State: Nevada
Volume: 129
Term: 2013-2013
Jurisdiction(s): Nevada
Source: https://static.case.law/nev/129.pdf

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, A MounIciPAL CORPORATION,
APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. CLIFF SHADOWS PRO-
FESSIONAL PLAZA, LLC, A Domestic Limirep LIABILITY
CoMPANY, RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT.

No. 55877
January 31, 2013 293 P.3d 860

IN}

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D.
Henriod, Las Vegas; Bradford R. Jerbic, City Attorney, and
James W. Erbeck, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Las Vegas, for
Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

Law Offices of Kermitt L. Waters and Kermitt L. Waters, James
J. Leavitt, Michael A. Schneider, and Autumn L. Waters, Las
Vegas, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, and R. Douglas Kurdziel, Las Vegas,
for Amicus Curiae City of Henderson.

David J. Roger, District Attorney, and Leslie A. Nielsen, Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Amicus Curiae Clark County.

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Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, Sarrra, J.:

In this appeal and cross-appeal, we resolve issues arising from
an eminent domain action brought by appellant City of Las Vegas
(the City) to acquire a 40-foot-wide strip of real property from re-
spondent Cliff Shadows Professional Plaza, LLC. Title to this
property was originally acquired by Cliff Shadows’ predecessor-in-
interest through a federal land patent that was issued pursuant to
the Small Tract Act of 1938, 43 U.S.C. § 682a (1938), repealed
by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-579, § 702, 90 Stat. 2743, 2789 (1976). The land patent states
that the property ‘‘is subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet
in width, for roadway and public utilities purposes, to be located
along the boundary of said land.’’ The issues raised are whether
(1) the district court erred in determining that the federal land
patent did not create a 33-foot-wide easement that the City is en-
titled to use, (2) the district court erred in determining that the
City’s proposed use of the easement constitutes a taking of private
property constitutionally requiring just compensation in return,
(3) the district court erred in disregarding the easement when it
computed just compensation, and (4) the district court’s award of
attorney fees was an abuse of discretion.

We conclude that (1) the district court erred in determining that
the federal land patent did not create a 33-foot-wide easement be-
cause the plain meaning of the patent’s language creates a valid
public easement and (2) the district court erred in determining that
the City’s proposed use of the easement constitutes a taking be-
cause the use of this easement is within its scope and does not strip
Cliff Shadows of a property interest. In light of these conclusions,
Cliff Shadows was not entitled to just compensation or attorney
fees,

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1956, pursuant to the Small Tract Act, the Bureau of Land
Management of the United States Department of the Interior
(BLM) issued a patent conveying the property in question to Cliff
Shadows’ predecessor-in-interest, Mary Patricia Tovey. The patent
conveyed title subject to a future right-of-way:

This patent is subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet
in width, for roadway and public utilities purposes, to be lo-
cated along the boundary of said land.

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Tovey recorded this patent in 1957. Thereafter, in 2008, Cliff
Shadows purchased the property and recorded a deed, which con-
veyed title to Cliff Shadows subject to ‘‘[rJestrictions, conditions,
reservations, rights, rights of way and easements now of record, if
any, or any that actually exist on the property.’

A 40-foot-wide strip of Cliff Shadows’ property was designated
by the City of Las Vegas for use in the Cliff Shadows Parkway Im-
provement Project. The improvement project sought to make use of
the federal land patent’s 33-foot right-of-way, plus an additional
7 feet, to widen a roadway. The issues on appeal concern the
City’s right to use the 33-foot right-of-way provided for in the fed-
eral land patent.

The City’s appraiser deemed the highest and best use of the 40-
foot-wide strip of property to be residential development and the
unencumbered portions thereof worth $15.50 per square foot. At
about 4,000 square feet, the City’s appraiser valued the unencum-
bered portions of the strip of property at $61,876. The appraiser
determined that the portion of the 40-foot-wide strip of property
that was burdened by the right-of-way had no value due to the en-
cumbrance and assigned a token value of $100 to this encumbered
portion of the 40-foot-wide strip of property. Pursuant to the ap-
praiser’s valuations, the City offered to pay Cliff Shadows $62,400
for the 40-foot-wide strip of property. Cliff Shadows rejected the
offer.

Thereafter, the City filed an eminent domain action seeking to
attain a permanent easement and all rights, title, and interest to the
40-foot-wide strip of property in order to construct its improvement
project. The complaint requested that the district court ascertain
the amount of just compensation due to Cliff Shadows. Cliff Shad-
ows answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for inverse
condemnation. In a subsequent motion, the City clarified that, de-
spite naming the entire 40-foot-wide strip of property in its com-
plaint, it was not seeking to acquire, through condemnation, the
property encumbered by the 33-foot right-of-way provided for in
the federal land patent. The City asserted that it sought to utilize
its existing rights to the 33-foot right-of-way under the federal land
patent’s easement and attain, by condemnation, the remaining 7-
foot portion of land unencumbered by the easement.

Cliff Shadows moved for partial summary judgment, arguing
that the federal land patent did not create an easement for the
City’s benefit and that the City was unconstitutionally taking Cliff
Shadows’ property. Cliff Shadows asserted that it was entitled to
$394,490 in just compensation, which represents $15.50 per
square foot for both the encumbered and the unencumbered por-
tions of the property. The City filed an opposition to Cliff Shad-
ows’ partial summary judgment motion and a countermotion for

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summary judgment, arguing that Cliff Shadows was not entitled to
compensation because the City’s use of the right-of-way for road-
way purposes did not constitute a taking. Around this time,
the City rejected a $228,707 offer of judgment made by Cliff
Shadows.

After holding a hearing, the district court entered an order
granting Cliff Shadows partial summary judgment. The district
court found that, although the federal land patent reserved a 33-
foot-wide easement across the 40-foot-wide strip of property iden-
tified in the City’s eminent domain complaint, the City lacked any
right to use this easement because the federal patent did not specif-
ically name the City. The district court also determined that the 33-
foot-wide easement must be disregarded when computing just
compensation for Cliff Shadows. It entered partial summary judg-
ment against the City for $394,490, which it computed by award-
ing $15.50 per square foot to Cliff Shadows for both the encum-
bered and unencumbered portions of the property.

Cliff Shadows then moved for attorney fees, asserting that it was
entitled to those fees under (1) NRS 17.115, which governs attor-
ney fee awards in connection with offers of judgment; (2) NRS
37.185, which provides that attorney fees may be awarded to suc-
cessful landowners in inverse condemnation proceedings; and
(3) the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tion Policies Act of 1970 (Relocation Act),! which also allows at-
torney fees to a successful landowner in an inverse condemnation
action. The City opposed Cliff Shadows’ motion for attorney fees.

The district court granted in part and denied in part Cliff Shad-
ows’ motion for attorney fees, determining that Cliff Shadows was
entitled to a portion of the attorney fees that it sought under NRS
17.115 because it obtained a judgment more favorable than its offer
of judgment. However, it also determined that Cliff Shadows was
not entitled to attorney fees under NRS 37.185 or the Relocation
Act.

Both the City and Cliff Shadows appealed, challenging the dis-
trict court’s partial summary judgment and its decision to award
only partial attorney fees, respectively.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the City challenges the district court’s conclusions
that the federal land patent did not grant the City an easement with
respect to the 33-foot-wide right-of-way and that, as a result, Cliff
Shadows is entitled to just compensation for the use of that right-
of-way as a taking. Cliff Shadows disagrees and asserts that it is
entitled to additional attorney fees under NRS 37.185 and the Re-
location Act.

142 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (2006) (codified in Nevada under NRS 342.105).

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The district court erred in determining that the federal land patent
did not create an easement that the City is entitled to use

The City asserts that the federal land patent created an easement
that the City is entitled to use. We agree.

The interpretation of an instrument allegedly creating an ease-
ment is a question of law that we review de novo. See Brooks
y. Bonnet, 124 Ney. 372, 375-76, 185 P.3d 346, 348 (2008). In
interpreting a federal land patent, we look to the patent’s specific
language. See id. at 375, 185 P.3d at 348 (an instrument creat-
ing an easement should be interpreted like a contract); Ringle v.
Bruton, 120 Nev. 82, 93, 86 P.3d 1032, 1039 (2004) (‘‘{W]hen a
contract is clear, unambiguous, and complete, its terms must be
given their plain meaning and the contract must be enforced as
written.’’).

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Here, again, the patent states that it ‘‘is subject to a right-of-way
not exceeding 33 feet in width, for roadway and public utilities
purposes.”’ The term ‘‘right-of-way’’ is defined as ‘‘[t}he right to
pass through property owned by another.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1440 (9th ed. 2009). Accordingly, ‘‘a right of way is an easement.”
Kurz v. Blume, 95 N.E.2d 338, 339 (Ill. 1950). Further, the term
“subject to’’ generally suffices to create an easement. See City
of Revere v. Boston/Logan Airport Associates, 416 F. Supp. 2d
200, 207 (D. Mass. 2005); Beebe v. Swerda, 793 P.2d 442, 444-
46 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Accordingly, here, the federal patent’s
use of the terms ‘‘right-of-way’’ and ‘‘subject to’’ created an ease-
ment on Cliff Shadows’ property for roadway and public utility
purposes.”

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Further, although Cliff Shadows argues that the right-of-way
was not reserved for use by the City, we conclude that the City is

?Cliff Shadows asserts that based upon the disposition in Kern River Gas v.
18.91 Acres of Land, 809 F. Supp. 72 (D. Nev. 1992), issue preclusion pre-
vents the City from asserting that the patent gave it easement rights. However,
Cliff Shadows is improperly raising this argument for the first time on appeal.
See Schuck v. Signature Flight Support, 126 Nev. 434, 437, 245 P.3d 542, 544
(2010). Cliff Shadows also argues that the City is estopped from asserting
rights to the easement because the City waited 50 years to assert its rights.
This argument fails because the timing of the City’s claim is irrelevant. Keener
v. State, 889 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Alaska 1995) (rejecting landowners’ laches ar-
gument because the state need not do anything to confirm ownership of a right-
of-way created in a federal patent unless and until its rights are challenged);
City of Phoenix v. Kennedy (Kennedy 1), 675 P.2d 293, 294-95 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983) (rights-of-way created by a federal patent need not be formally accepted
to be effective).

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entitled to use the easement. In Stoltz v. Grimm, this court con-
sidered two federal land patents that contained language nearly
identical to the patent in this case. Those patents provided:

This patent is issued subject to an easement for a road-way
not exceeding 33 feet in width, to be constructed across said
land, or as near as possible, to the exterior boundaries.

100 Nev. 529, 531, 689 P.2d 927, 928 (1984). Even though the
City of Reno was not specifically named in the patents, this court
treated those patents as compelling a dedication’ to the City of
Reno, concluding that the landowner who held those patents ‘“‘was
required to dedicate the land to the city under the language in the
1952 land patents.” Id. at 535, 689 P.2d at 931.

Similarly, other jurisdictions have found public easements when
considering the validity of patents containing the type of language
found in the patent at issue here. See, e.g., State, Dept. of High-
ways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 601-02 (Alaska 1978) (holding that
33-foot-wide right-of-way conveyed pursuant to the Small Tract Act
was effective despite the fact that a 50-foot-wide right-of-way cov-
ered the same area); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kennedy
(Kennedy I), 711 P.2d 653, 656 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding
public utility company’s right to install cable lines in right-of-way
conveyed under the Small Tract Act). For example, in City of
Phoenix v. Kennedy (Kennedy I), a landowner refused to allow the
City of Phoenix to use rights-of-way that the City of Phoenix
claimed were created by federal land patents conveyed under the
Small Tract Act. 675 P.2d 293, 294-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). The
patents contained the following language:

This patent is subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet
in width, for roadway and public utilities purposes, to be lo-
cated across said land or as near as practicable to the exterior
boundaries.

Id. at 294,

The City of Phoenix intended to ‘‘improve the street running
alongside [the landowner’s] two parcels and install sewer and water
lines.” Id. The Kennedy I court noted that ‘‘because a federal grant
is being construed, any doubts are to be resolved in favor of
the government, so as to accomplish the legislative intent behind
the grant.’ Id. at 295. The court explained that the intent of the

3A dedication of land for a street creates a public easement. See Carson City
v. Capital City Entm’t, 118 Nev. 415, 421, 49 P.3d 632, 635-36 (2002)
(‘‘{T]he fee of land dedicated for a street remains in the owner, subject to a
public easement in the land, which is vested in the municipality.”).

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Small Tract Act ‘‘was to utilize public lands effectively.’ Id. The
right-of-way ‘was included so as to avoid imposing the heavy bur-
den on local governments of subsequently having to acquire an
easement when the time came to install utilities and roadways.”’ Id.
The court concluded that the patents’ language sufficed to ‘‘create
a floating easement for a right-of-way.’ Id. Accordingly, the
Kennedy I court upheld the City of Phoenix’s right to improve a
street and install public utilities on the landowner’s parcels. Id.
Like in Stoltz, the lack of specific reference to any particular gov-
ernmental body in the federal land patents did not prevent the
Kennedy I court from finding that the patents gave the City of
Phoenix a right to the easement.

Further, even if the patent’s lack of specificity resulted in ambi-
guity, it is a well-established rule of construction that any ambigu-
ities within a federal land patent are construed in favor of the gov-
ernment. A leading treatise explains:

As a general rule, where the language of a public land grant
is subject to reasonable doubt, ambiguities are resolved
strictly against the grantee and in favor of the government.
This is the reverse of the rule controlling the construction of
grants or conveyances by private grantors.

3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statu-
tory Construction § 64:7, at 491-92 (7th ed. 2008) (footnotes
omitted); see United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 112,
116 (1957) (‘‘[L]and grants are construed favorably to the
Government, . . . [and any doubts] are resolved for the Govern-
ment, not against it’); see also Kennedy II, 711 P.2d at 655 (not-
ing that these rules of construction are ‘‘equally applicable [where]
the federal government reserves an interest in land for entities
[that are] not party to the grant’’).*

Accordingly, we conclude that the federal land patent burden-
ing Cliff Shadows’ property creates a public easement that the City
has a right to utilize based on (1) our interpretation of the language

‘Cliff Shadows argues that Nevada extends greater protection to landowners
in the eminent domain context than other jurisdictions and that, as a conse-
quence, the decisions of other jurisdictions are irrelevant. While Nevada “‘en-
joys a rich history of protecting private property owners against government
takings”? McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 670, 137 P.3d
1110, 1127 (2006), the issue of how to interpret the language of a federal land
patent is one of first impression. This court has often relied on the decisions
of other jurisdictions when, as here, it is faced with issues of first impression.
Thus, the decisions of other jurisdictions offer this court relevant guidance with
respect to interpreting the federal land patent.

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of the patent at issue and other jurisdictions’ similar interpretations
of federal land patents with nearly identical language and (2) the
tule of construction for federal land patents requiring any ambi-
guities to be construed in favor of the government.’ The district
court thus erred in determining that the federal land patent did not
create a valid easement that the City is entitled to use for roadway
and utility purposes.®

The district court erred in determining that the City’s proposed use
of the easement constitutes a taking

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The City asserts that the district court erred in determining that
the City’s use of the easement as part of its improvement project
constitutes a taking. Cliff Shadows argues that if a valid easement
exists, then the scope of that easement allows for roadways to be
created only if they directly benefit the owners of property issued
through federal land grants pursuant to the Small Tract Act. Cliff
Shadows contends that the City’s proposed use of the easement is
beyond the scope of the easement, thereby constituting a taking.”
We agree with the City.

Cliff Shadows asserts that this court should construe the patent’s language
in its favor and cites to State v. Jones, 52 S.B. 240, 245 (N.C. 1905) (Con-
nor, J., dissenting), and Aero Auto Parts v. State, Department of Transporta-
tion, 253 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Wis. 1977), which state that statutes providing for
the power of eminent domain should be strictly construed and statutes favor-
ing private landowners should be liberally construed. This assertion is flawed
because interpreting the federal land patent is a matter of contract, not statu-
tory, interpretation. See Brooks v. Bonnet, 124 Nev. 372, 375, 185 P.3d 346,
348 (2008) (an instrument creating an easement should be interpreted like a
contract).

Cliff Shadows argues that if the federal patent created an easement, it can-
not be enforced against Cliff Shadows because it is a bona fide purchaser. This
argument is meritless because the federal patent was recorded by Cliff Shad-
ows’ predecessor-in-interest in 1957. See NRS 111.320 (a recorded easement
imparts notice to all persons of the contents of the easement); Probasco v. City
of Reno, 85 Nev. 563, 565, 459 P.2d 772, 773 (1969) (‘‘The recording of a
deed of a positive easement makes it binding upon all subsequent owners.”).

7Cliff Shadows also argues that the City is estopped from asserting that there
has not been a taking because the City included the encumbered and unen-
cumbered portions of the strip of property in its initial eminent domain com-
plaint. We disagree. The record and the district court’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law reflect that the City maintained its position that it was not
seeking to condemn all property interests in the 33-foot right-of-way section of
property. Further, NRCP 15(a) and (b) permit the City to amend its complaint
at a later date to match the property it is actually taking. See United States v.
Herrero, 416 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming order permitting the
government to amend its condemnation complaint under FRCP 15(a)); see also
Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984) (‘‘Because Nevada
is a notice-pleading jurisdiction, our courts liberally construe pleadings to

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Whether a taking has occurred is a question of Jaw that this
court reviews de novo. McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev.
645, 661, 137 P.3d 1110, 1121 (2006). The Nevada Constitution
provides that ‘‘[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation having been first made, or secured.’
Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(6). Similarly, the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution proscribes the

government from taking ‘‘private property . . . for public use,
without just compensation.’ U.S. Const. amend. V.
Pt

One ‘‘must have a property interest . . . to support a takings
claim.” Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 658, 137 P.3d at 1119. Thus, when
analyzing whether the government’s activity constitutes a taking, a
court must first assess if one has a legitimate interest in property
that is affected by the government’s activity. Id. ‘‘It is well estab-
lished that an individual’s real property interest in land supports a
takings claim.’’ ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev.
639, 645, 173 P.3d 734, 738 (2007). ‘‘A taking can arise when the
government regulates or physically appropriates an individual’s
private property”’ Id. at 647, 173 P.3d at 740. A physical appro-
priation occurs if “the government seizes or occupies private prop-
erty or ousts owners from their private property.’ Id.

Here, whether the City’s proposed use of the easement as part
of its improvement project is a taking turns on whether the use of
the easement fits within the easement’s scope as articulated in the
federal land patent.

The City’s improvement project fits within the scope of the
easement

After having construed the patent in favor of the City and its en-
titlement to the easement therein, we now construe the scope of
that easement.

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The scope of an easement is defined by the terms of the instru-
ment creating it. Brooks v. Bonnet, 124 Nev. 372, 375, 185 P.3d
346, 348 (2008). ‘‘As with any other contract, courts must inter-
pret the specific language of the instrument creating the easement

place into issue matters which are fairly noticed to the adverse party’); Dept.
of Transp. v. El Dorado Properties, 971 P.2d 481, 488 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(‘When [condemnor] came to believe that its original estimate of value was
too high, it was entirely appropriate for it to amend its complaint to reflect that
new evaluation.’’),

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to identify the easement’s scope.’’ Id. ‘‘‘[AJn easement obtained
by a government entity for a public use is only as broad as neces-
sary for the accomplishment of the public purpose for which the
easement was obtained.’’’ Sisolak, 122 Nev. at 660, 137 P.3d at
1120 (quoting S.0.C., Inc. v. The Mirage Casino-Hotel, 117 Nev.
403, 409, 23 P.3d 243, 247 (2001)). In general, the scope of an
easement is strictly construed in favor of the landowner.® S.0.C.,
Inc., 117 Nev. at 408, 23 P.3d at 247. Furthermore, ‘‘[a] party is
privileged to use another’s land only to the extent expressly al-
lowed by the easement.’”’ Id.

Here, the City’s improvement project fits within the scope of the
easement created by the federal patent. Without qualification, the
federal land patent states that it is subject to an easement for
“‘roadway’’ and ‘‘public utilities’? purposes, and the City’s im-
provement project serves those very purposes. Contrary to Cliff
Shadows’ assertion, the patent does not explicitly or implicitly ex-
press that roadways may be created only if they directly benefit the
owners of property issued pursuant to the Small Tract Act. See
Bernal v. Loeks, 997 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (the
Small Tract Act ‘‘allows for roadway use without qualification’).
The City’s proposed improvement project does not exceed the
scope of the plain language of the easement.

No taking has occurred through the City’s proposed use of the
easement

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The United States Supreme Court has stated that it ‘‘assuredly
would permit the government to assert a permanent easement that
was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner’s title.” Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992).
This rule is well accepted by various jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 383 (9th Cir.
2002) (no taking occurs when the government simply exercises its
option to use an existing easement); U.S. v. 30.54 Acres of Land,
Situated in Greene Co., 90 F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1996) (where a
navigational servitude ‘‘was a preexisting limitation on the
landowners’ title to riparian land,’ the government’s use of the
servitude was not a taking); Keener v. State, 889 P.2d 1063, 1069
(Alaska 1995) (‘“The State does not have to pay a property owner

"To be clear, interpreting the federal land patent and the easement involve
two different processes. As demonstrated above, we interpret a federal land
patent’s ambiguities in favor of the government. 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 64:7, at 491-92 (7th ed.
2008); see Union Pacific, 353 U.S. at 116; see also Kennedy I, 711 P.2d at
655. However, we interpret the scope of the easement within the federal land
patent in favor of the landowner. See S.O.C., Inc., 117 Nev. at 408, 23 P.3d
at 247,

for a preexisting right of way [under the Alaska Constitution].’”’);
Bennett v. Tarrant Cty Water Control, 894 S.W.2d 441, 448 (Tex.
App. 1995) (holding that ‘‘the mere enforcement of an existing

easement does not rise to the level of a ‘taking’ ’’ under the Texas
Constitution). Thus, a taking does not occur when the government
uses its own easement without exceeding the easement’s scope. See
Daniel, 288 F.3d at 383; 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d at 792;
Keener, 889 P.2d at 1069; Bennett, 894 S.W.2d at 448.

Therefore, the City’s attempt to use its easement created in the
federal land patent does not constitute a taking in this case. The
City is not attempting to create an easement over a parcel that was
never previously burdened. Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (imposition of navigational servitude on
marina constituted a taking). The City’s easement existed when
Cliff Shadows purchased the property. Cliff Shadows therefore
lacks the property right that the City attempts to use. As estab-
lished above, the City’s proposed use of the easement fits within its
scope, and no taking occurred.

Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that the
City’s proposed use of the easement constitutes a taking.?

In light of the conclusions above, we need not discuss at length
the issues of whether the district court (1) erred in disregarding the
easement when it computed just compensation or (2) abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees.

Our conclusion that no taking occurred in the City’s use of its
easement disposes of the just compensation issue. The dissent con-
tends that we must address the total valuation of Cliff Shadows’
property. Valuation of the entire strip of property is not disputed on
appeal. As to the 33-foot-wide easement, no taking has occurred;
thus, Cliff Shadows lacks a right to compensation with respect to
the City’s use of the easement. As to the remaining unencumbered.
portions of Cliff Shadows’ property, neither Cliff Shadows nor the
City objected to the valuation of that land by the City’s appraiser.
In fact, Cliff Shadows actually used this valuation in its motion for
summary judgment, suggesting that Cliff Shadows implicitly
agreed with the valuation. Though our dissenting colleagues cor-
rectly articulate the law as to valuation, we shall not reach this
issue as it is not on appeal.

°Cliff Shadows appears to rely on McCarran International Airport v. Siso-
lak, 122 Nev. 645, 137 P.3d 1110 (2006), for the proposition that a taking oc-
curs when a government entity utilizes an easement arising from a federal land
patent. This reliance is misplaced. In Sisolak, this court concluded that a tak-
ing arose from a situation where a government entity exceeded the scope of its
easement. Id. at 660-61, 667, 137 P.3d at 1120-21, 1125. Here, unlike in Siso-
lak, the City’s street-widening project does not exceed the scope of its ease-
ment, such that a taking does not occur as a result of the City’s use of that
easement.

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Since no taking occurred in the City’s use of its easement, Cliff
Shadows is not the prevailing party on any of its claims and thus
is not entitled to attorney fees.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s partial summary judgment re-
garding (1) the determination that the federal land patent did not
create an easement that the City is entitled to use and (2) the de-
termination that the City’s proposed use of the easement constitutes
a taking. Further, we vacate the awards of just compensation and
attorney fees to Cliff Shadows and remand this matter to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, and DouGLas,
JJ., concur.

Gpsons, J., with whom Cuerry, J., agrees, dissenting:

The City initiated an eminent domain action against Cliff Shad-
ows to acquire a 40-foot-wide strip of property. The property is
subject in part to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet in width for
roadway and public utilities purposes. Therefore, at least a 7-foot
width of the property is not subject to the right-of-way. Cliff Shad-
ows filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the City filed
a countermotion for summary judgment. The City conceded that
the fee portion of the property subject to the right-of-way has
some value and that the portion of the property not subject to the
right-of-way is valued at $61,186.

In McCarran International Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645,
137 P.3d 1110 (2006), we concluded that ‘requiring uncompen-
sated conveyance of [an] easement outright would violate the Four-
teenth Amendment.’ Id. at 661, 137 P.3d at 1121 (alteration in
original) (quotations omitted). We further concluded that ‘‘even if
the Government physically invades only an easement in property,
it must nonetheless pay just compensation.’’ Id. at 666, 137 P.3d.
at 1124 (quotations omitted). We reasoned that ‘‘the Nevada Con-
stitution contemplates expansive property rights in the context of
takings claims through eminent domain. The drafters of our Con-
stitution imposed a requirement that just compensation be secured
prior to a taking, and our State enjoys a rich history of protecting
private property owners against government takings.”’ Id. at 670,
137 P.3d at 1127. Finally, we concluded that ‘‘the market value of
the property should be determined by reference to the highest and
best use for which the land is available and for which it is plainly
adaptable.”’ Id. at 671, 137 P.3d at 1128 (quotations omitted).

Further, in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, 122 Nev. 527,
134 P.3d 705 (2006), this court unanimously concluded that ‘‘a

po

fact-finder should determine . . . the value of the whole property
based on the whole property’s highest and best use. Therefore, it
is improper for a fact-finder to focus solely on the condemned por-
tion when determining its value.’’ Id. at 531-32, 134 P.3d at 708.
Analogous to the right-of-way in this case, the City of North Las
Vegas had sought to condemn a portion of the property for a road-
widening project.

Since the majority reverses the partial summary judgment in
favor of Cliff Shadows, I conclude that genuine issues of material
fact remain as to the valuation of the whole Cliff Shadows prop-
erty, which includes the 33-foot-wide right-of-way and the re-
maining 7-foot width of the strip of property.

KATHRYN GARCIA, oN BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHER
SIMILARLY SITUATED NEVADA CrrizENs, APPELLANT, v. THE
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENT.

No. 57779
January 31, 2013 293 P.3d 869

Matthew L. Sharp Ltd. and Matthew L. Sharp, Reno; Law
Offices of Curtis B. Coulter P.C. and Curtis B. Coulter, Reno;
Parry Deering Futscher & Sparks, PSC, and Ron R. Parry, Cov-
ington, Kentucky, for Appellant.

Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas, for
Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, Douctas, J.:

In this appeal, we examine whether preclusive effect should
be given to an order, entered by a federal district court sitting in
diversity, dismissing a complaint without prejudice for failure
to state a claim. In doing so, we clarify that our holding in Bower

PoC

v. Harrah’s Laughlin, 125 Nev. 470, 482, 215 P.3d 709, 718
(2009), which broadly required Nevada courts to apply federal law
in determining whether a prior federal court determination should
be given preclusive effect, applies only to federal-question cases.
When the federal court decides a case under its diversity juris-
diction, we recognize that the United States Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 508 (2001), governs the treatment of claim and issue
preclusion.

Here, New Jersey preclusion law applies under Semtek, and
under New Jersey law, appellant would be precluded from reliti-
gating her claims. Accordingly, we conclude that she is precluded
from litigating her claims in Nevada. As the district court properly
dismissed appellant’s claims, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Kathryn Garcia was the beneficiary of three life in-
surance policies insuring her husband. Each policy provided for the
policy proceeds to be paid immediately or promptly in ‘‘one sum”’
upon proof of death; however, they also provided that a beneficiary
entitled to receive payment in one sum could elect another payment
option.

Upon the death of Garcia’s husband in November 2005, re-
spondent Prudential Insurance Company of America sent Garcia its
death benefits claim form requesting instruction on how she wished
to have the proceeds distributed. This claim form was accompanied
by a brochure, explaining six settlement options through which
death benefits could be accessed. None of the options presented
were for a one-time lump sum payment of the death benefits. The
claim form also indicated that Prudential’s preferred method of
paying death benefits is through the Alliance Account settlement
option, which would allow Garcia ‘‘to access all of [her] funds im-
mediately or over time. [Garcia could] leave the money in the ac-
count, withdraw the entire amount or write checks against the
balance ($250 minimum).”’ The claim form further set forth that if
Garcia did not elect an alternative settlement option or another pay-
ment option allowed in the policy, the Alliance Account settlement
option would be the default option and the death benefits would be
paid via this method.'

Garcia signed the form but did not elect a specific distribution
plan. In accord with its default provision, Prudential subsequently
provided Garcia with a checkbook and documents which informed

'The original plan documents did not mention the Alliance Account settle-
ment option as a mechanism of distributing policy proceeds.

18 Po

her that a personal, interest-bearing Alliance Account had been es-
tablished in her name. The documents explained that Garcia could
write checks as often as she chose against her account balance and
that she would ‘“‘recéive a periodic statement detailing [her] ac-
count balance, interest earned, current interest rate, and any other
account activity’’ These documents further indicated that Garcia
could ‘‘withdraw the entire amount immediately.’

In November 2008, Garcia, a domiciliary of Nevada, filed a
complaint against Prudential on behalf of herself and a nationwide
class of similarly situated persons in federal court in Prudential’s
home state of New Jersey. Garcia asserted claims for (1) breach of
the life insurance contracts, (2) breach of the Alliance Account
contract, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) unjust enrichment
arising from Prudential’s Alliance Account program. Prudential
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). In December 2009,
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
granted Prudential’s motion to dismiss, noting that the dismissal
was ‘‘without prejudice”’? Garcia v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of
America, No. 08-5756 (JAG), 2009 WL 5206016, at *1 (D.N.J.
Dec. 29, 2009) (unpublished decision).

In September 2010, Garcia filed the instant action against Pru-
dential in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada
on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated Nevada citi-
zens. Garcia asserted claims for (1) breach of fiduciary duty;
(2) breach of duties arising from a special, confidential relation-
ship; and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Prudential moved to dismiss Garcia’s complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that her claims were
precluded by the federal court decision. Garcia opposed the mo-
tion. Following a hearing, the district court granted Prudential’s
motion and dismissed all of Garcia’s claims on issue preclusion
grounds, relying on this court’s decision in Bower v. Harrah’s
Laughlin.

DISCUSSION

In 2009, this court, in Bower v. Harrah’s Laughlin, 125 Nev.
470, 482, 215 P.3d 709, 718 (2009), established that a district

The New Jersey federal court applied the rule that ‘‘[a] motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim should be granted only if the party asserting the
claim is unable to articulate ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plau-
sible on its face’? Garcia, 2009 WL 5206016, at *4 (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This court has not adopted this
standard; however, neither party raised the issue of what effect the application
of this different standard may have had on the New Jersey federal court’s de-
cision. No appeal was taken as to the New Jersey federal court decision.

|S

court is required to apply federal law to determine the preclusive
effect of a federal decision. Garcia contends that the Bower hold-
ing stands in contrast to Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), which allows a district court
to apply state law instead of federal law to determine the effects of
a dismissal by a federal court. Specifically, Garcia argues that
Semtek is directly on point, as Semtek was a case based on diver-
sity jurisdiction, while Bower is distinguishable because it relied on
cases whose holdings were premised on federal questions. She ar-
gues that this distinction is determinative, and therefore, Bower
needs clarification by this court. Prudential responds that Garcia’s
claims are precluded because the New Jersey federal court actually
litigated the merits of her claims, which are identical to those pre-
sented here.?

Standard of review

| rere

“A district court order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion
to dismiss is subject to rigorous appellate review.’ Sanchez v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 125 Nev. 818, 823, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009).
In reviewing the dismissal order, this court will accept a plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true, however, these ‘‘allegations must be
legally sufficient to constitute the elements of the claim asserted.’’
Id. This court applies a de novo standard of review to all questions
of law, including to decisions applying issue preclusion principles.
Id.; Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. 394, 400-01, 282 P.3d 712,
716 (2012).

Issue preclusion

|

Initially, we acknowledge Prudential’s claim that Garcia failed to
raise this argument below and agree that ‘“‘we generally will not ad-
dress an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” Durango Fire
Protection v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. 658, 661, 98 P.3d 691, 693
(2004). Nonetheless, we elect to address this issue in order to clar-
ify our decision in Bower v. Harrah’s Laughlin, in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek International
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.*

5Prudential alternatively argues that Garcia’s claims should be dismissed for
failure to state viable causes of action. However, in light of our resolution on
issue preclusion grounds, we need not address this issue.

‘Prudential also argues that invited error should prohibit this appeal because
Garcia now complains about the application of law that she herself primarily
relied upon for support. ‘‘The doctrine of ‘invited error’ embodies the princi-
ple that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he

Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

In Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the
Supreme Court of the United States considered whether state or
federal law governs the claim-preclusive effect given to federal
court judgments. Recognizing that it has the ‘last word on the
claim-preclusive effect of all federal judgments,” the Court held
that whether any federal judgment is given preclusive effect is gov-
erned by federal common law. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507 (emphasis
in original); see Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008)
(‘‘The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined
by federal common law.’’). Thus, as with judgments rendered by a
federal court having federal-question jurisdiction, federal common
Jaw governs claim preclusion with respect to a judgment by a fed-
eral court sitting in diversity. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507, 508.

With regard to federal-question cases, federal common law en-
deavors to develop a uniform rule of preclusion. Taylor, 553 U.S.
at 891. Decisions rendered when the federal court is sitting in di-
versity, however, are, under federal common law, to be accorded
the same claim-preclusive effect as a state court decision in the
state in which the federal court sits, unless the state law is ‘‘in-
compatible with federal interests.’’ Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508, 509.
The Court reasoned that ‘‘any other rule would produce .. .
‘forum-shopping .. . and. . . inequitable administration of the
Jaws.’’’ Id. at 508-09 (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)); see also
18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4469 (2d ed. 2002). Although
Semtek involved claim preclusion, it appears that the same rule ap-
plies with respect to issue preclusion. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891-92
(discussing Semtek in light of issues regarding both claim and
issue preclusion). Because here the federal court was sitting in di-
versity in New Jersey, it follows that the preclusive effect of the
federal court’s judgment should be determined by the law applied
by state courts in New Jersey.

Bower v. Harrah’s Laughlin

In Bower v. Harrah’s Laughlin, this court recognized that ‘‘[t]o
determine the preclusive effect of a federal decision, we apply fed-

himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit.”
Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (quoting 5
‘Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962)). Here, Garcia neither “‘pro-
voked’’ nor “‘induced’’ an error to be committed; therefore Prudential’s as-
sertion is without merit.

Ee

eral Jaw.’ 125 Nev. at 482, 215 P.3d at 718. Bower failed, how-
ever, to distinguish the federal law applicable to diversity cases
from that applying to federal question cases, and in so doing, it
suggested that federal-question caselaw applies to all federal judg-
ments. Accordingly, we revisit and clarify our decision in Bower.

In Bower, this court found that the district court erred in apply-
ing federal issue preclusion to both state and federal decisions.* Id.
at 482, 215 P.3d at 718. We concluded that state law determines
the preclusive effect of a state decision, Clark v. Columbia/HCA
Information Services, 117 Nev. 468, 481, 25 P.3d 215, 224 (2001)
(citing Clark v. Clark, 80 Nev. 52, 57, 389 P.2d 69, 72 (1964)),
but ‘‘[t]o determine the preclusive effect of a federal decision, we
apply federal law.’ Bower, 125 Nev. at 482, 215 P.3d at 718.

This statement regarding the use of federal law evolved from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Fireman’s Fund Insur-
ance Co. v. International Market Place, 773 F.2d 1068, 1069 (9th
Cir. 1985). There, the court held that ‘‘[fJederal law governs the
collateral estoppel effect of a federal case decided by a federal
court.” Id. This statement by the Ninth Circuit was derived from
a United States Supreme Court case, which noted that, ‘‘[iJn
federal-question cases, the law applied is federal law. This Court
has noted, ‘It has been held in non-diversity cases . . . that the
federal courts will apply their own rule of res judicata’ ”’ Blonder-
Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 0.12 (1971)
(quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)). Thus,
since Blonder-Tongue is the root of Bower, Bower only has prece-
dential effect with regard to federal-question cases. Consequently,
the current controlling precedent where diversity jurisdiction is
concerned is Semtek.

| |

Accordingly, we now clarify Bower and recognize that, when a
federal court is sitting in diversity, the preclusive effect to be
given its judgments is governed by the federal common law de-
clared in Semtek, which incorporates ‘‘the law that would be ap-
plied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity
court sits.’ Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. The New Jersey federal dis-

SBower was initially filed in Nevada state district court. Bower, 125 Nev. at
477, 215 P.3d at 715. Subsequently, it was consolidated with other appellants’
cases. Id. While Bower’s case was still pending in Nevada state district court,
Harrah’s prevailed in both state and federal court in other cases arising out of
the same events. Jd. Harrah’s moved for summary judgment as to Bower’s case
in state district court, arguing for application of issue preclusion based on the
federal and state grants of summary judgment in the similar cases. Id. at 477-
78, 215 P.3d at 715-16. In granting the summary judgment motion, the district
court applied issue preclusion based upon the prior state and federal decisions.
Id. at 479, 215 P.3d at 717.

22 ee

trict court was sitting in diversity when it rendered the decision at
issue. Accordingly, we apply New Jersey issue-preclusion law to
determine whether that judgment precludes Garcia’s Nevada state
court claims.

Garcia’s claims would be precluded under New Jersey law
a

Applying New Jersey law, a party asserting issue preclusion

“‘must show that: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to
the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the
prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the
determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment;
and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a
party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.”

Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 897 A.2d 1003, 1009 (N.J. 2006)
(quoting Matter of Estate of Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 1034-35
(N.J. 1994)). While the substantive tests for issue preclusion in
federal courts and in New Jersey are ‘‘quite similar,’ the Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated that adhering to the correct approach
is important because it serves as a reminder that a court is con-
strained by the appropriate court’s framework. Gannon v. Ameri-
can Home Products, 48 A.3d 1094, 1104 (N.J. 2012).

The issues Garcia asserts in Nevada are identical in substance to
those she raised in New Jersey federal court.® These issues were
litigated in a prior proceeding, and the judgment of the New Jer-
sey federal court is final for issue preclusion purposes.” As the
New Jersey federal court found that Garcia failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, its determinations were essential

‘In New Jersey federal court, Garcia asserted claims for (1) breach of the
insurance contracts, (2) breach of the Alliance Account contracts, (3) breach
of fiduciary duty, and (4) unjust enrichment. Garcia now asserts claims for
(1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of duties arising from a special, con-
fidential relationship; and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.

7We acknowledge Garcia’s argument that the finality requirement is not sat-
isfied because the New Jersey federal court case was dismissed without prej-
udice. However, the cases that she cites to holding that a dismissal with-
out prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits are cases dealing with claim
preclusion and not issue preclusion. ‘‘It is widely recognized that the final-
ity requirement is less stringent for issue preclusion than for claim preclu-
sion.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000). See In
re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that, under New Jersey
aw, issue preclusion applies ‘“‘whenever an action is ‘sufficiently firm to be
accorded conclusive effect’’’ (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 13 (1995))).

ee

to its judgment. Additionally, the parties to the current litigation
are the same parties to the prior litigation. Thus, under New Jer-
sey state law, Garcia is precluded from relitigating her claims.

While we conclude the district court erred by applying federal
Jaw instead of state law to determine the preclusive effect of the
federal court’s decision, we hold that it reached the correct result
because it correctly determined that Garcia is precluded from re-
litigating her claims. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the dis-
trict court.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Cuerry, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, IN Her OrriciaL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
APPELLANT, v. GYPSUM RESOURCES, LLC, A NEVADA
Limirep LrasiLiry Company, RESPONDENT.

No. 59557

January 31, 2013 294 P.3d 404

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Bryan L.
Stockton, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for
Appellant.

Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, and Edward Gary Burg and
George M. Soneff, Los Angeles, California, for Respondent.

»

4

Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division, and Brenda J.
Erdoes, Legislative Counsel, and Kevin C. Powers, Chief Litiga-
tion Counsel, Carson City, for Amicus Curiae Legislature of the
State of Nevada.

Before the Court EN BANc.!
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
certified four questions to this court regarding the constitutionality
of Nevada Senate Bill No. 358, S.B. 358, 72d Leg. (Nev. 2003),
in which the Nevada Legislature adopted amendments to Nevada
law that prohibit Clark County from rezoning land in certain areas
adjacent to Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area, in-
cluding 2,500 acres owned by respondent Gypsum Resources,
LLC. Those questions are: (1) Does S.B. 358 violate Article 4,
Section 20 of the Nevada Constitution because it is a “‘local or spe-
cial law’? that ‘‘regulat[es] county . . . business’’?; (2) Does S.B.
358 violate Article 4, Section 21 of the Nevada Constitution
because a general law could have been made ‘‘applicable’’?;
(3) Does S.B. 358 violate Article 4, Section 25 of the Nevada Con-
stitution by establishing a ‘‘system of County . . . Government’’
that is not “‘uniform throughout the State’’?; and (4) If S.B. 358
would otherwise violate Article 4, Sections 20, 21, or 25 of the
Nevada Constitution, does it fall within an applicable exception and
so remain valid?

"THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE PICKERING voluntarily recused herself from
participation in the decision of this matter.

2

‘We answer the first three questions in the affirmative and the
last question in the negative.

FACTS

In 1990, the United States Congress allotted nearly 200,000
acres in southern Nevada to the establishment of the Red Rock Na-
tional Conservation Area (Red Rock) to preserve ‘‘the area in
southern Nevada containing and surrounding the Red Rock
Canyon.” 16 U.S.C. § 460ccc-1(a)(1), (2) (2006). In establishing
Red Rock, Congress expressed its opinion that these 200,000 acres
would adequately preserve the areas worthy of preservation: ‘“The
Congress does not intend for the establishment of the conservation
area to lead to the creation of protective perimeters or buffer
zones around the conservation area.’’ Id. § 460ccc-9.

By 2003, Las Vegas had become the fastest growing metropoli-
tan area in the country, and the prospect of urban sprawl reaching
the areas surrounding Red Rock became a distinct possibility. Cap-
italizing on this possibility, Gypsum purchased 2,500 acres of land
adjacent to Red Rock in March 2003. Although the land was
zoned as a rural area, Gypsum hoped to obtain a zoning variance
from the Clark County Board of Commissioners in order to un-
dertake a large-scale residential development project.

Also in March 2003, the Nevada Legislature was in session.
Dina Titus, a Senator at the time, explained to fellow legislators
that she had been working hand-in-hand with the Clark County
Board of Commissioners to curtail development near Red Rock.
See Hearing on S.B. 358 Before the Senate Government Affairs
Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., March 26, 2003). To this end, Senator
Titus explained that she and the county commissioners had for-
mulated a plan to protect the area adjacent to Red Rock’s eastern
border and west of the Las Vegas outskirts (Adjacent Lands). Id.

Senator Titus explained that the first step in implementing her
plan entailed the county commissioners creating a new zoning dis-
trict consisting of the Adjacent Lands. Jd. Once created, the com-
missioners would refuse to accept zoning-variance requests within
this new district.

The second part of the plan involved Senator Titus introducing
S.B. 358. She explained that, if enacted, the bill would remove
Clark County’s zoning powers over the Adjacent Lands. See id. In
other words, S.B. 358 would prevent the county commissioners
from later changing their minds about refusing to accept zoning-
variance requests. Senator Titus explained her reasons for seeking
legislative involvement:

Why does the State need to get involved at all? The answer is
simple; as you know, one Legislature cannot bind another
Legislature, one commission could not bind another commis-

Po

sion. Well, this current commission feels very strongly about
protecting Red Rock Canyon, but this does not mean in the
future some aggressive developer couldn’t go to the commis-
sion and attempt to get a zoning change, so they could do
more dense development. It is much harder to get a State law
changed than it is to get a zoning variance, and this is not an
issue just of zoning, it is an issue of protecting a state and na-
tional treasure.

Id.
Senator Titus garnered the support necessary to pass S.B. 358,
which was titled the Red Rock Canyon Conservation Area and
Adjacent Lands Act (Adjacent Lands Act). See 2003 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 105, §§ 1-10, at 595-98.

In pertinent part, S.B. 358 provides as follows:

With respect to adjacent lands, a local government:

1. Shall not, in regulating the use of those lands:

(a) Increase the number of residential dwelling units al-
lowed by zoning regulations in existence on the effective date
of this act... ;

(b) Establish any new nonresidential zoning districts, other
than for public facilities; or

(c) Expand the size of any nonresidential zoning district in
existence on the effective date of this act, other than for pub-
lic facilities.

Id. § 8, at 597.

S.B. 358 also defines ‘‘[a]djacent lands’’ on a parcel-by-parcel
basis in a manner that (1) encompasses Gypsum’s land, and
(2) makes Clark County the only possible ‘‘local government’ to
which S.B. 358 pertains. Jd. § 7, at 597. Thus, S.B. 358’s practi-
cal effect is to remove Clark County’s zoning powers over Gyp-
sum’s land.

Shortly after the passage of S.B. 358, the Clark County Board
of Commissioners adopted an ordinance that established a new
zoning district containing the Adjacent Lands and decreed that the
commissioners would refuse to entertain requests for zoning vari-
ances within this district.

Gypsum filed suit against appellant Attorney General in federal
district court, asking the court to enjoin the State of Nevada from
enforcing S.B. 358. As a basis for injunctive relief, Gypsum
claimed that S.B. 358 violated portions of the Nevada and U.S.
Constitutions.

Ruling on various motions, the federal district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Gypsum on its Nevada constitu-
tional claims and denied the Attorney General’s summary judgment
motion on Gypsum’s federal equal protection claim. Gypsum then

PO

voluntarily dismissed its equal protection claim, leaving only the
Nevada constitutional claims. The Attorney General then appealed
the district court’s summary judgment order to the Ninth Circuit.

Believing there to be no clearly controlling precedent on the
state constitutional issues, the Ninth Circuit certified the questions
currently before this court.

DISCUSSION

Gypsum argues that $.B. 358 is a local or special law that reg-
ulates county business and establishes a system of county govern-
ment that is not uniform throughout the State, in violation of Sec-
tions 20, 21, and 25 of Article 4 of the Nevada Constitution.
Gypsum further argues that S.B. 358 does not fall within any ex-
ception to the above constitutional provisions. We agree.

S.B. 358 violates Article 4, Section 20 because it is a local law
that regulates county business

The first certified question concerns Article 4, Section 20 of the
Nevada Constitution, which, in pertinent part, prohibits the Leg-
islature from passing local or special laws that regulate county
business. Nev. Const. art. 4, § 20. In answering the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s first question, we must examine whether S.B, 358 is local or
special in nature and whether it regulates county business.

| eee

We most recently examined the meaning of ‘‘local’’ and ‘‘spe-
cial’’ legislation within the context of Article 4, Section 20 in
Clean Water Coalition v. The M Resort, 127 Nev. 301, 255 P.3d
247 (2011). There, the Legislature passed a law requiring the
Clean Water Coalition (CWC) to relinquish $62 million of its own
money to the State of Nevada so that the State could balance its
budget. Jd. at 307, 255 P.3d at 252. Upon considering the CWC’s
challenge to this law, we concluded that the law was both ‘‘local’’
and ‘‘special’’ in nature. Id. at 312, 255 P.3d at 256. The analy-
sis in Clean Water provides an appropriate framework for consid-
ering whether the Adjacent Lands Act is a ‘‘local’’ or ‘‘special’’
law.

S.B. 358 is a local law

“A law is local if it operates over ‘a particular locality instead
of over the whole territory of the State’ ’’ Jd. at 312, 255 P.3d at
255 (quoting Damus v. County of Clark, 93 Nev. 512, 516, 569
P.2d 933, 935 (1977).

In Clean Water, the State defended the budget law, maintaining
that it was not local because ‘‘it advance[d] supervening statewide

ee!

concerns that transcend[ed] local interests.” Id. at 313, 255 P.3d at
255. We recognized that the law benefited the entire State, but nev-
ertheless concluded that the law was local because it ‘‘burden[ed]
only the CWC by appropriating funds collected from certain resi-
dents and businesses within a particular locality.’ Jd. at 314, 255
P.3d at 256. In other words, regardless of who benefited from the
law, it “‘operate[d] over’’ only one particular locality. Jd. at 312,
255 P.3d at 255.

A similar analysis applies here. Any statewide benefit that might
arise from preserving the Adjacent Lands does not change the fact
that S.B. 358 operates over only one particular portion of Nevada,
specifically small portions of Clark County. This is analogous to
the legislation addressed in Clean Water, which also operated over
only one particular portion of Clark County. Thus, applying the
same rationale we used in Clean Water, S.B. 358 is a local Jaw for
the purposes of Section 20.?

“Regulating county business”’

Having concluded that $.B. 358 is a local law, we address
whether S.B. 358 ‘‘[rJegulat[es] county . . . business.’’ Nev.
Const. art. 4, § 20.

We have broadly defined county business as ‘‘ ‘covering almost
everything that concerns the administration of the county govern-
ment, ’? McDonald y. Beemer, 67 Nev. 419, 425, 220 P.2d 217,
220 (1950) (quoting Singleton v. Eureka County, 22 Nev. 91, 101,
35 P. 833, 836 (1894) (Bigelow, J., concurring)), and it would be
difficult to conclude that zoning does not concern the administra-
tion of county government. Thus, the remaining question is
whether S.B. 358 ‘“‘regulates’’ Clark County’s business.

Two prior decisions provide guidance on whether a law imper-
missibly regulates county business, as opposed to merely affecting
county business. In the first, Cauble v. Beemer, the Legislature
passed a law authorizing Washoe County to issue bonds in order to
raise money to renovate a hospital. 64 Nev. 77, 177 P.2d 677
(1947). Because bond-issuance matters would typically need to be
approved by the voters, the law was challenged as an unconstitu-
tional regulation of Washoe County’s business.

This court concluded that the bond-issuance Jaw did not regulate
Washoe County’s business, but merely affected it. Id. at 90, 177
P.2d at 683. In drawing this distinction, the Cauble court reasoned:
“The provisions of the act relate entirely to the particular bond
issue for the single hospital construction and reconstruction proj-

*Because we conclude that S.B, 358 is a local law, we need not consider
whether it is also a special law under Section 20. See Clean Water, 127 Nev.
at 310, 255 P.3d at 254 (reiterating that either a special law or a local law po-
tentially violates Section 20).

0

ect.” Id. In other words, the law had an isolated and temporary ef-
fect on the county’s business, and was therefore permissible.

The second case is Town of Pahrump v. Nye County, 105 Nev.
227, 773 P.2d 1224 (1989). In Town of Pahrump, the Legislature
enacted a law that removed Nye County’s powers of planning, zon-
ing, land division, and building inspection, giving these powers in-
stead to the unincorporated town of Pahrump. Jd. at 228, 773 P.2d
at 1224. On appeal, it was argued that, pursuant to Cauble, this
power transfer merely affected Nye County’s business but did not
regulate it. Jd. at 229, 773 P.2d at 1225.

We disagreed and distinguished Cauble. ‘The powers vested by
the statute are broad and ongoing, and they substantially alter the
power structure of the county. They do not relate only to a single
item or project of county business, as do the statutes which we
have previously held merely ‘affect’ county business.’’ Jd.

Thus, whether a law regulates or affects county business hinges
on two criteria: (1) whether the challenged law governs a single
item or project rather than multiple items or projects, and
(2) whether the law’s effect is temporary rather than permanent.

Here, S.B. 358 does not relate to a specific item or project in
the way the bond-issuance legislation did. Rather, $.B. 358 has the
amorphous goal of keeping urban sprawl away from Red Rock.
Moreover, S.B, 358 permanently bans Clark County from ever re-
zoning the Adjacent Lands. Thus, we hold that $.B. 358 does reg-
ulate county business.

Since S.B. 358 is a local law operating over a particular local-
ity that regulates Clark County’s business by permanently divest-
ing the County of its zoning power over the Adjacent Lands, S.B.
358 violates Article 4, Section 20.

S.B. 358 violates Article 4, Section 21 because it is a local law
that falls within an enumerated category of Section 20

Article 4, Section 21 states that ‘‘[iJn all cases enumerated in
[Section 20], all Jaws shall be general and of uniform operation
throughout the State.’ Nev. Const. art. 4, § 21. However, a local
Jaw is not ipso facto unconstitutional. Clean Water, 127 Nev. at
312, 255 P.3d at 255. This court has previously held:

[If a statute be either a special or local law, or both, and
comes within any one or more of the cases enumerated in
[S]ection 20, such statute is unconstitutional; if the statute be
special or local, or both, but does not come within any of the

ee

cases enumerated in [SJection 20, then its constitutionality de-
pends upon whether a general [statewide] law can be made
applicable [to the locality].

Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 117, 45 P.2d 779,
782-83 (1935).

| |

Where a law is either local or special, such a law may be upheld
where ‘‘(1) it does not come within any of the cases enumerated in
Nevada Constitution Article 4, Section 20; and (2) a general law
could not have been made applicable.’ Clean Water, 127 Nev. at
312, 255 P.3d at 255. Here, S.B. 358 is a local law and falls
within one of Section 20’s enumerated cases in that it regulates
county business. Thus, as contemplated in Conservation District,
S.B. 358 is unconstitutional.?

S.B. 358 violates Section 25 because it establishes a system of
county government that is not uniform throughout the State

Article 4, Section 25 of the Nevada Constitution provides that
“Tt]he Legislature shall establish a system of County and Township
Government which shall be uniform throughout the State.’ Nev.
Const. art. 4, § 25.

bre

As for whether $.B. 358 violates Section 25, this court’s deci-
sion in Town of Pahrump v. Nye County, 105 Nev. 227, 773 P.2d
1224 (1989), is again instructive. In addition to its arguments
regarding Section 20, Nye County also argued that the power-
shifting legislation violated Section 25. To aid our analysis, we
“defined a ‘system of government, as used in the context of [S]ec-
tion 25, as consisting of ‘the powers, duties, and obligations placed
upon [a] political organization” ’’ Id. at 228, 773 P.2d at 1224
(second alteration in original) (quoting McDonald v. Beemer, 67
Nev. 419, 426, 220 P.2d 217, 221 (1950)).

‘We then explained, ‘‘[s]ince zoning and planning fall within the
powers, duties and obligations placed upon [a] political organiza-
tion, they are precisely the type of activities that [S]ection 25 was
intended to regulate.’ Id. at 228, 773 P.2d at 1225 (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we held that
“Tbjecause [the challenged law] delegates these powers away from
Nye County to the unincorporated Town of Pahrump in a unique
manner, one not utilized by other counties, it destroys the unifor-
mity of the system of government among the counties.’ Id. at 228-
29, 773 P.2d at 1225.

*Because we so hold, it is unnecessary to address whether the general law
could have been made applicable.

PO

The Zown of Pahrump analysis applies with equal effect here.
Having been divested of its zoning powers over the Adjacent
Lands, Clark County now lacks exclusive control over zoning.
Thus, in much the same way that the transfer of zoning authority
from Nye County to Pahrump violated Section 25, we conclude
that the divestment of Clark County’s zoning authority via S.B.
358 does the same.

S.B. 358 does not fall within any exception and thereby remains
invalid

As explained above, S.B. 358 violates Article 4, Sections 20,
21, and 25. The Ninth Circuit’s final certified question is whether
an exception applies that would render S.B. 358 valid despite oth-
erwise violating the Nevada Constitution.

The Attorney General has advanced two distinct justifications for
deeming S.B. 358 constitutional: (A) the emergency justification
and (B) the natural resource justification. Below, we describe each
justification and explain how they relate to the analyses of Sections
20, 21, and 25,

Emergency justification

| |

In considering prior legislation that amounted to local laws,
this court has occasionally validated such laws to address an emer-
gency. See Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 24-25, 115 P. 177,
180-81 (1911) (justifying local legislation removing the county seat
from Dayton to Yerington in the wake of the Lyon County court-
house burning down); Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. at
117, 45 P.2d at 782-83 (justifying local legislation necessary to
raise funds for a flood-prevention project); Cauble v. Beemer, 64
Nev. at 99, 177 P.2d at 687-88 (justifying local legislation because
it was needed to reconstruct the county hospital). However, these
cases discussed emergency justifications in relation to Article 4,
Section 21, where local laws could not be made generally appli-
cable. As such, these laws had passed the first part of the Conser-
vation District test, falling outside the enumerated categories of
Article 4, Section 20.

