State: Illinois
Volume: 415
Term: 1954-1954
Jurisdiction(s): Illinois
Source: https://static.case.law/ill/415.pdf

PC
No. 3755 TT

Tue Prope or THE State or Inz1No1s, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. JuLEs Hopxins, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953.

BR
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Wuaiitam C, Jerome, and Staniey H. Ricuarps, both
of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Ivan A. Exsiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Franx W. Curran, State’s Attorney, of Kankakee, (Ep-
warp P. Drozet, and Harry L. Pats, of counsel,) for
the People.

Mr. Justice Scuarrer delivered the opinion of the
court:

On February 18, 1935, the defendant, Jules Hopkins,
was indicted in the circuit court of Kankakee County for
murder. His motion to quash the indictment was overruled,
and he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment
in the penitentiary for ninety-nine years. The case is here
on writ of error.

The only contention made by defendant is that his mo-
tion to quash the indictment should have been allowed.
The motion charged (1) that the grand jury which returned
the indictment was not selected proportionately from each
town or precinct in the county as required by statute, and
(2) that the foreman of the grand jury was not a legally
selected grand juror. A third ground advanced in the mo-
tion to quash, that the jurisdiction of the grand jury had
terminated before it returned the indictment, was abandoned
on oral argument.

The facts are stipulated. On December 22, 1934, the
presiding judge of the circuit court of Kankakee County
entered an order directing the selection of a grand jury.

es 18

A resolution of the board of supervisors of the county,
adopted on January 8, 1935, selected twenty-three named
persons to serve as grand jurors at the January, 1935, term
of the circuit court. The population of Kankakee County,
according to the Federal census of 1930, was 50,095; the
population of Kankakee township was 27,289; there were
seventeen townships in the county; one grand juror was
selected by the board of supervisors from each township
except Kankakee township, and seven grand jurors were
selected from Kankakee township. The name of the twenty-
third person selected was listed as “E. E. Whimsett” of
Kankakee. The sheriff made a return on the summons
showing E. E. Whimsett “not found.” On January 26,
1935, Dr. George E. Irwin, supervisor of Kankakee town-
ship, where G. C. Whimsett resided, changed the name
“E. E. Whimsett” on the resolution of January 8 to “G. C.
Whimsett.” At the request o£ the county clerk and Dr.
Irwin, the circuit clerk took the original summons to the
sheriff’s office, delivered it to a deputy sheriff, and informed
him that the supervisor of Kankakee township had requested
that G. C. Whimsett be served as a grand juror. The name
“E. E. Whimsett” was changed to “G. C. Whimsett” on
the grand jury summons in the sheriff’s office. On the same
day, January 26, 1935, G. C. Whimsett was served with a
grand jury summons, Thereafter, he was appointed fore-
man of the grand jury and served in that capacity when
the challenged indictment was returned. The supervisor
of Kankakee township testified that he knew of only one
Whimsett, the Rev. G. C. Whimsett who actually served
on the grand jury, and that when he wrote the name E. E.
Whimsett on the resolution passed by the board of super-
visors on January 8, 1935, he had in mind and intended to
indicate G. C. Whimsett.

To the extent relevant, section 9 of the Jurors Act, in
force in February, 1935, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, chap. 78,
par. 9,) when this indictment was returned, provided for

14 |

the selection of twenty-three persons, possessing the quali-
fications prescribed by section 2, “and as near as may be a
proportionate number from each town or precinct in their
respective counties,” to serve as grand jurors. It also pro-
vided, “If for any reason the panel of grand jurors shall
not be full * * * the judge shall direct the sheriff to
summon from the body of the county a sufficient number
of persons having the qualifications of jurors, as provided
by this Act, to fill the panel.”

Defendant contends that compliance with the statutory
provision that a proportionate number of grand jurors
should be selected “from each town or precinct” required
that at least one half of the grand jury should have been
selected from Kankakee township. In support of that con-
tention he cites Miller v. People, 183 Ill. 423; People v.
Boston, 309 Ul. 77, and People v. Green, 329 Ill. 576. The
first and the last of these cases involved grand juries for
city courts which were selected from among the residents
of the particular city, to the exclusion of residents of the
other townships in the county. The factual situations there
involved obviously differ widely from that here presented.
In People v. Boston, 309 Ill. 77, numerous grounds were
urged in support of a challenge to the array of petit jurors.
This court there commented that “Nothing seems to have
been done as the statute directs.” One of the grounds upon
which the challenge was sustained was that while three
townships in the county each contained about one per cent
of the population of the county, two members of the panel
of twenty-four on duty at the time of the trial came from
each of those three townships. Again, there is but little
similarity to the present case.

The cases relied upon by the defendant do indicate that
the requirement of “a proportionate number from each
town or precinct” is to be interpreted as referring to the
population of the respective townships. They do not sug-
gest, however, that the geographical distribution which is

15

also commanded by the same phrase can be completely
ignored. In apparent recognition of the inherent conflict
between a geographical selection and one based upon popu-
lation, the legislative command was not expressed in abso-
lute terms. Selection was required only to be “as near as
may be a proportionate number from each town or precinct.”
In this case twenty-three grand jurors were to be selected
from a county containing seventeen townships. One of the
townships contained over half of the population of the
county. In our opinion, the method here employed, selec-
tion of one grand juror from each of sixteen townships,
and the remaining seven from the most heavily populated
township, constituted substantial, if not complete, compli-
ance with the statute.

Defendant’s other contention is that when the summons
was returned “not found” as to E. E. Whimsett, the statute
reqttired that the judge direct the sheriff to fill the panel
from the body of the county. Because this was not done,
he argues that there was no attempt to comply with the
statute, and that the indictment should have been quashed
even though no prejudice to the defendant was shown. In
support of this position, defendant relies upon People v.
Mack, 367 Ill. 481; People v. Clampitt, 362 Ill. 534, and
People v. Lindquist, 289 Ill. App. 250, in each of which
cases it was held that no attempt was made to comply with
the substantial statutory provisions for the selection and
summoning of grand jurors. We do not so regard the
present case. There is here not an absence of any attempt
to comply with the statute, but rather an instance of an
irregularity in attempting to proceed in accordance with
the statute. The effort here was to secure as a grand juror
the person actually intended to be selected by the county
board to serve in that capacity. Defendant does not suggest
that there was any person other than G. C. Whimsett who
might have been intended to be selected as a grand juror.
In our opinion the irregularity involved in service of the

16 [| _

grand jury summons on G. C. Whimsett does not amount .
to a substantial departure from the statute.

It is now settled that the statutory provisions concern-
ing the impaneling of a grand jury are directory and not
mandatory, and that where there is an attempt to comply
with statutory requirements, informalities or irregularities
will not vitiate the action of a grand jury in the absence of
prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant. (People v.
Gibbs, 413 Ill. 154; People v. Herkless, 361 Ill. 32; People
v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423; People v. Birger, 329 Ill. 352; Peo-
ple v. Wallace, 303 Ill. 504.) There is no showing in this
case of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
matters of which he complains.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County
is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Le
(No, 5:6:
CuristeNa Yates, Appellant, vs. BANKERS Lire AND
Casuatty Company, Appellee.

"Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

Pree & PREE, of Springfield, for appellant.

GuzsPiz, Burke & GiLEsriz, of Springfield, (FRED-
Erick H. Stone, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. Jusvice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Christena Yates, mother of the decedent, Oliver
Yates, instituted proceedings to recover as beneficiary under
an insurance policy issued by the defendant, Bankers Life
and Casualty Company, on the life of the decedent. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount
of $2000 upon which the circuit court of Sangamon County
entered judgment. The Appellate Court, however, reversed
that judgment on the ground that the evidence did not
establish that the decedent met his death by accidental
means, and this court has allowed plaintiff leave to appeal
therefrom.

The sole isstie in this cause is whether the Appellate
Court erred in concluding that the death of the decedent
was not occasioned by accidental means as provided by the
terms of the policy.

According to the uncontroverted evidence, the decedent,
Oliver Yates, had been physically disabled since the age

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1S ee

of eight in that he was paralyzed from his head to his
toes on his left side, his left leg was shorter than his right
leg, causing a decided limp, his left eye did not open and
shut well, he was hard of hearing in his left ear, and he
had difficulty in speaking and articulating words. Despite
these handicaps, Yates had been self-supporting all his adult
life, and was gainfully employed at the time of the event
which occasioned his death. His family consisted of two
daughters and a son, his wife having been dead for some
twenty years. A policy of insurance was issued to him by
defendant Bankers Life and Casualty Company, insuring
against loss of life from bodily injuries effected through
accidental means, under which policy his mother, plaintiff
herein, was the beneficiary.

The alleged accident which resulted in the death of
Oliver Yates occurred on November 25, 1948. Lloyd
Richardson testified that on that date while he was sitting
with his wife and two minor children in the living room
of his one-story frame home listening to the radio, Yates,
a total stranger, opened the front door and proceeded to
walk into the living room. Yates had his hands extended
and open, carried no weapon and made no threats or men-
acing gestures. However, he did not answer when Richard-
son asked him twice what he wanted, but merely walked
toward Richardson. The latter, without any intention of
hurting Yates in any way, pushed him by the shoulders out
of the front door. The front door opened onto a porch,
which, as revealed by an exhibit and the testimony, is six
inches lower than the floor of the living room, and there
is a single wooden step from the porch to the cement side-
walk. When Richardson reopened the door seconds later,
he saw Yates lying on his back on the cement sidewalk with
his feet on the porch step. Consequently, it was surmised
that Yates lost his balance and fell backwards from the
higher level of the living room down the porch step onto
the sidewalk where he struck the back of his head.

es

Richardson tried to revive Yates with water but failed,
whereupon Mrs. Richardson called the police, who arrived
ten minutes later and took Yates to the hospital by ambu-
lance. One of the police officers testified that he had known
Yates and corroborated the facts with reference to Yates’s
difficulty in walking and speaking. It was stipulated that
Yates died as a result of a skull fracture and severe injury
to the brain.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence the jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff for $2000 upon which the court
entered judgment. The Appellate Court reversed that judg-
ment on the theory that the event causing the insured’s in-
juries arose out of his own misconduct rather than through
accidental means.

It is evident that to recover upon the insurance policy
plaintiff must establish that the death of the insured re-
sulted solely from bodily injury caused by accidental means.
The Illinois case law is replete with definitions of what con-
stitutes death through accidental means. Christ v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 312 Ill. 525; Hutton v. States Acci-
dent Ins. Co. 267 Ill. 267; Higgins v. Midland Casualty Co.
281 Ill. 431; Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co. 333 Ill. 175.

In Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. the court re-
viewed the definitions and applications of the term “accident”
in cases involving recovery under insurance policies, and
adopted the interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court in United States Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry,
131 U.S. 100. Under the rule promulgated in the Barry
case, if an act is performed with the intention of accom-
plishing a certain result, and if, in the attempt to accomplish
that result, another result, unintended and unexpected, and
not the rational and probable consequence of the intended
act, in fact, occurs, such unintended result is deemed to be
caused by accidental means.

In the Barry case, the insured, along with two com-
panions, jumped from a platform 4 or 5 feet high, and

20

in alighting unexpectedly wrenched his body by a jar which
cause a stricture of the duodenum, resulting in his death a
few days later. In adjudging that decedent had sustained
an accident, the court stated: “The two companions of the
deceased jumped from the same platform at the same time
and place and alighted safely. It must be presumed not
only that the deceased intended to alight safely, but thought
that he would. The jury were, on all the evidence, at liberty
to say that it was an accident that he did not. The court
properly instructed them * * * that, if a result is such
as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in
a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a
result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act
which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unex-
pected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the
injury has resulted through accidental means.” Although
the insured voluntarily and intentionally jumped from the
platform, however, in the course of that act something un-
foreseen and unexpected occurred, i.¢., the wrenching of
his body and stricture of the duodenum, hence the resulting
death was deemed to be caused by accidental means.

In the Christ case the deceased also did an intentional
act by drinking from a faucet, however, because of an un-
known defect in the valve of the water pipes, he drank
polluted water and contracted typhoid fever from which
he died. This unforeseen and unexpected occurrence in the
act preceding the injury was deemed to render it accidental.

In the case at bar the decedent Yates voluntarily entered
Richardson’s home uninvited, and Richardson committed
the intentional act of pushing Yates by the shoulders out
of the room. Richardson’s act was done, not with the in-
tention of hurting Yates in any way, for they were not
engaged in any sort of controversy or fracas, but merely
to remove Yates from the room. In the course of that in-
tentional act Yates fell backwards from the higher level
of the living room floor onto the lower porch, and then

Ss

down the single step onto the cement sidewalk on which he
struck the back of his head in a fatal blow. Clearly, de-
cedent’s tripping backwards and ultimate skull fracture was
both unexpected and unforeseen. Not only were the serious
injuries to Oliver Yates unanticipated by him when he
entered Richardson’s home, but such a result was equally
unexpected by Richardson when he pushed him through
his doorway. Destroying the life of Yates was not even
remotely contemplated by Richardson. One step to the
porch and a single step to the sidewalk presented no ominous
hazard which might reasonably foreshow a fatal injury.

Defendant, however, argues that the fatal blow on the
back of decedent’s head was the natural and probable result
of his own misconduct, and cites the cases of Cory v. Wood-
man Accident Co. 333 Ill. 175, and Hutton v. States Acci-
dent Ins. Co. 267 Ill. 267, deemed determinative by the Ap-
pellate Court, in support of this contention.

In these cases the court reiterated the rule that where
the insured voluntarily engages in a fight as an aggressor
and receives injuries which are the natural and probable
consequences of his act, the injuries cannot be deemed to
be caused by accidental means. In the Cory case, the in-
sured was shot by a smaller and weaker youth whom the
insured had grabbed by the neck after the insured had been
warned to stand back or be shot. The court predicated its
determination that the injuries were not caused by acci-
dental means on the ground that the insured had been
warned that he would be shot, and could reasonably have
foreseen and expected that his own unnecessary advance
upon the boy would result in serious injury from the use
of the deadly weapon held by him.

In the Hutton case, the insured commenced a fist fight
with another powerful man, and in the course of the combat
the insured’s leg was broken. In holding that the injury
was not accidentally caused, the court stated: “Where one
voluntarily and deliberately engages in a fight or brawl

2 ee

and places another in a position where he, too, must fight
to defend himself, it is a natural result, and one known
to all sensible men as likely to follow, that one or both
of the combatants will receive more or less serious injury.”

In the instant case, in sharp contrast to both the Cory
and Hutton cases, the evidence, both direct and circum-
stantial, in no way suggests that decedent deliberately pro-
voked a fight, or put Richardson in fear of his life or of
his personal safety. Yates had no weapon, he did not
advance menacingly or threateningly, nor in any way evi-
denced a malevolent intent, but merely limped forward in
full view, with his hands open and arms extended, and then
permitted himself to be easily ejected without fighting back
in any manner. Moreover, Richardson testified that he did
not intend to hurt Yates in any way, but merely to eject
him, since he entered uninvited and did not answer when
asked what he wanted. That failure to respond immedi-
ately could reasonably be attributed to Yates’s speech diffi-
culties which were clearly established by the testimony of
a disinterested witness.

It is evident, therefore, that decedent’s bewildered con-
duct can in no way be analogized to the type of aggressive
action involved in the Cory and Hutton cases, hence, those
decisions may not properly be deemed determinative. More-
over, irrespective of those cases, the death of the decedent
as a result of a fall under the circumstances presented in
this record cannot be deemed to be the natural and probable
consequence of his confused conduct in walking into Rich-
ardson’s house in full view of the occupants without mani-
festing an evil or aggressive intention. We do not know
his purpose in limping into that household, but can ‘only
surmise from the nature of his conduct therein that he
did not enter pursuant to a malevolent design which could
conceivably have led to his death. As in the Barry case,
the injuries and death of Yates were caused by something
unforeseen and unexpected occurring in the course of an

Se

intentional act, i.¢., the backward fall from the living room
to the lower level of the porch and down the step onto the
cement sidewalk, where he hit the back of his head and
fractured his skull. Therefore, under the concept of “acci-
dental means” adopted and reiterated by the Illinois court,
the jury could properly have found that the death of the
insured Oliver Yates was caused by accidental means, and
that plaintiff, as beneficiary of the policy issued by defend-
ant upon Yates’s life, was entitled to recover thereunder.
The Appellate Court erred, therefore, in concluding that _
defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict should have been allowed and in reversing the judg-
ment of the circuit court entered on the jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff. Consequently, the judgment of the Ap-
pellate Court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit
court of Sangamon County is affirmed.
Appellate Court reversed; circuit court affirmed.

Le
No. 32576

Tux PEorLEe of THE Stats oF Inzinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. JouN Dantex Brown, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

BookwatEer, Carter, GUNN & Hickman, of Dan-
ville, for plaintiff in error.

Ivan A, Exiiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Wiisam T. HEenpgrson, State’s Attorney, of Danville,
(Joun T. Arten, and Harry L. Pare, of counsel,) for
the People.

Mr. Justicy Maxwet. delivered the opinion of the
court :

Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant,
John Daniel Brown, was indicted for murder in Vermilion
County and a jury found him guilty of manslaughter. The
trial court overruled his motion for new trial, entered judg-
ment and passed sentence. Defendant assigns the verdict,
judgment and sentence of manslaughter as error and con-
tends the trial court erred in submitting to the jury instruc-
tions pertaining to manslaughter. Defendant contends that
under the evidence he was either guilty of murder, or not
guilty by reason of insanity.

2%

On October 5, 1950, defendant shot and killed his wife,
and on the following day was indicted for the crime of
murder. On October 7, 1950, defendant was present in
the circuit court of Vermilion County, given a copy of the
indictment, and he then requested counsel. A few days
later, the public defender, appointed as his attorney, filed
a petition in the trial court alleging defendant was insane
to the extent that he was unable to plead to the indictment
and requested a jury hearing on this issue. On October 20,
1950, the jury, impaneled to hear evidence on said isstie,
returned a verdict finding defendant insane at the time of
said hearing, and he was accordingly committed to the
Security Hospital at Chester until he recovered from his
insanity,

On January 4, 1952, defendant was returned to Ver-
milion County. On January 21, 1952, counsel for defend-
ant applied for a jury hearing to determine the mental
capacity of the defendant to plead to the indictment and to
defend. A jury heard evidence presented on this issue on
February 8, 1952, and rendered a verdict finding that de-
fendant was on said date not an insane person. The court
entered judgment on said verdict. Thereafter, on the same
date, defendant was arraigned, given a copy of the indict-
ment, a list of the witnesses, and entered a plea of not
guilty, A trial of defendant was commenced March 10,
1952, and the jury’s verdict found him guilty of man-
slaughter. Defendant’s sole defense at the trial was that he
was insane at the time of killing his wife. No motion in
arrest of judgment was filed. A motion for new trial was
filed and denied by the lower court, and defendant was
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary.

It is undisputed that on the morning of October 5, 1950,
defendant shot his wife with a revolver inflicting a wound
in the head which almost completely severed the spinal
cord, killing her instantly. Another shot was fired, striking
her in the head but did not penetrate the skull. Defendant’s

26 |

brother and mother lived in the same house in Danville.
‘The mother heard the shot fired, ran to the room occupied
by defendant and his wife, and saw the deceased lying on
the floor of the bathroom adjoining their bedroom. She
immediately called the brother who quickly responded and
found defendant sitting on the bed with a gun in his hands.
The brother took this gun, put it in his hip pocket and
called the police. At this time defendant told his brother,
“Joe, if you had stayed out of here, I would have finished
it all.” The police arrived shortly thereafter. As his
brother was about to give the gun to the police, defendant
remarked, “Joe, that gun’s cocked.” The brother then care-
fully removed the gun from his hip pocket and noticed that
the gun was cocked. The gun was fully loaded except for
the two discharged shells. Defendant was then taken to the
Danville police station.

Officer Christy, who had known defendant for several
years, testified that at the time of the arrest he asked de-
fendant why he had shot his wife and received the reply,
“She told me she was going to leave me.” Coroner Cole
testifying to the same conversation, stated that defendant
talked quite a bit for approximately two or two and one-
half hours in the west room of the police station in the
presence of officers and the State’s Attorney and that de-
fendant then said that deceased had talked about packing
her things and leaving him because he had started drinking
again.

The defendant, a mechanic and welder, thirty-two years
of age at the time of trial, became afflicted with Raynaud’s
disease approximately two years before the killing. This
disease is a severe paroxysmal, nervous disorder causing
disturbance of the circulation, generally in the fingers,
causing intense pain. In defendant’s case it caused the ends
of his fingers to have broken sores, running pus, with
symptoms of gangrene. Defendant complained that for
several months prior to the shooting he could not work

es a7

and sleep and that he was required to use narcotics and
opiates to relieve his pain and to obtain a little rest. He
told of traveling to various cities and consulting various
doctors for the purpose of obtaining drugs. At Hines Hos-
pital he was first denied narcotics and later given some to
relieve his pain, and while there a sympathectomy was per-
formed to relieve his pain. This operation consisted of cut-
ting certain nerves along the spine that controlled the nerves
to the fingers. The operation was apparently unsuccessful
and failed to bring about the desired relief. Certain of the
drugs taken by defendant were by mouth and some by hypo-
dermic needle; some of the drugs taken were dilaudid,
demerol and barbiturates. The drugs appeared to give but
temporary relief and were taken in large and excessive
quantities. Drs. English, Bennett and Jordan, the latter a
psychiatrist, testified defendant was insane at the time of
the shooting. Dr. Bennett stated defendant was insane for
some time prior to the occurrence. Dr. Jordan classified
defendant as a case of schizophrenia or dementia praecox.
Dr. Jordan based his opinion for this classification on the
fact that he did not believe defendant could possibly realize
the type of pain of which he complained.

Dr. William H. Haines, a psychiatrist and expert in
mental and nervous diseases in this State, testifying for
defendant, stated that in his opinion defendant was not a
case of dementia praecox or schizophrenia and that if de-
fendant was insane at the time of the shooting the insanity
was produced from the excessive use of drugs. However,
on cross-examination Dr. Haines testified that if, shortly
after the shooting, defendant told his brother to be careful
because the gun was cocked, and that the gun in fact was
cocked, and that further, in making a statement to the
officers and State’s Attorney within a period’ one and a
half hours after the shooting, defendant displayed an accu-
rate awareness and knowledge of where he was, his wife’s
name, his mother’s name and various other details of his

28 ee

previous history, he then was of the opinion that the de-
fendant was in contact with his environment and that he
was sane. It was stipulated at the time that the statement
made by defendant at the police station was made within
one and a half hours after the shooting, and it was further
stipulated that officers Meeker, Scarlet, Christy and Cole
were present at the time and, from their observations of
defendant’s general demeanor, it was their opinion that
defendant was sane.

At the time of trial it appeared that the defendant had
not only recovered mentally but had recovered from the
Raynaud’s disease condition and drug addiction.

Various assignments of error are now urged in this
court by the defendant in respect to the trial court’s giving
of certain instructions pertaining to the defense of insanity.
We have carefully examined each of such instructions and
are unable to find any prejudicial error. We are satisfied
that the jury was fully and properly instructed by the court.
In addition, we doubt the propriety of the defendant’s right
to object in this court in respect to those instructions for
the reason that the motion for new trial filed in the lower
court assigned only one ground: “That the court erred
in the giving of instructions to the jury, defining man-
slaughter, giving the penalty in the event that the jury
found the defendant guilty of manslaughter and including
in the form of verdict in said cause, a form wherein the
jury might find the defendant guilty of manslaughter,
when the only crime the evidence tended to show that the
defendant could have committed in said cause, was murder.”

This court, therefore, is now concerned only as to
whether, under the evidence in the record in this case, the
trial court was warranted in giving instructions pertaining
to manslaughter. It is the general rule that where the evi-
dence admits.of but one of two conclusions, either that the
accused is guilty of murder, or is innocent, the giving of
instructions and form of verdict as to manslaughter is

29

error when given at the request of the People, and requires
reversal if the jury finds the accused guilty of manslaughter.
It is also the rule in homicide cases that if there is evidence
in the record which, if believed by the jury, would reduce
the crime to manslaughter, an instruction defining that
crime should be given. People v. Jones, 384 Ill. 407.

In the case of People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, at 519,
this court declared, “From an examination of the authori-
ties in this and other States we are of the opinion that the
true rule is, that where intoxication is so extreme as to
suspend entirely the power of reason and the accused is
incapable of any mental action he cannot be convicted of
any crime which involves intent or malice, but that he can
be’ convicted for committing, while in such state of in-
toxication, a crime which consists only of the doing of acts
which are prohibited by law and in which intent, delibera-
tion or malice is not an element.” In the case at bar it
appears from the record that defendant procured and con-
sumed drugs voluntarily far in excess of those prescribed,
and we are of the opinion that voluntary intoxication and
voluntary drug addiction as shown in this case are similar
conditions. In most cases, as in People v. Minzer, 358 Ill.
345, the defendant usually attempts to urge in this court
that the killing is manslaughter rather than murder by rea-
son of the mental condition due to intoxication.

In the case of People v. Tanthorey, 404 Il. 520, at 531,
we declared, “The evidence, in respect to his being intoxi-
cated, must show it was so great as to entirely suspend
his power of reasoning before a manslaughter instruction
would be warranted.” It clearly appears under the evidence
and the verdict returned in this case that the jury believed
defendant’s condition to come within the foregoing rule.
We fully believe that the evidence in this case warranted its
conclusion. In the case of People v. Griswold, 405 Ill. 533,
the defendant contended that the giving of instructions
pertaining to manslaughter was error. We there held that

30 Le Le |
manslaughter instructions were warranted by the evidence
and stated that the jury may well have deemed the evidence
established beyond all doubt that the defendant killed while
in the heat of a sudden passion he could not control, and
which was devoid of malice that is a necessary element of
the crime of murder. Where the evidence in a case is con-
flicting and the outcome depends upon the evaluation of
the credibility of the witnesses, this court will regard the
verdict of the jury as conclusive, especially when approved
by the trial judge, and we will not interfere unless some
fact or circumstance appears in the evidence from which
we can say that some witnesses have been truthful and
worthy of credit, while others have been untruthful or
mistaken. (People v. Colvin, 294 Ill. 196.) The jury and
trial judge observed the witnesses and heard them testify
and were in a far superior position to judge the credibility
of the witnesses and the facts in this case than a court of
review. We cannot say that the jury and trial judge were
not justified in returning a manslaughter conviction in this
case, in light of the conflicting expert medical testimony
and in view of the fact that defendant stated that he killed
his wife upon her telling him that she was going to leave
him and would not return. The fact that defendant at the
time of trial testified he intended to kill his wife is not
conclusive but merely another item of evidence for the
jury’s consideration. Nor is the defendant’s contention,
that this statement was not made by his wife but was a
delusion on his part, in any manner conclusive.

In the case of People v. Tilley, 411 Ill. 473, we held
that the offense of involuntary manslaughter includes the
killing of a human being without any intent to do so, in
the commission of an unlawful act. Even though in the
Tilley case there was a stipulation to the effect that if it
were proved defendant performed an abortion, then he
agreed that the abortion was not necessary to save the life

— es 81

of the deceased and no proof of criminal intent should be
necessary, we held that the waiver or agreement entered
into in the trial court does not eliminate any of the ele-
ments of the offense charged in that case. We further held
in the Tilley case that while the statute contemplates that
persons performing such acts (unlawful abortion causing
death of mother) shall be guilty of murder when death
results, it does not remove the offense from the definition
of manslaughter. Defendant cannot complain that the jury
convicted him of the lesser offense of manslaughter.

It is doubtful if defendant is in good standing in this
court for the purpose of assigning and urging any error.
Rule 38 of this court requires that the abstract filed in this
court must be sufficient to present fully every error relied
upon. Two lines on page 4 of the abstract state, “Motion
for new trial filed March 27, 1952. Motion for new trial
denied.”” We are unable to find any other reference in the
abstract to the motion for new trial. ‘The substance of the
record should be abstracted so that it is not necessary to
resort to the record to determine the issues presented. The
court will not search the record to supply deficiencies in
the abstract. Everything necessary to decide the questions
raised on the appeal must appear in the abstract. Where
the substance of the motion for a new trial is not shown
in the abstract, this court should not consider the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict. The abstract of the
record is the pleading of the party seeking to have such
record reviewed upon appeal or by writ of error, and the
error relied upon to effect a reversal of the judgment should
be made to appear by the abstract. People v. Mattei, 381
UL 21, 24, 25.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court of Vermilion County is affirmed.

7 Judgment affirmed,

No, 32557
THE Pxopie ex rel, Vivian Montgomery e¢ al., Appellants,
vs. Eucenr P. Lrerman, County Judge, Appellee.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

EE:

Donatp D. RicHMonp, of Champaign, and W. Lex
Summers, of Urbana, for appellants.

Joun J. BressEx, State’s Attorney, W. C. Nort, Gene
D. Weisicrr, Joun H. Fuvrrocx, and Oris Barts, all
of Urbana, (Henry I. Green, Caancy L. Fuvrroc,
WINKELMANN & WINKELMANN, J. M. Mrrcuem, W. A.
Nicwors, GLEN E. Caapman, Onin L. Browper, and
Roy R. Crine, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr, Justicy Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the circuit
court of Champaign County denying appellants’ petition
for a writ of mandamus directed to the county judge of
that county, commanding him to call an election in the
cities of Champaign and Urbana to vote on the proposition
of merging those two cities. The validity of article 6 of
the Revised Cities and Villages Act relating to the union
of contiguous municipalities (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 24,
par. 6-1 e¢ seq.) being in issue, the appeal is taken directly
to this court.

On December 27, 1951, there was presented to appellee,
Eugene P. Lierman, county judge of Champaign County,
a petition, signed by more than 250 electors of the city of
Champaign and by more than 250 electors of the city of
Urbana, both of said cities being located in the county of
Champaign, requesting him to call a special election pur-
suant to chapter 24 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. The
question to be submitted to the voters of said cities at the
proposed election was: “Shall the City of Urbana and
the City of Champaign be united into a single municipality

under the name of Champaign-Urbana, with the Alder-
zz

SS

manic form of municipal government?” Appellee set the
petition for hearing. Objections to the petition were filed
by the city attorney of Urbana and others. Hearing was
had and the matter taken under advisement. Thereafter
appellee issued a written decision refusing to call the elec-
tion because of his opinion that article 6 of the Revised
Cities and Villages Act was unconstitutional.

On March 18, 1952, appellants filed in the circuit court
of Champaign County a verified petition for a writ of
mandamus, directed to appellee, as county judge of said
county, commanding him without delay to call a special
election as requested in said petition, and to submit to the
electors of the cities of Champaign and Urbana the ques-
tion of uniting these two cities into one municipality. Ap-
pellee filed an unverified answer signed by himself and
fifteen attorneys. Attached to the answer, as “Exhibit A,”
was a copy of the opinion which he rendered as county
judge, declaring that sections 1, 6, 7, 9, 22, 25, and 27 of
article 6 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act are prob-
ably unconstitutional. He filed another unverified answer,
signed by himself and by the State’s Attorney of Cham-
paign County, in which he said the appellants were not
entitled to the writ of mandamus or to any other relief.
Appellants moved to strike these answers because they were
not verified. Thereupon appellee filed a countermotion re-
questing that verification of his answers be excused. Ap-
pellants then filed their reply. Upon a hearing before the
court without a jury, the petition for writ of mandamus
was denied.

The reasons given by the trial judge for his decision
were (1) that the cities of Champaign and Urbana are not
contiguous, within the meaning of the law, and (2) that
the act is vague, indefinite and uncertain, and therefore
unconstitutional. Among the points upon which the court
based its determination of unconstitutionality, and/or which
are urged by appellee on review are (1) that the act is

Ss

indefinite and uncertain in meaning and application; (2)
there is no provision for the creation of wards in the
united cities; (3) the act fails to provide for a primary
election; (4) the taxing powers of the community would
be disrupted by the merger; (5) the act attempts to amend
various other statutes and acts of the legislature; and
(6) it provides for unlawful classification.

The contention that the two cities are not contiguous
seems to be based upon our decision in the case of Village
of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, 255 Ill. 190. ‘The map
introduced in evidence shows that the cities of Champaign
and Urbana are divided by a line running due north and
south. The boundaries are contiguous throughout except
near the south end, where, at the north boundary line of
Mt. Hope Cemetery, the Urbana corporation line turns east
and the Champaign corporation line turns west. The Ur-
bana corporation line follows the north boundary line of
Mt. Hope Cemetery and the east boundary line thereof to
the southeast corner of the cemetery. The corporation line
then turns west, and runs along the south boundary line
of the cemetery to a point directly south of where it turned
east on the north boundary line of the cemetery. The
Champaign corporation line comes around the cemetery the
other way, and the corporation lines meet again on the south
boundary line of the cemetery, and from that point the
common boundary line between the two cities extends south
to the south boundary line of those cities, where the Cham-
paign boundary line extends west and the Urbana boundary
line extends east. Within the area enclosed with Mt. Hope
Cemetery and at the westerly end thereof is another ceme-
tery, called Roselawn Cemetery, and immediately north of
Roselawn Cemetery, and within the enclosed area, are some
horse barns belonging to University of Illinois, the grounds
of which are immediately adjacent on the north. The record
does not show the reason for excluding this small tract of
land, which is about 870 feet from north to south and

6 ee

about 2200 feet from east to west, but the situation is not
comparable to what it was in the Morgan Park case. In
that case the annexation enclosed some 200 acres of un-
incorporated land called “no man’s land.” The annexation
was denied because, the court states, “A city could not be
organized as the city of Chicago would be with the village
of Morgan Park annexed to it, having unorganized or un-
incorporated territory within its boundaries and entirely
surrounded by it.” There the boundary lines of the village
and the city were not the same for a distance of one and
three-quarters miles. The court further stated that a city
could not be organized that way and it was not intended by
the General Assembly that the same result should be accom-
plished by a change of boundaries, constituting to that
extent an amendment of its charter. Here only about 4o
acres are enclosed by the boundaries of the two cities which
are not common for only a distance of about 870 feet. It
cannot be said that the cities of Champaign and Urbana
are not contiguous because each city looped its boundary
lines in an opposite direction around this cemetery tract,
where nobody lives, or is likely to live, and no enterprise
is carried on, and the small tract occupied by horse barns
belongs to the University of Illinois, where their boun-
daries are contiguous throughout the remainder of their
length, both north and south of this small tract. In giving
effect to the word “contiguous” no strained, strict or un-
usual definition should be applied, but practical and common
sense should prevail by adopting the sense best harmonizing
with the context and promoting the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature in the light of the general pur-
poses of the act. (People ex rel, Singer v. Illinois Central
Railroad Co. 373 Ul. 523.) The court’s holding that the
cities of Champaign and Urbana are not contiguous is obvi-
ously a strained, unnatural construction, wholly out of har-
mony with the facts as they exist in this situation. Error
is manifest in such determination,

Ss

Appellants further contend that the merger provisions
of the act are unconstitutional. The cities of Champaign
and Urbana are creatures of the legislature with no vested
rights as such. Legislation enabling the electors of those
cities to unite or to change their boundaries is not per se
unconstitutional. In holding valid the annexation of the
city of Lake View to the city of Chicago we said, “Our
constitution contains no restriction as to the organization
of cities, towns and villages, or the changing and amending
or repeal of their charters, and, consequently, no restriction
in respect to uniting or dividing cities, towns and villages,
or annulling their charters, save only that it cannot be by
local or special law, but must be by a general law; and
it is familiar law that, in the absence of constitutional re-
striction, the legislature may provide for the organizing,
uniting, dividing or annulling such corporations, in such
manner as it shall deem best to promote the public welfare.”
True v. Davis, 133 Ill. 522.

Much is said by respondent about the merger provisions
of the act being incomplete, vague and uncertain, but we
do not think these objections are well founded. Article 6
of the Revised Cities and Villages Act is entitled “Union of
Contiguous Municipalities.” Section 6-1 provides that any
two or more incorporated contiguous municipalities situated

- in a single county may be united into one incorporated city
by a compliance with sections 7-13 and 7-14, save that the
petition shall be signed by electors of each of the municipali-
ties, shall state the name by which the united municipality
is to be known, and shall state the form of municipal gov-
ernment under which it is to operate. Paragraph (2) of
section 6-1 gives the form of the ballot, and the form of
the ballot set forth in the petition filed in the county court
of Champaign County in the instant case complies with
the statutory form. Section 7-13 provides that the petition
shall be presented to the county judge, that the county
judge shall thereupon submit the question to the electors

ee

of both municipalities, either at a regular municipal elec-
tion or at a special election to be held not less than 90 nor
more than 180 days subsequent to the filing of the petition.
Section 7-14 provides that the county clerk shall give
notice of the election and states the kind of notice that
shall be given. Section 6-2 provides that a certified copy
of the canvass of the votes of the election, made by the
proper officers, shall be submitted to the clerk of each
municipality and to the county clerk, and that each clerk
shall transcribe the certified copy on his official record. It
also provides that if the vote is in favor of the union the
mayor or president of the board of each municipality shall
immediately issue a proclamation declaring the existence
of the union. The union is then created, and each former
city is known as a borough. Sections 6-3 to 6-27, both in-
clusive, provide the manner in which the united city shall
be governed during its transitory stage. Section 6-6 makes
the city election law applicable to municipalities which have
united under this article and provides that within ten days
after compliance with section 6-1 the county court shall
create a board of election commissioners as provided in
the City Election Law, and that this board shall perform
all duties necessary for holding the first and subsequent
elections in the united city and in each borough thereof.
Section 6-7 provides the method of calling the first election
of officers in the united city and the time when it shall be
held. Section 6-8 provides when the terms of office of the
elected officers shall begin and end. Section 6-9 provides
that the united city shall assume and pay all the debts and
liabilities of each borough.

Other sections of that article provide that the creation
of a united city shall not adversely affect the collection or
enforcement of any tax or special assessment levied or
assessed in any municipality that has become a borough of
a united city; that proceedings to collect and enforce such
taxes and special assessments may be instituted and carried

ee EE
on in the name of the municipality; and that taxes and
special assessments when collected shall be paid over to the
treasurer of the united city and shall be used for the pur-
pose for which they were levied or assessed.

Section 6-14 provides that police magistrates and jus-
tices of the peace shall continue in office until their terms
expire or until they cease to function, and that at the ex-
piration of their terms they shall turn over all official
dockets, books and papers to the officer specified by law.
Policemen and firemen of both cities become policemen and
firemen of the united city, (sec. 6-15,) and all ordinances
and regulations pertaining to alcoholic liquors which were
in effect in either city continue in effect in the united city.
(sec. 6-16.) Section 6-25 provides that the valid ordi-
nances of the former cities shall remain valid within the
united city until repealed, either expressly or impliedly, and
that the school system in the united city shall not be affected
by the merger.

Section 6-19 provides that a united city selecting the
aldermanic form of government shall be governed, after
the first election held in compliance with section 6-7, by
a council composed of a mayor and a board of aldermen
selected by the electors of the united city as provided in
the Revised Cities and Villages Act relating to the election
of city officers, except that all elections in a united city
are controlled by the City Election Law, as provided in
section 6-6. The legislature contemplated that every pro-
vision of the entire Revised Cities and Villages Act should
be in effect in all cities organized under or adopting the
general act for the organization of cities and villages, inso-
far as the same are applicable. Section 9-28 provides the
number of aldermen that shall be elected in a united city
under the aldermanic form of government, and section 9-29
provides for the division of the city into wards. According
to the record in this case Champaign has a population of
about 39,000 and Urbana has a population of about 22,000,

0

making a total population of about 61,000. Section 9-26
provides for 14 aldermen for cities exceeding 10,000 but
not exceeding 30,000 population, and provides for two addi-
tional aldermen for every 20,000 inhabitants over 30,000.
Assuming that these figures are correct, the united city
would be entitled to 16 aldermen, and since this section
provides that two aldermen shall be elected in each ward,
the united city would be divided into 8 wards, as provided
in section 9-29.

It is objected that while section 6-2 of the act provides
that the united municipality shall be governed by sections
6-3 to 6-27, inclusive, there is no provision that the city
shall also be governed by the act concerning municipal offi-
cers tinder the aldermanic form. It is not necessary that
the act contain such a provision. Immediately upon the
cities being merged, the united city is just like any other
city operating under the provisions of the general cities
and villages act and is bound by all the provisions thereof,
besides being bound by the special requirements during the
period of transition. It is objected that section 6-7 fails
to define what is meant by the word “corporate authorities.”
Obviously, the “corporate authorities” in Champaign are
the mayor and four commissioners, and in Urbana the
mayor and the members of the city council. It is objected
that the section fails to designate which clerk shall certify
the ordinance for the first election of officers. That section
provides that the presiding officer of the oldest of the
boroughs shall call the meeting and preside over it and
that the clerk shall certify the ordinance adopted at that
meeting. It further provides that if the ordinance is prop-
erly adopted and executed by the corporate authorities of
one of the boroughs, the election shall be valid even if
the corporate authorities of the other boroughs fail to act.
This provision obviates that objection. It is objected that
the act fails to provide for the transfer of accounts by the
board of trustees of the Municipal Retirement Fund, fails

Se

to provide for the time or manner of consolidation of the
libraries of the two cities, fails to provide what disposition
is to be made of contracts and franchises in force. Many
other objections are made that are more fanciful than real.

All funds and records would be transferred to the proper
authorities of the united city. The libraries would belong -
to the united city and the corporate authorities of the united
city would determine by ordinance whether they would be
consolidated or operated separately. The ordinance could
also provide how the two library boards would be merged
or reorganized, or abolished and a new library board created,
as they saw fit. Policemen and firemen who were entitled
to a pension in one of the boroughs would have the same
right as a member of the police or fire department of the
united city. When the statute provides that all obligations
of the cities are assumed by the united city and that all the
assets of the former cities become the assets of the united
city there can be no uncertainty as to what disposition is
to be made of contracts and franchises in force.

Objection is made that section 6-6 automatically makes
the city election law applicable to merged cities, whereas
other cities have a right of referendum as to whether they
shall adopt the act. The legislature has the right to make
the city election law applicable to all cities, or it may
make it applicable to cities in a certain population class,
or it may make it applicable to cities operating under a
certain form of government. The legislature therefore was
acting properly within its function in making the city
election law atitomatically applicable to merged cities as
a class. It is urged that the act fails to provide for a pri-
mary election. This is not necessary. -After the separate
cities have become a united city all election laws and pri-
mary election laws that are applicable to cities under the
same form of government are applicable to the united city.
It is not necessary in all cases to nominate candidates by
primary elections, and where the act is silent as to the

es

method by which candidates are to be nominated at the
first election of the united city, resort may be had to the
other methods used in similar situations as may be deter-
mined by ordinance. (People ex rel. Hoyne v. Sweitzer,
266 Ill. 459.) Section 6-19 especially provides that when-

* ever a united city is formed and the decision is in favor
of an aldermanic form of municipal government, the united
city shall be governed, after the first election held in com-
pliance with section 6-7, by a council composed of a mayor
and a board of aldermen selected by the electors of the
united city as provided by the provisions of this act relating
to the election of city officers, except that all elections in
a united city are controlled by the city election law as
provided in section 6-6. The legislative intention is prop-
erly disclosed by the language of the act when viewed as a
whole, and the fact that the section does not specify in
detail the method of effecting consolidation does not in-
validate the proceeding, but merely leaves other details to
be governed by other sections of the act. (City of Nameoki
v. City of Granite City, 408 Ill. 33.) It is impracticable
for a statute to specify every detail of its administration,
It is sufficient if the statute contains the general principles
to be followed and leaves the details of the ministerial acts
in the hands of those who are charged with the duty of
administering the act. People ex rel. Armstrong v. Huggins,
407 Ill. 157.

We hold that the merger provisions of the Revised
Cities and Villages Act are valid and constitutional, that
they are not vague and uncertain in meaning or impossible
of application, nor do the merger provisions of the act
attempt to amend any other statute or act of the legislature
nor create any unlawful classification of employees. The
circuit court erred in declaring the act unconstitutional for
the reasons here assigned.

In his statement of the case and his assignment of errors,
points and authorities, appellee raises one other question of

ee EE
import. He maintains that no proof appears in the record
that the petitions filed with him as county judge to call the
election were signed by 250 legal voters of both cities, or
of either of them. He urges that the affidavits filed there-
with were insufficient proof of this necessary fact. Appellee
failed to argue this point in his brief. Failure to argue
points assigned as error is deemed a waiver and the points
will not be considered on appeal. Greer v. Carter Oil Co.
373 Ill. 168; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill. 204.

The circuit court of Champaign County erred in denying
the petition for writ of mandamus filed by appellants. ‘The
judgment of that court is, therefore, reversed and the cause
is remanded thereto with directions to award the writ as
prayed.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

P|
Oo. 3252 ET

Tue PEOPLE oF THE State oF InLinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs, ALBERT L. Haron, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

Roy P. Hur, of Peoria, for plaintiff in error.

Ivan A. Exziort, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Micuazt, A. SHorE, State’s Attorney, of Peoria, (RICHARD
E. Caprrenni, Davin C. McCarry, and Harry L. Pars,
of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Cuter Justice Crampton delivered the opinion of
the court:

The plaintiff in error, Albert L. Heaton, and William C.
Davis were indicted by a Peoria County grand jury upon
a charge of larceny of an automobile. Davis obtained a
separate trial, A jury found plaintiff in error guilty, and
the trial court, after overruling motions for a new trial
and in arrest of judgment, sentenced him to the Illinois
State Penitentiary for a term of not less than three years
and not more than five years. Heaton brings this writ of
error. The only issue to be decided in this court is whether
the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the plaintiff in error, a seventeen-year-
old boy, is guilty of larceny of an automobile.

Upon the trial the evidence disclosed that Marion L.
Barnes parked his 1936 Ford sedan, valued at $150, in
front of 718 Bigelow Street, Peoria, on the evening of July
29, 1950. Sometime after 10:30 P.M., Barnes heard and
saw the car being driven away toward McClure Avenue.
He immediately notified the police department, and the
defendant was apprehended within a matter of minutes
after driving several blocks only.

The facts further disclosed that on the afternoon of
July 29, 1950, the plaintiff in error, then seventeen years

re 45

of age, and William Davis, about the same age, had been
playing ball. After the game they went to their respective
homes, and then again met and went to a neighborhood
theater. After the show they walked along Bigelow Street
and both boys looked into cars to see if the ignition keys
had been left in one of those parked along the curb. They
found the Barnes car with the keys in the switch; plaintiff
in error got in the driver’s seat and Davis got in beside
him. They drove the car approximately seven minutes. At
the sound of a police siren, plaintiff in error immediately
pulled over to the curb and stopped the car. Before the
officers got to the car, plaintiff in error told Davis to let
him do the talking. The police officers approached the car,
pointed a pistol at plaintiff in error, and told him that the
car had been stolen. On the trial plaintiff in error testified
he was scared, that he replied to the officers that he did
not know that the car had been stolen, and that it had been
given to them by someone else.

Davis was a witness for the prosecution and testified
on cross-examination as follows: “In July, 1950, I was
eighteen years old and Albert Heaton was seventeen, I
believe. I had no hopes of getting anything in consideration
for my testimony. We did not intend to sell this automo-
bile; we did not intend to change the serial numbers on it;
we did not intend to repaint it or in any other way obliterate
its identity; we did not intend to leave the State of Illinois
in the car. We intended to just ride downtown and then
were going to leave it on the streets.”

Plaintiff in error contends that this statement of inten-
tion should exonerate the plaintiff in error because it shows
a lack of intention to deprive the owner permanently of his
property and cites a number of authorities from other States
to sustain his position. With this we do not agree under
the facts and circumstances of this case. This statement is
in effect self-serving, and is testified to by an accomplice
to the act complained of. Unfortunately, that which is

46 ee
contained within the confines of a man’s mind cannot always
be accurately ascertained, but true intention can be arrived
at as nearly as possible by an examination of the facts and
circumstances and from them draw a parallel measured by
the standards of reasonable men. We held in People v.
Baker, 365 Ill, 328, that intention may be proved by deduc-
tion from acts committed and from circumstances in evi-
dence. It was, therefore, as laid down in People v. Pastel,
306 Ill. 565, a question of fact for the jury whether the
automobile was taken with a felonious intent to steal, and
whether there was an intention on the part of the plaintiff
in error to return the automobile. If it appears that the
taker kept the goods as his own until his apprehension,
such fact has a material bearing upon that intention. There
is no fact or circumstance indicating an intention upon the
part of the plaintiff in error to return the auto to its true
owner, except the fact that he was promptly apprehended.
Under such circumstances he could make no effort to con-
ceal the car. He was apprehended promptly because the
true owner happened to see him driving the car away, and,
because of the fact that he only drove the car a short dis-
tance, he asks us to overrule the finding of the jury on
the ground that he intended to return the property to its
owner or at least that he merely intended to drive the car -
- without the owner’s consent.

‘The record shows the plaintiff in error made inconsistent
statements at two different times, once when he was appre-
hended and again at the trial when the same inconsistency
was repeated. When asked where he obtained the car, he
answered that it had been given to him by “Roy,” yet he
admitted that “Roy” did not give him the car when he was
asked the same question by his own counsel in the presence
of the jury, all of which tends to discredit the witness and
shed doubt upon his veracity. By his own testimony the
plaintiff in error admitted walking along the streets look-
ing into cars to see if the ignition keys had been left in

es 1

one of those parked along the curb. We held, in People v.
Carter, 410 Ill, 462, that this court will not disturb a verdict
of guilty on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient
to convict, unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to
the verdict, or so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfac-
tory as to justify the court in entertaining a reasonable
doubt of the plaintiff in error’s guilt.

In view of the state of the evidence and the observa-
tions here made, the judgment of the circuit court of

Peoria County is affirmed. Judgment affirmed,

PF
No. 525:

Tux Prope of THE State oF I11aNors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Paur J. Guenn e¢ al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

Eucene W. Woop, and AntHony B, Brasyzy, both of
Chicago, (Grtorce N. LxicHon, of counsel,) for plaintiffs
in error.

Ivan A. Exziorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun §. Boyiz, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Joun T.
GaLLAGHER, Rupoipx L. Jangca, Artuur F. Mannine,
WiiiaMm J. McGau, Jr., and Joszrs J. Arrwex1, Jr, all
of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justicy Bristow delivered the opinion of the
court: .

Defendants Paul J. Glenn and Harvey C. Summers,
on writ of error, seek a review of a judgment of the crim-
inal court of Cook County, entered in a trial without a
jury, finding defendants guilty of violating the confidence
game statute, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 256,)
whereupon each received a sentence of two to seven years
in the Illinois penitentiary.

‘The essential inquiry presented is whether the evidence
established that defendants were guilty of the crime of
operating a confidence game in violation of the statute.
Other specific issues interposed by defendants include the

es 49

assertion that the trial court erred in admitting proof of
other transactions; that the People did not prove that both
defendants participated in the offense; that the length of
time over which the trial extended amounted to a denial
of a fair trial; that the court failed to consider evidence
of defendants’ good reputation; and that the prosecutor
denied defendants a fair trial by referring to other indict-
ments pending against them,

The record is voluminous, and it would unreasonably
prolong this opinion to attempt even to summarize the tes-
timony of all the witnesses. Therefore, we shall confine
our analysis to reviewing the evidence pertaining to the
Dotson transaction, which was the basis for the indictment,
and shall allude summarily to the transactions with other
persons both prior to and following the Dotson case, inso-
far as they directly affect the charge against defendants.

During the early part of July, 1950, Lonnie Dotson
and his wife noted in the Chicago Defender, a Chicago
newspaper, a quarter page advertisement in bold type pre-
sented by the First Apartments Corporation, urging persons
who wished to live decently and get out of single rooms
into four-room apartments with modern conveniences and
reasonable rentals of about $50 a month to telephone a
designated number, or secure an application at their offices
at 6455 Cottage Grove Avenue. Included in the advertise-
ment were pictures of the exterior and interior of an attrac-
tive apartment building.

The Dotsons telephoned the number listed and shortly
thereafter received an application blank headed Apartment
Owners Inc., soliciting information regarding their finan-
cial status and apartment requirements, which they mailed
to the office on Cottage Grove Avenue. They received a
‘notice to appear at the office several days later, and were
directed to defendant Glenn, who had their application
before him. He proceeded to show the Dotsons pictiires,
of buildings, and, when Dotson said that he liked one,

| |

50 |

Glenn stated, “This is one of our buildings.” He explained
that it was located at 947 Hyde Park Blvd., and that it
would cost the Dotsons $500 to get an apartment in that
building, from which sum two months rent, at $75 a
month, would be deducted, and the balance repaid within
twelve months with 3% interest. Glenn further explained
that if he did not get the apartment for the Dotsons within
go days he would return their money with 3% interest.
At Glenn’s suggestion the Dotsons met him that same
afternoon at the Hyde Park building, and while he was
showing them an apartment purportedly similar to one he
could obtain for them in ninety days, he remarked, “Mr.
Dotson, you know that I would not have a key to this
building if I did not own it.” The building, however, was
owned by Mrs. Sarah Russo and her husband. They had
no agreement with defendants to sell it, and although there
had been some discussion of a sale several months before,
the Russos had rejected defendants’ offer and returned de-
fendant Glenn’s worthless check. However, in April 1950,
Glenn gave Mrs, Russo another check for $300 just to
keep apartments vacant. When that’ check was returned
for insufficient funds defendant Summers paid the obliga-
tion, and pursuant to their arrangement Mrs. Russo kept
apartments in that building vacant from March until some
time in September, and gave Glenn keys to three or four
apartments, even though he neither had an interest in the
building, nor the right to rent these apartments.
Defendants, without alluding to these arrangements ex-
isting at the time the apartment was shown to the Dotsons,
endeavored to explain the lack of ownership on the ground
that some broker would not get them a mortgage, and Mrs.
Russo subsequently refused to sell the building because
prejudice developed after a woman was attacked there.
Dotson gave Glenn a cashier’s check for $400 dated
July 21, 1952, payable to the First Apartments Corpora-

51

tion. Glenn indorsed it, and he and Summers gave it to
Lester Antler in payment for keeping apartments vacant
for them at 812-822 E. 46th Street. Thus the Dotsons’
check was utilized by both defendants in their joint ven-
ture in that building.

The Dotsons were given a contract and corporate note
signed by Glenn as vice-president of First Apartments Cor-
poration, under which the corporation was obliged to ob-
tain a dwelling satisfactory to the Dotsons within ninety
days and to return $500 within seven days after receipt
of written notice of termination of the contract. The words
“Paid, $400. 7-22-50. Balance due before occupancy” were
written on the contract. A corporate seal was affixed to
the contract which Dotson testified made him feel assured
of getting his money back. At the time these instruments
were executed, however, two of the bank accounts used
by defendants for the corporations were overdrawn, and
a third which had a balance of $85.51 was overdrawn im-
mediately thereafter. Moreover, the First Apartments Cor-
poration, according to their own admissions, owed more
than $52,000 from similar transactions with some 150
people, who had paid money to defendants in return for
corporate notes and promises of apartments.

On September 9, 1950, Dotson gave Glenn $100 in
cash which was noted upon the contract. In response to
Dotson’s query of how soon he would get an apartment,
Glenn assured him that it would be within the next few
days, and stated, “We are doing some work over there,
and we have to get somebody in the place because we are
getting too many vacants, and we are paying out money
and nothing coming in.” According to Dotson’s testimony,
the reference to “we” reassured him that Glenn or the cor-
poration owned the building and that he would get an apart-
ment shortly. This belief was further enhanced by the fact
that the building was in fact being sandblasted, but by the

52 ee
actual owners, the Russos. Notwithstanding the facts,
Mrs, Summers and others employed in the office told people
that they were having the building sandblasted.

The Dotsons waited until just before Christmas, 190,
and then telephoned Glenn and informed him that they
had to move by the first of the year. He reassured them
that he would have something for them in a few days, but
explained he could not place them in the Hyde Park build-
ing, but would place them in a building on 46th Street,
and move them to the Hyde Park building later. Nothing
further was done pursuant to that plan.

During the early part of January, 1951, Mrs. Dotson
made numerous telephone calls to Glenn, and went to his
office about five times, asking for a refund of the $500.
Glenn stated that he had no money, and insisted that she
give him a seven-day written notice, which she did on Jan-
wary 22, 1951. At the expiration of the seven days, when
Dotson demanded his money back, Glenn claimed that he
had none. In response to Dotson’s inquiry about the place
on 46th Street, Glenn said that he had turned it over to
Summers and did not know whether it was available. Sum-
mers was in the office at the time and explained that he
was not sure about that apartment because the man’s wife
was ill, but if it was available, another $300 would have
to be paid.

The Dotsons heard nothing further from Glenn or
Summers with reference to any apartment, and no part
of their $500 was ever returned.

Notwithstanding the lack of funds, the defendants paid
to the Chicago Defender some $3,936.73 for continuous
advertising similar to that which attracted the Dotsons to
their offices. Summers handled all of the advertising and
hired all the people who worked for the corporation. He
had the title of president of the First Apartments Corpo-
ration, which he incorporated in 1946, and he incorporated
Apartments Owners Inc., in February, 1930. He and Glenn

es 58

were the sole managers of the corporations and jointly
held complete control of the corporate affairs.

Evidence was further adduced that although defend-
ants promised to secure apartments in the Hyde Park build-
ing and in some five other buildings for numerous persons
who gave defendants large sums of money, neither de-
fendants nor their corporations owned any of those par-
ticular buildings, nor even had an interest in them, nor
were a party to any contract which had any of those build-
ings as’ the subject matter. At the time the Dotson con-
tract was executed, defendants had lost whatever interest
they had in other buildings purchased from funds given
them by persons who sought apartments, and were merely
paying owners to keep apartments vacant for them to show.
They had no source of income from any property; in fact,
they did not even own the furniture in their attractive
offices on Cottage Grove Avenue.

From the testimony of some fifteen witnesses, exten-
sive evidence was submitted of transactions following the
same pattern as the Dotson case: Applicants coming to
the office pursuant to the ad in the Chicago Defender; de-
fendants showing them vacant apartments in buildings in
which they had no interest or right to rent, but neverthe-
less creating the impression of ownership either by direct
statement to that effect or by unmistakable inferences;
promises for an apartment in return for the payment of
certain sums of money, with the proviso that the money
would be refunded if no apartments were procured; the
delivery of money to defendants by the applicants in re-
liance upon defendants’ representations; the formal exe-
cution of corporate notes and contracts; the prolonged
stalling and eventual loss of money without the delivery of
any apartments.

In one instance Summers secured a second $300 from
an applicant by going to his place of business and telling
him that an apartment was available in a building different

54 |

from the one in which the applicant had been promised an
apartment, but that it was necessary to have an additional
$300 to repay the “man ahead of him.” The applicant
made a second payment, but received neither the apart-
ment, nor the return of any part of the $600 he paid to
Summers.

The People adduced evidence that Summers admitted
that applicants putting up less than $1000 did not even
have a chance at an apartment, and also stated, that he
put $38,000 into a building which had never even been for
sale,

Defendants continued their transactions even after crim-
inal proceedings had been commenced against them. In
January, 1951, defendant Summers sent many of the cor-
porate-note holders a letter stating that defendants had the
same interest in the various buildings which they always
had, and that, “the recent and present program of refinan-
cing will tie our equities in such a way that the buildings
cannot be lost except through outside interference.” The
letter further requested the recipient not to make a com-
plaint to the State’s Attorney’s office, but to waive their
right to sue on the note.

Even while the trial was in progress, defendants, through
one of their employees, one J. Pierpont Morgan, whose job
was to smooth relations between applicants and the corpo-
ration, induced an applicant to part with $400 in order to
get an apartment.

In the light of the foregoing evidence the criminal
court of Cook County found defendants guilty of the crime
of violating the confidence game statute as charged in the
indictment.

Here, the defendants contend that they honestly en-
tered into a business agreement with Dotson which they
could not perform because of financial difficulties caused
partly by the State’s Attorney’s investigation of their af-
fairs, and partly by their lack of good business judgment.

es 66

The People, however, advance the theory that defend-
ants fraudulently obtained the confidence of Lonnie Dotson
by false representations and fraudulently induced him to
enter into an agreement which they had no intention of
performing, and then abused that confidence by defraud-
ing him of $500.

‘The essence of the crime of obtaining money by means
of the “confidence game,” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38,
par. 256,) is that trust or confidence, obtained by some
fraudulent scheme or device, is betrayed after money or
property has been obtained from the victim. (People v.
Shepard, 358 Ill, 338; People v. Burley, 357 Il. 584.)
Such a scheme may be a confidence game even though it
takes the form of a lawful business transaction or a valid
contract. People v. Burley, 357 Ill. 584; Chilson v. People,
224 Ill. 535.

In support of their contention that they were engaged
in a legitimate business enterprise in which they were
merely inept, defendants state that they were incorporated,
had offices at 6455 Cottage Grove Avenue, where they were
available for contact, paid large sums of money for ad-
vertising, had interests in several large buildings, and had
collected $135,000 from 479 persons and performed 65
per cent of their accounts. They urge that Lonnie Dotson did
not really rely upon what defendant Glenn told him, but
made some sort of independent investigations and relied
upon the reassuring things other applicants stated about
defendants, and that they could not perform their agreement
with him because Mrs. Russo unexpectedly decided not to
sell the property because of prejudice developing after a
woman was raped in the building.

In evaluating these assertions in the light of all the
evidence, it is patent that the use of a corporate device
would not legitimatize a confidence game, nor would the
mere availability of the participants at a place of business.
The attractive furniture, which did not belong to either

56 |

the defendants or the corporations, was more of a lure to
prospective “home seekers” than an indicia of legitimate
enterprise, since it suggested affluence and prosperity which
neither the defendants nor their corporations enjoyed. On
the day the Dotson contract was executed the corporation
owed, by defendants’ own admission, over $52,000 to some
Ig0 persons, and two of its bank accounts were over-
drawn, with $85 temporarily left in the third account. Not-
withstanding this financial condition, the First Apartments
Corporation continued to sign notes and contracts, and to
incur obligations, and did pay out almost $4000 for ad-
vertising during 1950 to lure more people to their office
where they could be induced to pay money for apartments
which could not be delivered, and which, according to Sum-
mers’ admission in one conversation, the people did not have
a chance to get. The payment of these huge advertising
expenses under these circumstances, instead of reflecting
the legitimacy of defendants’ operations, suggests a fraudu-
lent purpose.

The claim of legitimacy of defendants’ business is fur-
ther rebutted by the overwhelming evidence of defendants’
promises to secure apartments for persons in the Hyde
Park Building, and in other buildings which defendants
neither owned, nor had the right to rent, but merely pre-
tended to own, by showing vacant apartments which they
maintained by paying specified sums to the owners. More-
over, in other instances where defendants had actually
owned an interest in the building, they continued the pre-
tense of ownership even after they lost their interest. In
August, 1949, Summers and Glenn assumed a mortgage
on the property at 6625-27 Drexel, but were immediately
in default on this obligation, and, although they collected
all the rents, before July, 1950, they were in default more
than, $3000 and eventually assigned their interest. Never-
theless, defendants continued thereafter to promise persons

|] 51

apartments in the building, and induced them to part with
their money by showing them Summers’ own apartment.

It is significant that even when defendants did have
apartments available for rental, instead of giving them to
the persons to whom the apartments were promised, de-
fendants merely kept the apartments vacant for months,
as in the case of the building at 812-822 E. 4oth Street,
in which they had an interest for a short time, in order
to impress prospective victims that defendants could pro-
cure apartments. Thus, it is evident that whether defend-
ants could or could not obtain apartments made no dif-
ference, since the victims had no chance either to get the
apartments or the return of their money, despite all the
legal window dressing of contracts under corporate seal
and corporate notes.

Furthermore, there is no suggestion of legitimacy in
defendants’ letter to the holders of their corporate notes
in which the people were asked to waive their claims on
the basis of the legal double talk that defendants still owned
the same interest in buildings that they always had, and that
“the present refinancing program would tie our equities
in such a way that the buildings could not be lost except
through outside interference.” Nor do the activities of de-
fendants’ employee, J. Pierpont Morgan, in procuring $400
from an applicant for an apartment during a court holiday
while defendants were on trial, suggest that defendants
were merely inept businessmen.

The contention that the interference of the State’s
Attorney’s office was responsible for the inability of de-
fendants to perform their agreements is entirely without
foundation in fact, and cannot have been seriously urged.
The evidence of the operations of the Department of Frauds
and Complaints within the State’s Attorney’s office, which
handled this cause, reveals that after numerous complaints
against defendants’ machinations were received during 1949

58 es

the Department urged defendants, in private, to make set-
tlements; and in August, 1950, when there were about
ten to fifteen complaints against defendants, they were
again privately warned not to take money from one person
to pay another. Nevertheless, defendants persisted in their
conduct, and by October, 1950, when there were about
thirty complaints on file, the case was first assigned for
outside investigation. As hereinbefore noted, defendants
had been overdrawn in their accounts and had lost what-
ever interests they had in their buildings, and had failed
to deliver apartments or refunds to their applicants long
before this time.

Defendants argue that the court erred in considering
transactions with persons other than the Dotsons, and cite
People v. Livermore, 390 Ill. 85, in support of their con-
tention. The Livermore case merely holds that evidence of
other transactions may be introduced after testimony im-
plicating the accused in the case on trial is presented. That
was done in the instant case. Moreover, in the Livermore
case the evidence of other transactions involved conduct
of the conspirators more than two years before the offense
charged, whereas in the case at bar the other transactions
were contemporaneous with, or just preceding and follow-
ing, the Dotson case, and consequently tended to reveal
defendants’ intention in the Dotson transaction, as well as
their scheme of operations.

With reference to the Dotson transaction defendants
contend, first, that they made no representations of owner-
ship of the building on Hyde Park Boulevard to Dotson.
This assertion is not only contradicted by the statements
of Dotson and his wife, but by the reasonable inferences
from defendant Glenn’s conduct. At his first meeting with
Dotson, Glenn showed pictures of various buildings where
they allegedly had apartments and said, “This is one of
our buildings,” thereby suggesting ownership. When he
took Dotson and his wife to the vacant apartment in the

eS 59

building Glenn further stated, “Mr. Dotson, you know that
I would not have a key to this building if I did not own it.”
Moreover, even if he had said nothing, the fact that he
had access to the apartment and could take the Dotsons
there, coupled with his statement, which he admittedly
made, that he could procure another apartment just like
that one within ninety days, clearly implied control of
the building by defendant or the corporation. If that were
not sufficient, Glenn’s further statement in September, when
Dotson came to pay the $100 balance, that “we are doing
some work over there,” enhanced the impression of owner-
ship of the building, particularly since it was made at a
time when the rightful owners were in fact sandblasting
the building.

Defendants’ assertion that Dotson did not rely upon
what Glenn told him, but upon the remarks of other appli-
cants in the office, is also completely unsubstantiated by
the evidence. It was only Glenn who told Dotson that they
owned the Hyde Park Building; it was only Glenn who
stated that if Dotson put up the money he would get an
apartment in the building in ninety days or his money
would be refunded; and it was Glenn who reassured him
of the propriety of the transaction by affixing the corporate
seal on the contract, and who repeatedly promised to get him
an apartment in a few days during the ensuing months,

It is apparent that the instant case is in no way com-
parable to People v. Koelling, 284 Ill. 118, cited by defend-
ants where the complaining witness made an independent
investigation and confidence was inspired not by the defend-
ants but from outside sources.

Defendants’ explanation of their failure to secure an
apartment for Dotson in the Hyde Park building because
Mrs. Russo decided not to sell the property cannot be
reconciled with the testimony of the Russos and the cir-
cumstantial evidence. The negotiations, if any, for the
sale of the property had fallen through long before July

60 ee

when Dotson was shown the apartment. Defendants knew
that the property was not for sale, and had access to the
apartment only pursuant to an agreement with the Russos
to keep it vacant, for which defendants had paid $300 in
May. Hence defendants’ assertion that the purchase of the
building was being negotiated at the time Dotson was taken
to the apartment is contrary to fact.

Defendants argue at length that there was a fatal vari-
ance between the allegation of the indictment jointly charg-
ing two defendants with the crime of violating the confi-
dence game statute, and the evidence, which proved that
only defendant Glenn had dealings with the complaining
witness. Any attempt to isolate the conduct of defendant
Summers from that of defendant Glenn in the Dotson
transaction is not merely highly technical, but fictional.

Summers placed the ad in the newspaper which orig-
inally attracted the Dotsons, and paid for the advertising;
Summers was the president and incorporator of Apartment
Owners Inc., which was the corporation designated on the
letterhead of the application filed by Dotson; Summers

. was the president of First Apartments Corporation with
which Dotson signed the contract and to which he paid his
money; Summers paid the Russos the $300 to keep the
apartment in the Hyde Park building vacant, the apartment
which lured Dotson into parting with his money so that
he might secure a similar one within ninety days as Glenn
promised; Summers, as well as Glenn, enjoyed the direct
benefits from Dotson’s check, since it was used to pay
Antler in connection with defendants’ joint venture of
keeping apartments vacant in Antler’s building on Forty-
sixth street. It may be noted that this Antler who abetted
defendants’ plan to show applicants vacant apartments in
order to induce them to part with their money, testified as
to defendants’ good character and reputation. The record
further reveals that Summers participated with Glenn in
trying to secure another $300 from Dotson in January,

es 6

1951, when Summers said that they had an apartment in a
building on Forty-sixth Street but the man’s wife was sick
and they were not quite sure about it. In any case, another
$300 would have to be paid for that apartment.

Thus it appears that although Glenn did much of the
“smooth talking” to Dotson, Summers’s operations were
an integral part of their plan to first inspire confidence, by
advertising in a respected newspaper, setting up an attrac-
tive office, utilizing impressive legal device, showing an
ability to perform their contracts by visiting vacant apart-
ments in buildings supposedly owned by defendants; and
then to take the victims’ money without any intention of
either delivering an apartment or refunding the payment.
Clearly, such conduct constitutes a violation of the confi-
dence game statute,

Defendants’ argument that they merely failed to per-
form a contract, but committed no crime, cannot be sus-
tained, inasmuch as the evidence overwhelmingly establishes
that defendants never intended to perform this contract
and knew at the time it was entered into that it could not
be performed. (Chilson v. People, 224 Ill. 535.) More-
over, defendants evidenced a similar intention in their trans-
actions with other applicants, both preceding and following
the Dotson case. Under these circumstances, the remarks
of the court in the Chilson case are appropriate: “Chilson
says he has been convicted merely ‘for a failure to carry
out a plain civil contract or for a breach thereof,’ and that
the distinction between the breach of a contract and the
false and fraudulent scheme called the confidence game
has been disregarded. If plaintiff in error had entered into
the contract in good faith his reasoning would be conclusive.
Where a contract apparently legal is entered into by one
party with the intention of taking no step to carry it out,
but with the wrongful intent of causing the other to part
with his money without receiving any adequate considera-
tion therefor, such contract may, and in this case did, be-

62

come a mere incident of the ‘false and fraudulent scheme.’
* * * The fact that the affair was made to assume the
guise of an ordinary business transaction, whereby, as a
preliminary, Spooner was required to pay his money for
the lots, is without significance.”

In the Chilson case the defendant advertised in a news-
paper for a partner with $300 to go into the real-estate
business. Spooner answered the ad, entered into an agree-
ment with Chilson and put in his share of the price of lots
to be purchased by the firm. Chilson, however, never car-
ried out his part of the deal and was convicted of operat-
ing a confidence game, inasmuch as it appeared that he
never intended to carry out his part of the contract, and
used that device merely to obtain money from victims.

Although defendants cite People v. West, 406 Ill. 249,
in support of their argument that their conduct did not
violate the confidence game statute, it is not perceptible
to this court how that case can be compared to the instant
case. The parties therein had been doing legitimate busi-
ness for over a year with the complainant cashing checks for
the defendant, and all that was involved was one check
being returned for insufficient funds, whereas in the case
at bar defendants never intended to live up to any part of
their agreement with Dotson, and all that he ever received
for his money was a worthless note issued by a corporation
without property.

Defendants further urge that the trial court overlooked
the uncontroverted testimony of their good reputation.
There is no showing that the court overlooked the probative
value, if any, of this testimony submitted either by persons
who were participants in the swindling operation, or by
persons who admitted they knew nothing about defendants’
financial affairs, or by persons employed by defendants, or
closely connected with the lawyers who represented them.

The reference to the other indictments pending against
defendants could in no way be deemed prejudicial to de-

6

fendants. The subject arose when the trial judge, just
before imposing sentence, asked the trial assistant what
he was going to do with the other cases which were on
the docket before the judge. However, there was no state-
ment made during the trial, nor before the finding of guilty,
which in any way violated the rights of either defendant.
Moreover, in their application for probation defendants
themselves alluded to many of those other charges.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is our judg-
ment that the evidence clearly established the guilt of de-
fendants of the crime of violating the confidence game
statute, and that no errors were committed by the criminal
court of Cook County in the course of the trial. Hence,
the judgment of that court is properly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 32531
Axsert B, Ruppock ¢f al., Appellees, vs, AMERICAN MEpI-
car, Association, Appellant.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

Loxscu, Scorer & Burke, of Chicago, for appellant.

Dai.y, Dinxs, Ross & O’KEEFE, of Chicago, (HomER
D. Dives, Jon M. Connery, and Epwarp K, VincEK,
of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. Carer Justice Crampton delivered the opinion of
the court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of
Cook County which ordered defendant, the purchaser in a
contract for the sale of real estate, to specifically perform
its contract with plaintiffs, who were the vendors.

The case was decided upon the pleadings, which con-
sisted of a complaint, answer, and plaintiffs’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which motion was allowed.
Plaintiffs’ motion admitted all the facts well pleaded in
defendant’s answer and challenged the legal sufficiency of
such facts to constitute a defense. (Giese v. Terry, 382 Ill.
34.) It is therefore necessary to consider the complaint
and answer in detail so that we can determine whether the
answer of defendant raised any defense.

The following material facts are admitted by the plead-
ings: One Albert M. Billings was the owner of the real
estate here involved, prior to his death in 1897. By his will,
he devised this property, commonly known as 530-536
N. State Street, Chicago, as follows: Two thirds thereof
for life to testator’s son, Cornelius Billings, and one third
thereof for life to testator’s grandson, Albert Ruddock.
Upon the death of Cornelius Billings without issue surviv-
ing, the remainder passed to Albert Ruddock for life; upon

the death of Albert Ruddock without issue, the remainder
Le!

6 ee

passed to testator’s brother, John Billings, if alive at the
time of Albert Ruddock’s death, and to testator’s nephews
and nieces living at said time. It will be noted that no pro-
vision was made for the event of the death of either life
tenant leaving issue surviving.

In 1899, the will was construed by the circuit court of
Cook County, which appointed trustees to manage testator’s
property, including that involved here, during the lives of
the life tenants. In addition, the decree found that in the
event that either of said life tenants died leaving issue sur-
viving him, the remainder interest passed to said issue. The
1899 decree gave said trustees power to sell the property
but provided that “no sale * * * shall be made by said
trustees without first procuring the express order and direc-
tion of said Court.”

Cornelius Billings died in 1937, leaving as his only issue
Blanche Patiline Vander Poel, one of the plaintiffs, to
whom the trustees conveyed title in 1938, pursuant to an
order of court entered in the original chancery proceedings.

In 1947, the surviving trustees and Blanche Pauline
Vander Poel, as lessors and vendors, entered into a lease
and agreement with defendant, which agreement is the one
involved herein. Merritt Kirk Ruddock and Billings Kirk
Ruddock, who were the only children of Albert Ruddock,
joined in said lease and agreement for the purpose of being
bound by their provisions in the event that title to said real
estate would vest in them by the death of the said Albert B.
Ruddock. We may disregard the provisions of the lease,
for they are not material here. The agreement provided
that if, at any time the lease remained in effect, the lessors
were able to convey to lessee a merchantable title to said
property, the lessors agreed to sell and lessee agreed to buy
it for $125,000. It was provided in the agreement that
merchantable title might be evidenced by a report on title
to be made by Chicago Title and Trust Company, guar-
anteeing title in lessors, subject to the usual terms, condi-

SS

tions and exceptions contained in the regular form of
owner’s title guarantee policy or report on title, and subject
to certain restrictions of record with reference to sale or
use of the premises, and further subject to a certain peti-
tion for condemnation of a portion of said property filed
in the superior court of Cook County. Defendant acknowl-
edged in said agreement that it had been informed by lessors
that title to an undivided two thirds of said property was
vested in Blanche Pauline Vander Poel by virtue of said
will and deed; that Albert Ruddock was still living and
his two sons, Merritt Kirk Ruddock and Billings Kirk
Ruddock, had a contingent interest therein; and that said
sons were joining in the agreement so as to be bound
thereby in the event they survived their father. Defendant
further acknowledged that it had been informed by lessors
that the powers of the trustees to sell were subject to the
authority of the court. It was further agreed that lessors
were under no obligation to acquire any outstanding con-
tingent interest to perfect their title although they might,
in their discretion, acquire such an interest and thereupon
demand performance. Upon the furnishing of a report on
title, subject only to the exceptions referred to above and
“the usual objections contained in owners’ guarantee poli-
cies issued by Chicago Title and Trust Company,” the sale
was to be closed through an escrow with said company “in
accordance with the general provisions of the usual form
of Deed and Money Escrow Agreement then furnished
and in use by the Chicago Title and Trust Company with
such special provisions to be inserted therein as may be
required to conform with said report on title.”

In 1949 an order was entered in the original chancery
proceedings making any living nephews and nieces of tes-
tator parties to the suit, and thereafter an order was entered
finding that said living nephews and nieces had been made
parties as “unknown heirs or devisees of Albert M. Billings,
deceased,” and that due notice had been given them by

CS ee

publication. By said order it was found that all of testator’s
nephews and nieces were deceased, so that their contingent
interests had terminated. It was further found that John
D. Billings, testator’s brother, was deceased, so that his
contingent interest was likewise terminated. It was ordered
that the unknown heirs and devisees of testator, together
with any after-born children or grandchildren of Albert
Ruddock who might be living at his death, were bound by
the original 1899 decree and all subsequent decrees. By
this order, the trustees were expressly authorized to join
with Blanche Pauline Vander Poel in any conveyance. In
1950 an order was entered expressly authorizing the sale
of the property involved herein to defendant.

In 1950, while the lease was in force, lessors tendered
a report of title to defendant and demanded performance
of the agreement, and thereafter, in the same year, made
a second tender and demand. Defendant refused to perform
the agreement, and, in letters written by its attorneys to
plantiffs’ agent, set forth the grounds of their refusal to
perform, which were as follows: Lessors were unable to
furnish merchantable title because of (A) an ordinance
of the city of Chicago providing for the widening of North
State Street by the acquisition of adjoining property, which
included the property involved herein; (B) lack of au-
thority of trustees to sell; (C) the report on title specified
that deeds should be obtained from Albert B. Ruddock
and spouse and his children and respective spouses; (D)
said report on title was subject to the right of any party
interested to set aside, reverse or modify any of the orders
in said chancery proceedings by any direct proceedings;
(E) the issuance of a Chicago Title and Trust Company
guaranty policy would not give them a merchantable title,
even if all objections were waived by said company, since
said policy does not guarantee a merchantable title, but
only agrees to indemnify the policyholder from loss in the
event of defects in the title. A further objection was that

es

the agreement was void for indefiniteness since the language
quoted above pertaining to the escrow agreement did not
specify the terms of said agreement and particularly did
not provide whether the deeds should be recorded before the
money is paid over to lessors.

The foregoing facts stand admitted and we must deter-
mine whether, upon these facts, plaintiffs were entitled to
a decree. In addition to the objections to title noted above,
defendant claims that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief for
the following reasons: Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy
at law; the agreement provided that upon default by de-
fendant, lessors could terminate it, which defendant claims
was their sole remedy; plaintiffs were guilty of laches in
attempting to enforce the agreement; and finally, that the
agreement lacked mutuality.

Defendant’s first objection was to the ordinance which,
it will be noted, provided for the eventual taking of some
of the property here involved, as did the condemnation pro-
ceedings referred to in the agreement. The agreement pro-
vided that in the event the condemnation proceedings pro-
ceeded to judgment before the consummation of the sale,
the agreement could be canceled by either party. The filing
of the petition was not a taking of the property, and like-
wise the passage of the ordinance was not. (Mills v. Forest
Preserve Dist. 345 Il. 503.) ‘The parties contemplated that
the property might eventually be taken by power of emi-
nent domain and agreed that, if it were, the agreement
could be canceled. Until such time, however, the agreement
was to remain in force. The passage of the ordinance had no
more effect on the property than the filing of the condemna-
tion proceedings. Since the property had not actually been
taken under the ordinance at the time of the tender, we
are of the opinion that this objection was without merit.

The lack of authority on the part of the trustees to sell
is predicated upon the decree of 1899, which provided that
court approval of the sale was necessary, and also upon

0

the contention that none of the proceedings in the chancery
suit were binding upon possible after-born children of Albert
Ruddock.

The fact that approval was necessary before sale does
not render the agreement to sell void. In the agreement
it was expressly recognized that the power of the trustees
to complete the sale was subject to court approval, and
such approval was actually obtained prior to plaintiffs’
tender. An agreement to sell is far different than a sale.
(Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318.) While the actual sale, or
transfer of title by the trustees would not be valid without
court approval, the agreement to sell, subject to approval
by the court, needed no prior approval.

Nor do we believe that defendant’s objection concerning
after-born children is well founded. The children of Albert
Ruddock were parties to the proceedings wherein the sale
to defendant was approved. These children had the same
interest as any possible after-born children or grandchildren
and, under the familiar doctrine of representation, must
be held to represent the interests of any such after-born
persons. (Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227; Denegre v. Walker,
214 Ill. 113; Northern Trust Co. v. Thompson, 336 Il.
137.) The decree, therefore, was valid as to any after-
born children or grandchildren.

‘The next two objections, being those referred to herein
as “C” and “D” referred to notations appearing on the
Chicago Title and Trust Company report on title. Said
report specifically stated that these notations would be re-
moved upon a conveyance to a purchaser for value. Since
defendant was such a purchaser, these notations could be
ignored and the report of title, as submitted to defendant,
reported a merchantable title. In the contract defendant
agreed to accept as evidence of merchantable title a report
on title furnished by this company, and the case is quite
similar to Mackie v. Schoenstadt, 307 Ill. 398. In that case
plaintiff agreed to furnish a merchantable title, and it was

Ss

agreed that a guaranty policy made by the same company
would be furnished. Such a policy was furnished, but de-
fendant claimed that this was not sufficient evidence of
title. In disposing of this contention we said: “Appellee
was to furnish in a reasonable time a guaranty policy made
by the Chicago Title and Trust Company. She did procure
and tender the guaranty policy, and while it was not an
abstract of the title, the policy was reasonable proof ap-
pellee’s title was good. She never agreed to furnish an
abstract.”

What is said above also disposes of defendant’s fourth
contention, referred to herein as “EF,” to the effect that
such a policy guarantees nothing and is merely a policy of
indemnity. By the contract it agreed to accept such a
policy and is in no position now to challenge its sufficiency.

We are of the opinion that defendant’s contention that
the contract was void for indefiniteness is also without
merit. While the terms of the escrow agreement were not
set forth in the agreement, reference was made to the
“usual form” of agreement, a form which is commonly
used in Cook County and elsewhere. Not every detail must
be covered in a contract for it to meet the test of definite-
ness, and a contract is sufficiently definite if the court is
able from its terms and provisions, under proper rules of
construction and applicable principles of equity, to ascer-
tain what the parties have agreed to do. (Burns v. Epstein,
413 Ill. 476; Welsh v. Jakstas, go Ill. 288.) We are of
the opinion that the contract in the instant case met this test.

Defendant next contends that since plaintiffs sought
only a money payment, they had an adequate remedy at
law. It has long been well settled in this State that a
vendor in a real estate contract may have specific perform-
ance, even though he seeks only money. Andrews v. Sulli-
van, 2 Gilm. 327; Heller v. McGuin, 261 Ill. 588.

It is also urged that, since the agreement provided that
upon default by defendant plaintiffs could terminate this

7 es

agreement, this was the only remedy which plaintiffs had.
This contention is manifestly unsound. If such were the
law, defendants would have only to default, and thus elim-
inate their obligations under the contract and profit by their
own default. True, plaintiffs had the option of terminating .
the contract, but this was their option, not the defendant’s.
Plaintiffs chose not to terminate the contract and properly
proceeded to enforce the same. Defendant relies on cases
where the contract called for damages in event of default
and it was held that the innocent party is limited to his
action at law. These cases are not in point here.

Defendant argues that plaintiffs were guilty of laches
in tendering title and, after defendant’s refusal, in bringing
suit. In support of this objection, defendant states that
no tender was made until June, 1950, whereas the ordinance
referred to above was passed in January, 1949. Defendant
finally refused the tender in September, 1950, and suit was
not brought until October, 1951. It should be recalled that
plaintiffs did not obligate themselves to perfect their title
at any particular time and defendant obligated itself to
purchase at any time within the term of the lease. Tender
was made within said term, and the defendant, having
agreed to purchase, cannot raise the defense of laches unless
it can show that it was prejudiced by the delay. No such
prejudice is shown by the pleadings.

It is finally urged that the contract was lacking in
mutuality and that therefore plaintiffs cannot specifically
enforce the same. A like contention was made in Heller v.
McGuin, 261 Ill, 588, under a very similar set of facts.
There, the parties entered into a lease and a contract for
purchase simultaneously, as in the case at bar. It was
known at the time of contracting that seller did not have
a good title, but he agreed to furnish one when he con-
veyed. In an action for specific performance by vendor,
vendee claimed that since vendor did not obligate himself
to procure a good title, but only to convey if he did procure

73

it, the contract was lackitig in mutuality. We there held
that the vendor could enforce the contract. In the case at
bar, the lessors did not have a good title when the con-
tract was made, and did not obligate themselves to get a

> good title, but only to convey if they did. What was said
in Heller vy, McGuin is applicable here.

We are of the opinion that the facts admitted by the
pleadings entitled plaintiffs to relief. The trial court, there-
fore, properly entered a decree for plaintiffs upon the
pleadings and said decree is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

De
(No. 32602,
THE Propre ex rel. Elmer K. Smith, County Collector,
Appellee, vs. Joun O. CoEn, Appellant.

Opinion filed March 23, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

=

Homer C. Corn, of Elmhurst, for appellant.
Cuaries R. VAUGHN, of Olney, for appellee.

Mr, Cuter Justice Crampton delivered the opinion of
the court:

John D. Coen filed, in the county court of Richland
County, certain objections to an application of the collector
for judgment with respect to delinquent real-estate taxes
for the year 1950. The objections in controversy here were
overruled, and Coen appeals to this court.

Appellant is the owner of land leased for the production
of oil, from which he receives a one-eighth royalty. In the

eS 15

assessment of his land for tax purposes a valuation for oil
royalty was included, together with the valuation for struc-
tures, in the column of the assessor’s book designated “Im-
provements.” This valuation for “oil royalty” was ascer-
tained in accordance with a schedule recommended by the
Department of Revenue for use by assessors in valuing oil-
well working interests and royalty interests. Valuations set
by the schedule are based upon the daily average barrels
of oil produced during the month of March. Valuations
per barrel for royalty interests-vary according to the age
or type of production. Thus, for flush production (where
the well is less than seven months of age) the value is $770
per daily average barrel produced, for intermediate produc-
tion (from the seventh through the twenty-fourth month)
the value is $1160 per barrel, for settled production (the
third year and after) the value is $1550 per barrel, and for
stripper production (marginal producers) the value is $770
per barrel. Valuations per barrel for the working interests
of operators are made dependent, in addition, upon the
depth of the particular well and, in some cases, upon the
total number of barrels produced.

During the year in question the assessor followed the
customary practice in valuing such interests. He did not go
upon the land to count the wells and observe how they
were producing but instead obtained production figures
from the report submitted by the operator or leaseholder,
and determined a valuation for appellant’s royalty interest
accordingly.

Appellant urges that his royalty interest cannot be
“assessed” as an improvement, and that such a procedure
would result in double taxation. It is true, as he points out,
that the right to receive unaccrued oil royalty is a part of
the land and, in the absence of a conveyance by mineral
deed, cannot lawfully be assessed as one estate while the
land itself is assessed as another. Such was our holding in
People ex rel. Hargrave v. Phillips, 394 Ill. 119. But it is

76 ee

not the case here. In the present case the taxing authorities
did not purport to make separate assessments and to tax
individually both the land and the interest in oil royalty.
The individual valuations of land, structures and oil royalty
were made for the purpose of arriving at a proper value
for the land as a whole, including its structures and its sub-
surface oil deposits. That the decision in the Phillips case
has no application to the present facts is readily apparent
from a reading of that opinion, where we expressly ob-
served: “The effect of the oil-and-gas leases upon the
value of the land of appellee for taxable purposes is not
before us.” The position of appellant in the case at bar
is clearly without merit.

It is next insisted that use of the schedule constitutes
“an income tax, or a tax on production of oil, or a tax on
estimated future rents” and is therefore illegal. In support
of this contention appellant asserts that the valuation is an
attempt to estimate the future income for the year, based
upon the number of barrels of oil produced during the
thirty-one days immediately preceding April 1; that the
authorities “tax this annually estimated income, receipts on
production of oil from the tract, or the sales of oil off the
land as though it were an ‘improvement’ for that year;”
and that “the income or rent varies from year to year
under the formula, depending upon the daily average barrels
in the month of March.” Appellant’s argument falls far
short of sustaining his contention. It consists of little more
than assertions as to the alleged character of the tax, and
fails to point out any respect in which the amounts set by
the schedule fail to reasonably reflect the actual values of
the respective types of oil-well and royalty interest. The
schedule or formula is patently not a device for levying
an income tax, production tax, or tax on future rents. It
is simply a method for arriving at the full, fair cash value
of the premises, as such value is enhanced by the land’s
oil-producing capacity. For this purpose it purports to

| 1

classify oil wells on the basis of age, type, depth, and so on;
and the differences in the stated values, per average daily
barrel of oil, are presumably related to actual variations in
the quality and productivity of the several types of oil-
producing property.

It is obvious that differences in value must exist among
oil wells, and that such differences cannot be appraised by
visual examination. It is also clear that the quantity of
oil currently produced is not necessarily the sole measure
of value for oil remaining under the surface; that the
nature of the formation, life expectancy, and other factors
must also be considered. In its table of recommended values
the schedule purports to take account of such factors, and
the burden rests upon the objector to sustain by affirmative
proof his objection to the tax levied in accordance there-
with. (See People ex rel, Schrock v. First National Bank,
353 Ill. 447.) In the absence of a showing that the valua-
tions have no basis in fact, and amount in law to fraud,
the objection cannot be upheld. (See People ex rel. Tenny-
son v. Texas Co, 406 Ill, 120.) We find no such showing
in the record before us. .

Appellant argues, further, that use of the schedule re-
sults in unlawful discrimination and unreasonable classifica-
tion “as between the various owners of oil interests, as
between one land owner and another, and as between oper-

* ators and royalty owners.” He bases this argument upon
the facts that when the tax is broken down and applied
against the “per-barrel” production of various oil wells it
appears that a barrel of oil from one well has a much
larger burden of tax than that from another well, and that
in some cases the valuations for this tax, per barrel of oil
produced, exceed the value at which a barrel of oil on hand
and in storage is assessed for personal-property tax pur-
poses. The fallacy in the argument is apparent from what
we have already said concerning the character, of the valua-
tions designated in the schedule. They are not made for

78 A

the purpose of an excise tax on production or on the receipt
of income from the oil produced, where the arguments of
appellant might have some application, but for the purpose
of a property tax upon land as to which an oil lease has
been given. The mere fact that oil from one well may sell
for the same price per barrel as that from another, and
that both currently produce the same quantity, does not
tequire that the wells or royalty interests therein be valued
the same for purposes of real-estate tax. There may be
significant differences in the other factors we have men-
tioned, such as the life expectancy and the quantity of sub-
surface oil remaining in the land. The contention of ap-
pellant cannot, therefore, be sustained.

It is lastly maintained that as the assessor did not go
upon the land to make his valuation of the oil royalty but,
instead, accepted the figures supplied by the operator-lessee
and applied the schedule to ascertain the value, the tax, in
so far as it is based thereon, must be held illegal and in-
valid, It is true, as appellant points out, that the law re-
quires the assessor, in person or by his deputy, to actually
view and determine the value of the land. It does not
follow, however, that the assessment made in the case at
bar must be vitiated. The fact that the lessee oil company
supplied production figures, which the assessor determined
to adopt for the purpose of arriving at a value for appel-
lant’s oil royalty, does not mean that the company itself
made the valuation. Use of the figures for that purpose was
manifestly a result of the independent judgment of the
assessor. Nor does the failure of the assessor to actually
view the interest in question have the effect claimed by
appellant. ‘There is no evidence in the record that appellant’s
property is assessed upon any different basis than other like
property in the same vicinity. Nor is there any testimony
or other relevant evidence tending to show that the land is
assessed above its value. Under such circumstances the

eS 19

irregularity relied upon by appellant cannot be utilized to
defeat the assessment.

The law presumes that in fixing the value of property
the taxing authorities have properly discharged their duties
and that the tax is just. One objecting to the valuation
has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that an excessive valuation was made as the result
of some improper, corrupt.or illegal motive on the part of
the assessing authorities, or that the valuation is so grossly
excessive as to create a constructive fraud. (People ex rel.
Toman v. Marine Trust Co. 375 Ill. 488.) Such proof
has not been made in the case at bar. The fact, standing
alone, that there has been a failure to go on the land and
actually view the improvement is merely an irregularity and
is not sufficient to defeat the tax. See Grant Land Assn. v.
People ex rel. Hanberg, 213 Ill. 256, 259.

We have examined other points, raised by appellant but
not argued in his brief, and find them to be without merit.
The judgment of the county court of Richland County is

affirmed, Judgment affirmed.

Ee
No. 3265
THE PEOPLE ex rel. Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General,
Petitioner, vs. Danrer, A. CovELti, Judge, Respondent.

Opinion filed April 21, 1953—Rehearing denied May 18, 1953.

80 Ce

Ivan A. Exziorr, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Ben W. Herneman, JoserH D, Brocx, and Rozerr F.
Haney, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for petitioner.

Grorcr M. Crane, (Harry J. Buscu, Myer H. Grap-
stone, and Ropert W. Hetvzx, of counsel,) all of Chi-
cago, for respondent.

Mr. Jusv1ce Hersuy delivered the opinion of the
court:

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois, by leave
of this court first had, filed his original petition for a writ
of mandamus directed to the Hon. Daniel A. Covelli, sitting
as judge of the criminal court of Cook County, to compel
him, first, to vacate and expunge an order granting a peti-
tion to suppress evidence on motion of defendants in People
v. Lavin et al., and second, to enter nunc pro tunc as of
July 12, 1952, an order of nolle prosequi on petitioner’s
motion in that case.

In December of 1951 the grand jury of Cook County
returned four indictments against Thomas F, Lavin, Jr.,
and two others, all dealing with various alleged violations
of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 120, par. 453.1 et seq.) All these indictments were
in due course assigned by the chief justice of the criminal

eS st

court of Cook County to Judge Covelli, a judge of the
superior court of Cook County sitting as judge of the
criminal court thereof, for trial and disposition. On the
trial of one of the indictments, which lasted almost three
weeks, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty against
all defendants, after deliberating almost twenty-four hours,
and judgment was duly entered on the verdict. One of
the remaining indictments, which charged substantially the
same offense as that charged in the indictment on which
the defendants were acquitted, was nolled. The remaining
untried indictments charged the defendants with counter-
feiting Illinois cigarette tax meter stamps in violation of
section 22 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act and with con-
spiracy to violate various provisions of that act.

These proceedings were instituted and prosecuted pur-
stant to section 16 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act, which
directs that all legal proceedings thereunder shall be insti-
tuted and prosecuted by the Attorney General. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 120, par. 453.16.

After the one indictment was nolled, the Attorney Gen-
eral suggested to the court that the remaining cases be
transferred to the chief justice for reassignment. The
court continued the case, stating that the chief justice,
in assigning cases at the opening of the term, had advised
all judges that he did not wish to continue the practice,
then prevalent among trial judges,.that in the event the
chief justice sent three indictments to the trial judge he
would try one and send back the other two, but on the
contrary that the chief justice directed the trial judges to
try all indictments assigned, to which all the trial judges
agreed.

One of the defendants, Thomas F. Lavin, Jr., there-
after filed his petition to suppress certain evidence as hav-
ing been seized in an illegal search, such evidence having
been offered by the People and received in evidence at the
trial on the first indictment. The petition to suppress came

82 a

on for hearing before Judge Covelli, who had presided
over and heard the evidence in the first trial. The defend-
ant introduced testimony in support of his petition, and
after the defendant rested, the People proceeded with their
proof. After two witnesses for the People had testified,
the court stated “On the evidence I have already heard,
the motion to suppress is sustained.” At that time the Peo-
ple apparently had one more witness to present and had
made no oral argument.

Under such circumstances, at the time the court indi-
cated that the motion to suppress was sustained the special
assistant Attorney General stated, “The Court has not heard
the evidence, he has given me no opportunity to present
it to the Court or the cases with respect to it * * * I
can only state to this Court now that I respectfully request
this Court to retransfer this case.”

Upon a denial of such request, the Attorney General
orally moved to nolle prosse the pending cases, which mo-
tion was denied on July 10, 1952.

Two days later the Attorney General presented a written
motion for a nolle prosequi. ‘The written motion, after
setting forth the entry of an order sustaining the petition
to suppress before completion by the People of its evi-
dence and without opportunity to present argument, pro-
ceeded to state that it was the opinion of the Attorney
General that the People did not have sufficient evidence
admissible under such ruling to result in a conviction, that
it was the Attorney General’s considered view that it was
not in the best interests of the administration of justice
in the State of Illinois to proceed with the prosecution of
the defendant in these cases at this time under these in-
dictments, and that to proceed with the prosecution under
these indictments at this time under the order of court
stippressing evidence would result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court intimated that it would grant the motion of
the Attorney General to nolle if the Attorney General

es

agreed not to seek other indictments against the defendant.
When the Attorney General refused to make that commit-
ment the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the
Attorney General filed a nolle prosse, to which the court
refused to give any effect, and the cases were set for trial.

The facts from which this petition for writ of man-
damus originated present to the court two issues. The first
is whether the Attorney General of the State has the con-
stitutional power in the specific situation presented by the
instant case to nolle prosse the proceeding in his absolute
discretion free of encroachment by the judiciary. The
second issue is whether the trial court acted so arbitrarily
and capriciously in sustaining defendant’s petition to sup-
press evidence as to require this court to award the writ.

The legislature in this State has not by specific statutory
authority endowed the Attorney General with power to
nolle prosse criminal prosecutions. It thus becomes a ques-
tion for decision whether, in the situation we find here,
there is included among the inherent powers of the Attorney
General the power to nolle prosse, the maintenance of the
proceeding in his judgment being no longer in the public
interest.

In People ex rel. Barrett v. Finnegan, 378 ll. 387, this
court considered the nature of the office of Attorney Gen-
eral and the powers appendant thereto, observing, “The
office of Attorney General, as it existed at common law,
is one of ancient origin. He was the only law officer of
the Crown. (4 Reeves Hist. Eng. Law, chap. 25, p. 122.)
The prerogatives which pertained to the crown of England
under the common law, in this country are vested in the
people, and the necessity for the existence of a public officer
charged with the protection of public rights and the en-
forcement of public duties, by proper proceedings in the -
courts of justice, is just as imperative here as there. In
this State, the constitution, by creating the office of Attor-
ney General under its well-known common-law designation

84 De

and providing that he shall perform such duties as may be
prescribed by law, engrafted upon the office all the powers
and duties of an Attorney General as shown at the common
law, and gave the General Assembly power to confer addi-
tional powers and impose additional duties upon him. The
legislature cannot, however, strip him of any of his common-
law powers and duties as the legal representative of the
State. (Fergus v, Russel, 270 Ill. 304.) The statute creat-
ing the office of Attorney General of this State prescribes
his duties, which, under the above construction of the con-
stitution, are imposed upon him in addition to the powers
exercised by him at the common law.”

Fergus v. Russel, in its discussion of the attorney gen-
eralship, states, “The office of Attorney General is created
by section 1 of article 5 of the constitution of 1870, * * *,
It will be observed that the constitution confers no express
powers upon the Attorney General and prescribes no ex-
press duties for him to perform. It simply provides that
he shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by law.
The office of Attorney General was one known to the
common law, and under the common law the Attorney Gen-
eral had well known and well defined powers and it was
incumbent upon him to perform well known and clearly
prescribed duties. It is not necessary, and indeed it would
be difficult to enumerate all the powers vested in the Attor-
ney General at common law and all the duties which were
imposed upon him to perform. It is sufficient for the pur-
poses of the discussion of the point here involved to state
that at common law the Attorney General was the law
officer of the crown and its chief representative in the
courts. * * * The question presented for our deter-
mination is, whether by creating this office under its well
known common law designation the constitution engrafted
upon it all the powers and duties of the Attorney General
as known at common law, and gave the General Assembly
authority to confer and impose upon the Attorney General

eS 8

only such additional powers and duties as it should see fit.”
The opinion then proceeded to hold that, the Attorney
General being an officer known to the common law, the
constitution in creating the office did engraft upon the office
all the common-law powers and duties of an Attorney Gen-
eral, and permitted the legislature to confer upon him only
new and additional powers. It also held that it was not
competent for the State legislature to strip him of his time-
honored and common-law functions.

The powers and duties of the Attorney General were
reviewed in Hunt v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Railway
Co. 20 Ill, App. 282, reversed in an opinion by this court,
tat Ill, 638, but which nevertheless approved and adopted
the announcements of the Appellate Court on this subject.
That court said, “There is nothing in our present constitu-
tion or statute which necessitates, ii our opinion, a con-
struction which would exclude the attorney general from
the exercise of common law powers in addition to those
conferred by the statute. * * * We see, then, no diffi-
culty in interpreting the constitutional provision that the
attorney general shall perform such duties as may be pre-
scribed by law, as meaning that he shall perform such
duties as shall be prescribed by law, statutory or otherwise,
by which the duties of the attorney general, as that officer
is known to our jurisprudence, are imposed and defined.”

From a review of the foregoing authorities it is fairly
obvious that the courts of this State have considered the
Attorney General’s powers and duties to include not only
those conferred by statute, but also those powers and duties
inherent in the office as it existed at the common law. It
was stated by Justice Blackburn that the power of deter-
mining whether the prosecution of an indictment shall go
on or not is intrusted to the Attorney General, who is the
great law officer of the Crown; and, whether he is right
or wrong the court cannot interfere. (Regina v. Allen,
1 Best & S. 850.) Thus in Regina v. Comptroller Gen-

86 |

eral, 1 Q.B. (Eng.) gog—C.A., A. J. Smith, L.J., in dis-
cussing the broad extent of the powers of the Attorney
General, said: “Who can enter a nolle prosequi excepting
the fiat of the Attorney General is obtained? I do not
mean to say that, when some trivial case is before some
court, the prosecution may not ask the judge to be allowed
to withdraw the prosecution, and that the judge, after
having read the depositions, may not say that he agrees
that there is no case. But apart from that, who can enter
a nolle prosequi? In a prosecution by one man against
another for a crime, the Attorney General can, if he thinks
fit, enter a nolle prosequi, and nobody can say anything to
him as to whether he enters a nolle prosequi or not. He is
supreme in that matter, and there is no appeal.”

_A thorough and exhaustive annotation on the power
of a public prosecutor’ to dismiss a prosecution appearing
in 35 L.R.A., beginning at page 701, seems to recognize
a very real and ancient limitation on the power. After
recognizing that in England the Attorney General had
power to make the entry as the representative of the Crown
and thereby at once to stay the proceeding in any indict-
ment or criminal proceeding, citing as the basis for such
conclusion Regina v. Allen, 1 Best & S. 850, the following
statement is made: “By the English practice the entry of
a nolle prosequi was the prerogative of the Attorney Gen-
eral to which there was no limitation (except in case of
injury from unlimited repetition. King v. Webb, 3 Burr.
1468, 1 W. Bl. 160.)” In King v. Webb, Lord Mansfield
and the entire court, perceiving that an injury might arise
from an unlimited number of dissolutions, said, “There
can be no stich rte that, when a man is indicted for an
infamous offense, the prosecutor is entitled to come into
court and quash his indictment as often as he pleases, it
may be ad infinitum. The court will see that no mischief
or oppression ensued, before they will grant leave for that
purpose.” he refinement here urged does not come into

ee 87

play unless it is obvious that the use of the power of nolle
prosequi is capricious and vexatiously repetitious.

Thus under the common-law criminal procedure in Eng-
land, a nolle prosequi could be entered only by the authority
of the Attorney General, who had exclusive discretion in
the matter (9 Laws of England (Halsbury), p. 350,) ex-
cept that such power could not be exercised repeatedly with-
out good and sufficient cause. In the United States, the
powers and duties of the Attorney General with respect to
the conduct of criminal prosecutions generally pass to the
prosecuting attorney. (69 A.L.R. 240.) The rule is stated
in Corpus Juris Secundum to be as follows: “At common
law, only the attorney general could exercise the power to
enter a nolle prosequi on an indictment, and unless by
statute the authority is transferred elsewhere, this power
is still reposed in the attorney general or in the several
public prosecutors. .. . At common law, and under the
general rule prevailing in the absence of statute, the matter
of entering a nolle prosequi rests entirely within the dis-
cretion of the prosecuting officer, without leave of court,
at all stages of a criminal prosecution before the jury are
impaneled, or, as is sometimes stated, before trial of the
case.” 22 CJ.S., pp. 706-707.

In People ex rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, this
court held that a State’s Attorney in Illinois did not have
the power to enter a nolle prosequi at his own discretion.
The court was careful, however, to point out that the
powers of the State’s Attorney are not coextensive with
those of the Attorney General, who is the chief law officer
of the State and head of the legal department. Although
this court in the Newcomer case did not consider the
powers of the Attorney General of the State, it did have
occasion to analyze and consider the common-law powers
of the Attorney General of England. We said there, -at
page 320, “So far as the adoption of the common law is
concerned, the power of the Attorney General in England

88 |]

was not a matter of substantive law but of practice and
prerogative. He was the representative of the crown, and
the power to enter a nolle prosequi in criminal cases which
were set on foot by private persons was a prerogative of
his office to which there was no limitation.”

It is thus apparent that on those occasions when the
Illinois courts have had an opportunity to examine into the
matter of the rights and prerogatives of the Attorney Gen-
eral of the State, they have quite generally determined that
such officer, in addition to those powers and duties con-
ferred by statute, enjoys all the inherent powers and duties
of the Attorney General of England under the common
law, and that under no circumstances could those powers
be denied him.

The Attorney General having been held the chief law
officer of the State, and the courts having found that in
the creation of that office there were engrafted upon it all
the powers and duties of the Attorney General as the same
were known at common law, any limitations urged upon
his common-law power to nolle prosequi must necessarily
be of long common-law recognition. In a representative
government, such as we enjoy in Illinois, all powers of
government belong ultimately to the people in their sov-
ereign corporate capacity. Under such a government the
people may distribute, for the purposes of government, the
various powers thereof. ‘These they have divided into three
departments: Legislative, executive, and judicial. By arti-
cle III of our constitution it is provided that “no person
or collection of persons, being one of these departments,
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others.” By this provision the people intended to pro-
vide, and did provide, a complete separation of the branches,
and completely deprived a member of one branch of au-
thority to exercise any power properly belonging to the
other two branches. The Attorney-General’s office is a part
of the executive department, and the constitutional powers

es 89

exercised by that officer are all executive powers. For any
judge or court to assert or to deny the powers of the
Attorney General would constitute an unconstitutional en-
croachment of the judiciary upon the execiitive department.
Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600.

