same
level as the Bellows Falls facility. He then calculated the differ-
ence between the Bellows Falls facility and those in the compa-
rable sales analysis. Considering these factors, Sansoucy made an
upward adjustment on the price per kwh-yr of $0.007 for the
facility’s superior on-peak generation, and $0.006 for its superior
ancillary revenue.

150. Explaining the qualitative adjustments, Sansoucy testified
that as an appraiser, he considered all twelve market sales and
made a judgment as to what the competition and price would
bring for the facility if offered for sale compared to alternate
investments in hydroelectric facilities. He considered several char-
acteristics of the facility, including the amount of water on the
river, taxpayer’s control over that water, and the ability of the

facility to use that water, as well as the river head and the
marketplace which taxpayer can sell into. Considering these
characteristics, Sansoucy testified that he concluded that the
facility was superior to many of the comparable sales. Considering
all these factors, Sansoucy made a 5% upward adjustment on the
price per kwh-yr.

151. MM The trial court acknowledged that as with many
appraisals based on comparable sales, certain adjustments based
on the appraiser’s expert assessment may be critiqued as subjec-
tive. Considering Sansoucy’s explanation of the factors influencing
his adjustments to the average price per kwh-yr, the trial court
found merit in his assessment that the facility is generally a more
desirable hydroelectric facility than the average facility. We note
that Sansoucy’s adjustments were relative to the average facility
in the market generally, regardless of whether the Bellows Falls
facility is more desirable than the average facility in the compa-
rable sales analysis, specifically. Regardless, we agree with the
trial court that Sansoucy’s assessment is supported by the record.
Sansoucy explained the basis for his adjustments, including fea-
tures of the river and the facility itself that elevated it above the
average hydroelectric facility. Given the qualitative and quantita-
tive factors presented at trial and the range in sale price per
kwh-yr, which was as low as $0.40 and as high as $0.67, it is
reasonable that the trial court found Sansoucy’s adjustments to
$0.55 to be warranted. Furthermore, the trial court stated that it
was not persuaded by taxpayer’s argument that adjustments
based on Sansoucy’s expert assessment must be entirely disre-
garded as lacking support.

152. [HBB As stated above, we will uphold adjustment where the
court’s conclusion that the value of the subject property should or
should not be adjusted was rationally derived from the evidence.
See Garilli, 2008 VT 91, 113. Sansoucy’s findings were supported
by the record, despite taxpayer’s arguments to the contrary, and
“we must defer to the [court] when its findings are supported.”
In ve Southview Assocs., 153 Vt. at 178, 569 A2d at 504. It is
clear how the trial court’s decision was reached, and that its
conclusions were rationally derived from its findings and based on
a correct interpretation of the law. We will not reverse the trial
court merely because it relied on Sansoucy’s assessment rather
than Peaco’s. See Weyerhaeuser Co. x Town of Hancock, 151 Vt.

314 |

279, 286, 559 A.2d 158, 163 (1989) (stating court “not bound to
accept the evidence of either party”); Kruse, 145 Vt. at 374, 488
A2d at 774 (noting that trier of fact is under no obligation to
accept, interpret, or apply evidence in accordance with views of
either party; it is within its discretion to determine weight,
credibility and persuasive effect of evidence).

153. Finally, taxpayer argues that the Town’s comparable sales
analysis was incorrectly based on sales and offers, rather than
entirely on completed sales. The Town disagrees with this argu-
ment, suggesting that it is standard in a sales comparison
approach to “gather data on sales, listings, contracts, offers,
refusals, and options relating to properties considered competitive
with, and comparable to, the subject property.”

154. HM We acknowledge that the type of property involved in
this appeal, a hydroelectric generating facility, is difficult to value.
See USGen I, 2003 VT 102, 121 (noting that “utility property
tends to be unique, or close to it, and the methods for valuing it
are complicated and frequently contested”). Such facilities are not
frequently bought or sold in the usual sense, nor are they readily
marketable. Regardless, we have held that “(t]he touchstone for
property tax valuations is fair market value.” Sondergeld, 150 Vt.
at 567, 556 A.2d at 66; see also Royal Parke Corp. u Town of
Essex, 145 Vt. 376, 378, 488 A.2d 766, 767-68 (1985) (“{Section
3481] makes fair market value the standard for appraisal.”). Fair
market value is “the price that the property will bring in the
market when offered for sale and purchased by another.” 32 V.S.A.
§ 8481(1)(A). We have recognized that the sales of comparable
properties “between a willing buyer and seller at arms length” are
a valid basis for estimating fair market value. Barrett, 2005 VT
107, 16 (quotation omitted). This approach relies on voluntary
sales that generally take place in an open market, with parties
acting in their own best interest. Id.; see also Black’s Law
Dictionary 1535 (8th ed. 2004) (defining arm’s length transaction
as between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties; or “between
two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if
the parties were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises”
between buyer and seller.). Such sales must be made in good
faith, “and not to ‘rig’ a value.” Barrett/Canfield, LLC v City of
Rutland, 171 Vt. 196, 199, 762 A.2d 828, 825 (2000).

155. MB Although an actual sale provides “strong, if not
conclusive, evidence of fair market value,” the statute does not

limit a determination of fair market value to actual sales, allowing
for consideration of the price the property will bring on the
market. Jd. (quotation omitted). Certain situations may require
courts to “look beyond a sale,” such as “where some evidence
undermines the bona fide nature of the sale.” Id. In Barnett v.
Town of Wolcott, we held that listings, or unaccepted offers to sell,
are not reliable evidence of fair market value in a comparable
sales analysis “because they reflect a mere hope rather than ‘the
price which the property will bring in the market when offered
for sale and purchased by another?” 2009 VT 32, 110, 185 Vt.
627, 970 A.2d 1281 (mem.) (quoting 32 V.S.A. § 3481(1)). Unlike a
listing, an offer, or unaccepted offer to buy, reflects more than the
mere hope of a sale; it represents what the property would bring
in the market if the sale was completed. It does not, however, rise
to the level of reliability we demand to estimate fair market value.

156. Here, Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis considered ten
sales, an offer, and sale announcement. Recognizing that an
appraisal is “far from an exact science,” the trial court found
Sansoucy’s reliance on sales and offers, rather than sales alone, to
have “little measurable impact” on the analysis. As the trial court
noted, Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis relied on an average
price of $0.51 per kwh-yr and median price of $0.50 per kwh-yr.
He then adjusted the price of the facility upwards to $0.55 per
kwh-yr based on quantitative and qualitative factors he felt
rendered it more desirable than many of the comparables. At an
expected annual generation of 258,705,000 kwh-yr, Sansoucy esti-
mated a comparable sales value of $142,287,750. He then selected
the midpoint between the comparable sales value and the DCF
value of $116,417,250 for a fair market value of $129,352,500,
which he adjusted upward to $130,000,000. This value —
$129,352,500 — represents an average price per kwh-yr of $0.50,
$0.01 less than the average price in the comparable sales analysis.

157. Excluding both the offer to purchase the Newfound facility
in New Hampshire and the sale announcement for the Stillwater
facility in New York, however, the average price per kwh-yr would
be $0.495 per kwh-yr, a difference of $0.015.1° After adjusting that
price per kwh-yr upwards by $0.04, an adjustment we have

 Sansoucy’s analysis relied on twelve sales, at $0.41, $0.56, $0.66, $0.40, $0.42,
$0.51, $0.48, $0.58, $0.50, $0.42, and $0.51 (all in kwh-yr). Excluding the sale
announcement ($0.66) and the offer to purchase ($0.51), the average of $0.41, $0.56,
$0.40, $0.42, $0.51, $0.48, $0.58, $0.50, and $0.42 is $0.495 kwh-yr (4.95/10=$0.495)

316 |

affirmed above, and considering the same expected annual gen-
eration of 258,705,000 kwh-yr, the comparable sales value without
the offers is $138,407,175. The midpoint between that value and
the DCF value of $116,417,250 is $127,412,212 — $1,940,288 less
than Sansoucy’s valuation.® This lower figure represents an
average price per kwh-yr of $0.49, or $0.02 less than the average
price in Sansoucy’s comparable sales analysis.

158. I We will not set aside the trial court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, V.R.C.P. 52(a)(2), and we will
affirm its conclusions where they are reasonably drawn from the
evidence presented. See, e.g., Harte, 153 Vt. at 258, 571 A.2d at
54, Here, the trial court’s decision to credit an offer and a sale
announcement in the same manner as an actual completed sale
resulted in an inflated comparable sales value of nearly four
million dollars and an inflated fair market value of nearly two
million dollars. This is not an insubstantial figure. We therefore
conclude that the fair market value of the Bellows Falls facility
should be reduced by the amount attributable to the inclusion of
the offer and sale announcement in the comparable sales analysis
relied upon by the trial court. Because “the record affords the
means of correcting [the trial court’s] error,” the case will not be
remanded, and we will enter judgment here. Brooks u Brooks, 131
Vt. 86, 94, 300 A.2d 531, 536 (1978) (citing Doyle u Polle, 121 Vt.
335, 339-40, 157 A.2d 226, 280 (1960)). Accordingly, as calculated
above, we hold that the facility shall be listed at a fair market
value of $127,412,212 for the tax year 2012.

The trial court’s valuation is corrected to read $127,412,212, and
the remainder of the decision is affirmed.

16 As noted supra, 11 21, Sansoucy testified that he did not average the DCF and
comparable sales values to arrive at fair market value; rather, as he explained, he
“reconciled” the values. Because the $130,000,000 figure is, coincidentally, the
average between the comparable sales value and the DCF value, rounded up from
$129,352,500, we have likewise reconciled the DCF value and the adjusted
comparable sales value by averaging them.

2016 VT 107

In re B.G., Juvenile

[155 Ad 179]
No. 15-471
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed September 16, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied October 7, 2016

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Appellant Mother.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Benjamin D. Battles,
Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Appellee.

Joshua S. O'Hara, Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Appellee
Juvenile.

11. Skoglund, J. Mother appeals the family court’s order
concluding that her son B.G. is a child in need of care or
supervision (CHINS). Mother argues that the court erred in
finding that B.G. was abandoned or without proper parental care
because mother made arrangements for B.G.’s care. We affirm the
CHINS adjudication on the basis that B.G. was abandoned.

12. B.G. was born in September 2006. Mother and father
separated in 2007. B.G. has a younger half- r, C.B., born in
August 2009. Mother’s relationships with B.G.’s father and her two
subsequent partners, including C.B.’s father, were abusive. In 2010,
mother was prescribed pain medication, and this led to a heroin

318 |

addiction. She used between ten and fifty bags of heroin a day and
was under the influence at times when the children were in her
care. Mother often left B.G. with his paternal grandfather and
step-grandmother. In 2011, when mother planned to move to New
York, grandparents began caring for B.G. full time. At their
request, mother signed a letter allowing grandparents to commu-
nicate with school officials and to get B.G. medical attention. B.G.’s
step-grandmother has been responsible for all interactions with
school, doctors, dentists, and counselors. Mother did not participate
in any of these aspects of B.Gs life. After several failed attempts
at residential treatment, mother began medication-assisted treat-
ment in October 2014. She continued to use marijuana, and this
made her ineligible for take-home doses, requiring her to travel to
Rutland daily.

13. B.G. witnessed the domestic violence in mother’s relation-
ships even after 2011 when his time with mother was quite
limited. B.G. is afraid of mother’s former partners, has night-
mares, and has a high level of anxiety. Mother did not take steps
to get counseling for B.G. and did not participate once B.G’s
grandmother arranged for counseling.

14. In January 2014, the court removed B.G.’s half-sister, C.B.,
from mother’s home. The court issued a temporary custody order
transferring custody of the half-sister to grandparents with pro-
tective supervision by the Department for Children and Families
(DCF). There was no order issued pertaining to B.G., but the
court noted that there was an agreement reached by DCF,
mother, and step-grandmother that if mother tried to remove B.G.
from step-grandmother’s care, DCF would be notified and would
seek a conditional custody order. Mother did not progress past.
supervised visits with C.B.1

15. In January 2015, the State filed a petition alleging B.G. was
CHINS for lack of proper parental care. In October, the State
filed an amended petition adding an allegation that B.G. was also
CHINS because he had been abandoned. A contested hearing was

‘The family court subsequently granted a petition to terminate mother’s rights,
and this Court affirmed. In re C.B, No, 2016-014 (Vt. May 12, 2016) (unpub.
mem.), httpsy/www.vermontjudiciary.org/UPE02011Present/eo16-014.paf _ (https:/
perma.ce/Z3DT-RS5S}.

held in November 2015.7 Following the hearing, the court found
that there was sufficient evidence to support the petition on both
counts. The court found that mother had effectively abandoned
B.G. by failing to exercise any parental responsibilities and
voluntarily ceding all responsibility to grandparents. The court
concluded that prior to January 2014 mother was “either unwilling
or unable to exercise any meaningful degree of parental respon-
sibility for B.G.” It further concluded that from January 2014 until
the date of the petition, mother had exercised no parental
responsibilities and that “while this may have been by agreement
with DCF, it was in effect a more formal recognition of what had
been to that point a de facto abandonment.” It noted that mother
had the opportunity to assert parental rights and responsibilities
but chose not to do so. The court also found that mother was
unable to provide B.G. with proper parental care. The court
explained that at the time the petition was filed, in January 2015,
mother had not addressed her own addiction and victimization
issues sufficiently to provide B.G. with appropriate parental care.
Although she was in a program to treat her addiction, she
continued to use marijuana and needed to travel daily to Rutland
for treatment. In addition, mother required counseling to treat.
her history as a serial victim of abusive relationships. Mother
appeals.

16. A child may be adjudicated CHINS when the State
demonstrates, among other things, that the child has been “aban-
doned,” or “is without proper parental care or subsistence, edu-
cation, medical, or other care necessary for his or her well-being.”
33 V.S.A. § 5102()(A), (B). The State has the burden of demon-
strating CHINS by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 5815(a).

17. We begin with the court’s finding that B.G. was CHINS
because he was abandoned. Under the statute, there are several
different circumstances that can result in abandonment:

A person is considered to have abandoned a child if the
person is: unwilling to have physical custody of the child;

2 At the final hearing, father signed a stipulation admitting that B.G. was CHINS
for lack of proper parental care based on the facts that at the time the petition
was filed father’s contact with B.G. was minimal and father had previously
physically restrained B.G. and presented a risk of harm to B.G. We do not reach
the question of whether this stipulation was sufficient on its own to support a
CHINS determination.

320 Le

unable, unwilling, or has failed to make appropriate
arrangements for the child’s care; unable to have physical
custody of the child and has not arranged or cannot
arrange for the safe and appropriate care of the child; or
has left the child with a care provider and the care
provider is unwilling or unable to provide care or support
for the child, the whereabouts of the person are un-
known, and reasonable efforts to locate the person have
been unsuccessful.

Id. § 5102(8)(A).

18. Mother focuses on the third circumstance — when a parent
is “unable to have physical custody of the child and has not
arranged or cannot arrange for the safe and appropriate care of
the child.” /d. She argues that she did not abandon her child
because she arranged for the “safe and appropriate care of” B.G.
with his grandparents. /d. In contrast, the State argues that the
portion of the statutory definition applicable in this case is the
first. circumstance — abandonment due to mother’s unwillingness
to have physical custody of her child — and this circumstance is
not dependent on whether mother arranged for appropriate care.

19. BPM We conclude that the findings support abandonment
due to mother’s unwillingness to care for B.G. The evidence
demonstrated that at the time the CHINS petition was filed,
mother had not been exercising any parental responsibilities for at
least a year. Mother was not taking physical care of B.G. and
exercised only sporadic visitation. Further, she did not participate
in B.G’s life in any meaningful way, voluntarily abdicating all
responsibility for B.G.’s life, including his schooling and medical
needs, to B.G.’s grandparents. While mother testified that she
wanted to reunite with her child, the court was within its
discretion in failing to credit mother’s testimony and instead
relying on mother’s actions to conclude that she was unwilling to
take physical custody of B.G. and therefore abandoned him within
the meaning of the statute. See In re A.F, 160 Vt. 175, 178, 624
A.2d 867, 869 (1993) (explaining that family court has discretion to
determine witness’s credibility and weigh evidence).

110. Because we conclude that the CHINS adjudication was
proper under §5102(3)(A), we need not reach the question of

whether B.G. was also CHINS due to lack of proper parental care
under § 5102(3)(B).

Affirmed.

111. Dooley, J., concurring. I concur in the majority decision
that the trial court could find that B.G. may be adjudicated a child
in need of care or supervision (CHINS) under 33 V.S.A.
§ 5102(3)(A) on the basis that the child was abandoned. I agree
that the statute is so broadly written that it covers even a case
where the child is being safely and appropriately cared for as
arranged by the parent. I am writing this concurrence, as I did
in In re M.O., 2015 VT 120, 1917-25, 200 Vt. 384, 131 A3d 738
(Dooley, J., concurring), to point out that the fact that the
Department for Children and Families (DCF) can legally inter-
vene to have the child declared a CHINS does not mean that it
should do so in all cases. At least on the record before us, it
appears that the child is being cared for safely and appropriately
by the step-grandmother. The CHINS adjudication means the
commitment of extensive resources by DCF and the legal system
to this mother and child at a time when there are not enough
such resources to go around and when alternatives may be
available that will protect the interests of the child in a less
resource-intensive way. As I said in M.O., “I think DCF and the
Legislature need to take a hard look at cases like this one to
determine whether there is a way to protect a child in circum-
stances like this that involve an alternative to DCF custody.”
Id. 4 23. I make the same point if custody remains with the
step-grandmother but the extensive resources of an overloaded
legal system go to an adjudication and an appeal followed by
ongoing case supervision. All stakeholders in this system must
work together to prioritize and advance expeditiously the cases
where legal intervention is necessary to protect the critical
interests of the child; we cannot let other cases undermine that
challenging mission.

112. Robinson, J., dissenting. Nearly 4% of American children
live in a home without a legal parent present.> Of those children

= Forum on Child & Family Statistics, America’s Children in Brief: Key National
Indicators of Well-Being, 2016 tbl. FAMI.A [hereinafter America’s Children]
(providing table on “Family Structure and Children’s Living Arrangements:
Percentage of Children Ages 0-17 by Presence of Parents in Household and Race

&
&

living in a home without a legal parent, 1.7 million live with a
grandparent, 685,000 live with another relative, 203,000 live with a
nonrelative, and only 214,000 live in a legally recognized foster
home.‘ While some of these nonparental living arrangements may
arise from informal involvement of the State, there are clearly
more than 2 million children being raised, either on a short- or
long-term basis, by people who are not legal parents pursuant to
a voluntary arrangement with the children’s legal parent. Most of
these children are being raised by a grandparent. If a child is in
need of care or supervision (CHINS) whenever that child’s parent
or parents are unable to provide appropriate parental care, even
when they have made appropriate arrangements for a willing and
able grandparent to provide that care, then the State would be
free to intervene in the lives of millions of children who face no
particular risk of harm. This result is inconsistent not only with
the expressed intent of the Legislature, but also with the consti-
tutional imperative that “any time the State seeks to interfere
with the rights of parents on the generalized assumption that the
children are in need of care and supervision, it must first produce
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the statutory directives
allowing such intervention are fully satisfied.” Im re N.H., 135 Vt.
230, 235, 373 A.2d 851, 855 (1977).

113. The trial court found that in 2011, in planning to move out
of state, B.G’s mother asked the child’s paternal step-grandmother
and grandfather to care for the child full time. Since that time,
B.G’s paternal step-grandmother, “in part by agreement and in
part by default,” has effectively acted as the child’s parent,
exercising responsibility for “all dealings with his school, doctors,
dentists, and counselors.” Mother has failed to participate in any
meaningful way in these activities, “exercising only rights of
visitation and then only as convenient.” In January 2014, mother
agreed to effectively maintain the status quo, leaving the child
with the paternal step-grandmother. Mother, step-grandmother,

and Hispanic Origin, 1980-2015”), http:/Avww.childstats.gov/americaschildren/
index.asp [httpy/perma.ce/QY6K-CHZP].

“Jd. tbl, FAML.B (providing table on “Family Structure and Children’s Living
‘Arrangements: Detailed Living Arrangements of Children by Gender, Race and
Hispanic Origin, Age, Parent’s Education, and Poverty Status, 2015”); see also td.
fig. FAMI.B (providing figure on “Percentage of Children Ages 0-17 Living in
Various Family Arrangements, 2015,” reflecting proportions of various arrange-
ments among children who live in homes without legal parents).

| .

and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) agreed that
if mother attempted to remove the child from step-grandmother’s
home, DCF would be called and would seek a conditional custody
order. Mother had supervised visits with the child from that time
until DCF filed a CHINS petition in January 2015. The court
found that mother has longstanding and not fully addressed issues
arising from addiction and victimization and is not ready to
assume parental responsibilities for the child.

114. The court made no findings that the child, in the care of
his step-grandmother, lacks any care necessary for his well-being
or faces risk of harm, that mother or father poses a risk to him
in the context of the current arrangement, or that there is an
imminent risk that mother or father will seek to remove the child
from his step-grandmother’s home without DCF approval. The
court made no findings that step-grandmother or grandfather has
been unable to exercise parental responsibilities with doctors,
dentists, counselors, or the school. And the court did not find that
the arrangements mother made with step-grandmother did not
provide for safe and appropriate care, that step-grandmother is
unwilling or unable to provide care or support for the child, or
that mother is unwilling to have physical custody of the child.

115. Although it’s admittedly a close case, the trial court’s
findings in this case do not support a CHINS determination on
the basis of abandonment. 33 V.S.A. §5102(8)(A) (CHINS A).
Moreover, I cannot affirm on the basis of the trial court’s
alternate holding that the child is “without proper parental care
or subsistence, education, medical, or other care necessary for
his . . . well-being.” Jd. § 5102(3)(B) (CHINS B).

116. I disagree that the findings support a conclusion that
mother in this case is unwilling to have physical custody of the
child. The “CHINS A” section defines CHINS to include a child
who:

has been abandoned or abused by the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian. A person is considered to have
abandoned a child if the person is: unwilling to have
physical custody of the child; unable, unwilling, or has
failed to make appropriate arrangements for the child’s
care; unable to have physical custody of the child and has
not arranged or cannot arrange for the safe and appro-
priate care of the child; or has left the child with a care

324 |

provider and the care provider is unwilling or unable to
provide care or support for the child, the whereabouts of
the person are unknown, and reasonable efforts to locate
the person have been unsuccessful.

Id. § 5102(3)(A). The trial court did not specifically identify which
prong of § 5102()(A) applies in this case, but the majority focuses
on the first: that mother was unwilling to have physical custody of
the child?

117. The bases for this conclusion are that mother voluntarily
ceded parental responsibilities to the child’s step-grandmother;
subsequently exercised only rights of visitation and then only as
convenient; agreed with DCF in January 2014 that the child could
remain in the step-grandmother’s home and that DCF would seek
a conditional custody order if she sought to remove the child; and
that mother had not asserted parental rights and responsibilities
after that time. The court concluded that mother’s arrangement
with the step-grandmother amounted to a “de facto abandonment,”
and that “[i]t remained open to [mother] to assert parental rights
and responsibilities, and she chose not to do so.”

118. Especially bearing in mind the ubiquity of these kinds of
voluntary arrangements, and the requirement that a court ensure
“that the statutory directives allowing such intervention are fully
satisfied,” In re N.H., 185 Vt. at 235, 373 A.2d at 855, I cannot.
join the conclusion that mother is “unwilling to have physical
custody of the child” for two main reasons.

119. First, the majority's analysis suggests that voluntary
caregiving arrangements are time-limited, and that once a parent
entrusts the care of a child to a grandparent or another, at some
point the parent is deemed to have legally abandoned the child
without regard to the willingness of the grandparent to continue
providing care, and with no evidence that the parent actually
declined to reassume physical custody of the child. If this is true,
then thousands — perhaps millions — of family arrangements
that are functioning just fine, with no risk to the child, are now
open to state intervention.

5 The majority rightly does not suggest that the trial court’s findings could support
a conclusion that the child’s parents failed to make safe and appropriate
arrangements for the child’s care or that the child’s care provider is unwilling or
unable to provide care or support for the child and the whereabouts of the parents
are unknown, See 33 V.S.A. §5102()(A). The court’s findings could not support
either of these conclusions.

7 i.

120. Because of variations in family structures, minority fami-
lies are disproportionately subject to such intervention because a
disproportionate number of children in minority communities live
with a grandparent and no parent. Compare America’s Children,
supra, tbl. FAM1.B (stating that 30% of children who live with a
grandparent and no parent are black and 21% are Hispanic), with
K. Humes, et al. U.S. Census Bureau, Overview of Race and
Hispanic Origin: 2010 tbl.1 (March 2011), http:/Avww.census.gov/
prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf_ [https://perma.cc/LPJ2-UDNH]
(showing that in 2010 close to 18% and 16% of the population
were black and Latino/Hispanic, respectively). If a parent entrusts
the care of his or her child to a grandparent, and that grand-
parent is willingly raising the child without incident or risk to the
child, and does not seek to return care of child to the parent, or
to otherwise alter the arrangement without success, then grounds
for state intervention in the family do not exist.

121. Second, the trial court’s findings reflect that for the year
preceding the State’s petition, mother had agreed with DCF and
the step-grandmother that mother would not seek to assert
physical custody over the child, and that DCF would seek court
intervention if she did. This, rather than mother’s conduct in
years prior, is the relevant time frame for assessing whether the
child is CHINS. In re D.T., 170 Vt. 148, 156, 743 A.2d 1077, 1084
(1999) (“The issue before the family court at the merits stage of
a CHINS proceeding is a determination of whether, at the time of
the filing of the petition, the juvenile is a child in need of care and
supervision.”). Mother’s continued compliance with DCF’s informal
requirement that she not seek physical custody over the child
cannot be construed as an unwillingness to have physical custody.
Otherwise, the many parents who enter into similar informal
understandings with DCF face a risk that they may be deemed to
have abandoned their child by failing to repudiate such agree-
ments after some unspecified period of time.

122. The alternate basis for the trial court’s determination —
that this child is without proper parental care or subsistence —
presents an easier question. The law is clear that a CHINS
finding cannot be predicated on the unfitness of a noncustodial
parent who poses no threat to a child) When a parent who is
unable to provide proper parental care himself or herself makes
appropriate arrangements for the child’s care, the child is receiv-
ing proper parental care, and the child’s welfare is not in
jeopardy, that child cannot be a CHINS B.

326 |

123. We have long emphasized that the relevant question under
33 VS.A. § 5102(8)(B) is child-centered; the issue is not the fitness
of one or both parents, but is the well-being of the child. In
In ve B.R. this Court emphasized that the focus of a CHINS
proceeding is the child’s welfare, and that the time to focus on the
fitness of a parent is at disposition. 2014 VT 37, 1913-14, 196 Vt.
304, 97 A.38d 867; see also id. 129 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (“(A]
court does not make a CHINS determination ‘against’ or ‘as to’
one parent or another. Rather, a CHINS finding reflects that a
child . . . is without proper parental care ... .”). That’s why “a
child who lives with a responsible and capable parent who is
meeting the child’s needs is not a CHINS just because a
noncustodial, nonabusive parent who is not caring for the child is
incapable of meeting the child’s needs.” Jd. 132 (Robinson, J.,
dissenting).

124. We have likewise made it clear that “parental care” need
not be provided by a legal parent; the term “parental” describes
the type of care a child requires, but does not restrict the
caregiving to a legal parent. See In re G.C., 170 Vt. 329, 333-34,
749 A.2d 28, 31-32 (2000).

125. In In re G.C. we considered a case in which a child’s
mother had a history of severe mental illness and had arranged
for her and her newborn child to live with a foster family. The
arrangement worked well at first, but mother’s mental health
deteriorated and she was hospitalized after attempting suicide.
The family court determined that the child was a CHINS, and
mother appealed. She argued that she had made appropriate
arrangements to ensure that the child would be provided proper
parental care during the anticipated periods when she lapsed into
depression or was otherwise unable to cope with caring for the
child, that the arrangements worked as planned, and that the
child had never been without proper parental care because the
foster family took over care of the child following her suicide
attempt and hospitalization.

126. Although this Court ultimately affirmed the CHINS de-
termination, our discussion, and the cases we relied upon, estab-
lish that a child cannot be adjudicated CHINS B merely because
a parent has made arrangements for another to provide appro-
priate care for the child in the absence of substantial risk to the
child’s welfare arising from that arrangement. We explained:

| “

We agree with mother that the use of the term
“parental care” in [the statutory definition of CHINS]
does not compel a CHINS adjudication whenever inca-
pacitated parents leave their children with relatives or
others to provide “parental” care during the period of
incapacitation. See In re Ayres, 513 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1974) (dangerous precedent would be set by
charging parents with neglect whenever they placed
physical custody of their children with surrogate parent
or member of extended family; because in-laws had been
providing proper parental care at all times, court erred
in finding child to be neglected and placing her with state
agency); In re Murphy, 346 P2d 367, 870 (Or. 1959)
(legislature did not intend that children without parents
or guardians should be declared dependent for that
reason alone”; children are not dependent solely because
they are receiving “parental care” from persons other
than parents or guardians); Hendricks uv Curry, 401
S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1966) (statutory term “parental
care” is purely descriptive and refers to kind and quality
of care ordinarily provided by parents; “parental care” as
defined in statute may be provided by persons who
assume parental role in child’s life).

Id. at 338, T49 A2d at 31.

127. We affirmed the CHINS determination in In re G.C., not
because the child’s parental care was being provided in part by
someone other than mother, and not because mother was in some
abstract sense unable to provide proper care for the child, but
because on the facts of that case the parental care arrangement
posed a risk to the child. Mother continued to live with the child
and foster family, the foster couple had not been informed of the
depth of mother’s mental health challenges, the foster couple
could not stop mother from leaving their home with the child, and
mother testified that her most recent suicide attempt was in part
a response to the twenty-four-hour-a-day foster care arrangement
that made her feel as though she was not trusted. Jd. at 334-35,
749 A.2d at 32. The arrangement mother relied upon to ensure
proper care for G.C. was not working.

128. In this case, the court made no finding that there was a
risk that, notwithstanding the agreement with DCF and the

child’s step-grandmother, mother would attempt to remove the
child from the home. In fact, in contrast to In re G.C., where the
mother who posed a risk to the child lived in the same home as
the child, in this case mother’s contact with the child was limited
to supervised visits. Moreover, this was not a disposition hearing
in which mother sought custody of the child. Mother’s ability to
care for this child (or father’s for that matter) was only relevant
in the context of a hypothetical scenario that the court did not
find was actually likely to arise. The threshold question for
CHINS B purposes was whether this child was without proper
parental care, and the trial court made no findings to support a
determination that he was.

129. I do not mean to suggest that step-grandmother is forever
doomed to continue caring for this child without formal legal
authority. Mother could agree to a guardianship or even adoption
wholly apart from any formal state intervention. Step-grandmother
could indicate an unwillingness to continue to care for the child
under the current terms — thereby potentially triggering either a
CHINS B proceeding as projected by DCF if mother seeks to
take the child back or a CHINS A proceeding if she declines to
do so. But I do conclude that given the trial court’s findings as to
the existing circumstances, its CHINS conclusion is not warranted
under either potential prong of the CHINS statute.

2016 VT 54A

Carole Kuligoski, Individually and On Behalf of Michael J.
Kuligoski, and Mark Kuligoski and James Kuligoski v.
Brattleboro Retreat and Northeast Kingdom Human Services
[156 A.3d 436]

No. 14-396

Present: Reiber, CJ. Dooley, Skoglund and Robinson, JJ. and Morris,
Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed September 16, 2016
As Amended On Motion to Clarify October 10, 2016

330.

2

Ey

Pe
&

Richard T. Cassidy and Matthew M. Shagam of Hoff Curtis,
Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ritchie E. Berger and Angela R. Clark of Dinse, Knapp &
McAndrew P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Brattleboro
Retreat.

Stephen J. Soule and Pamela L. Eaton of Paul Frank +
Collins P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Northeast King-
dom Human Services.

384 Le

Joslyn L. Wilschek and Shireen T. Hart of Primmer Piper
Eggleston & Cramer PC, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae The
Vermont Association of Hospitals and Health Systems.

O. Whitman Smith of Mickenbery, Dunn, Lachs & Smith,
PLC, Burlington, for Amicus Curiae Vermont Council of Develop-
mental and Mental Health Services, Inc.

Allan R. Keyes of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for
Amici Curiae University of Vermont Medical Center, Central
Vermont Medical Center and Rutland Regional Medical Center.

A.J. Ruben, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Disability Rights of
Vermont, Inc.

11. Dooley, J. This case arises out of the assault of Michael
Kuligoski by a former Brattleboro Retreat patient, E.R., after the
patient was discharged from the Retreat, a mental health treat-
ment facility, and while he was undergoing outpatient treatment.
with Northeast Kingdom Human Services (NKHS). Plaintiff Car-
ole Kuligoski, individually and on behalf of Michael, Mark
Kuligoski, and James Kuligoski (collectively plaintiffs), filed suit in
Windham Superior Court against defendants Brattleboro Retreat
and NKHS, raising claims of failure to warn of E.R.’s danger to
others, failure to train E.R.’s parents in handling E.R., failure to
treat, improper release, and negligent undertaking. The superior
court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, and plaintiffs appealed. We reverse on the failure to warn
claim, and affirm on the failure to treat, improper release, failure
to train, and negligent undertaking claims.

336 |

112. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following facts,’ as relevant
to this appeal. On October 9, 2010, E.R. was voluntarily admitted
to the Psychiatric Department at Central Vermont Medical Center
(CVMC) with a “psychotic disorder” after having threatened
young children in his home. During his first few days at CVMC,
E.R. was easily agitated, made threatening remarks, reported
auditory hallucinations, and had fair-to-poor judgment. The exam-
ining physician tentatively diagnosed E.R. with a schizophreniform
disorder.

13. On October 15, 2010, the medical professionals at CVMC
completed the necessary documents to have E.R. involuntarily
committed. The documents stated that he was mentally ill, posed
a danger to himself and others, and was in need of involuntary
hospitalization. The following day, E.R. was placed in restraints
and transferred from CVMC to the Vermont State Hospital where
a physician examined him and determined that he was a danger
to others and, if released, would pose a danger to his family.
There is no indication that either the documents prepared at
CVMC or the determination of the physician at the Vermont State
Hospital were ever used to start a formal involuntary commitment
proceeding. Nor is there an explanation of the basis on which
E.R. continued to be held at the Vermont State Hospital. We can
conclude only that E.R. must have been held as a voluntary
patient

1 Plaintiffs also brought an action against E.R., E.R’s parents and E.R’s grand-
parents seeking the same damages they seek in this action. See Kuligoski x
Rapoza, No. 42-2-113 Caev (Vt. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2015). The superior court in that
case granted summary judgment for defendants and dismissed the action on May
13, 2015. The parties have stipulated that we can use the decision in that case in
deciding this appeal. We take that stipulation to mean that we ean consider the
undisputed facts as considered in that decision in addition to the factual allegations
made in the complaint in this case. The statement of facts in the body of this
opinion is based on both sources.

2 Without filing an application in the superior court for involuntary treatment or
accepting E.R. as a voluntary patient, the Vermont State Hospital could only hold
E.R. for seventy-two hours after the physician’s certification. See 18 VS.A.
§ 7508(d). Since no court order was sought, we conclude that E.R. must have been
considered a voluntary patient. Although the record does not show conclusively
whether E.R. was an adult, the facts indicate that his symptoms first arose in 2009
at the beginning of his sophomore year in college and his hospital treatment
occurred over a year later. It is very likely he was an adult, but was still living
with his parents. In the text, we have considered him to be an adult.

14. While at the Vermont State Hospital, E.R. was administered
anti-psychotic and anxiety medication. He repeatedly asked to
leave the hospital, once tried to escape, threatened to punch out
a window, and, although he denied having auditory hallucinations,
was observed reacting to unseen stimuli. After E.R. reported
feeling unsafe at the hospital, a social worker made a referral for
his transfer to the Retreat, a nonprofit psychiatric hospital in
Windham County, Vermont. Upon his discharge from the state
hospital, he was diagnosed with schizophreniform disorder.

15. On October 22, 2010, E.R. was examined by a physician at
the Retreat who confirmed the state hospital’s diagnosis. The
physician reported that E.R. “had verbalized homicidal ideation
toward staff” E.R. was thereafter placed on a_ staff-intensive
treatment plan but continued to exhibit “grossly psychotic” be-
havior, lack of insight, and severely impaired judgment. His
physician noted that he “required an in-patient level of care to
prevent further decompensation.”* Further reports indicate audi-
tory and visual hallucinations, menacing behavior, and homicidal
and suicidal ideation.

16. On November 1, 2010, E.R.’s physician noted that “E.R.
continued to be floridly psychotic, probably paranoid, guarded and
gradually improving but that he remained sufficiently ill that he
totally lacked insight into his illness and that E.R. would be
non-compliant with treatment outside of the hospital.” He further
noted that E.R. would remain on the treatment plan and be
allowed out only for brief intervals.

17. During his time at the Retreat, E.R.’s behavior did not
improve. In his November 10, 2010 assessment, E.R.’s physician
stated that, if discharged, E.R. would be a high risk for
decompensation, might stop his medication, and might not partici-
pate in aftercare treatment. Nevertheless, he stated that E.R.
would be discharged on November 12.

We recognize that his status as a voluntary patient seems inconsistent with

some of the later facts, including his attempt to escape from the Vermont State
Hospital. Inconsistencies of this type are not unusual in a complaint,
*In psychiatry, decompensation constitutes the “failure to generate effective
psychological coping mechanisms in response to stress, resulting in personality
disturbance or disintegration, especially that which causes relapse in schizophre-
nia” Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford Univ, Press 2015), httpsy/perma.ce/B6FR-
VWF.

338 |

18. On November 12, 2010, E.R.’s physician noted that he
stopped taking his medication and had been hearing voices
commanding him to kill himself. E.R. said of the commands, “I
feel like I should do it.” His physician wrote in his assessment,
“Obviously [E.R.’s] refusal of medications is very worrisome and
exactly what this writer was concerned about. Not only abstractly
is it a bad idea, but he actually seems to have experienced an
increase in his voices with only missing one night’s medications.”
E.R. was, however, discharged that same day.

19. Throughout the period of his treatment at both the Vermont
State Hospital and the Retreat, E.R. was closely monitored by his
parents, with whom he had been living. Exactly what the parents
were told at the time of discharge is disputed, although it appears
they were told that E.R. “might have schizophrenia.” They un-
derstood that E.R. was “going through a phase and would
recover.”

110. In the discharge summary, E.R.’s physician again stated
that E.R. was a high risk for poor compliance with post-discharge
treatment; E.R. had been diagnosed as having a “psychotic
disorder, not otherwise specified”; and that E.R.’s parents believed
his mental health was related to his breakup with a girlfriend in
2009 or possibly a sequela resulting from mononucleosis. He
stated that E.R. met the criteria for schizophrenia or, at the very
least, schizophreniform disorder.

111. Prior to E.R’s discharge, the Retreat developed an
aftercare treatment plan with E.R.’s parents that involved regular
visits to NKHS. E.R. was also prescribed daily medication, which
his mother was told to administer to him. E.R.’s mother believed
that E.R.’s condition had considerably improved at the time of his
release.

112. On December 1, 2010, E.R. met with a treatment team at
NKHS and signed a cognitive remediation therapy plan. A week
later, a member of the treatment team completed a Substance
Abuse Addendum, in which he stated “that E.R. was a high risk
for Dimension 3 of the Client Placement Criteria (emotional,
behavioral or cognitive conditions/complications) because E.R. had
recently been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and had
minimal insight surrounding the diagnosis.”

113. In mid-December, E.R. told his mother that he had
stopped taking medication. She called NKHS and spoke with
one of the physicians on E.R.’s treatment team. The physician told

E.R.’s mother that this was a cause for concern but that E.R. had
to decide to take care of himself. E.R. did not meet with anyone
at NKHS between mid-December 2010 and March 2011, and no
one at NKHS reached out to E.R. during that time or took any
action with respect to E.R.’s medication regime.

114. On February 26, 2011, E.R. accompanied his father to an
apartment building in St. Johnsbury owned by E.R.’s grandpar-
ents. Plaintiff Michael Kuligoski was also at the apartment
building, working on the furnace. E.R. went down to the basement
where Mr. Kuligoski was working and assaulted him, causing
serious injuries. The forensic psychiatrist who evaluated E.R. at
the request of the criminal court stated that the night before the
offense E.R. had not slept well, awoke early that morning, was
just “sitting and staring,” and was paranoid that people were
staring at him en route to the apartment. The psychiatrist
believed that E.R. likely was in a “psychotic haze” at the time of
the offense, having been “overcome by the symptoms of his
condition to the degree where he acted while in a psychotic
storm.”

115. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in superior court, alleging seven
counts: (1) the Retreat was negligent in discharging E.R. knowing
of his dangerous tendencies and that he was a high risk for
decompensation; (2) the Retreat was negligent in failing to warn
E.R_’s parents that he posed a risk to the general public; (3) the
Retreat was negligent in failing to train E.R.’s parents how to
supervise him, monitor and manage his medications, and take
necessary and appropriate measures to protect potential victims;
(4) the Retreat was negligent in its undertaking “to render a
service that it recognized or should have recognized as necessary
for the protection of third persons”; (65) NKHS was negligent in
failing to warn E.R.’s parents that he posed a risk to the general
public; (6) NKHS was negligent in failing to take “immediate and
affirmative steps” to treat E.R.; and (7) NKHS was negligent in
undertaking its duty to render services to E.R. Although the
complaint itemized separate counts, plaintiffs emphasized in the
superior court, as well as in this Court, that the counts were
based on a common “duty of reasonable care to act to avoid
needless risk to the safety of third parties” based on the “special
relationship” that existed between the Retreat and NKHS and
their patient, E.R.

116. Defendants moved to dismiss the respective claims against
them, pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They

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both argued that they owed no duty to protect plaintiffs from
attack by E.R. and that their alleged negligence was not the
proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. The superior court granted
both motions. Relying largely on our decision in Peck u Counsel-
ing Service of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422
(1985), the superior court concluded that defendants owed no duty
to plaintiffs because Michael Kuligoski was not an identifiable
victim and defendants were under no duty to control E.R. With
respect to the third-party duty, the court explained that plaintiffs’
claims “would push the ruling by the Peck majority far beyond the
bounds of the holding as limited by the facts there, and the
recognition of those claims would stake out expansive new terri-
tory not warranted by proper respect for the separation of
powers.” As to the duty of defendants to control E.R., the court
emphasized Vermont’s “policy of keeping mentally-ill persons in
the least restrictive environment possible.” This appeal followed.

117. On appeal, plaintiffs generally argue that the superior
court erred in holding that Peck barred its claims. They contend
that, while Peck involved an identifiable victim, its holding should
not be read as limiting its reach only to identifiable victims. They
argue that this reading is supported by public policy protecting
the public from dangerous individuals and is consistent with
modern tort scholarship, such as the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). Plaintiffs
argue that the trial court erred in concluding at this stage of the
case that there was no proximate cause. As we explain in our
discussion below, we hold that Peck and other precedents bar
plaintiffs’ duty-to-treat and negligent-undertaking claims. However,
we also hold that Peck extends to identifiable and foreseeable
victims, and that plaintiffs’ duty-to-warn claims should not be
dismissed at this stage in the litigation.

118. We review the superior court’s decision “on a motion to
dismiss de novo under the same standard as the trial court and
will uphold a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim only if
it is beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Birchwood Land Co. v
Krizan, 2015 VT 37, 16, 198 Vt. 420, 115 A.3d 1009 (quotation
omitted). “We assume as true all facts as pleaded in the com-
plaint, accept as true all reasonable inferences derived therefrom,
and assume as false all contravening assertions in the defendant’s
pleadings.” Id. We are “limited to determining whether the bare

allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

I. The Duty of Care

119. HM “The existence of a duty is a question of law to be
decided by the court.” Sorge uw State, 171 Vt. 171, 174, 762 A2d
816, 819 (2000). Once a legal duty is established, as well as breach
of that duty, there must be factual causation for the defendant to
be subject to liability for the harm caused to the plaintiff. See id.
(requiring duty before determining causation). “Ordinarily, proxi-
mate cause is a jury issue unless the proof is so clear that
reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all
reasonable minds would construe the facts and circumstances one
way.” Estate of Sumner vu Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 162 Vt.
628, 629, 649 A.2d 1034, 1036 (1994) (mem.) (quotation omitted).
On this motion to dismiss, some factual development is necessary
to reach the causation issue and determine whether, in light of
any possible duty and breach of that duty, there could be
proximate cause sufficient for liability.

120. IH Before addressing the specific issues, we start with a
discussion of the duty to third parties generally, as well as the
specific duty of mental health professionals to their patients and
nonpatient third parties. In doing so, we note that the main issues
in this case do not arise from a dispute as to whether defendants
had a general duty of care, or even whether that duty extends to
nonpatients in appropriate circumstances, but rather to the spe-
cific elements of that duty. Thus, we are starting at the most
general level where there is only limited disagreement between
the parties, and moving to more specific levels where the sharp
disagreement emerges. As we have repeatedly stated, background
principles of negligence provide that “duty is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only ‘an expression of the sum total of those consider-
ations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is
entitled to protection?” Sorge, 171 Vt. at 177, 762 A.2d at 820
(quoting W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 53, at 358
(5th ed. 1984)). The existence of a duty is “a question of fairness”
and “involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed
solution.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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121. The modern law on duty comes from the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41,
which provides:

(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes
a duty of reasonable care to third parties with regard to
risks posed by the other that arise within the scope of
the relationship.

(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty pro-
vided in Subsection (a) include:

(4) a mental-health professional with patients.

This Restatement section replaces three sections of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts (1965), which have been used extensively
in defining the duty owed by a mental health professional or
institution to third parties injured by a patient. See id. §§ 315(a),
319, 324A.

122. Comment g to § 41 of the Third Restatement addresses
the duty of mental health professionals to third Parties. The duty
begins with the physician using “customary care” to determine
whether a patient poses a risk of harm to others. “Once such a
patient is identified, the duty imposed by reasonable care depends
on the circumstances” and “may require providing appropriate
treatment, warning others of the risks posed by the patient,
seeking the patient’s agreement to a voluntary commitment,
making efforts to commit the patient involuntarily, or taking other
steps to ameliorate the risk posed by the patient.” Jd. Although
courts have been hesitant to embrace duties any broader than
those to “reasonably identified” victims, § 41 sets no express limit
on individuals to whom the duty is owed. Because “[{rJeasonable
care itself does not require warning individuals who cannot be
identified,” the proper inquiry is “a question of reasonable care,
not a question of the existence of a duty.” Jd. “However, when
reasonable care requires confining a patient who poses a real risk
of harm to the community, the duty of the mental-health profes-
sional ordinarily extends to those members of the community who
are put at risk by the patient.” Id. Bec: patients who are not
in custody cannot be controlled in the traditional understanding of
the term, the duty imposed on mental-health professionals “is only
one of reasonable care.” Id. Despite this duty, a “health-care

professional can pursue, and may have a statutory obligation to
seek, involuntary commitment of patients who are dangerous to
themselves or others.” Id.

123. We have not had the occasion to address § 41(b)(4), and no
other court has explicitly adopted it. Nonetheless, we note that
the principles enunciated in § 41 build upon those of § 315 et seq.
of the Second Restatement, and are an evolution of the duties
articulated in decades of case law.

124. [EB The history of this duty of care of mental health
professionals or institutions with respect to nonpatient third
parties begins with the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Tarasoff x Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976). This landmark case established that mental health profes-
sionals have a duty to warn “would-be” victims of a patient’s
dangerous conduct. Id. at 346. In Turasoff, a patient at the
University of California’s Cowell Memorial Hospital informed his
therapist that he was planning to kill an unnamed girl — readily
identifiable to the therapist as the victim Tatiana Tarasoff — after
she returned from her summer in Brazil. Jd. at 341. Although the
mental health staff sought the authority to petition for the
patient’s commitment, the university police took the patient into
custody briefly and released him after he promised to stay away
from the victim. Id. Shortly after Tarasoff’s return, the patient
went to her residence and killed her. Id.

125. Tarasoff’s parents filed a negligence suit against the
university, the psychotherapists employed by the university hos-
pital, and the campus police claiming that the defendants owed a
duty to protect their daughter from the patient and breached that.
duty by failing to warn the plaintiffs of the patient’s threats and
failing to confine the patient under a California statute that
governs the involuntary commitment of individuals with mental
health disorders. The California Supreme Court concluded that.
the defendants were shielded by governmental immunity from
liability under the statute for failing to confine the patient, and
addressed only the merits of the duty-to-warn claim. /d. at 341-42.

126. IM In conducting its analysis into the defendants’ duty to
warn, the California court balanced a number of considerations,
including

the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness

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of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availabil-
ity, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

Id, at 342 (quotation omitted). Although foreseeability is a signifi-
cant factor, the court noted that, in avoiding foreseeable harm, a
defendant will not be required to control the conduct of another
person or warn of such conduct unless “the defendant bears some
special relationship to the dangerous person or to the potential
victim.” Id. at 343. The court then concluded that a special
relationship existed between a therapist and patient, and that
“{sluch a relationship may support affirmative duties for the
benefit of third persons.” Jd. The court found that the interest in
protecting a potential victim who has been threatened by a patient
outweighs the countervailing policy considerations, such as doctor-
patient confidentiality, the difficulty of predicting a patient’s future
violent acts, and the risk of unnecessary warnings. Id. at 345-46.

127. Importantly, while the court observed that its prior
decisions recognizing such a duty involved situations where the
defendant maintained a special relationship with both the victim
and the person whose conduct created the danger, see, e.g.,
Johnson v State, 447 P.2d 352, 355 (Cal. 1968) (upholding suit
against state for failure to warn foster parents of dangerous
tendencies of child), it concluded the duty should not “logically be
constricted to such situations.” Id. at 344. As guidance, the court
cited cases from other jurisdictions recognizing such a duty in the
context of doctors failing to warn their patients not to drive when
taking certain medications for the safety of the general public, or
failing to warn the family members of patients with contagious
diseases. Id.

128. BPM As the California Supreme Court summarized:

[The] defendant therapists cannot escape liability
merely because [the victim] herself was not their patient.
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the stan-
dards of his profession should determine, that his patient
presents a serious danger of violence to another, he
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the

intended victim against such danger. The discharge of
this duty may require the therapist to take one or more
of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.
Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or
others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify
the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably
necessary under the circumstances.

Td. at 340. In summary, Tarasoff held that a therapist has a duty
to warn either “the endangered party or those who can reason-
ably be expected to notify him.” Jd. at 347.

129. On the heels of Turasoff came the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Thompson u County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728
(Cal. 1980), which further articulated the duty to warn when a
potentially dangerous individual makes a generalized threat to the
general public or a segment of the population — i.e, an uniden-
tifiable victim. In Thompson, a juvenile offender had been in the
custody of a county institution under a court order. Id. at 730.
After he was released on temporary leave into his mother’s
custody, he murdered a neighboring child in the garage of his
mother’s home. Jd. The complaint alleged that the county knew of
the juvenile’s “latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensi-
ties regarding young children and that sexual assaults upon young
children and violence connected therewith were a likely result of
releasing (him) into the community.” Jd. The complaint also
alleged that the county knew the juvenile offender “had indicated
that he would, if released, take the life of a young child residing
in the neighborhood,” although he gave no indication of any
specific child he intended to harm. Id.

130. I The plaintiffs, the parents of the victim, claimed that
the county was negligent in releasing the juvenile into the
community and failing to warn the juvenile’s mother, the local
police, or “parents of young children within the immediate vicin-
ity” of his mother’s residence. /d. In deciding the extent of the
duty, the court turned to Tarasoff, emphasizing that the holding
extended to “specifically foreseeable and identifiable victim[s] of
the patient’s threats.” Id. at 734. The court also reiterated
Tarasoff?s words of caution — that “‘the open and confidential
character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to
express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed’ ” and
that “‘a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal

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2 «

such threats’” because “‘such disclosures could seriously disrupt
the patient’s relationship with his therapist and with the persons
threatened’” Jd. (quoting Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347). The court
also cautioned that a therapist should not disclose confidential
information unless necessary to avert danger and that “ ‘even then
that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the
privacy of his patient to the fullest extent’” possible. /d. (quoting
Tarasoff, 551 P2d at 347). The Thompson court interpreted
Tarasoff to require as a precondition of liability that the victim be
“readily identifiable,” if not “specifically named.” Id. The court
thus rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to impose “blanket liability”
on the county for failing to warn the parents of the victim or
other neighborhood children, the police, or the juvenile’s mother.
Id. The court based its decision on policy considerations, as well
as “foreseeability” within the context of the case. Notably, the
court considered the “practical obstacles” to imposing a broad
duty:

In our view, the generalized warnings sought to be
required here would do little to increase the precautions
of any particular members of the public who already may
have become conditioned to locking their doors, avoiding
dark and deserted streets, instructing their children to
beware of strangers and taking other precautions. By
their very numbers the force of the multiple warnings
required to accompany the release of all probationers
with a potential for violence would be diluted as to each
member of the public who by such release thereby
becomes a potential victim. Such a warning may also
negate the rehabilitative purposes of the parole and
probation system by stigmatizing the released offender in
the public’s eye.

Id. at 736.

131. Thus, the court found that warnings to both the police and
the parents of neighborhood children would be of little beneficial
effect. Id. As specifically relevant to this case, the California high
court considered the effect of warnings to the juvenile offender’s
mother, into whose custody he was released. Id. at 737. The court
concluded that such a warning would not have the desired effect
of warning the potential victims because the mother would not be
likely to volunteer information to neighborhood parents that her

son posed a threat to their welfare, “thereby perhaps thwarting
any rehabilitative effort, and also effectively stigmatizing both the
mother and son in the community.” /d. The court did not find
persuasive the dissent’s reasoning “that the mother ‘might’ have
taken special care to control her son had she been warned of [his]
threats,” concluding that such “attenuated conjecture” cannot
alone support the imposition of liability. 7d. The court distin-
guished Johnson, 447 P.2d at 355, which held that the state had
a duty to warn the foster family of a child’s dangerous tendencies,
because it was the family in Johnson that was endangered,
whereas the mother in Thompson was not herself endangered and
would be expected to supervise her son “for the remote benefit of
a third party.” Thompson, 614 P.2d at 737.

132. In Vermont, our most significant decision on the duty of
mental health professionals to third parties is Peck, 146 Vt. 61, 499
A.2d 422, a duty to warn case.’ Like Turasoff, Peck deals with the
failure to warn an identified victim and expressed a broad general
duty of the mental health professional or institution to third
parties affected by the conduct of the patient. Unlike Tarasoff, the
patient threatened the property, rather than the person, of the
plaintiff. Jd. at 64, 499 A.2d at 424. In Peck, the plaintiffs sued a
mental health agency for damages to their property after their
son set fire to their barn. /d. At the time of the incident, the son
was an outpatient of Counseling Service of Addison County and
was living at home with his parents. Id. at 63, 499 A.2d at 424.
After a fight with his father, the son left home and went to the
Counseling Service to speak with his therapist. Jd. He told his
therapist about the fight and that “he didn’t think his father cared

* Peck is a 3 to 2 decision with no majority opinion. Justice Underwood concurred
in the result but did not join the opinion of Justice Hill, which explained the
rationale for reaching that result, Justice Underwood did not author a concurring
opinion explaining why he disagreed with the rationale of Justice Hill's opinion,
The dissent authored by Chief Justice Billings, and joined by Justice Peck, argued
that the mental health professional had no duty to third parties and the
recognition of any such duty should be undertaken by the Legislature and not by
this Court.

The plurality opinion of Justice Hill has been cited and quoted in part in later
opinions of this Court without an explanation that it is not a majority opinion. See,
e.g, Lenoci x Leonard, 2011 VT 47, 115, 189 Vt. 641, 21 ABd 694 (mem); Smith
x Day, 148 Vt. 595, 597, 508, 588 A.2d 157, 158, 159 (1987). We have similarly done
so here. To the extent that is necessary for the opinion reached herein, we adopt
the opinion of Justice Hill.

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about him or respected him.” Jd. At a following session, the son
stated that he was still angry with his father, and told his
therapist that he “wanted to get back at his father” by “burn[ing]
down his barn.” Id. at 64, 499 A.2d at 424. After discussing the
consequences of the act, the son promised his therapist that he
would not burn down the barn. The therapist did not disclose
these threats to the parents or any other staff members of
Counseling Service. Several days later, the son set fire to his
parents’ barn, which was completely destroyed. /d. at 63, 499 A.2d
at 424. The parents claimed that the therapist had a duty to
protect them from their son’s violent behavior, that the therapist
knew or should have known that their son presented an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to them, and that the therapist breached
that duty by failing “to take steps that were reasonably necessary
to protect” them. Id. at 64, 499 A.2d at 424.

133. [BB The Peck Court began its analysis with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315, which provides that a duty
arises if: “(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the
third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the
third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.”
The Court concluded that “the relationship between a clinical
therapist and his or her patient ‘is sufficient to create a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s
conduct, ” id. at 65, 499 A.2d at 425 (quoting Turasoff, 551 P.2d at
343), even though the level of control over an outpatient may be
Jess than that exercised over institutionalized patients. Jd. The
Court noted that “Vermont already recognizes the existence of a
special relationship between a physician and a patient that im-
poses certain legal duties on the physician for the benefit of third
persons,” citing statutes requiring doctors to warn others of
contagious diseases to protect the public health. Jd. For example,
18 V.S.A. § 1004, which has not been amended since the time of
the Peck decision, provides that: “A physician who knows or
suspects that a person whom he or she has been called to attend
is sick or has died of a communicable disease dangerous to the
public health shall immediately quarantine and report to the
health officer the place where such case exists.” Accordingly, the
Court saw no reason why the same duty should not exist in a
mental health setting. Id.

134. EI In imposing a duty on the therapist, the Court rejected
the defendant's arguments that a mental health professional
cannot predict future violent behavior and that physician-patient
privilege protects against disclosure of confidential information. Id.
at 66, 499 A.2d at 425; see also 12 V.S.A. § 1612(a). After quoting
at length from Turasoff, the Court noted that the trial court found
sufficient facts to demonstrate that the therapist knew or should
have known the defendant posed a threat to his parents and that
the failure of the therapist to reveal that threat “was inconsistent
with the standards of the mental health profession.” Id. at 66, 499
A2d at 425-26. Ultimately, we held that “a mental health profes-
sional who knows or, based upon the standards of the mental
health profession, should know that his or her patient poses a
serious risk of danger to an identifiable victim has a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect him or her from that danger.”
Id. at 68, 499 A2d at 427.

II. The Duty to Warn

135. Having set out the nature of duties for tort actions and
the important sources of law for defining the duties of mental
health professionals to third parties injured by their patients, we
look at the specific duties alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint in this
case. As we stated above, the positions of the parties begin to
differ when we look at the specific duties alleged. The decisions
from around the country reflect these differences. Although the
central holding of Turasoff has been widely accepted around the
country, the same is not true for extensions of the duty beyond
providing warnings. Further, courts in other jurisdictions are
divided on how far to extend the Tarasoff duty to warn, and the
subsequent limitation on that duty expressed in Thompson.

136. We first consider plaintiffs’ allegations that defendant,
Brattleboro Retreat, breached its duties to warn E.R.’s parents of
the risk of his dangerous behavior and to train them in how to
handle him. In examining the duty of defendant, we put these
claims together under the general description of duty to warn and
consider later whether separate duties are involved. Courts differ
when evaluating a claim of a duty to warn someone other than an
identified victim. As discussed previously, several courts have
limited the duty to identifiable victims, or a class of individuals
whose injury is foreseeable because of their relationship or
proximity to a specifically identifiable victim. See, e.g., Dawe vu Dr.

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Reuven Bar-Levav & Assocs, P.C., 780 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Mich.
2010) (establishing duty to warn for mental health professionals
when patient makes threat of violence against “reasonably iden-
tifiable third person” and has apparent intent and ability to carry
out threat); Hmerich wv Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev, Inc.,
720 A.2d 1032, 1040-41 (Pa. 1998) (stating that psychotherapist has
duty to warn only when specific and immediate threat of serious
bodily injury has been made against “specifically identified or
readily identifiable victim”). The reasoning is much the same in
these decisions, as they reflect the policies set forth by the
California Supreme Court in Thompson. See, e.g. Fraser v
United States, 674 A.2d 811, 816 (Conn. 1996) (stating that “the
interests of the mental health profession in honoring the confi-
dentiality of the patient-therapist relationship and in respecting
the humanitarian and due process concerns that limit the invol-
untary hospitalization of the mentally ill” counsel against imposing
“liability for harm to unidentifiable victims or unidentifiable
classes of victims” (citations omitted)). Many of these courts also
rely on their existing precedent in the area of negligence, citing
the limitations on third-party liability already recognized in their
common law. Jd. at 815-16 (observing that scope of liability in
negligence to injured third parties has not been enlarged by
changes in tort law).

137. However, several other courts have held that a duty to
warn is owed not only to specifically identified or identifiable
victims, but to foreseeable victims or to those whose membership
in a particular class — for example, those living with the patient
— places them within a zone of danger. See, e.g., Lipari u Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980) (applying
Nebraska law) (holding that if psychiatrist can reasonably foresee
risk of harm to plaintiffs or “class of persons” of which plaintiffs
were members, he or she has duty to warn, even if victims are
not specifically identified); Naidu u Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1073
(Del. 1988) (stating psychiatrist has duty to warn “potential
victims or a class of potential victims” when “in accordance with
the standards of the profession,” psychiatrist knows or should
know that patient’s “dangerous propensities present an unreason-
able risk of harm to others”); Schuster x Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d
159, 165 (Wis. 1988) (noting that psychotherapist’s duty to warn
“is not limited by requirement that threats made be directed to
an identifiable target” as it must simply be foreseeable that
omission “may cause harm to someone”).

138. Plaintiffs ask that we construe Peck broadly to find that
E.R’s parents should have been warned of his propensities in
order to protect third parties. Defendants, on the other hand,
focus on the language in our holding that specifies an “identifiable
victim,” a factor absent here. They argue that Peck is specifically
limited to the circumstance where there is an identifiable victim
and should be interpreted to hold that there is no duty to warn
in the absence of such a victim. We note that none of our more
recent cases have expanded the duty articulated in Peck to
unforeseeable victims. Nevertheless, we agree with plaintiffs that
the spe liability holding of Peck is based on the facts and
circumstances that were before the Court. Thus, while Peck finds
a duty to warn an identifiable victim, it does not hold that liability
is limited to those circumstances and in fact draws on public
health cases where there is no identified victim.? In saying this,
we are also cognizant of the fact that Peck was decided thirty
years ago, before modern trends in this area, such as the
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 41.

139. The dissent cites a number of cases that it argues show
that the majority rule is that there is no duty to warn anyone

5 Peck relied in part on the decision of a New Jersey court in McIntosh x Milano,
403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super, Ct. Law Div. 1979). That decision drew heavily on the
duty a physician has to the public when encountering a case of a communicable
disease to explain the duty of a mental health professional with a dangerous
patient. The court reasoned:

To summarize, this court holds that a psychiatrist or therapist may
have a duty to take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to protect
an intended or potential vietim of his patient when he determines, or
should determine, in the appropriate factual setting and in accordance
with the standards of his profession established at trial, that the patient
is or may present a probability of danger to that person. The
relationship giving rise to that duty may be found either in that
existing between the therapist and the patient, as was alluded to in
Tarasoff II, or in the more broadly based obligation a practitioner may
have to protect the welfare of the community, which is analogous to the
obligation a physician has to warm third persons of infectious or
contagious disease.

Id. at 511-12 (footnote omitted).

The communicable disease cases continue to be strong indicators of an extended
duty. For example, in CW. x Cooper Health System, 906 A.2d 440, 450 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), the court that decided McIntosh held that a physician
owed a duty to a patient and to others, specifically the patient's partner and child,
to disclose the patient’s HIV-positive status.

352 |

other than an identified victim. Post, 1% 87-90. In fact, most of
thes ‘s, including Tarasoff, do not contain such a limitation.
As we set out above, Tarasoff contains this explanation of the
duty: “Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or
others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the
police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.” Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.

140. Other cases, including Fraser, 674 A.2d at 817 — a duty
to treat and not a duty to warn case — acknowledge that the
duty can extend to persons in the zone of danger, one of the
bases for this decision. The court in Estates of Morgan uv Fairfield
Family Counseling Center, 1997-Ohio-194, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1831,
explicitly reserves the issue: “We need not determine at this time
whether and to what extent the readily identifiable victim rule
should attach in a failure-to-warn case. The case sub judice does
not involve any allegation that [the defendants were] negligent in
failing to warn [the plaintiff's] family.” In Emerich, 720 A.2d at
1040 n.8, the court stated: “(W]e are not required to address the
related issue of whether this duty to warn may be discharged by
notifying relatives of the victim, other individuals close to the
victim, or the police.” In fact, the only case cited by the dissent
that recognizes the Tarasoff duty but limits the required warning
to an identified victim is Eckhardt uv Kirts, 584 N.E.2d 1339 (IIL.
App. Ct. 1989), a twenty-seven year old intermediate appellate
court decision. The dissent asserts here that a holding that the
duty to warn extends beyond the identified victim represents an
unacknowledged minority position. We reject that assertion be-
cause it is not true.

141. [BB We agree that the Peck holding does not apply to a
duty to warn the general public. The complaint here expresses a
much narrower duty: to warn E.R.’s caretakers, here, his parents.
It alleges that the warnings would have informed them such that.
they could have properly supervised E.R. Any warning to E.R.’s
parents would not have been predicated on their membership in
the public at large, however, and would have been predicated on
their assumption of custody and caretaking responsibilities of
E.R., even though an adult, from the Retreat. For two reasons,
which circumscribe the scope of the duty we now recognize, we
conclude that the Retreat had a duty to give such warnings.

142. The first reason involves the unique circumstances of this
case. The complaint alleges that the parents had assumed the role

of E.R’s caretakers even though he was an adult. The extended
record shows that the parents were directly involved in E.R.’s
care and treatment from the first time that he showed symptoms
of mental illness and were involved in controlling his conduct. This
meant that they had assumed responsibilities, the discharge of
which could be affected by the information they received. For
example, the limited facts indicate that in a discharge conference,
Retreat staff told E.R.’s mother that she should give E.R. his
medication, but also indicate that E.R. stopped taking medication
on his own after discharge. A complete warning of the effect of
E.R. discontinuing the medication may have affected the parents’
degree of involvement in ensuring E.R. took his medication.

143. Because the parents were monitoring E.R.’s needs and
treatment, and were involved in his discharge, they were available
to receive information on his continuing need for treatment and
the actions that should have been taken based on his behavior. In
fact, the complaint alleges that the Retreat’s mental health
professional, who was aware of the risk that E.R. would suffer
decompensation and stop his medications if discharged, had “dis-
cussed discharge with E.R.’s mother” before determining such a
course was possible. Moreover, before the discharge, the Retreat
made an aftercare treatment plan “with E.R. and his parents.”
The complaint thus supports an inference that if E.R. had not had
parents into whose care he could be released, parents who could
monitor his symptoms and medication intake, Brattleboro Retreat
would not have authorized his release.

144. Again, we emphasize that we are dealing with a case that
was dismissed on the pleadings with no factual development.’ We
conclude that by transferring custody of a patient with a psychotic
disorder to caretakers whom they knew lacked psychiatric training
and experience, the Retreat owed a duty of care to provide
reasonable information to the parents to enable them to recognize

»

©The dissent goes through some of the known facts apparently to assert that the
Retreat took many steps to inform the parents of the risk and how to deal with
it, but those steps were not successful in controlling the risk of E.R.’s violent
actions, and demanding any more involves the imposition of unreasonable policy
judgments. Post, 1 102-105. At this point, the dissent’s concerns are premature
and speculative because no facts are established for purposes of the motion to
dismiss. It may be that the facts will show that the Retreat completely explained
the risks and how parents should respond to them. It may be otherwise as
plaintiffs allege. Neither assessment is possible on the very limited record before
us,

354 |

the dangers and fulfill the responsibilities envisioned for them in
the treatment plan. In adopting this duty definition, we are
relying upon Peck, as well as precedents from other jurisdictions
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§$315 and 319. Although
we have discussed it above for background, we have not adopted
and relied upon § 41(b)(4) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. We
recognize that there are contrary decisions from some of our
sister states, but generally we find them distinguishable. For
example, in In re Estate of Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 759, 760 (lowa
1982), the plaintiff was injured when a patient suffering from a
serious mental illness ran over her with a car. The plaintiff alleged
that the patient’s psychiatrist was negligent in failing to warn the
patient’s husband, a friend of the plaintiff, of the danger the
patient presented to the public “so he could have protected [the]
plaintiff” 7d. In its ruling, the lowa Supreme Court held that the
Tarasoff rule could not be “stretched” to support finding a cause
of action against a psychiatrist in these circumstances, as such a
theory would “attenuate[ ] the Tarasoff rule beyond the breaking
point.” Id. at 761-62. However, the decision was based on the
particular facts of the case. Unlike in Tarasoff, the record
“lack[ed] any basis for finding the therapist knew of the danger”
the patient presented, id. at 762, but instead, contained over-
whelming evidence to suggest the plaintiff was herself well aware
of the patient’s violent propensities; indeed, the patient had told
the plaintiff on multiple occasions that “she would kill her” Id. at
761.

145. By contrast, the complaint here is replete with allegations
that staff members at the Retreat were well aware of E.R’s
capacity for violence. Upon his admission at the Retreat, E.R.’s
records from the Vermont State Hospital were reviewed, including
the findings by his intake physician that E.R. was “clearly a
danger to others” and would be a “danger to his own family” if
released. He verbalized “homicidal ideation” toward staff only nine
days after his admission to the Retreat, and throughout his stay,
continued to have auditory hallucinations which commanded him
to kill himself or others. E.R.’s behavior was so aggressive that
his psychiatrist adopted an Alternative Low Stimulation Area
(ALSA) treatment plan, which involves “placing patients who are
verbalizing or demonstrating they are unsafe in a special area”
that is staff-intensive and free from any obj that can be used
to harm the self or others. Indeed, it appears from the complaint

that E.R. was kept in ALSA for all but the first nine days of his
stay at the Retreat.

146. Because the case never went beyond the complaint stage,
there is no allegation that the parents were aware of E.R.’s risk
of danger such that they could be charged with “knowledge of the
danger as a matter of law” sufficient to nullify any duty to warn.
Id. at 762. The expanded record shows that the state of the
parents’ knowledge is strongly disputed.

147. A second reason for finding a duty to warn in this case is
that E.R.’s parents fell within the “zone of danger” from E.R.’s
conduct. While there is no allegation that E.R. ever threatened his
parents, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that by failing to warn the
parents, the “Brattleboro Retreat needlessly endangered the
safety of third parties, including, not limited to the Plaintiffs.”
Moreover, it is alleged that E.R. specifically threatened his
caretakers, and the parents were to become his caretakers after
his discharge from the Retreat.

148. The duty to warn those in the zone of danger was
addressed by the Arizona Supreme Court in a case very similar to
this one. See Hamman u Cty. of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1123
(Ariz. 1989). In Hamman, the patient was brought to an emer-
gency psychiatric center because of violent and other “abnormal
behavior.” His parents expressed fear that he “would either be
killed or kill somebody” and reported that they maintained
constant supervision over him. /d. After speaking with a doctor,
the doctor refused to admit the patient to the hospital, but
prescribed medication and advised his mother to take him to
follow-up care at a medical center. Jd. at 1124. One morning, the
patient refused to take his medicine. Later that day, he attacked
his father with an electric drill.

149. The parents filed a claim against the hospital for negli-
gence, claiming that the doctor owed them a duty to reasonably
diagnose and treat their son’s condition and that they reasonably
relied upon the doctor’s advice that their son was harmless. In
assessing the scope of the duty, the court rejected the narrow
approach of requiring an identifiable victim but also cautioned
against adopting a rule that is “too inclusive, subjecting psychia-
trists to an unreasonably wide range of potential liability.” Jd. at
1127. The court concluded:

If indeed [the doctor] negligently diagnosed [the patient]
as harmless, the most likely affected victims would be

[his parents]. Their constant physical proximity to [the
patient] placed them in an obvious zone of danger. [His
parents] were readily identifiable persons who might
suffer harm if the psychiatrist was negligent in the
diagnosis or treatment of the patient. The fact that [the
patient] never verbalized any specific threats against [his
parents] does not change the circumstances that, even
without such threats, the most likely victims of the
patient’s violent reaction would be [his parents].

Td. at 1128 (emphasis added); see also Diu of Corr x Neakok, 721
P2d 1121 (Alaska 1986), overruled on other grounds by State v
Cowles, 151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006) (finding that state agencies
had duty to warn residents of small community of parolee’s
dangerous propensities, particularly victims, as one was foresee-
able and others were in zone of danger). We find Hamman
persuasive and follow its reasoning.

150. In recognizing a duty to warn, we distinguish this case
from Thompson, where the mother of the juvenile offender was
not foreseeably endangered, as the offender’s threats were to
children. By contrast, E.R.’s parents were in the zone of danger,
as E.R.’s dangerous propensities were not targeted towards any
one class of individuals. If E.R. had harmed his parents, we may
have easily concluded that the Retreat owed them a duty to warn
of his violent tendencies; if he directed violence towards a member
of the general public, the question becomes harder. If defendant
owed a duty to the parents and breached that duty, resulting in
harm to an unidentifiable third party, is defendant liable?

151. I To answer this question, we look to cases involving a
physician’s duty to warn a patient, the breach of which results in
injury to a third party. Most courts have recognized that physi-
cians owe a duty to their patients to warn them about the hazards
of driving on certain medications and that, when the physician
breaches that duty, causing harm to a third party, he or she is
liable for that failure to warn. See, e.g., Taylor vu Smith, 892 So.
2d 887, 893-94, 897 (Ala. 2004) (holding that duty of care owed by
physician to his patient “extends to third-party motorists who are
injured in a foreseeable automobile accident with the patient that
results from the [physician’s] administration of methadone” and
citing cases from Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas,
and Wisconsin that have imposed similar duty to warn); see also

Restatement (Third) of Torts $41 emt. h. But see Jarmie uv
Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 810 (Conn. 2012) (holding that physicians
owe no duty to warn patients not to drive for benefit of third
parties because “Connecticut precedent does not support it, the
plaintiff was an unidentifiable victim, public policy considerations
counsel against it, and there is no consensus among courts in
other jurisdictions, which have considered the issue only rarely”).
We conclude, based on existing precedent and modern trends in
negligence law, that the Retreat had a duty to warn E.R’s
parents as individuals in the “zone of danger” of E.R.’s dangerous
propensities.”

152. I This duty on which we base this decision is a narrow
one, and applies only when a caregiver is actively engaging with
the patient’s provider in connection with the patient’s care or the
patient’s treatment plan (or in this case discharge plan), the
provider substantially relies on that caregiver’s ongoing participa-
tion, and the caregiver is himself or herself within the zone of
danger of the patient’s violent propensities.* It does not require
health care providers to seek out a caretaker for the patient to
whom they can impart this information; nor does it require
physicians to make disclosures to family members or others who
may live with the patient but are not engaged with the patient’s
treatment and are not factored into the patient’s treatment plan.

153. As we noted above, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges two
separate duties — a duty to warn and a duty to train. The
complaint described the duty to warn as a duty to inform E.R.’s
parents that “he posed a risk to the public including themselves.”
It described the duty to train as the duty to instruct the parents
“to supervise him, how to monitor and manage his medications
intake, to effectively recognize when medications were being
avoided and to effectively respond so that measures necessary and
appropriate to protect potential victims could be implemented.”
The duty to warn as we have described it above contemplates
more than simply advising the parents that their son posed a risk;

7 Again, we do not adopt Restatement (Third) of Torts § 41(b)(4) to support this
holding.

5 At the same time as we stress the narrowness of the duty we recognize to decide
this case, we emphasize our recognition that neither Peck nor Tarasoff decided
whether a duty would be present based on facts and claims not in those cases. It
is the nature of development of the common law that we do not address whether
a duty can arise in cireumstances not before us.

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it may also entail a duty to provide reasonable information to
enable the parents to fulfill the role envisioned for them in the
treatment plan to help keep their son safe. The specific nature
and content of that information is case-specific, and a question of
fact. In that sense, the duty to “warn” may be better described as
a duty to “inform” that incorporates some elements of what
plaintiffs describe as a distinct duty to “train.”

154. [EB However, we find the amorphous concept of a “duty
to train” as a distinct cause of action unworkable, and note that
such a duty, in contrast to the duty to warn as we have described
it, lacks grounding in existing caselaw. For these reasons, we
decline to recognize a distinct cause of action for failure to “train”
E.R’s parents.

155. We have initially analyzed the duty to inform with respect.
to the Retreat. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a similar duty to warn
with respect to NKHS. Although the two entities had different
responsibilities, we see no reason to differentiate between them in
defining the duty that each owed. Thus, we hold that NKHS had
the same duty to warn, recast above as including a duty to
provide particular information, as the Retreat did.

156. HI As we discussed briefly above, defendants also allege
that plaintiffs’ duty-to-inform counts should be dismissed because
plaintiffs cannot show the element of causation. Duty is a legal
question, and is therefore appropriate for our consideration on an
appeal from a motion to dismiss. We cannot say the same about
the element of causation. Until there is factual development on the
extent to which defendants may have fallen short of their duty, if
any, and were negligent in doing so, we cannot determine whether
plaintiffs can meet their burden of showing that defendants’
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ damages. We
cannot dismiss the complaint based on the absence of causation.

157. Finally, as to the duty to warn or inform, we must address
the confidentiality arguments raised in the briefs of defendant
NKHS and amici curiae Vermont Council of Developmental and
Mental Health Services, Inc., Disability Rights of Vermont, Inc.,
and the Vermont Association of Hospitals and Health Systems.
Defendant NKHS and amici curiae argue that expansion of the
standards under which psychotherapists must disclose protected
health information without consent beyond those imposed in Peck
violates state and federal law and contrary to policy goals of

encouraging individuals to seek mental health treatment. In
particular, defendant and ami ‘uriae note that Vermont has
codified the physician-patient privilege in 12 V.S.A. § 1612(a), which
precludes the disclosure of confidential information absent patient
permission or authorization from an express provision of law.
Amici curiae argue that while Peck modified § 1612 to require
disclosure when a mental patient has threatened “serious harm to
an identified victim,” 146 Vt. at 67, 499 A2d at 426, no express
provision of Vermont or federal law permits disclosure under the
broad terms of Restatement (Third) of Torts § 41(a) — also urged
by plaintiffs — when a patient poses “risks” to the safety of the
public at large.