In the case at bar, S.B, 358 does not pass the first part of the
Conservation District test, as the regulation of county business is
enumerated in Section 20. Thus, the cases applying the emergency
justification are distinguishable. This court has steadfastly held that
we cannot ignore the constitutional limits placed on the Legislature
in Sections 20 and 25, and we would be venturing into rather un-
stable territory if we were to expand the emergency justification
beyond Section 21. Cf. Clean Water, 127 Nev. at 318, 255 P.3d at
260 (agreeing that the State’s budget shortfall was an emergency

Po

but declining to ignore Sections 20 and 21’s proscriptions on local
legislation).

Natural resource justification

Le

The natural resource justification derives from this court’s deci-
sion in State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 90 Nev. 272, 524
P.2d 1271 (1974), a decision that seemingly blurred the line be-
tween what does and does not constitute local legislation for pur-
poses of Section 20.

In List, the State of Nevada entered into an interstate compact
with the State of California to create the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. Id. at 274-75, 524 P.2d at 1272-73. The Agency’s purpose
was to conserve the natural resources in the Lake Tahoe Basin,
which encompassed portions of both states. Id. To fund the
Agency, the interstate compact required the five counties bordering
Lake Tahoe (three in Nevada, two in California) to contribute
money to the Agency. Id. at 275, 524 P.2d at 1273.

Douglas County challenged the compact, contending that it
amounted to local legislation under Section 20 because only three
of Nevada’s counties were affected by it. This court disagreed,
concluding that the compact was not ‘‘local,’ but ‘‘regional’’ in
nature, stating:

We .. . hold that the preservation of the region of the Lake
Tahoe Basin as a natural resource for the enjoyment of all
people sets it apart from the embrace of the commands of art.
4, §§ 20 and 21 of our State Constitution. Were we to rule
otherwise, every interstate compact proposing to protect and
preserve a common natural resource through an agency em-
powered to enact laws would be a nullity.

Id, at 279, 524 P.2d at 1275.

In its amicus brief to the Ninth Circuit, the Nevada Legislature
focused on the first sentence in the above holding, arguing that List
should be interpreted to mean that whenever legislation protects a
natural resource for the enjoyment of people statewide, it should be
deemed a general law and not a local law.

However, this argument is nearly identical to the one rejected in
Clean Water. That is, even though the Clean Water budget law
“‘advance[d] supervening statewide concerns that transcend{ed]
local interests,’ the law still burdened only one particular locality.
127 Nev. at 313, 255 P.3d at 255-56.

In light of Clean Water, we interpret List as standing for the
proposition that legislation is regional (and thus not local in viola-
tion of Article 4, Section 20) when it affects certain counties as
part of a broader interstate agreement. Clean Water, 127 Nev. at

34 Po

312, 255 P.3d at 255 (‘‘A law is local if it operates over a partic-
ular locality instead of over the whole territory of the State.’
(quotation omitted)).

In the above excerpt, we specifically noted that our reasoning in
List was predicated on the existence of an interstate compact. List,
90 Nev. at 279, 524 P.2d at 1275. We also specifically concluded
that “‘[slince the [Lake Tahoe] Basin lies within two states, the
concept of the [interstate cJompact is regional in character.’ Jd. at
277, 524 P.2d at 1274. Thus, this court assigned the legislation a
label of regional because two states were affected by the law, and
not just counties within Nevada. Because $.B. 358 affects only one
county in one state and does not require cooperation from another
state to protect Red Rock, it is distinguishable from List.

In sum, although this court has concluded that an emergency
may justify the need for local legislation in lieu of general legisla-
tion, Article 4, Section 21 does not permit local legislation in lieu
of general legislation where such legislation falls within an enu-
merated category of Article 4, Section 20. Moreover, to the extent
that List can be interpreted as providing a natural resource justifi-
cation, such an interpretation has been rejected by our recent
analysis in Clean Water of what constitutes a local law under Sec-
tion 20.

CONCLUSION

S.B. 358 is a local law that regulates county business. As such,
it violates Article 4, Sections 20 and 21 of the Nevada Constitu-
tion. S.B. 358 also violates Article 4, Section 25 by establishing a
nonuniform system of county government. Furthermore, $.B. 358
does not fall within any recognized exception to the Nevada Con-
stitution. Accordingly, we answer the first three certified questions
in the affirmative and the last certified question in the negative.

Grssons, Harpesty, DoucLas, Cuerry, and Sarria, JJ.,
concur,

PC Cids&€z:

THE EDUCATION INITIATIVE PAC, a Nevapa POLITICAL
AcTION COMMITTEE, APPELLANT, v. COMMITTEE TO PRO-
TECT NEVADA JOBS, A NEVADA NONPROFIT COMPANY; AND
ROSS MILLER, IN His OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE NEVADA
SECRETARY OF STATE, RESPONDENTS.

No. 61996

January 31, 2013 293 P.3d 874

Dyer, Lawrence, Flaherty, Donaldson & Prunty and Michael W.
Dyer, Francis C. Flaherty, and Sue S. Matuska, Carson City, for
Appellant.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Joshua J. Hicks,
Las Vegas; Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Sean D.
Lyitlle and Clark V. Vellis, Reno, for Respondent Committee to Pro-
tect Nevada Jobs.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and K. Kevin
Benson, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent
Secretary of State.

a

Before the Court En BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpgsty, J.:

In this appeal, we consider the proper standard of review to be
applied when reviewing the adequacy of a ballot initiative’s de-
scription of effect. Nevada’s Constitution permits the Legislature
to provide procedures to facilitate the initiative process. In 2005,
the Legislature enacted NRS 295.009(1)(b), which requires a bal-
lot initiative to provide in 200 words or less a description of the ef-
fect of the initiative. A description of effect serves a limited pur-
pose to facilitate the initiative process, and to that end, it must be
a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative summary of
what the initiative is designed to achieve and how it intends to
reach those goals. Given that limited purpose and the 200-word re-

8

striction, the description of effect cannot constitutionally be re-
quired to delineate every effect that an initiative will have; to con-
clude otherwise could obstruct, rather than facilitate, the people’s
right to the initiative process. In reviewing an initiative’s descrip-
tion of effect, a district court should assess whether the description
contains a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative state-
ment of what the initiative will accomplish and how it will achieve
those goals. Because we conclude that the description of effect at
issue in this case satisfies this requirement, and because the single-
subject challenge to the initiative lacks merit, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the district court’s order invalidating the initiative
here.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, The Education Initiative PAC (EI PAC), a Nevada po-
litical action committee, seeks to enact a law through Nevada’s bal-
Jot initiative process to provide a new funding source for the state’s
public school K-12 education needs. This proposed law, which EI
PAC entitled ‘‘The Education Initiative,’ would impose a two-
percent margin tax on all Nevada businesses with annual revenue
of more than $1 million.' After filing the proposed ballot initiative
with the Secretary of State, El PAC began circulating petitions to
gather the necessary signatures so that the Initiative could be pre-
sented to the Legislature in 2013 and, if necessary, be placed on
the 2014 general election ballot.

Respondent Committee to Protect Nevada Jobs filed a com-
plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the First Judicial Dis-
trict Court challenging the Initiative. In its complaint, the Com-
mittee sought a declaration that (1) EI PAC’s Initiative violated
NRS 295,.009’s single-subject rule because it sought to enact a
multi-subject law, and (2) its description of effect was misleading
in several respects. The Committee asked the district court to en-
join the Secretary of State from presenting the Initiative to the Leg-
islature in 2013 and from eventually placing the Initiative on the
2014 general election ballot.

Although the district court rejected the Committee’s single-
subject rule challenge, it found that the Initiative’s description of
effect was ‘‘incomplete, deceptive, [and] misleading.” As a result,
the district court granted the Committee’s requested relief in part,
enjoining the Secretary of State from presenting the Initiative to the
Legislature, but rejecting the Committee’s request that EI PAC be

'A complete copy of the Initiative is attached to this opinion as an
addendum.

ee °°

enjoined from continuing to gather petition signatures.” This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

If enacted, the Education Initiative would require, among other
things, that the margin tax revenues raised under the new law be
deposited into the state Distributive School Account, which, in
essence, is a subaccount of the State General Fund, NRS
387.030(1), and then be ‘‘apportioned among the several school
districts . . . at the times and in the manner provided by [existing]
Jaw for the money in the State Distributive School Account.’’ To
understand the arguments raised by the parties to this appeal and
this court’s legal conclusions, we begin by examining the initiative
process before addressing the parties’ contentions.

Nevada’s ballot initiative process

Since 1912, Nevada’s Constitution has secured to the citizens of
this state ‘the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and
amendments to statutes... and to enact or reject them at the
polls.” Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2(1). The constitution requires the
ballot initiative proponent to file a copy of the initiative with the
Secretary of State and then gather a required number of signatures
from registered voters who likewise support the initiative’s ideas.
Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2(2), (3). Once the required number of sig-
natures are gathered, the proponent must then submit the signa-
tures to the Secretary of State for verification. Nev. Const. art. 19,
§ 2(3). If the Secretary verifies that the required number of signa-
tures has been gathered, the Secretary must transmit the initiative
to the Legislature ‘‘as soon as the Legislature convenes and or-
ganizes”’ for its next legislative session. Jd. At that point, if the
Legislature chooses to enact the initiative and the governor ap-

2While this appeal was pending, EI PAC continued to obtain and ultimately
submitted more than the required number of voter signatures. The Secretary of
State subsequently completed the process of verifying those signatures. Nev.
Const. art. 19, § 2(3).

Because this appeal required resolution before the 2013 Legislature con-
vened, and since the issues involved are purely legal, both EI PAC and the
Committee agreed to not file appellate briefs. Thus, all of the arguments that
the parties made in the district court—including those made by the Committee
and rejected by the district court—are de facto before this court. Cf. Ford v.
Showboat Operating Co., 110 Nev. 752, 755, 877 P.2d 546, 548 (1994) (rec-
ognizing that a party ‘“‘who is not aggrieved by a judgment need not appeal
from the judgment in order to raise arguments in support of the judgment not
necessarily accepted by the district court”). Additionally, respondent Secretary
of State Ross Miller indicated, in the initial stages of this matter, that he took
no position on the merits of the initiative petition at issue in this appeal.

0 ee

proves it, the initiative becomes law. Jd. If, however, the Legisla-
ture rejects the initiative or simply fails to take action on it during
the first 40 days of the session, the Secretary must then place the
initiative on the next general election ballot, id., which in this case
would be in 2014.

The constitution authorizes the Legislature to ‘‘provide by
law for procedures to facilitate’? the people’s power to legislate
by initiative. Nev. Const. art. 19, § 5. Before an initiative can
be placed on the ballot, NRS 293.250(5) requires the Secretary
of State to prepare an explanation of what the initiative entails,
which ‘‘must be in easily understood language and of reason-
able length.’ In addition, the Secretary must appoint two commit-
tees, one of which writes arguments advocating passage of the
initiative, while the other drafts arguments in opposition to its pas-
sage.? NRS 293.252(1), (5)(d). Each committee also writes rebut-
tals to the other committee’s argument. NRS 293.252(5)(e).
Among other things, each committee’s argument and rebuttal
“Ts]hall address . . . [t]he fiscal impact of the initiative’’ NRS
293.252(5)(f)(1). Once the Secretary approves each committee’s
argument and rebuttal, they are placed on the sample ballot dis-
tributed to the voters before the general election along with the
Secretary’s explanation of the initiative. NRS 293.097; NRS
293.252(8). Thus, before casting their votes, voters are presented
not only with the Secretary’s neutral explanation of the initiative,
but also with arguments for and against the initiative’s enactment
prepared by people with an interest in seeing the initiative pass or
fail.

In 2005, the Legislature enacted NRS 295.009, the statute
at issue in this appeal, which made two key modifications to the
initiative process. Specifically, NRS 295.009 sets forth two
requirements that the proponent of a ballot initiative must satis-
fy: (1) the proposed law must embrace only ‘‘one subject,”
NRS 295.009(1)(a); and (2) when gathering petition signatures, the
proponent’s petition must include, ‘‘in not more than 200 words,
a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the
initiative or referendum is approved by the voters.’* NRS
295.009(1)(b). ‘‘The description must appear on each signature
page of the petition.’ Id.

To resolve this appeal, we begin by examining the function of a
description of effect in the initiative process and how a court

*Hach committee consists of three people, all of whom are appointed by the
Secretary. NRS 293.252(1). In making the appointments, the Secretary ‘shall
consider”? appointing ‘‘[ajny person who has expressed an interest in serving
on the committee.’ NRS 293.252(4)(a).

4By its terms, NRS 295.009 applies to both initiatives and referendums. Ac-
cordingly, the analysis in this opinion is equally applicable in the referendum
context.

PC

should analyze a description of effect in reviewing a challenge to
the sufficiency of this description. We then consider whether the
initiative violates the single-subject rule.

The Initiative’s description of effect adequately summarizes the
Initiative
a

In determining whether a ballot initiative proponent has com-
plied with NRS 295.009, ‘‘it is not the function of this court to
judge the wisdom’’ of the proposed initiative. Nevada Judges Ass’n
y. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 57, 910 P.2d 898, 902 (1996). When a dis-
trict court’s decision to grant declaratory and injunctive relief de-
pends on a pure question of Jaw, our review is de novo. Nevadans
for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 942, 142 P.3d 339, 347
(2006).

Pursuant to NRS 295.009(1)(b), EI PAC included with its peti-
tion the following description of effect of its Initiative:

This statutory initiative proposes to impose a 2-percent mar-
gin tax on business entities doing business in Nevada. Ex-
emptions include: natural persons not engaged in business;
entities with total revenue of $1,000,000 or less; passive en-
tities; Section 501(c) organizations. Margin is the lesser of:
(1) 70 percent of entity’s total revenue from its entire busi-
ness; or (2) entity’s total revenue from its entire business,
minus (at its election) the cost of goods it has sold or amount
of compensation it has paid to owners and employees. An en-
tity’s taxable margin, against which the tax is imposed, is that
part of its margin apportioned to Nevada. Revenues from the
tax would be deposited in the State Distributive School Ac-
count in the State General Fund, and used for the support of
K-12 education. The 2-percent modified business tax now
paid by financial institutions would temporarily be increased
to 2.29 percent, and potentially to 2.42 percent, to provide
money for the Department of Taxation to begin to administer
the margin tax. Liability for the margin tax would begin to ac-
crue on January 1, 2014, if the initiative is approved by the
Legislature, or January 1, 2015, if approved by voters.

Relevant to this appeal, EI PAC’s description of effect states that
the Initiative seeks to impose a new margin tax, describes certain
exemptions from the tax, and briefly summarizes how the tax will
be calculated. It then provides that the margin tax revenues ‘‘would.
be deposited in the State Distributive School Account in the State
General Fund, and used for the support of K-12 education’”’ and
notes that the two-percent modified business tax will be temporar-
ily increased to cover initial administrative costs for the margin tax.

ee
| eee

This court has previously declared that a description of effect
must be “‘ ‘straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative,’’’ Las
Vegas Taxpayer Comm. v. City Council, 125 Nev. 165, 183, 208
P.3d 429, 441 (2009) (quoting Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Sec’y of
State, 122 Nev. 877, 889, 141 P.3d 1224, 1232 (2006)), and it
must not be deceptive or misleading.’ See Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev.
826, 833, 839 P.2d 120, 124 (1992), overruled on other grounds
by Herbst Gaming, 122 Nev. at 888, 141 P.3d at 1231. However,
the description of effect does not need to explain ‘“hypothetical’’
effects of an initiative. See Herbst Gaming, 122 Nev. at 889, 141
P.3d at 1232. The opponent of a ballot initiative bears the burden
of showing that the initiative’s description of effect fails to satisfy
this standard. See Las Vegas Taxpayer Comm., 125 Nev. at 176,
208 P.3d at 436 (explaining that the party seeking to invalidate the
initiative bears the burden of establishing that the initiative is
“‘clearly invalid’).

In challenging the Initiative in district court, the Committee ar-
gued that EI PAC’s description of effect was inadequate, both be-
cause it failed to include certain information and because the in-
formation it did include was misleading. In responding to the
Committee’s contentions, EI PAC argued that, in light of the 200-
word limitation imposed on descriptions of effect, it would be im-
possible to include all of the information that the Committee be-
lieved was necessary for inclusion. Moreover, EI PAC maintained
that the perceived inaccuracies in its description stemmed from an
overly technical reading of the information contained therein. The
district court agreed with certain assertions made by the Commit-
tee and concluded that the description was ‘‘incomplete, deceptive,
{and] misleading”’ and invalidated the Initiative on that basis.

As explained below, both the Committee and the district court
have misapprehended the function of an initiative’s description of
effect, which we conclude does not need to mention every possi-
ble effect of an initiative. Instead, a description of effect must
identify what the law proposes and how it intends to achieve that
proposal, all within a 200-word limit. Given this constraint and in
light of its statutory function to facilitate the initiative process, a

Sin Las Vegas Taxpayer Committee, 125 Nev. at 181-82, 208 P.3d at 440,
invali ecause it violated the single-subject rule. In

i jative’s description of effect and agreed with
the district court’s conclusion that the description was ‘materially mislead-
ing.” Id. at 182-83, 208 P.3d at 440-41. The “‘materially misleading” standard
alluded to in Las Vegas Taxpayer Committee is thus attributable to the district
court and is not intended to be part of this court’s standard for reviewing de-
scriptions of effect.

2

hyper-technical interpretation of the requirements for a description
of effect may impede the people from exercising their constitutional
right to propose laws and is therefore an inappropriate method for
assessing the adequacy of a description of effect.

A description of effect serves to broadly inform a petition
signer about the initiative

With regard to the function of an initiative’s description of ef-
fect, in this case, the district court and the parties mistakenly re-
viewed the description of effect with an eye on hypothetical effects
or consequences of the Initiative, without regard for the role that
the description of effect serves in the initiative process. This court
has recognized that an initiative’s description of effect is intended
to ‘‘ ‘prevent voter confusion and promote informed decisions. ”’
Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 122 Nev. 930, 939-40, 142 P.3d
339, 345 (2006) (quoting Campbell v. Buckley, 203 F.3d 738,
745-46 (10th Cir. 2000)). Consequently, before circulating an
initiative for signatures, the proponents must file it with the Sec-
retary of State. NRS 295.015(1). The Secretary does not evaluate
or otherwise assess the description of effect before the proponents
begin gathering signatures. Id. Instead, the initiative and the de-
scription of effect are made available to the public in their entirety,
on the Secretary’s website. NRS 295.015(4). During the signature-
gathering process, signers, before signing the petition, may read
the initiative on the Secretary’s website or the copy in the circula-
tor’s possession, and/or signers may read the 200-word description
of effect, which must be located on each signature page of the pe-
tition. NRS 295.009(1)(b); see also Herbst Gaming, 122 Nev. at
888-89, 141 P.3d at 1232 (providing that if a petition signer ques-
tioned the meaning of a phrase used in the initiative’s title, that
question could be resolved by reviewing the actual text of the ini-
tiative). Under these circumstances, the legislative purpose of re-
quiring that a description of effect accompany the petitions circu-
lated for signature gathering is achieved by providing a summary
that captures what an initiative is designed to achieve and how it
intends to reach those goals, albeit within the boundaries of 200
words.

The utility of the description of effect is confined to the prelim-
inary phase of the initiative process, when the proponent seeks to
garner enough initial support so that the initiative will be consid-
ered by the Legislature and the voters. Our understanding of the
function of a description of effect to facilitate the initiative process
is informed by the Legislature’s deliberations when it considered
whether to adopt NRS 295.009(1)(b) and by the Legislature’s de-
cision to limit proponents to describing a proposed initiative in 200
words or less.

ee

Legislative deliberations

During the legislative process for enacting NRS 295.009(1)(b),
legislators raised concerns over who would write the description of
effect, who would determine its accuracy, and whether it would
even be possible to verify the accuracy of a position or opinion
presented in the description of effect. Hearing on A.B. 185 and
S.B. 224 Before the Senate Legislative Operations and Elections
Comm., 73d Leg. (Nev., May 12, 2005). With this in mind, in
an initial draft of the bill that would ultimately become NRS
295.009(1)(b), the Legislature considered requiring an initiative
petition to contain an ‘‘accurate description of the effect of the ini-
tiative’’6 A.B. 185, 73d Leg. § 1 (first reprint) (emphasis added)
(as discussed by the Senate Legislative Operations and Elections
Committee in conjunction with S.B. 224, May 12, 2005). The rea-
soning behind this initial approach was that the Legislature was
concerned with the prospect of people signing initiative petitions
without understanding what the initiative really entailed. See Hear-
ing on A.B. 185 Before the Senate Legislative Operations and
Elections Comm., 73d Leg. (Nev., May 10, 2005).

As the Legislature assessed how best to address this concern,
testimony addressing the proposed legislation highlighted a signif-
icant problem with the approach taken in the initial draft of this
bill, in that the Legislature could not constitutionally require an
accurate forecast of all of an initiative’s potential effects in
200 words or less. See Hearing on A.B. 185 Before the Senate
Legislative Operations and Elections Comm., 73d Leg. (Nev.,
May 10, 2005) (statement of John L. Wagner, Burke Consortium
of Carson City) (expressing skepticism as to whether a ballot ini-
tiative proponent could write an adequate summary in 200 words
or less); Hearing on A.B. 185 Before the Assembly Elections, Pro-
cedures, Ethics, and Constitutional Amendments Comm., 73d
Leg. (Nev., March 29, 2005) (statement of Janine Hansen, Presi-
dent, Nevada Eagle Forum) (discussing the constitution and ex-
plaining that ‘‘the Legislature should not be making it any more
difficult to petition, but [that it should] facilitate that process’’). In
the end, the Legislature came to a compromise in which it agreed
that the initiative’s proponent would write the description of effect,
it deleted the word ‘‘accurate’’ from the description-of-effect re-
quirement, and it determined that the only means of assessing a de-
scription of effect’s adequacy would be for someone to challenge
it in court. NRS 295.009(1)(b); NRS 295.061(1).

Although NRS 295.009 was enacted into law by Senate Bill 224, most of
the Legislature’s attention to the description-of-effect requirement comes from
.discussions of Assembly Bill 185. Shortly before Senate Bill 224’s enactment,
the Legislature inserted the desirable portions of Assembly Bill 185 into Sen-
ate Bill 224.

TCS

The Legislature, like in other states, could have prohibited a
ballot initiative proponent from gathering petition signatures until
the proponent receives a pre-approved summary from the state
official in charge of elections. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 15.45.090
(2012) (requiring the lieutenant governor to prepare an “‘impartial
summary’’); Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9004, 9008, 9014 (West 2013
Supp.) (requiring the attorney general to prepare a ‘‘circulat-
ing title’? and ‘‘summary’’); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-40-105,
1-40-106 (2012) (requiring the secretary of state to convene
a ‘‘title board,’ which prepares a ‘“‘title’’ and ‘‘submission
clause’’); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 250.065, 250.067 (2011) (requiring the
attorney general to prepare a “‘ballot title’); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 29A.72.060-.090 (West 2005) (requiring the attorney
general to prepare a ‘‘ballot title’’ and ‘‘summary’’). But the Leg-
islature chose instead to allow an initiative’s proponent to write the
required description and to gather signatures before its adequacy
has been determined. This approach makes sense because, under
Nevada’s Constitution, if an initiative is not adopted by the Legis-
lature and thus moves on for presentation to the voters, the voters
have the Secretary of State’s official explanation and the required
arguments for and against its enactment to review in determining
whether to vote in favor of or against the initiative. Thus, once pro-
ponents have gathered the necessary signatures to file the initiative
with the Secretary of State for verification, the description of effect
plays no further role in the remaining initiative process, except per-
haps, to assist the committees mandated with preparing the pros
and cons for the ballot under the Secretary of State’s supervision.

200-word limit

The Legislature also chose to restrict the description of effect to
a mere 200 words. As EI PAC points out, attempting to comply
with the district court’s findings regarding what must be included
in the description of effect is difficult at best given the 200-word
limit. Because a proponent can only explain so much in 200 words,
EI PAC maintains that its description should be deemed adequate
because it made a legitimate effort to summarize what it believes
to be the Initiative’s main components. EI PAC’s argument to that
effect is persuasive.

Given the 200-word limit imposed on these descriptions, they
cannot constitutionally be required to explain every detail or effect
that an initiative may have. This is especially true where, as here,
the actual text of the Initiative is 25 pages in length. To reach a dif-
ferent conclusion would significantly hinder the people’s power to
legislate by initiative and effectively bar all but the simplest of bal-
lot measures. Indeed, such a restriction would far exceed the
Nevada Constitution’s grant of authority to the Legislature to “‘pro-

Ce

vide by law for procedures to facilitate’ the people’s exercise of
the initiative process. Nev. Const. art. 19, § 5 (emphasis added);
Nevadans for Prop. Rights v. Sec’y of State, 122 Nev. 894, 912,
141 P.3d 1235, 1247 (2006) (indicating that this court ‘‘must
make every effort to sustain and preserve the people’s . . . initia-
tive process’).

| |

The Committee’s own arguments regarding the multitude of is-
sues it believes must be spelled out in an initiative’s description of
effect illustrate this point. For example, the Committee argues
that the Initiative’s description of effect misstates how certain tax
revenues generated by the margin tax would be used by stating that
“‘[rJevenues from the tax would be deposited in the State Distrib-
utive School Account’’ without noting that a portion of these funds
will be used to fund the Department of Taxation’s costs of ad-
ministrating the tax. We disagree. The description of effect recites
that the modified business tax ‘“.. would temporarily be
increased . . . to provide money for the Department of Taxation to
begin to administer the margin tax.’’ This statement recognizes the
need for the Initiative to provide the Department of Taxation with
enough money to cover the administrative costs of the margin tax.
See Nev. Const. art. 19, § 6. With the description of effect limited
to a mere 200 words, expecting this description to state specifically
that a fraction of the revenue generated by the tax will be used for
administering the tax would be unreasonable. Moreover, as all
statutes enacted by initiative must be self-funding, the inclusion of
this information is wholly unnecessary and its omission does not
render the description misleading or incorrect.

|

The Committee’s additional arguments focus on omissions that
it believes should have been included in the description of effect,
specifically the amount of revenue to be generated by the margin
tax, the fact that even unprofitable businesses will be required to
pay the tax,’ the fact that businesses subject to the tax might incur
compliance costs, the absence of explanations of the meaning of
certain key terms, such as ‘‘total revenue’’ and ‘‘cost of goods it
has sold’’ as used in the Initiative, the fact that, if enacted, the law
will not be capable of amendment or repeal for at least three
years, and an explanation of why the modified business tax might
increase from 2.29 percent to 2.42 percent. While this is all in-

7We note that the description of effect plainly explains that businesses with
annual “‘revenue”’ of more than $1 million will be subject to the margin tax.
‘Thus, if only by implication, the description of effect already informs petition
signers that unprofitable businesses will be subject to the tax.

ee

formation that may ultimately be useful for voters, in light of the
200-word limit placed on descriptions of effect, such a level of de-
tail far exceeds what a proponent can constitutionally be required
to include in a description of effect. See Nev. Const. art. 19, § 5;
Nevadans for Prop. Rights, 122 Nev. at 912, 141 P.3d at 1247.
Most ballot initiatives will have a number of different effects if
enacted, many of which are hypothetical in nature. We have previ-
ously rejected the notion that a description of effect must explain
“‘hypothetical’’ effects. See Herbst Gaming, 122 Nev. at 889, 141
P.3d at 1232. Thus, if we were to give credence to the Commit-
tee’s application of the description of effect requirement, any op-
ponent of a ballot initiative could identify some perceived effect of
an initiative that is not explained by the description of effect, chal-
lenge the initiative in district court, and block the people’s right to
the initiative process. Statutes enacted to facilitate the initiative
process cannot be interpreted so strictly as to halt the process.

A district court must not apply statutory interpretation
principles when examining a description of effect

| |

In addition to its errant belief that a description of effect must
highlight every nuance and effect of an initiative, the Committee
also maintained that the Initiative’s description of effect was mis-
leading with regard to the Initiative’s overall impact on education
funding. The Committee’s argument in this regard was based on
the description of effect’s following sentence: ‘“Revenues from the
tax would be deposited in the State Distributive School Account in
the State General Fund, and used for the support of K-12 educa-
tion.”’ By using the word ‘‘support,’ the Committee contended that
this sentence suggests to petition signers that margin tax revenues
will increase existing education funding. Focusing on what it be-
lieved to be a likely outcome of the influx of new education funds
from the margin tax enacted by the Initiative, the Committee as-
serted that the description of effect is misleading because it does
not clarify that margin tax revenues may serve only to replace ex-
isting education funds if the Legislature chooses to spend the ex-
isting funds elsewhere.

In response, EI PAC ascribed a more colloquial meaning to the
word ‘‘support’’ and maintained that the sentence is accurate: the
revenues generated from the margin tax will indeed be deposited in
the Distributive School Account and will certainly be used to
“support,” or fund, K-12 education. Thus, according to EI PAC,
because the sentence does not mislead petition signers into believ-
ing that funding for education will necessarily increase, its other-
wise straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative description

Co —

of effect does not need to explain a hypothetical scenario in which
the Legislature chooses to reallocate existing funds.

The district court agreed with the Committee. Specifically, it
concluded that the margin tax’s effect ‘‘is to free up funds for the
Legislature to use as it wishes, for education or non-education
purposes.’’ Without explaining why the description of effect, as
written, is necessarily misleading in this regard, the district court
concluded that this effect is “‘something those being asked to sign
the petition should know’’ and that the description of effect’s fail-
ure to provide such an explanation renders it ‘‘deceptive and
misleading.”

The parties’ efforts to advance their respective meanings for the
word “‘support’’ and the district court’s conclusion that the de-
scription of effect’s use of that word is misleading are grounded in
the idea that a reviewing court should apply principles of statutory
construction in examining information articulated in a description
of effect. Given the limited function ascribed to an initiative’s de-
scription of effect and the fact that these descriptions are relevant
only at the early stages of the initiative process, we conclude that
it is inappropriate to parse the meanings of the words and phrases
used in a description of effect as closely as we would statutory
text. Such exacting scrutiny comes at too high a price in that it car-
ties the risk of depriving the people of Nevada of their constitu-
tional right to propose laws by initiative, something this court has
expressly stated that it will not do. Nevadans for Prop. Rights, 122
Nev. at 912, 141 P.3d at 1247.

We therefore conclude that, when reviewing a description of ef-
fect, the district court must take a holistic approach to determine
whether the description is a straightforward, succinct, and nonar-
gumentative summary of an initiative’s purpose and how that pur-
pose is achieved, Las Vegas Taxpayer Comm. v. City Council, 125
Nev. 165, 183, 208 P.3d 429, 441 (2009), and whether the infor-
mation contained in the description is correct and does not mis-
represent what the initiative will accomplish and how it intends to
achieve those goals. Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 833, 839 P.2d
120, 124 (1992).

Here, a review of the description of effect makes clear that the
Initiative is designed to provide funding for education, and the
Committee itself acknowledges that the margin tax revenues will be
used in some way to fund K-12 education. The Committee’s at-
tempt to give meaning to the word ‘‘support’’ is founded entirely
on a hypothetical scenario that the Committee believes may
occur—that education funding may not increase because the Leg-
islature may choose to use the margin tax revenues to simply re-
place the existing funds it otherwise would have had to place into

eee!

the Distributive School Account.? The Committee’s hypothetical,
however, to provide meaning for the word ‘‘support’’ does not pro-
vide a valid basis for concluding that the Initiative’s description of
effect is inadequate.

Given the early stages of the initiative process at which a de-
scription of effect is relevant and the fact that these descriptions
are, by necessity, merely short summaries detailing what an initia-
tive is designed to achieve and how it will do so, a district court
examining a description of effect must determine whether the de-
scription provides an expansive view of the initiative, rather than
undertaking a hyper-technical examination of whether the descrip-
tion covers each and every aspect of the initiative. To that end, a
statutory interpretation-style construction of the description, in
which the meaning and purpose of each word and phrase contained
in the description of effect are examined, is not appropriate.

As a whole, our review of the Initiative’s description of effect re-
veals that it provides a straightforward, succinct, and nonargu-
mentative summary of what the Initiative is designed to achieve—
taise funds to support Nevada’s K-12 public schools—and how it
intends to do so—enacting a margin tax. The information contained
in the description is neither deceptive nor misleading, as it is sub-
stantively correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will
accomplish or how it will achieve those goals. As a result, we con-
clude that the Committee’s arguments regarding the description of
effect’s insufficiency lack merit and, to the extent the district court

*At oral argument, the Committee made several unsupported assertions
that the Legislature would be legally compelled to reduce its funding of the
Distributive School Account in an amount equal to the margin tax revenues de-
posited therein. Our independent review of the ‘Nevada Plan,’ however, re-
veals that these assertions are questionable at best. To fulfill its constitutional
obligation to fund education, the Legislature created the Nevada Plan, a statu-
tory scheme setting forth the process by which it determines the biennial fund-
ing for education. The Nevada Plan assumes certain local money will be
“reasonably available’’ to fund education and envisions funding from three
funding sources: local taxes consisting primarily of property taxes, local funds
consisting of a portion of the same property taxes and separate sales taxes, and
state funds. NRS 387.121; NRS 387.1235(1); NRS 387.195. In addition to fi-
nancing the State’s own share, the Legislature is required to ‘“‘guarantee”” a

. shortfall in local funds when the local funds are less than projected. NRS
387.121. To be sure, the Nevada Plan does not envision an influx of new rev-
enue being deposited into the Distributive School Account, meaning that it is
not entirely clear what the Legislature or the Superintendent of Public In-
struction would be authorized to do with the margin tax revenues. By the same
token, however, the Nevada Plan’s failure to account for a new revenue source
means that nothing in the current Plan compels the Legislature to reduce its
“guarantee” in the manner suggested by the Committee.

50

relied on them to invalidate the Initiative, that conclusion was in
error and must be reversed. Nevadans for Nevada y. Beers, 122
Nev. 930, 942, 142 P.3d 339, 347 (2006).

The Initiative complies with NRS 295.009(1)(a)’s single-subject
requirement

P|

The final issue that we reach in this appeal concerns the single-
subject rule. NRS 295.009(1)(a) requires that a law being proposed.
by ballot initiative embrace only ‘‘one subject and matters neces-
sarily connected therewith and pertaining thereto.” The Legislature
has clarified that a ballot initiative satisfies the single-subject re-
quirement when the initiative’s proposed parts are ‘‘ ‘functionally
related’ and ‘germane’ to each other and the initiative’s purpose or
subject.” Las Vegas Taxpayer Comm., 125 Nev. at 180, 208 P.3d
at 439 (quoting NRS 295.009(2)). Thus, in order to determine
whether a ballot initiative’s parts are ‘‘functionally related” and
“‘germane’’ to each other and the initiative’s purpose, this court
must first determine the Initiative’s primary purpose. Id.

Initiative’s primary purpose
Le

EI PAC maintains that the purpose of its Initiative is to fund
public education. The Committee counters that this is not the Ini-
tiative’s true purpose, as once the margin tax revenues are de-
posited into the Distributive School Account, the Initiative does
nothing to ensure that they will be used to increase education
funding. The Committee posits that the effect of the Initiative may
be to provide the Legislature with a larger general fund if it
chooses to let the margin tax revenues cover its education funding
requirements and uses the funds it would have otherwise been re-
quired to provide for education for other purposes.

A review of the Initiative substantiates EI PAC’s stance, as the
Initiative expressly provides that the newly generated margin tax
revenues must be deposited into the Distributive School Account.
Since the Distributive School Account is the account that the Leg-
islature uses to allocate money to cover the State’s obligation for
funding K-12 education, the Initiative’s textual language demon-
strates that its purpose is to fund public education. Las Vegas Tax-
payer Comm., 125 Nev. at 180, 208 P.3d at 439 (determining a
ballot initiative’s purpose by considering the initiative’s ‘‘textual
Janguage and the proponents’ arguments’’). We have little trouble
in rejecting the Committee’s argument, as it confuses ‘‘purpose’’

°To the extent that the district court rejected certain arguments by the Com-
mittee pertaining to the description of effect, we affirm the district court’s
determination.

rc tct‘“‘(#$T'. UCC

with ‘‘effect”’ The Committee is once again seeking to invalidate
the Initiative by using a hypothetical, something we have previously
declared to be impermissible. Herbst Gaming, 122 Nev. at 889,
141 P.3d at 1232. The Initiative’s primary purpose is clearly to
fund education.

The Initiative’s parts are functionally related and germane to
each other and the Initiative’s purpose

| |

The Committee’s assertion that the Initiative violates the single-
subject rule because it seeks to implement a new margin tax and
temporarily increase the existing modified business tax is without
merit. As previously explained, El PAC’s Initiative is constitution-
ally required to be self-funding, see Nev. Const. art. 19, § 6,
meaning that it must provide the Department of Taxation with
enough money to cover its costs of administrating the margin tax.
Thus, EI PAC’s Initiative also seeks to provide the funding that the
Department of Taxation will need to administer and enforce the
margin tax. To do so, the Initiative provides for a necessary por-
tion of the margin tax revenues to be allocated each year to the De-
partment of Taxation. Once these revenues are allocated, all re-
maining revenues are to be deposited into the Distributive School
Account. Since the Department of Taxation will necessarily incur
administrative costs before margin tax revenues start accruing, the
Initiative seeks to temporarily increase a different tax, the modified
business tax (or ‘‘[pJayroll tax,’ see NRS 363A.130), imposed on
all Nevada financial institutions. Thus, although the Initiative does
seek to implement a new tax and temporarily increase an existing
tax, both taxes are functionally related and germane to the Initia-
tive’s clear purpose of funding public education. Accordingly,
EI PAC’s Initiative complies with NRS 295,009(1)(a)’s single-
subject requirement, and the district court properly rejected this
argument.

CONCLUSION

A description of effect need not articulate every detail and pos-
sible effect that an initiative may have. Instead, given that these de-
scriptions are utilized only in the early, signature-gathering phase
of the initiative process and that descriptions of effect are limited
to 200 words, they need only provide a straightforward, succinct,
and nonargumentative summary of what an initiative is designed to
achieve and how it intends to reach those goals. Because the de-
scription of effect at issue here complied with these requirements,
the district court erred in concluding that the Initiative’s description
of effect was ‘‘incomplete, deceptive, [and] misleading’’ and in-
validating the Initiative on that basis. As the Committee’s remain-
ing arguments against the Initiative lack merit, we reverse the dis-

Se

trict court’s grant of declaratory relief invalidating the Initiative
and its decision to enjoin the Secretary of State from presenting the
Initiative to the 2013 Legislature and from placing it on the 2014
| general election ballot.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Cuerry, and Sarr, JJ., concur.

SS *:
ADDENDUM

dle Statuto ure

THE EDUCATION INITIATIVE,
‘planation Langasosinblifce tae Ise adde ta Nevada Revd Nate, Langs betnen bashes ekteHanzece toe dee
‘THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1, This act provides for tne imposition of a margin tax on business entities engayed in
‘business in this State, and requires that the proceeds of the tax be used fo fund the operation of the public
sohools in this State for kindergarten through grave 12.

See. 2. ‘Title 32 of NRS is hereby amended by adding thereto a new chapter to consist of the
provisions set forth us sections 3 10 45, inclusive, of this act.

See.3. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the words and terms defined
in sections 4 to 17, inclusive, of this act have the meanings aseribed to them in those sections.

See, 4. “Apfliued group” means a group of two or more business entities, each of which is
couteolled by one or more common owners or by one or more of the members ofthe group.

See. 5, “Business” means any activity engaged in or caused to be engaged in with the object of
‘guinn, benefit or autvantage, either direct or indirect, to any person or governmental entity.

See. 6. 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, “business entity” means a corporation,
partnership, proprietorship, limited-liability company, business association, joint venture, initedliubility
‘partnership, business trust, professional association, Joint stock company, holding company and ani
tather person engaging ina business and includes combined group.

2. “Business ently” does uot include

(a) A natural person untess that person is engaging in a business and is required toile with the
Internal Revenue Service a Schedule C (Form 1040), Profit or Loss From Business, or its eyulvatent or
successor form, a Schedule E (Form 1040), Supplemental Incomeand Loss, or is equivalent orsuccussor
form, of a Schedule F (Form 1040), Profit or Loss From Farming, or its equivalent or successor forn,
Sor that business:

(0) A governmental enti

(0) Any person or other entity that this State protibited from taxing under the Constitution, laws
‘or treaties of the United States ar the Nevada Constitution; or

(@) Any credit union that is uutloriced 0 transuct business in this State pursuant to the provis
of chapter 678 of NRS.

Sex, 7, "Cowbined group” menns an affileed group of business ene thai regured oie
«group return pursuant to seetion 27 of this uct.

See. 8. “Commission” means the Nevada Tax Commission,

Sev.9, “Contratted by” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to director cause
al

the direction of the management and policies of a business entity, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract or otherwise.

See, 10. “Engaging in a business" means commencing, conducting or continuing a business, the
exercise of corporate or franchise powers regarding a business, und the liquidation of a business which

i or was engaging ina business when the liquidator holds self on the public as conducting that
usiness.

See. “Goverumental entity” meanse

4, The United States und any of its unincorporated agencies und instrumentalities,

2, Any incorporated agency or instrumentality of the United States wholly owned by the United
States or by a corporation wholly owned by the United States,

3, The State of Nevada and any of its unincorporated agencies and instramentalites,

4. Any county, clty district or other political subiivision of this State.

Sec, 12. “Lending institution” means an entity that makes loans and:

1. Is regulated bythe Federal Reserve Board, the Office ofthe Comproller ofthe Curteney, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Office of
Thrift Supervision or auy comparable regulatory bodys

2. Is licensed by, registered with or otherwise regulated by the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions; Nib

3. Isa “broker™ or “dealer” as defined iu 15 US.C. § 78e; or Ant

4, Provides financing to unrelated parties solely for agricultural production. G tls

Page 1 of 31

See. 13. “Passthrough revenue” means:

1. Reveune received by a business entity solely on belalf of another in a disclosed agency
capacity, including, without limitation, revenue received as a broker, bailee, cousignee or auctioneer,
notwithstanding thatthe business entity may incue lability, primarily or secondacily, in a transaction in
‘ts capacity as an agent;

2 Tuxes collected from a third party by a business entity and remutted by the business entity 10
a taxing authoritys and

“3. Reimbursement for advances made by a business entity on behalf ofa customer orelent,otler
‘than with respect to services rendered ar with respect ta purchases of goods by the business entity in
carrying out the business in which it engages,

Seo, 14, “Taxuble year” means the taxable year used by a business entity for the purposes of
Sfetteral income taxation,

See, 15. “Total income” means the total amount received by a business entity from all sources,
without subtracting any costs oF expenses.

See. 16, “Total revenue” means the total revenue ofa business entity as determined under section
2M of this act

17, “Unltary business” means a business characterized by wnity of ownership, fimtctional
integration, ceutratization of management and econony of seate.

See. 18. 1, For the purposes of this chapter, an entity constitutes a “passive entity” only if
(a The entiy isa genera partaeshi ted parneshiplinel-tbitipartmrshiporlinied-
UabitgsTimited partnership or a trust, other than a business trusty and
(0) During the period on which margia is based, at least 90 percent of the entity’s federal gross
income consists oft
(1) Dividends or interests ant
(2) Royalties, bonuses or delay rental income from mineral properties and income from
other nonoperating mineral interests.
2, he income deserted a paragraph) afsubsecon 1 dae wo ince an
(a) Rent; or
(8) Income received by a nonoperator from mineral properties under ajoint operating agreement
ifthe nowoperatar is a member of an affiliated group and another member ofthat group is the operator
under that joint operating agreement.

See. 19. The Department shall:

1, Administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter, and may udopt such regulations as it
deems appropriate for those purposes.

Pe itopr seh regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to interpret and carry out the
provisions of sections 24 and 27 of this act.

4. Retain from the proceeds of the taxes, interest and penalties it receives pursuant to this
chapter an amowit sufficient to reimburse the Depurtment for the actual cost of administering this
chapter, to the extent that the Department incurs any cast it would not have incurred but for the
eanctment of this chapter, and deposit the amount so retained with the State Treasurer for credit to the
State General Fund, The amount so retained must wot exceed the amount authorized by statute for this
purpose,

4. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, deposit all taxes, interest anu penalties it
receives pursuant fo this chapter in the State Distributive School Account in the State General Pur.
The money so deposited must be apportioned among the severat school districts and charter schools of
‘this State at the tines and in the niauner provided by law for the money in the State Distributive School
Account,

Sec. 20. J. Euch person responsible for maintaining the records of « business entity shall:

(a) Keep such records as may be necessary to determine the amount of the lability of the
business entity pursuant to the provisions of this chapters

(0) Preserve those recorils for 4 years or until any litigation ar prosecution pursuant to this
chapter is finally determined, whichever ts longer; and

(6) Make the records available for inspection by the Department upon demu at reasonable
times duriug regular business hours,

2. The Department may by regulation specify the types of records which must be kept to
determine de anoint ofthe lablty ofa busines ey pursuant the provisions ofthis chapter,

3. Any person who violutes the provisions of subsection 1 is guilty of a misdemeanor.

See.21. 1. To verifi the accuracy of any return filed or, if uo return is filed by a business entity,
to determine the amount required to be puld, the Department, or any person authorized in writing by
the Department, may examine the books, papers and records of any person who may be liable for the
tax Imposed by this chapter,

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futewide Statutory Measure Sta

2, Any person who may be lable for the tax impased by this chapter and who keeps outside of
this State any books, papers ard records relating thereto shall pay to the Departinent an amount equal
tothe allowance provided for state ofcers aud cployes generally while raveling outside of the tae

for euch day or fraction thereof during which an employee of the Department is engaged in examining
‘those documents, plus any other actual expenses incurred by the employee while he or she is absent

from his or her regalar place of employment to examine those documents.

See.22. 1, Except as atherwise provided in this section, a margin tax is hereby imposed on each
business entity that engages in a business in this State during any taxable year beginning on or after
‘the effective date of this section, atthe rate of 2 perceut of the taxable margin ofthe business entity for
the taxable year,

2. The margin tax extends to the limits of the Nevada Constitution, the Constitution of the
United States and the federal law adopted under the United States Constiuution,

oye? 1 Business entity exempt from the margin tax imposed for enc taxable year regarding

whieh:

(a) The amount of the total revenue of the business entity from its entire business is less shan or
equal 10 $1,000,000, as derernatned under section 24 of ths act;

(6) The business entity qualifies as a passive entity, as determined pursuant to seetion 18 of this
act; oF

(o) The business entity qualifies us « tax-exempt organization pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § S01(c).

4. A business entity that pays uny tas imposed on the business enti pursuant fo NRS 3634.30
07 3638, 110 for any of the ast four calendar quarters ending on or before the last day ofa taxable year
for which the margin tax is iniposed pursuant to this section i entifed fo a credit against the amount
of the margin tax due from that business entity for that taxable year in the amount of the taxes paid by
the business entity pursuant to NRS 3634.130 and 363B,110 for those calendar quarters, but nat more
than the amount of the margin tax due from the business enilty for that taxable year.

See. 23. 1. Subject to the provisions of seetion 27 af this uct, the taxable margin of a business
entity must be computed by:

(@) Determining the business entiy’s margin, which is the lesser of 70 percent of the total
revenue of the business entity from ts eutire business, us determined ter section 24 af this act, or an
‘amotuut computed by:

(1) Determining the total revenue of the business entity frome its entire business under
section 24 of this act; and
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, subtracting from the amount determlaed!
under subparagraph (1), atthe election of the business entity, either:
(D) The cast of goods sol, as determined under section 25 of this act or
(1) The amount of compensation, as determined under section 26 of this act; and

( Apportioning the business entity’s margin to this State us provided in section 28 of this act
to determine the business endity’s taxable margin.

2. An election under subparagraph (2) of paragraph (a) of subsection I must he mude by a
business entity on its annual return and is effective oaly for that annual return, A business endity shall
notify the Department of is election uot later than the date the anual return ts due,

3. making any: computation under this section, an amount that is zero or less must be
computed as zero.

Sec.24, 1. Except as otherwise provided in this
27 of this act, for the purpose of computing
revenue of a business entity isz

(a) For a business entity treated for the purposes of federal income taxation as a corporation,
‘un amount computed by:

rection and subject to the provisions of section
taxable margin under seetion 23 of this act, the total

Aang:
() The amount reportable as income on line fe of tuternal Revenue Service Form
1120; aud
(11) The amounts reportable as iacome on lines 4 o 10, inclusive, of Internal Revenue
Service Form 1120; and

(2) Subtracting:

() The amount of any bud debts expensed for the purposes of federal income taxation
that corresponds to items of income included in subparagraph (1) for the current reporting periadl ar
4 past reporting period;
ivitenasy (0) TM este included in subparagraph (1), any foreign rayates and foreign
lividemis;

(1D To the extent included in subparagraph (1), any net distributive income from a
business entity treated as a partnership or as an S corporation for the purpases of federal icone
taxation;

(IY) Auy allowable deductions from Internal Revenue Se
Go the extent that the relating dividend inconie is included in total revenues

(V) To the extent included in subparagraph (1), any items of income attributable to an
‘entity that isa disregarded entiy for the purposes of federal income taxation; atu

Form 1120, Schedule

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Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory.

He.

(VY) Ta the extent included in subparagraph (1), any other amounts authorized by this
section;
(0) For a business entity treated for the purposes of federal income taxation as a partnership,
‘an amount computed by:
() Adding

() The amount reportable as income on line Le of Internal Revenue Service Form
1065;

(1)) The amounts reportable as income on lines 4, 6 and 7 of tuterual Revenue Service
Form 1065;

(111) The amounts reportable as income on tines 3a and $ 10 11, inclusive, of fnternal
Revenue Service Form 1068, Schedule K;
sarsyang (2 Th on reportable as Income on tne 17 of Tueruat Revenue Service Form

a

(¥) The amount reportable as income on tine 11, plus the amount reportable on line

2or line 45, of lnrerwal Revenue Service Form 1040, Schedule F3 and
(2) Subtracting:

(2 The amount of any bad debts expensed for the purposes of federal income taxation
‘that corresponds fo items of income included in subparagraph (1) for the current reporting periad or
a past reporting periods

(11) To the extent included in subparagraph (1), any foreign royalties and foreign
dividends;

(HL) To the extent included in subparagraph (1), any net distributive ineome from a
business entity treated as a purtuership or as an S corporation for the purposes of federal Income
taxation;

(1) To the extent incluted in subparagraph (1), any items of income attributable to.an
en tat separa enti forte punposes of federal income rxuon: and
() To the extent included in subparagraph (1), any other amaurts authorized by this

section; oF

(0) For any business entity other than a business entity treated for the purposes of federal income
taxation as a corporation or partnership, an amount determined in a manner substantially equivalent
{0 the amount determined ander paragraph (a) or (b), as prescribed in regulations adopted by the
Department

2. Subject to the provisions of section 27 of this act, a business entity that is part of u federal
consolidated group shall compute its total revenue under subsection 1 as if it had fled a separate return
‘Sor the purposes of federal ineome taxation,

3. A business entity that owns an interest in a passive entity may exclude from the tofal revenue
of the business entity the business entity's share of the net income of the passive entity, but only to the
extent the net income of the passive entity was generated by the margin of any other business entity.

4, Except as otherwise provided in subsection 5, to the extent included under subparagraph (1)
of pecan (a) of subsection 1, subparagraph (1) of paragraph (6) of subsection 1 or paragraph (c)
of subsection 1:

(a) A business entity may exetude from its total revenue:

2) The amount of any pass-through revenue of the business entity; and
(2) The amount of tax busis, as determined under the Internal Revenue Code and any
regulations adopted pursuant thereto, of any securities and loaus sold; and

(8) A business entity that isa lending institution may exclude from ts otal revenue the amount
of any proceeds from the principal repayment of loans.

5. Ia biusiness entity is part of an affiliated group, the business entity may not exclude from its
{otal revenue any of the amounts described in subsection 4 which are paid to entities that are ntembers
of the affliated group,

6 To the extent included under subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) of subsection 1,
subparagraph (1) of paragraph (6) of subsection 1 or paragraph (¢) of subsection I:

(a) A business entity nay exclude from its total revenue the amount of any revenue attributable
10 dividends aud interest upon any bonds or securities of the Federal Government, the State of Nevada
ora politcal subdivision of ths State,

(8) A business entity that is required to pay license fee pursuant to NRS 463.370 may excluile
from its total revenue the amount of ts gross revenue used io determine the amount of that fee,

7. Any amount excluled under this section from the total revenue of a business entity must not
be included in the determination of the cost of goods sold under section 25 of this act or the
determination of the amount of compensation iuuder section 26 of this uct.

8, For the purposes of this section, any reference to:

(¢) An Internal Revenue Service form includes any variant of the form and any subsequent form
Pa different number or designation that substantially provides the sume information as the original
fora.

(0) Au amount reportable as income on a tine number of an Internal Revenue Service form
‘means the amount eutered to the extent the amount entered complies with federal income tax lax and
{includes the corresponding umount entered on a variant of the form or subsequent form with a different
Tine number (othe extent the amount entered complies with federal incowe tax las

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Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure State of Nevada

See. 25. J, Subject to the provisions of section 27 of this act, a business entity that elects to
subtract the cost of gaods sold for the purpose of computing its eexable margin wider section 23 of this
‘act must deferimine the amount of that cost as provided in this section,

2. Except as otherwise provided in this seetion, the cost of goods sold iuclales:

(a) All direct costs of acquiring or producing the goods, including:

(1) Labor costs
2) The cost of materials that are an integral part of the specific property produced;
G) The cost of materials that are consumed in the ordinary course of performing production

activities;

(4) Hanulling costs, inetuding costs attributable to processing, assembling, repackaging and
transportation to the business emttys

(3) Storage costs, including the costs of carrying, storing or warehousing property;

(6) Depreciation, depletion and amortization, as reported on the federal income tax return
‘on which the return under this chapter is bused, to the extent associated with and necessury for the
Production of the goods;

(7) The cost of renting or leasing equipment, facilities or real property which is directly used
for the production of the goods;

(8) The cost of repairing and maintaining equipment, facilities or real property which is
directly used for the production of the goodss

@) The costs attributable to any research, experimental, engineering or design activities
directly related to the production of the goods;

(10) Taxes puid in relation to acquiring or producing any material, and taxes paid in
relation to services that are a direct cost of production; wid

(11) The cost of producing or acquiring any electricity sotd; and

(6) The following costs in relation to the basiness entity’ goods:

(1) Deterioration of the goods;

2) Obsolescence of the goods;

G)Spoitage und abandonment of the goods, including the costs of rework labor, reclamation

sand serap;

(4) If the property is hetd for future production, the dieect casts of preproduction allocable
40 the property;

(S) The direct costs of posiproduction allocabl

(6) The costs of insurance on any plant, facili
used in the production of the goods;

(7) The cost of insurance on the produced goodss

(8) The cost of utilities, including any electricity, gas and water, directly used in the
production of the goods;

() The costs of quality control, including any replacement of defective components pursuant
ta standard warranty policies, inspection directly allocable fo the production of the goods, and repairs
‘and maintenance of the goods; and

(10) Licensing and franchise costs inetuding any fees incurred in securing the contractual
right to use a trademarh, corporate plan, manufacturing procedure, special recipe or ofher similar right
directly associuted with the goods produced.

3. The cost of yoots sold does not include she following costs in relation fo the business entity's

& fo the property;
machinery, equipment or materials directly

gools:

(a) The cost of renting or leasing any equipment, facilites or real property that is not used for
the production of the goods

(0) Selling costs, including employee expenses relating to sales;

(0) Distribution costs;

(@) Advertising und marketing costs;

(e) Expenses for idle facilities;

@ Rehandting costs;

(8) Bidding costs incurred in the solicitation of contracts, whether or not the contracts are
ltimately awarded t0 the business entity;

(hy Interest, including interest on debt incurred or continued during the period of production of
‘the goods to finance such production;

) Any tues assessed on the business entity based on incomes

@ Strike or lockout expenses, except the wages of employees hired to replace striking personnel;

(4) Compensation of directors, officers and consultants;
Dividends toshurelolders or distributions to members or partners which are business enti

(nd Professional fees and costs of litigation;

{n) Fines, damages or restitution paid pursuant to judgments, consent decrees or settlements of
legal actions including arbitration; and

(0) Any of the amounts described in subsection 2 which are paid to entities that ure members of
an affiliated group of which the business entity is « part,

4, For the purposes of this section and section 23 of this aet, and subject to the provisions of
ion 27 of this act, a business enti

(a) May make a subtraction in relation to the cost of goods sold onty if that entity owns those

goods.

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Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure. State of Nevada

(&) Must determine its cost of goods sotd in accordance with the methods used on the federat
income tax return on sohich is bused the return under this chapter. This paragraph does not affect the
ype or category of cast of goods sold that may be subtracted in accordance with this section to compute
‘the taxable margin of a business entity.