Here, at the time of entry of the nolle prosequi by the
Attorney General, no jury had been impaneled and the
defendant had not been put in jeopardy-under these indict-
ments. In presenting this motion for nolle prosequi the
Attorney General gave as his reasons therefor that, under
the rulings on evidence theretofore rendered by the trial
court and with which he apparently disagreed, the People
did not have sufficient admissible evidence to result in a
conviction, and to proceed at that time under the order of
the court suppressing evidence would not be in the best
interests of the administration of justice in Illinois and
would result in a miscarriage of justice. It is also apparent
from the record here that the nolle prosequi sought to be
entered here is not repetitious, this being the only time that
a motion for that purpose has been filed. Therefore, the
limitation set forth in King v. Webb to the effect that a
court can interfere to prevent an injury from an unlimited
number of dissolutions has no application here. The record
also discloses that the nolle prosequi was sought to be en-
tered before the impaneling of the jury. Therefore, if the
general rule prevails as set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum,
the Attorney General would have the right to enter the
nolle prosequi in the instant case. Consequently, whether
the rule recognizing absolute discretion in the Attorney Gen-
eral in the matter of nolle prosequi, or the rule engrafting
limitation upon his power, is applied it is evident that the
trial court erred in denying the motion for nolle prosequi.

Our disposition of the issue made with respect to the
order of July 12, 1952, renders unnecessary a considera-
tion of the issue concerning the order granting the motion
to suppress evidence.

90 |

Subsequent to submission of this cause, the respondent,
on April 15, 1953, presented a motion to dismiss the orig-
inal petition for mandamus upon the ground that the issues
involved have become moot and abstract as the result of an
order entered by him on March 31, 1953, in Nos. 51-2392
and 51-2394, discharging the defendants, Lavin, Jr., Hor-
witz, and Nuzzo, conformably to section 18 of division XIII
of the Criminal Code, (Ill. Rev. Stat. rggt, chap. 38, par.
748,) which, so far as relevant, requires that when a de-
fendant is not admitted to bail, he must be tried within
four months from the day of his commitment, unless the
delay is occasioned by the application of the defendant,
and that if he is admitted to bail for an alleged criminal
offense, other than a capital offense, he shall be entitled, on
demand, to be tried within four months after such demand.
The Attorney General has countered with a motion to
amend the petition for mandamus by adding a third prayer
for relief, seeking the vacation and expunction of the order
entered in Nos, 51-2392 and 51-2394. on March 31, 1953,
discharging the defendants in those cases.

It necessarily follows from our conclusion that the
Attorney General’s motion for a nolle prosequi should have
been granted and from our direction to enter nunc pro tunc
as of July 12, 1952, an order of nolle prosequi on the nolle
prosequi filed by the Attorney General, that respondent was
without authority after July 12, 1952, and, in particular,
on March 31, 1953, to enter the order discharging defend-
ants. Since respondent lacked jurisdiction to enter thé
order of March 31, 1953, the issues made by the pleadings
in this court were not rendered moot and abstract by the
entry of the order of March 31, 1953. Accordingly, re-
spondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus
is denied. Disposition of petitioner’s motion to amend the
prayer of the petition for mandamus to seek vacation and
expunction of the order of March 31, 1953, becomes tn-
necessary.

eS 1

The writ of mandamus should be, and is hereby,
awarded directing Daniel A. Covelli, as judge of the
superior court of Cook County and as ex officio judge of
the criminal court of Cook County to enter nunc pro tunc
as of July 12, 1952, an order of nolle prosequi on the
nolle prosequi filed by petitioner on July 12, 1952, in the
cases instituted in the criminal court of Cook County and
entitled “People of the State of Illinois v. Thomas F. Lavin,
Jr., Jacob J. Horwitz and John Nuzzo,” General Nos.

51-2392 and 51-2394. Writ awarded.

Es
Ob. 8.
Tux Prope ex rel. Donald M. Gregg, Petitioner, vs. JoHN
W. Taucnen, Clerk of the Probate Court of Cook
County, Respondent.

Announced March 27, 1953—Opinion filed April 21, 1953.

92
es

Arzert E. Jenner, James A. Sprow1, and Kenner
J. Burns, Jr, (Jounston, Tompson, Raymonp &
Mayer (of counsel,) all of Chicago, for petitioner.

Ben Corrie, Cuarnes H. Soruxe, and Carzton
FiscHer, all of Chicago, for respondent.

Per Curtam: On leave granted, petitioner, Donald M.
Gregg, Judge of the County Court of Marshall County,
filed his original petition in this court, praying for a writ
of mandamus directed to the respondent as clerk of the
probate court of Cook County, commanding him (a) to
cease and desist from interfering with and preventing peti-
tioner from discharging the duties of judge of, and from
conducting, the probate court of Cook County, (b) to fur-
nish petitioner a courtroom and chambers wherein petitioner
might hold and preside over the probate court of Cook
County, (c) to furnish petitioner a deputy clerk and other
necessary attendants while sitting as such judge and hold-
ing said court, (d) to record in the records of said court
all proceedings conducted and orders made by petitioner
as judge of said court, (e) to enroll petitioner’s name on
his records as the judge holding said court and to certify
his name as such to the county treasurer and county clerk
of Cook County, and (f) to perform all other duties as
required by law to assist the petitioner in holding and con-
ducting the probate court of Cook County.

The respondent, as clerk of the probate court of Cook
County, filed his answer to the petition denying the peti-
tioner’s right to a writ of mandamus, on the ground that
under the facts alleged in the petition and answer the law

es 98

did not vest petitioner with any title or right to the office
of judge of the probate court of Cook County.

The basic facts giving rise to this proceeding are not
in dispute, and the issue for decision by this court is pri-
marily one of law.

Honorable William F, Waugh, the duly elected judge
of the probate court of Cook County, passed away sud-
denly on March 6, 1953, at 2:45 P.M. At the time of his
death, the unexpired portion of the term to which he had
been elected was more than one year.

On March 6, commencing with the opening of court in
the forenoon, and up to the time of Judge Waugh’s death,
petitioner was sitting and holding court in the probate
court of Cook County at the request of Judge Waugh pur-
suant to the statute providing for the interchange of judges
in the county and probate courts of Illinois. (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 37, pars. 297-298.) Upon the death of
Judge Waugh, petitioner continued to sit as a judge of
said court for the remainder of the day at the request of

respondent as clerk of said probate court.

On the following Monday, March 9, respondent re-
quested petitioner to continue to serve as a judge in said
court, which petitioner did. The said probate court was
officially closed on Tuesday, March 10, in memory of the
late Judge Waugh and to permit attendance at his funeral.
The next day, Wednesday, March 11, respondent told peti-
tioner that he should continue to act on a temporary basis
for a limited period of time until respondent determined
what course of action he would follow with respect to
designating and calling a county or probate judge to serve
as judge in the probate court of Cook County pursuant to
the statutory provisions in such cases made and provided.
Ill. Rev. Stat. rog1, chap. 37, par. 325.

Petitioner thereupon proceeded to hold court until the
close thereof on Friday, March 13. Late in the afternoon
of that day, respondent advised the petitioner that his ser-

94 |

vices were no longer required; that respondent had desig-
nated and called the county judge of Perry County to serve
as judge of and to hold the probate court of Cook County,
commencing Monday, March 16, together with the probate
judge of Du Page County as an assistant; that petitioner’s
name had been removed from the records of the clerk as
acting judge of the said court and that petitioner should
not appear further to serve as such judge except upon the
designation and call of respondent.

At that time petitioner advised the respondent that under
the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 37, par. 325,) peti-
tioner was the only county or probate judge in Illinois
authorized to hold said probate court of Cook County and
to act as judge thereof until the election and qualification
of a successor to the late Judge Waugh; that respondent
had no right or power to terminate petitioner’s rights as
such judge, after requesting him to so serve; and that
petitioner was willing to continue to so serve and would so
present himself at all subsequent sessions of the said court.

On the following Monday, March 16, petitioner did |
present himself and attempt to hold court in the probate
court of Cook County. However, respondent refused to
furnish him with a courtroom or a clerk or other attendants
necessary to carry out the court functions and to spread of
record any order signed by petitioner on that date, although
so demanded by petitioner. On the contrary, respondent
installed and recognized the county judge of Perry County
to serve as judge of the probate court of Cook County,
furnishing him the necessary chambers, courtroom and
court personnel, and recognized his orders, only, as the offi-
cial orders of the court entitled to record. On the following
day respondent installed the probate judge of Du Page
County as an assistant or alternate to the county judge of
Perry County as acting judge of the probate court of Cook
County, and has continued to refuse to recognize petitioner
as a judge of said probate court of Cook County.

es 9%

During the court week which commenced March 9,
1953, respondent caused to be published and circulated in
the course of his duties as clerk of the probate court of
Cook County the claim docket of the court for the March
term beginning March 23, on the cover and title page of
which the petitioner was listed and described as “Acting Pro-
bate Judge” over the facsimile signature of respondent. Such
claim docket had been prepared before the death of Judge
Waugh, and on Monday, March 9, while petitioner was
serving as judge of the probate court of Cook County under
the circumstances above stated, the printer was advised by
respondent to insert petitioner’s name as it appeared thereon.

This proceeding involves the construction, and applica-
tion to the facts here presented, of “An Act to authorize
county and probate judges to perform the duties of the
office of one another in certain cases” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 37, par. 325,) which provides as follows: “In case
of the death, resignation or inability of the judge of a
county or probate court, of any county, the clerk of such
court shall designate and call any county or probate judge
to hold such county or probate court; and such county or
probate judge, when so designated and called, may hold
such county or probate court and perform all the duties
of the judge thereof until the appointment or election of .
his successor, or until the disability to act ceases.”

The petitioner’s position is that the above facts con-
stitute his being designated and called by the respondent
under such statute to serve as judge of the probate court
of Cook County, and upon his accepting and entering into
his duties as such he thereby succeeded to the title and
right to the office of judge of the probate court of Cook
County, and that respondent as clerk of such court has no
power under the statute to remove him.

Respondent’s position is that there was no designation
and call of petitioner by him as clerk as contemplated by
the statute, and in the alternative that, if there was, peti-

96 ee

tioner did not thereby acquire title to the office, but was
merely performing the duties of the judge, subject to change
by the respondent, since any other construction would ren-
der the statute unconstitutional.

The burden is upon the petitioner to show a clear legal
title and right to the office in question and a right to the re-
lief demanded. People ex rel. Sanitary Dist. v. Schlaeger,
391 Ill. 314.

A consideration of the facts heretofore recited fails to
disclose, in our opinion, a “designation and call” as con-
templated by the statute in question. The very language
itself discloses an intent and requirement on the part of
the legislature that the clerk of the court acting thereunder
should exercise an act of deliberation and discretion as
such clerk in choosing, naming and‘ specifying a judge of
some other county or probate court to sit as judge in the
court of which he is clerk. At the time of Judge Waugh’s
death the petitioner was sitting as a judge in the probate
court of Cook County pursuant to the request of Judge
Waugh under the statutory provisions for the interchange
of county and probate judges in Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 37, pars. 297-298.) It was his duty to continue
to serve as such for the remainder of the day regardless of
Judge Waugh’s intervening death. The subsequent con-
versations of the respondent with the petitioner clearly

* indicate an intent to continue such status as a temporary
arrangement and measure, tacitly acquiesced in by the peti-
tioner. Nowhere does the record show a deliberate and
intentional naming and specification, or “designation and
call” of petitioner by respondent as clerk of the probate
court of Cook County. The most that is shown is a con-
tinuation by petitioner to serve as a judge in the court
pursuant to his original designation by Judge Waugh in
his lifetime, all on a temporary basis. No formal record
of the clerk of the probate court of Cook County, making
such “designation and call” has been presented to this court

eS a”

to sustain petitioner’s claimed legal right, and it is apparent
that none was intended.

Furthermore, to construe the statute in question as con-
tended for by petitioner would necessarily result in a hold-
ing which would render such statute invalid and uncon-
stitutional as being in conflict with article VI of the Illinois
constitution of 1870.

Article VI of the constitution of 1870 covers the whole
judicial power of the people of the State and is the source
of all legislative authority respecting courts. (People ex rel.
Nauert v. Smith, 327 Ill. 11; People ex rel. Sadler v.
Olson, 245 Ill. 288; Missouri River Telegraph Co. v. First
Nat, Bank, 74 Ill. 217.) Probate courts came into existence
by act of the legislature in 1877 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 37, par. 299 et seq.,) pursuant to the power granted
in section 20 of article VI of the constitution of 1870,
providing that the General Assembly may provide for the
establishment of a probate court in each county having a
population of 50,000 inhabitants and providing for the elec-
tion of a judge thereof whose term of office shall be the
same as that of the county judge and who shall be elected
at the same time and in the same manner. Thus probate
courts are created by the constitution, their jurisdiction
established thereby, and the qualifications of the judges of
such courts prescribed therein, and such courts and the
judges thereof are recognized as constitutional courts and
judges, although such courts, their clerks and judges and
other officers, did not come into existence until after the
legislative enactment above referred to. City of Moline v.
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 262 Ill. 52.

The office of judge of the probate court being a consti-
tutional office, and article VI of the constitution being the
source of all legislative authority respecting courts, the
legislature of this State can create no court and cannot
fix the term of office of a judge of any court nor prescribe

the manner of selection or election of any such judge,
—

98 ee

unless authorized by such article VI. Franklin v. Westfall,
273 Ill. 402.

Section 32 of article VI of the constitution provides in
part that all officers provided for in such article shall hold
their offices until their successors shall be qualified, and
they shall respectively reside in the division, circuit, county
or district for which they may be elected or appointed. The
petitioner, who is county judge of Marshall County, must
be a resident of Marshall County or he would not be quali-
fied and eligible to hold that office. Consequently petitioner
is ineligible, under the constitution, to election or appoint-
ment to the office of judge of the probate court of Cook
County because he does not reside in Cook County.

Section 32 of article VI of the coristitution also deals
with vacancies in judicial office and provides in part that
vacancies shall be filled by election, but where the unexpired
term does not exceed one year the vacancy shall be filled
by appointment by the Governor. Since the unexpired term
of office of the late Judge Waugh is more than one year,
the only way the vacancy in such elective office can be filled
under the constitution is by election.

Section 29 of article VI of the constitution provides
in part that all judicial officers shall be commissioned by
the Governor. It necessarily follows that legal title to a
judicial office in this State can only be established by the
written commission from the Governor. The petitioner
does not possess any written commission from the Gov-
ernor as judge of the probate court of Cook County, but
the only commission he possesses is one evidencing his elec-
tion to office as county judge of Marshall County.

In view of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
statute in question cannot be construed as conferring power
upon the clerk of the probate court to confer title to the
office of judge of the probate court of Cook County upon
petitioner since such construction would clearly render that
statute unconstitutional. The legislature of this State in

99

establishing probate courts recognized such constitutional
limitation by providing that when a vacancy shall occur
in the office of judge of the probate court of any county
the clerk of the court in which the vacancy exists shall
notify the Governor of such vacancy, and if the unexpired
term of office made vacant is less than one year at the time
the vacancy occurs, the Governor shall fill such vacancy by
appointment, and otherwise the Governor shall issue a writ
of election as in other cases of vacancy to be filled by elec-
tion. Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 37, par. 321.

Petitioner’s assertion of a right to the salary and fees
incident to the office of judge of the probate court of Cook
County, if adopted, would be in violation of the constitu-
tional prohibition against any increase or decrease in the
salary or compensation of a judge during his term of office.
In Cummings v. Smith, 368 Ill. 94, although it was held
that a county may be compelled to pay the legitimate ex-
penses of travel, upkeep and maintenance of outside judges .
holding court in such county under the statutes providing
for the interchange of judges, without violating -the con-
stitutional prohibition as to additional salary or compensa-
tion, it was readily conceded that any increase or decrease
in the salary or compensation of a judge during his term
of office was prohibited by the constitution. Section 16 of
article VI, providing for salaries for circuit judges, im-
poses the prohibition as to increase or decrease in salaries
during the judge’s term as to circuit judges. Section 25
of the same article imposes the same limitation as to judges
of the superior and circuit courts and State’s Attorney of
Cook County. Section 10 of article X of the constitution
provides that the compensation of no officer of any county
shall be increased or diminished during his term of office.
Section rz of article IX of the constitution provides that
the fees, salary or compensation of no municipal officer
elected or appointed for a definite term of office shall be
increased or diminished during such term. It is readily

100 ee

apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions and
the decision in the Cummings case that the statute authoriz-
ing the clerk of a court to appoint a county or probate
judge from some other county to the office of judge vacated
by death, together with the right to the salary of such office,
would be unconstitutional as authorizing an increase in
salary of a county or probate judge during such judge’s
term of office.

In the light of the foregoing constitutional provisions,
the statute in question cannot be construed as conferring
power on the clerk of the probate court to confer the title
to the office of judge of the probate court of Cook County
upon petitioner without clearly rendering such statute un-
constitutional.

However, such statute is susceptible of a construction
which does. render it valid and constitutional. For many
years there have been statutes which permit the interchange
.of judges not only in the county and probate courts but
also in the superior and circuit courts. (IIL Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 37, pars. 72.29, 297, 298, 338, 368, and 452.) In
fact, at the time of Judge Waugh’s death the petitioner
was sitting as a judge of the probate court of Cook County
at the request of Judge Waugh, pursuant to such inter-
change statute. Such statutes have consistently been held
constitutional. (City of Moline v. Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy Railroad Co. 262 Ill. 52; American Badge Co. v.
Lena Park Improvement Assn. 246 Ill. 589; American Car
and Foundry Co. v. Hill, 226 Ill. 227; Pike v. City of Chi-
cago, 155 Ill. 656; Jones v. Albee, 70 Ill. 34.) In the City
of Moline case the court in its opinion pointed out that the
terms “court” and “judge of the court” were not synony-
mous. The constitutionality of the same statutory provision
here in question was there considered, and the court held it
constitutional, pointing out that there was an analogy be-
tween the section under consideration and the statutes pro-
viding for interchange of circuit judges which had been

a  (

previously held constitutional. Such decision in the City of
Moline case is predicated primarily and basically upon the
reasoning that a judge called in to serve in another court
does not thereby acquire any title to the office of judge of
the court into which he is called, but retains his original
title of judge of the court to which he has been elected and
merely sits temporarily in and holds the other court under
such circumstances.

In Pike v. City of Chicago, 155 Ill. 656, the court, after
extensive consideration of the development of the various
statutes authorizing judges to interchange with each other
and to hold court in the same county at the same time, pro-
ceeded to consider the statutory enactment here in question.
After setting forth verbatim the principal section of the
act here in question, which has been in existence since its
enactment in 1885 to the present time, the court said, at
page 662: “Prior to 1885, when a county or probate judge
had died or had resigned or when there was some sudden
inability which might impair the mental powers of the
judge, there was no statute under which the court could
be held by a judge from another county until the difficulty
could be removed. This act was intended to remedy the
supposed defect in the statute, and also make provision
under which probate judges might hold county court and
county judges hold probate court. This, as we understand
the statute, is its real scope and purpose. Where the county
judge was dead or had resigned, or was afflicted with some
malady, so that he could not call upon a judge from an-
other county to come to his assistance, as might be done
under the act of 1879 where the judge was in the discharge
of his duties and desired assistance, it was very proper that
the legislature should enact a statute to remedy the sup-
posed evil. The third section of the act shows, plainly
enough, the purpose of the act. There had been a death,
and the legislature thought it wise to enact a law so that
court might be held until a successor could be elected by

102 |

the people.” The third section .of the act referred to in
such quotation clearly shows the purpose of the statute and
provides as follows: “Whereas, there has been a recent
death of a county judge, and a necessity thereby created to
authorize a county judge or probate judge to perform the
duties of the office of such deceased judge; therefore, an
emergency exists and this act shall be in force from and
after its passage.”

At the time of the passage of the statute here in ques-
tion, there were in existence statutes providing for the inter-
change of judges on request of a judge of a certain court.
However, there was no provision for one judge to substi-
tute for another and to perform the duties of office of
another judge in the event of an emergency creating a
vacancy in such judgeship, during the necessary time lapse
between the occurrence of such vacancy and the filling of
the vacancy in the manner provided by the constitution. The
earlier statutes for interchange of judges had been held
constitutional and interpreted as not vesting the visifing
judge with any title to office of judge of the court in which
he was serving, but merely as vesting him with power to
perform a judge’s duties temporarily therein. It is apparent
that the General Assembly, in conferring upon the clerk of
a county or probate court the power to call any sitting
county or probate judge to transact the business of a county
or probate court where the incumbent has either died, re-
signed or was unable to perform his duties, contemplated
the continuance of the court functions in an emergency
period on the same basis as the interchange of judges was
accomplished. No judge of the court being present to
request such interchange, the legislature has authorized the
court officer next most likely to know the needs and
demands of the court to make such call in order to meet
the public needs and to keep the court functioning until the
Governor has an opportunity to fill the vacancy pursuant

es  —{C

to notification of the vacancy by the clerk of the court
under the provisions of section 24 of the Probate Court
Act. (Ill Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 37, par. 321.) Under such
circumstances, the visiting judge called in by the clerk of
the court does not succeed to the title or office of judge of
the court which he is holding, but, on the contrary, the
clerk of the court succeeds to the powers of the incumbent
to call such judge or judges as may be necessary to prop-
erly meet the demands of the public upon such court on
a temporary basis. The rule of statutory construction set
forth in section 1.03 of the Statutory Construction Act,
(I. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 131, par. 1.03,) that words
importing the singular number may extend and be applied
to several persons or things, and words importing the
plural number may include the singular, justifies such in-
terpretation and achieves what we contemplate was the
intent of the General Assembly in passing the statute.

It is well established by decisions of this court that
where a statutory enactment is susceptible of two construc-
tions, one of which will render the same unconstitutional
and the other of which would constitute a valid enactment,
it is the duty of the court to adopt the construction which
favors the validity of the statute. People ex rel. Royal v.
Cain, 410 Ill. 39; People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusher, 411 Ill.
535; People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25; People v. Dale,
406 Ill, 238.

We are thus constrained to refuse petitioner’s claimed
construction of the statute in question as one which would
render it unconstitutional, and, on the contrary, hold that
the words “designate and call,” as used in the statute in
question, do not mean appointment nor do they confer upon
the judge who is designated and called the right or title of
office of judge of the probate court; that petitioner has
shown no title to the office; and that petitioner has shown
no right to the relief prayed.

104 ee

This case was argued, submitted, and decided at the
March term, 1953, and an order was entered denying the
writ of mandamus. This opinion 3 is filed in pursuance of
the announcement then made.

Writ denied.

PC
Oo. 32715

C. E. Harpin, Director of Revenue, Appellant, vs.
SatvatorEe A. Scorrt, Appellee.

Announced March 26, 1953—Opinion filed April 21, 1953—
Rehearing denied May 19, 1953.

105

Latnam Castix, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Ben W. HEtnemAN, and Josep D. Bock, both of Chi-
cago, of counsel,) for appellant.

Grorce M. Crane, and Lawrence A. Berman, both
of Chicago, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

November 21, 1952, the circuit court of Cook County
denied the petition of C. E. Halpin, as Director of Revenue
of the State of Illinois, to compel appellee, Salvatore A.
Scotti, to answer certain questions propounded to him in
an investigation then being conducted under section 10 of
the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap.
120, par. 453.10.) Appellant, Halpin, sought to compel
Scotti to answer said questions by invoking the immunity
provisions of section toa of the act. It is asserted that the
reason for the court’s denial of the petition to compel
appellee to answer said questions was that the statute relied
upon was unconstitutional, hence the appeal is brought here
directly.

On November 28, 1951, C. E. Halpin appointed one
Ben W. Heineman as an investigation officer of the Depart-
ment of Revenue to conduct an investigation pursuant to
section 10 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act. The purpose

106 ee

of the investigation was to determine what improvements
should be made in connection with the collection of the
tax imposed by the act, the enforcement of its various pro-
visions, and the rules and regulations of the Department,
to the end that any repetition of a recent counterfeiting of
tax-meter impressions might be prevented. He was also
directed to inquire into the extent to which counterfeiting
of tax-meter impressions had been carried on in Illinois,
and the extent to which such activity had been conducted
by licensed and unlicensed distributors and jobbers.

In the course of the investigation the Department issued
a subpoena, pursuant to section 10 of the act, commanding
appellee to appear before the Department, and served the
same upon him. Upon his appearance, Heineman asked him
various questions which he refused to answer, claiming his
constitutional privilege against self incrimination. ‘There-
after, on February 29, 1952, Halpin, pursuant to section 7
of the act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 120, par. 453.7,)
filed a sworn petition in the circuit court of Cook County
seeking an order compelling appellee to answer the ques-
tions put to him by the Department of Revenue. The peti-
tion set forth the above facts and the applicable provisions
of section roa, purporting to give appellee immunity from
any criminal penalty on account of any testimony he might
give. The petition sought the attendance of the appellee on
March 5, 1952. Summons was issued on March 3 return-
able on April 7 or April 21, 1952. Appellee was served
March 7, 1952. No answer or pleading was filed to this
petition on the return day or at any other time. There-
after, appellee was personally served with a notice that on
November 21, 1952, the appellant would present a motion
for entry of an order in accordance with the prayer of the
petition. Appellee appeared through his attorney and argu-
ment was had before the presiding judge. The court denied
the petition. Appellant then moved to vacate the order
denying the petition and to compel appellee to answer spe-

Ss 101

cific questions. That motion was also denied by the circuit
court.

Appellee contends that no constitutional question is
presented by this appeal, and hence the jurisdictional re-
quirements necessary for a direct appeal are not met. An
examination of the record presented here completely refutes
appellee’s contentions. Throughout the course of the argu-
ment before the court on the petition, the appellee con-
tinually attacked the immunity provision of the act as
unconstitutional, while petitioner sought to sustain its
validity. Moreover, the express reason given by the court
for its denial of the petition was that the act was uncon-
stitutional, as evidenced by the following statement:

“If the statute is as you contend it is, namely, all in-
clusive, that this person may be made to testify against
himself or anybody else involuntarily, it is unconstitutional.”
In response to appellant’s further question the court affirmed
that such was its holding. Clearly, the constitutionality of
section 10a of the act was presented to the trial court and
that issue determined. The appeal is properly before this
court. IIL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. r10, par. 199; People
ex rel. Farwell v. Kelly, 367 Il. 616.

Section ro of article II of the Illinois constitution pro-
vides that “No person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to give evidence against himself.” No substantive
difference appearing between this provision and the like pro-
vision in the fifth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion, the provisions may be construed alike and United
States Supreme Court decisions construing the fifth amend-
ment are authoritative in construing the similar provision
of our constitution. (People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584.) Ap-
propriately drafted immunity statutes have always been held
valid both under the United States and Illinois constitutions.
(Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591; People ex rel. Akin v.
Butler Street Foundry and Iron Co. 201 Il. 236; People v.
Rockola, 346 Ill. 27.) In order to hold valid a statute

108 ee

requiring a person to give evidence which might tend to
incriminate him, the immunity afforded must be broad
enough to protect him against all future punishment for
any offense to which the evidence relates. When, because
of an immunity statute, testimony cannot be used as a
basis for or in aid of a prosecution against the witness,
which might be followed by any criminal penalty, the rea-
son for the rule permitting a witness to refuse to give evi-
dence or to be a witness against himself is destroyed, and
such privilege cannot be claimed. (People v. Butler Street
Foundry.) The purpose of the constitutional provision that
a witness may not be required to give evidence against
himself is to protect the witness from prosecution and pun-
ishment on his own testimony. It is not the purpose of this
constitutional provision to save a witness from embarrass-
ment, disgrace or opprobrium arising out of the exposure
of a crime, and the fact that his answers may tend to de-
grade him does not permit him to refuse to testify. (People
v. Rockola.) When the court can clearly see that a person
is fully protected from the effects of his testimony he
should be required to give evidence, even though it may
show him to have been guilty of a criminal offense. People
v. Butler Street Foundry.

Section 10a of the act provides as follows: “No person
shall be excused from testifying or from producing any
books, papers, records or memoranda in any investigation
or upon any hearing, when ordered to do so by the Depart-
ment or any officer or employee thereof, upon the ground
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a criminal
penalty, but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any criminal penalty for, or on account of, any transaction
made or thing concerning which he may testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, before the Department
or an officer or employee thereof; provided, that such
immunity shall extend only to a natural person who, in

es 109
obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or
produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath.
No person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.”
(Emphasis supplied.) The plain language of section 10a
clearly renders appellee immune to prosecution or criminal
penalty for anything concerning which he may truthfully
give evidence. ‘The reason for the asserted constitutional
privilege thus ceases, and it cannot be claimed. The statute,
being coextensive in its immunity with the privilege guar-
anteed by our State and Federal constitutions, does not
offend that fundamental law, and its application here can-
not be invalid as a violation of that privilege.

Moreover, upon argument before this court, both oral
and written, the appellee concedes that section 10a of the
Illinois Cigarette Tax Act is constitutional. That being the
only ground upon which the lower court denied the petition,
this court has no alternative but to reverse the judgment of
that court and remand the cause.

The petition upon which appellant relies sets March 5,
1952, as the date upon which it is prayed that appellee
appear and answer the questions propounded by the De-
partment, That date being long since passed it is funda-
mental that appellee could only appear at a hearing held
upon some new and future date, as is the obvious intent
of appellant in pursuing this action. No prejudice will
result to appellee from an amendment of the prayer of
appellant to include the establishment of a new date for
the hearing. It is, therefore, both necessary and proper
that this court direct that appellant be allowed to amend
his petition to pray for the fixing of a new date for the
hearing, as authorized by section g2 of the Civil Practice
Act. II. Rev. Stat, 1951, chap. 110, pars. 216, 259.50.

This cause was argued, submitted, and decided at the
March term, 1953, and an order was entered reversing the
judgment and remanding the cause to the circuit court of

110 es

Cook County with directions to allow the appellant to
amend his petition to pray for the fixing of a new date
for the hearing upon the answering of questions to be pro-
pounded to appellee, Scotti, and to proceed in accordance
with law. This opinion is filed in pursuance of the announce-
ment then made.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

PC
Co,

Granp Leaper DEpartmEn't Store, Inc., Appellant, vs.
Tue Department or Lazor, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Jacozson, NiERMAN & Su.BERt, of Chicago, (Sipwey
C, Nrzerman, Davin Srizert, and Arraur ALTscHUL, of
counsel,) for appellant.

Ivan A. Exxiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Wiiam C. Wines, Raymonp S. Sarnow, and A. Zona
Groves, of counsel,) for appellee.

Cee

Mr, Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant, who is Grand Leader Department Store, Inc.,
a corporation, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook
County for review of administrative proceedings held in
the Unemployment Compensation Division of the Illinois
Department of Labor, wherein a decision was entered
assessing appellant for contributions to the tmemployment
compensation fund for the years 1946, 1947 and 1948.
The circuit court affirmed the decision and entered judg-
ment against appellant for $7118.09, being the amount of
the assessment for the three years plus interest and penalties.
This appeal has followed.

The decision of the Department in the administrative
proceedings was bottomed on a finding that appellant was
an employing unit within the meaning of section 2(a) of
the Unemployment Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, chap. 48, par. 218(d),) and thus an employer liable
for contributions, and that the services of the disputed em-
ployees was employment rendered for appellant within the
meaning of section 2(f)(1). (Ill Rev. Stat. 1947, chap.
48, par. 218(f)(1).) The Department reasserts those
claims in this appeal and, in addition, contends that the
services rendered by the employees to appellant were not
stich services as are exempted by section 2(f)(5). Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1945, chap. 48, par. 218(f) (5).

The decisive issue is whether appellant is the employ-
ing unit of the employees of various concessionaires who
lease space in the appellant store. There is little dispute as
to the material facts, but contest arises on the interpretation
to be given them. In 1938, appellant leased from others a
store building in the city of Chicago, consisting of a base-
ment and two upper floors, for a term of twenty years at
a fixed monthly rental. This lease provided that appellant
could sublet any or all of the space in the building to one
or more persons, as it saw fit, for the purpose of selling
merchandise. The appellant corporation did not thereafter

ee

engage in the business of selling merchandise itself but
entered into leases with divers parties wherein floor space
was assigned to each lessee for the sale of clothing, cos-
metics, liquor, groceries and the like. Throughout the
record these lessees are referred to as concessionaires and
hereafter we shall also use that designation, ‘

The leases entered into by appellant and the conces-
sionaires provided that the rental to be paid appellant was,
in every instance, a certain per cent of the concessionaire’s
gross sales. In addition it was provided that appellant
would be paid three per cent of such salés to be used for
advertising expense. Further provisions were that appellant
would furnish all heat, water, janitor and wiridow-trim-
ming services ; that the concessionaires would observe orders
and directions of a store manager, to be named and em-
ployed by appellant, who would allot window and advertis-
ing space to each concession, fix the store hours and examine
the cash registers on each day to ascertain the amount of
sales; that the parties agreed and understood that their
relationship at all times should: be that of landlord and
tenant; and that appellant retained the right to terminate
its relation with the concessionaire upon sixty days’ notice.

Other evidence discloses that each concessionaire paid
his own employees without contribution from appellant and
deducted social security and income tax from their wages.
Each concessionaire hired and discharged his own em-
ployees, the only measure of control in appellant in such
function being a provision in the lease that appellant could
insist upon the discharge of a dishonest employee. Each
concessionaire paid his own fire, workmen’s compensation
and public liability insurance and, where required, the indi-
vidual concessionaire applied and paid for his own city,
State or Federal license. The same was true of the occu-
pational tax on sales made by the separate concessions. The
income tax returns of appellant were separate and apart
and appellant paid tax only on its income from the rentals.

SS

In this respect, the concessionaires did not share in the cor-
poration’s profits or losses, nor it in theirs. It is shown, too,
that appellant paid wages and the taxes incident thereto,
only to its manager, janitor and one office clerk.

Further evidence appearing in the record is that the
name “Grand Leader Department Store” appears on a sign
in front of the building; that the same name is the only
one used in store advertising; that some of the concessions
used sales slips with the store name printed on them; that
the slips could be presented to a clerk hired by appellant
for the purpose of getting trading stamps redeemable at
any concession in the store; and that the telephone number
for the store was listed in appellant’s name.

No single concessionaire had the requisite six employees
to make him liable for contributions under the act and the
number of employees to whom appellant paid wages was
also less than six. Combined, however, the total number
of persons employed in the store for wages amounted to
more than six and it is upon this combined total that the
assessment against appellant was based. It is the Depart-

- ment’s contention that appellant and the concessionaires
were jointly engaged in the operation of a department
store and that persons hired by the concessionaires to work
in their concessions were performing services for both
appellant and the concessionaires, thus making appellant an
employing unit under the terms of the act. In support of
that position, the Department points to the facts and asserts
that appellant’s business was not that of leasing space to
a nuthber of independent and unrelated concessionaires but,
through the means of fifteen integrated concessions, was
that of operating a general department store under its
name, management and control. Appellant, on the other
hand, argues that the use of its mame on the store and
some sales slips, the functions of its manager, its control
of advertismg and window dressing, its handling of ad-
justments and complaints, fixing of store hours, etc., do

Le

ee

not establish a joint operation making appellant liable under
the act as the employer of the concessionaires’ employees.

We have not, to our knowledge, ever been called upon
to determine who is the employer under the same or a
similar factual situation. Somewhat comparable business
arrangements have been considered in other jurisdictions
under their unemployments acts and it was held that appel-
lant’s counterparts in those cases were employers liable for
unemployment contributions. The Department offers those
decisions as a guide in this case, and chief among them
are Levy's Ladies Toggery, Inc. v. Bryant, 183 Tenn. 372,
192 S.W. 2d 833; Goldsmith & Sons v. Hake, 187 Tenn.
91, 213 S.W. 2d 15, and Union Dry Goods Co. v. Cook,
zt Ga. App. 708, 32 S.E. 2d 190, Our examination of the
cited cases leads us to conclude that there are substantial
differences both in the facts and statutes involved, which
cause them to be of doubtful application. In the Levy case,
the court found the contract between the parties to be a
convenient agreement for the operation of a department
store since the licensor received all of the cash for sales
made, kept books, and accounted to the licensee for his
percentage at stated periods after paying, for the licensee’s
account, all salaries, advertising and insurance. The Gold-
smith case presented a situation where the agreement pro-
vided that the store management should handle all funds,
keep the books, records and accounts and make settlement
at stated times, retaining for the company the percentage
agreed upon. The Union Dry Goods case is not substan-
tially different, for there again the lessee agreed to deliver
all cash from sales to the lessor’s cashier as soon as the
sales were made, to be retained until the tenth day of the
month when it was turned over to the lessee after deducting
the agreed rental and monies advanced by the lessor for
advertising, wages, delivery, transportation and other ex-
pense. In all three cases, we find that the employees of the
management performed services for each of the depart-

ee

ments by keeping their account books and handling credit
matters.

The controls exercised by appellant in the present case
do not extend to the extremes of those in the cases relied
upon. Appellant did not at any time handle the cash, ac-
counting or credit matters of the concessionaires nor did
it agree to such an arrangement. ‘Those matters remained
solely in the hands of the concessionaires. Appellant did
not pay the employees out of its rentals from the sale of
merchandise and, in fact, did not pay them at all. No em-
ployee could claim, as was mentioned by the court in one
of the cited cases, that the store management owed him
wages at any time. Another factor to be considered is that
in the present case, the appellant took its rentals from a
percentage of the gross receipts, leaving the concessionaire
to pay all expenses, wages, taxes, licenses and insurance
incidental to the operation of the concession. Such an ar-
rangement is entirely incompatible with the concept of
joint operation, and its importance is borne out by the
fact that it was this feature of the business arrangements
considered in the cited cases which was determinative of
the court’s conclusions that the parties were engaged in
the joint operation of the stores involved.

Insofar as the Tennessee cases are concerned, another
distinguishing factor is that the assessment against the
department stores was made by virtue of a provision in
its statute whereby employers under the act are also deemed
to be employers of the employees of any persons with
whom they make contracts to assist them in their business,
unless the other party to the contract is also an employer
under the act. (Williams Code, Sec. 6901.19(e).) Illinois
has not had a comparable provision since 1945.

While factually different, this court’s decision in Mowry
v. Board of Review, 411 Ill. 508, is helpful in a determi-
nation of what controls may be said to impart a relation-
ship of employer-employee. The case was an action by

6 ee

unemployed musicians for unemployment compensation
and we held that, under the act, their employer was their
band leader rather than the hotel with which the band
leader had a contract. In that case the hotel had an énter-
tainment manager who exercised a degree of control over
the leader in integrating the orchestral music in prepara-
tion of floor shows and, further, the hotel, by terms of the
contract, deducted social security and income taxes for
each musician and reported the earnings of each to the
division of unemployment compensation. It was pointed
out, however, that these functions of the hotel were over-
shadowed by the fact that the band leader selected, trained
and discharged his own musicians, fixed and paid their
salaries, and shared his profits and losses independent of
the hotel. As a result we held that the band leader was the
employer responsible for unemployment contributions.

The circumstances relating to the employees of the
concessionaires are not substantially different. The con-
cessionaire hires his own employees, trains them, fixes
their pay and administers all tax matters incident to it.
The appellant performs none of these functions, gives no
other services and has no liability to such employees. -The
Mowry case, as others before it, states that the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act deals with economic realities.
It could only be by a torturing of the plain facts and by an
indulgence in technicalities not manifested in our statute
that we could hold appellant is the employer of these em-
ployees in any sense.

Nor do we think that such a conclusion is’ altered by
the circumstances of the relationship between appellant
and the concessionaires, There is no stiggestion that the
business arrangement of appellant and the concessionaires
is designed as a means of evasion or subterfuge, and we
believe, as the court did in Gabel Manufacturing Co. v.
Murphy, 390 Ill. 455, that the language of the leases,

SS

which fixes the relationships between them, must be given
the meaning which the words used imply. The leases, in
each instance, provide that the individual concessionaire
is to conduct his own business, at his own expense and
risk and that nothing in the lease is to imply a partner-
ship between the appellant and the lessee. This intent of
the parties is further given effect by the terms of the lease
which provide that rentals are to be based upon a per-
centage of the gross sales of a concessionaire and that
the latter have no authority to obligate appellant in any
manner. While the provisions which give appellant au-
thority to the degree that he may control advertising, fix
store hours and insist upon discharge of dishonest em-
ployees, go beyond the normal relationship of landlord
and tenant, we are not prepared to say, in the absence of
elements essential to a joint enterprise, that such authority
constitutes appellant a joint operator with the concession-
aires. Giving the terms of the lease their plain meaning,
it must be concluded that appellant is in the business of
leasing space and not that of operating a department store
jointly with its lessees.

For these reasons, our view is that appellant is not an
employing unit under the terms of the act and is, there-
fore, not liable for the assessments based on the employees
of the concessionaires. This result renders it unnecessary
to consider the Department’s contention that the services
rendered by the employees did not fall within the exemp-
tion of section 2(f)(5), or the contention of appellant
that the Department acted unreasonably and arbitrarily
when it assessed appellant for all the contributions and
assessed none against the concessionaires.

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is

reversed. Judgment reversed.

118 Po
(No. 32648

Marre Haprrasxi, Appellee, vs. Franx J. Hapgrasxt,
Appellant.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Earr, Witcox, and Joun P. Burrra, both of Chicago,
for appellant.

Tra D, Scuurtz, of Chicago, for appellee.

Mr, Justice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

Frank J. Haderaski, appellant, seeks here a review of
the decree entered in the superior court of Cook County,
wherein his marital status and property rights were ad-
judged contrary to his contention. A freehold being in-
volved, this court must assume jurisdiction. We will refer
to the plaintiff, Marie Haderaski, as appellee, and to the
defendant, Frank J. Haderaski, as appellant.

Appellee filed her complaint for divorce against appel-
lant on June 15, 1951, charging drunkenness and alleging
that one child, eight years of age, was born to the union;
that appellee and her two daughters by a previous mar-

es 119

riage had been gainfully employed for several years and
that the proceeds from such employment, in the main, went
into the hands of the appellee; that on September 6, 1944,
the appellee and appellant purchased a lot and frame shack
located on Fox Lake in McHenry County; that it was prin-
cipally her money that was used as a purchase price and
for extensive improvements made on the property; and that
the title to this real estate was placed in the names of the
parties as joint tenants. In the complaint appellee sought
a divorce, child support and the title to the Fox Lake
summer home.

The appellant, answering, denies that he and appellee
were lawfully joined in marriage on October 9, 1940, or
that he was married to her at any other time; and that
“as a result of said marriage there was born to the parties
hereto a child, named Diane, now the age of 8, or that
there was any other child or children born to the parties
hereto as a result of a marriage between them.” And he
further denies that it was appellee’s money used to purchase
the real estate involved.

Appellant also filed a cross complaint, alleging that on
October 9, 1939, the appellee had a husband living from
whom she was not divorced; that all real estate in the
name of appellee and appellant is equitably his and should
be so decreed.

Pursuant to an order of court, on August 1, I951,
appellee filed an amendment to her complaint, alleging
that she and appellant were lawfully married on February
13, 1944, in St. Lucy’s Catholic Church at Chicago. This
was denied by appellant in his answer thereto.

Trial was first had before the chancellor, without a
jury, to determine the validity of the church marriage.
Appellant contended in the court below and here that the
ceremony in the church was not a marriage, but was a
blessing of marriage. This contention was completely con-
tradicted by a document known as a church questionaire,

120 es

plaintiff’s exhibit No. 1, which appellant admitted signing
and which reads as follows:

“Q. 18. Are you entering this marriage freely and of
your own accord?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you being compelled by any person, circum-
stance, etc.?

A. No.

Q. Is your intended wife marrying you freely and
under her own accord?

A. Yes.

Q. Is she being compelled by any person, circum-
stance, etc. ?

A. No.

Q. Do you understand the nature and obligations of
marriage?

A. Yes.

Q. 20. Do you intend to enter a permanent marriage
that can be dissolved only by death?

A. Yes.

Q. 23. Are you entering this marriage without condi-
tion or reservation?

A. Yes.

Q.27. Do you understand that when you sign this
document you preclude the possibility of ever contending
that this marriage is invalid as far as you are concerned?

A. Yes.”

Plaintiff’s exhibit No, 2 is a marriage certificate signed
by the priest and two witnesses, which appellant acknowl-
edged seeing but said that appellee received both copies.

We are of the opinion that the chancellor properly re-
jected appellant’s contention on this issue. The rule in
Illinois as to the validity of a marriage without a license
is stated further in Puterbaugh Chancery Pleading and
Practice, 7th Edition, (Vol. 1, p. 631) as follows: “The
general rule in Illinois is that unless the Statute expressly

rs wi

declares a marriage contracted without the necessary paren-
tal consent, or compliance with other requirements to be
a nullity, such statutes will be construed to be directory
only in this respect, so that the marriage will be held valid,
although an infraction of the statute may entail penalties.”
Section 6 of the Marriage Act provides the necessity for
securing a license before marriage; it contains no provi-
sion, however, that any marriage without such license will
be null and void. (Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App. 5733
Springer v. Springer, 75 N.Y. S. 2d 471.) In the latter
case this language is found: “It is uniformly held in those
states in which a license is required that a marriage cele-
brated without a license, although the persons officially or
the parties, may be punished criminally, is valid unless the
statute contains mandatory provisions that the marriage
should be void.” Section 4 of the Marriage Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 89, par. 4,) sets forth the person or per-
sons ‘who are granted authority to perform marriage cere-
monies and under that section a duly ordained priest of
the Catholic church has the authority to perform a marriage
ceremony.

The same argument made by the appellant here was
urged in the case of Landry v. Bellanger, 120 La. 962.
‘There, the church marriage without a license was attacked
on the grounds that the husband intended merely a blessing
of a previously void civil marriage. In that case, as in
ours, the wife had a husband living from whom she was
not divorced at the time of her entering into her second
marriage; answering the husband’s claim that no new
marriage license was obtained and that the ceremony was
merely a blessing, the court, at page 964, said: “The priest
thought that, at the time of her marriage before the justice,
defendant had been divorced from her first husband, and
that as a consequence the first marriage was a valid mar-
riage in the eye of the civil law, though no marriage in
the eye of the church; and, as a consequence, he thought

122 es

that a new license did not need to be obtained nor a new
certificate, or act of marriage, be sent to the clerk of
court; but he considered that an act or record of the
marriage was necessary for the church, and accordingly he
made the following entry on the record of marriages of
his church, and caused the parties and two witnesses to
sign it, the church requiring only two witness and not three
like the civil law: * * * Learned counsel also argue
that the priest testifies that he understood that the parties
were already married civilly, and that all that was needed
at his hands was a religious blessing of their marriage.
It must be admitted that the Reverend Father is not as
clear as he might have been in his explanations; but the
foregoing extract from his testimony shows unmistakably
that the ceremony which had taken place before the justice
was no marriage at all in the eye of the church, and that
the ceremony which he performed was an actual marriage,
and not merely the offering of a prayer over an existing
marriage. The record which he drew up, in witness and
faith of what he had done, and which he caused to be
signed by the witnesses and the parties, was not the record
of a prayer or blessing over an existing marriage but, in
its own words, was ‘the present act of marriage.’ ”

Then the court proceeded to hear the evidence adduced
on behalf of appellee and appellant on the other issues pre-
sented by the pleadings. Although the proof was not very
heavy on the charge of drunkenness, we concur with the
determination made by the court that appellee should have
a divorce on that ground.

Appellant was a first and second cook on the New York
Central line running between Chicago and New York, earn-
ing between three and four hundred dollars a month. He
was thus employed for 18 years and was on the road most
of the time. The record discloses that his interest in his
family was negligible. From June 19, 1951, to November
of the same year, he paid only $24 for the support of his

es 128

only child. The court decreed that the real estate involved
equitably belonged to the plaintiff. The proof clearly indi-
cated that it was the product of her efforts and financial
contributions. The wisdom and fairness of this determina-
tion is readily apparent when it is considered that appellant
is relieved of all claim for alimony and his delinquency in
a child-support order was forgiven. Since their relationship
was no longer cordial and their conflicts irreconcilable, it
was certainly in the interest of harmony that their summer
home should no longer remain jointly owned.

The decree entered below also provided for child sup-
port and attorney’s fees. Appellant was ordered to pay $18
per week for the support of Diane and $250 for appellee’s
attorney. Like all other determinations made by the chan-
cellor in this cause, they are proper and should be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(No. 52657
Tue PEOPLE or THE State or Intmors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs, FRANK MuLrentn, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

124

Frank MUuLRENIN, pro se.

Ivan A. Enso, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurKnecut, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (JouNn
T. GanracHeEr, RuponPH L, Jangca, and ArtHur Man-
NING, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Hersuey delivered the opinion of the
court:

Frank Mulrenin, defendant below, was convicted in the
criminal court of Cook County of the crime of taking in-
decent liberties with a child of eight years. He now prose-
cutes this writ of error to review the judgment of that court.

On July 25, 1951, defendant was indicted in the criminal
court of Cook County on three counts. Of these, the first
charged him with committing an infamous crime against
nature upon a female person. The second count charged
that he took indecent liberties with a child eight years
of age. The third charged him with certain acts tending
to render the child delinquent. When arraigned, defendant
pleaded not guilty. With defendant’s acquiescence the public
defender was appointed to represent him. Upon being
brought to trial he waived a jury and submitted his cause
to the court. The State elected to stand on the second count
of the indictment, and the court found him guilty as charged
in that count. He was thereupon sentenced to the Illinois

rr 125

State Penitentiary for a term of not less than eighteen nor
more than twenty years.

Defendant assigns as error the fact that he was con-
victed of the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child
of eight years while the endorsement upon the face of the
true bill charged him only with the commission of a crime
against nature, the same crime charged in the first count
thereof. Defendant complains that he was convicted of a
“greater” crime than that charged on the face and in the
first count of the indictment, the penalty for a conviction
of indecent liberties with a child being not less than one
nor more than twenty years, and that for a conviction of
a crime against nature being not less than one and not
more than ten years. The endorsement upon the face of
the indictment does not charge the defendant with the per-
petration of any offense. Recourse to the body of the in-
dictment is necessary to discover the crime or crimes
charged. It is not required that the defendant be adjudged
guilty only of the crime endorsed on the face of the indict-
ment, but he may be convicted of any crime with which he
is properly charged within the body of the indictment,
though it be not endorsed upon the face thereof. (People
v. Woodward, 394 Ill. 433; People v. Sobucki, 387 Ill.
358.) Nor does it matter that the penalty of the crime for
which the accused may be indicted and convicted is greater
than that for the crime endorsed on the face of the indict-
ment. (People v. Sobucki.) Where they grow out of the
same act or transaction, separate and distinct offenses may
be charged in the same indictment and stated in different
ways, in as many different counts as are deemed necessary.
Unless it is shown that they do not relate to the same
transaction, the presumption obtains that they do. The
prosecutor need not elect upon which count he will rely
for conviction except when the offenses charged in the
different counts are actually distinct from each other and
do not arise out of the same transaction. (People v. Gray,

126 ee

402 Ill. 590.) However, in the instant case the State did
elect to rely only on the second count charging the crime
of taking indecent liberties with a child for which this de-
fendant was found guilty. Moreover, this case was tried
before the court on waiver of jury, the trial judge heard
the evidence and knew the crime for which he was finding
the defendant guilty. In the absence of a bill of exceptions,
the presumption obtains that the evidence was sufficient to
justify the finding of guilty of the crime of taking indecent
liberties with a child. (People v. Gray.) Moreover, the
offenses charged in the separate counts of this indictment
arose out of the same act and were properly included in the
same indictment. No question can properly be raised as to
the propriety of the indictment, the offense charged and
tried, or the conviction.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County

is, therefore, affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Pe
(No, 3266 ET

NELLROsE JARRETT vs, ROBERT JARREWT, Appellee —(ADA
Boccxss et al., Appellants.)

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

ee 187

L. A. Mesruorr, of Carrollton, Wiseman & CHap-
MAN, of Alton, and Rozeris & Kepner, of Springfield, for
appellants.

Joun B. Harris, of Granite City, for appellee.

Mr, Carer Justice ScHAEFER delivered the opinion of
the court:

The sole question in this case concerns the jurisdiction
of a circuit court to modify the custody provisions of a
divorce decree after the death of the spouse to whom
custody of the child was awarded by the decree.

A decree of the circuit court of Greene County entered
on May 26, 1949, granted Nellrose Jarrett a divorce from
her husband, Robert Nelson Jarrett, upon the ground of
desertion, and awarded: her the custody of their son, David
Nelson Jarrett, then two and one-half years of age. From
his birth the child lived with his maternal grandmother,
Ada Boggess, and her husband, Ernest Boggess, except for
a short time when he lived with his great-grandmother.
Each of the child’s parents remarried in 1950. The child’s
mother died in 1951 and his father filed a motion to amend
the divorce decree to provide that custody be awarded to
him until the further order of the court. The maternal
grandmother and her husband filed an intervening petition
seeking an order modifying the divorce decree so as to
grant the custody of the child to them. The father an-
swered the intervening petition, evidence was heard, and
an amended decree was entered awarding custody to the
maternal grandmother. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court
for the Third District reversed the amended decree and
remanded the cause, with directions to modify the original

128 ee

decree and grant the custody of the child to his father.
(Jarrett v. Jarrett, 348 Ill. App. 1.) We have granted
the intervenors’ petition for leave to appeal.

The contention of the intervenors is that upon the death
of a party to a divorce action the proceeding terminates so
far as questions relating to the custody of children are
concerned, and that the court thereafter lacks jurisdiction
to determine the custody of a child upon a petition filed in
the original divorce action, seeking to modify or amend
the divorce decree. They contend that habeas corpus is the
proper remedy. This jurisdictional issue was not raised
in the trial court but was urged for the first time by the
intervenors in their petition for rehearing in the Appellate
Court. The question of jurisdiction of the subject matter
may, however, be urged at any time either in the trial court
or in the reviewing courts. (Martin v. Schillo, 389 Ill. 607;
Burroughs v. Donner, 282 Ill. 299.) To sustain the judg-
ment of the Appellate Court, appellee urges that the Divorce
Act has conferred upon the court granting a divorce a con-
tinuing jurisdiction to make whatever changes in the cus-
tody of the child are necessary to his welfare, and that no
time limits are placed upon the exercise of this jurisdiction.

Section 18 of the Divorce Act, to the extent relevant,
provides that when a divorce shall be decreed, the court
may make such order with respect to the care, custody and
support of children as, in the circumstances of the parties
and the nature of the case, shall be fit, reasonable and just. *
It specifically declares: “The court may, on application,
from time to time, make such alterations in the * * *
care, custody and support of the children, as shall appear
reasonable and proper.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 40,
par. 19.) There is no express limitation of this authority
to the lifetime of one or both parties to the divorce action.

The intervenors’ position rests upon authorities from
other jurisdictions to the effect that the.court which grants
a divorce decree loses jurisdiction to amend: the custody

SS 129

provisions of the decree upon the death of one of the
parties. Many courts have so held, although the result is
frequently influenced by the provisions of their own con-
stitutions or statutes. (Hughes v. Bowen, 193 Okla. 271,
143 Pac. 2d 139; LeClerc v. LeClerc, 85 N.H. 121, 155
Atl, 249; Lindblad v. Peterson, 119 Neb. §11, 229 N.W.
885, (guardianship proceeding;) In re DeLeon, 70 Cal.
App. 1, 232 Pac. 738, (adoption proceeding;) Stone v.
Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N.E. 595, (habeas corpus;)
Barry v. Sparks, 306 Mass. 80, 27 N.E. 2d 728, (action
for board and lodging furnished the child of divorced par-
ents.) This view is described as “the prevailing rule” in
an annotation in 74 A.L.R. 1352, 1357. That annotation
also states that the contrary rule is supported by decisions
from five jurisdictions, including Illinois. (Stafford v.
Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 20 A.L.R. 827.) Other courts recog-
nize, either expressly or impliedly, the continuing power
of divorce courts to amend the custody provisions of their
decrees after the death of one of the parties to a decree.
Ellenburg v. Woodson, 131 Ore. 440, 283 Pac. 27; Purdy
v. Ernst, 93 Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429; Hill v. Hill, 49
Mad. 450.

Two cases give the flavor of the conflicting lines of
authority. In LeClerc v. LeClerc, 85 N.H. 121, 155 Atl.
249, a divorce decree had awarded custody of two of four
children to the father and two to the mother. Following
the father’s death, his sister petitioned the court which had
granted the decree for custody of the two children awarded
to the father. The mother sought custody of all four chil-
dren. An order was entered awarding the custody to a
third party. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
“When the joint rights of the parties were terminated by
the death of the father the problem of custody, so far as
it concerned the divorce court, ceased to exist, * * *,
The divorce laws gave the court no authority to consider
new questions then arising although similar in nature to

| |

130 ee

those previously passed upon, nor did they make the chil-
dren the permanent wards of the court. * * * For the
purpose of deciding who should have the custody of the
LeClere children after the death of their father, the divorce
proceeding was dead and the defendant’s [mother’s] ex-
ception to the attempt of the trial court to make further
orders therein must be sustained.”

In Purdy v. Ernst, 93 Kan. 157, 143 Pac. 429, the
statutory language with respect to modifying the custody
provisions of a divorce decree was substantially the same
as that of section 18 of our Divorce Act. After the death
of the father to whom custody had been awarded by a
divorce decree, the mother made a motion in the original
divorce action asking that the divorce decree be modified
by awarding her the custody of the child. Sustaining the
propriety of that procedure, the court said: “While the
power to provide for the custody of minor children will
be exercised in the first instance as a necessary incident to
the granting of a divorce, the welfare of the children thence-
forth becomes an independent subject over which the court
possesses a continuing jurisdiction. This jurisdiction may
be invoked by anyone interested in the children, or may be
exercised by the court on its own motion should circum-
stances require. The form of the proceeding is not very
material, but since a change of custody necessarily works
a modification of the original order it is proper to proceed
in the divorce action. The death of a party to the divorce
action cannot interfere. with the power of the court to
make suitable provisions for the custody of children as
changed conditions may demand, and no revivor is neces-
sary in order that such power may be called into exercise.”

Although the precise question has not been decided by
this court, the continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court
over the custody of children after the death of one of the
parties to the divorce has been implicitly recognized in
several cases. There are no decisions to the contrary, so

es 131

far as we are aware, although in like situations the custody
question has also been determined in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Habeas corpus was employed in People ex rel.
Good v. Hoxie, 175 Ill. App. 563, and in Smith v. Bruner,
312 Ill. App. 658, to determine the custody of children
after the death of the spouse to whom custody had been
awarded by a divorce decree. These cases, however, con-
tain no suggestion that the divorce court lacks jurisdiction.
Habeas corpus was also employed in People ex rel. Hana-
walt v. Small, 237 Ill. 169, and People ex rel. Burr v.
Fahey, 230 Ill. App. 143, but each of these cases strongly
suggests the propriety, at least, of submitting the custody
issue to the court which entered the divorce decree. “The
decree, [divorce decree,] until modified, is conclusive as
between the husband and wife and their representatives.
Circumstances, if any exist, which might move the court
to modify the decree cannot be considered in this proceed-
ing but should be presented to the court by which that decree
was rendered.” People v. Small, 237 Ill. at 172.

Stafford vy. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, involved both a
guardianship proceeding and a proceeding to modify a
divorce decree. The divorce decree had awarded custody
of a child to the mother and had found the father an
unsuitable person to have the care and custody of the child.
Thereafter, the child’s mother died testate, devising and
bequeathing all her property to him and directing that the
court appoint a guardian of his estate. Over the father’s
objection, the county court appointed a maternal aunt of
the child as guardian of his person and property. The
child’s father made a motion in the circuit court to open
up the decree of divorce with respect to the custody of the
child. He also appealed to the circuit court from the order
appointing the guardian, and the guardianship proceeding
was consolidated with the motion to modify the decree for
divorce. The court modified the divorce decree to award
custody to the father, and in the guardianship proceeding

182 |

appointed the atint as guardian of the property only. In
its opinion this court said: “That court [circuit court]
not only had the right and the jurisdiction to settle the
question [custody] in the first instance, but it continued to
have the right to reconsider the question upon proper appli-
cation and to make changes in its order as to the custody
of the child whenever new conditions warranted it under
the evidence produced. This right to modify the decree as
to the custody of the minor child from time to time, as
shall appear reasonable and proper, is expressly given by
section 18 of our Divorce act, which has been sustained
frequently by the decisions of this court.”

In Price v. Price, 329 Ill. App. 176, and Lucchesi v.
Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506, the court which had entered
the divorce decree modified the custody provisions of the
decree upon application after the death of the spouse to
whom custody had been awarded. In neither case was any
question raised as to the propriety of proceeding in this
manner or as to the jurisdiction of the court to modify
the decree.

This review of the Illinois cases indicates clearly that
rigid and mutually exclusive jurisdictional boundaries have
been neither fixed by statute nor established by decision in
proceedings involving the custody of minor children. Per-
haps sound policy would support the establishment of less
flexible jurisdictional lines. To make that determination,
however, is not the responsibility of this court. It is enough
for us that such implications as there are in our decisions
all support the jurisdiction which was exercised in this case.

The court which entered the decree in this case had
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the custody of the child,
whether the case in which it exercised that jurisdiction bore
the title of the divorce case or the caption of an independent
habeas corpus proceeding. (Cf.: Szewcayk v. Szewczyk,
320 Ill. App. 562, 566.) There is here no question of juris-
diction of the parties, for those who now challenge jurisdic-

133

tion voluntarily intervened and sought affirmative relief.
Like the Kansas court, we are inclined to feel that “The
form of the proceeding is not very material.”
We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not lack
jurisdiction.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
: Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justicy Hersey took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.

Ce
(No. 32:8

Lucy Buses ef al., Appellants, vs. Zora Hint, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Surman, SHuLMan & AzBrams, Myron K. Josxpx,
and Harry Grorcx, all of Chicago, for appellants.

LeRoy G. Cmarzes, and James G. Lemon, Jr., both
of Chicago, for appellee.

134 ee

Mr. Justice Hersuzy delivered the opinion of the
court: ‘

Certain heirs-at-law of Ponder Howard, deceased,
brought a suit in the superior court of Cook County
against Zola Hill, seeking to set aside, on the ground of
fraud and misrepresentation, a deed and an assignment
executed by plaintiffs and the remaining heirs. A hearing
was had, and a decree was subsequently entered dismissing
the complaint for want of equity. Plaintiffs appeal directly
to this court, on the theory that a freehold is involved.

It appears from the record that about three months
before his death Ponder Howard entered into a contract
with Amy M. Moore and Vernett B. Moore, for the pur-
chase of certain real estate. Under the terms of the con-
tract he paid $2500 down on a total purchase price of
$15,000, and agreed to pay the balance at the rate of $150
per month. About two months after his death his heirs
executed and delivered a quitclaim deed and an assignment,
purporting to convey to defendant their interest in the con-
tract and the real estate described therein. They also signed
an agreement with defendant that the deed and assignment
were given in settlement of a claim of defendant against
the estate of Ponder Howard, deceased. The deed and
assignment constitute the subject of this suit.

It is clear from this record that no freehold is involved
so as to confer jurisdiction of the appeal upon this court.
A freehold is involved for such purpose only where the
necessary restilt of the decree is that one party gains and
the other loses a freehold, or where title to the freehold
is.so put in issue by the pleadings that the decision of the
case necessarily involves a determination of that issue.
(Bennett v. Bennett, 318 Ill. 193.) It does not appear in
the case at bar that the purchase price under decedent’s
contract for deed has been fully paid, nor have the vendors
been made parties to this suit. The interest involved here
is merely a contract that a deed will be made after the

ee 135

completion of future payments. The word “freehold” does
not include the mere right to do that which in equity will
entitle a party to a freehold. (Moulopoulos v. Northern
Trust Co. 384 Ill. 41.) If the decree sought were entered,
plaintiffs would not gain and defendant would not lose a
freehold, nor, as between them, is the title to the freehold
so put in issue as to make a determination of that issue
necessary to a decision of the case.

The question of jurisdiction has not been raised by the
parties. It is our duty, however, to decline to proceed in
cases where jurisdiction to decide them is absent. The
appeal should have been taken to the Appellate Court for
the First District, and the cause will be transferred to that

court.
Cause transferred,

Le
(No. 3257)
THE Prorry ex rel, Lila F. Houghland, Petitioner, vs.
Cuaries W. Leonarp, Superintendent of the Illinois
State Training School for Boys, Respondent.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

36

Rozert M. Bett, and Burron H. Stone, both of
Rock Island, for petitioner.

Latwam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Wintiam C. Wines, Joan T. Cosurn, and Epwarp M.
Wurt, of counsel,) for respondent.

Mr. Carer Justice ScHazrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

This original petition for habeas corpus raises broad
questions concerning the validity of the provisions of the
Juvenile Court Act which deal with jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings arising under that statute, as well as narrower

ee | 37

jurisdictional questions arising from circumstances peculiar
to this case.

The petition is prosecuted by the mother and next friend
of Kenneth Moskaloff, a minor, who is held in custody by
the superintendent of the Illinois Training School for Boys
under a warrant of commitment issued by the county court
of Rock Island County. Kenneth’s parents were divorced
in 1944 by a decree of the circuit court of Rock Island
County. The divorce decree awarded custody of Kenneth
to his mother. In 1945, the county court of Rock Island
County declared him a “dependent” under the Juvenile
Court Act, and appointed a guardian of his person. After
vicissitudes not necessary to detail, the county court in 1951
found Kenneth to be a “delinquent” and ordered him placed
in the Illinois Training School for Boys at St. Charles.
Respondent, Charles N. Leonard, the superintendent of
that school, was appointed guardian of Kenneth’s person.

Petitioner first attacks the validity of section 2 of the
Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 23, par. 191,)
by which circuit and county courts are given “original juris-
diction in all cases coming within the terms of” that act.
It is argued that this statutory grant of jurisdiction is in-
valid because by section 20 of article VI of the constitution
exclusive jurisdiction over the “appointment of guardians”
is vested in probate courts in counties in which such courts
exist. Section 18 of article VI of the constitution provides
that county courts shall have original jurisdiction in all
probate matters, the settlement of estates of deceased per-
sons, the appointment of guardians and conservators and
settlement of their accounts, and in all matters relating to
apprentices. By section 20 of article VI the General Assem-
bly is authorized to establish probate courts and it is pro-
vided that such courts when established shall have jurisdic-
tion over the matters enumerated above. A probate court
has been established in Rock Island County, pursuant to

statute.

1

Petitioner contends that by sections 18 and 20 of arti-
cle VI, exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of guardian-
ship is placed in the probate courts in counties in which
such courts have been established, and in county courts in
all other counties. On this basis it is argued that the Juve-
nile Court Act is invalid insofar as it attempts to vest
jurisdiction over proceedings under the act in circuit courts,
and that since there is a probate court in Rock Island
County, only that court can have jurisdiction to appoint a
guardian over the person of petitioner’s son.

The argument thus made is based upon decisions hold-
ing that “upon the establishment of a probate court in a
particular county, the county court of such county is at
once, by operation of law, deprived’ of its jurisdiction in
matters of probate, and in all other matters over which
probate courts are given jurisdiction, * * *” (Klokke
vy. Dodge, 103 Ill. 125, 135; Meserve v. Delaney, tos Ill.
53; Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60; Bley v. Luebeck, 377
Ill. 50.) Because the constitution grants probate courts
jurisdiction over “the appointment of guardians,” and be-
cause the Juvenile Court Act provides for the appointment
of guardians, it is argued that jurisdiction of proceedings
under the act can be vested only in probate courts, or in
county courts in those counties in which there is no probate
court.

The Juvenile Court Act is a codification of the ancient
equitable jurisdiction over infants under the doctrine of
parens patriae. (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618.) Historically, courts of chancery, representing the
government, have exercised jurisdiction over the person
and property of infants’ to insure that they were not abused,
defrauded, or neglected. (Witter v. County Comrs. 256
Ill, 616; Cowles v. Cowles, 3 Gilm. 435.) As has been
pointed out, one method by which this general equity power
over infants was exercised has been the appointment of
guardians. (Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 364; Hohen-

EE

adel v. Steele, 237 Ill. 229.): But the broad objectives of
the Juvenile Court Act can be narrowed to an identity with
the appointment of a guardian only by mistaking method
for purpose.

The very title of the act suggests that it encompasses
a subject far more pervasive than the simple appointment
of a guardian. That title is: “An Act relating to children
who are now or may hereafter become dependent, neglected
or delinquent, to define these terms, and to provide for the
treatment, control, maintenance, adoption and guardianship
of the persons of such children, and to give to the courts
having jurisdiction of cases coming within this Act, juris-
diction to proceed with the prosecution and punishment of
the persons contributing to the dependency, neglect or
delinquency of children.” Nor is the fact that the power
authorized by the act is far more pervasive than is con-
templated by the customary appointment of a guardian of
a minor contradicted by petitioner’s assertion that the
act “basically functions through the instrumentality of a
‘guardianship of the person’ of dependent, neglected, and
delinquent children.” That observation simply underscores
the mistaken identification of method with purpose which
characterizes petitioner’s argument.

The argument which identifies “the appointment of a
guardian” with proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act
entirely overlooks the concern of that act for the delinquent
child as well as the child who is dependent. Concern with
juvenile delinquency largely motivated the establishment of
juvenile courts. “It was believed that if children were
separated from adult offenders and the judge dealt with
the problems of ‘erring children’ as a ‘wise and kind father’
—~as the statute creating the juvenile courts sometimes di-
rected—wayward tendencies would be checked and delin-
quency and crime prevented or reduced. Under these laws
the child offender was regarded not as a criminal but as a
delinquent, ‘as misdirected and misguided and needing aid,

0 ee

encouragement, help and assistance.’” (Abbott, The Child
and the State, vol. 2, pp. 331-332, University of Chicago
Press, 1938.) This court expressed the same thought when
it said that the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is “to
extend a protecting hand to unfortunate boys and girls
who, by reason of their own conduct, evil tendencies or
improper environment, have proven that the best interests
of society, the welfare of the State and their own good
demand that the guardianship of the State be substituted
for that of natural parents.” Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill.
328, 340.

To demonstrate the difference between an ordinary pro-
ceeding for the appointment of a guardian by a probate court
and the deeper thrust of the jurisdiction exercised under
the Juvenile Court Act, it is necessary to enumerate only a
few of the points of difference between the two proceedings.
The statutory provisions of the Probate Act with respect
to guardians establish no means for effective supervision of
the conduct of the guardians. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 3,
pars. 283-298a.) The Juvenile Court Act, on the other
hand, provides’ for probation officers, for the placing of
children in homes, and for other appropriate alternatives
to the simple custodianship of a guardian. (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 23, pars. 195, 196, 198.) The interest of the
State in the entire proceeding is made explicit in section 9
of the Juvenile Court Act. (IIL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 23,
par. 198.) By way of contrast, in a guardianship proceed-
ing in the probate court a minor has the right to nominate
his guardian. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 3, par. 288.)
And, finally, section 9a of the Juvenile Court Act gives
that court discretion to permit the child to be proceeded
against “in accordance with the laws that may be in force
in this State governing the commission of crimes or viola-
tions of city, village, or town ordinance.” (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 23, par. 199.) Where this is done, the petition
under the Juvenile Court Act is dismissed. There is no

EE

comparable authority in the probate court to make a pre-
liminary determination as to whether the conduct of the
minor is to be treated as of a criminal character or whether
the petition should be entertained.

Further differences could be pointed out. Those enu-
merated, however, are, in our opinion, sufficient to refute
the argument advanced by petitioner that the entire future
development of the doctrine of parens patriae was intended
to be committed irrevocably and exclusively to county or
probate courts by the constitutional references to “the ap-
pointment of a guardian.”

Petitioner next contends that the continuing jurisdic-
tion of the circuit court over the custody of the minor
child under the decree of divorce entered in February of
1944 precluded the subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the county court of the proceeding brought under the
Juvenile Court Act. It is well settled that while the circuit
court initially awarded custody of the child to the petitioner,
the jurisdiction of that court continued for the purpose
of making, from time to time, such orders relating to the
child’s care, custody, and support as reason and justice
might require. (Jarrett v. Jarrett, ante; p. 126; Nye v.
Nye, 411 Ill. 408; Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104; Stafford
v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438.) Petitioner regards the county
court’s assumption of jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
Act proceeding involving Kenneth as an infringement of
this continuing jurisdiction. As a consequence, petitioner
states, section 2 of the Juvenile Court Act violates sction 12
of article VI of the constitution, which gives the circuit
court jurisdiction in all matters of equity.

The argument raises two questions: (1) May a county
court be given jurisdiction of proceedings under the act;
and (2) If so, may that jurisdiction be exercised despite
the continuing jurisdiction of a circuit court under a decree
of divorce? The first question is readily answered in the
affirmative. By section 18 of article VI the county court

2

is vested with original jurisdiction over the subjects there
enumerated, “and such other jurisdiction as may be pro-
vided for by general law.” The latter clause atthorizes
the General Assembly to vest equity jurisdiction in county
courts; and section 12 of article VI is not to be construed
to confer exclusive jurisdiction in all equity matters upon
the circuit courts. (State of Illinois v. Aiello, 317 Ill. 159.)
It follows that county courts may validly exercise jurisdic-
tion over proceedings under the act.

The other aspect of petitioner’s second contention rests
upon an assumed identity between the award of custody in
a divorce action and a proceeding under the Juvenile Court
Act. But the dissimilarity between the issues presented by
the custody problem arising in a divorce action and those
raised in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act is
readily seen. The divorce court is primarily concerned with
determining the fitness of the parents for the purpose of
awarding the custody of the minor child, with a view to
serving the best interests of the child, (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 40, par. 14; Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408; Buehler v.

” Buehler, 373 1. 626.) The conduct of the parents and their
relative suitability is the typical issue. The hearing under
the Juvenile Court Act, however, involves an inquiry into the
behavior of the child for the purpose of determining whether
the child’s conduct requires the active intervention of the
State. That intervention may consist only of periodic visita-
tions to the family home by a probation officer; but in
more serious cases it may require actual commitment to a
State institution, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 23, pars. 193,
196, 198.) The isstie is not which parent should have cus-
tody, but whether the interest of the State requires that
neither parent have custody.

Although the question is one of first impression in this
State, other courts have concluded that the jurisdiction
exercised by a divorce court in awarding the custody of
a child is fundamentally different from that exercised by

Ss |:

a juvenile court. The precise question was raised in In re
Hosford, 107 Kan. 115, 190 Pac. 765, in which the court
said: “The juvenile court, however, stands upon a very
different footing. It is specifically given jurisdiction ‘of all
cases concerning dependent, neglected, and delinquent chil-
dren” * * * The conditions under which it may take
control of a child and the manner in which it may exercise
it are quite different from those existing in the case of any
other tribunal.” The conclusion reached by the Kansas court
is in full agreement with the majority view. See cases
collected at 11 A.L.R. 147 and 78 A.L.R. 317.

The basic differences in the two types of proceedings
justify the conclusion that the prior and continuing juris-
diction of the circuit court over Kenneth Moskaloff, stem-
ming from the original decree of divorce, did not prevent
the county court from assuming jurisdiction of the pro-
ceeding under the Juvenile Court Act, Inasmuch as the
circuit court never did exercise jurisdiction under the act
over Kenneth, there can be no constitutional objection to
the county court’s initial exercise of such power over the
person of Kenneth. Section 2 of the Juvenile Court Act
does not impinge upon the jurisdiction granted to circuit
courts by section 12 of article VI of our constitution.

Concurrent jurisdiction over an identical subject mat-
ter in several courts is no novelty in our law. The process
by which the courts of King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and
Exchequer acquired, through the use of fictions not per-
mitted to be disputed, concurrent jurisdiction over most of
the common-law actions is commonplace to law students.
(Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, 2d ed.,
pp. 153, 156.) The problems which arise from the exist-
ence of concurrent jurisdiction are ordinarily solved by
judicial comity,—as they have been solved in the very area
of the law with which we are now concerned for more
than fifty years. That concurrent jurisdiction is undesirable,
and gives rise to problems which a more orderly scheme of

eS

court organization would eliminate, is immaterial. The
problem for us is not the formulation of an ideal judicial
system but the determination of jurisdictional boundary
lines in a system in which concurrent jurisdiction is a
familiar phenomenon.

Petitioner next asserts that a comprehensive reading of
section 2 of the Juvenile Court Act, which vests jurisdic-
‘tion in the circuit and county courts, with section 3, dis-
closes violations of the uniformity provisions of section 29
‘of article VI of the constitution. Those provisions require
that all laws relating to courts shall be general and of
uniform operation and that the jurisdiction and powers of
all courts of the same class or grade shall be uniform.
Section 3 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that “In
counties having over 500,000 population the judges of the
‘circuit court shall, at such times as they shall determine,
designate one or more of their number whose duty it shall
be to hear all cases coming under this Act.” Ill, Rev. Stat.
1951; chap. 23, par. 192.

Petitioner’s objection takes on several forms. First it
is insisted that because it fails to give jurisdiction of pro-
ceedings under the Juvenile Court Act to the superior court
of Cook County and to the city courts throughout the State,
section 2 of the act is unconstitutional. Section 2 does not
expressly confer jurisdiction upon the superior court of
Cook County. But we have consistently held that where
special statutory jurisdiction is conferred upon circuit courts,
the superior court of Cook County, though not specially
designated, acquires identical jurisdiction under the statute.
(People ex rel. Donovan v. Sweitzer, 330 Ill. 426; Cobe
v. Guyer, 237 Ill. 516; Jones v. Albee, 70 Ill. 34.) Since
section 2 thus operates to confer upon the superior court
authority to hear these cases, to this extent the constitu-
tional objection fails.

Petitioner then urges that the city courts, in the exercise
of continuing jurisdiction of the custody provisions of

EE

divorce decrees, are courts of the same class or grade as
circuit courts, and that under our holding in People ex rel.
Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, statutory provisions as to
the exercise of such jurisdiction must be uniform. In view
of the basic differences between divorce-custody hearings
and proceedings under the act, it is clear petitioner has
missed the mark. Petitioner concedes that city courts are
not of the same class and grade as circuit courts. The
conclusion is inescapable that jurisdiction of the more seri-
ous matter of dependency or delinquency may be vested
in the circuit courts without encountéring any constitutional
requirement that like powers be given to city courts.

Finally, petitioner asserts that section 3 cannot be read
otherwise than to vest the circuit court of Cook County
with exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings arising under
the act in that county. She maintains that this section oper-
ates to deprive both the superior and county courts of Cook
County of jurisdiction in these matters, contrary to the
uniformity requirements of article VI, section 29. In sup-
port of her position, petitioner relies on People ex rel.
Florek v. Fenelon, 224 Il. App. 213, and states that the
practice in Cook County for over fifty-three years has
recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court
of that county. We need not express an opinion as to the
correctness of the view expressed in the Fenelon case, nor
need we consider whether the alleged practice is more than
a common-sense application of judicial comity, for we are
of the opinion that the point is not properly raised in this
proceeding, originating in Rock Island County. Moreover,
even if petitioner’s objections were valid, only section 3 of
the act would fall; the balance of the act would not be
affected. Myers v. People, 67 Ill, 503; People v. Dickel-
man, 304 Ill. App. 482.

Sections 2 and 3 of the Juvenile Court Act, therefore,
do not contravene the uniformity requirements of article VI,

section 29.
az

6

The last contention is that the amended decree of 1951
which changed the status of Kenneth Moskaloff from a
“dependent” to a “delinquent” and provided for respond-
ent’s substitution as guardian of the person of Kenneth,
is void for lack of proper notice to petitioner and to Ken-
neth’s father.

The act specifically provides for original service of
process. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 23, par. 194.) This
original notice to the parents is jurisdictional, (People ex
rel. McEntee v. Lynch, 223 Ul. 346.) Upon a finding that
the child is dependent, neglected, or delinquent and the ap-
pointment of a guardian over the person of the child, the
guardianship under the act continues until the court other-
wise directs. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 23, par. 201.)
The statute, however, makes no provision with respect to
further notice to the parents during the continuing juris-
diction of the court over the child. Petitioner insists that
a requirement of notice to the parents of contemplated
changes in guardianship or status must be read into the
act. Upon this record, however, petitioner is in no position
to attack the amended decree for want of notice. In her
motion to vacate that decree, petitioner expressly admits
that she and her son were present at the hearing which
culminated in the finding of delinquency. Moreover, peti-
tioner’s motion to vacate the delinquency decree attacked
the merits of that proceeding. Petitioner’s actions constitute
a general appearance and a waiver of process. People ex
rel. Akin v. Southern Gem Co, 332 Ill. 370; Bangor Fur-
nace Co. v. Magill, 108 Ill. 656.

It is, therefore, the order of this court that the writ of
habeas corpus be quashed, and that Kenneth Moskaloff be
remanded to the custody of the respondent, Charles W.
Leonard, Superintendent of the Illinois State Training
School for Boys. Writ quashed.

es ur
(No. 32533 — ET

ALEXANDER Maxwett, Appellee, vs, Tumorny J.
O'Connor, Appellant.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Joun J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louis Karron, A. A. Panraris, Wiiam J. KarKa,
and Josrrn F. Fox, of counsel,) for appellant.

Mr, Jusricz Furron delivered the opinion of the court:

On May 6, 1952, the appellee herein, as plaintiff, filed
a petition addressed to the chief justice of the criminal
court of Cook County, directed against the defendant-
appellant herein, Timothy J. O’Connor, Commissioner of
Police of the city of Chicago, which requested the entry
of an order requiring the defendant “to immediately and
forthwith surrender and deliver to this petitioner all rec-
ords, fingerprints, files and all other memoranda pertaining”
or relating to two certain cases lately pending in the mu-
nicipal court of the city of Chicago entitled “People v.
Alex Maxwell, Gen. No. 49MCr19158, and People v. Max-
well, Gen. No. 49MC296s6.”

On May 9, 1982, the petition was allowed and an order
entered as requested, but requiring destruction in plaintiff’s
presence of the items sought, rather than surrender, and
delivery to plaintiff. The defendant filed a petition to

14s ee

vacate the order of May 9, 1952, which was denied, but
on motion of plaintiff, the order was amended to read
“return to said Petitioner” rather than “destroy in the
presence of the said Petitioner.”

Plaintiff alleged in his petition that two complaints were
filed against him in the municipal court of Chicago on be-
half of the People; the first complaint charging assault;
the latter charging him with carrying a concealed weapon.
He alleged that he was fingerprinted in each case after
being taken into custody. Attached to his petition were
certified copies of dismissal in each case for want of prose-
cution. Plaintiff sought in his petition to recover from the
defendant “all records of fingerprints and divers other
records, if any,” pertaining to the two cases above referred
to. The petition further stated that records, fingerprints
and divers other memoranda relating to the two causes of
action were in the custody and possession of defendant as
police commissioner of the city of Chicago.

The right of recovery as claimed by plaintiff was based
upon section 5 of division XVI of the Criminal Code. (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 780e.) This section gen-
erally requires, among other things, that all sheriffs and
police officers furnish to the Department of Public Safety
daily copies of fingerprints and other records intended to
be used for unlawful purposes, and of all persons who,
at the time of arrest, are in possession of firearms or other
deadly weapons. The section further provides that “All
photographs, fingerprints or other records of identification
so taken shall, upon the acquittal of the person charged
with the crime, or upon his being released, without being
convicted, be returned to him.” _

On May 27, 1952, the defendant filed a petition in the
same cause setting forth that no order was entered requir-
ing him to answer the petition of plaintiff nor was he
present in court on May 9, 1952; that no evidence was

149

heard or arguments made on behalf of defendant at the
time the order above referred to was entered directing de-
fendant to destroy certain records in the office of the
Bureau of Identification of the city of Chicago.

The petition of defendant further stated that the photo-
graphs and fingerprints sought to be released or destroyed
by the petition of plaintiff, Alexander Maxwell, were taken
in connection with an arrest and prosecution in the mu-
nicipal court of Chicago. The defendant’s petition further
contended that the criminal court of Cook County was
wholly without jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy
over the subject matter; and prayed that the order of
May 9, 1952, be vacated and that the petition of Alexander
Maxwell be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There was
no denial contained in defendant’s petition concerning his
possession of the fingerprints and other memoranda which
plaintiff asked to be returned to him. The cause was set
for further hearing on June 20, 1952, on which date the
motion of defendant to vacate previous order of May 9,
1952, was denied,

On July 10, 1952, the defendant, Timothy J. O’Connor,
individually and as police commissioner of the city of
Chicago, filed a notice of appeal to this court and there-
after filed application to have the notice of appeal operate
as a supersedeas without bond, which was allowed.

The chief errors and points relied upon by defendant
for reversal are (1) that section 5 of division XVI of the
Criminal Code is unconstitutional and void as being vague
and indefinite in violation of the due-process provision in
article II of the Illinois constitution; and (2) that the
criminal court of Cook County had no jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant or of the subject matter.

The only possible basis for direct appeal to this court
is defendant’s assumption that a constitutional question is
presented. Defendant did not, however, raise any question

150 ee

in the criminal court with respect to the constitutional
validity of section 5 of division XVI of the Criminal Code.
For the reason that a constitutional question is not involved,
within the contemplation of section 75 of the Civil Practice
Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 199,) the cause
is transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District.
Cause transferred.

PC
(No. 32525

In rE Crartes J. Micuar, Attorney, Respondent.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Pt Pe 151
Pe

Cartes Levrron, of Chicago, amicus curiae.
Howarp B, Bryant, of Chicago, for respondent.

Mr, Justice Daty delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a disciplinary proceeding which brings to our
consideration a report of the Board of Managers of the
Chicago Bar Association, acting as commissioners of this
court, wherein it is recommended that Charles J. Michal,
the respondent, be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three years because of conduct and practices
tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute.

The complaint made against respondent stemmed from
his relationship with his client Joseph Fakan, a lifelong
friend whom respondent represented and advised in legal
matters for a period extending from 1912 to Fakan’s death
in 1948. The sequence of events which have come under
scrutiny date from October 31, 1928, when Fakan’s first
wife died. At that time Fakan was engaged in a successful
undertaking and garage business and was the owner of
seven parcels of unencumbered real estate. On November
24, 1928, respondent prepared a partnership agreement
between Fakan and his daughter Lillian, which recited that
they were to be partners in the undertaking and garage
business, that each was to furnish an equal amount of
capital and that the profits were to be shared in the same
manner. There is some evidence in the record that the
agreement was entered into in order to placate Lillian in
her hostility to her father’s intention to remarry. Besides
preparing the agreement, respondent was also a witness to
its execution. On December 13, 1928, Fakan executed
three trust deeds on his property which were made to secure
accompanying notes in the sum of $40,000, These instru-
ments were also prepared by respondent and were acknowl-
edged before one of his employees. The trust deeds were

162 ee

not recorded until March 18, 1929, and, after recording,
were placed in respondent’s box at the recorder’s office.

On the day following the execution of the trust deeds
and notes, Fakan and one Stefanie Janous, a domestic thirty
years his junior who neither read, wrote nor understood
English, entered into an antenuptial agreement which had
been prepared by respondent at Fakan’s request. The agree-
ment recited that Fakan had established an undertaking
business with the aid of his children and that he was the
owner of seven parcels of real estate; that Stefanie was
possessed of no property and that she was aware that
Fakan’s property was encumbered to secure debts and
loans; that Fakan would furnish her with a home and
necessities and that she in turn would accept the sum of
$5000 upon his death in lieu of all rights of dower and
in full settlement of any and all rights she might have in
his estate by virtue of the laws of descent. In addition,
the agreement contained a signed statement by Stefanie
that its contents had been explained to her, that she under-
stood the agreement and would abide by it. An employee
in respondent’s office acknowledged the signatures of the
parties. On December 15, 1928, the day following, Fakan
and Stefanie were married, and lived together until his
death in April, 1948. Sometime subsequent to his death,
Stefanie found the trust deeds and the notes they secured
among decedent’s papers and delivered them to the re-
spondent. The notes had never been negotiated.

While there are other incidents of respondent’s conduct
yet to be related, we pause here to consider the events up
to this point. The inescapable conclusion to be reached
from the evidence related is that Fakan executed the trust
deeds, notes and the antenuptial agreement with the inten-
tion of defrauding Stefanie Janous, who was to become
his wife. As we view the report and findings of the com-
missioners, a determination of whether respondent’s con-
duct involved moral turpitude depends greatly upon when

ee 158

it can be said he became aware of the fraud that had been
practiced upon Stefanie. Respondent insists that he did
not acquire such knowledge until after Fakan’s death, when
Stefanie brought him the unnegotiated notes and in sup-
port of his position points out that, prior to Stefanie’s dis-
covery, he had filed an inventory in Fakan’s estate show-
ing that the real estate was encumbered by the trust deeds.
The amicus curiae, however, interprets the evidence, and
respondent’s testimony in particular, as showing that re-
spondent was either a party to the fraud or had knowledge
of it from the beginning. We shall not belabor the evi-
dence on this point, for the conclusions to be reached from
it are entirely circumstantial and do not, in our opinion,
establish to a moral certainty either that respondent was a
party to Fakan’s scheme or that he was patently aware of
its fraudulent purpose. Only clear and satisfactory proof
can justify a decision from which flows the grave conse-
quence of disbarment of an attorney and destruction of his
professional life. In re Donaghy, 402 Ill. 120; People
ex rel. Deneen v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94.

It does emerge clearly from the evidence, however, that
respondent was aware that the trust-deed notes had not
been negotiated and that Fakan’s property was not in fact
encumbered when the antenuptial agreement was entered
into. Respondent knew, therefore, or should have known,
that the disclosure of Fakan’s property was not such a
bona fide disclosure as is necessary to a valid antenuptial
agreement. He defends his conduct by saying that he fully
relied upon Fakan’s assurance that the notes were to be
negotiated. While we are not constrained to say that his
act made him a party to fraud, it is our opinion that his
loose handling of legal documents in such a manner that
his client could bend them to fraud is practice which merits
censure.

Continuing with the facts pertinent to the complaint
against respondent, we return to a date seventeen years

154 De

after Fakan and Stefanie were married. On that day,
October 15, 1945, Fakan executed his last will and testa-
ment, which document was drawn for him by the respond-
ent. By its provisions, Fakan bequeathed his personal prop-
erty and household effects to Stefanie and directed that she
have the use of his home, rent free, for three years. There
followed a bequest to her of $5000 reciting that it was in
full settlement of all her rights of dower and descent and
that it was made in conformity with, and in discharge of,
their antenuptial agreement. By other provisions, Fakan’s
business was bequeathed to his daughter Lillian in trust
for three grandchildren; a daughter, Anna, was given a
small bequest and it was directed that Lillian was to re-
ceive the residue of the estate. An additional provision was
that the legal services of respondent be retained by Lillian,
the trustee, and by Stefanie, the executrix.

Fakan died in April, 1948, and soon thereafter respond-
ent, representing Stefanie as executrix, caused the will to
be admitted to probate and letters testamentary to be issued
to her. He also prepared and filed an inventory and, there-
after, a petition for a widow’s award which was allowed
in the sum of $2000, although it was later set aside on
Lillian’s petition. Sometime after the award was allowed,
specifically in December, 1948, is when Stefanie purport-
edly found the unnegotiated notes and turned them over
to respondent. In January, 1949, Stefanie filed a renuncia-
tion of the will and respondent thereupon presented a
petition praying that she be appointed administratrix with
will annexed.

‘The next event of consequence occurred in March, 1949,
when Anna Fakan Caithamer, a daughter of decedent,
filed a complaint in the superior court to contest the validity
of the will, alleging mental incapacity of the testator and
undue influence by Lillian. Stefanie was made a party
defendant both as an individual and as executrix and,
acting in her behalf, respondent filed an answer which

es 155

denied that Fakan lacked mental capacity or that the will
was improperly executed. The answer did, however, con-
tain an allegation that Lillian exercised a dominant influ-
ence and control over her father and that he had feared her.

The final event which concerns us here came to pass in
May, 1949, when respondent, again representing Stefanie,
filed a complaint in the superior court to invalidate the
antenuptial agreement on the ground that it had been ob-
tained by fraud and to cancel the trust deeds and notes on
the ground that they were undelivered and without con-
sideration. Among other things, the complaint attacked
Fakan’s partnership agreement with Lillian as a sham. Its
prayer was that Stefanie recover all interests in Fakan’s
estate accruing to her as his wife and widow and that a
decree of partition be entered,

It was respondent’s activities after Fakan’s death which
generated the complaint against him and, after hearing the
evidence, the commissioners found that his conduct of
actively attempting to overthrow the validity of the ante-
nuptial agreement, the partnership agreement, the will and
mortgages made by his client, Joseph Fakan, constituted
unprofessional and unethical conduct, involving moral tur-
pitude, which tended to bring the profession of law into
disrepute. Respondent excepted to the finding of the com-
missioners,

Generally speaking, it is the contention of the amicus
curiae that respondent was disloyal to his client, Fakan,
and violated the canons of ethics when he attacked the very
legal instruments that he had drawn for the client and
when he drew upon privileged knowledge of his client’s
affairs as a basis for the attack. For his part, respondent
urges that the situation became changed when, after Fakan’s
death, he discovered that the notes had not been negotiated
and that it then became his duty to rectify the fraud that
had been practiced upon Stefanie. He reasons from this
that his actions in attempting to upset the will, the ante-

156 ee

nuptial agreement and trust deeds were ethical and proper,
and honestly motivated. Amicus curiae counters this con-
tention by pointing out that respondent first sought to over-
throw the will and antenuptial agreement by securing a
widow’s award at a time when he was not yet aware that
the notes were unnegotiated. From the limited knowledge
that this record gives us of the facts, circumstances and
basis of the petition for the widow’s award, we are not
inclined to construe respondent’s action as an effort to run
counter to the terms of the agreement, because we are
aware that it is oftentimes a mixed question of law and
fact as to whether the language of an antenuptial agree-
ment may be said to bar a widow’s award. (See: Yockey
v. Marion, 269 Ill. 342; Pavlicek v. Roessler, 222 Ill. 83.)
We shall not adjudicate that question in this proceeding and
we conclude that respondent was within legal bounds in
deviating to this extent from the terms of his client’s will.

There remains, however, the fact that respondent did
attempt, first, to cast doubt on the validity of Fakan’s will
by the allegation that Lillian exercised a dominant control
and influence over her father, and, second, to overthrow
the will, the antenuptial agreement and the encumbrances
his client had executed, by the complaint for partition filed
in Stefanie’s behalf. In both instances, as well as in his
testimony before the commissioners, it appears without
doubt that respondent drew upon confidential knowledge
of Fakan’s affairs to make the attacks, and created an
irreconcilable conflict in his loyalties by so doing. Canon 6
of the Canons of Legal Ethics of both the Illinois State
and Chicago Bar Associations, provides as follows: “The
obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity
and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also
the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from
others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.”
Still another guide in our consideration of respondent’s

| 151

conduct is found in an opinion rendered by a committee
of the American Bar Association, which states: “The attor-
ney should not attempt to nullify his own works. He drew
the instrument and cannot attack its validity after his client
has died and his services are sought by new clients. The
death of the former client does not release the attorney
from the obligation.” (Opinion 64, ABA Opinions of the
Committee, 1947.) Though not always arising in disbar-
ment proceedings, this court has had occasion to express
its views of the principle involved. In People v. Gerold,
265 Ill. 448, we commented that an attorney owes to his
client fidelity, secrecy, diligence and skill and that he cannot
undertake to represent conflicting interests or to discharge
inconsistent duties which may cause a breach of the trust
due his client no matter how honest may be his motives or
intentions. The same case states that it is a general rule
that an attorney is not allowed to divulge information and
secrets imparted to him by his client or acquired during
their professional relation unless authorized to do so by
the client himself. Similar principles are expressed in Peo-
ple ex rel. Livers v. Hanson, 290 Ill. 370; People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Assn. v. Sullivan; 279 Ill. 634; Strong v.
International Investment Union, 183 Ill. 97; and Farwell
v. Great Western Telegraph Co. 161 Ill. 522. That the
view in this jurisdiction represents the universal rule is
borne out by 5 Am. Jur, Attorneys at Law, sec. 268, where
it is stated that an attorney may not use in behalf of his
second client, and against a former client, information
acquired in the employment of the latter.

The record in this case admits of no doubt that re-
spondent represented Fakan, and Fakan only, when he
drafted the legal instruments involved. Loyalty to his
client alone should have prevented respondent from attack-
ing them after Fakan’s death, yet we find him further
deviating from his trust by using his knowledge of his
first client’s affairs to assist his new client. It should be

158 ee

remembered too that Stefanie’s interests are not the only
ones at stake, for others would suffer if respondent were
successful in upsetting Fakan’s studied and expressed plan
for the distribution of his estate. If the respondent sus-
pected fraud, as he said he did, it was, of course, perfectly
proper for him to advise the widow that she might have
been victimized, but it was his further duty to advise her
to employ other counsel to represent her in the matter. It
is only by. such a method that he could avoid the representa-
‘tion of conflicting interests and maintain his trust to Fakan.
The result of his failure to pursue such a course is made
manifest by this record. Respondent has placed himself in
a position where he is charged with fraud, where he has
sought to dishonor the services he performed for Fakan
and where he has been catised to use knowledge gained
from his former client in behalf of his new client. In so
dividing his loyalties and deserting the cause of his former
client, it is our opinion that the commissioners were correct
in finding that respondent was guilty of conduct which
tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute. As stated
in United States v. Costen, 38 Fed. 24: “It is the glory of
the legal profession that its fidelity to its client may be
depended upon; that a man may safely go to a lawyer-
and converse with him upon his rights in litigation with
absolute assurance that that lawyer’s tongue is tied from
ever discussing it; and any lawyer who proves false to
such obligation, and betrays, or seeks to betray, any in-
formation or any facts that he has obtained while employed
on the one side, is guilty of the grossest breach of trust.”
Where the confidence in the individual lawyer is abused,
as it was in this case, the profession suffers by loss of the
confidence of the people.

We think that respondent’s actions were something more
than “indiscretions,” as he describes them, and that his
failure to obey the profession’s standards of loyalty, trust
and confidence cannot be condoned, and merits suspension.

ee 159

However, in view of the fact that we do not impute the
fraud to respondent’s actions that the commissioners did,
and in view of his age, long practice and hitherto unchal-
lenged standing, we fix the period of his suspension from
the practice of law at one year.

Respondent suspended.

PC
No, 320°

Curcaco Housine AuTnoriry, Appellee, vs. GmzErt R.
Berxson et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Francis B. Strne, of Chicago, (BRENDAN Q. O'BRIEN,
of counsel,) for appellants.

Roszrt A, Snow, and Wit.1am H. Powen1, both of
Chicago, for appellee.

60 ee

Mr. Cur Justice ScHarrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of
Cook County, denying defendants’ motion to set aside a
judgment of condemnation. Jurisdiction is based upon sec-
tion 12 of the Eminent Domain Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 47, par. 12; see, also, Chaplin v. Commissioners of
Highways, 126 Ill. 264.

By an amended petition to condemn, filed on October 5,
1948, the Chicago Housing Authority sought to acquire
certain real estate, including a lot owned by defendants,
for slum clearance purposes. Defendants were served and
on November 12, 1948, filed an appearance by an attorney.
No pleading was filed on behalf of defendants, however,
and on November 14, 1949, their attorney was granted
leave to withdraw from the case. On December 19, 1949,
the case was called for trial as to the lot owned by defend-
ants, and petitioner’s attorney proceeded to select a jury.
The court then learned that defendants were not represented
by counsel and dismissed the jury. After advising defend-
ants of their rights and suggesting that they retain counsel,
the court continued the case. After subsequent continuances,
a hearing was had on January 16, 1950. The defendants
were not represented by counsel. Petitioner introduced evi-
dence as to the value of defendants’ lot, and the jury fixed
its value at $2700. Judgment was entered on the verdict
on January 16, 1950.

On April 6, 1950, counsel who had been retained by
defendants after the judgment was entered filed a motion
to vacate the judgment. The motion charged that the judg-
ment was void for lack of jurisdiction, and that certain,
facts existed which, if they had heen made known to the
trial court, would have precluded the entry of judgment.
The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion and
then entered the order appealed from, denying defendants’
motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation,

TE

Defendants’ principal contention is that the petitioner
failed to obtain the approval of the governing body of the
city of Chicago before acquiring private property for public
purposes, as it was required to do, and that this failure
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the con-
demnation judgment.

When the amended petition to condemn was filed on
October 5, 1948, there was no requirement that the govern-
ing body of the city approve the proposed land acquisitions
of the petitioner. On August 3, 1949, after the filing of
the amended petition but before the entry of the condemna-
tion judgment, section 9 of the Housing Authorities Act
was amended and the following provision was added: “If
the area of operation of a housing authority includes a city,
village or incorporated town having a population in excess
of 500,000 as determined by the last preceding Federal
census, no real property or interest in real property shall
be acquired in such municipality by the housing authority
until such time as the housing authority has advised the
governing body of such municipality of the description of
the real property, or interest therein, proposed to be acquired,
and the governing body of the municipality has approved
the acquisition thereof by the housing authority.” Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 67%, par. 9.

Defendants maintain that this amendment to section 9,
requiring approval by the city of Chicago of property acqui-
sitions by petitioner, applies to condemnation proceedings
instituted before but completed after the effective date of
the amendment, and that the city’s consent is a jurisdic-
tional condition precedent to a condemnation award. As-
suming, without deciding, that the amendment applied to
pending condemnation proceedings, defendants are still not
in a position to complain, because the objection was waived
by failure to raise it at the appropriate time. The objection
goes only to the right of the condemnor to acquire property
by eminent domain. It does not affect the general jurisdic-

a

ee

tion of the court over the subject matter of an eminent
domain action, It is settled that if a property owner wishes
to contest the right of a condemnor to acquire his property
by eminent domain, he is required to raise that issue before
a jury is empaneled to determine the award. (City of Chi-
cago v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. 331 Ill. 322; Lieber-
man v. Chicago and South Side Rapid Transit Railroad
Co, 141 Ill. 140.) In the present case, the objection to the
right of petitioner to take the property, first asserted long
after the judgment was entered, came too late. It is un-
necessary, therefore, to spell out the facts in the record
which, in our opinion, clearly show that the city had con-
sented to the taking of the property here involved before
the amended petition to condemn was filed.

Defendants also argue that at the time the judgment
was entered the petitioner had abandoned its plan for the
public use of defendants’ lot and that this fact, known to
the petitioner, but unknown to the defendants and to the
trial court, would have precluded the entry of judgment if
the court had been aware of it. It is also urged that peti-
tioner’s failure to disclose this alleged fact to the trial court
constituted fraud which justifies the vacation of the judg-
ment. These contentions rest upon defendants’ construction
of two ordinances of the city of Chicago.

The first of these ordinances, adopted January 26, 1948,
recites that certain areas, one of which includes defendants’
lot, are blighted and slum areas and designates these areas
as an integrated project for rehabilitation or redevelopment.
Concerning the use to which the property is to be put after
it has been acquired, the ordinance directs the city comp-
troller to purchase, at a cost not less than the amount ex-
pended by petitioner for their acquisition, lands “owned or
now in process of acquisition by” petitioner. The city
comptroller is then directed to sell and convey back to
petitioner all lands so acquired, “the consideration for such
sale to be the benefit that will accrue by reason of the

TE

accelerating of the clearance of slum and blighted areas
located upon said lands.”

The second ordinance was recommended to the city
council of Chicago by the petitioner on November 23, 1949,
and was adopted on March 2, 1950. As proposed, it author-
ized petitioner to acquire seven sites for the development
of ten thousand units of public low-rent housing, with
financial assistance from the Federal government. One of
the sites recommended, the “Medill School Area,” was
substantially identical to one of the areas described in the
prior ordinance of January 26, 1948, but excluded a small
strip of land in which defendants’ lot was located. As
adopted on March 2, 1950, subsequent to the entry of the
condemnation judgment, the ordinance approved the acqui-
sition by petitioner of two of the suggested areas for the
development of public low-rent housing projects. One of
these areas was the “Medill School Area,” described so as
to exclude defendants’ property.

We do not construe either of these ordinances as indi-
cating an abandonment of the public use to be served by
the acquisition of defendants’ lot. The amended petition
to condemn was based squarely upon the power vested in
the petitioner to acquire blighted and slum areas for re-
habilitation and redevelopment. (Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap.
67%, par. 9.), Concerning the use to which the land was
to be put after it had been acquired, the amended petition
stated: “* * * which real estate your petitioner will clear
of improvements and will sell or lease, for redevelopment,
or otherwise utilize, * * *.” There is no suggestion that
the land is to be used for housing projects after it has beer
acquired. Under our decision in Zurn v. City of Chicago,
389 Ill. 114, the clearance of slums is itself a public use
sufficient to sustain the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, regardless of the disposition made of the prop-
erty after its acquisition. Section 9 of the Housing Au-
thorities Act provides: “The power of eminent domain

ee

shall apply not only to improved or unimproved property
which may be acquired for or as an incident to the develop-
ment or operation of a project or projects, but also to:
(a) any improved or tnimproved property the acquisition
of which is necessary or appropriate for the rehabilitation
or redevelopment of any blighted or slum area.” Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1947, chap. 6734, par. 9.

The ordinance of January 26, 1948, recognized and
approved the land acquisitions in question as part of a
State-aided program of slum clearance. Its principal con-
cern, however, was with the use to which the land was to
be put after it had been acquired. It provided that the city
should purchase the land acquired by the petitioner, clear
it, and then convey it back to the petitioner for the develop-
ment of “standard housing projects.” As we read that ordi-
nance, the transactions with which it is concerned relate
only to the method of financing the acquisition of the slum
or blighted area in question and to the subsequent use to
be made of the property after the public purpose of its
acquisition, the clearance of a slum or blighted area, has
been accomplished. Neither the statute nor the ordinance
conditions the petitioner’s authority to acquire the slum or
blighted land in question upon the use to which it is to be
put after acquisition.

‘The ordinance of March 2, 1950, related to a Federally-
aided development of public low-rent housing projects cover-
ing two sites. One of these sites is substantially identical
to the area described in the ordinance of January 26, 1948,
but omits a small strip of land which iricludes defendants’
lot. Defendants’ argument is that the omission of their land
from this ordinance shows an abandonment of the contem-
plated use of their land for housing purposes. There are
two answers to this argument. First, the record does not
disclose any reason why the petitioner could not carry to
completion the State-aided program in the strip of land
including defendants’ property which was omitted from the

EE

Federally-aided development. Second, and more important,
the use to which the property was to be put after its acquisi-
tion did not affect the authority of the petitioner to acquire
it for the clearance of a slum or blighted area.

It follows that the circuit court of Cook County prop-
erly denied and dismissed defendants’ motion to set aside
the judgment of condemnation entered on January 16, 1950.

Order affirmed.

PC
No, 3268

Tux Pxorix ex rel. Herman Armanetti, Inc., Appellee, vs.
Tux Crry or Curcaco ef al., Appellants.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Joun J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louis Karron, and Artaur Macn, of counsel,) for
appellants.