158. Amici curiae also note that other Vermont statutes, par-
ticularly 18 V.S.A. § 1852(a)(7) and § 7103, protect. from disclosure
clinical information identifying current or former hospital patients.
See id. §7103(a) (“All certificates, applications, records, and re-
ports .. . directly or indirectly identifying . . . an individual whose
hospitalization or care has been sought or provided under this
part, together with clinical information relating to such persons
shall be kept confidential and shall not be disclosed by any
person”); id. § 1852(a)(7) (“The patient has the right to expect that
all communications and records pertaining to his or her care shall
be treated as confidential. Only medical personnel, or individuals
under the supervision of medical personnel, directly treating the
patient, or those persons monitoring the quality of that treat-
ment .. . shall have access to the patient’s medical records.”).
Finally, amici curiae suggest that an expansion of the duty to
warn would violate the confidentiality provisions established in the
Privacy Rule adopted pursuant to the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq.,
which applies to the information acquired by community mental
health agencies across the United States and which is exempt
from any public policy exception created by this Court.®

° In its brief to this Court, amicus curiae The Vermont Association of Hospitals and
Health Systems also notes that under section five of the American Medical
Association's (AMA) Code of Medical Ethies, disclosure of confidential information
is permitted only when a patient “threatens to inflict serious physical harm to
another person or to him or herself and there is a reasonable probability that the
patient may carry out the threat” Code of Ethies of the American Medical
Association, Opinion 5.05 (2014-2015), https://perma.ce/5QPE-HYU3. We are mind-
ful, however, of the fact that ethical standards, whether promulgated by the AMA,

360 |

159. We recognize that although defendants and amici have
accepted Peck’s disclosure requirements as a baseline beyond
which we cannot go, that decision gave very limited consideration
to binding confidentiality requirements. The Peck Court noted that
the Legislature had created certain exceptions to the statutory
patient’s privilege and that an exception similar to that sought for
mental health professionals to warn identified potential victims
existed for lawyers and, consequently, created by judicial decision
an exemption for mental health professionals. 146 Vt. at 67-68, 499
A2d at 426. To ensure that the disclosure requirements we have
adopted fully comply with confidentiality requirements, we are
reexamining the issue here rather than relying upon Peck.

1160. J MM Our conclusion is that the aforementioned statutes
and regulations do not bar plaintiffs’ failure-to-inform cause of
action in this case for three reasons. First, while it is true that 12
VS.A. §1612 and the more comprehensive Vermont Rule of
Evidence 503 prevent physicians from disclosing health informa-
tion or history, the statute codifies an evidentiary privilege, thus
limiting its application to judicial proceedings. See Steinberg uv
Jensen, 534 N.W.2d 361, 370 (Wis. 1995) (“The physician-patient
privilege is a testimonial rule of evidence, not a substantive rule
of law regulating the conduct of physicians.”). As such, the
privilege does not preclude the Retreat from warning E.R.’s
parents of E.R.’s likelihood of violent actions.’° See 1 McCormick
on Evid. §72.1 (7th ed.) ({T]rue rules of privilege operate
generally to prevent revelation of confidential matter within the
context of a judicial proceeding. . . . [They] do not speak directly
to the question of unauthorized revelations of confidential matter

the Vermont Medical Society, or Vermont Psychiatrie Association, are “aspirational
in nature and not enforceable by law.” Bryson uv Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 114
(Okla. 1988); accord Caldwell x Chawvin, 464 8.W3d 139, 156 (Ky. 2015).

1° Peck accepted, without analysis, that 12 V.S.A. §1612(a) prohibited disclosure
outside of judicial proceedings and held that the privilege could be waived “under
appropriate cireumstances” by judicial decision. Peck, 146 Vt. at 67, 499 A2d at
426. As the text states, the statute does not prevent a mental health professional
from disclosing patient information as part of a warning to the patient’s family
because this is not an in-court disclosure. We do not consider whether a waiver of
the privilege, if it applied, is possible and appropriate.

outside the judicial setting, and redress .. . must be sought in the
law of tort or professional responsibility.” (footnotes omitted)).1*

161. MM Second, the confidentiality statutes cited by amici
curiae are not inconsistent with the disclosures required by the
duty described here. One statute sets forth a “bill of rights” for
patients who are admitted to a hospital on an inpatient basis.
Among other things, it states that “[t]he patient has the right to
expect that all communications and records pertaining to his or
her care shall be treated as confidential” except when authoriza-
tion is provided. 18 V.S.A. § 1852(a)(7). Further, it recognizes a
patient’s right to privacy and provides that case discussions are
confidential and “[t]hose not directly involved in the patient’s care
must have the permission of the patient to be present.” Id.
§ 1852(a)(6). The duty recognized in this decision — to provide
certain information to a caregiver actively engaged in the patient’s
care and treatment plan — is not at odds with these protections,
which prevent disclosures to those not directly involved in the
patient’s care without the patient’s permission. Likewise, the
mental health statute, 18 V.S.A. § 7103(b), explicitly states that
“{njothing in this section shall preclude disclosure . of
information concerning medical condition” to certain individuals
including the person’s family, clergy, health care agent, or “an
interested party.” Again, if the duty applies, it will be to provide
information to an interested individual whose ongoing participation
in the patient’s care is part and parcel of the patient’s treatment
plan.

162. Finally, the federal regulations governing HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule, relied upon by amici, also carve out two exceptions relevant.
to the disclosure obligation imposed in this decision. The first is a

“The defendants, and amici curiae who support their position, have raised in their
reargument motions potential sourees of restrictions on disclosure not identified in
the presentations to the trial court or to this Court in the briefs. We have
considered them in the interest of fully reflecting the effect of disclosure
restrictions on the duty in this case. We do not consider whether a duty of
confidentiality between a patient and mental health professional arises from any
other souree, See, eg., Schuster, 424 N.W2d at 171 (noting that exception to
psychotherapist-patient privilege is limited to evidentiary setting and exploring
physicians’ broader ethical duty of confidentiality); Sorensen » Barbuto, 2008 UT
8, 117, 177 P3d 614 (distinguishing physician’s duty of confidentiality from
physician-patient testimonial privilege and recognizing a “healthcare fiduciary duty
of confidentiality”)

362 Le

dangerous patient exception to the confidentiality requirement
intended to “avert a serious threat to health or safety”:

(1) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may, con-
sistent with applicable law and standards of ethical
conduct, use or disclose protected health information, if
the covered entity, in good faith, believes the use or
disclosure:

(A) Is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and
imminent threat to the health or safety of a person
or the public; and

(B) Is to a person or persons reasonably able to
prevent or lessen the threat.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (emphasis added). In this case, the disclo-
sure requirement is imposed to avert a serious threat to health or
safety and under circumstances that meet the specific language of
§ (@(A) and (B). The second exception is for emergency circum-
stances, allowing limited use and disclosures:

If the individual is not present, or the opportunity to
agree or object to the use or disclosure cannot practica-
bly be provided because of the individual’s incapacity or
an emergency circumstance, the covered entity may, in
the exercise of professional judgment, determine whether
the disclosure is in the best interests of the individual
and, if so, disclose only the protected health information
that is directly relevant to the [family member, other
relative, or close personal friend’s] involvement with the
individual’s care or payment related to the individual’s
health care.
Id. § 164.510(b)(3); see also Office for Civil Rights, A Health Care

Provider’s Guide to the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Communicating with
a Patient’s Family, Friends, or Others Involved in the Patient’s

facts to indicate that the Retreat was well aware of E.R.’s
propensity for violence, particularly when off his medication, and

that E.R.’s parents likely underestimated the degree of danger
E.R. posed to his etakers and to the public. Similarly, it is
evident from the fi that E.R. was sufficiently incapacitated

such that disclosure could not be practicably authorized and that
information about his condition and violent behavior would have
been “directly relevant” to the care his parents provided him. We
recognize that both of these subsections permit, rather than
mandate, unauthorized disclosure in the aforementioned instances,
as well as that both predicate the admissions in the medical
entity’s good faith belief and professional judgment that disclosure
was necessary. In essence, by this decision, we are imposing the
mandate as a matter of tort law in circumstances where the
mental health professionals and institution are authorized, but not
obligated, to disclose under HIPAA.

1164. [HB In reaching our decision, we recognize the “interest in
safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic com-
munications” as argued by the dissent. Post, 1 90. We are bound
by the direction of Peck: “In the same manner that due care must.
be exercised in the therapist’s determination of what steps may be
necessary to protect the potential victim of a patient’s threat of
harm, so too must due care be exercised in order to ensure that
only that information which is necessary to protect the potential
victim is revealed.” 146 Vt. at 68, 499 A.2d at 426-27. Based on the
above analysis, we hold that both the Retreat and NKHS had a
duty to provide information to E.R.’s parents, both to warn them
of E.R’s risk of violence to themselves and others and to provide
them reasonable information to enable them to fulfill their role in
keeping him safe. We stress that we are only defining the duty
owed by the mental health services providers, and allowing this
action to proceed to determine whether defendants breached their
duties, and if so, were negligent in doing so. We reverse the
dismissal of Counts II and V of plaintiffs’ complaint and remand
for those counts to proceed.

IIL. Duty to Protect

165. We next consider plaintiffs’ other counts, starting with
those against the Retreat. The complaint contains two additional
counts with respect to this defendant: (1) that defendant negli-
gently discharged E.R. and this discharge was the proximate
cause of plaintiffs’ damages; and (2) defendant undertook to
render a service to E.R. necessary to protect third parties, failed
to exercise due care in the performance of its undertaking, and its
negligence was a proximate cause of the damages to plaintiffs.

364 |

Plaintiffs allege these counts relying upon the general duty
expressed in Turasoff and Peck and the duty described in
§ 41(b)(4) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. With respect to the
second of these duties — that is, to exercise due care in the
performance of an undertaking — plaintiffs also rely on § 324A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.’

166. Relying principally on our decision in Sorge, the Retreat
argues that these duties do not exist or do not apply here. We
begin with the sources of law as argued by the parties.

167. We look first at Sorye, the most relevant of our precedents.
In Sorge, one of the plaintiffs was injured after being assaulted by
a juvenile offender who was in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS). The
victim and his wife filed suit against the State, alleging that SRS
was negligent in failing to adequately supervise and control the
juvenile and that, as a result of the negligence, the victim
sustained injuries. The plaintiffs claimed that SRS was aware of
the juvenile’s “history of violent, assaultive and delinquent behav-
ior,” but that SRS nonetheless placed him in the temporary
custody of his mother for the weekend and she “was either
unlikely or incapable of adequately supervising him.” Sorge, 171
Vt. at 178, 762 A.2d at 818.

168. J We began by summarizing the factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether a governmental body has a duty of
care to a specific person, beyond its duty to the public at large:

(1) whether an ordinance or statute sets forth mandatory
acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of
persons, rather than the public as a whole; (2) whether
the government has actual knowledge of a condition
dangerous to those persons; (3) whether there has been
reliance by those persons on the government’s represen-
tations and conduct; and (4) whether failure by the
government to use due care would increase the risk of
harm beyond its present potential.

Id. at 174, 762 A.2d at 819. The plaintiffs conceded that there was
no specific statutory provision mandating protection for the victim
or any other particular class of persons, arguing instead that

"This duty is also contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm § 43(a).

ee .

because SRS’s failure to control the juvenile resulted in harm,
liability should be imposed on the State. The plaintiffs further
contended that § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts creates
an exception for “persons having dangerous propensities” that
extends beyond the duty to warn and imposes an obligation to
control an offender for the protection of the public. This section
provides: “One who takes charge of a third person whom he
knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others
if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319. Thus, the section creates an
exception for cases where a “special relationship” exists between
the State and the juvenile.

169. [I We rejected both arguments. We found the first
theory at odds with the principle espoused in both Peck and
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 that “[glenerally, there is no
duty to control the conduct of another in order to protect a third
person from harm.” Sorge, 171 Vt. at 175, 762 A.2d at 819. We also
found the “special relationship” theory to be inconsistent with the
goals of rehabilitation and reunification underlying both juvenile
and adult detention programs. Id. at 177-78, 762 A.2d at 820-21;
see also Rivers u State, 183 Vt. 11, 14, 328 A.2d 398, 400 (1974)
(emphasizing rehabilitative goals of release of inmates on proba-
tion or parole, and stating that liability premised on duty of State
to third parties harmed during inmate’s release on weekend pass
“runs dangerously parallel to the arguments for preventative
detention that represent an overriding of constitutional limita-
tions”); Finnegan v State, 138 Vt. 603, 606, 420 A2d 104, 105
(1980) (holding that escaped prisoner’s negligence cannot be
transferred to State). We further observed that the §319 excep-
tion had been rejected by a number of other states “that have
recognized that most juvenile and adult programs dealing with
persons committed to the custody of the State are intended to
rehabilitate conduct rather than control it.” Sorge, 171 Vt. at 177,
762 A.2d at 820-21.

170. HI Importantly, we stated that for §319 to apply, the
State’s purpose in assuming custody of an individual “musi
explicitly be to control that person” and that “attempts to exercise
that control must be consistent with the specific objective of
insulating a person having dangerous propensities from uncon-

366 |

trolled contact with others whom the State knows or has reason
to know are likely to be harmed by the person the State intends
to isolate.” Jd. at 180, 762 A.2d at 822-28. This is true for both
public entities, like those at issue in Peck and Sorge, as well as
private institutions, like defendants here. See id. at 178, 762 A.2d
at 821.

171. Returning to plaintiffs’ theory of duty and liability in this
case, we can find no jurisdiction that has adopted Restatement
(Third) of Torts § 41(b)(4). The Reporter’s Notes to § 41(b)(4) cite
cases from seven jurisdictions that have adopted a duty commen-
surate with that in §41(b)(4) and broad enough to support the
counts included in plaintiffs’ complaint here. As defendant points
out, many of these decisions have been superseded by statutes
that narrow the duty.!* Two cases in particular are helpful to
understanding arguments for a broad expression of duty.

172. The first is Perreira vu State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989), a
4-3 decision from the Colorado Supreme Court. In that case, a
police officer was shot and killed by a former mental patient who
had been recently released from involuntary commitment to a
mental institution. The officer’s spouse brought a wrongful death
action against the state, the psychiatric hospital, and the treating
psychiatrist, alleging that the psychiatrist was negligent in releas-
ing the patient. The court held that:

[W]hen, as here, a staff psychiatrist of a state mental
health facility is considering whether to release an invol-
untarily committed mental patient, the psychiatrist has a
legal duty to exercise due care, consistent with the
knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by psychiatric
practitioners under similar circumstances, to determine
whether the patient has a propensity for violence and
would thereby present an unreasonable risk of serious
bodily harm to others if released from the involuntary
commitment, and, further, that in discharging this legal
duty the psychiatrist may be required to take reasonable
precautions to protect the public from the danger created
by the release of the involuntarily committed patient,
including the giving of due consideration to extending the

The presence of superseding statutes in many jurisdictions has made many
judicial decisions irrelevant to the current law such that the subject is now
controlled primarily by legislation.

term of the patient’s commitment or to placing appropri-
ate conditions and restrictions on the patient’s release.

Id, at 1200. The court reached that result primarily by relying
upon §§$315 and 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Jd. at
1208-09, 1211. The court also concluded that given the psychia-
trist’s knowledge of the patient’s condition and conduct, predic-
tions of future dangerousness were within the professional’s
expertise to a reasonable standard of accuracy. Jd. at 1216-17. The
court recognized the patient’s loss of liberty from commitment but
did not conclude that the liberty loss should be elevated above the
safety of others. Jd. at 1217-18. It found the duty of care to third
parties consistent with that otherwise imposed on a mental health
professional. Jd. at 1218-19. Finally, it rejected the claim that the
duty is inconsistent with the requirement that institutionalization
be used only when all lesser-restrictive alternatives are inad-
equate, as well as the argument that it would lead to over-
commitment by mental health professionals to avoid tort liability.
Id, at 1219-20.

173. In Estates of Morgan, the Ohio Supreme Court, also by a
4-3 decision, reached the same result in the context of a voluntary
outpatient who had received therapy and medication from a
community mental health center and thereafter shot and killed his
parents and injured his sister. The plaintiffs alleged the mental
health professionals were negligent in the treatment they pro-
vided. The court relied upon Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315
and 319 and Tusaroff in finding a broad duty. 673 N.B.2d at
1319-22. The court found that the defendants had sufficient control
over the patient’s behavior in the outpatient setting — or could
acquire that control — to support a broad duty of care. Id. at
1323-25. It found that although mental health professionals en-
counter difficulty in predicting dangerousness, the standard of
care is based on their ability to do so with limitations. Jd. at 1325.
It also found, as the court did in Perreira, that the duty of care
would not lead to excessive institutionalization of patients. Id.

174. The decisions contrary to Perreira and Morgan tend to
rely upon the possible adverse consequences of recognizing a duty.
The opposing arguments are captured in a quote from Sherrill v.
Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo. 1983), a case in which a patient
was given a two-day pass from a mental institution, during which
he shot another person:

368 Le

The treating physicians, in their evaluation of the case,
well might believe that [the patient] could be allowed to
leave the institution for a prescribed period and that his
release on pass might contribute to his treatment and
recovery. We do not believe that they should have to
function under the threat of civil liability to members of
the general public when making decisions about passes
and releases. The plaintiff could undoubtedly find quali-
fied psychiatrists who would testify that the treating
physicians exercised negligent judgment, especially when
they are fortified by hindsight. The effect would be fairly
predictable. The treating physicians would indulge every
presumption in favor of further restraint, out of fear of
being sued. Such a climate is not in the public interest.

See also Restatement (Third) of Torts §41 cmt. g (quoting
Sherrill). We look to two decisions that specifically reject the
holdings of Perreira and Morgan to explain this rationale.

175. In Leonard u State, 491 N.W.2d 508 (lowa 1992), which
specifically rejected the holding of Perreira, the court applied
§319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but held that it
created a duty to protect only “reasonably foreseeable victims”
and not members of the public generally. /d. at 511. The Iowa
Supreme Court quoted Sherrill and indicated concern about the
“limitless liability” created if the mental health professional’s duty
extended to the public generally, concluding that the victim’s
interest is outweighed by the harm to the public if “physicians
were subject to civil liability for discharge decisions.” Id. at 512.
The Iowa high court also concluded that liability for discharge of
a patient would chill the physician’s decision-making and threaten
the integrity of the civil commitment system. Jd.

176. In Adams uv Board of Sedgwick County Commissioners,
214 P.3d 1173 (Kan. 2009), which reinforced an earlier decision of
the Kansas Supreme Court, Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan.
1995), the court specifically rejected the Ohio Supreme Court’s
holding in Morgan. In Boulanger, the Kansas high court had
concluded that a mental health professional has no duty to third
parties who are injured by an attack from a released voluntary
patient, and no duty to initiate an involuntary commitment
proceeding. Adams, 214 P.38d at 1184 (citing Boulanger, 900 P.2d
at 823). The court in Adams reiterated this holding, particularly

differing with the Morgan analysis that the duty to the patient
and the duty to third parties are the same. Id. It also expressed
concern as to whether the policy of holding patients in the least
restrictive environment would be consistent with a broad liability
rule. Id.

177. Here, the parties’ arguments, joined by amicus curiae
representing the mental health provider community, mirror the
arguments in the cases described above. The briefs provide us
with cites to, and excerpts from, articles and studies that support
or oppose the claim that mental health provider liability of the
type sought here will cause an increase in unjustified commit-
ments and abandonment of treatment-in-the-least-restrictive-
environment requirement, as well as the claim that mental health
professionals cannot predict dangerousness with sufficient accu-
racy to act on their prediction. While these studies inform our
decision, we do not find sufficient consensus to act primarily on
them. They do suggest, however, that whatever decision we reach
in this case, the liability issues are appropriate for legislative
action, as has happened in many other states, to consider more
thoroughly the policy arguments and evidence.

178. HE Returning to the parties’ arguments, both plaintiffs
and defendants contend that we have essentially decided this case
with respect to the duty not to release, with plaintiffs relying
upon the broad statement of duty in Peck and defendants relying
upon the limitations on duty imposed by Sorge. We conclude that
defendants have the stronger support of this aspect of the
arguments. It would be difficult for us to reconcile the holding in
Sorge with a holding that the Retreat had a duty not to release
E.R. as a matter of public protection. In saying this, we specifi-
cally reject reliance on the Restatement (Third) of Torts
§ 41(b)(4)’s special rule for mental health professionals. We con-
clude that if mental health professionals have a broad duty of
public protection to institutionalize patients who may be danger-
ous, child protection workers would have a similar duty to
institutionalize a juvenile who may be dangerous to the public.
Our decision in Sorge rejects such a duty.

179. EI We are also reluctant to impose on mental health
professionals a duty to third persons generally to seek to prevent
the release of a voluntary patient. We are concerned by the broad
scope of such a duty and its consequences on the mental health

370 |

system. See 18 V.S.A. § 7251); In ve R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 173, 657
A.2d 180, 184 (1995) (stating that this Court requires consideration
of voluntary alternatives first before resorting to involuntary order
because involuntary treatment for mental illness is massive cur-
tailment of liberty often resulting in social stigmatization). In
Sorge, we recognized the conflict between the state’s obligation to
rehabilitate the juvenile involved and the obligation to protect the
public. 171 Vt. at 177, 762 A.2d at 820. We resolved that conflict
decisively in favor of rehabilitation in a noninstitutional setting.
Consistent with Sorge, we must resolve the conflict in the same
way here. Thus, we elect not to impose a duty.

180. [I We also reject on narrower grounds plaintiffs’ claim
that defendant Brattleboro Retreat can be liable for negligent
performance of an undertaking under § 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. That section requires plaintiffs to show one of
three circumstances. The only one possibly applicable in this case
is §324A(a): that defendants’ “failure to exercise reasonable care
increases the risk of such harm.” The standard of comparison for
this subsection is not the risk of harm created if defendant
exercised reasonable care, as under that standard the element
would always be met. Instead, the standard is the risk of harm
that would be present if defendant never undertook to render the
services. Plaintiffs cannot show, and do not allege, that defendant’s
care increased the risk to third persons. Murphy uv Sentry Ins.,
2014 VT 25, 128, 196 Vt. 92, 95 A.3d 985." Therefore, § 324A does
not apply.

181. ZB MM Finally, our holding on these counts of the
complaint against the Retreat apply equally against NKHS, the
outpatient service provider. Indeed, courts have held that duties to
control are lesser in outpatient programs because the ability to
control the behavior of the patient is more limited. See Santana
v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A2d 653, 665-66 (R.I. 2009).
Plaintiffs alleged in count VI that NKHS had a duty to treat E.R.
such that the risk of harm to the public would be reduced. We
decline to impose such a duty. For the reason expressed above
with respect to the Retreat, we hold that Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 324A does not impose a duty to the public on NKHS to

“This point is now explicitly recognized in the comparable section of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 43.

exercise reasonable care in its undertaking to provide services to
E.R.

11.82. J We emphasize the narrowness of our ruling today.
The question before us in connection with this motion to dismiss
is whether we can conclude beyond doubt that “there exist no
facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”
Bethel u Mount Anthony Union High Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 633, 634,
795 A.2d 1215, 1217 (2002) (mem.) (quotations omitted). Even
applying this liberal standard, we have concluded that defendants
had no duty enforceable by a third party to treat E.R., to seek
involuntary commitment of E.R., or to adopt a particular dis-
charge plan. The only potential duty we recognize in this case, as
in Peck, involves a duty to provide certain information in a specific
class of cases. That duty applies when a caregiver is actively
engaging with the patient’s provider in connection with the
patient’s care, the patient’s treatment plan (or in this case,
discharge plan) substantially relies on that caregiver’s ongoing
participation, and the caregiver is himself or herself within the
zone of danger of the patient’s violent propensities. The infor-
mation to be conveyed is reasonable information to notify the
caregiver of the risks, and of steps he or she can take to mitigate
the risks. This duty is, in turn, limited by HIPAA and any other
applicable statute restricting such disclosures. A provider has no
duty to convey any information in violation of HIPAA.’

183. We also note the significant obstacles this and similar
claims face. In addition to proving the necessary facts to establish
the limited duty recognized above, plaintiffs here will have to
establish the content of the reasonable disclosure, and a failure to
provide that information. Not only must plaintiffs prove duty and
breach, they will have to prove causation — that any failure to

18The caregiver need not be formally charged with legal responsibility for the
patient, as in a guardianship. The fact that the treatment plan relies on the
participation of the caregiver, even if the caregiver has no legal responsibility for
or authority over the patient, is sufficient to trigger a duty to inform.

16 Exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure under HIPAA may  inelude
disclosures the provider believes in good faith are necessary to prevent or lessen
a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the publie to
‘a person reasonably able to lessen that threat, 45 CPR. § 164.512(j), as well as
information conveyed with the patient's consent or pursuant to a valid authoriza-
tion. Id. § 164.506(b) (consent); id. § 164.508(a) (authorization).

3
®

inform they can prove was more likely than not a but-for cause of
their injuries.

184. In summary, we hold that counts II and V of plaintiffs’
complaint (the “failure to warn” counts), as construed to include
elements of count III (the “failure to train” count that was
otherwise properly dismissed) state causes of action that survive a
motion to dismiss. In all other respects, the motion to dismiss was
properly granted. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we do
not adopt § 41 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.

Affirmed on plaintiffs’ failure-to-treat, failure to train, and
negligent-undertaking claims. Reversed and remanded on the
failure-to-inform claims, which as set forth above, incorporate some
elements of what plaintiffs described as a distinct “duty to train.”

185. Reiber, C.J., dissenting. Chief Justice Roger Traynor of
the California Supreme Court, one of the great common-law
innovators in American legal history, nevertheless repeatedly cau-
tioned restraint, or what he called “cireumspection,” in the evolu-
tion of judicial precedent. “The greatest judges of the common law
have proceeded in this way,” he explained, “moving not by fits and
starts, but at the pace of a tortoise that explores every inch of the
way, steadily making advances though it carries the past on its
back.”"” Unlike a legislature, whose scope of inquiry is unbounded,
an appellate court is confined to the record, which in turn is
limited by the rules of evidence, and its decisions — unlike
statutes — become instantly resistant to change under the rule of
stare decisis. Hence the overarching need for judicial humility in
the face of our own limited knowledge — for incremental rulings
that allow a court “time to advance or retreat” from its forays
into the unknown with a minimum of unintended effects and
needless shock to those who must “act in reliance upon judicial
pronouncements.”"®

186. The majority abandons this cautious approach with no
apparent awareness that it is even doing so. It dresses its de
in the clothes of the “modern,” suggesting that its holding flows
from a natural “evolution of the duties articulated in decades of
case law” and thus represents no dramatic departure. Ante, 191 21,

TR. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appellate
Courts, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 255, reprinted in The Traynor Reader 200 (1987).
8 Traynor, supra, at 200.

23, 38. It embraces these “precedent[s] and modern trends” to
define for mental health care providers a new common-law duty.
Ante, 1 51.

187. But the argument is a fiction. Science and the law have
indeed evolved in the forty years since the California Supreme
Court’s seminal decision in Turasoff vu Regents of University of
California that a therapist who “determines, or pursuant to the
standards of his profession should determine, that his patient
presents a serious danger of violence to another, . . . incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger.” 551 P.3d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). They have
simply not evolved in any way that remotely supports the
majority’s decision to expand exponentially the duty owed by a
mental health professional to protect third parties in the circum-
stances presented here. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

188. The majority observes at the outset that since Turasoff
“several courts have limited the duty to identifiable victims, or a
class of individuals whose injury is foreseeable because of their
relationship or proximity to a specifically identifiable victim.”
Ante, 1 36 (emphasis added). Among these, of course, is our own
holding in Peck u Counseling Service of Addison County Inc.
that “a mental health professional who knows or, based upon the
standards of the mental health profession, should know that his or
her patient poses a serious risk of danger to an identifiable victim
has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him or her from
that danger.” 146 Vt. 61, 68, 499 A.2d 422, 427 (1985). “However,”
the majority continues, “several other courts have held that a duty
to warn is owed not only to specifically identified or identifiable
victims, but to foreseeable victims or to those whose membership
in a particular class . . . places them within a zone of danger.”
Ante, 1 37. Combined with the suggestion that “Peck was decided
thirty years ago, before modern trends in this area,” ante, 1 38
(emphasis added), the implication is that the states are now about
evenly divided between these camps.

189. This is decidedly not the case. The voluminous literature
canvassing the legal and medical ramifications of Torasoff over the
past four decades agree that the predominant legal response has
ifically define and limit a mental health provider’s
duty to protect third parties, generally requiring a serious threat
to a readily identifiable victim. See, e.g. D. Katner, Confidenti-
ality and Juvenile Mental Health Records in Dependency Pro-

374 Le

ceedings, 12 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rt. J. 511, 532 (2004) (Although
“most jurisdictions now recognize a Tarasoff-type duty, the vast
majority . . . limit it to situations in which . .. the patient has
communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.” (quo-
tations omitted)); C. Cantu, et al. Bitter Medicine: A Critical
Look at the Mental Health Care Provider’s Duty to Warn in
Texas, 31 St. Mary’s L.J. 359, 377 (2000) (“The majority of states
that have addressed this issue follow the Tarasoff/Thompson rule,
which states that when a mental health care provider foresees or
should foresee that a patent poses a serious risk of violence to a
readily identifiable third person, a duty arises to use reasonable
care to protect that individual against the danger.”).’° See also
Fraser v United States, 674 A.2d 811, 816 (Conn. 1996) (noting
that “state courts . . . have overwhelmingly concluded that an
unidentifiable victim has no claim in negligence against psycho-
therapists who were treating the assailant on an outpatient
basis”), Eckhardt wv Kirts, 584 N.E.2d 1839, 1344 (IIL App. Ct.
1989) (observing that, in “determin[ing] the legal duty of thera-
pists to third persons, numerous courts have concluded that a
therapist cannot be held liable for injuries inflicted upon third
persons absent specific threats to a readily identifiable victim”)?°

"In Thompson ux County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980), the California
Supreme Court clarified Tarasoff by explaining that a therapist’s duty to protect
arises only when the patient’s intended victim is “readily identifiable.” “[NJonspe-
cifie threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims” do not trigger the duty of
care, Id. at 735

2 As discussed more fully below, a few courts have expanded the duty slightly to
include persons within a “zone of danger” who were sufficiently targeted by the
patient even if not specifically threatened. See, e.g. Jablonski » United States, 712
F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying California law and Tarasoff to hold that,
although defendant’s patient had made no express threat against his domestic
partner, Melinda Kimball, she was within scope of duty where patient’s “previous
history indicated that he would likely direct his violence against Kimball,” his
psychological profile “indicated that his violence was likely to be directed against
women very close to him)’ and he had threatened Kimball's mother), overruled on
other grounds by In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane); Hamman
a Cty. of Maricopa, 715 P2d 1122, 1127-28 (Ariz, 1989) (holding that “Tarasoff
envisioned a broader scope” of duty than cirenmstance where patient “verbalized
[a] specific threat,’ and could include patient’s family where his threats placed
them “within the zone of danger, that is, subject to probable risk of the patient's
violent conduct”); see also Fraser, 674 A2d at 816 (noting that most courts have

190. The reason is readily apparent. Courts and legislatures
from Tarasoff onward have recognized the conflicting interests at
play in such cases and the freighted consequences however the
balance is struck. On one side is the obvious and compelling
interest in protecting the public from assault by mental health
patients with violent propensities. On the other is the strong
countervailing interest in safeguarding the confidential character
of psychotherapeutic communications,”' the inherent difficulty (of-
ten underappreciated by those with the luxury of hindsight) of
forecasting future dangerousness,” and the significant societal
concern that patients not be unnecessarily hospitalized as a means
to avoid liability." See, e.g. Estates of Morgan u Fairfield Family
Counseling Ctr, 1997-Ohio-194, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1322 (listing the
factors generally considered in determining a therapist’s duty of
care as including “the public’s interest in safety from violent
assault,” the “difficulty inherent in attempting to forecast whether

3?

a patient represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others,

extended therapist's duty of care only to “vietims who were . . . either specifically

identifiable or within a class of foreseeable victims”).

218ee, eg. D. Rosenhan, et al, Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of
Tarasoff, 24 Pac. LJ. 1165, 1222 (1993) (concluding, based on survey of mental
health providers, that in accordance with Tarasoff “psychotherapists continue to
warn patients that certain conversation is not confidential,” and “in accord with
expectation, many of these patients simply abandon treatment,” posing additional
risks to the public).

22The clinical difficulties in (1) assessing the risk of violenee posed by a patient
and (2) determining whether that risk is sufficient to warrant protective actions,
recognized in Tarasoff, have not appreciably lessened in the decades since. See,
e.g, D. Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment on Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75
U. Cin. L. Rev. 523, 601-02 (2006) (explaining that clinicians do not “predict
dangerousness” but simply identify different “levels of risk,” and that more
significantly few empirieal studies reveal “what level of risk is sufficient to
justify... action”); P. Herbert, The Duty to Warn: A Reconsideration and
Critique, 30 J. Am, Acad. of Psychiatry & Law 417, 421 (2002) (observing that,
“despite advances in risk assessment,” such assessments fall “substantially short of
exact science” and involve at best “approximations of the degree of risk”).

2°This coneern was cogently summarized by the court in Sherrill x Wilson, 653
S.W.2d 661, 664 (Mo. 1983):

The plaintiff could undoubtedly find qualified psychiatrists who would
testify that the treating physicians exercised negligent judgment, espe-
cially when they are fortified by hindsight. The effect would be fairly
predictable, The treating physicians would indulge every presumption in
favor of farther restraint, out of fear of being sued. Such a climate is
not in the public interest.

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the “goal of placing the mental patient in the least restrictive
environment .. . free from unnecessary confinement,’ and the
“social importance of maintaining the confidential nature of psy-
chotherapeutic communications”).

191. A few states, weighing these countervailing concerns, have
determined that public policy simply does not support the impo-
sition of any duty upon a mental health care provider to protect.
third parties from a potentially violent patient. See Boynton v.
Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting
Tarasoff-like duty to warn identified third parties of threats by
patient on the ground that it is “neither reasonable nor workable
and is potentially fatal to effective patient-therapist relationships”);
Thapar x Zeaulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Tex. 1999) (declining “to
impose a common law duty on mental-health professionals to warn
third parties of their patient’s threats”).

192. Several other courts have taken the opposite tack, broadly
defining the therapist’s duty to include any “foreseeable” victim
without limitation to specifically identified or identifiable targets of
violence. See Lipari uv Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185,
194 (D. Neb. 1980); Naidu u Laird, 589 A2d 1064, 1072-73 (Del.
1988); Petersen uv State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1983); Schuster
v. Altenbery, 424 N.W2d 159, 166 (Wis. 1988). Significantly,
however, these decisions have generally rested on the courts’
recognition of a corollary duty to control a violent patient through
involuntary commitment if necessary. See Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at
193 (holding that therapist’s duty includes “whatever precautions
are reasonably necessary to protect potential victims of his
patient,” including “duty to detain a patient” in hospital); Naidu,
539 A.2d at 1073 (holding that defendants had duty to warn “and
a duty to control the actions of a mentally ill patient” and were
negligent in discharging patient from hospital); Petersen, 671 P.2d
at 237 (upholding judgment for plaintiff based on psychiatrist’s
failure “to petition the court for a 90-day commitment, as he could
have done . . . to protect those who might foreseeably be
endangered”); Schuster, 424 N.W2d at 166 (rejecting defendants’
claim that they did not “have a duty to warn third parties or to
institute proceedings for the detention or commitment of a
dangerous individual for the protection of the patient or the
public”). See generally M. Quattrocchi, Tarasawrus Rex: A Stan-
dard of Care That Could Not Adapt, 11 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L.
109, 113 (2005) (“Some courts have imposed a duty to third

parties in the absence of an identifiable victim. These cases
emphasize . . . protection in the form of hospital confinement.”); R.
Schopp, The Psychotherapist’s Duty to Protect the Public: The
Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and
Empirical Premises, 70 Neb. L. Rev. 327, 845 (1991) (noting that
“the Schuster court interpreted warnings and civil commitment as
comparable techniques for protecting the public from foreseeable
harm”).

193. Thus, those courts that have broadened the therapist’s
duty to all “foreseeable” victims without limitation have resolved
the dilemma posed by the risk of over-commitment essentially by
ignoring it; under these rulings, anyone injured by a mental
health patient may argue that, in retrospect, the therapist was
negligent in failing to detain the patient. In states like Vermont,
however, where public policy militates against the recognition of a
duty to control a patient through involuntary hospitalization — a
policy reaffirmed by the majority today — extending the duty to
the public at large is not a sound or practical option. See ante,
1 77 (rejecting imposition of duty to institutionalize mental health
patient in order to avoid “an increase in unjustified commitments
and abandonment of treatment-in-the-least-restrictive-environment”
policy).

194. Most states, as noted, have pursued an approach between
these two extremes. Through case law or legislation they have
struck a balance among the competing concerns by recognizing a
relatively narrow duty of care limited to situations where the
therapist knows or should know that a patient poses a specific
threat to an identified or reasonably identifiable third person. This
standard, as one court has observed, “evinces a sound public
policy against expanding the liability of health professionals to an
indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs.” Eckhardt, 584 N.E.2d
at 1845. It reflects a considered policy judgment that the societal
costs of breaching the therapeutic bond based on generalized
threats of violence — all too commonplace in the therapeutic
setting’ — do not justify whatever uncertain benefits may flow
from expanding the duty to unspecified third parties based on an
inherently inexact risk assessment made all the more difficult

24 See Herbert, supra, 30 J. Am. Acad. of Psychiatry & Law, at 422 (explaining
that “mental health workers must grapple with threats of suicide or of violence
against others regularly as an integral part of their work,” and that such threats
“are daily grist”).

378 Le

where the potential target is not identified. See, e.g, Thompson,
614 P.2d at 736 (observing that “it is fair to conclude that
warnings given discreetly and to a limited number of persons
would have a greater effect because they would alert [them] . . .
of a specific threat pointed at them”).

195. This balancing of interests was cogently addressed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in considering “the conundrum a
mental health care professional faces regarding the competing
concerns of productive therapy, confidentiality and other aspects of
the patient’s well being, as well as the interest in public safety.”
Emerich v Phila. Ctr: for Human Dev, Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1040
(Pa. 1998). In light of these concerns, the court concluded that the
circumstances giving rise to a duty to third parties must neces-
sarily be “limited,” requiring “the existence of a specific and
immediate threat” which is “made against a specifically identified
or readily identifiable victim.” Jd. “Strong reasons,’ the court
concluded, compel the conclusion that the therapist’s duty “must
have some limits.” Jd. Many other courts have echoed these
concerns in reaching similar conclusions. See, e.g., Fraser, 674
A2d at 816 (adopting rule that therapist’s duty to protect third
persons is limited to identifiable victims or class of identifiable
victims based on “balance [of] the interests of those injured by
psychiatric outpatients against the interests of the mental health
ion in honoring the confidentiality of the patient-therapist
relationship and in respecting the humanitarian and due process
concerns that limit the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally
ill” (citation omitted)); Eckhardt, 534 N.E.2d at 1345 (rejecting
expansion of therapist’s duty beyond “cases involving specifically
identifiable, potential victims as evidenced by specific threats”
because “{h]uman behavior is simply too unpredictable and the
field of psychotherapy presently too inexact,” and imposition of a
broader duty “would be to place an unacceptably severe burden
on those who provide mental health care to the people of this
State, ultimately reducing the opportunities for needed care”). In
addition, as noted, numerous states have codified similar, practical
limits on a mental health care provider’s duty of care to third
parties. See D. Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or,
Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 523, 586 n.204 (2006)
(observing that, “[t]o clarify clinicians’ responsibilities, many states
’ potential liability if they
‘tified actions when a patient makes a serious threat

against an identifiable victim” (quotation omitted)); Nat’l Confer-
ence of State Legislatures, Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to
Warn, www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professonals-
duty-to-warn.aspx (2015) (collecting state statutes).

196. The point here is not that the Court has adopted a
minority position without expressly acknowledging it. If that were
the problem, it would be enough to simply articulate the compet-
ing viewpoint, and agree to disagree. However ill-advised the
majority’s choice, it would at least be based on familiar ground.
And while the decision to abandon a standard that so many states
have found to be the proper balance between competing public-
policy interests might be mistaken, it would at least have the
virtue of transparency.

197. The problem here is altogether different, however, and far
more serious. For the majority not only expands the scope of a
therapist’s duty beyond the limits recognized by this Court in
Peck, it creates an entirely new duty of care which plaintiffs here
have labeled a duty to “train” and the majority sees fit to recast
as “a duty to ‘inform’ that incorporates some elements of what
plaintiffs describe as a distinct duty to ‘train?” Ante, 1 53.
Elsewhere, the majority variously describe this as: “a duty of care
to provide reasonable information to the parents to enable them
to recognize the dangers and fulfill the responsibilities envisioned
for them in the treatment plan,” ante, 1 44; a duty that
“contemplates more than simply advising the parents that their
son posed a risk,” but also providing “reasonable information . . .
to help keep their son safe,” ante, 153; and a duty to notify the
caregiver of the risks “and of steps he or she can take to mitigate
the risks,” ante, 1 82.

198. If mental health care providers, patients and their families,
and the legal counsel who advise them remain uncertain as to the
precise nature and scope of this new duty, they are to be forgiven.
For the Court is making this up as it goes, with no input from the
mental health profession on whether standards even exist for such
a duty. This is not an easy task. But the real difficulty lies ahead,
when this Court has moved on and the mental health care
community must continue to grapple with the implications.

199. For make no mistake, this holding is extraordinary in its
scope and implications. To recall, most duty-to-protect cases have
divided along a fault-line between those limiting the duty to
identified or reasonably identifiable targets of violence and those

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that would include all “foreseeable” victims, the latter generally
predicated on a duty to treat and, if necessary, confine a
dangerous patient given the general impracticality of warning all
remote, albeit foreseeable victims. The majority rejects the prin-
ciple that a therapist’s duty extends only to reasonably identifiable
targets of specific threats by the patient. It also rejects as a
matter of policy any duty to control a mental health patient
through involuntary commitment. Ante, 1 79.

1100. Out of this seeming impasse the majority creates a new
duty — a duty to warn not the patient or the patient’s targeted
victims, but the patient’s parents or, more broadly, his or her
“caretakers” so that they may control the patient and prevent
injury to the public. This is worth a moment’s reflection. As a
matter of policy, according to the majority, no liability may attach
to E.R.’s mental health providers for their allegedly negligent
failure to control E.R.’s conduct by providing for his involuntary
commitment. Nevertheless, liability may attach to the same defend-
ants for their allegedly negligent failure to enable E.R.’s parents
to control his conduct by providing them with adequate warning
and information to “mitigate the risks.” Ante, 11 82.

1101. The imposition of a duty so novel and with such
potentially broad consequences for mental health care providers,
their patients, and the general public surely requires a more solid
foundation than an allegation in a complaint. Recognizing that this
case remains at the pleading stage, duty nevertheless constitutes
an essential element of plaintiffs’ cause of action, and its existence
is a question of law which this Court must decide in the first
instance in light of all relevant policy concerns. See Endres uv
Endres, 2008 VT 124, 111, 185 Vt. 63, 968 A.2d 336 (noting that
“(djuty . . . is central to a negligence claim” and that “its
existence is primarily a question of law” based on “those consid-
erations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is
entitled to protection” (quotation omitted)). Yet nothing in plain-
tiffs’ complaint even remotely identifies the basis for recognizing a
so-called duty to “inform” a patient’s parents or “caretakers” to
protect. the public. Nothing in plaintiffs’ briefing below or before
this Court identifies any medical treatises or other literature
defining and describing the basic clinical standards, practices, and
therapeutic goals underlying such a duty. Nothing in the briefing
identifies any decisional law or authority elsewhere specifically
recognizing and imposing such a duty.

1102. We do, on the other hand, know from plaintiffs’ complaint
that certain actions were taken by defendants after E.R.’s dis-
charge. We know that the Brattleboro Retreat made an aftercare
treatment plan for E.R. and reviewed it with E.R. and his
parents, and that the plan “involved E.R. being seen on a regular
basis” at NKHS. We know that the medical professionals at the
Retreat prescribed medications for E.R. to take on a daily basis.
We know that E.R. met with a “treatment team” at NKHS, and
that a “cognitive remediation therapy” plan was put in place and
signed by E.R. We know that E.R told his mother in mid-
December 2010 that he had ceased taking his medications, and
that she reported this to NKHS. And we know that, on the day
of the assault, E.R.’s father had taken E.R. with him to oversee
work being done at an apartment building owned by E.R.’s grand-
father.

1103. These facts themselves, hardly unique, highlight the most.
significant deficiency in the majority’s newfound duty. Even assum-
ing that plaintiffs could establish through expert evidence some
professional standards for the duty owed to a patient’s caretaker,
the imposition of such a duty demands consideration of the policy
implications underlying it — its practical benefits against its
societal costs. See Langle x Kurkul, 146 Vt. 518, 519, 510 A2d
1301, 1305 (1986) (noting that existence of duty is primarily
question of law dependent on variety of policy concerns, including
“the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered,” the “burden to the defendant,” and the
“consequences to the community” (quotation omitted)).

1104. The facts alleged by plaintiffs show that, even with the
practical steps undertaken by defendants and E.R.’s parents to
facilitate his functioning safely in a less restrictive environment
than a closed hospital ward — providing an aftercare plan and
reviewing it with E.R.’s parents, establishing an outpatient treat-
ment team, prescribing him daily medication, endeavoring to
monitor his activity by taking him to job sites, and reporting that
he had stopped his medication — they could not prevent him from
perpetrating a spontaneous act of violence.

1105. The majority’s speculation that defendants might have
provided some additional “information” to E.R.’s parents to pre-
vent the assault simply misses the point. To impose such a duty
on health care providers undermines the fundamental policy
underlying our mental health care system, a policy designed to

382 Le

maximize a patient’s freedom and dignity by providing treatment
in the least restrictive environment available. It is the same policy
resoundingly reaffirmed by the majority today in refusing to
impose a tort duty on health care providers to institutionalize a
patient. See ante, 1 77 (rejecting duty to institutionalize mental
health patient to avoid “an increase in unjustified commitments
and abandonment of treatment-in-the-least-restrictive-environment”
policy).

1106. Uncertainty counsels caution, for courts and clinicians
alike. Any responsible mental health care provider uncertain as to
how, if at all, to satisfy this new, amorphous duty to train or assist
a patient’s “caretaker” sufficiently to prevent future harm might
understandably decide to err on the side of a more — rather than
a less — restrictive treatment setting rather than risk a lawsuit
by the random victim of an outpatient assault. Moreover, consid-
ering the many adult patients living with someone who could be
characterized as a “caretaker” — be it the patient’s parents,
spouse, domestic partner, or friend — the consequences of such
decisions could be far reaching. Balanced against the dubious odds
of actually predicting, much less preventing, random acts of
violence by a patient absent any specific threat or identifiable
victim, the risk becomes prohibitive.

1107. The expected response to these concerns is that they are
merely “speculative” while we know — in contrast — that mental
health providers routinely make predictions of dangerousness in
deciding to commit a patient and routinely apply Tarasoff when
deciding whether a patient poses a threat. Thus, it is easy to posit
that the concern for overcommitment is exaggerated or un-
founded, that no responsible mental health care provider would
involuntarily hospitalize a nondangerous patient to avoid a lawsuit,
much less release a dangerous one despite the risk to the public.

1108. The flaw in this response is the assumption that there are
“yes” or “no” answers to the mental health clinician’s decisions.
The relevant medical and legal literature, however, belies this
assumption. There are, in fact, no answers, but only imperfect
sments of differential levels of risk, and there are no clear
standards defining the level of risk sufficient to trigger protective
measures. See, e.g., Mossman, supra, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev., at 567,
577 (observing that most recent medical studies show that “a
therapist’s predictive knowledge about future violence is really an
ability to make risk estimates,’ while “there is and can be no

ee “

rationally established, broadly accepted criterion for what prob-
ability of risk constitutes the level of ‘serious danger’ that should
trigger a protective response”); Herbert, supra, 30 J. Am. Acad. of
Psychiatry & Law, at 422 (noting the “residuum of uncertainty” in
assessing whether “a patient really means particular words as a
threat”). Tarasoff has worked, according to surveys and studies,
because most states employ reasonably clear, narrow, and under-
standable standards that require a serious threat to a reasonably
identifiable target. See, e.g, Rosenhan, supra, 24 Pac. L.J., at
1203, 1208, 1217 (findings from broad survey of psychotherapists
showed that, while very small percentage rated their ability to
assess dangerousness “very accurately,” most understood duty to
protect was predicated on identification of specific victim and
believed that duty was consistent with ethical obligations);
Mossman, supra, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev., at 603 (noting that clinicians
have sought and been well served by “statutory boundaries on the
duty to protect, boundaries that tell them when the duty arises
(usually, following explicit threats toward specific targets) and that.
define specific ways of discharging the duty”); M. Soulier, et al.,
Status of the Psychiatric Duty to Protect, Circa 2006, 38 J. Am.
Acad. of Psychiatry & Law 457, 471-72 (2010) (concluding from
surveys of psychotherapists and review of legal evolution of
Tarasoff duty that “statutes appear to promote a useful social
policy, limiting the duty to protect to cases in which victims are
identified or reasonably identifiable” and as such pose little threat
to clinician’s ability to practice). The broad duty created by the
majority, in contrast, contains none of the limits that form a
natural and necessary counterbalance to the risks of defensive
practice and overcommitment in the mental health context.

1109. To dismiss the concerns of the mental health care
profession in this case as speculative or even self-serving, more-
over, is presumptuous. It is all too easy to assign new duties to
a profession we know little about, and have no responsibility to
implement. Judicial restraint in creating duties for other profes-
sions is not an end in itself; it is the end-result of recognizing our
own limitations. It is wisdom grounded in humility.

1110. The majority ultimately attempts to minimize its deci-
sion’s impact by noting the “significant obstacles” in the way of
ful lawsuit, including the plaintiffs’ need to prove the
‘y facts,” a failure to disclose the necessary information,
as well as “causation — that any failure to inform ... was more

384 |

likely than not a but-for cause of their injuries.” Ante, 1 83. This
may reassure the majority, but it is cold comfort to the mental
health care providers and their colleagues and families compelled
to endure the personal and professional disruptions, stress, and
financial burdens of protracted lawsuits predicated on this amor-
phous new duty, regardless of their ultimate success.

1111. Finally, I would note that the majority’s alternative basis
for imposing a duty of care predicated on its conclusion that
“E.R’s parents fell within the ‘zone of danger’ from E.R.’s
conduct” is equally flawed and unpersuasive. Ante, 1 47. The
zone-of-danger doctrine, as noted, simply extends the therapist’s
duty to persons within a finite class of reasonably identifiable
potential targets. Thus, in the case cited by the majority,
Hanuman uv County of Maricopa, the record showed that the
patient had “expressed jealousy of his stepfather” to the therapist;
that the patient’s parents had expressed concern to the therapist
for their safety and begged the therapist to admit the patient to
the hospital; that the therapist failed to do so; and that the
patient subsequently attacked his stepfather with an electric drill.
775 P.2d at 1123-24. Based on these facts, the court reasonably
concluded that, despite the absence of a specific verbalized threat
against the parents, they “were readily identifiable persons who
might suffer harm.” Jd. at 1128.

1112. Despite the majority’s statement that it “find[s] Hamman
persuasive and follow[s] its reasoning,” ante, 1 49, nothing on the
limited factual record here brings this case within the “zone of
danger” doctrine articulated in Hamman and elsewhere. First, the
complaint did not allege that E.R. had threatened either his
parents or a class of persons that might reasonably be construed
to include his parents.2° Nor did plaintiffs claim, as the majority
argues, that E.R.’s earlier aggression toward a member of the
staff at the Retreat somehow brought E.R.’s parents into the zone
of danger applicable to all “caretakers.” To suggest that a threat
against a nurse, therapist, physician or other mental health care
provider somehow represents a threat against an identifiable class
of all family members and friends who help with the patient’s
outpatient care would stretch the “zone of danger” doctrine
beyond recognition.

25 At the motion hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel readily conceded that “there was no
identifiable victim” in this case.

1113. Second, and more significantly, the doctrine was designed
to protect a slightly expanded class of reasonably identifiable
potential victims, and E.R.’s parents were not the victims here.
As noted, plaintiffs did not allege any threats — explicit, implicit,
or otherwise — against his parents. Nor is there any factual basis
to support a conclusion that the actual victim, Mr. Kuligoski, was
within an identified or identifiable class of potential victims. The
“gone of danger” argument thus fails entirely.

1114. This Court has repeatedly cautioned against placing “our
imprimatur” upon a new legal duty “without first determining
whether there is a compelling public policy reason for the change.”
Langle, 146 Vt. at 520, 510 A2d at 1306; accord Goodby uv
Vetpharm, Inc., 2009 VT 52, W111, 186 Vt. 63, 974 A2d 1269;
Knight x Rower, 170 Vt. 96, 107, 742 A2d 1287, 1245 (1999);
Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 599, 588 A.2d 157, 158 (1987). The
majority identifies no compelling public policies to warrant the
extraordinary duty it imposes on mental health care providers by
today’s ruling. On the contrary, settled public policy governing our
treatment of the mentally ill demands precisely the opposite
result. I therefore respectfully dissent.

9115. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this
dissent.

1116. Skoglund, J., dissenting. I concur in the Chief Justice’s
well-reasoned, indeed unassailable, dissent. The majority has cre-
ated a heretofore unheard of duty based on an allegation in a
complaint. This new duty to train or assist or inform a patient’s
caretakers so as to protect the public finds no support in case law
or public policy. It is illogical, potentially fatal to effective patient-
therapist relationships, and places an impossibly onerous obliga-
tion on those who provide mental health care to the people of this
state.

1117. The facts of this case center around an unprovoked,
spontaneous act of violence directed against a stranger by an
individual suffering from a serious mental illness. Nothing short of
anticipatory confinement in a hospital could have prevented it. But
now, severely crippling Vermont’s public policy of treatment of the
mentally ill in the least restrictive environment, the majority has
delivered a cautionary tale involving the threat of tort liability for
releasing a mentally ill person to people not sufficiently warned/
trained to provide care and control. This is a preposterous,
reckless decision.

1118. The majority opinion identifies the cautious and thought-
ful evolution of the duty owed by mental health professionals
begun in Turasoff vu Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1976), Thompson v County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728
(Cal. 1980), and the cases that came after. It then abruptly
abandons consideration of identified victims or reasonably identi-
fiable victims and finds a duty “to warn E.R’s parents as
individuals in the ‘zone of danger’ of E.R.’s dangerous propensi-
ties.” Ante, 1 51. However, in the next paragraph it limits the duty
only to those who are engaged with the patient’s treatment, not
those that simply live with him. Ante, {1 52. That “zone” is flexible,
fluid and ambiguous.

1119. First of all, I posit that the parents of E.R. knew he
could be dangerous as it was his behaviors in their home that
precipitated his initial hospitalization. They were privy to the
discharge summary from the Brattleboro Retreat and worked with
the Retreat to develop an aftercare treatment plan that included
regular visits to Northeast Kingdom Human Services (NKHS).
They were aware he was on antipsychotic medications and had
been told that they should give E.R. his medications and not rely
on him to medicate himself. The mother knew enough to be
concerned when E.R. told her he had stopped taking his medi-
cation. They had been warned. They knew E.R. could be danger-
ous when deep in his illness. What further warning should have
been offered remains a mystery.

1120. What is substantially more troubling is the framework
upon which the majority builds its new duty. As explained by the
Chief Justice in his dissent, the majority relies on the “zone-of-
danger” doctrine that simply is not implicated in this case. There
is no allegation E.R. threatened his parents. The parents were not
injured. And, the actual victim could not have been identified as a
reasonably identifiable potential victim, the expanded class the
doctrine is designed to protect.

1121. The majority finds Hamman v. County of Maricopa, TTS
P2d 1122 (Ariz. 1989), “persuasive” and claims to follow its
reasoning. The Hanuman case is completely distinguishable from
the case at bar. In Hamman, the doctor refused to admit the
patient to the hospital and, according to the parents, told them
their son was “harmless.” Jd. at 1123. Two days later, the son
viciously attacked the stepfather. The court noted that the doctor
was aware that schizophrenic-psychotic patients are prone to

ee “

unexpected episodes of violence, knew that the son was living with
his parents, and thus should have known that “[i]f indeed [the
doctor] negligently diagnosed [the son] as harmless, the most.
likely affected victims would be the Hammans. Their constant
physical proximity to [their son] placed them in an obvious zone
of danger. The Hammans were readily identifiable persons who
might suffer harm if the psychiatrist was negligent in the
diagnosis or treatment of the patient.” Id. at 1128. The majority
neglects to provide any analysis to link the case at bar with the
situation described in Hamman.

1122. Under this new duty, mental health providers will have to
consider generalized threats of violence directed against no one in
particular, which I suggest are commonplace with severely ill
patients, and will have to weigh whether to violate the patient-
physician privilege, thus damaging whatever therapeutic relation-
ship existed and perhaps the treatment of the patient as well.
After the risk assessment, they will then, in trying to place the
patient in the least restrictive environment available, need to do
an educational assessment of potential caregivers. As the Chief
Justice notes, the majority identifies no professional standards,
legal authority, or public policies to support a duty so “extraor-
dinary in its scope and implications.” Ante, 1 99. Long after this
Court has forgotten about it, this amorphous duty to train or
assist will continue to perplex and bedevil practitioners in the field
of mental health who must actually attempt to understand the
obligations imposed and comply.

1123. Finally, the majority disposes of statutes and regulations
that govern confidential communications between patient and
physician by suggesting that, one, they only codify an evidentiary
privilege, and two, they do not prohibit disclosure to “caregivers”
involved in the patient’s aftercare plan. Ante, 1 61. This is a
breathtaking disregard for the tort liabilities or ethical claims that
can result from the disclosure of health information or history and
a startling conclusion that no objection occurs to them for the
wholesale disclosure of a person’s mental health condition and
history to the ambiguous sobriquet “caretaker.”

1124. The manner in which the majority disposes of the
requirements of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is rather cavalier. It notes
two exceptions relevant to the disclosure obligation imposed in this
de on. The first, the dangerous patient exception to the confi-
dentiality requirement intended to “avert a serious threat to

388 |

health or safety,” permits disclosure when the disclosure “i]s
necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to
the health or safety of a person or the public.” 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512G). Relying on “E.R.’s propensity for violence,” the
majority finds the subsection permits disclosure, ignoring the
requirement that a perceived serious threat must be imminent.

1125. The majority identifies a second useful exception, one
providing for standard uses and disclosures for involvement in an
individual’s care and notification purposes, citing to the provision
for emergency circumstances. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(3). The ma-
jority forgets to mention that the section’s primary application is
for “Limited uses and disclosures when the individual is not
present.” It then latches onto the conjunctive modifying language
contained in the section, “[ilf the individual is not present, or the
opportunity to agree or object to the use or disclosure cannot
practicably be provided because of the individual’s incapacity or an
emergency circumstance,” to support its dismissal of HIPAA
concerns. I suggest that the section is intended to apply when
“the individual’s incapacity” is of a sort that renders him uncon-
scious. Again the majority finds the subsection permits disclosure.

1126. Decisions to create and impose new legal duties on other
learned professions have profound consequences. To impose a
novel legal duty on mental health care professionals without
extensive discussion of the professional knowledge, skills, and
practice standards — if any — that may apply and the policy
consequences that may result, is not merely, as the Chief Justice
suggests, “presumptuous.” It is the essence of judicial arrogance.

2016 VT 110

State of Vermont v. John Powers

[157 A.3d 39)
No. 15-076
Present: Reiber, C-J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed October 14, 2016

Le

Christina Rainville, Bennington County Chief Deputy State’s
Attorney, Bennington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-
Appellee.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell,
Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Office
of Attorney General.

11. Dooley, J. In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges
the trial court’s suppression of two sets of statements that
defendant made to his probation officer. The trial court deter-
mined that suppression was warranted because the probation
officer did not provide defendant with the warnings required by
Miranda u Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The State argues that
Miranda warnings were not required because defendant was not
in custody at the time he made his incriminatory statements. We
agree with the State with respect to the first set of statements
and reverse the decision to suppress those statements; we reverse
and remand the trial court’s decision with respect to the second
set of statements for further findings on the issue of custody and
a new decision consistent with this opinion.

12. At the time of the alleged offense, defendant was on a
community furlough under the supervision of the Vermont Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC) following a conviction for a forcible
sexual assault on a thirteen-year-old girl. A probation officer
supervised defendant on furlough from 2009 until his arrest in
April 2014. During that period, the officer and defendant met
approximately twice a week. Defendant was on the “highest level
of supervision,” such that probation officers were permitted to
visit his residence at any time and inspect it for any violations of
the special restrictions placed on sex offenders. Prior to this case,
the probation officer investigated four alleged probation violations
by defendant, including pos on of pornography, peering into
female neighbors’ windows, and staring at nurses at his mother’s

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convalescent center. In response, the probation officer imposed
graduated sanctions in three instances and incarceration in one.

13. On April 3, 2014, a resident of defendant’s apartment
building phoned the probation officer to inform him that police
officers were at the complex to investigate reports that defendant
had drilled holes in a wall to view his teenaged neighbor in her
bedroom in her family’s apartment. The probation officer and
another community correctional officer with the Bennington office
of DOC went to defendant’s residence to investigate. The proba-
tion officer carried no weapons; the other community correctional
officer carried mace and wrist restraints. Upon their arrival, the
officers observed a police car in front of the apartment next to
defendant’s unit. They knocked at defendant’s back door. Defend-
ant answered, and the officers told him they needed to enter the
apartment to speak with him. Once they entered the apartment,
the probation officer instructed defendant to sit down on the living
room couch and asked the community correctional officer to go
upstairs to see if there was any evidence of drilled holes in a wall.
Neither officer placed defendant in restraints.

14. Thereafter, the probation officer began to question defend-
ant, asking if anything was going on or if defendant wanted to
report something. The probation officer did not mention the call
he had r ed from defendant’s neighbor. Although defendant
“initially acted confused” and appeared “visibly nervous,” the
probation officer continued to ask if defendant needed to report
anything until defendant finally responded “I screwed up; I think
I screwed up.” At that point, the community correctional officer
returned and announced he had found holes in the wall of the
upstairs bedroom. The probation officer asked defendant if he had
made the holes, and defendant admitted that he had drilled them
three days earlier. Defendant also admitted that he had been
struggling with fantasies about his teenaged neighbor but denied
that he masturbated while viewing her through the hole. The
probation officer then went upstairs to view the holes, which had
been covered with pictures and stuffed with toilet paper, and
confirmed that it was possible to see into the girl’s bedroom. After
inspecting the holes, the probation officer returned downstairs to
inform defendant he would be taken into custody and to place
restraints on defendant’s wrists. He then went to the apartment
of the teenaged neighbor to speak with the police officer present.
He informed the police officer of his presence in defendant’s

apartment and that he had placed defendant in custody. The
police officer eventually came into defendant’s apartment and took
a videotaped confession from him.!

15. After defendant spoke to the police officer, the probation
officer transported defendant to the DOC office for processing, to
be held under a charge that his behaviors constituted a violation
of his furlough conditions. Defendant remained in wrist restraints
until he arrived at the DOC office, at which point he was
transferred into shackles and leg restraints. Defendant completed
the necessary paperwork, and the probation officer took him
outside to have a cigarette in the parking lot. They then returned
to the DOC office, where DOC employees were continually coming
in and out of the room in order to check schedules and obtain
paperwork. The probation officer “started” a second conversation
with defendant about the events that had transpired that day.
During their conversation, defendant admitted that he had made
the holes three months earlier, that he regularly fantasized about.
his neighbor, that he had seen her naked on three occasions and
in her underwear over twenty times, and that he had masturbated
while watching her. The probation officer estimated that approxi-
mately twenty to twenty-five minutes elapsed from the arrival at
the DOC office to the conclusion of defendant’s second set of
statements, with their conversation about the offending behaviors
occurring about ten minutes after their arrival. Following this
statement, the probation officer called the police officer to come to
the DOC office to interrogate defendant.

16. Defendant was charged with thirteen counts of voyeurism
and one count of stalking. After a mistrial, defendant moved to
suppress four sets of statements: two to the probation officer and
two to the police officer. Following a December 2014 hearing, the
court granted the motion. It found that the statements to the
probation officer were inadmissible under State x Steinhour, 158
Vt. 299, 302, 607 A.2d 888, 890 (1992), which it read to preclude
the use of statements made by probationers to probation officers
in a new criminal proceeding unless Miranda warnings were
given. The court also found the statements and admissions to the
police officer inadmissible because the officer’s recitation of

‘The trial court suppressed this statement, and a later one made to the police
officer, The State has not appealed from these suppression decisions, and we do
not address them here.

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Miranda warnings was “woefully inadequate,” rendering defend-
ant’s resulting waiver invalid.

17. This interlocutory appeal on the two sets of statements
made to the probation officer followed. The State argues that the
court’s conclusion that a probation officer is obligated to give
Miranda warnings when an interview might result in new criminal
charges is legally wrong. It maintains that Miranda does not
apply to either probation officer interview because defendant was
not in police or coercive custody.

18. HM In reviewing a motion to suppress, we uphold the trial
court’s findings of fact absent clear error; we review the court’s
legal conclusions de novo. See State uv Simoneau, 2003 VT 83,
114, 176 Vt. 15, 83838 A.2d 1280. In determining whether an
individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, the U.S. Supreme
Court requires three discrete inquiries: first, an examination of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a purely factual
inquiry; second, based on the facts found, an inquiry into whether
a reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt
free to terminate the interview and leave? In recent cases, the
Sourt added a third inquiry: whether the environment presents
“the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station
house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Howes wv Fields, 565 U.S.
499, 509, 182 S. Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012). Whether the facts meet the
two latter standards is a question of law, which we review de
novo. In re E.W., 2015 VT 7, 19, 198 Vt. 311, 114 ABd 112.

19. Before embarking on our analysis, we make one general
observation. In our review of case law from other jurisdictions, the
only decisions from courts throughout the country that have
suppressed statements from defendants because a probation offi-
cer failed to give Miranda warnings to a defendant prior to the
statement reached these decisions in situations where the defend-
ant was inearcerated® or handcuffed‘ at the time of the statement.
This is true regardless of whether the defendant was on proba-

? Neither defendant nor the trial court has advanced any argument that this case
would be decided differently under the Vermont Constitution. Consequently, we do
not address that argument. here.

* See, e.g., Bradley u State, 559 A.2d 1234, 1245-46 (Del. 1989) (finding statements
made without Miranda warnings to director of prerelease services at department
of corrections in jail regarding possible parole violation were inadmissible in
prosecutor’s case and deemed subject of custodial interrogation); State x Roberts,
513 N.E.2d 720, 725 (Ohio 1987) (“{S]tatements by an in-custody probationer [in

tion, parole, or furlough, and regardless of the title of the
corrections officer who took the statement. It is even true in cases
where the statement was taken by a law enforcement officer who
acted in concert with the corrections officer. Because the situation
in this case is relatively common, there are many decisions that
align with our decision here that Miranda warnings were not
required. We have listed a representative sample in this footnote.®

110. HI We begin with the first set of statements to the
probation officer taken in defendant’s home. As the U.S. Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed in Howes, custody refers to a specific

Jail at the time] to his probation officer are inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
trial, where prior to questioning, the probation officer failed to advise the
probationer of his Miranda rights... ”); State x Saryent, 762 P2d 1127, 1131-38
(Wash. 1988) (concluding that probation officer’s interview of defendant as part of
preparation of presentence report, despite being routine post-convietion procedure,
necessitated Miranda warnings, where defendant was in jail, officer asked “Did
you do it?” and said defendant should “come to the truth” with himself, and officer
was undeniably an officer of the state with allegiance due to state, not defendant).
Sargent is distinguishable from the present case because in Saryent no probation-
ary relationship existed between the defendant and the officer at the time of the
interview. Although the probation department is statutorily required to conduct
presentence interviews, that does not mean the kind of rehabilitative relationship
evidenced in this case is created — the officer was acting as an information-
gatherer for the court, rather than as someone concerned with the defendant’s
rehabilitation and welfare. See People » Cortijo, 684 N.YS.2d 435, 440 (Sup. Ct.
1998). We note that the holdings in Bradley and Roberts are unlikely to have
survived the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Howes, 565 US. at 509, 132 S.
Ct. at 1189, that the interrogation of an incarcerated prisoner about a separate
crime did not require Miranda warnings.

4 ee People u Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 37 N.E.3d 360; Commonwealth
x Cooley, 118 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2015). These decisions rest on the rationale that the
application of handcuffs before the probationer is questioned creates an arrest.
There is no handeuffing or other prequestioning arrest in this case; defendant was
handeuffed after he confessed.

° United States x Cranley, 350 F3d 617 (7th Cir, 2003); Chruby u Gillis, 54 F.
App’x 520 (3d Cir. 2002); United States x Hines, No. 1:12-cr-00204-JAW, 2013 WL
1149310 (D. Me. Mar. 1, 2013); United States x Muhammad, 903 F. Supp. 2d 132
(E.D.NY. 2012); United States x Oakes, No. Crim, 00-76-P-C, 2001 WL 30530 (D.
Me. Jan. 10, 2001); McAllister x State, 807 A2d 1119 (Del. 2002); State u
Christensen, 360 P3d 348 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015); State x Schroeder, No. 90,011,
2004 WL 117340 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2004) (nonprecedential); State x Kittredge,
2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106; People » Blliott, 8383 N.W2d 284 (Mich. 2013); State
Hedlund, No. A08-0266, 2009 WL 1373670 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 2009)
(nonprecedential); State x Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, 336 P3d 446 (N.M. Ct.
App.); State » Scolt, 765 N.E.2d 930 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).

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set of circumstances that are “thought generally to present a
serious danger of coercion.” 565 U.S. at 508-09, 132 S. Ct. at 1189.
The first step of the inquiry is “to ascertain whether, in light of
the objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a reasonable
person would have felt “he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 509, 132 S. Ct. at 1189
(quotations and alteration omitted). Relevant factors include “the
location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during
the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints
during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the
end of the interrogation.” Id. (citations omitted); see also E.W.,
2015 VT 7, 115; State x Sullivan, 2013 VT 71, 129, 194 Vt. 361,
80 A.3d 67; State v Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 119, 189 Vt. 50, 12
A3d 518. The second step is to determine “whether the relevant
environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as
the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.”
Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 182 S. Ct. at 1190.

111. The State argues that the issue before us is controlled by
the first step in the inquiry and the answer at that step is
controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). In Murphy the defendant was on
probation for a sex-related charge, conditions of which included
mandatory participation in a treatment program for sexual offend-
ers, periodic reporting to his probation officer, and an obligation
to be truthful with the officer “in all matters.” Jd. at 422. During
one of his counseling sessions, defendant admitted to a rape and
murder seven years earlier, and the counselor informed his
probation officer of this admission. Id. at 423. The officer wrote to
defendant and asked him to contact her to discuss a treatment
plan for the rest of the probationary period. /d. The officer did
not disclose that she intended to confront defendant with his
confession at the meeting. When they met in her office, the officer
revealed the information she had learned from the counselor.
Although the defendant became angry and stated he “felt like
calling a lawyer,’ he admitted over the course of the conversation
to the rape and murder and tried to persuade the officer further
treatment was unnecessary. Id. at 424. At the end of the
conversation, the officer informed the defendant that she had an
obligation to tell the police of the newly disclosed crime. Id.

112. After he was charged with first-degree murder based on
his newly disclosed conduct, the defendant sought to suppress his

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confession on the grounds it was obtained in violation of his rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. /d. at 425. Specifically, the defendant argued that he
should have been given Miranda warnings before the probation
officer questioned him. The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted
that argument on the basis that the coercive powers of the
probation officer over the probationer made the interrogation the
equivalent of custodial interrogation addressed in Miranda such
that equivalent warnings were required in the probation interro-
gation case before the interrogation could be admitted in a
criminal case. State v Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982).

113. Hf The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the ruling of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, ruling that the general obligation to
appear before a probation officer and answer truthfully her
questions about incriminating conduct — akin to that imposed on
grand jury witnesses — did not automatically convert otherwise
voluntary statements into compelled ones for purposes of
Miranda. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431. The defendant was free to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination and would have
suffered no penalty for choosing to do so. Id. at 429. Indeed, there
was no direct evidence that the defendant “confessed because he
feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent”
and there was nothing in the Minnesota probation conditions to
suggest probation was conditional on waiving Fifth Amendment.
rights regarding future criminal prosecutions. Id. at 437.

114. The Supreme Court went on to analyze the case under
traditional custody factors and concluded that the defendant was
not in custody for Miranda purposes since there was no formal
arrest and no restraints on his freedom of movement. Jd. at 430.
The defendant was “not physically restrained” and could have left
the probation office, suggesting it would have been unreasonable
for him to believe that terminating the meeting would have led to
a revocation of probation. Jd. at 433. The Court concluded that the
psychological pressures stemming from the unfamiliar interroga-
tion environment that Miranda warnings seek to guard against
were simply not present, as the defendant had met regularly with
his probation officer and was familiar with her and her office. /d.

115. We agree with the State that Murphy answers much of
defendant’s argument on the special need for Miranda warnings
in probation officer interview cases where the State seeks to admit

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the result of that interview in a separate criminal case. After
Murphy, any such case must be analyzed under traditional factors
to determine whether a custodial interrogation, as defined in
Miranda, has occurred. See Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 197, 18
(finding no custody where defendant asked to come to probation
office and was interrogated there by two uniformed, armed state
troopers where: troopers told defendant “he was not under
arrest”; defendant “did not manifest any belief that he was not
free to leave”; the building was familiar to defendant; there were
only two officers present; defendant was not physically restrained;
and the interrogation lasted about an hour and occurred in “an
unlocked room without any additional coercive conditions”); Elliott,
833 N.W.2d at 293 (concluding that interview by parole officer of
incarcerated parolee was not custodial when meeting took place in
jail library, lasted between fifteen and twenty-five minutes, and
defendant was not physically restrained, even though defendant
was not told “he was free to leave the meeting and return to his
cell”).

116. Mf Further, we note that the degree of post-conviction,
post-incarceration restraint, and a defendant’s knowledge of that
restraint, have little if anything to do with whether the defendant
is in custody for purposes of Miranda requirements unless
defendant was actually under arrest. As the Supreme Court.
explained, the term “in custody” has different meanings in differ-
ent contexts and is “more narrowly circumscribed” in the context
of Miranda. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430. For purposes of Miranda,
custody is present only if a defendant is under formal arrest or
under restraint of movement of the degree associated with formal
arrest. Id. at 430-31. It is true, as we held in State x Bogert, that
“the restraints on [a] defendant's individual liberty associated with
his conditional-reentry status are significant.” 2013 VT 13A, 924,
197 Vt. 610, 109 A3d 883. These restraints go to the liberty
interests of a furloughed prisoner, as we held in Bogert, but do
not create custody under Miranda. Indeed, the point of furlough
is that the furloughee is not under arrest.

117. With respect to the asswmed knowledge of the defendant,
the Murphy Court made a critical distinction:

[W]e must inquire whether [the defendant’s] probation
conditions merely required him to appear and give tes-
timony about matters relevant to his probationary status

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or whether they went farther and required him to choose
between making incriminating statements and jeopardiz-
ing his conditional liberty by remaining silent. Because
we conclude that Minnesota did not attempt to take the
extra, impermissible step, we hold that [the defendant’s]
Fifth Amendment privilege was not self-executing.

465 U.S. at 436.

118. There is similarly no evidence here that the State
would penalize an exercise of a defendant’s  self-incrimination
privilege by revoking his furlough status. As in Murphy, there is
no direct evidence that defendant confessed “because he feared
that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent.” Id. at
437.

119. J Even this distinction does not end the inquiry. The
Murphy Court went on to hold that even if the defendant had “a
belief that his probation might be revoked for exercising the Fifth
Amendment privilege, that belief would not have been reasonable.”
Id. at 438. This is because decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
prior to Murphy had made clear that a “State could not consti-
tutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate
exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege” Jd. For the same
reason, such an expectation would not be reasonable in this case;
penalizing the exercise of defendant’s privilege against self-
incrimination would be unconstitutional.

120. Ef In Howes, the Court held that the questioning of a
prisoner by law enforcement officers about a separate sex crime
did not occur while the prisoner was in custody for purposes of
Miranda. 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. The Court defined
custody as follows:

As used in our Miranda case law, “custody” is a term
of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In
determining whether a person is in custody in this sense,
the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of “the
objective circumstances of the interrogation,” a “reason-
able person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave.” And, in order
to determine how a suspect would have “gauge[d]” his

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“freedom of movement,” courts must examine “all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” . . .

Determining whether an individual’s freedom of move-
ment was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in
the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom
of movement amount to custody for purposes of
Miranda. We have “decline[d] to accord talismanic
power” to the freedom-of-movement inquiry and have
instead asked the additional question whether the rel-
evant environment presents the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at
issue in Miranda. “Our cases make clear . . . that the
freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and
not sufficient condition for Miranda. custody.”

Td. at 508-09, 182 S. Ct. at 1189-90 (citations omitted). The Court
went on to hold that while the defendant’s freedom of movement
was restricted by his imprisonment, the coercive pressures of
station-house questioning were absent, and there was no Miranda
custody. 7d. at 514, 182 S. Ct. at 1192. It reached this conclusion
despite the facts that the defendant did not consent to the
interview in advance and was not told he could decline to speak
with the officers; the interview lasted between five and seven
hours and well beyond the defendant’s normal bedtime; the
officers were armed; and one of the officers used a very sharp
tone, and on one occasion, profanity. Id. at 514-15, 182 S. Ct. at
1193.

121. Howes was recently applied by the Michigan Supreme
Court in Hiliott, a decision that discusses and follows the teach-
ings of both Murphy and Howes. In Elliott, the defendant parolee
was incarcerated for failure to report to his parole officer as
required. The parole officer added new charges to the violation
complaint, including one related to a robbery for which the
defendant had never been convicted, and visited the defendant in
prison to serve the new complaint and determine whether the
defendant would waive a probable cause hearing on the new
complaint charges. During the meeting, the defendant confessed
to the robbery for which he had never been charged. The
Michigan Supreme Court held that the parole officer could testify
to the defendant’s confession to the robbery in a new criminal
case for that crime over the objection that the officer failed to

provide Miranda warnings before obtaining the confession. Elliott,
833 N.W.2d at 285. The court reasoned that the defendant was not
in custody under Howes, specifically, that the environment did not
present the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda. Id. at 294-95. The
court found the environment less coercive than that in Howes in
a number of respects, noting, for example, that a parolee “would
be aware that a parole officer is acting independently of the police
who placed him in custody and has no control over the jail.” Id.
at 294 (quotation omitted).

122. To that end, the above discussion shows that custody did
not occur for purposes of Miranda, and we reject the dissent’s
assertion to the contrary based on its position that defendant was
on furlough and knew he could be returned to incarceration
without a court order if he did not cooperate with the probation
officer by confessing to the conduct for which he was charged in
the resulting criminal proceeding. The theory that the restraints
on liberty created by probation, parole, or furlough mean there is
custody under Miranda is wrong. That theory was. specifically
rejected in Murphy and is wholly inconsistent with Howes and
other, newer cases from the U.S. Supreme Court.