5. As used i this section:

(@ “Goods” means real property or tangible personal property
business of a business entity,

(8) “Production” includes construction, installation, manufacture, development, extraction,
improvement, creation, raising or growth,

sold in the ordinary course of

Sec. 26, 1. Except as otherwise provided in this seetton and subject to the provisions of section
27 of this act, a business entity that elects to subtract the amount of compensution for the purpose of
computing its taxable margin tnuler section 23 of this at may subteact an amount equal tor

(aj All wages, salaries and bonuses paid by the business entity to its officers, directors, owners,
partners and eimployees who are natural persons; and

(b) The cos/ of all benefits, to the extent deductible for the purposes of federal income taxation,
the business eatity provides to ts officers, directors, owners, parters wid employees, including
retireinent, health care, employer contributions made to employees? health savings accounts and
workers? compensation benefits.

2, Notwithstanding the actual amount of wages, salaries and bonuses paid by a business entity
10 its officers, directors, dwners, partners and employees, a business entity may not include in the
amount of wages, salurtes and bonuses the business entity subtracts pursuant to paragraph (a) of
subsection 1, in relation to each individual person, more than $300,000 per taxable year on which
‘margin is based. If a peeson is paid by mare than one entity of a combined group, the combined group
‘nay riot subtract pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1, in relation to that person, @ total of more
than $300,000 per taxable yeur on whieh margin is base

3. «As used in this Section:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (6), “wages, salaries aud honuses means the
canount entered in the Medicare wages and tips bax of Internal Revenue Service Form W-2 or any
sidseqnent form wit different number or designation that substantially provides the same
information.

(b) “Wages, sataries and bonuses” includes, to the extent not included in the amount devertbed
in paragraph (a), the amount of anys

() Net distributive income from a business entity treated as a partnership forthe purposes
of federal income taxation, but only ifthe person receiving the distribution is a natural persons

(2) Net distributive income from timived-tabiity companies and corporations treated as S
comporations for the purpases of federal income taxation, but ouly if the person receiving the
distribution #3 a natural persons anit

(3) Net distributive inconne frome a limited-tiability company treated as « sole proprietorship
for the purposes of federal income taxation, but only ifthe person receiving the distribution is a natural
‘person.

See.27, 1. Business entities that are part of an affiliated group engaged in a unitary business
must file, in lit of individual returns, a combined group return based on the combined group's
busivess. The combined groups

(a) Must not include a business entity that conducts business outside of the United States if, as
determined in accordance with regulations adapted by the Department:

() Eighty percent or more of that business entity’s property and payroll are allocable to
locations outside of the United States; oF
(2) That business entity has no property or payroll and 80 percent or more of the business
entity's total income is allocable to focations outside of the United States.
aed) ensues w single business entity for purposes of the application of the tax impose by this
chapter,
dpe, Forthe purposes of section 23 of this at, «combined group shall determine is toa revenue
bys

(a) Determining the total revenue of each of its members as provided in section 24 of this act as
if the member was an individual business entity;

(1) Adding the toral revenue of all ts members determined under paragraph (a); and

(©) Subtracting from the amount determined uniter paragraph (8), fo the extent included under
subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) of subsection I of section 24 of this act, subparagraph (1) of
parugraph (b) of subsection 1 of section 24 of this act or purageaph (c) of subsection 1 of Section 24 of
‘this act, any items of total revenue received from u member of the combined group.

43. For the purposes of section 23 of tis act, a combined group shall make an election to subtract
either the cost of goods sold or the amount of compensation that applies to all of its members.
Regardless of the election, the taxable margin of the combined group may uot exceed 70 percent of the
combined group's total revenue from is entire business.

4. A member ofa combined group may claion as the cost af goods sold those costs that qualify
under section 25 of this actif the goods for which the costs are incurred are owned by another member
af the combined group.

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tion - Statewide Statutory. fevada

5. Far the purposes of section 23 of this act, a combined group that elects to subtract:
(@) The cost of goods sold must determine that amount by:
(1) Determining the cost of goods sald for each of its members as provided in section 25 of
this act as if the member was an individual business eutitys
yA) Adding al he emonnis ofthe cots of yoo sold determined ander subparagraph (Ue
and
G) Subtracting from the amount determined under subparagraph (2) any amount of the
coxts of gous sold paid from one member of the combined group to another member of the combined
group, but ouly to the extent that the corresponding item of total revenue was subtracted under
paragraph (c) of subsection 2,
(6) The amount of compensation must determine that amount by:
() Determining the amount of compensation for each of its members as provided in section
26 of this act as if the member was an individual business entity, subject to the limitation set forth in
subsection 2 of section 26 of this act;
2) Adding all the amounts of compensations determined under subparagraph (1): and
G) Subtracting from the amount determined under subparagraph (2) any amount of
compensation paid from one member of the combined group to another member of the combined grou
bu ay tothe exten that the corresponding em of total revenue was subtracted under paragraph a
of subsection
6. Each business entity that és part of a combined group's return must, for the purposes of
determining margin and apportionment, include its activities for the sume period as that used by the
combined group.
7, Each member of a combined group is jointly aud severally Hable forthe tax of the combined
group.

See. 28. 1 A business entity’s margin must be apportioned to this State to determine the
ammount of tax imposed by section 22 of this act by multiplying the margin by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the business entity’s total income from business done in this State, as determined under
section 29 of this act, and the denominator uf which is the business eutiy's total income from tts eutire
business, as determined under section 30 of this act

2 For the purpose of apportioning margin:

(a) Income excluded from total revenue by a business entity under section 24 of this act must not
be included in either the total income of the business entity from its business done in this State as
determined under section 29 ofthis act or the total income of the business entity fram its entire business
as determined under section 30 of this act.

(t) Income derived from transactions between individual members of a comblned group that ure
excluded tnuder paragraph (9 of subsection 2 of ection 27 ofthis act must na be include ne

(1) The tota income of the business entity from its business done in this State as deteenined
under section 29 of this act, except that income ultimately derived from the sale of tangible personal
property between individual members of a combined group where oie mentber party to the transaction
does not lave nexns in this State must be included in the total income of the business entity from its
business done in this State as determined unier section 29 of this act to the extent that the member of
the combined group that does not have nexus in this State resells the tangible personal property without
substantial modification to a purchaser in this State. For the purpases of this subsection, “income
ultimately derived from the sale of tangible personal property” means the amount paid for the tangible
personal property by the third-party purchaser,

(2) The total income of the business entity from its entire business us determined under
section 30 of this act.

(6) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (a) or (b) to the contrary, if« loan or security
4s reated as inventory of the seller for the purposes of federal income taxation, the grass proceeds of
the sate of that loan or security are considered total income.

See, 29, 1. Subject the provisions of section 28 ofthis act in apportioning margin, the total
income of a business entity from its business done in this State is the sum of the business entity’s total
income from:

w) Each sale of tangible personul property which is delivered or shipped toa buyer in this State,
regardless of the specified terms and conditions of the sale;

(6) Each service performed in this States

(©) Each rentul of property situated in this State;

(@) The use of « patent, copyright, tralemark, feanchise or license in this States

(@) Each sale of real property located in this State, incluing royalties from ait, gas ar other
mineral interests; and

QD Any other business done in this State,

2, For the purposes of paragraph (6) of subsection 1, the total income derived from serviclug
toans secured by real property shall be deemed to be performed in this State if the Feat property is
tocated in this State,

3, A combined group shall include in its total income computed under subsection I the total
income of each business entity that is a member of the combined graup which has a nexus in this State
for the purpose of taxation,

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Initiative wide Statutory Mec Nevada

See.30, 1. Subject fo the provisions of section 28 of this act, in apportioning margin, the total
income of a business entity from its entire business isthe sum of the Business entity's total income from:

(a) Each sate of thé busiuess entity's tangible personal property

(0) Bach serviee, rental ar coyaltys aad

(6) Any other business.

2 Ifa business entiy sells an investment or capital asset, the business entity's total income from
its entire business for taxable margin includes only the net gain from the sale,

3. A combined group shall include iu its total income computed under subsection 1 the total
income of each business entity that isa member of the combined group, without regard fo whether that
entity has a nexus with this State for the purpose of taxation,

See, 31. J. A business entity shall use the same accounting methods to apportion margin as
used in computing margin.

2. A business entity may not change its accounting methods used to calculate ts total income
more often than once every 4 years without the express written consent of the Department. A change
in accounting methods is not justified solely because the change results in a reduction of tax liabii,

Ses, 32. The tax imposed by this chapter for each taxable gear is due on the lst day of the
caterdtar month following that taxable year.

2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, euch business entity engaging in a business in
fui tte during taxable year thats exempt from he ta inpose bys chip for that ase
‘year shall file with the Department a return on a form prescribed by the Department, together with the
‘remittance of any tax due pursuant to this chapter for that taxable year, not later than 30 days after the
date the business entity is required to file its federal income tax return for that taxable year with the
Internal Revenue Service, The return required by this subsection must be executed under penalty of
perjury and include the: taxi ayer identification number or social security number of the business entity,
‘as applicable, and such other information as is required by the Departnent

See. 33. Upon written application made before the date on which « business entity is
required to file a retara and pay the tas imposed by this chapter, he Department may:

1, I the business entity is granted an extension of ime by the Federal Government forthe fling
of ts federal income tax return, extend the time for fling the return required by this chapter uutil not
Tater than 30 days after the date the business entity is required to fite its federal income tax return
pursuant (0 the extension of thne granted by the Federal Government. The Department may require,
‘as a condition to the granting of any extension pursuant to this subsection, the payment of te tax
estimated to be due pursuant to this chapter.

2, For gaod cause extend by 30 days the time within which the business entity is required to pay
the tas. Ifthe tax is paid during a periad of extension granted pursuant to this subsection, no penalty
‘or late charge may be imposed for failure fo pay at the fhave required, but the business entity shall pay
interest at the rate of I percent per month from the date on which the amount would have been due
without the extension until the date of payment, unless otherwise provided in NRS 360.232 or 360.320.

s otherwise

See.34. 1. Ifthe taxable margin of « business entity changes as a result oft

(e) The filing by the business ently of an amended federal income tax return ar other returtt
the business entity shall, within 30 days after that filing, fie aa amended return with the Department.

(0) An audit or other adjusiment by te Internal Revenue Service or another competent
authority, the business entity shal, within 30 days after the audit report or other adjustment Becomes
Final, fle an amended return with the Department,

2. Uf, based upon an amended return filed pursuant to this section, it appears that the tux
imposed by this chapter has not been fully assessed, the Department shall assess the deficiency, with
interest cateutated atthe rate und in the manner set forth in NRS 360.417. Any assessment required by
this subsection must be made within 3 years after the Department receives the anwended return,

‘See. 38. Af the Department determines that any tax, penalty or interest has been paid more than
once or has been erroneously collected or computed, the Department shell set forth that fuct in the
records of the Department and certify to the State Board of Examiners the amott collected in
of the amount legally due and the person from whom it was collected or by whom it was paid. If
approved by the State Bourd of Examiners, the excess amount collected or paid must, after being
credited against any amount then due from the person in accordance with NRS 360.236, be refunded
{othe person or his or her successors in interest.

See.36. J. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 360.235 and 360.395:

(i) No refund may be allowed wntess a claim for itis fled with the Department within 3 years
after the last lay of the month following the taxable year for which the overpayment was nade,

(b) No credit may be allowed after the expiration of the period specified for filing claims for
refund unless a claim for credit is fled with the Department within that period.
ound 2, Bach lain mus be tn writing and mus state he specie grown upon which the elim i

founded,
5. Failure to file a claim within the time prescribed in this chapter constitutes a waiver of any

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Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure State of Nevada

demau against the State on account of overpayment,
4. Bain 30 dys afer rejecting amyctaim in whole or inpart, the Department shasere noice
its action on the claimant in the manner prescribed for service of notice of a deficiency
letermination,

See.37. f. No injunction, writ of mandate or other legal or equitable process may issue in any:
suit, action or proceeding in any court against this State or against any officer of this State to prevent
or enjoin the collection tunder this chapler of the tax imposed by this chapter or any mount of tus,
penalty or interest required to be collected,

2, Nosuit or proceeding may be maiutained in any court for the recovery of any amount alleged
10 have been erroneously determined or collected untess a claini for refund or credit has been fled.

Sce.38. 1. Within 90 days after a final decision upon a claim filed pursuant to this chapter is
rendered by the Commission, the claimant may bring an action againsi the Department on the grounds
set forth in the claim in a court of competent jurisdiction in Carson City, the county ofthis State wher
the claimant resides or maintains his or her peineipal place of business or a county in which any.
relevant proceedings were conducted by the Department, for the recovery of the whole o any part af
‘the amount with respect fo which the clahn has been disallowed,

2 Failure to bring an action withix the time specified constitutes « waiver of any demand
‘against the State on account of alleged overpayments,

See.39, 1. Ifthe Department fats to mail notice of action on a claim within 6 months after the
claim is filed, the claimant nay consider the clan disallowed and ite an appeal with the Commission
within 30 days after the last day of the 6-mouth period. If the claimant is uggrieved by the decision of
the Commission rendered on appeal, the claimant may, within 90 days after the decision is rendered,
bring an action against the Department on the grounds set forth in the claim for the recovery of the
whole or any part ofthe amount claimed as an overpayment.

2 I judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, the umount of the judgment must frst be credited
towards any tax due from the plaintiff.

3. The balaice ofthe judgment must be refunded tothe plaintiff.

See. 40. Ifthe court finds that the Department acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the
plaintiffs claim, interest ou the amount refunded to the plaintiff may be allowed at the Federal Funds
Target Rate, but uo greater than 6 percent per annum, upon the amount refunded tothe plaintiff fram
the date of payment of the amount to a date preceding the date of the refund warrant by not more than
30 days. The date must be determined by the Department

See. 41. A juulgment may not be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in any action brought against
the Department o recover any amount paid when the action is brought by or iu the name of an assignee
of the person paying the umount or by any person other than the person who paid the amount.

See. 42, The Department may recover a refund or any part thereof which is erroneously
made and any eredit or part thereof which is erroneously allowed in an action brought in a court of
competent jurisdiction itt Carson City or Clark County in the name of the State of Nevada

2. The action must be tried in Carsou City or Clark County unless the court, with the consent
of the Attorney Generul, orders a change of place of trial

The Attorney General shall prosecute the action, and the provisions of NRS, the Nevada Rules

of Civil Procedure and the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relating to service of summons,
pleadtings, proofs, trials and uppeats are applicable to the praceediugs.

See. 43. J. If any amount in excess of $25 tas been iMegally determined, either by the
Department or by the person filing the return, the Department shall certify ths fact 0 the State Bourd
4 ‘Examiners, and the laiter shall authorize the cancellation of the amount upon the records of the
partment,
2. Ian amount not exceeding $25 has been illegally determined, either by the Department or
by the person filing the return, the Department, without certifying this fact to the State Board of
aminers, shall authorize the cancellation of the amount upon the records of the Department,

See.44, J. A person shall not:

(w) Make, cause 10 be made or permit to be made any fulse or fraudulent return or declaration
or false statement in any return or dectaration with intent to defraud the State or to evate payment of
the tax or any’ pe ‘of the tax imposed by this chapter.

(6) Make, cause to be made or permit to be made any false entry in books, records or accounts
wih intent fo defraa the State or tere the payment of the ax oranypart ofthe ax iposed by ths
chapter,

(6c) Keep, cause to be kept or permit to be kept more than one set of books, records or accounts
vt intent to defraud the State or to evade the payment of the tux or auy purt of the tax imposed by this

apter,

2. Any person who violates the provisions of subsection 1 is guilty of a gross misdemeanor,

Page 9 of 31

fic tion - Statewir ute "ASE. tate af Nevada

See. 45. The remedies of the State provided for in tis chapter are cumulative, and no action
taken by the Department or the Attorney General constitutes an election by the State to pursue any
remedy to the exclusion of any other remedy for which provision is made in this chapter.

See. 4G, NRS 360.2937 is hereby amended to read as follows:

360.2937. 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, NRS 360.320 or any other specific
statute, and notwithstanding the provisions of NRS 360.2935, interest must be pd upon an overgaynent
of any tay provided for in chapter 362. 363A, 363B, 369. 370, 372, 374, 377 or 377A of NRS | or
sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act, any fee provided for in NRS 444.090 or 482.313. or any
assessment provided for in NRS 585.497, ut the rate of 0.25 pereent per month from the last day of the
calenilar month following the period for which the overpayment was made,

2, Norefiund or credit may be made of any interest imposed on the person making the overpayment
‘wt espeet othe aman Being eluded or erie,

. The interest must be paid:

(a) In the ease ofa refund, to the last day of the calendar month following the date upon which
person making the overpayment, ifthe person has not already filed a claim, is notified by the Department
that a claim may be filed or the date upon which the claim is certified to the State Board of Examiners,
whichever is earlier.
the case of a credit, to the same date as that to which interest is computed on the tax or the
st Which the eredit is applied.

See. 47. NRS 360.300 is hereby amended to read as follows:

360.300 1, Ifa person fails to file a return oF the Department is not satisfied with the return or
returns of any tax, contribution or premium oF amount of tax, contribution or premium required to be paid
to the State by any person, in accordance with the applicable provisions ofthis chapler, chapter 360], 362,
363A, 363B, 369,370, 372, 372A, 374, 377,377A or 444A of NRS, sectlons 3 (0 45, inclusive, af this ach,
‘NRS 482,315, oF chapter 885 oF G80 ofNRS as administered or audited by the Department, i may
compute and determine the amount required to be paid upon the basis oft

(a) The fats contained inthe return;

(b) Any information within its possession or that may come into its possession: or
(c) Reasonable estimates of the amount.

2. One or more deficieney determinations may’ be made with respect fo the amount due for one or
{for more than one period.

3. In making its determination of the amount required to be pai, the Department shall impose
interest on the amount of tax determined to be due, ealeulated a the ate and in the manner set Forth in
NRS 360.417, unless a different rate of interest is specifically provided by sialute.

4. ‘The Department shall impose a penalty of 10 percent in addition to the amount of a
termination that is made in the ease ofthe failure ofa person to file a return with the Departenent.

5. When a business is discontinued, a determinati er withi
time preseribed in NRS 360.355 as to fiabil
determination is issued before the due da

See, 48, NRS 360.417 is hereby amended (0 read as follows:

360.417 Except as otherwise provided in NRS 360.232 and 360,320, und unless afferent penalty
or rate of interest is specifically provided by statute, any person who fils to pay any tax provided for in
chapter 362, 363A, 3631, 36% 570, 372, 378. 377, 317A, HAA or 583 Of NRS, or seeions 3 45,
inclusive, of this at, or any fee provided for in NRS 482.313. and any person or governmental entity that
fails to pay amy fee provided for in NRS 360.787, o the State or a county within the time required, shall
pay penalty of not more than 10 pereent ofthe amount ofthe tax oF fee which is owed, as determined by
‘the Department, in addition tothe tax or fee, pls interest atthe rate of 0.75 percent per month, oF fraction
‘of a month, from the ast day of the month following the period for which the amount or any portion of
the amount shold have been eprted unl he dof payment, Tamu of any penalty posed must
bbe based on a graduated schedule adopted by the Nevada Tax Commission which takes into consideration
‘the length of ime the tnx oF fee remained unpaid,

See. 49, NRS 360.510 is hereby amend to read as follows:

360.510 1. If any person is delinquent in the payment of any tan or fee administered by the
Department or if determination has been made against the person which remains unpaid, the Department
may:

(a) Not later than 3 years after the payment became delinquent or the determination became final:

or

(8) Not later than 6 years alter the last recording of an abstract of judgment or of a certificate
ituling alien for tax owed,

a notice of the delinquency and a demand to transmit personally or by registered or certified mail
to any person, including, without limitation, any officer or department of this State or any pol
subdivision or agency ofthis Stat, who has in his or her possession or under his or her control any credits
or other personal property belonging to the delinquent, or owing any debts to the delinquent of person
against whom a determination has been made which remains unpaid, or owing any debts tothe delinquent
oF that person, In the case of any state officer, department or ageney, the notice must be given to the

Page 10 of 31

PLLC

nitiative Petition tatutory Meus State of

‘oflicer, department or ageney before the Department presents the claim of the delinquent taxpayer to the
State Controller,

2 A stator deprient or ageny which essves such a note my say my debt owed
to it by that person belare it honors the notice of the Department,

3. lier receiving the demand to transmit, the person notified by the demand may not transler or
‘otherwise dispose ofthe eredits, other personal property, or debts in his or her possession or under his or
hr enol at thet te person ressived th nie il the Dspriment contents fa ante orth

isposition,

4. Every person notified by a demand to transmit shall, within 10 days after receipt of the demant
to transmit, inform the Department of and transmit to the Depariment all such ered, other personal
properly or debts in his o her possession, under his or her eontrol or owing by that person within the time
‘and in the manner requested by the Department. Except as otherivise provided in subsection 5, no farther
notice is required to be served to that person,

5. Ifthe property of the delinquent taxpayer consists of a series of payments owed to him or her,
the person who wes oF controls the payments shall transmit the payments to the Department anti
cathettvise notified by the Deparument, Ifthe debt of the delinquent taxpayer isnot paid within } year after
the Department issued the original demand transmit, the Department shall issue another demand 1
‘ransmit to the person responsible for making the payments informing him or her to continue to transmit
payments to the Department or that his or her duty to transmit the payments tothe Department has ecased,

6. IPthe notice of the delinquency seeks to prevent the transfer or other disposition of a deposit
in bank or eredit union or other eredits or personal property in the possession or under the control of «
bank, eredit union or other depository institution, the notice must be delivered or mailed to any branch or
office of the bank, eredit union or other depository institution at which the deposit is carried or at which
the eredits or porsonal property is held.

7, [any person notified by the notice of the delinquency makes any transfer or other disposition
‘of the property oF debts required to be withheld or transmitted, fo the extent of the value ofthe property
‘or the amount of the debts thus transferred or paid. tht person is liable to the State for any indebtedness
‘due pursuant fo this chapter, or chapter 3608, 362, 363A. 3638, 369, 370,372, 372A, 374,377, 377A or
444A Of NRS. sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act, NRS 482.313, or chapter 385 or 680B of NRS from
the person with respect (0 whose obligation the natice was given solely by reason of the transferor other

isposition the Stae is unable to recover the indebedness of the person with respect 10 whose obligation
the notice was given,

See, 50, NRS 3G3A.130 is hereby amended (o read as follows:

363.130 I, There is hereby imposed an excise tax on each employer al the rate of [2] 2.29
percent of the wages, as defined in NRS 612.190, paid by the employer during a ealendar quarter
respect to employment in connection with the business activities of the employer,

2. “The tt imposed by this section:

(a) Does not apply to any person or other entity or any wages this State is prohibited from taxing
under the Constitution, laws or iwaties ofthe United States or the Nevada Constitution,
sans ta deiucted, in whole or in pan, fom any wages of persons in the employment ofthe
employer.

3. each employer shall, on or before the last day of the month immediately following each
calendar quarter for which the employer is required to pay a contribution pursuant to NRS 612.535:

(a) File with the Department a return on a form prescribed by the Department; and

{(b) Remit to the Deparment any tex due pursuant to this section for that calendar quarter,

‘See. $1. NRS 363.130 is hereby amended to read as follows:
363A,130 1, There is hereby imposed an excise tax on each employer at the rate of [2:29] 2.42
percent of the wages, as defined in NRS 612.190, paid by the employer during a calendar quater with
respect fo employment in connection with the business activities ofthe employer.
2, ‘The tax imposed by this setion:
{2 Does not only to any person oo niyo any wages tis Ste poibied rom axing
under the Constitution, laws or ireaties ofthe United States or the Nevada Constitution,
sy) Mist ob deduce, noe orn par, om any wages of prsonsin te employment ofthe
employer.
3. Each employer shall, on or before the last day of the month immediately following each
andar quarter for which the employer is required to pay a contcibution pursuant to NRS 612.535:
(4) File withthe Department a return on a form prescribed by the Department; and
(b) Remit to the Department any tax due porsuant to this section for that calendar quarter.

See. 52. NRS 363A, 130 is hereby amended to rend as follows:

363A.130. 1, There is hereby imposed an excise tax on each employer atthe rate of [242] 2
vercont ofthe ges, defined NRS 12:90, pd bythe employer daring elena quer th
respect fo employment in connection with the business activities of the employer.

2. Theta imposed by this section:

{@) Does not apply to any person or other enlty or any wages this State is prohibited from taxing
under the Constitution, laws or teates ofthe United States or the Nevada Constitution,

(b) Must not be deducted, in whole or in part, from any wages of persons in the employment of the

Page U1 of 31

ition - Statewide Statutory Measure ada

employer,
3. Buch employer shall, on or before the Inst day of the month immediately following each
‘calendar quarter for which the employer is required to pay a contribution pursuant 10 NRS 612.53:
(a) File with the Department return on a form prescribed by the Department; and
(b) Remit to the Department any tax due pursuant to this section for that calendar quarter.

See, 83. NRS 78.245 is hereby amended to read as follows:

78245 No}

1, Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, no stocks, bonus or other sceurities issued by any
corporation eranized unr hs caper, or the income or pois thefom, porte transfer tea by
assigament, descent, testamentary disposition or atherwise, shall be taxed by tis State when such stocks,
Bonds or other secures sal be ove by nonresidents ofthis Stator by foreign comporatfons,

2, The provisions of subsection T do not apply'to the tax imposed pursuant ta sections 3 t0 45,
inclusive, of this act

See, 54, NRS 90.420 is hereby amended 10 read as follows:
90420" 1, The Administrator by order may deny, suspend or revoke any license, fine any licensed

n, limit the activites governed by this ehapler thal an applicant or ffeensed person may perform in
ate bar an applicant or icensed person from association with a Hieensed broker-dealer or investment
adviser of bar ftom employment witha licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser a person who is
pariner, officer, director, sales representative, investment adviser or representative of an i
adviser, ora person occupying a similar status or perTorming a similar function for an applicant or licensed
person. ifthe Administrator finds thatthe order is inthe public interest and that the applicant or Hicensed
person oF, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any pariner, officer, director, sales
representative, investment adviser, representative of an investment adviser, or person occupying a similar
status or performing similar fetions or any person directly or indirectly controlling | ealer or
investment adviser, o any transfer agent or any person dimectly or indirectly controling the transfer agent;

{a) Has filed an application for licensing with the Administrator which, as of its effective date, ar
as of any date after filing in the case of an ortter denying effectiveness, was incomplete in a material
respect or contained a stalement that was, in light ofthe eireumstances under which it was made, false or
inisleading with spect to-a material fact;

(b) Las violated or failed to comply with a provision of this chapter as now or formerly in effect
or a regulation or order adopted or issued under this chapter;

(c) Is the subject of an adjudication or determination after notice and opportunity for hearing,
W we last 5 years by a securities agency or administrator of another state or a court of competent
jurisdiction thac the person has violated the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
‘the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Commodity Exchange
‘Act or the securities aw of any other state, only ifthe acts constituting the violation of that state's aw
‘would constitute a violation ofthis chapter had the acts taken place in this State;

(@) Within the last 10 years has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor which the
Administrator finds:

(1) Involves the purchase or sale of a security, taking a false oath, making st false report,
bribery, perjury. burglary, robbery or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses;

{Q) Arists ott of the conduet of business as a broker-dealer, investment adviser, depository
institution, insurance company or fiduciary; or

(G) Involves the larceny, thell, robbery, extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, faudulent
concealment, embez/lement, fraudulent conversion or misappropriation of money or securities or
conspiracy 6 commitany ofthe oeping offenses

(6) Is or has been permanently oF temporarily enjoined by any eourt of competent jurisdiction,
unless the order has been vacated, from acting as an investment advise, representative ofa investment
adviser, underwriter, brokeralcaler or a an aliliated person or employee of an investment company,
depository institution or insurance eompany or from engaging in or continuing any conductor practice i
connection with any of the foregoing activities or in eonnection with the purchase or sale of a sceurity;

{Is or has been the snbjeet of an onder of the Administrator, unless the order has been vacated,
denying, suspending or revoking the person's license as a broker-dealer, sales representative, investment
adviser, representative of an investment adviser ar transfer agent;

{) Is or has been the subject of any of the Following orders which were issued within the last $
years, unless the order has been vacated:

(1) An order by the securities ageney or administrator of another slate, Canadian province or
territory or by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a comparable regulatory agency of unother
country, entered alter notice and opportunity for hearing, denying, suspending or revoking the person's
Jicense asa broker-dealer, sales representative, investment adviser, representative ofan investment adviser
or transfer agent;

©) A suspen:
selFregulatory organizatio

‘3) An order of the United States Postal Servige relating (o frauds

(4) An onder to cease and desist entered after notice and opportunity for hearing by the
nistrator, the securities agency or administrator of another state, Canndian province or territory, the
es and Exelunge Commission or 2 comparable regulatory agency of another country, oF the

mn oF expulsion from membership in or association with a member of a

Adi
Seeuri

Page 12 of 31

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure Stute of Nevada

Futures Trading Commission; or
(5) Anorder by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission denying, suspending or revoking
registration under the Commodity: Exchange Act;

(h) Las engaged in unethical or dishonest practices inthe securities business:

Is insolvent, either in the sense that liabilities exceed assets or in the sense thot obligations
ceannot be met as they’ mature, but the Administrator may not enfer an order against a broker-dealer or
investment adviser under this paragraph without a finding of insolvency as to the brokeradealer or
wvestment adviser;

i) Llas filed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS [i] or
sections 3 1045, inclusive, of tis act;

(k) Is detennined by the Administrator in compliance with NRS 90.430 not to be qualified on the
basis of lack of training, experience and knowledge of the securities business; or

\) las failed reasonably to supervise a Sales representative, employee or represuntative of an
investment adviser

2. The Administrator may not institute a proceeding on the basis of a fact or transaction known
{o the direetor when the license became effestive unless the proceeding is instituted within 90 days after
issuanee ofthe Hieense,

3. Ithe Administrator finds that an applicant or ficensed person is no longer in existence or has
eased 10 do business as a broker-dealer, sles representative, investment adviser, representative of an
investment adviser or transfer agent or is adjudicated mentally incompetent or subjected to the control of
‘xcommittee conservator or guardian or eannot be located afler reasonable search, the Administrator may
by onder deny the application or revoke the eens.

See. 55. NRS 90. is hereby ‘amended to read as follows:

90.730" 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, information and records filed with or
obtained by the Administrator ace public information and are available for public examination.

2, "Except as othenvise provided in subsections 3 and 4 and NRS 239.0115, the flow
information and records do not constitute public information under subsection 1 and are confide

(2) Information or records obtained by the Administrator in connection with an
concerning possible violations of this chapter: and

(b) Information or recor filed with the Administrator in connection with a registration statement
filed under this ehapter or a report under NRS 90.390 which constitute trade secrets or commercial or
financial information ofa person for which that person is cnltled to and has asserted a claim of privilege
or confidentiality authorized by ke,

3._‘The Administrator may submit any information oF evidence obtained in conneetion with an
investigation tothe:

‘a) Atlomey General or appropriate district atomey for the purpose of prosceuling a criminal
action under this chapter; and

(b) Department of Taxation for its use in earrying out the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS f}]
and sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act.

4. The Administrator may disclose any information obtained in conneetion with an inves
pursuant to NRS 90.620 to the agencies and administrators specified in subsection | of NRS 90.740 but
only if disclosure is provided for the purpose of a civil, administrative or criminal investigation or
proceeding, and the receiving agency or administrator represents in writing that under applicable luv
protections exist (o preserve the integrity. confidentiality and seeusity ofthe information,

5. This chapter dacs not ereate any privilege or diminish any privilege existing at common taxi,
by statute, regulation or otherwise.

tiga

See, 56, NRS 604A.§20 is hereby amended to read as follows:

04A.820 1. ifthe Commissioner has reason to believe that grounds for revocation or suspension
of a license exist, the Commissioner shall give 20 days’ writen notice to the licensee stating the
contemplated action and, in general, the grounds therefor and seta date fora hearing.

2. AAtthe conclsion ofa hearing, the Commissioner shall:
_ __(@) Lier a written order either dismissing the charges, revoking the lieense or suspending the
license for a period of sot more than 60 days, which period must include any prior temporary suspension,
“The Commissioner shall send a copy of the order to the licensee by registered or certified mail,

(b) Impose upon the licensee an administrative fine of not more than $10,000 foreach violation
by the lieensee of any provision of this chapter or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto.

(©) If'a fine is imposed pursuant this section, enter such onder as fs necessary to recover the casts
of the proceeding, including investigative costs and altomey’s fees ofthe Commissioner,

3. The grounds for revocation or suspension ofa license are that:
(o) The licensee has failed to pay the annual license fev:

(b1 The licensee, either knowingly or without any exercise of due eare lo prevent it has violated
any provision ofthis chapter or any lawl regulation adopted pursuant thereto;

{€) The licensee has failed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of
NRS [:] or sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act;
____(@) Any fact or condition exists which would have justified the Commissioner in denying the
Ticensee's original application for a license pursuant (othe provisions of this chapter; or

(©) The licensee:

Page 13 of 31

ee

nitiative Petition

de Statutory. State of Nevada

(1) Failed 0 open an office for the conduct of the business authorized by his or her license
Within 180 days afer the date the fleense was issueds or
(2) Las failed to remain open for the conduct of the business for a period of 180 days without
ood ease ter
“Any

. on or suspension applies only to the license granted to a person forthe particular
office for Wh i for revocation or suspension exis,

5. An order suspending or revoking a license becomes effective 5 days after being entered unless
Ahe order specifies otherwise oF a slay is granted,

See, $7, NRS 612,265 is herby amended to read as follows:

612.265. 1. Except as otherwise provided inthis section and NRS 239.01 15, information obtained
from any empioying unit oF person pursoant to the adminisration of this chapter and any determination
as to the benefit rights of any person is confidential ant may not be disclosed or be open to public
inspection in any manner which would revea! the person's or employing units identity

2, Any claimant oF legal representative ofa claimant is entitled to inform
ofthe Division, fo te exten neces or the proper presetavon of the claimants claim in ay
proceeding purstant (0 this chapter. A claimant or an employing unit is not entitled to information from
the records of the Division for any other purpos

3, Subj ionsas the Adm
obtained tbe made availabe t

(a) Any ageney of this or any other state or any federal agency charged with the administration or
enforcement of laws relating fo unemployment compensation, public assisianee, workers’ compensation
cor labor and industrial relations, or the maintenance of a system of public employment offices;

(b) Any state or local ageney for the enforcement of child support

{c) Lhe intemal Revenue Servies ofthe Department of the Treasury:

(4) The Department of ‘Fasation: and

{e) The State Contractors’ Board in the performance of its duties to enforce the pro
chapter 624 of NRS,

\+Information obtained in conneetion with the udministration of tho Employment Service may be made
available to persons or ayeneies for purposes appropriate to the operation of public employment service
‘ora public assistanee program,

4, Upon swrilten request made by a public officer of a local govemment, the Administrator shall
Sunnis ffom the records of the Division the name, address and place of employment of any person listed
in the records of employment ofthe Division, The request must se forth the social security number of the
person about whom the request is made and contain a statement signed by proper authority of the lacal
government certifying that the request is made to allow the proper authority to enforce a law to recover
a debtor obligation owed to the focal government. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 239.0115, the
information obtained by the local goverment is confidential and may not be used or disclosed for any
purpose other than the collection of' debt or obligation ovsed (0 that local government. The Administrator
may charge a reasonable lee for the cost of providing the requested information,

5. ‘The Administrator may publish or otherwise provide information on the names of employers,
their addresses. their type or class of business or industry, and the approximate number of employees

mployed by each such employer, ifthe information released will assist unemployed persons to obtain
ployment or will be generally useful in developing and diversifying the economic interests of tis Sta
Upon request by a state agency which is able to demonstrate tha its intended use ofthe information w
beuett dhe residents of this Stae, the Administrator may, in addition to the information listed in this
subsection, disclose the number of employees employed by each employer and the total wages paid by

istrator may charge a fee to cover the actual costs of any administra

losure ofthis information (0 a state agency. ‘The Administrator may require
to certify in writing that the agency will take all actions necessary to maintain the
confidentiality ofthe information and prevent its unauthorized disclosure,

6. Upon request therefor, the Administrator shall furnish to any ageney of the United St
charged with the administration of public works or assistance through public employment, and may fui
(o ay state ageney similarly charged, the name, address, ordinary occupation andl employment status of
each recipient of benefits and the recipients righis fo further benefits pursuant to this chapter.

7, To further a current criminal investigation, the chief executive officer of any ln enforcement
agency ofthis State may submit a written request to the Administrator that the Administrator furnish, from
the regards of the Division, the name, address and place of employment of any person listed in the records
of employment ofthe Division, The request must set forth the soeial security number of the person about
‘whom the request is made and contain a statement signed by the chief executive officer certifying that the
request is made to further a criminal investigation currently being conducted by the ageney. Upan recs
of sucha request, the Administrator shall furnish the information requested. The Adminisiralor nia charge
a fee to cover the actual costs of any related administrative expenses,

8. In addition to the provisions of subsection 5, the Administrator shall provide lists containing
the names ad addresses of employers, and information reading the wages pad by each employe othe
Department of Taxation, upon request, for use in verifying retuns fOr the laxes imposed pursuant 10
chapters 363A and 3631 of NRS [+] ad sections 3 (o 45, inclusive, of tis act, The Administrator may
charge a fee to cover the actual costs of any related administrative expenses.

9, A private carrier that provides industrial insurance in this State shail submit to the Administrator

istrator may by regulation prescribe, the information

s of

Page 14 of 31

Pe CCizCQYG

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure’ State of Nevada

1 ist containing the name of each person who received benefits pursuant fo chaplers 616A to 16D,
inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS during the preceding month and request thal the Administrator compare
the information so provided with the reords ofthe Division regarding persons claiming benefits pursuant
(o chapter 612 of NRS for the same period, ‘The information submitied by the private carrer must be in
«a form determined by the Administrator and must contain the sovial security number of each such person,
Upon receipt of the request, the: Administrator shall make such a comparison and, if appears from the
information submited that 4 person is simoltaneously claiming benefits under chapter 612 of NRS and
under chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS, the Administator shall notify the
Atoms Gener ov any oe appropri aw enforeementageney. The Administrator stall haga fe
to cover the actual costs of any related edministatve expenses.

10, ‘The Administrator may request the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States to cause
an examination of the correctness of any return or report of any national banking association rendered
‘pursuant tothe provisions of this chapter and may in connection with the request iansmit ay such report
‘or return to the Comptroller of the Curreney of the United States as provided in section 3305(c) of the
Internal Revemue Code of 1954,

1. Ifany employee or member ofthe Board of Review, the Administrator or any employes ofthe
Administrator, in violation of the provisions of this section, discloses information obtained from any
‘employing unit or person in the administration ofthis chapter, or ifany person who has oblained alist of
applicants for work, or of claimants or recipients of benefits pursuant to this chapler uses or permits the
use of the fist for any political purpose, he or she is guilty of a gross misdemeanor,

12, All letters, reports or communications of any kind, oral or written, from the employer or
employee to each other or (othe Division or any of ts agents, representatives or employees are privileged
and mist not be the subject matter or basis for any lawsuit ithe letter, report or communication is watten,
sent, delivered or prepared purstant to the requirements of this chapter.

‘See. 58. NRS 616B.012 is hereby amended to read as follows:

GIGR.O12“1, Except as otherwise provided in this section and NRS 239.0115. 6168.015,
{616B.021 and 616.208. information obiained from any insurer, employer or employee is confidential and
ay not be dslosed or be open to pull Inspection in any manner which woul rexel the pons
identity.

‘2. Any claimant or legal representative of the claimant is entitled to information from the reeords
of the insurer. to the extent necessary for the proper presentation of a claim in any procueding under
chapters 616A to 616D. inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS.

3, The Division and Administrator are entitled to information from the records ofthe insurer whi
is necessary for the performance of their duties, The Administrator may, by regulation, preseribe the
‘manner in Which otherwise confidential information may be made available to:

(a) Any agency of this or any other state charged with the administration or enforcement of laxss
‘tng nds sane employment compensation, publi ssisane or or and instal
relations;

(B) Any state or local agency forthe enforcement of child support;

(€) The Internal Revenue Serview ofthe Department ofthe Treasurys

(W) The Department of Taxation; and

(¢) The State Contractors’ Board in the performance of its duties to enforce the provisions of
chapter 624 of NRS.
‘information obtained in connect
made available 10 persons oF
industrial insurance,

44. Upon written request made by a public officer ofa local government, an insurer shall furnish
from itseeords the name, addross and place of employment of any person listed in its records, The request
inst set Trt the seta secunty number of the person about whom the request nade and contin
statement signed by proper authority of the local government certifying that the request is made to allow:
the proper authority to enforce a law to reeover a debt oro ‘owed tothe focal government, Except
as otherwise provided in NRS 239.0115, the information obtained by the local government is confidential
and may not be used or disclosed for any purpose other than the collection ofa debt or obligation owed
to the local govemment, The insurer may charge a reasonable fee for the cost of providing the requested
information.

5. To funthera current criminal investigation, the chief executive officer of
agency of this State may submit to the Administrator a written request fr te name, address and place of
‘employment of any person listed in the records ofan insurer. The request must set forth the social security.
number of the person about whom the request is made and contain a slatement signed by the chict
executive officer certifying that the request is made to further a criminal investigation currently being
conducted by the ageney. Upon receipt ofa request, the Administrator shall insruet the insurer to furnish
‘he information requested. Upon receipt of such an instruction, the insurer shall furnish the information
requested, The insurer may charge a reasonable fee to cove any relate administrative expenses,

6, Upon request bythe Deparinent of extn the Administrator shal powde

(a) Lists containing the names and addresses of employers; and
(by Other information concerning employers collected and maintained by the Administrator or the
Division to cary out the purposes of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS,,

‘to the Department for its use in verifying returns fr the tases imposed pursuant (o liapters 363A and

th the administration of « program of industrial insurance may
jes for purposes appropriate 10 the operation of a program of

Page 15 of 31

Cm

itiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Mea tate of Nevada

363B of NRS fe] and sections 3 1045, inclusive, ofthis act, The Administrator may charge a reasonable
fee to cover any elated administrative expenses.

7. Any peison who, in violation of this section, discloses information obt
claimants or polieyholders or obtains «list of claimants or policyholders under chapters 616A 10 616D,
Inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS and uses or permits the use of thelist for any political purposes, is guilty
of a gross misdemeanor.

8, All lellrs, epors or communications of any kind, orl or written, from the insurer, or any of
its agents, representatives or employees are privileged and mast not be the subject matter or basis for any
fawsuit if the letter, report or communication is written, sent, delivered or prepared pursuant 10 the
requirements of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS,

9. "The provisions ofthis section do not prohibit the Administrator or the Division from disclosing
‘any nonproprictary information relating to an uninsured employer or proof of industrial insurance,

See, 59, NRS G45B,060 is hereby amended to read as follows:

645H,060 1. Subject to the administrative control ofthe Director of the Department of Business
and Industry, the Commissioner shall exereise general supervision and control over mortgage brokers and
morigage agents doing business in this Stae,

%, In addition (othe other duties imposed upon him or her by law, the Commissioner shall:

(a) Adopt regulations:

(1 Setting forth the requirements for an investor to acquire ownership of oF a beneficial
interest in a loan secured by alien on real propery. The regulations must include, without limitation, the
‘minimum financial conditions that the investor must eamply with before becoming an investor,

(2) Esablishing reasonable limitations and guidelines on loans made by a mortgage broker to
® diy, offi, morgge agen or employe ofthe morn broker.

(b) Adopt any other regulations that are necessary to carry out the provisions ofthis chapter, exeept

ato loan brokerage fees,

{€) Conduct such investigations as may be necessary to determine whether any person has violated
any provision of this chapter, a regulation adopted pursuant to this chapter or an order of the
Commi ier.

(2) Exeept as otherwise provided insubseetion 4, conduet an annual examination of each mortgage
‘broker doing business in this State. The annual ination must include, without limitation, a formal exit

review wih the mortgage broker. The Commissioner sal adopt eulstionspesarbing:
(1) Standards for determining the rating of each mortgage broker based upon the results of the
annual examination; and

(2) Procedures for resolving any objections made by the mortgage broker (othe sesulls ofthe
annual examination, ‘The results of the annual examination may not be opened to public inspection
pursuant to NRS 615B.090 until after a period of time set by the Commissioner to determine any
objections made by the mortgage broker.

(6) Conds such ther examinations, pero or speci us investigation and earings as my
be necessary for the efficient administration of the laws of this State regarding mortgaue brokers and
mortgage agents. The Commissioner shall adopt regulations specifying the general guidelines that will be
followved when a periodic or special audit of a morigage broker is conducted pursuant fo this chapter,

(A) Classify as confidential certain records and information obiained by the Division when those
matters are obtained from a governmental agency upon the express condition tht they remain confidential,
‘This paragraph doesnot init examination by

(1) The Legislative Autor, or
2) The Department of Tasation if necessary to carry out the provisions of chapter 363A of
NRS [4 or sections 310 45, inclusive, ofthis act.

(a) Contduct such examinations and investigations as are necessary to ensure that mortgage brokers
and morigage agents meet the requirements ofthis chapter for oblaining a license, both wt the time ofthe
application fora ticense and thereafier on a continuing bas

3, Foreach special audit investigation or examination, a morigage broker or mortgage agent shall
pay a fee bused onthe rate established pursuant to NRS 645F.280,

4, The Commissioner may conduct examinatfons of a mortgage broker, as deseribed in paragraph
(d) of subsection 2, on a biennial instead ofan annual bass ifthe mortgage broker:

(a) Received a rating in the las annual examination that meets a threshold determined by the
‘Commissioner,

(b) Has not hnd any adverse change in financial condition since the last annual examination, as
shown by financial statements of the morigage broker;

(6) Has not had any complaints received by the Division tha resulted in any adi
by the Division; and

{@) Does not maintain any trust accounts pursuant to NRS 649B.170 or G45B.175 or arzange loans
funded by private investors.

trative action

See, 60. NRS 645B.670 is hereby amended to read as follows:

645B.670 Lseept as otherwise provided in NRS 645B.690:

1. For each violation committed by an applicant for a license issued pursuant to this chapter,
wheter or no the applicants sued lense the Commissioner may impose upon the applet an
aalminisrative fine of not more than $25,000 if te applicant:

Page 16 of 31

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure State of Nevada

(@) Ilas knowingly made or eaused fo be made to the Commissioner any filse representation of
material fact;

(©) Has suppressed or withheld ftom the Commissioner any information which the applicant

assesses and which, if submitted by the applicant, would have rendered the applicant ineligible to be
licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or

(6) Has violated any provision ofthis chapter,» regulaion adopted pursuant to this chapter oF an
exdeof th Conmisgner in completing ad flings rer pion frees or dring the ouse
‘of the investigation of his or her application for a license,

2. For each violation committed by a mortgage broker, the Commissioner may impose upon the
mortgage broker an adminisiatve fine of not more than $25,000, may suspend, revoke or place conditions
won megs brokers se. yd bah ifthe morgage broker, whether or not ueting as such:

(a) Is insolvent;

(0) [s grossly negligent or incompetent in performing any act for which the mortgage broker is
required to be licensed pursuant tothe provisions ofthis chapter;

{6} Does not conduet his or her business in accordance with law or has violated any proviston of
this chapter, a regulation adopted pursuant to this chapter or an order ofthe Commissioner:

(4) Is in such financial condition thatthe mortgage broker eannot continue in business with safely
to his or her customers;

hop) LS mle @ mtr miseresetin in coneation with any tnseton governed by hs
chapter,

(O Las suppressed or withheld from a client any materia facts, data or other information relating
to any transaction governed by the provisions of this chapter which the mortgage broker knew ar by the
exercise: ‘of resonable diligence, should have known;

(2) Ilas knowingly made or caused fo be mado to the Commissioner any false representation of
material fat or has suppressed or withheld from the Commissioner any information which the mortage
broker possesses and which, if submitted by the mortgage broker, would have rendered the mortgage
broker ineligible to be licensed pursuant tothe provisions ofthis chapter,

(0) Has failed to aocount to persons interested fr all money received fora trust accounts

as fefused to permit an examination by the Commissioner of his or her baoks and affairs oF
thas refused or filed, within a reasonable time, to furnish any information or make any report that may be
required by the Commissioner pursuant to the provisions of tis ehapuer or a regulation avopted pursiant
to this chapter:

() Has been convicted of, or entered or agreed to enter a plea of guilty oF nolo contendere to, a
felony in a donsestie, foreign or military court within the 7 years inmmediately preceding the date af the
application, or a any time if such felony involved an act of fraud, dishonesty or a breach of trust, moral
‘upitude of money laundering,

‘(K) Lins refused or filed to pay, within reasonable time, any foes, assessments, costs oF expenses
that the morigage broker is required 1 pay pursuant to this ehapter ora regulation adopted pursuant to

chapter:
{0 Has fale to satisfy a elim made by aelient which has been reduced to judgment;
(in) lias filed to account for oF to remit any money of a client within a reasonable tie alter a

request for an accounting or remittals

(n) [las commingled the money'or other property of a client with his or her own of has converted
the money or property of others to his or her own uses .
(0) Has engaged in any other condvet constituting a decvitlu, frmdulent or dishonest business

practi

(p) Sas repeatedly violated the policies and procedures of the mortyage broker:

{G) las fled to exereise reasonable supervision over he acivties of mortgage agents required
by NRS 645B.160:

(F) Las instructed a mortgage agent to cont an act that would be eause for the revocation of the
Viconse ofthe mortgage broker, whether or not the mortgage agen! commits the act,

(6) Ilas employed a person as a morigage agent oF authorized a person to be assocfated with the
mortgage broker as 2 mortgage agent at atime when the mortgage broker knew or. in light of all the
surrounding fcts and circumstances, reasonably should have known that the person:

(1) Had been convicted of, oF entered or agreed to enter a plea of gully or nolo contenders to,
a felony in a domestic, foreign or military court within the 7 years immediately preceding the date of
pplication, or a any time if such felony involved an act of fraid, dishonesty or a breach of trust, moral
‘urptude of money laundering: or

@) Tlad a license or registration as a mortgage agent, mongage banker, mortgage broker or
residential morigage loan originator revoked in this State oF any other juisdietion or had a fina
Services eens oeelstaion revoked within the ineditely preceding 10 yeas;

(9 Las violated NRS 645C.557; or

(0) Tas failed to pay a tas as required pursuant to the pro
sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this uct.

3. For each violation committed by a mortgage agent, the Commissioner may impose upon the
‘mortgage agent an administrative fine of not more than $25,000, may spspend, revoke or place conditions
upon the mortgage agent's license, or may do both, if the mortgage agent, whether oF nol acting as such:

(@) Is grossly negligent oF incompetent in performing any aet for which tie mortgage age
required to be licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter;

jons of chapter 363 of NRS [i] or

Page 17 of 31

State of Nevada

n= States

haper Hes made mati irpssention in comesion wih any ansscton govemed by this
chapter
* (@) Has suppressed or withheld from a client any material facts, data or other information relating
y transaetion governed by the provisions ofthis chapter which the mortgage agent knew or, by the
of reasonable diligence, should have known;

‘(4)Tlas Knowingly made or caused to be made to the Commissioner any false representation of
material factor has suppzessed or withheld from the Commissioner any information which the mortgage
ent possesses and which, if submited by the mortgage agent would have rendered the morgage agent
{neigible to be licensed purstant ( the provisions ofthis chapter:

(Ha been conte of entered or ars to nee filo nla contendere 3
felony in a domestic, foreign oF military eourt within the 7 years immediately preceding the date of the
application, oF at any time if such felony involved an aet of fraud, dishonesty ofa breach of rust, moral
turpitude oF money launder

() Us faited to account for or Co remit eny money of client within a reasonable time ater «
sequest for an accounting or remit;

(g) Has commingled the money or other property ofa client with his or her own or has converted
the money or property of others to his or her own use

~_(b)Hlas engoged in any other conduet constituting a deceitful, fraudulent or dishonest business

toa
e

tie,
Petey Hes voted NRS 645C.857;
G) lias repeatedly violuted the policies and procedures of the mortgage broker with whom the
mortgage agent is associated or by whom he or she is employed: or
(Has violated any provision ofthis chapter, a regulation adopted pursuant (o this chapter or an
onder of the Commissioner or has assisted or offered to assist another person to comunit such a vioation,

See, 61. NRS 64512300 is hereby amended 10 read as follows:

GASE300- 1, Subjeet to the administrative control ofthe Director ofthe Department of Business
nd Sndusey, the Commissioner shall exereise general supervision and control over morigige bankers
doing business in this State,

2, In addition to the other duties impased upon him or her by la, the Commissioner shal):

{@ Adopt regulations establishing reasonable limitations and guidelines on loans made by a
rmorigage banker to a director, officer or employee of the morgage banker.

() Adopt any other regulations that are necessary to carry out the provisions ofthis chapter, except
asta foan fees,

(€) Conduet suck investigations as may be necessary to letermine whether any person es violated
any provision of this chapter, a regulation adopted pursuant to this ehapter or an order of the
Commissioner,

(4) Esvept as otherse provided in subsection 4, conduet am annual examination ofeach mortgage
‘banker doing business in this State,

{(c) Conduct such other examinations, periodic or special audits, investigations and hearings as may
be necessary forthe efficient administration ofthe lass of this State regarding mortgaue hankers,

() Classify as confidential certain reeords and information obtained by the ‘when those
matters are obitined from a governmental agency upon the espress condition that they remain confidential,
‘This paragraph does not limit examination by:

(1) The Legislative Auditor; or
(2) The Department of Taxation if necessary (0 cary out the provisions of chapter 363A of
RS [1 orseettons 3 10 45, inclusive, of this act,

(g) Conduet such examinations and investigations
meet the requirements of this chapter for obining a tc
Jicense and thereafter ona continuing basis.

3. For each special audit, investigation or examination, a mortgage banker shall pay a fee based
on the rate established pursuant to NRS G45R.280,

4. ‘Te Commissioner may conduct biennial examinations ofa mortgage banker instead of annual
examinations, as decribed in paragraph (d) of subsection 2 ithe mortgage banker

(@) Recvived a rating in the last annual examination that moets @ threshold determined by: the
Commissioner;

(b) Ins not had any adverse change in financial condition since the last annual examination, as
shown by financial statements of the mortgage banker; and

{6 ITas not had any complaints recelved by the Division that resulted in any administrative action
by the Division,

Sve, 62, NRS 645E.670 is hereby amended to read as follows:

458.670. 1. For each violation committed by an applicant, whether or not the applicant is issued
aliens, the Conissioner may impose upon the applica an adnisitve fine f not more Han
$25,000 i the applicant
{a) Has knowingly made or caused to be made to the Commissioner any false representation of
material fact; .

{) Tas suppressed or withheld (fom the Commissioner any information shiel the applicant
possesses and which if submitted by the applicant, would have rendered the applicant ineligible 10 be

ire necessary {o ensure that mortgage bankers
nse, both at the time of the application for a

Page 18 of 31

Se

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure State of Nevadu

licensed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter; or

(c) Has violated any provision of this chapter,
order of the Commissioner in completing and filing his or her application fora license or during
of the investigation ofhis or her application fora license.

2. For cach violation committed by a licensee, the Commissioner may impose upon the licensee
an administrative fine of not more tan $25,000, may suspend. revoke or place conditions upon the license,
‘or may do both, ifthe licensee, whether or not acting as sue

{a) Is insolvent:

(b) Is grossly negligent or incompetent in performing any aet for which the licensee is required to
be licensed pursuant to the provisions ofthis chapter:

(€) Does not conduct his or her business in accordance with law or has violated any provision of
{his chapter. a regulation adopted pursuant to this chapter or an order of the Commissioners

(W)Isin such finanefal condition that the Hleensee cannot continue in business with safety to his or
ber customers;

apt) Het mde a mae msrepresentaon ia concen wi any tmnseton gover by his
chapter;

{Has suppressed or withheld from a client any material fuels, data or other information rel
taaany transaetion governed by the provisions of this chapter which the licensee knew or, by the exercise
‘of reasonable diligence, should have known

(g) Has knowingly made or caused to be made to the Commissioner any false representation of
‘material factor has suppressed or withheld from the Commissioner any information which the licensee
possesses and which, if submitted by the Ticensee, would have rendered the licensee ineligible to be
Ticensed pursuant tothe provisions of this chapter,

‘hy Tlas failed to aecount to persons interested forall money received for a trust account;

{) Has refused (0 permit an examination by the Commissioner of his or hee books and affairs or
‘has refused or failed, within a reasonable time, 10 ‘any information or make any report that may’ be
"ated by the Comassioner pursuant to te provisions of this chapter or a regulation adopted pursuant
to this chapter:

{G) Has been convicted of, or entered or agrecd to enter a plea of nolo contendere to, a felony in a
omens, foreign o lor cout within the 7 Years immediately presading the dle of the aplisition,
ora ay ime sue Eloy involved an net of rd ahonesty oF a bene of tus, mors upto
money laundering

(k) Has refused or failed to pay, within a reasonable time, any foes, assessments, costs oF expenses
that the licensee is required to pay pursuant (o this chapter ora regulation adopted pursuant to this chapter;

(1) Las filed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS [:] or
sections 3 t0 45, inclusive, ofthis act;

{an} Has failed to satisfy a claim made by a client which has been reduced to judgment;

{(n) Has failed to account for or to remit any money of a client within a reasonable time alter a
request for an accounting or remital:

(0) Has violated NRS 645C.557:

(p) Has commingled the money or other property ofa client with his or her own or has converted
‘he money or propery of others to hs or har ow tse: oF

__ (q) Has engaged in any other conduct constituting a deceitful, fraudulent or dishonest business
practice,
3. Anorder that imposes discipline and the findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting that
‘order are public records.