Tuomas J. Finngcan, of Chicago, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Datiy delivered the opinion of the court:

The question presented for decision in this cause is the
validity of section 58.1-10 of the Municipal Code of the
city of Chicago, which makes the following provision: “No
projecting electric sign over public property exceeding 75
square feet in area of one face shall be erected except under
authority of a City Council order in addition to the regular
permit. Projecting signs containing less than 75 square
feet in area of one face shall not require council approval,
but five days’ notification shall be given alderman in whose
ward sign is to be erected. Council approval shall be re-
quired on roof or ground signs over 60 feet in height.”
Appellee, Herman Armanetti, Inc., a corporation, was re-
fused a permit to erect and maintain an electric sign larger
than seventy-five square feet in area of one face, which

ee 57

was to project over and above the public sidewalk in
front of its business premises at 5806 Milwaukee Avenue.
Although appellee’s application complied with all other
requirements of the ordinance relating to electric signs, the
commissioner of buildings refused to issue the permit be-
cause appellee had not secured a council order as required
by section 58.1-10. Appellee thereupon instituted a man-
damus proceeding in the circuit court of Cook County, to
compel the city of Chicago and its building commissioner,
the appellants here, to issue a permit.

Summarized generally, appellee’s petition alleged that
the ordinance, insofar as it requires council approval, con-
stitutes a denial of due process of law and an unreasonable
and capricious exercise of the police power. Appellants
answered, admitting the facts alleged but denying the in-
validity and constitutional insufficiency of the ordinance.
After a hearing on the pleadings, the trial court found the
issues for appellee and ordered a peremptory writ of man-
damus to issue. Because the trial court has duly certified
that the validity of an ordinance is involved and because
the judgment of the court necessarily embraced a decision
of the constitutional issues raised, appellants have appealed
directly to this court for review.

There is no dispute over the power of the city to enact
the ordinance in question, but a consideration of the con-
tention that the ordinance violates due process, and that it
is unreasonable, should be prefaced by some discussion of
the general considerations underlying the city’s authority
to act in this field. The fee in streets and alleys is vested
in the local municipality in trust for all the citizens of the
State; however, the General Assembly has supreme control
over them unless restrained by constitutional limitation.
(People ex rel. Hill v. Eakin, 383 Ul. 383; Heppes Co. v.
City of Chicago, 260 Ill. 506.) “Sidewalks” have been
held to be public ways within the meaning of the word
“streets.” (City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248;

18 ee

Carlin v. City of Chicago, 262 Ill. 564.) The basic purpose
of a street is to afford a way for traffic, both pedestrian
and vehicular, to the public, and the public is rightfully
entitled to the use of such thoroughfare free of all obstruc-
tions and impediments which tend to delay or obstruct
traffic or annoy the public in the use of the streets. (City
of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445; City of Chicago v. Mc-
Kinley, 344 Ill. 297.) ‘That the city might effectually carry
out its trusteeship over streets by regulating and controlling
their use for the primary purpose for which they are created,
the legislature has specifically delegated many powers to
municipalities. Among them is that contained in section
23-15 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 24, par. 23-15) which empowers corporate au-
thorities to “regulate the use of space over the streets,
alleys, other municipal property and public places of the
city, and upon payment of proper compensation, to be fixed
by ordinance, to permit the use of the space more than
twelve feet above the level of such streets, alleys, property
or places, except for purely private uses.” Upon the basis
of the foregoing principles and authorities, it has been held
that objects, such as advertising signs, which project over
a public sidewalk or street, are encroachments on the public
way, in the nature of a purpresture, which an abutting
owner has no, right whatsoever to erect and maintain, or a
municipality to permit, in the absence of special legislative
authority. (See: Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City
of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91; People ex rel. Faulkner v. Harris,
203 Ill. 272; Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Co. 340 Ill. 270.)
In the present case the legislature has specifically delegated
authority to the city to act in the field and there remains
only the question of whether the ordinance relating to elec-
tric signs is a reasonable exercise of that authority.
Appellee contends that the section of the ordinance re-
quiring council approval for signs exceeding a certain size
is repugnant to section 2 of article II of the constitution of

36°

Illinois in that it grants unlimited power to the city council,
to be exercised according to the whim or caprice of alder-
men, unregulated by rules or conditions. In taking up this
phase of the case we should glance at the position of the
party who attacks the ordinance. Appellee seeks to utilize
the space above a public way, a forbidden domain, to carry
out its own private enterprise solely for its own financial
profit. It has no inherent right to operate its business in
or upon the streets of the city and its right to erect and
maintain a projecting sign over a public way is permissive
only, and may be withdrawn at any time. In addition,
appellee is not being completely deprived of advertising its
business, even in the space over the public way, for it may
still erect a sign which is within the limits permitted by the
ordinance. Since appellee has no property right in the use
of the streets of Chicago for the location and maintenance
of his business or advertising, we cannot say that the ordi-
nance deprives him of liberty or property. (City of Chicago
v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619.) While to constitute due process of
law orderly proceedings according to established rules
which do not violate fundamental rights must be observed,
a general law administered in its legal course according to
the form of procedure suitable and proper to the nature of
the case, conformable to the fundamental rules of right and
affecting all persons alike, is due process of law. (Italia
America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill. 427; Punke v.
Village of Elliott, 364 Ill. 604.) The ordinance here does
not infringe upon this concept of due process for its affects
equally, and under like conditions, all persons who seek to
erect a sign in excess of the maximum.

It is contended, however, that the form of procedure
fixed by the ordinance is not suitable and proper to the
nature of the case and that it is unreasonable in making
the right to erect large signs dependent upon the permission
of the city council without prescribing any limitation for
the exercise of discretion in granting or refusing such per-

Oe

mission. It is appellee’s position that the ordinance vests
a power in the city council which need not be exercised
impartially but which may be exercised according to the
whim or caprice of the council, This contention of ap-
pellee is bottomed largely on Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town
of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, and Rohrback v. Cavallini, 210 Ill.
App. 182. In the Cicero case, there was involved an ordi-
nance which forbade all persons to take heavy vehicles on
certain boulevards, other than private vehicles conveying
families, except upon special permission of the town board.
In the Rohrback case, the ordinance prohibited the erection
of any building without fireproof walls in a certain area,
unless permission for other type walls was obtained from
the city council. In both cases the ordinances were held
invalid for reason that they in no way regulated or con-
trolled the discretion vested in the municipal legislative
body, thus clothing it with power to grant the privilege
to a chosen few while denying it to others not in a sub-
stantially different situation.

We believe, however, that there is one substantial differ-
ence between the ordinance involved in the cited cases and
the one with which we are treating here. In those cases the
ordinances sought to require council permission for citizens
to perform a legal act, that is, to use boulevards for traffic
in the one instance and to erect a building on one’s property
in the other. In the present case, the permission required
by the ordinance and sought by appellee, is to erect and
maintain an encroachment over a public way. Such a right
is not inherent in a citizen and the legislature has expressly
delegated to municipal authorities the power to regulate
and control the use of space more than twelve feet above
public ways. Such a distinction between the two types of
ordinances was made in Wilmot v. City of Chicago, 328
Ill, 552, and was held to justify a provision requiring
council approval. In the Wilmot case, the city, acting under
express statutory authority, passed an ordinance fixing the

ES 17
grade of all sidewalks and providing that council permission
was necessary to change the established grade. In consider-
ing the validity of the requirement of council approval, this
court said, at page 562: “This ordinance does not grant a
privilege or attempt to regulate a right already vested, but
rather to provide relief from the operation of an ordinance.
No condition can be laid down by an ordinance of this
character applicable alike to all places where such change
is sought to be made, for the reason that conditions sur-
rounding the property involved are seldom the same. Per-
mission of the character referred to here is, in effect, per-
mission to amend the ordinance. * * * The passage of
the driveway ordinance in question was within the scope
of the power delegated by the legislature to the city council.
To allow a property owner to arrogate to himself the right
to change the grade of a sidewalk where it has been estab-
lished by the city council, in the manner sought to be done
by appellee, would put it within the power of the property
owner to render the sidewalk dangerous to persons using
the same.”

It is our conviction that the quoted language applies
with equal force to this case. Section 58.1-10 of the ordi-
nance, which is under attack, grants only a limited privilege
to erect signs up to a certain size and makes no attempt to
regulate any right vested in a property owner. The pro-
vision relating to council approval for signs in excess of
the fixed maximum size is, in effect, a method provided to
obtain relief from the operation of the ordinance. It is
understandable, too, that the extent to which large projecting
signs interfere with the public use of streets and sidewalks,
will vary on different streets and in different areas. Since
no condition or definite and comprehensive rule for guid-
ance can be laid down applicable to all cases where ex-
cessively large signs are sought to be erected, and because
the municipality is operating in a field in which the legisla-
ture has given it the exclusive authority to operate, we must

ee

conclude that the procedure which vests discretion in the
city council.is a reasonable one suitable and proper to the
nature of the case. To hold that the permission granted by
the city to erect signs of a reasonable size must operate as
a license to enable a property owner to erect a sign of what-
ever size he chooses, would manifestly have an effect which
would create conditions which would obstruct and imperil
the public in its use of public streets. An ordinance per-
mitting the city council to retain control of the space above
city streets and sidewalks as authorized by the legislature
is not discriminatory, unreasonable, oppressive or unjust.
Wilmot v. City of Chicago, 328 Ill. 552; Fischer v. City of
St. Lowis, 194 U.S. 361, 48 L. ed. 1018.

Section 58.1-10 of the Municipal Code of Chicago is
not unconstitutional for any of the reasons urged by ap-
pellee, and the trial court erred in holding it void and
ordering the peremptory writ of mandamus to issue. The
judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is therefore
reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to quash
the writ and dismiss appellee’s petition.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

PC
(No. 326:

B. H. Mower, Appellant, vs. Gust Cartenos et al.,
Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

173

Maurice Weissman, of Chicago, for appellant.

Aen, Dartincron & Exiiom, of Chicago, for ap-
pellee Gust Cartenos.

Mr. Cuter Justice ScHAEFER delivered the opinion of
the court:

B. H. Molner filed a complaint for partition against
Gust Cartenos and others in the superior court of Cook
County. This appeal is from an order dismissing that com-
plaint for want of equity. A freehold is involved. ‘The
question presented here relates to the propriety of the
court’s disposition of the case upon the merits, in view
of the state of the pleadings when the order was entered.

The verified complaint alleged that plaintiff is the owner
of an undivided one-half interest in certain premises, by
virtue of a deed from the bailiff of the municipal court.
The sworn answer of defendant Gust Cartenos charged
that the deed under which plaintiff claimed title was issued
as a result of an execution levied upon a joint judgment
entered in the municipal court against defendant and his
wife, Lillian Cartenos; that Lillian Cartenos had been
dead more than eleven years before the commencement of
the municipal court action; that the judgment and levy of
execution were therefore null and void, and that no right,
title, or interest in the property vested in the plaintiff by

174 ee

virtue of the bailiff’s deed. A certified copy of the cer-
tificate of the death of Lillian Cartenos was attached to
the answer. By his counterclaim, defendant Gust Cartenos
asked that the deed be declared void and removed as a
cloud upon his title. A transcript of the municipal court
proceedings was attached to the counterclaim.

One day following the filing of his answer, defendant
filed a motion for involuntary dismissal. This motion was
supported by his affidavit, a transcript of the municipal
court proceedings, and a certificate of the death of Lillian
Cartenos. On the same day he filed a separate motion to
strike certain paragraphs of the complaint, to dismiss Mol-
ner as plaintiff, and to substitute Cartenos as plaintiff in
the place of Molner. This motion attacked the validity of
the bailiff’s deed and the judgment on which it was based.
The plaintiff thereafter filed a reply to the answer and an
answer to the counterclaim, in which he alleged that he
had no information or knowledge concerning the death of
Lillian Cartenos, that the return of the bailiff of the mu-
nicipal court in the former action reveals that a summons
was properly served upon her, that defendant was guilty
of laches in not bringing to the attention of the municipal
court his knowledge concerning the judgment, and that
defendant is bound by the municipal court judgment. Plain-
tiff also filed a counteraffidavit and certain suggestions in
opposition to the motion of defendant, in which he set
forth substantially the same matters contained in his reply.

On July 3, 1952, after these pleadings and motions had
been filed, the court conducted a hearing “upon the written
motion of Gust Cartenos * * * ‘to have the Court pass
upon the validity of the deed of conveyance issued by the
Bailiff of the Municipal Court of Chicago to plaintiff
* * ** and then entered the disputed order. That order
recites that it was entered upon a consideration of the
sworn pleadings and exhibits, and after hearing “the state-
ments, admissions, and arguments” of counsel. It finds

es 115

that Lillian Cartenos died more than eleven years prior to
the commencement of the municipal court proceeding upon
which plaintiff's deed is based; that the municipal court
judgment is void as to Lillian Cartenos, and since it is a
joint judgment, is void also as to Gust Cartenos. It orders
the deed set aside as a cloud upon defendant’s title, and
dismisses the complaint for want of equity.

Plaintiff argues the case as though the order appealed
from reflects the court’s disposition of the motion for in-
voluntary dismissal under section 48 of the Civil Practice
Act. (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 172.) From the
record, however, it appears that no action was ever taken
with respect to the motion under section 48, which seems
to have been abandoned.

Plaintiff’s position is that the pleadings produced issues
of fact, and that the court was therefore without authority
to dispose of the case without a trial. Authorities to that
effect are cited. The motion for involuntary dismissal under
section 48 was abandoned, apparently because such a mo-
tion was determined to be unavailable on the facts of this
case, The limited scope of summary judgment (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 181,) does not extend to the
type of action here involved. Since these devices for prob-
ing beneath the surface of the pleadings to determine the
actual existence of a disputed question of fact are not
available, normal procedure would unquestionably call for
a disposition of the disputed issue by a trial.

Although ordinarily a trial would be required in these
circumstances, the order appealed from recites that it was
made upon “the statements, admissions and arguments of
respective counsel * * *,” The order then goes on to
make specific findings of fact concerning the date of death
of Lillian Cartenos, While it thus appears that the findings
of the trial court were based upon admissions of counsel,
the scope and the exact form of the admissions do not
appear.

176 ee

Plaintiff urges that the judgment must fall because the
defendant has failed to bring before the court a report of
proceedings showing that admissions were made which
justified the order which was entered. He relies upon the
following statement from Gengler v. Hooper, 324 Ill. 47:
“In chancery, it is incumbent upon the party in whose
favor a decree granting relief is entered, to preserve in
the record the evidence justifying the decree. The general
finding that all the material allegations in the bill are proved
and that the equities of the case are with the complainant
will not sustain a decree granting relief where there is no
finding of specific facts and the evidence is not preserved
in the record by a certificate of evidence, the report of a
master in chancery findings the facts, or the verdict of a
jury.” The doctrine upon which plaintiff relies, however,
if at all applicable here in view of the specific findings
made in this case, has been eliminated by section 64 of the
Civil Practice Act, which provides: “(3) No special find-
ings of fact or certificate of evidence shall be necessary in
any case in equity to support the decree.” Ill, Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 110, par. 188.

A decree is to be presumed correct, and one who seeks
to reverse it carries the burden of showing that it is erro-
neous. To sustain the plaintiff’s contention on the record
in this case would be tantamount to holding that under no
circumstances may a trial court dispose of contested issues
of fact upon the admissions of the parties without a trial.
That we decline to do. The factual issue in this case was
simple, and readily susceptible of resolution by admission.
Once.it was admitted, there was nothing to try.

The proceedings in this case have been rather eccentric
throughout. The motion upon which the case was disposed
of was irregular. It is impossible to determine from the
abstract exactly what issues were disputed, because the
complaint is abstracted in narrative form, without refer-
ence to paragraphs, whereas the denials in the answer refer

| it

to numbered paragraphs of the complaint. Because the only
factual dispute which the plaintiff mentions in his briefs
relates to the date of the death of Lillian Cartenos, we
have assumed that this was the only disputed issue of fact.
More important, the abstract omits the word “admissions”
from the introductory portion of the order appealed from,
although the body of that order is set forth in haec verba.
Plaintiff has argued the case as if it had been disposed of
under section 48, although the order appealed from makes
it clear that this is not the case.

The question here, however, is not the meticulous regu-
larity of the proceedings, but whether or not prejudicial
error occurred. Upon the record before us prejudicial
error does not appear.

The order of the superior court is therefore affirmed.

Order affirmed.

a
Oo. 375:

THe PxoPLE oF THE Stats oF Intrinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Wiiaam SHAMERY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

178

Wiitam SHAMERY, pro se.

Ivan A. Extiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GutKNEcHT, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Joun T.
GaLLacHER, RupoiPs L. Janeca, and ArtHur Mannie,
all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justicy Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

The plaintiff in error, hereinafter called defendant, was
indicted in the criminal court of Cook County, for unlaw-
ful possession of a narcotic drug, called cannabis or mari-
juana. The indictment consisted of two counts, the first of
which charged the defendant with unlawful possession of
the drug contrary to the statute, and the second, in addi-
tion to charging him with unlawful possession, also set
forth that he had been previously convicted in the municipal
court of Chicago on January 19, 1937, on an information
charging him with the unlawful possession of narcotic drugs
in violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, and had
been sentenced to confinement in the House of Correction
for a period of go days.

After the indictment was returned in the instant case,
a trial was had before the court, and the defendant was
convicted on the second count of said indictment. Motions
for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed and over-
rtled, as also was a motion to release the defendant on
probation. Thereupon the defendant was sentenced to the

es 119

Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of not less than 15
years nor more than 20 years.

The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 38, par. 192.23,) upon which the indictment in this
case was based, provides that whoever violates the act by
the unlawful possession of narcotic drugs shall be fined for
the first offense not more than $5000 or be imprisoned for
not less than one nor more than 5 years or both. The act
further provides that for any subsequent offense the vio-
lator shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term
from two years to life. It contains the further provision:
“Any offense under this Act shall be deemed a subsequent
offense if the violator shall have been previously convicted
of a felony under any law of the United States of America,
or of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia
relating to narcotic drugs.”

Defendant contends that his conviction in the municipal
court in 1937 was not for a felony and as a consequence
his conviction by the criminal court in this case cannot be
deemed a conviction for a “subsequent” offense within the
meaning of the act. Therefore, he argues, the trial court
upon finding him guilty in the instant case was limited in
the punishment that it could impose upon him to thet pro-
vided in the act for a-first offender, to wit, a fine of not
more than $5000 or imprisonment for a period of not less
than one nor more than five years, or both, and that the
court was in error when it imposed a sentence on him of
not less than 15 years and not more than 20 years in this
case.

Defendant contends that the statute in question is crim-
inal or penal and in consequence thereof is to be strictly
construed in favor of the accused and nothing is to be taken
by intendment or implication against him beyond the literal
and obvious meaning of the statute. (People v. Lund, 382
Ill. 213.) The case cited also states that the rules as to
strict or liberal construction are of value only as assisting

180 |

in finding the real meaning of the statute, and there is no
need of construction to ascertain the meaning of a statute
where the language is clear and unambiguous and the in-
tention of the law-making power is manifestly apparent
therefrom. A statute itself affords the best means of its
exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained
from its provisions, that intent will prevail without resort-
ing to other aids for construction. People v. Continental
Ill, Nat. Bank, 360 Ill. 454.

It is entirely unnecessary here to resort to extrinsic aids
in order to construe this statute. Its meaning is clearly
evident from the language employed. The unlawful pos-
session of narcotic drugs is thereby made a criminal offense
punishable by a fine of not more than $5000, or imprison-
ment for a period of not less than one year and not more
than five years, or both, for the first offense. For any sub-
sequent offense, the violator shall be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary for any term from two years to life. The first
offense is not a felony, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38,
par. 585,) nor does the statute require it to be so.

The defendant directs attention to the latter part of the
statute which provides that any offense under this act shall
be deemed a subsequent offense if the violator shall have
been previously convicted of a felony under any law of
the United States of America or of any State or Territory
or of the District of Columbia relating to narcotic drugs.
He argues that before the provision of the statute relating
to subsequent offenses may have application, the first offense
must necessarily be a felony. His contention is wholly with-
out merit. The language of the statute is clear that the part
thereof to which our attention is directed by defendant
relates to an offender who, previous to violating the Illinois
act, had been convicted of a felony under any law of the
United States of America or any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia relating to narcotic drugs. The lan-
gtiage employed and the arrangement of each word, clause,

181

and paragraph indicates that the very purpose of the para-
graph in question is to permit the application of the pro-
vision relating to punishment for subsequent offenses to
those who had previously violated a narcotic drug law of
the aforementioned governmental entities, and to render
Illinois no longer a haven for those persons so previously
convicted outside the jurisdiction of this State. This deter-
mination is substantiated by an inspection of the act as it
existed before the amendment of 1951. At that time the
first offense in Illinois was denominated a misdemeanor
and a subsequent offense thereof rendered a violator subject
to a prison term. The same thing remains true under the
act as amended in 1951, but with the further provision
relating to offenders who have previously been convicted of
a felony under the narcotic drug laws of the United States
of America, or any State or Territory or of the District
of Columbia. The first offense, if committed in Illinois,
could not be a felony and the subsequent offense provision
could never operate if defendant’s construction were true.
It is clear, however, that no conflict arises from any of the
provisions of the statute as interpreted above.

Therefore, the sentence imposed upon the defendant
was proper and the judgment of the criminal court of Cook
County is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justicy Maxwetu, dissenting :

I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion
of the court. It appears evident from a reading of the
section of the statute involved that it is highly penal in
nature and that the rule announced by this court in People
v. Byrnes, 405 Ill. 103, at page 107, should apply. We held
in the Byrnes case that a statute which authorizes the im-
position of a more severe punishment is highly penal and
should not be applied to cases which do not, by the strictest
construction, come under its provisions. The last paragraph
of the statutory section in question, in defining a subsequent

182 Pe

offense, provides that the violator shall have been previously
convicted of a felony under any law of the United States
of America, or of any State or territory or the District of
Columbia relating to narcotic drugs. The majority opinion
seems to hold that the term “any state” means any State
other than the State of Illinois, This conclusion can only
be reached by implication and not by strict construction.
If the legislature had such an intent, then it became in-
cumbent upon it to express that intent clearly and unmis-
takably. This it failed to do, and it is therefore just as
reasonable to assume and to imply that the legislature in
referring to “any state” meant all forty-eight in the union,
including Illinois.

By placing the latter construction upon the statute we
are then able to support the validity of this statute against
constitutional attack. If the majority opinion is fully ex-
tended, the effect of this holding will be to declare this
statute discriminatory. A violator of the narcotic laws of
another State must clearly have been convicted of a felony
in that State before he can be punished under the aggra-
vated penalty clause in this State for a subsequent violation
within our boundaries. However, this would not be true .
for a person who committed two narcotic law misdemeanor
violations in this State. I am unable to see any justification
in such a classification and if it can be placed upon the
basis only of geographical lines the apparent moral aim and
purpose of our statute is of little force. I fear that the
majority opinion would place a construction upon the stat-
ute that would be in contravention of the equal-protection
clause of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the con-
stitution of the United States. The judgment of the lower
court should have been reversed and remanded for the im-
position of the lesser penalty as provided for in the statute
involved.

ee 183
(No. 26:5 ET
THE PEOPLE oF THE STATE oF Inrrnors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Joun W. Moz, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed June 26, 1953.

Expon E, Hazuer, of Carlyle, for plaintiff in error.

Ivan A. Exsiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Josura B. ScHLARMAN, State’s Attorney, of Carlyle, for
the People.

Mr. Justice Maxwet, delivered the opinion of the
court:

The plaintiff in error, John W. Molz, hereinafter desig-
nated defendant, has sued out this writ of error to review
the judgment of the circuit court of Clinton County sen-
tencing him, on a plea of guilty to armed robbery, to a
minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of twenty

184 ee

years. Error is assigned on the trial court’s treatment of
his application for probation.

On January 15, 1952, the defendant and his nephew
and codefendant were arrested at their homes in Salem,
by the sheriff of Clinton County, accompanied by the
sheriff of Marion County, and were taken to the Clinton
County jail. Subsequently, both defendant and his co-
defendant signed confessions admitting the armed robbery
of one Edward Hoffman, proprietor of a filling station at
Beckemeyer, on the night of January 14, 1952. Defend-
ant’s confession, although not admitted in evidence, was
recited in counsel’s arguments and is set out in full in his
brief and argument. This confession stated that when de-
fendant returned from his work at United Contracting
Company, Salem, about 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. June 14, his
nephew and codefendant, Alva Wayne Letsinger, was at
his home; that his nephew, whom he called Wayne, had
not had steady work, told him he needed money and said,
“How about pulling a job tonight—I said no;” that Wayne
suggested they meet at “Joe’s” tavern after supper; that
after supper he and his wife went to the tavern, about
8:00 P.M. he drove his wife home, procured a 22-calibre
pistol which he placed in the glove compartment of the
car, and returned to the tavern and met Wayne. They
had several drinks together and then drove to Beckemeyer,
arriving there about 10:00 P.M.; that on the way there
Wayne again said he needed money and suggested they hold
up someone. Upon arriving in Beckemeyer, they parked
at a tavern, sat in the car talking about what job to do
and defendant stated he “tried to talk him out of doing
any.” Defendant then went into a tavern, had a couple of
drinks, and when he returned to the car Wayne suggested
they hold up the “Phillips 66” station. Defendant took
the pistol from the glove compartment, put it in his overall
bib, and drove up to that station just as it was closing.
They drove past the “Shell” filling station, operated by

ee 185

Edward Hoffman, noted that he was alone, turned around
and drove back there, parked the car between the build-
ing and the pumps. From this point we quote defendant’s
confession, as it appears in his brief and argument filed
in this court: “Wayne and I went into the station and
Edward Hoffman was in there. I walked first and Wayne
was behind me. I had my 22 pistol in my overall bib. We
walked in the door and I asked Hoffman if he had any
coffee, He said no but that we could get some down at
the tavern as they served it. I started back to the door
and Wayne punched me with his elbow. I pulled out my
22 pistol and turned around and said to Hoffman, ‘this is
a hold up.’ Hoffman backed up and pulled a pistol out
of his pocket. Then Wayne ran toward Hoffman and
clinched him. He grabbed the arm of Hoffman in which
he had the gun and also held his arms. They scuffled and
Hoffman’s gun went off. I went in behind Wayne and
grabbed Hoffman’s arm that he had the gun in and Wayne
grabbed Hoffman’s gun. Then Hoffman said, ‘he’s got my
gun.’ I turned him loose and he grabbed at my gun and
then ran out the front door. When he got outside he hol-
lered ‘help’ several times. We ran out the front door,
got into our car and drove off. We drove to Self’s tavern
in Wamac, south of Centralia. Got there about 11:30 or
12:00 that night. We stayed there only a few minutes.
‘Then we drove back to Salem. I drove to my home. Wayne
got out there and walked home from there. He took Hoff-
man’s 38 pistol with him. My Dodge sedan has reflector
shields over the headlights. Dated this 18th day of January,
1952.”

The record discloses that Edward Hoffman, then 70
years of age, died of a heart attack at his home at 1:30
A.M. the following morning. No evidence was adduced,
however, to attribute the death to the robbery.

On March 28, 1952, the Clinton County grand jury
returned a true bill of indictment charging defendant and

186 |

his codefendant with armed robbery. Upon arraignment
on the same day they were furnished with copies of the
indictment, lists of witnesses and jurors, and at 12:15
P.M., they advised the court they wished to plead guilty.
The court refused to accept their pleas, appointed counsel
for them and recessed to 1:30 P.M. At that time they
appeared with their appointed counsel, and, being questioned
by the court, advised him they had conferred with their
counsel and wanted to enter their pleas of guilty. The
court thereupon advised them of their right to trial by
jury and admonished them as to the consequences of their
pleas; they persisted therein and the court accepted their
pleas and adjudged them guilty of armed robbery as
charged in the indictment. Defendants’ counsel stated that
they wished to make application for probation, and the
court stated “They have that right, and their cases will
be referred to the probation officer for investigation and
report.”

On April 18, 1952, the probation officer filed a report
in the office of the circuit clerk of Clinton County. This
report stated that the probation officer had letters from
the sheriff of Marion County, defendant’s employer, and
a fellow worker, all attesting defendant’s good conduct in
Illinois; also letters from a former associate judge and
defendant’s family doctor from Reed Springs, Missouri,
defendant’s former home. The report further showed de-
fendant had been married ten years, had a wife and three
small children whom he had always supported. The re-
port also stated that the officer had talked with citizens
of Beckemeyer, including members of deceased’s family,
and that they opposed probation. Accompanying the re-
port was a letter from a police judge with a petition for
the allowance of probation signed by 84 citizens of Stone
County, Missouri, attesting to the excellent reputation of
defendant and his parents as upright, law-abiding citizens.

eS 187

On April 22, 1952, the defendants appeared in court
with their counsel and the State’s Attorney, and the fol-
lowing hearing was‘had. ‘The court stated he had received
the reports of the probation officer and asked the State’s
Attorney if he had anything to say. The State’s Attorney
then stated that he opposed probation for either of the
defendants, recited the details of the crime and argued
against any leniency being extended to them. Counsel
for defendants thereupon argued to the court what he
deemed to be the extenuating circumstances of the offense,
emphasizing the previous good record of the defendant,
and asked for probation for both defendants. Upon the
conclusion of counsel’s statement, the court asked each de-
fendant if he had anything to say and each replied in the
negative. The court then asked them to stand up and
stated: “It isn’t a question of vengeance; it’s a question
of what’s for the public good. I can’t see that it would
be for the public good if a crime of this kind should go
unpunished. It works a hardship on the family, but you
knew you had your family. It’s unfortunate that they be
made to suffer, but you are the men who committed the
crime, and if every man who committed a crime were re-
leased or released on probation simply because he had a
family there would be no punishment.” Then followed the
pronouncement of sentence as to each defendant.

We have recited the circumstances of this offense, the
probation officer’s report, and the procedure in some detail
because defendant’s contention that “The court, the State’s
Attorney and the probation officer have treated this pe-
tition with a lightness and carelessness bordering on com-
plete contempt and disregard for the wishes of the legis-
lature and the rights of the accused,” focuses our attention
upon those details.

Defendant’s specific contentions can be consolidated
into four objections, (1) the order referring the applica-

188 |

tion for probation to the probation officer did not comply
with the statute in that it failed to direct the officer what to
do; (2) the court failed to enter an order denying the
application for probation before passing sentence; (3) the
probation officer’s report does not show that a proper in-
vestigation was made and does not contain the facts re-
quired by the Probation Act, and (4) the defendant has
been deprived of due process in that he had no notice of
the hearing on his application for probation, he was not
furnished a copy of the probation officer’s report, had no
notice of its filing, and was deprived of an opportunity
to prepare and present his case.

A just, fair and legal determination of the specific
complaints of defendant requires, first, that we consider
the fundamental principles underlying and giving rise to
the theory of suspended sentences, now regulated by our
probation systems. Constitutionally, there is no right to
probation. After a plea of guilty a prisoner “stands con-
victed, he faces punishment, he cannot insist on terms or
strike a bargain.” (Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216;
53 S. Ct. 154). As a matter of constitutional rights, there-
fore, the rule of “strict law” which demanded fixed pun-
ishment for a crime according to its classification was per-
fectly justified and not objectionable. A trend away from
this strict rule developed, not from any rights vested in
the individual, but from the idea that society might be
benefited by vesting in a judge, a probation officer or some
authority, discretion to adjust the penalty to the indivi-
vidual and to the circumstances of the offense. This sys-
tem is known to the criminologists as “individualization
of punishment.” Its real purpose is not to deal sympa-
thetically or charitably with the individual but in the theory
that by benefiting the particular individual, society will
be the real beneficiary in that the individual will become
a useful member of society rather than an habitual criminal
and a menace and burden as a chronic offender. (C.J.S.,

es 189

Criminal Law, sec. 1618.) All our probation systems are
based on these principles and our statutes must therefore
be read, interpreted and applied to accomplish the purpose
for which they are intended.

The first rule of law, then, is that the granting or re-
fusing of an application for probation generally rests within
the sound discretion of the court, this discretion to be ex- °
ercised primarily for the benefit of society, and only inci-
dentally for the benefit of the accused. (People v. Miller,
317 Ill. 33, 38; People v. Bonheim, 307 Ill, 316; People
ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens, 394 Ill. 511.) Our reports are
replete with statements by this court that this discretion
is not even reviewable, (People v. S'yer, 400 Ill. 444; Peo-
ple v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549; People v. Racine, 362 Ill.
602; People v. Wheeler, 349 Ill. 230.) The only modi-
fication or relaxation of this rule which we have been
able to find in this State appears in People v. Donovan,
376 Ill. 602. In that case the defendant asked to be re-
leased on probation, the court heard the statements of the
prosecution in regard to the defendant’s admissions of
the commission of the offense, and summarily denied pro-
bation, knowing nothing and making no inquiry of any
kind about the defendant or the circumstances of the
offense. We there said, at page 606, “It is obvious that
where the facts are not shown and are not inquired into,
the denial of probation is an arbitrary and unauthorized
exercise of the power.”

In People v. Hughes, 386 Ill. 414, wherein defendant
objected to the court’s failure to hear evidence in mitiga-
tion or aggravation, as required by statute, before passing
sentence, we held that the record need not show the evi-
dence heard by the court, that such evidence need not be
preserved or that the court make any special findings on
the evidence. We further there said that the burden of
showing the illegality of the proceeding rests upon a de-
fendant seeking reversal of the judgment.

190 ee

We conclude therefore that denial of an application
for probation, after a hearing in substantial compliance
with the statute, cannot be set aside by this court unless
the defendant affirmatively shows the trial court’s decision
was purely arbitrary.

The record in the instant case does not meet this test.
“This record discloses that defendant’s application for pro-
bation was referred to the probation officer for investi-
gation and report; that that officer did investigate de-
fendant’s past record and his status as a law-abiding citizen,
his home life and his reputation, and that report included
every fact or circumstance favorable to the defendant, in-
cluding the opinions and recommendations of his and his
family’s acquaintances and friends. The record further
shows that this report was before the court at the hear-
ing, that the court was fully informed by counsel for
defendant as well as counsel for the people as to all the
circumstances of the offense, as to all extenuating circum-
stances in behalf of defendant that his counsel desired to
present, and that defendant himself was given ample op-
portunity to present anything further he might wish before
the court ruled on his application, and he stated to the court
there was nothing further. The court was fully advised
as to all the matters which should be taken into consider-
ation in exercising his discretion in granting or denying
probation, especially as to all matters which the defendant
desired to present, and we are, therefore, unable to find
that the court’s ruling was arbitrary or that he did not
know, and made no effort to inquire into, the circumstances
as required by statute.

Defendant’s objections as to the failure of the court
or the clerk to enter a formal order specifically command-
ing the probation officer as to what should be done in the
investigation and report, or the failure of the court to
either orally or by the entry of an order deny the applica-
tion for probation, cannot justify reversing the trial court’s

es 194

judgment. The statute itself advises the probation officer
what he must do when the application is referred to him
and this record shows that the probation officer substan-
tially complied with that statute. (People v. Miller, 317
Ill. 33.) The act of the court in sentencing the defendant
on his plea is a sufficient denial of the application for pro-
bation and no formal denial is deemed necessary. The de-
fendant has not pointed out and we are unable to perceive
how such irregularities did or could prejudice the de-
fendant or make the court’s action arbitrary. As we have
heretofore stated, one adjudged guilty of a criminal of-
fense is not entitled to probation as a matter of right (Peo-
ple v. Miller, 317 Ill. 33,) and therefore, when the record
discloses that the defendant was given the opportunity to
present his application, when an investigation and report,
deemed adequate by the trial judge to inform him of the
circumstances he considers in exercising his discretion, has
been made and considered, and defendant fails, as here, to
show that he has been prejudiced in any manner, the exer-
cise of the trial court’s discretion in denying probation is
not reviewable by this court.

We agree with the defendant’s contention that the
record in a probation hearing should be complete so as
to show what was done at such hearing and the court
here should have entered a formal order denying defend-
ant’s application. The entry of such order is indispensable
when probation is granted in order for the court to retain
jurisdiction, (People v. Cahill, 300 Ill. 279,) but where
probation is not granted and the defendant is sentenced
after a hearing on his application, the entry of a formal
order denying his application for probation is not essen-
tial to the validity of the sentence. The exercise of the
power to grant or deny probation should be in conform-
ity with the statute, but informalities or irregularities which
do not prejudice the defendant in any manner may be dis-
regarded. C.J.S. vol. 24, page 179.

192 ee

The defendant here had a fair hearing on his applica-
tion for probation, the court effectively denied that appli-
cation in the exercise of his discretion, and we cannot say
that the court abused that discretion or acted in an arbi-
trary manner.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

PC
Oo. 5 aT

Frep E. Scurorper et al., Appellees, vs. Vera M. Binks,
Director of Registration and Education, et al., Ap-
pellants.

Opinion filed June 17, 1953.

198

LatHam Caste, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Joun L. Davipson, Jr, Marx O. Roperts, Lez W.
EnseEt, and Norman P. Jonxs, of counsel,) for appellants.

Var, Minis & ARMstRONG, of Decatur, and GILLESPIE,
Burke & Grizesere, of Springfield, (Roper P. Vat,
Tomas H. Armstrone and Hucx J. Dosss, of counsel,)
for appellees.

Jounston, THompson, RaymMonp & Mayer, JaMEs A.
Sprrown, and Wxsiey G. Hart, all of Chicago, for the
Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Union, amicus curiae.

Cassipy, Sroan & Cassipy, of Peoria, for Illinois Mas-
ter Plumbers Association, amicus curiae.

Mr. Cuter Justice ScHarrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

This case involves the validity of the Illinois Plumbing
License Law of 1951. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 111%,
par. 116.1-116.35.) Alleging the invalidity of the act, the
plaintiffs, who are citizens and taxpayers engaged in the
business of selling hardware, heating and plumbing equip-
ment at retail, commenced this action in the circuit court of
Sangamon County, seeking to enjoin the expenditure of
public funds in its administration. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 102, pars. 11-16.) The defendants, who are State
officers charged with the enforcement of the act, answered.

. After hearing evidence, the circuit court entered a decree
finding the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforce-
ment. The defendants have appealed directly to this court.

In People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, the Illinois Plumbing
Law of 1935 was held unconstitutional. The act which is

now before us was then adopted. The basic contention of
| |

194 |

the plaintiffs is that the present statute has failed to cure
many of the defects which invalidated its predecessor. The
defendants maintain that the new statute has eliminated
the infirmities in the earlier act which were pointed out in
the Brown case. In this case, as in the Brown case, the
general power of the State to regulate plumbing and
plumbers for the protection of the public health is not
disputed. As in that case, the issue here is whether in the
exercise of a power acknowledged to exist, constitutional
limitations have been transgressed,

In broad outline the Illinois Plumbing License Law of
1951 defines “plumbing,” prohibits any person from en-
gaging in plumbing without a license, prescribes the condi-
tions upon which licenses may be issued, and commits the
administration of the act to the Department of Registration
and Education. All installation, repair and maintenance of
plumbing (except minor repairs on a person’s home prem-
ises) is required to be performed by or under the super-
vision of a licensed master plumber. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 11134, par. 116.4.) The act provides for licensed
master plumbers, licensed journeymen plumbers and for
plumber’s apprentices. Except for “grandfather” and reci-
procity provisions, the licenses are to be issued upon exam-
ination. Eligibility to take the examinations depends upon
a showing of compliance with stated prerequisites. Any
person over sixteen years old may work as a plumber’s
apprentice, but he must work under the supervision of a
master or journeyman. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 111¥4,
par. 116.4.) An applicant for the master’s examination
must show that he has been the holder of a journeyman’s
license in this State for one year, or that he has worked
as a plumber in another State or in the military service
for five years, or that he has a college degree in specified
courses and one year of practical experience in plumbing.
(IL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 11134, par. 116.12.) An appli-
cant for the journeyman’s examination must show that he

195

has worked as an apprentice for five years, or that he has
worked as a plumber in another State for two years or in
military service for three years, or that he has taken speci-
fied courses in college or trade school for two years and
has had one year of practical experience in plumbing. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 11134, par. 116.13.

Plaintiffs have attacked the validity of the act upon
many grounds. In the view we take of the case, however,
it is necessary only to determine whether or not the basic
objections to the 1935 act which were pointed out in People
v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, have been eliminated. The 1935
act was invalid because it imposed upon the plumbing busi-
ness a rigid economic pattern, with fixed categories of
employers and employees which were unrelated to con-
siderations of public health, and because it gave the class
of master plumbers an arbitrary control over access to the
plumbing business. That act required that journeymen
and apprentice plumbers be employees of master plumbers.
The present act eliminates the requirement of employment
by master plumbers, and substitutes for it a requirement of
supervision by master plumbers of all plumbing work done
by journeymen or apprentices. It is argued on the one
hand that this change has effected a complete cure, and on
the other that the change is a euphemism which has left
unaltered the underlying vice of the former statute.

Concerning this aspect of the 1935 act this court said
in People v. Brown, 407 Ill. at pp. 574-5: “When the ap-
prentice attains the status of licensed journeyman plumber,
he cannot ply his trade freely and in the manner of his
choice. He is denied the right to work for himself. From
this it appears the legislature was of the opinion that though
a licensed journeyman plumber is qualified to follow his
trade, as that trade is defined in the act, he is not qualified
to judge the merits or demerits of his own work and,
therefore, must always work under the general supervision
of a licensed master plumber. The act cannot be circum-

196 ee

vented by a licensed journeyman plumber following his
trade independently under a licensed master plumber he
hires to generally supervise his work. That would consti-
tute a reversal of the roles of employer and employee which
the act does not countenance. * * * ‘The above facts,
as do other facts, establish that a licensed master plumber
must always be at hand to exercise general supervision over
the work of the licensed journeyman plumber. The pos-
session of the exclusive and unregulated right bestowed by
the act to either pass, or condemn, the work of the licensed
journeyman plumber places the licensed master plumber in
complete control of the latter in respect to his work, so
long as he plys his trade within the geographical limits
prescribed by the act.”

In our opinion, the pertinence of these observations has
not been altered by the substitution of the present re-
quirement of “supervision” by a master plumber for the
former requirement of “employment” by a master plumber.
Realistically viewed, the economic effect is the same. No
duty to supervise is imposed upon the master plumber. He
may supervise, or he may not, as he sees fit. And the possi-
bility that his unregulated supervision will be available to
a competing journeyman upon economically feasible terms
is too remote to be acceptable. The net effect of the act
is that the journeyman’s status as an employee and the
master plumber’s status as an employer, remain as firmly
fixed as they were in the Brown case.

Common knowledge and experience suggest no con-
necting link between considerations of public health and
the requirement of the-act that all plumbing work—of
whatever kind or degree of complexity—which is done by
a licensed journeyman plumber must be done under the
supervision of a master plumber. Nor does the record sup-
ply the deficiency,

Harold E. Babbitt, professor of sanitary engineering at
the University of Illinois since 1913, testified that mechani-

eS 197

cally and manually there is no difference in the requisite
skill of the master and journeyman plumber; that in the
trade and in his experience the prime difference between
journeymen and master plumbers is that the master plumber
is the boss man who risks his capital and the journeyman
is the employee. Harry B. Greisbach, a public school
teacher at the Washburne Trade School in Chicago, testi-
fied that the term “journeyman plumber” referred to a
plumber employed by a “master plumber.” Phillip A. Ma-
honey, a licensed journeyman plumber, testified that he
was employed by W. T. Mahoney & Sons, a corporation
engaged in the plumbing business; that his brother, George,
was the only master plumber in the firm; that he, Phillip,
was engaged in the capacity of superintendent of plumbing
installation of all work on the firm’s contracts; that he
had forty journeymen under his supervision; that it was
his duty to select the men for jobs and to see that all plans,
specifications, and ordinances were complied with; that
to some extent he had designed and planned plumbing lay-
outs “under the coordination” of his brother. Ray Smythe,
who is engaged in the plumbing business in Missouri and
operated a plumbing school in that State and wrote the
Kansas City Plumbing Code in 1924 as well as the revision
in 1947 and assisted in writing the Denver and Colorado
Codes, testified that there is no real distinction between a
journeyman and a master plumber, except that the master
plumber is in the business of selling material and plumbing
contracts and collecting money on’ these sales, and that if
he is successful in collecting his money from job to job,
he is called a successful master plumber, but otherwise
there is no difference between the two.

In all of this there is no suggestion that protection of
the public health is enhanced by the requirement that all of
the work of a licensed journeyman must be supervised by
a master. Rather it appears that the roots of the require-
ment reach back to an economic pattern which is anachron-

198 |

istic today. We do not, of course, hold that economic rela-
tionships are per se beyond the regulatory powers of the
General Assembly. (See, e.g., Oak Woods Cemetery Asso-
ciation v. Murphy, 383 Il. 301.) The statute now before
us, however, in its preamble explicitly recites its concern for
public health, and that alone. (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap.
111¥, par. 116.1.) The rigid hierarchy it imposes upon
the plumbing business appears to be an incidental, or acci-
dental, appendage to regulations aimed primarily’ at pro-
tection of the public health. It has not been argued that
there are economic maladjustments in the plumbing busi-
ness which require or justify this feature of the act. No
such considerations occur to us, and the record indicates
none. We hold, therefore, that the circuit court was correct
in determining that the act violated section 2 of article IT
and section 22 of article IV of the constitution of Illinois,
and the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Federal constitution.

People v. Brown did not deal only with the artificial
categories of employer and employee which the 1935 act
imposed. It also held that statute invalid because of the
monopolistic control over the avenues of entry into the
plumbing business which it placed in the master plumbers.
“Obstacles are interposed by the act to a person freely and
of his own choice engaging in the occupation of master
plumber, the trade of journeyman plumber, and the activity
of learning the trade by apprenticeship. One cannot be a
licensed master plumber unless he has prior thereto been a
licensed journeyman plumber, and before that a certified
registered plumber’s apprentice. No matter how well quali-
fied a person may be by instruction and training, he can
never of his own free will and choice become a certified
registered plumber’s apprentice, a journeyman plumber or
master plumber, unless a licensed master plumber so wills.
The act does not load a licensed master plumber with the
obligation of employing a person who desires to enter into

199

an apprenticeship. The refusal to employ one as an ap-
prentice need not be based upon any valid reason. It may
be an arbitrary refusal, it may be a refusal predicated upon
an understanding between master plumbers to limit the
number of apprentices learning the trade, and it may be
upon one, or some, of the facts of race, color or creed.
The act does not allow a person to learn the trade of
journeyman plumber by acquiring the necessary instruction
and training in any way, other than as an apprentice to a
licensed master plumber. Just the refusal to employ will
effectually bar the way to an apprenticeship. The licensed
master plumber is in full and absolute control of the situa-
tion, a private citizen exercising a power under the pro-
tection of the State which the State cannot lawfully exer-
cise, i.¢., the arbitrary denial to a citizen of his inherent and
inalienable right to engage in a legitimate activity by his
own free will and choice. After a plumber’s apprentice
has started to serve the five years required of him, he is
still subject to the unregulated will of the licensed master
plumber employer. Under the act his tenure as an apprentice
may be terminated at any time by the employer, for it does
not require apprenticeship articles to stabilize the relation-
ship of the two.” People v. Brown, 4o7 Ill. at 573-4.

The barriers to access to the examinations for license
as journeyman and as master have been substantially
lowered in the 1951 act now before us. Alternative quali-
fications have been established to determine eligibility for
the examinations. The control of the master plumber over
access to the occupation still continues, however, to a de-
gree which, in our opinion, renders the act vulnerable upon
the grounds pointed out in the Brown case.

One who has held a journeyman’s license in this State
for one year is eligible to take the examination for a license
as a master plumber. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 111%,
par. 116.12.) The parties disagree as to whether this re-
quirement is to be interpreted as satisfied merely by the

200 ee

lapse of a calendar year or whether the requirement con-
templates a year of practical experience in plumbing. If
the former, the requirement has no significance in terms
of the public health; if the latter, the experience involved
can be secured, as a practical matter, only under the super-
vision of a master plumber. One who holds a college degree
in prescribed engineering courses may take the master
plumber’s examination only if, in addition, he has a year
of practical experience under the supervision of a master
plumber. In the case of the applicant for a license as a
journeyman plumber, practical experience under the super-
vision of a master plumber is required whether the applicant
qualifies by an apprenticeship or by the successful pursuit
of prescribed studies. Il Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 111%,
par. 116.13.

In the light of “common knowledge,” this court in the
Brown case rejected the underlying assumption that “the
business of master plumber, the trade of journeyman
plumber, and the occupation of plumbing generally, as
each is defined in the act, possess unusual and exceptional
characteristics which are inherent, and render it impossible
for an educational institution to instruct, or adequately in-
struct, in either.” (People v. Brown, 407 IL at 577.)
Upon this ground the provisions of the 1935 act which re-
quired five years’ practical experience as a journeyman as
a condition to the right to take the examination for a
master plumber’s license, and five years practical experi-
ence as an apprentice as a prerequisite for the examination
for a journeyman’s license were held to be “not in accord
with the actual realities of each calling.” The record in this
case does not suggest a contrary result.

Aside from those exceptional instances where applicants
have engaged in the plumbing business in other States or
in military service, the ultimate control of the situation
remains in the hands of the private group of master
plumbers. As we see it, it is no answer to say that credit

es 201

will be given for formal training or education in a trade
school, university, or college when that instruction must
be augmented by experience in the trade, under the super-
vision of a licensed master plumber. The master plumber
is under no duty to supervise. Nor is there any indication
as to the intensity or diversity of the required experience.
The master supervises, if at all, upon his own terms, and
to the extent that he sees fit. There is nothing in the record
before us to indicate that the manual skills at which the
experience requirements appear to be aimed cannot be
obtained by methods other than the supervised experience
which the act requires. Cf. People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143,
90 N.E. 451; Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630.

We are aware that there are decisions which, at least
inferentially, imply judicial approval of regulations of the
plumbing business which are similar to those here involved.
(See: People ex rel. Stepski v. Harford, 286 N.Y. 477,
36 N.E. 2d 670; Rountree Corporation v. City of Rich-
mond, 188 Va. 701, 51 S.E. 2d 256.) After careful analysis,
however, similar legislation has been denounced by other
courts as having no relation to the public health. (City of
Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W. 2d 797 (S.D. 19513)
Hench v. Michigan State Plumbing Board, 289 Mich. 108,
286 N.W. 176; compare Benedetto v. Kern, 167 Misc. 831,
4N.Y.S. 2d 844, with People v. Harrison, 170 App. Div.
802, 156 N.Y.S. 679, and People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143,
go N.E. 451.) We conclude that there is no persuasive
authority which supports the economic hierarchy sanctioned
by the Plumbing License Law of 1951 and that the act is
not a proper exercise of the police power of the State.

There is no need to take up the objections directed
against section 19, which the circuit court held invalid, or
the many other constitutional points raised by plaintiffs.
The provisions which have been discussed pervade the en-
tire legislative scheme. Without them, the act becomes
something far removed from the regulation contemplated

202

by the legislature. Where provisions held invalid are the
essence of an act, the entire act must fall. (People ex rel.
Greening v. Bartholf, 388 Ill. 445; Winter v. Barrett, 352
Ill. 441.) It follows that the entire Plumbing License Law,
with the exception of section 20 which declares a legislative
policy in favor of the municipal regulation of plumbing and
authorizes municipal regulation, is unconstitutional.

The’ decree.of the circuit court of Sangamon County
‘is affirmed. Decree affirmed.
—

(No. 32794 as
Tux Burrows Company et al., Appellees, vs. M. H. Hor-
LincswortH, Director of Finance, et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

208

LarHam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Wuatam C. Wines, Raymonp §. Sarwow, A. ZoLa
Groves, and Ricwarp 1. Cooper, of counsel,) for ap-
pellants,

Mapican & THorsENn, and FRED B. Hovey, both of
Chicago, (Ropert THoRsEN, of counsel,) for appellees.

Smiey, Austin, Burcess & Smrru, Winson & Mc-
Invaine, and Knapp, CusHinc, HERSHBERGER & STEVEN-
son, all of Chicago, (Wintiam H. Avery, JRr., R. Corwine
Stevenson, CLARENCE E. Fox, Emerson ‘T’. CHANDLER,
and Kent CHANDLER, JR., of counsel,) amici curiae.

Mr. Cuzer Justice Scuazrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

Acting upon its interpretation of our decision in Modern
Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, the De-
partment of Revenue has sought to impose the retailers’
occupation tax upon sales of tangible personal property by
suppliers to persons who retransfer such property in the
course of “service occupations.” In this case and the com-
panion consolidated cases, Material Service Corp. v. Hol-
lingsworth, No. 32795, and Chicago Fire Brick Co. v.
Hollingsworth, No. 32796, the position taken by the De-
partment is challenged.

The plaintiffs in this case are pharmaceutical companies
and other supply houses, who sell medicines, bandages,
dressings, splints, braces, and other medical supplies, as
well as foods, to doctors and hospitals who apply or serve

2 es

these products to their patients. Sometimes patients are
charged for each specific item used, and sometimes on the
basis of a flat charge which includes all medical services
and supplies. Some patients are “charity cases” and pay
nothing for the care they receive.

The dispute over the taxability of sellers of medical
supplies to doctors and hospitals has a long history. Prior
to 1941, taxability was denied in Mallen Co. v. Department»
of Finance, 372 ll. 598. In 1941, the rules of the Depart-
ment were changed to impose a tax upon sales of medical
supplies to doctors and hospitals. This change in the rules
was based upon that portion of the 1941 amendment to
section 1 of the Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act which ex-
tended the statutory definition of “use or consumption” to
the employment of tangible personal property by persons
engaged in service occupations. (Laws of 1941, p. 1079.)
This part of the 1941 amendment fell in Stolze Lumber Co.
v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334, and nontaxability of the medical
suppliers was reaffirmed in Huston Brothers Co. v. Mc-
Kibbin, 386 Il. 479.

In the meantime, the plaintiffs instituted this action in
the circuit court of Cook County. On November 22, 1944,
that court entered a decree holding that under the Stolze
Lumber Co. and Huston Brothers Co. cases the plaintiffs
were not subject to the retailers’ occupation tax on the
basis of sales made to doctors and hospitals who retrans-
ferred the supplies to paying patients. When the Department
took the position that the immunity provided by the Huston
Brothers Co. case did not extend to sales to charitable insti-
tutions because the retransfers were without consideration,
the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint, and by an
order entered June 20, 1947, the circuit court extended its
injunction to all sales to doctors and hospitals who retrans-
ferred the supplies to patients, whether or not the patients
paid for the supplies. No appeal was prosecuted from the
1944 or 1947 decrees of the circuit court of Cook County.

LD

After our decision in Modern Dairy Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, the Department promulgated Bul-
letin No, 11, which purports to impose the tax on sales by
suppliers to persons engaged in service occupations who
retransfer the property, whether or not the retransfer is
for a valuable consideration. The defendants then filed
motions in the circuit court to vacate the injunctive orders
of 1944 and 1947. On November 20, 1952, the circuit
court, on the basis of the Modern Dairy Co. case, entered
an order vacating its 1947 injunction as to future sales of
supplies to be retransferred without charge. The court
refused, however, to vacate its injunction as to sales made
prior to November 20, 1952, and ordered that the injunc-
tion continue in full force as to those prior sales. On
December 18, 1952, the court found that the sales to
doctors and hospitals who retransferred the supplies to
paying patients were sales for resale and therefore were
not taxable, and denied the defendants’ motion to vacate
the injunction order of 1944, pertaining to such sales.
Defendants appeal from the order of the circuit court of
Cook County entered December 18, 1952, and from that
part of the order entered November 20, 1952, which leaves
the injunction in effect as to sales for retransfer. without
charge which were made prior to the date of that order.

We shall first consider whether the tax applies to sup-
pliers selling to persons engaged in service occupations who
retransfer the products sold for a valuable consideration in
connection with the rendition of services. Defendants take
the position that Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 413 Ill. 55, compels the conclusion that sales to those
engaged in service occupations are “for tse and consump-
tion” and “not for resale in any form as tangible personal
property.” Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that a
retransfer for a valuable consideration is a “resale” which,
by the terms of the statute, immunizes the supplier from
the tax,

206 es

The Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 120, pars. 440 et seq.) is entitled, “An Act in
relation to a tax upon persons engaged in the business of
selling tangible personal property to purchasers for use or
consumption.” (Emphasis supplied.) The act (section 2)
imposes a tax “upon persons engaged in the business of
selling tangible personal property at retail * * *” (Em-
phasis supplied.) Section 1 of the act defines “sale at retail”
to mean “any transfer of the ownership of, or title to,
tangible personal property to the purchaser, for use or con-
sumption and not for resale in any form as tangible per-
sonal property, for a valuable consideration.” (Emphasis
supplied.) “Sale at retail,” however, is also defined to in-
clude “any transfer of the ownership of, or title to, tan-
gible personal property to a purchaser, for use or con-
sumption by any other person to whom such purchaser may
transfer the tangible personal property without a valuable
consideration.”

Modern Dairy Co. concerned the taxability of a dairy
which sold milk to a State mental hospital. The hospital
transferred the milk without consideration to patients for
consumption. We held that the dairy was subject to a tax
measured by these sales. The terms of that portion of the
1941 amendment to the act, which defined “sale at retail”
to include transfers “to a purchaser, for use or consumption
by any other person to whom such purchaser may transfer
the tangible personal property without a valuable considera-
tion,” were squarely applicable to the transactions before
us. It was argued, however, that the amendment was in-
valid because it was not within the title of the act. In
resolving that question, we traced the history of the act
from its origin in 1933. We observed that the title of the
act refers to persons engaged in the business of selling prop-
erty to purchasers “for use or consumption” and noted
that. the term “sale at retail” does not appear in the title
of the act. We then considered the decisions of this court

ee

which had applied a strict and narrow definition to the
words “use” and “consumption,” and pointed out that those
words are used in the disjunctive in the title of the act.
“Reviewing our previous decisions and the actions of the
legislature retrospectively,” we concluded that “it was not
the intention of the legislature to use the terms ‘user or
consumer’ in the title of the act in the strict and narrow
construction which this court placed upon those terms in
the earlier cases culminating in the decision of the Stolze
Lumber Co. case.” (413 Ill. at 65.) Defining the word
“use” as including “any employment of a thing which took
it off the retail market so that it was no longer the object
of a tax on the privilege of selling it at retail” we held
that the 1941 amendment, which defined sale at retail to
include sales for retransfer without consideration, was
within the title, was otherwise valid, and was applicable to
the transaction before us.

Defendants’ case rests largely upon certain statements
made by this court in the Modern Dairy Co. case. We have
examined those statements. In context they relate only to
the position of the court with respect to the scope of the
title of the act, and specifically to the proper definition to
be given to the phrase “use or consumption” as it appears
in the title. Thus, defendants stress the sentence “Consid-
ered in this sense it seems obvious that the legislature in-
tended and the act contemplates the use or consumption of
the property which took it off the retail market so that it
would no longer be an object of the tax.” (413 Ill. at
65-66.) When it is recalled that the problem in that case
concerned the validity of the extended definition of “sale
at retail” to includes sales where property was retransferred
without charge—a problem which stemmed from decisions
of this court which had unduly narrowed the scope of the
act as expressed in its title—it is apparent that this state-
ment related to the unsoundness of a narrow construction
and the propriety of a broad definition of the phrase “use

208 ee

or consumption” in the title of the act. Nothing in the
opinion, however, suggests that the broadened definition of
“use or consumption” in the title eliminates the tax liability
tests set up in the body of the act.

- Taxability resulted in Modern Dairy Co. because the
tax was imposed by the language of the statute. Before
the tax falls on the transactions here involved the defend-
ants must show not only that there is a sale “for use or
consumption” as defined in the Modern Dairy Co. case,
but also that the transaction is taxable under the statute.
That burden has not been met in this case. The tax is
imposed upon “persons engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail in.this State.” (Sec-
tion 2.) “Gale at retail” is defined as “any transfer of the
ownership of, or title to, tangible personal property to the
purchaser, for use or consumption and not for resale in
any form as tangible personal property, for a valuable con-
sideration.” (Section 1.) The sweep of the phrase “use
or consumption” as it appears in the definition of a sale
at retail is qualified by the following clause, which excludes
sales for resale for a consideration. As the act reads, a
person is not engaged in the business of selling at retail
unless he transfers tangible personal property (1) for use
or consumption and (2) not for resale in any form as
tangible personal property. Both tests must be met to
justify the imposition of the tax. This was pointed out
in Modern Dairy Co.: “It will therefore be seen that while
the title of the act requires a taxable sale to be to the pur-
chaser for use or consumption (as the legislature intended
these terms to be construed) this definition of ‘Sale at retail’
imposed the additional requirement that the sale be ‘not
for resale in any form as tangible personal property, for a
valuable consideration.’” 413 Ill. at 59-60.

Referring to Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 413 Ill. 55, Fefferman v. Marohn, 408 Ill. 542, and
Robertson Products Co, v. Nudelman, 389 Ill. 281, the de-

Dd

fendants assert that “this Court’s three most recent pro-
nouncements upon the general intendment and import of
the phrase ‘use or consumption,’ leave no doubt that, what-
ever may be the implication of prior decisions, there is
certainly no such ‘resale of commodities’ as will exempt
the supply house from the tax unless the re-transfer is for
a direct and specific charge and there is probably no such
resale even though a direct and specific charge is made
where the transfer is a minor incident of the rendition of
services.” We do not read those cases as formulating the
broad proposition urged by the defendants. Two of the
three cases involved subsequent retransfers without con-
sideration and, contrary to the defendants’ contention, ex-
pressly recognized that a retransfer for a valuable consid-
eration exempts the prior sale. In the Fefferman case we
stated that “Appellants argue, and we believe are supported
by previous decisions on the subject, that what is meant by
the buyer’s being the ‘ultimate user and consumer’ is that
the buyer must not further transfer the commodity pur-
chased for a consideration.” (408 Ill. at 546.) The dis-
tinction between a gratuitous retransfer and one for valu-
able consideration was noted further in Modern Dairy Co.
413 Ill. at 67: “It is true that the entire scheme of the act
will make vendors liable for the tax on some sales to the
institutions and not liable on other identical sales, depend-
ing upon whether the institution transfers to a paying
patient or a charity patient.”

In Robertson Products Co. v. Nudelman, 389 Ill. 281,
the supply house sold paper napkins, tissue, towels, cups,
and plates to hotels and office buildings. We held the sup-
plier subject to the tax because “No thought of transfer or
resale is indulged. Hotels and office buildings are not in
the business of selling paper napkins, tissue, cups, plates
and the like, but they are in the business of running a hotel
or an office building or the like. We are of the opinion it

is in this sense that they may be said to consume these
a

0 ee

articles. Nor is this to be confused with the materials used
by contractors which go to make up a given object sold
to a consumer. The items here considered are simply a
part of the equipment of hotels and office buildings just as
the contractor’s tools are a part of his equipment.” 389
Til. at 286,

The single attempt by the legislature to impose the tax
on suppliers making sales to persons engaged in service
occupations who retransfer the supplies for a valuable con-
sideration in connection with the rendition of services came
in 1941. At that time the General Assembly added the
following paragraph to section 1 of the act: “ ‘Use or con-
sumption,’ in addition to its usual and popular meaning,
shall be construed to include the employment of tangible
personal property by persons engaged in service occupa-
tions (including construction contracting and other service
occupations of like character,) trades or professions, in
the rendering of services, where as a necessary incident to
the rendering of such services, transfer of all or of a part
of the tangible personal property employed in connection
with the rendering of said services is made from the person
engaged in the service occupation (including construction
contracting and other service occupations of like character, )
trade or profession, to his customer or client.”

That 1941 amendment came before this court in Stolze
Lumber Co. v. Stration, 386 Ill. 334. There it was held -
invalid because it was thought to go beyond the scope of
the title under the restricted definition of “use or consump-
tion” applied by the court and because it was inconsistent
with the fundamental definition of “sale at retail” in sec-
tion 1. “Sale at retail” has always required a sale (1) for
“use or consumption” and (2) “not for resale in any form.”
In Modern Dairy Co. we specifically commented upon the
two reasons for the result reached in the Stolze Lumber Co.
case and upon reconsideration rejected only the first, hold-

a

ing that the narrow meaning attributed to the phrase used
in the title was unwarranted.

Subsequent to the decision in the Stolze Lumber Co.
case, the General Assembly repealed the invalidated amend-
ment by re-enacting section 1 without the paragraph added
in 1941. (Laws of Illinois, 1945, p. 1278.) It appears,
then, that the only provision which sought to tax suppliers
to service occupations which retransfer the property for a
valuable consideration, is no longer in the act. The “gap”
in the statute which was referred to in Modern Dairy Co.,
as a result of which neither persons engaged in what have
been characterized as “service occupations,” nor those who
sell to such persons, are subject to the tax, still exists under
the present language of the statute.

The remaining question concerns the effect which should
be given to the modification of the injunction. On Novem-
ber 20, 1952, the trial court set aside the original decree,
in so far as it concerned future sales of medical supplies
to doctors and hospitals who retransfer them without con-
sideration. This action was taken on the basis of our
decision in Modern Dairy Co. and the plaintiffs do not
question its propriety. ‘The defendants, however, have ap-
pealed from this ruling, contending that when the injunc-
tion was set aside a tax became due with respect to trans-
actions of this type which had occurred prior to the date
of modification of the injunction.

The defendants rely upon the general principle that a
judicial decision, unlike a statute, is not prospective in its
operation, but is expository of the law as the court declares
it to exist at the time of the decision. The plaintiffs urge
that a final injunction must be regarded as res judicata for
the period prior to its modification, because to rule other-
wise would nullify the effect of the injunction.

We have no doubt of the general soundness of the
plaintiffs’ argument. The injunction, so long as it remains

1

unmodified, is a continuing adjudication. That is the im-
plication of Mr. Justice Cardozo’s observation in United
States v. Swift & Co. 286 U.S. 106, 119, where the power
of a court of equity to modify or vacate-an injunction was
reaffirmed: “There is need to keep in mind steadily the
limits of inquiry proper to the case before us. We are
not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether
anything has happened that will justify us now in changing
a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not
subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions
that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse
under the guise of readjusting.” The same implication
appears in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. 270 U.S.
587, in which the Illinois Commerce Commission appealed
from an order enjoining the enforcement of a rate schedule
upon the ground that the effect of the decree was to pro-
hibit the Commission from supervising the rates of the
utility in the future. The court rejected this contention,
saying: “* * * there is nothing in the decree, rightly
construed, which attempts to curtail or could curtail the
legislative or rate-making powers of appellants to proceed
hereafter under the State law, subject to such limitations,
if any, as may be required by the doctrine of res judicata,
ordinarily applicable in such cases.”

The same view of an unmodified injunction as a con-
tinuing adjudication was expressed by this court in Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com. 387 Il. 256, 274,
in describing the effect of an earlier decree enjoining inter-
ference with railroad rates: “Any attempt to apply that
decree to a subsequent change in conditions or to a different
service or rates, is governed solely by the rules of law
applicable to the doctrine of res judicata.” To the same
effect is Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway
Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co. 40 N.D. 69, 168 N.W.
684. There the railroad succeeded in securing the modifica-
tion of an injunction which had restrained the collection of

EE

freight rates above those fixed by statute. It then sued the
shipper to recover increased compensation for shipments
made during the period the injunction was in effect. The
court held that the injunction bound the railroad during the
time it was in effect, saying: “* * * Were the rule
otherwise, the injunction, which is merely a continuing ex-
pression of the judgment of the court that the statutory
rate must be applied, is a judgment deprived of its force
as an adjudication of the rights of the parties. The error
of plaintiff’s contention inheres in the failure to recognize
the injunction as being the continuing expression of the
court until such time as it may be modified or dissolved by
a new judgment or decree. During such time, it is im-
possible that there could have been any other measure of
the rights and obligations of the parties than that provided
in the decree itself.” By analogy, the same result would
follow from the settled view that the erroneous character
of a temporary injunction does not justify a violation of
its provisions so long as it remains in effect.

It is true that res judicata and its kindred doctrines
have been tempered in their application to tax cases, (Com-
pare Blair v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S.
5, with Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371,) and that the underlying reason has
been the inequity which would follow if one taxpayer were
permanently protected by collateral estoppel from continu-
ing exactions which would fall unimpeded upon others sim-
ilarly situated. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591;
United States v. Stone & Downer Co. 274 U.S. 225. See,
Restatement, Judgments, sec. 70, Comment f (1948 Supp.
PP. 340-1.)

But the cases which have thus restricted the full scope
of res judicata in the tax field have not involved injunctions.
That remedy was available here because the question in-
volved was whether or not the imposition of the tax upon
the plaintiffs was authorized by law. (Owens-Illinois Glass

2

Co, v. McKibbin, 385 Ill. 245.) Whatever may be said as
to the inequity of a rigid application of res judicata in tax
cases generally, it could hardly be thought equitable now
to subject these plaintiffs to a retroactive tax extending
back into the period during which the imposition of the
tax was prohibited by injunction,

We hold, therefore, that the circuit court correctly ruled
that its modification of the injunction should only operate
prospectively. For the reasons stated, the orders of the
circuit court are affirmed. Orders affirmed.

PCs
Co. 77

Tue Department of Pustic Works AND BUILDINGS,
Appellant, vs. Lypia M. Kirxenpa et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Ivan A. Exsiort, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Waiitam C. Wines, Ravmonp S. Sarnow, and A, Zora
Groves, of counsel,) for appellant.

Joun J. BLacx, and Aucust B. Biacx,-both of Morris,
for appellees.

Mr. Justice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

The Department of Public Works and Buildings appeals
directly to this court from a judgment of the circuit court
of Grundy County awarding compensation to the defend-
ants for land and access rights taken in the improvement
of U.S. Route 66 as a freeway under the Illinois Freeways
Act. -

6

The appeal is made directly to this court because a free-
hold interest and public revenue are involved.

The pleadings consist of the petition in condemnation;
defendants’ answer with a copy of a certain lease attached;
petitioner’s motion to strike the answer, the lease, and that
part of the answer referring to the lease; petitioner’s mo-
tion that compensation for the land taken be ascertained by
a jury; defendants’ cross petition, and petitioner’s motion
for a new trial. Petitioner’s motions to strike the answer
and the lease, and for ascertainment of compensation by a
jury and for a new trial were all denied.

The State produced four witnesses, and the State’s tes-
timony as to value of the tract in question was as to fair
cash market value not taking into consideration the lease
in issue. Defendants’ witnesses as to the fair market value
of the premises considered a lease from the Shell Oil Com-
pany which had been negotiated by the defendants in good
faith for a considerable period of time and entered into
a short time prior to the filing of the petition in condemna-
tion. The evidence clearly shows that the property in ques-
tion had been considered for, purchased for, leased for,
plans prepared for, and the property cleared for a gas
station, truck stop and restaurant, all in good faith prior
to the commencement of the proceeding. Petitioner’s proof
placed the value of the land before taking at between $5000
and $6000, without taking into consideration the Shell Oil
Company lease. Defendants’ proof showed the value of
all the premises, with the lease taken into consideration,
between $14,000 and $18,000. The trial court, after hear-
ing the evidence without a jury and after a personal view
of the premises awarded damages for land taken in the
amount of $1400, for access rights taken $2400, and for
damages to land not taken $7000.

The appeal presents two issues to this court for deter-
mination, viz.:

EE

1. Does the State of Ilinois in proceedings to condemn
property for public use by the State have a right to a trial
by jury under the Illinois constitution of 1870 and the
Illinois Eminent Domain Act? Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap.
47, par. I et seq.

2. Was the Shell Oil Co. lease properly admissible in
evidence as material to the valuation of the property interest
involved?

The question whether there is a right to trial by jury
in condemnation proceedings where the compensation is
to be paid by the State of Illinois presents a question of
first impression never directly decided by this court. Sec-
tion 13 of article II of the constitution of 1870 provides
in part as follows: “Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such
compensation, when not made by the state, shall be ascer-
tained by a jury, as shall be prescribed by law.” Section 1
of the Eminent Domain Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 47,
par. 1,) provides substantially the same as the foregoing
constitutional provision with slightly varying language, as
follows: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation; and that in all
cases in which compensation is not made by the state in
its corporate capacity, such compensation shall be ascer-
tained by a jury, as hereinafter prescribed.” Such statutory
provision in the Eminent Domain Act has been the law
of the State of Illinois since the approval on April 10, 1872,
of “An act to provide for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain.”

“Eminent domain” is a phrase which has been used
for hundreds of years to designate the power and right
of the sovereign State, or those to whom its power has
been delegated, to take private property within its jurisdic-
tion for public use without the owner’s consent, upon pay-
ing due compensation. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.

re

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. 270 Ill. 399; Litch-
field and Madison Railway Co. v. Alton and Southern Rail-
road, 305 Ill. 388; Limits Industrial Railroad Co. v. Ameri-
can Spiral Pipe Works, 321 Ill. 101.

The power and right of eminent domain is inherent in
the sovereign State, existing independently of written con-
stitutions or statutory laws thereof, regulated by appropriate
legislation, limited only by the constitutional provision for
compensation, and extending to every kind of property.
South Park Comrs. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 248 Ill.
299; Litchfield and Madison Railway Co, v. Alton and
Southern Railroad Co. 305 Ill. 388.

Both the constitutions of 1818 and of 1848 provided:
“Nor shall any man’s property be taken or applied to public
use without the consent of his representatives in the general
assembly, nor without just compensation being made to
him.” Const. of 1818, article VIII, sec. 11; Const. of
1848, article XIII, sec. 11.

In People v. Stuart, 97 Ill. 123, which involved the
effect of an act of 1877, providing for the mode of making
payment of condemnation, on the liability of certain indi-
viduals on a bond given to provide or pay for additional
State House grounds, in a concurring opinion by the then
Chief Justice, it was noted that the constitution requires
the assessment of compensation by a jury in all condemna-
tion proceedings except where compensation was to be paid
by the State and that the act in question providing for
payment of compensation for land taken was void as being
in excess of legislative powers and that therefore, under
the terms of the bond in question, the compensation was
to be paid by the individual obligors thereon. The Chief
Justice then concluded: “They are not the State. The
State had no interest in the question of the amount of
compensation. The owners of the land and these obligors
alone were interested in that question. They had in such
case a right to have the amount determined by jury. That

EE

right is given to the party making compensation as well as
to the land owner. Until the amount was determined in a
manner effective under our constitution these obligors were
not bound by this bond to pay.” ‘Thus, by this case and
other later cases, it has been clearly established that, where
the State is not one of the parties in interest, both parties
to a condemmation suit have a right to have the amount
of compensation determined by a jury.

However, in Johnson v. Joliet and Chicago Railroad
Co. 23 Ill. 124, which arose under our earlier constitution,
the question was raised whether the right to a trial by jury
was guaranteed in eminent domain proceedings by the
constitutional provision declaring that “the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases
at law, without regard to the amount in controversy.” In
denying this contention the court stated, at page 130, “This
has reference only, and is so understood by all jurists, to
suits or actions for the recovery of money in actions ex
contractu or ex delicto. It never has been considered by
any court, as extending to the process in the exercise of
the right of eminent domain, nor in cases of that descrip-
tion, nor in cases in chancery, and other cases which might
be mentioned. * * * Nor do we see any conflict be-
tween that section and the eighth section, article thirteen
of our constitution, which declares ‘that no freeman shall
be imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privi-
leges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of
his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land.’ This clause does not apply,
and has never been made to apply, to cases of this descrip-
tion. This is a case clearly within the eleventh section of
article thirteen which we have cited and commented on.
It is a proceeding in the exercise of the right of eminent
domain by the State, to advance the public necessity, and
supply a want. We have no doubt the legislature, in the
exercise of this right, can, without notice of any kind, on

220 ee

an emergency of which they are to judge, take any man’s
property for public use, by making compensation, ‘and
prescribe the mode by which this compensation shall be
ascertained.”

In Wabash Railroad Co. v. Coon Run Drainage and
Levee Dist. 194 Ill. 310, this court held unconstitutional
a certain provision of the Levee Act of 1879 which pro-
vided a method for determining compensation in a drain-
age condemnation case not in keeping with the principle
of jury determination. After holding that the provisions
of section 13 of article II of our constitution and of sec-
tion 14 of article XI of the constitution guaranteeing that
the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate in all trials for
claims of compensation in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain by a corporation, it was noted that the
proceedings for the condemnation of property are judicial
in character.

In view of the foregoing decisions, it must be concluded
that the right to a jury trial where the sovereign State
exercises its right of eminent domain is not guaranteed as
a matter of common law, nor by the Bill of Rights of the
Illinois constitution. This conclusion is supported by the
statement contained in Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3rd edi-
tion, volume 2, sec. 509, page 922, where it is stated, “In
the absence of any express provision on the subject, the
authorities almost uniformly hold that it is not a matter of
constitutional right. The line of reasoning upon which
these decisions are founded is that, before any of our con-
stitutions were adopted, it had been the practice in America
and England to ascertain the compensation to be paid for
property taken for public use by other agencies than a
common-law jury; that this practice was well known to
the framers of those constitutions, and that presumably they
did not intend by any general language employed to abro-
gate a practice so universal and of such long standing and
against which no complaint existed.”

SS

Likewise, in 18 Am, Jur. “Eminent Domain,” sec. 337,
page 979, it is stated as follows: “Trial by jury in emi-
nent domain proceedings is not essential to due process of
law. A State may authorize any just and reasonable
method of determining the amount of compensation for
Jand taken for the public use without violating the 14th
amendment or similar provisions of the State constitutions.
Most of the State constitutions contain some specific pro-
vision in regard to trial by jury, but none of them require
jury trial in all justiciable controversies that may arise.
The usual requirement is that the right to jury trial shall
remain ‘inviolate,’ or the idea is expressed in some other
phrasing that no law shall be enacted cutting off trial by
jury in such cases as it was customary to employ it when
the constitution was adopted. As it has always been cus-
tomary in almost every State to have the damages in emi-
nent domain cases determined by three or more appraisers
or commissioners without the intervention of a jury at
any stage of the proceeding, it is held in such States that
there is no constitutional right to jury trial in eminent
domain cases.”

Inasmuch as there was no common-law right to trial
by jury in eminent domain proceedings guaranteed and
preserved by the Illinois constitution, and inasmuch as sec-
tion 13 of article II of the constitution excepts those cases
where eminent domain compensation is made by the State
from the requirement that eminent domain compensation
be ascertained by a jury, we must conclude that the Illinois
constitution does not require a jury trial where the State
is the condemning agency.

There being no constitutional limitation in such in-
stances, the General Assembly of the State has the power
and right to specify such method of determining compen-
sation in eminent domain cases where the State is the con-
demning party as it deems proper and reasonable, subject
only to the limitation that it shall enact no special law

2

where a general law could be made applicable. However,
an examination of the acts of the General Assembly in
reference to eminent domain discloses no provision by the
General Assembly providing for the method of determin-
ing compensation where property is taken or damaged by
the State, the only statutory requirement applicable to a
taking by the State being that the petition in condemnation
shall be signed by the Governor or such other person as
he shall direct or as shall be provided by law. Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 47, par. 2.

The only variance from the language of the constitution
found in section 1 of the Eminent Domain Act, (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 47, par. 1,) in exempting those condemna-
tion cases where compensation is made by the State from
the requirement for jury trial, is found in the language
specifying that cases in which compensation is made by
the State “in its corporate capacity” shall not be included.
This act of the General Assembly was adopted within two
years after the adoption of the constitution of 1870 and
has remained in the same form from then to the present
date. From what has been heretofore noted as to the nature
of the State’s power and right of eminent domain and
earlier methods of determining the compensation to be paid
for the taking of property and the exercise of such power,
it is apparent that the clause “in its corporate capacity”
was used by the General Assembly to designate those cases
in which the State itself, in its sovereign capacity as a
State, is the condemning party, as distinguished from those
cases in which the condemning party is a subordinate gov-
ernmental unit or other agency to which the State has
delegated its sovereign power and right of eminent domain.

The General Assembly not having chosen to prescribe
by general law a method for determination of compensa-
tion to be paid where private property is to be taken by
the State itself in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, the determination of just compensation for such

3:

taking becomes a judicial proceeding to be regulated by
the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. In the
instant case a duly constituted judicial tribunal having
heard the sworn testimony and evidence of all interested
parties, and having viewed the premises itself, we cannot
find any abuse of judicial discretion in denying a trial by
jury, no trial by jury being guaranteed at common law or
by our constitution, nor required by statutory enactment.

By such conclusion we do not hold nor infer that a jury
trial in such instances is prohibited by our constitution or
statutory enactments, but do hold that unless and until the
General Assembly acts upon the subject, the granting or
withholding of a jury trial in condemnation proceedings
where the State is the condemning party, as distinguished
from a petitioner to whom the power of eminent domain
has been delegated by the State, is within the sound judicial
discretion of the court, and it is not for this court to legis-
late judicially upon the subject.

It being elementary and fundamental that in condemna-
tion proceedings the land taken is to be valued at its highest
and best use as shown by the evidence, and as rental value
of property is clearly an important question to be consid-
ered in determining the fair cash market value of property,
it is our opinion that the lease of the property here in
question with Shell Oil Company, which was negotiated
and executed in good faith prior to commencement of the
condemnation proceedings in question, was properly ad-
mitted in evidence. City of Chicago v. Lord, 276 Ill. 5443
Forest Preserve Dist. v. Caraher, 299 Ill. 113 Department
of Public Works and Buildings v. Diggins, 374 Ill. 113
City of Chicago v. Witt, 289 Ill. 320; Southwest Chicago
Drainage Dist. v. McMahon, 329 Ill. 478.

For the reasons heretofore discussed, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

224 a Pe
0, 7; aT

Tue Prorie or THE Srate or Intinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Merug Haun, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Merrie Ham, pro se.

Latuam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Martin J. Corset, State’s Attorney, of Vandalia, (Frep
G. Leacu, and Harry L, Pats, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justicy Hersugy delivered the opinion of the
court:

Merle Hamm, defendant below, was convicted at the
February, 1950, term of the circuit court of Fayette County,
of the crime of escaping from the Illinois State Farm at

| 225

Vandalia, He brings this writ of error to review that judg-
ment of conviction.

At the February, 1950, term of the circuit court of
Fayette County the defendant was indicted for the crime
of escaping from the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia. The
indictment contained three counts, each charging the same
crime in different language. Judge Joe Dees, an attorney
of that county, was appointed to represent the defendant.
He was then duly arraigned and entered a plea of guilty,
which the court refused to accept, admonishing the defend-
ant of the consequences of his plea. Defendant persisted in
his plea of guilty and waived trial by jury, whereupon he
was adjudged guilty of the crime charged. He was then
sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a minimum
term of five years and a maximum term of ten years in
accordance with section 5 of the act in relation to the Illinois
State Farm. IIL. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 118, par. 18.

Defendant assigns error claiming that the indictment
under which he was convicted was void for the reason that
it purports to be a “True Bill” although count II thereof
contains false and erroneous information. Count II of the
indictment, in the first part thereof, asserts that the defend-
ant was convicted of stealing the property of one William
Oney in Whiteside County, and as a result of his convic-
tion on said charge was sentenced to the State Farm in
Fayette County. This, the defendant contends, was false
and erroneous for the reason that the information on which
he was convicted in Whiteside County charged that the
property alleged to have been stolen by him was the prop-
erty of Floyd Hamm. He, therefore, complains that he was
convicted, sentenced, and committed to the Illinois State
Farm for an alleged crime other than that stated in count IT
of the indictment,

In support of his contentions defendant presents an
“Exhibit B” purported to be a certified record of the pro-
ceedings of the county court of Whiteside County, wherein

7

226 ee

defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to the Illinois
State Farm, This cause comes here on the common-law
record, and our inquiry is circumscribed by what is con-
tained in that record. Where the alleged error is without
basis in the common-law record, it is not open to considera-
tion in the absence of a bill of exceptions. (People v.
Sweeney, 409 Ill. 223; People v. Baldridge, 403 Ill. 606;
People v. Corrie, 387 Ill. 587.) This “Exhibit B” is not,
nor does it purport to be, any part of the common-law
record here submitted. Neither is it, nor does it purport
to be, a part of any bill of exceptions in this cause, as none
is presented. Therefore, there is no basis for according it
consideration in support of the error assigned by defendant.

Even if count II of this indictment were defective, it
does not follow that the entire indictment would thereby
be rendered void and the conviction thereunder invalidated.
The statute, at the time defendant was sentenced, read:
“Whoever being a prisoner at the Illinois State Farm
escaped therefrom is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one
year nor more than ten years.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap.
118, par. 18°) An indictment is sufficient which charges
the offense in language of the statute when the words of
the’statute so far particularize the offense that by their use
alone the defendant is notified, with reasonable certainty,
of the precise offense with which he is charged. (People
vy. Klemann, 383 Ill. 236.) Counts I and III of this indict-
ment are substantially in the language of the statute, each
alleging defendant was a prisoner at the Illinois State
Farm and escaped therefrom, and are entirely sufficient
to notify the defendant of the nature of the offense with
which he is charged. The date of the alleged crime is set
forth in each of said counts, although it is not necessary
to be precisely proved by the People. (People v. Kennay,
391 Ill. 572.) By his plea of guilty to the indictment de-
fendant confessed his guilt and every essential element of

es 221

the crime, that he was a lawful prisoner of the Illinois
State Farm and that he escaped therefrom. (People v.
Devore, 402 Ill. 339.) He can hardly now urge that he
was not informed of the crime charged.

Defendant does not question counts I and III which
we have determined are sufficient to sustain the judgment,
but contends merely that count IT renders the entire indict-
ment void. Where one of several counts in an indictment
is sufficient to sustain a judgment, the conviction must
stand. (People v. Donaldson, 341 Ill. 369.) Accordingly,
the judgment of the circuit court of Fayette County is
affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

ee

(No. 32677
Grorce H. Apams ef al., Appellants, vs. Taz Boarp or
Epucation of Scuoor, District No. 41, Du Pacy
County, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Epear J. Exziorr, of Wheaton, for appellants.
Russgit W. KxEnry, of Wheaton, for appellee.

Mr. Justicy Hersuey delivered the opinion of the
court:

On May 17, 1952, School District No. 41, Du Page
County, held an election with reference to improvement in
the school district. Thereafter the petitioners-appellants
filed a petition to contest said election. After a hearing
thereon the circuit court of Du Page County dismissed said
petition, and thereupon the petitioners-appellants took an
appeal to this court as provided by statute.

Two forms of ballots were used in said election, sub-
mitting to the electors several propositions, which, if ap-
proved by the necessary number of voters, would authorize
the purchase of a new school site, the selection of a par-
ticular site, the building of a new school, and the issuance
of bonds therefor, and the building of an addition to an
existing school and issuance of bonds therefor.

One of the ballots, designated as ballot No. 2, gave to
the voters an opportunity to vote on five propositions,
which were as follows: Proposition I: Shall the Board
of Education purchase an additional school site; Proposi-
tion II: Shall the Board of Education build a new school
building; Proposition III: Shall the Board of Education
build an addition to one of the existing schools; Proposi-

er 229

tion IV: Shall the Board of Education issue bonds in the
sum of $865,000 to buy a school site and build a new
“school building; and Proposition V: Shall the Board of
Education issue bonds to build an addition to an existing
school.

The vote on Proposition I on said ballot No. 2, which
had to do with the purchase of an additional school site,
was: Yes (to purchase) 1144; No (against purchase) 653.
All the other propositions on ballot No. 2 carried.

Ballot No. 1 had to do with selection of a school site,
in event the voters authorized the purchase of an additional
school site, which proposition was submitted to them as
Proposition No. I on ballot No. 2.

Three specifically described sites were placed on ballot
No. 1 purstiant to petitions duly filed. A voter could indi-
cate his choice of any of said sites by placing a cross oppo-
site any of the described sites in the space provided for
that purpose on the ballot. Also on said ballot a blank
space was provided wherein the voter could place the de-
scription of any site he might favor and cast a vote there-
for by placing a cross opposite said description.

At the election 1933 No. 2 ballots were handed out to
the voters, and also the same number to the voters on the
selection of a school site designated as ballot No. 1. Of
the No. 1 ballots 1619 were returned voted and counted
by the election officials, and 311 No. 1 ballots were re-
turned to the election officials but not counted because they
were erroneously voted or returned in blank. Three of the
No. 1 ballots were not returned to the officials. The 1619
ballots counted, plus 311 not voted, plus 3 not returned
account for the entire 1933 No. 1 ballots handed out.

Of the 1619 legal and lawful votes cast on the propo-
sition set forth on ballot No. 1 for the selection of a site,
868 voted in favor of what was designated on the ballot
as Site 1 or the Hawthorne site, and which was one of the

230 ee

three sites specifically described on ballot No. 1, 158 voted
for Site 2 designated on ballot No. 1 as Site 2 or the
Western Avenue site, and 593 voted for the site designated
on ballot No. 1 as Site 3. No votes were cast in the blank
space designated as Site 4 on said ballot.

At the hearing on the petition to contest the election
in the circuit court of Du Page County, the court found
that 868 votes were cast for Site 1, being the Hawthorne
site specifically described on ballot No. 1, and that the
same was a majority of all the votes at said election voting
on the proposition and dismissed the petition to contest the
election.

The appellants contend that the trial court erred in
holding that the Hawthorne site had been selected by a
majority of the voters voting on the proposition for selec-
tion of the site. In their argument before this court they
assert that in order for the Hawthorne site to be selected
it was necessary for it to have received a vote equal to or
greater than a majority of the votes cast on the proposition
to purchase a school site, submitted at the same election
and upon which 1797 lawful votes were cast. A majority
of the votes cast on the proposition to authorize the pur-
chase of a site would be 898, or 30 votes more than the
vote for the selection of the Hawthorne site. The basis
for appellants’ contention is that the proposition to au-
thorize the purchase of any site, although on a separate
ballot, was voted on at the same election as the proposition
for selection of a site, the ballots therefor were placed in
the same ballot box with the ballots on the proposition for
the selection of a site, that only one set of pollbooks was
used, that all the ballots were canvassed and returned to-
gether, were cast by the same voters, the site selected could
not be acquired unless the authority to purchase a site were
given, and therefore, the general purchase of a site cannot
be considered separately from the selection of a particular
site.

ee 231

The election in this case was held pursuant to section
7-17 of the School Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 122,
par. 7-17.) The pertinent part of that statute here reads
as follows: “To buy or lease one or more sites for school-
houses, with necessary ground, and to purchase, build or
move a schoolhouse, but shall not purchase ur locate a
schoolhouse site, or purchase, build or move a schoolhouse,
unless authorized by a majority of all votes cast on the
proposition at an election called for such purpose in pur-
suance of a petition signed either by not less than three
hundred legal voters, or by one-fifth of all the legal voters
of the district, whichever is less; however, the questions
of purchasing a schoolhouse site, building a new school-
house, and issuing bonds for the purpose of borrowing
money to purchase a schoolhouse site and to build a new
schoolhouse may be combined into one or more propositions
on the ballot.” It is to be noted that said statute provides
that the questions to purchase a school site, to locate a site,
to build a schoolhouse, and to issue bonds for the purpose

. of purchasing a site and to build a new schoolhouse may
be combined into one or more propositions. This provision
of the statute was followed in the preparation of ballot
No. 2, each being a separate proposition. There is no con-
tention that each of the five propositions placed on said
ballot did not carry at the election.

Ballot No. 1, which is directly involved in this case,
contains the proposition to select a schoolhouse site, and
complies with the provisions of section 5A-12. That sec-
tion provides, that by a petition the proposition of select-
ing a particular site may be placed on the ballot to be
used at an election. There is no contention here that
such was not done in a proper manner in placing the
Hawthorne site and the other two specifically described
sites on ballot No. 1. Said section further prescribes the
form of the ballot to be used. There is no contention that
ballot No. 1 does not conform to such statutory require-

232 De

ments. It is also apparent that ballot No. 1 followed the
above statute in providing a blank space in order that any
voter might vote for a school site not listed on the ballot.

It is clear from the foregoing that the proposition to
purchase a site is separate and distinct from the proposition
to select a site. The statute recognizes the difference by
especially providing the form of the ballot to be used at
an election to select a school site. Section 5A-13 contem-
plates a vote on the general proposition to purchase a site
and section 5A-12 a vote whereby the voters are privileged
to vote their choice as to a school site. The two proposi-
tions are separate and distinct, and there is nothing in the
statute to indicate, or from which it can be concluded,
that the vote on the general proposition to purchase a site
shall be used as the basis for determining the. majority
that must be received by any particular proposition in order
to be approved by -the voters. ‘To so construe the statute
would do violence to the language used therein and be con-
trary to the expressed legislative intent.

Section 7-17, as set forth above in part, provides that
the powers of that section shall not be available to the
board of education “unless authorized by a majority of
all votes cast on the proposition at an election called for
such purpose.” We have already determined that each
power there enumerated may appear as a separate propo-
sion at the same election, as contemplated by the several
sections of the chapter relating to school law. It is not
required that each proposition receive a majority of the
votes cast at the election. A majority voting on a proposi-
tion is not synonymous with the majority of votes cast at
an election. The number of votes cast at an election is
determined by the pollbooks, while a majority of the votes
cast on a given proposition is determined by the ballots.
Moreover, the presumption is that the election officials
acted rightly, and that therefore the rejected ballots were
rejected for legal cause and were not votes properly cast

288

on any proposition. It is only those ballots legally capable
of being counted upon the proposition that determine the
majority necessary for approval. (People ex rel. Husser
v. Hedlund, 309 Ul. 280.) It is clear then that only those
votes legally and lawfully cast on the selection of a site
need be considered in determining the majority necessary
for approval. On the proposition for selection of a site
1619 votes were so cast, and the Hawthorne site received
868 votes, well over the bare majority. The Hawthorne
site we thus properly designated as the site to be purchased.

In support of their contentions the appellants cite
O’Connor v. High School Board of Education, 288 Ill.
240, and Hysler v. Springfield School Dist. 272 Ill. 458.
Neither of those cases can have any applicability here. In
the O’Connor case the proposition of building a new build-
ing and on what site it should be constructed were sub-
mitted to the voters as one proposition, whereas more than
one proposition was involved. That case said nothing con-
cerning the question whether the majority on one proposi-
tion must be equal to or greater than the majority voted
on another proposition to carry it, which appellants assert
is the sole and only question before this court. In the
Hysler case a school election was held at the same time
as an election on whether the territory should become anti-
saloon territory. The school law at that time, contrary to
the present provisions,.made no provision for a majority
voting on a proposition, but only for a majority voting at
the election,

Appellants argue before this court that the election was
not free and equal, as a greater burden was cast upon a
voter who wished to vote against the proposed sites than
on one registering an affirmative vote. This is a constitu-
tional question and it must appear that it was presented to
and passed upon by the trial court, its ruling preserved in
the record, and error assigned upon it for such question
to be considered by this court. (People v. Schmidt, 413

284 ee

Til. 80.) Upon strict examination of the record together
with the pleadings, stipulation and order contained therein,
we are unable to find that such question was presented to
the trial court or that the court passed upon it. Neither
is the question assigned as error here, but is raised only in
argument. Consequently, it cannot be considered by this
court,

We therefore hold that the Hawthorne Street site did
receive a majority of the votes cast upon the proposition,
and the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County
dismissing the petition is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Le
No. 32704 iT

Tue PEOPLE oF THE Stare oF InniNors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. CaRLYLE Davis, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

CarLyLE Davis, pro se.

Latuam Caste, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Jamxs P. Mourning, State’s Attorney, of Rushville, (FRED
G. Leacu, and Harry L. Pate, of counsel,) for the People.

es 235

Mr. Cuzzr Justice SCHAEFER delivered the opinion of
the court:

The defendant, Carlyle Davis, was indicted in the cir-
cuit court of Schuyler County for the crimes of burglary
and larceny. A motion to quash the indictment was over-
ruled. Defendant pleaded not guilty. On October 20, 1949,
a motion for continuance was overruled, and on October 24
the case went to trial. A jury found defendant guilty of
burglary and larceny. He was sentenced to imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term of not less than five nor
more than fifteen years. The judgment was affirmed.
(People v. Davis, 406 Ill. 215.) Thereafter defendant filed
a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the
State’s Attorney answered the petition, and an attorney
was appointed to represent defendant. Evidence was heard
and an order was entered dismissing the petition. We have
granted defendant’s application for a writ of error.

Defendant’s constitutional claims are based upon the
due-process guarantees of the Federal and State constitu-
tions and upon section 9 of article II of our constitution.
His petition, supported by five affidavits, charges that he
was denied the right to counsel of his own choice at the
original hearing; that he was forced to proceed to trial
four days after he was denied a continuance and, conse-
quently, was represented by an “unwanted” counsel, and
that he was denied the right to present a valid defense
because of the incompetency of counsel “forced” upon him
by the trial court.

Upon its review of the full record in 406 Ill, 215, this
court considered at length defendant’s contention that the
trial judge erred in overruling his motion for a continu-
ance due to the physical condition of one of his attorneys.
The question presented was then framed in terms of an
abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion.
Defendant also made the contention that he did not have a
fair and impartial trial. The court decided that the trial

236 |

judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion
for a continuance and that defendant received a fair trial.
The allegations of the post-conviction petition all go to
the correctness of the denial of defendant’s motion for a
continuance and to the proposition that he did not receive
a fair trial. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act was not
intended to be used as a device to obtain another hearing
upon a claim of denial of constitutional rights where there
has already been a full and final review of the issues raised.
The questions now urged were necessarily adjudicated
when this court held that denial of the defendant’s motion
for a continuance did not constitute an abuse of judicial
discretion and that he received a fair trial. (People v. Jen-
nings, 411 Ill. 21; People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238.) Describ-
ing them now in constitutional terms does not change the
character of the questions presented from those previously
advanced and decided. People v. Davis, 406 Ill. 215 is res
judicata of the contentions now presented.

The judgment of the circuit court of Schuyler County

is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

es
(No. 5262

Mer. PowE1, Appellant, vs. TRusTEEs or SCHOoLs oF
Townsurp 16, Henry Counry, et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

re 231

James H. Anprews, Harper AnprEws, and CAMPBELI,
ANvREWS, all of Kewanee, for appellant.

Suaw & Cuamserzatn, and Masrt W. Brown, both
of Geneseo, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal seeks a review of a judgment entered by
the circuit court of Henry County wherein the plaintiff
failed in his action for declaratory judgment to have fixed
in him the title to a schoolhouse site located on his 120-acre
farm. .

The complaint herein was filed on October 13, 1949.
Tt alleged that the plaintiff was the owner and in possession
of a certain 120-acre tract and that the defendant Trustees
of Schools is a corporation, and for many years, and until
about two years previously, maintained and operated a
public school on a small tract of about three fourths of an
acre in area on the southwest corner of his farm, at which
time school was closed and the school site was abandoned;
that in the summer of 1949 the defendant Trustees of
Schools held a public sale and auction and pretended to
sell said school lot with the school building located thereon

238 ee

to defendant Creighton Wilson for $1130, and received
from said purchaser a portion of the purchase price at said
sale; and that they are preparing a deed to said land for
delivery to said purchaser in exchange for the balance of
the purchase price; that defendants claim said school lot
adversely to plaintiff and plaintiff will be greatly injured
and damaged by the completion of said sale; that plaintiff
has requested defendant Trustees of Schools to vacate said
school lot but said defendant contends it has a superior
right to said property and a dispute exists between plaintiff
and defendant as to the ownership and right of possession
of said lot, and thus a justiciable controversy exists between
plaintiff and defendant as to the right of possession of said
school lot and the use thereof. Wherefore plaintiff prayed
that the court order, adjudge, and decree that plaintiff is the
owner of the entirety of the 120-acre tract, which is de-
scribed in the complaint, including the school lot mentioned.

Afterwards, Ada Wilson was made an additional de-
fendant, and all defendants filed answers. The answers of
all defendants deny that the plaintiff, or his predecessors
in title, have ever been in possession of said schoolhouse lot
or have any right or title thereto or have ever made claim
thereto until the commencement of this suit, and aver that
prior to the year 1866 a public school was established in
what was then known as District No. 3, and a public
schoolhouse was erected on a small tract of land containing
less than three fourths of an acre in the southwest corner
of the tract, and aver adverse possession of said tract for
public-school purposes from that time until September,
1947, when District No. 3 became a part of Unit School
District No. 226 in Henry County. Thereafter proceedings
were taken, as provided by statute, for selling the school-
house tract and schoolhouse which are in controversy in
this proceeding. The answers admit that no record exists
of there ever having been a conveyance of said tract to the
Trustees of Schools, but that the defendants have title by

es 229

adverse possession; further aver that plaintiff’s title is
derived from Oliver C. Barnes, who purchased the land
now owned by the plaintiff by deed dated April 12, 1866,
recorded April 16, 1866, in Book 54 of the records in the
office of the recorder of deeds of Henry County, at page 54,
and that the deed to Oliver C. Barnes, following the de-
scription of the 120-acre tract, contained the following
words: “excepting the School House Lot,” and that by
said deed Oliver C. Barnes acquired no title to the school-
house lot in question, and that the subsequent deeds in
plaintiff’s chain of title, purporting to convey the entire
120-acre tract, did not convey to him title to the school-
house site by reason of the exception. The answers further
averred that defendant Wilson, on October 13, 1949, and
before the service of summons in the case, had paid the
balance of the purchase price and received from the defend-
ant school trustees a deed for said premises which had
been executed on October 5, 1949.

There is no conflict as to the controlling facts in this
case. On the trial it was stipulated that the title from the
government to the 120-acre tract was in one H. D. Davis
on May 10, 1854, and that on February 11, 1856, H. D.
Davis conveyed to Oliver D. Barto, by warranty deed, the
entire 120-acre tract. A deed was introduced from Oliver
D. Barto and wife to Oliver C. Barnes, containing the
words “excepting the School House Lot.” The deeds in the
chain of title from Barnes down to the plaintiff for the
120-acre tract did not contain any exception of the school-
house lot.

Plaintiff, Mell Powell, testified he was 62 years of age
and had lived in the vicinity practically all his life and that
the school building had been in the present location as long
as he could remember; that he lived on the land and farmed
it from 1906 to 1946; that he had never measured the
area used, while the school was operated, as a schoolyard
but imagined it was about one third of an acre and might

240 ee

be a little more; that there was a garage and a coal house
and two outside privies, and that there is a fence around
this schoolyard and it has been there as long as he could
remember; that he had been familiar with that location
since about 1904 and the schoolhouse was in its present
location when he first knew the place and continued to be
in the same location. He further testified that nobody
occupied the schoolyard and building from the time it was
abandoned as a school until the Wilsons entered; that he
went by there every week and “watched what was going
on in the schoolhouse and went in and looked at it some-
times ;” that Charles Ball, son-in-law of Wilson, lives there
now on the school lot; that the farm buildings are about
80 rods east and about 20 rods south of the schoolhouse
over on the other forty, that is, the southeast quarter of
the southwest quarter; that to get to the farm buildings
“we used the road that was put through in ror4 that runs
between section 8 and section 5 east and west. We go
sotith from the farm residence to the highway and we have
used the road to the south fence since 1915. Before that
we came down the 20 rods north along the fence between
the two 40’s and went through the schoolyard. The gate
is still there. My tenants and employees went through the
schoolyard every year as long as there was a school, when-
ever we had any lime or produce to haul. We would go
through the school yard and have the corn picker come in
to pick corn and would go through the school yard instead
of going down a narrow lane. We went through there
every month of the year except may be in February.”

Evidence was offered showing that the schoolhouse lot
was not excepted on the tax lists and that taxes had been
paid on the entire 120 acres from the year 1865 when
Oliver D, Barto was the owner.

The evidence further showed that the plaintiff had been
a member of the school board from the year 1922 until the
new Unit District was organized, and he was then elected

2a

a member of the board of the new Unit District and was
still a member.

At the close of the evidence for the plaintiff, the de-
fendants made a motion to find the issues in favor of the
defendants and judgment was entered in favor of the de-
fendants and against the plaintiff, and it was adjudged that
the plaintiff was not at the time of said sale, and is not now,
the owner of the small tract in controversy.

The complaint did not assert a right to the schoolhouse
lot by reason of any alleged adverse possession but relied
upon the legal title. In plaintiff’s reply brief, it is stated
that there was no claim by plaintiff that he took title to
the lot by adverse possession. Therefore, the judgment of
the trial court must be affirmed unless the record shows that
the plaintiff has the legal title to the schoolhouse lot.

A plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength
of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of his
adversary, and if he claims title in fee he must show a
fee-simple title and must deraign title from the government
where there is no proof of a common source of title, nor
of possession by plaintiff of the strip of land in controversy
in himself nor in any prior grantor with whom he connects
himself. (Krause v. Nolte, 27 Ill. 298; Allott v. Wil-
mington Light and Power Co, 288 Ill. 541.) There is no
reason that this rule would not apply in an action for
declaratory judgment as to title, which relies upon the legal
title as the basis for the relief sought.

The record shows that Oliver D. Barto owned the 120
acres, and that he conveyed it to Oliver C. Barnes on April
12, 1866, but excepted therefrom the schoolhouse lot. This
deed is in the chain of plaintiff’s title and not only was
Oliver C. Barnes estopped to deny the recital in that deed
but since the deed was duly placed of record all persons
claiming in the chain of title from Oliver C. Barnes are
likewise estopped. Ambarann Coal Corp. v. Old Ben Coal
Corp. 395 Ill. 154; Wiley v. Lamprecht, 400 Ill. 587.

Le

ue |

Plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the exception in
his chain of title on the theory that the defendants offered
no proof of the location of the schoolhouse lot in 1866
when the Barto deed was filed and that the exception is
void for uncertainty, and on the further ground that since
the deeds in his chain of title subsequent to the Barto deed
included the entire tract of 120 acres it made a prima facie
title in plaintiff since there was no evidence of adverse
possession of the schoolhouse lot.

We believe the trial court properly rejected the conten-
tions of the plaintiff. It is well established that an excep-
tion in a deed is valid if the excepted land can be made
certain by parol evidence. No other reasonable inference
can be drawn from the words in the deed “excepting the
School House Lot” than the presence of a schoolhouse
somewhere on the 120-acre tract. If the exception had
been “a lot for school purposes” then it might reasonably
be argued that there was a tract of ground that could not
be located by parol evidence on which it was expected to
build a schoolhouse, but it is obvious that the tract of
ground within the contemplation of the parties was one
upon which a schoolhouse had already been erected. In
other words, “School House” identifies the “Lot.”

We do not believe that there was any burden upon the
defendants to affirmatively prove that there was a school-
house on the premises at the time the Barto deed was made,
but, on the contrary, the presumption is that there was a
schoolhouse on the premises. If the plaintiff in this case
contends contrary to the reasonable inference, then’ from
logical reasoning, the burden was upon the plaintiff to make
such proof. We think the authorities so hold. Maxwell
Land Grant Co. v. Dawson, 151 U.S. 586, 38 L. ed 279;
Corinne Mill, Canal & Stock Co. v. Johnson, 186 U.S. 574,
39 L.ed. 537; Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Gray, 73
W. Va. 503, 80 S.E. 821; Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226,
a1 S.E. 347 and 359; Hall v. Martin, 89 Ky. 9, 11 S.W. 953.