123. One other part of the trial court’s rationale on this point
deserves special mention and response. The trial court noted that
although a probationer’s statements to a probation officer are
“admissible in violation-of-probation hearings,” this “does not
render custodial unwarned statements per se admissible in other
criminal proceedings,” and cites Murphy to that effect. This is
obviously a misreading of Murphy because the facts of that case
did involve questions that incriminated the probationer in a new
criminal case, exactly the facts present here. The quote in
Murphy on which the trial court relies relates to the situation
where the state punishes a probationer for exercising his right to
remain silent in response to questions, the answers to which
would be incriminating. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. Neither the
defendant in Murphy nor defendant in this case exercised his
right to remain silent.

124. The trial court’s second rationale is that the procedure by
which defendant’s confession was obtained shows that custody was
involved. Specifically, the trial court references the appearance of
the probation officers at defendant’s apartment, the “order” for
defendant to sit on his sofa, the search of the apartment, and the

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nature of the questions. The short answer lies in a comparison of
the circumstances in Murphy to those present here.

125. In Murphy, the defendant was called to a meeting with his
probation officer at her office, albeit at a time convenient to him.
The announced reason for the meeting was a pretext, a fact that
the Supreme Court found that the defendant likely knew. When
the defendant appeared, he was confronted with an accusation
that he had committed a specific murder in the past and had
confessed to this murder to his treatment provider who in turn
told the probation officer of the confession. He responded that his
confession was true.

126. In the instant case, two probation officers went to defend-
ant’s apartment in response to a complaint that defendant drilled
a hole in his bedroom wall to look into the bedroom of a young
girl in the adjoining apartment. Defendant admitted the two
officers to the apartment, and one asked defendant to sit on the
sofa while the other looked at defendant's bedroom wall. Both
were unarmed and in plainclothes. The officer who remained with
defendant asked him if there was something defendant should tell
him. Defendant answered that he “screwed up.” When the second
officer returned and confirmed the holes drilled in the wall, the
first officer asked defendant if he drilled the holes, and defendant
answered that he did. All of this took a short period of time, a
matter of minutes.

127. If the circumstances in Murphy did not show the defend-
ant was in custody because of the location and substance of the
questioning, it is difficult to conceive how the circumstances in this
case could. Defendant here was not “yanked” from familiar to
unfamiliar surroundings. The questioning did not take place in a
stationhouse or even a probation office, but in defendant’s own
living room, with an officer he knew well and had worked with
over several years.

128. BI In Beckwith uv United States the Supreme Court ruled
that an investigative interview of a defendant in a home where he
occasionally stayed, rather than in a police-dominated atmosphere,
“simply [did] not present the elements which the Miranda Court
found so inherently coercive.” 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). We have
similarly held that the location of interrogation in a defendant’s
home is a significant indicator that the interrogation is not
custodial. Sullivan, 2013 VT 71, 1930-31 (concluding no Miranda

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warnings required when police did not restrict defendant’s move-
ments and “the interview took place in defendant’s own home,
under circumstances that did not resemble the sort of ‘police-
dominated atmosphere’ that typically supports a finding of cus-
tody”). Many other courts have ruled similarly. See United States
uv Murdock, 699 F.3d 665, 669 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding no custody
when defendant was interviewed on his front lawn “in familiar
surroundings”); United States x Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 260 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“easily dispens[ing]” with defendant’s claim he should
have received Miranda warnings when he was questioned on his
porch and was not arrested or restrained in any way); Common-
wealth x Carnes, 933 N.E.2d 598, 606 (Mass. 2010) (finding no
custody when nineteen-year-old interviewed “in a house owned by
his family” over seventy-five minutes in “informal and cordial”
manner). Moreover, the fact of defendant’s furlough suggests that
the circumstances of his questioning did not constitute a “sharp
and ominous change.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 511, 182 S. Ct. at 1190.
Defendant knew he was on the “highest level of supervision” and
that his probation officer was permitted to visit his residence at
any time and inspect it for violations.

129. Further, the probation officer’s initial questions were
entirely open-ended. Even after the officers discovered the holes
in the wall of defendant’s bedroom, the questions focused on what
had happened and were not accusatory. This is not a case like
Muntean, where defendant was confronted by evidence against
him, accused of a crime, and told that the interrogating police
officer believed that defendant was guilty. 2010 VT 88, {1 28-29;
see also State u Hieu Tran, 2012 VT 104, 1115-16, 193 Vt. 148,
71 A8d 1201 (finding custodial setting where, during interview,
detectives “explainfed] they knew [the defendant] was involved in
the crime and confront{ed] defendant with the existing evidence
they had of his guilt”).

130. The fact that the officers were questioning defendant in
response to a complaint and that they searched defendant’s
bedroom are not indicators of custody. Virtually all of the cases
cited in footnote five, supra, involve questioning in response to
some suspicion of conduct that violated conditions of probation,
parole, or furlough; indeed, virtually all cases involving the
admissibility of evidence under the Miranda standard have those
facts. Many of the cases with home interviews also involved
searches. See McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1126 (determining Miranda

>

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warnings not required where probation officers searched proba-
tioner’s home in response to tip and probationer “was in his own
home, to which he had come freely, there were no police officers
present, the probation officers were not armed or blocking his exit
in any way, and the questioning was direct and brief”); Christen-
sen, 360 P.3d at 352 (concluding interrogation was noncustodial
when parolee was questioned in his own home, by his parole
officer, in “low-key” and “relaxed” manner for sixty minutes and
noting fact police officers were simultaneously conducting a search
of parolee’s home “did not make the encounter police-dominated”);
Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, 111 26-29 (holding probationary home
visit not transformed into custodial interrogation although defend-
ant was handcuffed and told to remain seated while officers
searched because visit occurred in defendant’s home, “a
noncustodial setting,” defendant had tested positive for drugs and
“could reasonably expect that his probation officer might conduct.
a home visit to investigate these violations,’ defendant was not
“jsolated or overwhelmed by the police presence” even though
drug task force officer accompanied probation officer, and “there
[was] no evidence of force in relation to the handcuffing, or
isolation in a secure location, or confinement”); Hedlund, 2009 WL
1373670, at *2-8 (finding no custody for Miranda purposes
although probation officer made unannounced visit to probationer’s
home accompanied by nonuniformed police officers in unmarked
vehicle and conducted search because surroundings and officer
were “familiar,’ probationer was aware “interviews were a neces-
sary part of his conditions of release” and questions were
straightforward). None cite these facts as significant indicators of
custody.

131. J We acknowledge that at trial the probation officer
testified that defendant would not have been allowed to leave the
apartment had he tried to do so once he confessed to the offense.
But, we note that the consequence of an interrogation may be
arrest of the person interrogated, even though that person was
not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and, in many
circumstances, the interrogator may have decided to arrest even
before the interrogation. If the interrogator conveys belief in the
defendant’s guilt during the questioning, that communication can
be a factor supporting that the defendant was in custody. See
Hieu Tran, 2012 VT 104, 1915-16; Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 119. In
this case, the probation officer said nothing about restraining

| .

defendant until after the confession, and defendant was in no way
physically restrained throughout the course of the conversation
with the probation officer. There is nothing in the record to
suggest defendant knew the probation officer would not let him
leave and that that knowledge had any bearing on his decision to
give a statement. See Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 118 (noting that
because defendant “did not manifest any belief that he was not.
free to leave,” this weighs against finding of custody); Elliott, 833
N.W.2d at 293 (determining that fact defendant was never told he
was free to leave is not “particularly compelling, much less
dispositive” considering brief — fifteen to twenty-five minutes —
duration of interview).

132. We recognize that this is one area in which the circum-
stances differ from those in Murphy. In Murphy the defendant
was asked about a crime that occurred before the defendant was
on probation. Thus, the probation officer had no jurisdiction over
the conduct of the probationer at the time of the crime and thus
could not restrain the defendant when he confessed to that
conduct. In this case, the facts gathered by the probation officers
in probationer’s apartment and defendant’s acknowledgement of
his conduct during the inquiry determined that defendant would
be restrained for violation of his probation conditions. While this
is a difference, it is not a distinction that determines whether
custody occurred. Virtually all of the post-Murphy cases are like
this one, and not like Murphy on this point, and find no custody
even though the defendant is not told that he or she is free to
leave at any time.

133. [HB There is another reason why this issue is not
determinative. As the Court held in Howes, the fact that a
probationer is not free to leave is a necessary but not sufficient
element of custody. 565 U.S. at 509, 182 S. Ct. at 1189-90. The
second element is “whether the relevant environment presents the
same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house
questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. at 509, 132 S. Ct. at 1190.
That second element is not met here.

134. We note that the trial court mistakenly relied on
Steinhour, 158 Vt. 299, 607 A.2d 888, in reaching its decision.
Steinhour was not a case in which the defendant claimed admis-
sion of evidence violated the prohibition of Miranda because the
defendant was in custody and Miranda warnings were required.

406 |

In fact, the defendant in Steinhour challenged the introduction of
evidence in his probation violation proceeding, not its introduction
in a separate criminal proceeding. We explicitly noted that the
defendant in Steinkour “(did] not claim a failure to warn him of
his privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda”; rather, he
argued that the circumstances of his questioning by his probation
officer supported a reasonable belief that refusal to answer and
assertion of the self-incrimination privilege “would itself be a
ground to revoke probation,” thus rendering his statements invol-
untary. Id. at 300, 607 A.2d at 889. We refused to address whether
that belief was reasonable in Steinhour, particularly in the context
of a separate criminal proceeding because the circumstances were
hypothetical, although we noted the Murphy holding that punish-
ing a defendant for invoking his right to remain silent would be
unconstitutional. Jd. at 301-02, 607 A.2d at 890.

135. The trial court interpreted our statement in Steinhour that
we were not addressing the situation where the State seeks to use
statements from a probation interview in a separate criminal case
as a holding that the result would be different in the latter
circumstance. It then made the leap that the Steinhour holding
would require Miranda warnings if the statements were to be
admitted in the separate criminal case. We reiterate that the
Steinhour language on which the trial court relied was not a
holding, and Steinhour was not a Miranda case. In essence, the
trial court interpreted Steinkour as holding that the Minnesota
Supreme Court decision in Murphy was right and Miranda
warnings would be required whenever statements from a proba-
tion officer interview were introduced in a separate criminal case.
Such a decision would war directly with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Murphy and be beyond our power.

136. [HB There is an additional reason for our decision today.
Scholars and courts have consistently read Murphy as effectively
holding that probation officers are not required to give Miranda
warnings before questioning those whom they supervise absent
some form of police custody. See, eg. 2 W. LaFave et al.
Criminal Procedure § 6.10(¢) (4th ed.) (noting “Miranda has been
held inapplicable to questioning by . . . parole or probation
officers”); T. Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole,
87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 887, 923 (2014) (explaining that under Murphy,
“the typical parole interview does not constitute custody despite
the fact that parole officers could compel [a parolee’s] attendance

a “

and truthful answers” because “such seeming compulsion alone does
not transform[] a routine interview into an inherently coercive
setting,” and parolee’s nonMirandized statements can be used
against him or her in criminal case as well as in parole revocation
hearings (quotations omitted)), 8. Vance, Looking at the Law: An
Updated Look at the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Post-
Conviction Supervision, Fed. Prob., June 2011, at 88, 37 (ex-
plaining that probation officer can ask incriminating question of
offender on post-conviction supervision, and officer is not required
to read Miranda rights to offender unless offender is in “some
type of poli stody”).

137. The above findings comport with the nature and purposes
of probation. Because the “primary goal of probation . . . is
rehabilitation of the defendant,” the relationship between a defend-
ant and his or her probation officer should not be founded on fear,
intimidation, or authoritarianism, but on trust, openness, and the
commonly held goal of restoring the defendant to useful and
productive citizenship. State v Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tenn.
1996), see also 28 V.S.A. § 252(a) (noting that court may impose
conditions of probation deemed reasonably necessary “to ensure
that the offender will lead a law-abiding life or to assist the
offender to do so”). Furlough, particularly long-term furlough as
in this case, has similar purposes.

138. Treating probation officers as law enforcement officers
primarily motivated to secure convictions for crimes and required
to give Miranda warnings to those they supervise erects a
substantial barrier to the development of forthright, open commu-
nication between probation officers and those they supervise. The
facts of this case show exactly the difference. Defendant had been
in the same status under furlough for five years, longer than most
periods of probation. The probation officer in this case had
supervised him for all that time, during which they met approxi-
mately twice a week. The pair had a “good relationship.” Defend-
ant had admitted other violations of his furlough conditions
without resulting imprisonment. The officer testified that his goal
was to “have an honest, open relationship” with his clients so that
“if they were struggling and in need, they could come to [him]
and say I need help with this,” and receive appropriate treatment.
Miranda was built around a wholly different paradigm, one in
which police officers who have no relationship with a crime
suspect use a coercive environment and interrogation techniques
to extract a confession.

ws a

139. The standard Miranda warning requires the officer to tell
the suspect that he or she has a right to remain silent and
anything the suspect says can and will be used against him in a
court of law. The routine giving of these warnings in the context
where the officer must inquire about compliance with probation,
parole, or furlough conditions and the answers may disclose
conduct a prosecutor could charge as criminal would undermine an
atmosphere of trust and communication. The warnings would
identify a probation officer as just another police officer, who is an
adversary of the defendant.

140. For the above reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision
to suppress the first set of defendant’s statements to his probation
officer.

141. We next address defendant’s statements during the second
conversation with his probation officer. The trial court suppressed
these statements based on the same rationale it used for the first
interview — that the statements were not admissible without
Miranda warnings under the holding in Steinhowr. That rationale
was erroneous.

142. However, that this rationale was erroneous does not end
the inquiry. A court must still determine if defendant was in
custody under traditional factors at the time of the second
interview, and it is undisputed that defendant was physically
restrained in a DOC facility at the time of that interview.

143. Given the rationale for its decision, the trial court made
few findings about the environment and circumstances of the
second interview. The probation officer’s testimony during the trial
and the motion hearing indicates that defendant was transferred
into shackles and leg restraints upon his arrival at the DOC office,
and that after being taken outside for a cigarette, defendant and
the probation officer returned to the DOC office where the officer
“started” a conversation with defendant about the holes he had
found in the apartment wall.° However, the record contains no
information regarding the number, kind, or tone of the questions
the probation officer posed to defendant. The record also does not

° We note, however, that the State’s response to defendant’s supplemental memo-
randum in the trial court states that the conversation occurred in the parking lot
of the DOC office while the two men were smoking and that defendant began to
“spontaneously talk” and provide additional information without being prompted.
By contrast, the trial court’s decision on the motion to suppress states that “in
answer to more inquiries,” defendant admitted additional information.

contain information about whether defendant was still wearing
restraints after returning to the DOC office from smoking a
cigarette outside, a negative finding that is “qualitatively different
from stating that [the defendant] was free to move about,”
rendering it “impossible to determine if [defendant] retained his
freedom of movement through the questioning.” United States u
Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 2006).7 Although it is undis-
puted that defendant was “not free to leave,’ under Howes we
must find both that defendant was not free to leave and that the
questioning was done in a coercive environment comparable to the
station house atmosphere in Miranda. 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S. Ct.
at 1189. The trial court made no findings on this second element.

144. HI We recognize that defendant has the burden of proof
to establish custody for Miranda purposes and thus is responsible
for deficiencies in the record. Im re ELW, 2015 VT 7, 910.
Nevertheless, the evidence available shows factors that support a
conclusion that defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes:
the prior confessions to the probation officer and the police officer,
the prior accusations of the police officer, his arrest on the
probation violation charges so that he was held involuntarily, the
location of the interview under either version of the facts, and his
isolation from the outside world. Much of the State’s argument is
based on Howes. The Howes holding is that an interrogation in
prison, in a private location, and with respect to actions that took
place outside is not per se custodial for purposes of Miranda. 565
US. at 508, 182 S. Ct. at 1189. While the analysis may be helpful
to the State’s argument, it is not determinative.

145. HM On the sparse evidence presented, we would conclude
that it is impossible to determine as a matter of law whether
defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda without
findings of fact derived from the evidence that was presented.
Consequently, we reverse the decision to suppress the statements

7 Moreover, even if defendant was restrained during the conversation, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that “{nJot all restraints on freedom of movement amount
to enstody for purposes of Miranda” and “declined to accord talismanie power to
the freedom-of-movement inqniry;” focusing instead on whether the coercive
pressures of the station house are present. Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 8. Ct at
1189 (quotation omitted).

410 |

made in the second interview with the probation officer and
remand for additional findings of fact on the issue of custody.

The trial court’s order suppressing defendant’s first set of
statements to his probation officer is reversed; its decision as to the
second set of statements is reversed and remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

146. Skoglund, J., dissenting. I dissent. This was not a typical,
routine interview of a parolee or furloughee. This was a special
visit to respond to an allegation that defendant had committed a
crime. The totality of the circumstances shows that defendant was
“in custody” when he made involuntary, incriminatory statements
to his supervising Department of Corrections (DOC) officer, and
therefore his statements should be suppressed. I would affirm the
trial court’s decision.

147. Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, an
individual is privileged “not to answer official questions put to
him . . . where the answers might incriminate him in future
criminal proceedings.” Minnesota uv Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426
(1984) (quotation omitted); U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that no
person “shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness
against himself”). “A defendant does not lose this protection by
reason of his conviction of a crime.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426.
Thus, even if a defendant is “on probation at the time he makes
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they
are inadmissible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that
for which he has been convicted.” /d. And, just to be clear,
defendant was not on probation, he was under the “highest level”
of furlough supervision. Furlough “shall in no way be interpreted
as a probation or parole of the offender.” 28 V.S.A. § 808(c).

148. Although generally an individual must assert his or her
Fifth Amendment right to be entitled to its protection, an
exception is made for statements “obtained during custodial
interrogation.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430; Miranda w Arizona, 384
US. 436, 444 (1966) (explaining that “custodial interrogation”
means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way”). This is because “the
custodial setting is thought to contain ‘inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so

freely?” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430 (quoting Miranda, 384 US. at
467). Thus, “[t]o dissipate the overbearing compulsion caused by
isolation of a suspect in police custody,” law enforcement officers
must warn individuals of their right to remain silent and warn
them of the consequences of failing to assert such right before
engaging in any custodial interrogation. Jd. (quotation and altera-
tions omitted). If the warnings are not provided, any incriminatory
statements must be suppressed. Jd. (explaining that courts must
exclude “incriminating statements obtained during custodial inter-
rogation unless the suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege after being suitably warned of his right to remain silent
and of the consequences of his failure to assert it”).

149. The Supreme Court has identified a two-part test to
determine if an individual is “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
Howes wv Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 182 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012).
Courts must first consider if, “in light of the objective circum-
stances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt.
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.” Id. (quotations omitted). This requires an examination of
“all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including
“the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made
during the interview, the presence or absence of physical re-
straints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee
at the end of the questioning.” Jd. (quotations omitted). Because
“{nJot all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody
for purposes of Miranda,’ courts must also ascertain if “the
relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pres-
sures as the type of station house questioning at issue in
Miranda.” Id. at 509, 182 S. Ct. at 1189-90.

150. Here, because defendant was on furlough status, he could
be returned to jail without any evaluation by a court of the
reasons for his reincarceration. In State u Bogert this Court
recognized that “the restraints on defendant’s individual liberty
associated with his conditional-reentry status are significant.” 2013
VT 183A, 124, 197 Vt. 610, 109 A.3d 883. According to the
testimony of his supervising correctional officer, the officer could
enter the defendant’s apartment without permission and could
search it without any warrant. And, he could put defendant in
custody while searching the residence. As an example of this, he
ied that he could order a person on furlough to “stay seated
in a primary location so we can conduct the search.”

412 |

151. In Murphy the Supreme Court concluded that a proba-
tioner was not “in custody” during a “probation interview, ar-
ranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time” and
therefore reversed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court
that had suppressed Murphy’s incriminating statements to his
probation officer that implicated him in another crime. 465 U.S. at
433. In Murphy the probation officer wrote to Murphy and asked
him to contact her to discuss a treatment plan for the remainder
of his probationary period. In actuality, the meeting was in direct
response to her learning that Murphy had admitted committing a
rape and murder to his counselor in the required program for
sexual offenders, and she intended to report any incriminating
statements that Murphy made during the interview to police. /d.
at 422-23. Murphy admitted to the crimes during the interview. Id.
at 423. Murphy was not detained at the end of the interview. The
probation officer informed the police of Murphy’s admissions, and
he was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder.

152. As indicated, the Supreme Court determined that Murphy
was not in custody during the probation meeting. It found that
the meeting did not convey to Murphy “a message that he has no
choice but to submit to the officers’ will and to confess,” nor did
it thrust him into “an unfamiliar atmosphere or an interrogation
environment created for no purpose other than to subjugate the
individual to the will of his examiner” Jd. at 433 (quotation and
alterations omitted). The Court explained that Murphy met regu-
larly with his probation officer at her office, and that these
regular meetings “should have served to familiarize him with her
and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation
that might overbear his desire to claim the [Fifth Amendment]
privilege.” Id.

153. While the majority believes “Murphy answers much of
defendant’s argument on the special need for Miranda warnings
in probation officer interview cases where the State seeks to admit
the result of that interview in a separate criminal case,” ante,
1 15, reliance on Murphy cannot decide the issue in this case; too
many factors distinguish Murphy from this case. Again, defendant
here was on furlough, not probation. And, while the Supreme
Court found no custodial setting and no compulsion involved in
Murphy’s questioning and, thus, did not suppress his statements,
it acknowledged: “The result may be different if the questions put
to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status,

call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later
criminal prosecution.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.

154. Defendant here was in a custodial situation for Miranda
purposes. His supervisor said as much when he testified that he
directed defendant to sit on the couch while a search was
conducted and that he did not leave defendant alone until the
other correctional officer came downstairs to watch over defend-
ant. Defendant understood that his furlough status could be
immediately revoked if he failed to answer his DOC supervisor’s
questions without the need for the supervisor to resort to the
procedures offered for a probationer when charged with a viola-
tion of probation conditions. He had already received four gradu-
ated sanctions for prior incidents, with one resulting in incarcera-
tion. While the questioning occurred in defendant’s home and he
knew his supervising officer well, it is disingenuous to label this
visit as a typical “probation interview, arranged by appointment at
a mutually convenient time” as in Murphy. Id. at 433. The record
shows that defendant’s supervising officer, and a second DOC
officer, went to defendant’s home specifically in response to a
report that defendant was suspected of committing a new crime.

155. This record compels a finding of custody. It is significant
that defendant did not “arrive[] at the interview voluntarily,” or
leave “by his . . . own free will.” State u Muntean, 2010 VT 88,
119, 189 Vt. 50, 12 A.38d 518. Moreover, the focus of the interview
was not on the terms of defendant’s furlough agreement but
rather on investigating suspicions of involvement in new criminal
acts. Cf. State u Steinhour, 158 Vt. 299, 302, 607 A.2d 888, 890
(1992) (“The purpose of a probation officer’s questions about the
probationer’s behavior related to and affecting his probation is
ordinarily not aimed at ferreting out evidence to support an
additional criminal prosecution.”). While the interview occurred in
defendant’s home, this is not by itself determinative of the
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 119.
As one court has explained, “{q]uestioning which occurs in the
suspect’s own home may provide a margin of comfort, but... the
setting of the interrogation is not so important to the inquiry as
the question of police domination of that setting.” United States uv
Griffin, 922 F.2d 1848, 1854-55 (8th Cir. 1990).

156. During their conversation, the officers never told defendant
that he did not have to answer their questions or that he was free

414 Le

to terminate the interview. Like other courts, we have found this
type of disclosure “significant in determining whether a reasonable
person would have felt at liberty to terminate a police interview.”
Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 125 (citing cases). Indeed, we found the
absence of such a statement pivotal in both Muntean and State uv
Hieu Tran, 2012 VT 104, 114, 193 Vt. 148, 71 A3d 1201. In this
case, defendant could not have reasonably believed he could have
terminated the interview.

157. While the conversation here may have been short, the
questions were not open-ended as the majority posits. Ante, 1 29.
The supervising officer repeatedly asked defendant if he had
anything to report, conveying the officer’s belief that there had
been slippage on defendant’s part. Then, defendant was con-
fronted with evidence of a new crime by the discovery of drilled
holes in defendant’s bedroom that looked into the adjoining unit.
Prior to that announced discovery, defendant said only that he had
“screwed up.” The confrontation of defendant with evidence sug-
gesting his guilt of a serious crime contributed significantly to the
coercive atmosphere. See, e.g., Hiew Tran, 2012 VT 104, 115
(concluding that “the content of the [detectives’] questioning
created a custodial atmosphere because throughout the interview
the detectives repeatedly confronted defendant with evidence of
his guilt”); Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 129 (finding it significant to
custody analysis that “during the interview defendant was accused
of committing a serious crime and confronted with evidence of his
guilt”). As explained in Muntean, a reasonable person confronted
with such evidence “would not feel at liberty to terminate a police
interview” because “a reasonable person understands that the
police ordinarily will not set free a suspect when there is evidence
strongly suggesting that the person is guilty of a serious crime.”
Id. § 28 (quotation omitted).

158. This leads to another important distinction between the
instant case and Murphy. The probationer in Murphy was free to
leave the probation interview. The Supreme Court emphasized
that Murphy was free to leave during the interview and did in fact
leave the interview without being arrested despite confessing to
rape and murder. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433, 434 n.5. This was a
significant part of the Court’s calculus. Unlike Murphy, defendant
was not free to leave the interview “by his . . . own free will” even
before he admitted drilling the holes and was handcuffed behind
his back. Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 1119; see also Howes, 565 U.S. at

509, 132 S. Ct. at 1189 (stating that one relevant factor in custody
analysis is “the release of the interviewee at the end of the
questioning”); Hiew Tran, 2012 VT 104, 115 (finding it significant
in custody analysis that officers repeatedly confronted defendant
with evidence of his guilt, communicated that defendant could be
arrested for a serious offense based on that evidence, and did in
fact arrest defendant at the close of the interview).

159. Again, defendant was not on probation. He was on
furlough. And, while his furlough status alone is not sufficient
basis to require a Miranda warning, see State u LeClaire, 2003
VT 4, 116, 175 Vt. 52, 819 A2d 719, the conditions of his furlough
are strong evidence that he was not free to leave when confronted
by his probation officer. In fact, he was directed to stay on his
couch, an action the supervising officer testified was a means of
putting a person on furlough “in custody” for safety purposes
while conducting a search. No reasonable person in defendant’s
position would have felt free to terminate the interview. Here,
“the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in
Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 182 S. Ct. at 1189-90.

160. Other courts have reached similar conclusions in cases that
involved alleged “parole interviews.” See Commonwealth u Cooley,
118 A.3d 370, 379-80 (Pa. 2015) (concluding that “no mere parole
interview” occurred where parolee was immediately handcuffed
after voluntarily appearing at parole office, accused of crimes for
which he was not on parole, “there was no ‘interview’ or dialogue
related to the conditions of his parole or parole violations,” he was
not told that he was not under arrest or that he was being
handcuffed pursuant to routine policy, but was instead informed
that he was being investigated for new crimes, and agents’
interrogation and search of parolee’s home “was unquestionably
aimed at crimes for which he was not on parole”); see also People
v Coleman, 2015 IL App (4th) 140730, 87 N.E.3d 360 (concluding
that parolee was subject to custodial interrogation where parole
officer was looking for parolee because of tips indicating parolee
had committed new crime, parolee was separated from other
people in house, parole agents were armed and parolee was
required to cooperate, and parolee was handcuffed and then
questioned about an independent crime).

161. The trial court’s reliance on State u Steinhour, 158 Vt.
299, 607 A.2d 888 (1992), was not misplaced. While in Steinhour

416 Le

the State sought to use the defendant’s admissions to marijuana
use from a probation interview in a violation of probation hearing
and not to support a separate criminal charge, the implication of
the holding in Steinkour for this case is not a leap. This Court
wrote: “if [the] defendant is guilty of conduct which is a violation
of probation, . . . his answers are relevant and may be used
against him in the revocation hearing. That is because defendant
is not being compelled to give statements to be used against him
in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 300, 607 A.2d at 889. The Court
noted that Steinhour had not been charged criminally with using
marijuana and that, if he had been, “a motion to suppress would
stand squarely in both the Fifth Amendment and Article 10.” Id.
at 301, 607 A.2d at 889. It then quoted from Minnesota u
Murphy:

“There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for
concluding that if the State, either expressly or by
implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would
lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege
would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would
be deemed compelled and inadmissible in @ criminal
prosecution.”

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435).

162. This Court supported the Steinkour analysis four years
later in State v Cate, 165 Vt. 404, 683 A.2d 1010 (1996). In Cate,
the defendant argued that the probation condition requiring him
to admit his guilt as part of sex-offender therapy should be
stricken because it violated his Fifth Amendment and Article 10
rights against self-incrimination. We adopted the reasoning of the
federal district court in Mace v. Amestoy, which held that when
an individual asserts the privilege against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment “ ‘privileges [a person] not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal,
formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in
future criminal proceedings . . . unless and until he is protected
at least against the use of his compelled answers?” 765 F. Supp.
847, 850 (D. Vt. 1991) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426). We held
that a person in a probation setting cannot be forced to incrimi-
nate himself without first receiving immunity from criminal pros-
ecution as a result thereof. Cate, 165 Vt. at 415, 683 A.2d at 1018.

163. The circumstances surrounding the second set of incrimi-
natory statements to the probation officer are even more indica-
tive of a custody status. I would not remand this question, but
rather conclude on these facts that defendant was subjected to
custodial interrogation while in the probation office. Defendant
was “arrested or detained” at his apartment and placed in
handcuffs. It is clear that defendant was not free to leave. See
LeClaire, 2003 VT 4, 116 (“To determine whether an individual is
in custody for Miranda purposes, the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (quota-
tion omitted)); see also Cooley, 118 A.3d at 379 (recognizing that
while the use of handcuffs is not dispositive of custody analysis, it
is “generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest”
(quotation omitted)). Even the State agreed below.

164. After the investigating police officer provided what the
trial court found were inadequate Miranda warnings at the home,
defendant was transported to the DOC office in restraints. He was
again interrogated by his supervising DOC officer and admitted
the holes in the wall had been made some three months earlier,
and that he had seen his minor female neighbor when she was
naked or wearing underwear. Defendant’s supervising DOC officer
made these further inquiries because he felt that he needed to
have full information in making a decision about whether to
release defendant. This excuse strains credulity. The confrontation
by the supervising officer occurred on April 8. One day later, on
April 4, defendant was arraigned on fourteen misdemeanors of
voyeurism and stalking. Defendant was not going to be released.

165. The police officer was told of defendant’s further remarks.
When the officer arrived at the DOC office, he did not inform
defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant then confirmed what
he had told his supervising officer. The court found the evidence
unclear as to whether defendant remained handcuffed at the DOC
office. The State concedes that defendant was not free to leave
during his conversation with his supervising DOC officer as “he
was being proc d to return to jail,’ but questions whether
defendant was wearing any kind of restraints at that point. Given
all of the indicia of custody, we do not need to discern if
defendant was actually wearing restraints during his conversation
with his supervising DOC officer. Any reasonable person under
these circumstances would understand that he or she is in

418 |

custody, and the circumstances here present all of the indicia of
coercion that Miranda warnings are designed to protect against.

166. The interview was custodial, defendant’s statements were
coerced, and they should not be admissible in the criminal
proceeding. I would affirm the trial court’s decision, and suppress
both sets of defendant’s statements.

167. I am authorized to state that Justice Robinson joins this
dissent.

2016 VT 112

In re Mark Jankowski
[157 A.3d 573)
No. 15-194

Present: Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ. and Bent, Supr. J.,
Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed October 14, 2016

cy

Al

20

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Petitioner-
Appellant.

Rosemary M. Kennedy, Rutland County State’s Attorney, and
lan C. Sullivan, Deputy State’s Attorney, Rutland, for Respondent-
Appellee.

11. Dooley, J. Petitioner appeals from a denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR). We hold that petitioner is entitled
to PCR to overturn his probation revocation. We remand for a
new determination regarding whether his probation should be
revoked and a new sentencing hearing if it is revoked.

12. In November 2010, petitioner pled guilty to sexual assault
on a child, and was sentenced to a term of five to twenty years,
all suspended except for three years to serve, and probation. He
was charged with violation of probation (VOP) in August 2011. A
VOP merits hearing was held in December 2011. Following a
contested evidentiary hearing, the court issued a written decision
finding that petitioner had violated a condition of his probation. At
the conclusion of its dec n, the court indicated that the matter
would be “set for a sentencing hearing.” At the sentencing hearing
on March 13, 2012, the court asked if it would be a contested
sentencing hearing, prompting counsel for the State and for

422, |

petitioner to ask for time to confer. Their request was granted.
Upon their return to court with petitioner, counsel informed the
court that the parties had reached an agreement. Petitioner’s
sentence would be amended from a_five-to-twenty-year split
sentence with three years to serve to a four-to-twenty-years
straight sentence to serve. His probation would be revoked. He
would also be given credit for all time served. Defense counsel
indicated that he had spoken with petitioner and stated that
petitioner had agreed with the resolution. The court accepted the
agreement.

13. In March 2013, petitioner filed a pro se PCR petition, and
later an amended petition through counsel, alleging that the VOP
sentencing process violated his constitutional rights. He asserted
that no sentencing hearing was held, he did not waive such
hearing, and he was never personally addressed by the court. The
PCR court granted summary judgment to the State. It concluded
that petitioner’s rights were satisfied when he was afforded a full
evidentiary hearing on the merits portion of the revocation
hearing. This appeal followed.

14. Petitioner reiterates his argument that he was deprived of
due process by the court’s failure to hold a hearing on the
sentencing portion of the VOP proceeding without a valid waiver.
Petitioner contends that Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1
codifies due process requirements established by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, and that the Court established that a probation
revocation hearing includes not only a hearing on the merits of
the violation, but also a hearing on whether revocation is war-
ranted.

15. We review the court’s decision de novo, using the same
standard as the trial court. In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, 16, 176 Vt.
322, 848 A.2d 281. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are
no disputes of material fact and any party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id.

16. We note at the outset the procedure by which a court may
revoke a defendant’s probation and impose the consequences of
revocation. Following the summons or arrest of a probationer who
has allegedly violated a condition or conditions of probation, a
court must hold an evidentiary hearing that includes notice to the
probationer, legal counsel if requested, and a record that estab-
lishes the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 28
VS.A. § 301; id. §302(a). This is the violation stage of the

proceeding. If a violation is established, the court may elect to
continue probation, modify conditions of probation, conference
with the probationer, issue a warning, or require the probationer
to remain on probation but serve a portion of her sentence. Id.
§ 304(b). The court may also, “in its discretion,” revoke probation
and order a probationer to serve the balance of her sentence in
prison or in the community. 7d. §304(a). Probation shall be
revoked only if the court finds, “on the basis of the original
offense and the intervening conduct of the probationer,’ that
confinement is necessary for public safety, the probationer needs
treatment that can be best provided in a correctional facility, or a
failure to revoke probation would “unduly depreciate the serious-
ness of the violation.” Jd. § 303(b). This is the disposition phase of
the proceeding.

17. Defendant has not challenged the court’s determination that
he violated one of the conditions of his probation or the process
by which the court reached that conclusion. The sole question is
whether the court erred in accepting an alleged agreement under
which defendant waived his right to contest whether his probation
should be revoked, waived his right to address the proper
sentence after revocation of probation, and waived his right to
appeal, all without the written or on-the-record-agreement of
defendant. The PCR court appeared to hold that once the court
finds defendant violated a condition of probation, defendant no
longer has any due process or rule-based procedural rights such
that his right to personal agreement with a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the right to contest probation revocation is
unnecessary. We disagree for three reasons.

18. [EM Firstly, the PCR court appeared to believe that
defendant’s due process rights vanished following the evidentiary
hearing on the alleged violation of a probation condition; in other
words, because the VOP court afforded defendant notice, an
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, and a chance to
present evidence during the violation stage of the probation
revocation proceeding, there was no corollary obligation to provide
any procedural rights thereafter. However, the procedural rights
afforded to a probationer to permit her to contest allegations of a
violation of probation extend from the initial charge through
revocation; a delineation between adjudication and probation re-
vocation has no basis in the law of probation — be it our criminal
rules, our precedent, federal s, or the law of our sister states.

424 |

Rather, the procedural rights afforded to a probationer are
available until the court rules that probation will be revoked.

19. HEME Albeit in the context of parole revocation, the due
process procedural requirements for revocation were first set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrissey x Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). In that case, the federal high court held that, following a
preliminary hearing, a parolee may request a revocation hearing
during which he “must have an opportunity to be heard and to
show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or if he did,
that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does
not warrant revocation.” Id. at 488 (emphasis added); see also
Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (concluding
Morrissey also applies to probation revocation proceedings). The
Morrissey Court recognized that the decision to revoke parole
typically involves two steps: the factual question, wherein a court
determines whether a parolee has “in fact acted in violation of one
or more conditions of his parole,” and the discretionary question,
which seeks to answer whether the parolee should be recommitted
to an institution or punished in some other fashion. Morrissey, 408
US. at 479-80. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the
second component was not so wholly a discretionary matter that
procedural guarantees were “administratively intolerable.” Jd. at
483. In particular, the Court noted that society has an interest in
rehabilitating parolees, and therefore an interest in preventing the
erroneous revocation of parole and in treating parolees with “basic
fairness” which supports the recognition of due process rights
throughout the proceedings. Jd. at 484. To that end, the Court
concluded that at a hearing to determine whether “the facts as
determined warrant revocation,” a court must, at a minimum,
provide written notice of the claimed violations, disclose all
evidence against the defendant, provide an opportunity to be
“heard in person” as well as present witnesses and evidence, allow
the defendant to confront adverse witnesses, preside over the case
through a neutral and detached hearing body, and finally, provide
a written statement articulating the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 488-89.

110. Hf In Black u Romano, the U.S. Supreme Court further
elaborated on Morrissey with respect to the coverage and extent
of the due process right. 471 U.S. 606 (1985). In Black, the trial
court revoked probation without expressly stating that it consid-
ered alternatives to revocation. The Court rejected the claim that

a °

due process required consideration of an alternative, but reiter-
ated the due process procedural protections of Morrissey and
their applicability at the revocation stage:

Where such discretion [with respect to revocation] exists,
however, the parolee or probationer is entitled to an
opportunity to show not only that he did not violate the
conditions, but also that there was a justifiable excuse for
any violation or that revocation is not the appropriate
disposition.

Id. at 612. The Court went on to hold that probationer received
the process that was due because he received “the necessary
written statement explaining the evidence relied upon and the
reason for the decision to revoke probation” and “he had a full
opportunity to present mitigating factors to the sentencing judge
and to propose alternatives to incarceration.” Id. at 616.

11. Hl The effect of the holdings in Morrissey, Gagnon, and
Black on probationer’s right to address whether probation should
be revoked after a finding of violation was directly resolved in
State uv Talton. 737 P.2d 409 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). In Talton, the
court held that under U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the proba-
tioner was constitutionally entitled to two hearings: one to deter-
mine whether there was a violation of a condition of probation and
one to determine whether probation should be revoked. Jd. at 411.
At the latter hearing, the probationer has the right to present
mitigating evidence to argue that probation should not be revoked.
Id. The mitigation can be part of an overall disposition hearing.
Id. Failure to allow the probationer to have a mitigation hearing
is a violation of due process that results in the reversal of a
revocation of probation. Id. at 412; see also State u Montoya, 596
P.2d 527, 529 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Brown uv United States, 900
A2d 184, 192-93 (D.C. 2006) (concluding probationer constitution-
ally entitled to mitigation evidence after finding of violation).

112. [HB Like the above courts, we cannot square the clear
directives from the U.S. Supreme Court with the PCR court’s
decision. Under the PCR court’s position, the probationer has no
right to address whether probation should be revoked by either
arguing against revocation or offering evidence or alternatives to
revocation. Although we recognize that we have held that a
probationer has no right of “allocution prior to the imposition of

426 |

sentence” in a probation proceeding, the PCR court’s position is
nonetheless directly contradictory to the plain language of both
Morrissey and Black. See State v Germaine, 152 Vt. 106, 107, 564
A2d 604, 605 (1989); V.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(1)(C). Under both Morrissey
and Black, there is no distinction between the process due with
respect to an adjudication that a violation has occurred and the
process due with respect to the revocation decision.

1113. I Before closing on this point, we must address V.R.CrP.
32.1, the criminal rule on probation revocation. The rule is based
on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 which in turn was
adopted to implement Morrissey and Gagnon. See Advisory
Committee Notes — 1979 Amendment, F.R.Cr.P. 32.1. The appli-
cable part of the federal rule governing “a final revocation
hearing” covers “whether the probationer has, in fact, violated the
conditions of his probation and whether his probation should be
revoked.” Advisory Committee Notes — 1979 Amendment,
F.R.Cr.P. 32.1(a)(2) (emphasis added). The rule is titled “Revoca-
tion Hearing” and contained no procedural requirements with
respect to the imposition of a sentence after a revocation decision
is made.' The key section of the Vermont rule, V.R.Cr.P. 32.1(a)2),
is similarly headed “Revocation Hearing” and there is no indica-
tion that it deviates from the federal rule by applying procedural
rights only to the violation determination.

114. Based on the above discussion, we conclude that proba-
tioner undoubtedly had due process rights with respect to the
revocation decision. This does not mean, however, that probationer
is entitled to relief. We must determine whether probationer
validly waived his due process rights. The dispositive question is
whether the waiver of the right to contest revocation, the agree-
ment to a sentence, and the waiver of the right to appeal could be
effective without defendant’s explicit consent.

115. In his brief to this Court, defendant argues that
although he was present in court, no hearing was actually held;
defendant’s counsel and the attorney for the State informed the
court, after a brief consultation, that an agreement had been

*Tt now contains an explicit procedure for allocution after a number of federal
courts held that a right of allocution was required by due process. See Advisory
Committee Notes — 2005 Amendments, F.R.Cr.P. 32.1(b). As we indicated in the
text, we do not view the revocation stage as involving allocution so we are not
relying on the decisions on which the federal amendment. was based.

a “

reached and, consequently, defendant’s probation was revoked and
he lost any right to appeal the decision. Defendant contends that
because he was never addressed by the court and never spoke
during the proceeding, he “could not have waived his right” to
contest the revocation of his probation. We need not decide
whether a waiver can ever be deemed knowing and voluntary
pursuant to the totality of the circumstances test if the defendant
does not personally acknowledge the waiver in court because we
conclude that in this case there is insufficient evidence to support
the conclusion that defendant made a knowing and voluntary
waiver.

116. HM In neglecting to address defendant personally and
inquire as to whether he consented to the agreement proposed by
the attorneys, the court permitted defendant’s attorney to assume
a responsibility properly belonging to his client. State u Duffy is
controlling on this point. 151 Vt. 473, 562 A.2d 1036 (1989). In that
case, during a violation of probation hearing, the defendant and
the trial court engaged in a colloquy, during which the defendant,
notwithstanding the court’s willingness to “give him one more
chance” to comply with conditions, asked to serve the balance of
his remaining sentence. Jd. at 475, 562 A.2d at 1037. The trial
court accordingly revoked his probation and imposed the remain-
der of the previously suspended sentence. On appeal, the defend-
ant argued that by “allowing [the] defendant to speak for himself
at the probation hearing,” the trial court granted an invalid waiver
of counsel. Id. at 474, 562 A.2d at 1037. We disagreed, reasoning
that:

The problem with [the] defendant’s argument here is
that it confuses the role of the client with that of the
lawyer. We have recognized the authority of a lawyer to
act for a client and to control the procedural aspects of
his client's case without his client’s express consent.
While the lawyer can control procedural matters, the
client has control over the subject matter of litigation.
Thus, it is the client, and not the lawyer, that must
decide whether to settle and on what terms. In a
criminal case, it is for the client to decide what plea
should be entered.

Id. at 479, 562 A.2d at 1039 (quotations and citations omitted); see
also Strickland «x Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting

that attorney must function as “assistant to the defendant” with a
duty to “consult with the defendant on important decisions”).

117. HI Under Duffy, the decision whether to waive proba-
tioner’s due process right to contest revocation belongs to the
client and not the lawyer. In this case, the waiver was done by
probationer’s lawyer, not the probationer, but the lawyer was
ostensibly speaking for the client and within the hearing of the
client.

118. MB Although this is an issue of first impression in
Vermont, case law from the federal courts and our sister states is
clear that waivers of the right to revocation hearings or to
generally contest charges of violation of probation must come
from ja probationer and must be knowing, voluntary, and intelli-
gent”

119. Hersch uw State is instructive here. 562 A.2d 1254 (Md.
1989). In Hersch, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered two
cases that asked the court to determine whether an admission of
violation and probation can be knowing and voluntary where a
charge is not explained to a probationer, he “does not personally
address the court,” and the record is devoid of any evidence that
he understands his due process right to contest the charges. Id.
at 1256. In the first case, during the adjudicatory portion of a
violation hearing, the court asked if the defendant admitted or
denied the allegations and the defendant’s attorney responded:
“He admits, Your Honor.’ Jd. at 1255. Following remarks from
both attorneys on disposition and a brief allocution by the
defendant as to his drug addiction, the court reimposed the
original prison sentence. In the second case, during a bond
hearing in connection with a defendant’s detention for an alleged
probation violation, his attorney stated they “would enter an initial
plea of guilty” to an amended count and admitted that his client
had not obeyed all laws during his probation. Jd. After both
attorneys made arguments regarding sentencing and the defend-
ant made a statement about his problems with drugs, the court
imposed the initial sentence. Id. at 1256.

120. The Maryland appellate court reversed. The court noted
that while there are rights that “may be waived by the action or

® As stated in 15, we are not deciding in this case whether the defendant must
personally agree to a waiver on the record. Our holding is that whether or not a
personal on-the-record waiver is required, the waiver in this case is inadequate.

a °

inaction of counsel,” there remain “certain fundamental rights that
can be waived only where the record affirmatively discloses a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of the right by
the defendant himself.” Jd. The court acknowledged that admitting
a violation of probation is not the “legal equivalent” of a guilty
plea in a criminal case; nevertheless, it noted that the rights
surrendered when a probationer admits a violation are “substan-
tial.” Id. at 1256-57. The court concluded that fundamental fairness
required, if the right to contest violations of probation is waived,
“the record must show that ‘the charge was explained to the
probationer in understandable terms and that his responses
demonstrated that his actions were knowing and voluntary?” Id.
at 1258 (quoting Howlett u State, 456 A.2d 375, 380 (Md. 1988)).
The court noted that its approach found “substantial support in
other jurisdictions,” and cited cases from Michigan, Arizona,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois affirming that fundamental fairness
requires that a probationer “personally admit violation of proba-
tion on the record” as well as that he knows and comprehends the
due process rights he is about to waive. Id. at 1259 (quoting
People vu Allen, 248 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976));
accord United States vu LeBlanc, 175 F.8d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that waiver of right to revocation hearing under F.R.Cr.P.
32.1 and Morrissey “must be knowing and voluntary”); United
States u Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 68 n.9 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding
that while due process does not require formal waiver in probation
revocation context, defendant’s waiver of Rule 32.1 rights “must
actually be knowing and voluntary”), United States x Stocks, 104
F.3d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding waiver of Rule 32.1 rights
must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary).

121. I We recognize that the knowing and intelligent: waiver
cases involved a waiver of the right to contest whether there had
been a violation of a probation condition, as well as a waiver of
the right to contest revocation based on the violation. We can find
no precedents that address the exact facts of our case, where the
waiver is only of the right to contest revocation. We see no reason
for this distinction to dictate a difference in result. The constitu-
tional basis for the underlying right is derived from the same U.S.
Supreme Court precedents. We therefore hold that the waiver of
the right to contest revocation and offer arguments and evidence
in mitigation must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

430 |

122. HM There is another form of waiver in this case that adds
weight to the requirement that it be knowing and intelligent. The
accord between the State and defendant’s counsel contained a
promise by defendant not to appeal or question the trial court’s
determinations regarding the VOPs. We note at the outset that
the choice to take — or not take — an appeal is a “fundamental
decision[ |” regarding a case that a defendant “has the ultimate
authority to make.” Jones u Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983);
accord State v Tribble, 2012 VT 105, 154, 198 Vt. 194, 67 A.3d 210
(noting that some decisions “‘are so important that an attorney
must seek the client’s consent in order to waive the right’”
(quoting Gonzalez x United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250 (2008)). As
this Court has noted before, such fundamental rights cannot be so
easily discarded, absent a statement from defendant. See State v
Machia, 155 Vt. 192, 200, 585 A.2d 556, 560 (1990) (Dooley, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority opinion permitting defense
counsel’s stipulation to eleven-member jury on basis of defendant’s
implied consent and stating that because defendant “did not
personally waive his right to a twelve-person jury, the waiver was
constitutionally defective”).

123. We note that the waiver of appeal rights contravenes our
holding in State u Buck, 139 Vt. 310, 428 A.2d 1090 (1981) In
Buck, partially as “the result of an ‘agreement’ between the
defendant and the State,” the defendant was placed on probation
provided he accepted “definite restrictions upon the issues which
[he] could raise before [this Court] in the event of an appeal.” /d.
at 314, 428 A2d at 1093. We reversed, holding that we could
“neither condone nor enforce such a condition,” as the right of
appeal for criminal defendants is “conferred absolutely by statute”
and “its restriction or prohibition as a condition of sentence
deferment or probation cannot be reconciled with that statute.” Id.
at 314-15, 428 A2d at 1093 (citing 13 V.S.A. § 7401). The restric-
tion in the instant case is even more broad than that in Buck;
rather than limiting defendant to appealing only particular issues,

® We noted that the holding in Buck was dicta in State x Hance, 157 Vt. 222, 224,
596 A.2d 365, 366 (1991), but ultimately distinguished the holding on the waiver of
the right of appeal. Whether the waiver of the right to appeal the VOP holding
was valid is relatively unimportant in this case where defendant does not challenge
that holding. The point is that a waiver of an important right of defendant. was
accepted with no confirmation that defendant agreed to waive that right and no
assurance that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.

the provision would preclude defendant from engaging in “any
further activity, legal or otherwise” that seeks to appeal or
question the court’s determination as to the VOPs.

124. With the above standards in mind, what occurred here
cannot pass constitutional muster. The sentencing hearing in this
case lasted only ten minutes; seven of those were spent in a
recess, during which the attorneys — who had not previously
spoken — communicated about whether or not the hearing would
be contested. Following the recess, the state’s attorney described
the agreement: the parties consented to revocation of probation
with a four-to-twenty-year sentence to be imposed, with credit for
all previous time served and agreed not to appeal or question the
trial court’s determinations regarding the VOPs. When prompted
by the court, defendant’s attorney said only that he had “talked
about this proposal with [his] client, we feel that it is agreeable.”
Not only does the transcript bear little evidence that the attorney
“fully advised defendant of his options” and informed him of all
relevant considerations as to the revocation agreement — a
seemingly impossible task, as the recess was only seven minutes,
much of which was spent in conversation with the state’s attorney
— but it reveals defendant never said a word, and so did not
communicate to the court the content of a decision that was his
alone to make.* Duffy, 151 Vt. at 479, 562 A.2d at 1039.

125. The absolute invisibility of defendant in the record high-
lights the contrast between this case and those published decisions
cited by the dissent, where even if a trial court did not specifically
inform a probationer of his rights and no explicit waiver was
made, the probationer nonetheless had an opportunity to address
the court. See State v Sellers, 649 S.E.2d 656, 657 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (“Defendant then addressed the court, admitted that he uses
drugs, and apologized for ‘whatever I did in Structured Day
Program, ”); People v. Dale, 112 Cal. Rptr. 98, 94 (Ct. App. 1973)
(“Appellant personally sought to convince the trial court that he
should be recommitted to the California Rehabilitation Center.”).

*The uncertainty surrounding the degree to which defendant encouraged or even
acquiesced to his attorney’s assent belies the dissent’s assertion that Duffy cannot
control on the ground that Duffy merely resolved who may make the decision, not
how that decision must be communicated to the trial court. Post, 1 35. Where there
is little to no evidence in the record that defendant was solely responsible for this
crucial decision, we must err on the side of safeguarding the distinct roles of
lawyer and client.

Here, the trial court never addressed defendant personally with
respect to the waiver and never made a determination that it was
knowingly and intelligently made, an inquiry that was particularly
warranted given the haste with which the “agreement” was put
together.

126. Whether or not an on-the-record colloquy is required, the
totality of the circumstances must nonetheless demonstrate that.
the waiver was knowing and voluntary, the basis of our decision
here. See Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 68 n.9 (noting court’s holding
“{did] not address the situation where there is independent
evidence in the record suggesting” admission and waiver of a
hearing or attendant rights “was not knowing and voluntary — a
situation that does not exist in the instant case.”); United States
uv Melton, 782 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding defend-
ant’s claim “fails under the totality of the circumstances standard”
where there was record evidence that defendant reviewed super-
vised release violation report, “discussed it with his attorney and
confirmed with the magistrate judge that he understood the
report and still intended to admit to the violations,” where judge
“informed Defendant of the rights he would be waiving” and
where judge “conducted a very thorough colloquy before it
accepted Defendant’s admission” (quotations omitted)); United
States x Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding
waiver of right to counsel knowing and voluntary where defendant
“expressed not only an understanding of the purpose and possible
repercussions of the hearing” but “specifically noted that the facts
alleged against him constituted a class B violation,” defendant was
warned by court and his counsel of dangers of self-representation,
court explained to defendant his rights relating to hearing, and
court allowed defendant to consult with former counsel throughout
hearing and transcript “indicates several points at which [defend-
ant] did in fact consult with his former counsel”); United States uv
Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding only that
Boykin and Rule 11 protections do not apply to probation
revocation hearings without engaging in totality of imstances
argument, as defendant did not argue plea was unintelligent and
unknowing).

127. We conclude that, given the brevity of the hearing as a
whole, and the conference between the attorneys in particular,
combined with the fact that defendant never spoke or was
addressed by the court, the totality of the circumstances does not

show that the waiver was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. See
United States u Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2003)
(determining no evidence to show defendant’s waiver was knowing
and voluntary where defendant “said very little over the course of
the hearing,” exchanges between court and defense counsel “did
little to clarify matters,” and “the record does not reflect either
that the court advised [defendant] of his rights or that counsel
reviewed those rights with him”).

128. HM This leads us to our final consideration. That there
was ever an “agreement” in the first place as to disposition
highlights the fact that, ultimately, this was not a revocation
hearing but an agreement on an illegal new sentence, outside of
the reconsideration period and in contravention of 28 V.S.A. § 304.
When defendant initially pled guilty in 2010, he was sentenced to
a term of five-to-twenty years, all suspended except for three
years. Following the March 13, 2012, hearing, pursuant to the
aforementioned agreement between the attorneys, the court
amended defendant’s sentence to a term of four-to-twenty years to
serve, with credit for time already served. Setting aside the fact
that the court never asked defendant whether he agreed and
never ensured the waiver was knowing and intelligent, the VOP
court had no authority to impose a different sentence. Under
§ 304, the Legislature has identified the specific options available
to a court following the establishment of a violation of a probation
condition. The court has discretion to “revoke probation and
require the probationer to serve the sentence which was sus-
pended or order that the sentence be served in the community.”
28 VS.A. §304(a). Or, instead of probation revocation, a court
may: (1) continue probationer on her existing sentence, (2) put in
place “necessary or desirable changes or enlargements in the
conditions of probation,” (8) hold a conference with probationer in
order to emphasize compliance with probation conditions, (4) issue
a warning that probation may be revoked in case of further
violations, or (5) continue probationer’s existing sentence and
require probationer to serve a portion of his sentence. 28 V.S.A.
§ 804(b).

129. HM The fact that the parties agreed to the sentence —
itself a questionable proposition, given the above analysis — is
irrelevant. The court derives its sentencing authority from the
Legislature, which chose to afford judges discretion under § 304 to

434 |

select among the enumerated options. Nowhere in the statute is
it indicated that a judge may fashion an entirely new sentence.

130. HI HB Stote wv Pratt fully resolves this issue. 173 Vt.
562, 795 A.2d 1148 (2002) (mem.). In Pratt, we considered two
cases consolidated on appeal where the superior court had read
§ 304 in conjunction with 28 V.S.A. § 205(a), which provides for
courts to suspend all or part of a sentence “{alfter passing
sentence” to conclude that trial courts are permitted to impose
split-sentences for probation violations. We reversed, holding:

[Clourts have no authority to suspend a sentence or
impose a sentence contrary to that authorized by the
Legislature. In looking at the legislative authorization, we
must use familiar rules of statutory construction. Our
principal goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legisla-
ture. If the legislative intent is clear from the plain
meaning of the language chosen, we enforce the statute
according to its terms. If different sections of statutes
were drafted as part of an overall statutory scheme, we
must read and construe them together.

In State v Therrien, 140 Vt. 625, 627-28, 442 A.2d 1299,
1301 (1982), we described the options available under
§ 304 as “to revoke probation and require the original
sentence to be served, continue probation, or alter the
conditions of probation.” This list of options comports
with the plain meaning of the language used by the
Legislature. The options do not include the one at-
tempted to be exercised here, revocation of probation and
imposition of a different sentence from that imposed
originally.

We do not reach a different conclusion when we read
§ 304 together with 28 V.S.A. § 205(a). Section 205(a)
provides that “{alfter passing sentence, a court may
suspend all or part of the sentence” and place the
defendant on probation. We held in Therrien that the
sentence is “passed” when it is originally imposed and
suspended, not when the court requires that it be served
upon revocation of probation. Except where there is a
specific legislative authorization, a court cannot modify a
sentence once the defendant has commenced to serve it.

Pratt, 173 Vt. at 564, 795 A2d at 1150 (citations omitted).

131. In summary, defendant had a right to be heard and to
contest the State’s position on whether his probation should be
revoked. The trial court held that he waived that right because of
an agreement consented to only by his lawyer even though the
decision whether to contest revocation must be made by proba-
tioner personally. As a result, there is no indication in the record
that defendant’s waiver, even if agreed to by him, is knowing and
intelligent. Moreover, the court acted outside of its authority
under § 304 in fashioning his sentence. Accordingly, we hold that
defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief to overturn his
probation revocation and remand for a new determination on
whether his probation should be revoked and a new sentencing
hearing if it is revoked.

Reversed and remanded.

132. Bent, Supr. J., Specially Assigned, concurring and dissent-
ing. I concur in the majority’s holding that this Court looks to the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant’s
waiver of due process rights in a probation revocation proceeding
was knowing and voluntary. In so holding, the majority expressly
declines to address defendant’s claim that a knowing and volun-
tary waiver requires an in-court personal waiver by the defendant.
I agree with this decision as well.

133. I write separately for two reasons. First, despite the
majority's express reservation of the question of whether a
personal in-court waiver is required, its decision can easily be
read to suggest otherwise. Three statements in the majority
opinion, in particular, require clarification. First, the majority
states: “The dispositive question is whether the waiver of the
right to contest revocation, the agreement to a sentence, and the
waiver of the right to appeal could be effective without defendant’s
explicit consent.” Ante, 1 14 (emphasis added). Plainly, that is not
the question that determines how this appeal should be decided
inasmuch as the majority states in the very next paragraph that
we “need not decide whether a waiver can ever be deemed
knowing and voluntary .. . if the defendant does not personally
acknowledge the waiver in court.” Ante, 1 15.

134. Second, the majority states: “In neglecting to address
defendant personally and inquire as to whether he consented to
the agreement proposed by the attorneys, the court permitted

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defendant’s attorney to assume a responsibility properly belonging
to his client. State x Duffy is controlling on this point. 151 Vt.
478, 562 A2d 1036 (1989).” Ante, 1 16. Duffy holds that the
decision to contest a revocation of probation is personal to the
defendant. It does not hold that a defendant must personally
waive the right in open court. The majority is therefore incorrect
in stating that, by failing to “address defendant personally and
inquire as to whether he consented to the agreement” the court
contravened the holding in Duffy. This is important to understand
because, if Duffy actually required that the trial court personally
address the defendant to inquire as to whether he or she
consented to the waiver, then the majority’s reservation of the
question whether “the defendant must personally agree to a
waiver on the record,” ante, 1 18 n.2, would be meaningless.

135. Third, the majority’s reliance on Hersch u State, 562 A.2d
1254 (Md. 1989), as “instructive here” is unnecessary and mis-
placed. Ante, 1 19. First, that decision involved two consolidated
appeals where, in each case, the defendant’s attorney admitted a
charged probation violation without giving any indication that the
attorney had consulted with the defendant or that the defendant
agreed with the admission. The facts here, as discussed below, are
entirely distinguishable. More important, the Hersch court con-
cluded that the waivers were ineffective because neither of the
defendants had “personally admitted” the violations charged and
“personally advised” the court that he wished to waive a contested
hearing and admit the charge. Hersch, 562 A.2d at 1259. Given the
majority’s express reservation of the question whether a personal
on-the-record waiver by the defendant is required, Hersch is not,
in fact, instructive for our purposes here.

136. Second, I disagree with the majority’s application of the
totality-of-the-circumstances test in this case. Although relatively
sparse, the record is sufficient to demonstrate that defendant’s
waiver of a contested sentencing hearing was knowing and volun-
tary. At the scheduled hearing, defendant was present in court
when the prosecutor explained to the trial court that the parties
had formulated an agreement which provided for a stipulation to
a revocation of probation, a reduction in sentence, and credit. for
all time served. The net effect was to move defendant to within
several months of his new minimum sentence. This was plainly a
favorable outcome for defendant. Defendant’s attorney then affir-
matively represented to the court that counsel had “talked about

this proposal with my client, we feel that it is agreeable.” Counsel
thereupon outlined the total credit for time served that defendant
would receive under the agreement. At no point during this
discussion did defendant, who had a lengthy criminal history
which included a prior revocation of probation, raise any objection
to the agreement. Indeed, apart from his general claim that a
knowing and voluntary waiver requires a personal, in-court waiver
by the defendant, defendant here has not claimed that his waiver
was involuntary or unknowing, or that he was somehow prejudiced
by the agreement. In none of his pleadings has defendant
asserted that his attorney misrepresented to the court the fact
that defendant was agreeable to the stipulation, or the terms of
the agreement.

137. In these circumstances, there is ample reason and good
authority to conclude that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.
See, eg. United States v Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Cir.
2005) (upholding waiver of contested revocation hearing where
defense counsel “explicitly stated, in [defendant’s] presence, that
[defendant] admitted to” the violations, defendant did not object
to the assertion, and it was clear from the totality of the
circumstances that the waiver was knowing and voluntary); United
States wu Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.8d 181, 183, 184 (1st Cir. 2004)
(rejecting defendant’s claim that there was “no proper waiver of
his right to a hearing to contest the charges” where defense
counsel informed court that defendant admitted probation violation
charge, noting that the defendant was present when counsel
waived the hearing and had raised no protest, that defendant was
“not a novice” in such matters, and that defendant had not.
“identified . . . anything that he misunderstood”); United States v
Taylor, TAT F.3d 516, 518, 519 (8th Cir. 2014) (upholding waiver of
contested revocation where defense counsel, with defendant pres-
ent, “informed the court that his client admitted all the charged
violations” of his supervised release, and rejecting defendant’s
claim that “a personal colloquy was required” to ensure that
waiver was knowing and voluntary); People u DeGarmo, No.
A128716, 2011 WL 1885259, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 2011)
(relying on People vx Dale, 112 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App. 1973), for
proposition that “{iIn the context of a revocation of probation, a
defendant can waive the formal requirements of notice and a
hearing and admit a probation violation through the conduct of his
attorney and his own silence”); State vu. Sellers, 649 S.E.2d 656,

438 Le

657 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s claim that court
violated his due process rights when it “relied on the assertions of
his counsel and failed to make an adequate personal inquiry
regarding his waiver and admissions,” holding that due process
does not require “that the trial court personally examine a
defendant regarding his admission that he violated his probation”).
Accordingly, I would affirm that portion of the judgment uphold-
ing the validity of the waiver.

138. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this

concurrence and dissent.

2016 VT 114

In re B&M Realty, LLC
[158 A.3d 754]
No. 15-454

Present: Reiber, C.J., Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ, and Teachout,
Supr. J., Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed October 21, 2016

Ea
=

441

Robert E. Woolmington of Witten, Woolmington, Campbell &
Bernal, P-C., Manchester Center, for Appellant Two Rivers-
Ottauquechee Regional Commission.

Bridget C. Asay, Solicitor General, and Elizabeth M. Tisher,
Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Appellant Natural
Resources Board.

David K. Mears, Environmental and Natural Resources Law
Clinic, South Royalton, for Amici Curiae Vermont Natural Re-
sources Council and Preservation Trust of Vermont.

Nathan H. Stearns of Hershenson, Carter, Scott & McGee, PC.,
Norwich, for Amici Curiae Bennington County Regional Commis-
sion, Central Vermont Regional Planning Commission, Northwest
Regional Planning Commission, Southern Windsor County Re-
gional Planning Commission, and Windham Regional Commission.

Paul S. Gillies of Tarrant, Gillies & Richardson, Montpelier,
for Cross-Appellant B&M Realty, LLC.

11. Robinson, J. Appellants Natural Resources Board and Two
Rivers-Ottauquechee (TRO) Regional Commission appeal the En-
vironmental Division’s award of an Act 250 permit to applicant

442 |

B&M Realty, LLC, to construct a large mixed-use business park
near the Interstate 89 Exit 1 interchange in the Town of
Hartford. The trial court concluded that the project satisfied Act
250, including the requirement that it conform with the 2007 TRO
Regional Plan. The Natural Resources Board and the TRO
Regional Commission appeal, arguing that the project is inconsis-
tent with mandatory and unambiguous provisions in the regional
plan. Applicant cross-appeals, asserting that the 2007 Regional
Plan does not apply, and that the Court need not consider the
plan because the proposed development will not have substantial
regional impact. We conclude that the 2007 Regional Plan applies
and that the trial court’s conclusion that the project will have
substantial regional impact is supported by the evidence, but hold
that the project is inconsistent with several provisions in the
regional plan. We accordingly reverse.

1. Overview of Land Use Planning in Vermont

12. The Vermont Planning and Development Act, 24 V.S.A.
ch. 117, governs municipal and regional planning in Vermont. The
Act is intended to “encourage the appropriate development” of
state lands by providing for a “coordinated, comprehensive plan-
ning process and policy framework” to guide decisions by munici-
palities, regional planning commissions, and state agencies. 24
VS.A. § 4302(a), (b)(1). To that end, the Act provides for municipal
planning commissions, id. § 4321 et seq., and creation of regional
planning commissions by the act of voters or municipal legislative
bodies, subject to state approval. Id. § 4341. The regional com-
issions are composed of at least one representative appointed
from each member municipality. Jd. § 4842. Those commissions are
charged with, among other things, preparing regional plans con-
sistent with the general goals of the Planning and Development
Act articulated in § 4302. Id. § 4345a(5).

13. These broad land-use goals established by the Legislature
include “maintain[ing] the historic settlement pattern of compact
village and urban centers separated by rural countryside,” dis-
couraging “strip development along highways,” and encouraging
economic growth “in locally designated growth areas,” or in “exist-
ing village and urban centers, or both.” Id. § 4302(c)(1)(A)-(B). In
addition to serving these goals, regional plans must identify land
uses within each region that will further the region-specific goals

set forth in § 4347. Plans should also be “compatible with ap-
proved municipal and adjoining regional plans.” Id. § 4345a(5).

14. Regional plans provide a comprehensive framework for
regional development. They must include, among other elements,
“{a] statement of basic policies of the region to guide the future
growth and development of land and of public services and
facilities, and to protect the environment” as well as a “map and
statement of present and prospective land uses.” Id. § 4348a(1)-(2).
Plans must also discuss regional energy needs, transportation
issues, utility issues, and numerous other regional issues. Id.
§ 4848a(3)-(9). In this way, the plans serve to “guidfe] and
accomplish[ ] a coordinated, efficient and economic development of
the region” that will “best promote the health, safety, order,
convenience, prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants as well as
efficiency and economy in the process of development.” Id. § 4347.

15. The Act calls for “widespread citizen involvement” in the
regional planning process. Id. § 4345a(5)(A). At the outset of the
planning process and throughout the process, regional planning
commissions are required to “solicit the participation of local
citizens and organizations by holding informal working sessions
that suit the needs of local people.” Jd. § 4348(a). The commissions
must solicit comments from a range of identified stakeholders, and
hold two or more public hearings within the regions on any
proposed plans or amendments. Id. § 4348(b), (¢). At least 60% of
a region’s commissioners representing municipalities must vote to
adopt a regional plan before it can take effect. Id. § 4348(f).

16. In furtherance of the Legislature’s goal of a coordinated
state planning process, both municipal plans and regional plans
are made enforceable through Act 250. Thus, applicants who seek
Act 250 permits must show that their projects are “in confor-
mance with any duly adopted local or regional plan.” 10 V.S.A.
§ 6086(a)(10). Regional planning com ions must assist district
environmental commissions in assessing whether a project com-
plies with a regional plan. 24 V.S.A. § 4345a(13). A regional plan’s
provisions will apply in Act 250 proceedings “to the extent that
they are not in conflict with the provisions of a duly adopted
municipal plan.” Id. § 4348(h)(1). If a conflict exists, the regional
plan will be given effect if the project “would have a substantial
regional impact.” Id. § 4348(h)(2).

444 |

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

17. Applicant owns three separately deeded lots covering 167.7
acres in Hartford. The property is located between U.S. Route 4
and Old Quechee Road near the north and southbound I-89 exit
ramps. It is two miles away from Quechee Village and Quechee
Gorge and five miles from White River Junction. The property is
mostly undeveloped, although it presently contains a single-family
dwelling and a 2433-square-foot commercial building. There are
miscellaneous scattered businesses south of the property on U.S.
Route 4, including a former real estate office and a country store
with an upstairs apartment. There is a convenience store/gas
station adjacent to U.S. Route 4 opposite the I-89 southbound
ramp and U.S. Route 4 intersection.

18. Applicant proposes a development project designed as a
mixed-use business park with office, retail, restaurant and resi-
dential uses to proceed in three phases. Phase 1 of the project
contemplates a clustered mixed-use development encompassing
more than 115,000 square feet of new construction on approxi-
mately 15.5 acres. The first construction cycle consists of 18,142
square feet of office space, 18,142 square feet of retail space, and
a 5,667 square foot restaurant. The second cycle consists of 15,110
additional square feet of office space and 15,110 additional square
feet of retail space, and nine residential units. The final construc-
tion cycle of phase 1 consists of 33,000 square feet of office space.
Phase 2 consists of fifty residential units. The phase 1 buildout
includes approximately 2700 linear feet of internal roadway de-
signed more or less as a loop, and the proposal contemplates a
“center” that would mimic a small version of Church Street
Marketplace in Burlington, Vermont.

19. In July 2005, applicant and then-landowners David and
Ernest Punt sought to rezone portions of the Punt property and
create a new zoning district, the Quechee Interstate Interchange
(QID. The municipal planning commission approved the zoning
amendment in September 2005. In 2006, applicant presented a
sketch plan to the municipal planning commission for the
“Quechee Highlands Project.”

110. The regional plan in effect at that time, the 2003 TRO
Regional Plan, did not address the Town of Hartford because the
Town joined the TRO Regional Commission in 2004, after the 2003
Regional Plan went into effect. In 2007, the TRO Regional

Commission replaced the 2003 Regional Plan with the 2007 TRO
Regional Plan, which did specifically address Hartford.

111. In May 2012, applicant sought zoning permits for its
project from the Hartford Planning Commission. Applicant indi-
cated its intent to develop approximately 120,000 square feet of
commercial space and 10,000 square feet of residential space on
its property. The planning commission approved the project in
October 2012. Then, in December 2012, applicant sought an Act
250 permit. The district environmental commission unanimously
denied its request, concluding, among other things, that the
project failed to conform with the 2007 Regional Plan.

112. Applicant appealed to the Environmental Division of the
Superior Court. Applicant first moved for partial summary judg-
ment, asking the court to rule that the 2003 Regional Plan
governed its Act 250 application. Applicant offered two grounds.
First, it argued that its right to Act 250 review of its project
pursuant to the then-existing regional plan vested in 2005 when it
sought to amend local zoning bylaws. Alternatively, applicant
asserted that its rights vested in 2006 when it shared a sketch
plan with the municipal planning commission. The court rejected
these arguments and concluded that applicant’s rights vested in
2012 when applicant sought local zoning permits for its project.
The court therefore conducted its Act 250 review under the 2007
Regional Plan.

113. Following a merits hearing, the court determined that the
project complied with Act 250. The court’s consideration of
Criterion 10 of Act 250 — whether the project is “in conformance
with any duly adopted local or regional plan,” 10 V.S.A.
§ 6086(a)(10) — is at the heart of this appeal.

114. The threshold question before the trial court was whether
a conflict existed between the municipal and regional plans, since,
in the event of a conflict, the regional plan may only be given
effect if the project would have a substantial regional impact. See
24 VS.A. § 4348(h). Finding a lack of evidence in the record on
the point, and noting that the applicant bears the burden of
showing that the provisions of the plan do not conflict, the court
assumed that a conflict existed between the municipal plan and
the 2007 Regional Plan.

115. The court then considered whether the project would have
a substantial regional impact. It first addressed applicant’s asser-
tions that by empowering regional commissions to define “sub-

4146 Le

stantial regional impact” without providing any specific standards,
the Legislature had unconstitutionally delegated unconstrained
discretion to the regional commissions. See id. § 4845a(17) (requir-
ing regional com ions, as part of regional plan, to “define a
substantial regional impact, as the term may be used with respect.
to its region”). The court concluded that the applicable statutes
collectively provide guidance to the regional planning commissions
and noted that “substantial regional impact” is necessarily a
region-specific concept best determined on a regional level. Ulti-
mately, it decided that it was unnecessary to decide the delegation
issue given its conclusion that applicant satisfied Criterion 10 in
any event.

116. The court also considered and rejected applicant’s argu-
ment that the TRO Regional Commission’s definition of “substan-
tial regional impact” did not provide a clear and applicable
standard. It explained that the 2007 Regional Plan defined “sub-
stantial regional impact” as any development that met one or
more of eight criteria, and the court found these criteria suffi-
ciently clear to prevent discriminatory application and to provide
adequate information to landowners. It was uncontested that the
project as proposed would exceed 20,000 square feet and would
require substantial capital improvements of a local or state
highway, and the court found that either of these facts would
meet one or more of the criteria in the 2007 Regional Plan.

117. Having concluded that the project must accordingly com-
ply with the 2007 Regional Plan, the court turned to the terms of
the regional plan, focusing on the following provisions:

Principal retail establishments must be located in Town
Centers, Designated Downtowns, or Designated Growth
Centers to minimize the blighting effects of sprawl and
strip-development along major highways and maintain
rural character.

[The] existing settlement pattern . . . providfes] a system
of centers both efficient and economical for the conduct
of business enterprise and for the provision of social and
community facilities and services. This pattern must be
protected and enhanced and is supported by state plan-
ning law.

Any development planned for interchange development
must be constructed to . . . discourage creation or

establishment of uses deemed more appropriate to re-
gional growth areas.

Major growth or investments must be channeled into or
adjacent to existing or planned settlement centers and to
areas where adequate public facilities and services are
available.

[The Exit 1] interchange is not an appropriate location
for a growth center.

118. The court considered each provision separately. It acknowl-
edged that the first provision — dealing with principal retail
establishments — contains mandatory language, but concluded
that it did not apply. The court construed the term “principal
retail establishment” to mean a project where retail was the chief,
leading, or most important use. It reasoned that the project did
not fall within this definition because less than 40,000 of 115,000
square feet of development would be devoted to retail space. The
court considered the next three provisions to be unenforceable
either as aspirational policy statements or because they failed to
provide adequate guidance or clear definitions of terms such as
“major growth or investments,” and “planned settlement area.”
The court concluded that these standards gave unfettered discre-
tion to the regional commission, and thus, could not be grounds
for denying a proposed development.

119. The court concluded that the final provision prohibiting a
“growth center” at Exit 1 was mandatory but inapplicable. It
explained that the plan designated two types of growth centers:
regional growth centers, “the traditional developed areas in the
region,” and designated growth centers, areas that a municipality
seeks to designate as growth centers based on a number of
criteria. The court noted that the project here was not located in
an area where traditional development had occurred and that no
party was seeking to have the project receive a growth center
designation. The court thus concluded that the project conformed
with the 2007 Regional Plan and that as long as applicant
complied with conditions to mitigate traffic concerns, the project
satisfied Act 250. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

448 |

III. Applicability of the TRO 2007 Regional Plan
A. Vested Rights

120. We reject applicant’s assertion on cross-appeal that the
2007 Regional Plan does not apply to its project. Applicant argues
that it “started the process of obtaining a zoning permit” in 2005
by seeking to amend the town’s zoning regulations, and it thereby
acquired a vested right to use the 2003 Regional Plan for any Act
250 permit it might seek in the future. According to applicant, it
diligently pursued its plans to develop its project after securing
the zoning change.

121. Applicant provides no legal support for its position, and we
find none. We agree with the trial court that this argument fails
as a matter of law. See Richart w Jackson, 171 Vt. 94, 97, 758
A2d 319, 321 (2000) (explaining that Supreme Court reviews
summary judgment ruling using same standard as trial court;
summary judgment appropriate when there are no genuine issues
of material fact and any party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law).

122. [HM As the trial court explained, Vermont follows the
“minority rule” that a party obtains a vested right in existing
regulations “as of the time when [a] proper [permit] application is
filed.” Smith wu Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140 Vt. 178, 181, 436
A2d 760, 761 (1981). The majority rule holds, by contrast, that
“rights vest only if an applicant has both received a permit and
substantially relied on it in commencing work, or can show that an
amendment was enacted to target its development.” In re Key-
stone Dex Corp., 2009 VT 13, 16, 186 Vt. 523, 973 A.2d 1179
(mem.) (citing Smith, 140 Vt. at 181, 436 A.2d at 761). Pursuant
to the minority rule this Court adopted, a party’s ability to rely
on a particular zoning regime vests sooner than it would under
the majority rule. We adopted this minority rule because we found
it more practical to administer, it provided greater certainty, and
it avoided extended litigation. Smith, 140 Vt. at 181-82, 436 A.2d
at 761. We made clear that parties do not have an “open-ended
right to ‘freeze’ the applicable regulatory requirements by propos-
ing a development with inadequate specificity.” Im re Ross, 151 Vt.
54, 56, 557 A2d 490, 491 (1989). Instead, a party must file a
complete permit application before any rights will vest. Id.
(concluding that applicant had no vested right in town plan in

Le 449
a
existence at time it filed incomplete application for Act 250
permit).