2 regulation adoted pursuant to ths chops or an
the course

Sec. 63. NRS 658.151 is

658,11, The Commissioner may forth ake possesion of th business and property of any
depository instivution to which this tile or tile 56 of NRS applies when it appears thatthe depository
institution:

{a) Has violated its charter or any laws applicable thereto,

(b) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner,

{e) Is in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact ts business.

(Has a slockholders' or members’ equity.

{6) Ilas refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the terms on which such deposits were
rectived, or has refused to pay its holders of exrtifientes of indebledness or investment in accordance with
the terms upon which those certificates of indebtedness or investment were sold.

(O,Tas become or isin imminent danger of becoming otherwise insolvent,

{g) Has neglected or refused 10 comply with the terms of a lawtol order of the Commissioner.

(i) Has refused, upon proper demand, to submit its records, affairs and concerns for inspection and

ination of an appointed or authorized examiner ofthe Commissioner.
Jas made a voluntary assignment of ts asses (0 (ustoes,
i) lias filed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS f:] or
sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act.

2. The Commissioner also may forthwith take possession of the business and property of any
depository institution to which this ill or title 56 of NRS applies when appears tha the oles of the
<epository institution lave reused to be examined upon oath regarding its affairs.

Page 19 of 31

2

tition - Statewide Stututory Measure. State of Nevada

See, 64, NRS 665.133 is hereby amended to rea as follows: .
665.1331. ‘The records and information described in NRS 665,130 may be disclosed to:

‘An ageney of the Federal Government or of another state which regulates the financial
instuution which isthe subject of the records or information:

(b) The Director of the Deparunent usiness and Industry for the Director's confidential use;

(€) The State Board of Finance for its confidential use, if the report or other information is
necessary for the State Board of Finance to perform its duties under this title;

‘@) The Department of Taxation for its use in carrying out the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS
[3] aud sections 3 ta 45, inclusive, of this acts

(e) Anentity whieh insures oF guarantees deposits;

(DA public officer authorized to investigate eriminal charges in connection with the affairs ofthe
depository institution;

(8) A person preparing a proposal for merging with or acquiring an institution or holding company.
but only after notice ofthe disclosure has been given tothe institution or holding company:

“(h) Any person to whom the subject ofthe report has authorized the disclosure;

(i) Any othec person ifthe Commissioner determines, after notice and o for hearing, that
disclosure is in the public interest and outweighs any potential harm to the depository institution and its
stockholders, members, depositors and creditors; and

j) Any court in a proceeding initiated by the Commissioner coneeming the financial institution,

All the reports made available pursuant to this section remain the property af the Division of
Financial Insthutions, and no person, ageney or authority to whom the reports are made available, or a
officer, director or employee thereof, may disclose any of the reports or ay ‘information contained therei
xcept in published statstcal material that doesnot disclose the aflars of any natural peison ot
corporation,

Sec, 65, NRS 669.275 is hereby amended to read as follows:

669.278 1, The Commissioner may require a licensee (o provide an audited financial statement
prepared by an independent certified public accountant licensed to do business inthis State,

2. On the fourth Monday in January of exch year, each licensee shall submit co the Comr
4list of stockholders required to be maintained pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection } of NRS 78.
or thelist of members required to be mainlained puisuant to paragraph (a) of subsection | of NRS 86.241,

by the president ora manager, as appropriate.

3. The list of members required to be maintained pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 1 of NRS
86.241 must include the percentage of cach member's interest in the company, in addition to the
requirements set Forth in that section,

4, Except as othenvise provided inNRS 239.0115, ny document submitted pursuant to this section
is confidential, This subseerion does not limit the examination of any document by the Department of
Taxation if necessary to carry out the provisions of sections 3 10-45, inclusive, of this act

See, 66, NRS 669,282:

s hereby amended to read as follows:
669.2825. 1, The Commissioner may institute disciplinary action or forhwith initia proceedings
to take possession of the business and property of any retail ust company when it appears dat the retail
(cust company:

{a) Has violated its charter or any state or federal laws applicable to the business of a trust
company,

(6) Is conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe

(6) Is inan unsafe or unsound condition to transact its business,

(€) as an impairment of its stockholders’ equity,

(©) las refused to pay or transfer account asses (0 its account holders as required by the erms of
‘the accounts’ governing instruments,

(1) Tas become insolvent.

(g) Has neglected or refused 0 comply with the terms of a lawful order of the Commissioner,

{ly Has refused, upon proper demand, to subst its records, alfairs and eoncers for inspection and
examination of an appointed or authorized examiner of the Commissioner.

Gi) Tiag made a voluntary assignment of is assets (o reccfvers, conservators, trustees or ereditors
without complying with NRS 669.230.

() Has failed to pay a tax a8 required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of NRS [:] oF
sections 310 45, inclusive, of this act

(0 Las materially and wilfully breached its fiduciary duties to

1) Has Riled to properly disclose all fees, interest and other chi

(Qn) Lins witllly engaged in material eonfiets of interest regarding a customer's aceount,

(1) Has made intentional material misrepresentations regarding any aspect of the services
Performa of proposed toe perfomed by he etal rust oman,

2, The Commissioner also may forthwith initiate proceedings to take possession of the husiness
and property of any trust company when it appears that the officers of the trust company have refused lo

bbe examined upon oath regarding ts afai

‘See, 67, NRS 669.2847 is hereby amended to read as follows:
669.2847 1. Ifthe Commissioner has reason to believe that grounds for revocat

cor suspension

Page 20 of 31

ofa license exist, the Commissioner shall give at least 20 days’ written notice tothe licens
contemplated aetion and, in general, the grounds therefor and seta date fora hearing,

2. Atthe conclusion of a hearing, the Commissioner shall:

(a Enter a writen order dismissing the charges, revoking the license or suspending the license for
a period of not more than GO days, which period must include any prior temporary suspension, ‘The
‘Commissioner shall send a copy of the order to the lieensve by registered or cetified nial.

(b) Impose upon the licensee an administrative line of nok more than $10,000 for exch violation
bythe ene of any provision of his kalo any regulation adopted prs eo,

(6) Ifa fine isimposed pursuant to this section, enter such order as is necessary to recover the costs
of the proceeding. including his or her investigative costs and attorney's fees,

3. The grounds for revocation or suspension ofa license are that:

(G9 The licensee has failed to pay the annual license Fee

(b) ‘The licensee, either knowingly or without any exercise of due eare to prevent it has violated
ay provision of this chapter or any regulation adopted pursuant thereto or any Inwul order ofthe Division
Institutions;

(c) The licensee has failed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of
NRS [5] or sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act;

{) Any fact or condition exists which would have justified the Commissioner in denying the
Jicensee's original application fora license pursuant to the provisions of this ehupter; or

(@) The licensee:

(1) Failed to open an office forthe conduct of the business authorized by his or her license
within 180 days after dhe date the license was issued: or
(2) Has failed to remain open for the conduct of the business for a period of 30 days without

good vause therefor.

4, An order suspending or revoking a license becomes effective 5 days alter being entered unless
the order specifies otherwise ora stay is granted,

stating the

See, 68, NRS 669,285 is hereby amended to read a follows:

{669.285 lExeept as otherwise provided in NRS 239.0115, any application and personal or financial
reeords submitted by a person pursuant fo the provisions of tis chapter and any personal or financial
records or other documents obtained by the Division of Finanetal Institutions pursuant to an examination
‘or audit conducted by the Divisfon are confidential and may be disclosed only to:

. The Division, any authorized employee of the Division and any state or federal aency
investigating the aetvies eoveed ner the provision of his chap; an

°2, The Department of Taxation for its use in carrying out the provisions of sections 3 to 4S,
Inclusive, of this act; and

5. Any person witen the Commissioner, in the Commissioners diseretion, determines that the
interests of the public that would be protected by disclosure outweigh the interest of any person in the
confidential information not losed.

See, 69. NRS 669.310 is hereby amended to read as follows:

669A.310 1, Esceptas otherwise provided in this section, any application and personal or financial
revonis submitted by a person pursuant (o the provisions of this chapter, any personal or financial records
‘or other documents obtained by the Division of Financia! Insitutions pursuant to an examination or ait
conducted by the Division pursuant to this chapter and any other private information relating toa family
trust company are eonfidental and may be disclosed only to:

(@) The Division, any authorized employee of the Division and a state or federal agency
investing atv regulated pursuant ths chapter

(b) The Department of Taxation for its use in carrying out the provisions of sections 3 10 45,
inclusive, ofthis act; amd

(6) Any other person ifthe Commissioner, in the Commissioner's diseretion, determines that the
nteress of the public in disclosing the information outweigh the interests of the person about whom the
information pertains in not disclosing the information,

2. The Commissioner shall give to the family trust company to which the information relates 10-
days’ prior written notice of intent fo disclose confidential information directly or indirectly to a person
pursuant to paragraph {¢b}] (6) of subsection 1, Any family trust company which receives Such a notice
nay object tothe disclosure ofthe confidential information ancl will be afforded the right to a hearing in

ith the provisions of chapter 2338 of NRS, Ife family trust company requests heating.

‘Commissioner may not reveal confidential information prior to the conclusion of the hearing and a ruling,
Prior to dissemination of any confidential information, the Commissioner shall require written agreement
‘not fo reveal the confidential information by the party receiving the confidential information, Inno event
Shall the Commissioner disclose conidentl information 10 the general public, any competitor or any
potential competitor of family st company.

3. Nothing in this chapter is intended to preclude a law enforcement officer ffom gnining aecess
to otherwise confidential records by subposna, court order, search warrant or other lawful means,
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Commissioner shall have tho ability to share
information with other out of state or federal regulators with whom the Department of Business and
Industry has an agreement regarding the sharing of information, Nothing in this chapter is intended to
preclude any agency of tis State from gaining access to otherwise confidential records in accordance with

Page 21 of 31

——— ee

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure __ State of Nevada

any applicable kaw.

See. 70, NRS 673.484 is hereby amended to read as follows:
73.484 Ths Commision ay aftr notes an cing suspend or evoke the
for:
1, Repeated failure o abide by the provisions ofthis chapter or the regulations adopted thereunder,
2. Failure to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chupter 363A of NRS
sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act.

ss0«

See. TL, NRS 675-440 fs hereby amended to read as follow

675440. 1, Ihe Commissioner has reason to beliove that grounds for revocation or suspension
of license exist he or she shall give 20 days writen notice to the licensee stating the contemplated action
and, n general, the grounds therefor and seta date fora hearing,

2, Atthe eonelusion ofa hearing, the Commissioner shall:

(a) Enter a written order cither dismissing the charges, revoking the license, or suspending the
license fora period of not more than 60 days, which period must include any prior temporary suspension,
‘Acopy of the order must be sent by registered or certified mail tothe licensee.

8) Impose upon the licensee an administrative fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation
by the erst of any provision of tis chapter oc any lawful repuation adopted under

{) a fine is imposed pursuant to this section, enter such order asi necessary to recover the costs
of the proceeding, including his or her investigative costs and attorneys Fes,

3, The grounds for revocation or suspension of a fieense are that:

(a) The licensee has failed to pay the annual license fee;

(by The licensee, either knowingly or without any exercise of due care to prevent it, has violated
any provision ofthis chapter or any lawl reguation adopted under it

{)'The licensee has failed to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter 363A of
NRS [:] or sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act;

(@) Any fact or condition exists which would have justified the Commissioner in denying the
licensee's or

nal application fora license hereunder; or
{) The applicant filed to open an office for the conduet of the business authorized under this
chapter within 120 days after the date the license was issued, or has failed to remain open for the conduct
‘of the business for a period of 120 days without good eause therefor,

4, Any revocation or suspension applies only to the ieense granted toa person for the particular
office for which grounds for revocation or suspension exist

3, An order suspending or revoking a license becomes effective 5 days after being entered unless
the order specifies otherwise oF a slay is granted,

See, 72. NRS 677-510 is hereby amended (o read as follows:
677510 1. {the Commissioner has reason to believe that grounds for revocation or suspension

{he o she shall give 20 days' written notice fo the ieensee stating the eontemplated a
general, dhe grounds therefor and et dave for a hearing,

3, Atthe conclusion of a hearing, the Commissioner shall:

(@) Enter a written order cither dismissing the charges, or revoking the license, or suspending the
lense fora petad of aot more han 60 days, which period must nce any prior temporary suspension,
A copy of the order must be sent by registered or certified mail to the licensee,

(b) Impose upon the licensee an administrative fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation
by the licensee of any provision of this chapter or any lawful regulation adopted pursuant thereto,

{€) Ifa fine is imposed pursuant to this section, enter such order as is necessary to recover the costs,
of the proceeding, including his or her investigative costs and avorney's fes.

3. The grounds for revocation or suspension ofa license are that:

(a)‘The licensoe has fated to pay the annual license feet

(oT Heese, eer knowingly or without any exrieof du ae to prevent i ns woated
any provision ofthis chapter, orany lau regulation adopted pursuant thereto:

(6) The licensee has faite fo pay a tas as required pursuant tothe provisions of chapter 363A of
NRS fj] or sections 3 ta 45, inclusive, of this act;

(@) Any fect or condition exists which would have justified the Commissioner in denying the
Ficensce's original application fora license hereunder; or

(e) The applicant failed to open an office for the conduct of the business authorized under this
chapter within 120 days after the date the license was issued, or has failed to remain open for the conduct
‘of the business for a period of 120 days without good cause therefor.

4, Any revocution or suspension applies only to the license granted fo a person for the particular
office for which grounds for revocation or suspension exist

5. An order suspending or revoking a license becomes effective 5 days afier being entered unless
the order specifies otherwise ora stay is granted,

See, 73. NRS 680B.037 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(6801.037 [Payment]

1, Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, payment by an insure of the tax imposed by
[RS 68093.027 is in feu ofall tases imposed by the State or any city. own oF eounly upon premiums or

Page 22 of 31

tor

‘upon income of insurers and of franchise, privilege or other taxes measured by income of the insurer.
2. The provisions of subsection 1 do not apply to the tax duposed pursuant to the provisions of
sections 3 to 43, inclusive, of this act.

See, 74, NRS 683.451 is hereby amended to read as follows:
683A.451 ‘The Commissioner may refuse to issue a license or certificate pursuant to this ehapler
4 may plage any pera to whom aiens or ceria ssc pus otis ehapler on probation,
suspend the person for not more than 12 months, or revoke or refuse to renew his or her license or
certificate, or may impose an administrative fine or take any combination ofthe foregoing actions, for one
‘or more of the following causes:
ding incorrect, misleading, incomplete or partially untrue information in his oF her

appliation for license,

2._ Violating a fave regulating insurance, or violating a regulation, order or subpoena of the
Commissioner or an equivalent officer of another state,

3. Obiaining or attempting to obtain a license through misrepresentation or fined,

4 Misappropriating. converting or improperly withholding money or property received in the
course of the business of insirance,

5. Intentionally misrepresenting the terms of an actual or proposed contract of or application for
insurance.

6. Conviction ofa felony.

7, Admitting or being found to have committed an unfaie trade practice or fraud,

8. Using fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices, or demonstrated incompetence,
untrustworthiness or financial iresponsibility inthe conduet of business in this State or elsewhere

9. Denial. suspension or revocation of @ license asa producer of insurance, oils equivalent, in any
other state, territory or province.

10. Forging another's name to an application for insurance or any other document relating to the
transaction of insurance,

1, Improperly using notes or other reference materia! to complete an examination fora license
related to insurance,

12, Knowingly accepting business related to insurance from an unlicensed person,

15. Failing to comply with an administrative or judicial order imposing an obligation of child

supy

14, Failing to pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of ehapter 363A of NRS fl or
sections 3 to 45, inclusive, of this act.

Sec. 75, NRS 686C.360 is hereby amended to read as follows:
686C.360, ‘The Association is exempt from payment ofall fees and all taxes levied by this state or

any of its political subdivisions, except taxes on property [] and the tax imposed pursuant to sections 3
1045, inclusive, of this ack

Sce. 76. NRS 687A,130 is hereby amended to read as follows:

‘687A.130. The Association is exempt from payment ofall fees and all taxes levied by this State
or any of its subdivisions, except tax

1, Levied on real or personal property; or

2. Imposed pursuant to the provisions of chapler 363A or 3638 of NRS f}] or sections 3 10 45,
inclusive, of this act.

See, 77. NRS 688C.210 is hereby amended to read as follows

688210. 1. Afler notice, and after a hearing if requested, the Commissioner may suspend,
revoke, reise to issue or refuse to renew a license under this chapter if the Commissioner finds that:

(2) There was material misrepresentation in the application forthe license:

(b) The licensee or an officer, pariner, member or significant managerial employee hus been
convicted of fraudulent or dishonest practices, is subject to a final administrative action for
disqualification, or is otherwise shown to be untrustworthy or incompetent;

(c) A provider of viatical settlements has engaged in a pattern of unreasonable payments to viators;

() The applicant or lieensee has been found guilty or guilty but mentally ill of, or pleaded guily.
guilly but mentally ill or volo contendere to, a felony or a misdemeanor involving fraud, forgery,
embezzlement, obtaining money under fase pretenses, larceny, extortion, conspiracy fo defiaud or aay
crime involving moral turpitude, whether or nota judgment of conviction has been entered by the court:

Le) provider of waa seements has entered ina vita sefement ina form not apo
pursuant to NRS 688C.221

(0A provider of viatiea! settlements has filed to honor obligations of a viatial settlement or an
agreement fo purchase a vialical settlement;

{g)Te license no longer mess a euiement forint Fens

{h) A provider of viatical settlements has assigned, transferred or pledged a viticated policy to a
person other than another provider licensed under this chapter, a purchaser of the viatieal selllement ora
special organization:

{) The applicant or licensee has provided materially untrue information to an insurer that issued
a policy that is the subject ofa viatical settlement;

Page 23 of 31

1

ive Petition - State

ustire, levaclé

The applicant or licensee has filed (o pay a tax as required pursuant to the provisions of chapter
363A of NRS fe orsections 3 to 45, inclusive, ofthis,
(&) The applicant or licensee has violated provision ofthis chapter or other applicable provisions:

or

(1) The applicant or licensee has acted in bad faith with regard to. vintor.

2. A suspension imposed for grounds set forth in paragraph (&) or (1) of subsection 1 must not
‘exceed a period of 12 months.

3, Il'the Commissioner takes action as described in subsection 1. the applicant or licensee may
apply in writing fora heating before the Commissioner io determine the reasonableness of the action taken
by the Commissioner, pursuant to the provisions of NRS 679B.310 to 679.370, inclusive.

See, 78. NRS 694C.450 is hereby amended to real as follows:

694C.450 1, Exeept as otherwise provided in this section, a enptive insurer shall pay to the
Division, not later than March 1 of each year, a tas atthe rate of:

(a) Two-lifths of I percent on the first $20,000,000 of its net direct premiums;

of 1 percent on the next $20,000,000 of its net direct premium
ive thousandths of | percent on each additional dollar ofits net direct premiums,
as otherwise provided in this setion,n captive insurer shall pay tothe Division, not later
of each year, a tax at rate of:
0 hundred twenty-five thousandths of 1 percent on the first $20,000,000 of revenue from
assumed reinsurance premiums,

(b) One hundred fifty thousandths of 1 percent on the next $20,000,000 of sevenue from assumed
reinsurance premiums; and

{6) Twenty-live thousands of 1 percent on each additional dollar of revenue from assumed
reinsurance premiums.

surance premiums pursuant to this subseetion must not be levied on premiums fr ri

or portions of risks which are subject to taxation on a direct basis pursuant to subsection 1. A captive

inser sol eure py any reinsurance premix prs fo this subseation on eceme lated

receipt of assets by the captive insurer in exchange for the assumption of loss reserves and other

lials of anoter insure thats under common ownership ad conol wilh th captive isu, te

‘ransaetion is part of a plan to discontinue the operation of the other insurer and the intent ofthe parties
‘to the transaction is to renew or maintain such business with the captive insurer.

3. If the sum of the taxes to be paid by a captive insurer caleulated ‘pursuant 10 subsections 1 and
2 is less than $5,000 in any given year, the éaptive insurer shall pay a tax of $5,000 for that year, ‘The
maximum aggregate tax for any year must not exceed $175,000, ‘The maximum aggregate tax to be paid
bby a sponsored captive insurer applies only to each protected cell and does not apply to the sponsored
captive insurer asa whole.

4. Tivo or more captive insurers under common ownership and control must be taxed as if they
were a single captive insurer,

5. Nolwithstanding any specific statute to the contrary and exept as otherwise provided in this
subsection, the tax provided for by this section constitutes all the taxes colletible pursuant to the laws of”
{his State from a captive insurer, and no occupation tax or other taxes may be levied or collected from a
captive insurer by this State or by any counly, city or municipality within this State, except for twxes
imposed pursuant to chapter 363A or 363B of NIS or sections 3 t0 45, inclusive, af this aet and ad
valorem taxes on real or personal property located in this State sed in the production of income by the
captive insurer,

6, ‘Twenty-five percent of the revenues collected from the tax imposed pursuant to this section
must be deposited with the State Treasurer for credit (othe Account for tie Regulation and Supervision
of Copive nse crete portant NRS6P4C 460. The emaning 75 ptent of erevenescoleed
aust be deposited with the State Treasurer for eredit to the State General Fund,

7. A caplive insurer tha i issued a lense pursuant to this chapter after July 1, 2003, is ented
to receivea nonrefundable credit of $5,000 applied against the agaregate taxes owed by the cuplive insurer
for the firs year in which the captive insurer incurs any lability for te payment of taxes pursuant to this
section, A captive insurer is entitled toa nonrefindable credit pursuant {0
after the captive i ially licensed pursuant to this chapter.

n, unless the context otherwise requires:
ip and control” means:
(1) Inthe ease of a stock insurer, the director indirect ownership of 80 percent or more ofthe
‘oustanding voting stoek of tyo or more corporations by the same member or members.
(2) In the case of a mutual insurer, the direct or indirect ownership of 80 percent or more of
the surplus and the voting power of two or more corporations by the same member or members.

(b) "Net direct premiums” means the direet premiums collected or contracted for on policies or
‘contracts of insurance writen by a captive insurer during the preceding calendar year less the amounts

id to policyholders as return premiums, including dividends on unabsorbed premiums or pretnium
deposits returned or credited to polieyholders,

See. 79. NRS 695A.550 is hereby amended t0 read as follows:
695.550. Every soviety organized or ficensed under this chapter is hereby declared to be a
charitable and benevolent institution, and is exempt from every state, county, district, municipal and school

-seetion not more than once

Page 24 of 31

CO

Initiative Petition - Statewide Statutory Measure State of Nevada

tas other than the fax: impased pursuant to sections 3 t0 45, inclusive, of this act and tases on real
property and office equipment,

See. 80. 1, Subject to the provisions of section 82 of this act, there is hereby appropriated fram
the State General Fund to the Department of Taxation for the inital costs of administering the provisions
of sections 3 to 45, elusive, of his ace

For fiseal year 2013-3014. samen $2,900,000

For fiscal year 2018-2015

2, The sums appropriated by subsection sca
talanee ofthe appropriation made by subsection 1 mist not be commited fr expendi
215-and reverts to te State General Fund as soon aa prymens of money commited have been made,

See. 81. |. Subject to the provisions of section 82 of this act, there is hereby approy
the State General Fund fo the Department of Taxation for the initial costs of administering the provisi

of scetions 3 t0 45, inclusive, of this act:
For fiscal year 2014-2015 .. sn 400,000
For fiscal year 2015-2016 .. $4,200,000

2. The suims appropriated by subsection 1 are available for either fiseal year. Any remaining
balance of the appropriation made by subsection 1 must not be committed for expenditure after June 30,
2016, und reverts o the State General Fund as soon as all payments of money committed have been made.

See, 82, ‘The amendatory provisions of sections 50 and 51 of this act, as applicable, are intended
torus the revenue nscessary to support the appropriation made by sction 80 of ofthis at, which
becomes effective, as required by Section 6 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution. Ifthe revenue 50
raised is not sufficient to support the full amount of the appropriation in either fiscal year. the
appropriation for that year is reduced to the extent of the deficiency,

See. 83. 1. If this act is enacted by the 77th Session of the Legislature and approved by the
Governor as proxi in subsection 3 of Section 2 of Artilo 19 ofthe Nevada Constitution:

{a) This section, sections 1 to 2). inclusive, sections 23 (o 50, inclusive, scetions 53 to 80,
inclusive, and sections 82 and 84 of this act become effective on July 1.2013,

(b) Section 22 of this act becomes effective on Janwary 1.2014.

{c) Section 30 of this act expires by Timitation on June 30,2015,

(d) Sections 51, 52 and 81 of this act shall not become effective,

2. I this act is not enacted and approved as provided in subsection 1, but is approved by the voters:
after the et has been referred or submitted to the voters pursuant to subsection 3 of Section 18 of Article
4 or subsection 3 of Section 2 of Article 19 of the Nevada Constitution:

{a) This section, sections | to 50, inclusive, sections 53 10 79, inclusive, and sections $1, 82 and
£84 of this act become effective on January 1, 2015.

(b) Section 51 of this act bocomes effective on July 1, 2015.

(©) Section 52 of this act becomes effective on July 1, 2016.

(@ Section 80 of this act shall not become effect

3. For the purposes of subsection 1, this act shall be deemed to have been n approved by the
n aceordance with Section 35 of Article 4 of the Nevada Constitution:

(a) The Governor signs the act;

(b) The act is passed by both Houses of the Legislature during its 77th Session notwithstanding the
objections ofthe Governor, oF

(¢) The Governor fails to return or file the act within the time provided by Section 35 of Article 4
of the Nevada Constitution,

See. 84, If any provision of this aet or its application (o any person or cireumstance is held to
invalid or neti, that invalidity o nt fetveness must be given to nrroiest possible constuction
and shall not affect any other provision or application ofthis ac,

(The remainder ofthis page is blank}

Page 25 of 31

BUILDING ENERGETIX CORPORATION, A NEVADA CORPOR-
ATION; AND GARY HILL, APPELLANTS, v. EHE, LP, A
Nevapa Limivep ParrnersHip; JEWEL LEWIS, TRUSTEE OF
THE JEWEL LEWIS TRUST; K.M. KROYER, TRUSTEE OF
THE K.M. KROYER TRUST; ANp JOSEPH S. LOUDEN,
RESPONDENTS.

No. 57203
February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 1228

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low and Mark G. Simons, Reno,
for Appellants.

Jeffrey K. Rahbeck, Zephyr Cove, for Respondents.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and CuErry, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PickBRING, C.J.:

This appeal from a deficiency judgment after foreclosure raises
two questions: (1) whether a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale
may occur under NRS Chapter 107 after a delinquent-tax certifi-
cate has issued to the county treasurer under NRS Chapter 361;
and (2) whether, consistent with NRS 107.080(5), a trust-deed
beneficiary who acquires such property on credit bid at the fore-
closure sale can later redeem, or obtain reconveyance of, the prop-
erty from the county treasurer. We agree with the district court that
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale may occur after a delinquent-tax cer-
tificate has issued and before the final disposition of the property,
and that the property’s acquirer can then pay the delinquent taxes
and other amounts due to redeem or obtain reconveyance of the
property from the court treasurer. Thus, we answer both questions

0

in the affirmative. Since the foreclosure sale was proper, the defi-
ciency judgment was as well. We therefore affirm.

L

The parties presented their dispute to the district court on stip-
ulated facts. Appellant Building Energetix Corporation (BE) exe-
cuted a $490,702 promissory note, secured by a deed of trust on
property in Lyon County and guaranteed by appellant Gary Hill, to
respondents or their assignors (collectively, EHE). BE did not pay
the annual property taxes due, and in June 2007, a delinquent-tax
certificate issued under NRS 361.570. The certificate authorized
the Lyon County treasurer to hold the property in trust for the State
and County for the two-year statutory redemption period.

BE did not make the payments due on the EHE note, either. On
June 10, 2008, a year after the Lyon County delinquent-tax cer-
tificate issued, EHE, through its trustee, recorded a notice of de-
fault and election to sell. A nonjudicial foreclosure sale followed
on October 10, 2008, at which time EHE purchased the property
by credit bid of $325,000, receiving a trustee’s deed in return. On
April 8, 2009, EHE brought this action under NRS 40.455 against
BE and Hill (hereafter, collectively, BE) for the deficiency.

For some unknown reason, EHE did not record its trustee’s deed
until October 2009, a year after the foreclosure sale. In the mean-
time, the two-year period to redeem the property from the 2007
delinquent-tax certificate ran out. NRS Chapter 361 provides for a
treasurer’s deed to issue after the two-year redemption period ex-
pires. See NRS 361.585(1); NRS 361.390. A treasurer’s deed is-
sued in this matter on June 8, 2009—after EHE had foreclosed on
the property and sued BE for a deficiency judgment but before
EHE recorded its trustee’s deed. The county continued to hold the
property in trust under NRS 361.585(2) until EHE paid the back
taxes, interest, and penalties due, which occurred in March 2010.
In return, on April 19, 2010, the county issued a reconveyance
deed to EHE as provided in NRS 361.585(3) and (4).

BE asserted the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, and its associated
anti-deficiency statutes, see NRS 40.455-40.459, as a defense
to EHE’s suit for the deficiency remaining due on the note after
the foreclosure sale. BE argued that EHE could not validly fore-
close while the county treasurer held the property in trust on the
delinquent-tax certificate and that, without a valid foreclosure,
NRS 40.455 precluded EHE from recovering a deficiency judg-
ment. The district court disagreed. It held that the 2007 delinquent-
tax certificate did not diminish EHE’s trustee’s authority to sell the
property at foreclosure in 2008. It awarded EHE a $140,403 defi-
ciency judgment against BE, who now appeals.

pe

I

BE urges reversal on the grounds that the 2007 delinquent-tax
certificate prevented EHE from validly foreclosing on the property
in 2008 and that, without a valid foreclosure sale, EHE cannot re-
cover a deficiency judgment under NRS 40.455. BE maintains that
once a delinquent-tax certificate issues under NRS 361.570, the
subject property must be redeemed before a valid foreclosure sale
can occur. Going further, BE argues that EHE is precluded from
claiming rights under both the 2008 trustee’s deed and the county’s
2010 reconveyance deed. As support, BE points to language in
Nevada’s nonjudicial foreclosure statute, NRS 107.080, to the ef-
fect that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale ‘‘vests in the purchaser the
title of the grantor . . . without equity or right of redemption.”
NRS 107.080(5). In BE’s view, EHE could not have redeemed the
property by reconveyance deed in 2010 if it validly acquired the
property by credit bid at the 2008 foreclosure sale, because under
NRS 107.080(5), title acquired via nonjudicial foreclosure sale is
‘without . . . right of redemption.’ Because EHE did redeem the
property by reconveyance deed in 2010, BE argues that EHE must
not have validly acquired the property by credit bid in 2008. Fi-
nally, BE argues that since EHE acquired the property by recon-
veyance rather than trustee’s deed, EHE cannot recover a defi-
ciency judgment under NRS 40.455.

P|

While a district court’s deficiency determination ordinarily re-
ceives deferential review, Tahoe Highlander v. Westside Fed. Sav.,
95 Nev. 8, 11, 588 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1979), here the parties do not

1BE also urged in the district court and at oral argument that BHE’s delay
in recording its October 2008 trustee’s deed prevented completion of the fore-
closure sale, such that Lyon County’s later-issued but first-recorded June 2009
tax deed nullified the trustee’s deed. The district court rejected this con-
tention based on Jn re Grant, 303 B.R. 205 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2003), which
holds, consistent with early Nevada cases, that a trustee’s sale is complete
when the gavel falls. Id. at 210 (citing Dazet v. Landry, 21 Nev. 291, 297, 30
P. 1064, 1067 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79
Nev. 503, 387 P.2d 989 (1963); In the Matter of Smith, 4 Nev. 254 (1868))
(‘Notably missing from the Nevada foreclosure procedures is the requirement
that a trustee’s deed must be recorded in order for the sale to be complete or
the transfer to be effective.’”). BE did not address this issue in its opening
brief, so neither do we. See State of Nevada v. Glusman, 98 Nev. 412, 428,
651 P.2d 639, 649 (1982). Nor do we address the effect of the 2009 amend-
ments to NRS 107.080, which require recordation of the trustee’s deed fol-
lowing a nonjudicial foreclosure sale within 30 days of the sale or impose spec-
ified civil penalties, as both parties conceded at oral argument that the 2009
amendments to NRS 107.080 do not apply to a foreclosure sale set in motion
before their effective date. See 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 247, § 1, at 1005.

Ce

dispute the district court’s findings but only whether EHE was
statutorily entitled to a deficiency judgment at all. Statutory inter-
pretation involves law, not fact, so de novo review applies. Walters
v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. 723, 727, 263 P.3d 231, 234 (2011).

A.
|

The county’s 2007 delinquent-tax certificate did not prevent
EHE from purchasing the property at the 2008 foreclosure sale.
BE’s argument to the contrary proceeds from the premise that,
once a delinquent-tax certificate issues under NRS 361.570, the
county becomes the owner of the property, meaning the tax cer-
tificate must be extinguished before title can transfer, whether by
foreclosure sale or otherwise. But this is not what NRS 361.570
says or what NRS Chapter 361 contemplates.

In NRS Chapter 361, the Legislature has established a statutory
scheme for the collection of property taxes that, while amend-
ed from time to time, has endured since 1957. See Casazza v.
A-Allstate Abstract Co., 102 Nev. 340, 344, 721 P.2d 386, 389
(1986) (describing the statutory framework NRS Chapter 361
establishes for collecting property taxes). The issuance of a
delinquent-tax certificate is only a first step in the tax collection
process. If property taxes become delinquent, NRS 361.570(1)
provides that a tax certificate shall issue, ‘‘authoriz[ing] the county
treasurer, as trustee for the State and county, to hold [the] property
described in the certificate for the period of 2 years . . . unless
sooner redeemed.’ Assuming the 2 years pass with no redemption,
the next step is issuance of a tax deed of the property, again to the
county treasurer ‘‘in trust for the use and benefit of the State and
county... .’ NRS 361.585(1). But even then, the Legislature
gives ‘‘owners and others holding interests in property conveyed to
the county treasurer following the two-year redemption period an
additional opportunity to protect their interests.’ Casazza, 102
Nev. at 344, 721 P.2d at 389 (citing NRS 361.585(3) and (4)).

_

Until the county gives notice of sale or otherwise finally dis-
poses of the property, ‘“‘any person specified in subsection 4 [of
NRS 361.585] is entitled to have the property reconveyed upon
payment to the county treasurer’’ of the delinquent taxes, plus
penalties, interest, and costs. NRS 361.585(3). Subsection 4 of
NRS 361.585 provides for reconveyance to

one or more of the [following] persons . . . , as their interests
may appear of record:

(a) The owner.

(b) The beneficiary under a note and deed of trust.

ee:

(©) The mortgagee under a mortgage.
(d) The creditor under a judgment.

@ The person holding a contract to purchase the property
before its conveyance to the county treasurer.

(h) The successor in interest of any person specified in this
subsection.

Reconveyance under NRS 361.585, as distinct from conveyance
under 361.595, ‘‘is in the nature of a redemption, and divests the
county of its title to the property.’ Casazza, 102 Nev. at 347, 721
P.2d at 391. It does not give the redeeming party ‘‘any interest
greater than the interest he previously held.’ Jd. at 347, 721 P.2d
at 390.

Under these statutes, although the Lyon County treasurer
held the property in trust pursuant to the 2007 delinquent-tax cer-
tificate and thereafter the 2009 tax deed, it did not thereby become
the ‘‘owner’’ of the property, such that BE’s ownership could
not be extinguished by nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2008. On the
contrary, NRS 361.570 and NRS 361.585 both repeatedly refer
to “‘the owner”’ as the title holder of record, not the county, and
contemplate successorship despite the existence of the tax certifi-
cate or deed. Thus, NRS 361.570(2)(c) requires the tax certificate
to state ‘‘the name of the owner or taxpayer of each property, if
known.” NRS 361.570(4) states, ‘‘Before the owner or his or her
successor redeems the property, he or she must also pay the county
treasurer holding the certificate any additional taxes, penalties and
costs... ”’ And NRS 361.585(4)(a) and (h) list the “‘owner’’ and
“successor in interest of any person specified in this subsection’
as among the persons entitled to reconveyance.

“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to
‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there’ ’’ BedRoc Limited, LLC v.
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (quoting Connecticut Nat.
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). NRS 361.570
and NRS 361.585 both recognize that the ‘‘owner’’ remains the
title holder of record until the right to redeem or obtain recon-
veyance has expired. Cf. Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 788
(Utah 1992) (applying analogous Utah law, the court observed
that ‘‘following the preliminary tax sale, the property owner, al-
though he is delinquent in his real estate taxes, maintains the un-
derlying ownership interest in the property’’). These statutes ac-
knowledge that post-certificate and post-deed transfers might occur
when ‘“‘successors”’ are named as potential redemptioners. And
they say nothing about freezing all foreclosures or other transfers

“4 Po

until the property is redeemed from, or reconveyed by, the county
treasurer.

BE argues that ‘‘allowing a valid nonjudicial foreclosure process
to proceed during the pendency of a Tax Certificate would create
absurd results’’ and defeat “‘the purpose of the Tax Certificate[:] to
impede marketability of title until taxes are paid”’ But Chapter
361’s object, like statutory tax collection schemes elsewhere, “‘is
not the acquisition of the property, but rather the collection of
taxes.’ Little v. United States, 704 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1983) (applying an analogous California tax collection
statute). ‘‘[I]t is the settled policy of [such laws] to give a delin-
quent taxpayer every reasonable opportunity compatible with the
rights of the State to redeem his property and to return it to the tax
rolls for further governmental support.”’ Jd.

Neither Chapter 361’s text nor its apparent purpose supports
BE’s argument that the 2007 delinquent-tax certificate prevented a
valid foreclosure sale from occurring in 2008. At least one court
has held, under similar circumstances, that a valid foreclosure sale
can occur notwithstanding the state’s acquisition of the property,
subject to a still-open right of redemption. Potter v. Entler, 163
P.2d 490, 491-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (interpreting an analogous
tax collection statute). Contrary to BE’s assertion, this result is not
absurd; in fact, it appears to be the norm. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d Ju-
dicial Sales § 177 (2006); Marianne M. Jennings, From the
Courts, 37 Real Est. L. J. 175 (2008). Therefore, we conclude that
the 2008 foreclosure sale was valid.”

B.

BE next argues that there is a fatal inconsistency between EHE
acquiring BE’s title through the 2008 nonjudicial foreclosure sale
and thereafter, in 2010, obtaining a reconveyance deed from the
county. In essence, BE maintains a party cannot both purchase
property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and later redeem it from
the county by paying the back taxes due. Again, the applicable
statutes contemplate this exact scenario.

?This conclusion assumes that the foreclosure sale was complete in 2008,
when the gavel fell. See supra note 1. The result does not change even if the
foreclosure sale did not conclude until October 2009, when the trustee’s deed
was recorded. Although the tax deed was issued in June 2009, BE still had an
interest in the property, if only in obtaining its reconveyance, such that EHE
could validly foreclose. Compare Casazza, 102 Nev. at 347, 721 P.2d at 391
(holding that reconveyance pursuant to NRS 361.585 restores the redemp-
tioner’s interest, whatever it may be, in the property), with Potter, 163 P.2d at
491-92 (holding that an unexpired right of redemption is a property interest
that may be foreclosed).

ee:

Nevada law provides for both judicial and nonjudicial foreclo-
sure sales. NRS 40.430; NRS 107.080. A principal difference be-
tween them is that a judicial foreclosure sale ‘“‘must be conducted
in the same manner as the sale of real property upon execution,”
NRS 40.430(4), meaning the ‘‘property shall be subject to re-
demption’’ under NRS Chapter 21. See NRS 21.190. Under NRS
21.210,° the debtor has an absolute one-year right to redeem
the property from the purchaser at the execution- or judicial-
foreclosure sale. A nonjudicial foreclosure sale, by contrast, does
not give the debtor the right to redeem the property from the pur-
chaser. Thus, NRS 107.080(5) states, ‘‘Every sale made under the
provisions of this section and other sections of this chapter [107
governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales] vests in the purchaser the
title of the grantor and any successors in interest without equity or
right of redemption.’ (Emphasis added.)

BE seizes on NRS 107.080(5)’s words ‘‘without . . . right of re-
demption.”’ It argues that they curtail not only redemption by a
debtor from a purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale but also
redemption by the foreclosure-sale purchaser from the county
treasurer under NRS 361.570 and NRS 361.585. BE misreads
NRS 107.080(5). The phrase ‘‘without . . . right of redemption’
immediately follows and modifies the words ‘“‘title of the grantor
and any successors in interest.’ It addresses potential redemption
rights of the debtor—the grantor of the deed of trust being fore-
closed—not rights acquired by the purchaser at the nonjudicial
foreclosure sale as against a county treasurer under NRS Chapter
361.

The doctrine of noscitur a sociis teaches that ‘‘words are known
by—acquire meaning from—the company they keep.’’ Ford v.
State, 127 Nev. 608, 622 n.8, 262 P.3d 1123, 1132 n.8 (2011)
(citing Orr Ditch Co. v. Dist. Ct., 64 Nev. 138, 146, 178 P.2d
558, 562 (1947)). NRS 107.080(1) confers upon the trustee, when
real property is used to secure the performance of an obligation, a
power of sale when that obligation is breached. NRS 107.080(5)
deprives the debtor (BE) of rights of redemption against the pur-

3NRS 21.210 reads:

‘The judgment debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property from the
purchaser any time within 1 year after the sale on paying the purchaser
the amount of his or her purchase price with 1 percent per month
thereon in addition, to the time of redemption, together with:

1. The amount of any assessment, taxes or payments toward liens
which were created prior to the purchase, which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such amount; and

2. If the purchaser is also a creditor, having a prior lien to that of the
redemptioner, other than the judgment under which the purchase was
made, the amount of such lien, with interest.

86 Pe

chaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure. The remainder of NRS
107.080(5) and (6) make this clear. Thus, NRS 107.080(5)(a)-(c)
and NRS 107.080(6) enumerate the limited instances in which a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale may be made void, i.e., lack of sub-
stantial compliance with NRS Chapter 107 under NRS
107.080(5)(a) or lack of proper notice to the grantor or other per-
son entitled to notice of default and election to sell under NRS
107.080(6). With these exceptions, a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
terminates the debtor’s legal title. See Charmicor, Inc. v. Bradshaw
Finance Co., 92 Nev. 310, 313, 550 P.2d 413, 415 (1976). NRS
107.080(5)’s ‘‘right of redemption’” language ensures that pur-
chasers at nonjudicial foreclosure sales receive the “‘title of the
grantor,’ unencumbered by a judicial-foreclosure debtor’s “‘right of
redemption.’ Nothing in the statute suggests, however, that the
beneficiary of a deed of trust who takes title by credit bid at a non-
judicial foreclosure sale does not do so subject to whatever prop-
erty tax liens may exist, which it thereafter may pay off, whether
by redemption, reconveyance, or otherwise. See NRS 361.450.

In sum, the 2010 reconveyance deed to EHE was valid and did
not undermine the legitimacy of the 2008 trustee’s deed. Since
EHE was the legitimate grantee of both deeds, BE’s final argument
that a party who acquires title by means of reconveyance deed can-
not maintain a suit for a deficiency under NRS 40.455 fails.

We affirm.

Harpesty and Cuerry, JJ., concur.

BILAL ABDULLAH, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 57818
February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 419

Sandra L. Stewart, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Woifson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDzsTY and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

Tn this appeal, we address the district court clerk’s authority to
prepare and file a notice of appeal on an appellant’s behalf. We
conclude that the district court clerk lacks authority to prepare and

88 PO

file a notice of appeal on an appellant’s behalf unless authorized
by statute or court rule. There are two relevant examples. First,
NRS 177.075(2) authorizes the district court clerk to prepare and
file a notice of appeal on a criminal defendant’s behalf when the
defendant proceeded to trial without counsel and has requested an
appeal after being advised of the right to appeal at sentencing. Sec-
ond, NRAP 4(c) authorizes the district court clerk to prepare and
file a notice of appeal from a judgment of conviction on a crimi-
nal defendant’s behalf when the district court directs the clerk to
do so after finding that the defendant established a valid appeal-
deprivation claim and is entitled to a direct appeal.

The district court clerk prepared and filed the notice of appeal
in this case on appellant’s behalf designating the notice of entry of
the district court’s order denying a post-conviction petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, but the clerk lacked authority to do so be-
cause NRS 177.075(2) does not apply here and the notice does
not comply with NRAP 4(c). As the notice of appeal does not
specify the judgment of conviction and the district court clerk
may not prepare and file a notice of appeal from the denial of a
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we dismiss the
appeal with instructions to the district court clerk to prepare and
file a notice of appeal on appellant’s behalf from the judgment of
conviction, as directed by the district court pursuant to NRAP
A(c).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Bilal Abdullah pleaded guilty to one count of
attempted robbery, and the district court entered a judgment of
conviction on March 9, 2010. No appeal was filed from the judg-
ment of conviction. Abdullah later filed a timely proper person
post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he as-
serted, among other claims, that he asked counsel to file an appeal
from the judgment of conviction and counsel refused to file the re-
quested appeal. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the dis-
trict court granted the petition in part, finding that Abdullah had
been deprived of his right to a direct appeal due to ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, see Toston v. State, 127 Nev. 971, 267 P.3d
795 (2011); Lozada v. State, 110 Nev. 349, 871 P.2d 944 (1994),
and ordered the district court clerk ‘‘to prepare and file a Notice
of Appeal from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence on De-
fendant’s behalf’ See NRAP 4(c). The district court denied the re-
mainder of Abdullah’s claims. The court’s written order was en-
tered on January 14, 2011.

The district court clerk filed a notice of entry of the decision and
order on February 24, 2011, as required under NRS 34.830(2) and
(3). The same day, the district court clerk prepared and filed a no-

P| 89

tice of appeal on Abdullah’s behalf. The notice of appeal desig-
nates ‘‘the Order entered in this action on February 24, 2011.”

DISCUSSION

Abdullah raises some issues that would be appropriate on appeal
from the judgment of conviction and others that would be appro-
priate on appeal from the order denying in part his post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although the State responds
to the merits of all the issues raised by Abdullah, it also asserts
that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider any issues related to
the order denying in part the post-conviction petition because the
district court clerk did not have authority to prepare and file a no-
tice of appeal on Abdullah’s behalf from that order and Abdullah
failed to file a notice of appeal from that order. In Abdullah’s
reply, which this court ordered, he argues that as he was proceed-
ing in proper person at the time that the district court clerk pre-
pared and filed the notice of appeal, he should not be required to
have known that he had to file his own notice of appeal from the
order denying in part his post-conviction petition.

_

To resolve the jurisdictional issue presented, we first must de-
termine whether the district court clerk had authority to prepare
and file the notice of appeal on Abdullah’s behalf. The decision to
take an appeal rests squarely with the appellant. Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also NRS 177.075(2)-(3) (requir-
ing notice of appeal to be signed by appellant, appellant’s attorney,
or district court clerk where defendant who proceeded to trial
without counsel requests an appeal after being informed of the
right to appeal when the court imposes the sentence); NRAP 3C(c)
(‘‘When an appellant elects to appeal from a district court order or
judgment governed by this Rule, appellant’s trial counsel shall
serve and file a notice of appeal pursuant to applicable rules and
statutes.”’); NRAP 4(c)(1)(B)@ii) (providing district court clerk
may file notice of appeal where petitioner has demonstrated that he
was deprived of a direct appeal).' The district court clerk is au-
thorized to prepare and file a notice of appeal on a criminal de-
fendant’s behalf in two specific situations: (1) when a defendant
“‘who has not pleaded guilty or guilty but mentally ill and who is
without counsel’’ has been informed at sentencing of his right to
appeal and requests an appeal, NRS 177.075(2); and (2) when the

"Nevada law provides for an automatic appeal without any action by a
criminal defendant or his counsel in only one circumstance. When a defendant
has been convicted following a trial and is sentenced to death, the appeal from
the judgment of conviction is automatic unless the defendant or his counsel af-
firmatively waives the appeal. NRS 177.055(1).

90 Le

district court finds that a post-conviction petitioner has demon-
strated that he was deprived of his right to appeal from a judgment
of conviction and orders the clerk to prepare and file a notice of
appeal from the judgment of conviction as provided in NRAP
4©(DB@, Gi).

P|

These provisions ensure that a notice of appeal from a judgment
of conviction is prepared and filed on behalf of a defendant in two
circumstances in which there is a significant risk that the right to
appeal otherwise will be lost. In both instances in which the clerk
has authority to prepare and file a notice of appeal from a judg-
ment of conviction on a defendant’s behalf, the defendant has as-
serted his right to appeal from the judgment of conviction. These
provisions therefore are consistent with the notion that the defen-
dant has the ultimate authority to decide whether to take such an
appeal. No statute or court rule permits the district court clerk to
prepare and file a notice of appeal on a defendant’s behalf in any
other circumstance. In particular, NRS Chapter 34, which governs
post-conviction habeas petitions and appeals therefrom, has no
provision directing the court or clerk to prepare and file a notice
of appeal on an aggrieved litigant’s behalf.

Here, the notice of appeal was prepared and signed by the dis-
trict court clerk on Abdullah’s behalf. Because the district court
clerk only has that authority in limited circumstances, we must de-
termine whether any of those circumstances are present in this
case. NRS 177.075(2) does not apply because Abdullah was rep-
resented by counsel and entered a guilty plea. Although NRAP
4(c) clearly applies because Abdullah filed a post-conviction peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was deprived of
his right to a direct appeal and the district court found that that
claim had merit and ordered the district court clerk to prepare and
file a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sen-
tence, the notice of appeal prepared by the clerk does not designate
the judgment of conviction and sentence. We therefore must de-
termine whether the intent to appeal from the judgment of con-
viction can be inferred from the notice prepared and filed by the
clerk.

|

A notice of appeal must “‘designate the judgment, order or part
thereof being appealed.” NRAP 3(c)(1)(B). Generally, a judgment
or order that is not included in the notice of appeal is not consid-
ered on appeal. Collins v. Union Fed. Savings, 97 Nev. 88, 89-90,
624 P.2d 496, 497 (1981). This general rule is not inflexible.
Because ‘‘[t]he notice of appeal is not . . . intended to be a tech-
nical trap for the unwary draftsman,” this court will not dismiss
an appeal “‘[w]here . . . the intent to appeal from a final judgment

ee 91

can be reasonably inferred and the respondent is not misled.’
Lemmond vy, State, 114 Nev. 219, 220, 954 P.2d 1179, 1179
(1998); see also Collins, 97 Nev. at 90, 624 P.2d at 497 (explain-
ing that court will not dismiss an appeal for failure to designate the
correct judgment ‘‘where the intention to appeal from a specific
judgment may be reasonably inferred from the text of the notice
and where the defect has not materially misled the respondent’’).
Other courts have similarly looked beyond the face of the notice to
determine the order it intends to appeal. See Trustees of Const. In-
dustry v. Hartford Fire Ins., 578 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that opposing party was not prejudiced by incorrect docket
number on notice of appeal where judgment attached to notice had
correct docket number); U.S. v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1223
(10th Cir. 1997) (providing that court may look beyond the face of
the notice of appeal to supporting papers filed with it to determine
judgment it intends to appeal).

Ce

Even with that somewhat flexible approach, we cannot infer the
intent to appeal from the judgment of conviction based on the no-
tice of appeal prepared and filed by the district court clerk in this
case. In our decisions, we have only looked beyond the notice of
appeal to the order directly referenced by the notice to determine
what order the appellant intended to appeal. See Krause Inc. v. Lit-
tle, 117 Nev. 929, 933, 34 P.3d 566, 569 (2001) (looking at ref-
erenced judgment notwithstanding the verdict to construe notice of
appeal as referring to underlying verdict); Lemmond, 114 Nev. at
220, 954 P.2d at 1179 (looking at referenced notice of entry of
order to construe notice of appeal as referring to underlying
order). The notice in this case designates an order entered on Feb-
ruary 24, 2011. No order was entered on that date. However, the
notice of entry of the order denying the post-conviction petition
was filed on that date. When a notice of appeal designates the no-
tice of entry of an order, the court may infer that the appellant in-
tended to appeal from the order identified in the notice of entry.
Lemmond, 114 Nev. at 220, 954 P.2d at 1179. But to infer an in-
tention to appeal from the judgment of conviction based on the no-
tice in this case, we would have to look beyond the text of the no-
tice of appeal and the notice of entry designated in the notice of
appeal to the text of the order referenced in the notice of entry.
That goes beyond our prior decisions and would undermine the
general rule that an appealable judgment or order that is not des-
ignated in the notice cannot be considered on appeal. Although the
State was not misled by the notice of appeal as it responded to Ab-
dullah’s arguments concerning the judgment of conviction, it is dif-
ficult to reasonably infer from the text of the notice of appeal and
the notice of entry of order designated in the notice of appeal that
the intent was to appeal from the judgment of conviction.

m2 P|

CONCLUSION

We conclude that this appeal is not properly before us. The
notice of appeal prepared and filed by the district court clerk on
Abdullah’s behalf does not indicate that it is, and cannot be con-
strued as, an appeal from a judgment of conviction as ordered by
the district court pursuant to NRAP 4(c). Although the notice
could be construed as a notice of appeal from the order denying
in part Abdullah’s post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, the district court clerk does not have authority to file such
a notice; therefore, the notice may not invoke this court’s jurisdic-
tion to consider issues related to the order denying in part the post-
conviction petition. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and direct
the district court clerk to file a notice of appeal from the judgment
of conviction consistent with the district court’s order and NRAP
A(c).

PICKERING, C.J., and Sarrta, J., concur.

FRANK KEVIN BLACKBURN, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 58255
February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 422

ee 93

Almase Law Group, LLC, and Caesar V. Almase, Las Vegas, for
Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, and Danielle K. Pieper, Deputy District Attor-
ney, Clark County, for Respondent.

il

—_

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Pickerine, C.J.:

In this appeal we address psychosexual evaluations and consider
whether a risk assessment based on clinical judgment, in addition
to psychological tests, comports with Nevada law. Because NRS
176A.110 and NRS 176.139 call for the use of clinical judgment
in tandem with diagnostic tools, we affirm.

L

Appellant Frank Blackburn pleaded guilty to attempted sexual
assault pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Before sentencing, John Pacult, a licensed social worker, per-
formed a psychosexual evaluation of Blackburn as required by
NRS 176.139.

Pacult interviewed Blackburn. During the evaluation, Pacult
used four assessment tools: the Vermont Assessment of Sex-
Offender Risk (VASOR); the Rapid Risk Assessment of Sexual
Offender Recidivism (RRASOR); the STATIC-99; and the
STATIC-2002 (collectively, actuarial tools). Each actuarial tool
resulted in a different raw score. After categorization, these scores
fell within a range predicting a low-to-moderate risk to reoffend.
Additionally, Pacult considered various documents provided by the
Division of Parole and Probation, including Blackburn’s plea
agreement, multiple police reports, and Blackburn’s SCOPE and
arrest records. Pacult also spoke with Blackburn’s wife, his daugh-
ter, the author of his presentence investigation (PSI) report, and the
physician who had treated Blackburn’s bipolar disorder for ten
years.

Pacult concluded that the risk assessment tools underestimated
Blackburn’s risk to reoffend, primarily because Blackburn had no
prior criminal history. The offense dynamics, combined with

Pd 95

Blackburn’s reported history of sexual and physical aggression
and mental health issues, led Pacult to conclude that Blackburn had
a high risk to reoffend.

Unhappy with Pacult’s opinion, Blackburn filed a motion
to strike the psychosexual evaluation and to order a new psycho-
sexual evaluation and PSI report. The district court denied Black-
burn’s motion and sentenced him to prison. Blackburn appealed,
and this court reversed and remanded for the district court to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing on whether Pacult’s evaluation com-
ported with currently accepted standards of assessment. Blackburn
v. State, Docket No. 56246 (Order of Reversal and Remand, No-
vember 5, 2010).

As ordered, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. At the
hearing, Blackburn’s expert, Dr. Mark Chambers, testified that he
did not dispute how Pacult utilized the actuarial tools, nor how he
scored Blackburn. Instead, Dr. Chambers opined that Pacult vio-
lated NRS 176A.110 and NRS 176.139 by using clinical judgment
to override the tool-generated findings.

Pacult also testified at the hearing. After stating that he had
completed thousands of evaluations, he explained that he helped
the Nevada Legislature craft the language of NRS 176A.110 and
NRS 176.139, and was therefore familiar with those statutes. In his
view, the statutes require the evaluator to use ‘“‘all relevant docu-
ments,’ including victim statements and interviews with victims
and their families, in addition to the actuarial tools.'