243

We have held in Brenneman v. Dillon, 296 Ill. 140,
148, that a deed to “my house and lot” or to “one-half of
my lot” may be made sufficient by extrinsic evidence; and
in Wiley v. Lamprecht, 400 Ill. 587, 592, that a clause
“Excepting the road way as now located” and “Subject
to existing road way easements and to the rights of the
public in any and all legal established highways” could be
made definite and certain by parol evidence; and in In re
Estate of Frayser, 401 Il. 364, that a provision ‘The
grantor reserves surface of one-half acre, where. family
cemetery is” does not render the description uncertain.
We said that the reference to the family cemetery is a
sufficient indication of the location of the reserved portion.
In Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328, a description was held
certain when “Our farm in LeClaire’s reserve, Rock Island
county, and consisting of eighty-three and 31-100 acres,
more or less” was used. Of course, “eighty-three and 31-100
acres, more or less” would not be definite, but we held that
the word “Our” indicates that the farm referred to was a
farm owned by the vendors in the contract and it can be
shown with certainty what lands the appellees owned within
the reserve and county named.

The fact that the number of acres constituting the
schoolhouse lot was not mentioned is immaterial since, in
the case above cited, the statement of “eighty-three and
31-100 acres more or less” was entirely indefinite, but the
reference that it was the farm of the vendors permitted
parol evidence to show the boundaries of the farm. In this
case it is immaterial whether there was one third of an
acre in the schoolhouse lot, as testified to by the plaintiff,
or whether it was about three fourths of an acre as alleged
in the complaint.

In Honey v. Gambriel, 303 Ill. 74, in an action to enjoin
defendants from interfering with the use of a certain lot
described as a cemetery lot, and to have the boundaries of
the lot fixed by decree, the deed conveyed a 4o-acre tract

mad

“except one-half acre where the graveyard is now situate

and a passway from the road thereto.” The chancellor de- -

nied the injunction and refused to determine the lines of the
half acre reserved as prayed in the bill, but on appeal we
reversed and held that, while the language of the deed does
not designate or describe a particular one-half acre, the
description did sufficiently designate the location of the
tract reserved to enable a court of equity to fix the bound-
ary of the one-half acre tract with the graveyard as the
center of the tract.

We think, in principle, the case of Thomas v. Jewell,
300 Mich. 556, 2 N.W. 2d sor, 139 A.L.R. 1335, is con-
trolling on the merits of the instant case. In the Thomas
case the exception was “except ro rods square lying in the
northeast corner, which is leased to the School District as
long as occupied for school purposes, with the right to
occupy only,” and it was held that upon the termination
of the lease by abandonment of the land by the school dis-
trict the land belonged to the successors of the grantor,
and not to those of his grantees.

In this case we hold the exception in the Barto deed to
be sufficient as a valid exception and therefore ‘the title
would remain in Barto or his successors if it be held that
the rights of the school trustees were abandoned upon ceas-
ing to use the premises for school purposes. The argument
of the plaintiff that when a party has a deed for a tract
of land, actual possession of a part will, in law, constitute
possession of all of the tract not in the adverse possession
of another, is not relevant to the instant case, since the
record conclusively shows that the Trustees of Schools, as
far back as the plaintiff could remember, had the adverse
possession of the schoolhouse lot in dispute and evidently
that possession has been held as far back as April 12, 1866,
when Barto conveyed the 120 acres to Barnes and excepted
the schoolhouse lot.

~_— i

Pe 245

In the brief of plaintiff considerable reliance is placed
on the case of Miner v. Yantis, 410 Ill. 401, which, in
many respects, is analagous to the situation before us.
These are distinguishing features, however: (1) In the
Yantis case the plaintiff had title to the entire tract, evi-
denced by an unbroken chain from the government. In
the instant case the chain of title is broken by the deed
from Barto to Barnes, which contained the words “except-
ing the School House Lot;” (2) In the Vantis case the
school authorities had been in possession of the premises
for over fifty years. There was no deed to them and nothing
of record, similar to the exception in the Barto deed, to
indicate that they had any interest in the premises. In the
Yantis case it was held that the school trustees could acquire
title by adverse possession, but under the facts of that case,
such adverse possession had not been shown. The basis of
this finding was that at the time the school authorities had
first acquired an interest in the premises involved, the
applicable law provided that school authorities could select
schoolhouse sites and they should “have the right to take
the same for the purpose of a schoolhouse site either with
or without the owners’ consent.” ‘The language above
quoted, upon which the court relied to defeat a title by
adverse possession, was not in the applicable statute when
recognition was first made by the Barto deed, dated April
12, 1866, that there was a schoolhouse site at its present
location. That provision was added in 1881. Starr and
Curtis Annotated Statutes, 1885, Vol. 2, p. 2226 and 2227.

Since the plaintiff does not claim title by adverse pos-
session and has not proved adverse possession, the payment
of taxes is of no significance. (Kurz v. Blume, 4o7 Ill.
383, 390.) Plaintiff asserts error in describing in the final
judgment order a certain tract of land without any evi-
dence of the boundaries of the tract claimed by defendants.
It seems that, in the judgment appealed from, is copied

246 Ce]

from the answer of the defendant Wilson the description
used in his deed by the school trustees, and no evidence
was introduced at the trial to show the actual boundaries
of the schoolhouse lot. However, the record shows that
the order of the court found the issues for the defendants
and denied the prayer for declaratory judgment, and judg-
ment was rendered by the court in favor of the defend-
ants and against the plaintiff; that plaintiff was not, at
the time of said sale, and was not now, the owner of the
real estate described in the complaint, viz.: a small tract
of about three fourths of an acre in the southwest corner
of the 4o-acre tract on which a public school was situated.
This was a sufficient judgment, denying the declaratory
judgment sought, and the description of the premises in
accordance with the boundaries set forth in the deed exe-
cuted by the School Trustees may be entirely rejected as
surplusage, and does not vitiate the judgment.

The judgment of the circuit court finding the issues for
the defendants and denying the prayer for a declaratory
judgment is hereby affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

a
No, 3:57;

Giizert Krrv et al., Appellants, vs. Tag Cry of Carcaco
et al., Appellees,

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

I le le

es 2a

Moses Levitan, and Tuxoporg J. Leviran, both of
Chicago, for appellants.

Joun J. Morvumer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louts Karron, and Harry H. Por.acx, of counsel, )
for appellees.

Mr. Justicy Futon delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the circuit court of Cook County
seeking a construction of section 193-26 of the Municipal
Code of Chicago involving the licensing of certain games
of amusement. ‘The arguments concern the constitutionality
of the ordinance as well as its application to the matter in
question.

The plaintiffs-appellants, hereinafter designated as plain-
tiffs, are the distributors for the types of coin games in-
volved in this suit. They filed seven separate suits against
the defendant city, each suit covering a separate game or
games, asking for a writ of mandamus to require the proper
officials of the defendant to issue licenses for the operation

248 ee

of the machines. Subsequent amendments were filed asking
for a declaratory judgment that the machines in question
do not fall within the purview of the ordinance.

The enabling act, section 23-56 of the Revised Cities
and Villages Act, provides that the corporate authorities ‘of
a municipality shall have power “To license, tax, regulate,
or prohibit pin, ball, or bowling alleys, billiard, bagatelle,
pigeon-hole, pool, or any other tables or implements kept
for a similar purpose in any place of public resort.” Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 24, par. 23-56.

Acting under this authority, the city of Chicago adopted
an ordinance (Municipal Code of Chicago, sec. 193-26,)
which, as amended, now reads: “Bagatelle and pigeonhole.
It shall be unlawful for any person to keep or tse in any
place of public resort within the City any tables or imple-
ments for any game of bagatelle or pigeonhole. The term
‘bagatelle or pigeonhole’ as used in this section shall mean
a game played with any number of balls or spheres upon a
table or board having holes, pockets or cups into which
such balls or spheres may drop or become lodged and having
arches, pins and springs, or any of them, to control, deflect,
or impede the direction or speed of the balls or spheres
put in motion by the player, and shall include the modern
variety of bagatelle or pigeonhole commonly known as pin
games.”

The dictionaries define “bagatelle and pigeonhole” as
games similar to pool or billiards and played on a table
with a cue.

The plaintiffs make several attacks on the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance in question, claiming that it is
an attempt by the city to extend and enlarge the powers
granted by the enabling act in that the ordinance has been
amended to include pinball games; that it enlarges the
meaning of the term “place of public resort ;” and that the
enabling act does not authorize the city to pass an ordi-

es 249

nance restricting the mere keeping of a game without a
license.

The answer of the defendants alleged that the ma-
chines were within the prohibition of the ordinance and
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a declaratory judg-
ment. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case the defendant
moved for a finding for defendant, which motion was
granted. The order determined that a declaratory judg-
ment is not a proper remedy, that plaintiffs’ games are pin
games or modern variations of bagatelle and pigeonhole, and
that the ordinance is applicable to the plaintiffs’ machines.

We have read with care the arguments of the parties
on the point of the constitutionality of the ordinance and
come to’ the conclusion that the city did not exceed its
authority in amending the ordinance to include pinball games
or extending its right to regulate devices of like nature. In
People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, we said: “The
true rule is that statutes are to be construed as they were
intended to be understood when they were passed. * * *-
The words of a statute must be taken in the sense in which
they were understood at the time the statute was enacted.”

It is obvious that the legislature in enacting a statute
cannot foresee in physical detail all of the items and things
to be controlled under the general purpose motivating the
statute. Modern science moves too rapidly to make this
possible. The legislature must, in every instance, take
things as it finds them and extend the general purpose
concerning those things into the future by the use of gen-
eral language. Here the legislature gave the power to
municipalities to regulate certain games in existence at
the time the statute was adopted. These games were table
games to be found in places of general public resort. The
games in existence in these places have passed with time
and, taking their place, new games and devices have come
into existence. Some of these, it seeems to us, in this

250 ee

advanced day of development, are “tables or implements
kept for a similar purpose.”

It was not required that the city exercise all the license
powers granted it by the enabling act. The ordinance in-
cludes certain specific games which the city had the power
to regulate under the enabling act. It was not required to
adopt all. People v. Callicott, 322 Ill. 390.

The large question before this court is whether or not
the ordinance is applicable to the games in question. These
games are bowling games whereby a flat circular disc is
slid along a table some 8 feet long. At the end of the
table it passes under a partition on which are ten pins
arranged as for a game of bowling. These pins are capable
of being internally lighted. As the disc passes under the
partition it passes over electrical contacts wired to the pin.
The passing of the disc over the connection puts out the
light of a corresponding pin on the upper surface as if it
had been knocked down with a ball. There are no impedi-
menta in the path of the disc and there is no claim of
gambling in its operation.

Returning for a moment to the statute, we find an
explicit prohibition against bagatelle and pigeonhole. The
ordinance does not carry the words of the enabling act,
“or any other tables or implements kept for a similar pur-
pose in any place of public resort.” The definition of the
ordinance is, therefore, restricted to these two games.

If the games in question are to be prohibited under this
ordinance, the authority to support such a prohibition must
be found in the amendment bringing pinball games within
the ordinance. The entire authority of the city to prohibit
the licensing of the machines in question here must be
governed by the language the governing body of the city
used in adopting the restriction. The ordinance is explicit
in its description of what constitutes a prohibitable game.
By its terms it requires a game (1) played with balls or
spheres; (2) upon a table or board having holes, pockets

SS 251

or cups into which the balls or spheres may drop; and
(3) having arches, pins and springs, or any of them, to
control, deflect, or impede the direction or speed of the
balls or spheres. This is the only definition contained in
the ordinance to guide this court in determining this cause.

Comparing the physical appearance and use of the game
in question with the definition contained in the ordinance,
we find differences. As we understand the games in ques-
tion, the player slides a disc in an effort to simulate the
knocking down of pins in an actual bowling game. No
balls or spheres are used. The table on which the game
is played is a flat surface unmarred by any holes or cups.
In fact, the game, as it stands, could not be played were
there any such orificeg in the surface of the table. There
are no arches, pins, or springs which control, deflect, or

- impede the disc which is slid along the surface. Again,
such impedimenta in the path of the disc would make the
game impossible of play.

To us, there seems to be no relationship between the
physical aspects of the game in question and the descrip-
tion contained in the ordinance. The description in the
ordinance will cover any type of the so-called pinball games.
It cannot, under any method of stretching of the meaning
of words, cover the game which is in question here. There
is no similarity. Had the governing body desired to have
a catch-all phrase to cover all coin games depending on the
skill of the player and operated for amusement, the lan-
guage was available for it to do so. The game, when
compared to the regulatory language of the ordinance,
seems to fall more certainly under the language of the
licensing section of the Municipal Code. Section 104 pro-
vides: “The term ‘automatic amusement machine’ means
any mechanical amusement machine or device, the opera-
tion of which is governed or controlled by the deposit of
a coin or token including, without being limited thereto,
any such coin controlled amusement instrument or device

252 ee

capable of producing or reproducing any vocal or instru-
mental sounds.” This language contains the description of
all machines not excluded from licensing under the provi-
sions of section 193-26. It is the only section cited to us
with language which covers the machine here.

The city has cited to us several cases from the Appel-
late Court, which are not persuasive. (Levins v, City of
Chicago, 296 Ill. App. 645; Coleman v. City of Chicago,
297 Ill. App. 130, and others.) The city has the power
under the enabling act to prohibit “any other tables or
implements kept for a similar purpose in any place of
public resort,” but by the terms of the ordinance in ques-
tion has not done so. It has described what it chose to
regulate and it must be bound by the exact definition it has
itself selected.

The final arguments made here are concerned with the -
right of the plaintiffs to a declaratory judgment. The city
claims that since mandamus would lie in the case, that
remedy was, in a sense, exclusive, and plaintiffs were not
entitled to a declaratory judgment. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Tierney, at Ill. 421.

The declaratory judgment provisions of the Civil Prac-
tice Act (Ill Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 181.1,) pro-
vide that a declaratory judgment may be entered in cases
of actual controversy to determine rights of parties or to
construe a statute. The act, by its terms, is permissive,
but it appears the application of it here would have been
proper had the court so desired. The statute was designed
to provide a speedy and inexpensive method of determining
disputes. Its use in cases such as this is proper. Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331.

The court having erred in construing the ordinance, this
cause is reversed and remanded, with directions to enter
judgment in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

258

(No. 5-65 -—
Tue DEPARTMENT oF Pusiic Works AND BumpINcs,
Appellee, vs. Witi1am C. Boune et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed June 26, 1953.

254

Gower, Gray & Gower, Eva L. Minor, and Saver,
H. Swariro, all of Kankakee, (Donanp Gray, of counsel,)
for appellants.

Lataam Casiix, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Wiitiam C. Wines, Raymonp S. Sarnow, and A. ZoLa
Groves, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. Justick Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:
In a condemnation proceeding instituted in the county
court of Kankakee County by petitioner, Department of
Public Works and Buildings, to acquire certain lands to
relocate a State highway, the jury entered a verdict of
$36,000 as compensation to the owners of the tract, defend-

es (

ants William C. Bohne and Margaret Bohne, and to all
interested parties, and a verdict of $4000 to be paid from
that sum to the defendants Leland L. Bauer, Emory G.
Bauer, and Clarence J. Bauer, for their leasehold interest
in the premises. The court entered judgment on the ver-
dicts, from which both the defendant landowners and the
defendant lessees have prosecuted separate appeals.

The essential issues presented by these appeals are
whether the trial court erred in the admission and exclu-
sion of certain testimony, and in the submission of certain
instructions to the jury; and whether the verdicts and
judgment are supported by the evidence.

From the record it appears that the tract in question
consists of five acres of land owned by defendants William
C. Bohne and Margaret Bohne, and located east of the city
of Kankakee, with a frontage of 300 feet on the south side
of State highway 17 and extending back some 650 feet. The
front or north 204 feet, extending along the highway for
300 feet was leased by the Bohnes to the Bauers, doing
business as Bauer Trailer Park under a lease dated Febru-
ary 26, 1951, whereby the use of the property was restricted
to trailer sales, parking and renting, filling station, or other
retail purposes, for a term of 10 years at a rental of $100
a month, with the option of renewal by the lessees upon
the same terms, and with the right to make improvements
thereon. Upon the leased area is a building used as a sales-
room by the Bauers, and a small cottage used as a wash-
room in connection with the trailer camp. Upon the re-
maining property held and owned by the Bohnes is their
large six-room home, and a three-room cottage rented to
their son-in-law.

Negotiations for the condemnation of this property had
proceeded intermittently for a period of some 10 years.
However, on November 27, 1951, condemnation proceed-
ings were filed by the petitioner in the county court of
Kankakee County, alleging that it was necessary to acquire

060

the lands described for the reconstruction of Federal Aid
Route 26, a State highway. Separate trials were had as to
each tract. The defendant lessees filed an answer alleging
the facts with reference to their lease and their claim for
compensation on the ground that their leasehold interest
would be destroyed. They also requested that the court,
before impanelling the jury, enter an order fixing the rights
of the parties.

On petitioner’s motion that answer was stricken. How-
ever, by amendment through interlineation the answer was
called a motion, in which the Bohnes joined, and was allowed
to stand. The court ordered that the jury to be impanelled
should return three verdicts: to cover the entirety of the
fee, the damages to the landlord, and the damages to the
tenant.

Numerous witnesses testified with reference to the value
of the leasehold and the entire property, and inasmuch as
the propriety of the admission and rejection of such evi-
dence by the trial court is an issue in this appeal, it is
incumbent upon this court to review the testimony.

On behalf of the State, John Kreuger testified that he
had been in the insurance and real-estate business in the
vicinity of Kankakee for 30 years; that he was a member
of the county, State and national real-estate boards; that
he examined this property on March 22, 1951, and had
gone by it several times a week since that time; that its
highest and best use at the time of the filing of the con-
demnation petition on November 27, 1951, was either in-
dustrial, subdivision or its present use; that in his opinion
the fair cash market value of the property was $31,5345
and that he did not think there had been any real increase
in the value of the property between the date of his ap-
praisal in March, 1951, and the date the petition was filed,
even though there may have been some improvements. He
maintained on cross-examination that the improvements,
which included the installation of water pipes, cesspools

Ce 257

and a gravel road, would not increase the value of the
property because, he reasoned, these improvements made
by the tenant belonged to him, and he could move them
off, except perhaps the gravel road, and consequently none
of the improvements would add to the value of the property.
He reiterated that his opinion as to the value of the prop-
erty was based on what he saw on March 22, and that
there was a possibility that the best use of the property
would be for subdivision purposes. Consequently, in arriv-
ing at the $31,534 appraisal, he considered the costs of
using the property for that purpose.

With reference to the value of the lease, this witness
stated that it was worth only the actual monthly value of
the rent, and explained that that figure referred to the
value of the lease to the landlord. Moreover, even to the
landlord the lease was of no value since it was with an
individual. He made no attempt to appraise the leasehold
in any other respects, for he did not know its terms or of
the option to renew, and discounted the lease as though it
were not there in his appraisal of the property.

A motion to exclude his testimony on the ground that
it did not take into consideration the lease on the property,
or the improvements placed on the premises prior to filing
of the condemnation petition, was overruled.

Petitioner also submitted the testimony of Louis Ray
to establish the value of the condemned property. He
stated that he had been in the real-estate, insurance and
appraisal business in Kankakee for 28 years; that he ex-
amined the Bohne property in March, 1951, for the pur-
pose of testifying; that the highest and best use of the
property was its present use; and that its fair cash market
value on November 27, 1951, was $32,000, and that the
fair cash market value of the lease was $100 a month. On
cross-examination he explained that he meant the value
of the lease to the landlord, for the leasehold had no other
value, since in his 28 years of experience he never heard

| |

258 ee

of a lessee selling his lease. He explained further that at
the time his appraisal was made there were no trailers back
of the salesroom; that he did not know whether the prop-
erty was on the Kankakee or any other bus line; that he
did not know what improvements were made between the
date of his appraisal and that of the filing of the petition,
but did not think that they increased the value of the
property.

A motion to exclude his testimony on the ground that
the witness did not know the value of the premises on the
date the petition was filed was overruled.

The defendant lessees offered the testimony of some
five witnesses in addition to that of Leland Bauer to estab-
lish the value of their leasehold interest. Bauer stated the
terms of the lease and the nature of their business. He
revealed that prior to the present lease they operated under
another lease at a rental of $75 a month for about a year
and the reason for negotiating the present lease was that
the trailer park across the highway was going out of busi-
ness and the tenants approached him for a place to park
their trailers. The extension of time on the lease was
necessary because of the extensive investment required to
improve the property in order to properly park those ten-
ants, Although the court refused to permit him to testify
as to the cost or the value of the improvements, all of
which were installed after the lease was signed, but prior
to November 27, 1951, he did enumerate the improve-
ments. Water lines were put in whereby each trailer had
two water outlets, one on each side of the trailer; and
water was put in the sales location for, the filling station.
Sidewalks were laid, a 28-foot gravel roadway, which ex-
tended some 700 feet, was built, a cottage was painted,
remodeled and converted into washrooms, each of which
contained showers and lavatories, an oil heater, and a hot-
water heater. Defendants also installed a septic tank, under-
ground wiring and tandscaped the premises,

es

Bauer further testified that he was the vice-president
of the Illinois Trailer Association, and a member of the
board of governors of the national association, that he
had worked in setting up other trailer parks, and that he
owned land in Kankakee County. His opinion as to the
fair cash market value of the leasehold interest on the date
the condemnation petition was filed was that it could be
leased for $325 a month.

Bertha Orr, testifying on behalf of the defendant lessees,
stated that she has been in the retail and wholesale trailer
sales business for some 18 years. Although she lives in
Chicago, her contact with the national Trailer Association,
of which she is on the Board of Governors, involved travel
throughout the country, so that she is apprized of land
values as they pertain to the trailer industry. She is par-
ticularly familiar with the situation in Illinois since she
is President of the Illinois Trailer Association. She stated
further that she was familiar with the Bauer property,
which is excellently located for trailer sales since it is on
a travelled road, close to the city, has public transportation
to the door for the benefit of both the occupants and persons
with whom they do business, has shade trees and affords
an excellent means to display merchandise, since there is
over 300 feet on the highway. She read the Bauer lease,
and her opinion of the fair cash market value of the lease-
hold, or what it could be sold for in the open market to
persons interested in trailer sales and parks would be $300
a month as of November 27, 1951.

The court allowed a motion to strike her testimony as
to values on the ground that she was not qualified as an
expert in Kankakee County.

The defendant lessees also offered the testimony of
Herbert Reeves. He stated that although he presently lived
in Elkhart, Indiana, and was a national sales representative
of Florence Stave Company, he had lived in Kankakee
where he had been in business for himself as a house-trailer

260 A

dealer some three blocks west of the Bauer property from
April, 1947, to February, 1950, and that from February,
1950, to July, 1951, he had been sales and service manager
for the Bauers. He was familiar with the property, the
improvements, as well as with real estate generally, knew
the terms of the lease, and on the basis of these considera-
tions his opinion of the fair cash market value of the lease-
hold estate was $300 a month. A motion to strike his testi-
mony was allowed by the court on the ground that he was
not qualified as an expert on real-estate values.

The court also allowed a motion to strike the testimony
as to values of Ray Speckman, real-estate broker in Kan-
kakee for 714 years, who testified on behalf of the lessees.
He stated that he examined the Bauer property within the
last 30 days, was familiar with the terms of the leasé, that
in his opinion the highest and best use of the premises was
its present use, and that its value, after examining the sales
reports and park rental income, was $259 a month over
and above the rent reserved.

The witness Maurice Weaver, who also testified on
behalf of the lessees, stated that he was a real-estate broker,
handled trailer rentals and trailer parks, knew the premises
occupied by the Bauers, had sold property about a half mile
east of it, and had seen the lease. In his opinion the highest
and best use of the property was its present use because of
the physical advantages hereinbefore noted, and the fact
that Kankakee is growing in that direction. His opinion,
was that the fair cash market value of the leasehold estate
was $275 a month, and he explained that he took into
consideration the time element of the lease, but not the
business or profits involved. The court, however, struck his
testimony with reference to values.

The testimony of the witness LeClair with reference
to the value of the leasehold was permitted to stand. He
testified that he had been in the real-estate business in Kan-
kakee for more than 20 years, is president of the Kankakee

es

Real Estate Board, is familiar with the property in ques-
tion, had read the lease, and in his opinion the fair cash
market value of the leasehold, considering the facilities,
location and duration of the lease, was $300 a month. The
court, however, struck that portion of LeClair’s testimony
submitted on behalf of the defendants, William and Mar-
garet Bohne, wherein he stated that in his opinion the fair
cash market value of the entire property on November 27,
1951, was $45,000 plus the value of the leasehold, on the
+ ground that he explained that he valued the trailer park
separately from the home and lot.

‘The defendant landowners William and Margaret Bohne
also offered the testimony of Lawrence J. Costello, a mem-
ber of the Kankakee County Real Estate Board, who
appraised the property within 30 days prior to the hearing.
According to his opinion the fair cash market value of the
premises on November 27, 1951, was $48,487, and its
present use was its best use. The court allowed a motion
to strike his testimony on the ground that he stated that
he valued the building and land separately. The testimony
of the witness Warmbir, on behalf of the defendant land-
owners, was permitted to stand. This witness stated that
he was a real-estate agent, knew the property in question,
had made a detailed examination of it, was familiar with
the lease, and his opinion was that the value of the entire
property, including the leasehold interest and all improve-
ments, was $54,500.

Defendant William Bohne testified on his own behalf.
He described the premises, including his large six-room
home, and stated that he was familiar with real-estate
values in the area, and that the property had a value of
$57,000. On cross-examination he said that he knew of an
8o-acre tract a half mile away which was sold by an estate
for $64,000, but explained that it was just farm land, and
also admitted having purchased 914 acres of farm property
without buildings or improvements for $12,350.

22 es

The court, despite its earlier order, submitted two rather
than three verdicts to the jury: one for damages to the
leasehold interest, and the other for damages to the entire
property. As hereinbefore noted the jury fixed the dam-
ages to the leasehold interest ¢t $4000 and the damages to
the entire property at $36,000. The court overruled motions
for a new trial, and entered judgment on the verdicts from
which both the lessees and the landowners have appealed.

The defendant lessees maintain that the measure of
their damages is the value of the leasehold estate subject
to the rent; that the petitioner had the burden of intro-
ducing evidence on the value of that interest; that the
testimony of the witnesses Weaver, Orr and Reeves was
erroneously stricken; that instructions 5, 7, 12 and 13,
given on behalf of the petitioner, were erroneous because
they ignored the leasehold estate; that instructions 26 and
27 offered by the lessees should have been given; and that
the verdict fixing their damages is not within the range
of the evidence. They also question the constitutionality
of the Freeway Act, but recognize that the decision in the
pending case of Department of Public Works and Buildings
v. Lanter, which subsequently sustained its constitutionality,
413 Ill. 581, would be determinative.

The defendant landowners argue that the testimony of
petitioner’s witnesses, Krueger and Ray, was erroneously
admitted; that the valuations of LeClair and Costello
should not have been stricken, particularly since there was
no objection made when they were testifying, and that the
amount of compensation fixed by the jury is not within
the range of the evidence.

It is apparent that the Bauers, as lessees under a ro-
year lease, with a renewal option at the same terms, had an
interest for which compensation should properly have been
awarded in this condemnation proceeding. (18 Am. Jur.
865; 29 C.J.S. 988.) The measure of their damage was
the fair cash market value of the leasehold subject to the

es

rental. (Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537; Yellow
Cab Co. v. Howard, 243 Ul. App. 263.) That market value
was enhanced by the option to renew, which, in effect, ex-
tended the lease to a term of 20 years, (29 C.J.S. 9903
In re Triborough Bridge Approach of New York, 288
N.Y.S. 697,) and by the permanent improvements, not-
withstanding the fact that they would revert to the lessor
on termination of the lease. (Carlock v. United States,
53 Fed. 2d 926; United States v. Block, 160 Fed. 2d 604;
Bales v. Wichita Midland Valley R. Co. 141 Pac. 1009
(Kan.), 29 C.J.S. rogo, 1051.) It is the petitioner, more-
over, who has the burden of proving the fair cash value
of the property to be taken, including the value of this
leasehold interest, as defendant lessees contend. Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co, v. Reisch & Bros. 247
Ii. 350.

The only evidence submitted by petitioner with refer-
ence to the value of the leasehold estate was the testimony
of the witnesses Krueger and Ray. Krueger never read
the lease, knew nothing of the option for extension, made
no attempt to appraise the leasehold, and explained that
the $roo-a-month value which he ascribed to the lease
referred to its value only to the landlord. He had no
knowledge of the improvements effected by the lessees,
since he appraised the property prior to their installation,
and more than 8 months before the petition was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is not clear how his testi-
mony can be construed to sustain in any way petitioner’s
burden of establishing the value of the leasehold interest.

Krueger’s testimony as to the value of the entire prop-
erty was also objectionable, since it was not based on the
condition of the property at the date of the filing of the
petition, (Public Service Co. v. Leatherbee, 311 Ill. 505,)
and overlooked the permanent improvements, which en-
hanced the value of the premises. (Forest Preserve Dist. v.
Caraher, 299 Ill. 11; Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kercher, 394

264 ee

Ill. 12.) Where private property is taken for public use,
the owner is entitled to the fair cash market value based
on the most valuable use of the premises on the date the
petition was filed, (City of Chicago v. Lord, 276 Ill. 357,)
including anything upon it which enhances its value.

‘The testimony of petitioner’s only other witness, Louis
Ray, did not sustain the burden of establishing the value
of the leasehold interest either, inasmuch as the witness
merely stated the value of the lease to the landlord. Further-
more, his valuation of the entire property, just as the witness
Krueger’s, should have been stricken on the ground that
it was predicated upon an appraisal of the premises in
March, 1951, some eight months prior to the filing of the
petition, and prior to the installation of the aforementioned
improvements, and consequently failed to include those
values in the computation.

With reference to the propriety of the court’s striking
the evaluations of the lessee’s witnesses, Orr, Weaver and
Reeves, it is established that in condemnation proceedings
the value of land is a question of fact to be proved the
same as any other fact, and any person acquainted with it
may testify as to its value. It is not necessary that a wit-
ness be an expert, or be engaged in the business of buying
and selling the kind of property under investigation. “Any
person may testify in such cases who knows the property
and its value for the uses and purposes to which it is being
put.” People ex rel. McDonough v. Goldberg, 354 Ill. 423,
429; Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. Talbott, 321 Ill. 538.

It is apparent that these witnesses, in contrast to those
of the petitioner, were and had been in the business of
trailer sales and parks, which was the best use of the leased
premises as of November 28, 1951. Moreover, they knew
the particular property, and all stated that it was peculiarly
well suited for its present use since it had a 300-foot
frontage on a State highway where the trailers could be
displayed, was near Kankakee, which was growing in that

a —(

direction, was on a bus route, had city water and lights,
and was well shaded. It was error to strike the testimony
of Bertha Orr on the ground that she did not qualify as
an expert in Kankakee County, for her testimony revealed
that she knew the property, the terms of the lease, was
particularly qualified to judge the value of the property
for trailer sales, since, as president of the Illinois Trailer
Association she was familiar with land values throughout
the State as they pertain to the trailer industry. Her lack
of special experience in Kankakee County merely went to
the weight of her testimony.

The valuations of the leasehold interest offered by the
witnesses Weaver and Reeves were also improperly stricken,
for they both knew the property, the terms of the lease,
and were particularly familiar with the trailer sales and
park business in Kankakee, even though they did not live
in the town at the time the proceedings were instituted.

The valuations of the entire property given by the wit-
nesses LeClair and Costello, on behalf of the defendant land-
owners, William and Margaret Bohne, were also errone-
ously stricken by the court. The fact that the witnesses
stated that they considered the leased portion of the prem-
ises, and the Bohne home and lot, as distinct elements in
arriving at the value of the entire property, would not
render their testimony objectionable. City of Chicago v.
Callender, 396 Ill. 371.

The defendant lessees contend that the court erred fur-
ther in the submission and rejection of jury instructions.
This court is aware of the prevailing judicial disposition
against reversing a cause on the ground of a technical
error in instructions where the jury is otherwise correctly
instructed as to the law. In the instant case, however,
where petitioner offered no evidence as to the value of
the leasehold interest, and the court erroneously struck the
testimony of three of the lessees’ witnesses, the correctness
of the instructions was vital.

266 P|

Instruction 7 given by the court, by which the jury
was informed not to allow defendants anything in addi-
tion to just compensation for the lands, by implication
directed the jury to overlook the leasehold interest. Instruc-
tion 5 was objectionable for the same reason; for, by in-
forming the jury that “your deliberation should be con-
fined entirely to determining the just compensation to be
paid the owners of the lands to be taken in this proceeding,”
the instruction stressed only the interest of the Bohnes,
and overlooked the interest of the lessees. Instruction 12,
which provided that “the petitioner is condemning only the
real property described in the petition together with the
permanent improvements thereon,” implied that the lease-
hold interest was not included in the condemnation, and
created confusion since the jury was also required to assess
the damages to the leasehold estate separate from the land.
It is evident, therefore, that these instructions were mis-
leading, under the circumstances, and should not have been
given.

The court finds that instructions 26 and 27, submitted
by the lessees, correctly stated the law, and inasmuch as no
other instruction set forth the rule pertaining to the measure
of the lessees’ damage, it was error for the court to refuse
to give instruction 27.

Both the lessees and the landowners urge that the ver-
dicts fixing their respective damages are not within the
range of the evidence. There is no quarrel with the estab-
lished rule in eminent domain cases that where the jury
has viewed the premises, as in the instant case, and the
amount fixed is within the range of the evidence, the verdict
will not be disturbed, unless there has been a clear and
palpable mistake, or the verdict is the result of passion or
prejudice. Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kercher, 394 Ill. 11.

With reference to the $4000 verdict for the leasehold
interest, it appears that the sum bears no relation to the

es

evidence. The petitioner offered no evidence of the value
of the leasehold interest to the lessees, and the only other
evidence in the record permitted to stand was the testimony
of Leland Bauer and Maurice LeClair who valued the
leasehold at $325 and $300 a month, respectively. The
lease with the renewal option had 19 years and some 3
months to run when the condemnation petition was filed.
Even if those monthly valuations were discounted for cash,
and the rent reserved under the lease deducted therefrom,
it is not clear how the jury could have selected $4000 as
damages on the basis of the evidence. Or even if the jury
relied upon the $100 a month figure, which petitioner’s
witnesses stated was the value of the lease to the land-
owner, it is not perceptible how the jury could return a
verdict of $4000 for a 19-year lease, or—even without the
renewal option—a 10-year lease. Under these circumstances,
it is evident that despite the fact that the jury viewed the
premises its assessment of damages to be paid the lessees.
was not predicated upon or within the range of the evidence,
and should have been set aside. City of Chicago v. Cal-
lender, 396 Ill. 371, 380.

Similarly, the verdict of $36,000 for the condemnation
of the entire property, whereby the sum of $32,000 would
be allowed the landowners after the lessee’s damages were
deducted, is also unsupported by the evidence. For while
petitioner’s witnesses, Kreuger and Ray, valued the prem-
ises at $31,534 and $32,000 respectively, their appraisals
not only excluded the leasehold interest, but were made
prior to, and without knowledge of substantial permanent
improvements, such as the roadway, the water system, the
sidewalks, the installation of a septic tank, and the land-
scaping, all of which enhanced the value of the property
as devoted to its highest use. The only other testimony
permitted to stand in the record was that of the witness
Warmbir, who valued the premises at $54,500, and that of

268 |

the defendant William Bohne, who appraised his own prop-
erty at $57,000. Under these circumstances, the jury verdict
does not appear to be supported by the evidence, and de-
fendants’ motion for a new trial should have been sustained.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is our judg-
ment that the county court of Kankakee county erred in
the admission and rejection of evidence, in the submission
of instructions to the jury, and in the denial of defendants’
motions for a new trial. Therefore, the judgment of that
court must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new

trial. Reversed and remanded.

Le
Oo. 32706 iT
Henry Haver, doing business as Suburban By-Products
Company, Appellant, vs. Van Srtraaten CHEMICAL,
Company et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

269

THomas P. O’Matey, of Aurora, for appellant.

Witiam C. O’Brien, of Aurora, (Wirson D. Bur-
NELL, Donatp L. Puckert, and Josep H. Barner, of
counsel,) for appellees,

Mr. Justice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

On December 31, 1949, Henry Hauer brought suit in
the circuit court of Kane County, seeking to quiet title to
a strip of land twenty-one feet in width along the north,
and within the boundaries, of property to which he holds
record title. The principal defendant, Herbert Van Straaten,
holds record title to property adjoining the strip in ques-
tion on the north thereof. Defendants filed an answer
and a counterclaim asserting ownership of the strip of
land in Van Straaten by adverse possession. The cause
was referred to a master, who subsequently filed his report
finding the issues in favor of defendants. Objections to

0 ee

the report were overrtled, and a decree was entered ad-
judging Van Straaten to be the owner of the property free
and clear of any right, title, or interest of the plaintiff.
The latter appeals directly to this court, on the ground that
a freehold is involved.

Plaintiff complains, first, that the court erred in over-
ruling his motion to vacate the master’s report, and for a
re-reference of the cause for the taking of additional evi-
dence. In his sworn motion he states, as paragraph 1, “That
notice of the hearing before the Master in Chancery was
duly served but was never received by Emmerson C. Whit-
ney, the attorney for Plaintiff at that time, due to the fact
that said Attorney was in the process of dissolving his
partnership and upon information and belief the said dis-
solution was caused by some serious disagreement between
the partners and through oversight or otherwise the said
notice was never in fact transmitted to said Emmerson C.
Whitney until after the hearing date set forth in said notice
had gone by.” As paragraph 2 he avers “That because of
the foregoing facts the plaintiff was never heard nor was
any. evidence offered on his behalf; that the entire findings
of the Master in Chancery were based only on the evidence
offered on behalf of defendant counter-claimants.” And
for paragraph 3 he concludes “That equity requires the
vacating of said Master’s Report and a rereference to said
Master for further hearing.”

It appears from the record that the cause was first re-
ferred to the master on September 11, 1950, and that plain-
tiff made no effort thereafter to prosecute it. Defendants
finally caused it to be set for hearing before the master on
July 26, 1951, and notice thereof was duly served. Plain-
tiff failed to appear on that date, and only the defendants
produced evidence. On August 8, 1951, after notice that
the master would file his report on that day, plaintiff ap-
peared and asked that the hearings be reopened to enable

eee Ea

him to produce evidence. As excuse for his failure to
appear for the hearing of July 26, plaintiff stated, among
other things, that a confusion in the mail existed because
of a dissolution of the partnership of which his attorney
was a member, and that his attorney was out of the State
on vacation at the time of the hearing. The master then
consented to reopen the hearings, and set August 17, 1951,
as the date for plaintiff to present evidence. On August
17, 1951, and from time to time thereafter, plaintiff re-
quested and obtained continuances. On June 13, 1952,
plaintiff having failed to present any evidence, the master
filed his report at the request of defendants.

It is clear that plaintiff was not entitled to a re-reference
in this case. After the cause had been pending before the
master for so long a time, nothing but the most urgent
necessity for the attainment of justice between the parties
could warrant its reopening. (See Oliver v. Wilhite, 201
Til. 552, 565.) Upon plaintiff's own showing no sufficient
reason is given for the failure to come forth with evidence
during the period of more than ten months after the master
had once reopened the hearing at plaintifi’s request. Re-
gardless of the nature of his evidence plaintiff was not
entitled to a reopening under such circumstances. Seely v.
Board of Education, 315 Ill. 186, 196.

In addition, no showing whatever was made that any
such evidence would have materially affected the result if
the same had been heard and considered. Even without
the long period of inaction by plaintiff, an absence of such a
showing would be sufficient to warrant denial of the mo-
tion. (See Matthews v. Whitethorn, 220 Ill. 36.) There
is nothing in the record to indicate an offer of material
proof at the time of making the motion for re-reference,
nor is the nature of such evidence, if any exists, referred
to in plaintiff’s briefs in this court. During the entire
period of ten months plaintiff had full opportunity to

2 ee

secure and produce the evidence, if any, which he now
wants heard on a re-reference, and there is no contention
that it was not then available to him. The inference is
clearly warranted that his failure to present additional evi-
dence to sustain his case was caused by the fact that no
such evidence exists.

Certainly, the law imposes upon a plaintiff the duty of
exercising some diligence in looking after the prosecution
of his own case. Where a party makes no effort to intro-
duce proof before the master, and fails to show any excuse
for failing to appear with such proof at the hearing, the
court is clearly justified in refusing to order a re-reference
(Rudgear v. United States Leather Co. 206 Il. 743 White-
side v. Pulliam, 2g Ill. 257.) The order of the circuit court,
overruling the motion to vacate, is correct.

It is next insisted that defendants’ evidence is insufficient
to show title by adverse possession. There is no merit in
the contention. The testimony shows that since prior to
1915 defendant Van Straaten and his predecessors in title
have been in the visible possession of the land in contro-
versy, and have so occupied it under claim of ownership in
connection with the property adjoining it on the north, to
which they successively held the record title. Since prior
to 1915 there has been a fence along the southerly line of
the land in dispute, separating it from the land of which
plaintiff was in possession. The fence is now in a dilapi-
dated condition but remnants of it can still be seen. In
1945 a plat known and described as an Industry Owners
Plat was prepared pursuant to an agreement among the
local property owners, and for the purpose of selling the
properties. On that plat, which was introduced in evidence,
the property of defendant is shown as Lot 4 and that of
the plaintiff is shown as Lot 5. The line separating the
two lots bears the legend: “This line is along the line of
a fence that existed at the time of a survey made by us
in March, 1924. The stakes of that survey were found.

Ss 2:

Remains of old fence still in evidence.” Since before 1915
the industrial plant of defendant has been located on Lot 4,
and the industrial plant of plaintiff has occupied .Lot 5;
and to the knowledge of the witness, who had worked in
the vicinity since 1915, no person for a period of thirty
years had ever questioned the property line as being located
along the fence.

Plaintiff argues that the proof is deficient because it
fails to disclose that defendants’ possession was under a
claim of ownership. Proof of oral claims is not essential.
It is enough that the claimant prove he so acted that it
showed he claimed the title. (Leonard v. Leonard, 369 Ill.
572.) Using and controlling property as an owner is the
ordinary mode of asserting a claim of title, and it is the
only way a claim of title could be proved in many cases.

Plaintiff argues further that the record fails to contain
any clear and unequivocal proof of possession by defendant.
It sufficiently appears, however, that the latter’s possession
was as full as the character of the land would permit. The
acts required to constitute adverse possession are neces-
sarily varied, depending upon the nature, locality and use
to which the property may be applied. Such acts of do-
minion over the land as will indicate, to persons residing
in the immediate neighborhood, who has the exclusive
management and control of the land are sufficient to con-
stitute possession. A fence is notice of actual occupancy.
(Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Darley, 363 Ill. 197.)
Without’ reviewing the evidence in detail, it is sufficient to
say it adequately supports the decree.

No error has been shown on this appeal, and the decree
of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.
| |

(No. 3257:
Dowarp G. Spatpine, Appellant, vs. Tam Cry or
Granite Crry, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 26, 1953.

275

RanpaLt Rosertson, of Granite City, for appellant.
Frep P. Scuuman, of Granite City, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court: ,

This is a direct appeal from an order of the circuit
court of Madison County entered in an action for declara-
tory judgment on March 30, 1953, wherein sections 60-12
through 60-18 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act were
held to be constitutional. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. “24,
pars. 60-12 to 60-18,

The plaintiff, a resident of the former city of Nameoki,
now a part of Granite City, a property owner, taxpayer,
and a prospective user of the sewer system, filed this com-
plaint seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the con-
stitutionality of these sections by which the city of Granite
City seeks to finance an extension of its sewer system. The
complaint alleged that pursuant to the requests of the resi-
dents and property owners of the Nameoki area of the city
of Granite City, the council adopted a resolution on De-
cember 1, 1952, declaring its intention to construct an
extension to its existing sewerage system to serve the
Nameoki area. Granite City is a municipal corporation of

Cs

around 35,000 population. In 1949 it annexed to it another
city known as the city of Nameoki, populated by some five
or six thousand inhabitants, and now known as the Nameoki
area of Granite City. Prior to the annexation, Granite
City had installed an extensive sewerage system serving
the entire city. The city of Nameoki had no sewerage sys-
tem and its sewerage was and now is disposed of by septic
tanks and cesspools. It is stipulated by the parties hereto
that this is an exact statement of facts, and that the lack
of an adequate sewerage system constitutes a serious menace
to the public health of the entire city. It is further stipu-
lated that the present population of the Nameoki area is
about 8000 persons, and is expected to increase by 4000
persons within the near future. The resolution set forth
the boundaries of the proposed sewerage system extension,
of what the system would consist, its estimated cost, pos-
sible rates to be charged users thereof, reserved the right
of the city council to establish separate:and different prop-
erty classifications and to establish separate and different
rates as the occasion may arise, and stated the connection
charge. Under the provision of the resolution a public
hearing was held and notice was sent to persons as pro-
vided by law. At the public hearing it was unanimously
agreed that the project be built as provided in the resolu-
tion and on January 15, 1953, in accordance with the wishes
of the persons at the hearing, the city council adopted’a
second resolution determining to proceed with the con-
struction and acquisition of said sewerage system extension,
and to adopt an ordinance for the issuance of sewer revenue
bonds to defray the cost of said extension.

The complaint alleged several constitutional reasons
why the statute, under the provisions of which Granite
City proposes to construct this sewerage system extension,
is invalid. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed for a declaratory
judgment finding the statute unconstitutional and the reso-

Se

lutions of the city under said statute illegal. The procedure
of the city council pursuant to said statute is not in issue.

The matter was submitted to the court on the pleadings
and stipulation of the parties, together with arguments of
counsel thereon. The circuit court of Madison County held
the statute constitutional, the proceedings thereunder by
the city of Granite City legal and binding obligations, and
authorized the construction program of the sewerage sys-
tem extension.

It is first urged by plaintiff that the statute here in
issue is in violation of the constitution of the United
States and of the State of Illinois in that it permits plain-
tiff to be deprived of his property without due process of
law. Plaintiff contends that the city has singled out an
area for the purpose of locating a sewer system and seeks
to issue revenue bonds to finance the construction of said
system payable solely by the inhabitants of the area where
the sewer is to be located. Thus it is urged that the statute
is in violation of the due-process clause of both constitu-
tions in that it does not apply to all of the citizens of the
community and is a private law affecting only the rights of
individuals in the locality to be served. Hence, property
owners in the locality to be served will be burdened with
an expense for the use of a sewer system that other citizens
of the city do not have to bear while enjoying the complete
use of the sewer system without any such charge.

The case at hand involves a situation where a privilege
is extended to the property owners of the area to avail
themselves of the use of the sewer or not as they see fit,
and where the price to be paid for the privilege is tenta-
tively fixed beforehand. Where the use of such privilege
is left optional with the property owner, by his election to
avail himself of it or not, he contracts with the city to pay
the rental fixed by its ordinance, if he elects to use it. It is
obvious that plaintiff will be subject to no charge unless

ee

he elects to use the sewer, and such election constitutes a
contract between himself and the city to pay so much as
is the fixed charge for the use thereof. (Carson v. Sewer
Commissioners of Brockton, 182 U.S. 398.) There is no
element of deprivation here or even of taxation, but one
of contract, into which the property owner may or may
not enter. There is no allegation in the complaint that the
plaintiff will be required to discharge into this sewer sys-
tem. No allegation is made that the present charges fixed
by the council are unreasonable in any particular. Since
the property owner may use the sewer or not, as he sees fit,
and if he does choose to use it he contracts to pay a charge,
certainly no deprivation of property without due process of
law occurs. 7

The moneys obtained from the use of the proposed
sewer will go to retire the revenue bonds issued to pay for
the construction of this sewer extension. It is only those
property owners located in the area to be served by this
sewer who will have access to the use of this sewer. Other
citizens of the city of Granite City who are not located in
the Nameoki area cannot use this sewer extension. More-
over, those citizens use a sewer previously constructed and
for which they have paid by their taxes unaided by the
residents of the Nameoki area.

It has been stipulated and agreed between the parties
that the construction of a sewerage system to serve the
Nameoki area is necessary to remove a serious health
menace. Laws which tend to promote public health, com-
fort, safety and general welfare are deemed proper exer-
cise of the police power. The legislature has the full right
to delegate the execution of the police power to a munici-
pality and vest it with the authority necessary for the exe-
cution of that power. (People ex rel. Royal v. Cain, 410
Til. 39.) The constitutional guaranties that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, and that no State shall deny to any person within

Ss

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, were not
intended to limit the subjects upon which the police power
of the State may lawfully be asserted in matters of health
protection any more than in any other connection. It has
been almost universally held in this country that the consti-
tutional guaranties, including the prohibition of deprivation
of property without due process, must yield to the statutes
and ordinances designed to promote the public health as a
part of the police powers of the State. (People ex rel. Baker
v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360; People v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 289;
City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198.) It is manifest
that the purpose of the statute is to permit the construction
of sewers for the disposal of wastes and the ensuing pro-
tection of the public health. It is stipulated that the enact-
ment of the resolution and all these proceedings by the
city council in this situation were for the very purpose of
eliminating an existing menace to the public health. The
statute in question and the resolutions of the city council
are, therefore, proper enactments under the police power.
No constitutional rights could possibly have been infringed
by these proceedings since such rights must yield to a valid
exercise of the police power.

The second issue urged by the plaintiff is that this
statute permits the city council to°extend a sewer system
into a particular locality to a class of persons and compel
them to pay a charge for the use of that sewerage system
when other persons, residents of the same city, enjoy a
sewer system without paying any rental charges therefor.
For this reason it is contended that the statute is dis-
criminatory to a certain class of residents and citizens of
the city and violates both State and Federal constitutions.
It has been stated in Schuman v. Chicago Transit Au-
thority, 407 Ill. 313, that “Section 22 of article IV of our
constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing
any local or special law granting to any corporation, asso-
ciation or individual any special or exclusive privilege,

0 ee

immunity or franchise whatever. This provision stpple-
ments the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Federal constitution and prevents the enlarge-
ment of the rights of one or more persons in discrimina-
tion against the rights of others. (Michigan Millers Mutual
Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 358 Ul. 575; Marallis v. City
of Chicago, 349 Ill. 422.) Laws are not deemed special or
class legislation merely because they affect one class and
not another, provided they affect all members of the same
class alike, In short, the fact that a law discriminates
against an individual or group is not, of itself, sufficient
to render it invalid. (Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536.)
The controlling question is always whether the classifica-
tion of persons or objects for purposes of legislative regu-
lation is based upon some substantial difference bearing
proper relation to the classification or, on the other hand,
is arbitrary and capricious. (People v. Deatherage, 401
Ill. 25; Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193.) Unless the
legislative action is cleatly unreasonable and there is no
legitimate reason for the law which would not require with
equal force its extension to others whom it leaves un-
touched, the courts do not interfere with the legislative
judgment. Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536.” (See Hansen
v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536; Keig Stevens Baking Co. v. City
of Savanna, 380 Ill, 303; and Youngquist v. City of Chi-
cago, 405 Ill. 21.) It was held in Louisville and Jefferson
County Metropolitan Sewer District v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, that a city ordinance requiring
owners of land outside the city’s sewerage system to pay
an annual charge therefor, when no charge was made to
owners of land within the city for the same service, was
not invalid as a denial of due process of law, or a denial
to the outsiders of the equal protection of the law. The
charge was held to equalize the burden by requiring those
who had paid no part of the cost of construction of the
sewer to do so by paying for its use.

a

‘The same considerations apply with equal force in this
instance. The property owners of the Nameoki area were
not within the city limits of Granite City when its existing
sewer system was constructed and paid for by the taxes
of the property owners of Granite City. The sewerage sys-
tem extension will serve only the property located in the
Nameoki area, and the sewerage waste of the Nameoki
area will be carried into and through the existing sewerage
system of Granite City. It is only proper that the property
owners of the other areas of Granite City should not pay
for a sewerage extension which only the Nameoki area can
use, even though, as a matter of public health, the city could
charge all users of the system for the cost of an extension
in any area of the city. It is also proper that the burden of
the extension should be borne by the Nameoki area prop-
erty owners who elect to have the benefit of use of the exist-
ing sewer for which they paid nothing in taxes. It is a rea-
sonable classification to require the property owners and/or
residents of the area to pay the cost of the construction of
the sewer system by which sewage would be carried from
the locality into the existing sewer system. Moreover, all
those property owners in the Nameoki area who elect to use
the sewer system extension, while reasonably classified into
a separate class, are at the same time all affected alike
according to the use they make of the sewer. The statute
is clearly constitutional, not only because it constitutes a
proper exercise of the police power, but for the further
reason that the legislation sets forth a reasonable classifica-
tion to carry out the purposes and intent of the statute.

Tt is next contended that this statute, in authorizing
the construction of the sewer extension to be financed by
revenue bonds, is in violation of sections 9 and to of arti-
cle IX of the Illinois constitution. Section 9 of article IX
permits the General Assembly to vest the corporate authori-
ties of cities with power to make local improvements by
special assessment, or by special taxation of contiguous

28

property, or otherwise. Section 10 prohibits the General
Assembly from itself imposing taxes on municipal corpora-
tions, or the inhabitants or property thereof, for corporate
purposes. Relying on a definition contained in Northwestern
University v. Village of Wilmette, 230 Ill. 80, that a local
improvement is “a public improvement, which by reason
of its being confined to a locality, enhances the value of
adjacent property, as distinguished from benefits diffused
by it throughout the municipality,” plaintiff maintains that
this sewerage system extension in the Nameoki area is
purely a local improvement, specially benefiting the adjacent
property, and may be paid for only by special assessment
or special taxation. The difficulty with this position lies in
its assumption that section 9 of article IX of the constitu-
tion prescribes special assessment or special taxation as
exclusive methods of financing local improvements. That
is not the case. The pertinent language of section 9 of
article IX is: “The general assembly may vest the corporate
authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make
local improvements by special assessment, or by special
taxation of contiguous property, or otherwise.” Because the
method of financing local improvements is not limited to
special assessments or special taxation there is no necessity
for considering the local or public character of the benefits
flowing from the improvement here involved.

Plaintiff urges as its fourth contention that section 60-16
of the statute permits a lien against a property owner even
though he may not be a user of the sewer system, and de-
prives property owners of due process of law, as no notice
is required to be given of any delinquency. Hence a per-
son’s property could have a lien upon it without any notice
or any kind of hearing whatever. Plaintiff claims the sec-
tion violates the due-process clause of both the State and
Federal constitutions. It is provided in section 60-16 that:
“Charges or rates shall be established, revised, and main-
tained by ordinance and become payable as the corporate

|

authorities may determine by ordinance. Such charges or
rates are liens upon the real estate upon or for which
sewerage service is supplied whenever the charges or rates
become delinquent as provided by the ordinance of the
municipality fixing a delinquency date.”

The act providing for declaratory judgments must be
restricted to questions that are within the province of a
court to determine. It cannot be construed as authorizing
a court to grant declarations of rights involving mere
abstract propositions of law without regard to the interest
of the parties in such question, or the giving of advice.
“The statute provides that courts ‘may in cases of actual
controversy make binding declarations of rights, having
the force of final judgments.’ It also provides that a ‘bind-
ing declaration of rights’ may be granted regardless of
whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed.
* * * The statute is clear that before a declaration of
rights may be made there must be an ‘actual controversy’.”
(Saline Branch Drainage Dist. v. Urbana-Champaign Sani-
tary Dist. 399 Ill. 189.) No lien has been filed by the city
against the property of the plaintiff, nor is there any immi-
nent possibility of one being so filed. It is axiomatic that
one may not complain of a statutory provision which does
not affect him. (City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 Ill.
327.) No actual controversy involving this lien provision
of the statute being here involved, the question is not deter-
minable in an action for declaratory judgment.

It is finally contended by plaintiff that any revision of
rates made by the city council as authorized by section 60-16
without notice and a hearing would violate the dictates of
due process. No provision is incorporated in that section
requiring notice or public hearing prior to revision of
sewerage service rates. This contention is without basis
in the law for the same reason previously advanced to meet
plaintiff's first due-process argument. Plaintiff may or may
not use the sewerage system extension at his own election.

ee

Upon electing to use it he contracts for those charges
assessed for its use, or such revised charges as may be
subsequently determined. Certainly, there is no lack of due
process when plaintiff or any other user contracts to pay
such charges as may be determined to be necessary. More-
over, plaintiff may elect to cease his use of the sewer sys-
tem if he determines that the charges are too high.

From the foregoing it is apparent that the statute in
question, and the resolutions of the city of Granite City
adopted thereunder, do not violate any of the constitu-
tional provisions of either the State or Federal constitution
asserted by plaintiff. For these reasons, the judgment of
the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(Nos. 32795, 3279;

Matsriar Servicg Corporation ef al., Appellees, vs. M.
H. Horrincsworrs, Director of Finance, et al., Ap-
pellants—Cuicaco Fire Brick Co. et al., Appellees,
us. Same Appellants. °

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

ee EE:

Lataam Casrix, Attorney General, of Springfield,

(Wiiiam C, Wings, RaymMonp S, Sarnow, Ricwarp L.
Coopsr, and A. Zora Groves, of counsel,) for appellants.

ad

ScurapzKE, Gourp, Ratner & Burton, of Chicago,
(Benjamin Z. Goud, and Grratp Ratner, of counsel, )
for appellees Material Service Corp. et al.; Turner, Hunt
& Dr Bor, of Chicago, (Murray B. WootLry, of coun-
sel,) for appellees Chicago Fire Brick Co. et al.; Davin,
Fatvman & Asranams, (Sicmunp W. Dav, and Jamgs
J. GiassneEr, of counsel,) for certain contractors, appellees ;
Srey, Austin, Burcess & Smrra, Witson & McItvaing,
and Knapp, Cusuinc, Hersupercrr & STEVENSON, all of
Chicago, (Witi1am H. Avery, Jr., R. Corwing STEVEN-
son, CLARENCE E. Fox, Emerson T. CHANDLER, Jr., and
Kent CHANDLER, JR., of counsel,) amici curiae.

Mr. Cuter Justice ScHarrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

The principal question in each of these cases concerns
the applicability of the retailers’ occupation tax to persons
selling building supplies and materials to contractors who
retransfer such property as an incident to the services
they render, and is controlled by our decision in Burrows
Co. v. Hollingsworth, ante, p. 202.

These appeals are from two orders of the circuit court
of Cook County, denying motions to vacate decrees which
enjoined the collection of the disputed taxes from the
plaintiffs. In the Material Service case, the injunction
was entered in the first instance by the circuit court in
1941, and was sustained by this court in Material Service

286 ee

Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226. In the Chicago Fire Brick
case no appeal was taken from the injunction which was
entered by the circuit court in 1944.

Only a brief sketch of the facts is necessary here. A
complete statement may be found in the Material Service
case, 380 Ill. 226, where it was held that the act was
applicable neither to those selling building materials to con-
tractors, nor to the contractors. The plaintiffs are material-
men and supply houses who sell building materials and
supplies to contractors. The contractors install or incor-
porate these products into structures and buildings con-
structed for others.

In Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226,
it was held that vendors of building supplies selling to con-
tractors were not subject to the tax because their sales were
not “for use or consumption” within the meaning of the
act. Confronted with an amendment enacted in 1941, ex-
pressly extending the meaning of “use or consumption” to
include the employment of tangible personal property by
persons engaged in service occupations where the property
is retransferred as an incident to the services rendered,
more than one hundred materialmen, many of whom were
also plaintiffs in the Material Service case, commenced the
Chicago Fire Brick action. Prior to the decision in that
case, the critical 1941 amendment was held invalid in Stolze
Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334. Relying on the Stolze
case, the circuit court entered its injunctive decree in 1944.
From that time until after our decision in Modern Dairy
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, no further
action was taken with respect to the final decrees in the
two cases now before us,

The Director of the Department of Revenue, reading
the Modern Dairy Co case as authority for the taxability
of plaintiffs in their sales to contractors, promulgated Bul-
letin No. 11, to that effect. Then, on January 28, 1953,
defendants filed motions in each of these cases, seeking to

SS

vacate the injunctions, on the basis of Modern Dairy Co.
‘The court denied the motions to vacate, and defendants
appeal.

Certain of the parties in the Material Service case argue
that the circuit court “no longer had the power, authority
or jurisdiction in 1953 to entertain the motion of appellants
[defendants] to vacate the decrees entered in 1941 and
1944.” The jurisdiction of the trial court to modify its
injunction was conceded by the plaintiffs in Burrows Co.
v. Hollingsworth, anté, p. 202, and other parties to the ap-
peal in this case have not seen fit to question it.

The inherent power of a court rendering a permanent
injunction to modify or revoke that injunction for equitable
reasons is generally recognized. (See cases collected, 136
A.L.R. 765.) These plaintiffs do not dispute the existence
of that power “where there has been a change in the facts,
and perhaps also where there has been a change of statutory
law,” but they insist that the court “does not have such
power upon a change only in decisional law arising from
a subsequent decision in another case.” They rely primarily
upon National Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes, 32 F. Supp. 397,
and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Henneford, 199
Wash. 462, 92 Pac, 2d 214. As to the first of these cases,
its deviation from the weight of authority has been pointed
out. (136 A.L.R. at 769.) As we read the second case,
the court denied authority to vacate only because the power
to vacate a judgment was statutory, and “None of the stat-
utory grounds for the vacation of a judgment covers * * *
the case at bar.” See: Note 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 180.

Our courts are not so limited. Our decisions recognize
a broad, inherent power to modify injunctions in the light
of changing conditions. (Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Commerce Com, 387 Ill. 256; Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
St. Clair, 315 Ill. 40.) As Mr, Justice Cardozo put it in
United States v. Swift & Co. 286 U.S. 106, 114, “A con-
tinuing decree of injunction directed to events to come is

285

subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.”
The power to modify is essential, for without it an injunc-
tion awarded by a court of equity might itself become an
instrument of inequity. We see no reason why that power
should be curtailed because the change in relevant circum-
stances is by judicial decision rather than by legislation.
In Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112
Mont. 359, 116 Pac. 2d 1012, an injunction restraining the
collection of taxes was vacated when it appeared that there
had been a change in applicable law as announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States. It was there stated:
“An injunction is merely the process by which the court
enforces equity and it has not only the power but the duty
to modify or annul its injunction as equity demands. A
final or permanent injunction is a continuing process over
which the equity court necessarily retains jurisdiction in
order to do equity. And if the court of equity later finds
that the law has changed or that equity no longer justifies
the continuance of the injunction, it may and should free
the defendant’s hands from the fetters by which until then
its activities have been prevented, thus leaving it free to
perform its lawful duties.” See, also, Ladner v. Siegel,
298 Pa. 487, 148 Atl 699, 68 A.L.R. 1172.

We believe this reasoning to be sound. We conclude,
therefore, that the circuit court had jurisdiction to modify
or vacate its injunction to meet changing conditions of fact
or of law, legislative or judicial.

On the merits, the result is controlled by our decision
in Burrows Co. v. Hollingsworth, ante, p. 202. Here, as in
Burrows, the sale from the suppliers to the contractors is
followed by a subsequent transfer from the contractors for
a consideration. The statute imposes the tax “upon persons
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal prop-
erty at retail,” and a sale at retail is defined to exclude a
transfer of personal property “for resale in any form as
tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration.”

Se

(IL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 120, pars. 440, 441.) The
statute therefore does not reach transfers from the sup-
pliers to the contractors, because there are subsequent re-
sales for a consideration.

One question arises in this case which was not present
in Burrows. The resale for consideration which takes earlier
transfers out of the statute is a “resale in any form as
tangible personal property.” The defendants argue that
title to building materials does not pass until the materials
have been incorporated into the building and that the ma-
terials “become real estate simultaneously with their in-
corporation into the building and hence are not transferred
as tangible personal property.”

No reasons are advanced by the defendants in support
of their suggestion that the common-law doctrine which
converts personal property into real property when it be-
comes affixed to the land should be imported into the con-
struction of this taxing statute. The suggestion appears
to have been considered and rejected by earlier decisions of
this court. In Blome Co. v. Ames, 365 Ill. 456, 458, we
made this comment on our earlier decision in Bradley Sup-
ply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 162: “In the Bradley Supply Co.
case we recognized that plumbing fixtures become real in-
stead of personal property by accession, but we held that
there was a transfer of title to personal property from the
plumbing contractor to the owner of the real estate, and
that the words ‘any transfer,’ in the first section of the
act, were broader in scope than the technical term ‘sale.’
The owner was held to be the ultimate user or consumer
contemplated by the act, and the jobbers who sold plumb-
ing supplies to plumbing contractors were held to be exempt
for the reason that under this act their transfers were for
resale and not for use or consumption.” And in Material
Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 239, we said:
“Whether an article is detachable as a fixture or whether
it is such an integral part of the structure that it cannot

290

be detached is not the answer to the basic question as to
whether there has been a sale of tangible personal property
at retail within the meaning of the act.”

In our opinion the trial court was correct, both in enter-
taining the motions to vacate the injunctions and in denying
those motions, and its orders are affirmed.

Orders affirmed.

Le
(No. 32600-
Lorriz Vuxovicu, Admx., Appellant, vs. Wint1am
CustER, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953.

Lapscuin & Pucin, (GLENN K. SemEnFELD, of coun-
sel,) both of Waukegan, for appellant.

Haut, Meyer & Van Deusen, (Luoyp A. Van Devu-
sEN, of counsel,) both of Waukegan, for appellee.

— es 291

Mr. Cuter Justice Scuaxrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

On November 11, 1945, John Vukovich, while riding
in an automobile owned and operated by Mike Komadina,
suffered personal injuries in a collision between Komadina’s
car and another operated by William Custer. Vukovich
died on April 25, 1946, at 6:41 A.M. On the same day,
at some time after 8:00 A.M., a complaint captioned “John
Vukovich, plaintiff, vs. Mike Komadina and William Cus-
ter, defendants,” was filed in the circuit court of Lake
County. The complaint charged Komadina with wilful and
wanton misconduct in the operation of his automobile and
Custer with both ordinary negligence and wilful and wanton
misconduct. Damages in the amount of $25,000 were sought
against each defendant.

Thereafter, on April 24, 1947, the death of Vukovich
was suggested, and Lottie Vukovich, administratrix of her
husband’s estate, was substituted as party plaintiff and
granted leave to file an amended complaint. The amended
pleading, in addition to making the same allegations as the
original complaint with respect to the operation of the
automobiles by Komadina and Custer, alleged that Vuko-
vich died as a result of his injuries; that he was survived
by his wife, a son and a daughter as his next of kin and
heirs-at-law, and that, as a result of his death, they had
been deprived of money and services which the decedent
had been accustomed to contribute to them. Damages were
asked against each defendant in the amount of $10,000.

Summons was served on Komadina and returned not
found as to Custer. An alias summons was served on
Custer on April 27, 1951.

Komadina’s motion and supplemental motion to strike
the amended complaint and to dismiss the suit were denied,
and he answered on April 28, 1951. He is not a party to
this appeal.

292 |

Custer moved to strike the amended complaint and to
dismiss the action on the ground that the original complaint
was a complete nullity because it was filed after Vukovich’s
death, and therefore the amended complaint was likewise
of no force and effect. The motion was allowed, and judg-
ment was entered in favor of Custer and against plaintiff.
The Appellate Court affirmed, 347 Ill. App. 547, and we
granted leave to appeal.

To reverse the judgment plaintiff urges that the original
complaint was not a nullity but was susceptible of amend-
ment. She relies upon Challenor v. Niles, 78 Ill. 78, in
which the court rejected the contention that a scire facias
to revive a judgment was void because it was instituted
in the name of a deceased person, and approved the sub-
stitution of the administrator by amendment to cure the
“Grregular” commencement of the action. She cites also
cases from other jurisdictions in which it has been held
that actions instituted in the name of defunct corporations
are not nullities, but may be amended. And she suggests
that the law does not regard part of a day except in order to
promote justice,

The defendant relies upon Brooks v. Boston & Northern
Street Ry. Co. 211: Mass. 277, 97 N.E. 760, in which it
was held that a complaint filed in the name of a deceased
plaintiff was a nullity and therefore would not support an
amendment substituting the administrator as party plain-
tiff. He also urges that Pease v. Rockford City Traction
Co. 279 Il. 513, and Harkin v. Ferro Concrete Construc-
tion Co. 185 Ill. App. 239, would preclude the amendment
here attempted even if the deceased had been alive when
the complaint was filed.

In the view we take of the case it is not necessary to
resolve the dispute between the parties as to the effect of
the death of Vukovich a matter of hours before the com-
plaint was filed. Nor is it necessary to consider the extent
to which Pease v. Rockford City Traction Co, and Harkin

SS 298

v. Ferro Construction Co. have survived the enactment of
section 46 of the Civil Practice Act, liberally construed, as
the legislature has enjoined, “to the end that controversies
may be speedily and finally determined according to the
substantive rights of the parties, * * *.” IIL Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 110, pars, 128, 170.

For, in our opinion, even if the validity of the main
line of defense be conceded, and it is considered that a
proceeding brought in the name of a deceased plaintiff is
a nullity, it does not follow that the amended complaint
must fall. Considered entirely apart from the original com-
plaint, the amended complaint states a good cause of action
based upon the alleged wrongful death of the deceased.
If, indeed, the original proceeding was a nullity, there was
nothing to amend, and the so-called amended complaint
was, in reality, an original complaint filed within the pre-
scribed period of time. The net of defendant’s contention
is that plaintiff is not entitled to have the merits of her
case tried because she erroneously inserted the adjective,
“amended,” in the caption and in the body of the complaint.
Had she filed this same complaint, eliminating any refer-
ence to the earlier complaint, she would have stated a good
cause of action which defendant would be required to an-
swer. So far as any substantive rights of the defendant
are concerned, it can make no difference in this case whether
the claim was asserted in an amended or an original com-
plaint. To hold that the administratrix cannot have a trial
of the merits because she did not label the amended com-
plaint as a new and independent action would exalt form
at the expense of substantive rights. Such a technical and
sterile application of the Civil Practice Act would contradict
its command of a liberal construction and disregard its
emphasis on the substantive rights of the parties. Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 128.

If there was any prejudice to the substantive rights of
the defendant here, it resulted from the delay in effecting

294 |

service of process rather than from the formal defects
urged upon us. As we recently had occasion to point out,
Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 110, par. 259.5,) gives the trial court ample
authority to protect against impairment of the substantive
tights of a defendant by an unwarranted delay in serving
summons. Department of Public Works v. Lanter, 413
Tl. 581, 594. :
The judgments of the Appellate Court and the circuit
court of Lake County are each reversed and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule
defendant’s motion.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Es
(No. 3251 TT
Rai,way Express Acency, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE
InpustRiaL Commission et al.—(EucEeng P. AyL warp,
Defendant in Error.)

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

es 295
Henry I. Green, Orts Barta, Darius E. Pursus,

and Hurswar C. TumME.son, all of Urbana, for plaintiff
in error.

Donaip M. REwo, and J. Micuagr, O’Byrwz, both of
Champaign, for defendant in error.

Mr. Carer Justice ScHarrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

On November 24, 1948, Eugene P. Aylward filed with
the Industrial Commission his application for adjustment
of claim for an accidental injury which he alleged arose
out of and in the course of his employment with Railway
Express Agency on November 26, 1947. Immediately be-
fore the taking of evidence before an arbitrator on April
10, 1951, claimant made a motion to amend his applica-
tion. The motion, seeking to amend only the date of the
alleged injury to read August 20, 1948, instead of No-
vember 26, 1947, was allowed and an order entered amend-
ing the application. Although the employer received notice
of the presentation of the motion, it did not interpose any

2

objection to the amendment. The hearing proceeded as
soon as the application was amended. Evidence was heard,
and the arbitrator awarded claimant compensation benefits
for complete disability. The Industrial Commission sus-
tained the arbitrator’s award, and the circuit court of
Champaign County confirmed the decision of the commis-
sion. We have allowed the employer’s petition for writ of
error.

Claimant testified that on November 26, 1947, while
working as a truck driver for Railway Express Agency in
Champaign, he bumped his head against the roof of his —
truck, He experienced sharp pain. The pain recurred, par-
ticularly on Christmas day of 1947. After consulting sev-
eral physicians about this head pain, claimant went to a
clinic in Champaign where a diagnosis of osteomyelitis of
the skull was made on April 1, 1948. In May of 1948, he
underwent surgery, and the infected portion of the bone
was removed. About one month later, a second operation
was performed for the purpose of placing a metal plate
in claimant’s head. After his own doctor granted him
permission to return to work, claimant submitted to an
examination by the employer’s doctor and returned to his
regular duties on August 5, 1948. Fifteen days later, on
August 20, claimant again bumped his head while carrying
some bundles. Immediately after the blow, the metal plate
was exposed on the left side of claimant’s head. A clear,
colorless fluid began to drain from the open wound. Claim-
ant was taken to a hospital by Flowers, the employer’s local
superintendent. The employer thus had knowledge of this
accidental injury. While enroute to the hospital, claimant
made claim for workmen’s compensation benefits upon his
employer by making demand upon Flowers. Several un-
successful efforts were made to aid the re-healing around
the plate, and eventually the plate was removed. Claimant
has not been refitted for a plate and apparently will not be
refitted. After the second blow on August 20, 1948, more

SS °°

bone was cut away to remove additional infected area.
Claimant’s head has healed over but the metal plate can-
not be reinserted because of the enormous size of the defect
and the development of too much scar tissue.

The employer’s principal contention is that the Indus-
trial Commission lacked jurisdiction to award benefits for
the injury suffered on August 20, 1948, because no applica-
tion for adjustment of claim for injuries received on that
day was filed within one year. Section 24 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act in force on August 20, 1948, (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1947, chap. 48, par. 161,) so far as relevant, provided
that “No proceedings for compensation under this Act

._ shall be maintained unless notice of the accident has been
given to the employer as soon as practicable, but not later
than thirty days after the accident, * * * provided, no
proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be main-
tained unless claim for compensation has been made within
six months after the accident, Provided, that in any case,
unless application for compensation is filed with the Indus-
trial Commission within one year after the date of the
accident, where no compensation has been paid, * * *
the right to file such application shall be barred.”

This court has repeatedly announced that notice of the
accident within thirty days and the making of a clajin for
compensation within six months after the accident are each
jurisdictional and prerequisite to the right to maintain a
proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Fer-
guson v. Industrial Com. 397 Ill. 348; Burke v. Industrial
Com. 368 Ill. 554; Lewis v. Industrial Com. 357 Ill. 309.)
Here, these two statutory conditions precedent to a re-
covery were satisfied by claimant giving immediate notice
of the accident to his employer’s superintendent and by
making demand forthwith upon him for compensation
benefits. (Corn Products Refining Co. v. Industrial Com.
402 Ill. 250.) And the employer in its brief concedes that
“There was notice to, and a claim made of, the employer,

2 ee

for the August 20, 1948, bump.” The employer contends,
however, that claimant failed to meet the third statutory
prerequisite, namely, the filing of an application for com-
pensation within one year after the date of the injury.

As we have observed, the employer did not interject its
objection to the amendment but rather participated freely in
the hearing on the amended application for compensation.
Necessarily, the first question concerns the possibility of
waiver. The employer asserts that the filing of the applica-
tion within the statutory period is jurisdictional in the sense
that the requirement cannot be waived and, indeed, can be
taised for the first time in this court. In support of this
proposition, the employer refers to cases where objections
based upon section 24 were made before the arbitrator,
(International Harvester Co, v. Industrial Com. 410 Ill.
543; Ferguson v. Industrial Com. 397 Ill. 348; Burke v.
Industrial Com. 368 Ill. 554,) and cases indicating that
notice or claim within the prescribed period cannot be
waived. (American Car and Foundry Co. v. Industrial
Com, 335 Ill. 322; Ridge Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 298
Ill. 532; Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 262.) The
first cases hold only that a failure to comply with section 24
will defeat recovery where that failure was pointed out in
a timely fashion. And as to the latter group of cases, what-
ever the rule may be with respect to the failure to give
initial notice or to make proper demand for compensation,
consistency in this area of the law and the language of
section 24 require a different rule as to the filing of an
application for compensation where proper notice and de-
mand for compensation have been given.

Initially, we note that the statutory treatment afforded
the three statutory prerequisites (1) notice of injury, (2)
claim for compensation, and (3) application for compen-
sation, is not the same. While the statute provides that
“No proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be
maintained unless” notice is given and claim is made within

SE 2:9

the statutory periods, the effect of the failure to file a timely
application is stated in these words: “the right to file such
application shall be barred.” This is the language of limita-
tions, not of jurisdiction.

Several cases suggest that the statutory prerequisite of
the filing of an application can be waived. Thus, in Tribune
Co. v. Industrial Com. 290 Ill. 402, it appears that claimant
sustained an injury to his left knee on August 23, 1915,
and received compensation for but two months. Eighteen
months after his accident, claimant and the employer en-
tered into a settlement contract which the commission con-
firmed. On July 23, 1918, the employee filed a petition for
review with the commission alleging that his injury had
recurred and increased and had produced derangement of
the hip and other injuries. The commission made an award
in favor of the employee. The employer contended that
the commission was without jurisdiction to entertain or
to approve the claim because the employee had not filed a
claim for compensation within six months after the injury;
that, the claim for compensation not having been filed
within the time prescribed by section 24 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, the commission was without jurisdic-
tion, sixteen months after the last voluntary payment by it,
to approve the voluntary settlement award, and that ap-
proval of that award in March, 1917, did not give juris-
diction to the commission under section 19(h). Described
differently, the employer’s point was that the agreement for
the settlement award in March, 1917, specifically stated
that the settlement was made after jurisdiction had been
lost under the statute; that the settlement by the employer
was purely voluntary on its part and not required by the
act; and that, in consequence, the settlement did not give
the commission jurisdiction. T’o the employer’s contention,
this court answered: “By the settlement agreement both
parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Com-
mission on the merits of the case, and the conclusion neces-

0

sarily follows that they waived jurisdiction as to the time
limitation with reference to voluntary payment, even though
the agreement stated to the contrary. It is clear from the
wording of the Workmen’s Compensation Act that the
employer can waive the question of time as to when the
claim shall be filed. Section 24 of said act specifically so
provides, and some of the decisions already cited show
that it has been so held. We do not agree with the argu-
ment of counsel that the question of the time when the
application was filed is one of jurisdiction of the subject
matter rather than jurisdiction of the person.” In the
Tribune Co. case no application for compensation was filed
with the commission. In the case at bar, notice and demand
were made within the time limits. The amendment to cor-
rect the date of the accident stated in the application, made
after one year from the date of the accident, was not
objected to and not only did the hearing proceed without
objection and with dispatch but the employer participated
in the hearing upon the merits. See, also: Consumers Co.
vy. Industrial Com, 315 Ill. 592; Garden City Foundry Co.
v. Industrial Com, 307 Ill. 76.

An analogous situation was presented in Pocahontas
Mining Co. v. Industrial Com, 301 Ill. 462, where the
employer’s petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision
was filed with the commission in apt time but the steno-
graphic report required by section 19 was not filed within
the time prescribed. Section 19, to the extent pertinent,
provided: “Unless such party petitioning for a review
shall within twenty days after the receipt by him of the
copy of said decision, file with the board either an agreed
statement of the facts * * * or * * * a correct
stenographic report of the proceedings * * *, then the
decision [of the arbitrator] shall become the decision of
the industrial board.” (Hurd’s Stat. 1917, chap. 48, par.
144(b). Claimant contended in this court that the com-
mission lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s deci-

Cee EE

sion because of the failure to file a timely agreed statement
of facts or stenographic report before the commission, and
that, in consequence, the arbitrator’s decision should be
deemed final. Rejecting the contention, this court held that
the claimant, by participating in the proceeding upon re-
view, waived all right to challenge the jurisdiction of the
commission, observing: “Counsel for defendant in error
have presented this question upon the theory that the com-
mission had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of this
suit. This theory is entirely erroneous.”

Here, not only was no objection interposed but the
employer proceeded to resist the claim upon its merits. By
contesting the claim before the arbitrator to the point of
an award without objecting in any manner to the right
of the arbitrator to hear the application and to render a
decision, the employer waived the question of limitations
upon which it now insists. As stated in the Pocahontas case,
“that all objections to irregularities as to process or as to
the manner in which the suit was brought before the court
are waived if not properly raised in that court before
appearance, has been many times applied by this court to
proceedings of the Industrial Commission on review of
the award of an arbitrator.” Murphy v. Industrial Com.
408 Ill. 612, is to the same effect. We conclude that the
employer waived his right to object to the late filing of
the application for compensation.

On the merits, the employer contends that there was
no causal connection between any accident occurring dur-
ing the course of claimant’s employment and the disease
of osteomyelitis from which he suffered. Its argument is
that osteomyelitis is a disease of the marrow of the bone
resulting from the introduction of a virus in the blood-
stream; that the virus results from an infectious disease
or any infectious disease condition within the body in
which germs causing osteomyelitis may originally arise or
be produced, or an external wound, provided that the

0

wound involves a laceration of the skin; that there was
no laceration of the skin on claimant’s head at or near the
place where he bumped it against the top of the express
van on November 26, 1947; that the osteomyelitis was
not caused by the bump on November 26, 1947, and that
by August 20, 1948, the osteomyelitis had already re- ~
appeared. On the other hand, claimant directs attention to
Dr. Oldberg’s testimony in which he expressed the opinion
that a bump without any open wound or laceration might
have created conditions conducive to the development of
osteomyelitis at that particular point from any organism
that might already be in the body. Whether an open wound
is necessary for the development of osteomyelitis from
traumatic injury makes but little difference here where
the evidence amply discloses that claimant suffered an open
laceration on August 20, 1948. Dr. Christie testified that
infection first developed in claimant’s skull about December
8, 1948, almost four months after the injury, and that be-
ginning osteomyelitis was indicated in early January, 1949.
Dr. Christie expressed the opinion, based upon his exam-
ination and treatments, that claimant’s condition of dis-
ability was directly attributable to the injury of August
20, 1948. The fact that claimant’s physical condition sub-
sequent to his first injury may have predisposed him to
further injury was not a bar to his claim for compensation
where, as here, his employer accepted him as an employee
in such condition. (Marsh v. Industrial Com. 386 Ill. 115
Powers Storage Co. v. Industrial Com. 340 Ill. 498.)
Where expert witnesses disagree, courts will not undertake
to determine with technical accuracy where the preponder-
ance of the evidence lies, for that determination is pre-
eminently a function of the Industrial Commission. (J. I.
Case Co. v. Industrial Com. 378 Ill. x32; Chicago, Wil-
mington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. 400 Ill. 60.)
It is the province of the Industrial Commission to draw
reasonable conclusions and inferences from evidentiary

Ss 3:

facts, and the courts do not set aside a decision of the
Industrial Commission upon a finding of fact, unless its
decision is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
Quaker Oats Co. v. Industrial Com. 414 Ill. 326.

We repeat the observations made in Boutwell v. In-
dustrial Com. 408 Ill. 11, 17-18, “When opinions of the
medical witnesses are conflicting, it is difficult for lay

* opinions to determine with the requisite nicety upon which
side the weight of the evidence falls. * * * ‘The court
will not undertake to decide where the preponderance of
the evidence lies or which medical experts are more worthy
of belief, and will not substitute its judgment for that
of the commission unless the decision of the commission
is clearly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.”

The judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County

is affirmed, Judgment affirmed.

(No, 52495

Gracia M. F. Barnuarr et al., Appellees, vs. Stanza La-
ZELLE BARNHART ef al.— (STELLA LAZELLE BARNHART,
Appellant.)

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

305

KirxianD, Freminc, Green, Martin & Exiis, and
Bett, Boyp, Marswar, & Lioyp, both of Chicago, and
Epson R. SUNDERLAND, of Ann Arbor, Michigan, (JosrrH
B. Fiemine, Dwicut P. Green, Josep H. Prec, Jonn
M. O'Connor, Jr., Larrp Bern, THomas L, MarsHAtL,
and CaariEs T. Martin, of counsel,) for appellants.

CHapman & Cuter, of Chicago, (Gzorcr H. Jircar,
and Joun N. Vanper Vries, of counsel,) for appellees
Gracia M. F. Barnhart et al.; Vernon W. Foster, of Chi-
cago, for appellee Morgan L. Fitch; Danrit, A. CostIcANn,
Witiam C. Winxs, and Harry S. Ditcusurng, all of
Chicago, for other appellees.

Mr. Justice Furton delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant, Stella LaZelle Barnhart, individually and as
administratrix of the estate of Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr.,
deceased, appeals from a decree of the circuit court of
Cook County entered in a cause wherein Stella LaZelle
Barnhart and Livy L. LaZelle, as trustees under the last
will and testament of Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., deceased,
and Hiram P. Barnhart, Jr., ef al., were defendants and
Gracia M, F. Barnhart ef al. were plaintiffs. Cross ap-
peals have been filed by the original plaintiffs challenging
the correctness of certain rulings of the trial court. Hiram

306 |

P. Barnhart, Jr., e¢ al. have also filed cross appeals. Morgan
L. Fitch, who was named by the decree of the circuit court
a successor trustee under the last will and testament of
Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., appears as appellee and has filed
a brief and argument in his own behalf.

By their original complaint filed in the circuit court of
Cook County on August 13, 1936, plaintiffs, who are
descendants of full brothers and sisters of Arthur M. Barn-
hart, Sr., sought an accounting from Stella LaZelle Barn-
hart and Livy L. LaZelle as trustees under the will. The
complaint also sought removal of the trustees, damages
for alleged acts of wrongful investment, waste and mis-
management and the assessment of costs and expenses
against the trust estate. ‘The complaint asks that the court
find and determine that the plaintiffs are the heirs-at-law
of the testator and that they or their descendants are or
will be the only persons entitled to share in the distribution
of the corpus of the trust. Hiram P. Barnhart, Jr., et al.,
who are descendants of brothers of the half blood of
Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., were made defendants and as
to them the relief sought was that the court find and decree
that they had no interest and would have no interest in
the corpus of the trust provided for in said will.

After several motions to dismiss had been decided ad-
versely to the defendant trustees, the cause was finally be-
fore the court on the second amended and supplemental
complaint as amended. On June 24, 1942, upon motion of
the defendant-trustees and of Stella LaZelle Barnhart, in-
dividually and as administratrix of the estate of Arthur M.
Barnhart, Jr., deceased, over the objection of plaintiffs,
the cause was referred to a master for the limited purpose
of determining whether the plaintiffs and other collateral
relatives had any interest in the trust estate, the nature and
extent of such interest, if any, and whether or not attorneys’
fees and costs should be allowed to the various parties and

" assessed and paid out of the trust estate. The term of the

307

master to whom the cause was referred expired while the
proceedings were pending before him, but the cause was
rereferred to him as special commissioner on July 17, 1944.
‘The special commissioner’s report filed on May 10, 1951,
found that the will was ambiguous and required construc-
tion; that Stella LaZelle Barnhart either as heir-at-law of
the testator, Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., or as heir-at-law of
her son, Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., was entitled to the entire
corpus of the trust estate; that the plaintiffs and other
collateral relatives had no interest in the trust and that all
parties were entitled to an allowance of attorneys’ fees and
costs to be taxed and paid out of the estate. All parties
filed objections to the-report of the commissioner. After
these objections had been heard they were allowed to stand
as exceptions. The exceptions were then heard by the trial
court which, in an opinion filed October 24, 1951, decreed
that it was the intention of the testator, manifest from the
terms and provisions of the will, that the corpus of the
trust estate be distributed to the persons constituting his
heirs-at-law as of the date of the death of his widow,
Stella LaZelle Barnhart; that the widow had no interest
in the corpus of the trust and that none of the parties was
entitled to an allowance of attorneys’ fees and costs from
the trust. After further testimony was heard the court
decided the proportions in which the parties would ulti-
mately share in the corpus of the trust, according to de-
scendants of collateral relatives of the half blood the same
status as those of the full blood. The court held in its
opinion that those interested would be entitled to an account-
ing only if they could substantiate the charges of waste
and mismanagement alleged in the complaint. It was fur-
ther decided that a vacancy existed among the trustees
under the provisions of the will. The formal decree signed
on March 21, 1952, implementing the opinion, appointed
Morgan L, Fitch as successor trustee. ‘The decree ordered
that one tenth of the costs be taxed against plaintiffs and

308 |

nine tenths of the costs be taxed against Stella LaZelle
Barnhart individually. By the same decree the cause was
referred to a master for the purpose of taking testimony
on all issues raised by the pleadings and not passed upon
and disposed of by the entry of the decree. This decree of
March 21, 1952, is the decree from which the appeal and
cross appeals have been perfected.

Counsel for appellees and cross appellants, Gracia M. F.
Barnhart, e¢ al., and Hiram P. Barnhart, Jr., e¢ al., con-
tend that the decree of March 21, 1952, is not a final and
appealable order since it does not dispose of all of the
issues in the case and that this court is, therefore, without
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This raises a question
which must be decided before considering any of the other
matters urged. It must be remembered that the decree in
question determined the ultimate rights of the opposing
claimants to the corpus of the trust. While the complaint
seeks an accounting and the decree does not dispose of that
issue, it seems clear that before plaintiffs could avail them-
selves of that remedy, they must first establish their interest
in the trust estate. Whether or not plaintiffs had such an
interest was a separable issue. The defense urged against
the complaint from the outset by motion and otherwise
was that the plaintiffs had no right to an accounting because
they had no interest in the fund. The reference to the
master was for the limited purpose of resolving this pre-
liminary question and the decree makes final disposition
of it. Thus all rights of the plaintiffs in this case may be
regarded as dependent upon the ultimate question resolved
by the decree. We have held that a decree is “final” within
the meaning of that term as used in section 77 of the Civil
Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 110, par. 201,)
if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties either upon
the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate
branch thereof. (Altschuler v, Altschuler, 399 Ill. 5590;
Brauer Machine and Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co. 383

ee) 809

Ill. 569.) A decree is final if it determines the ultimate
rights of the parties with respect to distinct matters which
have no bearing on other matters left for further considera-
tion or if the matters left for future determination are
merely incidental to the ultimate rights which have been
adjudicated by the decree. (Moore v. Moyle, 4os Ill. 555.)
The decree of the circuit court settles and determines the
ultimate rights of the parties to the corpus of the trust and
is, therefore, upon the above authority a final and appeal-
able order. The remedy by way of an accounting is a mere
incident which flows from a right established by the decree.
We, therefore, hold that this court has jurisdiction to enter-
tain this appeal.

A consideration of the interesting problem of will con-
struction raised by this appeal demands an examination
not only of the provisions of the will of the testator itself
but of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the
time of its execution. Certain events occurring after the
probate of the will are also worthy of mention though not
controlling. We shall begin, therefore, by stating those
facts adduced at the hearing which we deem to be material
to a determination of the issues.

Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., a man of considerable wealth,
who had for many years been engaged in the type foundry
business in the city of Chicago with certain of his brothers
and nephews, executed his will on July 20, 1911. At the
time the will was executed the testator was 67 years of
age. His first wife, by whom he had had no children, had
died. His second wife, Stella LaZelle Barnhart, then aged
35 years, was living with testator, as was Arthur M. Barn-
hart, Jr., a son of the second marriage, aged 9% years.
Another child of the second marriage had died in 1904
at the age of 6 months. Testator’s father, Peter Barnhart,
had been married twice. Children were born to both mar-
riages and testator was a child of the second marriage.
At the time the will was made testator’s parents and all

310 |

of his half brothers and sisters were dead. Many of their
descendants were living but it appears that testator was
not in contact with them, and their whereabouts for the
most part were unknown to him, Of testator’s full brothers
and sisters, five of nine were living at the time he made
his will, as were six full nephews and nieces. It appears
that testator was on friendly terms with all his relatives of
the full blood. This is especially evidenced by his bene-
factions. On the very day that he made his will he trans-
ferred $400,000 worth of securities in trust for his rela-
tives, $100,000 for his surviving brothers and sisters of
the full blood, except his brother, Alson E. Barnhart, who,
like testator, was a man of considerable means; $75,000
for Maurice W. Barnhart, a nephew; $75,000 for Royal
B. Hovey, a nephew; $75,000 for E. Warren Conable,
a nephew; $50,000 for Frenella J. Barnhart, a niece;
$25,000 for W. Earle Barnhart, a nephew. On the same
day that he created the trusts and made his will he trans-
ferred $200,000 worth of securities by way of gift to his
wife and a like amount to his son, Arthur M, Barnhart, Jr.

Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., died on May 13, 1913, leav-
ing him surviving his widow, his son and collateral rela~
tives. His will was admitted to probate in Cook County
on July 18, 1913. By the will he gave his entire estate to
trustees to be held, managed and invested as directed.
Named as trustees were the widow and two of testator’s
nephews. Another nephew was named in the event of the
incapacity, death or designation of any of the others. The
son of the testator was also designated to become a trustee
upon reaching 21 years of age. The probate proceedings
show that the estate consisting of both real estate and per-
sonal property was estimated at $1,341,000. The petition
filed named certain of the collateral relatives and desig-
nates them as having an interest as “contingent devisees”
and “contingent legatees.” Following the probate of the
will the nephews named as trustees and successor trustee

eS ai

resigned. ‘The widow continued to act as trustee and later
her mother, N. Florence LaZelle, and her brother, Livy L.
LaZelle, were appointed successor-trustees to act with her.
Meanwhile inheritance taxes had been assessed and paid on
the assumption that the widow had a life interest only. A
tax was assessed against the interests of the collateral rela-
tives as “possible contingent heirs.” In a later proceeding
brought by the widow in the superior court of Cook County,
the court approved the action of the trustees in paying
inheritance taxes, found that there was among the assets
of the estate a claim against Stella LaZelle Barnhart for
$17,573.28 for inheritance tax paid on her behalf and that
the sum of $15,357.13 paid as inheritance tax for the pos-
sible contingent heirs “is a claim against said contingent
heirs should they further become entitled to any part of
said estate.”

On December 10, 1922, Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., at-
tained his majority and became a fourth trustee under the
- will. On December 11, 1934, N. Florence LaZelle died
but no successor-trustee was appointed. On April 7, 1936,
Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., died. Since his death Stella
LaZelle Barnhart and Livy L. LaZelle have acted as sole
trustees. Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., died intestate and a
bachelor. His mother qualified as administratrix of his
estate and still maintains that capacity. She filed an in-
ventory in the estate of her deceased son which does not
list as an asset any interest in the trust estate of Arthur M.
Barnhart, Sr. .

The will of Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., contains four
clauses. The dispositive provisions of the will are found
entirely in the second clause. The first clause directs the
payment of debts and funeral expenses. The third clause
directs that the son, Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., shall become
one of the trustees on attaining 21 years of age and pro-
vides for the succession of Royal B. Hovey, a nephew, to
the office of trustee upon certain contingencies. The third

a2 es

clause also deals with the number of trustees deemed
“sufficient.” The fourth clause appoints the wife as guardian
of the son and names the executors. The crucial provisions
of the second clause are as follows:

“Second: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and remainder
of my property of all kinds, whatsoever, real, personal and mixed,
and wherever situated, unto my dear wife, Stella LaZelle Barn-
hart, and my nephews, Maurice W. Barnhart and E. Warren Con-
able, as Trustees, and in trust for and upon the following terms,
trusts and conditions, to-wit: * * *

“(d) I£ my said son, Arthur M. Barnhart, shall survive my said
wife, Stella LaZelle Barnhart, then immediately upon the death of
my said wife, three-quarters (34) of all of the trust estate and
property then remaining in the hands of the Trustees hereunder
shall be turned over and go to my said son in absolute ownership,
and the other one-quarter (14) of said trust estate shall remain
in trust hereunder during the life of my said son and until his
death, and the income therefrom shall be paid over to him in
quarter-yearly installments during his life and at his death all the
remainder of the trust property shall be turned over and go, in
absolute ownership, to the issue of his body, if such issue there be
in life surviving him, and if there be no such issue surviving him,
then to my heirs at law under the Statutes of Descent of the State
of Illinois; and if my said son shall not survive my said wife,
Stella LaZelle Barnhart, then at her death all of the trust property
remaining in the hands of the Trustees hereunder shall be turned
over and go, in absolute ownership, to the issue of my said son,
taking per stirpes, if there be such issue in life, and if not, then
to my heirs at law under the Statutes of Descent of the State of
Illinois. All payments under this will provided to be made to the
beneficiaries shall be made in quarter-yearly installments; for the
sake of clearness it is hereby stated, and it is my will, that all of
the trusts created by this will shall terminate and be at end and
the trust property be all turned over out of trust forthwith upon
the death of the last survivor of my said wife and son.”

Since Arthur M. Barnhart, Jr., the son of the testator,
died prior to the wife without leaving any issue surviving
him, the contingencies mentioned in the latter portion of
paragraph (d) of clause 2 of the will have occurred. The
decision of the controversy between the parties therefore
depends upon the proper construction of that portion of
the will which provides that upon the happening of these

es 318

events the trust property is to go “to my heirs at law under
the Statutes of Descent of the State.of Illinois.” Appellant,
Stella LaZelle Barnhart, contends that these words mean
those persons and only those persons who answered the
description of heirs-at-law of the testator at the time of
his death, that is, his wife and his son. By virtue of such
a construction, she claims both the entire income and prin-
cipal of the trust estate either as the only survivor who
answers the description of “heir” or as the sole heir of her
deceased son, the other person fitting the description of
“heir” at the time of testator’s death. Appellees contend
that the words of the will mean those persons who will be
the heirs-at-law of the testator at the termination of the
life estates, i.¢., upon the death of the widow, and that the
heirs-at-law of the testator are to be determined as of that
later time rather than at the time of his death.

In construing a will the question for determination by
the court is not what the testator meant to say but rather
what he meant by what he did say. The primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the testator as expressed
in his will governs the distribution of his estate. The in-
tention of the testator, once it has been ascertained, will
be given full effect unless to do so would violate some
settled rule of law or be contrary to public policy. (Vollmer
v. McGowan, 409 Ill. 306; Storkan v. Ziska, 406 Ill. 259;
Walker v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11.) All rules of construction
yield to the intention of the testator as expressed in the
will. (Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Jackson, 412 Il.
261.) No rule of construction will be applied to defeat that
intention. Effect must be given to the whole will. The
testator’s intention cannot be determined from the lan-
guage of any particular clause, phrase or sentence. (Lydick
y. Tate, 380 Ill. 616; Papa v. Papa, 377 Ill. 316.) Be-
cause, as we have often noted, no two wills are ever exactly
alike, precedents in other will cases are never of controlling
importance in determining the intention of the testator as

314 |

expressed in the particular will under consideration. Geiger
v. Geer, 395 Ill. 367; Cahill v. Michael, 381 Ill. 395.

We believe that the will of Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr.,
clearly expresses his intention that his heirs are to be ascer-
tained at a time other than at the time of his death and at
a time when the immediate members of his family, i.e., his
wife, his son and his son’s issue, if any, had all died. There
are several compelling reasons for this conclusion, The
testator repeatedly and throughout the will limits the in-
terest of his wife to the receipt of income from the trust
estate though there are contingencies referred to in the will
upon the happening of which he might have given his wife
an interest in the corpus had he intended that result. Such
a contingency was the death of the son before the wife
without issue and the death of such issue, if any came into
existence, before the widow’s death. Testator foresaw the
contingency which actually did happen (i.¢., the death of
the son before his wife without leaving issue surviving
him) and clearly provides that upon the happening of such
contingency the wife’s interest shall be the right to receive
income from the trust until her death. The testator spe-
cifically provides for his immediate family, his son and his
wife (always referring to them and designating them as
such) and for all his lineal descendants, even to remote
generations, and only when, by the terms of the will, pro-
visions made for them therein could not take effect, did
he make any distribution of his property to his “heirs at
law.” It thus appears that the class of heirs to take after
the deaths of his wife, child and issue of his child, if any,
shall be composed of persons different from his wife, child
or child’s issue. The testator gives his son three fourths
of the corpus of the trust estate, if, but only if, he survives
the widow. It appears clear, therefore, that the testator
never intended that his son should be considered to be
within the class of heirs-at-law who were to share the.
corpus of the trust upon the happening of the contingencies

ais

present, because he would not reasonably intend that his
son take a greater interest in the corpus of the estate if he
did not survive the widow than he would take if he did
survive her. Moreover, the testator specifically provides
for the continuance of the trust estate after the death of
the son without leaving issue surviving him. The conclud-
ing words of paragraph (d) of the second clause of the
will are: “All payments under this will provided to be made
to the beneficiaries shall be made in quarter-yearly install-
ments; for the sake of clearness it is hereby stated, and
it is my will, that all of the trusts created by this will shall
terminate and be at end and the trust property be all turned
over out of trust forthwith upon the death of the last sur-
vivor of my said wife and son.” If testator’s intention
was, as the widow suggests, to give her the entire income
and the corpus of the trust as well, no reason for the con-
tinuance of the trust after the son’s death without issue
could possibly be conceived. Yet such are the clear provi-
sions of the will. The testator made it perfectly plain that
he wished this property to repose and be protected by the
trust as long as either his son or his wife should be alive.

‘The evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding
the testator at the time he made his will support our con-
clusion as to the intention of the testator expressed in the
will itself. Appellant has stressed the evidence concern-
ing the creation of the inter vivos trusts for his collateral
relatives as indicative of the fact that testator was doing
all he intended to do for them. She concludes that because
he went to such lengths to provide for them by the gifts
in trust, he did not intend that they should take as heirs-
at-law under his will. The entire circumstances revealed
by the evidence show that while testator had a very real
affection and concern for his wife and child, he also had
great pride of family and a deep sense of obligation to his
brothers and sisters and their descendants. We believe that
the will and all surrounding circumstances show that the

316 ee

testator wanted to provide adequately for his wife, his son
and the descendants of the son even to remote generations,
but that upon failure of the line of descent, his own family,
rather than strangers, should have his property. The fact
that he showed such affection and concern for his brothers
and sisters, nieces and nephews by creating the trusts for
them supports rather than negatives the proposition that
testator intended that they should take under his will. Cer-
tain letters written by the testator to various of his relatives
were introduced at the trial over objection. None of these,
in our opinion, shows any intention on the part of the
testator that his heirs are to be determined as of the date
of his death. We regard them as unimportant, and in view
of the fact that they have not influenced this opinion one
way or the other, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
objections raised to their admissibility.

Having determined that it was the clearly expressed
intention of the testator that his heirs-at-law should not be
determined as of the date of his death, the question re-
mains: Is there any settled rule of law which will prevent
giving effect to this intention? In construing a will, the
law existing at the time of its execution or as of the date
of the testator’s death must govern, whether that law be
founded upon statute or judicial decision. (Belfield v.
Findlay, 389 Ill. 526; Wallace v. Noland, 246 Il. 535.)
At the time the testator executed his will this court had
held that ordinarily the words “heirs at law” when used
in a will are words used to designate those persons who
answer this description at the death of the testator, and
such will be the construction unless the intention of the
testator to refer to those who shall be his heirs at a period
subsequent to his death is plainly manifested in the will.
We had also held that this rule might operate notwithstand-
ing the fact that a life estate may precede the bequest to
the heirs-at-law or that the life tenant, upon the expiration
of whose estate the distribution was to be made, was her-

es 37

self one of the heirs-at-law, and this whether the heirs-at-
law determined as of the time of the testator’s death be
living or dead when the time for distribution arrived.
(Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433.) But we had also held
that where there was a gift to a person for life, with
remainder to the testator’s heirs, and the person taking the
life estate was the sole heir at the date of the death of the
testator, the remainder will be considered as given to the
persons answering the description at the termination of
the life estate, when such appeared to be the intention of
the testator from the entire scope and plan of the will.
(Johnson v. Askey, 190 Ill. 58.) There was, therefore, at
the time Arthur M. Barnhart, Sr., made his will no positive
tule of law which prevented the words “heirs at law” of
the testator from being construed to mean those persons who
would be his heirs-at-law at the termination of the life
estate,

Appellant, Stella LaZelle Barnhart, relies most strongly
upon the decisions of this court in the cases of Himmel v.
Himmel, 294 Ill. 557, Hull v. Adams, 399 Ill. 347, and
Le Sourd v. Leinweber, 412 Ill. 100. We have examined
these cases with considerable care and find that the wills
construed are not similar to that in the case at bar. As
stated previously, precedents in other will cases are never
too valuable because of the dissimilarity of the wills in-
volved. (Geiger v. Geer, 395 Ill. 367.) In each of the
above cases relied upon by appellant the term “heirs” was
held to mean “heirs” at the time of the testator’s death but
the rule is consistently recognized that where the intention
of the testator to refer to those who would have been his
heirs had he died at a subsequent time is clearly manifest
by the language used in the will, such intention will be
given effect. Thus in Hull v. Adams, 399 Ill. 347, 352,
356, it is said: “But, as pointed out in all of the cases
above cited, a devise to the testator’s heirs will not be con-
strued as meaning a devise to those who are his heirs at

ais a

the time of his death, although such construction would be
prima facie correct, if it appears from the will, construed
as a whole and with reference to all its provisions, that the
testator used the words in an artificial sense as referring
to those persons who would have been his heirs had he
lived until some future time or until the happening of some
subsequent event. While the general rule is that the heirs
of a testator mentioned in the will are to be ascertained as
of the time of his death, yet this is merely a rule of con-
struction and gives way to a contrary intent to be found in
the will.” “The fact that the life tenant is the sole heir
of the testator does not, of itself, establish that the testator
used the word to indicate those who would be his heirs had
he died at the termination of the life estate, but such fact
may be considered, along with other facts, in determining
the intent of the testator as to the time when his heirs are
to be ascertained.” Similar language appears in Le Sourd
v. Leinweber, 412 Ill. 100, tos.

The case of Himmel v. Himmel, 294 Ill. 557, merely
holds that there is no substantive rule of law where the
life tenant is the sole heir-at-law of the testator that he is
excluded from the remainder where those who are his heirs
are to be ascertained at the termination of the life estate.
That decision does, however, recognize that such fact may
be a material factor in ascertaining.the testator’s intention
and the case does not purport to overrule Johnson v. Askey,
190 Ill. 58. At page 566 of the opinion in the Himmel case,
it is said: “It is clear that the statement made in Johnson
v. Askey, supra, in connection with the cases cited and the
provisions of the will under consideration, cannot be taken
as a substantive and positive rule of law controlling and
overcoming the intention of the testator upon a considera-
tion of the whole will and all its provisions, but the fact -
that the life tenant is the sole heir is to be considered in
determining the nature of the remainder and the time when
the heirs-at-law are to be ascertained.”

ee a9

No Illinois cases have been cited by counsel for either
side involving trusts like or nearly like that found in the
will now under consideration. Courts in other States have
held, however, in situations where similar trusts were in-
volved and under wills having similar dispositive provisions
that a gift to “heirs at law” following provisions for the
testator’s immediate family and all of his lineal descendants
must be construed as intending that such “heirs at law”
are to be determined as of the date of the termination of
the trust and not as of the date of death of the testator.
See: Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Blanchard,
196 Mass. 35, 81 N.E. 654; New York Life Inswrance &
Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N.Y. 93, 142 N.E. 431, and
Carter v. Martin, 124 N.J. Eq. 106, 199 Atl. 589.