123. JPA request to amend a town’s zoning regulations is
not tantamount to filing a complete permit application for a
particular project. We rejected a similar argument in In re Taft
Corners Assocs., 171 Vt. 185, 758 A.2d 804 (2000). In that case, a
developer sought and received a municipal permit to subdivide
Jand in 1987. 7d. at 135, 758 A.2d at 805. In that application, the
developer represented that its anticipated development would
include mixed uses, retail and light industrial. 7d. Following the
subdivision permit, the developer made considerable investment in
pursuing its development plans. /d. at 135, 758 A.2d at 806. In
1997, the town adopted an interim zoning amendment that
changed the available uses in the area of the subdivided property.
Id. at 136, 758 A.2d at 806. The developer subsequently sought a
permit for a specific development, and argued that by virtue of
the subdivision permit, it had a vested right to rely on the zoning
regulations in effect at the time of that permit. Jd. This Court
rejected that argument, explaining:

We have no doubt that a subdivision application creates
a vested right that the subdivision permit be evaluated
under the regulatory law in effect at the time of the
application. That is the holding of [Smith u Winhall], and
it is not under debate in this case. What [the developer]
seeks, however, is a vested right that a separate zoning
permit will be evaluated under the regulatory law in
effect at the time of the application for the subdivision
permit, and not that in effect at the time of the zoning
permit application. We can understand this position if the
legality of the act of dividing the parcel of land neces-
sarily depends upon a specific provision of the zoning
ordinance, and that zoning ordinance provision was
amended before the zoning permit was sought. Thus, if
the developer in Smith had been awarded a subdivision
permit despite the fact that his lots were undersized, but
had been denied a zoning permit because of the size of
the lots, he should have had a vested right to the zoning
permit provided he met all other zoning require-
ments. . . . Beyond this narrow circumstance, however,
we believe [the developer’s] position represents an un-

450 |

warranted and unprecedented expansion of our vested
rights jurisprudence. See L.M. Everhart Constr, Inc. uv
Jefferson Cty. Planning Comm’n, 2 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir.
1993) (“no court . . . has adopted such a broad conception
of vested rights”).

Td. at 139-40, 758 A.2d at 808-09 (footnote omitted). This is an
easier case because here, although the developer describes steps
that it took to pursue its development project (requesting a
change in the municipal zoning requirements), it did not prior to
2012 file a permit application of any sort.

124. [Nor do the facts that prior to 2007 applicant was
taking steps to advance the development project, and that mu-
nicipal leaders were aware of these efforts, give rise to a vested
right in application of the 2003 Regional Plan. A mere “sugges-
tion” to a municipality “that a property owner would like to
undertake ill-defined work at an unspecified time” is insufficient to
vest in a developer a right to rely on the then-existing regional
plan for purposes of an application for a future Act 250 permit. Jn
re Keystone Deu Corp., 2009 VT 13, 115-6 (holding that developer
acquired no vested rights in zoning ordinance where it did not
submit a “full and complete” application for a zoning permit but
merely alerted city officials that it intended to perform certain
work on its property). As in Keystone, applicant’s position here
would create great uncertainty in the law and move us even
further away from the majority rule. See id. 16 (explaining that
without a proper application, one cannot know “what rights,
exactly, had vested as to a particular party, or when”). It is clear
that applicant acquired no vested right in use of the 2003
Regional Plan for Act 250 purposes prior to the TRO Regional
Commission’s adoption of the 2007 Regional Plan.

125. We need not decide exactly when a party’s interest in
using a specific regional plan vests, whether it is when the
applicant files a complete application for an Act 250 permit, or
when a party files a complete application for a zoning permit
associated with that project.! In either case, the zoning and Act

1 We held in In re Molgano that where “a developer diligently pursues a proposal
through the local and state permitting processes before seeking an Act 250 permit,
conformance [with local and regional plans under criterion 10 of Act 250] is to be
measured with regard to zoning laws in effect at the time of a proper zoning
permit application.” 163 Vt. 25, 33, 653 A.2d 772, 776-77 (1994). Given the rationale

PC 451
a

250 permit requests here were both made in 2012, well after the

2007 Regional Plan took effect.

B. Substantial Regional Impact

126. We likewise conclude that because the project will have a
substantial regional impact, the 2007 Regional Plan applies. Ap-
plicant argues the 2007 Regional Plan does not apply because the
project will not have a “substantial regional impact.” See 24 V.S.A.
§ 4848(h) (directing that to the extent a conflict exists between the
regional plan and municipal plan, the regional plan shall be given
effect “if it is demonstrated that the project under consideration
in the proceedings would have a substantial regional impact”).
Applicant acknowledges that its project falls squarely within the
definition of “substantial regional impact” contained in the 2007
Regional Plan insofar as the project, among other things, contem-
plates commercial or industrial construction involving 20,000
square feet or more of gross floor area. It argues, however, that
the Legislature improperly gave “complete and utter discretion” to
regional commissions to define “substantial regional impact,” and
that the arbitrariness of the definition in the 2007 Regional Plan
highlights the improper breadth of the Legislature’s delegation.
See id. § 4345a(17) (requiring regional commissions, as part of
regional plan, to “define a substantial regional impact, as the term
may be used with respect to its region” and stating that commis-
sion’s definition shall be given “due consideration” in state regu-
latory proceedings).

127. In support of its claim that the 2007 Regional Plan
definition of “substantial regional impact” is arbitrary and uncon-
nected to actual regional impacts of development, applicant de-
scribes a hypothetical scenario in which a development may
exceed 20,000 square feet of commercial space without having any

Tor this decision, it is not necessarily dispositive of the question of whether a
proper zoning permit application vests the applicant's expectation in application of
the then-existing regional plan for purposes of an Act 250 permit. Moreover,
within the municipal zoning context we have held that an application for a
subdivision permit does not create vested rights in application of those zoning laws
to a distinct application for a development permit with respect to that same
property. In re Taft Corners Assocs., 171 Vt. at 139-40, 758 A.2d at 808-09. These
decisions leave unanswered the question whether it is the Act 250 application that
vests in the applicant a right to rely on the existing regional plan for purposes of
Act 250 review, or whether an application for a zoning permit for that project can
have that effect.

452 |

regional impact. In particular, it describes an antiques dealer who
sells only through the internet and has a direct route to the post
office with no neighbors who would be impacted by the limited
truck traffic. Applicant further argues that the court was only
required to give “due consideration” to the regional commission’s
definition of “substantial regional impact,” was required to make
an independent determination of such impact, and engaged in
“rank speculation” by finding a substantial regional impact here.

128. IMM We find these arguments without merit. First, there
can be no claim of “unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power” where a statute “establish[es] reasonable standards to
govern the achievement of its purpose and the execution of the
power which it confers.” Vermont Home Mortg. Credit Agency v
Montpelier Nat'l Bank, 128 Vt. 272, 278, 262 A.2d 445, 449-50
(1970) (recognizing that “(within these limits,” Legislature “may
confide a broad grant of authority to a subordinate agency in
intricate matters affecting the general welfare in natural re-
sources, health, education and economics”); see also Rogers v
Watson, 156 Vt. 488, 498, 594 A.2d 409, 415 (1991) (recognizing
that delegation of discretionary authority is valid as long as
Legislature provides “sufficient standard or policy to guide”
agency’s action). We conclude that the Vermont Planning and
Development Act provides ample guidance to regional commissions
regarding the development of regional plans. See 24 V.S.A. ch. 117.
The law identifies a legislative purpose for planning generally, id.
§ 4302, it lists specific goals with which regional plans must be
consistent, id. § 4347, it identifies the duties of regional planning
commissions and required elements for regional plans, id. § 4348,
and it provides procedural requirements for adopting plans,
including the opportunity for public hearing and comment. Id.
§§ 4350(a)-(e), 4345a, 4347, 4348a, 4348. Given this extensive statu-
tory scheme, we reject applicant’s unsupported suggestion that
requiring regional commissions to define “a substantial regional
impact” as part of developing its regional plan constitutes an
unlawful delegation.

129. I Moreover, applicant’s second argument swallows up its
first. applicant contends, a regional commission’s definition of
“substantial regional impact” is not binding on the court; rather,
it is entitled to “due consideration” in state regulatory proceed-
ings. Id. § 4345a(17). Because the court retains ultimate discretion

Cc 458
a

to determine a substantial regional impact with reference to the

statutory framework and goals, subject to due consideration of a

regional commission’s own definition, the Legislature has not made

the kind of wholesale delegation of legislative authority to the

regional commissions that applicant suggests.

130. Finally, the regional plan contains various nonarbitrary
provisions that the trial court concluded were sufficiently clear to
prevent discriminatory application and that support the court’s
conclusion that the proposed project would have a substantial
regional impact. As indicated above, the 2007 Plan states that a
substantial regional impact exists for “commercial or industrial
construction involving 20,000 square feet or more of gross floor
area” and for projects that “necessitat{e] substantive capital
improvements, such as widening or signalization of regionally
significant local or State highways.” These requirements are
clearly defined and reasonable. It is not “rank speculation” to
conclude that a project involving 115,000 square feet of commer-
cial development at a highway interchange, and that requires a
new traffic signal on a regionally significant roadway, as well as
construction of additional turning lanes, will have a substantial
regional impact. Indeed, as the regional commission emphasized in
the Plan, developments near highway exchanges are particularly
suited for evaluation on a regional basis “given the considerable
public investment in the interstate highway system and regional
growth areas, and the significant public exposure to such areas.”
These areas are “powerful magnets for nonresidential uses” that
“often compete[ ] with and erode[ ] regional growth areas.”

IV. Conformance with the 2007 Regional Plan
A. Standard of Review

131. JE I With respect to our standard of review, the
interpretation of a regional plan is analogous to the interpretation
of a zoning ordinance; it presents a legal issue that we review
without deference to the trial court. In re Grp. Five Invs. CU
Permit, 2014 VT 14, 14, 195 Vt. 625, 93 A.3d 111 (“The Supreme
Court reviews the environmental court’s rulings on questions of
law or statutory interpretation de novo.” (citing In re Vill. Assocs.
Act 250 Land Use Permit, 2010 VT 42A, 117, 188 Vt. 118, 998 A.2d
712)); see also In ve Lathrop Ltd. P’ship I, 2015 VT 49, 9921, 44,
199 Vt. 19, 121 A.3d 630 (explaining that proper interpretation of

454 |

terms of zoning ordinance presents legal question, and question of
whether project meets definition in ordinance is also subject to de
novo review).

B. Merits

132. [HB In determining whether a proposed project complies
with Criterion 10 of Act 250 — that is, whether it “fils in
conformance with any duly adopted local or regional plan,” 10
V.S.A. § 6086(a)(10) — a court must read the requirements of that
plan in light of several considerations.

133. First, courts must strike a balance between the need for
a plan to provide broad and flexible guidance with the need for
clear requirements. We require plan provisions to be clear and
definite to prevent arbitrary application and to provide adequate
notice to landowners. In re JAM Golf, LLC, 2008 VT 110, 19 13,
17-19 (We will not uphold a statute that fail[s] to provide
adequate guidance, thus leading to unbridled discrimination by the
court and the planning board charged with its interpretation.”
(quotation omitted)). Nonetheless, we do not require “mathemati-
cal certainty of language.” State x Danaher, 174 Vt. 591, 594, 819
A2d 691, 695 (2002) (mem.); see also Grayned u City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (concluding that ordinance was not
unconstitutionally vague because although language was “marked
by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous

2 We stated in In re Chaves Act 250 Permit that “{wle accord deference to the trial
court’s finding of conformity” 2014 VT 5, 138, 195 Vt. 467, 93 A3d 69. That
statement is inconsistent with our standard. See, e.g., In re JAM Golf, LLC, 2008
VI 110, 117, 185 Vt. 201, 969 A2d 47 (rejecting environmental court’s interpre-
tation of municipal plan, and concluding, based on our own review, that particular
provisions in plans could not be enforced). Moreover, it is inconsistent with our
actual analysis in Chaves. See 2014 VT 5, 1941-42.

Although we gave great deference to decisions by the former Environmental
Board as “an ageney charged with promulgating and interpreting its own rules,”
In we Vill. Assocs., 2010 VT 42A, 17 n2, the Environmental Division “is a part of
the judicial branch,’ and “there is no separation-of-powers imperative for defer-
ential review” In re Albert, 2008 VT 30, 16, 183 Vt. 637, 954 A2d 1281 (mem.).
Thus, we have stated “that where the outcome of the matter turns not on findings
of fact, but on interpretation of a statutory term, and where we are not reviewing
a decision by an agency charged with promulgating and interpreting its own rules,
we employ the familiar de novo standard of review for matters of law.” In ve Vill.
Assocs., 2010 VT 42A, 17 n.2. We clarify here that we review without deference
the environmental court’s interpretation of the terms of a regional plan as well as
its legal conelusion that a project does or does not conform to a regional plan

Cc 455
a

specificity,” it was clear what ordinance as a whole prohibited
(quotation omitted)). Even in the context of municipal noise
ordinances, we have recognized that “we are dealing with an area
where some imprecision and generality is necessary and inevitable
and our void-for-vagueness test is less strict where the regulation
is economic and the landowner can seek clarification of its
meaning or resort to administrative processes.” In re Ferrera &
Fenn Gravel Pit, 2013 VT 97, 116, 195 Vt. 188, 87 A.3d 483
(quotations omitted).

134. HI Additionally, a regional plan is not a municipal zoning
ordinance and is likely to contain even less detail than a zoning
bylaw. Zoning bylaws are designed to specifically “permit, pro-
hibit, restrict, regulate, and determine land development,” includ-
ing specific uses of land; dimensions, location, changes to and use
of structures; and areas and dimensions of land to be used by
structures or for other purposes. 24 V.S.A. § 4411(a). By contrast,
regional plans are designed “to guide the future growth and
development of land and of public services and facilities, and to
protect the environment.” Id. § 4348a(a)(1). They cover a much
broader geographic area than municipal ordinances. And they
serve a host of purposes — from informing consideration of Act
250 permit applications in cases like this to shaping highway
projects to informing economic development plans.? The breadth
of regional plans’ application is not an excuse for imprecision, but
it does shape reasonable expectations as to the level of detail in
those plans. In short, we will enforce a provision in a regional
plan where it is “sufficiently clear to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is proscribed.”
Brody uv Barasch, 155 Vt. 103, 110, 582 A.2d 132, 1387 (1990).

135. [I Second, “broad policy statements phrased as non-
regulatory abstractions are not equivalent to enforceable restric-
tions.” Chaves, 2014 VT 5, 138 (quotation omitted). Thus, provi-
sions that “recommend” or “encourage” certain uses are generally
insufficient to create an enforceable obligation. See id. 11 40-41
(concluding that plan provision stating that mineral extraction

*See 19 V.S.A. §10c(a) (providing that Agency of Transportation may pursue
exceptions to national standards for geometric design when appropriate to comply
with local or regional plans as interpreted by the adopting entities); 32 VS.A.
§ 5930a(c)(4) (directing Vermont Economie Progress Council to consider conformity
with regional plans in awarding tax incentives).

456 Le

“should minimize adverse effects on aesthetics and special com-
munity resources (such as historic sites) and should not interfere
with or have negative impacts on historic sites” was “broad and
nonregulatory, espousing general policies” without any “specific
requirements that are legally enforceable”); see also In re John A.
Russell Corp., 2003 VT 93, 119, 176 Vt. 520, 838 A.2d 906 (mem.)
(concluding that plan that “discouraged” certain uses in particular
area did not evince sufficiently “specific policy” against particular
kind of development to support finding of nonconformity with
town plan); Jn re MBL Assocs., 166 Vt. 606, 607-08, 693 A.2d 698,
700-01 (1997) (mem.) (concluding that use of word “should” in
regional plan did not create mandatory enforceable requirement).
Mandatory language includes terms like “must” and “shall” and it
sets forth a requirement rather than a recommendation.

136. J MM Third, in considering a provision’s enforceability,
we must view the provision in the context of the regional plan as
a whole, bearing in mind the legislative goals that regional plans
must serve. See In re Tyler Self-Storage Unit Permits, 2011 VT
66, 113, 190 Vt. 182, 27 A.3d 1071 (explaining that in interpreting
zoning ordinances, Court must “examine not only the plain
language . . . but also the whole of the ordinance in order to try
to give effect to every part, and will adopt an interpretation that
implements the legislative purpose” (quotations omitted));
Williston Citizens for Responsible Growth u Maple Tree Place
Assocs., 156 Vt. 560, 563, 593 A.2d 469, 470 (1991) (holding that
construction of ordinance “not limited to consideration of an
isolated sentence . . . rather, we must look to the whole of the
ordinance”). This does not mean that the aspirational goals of a
plan as a whole can salvage a vague or aspirational provision, but
it does mean that a court must view provisions with reference to
the broader purposes articulated in the plan, especially where
they are not internally inconsistent. See In re Tyler Self-Storage,
2011 VT 66, 113 (explaining that provisions should be construed
“to determine and give effect to the intent of the drafters,” and
this intent “is most truly derived from a consideration of not only
the particular statutory language, but from the entire enactment,
its reason, purpose and consequences” (quotation omitted)); see
also In re Green Peak Estates, 154 Vt. 363, 368-69, 577 A.2d 676,
679 (1990) (concluding that regional plan providing that residential
development on slopes greater than 20% “should not be permit-
ted” was sufficiently specific to be enforceable, and, while it did

PC 50
a

not explicitly state that all development was precluded, “Board’s

commonsense interpretation of the plan’s policy” was “consistent

with the overall approach to use of the region’s intermediate

uplands”).

137. EJ With these principles in mind, we consider several
salient provisions of the regional plan that individually, but, more
importantly, in concert, establish that the project does not con-
form to the plan as required by 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(10).

1. “Principal Retail Establishments”

138. The 2007 Regional Plan states: “Principal retail establish-
ments must be located in town centers, designated downtowns, or
designated growth centers to minimize the blighting effects of
sprawl and strip-development along major highways and maintain
rural character.”

139. This language is mandatory and the proscription is clear:
retail development must be limited to specified areas within the
region to promote clearly identified land-use goals. There is no
dispute that the proposed project is not located in a town center,
designated downtown, or designated growth area. Nevertheless,
the trial court concluded that the proposed project conformed with
this provision of the 2007 Regional Plan. It viewed the mixed-use
development project in its entirety as a single “establishment” and
concluded that it was not a “principal retail establishment”
because the project’s total proposed retail square footage was not
greater than the total square footage of any other use.

140. We reject the trial court’s construction of the regional plan
on the basis of the plain language of the plan itself and because
the court’s construction of the “principal retail establishment”
provision would lead to results squarely at odds with the purpose
of the plan and the underlying enabling legislation. The proposal
in this case is for a mixed-use development — one that encom-
passes multiple primary or principal uses in multiple establish-
ments. As appellants’ expert testified below, a principal retail
establishment is an establishment where retail is the primary
occupant of space in a building, as distinguished from an ancillary
use. See also 4 P. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 41:16 (th ed.
2015) (explaining that accessory use, unlike principal use, is “use
of a building or structure which . . . is subordinate to or
customarily incidental to the main use of the building and the

458 |

permitted use of the zoning district in which it is located”). The
trial court’s approach of considering the proposed mixed-use
project as a whole as a single establishment for purposes of this
requirement is not supported by the plain meaning of “principal
retail establishment.”

141. Moreover, the interpretation would yield a result at odds
with the stated purposes of the regional plan itself. A general goal
outlined in the plan is preserving the existing settlement pattern
consisting of “clusters of residences and other activities in the
form of villages and hamlets surrounded by less dense settlement,
rural in character, or large spaces in natural vegetation.” The plan
explains that such a pattern of development has proven to be “of
a sociological, psychological, and aesthetic benefit to the region,
while at the same time providing a system of centers both
efficient and economical for the conduct of business enterprise and
for the provision of social and community facilities and services.”
The plan promotes this goal by requiring “[mJajor growth or
investments [to] be channeled into or adjacent to existing or
planned settlement centers and to areas where adequate public
facilities and services are available” and specifically defines seven
types of growth center in the region. It further articulates a
series of goals as promoting the public interest, including encour-
aging “full use” of regional growth areas, protecting the character
of rural areas by avoiding sprawling development, and reserving
land at interchange areas for the development of services for the
traveling public and transport of goods, not for high traffic-
generating commercial activities that are unrelated to services for
the traveling public or trucking interests. And the requirement
that “principal retail establishments” be located in town centers,
designated downtowns, or designated growth centers was, by its
own terms, designed to “minimize the blighting effects of sprawl
and strip-development along major highways and maintain rural
character.”

142. I Under the trial court’s interpretation, unlimited retail
development could occur outside of growth areas consistent with
the regional plan as long as such development was folded into
even larger square footage development of other sorts. This
interpretation cannot be squared with the clearly stated goals of
the regional plan as a whole and the particular limitation on retail
development. The trial court’s interpretation would allow sprawl
and strip-development, rather than minimize it, and thus cannot

es 469
a

be squared with the regional plan as a whole. In re Grp. Five
Ins. CU Permit, 2014 VT 14, 123 (“We adopt a construction that
implements the ordinance’s legislative purpose and, in any event,
will apply common sense.” (quotation omitted)). This project,
which proposes to create a restaurant and almost 35,000 square
feet of new retail space, clearly includes “principal retail estab-
lishments” as contemplated by the Plan, and thus squarely runs
afoul of the requirement that “principal retail establishments”
must be located in designated areas that do not include the site
of this project.

2. “Regional Growth Areas”

143. As noted above, the regional plan seeks to limit “major
growth or investments” into existing or planned settlement cen-
ters:

Due to severe physical site limitations and the rela-
tively high costs incidental to land development in certain
areas as compared to others, much of the region is
neither readily available nor suited for intense develop-
ment. Major growth or investments must be channeled
into or adjacent to existing or planned settlement centers
and to areas where adequate public facilities and services
are available. Regional Growth Areas are the traditional
developed areas in the region. They are differentiated
into the following seven types: Regional Center, Town
Centers, Village Settlements, Hamlet Areas, Designated
Growth Centers, Designated Downtowns, and Designated
Village Centers as well as expansion areas that are
designated to accommodate future growth based on the
capacity to provide infrastructure and suitable land with-
out threatening critical resources or creating sprawl.

Like the provision governing “principal retail establishments,” this
provision contains mandatory language. It requires major growth
or investments to be located in specified areas.

144. The trial court recognized the mandatory nature of this
provision but concluded that the “critical words are undefined and
subject to interpretation,” and thus, it could not “discern a specific
policy” that prohibited this project. In particular, the trial court
stated that terms “major growth or investment” and “planned
settlement area” were undefined, and their meaning was unclear

460 Le

so that this provision did not establish a clear, unqualified and
unambiguous standard that could be enforced.

145. We disagree. Considering this language in the broader
context of the regional plan, a reasonable person can discern what
is prohibited. In the context of this case, the term “major
development” is “sufficiently clear to give a person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is proscribed.”
Brody, 155 Vt. at 110, 582 A.2d at 137. A reasonable person would
recognize that “major development” is large-scale development,
including development with the potential to have a “substantial
regional impact.” A proposal that contemplates 115,000 square feet
of new construction in a largely undeveloped area near an
interstate exchange falls within a common-sense understanding of
this term. As the NRB notes, moreover, this project represents a
significant change to the existing landscape and contemplates a
level of development much greater than the yearly average for the
entire Town of Hartford between 1998 and 2005. The project at
issue here is clearly “major development” as that term is com-
monly understood.

146. Nor is the requirement that major development be chan-
neled into or adjacent to “existing or planned settlement centers
and... areas where adequate public facilities and services are
available” obscure in the overall context. Directly following this
requirement, the regional plan identifies “regional growth areas”
as the “traditional developed areas in the region,” and categorizes
these areas into seven types, recognizing as well “expansion areas
that are designated to accommodate future growth.” It is evident
that the commission is referring to these areas as the “existing or
planned settlement centers” appropriate for “major growth and
development.” A review of the more specific definition of each of
these areas, stated elsewhere in the plan, underscores this con-
clusion. The plan recognizes, for example, that a regional center
has existing public sewer and water utilities, as well as transpor-
tation infrastructure capable of handling significant volumes of
commuting and commercial traffic, and that “[mJajor developments
like large governmental, medical, commercial, industrial building
must be located in Regional Centers where utilities, facilities, and
human capital are concentrated.” The Exit 1 interchange is not an
“existing or planned settlement center” under the regional plan,
and therefore, it is not an appropriate location for major devel-
opment.

es 461
_

3. Development at Highway Interchange

147. Given that there are thirteen highway interchanges in this
region, the plan also includes a general discussion of development
at highway interchange areas. The plan states that it is in the
public interest to “reserve land at Interchange Areas for the
development of services for the traveling public and transport of
goods, not for the development of high traffic-generating commer-
cial activities that are unrelated to services for the traveling public
or trucking industry, or institutional uses such as governmental
offices or post offices.” It cautions that “Interchange Area devel-
opment should not be promoted to the detriment of regional
growth areas or the public investments made therein.” It reiter-
ates that “{rJetail establishments providing goods and services to
a regional clientele should be located in Regional Centers to
minimize the blighting effects of sprawl and _ strip-development
along major highways and to maintain rural character.”

148. The plan identifies general highway interchange policies,
indicating again that land uses planned for interchanges areas
should “complement rather than compete with uses that exist in
Designated Downtowns, Designated Village Centers, Designated
Growth Centers, and other regional growth areas.” It identifies
specific uses appropriate for interchange development, which “in-
clude highway-oriented lodging and service facilities, trucking
terminals, truck-dependent manufacturing, and park-and-ride com-
muter lots.”

149. The plan then specifically states what is not appropriate:
“Any development planned for interchange development must be
constructed to... discourage creation or establishment of uses
deemed more appropriate to regional growth areas.” Specific to
Exit 1, the plan provides that “[t]his interchange is not an
appropriate location for a growth center.” The plan identifies the
types of development appropriate for Exit 1 as “residential,
appropriately-scaled traveler-oriented uses, and other similar uses
that are not intended to draw on regional populations.”

150. The trial court turned this language on its head, conclud-
ing that because the project is not located in an area where
traditional development has occurred and no party is seeking to
have the project receive a formal growth center designation, the
prohibition on growth centers at Exit 1 does not apply to the
project. This ignores the obvious intent of the provisions above.

462, |

The plan clearly and repeatedly states that the type of develop-
ment that belongs in a regional growth center — which includes
“{rjetail establishments providing goods and services to a regional
clientele” and “major developments” — does not belong at the
Exit 1 interchange. Applicant’s proposed project is not transit-
oriented, nor is it scaled to fit among the small, low-density
residential and commercial structures that currently exist in this
area. It is a “major development” that includes a significant retail
component, which, as stated throughout this plan, must be chan-
neled into or adjacent to planned settlement areas to “minimize
the blighting effects of sprawl and strip-development along major
highways and to maintain rural character”

151. These provisions, all of which are clear and enforceable,
reinforce each other in establishing a clear and mandatory frame-
work for development. That framework does not authorize major
development — including principal retail establishments — at this
nongrowth-center highway interchange major development, given
that the development as proposed is not oriented to the traveling
public or trucking industry. For these reasons, we conclude that
the project does not satisfy the requirements of Criterion 10
because it does not conform with clear and enforceable provisions
of the applicable regional plan. 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(10).

152. [BM The Legislature has made clear that regional plans
are key to the “appropriate development” of state lands, 24 V.S.A.
§ 4302(a), with Act 250 serving as a critical enforcement mecha-
nism. Consistent with its statutory obligations, the TRO Regional
Commission developed a comprehensive plan to guide development
in its region. It repeatedly manifested its intent to prohibit
large-scale development of this sort at the Exit 1 interchange,
thereby serving key land-use goals identified by the Legislature:
maintaining historic settlement patterns, discouraging strip devel-
opment along highways, and encouraging economic growth in
specific areas. Id. § 4302(¢)(1). The TRO Regional Commi:
used language that is “clear and unqualified, and creates no
ambiguity,” Chaves, 2014 VT 5, 138 (quotation omitted), and thus,
those standards must be enforced. Any other conclusion would
undermine the continued viability of regional planning in this
state. Applicant’s proposal does not conform to the regional plan,
and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

Reversed.

&

a _
2016 VT 116
Michael J. Regan, Denise Regan and Andree Falardeau v. Allen

Spector, Marcia Spector, Allen Spector Retirement Trust and
Town of Fayston

Bruce Chapin and Susie Chapin v. Allen Spector, Marcia
Spector, Allen Spector Retirement Trust and Town of Fayston
(158 A.3d 311]

No. 15-415
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed October 21, 2016

Mare B. Heath of Downs Rachlin Martin, PLLC, Burlington,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants Regan.

Joel P. lannuzzi and Thomas P. Aicher of Cleary Shahi &
Aicher, P-C., Rutland, for Defendants-Appellees Spector.

James F. Carroll of English, Carroll & Boe, P.C., Middlebury,
for Defendant-Appellee Town of Fayston.

11. Reiber, C.J. Plaintiffs Michael and Denise Regan appeal
from the trial court’s decision denying them relief with respect to
their complaint alleging that the redirecting of surface waters by
defendant Town of Fayston and defendants Allen and Marcia
Spector and the Spector Retirement Trust! caused ongoing flood
damage to their property. We affirm.

12. The trial court made the following findings, which are
supported by substantial evidence. Other than the Town, the
parties to the two underlying cases consolidated for trial all own
property on a developed hillside in the town. The hillside is
dissected by Stagecoach Road, which crosses the upper portion of
the hillside, and Farm Road, which curves across the hillside
below Stagecoach Road. The Town is responsible for maintaining
the two town roads and controlling stormwater drainage on the
hillside. The cases concern the impact that activities on the
Spectors’ land had on properties owned by the downhill neighbors,
including the Regans, who own land on the lower side of
Stagecoach Road east of the Spectors’ land.

13. During the 1980s, a twenty-three-lot subdivision called
Fayston Farms was developed on the hillside between Stagecoach

‘Hereinafter, we refer to Allen and Marcia Spector and the Spector Retirement
‘Trust simply as the Spectors.

| .

Road and Farm Road. The Spectors became actively involved in
the development, at one time owning half of the lots. In 1992, the
Spectors purchased three lots, totaling 83 acres, which later
became the site of their residence just below Stagecoach Road.
When the Spectors purchased the lots, culvert #7 was a fifteen-
inch culvert that carried stormwater from a portion of the hillside
above Stagecoach Road, under the road, and onto the wooded
hillside below. Culvert #8, which was located to the west and
uphill on Stagecoach Road, drained in a westerly direction.
Culverts #6 and #5, which were located further to the east and
downhill on Stagecoach Road, drained in an easterly direction. As
the trial court stated, the salient factual dispute in the consoli-
dated cases was which direction the stormwater flowed through
culvert #7 both before and after it was repositioned in 2004 and
then again in 2008.

14. The same year that the Spectors purchased the three lots
off Stagecoach Road, the Town installed a culvert under Old
Stagecoach Road, a farm lane that runs from Stagecoach Road
diagonally in a westerly direction downhill below the site of the
Spectors’ future residence. The Town later installed a stone-lined
ditch along the upper edge of Stagecoach Road to manage water
draining downhill toward Fayston Farms. In 1996, the Town
required the Spectors to participate in the cost of enlarging the
culvert under Old Stagecoach Road when the Spectors sought a
permit for a driveway at the location of culvert #7. The Spectors
wanted to move culvert #7 further up the hill to the west, closer
to culvert #8, but the town road commissioner did not want to
move the culvert further to the west or the east because of
concerns that it would increase the flow of stormwater in either
direction. Rather, his strategy was to divert the water under
Stagecoach Road at culvert #7 so it would disperse before its
volume and speed became a bigger problem downhill.

15. In 2004, the Spectors applied for a permit to build a house
on Stagecoach Road with driveway access close to culvert #7. The
town road commissioner dug out a box ditch from the outlet of
culvert #7 for several feet in an easterly direction. It sent the
flow of water from culvert #7 towards the east approximately
fifteen feet, at which point the water was free to run in sheets
down the hillside. When the Spectors built their driveway close to
culvert #7, they placed a culvert in the box ditch and covered it
with gravel for the driveway to run over it. The result was that

466 Le

water from above Stagecoach Road flowed through culvert #7 into
the box ditch and then turned at almost a ninety-degree angle to
proceed through the culvert under the Spectors’ driveway toward
the east for a distance of fifteen to thirty feet.

16. In 2005, the Spectors built a three-story 7100-square-foot
house off Stagecoach Road. Clearing and grading around the
house altered the contours of the land. As a result, erosion
problems below the outlet of culvert #7 occurred. As the trial
court found, “{t]here may have been some shift of water drainage
from the west to the east toward the Regan land, but it was not
significant and apparently not noticed by anyone.”

17. In 2007, the Regans purchased property adjacent to,
downhill, and easterly from the Spectors’ property on Stagecoach
Road. The Regans’ house and driveway is located just off Stage-
coach Road, and their property slopes downhill to a wetland area.
At the time they purchased their property, the Regans were
unaware of a small pond at the bottom of the property that.
served as a sediment pond for an adjacent pond that had been
built by adjoining landowners, Bruce and Susie Chapin, in 2004.

18. In the summer of 2008, the Spectors did extensive
clearcutting of trees on the hillside below their house downhill
toward Farm Road. In the fall of that year, the Spectors sought
once again to move culvert #7. The new road commissioner, who
was concerned that culvert #7 might flow to an identified well
site, agreed to move the culvert as long as the Spectors paid for
the excavating work. The Town would not have proceeded with the
project if the Spectors had not requested it, but as long as the
Spectors were willing to pay for it, the Town went along because
of its own concerns with culvert #7, including the troublesome
maintenance of the box ditch. In October 2008, culvert #7 was
expanded to 24 inches and moved approximately 100-150 feet
downhill and easterly on Stagecoach Road closer to the Regans’
land. When the Regans saw the outlet pipe of culvert #7 directing
water toward their land, they protested to the town selectboard,
which attempted to mediate a solution by requiring the Spectors
to install a stone-lined channel from the end of the outlet to
redirect water back toward the Spectors’ land.

19. In May 2009, as the trial court found, “a huge rainstorm
occurred with devastating consequences for all parties,” including
the Spectors, the Regans, and other neighbors downhill from the
Spectors’ lot. A culvert on the hillside above the Spectors’

property plugged, causing large amounts of water to skip over
culvert #8, which would have carried the water in a westerly
direction, and instead ran along Stagecoach Road through culvert
#7. The water continued downhill onto the Spectors’ land, plugged
up the culvert under Old Stagecoach Road, and gushed down the
newly created stone-lined channel causing severe erosion and
creating a deep gash. The water continued through the woods in
the eastern drainage, eventually entering the Regans’ land several
feet above their sediment pond. Following this event, the Spectors
installed a new stone-lined channel on at least two occasions, but
subsequent storms continued to overwhelm the erosion-control
device and caused sediment to be brought downhill to the Regans’
pond.

110. There was also significant damage to the properties of
downhill neighbors in the western drainage caused by the
clearcutting the Spectors had done the previous year. One of those
neighbors, Susie Chapin, sued the Spectors and the Town in
October 2010. In January 2012, the Regans also sued the Spectors
and the Town, alleging trespass and nuisance against the Spectors
and inverse condemnation against the Town.2 The Regans sought
an injunction requiring the Spectors and the Town to relocate
culvert #7 from where it had been moved in 2008 back to its
original location and configuration. They also claimed money
damages, but the trial court precluded them from presenting
evidence on their damage claim as a discovery sanction. Chapin
opposed the Regans’ claim for injunctive relief and settled her
claim for money damages contingent on culvert #7 remaining in
its current location.

111. At trial, the court heard extensive testimony from various
experts with a variety of specialized training and experience. The
experts from the opposing parties fundamentally disagreed about
whether the water that flowed through old culvert #7 before 2004,
and again between 2004 and the fall of 2008 when the culvert was
moved 100-150 feet downhill and easterly on Stagecoach Road,
drained toward the west or east. The Regans’ expert opined that
before 2004 water flowing through culvert #7 drained to the west,
that the Town’s construction of the box ditch in 2004 significantly

2 Another downhill neighbor joined in the Regans’ lawsuit against defendants, but
by the time of trial she no longer sought affirmative relief and remained in the
case only to participate in any action that might affect her property.

468 Le

changed the stormwater flow by sending water from culvert #7
toward the eastern drainage, and that the situation was further
exacerbated in 2008 by the relocation of culvert #7 further to the
east. The Spectors’ expert testified that neither the addition of the
box ditch in 2004 nor the relocation of culvert #7 in 2008 had a
significant impact on the volume of water flowing into the
wetlands region of the Regans’ property above their pond. The
Town’s expert opined that it was impossible to know exactly where
water flowed before the box ditch was added in 2004, and he
agreed with the Spectors’ expert that the relocation of culvert #7
did not significantly change the amount of water affecting the
Regans’ pond.

112. The court found that it was virtually impossible to know
where water flowed from culvert #7 before 2004, but that the
former road commissioner had the best opportunity to observe
pre-2004 conditions. The court found credible his testimony that
before he installed the box ditch, the water from culvert #7
sheeted out as it went downhill but was directed to some degree
to the west by the Old Stagecoach Road culvert. According to the
court, the most credible evidence indicated that both before and
after 2004, when the box ditch was put in, there was not a single
linear path of drainage from culvert #7, but rather some water
drained to the west and some water drained to the east. The
court could not find that “installation of the box ditch resulted in
an all-or-nothing shift of water drainage from west to east, or that
there was a linear pattern of drainage exclusively to the west
prior to the construction of the box ditch.” Moreover, the court
found that the relocation of culvert #7 in 2008 “increased the
amount of water flowing from above Stagecoach Road through
culvert #7 to some degree but not to the degree of being a major
shift in direction.” The court further found that the road commis-
sioners’ decisions in 2004 and 2008 to install a box ditch at culvert
#7 and then to move the culvert further east were both reason-
able in light of the circumstances at the time.

113. The court also found that mitigation measures installed on
the Spectors’ land since 2009 “have slowed and dispersed water in
the eastern drainage to a very significant degree.” The court
rejected the Regans’ claim of significant damage to their pond,
finding that “there has been a marginal increase in the amount of
water flowing through culvert #7 in the eastern drainage” and
that “much of such flow enters the wetland further to the east of

the Regan pond and the amount is not significant.” The court
explained that the Regans’ pond was an artificially-made sediment
pond that could be preserved only through ongoing cleaning and
maintenance, which the Regans had not done. The court further
found, based on expert testimony, that fallen trees such as the
Regans had observed were part of the normal processes in a
seepage wetland where the pond was located.

114. Hence, the court concluded that “the conditions on the
ground of which Regan complains are due almost entirely to the
natural evolution of a seepage wetland that was disturbed by and
is incorporating over time the installation of two unnatural and
unmaintained ponds.” The court further concluded that the box
ditch at culvert #7 and the relocation of the culvert had “little, if
any, effect on current conditions,” and that returning culvert #7 to
its original location was “highly unlikely to have positive impact on
the Regan pond of any consequence.” Given the Regans’ failure to
prove “any substantial, ongoing injury” attributable to the
Spectors or the Town, the court found no need to consider the
Regans’ claim for inverse condemnation. The court briefly noted,
however, that the Town’s decisions regarding the location of
culvert #7 were part of their duty to maintain roads and drainage
systems, and that there was no incursion amounting to an
easement on the Regans’ land.

115. On appeal, the Regans argue that the trial court: (1)
abused its discretion by imposing a discovery sanction that
precluded them from submitting evidence on money damages; (2)
applied the wrong legal standard in rejecting their claim of
inverse condemnation; and (3) erred in rejecting their nuisance
and trespass claims because the Spectors’ construction of the
stone-lined channel in 2008 constituted an alteration of the pattern
of flow within the watershed.

116. We need not consider the Regans’ first claim of error
because we are upholding the trial court’s decision in favor of the
Spectors and the Town as to liability and causation, which, as the
Regans’ acknowledged at oral argument, moots their claim that
the court abused its discretion by precluding evidence of money
damages as a discovery sanction. We recognize that the trial court
made few findings and conclusions regarding the impact of the
Spectors’ clearcutting their hillside in 2008, but its findings
demonstrate that the clearcutting impacted only the western
drainage, and not the eastern drainage in which the Regans’

470 |

property is located. As noted, the downhill landowner most
affected by the clearcutting, Susie Chapin, settled with the
Spectors and is not a party to this appeal. The Regans’ claim for
injunctive relief and money damages centered on the repositioning
of culvert #7, which the trial court found to have no significant
impact on the land around Regans’ pond.

117. The Regans’ second claim of error is that the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard in rejecting their inverse con-
demnation claim against the Town. In their view, the court
erroneously applied a “substantial injury” test focusing on the
degree of damage to their property rather than the nature and
character of the invasion of the property. In making this argu-
ment, they rely on two Vermont cases. The first case, Doty v.
Village of Johnson, involved a situation in which a portion of the
plaintiff landowner’s property was flooded periodically after the
defendant village raised the height of a dam beyond the bench-
mark height to which it had a right to maintain the water level.
84 Vt. 15, 77 A. 866 (1910). The injury to the landowner was found
to be comparatively slight as measured against what the village
would incur if it were required to lower the dam. After noting
that the raising of the dam caused the water to periodically cover
a portion of the landowner’s property, this Court held that “where
some degree of injury is shown” and “seems likely to continue,
equity will not refuse to interfere because the damage is slight.”
Td. at 22, 77 A. at 869. The Court held that the landowner was
entitled to “at least nominal damages” because the record showed
an “invasion of the [landowner’s] rights, continuous in its nature,
which, continued a sufficient length of time under a claim of right,
may ripen into an easement.” Id. at 23, 77 A. at 869.

118. J The second case, Ondovchik Family Limited Partner-
ship u Agency of Transportation, rejected a claim of inverse
condemnation that was based on alleged damages caused by a
state agency depositing snow on the plaintiffs property when
periodically snowplowing the adjacent highway. 2010 VT 35, 117,
187 Vt. 556, 996 A.2d 1179. In so ruling, this Court relied upon
the two-part test established in Ridge Line, Inc. u United States,
346 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2003), for determining when
governmental conduct amounts to a potential taking as opposed to
a possible tort. Ondovchik Family Limited P’ship, 2010 VT 35,
1916, 18. Under that test: (1) “a property loss compensable as a
taking only results when the government intends to invade a

protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the direct,
natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the
incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action”; and (2)
“felven where the eff of the government are predictable, to
constitute a taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit to the
government at the expense of the property owner, or at least
preempt the owners|’] right to enjoy his property for an extended
period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces
its value” Ridge Line, Inc, 346 F.3d at 1355-56 (quotation
omitted). In Ondouchik Family Limited Partnership, we empha-
sized that: (1) “temporary, repeated incursions . . . rise to the
level of a taking . . . only in instances where the incursions
amount to the taking of an easement”; (2) “courts generally find
a taking of an easement only when the government requires an
‘onerous’ dedication of property”; and (3) “[w]hen the intrusion is
‘limited and transient’ in nature and occurs for legitimate govern-
mental reasons, it does not amount to a taking.” 2010 VT 35, 118.

119. J} I There is nothing in the trial court’s decision
indicating that the court failed to follow the law as stated above.
The court did not apply a substantial-injury test, but rather noted
that it did not need to consider in depth the Regans’ inverse
condemnation claim because the Regans had failed to prove a
“substantial injury potentially warranting equitable relief” To the
extent that the court did consider the inverse condemnation claim,
it concluded that there was no permanent physical occupation or
temporary incursions by the Town amounting to an easement on
the Regans’ land. The court further concluded that the evidence
showed that the substantial cause of the ongoing minor erosion on
Regans’ land was due almost entirely to the natural evolution of
the seepage wetland near the sediment pond rather than any
repositioning of culvert #7 on Stagecoach Road. There was ample
evidence, including expert testimony, to support the court’s find-
ings and conclusions concerning the cause of the condition of the
Regans’ property near their pond. See Highgate Assocs. uv
Merryfield, 157 Vt. 318, 315-16, 597 A.2d 1280, 1281-82 (1991)
(“Where the trial court has applied the proper legal standard, we
will uphold its conclusions of law if reasonably supported by its
findings.”); see also Obolensky vu Trombley, 2015 VT 34, 127, 198
Vt. 401, 115 A3d 1016 (emphasizing that it is province of trial
court to determine credibility of witnesses and weigh persuasive-
ness of evidence).

472 |

120. HM Finally, the Regans briefly argue that the trial court
should have found in their favor on their trespass and nuisance
claims due to the Spectors’ redirection of the flow of surface water
toward their property through construction of the stone-lined
channel. In so arguing, they rely upon Canton v Graniteville Fire
District No. 4, where we stated that a property owner “is entitled
to have surface water pass to lower lands in its natural condition,”
but “cannot artificially change the manner of flow by discharging
it onto the lower land at a different place from its natural
discharge.” 171 Vt. 551, 552, 762 A.2d 808, 810 (2000) (mem.).

121. EELM We reject this argument because, as noted above,
the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
the conditions on the Regans’ property of which they complain
“are due almost entirely to the natural evolution of a seepage
wetland that was disturbed by and is incorporating over time the
installation of two unnatural and unmaintained ponds”; (2) “the
precise location of the culverts on Stagecoach Road have little, if
any, effect on current conditions”; and (8) returning culvert #7 to
its original location and configuration, if possible, “would be highly
unlikely to have positive impact on the Regan pond of any
consequence.” The evidence, including expert testimony, supports
the court’s findings, and those findings support its conclusions. See
Merryfield, 157 Vt. at 315, 597 A.2d at 1281-82 (“The trial court’s
findings of fact must stand unless they are clearly erroneous,
viewing the supporting evidence in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party and excluding the effect of modifying evidence. A
finding will not be disturbed merely because it is contradicted by
substantial evidence; rather, an appellant must show there is no
credible evidence to support the finding.” (citations omitted)).
While some of the trial court’s findings indicate that some
sediment was carried down to the area of the Regans’ pond
through the stone-lined channel during past severe storms, the
preponderance of the evidence and the court’s findings demon-
strate that the condition of the area around the pond of which the
Regans complain was almost entirely the result of natural pro-
cesses and not the repositioning of culvert #7.

Affirmed.

2016 VT 102

Sandy Gordon Rounds, John F. Gordon, Richard Gordon and
Margaret W. Gordon v. Malletts Bay Club, Inc. and James
McGarry
(157 A.3d 1101]

No. 15-376
Present: Reiber, C.J, Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed September 9, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied October 25, 2016

Matthew B. Byrne and Matthew S. Stern of Gravel & Shea PC,
Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

James B. Anderson of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland,
for Defendants-Appellants.

11. Robinson, J. This case revolves around sixteen shares in
the Malletts Bay Club, Inc. (MBC) that have been sitting in
escrow since 1998, when George Gordon conveyed the associated
real property to J. Douglas Johnson. On summary judgment, the
trial court ruled that defendant James McGarry, as agent for
transfer of the MBC shares, breached the parties’ contract and
his fiduciary duty by failing to issue the shares to Gordon’s
successors upon their demand, and that defendant MBC had
waived its right to challenge Gordon’s failure to transfer those
shares to Johnson by agreeing to the Gordon-to-Johnson convey-
ance. We conclude that the agreement defining the parties’ rights
and obligations with respect to the MBC shares does not require
McGarry to return the shares to Gordon on demand, that based
on the undisputed evidence MBC did not waive its right to
enforce its bylaws with respect to the transaction, and that
therefore defendants are entitled to summary judgment and
plaintiffs are not. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
to resolve any remaining claims of plaintiffs that were not the
subject of the cross-motions for summary judgment.

12. The material facts are not in dispute unless otherwise
noted. In 1968, George Gordon purchased property in MBC. As
part of that purchase, he received twenty-seven shares of MBC
stock. MBC is an association of homeowners organized to occupy
and manage the jointly owned property. In 1975, Gordon gave four
shares of MBC stock to his children, and he retained twenty-three
shares in his name.

13. In 1992, MBC’s bylaws were amended. Prior to the 1992
amendments, section 24 of the bylaws included a requirement that

an “owner of real property within or contiguous to [MBC who]
wishes to sell or transfer that real property to a nonmember/
stockholder . . . must either include in the sale, or insure that the
purchaser has at the time of the sale, at least seven shares of
[MBC] stock.” The 1992 amendment added a requirement that
“the selling member/stockholder must include in the sale all of his
or her shares of stock in [MBC].” Both before and after the 1992
amendment, the MBC bylaws granted MBC a right of first refusal
with respect to the sale of property in MBC or MBC stock to
anyone other than specified family members.

14. In 1997, Gordon conveyed his residence to his daughter,
Sandy Gordon Rounds, as “Trustee of the George S. Gordon
Qualified Personal Residence Trust.” In 1998, the Trust sold the
property to Johnson. In connection with that transaction, on
February 12, 1998, James McGarry, as president and duly autho-
rized agent of MBC, signed a “Waiver and Agreement” providing
as follows:

NOW COMES [MBC] by and through its duly autho-
rized agent, James McGarry, President, and does
hereby . . . waive its right of first refusal to purchase 23
shares of stock in [MBC] and the property owned by
George S. Gordon Personal Residence Trust . . . Said
waiver being effective the 10th day of February, 1998.
[MBC] represents and warrants that said waiver was
obtained and is granted in accordance with the provisions
of the By-Laws.

Furthermore, [MBC] acknowledges and agrees with
the sale of said property at Mallets Bay Club and 7
shares of [MBC] stock to J. Douglas Johnson.

15. That same day, Gordon’s attorney sent James McGarry a
letter stating:

As you are aware, George Gordon recently sold his
Mallets Bay Club property to J. Douglas Johnson. At the
time of the sale, George owned 23 shares in the Malletts
Bay Club, evidenced by Stock Certificate no. 113, which
certificate I am hereby enclosing. I am also enclosing
George’s Stock Transfer Agreement whereby you are to
now ie 7 shares to Mr. Johnson and retain the
remaining 16 shares in escrow until further directive by

476 |

George or, if necessary, pursuant to the order of a court
of competent jurisdiction.

The enclosed handwritten document, signed by Sandy Rounds, as
Trustee of the George S. Gordon Trust and also signed by George
Gordon, reflected an agreement to transfer the stock certificate to
the transfer agent with instructions for the agent to immediately
issue seven shares to J. Douglas Johnson. The document further
provided: “The remaining sixteen (16) shares shall remain in the
control and custody of the transfer agent until further directive by
George Gordon or, if necessary, the order of a court of competent.
jurisdiction.” It further assigned Johnson a right of first refusal to
purchase the sixteen shares from Gordon at a price and on terms
to be determined. George Gordon also signed this document on a
line labeled “Agreed.”

16. The next day, George Gordon signed a substantially similar
document, entitled “Stock Transfer Agreement” which provides
that:

I, George S. Gordon, the owner of twenty-three (23)
shares of [MBC] . . . hereby sell, assign, and transfer
unto J. Douglas Johnson . . . seven [7] shares of said
stock, and do hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint
James McGarry my transfer agent and attorney to
transfer the said seven (7) shares of stock on the books
of [MBC] with full power of substitution in the premises.

Furthermore, I do hereby direct that my remaining
sixteen (16) shares of the capital stock of [MBC], shall
remain in the control and custody of James McGarry
until further directive by me or, if necessary, pursuant to
the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.’

17. In September 1998, Gordon sent a written demand directing
McGarry to send him a stock certificate for the remaining sixteen
shares of the MBC stock that had not been assigned at the time
of the February 1998 sale to Johnson. McGarry did not comply
with that request.

18. In November 1998, Gordon received a letter from Jan
Rozendaal, the new president of MBC. Rozendaal stated, “As the

‘The record reflects that the Trast owned the real property but does not reftect
that it owned the MBC shares. We need not decide which of these two documents
is operative

incoming president of the Malletts Bay Club I seem to have
inherited the matter of your 16 shares of stock.” The letter
references correspondence between Gordon and Johnson concern-
ing the sixteen shares, and says, “While this is primarily a matter
between you and Doug Johnson, the club obviously has a very
real interest in the matter.” The letter acknowledges and responds
to Gordon’s argument that the 1992 amendment to the MBC
bylaws effected a confiscation of his additional shares, and notes
that Gordon had voted for the bylaw amendment which unani-
mously passed in a 1992 directors meeting and the subsequent
stockholders meeting. Rozendaal stated that the directors contin-
ued to support the amendment, and if Gordon was anticipating
any change or repeal of the bylaw he would be disappointed.
Rozendaal concluded by asserting that even if Gordon has decided
that his support for the 1992 amendment was a mistake, he is
legally and ethically bound by it.

19. In December 1998, Gordon responded by letter to
Rozendaal. He expressed his continuing opposition to the 1992
amendment, stating that it is so grossly unfair that he has chosen
to challenge it. He said that one ill-advised and casual vote on
what has proved to be an unworkable and unfair bylaw should not
be taken as a moral commitment to self-enforce it. Gordon
concluded: “I am disappointed to learn that the Board seems
disinclined to take another look at Section 24. I guess we'll have
to wait for a few more owners to sell and repeat my experience.”

110. There were no further communications between Gordon
and the MBC board or McGarry. The matter lay dormant until
after Gordon’s death. In October 2010, Gordon died, leaving his
sixteen shares of MBC stock to his four children, Sandy Gordon
Rounds, John F. Gordon, Richard C. Gordon, and Margaret W.
Gordon. The Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylva-
nia purported to distribute the sixteen shares of MBC stock to
Gordon’s children, and Gordon’s estate was closed. Defendants
dispute the efficacy of that purported distribution.

111. Subsequently, in January and then May of 2011, Rounds
wrote to McGarry requesting that he issue the sixteen shares of
MBC stock to Gordon’s children (four shares apiece). MBC and
arry both declined in separate communications. They took the
position that pursuant to the 1992 bylaw, Gordon was required to
include in his sale all of his MBC shares and therefore he had no
transferable MBC shares at the time of his death. They indicated

478 Le

that no transfer of stock would be made to Gordon’s family
without an order from a Vermont court.

112. Plaintiffs filed suit against MBC and McGarry on October
27, 2014, asserting breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
against McGarry for failing to issue the sixteen shares to Gordon’s
children on demand of Sandy Gordon Rounds, and seeking a
declaratory judgment that MBC waived its right to purchase
Gordon’s shares or to object to Gordon’s transfer to Johnson of
only seven of his twenty-three shares in 1998 at the time the
home was sold. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the remaining
sixteen shares belonged to them. Defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the complaint was barred by the
statute of limitations, and that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by
estoppel, waiver, and ratification because Gordon expressly con-
veyed his property subject to the MBC bylaws and Gordon had
waived any claim that the 1992 bylaw amendment was invalid by
supporting the amendment. Defendants sought dismissal of plain-
tiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment arguing
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until defend-
ants’ 2011 refusals to transfer the shares, and that MBC waived
any claim to the shares when it signed the Waiver and Agreement
in connection with the 1998 conveyance from Gordon to Johnson.

113. In August 2015, the trial court issued its decision on the
cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded
that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by the statute of
limitations because McGarry did not actually refuse to issue the
sixteen shares until 2011; (2) McGarry breached his fiduciary duty
and his agreement as escrow agent by not transferring the sixteen
shares when requested to do so by Sandy Gordon Rounds in 2011;
and (3) plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment that by
signing a document approving Gordon’s sale to Johnson in 1998,
MBC waived its right to challenge Gordon’s failure to transfer the
sixteen shares to Johnson under the 1992 amendment, and that.
the shares belong to plaintiffs. Defendants appealed.

114. We review a motion for summary judgment de novo under
the same standard as the trial court. In re All Metals Recycling,
Inc., 2014 VT 101, 16, 197 Vt. 481, 107 A.3d 895. “[S]ummary
judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Bacon vu. Lascelles, 165 Vt. 214,
218, 678 A.2d 902, 905 (1996) (citation omitted); V.R.C.P. 56(a).

115. Plaintiffs’ case rests on the claims that the Stock Transfer
Agreement compels McGarry to issue sixteen shares to Gordon, or
his successors, on demand, without condition, and that the Waiver
and Agreement reflects MBC’s waiver of the bylaw requirement
added in 1992 requiring that a seller convey all the seller’s MBC
shares to the buyer of a property. For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that: (1) the agreement defining the parties’
rights and obligations with respect to the MBC shares does not
require McGarry to return the shares to Rounds on demand, but,
rather, requires him to relinquish the shares only upon a court
order adjudicating the validity of the 1992 bylaw amendment; and
(2) by signing a document approving the Gordon-to-Johnson sale,
MBC did not waive its right to challenge Gordon’s failure to
transfer the contested shares to Johnson as required by the 1992
amendment.”

116. Hl Generally, the proper interpretation of a contract is a
question of law, which we review without deference. Dep't of Corr.
uv Matrix Health Sys, P-C., 2008 VT 32, 111, 183 Vt. 348, 950
A2d 1201. As with any contract, “our goal is to give effect. to the
intent of the parties as it is expressed in their writing.” Southwick
v. City of Rutland, 2011 VT 58, 14, 190 Vt. 106, 35 A.8d 113.
When the contract language is unambiguous, we take these words
to represent the parties’ intent. Hamelin v Simpson Paper (Vt)
Co., 167 Vt. 17, 19, 702 A.2d 86, 88 (1997). “We assume that
parties included contract provisions for a reason, and we will not
embrace a construction of a contract that would render a provi-
sion meaningless.” In re West, 165 Vt. 445, 450, 685 A.2d 1099,
1103 (1996). The circumstances surrounding the making of an
agreement are admissible in determining whether the agreement
is ambiguous. [sbrandisen x North Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575,
578, 556 A.2d 81, 84 (1988).

117. The Stock Transfer Agreement transfers the sixteen
shares to the control of James McGarry “until further directive by
[Gordon] or, if necessary, pursuant to the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.”

2 We begin by considering the merits rather than the statute-of-limitations defense
because the statute of limitations might present an obstacle to plaintiffs’ claims
against McGarry, but does not necessarily resolve the central issue in this appeal:
who owns the sixteen shares that continue to sit in limbo? Becanse we ultimately
conclude that plaintiffs’ claims do not survive summary judgment on the merits, we
need not address the statute-of-limitations argument.

480 |

118. The circumstances surrounding the execution of these
documents undisputedly illuminates their clear meaning. In their
statement of undisputed facts, plaintiffs acknowledge that Gordon
executed the Stock Transfer Agreement “[i]n connection with the
sale of the property and MBC shares” to Johnson. Plaintiffs’
complaint acknowledges that at the time there was a dispute over
the validity of the 1992 bylaw amendment. Defendants likewise
point to, among other things, correspondence by Gordon in the
fall of 1998 in which he describes the 1992 amendment as “a de
facto confiscation” and explains that he has chosen to challenge
the amendment.

119. BB If McGarry was unconditionally required to relinquish
the stocks upon Gordon’s directive, as Gordon contends, the “if
necessary” clause contemplating a court order as an alternative
would serve no purpose. Gordon’s asking McGarry to hold the
shares would make no sense if the expectation was that Gordon
could get them back on demand, without limitation. The only
reasonable understanding of the document is that McGarry was
required to release the shares upon an agreement between the
parties or an order arising out of litigation resolving the validity
of the bylaw amendment. Accordingly, McGarry has not breached
any obligation, whether contractual or fiduciary, by failing to issue
shares to Gordon or his successors upon demand, and defendant.
McGarry is entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of the
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty counts in plain-
tiffs’ complaint.

120. I Given this, it is also clear that MBC did not waive its
right to enforce the 1992 bylaw amendment by signing a docu-
ment approving the sale. Instruments executed as part of the
same transaction should be read together to discern the intent of
the parties. See O’Brien Bros.’ P’ship, LLP v Plociennik, 2007 VT
105, 115, 182 Vt. 409, 940 A.2d 692 (“[T]wo instruments dealing
with the same subject matter [which] are executed at the same
time by the same parties . . . should be construed together.”);
Wing uv Cooper, 37 Vt. 169, 178 (1864) (“[W]hen several instru-
ments are executed at one and the same time, between the same
parties, and upon the same subject matter, they are to be treated
as one instrument and construed together.”); 11 Williston on
Contracts § 30:26 (4th ed.) (noting that “all writings which are
part of the same transaction” may be “interpreted together,” even

where there is no specific incorporation clause contained in any of
the agreements — “absent anything to indicate a contrary inten-
tion, written instruments executed at the same time, by the same
contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the
same transaction will be considered and construed together as one
contract”). The Stock Transfer Agreement and the Waiver and
Agreement were undisputedly executed at the same time and
neither should be construed in isolation.*

121. [HM Viewing the documents together, the only coherent
explanation of the parties’ intent is that they sought to allow the
Gordon-to-Johnson property transfer to close notwithstanding
their differences concerning the bylaw requirement that Gordon
transfer all of his MBC shares in connection with that conveyance.
The parties agreed that McGarry, then president and transfer
agent for MBC, would hold the sixteen contested shares until the
dispute could be resolved, by agreement or court order if neces-
sary, and MBC would not stand in the way of the Gordon-to-
Johnson transfer. Gordon could then complete his sale to Johnson
and then challenge the 1992 amendment, which he had come to
view as unfair and confiscatory, in the context of negotiations or
court proceedings concerning the sixteen shares.* The Waiver and
Agreement did not constitute a waiver by MBC of the require-
ments of the 1992 amendment, but, rather, reflected MBC’s
agreement to relinquish its rights of first refusal and to allow the
Gordon-to-Johnson sale with the understanding that the shares
would be held by McGarry pending resolution of the outstanding
issues concerning the sixteen shares, whether by agreement or
court order.

122. Because we conclude that MBC did not waive its right to
enforce the 1992 amendment to the MBC bylaws by signing the

® The “Stock Transfer Agreement” signed by George Gordon was executed the day
after MBC signed the “Waiver and Agreement,” but the Stock Transfer Agreement
essentially restates the provisions of the document executed the previous day by
Sandy Gordon Rounds, as trustee of the George S. Gordon Trust, and also signed
that day by George Gordon.

* Although we do not rely on this document in deciding the case, we note that an
undisputed November 2013 email from Sandy Gordon Rounds to the president of
MBC expressly validates our understanding. The email written by Sandy Gordon
Rounds explains that when Johnson bought the Gordon home in February of 1998,
he was not willing to purchase any shares other than the required seven. Gordon
was not willing to give the excess shares away. Gordon allowed the remaining
sixteen shares to be held in escrow “in order to allow the closing to proceed.”

482 |

Waiver and Agreement, defendant is entitled to summary judg-
ment dismissing plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment that
defendant waived its right to enforce that provision.

123. Our award of summary judgment to defendants on these
issues does not fully resolve this case. As a practical matter, an
order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint — the relief sought by
defendants — would leave the parties back in the exact limbo they
have occupied for eighteen years. McGarry would hold the sixteen
shares and may be required to await a court order before taking
any action to transfer those shares. Moreover, in their complaint,
plaintiffs alleged that the 1992 amendment was “not validly voted
on and approved” and requested a declaration that the remaining
sixteen shares of MBC stock belong to plaintiffs. Although we
reject. plaintiffs’ argument that MBC waived its right to enforce
the 1992 bylaws amendment, we do not in this appeal address
plaintiffs’ remaining claim that the amendment was not validly
voted on and approved. This claim was not the basis for plaintiffs’
summary judgment request, and is not resolved by our award of
summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ other claims.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order directing the shares
be issued to plaintiffs and remand for a hearing to resolve this
outstanding issue in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

2016 VT 104

Dennis K. Chandler v. Andrew A. Pallito
[158 A.3d 296]
No. 16-016
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed September 23, 2016
Motion for Reargument Denied October 26, 2016

483

zg
&

Dennis K. Chandler, Pro Se, Baldwin, Michigan, Plaintiff-
Appellant.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David McLean,
Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Jill Paul Martin,
Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Defender General.

11. Skoglund, J. Plaintiff Dennis Chandler appeals a decision
by the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, denying
his claim for summary judgment and granting the summary
judgment motion filed by the Commissioner of the Vermont
Department of Corrections. Plaintiff claims that several statutes
and policies enacted after his incarceration had the collective
effect of retroactively increasing the length of his sentence and, as
a result, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. We affirm, concluding that, because the statutes and
policies did not retroactively alter or limit the Department’s
discretion over plaintiff's treatment programming and early re-
lease, their application did not result in a longer sentence than
under the prior statutes and policies.

12. On February 6, 1997, plaintiff pled guilty to one count of
aggravated sexual assault, one kidnapping count, and one count of

burglary. He was sentenced in April 1997 to twenty-five to sixty
years. At his sentencing hearing, an employee of the Department
described the sex offender treatment programming available to
plaintiff and indicated that programming would not be automati-
cally available to plaintiff prior to his minimum release date, but
that plaintiff would be eligible to have an a ment. The
employee also testified that, based on plaintiffs participation in
the programming and the Department’s assessment of that par-
ticipation, the goal of the sex offender treatment program was for
plaintiff to be released at his minimum incarceration date in 2013.

13. At the time of plaintiff's incarceration, only the parole
statute provided for release at an offender’s minimum release date
— the remainder of the offender’s sentence would be served on
parole. Under that statute — 28 V.S.A. § 501(a) (1997) — offend-
ers with a minimum term were not eligible for parole until they
served the minimum sentence, less any reduction in time for good
behavior.’ Section 501(c) of the same statute granted the Parole
Board the discretionary authority to place such an offender on
parole as long as the Board determined that, after considering
factors like the nature of the offense and the Department’s
examination reports, the offender could be a law-abiding citizen

‘Specifically, the statute mandated that “{nJo inmate serving a sentence with a
minimum term and a maximum term shall be released on parole until he has
served the minimum term of the sentence, less any reductions for good behavior
computed in accordance with section 811 [governing a facility administrator's
required and discretionary ability to reduce time].” 1983, No. 89, § 2. This statute
was amended in 1998 as follows: “(T]he inmate shall be eligible for parole
consideration after the inmate has served the minimum term of the sentence less
any reductions in term for good behavior” 1997, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), §59. The
current version of the statute eliminates the reduction for good behavior and states
that an “inmate shall be eligible for parole consideration after the inmate has
served the minimum term of the sentence.” 2001, No. 61, § 85.

2 Tn 1998, the Legislature removed this subsection and added 28 V.S.A. § 502a(b),
whieh provided:

An inmate shall be released on parole by the written order of the
parole board if the board determines:
(1) the inmate is eligible for parole;

(2) there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released
without detriment to the community or to the inmate; and

(3) the inmate is willing and capable of fulfilling the obligations of a
law-abiding citizen

1997, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), $61. The current version of § 502a(b) retains this
language. 2013, No. 96 (Adj. Sess.), § 187.

486 |

The furlough statute in effect was also completely discretionary,
but authorized the Department’s Commissioner to grant a maxi-
mum fifteen-day furlough for certain purposes, such as securing a
residence or employment upon release.*

14. Subsequently, in addition to the parole and basic furlough
statutes, the Legislature added two new avenues for an offender
to be released at his or her minimum release date: reintegration
furlough was added in 2005 and conditional reentry was enacted
in 2001.4 28 V.S.A. §808(a)(8) of the amended furlough statute
gave the Department discretion to grant reintegration furlough to
an offender in accordance with Department directives and rules
adopted to evaluate the offender’s fitness for reintegration. An
offender in plaintiffs position could be granted reintegration
furlough up to 90 days prior to the completion of his or her
minimum sentence, a timeframe the Legislature extended to 180
days in 2011.° Similarly, the newly enacted conditional reentry
statute, 28 V.S.A. § 723, allowed the Department discretionary

2 This broad discretionary authority to grant furlough allowed the Commissioner

to extend the limits of the place of confinement of an inmate at any
correctional facility if in the judgment of the commissioner the inmate
will honor his trast, by authorizing the inmate under prescribed
conditions to visit a specifically designated place or places for a period
not to exceed 15 days and return to the same facility.

1971, No. 199 (Adj. Sess.), § 20.

‘Plaintiff appears to base his claims on the classification system created by the
Department to administer the conditional reentry program, not the Department
directives that control reintegration furlough; however, given the similarity of the
two policies’ effects and statutory authority, we examine both programs in light of
plaintiffs claims. Compare Dep't of Corr, Agency of Human Servs. Conditional Re-
Entry, Directive 317.15 (2002) [hereinafter Conditional Re-Entry, Directive 371.15],
http://Awww.doe.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/correetional-services-301-550/371-375-
programs-classification-and-case-planning/371.15-%20Directive-%20Conditional%20Re-
entry.pdf [httpsy/perma.ce/ZBP4-ACNW], with Dep't of Corr, Agency of Human
Servs., Reintegration Furlongh, Directive 371.26 (2011), httpy/Avww.doestate.vt.ns/
about/policies/rpd/correctional-services-301-550/371-375-programs-classification-and-
case-planning/371.26%20Reintegration%20Furlough.pdf [https://perma.ce/J58Z-WFY5].
*In 2011, the furlongh statute was subdivided into multiple parts covering
treatment, home confinement, and reintegration furlough. See 2011, No. 41, § 3a.
The new reintegration furlough statute, § 808c, extended the time that an offender
could be released prior to the expiration of his or her minimum release date to 180
days. Id,

a “

authority to place an offender on conditional reentry s
end of his or her minimum sentence. Supervision while on
conditional reentry status was governed by another subsection of
the amended furlough statute, § 808(a)(6). After 180 days of
satisfactory supervision in the conditional reentry program, the
Department could, in its sole discretion, submit a recommendation
to the Parole Board that an offender convicted of offenses such as
plaintiff's should be released on parole.° The Parole Board could
take this recommendation into account at its discretion; however,
the Board’s discretion and the criteria for placing an offender in
the conditional reentry program on parole remained the same as
the prior version of 28 V.S.A. § 501.

15. In response to these legislative changes, the Department
promulgated a series of directives to manage the conditional
reentry and reintegration furlough programs; broadly speaking,
Directive 371.15 governs conditional entry and Directive 371.26
controls the reintegration furlough process. To administer the
conditional reentry program, the Department created a three-
tiered classification system that puts each offender on a custody
level — Level A, B, or C — depending on the Department’s
validated risk assessment of each offender and the offender’s
program needs. An offender's level of custody informs the creation
of an offender’s case plan and also affects the reentry options
available to an offender. Similarly, an offender’s eligibility for
release on reintegration furlough depends on factors like his or
her compliance with the case plan, the offender’s risk of reoffense,
and the level of violence involved in the original crime. Unlike
conditional reentry, however, the reintegration furlough directive
does not explicitly require the Department to consider the offend-
er’s classification level; instead, the level implicitly affects the
Department’s decision to grant or deny reintegration furlough
because an offender’s ability to complete the programming and
case plan — explicit factors in reintegration furlough — depend
on his or her classification level. Ultimately, like conditional
reentry decisions, reintegration furlough determinations are at the
discretion of the Department.

©The listed offenses include all of plaintiff's offenses, See 28 V.S.A. § 725(2)
(describing “listed offenses”); id. §722(2) (defining “listed crime” as any crime
contained in 13 V.S.A. $5301(7)).

7In 1998, the Legislature added 28 V.S.A. §502a and shifted the criteria for
granting parole to this new statute. 1997, No. 148 (Adj. Sess.), § 61

488 |

16. As of 2008, plaintiffs case plan listed his Level of Services
Inventory (LSD risk at twenty-four and his combined reoffense
and violence risk score at sixty-three.* Together, these validated
assessments apparently placed plaintiff in custody Level B.° Level
B offenders are eligible for sex offender treatment programming
only after the Department considers a number of discretionary
factors, such as the risk evident in the instant offense and the
appropriateness of the specific programming methods.’? Once a
Level B offender is placed in a program and “satisfactorily”

5 Plaintiff's reoffense score of forty-three and his violence score of twenty
corresponded to moderate risk of reoffense and low risk of violence in the Vermont.
Assessment of Sex Offender (VASOR) system. See R. McGrath & S. Hoke, Dep’t
of Corn, Agency of Human Servs., Vi. Assessment of Sex Offender Risk Manual
6 (2001), http:/www.esom.org/pubs/VASOR. pdf [https://perma.ce/932V-XH5P].

° Directive 371.08 governs categorization of offenders convieted of the same offenses
as plaintiff — aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, and burglary. See generally
Dep’t of Corr, Agency of Human Servs., Classification of Offenders Convicted of
Listed Offenses, Directive 371.08 (2002) [hereinafter Classification of Offenders
Convieted of Listed Offenses, Directive 371.08], http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/
policies/rpd/correctional-services-301 -550/37 1-375-programs-classification-and-case-
planning/371.08-%20Directive-%20Classification %200f%200ffenders%20Convicted%
20of%20Listed%200ffenses.pdf [https:/perma.ce/T8SNY-XTUS]. We note, however,
that nothing in the appellate record indicates that he was explicitly classified as a
Level B offender and that the statute requiring the classification of certain listed
offenses was not enacted until 1999, after he was sentenced. 1999, No. 4, $1; see
generally Dep’t of Corrs., Agency of Human Servs. Designation of Listed Offenses,
Directive 371.09, §§ 4.2.7, 4.2.18 (2002), httpy/www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/
correctional-services-301-550/371-375-programs-classification-and-case-planning/
371.09-%20Directive-%20Designation %200f%20Listed%200ffenses.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9B3J-6CPT].

Under Directive 371.12, $4.3, the Department determines the programming for
Level A and B offenders using the following standard:

The [Department] shall weigh several considerations in determining
the appropriateness of a program for a specific offender, including (but
not limited to) the eriminogenic risk and need factors evident in the
instant offenses, assessment data collected in various reports and the
LSI, the appropriateness of specific methods, responsivity factors for
the offender, overall risk of recidivism, special needs and accommoda-
tions, and other factors highlighted in the assessment.

Dep't of Corr, Agency of Human Servs., Participation Requirements for Offenders
Convicted of Listed Offenses, Directive 371.12, § 4.3 (2002) [hereinafter Program
Participation Requirements, Directive 371.12], http:/Avww.doe.state.vt.us/about/policies!
rpd/eorrectional-services-301-550/371-375-programs-classification-and-case-planning/
371.12-%20Directive-%20Program%20Participation% 20 Requirements %20for%20
Listed%200ffenders pdf [https:/perma.ce/5F6V-P3LR].

a .

participates in the required treatment programming, conditional
reentry will be granted at the offender’s minimum release date,
subject to additional discretionary exceptions, such as “risk to
public safety”* In the plaintiffs case, his case plan or Offender
Responsibility Plan (ORP) scheduled him to begin the Vermont
Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers (VTPSA) on September 1,
2009, well in advance of his minimum release date.'?

17. On July 1, 2009, the Legislature enacted 28 V.S.A. § 204b,
which prohibited parole, furlough, or any other type of early
release until seventy percent of a “high risk” offender’s maximum
sentence was completed. An offender was “high risk” under § 204b
if, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. §5411b, the offender was convicted of a
listed crime and the Department designated the offender “high
risk” while he or she served the sentence. The definition for “high
risk” was drawn from § 5401(16), which defines “high-risk” as “a
high degree of dangerousness that a sex offender poses to
others.”"*

18. On October 21, 2009, the Department reclassified plaintiff a
Level C offender pursuant to Directive 371.10, the governing
directive for some listed offenses. The brief case note accompa-
nying the plaintiff's redesignation indicates that the Level C
classification was based on the kidnapping of the victim, the sexual
violence that occurred, the victim’s vulnerability and emotional

11Tf the Department determines, at the end of a Level B offender’s programming,
that he or she has not “yet satisfactorily participated in the number of months of
treatment required by his/her sentence” he or she is not eligible for conditional
reentry and, even if the Level B offender completed the programming, a facility
superintendent may recommend that reentry be delayed based on several factors,
including “imminent risk to public safety” Conditional Re-Entry, Directive 371.15,
supra, $$ 4.1, 4.2.

This determination that plaintiff should be considered for VIPSA echoes the two
other case plans contained in the trial court record; in both — one dated May 21,
1999, and the other dated July 9, 2003 — the Department employee recommended
that plaintiff be considered for VTPSA.

18 The subsequent rule adopted by the Department to administer §5411b largely
repeats this requirement that an offender designated “high risk” for purposes of
the internet registry possess a high degree of dangerousness to others, but does
not list specifie crimes that are per se high risk. Determination of High Risk and
Failure to Comply with Treatment for Purposes of Sex Offender Internet Registry
§3.6, Code of Vt. Rules 13 130 025 [hereinafter Determination of High Risk, Rule
13 130 025], httpy/wwwlexisnexis.com/hottopies/codeofvtrules/.

490 |

trauma, and the premeditated nature of the crime.'* Unlike Level
B offenders, the case plans for Level C offenders are focused on
long term confinement; under Directive 371.11, Level C offenders
are not even eligible for treatment programming until the offender
has served his or her minimum sentence. Then, to be eligible for
conditional reentry, Level C offenders must complete any pro-
gramming in an “exemplary fashion” consistent with public safety.
Although the focus of Level C is long term confinement, Level C
offenders are not entirely foreclosed from the conditional reentry
and reintegration furlough programs; similarly, Level C offenders
are still eligible for traditional parole.

19. In February 12, 2010, the Department acknowledged in
another case note that plaintiff's designation as a Level C offender
was a mistake; instead of classifying plaintiff as a Level C
offender, the Department had intended to merely evaluate plain-
tiffs appropriateness for Level C. The Department indicated that
plaintiff's classification would be restored to Level B.

110. Five days later, on February 17, 2010, another Department.
case note described in a “Programming Determination Decision”
that the Department would base plaintiff's case plan on his
anticipated maximum release date. The case note cited supporting
factors like the seventy percent of maximum release date require-
ment articulated in 28 V.S.A. § 204b, plaintiff's “high risk” desig-
nation, his LSI score, and the offense severity. Apparently, this
decision precluded plaintiff from participating in the programming
necessary to be eligible for conditional reentry, particularly the
VTPSA program scheduled in his 2008 case plan.

111. Subsequently, in an April 21, 2010 letter, the Sex Offender
Review Committee informed plaintiff that he would be designated
a “high risk” sex offender under 13 V.S.A. § 5411b(b). Practically,
this designation meant that plaintiff would be placed on the Sex
Offender Internet Registry and that his sentence would be

‘4In addition to these criteria, in order to be designated Level C, an offender must
be evaluated on the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which does not appear
to have occurred prior to plaintiff's Level C classification. Dep't of Corr., Agency
of Human Servs., Level C Designation of Offenders Convicted of Listed Offenses,
Directive 371.10, §4.2.D. (2002) [hereinafter Level C Designation of Offenders
Convieted of Listed Offenses, Directive 371.10], http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/
policies/rpd/correctional-services-301-550/371-375-programs-classification-and-case-
planning/371.10-%20Directive-%20Level%20C%20Designation.pdf [https://perma.ca/
REQ3-2M4Y). In this case, however, the plaintiff's classification has no bearing on
the resolution of his ex post facto claim. See infra, 1 28-30.

subjected to the seventy-percent rule; that is, he would be
required to serve seventy percent of his maximum sentence under
28 VS.A. § 204b. But in Wood u Pallito, the trial court invalidated
the seventy-percent rule’s application to plaintiff, concluding that
the rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. No. 947-12-09 Wnev,
2010 WL 4567692 (Vt. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2010), https://Avww.
vermontjudiciary.org/20062010%20TCdecisioncv1/2010-11-8-5.pdf.