The district court ultimately held that the Pacult evaluation was
proper because it was conducted using currently accepted standards
of assessment pursuant to NRS 176.139. The court then reinstated
the judgment of conviction and Blackburn appealed once again.

OL.
a

This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011).
Our analysis begins and ends with the statutory text if it is clear
and unambiguous. Id.

NRS 176A.110(1)(a) provides that a court shall not grant pro-
bation to a person convicted of a sexual offense, including at-

"Though neither party questioned the appropriateness of a medical expert
opining on the meaning of a statute, courts normally “exclude testimonial
opinion on the state of the law’? United Fire Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 105
Nev. 504, 509, 780 P.2d 193, 196 (1989); cf. A-NLV Cab Co. v. State, Taxi-
cab Authority, 108 Nev. 92, 95, 825 P.2d 585, 587 (1992) (disapproving
the use of a legislator’s statement of opinion as a means of divining legisla-
tive intent or deciphering statutory text). In resolving the statutory construc-
tion issue at the heart of this appeal, we rely on the statutes’ text and conven-
tional principles of statutory interpretation, not the opinions of Dr. Chambers
or Pacult.

96 P|

tempted sexual assault, unless ‘‘the person who conducts the
psychosexual evaluation [required by NRS 176.139] certifies in the
report prepared pursuant to NRS 176.139 that the person convict-
ed of the offense does not represent a high risk to reoffend based
upon a currently accepted standard of assessment.’ (Emphasis
added.) Under NRS 176.139(3), the person who prepares this re-
port “‘must use diagnostic tools that are generally accepted as
being within the standard of care for the evaluation of sex

offenders... ”’ (Emphasis added.) Additionally,
3. ... the psychosexual evaluation of the defendant must
include:
(a) A comprehensive clinical interview with the defendant;
and

(b) A review of all investigative reports relating to the de-
fendant’s sexual offense and all statements made by victims of
that offense.

4, The psychosexual evaluation of the defendant may
include:

(a) A review of records relating to previous criminal of-
fenses committed by the defendant;

(b) A review of records relating to previous evaluations
and treatment of the defendant;

(c) A review of the defendant’s records from school;

(d) Interviews with the defendant’s parents, the defendant’s
spouse or other persons who may be significantly involved
with the defendant or who may have relevant information re-
lating to the defendant’s background; and

(e) The use of psychological testing, polygraphic examina-
tions and arousal assessment.

NRS 176.139(3)-(4).

Blackburn emphasizes the phrase ‘‘currently accepted standard
of assessment’’ and extracts the words ‘‘standard’’ and “‘assess-
ment’’ from the rest of NRS 176A.110. Blackburn asserts that the
word ‘‘standard”’ refers to an objective measurement that practi-
tioners can quantify and use. He continues that an ‘‘assessment”’
is the testing used to predict an outcome, which in the field of psy-
chology is limited to tools such as the VASOR, RRASOR,
STATIC-99, and STATIC-2002.

Similarly, he maintains that a clinician’s professional opinion is
not a generally accepted diagnostic tool as required by NRS
176.139(3). He then argues that ‘diagnostic tools’’ must use stan-
dardized principles of measurement to be ‘‘generally accepted’’—
which again refers only to the VASOR, RRASOR, STATIC-99,
STATIC-2002, and similar actuarial tools.

Pd 97

P|

We disagree. Blackburn’s approach focuses on a single phrase in
NRS 176A.110 to the exclusion of its remaining text and that of its
associated statute, NRS 176.139. This violates the basic rule of
statutory interpretation that holds that statutes ‘‘must be construed
as a whole and not be read in a way that would render words or
phrases superfluous or make a provision nugatory.’ Butler v. State,
120 Nev. 879, 892-93, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004) (internal quotations
omitted). ‘‘‘A statute cannot be dissected into individual words,
each one being thrown onto the anvil of dialectics to be hammered
into a meaning which has no association with the words from
which it has violently been separated.’ ’? 2A Norman J. Singer &
J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:5
n.10 (7th ed. 2008) (quoting Bertera’s Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v.
Masters, 236 A.2d 197, 204 (Pa. 1967), overruled on other
grounds by Goodman v. Kennedy, 329 A.2d 224, 231 (Pa. 1974)).

Examining the words that precede the phrase ‘‘standard of as-
sessment’ in NRS 176A.110 reveals that the statute does not con-
template a single acceptable standard of assessment. The statute al-
lows a professional to make his or her assessment “‘based upon a
currently accepted standard of assessment.’ NRS 176A.110(1)(a)
(emphasis added). If the word ‘‘a’’ in this statute were ‘‘the,’ then
the statute might indicate only a single standard exists. The sen-
tence as written, however, requires only that the basis of the psy-
chosexual report be some currently accepted standard that satisfies
the requirements of NRS 176.139.

NRS 176.139(3) defines what the evaluation must include, NRS
176.139(4) sets forth what the evaluation may include, and NRS
176.139(5) indicates that the person conducting the evaluation
must be given access to all the records needed to conduct the eval-
uation. Psychological testing is one factor that may be included in
an evaluation, NRS 176.139(4)(e), but the plain meaning of
“‘may’’ does not indicate that actuarial tools are the only generally
accepted diagnostic tools or standards of assessment that an eval-
uator can use. See Butler, 120 Nev. at 893, 102 P.3d at 81
(“ “May, as it is used in legislative enactments, is often construed
as a permissive grant of authority... ”’). Further, Blackburn’s
argument that actuarial tools are the only valid source of informa-
tion would make the other articulated sources in NRS 176.139(3)-
(5) superfluous. This approach is inconsistent with the rule against
reading statutes in a way that makes some of their words or phrases
superfluous. Butler, 120 Nev. at 892-93, 102 P.3d at 81.

Even taken alone, the term ‘‘diagnostic tools’’ used in NRS
176.139(3) cannot be construed to mean only actuarial tools be-

98 ee

cause ‘‘words that have a technical or special meaning are pre-
sumed to carry their technical or special meaning.’ Savage v.
Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 94, 157 P.3d 697, 702 (2007). In the con-
text of mental health care, there are an ‘enormous number of psy-
chometric instruments commercially available,” all of which con-
stitute diagnostic tools. Thomas A. Powell & John C. Holt,
Forensic Psychological Evaluations: The Methods in Our Madness,
31 Vt. Bar J., no. 4, 2005, at 40. We acknowledge that mental
health professionals are increasingly dependent on actuarial tools.
However, ‘‘[e]valuators should review as much existing documen-
tation on point as is available, such as prior mental health records,
school reports, and hospitalization files. This limits over-reliance
on psychological testing or clinical interviewing as the only sources
for findings and conclusions.” Jd. at 42. Therefore, the technical
term ‘‘diagnostic tools,’ when understood in the proper context of
mental health, does not refer exclusively to actuarial tools.

Thus, NRS 176A.110 and NRS 176.139 do not mandate re-
liance on actuarial tools alone, and a clinician may rely on his or
her professional opinion in conducting a psychosexual evaluation.
When a clinician’s professional opinion departs from the quantifi-
able test results, as here, the district court should acknowledge the
discrepancy and make specific findings about the deviation in its
determination of whether a psychosexual evaluation is based upon
a currently accepted standard of assessment.

m.
a

Next, we consider whether the district court abused its discre-
tion in accepting Pacult’s evaluation of Blackburn in making its
sentencing determination. See Parrish v. State, 116 Nev. 982, 989,
12 P.3d 953, 957 (2000). An appellant must show that the district
court relied solely on impalpable or highly suspect evidence to ren-
der the court’s sentencing decision invalid. See Silks v. State, 92
Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976).

Before a district court can accept a psychosexual evaluation, it
has an obligation to determine whether the evaluator was qualified
under NRS 176.139(2) and whether the evaluation is based upon
currently accepted standards of assessment. In making these de-
terminations, the court also must articulate specific findings so that
this court can properly review its reasoning. See Webb v. Shull,
128 Nev. 85, 93, 270 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2012).

Here, Pacult, a licensed social worker, demonstrated his quali-
fications to perform psychosexual evaluations, see Austin v. State,
123 Nev. 1, 2, 151 P.3d 60, 60 (2007), and the district court cor-

pO 99

rectly sought guidance in NRS 176.139. The court erred, however,
by failing to make specific findings regarding the justification of-
fered for Pacult’s deviation from the psychological test results. De-
spite this omission, the district court did not abuse its discretion
because the record supports its decision.

As the district court found, Pacult’s evaluation included
the mandatory items articulated in NRS 176.139(3)(a) and (b).
Pacult also utilized additional information, as allowed by NRS
176.139(4), and as discussed above, evaluators should review as
much existing documentation as is available to ensure accuracy. Al-
though Pacult deviated from the test-based results, his ultimate as-
sessment was based on a detailed document review and Pacult’s ex-
tensive professional expertise. Further, Blackburn’s expert witness,
Dr. Chambers, did not claim that actuarial tools are the only ac-
ceptable method of assessment or that Pacult’s evaluation fell
below the standard of care required for psychosexual evaluations.
In fact, Dr. Chambers acknowledged that clinical judgment is the
only way to synthesize multiple actuarial scores into a single risk
to reoffend. More notably, Dr. Chambers also admitted that devi-
ation from standardized tests may be warranted, particularly when
the actuarial tools do not adequately address important variables—
as Pacult found was the case here. Thus, we conclude that the

evidence in the record supports the district court’s decision to
deny Blackburn’s request for a new psychosexual evaluation and to
reinstate the judgment of conviction.

For these reasons, we affirm.

Harpesty and Sairta, JJ., concur.

RICK SOWERS, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANT, v. FOREST HILLS
SUBDIVISION; ANN HALL anp KARL HALL, Inprvipu-
ALLY, RESPONDENTS.

No. 58609
February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 427

[|
[Rehearing denied April 15, 2013]
[En banc reconsideration denied June 20, 2013]

Fahrendorf, Viloria, Oliphant & Oster, LLP, and Patrick R.
Millsap, Reno, for Appellant.

Karl S. Hall, Reno; Bowen Hall and Ann O. Hall, Reno, for
Respondents.

ILA

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and SaITTA, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

In this appeal, we address whether the district court properly
concluded that, under the particular circumstances and’ surround-
ings of the case, a proposed residential wind turbine would con-
stitute a nuisance warranting a permanent injunction against its
construction. Below, respondents Forest Hills Subdivision, Ann
Hall, and Karl Hall (collectively, the Halls) sought to permanently
enjoin their neighbor, appellant Rick Sowers, from constructing a
wind turbine on his residential property, asserting that the proposed
turbine would constitute a nuisance.' The district court agreed and
granted the permanent injunction.

We conclude that, in this case, substantial evidence exists to sup-
port the district court’s conclusion that the proposed wind turbine
constitutes a nuisance. We also determine that the wind turbine at
issue would create a nuisance in fact. In reaching our conclusion,
we hold that the aesthetics of a wind turbine alone are not grounds
for finding a nuisance. However, we conclude that a nuisance in
fact may be found when the aesthetics are combined with other fac-
tors, such as noise, shadow flicker, and diminution in property
value. In this case, the district court heard testimony about the aes-
thetics of the proposed wind turbine, the noise and shadow flicker

‘Though respondents and the district court refer to the wind turbine gener-
ally as “a nuisance,” there are different types of legally defined nuisances. As
addressed in detail below, this particular proposed wind turbine constitutes a
nuisance in fact.

ee 103

it would create, and its potential to diminish surrounding property
values. Based on this evidence, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the district court’s finding that the proposed
residential wind turbine would be a nuisance in fact. Thus, we
affirm the order granting a permanent injunction prohibiting its
construction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sowers informed residents of the Forest Hills Subdivision that he
planned to construct a wind turbine on his residential property.
After this announcement, Sowers’ neighbors, the Halls, and the
Forest Hills Subdivision filed a complaint in district court claim-
ing that the proposed wind turbine posed a potential nuisance be-
cause it would generate constant noise and obstruct the views of
neighboring properties.” The Halls sought to permanently enjoin
construction of the wind turbine and requested preliminary in-
junctive relief.

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court heard
testimony that the subdivision was a very quiet area, and that the
turbine would obstruct Mr. Hall’s view and create noise and
shadow flicker.? Another resident, who was also a licensed realtor,
testified that the proposed wind turbine would diminish property
values in the neighborhood. A renewable energy specialist testified
that the proposed wind turbine would likely generate the same level
of noise as ‘‘the hum of a highway,’ and a contractor hired to con-
struct the turbine testified that there was no way to mitigate the
shadow flicker caused by the wind turbine.

The district court then conducted a site visit to the location of
a comparable wind turbine. At this site visit, Sowers brought a
decibel-reading machine that indicated that the noise from the
wind turbine did not exceed 5 decibels from 100 feet away. A
neighbor to that wind turbine testified that it produced some noise
and shadow flicker, but that the turbine did not bother him. The
district court also visited Sowers’ home in Forest Hills, the pro-
posed site for his wind turbine, but noted there was no way for
Sowers to test the possible decibel level at that location.

?The Halls also claimed that the proposed wind turbine violated the CC&Rs
of the Forest Hills Subdivision. We agree with the district court that the
CC&R subsections attempting to limit wind turbines in the community violate
NRS 278.02077. Thus, further analysis into the breach of contract claims as-
sociated with the CC&Rs is not needed.

3**Shadow flicker’ refers to the alternating pattern of light and dark shad-
ows occurring when the blades of a wind turbine rotate in the line of sight of
the sun. These shadows often create a flickering or strobe effect. See Burch v.
Nedpower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 891 (W. Va. 2007); Residents
Opposed Turbines v. State EFSEC, 197 P.3d 1153, 1160 n.4 (Wash. 2008).

to4 Pe

Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court
granted the permanent injunction.* The district court heavily con-
sidered its visit to the site of the comparable turbine and its ob-
servation that it ‘‘was astonished by the size of the structure and
the ‘overwhelming impression of gigantism.’’’ The district court
also considered that the Forest Hills Subdivision had panoramic
views and was a very quiet neighborhood, and that the proposed
wind turbine would likely lower property values in the area. Based
on these findings and the site visits, the district court held that the
proposed wind turbine constituted a nuisance because the turbine
would substantially interfere with the neighboring residents’ en-
joyment and use of their property. As such, the district court or-
dered a permanent injunction enjoining construction of the wind
turbine. Sowers now appeals.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Sowers argues that the district court improperly con-
cluded that the proposed wind turbine constituted a nuisance and
improperly granted the permanent injunction. We disagree.

Le

A nuisance is ‘‘[aJnything which is injurious to health, or inde-
cent and offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use
of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property.’ NRS 40.140(1)(a). There are several kinds of
nuisances, two of which are pertinent to this discussion. A nui-
sance at law, also called a nuisance per se, is ‘‘a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or sur-
roundings.”’ See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 4 (2013). A nuisance in
fact, also called a nuisance per accidens, is ‘“‘one which becomes
a nuisance by reasons of circumstances and surroundings.”’ Id.

a

We recognize that the Washoe County Development Code per-
mits the construction of private wind turbines in residential areas
if such turbines otherwise comply with the requirements of the
Code. See generally Washoe County Code Ch. 326 (2010). We are
also cognizant of this state’s aggressive policy favoring renewable
energy sources, such as wind turbines. See NRS 278.02077. We
further acknowledge the testimony from the neighbor of the person
owning the comparable wind turbine who said that the turbine did
not bother him. Based on these considerations, we do not believe

“At the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties stipulated to advance the
hearing into a trial on the merits of the Halls’ claim for a permanent injunc-
tion pursuant to NRCP 65(a)(2).

ee 105

that wind turbines are severe interferences in all circumstances,
and thus wind turbines are not nuisances at law.

However, even when a structure or act is not a nuisance per se,
“‘Ta] nuisance may arise from a lawful activity conducted in an un-
reasonable and improper manner.’ 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 16
(2012) (footnote omitted). Thus, a wind turbine may ‘‘be or be-
come a nuisance by reason of the improper or negligent manner in
which it is conducted, or by reason of its locality, as where it is
done or conducted in a place where it necessarily tends to the
damage of another’s property’’ Id. Accordingly, ‘‘a fair test as to
whether a business or a particular use of a property in connection
with the operation of the business constitutes a nuisance[ ] is the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the operation or use in re-
Jation to the particular locality and under all existing circum-
stances.”’ Burch v. Nedpower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879,
893 (W. Va. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).

“When deciding whether one’s use of his or her property is a
nuisance to his neighbors, it is necessary to balance the competing
interests of the landowners, using a commonsense approach.” 66
C.J.S. Nuisances § 13 (2012). Although we recognize that pre-
serving a residential neighborhood’s character is an important and
substantial interest for subdivision homeowners, see Zupancic v.
Sierra Vista Recreation, 97 Nev. 187, 194, 625 P.2d 1177, 1181
(1981), we have consistently held that a landowner does not have
a right to light, air, or view. See Probasco v. City of Reno, 85 Nev.
563, 565, 459 P.2d 772, 774 (1969); Boyd v. McDonald, 81 Nev.
642, 651, 408 P.2d 717, 722 (1965). Thus, in resolving this issue
on appeal, we must determine whether the proposed wind turbine
is ‘‘so unreasonable and substantial as to amount to a nuisance and
warrant an injunction’ by balancing “‘the gravity of the harm to
the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant’s conduct, both to
himself and to the community.’ Cook v, Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059,
1066 (N.H. 2003) (internal quotations omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that
the proposed wind turbine is a nuisance in fact

| reer

The determination of whether an activity constitutes a nuisance
is generally a question of fact. Jezowski v. City of Reno, 71 Nev.
233, 239, 286 P.2d 257, 260 (1955). This court will uphold the
factual findings of the district court as long as these findings are
not clearly erroneous and are supported by substantial evidence.

106 Lt

Kockos v. Bank of Nevada, 90 Nev. 140, 143, 520 P.2d 1359, 1361
(1974).

a

To sustain a claim for private nuisance, an interference with
one’s use and enjoyment of land must be both substantial and un-
reasonable. Lied v. County of Clark, 94 Nev. 275, 278, 579 P.2d
171, 173 (1978). Interference is substantial ‘‘ ‘[i]f normal persons
living in the community would regard the [alleged nuisance] as de-
finitively offensive, seriously annoying or intolerable’ ’’ Rattigan v.
Wile, 841 N.E.2d 680, 688 (Mass. 2006) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 821F cmt. d (1979)). Interference is unrea-
sonable when ‘‘the gravity of the harm outweighs the social value
of the activity alleged to cause the harm.’’ Burch, 647 S.E.2d at
887 (internal quotations omitted).

In the small body of national caselaw regarding wind turbines,
noise and diminution of property values are the most universally
considered factors in determining whether a private nuisance exists.
Some states also consider the presence of shadow flicker in com-
bination with noise and property value reduction.>

Noise

In a case with similar facts from another jurisdiction, the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey held that a residential wind turbine lo-
cated in a quiet neighborhood constituted a nuisance solely on the
basis of the constant loud noise that the turbine generated. Rose v.
Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1982). In Rose, the Superior Court found that the distinctive sound
of the wind turbine produced a heightened level of intrusiveness

‘We have not previously addressed whether the aesthetics of a wind turbine
is a proper consideration in determining the existence of a nuisance. We adopt
the view of several jurisdictions that hold aesthetics alone cannot form the basis
of a private nuisance claim. See Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 121-22
(ind. Ct. App. 1992); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Services, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491,
500 (Ct. App. 1999); Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 1-2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
The reason for this general rule, with which we agree, is that ‘‘[aJesthetic con-
siderations are fraught with subjectivity’’ Ness, 665 S.W.2d at 2. But we also
adopt Burch v. Nedpower’s holding that aesthetics-based complaints can be one
of several factors to consider, because we agree with the rationale of that court
when it stated: ‘‘ ‘Unsightly things are not to be banned solely on that account.
Many of them are necessary in carrying on the proper activities of organized
society. But such things should be properly placed, and not so located as to be
unduly offensive to neighbors or to the public.’ ” 647 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting
Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (W. Va.
1937)). Thus, while Sowers is correct that the large proportions of the turbine
alone cannot form the basis of a nuisance finding, the district court may prop-
erly consider the enormity of the object as one factor in its decision.

ee 107

because the neighborhood was quiet, separated from commercial
and heavier residential noise, and the residents had specifically
chosen to live in the area due to the peacefulness the community
afforded. Jd. We conclude that the citizens who were protected in
Rose are analogous to the Halls and other Forest Hills residents, as
the district court heard testimony of several persons living in the
Forest Hills Subdivision that the subdivision was very quiet, and
they were concerned that the level of noise from the wind turbine
would change the character of the neighborhood they had sought to
live in. Since a renewable energy expert testified that the noise cre-
ated by the turbine would be similar to that of the hum on a
nearby highway, there is some evidence that the quiet would most
likely be gone. Based on this evidence, the district court could have
determined that the proposed wind turbine constitutes a nuisance
as a source of excessive noise.

Diminution to property value

Burch also allows for the consideration of potentially diminished
property values where it is shown that a landowner’s use and en-
joyment of his or her property may be infringed. 647 S.E.2d at
892. Since the district court received testimony from subdivision
residents that they feared an impact on the use and enjoyment of
their property, it was fair for the district court to also take into ac-
count potential harm to property values. Thus, it was acceptable to
include in its findings and conclusions the opinion of the real es-
tate agent who testified that properties in proximity to wind tur-
bines decreased in value.°

Aesthetics and shadow flicker
Le

As noted in footnote 5, a district court may consider the aes-
thetics of the wind turbine only if factors other than unsightliness
or obstruction of views are claimed. In Burch, the West Virginia
court noted that shadow flicker was a kind of aesthetic concern that
could be considered in conjunction with other factors. Id. at 898.
It further anticipated how a commercial wind turbine facility abut-
ting a neighborhood could constitute a private nuisance where
constant shadow flicker was likely to ruin the enjoyment of resi-
dents. Here, Karl Hall testified that the wind turbine would create
a shadow flicker on his property, and the contractor hired to con-

*While Sowers objected to the real estate agent’s qualifications as an expert,
he does not raise that issue on appeal. See Attorney General v. Montero, 124
Nev. 573, 577 n.9, 188 P.3d 47, 49 n.9 (2008) (an issue raised by the appel-
Jant for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief need not be considered on
appeal).

108 PO

struct the wind turbine testified that there is no way to mitigate
shadow flicker. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the district
court to consider shadow flicker.

Nor was it error for the district court to consider the size of the
proposed wind turbine. Evidence was heard from a representative
of the company who was supposed to construct the turbine indi-
cating that the height of the proposed turbine exceeded 75 feet. The
district court got to experience just how tall 75 feet is during its
site visit to a comparable wind turbine. With this perspective, the
site visit to Sowers’ property revealed that his proposed turbine
would be a significant imposition on the Halls’ ability to use their
property, as their land, which Jays lower than Sowers’ land, would
now have a sizeable obstacle overshadowing it. Since evidence of
other factors was presented, it was proper for the district court to
add into its consideration the presence of shadow flicker and the
size of the turbine and the impact on views.

As such, we conclude that this evidence concerning the noise,
diminution in property value, shadow flicker, and aesthetics far
outweighs any potential utility of the proposed wind turbine within
the Forest Hills Subdivision.” Accordingly, we conclude that the
proposed wind turbine constitutes a nuisance in fact.

The district court properly granted the injunction

a

A district court may grant a permanent injunction to abate a nui-
sance. NRS 40.140(1). Typically, we review the district court’s de-
cision to grant a permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion.
Commission on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 291, 212 P.3d
1098, 1103 (2009). Purely legal questions surrounding the is-
suance of an injunction, however, are reviewed de novo. Secretary
of State v. Give Nevada A Raise, 120 Nev. 481, 486 n.8, 96 P.3d
732, 735 n.8 (2004).

Le

Sowers argues that the injunction is void because it does not
specifically state the reasons for its issuance as required by NRCP
65(d).8 Specifically, Sowers complains that the district court judg-

We recognize that the utility of the wind turbine is the fact that it is an al-
ternative energy source, which Nevada’s public policy favors. See NRS
278.02077. However, an NV Energy representative informed the court that
only Sowers would benefit from this alternative energy source since any energy
credit for the turbine’s use would only be extended to Sowers’ property, and
not to the other subdivision residents. Thus, we conclude that the wind tur-
bine’s utility within the community is far outweighed by its potential harm to
the Forest Hills Subdivision residents.

In addition, Sowers argues that the injunction should not have been granted
pursuant to NRS 33.010(1) and (2) because the Halls’ complaint merely al-
leged that the proposed wind turbine will cause inconvenience, annoyance, and

ee 109

ment only discussed the aesthetics of the proposed wind turbine,
and thus, any other factors considered by the district court are not
apparent on the face of the judgment.

Pursuant to NRCP 65(d), “‘[e]very order granting an injunction
and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its is-
suance; shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reason-
able detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other docu-
ment, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . ’’ However, ‘‘the
Jack of a statement of reasons does not necessarily invalidate a per-
manent injunction, so long as the reasons for the injunction are
readily apparent elsewhere in the record and are sufficiently clear
to permit meaningful appellate review.’ Las Vegas Novelty v. Fer-
nandez, 106 Nev. 113, 118, 787 P.2d 772, 775 (1990).

While the district court expressed concern with the size of the
proposed wind turbine, a review of the record reveals it did con-
sider the anticipated noise level of the proposed wind turbine, the
actual noise level of an existing wind turbine, the quietness of the
Forest Hills Subdivision community, the effects of shadow flicker,
and the diminution in value of surrounding properties that the
wind turbine would cause. Since each of these findings is sup-
ported by evidence in the record, we conclude that the reasons for
the injunction are readily apparent in the record and are suffi-
ciently clear to permit meaningful appellate review.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting a per-
manent injunction.

PICKERING, C.J., and Sairta, J., concur.

hardship, and did not specifically address how the plaintiffs would prevail on
their claims or how Sowers’ turbine would produce irreparable and great in-
jury. However, Nevada is a notice-pleading jurisdiction where courts liberally
construe pleadings so long as claims are fairly noticed to the adverse party.
Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984). In addition, the
permanent injunction was based on more than the Halls’ complaint. The dis-
trict court reached its decision based on the evidence presented by both par-
ties. Thus, because the district court’s decision was based on the evidence and
the district court retains the authority to grant any appropriate relief, see
NRCP 54(c), Sowers’ argument lacks merit.

110

CRAIG MORROW, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN
AND FoR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONOR-
ABLE CYNTHIA DIANNE STEEL, District Jupcg,
RESPONDENTS, AND KOURTNEY MORROW, REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.

No. 61102

February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 411

The Grigsby Law Group and Aaron Grigsby, Las Vegas, for
Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and C. Wayne
Howle, Solicitor General, Carson City, for Respondents.

Law Offices of Eric P. Roy and Eric P. Roy, Las Vegas, for Real
Party in Interest.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

At issue in this petition for extraordinary writ relief is the pro-
cedure for determining the timeliness of a peremptory challenge of
a district judge under Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 48.1. Initially,
we must determine whether the time in which to file a peremptory
challenge begins to run before a party’s first appearance, and
whether the time period is capable of expiring before the first ap-
pearance. We then must determine the method for computing the
time period for bringing a peremptory challenge. By its plain lan-
guage, SCR 48.1(3)(a) requires that a peremptory challenge must
be filed within ten days of notice of a hearing before a judicial of-
ficer. Neither SCR 48.1 specifically, nor the SCR generally, states
whether the computation of ten days includes or excludes interme-
diate nonjudicial days. We conclude that the time to file a peremp-
tory challenge begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing and
may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the ac-
tion. But because we also conclude that SCR 48.1(3)(a)’s ten-day

112 Ee

window excludes intermediate nonjudicial days, we conclude that
the instant peremptory challenge was timely filed, and thus, we
grant the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 18, 2012, real party in interest Kourtney Morrow
filed a complaint for divorce from petitioner Craig Morrow and
a contemporaneous motion for child custody in the Eighth Judicial
District Court. The motion sought temporary child custody and
a hearing was set for May 18, 2012, to be heard by the Honorable
Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney properly served
Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. Thereafter, on
May 4, 2012, Craig, through counsel, made his first appearance
and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. On May 8,
2012, the clerk of the court reassigned the matter to the Honorable
Cynthia Dianne Steel. On May 11, 2012, Judge Steel rejected the
peremptory challenge and transferred the matter back to Judge
Teuton, ruling that the time to file a peremptory challenge had ex-
pired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Kourtney served
Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. Craig then filed
the instant writ petition.

DISCUSSION
a

This writ petition involves an issue of first impression concern-
ing computing the allowable time for filing a peremptory challenge.
Extraordinary writ petitions are the appropriate means to challenge
district court decisions concerning peremptory challenges. State
Engineer v. Truckee-Carson Irrig., 116 Nev. 1024, 1029, 13 P.3d
395, 398 (2000). ‘‘A writ of mandamus is available to compel the
performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion.’’ International Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct., 124
Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (citations omitted); see
also NRS 34.160. A writ of prohibition is available to arrest the
proceedings of a district court exercising its judicial functions,
when such proceedings are in excess of the district court’s juris-
diction. NRS 34.320. Writ relief may be warranted when important
issues of law need clarification. See International Game Tech. v.
Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 132, 142, 127 P.3d 1088, 1096 (2006). As
there is potential for the district courts to inconsistently apply
SCR 48.1(3)(a), we elect to exercise our discretion to entertain the
merits of this writ petition and to clarify this issue of law.

Peremptory challenge rule

As a matter of right, each side in a district court civil action is
entitled to change the judge assigned to the case, before any hear-

ee 113

ing is commenced or any ruling is made on a contested matter,
by peremptory challenge. SCR 48.1(1); SCR 48.1(5). ‘‘[TJhe
peremptory challenge shall be filed: (a) [w]ithin 10 days after no-
tification to the parties of a trial or hearing date; or (b) [nJot less
than 3 days before the date set for the hearing of any contested pre-
trial matter, whichever occurs first.’ SCR 48.1(3)(a) and (b).
Judge Steel concluded that Craig had received notification of the
hearing on April 20, 2012, when he was served with the sum-
mons, complaint, and motion, and thus, the time to file a peremp-
tory challenge ended on April 30, making Craig’s May 4 peremp-
tory challenge untimely. Craig argues that the time to file a
peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has made a first
appearance, and thus, his May 4 peremptory challenge was timely.
Kourtney contends that the time to file a peremptory challenge may
expire before a first appearance and that Judge Steel properly de-
termined that the deadline to file a peremptory challenge had
lapsed by counting ten calendar days from April 20 to April 30.
The first step in determining when the time to file a peremptory
challenge expires is to determine when that time begins to run.

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo, even in the context of a writ petition.’ International Game
Tech., 124 Nev. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559. When a rule is clear on
its face, we will not look beyond the rule’s plain language. See
Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97
P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004).

The plain language of SCR 48.1(3)(a) provides only ten days to
file a peremptory challenge, and in the face of that plain Jan-
guage, we cannot come to another construction. Beazer, 120 Nev.
at 579-80, 97 P.3d at 1135. The record shows that Craig was prop-
erly served with the summons, complaint, and motion, giving him
notice of the hearing on the motion. Thus, although Craig had 20
days to respond to the complaint to avoid a default, NRCP
12(a)(1), there is no legal basis for holding in abeyance all other
timelines until Craig appeared; and Craig had only ten days to file
his peremptory challenge. SCR 48.1(3)(a). The fact that Craig took
several days to retain counsel and did not appreciate that the time
period set forth by SCR 48.1(3) had started to run does not alter

1Although some jurisdictions specifically provide that the time to file a
peremptory challenge only begins to run after an appearance, see, ¢.g., Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 170.6(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013) (stating that any challenge to
an assigned judge must be made within 15 days after notice of the all-purpose
assignment, or, as to a party who has not yet appeared in the action, within 15
days after that party’s first appearance), SCR 48.1(3) contains no such provi-
sion concerning appearances.

114 ee

this conclusion. Indeed, in his petition, Craig notes that the warn-
ing in the summons specified that the 20-day period to respond was
to avoid the entry of default, not that Craig had 20 days to avoid
any negative consequence. Further, Craig concedes that he was
served with the motion on April 20, 2012, and does not argue that
he did not receive notification of the hearing date on that day.
Thus, because Craig was properly served with the summons and
complaint, and properly notified of the hearing, the ten-day period
of SCR 48.1(3)(a) commenced on April 20, 2012.

NRCP 6 controls the computation of time for SCR 48.1(3)

SCR 48.1(3)(a) specifies that a peremptory challenge must be
filed within ten days after notice of a hearing date. The district
court counted ten calendar days in determining that the challenge
was untimely. SCR 4 states that ‘‘[iJf any day on which an act re-
quired to be done by anyone by these rules falls on a nonjudicial
day, the act may be performed on the next succeeding judicial day.”
SCR 4 does not discuss the computation of time, but merely ad-
dresses the treatment of days when the deadline to act falls on a
nonjudicial day. By contrast, NRCP 6(a) expressly sets forth a
method for ‘‘computing’’ time in a subsection titled ‘“Computa-
tion’’ in a rule titled ‘“Time.’’? Although Kourtney argues that SCR.
4 is a timing rule that specifically excludes only nonjudicial days
from the computation of time when the day to act falls on the non-
judicial day, and thus, impliedly includes intermediate nonjudicial
days, we disagree with this interpretation. SCR 4 does not discuss
the computation of time.

| ree!

When two rules apply, they are to be harmonized and read so as
to provide effect to both whenever possible. Albios v. Horizon
Communities, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028
(2006). Read together, SCR 4 and NRCP 6 do not conflict, as SCR
4 simply states that all acts required to be performed by the SCR
in any relevant court may be performed on the next judicial day if
the day to act is a nonjudicial day.? SCR 4 is not a rule of timing,

2NRCP 6(a) states, in pertinent part, that “*[wJhen the period of time pre-
scribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and
nonjudicial days shall be excluded in the computation [of time].”

3Many of the provisions of the SCR concern appellate procedure or bar mat-
ters and have no applicability to actions in the district court. Insofar as Kourt-
ney contends that SCR 4 is a timing rule that tramps NRCP 6(a) on the basis
that they conflict and that SCR 4 is more specific to SCR 48.1, we disagree.
Even if we found a conflict between SCR 4 and NRCP 6(a), we would con-
clude that the 2005 amendment to NRCP 6(a), extending the procedure for
computing time excluding intermediate nonjudicial days to time periods less
than 11 days is more specific to the time period prescribed by SCR 48.1(3),
which is a time period of less than 11 days in a district court civil action. To

ee 115

and thus, no SCR specifies how to compute the time set forth by
SCR 48.1). NRCP 6(a), by its own terms, applies to the com-
putation of any period of time prescribed or allowed by the NRCP,
local rules of the district court, by an order of the court, or by any
applicable statute. The NRCP govern the procedure in any civil ac-
tion in the district court. NRCP 1. SCR 48.1(1) specifically states
that it is a procedure in a civil action in the district court. The
plain language of SCR 48.1(1) places it within the ambit of the
NRCP.‘ Thus, NRCP 6(a) informs parties how to count prescribed
time periods in the district court, while SCR 4 instructs parties
what to do if they are required to perform some act in any court
on a nonjudicial day when such court is closed.

Having determined that the time for filing a peremptory chal-
lenge begins to run upon notice of the hearing, regardless of
whether an appearance has been made, and that NRCP 6(a) applies
in determining the timeliness of a peremptory challenge under
SCR 48.1, we conclude that with the excluded intermediate week-
ends, Craig’s peremptory challenge was timely filed on the tenth
day, May 4, 2012. Thus, Judge Steel erred in rejecting the peremp-
tory challenge and returning the matter to Judge Teuton.

CONCLUSION

We grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue
a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order
rejecting as untimely petitioner’s peremptory challenge and in-
struct the district court clerk to reassign the case to a judge other
than Judge Teuton.>

the extent that the two rules could be construed to conflict, a resolution would
be better made by a rule amendment. But, we conclude that a harmonious in-
terpretation of the rules is possible, see Albios, 122 Nev. at 418, 132 P.3d at
1028, and accordingly, NRCP 6(a) controls.

‘NRCP 6 has been applied to other rules not covered by the express lan-
guage of NRCP 6. See, e.g., FMR 1(4) (applying NRCP 6 to the Foreclosure
Mediation Rules); of. NAR 4(@) (adopting the same rules for calculation of
time as the NRCP, which is NRCP 6, for the Nevada Arbitration Rules).

‘We deny the alternative request for a writ of prohibition.

116

DEWEY DAVIS, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIS-

TRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR

i THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE

i DOUGLAS W. HERNDON, District JUDGE, RESPONDENTS,
AND THE STATE OF NEVADA, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 62260
February 14, 2013 294 P.3d 415

Nguyen & Lay and Rochelle T. Nguyen, Las Vegas, for
Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

In this original writ proceeding, we consider whether facsimile
service of a notice of intent to seek an indictment constitutes ade-
quate service under NRS 172.241(2). We conclude that it does,
as NRS 172.241(2) does not require personal service and NRS
178.589(1) permits facsimile transmission of motions, notices, and
other legal documents where personal service is not required. We
therefore deny the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Dewey Davis is awaiting trial on multiple counts of
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted robbery with
the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery, and
burglary while in possession of a firearm. From the documents
submitted, it appears that a criminal complaint was filed against
Davis on March 16, 2011. Thereafter, he was represented by at
least two counsel who were later allowed to withdraw from their

118 PE

representation. On August 25, 2011, Richard Tannery was ap-
pointed to represent Davis. Notice of the appointment was served
on Tannery that day, with confirmation of the appointment appar-
ently occurring on the following day, August 26, 2011. A notice
of intent to seek an indictment was served by facsimile transmis-
sion to Tannery’s office on August 25, 2011. The grand jury met
in August and September 2011 and April 2012, ultimately return-
ing an indictment against Davis. Davis subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment because, among other things, he was not
provided reasonable notice because NRS 172.241(2) requires per-
sonal service of the grand jury notice and the notice did not in-
clude the date, time, and place of the grand jury hearing. The dis-
trict court denied the motion, and this original petition for a writ
of mandamus followed.

DISCUSSION
Leper

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or ar-
bitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, see Round Hill Gen.
Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536
(1981); see State v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931-32,
267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse of discretion
and arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion in context of
mandamus). The writ will not issue, however, if a petitioner has a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. NRS 34.170. Ultimately, the decision to entertain an extraor-
dinary writ petition lies within our discretion, and we must
“‘consider[ ] whether judicial economy and sound judicial admin-
istration militate for or against issuing the writ.’ Redeker v. Dist.
Ct., 122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 520, 522 (2006), limited on
other grounds by Hildalgo v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 330, 341, 184
P.3d 369, 377 (2008). “Where the circumstances establish urgency
or strong necessity, or an important issue of law requires clarifi-
cation and public policy is served by this court’s exercise of its
original jurisdiction, this court may exercise its discretion to con-
sider a petition for extraordinary relief.’ Schuster v. Dist. Ct., 123
Nev. 187, 190, 160 P.3d 873, 875 (2007). Because the petition
raises an important matter that needs clarification, we exercise our
discretion to consider its merits. Further, we have concluded that
a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for inadequate notice
of a grand jury hearing. Solis-Ramirez v. District Court, 112 Nev.
344, 347, 913 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1996).

a
In his petition, Davis argues that the State’s facsimile service of
the grand jury notice was inadequate under NRS 172.241(2) be-

pd 119

cause that statute requires personal service and therefore the dis-
trict court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious
manner in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. ‘‘‘Gen-
erally, when the words in a statute are clear on their face, they
should be given their plain meaning unless such a reading violates
the spirit of the act.’ ’’ Speer v. State, 116 Nev. 677, 679, 5 P.3d
1063, 1064 (2000) (quoting Anthony Lee R., A Minor v. State, 113
Nev. 1406, 1414, 952 P.2d 1, 6 (1997)). The plain language of
NRS 172.241(2) provides in relevant part that ‘‘reasonable notice’’
shall be served ‘‘upon a person whose indictment is being consid-
ered by a grand jury”’ and ‘‘[t]he notice is adequate if it: (a) [i]s
given to the person, the person’s attorney of record or an attorney
who claims to represent the person.’’

|

In legal usage, ‘‘personal service’’ has a distinct meaning—
“JaJctual delivery of the notice or process to the person to whom
it is directed.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 933 (7th ed. abridged
2000). Several Nevada statutes expressly require that notices re-
garding a variety of matters must be accomplished by ‘‘personal
service” or some other specified means when personal service
cannot be accomplished. See, e.g., NRS 107.085(3) (relating to
trust agreements concerning real estate; requiring ‘‘personal serv-
ice’’ of notice of sale to grantor or title holder unless personal
service cannot be timely effected); NRS 159.0475(1) (relating to
guardianship proceedings and identifying methods of service of ci-
tations to appear at guardianship hearing, included certified mail
and ‘‘[p]ersonal service in the manner provided pursuant to NRCP
4(d)’’); NRS 283.180 (relating to impeachment of public officers;
requiring that service of notice to appear and answer articles of im-
peachment ‘‘shall be made upon the defendant personally’’); NRS
696B.200(2) (relating to delinquent insurers requiring that ‘‘per-
sonal service of process shall be made as in other civil actions’”’
when action involves in-state insurers). Nothing in the plain lan-
guage of NRS 172.241(2) requires personal service upon the per-
son who is the subject of the indictment. Had the Legislature in-
tended to require personal service, it could have expressly done so
as it has in other statutes. Because the Legislature did not, we con-
clude that NRS 172.241(2) does not mandate personal service of
the grand jury notice.

|

Where, as here, personal service is not required, NRS
178.589(1) provides that a person represented by counsel may be
served with any motion, notice, or other legal document by fac-
simile transmission if ‘‘(a) [t]he document is transmitted to the of-
fice of the attorney representing the person; and (b) [t]he facsim-
ile machine is operational and is maintained by the attorney

120 Pd

representing the person or the employer of that attorney.’ Here, the
documents before us indicate that Tannery was appointed to rep-
resent Davis on August 25, 2011, and the State faxed the grand
jury notice to Tannery’s office that day.! Although Tannery may
have discovered the grand jury notice at a later time, that circum-
stance is irrelevant because the notice was properly served upon
facsimile transmission that satisfies NRS 178.589(1). And while
Davis argues generally that the unreliability of facsimile service
makes that method inadequate, nothing in his submissions indicates
that the facsimile machine was not operational.

|

As to Davis’s contention that the grand jury notice was deficient
because it failed to inform him of the date, time, and place of the
grand jury hearing, we disagree. NRS 172.241(2)(b) provides that
a grand jury target may testify before the grand jury if he ‘‘submits
a written request to the district attorney and includes an address
where the district attorney may send a notice of the date, time and
place of the scheduled proceeding of the grand jury.’ Therefore,
the State is not required to include date, time, and place in the
grand jury notice but must forward that information only upon the
grand jury target’s written request.

Because we conclude that the district court did not manifestly
abuse its discretion or exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner by denying Davis’s motion to dismiss the in-
dictment, we deny the petition.

FRANK MILFORD PECK, APPELLANT, v.
LESLIE ELLEN CROUSER, RESPONDENT.

No. 59258
February 28, 2013 295 P.3d 586

'To the extent Davis argues that the grand jury notice was deficient because
he did not receive it from the State or Tannery, his claim lacks merit as the no-
tice may be served on counsel. See NRS 172.241(2)(a).

Frank Milford Peck, Indian Springs, in Proper Person.

Leslie Ellen Crouser, Reno, in Proper Person.

Before the Court EN BANc.

122 Ed

OPINION

By the Court, Grppons, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether this court has jurisdiction
to review an appeal from a post-judgment district court order de-
claring a party to be a vexatious litigant. Because we conclude that
we do not have jurisdiction over such an order, and because this
appeal appears untimely as to the final judgment, we dismiss this
appeal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the district court, appellant Frank Milford Peck filed a civil
complaint, which respondent Leslie Ellen Crouser moved to dis-
miss. Respondent also filed a motion for an order declaring ap-
pellant a vexatious litigant. The district court granted the motion to
dismiss on June 10, 2011, and the district court docket sheet
shows that notice of entry of the dismissal order was filed on the
same day. No notice of appeal was filed at that time.

The district court subsequently entered an order on August 30,
2011, declaring appellant to be a vexatious litigant and ordering
that appellant must submit for court review any future proposed fil-
ings seeking relief against respondent. Notice of entry of that
order was served on September 2, 2011. Appellant’s notice of ap-
peal was then filed on September 21, 2011. The notice of appeal
was therefore untimely as to the order of dismissal, but timely as
to the vexatious litigant order. See NRAP 4(a)(1). As a result, we
must determine whether the vexatious litigant order is substantively
appealable.' In doing so, we first briefly discuss the purpose and
effect of vexatious litigant orders before turning to whether this
court is authorized to review such orders on appeal.

DISCUSSION
Vexatious litigant orders generally

P|

A “‘vexatious litigant’ is one ‘‘who repeatedly files frivolous
lawsuits.” Black’s Law Dictionary 952 (8th ed. 2004). In order to
deter such conduct, this court has approved of the use of sanctions,
including limiting by order a vexatious litigant’s right to access the
courts. See Jordan v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 44,
58-60, 110 P.3d 30, 41-42 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by
Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6,

‘This court may consider jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Landreth v. Malik,
127 Nev. 175, 179, 251 P.3d 163, 166 (2011).

pd 123

181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008). Restrictions imposed by vexatious
litigant orders may include prohibiting the litigant from filing fu-
ture actions against a particular party or barring the litigant from
filing any new action without first demonstrating to the court that
the proposed case is not frivolous. See id.

While we have previously reviewed the propriety of interlocutory
vexatious litigant orders challenged in the context of an appeal from
a final judgment, see Jordan, 121 Nev. 44, 110 P.3d 30, we have
not yet addressed our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a
post-judgment vexatious litigant order. This court has jurisdiction
to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute
or court rule. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207,
209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1984). NRAP 3A(b) sets forth the
judgments and orders that are subject to appeal in this court. Our
review of NRAP 3A(b) reveals two types of appealable orders that
could arguably provide a basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction
over post-judgment vexatious litigant orders: special orders en-
tered after final judgment, see NRAP 3A(b)(8), and orders grant-
ing injunctions.” See NRAP 3A(b)(3). We address each of these in
turn.

Basis for this court to exercise jurisdiction over post-judgment
vexatious litigant orders

Special order entered after final judgment

Le

An appealable special order entered after final judgment is ‘‘an
order affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out
of the judgment previously entered. It must be an order affecting
rights incorporated in the judgment.’’? Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev.
912, 920, 59 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2002); see also NRAP 3A(b)(8).
Vexatious litigant orders inhibiting a party’s ability to submit court
filings without particular restrictions do not affect the party’s rights
arising out of a judgment because the party’s right of access to the

2While an appeal from a judgment or order not identified in NRAP 3A(b)
may be authorized by statute, see, ¢.g., NRS 340.210(1) (permitting an appeal
from certain interlocutory orders entered in eminent domain actions), no such
statute provides authority for this court to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal
from a vexatious litigant order.

*When Gumm was decided, special orders made after final judgment were
appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(2). Effective July 1, 2009, NRAP 3A was re-
organized, such that special orders entered after final judgment are now ap-
pealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8). ADKT No. 381 (Order Amending the Nevada
Rules of Appellate Procedure, December 31, 2008). No substantive alteration
was made to NRAP 3A in the 2009 amendment. Id.

14 P|

courts does not arise out of a judgment in an action, but instead,
arises out of the United States and Nevada Constitutions, case au-
thority, statutes, and court rules. See, e.g., NRCP 2 (providing for
a civil action); Jordan, 121 Nev. at 55-56, 110 P.3d at 39 (dis-
cussing the constitutional right of access to the courts). Thus, a
post-judgment vexatious litigant order is not appealable under
NRAP 3A(b)(8) as a special order entered after final judgment.
See Gumm, 118 Nev. at 920, 59 P.3d at 1225.

Injunction

be

An injunction is ‘‘[a] court order commanding or preventing an
action.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 800 (8th ed. 2004). Because vex-
atious litigant orders restrict a party’s conduct, courts in other ju-
risdictions have treated such orders as injunctions and found them.
to be appealable on this basis. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445
(3d Cir. 1982); Riffin v. Baltimore County, 985 A.2d 612, 620,
623 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Pandozy v. Beaty, 254 S.W.3d
613, 618 (Tex. App. 2008). In Nevada, however, injunctions are
governed by NRCP 65, which sets forth the procedure for seeking
an injunction and the form that an order granting an injunction
must take. Because vexatious litigant orders are not subject to the
provisions of NRCP 65, they are not injunctions appealable under
NRAP 3A(b)G3).

CONCLUSION
Lee

As vexatious litigant orders are not independently appealable
under NRAP 3A(b) or any statutory provision, we lack jurisdiction
to review an appeal from such an order. See Taylor Constr. Co.,
100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152. Thus, we conclude that post-
judgment vexatious litigant orders may only be challenged by fil-
ing an original petition for writ relief pursuant to NRS Chapter 34.
Cf. Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 649,
5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000) (explaining that, because no statute or rule
authorizes an appeal from an order of contempt, such orders must
be challenged through a petition for writ relief). We further con-
clude that writ relief is the appropriate vehicle to review vexatious
litigant orders because review of such orders will involve whether
the district court manifestly abused its discretion, such as where
the district court fails to follow the clearly established procedures
for imposing a vexatious litigant order, see Jordan, 121 Nev. at
58-62, 110 P.3d at 41-44 (outlining the procedures for imposing
vexatious litigant orders and providing that this court reviews such
orders for an abuse of discretion); see also NRS 34.160; Interna-
tional Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556,

Po 125

558 (2008) (‘‘A writ of mandamus is available to compel the per-
formance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion.’’ (footnotes omitted)), or to prevent the dis-
trict court from acting in the absence of jurisdiction. See NRS
34.320; Smith v. District Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849,
851 (1991) (ecognizing that a writ of prohibition may issue to
arrest the proceedings of a district court exercising its judicial
functions when such proceedings are in excess of the district
court’s jurisdiction).
Because we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we dismiss it.

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Curry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

IN THE MATTER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.G.

WASHOE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
APPELLANT, v. KORY L.G., RESPONDENT.

No. 60071

February 28, 2013 295 P.3d 589

Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Janice Anne
Hubbard, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Appellant.

Jeffrey Friedman, Reno, for Respondent.
PT

S

Before the Court EN BANc.

po
OPINION

By the Court, Douatas, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a parent of a child placed
into state custody and made the subject of a dependency proceed-
ing, based on the neglectful actions of the other parent, is required
to comply with a case plan and accept services under NRS
432B.560 for purposes of reunification, when that parent has not
been found to have neglected the child (nonoffending parent).! In
connection with these circumstances, we must also determine
whether presumptions that arose in the dependency proceeding
should operate against the parent in a subsequent action to termi-
nate his parental rights.

We conclude that keeping the child from the custody of the par-
ent who is not the subject of the dependency proceeding violates
the parent’s fundamental constitutional rights to parent his child,
when the child was not removed from the home because of his con-
duct, there were no substantiated findings that he had neglected the
child, and the petition for neglect was dismissed as to him. There-
fore, the presumptions favoring termination of parental rights under
NRS 128.109, which arose from the child being placed outside the
home in the dependency proceeding, do not apply to respondent,
and the district court correctly concluded that appellant failed to
establish parental fault and that terminating respondent’s parental
rights is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s order.

FACTS

This case comes to us after two-year-old A.G. was placed into
the protective custody of appellant Washoe County Department of
Social Services in May 2009, after the child was found at a camp-
site with her mother Rachael L., who was extremely intoxicated.
This was not the family’s first involvement with Social Services.

Social Services had previously been contacted by the maternal
grandmother over concerns that she had for A.G. because of
Rachael’s drug use. At a meeting with Rachael around one week
before the night in question, the social worker noted that Rachael
was unemployed, her food stamps had run out, and her drug
screen had come back positive for methamphetamine and mari-
juana. The social worker scheduled a follow-up home visit with
Rachael to discuss the drug screen and possible services.

'Nonoffending parent doctrine. Vivek S, Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run
Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for the Constitutional Rights of
Nonoffending Parents, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 55, 73-74 (2009).

128 ee

The night before the scheduled home visit, however, Rachael
took A.G. to a camping party at Pyramid Lake. Rachael had a his-
tory of drug and alcohol use as well as suicidal thoughts, and she
had made statements to relatives that she believed A.G. was going
to be taken into custody the following day, and she wanted to spend
one last night with her and ‘‘show her a good time.’ Based on
concerns over Rachael and A.G.’s welfare, the maternal grand-
mother called authorities. In responding to the call, the police
found A.G. with Rachael at the campsite.

A.G’s father, respondent Kory L.G., was not present at the time
of this incident, and was in no way involved in the events that led
to A.G’s removal from Rachael’s custody. In fact, Kory and
Rachael were separated at the time. Kory primarily cared for A.G.
since the child’s birth, and she had been well cared for. At the time
of A.G.’s placement in protective custody, however, she had been
in Rachael’s care for about a month because Rachael had obtained
a temporary protective order (TPO) against Kory in April 2009.
Kory and Rachael’s relationship had been tumultuous at best, and
the TPO was based on an alleged physical altercation that occurred
between Kory and Rachael in front of the child, when Kory went
to retrieve A.G. after a visit with Rachael. The TPO initially pro-
hibited Kory from having contact with Rachael and A.G.

Despite Kory’s lack of involvement in the events leading to
A.G’’s removal, shortly after the child was removed from Rachael’s
custody, but before the protective custody hearing and the ap-
pointment of counsel for Kory, Social Services required Kory to
submit to a drug test, for which he complied and tested positive for
marijuana and methamphetamine.

An initial protective custody hearing was conducted before a ju-
venile master to determine whether A.G. was a child in need of
protection. At the hearing, the master found that there was rea-
sonable cause to believe that it was contrary to A.G.’s welfare to
remain in Rachael’s home because of her intoxication while caring
for A.G. It was further determined that the child could not be
placed with Kory because of the TPO. The master granted Social
Services the discretion to temporarily place A.G. with appropriate
relatives or in foster care. The child was placed in foster care.”

Social Services subsequently filed a petition for a hearing
against both parents, alleging that A.G. was in need of protection
from neglect under NRS Chapter 432B. An adjudicatory hearing
was conducted during which Rachael submitted to the allegations,
which included her drug use, that her home was not in a suitable
condition for the child, that she was unable to provide for A.G.’s

2Sometime after A.G.’s placement in protective custody, Kory divorced
Rachael and sought custody of A.G. At the termination trial, Rachael testified
that she was willing to relinquish her parental rights, and she is not a party to
this appeal.

Pe 129

needs, and that she was intoxicated at the time of A.G.’s removal.
The allegations as to Kory included only the TPO. Through coun-
sel, Kory denied the allegations of neglect. The master sustained
the allegations as to Rachael and found that A.G. was a child in
need of protection and set a dispositional hearing as to Rachael.
Because Kory had denied the allegations, the court set the matter
for an evidentiary hearing as to him.

In July 2009, before the evidentiary hearing, Kory and Social
Services met and reached an agreement to dismiss the petition for
a hearing as to Kory. The stipulation to dismiss was placed on the
record, and the master filed findings and recommendations reciting
the stipulation and vacating the evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless,
Social Services filed a case plan and service agreement, which
Kory did not sign. Because Kory had tested positive in a drug
screening, the case plan included requirements that Kory submit to
random drug screens and submit to a substance abuse evaluation
and that he undergo a domestic violence evaluation. That same
month, a dispositional hearing was held for Rachael, during which
Kory requested that A.G. be placed with him. By this time, the
TPO against Kory had been modified to allow Kory to have con-
tact with A.G., and he argued that he had challenged the suffi-
ciency of the TPO and that the matter was pending in another
court.

Following the stipulation to dismiss the petition between Social
Services and Kory, and the dispositional hearing for Rachael, the
master found that A.G. was a child in need of protection under
NRS 432B.330 as to Rachael. The master further denied the
child’s placement with Kory, approved A.G.’s placement in family
foster care, and recommended that legal custody of A.G. remain
with Social Services. The master also recommended that Kory
comply with his case plan and ordered him to pay child support.
Kory did not file an objection to these recommendations. Ulti-
mately, the juvenile court adopted the master’s recommendations
by order on July 29, 2009. Kory was granted supervised visitation
with A.G., which he exercised on a regular basis. In August 2009,
the TPO was dismissed based on insufficient evidence.

With the TPO and the petition for a hearing having both been
dismissed, Kory filed a motion in the juvenile court to terminate
Social Services’ action and return the child to him or begin reuni-
fication with unsupervised home visits. After a hearing in October
2009, the master denied the motion, recommending that A.G. re-
main in the physical and legal custody of Social Services. The mas-
ter found that although the TPO had been dismissed, there was still
an obligation to determine whether Kory was a safe placement for
A.G. The master stated that the primary issue preventing unsu-
pervised visits was its inability to determine the extent of Kory’s
drug use and whether he could abstain from substance use while

130 es

caring for A.G. The master noted that Kory had recently tested
negative in a September 2009 drug screen but the master could not
determine Kory’s abstinence between May and September 2009,
because Kory had not taken drug tests during that time. Although
the master recommended that Kory’s motion for immediate place-
ment be denied, the master concluded that A.G. could be safely
placed with Kory if he was not actively using drugs, and recom-
mended that Kory submit to a substance abuse evaluation and con-
tinue to submit to drug screens. Kory did not file any objection to
the recommendations, and the juvenile court entered an order af-
firming and adopting the master’s recommendations. Social Serv-
ices retained custody of A.G., she was moved from foster care to
Jive with her maternal grandmother, and Kory continued super-
vised visits.