Counsel have discussed at length the question whether
in any event the widow could be considered an heir-at-law
of the testator under the law as it existed at the time the
will was drawn, stressing the fact that the Statutes of
Descent and Distribution in effect in Illinois at that time
were different from the present laws. In view of the con-
clusion we have reached, based upon our conception of the
clear meaning of the will, it becomes unnecessary to con-
sider this point. We hold that the trial court correctly con-
strued the last portion of the will to mean those persons
who would constitute the heirs-at-law of the testator under
the Statutes of Descent of the State of Illinois at the death
of the widow and determined at that time; that the said
collateral relatives will be entitled to the remainder of said
estate if they survive the widow, provided, however, that
if any of them fail to survive, then the persons entitled to
the principal of the trust estate will be those who at the
date of the death of the life beneficiary will be the heirs-
at-law of the testator under the Statutes of Descent of the
State of Illinois determined as of that time. Appellees,
Gracia M. F, Barnhart e¢ al. have abandoned their con-
tention that they are entitled to the corpus of the estate to

320 ee

the exclusion of the relatives of the half blood and we find
that the ruling of the trial court that the collateral relatives
of the half blood should take on the same basis as those
of the full blood was correct.

The trial court found that a vacancy existed among the
trustees of the will because of the death of N. Florence
LaZelle and appointed Morgan L.. Fitch a successor-trustee
to fill the vacancy. Appellant, Stella LaZelle Barnhart,
individually and as administratrix, says that there was no
vacancy in the trusteeship and no occasion for the appoint-
ment of a successor-trustee. It is also contended that the
court erred in declining a request to appoint a successor-
trustee acceptable to the other trustees and to Stella LaZelle
Barnhart as life beneficiary, but no objection has been made
to the character, fitness or qualifications of the trustee
appointed.

The third article of the will of the testator provides
that three trustees shall constitute a “sufficient” board of
trustees under the will; that if, by reason of the addition
of his son to the board, the board be increased to four,
and thereafter it be reduced to three, it shall not be neces-
sary to appoint a successor to constitute a board of four,
the intent being that a board of three shall be sufficient.
By paragraph (a) of the second clause of his will, tes-
tator mentions the trustees and “their successors.” He
provides that none of the trustees or the successors named
in the instrument shall be required to give bond, but “in
case any Trustee be appointed by any Court to act here-
under” that a bond be given by such appointee. We believe
that the will of the testator, taking all of its provisions
together, contemplates that the trust shall be administered
by a board of three trustees. The will mentions trustees
and “their successors.” The definite inference from the
fact that the provision is that no successor need be appointed
if the board be reduced from four to three, is that the

es 82

testator means that one be appointed if the board be re-
duced to less than three, for three is the figure he has
definitely in mind since he names three trustees in the first
instance and states that a board of three trustees shall be
sufficient. We believe the testator intended that there
should at all times be a board of three trustees. Appellant
cites the case of Mullanny v. Nangle, 212 Ill. 247, as au-
thority for her position, but the will there involved was
entirely different. The conveyance was to two trustees “or
the survivor” of them and the court held that by so doing
the testator showed that he did not intend that there should
always be two acting trustees.

Since by his will the testator manifests an intention that
there should be a board of three trustees, a vacancy existed
and an appointment was required. That appointment will
not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of
discretion by the trial court in making it. None appearing,
that part of the decree finding the vacancy and making the
appointment should be affirmed.

The court declined to order an allowance of attorneys’
fees to the various parties to be taxed and paid out of the
corpus of the estate. It is true that the action before us
involved an accounting for the purpose of establishing plain-
tiffs’ rights in the trust property. The right to an account-
ing, however, depended entirely upon a construction of the
will, Unless that question was determined in favor of the
plaintiffs, there was obviously no right to an accounting.
On that question there was a determined contest and there
were adverse claims over the disposition of the corpus of
the estate at the termination of the trust period. Because
of the ambiguous and uncertain terms of the will, it re-
quired construction by a court of equity to determine which
of the several adverse claimants were entitled to share in
the balance of the estate. We are of the opinion that the
facts reported in this record justify the attorneys’ fees being

Le

522 ee

taxed against and paid by the estate. (In re Estate of
Reeve, 393 Ill. 272.) In declining to so order, the decree
in this respect is reversed,

In the final paragraph of its decree the trial court re-
serves jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs and the half-blood
defendants an accounting if, upon the hearing of the cause
before the master, it shall be proved that the defendant
trustees have been guilty of waste or mismanagement in
their administration of the trust estate, the inference being,
of course, that such relief will not be granted unless such
a showing is made. Plaintiffs and collateral relatives of
the half blood have assigned error to this part of the decree.
The nature of the interest of the collateral relatives is that
of contingent remaindermen. This has been recognized by
all of counsel in their respective briefs and arguments. The
question for decision is, therefore, whether a contingent
remainderman by virtue of being such or after demand is
entitled to an accounting as a matter of right without any
showing of mismanagement or of facts giving rise to an
inference of waste or that a property right under the trust
is being dissipated.

No authorities have been cited by counsel holding that
one who has a contingent interest in trust property may
demand an accounting as a matter of right. Several cases
from other jurisdictions have been cited which hold that
the owner of a contingent interest may have equitable relief
to prevent waste or dissipation of the trust estate or to
prevent disposition of the trust property contrary to the
intention of the trustor. (See: Northwestern Nat. Bank
and Trust Co, v. Pirich, 213 Minn. 313, 9 N.W. 2d 773;
Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co. 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W.
744.) No cases going any further than these in affording
relief to a contingent remainderman have been called to
our attention and the court in the Pirich case recognizes
that there are authorities holding that one having a con-
tingent interest may not have an action against a trustee.

es 328

Section 50 of the Illinois Chancery Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 22, par. 50,) provides in substance that where
any estate is subject to a contingent future interest, legal
or equitable, arising by way of remainder or otherwise,
and whether a trust is involved or not, it may be brought
under the jurisdiction of a court of equity and a trustee
appointed whenever it is made to appear that such estate
is liable to waste or depreciation in value.

In 65 C.J. (Trusts,) paragraph 780, at page 882, it is
said: “Contingent or reversionary interest as basis of
right. By statute in a number of jurisdictions the right to
require an accounting is expressly recognized as apper-
taining, more or less generally, to persons possessing an
interest contingent in nature; and, apart from any statute,
trustees may be required to account, it has been held, at
the instance not only of the cestui que trust or of those’
having a vested or even a contingent interest therein, but
also, in a proper case, by those having an estate in rever-
sion; however, a person only contingently interested has
no standing to require an accounting without showing some
mismanagement or other facts giving rise to an inference
of waste or that a property right under the trust is likely
to be dissipated or wasted.”

We believe the better rule to be that while a contingent
remainderman should not be denied the right to bring an
action against the trustees regardless of circumstances and
merely because his interest is remote and contingent, never-
theless, the scope of the right should be limited to that
which is necessary to protect his possible eventual interest,
ie., the protection and preservation of the trust res. It
should be afforded only where waste, mismanagement or
dissipation of assets appear or can be shown. We hold,
therefore, that the final paragraph of the decree was correct.

Finally, error has been assigned upon the trial court’s
order assessing nine tenths of the costs against Stella
LaZelle Barnhart individually and one tenth of the costs

324

against plaintiffs. The assessment of costs is a matter
largely within the sound judicial discretion of the chan-
cellor. His order will not be disturbed unless abuse of that
discretion is shown. In view of the history of this litiga-
tion, the circumstances appearing and the outcome of this
case, we find that the assessment of costs was just and
equitable. The court’s order in that regard should be
affirmed, .

The decree of the circuit court of Cook County is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is
remanded, with directions to enter a decree in accordance
with the views herein expressed.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part
and remanded, with directions.

a
(No. 32560

Samuerr J. Frewps, Appellee, vs. Leroy W. Frenps et al—
(Deorrese M, Fretps, Appellant.)

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

325

Frouiica & Wacuowsxi, of Chicago, (Casmmir R.
Wacuowsxl, and Raymonp Wasik, of counsel,) for ap-
pellant.

Prescott, Burroucus & Taytor, of Chicago, (A.
Morris Burroucus, and Euciip Louis Tayzor, of coun-
sel,) for appellee.

Mr, Justicy Maxwetz, delivered the opinion of the
court:

The plaintiff, Samuel J. Fields, filed suit in the circuit
court of Cook County, against the defendants, Leroy W.
Fields and Deoitese Fields, to impress an improved parcel
of real estate in Chicago with a resulting trust. The trial
court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff. Deoitese M.
Fields, one of the defendants, prosecuted a direct appeal
to this court since a freehold is involved.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff paid for the
property from his own funds, that the legal title thereto
was vested in plaintiff's son, Leroy W. Fields and his son’s
wife, Deoitese M. Fields, as joint tenants, but that they
held title in trust for him. The son filed an answer admit-
ting all of the substantial allegations of the complaint and
averring that he had made alterations and improvements,
for which he was obligated, but that his wife collected
rents and refused to account for same or to use any of
the rentals to pay for such improvements. Deoitese M.
Fields filed a separate answer relating that the premises

326 |

were purchased by her and her husband, that she has been
paying taxes and maintaining the property from rents and
that a conspiracy existed between her husband and his
father to defraud her of her rights and interest in the
property.

It appears that Leroy moved to Chicago to work in
July, 1947, without his wife and that in February, 1948,
he approached his father and indicated that living quarters
were not obtainable for him and his wife without buying
a property and that they did not have funds with which
to buy. Plaintiff went to Chicago in the early part of 1948
and made some inquiries relative to the purchase of a prop-
erty. Several buildings were shown to him including the
three-story flat in question. On March 31, 1948, a contract
was entered into for the flat, the purchase price of which
was $14,000. Such contract was signed by the seller and
Leroy W. Fields and provided for the payment of $1000
earnest money and the balance to be paid within fifteen”
days after approval of title. The contract was indorsed
with a cash payment of $600, and a check for $400 payable
to seller’s agent was given by Samuel J. Fields to complete
the $1000 down payment.

On April 9, 1948, under the terms of an escrow agree-
ment there was deposited with the escrow agent the sum of
$4000, and a few days later the proceeds of a $9000 loan
were likewise deposited. ‘The escrow provided that the deed.
was to be made to the defendants as joint tenants. The
record is obscure as to how the property came to be con-
veyed in joint tenancy but there is nothing to show that
the parties were not fully aware of the joint-tenancy con-
veyance. The plaintiff was present during the transaction
and signed the $9000 note secured by a mortgage on
the premises as additional security. When the title company
asked for a statement as to the interest, if any, of Samuel
J. Fields in the property because he had signed the note, one

es 821

Taylor, an attorney, gave a written statement that plaintiff
had no interest therein. There was some dispute as to who
such attorney represented, but immediately thereafter the
objection was waived and the transaction consummated.

Plaintiff contends that since his funds were used for
such purchase and additional sums were put up by him
thereafter for improvements, a trust resulted in his favor
and that he is entitled to a deed to the premises. The
record is clear that $400 of the earnest-money payment
was paid by a check drawn by the father, as well as $360
for the loan commission. He advanced $25 to his son for
an appraisal and the $4000 escrow payment was made by
a check drawn by Samuel J. Fields payable to himself and
indorsed over to his son, who in turn indorsed it in blank
and delivered it to the escrow agents. The question for
determination is the legal effect of the payment and ad-
vancement of funds.

A resulting trust arises by operation of law and is
founded on a presumed intent gathered from the acts of
the parties. It does not depend upon a contract or agree-
ment and usually comes into being when one person fur-
nishes the consideration for the purchase of property while
the conveyance is taken in the name of another. (Kane v.
Johnson, 397 Ill. 112; Houdek v. Ehrenberger, 397 Ill. 62;
McCabe v. Hebner, 410 Ill. 557.) It arises, if at all, the
instant the legal title is taken and the title vests. (Kohlhaas
v. Smith, 408 Ill. 535; Brod v. Brod, 390 Ill. 312; Spina
v. Spina, 372 Ill. 50.) The burden of proof rests upon the
person seeking to establish a resulting trust, and the evi-
dence, to be effective for that purpose, must be clear, con-
vincing, unequivocal and unmistakable, and must establish
beyond a doubt the payment by the claimed beneficiary at
the time the title was taken in the alleged trustee. Kohlhaas
v. Smith, 408 Ill. 535; Hille v. Barnes, 399 Ill. 252;

*Houdek v. Ehrenberger, 397 Ill. 62.

828 ee

It is sometimes difficult to ascertain the intention of the
parties in a transaction such as this, but here much of the
evidence is not in dispute. Paragraph 6 of the complaint
alleges that defendants promised to pay the plaintiff the
money invested by him. Plaintiff repeatedly testified that
he loaned the money to the defendants, that he expected
no interest, that he was to be repaid a little at a time
monthly but that no regular payments were agreed upon.
Similar testimony was given by his son. Deoitese testified
that plaintiff told her, on the way up to Chicago to pur-
chase the property, that in buying the building it was going
to be hard on them (the defendants) in the beginning but
if they worked hard and paid the bills and mortgage then
they would be able to take vacations and buy cars and
furniture that they could not now afford. Her testimony
was not disputed.

Subsequent events, while relatively unimportant since
a resulting trust, if any, arose at the time of the purchase,
indicate that plaintiff treated the advancements as loans.
He turned over to the defendants various sums of money,
totalling several thousand dollars, which he said one or
both of them agreed to repay. They drew plans, with his
knowledge, and did extensive remodeling which was financed
largely from F.H.A. guaranteed loans.

Tt seems clear that it was the intention of the plaintiff
to loan money to the defendants for the purchase of the
building and for subsequent improvements and furnishings.
The relation of debtor and creditor was thus created and
the funds used for the purchase were those of the borrower,
not the lender,

A loan and a resulting trust are inconsistent. To say
that a person could make a loan to another, the proceeds
of which went to the purchase of property, and three years
later, when his loan appeared to be in jeopardy, be granted
a resulting trust in lieu of the debt, would in effect permit
him to change the type of his investment at his own option.

Ure 329

A resulting trust does not arise where funds advanced are
either a gift or a loan. Briscoe v. Price, 275 Ill. 63; Rem-
inger v. Joblonski, 27% Il. 71.

It is argued that, while plaintiff testified that both de-
fendants agreed to repay the funds advanced for the pur-
chase, Deoitese denied she had promised to repay it. This
is not an action to recover a debt and we are therefore not
called upon, nor privileged, to pass upon that disputed. ques-
tion of fact.

One point of plaintiff's brief is devoted to the law
regarding constructive trusts. Since his pleadings were
drafted on the theory of a resulting trust and his proof
throughout was an attempt to establish a resulting trust,
there is no need to discuss the possibilities of a constructive
trust. .

We are of the opinion that a resulting trust has not
been established. The decree of the circuit court of Cook

County is reversed.
y “ Decree reversed.

De
No. 32371

THE PEOPLE oF THE State oF IntiNnors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Josep G. Branp et al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

2
Pan)

331

Arruur FRANKEL, of Chicago, (Hersurt M. WErzEL,
of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

LatHam Casti4, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun Gurxnecu’, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (ABBEY
Brarrserc, Joun T. GawwacHER, Ruporps L, JANEGA,
and ArtHur MaNnIne, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for
the People.

Mr. Justice Datty delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs in error, Joseph G. Brand and Anton A. Mor-
vay, whom we shall refer to as defendants, were found
guilty by a jury in the criminal court of Cook County of
the crime of obtaining money by use and means of a con-
fidence game. They bring this cause here for review on
writ of error assigning numerous errors in their trial.

The defendant Brand was president and principal stock-
holder of an Illinois corporation called Industrial Exchange,
Inc., whose principal business was that of barter and ex-
change. The defendant Morvay was president of an Illinois
corporation called Morvay & Company, which was appar-
ently engaged in the construction business. Morvay & Com-
pany had offices at 39 S. LaSalle Street, in Chicago,
where it employed as many as twenty-five persons, includ-
ing draftsmen who occupied a suite of offices in the same
building but not adjacent to the general office of the cor-
poration. Industrial Exchange, Inc., in June of 1949, had
an office at 30 S. La Salle Street, Chicago, but some time
thereafter moved into the same building as Morvay &
Company.

382 ee

The complaining witness, Herbert Bomar, a man of
about thirty-five years of age, was employed by Brunswick
Balke-Collender Company in the promotion department. In
June, 1949, after conversations over the telephone, he called
at Brand’s office to discuss the sale to Brarid of a lot he
owned. The testimony as to which party first contacted
the other is in direct conflict. Bomar testified that Mrs.
Brand telephoned his wife and expressed a desire to buy
the Bomar property. Brand testified that the situation was
just the opposite. During the conversation Brand invited
Bomar to accompany him to 39 S. La Salle Street to look
at a suite of offices which he planned to move into. They
stopped at the coffee shop in the building, and Brand in-
troduced Bomar to the defendant Morvay. During the con-
versation which ensued Brand talked about a bowling alley
building which he was going to build for Bomar to operate.
However, Bomar stated that he was only interested in sell-
ing his lot. Brand inquired as to why Bomar did not build
a home on his lot, and Bomar informed him the costs were
too high,

Subsequent to that meeting, Bomar received a notice to
vacate the apartment, in which his family lived, within
sixty or ninety days. A few days later Brand called at
Bomar’s office with a book of plans and home designs, and
stated that he could build a house for as little as $1000
down. Brand told Bomar to take the plans home and show
them to his wife. The plans consisted of a printed book
containing some eighty pages, entitled “Designs for Con-
venient Living,” distributed by Home Planners, Inc., and
had a price printed on the cover of the book of $1.50.
The plan book can be purchased at various stores through-
out the country.

Bomar and wife studied the book for several days, and
on July 21, 1949, called at Brand’s office, which was then
located at 39 S. La Salle Street, where they met one Addi-
son Brown, a Mr. Lauren and Brand. The Bomars told

338

Brand that they were interested in design No. 17 in the
book of plans, and Brand sent for Morvay. Morvay came
into the office with a cardboard model of design No. 17,
and told them that the house would be constructed with
Jannen stone and would cost around $12,000 to construct
on their lot. Bomar testified that he inquired of Morvay
how they could build a house for that price, and that he
was told that they owned their own rock quarry, their own
mill and own lumberyard and had various trading powers
by which they could get the materials cheaper than com-
petitors. These statements were denied by the testimony
of Brand, Brown and Lauren. Plans were shown to the
Bomars and a few minor changes agreed upon. Contracts
and papers were brought out and Morvay asked for a
$4000 down payment. Brand spoke up and said-that the
Bomars would only have to make a $1000 down payment,
and that they could sign a note to him for $3000. Bomar
wrote a check for $1000 payable to the Industrial Ex-
change, Inc., and gave it to Brand. Other papers were
signed at this time, including a building contract, all of
which were delivered to Brand, Within a day or two after
the meeting other papers were forwarded to the Bomars
by mail who signed them and returned them. They included
a trust deed for $12,200, which was recorded in the re-
corder’s office of Cook County, and a note in the sum of
$3000 payable to Brand.

Bomar testified that Brand and Morvay both told him
that the house would be started within a week or ten days
and would be finished within four or five months, and
Brand admitted that he told Bomar that the house would
be started in October and completed by Christmas, 1949.
When work was not started on the home by the latter part
of July, Bomar made repeated calls to Brand and Morvay
to find out when they were going to start, and received
numerous excuses. Finally he went to the courthouse and
discovered that none of the permits had been applied for,

384 es

and he himself obtained all of the necessary permits ex~-
cepting a building permit. After two months had elapsed,
Morvay finally told Bomar that Brand had never given
him the $3000 for the second mortgage and that he needed
that money before he could start. When Bomar confronted
Brand with this he explained that he had a $3000 credit
with Morvay & Company which he had acquired by paying
some of their bills, and that he had assigned this credit to
Bomar in exchange for the $3000 note, and suggested that
Bomar see Morvay about it. On September 21, 1949, the
Bomars called Morvay’s office and met a Colonel Warren
who stated that he had nothing to do with the transaction, ©
but recommended that Bomar write out a check to Morvay
for the $3000 and go ahead with the deal.

When Morvay came into the office he said, “Let’s start
over,” and tore up the old contract and papers and had the
Bomars sign a new building contract which called for a
building to be commenced on October 1, 1949, on Bomar’s
lot and acknowledged receipt of a $4000 down payment,
which included a $3000 check that the Bomars gave to Mor-
vay on that date. The contract specified that the total price
was to be $16,200, of which the $4000 down payment was
a part, and the balance was to be paid by a $12,200 mort-
gage which was previously recorded, The Bomars insisted
on and received a release from Brand of the $3000 note
which they had previously executed and delivered to him.
Morvay agreed to immediately start construction on the
home, but even though building permits were finally ob-
tained no work was done other than having the lot staked
out.

In October, Bomar demanded that his money be re-
funded, and Morvay took Bomar to a builder whom he
claimed was looking over the Morvay projects. ‘The builder,
however, denied this. Bomar was then taken to one Hicks,
an employee of the Equitable Life Assurance Society, who
told him that he was trying to arrange for a loan to handle

es 835

the papers of Morvay & Company. However, this was
denied by Thomas J. Murray who testified that he was
sales supervisor for residential mortgages for the states of
Illinois and Wisconsin for the Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, and that the company would
not finance the construction of a home, and further that
James Hicks was employed by the company as a life in-
surance agent who worked on commission with one of the
agencies in Chicago, and had no authority to make any
commitments for mortgages. Subsequently, and before the
trial of this case, Bomar received $500 from Morvay and
$450 from Brand.

The defendants contend that they operated legitimate
businesses as legitimate businessmen, and that they oper-
ated according to accepted business practice procedures,
but that in the course of their business they became unable
to meet their obligations and commitments.

Although the defendant Morvay elected to remain silent,
the defendant Brand testified that he had been engaged
in the business of barter and exchange which he explained
was sometimes called reciprocity with various corporations.
He further explained that his method of operation was to
acquire a credit with some company by selling their produce
for a commission consisting of the credit, and then in turn
selling the credit which he had established to a third person
who wished to do business with the original company. In
the instant case, he established a credit with Morvay &
Company by paying some indebtedness of the defendant
Morvay and of one Donald Lynn, an officer of Morvay &
Company, who is under indictment and is now a fugitive
from justice. It was not established how a credit with
Morvay & Company could be obtained by paying the in-
debtedness of two of the officers of the corporation, Brand
further testified that he sold the complaining witness a
$4000 credit with Morvay & Company on July 21, 1949,
for which he received the sum of $1000 paid to him on

336 ee

that date, and claimed that Bomar owed'him the sum of
$3000 until September 28, when he claimed to have first
received the Bomar note. He contends that that indebted-
ness continued to exist until the note was paid at the time
Bomar entered into a new contract with Morvay & Company.

Plaintiffs in error are represented in this review by
other counsel than participated in the proceeding in the
trial court, and throughout his brief and argument he has
asserted that the failure to lay the proper foundation for
our consideration of numerous points on review lay in the
incompetency of the trial counsel. We have carefully ex-
amined the record and have reached the conclusion that
defendants were ably represented by counsel of their own
choosing. Counsel seems to have been familiar with the
rules of evidence and the practice in criminal cases. ‘The
record was long. Many exhibits were introduced both in
behalf of the prosecution and in behalf of the defendants.
None of the alleged errors brought to our attention con-
stitute reversible error. We cannot justify suspending the
well-established rule of appellate practice of this court
purely because their appellate counsel would have tried the
case in the trial court in a different manner than the theory
of defense advanced by thé trial counsel.

In addition to the alleged incompetency of trial counsel,
defendants contend that their failure to challenge the in-
dictment in the trial court on the question of the’constitu-
tionality of sections 98 and 99 of division I of the Criminal
Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 38, pars. 256-257,) should
be waived for the reason that it would have been useless to
there challenge the indictment since the trial court would
have been bound by the previous decisions of this court
which fourid them constitutionally sufficient. Nevertheless,
they now assert that it is our duty to reconsider the previous
decisions, because we might have failed in earlier decisions
to. have considered other bases on which the constitution-
ality of these sections might be attacked, and argue that by

es 337

virtue of our oaths of office we should hold unconstitu-
tional that which is unconstitutional, irrespective of whether
the question was saved for review. It is fundamental that
the question of the constitutionality of a statute cannot be
properly raised for the first time in a court of review, but
must have been presented to the trial court and ruled upon
by it, and‘the person challenging its validity must have
preserved proper exceptions to such ruling. (Mechanics’ and
Traders’ Savings Assn. v. People ex rel. Auditor of Public
Accounts, 184 Ill. 129; People v. McCoy, 132 Ill. 138;
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of
Ottawa, 165 Ill, 207; Cummings v. People, 211 Ill. 392.)
It is a rule of universal application that the reversal of a
judgment cannot be urged upon a ground not submitted
to the trial court and upon which it did not and was not
asked to decide. Cummings v. People, 211 Ill. 392.

Tt is contended that given instruction No. 2 was an
abstract proposition of law that did not in any way make
it applicable to the facts of the case; that it omitted speci-
fication of requirements, elements and definition of the
crime, and that giving it constituted reversible error. The
instruction is as follows: “The Court instructs the Jury
that every person who shall obtain from any other person
or persons any money, property or credit, by any means,
instrument or device, commonly called the Confidence Game,
shall be guilty of the crime of confidence game, and it is
immaterial that such means, instrument or device takes
the form of a business transaction.” No one instruction
must contain all of the law appertaining to the case. (People
v. Barnett, 347 Ill. 127.) Given instructions Nos. 9 and
to advised the jury of the proof necessary to convict and
also the elements of the crime. Given instruction No. 2
was in the language of the statute, and was simply given
to inform the jury generally as to the law of the case. It
was not error to give the same. People y. Crawford, 278

Tl. 134.
[|

338 De

Defendants contend that the refusal of the trial court
to give certain instructions in their behalf constituted re-
versible error. We deem it unnecessary to set forth the
text of the refused instructions, and consider it sufficient
to state that we have considered the given instructions
in connection with the court’s refusal to give the others,
and are of the opinion that the jury was adequately in-
structed as to the elements of the offense, their duties as
jurors and of the weight of the evidence, and we are of
the opinion that no reversible error was committed by the
refusal to give the instructions,

Considerable evidénce was introduced showing the com-
mission of similar offenses by Brand and Morvay against
one Ivan W. Brunk and against Harold F. Baker. It is
not contested that evidence of prior similar offenses is com-
petent to prove the criminal intent of one accused of vio-
lating the confidence game statutes. (People v. Novotny,
305 Ill. 549; DuBois v. People, 200 Ill. 157.) However,
it is the contention of the defendants that the evidence
relating to the Baker and Brunk cases is not admissible
as against the defendant Brand inasmuch as there is no
connection in the record between him and the other victims,
and it is further contended that the evidence of those
transactions is not admissible as against the defendant Mor-
vay, as they claim that those offenses were committed sub-

_ sequent to the offense against Bomar. The record discloses
the date of the Baker transaction with Morvay to be August
16, 1949, and the date of the Brunk transaction to be Sep-
tember 16, 1949. Defendants argue that the date of the
Bomar transaction with Morvay was the date that Morvay
paid the money to Brand on July 21, 1949. We have re-
peatedly held that evidence of the commission of subsequent
crimes is not admissible for the purpose of proving guilty
knowledge or intent in the absence of proof that the de-
fendant has formerly committed similar offenses, and that
his intent in the commission of the first offense may not

es 329

be presumed from the commission of subsequent similar
and distinct offenses. (People v. Moshiek, 323 Ill. 11;
People v. Hobbs, 297 Ul. 399.) Inasmuch as Bomar paid
money on July 21 and additional sums on September 21,
1949, the offense against him was not completed until the
latter date, and, therefore, the Baker and Brunk cases were
not subsequent offenses.

‘The admission of such evidence is subject to the limita-
tion that it may be considered by the jury only in deter-
mining the intent of the accused. Defendants insist that
the court had an affirmative duty to admonish or instruct
the jury that consideration of the testimony as to those
other offenses should be limited to the question of defend- .
ants’ intent, and they also contend that the court should
have instructed the jury that the evidence of the Baker and
Brunk cases should be disregarded as far as the defendant
Brand is concerned. No affirmative duty to admonish or
instruct the jury attaches to the court because evidence of
such nature is introduced, and the defendant having failed
to invoke the ruling by exception or by request for admoni-
tion or instruction cannot now complain. People v. Tilley,
406 II. 398.

It is next contended by the defendants that the crime
of obtaining money or property by means of the confidence
game is undefined and not provable with the certainty re-
quired of crimes by its nature. The contrary has been
repeatedly held ever since the enactment of the statute. No
more certain definition could be given than that method
of swindling called the confidence game. The means that
may be used are different and varied, but that fact no
more renders the statute uncertain than the different means
employed to gain entrance to a building make burglary
uncertain, or the various means by which death may be
caused render the crime of murder uncertain. People v.
Bertsche, 265 Ul. 272; Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 4683
Maxwell v, People, 158 Ill. 248.

340 es

The defendants contend that the crime charged against
them was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt and the
corpus delicti was not proved. The, confidence game has
been defined as any swindling operation in which advantage
is taken of the confidence reposed by the victim in the
swindler. (People v. Gair, 379 Ill. 458.) The fact that
the transaction was made to assume the form of a business
deal is not material, if in fact it was a swindling operation.
(Chilson v. People, 224 Ill. 5353 People v. Westrup, 372
Ill. 517.) However, there may be a swindling in a business
transaction without the person who is responsiblé for the
swindling being guilty of operating the confidence game.
Thus, where the confidence of the victim is honestly ob-
tained through a course of regular business dealings, the
confidence game statute is not violated. (People v. Schach-
ter, 361 Ill. 573.) The confidence game statute was de~
signed to reach a class of offenders known as “confidence
men” who practice swindling schemes as various as the
mind of man is suggestive. (People v. Martin, 372 Ill.
484.) The essence of the crime of obtaining property by
means of the confidence game is a trust reposed in the
swindler, and betrayed by him, as a means of obtaining the
victim’s property or money. The moving cause for the
victim’s parting with his money or property and giving it
to the accused must be the confidence reposed in the accused.
- (People v. Gallowich, 283 Ill. 360.) ‘There is no basis for
the defendant’s contention that there was a mere breach
of an ordinary business contract honestly entered into with
the parties under a dealing at arm’s length. The confidence
of the complaining witness was secured by the promise to
build them a home at a low cost for a low down payment,
furthered by the claim of ability to perform the contract
with the statements that they controlled the sources of
materials and could obtain them at a lower price than
their competitors, and by the use of employees of legitimate

aad

financial institutions to give the impression that these insti-
tutions were willing to support them. The intent to swindle
on the part of Brand was evidenced by his selling to the
complaining witness a purported credit with Morvay &
Company, which he obtained by paying the bills of two
of the officers of the company, and which he well knew
at the time of the sale he could not recover from the
corporation. The intent to swindle by the defendant Mor-
vay was further evidenced by his failure to obtain building
permits, or in any way attempt to carry out the terms of
his contract, and by the fact that he must have known from
the condition of his bank accounts, which were introduced
in evidence, that he did not have the financial ability to
carry out the terms of the contracts which he entered into
with the complaining witness.

We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of the
presence of the element of confidence and the betrayal of
that confidence to justify the jury bringing in a verdict of
guilty. When the evidence is clear and convincing, this
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.

It is urged by the defendants that the conduct of the
jury in rendering its verdict in less than two hours after
receiving its instructions in a case with as many exhibits
and as long a record as the instant case is an indication
that the jury did not consider all of the evidence after the
case was referred to it, and thus the defendants were
deprived of a trial by jury. There is no evidence in the
record that the jury or any of its members violated their
oaths as jurors, and in the absence of such evidence we
must assume that they acted according to law. They con-
tend that the form of the verdict which found the defend-
ants “guilty of confidence game in the manner and form
charged in the indictment” did not contain the essential
element of the crime, and argue further that inasmuch as
defendants were indicted under three counts, of which two

342 ee

were nolle prossed, the jury did not know on what count
it was finding the defendants guilty. There is no merit
to their contention in this regard. The rule is that in
determining the sufficiency of a judgment of conviction
the entire record will be searched, and all parts of the
record interpreted together, and a deficiency in one place
may be cured by what appears in another. (People v.
Woods, 393 ll. 586; People ex rel. Ewald v. Montgomery,
377 Ul. 241; People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill, 345 Il. 103.)
The test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury’s
intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
(People ex rel. Reed v. Williams, 334 Ill. 241.) The law
does not require specific repetition, and a verdict contain-
ing a reference to the allegations of an indictment is suffi-
cient. (People v. Norwitt, 394 Ill. 553; People v. Jensen,
392 Ill. 72.) Looking to the evidence and instructions by
which the issues were submitted to the jury, we must con-
clude that the jury was aware of the count upon which
it found defendants guilty and that its verdict was sufficient
to inform the court of its intention.

It is unnecessary for us to consider the contention that
the State’s Attorney’s closing argument was prejudicial and
replete with misstatement of law. No question as to the
propriety of his argument was raised in the motion for a
new trial. Points not set out in a motion for a new trial
are waived. People v. Vickers, 326 Il. 290.

The next contention of the defendants is that the pro-
ceedings were void because the criminal court of Cook
County functioned without judges who were designated
in accordance with section 26 of article VI of the constitu-
tion, and who had taken an oath to perform the duties of
said court. We were called upon to decide this identical
point in the case of People v. Lindsay, 412 Ill. 472, and
there held that the method of assigning judges of the crim-
inal court of Cook County pursuant to the rules of the court
was constitutional, and that it was unnecessary for a judge

es 34a

of the circuit court to take an additional oath as a judge
of the criminal court. The present contention necessitates
no further elaboration of that decision.

We have carefully considered the entire record in this
case, as well as the arguments of counsel and the authorities
cited by him, and we are of the opinion that the judgment
of the criminal court of Cook County should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 32605
Tue PEOPLE oF THE State or ILLinois, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. TRUMAN O’DEw1 Rocers, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

Cuartes E. Mason, and Sipwey H. Brock, both of
Waukegan, for plaintiff in error.

344 |

Latsam Casiis, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Rosert C. Nexson, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan, (Eu-
cene T. Day, Ricnarp Bairstow, Harry L. Pate, and
Frep G. Leacu, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr, Justicy Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

Truman O’Dell Rogers, hereinafter referred to as the
defendant, was indicted in the circuit court of Lake County,
on April 2, 1952, the first and third counts of which in-
dictment charged forcible rape, the second count charging
statutory rape. On the trial of this cause on June 10, 1952,
the jury by its verdict found the defendant not guilty
on counts I and III and guilty on count II, and fixed his
punishment at ten years in the penitentiary. A motion for
a new trial and arrest of judgment were overruled. Re-
sponding to a writ of error sted out of this court by the
defendant, the record is here for review.

Numerous issues of law and fact are presented, but in
light of our ultimate disposition of the case, it will only
be necessary to consider two issues of law. There will be
no necessity for a detailed factual account. The complain-
ing witness is a high school girl under the age of sixteen
years. She became acquainted only slightly with the de-
“fendant while he was working in a small hamburger stand.
She resided at 8842 West Grand Avenue, River Grove,
Cook County, Illinois. She was a student at Lyden Com-
munity High School. On December 11, 1951, at about
6:30 P.M., the defendant persuaded her to ride with him
in his automobile. She had planned and was enroute at
the time to attend a social function at the high school, but
the defendant failed to take her to the high school as he
had promised and persuaded her to go for a ride. The two
drove aimlessly about in the northwest part of Cook County
and the southwest part of Lake County for several hours.
The alleged rape occurred near the Dome Tavern. The
exact location of this tavern, near which the complaining

es 45

witness testified that the assault occurred, was a matter
of considerable uncertainty. Consequently, it was with
some difficulty that the State was able to properly establish
venue. This was accomplished, however, when a deputy
sheriff, Frank Valenta, testified without equivocation that
the Dome Tavern was situated in Lake County.

Early in the proceedings the defendant moved for his
discharge under section 18 of division XTII of the Criminal
Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 748.) ‘This
protective measure was enacted to implement section 9 of
article II of our constitution which guarantees every person
accused of crime a speedy and public trial. Pertinent pro-
visions of section 18 read as follows: “Any person com-
mitted for a criminal or supposed criminal offense, and
not admitted to bail, and not tried by the court having
jurisdiction of the offense, within four months of the date
of commitment, shall be set at liberty by the court, * * *.”
This court has repeatedly held that it is mandatory and
not discretionary that the State afford a defendant a trial
within the statutory period, that such statute confers upon
a defendant a substantial and absolute right under the con-
stitutional guarantee. The facts surrounding the prolonged
detention of Rogers in the instant case are not in dispute.
The alleged offense occurred on December 11, 1931. He
was arrested and committed to the Cook County jail on
December 12, 1951. Thereafter he was indicted by the
Cook County grand jury for statutory and forcible rape.
This indictment was nolle prossed on February 15, 1952.
On the same date, without being released, he was trans-
ferred to the sheriff of Lake County, where he remained
in custody until the date of his trial, June 10, 1952. He
was indicted by the March, 1952, Lake County grand jury
which was recalled in April.

The problem presented therefore is as follows: The
prosecuting authorities in Cook County proceeded upon the
theory that the complaining witness was assaulted in Cook

346 |

County. There was much confusion and uncertainty on
that question. Further investigation, however, revealed that
the alleged offense was committed in Lake County. After
this determination, the defendant was transferred to Lake
County and it was within four months of his commitment
to jail in Waukegan that he received a trial. It is contended
by the defendant that the four months’ period should be
computed from December 12, 1951, the date of his con-
finement in the jail in Cook County.

Similar in many respects to the case under consideration
is that of People v. Stillwagon, 373 Ill. 211. There the de-
fendant was involved in a holdup in Lake County on August
18, 1936. The proceeds of the robbery were transported
into Cook County, whereupon defendant was arrested,
and held in custody until November 18, 1936. Although
indicted by the Cook County grand jury for larceny, the
indictment was stricken with leave to reinstate on Novem-
ber 18, whereupon the defendant was surrendered to the
sheriff of Lake County who placed him in the jail of Lake
County where he remained until February 8, 1937. ‘The
defendant was tried on a charge of robbery. The criminal
court of Cook County had jurisdiction to try defendant on
the charge of larceny under the statute which provides that
where property is stolen in one county of the State and
carried into another, the jurisdiction shall be in any county
into or through which the property may have passed, ot
where it may be found. The defendant in that case con-
tended that the four months’ period should have started
from the first day of his confinement in the Cook County
jail, but the court holding adversely said, at page 214: “The
only court competent to try defendant for robbery was the
court having jurisdiction of the offense,—namely, the cir-
cuit court of Lake county. He had been neither indicted
nor held in custody in Cook county on the charge of rob-
bery. Since the one court having jurisdiction of the crime
of robbery tried defendant within four months of the date

ee at

of his commitment on this charge, it follows, necessarily,
that his right to a speedy trial was not invaded and his
motion for discharge properly denied.” In this case defend-
ant’s indictment in Cook County contained the same charges
as those appearing in the Lake County indictment, but it was
discovered that Cook County did not have jurisdiction be-
cause of the lack of venue. Cook County, in the Stillwagon
case, did not have jurisdiction of the robbery charge but
did have jurisdiction under a special statute of the larceny
offense, although the robbery out of which the larceny
stemmed occurred in Lake County. The uncontradicted
proof in the instant case demonstrates that the crime, if
any, was committed in Lake County. Therefore, the circuit
court of Lake County and not Cook County was the only
court that had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. Since
the trial occurred in that county within the statutory period,
the court properly ruled that the defendant was not entitled
to the relief sought under section 18,

At the close of the State’s case, defendant moved for
a directed verdict and among other deficiencies in the State’s
proof pointed out the failure to prove the defendant’s age.
The court permitted the prosecution to reopen the case and
to make such proof. Robert O’Halen, the chief of police
of River Grove, testified that when he arrested Rogers,
he told him he was 35 years of age. The court inquired if
that was all they had to offer on the age of the defendant,
and the State’s Attorney made an affirmative reply. It is
contended by the defendant that his age, a necessary ele-
ment of the corpus delicti, was not properly proved. It is
a fundamental proposition of law in American Criminal
Jurisprudence that the corpus delicti cannot be established
by an extrajudicial verbal confession or admission alone.
There is only one American case that holds to the contrary.
One of the leading cases in the United States, relied upon by
the defendant and cited approvingly in many foreign juris-
dictions, is Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 79. A copious

348 |

quote from that decision will delineate its applicability to
our problem: “Where a conviction of the crime of rape
without force is sought, to establish the corpus delicti, it
is necessary that the proof should show, first, that the
female was under the age of fourteen; second, that the
male was over the age of sixteen; third, that sexual inter-
course occurred between them. In this case the fact that
the female had not reached the age of fourteen was shown
by the evidence of her father. The fact that the sexual
intercourse took place was shown by the evidence of the
female herself and by the written confession of the male,
made shortly after his arrest. This confession contained also
a statement that he was forty-four years old, and his age
was not otherwise proven. It is elementary that the corpus
delicti cannot be proven by the confession of the defendant
alone. (May v. People, 92 Ill. 343; Williams v. People,
tor id. 382; Gore v. People, 162 id, 259.) Unless the de-
fendant was above the age of sixteen at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, there was no violation
of the statute. It was as essential to prove his age as it
was to establish the age of the female, or to show that
fornication occurred. Either of the three elements lacking,
the corpus delicti is not established.” The People suggest
that the defendant was present in court on the trial, and
that this together with the confession was sufficient to
justify the jury in finding him to be more than sixteen
years of age. In the People’s brief, it is argued that the
jury, having had an opportunity to see the defendant on
the witness stand, could safely conclude that he was more
than seventeen years of age. Answering this same argu-
ment in the Wistrand case, the court said: “While the ap-
pearance of the defendant might be conclusive evidence to
the jury, there would be some difficulty in having evidence
of that character preserved in the bill of exceptions for the
inspection of a court of review. “To allow a jury to make
up their verdict upon a disputed fact from their own indi-

349

vidual observation would be most dangerous and unjust.’
Seaverns v. Lischinski, 181 Ill. 358.”

That this rule of criminal procedure is general can be
ascertained in A.L.R., vol. 40, p. 461, also Greenleaf on
Evidence, vol. 1, sec. 217, also McClain on Criminal Law,
vol. 1, p. 379, sec. 397. Our predecessors on this court
have not deviated from such rule. People v. Davidson, 240
IL 191; People v. Claussen, 367 Ill. 430; People v. Will-
son, 401 Ill. 68-77; People v. Davis, 358 Ill. 617.

In this particular case, it may appear that undue im-
portance is being attached to a technical error. However,
we do not feel at liberty to disregard a rule of procedure
that is so deeply and uniformly fixed as the law in all
jurisdictions. The judgment entered herein must be re-
versed and the cause remanded for another trial.

Reversed and rémanded.

a
(No. 32657

Tux Propig ex rel. Margaret Gilbert, Appellant, vs. Joun
E. Bass, Sheriff, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

350

GorpsERc, Devoz, Brusseit, & SHADUR, of Chicago,
(Asrauam W. Brussett, Miron I. SHapur, and ABNER
J. Mixva, of counsel,) for appellant.

Latnam CastiE, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GuTKNECHT, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (JoHN
T. Gantacuer, Ruporpa L. Janeca, ArtHur F. Man-
NING, and James V. CunnincHam, all of Chicago, and
Epuraim Martin, of Cambridge, Mass., of counsel,) for
appellee.

Mr, Justice Daty delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal brought under section 2 of the Fugi-
tives From Justice Act, (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 60,
par. 2,) from the judgment of the criminal court of Cook
County remanding the appellant, Margaret Gilbert, to the
custody of the appellee, the sheriff of Cook County, for
delivery to an agent of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
On October 9, 1951, appellant was arrested under a
fugitive warrant issued by the municipal court of Chicago

es

on a complaint filed by a Chicago police officer at the instiga-
tion of Massachusetts authorities. She was granted a con-
tinuance and released on bond the same day and the cause
was set for trial on November 13, 1951. Before that time,
on November 8, 1951, Massachusetts authorities filed requi-
sition papers with the Governor of Illinois, The basis of
the requisition was a Massachusetts indictment returned
on September 1, 1951, charging that appellant and one
Martha H. Fletcher did, on January 1, 1947, and on divers
other days between that date and the presentment of the
indictment “conspire together and with Dirk J. Struik and
Harry E. Winner to advocate, advise, counsel and incite
the overthrow by force and violence of the government of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by speech, exhibition,
distribution and promulgation of certain written and printed
documents, papers and pictorial representations, against the
peace of said Commonwealth, and contrary to the form of
the statute in such case made and provided.”

Upon learning that demand had been made for her ex-
tradition, appellant, on November 13, 1951, requested a
hearing before the Governor of Illinois. The request was
granted and hearings were held on December 15, 1951,
and January 21, 1952, before a representative acting for
and in behalf of the Governor. One of the contentions
raised by appellant at these hearings was that the pendency
of the proceeding in the municipal court, which had been
continued from time to time on motion of both parties,
precluded action by the Governor on the extradition re-
quest. However, on March 20, 1952, the Governor issued
a rendition warrant directed against appellant.

In accordance with the provisions of the rendition war-
rant and section 2 of the Fugitives From Justice Act,
appellant was produced in open court and permitted to file
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is from the judg-
ment of the criminal court quashing her petition for writ
of habeas corpus and remanding her to the custody of the

352 ee

sheriff, that appellant has appealed to this court for review.
Throughout the period of the proceedings in the criminal
court, and up to the present’ time, the proceeding in the
municipal court has been continued.

Before looking to other errors assigned, we shall first
consider appellant’s contention that the Governor of Illinois
was without authority to issue a rendition warrant in this
cause during the pendency of the proceeding commenced
in the municipal court. There are two alternative methods
by which extradition proceedings may be commenced in
this State. It is admitted that they do not conflict and the
choice of method is optional in the demanding State. The
first method is by direct application to the Governor for
a writ of extradition, the procedure established by the con-
trolling Federal statute (18 USC, sec. 3182.) The second
method is by complaint, under oath, to any judge, justice
of the peace or police magistrate of this State, in the manner
prescribed by sections 3 and 4 of the Fugitives From Jus-
tice Act. (IIl. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 60, pars 3 and 4.)
Appellant sees the Illinois statute as an alternative means
of extradition designed to relieve the Governor of a heavy
administrative burden and to hold a fugitive prior to the
issuance of a rendition warrant, but takes the position
that once extradition proceedings have been commenced
before a judicial officer, the Governor is without power
to act upon a later and direct writ of extradition, unless
and until the proceedings before the court have been con-
cluded and a report delivered to the Governor as provided
in section 4.

It is our opinion that appellant has placed herself beyond
the position whiere she may raise the question. The record
shows that it was the appellant, and not the Governor of
Illinois or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who was
the moving party in obtaining a hearing on the writ filed
with the Governor and who, for the purpose of obtaining
such a hearing, first moved to continue the proceedings in

8

the municipal court. In so doing, appellant waived further
proceedings in the court, for, after the hearing before the
Governor was completed, there was no necessity, either in
law or fact, to complete the court proceeding. We believe
such a result occurs notwithstanding the fact that appellant
questioned the propriety of the executive to proceed while
the court action was pending. Since appellant requested the
hearing before the Governor, she was hardly in a position
to complain of it at the same time. Some suggestion is
made by appellant that different matters could have been
presented in the municipal court than were presented to
the Governor. Just what those matters were is left to
speculation. Moreover, appellant states in her argument
that there is no dispute in the facts of this case, that the
facts were stipulated and that the issues are solely ques-
tions of law. Of necessity, the legal questions could not
arise until the habeas corpus proceeding. By either method
of procedure, the ultimate responsibility of determining
whether one is a fugitive rests with the Governor issuing
the fugitive warrant, and it has been held (People ex rel.
Guidotti v. Bell, 372 Ill. 572,) that the authority of the
executive is restricted to questions of fact. We fail to
perceive where the Governor’s act of determining the facts
by direct hearing, rather than from a report of a judicial
officer, can be said to work any substantial injustice on the
appellant.

It is next contended that the ruling of the trial court
was erroneous for reason that the indictment upon which
the Governor’s extradition warrant was issued violated the
fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution
and therefore could not charge appellant with an offense
punishable by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Spe-
cifically, it is urged that the indictment invades her funda-
mental right of freedom of speech, which is protected by
the fourteenth amendment. The trial court declined to pass
upon the constitutional sufficiency of the indictment, hold-

Le

354 re

ing that such a determination rests with the courts of
Massachusetts. Appellant insists that the stipremacy clause
of the Federal constitution (article VI, clause 2) makes
it incumbent upon courts of the asylum State in extradi-
tion proceedings to examine the validity of the indictment,
or its underlying statute, under the Federal constitution,
before they can permit extradition to the demanding State.

The contention made raises the question of how far
courts of an asylum State may or must go in their inquiry
into the validity of extradition proceedings. The scheme of
interstate rendition of persons accused of a crime is estab-
lished by the constitution of the United States and by the
statutes enacted by Congress to implement the constitution.
The constitutional provision, which is found in article IV,
section 2, clause 2, is as follows: “A Person charged in
any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.” Of this clause,
one court has said that it is a procedural provision which
does not impinge on any substantive right of any indi-
vidual and does not affect any provision of the constitu-
tion or its amendments protecting such rights. (Johnson
v. Matthews, 182 Fed. 2d 677.) Judicial decisions which
have considered the extradition scheme establish that be-
fore the executive of the asylum State should comply with
the demand, he must determine, first, that the person de-
manded is substantially charged with a crime against the
laws of the State from whose justice he is alleged to have
fled, by an indictment or affidavit certified as authentic
by the Governor of the demanding State, and, second, that
the person demanded is a fugitive from the justice of that
State. (Roberis v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L.ed. 5443
People ex rel. Kahn v. Meyering, 348 Ill. 486.) Though
the extradition agreement of the constitution makes no

ee 355

provision for judicial review, habeas corpus has historically
been the process available for testing the validity of the
arrest and detention by authorities of the asylum State for
extradition purposes. The scope of the extradition inquiry
and the issues which are presented by it have been resolved
by many decisions of the Supreme Court of this nation
and, in essence, the established rule is that the court may
determine whether a crime has been established in the
demanding State, whether the fugitive in custody is the
person so charged, and whether the fugitive was in the
demanding State at the time the alleged’ crime was com-
mitted. (See: Johnson v. Matthews, 182 Fed. 2d 677,
p. 679 and cases there cited.) The Johnson case also gives
expression to the rule that the habeas corpus proceeding
tests only the arrest and detention by authorities of the
asylum State and does not test the validity of the original
or contemplated incarceration in the demanding State.

In Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 59 L. ed. 302, the court
had this to say about the scope of the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding: “In extradition proceedings, even when, as here,
a humane opportunity is afforded to test them upon habeas
corpus, the purpose of the writ is not to substitute the
judgment of another tribunal upon the facts or the law of
the matter to be tried. The Constitution says nothing about
habeas corpus in this connection, but peremptorily requires
that upon proper demand the person charged shall be deliv-
ered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of
the crime. * * * There is no discretion allowed, no
inquiry into motives. * * * The technical sufficiency
of the indictment is not open.”

In face of these established limitations which have been
placed upon judicial inquiry into the validity of, extradi-
tion proceedings, appellant contends ,that it is incumbent
upon courts of the asylum State, by virtue of the supremacy
clause of the Federal constitution, to hear and determine
the constitutional validity of the indictment returned in the

356 ee

demanding State. We have found no case presenting or
determining the exact contention made, but we are not
without Federal precedent for decision on the principle
involved. In two recent cases, Sweeney v. Woodall, 344
ULS. 93, 97 L.ed. (Adv. Sheet p. 86) and Johnson v.
Matthews, 182 Fed. 2d 677, (certiorari denied 340 U.S.
828,) there was presented the question of whether it was
proper, in habeas corpus testing the validity of extradition
proceedings, to hear and determine the constitutional validity
of phases of the penal action by the demanding State in
respect to the fugitive. In each case the fugitive sought to
avoid extradition by asserting that because of alleged cruel
and inhuman treatment by penal authorities, his past and
any future confinement by the demanding State was in
violation of the fundamental rights secured to him by the
Federal constitution. Thus, in those cases, as in the present,
the fugitives sought to use the judicial review of extradi-
tion proceedings as a vehicle to obtain a hearing on claims
that the State’s action was an invasion of the personal
rights and liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment.

In the Sweeney case, the Supreme Court stated that
the constitutional scheme of extradition and considerations
fundamental to our Federal system require that the prisoner
test the claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment in the
courts of the demanding State, and held that the Court of
Appeals had erred in holding that the applicant for habeas
corpus was entitled to a hearing in the asylum State on
the merits of his constitutional claims.

The same result was reached in the Johnson case where
the court, after stating that the matter was not merely
one of forum non conveniens, held that the hearing on the
merits of the constitutional claim made should properly be
held in the demanding State. It appears that this result,
too, was prompted by “considerations fundamental to our
federal system” for the opinion states, at page 680: “To
say that the federal courts may interpose in this process

es

their judgment of the internal processes of the states and
the fidelity of their officials to their duties, is to nullify
the agreement embedded in the Constitution and to re-
establish the rule of the law of nations which it was in-
tended to disestablish. The federal courts have no power
to nullify a provision of the Constitution. Of course,
appellant has a right to test in a federal court the consti-
tutional validity of his treatment by Georgia authorities.
But that test cannot come as a part of the constitutional
process of returning a fugitive to the state where he is
charged. If this fugitive’s constitutional rights are being
violated in Georgia, he can and should protect them in
Georgia. Not only state courts but a complete system of
federal courts are there.”

From these decisions limiting the scope of the judicial
inquiry into extradition proceedings, we believe it emerges
clearly that this court may not properly, even under the
supremacy clatise, nullify the extradition agreement con-
tained in the constitution by interposing our judgment on
the merits of the constitutional attack made by appellant
on the processes of Massachusetts. As previously noted,
it is said that the extradition clause is a procedural provi-
sion which does not conflict with or affect any provision
of the constitution or its amendments protecting the rights
of individuals. The applicable decisions of the Federal
courts, by which we are bound, show no tendency to extend
the judicial inquiry into the extradition process beyond
that concept. We shall not presume to exercise any au-
thority over the courts or officials of Massachusetts by
holding to the contrary. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court in this cause properly refused to hear and determine
the constitutional objections to the indictment returned by
Massachusetts authorities.

The remaining error assigned by appellant is that the
indictment is so vague and indefinite as to fail to substan-
tially charge her with a crime. Appellant does not complain

258 ES

of technical matters as to form but of the substance of the
indictment, contending that the common-law crime of con-
spiracy upon which the indictment is based is too nebulous
and vague a concept by which to punish the constitutionally
protected conduct of free speech, or to inform appellant
wherein her conduct was criminal.

Here, again, appellant seeks to raise matters which can-
not be tested in the constitutional process of returning a
fugitive to the State where he is charged. It is within the
power of each State, except as limited by the constitution
of the United States, to declare what shall be offenses
against her laws, and the words of the extradition clause
are sufficiently comprehensive to include every offense
against the law of the demanding State. In addition, each
State has the right to establish the forms of pleading and
process to be observed in her own courts in both civil and
criminal cases. It is, therefore, according to the laws of
the State whose laws are alleged to be violated, that the
indictment must be construed, and not by technical rules
of criminal pleading at common law or by the statutes of
the State in which the person demanded is found. (Ex parte
Reggel, 114 U.S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250; People ex rel. Kahn
v. Meyering, 348 Ill. 486.) If the indictment is in substan-
tial conformity with the law of the demanding State, its
sufficiency as a matter of technical pleading cannot be in-
quired into on habeas corpus. (Pearce v. Texas, 155 U.S.
311, 39 L. ed. 164.) The reason for such a rule is succinctly
stated in Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 52 L.ed. 1113,
as follows: “* * * the indictment, in order to constitute
a sufficient charge of a crime to warrant interstate extra-
dition, need show no more than that the accused was sub-
stantially charged with crime. * * * If more were
required it would impose upon courts, in the trial of writs
of habeas corpus, the duty of a critical examination of the
laws of states with whose jurisprudence and criminal pro-

Ss

cedure they can have only a general acquaintance. Such
a duty would be an intolerable burden, certain to lead to
errors in decision, irritable to the just pride of the states,
and fruitful of miscarriage of justice. The duty ought not
to be assumed unless it is plainly required by the Con-
stitution; * * *”

The indictment here charges that appellant “did con-
spire together and with * * * to advocate, advise,
counsel and incite the overthrow by force and violence of
the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
by speech, exhibition, distribution and promulgation of
certain written and printed documents, papers and pictorial
representations, against the peace of said Commonwealth,
and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made
and provided.” It is admitted that the reference to a stat-
ute is erroneous surplusage but appellant stated to the court
below that she did not base her attack on that error of
form. Looking to the record in light of the remaining
language of the indictment, we find that it is established
without question that by operation of the Massachusetts
constitution, (Part the Second, Article VI,) the general
iules of common law making conspiracy an indictable
offense are presently in force in that jurisdiction, (See:
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. Rpts., Mass. 111.) Also,
portions of the Massachusetts “Simplification of Criminal
Pleadings Act” (chapter 277, secs. 17 and 79,) given in
evidence, demonstrate that the indictment complies with
the established form of pleading. Appellant does not deny
the charge against her and does not deny that she is the
fugitive charged or her presence in Massachusetts on the
date of the crime. Without more, we must conclude that
the indictment is in substantial conformity with the laws
of Massachusetts, which is all that we may determine in
this habeas corpus proceeding. Its sufficiency to substan-
tially charge a crime as a matter of technical pleading is

ee

for the courts of Massachusetts to decide under Massa-
chusetts law, and, in so doing, it is to be presumed that
the constitutional considerations urged upon us by appel-
lant will not go unheeded.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County
is affirmed, Judgment affirmed.

(No. 32578.
Evetyn Freymarx et al., Appellants, vs. Orto F. HanpDKE
et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

361

Epwarp H. Enricu't, and Herman Herson, both of
Chicago, for appellants,

Joun P. Derwine, and Orro M. Hamer, both of Chi-
cago, (Cartes D, SNEWIND, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. Justice Maxwett, delivered the opinion of the
court: :

‘This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court
of Cook County wherein plaintiffs’ complaint seeking cer-
tain equitable relief was dismissed. Plaintiffs and defendant
Otto F. Handke are the surviving children of the decedent,
Dr. Otto K. Handke. Dr. Handke died June 7, 1943, at
the age of 78. All the sisters have joined as plaintiffs in
a suit seeking to set aside a certain deed, three notes and
two trust deeds; other relief requested was for discovery,
accounting and partition of other real estate.

362 ee

Three parcels of real estate are involved herein: Parcel
No. 1, located in River Forest, is a brick residence built
by the doctor in 1923; at the time of his death this parcel
was encumbered by an $8,500 mortgage and also a junior
mortgage for $3,500 made by the doctor April 1, 1943,
and delivered to his son; a probate court sale in 1947
brought $24,000 for this parcel. Parcel No. 2, located in
Forest Park, consisted of a two-story brick building and
a one-story building; the doctor purchased this parcel for
$5,000 in 1898; it had two stores, and an apartment which
was occupied by him as his office and residence until 1924;
he encumbered this parcel with a $25,000 mortgage in
1927, which was regularly reduced to $15,520 in April
1942; March 8, 1943, the doctor conveyed it to his son
and wife. Parcel No. 3, located in River Forest also, was
purchased by the doctor and his son in 1924; as tenants
in common they improved it with a filling station and store
buildings; on an original price of $30,000 the down pay-
ment was $12,500 in cash and it was mortgaged for the
balance of $17,500. The parties stipulated that as to this
last parcel one half was owned by plaintiffs and the other
half was owned by their brother and his wife, the defend-
ants. A $5,500 junior mortgage on parcel No. 3 was can-
celled in 1946 when the son and his wife completed pay-
ment to a certain bondholder on parcel No. 2.

Plaintiffs alleged that their father was in ill-health, suf-
fering from senility and infirmity due to advanced age,
arteriosclerosis and uremic poisoning, and was unable to
comprehend or transact business matters for a period of
a year prior to his death, and that during this time his son
took care of all his business. The son is charged with mak-
ing misrepresentations to the father while a confidential
relationship existed and while he was acting in a fiduciary
capacity. It is charged that he thereby acquired title to
parcel No, 2 without consideration, and also obtained with-
out consideration a note made by the son to the father,

363

having a balance due in the amount of $3,200.91, and it
is further charged that the father also executed and de-
livered a note and mortgage on parcel No. 1 for $3,500 to
his son. The amended answer denied the charges of the
father’s incompetency, the existence of a fiduciary relation,
fraud and undue influence. Defendants, further answering,
alleged good and sufficient consideration for all the tran-
sactions involved and charged plaintiffs with laches.

The decree, in confirming the master’s report, found
that neither fraud, breach of fiduciary relationship nor
incompetency of the deceased was established; that the
conveyance of parcel No, 2 was supported by good and
valuable consideration that also benefited plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs knowingly stood by for six years and permitted
defendants to expend large sums of money in improvements
on this parcel. As to the points in issue the complaint was
dismissed for want of equity. Plaintiffs now urge in this
court that the lower court’s decree is based on erroneous
conclusions as to the law involved and upon erroneous fac-
tual findings. Appellants, Evelyn Freymark, Edna Ketel-
hut, Alfreda Bolduan, and Irene Hansen are herein re-
ferred to as plaintiffs, and appellees, Otto F. Handke and
Catherine S. Handke, as defendants.

Plaintiffs attempt to create a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the father and son based on the fact that at one time
there existed an oral partnership arrangement between them
respecting parcel No. 3. The evidence clearly revealed that
this arrangement was terminated by a written dissolution
of partnership. Nor is the blood relationship of any con-
sequence as to this issue. A fiduciary relationship between
parent and child does not exist as a matter of law, but must
be established by evidence. (O’Malley v. Deany, 384 Ill.
484.) It is apparent that the aged father here was not
under the domination of his son; in fact he lived with one
of the plaintiffs for five years preceding his death. He also
consulted with other persons concerning the transactions

364 eS

concerning parcel No. 2 shortly before his death. Plain-
tiffs insist that the collection of certain rents by the son
created a principal-and-agent relationship and this in law
made him a fiduciary. This conclusion is not based on the
evidence in this case. It is also claimed that by original
answer defendants admitted fiduciary relationship. The
amended answer denied existence of unlimited confidence
and denied that the legal concept, fiduciary relationship,
existed, It is fundamental that the filing of an amended
pleading operates as an abandonment of the original plead-
ing it supersedes. (Board of Education v. City of Chicago,
402 Ill, 2gz.) It is also noteworthy that a reading of the
original answer does not admit of the conclusion plaintiffs
attach to it and therefore the original verified answer does
not amount to an admission within the rule announced in
Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 265 Ill. 48. It became incumbent on
plaintiffs to prove the existence of the alleged fiduciary re-
lationship by clear and convincing evidence. (IdcGlaughlin
y.Pickerel, 381 Ill. 574.) ‘This plaintiffs have failed to do.

Certain charges of fraud are made concerning the son’s
conduct in obtaining the transfer of parcel No. 2 to him-
self and his wife. A review of the facts as disclosed by
the record in this case reveals quite the contrary. Not
only was the father fully informed as to the transaction
and its details, but plaintiffs were given the same informa~
tion and they not only assented but believed it was a benefit
to all of them, At the time of the transfer, there existed
reasonable and good grounds for believing there was no
equity in this parcel over and above the mortagage debt.
In fact, competent appraisal and good-faith efforts to sell
indicated its value was considerably less. Appraisals of
$8,000 and $10,000 and futile attempts to sell for $10,000
in 1942 and 1943, the deteriorated condition of the build-
ing, several vacancies of business premises in the neigh-
borhood, low rental income of the property, and the pos-
sibility of a foreclosure suit and deficiency ‘decree, were all

Ss 8 =

factors testified to and well known to all the plaintiffs and
their father. Any charges of fraud or undue influence have
collapsed by virtue of the evidence of full and fair dis-
closure. It therefore follows that even had there existed
a fiduciary relationship between the father and son, the
fact that the transfer did not proceed from fraud or undue
influence and was in fact a voluntary and fair transaction
will prevent an attempt to set it aside. Stone v. Stone,
407 Ill. 66.

The strongest testimony of plaintiffs in respect to the
father’s alleged mental incompetency was that of Dr.
Cooper, a physician who first treated the father in April,
1942, in the hospital. Decedent there had a prostatic re-
section, and after leaving the hospital Dr. Cooper stated
he saw him twice a week and decedent was suffering
from azotemia hypertension and generalized arteriosclerosis
which affected his brain. After giving a detailed descrip-
tion of his observations, this witness stated that in his
opinion the decedent was of unsound mind from April 30,
1943, until his death. The deed in question, however, was
executed March 8, 1943. Another doctor, testifying for
defendants, stated decedent not only was of sound mind
during this périod but exceptionally alert for one of his
age. Lay witnesses on each side testified pro and con on
this issue of incompetency. Where a master saw and heard
witnesses testify, his findings are entitled to great weight
in determining the credit to be given the testimony, and
such findings, when approved by the chancellor, will not
be disturbed unless manifestly against the weight of the
evidence. (Bydalek v. Bydalek, 396 Ill. 63; Brubaker v.
Hatjimanolis, 404 Ill. 342.) In addition to the presump-
tion of competency of the grantor, it appears that in this
case he was familiar with the transaction, including its
details, and understood its nature, character and extent.
His physical disabilities and infirmities were merely coinci-
dent with his advanced age.

366 De

We are of the opinion that the lower court was correct
in finding good and sufficient consideration passed to the
grantor. Taking parcel No. 2 at $10,000, (a value agreed
upon by the parties in a proposed prior transaction,) the
giving of the $3200.91 note to the son and also the execu-
tion and delivery of the $3500 note and mortgage on parcel
No. 1 to the son are readily understandable, since the son
and his wife assumed an indebtedness of $15,520 and, in
addition, expended other money in the refinancing. It was
admitted and stipulated by the parties that the actual in-
debtedness, plus interest and cost of securing a release was
in excess of $17,000. Decedent’s daughter Evelyn Frey-
mark is also executrix of his estate. In the inventory filed
October 28, 1943, in said estate she failed to include parcel
No. 2. The inventory also refers to the $3200.91 note,
stating it had come “into the possession of the maker who
claims it was paid during the lifetime of the decedent. The
amount that can be realized thereon is doubtful.” Plaintiffs
have stood by for six years, allowed defendants to expend
more than $13,000 in improvements and have made no
offer of reimbursement. Now that the property has been
improved, enhanced in value and yields a much greater
rental income, plaintiffs beseech equity for relief. It is
idle to contend here that plaintiffs had no knowledge of
the conveyance of parcel No. 2 six years before filing suit.
We cannot agree with plaintiffs’ contention that the doc-
trine of laches has no application here. The exact number
of years which have elapsed is not the controlling element.
Laches depends on whether, under all the circumstances
of the particular case, plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to institute proceedings before he
did. It has been defined to be such a neglect or omission
to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
of more or less duration, and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in
a court of equity, Where there is such a change in the rela-

367

tions of the parties or such a change in the subject matter
of the suit as to render it inequitable to grant relief, it
will be refused without reference to the statutory period
of limitation. (McKey v. McKean, 384 Ill. 112, 126.)
We believe the defense of laches was properly established
here by the defendants under the principles announced in
the McKey case. In the latter case, the period of time in-
volved was only four years.

From a careful examination of the record, it is our
opinion that the lower court was correct in its decree of
dismissal as to the controverted issues hereinabove dis-
cussed, We are also of the opinion that the master’s fees
in this case were reasonable, in view of the large record,
time required and the issues involved.

The decree of the superior court of Cook County is
affirmed. Decree affirmed.

a
(No. 3255
Union Aszrstos aND Rusper Company, Plaintiff in Er-
ror, vs. Tax InpustRiaL, Commission et al—(HEnen
Rusurorp e¢ al., Defendants in Error.)

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

os

Ancrerstein & AncrErstEIN, of Chicago, for plaintiff
in error.

Artur O, Kani, of Chicago, (Hrnry L. Kann, of
counsel,) for defendants in error,

Mr. Justice Datry delivered the opinion of the court:

We have granted a writ of error in this cause to review
a judgment of the superior court of Cook County affirming
a decision of the Industrial Commission awarding to the
widow and minor child of Harold Rushford, deceased, the
death benefits provided for in sections 7(a) and 7(h) of
the Occupational Diseases Act. Ill, Rev. Stat. 1949, chap.
48, pars. 172.7(a) and 172.7(h).

The facts show that on July 18, 1947, Harold Rushford
filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Indus-
trial Commission in which he alleged disablement from
asbestosis on May 2, 1947, the date of last exposure. On
this claim the commission ultimately found that Rushford
had become permanently disabled from asbestosis on May
2, 1947, and awarded him compensation of $18 pet week
for a period of 26624 weeks and thereafter an annual pen-
sion of $384 for life. The employer instituted certiorari
proceedings in the superior court to review the decision of
the commission, and while that proceeding was pending
the claimant died on January 2, 1950. The employer there-
upon suggested the death to the court and filed a motion
to set aside the commission’s award contending that claim-
ant’s right to compensation abated at his death; that the
right decedent had had to compensation was entirely sepa-
tate and distinct from the right of his dependents; that

EE

upon his death a separate and distinct right to the full
amount of death benefits would have vested in his depend-
ents subject to the conditions and limitations of section 24
of the Occupational Diseases Act; (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
chap. 48, par. 172.24,) and, that death having occurred on
January 2, 1950, no compensation having been paid to the
deceased, no right of compensation vested in the dependents.

The claimant’s wife, Helen Rushford, individually and
as the administratrix of his estate, likewise suggested his
death and filed a petition to substitute the administratrix
in lieu of Harold Rushford, in the proceedings brought by
him, for the purpose of enforcing his rights under the act.
The employer resisted the motion, contending that the right
which decedent had to compensation in his lifetime abated
and terminated with his death and that the court was with-
out authority under the act to substitute the administratrix
and without jurisdiction to award the compensation to her,
and that no right had vested in or accrued to the dependents
to maintain a claim for death benefits because the condi-
tions of section 24 had not been met. The court, however,
entered an order substituting the administratrix and finding
and ordering that compensation for 139 weeks was due and
payable to the administratrix, being the period from the
date of disablement to the date of death, and that as to
payments of compensation stibsequent thereto the award
was abated. No adjudication was made as to the depend-
ents’ rights to death benefits. .

Following this, the employer filed a petition for writ
of error in this court to review the judgment of the superior
court, seeking thereby to set aside the award of the com-
mission in its entirety on the grounds that Rushford’s right
to compensation abated and terminated at his death; that
the court was without authority to substitute the admin-
istratrix in his stead; and that the finding that Rushford’s
disablement was due to an occupational disease was con-
trary to the manifest weight of the evidence. ‘This cotirt

7

0 es

denied the petition on September 18, 1950, and three days
later the employer paid the administratrix the 139 weeks’
compensation, plus interest and certain costs, as ordered by
the superior court.

On September 22, 1950, under the provisions of sec-
tions 7, 8(g) and 24 of the Occupational Diseases Act,
(Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 48, pars. 172.7, 172.8(g) and
172.24,) the widow and minor child filed their application
for adjustment of claim with the commission to recover
death benefits. The employer filed a special and limited
appearance accompanied by a motion to dismiss the applica-
tion for want of jurisdiction in the commission, contending
that the dependents had no right to death benefits because
no compensation had been paid to the employee in his life-
time and because his death had occurred more than one
year after the date of disablement. After a hearing, the
arbitrator found that Harold Rushford had become perma-

* nently disabled from an occupational disease on May 2,
1947, and that he died therefrom on January 2, 1950; that
compensation had been paid during that period; and
awarded the dependents benefits of $18 a week for 157
weeks and one week at $12 under sections 7(a) and 7(h).
On review, the commission entered a decision which, in
effect, affirmed the arbitrator, but made a finding that the
previous compensation had been paid to the administratrix
of the employee’s estate. On certiorari, the superior court
affirmed the decision of the commission and it is from the
latter judgment that this writ of error is prosecuted.

We must first consider the employer’s contention that
it is necessary and proper in this review to reconsider and
determine the issues which were raised in the writ of error
taken from the first judgment of the superior court, which
writ of error this court denied. In other words, the em-
ployer contends again in this proceeding by the dependents
for death benefits, that Rushford’s right to compensation
abated and terminated with his death and that the superior

EE

court had no authority to substitute the adminisratrix in
the claimant’s stead. It is urged that our denial of the first
petition is not res judicata on the merits of issues raised
and that since the record of the proceeding by the dependents
brings before us the entire record of the original proceed-
ing, both records are now subject to review. No authority
holding that a denial of writ of error is, or is not, res
judicata on the merits of the case has been found, but
counsel for the employer seeks to draw an analogy from
the oft expressed statement of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 67 L. ed.
361, that a denial of a writ of certiorari by the court im-
ports no expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
We think the analogy is well taken, but, while the denial
of an appeal court to review imports no expression of
opinion, we believe it is also true, and find no authority
to the contrary, that the denial makes the judgment of
the lower court the final and binding adjudication of the
issues between the parties. If no review is sought at all,
the judgment of the nisi prius court stands as final and res
judicata on the merits; if review is sought and denied, it
follows logically that the judgment of the lower court
assumes the same proportions.

In again seeking review of the issues raised in the first
petition for writ of error, the employer relies greatly upon
the decision of American Manganese Steel Co. v. Indus-
trial Com. 399 Ill. 272. We find, however, that there are
distinguishing features which render it uncontrolling in
this proceeding. In that case, the first order of the superior
court on certiorari remanded the cause to the commission
with directions to ascertain the extent of disability and to
fix the award. The employer in that case then filed a peti-
tion for writ of error to this court and it was denied. The
cause returned to the commission and a new decision was
entered conforming to the order of the superior court.
Certiorari was then taken to the circuit court and that court

es

affirmed the new decision of the commission. The em-
ployer then filed a second petition for writ of error in this
court and the employee filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that because the first writ of error was not allowed it was
res judicata on the merits of the case. In denying the
motion to dismiss, this court said (p. 274): “The decision
made by the commission in this case was not its decision
but the decision of the superior court, and such decision
was not a final order, (emphasis supplied) because the
cause was remanded back to the Industrial Commission to
carry out the decision. Under stuch circumstances we have
held that the decision of the court confirming the order of
the commission, made under directions of the court under
a former certiorari proceeding, is reviewable by this court.
* %* * There is nothing in this proceeding which bars
the plaintiff in error from having the rulings of the superior
and circuit courts in this case reviewed.” ‘The same pro-
cedural circumstances are not present in the instant case,
for here the first writ of error sought review of a final
order which became binding on the parties and left nothing
further to be done but the payment of the compensation
when the petition was denied.

We must conclude, therefore, that our denial of the first
petition for writ of error had the effect of leaving the
judgment stand as it was entered by the trial court. It is
therefore res judicata on the merits of the proceeding and
the employer may not again relitigate its claims that the
employee’s right to compensation abated at his death and
that the superior court was without authority to substitute
the administratrix. Insofar as those questions are concerned,
we must hold that the conditions precedent to the right of
the dependents to maintain a claim for death benefits have
been established.

This brings us to the remaining question which is raised
in this proceeding. Section 24 of the Occupational Diseases
Act, which pertains to notice of disablement and limitation

Ee

of commencement of proceedings, contains the following
provisions: “* * * provided, no proceedings for com-
pensation under this Act shall be maintained unless claim
for compensation has been made within six (6) months
after the occurrence of the disablement from the occupa-
tional disease; provided further, that in any case, unless
application for compensation is filed with the Industrial
Commission within one (1) year after the date of the dis-
ablement, where no compensation has been paid, or within
one (1) year after the date of the last payment of com-
pensation, where any has been paid, the right to file such
application shall be barred: Provided, further, that if the
occupational disease results in death within said year, ap-
plication for compensation for death may be filed with the
Industrial Commission within one year after the date of
death, but not thereafter.” Looking to the provisions of
this section, the employer contends that no right to death
benefits vested in the dependents and that the commission
was without jurisdiction to hear their claim because the
employee died more than one year after the date of dis-
ablement and because no compensation had been paid to
him during his lifetime.

In making this contention, the employer argues that all
provisions in the act for payment of compensation are for
payment to the employee himself and infers that payment
to the administratrix does not satisfy the condition. Refer-
ence to the language of section 24 refutes the narrow con-
struction advanced, for the language which establishes the
period of limitation is that the right to file the application
is barred unless it is filed “within one (1) year after the
date of the disablement, where no compensation has been
paid, or within one (1) year after the date of the last pay-
ment of compensation, where any has been paid.” The
statute does not specifically provide that the payment of
compensation must have been made to the employee but
refers only to the element of time of payment.

ee

Respondents point out that the employee filed his claim
within the period fixed by the act, that the employer’s
liability for compensation was determined by the commis-
sion during the claimant’s lifetime, and contend that when
the award was judicially confirmed after his death and
payment thereof made to his administratrix, it was pay-
ment of compensation which was due to him in his life-
time, and was payment within the meaning of section 24.
While we have found no comparable decisions, we believe
that such an interpretation of the statute must follow under
the facts of this case. A reviewing court’s adjudication that
an employer is liable for periodic payments of compensa~
tion to an employee and an affirmation of the award is,
in effect, a finding and judgment that compensation became
due and payable on the date fixed by the commission. The
judgment of the reviewing court does not reinvest the
claimant with new rights of compensation nor does it ex-
tend or lessen the period of liability fixed by the commis-
sion, unless that question is expressly an issue, but, rather,
relates back to the rights and liabilities decided by the com-
mission. In the present case, the payment made to the
administratrix was but a payment of the weekly sums
which were due the employee in his lifetime and which
would have been paid right up to the week before his death,
had not payment been postponed by the proceedings for
judicial review. Payment to the administratrix under such
circumstances must be held to be payment of compensation
within the meaning of section 24. ‘To indulge in the con-
struction urged by the employer ignores the humanitarian
purpose and spirit of the act and imputes to the legislature

"an intent to bar the claim of dependents before that claim
arose or could be prosecuted when, in a case such as this,
payments due the employee in his lifetime, have been
avoided by prolongation of the litigation to a point beyond
his death. We cannot say that an employer need only
litigate and delay payment of compensation due a legiti-

Se

mately disabled individual to a point beyond his death
from the disablement and thereby defeat both his right to
compensation and that of his dependents to death benefits.
Parties are, of course, entitled to review but the process
is neither designed nor intended to work to the advantage
or disadvantage of litigants,

The facts here show that the claim of respondents was
filed within a few days after the payment of compensation
to the administratrix and within one year after the em-
ployee’s death. We conclude, therefore, for the reasons
stated, that a right to death benefits had vested in the
dependents and that the commission had jurisdiction to
entertain their claim. There being no other objections, the
judgment of the superior court of Cook County will be

affirmed, Judgment affirmed.

[|
(Nos. 32543, 32544

Tue PEorie oF THE State oF In1iNors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. VERNoN McGowan, Plaintiff in Error.—Same
Defendant in Error, vs. THomas McGowan, Plaintiff
in Error. .

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

Frank J. Feriic, Josepx D. Gannon, and Eucens
Woon, all of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error.

Sr at7

Ivan A. Exxiorr, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun S. Boyte, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Joun T.
GaLLacuEr, Ruponps L. Jangca, ARTHUR F. Manwinc,
Wiutam J. McGanu, Jr, and Eucene F. Werrer, all of
Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr, Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

Upon separate informations filed in the municipal court
of Chicago, plaintiffs in error, Vernon McGowan and
Thomas McGowan, were tried and convicted by the court,
after waiving a jury, for knowingly possessing “policy slips”
in violation of section 3 of the act to prevent policy-playing.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 414.) Each was sen-
tenced to a term of thirty days in the house of correction
and each has sued out a writ of error from this court.
Since identical issues are presented the causes have been
consolidated for purposes of opinion.

Although the crime for which plaintiffs in error were
charged and convicted is a misdemeanor, reviewable in the
first instance by writs of error sued out of the Appellate
Court, (IIL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 78014,) they
seek to have the cause reviewed in this court on the ground
that they were illegally arrested and searched in violation
of section 6 of article II of the Illinois constitution and
the fourth amendment to the Federal constitution. Since a
sufficient number of my colleagues construe the contention
as involving a fairly debatable constitutional question which
was passed upon by the trial court, we have taken jurisdic-
tion over the contention of the People that the cause should
be transferred to the Appellate Court.

The record discloses that Chicago police officers, pro-
ceeding in the course of their duties, observed Vernon
McGowan park his automobile near a building at 2944
Vernon Avenue, after which he entered the building by
the rear basement door. Shortly thereafter three men, -
Thomas McGowan, Kermit Dowkins, and Washington

378 |

Taylor, emerged from the same door carrying four bulging
canvas zippered bags of the same type. Two of the bags
were carried by Dowkins and were open at the top dis-
closing to the view of the officers that they contained policy
slips. All three men were arrested on the spot and the
canvas bags taken from them and those carried by Taylor
and Thomas McGowan were likewise found to contain
policy slips. While two officers kept the three men in cus-
tody, officers Allman and Flynn went to the basement door *
and knocked. They received no answer and Allman then
went to the first-floor front door and told the landlady
that he wanted to see Vernon McGowan, who was in the
basement. She led him through her apartment to the kitchen
door and told him to go outside to the basement door,
then she went to the basement by an inside stairs, opened
the basement door and admitted the officers. The front
part of the basement was partitioned off and the door
leading to that space was locked from the inside. Allman
then started up the inside staircase and encountered Vernon
McGowan on a landing where he was peeking out a window.
He brought McGowan to the partitioned space and asked
him to tell the persons inside to open the door. McGowan
replied: “You are a policeman, smash it in,” following
which the officers took the pins from the hinges and re-
moved the entire door. They found four men in the room,
two of whom had ink smeared on their hands similar in
color to that used on the policy slips. There was also a
small closet, the door of which was locked. The officers
removed the hasp and broke the lock and found two large
bags containing policy slips, a small box of policy slips,
two printing presses, type, paper and ink. All the men in
the room were arrested and later, at the police station,
policy slips and a rent receipt for the front basement rooms
were taken from the person of Vernon McGowan.

Before each cause was heard, motions were presented
seeking to suppress from evidence the “policy parapher-

es at9

nalia” allegedly seized by the officers forcibly and without
right of search warrant. After hearing evidence, the mo-
tions to suppress were denied.

Plaintiffs in error contend that the police had no in-
formation that they were in the commission of any crime
at the time of their arrest, that there is no evidence to
show that they were in the commission of a crime, and
that the police had no reason to believe that they had com-
mitted an offense or were in the commission of a crime.
Thomas McGowan asserts that he was merely walking
down the street carrying a zippered bag fully closed and
Vernon McGowan contends that he was doing nothing
more suspicious than standing in a building looking out a
window. It is their position that, since the officers did not
have warrants for their arrest, the arrest was illegal and
the searches made incident thereto were in violation of
the State and Federal constitutions.

The fourth amendment to the Federal constitution pro-
vides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” Section 6 of
article II of our constitution is in substantially the same
language. It is these provisions, and the rights secured by
them, which plaintiffs in error claim have been violated.

Section 4 of division VI of our Criminal Code (IIL.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 657,) makes this provision:
“An arrest may be made by an officer or by a private per-
son without warrant, for a criminal offense committed or
attempted in his presence, and by an officer, when a crim-
inal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reason-
able ground for believing that the person to be arrested
has committed it.” In construing this provision of the
code, we have held that the term “criminal offense” includes

380 Le

misdemeanors as well as felonies. (People v. Roberta, 352
Ill. 189; People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131.) We have like-
wise upheld the provision that where a criminal offense has
been committed, an officer has the right to arrest without
a warrant provided he has reasonable ground for believing
that the person to be arrested is implicated in the offense.
(People v. Humphreys, 353 Il. 340; People v. McGurn,
341 Ill. 632; People v. Swift, 319 Ill. 359.) To justify
the arrest by an officer without a warrant, his ground for
belief that the person arrested is guilty must be such as
would influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious man
under the circumstances. (People v. Macklin, 353 Ul. 64;
People v. Doody, 343 Ill. 194.) It has also been stated
that whether or not in a given case there are reasonable
grounds to warrant an arrest is a’mixed question of law
and fact. No géneral rule applicable to every case has been,
or probably can be, announced as to what facts will consti-
tute justification, in law, for an arrest by an officer with-
out a warrant, other than that such ground of suspicion
or belief exists as should influence the conduct of a prudent
and cautious man under the circumstances. (People v.
Roberta, 352 Ill. 189.) From these cases it may be seen
that the constitutional prohibitions relied upon by plain-
tiffs in error extend only to unreasonable arrests.

A further well-established legal concept which concerns
our interpretation of the facts in this case is that if the
right of arrest exists the right of search and seizure is inci-
dental thereto. In People v. Hord, 329 Ill. 117, we stated
that generally, when an arrest is made by an officer who
has reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested
is implicated in the crime, the officer has the right to arrest
without a warrant and to search the party arrested with-
out a search warrant, inasmuch as the guaranty of the
constitution is not against all search and seizure but against
unreasonable search and seizure, and does not extend to
immunity from search as an incident to a valid arrest.

es 381

Among the cases enumerating the same principle are North
vy. People, 139 Ill. 81, People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, and
People v. Humphreys, 353 ll. 340. The interpretation of
the constitutional prohibition has likewise been considered
many times by the Supreme Court of the United States,
and from their decisions it may be taken as well settled
that a valid arrest is accompanied by the right to search
the person of the one arrested and also to search things
within his immediate control. (See: Annotation, 94 L. ed.
671.) In discussing the scope of the exceptions to the
prohibition of the fourth amendment, the court said in
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. ed. 653:
“The right ‘to search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected .with the crime
as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed’

. seems to have stemmed not only from the acknowledged
authority to search the person, but from the long-standing
practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the
control of the accused upon arrest. [Citation] It became
accepted that the premises where the arrest was made,
which premises were under the control of the person
arrested and where the crime was being committed, were
subject to search without a search warrant. Such a search
was not ‘unreasonable’.”

We think it manifest from the facts in this record that
the arrests and searches of which plaintiffs in error com-
plain, fall within the well-defined exceptions to the pro-
hibitions of the respective constitutions. Section 3 of the
act to prevent policy-playing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38,
par. 414,) provides in part as follows: “The possession by
any person other than a public officer, of any writing,
paper or document representing or being a record of any
chance, share or interest in numbers sold, drawn or to be
drawn, or in what is commonly called ‘policy, * * * is
presumptive evidence of possession thereof knowingly and
in violation of the provisions of this act.” When the police

382 |

officers observed Dowkins carrying a bag which was open
in such a manner that policy slips could be seen, it was
obvious to the officers that he was violating the foregoing
provision of the code. When it is considered that Dowkins’
companion, Thomas McGowan, was seen to emerge from
the building carrying a bag of a similar type and similar
in appearance, we believe such facts were sufficient to justify
the belief of a prudent and cautious man that McGowan
was likewise implicated in the offense and that the bag
carried by him also contained policy slips. Under such cir-
cumstances, we must conclude that the arrest of Thomas
McGowan and the search made incident thereto were justi-
fied under the law.

Turning to the arrest of Vernon McGowan and the
search of the premises where he was found, we note that
officer Allman testified that in his capacity of police officer
he had previously known all of the men who were seen
and found at 2944 Vernon Avenue on the day in question.
It was apparent after the arrest of Dowkins and his com-
panions that the laws relating to policy were being violated.
The officer had seen Vernon McGowan enter the basement
door from which the first three men arrested had emerged
a moment later with policy slips in their possession, and,
knowing the association of the men, it was reasonable for
him to believe that Vernon McGowan was likewise impli-
cated and that the premises housed things connected with
the crime. Under the authorities discussed and in view of
the validity of the arrest of Thomas McGowan, Dowkins,
and Taylor, we must conclude that the right to search
without a warrant was, in this case, contemporaneously
extended to the premises from which the violators had
come. The attitude displayed by Vernon McGowan when
the landlady admitted the officers to the basement further
justified a belief in the officers that Vernon was implicated
and that articles used in connection with the crime were
present. We conclude that the arrests of the plaintiffs in

es 388

error without warrants were lawful and that the evidence
obtained from the contemporaneous searches, both of the
premises and their persons, was lawfully seized and properly
admitted.

Plaintiffs in error next contend that the informations
filed against them failed to describe with particularity and
with certainty the kind of a writing or paper that was in
their possession, viz., whether it was a document or a
record of a chance, share or interest in numbers sold,
drawn or to be drawn, or whether it was based upon a
public or private lottery, or whether it was any paper print-
ing relating to numbers or device or policy slips of any
kind. An examination of the respective informations re-
veals that they charge as follows: “* * * did then and
there, not being a public officer, knowingly and unlawfully
have in his possession a writing, paper or, document, repre-
senting or being a record of any chance, share or interest
in numbers sold, drawn or being drawn or in what is com-
monly called ‘Policy’ or in the nature of a bet, wager, or
insurance upon the drawing or drawn numbers of any
public or private lottery * * *,” The information sub-
stantially uses the language of the statute. The offense is
statutory, and where the statute sufficiently defines the
crime it is sufficient that the indictment or information
charged the breach thereof in words of the statute. People
v, Green, 362 Ill. 171; People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345;
McCracken v. People, 209 Ill. 215; Meadowcroft v. Peo-
ple, 163 Ill. 56,

They next contend that they were not found guilty as
required by law, because the judgment of the court neglected
to state that they knowingly had policy tickets in their
possession, and in support of this contention cite the case
of People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, in which we held that it
was necessary to use the word “knowingly” in an informa-
tion filed under the same section of the statute. There is
no merit to their contention in this regard. The rule is

384 ee

that in determining the sufficiency of a judgment of con-
viction based thereon the entire record will be searched and
all parts of the record interpreted together, and a deficiency
in one place may be cured by what appears in another.
(People v. Woods, 393 Ill. 586; People ex rel. Ewald v.
Montgomery, 377 Ill. 241; People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill,
345 Ill. 103.) Since the informations in the instant case
both alleged that the plaintiffs in error knowingly had the
policy tickets in their possession, the deficiency is cured
and the judgment is deemed sufficient.

The information against Vernon McGowan, which was
sworn to on April 10, 1952, and presented and ordered
filed and filed on the same date, showed, upon its face,
that the date of the offense alleged therein was “the 7th
day of April, 19__.” This violates the rule that an informa-
tion must allege the commission of an offense on a certain
date prior to the filing of the information, which must be
within the time fixed by law for the prosecution of the
offense. (People v. Angelica, 358 Ill. 621.) Such irregu-
larity is one of form only. In addition plaintiff in error .
neglected to take advantage of this defect in apt time. Sec-
tion 9 of division XI of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 38, par. 719,) provides in part: “All exceptions
which go merely to the form of an indictment, shall be made
before trial, and no motion in arrest of judgment, or writ
of error, shall be sustained, for any matter not affecting the
real merits of the offense charged in the indictment.” Plain-
tiff in error not only neglected to file a motion to quash or a
request for bill of particulars, but he did in fact file a mo-
tion to suppress the evidence which stated in part “that
on, to-wit the 7th day of April, A.D. 1952, the police -de-

_ partment of the City of Chicago, through its police force,
forcibly and without right of search warrant, did seize and
take evidence, * * *,” He was.in fact fully informed of
the date the offense was alleged to have been committed, and,
furthermore, the proofs submitted in the trial of the case

es 885

indicated that the offense was actually committed well
within the period provided for by the statute of limitations.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the defect was not
fatal in the instant case.

It is unnecessary for us to consider the contention of
plaintiffs in error that prejudicial testimony was introduced
in evidence showing that plaintiffs had been previously
arrested, as the question was not saved for review by an
objection and ruling preserved in the record for review.

We have carefully examined the entire record in this
cause and the points and authorities submitted by counsel
for plaintiffs in error, and are of the opinion that the judg-
ments of the municipal court of Chicago should be affirmed.

Judgments affirmed.

PC
Oo, 57

Tue Pxorie or THE Stave oF In1ivors, Plaintiff in Er-
ror, vs. Meyer Dorman eé al., Defendants in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

Laruam Castre, Attorney General, and Grorce P.
Courrakon, State’s Attorney, both of Springfield, (JonN
L. Davipson, Jr., Mark O. Ropert's, Roser B, Ox'rony,

a .

386 ee

Raymonp L, Trrrity, Frep G. Leacs, and Harry L.
Pats, of counsel,) for the People.

Lonprican & LonpRIGAN, (PREE & PreE, and RoBERT
Weiner, of counsel,) all of Springfield, for defendants in
error.

Mr. Justice Furron delivered the opinion of the court:

The People seek review of an order of the Appellate
Court, Third District, entered in the above entitled cause
on writ of error to the circuit court of Sangamon County
pursuant to the provisions of section 17 of division XIII
of the Criminal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38,
par. 747.

The defendants in error, five in number, were indicted
by the grand jury of Sangamon County, in an indictment
returned in the circuit court of said county, containing two
counts. The first count charges the operation of a “book”
upon certain premises in the city of Springfield, in viola~
tion of an act to prohibit book-making and pool-selling.
(IL Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 38, par. 336.) In the second
count the defendants in error were in substance charged
with the common-law and statutory crime of conspiracy
to do an act injurious to public morals, vig: by keeping a
room with a book for the purpose of registering bets upon
a horse race, based on the provisions of section 46 of divi-
sion I of the Criminal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 38,
par, 139.) Each of the defendants, after arrest, moved to
quash the indictment. The circuit court upon a hearing
allowed the motion to quash as to count II and denied the
motion as to count I. A writ of error was prosecuted by
plaintiff in error to the Appellate Court, Third District,
where the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The
present writ of error has been sued out to secure a review
of the judgment of the Appellate Court, reported in 347
Til. App. 317.

ee 387

The second count specifically charges the defendants in
error with conspiring “to do an illegal act injurious to the
public morals, police and administration of public justice,
to-wit: to wilfully and wrongfully keep a certain room in
the rear of the premises then and there known as 127 North
Fifth Street, within the City of Springfield, County of
Sangamon and State of Illinois, with a certain book and
instrument known as a book, said book then and there
being kept for the purposes of registering bets and wagers
upon the result and test of speed of a beast, to-wit: a
horse, contrary to the law, and contrary to the form of
the statute in stich case made and provided, and against
the peace and: dignity of the same people of the State of
Illinois.”

The act to prohibit book-making (par. 336,) provides
that the keeping of a “book” or “handbook” is a mis-
demeanor and punishable by a fine up to $2000, and im-
prisonment in the county jail for a period of not to exceed
one year.

Section 46 of division I of the Criminal Code pro-
vides that any person who shall conspire to do an illegal
act injurious to the public health or morals shall be fined
not exceeding $2000 or shall be imprisoned in the county
jail not exceeding one year, or shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and not
exceeding five years. The conspiracy statute was adopted
in the year 1874, and was amended in 1947.

Section 46 specifically enumerates certain crimes in
which two or more persons may be indicted for conspiracy
and in addition uses the following language, “or to do
any illegal act injurious to the public trade, health, morals,
police or administration of public justice.”

The gist of the present indictment is that of keeping a
book for the purpose of registering bets. The plaintiff in
error does not contend that either by statute or common
law can it be assumed that a bookmaking conspiracy is

388

prohibited by specific language, but submits that upon an
exhaustive historical review of statutory and text law,
brought down to the present day, such general terms as
“Snjurious to public morals” and “illegal” should be read
as including such prohibition. It is hard to find precedent
for such assumption.

The defendants in error urge that said section 46 is
void for vagueness and uncertainty. They contend that
although the conspiracy statute’ has been in effect since
1874, the present indictment is the first attempt to apply
it to the act of keeping a book for registering bets on horse
races. They are not charged here with that offense but
are charged with conspiring to do an illegal act injurious
to public morals, carrying a possible penalty and sentence
of as much as five years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary.

The situation in this case causes some concern becatise

* of the fact that under the statute against book-making,’'an
offender, for keeping a room for the purpose of bookmak-
ing, may be punished by fine and imprisonment in the
county jail not to exceed one year; whereas, for the same
offense, under the conspiracy section he may be charged
with conspiring to injure the public morals and his punish-
ment may be as much as five years in the penitentiary.

In the case of Maloney v. People, 229 Ill. 593, we stated
that, “An indictment charging a conspiracy to do an illegal
act which in its nature could not be injurious to public
trade, health, morals, police or the administration of public
justice, and not to commit any felony, would ‘not be a
conspiracy under our statute. * * * If defendant in
error’s position is sustained, then any illegal act which is
prohibited by the statute may become, when two or more
persons are charged together, the subject of an indictment
for conspiracy and subject the offender to imprisonment
in the penitentiary, or a fine of $2000, or both.”

The clear intention of the statute is not disclosed, but-
the legislature could not well intend that a charge which

es 389

may be punished by a five-year sentence in the penitentiary
should be applied to a conspiracy to keep books for regis-
tering bets on horse races when, in the same act, (par. 336,)
it is provided that provisions of the act do not apply to the
actual enclosure of fair or race track associations where the
races are run. :

In the Appellate Court opinion, 347 Ill. App. 317, the
court commented upon the case of City of Chicago v. Ross,
257 Ill. 76, which dealt with an ordinance of the city of
Chicago, seeking to suppress gambling houses, lotteries and
all fraudulent devices and practices, where it was stated
that the words “all fraudulent devices and practices” must
be held to refer to the devices and schemes which involve
an element of chance and which are similar to the things
designated by the particular words found in the statute,
that is gaming, gambling houses and lotteries. In the
Ross case this court further said, “It has been repeatedly
held by this and other courts that where general words
follow particular and specific words in a statute, the gen-
eral words must be construed to include only things of the
same kind as those indicated by the particular and specific
words; [citing Shirk v. People, 121 Ill, 61, and other Illi-
nois cases] and this rule is enforced in the construction of
a statute unless there is something in the statute or its
context which shows that the doctrine of ejusdem generis
should not be applied.”

We hold that the legislature did not intend the con-
spiracy statute to include bookmaking. Neither does there
appear to be any atithority to support a finding that con-
spiracy to keep a book was an indictable offense at common
law. In People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, it is stated that
“betting on horses races is not malum in se but is only
malum prohibitum.”

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

390 es

Ce
Hiram Caxcurt, Appellee, vs. CHartes A. GAYLORD ef al.,
Appellants, ,

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

391

Eacta & Eactx, of Rock Island, for appellants.

Winstein & Rimmerman, of Rock Island, (Srewart
R, Winstern, and Samui, M. Gian, of counsel,) for
appellee.

Mr. Justice Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

On August 1, 1951, appellee, Hiram Calcutt, filed his
complaint in the circuit court of Rock Island County pray-
ing that he be declared the legal and equitable owner of
certain real estate, that said realty be impressed with a
trust for his benefit and appellants be ordered to convey the
premises to him, or that specific performance be decreed
of an oral agreement alleged to have existed between him
and George B. Gaylord, deceased, wherein Gaylord prom-
ised to convey the property to appellee and his wife pro-
viding they came to live with him, furnished meals and
cared for him. An answer was filed denying plaintiff was
entitled to any of the relief prayed. The cause came on for
hearing before the court, which decreed that a deed from
George B. Gaylord to Hiram Calcutt was confirmed and
established and restrained appellants from asserting any
right, title, or interest in or to the premises, and ordered
each of the appellants to execute and deliver a deed of and
to said premises to appellee. Appellants appeal directly to
this court, as a freehold is involved.

George B. Gaylord and his wife, Hattie, resided for
many years in Rock Island. In July of 1949 Mrs. Gaylord .
passed away. Soon thereafter Mr. Gaylord invited appellee

392 ee

and his wife to move into his apartment and make their
home with him, Gaylord paid the rent and the Calcutts
purchased the groceries and paid various household ex-
penses. Appellee, Hiram Calcutt, was a nephew of the late
Mrs, Gaylord. In August, following the death of his wife,
Gaylord gave appellee and his sister, Ida Korsell, each
$5000. In December of that year he gave Ida Korsell
$1000 and gave $2500 to Lizzie Moulton, also a niece of
Mrs. Gaylord.

In May, 1950, after receiving a notice that his rent
was to be increased, Gaylord purchased the residence prop-
erty at 1511 Twelfth Street in Rock Island, which is the
subject of this controversy. He paid the purchase price of
$10,500 and received a deed naming him as grantee. He
and the Calcutts then moved into this house. During June
of 1950, Gaylord went to his attorney, Leo Herbert, and
signed a deed to the property, naming appellee as grantee.
At the same time he executed a will which did not cover
this property. The attorney, upon taking the stand, testi-
fied that Gaylord directed that the property covered by
the deed was to be so conveyed that it would be no part
of his estate. He also stated that he inquired of Gaylord
why he did not turn the deed over to Hiram, and was in-
formed that deceased wanted the deed to remain in his
attorney’s safe, saying one never knows what will happen
in the future and that he wished to retain control over
the deed. The deed and will remained, thereafter, in Her-
bert’s safe until November, r9s0. At that time Gaylord
came to the attorney’s office and asked for the deed, which
he then and there destroyed. He thereupon destroyed the
existing will and executed a new one. By the terms of
the new will he devised this residence property in Rock
Island to Ida Korsell as executrix and directed that she sell
it and divide the proceeds between herself, Lizzie Moulton,
and Charles Gaylord, his half brother. About the first of
October, prior to the destruction of the deed, the Calcutts

393

and Korsells had quarrelled and Gaylord had thereby be-
come greatly disturbed. Consequently, he had departed
from the Calcutt residence and made his home with Mr.
and Mrs. Korsell. He continued to reside with Mrs. Korsell
until the time of his death on January 30, 1951.

Mary E. Schnoor was one of the witnesses presented
by the appellee. She was a close friend of the Gaylords for
many years. She testified that Gaylord told her he wanted
to buy the Calcutts a house so that he would always have
a home. He told her he was going to purchase this house
and leave a deed to the Calcutts with Herbert, so that when
he died they could pick up the deed and the home would
be theirs. She also identified plaintiff's exhibit No. 1 as a
letter she and her husband received from Gaylord. In that
letter he stated, “I have given them [the Calcutts] a home.
* * * Now when I bought that house I thought I would
have a nice home. But things changed pretty fast. * * *
So all I could do was walk out.”

John Wetzel, a neighbor of the Calcutts, related that
Gaylord told him, when he and appellee were moving in
next door, that he was buying the place for the kids, ap-
pellee and his wife. He later told witness that the place
was appellee’s and that he had made out two deeds which
were in a safe place and if anything happened to him the
other one was to be filed immediately.

Edwin Faust, also a witness and a friend of appellee
and decedent, said that decedent asked him what he thought
of the place he had bought the kids, and told him he had
it fixed so that when he passed on all they had to do was
to call the attorney and the place was theirs. He also told
this witness that the furnace was no good in the house and
he wanted a better furnace for the kids.

William Schnoor, husband of witness Mary Schnoor,
and a friend of decedent, stated that during a visit he was
told by the decedent that he was giving the house to appellee
and that he had a deed executed and deposited with his

394 ee

attorney which was to be turned over to appellee upon his
death. In his testimony Schnoor also said that in August
following the purchase of the Rock Island property, the
decedent told him that he had purchased a lot in Kewanee
for the Korsells and was going to help them build a house
on it so he would have a home in Kewanee and in Rock
Island. ,

Following the presentation of his case appellee dis-
missed count II of his complaint, which alleged a failure
on the part of Gaylord to perform the covenants and con-
ditions of their agreement, in that he failed to give, convey,
or devise the property to the appellee, and requested spe-
cific performance of that agreement. He also struck all
language from count I which alleged that the deed exectited
by decedent to appellee was done in pursuance of said agree-
ment. While count I, as amended, does allege the making
of an oral agreement between decedent and appellee, it
contains no allegations of any failure of decedent or his
heirs to convey the property in accordance with the condi-
tions and covenants of the said agreement. In their answer
to count I, the appellants specifically denied the delivery of
the deed to Leo Herbert for the benefit of appellee. Thus,
the issue was joined upon whether a valid delivery and a
completed conveyance had been executed. ‘There being no
question of contract remaining in count I as amended, the
sole remaining issue as to whether there was a completed
conveyance was presented to the court for determination.
The chancellor decreed that the deed of George B. Gaylord
to Hiram Calcutt was established and confirmed. The same
question is presented here on review. Determinative of the
question is the resolution of whether a valid delivery to
Hiram Calcutt was effected by the deposit of the deed from
decedent to appellee with attorney Herbert.

The delivery of a deed is essential to the operation and
validity of a conveyance. Delivery is determined by the
intention of the grantor manifested by words and acts or

es 295

the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Unless the
grantor intended to pass title, no delivery occurs even
though there has been a manual transfer of the deed. Thus
it is essential that the intention of the grantor be manifest
and he surrender all control and dominion over the deed.
Alexander v. American Bible Society, 407 Ill. 49.

Where a grantor delivers a deed of conveyance to a
third person to be delivered to the grantee after the death
of the grantor, certain questions of law and fact are pre-
sented. We have held that in such a case the effect of the
delivery of the deed depends upon the intention of the
grantor at the time the deed was delivered to the custodian.
To be a valid and complete delivery the grantor must at
that instant surrender all dominion over the deed. Where
the grantor intended to part with all control over the deed,
a subsequent change of his intention can have no effect
upon the delivery. Where the deed is placed in the hands
of a third party merely for safekeeping and as a convenient
place of deposit, the deed is not validly delivered and con-
veys no title. Alexander v. American Bible Society.

The question of delivery is one of fact and must be
gathered from all of the surrounding circumstances estab-
lished by the evidence. (Fonda v. Miller, 411 Ill. 74.) The
intent to deliver may be shown by direct evidence or pre-
sumed from acts and declarations of the parties, and, in
like manner, presumptions of delivery may be rebutted or
overcome by proof or presumption of a contrary intention.
A grantee claiming under a deed not in his possession at
the death of the grantor has the burden of proving delivery,
and it is incumbent upon the grantee to overcome the
prima facie case against delivery by showing the terms
and conditions of the escrow and their complete perform-
ance. (Schnepper v. Ashlock, 404 Ill. 417.) The execution
of the deed with the formality required by law, the con-
sultation with an attorney at the time of making it, and the
subsequent acts of the grantor recognizing the title in the

396 ee

grantee, may all be considered as an indication thdt the
grantor intended the deed to take effect immediately upon
its execution, and that he delivered it with such thought
in mind. Fonda vy. Miller.

It is conclusively shown by the evidence presented that
in June of 1950 the decedent did execute a deed to the
premises naming appellee as grantee, which he deposited
with his attorney. Appellee produced several witnesses who
testified to numerous statements of decedent wherein he
declared that he purchased this house for appellee and his
wife, and that he had executed a deed to them which they
need only obtain from his attorney after his death, Plain-
tiff’s exhibit No. 1, a letter written by decedent, clearly
acknowledges that he had given the home to appellee.
Plaintiff offered as his exhibit No. 2 a tablet wherein de-
cedent had listed some of the gifts he had made to various
persons. Therein, under the name of Hiram Calcutt and
date of May, 1950, appears an entry of $10,500 for “House
and lot,” indicating that he purchased the same for the
appellee.

The uncontroverted testimony of William Schnoor that
soon after the purchase of the subject property the decedent
bought a lot in Kewanee for the Korsells and was going to
help them erect a home on it, together with the evidence of
the various cash gifts to Ida Korsell and Hiram Calcutt,
indicates that Gaylord made an attempt to even up the gifts
to appellee and his sister; all of which raises a very sub-
stantial inference that his intention in delivering the deed
to his attorney was for the purpose of vesting the title to
the Rock Island property in appellee.