112. After this holding, plaintiff attempted to gain admission to
the treatment programming described in his ORP case plan,
particularly VTPSA. The Department reviewed plaintiff's case and,
in a letter to plaintiff on February 16, 2011, declined to initiate
the sex offender treatment program necessary for plaintiff to be
conditionally reentered into the community. Specifically, the De-
partment concluded that the “egregious nature of the offenses
indicates that the potential risk of harm and risk to public safety
would not be sufficiently mitigated by program participation” and
explained that, rather than enrolling plaintiff in the rehabilitative
program, the Department would review his case every two years.

113. In April 2018, plaintiff filed this action against the
Department’s Commissioner in the superior court. After extensive
discovery and pretrial motions, plaintiff filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Broadly stated, plaintiff argued that the mixture
of statutes and administrative policies described above constituted
a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because their retrospec-
tive application eliminated any “opportunity for him to obtain
parole, or any other type of early release” and created a sufficient
risk of increasing the punishment attached to his crimes. Specifi-
cally, plaintiff alleged that, after the superior court invalidated the
seventy-percent rule’s application to his sentence, the Depart-
ment’s decision to deny his participation in treatment program-
ming effectively created the same result because, if he could not
complete the required VTPSA programming, he could not be
eligible for conditional reentry, reintegration furlough, or parole at
his minimum release date.

114. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment claiming that the statutory changes did not increase the
measure of punishment associated with plaintiff's crimes and that
the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to the Department’s
programming decisions because they were rehabilitative and ad-
ministrative in nature, not punitive.

492 |

115. In its analysis of the competing cross-motions, the superior
court focused on the Department’s historically broad discretion
over programming decisions, concluding that any change in the
way the Department exercised its discretion did not amount to a
legislative act subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. Moreover,
according to the court, the plaintiff provided no evidence that the
Department applied some unwritten rule or policy to him that
subjected his sentence to the same effect as the seventy-percent
rule. Reasoning that because there was no evidence that a change
in the law caused plaintiff to lose the opportunity for parole, the
superior court. granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. This appeal followed.

116. This Court reviews decisions denying or granting summary
judgment by applying the same standard as the superior court. In
re Carter, 2004 VT 21, 16, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281. Under this
standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party; the superior court’s decision will be affirmed if
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also V.R.C.P.
56(a).

117. On appeal, plaintiff repeats his broad argument that the
Department’s decision to deny him the opportunity to participate
in programming amounted to an ex post facto violation, but his
claim now has a slightly different emphasis. Specifically, the
plaintiff argues that the Department’s decision to deny his pro-
gramming improperly relied on the same criteria it used to
designate him “high risk” under 13 V.S.A. §5411b(b) and to
subject him to 28 V.S.A. § 204b’s seventy-percent rule, despite the
superior court’s prior invalidation of this rule. Without this
reliance on the “high risk” designation, plaintiff claims that he
would be automatically eligible for the programming necessary for
his reentry into the community. By contrast, the Department
claims on appeal that the Department’s discretionary classification
and programming decisions are not legislative acts subject to the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Similarly, the Department argues that,
because the programming and classification system was not pro-
mulgated through the Administrative Procedure Act, the policies
do not raise ex post facto concerns.

118. Although we do not agree that the Department’s clas
cation and programming system is immune from ex post fac
analysis, we affirm the superior court’s decision granting the

Commissioner’s summary judgment motion and denying plaintiffs.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, we conclude that, because the statutes and directives
cited by plaintiff did not alter the Department’s fundamental
discretion over treatment programming and early release, their
practical implementation did not create a sufficient risk that
plaintiff would be incarcerated for a longer period than under the
earlier statutes and rules. As a result, the Department is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.

119. JH Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, states may not
retrospectively apply laws to a criminal defendant’s prior actions,
if that retroactive application disadvantages the affected offender.
Lynce vx Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997); see U.S. Const. art. 1,
§ 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall... pass any .. . ex post facto Law.”).
To disadvantage an offender, the law must “retroactively alter the
definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.”
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. wv Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (quotation
omitted). Specifically, to run afoul of the clause, the U.S. Supreme
Court has long made clear that a law must fit within the four
categories described in Calder v Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).!>
See, e.g., Carmell x Texas, 529 U.S. 518, 5389 (2000) (noting prior
precedent holding “it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder’s four
categories”).

120. IM In this case, plaintiff's contention falls within er’s
third category, which prohibits the retroactive application of
“[elvery law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.”
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. A law retroactively increases punishment if,

Tn Calder, Justice Chase described the four categories as follows:

I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words
and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action,
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action, 2nd. Every law that aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to conviet the offender.

3 US. at 390.

494 Le

objectively analyzed, the legislative change “created a sufficient
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the
covered crimes.” Garner vu Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)
(quotation omitted); see also Girouard v. Hofmann, 2009 VT 66,
18, 186 Vt. 153, 981 A.2d 419. No exact formula exists for
determining whether a change in the law affects punishment
sufficiently enough to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; however,
a “speculative and attenuated possibility’ of increasing the pun-
ishment does not trigger an ex post facto violation. Morales, 514
US. at 509.

121. In the context of an offender’s release date, the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that whether a change in a law creates
a sufficient risk of increasing a plaintiffs punishment “is often a
question of particular difficulty when the discretion vested in a
parole board is taken into account.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. In
Morales, for example, the Supreme Court held that a statute that
changed the frequency of parole reconsideration hearings for
certain violent offenders from every year to every three years did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 514 U.S. at 508. In support.
of this holding, the Supreme Court noted that the question was
one of degree that could not be reduced to a “single formula” and
concluded that, under California’s parole structure, the amend-
ment did not alter the statutory standards for determining either
the initial date for parole eligibility or an inmate’s suitability for
parole. Id. at 507. Instead, the amendment merely altered the
method to be followed in fixing a parole release date, “[rJather
than changing the sentencing range applicable to covered crimes.”
Id. at 507-08; cf. Peugh v United States, 569 U.S. 530, 544, 133
S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013) (holding that retroactive application of
advisory sentencing guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause
because guidelines created sufficient risk of increased sentencing
range).

122. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court directly addressed
a state statutory scheme providing a parole board with great
discretion to determine whether an offender should receive early
release. Garner, 529 U.S. 244. In Garner, a new Georgia law
required the Georgia parole board to reconsider parole for all
inmates serving life sentences every eight years, instead of every
three years, as the previous law required. Jd. at 247. As with the
Vermont statute in ef when plaintiff was sentenced, the
Georgia parole scheme as a whole invested great discretion in the

a .

parole board to determine whether an offender could be released
on parole.'®

1123. EM In its analysis, the Supreme Court first reiterated that
the relevant question was whether the new statute created a
significant risk of prolonging the prisoner’s incarceration, empha-
sizing “that not every retroactive procedural change creating a
risk of affecting an inmate’s terms or conditions of confinement is
prohibited.” Id. at 250. In determining whether that sufficient risk
exists, the Supreme Court noted that “(t]he presence of discretion
does not displace the protections of the Hx Post Facto Clause.” Id.
at 253. But the Supreme Court also acknowledged that, in the
context of parole, discretion allows a parole board to adapt to
“{njew insights into the accuracy of predictions about the offense
and the risk of recidivism consequent upon the offender’s release,
along with a complex of other factors.” Id. According to the
Supreme Court, that is exactly what Georgia’s parole scheme
accomplished. Jd. In fact, in conjunction with two other statutes
that qualified the law at issue, the amendment permitted Georgia’s
parole board “a more careful and accurate exercise of the
discretion [it] has had from the outset.” Jd. at 254. More
important, although this more flexible and accurate system
“seem[ed] certain to result in some prisoners serving extended
periods of incarceration,” id. at 255 (quotation omitted), the
“significant risk” test nevertheless required the prisoner to meet.

©The Vermont statute in effect when plaintiff was convicted is remarkably similar
to the statute at issue in Garner, Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-42(c) (1997):

No inmate shall be placed on parole until and unless the board shall
find that there is a reasonable probability that, if he is so released, he
will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person
and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the
welfare of society. Furthermore, no person shall be released on pardon
or placed on parole unless and until the board is satisfied that he will
be suitably employed in self-sustaining employment or that he will not
become a public change.

See also Ga, Code Amn. § 42-9-43 (1997) (listing information parole board should
consider, ineluding wardens’ reports, results of physical and mental examinations,
and reports regarding prisoners’ performance in edueational programs); cf. 28
VS.A. §502a(b) (1997) (‘An inmate shall be released on parole by the written
order of the parole board if the board determines . . . there is a reasonable
probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or
to the inmate; and . . . the inmate is willing and capable of fulfilling the obligations
of a law-abiding eitizen.”)

496 |

a more demanding standard. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
concluded that the prisoner had not met this more rigorous
burden, holding that, “[wJhen the rule does not by its own terms
show a significant risk, the [prisoner] must demonstrate, by
evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the
agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive
application will result in a longer period of incarceration than
under the earlier rule.” Id.
124. Plaintiff fails to meet this burden here.

125. I First, insofar as plaintiff's claims rest on the applica-
tion of 13 V.S.A. §5411b and 28 VS.A. § 204b to his sentence
length, no evidence indicates that either statute created a signifi-
cant risk that plaintiff would be incarcerated for a longer period
of time than his original sentence. By § 5441b’s plain terms, the
Department must designate an offender “high-risk” for the sole
purpose of increasing public access “to his or her status as a sex
offender and related information, including Internet access.” 13
VS.A. §5411b(a). Similarly, although the enactment of the sev-
enty-percent rule in 28 V.S.A. §204b could have retroactively
increased plaintiff's minimum sentence," after the superior court’s
decision holding that § 204b violated the Ex Post Facto Clause,
that statute had no legal effect on the length of plaintiffs
incarceration. Simply stated, neither statute increased nor even
applied to plaintiffs length of incarceration and, as a result,
neither statute constituted an ex post facto violation.

126. As a result, instead of relying on the plain terms of 13
VS.A. §5411b and 28 V.S.A. § 204b, plaintiff endeavors to prove

17 Without making a determinative decision, we note that the practical application
of §204b to plaintiff presents an instructive comparison to the case at bar. Unlike
the current case, if § 204b’s seventy-percent rule had been applied to plaintiff, the
statute’s plain terms would have retroactively increased the length of plaintiffs
minimum sentence. This, presumably, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Peugh, 569 US. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (holding that retroactive application of
advisory sentencing guidelines violated Ex Post Facto Clause because guidelines
increased minimum sentencing range); see also Puckett x Abels, 684 So. 2d 671,
678 (Miss. 1996) (holding that statutory amendment requiring eighty-five percent of
sentence be served before prisoner is eligible for parole is Ex Post Facto Clause
violation). By contrast, plaintiff alleges in this case that a number of changes to
the discretionary statutes and administrative directives created the same effect as
the plain terms of § 204b’s language, a claim we hold to be too speculative because
the statutes and directives cited by plaintiff did not change the Department's
fundamental discretion over his programing. See infra, 11 28-30.

a “

that the Department’s decision to deny his sexual offender treat-
ment programming improperly employed the same criteria as the
determinations under § 204b and §5411b, which then led to the
same effect as the seventy-percent rule. For support, he points to
the February 16, 2011 letter denying his participation in the
programming as well as the February 17, 2010 case note listing
the Department’s decision to “program toward a maximum release
date” and citing factors like the seventy-percent rule, his desig-
nation as “high risk,” his LSI score, and the offense severity. In
particular, he seizes on the language in the Department’s Febru-
ary 17 letter that analyzes the severity of the original offense and
concludes that his “potential risk of harm and risk to public
safety” would not be mitigated by program participation, a
conclusion he claims demonstrates an improper reliance on the
same “findings” used to categorize him as “high risk” for the Sex
Offender Registry. Without this reliance on the “high risk”
designation, plaintiff claims that he would be a Level B offender
and, under Directive 371.15, automatically eligible for the pro-
gramming necessary for his reentry into the community.’

127. MM But plaintiff's claim of improper reliance on “findings”
is too attenuated and speculative to establish an ex post facto
violation. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 508-09 (“These and countless
other changes might create some speculative, attenuated risk of

‘Both plaintiff and amicus curiae claim that plaintiff has been categorized as a
Level C offender, but we note that no evidence in the record establishes this fact.
It is true that the Department’s February 16, 2011 letter denied his participation
in treatment programming, but the letter does not explicitly assign plaintiff a
category level. To the contrary, the letter indicates that all of plaintiff's “risk
assessment scores are in the moderate range,’ including his LSI score. Despite
these moderate scores, the letter concludes that, based on the Department’s review
of the offense details, programming would not mitigate the potential risk of harm
or risk to public safety, This analysis and conelusion is partially consistent with the
directed assessments in plaintiffs case plan and the program referral process for
Level A and B offenders described in the Program Participation Requirements,
supra, Directive 371.12 $43. On the other hand, the two-year review plan
described in the letter is also consistent with a Level C classification. See Level
C Designation of Offenders Convicted of Listed Offenses, Directive 371.10, supra,
$4.4. Similarly, the April 21, 2010 letter did not classify plaintiff as a Level C
offender for purposes of conditional reentry; rather, the “high risk” designation in
this letter plainly relates to plaintiff's placement on the Sex Offender Internet
Registry. Regardless of the classification level, however, plaintifs claim is too
attenuated to demonstrate a significant risk that the length of his incarceration is
greater than under the earlier rules. See infra, WM 29-31

498 |

affecting a prisoner’s actual term of confinement by making it
more difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early release,
but that fact alone cannot end the matter for ew post facto
purposes.”). Collectively, the current statutes governing reentry
provide the Department with the discretion to make programming
decisions for offenders and to determine their eligibility for early
release, as long as that discretion is tempered by the potential
risk to the public and risk of reoffense. See, e.g., 28 V.S.A. § 721
(release on conditional reentry program); id. § 808c(a)(1) (release
on reintegration furlough), id. § 502a(b)(2) (release on parole). This
concern for the potential risks posed by an offender is echoed in
the Department’s directives; for example, the three-tiered condi-
tional reentry classification system uses evidence-based methods
like LSI and VASOR to evaluate an offender's risk of violence to
the community before categorizing an offender. See Classification
of Offenders Convicted of Listed Offenses, Directive 371.08, supra,
§§ 2.1.2, 4.3. Similarly, to be placed in a sex offender treatment.
program, the Department analyzes criteria like the “risk and need
factors evident in the instant offenses.” Program Participation
Requirements, Directive 371.12, supra, § 4.3 (emphasis added).

128. The mere fact that 13 V.S.A. § 5411b uses similar language
and “findings” to place offenders on the Sex Offender Internet
Registry does not demonstrate that the Department’s decision to
delay plaintiff's programming and subsequent early release was an
ex post facto violation. See 13 V.S.A. § 5401(16) (“High-risk’ means
a high degree of dangerousness that a sex offender poses to
others. Dangerousness includes the probability of a sexual
reoffense.”). Practically speaking, the statutes governing treatment
programming and the reentry system operate on a different. track
than 13 V.S.A. §5411b, which governs placement on the Sex
Offender Internet Registry after reentry. See Determination of
High Risk, Rule 13 130 025, supra, § 2 (indicating Department’s
focus under § 5411b is determining whether offender should be
placed on Sex Offender Internet Registry and terms of that
placement). Any similarity between the Department’s analysis of
plaintiffs programming and §5411b is a product of the Legisla-
ture’s intention to minimize the risk to the public and its intention
to notify the public of that risk in all aspe of offender
reintegration. As a result, the use of similar language or “find-
ings” to delay plain programming and to evaluate plaintiff for
the sex offender registry was not improper and, more important,
is far too speculative to establish an ex post facto violation.

a °

129. Moreover, even if we accepted as true plaintiff's argument
that the Department’s reliance on the improper “findings” led the
Department to categorize him as a Level C offender — conse-
quently denying plaintiff's treatment programming and preventing
his early release — plaintiff fails to demonstrate how the retro-
actively applied statutes and administrative directives altered or
eliminated the Department’s fundamental discretion over plaintiffs
treatment programming and led to an increase in his sentence.

130. At the time of his incarceration, plaintiff could be released
only for a maximum fifteen-day furlough for certain reasons, none
of which included reintegration furlough or conditional reentry.
1971, No. 199 (Adj. Sess.), § 20. Further, he was not eligible for
parole until the expiration of his minimum sentence, less any
reductions for good behavior. 28 V.S.A. § 501(a) (1997). The parole
statute gave broad discretion to the Parole Board to grant parole,
after considering whether there was a “reasonable probability that
the inmate be released without detriment to the community or to
himself.” 7d. If the Board did not grant parole, the Board was
required to review an offender’s parole eligibility every six
months, considering factors like “the circumstances of the inmate’s
offense, his previous social history and criminal record, any
presentence report, . . . and the reports of such physical and
mental examinations as have been conducted.” Id. § 501(c) (em-
phasis added). At each review, after considering these factors, the
Board had no obligation to release plaintiff to parole. Similarly, as
the Department’s employee testified at plaintiff's sentencing hear-
ing, plaintiff was entitled only to be assessed for the sex offender
treatment program, he was not entitled to actually be placed in
the sex offender treatment program. Thus, even though plaintiff
was eligible for parole after twenty-five years, any early release
was still dependent on the Department’s discretion, as was any
participation in treatment programming.

131. The subsequent enactment of the conditional reentry and
reintegration furlough statutes did not alter this fact, because the
Department’s fundamental discretion over plaintiff's treatment
programming did not change. Instead, as in Garner, the enact-
ment of the conditional reentry and reintegration furlough stat-
utes allowed the Department to incorporate “[nJew insights into
the accuracy of predictions about the offense and the risk of
recidivism consequent upon the offender’s release, along with a
complex of other factors.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 253. This is evident

500 Le

from the text of the new statutes, which still provided the
Department with discretion over release. See, e.g., 28 V.S.A. § 721
(“An offender . . . may be placed in the community . . . if the
department is satisfied that the offender is demonstrating prog-
ress in his or her reentry programs and that the offender does
not present an unreasonable risk to his or her victims or to the
community at large”); id. § 808c(c) (“The Commissioner may
authorize reintegration furlough.”); id. § 502a(b)(2) (conditioning
grant of parole on discretionary factors like “a reasonable prob-
ability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the
community or to the inmate”). And it is evident from the detailed
use of evidence-based methods like LSI and VASOR to evaluate
an offender’s risk of violence to the community before categorizing
an offender. See Classification of Offenders Convicted of Listed
Offenses, Directive 371.08, supra, §§ 2.1.2, 4.3. Thus, despite the
statutory and administrative changes, the basic structure of plain-
tiffs sentencing range did not change, nor did the Department’s
discretion over his programming. Rather, the newly enacted
statutes and the Department’s directives simply evince “a more
careful and accurate exercise of the discretion the Board has had
from the outset.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 254. Although this more
flexible and accurate system “seems certain to result in some
prisoners serving extended periods of incarceration,” id. at 255
(quotation omitted), we conclude that the “significant risk” test
requires a more concrete demonstration that the statutes and
directives retroactively increased plaintiff's sentencing range.
132. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs reliance on In re
Shaimas, 2008 VT 82, 184 Vt. 580, 958 A.2d 646 (mem.). In
Shaimas we upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the petition-
er’s misunderstanding of the availability of treatment program-
ming and early release did not invalidate his plea deal. /d. 19. To
the limited extent a case involving a plea bargain applies to an ex
post facto claim, we note that this Court acknowledged in
Shaimas that “information concerning parole eligibility is inher-
ently imprecise owing to any number of variables such as the
petitioner’s conduct while in prison, changes in the makeup or
philosophy of parole boards, and changes in the law.” Id. (quota-
tion omitted). Thus, although it is true that the new statutes and
directives attempt to make this information more urate, they
do not alter the Department’s fundamental discretion in a manner
that could retroactively increase plaintiff's quantum of punishment.

133. Similarly, this is not a case where plaintiff's previous
eligibility for early release was eliminated by the new statutes and
directives. See generally Girouard, 2009 VT 66. In Girouard the
plaintiff's sentence contained no minimum term; then, after his
incarceration, a 2001 amendment conditioned all inmates’ reinte-
gration furlough on completion of a minimum prison term. The
plaintiff argued that his lack of a minimum sentence made him
ineligible for furlough and, as a result, his likelihood of parole was
also significantly decreased because the Department’s policy was
to grant parole only if an offender had participated in furlough.
We agreed with the plaintiff, concluding that the passage of the
reintegration furlough statute could have eliminated an opportu-
nity for parole that previously existed for the plaintiff. Jd. 1910,
12. As a result, we reversed the trial court’s decision to grant the
Department’s motion to dismiss and remanded for the trial court
to determine if, in fact, the Department’s policy was to deny
parole if an offender had not participated in furlough. /d. 1 12.
Here, we examine the facts at a later stage in the proceedings,
after the cross-motions for summary judgment. From the more
developed factual record, it is clear that the Department has long
had the discretion to determine the timing of plaintiff's treatment
programming; the new statutes and administrative directives did
not alter this fact.

1134. [I To be clear, the mere fact that the Department has the
discretion to determine whether plaintiff may participate in pro-
gramming does not preclude plaintiff's ex post facto claim. “The
presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the Hw
Post Facto Clause,” Garner, 529 U.S. at 253; rather, nothing
suggests that the Department’s fundamental discretion over the
timing of plaintiff's programming has been changed by a statute
or directive since the date of plaintiffs incarceration. Likewise, we
reject the Department’s arguments that the directives and policies
of the Department may not be examined for ex post facto
violations because they are not legislative acts. “At a minimum,
policy statements, along with the [Department’s] actual practices,
provide important instruction as to how the [Department] inter-
prets its enabling statute and regulations, and therefore whether,
as a matter of fact, the [legislative acts] created a significant risk
of increased punishment.” Id. at 256; Girouard, 2009 VT 66, 1112
(remanding for trial court to determine if, in fact, Department’s
policy was to deny parole if offender had not participated in

502 |

furlough). In this case, plaintiff's claim fails because he can point
to no statute or directive that retroactively removed or limited the
Department’s discretion over his treatment programming and that.
consequently resulted in a longer period of incarceration. Garner,
529 US. at 255.

135. Finally, we briefly address the argument advanced by
amicus curiae, the Office of the Defender General. The Defender
General claims that, since plaintiff's conviction, Vermont has
adopted a “hard line” towards sentencing and treating sex offend-
ers because of negative publicity stemming from the kidnapping,
rape, and murder of Brooke Bennett.!® According to the Defender
General, this negative publicity not only spurred the Legislature
to impose stricter sentencing guidelines, but also prompted the
Department to pursue an unwritten policy of using any means
necessary to increase sex offenders’ quanta of punishment. The
Defender General claims that this pressure, coupled with the
series of statutory amendments described above, increased plain-
tiffs punishment and constituted an ex post facto violation. In an
attempt to support this claim, the Defender General alleges that
two material facts remain in dispute: whether any written or
unwritten rule exists regarding offender suitability for program-
ming and whether the sentencing court considered the impact of
the Department’s treatment plan when imposing plaintiff's sen-
tence.

136. I We fail to see how either alleged material fact remains
in dispute, much less how either impacts our decision. As indicated
above, there are many written directives that govern how offend-
ers are categorized for treatment programming; nevertheless, all
of these directives plainly preserve the discretion the Department
has always had over plaintiffs treatment programming and early
release. Garner, 529 U.S. at 254. Moreover, to the extent the
Defender General relies on an “unwritten policy” adopted in
response to public pressure, we find the claim that public pressure
increased plaintiff's incarceration a far too “speculative and at-
tenuated possibility” Morales, 514 U.S. at 509. Finally, it is

Tm March 2009, the Legislature responded to publie pressure by passing
“Brooke's Law,’ which stiffened penalties against child sex offenders. See “Brooke's
Law” Signed by Governor Wednesday, WPTZ.com (March 4, 2009), http:/
www.wptz.com/-Brooke-s-Law-Signed-By-Governor-Wednesday/5778046_[https://
perma.ee/9EZV-GGDG}.

irrelevant to the ex post facto inquiry if the sentencing court
considered the impact of the treatment plan when imposing
plaintiff's sentence. The question is whether a subsequent law,
retroactively implemented by the Department, “increas[ed] the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” Garner,
529 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted). The factors the sentencing
court used to arrive at the original measure of punishment
attached to the crime do not bear on this comparative analysis.
Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate the practical implementation
of the new statutes and rules resulted “in a longer period of
incarceration than under the earlier rule.” Id. at 255. In this ce
plaintiff fails to make this demonstration.

Affirmed.

2016 VT 115

Edward F. Flanagan v. Nancy duMont (Flanagan)
[159 A.3d 99]
No. 15-466
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed November 4, 2016

Peter G. Anderson of Anderson & Associates, Stowe, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cynthia L. Broadfoot of Broadfoot, Attorneys at Law,
Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Robinson, J. This appeal arises from a dispute regarding
the parties’ obligations with respect to several tax liens discovered
post-divorce in light of two hold-harmless provisions in a final
divorce decree. Wife contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to enforce the hold-harmless and indemnii
cation provisions and failing to address the parties’ respective
obligations with respect to the tax liens. We agree, and a

506 |

ingly reverse and remand so the trial court can address wife’s
claims under Article 13 of the parties’ divorce decree.

12. The parties’ final divorce decree, entered on March 26,
2013, was based on a partial settlement agreement and the court’s
order resolving the remaining contested matters after a contested
hearing. Articles 8, 11, and 13 are particularly relevant to this
appeal.

13. Article 8 awarded wife “sole use, ownership, and pos:
of a property on Taber Hill Road in Stowe, Vermont (the
property) free of any marital interests of husband. Wife was
obligated to refinance the outstanding mortgage loan on the
property to remove husband from any liability by February 26,
2014. In connection with this refinance, husband was obligated to
“execute and deliver appropriate documents of conveyance to
[wife] to convey all right, title and interest in the property.” If
wife was unable to refinance, then she was required to immedi-
ately sell the property at a price agreeable to both parties. In the
event that wife failed to make any mortgage loan payments on the
property, after ten days husband was authorized to make the
outstanding loan payment and offset any sums owed to wife for
spousal maintenance and child support.

14. Article 11 gave husband sole ownership of his business, The
Dayboat Fish Company LLC. Husband was solely responsible for
“all liabilities in connection with the business,” and was required
to “hold [wife] harmless and indemnify her against the payment of
any monies and obligations or expenses in connection [with the
business] which [wife] shall be obligated to pay to third parties by
virtue of [husband's] failure to comply with the terms of this
paragraph, including reasonable counsel fees and costs.”

15. Finally, Article 13 allocated various debts of the parties. In
addition to specifically addressing certain outstanding debts, it
included the following general provisions:

[Wife] shall be solely responsible for any and all debts
or obligations, including credit cards debts [sic], which
are in her name alone.

[Husband] shall be solely responsible for any and all

debts or obligations, including credit cards debts [sic],
which are in his name alone.

Neither party shall incur or contract any debt, charge,
obligation or liability whatsoever for which the other

a ™

party, his or her legal representatives or his or her
property or estate is or may become liable, and shall
indemnify and hold the other party harmless of all loss,
expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) and dam-
ages in connection with or arising out of a breach of the
foregoing.

The provision did not mention any outstanding tax obligations.

16. The trial court found that the events giving rise to this
particular dispute began in February 2014, when wife was unable
to refinance the outstanding mortgage on the property and
accordingly listed the property for sale. Wife entered into a
purchase and sale agreement with a buyer in September 2014 at
a sale price of $220,000. This sale price would have been sufficient
to discharge the outstanding mortgage and provide wife with net
proceeds of about $31,000. The closing for the purchase and sale
of the property was to take place in November 2014. However,
during the title search of the property, the buyers discovered that.
both the IRS and the State of Vermont Tax Department had
outstanding tax liens on the property.

17. The first IRS lien was recorded in the Stowe land records
on November 25, 2013, in the amount of $10,841 for alleged
underpayment of 2011 income taxes. The second was recorded on
January 1, 2014, in the amount of $3949 for alleged underpayment
of 2010 income taxes. Both IRS liens were recorded as against
husband only. The family division noted that the parties filed their
federal taxes jointly for the 2010 tax year, but that it was not
clear how they filed in 2011. As for the state tax liens, the first
was recorded on May 15, 2014, in the amount of $9287, and the
second was recorded on August 29, 2014, in the amount of $1055.
Both of the Vermont tax liens were against “{husband|/Dayboat.
Fish Co LLC” and were for sales and use taxes allegedly not paid
or underpaid by husband’s business.

18. The family division found the record to be “murky and
inconclusive” regarding whether wife knew previously about the
IRS tax claims. Wife testified at the hearing that she looked at
the land records when she originally listed the property, but that
it did not occur to her that she should be looking for outstanding
liens on the land. The family division noted that wife’s claim she
was “totally ignorant” of at least the 2010 tax lien was not
credible because she filed an application for “Discharge of Prop-

508 |

erty from Federal Tax Lien” in January 2014, and had filed with
the IRS a “Request for Innocent Spouse Relief” as to the 2010
tax deficiency in September 2013. However, it also found that.
husband did not inform wife about the existence of any of the
liens and did not inform wife that he was having tax issues, even
though he had admitted the state deficiencies and entered into a
payment plan with the Vermont Department of Taxes in June
2014. In any event, husband was not able to clear the tax liens in
September and October of 2014, thus preventing the closing and
sale of the property.’

19. Because of the difficulties surrounding the attempted sale of
the property, including the need for wife’s tenants to move out
and the consequent loss of her rental income, wife missed some
mortgage payments. Husband eventually made some payments on
the mortgage, and he deducted those payments from the child
support and spousal maintenance payments he owed to wife as
permitted by the final divorce decree. The proper accounting for
these deductions was one of the issues before the trial court
below.

110. Husband’s deductions from child support and spousal
maintenance payments and wife’s inability to sell the property due
to tax liens prompted wife to file with the family division a motion
to enforce the final divorce decree and for attorney’s fees. Wife
pointed to the debt allocation and indemnification provisions in the
final divorce decree, and explained that the likely loss of this
buyer put her in a vulnerable position economically. She requested
that the court order husband to immediately pay the tax obliga-
tions or otherwise arrange for discharge of the liens so that the
home could eventually be sold. In addition, wife requested that the
court order husband to assume wife’s obligation to pay the
mortgage, taxes, and all other carrying costs of the property until
the liens were removed and the property sold. Wife further asked
the court to suspend the provision in the final decree that allowed

‘Tn December 2014 husband apparently received another “Notice of Deficiency”
from the IRS asserting unpaid income taxes by him for the 2012 tax year of
$145,572, plus a substantial tax understatement penalty of $29,114, for a total
amount due of $174,686. This alleged deficiency apparently arose from the sale of
the parties’ other residence in 2012 in connection with which the 1099 documenting
the entire amount of the sale proceeds was issued to husband only. Questions
regarding responsibility for this tax liability were not the subject of the motions
giving rise to this appeal, and are not before us.

husband to offset his mortgage payments from his spousal and
child support obligations. Finally, wife requested that the court
order husband to hold wife harmless and indemnify her for any
damages she suffers from the attachment of his tax liens to the
property.

111. Husband opposed the motion and cross-moved for con-
tempt and enforcement against wife. He argued that because the
trial court had awarded the property to wife before the tax liens
attached, the tax liens were inoperative and wife’s time would be
better spent seeking confirmation from the IRS that the liens are
inoperative. He took the position that any indemnification obliga-
tions he had under the final order “do not arise until such time
as [wife] is actually obligated to pay monies to a third party” and
are not triggered by the tax liens. And he argued that wife was
attempting to modify the final order concerning property division
by requesting that he become responsible for the mortgage and
any taxes and carrying costs associated with it. Husband sought
a contempt finding against wife for her failure to pay the
mortgage. He further requested that the court order wife to
reimburse him for all costs and expenses incurred by him in
paying the past-due mortgage.

112. The family division held a contested hearing on the
motions on April 23, 2015, and July 8, 2015.2 With respect to the
financial issues, the court concluded that the only issue before it
and capable of resolution was “whether the accounting for [the]
mortgage payments not made by [wife], and deductions (or
credits) taken by [husband] against his combined spousal mainte-
nance and child support payment, is accurate” The trial court
found on the basis of the record before it that husband owed wife
a total of $94.30. With respect to the tax liens, their effect on
wife’s ability to sell the property, and wife’s request to suspend
the offset of husband’s child and spousal support obligations on
account of his mortgage payments, the trial court wrote:

As to the larger issue of [wife’s] inability to sell [the
property], the court is unable to force any effective
resolution until the tax liens are resolved, and lifted from

2 Although this appeal focuses narrowly on the property issues before the court in
that hearing, we note that the hearing also addressed mother’s motion to modify
parent-child contact, and much of the court’s order relates to parent-child contact
issues.

510 |

the land records. The latter is essentially undoable on
this record because either [husband] does not have the
wherewithal to do so, or the court under this docket.
number does not have the authority to adjudicate their
respective liabilities. No contempt order, or monetary
sanction is going to have any practical effect or achieve
the desired result.

The court concluded that the “property situation is still too fluid
for the court to make any definitive determination of who owes
what to whom.” It therefore denied without prejudice all requests
regarding the property and ordered husband to pay wife the
outstanding $94.30 in combined spousal maintenance and child
support payments. The court did not consider whether husband
had an affirmative obligation to clear the tax liens, whether he
was liable for any damages pursuant to the indemnification
provisions, or whether wife was entitled to any of the relief she
requested as a means of enforcing husband’s obligation. Wife
appealed.>

113. On appeal, wife argues that the trial court erred by failing
to enforce the hold-harmless and indemnification provisions of the
parties’ final decree and order. Husband reiterates the arguments
he made below as to the merits of wife’s motion.

114. We conclude that the trial court did err in failing to
address the questions raised in wife’s motion as to the parties’
respective legal obligations, and that husband does have a present
legal obligation pursuant to the indemnification provisions.
Whether wife is entitled to any of the remedies she requests is a
matter to be addressed in the first instance by the trial court.

I. Failure to Address Wife’s Claims

115. In her motions, wife argued that husband has various
obligations with respect to the tax liens by virtue of the final
divorce order, and she requested various types of relief to enforce
those obligations. The trial court’s observation that its order was
unlikely to have any practical effect in light of the tax liens and
the parties’ financial circumstances was reasonable, but this fact
did not discharge the trial court from addressing the claims

® Husband did not cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for contempt,
and we do not address that issue.

before it. The trial court should have addressed the arguments in
wife’s motion.

116. MMM Although the trial court may be right that husband
does not have any practical ability to immediately pay the
outstanding taxes that underlie the liens, this fact does not
prevent the trial court from issuing an order reflecting the parties’
respective obligations. The inability to comply with a financial
obligation in an order issued by the family division may be a
defense in a contempt proceeding, 15 V.S.A. § 603(e), but it does
not vitiate the underlying obligation to pay. Moreover, an order
establishing husband’s obligations relative to the liens may have
influenced his decision to leave wife the task of advocating to the
IRS that the liens were invalid. Insofar as the parties’ circum-
stances were, as the court suggested, fairly hopelessly “stuck,” an
order establishing their legal rights was one potential step toward
breaking the logjam. Cf. State x Ryan, 135 Vt. 491, 497, 380 A.2d
525, 529 (1977) (noting in context of pretrial motions in criminal
case that, although trial court has some discretion as to which
motions to resolve before trial versus later, where defendant.
requests ruling that will affect defense strategy and “there is no
apparent reason to postpone the determination of the motion
other than the desire to avoid a difficult issue,” court should rule).

117. Additionally, while the trial court was correct that it did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties’ respective liabilities
to the IRS, and could not have issued a binding order as to
whether the liens were enforceable by the IRS, it did have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the parties’ respective obligations to one
another pursuant to the final divorce decree. Because the issue of
the parties’ obligations to one another was squarely before the
court below, it had a duty to resolve that issue. See Sec’y Vt.
Agency of Nat. Res. x Trish, 169 Vt. 407, 419, 738 A.2d 571, 580
(1999) (recognizing trial court’s “fundamental duty” to “resolve the
issues before it”).

II. Indemnification and Hold-Harmless Clauses

118. Wife argues that the clear and unambiguous language of
Articles 11 and 13 place the burden on husband to bear respon-
sibility for any liabilities in his sole name or associated with his
business. She asserts that the hold-harmless and indemnification
agreements should be read to protect her from the consequences

512 |

of husband’s tax liens currently encumbering the property in her
sole name. She also asserts that, because of husband’s tax liens,
she has suffered damages that are recoverable under the final
decree. Husband argues that the indemnification and hold-
harmless clauses kick in only when wife has paid money to third
parties on account of husband’s debts. Since wife has not been
forced to pay any money on husband’s outstanding tax liens, she
remains unharmed for purposes of the indemnification and hold-
harmless clauses, and therefore there is nothing for husband to
indemnify.

119. [I We interpret final divorce decrees “according to
contract principles.” See Meyncke v Meyncke, 2013 VT 82, 1 12,
194 Vt. 556, 82 A.3d 585 (iting Sumner vu Sumner, 2004 VT 45,
19, 176 Vt. 452, 852 A.2d 611). Our review of the trial court’s
interpretation of any contract is nondeferential and plenary. Dep't
of Corr. x Matrix Health Sys. P-C., 2008 VT 32, (9 11-12, 183 Vt.
348, 950 A.2d 1201. We look first to the explicit terms of the
decree and decide if they are ambiguous. John A. Russell Corp.
v. Bohlig, 170 Vt. 12, 16, 739 A.2d 1212, 1216 (1999). “Where the
language of the decree is unambiguous, we apply it according to
its terms.” Sumner, 2004 VT 45, 19 (citation omitted). “If an
agreement, even if ‘inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly
admits of but one interpretation, it may not be said to be
ambiguous or fatally unclear?” Towslee vu Callanan, 2011 VT 106,
15, 190 Vt. 622, 55 A.8d 240 (mem.) (quoting Isbrandtsen u N.
Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 580-81, 556 A.2d 81, 85 (1988)). Because
the applicability of the indemnification clauses in this case pres-
ents a question of law that we review without deference, and
because a remand would be unnecessary if wife’s arguments had
no merit, we consider the applicability of the indemnification
provisions to the circumstances of this case.

A. The Scope of Articles 11 and 13

120. Hl We conclude that husband does not have present legal
obligations to wife pursuant to Article 11, but that he may have
present legal obligations pursuant to Article 13. “We interpret the
indemnification provisions of this document as we do all contract
provisions — to give effect to the intent of the parties as that

intent is expressed in their writing”* Hamelin x Simpson Paper
(Vi.) Co., 167 Vt. 17, 19, 702 A.2d 8&6, 88 (1997).

121. To indemnify is “[tlo reimburse (another) for a loss
suffered because of a third party’s or one’s own act or default” or
“{tlo promise to reimburse (another) for such a loss” or “[t]o give
(another) security against such loss.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014). To hold a person harmless means “[t]o absolve (another
party) from any responsibility for damage or liability arising from
the transaction.” Id.

122. J In some cases, an indemnitor’s obligation may accrue
only when “the indemnitee has actually paid an obligation for
which the indemnitee has been found liable” and the indemnitor’s
liability is limited to the actual amount the indemnitee was
required to pay. Long vu McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2006). In other cases, a hold-harmless provision may
require the indemnitor to pay certain sums of money or to
perform other acts that will prevent harm or loss to the
indemnitee. Id. Such provisions are sometimes described as “in-
demnity against liability” agreements. Id. (citing Crestar Mortg.
Co. u Peoples Mortg. Co., 818 F. Supp. 816, 819 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Diaz v Diaz, 403 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
Ultimately, the scope of the indemnitor’s liability is determined by
the parties’ intent as reflected in their indemnification provision.

123. IB Applying this guidance, we conclude that husband has
no present legal obligation to wife pursuant to Article 11 solely by
virtue of the tax liens attached to her property. Article 11 assigns
husband sole ownership of his business and requires that he “hold
[wife] harmless and indemnify her against the payment of any
monies and obligations or expenses in connection [with the
business] which [wife] shall be obligated to pay to third parties by
virtue of [husband’s] failure to comply with the terms of [Article
11], including reasonable counsel fees and costs.” Husband’s
obligation under this provision may accrue if wife becomes obli-
gated to pay a third party — in this case the IRS or Vermont
Department of Taxes — but his obligation does not extend to
circumstances like this in which wife is not currently obligated to

* Although the indemnification provision at issue here was incorporated into @ court
order, the record refleets that the parties mutually approved the language of the
indemnification provisions in the court’s order.

514 |

pay the tax arrears upon which the liens are based. See, e.g.,
McDonald v. McDonald, 882 S.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Ky. Ct. App.
1994) (noting trial court had no authority to order husband to
indemnify wife under hold-harmless clause where husband had
underlying debt discharged in bankruptcy and creditor had not
yet proceeded against wife).

124. J In contrast, we conclude that Article 13 imposes a
broader obligation on husband and that he does have potential
present liability on the basis of the tax liens regardless of whether
wife is personally liable for any of the tax arrears. Article 13
assigns to husband and wife responsibility for each of their
respective individual debts and provides:

Neither party shall incur or contract any debt, charge,
obligation or liability whatsoever for which the other
party, his or her legal representatives or his or her
property or estate is or may become liable, and shall
indemnify and hold the other harmless for all loss,
expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees) and dam-
ages in connection with or arising out of a breach of the
foregoing.

(Emphasis added.)

125. Several features of this provision support our conclusion
that husband’s potential legal obligations under Article 13 have
accrued and are not dependent on an enforcement action by a
third party. First, the provision specifically prohibits both parties
from not only personally incurring any obligations for which the
other may become liable, but also from incurring any obligations
which the other’s “property or estate” may become liable. This
provision expressly contemplates and addresses liabilities that
attach to “property” or “estates” in addition to those for which
the other person may become individually liable. Second, the
provision is not limited to indemnifying wife against payment of
monies for which she may become obligated; it expressly provides
for payment of expenses, including attorneys’ fees, and damages
arising from a breach of either party’s obligation not to incur debt
for which the other person or his or her property may become
liable. Husband’s obligation under this broadly worded provision
arises upon breach of his obligation not to subject wife or her
property to liability, rather than upon a third party’s efforts to
collect from wife, determination of her liability, or actual payment

by her. See, e.g., Gardner x Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, 124, 294
P.3d 600 (holding that, where hold-harmless clause required wife
to “prevent harm or loss to” husband resulting from parties’
mortgage, wife must indemnify husband not only for his mortgage
payments, but also for damages flowing from her nonpayment);
Long, 221 S.W.3d at 11 (reasoning that “{a] hold harmless
agreement .. . is generally classified as an indemnity against
liability” agreement).

126. J MM We reject the suggestion that the indemnification
requirement in Article 13 applies only to debt incurred after the
divorce. The placement of this provision in the section governing
“distribution of debts,” immediately following provisions assigning
the parties any and all debts or obligations in their respective sole
names, and the indemnification provision’s express application to
“breach of the foregoing” supports the conclusion that the indem-
nification requirements apply not only to debts incurred post-
divorce, but also to individual debts incurred during the marriage
and either undisclosed or unaddressed in the final divorce order.
To conclude otherwise would render the word “foregoing” super-
fluous. See Dyke w Scopetti, 2015 VT 58, 121, 199 Vt. 127, 121
A3d 684 (applying Pennsylvania law and explaining that “‘we
must give effect to every word and clause’ of a legal instrument,
‘so as not to render any provision nugatory or mere surplusage’ ”
(citation omitted)).

127. I Moreover, this understanding is most consistent with
Article 13 as a whole. Article 13 allocates some specified debts to
one party or another, and each such allocation is accompanied by
an indemnification clause. If we read the clause at issue here as
applying only to post-divorce debts, then Article 18 would allocate
specific debts to each individual through express indemnification
provisions and would provide for indemnification in connection
with debt incurred post-divorce, but would include no enforcement
mechanism for its general catch-all allocation of individual debts.
SKI, Ltd. v Mountainside Props. Inc., 2015 VT 33, 123, 198 Vt.
384, 114 A8d 1169 (“When interpreting a contract, we ‘strive to
give effect to every part of the instrument and form a harmonious
whole from the parts?” (citation omitted)).

B. Application to the Liens in Question

128. We conclude that husband may have breached his obliga-
tions pursuant to Article 13 and may therefore be subject to

516 |

present liability with respect to one of the two federal tax liens,
and that he has breached the requirements of the final divorce
order as to both of the state tax liens.

129. HH Husband has not breached Article 13 in connection
with the tax lien for the outstanding 2010 federal taxes because
those taxes were a joint debt at the time of the divorce. The trial
court found that for the 2010 tax year husband and wife filed a
joint federal tax return, meaning the tax obligation associated
with that return was a joint debt. The court found that following
the divorce wife had requested from the IRS “Innocent Spouse
Relief” in connection with this tax arrearage, and that the IRS
had either denied the relief or had not yet ruled on it.2 Even
assuming that the IRS has formally released wife from the joint
debt so that she is not liable to the IRS, husband has not.
breached Article 13 in connection with that debt because he did
not fail to pay a debt that was his sole debt at the time of the
divorce and did not incur a debt post-divorce for which wife or her
property became obligated.

130. By contrast, it appears that husband has breached Article
13 in connection with the second federal tax lien for underpay-
ment of 2011 income taxes. We hedge in our analysis of the 2011
tax arrearage because the trial court found that the record was
not clear as to whether the parties filed their federal income tax
return jointly in 2011 and that the tax return was not of record.
It also found that the tax lien itself was recorded as against
husband only. On remand, the trial court should determine
whether the 2011 income tax arrearage upon which the tax lien is
based is a personal debt owed by husband only at the time of the
divorce or if it is instead a joint debt.

131. [HM The tax arrearages underlying the two state tax liens
are and were at the time of divorce husband’s sole debts, and his
failure to pay them amounts to a breach of Article 13. Both
arrearages were for unpaid sales and use taxes that were either
not paid or were underpaid by husband’s business. Although the
unpaid taxes were due from husband’s limited liability company,
liability for failure to pay them extends to husband individually. 32

® Wife testified at the hearing that she had been awarded relief from the IRS in
response to her request, and the court admitted a copy of an IRS letter dated
March 13, 2014, reflecting its grant of the requested relief. Our analysis does not
turn on the accuracy of the trial court’s finding on this point,

VS.A. $9703 (providing that liability to pay sales and use tax
extends to any officer or agent of corporation or entity who is
under duty to collect tax and transmit it to tax commissioner). A
substantial portion of the unpaid sales and use taxes were unpaid
at the time of the final divorce, and husband has incurred the
additional debts since that time. Husband’s failure to pay these
taxes, and the consequent impact on wife as a result of the tax
liens, triggers the protections of Article 13 and may support a
claim for damages or other relief.

III. Damages and Remedies

132. Whether in this case wife is entitled to damages or other
remedies is a question for the trial court to consider on remand.
In connection with her motion to enforce below, wife asked the
trial court to: (1) order husband to immediately pay off the liens
or otherwise obtain their discharge from the property; (2) order
husband to assume all carrying costs associated with the property,
including the mortgage and property taxes, until the property is
sold; (3) suspend husband’s ability to offset any mortgage pay-
ments made on the property from his spousal maintenance and
child support obligations; (4) order husband to hold wife harmless
and indemnify her against any obligations or expenses arising
from the tax liens, including but not limited to any cause of action
by the buyers under the purchase and sale agreement; and (5)
order husband to pay any attorney’s fees incurred by wife in
connection with her motion to enforce.

133. Whether any or all of these remedies are warranted by
the evidence and are permissible methods of enforcing husband’s
obligations under Article 13 are questions for the trial court to
consider on remand. Compare Boisselle u Boisselle, 162 Vt. 240,
242, 648 A.2d 388, 389 (1994) (“Vermont law is clear that the court
cannot modify the property disposition aspects of a divorce decree
absent circumstances . . . that would warrant relief from a
judgment generally.”), with Schwartz vu Haas, 169 Vt. 612, 614,
739 A2d 1188, 1190-91 (1999) (mem.) (affirming trial court’s order
under motion to enforce suspending portion of husband’s mainte-
nance payments under decree until wife paid him $50,000 because
this Court “view[ed] this situation as one in which the family court
was not modifying its property division or maintenance award but,
rather, was seeking to enforce the terms of the decree as

518 |

originally entered in the face of intransigence by one of the
parties”).

Affirmed in part (as to claims based on Article 11), reversed in part
(as to claims based on Article 13), and remanded.

2016 VT 117

State of Vermont v. Michael Rondeau

[159 A.3d 1073]
No, 14-048
Present: Reiber, CJ, Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed November 18, 2016

g
icy

a
a
a

a *

Christopher C. Moll, Orleans County Deputy State’s Attorney,
Newport, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Marshall Pahl,
Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Skoglund, J. Defendant Michael Rondeau appeals his
convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual assault, which
were based on an information citing statutes not yet in effect at
the time of the alleged criminal acts. Resolution of his appeal
requires us to answer three related questions: first, whether
defendant’s convictions under the statutes listed in the information
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; second, whether the sentenc-
ing court could, post-verdict and sua sponte, amend the informa-
tion to list statutes in effect when the alleged acts occurred; and
finally, whether the original unamended information provided
sufficient notice to sustain defendant’s convictions under the
statutes in effect when defendant’s alleged criminal conduct oc-
curred. Because we conclude that defendant’s convictions under
the listed statutes violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, that the
sentencing court lacked the authority to sua sponte amend the
information after trial, and that the original, unamended charging
documents provided defendant with insufficient notice of the
charges, we vacate defendant’s convictions.

12. In March 2011, the State charged defendant with two
counts of aggravated sexual assault. The information described the
charges as follows. Count One of the information alleged that
defendant committed aggravated sexual assault in violation of 13
VS.A. §3253(a(8) at some time between October 1989 and
October 11, 1997, when the complainant was under thirteen years
old and defendant was at least eighteen years old. Under the first
count, defendant faced a minimum ten-year sentence, without
possibility of early release, and a maximum sentence of life in
prison. Count Two of the information charged defendant with
violating 13 V.S.A. § 3253a(a)(8), or aggravated sexual assault of a
child as part of a common scheme, during the period between

524 |

October 12, 1997, and October 11, 2000, when defendant was at
least eighteen and the complainant was under sixteen. Under this
count, defendant faced a minimum twenty-five-year sentence,
without possibility of early release, and a maximum of life in
prison. A jury convicted defendant on both counts on May 31,
2013.

13. During the subsequent sentencing hearing on October 25,
2018, the sentencing court raised, for the first time, significant
issues surrounding the charging information and defendant’s con-
viction. Specifically, the sentencing court noted that, although
defendant had been charged and convicted pursuant to an infor-
mation that listed the 2013 versions of § 3253(a)(&) and
§ 3253a(a)(8), the charged conduct occurred approximately a de-
cade before the current statutes were enacted. The aggravated
sexual assault statute was first enacted in 1977,’ amended in
1990,” and then amended again in 2006°; as a result, the conduct
charged in Count One spanned two versions of the aggravated
sexual assault statute, neither of which was the version that was
listed in the information. Similarly, aggravated sexual assault of a
child as part of a common scheme was not enacted until 20094;
thus, defendant was charged and convicted of violating a statute

1 The 1977 version defining aggravated sexual assault read in full: “A person who
violates section 3252 of this title [sexual assault] and causes the other person
serious bodily injury shall be imprisoned for not more than 25 years, or fined not
more than $15,000.00, or both? 1977, No. 51, $1

2 Tn conjunction with an amendment to the basic sexual assault statute, the version
of aggravated sexual assault enacted in 1990 greatly expanded the aggravated
sexual assault definition to nine subsections, including § 3253(a)(8), which read, “A
person commits the crime of aggravated sexual assault if the person commits
sexual assault under any one of the following circumstances: . . . (8) The victim is
under the age of 10 and the actor is at least 18 years of age.” 1989, No. 293 (Adj.
Sess.), § 6.

The 2006 version of aggravated sexnal assault kept the nine subsections
introduced in 1990, including § 3253(a)(8), amending it to read, “A person commits
the crime of aggravated sexual assault if the person commits sexual assault under
any one of the following circumstances: . . . (8) The victim is under the age of 13
and the actor is at least 18 years of age.” 2005, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 10.

4 The relevant provision of § 3253a prohibits aggravated sexual assault of a child as
part of a common scheme and reads:

A person commits the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child
if the actor is at least 18 years of age and commits sexual assault
against a child under the age of 16 in violation of section 3252 of this
title [sexual assault] and at least one of the following cireumstances

that did not exist when the acts alleged in Count Two occurred.
As a result of this new concern, the sentencing court did not
impose a sentence at the hearing. Instead, the sentencing court
asked for additional briefing from the parties to determine
whether defendant’s convictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.

14. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for arrest of judg-
ment under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 34, which the
State opposed.

15. On February 3, 2014, the sentencing court issued a written
order vacating defendant’s convictions. Instead of relying on the
Ex Post Facto Clause, the court vacated the convictions because
the charging information was legally insufficient. Procedurally, the
court noted that defendant’s motion for arrest of judgment was
foreclosed as untimely, but found that, under Vermont Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), defendant could challenge the legal
insufficiency of the information at any time.

16. Further, according to the sentencing court, Count One of
the information was insufficient to charge defendant with aggra-
vated sexual assault under either prior version of the statute.
Specifically, the court determined that the two previous iterations,
which spanned the period when the information alleged that the
acts occurred, had distinct elements not alleged in Count One. The
earliest version, § 3253, governed up to June 1990, and required
“serious bodily injury” for a conviction. Because the information
did not allege this necessary element for Count One, the court
concluded that the charge was insufficient to support a conviction
under the statute’s first iteration. The court then noted that the
second iteration, § 3253(a)(8), which controlled from 1990 to 2006,
prohibited aggravated sexual assault of a victim under ten.
Because the information alleged that the victim was under thir-

exists: . . . (8) The victim is subjected by the actor to repeated
nonconsensual sexual acts as part of the same oceurrence or the vietim
is subjected to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as part of the actor’s
common scheme and plan.

The structure and text of the statute prohibiting aggravated sexual assault of a
child as part of a common scheme mimies a similar subsection in the aggravated
sexual assault statute, §3253(a)(9). Essentially the only difference between aggra-
vated sexual assault as part of a common scheme and aggravated sexual assault of
a child as part of a common scheme is that the later has a mandatory minimum
of twenty-five years. See 13 V.S.A. §3253a(b).

526 |

teen, the court found that Count One could not support a
conviction under § 3253(a)(8) either. Thus, the court vacated the
conviction under Count One. Similarly, the court vacated the
conviction under Count Two because the statute — § 3253a(a)(8)
— did not exist during the time period specified in Count Two,
1997 to 2000.

17. After vacating the convictions, the sentencing court went on
to examine whether “the facts alleged in Counts [One] and [Two]
fairly and sufficiently charged violations of other criminal statutes
in effect at the time.” Although the sentencing court’s language is
unclear, the court appeared to base its authority for this exami-
nation on Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, first redacting
and altering the language of both Count One and Two and then
concluding that the amended versions of the counts sufficiently
notified defendant that he could be convicted under the statutes in
effect when the majority of the alleged conduct occurred: aggra-
vated sexual assault of a victim under ten years old, § 3253(a)(8),
and aggravated sexual assault as part of a common scheme,
§ 8253(a)(9).

18. For Count One, the sentencing court changed the date the
alleged conduct began to July 1, 1990, to avoid the first version of
the aggravated sexual assault statute, which required “serious
bodily injury.” The court also changed the complainant’s age from
thirteen to ten. The altered version of Count One alleged that
defendant:

sometime during the period of Octeber—of1989 [July 1,
1990] up through and including October 11, 1997 engaged
in the crime of aggravated sexual assault... with a child
under the age of 48 [10] at a time when the defendant
was 18 years of age or older, in violation of 13 V.S.A.
§ 8253(a)(8).

According to the court, the altered Count One covered the
majority of defendant’s acts and conformed to the contemporane-
ous version of § 3253(a)(8), aggravated sexual assault of a victim
under ten.

19. For Count Two, because § 3258a(a)(8) did not exist during
the time specified in the information, the sentencing court
changed the statutory citation in the information from
§ 8258a(a(8) to § 3253(a)(9). To conform with § 3253(a)(9), the
court also excised the “irrelevant ages of the victim and actor.”
The new information for Count Two alleged that defendant:

sometime during the period of October 12, 1997 up
through and including October 11, 2000, engaged in the
crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child at-atime
when-the-defendantwas-atteastt ars-ofage-andth
ictim—was—inder—theage—of 46 . . . as part of the
defendant’s common scheme and plan, in violation of 13
VS.A. § 8258ate}8)[(a)(9)].

110. With this altered information in hand, the sentencing court
concluded that the amended charges in Count One and Count Two
provided defendant with sufficient notice of all the essential
elements in § 8253(a)(8) and § 3253(a)(9), as required by Criminal
Procedure Rule 7(b). Specifically, the court determined that the
altered age ranges in both counts were excess elements that did
not substantially mislead or unfairly frustrate the defense. Ac-
cording to the court, the case was not a dispute over age, dates,
and assault details; rather, defendant’s case rested on disproving
the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. Moreover, the court
opined that the redacted information benefited defendant because
the altered counts constricted the State’s original charge and did
not undermine the defense. As a result, the court entered
judgment on the guilty verdicts for the altered versions of Count
One and Count Two, “as limited to the elements and statutes in
effect at the time of the misconduct charged.”

111. The sentencing court concluded its written decision by
sentencing defendant. The court noted that, unlike the statutes
originally charged, the versions of § 3253(a)(8) and § 3253(a)(9)
imposed sua sponte by the court each carried a maximum
sentence of life in prison with no mandatory minimum.* The court
sentenced defendant consistent with these sentencing ranges to a
minimum sentence of twenty-five years and a maximum of life to
serve on each altered count, to run concurrently with each other.

112. On appeal, defendant claims the court erred in three
respects: first, defendant argues the court usurped the jury’s duty
by impermissibly entering a judgment of guilty on the altered

5 The 1977 version of aggravated sexual assault imposed a sentence of not more
than 25 years, 1977, No. 51, §1; the sentence under the version enacted in 1990
was a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, 1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), § 6; and
the sentence under the current version of the statute is “not less than ten years
and a maximum term of life.’ 13 V.S.A. §3253(b). The sentence for committing
aggravated sexual assault of a child is imprisonment for “not less than 25 years
with a maximum term of life” Id. § 8258a(b).

528 |

information; second, defendant contends the court did not possess
the authority to amend the charges sua sponte and post-verdict;
third, defendant asserts the jury’s verdict was not consistent with
the newly identified charges and applicable penalties.

113. HM Although defendant failed to object at trial that the
information was legally insufficient to support a conviction, under
Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) a motion alleging a defect in the
information may be made at any time. See State x Stell, 2007 VT
106, 110, 182 Vt. 368, 937 A2d 649. This is particularly true
where, as in this case, our review of the information implicates
two constitutional provisions directly related to whether a defect
exists in the information: the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Sixth
Amendment.

114. JPM Under the Ex Post Facto Clause, states may not
retrospectively apply laws to a criminal defendant’s prior actions,
if that retroactive application disadvantages the affected offender.
Lynce «x Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997); see U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall... pass any .. . ex post facto Law.”).
The Ex Post Facto Clause protects criminal defendants by
assuring that “legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and
permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
changed.” Weaver x Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment, incorporated by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, confers upon an accused criminal the
right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation
against him or her. State uv Christman, 135 Vt. 59, 60, 370 A.2d
624, 625 (1977); see U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation.”); Vt. Const. ch. I, art.
10 (“That in all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person hath
a right . .. to demand the cause and nature of the accusation.”).

115. Whether defendant’s convictions sufficiently complied with
these constitutional requirements is a question of law that we
review de novo. State wu Thayer, 2010 VT 78, 119, 188 Vt. 482, 14
A3d 231. Specifically, as indicated above, resolution of this appeal
requires us to determine if defendant’s convictions violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause; and, if so, whether the sentencing court could,
post-verdict and sua sponte, amend the information to cure the ex
post facto violation or, alternatively, whether the original informa-
tion provided sufficient notice to sustain defendant’s conviction

a »

under the statutes in effect when the alleged conduct occurred.
We address each count separately, with these questions in mind.

I. Count One: Aggravated Sexual Assault Under § 3253(a)(8)

116. TM It is plain that defendant’s convictions under the
current version of the aggravated sexual assault statute violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause by retrospectively applying a statute
that increased the punishment defendant faced. Thus, we agree
with the sentencing court that defendant’s convictions under the
current aggravated sexual assault statutes should be vacated,
albeit on a different legal basis.° We further conclude that the
information could not be altered sua sponte by the sentencing
court after conviction and that the information as written did not
provide defendant with sufficient notice pursuant to Criminal
Procedure Rule 7 to sustain defendant’s convictions under the
statutes in effect when the acts occurred.

A. Ex Post Facto Clause

117. JIM As stated above, the general focus of the Ex Post
Facto Clause is to protect criminal defendants from “laws that
retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punish-
ment for criminal acts.” Cal. Dep’t of Corr, wv Morales, 514 US.
499, 504 (1995) (quotation omitted). To run afoul of the clause, the
U.S. Supreme Court has long made clear that a law must fit
within the four categories described in Calder x Bull, 3 U.S. 386,
390 (1798).” See Carmell v Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 539 (2000) (noting

As described above, the sentencing court asked the parties to brief the ex post
facto issue raised by defendant’s convictions, but ultimately vacated defendant’s
conviction on the basis that the information was not sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the statutes in effect when the alleged acts occurred. This basis
for vacating defendant’s convictions is cireular and suspect. The plain language of
Criminal Procedure Rule 7(d) precludes amendments post-verdict. See V.R.Cr.P.
7(d) “[T]he court may permit an... information to be amended at any time
before verdict”); infra, 1M 21-38. Without any authority for amending the infor-
mation after the jury’s verdict, defendant’s convictions can stand only if the
original information was sufficient to sustain the convictions under the statutes in
effect when the alleged acts occurred — the basis the sentencing court had already
held invalid.

7In Calder, Justice Chase described the four categories as follows:

I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words
and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action,
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,

530 |

prior precedent holding “it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder’s
four categories”).

118. El Calder’s third category prohibits retroactive application
of “[elvery law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.”
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. A law retroactively increases punishment if,
objectively analyzed, the legislative change “created a sufficient
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the
covered crimes.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000)
(quotation omitted). No exact formula exists for determining
whether a change in the law affects punishment. sufficiently
enough to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; however, a “specu-
lative and attenuated possibility’ of increasing the punishment
does not trigger an ex post facto violation. Morales, 514 U.S. at
509.

119. Here, the Legislature amended the aggravated sexual
assault statute twice, in 1990 and 2006, increasing the penalty
each time. Prior to the 1990 amendment, the maximum sentence
a defendant faced for aggravated sexual assault was twenty-five
years in prison. 1977, No. 51, § 1. The 1990 amendment did not
impose a mandatory minimum, but it increased the maximum
sentence to life in prison. 1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), § 6. Then, the
2006 amendment imposed a mandatory minimum of “not less than
ten years” and retained the maximum sentence of life in prison.
2005, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), §10; see also 13 V.S.A. §3253(b)
(describing sentencing range for violators of § 3253(a)).

120. I ME Thus, under the statutes in effect at the time,
defendant would have faced a maximum of twenty-five years for
the alleged conduct that occurred prior to 1989 and, for the
conduct that occurred between 1990 and 1997, life in prison with
no mandatory minimum. Instead, under the current version of the
aggravated sexual assault statute, defendant faced a mandatory

criminal; and punishes such action, 2nd. Every law that aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to conviet the offender.

3 US. at 390.

minimum of ten years in prison and a maximum of life impris-
onment. See 13 V.S.A. § 3253(b). This retrospectively applied
sentencing range — a ten year mandatory minimum with a
maximum of life in prison — created a sufficient risk that
defendant would receive a higher sentence and, as a result,
constituted an ex post facto violation under Calder’s third cat-
egory. See Peugh v United States, 569 U.S. 580, 544, 133 S. Ct.
2072, 2084 (2013) (“A retrospective increase in the [sentencing]
range applicable to a defendant creates a sufficient risk of a
higher sentence to constitute an ew post facto violation.”); see also
Lindsey x Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400-01 (1937) (holding that
statute that makes “mandatory what was before only the maxi-
mum sentence” violates rule against ex post facto laws).

B. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d): Amending the
Information

121. This does not end our inquiry, however. We must deter-
mine whether the sentencing court could sua sponte amend the
information after conviction to list the statutes in effect when the
alleged acts occurred.

122. MM We conclude that Rule 7(d) does not allow a trial
court to sua sponte amend the information post-verdict. Under
Rule 7(d), “{i]f no additional or different offense is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the court
may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any
time after trial has commenced and before verdict.” V.R.Cr.P. 7(d).
We have upheld “merely technical” amendments under this rule,
as long as the amendment does not prejudice the defendant or
impair his defense. State u Burclaff, 138 Vt. 461, 465-66, 418 A.2d
38, 41 (1980).

123. In this case, although the sentencing court did not cite to
Rule 7(d), the court altered the following portions of Count One’s
charge:

® Our review is somewhat complicated by the sparse authority cited by the
sentencing court for its sua sponte action. The sentencing court altered and
redacted Count One’s language, suggesting that it relied on Criminal Procedure
Rule 7(d), which allows for amendments to the information under certain cireum-
stances prior to verdict. On the other hand, the court did not specifically cite to
Rule 7(d); instead, the court indicated that the information was sufficient under
Rule 7b) to meet defendant’s due process rights. As a result, we examine the
court’s authority under both subsections,

582 |

sometime during the period of Oeteber—ef4989 [July 1,
1990] up through and including October 11, 1997 engaged
in the crime of aggravated sexual assault[, consisting of
contact between the defendant’s penis and the victim’s
mouth, or any intrusion however slight by the defendant’s
hand into the victim’s vagina,] with a child under the age
of 48 [10] at a time when the defendant was 18 years of
age or older, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8).

By altering the information in this manner, the sentencing court
sought to conform the charge with the post-1990 version of
aggravated sexual assault. See 1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.

124. [I But the plain language of Rule 7(d) indicates that it
cannot be invoked post-verdict.? See V.R.Cr.P. 7(d) “(T]he court
may permit an... information to be amended at any time . . .
before verdict.” (emphasis added)); State u O'Neill, 165 Vt. 270,
275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996) (“We presume the Legislature
intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language.”).

125. Moreover, it is plain that the trial court’s alterations
substantially prejudiced defendant under our precedent governing
amendments to an information. In State u Woodmansee, the
original version of Count Three’s information charged the defend-
ant with burglary — specifically entering a building with the
intent to commit larceny — and the information for Count Four
charged the defendant with attempted arson of the same building.

With respect to the timing of the amendment, the majority of our sister
jurisdictions do not allow an amendment to the charging information post-verdict.
See, eg, Me.R.CrP. Ue) (“The court may permit the amendment of . . . an
information at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different crime
is charged and if no substantial right of the defendant is prejudiced” (emphasis
added); R.LR.CrP. 7(e) (“The court may permit an information or a complaint to
be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different
offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.”
(emphasis added)). The likely prejudice to the defendant, moreover, increases as
the trial moves towards verdict. See, e.g., State x Guerra, 562 N.W.2d 10, 12-13
(Minn. 1997) (“Prior to trial the presiding court is ‘relatively free’ to allow an
amendment charging an additional offense in a criminal complaint. But after the
trial has begun and jeopardy has attached, an amendment is appropriate only if it
does not charge an additional or different offense and only if it does not prejudice
substantial rights of the defendant.” (citation omitted); State u Pelkey, 745 P.2d
854, 857 (Wash. 1987) (en bane) (“A criminal charge may not be amended after the
State has rested its case-in-chief unless the amendment is to a lesser degree of the
same charge or a lesser included offense.”).

124 Vt. 387, 389-90, 205 A.2d 407, 409 (1964). Then, on the fifth
day of a six-day trial, the trial court permitted the State to amend
Count Three’s information to indicate that the burglary charge in
Count Three was based on the defendant entering the building
with the intent to commit arson, not larceny. Id. at 388-90, 205
A.2d at 408-09. We set aside the defendant’s subsequent conviction
under Count Three and ordered a new trial. Jd. at 392, 205 A2d
at 410-11. In doing so, we noted that the defendant could “hardly
have failed reasonably to have apprehended the nature of the
offenses with which he was charged”; however, given the consti-
tutional policy underscoring a defendant’s right to be notified of
the charges and the timing of the amendment (five days into a
six-day trial), we held that the prosecuting authority should be
strictly accountable for substantive shortcomings in its pleadings.
Td. at 390, 205 A.2d at 410. Moreover, we concluded that if we
used the defendant’s subjective understanding of the defective
charges as the bellwether for determining whether an amendment
to the charges violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, it
would allow courts to exercise “{aJuthoritarian caprice” instead of
ensuring jus and fair dealing. Id.

126. HM Here, the timing of the court’s alteration occurred
post-verdict, far after the time found questionable in Woodmansee.
Like Woodmansee, moreover, the sentencing court’s alterations
changed substantive factual elements to eliminate the applicability
of the pre-1990 statute and to conform with the post-1990 version
of the aggravated sexual assault statute. First, modifying the
dates and the age of the victim ensured the State would not have
to prove “serious bodily injury,’ as required by the pre-1990
version of aggravated sexual assault. See 1977, No. 51, §1.
Second, as described above, changing the age of the victim to
under ten increased defendant’s sentencing exposure from a
maximum twenty-five year imprisonment to a maximum of life
imprisonment. 1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), §6. Thus, because the
trial court’s modifications occurred post-verdict and altered the
information to expose defendant to a greater penalty, the changes
substantially prejudiced defendant and were not permitted under
Rule 7(d). Compare State u Verge, 152 Vt. 93, 96, 564 A.2d 1353,
1355 (1989) (concluding that amendment effectively raising poten-
tial maximum punishment from six months imprisonment to one
year imprisonment violated Rule 7(d)), with State u Burclaff, 138
Vt. 461, 465-66, 418 A.2d 38, 41 (1980) (finding court had authority

534 |

under Rule 7(d) to permit State to amend charging information at
close of State’s case because amendment was merely technical and
did not prejudice defendant).

127. I More fundamentally, the sua sponte nature of the
alteration implicated separation of powers and usurped the jury’s
role in determining defendant’s guilt. As delegates of the execu-
tive, the power to charge rests with the prosecuting authority,
State v. Wesco, Inc., 2006 VT 93, 111, 180 Vt. 345, 911 A.2d 281,
and courts must hold that authority strictly accountable for
substantive shortcomings in the information. Woodmansee, 124 Vt.
at 390, 205 A.2d at 410. Likewise, the jury must determine that
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of the crime for which he is charged. Sullivan uv
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). Here, the sentencing
court, confronted with defendant’s improper conviction, chose from
one of two aggravated sexual assault statutes that could apply to
defendant’s conduct, summarily altered Count One in lieu of the
prosecution, determined the elements of the new charge were met
beyond a reasonable doubt, and then sentenced defendant — all in
a single written opinion issued post-verdict. This verges on the
authoritarian caprice we warned against in Woodmansee and
cannot stand. 124 Vt. at 390, 205 A.2d at 410. As a result, we
conclude that Rule 7(d) does not allow a court to amend the
information sua sponte and post-verdict.

C. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b): Sufficiency of
the Information

128. Having determined that the sentencing court had no
authority to amend the information post-verdict, we are left with
one remaining question: whether Count One, as originally charged
and without alterations, provided sufficient notice to sustain
defendant’s conviction under either the pre-1990 or post-1990
version of aggravated sexual ult.

129. HB Rule 7(b) requires the information to “be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.” Rule 7(b) is based on the
constitutional requirement that a defendant must be “informed of
the cause and nature of the accusation against him” and ensures
that the information provides a defendant with sufficient notice to
enable an intelligent defense and to protect the defendant from

a *

subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Christman, 135 Vt.
at 60, 370 A.2d at 625-26. At the most basic level, the information
must contain the elements of the offense in order to satisfy the
constitutional demands. See State uv Kreth, 150 Vt. 406, 407-08,
553 A.2d 554, 555 (1988). This is not a subjective inquiry of what
the defendant “actually understood, but a scrutiny of the charge,
as made, to determine what offense is reasonably indicated by its
language.” Christman, 135 Vt. at 60-61, 370 A2d at 625. “A
reasonable understanding of the charge is not based solely on the
precise wording of the information but draws upon the additional
facts found in the accompanying affidavit.” State u Neisner, 2010
VT 112, 127, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597.

130. [BB Defendant’s charged conduct under Count One
spanned a period when two different aggravated sexual assault
statutes controlled. On its face, therefore, Count One as charged
created an ambiguity because defendant could not reasonably
know which aggravated sexual assault statute applied to the
conduct. Moreover, under either version of the statute, the
information lacked an essential element necessary to sustain
defendant’s conviction.

131. Count One alleged that defendant:

sometime during time period of October of 1989 up
through and including October 11, 1997 engaged in the
crime of aggravated sexual assault with a child under the
age of 13 at a time when the defendant was 18 years of
age or older, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8).

Apart from the dates, this information closely tracked the statu-
tory language of the aggravated sexual assault statute as amended
in 2006. See 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(8) (“A person commits the crime
of aggravated sexual assault if the person commits sexual assault
[and] . . . [tlhe victim is under the age of 13 and the actor is at
least 18 years of age.”); 2005, No. 192 (Adj. Sess.), § 10. The
accompanying affidavit contained the facts underlying the charge,
including the complainant’s interview with the state police, which
lists multiple sexual acts perpetrated by defendant on the com-
plainant, beginning in 1988 — when the complainant was four —
and continuing to her birthday in October 2000 — when she
turned seventeen. During the time period specified in Count One,
the complainant described several sexual acts that occurred when

536 Le

she was under ten years old and numerous sexual acts that
happened between the ages of ten and thirteen.

132. [I Despite these specific descriptions, however, Count
One did not state that the complainant sustained a “serious bodily
injury,” as required by the aggravated sexual assault statute in
effect prior to 1990. See 1977, No. 51, § 1. To be a “serious bodily
injury” under the pre-1990 statute, the injury must have “cre-
ate[d] a substantial risk of death or . . . cause[d] serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. And, even if Count.
One contained this element, no factual allegation indicates that the
complainant suffered such an injury during the acts that occurred
prior to 1990. Because Count One does not contain this essential
element, the information was not sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction under the pre-1990 version of the aggravated sexual
assault statute. Kreth, 150 Vt. at 408, 553 A2d at 555 (“An
information that omits an essential element of the crime charged
is defective and cannot serve as the basis of a conviction.”); see
also 1 C. Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Crim. § 125 (4th ed.
2016) (“Every essential element of the offense must be alleged in
the pleading.”).

133. Similarly, Count One omits a necessary element for the
aggravated sexual assault statute in effect from 1990 to 2006. That
statute required the victim to be under ten years old. See 1989,
No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), §6 (amending statute to define aggravated
sexual assault as sexual assault when “victim is under the age of
10 and the actor is at least 18 years of age”). By contrast, Count
One charged defendant with committing the sexual assault when
the complainant was under thirteen, during the period from 1989
to 1997.

134. [EB Generally speaking, “great generality in the date
allegation is acceptable.” 1 Wright, swpra, § 125. And this Court
has specifically found that “time is not an essential element to be
charged in the information” for sex-related crimes. State x Ross,
152 Vt. 462, 465, 568 A.2d 335, 337 (1989). In this case, however,
it is not the time that the acts occurred that is essential to the
statute, but the age of the victim. The victim’s age determines
whether the applicable subsection of the aggravated sexual assault
statute applies, rather than the basic sexual assault statute. See
1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), §6. Indeed, the victim’s age controls

whether a defendant faces a maximum sentence of thirty-five
years in prison or a maximum of life imprisonment. Id. In this
statutory scheme, defendants who sexually abuse children are
more culpable and, for this greater culpability, defendants face an
increased penalty. See State v Walton, 958 S.W.2d 724, 729 (Tenn.
1997) (noting victim’s age was essential element of aggravated
sexual offense against children because age determined culpability
and penalty).

135. Moreover, that essential element could not be ascertained
from the original information, nor could defendant reasonably
know which factual allegations in the affidavit exposed him to
punishment under the aggravated sexual assault statute, without
the essential element of the victim’s age. See Apprendi u New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (noting that, historically, “[tJhe
defendant’s ability to predict with certainty the judgment from the
face of the [information] flowed from the invariable linkage of
punishment with crime.”); see also State u Bradley, 145 Vt. 492,
495, 494 A.2d 129, 132 (1985) (“[A]n essential fact, affecting the
degree of punishment, must be alleged in the information.”).
Although the accompanying affidavit described conduct that oc-
curred when the victim was under ten, it did not put defendant on
notice that Count One was based on that specific conduct. See
State vu Aiken, 2004 VT 96, 111, 177 Vt. 566, 862 A.2d 285 (mem.)
(reversing conviction because “the fact that the accompanying
affidavit described separate conduct for which defendant could
have been charged . . . did not put defendant on notice that
the . . . charge was based on that conduct”). As a result, the
information lacked an essential element necessary to notify de-
fendant of the charge and was not sufficient to sustain his
conviction under the post-1990 version of aggravated sexual as-
sault. Kreth, 150 Vt. at 408, 553 A.2d at 555.

136. HM It is true, as the sentencing court noted, that Count
One and the accompanying affidavit include factual allegations that
could support a charge under the post-1990 version of the
aggravated sexual assault statute. That does not mean, however,
that defendant had notice of the essential elements of the charge
or that the jury actually found the ntial facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. A properly pled charge forms the basis for the
State’s burden of proof and the jury instructions; in turn, correct
jury instructions ensure that the jury determines each essential
element beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S.

538 |

358, 364 (1970) (concluding that due process “protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged”). Under the statute in effect when the alleged acts
occurred, defendant’s guilt and related sentencing exposure de-
pended on the State establishing that the complainant was under
ten and the jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
complainant was under ten when the sexual assaults occurred. But
at trial, as directed by the original charge and jury instructions,”
the jury determined the conduct occurred when the complainant
was under thirteen. Given the three-year difference in the victim’s
age between the initial charge and the altered charge, the
sentencing court could not presume that the jury found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the conduct occurred when the complainant
was under ten. Rather, by concluding that the information pro-
vided defendant with sufficient notice of the charge to sustain his
conviction, the court effectively determined an essential fact in lieu
of the jury, an essential fact. Cf. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78. We
thus conclude that defendant did not have sufficient notice of the
charge under Rule 7(b) because the information does not include
an essential element of the charge.

D. Lesser-Included Offense

137. On appeal, the State argues that the statutory rape
subsection of the sexual assault statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a)(3), is a
lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a victim
under ten. The version of § 3252(a)(3) in effect when the acts
occurred prohibited sexual acts with another person under the age
of sixteen, “except where the persons are married to each other
and the sexual act is consensual.” Because the jury found at trial
that the sexual conduct occurred when the complainant was under
thirteen, the State claims that the sentencing court could infer
that the jury also found each element of § 3252(a)(8) beyond a
reasonable doubt. As a result, the State asks us to remand Count
One for the sentencing court to enter judgment on the lesser-
included offense.