Six months later, a permanency hearing was held, and the mas-
ter approved a ‘‘permanency plan of reunification with Kory
... together with a concurrent plan of termination of parental
rights followed by adoption.’ The master was persuaded by Kory’s
argument that his progress on the case plan had been impeded by
a lack of communication and specificity regarding the services he
was expected to complete. The master ordered Kory to enter into
a revised case plan with Social Services, which included more de-
tailed terms regarding visitation, weekly drug testing, counseling
services and monitoring, and communications. Social Services
filed an objection challenging the master’s authority to rework
Kory’s case plan; the juvenile court denied the objection and re-
manded the case to the master for further proceedings. On remand,
the master ordered Kory to comply with the revised terms of the
case plan.

Another six months passed, and a second permanency hearing
was conducted, after which the master found that despite extensive
modification to Kory’s case plan, he had not been in compliance
with the plan because he failed his drug test, failed to communi-
cate with Social Services, and failed to attend any counseling or
substance abuse treatment. The master did find that Kory had
maintained a fairly consistent visitation schedule with A.G. The
master recommended A.G.’s continued placement with the mater-
nal grandmother, approved a permanency plan of termination of
parental rights followed by adoption, and recommended that Social
Services be relieved of providing further reunification efforts with
the parents. Kory objected to the recommendation for termination
of parental rights. He argued that he had provided good care to
A.G. before her removal from Rachael’s custody and that Social
Services had not shown that he used drugs to an extent that would
render him unable to responsibly and capably care for A.G. Not
persuaded by Kory’s arguments, the juvenile court affirmed the

Pe 21

master’s findings and recommendation for termination of Kory’s
parental rights.

Social Services then filed a petition in the district court to
terminate Kory’s parental rights to A.G. At that point, A.G. had
been in the custody of Social Services for 18 months and Kory had
not substantially complied with his case plan. This triggered
the presumptions for termination under NRS 128.109, where the
child has been out of the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive
months and where the parent has failed substantially to comply
with services for reunification within 6 months. Thus, Social Serv-
ices argued that it must be presumed that Kory had provided only
token efforts and had failed to adjust his conduct, and that termi-
nation was in A.G.’s best interest. In addition to the presumptions,
Social Services further argued that the facts affirmatively estab-
lished parental fault and that the child’s best interest would be
served by termination.

Following a three-day bench trial, the district court denied the
petition, finding that the presumptions did not apply and that So-
cial Services had otherwise failed to demonstrate parental fault or
that termination was in A.G.’s best interest. The court explained
that its decision was based on Kory’s status as a nonoffending par-
ent, which it noted is an issue that this court has not previously ad-
dressed. Social Services now appeals from the order denying its
petition to terminate Kory’s parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Legal presumptions

The action to terminate Kory’s parental rights was preceded by
the separate dependency proceeding instituted by Social Services
under NRS Chapter 432B to protect A.G. from abuse or neglect by
the person responsible for the child’s care, in this case Rachael.
Because events that occurred in that dependency proceeding gave
rise to certain legal presumptions under both the abuse and neglect
statutes, NRS Chapter 432B, and the termination of parental rights
statutes, NRS Chapter 128, which were applied against Kory in the
case to terminate his parental rights, we begin by briefly reviewing
the legal framework of the dependency proceeding and how the
presumptions arose.

Dependency proceedings
| |
In Nevada, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings concerning a child who is or may be a child in need of
protection. See NRS 432B.410(1); see also NRS 432B,050; NRS
62A.180. A child is in need of protection if, among other things,

132 Po

“‘Tt]he child has been subjected to abuse or neglect by a person re-
sponsible for the welfare of the child.’’ NRS 432B.330(1)(b). An
agency that provides child welfare services must file a petition in
the juvenile court alleging that a child is in need of protection. See
NRS 432B.490; NRS 432B.510. When the petition alleges abuse
or neglect by only one parent, the other parent nonetheless has
constitutional protections and must be treated individually. See
NRS 432B.457 (requiring that each parent be notified of any plan
for the child’s temporary or permanent placement); NRS
432B.510(4)(c) (stating that the petition for hearing must include
the names of the child’s parents); NRS 432B.520(1) (requiring that
the parent be notified of the hearing on the petition if the child is
in the custody of a nonparent). Due process requires that each par-
ent is entitled to a hearing before being deprived of the custody of
his or her child. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); of.
In re Doe, 465 A.2d 924, 931 (N.H. 1983) (noting that funda-
mental liberty interests prohibit imputing one parent’s conduct to
terminate the parental rights of the other parent).

Shortly after the child is placed into protective custody, the
court conducts an adjudicatory hearing and, if the allegations in
the petition are denied by the person responsible for the child, an
evidentiary hearing on the petition must be conducted. See NRS
432B.530. ‘‘If the court finds that the allegations in the petition
have not been established, it shall dismiss the petition’’ and order
the child’s immediate release from protective custody. NRS
432B.530(5). If the juvenile court finds that the child is in need of
protection, the court may make a number of dispositions, includ-
ing allowing the child to remain with a parent or placing the child
with a nonparent. See NRS 432B.530(5); NRS 432B.550. If the
child is placed outside the home, the agency must make reasonable
efforts to reunify and preserve the family of the child, with the
child’s health and safety being a paramount concern. See NRS
432B.393(1) and (2). The agency must submit a plan concerning
placement of the child, including a description of services to be
provided to the person responsible for the child and to the child in
order to facilitate reunification or to ensure a permanent placement
for the child. NRS 432B.540(2)(b). The juvenile court may also
order ‘‘[t]he child, a parent or the guardian to undergo such med-
ical, psychiatric, psychological, or other care or treatment as the
court considers to be in the best interests of the child’’ NRS
432B,560(1)(a).

Within 12 months after the initial removal of the child from
the home, and annually thereafter, the juvenile court must conduct
a dispositional hearing to review the plan for permanent placement
of the child and to determine whether the agency has made rea-
sonable efforts to finalize the child’s permanent placement.

Po 133

NRS 432B.590(1)(a) and (3); see also NRS 432B.553(1). The
court may consider whether the child should be returned to the
parents or whether termination of parental rights proceedings
should be instituted under NRS Chapter 128, so that the child can
be placed for adoption. NRS 432B.590(3)(b). If the child has been
placed outside of the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive months,
“the best interests of the child must be presumed to be served by
the termination of parental rights.’” NRS 432B.590(4).

Termination of parental rights proceedings

a

If a parental termination proceeding is instituted against a par-
ent, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that parental fault exists and that the child’s best interest would be
served by termination of parental rights. NRS 128.105. Parental
fault can be established by findings that the parent’s conduct con-
stitutes abandonment, neglect, unfitness, failure of parental ad-
justment, risk of injury, or token efforts. NRS 128.105; Matter of
Parental Rights as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 428-33, 92 P.3d
1230, 1234-37 (2004). In addition to affirmative findings, certain
presumptions can arise to establish parental fault and that the
child’s best interest would be served by termination. In this regard,
when a child has been placed outside his or her home under NRS
Chapter 432B for 14 of any 20 consecutive months, ‘‘it must be
presumed that the parent or parents have demonstrated only token
efforts to care for the child.’ NRS 128.109(1)(a). These token ef-
forts demonstrate parental fault and give rise to the presumption
that termination of the parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interest. NRS 128.109(1)(a) and (2). Another presumption, failure
of parental adjustment, arises when the parent fails to substantially
comply ‘‘with the terms and conditions of a plan to reunite the
family within 6 months after the date on which the child was
placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later”’ NRS
128.109(1)(b); NRS 128.105(2)(d). These presumptions are re-
buttable and once established, the burden shifts to the parent to
overcome the presumptions. Marter of Parental Rights as to J.L.N.,
118 Nev. 621, 625-26, 55 P.3d 955, 958 (2002). It is these pre-
sumptions that are at issue in this case.

In denying the petition to terminate Kory’s parental rights, the
district court recognized that because Kory was not responsible for
A.G.’s removal from the home and Kory had never been found to
have abused or neglected A.G., he had a constitutionally pro-
tected right to the custody of his child as a nonoffending parent.
The district court defined a nonoffending parent as ‘‘an individual
against whom no allegations of abuse, neglect or unfitness have
been substantiated, and whose only proven ‘fault’ is to have had a

134 Po

child in common with a parent from whom the child was re-
moved.’’ Thus, the district court concluded that the child’s removal
from the home and Kory’s failure to comply with the case plan
could not be used as a basis for presuming parental fault in the ter-
mination proceeding and that Social Services otherwise failed to
carry its burden of establishing that termination was in A.G.’s best
interest.

On appeal, Social Services argues that once a child is found to
be a child in need of protection based on the conduct of only one
parent, the juvenile court may take jurisdiction over that child even
if there is a noncustodial parent available to take custody. Social
Services asserts that it has an obligation to ensure the health and
safety of the child, and to investigate a proper placement, and that
Kory was not a proper placement in this case. According to Social
Services, the juvenile court may require the parent to comply with
services under NRS 432B.560 to determine whether the parent is
fit for placement and to facilitate reunification, and that Kory’s
failure to timely comply with his case plan gives rise to the pre-
sumptions for parental termination under NRS 128.109. Social
Services argues that the presumptions arising from the neglect
proceeding should have applied in this case to establish parental
fault by Kory and that termination was in A.G.’s best interest.

While neither Nevada’s statutes nor caselaw addresses the rights
of the nonoffending parent, we take this opportunity to clarify the
constitutional rights of a parent whose child is the subject of a de-
pendency proceeding based on the conduct of the other parent,
and against whom no allegations of abuse or neglect have been
substantiated.

A parent's constitutionally protected parental rights

P|

This court has consistently recognized that severing the parent-
child relationship is an extreme measure and an exercise of awe-
some power. Parental Rights of J.L.N., 118 Nev. at 625, 55 P.3d.
at 958; Matter of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 795,
8 P.3d 126, 129 (2000). Termination of parental rights implicates
fundamental liberty interests of a parent’s relationship with his or
her child. Parental Rights of D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 426-27, 92 P.3d
at 1233. The procedures for terminating parental rights, and grant-
ing custody of a child to a nonparent, must be fundamentally fair.
Id.; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Even when the
fairness of the procedures afforded to the parents is not called into
question, substantive due process nevertheless demands that the
government have a basis for subjecting the parents to the proce-
dures in the first instance. Licari v. Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that substantive due process tenet, which

Pe 135

ensures that government action is not arbitrary, regardless of
whether the procedures afforded were fair).

| rrrerreae|

The United States Supreme Court has held that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also In re
Parental Rights as to C.C.A., 128 Nev. 166, 169, 273 P.3d 852,
854 (2012). This liberty interest is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. It
is presumed that fit parents act in the best interest of their children.
Id. As long as parents adequately care for their children, there is
ordinarily ‘‘no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent
to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
children.”’ Jd. at 68-69. These substantive due process rights pro-
hibit the government from depriving parents of the custody of
their children without a finding of parental unfitness. Stanley, 405
U.S. 645 (holding that parents are constitutionally entitled to a
hearing on parental fitness before children are removed from their
custody).

In applying these constitutional principles to custody determi-
nations that arise in dependency proceedings, other courts have rec-
ognized a preference for placing the child with a fit parent, where
the child was removed from the home based on the conduct of the
other parent. See, e.g., In re D.S., 52 A.3d 887 (D.C, 2012) (rec-
ognizing a parental preference in neglect proceedings in the ab-
sence of evidence that the parent is unfit or that granting custody
to that parent would be detrimental to the children’s best interest);
In Interest of M.M.L., 900 P.2d 813 (Kan. 1995) (recognizing that
a parent’s fundamental right to the care of his or her child may not
be disturbed absent a finding of parental unfitness or substantial
endangerment to the child’s welfare); Matter of Cheryl K., 484
N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (holding that when the child
was removed from the home because of the father’s actions, the
mother, who had never been adjudicated an unfit parent, had a su-
perior right to custody as against third parties). This preference is
rooted in these constitutionally protected parental rights, as well as
statutory dependency provisions that express a preference for keep-
ing the child with his or her family. See In re D.S., 52 A.3d at
894; see also NRS 432B.393(1) (providing that the agency shall
make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family). Addi-
tionally, the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of children is
served because, in the absence of findings of parental unfitness, a
parent is presumed to make decisions in the best interest of his or
her child. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; see also NRS 432B.393(2)

136 Po

(stating that the child’s health and safety is a paramount concern in
reunifying the family).

This leads us to the case at hand and whether Kory was afforded
his constitutionally protected rights as a parent in this case.
Nevada’s statute requires a finding that the child has been abused
or neglected only by ‘‘a person’’ responsible for the child’s wel-
fare, before the court can assume jurisdiction over the child. NRS
432B.330(1)(b). It does not require a finding that both parents have
abused or neglected the child. Thus, in this case, the juvenile court
properly had jurisdiction over A.G. based on the mother’s neg-
lectful conduct.

The problem arose, however, when the juvenile court required
Kory to comply with a case plan for reunification after the petition
for neglect had been dismissed as to him and denied his request to
have the child returned to his care. That decision also resulted
in the child being outside of Kory’s home for 14 of any consecu-
tive 20 months, and because Kory failed to complete the case
plan, gave rise to the presumptions under the termination statute
that parental fault existed and that it was in A.G.’s best interest to
terminate Kory’s parental rights. Social Services argues that, in
light of its concerns over Kory’s substance abuse, the juvenile
court had authority to order Kory to complete a case plan under
NRS 432B.560, which provides that the court may order ‘‘a
parent . . . to undergo such medical, psychiatric, psychological, or
other care or treatment as the court considers to be in the best in-
terests of the child”’ While NRS 432B.560 may allow the juvenile
court to order services for a parent, it does not allow the court to
require the noncustodial parent to complete a case plan for reuni-
fication under the circumstances presented here.

In this case, A.G. was taken into protective custody because of
the mother’s neglect and not because of any neglect by Kory. Kory
had been the primary caretaker to A.G. for most of her life, and
she had been well cared for. Although A.G. could not be imme-
diately placed with Kory because of the TPO, the protective order
was quickly modified to allow contact between Kory and A.G.,
and was later dismissed altogether for lack of evidence. Thus, the
predicate for the neglect petition as to Kory no longer existed.
Aside from the TPO, the petition contained no other allegations of
neglect by Kory, and Social Services never substantiated any. In-
deed, Social Services agreed to dismiss the neglect petition as to
Kory within two months after it was filed.

Despite that dismissal, Social Services submitted a case plan for
Kory, and over the next 18 months, the court required Kory to
comply with the identified services based upon concerns over

137

Kory’s drug use. These concerns, however, were unrelated to the
initial basis for the neglect petition against Kory (i.e., the TPO),
but instead, arose because of a drug screen given to Kory before
the protective custody hearing and even before Kory had counsel.
For months thereafter, A.G. was kept from Kory’s custody not be-
cause of any findings of neglect by Kory, but because the juvenile
court could not determine the nature and extent of Kory’s drug use
or whether it would affect his ability to parent the child based upon
Kory’s inconsistent compliance with the drug screening and the
other terms of the case plan—a case plan that Kory should not have
been required to complete in the first place.

While we recognize that the child’s health and safety is a para-
mount concern in the government’s efforts to preserve and reunify
the family unit, it must be balanced with the protection of a par-
ent’s constitutional rights. NRS 432B.393(1) and (2); see Matter of
Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 801-02, 8 P.3d 126, 133-
34 (2000) (recognizing that in parental termination proceedings,
the fundamental liberty interest of parents must be balanced with
society’s interest in protecting the welfare of children). Social
Services has an obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of
the child, and it has the authority under NRS Chapter 432B to de-
termine whether it is safe to place the child with the parent who
was not responsible for the abuse or neglect that brought the child
into Social Services’ purview. Thus, if Social Services had con-
cerns over Kory’s drug use and its effect on his ability to care for
A.G., Social Services should have maintained a petition for neglect
as to Kory and sought to substantiate allegations of Kory’s neglect.
See NRS 432B.330. As the district court correctly recognized, re-
quiring Social Services to maintain a petition and prove neglect by
Kory protects the due process rights of the parent’s relationship
with his child, while also serving the government’s interest in pro-
tecting the child’s welfare if there is an adequate basis for concern.
A parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
control of his child does not ‘‘simply evaporate’’ because the par-
ent has not been a model parent or may have lost temporary cus-
tody of his child to Social Services. Stantosky, 455 U.S. at 753.

Ye

Because of the constitutional violation that kept A.G. from
Kory’s custody in the dependency proceeding, we conclude that the
presumptions of token efforts and failure of parental adjustment
under NRS 128.109 cannot apply against Kory in the parental ter-
mination case. Those presumptions arose because A.G. was placed
outside of the home for 14 out of 20 consecutive months, NRS
128.109(1)(a) and (2), and because Kory failed to comply with the
case plan within six months, NRS 128.109(1)(b), but these cir-

138 Po

cumstances would not have occurred if it were not for him being
subjected to the case plan. Applying those presumptions here
would be fundamentally unfair.

A.G. was removed from the home because of the mother’s ac-
tions, and Social Services never substantiated findings that Kory
had neglected A.G. When a parent did not cause the child’s re-
moval and was never found to have neglected the child, the statu-
tory presumptions cannot apply to support the termination of the
parent’s rights. Thus, the district court properly concluded that
these presumptions should not apply to terminate Kory’s parental
rights.

Termination was not established by clear and convincing evidence

In the absence of any presumptions, the district court also found
that Social Services failed to establish by clear and convincing ev-
idence that termination of Kory’s parental rights was warranted. In
re Parental Rights as to C.C.A., 128 Nev. 166, 169, 273 P.3d 852,
854 (2012); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. The district court
found that Social Services did not prove parental fault on any of the
grounds alleged, including parental unfitness, failure of parental
adjustment, and the demonstration of only token efforts. See NRS
128.105(2). The district court further found no evidence that Kory
had abused or neglected A.G., or that Kory’s drug use rendered
him unable to provide a safe and caring home for A.G. See NRS
128.106. The district court found that Kory should never have been.
required to comply with the case plan; and to the extent that he
ever orally agreed to comply or partially performed some of the
plan’s components to facilitate reunification, such an agreement
had a coercive element and was an improper basis for termination.

As for the child’s best interest, the district court took into ac-
count the comparative analysis between the child’s family and the
foster family, when the child has been living in a foster home, as
well as A.G.’s attachment to Kory and her maternal grandmother.
See NRS 128.105; NRS 128.108. The district court found that
while A.G. had bonded with her maternal grandmother, A.G. still
had ‘‘considerable love, affection, and emotional ties’’ with Kory.
The court further found that Kory ‘‘has the resources, ability, and
desire to care for [A.G.]’s proper physical, mental, and emotional
growth and development.’ We conclude that the district court’s de-
cision is supported by substantial evidence and that termination of
Kory’s parental rights is not in A.G.’s best interest. See Matter of
Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759,
763 (2006) (recognizing that the district court’s decision to termi-

Pd 139

nate parental rights will be upheld by this court if it is supported
by substantial evidence).

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Kory had constitutionally protected rights in
the dependency proceeding and could not be compelled to comply
with a case plan for reunification with A.G. when Kory was not re-
sponsible for her removal from the home, Kory had never been
found to have abused or neglected A.G., and the petition for neg-
lect was dismissed as to Kory by agreement of the parties. Thus,
the presumptions that arose from A.G.’s lengthy placement in fos-
ter care could not be used against Kory (nonoffending parent) in
the parental termination proceeding to establish either parental
fault or that the child’s best interest would be served by termina-
tion. Further, Social Services otherwise failed to demonstrate that
termination of Kory’s parental rights was warranted. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s order denying the petition to termi-
nate Kory’s parental rights.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Curry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

I, COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LLC, A Nevapa LIMITED
LraBitity COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. CH2 INVESTMENTS,
LLC, a Nevapa Limitep Liapiiry Company; JIM
HARWIN, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND SAFE SHOT, LLC, a
NevabA Limrrep LIABILITY COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

No. 58393

March 7, 2013 296 P.3d 1202

Holland & Hart LLP and Jerry M. Snyder, Reno, for Appellant.

&

0

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low and Mark G. Simons, Reno,
for Respondent CH2 Investments, LLC.

Jim Harwin, Reno, in Proper Person.

Safe Shot, LLC, Reno, in Proper Person.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and SaITTA, JJ.

ee 141

OPINION

By the Court, PickERING, C.J.:

Mechanics’ liens provide a security interest in property for those
who contribute labor or materials to construction projects. A lien
must be timely filed, within 90 days of the completion of the
“‘work of improvement,’ to be valid. We have not interpreted
“‘work of improvement’’ since before the Legislature revised the
mechanic’s lien statutes. Here, the primary questions are whether
the district court erred in relying on Vaughn Materials v. Mead-
owvale Homes, 84 Nev. 227, 438 P.2d 822 (1968), to define the
scope of a contract for a work of improvement and in determining
a lien was untimely. Because the district court did not err in rely-
ing on Vaughn, and its findings were not clearly erroneous, we
affirm.

L

Respondents Jim Harwin and Safe Shot, LLC (together, Harwin)
hired appellant I. Cox Construction Company, LLC, to construct
a shooting range. Cox originally estimated the cost at approxi-
mately $37,000 but informed Harwin that that number would
change as Cox ascertained actual costs and additional expenses.
Harwin approved construction, and Cox prepared plans, which in-
cluded a number of additional items not included in the original
cost estimate, and then began work. The parties did not have a
written agreement.

Harwin paid Cox’s bills as the construction continued through
the summer and fall of 2009. By September, Cox had billed
$48,810. Harwin paid $46,000 by October 8 without complaint,
but then refused to pay anything further. Cox worked through
October, then left the project. By this point the project was largely
finished, and Harwin opened Safe Shot for business soon after.
Harwin received complaints from other tenants about the noise
and, in late 2009 and early 2010, installed soundproofing and
made other improvements to the building.'

In March 2010—more than 90 days after Cox had left the proj-
ect but less than 90 days after Harwin installed the soundproofing—
Cox recorded its mechanic’s lien. In August, Cox filed a complaint
against Harwin and Harwin’s landlord, respondent CH2 Invest-
ments, LLC, claiming the project had cost in excess of $86,000
and seeking to foreclose on the property to recover over $40,000

‘Harwin also installed some glass in January 2010, but Cox does not rely
on this fact in his appeal.

142 ee

in damages and costs. Harwin petitioned the court to remove the
lien, and Cox opposed removal. The district court heard argu-
ment on December 21, 2010, and January 11, 2011. Relying on
Vaughn, the district court held that Cox could not ‘‘tack’’ the
soundproofing to the ‘‘work of improvement’’ of constructing a
shooting range. Accordingly, the district court held the lien was not
timely and was therefore frivolous, and that the lien was excessive,
and it ordered the lien released. Cox appealed.

IL.

Cox argues that it was improper for the district court to consider
the timeliness issue because Harwin did not raise that issue prior
to the hearing; that the district court erred in determining, under
Vaughn, that the soundproofing was not part of the ‘‘work of im-
provement’; and that the district court erred in finding the lien was
both frivolous and excessive.

| re

This court reviews questions of statutory construction and the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Buzz Stew, LLC y. City
of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008);
California Commercial v. Amedeo Vegas I, 119 Nev. 143, 145, 67
P.3d 328, 330 (2003). In interpreting a statute, this court will look
to the plain language of its text and construe the statute according
to its fair meaning and so as not to produce unreasonable results.
Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 641-42,
81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003).

P|

The mechanic’s lien statutes are remedial in nature and should
be liberally construed to protect the rights of claimants and pro-
mote justice. Peccole v. Luce & Goodfellow, 66 Nev. 360, 370-71,
212 P.2d 718, 723-24 (1949). However, claimants must substan-
tially comply with the statutes’ requirements. Id. at 370, 212 P.2d
at 723. The scope of an ‘‘improvement’’ is a question of fact for
the trial court to determine, Schultz v. King, 68 Nev. 207, 214, 228
P.2d 401, 404 (1951), and this court will not set aside the district
court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous,
J.D. Construction v. IBEX Int’l Group, 126 Nev. 366, 381, 240
P.3d 1033, 1043 (2010).

A.

As a preliminary matter, Cox argues that the district court erred
by determining the lien’s timeliness because Harwin did not raise
the issue prior to hearing and then misled the court by stating the

Pr 143

issue had been previously raised as an affirmative defense when it
had not.

NRCP 15(b) allows a court to hear an issue not raised in the
pleadings when the issue is tried with the express or implied con-
sent of the parties. E.g., Elliot v. Resnick, 114 Nev. 25, 30, 952
P.2d 961, 964-65 (1998). Here it can be fairly inferred that the dis-
trict court found Cox had impliedly consented to the issue being
heard. Cox broached the issue first, early in the December 21
hearing, by questioning Harwin regarding the scope of the “work
of improvement.” Furthermore, although Cox later questioned
whether timeliness had been waived, it did not press the point, in-
stead arguing the issue extensively on the merits at both hearings.
Cox therefore gave implied consent and the district court did not
err in addressing timeliness.

Harwin’s inaccurate statement that he challenged timeliness in
his answer does not change this analysis. Cox joined issue on
timeliness before Harwin made the statement, and it was incum-
bent on Cox, if it intended to claim waiver, to verify the record. A
party cannot raise an issue, argue it on the merits at two separate
hearings, and then, after the party loses on the issue, claim that it
should not have been heard.

B.

Cox disputes the district court’s reliance on Vaughn Materials v.
Meadowvale Homes, 84 Nev. 227, 438 P.2d 822 (1968), to deter-
mine the soundproofing was not part of the ‘‘work of improve-
ment.” The district court found that the ‘‘work of improvement’’
had been completed before the need for soundproofing arose and
telied on Vaughn to determine Cox could not enlarge the time for
filing a lien by “‘tacking’’ the soundproofing to the work of com-
pleting a shooting range.? Because it found the ‘‘work of improve-
ment’’ concluded more than 90 days before Cox filed the lien, it
held the lien was untimely and therefore dismissed it as frivolous.

Vaughn was decided under the since-repealed NRS 108.060,
which read:

Every person claiming the benefit of NRS 108.010 to
108.220, inclusive, shall, not earlier than 10 days after the
completion of his contract, or the delivery of material by
him, or the performance of his labor, as the case may be, and

In Vaughn, this court prevented a lien claimant from ‘“‘tack[ing]’’ certain
projects or contracts together to extend a “‘work of improvement”’ and enlarge
the filing period. 84 Nev. at 229, 438 P.2d at 823-24.

1

in each case not later than 30 days after the completion of the
contract and the recording of the completion notice by the
owner as provided in NRS 108.090, and in all other cases 90
days after the completion of the contract, or the delivery of
material, or the performance of his labor, as the case may
be....

NRS 108.060 (1967), repealed by 1969 Nev. Stat., ch. 467, § 3,
at 824 (emphasis added). Cox argues that former NRS 108.060
limited the ‘‘work of improvement’? to work done by the lien
claimant and that, in contrast, current statutes NRS 108.226 and
NRS 108.22188 define ‘‘work of improvement’’ more broadly to
include work done by other parties.

NRS 108.226 reads:

Perfection of lien: Time for recording notice of lien... .
1. To perfect a lien, a lien claimant must record a notice
of lien...
(a) Within 90 days after the date on which the latest of the
following occurs:
(1) The completion of the work of improvement;
(2) The last delivery of material or furnishing of equip-
ment by the lien claimant for the work of improvement; or
(3) The last performance of work by the lien claimant
for the work of improvement... .

(Emphasis added.) NRS 108.22188, a companion statute to NRS
108.226, defines ‘‘[w]ork of improvement’:

‘Work of improvement’’ means the entire structure or scheme
of improvement as a whole, including, without limitation, all
work, materials and equipment to be used in or for the con-
struction, alteration or repair of the property or any improve-
ment thereon, whether under multiple prime contracts or a
single prime contract... .

NRS 108.226 and former NRS 108.060 are similar if not ef-
fectively identical regarding the 90-day filing deadline. Both give
three similar trigger dates for when the deadline begins to run:
first, from ‘‘the completion of the contract’? under former NRS
108.060, or ‘‘[t]he completion of the work of improvement’’ under
NRS 108.226—both referencing a general event not specifically
tied to the claimant’s work; second, from the date of the delivery
of material for the project; and third, from the completion of the
claimant’s own labor on the project. Significantly, neither statute
requires that the 90-day filing period begin to run from the time
the claimant completes its own work, although both list that as one
possibility.

ee 145

NRS 108.22188 defines ‘‘work of improvement’’ to include
more than the particular claimant’s work. However, this broad
definition existed before Vaughn. For example, this court in 1949
looked at the scope of ‘“‘work of improvement”’ and noted that the
Jaw at the time defined ‘‘improvement”’ to broadly encompass
“the entire structure or scheme of improvement as a whole.” Pec-
cole, 66 Nev. at 378, 212 P.2d at 727. It further noted that sepa-
rate contracts would still come together under the definition of
“‘work of improvement’ if that work were continuous. Jd.

Thus, although the mechanic’s lien statutes have been revised
since Vaughn, the analysis of what constitutes a ‘‘work of im-
provement’’ has remained unchanged. The district court did not err
by relying on Vaughn.

Neither did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that
the soundproofing fell outside the scope of the ‘‘work of improve-
ment.’ As noted, the scope and duration of the ‘‘work of im-
provement” is a fact for the district court to determine. Schultz v.
King, 68 Nev. 207, 214, 228 P.2d 401, 404 (1951). Here, the dis-
trict court heard significant testimony and argument regarding the
purpose of and impetus for the soundproofing, including evidence
that neither party contemplated the soundproofing as part of the
project, neither the building nor the operating permits required
soundproofing, and the project was completed such that Harwin
opened for business before the need for soundproofing arose.
Therefore, the district court’s finding that the ‘“‘work of improve-
ment’’ was complete before Harwin installed the soundproofing is
not clearly erroneous.

Moreover, to adopt Cox’s definition of ‘work of improvement’’
would enlarge the statute to unreasonably extend the time during
which a ‘‘work of improvement’’ is ongoing. Harwin may not have
become aware of the need for soundproofing for months, years, or
even decades after opening for business. Were that the case, it
would be unreasonable for the court to find that the ‘‘work of im-
provement’ was still ongoing simply because Harwin suddenly had.
to install soundproofing. This interpretation would enable any
number of unforeseen and unforeseeable projects or repairs to
continue the ‘‘work of improvement.’’ Such an interpretation is far
too broad.

| |

In sum, the district court did not err in relying on Vaughn be-
cause the analysis of what constitutes a ‘‘work of improvement’
remains the same today as it was then, despite revisions to the
statute. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the

46 Pe

soundproofing was not within the scope of the ‘‘work of improve-

ment”’ or finding that the lien was untimely and frivolous.? Be-

cause the lien was frivolous, NRS 108.2275(6)(a) required the

court to expunge it. This conclusion resolves this appeal, making

it unnecessary to address the additional finding of excessiveness.
We affirm.

Harpesty and Sarrra, JJ., concur.

STEPHEN STUBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANT, v.
TRACY STRICKLAND, AN INDIVIDUAL, RESPONDENT.

No. 58751

TRACY STRICKLAND, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANT, v.
STEPHEN STUBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, RESPONDENT.

No, 59145
March 14, 2013 297 P.3d 326

°Cox also argued the district court should have granted additional time for
discovery and that the court erred by not determining an appropriate amount
for the lien. These arguments are without merit. The district court did not err
by failing to grant additional time for discovery because a district court may
appropriately base its decision on affidavits and deposition testimony. J.D.
Construction v. IBEX Int’l Group, 126 Nev. 366, 376, 240 P.3d 1033, 1040
(2010). The permissive nature of NRS 108.2275(6)(b) does not require the
court to determine an appropriate amount for a lien it deems excessive. More-
over, Cox has the burden of proving the amount of the lien, and as the district
court found Cox failed to meet this burden of proof, it was not under obliga-
tion to determine an appropriate amount. J.D. Construction, 126 Nev. at
369, 240 P.3d at 1036.

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, Las Vegas, for
Stephen Stubbs.

L.G. Strickland, Boulder City, for Tracy Strickland.

VET

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, Gipgons, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant can file an anti-
SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) suit after
the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the initial lawsuit. We conclude
that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action before the de-
fendant files either an initial responsive pleading or a special mo-
tion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.670, the defendant cannot file
an anti-SLAPP suit against the plaintiff based on that action.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2010, Stephen Stubbs gave a speech during the
public comment portion of a Boulder City Council meeting. In the
speech, Mr. Stubbs accused Boulder City Councilwoman Linda
Strickland and her husband, Tracy Strickland, of not following
Boulder City Municipal Code requirements for the licensure of
their law firm. Afterwards, Mr. Stubbs posted the speech on his
website.

In January 2011, Mr. Strickland, represented by Councilwoman
Strickland, filed a complaint against Mr. Stubbs for libel per se
and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the Internet
posting. However, Mr. Strickland voluntarily dismissed the suit
under NRCP 41(a) nine days after Mr. Stubbs received the com-
plaint and before Mr. Stubbs filed an answer or any pleading in the
case. Following the voluntary dismissal, Mr. Stubbs filed a sepa-
rate complaint against Mr. Strickland, seeking damages and attor-
ney fees pursuant to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute. In response, Mr.
Strickland filed an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. The district court granted Mr. Strickland’s motion, finding
that Mr. Stubbs had no standing to file his complaint under the
anti-SLAPP statute once Mr. Strickland voluntarily dismissed his
action. After prevailing on his motion to dismiss, Mr. Strickland
moved for attorney fees and sanctions. The district court denied his
motion without making any specific findings.

150 —

Mr. Stubbs now appeals the district court’s order dismissing his
anti-SLAPP action, arguing that such an action is permitted by
NRS 41.670, regardless of whether Mr. Strickland voluntarily dis-
missed the original suit before Mr. Stubbs could file an answer. We
disagree and therefore affirm the district court’s order dismissing
Mr. Stubbs’s action.

Mr. Strickland appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion for attorney fees and sanctions, arguing that Mr. Stubbs
filed his complaint without reasonable grounds, the complaint was
not warranted under existing law, and Mr. Stubbs failed to argue
for an extension of the law. We disagree and therefore affirm the
district court’s order denying Mr. Strickland’s request for attorney
fees and sanctions.

DISCUSSION

The district court properly dismissed Mr. Stubbs’s complaint
because Mr. Strickland voluntarily dismissed the original suit
before Mr. Stubbs filed an answer

Mr. Stubbs argues that NRS 41.670(2) allows a defendant to
bring a separate action for damages, attorney fees, and costs re-
sulting from a SLAPP suit, even if the plaintiff filing the alleged
SLAPP suit voluntarily dismisses the action before a defendant ap-
pears in the Jawsuit or has the opportunity to file the special mo-
tion to dismiss. In response, Mr. Strickland argues that the statute
allows a party to file a separate action for damages and attorney
fees only if the district court grants a special motion to dismiss
pursuant to NRS 41.660.

Le

An order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss ‘‘is sub-
ject to a rigorous standard of review on appeal.’ Buzz Stew, LLC
v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672
(2008) (quotations omitted). This court presumes all factual alle-
gations in the complaint are true and draws all inferences in favor
of the plaintiff. Jd. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672. Dismissal is appro-
priate when ‘‘it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could
prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to
relief.” Id. We review all legal conclusions de novo. Id.

A SLAPP suit is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates pri-
marily to chill a defendant’s exercise of his or her First Amend-
ment free speech rights. John v. Douglas County School District,
125 Nev. 746, 752, 219 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009). When a plaintiff
files a SLAPP suit against a defendant, Nevada’s anti-SLAPP
statute allows the defendant to file a special motion to dismiss in
response to the action. NRS 41.660(1). NRS 41.670(2) further

PE 151

provides, “‘If the court grants a special motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to NRS 41.660 . . . [t]he person against whom the action
is brought may bring a separate action to recover: (a) [c]ompen-
satory damages; (b) [p]unitive damages; and (c) [a]ttorney’s fees
and costs of bringing the separate action.’”’

| |

‘We construe a plain and unambiguous statute according to its or-
dinary meaning. Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d
788, 790 (2010). The plain language of NRS 41.670 clearly con-
ditions a defendant’s ability to bring a separate action for damages
and attorney fees in response to a SLAPP suit on the district
court’s grant of a special motion to dismiss. Therefore, an anti-
SLAPP suit for damages and attorney fees may not proceed unless
the district court previously granted a special motion to dismiss.
This special motion to dismiss functions as a motion for summary
judgment and allows the district court to evaluate the merits of the
alleged SLAPP claim. See NRS 41.660(3), (4); John, 125 Nev. at
753, 219 P.3d at 1281.

_

In this case, a special motion to dismiss was neither filed nor
granted before Mr. Strickland voluntarily dismissed the alleged
SLAPP suit. A plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action ‘“‘at any
time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment.’ NRCP 41(a)(1)(i). After a plain-
tiff files a notice of voluntary dismissal, the file is closed and a
defendant may not revive the action. Harvey L. Lerer, Inc. v. Dis-
trict Court, 111 Nev. 1165, 1170, 901 P.2d 643, 646 (1995) (cit-
ing Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Moss, 88 Nev. 256, 259,
495 P.2d 616, 618 (1972)). Therefore, the anti-SLAPP suit remedy
was unavailable to Mr. Stubbs after Mr. Strickland’s voluntary
dismissal.

Mr. Stubbs claims this interpretation of NRS 41.670(2) violates
the public policy behind Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, as it would
allow a plaintiff to file a SLAPP suit and force a defendant to suf-
fer expenses and intimidation, while also allowing the plaintiff to
escape any penalty if he or she dismisses the action before the de-
fendant has a chance to seek relief. However, ‘‘[p]laintiffs have the
freedom to reconsider the wisdom of their actions without penalty
before defendants have incurred clearly identifiable and recoverable
legal fees.’’ S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 718
(Cal. 2006).

S.B. Beach Properties is instructive here. In reviewing facts
similar to this instant case, the California Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that legal actions, even those ultimately dismissed, are
a burden on a defendant. Id. Nonetheless, it ruled that permitting
plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their claims without penalty prior

152 Ce

to the filing of an anti-SLAPP special motion serves the dual pur-
poses of allowing a plaintiff freedom of action and extracting a de-
fendant from a lawsuit as quickly and inexpensively as possible.
S.B. Beach Properties, 138 P.3d at 717-18. We agree with the Cal-
ifornia court and decline to penalize plaintiffs who opt to discon-
tinue frivolous lawsuits.

| areas!

Therefore, we conclude that a defendant may not pursue an ac-
tion for damages and attorney fees pursuant to NRS 41.670(2)
when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the alleged SLAPP suit be-
fore a special motion to dismiss is filed or granted. As a result, the
district court properly dismissed Mr. Stubbs’s complaint.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award
attorney fees or impose sanctions because Mr. Stubbs argued for a
change or clarification in existing law

Mr. Strickland argues that the district court abused its discretion
by refusing to award him attorney fees or other sanctions because
Mr. Stubbs filed his complaint without reasonable grounds, the
complaint was not warranted by existing Jaw, and Mr. Stubbs failed
to argue for an extension of the law.! Mr. Stubbs responds that he
filed his complaint in good faith to either clarify the law or possi-
bly change the law as it relates to a defendant’s ability to bring a
separate action for damages and fees under NRS 41.670(2). We
agree with Mr. Stubbs.

P|

We review orders refusing to award attorney fees or issue sanc-
tions under NRS 18.010(2)(b), NRS 7.085(1), and NRCP 11 for
an abuse of discretion. Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, 124 Nev.
951, 967, 194 P.3d 96, 106 (2008); Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev.
670, 676, 856 P.2d 560, 564 (1993).

NRS 18.010(2)(b) permits a district court to award attorney
fees to a prevailing party when the district court determines a
claim of the opposing party was brought without reasonable

'Mr. Strickland asserts that the district court made no specific findings when
denying the motion for attorney fees and seems to suggest that this court
should require district courts to articulate findings as to why attorney fees are
not warranted. While we require a district court to make findings regarding the
basis for awarding attorney fees and the reasonableness of an award of attor-
ney fees, see Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga, 125 Nev. 527, 540
n,2, 216 P.3d 779, 788 n.2 (2009), this court has not required such findings
when a district court denies a motion for attorney fees. Therefore, we conclude
that Mr. Strickland’s argument lacks merit.

Po 153

grounds or to harass the prevailing party. NRS 7.085(1) also allows
a district court to require an attorney to personally pay expenses
and attorney fees relating to a case when the attorney filed or
maintained an action that was not well-grounded in fact or existing
law, did not provide a good faith argument for a change to existing
law, or unreasonably extended the proceedings.

Mr. Strickland contends that Mr. Stubbs’s complaint misrepre-
sented the law by omitting pertinent portions of NRS 41.670 that
condition a party’s recovery of damages and attorney fees on the
grant of a special motion to dismiss. Mr. Strickland also asserts
that Mr. Stubbs’s complaint was misleading because it relied upon
a California appellate case, ARP Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Gal-
lagher Bassett Services, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256 (Ct. App.
2006), that did not support his position, while failing to distinguish
S.B. Beach Properties, which was directly on point. Mr. Strickland
also claims that Mr. Stubbs never raised statutory interpretation ar-
guments before the district court and, therefore, waived this argu-
ment on appeal.

|

First, we conclude that Mr. Stubbs’s complaint adequately in-
corporates the relevant portions of NRS 41.670, as Counts 2 and
3 of the complaint seek remedy under ‘‘41.635 et seq.’ and
Nevada is a notice pleading state. See, e.g., Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev.
196, 198, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984). Second, we do not agree that
Mr. Stubbs attempted to mislead the district court by arguing for
application of ARP Pharmacy Services, as his argument did not
suggest that case was directly on point with the circumstances of
this case. Third, we do not agree that Mr. Stubbs waived his ar-
guments regarding statutory interpretation, since he made similar
statutory interpretation arguments at the hearing on the motion to
dismiss, in his opposition to Mr. Strickland’s motion for attorney
fees, and during the hearing on the motion.

Mr. Strickland also asserts that Mr. Stubbs filed his pleading for
an improper purpose, as Mr. Stubbs’s claims focused on Council-
woman Strickland as an elected official rather than Mr. Strickland,
who was the plaintiff in the original complaint. Mr. Stubbs argues
that he mentioned Councilwoman Strickland’s misconduct in the
complaint because he believed Mr. Strickland was attempting to
quiet Mr. Stubbs on behalf of Councilwoman Strickland by filing
the original complaint. We conclude that Mr. Stubbs did not bring
his complaint for an improper purpose because Mr. Stubbs argued
for a change or clarification in existing law and nothing in the
record demonstrates Mr. Stubbs made accusations he knew were

1st Po

untrue. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Mr. Strickland’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to NRS
7.085(1) and NRS 18.010(2)(b).?

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.?

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLas,
Cuerry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

LUCIAETTA MARIE IVEY, Peririoner, v. THE EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, IN AND FoR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND
THE HONORABLE JENNIFER P. TOGLIATTI, Districr
JuDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND PHILLIP DENNIS IVEY, JR.,
REAL Parry IN INTEREST.

No. 59297
March 28, 2013 299 P.3d 354

Pecos Law Group and Bruce I. Shapiro and Shann D. Winesett,
Henderson, for Petitioner.

2Moreover, sanctions were not appropriately requested in this case under
NRCP 11. NRCP 11(c)(1)(A) requires a party to file a motion for sanctions
separately from other motions or requests. Mr. Strickland filed a motion for at-
torney fees that mentioned NRCP 11 but did not file a separate motion for
sanctions based on NRCP 11. Even if Mr. Strickland had filed the NRCP 11
request in the appropriate form, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the request because Mr. Stubbs made a good faith argument for
clarification or change to existing aw and made a reasonable and competent
inquiry before filing the claim, as discussed above.

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude they are
without merit.

155

Chesnoff & Schonfeld and David Z. Chesnoff and Richard A.
Schonfeld, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Gissons, J.:

The case underlying this original writ petition involves post-
divorce-decree proceedings between real party in interest Phillip
Dennis Ivey, Jr., and petitioner Luciaetta Marie Ivey. More than a
year after Luciaetta’s and Phillip’s divorce, Luciaetta filed a ‘“Mo-
tion For An Order To Show Cause Why Defendant Should Not Be
Held In Contempt Of Court, To Reopen Discovery, And For At-
torney’s Fees; And For Related Relief”’ (motion to reopen discov-
ery). Luciaetta then filed a motion to disqualify Judge William
Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen discovery. In Luci-
aetta’s motion to disqualify, Luciaetta asserted that Judge Gonza-
lez’s recusal was required under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution and under Nevada law. Luciaetta
claimed that Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion would create an
appearance of impropriety because Phillip and others connected to
the Ivey divorce contributed to Judge Gonzalez’s reelection cam-
paign. After a hearing, respondent Judge Jennifer P. Togliatti de-
nied Luciaetta’s motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez, and Judge
Gonzalez went on to preside over Luciaetta’s motion to reopen dis-
covery. As a result, Luciaetta petitioned this court for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition vacating Judge Togliatti’s order and dis-
qualifying Judge Gonzalez from hearing the motion to reopen dis-
covery. Because we conclude that the failure to disqualify Judge
Gonzalez did not violate Luciaetta’s due process rights or Nevada
Jaw, we deny Luciaetta’s petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After seven years of marriage, Phillip and Luciaetta filed a joint
petition for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, attorney

Po 157

David Chesnoff represented Phillip. Phillip also hired attorney
John Spilotro to represent Luciaetta and paid Spilotro a flat fee of
$10,000. On December 29, 2009, Judge Gonzalez entered a di-
vorce decree ending the marriage.

According to the divorce decree, Luciaetta and Phillip entered
into a Marital Settlement Agreement that outlined the distribution
of the community property and Phillip’s and Luciaetta’s obligations
following the divorce. Under the Marital Settlement Agreement,
Phillip was to pay Luciaetta $180,000 per month as alimony from
the income that he received from his interest in Tiltware, LLC, an
Internet poker company. The Marital Settlement Agreement stated
that Phillip’s obligation to pay alimony would end if he ever
stopped receiving income from Tiltware. The Marital Settlement
Agreement also contained a provision that acknowledged that
Phillip and Luciaetta received the advice of independent counsel in
connection with the terms of the agreement.

After the entry of Phillip’s and Luciaetta’s divorce decree, Judge
Gonzalez successfully ran for reelection as a judge for the family
division of the district court in Clark County. During Judge Gon-
zalez’s campaign for reelection, he received a total of $71,240 in
cash donations and a total of $14,216.65 for in-kind contributions.
Phillip and others connected to the Iveys’ divorce contributed to
these totals for Judge Gonzalez’s campaign. In February 2010,
Chesnoff donated $1,000 in cash to Judge Gonzalez and a few
months later made an in-kind contribution of $3,543.54 by holding
a fundraiser. In April 2010, Chesnoff’s wife contributed $2,500 in
cash, while Chesnoff’s law partner donated $1,000 in cash. Spi-
Jotro’s law firm contributed $500 in cash to Judge Gonzalez dur-
ing the month of April as well. Finally, Phillip donated $5,000 in
cash to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign on April 17, 2010.

The cash contributions from all of these individuals amounted to
$10,000 and were approximately 14 percent of the total cash con-
tributions to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign. Chesnoff’s in-kind do-
nation equaled 25 percent of the total in-kind contributions to
Judge Gonzalez’s campaign. Phillip’s $5,000 donation was the
Jargest amount contributed by any individual person, but two po-
litical action committees donated $5,000 as well. Phillip’s contri-
bution amounted to 7 percent of the total cash contributions to
Judge Gonzalez’s campaign.

In May 2011, a dispute arose over Phillip’s monthly alimony
payments. Following the dispute, Luciaetta filed a motion to reopen
discovery. Judge Gonzalez was assigned to hear Luciaetta’s motion.

Prior to the hearing, Luciaetta filed an affidavit requesting that
Judge Gonzalez recuse himself from hearing the motion to reopen
discovery because the campaign contributions created an appear-
ance of impropriety. In response, Judge Gonzalez filed an affidavit
acknowledging the campaign contributions, but noting that under

188 Po

Nevada law, the receipt of campaign donations alone does not
serve as grounds for disqualification. Judge Gonzalez also stated in
the affidavit that he met with Phillip only one time at an event sev-
eral months after he entered the Iveys’ divorce decree and that he
never discussed the divorce with Phillip or his attorney outside of
court.

Luciaetta then filed a motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez from
hearing her motion to reopen discovery based on the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution and Nevada law. Judge
Togliatti held a hearing on Luciaetta’s motion to disqualify and
subsequently denied the motion. Judge Togliatti determined that
based on both federal and Nevada law, the campaign contributions
did not rise to such a level as to create an appearance of impro-
priety requiring Judge Gonzalez’s recusal.

Luciaetta now petitions this court for writ relief, requesting that
this court vacate the order denying the motion to disqualify Judge
Gonzalez and order that the case be assigned to a different de-
partment because Judge Gonzalez hearing the motion to reopen
discovery violated due process and Nevada law.!

DISCUSSION
Standard of review

||

Luciaetta has petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus
or prohibition. ‘‘[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the ap-
propriate vehicle to seek disqualification of a judge.’ Towbin
Dodge, LLC v. Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. 251, 254-55, 112 P.3d 1063,
1066 (2005). Mandamus is available ‘‘to compel the performance
of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from.
an office, trust or station,’ NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary
or capricious exercise of discretion. International Game Tech. v.
Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). Gener-
ally, this court will not issue a writ of mandamus when a petitioner

‘Phillip asserts that Luciaetta’s writ petition is moot because Luciaetta did
not seek a stay of the district court proceedings and the matter has now
reached its conclusion. We disagree. This court determines only actual, live
controversies and will not render opinions on issues that cannot affect the out-
come of a case. University Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 120 Nev. 712,
720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004). As a result, a case may become moot by the
occurrence of subsequent events that eliminate any actual controversy. Id.
After filing the writ petition, Luciaetta did not seek a stay of the post-divorce
proceedings with the district court or this court. Thus, Judge Gonzalez con-
tinued to preside over the underlying proceedings and ultimately denied Luci-
aetta’s motion to reopen discovery. While Judge Gonzalez already denied
Luciaetta’s motion, we conclude that an actual controversy still exists because,
if rendered in violation of Luciaetta’s due process rights, that decision could
be void. As a result, Luciaetta’s writ petition is not moot.

Po 139

has ‘‘a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law’’ NRS 34.170. No such legal remedy exists here. Accord-
ingly, we exercise our discretion to determine whether Judge Gon-
zalez should have been disqualified from hearing and ruling on Lu-
ciaetta’s motion.

Judge Gonzalez hearing Luciaetta’s motion to reopen discovery did
not violate Luciaetta’s due process rights

Luciaetta argues that the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), re-
quires Judge Gonzalez’s recusal under the Due Process Clause. We
disagree.

Lee

The Due Process Clause guarantees the right to a fair trial be-
fore a fair tribunal. Jd. at 876 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)). Determining whether a judge’s recusal is com-
pelled by the Due Process Clause does not require proof of actual
bias; instead, a court must objectively determine whether the prob-
ability of actual bias is too high to ensure the protection of a
party’s due process rights. Jd. at 883-84 (citing Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). When an individual with a personal in-
terest in a specific case ‘‘ha[s] a significant and disproportionate
influence’’ in putting a judge on the case by contributing funds to
the judge’s campaign while the case is pending, the United States
Supreme Court has concluded that the risk of actual bias is great.
Id. at 884. In such a situation, a court must examine the size of the
contribution in comparison to the total campaign contribution
amount, the total sum spent during the election, and the effect that
the contribution may have had on the election’s outcome. Jd. A
court must also review the timing of the campaign contributions in
relation to the judge’s election and the status of the contributor’s
case. Id. at 886. Thus, determining whether the risk of actual bias
violates a party’s due process rights must be done on a case-by-
case basis. See id. at 884-86.

The Caperton decision addressed whether the Due Process
Clause required a West Virginia Supreme Court justice’s recusal
when substantial third-party expenditures had been made support-
ing the justice’s election by a party to a case pending before the
court. Id. at 872. In concluding that the justice’s failure to dis-
qualify himself violated due process, the United States Supreme
Court noted that while not every contribution by a litigant or at-
torney creates such a high risk of actual bias requiring recusal, the
Caperton circumstances were an ‘‘exceptional case.’’ Id. at 884.
The party in Caperton contributed $3,000,000 to a committee ad-
vocating the justice’s election in place of an incumbent justice, 300

160 Po

percent more than the justice’s own campaign committee spent on
the election and $1,000,000 more than the total amount spent by
both candidates’ campaign committees combined. Id. The Court
also noted that the timing of the contributions was critical, as they
were made prior to the party’s appeal of the district court judg-
ment, when it was reasonably foreseeable that the case would be
before the newly elected justice. Jd. at 886. Thus, the Court de-
termined that the timing of the contributions, along with the dis-
proportionate influence that the donations had in placing the justice
on the case, created such a high risk of actual bias that the justice’s
failure to disqualify himself violated due process. Id. at 886-87.

Pt

We conclude that the donations by Phillip and others connected
to the Ivey divorce do not rise to the ‘‘exceptional’’ level of the
campaign contribution at issue in Caperton. See id. at 884. First,
the donations at issue are much smaller than the $3,000,000 con-
tribution in Caperton. Phillip’s $5,000 donation amounted to 7
percent of Judge Gonzalez’s total campaign contributions. Phillip’s
donation combined with the others’ contributions amounted to
$10,000 and constituted 14 percent of the total cash contributions
to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign. The in-kind donation of Phillip’s
attorney equaled 25 percent of the total in-kind contributions to
Judge Gonzalez’s campaign. We recognize that these donations are
greater than the contributions of other individuals to Judge Gon-
zalez’s campaign. However, these amounts do not reach the ex-
traordinary level of the sum at issue in Caperton. See id.

Second, the timing of these contributions is less suspicious than
the timing of the Caperton donations. Phillip and the others con-
tributed to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign only after the conclusion of
the divorce. Luciaetta points out that the contributions occurred
prior to the expiration of the six-month time limit in NRCP 60(b).
Despite the contributions occurring within this six-month period,
and although post-decree motions are not uncommon in divorce
proceedings, the particular facts of this appeal do not demonstrate
such a high risk of bias that due process required Judge Gonzalez’s
recusal. Phillip and Luciaetta filed a joint petition for divorce,
which indicated that Phillip and Luciaetta had executed a Marital
Settlement Agreement that divided their community property and.
set forth their obligations post-divorce. Luciaetta was represented
by counsel during the negotiation of the Marital Settlement Agree-
ment and throughout the divorce proceedings. Although Luciaetta
notes that Phillip was paying for her representation during the di-
vorce, Luciaetta signed the Marital Settlement Agreement, which
specifically states that both Phillip and Luciaetta recognize that
they had the opportunity to receive the independent advice of
counsel. Furthermore, Luciaetta did not bring her motion to re-
open discovery until June 6, 2011, more than a year after the di-

Po 161

vorce decree was entered and the contributions were made. As a
result, Judge Togliatti did not abuse her discretion by finding that
Judge Gonzalez hearing Luciaetta’s motion to reopen discovery
would not violate Luciaetta’s due process rights.

Judge Gonzalez hearing Luciaetta’s motion to reopen discovery did
not violate Nevada law

Luciaetta argues that if Judge Gonzalez’s disqualification is not
required under the Due Process Clause, the district court should
have disqualified Judge Gonzalez under more stringent Nevada
Jaw—NRS 1.230 and the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct
(NCIC). We disagree.

In Nevada, “‘a judge has a general duty to sit, unless a judicial
canon, statute, or rule requires the judge’s disqualification.” Millen
v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1245, 1253, 148 P.3d 694, 700 (2006). NRS
1.230 prohibits a judge from presiding over any matter when actual
or implied bias exists on the part of the judge. The relevant provi-
sions of NCJC Rule 2.11(A) provide:

A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceed-
ing in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, including but not limited to the following
circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts
that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows that the judge . . . is:

(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest
that could be substantially affected by the proceeding . . . .
(3) The judge knows that he or she . . . has an economic
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding.

NCIC defines ‘‘[dje minimis’ as ‘‘an insignificant interest that
could not raise a reasonable question regarding the judge’s impar-
tiality’’ NCJC Terminology (2011). This court has recognized
“‘that a contribution to a presiding judge by a party or an attorney
does not ordinarily constitute grounds for disqualification.’ Las
Vegas Downtown Redev. v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 640, 644, 5 P.3d
1059, 1062 (2000) (ordering judge who recused himself to hear
case).?