The only evidence tending to refute appellee’s conten-
tions is the testimony of decedent’s attorney, Leo Herbert.
He asserts that upon delivery of the deed to him, Gaylord
directed that it was not to be delivered to appellee until
after his death, as he wished to retain control of it until
that time. The fact that decedent did subsequently obtain

ee 397

and destroy the deed and did then include the property in
.a new will, is some indication that he never intended to
part with all control over the deed. It may also indicate
merely a change of intention subsequent to the delivery,
which would be of no effect. To corroborate this possibility
the statement is also made by the attorney that at the time
the deed was executed and placed in his hands, the decedent
said that he did not want the deeded property to be a part
of his estate. To hold otherwise would be to hold the deed
testamentary in character and to include it as a part of his
estate, (Hudson v. Hudson, 287 Ill. 286,) contrary to ex-
pressed statement of the decedent. As a result, the testi-
mony of the attorney is contradictory and inconsistent.
This may well be the reason why the chancellor in this case
gave credence to the many declarations of the decedent to
the effect that he purchased the property for the appellees,
and that at his death all that would have to be done was
for the appellee to acquire the deed from the attorney and
thus become the absolute owner of said property. The
mere fact that the grantor chose his own attorney as the
person to hold and deliver it to the grantee at his death
raises no presumption that the delivery was not valid.
Healy v. Stevens, 347 Ill. 202.

The chancellor, having heard and observed all the wit-
nesses, was best able to judge their credibility. The testi-
mony presented by the appellee is in conflict with most of
the assertions of Herbert, appellant’s only witness. The
chancellor chose to believe that evidence supporting the
cause of the appellee. Where the evidence is in conflict,
the finding of the chancellor, who saw and heard the wit-
nesses, will not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless it is
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or unless
it is apparent that error has been committed. (Arliskas v.
Arliskas, 343 Ill. 112.) We cannot here say that the deter-
mination of the court that there was a valid delivery of
the deed and hence a completed conveyance is against the

898

weight of the evidence. Most of the evidence presented by
appellee is undisputed, whereas practically all of appellant’s
contentions are contradicted by some testimony presented
by appellee. Appellee adequately met the burden of proving
delivery, the terms and conditions of the escrow, and the
completed conveyance. No error appearing upon this record,
the decree of the circuit court of Rock Island County
is consequently affirmed,

)
0, ;7) aT

Tue Pxorrg oF THE State oF Inninors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. THomas Morert et al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Decree affirmed.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehéaring denied September 21, 1953.

399

Awan R. Brocu, and Swney Z, TEPPER, both of Chi-
cago, (Opg L. RANKIN, of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

LatHam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Harorp A, Smrrs, special State’s Attorney, of Chicago,
(Ricwarp B. Austin, of Chicago, of counsel,) for the
People. .

Mr. Justice Maxwent, delivered the opinion of the
court:

Thomas Moretti, Lawrence Moretti and Pasquale Mor-
etti, plaintiffs in error, hereinafter designated defendants,
were found guilty by a jury in the criminal court of Cook
County on an indictment charging them with having con-
spired to obstruct justice. Thomas was sentenced to one
year in the county jail and fined $2,000; Lawrence was
fined $2,000, and Pasquale was fined $1,000. On writ of
error the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed
the judgments of conviction and defendants seek review
in this court on writ of error.

The material evidence, the procedure in procuring the
defendants’ indictment and in the conduct of the trial, and
defendants’ contentions relied upon for reversal of the
‘rial court’s judgment have been adequately and correctly

‘ated in the opinion of the Appellate Court, and need not
ve repeated here. We have examined the record and con-
sidered the issues presented by the defendants and find

400 ee

that the Appellate Court has correctly determined those
issues, and we concur in that court’s opinion on those issues.

Only one of defendants’ contentions, in our opinion,
merits further discussion. Defendants contend that the in-
dictment should have been quashed because the orders
entered by the criminal court on September 18, 1951, and
October 18, 1951, appointing a special prosecutor to repre-
sent the People before the grand jury, in place of the
State’s Attorney, were void, the special prosecutor so
named by the court and his appointed assistant were there-
fore unauthorized persons appearing before the grand jury.
Appellants here contend that this constitutes a denial of
their substantive legal rights which the Appellate Court
brushed aside as a technical matter.

John S. Boyle, State’s Attorney of Cook County, on
September 18, 1951, presented a petition to the chief jus-
tice of the criminal court of that county, reciting that he,
through a regularly-appointed assistant, had presented evi-
dence to the Augusty 1951, grand jury in regard to a
homicide charge against Michael Moretti for the deaths
of Arthur Gamino and Edward Salvi, who were shot and
killed August 24, 1951, and for the shooting of Leonard
Monaco who was wounded in the affray. The petition fur-
ther stated that no true bill was returned by that grand
jury, that the matter was still under investigation by the
State’s Attorney’s office, that new evidence had come to
his attention, that the matter was to be submitted to the Sep-
tember, 1951, grand jury, and that “11. Your petitioner
further represents that he verily believes he is a prospec-
tive witness and as such may be called to give evidence
before the Grand Jury for said September Term.” The
Chief Justice, pursuant to the prayer of that petition,
ordered that Harold A. Smith, an attorney, be appointed
to investigate the homicides and shooting and present the
evidence to the September, 1951, grand jury, prepare such
presentments and indictments for said homicides and shoot-

es 401

ing as the grand jury should direct, and to “prosecute said
causes with the same power and authority in relation to
stich causes as the State’s Attorney would have in the
premises.” Said Harold A. Smith on the same day took
the statutory oath of office before the chief justice.

On September 26, 1951, said Harold A. Smith pe-
titioned the chief justice to continue his powers as special
attorney for the People and for an order directing him
to present the evidence to the October, 1951, grand jury,
and such order was entered. Subsequently, Smith appointed
Richard B. Austin as his assistant, the two of them pre-
sented the evidence to the grand jury, and on October 3,
1951, indictments charging Michael Moretti with the mur-
ders of Gamino and Salvi were voted and returned.

On October 18, 1951, Smith presented an ex parte pe-
tition to the chief justice, alleging that the grand jury
was still considering the question of an indictment for the
shooting of Monaco, that there had been offers communi-
cated to Monaco by certain members of Michael Moretti’s
family to pay him to change his testimony, which offers
Monaco had refused; that certain members of Moretti’s
family had communicated threats of violence to Monaco
and to members of his family unless his testimony was
changed ; petitioner prayed for instructions from the court
and for an order directing the course that should be pur-
sued, if any, by petitioner. The chief justice, on the same
day, entered an order directing petitioner to continue to
investigate and present evidence to the October, 1951, grand
jury “relating to offers of bribery to Leonard Monaco
and threats of violence to the said Leonard Monaco and
members of his family and friends, and to prepare such
presentments and indictments as to such offers and threats
as the Grand Jury may direct, and to prosecute such causes
with the same power and authority in relation to such
causes as the State’s Attorney of Cook County would have
in the premises.”

402 es

Smith and Austin thereafter presented the evidence to
the Grand Jury and the indictment in the instant case re-
sulted. Defendants’ motion to quash this indictment was
based on the theory that Smith and Austin appeared before
the grand jury, questioned witnesses, advised the grand
jurors, and prepared and presented the indictment, all with-
out lawful authority of any kind and to the prejudice of
defendants. This motion was overruled by the court.

Section 6 of the act in regard to Attorneys General and
State’s Attorneys, (Ill, Rev. Stat., 1951, chap. 14, par. 6,)
provides: ‘Whenever the attorney general or state’s attor-
ney is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested
in any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is
or may be his duty to prosecute or defend, the court in
which said cause or proceeding is pending may appoint
some competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause
or proceeding, and the attorney so appointed shall have
the same power and authority in relation to such cause or
proceeding as the attorney general or state’s attorney would
have had if present and attending to the same, * *. *.”

‘The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Tear-
ney v. Harding, 335 Ill. 123. We held in People v. Doss,
384 Ill. 400, that where the State’s Attorney was a witness
before the grand jury, the appointment of a special State’s
Attorney to act in that case before the grand jury was the
regular and proper procedure. In Lavin v. Board of Comrs.
of Cook County, 245 Ill. 496, we held that the filing of
a petition by the State’s Attorney setting forth the grounds
for his petition gives the court jurisdiction of the subject
matter and requires it to judicially determine whether a
proper case for the appointment exists.

Defendants next contend that the court had no juris-
diction to enter the order of October 18, 1951, directing
the special attorney to prosecute the instant case before
the grand jury because the petition failed to allege and the
order failed to find that the State’s Attorney was sick, ab-

es 408

sent, unable to attend or interested in the alleged crime
of bribery or threats of violence. They contend that the
crimes here considered are different from those mentioned
in the petition of the State’s Attorney filed September 18,
and there can be no causal connection between them, We
cannot agree with this contention. Smith’s petition alleged
the bribes and threats made to the witness in the cause in
which the court had previously taken proper jurisdiction.
The court had directed the special attorney to prosecute
the original cause before the grand jury, and the crimes
described in the latter petition were certainly attempts to
prevent the special attorney from effectively carrying out
the court’s order. The court knew of the disqualification
of the State’s Attorney in the Michael Moretti case and
could, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, determine
that justice could-be best served by disqualifying him in
prosecuting the members of Michael Moretti’s family.
Defendants contend that Smith, as special attorney,
had no authority to appoint his assistant Austin and there-
fore Austin’s appearance before the grand jury and his
active participation in presenting the case makes this in-
dictment void. They argue that the appointment of assist-
ant State’s Attorneys is an adminstrative function regu-
lated by statute. (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 53, par. 18.)
We do not believe that statute is applicable here. The pur-
pose of that statute is to authorize the county board to
determine when and how many assistant State’s Attorneys
may be required by the county and to provide for their
compensation. Austin here was certainly not an assistant
such as is contemplated by that statute. Smith was a special
prosecuting attorney appointed by the court to prosecute a
certain cause with all his authority conferred upon him
by the court. That he would require legal assistance to
investigate and prosecute these crimes before the Cook
County grand jury is foreseeable. He appointed Austin as
his assistant, Austin was sworn in as a special assistant

404 ee

prosecutor, and he participated in the prosecution before
the grand jury in the presence of, and under the supervision
of, the court-appointed special prosecutor. Defendants have
not shown that Austin was present in the grand jury room
while that body was deliberating or voting, that he in-
fluenced the jurors in any manner or that he did anything
other than interrogate the witnesses in the presence and
under the supervision of Smith. _We have, under like cir-
cumstances, found that this does not invalidate the pro-
ceedings where no prejudice is shown. (People v. Harten-
bower, 283 Ill. 591.) Defendants do not point out in what
manner they were prejudiced by Austin’s interrogation of
the witnesses instead of Smith and we are unable to con-
jure any.

The defendants have not shown the deprivation or in-
vasion of any of their legal or constitutional rights and
their convictions must be, and are, affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

es
Oo. ;:7:)

Tur PEorie or THE State or Ininois, Defendant in Er-
tor, vs. Ropert Lee KIRKENDOLL, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

405

Aaron H. Payne, of Chicago, (Juntan B. WILKINS,
of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

Lariam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurKnecut, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (JoHN
T. Gatzacner, Ruponpo L. Jangca, and Artuur F.
Manning, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in error, Robert T. Kirkendoll, a colored
boy, 19 years of age, hereinafter referred to as defendant,
was found guilty of forcible rape by a jury in the criminal
court of Cook County, and his punishment was fixed at
75 years in the penitentiary. To review the record, after
motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were
overruled, this writ of error is prosecuted.

The prosecutrix, a spinster, was 50 years of age. On
Friday, July 29, 1949, at about 5:30 P.M., she walked
home from the place of her employment, the Langley
Branch of the Chicago Public Library. She stopped only
briefly at the neighborhood store and purchased a few
groceries. With her pocketbook in one hand and the rattan
bag containing the groceries in the other, she entered her
apartment building at 4025%4 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, and
had proceeded only a few steps on her way to her apart-
ment, which was located on the third floor, when she heard
the door ‘open behind her. She stepped aside to permit

406 De

whomever it might be to pass. Just as the defendant went
by her, he suddenly turned and, with a knife drawn, said:
“This is a stickup.” The defendant then told prosecutrix
that money was not really what he wanted, and ordered
her to lie down on her back on the landing just above the
first floor, in front of a large window, and there the assault
was accomplished. .

Immediately thereafter the prosecutrix went to her
apartment, changed her clothes and proceeded to her doctor.
She and the doctor went to the Hyde Park Police Station
and filed a complaint. The doctor testified at the trial that
he had made an examination of the lady, and that it was
his opinion that she had been assaulted.

The following Sunday the police officers from the Hyde
Park station requested the complaining witness to look
through a group of pictures, and, in doing so, she picked
out the picture of the defendant. The day following, the
defendant was arrested and exhibited in a showup which
consisted of the defendant and five other men, and on that
occasion the prosecutrix pointed to the defendant as her
assailant. .

The defendant relies upon an alibi to accomplish his
acquittal. He and his wife, in support of this defense,
testified that on the day in question, between 5:00 o’clock
and 6:00 P.M., they went to the office of defendant’s
lawyer, Eugene Wood, at 309 E. Forty-seventh Street.
Wood had called defendant’s home and requested that he
come to see him. They found upon arriving at his office
building that their lawyer had left for the day, and instead
met a Mr. Harsh, a realtor and insurance agent with 25
years’ experience. It was 5:20 P.M. when he gave the de-
fendant and his wife the word that their lawyer had already
departed. Thereafter the two walked down the street and
did some window-shopping, then they went to a new grocery
store at Forty-eighth and South Parkway Avenue and
shopped until after 6:00 P.M., and, after purchasing two

| 407

large sacks of groceries, went home. Harsh, the insurance
agent, testified on behalf of the defendant and said: “I met
Mr. & Mrs. Kirkendoll at the head of the stairs in my
building about 5:20 to 5:30 P.M. in the afternoon of
July 2oth. I was coming back from the washroom to my
office and saw the two standing there. He turned around
and asked me if Mr. Wood had gone for the day and I said:
‘Oh, they have gone to a picnic,’ meaning Wood and Beas-
ley, his law partner. Then Kirkendoll said: ‘Will you
please tell him that Mr. and Mrs. Kirkendoll will be back
tomorrow?” Mr, Harsh further testified that he had not
seen the defendant since, but he was sure that it was he
who was in his office building at 5:30 P.M. on July 29.
On cross-examination he testified that Wood came to his
‘office and “asked about these people, and I told him their
name was Kirk- somebody, and Mr. Wood told me that he
wanted me to be a witness.” He further was questioned
on cross-examination as to how far it was from his build-
ing to the home of the prosecutrix and how long it would
require one to get there. He said it was about fourteen
blocks and if one caught an elevated train immediately it
would require eight to ten minutes.

Eugene Wood, an attorney practicing in Chicago for
21 years, testified that his office was at 309 East Forty-
seventh Street, the same building in which Harsh has an
office; that he had represented defendant on two occasions
on charges involving larceny; and that he had been granted
probation by Judge Lindsay in June or July of 1949; that
he had sent word to the boy that he wanted to see him
and he came to his office on Friday, July 29, about 5:05
P.M., but he had already gone; that “he called my home
on Saturday and Sunday and I surrendered him to the
officers on Monday.”

In further support of defendant’s alibi was the testi-
mony of Marie Fitzhugh, who was a cashier in the grocery
store on South Parkway. She testified that Bob and Jean

408 ee

Kirkendoll were in the store at about 15 minutes until 6:00
P.M. on July 29, 1949. She remembered the date for two
reasons}; first, it was the day following the official opening
of the market, second, Bob’s wife, Jean, came into the
store on Monday, July 31, and told her of her husband’s
arrest and requested that she bear in mind the presence of
her and her husband in her store on the preceding Friday.
Miss Fitzhugh remembered specifically the time of day
when Bob and Jean were in the store because at the time
of their appearance she was in the process of “checking
out,” and on weekends that was invariably around 6:00
o'clock. She further testified that she said nothing to them,
except to speak to Jean whom she had known previously ;
that they had checked out two counters behind her station;
and that she was acquainted with officer Howard Pierson
who came in to question her about the presence of the
Kirkendolls at her store on the previous Friday. On cross-
examination she said the first she knew that she might be
a witness was the next day following the arrest of Bob
when his wife Jean came into the store to make sure she
remembered seeing her and her husband in the store on
Friday evening, July 29. Jean had told the officers of the
circumstance, who, in turn, interviewed the cashier to check
its reliability. .

Dorothy Mary Walter, a janitress and neighbor, saw
the Kirkendolls carrying home two sacks of groceries on
the evening in question ‘at about 6:00 P.M.; LeRoy Sikes,
another neighbor, saw them coming home with groceries
at suppertime; Elizah Moss saw them “packing” the gro-
ceries home and remarked “I want that cake” which appar-
ently was extending above the confines of the bag. These
witnesses all remembered distinctly that it was July 29 that
they saw Bob and Jean about suppertime, because of his
arrest on the following Monday, thus their attention was
focused on a day and hour well within their memory.

ee 409

George and Lola Kirkendoll, father and mother of de-
fendant, also testified. Officer Howard Pierson testified on
behalf of the State, but he was not called upon to contradict
or impeach the testimony of Miss Fitzhugh whom he inter-
viewed at great length on the Wednesday following the
defendant’s arrest.

We are not unmindful of a superior advantage of the
jury and court in seeing and hearing witnesses, to properly
evaluate their credibility. We find it impossible however
to read the record in this case without having a reasonable
doubt of defendant’s guilt.

The State in their brief and argument apparently rec-
ognized the force and character of the evidence introduced
on behalf of the defendant in support of his alibi. They
contend that the defendant lacks support in his account of
his whereabouts from 5:20 to 5:45 P.M. on the day in
question. They elicited from Harsh, on cross-examination,
that it would be humanly possible for a person to travel
a distance of twelve blocks on the elevated train in eight
to ten minutes. The State, in their brief, argue as follows:
“The time of 25 minutes, unaccounted for by any person
but the wife of the defendant, was sufficient to drive his
truck from 47th and Prairie to 4oth and Ellis, commit the
crime of 15 minutes duration and return to 47th and South
Parkway.” This argument is premised upon the following
sttppositious state of facts: that the defendant suddenly
abandoned his wife at his lawyer’s office and in great haste
travelled by truck or elevated train to the apartment build-
ing of the prosecutrix, 12 blocks away, encountered the
complaining witness, a stranger, the meeting with her being
unscheduled, attacked her for a period of fifteen minutes
and then in haste returned to his wife at Forty-seventh and
South Parkway, another dozen or more blocks, all in the
space of 25 minutes. The State’s attempt to weaken the
defendant's alibi in this manner is not persuasive.

410 |

Each of the alibi witnesses who testified on- behalf of
defendant was subjected to a vigorous cross-examination.
Unlike most alibi defenses, the State in the instant case
knew the nature of the defendant's alibi. Immediately fol-
lowing the defendant’s arrest, the police officers were told
the names of several persons who would corroborate de-
fendant’s claim that he was not in the vicinity of prose-
cutrix’s home at the time in question. Notwithstanding the
State’s advantage in knowing the defense in advance, none
of the witnesses appearing in his behalf were impeached
or discredited.

‘The sentence found by the jury to be proper in this
case was 75 years. Although in statutory range, it is a
severe one. Surely this was a very close case on the facts.
The prosecuting witness, and we cast no adverse reflection
on her honesty, was not corroborated. The witnesses sup-
porting defendant’s claim of nonpresence at the scene of
the crime were very convincing. In this state of the record
it is important that there be no prejudicial error. This
was not so. The State’s ‘Attorney in his closing argument
to the jury used strong language that would have a tend-
ency to stir passion and prejudice. He characterized the
defendant as a “sex maniac” and “robber-rapist,” and fur-
ther “he is a liar. There was a time in the law when a
convicted felon couldn’t testify.” It is true that defendant
had a record of misbehavior, nothing however involving
sex perversion, but crimes against property where probation
was adjudged to be appropriate.

The defendant requested the following instruction be
given: “It is the duty of the jury to consider the prisoner’s
case as if he were a white man, for the law is the same as
to both white and colored men, there being no distinction
in principles in respect to color.” Its refusal was error.

Tt was just 99 years ago that a negro by the name of
Decatur Campbell was tried for murder in the circuit court
of Massac County. The.trial court refused to read to the

Pee) au
jury the exact instruction quoted above and on review in
this court in the case of Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17, we
held that the instruction should have been given, saying,
“The proposition is undoubtedly exceedingly plain and
altogether undeniable, and I trust is universally understood
and recognized, but it was still the right of the prisoner
to have the law, plain as it was, declared to the jury by
the court.”
Practical justice dictates the necessity of a new trial.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.

be
(No. 32701-
Tue Prorix ex rel. Harland D, Warren, State’s Attorney,
Appellee, vs. Ra,pH Drummer et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

412

Berry & O’Conor, of Streator, for appellants.

Harrtanp D. Warren, State’s Attorney, of Ottawa,
and McNetriy & Ryan, of Peru, for appellee.

Harorp W. Norman, and Atiyn J. Franxe, both of
Chicago, amici curiae.

Mr, Curr Justice Scuarrer delivered the opinion of
the court:

This quo warranto action, instituted in the circuit court
of La Salle County by the People on the relation of the
State’s Attorney of that county, challenges the valid exist-
ence of Wenona Community Unit School District No. 1
of LaSalle and Marshall Counties, (hereafter, “Wenona
District.”) The defendants, members of the board of edu-
cation of the district, answered the complaint, setting forth
in detail the steps taken to organize the district and assert-
ing an affirmative defense of laches. A reply was filed, the
case was tried, and a judgment of ouster was entered, De-

Pe

fendants prosecute this direct appeal, a franchise being
involved,

The contention that the initiating petition for the elec-
tion at which the district was created failed to contain the
signatures of one hundred legal voters residing in the terri-
tory, as required by section 8-9 of the School Code (Til.
Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 122, par. 8-9,) does not require’ de-
tailed discussion. We have considered the evidence upon
the basis of which the trial judge found that the petition
was signed by 106 qualified voters residing within the pro-
posed district. The evidence amply supports that finding.

The principal issue under the statute is whether the
territory described in the petition was contiguous and com-

. pact for school purposes, within the contemplation of sec-
tion 8-9 of the School Code, under which the district was
organized. Plaintiff maintains that this territory was not
a “natural school community,” compact and contiguous for
school purposes, that the new district invaded the natural
school community of the existing Rutland High School
District No. 340J and Rutland Common School District
No, 1ooJ, and that the organization of the district in effect
deprived some children of an opportunity to receive a good
common-school education, in violation of the command of
section 1 of article VIII of our constitution. From the
opinion of the circuit court it appears that the judgment
was based upon a finding that the existing Rutland school
districts, and especially the high school district, constituted
“a community for school purposes which must be respected
by other neighboring communities.”

The territory of the Wenona District includes 87 sec-
tions of land. The district measures twelve miles east and
west at the widest, or northerly, part, and it is nine and
one-half miles in length, from north to south, at the longest
point. The city of Wenona, the only incorporated city or
village in the district, has a population of 1005. It lies three
and one-half miles south of the north boundary of the dis-

rs

trict, six miles north of its south boundary, and about mid-
way between the east and west boundaries at their widest
points. The high school and the principal grade school
operated by the district are located in Wenona and have
enrollments of about 121 and 164 students, respectively.
During the first year of its existence, the district also oper-
ated two rural schools in La Salle County. Five buses are
maintained to transport students to and from school, and
a one-way trip does not exceed fifty minutes in duration -
for any student.

The rub in this case comes from the effect of the forma-
tion of the Wenona District, and two other new community
unit districts, upon Rutland High School District No. 340J
and Rutland Common School District No. 100] of La Salle
and Marshall Counties. These districts operated a four-
year high school and an eighth-grade elementary school, re-
spectively, in Rutland, a village of 486 inhabitants, located
near the southern edge of the proposed Wenona District.
At the time the Wenona District was being formed, two
other community unit school districts were being organized
to the south and west of the Wenona District. Each of the
three new community unit districts included portions of
the Rutland districts. A somewhat detailed explanation is
necessary for an understanding of the situation.

Rutland High School District No. 340J consisted of
28146 sections in Groveland Township, La Salle County,
and Bennington Township, Marshall County. On October
30, 1948, an election was held establishing Community Unit
School District No. 108 of Woodford County to the south
of Rutland. As the result of this election 1134 sections
which had been a part of the Rutland High School District
were disconnected and became a part of the Community
Unit District No. 108. The northern boundary of this dis-
trict was about half a mile south of the village of Rutland.
On January 22, 1949, the day on which the election estab-
lishing the Wenona District was held, Community Unit

Ce

School District No. 2 of Marshall County to the west of
Rutland was established by election. By this election *%46
of a section was disconnected from the Rutland High
School District and became a part of Community Unit
District No, 2. The eastern boundary of this district was
one mile from the village of Rutland. By the election of
January 22, 1949, establishing the Wenona District, 14
more sections were disconnected from the Rutland High
School District leaving it with an area of 242 sections, or,
as the parties state it, two sections,

Prior to October 30, 1948, Rutland Common School
District No. 1o0J consisted of 8%¢ sections of land located
in Groveland Township, La Salle County, and Bennington
Township, Marshall County. By the election of October
30, 1948, establishing Community Unit District No. 108
of Woodford County, one section was disconnected from
the Rutland Common School District and became a part
of District No. 108. By the election of January 22, 1949,
establishing Community School District No. 2 of Marshall
County, %e of a section was disconnected from the Rut-
land Common School District and became a part of Dis-
trict No. 2. And by the election of January 22, 1949,
establishing the Wenona Community District, 434 sections
were disconnected from the Rutland Common School Dis-
trict and became.a part of the Wenona District, leaving it
as an area of two sections,

Each of the three new community unit school districts
thus took a portion of the two Rutland districts, leaving
the Rutland Common and Rutland High School districts
with but two sections of land and their school buildings.
‘The assessed valuation and the population of the two Rut-
land districts, already below the minimums declared by
statute to be essential for a new high school district, were
brought even further below minimum requirements.

As a result of these several elections, and the three
disconnections, two sections of land were left as a small

SO

island, bounded on the east, north and west by the Wenona
District and, on the south by Community Unit District 108 -
of Woodford County. The village of Rutland, which was
not included in any of the new districts, lay north of the
southernmost portions of the Wenona District, which ex-
tended south for two miles on either side of it. When the
Wenona District was originally formed, the school building
of the Rutland districts, located in Rutland, was only about
a block and one-half from the boundary line of the Wenona
District although the boundary line has since been moved,
and in September, 1949, was about two miles north of the
Rutland school building.

To complete the picture, in August, 1949, by an appro-
priate proceeding, 714 sections in Groveland Township,
LaSalle County, and Bennington Township, Marshall
County, were detached from the Wenona District and
again became a part of the Rutland school districts. There
were additional later changes in the boundaries of the
Wenona District which do not require description. The
net result was that when the new Wenona District started
to operate its schools in September of 1949, the total area
of Rutland Districts 340J and 10oJ was 92 and 9% sec-
tions, respectively.

The impact of the changes resulting from the creation
of the three new community tinit districts upon the Rutland
school districts was serious. Prior to the organization of
the community unit school districts, there were fifty-one
persons of high school age living in the territory of the
Rutland High School District. There were 24 high school
students living in the two sections of land remaining in
that district after the reorganization. For the lack of funds
this district did not operate a high school during the school
year 1949-50. The students attended the three community
unit districts surrounding Rutland. The 75 elementary
school students living in the two sections of land remaining
in the Rutland Common School District continued to attend

Pn

the school in that district, but the money received from
taxes and other sources was insufficient to pay their teachers.
Individuals in the community cashed the teachers’ orders
and held them until a later date when sufficient funds would
be received by the district. The Rutland High School Dis-
trict retained only 17.1 per cent of its original assessed
valuation, and the Rutland Common School District re-
tained only 48.3 per cent of its assessed valuation.

Plaintiff argues that the evidence is insufficient to show
that the territory which was formerly a part of the Rutland
districts forms a part of the “natural school community”
of the Wenona District. It is urged that this territory is
in fact a part of the Rutland community, separate and
distinct from the Wenona community. This argument, with
its emphasis upon the inviolability of existing school dis-
tricts, loses sight of the purpose of the General Assembly
in revising the school laws. It is common knowledge that
prior to the legislative changes of 1945 and 1947, Illinois
had an extremely poor school organization, with nearly
12,000 school districts, almost 10,000 of which operated
one-room schools. (Report No. 86 of the Illinois Legisla-
tive Council.) It was to meet this situation and to make
possible a more effective scheme of organization that the
1947 legislation, under which this case arises, was adopted.
The purpose of that legislation was to provide the means
by which existing school district boundaries could be altered,
and a more efficient system of schools provided.

The School Code as amended in 1947 reflects that pur-
pose. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 122, pars. 8-9 to 8-14.)
The only restriction with respect to the territory to be
included in the new “community unit school district,” which
was provided for by the 1947 legislation, was that the
territory be contiguous and compact. Section 8-12 reflects
legislative recognition of the likelihood that school districts
to be organized under the statute might well be of sub-
stantial size by providing for geographical representation

a

|

on the boards of education of districts exceeding 72 square
miles in area. That it was contemplated that more than
one city, village, or incorporated town might be included
within the boundaries of a new community unit district is
clear from section 8-10 which makes provision for estab-
lishing separate voting precincts “if one or more cities,
villages or incorporated towns is or are located within such
territory.” Section 8-13 anticipated that a community unit
school district might include several elementary and high
school districts when it specifically provided that all such
districts wholly included within the new district should be
automatically dissolved, and “If there is included within
the territory so reorganized a part or parts of elementary
districts or high school districts, said part or parts shall
automatically be detached from such district or districts
and become a part of said community unit school district.”
Section 8-14 provides for the detachment of territory from
adjoining school districts and annexation to a community
unit school district. When the entire statute is considered,
the legislative intent is clear that a community unit school
district established under its provisions might include exist-
ing school districts, and parts of existing school districts,
as well as separate municipalities which, for many purposes,
would be deemed distinct communities.

People ex rel. Snowden v. Hurst, gor Ill. 158, cited by
the trial court in its opinion and relied upon by plaintiff,
must be limited to the unique factual situation there pre-
sented, And apart from its extreme facts, People v. Hurst
was decided under a different law. The statute here in-
volved deliberately provides for the formation of new dis-
tricts which would invade the territory of existing districts,
—which were presumably different natural school commu-
nities, as the term is employed in People v. Hurst. An
unmistakable purpose of the statute was to sanction the
organization of school districts formed by combining pre-
viously existing districts and parts of districts to the end

PE
of reduction in the number of school districts and the
formation of larger school districts designed to promote
more effective and more economical education. To hold
that under the present School Code a school district can
comprise only what has formerly been regarded as a single
school community would frustrate the objectives of the
statute.

In our opinion the argument that the territory formerly
a part of the Rutland districts constitutes a natural school
community, which must be regarded as separate and dis-
tinct from the Wenona community, for community unit
school district purposes, is untenable. The present statute
not only approves invasion of the territory of existing dis-
tricts when new districts are being formed but spells out
that intent and provides adequate machinery for adjusting
the boundaries of a new community unit school district
if it fails to include territory which should have been in-
cluded or if it takes territory which should have been
excluded. .

The issue, under the present statute, is whether the
territory of the new district is contiguous and is sufficiently
compact in size to enable the children residing in the dis-
trict to avail themselves of the privileges of the school in
Wenona without undue inconvenience. The statutory com-
mand that the territory be contiguous and compact does
not admit of an all-inclusive definition drawing hard-and-
fast lines. As said in People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 301
Ill. 67, “It is impossible, of course, to give a definition of
the terms ‘community,’ ‘compact’ and ‘contiguous,’ when
applied to school districts, that will apply under all circum-
stances.” And, more recently, “The territory of a school
district is compact and contiguous when it is so closely
united and so nearly adjacent to the school building that
all the students residing in the district, their ages consid-
ered, may conveniently travel from their homes to the
school building and return the same day in a reasonable

0

time and with a reasonable degree of comfort. [Citations]
The territory need not be rectangular or square to be con-
tiguous and compact. Again, every reasonable presumption
is indulged in favor of the validity of a school district
established pursuant to legislative authority. Conversely, a
school district will not be held invalid for lack of con-
tiguity or compactness unless it clearly appears from the
evidence that children of school age residing in the district
cannot reasonably avail themselves of the privileges of
the school.” (People ex rel. McLain v. Gardner, 408 Ill.
228.) People v. Deatherage, 4ot Ill. 25, is to the same
effect. The requirements of compactness and contiguity
have been satisfied in this case.

Plaintiff argues further that if the territory taken is
part of the Wenona school community, the two sections
omitted should also have been included. It is pointed out
that children in the two omitted sections reside as much as
5% miles closer to the attendance center in Wenona than
do children living in other parts of the territory included.
The substance of this argument seems to -be not that the
territory included belongs to a different school community,
but rather that territory excluded belongs to the newly
created school unit. The statute speaks, however, of in-
clusion rather than exclusion. The issue is whether the
territory described in the petition seeking organization of
a new community unit school district is contiguous and
compact, and whether children residing within the terri-
torial boundaries are afforded the opportunity of traveling
to and from school in a reasonable time and with reasonable
comfort. If the territory included in the district is con-
tigtious and compact, objections that the district could have
been formed in a better and different manner are not open
to consideration. ‘The fact that territory is excluded which
might have been included, destroys neither the contiguity
nor the compactness of the unit district.

Se

Plaintiff also directs attention to the fact that the Rut-
land districts were left with assessed valuations too low
to enable them either to maintain a school or to pay tuition
based upon the per capita cost of education elsewhere. On
that basis it is contended that the children residing within
such districts are deprived of the right to receive the free
education guaranteed by section 1 of article VIII of our
constitution. This contention lacks merit. Adequate pro-
visions are included in the School Code whereby the ob-
jection can readily be obviated. The statute provides ma-
chinery for the attachment of territory or the annexation
of a common school district to a community unit school
district. On the other hand, territory included in the new
community unit districts could be annexed to the Rutland
districts. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 122, pars, 8-6, 8-14.)
Indeed, this was done as to 7% sections. It may well be
that the residents of the former Rutland districts did not
desire reannexation. The record supports the inference
that the two sections of land including and surrounding the
village of Rutland were left out of each of the three peti-
tions for the formation of community unit school districts
in late 1948 and early 1949 in order to afford the residents
of those two sections an opportunity to decide which of
the three new districts they desired to join. Perfection
cannot always be achieved in the initial proceedings inci-
dent to the formation of new school districts. Adjustments
become necessary, and statutory provision is made for them.
As was observed in the Deatherage case, (401 Ill. 25,)
“os * %* the School Code makes ample provision for the
fitting of detached, or left-over territory, into the school
system of the State, either by annexation to an existing
district, by the organization of an appropriate new district,
or by sending the children of the territory to a school in
an existing district, at public expense.” See, also, People

ex rel. McLain v. Gardner, 408 Ill. 228, 236-237.

2

Our conclusion that there has been full compliance with
the relevant requirements of the School Code renders un-
necessary a consideration of the contention that plaintiff’s
action was barred by laches.

The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County
is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to dis-
miss the complaint and to enter judgment in accordance
with the views expressed in this opinion.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

a
(No. 32665-
Exzanor AmMANN, Appellant, vs. Aer, Famy, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

Finn & Getcer, of Waukegan, for appellant.

es 428

Snyper, Crarke & Danzrer, of Waukegan, (GERALD
C. Snyper, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr, Cuter Justice SCHAEFER delivered the opinion of
the court:

The question in this case is whether there can be re-
covery for the wrongful death of a child who was negli-
gently injured en ventre sa mere and who, after his birth,
died as a result of those injuries. Because the Wrongful
Death Act allows recovery only where the “act, neglect or
default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages” (Ill, Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 70, par. 1,) the result
depends upon the right of one negligently injured en ventre
sa mere to recover for those injuries. Holding that such
an action would not lie, the circuit court of Lake County
sustained a motion to strike the count of the complaint
which asserted it, and entered judgment for the defendant
on that count. The Appellate Court for the Second District
first reversed, and then, upon the ground that modification
of existing precedent was more appropriately the function
of the court of last resort, allowed a rehearing and affirmed.
(Amann v. Faidy, 348 Ul. App. 37.) We granted leave to
appeal.

An initial question is raised by defendant’s argument
that the complaint contains no allegation that there was a
living child who died subsequent to birth. The complaint
was filed by Eleanor Amann, as administratrix of the estate
of William Joseph Amann, deceased, and individually. The
count in question alleged that on December 26, 1949, as
the result of defendant’s negligent operation of his auto-
mobile, the cars which plaintiff and defendant were driv-
ing collided, causing personal injuries to plaintiff and such
injuries to William Joseph Amann, “a living human entity
en ventre sa mere,” as to cause his death on January 26,
1950; that he left surviving as his next-of kin his parents

424 ee

and three brothers; that on January 18, 1951, plaintiff was
appointed administratrix of the estate of William Joseph
Amann, deceased, by the probate court of Lake County;
that she duly qualified and has since acted as administratrix,
and that she brought this action pursuant to the Wrongful
Death Act for the benefit of the next of kin. In our opinion
this complaint is hardly susceptible of the construction that
plaintiff was appointed administratrix of the estate of a
child. who died before birth. In any event, defendant’s
motion to strike was required by section 45 of the Civil
Practice Act to “point out specifically the defects com-
plained of.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 110, par. 169.)
The motion did not attack the complaint on this ground.
We therefore treat the complaint, as did the Appellate
Court, as presenting a case of prenatal injuries which, after
the child was born, caused its death.

The question thus presented has not been considered
by this court since the decision in Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hos-
pital, 184 Ill. 359, (1900). This court then adopted the
opinion of the Appellate Court, (Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hos-
pital, 76 Ill. App. 441, Mr. Justice Windes dissenting,)
which relied upon Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,
138 Mass, 14, decided in 1884, and Walker v. Great North-
ern Railway Co. 28 L.R. (Ire.) 69, decided in 1891, both
of which denied recovery for a prenatal injury. The basic
reason assigned by the Appellate Court in the Allaire case
and adopted by this court was that the courts of common
law, while regarding’an unborn child as in esse for some
purposes, had not extended the doctrine to allow an action
for injuries sustained before birth. Mr. Justice Boggs dis-
sented, and his dissenting opinion has been heavily relied
upon by the many courts which now recognize a right of
action for injuries sustained by a viable child en ventre
sa mere,

Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14,
appears to have been the first case either in England or the

es 425

United States to pass upon the right of an unborn child
to recover damages for a tort. In that case, the mother of
the deceased slipped and fell upon a defective highway in
the defendant town. “At the time, she was between four
and five months advanced in pregnancy, the fall brought
on a miscarriage, and the child, although not directly in-
jured, unless by a communication of the shock to the
mother, was too little advanced in foetal life to survive its
premature birth.” It lived but ten or fifteen minutes. The
administrator of the child’s estate brought an action for
the benefit of the next of kin. Mr. Justice Holmes, speak-
ing for the court, said that, so far as known, no case had
ever decided that, if the infant survived, it could maintain
an action for injuries received while in its mother’s womb
and “that, as the unborn child was a part of the mother
at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not
too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable by
her.” : :
In Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co. of Ireland,
28 L.R. (Ire.) 69, a pregnant woman, who suffered an
injury upon defendant’s railway, gave birth to a deformed
child. The question presented for decision was whether the
child could maintain an action for its deformities caused by
defendant's negligence. ‘Two of the justices, following the
Dietrich case, expressed the view that the child was not
in esse at the time of the wrong, being neither a person,
passenger, nor a human being. The other two regarded
the action as one brought upon the contract of transporta-
tion with the mother, with no duty of care owed by the
defendant carrier to the unborn child whose presence was
unknown.

Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, and Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, were uni-
formly followed until 1933 when the Supreme Court -of
Canada, in Montreal Tramways v. LeVéillé, 4 D.L.R. 337,
(1933) held that a child was entitled to recover for prenatal

ag ee

injuries, rejecting the defenses (1) that the child was not
in esse at the time of the accident, but was a part of the
mother, and (2) that a contractual obligation with the child
was lacking. Subsequently, decisions of the District Court
for the District of Columbia, and in Ohio, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Georgia and New York, reflecting the realistic ap-
proach to the problem stated by Mr. Justice Boggs in his
dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 184
Ill. 359, have held that an unborn child, viable and capable
of existing independently of the mother at the time injuries
are wrongfully inflicted, may, after birth, maintain an
action for such injuries. (Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 Fed. Supp.
138, (1946); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc. 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334, (1949); Cooper v. Blanck,
39 S. 2d (La. App.) 352, (decided in 1923 but not re-
leased for publication until 1949;) Damasiewicz v. Gor-
such 79 Atl. 2d (Md.) 550, (1951); Tucker v. Howard L.
Carmichael & Sons, Inc. 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909,
(1951); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d
691, (1951); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.
2d 809, (1951). California has reached the same result,
influenced perhaps by a special statutory provision. (Scott
v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 629, 92 Pac. 2d 678, (1939).)
And, in Minnesota it has been adjudged that an action lies
for prenatal injuries to an unborn viable child even if the
child be born dead. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N.W. 2d 838, (1949).

Cases to the contrary, all subsequent to the Dietrich
and Allaire cases, denying a right of action for prenatal
injuries, are Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704,
(1901); Buel v. United Railways Co. 248 Mo. 126, 154
S.W. 71, (1913); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Railway &
Light Co. 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916, (recovery sought
for a non-viable child) (1916); Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, (not adhered to in Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691,) (1921); Stan-

Se ar

ford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co, 214 Ala. 611,
108 So. 566, (1926); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944, (1935); Newman
v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710, (1937);
Smith v. Trostler, 299 Ill. App. 100, (1939); Berlin v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc. 339 Pa. 547, 16 Atl. 2d 28, (1940) ;
Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 Atl. 2d 489 (but
see dissenting opinion, 128 N.J.L. 459, 26 Atl. 2d 685,)
(1942); Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d
206, (1950); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co. 155 Neb. 17, 50
N.W. 2d 229, (1951).

Writers who have considered the question have not only
long condemned and deplored the illogical rationale of the
doctrine denying a right of action for prenatal injuries but
have unanimously urged that a viable child, who survives
birth, should be permitted, upon proper proof, to recover
for injuries incurred before birth. Morris, Injuries to In-
fants En Ventre Sa Mere, 58 Cent. L.J. 143 (1904); Kerr,
Action by Unborn Infant, 61 Cent. L.J. 364 (1905);
Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in Law of
Torts, 10 Cal. L. Rev. 461 (1922); Frey, Injuries to
Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 St.Louis L. Rev. 85
(1927); Straub, Rights of Action for Prenatal Injuries,
33 Law Notes 205 (1930); James, Scope of Duty in Neg-
ligence Cases, 47 N.W. Law Review 778, 786, (1953).
See: Notes, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1921); 6 Cornell L.Q.
341 (1921); 44 Yale L.J. 1468 (1935); 20 Minn. L. Rev.
321 (1936); 36 Mich. L. Rev. 512 (1938); 34 Minn L.
Rev. 65 (1949); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 539 (1950); 35 Cornell
L. Q. 648 (1950); 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 518; 50 Mich. L.
Rev. 166 (1951); 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949-50) ;
2 DePaul Law Rev. 97; Prosser on Torts, sec. 31, pp. 188-
190 (1941).

When the Allaire case was decided in 1900, there were
two cases available as precedents, and both of those cases
had been but recently decided. Since that time many courts

428 ee

have dealt with the problem, and their opinions have been
supplemented by the analyses and comments of students of
the problem. It is appropriate, therefore, that we re-
examine the question in the light of the broader information
now available.

As they emerge from the many opinions which have
now considered the problem, the chief grounds urged in
support of the rule denying a viable child a right of action
to recover for prenatal injuries have been (1) the lack of
precedent; (2) the difficulty of determining the existence
of a causal relation between a prenatal injury and the death
or the condition of the child and the consequent possi-
bility of fictitious claims; (3) the absence of a duty to
the unborn child because it is thought to have no separate
being apart from its mother. And where the child has died
after birth and an action is brought under a wrongful death
statute, recovery has been denied on the ground that since
the child injured en ventre sa mere could not recover for
prenatal injuries, its parents or next of kin could not re-
cover for its death. Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49
Atl. 704; Buel v. United Railways Co. 248 Mo. 126, 154
S.W. 71; Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich 60, 274
N.W. 710; Smith v. Trostler, 299 Ill. App. 100; Drabbels
v. Skelly Oil Co. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 220.

Principal reasons advanced in support of allowing re-
covery where the injuries occur when the child is viable
are: (1) an unborn viable child, being capable of inde-
pendent physical existence, should be regarded as a sepa-
rate entity from the mother; (2) the law recognizes the
separate existence of an unborn child for the purpose of
protecting his property rights and to protect him against
criminal conduct; (3) a wrong jis inflicted for which there
is no remedy unless there is recognition of the legal right
of a child to commence life unimpaired by physical or
mental defects caused by the negligence of others while it
was a viable child en ventre sa mere; and (4) lack of

es 429

precedent should not bar recovery where a wrong has been
committed.

Turning, then, to the reasons which have prompted the
denial of recovery, we consider first the alleged lack of
common-law precedent. It has been said that Justice
Holmes, unable to find any precedent for the action for
prenatal injuries, believed that the common law afforded
no remedy, whereas a more accurate statement, according
to Salmond, Torts, 346 (roth ed., Stallybrass, 1945,)
would have been that there was no English authority on
either side of the question. As the Supreme Court of
Georgia forcefully pointed out, there is no common-law
precedent denying recovery : “Thus it is seen that Blackstone
says that, in contemplation of the common law, life begins
when the child is able to stir in the mother’s womb. It can
have a legacy, can own an estate, and a guardian can be
assigned to it. It cannot seriously be denied that the pur-
pose of the common law in allowing the appointment of
a guardian for the unborn child is to make available
processes of the law for the protection and preservation
of the properties belonging to the child. There is nothing
in the common law to indicate that it would withhold from
such a child its processes for the purpose of protecting and
preserving the person as well as the property of such child.
It would therefore seem to us to be an unwarranted reflec-
tion upon the common law itself to attribute to it a greater
concern for the protection of property than for the protec-
tion of the person. * * * If the killing of the unborn
child is regarded by the law as being sufficient injury to
society to justify taking the life of the perpetrator of the
crime, then, to be logical and just to the injured child, the
law must allow it to employ legal process and recover dam-
ages for the injury inflicted upon it. It would be contrary
to every principle of right and justice, which are the very
There is nothing in the common law denying such a right
essence of law, to deny such rights to the injured child.

430 er

to the child.” Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons,
Inc. 208 Ga, 201, 65 S.E. 2d gog (1981).

To the same effect is this statement by the Maryland
court in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 Atl. 2d (Md.) 550
(1951): “The only logical basis for denying recovery
by a child for an injury while en ventre sa mere is that
stated by Justice Holmes. He based it upon a common law
which had no positive existence, but is derived from an
isolated statement by Lord Coke, which is itself modified
in the same sentence by the suggestion that the law in many
cases has consideration for the unborn child by reason of
the expectation of its birth. The will and inheritance cases
recognize the rights of an unborn child, and so do the crim-
inal cases. His right to claim damages in admiralty is
established. All of these may be under adaptations of the
civil law to the common law, but when incorporated in it,
they become part of the common law. If we were con-
sidering a case of first impression anywhere, we would be
unable to find that the common law denied the right. On
the contrary, it would appear that, in so far as there was
any common law on the subject, the right would be recog-
nized under the general theory, ubi jus ibi remedium.”

The argument based upon the difficulty of proof of a
causal relation between the injury en ventre sa mere and
the damage which subsequently becomes apparent has like-
wise been rejected. “The difficulty of obtaining proof of
the wrong should prompt greater leniency in affording the
remedy, rather than a denial of plain justice. We are not
impressed with the reasoning that a clear remedy for an
injustice should be denied because a wrong is not readily
susceptible of proof.” (Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
629, 92 Pac. 2d 678, (1939).) Concerning “the argument
of convenience, based upon the difficulty of proof,” the
Maryland court made these observations in the Damasiewica
case: “It is probable that this would have been almost in-
surmountable in the days of Coke, Hardwicke and Black-

42

stone, and perhaps of Holmes, and may have influenced
their conceptions of the law. Physicians of today would
have less trouble with the problem, but apart from this, the
right to bring an action is clearly distinguishable from the
ability to prove the facts. The first cannot be denied be-
cause the second may not exist. Another suggestion, some-
what allied, is the fear that numerous faked or fraudulent
claims will overwhelm the courts. This argument ad ter-
rorem should have no weight to prevent legitimate claims
from being heard. Fraud can be dealt with in this class
of cases, just as in others, and the detection and elimination
of faked contentions present no novel question to judicial
bodies. Here again, modern medical knowledge will do
away with much of the difficulty.” 79 Atl 2d (Md.)
550; 559-

The third ground upon which recovery has been denied
is the assumed identity of mother and unborn child, and
the consequent absence of any duty to the child. The Diet-
rich case, which originated the doctrine of nonliability,
largely upon the ground that the unborn child is a part of
its mother, has been both criticized and distinguished. One
writer describes most of the opinion as “sheer dicta,” say-
ing, “The fact is that the infant lives with its mother while
in its prenatal state rather than being a part of the mother.”
(Gaines, “The Infant’s Right of Action for pre-Natal In-
juries,” 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 518.) A distinction frequently
drawn is that the unborn child in the Dietrich case had not
attained a state of viability, whereas the unborn children in
recent cases sustaining a right of action were viable when
injured. A viable foetus has been defined as one sufficiently
developed for extra-uterine survival, normally a foetus of
seven months or older. (Stedman, Medical Dictionary, 1234
(16th ed. Taylor, 1946).) “All authorities agree that at
some time during the period of gestation, the infant, yet
unborn, reaches a stage of development where it can live
outside of the mother.” ‘Taylor, Principles and Practice of

432 ee

Medical Jurisprudence, 34. (roth ed.). See: Dorland, The
American Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 1625 (2oth ed.
1945).

This basis of nonliability was disposed of by the New |
York Court of Appeals in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349,
102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951). There the court said: “To hold,
as matter of law, that no viable foetus has any separate
existence which the law will recognize is for the law to
deny a simple and easily demonstrable fact. This child,
when injured, was in fact, alive and capable of being deliv-
ered and of remaining alive, separate from its mother. We
agree with the dissenting Justice below that “To deny the
infant relief in this case is not only a harsh result, but its
effect is to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn fiction
not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue
and unjustified.’ ”

Upon a reappraisal of the question, we conclude that the
reasons which have been advanced in support of the doc-
trine of nonliability fail to carry conviction. We hold,
therefore, in conformity with the recent decisions of the
courts of last resort of New York, Maryland, Georgia,
Minnesota, and Ohio, and the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, that plaintiff, as administratrix of the
estate of a viable child, who suffered prenatal injuries and
was thereafter born alive, has a right of action against the
defendant whose alleged negligence caused the injuries.
Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, is overruled.

A further word is appropriate to dispose of the defend-
ant’s insistence upon Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 28, par. 1,
as a statutory bar to this action. That act provides: “That
the common law of England, so far as the same is appli-
cable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of
the British parliament made in aid of, and to supply the
defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of
James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth
chapter of 43d Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th

| 438

Elizabeth, and ninth chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and
which are of a general nature and not local to that king-
dom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered
as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.”
Upon the basis of this statute defendant contends: “The
power of this Honorable Court to adjudicate between liti~
gants is derived from two sources, namely: the Common
Law as it existed prior to March 24, 1606, and Statute
Law. A cause of action for prenatal injuries was unknown
at Common Law. There is no statute permitting such
cause of action.” :

Tt is at once apparent that defendant’s contention that
the only available materials for decision are our own stat-~
utes and English decisions rendered before 1607 would,
if adopted, drastically change our law. The complaint in
this case would certainly fail to state a cause of action
because negligence did not emerge as a separate basis of
tort liability until two hundred years after 1607. (Prosser
on Torts, sec. 28.) The development of the law of con-
tracts would lie before us, for Slade’s case (76-Eng. Repr.
1074) was not decided until 1602. The law of quasi-
contracts began with Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Repr.
676, decided in 1760. The validity of a future interest in
real property was first made to depend upon the period
within which it would vest in the Duke of Norfolk’s case,
22 Eng. Repr. 931, decided in 1682, and the present period
of the rule against perpetuities became settled in Codell v.
Palmer, 1 Clark & F. 372, decided in 1833. We would
have no law of agency, for it, too, developed after 1607.
(Holmes, Common Law, 228.) The list could be expanded.

What the statute adopted was not just those precedents
which happened to have already been announced by English
courts at the close of the sixteenth century, but rather a
system of law whose outstanding characteristic is its adapt-
ability and capacity for growth. The common law which

the statute adopted “is a system of elementary rules and of
L |

434 Le

general judicial declarations of principles, which are con-
tinually expanding with the progress of society, adapting
themselves to the gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts,
inventions and the exigencies and usages of the country.”
Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496.

In rejecting the contention upon which the defendant
now insists, this court pointed out more than a hundred
years ago, “that if we are to be restricted to the common
law, as it was enacted at fourth James, rejecting all modi-
fications and improvements which have since been made,
by practice and statutes, except our own statutes, we will
find that system entirely inapplicable to our present condi-
tion, for the simple reason that it is more than two hundred
years behind the age.” Penny v. Little, 3 Scam. 301, 304.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and the circuit
court of Lake County are each reversed and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule
defendant’s motion to strike count II of the complaint.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

es
Oo, 72

THE PEOPLE oF THE STATE oF InLinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Max Dorer, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed May 20, 1953—Rehearing denied September 21, 1953.

1p
ry

8
g

437

| {

Caries A, BetLows, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

LatHam CastLe, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Ben W. Hememan, Josep D. Biocx, and Roper? F.
Han ey, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr, Justice Furton delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error, Max Dolgin, and one Jacob Lieb were
indicted by the grand jury of Cook County on a charge of
forging and counterfeiting cigarette tax meter stamps for
the purpose of evading the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act. The
indictment contained two counts, the first charging that the
defendants themselves forged and counterfeited the stamps
and the second that they caused and procured others to
do so. At the trial before a jury in the criminal court of
Cook County, the People elected to stand on the first count.
The jury found Lieb not guilty but returned a verdict of
guilty against plaintiff in error, upon which he was sen-
tenced by the court to confinement in the State Penitentiary
for a term of not less than two years nor more than ten
years. He has sued out a writ of error to review the judg-
ment and sentence.

The first assignment of error relates to the refusal by
the trial court to allow a motion to suppress certain evi-
dence, consisting of metering machines and equipment and
cartons of stamped cigarettes seized in a raid made upon
the place of business occupied by the R&L Tobacco Co.,
Inc., the corporation of which plaintiff in error was ‘presi-

438 es

dent. This evidence was seized by State highway policemen
under authority of a search warrant issued by one of the
judges of the criminal court of Cook County and a directive
issued by the Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois
under‘section 11 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act. (IIL
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 120, par. 453.11.) It is contended
that the affidavits supporting the complaint for the search
warrant are legally insufficient; that there was an unrea-
sonable delay between the time the authorities obtained the
information concerning the counterfeit tax stamps and the
time of application for the search warrant and that a State
highway policeman did not have authority to execute the
warrant. Plaintiff in error also contends that section 11 of
the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act, empowering officers and
agents of the Department of Revenue to enter the place of
business of a distributor without a search warrant and in-
spect the premises, stock of cigarettes, and vending devices
with a view to determining if any of the provisions of the
act are being violated, does not extend to State highway
policemen, and that mere possession of a directive from the
Department of Revenue does not make such an officer an
agent or employee of the Department.

Plaintiff in error says that the search warrant was issued
upon hearsay affidavits. The complaint for the warrant
was signed by H. W. Nofs, a State highway policeman.
It charges that the R&L Tobacco Co., Inc., William M.
Levy and Max Dolgin counterfeited tax meter stamps and
that the stamps and various tools for making them were
concealed at 5645-47 South Harper Avenue, Chicago, IIli-
nois, the business address of R&L, Tobacco Co., Inc.
Three affidavits were attached to the complaint. The first
is that of A. H. Johnson, an investigator. He swore that
on various dates between August 24, 1951, and October 8,
1951, he purchased eleven cartons of cigarettes of various
brands at six retail stores. ‘These he marked with a symbol
for identification, the date of purchase and the name and

es 439

address of the store where purchased. He sent them un-
opened to Pitney-Bowes, Inc., at Stamford, Connecticut.
‘The second affidavit was that of S. J. Madenford, assistant
manager of the tax equipment section of Pitney-Bowes, Inc.
He swore he received the cartons sent by Johnson, identify-
ing them by the symbols; that he opened the cartons and
examined the Illinois cigarette tax stamps appearing on the
packages therein and that the same were counterfeit. His
affidavit also sets forth that Pitney-Bowes is the exclusive
manufacturer of tax meters used in Illinois as well as in 36
other States; that each tax meter is assigned an exclusive
serial number which is never reissued or duplicated; that
this serial number represents a particular distributor to
whom the meter is licensed in the State of Illinois; that
this serial number is imprinted in boldface type on each
package of cigarettes upon which a cigarette tax meter
stamp is imprinted. He further swore that of the eleven
cartons of cigarettes received, all but one bore the serial
number 23227, the serial number assigned to R&L, To-
bacco Co., Inc. The third affidavit was another sworn to
by A. H. Johnson. It states that affiant went to the six
retail establishments where he had originally purchased the
cigarettes; that he examined sales invoices and various
other records covering a certain period before and after
the date of purchase and that in five of the six cases the
records examined disclosed that the R&I, Tobacco Co.,
Inc., was the retailer’s exclusive supplier of cigarettes for
the period in question. Johnson also stated that he had
personally examined the premises of the R&I, Tobacco .
Co, and that he personally knew the company was engaged
in the business of selling cigarettes at wholesale. His affi-
davit stated that he had personally examined the records
of the Department of Revenue of which he was an em-
ployee and that they disclosed that the tax meter bearing
serial number 23227 had been assigned to R& L Tobacco
Co., Inc.

440 ee

Specifically stated, plaintiff in error’s objection is that
Johnson’s second affidavit is hearsay because it sets forth
what he observed upon checking the records of the six retail
establishments without incorporating the records themselves
or authenticated copies thereof. It is said that because of
this omission the affidavits contain no facts from which the
issuing magistrate could conclude that the R &L Tobacco
Co., or plaintiff in error was the supplier of cigarettes to
the retail establishments in question,

Section 6 of article II of the constitution of this State
provides that no search warrant shall be issued without
probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. In applying these provisions of our basic law this
court has repeatedly held that the affidavit in support of a
search warrant must state facts which are within the per-
sonal knowledge of affiant; that affidavits made upon in-
formation and belief are legally insufficient and that search
warrants issued upon such complaints or affidavits are in
violation of the constitutional rights of the persons affected.
(People v. Elias, 316 Ill. 376; People v. Sovetsky, 343 Il.
583.) The existence of probable cause is always the ulti-
mate question. This is judicial—to be decided by the magis-
trate before whom the complaint is made. (People v. Prall,
314 Ill. 518.) We have said that the complete legal idea
expressed by the term “probable cause” is not to be gathered
from a mere definition. (People v. Daugherty, 324 Il.
160.) However, where a belief is held in good faith by
the prosecutor of the guilt of the accused based upon cir-
cumstances sufficiently strong to induce the belief in the
mind of a reasonably cautious person that the defendant in
the prosecution was guilty of the particular offense charged,
probable cause for the arrest of the person exists. (Glenn
v. Lawrence, 280 Ill. 581.) If there is reasonable ground
for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that

es 4a

the person accused is guilty of the offense charged, it is a
sufficient basis for the issuance of a search warrant. (Peo-
ple v. Lavendowski, 329 Ill. 223.) In People v. DeGeovanni,
326 Ill. 230, at page 234, we said: “A complaint for a search
warrant is to be regarded as sufficient to authorize the issu-
ance of a search warrant when the facts therein stated and
sworn to show probable cause for the writ. It is not re-
quired that the complaint for a search warrant should show,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the writ should be issued.”

In the case before us the affidavit of Johnson is not
made upon information and belief. It states positively and
unequivocally that affiant visited the retail establishments
where cigarettes bearing forged stamps had been purchased
originally and that upon personal inspection of their records
by affiant it appeared that defendant’s company had been
the sole supplier of cigarettes at the times in question. The
affidavit sets forth in considerable detail what records were
examined and what the records showed; this evidence was
competent and direct as bearing upon the issue of probable
cause. It is a statement of facts within affiant’s personal
knowledge—of what he himself saw and observed. While
it is true that the records themselves would have to be pro-
duced to prove the truth of the facts recited therein, affiant’s
statements to prove what the records showed were com-
petent upon the issue of probable cause so long as they
were based upon his personal inquiries and observations.
We believe that the affidavits, taken together, make a clear
case of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.
They are not subject to the hearsay objection interposed
by plaintiff in error.

‘The cigarettes in question were purchased over a period
from August 24, 1951, to October 8, 1951, from various
retailers on repeated shopping days. The search warrant
was not applied for until November 26, 1951, some 49 days
after the date of the last purchase. Plaintiff in error says
that this lapse of time between the last date of information

442 es

and the date of application for the warrant invalidates the
warrant. No Illinois decisions are cited in support of this
position but a number from other jurisdictions are cited in
which, under the particular circumstances, the lapse of
time was held to be unreasonable. We have examined the
cases cited by plaintiff in error. In most of them the war-

rant was based upon an isolated event taking place some *

time previously. There was no evidence of a continuing
offense such as was made to appear to the magistrate in
this case. This court has said that no hard-and-fast rule
concerning the time within which the complaint should be
made can be established except that it should not be too
remote. (People v. Holton, 326 Ill. 481.) Whether or not

it is too remote must depend upon all the facts and circum- _

stances of the particular case. The only bearing that pas-
sage of time of itself has upon the question is its effect
upon the existence or nonexistence of probable cause. Here
the magistrate had before him the evidence that the R&L
Tobacco Co. had, over a considerable period of time in an
extensive territory, made repeated sales and deliveries of
cigarettes bearing counterfeit tax stamps. We believe that
there was reasonable cause to believe that this offense was
continuing, so that even after the lapse of the time indicated
the issuance of the warrant would not be improper.

The search warrant was served by a State highway
police officer. Plaintiff in error contends that a search war-
rant is in the nature of civil process and since State high-
way policemen are specifically prohibited by statute from
serving civil process, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 121, par.
307.16,) the service here was illegal and void. Plaintiff in
error cites People v. Moore, 410 Ill. 241, as authority for
the position that a search warrant is civil process. But that
case contains no such holding. The question before this
court was whether the State could appeal from that portion
of an order of a county court ordering the return of con-
traband property which had been seized upon a search war-

ee] 443

rant and ordered suppressed. This court recognized the
difference between that portion of the order suppressing
the warrant and the use of the property as evidence in a
criminal proceeding from that part ordering a return of
the property. We said that the former, being an order in
a criminal proceeding, was one from which the State could
not appeal. The latter, being an order civil in its nature,
was one from which an appeal would lie on behalf of the
People. While the case does not decide the precise question
here involved, it does stand for the proposition that an-
order entered suppressing evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing after seizure of the same upon a search warrant is
criminal in its nature. We believe the warrant itself is in
the nature of criminal rather than civil process. This was
recognized in principle in our decision in Lippman v. People,
175 Ill. ror where, at page 111, we quoted with approval
the language of Bishop on Criminal Procedure (vol. 1,
sec. 716) from Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Gray 454:
“Search warrants were never recognized by the common
law as processes which might be availed of by individuals
in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance
of any mere private right, but their use was confined to
cases of public prosecutions instituted and pursued for the
suppression of crime or the detection or punishment of
criminals.” Under modern statutes relating to search and
seizure the same principles prevail. (People v. Kempner,
208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794.) A search warrant is in the
nature of criminal process. Its purpose is to aid in the
detection and punishment of crime. It has no relation to
civil process or civil trials. By statute State highway police-
men are expressly designated as “conservators of the peace”
with “all powers possessed by policemen in cities, and
sheriffs, except that they may exercise such powers any-
where in this State.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 121, par.
307.16.) Section 20 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap, 120, par. 453.20,) authorizes “any

444 |

peace officer of the State” to obtain a search warrant under
that section and section 3 of division VIII of the Criminal
Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 693,) provides
that a search warrant shall be directed to the sheriff or any
constable of the county, or bailiff of the municipal court
of Chicago. Whether we regard the search warrant as
having been issued under the Criminal Code or under the
Cigarette Tax Act, a State highway policeman had the
power and authority to execute the warrant.

Moreover, it may be seriously questioned that a search
warrant was needed to make the search and seizure valid.
Section 11 of the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 120, par. 453.11,) provides in part as follows:
“At all times during the usual business hours of the day
any duly authorized agent or employee of the Department
may enter any place of business of the distributor, without
a search warrant, and inspect the premises and the stock or
packages of cigarettes and the vending devices therein con-
tained, to determine whether any of the provisions of this
Act are being violated.” Under the authority of this sec~
tion the State police officers who served the warrant were
also given written authority by the Department of Revenue
to inspect the premises as its agents, with specific instruc-
tions as to the scope and nature of the inspection and exam-
ination. This written authority was read to the plaintiff in
error on the premises following the reading of the search
warrant and before the inspection began. Plaintiff in error
says that the State highway police officers could not be
agents of the Department, but assigns no reason for his
conclusion and no reason is perceived by us why the fact
that an individual happens to be a State police officer
would prevent him from being an agent and so designated
by the Department. Being agents of the Department of
Revenue, these officers were lawfully on the premises under
section 11 of the Cigarette Tax Act and the written au-
thority.received from the Department. While lawfully on

445

the premises these officers observed a felony being com-
mitted in their presence in violation of section 23 of the
Cigarette Tax Act and forthwith arrested plaintiff in error.
As peace officers they had authority to make the arrest, and,
the arrest being lawful, a search of the immediate premises
incident thereto would also be lawful, including the search
of the safes in which the metering machines were found.
(United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56; People v.
Dubin, 367 Ill. 229.) We find, therefore, that the search
and seizure were lawful and not in violation of the con-
stitutional rights of plaintiff in error. The court correctly
tefused to allow the motion to suppress.

During the course of the trial a juror reported to a
bailiff that an effort had been made to bribe her. The
bailiff immediately brought the juror before the trial judge
where she was examined in the presence of counsel for
the People and counsel for both defendants. She described
the attempt as having been made at her home by a man
unknown to her who offered her $500 to vote for a verdict
of “not guilty.” The juror repeatedly stated that the ex-
perience would not prevent her from being a fair juror
for both sides and that she held nothing against the de-
fendants or the People because of the attempt. She also
stated that she had not discussed the matter with any other
juror and assured the court and counsel that she would
not do so. It appeared that no member of the jury knew
that she was in chambers discussing the matter. At. the
request of counsel for the People the court admonished the
juror that she was to say nothing to the other jurors about
the matter. She assured all concerned that she would say
nothing to the other jurors. Following her return to the
jury room, counsel for plaintiff in error and counsel for
Lieb moved for a mistrial, The motion was denied and
error has been assigned upon the ruling.

Not every effort by an unknown person to bribe a
juror will require a mistrial. If it did, a defendant, if so

446 ee

disposed, could hamper and delay the administration of
justice indefinitely merely by adopting the expedient of
having someone approach a juror. Whether or not a mis-
trial shall be ordered upon such an occurrence rests in the
sound judicial discretion of the trial judge. It is not the
law that a mistrial must result as a matter of course. No
decisions of this court standing for such a position have
been cited and we are aware of none. An examination of
the authorities from other jurisdictions and of our own
decisions relative to other forms of improper conduct of
or affecting the jury leads us to the conclusion that the
tule should be that such a motion is addressed to the sound
judicial discretion of the trial judge in the first instance
and that, in the absence of a showing that the defendant
has been prejudiced, a ruling denying the motion is proper.
See, People v. Strause, 290 Ill. 259; People v. Coniglio,
353 Ill. 643; People v. Cain, 365 Ill. 494; People v. Man-
gano, 354 Ill. 329; People v. Phelps, 388 Ill. 618. The
record before us is devoid of anything showing prejudice
to the rights of the defendant. On the other hand, it
reveals zealous efforts by the court, counsel and the juror
herself to safeguard those rights. The repeated assurances
by the juror that she had not been prejudiced, her full and
frank disclosure of the occurrence, the opportunity given
to all counsel to examine her as much as they wished, the
admonitions given by court and counsel and the assurance
of the juror that she would follow those admonitions, all
lead to the conclusion that the court acted properly in the
exercise of its discretion. We find no error in the denial of
the motion for a mistrial.

Plaintiff in error says he was refused counsel of his
own choosing at the trial. The facts upon which this con-
tention is based show that the indictment was returned
again Lieb and Dolgin on December 18, 1951. They were
arraigned on December 27, 1951. Both defendants were
represented by Maurice J. Walsh, an attorney chosen by

a Aa

them, who continued to represent them in the case through-
out January, February, March, and early April of 1952,
during which time many preliminary motions were made
and disposed of. The case was finally set for trial on April
23, 1952. On the day prior to the trial both defendants
filed a motion for a continuance until after the November
elections, the grounds as stated being in essence that the
case had been made a “political football.” This motion con-
tained no mention of possible antagonistic defenses. The
motion was denied by the court and that ruling has not
been questioned by the plaintiff in error. On April 23,
1952, the day of the trial, attorney Walsh filed a petition
for severance on behalf of Lieb on the ground that the
testimony of one of the witnesses for the People whose
name had been furnished on April 15 would be derogatory
as to Dolgin and that Lieb’s rights would be affected. The
motion was denied and Walsh then sought leave of court
to withdraw as attorney for Dolgin on the ground that
Lieb’s and Dolgin’s defenses would be antagonistic. This
motion was also denied. Thereupon, on the same date,
Harold S. Rosenfield, an attorney, filed a motion for a
continuance on behalf of Dolgin, stating it was necessary,
because of the conditions as outlined in Walsh’s motion,
that Dolgin have separate counsel; that he had only re-
cently been consulted and had not had an opportunity to
acquaint himself with the case; that Dolgin desired that
he (Rosenfield) represent him. The trial court denied the
motion for a continuance but allowed Rosenfield to enter’
his appearance and to represent plaintiff in error. There-
after the trial proceeded with both Walsh and Rosenfield
representing Dolgin and Walsh alone representing Lieb.
From these events plaintiff in error contends that the trial
court prevented him from receiving a fair trial by depriv-
ing him of an opportunity to prepare properly his defense
and that, by refusing to permit Walsh to withdraw as
attorney for Dolgin, Dolgin was, in effect, denied the right

448 es

to be represented by an attorney of his choice, contrary to
his constitutional rights.

This argument can have merit only if the defenses of
Lieb and plaintiff in error were, in fact, antagonistic. If
this be not so, then there was no necessity for the inter-
vention of new counsel at the last moment. And if new
counsel was unnecessary there was no real need for a con-
tintance. We have carefully examined the record to deter-
mine in what respects the defenses of Lieb and Dolgin were
antagonistic but find nothing to indicate any incompatibility
of interest. Neither defendant testified in his own behalf.
Neither put in any evidence except that of his prior good
reputation. It appears that counsel representing the defend-
ants made substantially the same objections and filed the
same motions on behalf of both defendants during the trial.
Both defense counsel availed themselves of the oppor-
tunity given to cross-examine the witnesses for the People,
but none of the testimony adduced either on direct or cross-
examination indicates that either defendant was placed at
a disadvantage because of a conflict of interests or defenses.
The fact that counsel finally submitted and requested joint
instructions on behalf of both defendants is probably the
best indication that their positions were entirely compatible.
A trial judge has considerable discretionary power in mat-
ters of granting a continuance to allow for the presentation
of a defense and in connection with the substitution of

counsel. (People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill. 176; People v..

Ritcheson, 396 Il. 146; .People v. Martin, 376 Ill. 569;
People v. Storer, 329 Ill. 536.) No showing is made here
that the defense of plaintiff in error would have been any
different had the motion fora continuance been granted.
He had the benefit of two counsel, both of his own choos-
ing. Walsh had been in the case from the start. He was
thoroughly familiar with all preliminary proceedings and
had nearly four months to prepare for trial, Rosenfield,
who was allowed to enter the case on behalf of plaintiff in

es 449

error on the day of the trial, proceeded to represent him
diligently thereafter. The rights of plaintiff in error were
not prejudiced by the action of the trial court in refusing
to allow Walsh to withdraw as his counsel and to grant a
continuance as requested by Rosenfield.

At the trial, certain records and documents of the De-
partment of Revenue were admitted under section to of
the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act which provides in part as
follows: “The books, papers, records and memoranda of
the Department, or parts thereof, may be proved in any
hearing, investigation or legal proceeding by a photostatic
copy thereof under the certificate of the Director of Reve-
nue. Such photostatic copy shall, without further proof,
be admitted into evidence before the Department or in any
legal proceeding.” (IIL Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 120, par.
453-10.) Documents entered at the trial pursuant to this
provision were People’s exhibit 4, being a photostatic copy
of a letter from Pitney-Bowes, Inc., to the Department
stating that meter No. 23227 was installed with R&L
Tobacco Co., Inc., on June 14, 1948, and having attached
thereto a code-layout of the counterfeit detection devices
peculiar to that meter; People’s exhibits 5 through 13,
being revenue returns of R&L Tobacco Co. to the De-
partment signed by plaintiff in error, showing use of meter:
No. 23227 and monthly quantities of cigarettes sold and
stamped with this machine; and People’s exhibit 50, being
a copy of a letter of June 6, 1941, from the Department
of Revenue to Pitney-Bowes, Inc., approving a design for
the Illinois tax meter stamp, the form of the design being
attached. Plaintiff in error challenges the constitutionality
of the section of the statute pursuant to which these docu-
ments were admitted under the certificate of the Director
of Revenue and questions the relevancy of the exhibits
themselves,

The statute in question represents, we believe, an ex-
tension of the public-documents exception to the hearsay

450 |

tule, which, at common law, permitted the reception into
evidence of public documents and official statements made
by public officers in the performance of their official duties.
In People v. Love, 310 Ill. 558, the defendant challenged
an act of this State providing that the certificate of the
Secretary of State placed in evidence in any prosecution,
action, suit or proceeding, showing compliance or noncom-
pliance with the Illinois Securities law, should be prima
facie evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the law.
There, as here, the contention was made that the act vio-
lated the defendant’s constitutional rights by denying him
the opportunity of seeing his witnesses in court and cross-
examining them. There, as here, it was argued that the
act changes the rules of evidence in criminal cases and that
this cannot be done in a revenue act. At page 563 of that
opinion we said: “While the legislature does not have
power to declare what shall be conclusive evidence, (People
vy. Rose, 207 Ill. 352,) no one has any vested right in a rule
of evidence either in a criminal or civil case, and there is
no constitutional prohibition against the legislature chang-
ing it so long as it leaves to a party either in a criminal
or civil case a fair opportunity to make his defense and to
submit all the facts to the jury. The fact that the statute
makes the certificate of the Secretary of State prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated does not make such act
void, as contravening the constitution. (People v. Beck,
305 Ill. 593; People v. Falk, ante, p. 282; Johnson v.
Pendergast, 308 Ill. 255.) Nor is the section void as de-
priving the accused of a right to meet witnesses face to
face. Such doctrine has no application to documentary
evidence of this character. (Sokel v. People, 212 Ill. 238;
Tucker v. People, 122 id. 583.) ‘The certificate of the
Secretary of State is an official act under the seal of the
State, required of a public officer by the statute, certifying
to what the records of his office show. It is within the
category of documentary evidence referred to in these cases.

es 454

‘The act is not open to the constitutional objections urged.”

We believe that the constitutional objections made here
as to section 10 of the Cigarette Tax Act are disposed of
by the quoted portion of our former opinion. Further,
it is true that most of the documents objected to would
have been admissible at common law under the well-settled
public-documents exception to the hearsay rule without
regard to section 10 of the act. People’s exhibit 4 is the
only document which may not have been admissible under
common-law principles. The record shows that every one
of the facts sought to be established by the questioned docu-
ments is also established by other competent evidence in
the case, removing all likelihood of prejudice. Nor are
People’s exhibits 5 through 13 irrelevant, as plaintiff in
error contends, These revenue reports made by the plain-
tiff in error himself showed that the licensee was regularly
using tax meter No. 23227, from which the inference arises
that the Department had adopted the stamp contained in
the meter and plaintiff in error had acquiesced in that
adoption.

The objection that the court erred in permitting the
jury to take exhibits 4, 50, and 5 through 13 with them
into the jury room is also without merit. These exhibits,
we believe, bore directly on the charge. It was discretionary
with the trial judge whether or not to allow the jury to
take them and no abuse of discretion is manifest. (People
v. Love, 310 Ill. 558.) No objection was made to this pro-
cedure at the trial; nor was it raised in the motion for a
new trial. It cannot be urged for the first time here. People
v. Thompson, 406 Ill. 555; People v. Niemoth, 4og Ill. 111.

Objection is made to certain instructions which were
given on behalf of the People. One of these informed the
jury that it was not necessary that the People prove every
incriminating fact or circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt, but to warrant a verdict of guilty it was sufficient
if the jury believe from all the evidence that the guilt of

452 ee

the defendants in manner and form as charged in the
indictment had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
This instruction was accompanied by others which informed
the jury as to the essential elements of the crime which
must be proved by the State. This was proper. (People v.
Ritcheson, 396 Ill. 146.) We have examined all the in-
structions. We find that, taken together, they fairly state
the law applicable to the case and are not open to the
objection that they may have misled the jury.

We come, finally, to the contention that the evidence
does not establish the guilt of the plaintiff in error beyond
a reasonable doubt. The plaintiff in error argues that his
conviction was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
He urges that proof of opportunity, alone, is not sufficient
to warrant a conviction and that, where a conviction rests
upon circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be con-
clusive in character and guilt so thoroughly established as
to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis. Plaintiff in
error says that the machine for making counterfeit tax-
stamp impressions which it is undisputed was found in a
locked safe on the business premises occupied by R&L
Tobacco Co., Inc., may have been placed there by someone
else. This is entirely unlikely. The R&L Tobacco Co.
was a small corporation. Only the defendants and their
wives appear to have had any interest whatever in this
business. They, or some of them, alone stood to profit by
evasion of the Cigarette Tax Act. The suggestion that
some employee may be responsible is absurd because it
ignores the fact that no employee could profit by such con-
duct without the knowledge of the owners of the business,
and connivance with them. It is undisputed that some
eight months before the counterfeiting was discovered,
plaintiff in error told one Michelson, a former business
associate, of his plan to avail himself of such a counter-
feiting machine. It is also undisputed that the machine
was found at the place of business together with packages

453

of cigarettes which had been stamped with the spurious
machine. The genuine machine, which had been supplied
by Pitney-Bowes, was also found on the premises. The
entire evidence, carefully considered, leads us to find that
the jury was warranted in believing that the guilt of the
plaintiff in error had been established beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County

will, therefore, be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

PO
(No. 5265)

Wittis Jackson, Appellant, vs. First Nationa, Bang
or Laxg Forest ef al., Appellees.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

454

Ernest S. Gam, of Highland Park, and Hupzarp,
Husparp & Dorean, of Chicago, (Arvin GLEN Husparp,
and Reese Husgarp, both of Chicago, of counsel,) for
appellant,

Tom L. Yarxs, of Chicago, for appellee First National
Bank of Lake Forest; Hart, Meyer & Van Dusen, of
Waukegan, (Luoyp A. Van Dusen, of counsel,) for ap-
pellee John F, Leonardi.

Downatp N. Crausen, Hersert W. Hirsu, and Nor-
man A. Miter, all of Chicago, amici curiae.

Mr. Justice Futon delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant, Willis Jackson, brought an action in the cir-
cuit court of Lake County against First National Bank
of Lake Forest, individually and as trustee, and John F.
Leonardi, seeking darhages for permanent injuries allegedly
sustained through defendants’ negligence when appellant fell

eS 455

down an outside cellarway located at the rear of certain
business premises in the village of Highland Park. At the
close of plaintiff’s evidence the trial court directed a verdict
against the plaintiff and in favor of the bank individually
and as trustee on all counts of the complaint. At the close
of all the evidence the court directed a verdict in favor of
defendant Leonardi on counts II, III and IV and the case
was submitted to the jury upon count I as against Leonardi.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the
sum of $5000 and the court entered judgment upon the
verdict. Defendant Leonardi then filed motions to set aside
the judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict and the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial as to
the bank only. Defendant’s motions were allowed and
plaintiff's motion was denied. Whereupon the court entered
judgment for the defendant Leonardi notwithstanding the
verdict. Plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court for the
Second District. The Appellate Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court in all respects and the case is here
after the granting of a petition for leave to appeal.
Appellant’s complaint as amended contained four counts.
The first count was directed against both defendants alleg-
ing the violation of their common-law duty owed to appel-
lant as a tenant to keep the stairway and its railings in
proper repair. The second count was directed against both
defendants and, in addition to allegations of common-law
negligence as in count I, charged the violation of certain
ordinances of the village of Highland Park requiring stair-
ways of certain width to have at least two handrails and
specifying risers not more than eight inches high and treads
not less than ten inches wide. Count III was like count IT
except that it was directed against the defendant Leonardi
only and count IV is the same except that it was directed
against the bank alone. The complaint alleged that the de-
fendants owned, controlled and operated a certain one-story
business building in the village of Highland Park which

456 ee

was divided into several storerooms bearing the numbers
51, 53, 55, 57 and 59 S. St. Johns Avenue; that they
rented to plaintiff the storerooms of the building numbered
51 and 53 together with a room in the basement under
number 53 with a right of ingress and egress to such room
over lands in the rear of said building and down an outside
stairway to the furnace room in the basement maintained
by defendants and thence to the basement room rented by
plaintiff where he maintained certain boilers and apparatus
used in connection with the operation of his tailor shop,
. cleaning and pressing establishment and shoe-repair shop.
The complaint alleged that the stairway in the back of the
building leading to the basement room was the only means
of ingress to and egress from that part of the building;
that it was an open stairway with walls and steps of con-
crete; that the top of the concrete wall forming the south
side or outside of the areaway was at ground level; that
attached to the top of this concrete wall was an iron pipe
railing with three upright standards fastened into the top
of the concrete wall and the ends of its horizontal rails
fastened to the west wall of the building; that on the north
side of the areaway was a brick wall being part of the
south wall of the building to which was attached an iron
handrail to be used by those ascending and descending but
that there was no handrail on the south side of the stairs.
The complaint further alleged that the upright railing
was for the protection of those using the stairway, includ-
ing the plaintiff; that it was the duty of defendants to use
due care to maintain said stairway and railing in a reason-
ably safe condition; that defendants in violation of their
duty negligently allowed the railing to become worn, fragile,
broken and rusted; that they knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known of this condition; that
plaintiff while in the exercise of due care for his own
safety and while attempting to use the stairway as a means ©
of ingress to the basement storeroom suffered a fall due

es 41

to the breaking of the railing he was using in descending,
causing serious and permanent injuries. The complaint also
alleged that the stairs were negligently constructed and
maintained in violation of certain provisions of the village
ordinances above referred to; that the treads sloped from
the risers toward the nosings, and that this negligence also
contributed to plaintiff’s injuries.

The defendant bank by its separate answer admitted
that it held legal title to the premises as trustee but denied
that it owned or controlled the premises or any part thereof.
The answer further denied that it owed any duty whatever
toward plaintiff, set forth certain portions of the written
lease and trust agreement and denied the negligence alleged.
As an affirmative defense the bank pleaded an exoneration
clause found in paragraph 7 of plaintiff's lease. Defendant
Leonardi’s separate answer denied ownership, admitted leas-
ing of the premises to the plaintiff for business purposes,
admitted receiving rents, denied the negligence complained
of and also pleaded the exoneration clause as an affirmative
defense,

Certain facts are not disputed. Defendant Leonardi
was the donor in a certain trust agreement with the bank
whereby the legal title to the premises in question and other
real estate was held by the bank in trust to pay the net
income to the donor for life and after his death to mem-
bers of his family, with provisions as to the eventual dis-
tribution of the corpus. The agreement provided that the
trustee “shall sell, lease, mortgage and otherwise deal with
the property * * * as, if and when and only as, if and
when directed in writing so to do by the Donor during his
lifetime. During the Donor’s lifetime he shall be solely
responsible for the payment of taxes, assessments, repairs,
maintenance, insurance premiums and all other costs and
expenses incident to the ownership, maintenance and upkeep
of said premises and for the leasing of said premises and
the collection of rents thereon and the payment of all com-

458 ee

. missions or other charges to agents and brokers employed
in the management and operation or sale of said prem-
ises.” The trust agreement is dated December 13, 1941.
Leonardi acquired the business property here involved in
July of 1946 and placed it in trust with the bank at that
time under the aforesaid agreement. Plaintiff, Jackson,
was already occupying a part of the premises. He had
been in business at that address since 1944. On May 27,
1947, the bank as trustee entered into a lease agreement
with Jackson, leasing to him the same premises he had
been occupying for a further period of five years, begin-
ning on July 1, 1947, and ending on June 30, 1952. The
lease provided for a total rental of $10,800, payable in
monthly installments of $180 at the offices of John F.
Leonardi, agent, Highwood, Illinois. Leonardi negotiated
this lease with the plaintiff and collected all of the rents
thereunder. He was the manager of the building. The
bank collected no rents and was not requested to assume
any managerial duties. Clause 7 of the lease provided:

Lessor shall not be liable to Lessee for any damage or
injury to him or his property occasioned by the failure of
Lessor to keep said premises in repair, and shall not be-
liable for any injury done or occasioned by wind or by or
from any defect of plumbing, electric wiring or of insula-
tion thereof, gas pipes, water pipes or steam pipes, or from
broken stairs, porches, railings or walks, or from the back-
ing up of any sewer pipe or down-spout, or from the burst-
ing, leaking or running of any tank, tub, washstand, water
closet or waste pipe, drain, or any other pipe or tank in,
upon or about said building or premises nor from the
escape of steam or hot water from any radiator, it being
agreed that said radiators are under the control of Lessee,
nor from any such damage or injury occasioned by water,
snow or ice being upon or coming through the roof, sky-
light, trap-door, stairs, walks‘or any other place upon or
near said premises, or otherwise, nor for any such damage

459

or injury done or occasioned by the falling of any fixture,
plaster or stucco, nor for any damage or injury arising
from any act, omission or negligence of co-tenants or of
other persons, occupants of the same building or of adjoin-
ing or contiguous buildings or of owners of adjacent or
contiguous property, or of Lessor’s agents or Lessor him-
self, all claims for any such damage or injury being hereby
expressly waived by Lessee.” J Plaintiff was injured on
February 19, 1948, when he fell on the outside stairway in
the rear of the premises in question while going down to
the basement room leased to him. The iron railing at the
top of the wall was found to be broken after plaintiff’s fall.
All three of the upright posts were broken off or pulled
loose and the rail remained fastened only where its hori-
zontal parts were attached to the west wall of the building.

‘The first question to be considered is whether the action
of the trial court in directing a verdict for the bank on all
counts at the close of plaintiff’s case was proper. In direct-
ting a verdict the court held that clause 7 of the lease con-
stituted a complete defense to plaintiff’s action so far as
the bank was concerned. ‘The Appellate Court has affirmed
that ruling. Appellant contends that the agreement, insofar
as it purports to exempt the lessor from liability for negli-
gence, is void as against public policy and that the trial
court erred in directing a verdict. Thus the question as to
the validity of clause 7 of the lease is directly presented
for our consideration.

In what respects or to what extent the parties to a legal
relationship may, by contract, destroy the incidents normally
arising from such relationship, is always a difficult ques-
tion for the courts. On the one hand, because both State
and Federal constitutions guarantee freedom of contract,
the courts are anxious to preserve the rights of the parties
arising by agreement where the contract has been freely
entered into and is not tainted with fraud. On the other
hand, the courts have recognized the desirability of pre-

460 ee

serving those legal rights and duties arising by operation
of law out of the creation of certain legal relationships
and, for the general social good, have refused to recognize
the validity of some agreements seeking to set them aside.
Thus while some of the legal incidents arising upon the
creation of the relationship can be avoided by express con-
tract, others cannot, and the courts, in considering whether
or not effect shall be given to the particular agreement in
question have constantly to weigh the advantages of pre-
serving the contract of the parties against the disadvantages
of possible serious social consequences arising from its
enforcement. Contracts by which one seeks to relieve him-
self from the consequences of his own negligence fall
within this category. They attempt to abrogate certain
tights and duties normally arising. Whether or not, in a
given case, effect shall be given depends upon a complexity
of considerations, and the rules and principles deducible
from the opinions of the courts are not always clear.
Generally, we believe it may be said that such contracts
will be enforced unless (1) it would be against the settled
public policy of the State to do so, or (2) there is some-
thing in the social relationship of the parties militating
against upholding the agreement. Illustrative of exculpa-
tory agreements held to be void on grounds of public policy
are those by which a common carrier of goods or passengers
attempts to avoid liability for loss or damage arising from
its negligence or that of its servants. Such agreements are
universally held to be void and unenforceable. (Am. Jur.
874, sec. 739.) Among the contracts held to be void be-
cause of the social relationship of the parties are those
between employer and employee which would exonerate
the employer from liability for future negligence either of
himself or other employees. 35 Am. Jur. 565, sec. 1365
Campbell v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.
243 Ill. 620.

es 461

Though there have been pronouncements that one may
never, by contract, avoid liability for his negligence, that
has not been the law of this State, and this court has,
under proper circumstances, recognized the validity of such
agreements. In 1899, in Blank v. Illinois Central Railroad
Co, 182 Ill, 332, this court held that the railroad company
might by contract relieve itself from liability for injury
to an express messenger; that, while the railroad could not,
because of its position as a public carrier, relieve itself
from liability to a fare-paying passenger, it could do so as
to an employee of the express company, riding in an express
car and attending to express business, there being no obliga-
tion on the part of the railroad as a common carrier to
carry express or the employees of express companies. The
same rule was applied to a contract relieving a railroad
company from liability to a porter employed by a sleeping
car company in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525. Again, it was observed that
the railroad was not acting as a common carrier in trans-
porting employees of the sleeping car company. In 1913,
this court decided a case involving an exculpatory agree-
ment growing out of the landlord and tenant relationship.
(Checkley v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 257 Ill. 491.)
In that case the railroad company leased a portion of its

right of way for elevator and warehouse purposes, the lease
providing that the lessee would assume all risk of loss by
fire even though caused by the negligence of the railroad
company’s servants. The court held that the railroad was
not acting in its capacity as common carrier in leasing the
property in question; that the contract was not against
public policy and that its provisions would be enforced. It
was observed that the question of who might have to bear
the loss was not a matter of public concern. In Bartee Tie
Co, v. Jackson, 281 Ill. 452, this court upheld the validity
of an agreement in a lease providing that a railroad com-

462 es

pany which leased its lands adjacent to its right of way
for the storage of ties should not be liable for negligence
resulting in the destruction of the ties by fire. We held
that the contract in question was not void as against public
policy, the bearing of the loss not being a matter of public
concern, since the railroad was not acting in its capacity
as common carrier in the particular transaction. This court
has, therefore, gone upon record as approving exculpatory
agreements in business leases relieving the landlord from
liability for injuries to the tenant’s property due to the
negligence of the landlord or his servants.

An examination of the authorities in other jurisdictions
leads us to the conclusion that by the great weight of
authority the rule is that an exculpatory clause, specifically
or generally providing that the lessor shall not be liable for
damages or injuries to the lessee or his property from all
or certain causes, is not against public policy but is valid
and enforceable. (See Annotation: 175 A.L.R. 8, 83.)
The cases emphasize that there is nothing in the lessor-
lessee relationship which in and of itself militates against
the validity of such agreements; that such agreements relate
to the private affairs of the parties and their private busi-
ness; that they are not a matter of public concern. No
distinction has been made between agreements relieving the
landlord from liability for negligent injury to the tenant’s
property and those which relieve from liability for injuries
to the person.

In accordance with former decisions of this court and
those of other jurisdictions, the provisions of the lease now
before us are valid and enforceable unless there is some-
thing in the social position or social relationship of the
parties opposed to its operation. It is suggested by appel-
lant that there is a-disparity of bargaining power between
the parties to this agreement, so that to enforce it would
result in great injustice. The inference sought to be drawn
from this line of argument is that the lessee had no free-

462

dom of choice; that he had either to accept what was
offered or be deprived of the advantages of the relation-
ship. There is nothing in the record or the circumstances
surrounding the parties to bear out this contention. This
is a business lease. There is nothing to suggest that the
parties were not dealing at arms’ length and upon equal
footing. No facts are brought to our attention from which
it might be reasonable to infer that the lessee was forced
to take the storeroom upon lessor’s terms. Certainly we
are not prepared to say that in all transactions involving
business leases there is always a balance of bargaining
power in favor of the landlord.

It is also suggested that contractual provisions of the
type now under consideration are always to be strictly con-
strued against the party in whose favor they operate and
this is the announced rule of most of the courts. But there
is nothing to suggest that the clause now under considera-
tion is not broad enough or explicit enough in its terms to
cover the situation presented by this record. The lease
purports to exempt the lessor from liability to the lessee
for any damage or injury to him or his property occasioned
by the failure of the lessor to keep the premises in repair,
and broken stairs, porches and railings, and all injuries tak-
ing place thereon or arising therefrom, are specifically men-
tioned. All claims for any such damages are expressly
waived by the lessee. Thus both by specific terms and
general provisions the lease covers the present situation.
We find that its provisions, applied to the facts before us,
are not contrary to the settled public policy of this State
and that there is nothing in the apparent social relationships
of the parties to prevent its enforcement. The trial court
properly directed the verdict in favor of the bank as lessor.

In setting aside the verdict of the jury and awarding
judgment in favor of the defendant Leonardi notwith-
standing the verdict, the trial court held that the defect in
the railing which gave way was a latent defect; that the

464 De

defendant did not know of the condition and could not,
by the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered it; that
he was, therefore, not liable. In considering whether or
not this ruling was correct, this court is not permitted to
weigh the evidence. In considering whether a judgment
should be set aside, the court must view all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and if it tends
to show any negligence on the part of the defendants which
caused plaintiff’s injury, then the case was properly sub-
mitted to the jury and its verdict should not be disturbed.

The evidence clearly shows that neither plaintiff nor
defendant Leonardi actually knew of any defective condi-
tion in the railing. Leonardi testified that he had used the
stairway on numerous occasions after purchasing the build-
ing and prior to February 19, 1948; that his last use of
the stairway was within a month prior to the accident; that
on all occasions he had observed the rail and the steps;
that he saw no defects in the rail or its supports; that the
metal itself looked perfectly good. Leonardi further testi-
fied that no one had ever complained to him prior to the
accident of there being any defective condition in the
railing. Plaintiff used the stairway more frequently than
Leonardi. He testified that he went up and down the stairs
as often as three times a day. On the date of the accident
he had already made one trip to the basement and was on
his way down for the second time before 7:15 A.M. when
the accident happened. Plaintiff testified that he too had
observed the railing on numerous occasions; that it ap-
peared to him to be all right. The facts brought out by the
foregoing testimony on both sides are undisputed. It seems
to be the inescapable conclusion from all of the evidence
that the defect in the railing was not apparent, but con-
cealed, otherwise plaintiff with numerous opportunities to
observe it, must have seen it. The defect did not become
apparent until the plaintiff, in the act of falling grabbed
the railing and it broke or came loose.

es 465

There being no evidence that defendant Leonardi actu-
ally knew or had notice of any defective or dangerous con-
ditions in the railing, he must be held liable, if at all, upon
the ground that he failed to use ordinary care to discover
the defective condition. Again the evidence is clear that
there was nothing observable from ordinary inspection on
the outside of the railing indicating any defect. There was
nothing which from ordinary inspection would lead either
plaintiff or defendant to believe there was a hidden defect
in the railing. For all that appears defendant would have
to have taken the railing apart to have discovered the fault.
This he was not required to do in the exercise of ordinary
care, Just what caused the plaintiff to fall in the first place
is not clear. His own testimony is conflicting as appears
from the abstract of record and the additional abstract of
record filed by defendant Leonardi. It fairly appears from
all the evidence, however, that plaintiff was one, two or
perhaps three steps down the stairs before he started to
fall; that when he started to fall he grabbed the railing
for support; that it was only when this strain of the fall
and the weight of his body was placed on the railing that
it broke. We conclude that it is clear from all the evidence
that the defect in the railing was a latent defect; that
defendant Leonardi had no knowledge or notice of the con-
dition and that he did not fail in his duty to use ordinary
care to discover such a defect. There is no evidence in
the record, considering it with all inferences and intend-
ments favorable to the plaintiff, tending to show negligence
on the part of Leonardi, and the action of the court in
entering judgment in his favor, notwithstanding the verdict
of the jury, was in accordance with the law and the evidence.

Our attention has been called to the fact that appellant
has not appealed from the order of the trial court directing
a verdict in favor of Leonardi on counts II, III and IV at
the close of all the evidence. It is also pointed out that
appellant did not file a motion for a new trial as to Leonardi.

[|

466

Therefore the alleged violations of the village ordinances
are not to be considered as to defendant Leonardi on this
appeal. Counsel for appellant concede this point in their
brief and argument. Counsel for appellee Leonardi have
also argued that the exculpatory clause in the lease pro-
tects Leonardi from liability as well as the bank though
he is not a party to the lease, but under the view we have
taken of the evidence, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon
this contention.

The judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the
judgment of the circuit court of Lake County will, there-

fore, be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

[|
No. 32650 is

Tue PxoPLE oF THE Stary oF Inir1Nors, Defendant in Er-_
ror, vs, RicHARD TamzorskI, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

467

_  Emmerr F. Byrne, of Chicago, (Ong L. Ranxry, of
counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

Latuam Casti#, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurKnecut, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Joun T.
GALLAGHER, RupoyPa L, JANEGA, and ArtHur MANNING,
all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Jusvicz Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

Richard Tamborski was indicted for the crime of murder
in the criminal court of Cook County. He was tried by
jury, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for a term of seventeen years. To review the
judgment of conviction, he prosecutes the present writ of
error.

The only error assigned is that the trial court erred
in failing to discharge defendant for want of prosecution
pursuant to section 18 of division XIII of the Criminal
Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 748,) which
provides as follows: “Any person committed for a crim-
inal or supposed criminal offense, and not admitted to bail,
and not tried by the court having jurisdiction of the offense,
within four months of the date of commitment, shall be set
at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall happen on
the application of the prisoner, or unless the court is satis-

EE

fied that due exertion has been made to procure the evi-
dence on the part of the People, and that there is reason-
able grounds to believe that stich evidence may be procured
at a later day in which case the court may continue the
cause for not more than sixty (60) days. If any such
person shall have been admitted to bail for an alleged
offense, other than a capital offense, he shall be entitled, on
demand, to be tried within four months after such demand:
Provided, that if the court shall be satisfied that due exer-
tion has been made to procure the evidence on behalf of
the People and that there is reasonable ground to believe
such evidence may be procured at a later day the court may
continue the cause for not more than sixty (60) days.”

Three separate motions for discharge were made by
defendant in the trial court, each of which was denied. A
proper understanding of the issues involved in these mo-
tions will be aided by a complete statement of the material
facts, which are as follows:

June 25, t949—Armed robbery of Brink’s truck result-
ing in killing of Joseph Kozoil and Joseph Den.

August 19, 1949—Defendant surrendered to Federal Bu-
reat of Investigation in Alaska and was returned to Chicago.

September 2, 1949—Defendant committed to county jail
without bail by municipal court on charge of murder of
Joseph Den,

September 16, 1949—Three indictments returned. No.
49-1746 charged defendant jointly with Joseph Jakalski,
James Hoyland, and David Edgerly with the murder of
Joseph Den. No. 49-1747 charged defendant jointly with
the same persons with murder of Joseph Kozoil. No.
49-1748 charged defendant jointly with the same persons
with robbery.

September 21, 1949—Municipal court complaint dis-
missed.

September 23, 1949—Defendant arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to all indictments,

469

October 20, 1949—Defendant filed motion for sever-
ance. Jakalski filed motion for severance,

October 24, 1949—Tamborski and Jakalski granted sev-
erance from other defendants, but denied severance from
each other.

November 25, 1949—Tamborski moved for severance
from Jakalski on No. 49-1746. Motion denied. Counsel
for Jakalski moved for a continuance. Hearing on this
motion continued until November 28, 1949. State’s Attorney
stated to court that he was having trouble locating a witness
and that therefore he was a agreeable to a continuance. ‘The
court remarked, “If it goes over, it will have to go over
until after the first of the year,” to which the State’s Attor-
ney replied, “That is what I would have to ask for, too.”

November 28, 1949—Defendant demanded trial. The
motion of counsel for Jakalski for a continuance was
allowed and the cause as to each defendant was continued
to January 9, 1950.

January 9, 1950—First motion by defendant for dis-
charge under section 748 of Criminal Code, commonly re-
ferred to as the “four-month statute.” (Judge Klarkowski
presiding.) Defendant alleged confinement on charge of
murder of Joseph Den since September 2, 1949, the date on
which he was committed by municipal court, and further
alleged that at no time did he seek to delay trial. The motion
was denied upon the grounds that the continuance of No-
vember 28 was to enable the State to procure evidence, and
since the continuance was for less than sixty days, it was
‘within the proviso of the statute.

January 11, 1950-February 10, 1950—Defendant and
Jakalski were tried under indictment 49-1747 for Kozoil
murder and found not guilty.

February 14, 1950—On motion of defendant, cause con-
tinued until March 20, 1950.

March 20, 1950—By agreement, cause No. 49-1746 con-
tinued until May 8, 1950.

470 ee

May 3, 1950—Defendant granted severance from Ja-
kalski.

May 8, 1950—Defendant demanded trial.

May 8, 1950-May 18, 1950—Jakalski tried by jury and
found not guilty.

May 22, 1950—On motion of State, cause continued
until June 14, 1950.

June 14, 1950—By order of court, cause continued to
June 19, 1950.

June-19, 1950—By order of court, cause held on call.

June 29, 1950—On motion of defendant, cause con-
tinued until July 6, 1950.

July 6, 1950—Defendant demanded trial. By order of
court, cause continued.

August 10, 1950—Defendant demanded trial. On mo-
tion of State cause stricken, with leave to reinstate. De-
fendant taken into custody by U.S. Marshal.

September 16, 1950—Defendant demanded trial.

October 3, 1950—Defendant demanded trial.

November 6, 1950—Indictment No. 49-1746 nolle
prossed. Defendant demanded trial.

June 16, 1951—Defendant tried in U.S. District Court
for aggravated bank robbery arising out of same facts as
indictment 49-1746 and found not guilty. He was imme-
diately taken in custody by sheriff on municipal court war-
rant charging murder of Joseph Den (same charge as
49-1746).

July 18, 1951—Indictment 51-1384 returned charging
murder of Den. .

July 25, 1951—Second motion for discharge under sec-
tion 748 of Criminal Code. (Judge Padden presiding.)
This motion alleged the same facts as the motion before
Judge Klarkowski. The hearing on the motion was con-
tinued until August 1, 1951.

August 1, 1951—Hearing on motion. Continued until
August 10, 1951.

am

August 10, 1951—Motion for discharge denied. De-
fendant pleaded not guilty. Case continued until September
17 by order of court.

September 17, 1951—Defendant demands trial. State
asked for continuance to October 22, 1951. Order entered
continuing case for trial to October 22, 1951.

October 22, 1951—Third motion for discharge under
Section 748 of Criminal Code alleging continuous confine-
ment since June 16, 1951, more than four months prior
to motion. This motion was denied by Judge Crowley, on
the basis that defendant caused delay of trial by moving for
discharge on July 25, 1951, and that four months did not
start until August 10, 1951, when that motion was denied.

October 22, 1951-October 31, 1951—Defendant tried
by jury, convicted and sentenced to seventeen years, from
which judgment he prosecutes the present writ of error.

The ruling of Judge Klarkowski on the first motion was
not a final order and could not be reviewed by writ of error.
(Healy v. People, 193 Ill. 370.) Hence, this ruling was not
binding upon Judge Padden in the second proceedings and
it was therefore proper for him to consider the motion for
discharge, even though a substantially similar motion had
been denied by Judge Klarkowski. The ruling of Judge
Klarkowski is not actually before us, except to the extent
that the bill of exceptions at the hearing before him was
introduced in evidence at the hearing of the second motion
before Judge Padden. However, the record of the pro-
ceedings on the second motion has been preserved by a
properly certified bill of exceptions and the ruling of Judge
Padden thereon is subject to review by this writ of error.
(People v. White, 405 Ill. 152.) From a careful examina-
tion of the record of these proceedings, we are of the
opinion that the court properly denied the second motion.
The date upon which the four months commenced to run
was September 2, 1949, the date upon which he was con-
fined on the warrant charging him with the murder of

472 ee

Joseph Den. (Guthmann v. People, 203 Ill. 260.) It is con-
ceded that the defendant made no application for delay
and, in fact, demanded immediate trial. The four-month
period therefore expired January 2, 1950, and in the ab--
sence of further evidence, defendant was entitled to dis-
charge on January 9. However, on November 25, 1949,
the State explained to the court that they were unable to
have a key witness present and requested that the case be
continued until after the first of the year. It is the State’s
contention that this continuance, being for less than sixty
days, came within the proviso of the statute and that de-
fendant was therefore not entitled to discharge. It is true
that the State made no formal motion for a continuance,
while such a motion was made by defendant’s codefendant,
Jakalski. The statute does not require such a motion. It
provides that if the court shall be satisfied that due exer-
tion has been made to procure the evidence on behalf of
the People and that there is reasonable ground to believe
such evidence may be procured at a later day, the court may
continue the cause for not more than sixty days. The con-
tinuance ordered by the court after the showing made by
the State was squarely within the meaning of the above
quoted language. The ruling of the court on the second
motion was therefore correct.

An entirely different set of facts is involved in the third
motion. In that motion defendant alleged that he was con-
fined on the charge of murdering Joseph Den on June 16,
1951, when he was arrested by State authorities following
his acquittal in Federal court. This confinement was con-
tinuous until October 22, 1951, a period of more than four
months; hence, the defendant contends that he is entitled
to discharge. The trial court held that he was not, upon
the reasoning that when defendant moved for discharge
on July 25, 1951, based upon his earlier confinement in
1949, he thereby delayed the trial. It has long been settled
that where a prisoner obtains a continuance or in any

ee 13

way, by his own action, causes a delay in his trial, he
is not entitled to discharge. We are unable to agree, how-
ever that the motion for discharge on July 25, 1951, was
stich an act as would delay the trial. Defendant did not
seek thereby to delay his trial—he sought discharge. Nor
does the fact that the trial court did not immediately hear
his motion and later took it under advisement tend to show
that the trial was delayed by any act on the part of defend-
ant. The fact that both the first and third motions were
heard and decided on the date they were presented shows
that such a motion does not involve a delay in trial. In fact,
after the third motion was disposed of, the court proceeded
to trial on the same day.

In a proceeding for discharge under this statute, a de-
fendant must show in substance that he was committed,
gave no bail, was not tried within a period of four months
thereafter, and that the delay of trial did not happen on
his application. (People v. Emblem, 362 Ill. 142.) The
record must affirmatively show that the conditions precedent
prescribed by the statute for his right to release exist.
(People v. Hotz, 261 Ill. 239; People v. Linder, 262 Il.
223.) If a defendant in a motion for his discharge under
such statute relies upon facts dehors the record, such facts
must be preserved in the record; otherwise, the court will
not recognize such facts as existing. (People v. Linder,
262 Ill. 223.) By the same token, if the State has a de-
fense dehors the record to stich a motion, the State must
present such facts and preserve them in the record, or the
court cannot recognize such facts as existing.