138. EI We need not address whether § 3252(a)(8) is, in fact,
a lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a victim

The trial court instructed the jury that, “The fifth essential element is that at
the time of the sexual assault, [the complainant] was under the age of 13.”

under ten because we conclude that no “inherent authority” exists
for a trial court to infer from a jury’s verdict that the jury also
found the elements of a lesser-included offense, when that lesser-
included charge was not submitted to the jury.

139. MM Under 13 VS.A. § 14(a), a trial court “on its own
motion, may raise the issue of a lesser included offense at a jury
charge conference.” In addition, upon request of either party, the
“jury shall be informed of the lesser included offense if supported
by the evidence.” Id. Although this language seemingly allows a
court to raise the issue of a lesser-included offense sua sponte, it
plainly contemplates that the jury will actually be instructed on
the charge. This aligns with the due process concerns supporting
the lesser-included offense doctrine. As stated in Keeble u United
States, in the general case, “if the prosecution has not established
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged,
and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must .. .
return a verdict of acquittal.” 412 U.S. 205, 212 (1973). An
instruction benefits a defendant because it provides the jury with
a less severe alternative that lessens the risk of an unwarranted
conviction. Beck u Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634, 637 (1980). If after
being acquitted, a trial judge could then determine, sua sponte
and post-verdict, that the jury’s finding supported a conviction of
an uncharged, lesser-included offense, it would completely usurp
the jury’s role and undermine a defendant’s due process rights.

140. MM The State argues that the common law and our
precedent provides the court with the authority to infer that the
jury found the elements of an uncharged, lesser-included offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the State’s first claim,
“{ajt common law the jury was permitted to find the defendant
guilty of any lesser offense necessarily included in the offense
charged,” not the trial court judge. Beck, 447 U.S. at 633.
Moreover, the cases cited by the State do not support the State’s
proposition. For example, in State uw Gosselin, we found that
Count One of the complaint was defective because it lacked a
material element; the defendant was charged with leaving the
e of an accident, but the information did not allege that the
accident resulted in an injury to any person or property other
than the defendant’s vehicle. 110 Vt. 361, 365, 6 A.2d 14, 16 (1939).
We held that the information charged no offense under Vermont
law and that, further, the defect could not be cured by the verdict

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because it could not “be implied or inferred from the finding that
injury as defined by the statute resulted from the accident.” Id.
From this language, the State maintains that a trial court may
cure a defect in the pleading “if and only if such a fact must
necessarily be implied or inferred from the jury finding.” But
Gosselin’s facts and legal analysis are distinct from this case.
First, in Gosselin, we did not consider whether a court could
enter a conviction on a lesser-included offense not given to the
jury; our analysis involved the information’s sufficiency. Second,
nothing regarding a lesser-included offense could be inferred from
the jury finding in this case because the jury was not actually
instructed on the lesser-included offense. Cf. 18 V.S.A. § 14(a). For
the reasons stated, we decline to remand Count One for the
sentencing court to enter judgment on the lesser-included offense.

II. Count Two: Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child Under
§ 3253a(a)(8)

141. Like Count One, defendant’s conviction for aggravated
sexual assault of a child as part of a common scheme violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, the
information could not be altered sua sponte by the sentencing
court after defendant’s conviction and the information as written
did not provide defendant with the notice required under Rule 7.

A. Ex Post Facto Clause

142. J MM As described above, the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits “laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or
increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Morales, 514 U.S. at
504 (quotation omitted). Defendant’s conviction violated this pro-
scription in two respects: first, the law specifically prohibiting
aggravated sexual assault of a child did not exist at the time the

cts occurred; second, an analogous law in effect when the
occurred — aggravated sexual assault as part of a
common scheme, 13 V.S.A. §3253(a)9) — imposed a lesser
mandatory minimum than the statute defendant was convicted of
violating.

143. HM At the most basic level, the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits a conviction that relies on a law enacted after the
alleged conduct occurred, if it criminalizes new conduct or imposes
a greater punishment. Collins u Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 44

a "

(1990) (“[A] law is ew post facto when after an action (indifferent
in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time
declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon
the person who has committed it.” (quotation omitted)); see also
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (listing as first category of law prohibited as
ex post facto, “[elvery law that makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal;
and punishes such action”).

144. HM Here, even if defendant’s conduct was already crimi-
nal under § 3253(a)(9), allowing defendant’s conviction under
§ 3253a(a)(8) would violate Calder’s second category, which pro-
hibits “[elvery law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. Section
3253a(a)(8) was not added by the Legislature until 2009, nine
years after the acts described in Count Two concluded. 2009, No.
1, §30. As noted, the text of § 3253a(a)(8) essentially mirrors the
1990 version of §3253(a)(9), but specifically prohibits aggravated
sexual assault of a child as part of a common scheme. Compare 13
V.S.A. § 8253a(a)(8) (“A person commits the crime of aggravated
sexual assault of a child if the actor is at least 18 years of age
and commits sexual assault against a child under the age of 16 in
violation of section 3252 of this title [basic sexual assault] and
the victim is subjected to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts
part of the actor’s common scheme and plan.”), with 1989, No. 293
(Adj. Sess.) §6 (A person commits the crime of aggravated
sexual assault if the person commits sexual assault ... [and]...
[t]he victim is subjected to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as
part of the actor’s common scheme and plan.”). The fundamental
difference between the two statutes rests in their prescribed
mandatory minimums: a violation of § 3253a(a)(8) carries a man-
datory minimum of twenty-five years, while the 1990 version of
§ 3253(a)(9) did not impose a mandatory minimum. See 1989, No.
293 (Adj. Sess.), §6. Thus, defendant’s conviction under
§ 3253a(a)(8) exposed him to a mandatory minimum of twenty-five
years and, if he were properly charged and convicted under the
1990 version of § 3253(a)(9), he would have faced no mandatory
minimum. This created a sufficient risk that defendant would
receive a higher sentence and, as a result, constituted an ex post
facto violation. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 138 S. Ct. at 2084 (“A
retrospective increase in the [sentencing] range applicable to a

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defendant creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to
constitute an ex post facto violation.”).

B. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d): Amending the
Information

145. As with Count One, we reiterate our holding that the plain
language of Criminal Rule 7(d) does not allow a court to, sua
sponte and post-verdict, amend the charging information. See
supra, I 21-28.

C. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b): Sufficiency of
the Information

146. HI We are left to determine whether Count Two's
original, unaltered language sufficiently informed defendant that
he could be found guilty of violating 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(9) (1990).
As indicated above, to be sufficient, the information must contain
all of the offense’s elements, based on common sense and reason.
Neisner, 2010 VT 112, 127. To make this determination, we must
objectively scrutinize the charge and affidavit to ascertain “what
offense is reasonably indicated by its language.” Christman, 135
Vt. at 61, 370 A.2d at 625. In particular, although the information
must specify the statutory citation the defendant is alleged to
have violated, failure to name the correct citation will not result
in dismissal of the information unless it “misle[d] the defendant to
his prejudice.” V.R.Cr.P. 7(b).

147. The information alleged in Count Two that defendant,

sometime during the period of October 12, 1997 up
through and including October 11, 2000, engaged in the
crime of aggravated sexual assault of a child at a time
when the defendant was at least 18 years of age and the
victim was under the age of 16 by subjecti icti
to repeated non-consens'
contact between the defendant’s penis and the victim’s
vulva, or contact between the defendant’s penis and the
victim’s mouth, or any intrusion however slight by the
defendant’s hand into the victim’s vagina, as part of the
defendant’s common scheme and plan, in violation of 13
VS.A. § 3258a(a)(8).

148. In support of this information, the affidavit alleged that
defendant subjected complainant to multiple sexual acts, beginning

in 1988 — when the complainant was four — and continuing to
her birthday in October 2000 — when she turned seventeen. For
the time period specified in Count Two, complainant recounted a
specific act of sexual intercourse that occurred when she was
home sick from school as well as numerous acts of oral sex in
defendant’s truck and in the family home. The complainant could
not remember the exact dates of the alleged sexual acts, but the
time frame she described was consistent with Count Two's time
period.

149. Plainly, Count Two closely tracks the language of
§ 3253(a)(9)'! but for two differences: first, the information lists
the defendant and complainant’s respective ages during the speci-
fied time period; second, the information describes the statute
violated as “aggravated sexual assault of a child” and lists the
corresponding citation, § 3253a(a)(8). The question becomes
whether these distinctions would prevent a reasonable person
from understanding that Count Two could support a conviction
under § 3253(a)(9). Christman, 135 Vt. at 61, 370 A.2d at 625.

150. HM First, we conclude that the inclusion of the age range
described in Count Two would not, on its own, prevent defendant
from ascertaining the nature of the charge. Unlike the essential
elements lacking from Count One, neither the age of the com-
plainant nor defendant’s age was the critical element that differ-
entiated § 3253(a)(9) from the basic sexual assault statute in effect
at the time. At the time of the alleged acts, age was not an
element of aggravated sexual assault as part of a common scheme
and any age reference in Count Two was merely surplus language

“The version of § 3253(a)(9) enacted in 1990 prohibited aggravated sexual assault
that subjected a victim “to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as part of the
actor’s common scheme and plan” Whether a sexual act is repeated or a single
continuous occurrence depended on a variety of factors, including the following:

[The elapsed time between successive parts of the defendant’s conduct;
whether the defendant's conduct occurred in more than one geographie
location; whether an intervening event occurred between successive
parts of the defendant’s conduct; whether there was sufficient time for
reflection between assaultive acts for the defendant to again commit
himself.

State w Puller, 168 Vt. 396, 400, 721 A.2d 475, 479 (1998). Based on these factors,
the affidavit contains sufficient allegations of repeated acts during the time period
specified in Count Two. Further, the affidavit sufficiently deseribes the sexual
nature of the acts. See 13 V.S.A. §3251(1) (defining sexual acts).

544 |

not necessary to a charge under § 3253(a)(9). See United States v.
Di Pietroantonio, 289 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1961) (“An appellant
should not be able to reverse a conviction on a claim of variance
merely because some surplus statutory language appears in the
indictment unless he can show that he was misled by the use of
the statutory term.”); see also Ross, 152 Vt. at 465, 568 A.2d at
337 (noting that, for sex-related crimes, “time is not an essential
element to be charged in the information”). This surplus language
would not, on its own, deny defendant the right to be informed on
the nature of the allegations.

151. SMM This does not end the inquiry, however. Criminal
Procedure Rule 7(b) indicates that failure to list the correct
citation will not result in dismissal of the information unless it
“misle[d] the defendant to his prejudice.” V.R.Cr.P. 7(b). Although
we have not had occasion to examine this rule, many federal
courts have analyzed the analogous federal version.” See, e.g.,
United States v Groce, 398 F.3d 679, 683 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States u Gordon, 641 F.2d 1281, 1284 @th Cir. 1981). Generally,
these courts have determined that, when the facts alleged in the
information clearly charge a violation of the correct statute, an
incorrect citation does not warrant dismissal of the charge, absent
prejudice to the defendant. Kersten u United States, 161 F.2d 337,
339 (10th Cir. 1947) (affirming conviction despite fact that neither
caption nor body of information listed proper citation or name of
act violated). Examination under Rule 7(b) is thus a two-part
inquiry: whether the facts alleged clearly support the correct
charge; and whether a defendant would be prejudiced by appli-
cation of the correct charge. We conclude that, although the facts
alleged in the affidavit support a charge under § 3253(a)Q),
defendant’s inability to ascertain the penalty prejudiced defendant
under Rule 7(b) and violated his right to be notified of the
charges.

152. [HB Prejudice exists when defendants do not “know with
certainty the offense with which they were charged and_ the
possible penalty threatened.” Smith wv District of Columbia, 387
F.2d 233, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). Thus, the

® Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)@) states, “Unless the defendant was
misled and thereby prejudiced, neither an error in a citation nor a citation’s
omission is a ground to dismiss the indictment or information or to reverse a
conviction.”

prejudice under Rule 7(b) inures, not from the comparative length
of the sentences imposed by § 3253a(a)(8) and § 3253(a)(9), but
from defendant’s inability to know with certainty the possible
penalty he faced. Smith, 387 F.2d at 237; see also Apprendi, 530
US. at 479 (noting that, historically, defendants were able to
predict judgment from charging information); Bradley, 145 Vt. at
495, 494 A.2d at 182 (“[AJn essential fact, affecting the degree of
punishment, must be alleged in the information.”).

153. In this case, everything in the information and its accom-
panying affidavit suggested that defendant was exposed to a
mandatory minimum of twenty-five years and a maximum of life,
a fact that likely informed all aspects of his defense, including
whether to attempt to negotiate a plea deal or not.'* Although it
is true that, if convicted under § 3253(a)(9), defendant did not face
the mandatory minimum imposed by § 3253a(a)(8), no reasonable
defendant could ascertain this fact from the charge or adequately
prepare a defense with this certainty in mind.®

A violation of §3258a(a)(8) carries a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years,
while the 1990 version of § 3253(a)(9) did not impose a mandatory minimum.

“The dissent argues that “the possible impact on plea negotiations is not part of
the prejudice determination” because prejudice is measured by a defendant's
ability to prepare an intelligent defense. Post, 1 64. Although the standard for
analyzing the potential prejudice surrounding plea deals is not as developed in the
notice context, ef. Smith, 387 F.2d at 237, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear
that a defendant may be prejudiced under the Sixth Amendment by a counsel's
ineffective advice to accept or decline a plea deal. See Lafler x Cooper, 566 U.S.
156, 170, 132 S, Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). The Supreme Court’s position acknowledges
“the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not
a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Id. In the notice
context, moreover, a defendant. is statistically more likely to accept a plea deal
when offered a plea that does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence. See
United States x Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 24 417, 449-51 (B.D.N.Y. 2013) (criticizing
government's use of prior felony informations and mandatory minimums to coerce
defendants to plead guilty to lesser sentences without minimums); see also M.
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 492 (2004), http.//
epstein.wustl.edu/research/courses,judpol.Galanter.pdf_ [https://perma.ce/VT9H-
YE2E]. Given these facts, we believe the prejudice inquiry extends to plea
negotiations and is not limited only to acts that oceur at trial, as the dissent
appears to suggest.

18 We are not persuaded by the State’s argument that defendant actually benefited
from the imposition of § 3253(a)(9) because that statute did not impose a
mandatory minimum. As explained above, the prejudice arose from defendant's

546 |

154. More fundamentally, the specific legal circumstances in this
case compounded the prejudice; because defendant’s underlying
convictions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, relying on the
sufficiency of the information to find defendant guilty of the
statutes in effect at the time of his alleged acts stretches the
limits of Rule 7(b).'° In a strikingly similar case, Seaton u State,
the Kansas Court of Appeals concluded that such an attempt to
remedy an ex post facto violation was “fruitless.” 998 P.2d 131, 136
(Kan. Ct. App. 2000). In Seaton, the trial court determined,
post-verdict, that the jury’s findings were sufficient to support a
conviction under the indecent liberties statute in effect when the
acts occurred, in lieu of a conviction that violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Jd. The appeals court held that, because the ex post
facto conviction was void, it was an inappropriate “legal fic-
tion[] . . . to presume that an unconstitutional conviction [could]
be cured by simply announcing that a defendant [was] no longer
guilty of violating the ex post facto law but rather the statutory
provision in effect at the time of the alleged offense.” Id. Similarly,
we conclude that relying on the sufficiency of the information in
these circumstances is not only inappropriate, but also prejudiced
defendant.

155. Because defendant’s convictions under statutes listed in
the information violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, because the
sentencing court had no authority to amend the information after
trial, and because the information was insufficient to put defend-
ant on notice of the charges in effect at the time of his actions,
the convictions must be vacated.

Convictions are vacated.

156. Reiber, C.J., dissenting. Defendant’s conviction for aggra-
vated sexual assault based on repeated nonconsensual sexual acts
should stand. Although the information cited the incorrect statute
and contained superfluous information, it provided defendant with

inability to understand with certainty the penalty he faced and the implications
that uncertainty had on his defense. Smith, 387 F.2d at 237.

16 We note that this is a key difference between the cases cited by the dissent and
this case: none of the cases relied upon by the dissent involved an underlying
conviction that violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, eg., United States v
Kennington, 650 F.2d 544, 546 (th Cir, 1981) (per curiam); United States v
Walker, 557 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1977); Enzor u United States, 262 F.2d 172,
174 (th Cir. 1958); Moore u State, 264 So. 2d 414, 415 (Miss. 1972) (specifically
noting that Ex Post Facto Clause was not implicated),

notice of all elements of the correct charge. Defendant can point
to no way in which he was prejudiced in the preparation and
presentation of his defense. He knew all elements of the charge,
the jury determined those facts against him, and he was sen-
tenced according to the correct statutory range. Therefore, I
would affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence for this charge
and dissent from the majority’s reversal.

157. I concur with the majority’s analysis of the first charge.
This dissent solely concerns the second charge listed in the
information, which was described as a violation of 13 V.S.A.
§ 8253a(a)(8) for aggravated sexual assault of a child as part of a
common scheme. More particularly, the information provided:

sometime during the period of October 12, 1997 up
through and including October 11, 2000, [defendant]
engaged in the crime of aggravated sexual assault of a
child at a time when the defendant was at least 18 years
of age and the victim was under the age of 16 by
subjecting the victim to repeated non-consensual sexual
acts, consisting of contact between the defendant’s penis
and the victim’s vulva, or contact between the defendant’s
penis and the victim’s mouth, or any intrusion however
slight by the defendant’s hand into the victim’s vagina, as
part of the defendant’s common scheme and plan, in
violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3258a(a)(8).

The information listed the penalty for the charge as not less than
twenty-five years to a maximum term of life and fine of not more
than $50,000.

158. The statutory reference is incorrect. Section 3253a(a)(8)
was not enacted until 2009, long after the acts alleged in the
information occurred. See 2009, No. 1, $30.17 Because the incor-
rect. statutory citation was used, the information also contains
unnecessary facts regarding the age of the victim and the
defendant and lists a mandatory minimum that was inapplicable to
defendant. The question is whether these errors require reversal.

1TT agree with the majority’s assessment that retroactively applying § 3253a(a)(8)
to defendant would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution
becanse application of the mandatory minimum sentence, which was enacted after
defendant’s crimes were committed, would expose defendant to a possibly en-
hanced penalty.

548 |

159. An information must provide a “plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.” V.R.Cr.P. 7(b). It should also provide a citation to the
provision of law allegedly violated, but error in the citation or
omission of the citation is not “ground for dismissal of the
indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction or any
other post-conviction relief if the error or omission did not mislead
the defendant to his prejudice.” 7d. The purpose of having a clear
and concise statement of the charge is to “ensure[] that a
criminal defendant is provided with sufficient notice to enable the
preparation of an effective defense.” In re Carter, 2004 VT 21,
113, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A2d 281. In determining whether an
information is sufficient, the information is read in conjunction
with the affidavit of probable cause. Id.

160. Therefore, the error here is not fatal if the information
provided defendant with notice of all essential elements of the
crime and “did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.”
V.R.Cr.P. 7(b); see State u Christman, 185 Vt. 59, 60, 370 A.2d
624, 625 (1977) (explaining that information is sufficient if it “set[s]
forth charges with such particularity as will reasonably indicate
the exact offense the accused is charged with, and will enable him
to make intelligent preparation for his defense”).

161. Despite the reference to the incorrect statute, the notice
requirement was satisfied in this case.'* It is immaterial that the
statutory citation error appears to have been purposeful rather
than inadvertent. The critical inquiry is whether the facts alleged
provide all elements of the proper charge. See 1 C. Wright et al.,
Federal Prac & Procedure: Criminal § 124 (4th ed. 2016)
(explaining that it is facts alleged, rather than statutory citation,
that control, “and so if an indictment or information properly
alleges an offense it is sufficient, even though the attorney for the
government . .. believed that the crime charged was covered by
a different statute”). Although the statute cited was not effective
at the time of defendant’s alleged acts, the crime of aggravated
sexual assault pursuant to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts
existed and was properly described in the information. During the

18 Because the information was sufficient as written to put defendant on notice of
the charge against him, there was no need to amend the information. Therefore,
it is not necessary to reach the question of whether the trial court had authority
under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 to sua sponte amend the information
after trial.

period of the acts described in the information, aggravated sexual
assault was a crime where “(t]he victim is subjected by the actor
to repeated nonconsensual sexual acts as part of the same
occurrence or the victim is subjected to repeated nonconsensual
sexual acts as part of the actor’s common scheme and plan.” See
1989, No. 293 (Adj. Sess.), § 6. The information set forth all of the
essential elements of this charge alleging that defendant had
repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim as part of a common
scheme and plan. Thus, the description of count two in the
information provided defendant with a “plain, concise, and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting” aggravated
sexual assault and satisfied Rule 7(b)’s notice requirement.
V.R.CrP. 7b).

162. In addition, defendant did not suffer prejudice from the
use of the incorrect citation. Certainly, the statutory reference
itself was not prejudicial. See State x Bowers, 673 S.W.2d 887, 888
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (“(T]he erroneous recitation of a statute
is mere surplusage and not fatal to the charging instrument.”).
The question is whether prejudice resulted from the inclusion of
other extraneous information that flowed from the use of the
wrong statute. Because the statute cited in the information had an
additional element, requiring that the act be committed against a
child, the ages of the actor and victim were included in the
information. See 13 V.S.A. § 3253a(a). The majority concedes that
the superfluous content in the information regarding the ages of
the actor and the victim did not require reversal. See State uw
Eaton, 191 P.3d 1270, 1274 (Wash. 2008) (explaining that surplus
information in charging document does not require reversal unless
“it prejudices the accused either by misleading him in making his
defense or by exposing him to double jeopardy”) (Johnson, J.,
concurring). Defendant’s theory at trial was not dependent on his
age or that of the victim. Defendant wholly denied the accusation
and the trial was about the credibility of the victim’s accusations.

163. Further, no prejudice resulted to defendant from the fact
that the information listed a mandatory minimum of twenty-five
years, which was inapplicable to defendant, whose behavior was
criminalized by §3253(a)(9) and not § 3253a(b). There was no
actual prejudice because defendant was sentenced under the
correct statute and was not subjected to the mandatory minimum.
An incorrect statutory citation does not require reversal if “all of
the essential elements of the correct statute are otherwise cov-

550 Le

ered” and the sentence is imposed under the correct statutory
range. United States x Walker, 557 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1977);
see Moore v State, 264 So. 2d 414, 415 (Miss. 1972) (holding that.
even though indictment cited statute that did not become effective
until after alleged crime was committed there was no error where
action was criminal prior to statutory change and penalty did not
change).

164. The majority concludes that defendant was nonetheless
prejudiced because he could not know with certainty the possible
penalty he faced and this “informed all aspects of his defense,
including whether to attempt to negotiate a plea deal.” Ante, 1 53.
This conclusion is faulty for two reasons. First, the possible
impact on plea negotiations is not part of the prejudice determi-
nation. Prejudice is measured by whether a defendant is able to
prepare “an intelligent defense.” State x Brown, 153 Vt. 263, 272,
571 A2d 643, 648 (1989); see Christman, 135 Vt. at 60, 370 A.2d
at 625 (explaining that test of whether information is sufficient is
whether it will enable accused “to make intelligent preparation for
his defense”). Here, defendant does not even allege that he was
impeded in preparing his defense by the inclusion of the incorrect
statutory citation and mandatory minimum sentence. He was put
on notice of all elements of the crime alleged, the jury was
charged with resolving all necessary elements, and defendant was
sentenced under the correct sentencing range.

165. Second, even if prejudice could be imputed based on the
presence or absence of an incentive to accept a plea agreement,
there is no such allegation or demonstration in this case. At no
time, either before the trial court or on appeal, did defendant
allege that he was prejudiced during plea negotiations. Further, it
is insufficient for defendant to allege that he subjectively believed
that he could receive a mandatory minimum and that caused him
to reject the possibility of a plea agreement. Determining preju-
dice is not subjective. It is an objective inquiry of whether the
facts alleged are sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the
charge against him. Christman, 1385 Vt. at 60, 870 A.2d at 625.
“The statute on which an indictment is founded is to be deter-
mined from the facts charged in the indictment, and the facts
pleaded may bring the offense within one statute, although
another statute is referred to in the indictment.” Enzor x United
States, 262 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1958). Objectively, the infor-
mation and accompanying affidavit set forth the elements of

aggravated sexual assault pursuant to a common scheme and
therefore provided defendant with notice that his conduct was
being punished pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 3253(a)(9). See United
States u Kennington, 650 F.2d 544, 546 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that he was influenced to plead not guilty
and therefore prejudiced by incorrect citation in indictment to
statute with maximum five-year sentence where proper charge,
which had a higher maximum sentence, was evident from facts in
charging information).

166. Because the information provided defendant with a definite
statement of all essential elements of the charge of aggravated
sexual assault and he suffered no prejudice from inclusion of the
incorrect statutory citation, I would affirm this conviction.

2016 VT 119

State of Vermont v. Cameron Albarelli
[159 A.3d 627]
No. 15-165
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed November 18, 2016

3
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553

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Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., Chittenden County State’s Attorney,
and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State’s Attorney, Burlington,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Joshua O'Hara,
Appellate Defender, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

11. Skoglund, J. Defendant Cameron Albarelli appeals his
convictions following a jury trial in the Superior Court, Chittenden
Unit, Criminal Division. Defendant asks this Court to reverse his
convictions of simple assault, disorderly conduct, and providing
false information to a police officer. He also challenges various
conditions of his probation. We affirm defendant’s convictions and

a ”

a number of defendant’s probation conditions, but strike several
probation conditions, and remand.

I. Factual Background

12. This case arises from a fight involving two groups of men
that occurred on July 18, 2013, around midnight at the north end
of Church Street in Burlington. As a result of the altercation,
defendant was charged with simple assault, disorderly conduct,
and giving false information to a police officer with the intent to
deflect the investigation. At his jury trial on February 3, 2015, the
State presented several witnesses to prove the charges, including
the complainant, two eye witnesses socializing with defendant’s
group, one eye witness that was unaffiliated with either of the
parties, and the officer who assisted with the arrest. The wit-
nesses described the events on the night of July 18 as follows.

13. That night, the complainant, his brother, and four other
friends were bar hopping on Church Street to celebrate the
complainant’s brother’s wedding, which was the following day.
After a drink at a bar on Pearl Street at the north end of Church
Street, the bachelor party intended to move back south on Church
Street to visit another bar. While they were walking, the com-
plainant’s party observed what was described as “not a friendly
conversation” between an older man sitting alone on a bench and
a group of five people.

14. Defendant was part of that group. According to trial
testimony, he and four friends — two male and two female —
were walking north on Church Street when the older man said
something to the group and, in response, defendant and his two
male friends yelled at and threatened the man.

15. Observing this argument, the complainant’s party suggested
that the three men, including defendant, leave the man alone.
They were told to mind their business. Words were exchanged
between the two groups until defendant “freaked out” and at-
tacked the complainant’s brother. Members of both parties moved
to separate defendant and the complainant’s brother. The com-
plainant, who was about 6'3" tall, placed himself between the men,
with his back to his brother and his face to the defendant, who
was about 5'9" tall.

16. Defendant continued his attack, but now targeted the
complainant. Trial witnesses’ accounts differed regarding the lo-
cation of the fight and the direction in which the fight was

560 Le

moving, but they all agreed that the complainant did not raise his
hands or fight back during defendant’s attack. Instead, the
complainant walked towards defendant to maintain the space
between defendant and the complainant’s brother, even though
defendant repeatedly punched the complainant in the face. After
defendant landed three or more punches, splitting the complain-
ant’s lip, a member of the complainant’s party called the
Burlington Police Department, and defendant and his two male
friends fled south on Church Street.

17. With a description of two males, one in a sweatshirt and
another in a grey t-shirt with “Chicago” written on it, the
arresting officer and sting officer circled the area, observed
two individuals matchin; tion, and stopped them for
questioning. Defendant initially denied being on Church Street or
being involved in any altercation, but after continued questioning,
the assisting officer heard defendant say, without admitting to
being in the fight, that he was outnumbered and had fled south on
Church Street. When the officers asked defendant to identify
himself, he provided the name “Cameron Mitchell” and the birth
date July 14, 1994. The officers discovered no Vermont records
under the provided name and confronted defendant about the
crime of providing false information to a police officer. It was then
that defendant gave his full name, “Cameron Mitchell Albarelli,”
and correct birth date, July 14, 1995. Following this exchange,
defendant was taken into custody and charged with the offenses
listed above.

18. After the State concluded its case, defendant chose not to
present witnesses or evidence. At a subsequent charge conference,
defendant asked the court to instruct the jury on self-defense. The
court refused to give a self-defense instruction because “no
evidence at all” raised the issue of whether defendant believed he
was in immediate danger of bodily harm.

19. Subsequently, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three
charges.

110. At sentencing, defendant asked the court to impose a
sentence crafted around probation and rehabilitation with no
further incarceration. The State requested two additional months
of incarceration, as well as substance-abuse and anger-
management counseling. The court imposed a sixty-day to two-
year sentence, with all but sixty days suspended, which were to

a "

be spent on work crew. In addition, the court imposed “standing
conditions A through N” and several other conditions.

111. This appeal followed. Defendant argues that (1) his simple
assault conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed
to give a self-defense instruction; (2) his disorderly conduct.
conviction should not stand because the evidence was insufficient
to convict and because the court failed to instruct the jury on
unanimity; (3) his false information to a law enforcement officer
conviction should be reversed because there was insufficient
evidence to prove he had the purpose to deflect an investigation;
and (4) the trial court committed a reversible sentencing error
when it imposed defendant’s probation conditions.

II. Simple Assault and Self-Defense Instructions

112. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to provide a
self-defense instruction to the jury. We affirm.

113. JEM To be entitled to a defense instruction, defendant
must establish a prima facie case for each element of the defense
asserted. See State u Wetter, 2011 VT 111, 117, 190 Vt. 476, 35
A3d 962 (citing State u Knapp, 147 Vt. 56, 59, 509 A.2d 1010,
1011 (1986))). Thus, a self-defense instruction is warranted only if
a defendant can show that (1) he had an honest belief that he
faced imminent peril of bodily harm and that (2) the belief was
grounded in reason. See State u Shaw, 168 Vt. 412, 414, 721 A.2d
486, 489 (1998). Once a defendant has satisfied the initial burden
of production for the defense, the burden then shifts to the State
to “disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State uv
Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 220, 719 A.2d 339, 401 (1998). Here, the court
concluded that defendant did not meet his initial burden, and thus
was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. We agree.

114. First, there is a dearth of evidence in the record to show
that defendant believed he was in peril of imminent bodily harm.
In fact, there is testimony that suggests the opposite. Two of the
State’s witnesses testified that, after the initial altercation between
defendant and the complainant had ended and the complainant’s
party had decided to remove themselves and call the police,
defendant pursued the complainant’s party, threatening to attack
again. Another of the State’s witnesses testified that defendant,
with his friend’s encouragement, continued hitting the complain-
ant, even after it was apparent that the complainant was not

562 |

striking back. Defendant suggests the evidence supports a belief
of imminent peril, but he points only to the size difference
between defendant and the complainant, compounded by the
testimony that the complainant walked towards defendant.

115. HM The trial court did not err when it found that this
evidence, as a whole, did not support defendant’s belief of
imminent bodily harm. See, e.g., People x Blair, No. 298377, 2011
WL 4501909, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011) (“The evidence
regarding the size difference between the victim and defendant is
not enough to support an inference of self-defense.”); State u
Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (“Something
more than fear of size, however, is required to justify . . .
self-defense.”); State u Davis, No. 01 JE 18, 2002 WL 924609, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to find defendant had belief of
imminent bodily harm and holding that even though victim was
walking towards and pointing his finger at defendant, victim “was
not waiving his fists in [defendant’s] face,” his “hand was not even
balled into a fist, nor was [he] even touching [defendant]”); cf.
People v Rodriguez, 631 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(finding defendant presented sufficient evidence to raise issue of
self-defense when record indicated that — along with evidence
showing defendant was physically smaller than victims — defend-
ant observed men beating another man; defendant attempted to
break up fight; defendant was hit over head with beer bottle;
defendant ran away but was chased by eight to ten larger men;
and when defendant was cornered, he took out little pocket knife
and “started swinging because [he] was scared”).

116. Further, defendant failed to show that his belief of
imminent bodily harm was based in reason. Without citing sup-
porting case law, defendant argues that the court should have
inferred the belief was reasonable from the evidence of the size
difference and the forward progress of the complainant. This
Court agrees with the lower court’s conclusion there was “no
evidence at all that [the complainant] was acting aggressively
toward [defendant],” and thus concludes that the presented evi-
dence was insufficient to infer a belief based in reason. See, e.g.,
People v Dillard, 745 N.E.2d 185, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding
that evidence that victim was physically larger and had initiated
first of two altercations could not support self-defense instruction);
Rajnic v. State, 664 A.2d 432, 436 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)
(affirming that evidence was sufficient to support jury’s finding

that defendant did not have reasonable belief of bodily harm, even
though victims were larger than defendant, intoxicated, and
“charged into defendant’s bedroom on the heels of the threats”);
State u Broussard, 768 S.E.2d 367, 370 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015)
(denying self-defense instruction where “uncontroverted evidence
shows that defendant fully and aggressively participated in the
altercation,” even though defendant was significantly shorter and
lighter than victim).

117. [MM Defendant further contends that the law does not
require defendant to wait until “[the complainant] cocked his fist
back to punch” in order to be entitled to a self-defense instruc-
tion. We agree; it is well-established that “{t]he right of self-
defense does not require that one be actually assaulted.” State v.
Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302, 307, 609 A.2d 972, 975 (1992). As described
above, however, the right of self-defense does require that a
defendant have an honest and reasonable belief that he faces
imminent bodily harm. Shaw, 168 Vt. at 414, 721 A.2d at 489.
Here, no evidence sufficiently established this belief. Because “[a]
court’s obligation to charge on a defendant’s theory is limited to
situations in which there is evidence supporting the theory,” State
uv Nunez, 162 Vt. 615, 617, 647 A.2d 1007, 1009 (1994) (mem.), the
lower court did not err by refusing to instruct on self-defense
after defendant failed to prove the necessary prima facie case.'

118. We find no error and affirm the lower court’s refusal to
issue a self-defense instruction.

III. Disorderly Conduct.

119. Couched in the self-defense jury instruction argument,
defendant briefly contends that the evidence was insufficient to
convict on disorderly conduct and that “there [was] a jury
unanimity problem because the jury instructions did not require
the jurors to be unanimous as to the conduct that resulted in [the
disorderly conduct] conviction.” We affirm.

A. Insufficient Evidence

120. TB Defendant argues that the State did not produce
evidence sufficient to establish the elements of disorderly conduct,

TWe note that defendant presents several arguments as to why the alleged jury
instruction error would not be harmless. Because defendant’s arguments rest on
the assumption that error occurred, which we conclude it did not, we do not
address these arguments.

564 |

as defined by 13 V.S.A. § 1026(a) — specifically, that the State
failed to show defendant “recklessly creat[ed] a risk” of “public
inconvenience or annoyance” by “engagling] in fighting . . .
behavior.” Id. “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the Court must determine if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the State and excluding modifying
evidence, fairly and reasonably supports a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State x Vargas, 2009 VT 31, 1118, 185 Vt. 629,
971 A.2d 665 (mem.) (quotation omitted). “In doing so, we assess
the strength and quality of the evidence; evidence that gives rise
to mere suspicion of guilt and leaves guilt uncertain or dependent.
upon conjecture is insufficient.” State uv Albarelli, 2011 VT 24,
117, 189 Vt. 293, 19 A.3d 130 (quotation omitted).

121. EB First, defendant contends that because there was a
lack of evidence as to how the fight between defendant and the
complainant’s brother started, the State failed to produce suffi-
cient evidence to show defendant “engaged in fighting behavior.”
“Where the statute does not specifically define a term, courts
resort to the common understanding of a term.” State u Amsden,
2013 VT 51, 119, 194 Vt. 128, 75 A.3d 612. The verb “engage” is
defined as “[t]o employ or involve oneself; to take part in; to
embark on.” Engage, Black’s Law Dictionary 570 (8th ed. 2004).
Thus, the State does not need to prove that defendant started the
fight, but only that he was part of it. Viewed in a light most
favorable to the State, the witnesses’ testimony that defendant
repeatedly punched complainant’s brother “fairly and reasonably
supports” the conclusion that defendant “engaged in fighting
behavior” Vargas, 2009 VT 31, 918.

122. J MM Defendant continues by arguing that the State did
not. sufficiently prove he recklessly caused the risk of public
inconvenience or annoyance. We have adopted the Model Penal
Code’s definition of recklessness, which states:

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a

2 The complainant testified to witnessing a fight between defendant and the
complainant’s brother. Two additional State witnesses, although unclear on the
timeline of the fight with the complainant and the fight with the complainant’s
brother, testified that the complainant's brother was involved in a fight with
defendant, and that the complainant attempted to separate the two.

a .

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material ele-
ment exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
Stal known to him, its disregard involves a
deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.

Model Penal Code § 2.02(¢); see, e.g., State uv Brooks, 163 Vt. 245,
251, 658 A.2d 22, 26 (1995); State v O'Connell, 149 Vt. 114, 115
n.1, 540 A.2d 1030, 1031 n.1 (1987). Additionally, we have held that
“{iIntent is rarely proved by direct evidence; it must be inferred
from a person’s acts and proved by circumstantial evidence.” State
v Cole, 150 Vt. 458, 456, 554 A2d 258, 255 (1988) (citation
omitted). Thus, while “the conduct giving rise to the criminal
liability is confined to that which was charged,” defendant’s
behavior leading up to and following the charged conduct is
“probative with respect to [his] mental state at the time of the
alleged disorderly conduct.” Amsden, 2018 VT 51, 125.

1123. [I This Court has also affirmed that proof of defendant’s
awareness of the risk can be satisfied not only by evidence that a
crowd of people were drawn to the incident, but also by evidence
that the conduct occurred in a public place with or without people
present. State uv Lund, 144 Vt. 171, 178-79, 475 A.2d 1055, 1060
(1984) (concluding that disorderly conduct may be based on
showing that tumultuous behavior occurred in public place, with or
without many people present), overruled on other grounds by
State v Begins, 148 Vt. 186, 531 A.2d 595 (1987); State v Pickett,
137 Vt. 336, 338-39, 403 A.2d 272, 273-74 (1979) (finding sufficient
evidence of intent where defendant engaged in threatening behav-
ior while observed by crowd sufficient to establish intent).

124. JH Here, the State presented evidence of defendant’s
behavior surrounding the charged conduct, including testimony
that: the events of the night took place in a public place; there
was a loud, heated exchange of words between defendant and
complainant’s group; at least one member of the public was drawn
to the incident; members of both groups tried to separate
defendant from the complainant’s brother; and defendant pursued
the complainant’s group after both fights were separated. We are
satisfied that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed in a light
most favorable to the State, “fairly and reasonably supports” the

566 Le

jury’s conclusion that defendant was aware of the risk posed by
his behavior but consciously disregarded it through behavior that
was a gross deviation from that of a law-abiding person in
defendant’s situation. See Pickett, 137 Vt. at 389, 403 A.2d at 274.

B. Unanimity-of-Jurors

125. [HB Defendant argues that his conviction of disorderly
conduct for engaging in fighting behavior must be reversed
because the court’s instructions failed to identify what conduct.
was the basis for the charge — the fight with complainant’s
brother or the assault on complainant. Before reviewing the
merits of defendant’s jury unanimity argument, it must be noted
that this challenge was not preserved for appellate review per
Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Because the record is
void of any effort by defendant to object to the instruction on
disorderly conduct, we can review only for plain error. See State
uv Myers, 2011 VT 48, 117, 190 Vt. 29, 26 A3d 9.

126. HI We have consistently held that “{p]lain error will be
found only in rare and extraordinary cases where the error is
obvious and strikes at the heart of defendant’s constitutional
rights or results in a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Streich, 163
Vt. 381, 353, 658 A.2d 88, 53 (1995); see also State vu Gagne, 2016
VT 68, 131, 202 Vt. 255, 148 A.3d 986; State u Bruno, 2012 VT
79, 148, 192 Vt. 515, 60 A3d 610. To find plain error, “(1) there
must be an error; (2) the error must be obvious; (3) the error
must affect substantial rights and result in prejudice to the
defendant; and (4) we must correct the error if it seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.” State x Herrick, 2011 VT 94, 118, 190 Vt. 292, 30 A3d
1285.

1.27. HM The Vermont Constitution ensures a defendant’s right
to unanimous jury verdicts. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10. “(WJhere
there is evidence of more than one act that would constitute the
offense charged, the State must specify the act for which it seeks
a conviction.” State u Gilman, 158 Vt. 210, 215, 608 A.2d 660, 664
(1992). This ensures a defendant's right to a unanimous verdict by
protecting against the possibility that “part of the jury will base
its decision to convict on evidence of conduct different from that
considered by the rest of the jury.” Id.

a “

1.28. IB Looking at the instructions as a whole, we find that
the court’s instruction on disorderly conduct failed to specify the
conduct the jury should examine to convict defendant of the
charge. However, said failure does not rise to the level of plain
error because it could not result in prejudice to defendant and the
miscarriage of justice.

129. First, the trial court included a general instruction on
unanimity, clearly stating the “necess[ity] that each juror agree to
[each verdict].” State x Verge, 152 Vt. 93, 97-98, 564 A.2d 1353,
1355-56 (1989) (finding no plain error where court gave general
instruction on requirement of juror unanimity and defendant did
not request special verdict); see also United States u Eagle Elk,
820 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The mere fact . . . that an
instruction could conceivably permit a jury to reach a non-
unanimous verdict is not sufficient to require reversal when the
jury has been instructed that it must reach a unanimous verdict.”).

130. Of far more importance, in both the State’s opening and
closing arguments the disorderly conduct charge was specifically
tied to defendant’s altercation with complainant’s brother. Defend-
ant’s closing arguments recognized that the disorderly conduct
charge was based on defendant’s fight with the complainant’s
brother. “So one of the State’s charges is disorderly conduct.
They‘re saying that basically, you know, Mr. Albarelli engaged in
fighting behavior on Church Street stemming from the altercation
or alleged altercation with [the complainant’s brother].” In his
brief to this Court, defendant acknowledges that “the State and
the defense argued about whether the scuffle with [complainant’s
brother] constituted disorderly conduct for engaging in fighting
behavior.” Thus, although the court’s instruction lacked specificity,
no reversal is warranted; it is reasonable to conclude that the jury
understood that the charge of disorderly conduct referred to
defendant’s fight with the complainant’s brother.

IV. False Information to a Police Officer
A. Section 1754(a)

131. Defendant argues that 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a), which prohibits
knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer,
must be construed narrowly, so as to not criminalize otherwise
protected speech. Although we agree that §1754(a) must be
construed to avoid criminalizing protected speech, we conclude

568 |

that defendant’s behavior falls squarely within § 1754(a)’s reach
and that the statute, as applied, does not criminalize protected
speech.

132. In May 2006, the Legislature amended § 1754(a). The
modified section reads: “A person who knowingly gives false
information to any law enforcement officer with purpose to
implicate another or to deflect an investigation from the person or
another person shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or
fined not more than $1,000.00, or both.” 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a)
(emphasis indicates amendment language). Although the meaning
of the original statutory language is well established, we have
addressed the new language of § 1754(a) only once. See State u
Delaoz, 2010 VT 65, 189 Vt. 385, 22 A.2d 388, superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated by State x Scott, 2013 VT 103,
195 Vt. 330, 88 A.3d 1173. There, we were asked to determine the
admissibility of a piece of evidence. Without examining the specific
statutory language, we held that “[bJecause intent must be
inferred from a person’s acts and proved by circumstantial
evidence, possession of a handcuff key triggers a reasonable
inference that defendant ... had taken steps to avoid prosecution
and punishment.” /d. 130. Because Delaoz speaks only to the
issues of evidence admissibility and sufficiency, we are still left
with the task of construing the meaning and breadth of § 1754(a).

133. BB Our main goal in “statutory construction is to
determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature” In re
CS., 158 Vt. 339, 348, 609 A.2d 641, 643 (1992) (citation omitted).
To do so here, we look at the meaning of one operative clause: “A
person who knowingly gives false information to any law enforce-
ment officer with purpose ... to deflect an investigation from the
person.” First, structurally and grammatically, all three elements
are within a single clause. Each one is intrinsically linked to the
next — the false information must be given to a law enforcement
officer and it must be given with the purpose to deflect an
investigation. These are not separate elements that can be
checked off individually; instead, they are one clause explaining
the action necessary to violate § 1754(a).

134. I Next, when specifically considering the phrase “with

purpose to deflect an investigation from the person,” we look at
the plain meaning of the individual language. The Model Penal

a .

Code, which forms the basis for the statute’s original iteration,
states that a person acts purposely if, when “the element involves
the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(1) revised cmts. (Am. Law
Inst., Proposed Official Draft 1985). And, the verb “deflect” is
defined as “to keep (something, such as a question) from affecting
or being directed at a person or thing.” Deflect, Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deflect [https://
perma.cc/EA6R-FA8W]. Taking these two plain meanings together,
to violate § 1754(a), an individual must give false information to a
law enforcement officer to achieve his or her conscious objective of
directing the investigation away from him or herself. Here,
defendant’s actions fit squarely within this definition. See infra,
TW 36-43.

135. We recognize that the language of § 1754(a), if interpreted
too broadly, could result in the statute’s uncertain application in
some factual circumstances. Indeed, after a brief comparison to
other similar statutes it is clear that, in some respects, the
statutory language is more broad than other statutes, while in
other respects it is more narrow.’ Defendant seizes on this
ambiguity at the fringes of § 1754(a) and argues that the broad

° The MPC § 241.5, which covers “False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities?”
reads “(1) Falsely Incriminating Another. A person who knowingly gives false
information to any law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another
commits a misdemeanor.” The original version of pre-2006 version of § 1754 mirrors
this closely, reading, “A person who knowingly gives false information to any law
enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another [commits a misdemeanor)”
1981, No. 223 (Adj. Sess.), § 28. However, § 1754 parted ways with the MPC when
the “deflect” clause was added in 2006. 2005, No. 149 (Adj. Sess.), $ 1.

For example, §1754(a) criminalizes false information intended to deflect the
investigation from the speaker, but the majority of other state statutes limit
false-reporting misdemeanors to actions intended to ineriminate or implicate
another person. See, eg., N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4 (“A person who knowingly gives
false information . . . with purpose to implicate another”); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906(a)
[A] person who knowingly gives false information . . . with intent to implicate
another”); Mont. Code Ann. 45-7-205 (“A person . . . knowingly . . . gives false
information . . . with the purpose to implicate another”); K.R.S. $519.040 (‘A
person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident when he . . . [k]nowingly gives
false information to any law enforcement officer with intent to implicate another.”)
At the same time, the word “deflect” is only used in § 1754(a), which appears to
narrow the statute’s application in comparison to similar statutes. Cf, eg. K.R.S.
§ 519.040; N.C.G.S.A. § 14-22 ({A]ny person who shall willfully make or cause to
be made to a law enforcement agency or officer any false, deliberately misleading

570 |

application of §1754(a) could result in the criminalization of
otherwise protected speech. In these circumstances, however, we
are not dealing with a broad restriction on false speech because
the statutory prohibition is linked to preventing government
waste.

136. J MM “(AJs a general matter, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” Ashcroft x Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573
(2002) (quotation omitted). Although this protection extends to the
majority of false speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear
that the First Amendment does not protect all false statements
“made to any person, at any time, in any context.” United States
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720, 182 S. Ct. 25387, 2546 (2012)
(“{C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a
general matter, only when confined to the few historic and
traditional categories of expression long familiar to the bar.” Id. at
717, 182 S. Ct. at 2544 (quotations omitted)). For restrictions on
speech to stand, even restrictions on false speech, “[t]here must
be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the
injury to be prevented.” Id. at 725, 182 S. Ct. at 2549. In Alvarez,
for example, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that such a link exists
when the statute in question “also protect[s] the integrity of
Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false
speech.” /d. at 721, 182 S. Ct. at 2546. Similarly, under § 1754, the
prohibition of false speech is directly linked to a defendant’s
intent to deflect a government investigation, thus preventing
government waste.> We do not read § 1754(a) to criminalize all
false statements to law enforcement agents, regardless of a
defendant’s intent. Rather, as stated above, the statute prohibits
false statements intended to deflect an investigation.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

137. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of giving false

or unfounded report, for the purpose of interfering with the operation of a law
enforcement agency . . . shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor”)

® Defendant argues that this direct link is missing. We disagree. As explained
above, the Alvarez Court specifically noted that statutes protecting the integrity of
government processes link the restriction on false speech to the prevention of
government waste. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722-23, 132 S. Ct. at 2547.

information to law enforcement with the purpose of deflecting the
investigation. He contends that the State failed to produce evi-
dence sufficient to prove defendant had the intent to deflect the
investigation from himself. We affirm.

138. I We review denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal de novo. State v. Ellis, 2009 VT 74, 121, 186 Vt. 232, 979
A2d 1023. A judgment of acquittal is proper only if the State
failed to put forth any evidence to support a jury verdict. See
State vu Couture, 169 Vt. 222, 226, 734 A2d 524, 527 (1999);
V.R.Cr.P. 29. As explained above, “[w]e are not triers of fact, and
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” State v
Johnson, 2013 VT 116, 127, 195 Vt. 498, 90 A.8d 874. This Court
must “consider[ ] whether ‘the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the State and excluding any modifying evidence,
fairly and reasonably tends to convince a reasonable trier of fact
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?” Ellis,
2009 VT 74, 1.21 (quoting State vu Turner, 2003 VT 73, 17, 175 Vt.
595, 8380 A.2d 122 (mem.)).

139. HJ Defendant was charged under § 1754(a) for allegedly
“giv[ing] false information to any law enforcement officer with
purpose [to] . . . deflect an investigation from [himself].” Defend-
ant correctly notes, as made clear from the language and from
our discussion above, that the intent to deflect an investigation
away from one’s self is an essential element, which the State
bears the burden of proving.®

140. As explained above, § 1754(a) has been at issue before us
only once. See Delaoz, 2010 VT 65. The Delaoz facts are as
follows. Officers responded to a report of an individual screaming
in the middle of the street, where they found the defendant. Id.
1 2. When approached, the defendant admitted responsibility for

®We acknowledge defendant’s brief aside regarding the discrepancy between the
language of the statute and the language of the Act Summary — the first states
“deflect an investigation from the person or another person” while the latter states
“deflect. an investigation from the person fo another person.” However, after a
review of the legislative history and the numerous drafts of the bill, all of which
contain the language “deflect an investigation from the person or another person,”
it is reasonable to conelude the Act Summary contains a clerical error and was
intended to reflect the language of the enacted bill. See Vermont General
Assembly, Summary, Act No. 149 (S. 186), Crimes; false reports to law enforee-
ment authorities, http/Avww.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm? URL=/does/2006/acts/
ACTL49SUM.HTM [https://perma.ce/UJ58-QZSF)

572 Le

the noise but identified himself by a false name. Id. During the
encounter, officers discovered drugs, including cocaine and mari-
juana, in the defendant’s possession. Jd. {1 3-4. When the
defendant was taken into custody, officers found a handcuff key
inside the defendant’s shoe and subsequently confirmed the de-
fendant’s real identity. Id. 19 5, 9. At trial, the defendant moved
to exclude evidence of the handcuff key as both irrelevant and
prejudicial. /d. 1 29. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion,
finding that the relevancy of the evidence to the defendant’s state
of mind outweighed its possible prejudicial effects. Jd. This Court
affirmed, finding that “[bJecause intent must be inferred from a
person’s acts and proved by circumstantial evidence, possession of
a handcuff key triggers a reasonable inference that defendant . . .
had taken steps to avoid prosecution and punishment.” Jd. 1 30
(citing Cole, 150 Vt. at 456, 554 A2d at 255 (“Intent is rarely
proved by direct evidence; it must be inferred from a person’s
acts and proved by circumstantial evidence.”)).

141. EJ Defendant argues that this Court implicitly recog-
nized in Delaoz that giving a false name is never alone sufficient
to sustain a conviction under § 1754(a). We agree that § 1754(a)
requires more than just the giving of false information — it
requires the giving of false information with the intent to deflect
the investigation. In Delaoz, however, the issue was the admissi-
bility of the handcuff key evidence — it was not whether the
§ 1754(a) conviction could have been sustained without said evi-
dence. Additionally, we have repeatedly “decline[d] to fashion a
hard and fast rule regarding the sufficiency of evidence in a
circumstantial evidence case. Rather, each case must be based on
its own facts and circumstances . . . .” Couture, 169 Vt. at 226, 734
A.2d at 527. Thus, we refuse to hold that evidence of a defendant
giving a false name alone is never sufficient to sustain a conviction
under § 1754(a) and, as with all other cases involving circumstan-
tial evidence, we must look at the record as a whole and
determine if it can fairly and reasonably convince a jury of guilt.

142. The State produced the following evidence through witness
testimony: defendant fled the scene of the altercation on Church
Street after expressing anger that the complainant’s party called
the police; officers found defendant, who looked as though he was
ing, at the south end of Church Street; officers began to
stion defendant because he matched the witnesses’ descriptions
of the individual involved in the altercation at the north end of

Church Street; defendant denied being on Church Street or being
involved in a fight, but then, without admitting to being in a fight,
stated that he was outnumbered and had fled south on Church
Street; when asked for his name, defendant provided his first and
middle name and correct birth month and day, but incorrect birth
year; when the provided name produced no Vermont records and
the officers confronted defendant with providing false information
to a police officer, defendant provided his true full name and birth
date.

148. With this evidence, the question presented to the jury was
whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
State’s allegation that defendant provided false information to the
police officers with the intent to deflect the investigation away
from himself. They were not asked, as defendant tries to argue,
whether defendant knew he was already under investigation and
did not feel free to leave, whether defendant thought that giving
the false information would successfully deflect the investigation
from himself, whether defendant chose a good method in attempt-
ing to deflect the investigation, whether the police officers had the
authority to arrest defendant before the false information was
given, whether the police officers had some other method to fulfill
all identity-related needs they had, or whether defendant was
actually successful in his deflection.

144. HJ When viewed in a light most favorable to the State,
the evidence presented reasonably and fairly supports the jury’s
conclusion that defendant, by providing the police officers with his
first and middle name and an incorrect birth year, intended to
deflect their investigation away from himself. Cf. Iv re QP, 2015
IL 118569, 1923-27, 40 N.E.3d 9 (finding evidence of juvenile
giving misspelled name and false birthdate, even after being
handcuffed and placed in police car, sufficient to show juvenile
intended to avoid apprehension on outstanding arrest warrant and
thus support obstruction of justice conviction); Hdmondson v.
Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 635, 637 (Va. 1994) (finding that use of
false name following commission of crime can constitute form of
flight).”

7 We disagree with defendant that neither Edmondson nor In re Q.P. is applicable
to the case at hand. Defendant argues the Edmondson defendant gave his false
name during the initial investigation process, which, in this case, had been
completed by the time defendant gave the false information. However, the

574 |

145. We find there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support defendant’s conviction and so affirm.

V. Probation Conditions

146. Defendant presents several arguments regarding his pro-
bation conditions: first, the sentencing court failed to exercise its
discretion and violated Vermont’s individualized sentencing scheme
by imposing “standard conditions” A through N; second, the
sentencing court’s oral pronouncement of conditions should control
over the broader, written probation order with regard to condi-
tions M, 1, 3, 5, and O through §; third, Conditions A, D, and E
should be vacated because they are harsh or have no reasonable
relationship to defendant’s conviction or public safety; and fourth,
Conditions K and 5 should be vacated as an unlawful delegation
of sentencing authority.

147. HM Probation is governed by 28 V.S.A. § 252, under which
a court is permitted to impose such probation conditions as, “in its
discretion[, it] deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the
offender will lead a law-abiding life or to assist the offender to do
so.” In addition to eighteen potential probation conditions, § 252(a)
mandates that courts “provide as an explicit condition of every
sentence to probation that if the offender is convicted of another
offense during the period for which the sentence remains subject
to revocation, then the court may impose revocation of the
offender’s probation.” Thus, as we held in State x Putnam, “the
only truly ‘standard’ condition is [Condition B,] the one providing
that the court may revoke an offender’s probation if the offender
is convicted of another offense during the period when the

Edmondson false information was given well after the “initial investigation
process” — the Edmondson defendant gave the false name after the police
approached the defendant at a motel, asked him if he owned the car that was seen
leaving the crime scene, left the motel to obtain a search warrant, returned to the
motel, and began exeeuting the search warrant. 448 S.E.2d at 636. Similarly,
defendant argues that Q.P. is inapplicable because the QP. defendant provided
information to deflect an investigation other than the one that initiated his contact
with the police. In we QP, 2015 IL 118569, 1123-27. This is a misreading. QP,
much like Edmondson, speaks to the timing of the false information — false
information, even given after a defendant is in police custody, can still be an
attempt to deflect an investigation. Moreover, as was true here, the defendants in
both cases knew they were the center of an investigation at the time they provided
false information to the police.

sentence is still subject to revocation.” 2015 VT 113, 132, 200 Vt.
257, 130 A.3d 836 (citing § 252(a)).

148. EE “A trial court enjoys broad discretion in fashioning a
sentence,” including probation conditions. Putnam, 2015 VT 113,
128 (citing State u Gibney, 2003 VT 26, 153, 175 Vt. 180, 825
A.2d 32). We review for abuse of such discretion, ensuring the
sentencing court used “‘ “sound discretion,” not discretion exer-
cised arbitrarily, but with due regard for that which is right and
equitable under the circumstances, and directed by reason and
conscience to a just result?” Jd. 143 (quoting State u Hunt, 145
Vt. 34, 43, 485 A.2d 109, 113 (1984)). The conditions will be upheld
as long as “there is a reasonable basis for the court’s action.”
State v. Savo, 141 Vt. 203, 208, 446 A.2d 786, 789 (1982) (citation
omitted). The party alleging the abuse bears the burden to “show
that the court failed to exercise its discretion or did so for
‘reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable’ ”
Putnam, 2015 VT 118, 144 (quoting Savo, 141 Vt. at 208, 446 A.2d
at 789).

149. I Defendant contends that the sentencing court abused
its discretion by imposing Conditions A-N “without individualized
findings or reasons supporting each condition.” This Court has
addressed this argument several times. In Putnam we held that
“{tlo determine if the court acted within its discretion in imposing
particular conditions, we have not required the sentencing court to
make specific findings regarding each condition, but have looked to
whether the record supports the court’s exercise of its discretion.”
Putnam, 2015 VT 113, 99145, 45 n.10 (noting that in some
instances, “particularized findings may be necessary to support
imposition of a condition for reasons other than demonstrating the
requisite nexus”). Subsequently in State u Levitt, we reiterated
Putnam’s rejection of a narrow reading of § 252, found that this
Court “must examine the record available to the trial court
regarding each complained-of condition,” and declined to summar-
ily reject Conditions A-N “on the ground they were all errone-
ously imposed.” 2016 VT 60, 1117-18, 202 Vt. 193, 148 A.38d 204.
We do so here.

150. HJ Condition A requires defendant to notify his probation
officer within forty-eight hours if he is arrested or given a citation
for a new offense. Defendant contends that Condition A is not
“finely-tuned” and may result in revocation for a defendant who

516 |

never violates § 252(a)’s mandate that a defendant not commit a
new crime. In Putnam we held that Condition A “is linked to
enforcing the mandatory condition that defendant not be convicted
of another crime, and ass the probation officer in knowing if
defendant has been involved in any criminality” 2015 VT 118, 148.
We uphold Condition A, here, finding that it reasonably relates to
aiding defendant in leading a law-abiding life in light of the
record’s evidence of other convictions and the crime for which he
was convicted of below.

151. HM The State concedes that the record does not support
the imposition of Conditions C-E because it does not show that.
the conditions would address the conduct for which defendant was
convicted or aid him in leading a law-abiding life. Condition C
requires defendant to regularly work at a job, look for a job, or
get job training if his probation officer tells him to do so.
Condition D requires defendant to work regularly at a community
service job if ordered by the court. Condition E requires defe
ant to support his dependents or meet other family responsi
ties. We agree the record does not support the imposition of these
conditions and strike Conditions C, D, and E.

152. EB Conditions F, G, H, I, and J are all similar to
Condition A because they also relate to the supervision of
defendant by his probation officer. Condition F requires defendant
to meet with his probation officer, upon request. Condition G
requires defendant to notify his probation officer within two days
if he moves or if his address changes. Condition H requires
defendant to tell his probation officer if he loses or changes his
job. Conditions G and H are “mere notification requirement[s]
that neither impinge[ ] on any fundamental freedom nor permit[ |
a probation officer to wield any kind of discretion.” Levitt, 2016
VT 60, 123. Although Condition F permits a probation officer to
exercise minor discretion to determine when to meet defendant, it
is directly related to the “supervision of defendant by his proba-
tion officer to assist defendant in leading a law-abiding life.”
Putnam, 2015 VT 113, 148. Because Conditions F, G, and H are
“bas dministrative requirements that are necessary to super-
vised release,” United States vu Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.
2002) (quotation omitted), and do “not burden defendant, unduly
restrict protected freedoms, or delegate sentencing authority to a
probation officer — we affirm [their] imposition.” Levitt, 2016 VT
60, 128.

a =

153. HI Condition I prohibits defendant from leaving Vermont
without written permission from his probation officer. In Levitt we
concluded that although Condition I is valid on its face, it “turn[s]
over to a probation officer the complete power to determine
defendant’s [ability to travel], with no guiding standards.” Id.
1125, 27 (quotation omitted). Because “the reasons why defendant
would need to travel outside of Vermont are predictable, and
defendant can give prior notice of the time of the travel, desti-
nation, and reason for it[,] . . . we believe that standards can be
created even though they may, in turn, accord substantial discre-
tion to the probation officer in making the decision.” Id. 128.
Thus, we remanded Condition I for the sentencing court to add
the necessary guiding standards. We do so here, as well.

154. HI We also discussed Condition J — which requires
defendant, upon request and without delay, to allow his probation
officer to visit him wherever he is staying — at length in Levitt.
2016 VT 60, {{1 29-32. There, after a survey of both federal and
state law, we concluded that “a home visit is not a search and a
home-visit requirement does not run afoul of the Vermont or
Federal Constitution search and seizure provisions.” Id. 132. We
held that home visits are “legitimate tool[s] of probation admin-
istration and [are] valid.” Jd. Similarly, we uphold the imposition
of Condition J in this case.

155. IH Condition K orders defendant to participate in any
counseling or training program deemed appropriate by his pro-
bation officer and to complete said counseling or program to the
satisfaction of his probation officer. Defendant argues that Condi-
tion K should be vacated as unlawful delegation of sentencing
authority. The State concedes that this condition gives the proba-
tion officer the open-ended authority found to constitute plain
error in Putnam. 2015 VT 113, 178. Condition 31, mandating
anger management and mental health counseling per his probation
officer, fails for these same reasons. Thus, we remand Conditions
K and 31 to give the trial court an opportunity to make findings
to support, revise, or remove the conditions.

156. I Condition L prohibits defendant from buying, having,
or using any regulated drugs unless they are prescribed by a
doctor. “A condition that forbids criminal conduct is valid.” Id.
1 56. Thus, “[bJecause the condition precludes conduct that is
criminal, the trial court was not required to find a reasonable

578 |

relationship between defendant’s conviction and the condition.” Id.
We affirm the imposition of Condition L.

157. [EE MM Condition M authorizes defendant’s probation
officer or any other person authorized by said officer to require
defendant to have random urinalysis testing. Defendant contends
that Condition M exceeds the oral pronouncement of conditions,
and thus the oral pronouncement should control over the broader,
written probation order. Additionally, he argues that “the absence
of the necessary findings not only invalidates the warrantless
search condition[ | itself, but also demonstrates the court did not.
intend to impose the[ ] obligation[ ].” In Putnam we concluded
that “[tlo the extent that the testing is not limited to detecting
the use of regulated drugs and the condition thus authorizes
regulation of otherwise lawful conduct, with significant implications
for defendant’s liberty, it must bear some reasonable relationship
to the crime for which he was convicted.” Jd. 157. There, we
found the record contained no such evidence, and thus struck the
condition. Jd. Here, we find a similar lack of supporting evidence
and specificity of the condition. Although the sentencing court
suspected that alcohol was involved in the offense, and defendant
himself admitted to abusing alcohol, there was no evidence
presented to indicate defendant also abused drugs. Because the
scope of testing permitted by the condition is not tailored to
defendant’s rehabilitation, we strike Condition M*

158. II Condition N prohibits violent or threatening behavior
at any time. The sentencing court reasonably found a relationship
between the condition — forbidding violent and threatening
behavior, including threats of personal injury or property damage
— and the crime for which defendant was convicted — simple
assault. We affirm the imposition of Condition N, as modified by
Condition 33, to prohibit verbal, written, or electronic threats of
personal injury or property damage.

159. HI The State concedes that “there does not appear to be
a nexus” between Condition O, which prohibits defendant from

® Because we are striking on other grounds, we need not address defendant's
argument of whether the oral pronouncement or written order of Condition M
should control. Moreover, as in Putnam, because we strike the condition based
solely on the lack of nexus, we do not reach defendant’s argument that Condition
M, which authorizes his probation officer to require random urine analysis, is
unconstitutional. Putnam, 2015 VT 113, 157 n.16,

operating, trying to operate, or being in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle on a public highway unless in possession of a valid
Vermont operator’s license, and defendant’s rehabilitation or
crime. Because this condition could pertain to conduct which may
or may not be criminal, the trial court was required to find a
reasonable relationship between defendant’s conviction and the
condition. Cf. Putnam, 2015 VT 118, 159. Because that nexus
does not exist, we strike Condition O. Similarly, Conditions Q and
R are related to restitution and because the sentencing court did
not order restitution, the conditions are inapplicable and will be
struck.

160. [I Condition 1 completely prohibits defendant from
buying, having, or drinking any alcoholic beverages. To enforce
this prohibition, Condition 1 requires defendant to submit to
alcosensor tests or any other alcohol test when his probation
officer or their designee tell him to do so. It is apparent that
Condition 1 is at direct odds with Vermont’s policy regarding
alcohol and drug abuse programs under 18 V.8.A. § 4801. Through
§ 4801(a), the Legislature declared “[i]t is the policy of the State
of Vermont that alcoholism and alcohol abuse are correctly per-
ceived as health and social problems rather than criminal trans-
gressions against welfare and morals of the public.” And the
Legislature also announced that “alcoholics and alcohol abusers
shall no longer be subjected to criminal prosecution solely because
of their consumption of alcoholic beverages.” § 4801(b)(1). Condi-
tion 1 does exactly that — it criminalizes, through probation
revocation, defendant’s failure to overcome his alcohol abuse
issues. This condition sets up for failure alcoholics and alcohol
abusers, whom the Legislature intended to protect from “criminal
prosecution solely because of their consumption of alcohol.”

161. [IB As stated before, the purpose of imposing probation
conditions is to “ensure that the offender will lead a law-abiding
life or to assist the offender to do so.” 28 V.S.A. § 252(a). Neither
Condition 1’s complete prohibition of alcohol nor Condition 1’s
alcosensor requirement achieves this goal. Instead, they impose a
strict. limitation that will likely be violated, not because of
defendant’s delinquency, but because of his “inability . . . to
. drinking prac’ in spite of the
onset of a variety of consequences deleterious to his . . . health.”
18 VS.A. § 4802(2)(B). Thus, we strike all of Condition 1.

580 Le

162. EM Unlike Condition 1, Condition P does not categorically
prohibit defendant from drinking alcoholic beverages. Instead,
Condition P prohibits defendant from drinking alcoholic beverages
to the extent it interferes with his employment or the welfare of
his family, himself, or any other person. Defendant plainly admit-
ted to having an alcohol-abuse problem, and defendant has
previously been convicted of alcohol related offenses. We find that
the record supports Condition P’s narrower prohibition of alcohol
consumption because it does not, as Condition 1’s complete
prohibition does, criminalize defendant solely because of his
consumption of alcohol. Rather, the alcohol prohibition is linked to
preventing his future criminality and ensuring his alcohol con-
sumption does not interfere with his ability to lead a law-abiding
life. Thus, we uphold Condition P’s limited prohibition of alcohol
consumption and the attendant alcosensor tests necessary to
administer the condition.

163. [HB Condition S requires defendant to pay any unpaid
amounts due to the court or the Tax Department for any legal
services provided at state expense. This Court follows Putnam,
and upholds Condition S. 2015 VT 113, 161.

164. Defendant contends that Conditions 3 and 5 are broader
than the sentencing court’s oral pronouncement, which (a) prohib-
ited defendant from purchasing, possessing, or drinking any
alcohol, (b) directed defendant to participate in substance-abuse
screening and, if so directed, complete counseling and treatment
to his probation officer’s satisfaction, and (c) required defendant to
complete mental health and/or anger management counseling to
the satisfaction of his probation officer.

1165. HI Condition 3 requires defendant to have alcohol and/or
drug screening, and, if the screening shows that counseling and/or
treatment is needed, he must attend and participate in whatever
counseling and/or treatment his probation officers tells him to.
Condition 3 falls squarely within the oral pronouncement that.
defendant was to participate in substance abuse screening and if
directed, to complete counseling or treatment. The written state-
ment simply separates each step into a different sentence —
defendant must have alcohol screening; if
need for counseling and/or treatment, his probation officer will
direct him to do so; if he is directed to do so, he must complete
it to his officer’s satisfaction. Thus, we uphold Condition 3.

a *

166. HM Condition 5 requires defendant to attend, participate
in, and complete a residential treatment program if his probation
officer tells him to do so. The State concedes that Condition 5
does not specify the type of residential training that the probation
officer has the authority to order. Thus, this gives the probation
officer the same open-ended authority as we found with Condition
K. Therefore, we remand Condition 5 for the sentencing court to
justify the condition, make it more specific, or strike it.

167. HI Condition 32 notes that defendant is subject to
standard conditions A-N. We strike Condition 32 as failing to
follow our directive for individualized sentencing.

168. Finally, the following conditions are uncontested and thus
we affirm their imposition: Condition 4, requiring defendant to
allow any treatment or counseling program to tell his probation
officer and the court about his attendance and participation in the
program; Condition 33, amending Condition N to prohibit verbal,
written, or electronic threats of personal injury or property
damage; Condition 34, allowing defendant’s probation officer to
restrict associates and set a curfew; Condition 35, prohibiting
defendant from contacting complainant or complainant’s brother;
and Condition 36, authorizing electronic monitoring per defend-
ant’s probation officer.

Affirmed as to defendant’s simple assault conviction under 13
VS.A. § 1023(a)(1), disorderly conduct conviction under 13 V.S.A.
§ 1026(1), and conviction for false information to a. police officer with
intent to deflect under 13 V.S.A. § 1754(a). Probation conditions A, B,
FG, H, J, L, N (as modified by 33), P. 8, 3, 4, 34, 35, and 36 are
affirmed. Conditions C, D, E, M, O, P (alcosensor testing portion), Q,
R, 1, and 32 are struck. Conditions I, K, 5, and 31 are remanded to the
sentencing court to justify the conditions, make them more specific,
or strike them.

gt
Pa
&

2016 VT 109

Heidi Corcoran Wener v. Erik Wener
[157 A.3d 1108)
No. 15-316

Present: Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ. and Tomasi, Supr. J.,
Specially Assigned

Opinion Filed September 16, 2016
Motion for Clarification Denied November 22, 2016

583

David G. Carpenter of Kenlan, Schwiebert, Facey & Goss, P-C.,
Rutland, for Plantiff-Appellant.

Pamela Gatos of Kenny & Gatos, LLP, Rutland, for Defendant-
Appellee.

11. Dooley, J. Mother appeals from a superior court decision
finding that her proposed relocation and parents’ breakdown in
communication were changed circumstances warranting modifica-
tion of parental rights and responsibilities and transferring sole

584 Le

legal and physical responsibilities to father. She argues that the
court erred in finding a real, substantial, and unanticipated change
in circumstances, and that the decision to modify the extant
custody agreement was not in the best interests of the child as
required by 15 V.S.A. § 665. We affirm the court’s finding of
changed circumstances with respect to the court’s award of legal
rights and responsibilities to father based on the breakdown in
parental cooperation, but reverse and remand the modification in
the order with respect to physical rights and responsibilities and
parent-child contact.

12. The parties are parents of an autistic son born on January
19, 2000. They divorced in August 2008, and stipulated to the
following regarding parental rights and responsibilities:

(a). Legal and Physical Parental Rights and Responsibili-
ties and Parent-Child Contact:

. .. The parties shall share parental rights and respon-
sibilities for [child] with parent child contact established
at [mother] having [child] 57% of the time and [father]
having [child] 48% of the time as mutually agreed upon.
Vacations and Holidays shall be shared as mutually
agreed upon. In the event the parties cannot agree upon
a major issue affecting legal responsibility (educational,
religious, medical, travel) for [child], and only after good
faith mediation has been unsuccessfully pursued, and
absent court order, [mother] shall have the final say in
the matter.

Following a discussion between the parties in August 2013, the
schedule was altered, such that child spent 64% of his time with
mother and 36% with father, and this schedule remained in place
until the family court’s decision. The child has lived in West
Rutland since he was two years old, and has attended West
Rutland schools from kindergarten onward.

13. The family court found that both parents “consistently
participated” in all aspects of the child’s education and, in the
initial years following their divorce, were able to “communicate
and cooperate in making joint decisions regarding [child’s] educa-
tion and medical care.” For example, although mother moved from
West Rutland to Proctor, the parties agreed to keep child in the
West Rutland school and continued to share their time with him,

a *

with “no transportation issues between the two homes.” However,
the court found that in recent years the parties’ ability to
cooperate “evaporated,” and that the increasing level of disagree-
ment over matters ranging from which dentist child would see or
whether he would ride the bus to school or participate in the free
Junch and milk program has “directly impacted” the child’s
wellbeing.

14. On February 18, 2015, mother informed father by certified
mail that she planned to move to South Burlington and enroll
child in South Burlington High School for the 2015-16 academic
year. On March 31, father filed a motion to modify parental rights
and responsibilities on the basis of changed circumstances; he
requested emergency relief, and proposed a schedule that reallo-
cated child’s time to 14% with mother and 86% with father during
the school year. Father requested sole legal and physical parental
rights, subject to contact with mother on the first, second, fourth,
and fifth weekends of each month, with the parties alternating and
sharing holidays. Mother in turn proposed that she be awarded
sole legal and physical rights and responsibilities but agreed to
consult with father before making major decisions and to permit
father to have contact with child three weekends a month as well
as during summer and school vacations. Mother’s schedule also
contained an alternate plan: should the court decide it was in
child’s best interests to remain in the West Rutland school system,
mother would maintain her Proctor residence to permit the
existing parent-child contact arrangement, which the court could
memorialize in an order, to continue without interruption. The
family court denied father’s request for emergency relief on April
1 and scheduled a hearing for June 17. The parties participated in
two mediation sessions before the hearing without success.

15. Following two days of evidentiary hearings, the trial court
issued its decision in July 2015. The court found that father had
met his burden in demonstrating by a preponderance of credible
evidence that there had been a real, substantial, and unanticipated
change in circumstances since the date of the prior order justi-
fying a modification of parental rights and parent-child contact.
The court noted there were at least two potential bases for the
change: the “breakdown in the parents’ ability to communicate,
cooperate and make joint decisions” and mother’s relocation to
South Burlington and decision to change the child’s school. The
court also applied the factors itemized in 15 V.S.A. § 665, outlining

586 Le

the best interests of the child, and found that the circumstances
favored father. In particular, the court agreed with father that an
autistic child’s developmental needs were promoted by “consis-
tency, continuity, and stability” and that the child has “flourished”
in West Rutland schools and enjoys “strong bonds” with class-
mates, school personnel, and the extended family that live in the
community. Accordingly, the court awarded sole “legal and physi-
cal parental rights” and responsibilities to father, adopting father’s
proposed schedule for mother’s parent-child contact and vesting
him with the right to act as child’s “designated decision maker.”
This timely appeal followed.

16. On appeal, mother raises two primary arguments. First, she
contends that under either of its rationales the family court erred
in finding a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circum-
stances. Second, she avers that the de n to modify the 2008
order — and the de facto 2013 arrangement — was not in the
child’s best interests as required by § 665. While we agree with
the family court that the breakdown in parental cooperation was
a sufficient change in circumstances to allow a reexamination of
the 2008 order with respect to legal rights and responsibilities, we
also conclude that the court failed to separately consider whether
grounds existed to modify the physical rights and responsibilities
in light of mother’s alternate physical responsibility and parent-
child contact plan. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the part of
the trial court order relating to physical rights and responsibilities
and parent-child contact.

17. In addressing mother’s argument with respect to changed
circumstances, it is instructive to review the statutory law on
parental rights and responsibilities and how the parties’ agree-
ment on which the divorce order is based fits with that law. The
sections of the statutes on parental rights and responsibilities in
divorce and annulment actions begin with a series of definitions.
“Parental rights and responsibilities” is defined to mean “rights
and responsibilities related to a child’s physical living arrange-
ments, parent child contact, education, medical and dental care,
religion, travel and any other matter involving a child’s welfare
and upbringing.” 15 V.S.A. § 664(1). “Legal responsibility” is
defined to mean “the rights and responsibilities to determine and
control various matters affecting a child’s welfare and upbringing,
other than routine daily care and control of the child, [includ-
ing] . . . education, medical and dental care, religion and travel

a =
arrangements. Legal responsibility may be held solely or may be
divided or shared.” Jd. § 664(1)(A). “Physical responsibility” means
“the rights and responsibilities to provide routine daily care and
control of the child subject to the right of the other parent to
have contact with the child. Physical responsibility may be held
solely or may be divided or shared.” Jd. § 664(1)(B). In turn,
“(plarent child contact” means “the right of a parent who does not.
have physical responsibility to have visitation with the child.” Id.
§ 664(2).

18. The statutes go on to authorize pe s to agree “to divide
or share parental rights and responsibilities.” Id. § 665(a). The
effect and content of such an agreement is provided by 15 V.S.A.
§ 666. An agreement between parents that divides or shares
parental rights and responsi| ies “shall be presumed to be in
the best interests of the child.” Jd. § 666(a). To be “a complete
agreement,” the pact must include provisions that address (1)
physical living arrangements; (2) parent-child contact; (3) educa-
tion of the minor child; (4) medical, dental and health care; (5)
travel arrangements; (6) procedures for communicating about the
child’s welfare; and (7) if parental rights and responsibilities are
to be shared or divided, procedures for resolving disputes, which
may include mediation and binding arbitration. Jd. § 666(b).

19. The agreement in this case, according to its words, shared
parental rights and responsibilities. With respect to physical
responsibilities, it shared those responsibilities, with 57% of the
time going to mother and 43% of the time going to father, with
no specification of how this division of time was to be allocated
over the days of the week, month or year. That allocation was left
to be worked out by the parties, which they did, including an
agreement by father to lower his hours with the child to 36% of
the time to give mother weekend time with the child.