2After filing her writ petition, Lucizetta later filed a motion to supplement
her petition with a memorandum from the American Bar Association (ABA)
on potential changes to the provisions of the ABA Model Code concerning ju-
dicial disqualification. We granted Luciaetta’s motion and allowed her to file

1 Po

‘We conclude that the campaign contributions at issue here were
not significant enough to ‘‘raise a reasonable question’ as to
Judge Gonzalez’s impartiality. The individual contributions of
Phillip and the others ranged from $500 to $5,000. These amounts
are within the statutory limits for campaign contributions. See
NRS 294A.100 (stating that a person shall not contribute more
than $5,000 to a candidate within a certain time). Furthermore, the
contributions occurred after Phillip and Luciaetta filed the joint pe-
tition for divorce and Judge Gonzalez entered the divorce decree.
Thus, the campaign contributions are not exceptional. See Las
Vegas Downtown Redey., 116 Nev. at 645, 5 P.3d at 1062 (stating
that contributions ranging from $150 to $2,000 to a district court
judge’s campaign were not extraordinary and did not require the
judge’s disqualification). Without more, the campaign contributions
are insufficient to demonstrate that actual or implied bias existed
on the part of Judge Gonzalez. Campaign contributions made
within statutory limits cannot constitute grounds for disqualifica-
tion of a judge under Nevada law. See In re Petition to Recall Dun-
leavy, 104 Nev. 784, 790, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (explaining
that ‘‘intolerable results’’ would occur if litigants could disqualify
a judge because an attorney for the opposing party donated to the
judge’s campaign).? Therefore, Judge Togliatti did not abuse her
discretion by finding that Nevada law does not require Judge Gon-
zalez’s disqualification.

CONCLUSION

‘We conclude that Judge Gonzalez was not disqualified from
presiding over Luciaetta’s motion based on the contributions made
to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign because doing so violated neither
Luciaetta’s due process rights nor Nevada law. Accordingly, we
deny Luciaetta’s writ petition.

Curry, J., concurs.

the ABA memorandum as a supplemental appendix. Having reviewed the sup-
plemental appendix, we conclude that it does not affect our analysis of Nevada
law and judicial disqualification.

*The Nevada Constitution specifically requires the election of district court
judges. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 5. Furthermore, the citizens of Nevada defeated
a recent ballot initiative to change the selection process for judges from elec-
tion to appointment. See Nevada Ballot Questions 2010, Nevada Secretary of
State, Question No. 1; Nevada Secretary of State, 2010 Official Statewide
General Election Results, available at http://www.nvsos.gov/soselectionpages/
results/2010StatewideGeneral/BlectionSummary.aspx. Campaign contributions
are necessarily a part of judicial elections.

Po 168

Harovesty, J., with whom PICKERING, C.J., and PARRAGUIRRE
and Douczas, JJ., agree, concurring:

I concur that the petition should be denied for the reasons ex-
pressed by the majority. I write separately, however, to address our
concurring colleague’s criticism of the Nevada Code of Judicial
Conduct’s (NCIC) current campaign contribution rules. Although
the concurrence voices concerns about the rules, it offers no solu-
tions and fails to engage the administrative docket process, as this
court did in 2009, to solicit comments from the judiciary, the bar,
and the public to consider potential amendments. See Nevada
Rules on the Administrative Docket (NRAD) 3.2, 7.

In 2009, this court initiated a thorough review of the NCIC,
which included a study of the Code’s campaign finance rules and
due process considerations in light of the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Caperton v. A. T: Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868 (2009). A committee appointed by this court, comprised of
members of Nevada’s judiciary, the bar, and professors from the
William S. Boyd School of Law, filed a supplement to its final re~
port on August 13, 2009, recommending two bright-line rules for
judicial disqualification because of campaign contributions that
substantially deviated from campaign contribution provisions con-
tained in Nevada’s campaign finance statutes. See In the Matter of
the Amendment of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, ADKT
No. 427 (Supplement to Final Report, August 13, 2009). The
first proposed rule change would have required disqualification by
a judge who received financial support ‘‘within the previous 6
years from a party, or a party’s affiliate[]..., or a party’s
lawyer or the Jaw firm of a party’s lawyer in an aggregate amount
that exceeds $50,000.’’ Id. The second suggestion would have re-
quired disqualification if the judge ‘‘received aggregate campaign
support exceeding 5 [percent] of the judge’s total financial [sup-
port] within the previous 6 years from a party, or a party’s
affiliated entities . . . , or a party’s lawyer or the law firm of a
party’s lawyer,’ and required disqualification if the support ‘‘cre-
ate[d] a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality.” Id.

Following extensive public comment, all justices, including our
concurring colleague, voted to adopt the Revised Nevada Code
of Judicial Conduct without inclusion of either of the committee’s
recommended amendments to the judicial campaign finance rules.
See In the Matter of the Amendment of the Nevada Code of Judi-
cial Conduct, ADKT No. 427 (Order, December 17, 2009). The
Nevada Constitution gives our citizens the right to elect their
judges and justices. Informed exercise of this right requires cam-
paigns, which in turn require campaign finances. As this court

164 Po

learned in 2009 when it engaged in the administrative docket
process, there are no easy answers when one weighs the duty of a
judge to sit on a case against a party’s due process right to an im-
partial adjudication in a state that has chosen to elect its judges.
But the due process considerations are, at this juncture, limited
by the exceptional circumstances discussed in Caperton. While
individual cases may require disqualification because of unique
campaign-based relationships, Caperton did not compel per se
rules that are stricter than statutory campaign limits. As our con-
curring colleague concedes, this case is substantially different
from Caperton as all of the campaign contributions to Judge Gon-
zalez at issue here were within statutory limits and made after this
court entered its order amending the NCJC without the commit-
tee’s recommended changes. Under these circumstances, it would
be unreasonable to conclude that Judge Togliatti abused her dis-
cretion by finding that Nevada law does not require Judge Gonza-
Jez’s disqualification.

Sarrta, J., concurring:

Though I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion, I write
separately in order to voice my concerns with the current judicial
campaign contribution rules. The error asserted in this case clearly
does not rise to a level that violates either party’s due process right
to a fair trial before a fair tribunal. Further, as discussed by the
majority, the contributions made to Judge Gonzalez’s reelection
campaign were all within the statutory limit. Therefore, under our
current codical scheme, recusal or disqualification was not specif-
ically required. However, I find it necessary to voice my concerns
regarding the potential that the circumstances in this matter lend an
air of impropriety to the proceedings.

It is arguably the most significant responsibility of a judge to
“‘act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and
[to] avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”’ NCJC
R. 1.2. The comments to this rule recognize that impropriety and
appearances of impropriety, or ‘‘[cJonduct that compromises or ap-
pears to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of a judge,’ diminish the public’s confidence in the judiciary. Id.
cmt. 3. The test for an appearance of impropriety is “‘whether the
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge violated [the Nevada] Code [of Judicial Conduct] or engaged
in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, im-
partiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.’’ Jd. cmt. 5.
Perhaps the most significant challenge to the judiciary’s independ-
ence and impartiality is the increase in the volume and amount of
campaign contributions.

Po 165

Generally, ‘‘a contribution to a presiding judge by a party or an
attorney does not . . . constitute grounds for disqualification.’ Las
Vegas Downtown Redeyv. v. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 640, 644, 5 P.3d
1059, 1062 (2000). Thus, it appears that a judge’s duty to sit is not
overcome by campaign contributions within the statutory limit. See
id. Presently, NRS 294A.100(1) imposes a $10,000 aggregate
limit on individuals making campaign contributions. Consequently,
a judge must constantly balance the duty to sit, Millen v. Dist. Ct.,
122 Nev. 1245, 1253, 148 P.3d 694, 699 (2006), with the duty to
“respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive
to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.’ NCJC
preamble. I propose that the judge’s duty to sit ‘‘should not be
construed to suggest that judges should refuse to disqualify them-
selves in apt circumstances or that close cases should routinely be
resolved against disqualification. On the contrary, close questions
should ordinarily be resolved in favor of disqualification in order
to preserve public confidence in the judicial system.” Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the
Duty to Sit, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 813, 957-58 (2009).

As my concurring colleagues point out, this court, following an
administrative process including public hearings and participation
by leading scholars, adopted the Revised Nevada Judicial Code. At
that time, we chose not to adopt bright-line rules to guide judges
in making the difficult decision to recuse themselves following sub-
stantial campaign contributions. Although I joined my colleagues
in adopting the revisions to the code, the instant case reveals that
it is perhaps time to revisit the current rules and their application
to real cases in controversy. In our current political landscape,
we must be cognizant of the potential appearance of impropriety
arising from the type of campaign contributions made in this
case—numerous contributions within the statutory limit made by a
group of individuals who all have interests in a single case. Ongo-
ing judicial review, indeed our core function, commands that we
reconsider prior decisions in light of the case presented.

Here, Phillip, his attorney, his attorney’s spouse, and his attor-
ney’s law partner contributed a total of $9,500. Luciaetta’s attor-
ney also contributed $500. In total, these contributions made up
only 14 percent of the total cash donations to Judge Gonzalez’s re-
election campaign. Phillip’s attorney also made a $3,543.54 in-
kind contribution by holding a fundraiser. This amount consti-
tuted 25 percent of the total in-kind contributions made to Judge
Gonzalez’s reelection campaign. Although the monetary value of
these contributions are not so significant that they rise to the level
described in Caperton v. A. T: Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868
(2009), the fact that so many individuals associated with the Iveys’
divorce contributed to Judge Gonzalez’s campaign lends a definite
air of impropriety, especially in light of the fact that it was possi-

166 Po

ble that future matters related to the divorce would come before
him.

The divorce decree specifically approves of the marital settle-
ment agreement, which contained specific provisions relating to
Luciaetta’s alimony. Significantly, alimony would only continue so
long as Phillip was receiving income from Tiltware, LLC. Thus, it
is clear that the district court could at some point be called on to
redefine the parties’ rights under the marital settlement agreement
if Phillip stopped receiving income from his company, which, in
fact, is what happened. Therefore, although the divorce decree was
final, the district court maintained jurisdiction to modify any pre-
vious adjudication of Phillip and Luciaetta’s property rights. See
NRS 125.150(7). Further, under Nevada’s one family, one judge
tule, the same judge must preside over any matters involving the
same family. NRS 3.025(3).

A significant portion of the majority opinion focuses on Caper-
ton, the United States Supreme Court’s most recent and expansive
decision regarding due process and judicial campaign contribu-
tions. I agree with the majority in its determination that Luciaetta’s
right to a fair trial before a fair tribunal was not violated by the
various contributions made to Judge Gonzalez’s reelection cam-
paign. And I reiterate that under the current contribution rules,
Judge Gonzalez did nothing wrong. However, as noted in Caper-
ton, ensuring that the parties’ due process rights are upheld is only
the ‘‘ ‘constitutional floor, ’’ and individual states are free to set
more rigorous standards on judicial disqualification based on cam-
paign contributions. 556 U.S. at 889 (emphasis added) (quoting
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)). Thus, it is the in-
dividual state’s responsibility to take further action to ensure that
the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary is strong.
“The citizen’s respect for judgments depends . . . upon the issu-
ing court’s absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence,
a state interest of the highest order.’ Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Following Caperton, a number of states have adopted new dis-
qualification rules. Several states have promulgated new rules
or comments that either cite to Caperton or to the specific factors
relied upon in the decision. See, e.g., Ark. Code of Jud. Conduct
R. 2.11 cmt. 4A (LexisNexis 2012); Ga. Code of Jud. Conduct
Canon 3E(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. R. Ann. R. 21-211
cmts. 6 & 7 (2012); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, R. of Jud. Conduct
2.11 cmt. 7 (LexisNexis 2012); Wash. Code of Jud. Conduct R.
2.11(D) (West 2011).

Prior to Caperton, the American Bar Association amended the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct regarding campaign contribu-
tions as grounds for judicial disqualification as follows:

po 161

A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceed-
ing in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned, including but not limited to the following
circumstances:

(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion
that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s
lawyer has within the previous [insert number] year[s]
made aggregate contributions to the judge’s campaign in
an amount that is greater than $[insert amount] for an in-
dividual or $[insert amount] for an entity [is reasonable
and appropriate for an individual or an entity].

Model Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A) (2011). In adopting this
provision, Arizona set the time period at four years and the con-
tribution level at the maximum campaign contribution allowed in
the state. Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 81, Code of Jud. Conduct R.
2.11(A)(4) (West 2010). Utah set its threshold at a much lower
level: three years and $50. Utah Code of Jud. Conduct R.
2.11(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2012).

Other states like Alabama, California, and New York have
adopted explicit statutes or rules that require a judge’s recusal
if the party or attorney appearing before the judge has contribu-
ted a certain dollar amount and did so within a specific period of
time before or after the judge’s election. Ala. Code § 12-24-2(c)
(LexisNexis 2005); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(9)(A) (West
Supp. 2012); N.Y. Ct. R. § 151.1(B) (McKinney 2012). The New
York rule also imposes a collective contribution cap, which limits
the amount of contributions that a law firm, individual lawyer,
and individual clients can contribute as a group. N.Y. Ct. R.
§ 151.1(B)(2) (McKinney 2012).

As stated above, it is not my wish to insinuate that Judge Gon-
zalez or Judge Togliatti have acted improperly in their review of
Luciaetta’s motion to disqualify Judge Gonzalez. As our Code of
Judicial Conduct stands today, there is no bright-line test to apply
to judicial contributions. Rule 2.11 of the Nevada Code of Judicial
Conduct lacks any iteration of the rules described above. This
Jack of definition fails to provide a concrete rubric against which
to analyze such contributions.

Here, Phillip contributed the single largest contribution by an in-
dividual and, in addition to his individual contribution, his attor-
ney, his attorney’s wife, and his attorney’s law partner all con-
tributed somewhat substantial amounts of money to Judge
Gonzalez’s campaign. Further, although these contributions came
after the divorce decree, it was entirely foreseeable that Phillip and
Luciaetta would have to appear before Judge Gonzalez in future

168 Pe

matters relating to alimony payments. These circumstances create
an appearance of impropriety that the judiciary should strive to
avoid. By adopting some variation of the judicial contribution rules
promulgated in other jurisdictions, this court could lend clarity not
only to judges and justices, who rely on contributions to fund their
campaigns, but also to the citizens who rely on the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

MICHAEL D. PATTERSON, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 54408
April 4, 2013 298 P.3d 433
TS
[Rehearing denied July 24, 2013]
PoC

Law Office of Lisa Rasmussen, PC, and Lisa A. Rasmussen, Las
Vegas, for Appellant.

169

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, and Carrie A. Morton, Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County, for Respondent.

170

:
Pe

171

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, HarbEsty, J.:

Appellant Michael Patterson was convicted of conspiracy to
commit murder, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and dis-
charge of a firearm into a vehicle. He now appeals arguing, among
other things, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was vio-
lated when he was denied his counsel of choice at his preliminary
hearing before the justice court.

We recognize that the preliminary hearing is a ‘‘critical’’ stage
of criminal proceedings at which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches, and we conclude that the justice court’s
denial of Patterson’s request to be represented by retained counsel
at the preliminary hearing violated Patterson’s qualified right to
counsel of his choice. In particular, the justice court failed to con-
duct a sufficient inquiry into the request. We further conclude,
however, that the denial of Patterson’s counsel of choice at the pre-
liminary hearing is subject to harmless-error review, and that the
error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Patterson’s conviction stems from the shooting death of Bobby
Wilkerson in Las Vegas. Video surveillance footage of a parking lot

12 PE

on the night of Wilkerson’s death revealed that a person exited the
passenger side of a vehicle, approached the driver’s side of Wilk-
erson’s car, and then jumped back into the passenger side of the
other vehicle and drove away. Wilkerson then exited his car and fell
to the ground. He was later found lying outside of his car with a
shotgun wound to his head.

Wilkerson’s mother informed the police that her son was plan-
ning to meet with Patterson that evening to resolve a dispute con-
cerning a puppy that Patterson sold to Wilkerson. The police lo-
cated the vehicle pictured in the surveillance footage that left the
scene in the apartment complex where Patterson lived. The vehi-
cle belonged to Patterson’s roommate, who told the police that she
frequently let her boyfriend! and Patterson use it. A search of Pat-
terson’s cell phone records revealed that he made frequent calls to
Wilkerson’s cell phone, but the calls stopped the night of the
shooting.

The police then issued an arrest warrant for Patterson, and he
was Jater apprehended in Chicago, Illinois, by FBI Agent Pablo
Araya. During his interrogation by Agent Araya, Patterson al-
legedly confessed to shooting Wilkerson and described where in
his apartment he hid the shotgun used in the killing. This interro-
gation was not recorded, but following the interrogation, the police
found the shotgun in Patterson’s apartment in the exact location he
stated in his alleged confession.? Agent Araya’s testimony was the
only evidence of the interrogation presented at trial.

Attorney Richard Tannery was appointed to represent Patterson
on his criminal charges. Patterson retained another attorney, Gar-
rett Ogata, to represent him the evening prior to his preliminary
hearing before the justice court.? At the preliminary hearing, Ogata
sought substitution as counsel of record for Patterson. Ogata also
requested that the justice court continue Patterson’s preliminary
hearing so that he could complete his preparation for the case.
Without asking Patterson any questions concerning Ogata’s repre-
sentation, the justice court denied Ogata’s request because Ogata
was not prepared to proceed immediately, and Patterson’s ap-
pointed attorney, Tannery, was present and prepared to represent
him. However, the justice court allowed Ogata to sit at counsel’s
table and provide input to Tannery. Following the preliminary
hearing, it appears that Ogata spoke with Tannery several times but

"The boyfriend was charged as a codefendant, but is not a party to this ap-
peal. He allegedly drove the vehicle the night of the shooting.

Patterson was arrested in Chicago and extradited to Nevada after his
interrogation.

3Patterson’s mother retained Ogata. However, Patterson met with Ogata a
week and a half earlier to discuss representation.

Po 1

Ogata never requested that he be substituted as Patterson’s counsel
of record for trial. Patterson was ultimately convicted on all
charges. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we address whether denial of a defendant’s request
to be represented by retained counsel at the preliminary hearing
stage, when the defendant has been represented by appointed coun-
sel up to that point, violates the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel of choice, and if so, whether such a violation is subject to
harmless-error review. We conclude that there was a Sixth Amend-
ment violation, and reaffirming our prior jurisprudence, we hold
that the error is subject to harmless-error review. We further con-
clude that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), regarding disclosure of evidence.*

‘Patterson also seeks reversal of his conviction on the grounds that (1) the
district court abused its discretion when it denied Patterson’s motion to sup-
press his arrest warrant because it did not set forth specific factual or legal
findings in its order; (2) the arrest warrant did not contain sufficient probable
cause; and (3) the district court improperly denied Patterson a hearing pursuant
to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), regarding the voluntariness of his
confession. With regard to the motion to suppress and the arrest warrant, we
conclude that these arguments are without merit, as there was ‘‘a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’ Doyle v. State, 116 Nev.
148, 158, 995 P.2d 465, tn (2000). Moreover, although the lack of factual
findings in an order may prevent appellate review and may be grounds for re~
versal, see Somee v, State, 124 Nev. 434, 443, 187 P.3d 152, 158 (2008), we
further conclude that the arrest warrant attached to the motion in limine suf-
ficiently enabled us to review the district court’s decision. Additionally, we de-
cline to consider Patterson’s Jackson v. Denno argument because Patterson had
the burden to request such a hearing and he never made that request. See
Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 372, 609 P.2d 309, 312 (1980) (‘‘[F]ailure to
request a voluntariness hearing below precludes appellate consideration.’’). Pat-
terson further argues that the district court erred by: (1) failing to record sev-
eral bench conferences, (2) failing to properly handle juror’s questions, (3) fail-
ing to have Patterson present during a telephone conference between the court
and counsel, and (4) giving improper jury instructions on manslaughter. We
conclude that these arguments are without merit and require no further dis-
cussion. Finally, Patterson argues that the district court erred by admitting rap
lyrics that were inadmissible bad acts evidence. We note that Patterson never
objected to the admission of these lyrics at trial. See Flores v. State, 121 Nev.
706, 722, 120 P.3d 1170, 1180-81 (2005) (‘* ‘{Flailure to object will [gener-
ally] preclude appellate review of an issue’ unless plain error affecting the de-
fendant’s substantial rights is shown,” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Leonard v. State, 117 Ney. 53, 63, 17 P.3d 397, 403 (2001))). Furthermore,
even if we were to agree with his contention that the admission of the rap
lyrics was plain error, we conclude that Patterson has failed to show “‘actual
prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.’ See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545,
80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) (‘‘In conducting plain error review, . . . the burden is
on the defendant to show actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.””).

174 Pd

The preliminary hearing is a “‘critical’’ stage at which a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, U.S. Const. amend.
VI, and that right is protected against state action by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963).
The United States Supreme Court has ‘‘construed the Sixth
Amendment guarantee [of counsel] to apply to ‘critical’ stages
of the proceedings.’ United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
224 (1967). Pretrial proceedings are often considered to be ‘‘crit-
ical’ stages because ‘‘the results might well settle the accused’s
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.’ Id.; see
also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (stating that the
right to counsel ‘during perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings . . . that is to say, from the time of [a criminal de-
fendant’s] arraignment until the beginning of [the defendant’s]
trial. . 2’ is as important ‘‘as [it is] at the trial itself’). A pretrial
proceeding is “‘critical’’ if ‘‘potential substantial prejudice to de-
fendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the
ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.’ Wade, 388 U.S. at
227.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the presence of counsel
at a preliminary hearing may avoid prejudicial effect to the defen-
dant’s rights because: (1) skilled cross-examination of the State’s
witnesses may expose fatal flaws in the State’s case, give rise to
impeachment evidence for the subsequent trial, and preserve testi-
mony from unavailable witnesses for later use at trial; (2) an at-
torney is better equipped than a lay defendant to ‘‘effectively dis-
cover the case the State has against his client and make possible
the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial’’;
and (3) an attorney is in a better position than a lay defendant to
make arguments concerning matters like psychiatric evaluations or
bail at preliminary hearings. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-
10 (1970) (plurality).

In addition, this court has previously recognized that preliminary
hearings can give rise to Sixth Amendment concerns. See Mess-
more v, Fogliani, 82 Nev. 153, 154-55, 156, 413 P.2d 306, 306-
07 (1966) (holding that an unrepresented defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment rights to counsel and to confrontation of witnesses were
violated when witness testimony taken during the preliminary
hearing was introduced into evidence at trial). We have also rec-
ognized that a preliminary hearing is an adversarial proceeding at
which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
See Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 326, 91 P.3d 16, 25 (2004)

PO 115

(‘‘[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not even attach in
a case until adversarial proceedings have commenced...
“*‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment.’ ’’’ (quoting Fellers v. United
States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977)))); see also Dewey v. State, 123 Nev. 483,
488, 169 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2007).

Because the preliminary hearing is a “‘critical’’ stage in the
criminal proceeding at which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attaches, we must examine the justice court’s denial of
Patterson’s request for counsel of his choice to determine whether
error occurred. We review the justice court’s denial of Patterson’s
request to substitute Ogata as counsel for an abuse of discretion.
Young v. State, 120 Nev. 963, 968, 102 P.3d 572, 576 (2004).

Lene

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses two differ-
ent rights, namely, the right to effective assistance of counsel and
the right of a nonindigent defendant to be represented by the coun-
sel of his or her choice. U.S. v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979
(9th Cir. 2010). The first right (to effective assistance of counsel)
is at issue where an indigent criminal defendant seeks to replace
court-appointed counsel with new appointed counsel. Jd. at 978.
Thus, the three-part inquiry that is used to evaluate an attempt to
substitute one appointed attorney for another, see Young, 120 Nev.
at 968-69, 102 P.3d at 576, ‘‘is designed to determine whether [an]
attorney-client conflict is such that it impedes the adequate repre-
sentation that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to all defendants,
including those who cannot afford to hire their own attorneys,’
Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979. But the other Sixth Amendment
right is at issue where a criminal defendant seeks to replace court-
appointed counsel with privately retained counsel, or previously re-
tained counsel with newly retained counsel, or privately retained
counsel with court-appointed counsel. In that context, the focus is
on the right to counsel of one’s choice. Id.

be

Generally, a defendant is free to replace existing counsel with re-
tained counsel. Miller v, Blackletter, 525 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.
2008). The right to counsel of one’s choice is not absolute, how-
ever, and a court has “‘wide latitude in balancing the right to
counsel of choice against the needs of fairness . . . and against the
demands of its calendar’’ Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152; see
also Ryan v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 419, 426, 168 P.3d 703, 708
(2007) (‘‘[C]riminal defendants ‘who can afford to retain counsel
have a qualified right to obtain counsel of their choice.’ ’’ (quoting

196 Po

United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984))).
Thus, the appropriate test to determine whether the justice court
abused its discretion in denying Patterson’s request to substitute re-
tained counsel (Ogata) in place of appointed counsel (Tannery) is
whether denying the substitution: (1) would have significantly prej-
udiced Patterson, or (2) ‘‘was untimely and would result in a ‘dis-
ruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the
circumstances of the particular case.’ ’’ People v. Lara, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 201, 211-12 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting People v. Ortiz,
800 P.2d 547, 552 (Cal. 1990)).

At the commencement of the preliminary hearing, Patterson re-
quested to substitute his court-appointed counsel, Tannery, with his
retained counsel, Ogata. Ogata informed the justice court that he
had been retained the day before the preliminary hearing and had
reviewed about half of the discovery in the case. The justice court
denied Patterson’s request for chosen counsel because Ogata was
unprepared, Tannery was present and prepared to represent Pat-
terson, and the State had an out-of-state witness (FBI agent Araya)
present to testify. However, the justice court’s reasons for denying
Patterson’s request did not take into consideration any prejudice to
Patterson or assess whether Ogata’s substitution would cause an
unreasonable disruption in the proceedings.

Although Ogata’s substitution may have caused some inconven-
ience and delay because Patterson’s request was made at the pre-
liminary hearing, the justice court failed to ‘balance the defen-
dant’s interest in new counsel against the disruption, if any, flowing
from the substitution.’ Lara, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212. For exam-
ple, the justice court did not inquire as to the amount of time
Ogata would need to prepare for the preliminary hearing or the in-
convenience to the State or its out-of-state witness resulting from
a short delay. Furthermore, any delay in the preliminary hearing to
allow Patterson’s chosen counsel time to prepare likely would have
been minimal given Ogata’s review of some of the discovery and
the significantly lesser evidentiary burden required to be met at the
preliminary hearing, see Sheriff v. Middleton, 112 Nev. 956, 961,
921 P.2d 282, 286 (1996) (stating that the State need only present
“‘marginal”’ or ‘‘slight’’ evidence at the preliminary hearing to es-
tablish probable cause that a crime occurred and that the defendant
is the person who committed the crime).

This court has previously noted that an abuse of discretion oc-
curs whenever a court fails to give due consideration to the issues
at hand. State v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 932, 267
P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (citing to Jones Rigging and Heavy Hauling
v. Parker, 66 S.W.3d 599, 602 (2002)); see also United States v.
Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that “‘as a gen-
eral rule, the existence of discretion requires its exercise’’). Here,
the justice court failed to make an adequate inquiry and give due

Pe a

consideration to the prejudice to Patterson or the extent of the delay
or inconvenience that the substitution of Ogata would have caused.
This was an abuse of discretion.*

We must now determine whether the deprivation of Patterson’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice at the prelimin-
ary hearing was a structural error warranting reversal of Patterson’s
judgment of conviction, or trial error subject to harmless-error
review.

The denial of Patterson’s Sixth Amendment right to retain his
counsel of choice at his preliminary hearing was trial error and is
thus reviewed for harmless error

Patterson contends that the denial of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing is a structural
error that requires reversal of his conviction. We disagree.

Pe

There are two classes of constitutional errors, ‘‘trial error[s]’’
and ‘“‘structural defects.’ Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148; Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 309-10 (1991).
“fT rial error[s]’’ are subject to harmless-error review because
these errors ‘‘may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence presented in order to determine whether [they were]
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
307-08. Conversely, ‘‘structural defects’ ‘‘affect[ ] the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself”’ Jd. at 309-10. Such errors are grounds for re-
versal because they ‘‘defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.”’
Id. at 309.

||

It has long been established that the complete denial of counsel
at trial is a structural error under the Sixth Amendment. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that the “‘deprivation of the right to
counsel of choice . . . unquestionably qualifies as structural error’’
when it occurs at the trial court level because ‘‘the erroneous de-
nial of counsel bears directly on the framework within which the
trial proceeds.’ Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (internal quota-
tions omitted). Therefore, we recognize that had Patterson erro- -

SPatterson claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was also vio-
lated at the district court level when the district court allowed ‘Tannery to con-
tinue as Patterson’s attorney even though Ogata had approached the prosecu-
tors the morning of the trial and informed them that he was Patterson’s
attorney. We disagree. The district court was never asked to review what oc-
curred at the justice court level, and Ogata never formally requested that he be
substituted as counsel of record after the preliminary bearing.

78 PT

neously been denied his retained counsel of choice at trial, it
would have been a structural error requiring reversal of the judg-
ment of conviction.

|

However, as we have noted, not all ‘‘errors involving the right
to counsel are reversible per se,’’ and we have distinguished
Gideon and its progeny from cases where the error did not result
in total deprivation of counsel. Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114,
123, 979 P.2d 703, 708-09 (1999) (applying harmless-error review
to a claim that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was violated by prosecutorial questions abridging the attorney-
client privilege because the defendant was “‘represented by coun-
sel at all times’’ and such an error ‘‘did not affect the framework
within which the trial proceeded’’). In addition, we have expressly
held that ‘‘refusal by the magistrate to permit [a criminal defen-
dant] to have counsel of his own choosing”’ at a preliminary hear-
ing ‘‘falls into the category of harmless error’’ where the defen-
dant was represented by counsel. State v. Rollings, 58 Nev. 58, 63,
68 P.2d 907, 909 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Sturrock
v. State, 95 Nev. 938, 943, 604 P.2d 341, 345 (1979), receded
from by Lisle v. State, 114 Nev. 221, 954 P.2d 744 (1998). In fur-
ther support of our position, the Supreme Court has held that at
the preliminary hearing stage, ‘‘[tJhe test to be applied is whether
the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless
error.’ Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (majority).®
Accordingly, we reaffirm our prior jurisprudence and specifically
hold that violations of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice at a preliminary hearing are reviewed for barm-
less error.

bere

An error is harmless if this court can determine, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the defendant’s
conviction. Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 639, 653, 188 P.3d
1126, 1136 (2008). Patterson has not demonstrated how the justice
court’s denial of his counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing
contributed to his conviction, particularly since Ogata was al-
lowed to sit at counsel’s table during the hearing and provide
input to Tannery.

“Other jurisdictions have similarly held that violations of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing stage
are reviewed for harmless error. See Ditch v. Grace, 479 R3d 249, 254 3d
Cir, 2007); U.S. v. Lott, 433 R3d 718, 723 (10th Cir. 2006); State v. Brown,
903 A.2d 169, 178 (Conn. 2006).

Pe v9

Furthermore, Patterson has not demonstrated how having Ogata
as counsel at the preliminary hearing instead of Tannery would
have produced a different result at trial when the State presented
overwhelming evidence of Patterson’s guilt. This evidence included
proof that Wilkerson met with Patterson on the night of his death,
the vehicle from the surveillance video belonged to Patterson’s
roommate, the gun used to kill Wilkerson was found concealed in
Patterson’s apartment, and Patterson frequently called Wilkerson
before the shooting but all calls to Wilkerson’s cell phone from
Patterson’s phone ceased after the shooting. In addition, FBI Agent
Araya testified that Patterson confessed to shooting Wilkerson.
Based on this evidence, we can conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the justice court’s denial of Patterson’s counsel of
choice did not contribute to Patterson’s conviction. Therefore, we
hold that the justice court’s denial of Patterson’s right to counsel of
choice was harmless error.

The State did not commit a Brady violation

a

Patterson contends that his rights under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), were violated because of the State’s failure to
provide information that the FBI never records interviews, which
could have been used to impeach Agent Araya’s testimony.
“**Brady and its progeny tequire a prosecutor to disclose evidence
favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment.’ ’’ State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198,
275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (quoting State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589,
599, 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003)). A defendant’s rights are violated under
Brady where: ‘‘(1) the evidence is favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State withheld the
evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) . . . the ev-
idence was material.” Jd. (internal quotations omitted). Evidence
is material if ‘‘there is a reasonable probability of a different result
{at trial] if the defense had known’’ of the withheld evidence. Lay
v. State, 116 Nev. 1185, 1196, 14 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2000).

Here, the purported impeachment evidence consisted of FBI
memoranda stating that FBI agents are encouraged to seek per-
mission to record interviews. However, encouragement to seek
permission to record interviews necessarily implies that the FBI’s
default policy is not to record interviews. Thus, this evidence does
not impeach Araya’s testimony that the FBI’s policy is not to
record interviews. Furthermore, we cannot conclude that there
was a reasonable probability that the result would have been dif-
ferent had this evidence been disclosed. Therefore, we conclude
that the State did not commit a Brady violation.

Having determined that none of Patterson’s claims warrant re-
versal, we affirm the judgment of conviction.”

Satta, J., concurs.

PARRAGUIRRE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with most of the majority’s determination, but I part
company in their finding that the justice court abused its discretion.
in failing to adequately consider the delay or inconvenience the
substitution of counsel would occasion.

Here, after Ogata sought to substitute as counsel and continue
the preliminary hearing set that day, the justice court conducted a
bench conference and thereafter stated several factors that directly
implicated the inconvenience that a delay would cause. Particularly,
the court noted that Tannery was qualified to handle the case and
was prepared to proceed, and that both the State and codefendant’s
counsel were prepared to move forward. Additionally, the court
recognized the presence of the State’s out-of-state witness and im-
plicit therein, the resulting inconvenience. Finally, the court noted
that it did not believe that bifurcating the hearing was appropriate.

Under these circumstances, I do not find that the justice court
abused its discretion.

7Patterson contends that the cumulative errors during his trial warrant re-
versal of his conviction. We disagree. ‘‘ “The cumulative effect of errors may
violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial even though errors are
harmless individually’ ”” Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1195, 196 P.3d 465,
481 (2008) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 535, 50 P.3d 1100,
1115 (2002)). “When evaluating a claim of cumulative error, we consider the
following factors: ‘(1) whether the issue of guilt is close, (2) the quantity and
character of the error, and (3) the gravity of the crime charged.’ Id. (quot-
ing Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000)). Despite
the serious nature of the crimes charged, the State presented compelling evi-
dence of Patterson’s guilt and we are not convinced that the cumulative effect
of the two errors acknowledged in this opinion—the denial of retained counsel
of his choice at the preliminary hearing and the admission of the rap lyrics (ad-
dressed supra note 4)—deprived Patterson of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. As a result, we conclude that Patterson’s cumulative error challenge is

unavailing.

Ss:

HOLCOMB CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIA-
TION, INC., A NEVADA NONPROFIT CORPORATION, APPEL-
LANT, v. STEWART VENTURE, LLC, a Nevapa Limirep
Liasitiry Company; LUTHER DAVID BOSTRACK, INpI-
VIDUALLY; MARTHA ALLISON, INpIvipuUALLy; PAUL
MCKINZIE, INDIVIDUALLY; AND Q & D CONSTRUCTION,
INC., A NEVADA CorPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

No. 57024
April 4, 2013 300 P.3d 124

Robert C. Maddox & Associates and Robert C. Maddox, Nancy
A, Cyra, Bruce E. Cyra, Nancy H. Jasculca, and Eva G.
Segerblom, Reno, for Appellant.

Hoffman, Test, Guinan & Collier and David J. Guinan, Reno,
for Respondent Martha Allison.

Hoy & Hoy, PC, and Michael D. Hoy, Reno, for Respondent
Paul McKinzie.

Kelly L. Turner, Reno, for Respondent Stewart Venture, LLC.
Lee, Hernandez, Landrum, Garofalo & Blake, APC, and David

S. Lee, Natasha A. Landrum, and Kelly L. Kindelan, Las Vegas,
for Respondent Q & D Construction, Inc.

82

Luther David Bostrack, Reno, in Proper Person.

183

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarria, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HaRDEsty, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether statutory limitations periods
for constructional defect claims may be contractually modified by
parties to residential unit purchase agreements. We conclude that,

Se

in general, statutory limitations periods may be reduced by contract
provided there is no statute to the contrary and the reduced limi-
tations period is reasonable and does not violate public policy.

The parties dispute whether a provision in an arbitration agree-
ment validly reduced the limitations period for appellant Holcomb
Condominium Homeowners’ Association’s (HCHA) constructional
defect negligence and warranty claims. NRS 116.4116 expressly
permits a contractual reduction of its six-year limitations period for
warranty claims to not less than two years if, with respect to res-
idential units, the reduction agreement is contained in a “‘separate
instrument.’ Since the reduction provision is within an arbitration
agreement that is attached to and incorporated into a purchase con-
tract, we conclude that the reduction provision does not qualify as
a ‘‘separate instrument”’ and the arbitration agreement provision is
unenforceable for HCHA’s breach of warranty claims. As such, the
district court improperly dismissed HCHA’s breach of warranty
claims as contractually time-barred.

We further conclude that the district court improperly relied
upon NRS 116.4116, which only governs warranty claims, in dis-
missing HCHA’s negligence-based claims, and in declining to
allow HCHA to amend its complaint to add additional claims for
intentional conduct on the ground that these claims were also con-
tractually time-barred. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s
orders and remand this matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Holcomb Condominiums is a common interest community that
was developed by respondent Stewart Venture, LLC. Respondents
Paul McKinzie, Luther David Bostrack, and Q & D Construction,
Inc., allegedly were involved in the development and construc-
tion of the condominiums, while respondent Martha Allison rep-
resented both the individual purchasers and Stewart Venture in
the sale of the condominiums during July and August, 2002.
Appellant HCHA is the homeowners’ association for Holcomb
Condominiums.

In 2007, HCHA served a notice of constructional defect claims
pursuant to NRS 40.645. In 2009, HCHA filed, on behalf of itself
and all Holcomb Condominium homeowners, a constructional de-
fect complaint against respondents, alleging a variety of defects
and claims for negligence, negligence per se, negligent misrepre-
sentation, and breach of express and implied warranties.

Stewart Venture and Allison moved to dismiss HCHA’s com-
plaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), asserting that the complaint was
time-barred by a contractual two-year limitations period found in
nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the

Po

homeowner’s purchase contracts.! The arbitration agreements at-
tached to the purchase contracts contain a provision reducing the
applicable statutory limitations periods for constructional defect
claims to two years from substantial completion of the home-
owner’s property. In particular, the provision states

I. TIME LIMITATIONS TO COMMENCE ACTION FOR
DISPUTE

In the event that a Dispute arises, Buyer and Seller hereby
waive the statute of limitations and statute of repose com-
mencement requirements contained in Nevada Revised
Statutes Chapter 11.190 to 11.206 inclusive, and Chapter
116.4116, and instead agree to submit all Disputes, under the
procedures provided herein, within two (2) years from sub-
stantial completion of the Buyer’s Property within the project.
This limitation applies, without limitation, to known or un-
known claims, claims which could have or could not have
been discovered by a reasonable inspection, and claims which
result from willful misconduct or which were fraudulently
concealed.

The first lines of each arbitration agreement state that the agree-
ment is a part of the purchase contract. In addition, paragraph 19
of the purchase contract states that the arbitration agreement is ‘‘at-
tached”’ and ‘‘incorporated’’ into the purchase contract, and para-
graph 25 requires the homeowner’s initials to confirm that he or
she received the arbitration agreement ‘‘incorporated herein and at-
tached hereto.’

The district court found that the arbitration agreements met the
“separate instrument’’ requirement of NRS 116.4116 and that the
reduced limitations period provision was not unconscionable. Thus,
the court dismissed HCHA’s complaint as time-barred by the two-
year contractual limitations period. The court also denied as futile
HICHA’s oral request to amend its complaint to add causes of ac-
tion for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on
missing roof underlayment because it found that this claim would
also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period.

HCHA then filed a motion for reconsideration of the district
court’s order and moved in writing to amend its complaint to add
causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent conceal-
ment. HCHA asserted that the proposed claim was the result of

‘The parties do not address whether the district court had authority to re-
solve issues relating to the interpretation of the arbitration agreements even
though the homeowners and Stewart Venture agreed to submit future disputes
to arbitration. Thus, we do not address whether the issues on appeal should
have first been submitted to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreements.

Ce

newly discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered
previously because the roofing shingles were not removed until
after the court heard HCHA’s original motion. The district court
denied both of HCHA’s motions. It found that HCHA presented no
evidence to alter the court’s original findings that the arbitration
agreements complied with the ‘separate instrument’’ requirement
of NRS 116.4116, or that the proposed claim would also be time-
barred by the contractual limitations period. HCHA now appeals.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the homeowners
and Stewart Venture validly contracted to reduce the limitations pe-
riods applicable to HCHA’s claims, and whether the district court
properly refused to allow new claims for intentional conduct be-
cause they also would be barred by the contractual limitations pe-
riod. To do so, we must determine in the first instance whether
statutory limitations periods may be contractually modified. We
conclude that, generally, statutory limitations periods may be con-
tractually reduced, as long as there is no statute to the contrary and
the reduced limitations period is reasonable and does not violate
public policy.

NRS 116.4116 allows parties to contractually reduce the limita-
tions periods for constructional defect warranty claims to two
years provided the agreement to do so is contained in a ‘‘separate
instrument.’ We determine that the arbitration agreements con-
taining the reduced limitations period that are attached to and in-
corporated into the purchase contracts do not satisfy the ‘‘separate
instrument’”’ requirement of the statute. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court improperly dismissed HCHA’s breach of war-
ranty claims as contractually time-barred.

Standard of review

Under NRCP 12(b)(5)’s failure-to-state-a-claim dismissal stan-
dard, ‘‘[a] complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would
entitle him or her to relief?’ Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 119
Nev. 1, 22, 62 P.3d 720, 734 (2003). This is a rigorous standard,
“‘as this court construes the pleading liberally, drawing every in-
ference in favor of the nonmoving party.” Citizens for Cold Springs
v. City of Reno, 125 Nev. 625, 629, 218 P.3d 847, 850 (2009). ‘‘A
court [may] dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted [when an] action is barred by the
statute of limitations.’ Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021,
1024, 967 P.2d 437, 439 (1998); NRCP 12(b)(5). When the facts
are uncontroverted, as we must so deem them here, the application
of the statute of limitations is a question of Jaw that this court re-

Pe

views de novo. Citizens for Cold Springs, 125 Nev. at 629, 218
P.3d at 850; Day v. Zubel, 112 Nev. 972, 977, 922 P.2d 536, 539
(1996).?

Contractual reduction of statutory limitations periods

Whether a party may contractually modify a statutory limitations
period is an issue of first impression in Nevada. However, in other
jurisdictions, ‘‘it is well established that, in the absence of a con-
trolling statute to the contrary, a provision in a contract may validly
limit, between the parties, the time for bringing an action on such
contract to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute
of limitations, provided that the shorter period itself shall be a rea-
sonable period.’ Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608
(1947); see, e.g., William L. Lyon & Assoc. v. Superior Court, 139
Cal. Rptr. 34 670, 679-80 (Ct. App. 2012); Country Preferred Ins.
Co. v. Whitehead, 979 N.E.2d 35, 42-43 (Ill. 2012); Robinson v.
Allied Property and Cas. Ins., 816 N.W.2d 398, 402 (lowa 2012);
Creative Playthings v. Reiser, 978 N.E.2d 765, 769-70 (Mass.
2012); DeFrain v. State Farm, 817 N.W.2d 504, 512 (Mich. 2012);
Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Medical Cent., 287 P.3d 1113, 1121
(Or. Ct. App. 2012). The policy underlying this rule is the recog-
nition of parties’ freedom to contract. See Nuhome Investments,
LLC v. Weller, 81 P.3d 940, 945 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that en-
forcing a contractual limitations period ‘‘comport[s] with the con-
cept of freedom of contract’’); see also Notre Dame v. Morabito,
752 A.2d 265, 273 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (adopting this gen-
eral rule ‘‘[iJn light of the[ ] well-settled holdings recognizing that
parties’ freedom to contract should be given effect absent clear
policy considerations to the contrary’’).

Lee

Because Nevada has long recognized a public ‘‘interest in pro-
tecting the freedom of persons to contract,” Hansen v. Edwards, 83
Nev. 189, 192, 426 P.2d 792, 793 (1967), we join these jurisdic-
tions and hold that a party may contractually agree to a limitations
period shorter than that provided by statute as long as there exists
no statute to the contrary and the shortened period is reasonable,
and subject to normal defenses including unconscionability and vi-
olation of public policy. See generally Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev.

2MicKinzie contends that the appropriate standard of review in this matter is
the standard applied to an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56,
because after HCHA provided homeowner affidavits in support of its motions
for reconsideration, the district court allowed HCHA to offer testimony to
show what evidence it could produce if the motions to dismiss were treated as
NRCP 56 motions for summary judgment. However, we conclude that the ap-
propriate standard of review is that of an order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) mo-
tion to dismiss, because the district court did not rely on any of HCHA’s ad-
ditional evidence when entering its order to dismiss.

=e

410, 429, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009) (‘‘Parties are free to contract,
and the courts will enforce their contracts if they are not uncon-
scionable, illegal, or in violation of public policy.’’).

P|

A contractually modified limitations period is unreasonable if
the reduced limitations period ‘‘effectively deprives a party of the
reasonable opportunity to vindicate his or her rights.’ Hatkoff, 287
P.3d at 1121; see also William L. Lyon & Assoc., 139 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 680 (‘‘‘‘‘Reasonable’’ in this context means the shortened
period nevertheless provides sufficient time to effectively pursue a
judicial remedy’ ’’ (quoting Moreno v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d
684, 695 (Ct. App. 2003))). Thus, ‘‘a limitations provision that re-
quires the plaintiff to bring an action before any loss can be as-
certained is per se unreasonable.’” Furleigh y. Allied Group Inc.,
281 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (N.D. Iowa 2003).

In this case, the district court dismissed HCHA’s asserted claims
for negligence, negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation,
and breach of express and implied warranties. In doing so, it relied
upon NRS 116.4116’s provisions permitting reduction of the ap-
plicable statutory limitations period to two years as long as such
reduction is in a ‘‘separate instrument.’’ However, NRS 116.4116
only applies to HCHA’s breach of warranty claims and does
not apply to HCHA’s claims for negligence, negligence per se,
and negligent misrepresentation. Therefore, we conclude that the
district court erred in relying on this statute to find that HCHA’s
negligence-based claims were time-barred. Accordingly, we re-
verse the district court’s order as to HCHA’s negligence-based
claims and remand these claims to the district court for it to de-
termine whether the contractually modified limitations period was
reasonable given the above factors.*

2The provision in the arbitration agreement stated that the statutory limita~
tions periods in NRS 11.190-11.206 and NRS 116.4116 were ‘‘waive[d].”” Al-
though it appears from the language of the provision that the parties actually
intended to reduce, and not waive, the limitations periods, a total waiver of a
limitations period is unreasonable per se because it “effectively deprives a
party of the reasonable opportunity to vindicate his or her rights.” See Hatkoff
y. Portland Adventist Medical Cent., 287 P.3d 1113, 1121 (Or. Ct. App.
2012).

We note that, on appeal, HCHA argues that the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable because the reduced limitations period is unreasonable.
Because we conclude that reversal is warranted on other grounds, we do not
reach HCHA’s unconscionability argument. Further, HCHA does not raise this
argument in the context of contractual modification of limitations periods. The
parties do not address whether contractual modification of the limitations pe-
riod for HCHA’s negligence claims was prohibited by a statute to the contrary,
‘was unreasonable within the test we have set forth above, or was against pub-
lic policy.

eee!

Because NRS 116.4116 expressly permits reduction of the statu-
tory limitations period to two years, the relevant consideration is
whether the reduction complies with the terms of the applicable
statute. The factors to be considered for purely contractual modi-
fication are therefore not relevant to this analysis. Thus, HCHA’s
breach of warranty claims will be time-barred if the arbitration
agreement otherwise complies with NRS 116.4116’s requirements.

NRS 116.4116’s ‘‘separate instrument’’ requirement

Le

“‘Statutory interpretation is a question of Jaw that [this court] re-
view[s] de novo.’ Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev.
454, 460, 282 P.3d 751, 756 (2012). When interpreting statutes,
the court’s main concern is the intent of the Legislature. Hardy
Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. 528, 533, 245 P.3d
1149, 1153 (2010).

Respondents argue that the arbitration agreement constitutes a
“separate instrument”’ because it is separate from the body of the
main agreement. We disagree. NRS 116.4116 permits parties ‘‘to
reduce the period of limitation to not less than 2 years’ for breach
of warranty claims arising under NRS 116.4113 or NRS 116.4114.
NRS 116.4116(1). When residential-use units are involved, such
agreements ‘‘must be evidenced by a separate instrument executed
by the purchaser.’ Jd. However, the term ‘‘separate instrument”’ is
not defined in NRS Chapter 116 or in the Uniform Common In-
terest Ownership Act (UCIOA). See NRS 116.4116; NRS
116.005-116.095 (providing definitions for NRS Chapter 116);
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act §§ 1-103, 4-116 (2009).

|

Because there is no statutory definition, we must look to the
plain meaning of the term ‘‘separate instrument.’ See Consipio
Holding, 128 Nev. at 460, 282 P.3d at 756. Black’s Law Diction-
ary defines ‘‘separate’’ as “‘individual; distinct; particular; dis-
connected,’ 1487 (9th ed. 2009), and ‘‘instrument”’ as ‘‘[a] writ-
ten legal document that defines rights, duties, entitlements, or
liabilities.’ Id. at 869. Applying these definitions, we conclude that
a “‘separate instrument’’ under NRS 116.4116 is any legal docu-
ment defining rights, duties or liability that is not attached to or in-
corporated into the primary agreement itself.>

Our approach is consistent with that of another court addressing
this issue. In 301 Clifton v. 301 Clifton Condominium Association,

SThe parties do not argue, and we do not address, whether NRS 116.4116
requires that the reduced limitations provision be in an instrument completely
separate from any other instrument (including an arbitration agreement).

0

the Court of Appeals of Minnesota considered a similar statute
adopted from the same provision of the UCIOA. 783 N.W.2d 551,
566-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The court noted that the American
Heritage College Dictionary defined ‘‘separate’’ as something that
is “‘set or kept apart; disunited.”’ Jd. at 567. Applying this defini-
tion, the court held that an ‘‘attached exhibit’’ shortening the lim-
itations period to two years was not a ‘‘separate instrument’’ be-
cause it was ‘‘incorporated into the purchase agreement by the
Janguage of the contract.”” Id.

Although the arbitration agreement is an ‘“‘instrument’’ that de-
fines the parties’ rights and liabilities, it is attached to the purchase
contract, and the purchase contract’s language incorporates the ar-
bitration agreement in three places. First, the opening paragraph of
the purchase contract states that it and all of the attached addenda
constitute one single agreement; second, paragraph 19 states that
the arbitration agreement is ‘‘attached . . . and incorporated”’ into
the purchase contract; and last, paragraph 25 requires the home-
owner’s initials to confirm that he or she received the arbitration
agreement ‘‘incorporated herein and attached hereto.” In addition,
the first lines of the arbitration agreement state that it is a part of
the purchase contract. Thus, the arbitration agreement was not
“‘distinct’” or ‘‘disconnected’’ because it was attached to and in-
corporated into the purchase contract by the language of the agree-
ment and the purchase contract. Therefore, we conclude that the
arbitration agreement is not a ‘separate instrument’’ under NRS
116.4116.

Because the arbitration agreement is not a ‘‘separate instru-
ment’? under NRS 116.4116, the reduced limitations provision is
not enforceable and did not effectively reduce the limitations pe-
riod to two years for HCHA’s breach of warranty claims. See 301
Clifton, 783 N.W.2d at 567. Absent valid contractual modification,
the limitations period for a breach of warranty claim in a con-
structional defect action is six years from the date the ‘‘purchaser
to whom the warranty is first made enters into possession”’ of the
unit. NRS 116.4116(1)-(2)(a). As noted above, HCHA provided
the first notice of its constructional defect breach of warranty
claims five years after substantial completion of the units. Thus,
HCHA’s breach of warranty claims under NRS 116.4113 and NRS
116.4114 were timely, and the district court improperly dismissed
HCHA’s breach of warranty claims as time-barred.®

SHCHA also asserts that the contractually reduced limitations period does
not apply to it because it was not a party to the agreements. Because we re-
verse and remand the district court’s orders on other grounds, we do not reach
this issue.

|!

HCHA’s motion to amend its complaint

HCHA argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying as futile the motion to amend its complaint because the
contractual limitations period does not apply to HCHA’s proposed
causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent conceal-
ment. Leave to amend should be “‘ ‘freely given? ’’ Kantor v. Kan-
tor, 116 Nev. 886, 891, 8 P.3d 825, 828 (2000) (quoting NRCP
15(a)), and this court will not disturb a trial court’s denial of leave
to amend absent an abuse of discretion. University & Cmty. Coll.
Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 988, 103 P.3d 8, 19 (2004).

| |

Tn this case, the district court denied as futile HCHA’s motion to
amend its complaint because it found that the contractual limita-
tions period barred all claims not commenced within two years.
Because we conclude that this provision was unenforceable, the
district court’s denial of the motion to amend on this basis was im-
proper. On remand, the district court must determine whether
leave to amend should be given.”

Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and Saita, J., concur.

MAJUBA MINING, LTD., A NEVADA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
vy. PUMPKIN COPPER, INC., NkKA NEVADA COPPER,
INC., A NEVADA CorPORATION, RESPONDENT.

No. 58149
April 4, 2013 299 P.3d 363

"For this same reason, we also reverse the district court’s denial of HCHA’s
second motion to amend its complaint.

192

Law Offices of John P. Schlegelmilch, Ltd., and John P.
Schlegelmilch, Yerington, for Appellant.

Erwin & Thompson LLP and Thomas P. Erwin, Reno, for
Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Cuprry, J.:

In this opinion, we consider whether a mining claimant’s failure
to comply with federal claim maintenance fees renders a contro-
versy over superior title moot. This appeal was taken from a dis-
trict court order in a quiet title action. While this appeal was
pending, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued two sep-
arate decisions declaring 27 unpatented mining claims asserted by
appellant Majuba Mining, Ltd., forfeit and void by operation of
Jaw because Majuba failed to comply with the statutory mining
claim maintenance requirement. 30 U.S.C. § 28i (2006) (‘‘Failure
to pay the claim maintenance fee . . . shall conclusively constitute
a forfeiture of the unpatented mining claim . . . by the claimant
and the claim shall be deemed null and void by operation of
law.”); 43 C.BR. § 3830.91(a)(3) (2011) (claimants will forfeit
their mining claims or sites by failing to ‘‘[p]ay the annual main-
tenance fee on or before the due date’’). Under federal law, Ma-
juba was required to pay an annual mining claim maintenance fee
for each of its asserted claims. 43 C.ER. § 3834.11(a)(2) (2011)
(a claimant “‘must pay an annual maintenance fee on or before
September 1st of each year in order to maintain a mining claim or

—

site for the upcoming assessment year’’). For assessment year
2012, Majuba failed to deliver a maintenance fee to the BLM for
each of its 27 asserted claims. As a result of Majuba’s inaction in
this regard, respondent Pumpkin Copper, Inc., filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was rendered moot
when the BLM declared Majuba’s asserted claims forfeit and void
by operation of law.

P|

We must determine whether the controversy over superior title is
moot. Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d.
572, 574 (2010) (providing that ‘‘[t]he question of mootness is one
of justiciability’’). We have a duty to ‘‘decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to de-
clare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue be-
fore [us].’’ NCAA v. University of Nevada, 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624
P.2d 10, 10 (1981). We recognize ‘‘that cases presenting live con-
troversies at the time of their inception may become moot by the
occurrence of subsequent events.’’ University Sys. v. Nevadans for
Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004). Here,
the controversy that existed at the beginning of this litigation con-
cerning superior title is no longer at issue because Majuba’s as-
serted claims do not exist as a matter of law and, thus, Majuba no
longer has mining claims to protect in a quiet title action. Cf. Daly
y, Lahontan Mines Co., 39 Nev. 14, 23, 151 P. 514, 516 (1915) (a
plaintiff must have rights to real property and must redeem those
rights within the time period proscribed by statute in order to
maintain a claim for quiet title). We need not reach Majuba’s ar-
guments on appeal because we conclude that this appeal is moot.
See All Minerals Corp. v. Kunkle, 105 Nev. 835, 838, 784 P.2d 2,
5 (1989); Pac. L. Co. v. Mason Val. M. Co., 39 Nev. 105, 113-14,
153 P, 431, 433-34 (1915). Accordingly, Pumpkin Copper’s mo-
tion to dismiss is granted, and we dismiss this appeal.

HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

JOSEPH TRUESDELL, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No, 58628

April 4, 2013 304 P.3d 396

[Rehearing denied May 31, 2013]
[En banc reconsideration denied July 18, 2013]

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Howard Brooks and
Sharon G. Dickinson, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for
Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, for Respondent.