On the first motion for discharge, evidence was intro-
duced by the State as to what transpired at a prior hearing
on a motion for continuance and preserved by a bill of
exceptions, showing that such continuance was within the
statutory proviso of sixty days for obtaining State’s evi-
dence. On the second motion for discharge the bill of
exceptions was introduced in evidence and all preserved in

44 ee

the record. Thus, on the first two motions, the State has
presented and preserved facts dehors the record in defense
thereto.

On the third motion for discharge, however, the State
presented only a legal defense, that the delay from July 25
to August ro in passing on defendant’s second motion was
caused by the defendant and stopped the four months’
period from runnifig. No other defense is shown by the
record to have been made.

The abstract of record as to the proceedings on August
to shows as follows: “Parties present on August 10, 1951,
before Judge Crowley; defendant ready for trial, cause
continued by order of court to September 17, 1951.”

As to the proceedings of September 17, 1951, the ab-
stract shows as follows: “Proceedings of September 17,
1951, shows parties present and defendant files written
demand for trial. On motion of State’s Attorney catise
continued to October 22, 1951.”

Bills of exceptions of the proceedings had on October
22, 1951, on the third motion for discharge, shows that
at the request of the State’s Attorney and by stipulation
the record was made to show all previous orders; and as
to the proceedings on August 10, 1951, the bill of excep-
tions shows as follows: “On August 10, 1951, Judge
Padden entered an order overruling the motion for dis-
charge under the Fourth Term Act and allowed them to
file bill of exceptions in ninety days, and the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty on the arraignment and the
catse was assigned to Judge Crowley.”

“On August 10, 1951, the parties appeared before
Judge Crowley and on order of court the case was set
for September 17, 1951, the defendant answering ready
for trial and demanding trial on August 10, 1951.”

The bill of exceptions also shows the stipulation on
October 22 as follows: “On September 17, 1951, before
Judge Crowley, the State moved for and received continu-

45

ance to October 22, 1951, and the defendant filed his writ-
ten demand for trial and was ready for trial.”

A supplemental and additional abstract of proceedings
held on July 2, 1953, on the State’s motion to amend the
original bill of exceptions, has been filed by leave of court,
wherein the trial court, in passing on said motion, stated
as follows: “So, as far as this here transcript is concerned,
if you want to add it to a bill of exceptions in the whole
matter, it seems to me that it speaks quite plainly in the
matter. If the State interprets it as a motion for continu-
ance by Mr. Byrne, the common law record shows that
there was no motion for continuance by Mr. Byrne. I so
understand he didn’t make any-motion and the language is
clear that he made no motion for continuance and he didn’t
acquiesce in any motion for continuance, so the court makes
up the record; and if this here was intended, as part of the
transcript, to interpret that record for the Supreme Court,
—if the words are capable of more than one interpretation,
one being that he was agreeable to it, even though he said
quite distinctly several times in the same breath, and I te-
peated it, that he was objecting and filing a demand for
trial—this court will make that record clear and unequivocal
that at this time he did not consent to any delay. Whatever
delay occurred on this day was the delay of the State.”

As heretofore stated, the defendant’s second motion for
discharge was not a motion to delay trial and the delay in
passing thereon is not chargeable to the defendant.

‘The record shows that on his third motion for discharge
the defendant established a commitment for a supposed
criminal offense from June 16, 1951, to October 22, 1951,
a period of over four months, without having been tried by
a court having jurisdiction of such offense, in spite of
demands by defendant for such trial; and the defendant
also showed that the delay of the trial was not on his appli-
cation. Under the statute, the defendant’s third motion
should have been granted and he should have been set at

416 ee

liberty by the court, the State having shown no continuance
for statutory cause as justification for the delay.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County
is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged from
imprisonment and set at liberty.

Judgment reversed,

Pe
(Nos. 32733-32841 in

THe Vinwacg or LAKE Brurr, Appellant, vs. WaLtER
Wiiam Daxrrscx et al., Appellees,

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

Fn
es

Rosert McCrory, of Waukegan, for appellant.

Baker, McKenziz & Hicwrowrr, of Chicago, (Joun
C. McKewzixz, and Donarp J. Donovan, of counsel,) for
appellees.

Mr. Justicy Hersury delivered the opinion -of the
court: ”

_ The Village of Lake Bluff, a municipal corporation
bordering on Lake Michigan in Lake County, brought an
action in the circuit court of that county under section 5714
of the Civil Practice Act in which it sought a declaration
of rights in and to Lillian Dells Drive, a public driveway
located within the village. The case was tried by the court
without a jury, and the court held that there had been no
breach of the condition contained in the deed of dedication
to maintain the drive in a reasonable state of repair, except

es

as to the lower portion of the drive extending along and
upon the beach adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan.
The abutting owners were enjoined from asserting any
right or undertaking any act in derogation of the village’s
rights in the dedicated road, including that part lying along
the beach, provided, however, that unless the village should
construct a usable pleasure driveway along the beach por-
tion of the dedicated driveway within six months, that
part of the driveway would revert to and vest in the abut-
ting owners.

The village appealed only from those parts of the de-
cree which declared a breach of condition in failing to
maintain a driveway along the beach and which required
a driveway to be constructed there within six months, and
in all other respects urged that the decree of the trial court
be affirmed. After the appeal was in this court, two of the
defendants, Walter William Dalitsch and Selma K. Dalitsch,
his wife, filed their petition in this court for leave to appeal
from the entire decree of the trial court, which was allowed.
The cases have been consolidated for hearing and opinion.

The area embraced within the corporate limits of the
village of Lake Bluff is an incorporated community on the
shore of Lake Michigan, which includes several ravines
running in a general easterly and westerly direction. These
ravines have eastern termini at the lake front. On and
prior to November 30, 1909, one of these ravines was em-
braced within the property owned by Luther P. Friestedt,
then resident in the village. He saw fit to dedicate the bed
of the ravine within his property as a pleasure driveway
to be known as Lillian Dells Drive. This driveway began
at what is now known as Maple Aventie and extended east-
erly down through the ravine to the shore at Lake Michigan,
where it turned south for a distance of some 150 feet. The
dedication was in statutory form, duly recorded, and was
accepted by the village on November 30, 1909. Certain
conditions were annexed to the dedication, which in sub-

stance required its maintenance and use as a pleasure drive-
way only. The deed of dedication provided that “the fail-
ure to comply with-any or all of the foregoing conditions
shall ipso facto revert the title to the premises herein dedi-
cated in the dedicator, his successors or assigns, and they
shall re-enter and take said premises as of their first estate.”

The complaint for declaratory judgment filed by the
village set forth that’ in 1909 Luther P. Friedstedt, as the
owner of certain land, laid out a subdivision called “Frie-
stedt’s Addition to Lake Bluff,” containing lots 1 and 2,
and in connection with it the owner dedicated a public
driveway, named “Lillian Dells Drive,” to be kept in repair
by the village and to be used and maintained as a pleasure
driveway only. The drive is abutted on one side by lot 1
of Friestedt’s Addition and on the other side by lot 2
thereof. Lot 1 is owned by Alice Crosby and Hildegard
Crosby Melzer, and lot 2 by Walter William Dalitsch and
Selma K. Dalitsch. The village accepted the dedication and
in its complaint alleged that it had expended large sums of
money in maintaining and repairing the driveway and that
the public had used the drive for horsedrawn and motor
vehicles, bicycles and other means of conveyance, and as
a footpath or walk from North Avenue and Maple Avenue
in the village to the beach and shore of Lake Michigan. It
was also contended that the drive was in a reasonable state
of repair except for the portion extending along the shore
of Lake Michigan; that it was regularly used as a foot-
path and for the motor vehicles of the village and of Lake
Bluff Park District and for emergency use by other motor
vehicles; that subsequent to the original grant of Lillian
Dells Drive, part or all of it extending along the shore of
Lake Michigan became submerged by avulsion or erosion,
but that subsequent accretions have resulted in the restora-
tion and re-appearance of that part of the drive extending
along the lake shore. In 1948 the Dalitsches caused a notice
to be served on the village which stated that a blocking of

80 ee

the drive at the western entrance and the alleged failure
of the village to maintain the drive in repair constituted
breaches of the dedication, and that if the same were not
corrected forthwith the Dalitsches would enter upon and
take possession of the adjacent one-half thereof where the
same abutted their property.

In its suit for a declaratory judgment the village named
as defendants the abutting owners, the heirs of Luther P.
Friestedt, deceased, Lake Bluff Park District and “unknown.
owners.” It prayed that the court declare the rights of the
parties in the drive and also declare whether there had
been any breach of condition entitling any of the defend-
ants to interests therein superior to the interests of the
village, declare the riparian ownership of the property along
the shore of Lake Michigan, declare property rights, if any,
of other defendants, and grant necessary and proper in-
junctional or other relief. The answer of Lake Bluff Park
District admitted the allegations of the complaint. The
defendants Alice Crosby and Hildegard Crosby Melzer
filed no answer and made no charges of any breach of
condition. The Dalitsches denied in their answer that the
drive was in a reasonable state of repair, that large sums
had been expended to maintain and repair it, or that it was
used as a footpath or walk and for municipal and emergency
vehicles. Their answer also denied that the village had the
right to place boulders at the western entrance to the drive,
or that it had the right to regulate traffic thereon, and
averred that its acts in regulating traffic constituted a breach
of the dedication. The issues raised by the pleadings are
(1) whether the village has maintained Lillian Dells Drive
in a reasonable state of repair, and (2) whether the village
can regulate traffic thereon so as to permit only non-
automotive vehicular traffic, excepting that of a public or
emergency nature. The court resolved the issue of reason-
able repair and maintenance of the drive in favor of the
village, except as to the part of the drive lying along the

a  :

beach. It also resolved in favor of the village the issue
as to the village’s right to restrict traffic to nonautomotive
and emergency and public vehicles. The trial court held,
however, that the village had not kept and maintained that
part of the drive lying along the beach in a reasonable state
of repair and that this constituted a breach of condition
of the dedication and decreed that unless the village should
construct a usable pleasure driveway along the beach within
six months the rights of the village in and to the beach
portion of the drive would be forfeited.

The village is located on a high bluff and the drive in
question extends from the developed part of the commu-
nity through a long ravine running down to the shore of
Lake Michigan. It is approximately 16 feet wide and is
covered with gravel and small rocks. It extends in a gen-
eral easterly direction toward the lake until it comes within
approximately 50 feet of the lake shore and it then turns
south and parallels the lake a distance of about 150 feet.
The village objects to that part of the decree which finds
that its failure to keep that part of the drive lying along
the beach in a proper state of repair constituted a breach
of the condition of dedication, and which orders the village
to correct that condition by constructing a driveway along
that part of the beach within six months, or suffer a for-
feiture, by means of which that part of the beach would
revert to the abutting owners. The Dalitsches, in their
appeal, contend that the trial court erred in declaring Lillian
Dells Drive separable, one portion from the other, and in
holding that the village had not breached the conditions
of the dedication as to the upper part of the drive extending
through the ravine to the place near the shore where the
drive turns south. They ask that the decree be reversed
and remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a
decree to the effect that the village has breached the con-
ditions of dedication as to the entire drive; that the village
has no prescriptive rights in the drive but only the rights

| |

8

derived from the dedication of the drive by Luther P. Frie-
stedt; that the village be required to repair, miaintain and
use Lillian Dells Drive as a pleasure driveway and place
it in proper condition within six months or allow the abut-
ting owners to re-enter and take it as their own estate;
and to find that Walter William Dalitsch, Selma K. Dalitsch,
Alice Crosby and Hildegard Crosby Melzer, abutting larid-
owners, are the only persons who have an interest in the
right of re-entry in Lillian Dells Drive.

In its brief filed in this case the village contends that
there was no intention to require the village to construct
a roadway upon the beach portion of the drive at the time
of the dedication; and that practical construction of the
dedication negates the need to pave the beach portion of
the roadway. The village argues that the facts and circum-
stances in evidence demonstrate a clear intention that the
beach portion was not to be improved with any pavement.
We find no contention or suggestion in the record that a
pavement should be constructed upon the beach, The evi-
dence does indicate that the beach area of the driveway has
fallen into a state of disrepair, due mostly to the encroach-
ment of the waters of the lake. It is indicated that it was
the intention of the parties, at the time the drive was dedi-
cated, to make it usable throughout its entire length. All
that is required is that some type of usable driveway be
constructed there. The evidence indicates a drop-off where
the road enters the beach, and the decree contemplates that
this condition be repaired and necessary measures be taken
by the village to make the beach portion of the driveway
as usable as the remainder of the drive.

The village next urges that the abutting property own-
ers have waived any right to claim a breach of condition
resulting from a failure of the village to improve the beach
portion of the drive with a surface roadway, and from the
exclusion of automotive vehicular traffic from the drive.
It is insisted by the village that the original dedicator and

es

subsequent owners of abutting property have not merely
acquiesced in the use of the drive by pedestrian traffic only,
but have taken active steps to prevent atttomotive vehicles
from using the drive. During the more than forty years
since the dedication, the beach was never improved with a
pavement or other surfaced roadway and no objection was
heard concerning the same. However, upon strict exam-
ination of the record, we find no evidence or testimony
indicating any affirmative action by defendants or their
predecessors in title releasing the village from the terms
of the dedication. It has generally been held that no waiver
is occasioned by a mere indulgence, or mere silent ac-
quiescence, especially where it does not appear that the
grantee understood that there was a waiver or that he re-
lied thereon in proceeding to do the act claimed as a for-
feiture. (26 C.J.S. 499, Deeds, par. 158; Sherman v.
Town of Jefferson, 274 Ill. 294; First Lutheran Church
v. Rooks Creek Evangelical Lutheran Church, 316 Ill. 196.)
This record indicates no positive acts by defendants or
their predecessors in title showing any intention to relin-
quish their rights to declare a forfeiture for any breach
of condition occasioned by the village. In every instance
of possible breach of condition set forth by the village,
any acquiescence by the owners of the abutting property
was by silence alone. Such facts and circumstances are not
sufficient to constitute a waiver of defendants’ rights.

It was further asserted by the village that prior to the
dedication of Lillian Dells Drive as a public highway in
November, 1909, it had been used as a public thorough-
fare for twenty years or more, and the village had thus
acquired rights in the roadway by prescription and user.
These rights, the village claims, could not be denied by a
subsequent dedication. By prescription and user the village
obtained only an easement to use this roadway as a public
way. The dedication to the village in 1909 invested it
with more than a mere easement. The dedication consti-

tuted a conveyance of the drive in fee to the municipality,
which holds it as trustee for the public use. (Prall v.
Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19.) It is settled law that where there
is a unity of title to and possession of the dominant and
servient estates in the same owner, that fact operates to
extinguish the servient estate absolutely and forever. No
one may have an easement in his own land. (Smith v.
Roath, 238 Ill. 247.) Here, the city held an easement for
public use of this roadway, the servient estate. Subse-
quently it obtained a conveyance of the roadway in fee,
the dominant estate. By application of the general rule
above, the easement is merged in the fee, extinguishing
the servient estate. Thus, subsequent to the dedication of
this roadway, the prior prescriptive easement claimed by
the city could no longer exist, and any rights that might
be claimed thereunder are necessarily terminated.

The defendant owners of abutting property contend
that the record evidences a continuous series of acts incon-
sistent with any intention of the village to retain Lillian
Dells Drive under the terms of the dedication, constituting
a breach of condition. In support of this contention they
urge (1) that the entrance of the drive has been obstructed
by the placing of several large boulders across its entrance
so as to prevent the passage of most vehicles in use in
Lake Bluff today, (2) that an ordinance of the village bars
bicycles and automobile traffic, and (3) that a gully or
stream now occupies a portion of the dedicated roadway
while another portion is now beach with no apparent vestige
of a road. For these reasons defendants maintain that the
roadway cannot long be considered usable as a “pleasure
driveway,” the purpose for which it was dedicated.

The record discloses that the roadway was dedicated
to the village for public use as a “pleasure driveway” in
1g09, and was then accepted by the village and used by
the public as a footpath, bridle path, and driveway for
horsedrawn conveyances, the only means of local transporta-

a

tion then in vogue. The dedicated drive is only sixteen feet
in width. It remains in use today as a footpath to the
beach, and is available for horse and carriage were such
conveyance used in Lake Bluff. The boulders could: easily
be spanned by such vehicles. ‘he roadway continues in rea-
sonable passable condition for the means of travel per-
missible thereon, except for a steep drop-off near the beach
occasioned by the action of the lake waters.

The defendants -assert that the drive was to be a
“pleasure driveway” only and since the only available con-
veyances for driving are denied the use of the drive by
ordinance, a breach of condition has occurred. It is well
settled and accepted that an owner, in making a voluntary
dedication of his property to the public, may annex condi-
tions and limitations to his grant at his pleasure, provided
such limitations and conditions are not inconsistent with
the dedication and will not defeat the operation of the
grant. (People’s Gas Light and Coke Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 255 Ill. 612.) However, the dedicator cannot attach
to the dedication any conditions or limitations inconsistent
with the legal character of the dedication, or which take
the property from the control of the public authorities, or
which are agairist public policy. The dedication will take
effect regardless of such condition, which will be construed
as void. (26 CJ.S. 91, Dedication, sec. 31.) State or
municipal power to control and regulate streets is in trust
for the general public, and not only for the people who
live within the municipality, but also for those who come
there, and neither the State nor the municipality can divest
itself of this trust. Accordingly, any contract whereby the
State or municipality surrenders its police power over the
streets is invalid. (64 C.J.S. 79, Municipal Corporations,
par. 1688.) The statutes of Illinois have for many years
given to municipalities the right to regulate traffic upon their
streets and public places. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 24,
par. 23-27.) By virtue of that authority we have held in

0 ee

many cases that municipalities may legislate concerning the
use of their streets and public places within reason. City of
Chicago v. Rhine, 363 Ill. 619.

After carriages and buggies had practically passed out
of common use and had been supplanted almost entirely by
motor vehicles, the village authorities, believing that a
pleasure driveway only sixteen feet in width extending
down through a ravine was not suitable for fast motor
traffic, adopted this ordinance barring the use of the drive
to all vehicles of an automotive nature. The ordinance
recites that at the time of the dedication the drive was
designed and intended for the use of pedestrians and horse-
drawn pleasure vehicles and similar uses, and the extent
and nature of atitomobile traffic was not anticipated. The
ordinance concluded that the narrowness of the drive and
the sharpness of certain turns made the use thereof by
automotive vehicles exceedingly hazardous, and not within
the contemplation of the dedicator. It is altogether proper
for the village to bar automotive vehicles from this drive
under its regulatory and police powers in the interests of
public safety, if the measure is reasonable. (City of Elm-
hurst v. Buetigen, 394 Ill. 248.) The recitation contained
within the ordinance itself indicates the reasonableness of
the measure. The protection of both the pedestrian and
automotive public is a valid purpose. Being a reasonable’
regulation within the power of the village, the dedication
could not deprive the village of its power to so regulate
traffic on Lillian Dells Drive by condition or limitation
constituting such ordinance a breach of condition. It is
highly doubtful, as noted in the ordinance, that the dedi-
cator intended any such result. The dedicated driveway
remains open and available for all pleasure driving and
use contemplated and known at the time of its dedication.
Its general physical condition is satisfactory for such traffic
as is properly permissible thereon, with those exceptions

ee

noted in the judgment of the trial court. No such breach
of condition, as urged by defendants, is apparent from the
record,

Other errors have been assigned on this appeal, but they
have not been argued in the briefs submitted to this court.
Consequently these assignments are considered waived and
not presented here for review. People v. Davis, 412 Ill. 391.

The trial court in its decree for declaratory judgment
did recognize that the lower, eastern, or beach portion of
Lillian Dells Drive is located upon sand, is subject to ero-
sion and avulsion as a result of waves, tides and currents
of Lake Michigan and has never been improved with any
pavement or roadway. The drive has, in this area, con-
sisted of the beach surface itself. The village argues that
it is inconsistent and illogical for the trial court, in the
face of these findings, to hold that it had breached the
conditions contained in the dedication insofar as the beach
portion of the drive is concerned. We believe, however,
that this finding of the trial court is justified by the evidence
that there is a drop of several feet between the upper por-
tion of the drive and the beach portion. The decree contem-
plates merely that the beach area shall be so repaired as to
constitute a usable drive throughout its entire length.

We are of the opinion that the conclusions reached by
the circuit court of Lake County are in conformity with
the evidence in this case and that the decree entered by that
court is correct and is not vulnerable to any of the objec-
tions made thereto either by the village or by the abutting
owners. The decree of the circuit court of Lake County

is therefore affirmed. Decree affirmed.

Mr, Cuter Justice Scuazrer took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this case.

488 SE

(No. 32682.
Ray ZEN et al, Appellees, vs. Tae Cry or CHrcaco,
Appellant.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

489

Joun J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louis Karton, and Arruur Macm, of counsel,) for
appellant,

McKay & Krurewircu, and WorFserc & Kroi,
both of Chicago, for appellees,

Mr. Justice Dariy delivered the opinion of the court:

The city of Chicago here appeals from a judgment of
the circuit court of Cook County holding section 10 of
the 1942 amendment to the city zoning ordinance uncon-
stitutional and void in its application to certain property
either owned or leased by appellees. The trial judge has
certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance is in-
volved and that the public interest requires a direct appeal
to this court.

‘The property involved consists of several parcels of
land which front on the west side of South Ashland Avenue
between Ninetieth and Ninety-second streets and upon which
appellees operate used-car sales lots. The original zoning
ordinance of 1923 zoned the property for commercial use,
a use which permitted the open-yard storage of cars under
certain conditions; by the 1942 amendment, however, the
same property was rezoned for business use, The latter
use did not permit used-car lots, it appearing, rather, that
the amendment clarified and continued the classification of
such lots as a commercial use. Appellees did not start to
operate their lots until dates which progress from 1946
and, it was not until 1952 that they initiated this action.
Their complaint, after alleging that the city threatened to
enforce the amended ordinance as to their properties,
charged that the rezoning was unreasonable and void as
applied to their lands, that it violated divers of their con-
stitutional rights and prayed for appropriate legal and

490 es

equitable relief. The city filed an answer putting in issue
all the material allegations of the complaint and, after a
hearing on the pleadings, the court held the amendatory
ordinance void in its application to appellees’ property, as
being an unreasonable exercise of the police power which
arbitrarily restricted the use of such property without any
substantial bearing on the public health, safety, comfort,
morals or welfare. In reaching this result the record reflects
that the trial court found from the evidence that no change.
had occurred in the area between 1923, when it was zoned
commercial, and 1942, when it was rezoned for business,
and concluded that since there had been no change, there
could be no real or substantial public need for the area to
be rezoned and therefore no relation to the public welfare.

On this appeal the city urges that appellees have failed
to overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to
zoning legislation and, in addition, insists that there is
affirmative proof in the record that the rezoning was re-
lated to the public good. Appellees contend that the deter-
mination of the city council of the need for rezoning is not
conclusive but is subject to judicial review; that in this
instance there were no changes bearing a reasonable relation
to the public need which justified the rezoning; that the
rezoning of their property constituted “spot” zoning and
that the proper zoning of the blocks in question is con-
trolled by the adjoining commercial property in the blocks
to the north and south,

The facts show that Ashland Avenue is an import-
ant public thoroughfare running directly north and south
through the city of Chicago from 9500 south to 7600 north.
It is a major traffic artery bearing both streetcars and
busses and serves as a connecting link to main highways
running east and west. Under the zoning ordinance of
1923, both sides of South Ashland Avenue, from Ninety-
fifth to Eighty-seven streets, were zoned for commercial
use. By the amendatory ordinance of 1942, the three

es 4a

blocks from Ninety-fifth to Ninety-second streets were con-
tinued as commercial; the two blocks from Ninety-second
to Ninetieth streets were rezoned to business use; the block
between Ninetieth and Eighty-ninth street was continued
as commercial, and the two blocks from Fighty-ninth to
Eighty-seventh streets were rezoned to business use. The
leap-frogging pattern pursued thus caused appellees’ lots
lying between Ninetieth and Ninety-second streets to be
rezoned for business use while the property in the blocks
flanking them was continued as commercial. It should be
noted at this time that the original zoning ordinance di-
vided the city into four use districts as follows: (1) resi-
dence, (2) apartment, (3) commercial, (4) manufacturing.
The 1942 amendment, however, created nine use districts,
namely: (1) single-family residence, (2) duplex residence,
(3) group houses, (4) apartment houses, (5) specialty
shops, (6) business, (7) commercial, (8) manufacturing,
(9) industrial. Because of this refinement in classifications,
many uses originally classified as “commercial” were classi-
fied as “business” uses under the amendatory ordinance.
This feature becomes significant in view of the city’s argu-
ment that the rezoning was justified and reasonable, the
“business” uses which presently exist in the blocks of Ash-
land Avenue being considered. In that respect, the record
shows that the lots on Ashland Avenue between Ninety-fifth
and Eighty-seventh streets were largely vacant properties
when first zoned “commercial” in 1923 and, for the most
part, remained so when the rezoning took place in 1942.
Since the latter date the properties in these blocks, except-
ing the used-car lots of appellees, and other isolated prop-
erties, have largely been utilized for uses classified as
“business” by the 1942 amendment.

Other pertinent facts show that under the 1923 ordi-
nance all property for more than a mile east of Ashland
Avenue between Ninety-fifth and Eighty-seventh streets
was zoned for apartment use while the property for more

492 |

than a mile west of the same area was zoned for residence
use. The area to the west was fairly well built up by the.
time the 1942 amendment was passed and its classification
was continued as a single-family residence area. The area
to the east was sparsely settled in 1942, at which time por-
tions of it were rezoned for single-family and duplex resi-
dence use. Since 1942, this area has experienced an in-
tensive residential building increase. The residential char-
acteristics of the adjoining areas are likewise advanced by
the city as a reasonable basis for rezoning appellees’ prop-
erty from “commercial” to “business.”

The decisions of this court announcing the legal prin-
ciples which must guide a judicial determination of the
validity of both original and amendatory zoning legislation
are legion and require little citation in this opinion. The
power of a municipality to amend its zoning ordinances in
the reasonable exercise of its police power is well estab-
lished. Such power is not unlimited, however, and such an
ordinance must have a real and substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Whether
the restraints imposed by a zoning ordinance on the use of
private property do, in fact, bear a real and substantial
relation to the public good, or whether they are essen-
tially capricious and unreasonable is a question for judicial
review. (Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408
Ill. 91.) In turn, the question of its unreasonableness or
capriciousness is always a question depending on the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the particular case. As stated
in Hannifin Corporation v. City of Berwyn, 1 Ill. 2d 28,
(opinion filed at this term of court): “In each case the
problem resolves itself into a weighing of the equities.” In
approaching the problem it is to be borne in mind that
ordinances duly enacted lie behind the bulwark of presump-
tive validity and the burden is upon the one assailing them
to overcome that presumption. Because of this presump-
tion, we have consistently held that it must be clearly and

ee 498

affirmatively shown that the ordinances attacked are un-
reasonable and capricious, as claimed, for we will not upset
the municipality’s action where there is room for a fair
and debatable difference of opinion on the question. (Miller
Brothers Lumber Co, v. City of Chicago, 414 Ill. 162.)
Insofar as the property owner is concerned, he has the
right to rely upon the rule of law that the classification of
his property will not be changed unless the change is re-
quired for the public good. (Phipps v. City of Chicago,
339 Ill. 315.) Therefore, while courts have given the pre-
sumption of validity to zoning ordinances, they have not
hesitated to examine with care the question of whether the
act was an exercise of sound discretion. It is with these
principles in mind that we turn to the facts to determine
whether the city’s action in this case was reasonable and
and related to the public good or whether it was an arbi-
trary and capricious action bearing no such relation.

‘The city first contends that the reasonableness of the
1942 amendment, as applied to appellees’ property, is affirm-
atively established by the residential character of the areas
immediately to the east and west of the rezoned Ashland
Avenue frontage. It is urged that the increased residen-
tial population created a necessity for more proximate
“business” zoning and that proper zoning requires the next
possible highest zoning classification adjacent to residential
areas, While the principles advanced are no doubt sound,
it is our opinion that the argument advanced serves to dem-
onstrate the unreasonable and arbitrary character of the
amendatory ordinance as it applies to the lots and blocks
in question. In the first place, the intensive residential
building in the area to the east occurred largely after the
amendatory ordinance was passed, and the zoning classifica-
tion of the areas both to the east and west was substan-
tially the same under both the original and the amending
ordinances. Next, it is to be noted that these residential
areas abutted for the full distance of the Ashland Avenue

494 P|

properties from Ninety-fifth to Kighty-seventh Street. The
problems, the public needs and the zoning requirements were
the same throughout the entire length of the Ashland Ave-
nue frontage, yet we find that the city continued to zone
part of this frontage as “commercial” and zoned as “busi-
ness” some properties, including that of appellees, that were
similarly situated in respect to the adjacent residential areas.
No reason suggests itself, nor has any been advanced, which
justifies the city’s action of alternating between “business”
and “commercial” use in the eight blocks of Ashland Ave-
nue frontage involved. It would appear, rather, that cer-
tain of the blocks were arbitrarily singled out for rezoning
to business use. Another factor which raises doubt as to
the public need and of the reasonableness of the 1942 re-
zoning, is that these areas remained substantially unchanged
between 1923 and 1942, the “intensive” residential build-
ing, upon which the city relies, not occurring until after
1946.

To further establish the reasonableness of its amenda-
tory ordinance, the city urges that the increase of business
uses on Ashland Avenue between 1923 and 1942 justified
the rezoning. The fallacy of this argument is that there
was no “business” use during the period in question and
such uses were necessarily “commercial” under the terms
of the 1923 ordinance. Here, again, there appears to have
been an arbitrary singling out of certain of the blocks on
Ashland Avenue to remain under a “commercial” classifica~
tion, for the evidence shows that the blocks so classified
contained uses newly classified as “business” in equal pro-
portions to the blocks that were rezoned for “business” use.
Again, we must consider the additional factor that much
of the land still remained vacant when the 1942 amend-
ment was adopted and that, while the classification of the
use itself was changed, the character of the use to which
the property was being put did not undergo substantial
change.

es 495

The next contention of the city is that its amending
ordinance was reasonable because there were no used-car
lots in the entire Ashland Avenue frontal area when the
1942 amendment was enacted. While this fact may demon-
strate that the city did not single out any particular enter-
prise in making its classifications, we fail to see where the
absence of any particular use may, in all cases, be said to
justify a complete change in zoning classification. It re-
mains that the open-lot storage of vehicles was a use per-
mitted under the 1923 ordinance and that the property
owners had a right to rely upon such a classification until
the public good required a change.

The final contention of the city touching upon the rea-
sonableness of the rezoning ordinance is that used-car lots
would not have been permitted in such close proximity to
a residential district as are those of appellees, even under
the original 1923 ordinance. Here, again, we see no relation
between the operation of the ordinance and the justification
for changing the classification of appellees’ property. In
addition, the record and abstract do not reflect that appellees’
legal rights under the 1923 ordinance were made an issue
in this proceeding, it appearing, rather, that the city con-
ceded to the trial court that the zoning was such in 1923
as would have permitted the questioned properties to be
utilized as used-car lots.

Considering the affirmative evidence upon which the city
bases its contentions together with that of the appellees’
reflecting no substantial change in the area rezoned which
would cause the rezoning to be related to the public good,
it is manifest that the erratic pattern of zoning was un-
reasonable and arbitrary insofar as it applied to the prop-
erties owned and occupied by appellees.

The circuit court did not err in granting the legal and
equitable relief sought and its declaratory judgment is

therefore affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

496 Le
Oo. 32737

Enrigur Davita RopriQuez, a minor, by Lucy Rodriquez,
his mother and next friend, et al., Appellants, vs. Marto
Parti, Appellee.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

ArtHur S. Gomperc, and Evcrng P. Megcan, both
of Chicago, (Samurt Nineserc, of counsel,) for ap-
pellants.

Rozert L. Bropy, Rosert F. Surraivan, and Grorce
J. Gors, all of Chicago, for appellee.

Mr. Carer Justice ScHArrFEr delivered the opinion of
the court:

The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the amended
complaint in this case insofar as it sought to recover dam-
ages for injuries inflicted upon Enrique Davila Rodriquez,
a minor, while he was an infant en ventre sa mere. ‘The
Appellate Court for the First District affirmed upon the
authority of Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 184 Ill. 350,
and we granted leave to appeal.

After these judgments of the circuit and Appellate courts
were rendered, this court again considered the controlling
question of law in Amann v. Faidy, ante, p. 422, decided
May 20, 1953. In that case we held that the plaintiff, who
was the administratrix of the estate of a child alleged to
have died as a result of injuries inflicted upon him before
his birth, had a right of action against the defendant whose

es 491

negligence was alleged to have caused the injuries. Allaire
v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, was overruled. Our
holding in Amann v. Faidy is decisive of the legal issues
presented in this case.

The judgment of the Appellate Court and the judg-
ment of the circuit court of Cook County are therefore
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court,
with directions to overrule defendant’s motion to dismiss
the amended complaint as to the minor plaintiff, Enrique
Davila Rodriquez. 2

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

a
O, 75

THE PEoPLé of tHE State oF ILLmvors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs, CHARLES S, SHEPPARD, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

Caries S. SHEPPARD, pro se.

LatHam Caste, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurxnecH’, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Jonn
T. GariacnEr, Rupowpx L, Jannea, and ArtHuR Man-
NING, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

| |

498 ee

Mr. Justice Furon delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error, Charles’ S. Sheppard, was convicted
of the crime of assault with intent to commit robbery in
the criminal court of Cook County. His motions for a
new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and
he was sentenced to imprisonment in the Illinois State Peni-
tentiary for a period of not less than eight years nor more
than fourteen years. By writ of error he seeks a reversal
of the judgment of conviction and the case is presented
here upon the common-law record only. ,
The record shows that the grand jury of Cook County
returned an indictment against plantiff in error containing
. four counts, the first charging assault with intent to commit
murder, the second, assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to inflict bodily harm, the weapon being a knife, the
third, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict
bodily harm, the exact nature of the weapon being un-
known, and the fourth, assault with intent to commit rob-
bery. The plaintiff in error appearing in person and by
counsel pleaded not guilty on all counts. When his case
came on for trial plaintiff in error requested that the court
hear the case without a jury. The motion was allowed and
the case proceeded to trial. At the close of the People’s
case, counsel for the plaintiff in error moved to compel
the People to elect to stand on count IV alone. This
motion was also allowed. At the conclusion of the trial,
the court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged
in count IV.

Plaintiff in error urges that the judgment of the trial
court is not supported by the evidence. His statement goes
at some length into questions of fact, but in the absence of
a bill of exceptions and report of proceedings properly
certified we cannot consider arguments relative to such
matters. People v. Griffin, 402 Ill. 247; People v. Ball,
412 Ul. 37; People v. Thompson, 413 Il. 53.

es 49

Plaintiff in error contends that count IV of the indict-
ment under which he was convicted is not legally sufficient
because it fails to charge a crime under the statute; that
it lacks allegations of fact to show that the party charged
actually attempted robbery and was intercepted and pre-
vented or that the property of the owner was in his posses-
sion “even for a moment.” It appears to us that this line
of argument confuses indictments for assault with intent
to commit a crime with those charging an attempt to com-
mit a crime, but in any event no objection to the indictment
was interposed in the trial court and its legal sufficiency
cannot be challenged here for the first time. (People v.
Biloche, 414 Ill. 504.) Further, the indictment, being sub-
stantially in the language of the statute, was legally suffi-
cient. People v. Crump, 402 Ill, 204.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is

affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Le!
(No. 32747

Tuy PEopLE of THE State or Ituiors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Netson Howarrs ef al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

501

Brown, Hay & Srevens, and Nezson O. Howarts,
both of Springfield, (Paut W. Gorpon, and Joun B. Stop-
DaR?, JR., of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

Latuam Castiz, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
C. Marvin Hamtzron, State’s Attorney, of Lincoln, (Joan
L. Davinson, Jr., Frep G. LeacH, and Harry L, Pars,
of counsel,) for the People.

Ricuarp F. Bazcocx, Leon M. Despres, F. Raymonp
Marx, Jr., and Grorcr W. Overron, all of Chicago, for
American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae; ALEX
Etson, and G. Norman Kenwepy, both of Chicago, and
Grorce F. Nicuors, of Dixon, for Illinois State Bar Asso-
ciation, amicus curiae; and CLAupE M. Swanson, of Pax-
ton, amicus curiae,

502 |

Mr. Justice Hersuxy delivered the opinion of the
court: .

On November 6, 1952, Nelson A. Howarth, an attor-
ney, together with Alan Wyneken and LeRoy Clapper, his
clients, were adjudged to be in contempt of court in the
filing of a certain petition in the circuit court of Logan
County, were each ordered to pay fines, and received sepa-
rate jail sentences. They appear in this court as plaintiffs
in error prosecuting a writ of error to the circuit court of
Logan County to review the judgment and orders of that
court, urging that the acts with which they were charged
do not constitute criminal contempt, and that they have been
denied certain constitutional rights. A constitutional ques- -
tion being presented, the cause comes here directly.

It appears from the record that an organization in
Lincoln, Illinois, known as the Good Government Council,
had caused an audit to be made‘of the books of one Vincent
Jones, justice of the peace in and for East Lincoln Town-
ship in Logan County. That audit purported to show dis-
crepancies and omissions in the books of Jones when com-
pared with certain records of the highway police of the
State of Illinois. This audit was turned over to Edwin C.
Mills, State’s Attorney of Logan County. After a delay
of about two weeks, nothing having been done by the State’s
Attorney, several members of the Good Government Coun-
cil caused a warrant to be issued for the arrest of Jones on
a charge of embezzlement. The State’s Attorney, by letter
to Judge Bevan, judge of the circuit court, requested that
he be relieved of the duty of prosecuting Jones. His request
was denied and he thereafter presented the evidence to the
grand jury. Indictments were returned against Jones on
June 4, 1952, who then filed motions to quash the indict-
ments. Hearing on said motions was set for July 23, 1952.

The Good Government Council’ then retained Howarth
to prepare a petition directed to the circuit court requesting
the appointment of a special prosecutor. Twenty copies of

eS 508

this petition were circulated and a total of 586 signatures
procured. ‘These petitions were assembled and consolidated
by removing the first three identical typewritten pages of
eight copies, and presented by Howarth to the court on
July 21, 1952. Among other things, the petition alleged
that the State’s Attorney, by informal letter to the court
more than a month after issuance of the warrants, ad-
mitted that he “had not yet checked the accuracy of the
allegations made in said complaint,” that he had made no
effort to confer with or to interview those citizens who
signed the original complaint except to advise them that
he intended to withdraw as prosecutor, and that petitioners
believed the State’s Attorney would use the hearings on the
motions to quash, not for the purpose of defending the
indictments, but to intimidate, harass and subject to public
ridicule certain members of the Good Government Council.
The petition prayed that the hearings on the motions to
quash the indictments be continued, and that the State’s
Attorney be permitted to withdraw and a disinterested
attorney be appointed to prosecute the causes.

A hearing on the petition was had July 22, 1952. There
the State’s Attorney asked leave to join in the prayer of
the petition, but controverted certain allegations of fact
therein. The court took no action on this request, nor on
an offer by Howarth to withdraw the petition if the State’s
Attorney was permitted to withdraw. ‘The petitioners then
presented evidence as to the manner of procuring the sig-
natures and as to their belief that the allegations were true.
After a colloquy between the court and Howarth concern-
ing the form and allegations of the petition, the court con-
tinued the cause to July 30, 1952. On that date Judge
Bevan entered an order relieving the State’s Attorney from
prosecuting the Vincent Jones case, and then read an order
on these plaintiffs in error and the other petitioners (578
persons more or less) to appear in the circuit court of
Logan County on August 13, 1952, to show cause why

* 504 es

they should not be adjudged in contempt of court for
(1) having filed in that court a document containing pages
taken from altered instruments, (2) having filed a docu-
ment containing odious and defamatory language concern-
ing an official of that court, and (3) having filed a petition
containing an inaccurate quotation where the accuracy of
the quotation might materially affect the decision of the
court. Judge Bevan refused to disqualify himself.

On August 13, 1952, approximately 500 petitioners and
Howarth appeared in court with their counsel. Twelve
petitioners filed verified answers denying any knowledge
of the petition and were discharged by the court. The court
then appointed State’s Attorney Claude Swanson of Ford
County to act as amicus curiae in the contempt proceedings.
The court then discharged twelve more petitioners, who,
upon examination by Swanson, stated they did not read
the petition before signing it. The court refused to allow
Howarth to cross-examine any but one of these twelve.
The court subsequently discharged seven others upon their
filing verified answers denying knowledge of the contents
of the petition.

Howarth and almost all of the petitioners, including
Wyneken and Clapper, filed written motions to quash the
rule to show cause, based upon the proposition that the acts
charged did not constitute contempt of court, that the rule
charges indirect contempt requiring that they be served
with signed, verified charges, and asserting a denial of
certain constitutional rights. These motions were over-
ruled. Motions to suppress the taking of evidence were also
overruled. The court then entered a rule on Howarth and
all petitioners who had participated in the hearings on
July 22, 1952, to plead to the rule to show cause on or
before October 8, 1952, and all other petitioners were to ©
plead on or before November 5, 1952. Motion was made
to discharge all those who had not appeared in court July 22

ee 505

as they could not therefore be guilty of direct contempt,
but the court overruled the motion.

On October 8 Judge Bevan again refused to disqualify
‘himself and overruled motions for jury trial based on con-
stitutional grounds. Thirty-one defendants, including these
plaintiffs in error, then filed answers alleging in detail the
acts performed by them in connection with the petition.
‘The remaining petitioners filed an unverified answer deny-
ing their guilt.

On November 1, 1952, the court entered its judgment
and order. The court found plaintiffs in error to be in
contempt for the filing of an “altered” petition in court,
which deceived the court and constituted a fraud upon the
court and was done by plaintiffs in error with the deliberate
intent of intimidating the court and impeding and obstruct-
ing the functioning of the court. Howarth was also found
guilty of contempt for misquoting the letter of State’s At-
torney Mills to the circuit court. All other petitioners were
discharged. Wyneken and Clapper were each fined $250
and sentenced to two days in jail. Howarth was fined $500
and sentenced to five days in jail.

On November 13, 1952, plaintiffs in error filed a written
exception to that part of the judgment reading “from the
evidence adduced,” as no evidence had been taken against
them under the rule to show cause, and filed a motion in
arrest of judgment covering the same points urged in the
motion to quash previously filed and argued, and additionally
objected to the court’s refusal to disqualify himself and
the denial of a jury trial, questioned the sufficiency of the

. judgment, and objected to procedural irregularities in the
hearing. The exception was overruled and the motion
denied.

Plaintiffs in error appear before this court, having been
found guilty of direct criminal contempt in the circuit
court of Logan County. A criminal contempt of court is

506 ee

a crime against the court and against the people and is a
misdemeanor, and a writ of error in such a proceeding
is properly sued out of the Appellate Court unless there is
fairly involved a debatable constitutional question which
was passed upon by the trial court and the issue properly
preserved for review by a bill of exceptions. In such case
the writ of error may be sued out of the Supreme Court
directly. People v. Siegal, 400 Ill. 208.

In the instant case plaintiffs in error claim, as the foun-
dation for direct review, a denial of their constitutional
rights to freely express themselves and to petition for a
tedress of grievances, and violations of the due-process
clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. They con-
tend that their constitutional right to freely express them-
selves was infringed for the reason that the court was
obviously influenced in its judgment by what it termed

“odious, defamatory language concerning an official of this
Court.” They insist that the right to petition for redress
of grievances was denied by this contempt proceeding
against more than 500 citizens of Logan County. Plain-
tiffs in error further contend that the acts charged in the
tule to show cause, if they constituted contempt at all, con-
stitute indirect and not direct contempt, and that they were
not accorded the fair hearing with all due process of law as
required in an indirect contempt proceeding.

These constitutional issues were raised and passed upon
in the trial court when it denied plaintiffs in error their
motion in arrest of judgment. (People v. Pomeroy, 405
Ill. 175.) The constitutional issues have properly been pre-
served for review, hence the writ may be sued out of this
court.

Plaintiffs in error contend that because, in the rule to
show cause entered upon them, one of the charges was that
the petition contained “odious, defamatory language con-
cerning an official of this court,” and during the course of
the hearing the court uttered statements in criticism of the

507

language employed, they were denied their constitutional
right to freely express themselves in their petition. It is

. undisputed that the charge was abandoned in the judgment
order entered in this cause, and no mention thereof appears
throughout the opinion of the court. That the court’s judg-
ment order was influenced and colored by considerations
arising from this charge is purely a conclusion of plaintiffs
in error wholly unsupported by the record. The charge that
the right to freely express themselves within constitutional
limit has been denied them is not well taken.

It is next asserted by plaintiffs in error that the court
has denied the right to petition for redress of grievances.
The record indicates that the petition was filed in the
circuit court of Logan County on July 21, 1952, and that
a hearing was had on the petition on July 22, 1952, at
which time petitioners were permitted to produce evidence
in behalf of the petition and its allegations. On July 30,
1952, the court stated that acting upon the request of Edwin
C. Mills and in view of the filing of the petition, it ordered
that State’s Attorney Mills be relieved from acting as
State’s Attorney in prosecuting Vincent Jones. The ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor was deferred until August
13, 1952. After the prayer of the petition for withdrawal
of the State’s Attorney had been granted, the court read
the rule on Howarth and petitioners to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt of court. The court
at no time objected to the filing of this petition nor did
it deny to the petitioners their right to file the same. The
court’s only objection was to the form and contents of
the petition. Certainly, these petitioners were not deprived
of their right to petition to redress their grievance in the
instant case. Nothing that happened in this proceeding
denies to the plaintiffs in error or any of the petitioners
their right to petition in the future. Whether any of the
petitioners have been so “coerced” as to be afraid to exer-
cise their constitutional prerogative in the future is purely

508 ee

speculative and on this record cannot be the basis for a
finding of denial of constitutional right.

These plaintiffs in error urge that their acts consti-
tuted, if anything, indirect contempt, and to try them as
for direct contempt denied them their constitutional rights
to a fair hearing. The charges upon which this proceeding
resulting in a finding of guilty of direct criminal contempt
are based all arise from the petition filed in the circuit court
of Logan County. A direct criminal contempt is one which
takes place in the very presence of the judge, making all
of the elements of the offense matters within the personal
knowledge of the judge and tending directly to obstruct
and prevent the administration of justice, and includes acts
committed in an integral part of the court although out of
the physical presence of the judge. An indirect contempt
is one which occurs out of the presence of the judge and
is therefore dependent for its proof upon evidence of some
kind or upon facts of which the court has no judicial notice.
(People v. Harrison, 403 Il. 320.) The mere filing with
the clerk of the court of any document containing con-
temptuous matter is sufficient to constitute direct contempt.
(In re Estate of Kelly, 365 Ill. 174.) The charges here
arose directly out of matter contained within the signed
petition filed in the circuit court, and do not depend on any
act occurring outside of an integral part of the court as
an essential part of the contempt charged. Without doubt
the rule to show cause charged, if anything, direct criminal
contempt. It has been held that even though the charge
be of direct contempt, that fact does not entirely preclude
the judge from hearing evidence to fully establish the direct
contempt. (People v. Harrison, 403 Ill. 320.) Where a
direct contempt is committed in open court it is competent
for the judge to proceed upon his personal knowledge of
the facts and to punish the offender summarily without
entering any rule against him and without hearing any evi-
dence. However, when a direct contempt occurs in a con-

es fF

stituent part of a court and not in the immediate presence
of the judge as is the case here, extrinsic evidence is essen-
tial to substantiate the charge. (In re Estate of Kelly, 365
Ill. 174.) When the contempt is not an apparent one and
its demonstration depends upon the proof of facts of
which the court has no judicial notice, due process requires
a citation in order that defendant may meet and refute the
charges. (Dangel, Contempt, p. 221.) The instant pro-
ceeding being one based upon charges constituting, if any-
thing, direct contempt, violated no constitutional rights as
guaranteed by the due-process clause. The court did enter
a rule to show cause for these charges of direct contempt
not committed in open court, permitted answers and heard
evidence, affording plaintiffs in error all the privileges they
could demand. The procedure followed by the court in
this proceeding was the proper one for the direct contempts
charged. The plaintiffs in error were not denied any of
the constitutional prerogatives which they have asserted
here.

The rule entered by the court in the present case di-
rected the plaintiffs in error to show cause why they should
not be adjudged in contempt for having done three things,
(1) having filed in that court a document containing pages
taken from an altered instrument; (2) for filing a docu-
ment containing odious and defamatory language concern-

. ing an official of that court; and (3) having filed a petition
containing an inaccurate quotation where the accuracy of
the quotation might materially affect the decision of the
court.

Plaintiffs in error contend that the filing of a consoli-
dated petition does not amount to an act of contempt. The
judgment order states that the filing of the petition did
“deceive the Court and constituted a fraud upon the Court,”
for the reason that it was an altered instrument. These
plaintiffs in error were found by the court to have par-
ticipated in, and shared the responsibility for, filing the

510 ee

t

petition in this manner. The court nowhere stated in what
manner it was deceived or in what way the filing of the
petition constituted a fraud upon the court. There is no
contention that the signatures on the petition as filed were
not genuine. The court seems to base its determination on
the fact that the petition as filed is a consolidated petition.

We have noted that twenty identical petitions were
circulated to obtain signatures. These identical petitions
consisted of three full pages of typing and a fourth page
upon which some typing appeared and the remaining space
was devoted to signatures. The remaining pages were
signatures only. In assembling the petitions, for the sake
of compactness and brevity, the first three identical pages
of several petitions were removed but the fourth page and
all of the signature pages were retained and incorporated
in the petition filed. A number of complete petitions, in-
cluding the first three pages of typing, were incorporated
in the petition as filed. ‘The testimony of the witnesses and
the answers of the plaintiffs in error clearly show that the
only purpose was to reduce the bulk of the petition. With-
out doubt the court was apprised of this fact and recog-
nized it in its rule to show cause. Obviously, the court was
not deceived. Had such been the purpose of the petitioners
it is clear that the fourth page of the petitions would also
have been removed so as to present only a petition followed
by nothing but signatures, Nothing that occurred in the
consolidation of these several petitions into one compact
petition changed the legal significance of the petition as
signed. No allegation, statement, prayer, sentence or phrase
was changed in any manner. Only the physical appearance
was altered. It has been held in Illinois that where the
legal effect is not changed the instrument is not altered,
although some change may be made in its appearance. To
effect an alteration the change must be material. If the
legal import of the instrument is not changed the alteration
cannot be material, nor fraudulent. (Ryan v. First Nat.

ee si

Bank, 148 Ill. 349; Vogle v. Ripper, 34 Ill. 100.) The
change in physical appearance alone could not be material,
and the petition does not constitute an altered instrument.
No certain number of signatures was necessary to the
validity of this petition, and several of the circulated peti-
tions were filed intact as circulated. No fraud or deceit
could possibly have resulted from the filing of this petition,
especially in the light of the information accorded the trial
court. Consequently, the filing of this consolidated petition
constitutes no basis for a finding of contempt.

The judgment order here fails to make any reference
or finding concerning the second charge of the rule to
show cause, to wit, the filing of a document containing
odious and defamatory language concerning an official of
the court. Apparently this allegedly contemptuous act is
abandoned by the court and does not serve as a basis for
the judgment order. It is undisputed that this charge is
not before this court for review.

The only other formal charge referred to in the judg-
ment order is charge 3, which is to the effect that the peti-
tioners filed a petition containing an inaccurate quotation
where the accuracy of the quotation might materially affect
the decision of the court. It is true, in the preparation of
the petition a letter from the State’s Attorney to Judge
Bevan was misquoted. As to whether or not this was the
basis for entering the judgment order is not altogether
clear. However, the court in said order does refer to the
inaccurate quotation and places the responsibility therefor
on the plaintiff in error Howarth. Howarth assumed re-
sponsibility for the misquotation at the hearing on the peti-
tion of July 22, and in his answer explained that the mis-
take occurred in summarizing the letter for brevity’s sake
and failing to remove quotation marks. The language
appearing in the petition did not in any material respect
change the meaning of the State’s Attorney’s letter. It is
impossible that the court could have been deceived or mis-

2 ee

led as the identified letter was at all times in the possession
of the court. The petitioners and their counsel knew it was
in the court’s possession, and therefore it is not reasonable
to believe that the inaccurate quotation from said letter was
intentionally made. It is impossible that the misquotation
could have embarrassed, hindered or obstructed the court
in the administration of justice or lessened its authority or
dignity. This inadvertence could not have amounted to
contempt in this case.

Although not included as one of the charges in the rule
to show cause entered by the court in this case, the judg-
ment order contained a finding that the filing of the petition
was an attempt to “pressurize” the court. The written
opinion of the trial judge stated that the Good Government
Council, which he refers to as a “dominating group,” by
sheer numbers attempted to exert political pressure upon
him and subject him to the fear of political reprisals if he
failed to do their bidding. This statement from the opinion
of the trial judge is the only indication appearing anywhere
as to the type of “pressurizing” to which his order refers.

Since the charge of exerting pressure upon the court to
enter an order appointing a special prosecutor is not one
of the charges set forth in the rule to show cause, a finding
of direct contempt based thereon is of a summary nature.
It has been held by this court that in cases of direct con-
tempt, where the contempt is committed in the presence of
the judge and he is aware of all the circumstances, the ac-
cused may be summarily found to be in contempt. (People
v. Siegal, 400 Ill, 208.) In cases of direct contempt the
only record required to be made up is the order of the
court finding the contempt to have been committed and
fixing the punishment therefor, which order, however,
should set out the facts constituting the offense so fully

- and certainly as to show that the court was authorized to
make the order. (People v. Rongetti, 344 Ill. 107.) ‘The
judgment order entered in this case merely found the

es 518

plaintiffs in error guilty of contempt for attempting to
“pressurize” the court without any statement of facts con-
stituting the offense. The statement regarding the attempt
to “pressurize” in the judge’s opinion only identifies the
type of alleged pressure. Obviously, we cannot from this
record perceive whether the court was authorized to make
such an order. This part of the judgment order amounts
to a mere conclusion of the trial judge unsupported by any
findings of fact constituting the offense, and cannot be the
basis for a finding of contempt.

It is broadly asserted by defendant in error that the
filing of this kind of a petition without leave, and not
being parties to the litigation or counsel therein, constituted
contempt. However, it is provided by section 6 of the act
in regard to Attorneys General and State’s Attorneys (Ill.
Rey. Stat. 1951, chap. 14, par. 6,) that a special prosecutor
may be appointed by the court before whom a cause is
pending when the State’s Attorney is interested in the par-
ticular cause or proceeding. The statute does not specify
the procedure to be followed in bringing such matter to
the court’s attention and invoking its action. It has been
determined that the filing of a petition is the proper method
of arousing the court’s jurisdiction to appoint a special
prosecutor, and that the State’s Attorney may properly file
such petition. (Lavin v. Board of Comrs. of Cook County,
245 Ill. 496.) That opinion, however, made no determina-
tion that only a State’s Attorney could file such a petition,
and subsequently the Appellate Court for the First District
went even further and held that, “True, the jurisdiction
of the court in that respect may be thus invoked [by State’s
Attorney’s petition,] but such jurisdiction may also be
properly invoked by the court upon its own motion or
upon the petition of a citizen.” (People ex rel. Hoyne v.
Northup, 184 Ill. App. 638.) While a decision of an Appel-
late Court is not authority in this court, but advisory only,

we can see no reason to disagree with this pronouncement.
| el

514 ee

Hence, we adopt it as applicable to the instant case. This
petition was filed by citizens to invoke the jurisdiction and
action of the court and cannot alone constitute contempt.

No contempt having been committed by these plaintiffs
in error on any of the grounds assigned in the judgment
of the trial court, the determination cannot stand. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Logan County

is reversed,
€ Judgment reversed,

es
——-

Tue PEoPLg oF THE STATE oF In11Nors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Wooprow FRANKLIN, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

E. Harotp WINELAND, of Flora, for plaintiff in error.

Latuam Caste, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
H. Carrot Bays, State’s Attorney, of Louisville, (Frep
G, Leacu, and Harry L, Pats, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Daty delivered the opinion of the court:

Woodrow Franklin, to whom we shall refer as defend-
ant, was indicted and convicted in the circuit court of Clay
County for the larceny of three notes having a total value
of $2500. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term
of two to five years and prosecutes this writ of error to
review the record of his conviction.

The indictment against defendant was returned on Sep-
tember 8, 1952, He was arraigned on September 15, 1952,

516 Le

at which time he appeared with an attorney of his own
choice, entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury
trial. The court set the cause for hearing on October 27,
1952. When that day arrived the case was not reached but
it was called for hearing the following morning at 11:00
A.M., at which time the court was first confronted with
a motion which was then filed by defendant’s counsel for
leave to withdraw. No grounds for withdrawal were stated.
The court questioned defendant relative to the motion and
was informed that he had contacted an attorney in another
city by telephone, but the latter had stated that he could
not be present in court on that day. Under the circum-
stances, the court denied the motion and the trial proceeded
without objection or further motion by anyone.

The first contention made by defendant is that the court
erred in denying him his right to substitute counsel. The
contention made ignores the fact that the record is barren
of any showing that defendant sought or was ever denied
his right to substitute counsel. Insofar as the attorney’s
motion is concerned, it has been the rule in this jurisdiction
that an attorney may not, in the absence of his client’s con-
sent, withdraw from a case without justifiable cause, and
then only after proper notice to his client and leave of court,
where his name has been entered as attorney of record.
(Jacobson v. Ashkinaze, 337 Ul. 141; Hollan v. Kepner,
297 Ill. 332.) The record here shows no cause upon which
we might base a finding that the court abused its discretion
in denying the motion. Even if defendant’s acquiescence
in his counsel’s motion can be termed an effort on defend-
ant’s part to effect a substitution of counsel, and we think
it is not, we cannot say that the court erred in ruling as it
did. The right of a client to discharge his attorney at any
time, or to substitute attorneys at any stage of a proceeding
either with, or without cause, is well established. (See:
7 CJ.S., Attorney & Client, sec. 119.) It is not, however,
a right so absolute that its exercise may not be denied where

es sat
it will unduly prejudice the other party or interfere with
the administration of justice. To hold otherwise would
enable a defendant in a criminal proceeding such as this, to
delay his trial until he had exhausted his capabilities of
hiring different counsel and to thus harrass and delay the
effective prosecution of crime.

When questions of this nature arise in the conduct of a
trial, we have held that the manner in which the trial shall
proceed is largely within the discretion of the nisi prius
court and this court will not interfere unless it appears
from the record that the party complaining was prejudiced.
(Vincendeau v. People, 219 Ill. 474.) Defendant argues
that he was prejudiced in that he was forced to trial with
counsel in whom he had no confidence and with whom he
had had a disagreement over the conduct of the trial.
Insofar as the record is concerned, these are entirely self-
serving statements made for the first time in this court.
While it does appear that defendant contacted another
attorney by telephone, he made no further effort at sub-
stitution; he acquiesced in the court’s ruling on his coun-
sel’s motion and accepted the latter’s services without ob-
jection. Such a passive attitude can be said to have been
a waiver of any objection to his counsel. (Cf. People v.
Ephraim, 411 Ul. 118.) In addition, our examination of
the record indicates that the counsel conducted a full and
complete defense in a manner which demonstrated his
familiarity with criminal matters. We therefore find no
prejudice to defendant in that sense. Considering these
matters in the light of the facts which show that defendant
employed his counsel some six weeks before his cause was
set for hearing, that no effort was made to substitute or
withdraw until the jury panel had been assembled and the
cause called for hearing, and that no grounds or justifica-
tion were offered for the withdrawal, we must conclude that
the court did not, in this instance, abuse its discretion in
denying the counsel’s motion and continuing with the trial.

518 ee

The next errors assigned by defendant relate to the
sufficiency of certain elements of proof and require some
discussion of the facts. It is undisputed that Belle Tolliver
loaned the sum of $2500 to members of defendant’s family
and received from them two notes for $1200 and one for
$100. The first of the larger notes was dated April 11,
1950, and was signed by defendant and his parents; the
second was dated February 1, 1951, and was signed by
defendant, his mother and wife. The $100 note was signed
only by defendant’s mother and was dated June 2, 1951.
All of the notes recited that they were payable to the order
of Belle Tolliver and payable at Sailor Springs, Illinois,
to W. O. Bunn, a merchant who handled business matters
for Belle Tolliver and who was given possession of the
notes.

Bunn testified that defendant came to his store on
August 18, 1952, asked to see the notes and was permitted
to do so. When defendant completed his examination he
left the store but returned in a few minutes with his mother
who also wished to see the notes. After she had looked at
them, Bunn returned them to an envelope and placed it
behind a scales on a counter of his store. The mother then
stated that she wished to buy a can of paint and went with
Bunn to a back room to procure it, leaving defendant alone
in the front part of the store. After the Franklins left,
Bunn looked for the notes and when he found the envelope
and notes missing, immediately swore out a warrant for
defendant’s arrest. A deputy sheriff named Long served the
warrant the same day and, after questioning, defendant
admitted taking the notes and stated that he had burned
them.

Defendant was then taken to the office of the State’s
Attorney where, after admonition, he made a written,
signed statement to the effect that he had stolen two notes
of $1200 each and one of $100 from W. O. Bunn at the
latter’s store in’ Sailor Springs, Illinois; that the notes

eS si

were all payable to the order of Belle Tolliver and signed
by defendant, his mother and wife, with the exception of
the $100 note which was signed by his mother alone; and
that he had burned the notes after taking them. Following
this, defendant was taken to the Bunn store, where he
again admitted that he had taken the notes, and then to
the place where he had burned the notes at which place the
deputy sheriff found ashes of burned paper. At the trial,
defendant testified that Bunn had given him the notes on
August 18, 1952, telling him to look them over but saying
nothing as to when they were to be returned. In rebuttal,
Bunn denied that defendant had come into possession of the
notes in such a manner,

In attacking the proof, defendant contends that there
was a complete failure to establish the corpus delicti, unless
it was proved by defendant’s confession, and proceeds on
the theory that the corpus delicti must be established beyond
a reasonable doubt, independent of any confessions or ad-
missions of an accused. A complete and controlling answer
to the contention is found in People v. Brown, 379 Ill. 262,
where this court stated: “The true rule is that although a
mere naked uncorroborated confession is insufficient to con-
vict, the corpus delicti is not required to be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt by evidence aliunde the confession or
admissions of the accused. It is not essential that the
corpus delicti shall be established by evidence other than
that which tends to connect the accused with the crime.
The same evidence may be used to prove both the existence
of the crime and the guilt of the defendant. The test is
whether tle whole evidence proves the fact a crime was
committed and that the accused committed it.” In the
present case the confession of defendant was amply cor-
roborated by numerous other circumstances in evidence.
The record shows that defendant was on the scene when
the notes disappeared; that he knew of their whereabouts
and that he had an opportunity to take them by stealth.

520 De

He says that the notes were given-to him but such testi-
mony loses its force when it is considered that Bunn made
an immediate report to the sheriff and caused defendant’s
arrest within a few hours after the notes disappeared.
These facts and circumstances, together with defendant’s
oral admissions and written confession, established the
corpus delicti beyond any reasonable doubt.

It is next urged that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the property stolen was the
property alleged as stolen in the indictment. The conten-
tion as made is based upon Belle Tolliver’s failure to testify
as to dates in the notes, together with her apparent lack of
knowledge that one of the notes was a renewal note, and
upon some confusion exhibited by Bunn when he was ex-
plaining that the renewal note had been one of those stolen.
Belle Tolliver’s sketchy knowledge of the details of the
notes is not surprising in view of the fact that she entrusted
her business affairs to another. However, we find no merit
in this contention. Aside from the isolated instances com-
plained of, a complete examination of Bunn’s testimony
discloses that he fully and accurately described the notes
stolen, in a manner which established beyond a reasonable
doubt their identity as the notes referred to in the indictment.

Further attacking the proof, defendant complains that
the proof of value of the notes was deficient in that there
was no attempt to prove their market value, which is the
true test of value to be applied in larceny cases. ‘T'wo wit-
nesses for the People testified that the value of the notes
was $2500, and defendant contends this may or may not
have been their market value. We stated in thé early case
of Little v. People, 157 Ill. 153, that testimony to the value
of stolen property, given in answer to the question, “How
much is it worth?” was sufficient to warrant a finding by
the jury of such value and, there being no other evidence
on the question, such value must be taken as that required
by law. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it

re sa

must be concluded that proper proof of value was made in
this case. .

The next error which defendant advances as grounds
for reversal is that the State’s Attorney.was guilty of
prejudicial conduct in the eyes of the jury when he char-
acterized part of defendant’s testimony on cross-exam-
ination as a lie. The record shows that defendant’s counsel
objected to the remark and was sustained by the court.
Unless it is apparent that a defendant is injured by im-
proper remarks, a judgment of conviction will not be re-
versed on that ground alone. (People v. Jenko, 410 Ill.
478.) While the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s
truthfulness was improper in the present case, it does not
appear that the evidence was so close or of such a circum-
stantial nature that the error was such as to require a re-
versal of the judgment.

Defendant also urges for the first time in this court
that the indictment against him is void for repugnancy in
that it contains contradictory allegations as to whom the
notes were payable. While we think the plain meaning of
the words “payable to the order of Belle Tolliver * * *
payable at Sailor Springs, Ilinois, to W. O. Bunn” do not
render them adverse and conflicting, it is sufficient to point
out that the attack on the indictment comes too late. No
advantage can be taken for repugnancy in the allegations
of an indictment except by motion to quash, as the charge
of repugnancy merely goes to the form of the indictment.
People v. Miller, 278 Ill. 490.

The record discloses that defendant had a fair and im-
partial trial in which he was ably represented by counsel.
Finding no merit in the numerous contentions of error

" assigned here, it is our opinion that the judgment of the
circuit court of Clay County was correct, and it is therefore

affirmed, Judgment affirmed.

522

(Nos. 32546 and 32549 i
Creu, Arvigw and Orp Ben Coar, Corporation, Plain-
tiffs in Error, vs. Tax Inpustriar, Commission et al.—
(Wi1am G. Srravion, State Treasurer, Defendant

in Error.)

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

523

M. J. Hanacan, of West Frankfort, for plaintiff in
error Cecil Arview; ANGERSTEIN & ANGERSTEIN, of Chi-
cago, and Wi1ams & Harrison, of Benton, for plaintiff
in error Old Ben Coal Corporation.

LatuHam Castix, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Wiiitam C. Wines, and JosgpH R. Kerwin, of counsel,)
for defendant in error.

Mr. Jusricy Bristow delivered the opinion of the court:

This cause is heard on a writ of error to review the
judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County, con-
firming the decision of the Industrial Commission in certain
consolidated cases, awarding workmen’s compensation to
claimant Cecil Arview, payable solely from his employer,
the respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation. During the
course of the original proceedings before the commission
respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation filed a special appli-
cation for adjustment of claim to make the then State
Treasurer and ex-officio custodian of the special fund,
William G. Stratton, a party respondent under the pro-
visions of, section 8(f£) of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. (IIL Rev. Stat. 1947, chap. 48, par. 145(f).) The
Industrial Commission did not rule thereon at the original
hearing, but on a second hearing, held pursuant to an order
of the circuit court remanding the cause, the commission

524 |

consolidated the cases and the State Treasurer was made a
party.

The issue presented herein is a question of law of first
impression, and involves the construction and interrelation
of the 1925 amendments to sections 7(e), 8(e) (18), and
8(f) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to determine
the amount, and from whom compensation is payable where
an employee, who previously lost the sight of an eye, sub-
sequently, in an independent accident, loses several other
members.

The evidence is entirely uncontroverted, and reveals
that on September 6, 1944, Cecil Arview, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the claimant, sustained the permanent and com-
plete loss of sight of the right eye in an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment for respondent
Old Ben Coal Corporation, for which he was paid by
respondent, compensation for the proper period of tempo-
rary total incapacity, and for the specific loss of an eye.
Respondent also paid at that time, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the act (sec. 8(e) (20),) the sum of $100 into the
special fund, since an employee had lost the sight of an
eye in a compensable accident.

Claimant continued in the employment of the Old Ben
Coal Corporation, and on October 25, 1948, he sustained
accidental injuries by coming in contact with an overhead
power line, resulting in the amputation of his right leg
7 inches below the knee, the amputation of his left leg 8
inches below the knee, and the amputation of his left arm
at the shoulder joint. For these injuries respondent Old-
Ben Coal Corporation has already paid the medical and
hospital expenses, for the artificial limbs, 37 weeks of com-
pensation for temporary total disability, and 190 weeks of
compensation at the scheduled rate for the specific loss
of one leg. .

On the basis of this evidence the commission found
that claimant was not entitled to any compensation from

es 525

the special fund, and ordered that the State Treasurer be
dismissed as a party respondent. The commission fur-
ther ordered that respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation
pay claimant compensation for total permanent disability
amounting to the sum of $26 per week for 275 weeks, and
thereafter a pension, amounting to $858 annually, payable
in 12 equal monthly installments of $71.50, during his
lifetime. The circuit court of Franklin County affirmed
the orders of the commission and both claimant and re-
spondent Old Ben Coal Corporation filed petitions for writ
of error, which have been allowed by this court.

Claimant Arview contends on this review that under a
proper construction of the act, particularly sections 7(e),
8(e) (18) and 8(£), he is entitled to be paid, not only for
his medical and hospital expenses, for his artificial limbs
and for temporary total disability for 37 weeks, but for
the specific loss of the left arm, amounting to $5850 as
scheduled by the act, for the specific loss of the left leg,
amounting to $4940, and for the specific loss of the right
leg, also amounting to $4940; and that after the payment
of all these specific losses, he is entitled to a 12 percent
pension for his lifetime. These sums, claimant suggests,
except for the specific loss of one leg, should be payable
from the special fund of the State.

Respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation urges that, under
a proper construction of these same sections of the act,
its liability is limited to the payment of medical and hos-
pital expenses, furnishing artificial limbs, and to the pay-
ment of compensation for the specific loss of one member,
but that the claimant is further entitled to be paid from
the special fund of the State compensation for the differ-
ence between the loss of the one member and permanent
total disability, as well as a pension during his lifetime.

The State Treasurer, as ex-officio custodian of the spe-
cial fund, contends that inasmuch as more than two mem-
bers were lost in one accident the employer alone is liable

526 ee

for compensation for permanent and total disability and for
a lifetime pension.

In determining questions of law under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, where the facts are uncontroverted, the
Supreme Court is in no manner bound by the findings and
conclusions of the Industrial Commission or of the circuit
court. (Dietgen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Il. 11.) The
objective of all statutory construction is to ascertain the
legislative intent. As reiterated by the courts, since the days
Lord Coke first expounded his theory of statutory con-
struction, this intent may be gleaned by first analyzing the
law prior to the change, noting the defect to be remedied,
and then analyzing the terms and provisions of the entire
statute in the light of its objective. Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Vol. 2, 3d ed., sec. 4501; Burke v. Industrial
Com. 368 Ill. 554; City of Rockford v. Schultz, 296 Tl.
254; Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co. 360 Ill. 160,
163; Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244.

In City of Rockford v. Schultz, 296 Ill. 254, the court
stated, at page 257: “The object in construing a statute is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, and to
that end the whole act, the law existing prior to its passage,
any changes in the law made by the act, and the apparent
motive for making such changes, will be weighed and
considered.”

While this approach does not sanction judicial legisla-
tion, it does direct the court to avoid a construction of the
act which will render it ineffective or produce absurd con-
sequences, (Patterson Pure Food Pie Co. v. Industrial’
Com. 335 ll: 476, 480; Moweaqua Coal Corp. v. Indus-
trial Com. 360 Ill. 194, 200.) It is therefore incumbent
upon this court'to first review the legislative metamorphosis
of the relevant sections of the act.

Prior to the 1925 amendment’ section 8(e)(18) .of
the act provided that the loss, or the permanent and com-

eS oan

plete loss of use of both hands, or both arms or both feet
or both legs or both eyes, or of any two thereof shall con-
stitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated
according to the compensation fixed by section 8(f), and
that these specific cases of permanent total disability should
not be construed as excluding other cases.

At this time section 8(f) provided compensation for
permanent total disability in the amount of a death benefit
and thereafter a life pension equal to 8 percent thereof.
It also provided in substance that the award may be modi-
field if the employee returned to work and his earning
capacity increased. Section 7(e) at this time contained no
reference to the special fund, and provided merely that if
no amount is payable in certain enumerated death cases, a
sum not to exceed $150 should be paid for burial expenses
by the employer.

Under this status of the law it was held that where

‘an employee had previously sustained the loss or loss of
use of one member or the sight of an eye, and subsequently,
in an independent accident sustained the loss, or loss of
use of another member, or the sight of an eye, he would
be deemed to be permanently and totally disabled, and his
employer at the time of the second loss was liable not merely
for the member lost in the accident in his employment, but
for such entire permanent and total disability. Wabash Rail-
way Co. v. Industrial Com. 286 Ill. 194; Heaps v. Indus-
trial Com. 303 Tl. 443.

As a result of this interpretation of the law, consider-
able hardship was imposed upon handicapped persons who
had sustained, from any cause whatever, the loss, or loss
of use of some member or the sight of an eye, for they
were dismissed or unable to secure employment since em-
ployers could not reasonably assume the hazard of paying
compensation for permanent total disability and a pension
in case stich employees lost another member in a com-

528 ee

pensable accident. Furthermore, the likelihood of such a
second accident and loss was enhanced by reason of the
disabled condition of such employees. To remedy this un-
fortunate situation, i.¢., the unemployability of such handi-
capped persons, representatives of employers and employees
formulated, by agreement, amendments to these sections
of the act. Inasmuch as the construction of these provi-
sions as amended is the determinative issue in this case,
the relevant provisions will be set out in haec verba.

Section 8(e) (18), as amended in 1925, provided: “The
loss of both hands, or both arms or both feet or both legs
or both eyes, or of any two thereof, suffered in one accident,
or the permanent complete loss of use thereof suffered in
one accident shall constitute total and permanent disability
to be compensated according to the compensation fixed by
paragraph (f) of this section, provided that these specific
cases of permanent and total disability shall not be con-
strued as excluding other cases; provided further that any
employee who has in a previous and independent accident
suffered the loss or permanent and complete loss of use of
any one of such members and in a subsequent independent
accident loses another or suffers the complete and perma-
nent loss of use of any one of said members, the employer
for whom the injured employee is working at the time of
said last independent accident shall be liable to pay com-
pensation only for the loss or permanent and complete loss
of use of the member occasioned by the last independent
accident.”

This section was further amended in 1931 in a respect
not material for the present inquiry, whereby the paragraph
began with the words, “Specific cases of,” and the words
“in a previous and independent accident” were omitted and
the word “previously” substituted therefor. By this latter
change the benefits of this section were available in all cases
where there had been a previous loss, or loss of use, of a
member or loss of sight from any cause whatever.

eS 629

Section 8(£) was also amended in’1925 by adding the
following provision: “if an employee who had previously
incurred loss or the permanent and complete loss of use
of one member through the loss or permanent and complete
loss of use of one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg or one
eye, incurs permanent and complete disability through the
loss or the permanent and complete loss of use of another
member, he shall receive in addition to the compensation
payable by the employer and after such payments have

* ceased, an amount from the special fund provided in para-

gtaph (3) of section 7, which, together with the compensa-
tion payable from the employer in whose employ he was
when the last injury was incurred, will equal the amount
payable for permanent and complete disability, as provided
in this paragraph of this section.” By amendment in 1931
the pension provided in that section for total and perma-
nent disability was to be equal to 12 percent of the death
benefit in such cases of permanent and total disability
through loss of members.

Section 7(e) was also amended in 1925 to create the
special fund. The fund was accumulated by funds paid by
employers under certain specified circumstances. In section
7(e) it was provided that in death cases where no depend-
ents survived, the sum of $400 should be paid into the
special fund by the employer, and section 8(e)(2) pro-
vided that the employer pay, in cases where an employee
lost a member or its use, or the sight of an eye, in addition
to compensation to the employee, the further sum of $225
(later reduced to $100) into the special fund. This pay-
ment by the employer constituted a type of insurance
whereby if the same employee lost another member in a
compensable accident, the employer in whose employment
the second loss occurred would be liable only for compensa-
tion of the member lost, and not for the permanent and
total disability as defined in section 8(e)(18) where two
members are lost. It was further provided that the fund

| |

530 ee

was to be under the custody and care of the State Treasurer,
and would be subject to withdrawal upon orders of the
Industrial Commission.

The obvious purpose of all these amendments was to
enhance the employability of handicapped persons who pre-
viously lost a member or its use, or the sight of an eye,
by limiting the liability of employers hiring or retaining
such persons in their employment, and at the same time
to afford such handicapped persons the proper measure of
compensation if a second loss was sustained, with industry
itself bearing the burden of such losses.

Under these provisions the law is clear that if claimant
Cecil Arview had lost just one member in the second acci-
dent, the respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation would have
been liable for compensation for just the loss of that mem-
ber, and the respondent State Treasurer would be required
to pay from the special fund the difference between the
payment by the employer and the amount allowed for per-
manent and total disability, as well as a life pension at
12 percent of what the death benefits would have been had
the employee’died as a result of the accident.

The law, however, does not provide for, either in clear
terms, or by implication, the situation in this case where
an employee who had previously lost an eye in a com-
pensable accident loses several additional members in a
second independent accident. Each of the parties have
conjectured from the foregoing amended provisions of
the act what the elusive legislative intent would have been
had the legislature envisaged these circumstances, and each
has advanced, as hereinbefore noted, varying and diverse
conclusions. ,

The Industrial Commission and the circuit court sus-
tained the interpretation of the State Treasurer as ex-officio
custodian of the special fund that where an employee loses
more than one member in one accident, irrespective of
whether he had previously lost a member or the sight of

ee o3

an eye, his employer alone is liable for permanent and total
compensation as well as for the pension, and there can be
no recourse to the special fund.

In our judgment that interpretation is unwarranted from
the terms of the statute, and is inconsistent with the legisla-
tive purpose and with the scheme of compensation provided
for handicapped persons in the foregoing sections of the act.

In the light of the law prior to the 1925 amendments,
and the resulting unemployability of handicapped employees
‘who had previously lost a member, or its use, or the sight
of an eye, and the objectives of the representatives of em-
ployers and employees in formulating the amendments to
obviate that hardship, it is evident that the legislative intent
was broader than that suggested by the State Treasurer.
Not only were the amendments designed to impose the
same compensation liability upon employers for the loss of
a member or the sight of an eye sustained by any employee
irrespective of whether the employee had previously lost a
member, but they were also intended to afford greater em-
ployability for such handicapped persons by limiting the
compensation liability of their employers and substituting
therefor recourse to the special fund, created by prescribed
contributions from all industry under the act.

The fact that the statute specifically provides for the
payment of compensation for permanent and total disability
and a pension from the special fund where a person who
previously lost a member, or its use, or the sight of an
eye, subsequently loses another member or the sight of an
eye, does not by its terms, or by implication, preclude
recourse to the special fund if such previously handicapped
person loses more than one other member in the subsequent
accident. Nor is it a logical application of the act to con-
clude that the loss of more than one other member converts
the status of a handicapped employee, for whose benefit
the special fund was created, into that of a nondisabled
employee, who at no time had recourse to the special fund,

532 ee

and thereby deprives such handicapped person of the bene-
fits of the fund.

Nor should the loss of more than one member by such
previously handicapped person eliminate the limited liability
of his employer, as intended by the legislature, and render
such employer liable for compensation to the same extent
as though the employee had not been previously disabled,
and as though the employer had not hired and retained
such employee as a handicapped person with the increased
hazard of a second accident. Employers are encouraged to
retain and hire such previously disabled employees, even
though they may be more prone to accident, because of the
provisions in the act limiting compensation liability for such
persons. As noted herein, under the act, where an em-
ployee loses an eye or a member, or its use, his employer
is required to pay, in addition to compensation, the sum
of $100 into the special fund, which payment is in the
nature of insurance, so that if the employee ever loses
another member in a compensable accident his employer
at that time will have to pay only for the loss of a single
member, while the employee will be entitled to be com-
pensated for the permanent and total disability thereby sus-
tained from the special fund.

In the instant case the claimant Cecil Arview lost an
eye in a previous accident for which the respondent Old
Ben Coal Corporation paid compensation and also paid $100
into the special fund, as required under section 8(e) (20)
of the act. If the loss of the additional members in the
second accident deprives both the employee and the em-
ployer of any benefits of the special fund, it is evident that
the $100 paid by the respondent, or by any other employer
under similar circumstances, was for naught.

Such a construction, contended for by the State Treas-
urer, would render entirely ineffective the legislative en-
deavor to protect handicapped employees, inasmuch as em-
ployers once again, as after the Wabash Railway case,

es 633

would be reluctant to hire or retain such previously handi-
capped employees on the ground that if they lost more
than one other member in another accident, the likelihood
of which would be enhanced by reason of the existing dis-
ability, all benefits of the special fund would be inoperative.

Therefore, it is our judgment that the only construction
of these provisions, consistent with other provisions of the
act and with the legislative purpose, would be that the loss
of more than one member in a compensable accident by
an employee who had previously lost a member, or its use,
or the sight of an eye, cannot deprive the employee or his
employer of the benefits of the special fund. In the instant
case, therefore, the respondent Old Ben ‘Coal Corporation
is liable for compensation for the loss of a single member,
and the State Treasurer should pay claimant the difference
between that sum and the amount payable under the act
for permanent and total disability as well as a 12 percent
lifetime pension as specified in section 8(f) of the act.

We cannot sustain claimant’s contention that he is en-
titled, in addition to the 37 weeks of compensation for
temporary total disability, to compensation for the specific
losses of both legs and the arm, totalling some 642 weeks
of compensation at $26.50 per week, and thereafter to a
life pension, which sums, except for the compensation for
temporary total disability and for the loss of one member,
claimant urges, should be payable from the special fund.

It is evident from the terms of section 8(f) that the
only payment contemplated from the special fund relates
to permanent and total disability and the 12 percent pen-
sion. There is no reference authorizing payment from
the fund for specific losses. The fund may be used only
in cases of permanent and total disability involving handi-
capped persons who previously had lost a member, or its
use, or an eye, and who subsequently become permanently
and totally disabled by reason of the loss of another mem-
ber or eye.

534 ee

Furthermore, the life pension from the special fund
authorized in section 8(f) is based entirely upon a per-
centage—12 percent in specific cases of total and perma-
nent disability—of the amount which would have been
payable as a death benefit. The pension is not, and cannot
be, based upon the total amount of compensation payable
for specific losses. In fact, the specific injury schedule
(section 8(e)) provides that any employee shall not re-
ceive any compensation for such injuries under any other
provision of this act. Hence a pension would be entirely
incompatible with an award for specific losses as claimant
urges,

Moreover, inasmuch as under the act the loss or loss
of use of two members or the sight of both eyes is defined
as permanent total disability, (section 8(e) (18),) for which
a designated amount of compensation is payable, it would
be specious reasoning to conclude that the loss of more
than two members would not constitute permanent and
total disability, but revert to a condition of specific loss.
The loss of the additional members over and above the
two specified in the act cannot convert such statutory per-
manent and total disability into a case of specific losses.
That the employee disabled by the loss of more than two
members may sustain greater hardship than an employee
who has lost only two members should be recognized by
the legislature and provision made for him in the act.
However, this circumstance does not modify his condition
into one of specific losses under the present law, or give
him the right to elect whether he will itemize his disabilities
or claim permanent total disability. There is no provision
in the act giving any employee, previously handicapped or
otherwise, the right to elect whether he will claim compen-
sation for the cumulative loss of members sustained in one’
accident, or claim statutory permanent and total disability.
Any such interpretation of the act would render meaning-
less both the provision relating to the sum payable for per-

SS 535

manent and total disability and the provision defining the
loss, or loss of use of two members, or the sight of both
eyes as permanent total disability. An employee so disabled
could either add up the compensation due for loss or loss
of use of members sustained in an accident and compare
that sum with the amount payable to him for permanent
total disability, and then label his condition so as to pro-
cure the greatest amount of compensation. It is evident
that such a procedure is not within the purport of the act.
In the instant case, according to claimant’s contention
the payments for specific loss of members would extend over
a period of 605 weeks and would total some $15,730. Not
only is this interpretation unwarranted from the terms and
provisions of the act as hereinbefore noted, but it is ex-
pressly barred by section 8(h) which prohibits compensa-
tion payments from extending over a period of more than
8 years, except in cases of complete disability, and claim-
ant here would be seeking only cumulative specific losses.
In support of his contention that the act authorizes the
payment of compensation for combined specific losses sus-
tained in a single accident to be in excess of the amount of
compensation allowed for permanent and total disability or
for death, claimant cites Henson Robinson Co. v. Industrial
Com, 386 Ill. 232. It is our judgment that the Henson case
does not sanction any such result. The court therein de-
termined that the provisions for compensation for tem-
porary total incapacity and those for specific loss are inde-
pendent of each other, and the combined sum of these two
categories is not limited by the amount payable on death.
The court was not called upon to determine whether the
amount and duration of compensation payments for spe-
cific losses was entirely unlimited as claimant contends.
Claimant further contends that he is also entitled to
retain the 37 weeks of temporary total disability compen-
sation paid by the respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation.
Apparently there has been a conflict in the decisions with

536 Dn

reference to such payments in cases involving permanent
and total disability as a result of the loss of members.
In Panther Creek Mines, Inc. v. Industrial Com. 342 Ill. 68,
it was argued that in cases involving total and permanent
disability of an employee by reason of the loss of a mem-
ber where the employee had previously lost a member,
the employer should not be compelled to pay any com-
» pensation during the period of temporary total incapacity,
but liability should be limited to the loss or loss of use of
the members occasioned by the last independent accident.
The court rejected that contention and held that section
8(e) (18) of the act must be construed with other provi-
sions of the entire section, and that in addition to the com-
pensation payable for the loss of a member or eye, the
employer was liable for cormpensation during the period of
temporary total incapacity. Although a contrary result was
reached in Hamilton Engineering Co. v. Industrial Com.
3099 Ill. 30, it is believed that the decision in the Panther
Creek Mines case allowing compensation for temporary
total incapacity in these cases of statutory permanent total
disability is more in accordance with the entire theory and
system of compensation established by the act, and should
be followed,

On the basis of our analysis, the claimant herein was
entitled to receive from his employer, the respondent Old
Ben Coal Corporation, the necessary medical and hospital
services, artificial members, temporary total disability com-
pensation for 37 weeks and compensation for 190 weeks
for the loss of a leg, all of which has been paid. In addi-
tion thereto the claimant is entitled to be paid from the
State fund an amount which, together with the 190 weeks
paid by the employer, will equal the sum payable for per-
manent and complete disability under the act, as well as a
12 percent pension as provided by the act.

The determination of the commission, as affirmed by
the circuit court, imposing the entire burden of liability

es sat

upon the respondent Old Ben Coal Corporation for perma-
nent and total disability, as well as for an annual pension,
was not in accordance with the law and should, therefore,
be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter
judgment in accordance with the determinations set forth
herein.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

J

(No. 3272

CxHicaco anpD Western InpiANA RatLroap Company,

Appellee, vs, Eric Agutst et al.— (Tue Crry or Car-
caco, Appellant.)

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

on
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Joun J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louts Karton, and Josep F. Fox, of counsel,) for
appellant.

J. R. Barsg, Sauer, KasseEt, and FRANKLIN C. GacEN,
all of Chicago, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Maxwet1 delivered the opinion of the
court :

This is a direct appeal from a judgment of the circuit
court of Cook County finding that neither the city of Chi-
cago nor the public had any rights or interest in a certain
tract of land which appellee sought to condemn for railroad
purposes. This court has jurisdiction because a freehold
is involved.

On June 17, 1949, appellee filed its petition to condemn
certain properties in the city of Chicago for railroad pur-
poses. Only one tract, designated in the petition as tract 3,
is involved in this appeal. Tract 3 is a strip of land approxi-
mately 66 feet wide running from the south line of Forty-
seventh Street in the city of Chicago south to the north
line of appellee’s right of way. It is a part of a tract ih-
cluded in an attempted subdivision made by one William
H. W. Cushman in 1871 commonly called South Side Home-
stead Association Addition and appears on the plat of such
attempted subdivision as a small part of Bissell Street.
The name was later changed to Butler Street and more
recently called Normal Avenue.

The plat of this attempted subdivision was recorded
January 19, 1871. In 1877 Connecticut Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company filed its complaint in the United States Cir-

eS sa

cuit Court to foreclose a mortgage on certain lands includ-
ing this subdivision. The complaint alleged that the pur-
ported subdivision was not binding upon the mortgagee.
The city of Chicago was made a party to the suit. On
July 14, 1879, a decree of foreclosure and sale of the
mortgaged premises was entered and the court found that
the mortgaged premises were subdivided after the execu-
tion of the mortgage and such subdivision being unauthor-
ized by the mortgagee was not binding on the mortgagee.
‘The subdivision was also found to be defective because of
a failure to conform to the statute. Prior to the commence-
ment of the foreclosure proceeding the mortgagor had con-
veyed certain of the lots in the purported subdivision.

The decree of foreclosure and sale provided that the
lots in the purported subdivision be sold first and that in
case of a deficiency the streets and alleys be sold last. The
sale of the lots by the master failed to realize the amount
of the remaining indebtedness, interest and costs and at a
later date the street and alleys, including tract 3, were sold.
The mortgagee purchased the streets and alleys, they were
not redeemed and the mortgagee received a master’s deed
therefor on October 22, 1891.

On June 19, 1900, Connecticut Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company filed its original petition in chancery in the
superior court of Cook County against the city of Chicago
and other defendants seeking to confirm its title in fee
simple absolute to certain lands including the tract herein
referred to as tract 3. The city of Chicago filed its answer
and cross petition in said suit contesting the title of the
petitioner. to the portions of land described in the petition
shown as streets and alleys on the purported subdivision
of South Side Homestead Association Addition. The city
contended the streets and alleys were public property, while
petitioner contended they were private property.

Prior to the rendition of the final decree in said cause,
the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company conveyed

540 ee

the property to one Walter Mills who filed his supplemental
and intervening petition in said cause. The conveyance by
the insurance company to Mills was effected by two deeds
dated December 10, 1906, one of which included the land
referred to herein as tract 3.

A special master found against the city of Chicago as
to the streets and alleys including tract 3. The chancellor
approved the master’s report in its entirety.

At a later date the city council of Chicago authorized
its corporation counsel to enter into and file a stipulation
in said cause by which it was stipulated and agreed that
upon the payment of the sum of $6000 to the city of Chi-
cago, the city would not appeal from the final decree entered
in said cause, nor sue out a writ of error thereto, nor file
a bill of review concerning the matters therein decided and
that it would waive and release all errors that might exist
or intervene in said proceedings including the entry of the
final decree. This stipulation was incorporated into the
final decree of the court, and on June 21, 1907, the city
of Chicago was paid the $6000 pursuant to the stipulation.

In its final decree the court found that Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Company became the owner of the
streets and alleys by virtue of the master’s deed and that
the insurance company did convey to Walter Mills all of
the premises so owned by it by its two deeds of December
10, 1906, and it further found “that the city of Chicago
and the public have no right, title or interest by way of
easement or otherwise in and to the portion of the premises
so owned by the petitioner, Walter Mills, shown as streets
or alleys upon said pretended map of subdivision, so made
by William H. Cushman * * *, and that neither the
petitioner, Walter Mills, nor said Insurance Company are
estopped by reason of any acts or doings of said Insurance
Company, or said Mills, to deny that said portions are
public streets or alleys, and that said plat did not constitute
a conveyance or dedication of the said streets and alleys

eS sa

in any wise binding upon the said insurance company, or
the said Mills; * * * that the city of Chicago has failed
to prove the allegations of its said cross petition herein and
that the same is without equity.”

In the legal description of the land decreed to be the
property of Mills the eastern boundary of the tract was
recited as running along the west line of Bissell Street
instead of the east line. The effect of this was to omit
Bissell Street from the legal description in the decree
although it was included as one of the streets and alleys
on the plat of the pretended subdivision and was specifically
included in the description contained in the master’s report,
and was included in one of the two deeds made to Walter
Mills and specifically referred to by the court.

After the entry of the final decree in said cause Walter
Mills and his wife conveyed tract 3 and other lands to
appellee and appellee bases its title on such conveyance.

Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment from which
this appeal is taken on the ground that filing of the plat of
the defective subdivision and subsequent acceptance by the
city of the streets and alleys therein constitutes a common-
law dedication. .

Appellee contends that the decision of the superior court
of Cook County in 1907 is res judicata on that question.

The principle of res judicata is that where a cause of
action has once been decided on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction such decision is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar of a subsequent action involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action. In all cases
where the second suit is upon the same cause of action and
between the same parties or their privies as the former
action, the doctrine extends to all grounds of recovery or
defenses which might have been presented. People v. Kidd,
398 Ill. 405; Leitch v. Hine, 393 Ill. art.

542 ee

It is apparent from the pleadings and the final decree
of the superior court of Cook County rendered in 1907 in
the suit to confirm title to the streets and alleys in Con-
necticut Mutual Life Insurance Company and Walter Mills,
that that case is determinative of the question of common-
law dedication by reason of the defective plat, and we hold
that the decision in that case, being a final decree upon the
merits and being within the jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering it, is res judicata between the parties on that ques-
tion. Appellant argues strenuously that the decision of the
superior court cannot affect tract 3 because the legal de-
scription of the land set forth in the decree omitted tract 3.
This argument is without merit because tract 3 was one
of the streets and alleys included in that litigation and the
court expressed its intention to confirm title to all of such
purported streets and alleys in Walter Mills. In addition
to this the city entered into a stipulation, which is included
in the final decree, whereby, in consideration of the pay-
ment of $6000, it waived all errors in the proceeding, in-
cluding any errors in the final decree.

Appellant next contends that if there was no common-
law dedication the city has an easement to tract 3, and
especially the north 141 feet thereof by reason of prescrip-
tive use for over fifteen years.

Appellee contends that the use was permissive and
therefore could not ripen into an easement by prescription.

In order to clearly understand the issue involved it is
necessary to examine the physical condition of the prop-
erties adjoining tract 3. As heretofore stated, tract 3 runs
from Forty-seventh Street south to appellee’s railroad
tracks. It does not cross the tracks, but comes to a dead
end and there are no other streets entering tract 3 south
of Forty-seventh Street. There are a number of other rail-
toad tracks in close proximity to appellees tracks south
and east of tract 3. The next street west of tract 3 is
Wallace Street. Between tract 3 and Wallace Street there

es o48

is a row of lots fronting on Forty-seventh Street and run-
ning south to a depth of 125 feet. These lots are improved
with dwelling houses. At the rear or south end of these
lots there is a 16-foot alley or driveway running east and
west between Wallace Street and tract 3. The land to the
south of this alley, adjoining tract 3 on the west and ex-
tending south to the railroad tracks, is occupied by freight
yards, warehouses, loading docks and related business build-
ings. The land ajoining tract 3 on the east from Forty-
seventh Street south to appellee’s tracks is occupied by a
coal yard. The freight houses, loading docks and related
business structures on the land adjoining tract 3 have for
many years been occupied by tenants and patrons of appellee
and the evidence discloses that at the time of the decree
of the superior court in 1907 tract 3 was being used as a
way of ingress to and egress from these properties. There
is no other way of ingress to or egress from these prop-
erties and this tract has been in continuous use for that
purpose by tenants, subtenants and patrons of appellee. No
improvements were placed on tract 3 except by the railroad
company which filled it in with cinders to facilitate its use
sby motorcars and freight trucks. During the same period
occtipants of the dwelling houses facing on Forty-seventh
Street have frequently ‘used the north 141 feet of tract 3
as an entrance to or exit from the east end of the alley at
the rear of their lots. Appellee has never sought to prevent
the public generally from using any part of tract 3.
Witnesses for the city testified that tract 3 has been used
by the public generally for more than fifteen years prior to
the filing of the condemnation proceeding, but on cross-
examination these witnesses testified that the character of
the traffic was chiefly that of large transport and freight
trucks of the types that would load and unload freight at
- the loading docks and freight houses occupied by appellee’s
tenants, and although it is apparent that the public generally
used tract 3 as a roadway without objection and without

544 ee

seeking a license or permission from appellee, its chief use
was by persons desiring to do business with occupants of
the railroad properties. The use by the public was merely
incidental and no attempt was made by appellee to exclude
this incidental use.

In this respect this case is not unlike the case of Doss
v. Bunyan, 262 Ill. ror. In that case an elevator was con-
structed on the railroad right of way and a lumber shed,
coal shed and grain office with scales were located on lands
adjoining the railroad right of way. The only means of
ingress and egrees from these buildings was a strip of the
railroad right of way which was used by persons having
occasion to transact business with the railroad company’s
tenants or to haul grain, lumber or coal to or from those
places. It was constantly used for those purposes. The
public generally also traveled this tract at will for many
years, more than the number required by the statute for
the establishment of a highway by prescription, without
objection or interruption by the owner. We held in that
case that under those circumstances the use of this highway
by the public was permissive. In order to establish a high-
way by prescription the use of such a highway by the-
public must be adverse and under claim of right. Town of
Anchor v. Stewart, 270 Ill. 57.

‘The use of tract 3 by the public in the case at bar was
wholly permissive. There is nothing to indicate that the
railroad company or its tenants had any reason to suppose
that the public claimed the right to use the roadway after
the city acquiesced in the superior court decree of 1907.
Such use cannot create a highway by prescription. The
numerous cases cited by appellant in support ‘of its argu-
ment are all distinguishable on the facts.

The judgment of the circuit court is correct and is

ed. Judgment affirmed.

545

Oo. 375
Micwarz, Davin, Appellant, vs. Micuaxt, Scutrz et al.,
Appellees.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

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Joun Cuivart, of Aurora, for appellant.

Tuomas J. Banzury, of Aurora, and Ropert J. Szars,
of Plano, for appellees.

Mr. Jusricgy Daty delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal, involving a freehold, is taken from a
decree of the circuit court of Kendall County which (1)
reformed the legal description contained in four deeds in
the chain of title to a four-acre tract of land, commonly
known as “Four Acres,” located in the town of Little Rock,
(2) removed one deed as a cloud upon title, and (3) ordered
partition of the premises.

The pertinent facts show that the four-acre tract was
conveyed to one Amy L. Gregory in 1906 by a warranty
deed which described the land as follows: “A part of the
South-East Quarter (S.E. 34) of Section Twenty Seven
(27), Township Thirty Seven (37) North, Range Six (6)
East of the Third (3) Principal Meridian, Commencing
in the center of a public road at the North West corner of
Steward’s land; thence South 35° West 10.10 chains;
thence North 33° West 4.63 chains; thence North 35° East
8.39 chains to said road; thence South 50° East along the
center of said road 4.32 chains to the place of beginning,
containing Four acres more or less.” For convenience we
shall refer to this as description “A.”

es sar

In 1927, the premises were purchased from the heirs-at-
law of Amy L. Gregory by Michael Schiltz, Jesse Sheer,
Lyle Hansen and A. Moxey (also known as Alex Moxey,
J. A. Moxey and James A. Moxey), who took title as
tenants in common. The description in the deed effecting
this conveyance, which we designate description “B,” was
as follows: “A part of the South-east Quarter (S.E. 4)
of Section numbered Twenty-seven (27) and a part of
the South-west Quarter (S.W. 14) of Section numbered
Twenty-six (26), in Township numbered Thirty-seven
(37), North, Range numbered Six (6) East of the Third
Principal Meridian and further described by commencing
at the Quarter section corner on the East side of said Sec-
tion numbered Twenty-seven (27) and running thence
South along the East line of said Section, Sixteen (16)
chains and Five (5) Links to the center of the highway
and place of beginning; thence North Fifty (50) Degrees
West Three (3) Chains and Fifty-nine (59) Links; thence
South Thirty-five (35) Degrees West Eight (8) Chains
and Thirty-nine (39) Links to the center of Big Rock
Creek; thence South Thirty-three (33) Degrees East along
the center of said creek, Four (4) Chains and Sixty-three
(63) Links; thence North Thirty-Five (35) Degrees East
Ten (10) Chains and Ten (10) Links to the center of said
highway; thence North Fifty (50) Degrees West along the
center of said highway Seventy-three (73) Links to the
place of beginning; containing Four (4) acres of land
more or less.” It is conceded that descriptions “A” and “B”
substantially describe the same land consisting of some four
acres, more or less.

Several years later, in April, 1930, Jesse Sheer, a
bachelor and one of the tenants in common, executed a
deed conveying to Michael Schiltz, for a recited considera-
tion of $1, an undivided one-fourth interest in real estate
which is described in the deed as follows: “An undivided
one-fourth interest in and to a part of the Southeast quar-

548 ee

ter of Section 27, Township 37 North, Range 6 East of
the 3rd P.M., in the County of Kendall and State of Illinois,
commencing in the center of a public road at the northwest
corner of lands formerly belonging to Lewis Steward;
thence south 35 degs. west 4.63 chains; thence north 35 degs.
east 8.39 chains to said road; thence south so degs. east
along the center of said road 4.32 chains to the place of
beginning, containing four acres of land more or less.”
This description shall be referred to as description “C.”

On August 1, 1938, J. A. Moxey, admittedly another
of the tenants in common, executed a warranty deed in
which he was joined by his wife, Rannie Moxey, wherein,
for a recited consideration of $300, an undivided one-fourth
interest in real estate described as in description “C” was
conveyed to Michael Schiltz and his wife, Lena Schiltz, as
joint tenants. A-week later, the Schiltzes conveyed an un-
divided one-half interest to one R. Lucille Darnell, who
immediately reconveyed to them as joint tenants. Descrip-
tion “C” was also employed in the latter two deeds.

An analysis of description “C” discloses that it de-
scribes only two intersecting lines lying partly within and
partly without the premises described by descriptions “A”
and “B.” It is identical with description “A,” the one
employed in the deed by which Amy L,. Gregory received
title, except that the distance of one boundary is deleted
by the omission of “to.10 chains” and the direction of
the next course has been deleted by the omission from the
course of the words “thence North 33 degrees West.” A
comparison of descriptions “A” and “C” makes it apparent
that the scrivener who prepared the deed first using de-
scription “C,” sought to use description “A” but, after
reaching the words “degrees West” in one line, dropped
down to the same two words in the following line, thus
omitting the intervening description of the course. It is
the four deeds described as containing description “C”
which the trial court reformed to reflect description “B.”

es 549

In July, 1947, approximately eleven years after Moxey
and his wife had executed their deed to Michael and Lena
Schiltz, Moxey died intestate leaving Ranghild Moxey (also
known as Rannie Moxey), his widow, and Robert, Walter
and Francis Moxey, his children, as his heirs-at-law. On
May 2, 1951, Michael David, the appellant in this court,
obtained a quitclaim deed from Ranghild Moxey which, for
a recited “good and valuable consideration,” conveyed and
quit-claimed to David the grantor’s interest in real estate
described as in description “B.” It is this deed which the
decree of the circuit court removed as a cloud upon the title
of appellees, Michael and Lena Schiltz. On the same day,
David also purchased the undivided one-fourth interest of
Lyle Hansen and received from him a deed employing
description “B,” that is, the description which had been
used in the deed by which the Gregory heirs had conveyed
to Schiltz, Sheer, Hansen and Moxey as tenants in common.

Based upon the deeds from Hansen and Ranghild
Moxey, David filed a complaint for partition claiming an
undivided one-half of the premises. The answer of Michael
Schiltz and his wife, admitted that David was the owner
of an undivided one-fourth as the result of Hansen’s deed
but denied that he had received any interest by virtue of
the deed from Ranghild Moxey. They also filed a counter-
complaint in which they claimed an undivided three-fourths
interest in the premises, based upon the deed of the Greg-
ory heirs and those from Jesse Sheer and J. A. and Rannie
Moxey, and sought partition, reformation and removal of
a cloud upon their title in the respects previously referred
to. The trial court granted a motion striking David’s com-
plaint, overruled a motion to dismiss the Schiltz counter-
complaint and entered a decree for partition on the counter-
complaint, finding that Michael and Lena Schiltz were
entitled to an undivided three-fourths interest in the tract
and that David was entitled to an undivided one-fourth
interest. The decree further reformed all deeds containing

550 ee

description “C’” to show description “B,” ordered that the
deed of May 1, 1951, from Ranghild Moxey to David be
removed as a cloud on the title, and disallowed a claim
made by David for the value of improvements, a point
which shall be treated upon separately later in this opinion.
David, to whom we shall hereafter refer as appellant, has
prosecuted this appeal.

The errors assigned in this court are that the decree to
reform the Sheer and Moxey deeds is not supported by
the law or evidence; that the court erred in overruling
appellant’s motion to strike the countercomplaint by reason
of the Statute of Frauds; and that the court should have
allowed appellant’s claim for the cost of improvements to
the land on an equitable basis.

Subsequent to the start of this litigation, one Herbert
Sheer, the sole heir-at-law of Jesse Sheer, the tenant in com-
mon who first conveyed his interest to Schiltz using descrip-
tion “C,” executed a warranty deed to the appellees convey-
ing an undivided one-fourth interest in real estate, described
the same as in description “B,” and reciting: “This deed is
given to grantee and is intended as a title correction deed,
intending hereby to correct the misdescription in the deed
made by Jesse Sheer to said Michael Schiltz in which the
premises aforesaid are misdescribed.” At the trial, appel-
lant’s attorney stipulated that the share of Jesse Sheer in the
property was not in dispute. The cross conveyances repre-
sented by the deeds exchanged between appellees and R. Lu-
cille Darnell were given for the purpose of placing the title
in appellees as joint tenants. R. Lucille Darnell was made a
party to the countercomplaint, was defaulted by the court,
and the countercomplaint taken as confessed by her. ‘thus
the only deeds it is necessary to examine are the one of
August 1, 1938, executed by J. A. Moxey and Rannie
Moxey, his wife, to the appellees, and the one of May 2,
1951, from Ranghild Moxey to appellant. Moxey’s widow
and heirs were made parties defendant to the counter-

Ss 551

complaint but, when they filed no appearance or answer,
were defaulted and the countercomplaint taken as con-
fessed. Since appellant obtained his title to the contested
one-fourth interest by the deed of Ranghild Moxey, he
takes no better title than his antecedent, if any she had.