110. With respect to legal responsibilities, mother argues in her
brief to this Court that the agreement also granted “full legal
custody” to her in the form of a veto power, or, at the very least,
“enhanced legal authority.” We do not read the agreement in that.
manner. Instead, we believe its language indicates an intention to
share legal responsibility, although the language is specific for
this part of parental rights and responsibilities. The sharing
relationship was defined in terms of what would happen if the
parents could not agree on a matter of legal responsibility related
to education, religion, medical care or travel. They were required

588 |

to “first attempt to resolve such dispute between themselves.” If
that did not work, they were required to “engage in two inde-
pendent good faith mediation sessions prior to returning to [the
family court] for a hearing”' Absent a court order, mother was to
“have the final say in [the] matter.” Although the parties’ agree-
ment touched on the subjects required for a complete agreement,
it did not specifically regulate most of them. See id. § 666(b).

111. IB With this background in mind, we look at the law
applicable to the motions to modify filed by the parties. Much of
the difference in the positions of the parties in this case and the
analysis of the trial court relate to the interaction of the statutory
provisions and the agreement, with the grounds for modification of
a court order based on a parental agreement governing parental
rights and responsibilities. 15 V.S.A. § 668(a) provides that such an
order may be modified “upon a showing of real, substantial and
unanticipated change of circumstances,” whether or not the order
is based upon a stipulation or agreement. Although the standard
for modification is the same under the statute, whether the issues
deal with legal or physical responsibilities, our case law has
viewed these situations somewhat differently. In cases involving
changed circumstances that impacted physical responsibilities, we
have stated that in order to ensure stability in the lives of
children, a party seeking a modification in the allocation of
physical responsibilities has a heavy burden to show changed
circumstances. See deBeauwmont uv Goodrich, 162 Vt. 91, 97, 644
A.2d 843, 847 (1994); Pill uw Pill, 154 Vt. 455, 460, 578 A2d 642,

TIn Gazo w Gazo, 166 Vt. 434, 442-44, 697 A.2d 342, 346-47 (1997), a case in which
legal rights and responsibilities with respect to the children were awarded to the
mother, the court order added an obligation to consult with the father with respect
to “major decisions” In response to the mother’s facial challenge that the
consultation provision was not authorized, we held that some sharing of respon-
sibility short of joint custody was authorized by the statute and ruled that the
family court had the power to require consultation. We further ruled, however, that
the language was too vague to be enforceable and remanded for the court to
specify the decisions involved and to set an ascertainable standard to determine
whether a decision is so important as to require consultation. Id. at 445-46, 697
A2d at 348. The language in the order before us is similar, although it arises by
agreement and in the context of shared legal rights and responsibilities. In any
event, mother has not challenged the validity of the provision in this case, and the
decision that underlies the changed cireumstances here was “major” under any
standard

a ”
645 (1990) (finding change of physical custody involves violent
dislocation and requires higher burden to justify).

112. HM On the other hand, we have defined a lesser burden for
modification of legal responsibilities, including in circumstances
where legal rights and responsibilities are shared. The leading
decision in this regard is Kilduff u Willey, 150 Vt. 552, 554 A2d
677 (1988). That case involved a divorce order based on a
stipulation for joint custody, but joint decision-making broke down
over visitation rights, leading to cross-motions for modification for
greater rights in each party without the joint decision-making. We
held that there were not changed circumstances to change the
allocation of physical responsibilities, but our view of the need to
modify the joint decision-making was different:

What the findings do appear to demonstrate, however,
is that substantial changes have occurred with respect to
the joint custody arrangement. That arrangement, which
requires cooperative efforts of both parents in deciding
the major questions for [the child’s] life, appears to have
broken down. If this is so, it is proper for the court to
proceed to the question on the merits of what decision-
making arrangement is in the best interests of this child.
On this question the stakes are not so high: a modifica-
tion of the decision-making arrangement does not entail
the violent dislocation realized by a change in physical
custody. The critical value of continuity is less threat-
ened. Accordingly, the burden may be easier for the
moving party to carry. While a substantial and unantici-
pated change must still be shown, the breakdown in
communication between the parents may suffice to reach
the threshold. On remand, the court must make specific
findings on this issue, asking first whether the threshold
requirement for a modification of the decision-making
arrangement has been established, and, if so, what
arrangement will best serve [the child’s] interest.

Td. at 555, 554 A.2d at 679-80. We summarized that: “the threshold
findings with respect to the issues of physical custody and the
decision-making arrangement are distinct. The record must inde-
pendently support each threshold finding; crossing the threshold
to the best interest test on one issue does not ipso facto warrant

590 |

proceeding to the best interest test on the other” Id. at 557, 554
A2d at 680.

113. The dissent argues that Kilduff does not apply because
one parent had sole physical rights and responsibilities, with the
other parent having only parent-child contact, in that case where
in this case the parties had joint, but unequal, physical rights and
responsibilities, with no additional provision for parent-child con-
tact needed. This is largely a distinction without a difference, and
nothing in Kilduff suggests that its holding is limited to sole
custody situations.

114. Bi In as ing whether father’s motion for modification in
this case was based sufficiently on changed circumstances, the
first major question the trial court confronted was whether this
case primarily involved relocation of mother and its effect on
physical responsibilities of the parties, or alternatively, primarily
involved legal rights and responsibilities — namely, decision-
making concerning the child’s education. To put this question in
context, the vast majority of parental-responsibility cases that
have reached this Court since Kilduff have involved relocation of
the child to accompany the parent who has primary physical
responsibilities such that the ability of the other parent to have
parent-child contact is impaired. See Hawkes wu Spence, 2005 VT
57, 178 Vt. 161, 878 A.2d 273; Lane u Schenck, 158 Vt. 489, 614
A.2d 786 (1992). We have observed that “when childrearing and its
concomitant decision-making are shared, relocation to a remote
location by one parent requires at the very least a reassessment
of the custodial arrangement and, because of the practicalities
involved in shared parenting, will often necessitate a change in
custody.” Hoover vx Hoover, 171 Vt. 256, 259, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194
(2000). Both parties in this case relied upon the relocation cases,
at least in part, to make their arguments.

115. The trial court considered whether to apply this Court’s
jurisprudence concerning instances of parental relocation. It con-
cluded that those 's were inapplicable to these circumstances.
Given mother’s position that, if father were awarded legal rights
and responsibilities, she would retain her Proctor home and
maintain her presence there for all of the parent-child contact
called for in the existing order, we agree that the principal
dispute in this case does not involve relocation. Instead, the
primary issue to be resolved here is whether changed circum-

stances exist regarding educational and other important decision-
making, and, if so, whether the best interests of the child favor
awarding sole legal rights and responsibilities to father or mother.
Further, unlike in the relocation cases, it is not necessary to
address the allocation of physical rights and responsibilities pro-
vision of the divorce order to respond to the grounds for changed
circumstances. The physical rights and responsibilities order sets
only the percentage of time each parent is entitled to have with
the child, rather than an hour by hour schedule. The latter is to
be worked out by the parties, and there is no finding that the
parties have been unable to do that. Nor is there any finding that
it could not be worked out if the child moved to South Burlington
and attended school in that location. This dispute is about the
education of the parents’ child, an aspect of legal responsibilities.
While we accept that changing the school for an autistic child can
be difficult if not traumatic, we cannot equate it with the “violent
dislocation” that occurs when a child moves far from one parent
to the point where parent-child

116. This brings us to the trial court’s decision that changed
circumstances existed to grant father’s motion to modify the
parental responsibility provisions of the divorce order. The trial
court relied on relatively small matters — dental care for the
child, taking the bus to school during days the child was with
father, and payment for school breakfast — to find that mother
was acting without attempting to reach a joint decision with
father. This came to a head when mother announced by letter to
father in February 2015 that she was moving to South Burlington
to enroll the child in the South Burlington school system in the
fall of 2015. There had been no consultation on this decision prior
to the announcement, and mother refused to engage in mediation
as required by the divorce order until ordered to do so by the
court. Based on mother’s testimony, the court concluded that
mother did not participate in mediation in good faith as also
required by the divorce order. Mother also moved with the child
during the trial court hearings. On these facts, the court found
changed circumstances and modified the divorce order to award
both legal and physical responsibilities to father with parent-child
contact on weekends to mother.

117. EMM We first examine whether there were grounds to
modify legal rights and responsibilities. We will uphold a family
court’s decision as to whether there has been a real, substantial,

592 |

and unanticipated change in circumstances “unless the discretion
of the lower court was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Hayes vu Hayes,
144 Vt. 332, 336, 476 A2d 135, 138 (1984) (quotation omitted).
Similarly, findings are viewed in the light “most favorable to the
prevailing party” and the decision will be upheld unless the court
exercised its discretion upon “unfounded considerations.” Paine uv
Buffa, 2014 VT 10, 110, 195 Vt. 596, 93 A3d 90 (quotation
omitted). While there are no fixed standards to determine what is
a change of circumstances, the welfare and best interest of the
child are the primary considerations in determining whether
circumstances have changed. Wells v. Wells, 150 Vt. 1, 4, 549 A.2d
1039, 1041-42 (1988).

118. I Under this standard of review and the standard of
substantial change set out in Kilduff, see supra, 1 12, we agree
that the trial court did not err in finding a substantial change of
circumstances with respect to legal responsibilities. The decision of
where the child would go to school was among the most important
of the legal rights and responsibilities the parties had because the
decision was central to the welfare and best interest of the child.
Joint decision-making had wholly broken down with respect to
that decision, and the court found that mother violated the
protocol established by the parties in their agreement. See, e.g.,
Maurer x Maurer, 2005 VT 26, 18, 178 Vt. 489, 872 A.2d 326
(mem.) (finding changed circumstances based on “new develop-
ment” that parents could not agree on transportation, counseling,
and parenting styles); Meyer u Meyer, 173 Vt. 195, 198, 789 A.2d
921, 923 (2001) (concluding change in circumstances present where
there had been “extensive cooperation” between parents in years
following divorce before “significant change for the worse” in time
immediately preceding modification suit). We agree that there was
a change of circumstances with respect to that decision, and the
court acted appropriately in modifying the divorce order to assign
legal rights and responsibilities to one parent.

119. I We take this opportunity to address an approach that
has been part of several trial court custody decisions reviewed by
this Court. The trial court’s decision is replete with suggestions
that the court involved itself in the question of what school was
better for the child. We remind trial judges that the duty of the
court is to determine which parent should be making educational

decisions, not which educational decision is best, even if the
parties call upon the court to do so. See Hawkes, 2005 VT 57, 111
(observing that court “may not substitute its judgment for that of
the custodial parent merely because the court would have done
something different if it had been the parent” (quotation omitted)).
While we affirm the trial court’s decision as to the allocation of
parental rights and responsibilities, we stress that the proper role
of the court in this case was to determine whether the decision-
making process contained in the divorce order was properly
implemented and not whether the right school for the child is in
West Rutland rather than in South Burlington. If we had con-
cluded that the sole basis for the court’s decision was to ensure
that the child stayed in the West Rutland school district, we could
not affirm the decision.

120. I Mother’s final argument is that the court erred in
determining that it was in the best interest of the child to modify
the parental rights and responsibilities order as the court did. As
we did above, we consider first the best-interest analysis with
respect to legal rights and responsibilities. In making its decision,
the court went through each of the best-interest factors specified
in 15 V.S.A. § 665 and found that most of them favored father. As
with the decision on whether there were changed circumstances,
the court’s best-interest determination lies within its broad dis-
cretion. See LeBlanc vu LeBlanc, 2014 VT 65, 121, 197 Vt. 17, 100
A.3d 345. While mother disagrees with the weight to be assigned
to the various factors and the court’s determination of which
favored a particular parent, we cannot conclude that there was an
abuse of discretion. Therefore, we must affirm the court’s best-
interest determination and the resulting modification with respect
to legal responsibilities.

121. I We now turn to the same two questions with respect
to physical rights and responsibilities. The trial court did not
separate its analysis between legal rights and responsibilities and
physical rights and responsibilities. It apparently believed that the
same facts and circumstances that warrant modification of the
order with respect to legal rights and responsibilitie
justify modifying the order’s shared physical rights and respon-
sibility and parent-child contact provisions and that the burden of
establishing changed circumstances is the same. We do not agree.
We have previously held that § 665(a), which governs where

594 Le

parents cannot agree, “does not mean that the court must award
all rights and responsibilities to one parent,” as “(t]he statute’s
purpose is to avoid the disruption to children caused by forcing
unwilling parents to participate in joint decision-making.” Chase v.
Bowen, 2008 VT 12, 139, 183 Vt. 187, 945 A.2d 901 (emphasis
added). We conclude that modification of physical rights and
responsibilities was inappropriate without separate findings and
analysis as specified in the following paragraphs.

122. Although the burden for modification of the allocation of
physical rights and responsibilities eater than that for modi-
fication of legal rights and respons 's, the decision of the trial
court barely mentions the grounds for modification of the physical
rights and responsibilities aspect of the order. This is a significant
deficiency because most of the incidents the court relied upon go
to decisions relating to legal rights and responsibilities, most
importantly where the child would go to school. The decision does
not reflect that the order’s provisions on physical rights and
responsibilities were general and not specific and left to the
parties the responsibility to work out how to implement them and
did not specify where the parties must live. Nor does it reflect
that the parties were able to agree on the specifics of parent-child
contact from the beginning of the governing order, including how
to allocate contact time during vacations, and agreed without
acrimony that mother would have more time with the child than
the order allowed.

123. We recognize that mother’s move to South Burlington,
some sixty miles away, would necessarily cause a different allo-
cation of the parties’ child contact time but that does not
necessarily mean that the 64%-36% allocation as modified by the
parties’ agreement could not be implemented in the changed
environment. There is no discussion in the trial court decision of
whether the order would be violated as a result of the move. The
discussion was only about how the preexisting implementation of
the order would have to change, a decision left to the parties.

124. We again emphasize the high burden on modification of a
physical rights and responsibilities order, higher than the burden
for modification of a legal rights and responsibilities order. See
Hawkes, 2005 VT 57, 120 (recognizing “heavy burden of showing
changed circumstances” for parties seeking change of physical
custody); Gates u Gates, 168 Vt. 64, 68, 716 A.2d 794, 797 (1998)
(noting threshold requirement of finding change occurred for

Le *

modifications of decision-making arrangements is “not as high” as
that required to alter physical custody); Kilduff, 150 Vt. at 555-56,
554 A2d at 679-80 (“What the findings do appear to demonstrate,
however, is that substantial changes have occurred with respect to
the joint custody arrangement. That arrangement, which requires
cooperative efforts of both parents in deciding the major questions
for [their child’s] life, appears to have broken down. . . . In
contrast, the findings required to demonstrate a change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to modify the physical custody of the child
are much less apparent in this case.”). Excepting the move to
South Burlington, the incidents on which the trial court relied
showed that mother exhibited some unpleasant and unwarranted
behavioral traits in her interaction with father. They often showed,
however, that the parties were able to work out their differences.
Unfortunately, these kind of incidents are too common between
couples who are deeply committed to the best interests of their
children and have strong views on how those best interests should
be achieved. Modification of parental right orders would become
routine if these types of incidents were sufficient to demonstrate
a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances as
required by 15 V.S.A. § 668. We cannot conclude that these
incidents alone, without considering the enrollment of the child in
school in South Burlington, were sufficient to meet the high
burden to authorize a modification of physical rights and respon-
sibilities.

125. We need not rule, however, on whether the weaknesses in
the trial court decision would have required us to remand it for
a more detailed analysis under the proper standard because that
decision is based on the original proposals of the parties which
were premised on mother moving to South Burlington and the
child attending South Burlington schools. In fact, mother pre-
sented an alternative proposal, replacing her original proposal if
the court decided to award legal rights and responsibilities solely
to father so he could continue to enroll the child in the West
Rutland school. Her alternative was that she would move back to
her Proctor home so that the parties could continue to operate
under the provisions of the divorce order implementing it exactly
as they had in the past.

126. The court did not address the substance of the proposal.
Its sole response to the proposal is in a footnote that states: “The
proposal doesn’t seem to contemplate that once a change in

circumstances is established, the court has the authority and the
responsibility to ‘annul, vary or modify an order . . . if it is in the
best interests of the child... /”

127. The court never analyzed whether there was a real,
substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances such as to
modify the physical rights and responsibilities order if mother
lived in Proctor as before and the child went to West Rutland
schools. Moreover, it engaged in an extensive analysis of the best
interests of the child using the statutory best interest factors, see
15 VS.A. § 665, based solely on the circumstances in the original
proposals of the parties. Thus, the court decided that factor (3), 15
V.S.A. § 665(b)(8) (ability and disposition of each parent to meet
the child’s present and future developmental needs), favors father
because of “his commitment to providing [the child] with stability
in the community [the child] has known since he was two years
old, and the school he has known since he was three years old.”
The court decided that factor (4), id. § 665(b)(4) (quality of child’s
adjustment to present housing, school and community and poten-
tial effect of any change) favors father strongly because “the
evidence does show that there is a substantial risk that change
will not be good for [the child]. The evidence shows that he does
not adjust well to change ... . It is difficult to imagine a more
substantial change for [the child] than that proposed by mother.”
The court decided that factor (7), id. § 665(b)(7) (the relationship
of the child with any other person who may significantly affect the
child), heavily favored father because “if [the child] were to move
to Burlington, his relationships with his stepmother, his step
brother, his grandfather, his classmates . . . and his teachers
would all be negatively impacted by the reduced time in West
Rutland and by changing schools.” None of these conclusions are
applicable if mother lives in Proctor and the child is enrolled in
the West Rutland schools.

128. I Contrary to the dissent’s argument, the court’s failure
to analyze mother’s alternative plan implicates more than parent-
child contact alone, and the possibility that mother might obtain
greater parent-child contact on remand cannot remedy that error.
The trial court here failed to analyze whether there were grounds
for a modification of the physical rights and responsibilities order,
and whether such a modification was in the best interest of the
child, in light of mother’s alternative proposal. Given the court’s
focus on the child’s great need for “consistency, continuity, and

stability,” we believe it especially important that it evaluate
mother’s proposal with regard both to the issue of physical rights
and responsibilities and ongoing parent-child contact.

129. Therefore, we must reverse the part of the court’s order
that modified the preexisting provisions on physical rights and
responsibilities and parent-child contact and remand for the court
to determine, whether in light of the evidence and mother’s
proposal, there are changed circumstances sufficient to modify the
physical rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact por-
tions of the divorce order; and, if so, whether the best interests
of the child favor altering those provisions.”

Affirmed as to the order of the superior court modifying the divorce
order with respect to the allocation of legal rights and
responsibilities; reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent
with this decision with respect to the order nodifying the divorce
order allocation of physical rights and responsibilities and parent-
child contact.

130. Skoglund, J., concurring and dissenting. In reversing on a
ground that no party has raised, the majority misconstrues the
record and misstates the law. The trial court obviously considered
and found changed circumstances with respect to both legal and
physical rights and responsibilities and it applied the correct
standard in doing so. The court acknowledged the case law, relied
upon here by the majority, and largely distinguished it because
neither parent here had sole physical custody. The key questions
before the court were which parent should have the right to
determine where the child went to school — authority encom-
passed within legal rights and responsibil! — as well as which
parent had authority to provide routine daily care and control of
the child — a right that belongs to the primary physical
custodian. Mother proposed, both in her primary and alternate
plans, that she have the right to make these decisions. The court
clearly determined, based on an evaluation of the child’s best
interests, that father should have these rights. The trial court’s

2 The dissent claims that we are deciding the case on a ground not raised by
appellant. In fact, mother argued in her brief that there were not grounds for
modifying the physical rights and responsibilities order, and particularly that the
trial court erred in ignoring her alternative proposal once the court decided the
child should stay in the West Rutland school, Mother’s counsel emphasized this
position during the oral argument.

598 Le

findings amply support its conclusions, and we should affirm its
decision modifying physical and legal rights and responsibilities.
Because the trial court did not consider mother’s alternate
proposal in fashioning a parent-child contact schedule, I would
remand for findings and conclusions on that issue alone. Accord-
ingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.

131. As we have repeatedly emphasized, the trial court has
broad discretion both in assessing whether there has been a
change in circumstances and in evaluating what parenting ar-
rangement is in a child’s best interests. deBeawmont uv Goodrich,
162 Vt. 91, 98, 644 A.2d 843, 847 (1994); see also Gerety u Gerety,
131 Vt. 396, 402, 306 A.2d 693, 695 (1973) (recognizing that
“(there can be no fixed standards to determine what constitutes
a substantial change in material circumstances,” and courts must
be “guided by a rule of very general application that the welfare
and best interests of the children are the primary concern in
determining whether the order should be changed”). We apply “a
highly deferential standard of review to decisions of the family
court regarding parental rights and responsibilities.” Paine u
Buffa, 2014 VT 10, 110, 195 Vt. 596, 93 A.3d 90. Given its unique
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the
evidence, the court’s findings will stand “unless they are clearly
erroneous, and we uphold the court’s legal conclusions if they are
supported by the findings.” Jd. (quotation omitted). “We view the
findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and
only reverse if the court exercised its discretion upon unfounded
considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable upon the facts
presented.” Jd. (quotation omitted).

132. The trial court here held two days of hearings and issued
a twenty-eight-page opinion, half of which is devoted to findings of
fact. The court’s numerous findings include the following. When
the parties divorced in August 2008, they agreed to share legal
rights and responsibilities for their son. At that time, they could
communicate and cooperate in making joint decisions regarding
the child’s education and medical care. Over time, however, they
became unable to do so, and the increasing level of hostility and
disagreement between parents directly affected their child. The
most serious disagreement concerned mother’s desire to enroll the
child in South Burlington High School for the 2015-2016 school
year, with mother claiming that she had the unilateral right to
make this decision.

a ”

133. The court found that mother bore much responsibility for
the deterioration of the parties’ ability to share parental respon-
sibilities. She had a tendency to turn small disputes into large
ones, and she made inflammatory and incorrect accusations both
to father directly and about father to the child’s educators and
school administrators. She posted derogatory comments about
father on Facebook. Mother threatened father that if he did not
agree to one of her proposals for picking up the child that she
would call the police and say that father had abandoned child. The
court found this last example “disturbing, at least.” The court also
found that mother’s refusal at trial to acknowledge the obvious
benefit that the child received from his current school cast doubt
on the credibility of the rest of her testimony. Additionally, it
noted that mother had not displayed good faith in the mediation
process over the schooling issue, and she had to be ordered to
attend mediation.

1134. Based on the record, the court determined that mother
exhibited a strong tendency to assert unilateral control over issues
regarding the child, even issues that arose during father’s time
with the child. The most significant example of this behavior was
the way in which mother went about moving to South Burlington.
She simply informed father that she and the child would be
relocating, and following the first hearing in this case, she did
relocate to South Burlington with the child. Mother emailed father
that, despite the ongoing court proceedings, the child’s residence
was “not up in the air he is moving to Burlington . . . regardless
of the court decision.” She told father that she would “retain at
least. the custody that I have unless you are able to prove me
unfit to the court and they change [sic] 66% to 33% custody of
[the child].” The court found that this email reflected mother’s
lack of understanding of the nature of the court proceedings. It
explained that there was no burden to prove “unfitness” on a
motion to modify; rather, the burden was to prove a real,
substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances, and if that
was proven, then to persuade the court what outcome was in the
child’s best interests. The court also made note of mother’s
proposal that “even if the Court should order that [the child]
remain in the West Rutland School, the only change that the court
would be required to make to the existing [parental rights and
responsibilities] schedule would be to provide the relief requested
in [mother]s response to the instant motion in this matter — that

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is, to memorialize in an Order the actual existing arrangement
from 2018, described herein.” The court explained that mother’s
proposal did not appear to contemplate that once a change in
circumstances was established, the court had the authority and
the responsibility to “annul, vary, or modify an order . . . if it is
in the best interests of the child, whether or not the order is
based upon a stipulation or agreement.” 15 V.S.A. § 668.

135. Based on its findings, the court found at least two grounds
to show that there had been a “real, substantial and unanticipated
change of circumstances” since the August 2008 final divorce
order. Jd. First, the parti uild no longer communicate, coop-
erate and make joint decisions regarding their child. Second,
mother had relocated to South Burlington and decided to change
the child’s school. The court detailed the communication break-
down that had occurred, and also explained that mother’s move to
a new location sixty miles away impacted the daily question of
where the child would attend school and which parent would be
with him on a daily basis.

136. Having reached these conclusions, the court further ob-
served that this case did not appear to fall within the classic type
of “relocation” cases addressed by this Court. Because parents
were joint custodians, moreover, father did not squarely bear the
burden of “justifying the violent dislocation of a change in custody
from one parent to the other.” Hawkes u Spence, 2005 VT 57,
V11, 178 Vt. 161, 878 A.2d 273 (cautioning that “‘when a
noncustodial parent seeks a change in custody based solely on the
custodial parent’s decision to relocate, the moving party faces a
high hurdle in justifying the violent dislocation of a change in
custody from one parent to the other” (quoting Hoover v.
Hoover, 171 Vt. 256, 259, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194 (2000)). Additionally,
the court found that mother sought to move for the specific
reason of changing the child’s school, rather than to better her
own life. She wanted the unfettered right to do so despite the
parties’ shared parenting arrangement. Father was forced to file
his motion to modify because mother disregarded the need to
mediate this issue and failed to ask the court’s permission to
change the existing order.

137. Even if the classic relocation analysis did apply, the court
continued, it would find the requisite inge in circumstances
because mother’s relocation clearly impaired father’s ability to
exercise the responsibilities that he had been exercising under the

current plan. Changing that arrangement, the court explained,
would substantially diminish the significant parenting responsibil-
ity that father has had for the child for the prior seven years. The
court reiterated that father did not have the “heavy burden” of
overcoming the impact of a “violent dislocation” cautioned against
by this Court, and it concluded that any “dislocation” would result
from mother removing the child from the only community he had
known, and away from father’s home where he had lived since he
was two years old. Thus, the court determined “that under any
possible legal analysis, father met his burden of providing a real,
substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances.”

138. In the face of this analysis, the majority somehow con-
cludes that the court failed to adequately address the burden
required of a party seeking to change an arrangement of physical
rights. Ante, 1 21. The majority cites cases that involve, as the
trial court recognized, situations where a court was shifting sole
physical custody from one parent to the other. See Hawkes, 2005
VT 57, 15 (pursuant to final divorce order, mother had sole
physical rights and responsibilities, and parties shared legal rights
and responsibilities); deBeawmont, 162 Vt. at 94, 644 A.2d at 845
(mother appealed modification order that shifted parental rights
and responsibilities from her to children’s father); Pill v Pill, 154
Vt. 455, 455, 578 A.2d 642, 643 (1990) (mother appealed modifi-
cation order that transferred primary physical rights from her to
children’s father); Kilduff vu Willey, 150 Vt. 552, 554, 554 A.2d 677,
678 (1988) (recognizing that, under existing order, mother had sole
physical custody of child, while father had liberal visitation rights).
The language concerning a “heavy burden,” and a “violent dislo-
cation” presumes that this factor is present, based in part on the
fact that “the physical custodian has a right to determine the
children’s residence,” and there are various policy reasons why a
parent with sole physical custody should be allowed to relocate.
Howkes, 2005 VT 57, 19. We made this clear in Hawkes, holding
that “‘when a noncustodial parent seeks a change in custody
based solely on the custodial parent’s decision to relocate, the
moving party faces a high hurdle in justifying the violent dislo-
cation of a change in custody from one parent to the other?” Id.
{111 (quoting Hoover, 171 Vt. at 259, 764 A2d at 1194) As the

*Tt is not clear from Hawkes if this language refers to an assessment of a child’s
best interests, or an assessment of changed circumstances, although it appears to

602 |

trial court observed, this language is inapplicable because neither
parent was the sole physical custodian; parents here had joint
custody. Yet the trial court even went on to assume arguendo that
this language did apply, and concluded that father had met its
burden. The majority is wrong in asserting that this issue was not.
adequately addressed.

139. Compounding its error, the majority inexplicably fails to
discuss the law that applies to modification of shared parenting
arrangements. Where, as here, a shared parenting arrangement
becomes unfeasible due to the parents’ inability to cooperate in
decision making or other circumstances, we require “at the very
ment of the custodial arrangement and, because of
ities involved in shared parenting,” these circum-
stances “will often necessitate a change in custody.” Hoover, 171
Vt. at 259, 764 A2d at 1194. “This result is further compelled
when the parties are no longer able to engage in shared decision-
making because of a deterioration in their parenting relationship.”
Id. We repeated this standard in Hawkes, 2005 VT 57, 11 11-12
(citing Hoover and drawing clear distinction between cases involv-
ing shared parental rights and those where one parent has sole
physical custody); see also Maurer x Maurer, 2005 VT 26, 118, 178
Vt. 489, 872 A2d 326 (mem.) (affirming trial court’s finding of
real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances in
context of shared parenting arrangement where parents were
unable to agree on transportation or counseling, were setting up
activities for child without consulting one another, and had differ-
ent parenting styles).

140. Indeed, Vermont law requires that “[w]hen the parents
cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibili-
ties, the Court shall award parental rights and responsibilities
primarily or solely to one parent.” 15 V.S.A. § 665(a) (emphasis
added); see also Chase vu Bowen, 2008 VT 12, 139, 183 Vt. 187,
945 A.2d 901 (explaining that statute’s purpose is to avoid
disruption to children “caused by forcing unwilling parents to
engage in joint decision-making,” and recognizing that “by forcing
unwilling parents to share parental rights and make joint deci-
sions, a court risks placing a child in the middle of constant and
harmful disputes” (quotation omitted)).

be the former. In any event, this Court has acknowledged that “the difference
between the separate analyses under the modification statute’s two distinct steps
is ‘subtle? ” Hawkes, 2015 VT 57, 110 (citation omitted).

141. Parents here could not agree where the child would live
and go to school. Both sought sole physical and legal rights and
responsibilities so that they could make these decisions. Mother
had relocated to South Burlington and wanted the child to live
with her there and attend school in that city; father wanted the
child to live with him in West Rutland and attend school in that
town. Beyond this fundamental disagreement, the parents could no
longer engage in joint decision-making on other topics, to the
detriment of their child. Based on its findings, the court did not
err in concluding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there
had been a “real, substantial and unanticipated change of circum-
stances” since the August 2008 final divorce order. Its decision is
consistent with our case law and it reflects the trial court’s
sment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
2s. See Hawkes, 2005 VT 57, 110 (explaining that “whether
a relocation or other change is substantial enough to meet the
threshold must be determined in the context of all the surround-
ing circumstances, keeping in mind that the effect on the child is
what makes a change substantial”); Gates u Gates, 168 Vt. 64, 70,
716 A2d 794, 798 (1998) (“[W]hile the court is not permitted to
decide what is in the best interests of the children during the first
phase of the hearing, it may still consider the impact of the
change upon the children in deciding whether the circumstances
have substantially changed.”).'

142. In Hoover, as here, “mother and father were unable to
resolve their conflict and reach an agreeable arrangement that
would enable them to continue co-parenting,” and thus, “a disrup-
tion of the custodial arrangement in this case was inevitable. The
trial court was merely in the position of deciding what was in the
best interests of the child[]: sole custody with mother or sole
custody with father.” 171 Vt. at 259-60, 764 A2d at 1194. The
court here determined that father should have sole physical and
legal rights and responsibilities, and its findings support this
conclusion. Mother disagrees with the result, but challenges only
the court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence. Her argu-
ments are easily disposed of on appeal. See, e.g., Payrits uv

*The majority appears to ignore this case law, finding fault with the trial court for
considering the impact that transferring schools would have on the child. Ante, 1
19, The court was required to consider what effect a move to South Burlington
would have on the child both in assessing changed circumstances and in evaluating
what allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was in his best interests.

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Payrits, 171 Vt. 50, 54, 757 A.2d 469, 472-73 (2000) (“We have
consistently held that . . . the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight of the evidence, and its persuasive effect are questions for
the trier of fact, and its determination must stand if supported by
credible evidence.”); Meyncke u Meyncke, 2009 VT 84, 115, 186
Vt. 571, 980 A2d 799 (mem.) (explaining that arguments which
amount to nothing more than a disagreement with court’s reason-
ing and conclusion do not make out a case for an abuse of
discretion).

143. The majority, however, only sees the problem as a question
of which school the child should attend and decides that this case
is “about the education of the parents’ child, an aspect of legal
responsibilities.” Ante, 1 15. Although it accepts that a change in
circumstances exists that requires the abandonment of shared
custody, it disregards all the findings about mother’s behavior that
contributed to the demise of cooperation and sends the matter
back to the trial court to assess whether there were changed
circumstances that would support a modification of the parental
responsibility provisions concerning physical responsibilities. For
support, the majority relies on cases that involved modification of
sole custody orders: Hawkes, Kilduff and a decision that is of
little relevance to this case, Gates, 168 Vt. at 68, 716 A.2d at 797.
The majority fails to recognize the litany of findings reflecting an
overall breakdown in these parents’ ability to cooperate with
respect to the routine daily care and control of their child, above
and beyond their disagreement concerning the child’s schooling.
On the basis of these findings, which are supported by the
evidence, the court found that the parties’ ability to communicate,
cooperate and make joint decisions has, “for all intents and
purposes, evaporated,” and that “the increasing level of disagree-
ment has directly impacted the child.” Moreover, the breakdown in
the parties’ ability to effectively cooperate described by the trial
court extended to the matters central to physical rights and
responsibilities — the routine daily care and control of the child.
Given these findings, the trial court’s decision to modify physical,
as well as legal rights and responsibilities, was within its discre-
tion.

144, Although I would affirm the trial court’s decision to modify
legal and physical rights and responsibi s, and to assign them
solely to father, I agree with the majority that on this record we
cannot affirm the trial court’s parent-child contact schedule.

a “

Before the events that triggered this change from shared custody,
this child was spending 64% of his time with his mother. The trial
court’s modified order allocated roughly 20% of the child’s time to
mother — three (and occasionally) four weekend visits per month,
and no mid-week visits. This is a dramatic change for a child the
court found to have a particular need for “consistency and
continuity.” To the extent this schedule is a natural consequence of
mother’s relocation to South Burlington, and a desire to protect
the child from disruptive mid-week commutes, it may serve the
child’s best interests. However, mother presented the trial court
with a “Plan B,” indicating that if the court ordered a custodial
arrangement in which the child remained in the West Rutland
school district, she would continue to use the Proctor home owned
by her significant other for the purpose of continuing the existing
parent-child contact arrangement. The trial court’s parent-child
contact (PCC) order does not address this possibility, or explain
why, in the face of mother’s stated willingness to return to the
West Rutland area to facilitate ongoing contact with the child,
such a dramatic curtailment of mother’s PCC time was in the
child’s best interests. Because the trial court did not address this
consideration in determining the PCC schedule, I would remand
for reconsideration of the schedule in light of this factor. I join
the majority’s decision to that extent.

145. In reversing the court’s decision as to physical rights and
responsibilities, however, the majority ignores our standard of
review and ignores the clear rationale advanced by the trial court
in support of its decision. Where, as here, “the family court’s
award of custody reflects its reasoned judgment in light of the
record evidence, its decision may not be disturbed.” Kasper u
Kasper, 2007 VT 2, 15, 181 Vt. 562, 917 A.2d 463 (mem.). Based
wholly on an argument of its own making, the majority holds the
trial court to an erroneous legal standard, and finds reversible
error where no error exists at all. Although I concur with the
majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s order with respect to
legal rights and responsibilities, as well as its remand with respect
to PCC, I dissent from its conclusion as to the modification and
allocation of physical rights and responsibilities.

146. I am authorized to state that Justice Robinson joins in this
concurrence and dissent.

606 |

2016 VT 122

In re J.H.
[160 A.3d_ 1023]
No. 16-059
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed December 2, 2016

Le “
ee Se

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Seth A.
Steinzor, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Appellant.

Christine Speidel, Springfield, and W. David Koeninger,
Bennington, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., for Amicus Curiae Office of
the Health Care Advocate.

11. Reiber, C.J. The State appeals the Human Services Board’s
om reversing a determination by the Economic Services
Division of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) that
J.H. cannot be considered for a subsidized qualified healthcare
plan on the Vermont Health Connect exchange because she has
health insurance available to her through her husband’s employer.
The appeal turns on the question of whether, under controlling
federal law, healthcare insurance must be considered available to
JH. through her husband’s employer even though her husband
elected not to enroll in his employer’s plan and she herself could
not enroll in the plan unless he did. We affirm the Board’s ruling
that J.H. could be considered for a subsidized healthcare plan
through Vermont Health Connect, but we do so based on a
different rationale than that given by the Board.

12. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (Affordable Care Act), each and every “applicable individual”!
is required to maintain “minimum essential coverage” (MEC) for
health care or pay a tax. LR.C. § 5000A(a)-(b). Individuals may
obtain MEC through government-sponsored or employer-
sponsored healthcare plans or through a state insurance exchange

'Under the Affordable Care Act, individuals with religious exemptions and
individuals who are incarcerated or who are not lawfully in the country are not
“applicable individuals.” LR.C. § 5000A(@). All other individuals are “applicable
individuals” under the Act. Id. § 5000A(A)(1).

608 |

such as Vermont Health Connect? Id. § 5000A(f)(1). Moreover,
individuals meeting certain criteria may obtain federal subsidies to
help them purchase insurance on an exchange. Those subsidies
consist of credits against income tax liability, which are called
advance premium tax credits (APTC), and limits on out-of-pocket
expenses for health care, which are called cost-sharing reductions.
See id. §36B (creating tax credit for individuals with coverage
under qualified health plan); 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (establishing pro-
gram for advance determination of premium tax credits and
cost-sharing reductions and for payment of such subsidies to
issuers of qualified healthcare plans on behalf of eligible individu-
als). To receive the cost-sharing reductions, an individual must be
eligible for APTC. 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(g)()@)(B). Similar state
subsidies may also be available to those eligible for federal
premium tax credits. See 33 V.S.A. § 1812 (setting forth eligibility
standards for state subsidies).

13. Federal regulations require state exchanges like Vermont
Health Connect to perform certain functions related to eligibility,
including determining, based on federally prescribed standards, an
individual’s eligibility to purchase a qualified healthcare plan
through a state exchange and to receive APTC and cost-sharing
reductions. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.200(a) (requiring exchanges to per-
form functions set forth in specified subparts of regulation related
to determining individual eligibility); 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(f)(5) (“The
Exchange must calculate advance payments of the premium tax
credit in accordance with [Treas. Reg.] 1.86B-3.”); see also 33
VS.A. § 1805(6) (listing, as one of state exchange’s duties, deter-
mining premiums and subsidies required under federal law). In
Vermont, DCF’s Economic Services Division determines eligibility
for enrollment in qualified healthcare plans through Vermont
Health Connect “in accordance with applicable provisions of federal
and state law and regulations” pursuant to its Health Benefit
Eligibility and Enrollment Rules. Health Benefit Eligibility and
Enrollment Rule 2.05, Code of Vermont Rules 13 170 001 [here-
inafter HBEE Rules], https:/Avwwlexisnexis.com/hottopics/codeofy
trules.

14. The critical federal regulation in this case is Treasury
Regulation § 1.36B-2. Under that regulation, an applicable tax-
payer — defined as “a taxpayer whose household income is at

2 Vermont Health Connect is the only such exchange in the State of Vermont.

least 100 percent but not more than 400 percent of the Federal
poverty line for the taxpayer’s family size for the taxable year” —
may obtain the federal subsidies if the taxpayer is enrolled in a
healthcare plan through an exchange and is not eligible for MEC
other than through the exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(a)-(b). In
general, “an employee who may enroll in an eligible employer-
sponsored plan . . . and an individual who may enroll in the plan
because of a relationship to the employee (a related individual),
are eligible for minimal essential coverage under the plan.” Id.
§ 1.36B-2(¢)(3); HBEE Rule 23.01(¢)(2) (same). “An employee or
related individual may be eligible for minimum essential coverage
under an eligible employee-sponsored plan . . . if the employee or
related individual could have enrolled in the plan... during an
open or special enrollment period.” Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(8)(iii)
(emphasis added); HBEE Rule 23.01(c)(4)@) (same).

15. Pursuant to these rules, if J.H. is eligible for MEC under
her husband’s healthcare plan — meaning she “could have en-
rolled” in the plan — she may not receive federal or state
subsidies through a Vermont Health Connect plan on the ex-
change.

16. The salient facts in this case are undisputed. J.H. previ-
ously received Medicaid through the Dr. Dynasaur program but
aged out of the program upon turning nineteen in 2013. The State
continued to provide her with coverage under the program for two
more years, however, due to an administrative error. In October
2015, DCF notified J.H. that her Dr. Dynasaur coverage would
terminate at the end of that month but that she could apply for
coverage through Vermont Health Connect.

17. The following month, J.H. applied for healthcare coverage
on the exchange. She reported that she was newly married, had
a total gross household income of $86,868, and that her husband’s
employer offered healthcare insurance to him and to her as a
spouse. The coverage available under the husband’s employer-
sponsored plan met the Affordable Care Act’s MEC standards.
Under the plan’s terms, J.H. could not enroll in it unless her
husband also enrolled.

18. J.H’s husband, as an unadopted former foster child over
the age of eighteen, is eligible for Medicaid until he reaches the
age of twenty-six. HBEE Rule 9.02(2)(e). Persons with this status
are eligible for Medicaid regardless of the amount of their
household income. Jd. Rule 9.03(e). The husband could have

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enrolled in his employer-sponsored plan, but he chose not to do so
because he had available to him premium-free Medicaid coverage.

19. Based on these facts, DCF’s Economic Services Division
concluded that the husband’s employer-sponsored plan was avail-
able to both J.H. and her husband and that J.H. was therefore
ineligible to receive subsidies for insurance purchased through
Vermont Health Connect. J.H. appealed to the Human Services
Board, which reversed DCF’s determination that J.H. was ineli-
gible to receive the subsidies.

110. In so ruling, the Board framed the issue as whether J.H’s
husband “is liable to enroll in his employer’s insurance when he
already has Medicaid coverage that meets MEC.” The Board then
determined that a conflict exists between the HBEE rule pre-
cluding a subsidized exchange plan for those who fail to enroll in
an available employer-sponsored plan, see HBEE Rule 12.02(b),
and the HBEE rule stating that MEC is automatically met when
an individual is eligible for government-sponsored insurance such
as Medicaid irrespective of whether other insurance is available to
the individual, see id. 23.01(B)(1)Gi). According to the Board, the
latter rule requires an individual such as J.H.’s husband who has
MEC through a government-sponsored plan to apply for that
coverage and not seek subsidies on an exchange, while the former
rule requires the same individual to elect an employer-sponsored
plan that would be superfluous in light of the premium-free
government-sponsored plan and would bar a spouse from access-
ing affordable insurance. The Board declined to read the rules to
require J.H.’s husband to obtain two insurance policies, stating
that requiring him to obtain a second duplicative health insurance
policy from his employer was contrary to the Affordable Care
Act’s primary intent of providing affordable health care to each
individual and would deprive the husband of the special govern-
ment benefit he receives as a former foster child.

111. The Board further concluded that because the husband
cannot be required to enroll in a duplicative employer-sponsored
plan when he has met MEC through a government-sponsored
plan, and because J.H. cannot obtain insurance through her
husband’s government-sponsored plan and cannot enroll in his
employer-sponsored plan unless he does, she is eligible for sub-
sidies through a Vermont Health Connect plan. Accordingly, the
Board directed the Department of Vermont Health Access, which
is within the Agency of Human Services and administers Vermont

Health Connect, to award federal and state subsidies for J.H/’s
purchase of healthcare insurance through Vermont Health Con-
nect.

112. On appeal, the Department argues that the Board erred as
a matter of law in ruling that J.H. was eligible for subsidized
insurance through Vermont Health Connect and in requiring the
Department to provide J.H. with tax subsidies for the purchase of
insurance through the exchange. According to the Department, a
plain reading of the relevant law compels the conclusion that J.-H.
was not entitled to the subsidies. In the Department’s view,
because both J.-H. and her husband “could have enrolled” in the
husband’s employer-sponsored plan, J.H. was eligible for MEC
under the plan and thus not eligible to receive subsidies through
a Vermont Health Connect plan.

113. The Department further argues that the perceived conflict
between HBEE rules cited by the Board in support of its decision
does not exist because no rule or regulation requires husband to
enroll in his government-sponsored Medicaid plan. The Depart-
ment notes that the rule relied upon by the Board does not.
require individuals to enroll in an available government-sponsored
Medicaid plan, as the Board concluded, but rather provides only
that an individual who wants government-sponsored insurance
must apply for it to receive it. See HBEE Rule 23.01(b)(2) (“An
individual who meets the eligibility criteria for government-
sponsored MEC must complete the requirements necessary to
receive benefits.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(2)(ii) (same). The De-
partment agrees with the Board that J.H.’s husband cannot be
compelled to enroll in his employer-sponsored plan, but asserts
that that fact is not relevant to the question of whether J.H. is
entitled to the tax subsidies. The Department emphasizes that it
is the household’s eligibility for employer-sponsored insurance
through J.H’s husband that controls the availability of the
subsidies to J.H. According to the Department, J.H. and her
husband had to decide whether it was in their best interests for
the husband to retain his government-sponsored plan and decline
his employer-sponsored plan, in which case J.H. could purchase an
unsubsidized exchange plan, or for husband to enroll in the
employer-sponsored plan, either in addition to or instead of his
government-sponsored plan, in which case J.H. could also enroll in
the plan.

114. The Department further states that, given the plain
meaning of the controlling law and the absence of any conflict

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among the controlling rules and regulations, there is no need for
this Court to delve into the policies underlying the Affordable
Care Act. In the Department’s view, however, even if we were to
do so, we would find that those policies are aimed at strength-
ening our employer-based health insurance system and thus
actually support reversing the Board’s decision.

115. In its amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of J.H., Vermont
Legal Aid’s Office of the Health Care Advocate (HCA) argues that
because J.H.’s ability to enroll in her husband’s employer-
sponsored plan was conditioned upon her husband enrolling — a
condition that was unmet and not within her power to fulfill —
she could not have enrolled in the plan and thus was eligible for
tax subsidies through a Vermont Health Connect plan.

116. TM As noted, federal law is controlling in this case. We
review de novo the Board’s construction of federal law and of
state rules implementing federal law. See Hogan uv Dep't of Soc.
& Rehab. Servs., 168 Vt. 615, 617, 727 A2d 1242, 1244 (1998)
(mem.) (“We defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of
its own statutes and rules but not to a state agency’s interpre-
tation of federal law where the state agency is charged with
administering the federal program at the local level.”); see also
Dutton v Dep't of Soc. Welfare, 168 Vt. 281, 284, 721 A.2d 109, 111
(1998) ({D]etermining whether the federal and state definitions
are consistent is a matter that requires statutory interpretation —
the exclusive province of the courts.” (quotation omitted)).

117. [HM As explained above, the Department’s principal argu-
ment is that the plain meaning of the most critical federal
regulation at issue here, Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3), demonstrates
that J.H. was eligible for her husband’s employer-sponsored plan
and thus could not obtain tax subsidies through a Vermont Health
Connect plan. Our primary objective in construing a statute or
regulation is to effectuate the intent of the legislative body. In re
Jones, 2009 VT 113, 17, 187 Vt. 1, 989 A.2d 482. “Our first step
in the process is to ascertain the plain meaning of the statute, as
we presume that that is the most basic expression of legislative
intent.” Id.

118. We conclude that the plain meaning of the regulation
supports the HCA’s position rather than that of the Department.

119. Although in most instances married couples must file a
joint tax return to claim premium tax credits, see Temp. Treas.

Reg. § 1.36B-2T, and household income is an eligibility criterion
for such credits, see Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(b)(1), eligibility for the
healthcare insurance subsidies, including APTC, is generally de-
termined on an individual basis. See 42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(3)
(T]he Secretary of the Treasury makes advance payments of
[premium tax credits] or reductions to the issuers of qualified
health plans in order to reduce the premiums payable by indi-
viduals eligible for such credit.”)> A tax filer who meets the filing
status and income requirements may receive premium tax credits
“for any month that one or more members of the applicable
taxpayer’s family” is enrolled in an exchange health plan and is
not eligible for MEC other than coverage through an exchange.
Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(a); HBEE Rule 12.02 (providing that “ap-
plicable tax filer . . . is eligible for APTC for any month in which
one or more individuals for whom the tax filer expects to claim a
personal exemption deduction on their tax return for the benefit
year” is eligible to enroll in qualified health plan on exchange and
is not eligible for MEC in individual market).

120. Notably, the critical regulation at issue addresses em-
ployer-sponsored eligibility for employees and for related family
members separately. See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(¢)(8)@) (discussing
eligibility for MEC with respect to “an employee who may enroll
in an eligible employer-sponsored plan” and “an individual who
may enroll in the plan because of a relationship to the employee”);
id. § 1.36B-2(¢)@)(iii) (discussing consequences of failure to enroll
in employer-sponsored plan by “[aln employee or related indi-
vidual . . . if the employee or related individual could have
enrolled in the plan”); id. § 1.36B-2(c)(8)(v)(A)(1)-2) (separately
addressing affordability for employee and affordability for related
individual).

121. HM In its most relevant part, the regulation provides as
follows: “An employee or related individual may be eligible for
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored
plan . . . if the employee or related individual could have enrolled

* As set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 18082(a)(8), APTC are paid directly to the insurer and
thus benefit the individual healtheare reeipient directly by reducing the amount of
the reeipient’s overall tax burden, See Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-4(a)(1) (reconciling
premium tax credit with advance credit payments). Spouses filing a joint tax return
would be directly benefitted only to the extent that they were entitled to a tax
refund, which would happen only when the premium tax credit exceeded their
APTC. See id.

614 |

in the plan . . . during an open or special enrollment period.” Id.
§ 1.36B-2(¢)(3)(iii)(A) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this
sentence is that an employee is eligible for MEC if the employee
could have enrolled in an employer-sponsored plan, and a related
individual is eligible for MEC if the related individual could have
enrolled in the employer-sponsored plan. The two scenarios are
treated separately in the regulation.

122. In the instant case, J.H.’s husband could have enrolled in
his employer-sponsored plan but decided not to for apparent.
financial reasons — he had to a premium-free government-
sponsored plan through Medicaid. Thus, under the regulation, he
would not be entitled to tax subsidies through an exchange plan.
On the other hand, because her husband elected not to enroll in
the employer-sponsored plan, J.H. could not have enrolled in the
plan independent of him, insofar as the plan allowed family
members to enroll only if the employee enrolled. We discern no
basis in law or fact to assume that J.H. could have compelled her
husband to enroll in his employer-sponsored plan.

123. JE} Nowhere does the subject regulation, or any other
regulation implementing the Affordable Care Act, indicate that an
employee’s decision whether to enroll in an employer-sponsored
plan is imputed to family members or that family members are
subject to the consequences of such a decision with respect to
availability of tax subsidies through an exchange plan. Imputing
the husband’s decision to J.H. without a specific factual or legal
basis would be inconsistent not only with the Affordable Care
Act’s general determination of healthcare subsidies on an indi-
vidual basis but also with the law’s general treatment of spouses
as individual persons. See Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt. wv Lorrain, 165
Vt. 12, 15, 675 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1996) (“Irrespective of their
marital status, women have property and contractual rights equal
to men, and thus the legal existence of married women is no
longer merged into that of their husbands.”); ef. United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 281 (2002) (noting, in context of detailing
history of tenancy by entirety, outdated “common-law fiction that
the husband and wife were one person at law”).*

*Tmputing the husband’s decision to J.H. would also appear to be inconsistent with
the Internal Revenue Service’s position that “{a] conditional offer [of health
insurance coverage under an employer-sponsored plan] generally would impact a
spouse’s eligibility for the premium tax eredit . . . only if all conditions to the offer

124. I This is not a situation where the plain meaning of
the pertinent regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory scheme
as a whole, the governing statute, or the legislative goals under-
lying the statute. See Delta Psi Fraternity v. City of Burlington,
2008 VT 129, 1.7, 185 Vt. 129, 969 A.2d 54 (stating that legislative
intent is derived from plain meaning of statutory language unless
literal reading is inconsistent with legislative scheme or purpose of
statute). The Affordable Care Act includes private health insur-
ance market reforms, new tax subsidies, an expansion of the
Medicaid program, an individual requirement to maintain health
insurance, and many other provisions. See generally Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). The Department argues that allowing J.H. to obtain tax
subsidies under the circumstances in this case would undermine
the Act’s goal of strengthening the employer-based insurance
system. This argument is based on one of ten effects of the MEC
requirement listed in Congressional findings — which is that the
requirement “achieves near-universal coverage by building upon
and strengthening the private employer-based health insurance
system.” See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D). The focus of the Affordable
Care Act, however, is not to bolster the employer-based healthcare
system. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the
principal purpose of the Act is “to increase the number of
Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of
health care.” Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
588, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). Our construction of the relevant
regulation is not inconsistent with that purpose.

Affirmed.

aire satisfied (that is, the spouse was actually offered the coverage and eligible for
it)? See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Draft Instructions
for Forms 1094-C & 1095-C for tax year 2016 (emphasis added), available at
https://www:irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i109495e—dft.pdf_[https://perma.ce/GKTY-5V7A]. Tt
may be highly unlikely that an insurer would offer an employer-sponsored
healtheare plan that would allow an employee’s family members to enroll in the
plan without the employee enrolling; however, because federal law does not require
that family-member enrollment be conditioned on employee enrollment, an em-
ployer’s offer of coverage to family members is, essentially, a conditional offer.

616 |

2016 VT 128
David Barron v. Lisa Menard, Commissioner, Department of
Corrections and Ralph Cherry
[160 A.3d 1030]
No. 16-151
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
Opinion Filed December 9, 2016

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Kelly Green, Pris-
oners’ Rights Office, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andrew Bolduc of McNeil, Leddy & Shehan, P.C., Burlington,
for Defendant-Appellee.

11. Robinson, J. Petitioner appeals the superior court’s sum-
mary judgment decision upholding his prison disciplinary convic-

tion for threatening another person. He argues that the Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC): (1) failed to prove that he had the
ability and opportunity to carry out his threat as required by
DOC policy for a prison disciplinary conviction, and (2) failed to
hold petitioner’s hearing within the time allowed by the policy. We
affirm.

12. The undisputed facts in the summary judgment record
reflect the following. Petitioner is incarcerated. On the morning of
Thursday, October 22, 2015, a kitchen supervisor filed a written
report describing an incident that occurred when she was taking
a group of prisoners, including petitioner, to the prison kitchen.’
She reported that a correctional officer came into view, and
petitioner told the kitchen supervisor, “you have to make sure [the
correctional officer] is never around me. I will beat him up.” The
kitchen supervisor explained that petitioner “looked like he would
assult [sic] him at any moment,” and stated that, because of “the
look on his face and clinched [sic] hands,” she was “afraid for [the
officer’s] life.”

13. The inmate disciplinary report filed and delivered on
October 22 reflects that, pursuant to a DOC policy, petitioner was
put in administrative segregation that day — October 22 —
pending a disciplinary investigation for a major rule violation. Vt.
Dep’t of Corr., Directive No. 410.01, Facility Rules and Inmate
Discipline 7 (2012) [hereinafter Directive No. 410.01, Facility Rules
on Inmate Discipline], http:/www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/
correctional-services-301-550/401-500-programs-security-and-
supervision/410-01-facility-rules-and-inmate-discipline.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/TIVB-5ZJP]. The policy requires the investigation to be
completed within three business days and the disciplinary hearing
to be held within four business days of the inmate being
segregated. Jd. It specifies that “Day one” is considered the first
full business day after the inmate is put into segregation. Id.

14. The DOC held petitioner’s hearing on Wednesday, October
28, 2015 at approximately 8:00 p.m. The hearing officer found
petitioner guilty of violating a DOC rule that prohibits “threat-
ening another with harm, bodily injury or an act with adverse
consequences.” Id. at 20. The rule defines “threatening or threat-

The incident report reflects that this incident occurred on October 21. The
ensuing disciplinary report identified the date of the incident as October 22. For
the reasons set forth below, the lack of clarity as to the date of the incident does
not affect our analysis.

618 Le

ening behavior” to include: (1) “[vJerbal threats when the offender
has the ability and opportunity to carry out the threat,” and (2)
“physical threats when the offender has entered into another
person’s space in an intimidating manner.” Jd. at 6.

15. Petitioner sought review of his disciplinary conviction in the
superior court under Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner and the DOC each filed for summary
judgment, and the trial court granted the DOC’s motion and
denied petitioner’s. In response to petitioner’s arguments that the
evidence was insufficient to show that he had the ability or
opportunity to carry out the threats and that the hearing was
untimely, the trial court concluded that the evidence was sufficient
to support the hearing officer’s decision and that, consistent with
the DOC directive, the hearing took place on the fourth business
day. Petitioner appealed.

16. This Court applies the same standard as the trial court
when reviewing a summary judgment decision. “Summary judg-
ment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material
fact and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, 16, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A2d
281.

17. HI When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence at a disci-
plinary hearing, the decision “must be upheld if it is supported by
‘some evidence’ in the record.” Herring u Gorczyk, 173 Vt. 240,
248, 789 A.2d 955, 958 (2001). The question is “ ‘whether there is
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board?” Id. (quoting Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985).

18. The two questions on appeal are: (1) whether there is
sufficient evidence to support petitioner’s disciplinary conviction,
and (2) whether the DOC was timely in holding petitioner's
hearing after placing him in administrative segregation.

19. Hl Regarding the first question, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support petitioner’s disciplinary conviction.
Petitioner argues that the DOC failed to meet its burden to prove
that he had the “ability and opportunity to carry out the threat”
under the DOC’s definition of verbal threats. He argues that the
DOC did not present evidence about the context of the threat, for
example the physical size differences and the distance between the

men, whether the officers were armed, or how many other people
were nearby. We conclude that this additional evidence was not
necessary to support the DOC’s determination.

110. The kitchen supervisor’s statement was sufficient to sup-
port the disciplinary determination. At petitioner’s hearing, the
DOC introduced her statement that it looked like petitioner would
assault the other officer at any moment and that she was afraid
for his life. This statement provides “some evidence” that supports
the disciplinary conviction. The f that the object of petitioner’s
threat was walking near petitioner and that someone witnessing
the event believed petitioner would attack at any moment and was
afraid that he would do so, support the inference that petitioner
had the ability and opportunity to carry out his threat. We
therefore uphold the superior court’s decision that there was
sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary conviction insofar as
there was “some evidence” that defendant violated the rule
against threatening another person.

V11. HI With respect to the timeliness of the disciplinary
hearing, we conclude that the DOC followed its policy and held
the hearing within four business days after segregating petitioner.
Petitioner was placed in segregation on Thursday, October 227
According to the policy, the first business day was therefore
Friday, October 23. Accordingly, the fourth business day, the last
day the DOC could hold the hearing, was Wednesday, October 28,
which is when the hearing was held.

112. We reject petitioner’s argument that the 8:00 p.m. hearing
was untimely because the DOC was required to conduct the
disciplinary hearing by 5:00 p.m. on October 28. There is nothing
in the record that shows that a “business day” under the DOC
policy ends at 5:00 p.m. The policy defines “business day” as
“Monday through Friday, excluding weekends and recognized
State holidays,” and does not purport to define “bus
within those days. Directive No. 410.01, Facility Rules and Inmate
Discipline 2. Further, the policy does not require the hearing to

2 On appeal, petitioner argues that the date his administrative segregation began
is a matter of dispute. Although, as noted supra, note 1, the record contains
conflicting statements as to the date of the incident, the documents in the
summary judgment record reflect that the incident report and inmate disciplinary
report were filed on October 22, and that petitioner was placed in administrative
segregation on that date. We cannot find support in this record for petitioner’s
claim that the facts are disputed as to the date of his segregation.

620 |

be held during business hours. A prison operates twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week. On this record, there is no basis
to support a conclusion that a “business day,” as defined in this
policy, ends at a specific time, other than the end of the day itself.
Because the DOC held petitioner’s hearing on the fourth business
day, as required by its policy, the prosecution was timely.

Affirmed.
P|
2016 VT 125
Kenneth W. Miller, II v. Eric Flegenheimer
[161 A.3d 524)

No. 15-448
Present: Reiber, CJ., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.

Opinion Filed December 9, 2016

Kevin M. Henry and Malory S. Lea of Primmer Piper
Eggleston & Cramer PC, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.

Andre D. Bouffard of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC,
Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

11. Reiber, C.J. This is an appeal from the trial court’s decision
on the merits. The case requires us to determine whether a series
of e-mails exchanged between two business partners who jointly
own a document shredding company constituted an enforceable
contract to sell one partner’s interest in the company to the other
partner. The defendant (seller) appeals the trial court's determi-
nation that the partners had an enforceable contract and that
seller is obligated to negotiate the remaining terms of the deal in
good faith. He argues that there were too many open terms to
produce an enforceable contract and that the partners had no
intent to be bound to a contract by their e-mails. The plaintiff
(buyer) cross-appeals and argues that the e-mails do demonstrate
intent to be bound and that we should enforce the contract. We

622 Le

reject buyer’s argument that the parties had entered into a fully
completed contract, agree with seller that there was no enforce-
able contract at all, and accordingly reverse and enter judgment
for defendant.

12. Buyer and seller are joint owners and two of three
cofounders of a document shredding company (the company).
Each partner currently owns half of the stock in the compan:
The company has been successful. The same cannot be said of its
partners’ working relationship. By 2010, it had become apparent
to the partners that they were not working well together, so they
hired an outside CEO and put in place a three-person advisory
board to resolve their disputes independently. They also consid-
ered selling the company to an interested outside purchaser but
could not agree on the price. The following year, the outside CEO
left and seller became CEO. Buyer withdrew from day-to-day
operations for both business and personal reasons.

13. The partners then conducted months of negotiations in an
attempt to include a buy-sell agreement in their shareholders’
agreement. The buy-sell agreement would create a process for one
partner to buy out the other. The partners engaged counsel and
exchanged numerous drafts of the proposed agreement. They
spent over $30,000 of company money on the effort. In the end,
buyer refused to sign the final draft of the agreement, and
negotiations fell apart on December 9, 2013.

14. The buy-sell agreement drafts had several features that
mirrored seller’s eventual offer to buyer. These included a “claw-
back provision,” which provided that if one partner bought out the
other and then sold the company for a higher price within two
years, the partner who was bought out would receive half of the
difference between the value at which he sold the company and
the value his partner received when he resold it. The buy-sell
agreement drafts did not name a fixed price for the company, and
they did not include a non compete agreement or a non solicita-
tion agreement.

15. On December 26, fifteen days after negotiations had broken
down over the buy-sell agreement, seller sent buyer an e-mail
offering terms of sale for his stock in the company. In the e-mail,
seller offered to sell the company to buyer at a price reflecting
the average of two appraisals they had previously commissioned
and also with the claw-back provision in place:

a .

Your decision not to sign the buy/sell agreement on the
day of our last Board meeting on December 9, 2013, an
agreement that the Board had endorsed and we had
previously agreed to sign, has made me realize that our
goals for the company are inconsistent and incompatible
with each other.

Accordingly, I am offering you the option to purchase
my share of [the company] for a price [which] .. .
reflects the average of the 2 professional appraisals we
had done in the fall of 2012. I extend this offer to you in
a good faith attempt to allow you to purchase the entire
company with 1 condition, namely, if you sell the com-
pany within 2 years of acquiring my shares, you will
agree to equally split with me all proceeds in excess of
[twice the price above]. This offer will remain open until
Friday, January 10, 2014 at which point it will be
withdrawn.

Likewise, I am prepared to purchase all of your shares
on the same terms and conditions as outlined above.

16. Five days later, on December 31, buyer replied by e-mail
that “I will accept” the offer, acknowledged the claw-back, and
that seller should expect “definitive documents” with “customary
provisions” within about two weeks:

Thank you for your e-mail of December 26, 2013. I will
accept your offer to purchase your shares of [the com-
pany] for a price of [same as proposed]. I also agree that
the definitive documents evidencing this sale will contain
a claw-back in the event that I sell the company within
two years of the closing in excess of [twice the price
above] . . . . You should expect to see drafts of the
definitive documents containing customary provisions for
transactions of this type prior to January 10th.

17. On January 9, 2014, buyer sent a short e-mail to seller and
attached a twelve-page Stock Purchase Agreement and a six-page
Confidentiality, Non-Competition, and Non-Solicitation Agreement
(Non-Compete Agreement). In the Non-Compete Agreement,
seller would agree not to compete with the company or solicit
employees or customers of the company for three years. The
Non-Compete Agreement referred to itself as “a condition prec-

624 Le

edent” of the Stock Purchase Agreement. The agreements also
lowered the price buyer offered seller for his shares by $50,000,
assigning that consideration to the Non-Compete Agreement. Five
days later, on January 14, seller responded that he had reviewed
the Stock Purchase Agreement and Non-Compete Agreement and
would be withdrawing his offer to sell his shares:

I am in receipt of the draft Stock Purchase Agreement
and Non-compete. . . . After reviewing the documents
with my counsel, and after further contemplation of the
terms of the sale as well as my own personal investment.
in the company, I have determined that it is not in my
best interest to move forward with the transaction at this
time. Accordingly, I am withdrawing my offer to sell my
shares.

In the same e-mail, seller also told buyer that he would be
stepping away from the day-to-day operations of the company by
March 31.

18. Buyer brought suit against seller, requesting specific per-
formance of the contract. Seller moved for summary judgment.
The court, in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment,
adopted a framework from New York law in which there are two
categories of preliminary agreements: Type I and Type II. See
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. uv Tribune Co., 670 F.
Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N-Y. 1987). The court defined a Type I
agreement as “essentially a done deal that merely needs follow-up
documentation” and a Type II agreement as “a preliminary
agreement that obligates the partners to negotiate further terms
in good faith.” The court later used the same framework in its
ruling on the merits of the case. In its ruling on the merits, the
court found that buyer and seller had entered into a Type II
agreement by exchanging their December e-mails. It found that
buyer’s January 9 e-mail and draft documents constituted a
proposal of additional terms that did not invalidate the original
acceptance of the offer. Further, the court ordered that the
partners were obligated to negotiate the remaining terms of the
contract in good faith.

19. On appeal, seller argues that the court erred in its ruling
on the merits when it found an enforceable contract to negotiate
the remaining terms of the contract in good faith, specifically a
Type II agreement. Buyer cross-appeals and argues that the court

a i.

erred in not finding a Type I agreement. We conclude that there
was no enforceable contract between buyer and seller and accord-
ingly reverse the judgment for buyer.

110. JI We first address whether a series of e-mails exchanged
between two business partners constitutes an enforceable contract,
either for the terms of the contract or as a preliminary agreement
to negotiate further terms in good faith. In doing so, we note that
we have never adopted the New York Type I-Type II approach,
and we decline to do so here. This approach would lead to courts
enforcing agreements to agree, a practice we have historically
approached with caution and that could lead to extensive follow-up
litigation. See, e.g., Catamount Slate Prods. Inc. wu Sheldon, 2003
VT 112, 176 Vt. 158, 845 A.2d 324. When reviewing the court’s
analysis, we will determine whether the court considered all the
factors appropriate for determining that an enforceable agreement
exists under the precedent of this Court. However, we will use
Type I-Type II labels when referring to the trial court’s decision.

111. Our review is concerned with the “legal interpretation of
whatever hazy agreement existed,” namely whether there was an
enforceable contract to negotiate the remaining terms in good
faith, which is a question of law. Kellogg wu Shushereba, 2013 VT
76, 117, 194 Vt. 446, 82 A.3d 1121. We therefore review de novo
whether there was an enforceable contract as a matter of law.

112. [Preliminary agreements are not a novel concept.
Courts have long acknowledged that there is a range of prelimi-
nary agreements, some of which are enforceable and some of
which are not. See Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. vu Henry &
Warren Corp., 548 N.E.2d 203, 206 (N.Y. 1989) (“[A]t some point.
virtually every agreement can be said to have a degree of
indefiniteness.”). On the one hand, “mere agreement to agree at
some future time is not enforceable.” Wolvos u Meyer, 668 N.E.2d
671, 674 (Ind. 1996). But on the other hand, “{a] contract is not
necessarily lacking in all effect merely because it expresses the
idea that something is left to future agreement.” Tractebel Energy
Mktg, Inc. uv AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.
2007) (quotation omitted).

113. Here, whether the series of e-mails constituted an enforce-
able contract or — instead — a preliminary agreement depends
on two factors: the parties’ intent to be bound and the definiteness
of terms in the communications between the parties. See Meyer,

626 Le

668 N.E.2d at 675 (“The question of whether an agreement is an
enforceable . . . contract or merely an agreement to agree involves
two interrelated areas: intent to be bound and definiteness of
terms.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore begin our analysis by
examining whether the parties intended to be bound by their
e-mails. In doing so we recognize the paramount right of each
party to determine the exact moment at which it becomes bound
to an agreement. See Catamount Slate Prods., Inc., 2003 VT 112,
116 (The freedom to determine the exact moment in which an
agreement becomes binding encourages parties to negotiate as
candidly as possible, secure in the knowledge that they will not be
bound until the execution of what both parties consider to be a
final, binding agreement.”). This consideration is born out of the
“primary concern for courts in such disputes . . . to avoid trapping
parties in surprise contractual obligations that they never in-
tended.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 670 F. Supp. at 497.

114. Indeed, at oral argument, seller recognized this concern
when counsel referred to contracts formed to the surprise of a
party as “gotcha contracts.” It is because of the danger of such
“gotcha contracts” that the Second Circuit has recognized a
“strong presumption” against finding a binding obligation to be
bound. See Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d
69, 73 (2d Cir. 1989) (“There is a strong presumption against
finding binding obligation in agreements which include open
terms, call for future approvals and expressly anticipate future
preparation and execution of contract documents.” (quotation
omitted).

115. IH Because of this concern, we determine intent to be
bound using an objective test. Kvarts u Forte, 135 Vt. 306, 310,
376 A.2d 766, 769 (1977) (“It is never enough that the parties
think they have made a contract; they must express their subjec-
tive intent in a manner that is capable of understanding.”). This
objective test requires that intent to be bound be “established by
some unequivocal act or acts.” McSweeney vu Dorn, 104 Vt. 110,
114, 158 A. 88, 89 (1932). Parties can show that they intend to be
bound through their words or through their actions. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18 (1981) (“Manifestation of
mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either
make a promise or begin or render a performance.”). Parties must.
show intent to be bound at the time of agreement and “{a]ssent

a =

to the formation of an informal contract is operative only to the
extent that it is manifested.” Jd. § 18 cmt. a.

116. [I Although we review de novo whether there was an
enforceable contract as a matter of law, we review the court’s
determination in its ruling on the merits that the partners
intended to be bound for clear error because whether an intent to
be bound existed is a question of fact. Quenneville uv Buttolph,
2003 VT 82, 917, 175 Vt. 444, 833 A.2d 1263 (“The intent of the
parties to be bound, however, is a question of fact to be
determined by examining the objective words and deeds of the
parties.”). We first note that the court found that the partners did
intend to be bound, though it never said so explicitly in its
findings, because it found in its ruling on the merits that seller
“flat-out accepted” the terms of the offer. However, “[iJn this
case... the findings of the trial court contain inconsistencies
flowing from a misapplication of the governing legal standards.”
Vaughan v Tetzlaff, 141 Vt. 150, 158, 446 A.2d 356, 857 (1982)
(reversing court’s holding for clear error). Here, we hold that the
court erred in determining that the partners intended to be
bound.

117. HI As we noted in Catamount Slate Products, Inc. v
Sheldon, in the absence of a fully executed document, we apply a
four-factor test to determine whether parties intended to be
bound:

“(1) whether there has been an express reservation of the
right not to be bound in the absence of a writing; (2)
whether there has been partial performance of the
contract; (8) whether all of the terms of the alleged
contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the
agreement at issue is the type of contract that is usually
committed to writing.”

2003 VT 112, 117 (quoting Winston u Mediafare Entm’t Corp.,
777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985)).

118. The first factor is “whether there has been an express
reservation of the right not to be bound.” When determining
whether the partners expressly reserved the right not to be
bound, we look first at the “parties’ correspondence and other
documentary evidence.” Catamount Slate Prods. Inc. v Sheldon,
2003 VT 112, 118. Here, the most relevant pieces of documentary

628 Le

evidence are the e-mails between the partners. A party’s intent to
be bound must be shown by his or her actions at the time of
agreement. Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 73 (“[A] party that
wishes to be bound can very easily protect itself by refusing to
accept language that shows an intent not to be bound.”). In his
December 31 e-mail, buyer makes reference to forthcoming
“drafts of the definitive documents.” The Second Circuit, from
which we have adopted the four-factor Catanvount Slate test, has
found that a reference to a future writing shows an intent not to
be bound. See Arcadian Phosphates, 884 F.2d at 72 (“The
language of the November memorandum — two references to the
possibility that negotiations might fail and the reference to a
binding sales agreement to be completed at some future date —
shows that Arcadian did not intend to be bound.”). This factor
therefore weighs against enforceability.

119. Buyer argues that we cannot consider the plain language
argument above because seller did not assert it at trial. However,
we have found that “[t]he preservation rule is satisfied when the
trial court had a fair opportunity to consider, evaluate and rule
upon the question raised on appeal.” Vermont Built, Inc. v
Krolick, 2008 VT 131, 110, 185 Vt. 139, 969 A.2d 80 (quotation
omitted). Here, the court quoted the language of the e-mails at
length in its ruling and performed considerable evaluation of their
contents and wording. We therefore have no doubt that the seller
met the preservation rule and properly raised the argument at
trial.

120. The second factor is whether there has been partial
performance of the contract. As the court found and as both buyer
and seller acknowledge, there was no partial performance of the
purported contract. We agree with the court that “[t}his factor
weighs against enforceability.”

121. The third factor is whether all the terms have been agreed
on. As the court recognized by requiring the partners to negotiate
the remaining terms in good faith, not all the terms were agreed
on here. Several large and material terms were not decided. These
include whether or not the contract includes a form of non
compete or non solicitation agreement, the price to be paid for the
shares (as opposed to the Non-Compete Agreement), and the
structure of the claw-back provision. While it is true that “not all
terms of a contract need to be fixed with absolute certainty,” it is
also true that an agreement “in which a material term is left for

a ”

future negotiations, is unenforceable.” Tractebel Energy Mktg., 487
F.3d at 95 (quotations omitted). Therefore, terms left open for
negotiation must be minor terms, so buyer’s argument that “they
are not unimportant or fine details, but also they're not . . .
insurmountable” is flawed.

122. Buyer states on appeal that he will give in on all
remaining terms and that seller can “draft [the agreement] up
however [he] want[s].” Buyer therefore asks us to imply terms on
the issues not discussed in the e-mails to favor seller. “To imply
such terms, however, would be to impermissively make a contract
for the parties rather than to enforce any bargain the parties
themselves may have reached.” Candid Prods, Inc. uv Int'l
Skating Union, 530 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (S.D.N-Y. 1982). Further-
more, this approach disregards the fact that a contract is formed
at the time of agreement, not later, and that buyer cannot change
the terms of his e-mail to reflect what he now subjectively believes
they were. The parties’ actions at the time of agreement must
speak for themselves and be interpreted as a reasonable person
would have interpreted them under the circumstances. This factor
therefore weighs against enforceability.

123. “The fourth Catamount factor has two aspects: first,
whether the agreement at issue is of a type that is usually
committed to writing and, second, whether the agreement is so
complex that the parties could not reasonably have expected to be
bound without a writing.” Willey v. Willey, 2006 VT 106, 118, 180
Vt. 421, 912 A.2d 441 (quotation omitted). We address the first
aspect of this factor first. Since Catamount Slate involved an oral
agreement, whereas here there are e-mails and draft documents,
we construe this factor to ask whether this is the type of contract
usually reduced to a formal writing of the type that seller
contends it must be reduced to in order to be enforceable. The
short answer is yes. The court likewise found that this is the type
of contract that is usually reduced to a writing, and we agree. The
court found that “(t]he parties agree they intended a written
document to follow their emails.”

124. Buyer argues that in this case, because he had other
options for financing available, the contract need not live up to the
standard a bank would use in order to determine financing.
However, there are two flaws in this reasoning. First, this line of
thought ignores the principle, as we have stated above, that intent
to be bound is an objective standard. A reasonable person would

630 Le

expect such a contract to be reduced to a formal writing. The
buyer’s unusual financing capabilities should not enter into a
court’s objective determination. Second, a bank’s standard for
financing is a useful reference point for determining the objective
standard for when a contract of this nature would be reduced to
a writing, and it is therefore relevant not for the subjective value
of whether or not this transaction would have been financed but
for determining the objective standard. We agree with the court
that “[t]his [factor] cuts against enforceability.”

125. We finally address the second aspect of the fourth factor:
whether the potential contract is so complex that the partners
could not reasonably have expected to be bound without a writing.
Here, we conclude that it was. The contract the buyer prepared
included a twelve-page Stock Purchase Agreement and a separate
six-page Non-Compete Agreement. The court found that “there is
no evidence presented that there was anything complicated about
this deal.” However, seller presented evidence that this contract
contained numerous complicated provisions, including the claw-
back and the Non-Compete Agreement. Seller testified, “[nJoth-
ing’s simple about a 3.6-million dollar deal.” While the court did
not find this evidence credible, and while that determination lies
with the court, the court erred in stating that there was “no
evidence” of complexity. Further, the fact that the partners were
considering a very similar agreement — the buy-sell agreement
— to which they both agreed they were not bound without a
signed writing also demonstrates that this potential contract was
so complex that the partners could not reasonably have expected
to be bound without a writing. This factor therefore weighs
against enforceability.

126. Having determined that the partners did not intend to be
bound, we next look to the definiteness of terms in the agreement.
Here, framed only by the two e-mails, the terms of the agreement.
are unclear. First, the very nature of what seller was selling was
unclear. In his December 26 e-mail, seller referred both to “my
share of [the company]” and “the entire company.” Buyer, in his
reply on December 31, refers to “your shares of [the company]”.
“Share” and “shares” are distinct terms, and neither of them
refers to a non compete or non solicitation agreement. Buyer
replied by sending the Non-Compete Agreement on January 9 —
and referring to it as a “condition precedent” of the Stock
Purchase Agreement — revealing that he assumed that the terms

“share” and “shares” must include such an agreement. In other
words, buyer assumed that the Non-Compete Agreement was part
of the contract as agreed to in the e-mails. If he had not made
such an assumption, buyer could have sent a cover letter explain-
ing that he was proposing additional terms, which the court
acknowledges “certainly would have been simpler,’ but he did not.

127. Second, the price seems unclear. While both partners refer
to the same price for seller’s “shares,” buyer lowered that price
by $50,000 in his draft contract, calling the difference in consid-
eration the price of the Non-Compete Agreement. Finally, the
e-mails lay out none of the particulars regarding the claw-back
provision. These particulars are important because in buyer’s
version of the claw-back provision, he could sell up to 75% of the
company within two years without having to pay seller, whereas
the proposed buy-sell agreement’s claw-back provision triggered
the claw-back at 50%.

128. I We come now to the question of whether buyer’s
response to seller’s offer was an acceptance with a proposal of
additional terms or — instead — a counter-offer. “A counter-offer
is an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same
matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain
differing from that proposed by the original offer.’ Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 39(1). “An offeree’s power of acceptance is
terminated by his making of a counter-offer.” Id. § 39(2).

129. [HB Buyer later argued that his response was not a
counter-offer by stating that he would give in on all the terms in
his draft that differ from the terms in seller’s e-mail. However,
intent to be bound is an objective test to be determined at the
time of agreement. Buttolph, 2003 VT 82, 117 (“The intent of the
parties to be bound, however, is a question of fact to be
determined by examining the objective words and deeds of the
parties.”). Further, regarding counteroffers in Vermont:

It has long been the law in Vermont and elsewhere that
an acceptance of an offer, to be good, must in every
respect. meet and correspond with the offer. An accep-
tance on terms varying from those proposed is, in effect,
a counter proposal, and is not binding until it is itself
accepted.

Okemo Mountain, Inc. x Okemo Trailside Condominiums, Inc.,
139 Vt. 433, 435, 431 A.2d 457, 459 (1981) (quotation omitted); see

632 Le

also Rule uv Tobin, 168 Vt. 166, 171, 719 A.2d 869, 872 (1998)
(“Under contract law, an acceptance of an offer must be uncon-
ditional”); Benya u Stevens & Thompson Paper Co., 143 Vt. 521,
525, 468 A.2d 929, 931 (1983) (“An acceptance that modifies or
includes new terms is not an acceptance of the original offer; it is
a counteroffer.”). Therefore, the court erred in finding that buyer’s
response to seller’s offer was an acceptance with additional
proposals, and we conclude that buyer’s response was a counter-
offer.

130. The court found that “[t]his case is akin to Camara vu
Camara,” where we ordered specific performance of a divorce
agreement. We disagree for three reasons. First, in Camara, we
ordered specific performance of a completed agreement with no
open terms. 2010 VT 53, 16, 188 Vt. 566, 998 A.2d 1058 (mem.)
(T]he terms of settlement set forth in the email were compre-
hensive of all the issues in the divorce.”). Second, Camara involved
a litigation settlement negotiated by the parties with the help of
their counsel. Here, buyer and seller are two businessmen dis-
cussing a possible deal and, while buyer discussed the deal with
counsel, there is no evidence seller consulted counsel until receiv-
ing the December 31 e-mail. Finally, the public policy consider-
ations here are markedly different from those in Camara. There
is a strong public policy in favor of settling litigation. See New
England Educ. Training Serv, Inc. uv Silver St. P’ship, 148 Vt.
99, 101, 528 A2d 1117, 1118 (1987). But the public policy
considerations here, as we discussed above, are different — split
between giving credence to parties’ expectations and discouraging
“gotcha contracts.” Buyer’s reliance on Willey, a case which shares
many similarities with Camara, is inapplicable for the same
reasons.

131. Because we conclude that there was no enforceable
contract between buyer and seller, we need not consider whether
the contract — had it existed — would have been enforceable by
specific performance. We also need not speculate as to the
meaning of “good faith” in the court’s ruling. But we do note that.
enforcing contracts to negotiate future terms in good faith by
specific performance is extremely difficult, and courts have tradi-
tionally gone to great lengths to avoid doing so. The Second
Circuit, for example, refused to enforce such a contract by specific
performance in Brown v Cara, even though the parties there had
a signed writing. 420 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005).

132. Finally, we address buyer’s cross-appeal. Buyer urges us
to find that the contract was enforceable as written and to find
that seller is obligated, not to negotiate in good faith, but to abide
by the terms of the contract without further negotiation. Both
preliminary agreements that would require further negotiation in
good faith and contracts that are enforceable as written must be
analyzed under the same factors we have considered here. To be
enforceable, both a contract and a preliminary agreement require
the same burden of proof — a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, because the parties have not shown the requisite intent
to be bound to meet the standard of a preliminary agreement,
they also have not shown the intent to be bound necessary for a
contract to be enforceable as written. We therefore agree with the
trial court that buyer and seller did not enter into a fully
enforceable contract. Further, as stated above, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court that there was a preliminary agree-
ment requiring the parties to negotiate in good faith, and we
conclude that buyer and seller did not have an enforceable
contract.

Reversed; judgment entered for defendant.

133. Robinson, J., concurring. I concur in the result because
the “claw-back” is an essential component of the purported deal,
and the parameters of the claw-back are sufficiently complex and
individualized that a general reference to the broad concept of a
claw-back is insufficient to establish a binding contract. Notwith-
standing the purported agreement for the sale of the shares,
without a meeting of the minds as to the way the claw-back would
operate, the parties did not truly have a deal. There is no
evidence of any customary trade practices that would reasonably
enable a court to fill in the blanks as to the specifics of that
provision, and I do not believe a court could rely on the proposed
terms from the parties’ prior negotiation which ended without a
meeting of the minds.

134. I write separately because I cannot join the majority’s
suggestion that the parties’ failure to address whether or not their
agreement would include a form of non compete or non solicita-
tion agreement rendered it illusory or fatally incomplete. A non
compete agreement may be desirable in connection with sales like
this; it may even be common. But in contrast to the details
concerning the claw-back, a non compete agreement is in no way

634 Le

essential to a coherent agreement that can be understood and
enforced by a court. The fact that a party subsequently seeks to
add a non compete term to an otherwise complete agreement to
buy a business, or shares in a business, cannot render the
underlying agreement illusory and incomplete.

135. To suggest otherwise would invite buyers to engage in a
form of “bait and switch,” negotiating a concluded agreement,
then strategically raising additional non compete terms to either
move the goalposts on the seller or avoid the contract. If the
initial agreement in this case could have been fully understood
and readily enforced without a non compete provision, the absence
of any discussion about such a provision in the parties’ initial
email exchange would not have undermined the integrity of their
agreement. See Osler Inst. Inc. uv Forde, 386 F.3d 816, 818-19
(7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that non compete provision was not so
essential to purpose of contract that invalidation of provision
would void contract in its entirety); Murphy u Hosanna Youth
Facilities, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
(holding that parties’ failure to reach meeting of minds on non
competition agreement does not cause other provisions of agree-
ment to be unenforceable because non competition agreement was
not essential provision).

136. For this reason, I separately concur.

2016 VT 94

In re PRB DOCKET NO. 2016-042
[154 A.3d 949]
No. 16-259

‘V1. August 24, 2016, Upon review of the
hearing panel decision in this matter, the
Court concludes as follows: The decision
presents a well-reasoned discussion and
resolution of a problem common in legal
practice, particularly for small firms and
solo practitioners. Accordingly, the Court
orders review of the decision on its own
motion, adopts the hearing panel decision
in its entirety as a final order of this
Court, waives briefing and oral argument,
and orders that the decision be published
in the Vermont Reports

STATE OF VERMONT
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
BOARD
In re PRB File No. 2016-042
Decision No. 198

The Hearing Panel hereby approves
Respondent receiving a private admoni-
tion from Disciplinary Counsel for viola-
tion of Rules 1.15(a), 5.3(a) and 5.3(b) of
the Vermont Rules of Professional
Conduet, as Respondent failed to main-
tain proper control and oversight of his
client trust accounts.

Hearing Panel No. 10, consisting of
Joseph J. O'Dea, Esq., Chair, Jonathan
M. Cohen, Esq. and Mr. Roger Preuss,
has received and considered Disciplinary
Counsel’s and Respondent’s written sub-
missions. Disciplinary Counsel and Re-
spondent jointly requested that this dis-
ciplinary matter be resolved by private
admonition by Disciplinary Counsel.
Based upon the parties’ submissions, in-
cluding the Stipulation of Facts, Joint

Recommendation for Conclusions of Law,
Disciplinary Counsel’s Sanction Memo-
randum, letters of support submitted on
Respondent’s behalf, and Joint. Recom-
mendation for Admonition by Diseiplin-
ary Counsel, the Hearing Panel makes
the following findings of fact and conelu-
sions of law.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Respondent is an attorney licensed to
practice law in Vermont and New Hamp-
shire. He was admitted to the New
Hampshire bar in 1972 and the Vermont
bar in 2000. Respondent currently works
as a sole practitioner. Respondent main-
tains an office in New Hampshire, but
represents clients in both Vermont and
New Hampshire. His practice is focused
on business law, commercial transactions,
business litigation, and real estate trans-
actions.

In 1991, Respondent joined a New
Hampshire law firm and was assigned to
the firm’s new satellite office. Respondent
hired a nonlawyer employee to work with
him. Respondent knew the employee
prior to hiring her, as the employee had
worked for Respondent’s wife for five
years, prior to Respondent’s and his
wife’s marriage. The employee's work for
Respondent’s wife was highly regarded

For the first nine years the employee
worked with Respondent, the employee
did not handle money or Respondent's
office accounts because those tasks were
handled by staff at the law firm’s main
office. Respondent found the employee to
be smart and capable. During their years
working together, Respondent and the
employee beeame personal friends.

In 2000, Respondent left the law firm,
established his own office, and began
working as a solo practitioner. Respond-
ent hired the employee to work for him in
his new office.

636

At the new office, Respondent assigned.
the employee some new duties, ineluding
handling Respondent’s operating account.
and client trust accounts.’ (Respondent
maintained client trust accounts in New
Hampshire and Vermont.) Respondent.
would make all of the bank deposits him-
self, and confirm the deposits were re-
corded in his QuickBooks accounting sys-
tem. Respondent’s employee was
responsible for all of the other bookkeep-
ing tasks associated with Respondent’s
accounts, For example, the employee
opened the monthly bank statements and
performed the monthly reconciliations for
each account, including the client trust
accounts.

Respondent performed some limited
oversight of his client trust accounts.” At
the end of each month, the employee
prepared a ledger report for each elient’s
trust account, showing all deposits to and
withdrawals from each client’s trust ac-
count, Each ledger report also stated the
balance for each client’s trust account as
of the end of the month. Each month,
Respondent reviewed the employee’s led-
ger reports for each client’s trust account.
The employee’s ledger reports showed
the client’s respective trust accounts were

1 As a matter of convenience, the terms
“JOLTA account” and “client trust ac-
count” will be used interchangeably to
refer to any bank aceount holding client
funds.

2 Lawyers’ IOLTA and trust accounts in-
volve a bank account, holding money for
one client or for multiple clients. Techni-
cally, it may be more appropriate to refer
to a client’s funds held in an IOLITA
account as a “subaccount.” As a matter of
convenience, however, a client’s funds
held by a lawyer in trust shall be referred
to as a client trust account, regardless of
whether that money is held in a bank
account containing only one client's
money, or an IOLTA account holding
money for several clients.

in balance and there were no problems
with the accounts. When Respondent con-
cluded work on a client’s matter, the
client’s trust account would be reduced to
zero by payment of outstanding fees and
costs, and by refunding the unexpended
balance to the client. After final disburse-
ment from the client trust account, the
employee prepared a final ledger report
for the client’s trust account for Respond-
ent’s review. Respondent always reviewed
the employee’s final ledger report to con-
firm that the client’s trust account showed
a zero balance.

Annually, Respondent hired an outside
certified public accountant (CPA) to re-
view his financial records and prepare his
tax returns. The CPA’s work included a
review of all of Respondent’s QuickBooks
entries. The CPA never brought any is-
sues to Respondent's attention concern-
ing Respondent's accounts or financial
records.

Respondent’s title insurance company
periodically reviewed — Respondent's
TOLTA accounts and, it appears, the title
insuranee company never discovered any
irregularities.

Respondent did not implement or fol-
low reasonable procedures to safeguard
client funds while he worked as a sole
practitioner. Respondent, did not. person-
ally review the monthly bank statements
or cancelled cheeks. Respondent did not
review his employee’s monthly account
reconciliations. Respondent’s oversight
was limited to reviewing the ledger re-
ports prepared by his employee. Had
Respondent compared the employee’s
ledger reports against the corresponding
bank statements, Respondent would have
discovered significant discrepancies, as
the information recorded in his
QuickBooks accounting system did not
match the transactions reported in corre-
sponding bank statements

Unbeknownst to Respondent, the em-
ployee was engaged in an embezzlement
scheme, and was periodically taking

money from Respondent’s operating ac-
count. The employee used different tech-
niques to embezzle money from the oper-
ating account. For example, the employee
wrote cheeks payable to herself, forged
Respondent’s signature on the checks,
and cashed the checks. The employee did
not reeord these cheeks in QuickBooks,
but she would reduce the amount of a
deposit previously recorded in
QuickBooks by the amount of the check
she had just written to herself. Following
this procedure, the QuickBooks accounts
always appeared to be in balance. The
employee would also write checks payable
to herself and record the checks in
QuickBooks as payment of an office ex-
pense, thereby disguising her theft as a
business expense.

During the course of her employment,
the employee engaged in one instance of
embezzling money from Respondent’s cli-
ent trust account. In November 2014, the
employee wrote one trust account check,
payable to herself, in the amount of
$2020.18, and forged Respondent’s signa-
ture on the check. The employee recorded
the check in QuickBooks, falsely desig-
nating “Capitol One” as the payee.

In January 2015, Respondent needed
to pay his fourth quarter estimated taxes.
‘To make the payment, Respondent tried
to transfer funds from his operating ac-
count, but the transfer failed due to insuf-
ficient funds. Respondent went to the
bank to look into the matter and diseov-
ered his employee's unauthorized with-
drawals from his operating account. Re-
spondent was in disbelief that his trusted
employee, with twenty-four years of ser-
vice, had stolen money from him. Re-
spondent felt completely betrayed.

Respondent immediately terminated
the employee. Respondent hired an expe-
rienced paralegal to take over the former
employee’s duties, Respondent promptly
notified law enforcement about the em-

bezzlement.® Respondent asked the CPA
firm that annually prepared his tax re-
turns to examine all of his accounts and
finaneial records. Respondent also en-
gaged the services of the CPA firm's
forensic specialist to do a specialized re~
view, Law enforcement and Respondent’s
title insurance company conducted their
own examinations of Respondent’s ac-
counts and financial records. All of Re-
spondent’s financial records for his oper-
ating accounts and his client trast
accounts were thoroughly examined.

The investigations revealed a substan-
tial sum of money was missing from Re-
spondent’s operating account, but no
money appeared to be missing from Re-
spondent’s client trust accounts. Re-
spondent self-reported the embezzlement
to Vermont Disciplinary Counsel, out of
an abundance of caution and a desire for
transparency.

In August 2015, Disciplinary Counsel
selected Respondent's Vermont client
trust aceount for a compliance exarnina-
tion. Once notified of the upeoming exami-
nation, Respondent and his paralegal re-
reviewed the records for his client trast
account. Respondent discovered his for-
mer employee had written a check to
herself in November 2014 for $2020.18, as
described above. On discovering the mis-
appropriation, Respondent immediately
transferred money from his operating
account to the client trust account, to
cover the loss caused by the misappro-
priation of funds. Respondent also re-
ported the misappropriation of client
funds to Disciplinary Counsel,

In September 2015, Disciplinary Coun-
sel’s CPA completed the compliance ex-

°"The former employee was prosecuted in
federal court for taking money from Re-
spondent’s operating account and con-
vieted of mail frand. The federal court
sentenced the former employee to 36
months in prison and ordered her to pay
approximately $903,000 in restitution.

638 |

amination of Respondent’s Vermont
IOLTA account. The CPA found no evi-
dence that the former employee had mis-
appropriated funds from Respondent's
client trust account, exeepting only the
one check for $2020.18 written in Novem-
ber 2014. The CPA informed Disciplinary
Counsel that Respondent’s Vermont.
IOLTA account was used solely for Ver-
mont real estate closings and refinances.
Respondent averaged about two Vermont,
closings per month and, typically, the
Vermont trast account did not carry a
substantial balance. Respondent's title in-
suranee company periodically reviewed
Respondent’s IOLTA account, and his for-
mer employee knew the title insurance
company was conducting these reviews
In the CP4A’s opinion, the risk of a sub-
stantial misappropriation of client funds
from Respondent’s Vermont IOLA. ac-
count was low.

In response to the defaleation, Re-
spondent implemented internal controls
to assure the safekeeping of client funds
held in his trust accounts. On a monthly
basis, Respondent personally reviewed
the bank statements for both his operat-
ing account and his client trust accounts.
Each month Respondent would either
personally reconcile his bank statements
or closely review the reconciliations per-
formed by his paralegal.

Respondent did not intend for his for-
mer employee to embezzle client money
from his Vermont trast account, nor did
he know that she had done so. Respond-
ent’s mental state was one of negligence.
The degree of Respondent's negligence is
shown, in part, by the fact the employee
repeatedly embezzled money from Re-
spondent’s operating account, over a pe~
riod of many years, without being diseov-
ered. The former employee embezzled a
total of about $962,000 from Respondent's
operating account. (It must be empha-
sized that Respondent’s operating ac-
count only held Respondent’s money, not
client money, and whatever losses Re-

spondent suffered as a result of the thefts
from his operating account were his
alone.)

The injury suffered in this case is lim-
ited to the $2020.18 of client funds, which
Respondent refunded with his own money
once he discovered client money had been
misappropriated. The potential for injury
was not insignificant, as suggested by the
employee's repeated thefts from Re-
spondent’s operating account over many
years. The potential for injury is also
shown by the fact that Respondent, the
CPA, the forensic specialist, and law en-
foreement all reviewed his trust accounts
looking for irregularities, but found none.
This fact suggests money could have been
misappropriated from the trust account
without being discovered

The potential for injury, however, was
mitigated by several factors. Typically,
Respondent’s Vermont trast aceount did
not maintain a substantial balance. Client
funds held in Respondent’s trust account
were earmarked for specific purposes
(ie., mortgage payoffs, filing fees and
other closing costs), making an attempted
embezzlement more obvious, and there-
fore, less likely. The former employee was
also aware that Respondent’s title insur-
ance company was periodically reviewing
Respondent’s client trust accounts,
thereby discouraging theft of client funds.
Disciplinary Counsel’s CPA assessed the
risk of potential for injury as low.

Respondent submitted letters of sup-
port to the Hearing Panel from two Ver-
mont attorneys, from Respondent's
banker, and from a man who was both
Respondent’s client and rabbi, The tenor
of the letters is that Respondent is a man
of integrity, who adheres to the highest
professional and ethical standards, One of
the attorneys stated that Respondent is
conscientious and attends to details when
representing a client. The letter submit
ted by Respondent’s banker attested to
Respondent’s thoroughness and skill. The
banker stated that Respondent’s “efforts

and competencies in the legal aspects of
Real Estate transactions have greatly
benefited [the bank and its] clients.” Re-
spondent’s rabbi stated that, as a rabbi
and client, he trusted Respondent’s skill
and judgment in matters both legal and
nonlegal. The letters emphasize that Re-
spondent is the vietim of his former em-
ployee’s callous wrongdoing.

Il. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Applicable Legal Standards

“In general, the (Rules of Professional
Conduct] are ‘intended to protect the
public from persons unfit to serve as
attorneys and to maintain public confi-
dence in the bar?” In 1 PRB Docket No.
2006-167, 2007 VT 50, 119, 181 Vt. 625, 925
A.2d 1026 (mem.) (quoting In re Berk, 157
Vb. 524, 532, 602 A.2d 946, 950 (1991) (per
curiam)); accord In re PRB Docket No.
2006-167, 2007 VT 50, 19 (although Berk
referred particularly to sanetions, it is
clear that these are the overarching goals
of the rules).

‘The Hearing Panel’s findings as to each
element of a charge of professional miscon-
duet must be supported by clear and con-
vineing evidence. A.0. 9, Rule 16(C); In re
McCarty, 2013 VT 47, 1.12, 194 Vt. 109, 75
A3d 589 (“All formal charges of miseon-
duct ‘shall be established by clear and
convincing evidence? ”). “The burden of
proof in proceedings seeking discipline or
transfer to disability inactive status is on
disciplinary counsel.” A.0. 9, Rule 16(D).

If a violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduet is proved by clear and
convineing evidence, one or more sane-
tions may be imposed. A.O. 9, Rule 8. The
purpose of sanctions is not “‘to punish
attorneys, but rather to protect the public
from harm and to maintain confidence in
our legal institutions by deterring future
misconduet. ” In 1 Obregon, 2016 VT
1119, 201 Vi. 463, 145 A.3d 226 (quoting In.
re Hunter, 16T Vt. 219, 226, 704 A.2d 1154,
1158 (1997)); see also In re Neisner, 2010
VI 102, 124, 189 Vt. 145, 16 A.Bd 587.

639

B. Viol:

ion of Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct

1. Rule 5.3(a)

Rule 53 of the Vermont Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct governs a lawyer's re-
sponsibilities regarding nonlawyer assis-
tants. Rule 5.3 responsibilities extend to
the supervision of a nonlawyer assistant
who handles funds held in a trust account.
See V.R.Pr.C. 53, Comment [2]. The An-
notated Model Rules of Professional Con-
duet provide

Lawyers are responsible under
Rule 53 for the mishandling of
client funds by non-lawyer assis-
tants. Courts view holding money
in trust for clients as a nondeleg-
able fiduciary responsibility that
cannot be excused by someone
else's ignorance, inattention, in-
competence, or dishonesty. Al-
though lawyers may employ non-
lawyers to assist in fulfilling this
fiduciary duty, lawyers must pro-
vide adequate training and super-
vision to ensure that ethical and
legal obligations to account for
client funds are being met. When
it comes to handling elient funds,
“there must be some system of
timely review and internal control
to provide reasonable assurance
that the supervising lawyer will
learn whether the employee is
performing the delegated duties
honestly and competently.” In re
Cater, 87 A.2d 1 (D.C, 2005).

Annotated Model Rules at 450.4

Rule 5.3(a) of the Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct provides that a law-

4'The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are available online at httpy/Avww.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional
_eonduet/model_rules_of_professional_con
duet_table_of_contents.html

640

yer “shall make reasonable efforts to en-
sure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that the
Inonlawyer] person’s conduct is compat-
ible with the professional obligations of
the lawyer” The Comments explain
“Paragraph (a) requires lawyers ... make
reasonable efforts to establish internal
policies and procedures designed to pro-
vide reasonable assurance that
nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way
compatible with the Rules of Professional
Conduet V.R.Pr.C. 5.3 Comment [2]. Ac-
cordingly, a solo practitioner, or a lawyer
in a firm with managerial responsibilities
has a duty to assure that the law practice
has policies and procedures in place to
assure nonlawyer employees adhere to
the standards established by the Rules of
Professional Conduct.

Here, Respondent had his nonlawyer
employee handle client money without
having policies and procedures in place to
assure client funds were safeguarded. Re-
spondent’s procedures were minimal, and
lacked the internal controls needed to
asstire no one person had absolute control
over client funds and the bookkeeping
related thereto. Once the employee’s em-
bezzlement scheme was uncovered, Re-
spondent adopted a system of internal
control, including: (a) Respondent per-
sonally reviewing bank statements on a
monthly basis; and (b) Respondent per-
sonally reconciling his bank statements,
or closely reviewing reconciliations per-
formed by his paralegal. Respondent's
failure to implement a reasonable system
of internal controls constitutes a violation
of Rule 5.3(a). See In re Anonymous, 876
N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 2007) (lawyer’s failure to
have systems in place to safeguard client
funds constituted a violation of Rule
5.3(a)); Curtis x Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 959
S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1998) (lawyer's failure to
have proper procedures in place to pro-
tect client funds constituted a violation of
Rule 53(a)); Attorney Grievance Com-
mission x Zuckerman, 944 A.2d 525 (Md,

2008) Gawyer’s failure to have appropri-
ate policies in place to protect client funds
constituted a violation of Rule 5.3(a)).

2. Rule 5.3(b)

Rule 53(b) of the Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct states a lawyer hav-
ing direet supervisory authority over a
nonlawyer employee “shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the [employ-
ee’s] conduct is compatible with the pro-
fessional obligations of the lawyer”
V.R.PrC. 5.3(b). So, in addition to putting
policies in place, lawyers are required to
supervise their nonlawyer employees so
that the nonlawyer employees comply
with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Id, As explained in the Annotated Model
Rules, “a lawyer may not turn over the
day-to-day operations of a law offiee — or
any discrete part of it, such as its book-
keeping funetions — without continuous
serutiny of those operations.” Annotated
Model Rules at 458. The commentary to
Rule 53 explains:

Lawyers generally employ as-
sistants in their practice .
Such assistants . act for the
lawyer in rendition of the law-
yer’s professional services. A
lawyer must give such assistants
appropriate instruction and su-
pervision concerning the ethical
aspects of their employment
and should be responsible for
their work product. The mea-
sures employed in supervising
nonlawyers should take account
of the fact that they do not have
legal training and are not subject,
to professional discipline.

VR.Pr.C. 53 Comment [1]

The lawyer’s duty to supervise the con-
duet of nonlawyer employees is well ree-
ognized. In In re Joiner the Louisiana
Supreme Court explained:

A seminal case addressing this
issue is Louisiana State Bar

EE 641

Ass’n v. Keys, 567 So. 2d 588 (La.
1990). In Keys, the lawyer was
representing a succession and
established a checking account
for suecession funds. Without the
lawyer’s knowledge, his secre-
tary removed funds from the
suecession account and trans-
ferred them to an operating ac-
count. Upon learning of the with-
drawals, the lawyer reimbursed
the funds prior to the filing of the
complaint. In our opinion, we
agreed that the lawyer was un-
aware of his secretary’s actions.
Nonetheless, citing DR 9-102
(the predecessor provision to
Rule 1.15), we found the lawyer
was negligent in failing to estab-
lish adequate procedures for
handling client. funds:

While respondent did
not know of the misuse of
the funds in the present
ease at a time when the
consequences could have
been avoided, his negli-
gence in failing to estab-
lish adequate procedures
for handling the client's
funds resulted in the
commingling of the cli-
ent’s funds with those of
the attorney and the use
of the client's funds for
the attorney's personal
purposes. Perkaps an at-
torney may blindly trust
an employee with his
own funds, but the attor-
ney who undertakes to
hanile a client’s funds
has the duty to take rea-
sonable steps to safe-
guard the funds. Here,
respondent's duty under
DR 9-102 to safeguard
the funds of a elient in-
cluded the duty of rea-

sonable supervision of
the nonlawyer employee
who actually handled the
funds. Respondent failed
to instruct his employee
on the eoneept of escrow
accounts and failed to
check periodically the
handling of the funds
held in escrow. Respond-
ent’s supervisory failures
over along period of time
created a fertile environ-
ment for his employee's
misuse of the funds

Id, at 592 (emphasis added).

The reasoning of Keys is par-
ticularly appropriate under the
facts of the case at bar. Although
respondent may have been vie-
timized by his assistant’s im-
proper actions, the ethical rules
and jurisprudence of this court
impose an overarching duty on
the lawyer to safeguard the
funds of the lawyer's clients. As
in Keys, respondent's failure to
supervise his assistant created a
fertile environment for her em-
bezzlement, Respondent’s ac
tions clearly constitute negligent
violations of Rule 5.3 and Rule
1.15.

2015959-B-0, 2015 WL 8225728, at *5-6
(La. Dee. 8, 2015) (emphasis added); ac-
cord In re Otlowski, 976 A.2d 172, 2009
WL 1796083, at *4 (Del. June 23, 2009)
(unpub.) (“By . . . failing to supervise his
employee(s) generally with respect to
compliance with the Rules and specifically
regarding safeguarding of escrow funds,
the Respondent violated Rule 5:3”); see
also In re Martin, 163 Vt. 633, 634, 660
‘A.2d 300, 302 (1995) (mem.) (“{RJespond-
ent’s misconduct was due to his gross
negligence in turning over financial mat-
ters to a bookkeeper without proper over-
sight,

642

Here, Respondent delegated responsi-
bility for the handling of client money to
his nonlawyer employee, but did not pro-
vide appropriate oversight. Respondent
implemented a system of internal con-
trols only after he discovered his em-
ployee had embezzled funds from his op-
erating account. Respondent’s failure to
supervise his employee constitutes a vio-
lation of Rule 5.3(b). See In re Anony-
mous, 876 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 2007) (law-
yer's failure to supervise wife’s handling
of client funds constituted a violation of
Rule 53(b)); Curtis u Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 959 S.W.2d 94 (Ky. 1998) (lawyer
failed to supervise his bookkeeper, who
wrote a client trust account check to buy
a personal pet); Attorney Grievance Com-
mission v Zuckerman, 944 A.2d 525 (Md.
2008) (lawyer failed to supervise two em-
ployees, both of whom embezzled sub-
stantial sums from client trust account);
see also In re Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708
(Minn. 2001) (failure to supervise em-
ployee who embezzled violated Rule 5.3);
In ve Cater, 887 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2005) (failure
to supervise employee who embezzled
violated Rule 5.3(b)); State ex rel. Okla-
homa Bar Ass'n x. Mayes, 977 P2d 1073
(Okla. 1999) (failure to supervise embez-
zling employee violated Rules 5.3(a),
5.3(b), and 5.3(¢)); In re Marshall, 498
8.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1998) (failure to super-
vise embezzling employee violated Rule
5.3 and Rule 1.15); In ve Ponder, 654
8.E.2d 533 (S.C. 2007) (failure to super-
vise embezzling employee violated Rules
5.3(a), (b), and (¢), and Rule 1.15(a)); In re
Shamers, 873 A.2d 1089 (Del. 2005) (fail-
ure to supervise embezzling employee
violated Rule 5.3 and Rule 1.15).

3. Rule 1.15

Rule 1.15 of the Vermont Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduet is entitled “Safekeep-
ing Property.” Rule 1.15(a) requires law-
yers to hold property belonging to clients
or third persons separate from the law-
yer’s own property, and in accordance

with Rules 1.15A and 1.15B. The Com-
ment to the rule states: “A lawyer should
hold property of others with the care
required of a professional fiduciary? Rule
1.15(2) Comment [1]. To meet this duty, a
lawyer “should maintain on a current
basis books and records in accordance
with generally accepted aecounting prac-
tice?” Id, Failure to take reasonable steps
to protect client funds held by a lawyer in
trast constitutes a violation of Rule
1.15(a). See In re Martin, 163 Vt. at 634,
660 A.2d at 302 (lawyer sanctioned for
failing to properly supervise nonlawyer
employee who engaged in a pattern of
embezzlement over several years.); see
also In re Anonymous, 816 N.E.2d 333
(Ind. 2007) (failure to supervise employee
who embezzled funds constituted viola-
tion of Rules 53 and 1.15(a)); In re Mar-
shall, 498 S.E.2d 869 (S.C. 1998) (failure
to supervise employee, resulting in em-
ployee embezzling client funds, consti-
tutes a failure to safeguard client prop-
erty pursuant to Rule 1.15); In ve Ponder,
654 S.E.2d 583 (G.C. 2007) (failure to
supervise employee who embezzled funds
constitutes a failure to safeguard client
property pursuant to Rule 1.15).

Here, Respondent did not adopt rea-
sonable internal controls to protect client
funds. Respondent did not supervise his
employee by personally reviewing and
reconciling bank statements, or closely
reviewing the employee’s bank reconeili-
ations, Respondent’s errors and omis-
sions were serious in that they put client
funds at risk, and, in fact, some were
misappropriated. Accordingly, Respond-
ent’s failure to safeguard client property
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15(a).

Based on the stipulated facts submitted
by Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent,
there is clear and convincing evidence
that Respondent violated Rules 1.15,
5,3(a) and 5.3(b) of the Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct. The violations
fond are solely related to Respondent

handling of client funds and his client
trust account.”

C. Applicability of the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanetions

The Vermont Supreme Court has ruled

When sanctioning attorney
misconduct, we have adopted the
ABA. Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline which requires
us to weigh the duty violated, the
attorney’s mental state, the actual
or potential injury caused by the
misconduct, and the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.

In vw Andres, 2004 VT 71, 114, 177 Vt.
511, 857 A.2d 803 (mem,); accord In re
Blais, 174 Vt. 628, 817 A.2d 1266 (2002)
(mem,). Accordingly, the Hearing Panel
employed the ABA Standards as a tool to
determine the appropriate sanction to
impose in Respondent’s case.

1. The Duty Violated

A lawyer owes certain duties to his
clients, including the duty to preserve
client property. V.R.Pr.C. 1.15; see also
ABA Standards § 4.1. Respondent failed
to take reasonable and appropriate action
to protect client property. Respondent
failed to adopt policies and procedures to
protect client’s funds held in trust,
thereby violating V.R-Pr.C. 5.3(a). Re-
spondent failed to supervise his employ-
ee’s handling of his client trust accounts

5 Respondent's handling of his operating
account is useful background information,
providing insight into how he managed
his client trast accounts, and the potential
for injury posed by his eonduet. Whether
Respondent’s handling of his operating
conduet should be the subject of disciplin-
ary action is beyond the scope of the
charge presented and, accordingly, be-
yond the scope of the Hearing Panel's
review.

643

Respondent did not personally review
bank statements or perform bank recon-
ciliations, Respondent did not review his
employee bank reconciliations carefully.
Respondents failure to carry out internal
controls and supervise his employee's
work resulted in $2020.18 of client funds
being misappropriated. Respondent's
failure to supervise his employee consti-
tutes a violation of Rule 53).

2. Mental State

The second factor to be considered
under the ABA Standards is the lawyer's
mental state. ABA Standards $3.0. The
ABA Standards explain the relevant men-
tal states as follows:

‘The most culpable mental state
is that of intent, when the lawyer
acts with the conscious objective
or purpose to accomplish a par-
ticular result. The next most eul-
pable mental state is that of
knowledge, when the lawyer acts
with conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant cireum-
stances of his or her conduet but
without the conscious objective
or purpose to accomplish a par-
ticular result. The least culpable
mental state is negligence .

ABA Standards, Theoretical Framework
SIL, at 6.

Respondent had no intent to embezzle
client fands, and in no way benefited from
his employee’s criminal conduct. Re-
spondent had no knowledge that his em-
ployee was engaged in an embezzlement
scheme. Respondent’s personal and pro-
fessional relationship with the employee,
and Respondent’s wife’s prior relation-
ship with the employee, blinded Respond-
ent to the fact that the employee was
capable of embezzling funds on a grand
seale, While Respondent had some sys-
tems in place, such as making the bank
deposits himself and confirming deposits
were recorded in QuickBooks, Respond-

644

ent’s procedures were seriously flawed
due to a lack of internal controls and
proper oversight. Accordingly, the clear
and convineing evidence of record estab-
lishes that Respondent’s mental state was
one of negligence.

3. Injury & Potential Injury

The ABA Standards next require a
review of the injury and potential injury
that may have resulted from the attor-
ney’s professional misconduet.

Respondent’s lack of internal controls
and oversight resulted in $2020.18 of eli-
ent funds being misappropriated from his
client trust account. There was no actual
injury to a client because Respondent
promptly deposited his own money into
the trust account to cover the loss. Re-
spondent’s client trust account was short
by $2020.18 for a period of time; there is,
however, no evidence that the shortfall
caused any client actual
person to suffer actual injury
spondent, as he used his own funds to
make the client trast account whole.

As for potential injury, the lack of
internal controls and appropriate super-
vision put client fands at risk. The em-
ployee could have misappropriated more
client money than was actually taken, as
evidenced by the employee's pattern of
embezzling funds from the operating ac-
count. The client money ($2020.18) the
employee misappropriated from the trust.
account evaded discovery by law enforce-
ment, Respondent’s CPA, and the foren-
sie specialist, all of whom were tasked
with finding defaleation. Respondent only
found the theft when he re-reviewed his
trust in preparation for a trust account
andit.

Disciplinary Counsel’s CPA opined that.
the risk of injury was low, Respondent
condueted one or two real estate closings
or refinances each month, so the trast
account usually held a minimal balance.
Respondent’s employee understood that
fands held in the trust aceount were

earmarked for particular expenses, mak-
ing it difficult to disguise a theft from the
account. Respondent’s employee also
knew that the title insurance company
periodically reviewed the trust accounts.
Clear and convineing evidence establishes
that there was a potential for injury, but
risk posed was low.

4. Presumptive Sanction under
the ABA Standards

Section 4.1 of the ABA Standards de-
scribes the sanctions that apply when a
lawyer fails to preserve client property.
When the lawyer’s mental state is one of
negligence, the ABA Standards. state
there are two possible presumptive sane-
tions, being:

§4.13 Reprimand is generally
appropriate when a lawyer is
negligent in dealing with client
property and causes injury or
potential injury to a client.

§ 4.14 Admonition is generally
appropriate when a lawyer is
negligent in dealing with client
property and causes little or no
actual or potential injury to a
client.

In Respondent’s case, the evidence es-
tablishes there was a potential for injury.
Disciplinary Counse?s CPA stated there
was a potential for injury, but the risk was
low. As there was some potential for in-
jury, $4.13 applies, rather than § 4.14,
and reprimand is the presumptive sane-
tion.

5, Aggravating & Mitigating
Factors

a. Aggravating Factors

In this case, there is one aggravating
factor. Respondent has substantial expe-
rience in the practice of law. ABA Stan-
dards § 9.22(). Respondent has practiced
law for more than 40 years.

b. Mitigating Factors

Section 9.32 of the ABA Standards sets.
forth a list of mitigating factors. There
are substantial mitigating factors present
in Respondent’s case.

During Respondent’s four plus decades
of practicing law, Respondent has never
been subject to disciplinary action. ABA
Standards § 9.32(a).

Respondent had no selfish or dishonest
motive for failing to enact reasonable
internal controls over his client trust ac-
counts, or his failure to supervise his
employee. Id. § 9.32(b). Respondent did
not know his employee was embezzling
funds and did not benefit from her illegal
conduet. Respondent did not condone his
employee’s unlawful conduet. Id.

When Respondent discovered his em-
ployee had misappropriated client funds,
Respondent immediately used his own
money to make his client trust account
whole, and reported the misappropriation
to Disciplinary Counsel. ABA Standards
$9.32(d). Respondent also took timely
action “to rectify the consequences” of his
employee's actions. Respondent hired
both his CPA and a forensic specialist, at
his own expense, to review all of his
accounts to determine the nature and
scope of the theft. See id.

Respondent self-reported the violation
to Disciplinary Counsel. During Disciplin-
ary Counsel’s investigation, Respondent
made full and free disclosure of all rel-
evant facts to Disciplinary Counsel. Re-
spondent also cooperated fully with both
Disciplinary Counsel and the Hearing
Panel during these disciplinary proceed-
ings. ABA Standards § 9.32(e).

Clear and convineing evidence estab-
lishes that Respondent enjoys an excel-
lent reputation and good character. ABA
Standards § 9.32(g). The letters Respond-
ent submitted show that he is respected
by his peers in the profession, his clients
and other professionals. Moreover, Re-
spondent’s reaction to the embezzlement

645

is precisely what the rules expect of a
lawyer. Respondent’s forthright response
to the events and underlying eireum-
stances, including the remedial measures
he voluntarily put in place, is clear and
convincing evidence of Respondent’s good
character. See In re PRB Docket No.
2012.155, 2015 VT 57, 123, 199 Vt. 143,
121 A.3d 675.

Respondent is genuinely remorseful
that he did not effectively manage his
client trust accounts. See ABA Standards
§ 9.32(). Respondent converted his re-
morse into action by willingly changing
his bookkeeping procedures and imple-
menting a system of internal eontrols to
safeguard client funds.

c. Mitigating Factors Outweigh
Aggravating Factors

The presumptive sanction in this mat-
ter is a public reprimand. There are,
however, substantially mitigating factors
that outweigh the one aggravating factor
present in this case.

The actual injury in this case was lim-
ited to one instance of theft of client
funds, in the sum of $2020.18. The loss did
not cause the client actual harm as Re-
spondent promptly covered the loss with
his own funds. The potential for substan-
tial injury to a client, as Disciplinary
Counsel’s CPA opined, was low. Respond-
ent acted immediately and effectively, to
address the theft of funds, bringing in
financial experts, and reporting the theft
to law enforeement and Disciplinary
Counsel. On discovering the misappro-
priation of client funds, Respondent made
a second report to Disciplinary Counsel.
Respondent then voluntarily _imple-
mented internal controls in his accounting
procedures to assure client funds were
properly safeguarded.

In the matter of In re PRB Docket No.
2012.155, the Vermont Supreme Court
reviewed a disciplinary matter involving a
lawyer who deposited personal funds into
a client trust account and then kept a

646 Le

separate ledger of the lawyer’s funds.
2015 VT 57. The lawyer was cited for
commingling his funds with client fands
in his client trast account. Id. The Court
gave great weight to the attorney’s efforts
to rectify the error when considering the
appropriate sanction to impose. The
Court wrote:

As Disciplinary Counsel recog-
nized, attorney took additional
affirmative steps in hiring a CPA
at his own expense, ordering
bank and court records, and dili-
gently tracking every irregular-
ity going back to the opening of
his TOLTA account in 1997. His
personal investigation far ex-
ceeded that of Disciplinary
Counsel, resulting in details of
violations and irregularities that
Disciplinary Counsel would not
have uncovered. He disclosed far
more information than was re-
quired, including several book-
keeping errors and other irregu-
larities that already had been
remedied. Attorney's extensive
efforts go beyond what was re-
quired of him and weigh heavily
in our consideration of mitigat-
ing factors.

Id, 123. Like the lawyer in In 1 PRB
Docket No. 2012.155, Respondent did ev-
erything expected of him to discover the
full extent of the losses caused by his
employee's illegal conduet, and reported
the thefts to Disciplinary Counsel.

Tt must be acknowledged that Re-
spondent was also the vietim of a serious
crime. His employee misappropriated
$962,000 from his law practice over the
course of several years. From the record,
it cannot be determined if Respondent's
losses, or any part thereof, were covered
by insurance. The parties stipulated, how-
ever, that Respondent personally reim-
bursed his client trust account, and per-
sonally paid for the CPA’s and forensic

specialist’s reviews of his accounts. It is
also clear that Respondent. diverted a
substantial amount of his time and re-
sourees from serving clients to address-
ing his employee’s criminal conduet and
putting his practice back on a solid foot-
ing.

There is limited Vermont. precedent
available to provide guidance on the ap-
propriate sanction. The case of In re
Martin is somewhat similar to the facts of
Respondent’s case. 163 Vt. 638, 660 A.2d
300 (1995). In Martin the lawyer hired an
office manager, who, for many years,
handled all aspects of the firm’s financial
affairs. Unbeknownst to the lawyer, his
office manager used her position to em-
bezzle money from both the firm’s oper-
ating account and client trust account. Id.
The disciplinary board conelnded, and the
Vermont Supreme Court concurred, pub-
lie reprimand was the appropriate sanc-
tion. Id. at 635, 660 A.2d at 302 (public
reprimand imposed for violation of DR
9-102). Although the Martin case was
decided under the former Code of Profes-
sional Conduct, the case is instructive.

In Martin the lawyer’s office manager
served in her position for many years and
the lawyer placed enormous trust in her.
Id. at 633-34, 660 A.2d at 301. The lawyer
did not personally review any of the firm’s
financial accounts or supervise the office
manager’s work. Id. The Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) notified the lawyer
that the lawyer owed $10,000 in unpaid
federal payroll taxes. Id. The office man-
ager assured the lawyer that the back
taxes would be paid. Id. The lawyer took
the office manager at her word and did
nothing further, Id. Three years later, the
IRS notified the lawyer the debt for un-
paid taxes had grown to $40,000. Id. The
lawyer continued to trust his office man-
ager and did not investigate the source of
the tax delinquency. The following year,
the lawyer discovered his officer manager
had embezzled $130,000 from his operat-
ing and client trust accounts. Id. Of the

money stolen, $113,000 was taken from
one client’s trust account. Id. By then, the
amount stolen was so large the lawyer
was unable to pay it all back at once; as of
the date of the disciplinary hearing, the
lawyer still owed his client $30,000. Id.

The disciplinary board found the law-
yer’s conduet violated the Code of Profes-
sional Conduet and coneluded a sanction
was appropriate. [d. at 633-34, 660 A.2d at
302. When analyzing the question of what
sanction to impose, the board coneluded
the lawyer’s conduct was grossly negli-
gent, and the presumptive sanction was
suspension. Id. The Board found that a
number of mitigating factors were pres-
ent, and warranted reducing the sanction
toa reprimand. Id. The Board found the
lawyer grossly negligent because the no-
tices from the IRS should have alerted
the lawyer that there were financial ir-
regularities, but the lawyer did nothing
Id. The mitigating factors in Martin in-
cluded: absence of prior discipline; the
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; a
timely, good faith effort to make restitu-
tion; cooperation with the disciplinary
board; and remorse. Id, at 635, 660 A.2d
at 302. There, as here, the only aggravat-
ing factor was substantial experience in
the practice of law. Id,

Both the Martin case and the Re-
spondent’s case involve the lawyer’s fail-
ure to have and follow a system of inter-
nal eontrols to safeguard client funds
There are two significant differences be-
tween the Martin case and Respondent’s
case. In Martin the employee embezzled
$113,000 of client funds and the lawyer
was not able to reimburse the client’s
account immediately. In Respondent’s
case, the employee took a much smaller
amount. ($2020.18), and Respondent was
able to promptly cover the entire loss
with his own funds. The second significant
distinction between the Martin case and
Respondent’s case is that Respondent did
not commit gross negligence. In Martin
the lawyer was grossly negligent when he

647

failed to heed the early warning signs of
financial impropriety. In Martin the law-
yer received notice of an IRS debt, but
did nothing to investigate the debt. In
contrast, Respondent had one warning
sign, being the notice from the bank that
Respondent had insufficient funds in his
operating account to make a transfer of
funds. Once Respondent learned his ae-
count had insufficient funds, he immedi-
ately took action. By investigating the
shortfall, Respondent discovered his em-
ployee had embezzled money from his
operating account. The presence of gross
negligence in Martin made reprimand,
rather than admonition, the appropriate
sanction. See also In re Ponder, 654
S.E.2d 533 (S.C. 2007) (attorney received
public reprimand because he was grossly
negligent in ignoring multiple warning
signs that something was amiss with his
client trust account), Here, clear and con-
vincing evidence establishes that Re-
spondent was simply negligent.

The facts of Respondent’s case are
somewhat similar to the facts of In re
Anonymous, 876 N.E.2d 333 (Ind. 2007).
In In ve Anonymous the lawyer em-
ployed his wife as the accountant and
bookkeeper for his two attorney practice
‘The lawyer was primarily responsible for
the firm’s finances, but his wife had con-
trol of the firm’s trust account. The law-
yer did not have a system of internal
controls in place or supervise his wife’s
work, The lawyer’s wife wrote unauthor-
ized trust account checks, totaling
$22,257, and forged the lawyer's (her hus-
band’s) signature on the checks. When
the lawyer discovered his wife’s actions
and confronted her, she admitted the
misappropriation. Id, at 333-34. The Indi-
ana Supreme Court found the lawyer
violated his duty to protect client prop-
erty and failed to make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the conduct of nonlawyer
employees was compatible with the law-
yer’s own ethical obligations. The court
found the lawyer was negligent in super-

vising his firm’s trust account but, as
mitigating factors, found he took immedi-
ate steps to rectify the situation and
cooperated fully with the disciplinary
commission, The court coneluded that pri-
vate admonition was the appropriate
sanction. Id. at 335,

Based upon the substantial mitigating
factors present in Respondent’s ease, the
Hearing Panel concurs with the parties’
recommended sanetion, being an admoni-
tion by Disciplinary Counsel.

II. ORDER

BASED UPON the foregoing findings
of fact and conelusions of law, the parties
request for admonition by Disciplinary
Counsel for violation of Rules 53(a),
5.3(b) and 1.15 is GRANTED.

2016 VT 118

STATE of Vermont v. Carolyn.
LYFORD

(160 A.3d 317]
No. 16-350

11. November 15, 2016. The criminal
division of the superior court granted
defendant’s motion for permission to file
an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to
Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure
5(b), from the court’s decision denying
defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress
and dismiss, which alleged an illegal ca-
nine search. For the reasons explained
below, we dismiss the appeal as improvi-
dently granted. See VR.A.P. 5()(8) (“On
its own or the appellee’s motion, the Su-
preme Court may at any time dismiss the
appeal as improvidently granted”).

12. Since 1989, a defendant, with the
approval of the trial court and the State,
may enter a conditional guilty plea while
reserving the right to appeal “the adverse
determination of any specified pretrial

motion.” V.R.CrP. 11(a)(2); id. Reporter's
Notes-1989 Amendment. Generally, this
Court does not accept interlocutory ap-
peals of decisions denying motions to
suppress in criminal cases unless a condi-
tional plea is not available or practicable
under the cireumstances and the criteria
in Rule 5(b) have been met. This is con-
sistent with our general rule that “an
appeal will not lie to review the denial of a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence on
the claim of illegal search and seizure”
State x Blondin, 128 Vt. 613, 615-16, 270
A2d 165, 166 (1970) (citing 13 V.S.A.
§§ 7401, 7403 in support of “the general
rule that an appeal should not be permit-
ted in criminal causes until a final verdict,
adverse to the appellant, has been ren-
dered in the trial court,’ and noting that
12 VS.A. § 2386 “affords limited variance
to the general rule by granting discre-
tionary authority” to the superior court
“to permit an appeal before final judg-
ment for the determination of questions
of law”); see also ABA Minimum Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Ap-
peals, Standard 21-1.3(b)-(c) (stating that
defendants generally should not be per-
mitted to take interlocutory appeals in
criminal cases and that conditional plea
procedure should be established to allow
review after final judgment of decisions
on contested pretrial motions such as
motions to suppress evidence).

113. Although we recognize that on o¢-
casion this Court has accepted interlocu-
tory appeals from decisions denying mo-
tions to suppress, in this case defendant
has not indicated that a conditional plea is
unavailable or impracticable under the
cireumstances, and the trial court has not
made any findings indicating that the
criteria set forth in VIR.AP. 5(b) have
been met. Accordingly, we decline to ac-
cept the appeal.

Appeal dismissed as improvidently

granted.

2016 VT 120

STATE of Vermont v. Harley L.
BREER, Jr.

[160 A.3d 318]
No. 16-338

11. November 17, 2016. Defendant
Harley Breer appeals the trial court’s
decision to deny defendant's motion to
review his hold without bail order. We
affirm.

12. Defendant was previously con-
vieted in 2003 of three different felonies
and subsequently released on conditions
of probation. On December 8, 2011, he
was charged with several new crimes
including two counts of second-degree
aggravated domestic assault, 13 V.S.A.
§ 1044(a)(2(A), and one count of second-
degree unlawful restraint, id. § 2406(a)(3).!
On the same date, he was charged with his
fifth and sixth violations of his probation
(VOPs) conditions, based on the new erimi-
nal charges At the arraignment for the
VOPs and the new charges, the trial court
issued a hold without bail order from the
bench. In this order, the court specifically
noted defendant’s sixteen prior convie~
tions, including an escape couvietion, and
seven failures under either parole or pro-
bation supervision. As a result, the court:
held defendant without bail on the VOPs as
well as the new criminal charges. Finally,
the court noted that defendant could re-
quest a hearing date to challenge the hold
without bail order on the new criminal
charges.

13. While defendant was being held
pending trial and prior to his bail hearing,
the State charged defendant on April 6,

‘These new charges were docketed un-
der Docket No. 1524-12-11 Wner.

2 The VOPs are in Docket No. 299-3-99
Wher.

649

2012, with two counts of sexual assault
and one count of violating an abuse pre-
vention order,? id. $$ 3252(a)(1), 1030(b);
then, on June 25, 2012, the State charged
defendant with another count of violating
an abuse prevention orden! id. § 1030(b),
and, on August 9, 2013, charged him with
numerous counts of attempting to violate
his conditions of release while in custody.>
Id, § 7559(e). In each new charge, the trial
court noted at arraignment that defend-
ant was being held without bail pending
trial, but imposed conditions during his
custody.

414, Subsequently, defendant moved for
release and requested that the court set
bail, arguing that the evidence of guilt
was not great. Defendant’s bail hearing
was held over three days in the summer
of 2014. The trial court reviewed evidence
in the form of affidavits, court documents,
and audio recordings; it also heard testi-
mony. In its subsequent written order,
the trial court noted that there were two
bases for holding defendant without bail:
because he was charged with several of-
fenses punishable by life imprisonment,
13. VISA. § 7553, and also because he was
charged with violations of probation, 28
VS.A. § 301(4). The trial court then made
specific findings that the evidence of guilt,
on the criminal charges was great under
§ 7553. The trial court also coneluded
that, in relation to the VOP charges,
defendant was a flight risk and that public
safety required his detention. A three-

"Phe sexual assault charges are in
Doeket No. 430-4-12 Wner and the charge
of violating an abuse prevention order
charge is docketed in Docket No. 431-4-12
Wher.

“This count was docketed as Docket No.
803-6-12 Wher.

©The nineteen counts of attempted viola-

tion of his conditions of release are in
Docket No. 930-8-13 Wner.

650

justice panel of this Court affirmed the
trial court’s determination, concluding
that the evidence supported the trial
court’s order and that, even if the evi-
dence was insufficient to hold defendant
without bail pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7553,
defendant was properly held without bail
under 28 V.S.A. § 301(4). State x Breer,
2014 VT 132, 119-11, 198 Vt. 629, 112 A.3d
1273 (mem.).

115. On July 19, 2016, defendant filed a
motion to review the trial court’s hold
without bail order. First, he claimed that
the court improperly denied his bail for
the VOPs because he was denied his
rights under Vermont Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32.1 to confront adverse wit-
nesses and to present evidence on his
behalf. Second, he asserted that the evi-
dence of guilt was no longer great under
13 V.S.A. § 7553 on the charges punish-
able by life imprisonment because new
exculpatory evidence came to light during
diseovery. Defendant argued that the new
evidence was not known at the time of the
prior hearings and was not modifying
evidence being offered to challenge the
State’s evidence. As a result, defendant
claimed that the new, allegedly exculpa-
tory evidence should be used by the trial
court to review its decision to hold him
without bail and to set conditions of re-
lease.

116. Without conducting a new hearing,
the trial court issued a written order
denying defendant's motion. The trial
court concluded that defendant was af-
forded the opportunity to present. evi-
dence and to confront adverse witnesses
both at his initial arraignment for the
VOPs and at the three-day bail hearing;
thus, the rights provided by Criminal
Procedure Rule 32.1 were not violated
and he was properly held without bail
under 28 V.S.A. §301(4). Second, the
court found that the new evidence ad-
vanced by defendant was testimonial in
nature and related to witness credibility.
Because the evidence was testimonial

and, as a result, was modifying evidence
properly excluded from its bail determi-
nation, the court concluded that the new
evidence did not provide a basis for re-
viewing its decision to hold defendant
without bail under 13 V.S.A. § 7553. De-
fendant appeals this determination, chal-
lenging the basis for denying his bail
under both 28 V.S.A. §301(4) and 13
VISA. § 7553.6

17. Under 28 V.S.A. § 301(4), after ar-
raignment for a VOP, a court may release
‘a probationer on bail pending the revoca-
tion hearing, but there is “no right to bail
or release.” As stated above, this Court
previously affirmed the trial court’s de-
nial of defendant’s bail under § 301(4),
noting that the trial court had wide dis-
cretion in denying bail for VOPs and
coneluding that, given the court's findings
that defendant presented a flight risk and
risk to public safety, its decision to deny
bail was supported by the evidence
Breer, 2014 VT 132, 111; see also State
Barrows, 172 Vt. 596, 597, 776 A2d 431,
432 (2001) (mem.) (“Where the statute
creates no right to bail in the first in-
stance, it cannot be said that the court’s
decision was clearly untenable or unrea-
sonable.”). Defendant does not advance
any new claim or new evidence challeng-
ing the trial court’s broad discretion to
deny bail under § 301(4).

118. Instead, defendant now claims that.
he was not provided the rights under
Criminal Procedure Rule 32.1 to confront
witnesses and to present evidence to re-
fute the State’s allegations that he vio-
lated his probation. Because a revocation
hearing on the merits has not yet been
held, his claim is properly brought under
Rule 32.1(a)(1), which governs the pre-
liminary hearing necessary to establish

° Defendant also raises a speedy trial
claim on appeal, a claim that is more
properly raised in the trial court in the
first instance. See State » Russo, 2004VT
103, 1.27, 177 Vt. 394, 864 A.2d 655.

EE 651

probable cause that a probation violation
occurred. V.R.Cr.P. 32.1(a)(1); see also
State x Benjamin, 2007 Vt. 52, 19, 182
Vi. 54, 929 A.2d 1276 (noting that two
hearings must be held under Rule
32.1(a)). At a preliminary hearing under
Rule 32.1(a)(1), a probationer must be
afforded an opportunity to present evi-
dence, the opportunity to question oppos-
ing witnesses, and the right to counsel.
V.R.CrP. 32.1 (a)(A)-(D).

119. Plainly, defendant was provided
with these rights during the three-day
bail hearing conducted in the summer of
2014: defendant presented voluminous
testimony, cross-examined witnesses, and
understood that, he was being held with-
out bail on the VOP. As a result, we affirm
the trial court’s conclusion that defendant
received an adequate preliminary hearing
under Rule 32.1(a). Therefore, there is no
basis to reverse the hold without bail
decision in the probation violation docket.

110. Furthermore, we conclude that.
the trial court correctly found that the
new evidence advanced by defendant was
modifying evidence that should be ex-
cluded from the trial court’s bail analysis.
‘This is a question this Court reviews de
novo. State x Eldredge, 2006 VT 80, 17,
180 Vt. 278, 910 A.2d 816.

‘4111. As to the cases punishable by life
under 13 V.S.A. § 7553, if the evidence of
guilt is not great, a defendant shall be
bailable in accordance with 13 V.S.A.
§ 7554, which governs release prior to
trial. The standard for determining
whether the evidence of guilt is “great” is
whether “the evidence, taken in the light
most favorable to the State and excluding
modifying evidence, can fairly and rea-
sonably show [the] defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt.” State x Duff,
151 Vt. 433, 439, 563 A2d 258, 262-63
(1989) (emphasis added) (quotation omit-
ted). The exclusion of modifying evidence
is intended to avoid judicial decisions on
credibility at bail hearings. State v Stolte,
2012 VP 12, 113, 191 Vt. 600, 44 A.Bd 166

(mem.). Thus, this Court has  distin-
guished between testimonial evidence,
which “raises inherent credibility ques-
tions not properly resolved by judges at
bail hearings,’ and nontestimonial evi-
dence, which “is any evidence which does
not derive and depend on the observation,
recollection, reliability, or veracity of wit-
nesses, whether in the form of live testi-
mony or a sworn statement, and which
therefore does not implicate a credibility
determination.” Id. 113. As this Court
made clear in Stolte, however, the true
inquiry is whether the new evidence
raises a factual dispute more appropriate
for the jury to determine. Id. 114 (noting
that, if underlying validity of nontesti-
monial evidence is contested, disputed
evidence is modifying evidence properly
excluded by trial court).

112. Defendant offers two broad cat-
egories of evidence, which he concedes
have not been fully developed: alibi evi-
dence and phone and computer forensic
evidence. The alibi evidence allegedly in-
volves location evidence based on defend-
ant’s and the complaining witness's
phones; specifically, defendant claims that
a forensic examination of the phones by a
technician will establish that he and the
victim were located in different places
during the alleged criminal acts. Further,
he claims that the phone and computer
forensic evidence will demonstrate tam-
pering, purportedly by the complaining
witness, undermining and discrediting
the witness’s credibility.

1113. Even if the “location” and “tam-
pering” evidence ultimately shows what
defendant represents, the validity of the
potential new evidence is not undisputed.
‘As a result, it is modifying evidence prop-
erly exeluded by the trial court. Cf. Stolte,
2012 VT 12, 113. Defendant claims that,
because the newly proffered evidence is
scientific and nontestimonial, it is not
modifying evidence under Stolte. But, as
defendant and the State acknowledged in
oral argument, the State would be free to

652

present evidence to counter defendant's
expert testimony relating to both the alibi
and tampering claims. Moreover, even if
the validity of defendant’s proffered evi-
dence were undisputed, that would not
change the outcome. The effect of the
“tampering” evidence is to undermine a
witness's credibility — classic modifying
evidence. And the “location” evidence
does not directly refute defendant’s guilt;
any theory that it undermines the State’s
case depends on a series of inferences,
including about who possessed the re-
spective cell phones at certain times.
114. In Stolte, this Court remanded for
the trial court to determine whether the
nontestimonial, scientific evidence at is-
sue was “undisputed as to its origin and
result as a matter of fact.” Id. 115. If a
genuine dispute as to either arose, then
we directed the trial court to consider the
evidence as modifying evidence and ex-
elude it from the bail determination. Id.
In this case, because the new evidence at
most may raise a genuine dispute be-
tween the parties, it must be left for a
jury to consider at trial and it was prop-
erly excluded as modifying evidenee when
the trial court denied defendant’s motion
to review bail. Accordingly, the evidence
of guilt remains great in the charges
punishable by life imprisonment.

Affirmed.
a
2016 VT 121
STATE of Vermont v. Pat
[160 A.3d 1020]
No. 16-289

KANE

411. November 22, 2016. Defendant ap-
peals the trial court’s order holding her
without bail pending a probation revoca-
tion hearing. On appeal, defendant argues
that pursuant to statute she has a right to
bail, We reverse and remand.

12. The basic facts are not disputed.
Defendant. pleaded guilty to custodial in-
terference in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2451.
In October 2014, she was sentenced to
two-to-five years, all suspended except
one year.

113. In August 2016, her probation offi-
cer filed a probation violation complaint
alleging that defendant had violated the
four conditions of her probation. These
conditions required her to: meet with her
probation officer whenever told, notify
her probation officer of an address
change within two days of moving, obey a
curfew, and abide by electronie monitor-
ing. The probation officer's affidavit al-
leged that defendant failed to meet her
probation officer as scheduled, had not
reported a change of address, violated
her curfew for three days, and did not
keep her electronic monitoring device
properly charged. The affidavit also
stated that defendant had made “con-
cerning reports” to an Easter Seals
worker, specifically telling the worker
that “What happened with Jody Herring
is understandable” Jody Herring is
charged with shooting and killing an em-
ployee of the Department. for Children
and Families. The affidavit further stated
that defendant had called the sheriffs
department and reported that she was
not feeling safe and did not care if she
lived or died or went to jail. The probation
officer explained that due to defendant’s
violations and her statements of self-
harm, he was requesting that her proba-
tion be revoked.

114, The following day, defendant was
arraigned on the probation violation com-
plaint. The State requested that defend-
ant be held without bail pending a revo-
cation hearing. The State’s proffered
basis for holding without bail was that
defendant’s failure to report to her pro-
bation officer as required demonstrated
that she would not come to court as
required. The State further asserted that
defendant posed a risk of harm to herself.

and to the community. Defendant claimed
that she was attempting to comply with
all conditions and that her record of at-
tending court hearings demonstrated
that she was not a risk of flight. Defend-
ant’s probation officer was present at the
hearing and stated that he was unable to
properly supervise her under her current
conditions. The court made an oral ruling,
concluding that defendant should be held
without bail pending the revocation hear-
ing.

115. On September 1, 2016, this Court
issued a single-Justice order affirming
the trial court’s decision to hold defend-
ant without bail pending the probation-
revocation hearing. The order explained
that pending a hearing, the probationer
does not have a right to bail, that release
is therefore subject to the court’s disere-
tion, and that the court did not abuse its
discretion in holding defendant. without
bail. See State » Campbell, 2014 VT 123,
110, 198 Vt. 627, 110 A.3d 289 (mem.)
(explaining that defendant had no right to
bail and trial court had broad diseretion
in determining whether to grant bail or
release). Defendant then moved for fall-
Court review.

116. Defendant’s request for review
stems from a statutory change that was
made in 2010. The Legislature changed
the statute regarding detention of a pro-
bationer following a charge of a violation.
Prior to that time, the statute stated
simply that there was no right to bail
pending a hearing. The statute was
amended as follows:

(4) Detention pending hearing
for probationer. Pending ar-
raignment for any charge of vio-
lation, the probationer shall con-
tinue to be detained at a
correctional facility. Thereafter,
the court may release the proba-
tioner pursuant to seetion F554
of Filed 139 VS.A. § 7554. There
shall be no right to bail or re-

lease, unless the person is on
probation for a nonviolent mis-
demeanor or nonviolent felony
and the probation violation did
not constitute a new crime.

2009, No. 157 (Adj. Sess.), § 5 (codified at
28 V.S.A. §301(4)). New language was
also added to define nonviolent felony as
an offense which is not a listed crime in 13
VS.A. § 5301(7) or “an offense involving
sexual exploitation of children.” 28 V.S.A.
§ 301(4)(A).

117. Here, the parties do not dispute the
underlying facts. Defendant was con-
victed of custodial interference, which is a
nonviolent felony; it is not a listed erime
in 13 VS.A. §5301(7) and it does not
involve sexual exploitation of children.
Further, the probation violations she was
charged with do not constitute a new
crime. Therefore, defendant falls within
the “unless” clause of the statute. Given
that this Court has not previously con-
strued the amended language in 28V.S.A.
§301(4) for probationers that fall within
this clause, we grant full-Court review.

418. We begin with the familiar premise
that in interpreting a statute, “[ojur goal
is to implement the Legislature's intent
and the definitive source of legislative
intent is the statutory language, by which
we are bound unless it is uncertain or
unclear” State x Stell, 2007 VT 106, 1112,
182 Vt. 368, 937 A.2d 649 (quotation and
alteration omitted). Therefore, we imple-
ment the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statutory language and depart only
where “the objective of the legislation
would be defeated.” Id. (quotation omit-
ted).

119. In this instance, the statute’s plain.
language and its purpose statement both
demonstrate that the statute was enacted
to remove the presumption against bail
for probationers like defendant. The
amended language states that probation-
ers who are charged with violations do
not have a right to bail or release unless

654

they fit certain factual criteria, This lan-
guage on its face means that those who fit
the criteria do have a right to bail.

1110. Further, the Act’s statement of
findings and intent provided:

(a) It is the intent of the gen-
eral assembly that term proba-
tion be the standard, the default,
for misdemeanors and nonvio-
lent felonies and that the exeep-
tion in the law that allows a court
to deviate from this standard in
the interest of justice should be
used judiciously and sparingly.

(b) Similarly, it is the intent of
the general assembly that ad-
ministrative probation be the
standard, the default, for quali-
fying offenses for which proba-
tion is ordered and that the ex-
ception in the law that allows a
court to deviate from this stan-
dard in the interest of justice
should be used judiciously and
sparingly.

2009, No. 157 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. The Act
also included a finding that the number of
persons detained in Vermont's corree-
tional system was increasing and directed
several agencies, including the courts, to
“work cooperatively to reduce, to the ex-
tent possible, the average daily number of
incarcerated detainees” Id. § 11(b)
These staternents — indicating that the
‘Act was intended to decrease the number
of incarcerated persons and that proba-
tion would be the “default” for people
with nonviolent felonies — are consistent
with an interpretation of the statutory
language that for certain individuals
there is a right to bail pending a proba-
tion violation hearing

111. Therefore, we conclude that de-
fendants who fit the statutory criteria
have a statutory right to bail or release
and that the conditions of that release
should be determined by a consideration

of the factors in 13 V.S.A. § 7554. The
State maintains that the trial court still
has diseretion to hold these individuals
without releasing them under conditions.
The statutory language does not support
this construction. Although the statute
states that following arraignment, the
court “may release the probationer,” this
phrase existed prior to the statutory
change and we do not construe it to mean
that even those with a right to bail ean be
held without bail. Under the prior law any
probationer could be held or released
pending a violation hearing. It remains
the case that the court has discretion to
release any probationer. However, if we
construed the statute to continue to allow
all probationers to be held without condi-
tions of release pending the hearing, then
the statutory change would have made no
difference in how probationers are held or
released pending a violation hearing.
Therefore, we conclude that those proba-
tioners with a right to bail may not be
held without bail and reverse the trial
court’s order holding defendant without
bail. On remand, the trial court is directed
to hold a hearing forthwith to determine
the conditions of release for defendant
pending the probation-violation hearing.

4112. We recognize that in this case the
trial court’s decision to hold defendant
without conditions of release was influ-
enced by concerns that defendant posed a
risk of harm to herself and to the commu-
nity. Certainly, defendant's staternent.
about Jody Herring is concerning and
may be taken into consideration in deter-
mining which conditions of release to
impose. The fact remains, however, that
the actual probation violation charges did
not “constitute a new crime” — failing to
meet with her probation officer, failing to
keep a curfew, failing to report a change
of address, and failing to comply with
electronic monitoring. Because defend-
ant’s underlying crime was a nonviolent
felony and the probation violations did
not amount to new crimes, defendant had
a right to conditions of release.

FP ”

Reversed and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with the decision;

hearing to be held forthwith to determine

the conditions of release for defendant.
Reiber, C.J. dissenting.

2016 VT 132

In re Petition of VERMONT GAS.
SYSTEMS, INC.

[161 A3d 522]
No, 16-396

411. December 8, 2016. In this case, the
Public Service Board authorized Vermont
Gas Systems (VGS) to eondemn a pipeline
easement through Geprags Park and to
install the pipe underground utilizing
horizontal directional drilling. Appellants-
intervenors, who are park users, filed a
notice of appeal, which triggered an auto-
mati¢ stay of the Board’s decision under
30 VS.A. § 124. VGS asks this Court to
vacate the automatic statutory stay. See
id. (providing that Supreme Court may
vacate statutory stay “as justice and eq-
uity require”). The Department of Public
Service supports VGS's request. As set
forth below, we grant VGS’s request and
vacate the statutory stay.

12. In reaching our conelusion, we con-
sider the traditional factors concerning
the issuance of a stay. Thus, we consider:
(1) the likelihood that the moving party
will prevail on the merits; (2) the threat of
irreparable injury to the moving party;
(8) the threat of irreparable injury to the
nonmoving party; and (4) the publie inter-
est to be served by a stay. Auclair » Vt.
Elec. Power Co., 132 Vt. 519, 520-21, 323
A.2d 578, 579 (1974) (per curiam). We are
mindful that “{w]hen considering the like-
lihood of success on the merits, the Court
must be careful not to allow the argument
on the interlocutory issue to be expanded
into a full-blown debate on all issues likely
to be raised on appeal.” In 7 New Eng-

land Tel. & Tel. Co., 145 Vt. 309, 312, 488
A.2d 746, 748 (1984).

418. As to the first factor, appellants
maintain that they are likely to prevail on
appeal because the Board created an ex-
ception to the prior public use doctrine
that is at odds with existing Vermont case
law. The Board recognized this case law in
its decision and found it distinguishable.
The Board concluded that the evidence
showed that the limited condemnation
involved here would not destroy or mate-
rially impair the existing public recre-
ational use of Geprags Park. Instead, it
found that the pipeline segment, which
would be located thirty to fifty feet below
the surface of the park, would be compat-
ible with the existing above-ground ree-
reational uses, The Board explained that
other jurisdictions had similarly accepted
the principle that where land is already
devoted to a prior public use, a subse-
quent additional condemnation is not
foreclosed when the second taking will
also serve a public use and will neither
destroy nor materially impair the existing
public use. The Board determined that
the public good would best be served by
authorizing a condemnation that would
result in the joint use of the Geprags Park
for both the existing public recreational
purpose and the second, additional public
use proposed by VGS,

414, As is common, the stay vacation
request comes before there has been
briefing and argument so we must judge
the likelihood of success on the merits
primarily on the basis of the thorough-
ness and completeness of the Board's
decision, and its support in existing law, in
light of the claims of appellants. Given the
Board’s careful and reasoned consider-
ation of this case, we cannot conelude at
this juncture that appellants have demon-
strated a sufficiently strong likelihood of
success on the merits such that the first.
factor weighs heavily in their favor. We
emphasize, however, that this conelusion
does not have any impact on our later

656

consideration of the merits of the under-
lying appeal.

415. Turning to the remaining factors,
we conclude that they weigh in favor of
vacating the stay. VGS has demonstrated
a threat of irreparable injury from the
continuation of a stay for the reasons
identified in its motion, while appellants
have not. We note that VGS has obtained
a $1,000,000 bond to indemnify the Town
of Hinesburg if its installation of the
pipeline harms the park, We are also
perstiaded by VGS’s assertion that,
should appellants prevail on appeal, it
could return the park to its pre-drill

condition. Finally, we agree with VGS and
the Department of Public Service that the
public interest is served by vacating the
statutory stay as this will allow VGS to
complete construction of the pipeline,
which the Board found will provide sig-
nificant economie benefits to the state, We
have considered all of appellants’ argu-
ments in opposition to VGS's request and
find them unpersuasive. The motion to
vacate the statutory stay is granted.

The statutory stay is vacated.

16-136

16-304
16-250.

16-313
15-315
15-361
15-378

15-427
16-037

16-088

16-100

16-101

16-177

16-208
16-212

Chandler v, Rutland
Herald Publishing
Dowling v. Point Five
Development L
Grant & James, LLC
State v. Kane
Hobson v. Hobson

Bandler v. Cohen
Rosenthal & Kramer,
LLP

State v. Gould

Bank of New York
Mellon v. Quinn
State v. Pape

State v. Brakarenka
State v. Chance
State v. Nutbrown-
Covey

State v. Wright
Schipper v. Sullivan

Fellows v. Pallito
Maunsell v, Bank of
New York Mellon
Trust Co

Ageney of Natural
Resourees v, Davis
Inre NR.

Inre BM.

Inve MK

Affirmed

Denied

Aftirmed
Reangument
denied
Denied

Reversed
Reconsidera-
tion denied
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed

8/23/16
8/29/16
9/16
9/2/16
9/2/16
9/2/16
O/T/16
9/15/16
9/16/16
9/16/16

9/16/16

9/16/16
9/16/16

9/16/16
9/16/16
9/16/16
9/16/16

9/16/16
9/16/16

Windham Civ.

Orig. Juris.

Benn. Crim.
Wash. Fam.

Orig. Juris.

Rat, Crim
Orig. Juris.

Wash. Crim.
Lam. Crim.
Chit. Crim.
Wash. Crim.

Frank. Crim.
Windham
Fam.

Wash. Civ.
Chit. Civ.

Envtl. Div.
Windsor Fam.

Cal. Fam.
Chit. Fam.

151/344
151/344
152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468

152/468

152/468
152/468

152/468
152/468
152/468
152/468

152/468
152/468

658

16-038

16-281

10-243

15-315

16-115

16-048

16-049

16-058
16-131
16-156
16-165
16-180
16-188
16-209

16-351
16-340
16-363
16-365
16-360
16-366
16-367
16-334
16-352

16-364

16-368

16-371

16-349

16-380
15-383,

Hobson v. Hobson

In re Meteorological
Tower
Inre CC.

State v. Brakarenka.

Bank of America,
NA. v. Oakley
State v. Ward

In re Fuad
Naibalema SNF
Freshstart, LLC
Inre DG

Day v. DOL
Newton v. Mack
Inve JB

In re Earle
Inre RL.

Inre HP.

In re Bruyette
State v. Williams
State v. Abel

Inre SS.

Campbell v. State
Inre AK.

Inre SC.

State v. Woods
MeDonald v. Office of
Professional Regula-
tion

Bedell y, Vermont
Legislature

In re Bean

Nichols v. Hofmann
US. Bank National
Ass’n v. Johnston

In re Hayes

Cavett v. Pallito

Reconsidera-
tion denied
Dismissed

Reopen de-
nied
Reargument
denied
Dismissed

Affirmed

Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Reversed
Affirmed
Affirmed;
reversed
Dismissed
Denied
Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed
Denied
Dismissed
Dismissed
Dismissed

Dismissed
Dismissed
Denied

Denied

Dismissed
Affirmed

9/22/16

9/23/16

10/5/16

10/5/16

10/5/16

10/7/16

10/7/16

10/7/16
10/7/16
10/7/16
10/7/16
10/7/16
10/7/16
10/7/16

10/19/16
10/25/16
10/25/16
10/25/16
10/26/16
10/27/16
10/31/16
1/1/16

1/1/16

1/1/16
1V/I/16
1/1/16
11/2/16

11/3/16
11/4/16

Wash. Fam
PSB

Chit. Fam,
Lam, Crim.
Orange Civ.

Grand Isle
Crim.
Board of
Health

HSB
ESB

Chit. Giv.
Orange Fam.
Lam. Ci,
Frank. Fam.
Chit. Fam,

Orig. Juris.
Orig. Juris.
Orleans Crim.
Frank. Fam.
Chit. Crim,
Frank. Fam
HSB

Orig. Juris.
Wash. Civ.

Orig. Juris.
HSB
Orig. Juris.

Orig. Juris.

ESB
Chit. Civ.

152/468

152/468

152/468

152/469

152/469

152/469

152/469

152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469

152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
152/469
1538/1230
1583/1230

1583/1230
1538/1230
1538/1230

1583/1230

1538/1230
1538/1230

BAD
16-066

16-127
16-128

16-154
16-184
16-187
16-204
16-217
16-220
16-225
16-364

16-390

16-392
16-398

15-475
16-401
16-406
15-383
16-204
16-333

16-403
16-333

avett Vv. nto,
Mannings v.
Mannings
Clough v. Arapina
Bishop v. Town of
Springfield
Roberts v. Roberts
Inve GH
State v. Raymond
Inre K.C,
Inre AE
In re Rheaume
Manning v. Pallito
Bedell v, Vermont
Legislature
In re Guardianship of
MM.
In re James
In re Laberge Shoot-
ing Range JO
Cavett v. Pallito

In re Sandoval
Tn re Cornelius
Cavett v. Pallito

In re K.C,
State v. Woods

State v. Rabtoy
State v. Woods

ime
Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed

Affirmed
Affirmed
Dismissed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Affirmed
Denied

Dismissed

Dismissed
Dismissed

Reargument
denied
Dismissed
Dismissed
Reargument
denied
Reargument
denied
Affirmed
Affirmed
Reconsidera-
tion denied

11/4/16

11/4/16
11/4/16

11/4/16
11/4/16
11/4/16
11/4/16
11/4/16
11/4/16
11/4/16
11/21/16

11/28/16

11/28/16
11/28/16

11/29/16
11/30/16
11/30/16
12/1/16
12/1/16
12/1/16

12/5/16
12/7/16

hit. Clv.
Frank. Fam.

Cal. Fam.
Windsor Civ.

Lam. Fam.
Frank. Fam.
Chit. Crim.
Benn. Fam.
Orleans Fam,
Frank. Civ.
Windsor Civ.
Orig. Juris.

Wash. Civ.

HSB
Envtl. Div.

Chit. Civ.
HSB
HSB
Chit. Civ.

Benn. Fam.

Orleans Crim.

Rut. Crim.
Orleans Crim.

Oe 0
1538/1230

1583/1230
1583/1230

1538/1230
1583/1230
1583/1230
1538/1230
1583/1230
1538/1230
1538/1230
1583/1230

1538/1230

1538/1230
1583/1231

1538/1231
1583/1231
1538/1231
1583/1231
1583/1231
1538/1231

1538/1231
1583/1231