In the construction of deeds, it is the rule that the in-
tention of the parties is the test by which to determine
the effect of a deed, and that rule also applies to ques-
tions involving descriptions and boundaries. The intention
must be gathered from the instrument itself and the ad-
missible extraneous facts and circumstances. (Branstetier
v. Dahucke, 394 Ill. 40; Brunotte v. DeWitt, 360 Il. 518.)
In ascertaining and giving effect to the intent of the parties
to a deed, courts are not confined to a strict and literal
construction of the language used when to do so would
frustrate the intent of the parties, but the surrounding cir-
cumstances may be considered if they indicate the construc-
tion placed upon the words by the parties, or their practical
construction of the instrument. (Henry v. Metz, 382 Ill.
297.) Commencing with the early case of Worden v. Wil-
liams, 24 Ill. 67, this court has repeatedly held that it is
within the jurisdiction and is the duty of courts of equity
to correct mistakes in conveyances by reformation. In
treating upon this duty in Ambarann Corp. v. Old Ben Coal
Corp. 395 Ill. 154, we stated, (p. 166): “T'o reform an
instrument upon the grounds of mistake, the mistake must
be of fact and not of law, mutual and common to both
parties, and in existence at the time of the execution of
the instrument, showing that at such time the parties in-
tended to say a certain thing and, by a mistake, expressed
another. Before a deed will be reformed, satisfactory evi-
dence of mistake must be presented, and the evidence must
leave no reasonable doubt as to the mutual intention of the
parties, a mere preponderance of the evidence being in-
sufficient.” Again, in Tope v. Tope, 370 Ill. 187, which
appellant advances as controlling in this case, we said,

552 |

(p. 191): “Patterson v. Patterson, 251 Ill. 153, holds the
facts upon which reformation may be granted should be
so convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind
of the court. And in Christ v. Rake, 287 Ill. 619, it is said:
‘Where contracting parties have reduced their agreement
to writing it is presumed to express their mutual intention,
and that presumption does not yield to any claim of a
different intention unless the evidence of a mutual mistake
is of a strong and convincing character. A written instru-
ment will not be reformed on the ground of mistake unless
the evidence that it does not express the intention of the
parties is such as will strike all minds alike as being un-
questionable and free from reasonable doubt. The remedy
of reformation on account of an alleged mistake is never
granted upon a probability nor upon a mere preponderance
of the evidence but only upon evidence amounting to a
certainty.’ ”

Appellant does not deny the general power and duty of
equity to reform deeds but contends that reformation
should not be allowed in this case because of a total lack
of evidence showing that the questioned deed resulted from
a mistake of fact, mutual and common to both parties, or
evidence showing that the parties to the Moxey-Schiltz
deed intended to say one thing and, by mistake, said an-
other. The vital issue in this proceeding is the description
of the property these parties intended to be conveyed and
in resolving that issue, as seen by the rules heretofore ex-
pressed, we must consider the circumstances and place our-
selves in the situation of the parties to the deed. We must
consider the objects they wished to attain and the objects
they had in mind, as well as those which they did not have
in mind and could not attain. (Texas Co. v. O’Meara, 377
Ill. 144.) Approached in this manner, we think the record
is more than sufficient to show what the parties to the
questioned deed intended to convey and that such intention
was, with certaihty, defeated by an erroneous description

es 558

of the property as conveyed, a mistake which was neces-
sarily one of fact and which, the circumstances show, was
mutual and common to both parties.

First of all, the ‘questioned deed itself contains two
descriptions of what was intended to be conveyed, one
description being by course and distance, the other by
quantity. When the specific description by course and dis-
tance is projected on a surface, it produces only two inter-
secting lines which enclose no area, yet the general descrip-
tion by quantity, indicates that an area of four acres was
intended to be conveyed. While we are not unaware of
the rule which holds that description by quantity must yield
to a specific description, both may be considered in ascer-
taining what the parties intended to convey. As the facts
appear here, the incompatability of the two descriptions
demonstrates that a mistake occurred and, since the spe-
cific description describes only two intersecting lines, lends
support to a conclusion that the parties, by mistake, did not
say what was intended in the specific description. The
record also shows that the two intersecting lines fall partly
within and partly without the four-acre tract in which
Moxey and Schiltz admittedly shared an interest as tenants
in common, Putting ourselves in the situation of the parties,
it is reasonable to assume that Moxey intended to convey,
and Schiltz to buy, only that land in which Moxey had an
interest. It is unreasonable to assume that Moxey intended
to convey property he did not own, or that Schiltz would
think he could. Further, in regard to the deed, it is appar-
ent that Moxey would be performing a useless act and
conveying nothing by a deed describing two intersecting
lines and it is most certain that Schiltz did not pay the
recited consideration of $300 for such a nebulous interest.

Other facts shown by the evidence are that Moxey
asserted no proprietary rights over the premises following
the conveyance to Schiltz and, subsequent to that date,
no longer contributed to the payment of taxes, his share

5b4 ee

thereof being assumed by his grantee, Schiltz. In this
manner the construction placed upon the deed by the parties
themselves indicatés what they intended and thought they
had attained by their deed. Other extraneous circumstances
which may be considered are that the tract of land involved
was the only land in which the two men had any common
interest. If either party to this appeal is to have any
standing in this, or any, court it must be admitted that
description “A,” which was employed in the deed by which
Amy L. Gregory received title, substantially described the
four-acre tract involved. A comparison of description “A”
with description “C,” used in the Moxey to Schiltz deed,
shows the only difference to be the deletion of one course
and one boundary in description “C.” The fact that the
deletion occurs between the use of the word “West” in
separate lines of description “A” reasonably gives rise to
an inference that description “C” arose from a scrivener’s
error and that description “A” was, in fact, the one intended
by the parties.

Looking to the disputed déed itself, the relationship of
the parties, the interpretation the parties themselves placed
upon the instrument, and to the other circumstances which
reflect their true intent, we are of the opinion that it emerges
clearly and without question that the parties intended that
the deed convey to Schiltz all of Moxey’s interest in the
four acres but, by mutual mistake of fact, did not execute
a deed which completely reflected that intention. The chan-
cellor properly allowed reformation of this and of the other
deeds employing the faulty description.

_The next error assigned is that the trial court erred in
overruling appellant’s motion to dismiss appellees’ counter-
complaint on the ground that allegations therein relating
to verbal agreements between Schiltz and Sheer and be-
tween Schiltz and Moxey for the purchase of interests in
the land in question were improperly pleaded insofar as
they did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. An exam-

Se 555

ination of the pleading discloses allegations of oral con-
tracts, both with Sheer and Moxey, for the purchase of
their interests in the four-acre tract; an allegation that
appellee Schiltz had performed the contract by payment
of consideration and that Sheer and Moxey had performed
by the execution and delivery of their deeds, in which deeds
there had been a mutual mistake as to the description of the
property conveyed. It is appellant’s contention that since
an agreement to sell real estate is within the Statute of
Frauds, the complaint setting up oral contracts was insuffi-
cient at law. The Statute of Frauds cannot be invoked
to avoid a contract that has been carried into execution.
(People v. Tombaugh, 303 Ill. 591; Pearce v. Pearce, 184.
Ill. 289; Swanzey v. Moore, 22 Ill. 63.) Further, in
Fleming v. Dillon, 370 Ill. 325, and Ropacki v. Ropacki,
354 Ill. 502, we held that an oral contract, even for the
future conveyance of land, is not within the Statute of
Frauds if it has been completely performed by one party.
Where, pursuant to an oral sale of land, the consideration
is fully paid and possession given the purchaser, there is
sufficient performance to take the agreement out of the
Statute of Frauds. (Pasquay v. Pasquay, 235 Ill. 48.)
Applying the principle announced in the foregoing cases to
the allegations of performance and possession contained in
the countercomplaint, it is manifest that the court did not
err in denying the motion to dismiss. Additional support
for the court’s ruling is found in those cases which hold
that the Statute of Frauds cannot be interposed by strangers
to the agreement. People v. Tombaugh, 303 Ill. 591; Pas-
quay v. Pasquay, 235 Ill. 48.

The remaining error assigned has to do with the cost
of a road appellant constructed on the land involved. The
pertinent facts show that there are two cottages on the
four-acre tract; one built by Schiltz and the other by
Hansen, who conveyed to appellant. The tract is bounded
on one side by a graveled public road and on the opposite

556 ee

side by a creek, ‘The Schiltz cottage is located in the proxi-
mate center of the tract, while the David cottage is nearer
the creek. In 1927, before appellant’s cottage had been
built, Schiltz installed a gravel road leading from the high-
way to his cottage and, in 1951, that was the only usable
road on the premises. Appellant’s cottage was approxi-
mately two hundred feet from such road and, at certain
times of the year when the creek overflowed, it was difficult
to get from the road to his cottage. Appellant, therefore,
constructed a gravel road from the highway to his own
cottage at a cost of approximately $1100. Though it does
not appear Clearly in the pleadings, appellant apparently
made some claim for the cost of the improvement. In its
decree the trial court disposed of the claim with this find-
ing: “8. That the claim of Michael David for gravel and
labor does not constitute a permanent and valuable im-
provement to said real estate and was made for his sole
benefit, without the consent of the co-owners of the land.”

Appellant does not challenge this finding as being against
the manifest weight of the evidence but assigns as error
that “The court should have allowed the counter-defendant
[appellant] his claim for the cost of improvements made
to the land on an equitable basis.” In assigning this error
appellant admits that he introduced no testimony of values
or evidence that the alleged improvement had increased the
value of the land. In Heppe v. Szczepanski, 209 Ill. 88,
and Manternach v. Studt, 240 Ill. 464, we stated the rule
to be that where improvements are made by one tenant in
common without the knowledge or consent of the others,
compensation allowed for the improvements on partition
should be estimated so as to inflict no injury upon the
cotenant against whom the improvements are charged and,
if possible, the court should allot the portion improved to
the one making the improvement without taking into account
the value of the improvement. If such a division cannot be
made the court will, upon proper proof being made, allow

557

to the one making the improvement the increased value of
the premises caused thereby, but not the cost of the im-
provement. In this case, as in the cited cases, there was
no evidence of values from which the trial court or this
court could ascertain what ought to be done about the
alleged improvement. In addition, and more important, the
court also made a finding, which is not challenged, that the
alleged improvement was not a permanent or valuable im-
provement. In either case, therefore, the contention that
appellant should have been compensated for the cost of the
improvement must fail.

The decree of the circuit court of Kendall County was
correct and is affirmed.

es
oo. 3°

Fay Ickes et al., Appellees, vs. THe Boarp or SUPERVISORS
or Macon Counry et al., Appellants.

Decree affirmed.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

x
ry
©

Kewneta E. Evans, State’s Attorney, Roy B. Fosrsr,
and Davin C. Jack, all of Decatur, for appellants.

Cuaruus E. Lex, of Decatur, for appellees.

Mr. Jusrice Futon delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the circuit court of Macon County
involving the construction, interpretation and constitution-
ality of the Indigent War Veterans Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 23, pars. 154-154i,) also known as the Bogardus
Act. The appellants are the county of Macon and the board
of supervisors of Macon County, and the appellees are the
superintendent of the veterans assistance commission of
Macon County and two taxpayers. The action originated
as one for mandamus, in which the court issued an alias
writ against the appellants,

There is no conflict as to the facts of the situation. Sec-
tion 2 (par. 154a) of the act provides for the assistance of
veterans of the wars and campaigns in which the United
States has been engaged and their families who have been
residents of the State for a year or more. The county
board shall provide such sums as may be just and necessary
.to be drawn by the commander, quartermaster or com-
mandant of specified veterans organizations on the recom-
mendation of the assistance committee of the post, ship,
camp or chapter. On failure of the county board to appro-
priate for such assistance, the organization, its commandant,
or the superintendent of any veterans assistance commission
shall apply to the circuit court for a writ of mandamus,

es 559

and upon proof of the justice and necessity of the claim
the writ shall issue. It is apparent from the language em-
ployed in this section that it applies only to writs of man-
damus to require the board to appropriate just and neces-
sary sums to meet claims for assistance only.

Section 9 (par. 154h,) in essence, provides for the
establishment of a county veterans assistance commission
where the county has two or more posts, camps, chapters
or detachments of specified veterans organizations with one
delegate and one alternate from each division making up its
membership. This commission and the president of the
county board are to oversee the distribution of funds. Sec-
tion 10 (par. 154i) vests the executive powers of the com-
mission in a superintendent elected by the commission from
among veterans of certain specified wars, who is to have
charge of the office provided by the county board. The
county is to furnish necessary supplies and also, in counties
where a commission has been organized, “appropriate such
additional sums, upon recommendation of the Veterans
Assistance Commission, as may be deemed necessary, to
properly compensate the officers and employees required to
administer such assistance,” with a ceiling on such salaries
in counties the size of Macon of $3600 per year for super-
intendent and $2400 for secretary.

Prior to 1950 a veterans assistance commission was
organized in Macon County and a recommendation was
made for an appropriation to pay the necessary salaries.
The board failed to appropriate for that year and a man-
damus action was brought, to which the board filed a
motion to dismiss. This motion was denied and the board
stood on the motion, whereby the circuit court issued a
writ. The board appealed but subsequently dismissed the
appeal and appropriated for that year the sum of $2400
for the superintendent and $1500 for a secretary. In the
fiscal year 1951-1952 the board appropriated the sums re-
quested by the commission for the expenses and salaries,

560 ee

In 1952, the veterans assistance commission made a
“recommendation asking for a total appropriation of $7400,

which included the maximum of $3600 for the salary of a
superintendent and $2400 for a secretary. The board did
not follow this recommendation but instead made a total
appropriation of $4000, which fixed the superintendent’s
salary at $2100 and the secretary’s at $1500. On October 1,
1952, the appellees filed a motion to redocket the original
catise and a complaint for an alias writ. Appellants filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint for an alias writ, which
motion was overruled. Appellants then answered the com-
plaint, a hearing was had, and the court then made a finding
that the appellants had acted capriciously and arbitrarily in
failing to “make such appropriations of moneys to provide
an office and employees for the Veterans Assistance Com-
mission of Macon County, Illinois, as directed by the Court
in previous Writ of Mandamus entered herein.” The alias
writ then ordered the board to make stich appropriations
as are necessary to provide and equip an office and such
additional sums as might be deemed necessary to properly
compensate officers and employees required to administer
such assistance.

At the hearing, the present superintendent testified that
the original superintendent had died and that he was new,
that he was unable to work for the amount appropriated,
that some 12 to 35 people a day came to the’ veterans
assistance office, and that he had no prior experience, except
as a volunteer, in the type of work he was then doing. The
secretary testified that she had been secretary for the entire
time the office had been in existence and could not work
for $1500. The service officer of the Illinois veterans com-

* mission testified that the work of his office and that of the
Macon County office were parallel and that the offices are
duplications. He further stated that he felt the work in
the offices would continue at present levels or increase. The
chairman of the board of supervisors was called, and he

es oe

testified over objection that at a caucus of Republican board
members it was voted to drop the veterans assistance com-
mission appropriation, and further stated that other salaries
in the courthouse had been adopted on the recommendation
of the committee on fees and salaries. To like effect was
the testimony of the chairman of the fees and salaries com-
mittee and the chairman of the finance committee. ,

At the conclusion of the hearing the court rendered
an opinion appearing in the record which, while not de-
ciding the legal issues of the case, found that the board
sought to do by indirection what it could not do by direc-
tion, namely, abolish the commission, and, therefore, the ~
board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The only refer-
ence the opinion makes to the statute was language to the
effect that the intervention of the veterans assistance com-
mission in making a recommendation for an appropriation
was, in effect, the legislature itself speaking and making the
appropriation for the board.

The appellants argue that an alias writ of mandamus
will only lie in situations where the public authority or
official has not complied with the original writ, and, since
the board did make an appropriation, it had complied with
the original writ; that a writ of mandamus will not lie to
challenge the sufficiency of an appropriation made by the
board where the amount to be appropriated is within the
discretion of the board; and that a court cannot substitute
its discretion for the discretion vested in a public body.

The appellees raise the argument of res judicata which
is raised for the first time on this appeal, claiming that any
questions involving the present conflict were determined in
the original proceedings; and that an alias writ may be
awarded to compel the performance of acts unfulfilled or
not in compliance with the original writ.

It is the opinion of this court that the decision of the
trial judge in awarding an alias writ to the appellees can-
not stand. Analyzing the statute in question, it is apparent

[|

562 ee

that the county board must make an appropriation upon
the recommendation of the veterans assistance commission.
That appropriation, however, can be no more than the
maximum allowed by the statute. The act does not say
that the appropriation must be in the amounts recommended
by the commission. It states purely and simply that the board
shall appropriate such amounts as may be deemed necessary
to properly compensate employees. What is a proper com-
pensation is certainly within the discretion of the board.
A writ of mandamus will not lie to challenge the sufficiency
of an appropriation made by the board where the amount
to be appropriated lies within the discretion of the board.
People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Jarmuth, 398 Ill. 66; McFarlane
v. Hotz, 4or Ill. 506.

Further, the act provides for an appropriation. The
original mandamus proceeding was instituted to force the
board to make an appropriation which it had refused to do.
When the board did make the appropriation it had done all
that the statute required of it. The alias writ, instituted
by reactivating the former and original proceedings, was
not designed to force the board into making an appropria-
tion but to appropriate a specific amount which the com-
mission and the court felt it should appropriate. However,
when the board made the. appropriation as a result of the
order in the original proceeding, that writ was satisfied.
It again made an appropriation as a result of the 1952
request. The alias writ could only lie tp enforce compli-
ance with the original writ. (People ex rel. Illinois Mid-
land Railway Co. v. Supervisor of Barnett Township, 100
Ill, 332.) Bearing in mind that the board had acted in
compliance with the original writ and had so acted in the
year in question, it is obvious that the cases cited by ap-
pellees are not pertinent in the cause before us. The alias
writ is issued to compel compliance with the original order.

The net effect of the court’s order has been to hold that
the board, by setting a superintendent’s salary of $2100

eS 563

and a secretary’s salary of $1500, was capricious and arbi-
trary. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that appellees
were not entitled to an alias writ, the court has here sub-
stituted its discretion for that of the board. That there is
some substantiation for the amounts set forth in the appro-
priation, regardless of the desire expressed to do away with
the commission and the fact that parallel and duplicating
services existed, is apparent from the fact that the original
appropriation to pay the original staff was in the amount
of a $2400 salary for a Superintendent and $1500 for a
Secretary. In any case, regardless of the basic reasons
behind the cut in appropriation on the part of the men who
testified, the entire board in open meeting passed an appro-
priation which was within its discretion to determine. “A
court will not issue a writ the effect of which command
would be to substitute the court’s judgment or discretion
for that of the body which is commanded to act. The
application of the writ is restricted to directing that action
be taken and is not available to direct what action shall be
taken.” (People ex rel. Walsh v. Board of Comrs. 397 Ill.
293.) It could well be pointed out that to allow the judge
to set his discretion over that of the board by determining
that the amount it set was a result of arbitrary and capri-
cious action would be, in itself, a method whereby the court
could require the board to set the maximum of the statute.
The court could do by indirection that which it could not
do by direction.

There is no evidence in the cause which would indicate
that the board abused its discretion in the matter. The
statute is clear in its terms and allows the board to act
within the limits of the statute. ‘This the board here has
done and this action may not lie. For the reasons stated
herein, the order of the circuit court of Macon County is

reversed.
Order reversed.

564

(No. 32683.
Ciypy Hewson et al., Appellants, vs. Tux Cry oF
Cucaco et al., Appellees,

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

an
a
a

Josern S. SNowpbeEn, of Chicago, (Wiri1Am R. Mine,
Jr., of counsel,) for appellants.

Joun J. Morrimer, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago,
(L. Louis Karron, Cuariys P. Horan, and Harry H.
Porrack, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. Justicy Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

Appellants, hereinafter to be referred to as plaintiffs,
are retail liquor licensees and female employees of such
licensees. Plaintiffs appeal here from an order of the
superior court of Cook County granting the motion of
defendants below and dismissing the suit to restrain the
enforcement of an ordinance of the city of Chicago pro-
hibiting women, other than licensees or the mother, daugh-
ter, wife or sister of a licensee from being employed as
bartenders. The constitutionality of a municipal ordinance
being involved, the appeal comes here directly,

In 1941 the General Assembly amended section 1 of
article IV of the Liquor Control Act to provide in part
that: “In every city, village, or incorporated town, the
city council or president and board of trustees * * *
shall have the power by general ordinance or resolution

667

* * * to prohibit any woman or minor, other than a
licensee or the wife of a licensee, from drawing, pouring
or mixing any alcoholic liquor as an employee of any retail
licensee; * * * and to establish such further regula-
tions and restrictions upon the issuance of and operation
under local licenses not inconsistent with law as the public
good and convenience may require; * * *,” Til. Rev.
Stat. 1951, chap. 43, par. II.

Subsequently, on January 30, 1952, the city council of
the city of Chicago amended its ordinances as follows:

“Be It Ordained by the City Council of the City of
Chicago:

“Section 1. Section 147-15 of the Municipal Code of
Chicago is amended to read as follows:

“147-15. Employment of females.) It shall be unlaw-
ful for any licensee, his manager, or other person in charge
of any licensed premises where alcoholic liquor is sold or
offered for sale for consumption thereon to engage, em-
ploy or permit the engagement or employment of any
female person other than the licensee or the mother,
daughter, wife or sister of the licensee to draw, pour or
mix any alcoholic liquor, nor shall any other female be
permitted to remain on said premises, who shall solicit any
patron or customer thereof to purchase alcoholic or non-
alcoholic liquor for her, himself, or any other person therein ;
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall pro-
hibit any adult manageress or waitress who shall be regu-
larly employed therein from accepting and serving the order
of a patron or customer in the regular course of her em-
ployment as such manageress or waitress,

“Section 2. This ordinance shall be in force and effect
from and after its passage and publication.”

It was thereafter provided that any person violating the
above provision shall be fined not more than two hundred
dollars for each offense, every day that thé violation con-
tinues constituting a separate and distinct offense.

568 De

When enforcement of the Chicago ordinance was threat-
ened, these plaintiffs instituted a suit in the superior court
of Cook County against the city of Chicago, the mayor,
the commissioner of police and others to restrain its en-
forcement. Plaintiffs alleged that the purpose of the amend-
ment is to enable male bartenders to monopolize the trade
and calling of drawing, pouring and mixing alcoholic
liquors on licensed premises where alcoholic liquor is sold
ot offered for sale for consumption. They also asserted
that the limitations on, and interference with, the business
of selling alcoholic liquors at retail are so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to be in violation of, and repugnant to,
sections 1, 2, and 13 of article II, and section 22 of arti-
cle IV of the constitution of the State of Illinois, section 1
of article IV of the Liquor Control Act, and the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution of the United States. These
assertions are based on the contention that the city of Chi-
cago lacked authority to so regulate the business of the
plaintiffs, that the contested ordinance deprives the plain-
tiffs of liberty and property without due process of law and
denies them equal protection of the laws of Illinois, and,
moreover, that if section 1 of article IV of the Liquor Con-
trol Act does so authorize the city, the said section 1 is
itself likewise arbitrary and unreasonable for the same
reasons, Finally, plaintiffs contend the ordinance is so
vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be incapable of precise
application.

Plaintiffs moved for a temporary injunction and de-
fendants moved to strike the amended complaint and to
dismiss the suit. The superior court granted the motion to
dismiss. .

On this appeal it is first contended by plaintiffs that the
city of Chicago had no authority to adopt this ordinance.
It is asserted that the city council did not do what the legis-
lature had authorized, in that the legislature had directed
that if women were prohibited from “drawing, pouring,

es 569

and mixing alcoholic liquors” only licensees or wives of
licensees were to be exempted. The council, however, ex-
empted mothers, daughters and sisters as well as the wives
of licensees, and, in addition, plaintiffs assert, provided that
adult manageresses and waitresses may be employed to
draw, pour and mix,

It is undisputed that the power to license, regulate or
prohibit the traffic in intoxicating liquors rests in the police
power of the State, and the State may delegate it to munici-
palities if it so desires. The only power a municipality has
to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages is that conferred
upon it by the State. (Sager v. City of Silvis, 402 Ill. 262.)
Section 1 of article IV of the Liquor Control Act merely
states that any and all women may be prohibited from
“drawing, pouring, or mixing” alcoholic liquors except
licensees and wives of licensees. That constitutes the limits
restricting the actions of the city council in passing such
an ordinance. Section 1 of article I of the Liquor Control
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 43, par. 94,) provides
that: “This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end
that the health, safety and welfare of the People of the
State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the
consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and
promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of
the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.”

In line with this admonishment in the act itself, it is
obvious that the language with which we are concerned
directed merely that of all women, licensees and wives of
licensees could not in any case be prohibited from “draw-
ing, pouring, or mixing” alcoholic liquors. That act does
not direct that only licensees and wives of licensees may be
excused from the prohibition. Authority is deposited with
the city council in the enactment of an ordinance pursuant
thereto, to exclude any other women it may see fit to ex-
clude under that part of the act giving it the right to
“establish such further regulations and restrictions upon

570 ee

the issuance of and operation under local licenses not in-
consistent with law as the public good and convenience may
require.” The act merely sets the most extreme limits to
which the council may go in enacting an ordinance pur-
suant to the legislative authorization. We have previously
held that authority for the passage of an ordinance need

* not be wholly derived from a single grant of power by the
legislature but may be derived from several different grants
of power. Father Basil’s Lodge, Inc. v. City of Chicago,
393 Ill. 246.

The ordinance does not, as plaintiffs contend, permit
adult manageresses and waitresses to draw, pour and mix
alcoholic liquors but merely authorizes them to accept and
serve the order of a patron or customer, The very language
of the ordinance draws a difference between “drawing,
pouring or mixing” and “accepting and serving an order.”
Obviously, “accepting and serving an order” is merely re-
ceiving the request of a customer and placing the requested
article before him. Such an enactment is authorized by the
grant of power to regulate and restrict the issuance and
operation under local licenses.

The second issue raised by plaintiffs is that this munici-
pal ordinance deprives them of their liberty and property
without due process of law in that they are deprived of
freedom of contract and the right to work at a trade or
occupation of their own choosing. The constitutions of
Illinois and of the United States expressly prohibit gov-
ernmental action which deprives any person of his life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Const.
Illinois, art. II, sec. 2; Const. of the United States, 14th
amendment.

Tt is axiomatic that an ordinance passed in pursuance
of competent statutory authority is presumptively valid.
(Kinney v. City of Joliet, 411 Til. 289.) The power of
the judiciary in determining the constitutionality of laws
or ordinances is limited to deciding whether or not the law

eS ot

is within the scope of the constitutional powers of the
legislative department. (Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.
v. Mayor of Danville, 367 Ill. 310.) It is well settled that
the legislature may, in the exercise of the police power of
the State, enact those measures which have a tendency to
promote the public comfort, health, safety, morals or wel-
fare of society. In the exercise of this power the legisla-
ture may enact laws regulating, restraining or prohibiting
anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though
such regulation, restraint or prohibition interferes with the
liberty or property of an individual. Neither the fourteenth
amendment to the Federal constitution nor any provision
of the constitution of this State was designed to interfere
with the police power to enact and enforce laws for the
protection of the health, peace, morals or general welfare
of the people. (Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492.) If it is
claimed the statute is referable to the police power, the
court must be able to see that it tends, in some degree,
toward the prevention of offenses or the preservation of
the public health, morals, safety or welfare. It must be
apparent that there is some connection between the provi-
sion of the law and such purpose. If it is manifest that the
statute has no such object, but, under the guise of a police
regulation, is an invasion of the property rights of an indi-
vidual, it is the duty of the courts to declare it void. Metro~
politan Trust Co. v. Jones, 384 Il. 248.

Statutes prohibiting the employment of females as bar-
maids or in any other capacity in establishments where
alcoholic liquors were sold for consumption have quite
generally been held valid enactments under the police power
as tending to safeguard the morals of such females and in
some cases of the customers. (See 172 A.L.R. 620.) We
may assume that the legislature in passing the enabling
act and the council in enacting this ordinance concluded
that women generally should not be allowed to draw, pour
or mix alocoholic liquors in a place where alcoholic liquor

572 ee

is sold for consumption on the premises, in the promotion
and protection of the good morals of the women or of the
public. Such intent being attributed to the act and ordi-
nance passed pursuant thereto, a valid exercise of the police
power is apparent, and no constitutional rights of liberty
and property are thereby infringed, for the reasons assigned
above,

Plaintiffs next contend that females who are not licen-
sees, or the mother, daughter, wife or sister of a licensee,
are not afforded equal protection of the law in being denied
employment as bartenders, especially where women are also
employed as manageresses and waitresses. In Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, the Supreme Court of the United
States had before it the constitutionality of a Michigan
statute which prohibited women from being licensed as
bartenders except such women as were wives or daughters
of male owners of liquor establishments. The court there
said: “Since bartending by women may, in the allowable
legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social prob-
lems against which it may devise preventive measures, the
legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition
if it believes that as to a defined group of females other
factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce the
moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibi-
tion. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured
through ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or
father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid
without such protecting oversight. This Court is certaintly
not in a position to gain-say such belief by the Michigan
legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan
has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of the
laws.” The court then stated that it could in no manner
profess to cross-examine the minds of the legislators who
passed such an act, nor question their motives. It was held
that since the line drawn was not without reason, the court
must refuse to listen to any suggestion that the real impulse

rr sm

behind the legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male
bartenders to monopolize the calling.

The opinion further held that it was not unconstitu-
tional to withdraw women from bartending while allow-
ing women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed,
and approved the reasons set forth in Goesaert v. Cleary,
74 Bed. Supp. 735. There the court concluded that the
legislature may have reasoned that a graver responsibility
attaches to the bartender who has control of the liquor
supply than to the waitress who merely receives prepared
orders of liquor from the bartender for service at a table,
and determined that the presence of female waitresses does
not constitute a serious social problem where a male bar-
tender is in charge of the premises, or where a male licensee
bears the ultimate responsibility for the operation therein.

The council may have deemed it necessary to have a
male or a female relative control and be responsible for
the supply of liquor, since it is the improper dispensing
thereof which tends to lead to the lowering of moral stand-
ards, especially when tempted by the presence of women
who dispense the same while unsupervised, except as a mere
employee. Licensees, whether male or female, would have
a special interest in obtaining the help of their family in
the conduct of the business, and would enjoy a control over
their own families conducive to good morals. Such licensees
would tend to conduct moral, law-abiding establishments
and avoid practice inimical to their own welfare and that
of their family. They would naturally exercise careful
supervision over the members of their family responsible
for the liquor supply. It is highly unlikely that members
of the family would so conduct themselves as to jeopardize
the family invéstment. The council obviously considered it
unnecessary to prohibit waitresses from performing the rou-
tine tasks of bringing food and drinks to customers at
tables. This constitutes a reasonable exercise of the city’s
power to regulate the liquor traffic. When the power to act

514 ee

is vested in the legislative department and the means it
chooses are reasonably calculated to subserve the exercise
of the power, courts will not inquire whether the legislature,
in delegating the power, or the subordinate legislative body
selected to exercise it, acted wisely or not, and such action
cannot be set aside by the court on the ground that it is
unreasonable, as it is not the province of the court to pass
on the reasonableness of an act of the General Assembly.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Mayor of Danville,
367 IIL. 310.

Plaintiffs argue as their fourth point that this ordinance
enacted pursuant to a grant of power from the General
Assembly violates section 22 of article IV which reads:
“The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws
in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:
for * * * granting to any corporation, association or
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or
franchise whatever.” .

Plaintiffs assert that this ordinance grants a monopoly
to male bartenders, while providing exemptions to the
immediate female relatives of the licensee and to waitresses
and manageresses. We have above pointed out that the
plaintiffs are clearly mistaken in assuming the waitresses
and manageresses are permitted to draw, pour or mix alco-
holic liquors. It is fundamental that the legislature, or its
delegated subordinate body, may, under its police power,
adopt classifications of persons or things based upon rea-
sonable distinctions. (Josma v. Western Steel Car and
Foundry Co. 249 Ill. 508; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270.)
This asserted provision of our State constitution supple-
ments the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Federal constitution and prevents the enlarge-
ment of the rights of one or more persons in discrimination
against the rights of others. Laws are not special or class
legislation because they affect one class and not another,

ot

provided they affect all members of the same class alike.
If the classification of persons for purposes of legislative
regulation is based upon some. substantial difference bearing
proper relation to the classification, and is not arbitrary or
capricious, the statute does not violate this constitutional
provision. (Schuman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 407 Il.
313.) It has been amply demonstrated above that a sub-
stantial difference exists between licensees and the mother,
daughter, wife or sister of a licensee and other women
when acting as bartenders. The classification is reason-
able and not arbitrary, being grounded upon a proper and
judicious control of the liquor supply which the legislature
and the city council, in their wisdom, have determined
should be controlled by a male bartender or a woman of
the exempted class in the furtherance of the morals and
welfare of society. The ordinance affects all those in the
same class in exactly the same manner. Here, a specifically
defined class is excluded from a particular employment
unless it is so situated as to be assured certain necessary
supervision and protection, in the paramount interests of
public morals and welfare. It is thus seen that this ordi-
nance, enacted pursuant to powers delegated by the General
Assembly, does not constitute a violation of section 22 of
article IV of our State constitution.

Plaintiffs assert finally that the ordinance is so vague
and indefinite as to fail to meet the requirements of due
process of law, in that the statute does not make clear
whether waitresses and manageresses are prohibited from
“drawing, pouring or mixing” alcoholic liquors. We have
demonstrated above that the use of the different language
describing the permissible duties of ‘waitresses and man-
ageresses indicates their permissible duty is merely to
accept orders and carry food and drink to customers at
places other than the bar. (See, Goesaert v. Cleary.) This
contention is of so little merit as to prohibit further dis-

576 ee

cussion. Certainly, no constitutional question of due process
arises from the language employed, as no vagueness or
indefiniteness is apparent.

The ordinance and statute are not susceptible to the
constitutional attacks here leveled against them, and the
ordinance is completely within the authority granted by the
General Assembly. No violation of the State or Federal
constitutions being apparent from this review, and the ordi-
nance being otherwise valid, the order of the superior court
of Cook County dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit is affirmed.

Order affirmed. °
Lee
(No. 32804.
Corypon C, BrapLey, Appellant, vs. Carnes P. Casey,

Director of Public Works and Buildings, ei al., Ap-

pellees,

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

517

Horrman & Horrman, of Springfield, for appellant.

Latuam Castis, Attorney General, of Springfield,
(Witiam C, Wings, RaymMonp S, Sarnow, and A. Zona
Groves, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr, Justicy Maxwett, delivered the opinion of the
court:

This is an appeal from ‘he circuit court of Sangamon
County involving the Prevailing Wage Act of this State.
Appellant filed his petition seeking to enjoin the Director
of Public Works and Buildings, the Chief Highway Engi-
neer, the Director of Finance, the Auditor and the Treas-
urer of the State of Illinois, and also Sangamon County,
its superintendent of highways, county clerk, and treasurer,
from making contracts and disbursing funds under said
act. Appellant’s petition for leave to file his injunction suit
was granted upon a hearing wherein the trial court found
reasonable grounds existed for filing the suit. Appellant,
hereinafter referred to as petitioner, based his right to sue
upon the facts that he is a citizen and taxpayer of this
State, having paid all realty taxes assessed against real
estate he owns, all license taxes under the Motor Vehicle
Act, and all taxes for gasoline purchased under the Motor
Fuel Tax Act. The complaint, in substance, attacked the
constitutionality of the Prevailing Wage Act.

378 ee

Appellees, hereinafter referred to as defendants, filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the act in all respects
is constitutional and valid. The trial court thereupon dis-
missed the complaint for want of equity.

Petitioner now urges in this court that the provisions
of the act which purport to pertain to direct employment
of employees in public works by public bodies is invalid
for the reason that it is not embraced within the title of
the act and, therefore, within the prohibition of section 13
of article IV of the constitution of Illinois, It is further
contended the act is vague, indefinite and uncertain in its
terms so as to amount to a delegation of legislative power
in violation of due process; that the 1951 amendment de-
fining wages under a collective bargaining agreement as
the prevailing rate of wages is invalid in delegating a dis-
cretionary power to private parties and in being too re-
strictive and discriminatory, defining that to be a fact
which is not a fact; that fi edom of contract between
employers and employees is de ied in violation of the Fed-
eral and State constitutions; that it is arbitrary and un-
reasonable in requiring employment of workmen on a per
diem basis; that it produces waste and illegal expenditure
of public funds,

The act in question was approved by the Governor of
this State, June 26, 1941, and is entitled “An Act regulating
wages of laborers, mechanics and other workmen employed
under contracts for public works.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
chap. 48, pars, 39s-1 to 398-12, incl.) Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8,
and 9 were amended in the year 1951. ‘The act as amended is
now here subjected to the constitutional attack of petitioner.

The declaration of policy of the State is set out in
section 1 of the act, wherein it is declared that a wage of
not less than the general prevailing rate per diem for work
of a similar character in the locality in which the work is
performed shall be paid to all laborers, workmen and
mechanics employed by or on behalf of the State or by

Ss 519

or on behalf of the county, city and county, city, town,
township, district, or other political subdivision of the State
engaged in public works, exclusive of maintenance work.
Section 2 of the act defines “public works,” “maintenance
work,” “locality in which the work is performed,” “general
prevailing rate of per diem wages,” “general prevailing rate
of wages,” and “prevailing rate of wages.” This section
also provides that when there is in effect a collective bar-
gaining agreement negotiated by employer and employee
covering the rates of wages for work of a similar char-
acter in a locality in which the work is to be performed,
then such rates of wages shall be considered as the pre-
vailing rate of wages in such locality. This latter provision
concerning the collective bargaining agreement was added
by amendment in 1951.

Section 3 provides that no less than the prevailing rate
of per diem wages shall be paid to employees employed by
or on behalf of the State or the other public bodies enumer-
ated. Maintenance work is excluded from the section. This
section further provides that only employees direcily em-
ployed by contractors or subcontractors shall be deemed to
be employed upon public works.

Section 4 makes provision for the ascertaining by the
public body awarding the public works contract of the gen-
eral prevailing rate of per diem wages in the locality where
the work is to be performed for each craft or type of work-
man or mechanic needed to execute the contract or project.
Said rates must then be included in the resolution or ordi-
nance and the call for bids, and the section makes it manda-
tory upon the successful contractor and: any subcontractor
under him to pay no less than said specified rate. The
public works contract must contain a stipulation of like
effect,

Section 5 requires the keeping of records by the con-
tractor and subcontractors and the public body for carrying
out the purpose of the act.

580 ee

Section 6 makes a violation of the act a misdemeanor
and directs the Department of Labor to inquire diligently
as to any violation.

Section 7 makes the finding as to prevailing wages final
unless reviewed under the provisions of the act.

Section 8 provides that in the event the public body is
unable to ascertain the prevailing rate of wage of any class
of work required to be performed under its proposed con-
tract, it shall be the duty of said body to state such fact in
its resolution, ordinance or notice for bids, and in this
event the clause specifying the prevailing wage as to such
class of work may be excluded from the contract unless
such wage may be determined by the court on appeal as
provided for in the act.

Section 9 requires the public body to investigate and
ascertain the prevailing rate of wages from time to time
and to publicly post its determination. A certified copy is
sent to the Secretary of State and within thirty days there-
after is published in a newspaper of gerieral circulation in
the area concerned, notifying all persons of its determina-
tion; other notices to employers, employees and other asso-
ciations are provided. A time for filing objections and
having a hearing is provided. Also included is a method
of review under the provisions of the Administrative Re-
view Act. An appeal thereafter to this court may then be
had and these proceedings are given priority in the trial
court over all other civil proceedings except election con-
tests. The Attorney General is required to represent the
public body and defend its determinations.

Section 10 contains provisions for general subpoena
powers,

Section 11 permits recovery by employees of any differ-
ence between the stipulated rates and the actual wages
received, :

Section 12 is the usual section providing for the keep-
ing intact of the remaining portions of the act in the event

es se

any portion thereof is declared unconstitutional. The fore-
going is intended merely to furnish a brief sketch of the
act without going into the detailed provisions word for
word,

The first prevailing wage act enacted in 1931 was de-
clared unconstitutional the same year in Mayhew v. Nelson,
346 Ill. 381. In 1939, a second prevailing wage act was
passed and it was declared unconstitutional in 1940 in
Reid v. Smith, 375 Ill. 147. From the latter opinion two
judges dissented. Thereafter, the 1941 act was passed in
the following year. As previously stated certain amend-
ments were added in 1951. It therefore appears that the
present act, containing many changes from the former
ones, is a serious declaration of the public policy by the
elected representatives of the people of this State, with an
evident attempt to cure the law of its former alleged evils.

The objection in respect to certain provisions embraced
in the act but which are not expressed in the title was not
treated in either of the aforesaid opinions. We have care-
fully studied the act and we believe it is a fair conclusion
to state that, when the entire context of the act is con-
sidered, it appears manifest that the legislature intended
the act to apply only to contractors under contracts for
public works. Apparently due to human error in drafting
certain provisions of the act, improper terms have been
employed to the extent that the impression is reasonably
given that the act applies also to direct employment by the
State and other public bodies. For example, section 1 of
the act refers to persons employed by or on behalf of the
State, or by or on behalf of the county, city and county,
city, town, township, district or other political subdivision
of the State, engaged in public works. Section 3 also refers
to persons employed by or on behalf of the State, or by or
on behalf of the county, etc. although the last sentence of
this section provides that only those employees directly em-
ployed by contractors or subcontractors shall be deemed to

582 De

be employed upon public works. Without commenting on
various other provisions of the act which would clearly
indicate the legislative intention to extend the act only to
public work contracts with contractors, we are of the
opinion that the title of the act refers only to those persons
covered by the act and employed under contracts for public
works.

The language of the title is clear and unmistakable and
it does not embrace persons directly employed by the State
or other public bodies. To declare otherwise would do
violence to accepted concepts of ordinary language. We,
therefore, hold that such provisions of the act which
heretofore might have been construed as requiring payment
by public bodies of prevailing per diem wages in direct
employment of workmen in construction of public works
are invalid as being within the prohibition of section 13 of
article IV of our State constitution which provides, inter
alia, that if any subject shall be embraced in an act which
shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void
as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.

The objection that the act is vague, indefinite and un-
certain, resulting in a delegation of legislative power in
violation of due process is reasserted in this case. It is
contended that no adequate standard or guide is established
for ascertaining what the prevailing rate of wages for the
various crafts might be in a given locality. Defendants
contend that the public bodies merely ascertain the facts
in respect to a prevailing rate of wages. It must be con-
ceded that the word “prevailing” ipso facto connotes the
existence of a condition. However, we declared in the
Mayhew case, at page 388 “Whether it means the rate
which the most skillful, the average, the least capable
or the most numerous group command, the act does not
disclose. Even if these varying factors could be brought
into harmony, there is no assurance that agreement upon
a rate of wages for work of a certain nature as prevail-

588

ing in a particular community would result.” Later, in
the Reid case, we stated that the term “prevailing rate per
diem wages” neither defines the term nor furnishes a stand-
ard for asserting a wage. Petitioner also contends that
giving the court the right to determine, under section 8 of
the act, the prevailing rate of wage on an appeal from the
determination of a public body, when such rate is not
ascertainable, is an unlawful delegation of the legislative
power to the courts. This proposition again turns on the
point as to whether there is a finding, ascertaining and
determining of a condition that already exists with sufficient
notoriety as to be generally known in a certain community,
or whether it is a grant of power to declare or fix, or
create the condition in the first instance. There is much
force to the assertion in the dissenting opinion in the Reid
case that “Common experience verifies the existence of a
prevailing wage rate in each community for each craft or
type of workmen, An engineer, construction contractor or
a public official charged with the duty of letting public con-
tracts can readily determine the general prevailing rate of
per diem wages in each locality. In the making of private
contracts or in the letting of public contracts, the prevail-
ing rate of wage for each craft or type of workman or
mechanic forms the basis of every estimate of the cost of
such construction work.” We feel that a further refine-
ment of the term “prevailing” would serve no useful pur-
pose. Webster’s definition as “generally current,” or “most
frequent” will suffice,

In 1927, Justice Cardozo declared “This is not the time
to attempt a definition of ‘the prevailing rate of wages’
with its background of legislative history and twenty years
or more of practical construction. One finds it hard to
believe that a cliché so inveterate is devoid of meaning alto-
gether. Learned judges have said (e.g. Haight, J., in
People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, supra, at p. 42) [52
L.R.A. 814, 82 Am. St. Rep. 605, 59 N.E. 730] that it is -

584 ee

synonymous with market rate. This might not exclude
altogether the possibility of fluctuations and diversities at
a given day and place. There can be little doubt that it
would furnish us with criteria of conduct adequate for
civil, if not criminal, liability. (Sloan v. Baird, 162 N.Y.
327, 330; Muser v. Magone, 155 U.S. 240, 249; Wig-
more, Evidence, § 719; cf. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373) 377-) Other judges have believed that the range of
variation is wider and less certain than any that is con-
sistent with the standards of a market value. Even so,
a customary minimum might co-exist with a customary
maximum, however, varying the number of intermediate
gradations. A standard so indefinite, if effective for nothing
else, would prevent the fall of wages below the customary
minimum. A level would be established below which the
rate could not descend and still be characterized as ‘pre-
vailing.’ The Legislature may have thought that the stat-
utory promise would not be wholly without value if it
availed for this and nothing more. There would be no
merciless exploitation of the indigent or idle.” Campbell
v. New York City, 244 N.Y. 317, 155 N.E. 628.

Upon re-examination of the Mayhew and Reid cases
and cases from other jurisdictions holding to the contrary,
we are now of the opinion that it is within the power of
the General Assembly of this State to enact into law (if
within constitutional bounds) that those persons employed
under public works contracts paid for from public funds
shall receive no less than the prevailing rate of per diem
wages paid in the particular locality to various crafts and
types of works. The legislature has the power to pass any
law not expressly prohibited by the constitution, and it
possesses every power not delegated to some other depart-
ment or to the Federal government and not denied to it by
the Federal or State constitution. Gillespie v. Barrett, 368
Ill. 612.

Ss 586

We believe, however, that there is merit in petitioner’s
contention that the 1951 amendment to section 2, defining
wages under a collective bargaining agreement as the pre-
vailing rate of wages in a given locality, is invalid for the
reason that it delegates a discretionary power to private par-
ties and that it tends to be too restrictive and discriminatory
in defining that to be fact which is not a fact. Upon close
analysis it can be seen that this amendment permits the
“fixing of the standard rather than finding or ascertaining
an existing fact. This amendment then, being vulnerable to
the foregoing criticism, is clearly unconstitutional.

We might in passing here point out that the New York
constitutional amendment referred to in the majority opinion
of the Reid case is not a sound ground for drawing a dis-
tinction, for, as pointed out in the Campbell case by Justice
Cardozo, this amendment was enacted to overcome the
objection that there existed some immunity supposed to be
inherent in the municipality itself.

That there is here involved the liberty of contract
within the constitutional concept we cannot agree. The
United States Supreme Court held in Atkin v. Kansas, 191
U.S. 207, “It cannot be deemed a part of the liberty of
any contractor that he be allowed to do public work in
any mode he may choose to adopt without regard to the
wishes of the state.” See, also, People ex rel. Cossey v.
Grout, 179 N.Y. 417, 72 N.E. 464. In the case of Long
Island Railroad Co. v. Department of Labor, 256 N.Y.
498, 177 N.E. 17, the New York Court of Appeals, in
upholding a statute with similar provisions in reference to
prevailing wages stated, “But for the provisions of the
statute, the company would be free to determine for itself
whether it should adopt the policy of employing the cheap-
est labor it can obtain in the cheapest market or the policy
of paying at least as much as the average workman would
receive in the locality where the work is to be done. The

586 |

railroad company might even be willing to assume the risk
that the employment of poorly paid laborers would cause
unrest and consequent delays and interruptions in work
performed for the public benefit upon public highways.
To that extent the labor law may increase the cost of the
work and the burden of the railroad company; but it seems
to us that such an increased burden cannot be regarded as
unreasonable when balanced against the advantage to the
state of having the work performed under conditions which
give some assurance that the work will be completed with-
out interruptions or delay by workmen of average skill. To
secure that advantage for the state, the legislature had the
power to impose the increased burden upon the railroad
company.”

Common experience over many years clearly reveals that
two or more contractors employing the same materials and
work personnel for which they pay the same basic wages
will still submit bids for the same job at varying levels.
This is attributed to the variations and differences in man-
agement efficiency, modes of procedure, margins of profit,
etc. The public bodies will still therefore be the beneficiaries
of competitive bidding. Nothing contained herein, however,
is to be construed as meaning that a taxpayer of this State"
cannot enjoin the improper disbursement of public funds
when such conduct is in violation of law.

For the reasons assigned, the decree of the circuit court
of Sangamon County is reversed and the cause remanded,
with directions to find and hold the last paragraph of sec-
tion 2 of the present act, being the 1951 amendment to said
section, invalid, and to further find and hold that any pro-
visions of the act which purport to require public bodies
to pay prevailing per diem wages to employees directly
employed by such public bodies are invalid. The decree in
all other respects is affirmed,

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and remanded.

587

Oo, 7) aT
Tue PxorLE of THE Stats or Inzinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Francis Ventura, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

588 |

RicHarp H. DEviNE, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Latuam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Franx H. Masters, Jr., State’s Attorney, of Joliet, (FRED
G. Lzacu, and Harry L,. Pats, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Maxwet1 delivered the opinion of the
court:

A writ of error brings before us for review a judgment
of conviction entered by the circuit court of Will County
upon a plea of guilty entered by plaintiff in error, Francis
Ventura, hereinafter referred to as defendant, to the charge
of forcible rape.

We find no necessity to repeat the facts as they have
been substantially covered in our opinion rendered in Peo-
ple v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148. This defendant, one of four
jointly indicted for the crime of forcible rape, now urges
that his conviction be set aside for the reason that the trial
court failed to set aside his plea of guilty when it allegedly
became apparent at the hearing that defendant had a legal
defense; that the trial court failed to properly inform de-
fendant that his punishment would be a fixed and definite
sentence and that the trial court allowed incompetent counsel
to represent the defendant, who was then a minor under
18 years of age. In answer the State claims that it was not’
apparent that defendant had a legal defense to the crime
charged; that defendant was properly informed of his
punishment by the court, and that the record fails to show
that the defendant was represented by incompetent counsel.

We have carefully examined the record, including the
transcript of the proceedings wherein the court heard testi-
mony in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. It con-
clusively appears from the proceedings below that the crime
of rape had been committed and that all four of the young
men indicted, including the defendant, jointly participated
therein. It was not denied that only two of these men had

re 589

relations with the complaining witness. The codefendant
Hancasky was definitely identified by her but she believed
the second man was the codefendant Sinchak. However,
she was not sure as to the identity of Sinchak and testified
that she could have been mistaken in light of the fact that
prior to the occurrence she had known neither of the de-
fendants. Hancasky testified that Ventura was the other
man. The defendant admitted that on the day following
the occurrence he had remarked to Koutras, a codefendant,
that “Hancasky and I had intercourse,” but stated that he
was merely joking when making such statement. A fair
appraisal of all of the testimony in respect to the occurrence
does not yield a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s partici-
pation. We cannot therefore agree with the assertion that
it became apparent that defendant had a legal defense to
the indictment,

An examination of the proceedings in the trial court
further reveals that the learned trial judge went to great
lengths to admonish the defendant of all of his rights and
further advised him of the nature of the crime with which
he was charged and the consequences of his plea of guilty.
It is difficult to understand how a trial court could have
been more cautious in advising, informing and admonishing
the defendant than was done in the instant case. Even the
statute was read to the defendant by the trial court. The
fact that the trial judge did not specifically thereafter tell
defendant that he would receive a definite term of years
as his sentence before accepting his plea of guilty could
surely have had no prejudicial effect upon defendant. De-
fendant was represented by counsel of his own choosing
and after acceptance of defendant’s plea the court asked
if there was any reason why sentence should not be im-
posed. Neither defendant nor his counsel responded. ‘There
is no showing in the record that either the State’s Attorney
or the court made any promises to defendant which per-
suaded him to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter

590 |

his plea of guilty. The State’s Attorney’s recommendation
of a five-year sentence was not binding upon the court in
any respect, and the proceedings below clearly indicate this
condition. We find no violation of Rule 27A of this
court but rather a full compliance on the part of the trial
court.

Defendant’s contention that he was represented by in-
competent counsel finds little support in the record or report
of proceedings in this case. We are of the opinion that
such serious charges in respect to the competency of an
attorney and an officer of the court should not be lightly
treated. The fact that the trial court felt compelled to go
beyond the recommendation of the State’s Attorney because
of the aggravated nature of the crime can in no way be
attributed to the inability of counsel. It is only in cases
where the attorney for defendant is one appointed by the
court and is inexperienced in the trial of criminal cases, or
where an attorney is stupidly and obstinately recreant in
performing his duty towards his client, that this court
will consider such a charge. Furthermore, poor representa-
tion by an attorney of a defendant’s own choosing is of no
legal moment. People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608.

The fact that there was no proof or testimony concern-
ing defendant’s age prior to the acceptance of his plea of
guilty is of little consequence. The indictment charged he
was a male person of the age of 16 years and upwards,
towit, 17 years, and as to this allegation his plea of guilty
must necessarily be taken as an admission. (People v. Day,
404 Ill, 268.) We held in the case of People v. Musial,
349 Ill. 516, that the allegation of the age of a defendant
charged with the crime of rape by force may be rejected
as surplusage. Furthermore, from the rule announced in
People v. Schultz, 260 Il. 35, it becomes incumbent upon
the defendant to prove that he was not 16 years of age.
In any event, the defendant testified under oath and stated
he was seventeen years of age.

| 501

We find that no constitutional rights of defendant were
violated; that he was accorded every right and privilege
consistent with fairness and justice; that no error was
committed by the trial court in respect to any part of the
proceedings below. For the foregoing reasons, the judg-
ment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

ee
Oo, $75)

Cuaries A. Ocpon ef al., Admrs., Appellants, vs.
Antuony L. Granaxos, Appellee.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

592

Henry I. Green, Oris Barta, Darrus E. PuEsus,
and Hurswar C. Tummerson, all of Urbana, for ap-
_ pellants,

Burt Greaves, of Champaign, for appellee.

Mr. Justicz Hersury delivered the opinion of the
court:

This appeal is brought by Charles A. Ogdon and R. C.
Ogdon, administrators of the estate of Kenneth Wayne
Ogdon, deceased, and the personal representatives of Ken-
neth Wayne Ogdon, to reverse a judgment of the Appellate
Court, Third District, reversing and remanding a judgment

es 598

of the circuit court of Champaign County. The Appellate
Court judgment sustained the action of the trial court in
setting aside a judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of
$12,000 rendered on the verdict of the jury in a case in-
volving an automobile collision on November 17, 1948,
resulting in the death of Kenneth Wayne Ogdon, but re-
versed the lower court for the reason that all acts therein
were without jurisdiction for lack of service of process on
defendant, Anthony L. Gianakos. Leave to appeal being
allowed, the judgment is here for our review.

This action began by the filing of a complaint by plain-
tiffs on November 15, 1949, in the circuit court of Cham-
paign County against defendant, Anthony L. Gianakos.
The complaint alleged that on the night of November 17,
1948, the deceased was pushing a stalled and disabled auto-
mobile off of the west half of U.S. highway No. 45, a
four-lane highway, at a point one mile north of the city
of Urbana in Champaign County. It was further alleged
that defendant was then driving his automobile in a south-
erly direction on U.S. Route 45 and struck the deceased,
injuring him so severely that he died that same evening,
leaving a widow and a son, two years of age.

Summons was issued on November 15, 1949, and was
returned by the sheriff of Champaign County showing that
the defendant was not found. Alias summons issued August
4, 1951. On that date plaintiffs’ affidavit was filed stating
that the defendant was a resident of the city of Champaign,
Champaign County, Illinois, at the time of this collision
and injury, but had since gone outside of the State and
become a nonresident thereof. Hence plaintiffs asserted they
were entitled to and did invoke the benefits of section 20a
of the Motor Vehicle Act providing for service on non-
residents by serving the Secretary of State.

An attorney for plaintiffs did, on September 18, 1951,
file an affidavit that he had been informed that defendant
was in the military service of the United States and that

[|

594° |

an attorney should be appointed to represent the defendant
at the trial. The court then appointed an attorney to repre-
sent the defendant. The cause came on for trial before a
jury and a verdict was returned in the sum of $12,000, and
judgment was entered in that amount. Thereafter, in due
time, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and, in the alternative, to set aside the
verdict and grant a new trial, basing his motion on lack
of jurisdiction because of failure of service. The court
granted the motion and entered judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, judgment in bar of further action, and rendered
judgment for the defendant.

Appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court which
reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
remanded the causé with directions to vacate the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, to vacate the judgment in bar
of action of plaintiffs, and to quash the service of process.
By its opinion the Appellate Court in effect affirmed the
determination of the circuit court that it had not acquired
jurisdiction of defendant’s person. The judgment of the
Appellate Court thus became’ final and appealable on that
branch of the case. Brauer Machine and Supply Co. v.
Parkhill Truck Co. 383 Ill. 569.

The directions were based upon the Appellate Court’s
conclusion that jurisdiction was not acquired over defend-
ant’s person because the amendment to section 20a relating
to service of process upon motorists who were residents of
the State when the cause of action arose but afterwards
became nonresidents, did not apply to cases where the cause
of action arose before the date of the amendment, which
was August 10, 1949.

It is provided in section 20a of the Motor Vehicle Act,
as amended, (Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 95%, par. 23,) that:
“The use and operation by any person of a motor vehicle
over the highways of the State of Illinois, shall be deemed
as appointment by such person of the Secretary of State,

rs 595

to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all legal process in any action or proceeding against
him, growing out of such use or resulting in damage or
loss to person or property, and said use or operation shall
be signification of his agreement that any such process
against him which is so served, shall be of the same legal
force and validity as though served upon him personally
if such person is a non-resident of this State or at the time
a cause of action arises is a resident of this State but sub-
sequently becomes a non-resident of this State.”

There is no dispute between the parties but that defend-
ant Gianakos was served with process in conformity with
the laws of Illinois in force at the time of service. The
Appellate Court determined, however, that the cause of
action arose before the amendment to section 20a permitting
substituted service on the Secretary of State for a person
who was a resident of Illinois at the time the cause of
action arose but who has since become a nonresident. Hence,
the Appellate Court held the amendment could not apply
in this case because its language is prospective and not
retroactive. Plaintiffs contend that the statute as amended
is procedural and not substantive, and as such is enforceable
at the time of its enactment and thereafter, whether the
cause of action arose before or after the enactment of the
statute,

Procedure is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Third
Edition, as: “The mode of proceeding by which a legal
right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives
or defines the right, and which, by means of a proceeding,
the court is to administer, the machinery as distinguished
from its product. Per Lush, L.J., in 7 Q.B. Div. 333. * * *
This term is commonly opposed to the sum of legal prin-
ciples constituting the substance of the law, and denotes the
body of rules, whether of practice or of pleading, whereby
rights are effectuated through the successful application of
the proper remedies. It is also generally distinguished ‘from

596 |

the law of evidence. Brown, Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215
N.Y. 62, 109 N.E. 109, 111. See, also, Kring v. Missouri,
107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.ed. 506; Cochran v.
Ward, 5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N.E. 795, 31 N.E. 581, 51 Am.
St. Rep. 229. Procedure is the machinery for carrying on
the suit, including pleading, process, evidence and practice,
whether in the trial court, or in the processes by which
causes are carried to appellate courts for review, or in lay-
ing the foundation for such review. Jones v. Erie R. Co.,
106 Ohio St. 408, 140 N.E. 366, 367.”

In the case of Hunt v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp. 355 Il.
504, this court defined “procedure” as including in its mean-
ing whatever is embraced by the three technical terms—
pleading, evidence and practice. Practice means those legal
rules which direct the course of proceedings to bring
parties into court and the course of the court after they
are brought in.

‘The statute in question is certainly not a part of that
law which creates, defines, or regulates rights. It delineates
the proper method of obtaining jurisdiction in specific in-
stances. Any means of acquiring jurisdiction is properly
denominated process, and includes the serving of summons.
‘The issue or service of process is not what makes one a
party to a suit. It is merely a step in obtaining jurisdiction
of his person after he is a party to a suit. (Alexander
Lumber Co. v. Kellerman, 358 Ill. 207.) The right or
cause of action exists when a person or his property is
injured or damaged by the use of a motor vehicle upon the
Illinois highways. Section 20a of the Motor Vehicle Act
sets forth the manner of serving process on the nonresident
operator of that motor vehicle, or upon the operator who,
at the time of an accident, was a resident of Illinois but has
since become a nonresident. It is a part of the machinery
to be employed in obtaining a redress for such injury or
damage. Accordingly, it is a part of the law of procedure
and not a part of substantive law.

591

The law applicable in the State of Illinois is that there
is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of
procedure, and that, while generally statutes will not be
construed to give them a retroactive operation unless it
clearly appears that such was the legislative intent, never-
theless, when a change of law merely affects the remedy
or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforce-
able under the new procedure without regard to whether
they accrued before or after such change of law and with-
out regard to whether the suit has been instituted or not,
unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation.
(Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie,
192 Ill. 579; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379
Ill. 148; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill.
291.) This statute embodies no saving clause as to existing
litigation. It merely establishes a new mode of obtaining
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in order to
secure existing rights, which are unaffected by this amend-
ment. As a change which affects merely the law of pro-
cedure, there can be no valid objection to enforcing the
existing cause of action under this new procedure. In view
of the record in this case and the application of the fore-
going legal principles, it is evident that this defendant was
properly served with process and jurisdiction of his person
obtained. The appointment by the legislature of the Secre-
tary of State as an agent of a defendant for service of
process in suits arising from the defendant’s operation of a
motor vehicle upon the highways of the State has been
held a valid exercise of the police power based upon the
right of the State to regulate the use of its highways for
their protection, and the protection of persons and property
within the State. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 71
L. ed rogr.

Defendant contends that the designation of the Secre-
tary of State as an agent for service of process rests solely
on an implied consent and implied agreement of the de-

598 |

fendant, and since the amendment occurred subsequent to
the occurrence giving rise to this cause of action no consent
can be attributed to him, and hence the statute cannot apply.
However, in no case does the operator of the motor vehicle
actually or constructively assent to the appointment of the
Secretary of State as his agent for service of process. The
statute merely declares that such a consent existed at the
time the motor vehicle was operated upon the Illinois high-
ways, without any kind of approval, actual or implied, by
the operator thereof. In the case of a nonresident it is the
fact of nonresidence that enables a plaintiff to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction of defendant by service on the Secretary
of State. In the instant case, it is the fact of subsequent
nonresidence that enables the plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction
of the defendant by serving the Secretary of State in accord-
ance with the statute. The service depends on no consent,
actual or implied, but merely upon declarations of the legis-
lature in the valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Defendant also urges that the statute places residents of
Illinois who subsequently move out of the State at a dis-
advantage in contrast to residents who remain in Illinois,
Contrariwise, the statute effectively places them in a posi-
tion of equality. To exempt the resident who subsequently
becomes a nonresident from service of process would place
him in a superior position where he would escape liability
for his acts. The operators of motor vehicles, who are
affected by this statute, cannot help but be cognizant of
the plaintiffs’ rights of redress for injury or damage occa-
sioned by the operation of their vehicles. The statute makes
adequate provisions to be employed in order to actually
notify such defendants. It is a rare case where such defend-
ant will not, or should not, be actually notified or informed
of the action against him, unless he purposely wishes to
evade responsibility.

We hold, therefore, that the trial court had jurisdiction
of the defendant, and that the contrary conclusion of the

es 699
Appellate Court was in error. Because it passed only upon
the question of jurisdiction, the Appellate Court did not
review on the merits the action of the trial court in enter-
ing judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It also took
the position that it was “immaterial whether the trial court
ruled on the motion for a new trial.” Nor are we able to
say with certainty that the trial court passed upon the
merits of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict uninfluenced by jurisdictional considerations,

In order that these undetermined issues may be most
expeditiously resolved, the judgment of the Appellate Court
is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court
with directions to rule upon the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and the motion for new trial in
accordance with Rule 22 of this court.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Oo. 9:77;

Tue PEOPLE oF THE S'taty oF Intinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Levi Lone, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

2
Ss
Ss

Nayzror & Austin, of Carthage, for plaintiff in error.

Latuam Caste, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Preston W. Kimpar, State’s Attorney, of Carthage,
(Frep G. Leacu, and Harry L. Pare, of counsel,) for
the People,

Mr. Justice Futon delivered the opinion of the court:

After a trial by jury in the county court of Hancock
County, Levi Long was convicted of the offense of driving
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, a misdemeanor. He was fined $100 and sentenced
to six months’ imprisonment in the Illinois State Farm at
Vandalia. He seeks a reversal by writ of error in this
court, on the theory that a constitutional question is involved.

On Saturday, July 12, 1952, at about 10:30 P.M., de-
fendant was arrested without a warrant by a deputy sheriff,
and was brought before a justice of the peace where a com-
plaint was signed by the deputy sheriff. Defendant was
thereupon lodged in jail, where he remained until the fol-
lowing, Monday. On that day an attorney appeared on
defendant’s behalf, and the latter was released upon enter-
ing into a bond to appear before the justice of the peace
on July 22. At the same time, the attorney talked to the
State’s Attorney by telephone, and agreed that defendant
would appear before the county court on July 22. On the
latter date defendant appeared in the county court with
his attorneys, and the present information against him was

SS 601
filed by the State’s Attorney. The complaint pending before
the justice of the peace was then dismissed and the bond
released.

Defendant thereafter filed a motion to quash the in-
formation on the grounds that the statute under which it
was brought is unconstitutional because of vagueness and
indefiniteness, and that failure to hold a hearing before
the justice of the peace prior to the county court proceed-
ings denied him due process of law. Among his 34 assign-
ments of error on this writ of error, defendant charges that
the county court erred in overruling his motion to quash.

The People maintain that a fairly debatable constitu-
tional question is not involved in this case so as to confer
upon this court jurisdiction of the writ of error. We agree.
Defendant was convicted as a second offender, for which the
statute provides as follows: “On a second or subsequent
conviction he shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than 90 days nor more than 1 year, and, in the discre-
tion of the court, a fine of not more than One Thousand
Dollars ($1000).” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 95%, par.
144.) Defendant’s contention is that by permitting the
court in its discretion to impose a fine in addition to im;
prisonment, the legislature has unconstitutionally delegated
its function of prescribing the punishment for the offense.
The law is clearly to the contrary and is supported by pre-
vious decisions of this court. People v. Reid, 396 Ill. 592;
People v. Roche, 389 Ill. 361.

Defendant’s further argument that he was denied due
process of law because no preliminary hearing was held
before the justice of the peace likewise fails to present a
fairly debatable constitutional question. (People v. Jones,
408 Ill. 89; United States ex rel. Dilling v. McDonnell,
130 Fed: 2d ror2.) The matters alleged and argued in this
respect present, at most, a question whether the pertinent
statutory provisions were complied with. They do not in-
volve constitutional issues,

602 ee

Before we can assume jurisdiction of a writ of error
on the ground that a constitutional question is involved,
it must appear from the record that a fairly debatable con-
stitutional question was urged in the trial court, that the
ruling on it was preserved in the record for review, and
that error was assigned on it. (People v. Schmidt, 413 Ul.
80; People v. Estep, 409 Ill. 125.) Since no constitutional
question is involved in this case, and no other matter ap-
pears which would afford this court jurisdiction, the cause
will be transferred to the Appellate Court, Third District.

Cause transferred.

Ce
(No, 3-8-1

THE Farmers State BANK AND Trust Company, Exr.,
Appellant, vs. Gerrrupe R. Mancorp et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

Epwarp W. Curary, and Ricwarp J. Farerrt, both of
Urbana, and Witson & Wricu', of Jacksonville, for ap-
pellant.

Axprrt W. Hatt, of Jacksonville, for appellee Lelia B.
Milstead Petefish.

Se «(

Mr. Cuter Justicg Scuarrer delivered the opinion of
the court: .

The question in this case is the effect to be given to
the will of J. W. Liter, which disposed of his property in
these words: “That after my demise that I do now desire
that all my property Both real and personal to revert to my
wife Annie Elizabeth all her natural life—Then to go to
the two girls now in our home—Lelia B. Milstead and

- Marie Pauline Dawson Providing the. do that which is
right—otherwise to be distributed as my wife Lizzie may
see fit or direct—”

The issue arises in an action to construe his will and
to quiet title to land which passed under it. The action
was instituted in the circuit court of Morgan County by
The Farmers State Bank and Trust Company, executor of
the will of Anna Elizabeth Liter, the widow of J. W. Liter.
The court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that neither the widow nor the plaintiff had
any interest in the land, and the plaintiff has appealed.

From the complaint it appears that the will was exe-
cuted on March 30, 1911, and Liter died the same day. His
widow remained in possession of the land in question until
her death on September 15, 1950. By her will she directed
the plaintiff, as executor, to sell the real estate “devised” to
her or which she “received” under her husband’s will and
from the net proceeds to pay $500 each to two named
churches, and to pay one half of the balance to Pauline
Dawson, one-fourth to the heirs-at-law of J. W. Liter,
and the remaining one-fourth to the heirs-at-law of the
testatrix.

Plaintiff also alleged that after the death of Anna
Elizabeth Liter it found among her papers an affidavit or
statement dated September 21, 1911, and sworn to by three
persons which stated that in the month of February, 1911,
each of them conversed with John W. Liter about his
financial and personal affairs, and that in the course of

0 es

these conversations he made the statement that Lelia B.
Milstead, his foster child, had in certain things conducted
herself contrary to his wishes, and that he had informed
her that if she continued so to do and that if she married
one Claude Petefish, she should receive nothing from his
estate or any property which he might leave except that
which he had already given her. Upon information and
belief plaintiff further alleged that Mrs, Liter, knowing
the purpose of the proviso in her husband’s will and also
knowing that Lelia B. Milstead, contrary to the wishes and
directions of J. W. Liter, married Claude Petefish on May
22, 1911, made her will with the purpose of exercising the
power given her by her husband’s will, to dispose of the
real estate she received under that will.

The motion to dismiss which was filed on behalf of the
principal defendant, Lelia B. Milstead Petefish, was based
upon the grounds that it appears from the face of the com-
plaint that under the will of J. W. Liter, the defendant
Mrs. Petefish, who was formerly Lelia B. Milstead, and
the defendant Marie Pauline Dawson Elliott, who was
formerly Marie Pauline Dawson, are the owners of the
real estate described in the complaint in fee simple as
tenants in common; that the proviso in the will of J. W.
Liter is void for uncertainty, and that his wife was there-
fore without power to dispose of the real estate or of any
interest therein,

By agreement the cause was submitted upon the fol-
lowing questions: (1) whether the proviso of the will of
J. W. Liter is void for uncertainty; (2) whether parol
evidence is admissible to explain the purpose of the pro-
viso, and (3) whether the will contained an unqualified
power of appointment exercisable by Anna Elizabeth Liter.
‘The trial court held that the proviso is a condition subse-
quent, incapable of definite ascertainment and so void for
uncertainty; that Mrs, Liter had no authority or power

SC

to dispose of the real estate or any interest therein by her
will; that neither she nor her executor or her legal repre-
sentatives had any right, title or interest in the property,
and that Lelia B. Milstead Petefish and Marie Pauline
Dawson Elliott are the owners of the real estate in fee
simple as tenants in common.

The plaintiff’s position is that Liter’s will created a life
estate in his wife with remainders in Lelia B. Milstead and
Marie Pauline Dawson, which remainders are subject to
the condition expressed in the will (“—Providing they do
that which is right—”), with an alternative disposition by
way of power of appointment conferred upon the wife
(“otherwise to be distributed as my wife Lizzie may see
fit or direct—”) in the event of nonperformance of the
condition. The defendants support the construction adopted
by the trial court.

Plaintiff argues that the construction which it advances
is the only construction which gives effect to all of the
clauses of the will, that it is consistent with the intent of
the testator in the light of the circumstances which existed
at the time the will was drafted and that Liter’s widow acted
upon this interpretation of the will, thereby effecting a prac-
tical construction which is entitled to judicial consideration.

It is true that the construction advanced by the plaintiff
gives an effect to all of the provisions of the will which is
not given by the construction advocated by the defendants
and adopted by the trial court. And it is true, also, as the
plaintiff points out, that the “legally more effective” con-
struction is, as a general proposition, to be favored. (Papa
v. Papa, 377 Il. 316, 319; cf. Am, Law Inst., Restatement
of the Law of Property, sec. 323(c) and Comment m.)
But of course it is not true that a construction which gives
an effect to all of the clauses of a will is, for that reason
alone, to be adopted. The proffered interpretation must
gibe with the intent of the testator. The question remains,

Cs

therefore, whether this “legally more effective” construction
sqtiares with what the testator said in his will.

By way of answer to this question, plaintiff points to
the affidavit with respect to the testator’s disapproval of
the then anticipated marriage of Lelia B. Milstead with
Claude Peterfish, and suggests that the widow of the tes-
tator acted in accordance with his views as there described.
There are difficulties in the way of this interpretation of
the intent of the testator. Viewed in the light of prevailing
theories as to the admissibility of evidence extrinsic to the
will itself, the allegations of the complaint would be proper
only to the extent that they afforded a standard of inter-
pretation, or glossary, of the words used by the testator.
(Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2470; Kales, Estates, Future
Interests, sec. 128.) So regarded, the allegations might
tend to suggest that to the testator the expression “do that
which is right” meant “do not marry Claude Petefish.” ‘To
that extent, it might be argued, the testator’s understanding
of the very general concept “that which is right” is reduced
to certainty. But obviously the phrase must have a broader
meaning, for it was to apply not only to the Milstead girl,
whose marriage with Petefish was disapproved by the tes-
tator, but also to the Dawson girl, as to whom no pat-
ticularization is suggested. If we were to venture further,
into terrain normally not considered open for judicial ex-
ploration, and consider the evidence not only as indicating
the standard of interpretation with respect to which the
testator used the words he did, but also as a direct ex-
pression of his intention, the same difficulty of incomplete-
ness of expression would confront us.

To avoid the difficulties which flow from the generality
of the expression “do that which is right” and from the fact
that the will names no one whose standard of “rightness”
is to control, the plaintiff advances this proposition: “Liter
could have conferred upon his wife an unlimited power to
divest the remainders given to the two girls without refer-

Ss

ence to any condition; a fortiori, he can confer on his
wife the power of divesting the remainders (or of affirm-
ing them) only upon the occurrence of a condition to be
determined in her uncontrolled discretion.” But the ques-
tion is not whether the testator could have given his wife a
completely discretionary power of appointment, but whether
he did so. A short answer is that no such discretionary
power is expressed in the will, Beyond that, since the pur-
pose of a condition of this type is to influence the conduct
of the donee, (American Law Inst. Restatement of the
Law of Property, sec. 435,) it follows that the substitu-
tion of an unexpressed personal and subjective yardstick
for an expressed objective one would distort the testator’s
intent and make it difficult, if not impossible, for the donee
to know the standard of conduct to which he is to conform.

As a matter of law, the plaintiff’s contention that the
practical construction of the testator’s will made by his
widow is an element which may be considered finds some
support in the authorities. (Smith v. Creech, 186 N.C. 187,
119 S.E. 3; Smith v. Bartlett, 79 App. Div. 174, 81 N.Y.
Supp. 231 (reversed on other grounds, 180 N.Y. 360) ; In re
Estate of Kelly, 177 Minn. 311, 225 N.W. 156.) But we
do not find any support for the plaintiff's theory in what
Mrs. Liter actually did. There is no suggestion in the com-
plaint that Marie Pauline Dawson Elliott ever failed to
“do that which is right,” whatever interpretation be given
to those words. Her undivided half interest in the land
would therefore come to her directly under the will of the
testator, free of any power of interference on the part of
the testator’s widow. ‘The testator’s widow, however, by
her will devised to Mrs. Elliott something less than a half
interest in the proceeds of the sale of the land. Her con-
duct in so doing can only be reconciled with her authority
under the will of the testator by assuming, first, that acting
under the testator’s will she determined that Mrs. Elliott’s
conduct had been such that the interest given her by the

0 es

testator should be forfeited, and, second, that acting for
herself she decided that regardless of Mrs. Elliott’s failure
to comply with the standard of conduct laid down by the
testator, she should, nevertheless, receive from the testator’s
widow substantially the same interest for which she had
failed to qualify under the testator’s will. The inferences
are too tenuous to be persuasive.

The dictum in Cassem v. Kennedy, 147 Ill. 660, 663,
“Had the conditions stopped with the words ‘till he settles
down in life,’ it might have been said the event was not
capable of definite ascertainment” does not aid us in the
decision of this case. Counsel for the plaintiff have also
brought to our attention numerous decisions of other juris-
dictions in which conditions for the vesting or divesting
of estates have been sustained, although’ expressed in more
or less general terms. Among them are: “provided he con-
tinue a steady boy,” Pew v. Lefferty, 16 Grant CH. Rep.
408; “continue to conduct herself as she has heretofore
done,” Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171, 3 S.E. 5973 “if
he refrains from vicious habits and conducts himself with
sobriety,” Dustan v. Dustan, 1 Paige 509; “Should he con-
tinue in the same course of life which he has followed for
many years in keeping low company and frequenting the
public houses,” Tattersall v. Howell, 2 Meriv. 26, 35 Eng.
Rep. 850; “abtain totally from intoxicating liquors and card
playing and be kind to mother, and be known among friends
as an industrious man,” Jordan v. Dunn, 13 Ont. Rep. 267,
aff’d 15 Ont. App. Rep. 744; “so long as her conduct and
behavior should be discreet,” Wynne v. Wynne, 2M. &G. 8,
133 Eng. Rep. 642; “be known as a sober, steady and i
dustrious man,” Re Fox, 8 Ont. Rep. 489, “Providing
they are not lazy and spendthrifts, drunkards, worthless
characters, or guilty of any act of immorality,” Woodhill
v. Thomas, 18 Ont. Rep. 277; “but if he does not make
proper use of his money,” Pedrick v. Pedrick, 50 N.J.Eq.

Eee!
479, 26 Atl. 267; “learn some useful trade, business or
profession, and is of good moral character,” Webster v.
Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353; “be deemed a re-
formed man in judgment of the Executors,” Markham v.
Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222, 48 L.R.A. 580;
“reformed of his intemperate * * * habits and
shall then be living * * * a virtuous, industrious, tem-
perate * * * life,” Hawke v. Euyart, 30 Neb. 149, 46
N.W. 422; “have reformed, and become a sober and re-
spectable citizen of good moral character,” Burnham v.
Burnham, 79 Wis. 557, 48 N.W. 661; “good habits,”
Campbell v. Clough, 71 N.H. 181, 51 Atl. 668; “five
years of continued sobriety and good behavior,” Colket v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. 52 Fed. 2d 390, cert. den. sub
nom. Kerens v, Colket, 285 U.S. 543; Kerens v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. 283 Mo. 601, 223 S.W. 645, 11 A.L.R.
288; “contract habits of vice, such as drinking, gambling,
ete.” Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. 156 Cal. 657, 105
Pac. 971; and “led a sober and industrious life * * *
to the reasonable satisfaction of * * * trustee,” Wat-
ters v. First National Bank, 233 Ala. 227, 171 So. 280.

We have examined these cases. In none of them, in
our opinion, is the critical condition expressed in terms so
highly abstract as the one with which we are concerned.
In many of them, no issue as to the generality of the con-
dition. was raised, and in others a specific person was desig-
nated as arbiter to determine compliance or not. Here, not
only is the condition expressed in terms of the utmost gen-
erality; the arbiter is unmentioned and can be ascertained
only by inference.

In our opinion the condition upon which the testator’s
widow was given the power to affect the Milstead and
Dawson remainders was expressed in terms so generalized
and vague as to be devoid of effective meaning. If a tes-
tator is to project his control beyond his death by directing

|

0

the disposition of his property in the event of future con-
tingencies, he must do so in terms more specific than those
in the will before us,

Since the condition upon which is based the | power of
the testator’s widow to affect the interests of Lelia B. Mil-
stead Petefish and Marie Pauline Dawson Elliott must fail
because of its lack of certainty, it follows that the decree
of the chancellor was correct and should be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Oo, 328)

THE PEOPLE oF THE STATE oF InL1Nors, Plaintiff in Error,
vs. LESLIE Grorcg Waxat, Defendant in Error,

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

ee 611

Lataam Castik, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurxnecHt, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (JonN
T. GannacHEer, Ropert McDonnew., and Wiriiam J.
McGau, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

CHartes SHANNER, and Cavin SawyrEr, both of
Chicago, for defendant in error.

Mr. Cuter Justice ScHAEFER delivered the opinion of
the court:

After a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
the criminal court of Cook County set aside a judgment
convicting Leslie George Wakat of burglary and sentencing
him to the penitentiary, and granted him a new trial. By
this writ of error, the People seek to review the judgment
entered in the post-conviction proceeding.

Wakat was convicted after a jury trial and was sen-
tenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a minimum
term of ten and a maximum term of twenty years. It is
not disputed that he was without funds to finance a review
of his conviction,

His petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(IIL. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 38, pars. 826-832,) alleges that
in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction peti-
tioner’s constitutional rights were violated in numerous
respects. Of the many claims made, only two are now
pertinent: (1) that a written confession, admitted in evi-
dence against him, had been dictated by the police and his
signature thereto coerced, and (2) that perjured testimony
was knowingly used against him by the prosecuting officers.

A motion by the People to dismiss the petition was sus-
tained. Upon a writ of error, we reversed the order dis-
missing the petition, and remanded the cause with directions
that the People file an answer and that a hearing be had
upon the merits. The answer which was filed denied peti-

612 ee

tioner’s allegations and with respect to the confession stated
that in any event its voluntary character was res judicata
because that issue was submitted and decided at the original
trial. Evidence was heard, and at the conclusion of the
hearing judgment was entered granting petitioner a new
trial.

To reverse that judgment the People contend (1) that
upon a post-conviction hearing an issue of fact which was
previously decided adversely to the petitioner at his original
trial cannot be questioned, but the hearing is to be limited
to the existence of constitutional defects in the orginal pro-
ceedings which prevented a fair adjudication of the issue,
and (2) that the post-conviction hearing judge erred in
considering evidence which was not before the trial judge
and in re-evaluating the credibility of witnesses who had
testified at the original trial.

Wakat was first arrested on September 21, 1946, by
police officers investigating an arson and a burglary. He
was released on a writ of habeas corpus on September 24,
but was re-arrested late in the afternoon of the same day.
There is neither doubt nor denial that he sustained serious
injuries while in police custody after his rearrest. A report
of the county jail physician, who examined him on Sep-
tember 27, described the prisoner as suffering multiple
bruises and large areas of hemorrhage under the skin, a frac-
ture of a bone in the right arm and injuries to the left leg
and knee. He was hospitalized for eleven days and medically
treated for several weeks as a result of these injuries.

’ The substance of petitioner’s testimony, both at the trial
and at the post-conviction hearing is as follows: Soon after
his rearrest on September 24, he was taken to the scene of
the crimes of which he was suspected. While there, an
officer named Harlib twisted his handcuffed arm behind his
back and struck him in the face three or four times. Later
he was taken to the police station gymnasium where he was

es ois

beaten for half an hour with a stick, a sandbag, and two
blackjacks wielded by four officers in the presence of the
city fire attorney. After this occurrence he was taken to
various offices, then returned to the gymnasium where the
beating was resumed and continued until he lost conscious-
ness. When he revived in a cell the following morning,
officer Suckow showed him statements he had allegedly
signed the previous evening and threatened him with fur-
ther mistreatment if he did not “go through” with his con-
fession. When he asked Suckow for medical treatment he
was told that a doctor would be called if he repeated the
text of the written confession he had signed. Thereafter
he was questioned by an assistant State’s Attorney, a police
captain and other officials. While he answered the questions
which they put to him, he said nothing of the beatings.

Of those charged with being present in the gymnasium
when the alleged beatings occurred, two officers and the
fire attorney testified that they had not struck petitioner
and that no other person had struck him in their presence.
A third officer, Suckow, was deceased at the time of the
post-conviction hearing. At the trial Suckow had testified
that the petitioner’s injuries were received when he fell
down a flight of stairs at the police station. Dr. Lipsey,
Cook County jail physician, who examined petitioner, testi-
fied that his injuries could not have been caused by such a
fall. At the post-conviction hearing there was testimony
that Suckow had stated, at the petitioner’s preliminary hear-
ing, that petitioner was suffering from the injuries in ques-
tion at the time of his arrest.

Harlib, the fourth officer, testified both at the original
trial and at the post-conviction hearing, and it appears
that certain discrepancies and incongruities in his testimony
largely moved the hearing judge to set aside the conviction.
Upon both occasions of his testimony, Harlib stated that
he was taking petitioner to a washroom on the second floor

614 |

of the police station shortly after the rearrest and that they
became engaged in a tussle which caused both men to fall
down a flight of stairs consisting of about thirty steps.
Just what precipitated the scuffle was not clearly shown at
the original trial, but at the second hearing Harlib said
petitioner had lunged for the officer’s revolver. Harlib testi-
fied that both he and the prisoner had been injured in the
fall, and that for thirty days following September 27, 1946,
he was confined in a sanitarium in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
to receive treatment for his injuries.

At the post-conviction hearing it was brought out for
the first time that Harlib had stated to the sanitarium
authorities who were making up his admission records that
he had sustained his injuries when he fell while getting
out of his automobile. The hospital records also showed
that he was not admitted as a patient until October 6, 1946.
On cross-examination Harlib stated that he had not told
the sanitarium authorities the true cause of his injuries
because he was of a different religious faith than the hos-
pital attendants and did not want to embarrass them or
arouse their sympathy for him by telling them that he had
been hurt in a scuffle with a prisoner. It was further brought
out that Harlib did not report his alleged struggle with the
petitioner to his superior or note his own injuries in the
station accident book, as he was required to do by police
department regulations, that he did not seek treatment by
police department doctors, and that he went to the sani-
tarium during the period of his annual vacation rather than
on sick leave.

Finding Harlib’s testimony unworthy of belief, the post-
conviction hearing judge held that petitioner had sustained
the allegations of his petition and ordered a new trial. The
People do not dispute that this finding is fully supported
by the evidence, but challenge the post-conviction judge’s
power to consider issues litigated at the original trial and
to receive evidence not heard at the original trial. In our

es 615

view, post-conviction judges have such power, as well as
the obligation to exercise it.

The history of our Post-Conviction Hearing Act and
the construction placed upon it by this court establish that
it provides, and was meant to provide, an original and inde-
pendent remedy by a proceeding, civil in nature, to investi-
gate into the existence of a substantial denial of the con-
stitutional rights of a prisoner in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction. (Jenner, The Illinois Post-Con-
viction Hearing Act, Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann Stat., chap. 38,
supp, following par. 825, 9 F.R.D. 347; People v. Berna-
towicz, 413 Ill. 181; People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238.) The .
People concede this to be true, and likewise seem to admit
that one of the constitutional issues which here permits the
act to be invoked is the question of whether the confession
admitted in evidence against petitioner was unconstitu-
tionally coerced. They contend, however, that under prin-
ciples said to have been laid down in People v. Jennings,
4z1 Ill. 21, the post-conviction hearing court may neither
hear the evidence on the constitutional claim anew nor
expand the original record by hearing additional evidence,
but that it is limited to an inquiry which determines only
whether there were some defects or irregularities at the
original proceeding, which, through no fault of the peti-
tioner, prevented him from fully presenting his constitu-
tional claim for adjudication.

We do not find such limitations either in the statute or
in the Jennings case. The statute contemplates a hearing
at which “The court may receive proof by affidavits, deposi-
tions, oral testimony, or other evidence.” (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, chap. 38, par. 831.) Nothing in the statute suggests
that it is to apply only to those claims of deprivation of
constitutional right which did not culminate in rulings of
the court at the original trial. The Jennings case itself in-
volved claims of coerced confessions which had been ad-
mitted into evidence at the original trial, after evidence as

616 |

to their voluntary or involuntary character had been heard,
as in the present case. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 1045
People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. at.

Basically, what the People contend for is the mechanical
application of the doctrine of res judicata, which this court
expressly rejected in the Jennings case. “Where it appears
that a petitioner’s claims were fairly asserted and litigated
and the issues of fact have been resolved against petitioner
by the judge or jury that heard the witnesses, due weight
should be accorded that determination, But it is clear that
res judicata cannot be mechanically applied to foreclose an

. inquiry which probes beneath the mere fact of adjudication
to determine whether or not, in the process of adjudica-
tion, there has been any infringement of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner. Such an inquiry must be made
even though it involves a collateral attack upon a judgment
which the court had jurisdiction and authority to enter.”
People v. Jennings, 411 Ul. 21.

As we stated in the Jennings case, res judicata is not
applicable under the circumstances here presented. Quite
apart from petitioner’s inability to appeal from his original
conviction, the voluntariness of the confession in this case
would be subject to scrutiny on a post-conviction hearing
because of newly discovered evidence of perjury with re-
spect to testimony bearing on the confession issue. More-
over, ves judicata can have no application to petitioner’s
allegation of knowing use of perjured testimony which was
not, and could not, have been tried out at the original trial,
and as to which new evidence must of necessity have been
considered.

The hearing on a post-conviction petition is a new
and independent investigation, with the hearing court au-
thorized and required to use any proper procedure neces-
sary and appropriate in order to discharge its duty of deter-
mining the existence or nonexistence of facts which would

rs out

constitute a denial of a claimed constitutional right. To
hold, as the People contend, that the post-conviction hearing
is but a form of appeal or limited review, in the course of
which the hearing court is confined to a consideration of
the testimony given at the original trial, would in no wise
afford the petitioner the full and complete hearing upon
his constitutional claims that was intended and to which
we have held he is entitled. The contentions of the People
overlook the fact that we are dealing here with a statute
creating a new remedy designed to bridge the gaps between
the pre-existing Illinois remedies and the remedy by way of
Federal habeas corpus. (Jenner, The Illinois Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act, Smith-Hurd Ill, Ann, Stat., chap. 38,
supp. following par. 825; 9 F.R:D. 347.) In a Federal
habeas corpus proceeding, it is held that a trial court loses
jurisdiction if there is a violation of constitutional right
in the trial, or in proceedings leading up to it. (Dowd v.
United States, 340 U.S. 206; Waley v. Johnston, 316
U.S. 101; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458; Ch: United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205.) In such a proceeding,
therefore, the adjudication at the original trial is not con-
clusive. If the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to serve
its purpose res judicata cannot be an automatic barrier
to an investigation into alleged deprivations of constitu-
tional rights.

To hold that the post-conviction court may not go beyond
the original record in determining such claims would still
leave claimants without an adequate remedy and would
merely add to the procedural difficulties which the statute
was intended to cure. Beginning with People v. Dale, 406
Ii. 238, our decisions have made it clear that a post-con-
viction proceeding is not an appeal or a limited review by
an intermediate court, but is an original proceeding in
which a petitioner who complies with the requirements of
the statute is entitled to a full judicial hearing upon the

6i8 Le

merits of the constitutional claims asserted. We conclude
that the court did not exceed its authority when it reheard
the evidence upon the claim asserted or when it permitted
new and additional evidence to be introduced.

The judgment of the criminal court of Cook County is
affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

es
Oo. 32775 TT

Tux Crry or Curcaco, Appellee, vs. Dorotuy Provus
et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

619

Samus, T. Lawton, and Samusr, T. Lawton, Jr.,
both of Chicago, for appellants.

Joun J. Mortimer, Corporation Counsel, (Wirtram
H. Sexton, and Frank S. Ricurrmer, all of Chicago,
(Frank §. Ricwemer, Jr, and Pavuy B. Yourn, of
counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. Justicg Maxwet, delivered the opinion of the
court:

The city of Chicago, appellee, filed an eminent domain
proceeding in the circuit court of Cook County against
Dorothy Provus and others, to condemn the south 14 feet
of a certain lot designated as tract N-3, to construct an
improvement as a part of its superhighway system. Later,
a second petition was filed to condemn an additional tri-
angular strip of said lot, designated as tract N-4. Appel-
lants filed a cross petition to the original petition, which
cross petition was ordered to stand as a cross petition upon
the consolidation of the two causes. The jury awarded
$11,135 as compensation for both tracts and specifically
found that there were no damages to that portion of the
lots not taken. A motion for a new trial was denied and
appellants take a direct appeal from the judgment entered
on the verdict,

Appellants are the owners of lots 23 and 24, which con-
stitute a single, unbroken, unimproved tract of land on the
north side of Chicago about seven miles from the Loop,
with a combined frontage of 100 feet on North Sheridan
Road and extending east along the north line of West

620 |

Hollywood Avenue 163 feet to Lake Michigan. Tract N-3
is fourteen feet wide off the south side of lot 24 adjoining
Hollywood Boulevard, and tract N-4 is a triangular strip
adjoining tract N-3 on the north and west, 43 feet parallel
to Hollywood Avenue by 32 feet on Sheridan Road.

The city of Chicago, in conjunction with three other
public bodies, has a plan for an improvement known as
the North Route of the comprehensive superhighway sys-
tem, commonly known as the North Outer Drive, which
has been practically completed. The extension now pro-
posed will be north from Foster Avenue (5200 north) to a
connection with and into Hollywood Avenue (5700 north).
The acquisition of the two tracts in question is to permit
the widening of Hollywood Avenue and to make an easy
turn from it into Sheridan Road to facilitate the flow of
traffic around the corner.

Appellants contended that, in addition to the loss of a
portion of their property, they would be damaged in their
ownership of the remainder ofthe tract. In compliance
with an order, they filed a bill of particulars setting up
the items of damages claimed by them. Items one and two
of the bill of particulars alleged the value of tracts N-3
and N-4 at $13,167 and $2408, respectively, and item three
alleged damages to that portion of the lots not taken at
$44,486. In addition, items four, five and six were claims
for loss of an appraisal fee in connection with a proposed
FHA loan, loss occasioned by inability to use architects’
plans for an apartment building, and a claim for mortgage
service charges,

Appellee’s answer denied that appellants were entitled
to the amount of damages claimed in items one, two, and
three and denied that there was any basis for recovery of
the damages alleged in items four, five and six. Before
trial the court, after arguments, ordered the last three items
excluded from the consideration of the jury. After assign-
ment of the case, appellants moved for leave to file an

oa

amended bill of particulars to include such items, with
some amplifications, which motion was denied. The trial
court offered to hear evidence on the question for the
record outside of the presence of the jury, but appellants
did not avail themselves of this opportunity.

‘The first and second assignments of error are based
upon the court’s withdrawal from consideration of the
jury before trial of items four, five and six of the bill of
particulars, and the refusal to permit the filing of an
amended bill containing such items, respectively. Appel-
lants’ position is that they should have been allowed to
make proof of expenditures alleged to have been made by
them for financing, appraisal and architects’ fees, and are
entitled to be made whole by an allowance of damages to
include such expenditures,

It has long been established by this court that the
measure of compensation for land taken by eminent do-
main is the fair cash market value for the highest and best
use to which it is available and the decrease, if any, in the
fair cash market value of the part not taken. (Forest Pre-
serve Dist. v. Lehmann Estate, Inc., 388 Ill. 416; City of
Chicago v. Harbecke, 409 Ill. 423; Department of Public
Works and Buildings v. Barton, 371 Ill. 11.) The market
value standard thus established precludes taking into con-
‘sideration as a measure of damages the peculiar value to
the owner because of some contemplated improvement by
which he hoped to secure an income or profit. (Forest Pre-
serve Dist. v. Hahn, 341 Ul. 599; Sanitary Dist. v. Chicago
and Alion Railroad Co. 267 Ill. 252.) Since the outlay of
capital for future use planning and financing of improve-
ments to vacant land cannot be said to increase the market
value thereof, such outlay comes within the exclusion and
should not be considered in ascertaining the fair cash market
value.

Appellants cite several cases in support of their position,
including Metropolitan West Side Elevated Railroad Co. v.

622 ee

Siegel, 161 Ill. 638. There the award included damages for
cost of removal and loss of profits, and our decision upheld
the award. But, as we said in Braun v. Metropolitan West
Side Elevated Railroad Co. 166 Ill. 434, in commenting
upon the Siegel case, “the allowance of such items in that
case was sustained solely on the ground that petitioner had
* * * conceded upon the trial that that might properly
be considered.” Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Co. v. Naperville, 166 Ill. 87, also cited, is distinguishable
in that it involved damages to railroad property which
does not have “market value,” within the commonly ac-
cepted meaning of the term, and is in the category of special
use properties, such as churches, school, etc. Sanitary Dist.
v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne and Chicago Railway Co, 216
IL 57s.

The cases of City of Chicago v. Koff, 341 Ill. 520, and
City of Chicago v. Callender, 396 Ill. 371, are distinguish-
lable from the case at bar in that they involved the taking
land destruction of part of the buildings and other improve-
jments. There the elements taken into consideration made
@ part of the market value. We do not consider either case
‘a departure from the long-established market-value rule.
‘We are of the opinion that the trial court properly excluded
evidence upon items four, five and six of the bill of par-
ticulars from the consideration of the jury. Likewise, since
the amended bill of particulars was merely an amplification
and enlargement of the original bill of particulars, the trial
court acted entirely within its discretion in refusing to per-
mit appellants to file the amended bill.

In view of our opinion herein expressed it is unneces-
sary to consider appellee’s suggestion that appellants were
precluded from raising the question of the exclusion of
items four, five and six because of their failure to offer
evidence in support of such items out of the presence of
the jury.

es 628

- All witnesses agreed that the highest and best use to
which the property could be put was for apartment build-
ing purposes. Petitioner’s witnesses, including Newton C.
Farr, with vast experince in the construction and manage-
ment of multistory buildings, testified unequivocally and
positively that there was no damage to the portion of the
premises not taken. Appellants’ witnesses on the contrary
testified that the market value of the remainder not taken
would be reduced substantially. After a review of all the
evidence, we are of the opinion that the verdict finding no
damages to the land not taken was within the range of the
testimony. The burden of proof was on appellants to show
damages to the part not taken. They have not met that
burden. It is the settled doctrine of this court that the
damages award by a jury in a condemnation proceeding
will not be disturbed when the evidence is conflicting, the
jury views the premises and the amount of compensation
fixed is within the range of the evidence, unless there
appears to have been a clear and palpable mistake or the
verdict was the result of passion or prejudice. (Forest Pre-
serve Dist. v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. 351 Ill. 48;
Jefferson Park Dist. v. Sowinski, 336 Ill. 390; Southern
Illinois and Kentucky Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 321 Il.
187.) In any event appellants do not assign as error the
question of whether the verdict was within the range of the
testimony and only comment on the proposition in reply to
appellee’s treatment of the subject.

The only remaining questions raised are as to the pro-
priety of one instruction which was given and two which
were refused,

Instruction 8, offered by appellee and given, read as
follows: “The court instructs the jury that in considering
damages, if any, to the property not taken, you should not
take into consideration anything as an element of damages
which is remote, or imaginary, or uncertain, or speculative,

624 ee

even though mentioned or testified about by witnesses; but
the only elements which you should take into consideration
as tending to reduce the market value are those which are
appreciable and substantial and which will actually lessen
the market value of said property.” This instruction, in
practically identical form, was approved by this court in
Kiernan v. Chicago, Santa Fe and California Railway Co.
123 Ill. 188; Public Service Co. v. Leatherbee, 311 Ill. 508,
and East St. Louis Light and Power Co. v. Cohen, 333
Ill. 218. Appellants concede that the instruction is correct
in the abstract but argue that it is proper only when evi-
dence is based wholly or partially upon nonrecoverable
elements, and that in this case the evidence did not contain
any stich elements, .

We regard as highly speculative the observation by
Arthur Kruggel, one of appellants’ witnesses, “this addi-
tional traffic which creates noise, confusion, dirt, dust and
everything which is undesirable, and people who have a
choice would rather not live on that kind of a street that has
a lot of traffic.” Considerable space in the briefs is devoted
to the question of whether the effect of traffic caused by
an improvement was a certain and recoverable element of
damage. We do not consider it necessary to dwell upon
that proposition because of our belief that the record does
contain nonrecoverable elements other than the effect of
traffic. Since it is agreed that the instruction complained
of is correct in the abstract, the jury could not have been
misled.

Appellants complain of the court’s refusal to give their
tendered instruction 4 which reads as follows: “The jury
is instructed that in addition to arriving at a fair cash
market value of the land sought to be taken by the peti-
tioner in this proceeding, you must also determine the ques-
tion of whether or not the remainder of the property not
taken will or will not be damaged, and if damaged, in deter-
mining the amount of such damages, you should consider

625

the use to which the parcel of land claimed to be damaged
was put or adapted on the date of the filing of the petition
herein.” This instruction is substantially the same as ap-
pellants’ instruction 7, except that it did not contain the
last clause of the refused instruction,

It is well settled that where a refused instruction con-
tains the same principles contained in other instructions
given and the instructions given correctly state the law,
it is proper to refuse the tendered instruction even though
it also correctly states the law. (Department of Public
Works and Buildings v. Lambert, 411 Ill. 183; Central
Illinois Public Service Co. v. Deterding, 331 Ill. 277.)
It was admitted by all parties that the property was vacant
and that its highest and best use was for an apartment
building. We do not believe that appellants were injured
by the failure to give the refused instruction,

The last contention of appellants is that the court erred
in refusing their tendered instruction 5, which attempted
to define specific elements of damage to the land not taken
and which could be considered, such as “the land not taken
is put in a less desirable shape for development,” and “that

"its use will be adversely affected by the traffic upon such
highway caused by such improvement.” The instruction
tended to give undue emphasis and importance to certain
portions of the evidence and it was not reversible error to
tefuse it.

After reading the whole series of instructions which
were: given, we are of the opinion that they fairly stated
the law and that the’ jury was not misled.

We find no reversible error in the record. The judg
ment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. ~

Judgment affirmed.

626
Oo, 32°?

TuE PEOPLE of THE StTaTE oF Intinors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. Ina G. Brown, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed September 24, 1953.

Ray E. Lane, of Chicago, -for plaintiff in error.

Latuam Castig, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurxKNEcut, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Joun
T. Gatracuer, Rupotys L. Janeca, Arraur F. Man- ©
‘NING, and Roman Sracuntik, all of Chicago, of counsel, )
for the People.

Mr. Justice Hersuty delivered the opinion of the
court:

Upon trial by jury in the county court of Cook County
Ira G. Brown was convicted of violating section 24 of the
Medical Practice Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, chap. 91,
par. 16i,) which prohibits the treatment of physical ail-
ments for profit without a license and prescribes penalties
for such misdemeanors. He was sentenced on each of five
counts of the information to a term of six months in jail,
with sentences to run concurrently, and was fined $200 on
each count. He seeks direct review by this court,

oan

It appears from the record that plaintiff in error held
himself out as a chiropractor and administered certain treat-
ments to Frances Dickerson, an investigator for the Illinois
Department of Education and Registration, for which he
received a fee.

It is contended, inter alia, that plaintiff in error was
respectively denied his constitutional rights because of de-
ficiencies in the allegations of the information, prejudicial
conduct of the State’s Attorney in questioning witnesses,
and the admission of improper evidence. A fairly debatable
constitutional question authorizing a direct review is not
presented by the contention that the information is defec-
tive, (People v. Kabana, 383 Ill. 284,) or that the conduct
of the prosecuting attorney was prejudicial, (People v.
Estep, 409 Ill. 125,) or that error was committed in the
admission of evidence. (People v. Jiras, 340 Ill. 208.)
These are questions of practice and procedure which may
or may not be ground for reversal of the judgment, but
they do not raise any constitutional issue. The mere fact
that the trial court may have committed error for which
the judgment should be reversed does not present any con-
stitutional question but simply involves the question whether
the court erred in construing and applying the law. (Peo-
ple v. Jiras, 340 Ill. 208.) The other assignments of error
do not even purport to present any grounds affording this
court jurisdiction on a direct review.

Since there is no constitutional question involved in the
case, and no other question is present which would confer
jurisdiction upon this court, the cause will be transferred
to the Appellate Court, First District.

Cause transferred.

628 a
(Nos. 92389 and 9-52

THE PEOPLE or THE STATE oF I1,inors, Defendant in Er-
ror, vs. WALTER Jounson ef al., Plaintiffs in Error.

Opinion filed September 25, 1953.

Francis ‘IT. McCurrik, of Chicago, (Joan M. Fua-
ueERTY, and Joun M. Branion, of counsel,) for plaintiff
in error Daniel Gaines; WattEeR JoHNSON, pro se.

LatHam Castie, Attorney General, of Springfield, and
Joun GurKnecu?, State’s Attorney, of Chicago, (Jonn
T. Gatacuer, RuporpH L. Januca, and Artaur F.
Manning, all of Chicago, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. Justice Fur/ton delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiffs in error, herein termed defendants, were
indicted in the criminal court of Cook County for armed
robbery, where each defendant pleaded not guilty. Both
defendants were awarded separate jury trials and both were
found guilty by the verdict of a jury. Judgments were
entered upon the verdicts and both defendants were there-
upon sentenced by the court to the penitentiary for a mini-
mum term of years “not less than life”, and a maximum
term of “not more than life.”

The defendant, Walter Johnson, appearing pro se, and
the defendant, Daniel Gaines, by his attorney, moved the
court to vacate the sentence on the grounds that a sentence

es 629

for armed robbery falls within section 2 of the Sentence
and Parole Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 802,)
and must be indeterminate rather than a definite sentence;
that a sentence where the court fixed the minimum and
maximum duration of imprisonment at life is a definite
sentence and, therefore, invalid. The court denied the mo-
tion to vacate; judgment was entered on the respective
verdicts and the defendants sentenced accordingly.

Both defendants have sued out a writ of error to review
their convictions and the questions are identical. No facts
are in controversy.

The sole contention of the defendants, as presented on
the motion to vacate, is that a sentence for armed robbery
fixing both the minimum and maximum duration of im-
prisonment at life is a definite rather than an indeterminate
sentence,

The defendants rely upon the recent case in this court,
People v. Westbrook, 411 Ill. 301, where the exact prin-
ciple was stated in the following language, “For these rea-
sons, we are of the opinion that the imposition of a sentence
for armed robbery with both minimum and maximum terms
fixed at life imprisonment is invalid.”

The provisions of the Sentence and Parole Act (Ill.-
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, par. 801 et seq.) have frequently
been the subject of comment in the decisions of this court,
and we have consistently held that section 1 of that act
provides definite sentences for four crimes specifically men-
tioned and indeterminate sentences for all other crimes.
Section 2 requires the courts, in imposing sentences for
crimes not specifically mentioned in section 1, to fix the
minimum and maximum limits of imprisonment. (People
v. Westbrook, 411 Ill, gor.) The case cited also held that
a sentence for armed robbery falls within the terms of
section 2 of the Sentence and Parole Act and must be an
indeterminate rather than a definite sentence; citing People
v. Ross, 396 Ill. 11; People v. Secco, 303 Il. 546.

630

As in the Westbrook case the controlling question here
is whether a sentence “from life to life” is an indeterminate
sentence,

It is urged on the part of the People that the terms of
the Sentence and Parole Act operate to make the sentence
indeterminate, insofar as the punishment is concerned, be-
cause in reality a definite sentence under section 1 for a
life term is in fact indeterminate as to punishment, since
the prisoner is subject to punishment terminal between
20 years and life by the executive department.

This question was fully covered in the Westbrook
opinion where we held that the statutes referred to (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, chap. 38, pars. 801, 801.1,) “apply only
to definite sentences imposed for specific crimes” and were
not intended to cover or be applied to a sentence for life
imposed as a minimum term of an indeterminate sentence.

Adhering to the plain provisions of our opinion in the:
Westbrook case, we hold that the sentences for armed
robbery in the present cases imposing identical minimum
and maximum terms at life imprisonment are definite sen-
tences and invalid.

The judgments of the criminal court of Cook County
are reversed and the causes remanded to the criminal court
of Cook County, with directions to enter indeterminate
sentences in accordance with the views expressed in this
opinion.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Mr. Justick Maxwet1, dissenting.