Py
a

S
&

Before GrpBons, PARRAGUIRRE and Douc.as, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Grspons, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a party may collaterally at-
tack a temporary protective order in a separate criminal proceed-
ing for violation of that order. We conclude that a party must ini-
tially challenge the validity of a temporary protective order under
NRS 33.080(2) before the court that issued the order. Further, the
party may not collaterally attack the order’s validity in a separate
proceeding. In light of this, and because all of appellant’s other ar-
guments on appeal lack merit, we affirm the district court’s judg-
ment of conviction.

es 191

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Joseph Truesdell lived in an apartment with Mika
Bennett and her two children in Las Vegas. The apartment lease
did not list Truesdell as a resident of the address. On October 26,
2010, Truesdell struck Bennett during an argument. He was ar-
rested and jailed and then later pleaded no contest to the domestic
violence charges against him.

On October 28, 2010, Bennett contacted SafeNest, a domestic
violence advocate organization, to obtain a temporary protective
order (TPO) against Truesdell. The same day, the district court
granted a five-day TPO against Truesdell based on a typed appli-
cation that contained the details Bennett relayed to SafeNest but did
not state who filled out the application or how the district court re-
ceived it. The TPO required Truesdell to stay at least 100 yards
away from Bennett’s apartment but allowed him to return a single
time with a police officer to collect his personal belongings.

Corrections Officer Theodore Wylupski served Truesdell with
the TPO at the Clark County Detention Center the same day. On
November 1, 2010, while the TPO was still valid, Truesdell was
released from jail and went back to the apartment without a police
officer. Despite the TPO, Bennett allowed Truesdell to enter the
apartment, where they argued for an hour and a half. Truesdell
then left at Bennett’s request.

On November 2, 2010, Truesdell returned to the apartment and
started knocking on the door. Bennett called 911. Truesdell then
began kicking the door. Bennett never gave Truesdell permission to
enter the apartment and did not unlock the door. Eventually, he
kicked in the door and walked Bennett into the bedroom where her
two children slept, but hastily left a few minutes later after several
neighbors approached the apartment. Thereafter, police officers
found and arrested Truesdell.

On November 4, 2010, the State filed a complaint against Trues-
dell, alleging he committed one count of invasion of the home.
After the preliminary hearing, where Bennett testified that she
called SafeNest to obtain the TPO against Truesdell, the State filed
an information against Truesdell alleging he committed invasion of
the home in violation of a TPO.

On the first day of Truesdell’s three-day trial, he requested a
continuance in order to litigate the validity of the TPO. Truesdell
claimed that he was unaware of the TPO application until a day or
two before trial, when the State provided him with a copy. Based
on that application, Truesdell argued the procedure for obtaining a
TPO by phone violated his due process rights. The district court
denied his motion, but told the parties they could address the
issue prior to sentencing, as the constitutionality of a TPO was a
question of law.

198 PO

During the trial, Bennett testified about the events of Novem-
ber 2, 2010, and identified Truesdell as the one who kicked down
her door. Officer Wylupski also testified that he did not specifi-
cally recall serving Truesdell with the TPO, but was able to iden-
tify his signature on a proof of service that also contained Trues-
dell’s signature and fingerprint. Officer Wylupski also testified to
the general procedure he follows when serving a person with a
TPO. In its closing argument, the State argued that the jury did not
have to find that Truesdell understood the TPO in order to deter-
mine whether he committed home invasion in violation of a TPO.
Instead, the State asserted that the jury only had to find that
Truesdell willfully violated the TPO. The district court allowed
these comments over Truesdell’s objections. Following the closing
arguments, the jury found by special verdict that Truesdell was
guilty of invasion of the home in violation of a TPO.

After the trial, Truesdell did not file a motion with the district
court regarding the TPO’s validity and did not address the issue
during his sentencing. The district court imposed a 12- to 48-
month sentence on Truesdell for the home invasion charge and a
concurrent 12- to 36-month sentence for the violation of the TPO.
The district court also ordered Truesdell to pay $500 to the Indi-
gent Defense Fund. He now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Because a party cannot collaterally attack a TPO in a separate
criminal proceeding and because the other issues raised by Trues-
dell lack merit, we affirm his conviction.

Truesdell may not collaterally attack the TPO’s validity in a
subsequent prosecution for violating the TPO

P|

Truesdell argues that SafeNest’s procurement of the TPO on
Bennett’s behalf, after speaking with her by telephone, violates the
procedure set forth in NRS 33.020(5) and violates his due process
rights. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo. Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 642, 218
P.3d 501, 506 (2009). We also review issues relating to the con-
stitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Hughes, 127 Nev. 626,
628, 261 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2011).

Whether a party may collaterally attack the validity of a TPO in
a subsequent criminal proceeding for violation of that TPO is a
question of first impression in Nevada. We take this opportunity to
clarify that a party may not collaterally attack the validity of a TPO
in a subsequent criminal proceeding based on violation of the
TPO.

Pe 199

Many jurisdictions follow the collateral bar rule, which pre-
cludes a party from collaterally attacking a protection order in a
later proceeding for violating the order, even to question the con-
stitutionality of the statute that authorized the protection order. See
State v. Chavez, 601 P.2d 301, 302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (indi-
cating that parties could not collaterally attack the constitutionality
of an injunction by an appeal from their convictions of criminal
contempt for violating that injunction); State v. Grindling, 31 P.3d
915, 919 (Haw. 2001) (concluding that the defendant could not col-
Jaterally attack the underlying factual basis of a temporary re-
straining order in a later criminal proceeding for violating the
order); Wood v. Com., 178 S.W.3d 500, 512-13 (Ky. 2005) (con-
cluding that appellant could not collaterally attack the validity of an
emergency protective order in a later proceeding for violating that
order and this preclusion did not violate appellant’s due process
rights because a statute allowed appellant to directly challenge the
order); State v. Small, 843 A.2d 932, 935 (N.H. 2004) (‘‘ ‘The
general underlying premise [against collateral attacks] is that a per-
son subject to an injunctive order . . . should be bound to pursue
any objection to the order through the constituted judicial process
available for that purpose.’ ’’ (quoting State v. Grondin, 563 A.2d
435 (N.H. 1989))); City of Seattle v. May, 256 P.3d 1161, 1163-
64 (Wash. 2011) (concluding that the collateral bar rule prohibited
a defendant from challenging the validity of permanent domestic
violence order in a later prosecution for violation of that order, un-
Jess the defendant could show that the order was void).

Other courts, however, have concluded that such collateral at-
tacks on a court order are permitted in certain circumstances. See
People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 1366, 1373-76 (Cal. 1996) (inter-
preting California’s criminal contempt statute and determining that
a person may challenge the constitutional validity of a court order
in a later contempt proceeding); Gilbert v. State, 765 P.2d 1208,
1209-11 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (addressing the defendant’s
vagueness arguments on a domestic violence statute and due
process claims relating to the issuance of an emergency protective
order in an appeal from an order revoking the defendant’s sus-
pended sentences based on continued violations of the order);
State v. Orton, 904 P.2d 179, 182 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (conclud-
ing that the collateral bar doctrine could not preclude the defendant
from raising issue of whether statute pertaining to a violation of a
protection order was unconstitutionally vague because the issue was
not susceptible to litigation during the proceeding when the order
‘was issued).

Although Nevada law allows a party to collaterally attack prior
convictions that are offered by the State to prove the defendant is
a habitual criminal or to enhance a charge to a felony, see Hobbs

200 Pe

v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 241-42, 251 P.3d 177, 181-82 (2011) (re-
viewing validity of defendant’s prior misdemeanor convictions that
were used to enhance charged offense to a felony under NRS
200.485); Arajakis v. State, 108 Nev. 976, 982-83, 843 P.2d 800,
804 (1992) (examining defendant’s claims relating to the validity of
prior convictions used to adjudicate and sentence defendant as ha-
bitual criminal), a collateral attack on a court order in a later pro-
ceeding that involves a violation of that order presents a different
set of circumstances.

First, in certain circumstances involving an offense enhance-
ment, the validity of the prior conviction is a necessary element
that the State had to prove in order to enhance an offense. See,
e.g., NRS 200.485(4) (requiring the State to prove facts of a prior
offense for battery constituting domestic violence in order for of-
fense enhancement to be imposed). In contrast, the validity of a
TPO is not an element that the State must prove for the crime of
home invasion or for a sentence enhancement for the violation of
a TPO. See NRS 193.166(1)(a); NRS 205.067(1).

be

Second, the enhancement cases do not implicate the policy be-
hind the collateral bar rule—that a court order must be obeyed so
long as it remains in effect, and therefore, disobedience results in
a violation of the order. See Wood, 178 S.W.3d at 512-13; Small,
843 A.2d at 935. Nevada law provides a means for a party to chal-
lenge a TPO issued against him or her in the court that issued the
order. See NRS 33.080(2) (‘‘On 2 days’ notice to the party who
obtained the temporary order, the adverse party may appear and
move its dissolution or modification, and in that event the court
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously
as the ends of justice require.’”’). Until the order is dissolved or
modified or expires by its terms, it must be obeyed.

Therefore, we conclude a party must challenge a TPO’s validity
before the court that issued the order and may not collaterally at-
tack the TPO’s validity in a subsequent prosecution for its viola-
tion. As Truesdell did not challenge the TPO in the issuing court,
we cannot consider his arguments pertaining to the TPO’s validity
in this appeal.'

'Truesdell alleges that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant a continuance. He requested the continuance in order to investigate the
constitutional issues that the TPO raised. However, because the issue of the
TPO’s validity was a question of law, we conclude Truesdell was not preju-
diced by this action. See Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 9, 222 P.3d 648, 653
(2010) (explaining that in order to demonstrate a district court’s abuse of dis-
cretion when denying a continuance, the challenging party must demonstrate
the denial had a prejudicial effect on the case).

The other issues Truesdell raises on appeal also lack merit

Sufficient evidence existed to convict Truesdell of home
invasion in violation of a TPO
| ee

Truesdell claims that the State failed to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that he committed home invasion in violation of a TPO
because (1) the TPO was invalid, (2) Bennett waived any claim of
a TPO violation by allowing him to enter the apartment the previ-
ous night, and (3) the evidence does not support that Officer Wy-
lupski served Truesdell with the TPO or that Truesdell understood
the TPO’s contents. We disagree and conclude that, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
juror could have been convinced of Truesdell’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);
Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1102, 968 P.2d 296, 306
(1998).

NRS 205.067(1) states, ‘“‘A person who, by day or night,
forcibly enters an inhabited dwelling without permission of the
owner, resident or lawful occupant, whether or not a person is
present at the time of the entry, is guilty of invasion of the home.’
A district court may impose a sentence enhancement for a TPO vi-
olation when an individual commits a felony in violation of a
TPO ‘‘against domestic violence issued pursuant to NRS 33.020.”
NRS 193.166(1)(a).

Bennett obtained a five-day TPO against Truesdell on Octo-
ber 28, 2010, that prohibited him from being within 100 yards of
the apartment. The proof of service, which contains Officer Wy-
lupski’s signature, as well as Truesdell’s signature and fingerprint,
demonstrates that an officer served Truesdell with the TPO. Offi-
cer Wylupski also testified as to the procedures that he generally
follows when serving a person with a TPO. Truesdell did not chal-
lenge the validity of the TPO in the issuing court; and on Novem-
ber 2, 2010, prior to the TPO’s expiration, he went to the apart-
ment where Bennett was living and forcibly entered the apartment
without permission in violation of the TPO. Based on this evi-
dence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of home invasion in violation of a TPO beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Middleton, 114 Nev. at 1102, 968 P.2d at 306.

Nevada's home invasion statute is constitutional

Truesdell also argues that NRS 205.067(1), the home invasion
statute, is unconstitutionally vague because it does not contain an
intent requirement and fails to state that a person must enter the

202 Le

home of another. We disagree and review for plain or constitutional
error because Truesdell failed to object below. See Grey v. State,
124 Nev. 110, 120, 178 P.3d 154, 161 (2008). We will only find
a criminal law void for vagueness when the statute fails to provide
sufficient notice of the conduct that is prohibited or when the
statute fails to provide definitive standards and results in arbitrary
enforcement. State v. Hughes, 127 Nev. 626, 628, 261 P.3d 1067,
1069 (2011).

‘We have previously stated that invasion of the home is a general
intent crime. Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 923, 124 P.3d 191,
201 (2005) (referring to home invasion as a general intent crime),
receded from on other grounds by Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev.
1013, 1016, 195 P.3d 315, 317 (2008). Therefore, the statute
contains an intent requirement. Furthermore, the plain language of
NRS 205.067(1) requires that a person ‘‘forcibly enters an inhab-
ited dwelling without permission of the owner, resident or lawful
occupant.’ Therefore, a person cannot commit the crime of home
invasion by forcibly entering his or her own home if that person is
a lawful occupant or resident of the home. NRS 205.067(1) con-
sequently provides sufficient notice of the conduct that it prohibits
and does not encourage arbitrary enforcement.”

The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
approve Truesdell’s jury instructions

Truesdell argues that the district court abused its discretion
by denying his proposed jury instructions for trespass and mali-
cious destruction of private property as lesser included offenses of
home invasion. We disagree because trespass and malicious de-
struction of property are not lesser included offenses of home in-
vasion. See Peck v. State, 116 Nev. 840, 845, 7 P.3d 470, 473
(2000), overruled on other grounds by Rosas v. State, 122 Nev.
1258, 1266 n.22 & 1269, 147 P.3d 1101, 1107 n.22 & 1109
(2006). Although we characterized trespass as a “‘lesser offense’’
to invasion of the home in Knight v. State, we did not specifically
state whether it was a lesser included or lesser related offense of
home invasion. 116 Nev. 140, 142-43, 993 P.2d 67, 69-70 (2000).
‘Trespass contains an element that is not part of the home invasion

"Truesdell claims the district court committed plain error by failing to sua
sponte bifurcate the trial because the evidence relating to the TPO created sub-
stantial prejudice against him by implying prior criminal misconduct. We dis-
agree and conclude that Truesdell has not demonstrated that the failure to bi-
furcate the trial based on the TPO violation affected his substantial rights, as
the evidence was sufficient to convict him of home invasion without the TPO.
See Melellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 269, 182 P:3d 106, 110 (2008) (when a
defendant fails to raise the issue below, this court reviews for plain error and
will only reverse when clear error affects the defendant’s substantial rights).

ee 203

statute: that a person goes into any building of another with the
specific intent to ‘‘vex or annoy the owner or occupant thereof, or
to commit any unlawful act.” NRS 207.200(1)(a). Home invasion
does not require forcible entry into the dwelling of another, only
that the forcible entry occurs without permission. NRS 205.067(1).
Therefore, we conclude trespass is not a lesser included offense of
home invasion. Likewise, malicious injury to property contains an
element that home invasion does not: that the property belongs to
another. NRS 206.310. Home invasion only requires a forcible
entry of an inhabited dwelling, not necessarily of another.

The majority of the prosecutor’s statements were proper and
any comments that were improper did not affect Truesdell’s
conviction

Truesdell contends that the State committed prosecutorial mis-
conduct during closing arguments by mentioning facts not in evi-
dence, misstating the law, and disparaging the defense. We dis-
agree. We examine claims of prosecutorial misconduct by first
determining whether the prosecutor’s behavior was improper.
Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008).
If the conduct was improper, we next review the comments for
harmless error. Id. When prosecutorial misconduct does not in-
volve constitutional error, we only determine whether the error
substantially affected the jury’s verdict. Jd. at 1189, 196 P.3d at
476.

P|

While the evidence must support a prosecutor’s statements re-
lating to the facts of the case, the prosecutor may also assert in-
ferences from the evidence and argue conclusions on disputed is-
sues. Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 100, 110 P.3d 53, 59 (2005).
Here, the prosecutor’s arguments regarding the service of the TPO
were reasonable inferences from the evidence and do not amount
to improper conduct. The prosecutor’s statement that the State only
had to prove that Truesdell received service of the TPO correctly
reflected the law. NRS 193.166(1)(a) does not require the State to
prove that Truesdell understood the TPO, only that he willfully vi-
olated the TPO. Therefore, these comments were proper.

On the other hand, the prosecutor’s statements that the defense
was attempting to confuse the jury amounted to misconduct, but
the comments did not substantially affect the verdict. See Brown-
ing v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 534, 188 P.3d 60, 72 (2008) (a prose-
cutor’s disparagement of defense counsel or the legitimate tactics
of defense counsel is improper conduct). The State’s comments on

204 P|

confusion were very limited and after the district court sustained
Truesdell’s objection, the State immediately moved on. Therefore,
we conclude that while improper, the State’s remarks constitute
harmless error and did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict.

The district court did not plainly err when imposing the
sentence enhancement for the TPO violation

| |

Truesdell argues that his conviction violates due process, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment because the sentence enhancement for the TPO violation
punishes the same conduct that the State relied upon to prove that
he committed home invasion. We disagree and review this matter
for plain error since Truesdell failed to object to the district court’s
imposition of a sentence enhancement for the TPO violation. See
Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110.

Under NRS 205.067(1), a person does not have to violate a
TPO in order to commit home invasion; instead, a person must
forcibly enter an inhabited dwelling without permission. Although
a home invasion may occur in the course of the defendant’s viola-
tion of a TPO, a defendant may also invade a home in a variety of
different ways not involving a TPO. See Cordova v. State, 116 Nev.
664, 667-68, 6 P.3d 481, 483-84 (2000) (determining that a de-
fendant’s sentence enhancement pursuant to NRS 193.165(3) was
not improper because use of a deadly weapon is not a necessary el-
ement of second-degree murder because a person could commit the
crime in a variety of ways not involving a deadly weapon). There-
fore, the district court did not commit plain error by applying the
sentence enhancement under NRS 193.166(1)(a) for commission of
a felony in violation of a TPO against domestic violence.

The district court did not plainly err by ordering Truesdell to
pay $500 to the Indigent Defense Fund

P|

Truesdell alleges the district court committed plain error by or-
dering him to pay $500 to the Indigent Defense Fund without mak-
ing any findings regarding his ability to pay such an amount, or the
reasons why the amount was appropriate. We disagree and review
for plain error since Truesdell failed to object to the district court’s
imposition of the fee. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at
110.

A district court may order a defendant to pay all or part of the
expenses that the state incurred by providing the defendant with an

pe 20s

attorney, but must consider the defendant’s financial resources and
the burden the payment will cause. NRS 178.3975(1). While the
district court in this case did not make specific findings when or-
dering Truesdell to pay the Indigent Defense Fund, he does not
demonstrate how this payment affects his substantial rights.? There-
fore, we conclude the district court did not commit plain error by
requiring Truesdell to pay $500 to the Indigent Defense Fund.*

We have considered Truesdell’s remaining arguments and con-
clude they are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment of conviction.

PARRAGUIRRE and Dous.as, JJ., concur.

ROCK BAY, LLC; anp MAYBOURNE, INC., PETITIONERS, v.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FoR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AnD THE HONORABLE STEFANY MILEY, Dis-
TRICT JUDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND REDWOOD RECOVERY
SERVICES, LLC; anp ELEVENHOME LIMITED, REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST.

No. 61646
April 4, 2013 298 P.3d 441

3NRS 178.3975(3) allows Truesdell to petition the district court for relief
from this reimbursement obligation at any time. See Taylor v, State, 111 Nev.
1253, 1259, 903 P.2d 805, 809 (1995) (noting that NRS 178.3975 provides ad-
equate safeguards to prevent an indigent defendant from being required to pay
for his defense), overruled on other grounds by Gama v. State, 112 Nev. 833,
836, 920 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1996).

‘We reject Truesdell’s claim that cumulative error warrants reversal. See
Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 211, 163 P.3d 408, 419 (2007) (outlining factors
for cumulative error).

|
| a

Gordon Silver and Eric D. Hone and Joel Z. Schwarz, Las
Vegas, for Petitioners.

Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish and L. Christopher
Rose and Brian C. Wedl, Las Vegas, for Real Parties in Interest.

Wil

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

In this opinion, we must determine when discovery of a non-
party’s assets is permissible under NRCP 69(a), which permits

208 Po

post-judgment discovery in aid of execution of a judgment. We
conclude that discovery of a nonparty’s assets under NRCP 69(a)
is not permissible absent special circumstances, which include, but
are not limited to, those in which the relationship between the
judgment debtor and the nonparty raises reasonable suspicion as to
the good faith of asset transfers between the two, or in which the
nonparty is the alter ego of the judgment debtor.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2011, real parties in interest Redwood Recovery Serv-
ices, LLC, and Elevenhome Limited (collectively, the judgment
creditors) obtained judgments in Florida against Jeffrey Kirsch
and various entities that he created throughout the United States
(collectively, the judgment debtors).! The judgment debtors form
limited liability companies with third-party investor funds and
purchase pools of residential mortgages, which are then resold for
a profit. According to the judgment creditors, the judgments were
based on the judgment debtors’ unfulfilled promises to pay back
promissory notes and obligations owed under a settlement agree-
ment obtained in March 2008 and amended in August 2008.

In addition to the judgment debtor entities, Kirsch created other
companies, including Rock Bay, which is a small limited liability
company that administers pools of investor-purchased residential
mortgages. Rock Bay was organized in Delaware in August 2008,
around the time that the amended settlement agreement was signed,
and that same year, Kirsch reserved the name and registered Rock
Bay as a Nevada company. Rock Bay was listed as ‘‘doing business
as’’ American Residential Equities, LLC, which is the name of
one of the judgment debtors.

According to the 2010 and 2011 annual lists of officers and di-
rectors filed with the Secretary of State, Rock Bay’s managing
member is Maybourne, which is a Nevada corporation organized in
2008 by the judgment debtors’ in-house counsel. Kirsch was listed
as an officer of Maybourne, and he signed Rock Bay’s 2009 initial
list as Maybourne’s president and the 2010 annual list as Rock
Bay’s authorized signatory.

After the Florida litigation began, a series of monetary transfers
occurred between Rock Bay and the judgment debtors. In Decem-
ber 2011, when the judgment creditors were unsuccessful in exe-
cuting their Florida judgments on the judgment debtors’ assets,
they domesticated the Florida judgments in Nevada. Rock Bay
was voluntarily dissolved by Kirsch approximately one week later.
Undeterred, the judgment creditors served a subpoena on the Las
Vegas accounting firm of McNair & Associates, which performed

‘The judgment debtors are not parties to this writ proceeding.

209

accounting services for the judgment debtors, Rock Bay, and May-
bourne. The subpoena sought all McNair records related to the
judgment debtors, Rock Bay, and Maybourne.

Rock Bay and Maybourne moved to quash the McNair sub-
poena on the ground that they were not parties to the underlying
litigation. The district court denied the motion to quash because it
found that the relationship between Rock Bay and the judgment
debtors raised reasonable suspicion of good faith as to the asset
transfers because Kirsch had reserved Rock Bay’s name in Nevada,
there were multiple transfers of money between Rock Bay and the
judgment debtors after the Florida litigation began, and Rock Bay
was voluntarily dissolved shortly after the Florida judgments were
registered in Nevada. The district court further found that there
was a reasonable inference of a relationship between Maybourne
and the judgment debtors because Maybourne has the same address
as the judgment debtors, Maybourne’s incorporator was in-house
counsel for the judgment debtors, and Kirsch was initially regis-
tered as a corporate officer of Maybourne. As such, the district
court declined to quash the McNair subpoena as to Rock Bay and
Maybourne.?

The judgment creditors then subpoenaed Rock Bay’s financial
records from U.S. Bank. Rock Bay filed a motion to quash the
U.S. Bank subpoena or, in the alternative, to limit the scope of dis-
covery to the judgment debtors’ assets. It argued that the U.S.
Bank subpoena sought highly sensitive financial information that
was protected from disclosure. The district court denied the motion
to quash for the same reasons that it denied the prior motion to
quash the McNair subpoena, and it declined to limit the scope of
the subpoena because it found that disclosure would not harm
Rock Bay. This petition for a writ of prohibition followed.

DISCUSSION
| ere

Writ relief is an ‘‘extraordinary remedy, and therefore the deci-
sion to entertain a petition lies within the discretion of this court.’
State v. Dist. Ct. (Jackson), 121 Nev. 413, 416, 116 P.3d 834, 836
(2005). A petitioner bears the burden of ‘‘demonstrat[ing] that ex-
traordinary relief is warranted.”’ Valley Health System v. Dist. Ct.,
127 Nev. 167, 171, 252 P.3d 676, 678 (2011). A writ of prohibi-
tion may be granted when the district court exceeds its jurisdiction.
NRS 34.320. Thus, it is an “‘appropriate remedy for the prevention
of improper discovery.’ Valley Health System, 127 Nev. at 171 n.5,

2The subpoena also sought the records related to another nonparty, Sloan
Park, LLC, who is not a party to this writ proceeding because the district
court quashed the subpoena as it related to Sloan Park’s independent records.

210 Pe

252 P.3d at 678 n.5; Wardleigh v. District Court, 111 Nev. 345,
350, 891 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1995).

_

However, this relief, designed to prevent the district court from
acting beyond its authority, is not available when there is a ‘‘plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law’’ NRS
34.170; Ashokan v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 665, 856
P.2d 244, 246 (1993). Although the right to appeal is generally an
adequate legal remedy that would preclude writ relief, Pan v. Dist.
Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004), an appeal is not
available here because petitioners are not parties to the action
below, NRAP 3A(a), and because a post-judgment order denying
a motion to quash is not substantively appealable. NRAP 3A(b).
Further, while we typically decline to consider writ petitions chal-
lenging discovery orders unless certain exceptions exist, Valley
Health System, 127 Nev. at 171, 252 P.3d at 678-79, here, the writ
is necessary to prevent improper post-judgment disclosure of pri-
vate information, the issues are novel and important to Nevada ju-
risprudence, and those issues might avoid appellate review were we
not to consider them now. See, e.g., Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev.
181, 160 P.3d 878 (2007) (explaining when a judgment creditor
must proceed against a nonparty in an independent action). Thus,
we exercise our discretion to entertain this writ petition.

Discovery of nonparty assets under NRCP 69(a) is permissible in
limited circumstances

P|

When interpreting Nevada’s Rules of Civil Procedure, we turn to
the rules of statutory interpretation. Webb v. Clark County School
Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 618, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009). ‘‘Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Con-
sipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. 454, 460, 282 P.3d 751,
756 (2012). ‘‘When a statute is clear and unambiguous, this court
gives effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and
does not resort to the rules of construction.” Id.

NRCP 69(a) provides that ‘‘[iJn aid of the judgment or
execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain discovery from
any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided
in these rules”’ Rock Bay and Maybourne concede that this rule
permits the judgment creditors to obtain discovery from nonparties,
but they argue that such discovery must be limited. To the extent
discussed herein, we agree.

As the federal courts have recognized when examining this issue,
obtaining post-judgment discovery from nonparties is generally

Po a1

limited to a judgment debtor’s assets, and a judgment creditor may
not inquire into the nonparties’ own assets. See Caisson Corpora-
tion v. County West Building Corp., 62 ER.D. 331, 334 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (holding that inquiries of nonparties under FRCP 69(a)
““must be kept pertinent to the goal of discovering concealed assets
of the judgment debtor and not be allowed to become a means of
barassment’’ of the nonparties); Burak v. Scott, 29 F. Supp. 775,
776 (D.D.C. 1939) (holding that ‘‘a judgment creditor [does not
have] any right to. . . require the disclosure of assets of persons
other than the judgment debtor’’ under FRCP 69).? However, this
general rule should not be ‘‘applied mechanically.”’ Magnaleasing,
Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Because the purpose of post-judgment discovery is to locate the
judgment debtor’s assets, discovery of a nonparty’s assets is per-
missible if it will lead to discovery of ‘‘hidden or concealed assets
of the judgment debtor’ Caisson Corporation, 62 E.R.D. at 334.

P|

Thus, we conclude that discovery of a nonparty’s assets is per-
missible in certain limited circumstances. These circumstances in-
clude, for example, a situation ‘‘where the relationship between the
judgment debtor and the nonparty is sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt about the bona fides of the transfer of assets between them,’
Magnaleasing, 76 F.R.D. at 562; see also Alpern v. Frishman, 465
A.2d 828, 829 (D.C. 1983), or where the nonparty is the alter ego
of the judgment debtor. See Falicia v. Advanced Tenant Services,
Inc., 235 ER.D. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that post-judgment
discovery of nonparties was permissible in light of evidence sug-
gesting that the nonparties were ‘‘mere extensions’’ and ‘‘possible
successor entities of a judgment debtor’’). We now must determine
whether there were certain limited circumstances present in this
case to support the district court’s denial of the motions to quash
the subpoenas seeking discovery of Rock Bay’s and Maybourne’s
assets.

Denial of the motions to quash

The judgment creditors subpoenaed all of McNair’s records re-
lated to the judgment debtors, Rock Bay, and Maybourne. They
also subpoenaed Rock Bay’s financial records from U.S. Bank.

SNRCP 69(a) is modeled after its federal counterpart, FRCP 69(a)(2), and
thus, cases interpreting the federal rule are strongly persuasive. See Executive
Mgmt. v, Ticor Title Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 46, 53, 38 P.3d 872, 876 (2002)
(“Federal cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘are strong
persuasive authority, because the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are based in
large part upon their federal counterparts’ ”” (quoting Las Vegas Novelty v. Fer-
nandez, 106 Nev. 113, 119, 787 P.2d 772, 776 (1990))).

212 Po

The district court ultimately declined to quash these subpoenas
after finding that there was a reasonable inference of a close rela-
tionship between the judgment debtors, Rock Bay, and Maybourne.

The McNair subpoena

| reel

Rock Bay argues that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to quash the McNair subpoena because there was no ev-
idence supporting its conclusion that the asset transfers between
Rock Bay and the judgment debtors might not have been in good
faith. We disagree.

The district court found that the apparent relationship between
Rock Bay and the judgment debtors, and the overall timing of
events, raised reasonable suspicion as to the good faith of the
asset transfers because Kirsch reserved the name for Rock Bay in
Nevada, there was evidence of money being transferred between
Rock Bay’s and the judgment debtors’ bank accounts, and Rock
Bay was voluntarily dissolved shortly after the judgment creditors
registered their judgment in Nevada. In addition, there was evi-
dence before the district court that Rock Bay was registered as
doing business under the name of one of the judgment debtor en-
tities, the signer of Rock Bay’s operating agreement was the judg-
ment debtors’ in-house counsel, and the form listing Maybourne as
the managing member of Rock Bay was signed by Kirsch. We con-
clude that the relationship established by this evidence is sufficient
to raise a reasonable suspicion as to the good faith of the asset
transfers between Rock Bay and the judgment debtors. As the dis-
trict court acted within its discretion in so concluding, it has not
exceeded its authority over Rock Bay such that a writ of prohibi-
tion is warranted as to the McNair subpoena.*

|

However, we cannot reach the same conclusion as to May-
bourne. As Maybourne points out, there is no evidence that May-
bourne ever held or transferred assets with the judgment debtors.
In addition, the judgment creditors never argued or established that
Maybourne was the judgment debtors’ alter ego.> Thus, because

We decline to consider Rock Bay’s argument as to the confidentiality of the
records sought by the McNair subpoena because Rock Bay did not argue that
the McNair records were confidential and private before the district court. See
In re AMERCO Derivative Litigation, 127 Nev. 147, 155 n.6, 252 P.3d 681,
697 n.6 (2011) (‘‘[W]e decline to address an issue raised for the first time”
before this court.).

‘In order to show that Maybourne was the alter ego of the judgment debtors,
the judgment creditors would have needed to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) Maybourne is ‘‘ ‘influenced and governed by’” the judg-
ment debtors, (2) there is a ‘‘ ‘unity of interest and ownership’ ’’ between the

Pe 213

the judgment creditors did not demonstrate anything about the re-
lationship between Maybourne and the judgment debtors that raises
suspicion sufficient to require access to Maybourne’s financial
records, the district court improperly declined to quash the McNair
subpoena as to Maybourne.

The U.S. Bank subpoena
| er

Rock Bay also argues that the district court exceeded its author-
ity in allowing the U.S. Bank subpoena to endure because in it, the
judgment creditors impermissibly sought to acquire highly confi-
dential and private financial information.* Although Nevada does
not recognize a privilege for financial documents, see NRS Chap-
ter 49 (detailing Nevada’s evidentiary privileges), this court has
recognized that ‘‘public policy suggests that . . . financial status
[should] not be had for the mere asking.’’ Hetter v. District Court,
110 Nev. 513, 520, 874 P.2d 762, 766 (1994). In the context of
post-judgment discovery, courts have recognized that a nonparty’s
privacy interests ‘‘must be balanced against the need of the judg-
ment creditor’’ for the requested information. Blaw Knox Corp. v.
AMR Industries, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
Thus, a nonparty’s financial assets are generally protected where
“‘the information sought was critical to the financial health of the
non-party’s business and was being requested by a direct competi-
tor.’ Falicia, 235 F.R.D. at 10.

However, the need of a judgment creditor to examine a non-
party’s financial records outweighs the nonparty’s privacy interest
where, as in this case, there are reasonable doubts as to the good.
faith of the transfer of assets between the nonparty and the judg-
ment debtor, and the judgment creditor is not a competitor of the
nonparty. Id. at 9-10. In Falicia, the court held that disclosure of
a nonparty’s bank records was appropriate because there was a
“reasonable belief that inspection of the bank records by the [judg-
ment creditor] could lead to the discovery of concealed assets of

two such that they are essentially the same company, and (3) ‘‘ ‘adherence to
the corporate fiction of a separate entity would, under the circumstances,
sanction [a] fraud or promote injustice. ’? LFC Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Loomis,
116 Nev. 896, 904, 8 P.3d 841, 846-47 (2000) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Polaris Industrial Corp. v. Kaplan, 103 Nev. 598, 601, 747 P.2d 884, 886
(1987).

®Maybourne also challenges the U.S. Bank subpoena on the basis of confi-
dentiality and privacy. However, it appears that Maybourne was not included in
the U.S. Bank subpoena, and Maybourne moved to quash only the McNair
subpoena. Therefore, we do not consider Maybourne’s argument. See In re
AMERCO, 127 Nev. at 155 n.6, 252 P.3d at 697 n.6.

a4 Pe

the judgment debtors.’ Jd. at 10. After considering the content and
recipient of the requested documents, the court concluded that
protection of the nonparty’s financial information was not war-
ranted because the judgment creditors were not competitors of the
judgment debtors. Id.

| ere

Similarly, in this case, the judgment creditors are not competi-
tors of Rock Bay. Moreover, the financial records requested from
U.S. Bank are relevant and pertain to financial account activity that
occurred throughout the underlying litigation, as Rock Bay was not
created in Nevada until after the judgment creditors commenced
the Florida lawsuit. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
did not act in excess of its jurisdiction when it declined to quash
the U.S. Bank subpoena.”

Accordingly, we grant the petition as to Maybourne because
the district court improperly declined to quash the McNair sub-
poena as to Maybourne. Thus, we direct the clerk of this court to
issue a writ of prohibition instructing the district court to quash the
McNair subpoena as it pertains to Maybourne. However, we deny
the petition as to Rock Bay because the relationship between Rock
Bay and the judgment debtors raises reasonable suspicion as to the
good faith of the asset transfers between them, and because no pri-
vacy interest will be impacted in a way sufficient to overcome the
judgment creditors’ interest in discovering any concealed assets.*

PICKERING, C.J., and Sarrma, J., concur.

"The parties also dispute whether Rock Bay previously rejected a confiden-
tiality agreement. In support of this argument, the judgment creditors rely on
a letter their counsel sent to Rock Bay stating that the nonparties had not an-
swered the judgment creditors’ request for a proposed confidentiality agree-
ment. However, Rock Bay argues that the proposed agreement was not suffi-
cient, and that the agreements it alternatively proposed were similarly rejected
by the judgment creditors. We do not address this issue because it is a ques-
tion of fact, and it was not raised in the district court. See State v. Rincon, 122
Nev. 1170, 1177, 147 P.3d 233, 238 (2006) (‘‘This court does not act as a
finder of fact . . . ”’); In re AMERCO, 127 Nev. at 155 n.6, 252 P.3d at 697
n.6.

SAs such, we deny as moot Rock Bay’s and Maybourne’s petition for re-
hearing of the order denying their motion for a stay.

Pe 21s

LEOPOLDO GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HON-
ORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, Districr Jupcr, RESPON-
DENTS, AND THE STATE OF NEVADA, REAL Party IN
INTEREST.

No. 62361 .
April 4, 2013 298 P.3d 448

Las Vegas Defense Group, LLC, and Michael V. Castillo and
Michael L. Becker, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

Per Curiam:

At issue in this petition for extraordinary writ relief is the proper
analysis of a Double Jeopardy Clause claim when it is based up-
on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We conclude that Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970), sets forth the proper analy-
sis for determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been de-
cided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial: The district
court must examine the record of the first trial and determine
whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some
other issue of fact. And, in conducting this analysis, the district
court may not consider the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the
other counts. Because the district court improperly analyzed peti-
tioner’s double jeopardy claim, we grant the petition for a writ of
mandamus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Leopoldo Gonzalez was charged with sexual assault of
a minor under the age of 14 and Jewdness with a child under the
age of 14. During the trial that followed, the jury acquitted Gon-
zalez of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault
count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault
count and set a date for a new trial. Gonzalez subsequently moved
to dismiss the information, arguing in relevant part that the Dou-

Pe 217

ble Jeopardy Clause and collateral estoppel rule prohibit a second
trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness and
both offenses were based upon the same event.! The State opposed
the motion, asserting that lewdness and sexual assault are not the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes and the collateral estop-
pel rule was not implicated because the jury did not necessarily de-
termine an issue of ultimate fact as to the sexual assault count
when it acquitted Gonzalez on the count of lewdness with a child.
The district court heard argument and denied the motion based
on the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the sexual assault
count. This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
followed.

DISCUSSION

Gonzalez argues that he is entitled to relief from the district
court order denying his motion to dismiss the information because
the district court failed to apply the analysis required by Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), when determining whether the
jury’s verdict on the lewdness count estopped the State from relit-
igating the issue of sexual touching in the sexual assault count.

| |

‘We have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus and
prohibition. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4. A writ of mandamus is avail-
able to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127
Nev. 927, 931, 267 P.3d 777, 779 (2011). The writ will not issue
if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. And, because a writ
of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, the decision to enter-
tain a petition for the writ lies within our discretion. Hickey v. Dis-
trict Court, 105 Nev. 729, 731, 782 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1989). In
deciding whether to exercise that discretion, we may consider,
among other things, whether the petition raises an important issue
of law that needs clarification. Armstrong, 127 Nev. at 931, 267
P.3d at 779-80.

|

Here, Gonzalez asserts that the district court failed to apply the
controlling legal authority. If true, this is a classic example of a
manifest abuse of discretion that may be controlled through a writ
of mandamus. See id. at 932, 267 P.3d at 780 (explaining that ‘‘[a]
manifest abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous interpretation of

"The information alleged that Gonzalez committed sexual assault by ‘“plac-
ing his mouth and/or tongue on or in the [victim’s] genital opening,” and he
committed lewdness ‘“‘by licking the [victim’s] genital area.’ It is clear from
the record that both offenses were based on the same act of sexual touching.

218 ee

the law or a clearly erroneous application of a Jaw or rule’’ (in-
ternal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Although Gonzalez
has another remedy because he could raise the double-jeopardy
issue on appeal from a judgment of conviction, NRS 177.015;
NRS 177.045, that remedy is not adequate to protect the right af-
forded by the Double Jeopardy Clause—to not be placed twice in
jeopardy. And the petition raises an important issue of law that
needs clarification. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to con-
sider the merits of the petition.

“[C]ollateral estoppel in criminal trials is an integral part of the
protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.’ Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56
(1971); see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46. ‘‘‘[W]hen an issue of ulti-
mate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment’
of acquittal, it ‘cannot again be litigated’ in a second trial for a
separate offense.” Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119
(2009) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443). An ‘“‘ultimate fact’’ is
“‘fa] fact essential to the claim or the defense.’ Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 671 (9th ed. 2009). The defendant has the burden to
demonstrate that the issue of fact that he seeks to foreclose from
consideration was actually decided by the jury.in the first trial.
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 (1990).

To determine whether an issue of ultimate fact was decided by
the jury during the first trial, the court must ‘‘examine the record
of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evi-
dence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a
rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other
than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from considera-
tion.’ Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (internal quotations omitted); see
also Yeager, 557 U.S. at 119-20 (same); Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350
(same). The court may not consider a jury’s inability to reach a
verdict on some of the counts; ‘‘[b]ecause a jury speaks only
through its verdict,’ its inability to reach a verdict is a ‘‘non-
event,’ and ‘‘consideration of [the] hung counts has no place in the
issue-preclusion analysis.’”? Yeager, 557 U.S. at 120-22.

Pe

The district court order denying Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss
the information does not contain any findings of fact or conclusions
of law. However, it is clear from the transcript of the hearing on
the motion that the district court erroneously based its analysis of

*The Supreme Court now generally uses the term “tissue preclusion’? in-
stead of “collateral estoppel.” See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5
(2008).

Te 219

the collateral estoppel claim on the jury’s inability to reach a ver-
dict on the sexual assault count. Because the district court’s deci-
sion to deny Gonzalez’s motion was clearly based on an incorrect
interpretation or application of controlling legal authority, we con-
clude that extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of mandamus
is appropriate. See Armstrong, 127 Nev. at 932, 267 P.3d at 780.3

CONCLUSION
‘We grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue
a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its
order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and reconsider the
motion based on the controlling legal authority as set forth in this
opinion.

JON ROBERT SLAATTE, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 60799

April 18, 2013 298 P.3d 1170

Derrick M. Lopez, Gardnerville, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark
B. Jackson, District Attorney, and Thomas W. Gregory, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Douglas County, for Respondent.

2We have stated that a writ of prohibition will be issued to preclude a retrial
that would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Glover v. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev.
691, 701, 220 P3d 684, 692 (2009). Here, however, we cannot determine
on the record before us whether retrial is precluded. The issue is better re-
solved in the first instance by the district court, applying the controlling legal
authority. For this reason, we deny Gonzalez’s alternative request for a writ of
prohibition.

Before PicKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sairra, JJ.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

In this appeal, we address a threshold jurisdiction issue: Is a
judgment of conviction that imposes restitution in an uncertain
amount an appealable final judgment? We conclude that it is not,
and, as a result, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant Jon Robert Slaatte pleaded guilty to one count of
lewdness with a child under 14 years of age. The district court sen-
tenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after ten
years. The district court also determined that restitution should be
imposed as part of the sentence, but the court did not set an
amount of restitution. Instead, the judgment entered by the court
orders Slaatte to appear at 9 a.m. on a Tuesday Jaw-and-motion
calendar within 60 days after his release from prison ‘‘to have this
Court determine what restitution for victim compensation that will
be ordered at that time.’’ Slaatte filed a timely notice of appeal.

Slaatte argues that Nevada law requires that the district court set
an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is ap-
propriate as part of a sentence. Because the district court failed to
comply with that requirement, Slaatte urges this court to ‘‘set
aside or reverse the district court’s order regarding restitution.”
For its part, the State concedes error and urges the court to remand
this matter to the district court so that it can specify the amount of
restitution imposed as part of the sentence.

We agree with the parties that the district court clearly erred.
NRS 176.033(1)(c) requires the district court to ‘‘set an amount of
restitution’ when it determines that restitution ‘‘is appropriate’’ as
part of a sentence. When the district court determines that restitu-
tion is appropriate as part of a sentence, it must include the amount
and terms of the restitution in the judgment of conviction. NRS
176.105(1)(c) (‘‘the judgment of conviction must set forth . . . any
term of imprisonment, the amount and terms of any fine, restitu-
tion or administrative assessment”’). Consistent with these statu-
tory requirements, this court has held that a district court is not al-

Pe 221

lowed ‘“‘to award restitution in uncertain terms.’ Botts v. State, 109
Nev. 567, 569, 854 P.2d 856, 857 (1993). In cases where a district
court has violated this proscription, this court historically has re-
manded for the district court to set an amount of restitution. E.g.,
Washington v. State, 112 Nev. 1067, 1075, 922 P.2d 547, 551-52
(1996); Smith v. State, 112 Nev. 871, 873, 920 P.2d 1002, 1003
(1996); Roe v. State, 112 Nev. 733, 736, 917 P.2d 959, 960-61
(1996); Botts, 109 Nev. at 569, 854 P.2d at 857.

_ |

None of our prior decisions addressed whether the judgment was
final given its failure to comply with NRS 176.105(1). If such a
judgment is not appealable as a final judgment, see NRS
177.015(3), we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Castillo v.
State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990) (explaining
that court has jurisdiction only when statute or court rule provides
for appeal). Our recent decision in Whitehead v. State, 128 Nev.
259, 285 P.3d 1053 (2012), is controlling. In that case, we con-
sidered whether a judgment of conviction that imposed restitution
but did not specify the amount of restitution was sufficient to trig-
ger the one-year period under NRS 34.726 for filing a post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 263, 285
P.3d at 1055. Based on the requirement in NRS 176.105(1)(c) that
the amount of restitution be included in the judgment of conviction
if the court imposes restitution, we concluded ‘‘that a judgment of
conviction that imposes a restitution obligation but does not spec-
ify its terms is not a final judgment”’ and therefore it does not trig-
ger the one-year period for filing a habeas petition. Jd. Given our
decision in Whitehead that such a judgment is not a final judgment,
we necessarily conclude that it also is not appealable.

P|

In this case, the district court clearly determined that restitution
should be imposed as part of the sentence. The court, however, did
not specify the amount of restitution, as required for a final judg-
ment. We acknowledge that the district court appears to have been
concerned with setting an amount of restitution because of the pos-
sibility that the victim, who had been in counseling, would incur
additional counseling expenses in the future.! Any concern about
ongoing counseling expenses, however, does not override the dis-
trict court’s statutory obligation to award restitution in certain
terms and to do so in the judgment of conviction. See Washington,

"The record suggests that the parties and the district court had some concern
that as of the date of sentencing there had not been any expenses for counsel-
ing that could properly be included as restitution. Because the district court has
not imposed a specific amount or identified who it must be paid to, those con-
cerns are not before us, and we therefore express no opinion on those matters.

222

112 Nev. at 1074-75, 922 P.2d at 551 (concluding that district
court, which ordered defendant to ‘‘pay any future counselling
costs for victim,” erred by failing to set specific dollar amount of
restitution for such costs (internal quotation marks omitted)). Be-
cause the judgment of conviction contemplates restitution in an un-
certain amount, it is not final and therefore is not appealable. Ac-
cordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. The appeal is
dismissed on that basis.”

SHAWN TIMOTHY NEWMAN, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 56151

April 18, 2013 298 P.3d 1171

2We provided Slaatte with an opportunity to show cause why this appeal
| should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He has not responded.

[Rehearing denied May 10, 2013]
[En banc reconsideration denied July 18, 2013]

Jeremy T. Bosler, Public Defender, and Cheryl Bond, Appellate
Deputy Public Defender, Washoe County, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City;
Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Gary H. Hatlestad,
Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for
Respondent.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Pickerine, C.J.:

Appellant Shawn Newman appeals his conviction, on jury ver-
dict, of one count of willfully endangering a child as a result of
child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and one count of battery by
strangulation, a felony. The charges grew out of an incident in
which Newman yelled at his son, Darian, in public; when New-
man took off his belt to strike the boy, a witness, Thomas Car-
mona, tried but failed to stop him. Newman and Carmona fought
until Newman grabbed Carmona’s neck to choke him into sub-
mission. At trial, Newman admitted these facts and that he acted
intentionally. His defense was justification: parental discipline
privilege as to the child abuse charge; and, to some extent, self-
defense as to the battery charge.

_ |

Newman raises two issues on appeal, both rooted in NRS
48.045’s prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evi-
dence to prove criminal propensity. First, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence that Newman had struck his other son, Jacob, in
public and that Newman got into a heated argument with nursing
staff about Jacob while Darian was hospitalized for an appendec-
tomy. The district court deemed this evidence admissible under
NRS 48.045(2) to show absence of mistake or accident as to the
child abuse charge. Second, the prosecution presented a surprise
rebuttal witness, Connie Ewing, who reported that she, too, had a
heated but nonphysical exchange with Newman over his disciplin-

PO 227

ing a young boy outside a local Walmart. The district court allowed
this testimony as rebuttal under NRS 48.045(1)(a) and NRS
48.055, to rebut Newman’s testimony that he strangled Carmona in
self-defense.!

Evidence of one of the episodes involving Jacob was properly
admitted to refute Newman’s claim of parental privilege. The other
episodes involving Jacob were not proven by clear and convincing
evidence, as required by our case law, and it was an abuse of dis-
cretion to admit the Ewing testimony. Nonetheless, Newman’s
guilt was established by his own admissions and overwhelming ev-
idence. We therefore conclude that the errors were harmless and
affirm.

L
A.

The incident underlying this appeal occurred on September 14,
2009. At the time, Newman was a single father raising two sons:
twelve-year-old Darian and six-year-old Jacob. Darian had started.
middle school the previous week. Jacob’s day care opened at 7
a.m. and Darian needed to be to middle school by 7:30 a.m. The
family’s apartment was close to both. Darian had recently gotten a
bike with gear-speeds. The plan was for Darian, who felt uncom-
fortable riding double with Jacob, to walk Jacob and the bicycle to
Jacob’s day care and to ride from there to middle school. The tim-
ing was tight and the first week this plan did not work out. One
day, Newman went looking for Darian along what he thought was
his route but could not find him. Another day, Darian got lost and
was tardy.

Six weeks earlier, in late July, Darian had been hospitalized for
appendicitis. A secondary infection developed that extended his
hospital stay to 19 days. The wound was dressed, not sutured
closed, meaning it had to be cleaned and the dressing changed
daily while the open incision healed. On September 14, the wound
had mostly closed but still required daily dressing, which Newman
attended to.

On the day of the incident, Newman followed Darian in his
truck to see his son’s exact route. All went well until Darian, who

‘Newman also argues ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on his
lawyer’s statement to the district court, arguing against the admission of
Ewing’s testimony, that she would have urged Newman not to testify if she had
known about Ewing. We normally do not ‘‘consider ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims on direct appeal unless the district court has held an evidentiary
hearing on the matter or an evidentiary hearing would be needless.” Archan-
ian y. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1036, 145 P.3d 1008, 1020-21 (2006). The dis-
trict court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and one would be needed to de-
termine whether Newman would have testified no matter what his lawyer
said. Therefore, we do not reach his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

228 ee

had his new bike in third gear, could not make it up a hill. New-
man got out of his truck, put and rode the bike in lower gear to
show Darian how the gearing worked, and then held the bike for
Darian to try. For whatever reason—Newman testified he saw
Darian deliberately slip his foot off the pedal, while Darian told a
responding officer he was tired and his stomach hurt—Darian did
not succeed, even in the lower gear. Admittedly angry, Newman
started yelling at Darian. He gave Darian an ultimatum: ride the
bike up the hill or be spanked. Darian let go of his bike, went to
a low wall nearby, and bent over to be spanked.

From his home across the street, Thomas Carmona heard the
commotion and saw Newman take off his belt. Carmona ran over
to stop him from striking the boy. They argued over Newman’s
right to physically discipline his child and then fought. The fight
did not end until Newman pinned Carmona to the ground in a
stranglehold. Carmona and Newman accused each other of throw-
ing the first blow. Newman is bigger than Carmona and, unlike
Carmona, looked none the worse for wear after their fight. Car-
mona and another eyewitness described Newman as in a rage and
Darian as crying uncontrollably. One witness testified that Darian
said his father terrified him.

When the police arrived, they found a red welt on Darian’s but-
tocks, which they photographed. They also photographed Dar-
ian’s abdominal bandage and healing incision. Paramedics exam-
ined Darian and Carmona but did not take either to the hospital.
Carmona’s Adam’s apple was sore and it hurt to swallow for some
days afterward.

B.

Trial took four days. The prosecution presented its case-in-chief
through eyewitness, responding officer, and expert medical testi-
mony without using any prior-bad-act evidence. After the prose-
cution rested, the district court advised Newman of his right to tes-
tify in his own defense. The prosecution warned that it would
explore prior bad acts if Newman testified that parental privilege
justified his discipline of Darian.

The district court then heard from the lawyers on the prior-bad-
act issue. No testimony was presented; the lawyers argued from a
child protective services (CPS) report that the appellate record
does not include. The transcript reveals that the CPS report lists
two of the three incidents involving Jacob as ‘‘information only’’
under a heading, ‘‘unsubstantiated reports?’ and that the police in-
vestigated one of the incidents but could not verify it. Despite this,
the district court determined that the following incidents were es-
tablished by clear and convincing evidence and could be used by
the prosecution if Newman testified: (1) Newman hit Jacob in No-

Pi 229

vember 2006, February 2009, and late July or early August 2009
when Darian was in the hospital; and (2) Newman had an ugly
verbal run-in with hospital staff during Darian’s stay. Although the
court deemed this evidence more probative than prejudicial, it did
not identify a permissible nonpropensity purpose for admitting it
until later in the trial, when it held that the evidence tended to
show absence of mistake or accident as to the child abuse charge.

Newman elected to testify. His direct-examination testimony
hewed close to the events of September 14. He gave background
concerning Darian’s appendectomy and recuperation and explained
why he followed Darian by truck instead of just driving him to
school that day. He admitted that he gave Darian the choice of rid-
ing up the hill or being spanked; that he struck Darian on the but-
tocks with his belt, raising a welt; and that he fought with Car-
mona and put him in a stranglehold when Carmona would not back
off. Finally, Newman testified that Carmona attacked him, not the
reverse. He conceded being angry and loud but denied being out of
control.

On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Newman about the
hospital incidents in late July/early August 2009. Newman admit-
ted that he “‘smacked’’ Jacob on the back of the head for bounc-
ing on Darian’s bed and that he eventually got into such a heated
argument with hospital staff over Darian’s care and his and Jacob’s
use of a break room that he was told to leave and not come back.
The prosecution had Newman acknowledge that he ‘‘grew up on
the streets,’ is ‘‘on the hard side,’ and can be perceived as ‘‘an
aggressive, loud, obnoxious kind of person.”’ He said, “‘I don’t
hide anything I do. I will spank my children in public as I will in
private.’ Newman described his progressive discipline of his sons,
ranging from raised voice, to corner time, to spanking. He also de-
scribed the special tutoring he had arranged for Darian and later
Jacob at the University of Nevada Reno and expressed pride in
Darian’s reading level. When the prosecution asked Newman about
the November 2006 and February 2009 incidents with Jacob men-
tioned (but not substantiated) in the CPS report, Newman said he
did not recall either.

The defense then called the psychologist who counseled Darian
after the charges in this case led to Darian and Jacob being
removed from Newman’s care. The psychologist characterized
Newman’s parenting style as between “‘authoritarian’’ and ‘‘auto-
cratic”’ but also opined that Darian and Newman had ‘‘a fairly nor-
mal parent/child relationship.’ He testified that he had no qualms
when Darian and Jacob were returned to Newman’s care shortly
before trial.

After the defense rested, the prosecution alerted the court and
the defense counsel to Connie Ewing, who came forward after
reading about the case in the newspaper. She related an incident in-

230 Po

volving a stranger she now recognized as Newman yelling and hit-
ting a boy outside Walmart in early September 2009. When she de-
manded that he stop, Newman told her to ‘‘mind [her] own
£#$%ing business.’ Ewing went inside to complain to the Walmart
greeter and then security and Newman followed. Two security
guards flanked Ewing while she and Newman argued about single
parenting and appropriate discipline. No physical contact occurred
and eventually Newman left. Over defense objection, the district
court admitted this evidence to rebut Newman’s testimony that
Carmona attacked him first. The prosecution did nothing to prove
the November 2006 and February 2009 incidents involving Jacob
that Newman testified he did not know about or recall.

In closing, neither side argued the prior-bad-act evidence in-
volving Jacob. The Ewing testimony was alluded to but briefly.
During deliberation, the jury sent out two questions, both con-
cerning the child abuse count. Ultimately, it returned a verdict of
guilty and the district court sentenced Newman to a maximum
term of 60 months incarceration for the battery with a consecutive
term of 12 months for child endangerment.

I.

NRS 48.045(2) prohibits the use of evidence of ‘‘other crimes,
wrongs or acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith.’ Such evi-
dence ‘‘may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’’ Jd. NRS 48.045(2)’s
list of permissible nonpropensity uses for prior-bad-act evidence is
not exhaustive. Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. 108, 115, 270 P.3d
1244, 1249 (2012). Nonetheless, while ‘‘evidence of ‘other
crimes, wrongs or acts’ may be admitted . . . for a relevant non-
propensity purpose,’ id. at 116, 270 P.3d at 1249 (quoting NRS
48.045(2)), ‘‘‘[t]he use of uncharged bad act evidence to convict
a defendant [remains] heavily disfavored in our criminal justice
system because bad acts are often irrelevant and prejudicial and
force the accused to defend against vague and unsubstantiated
charges.’ ”” Id. (quoting Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 730, 30
P.3d 1128, 1131 (2001)). Thus, ‘‘ ‘[a] presumption of inadmissi-
bility attaches to all prior bad act evidence.’’’ Jd. (quoting Rosky
y, State, 121 Nev. 184, 195, 111 P.3d 690, 697 (2005)).

Lr

“{TJo overcome the presumption of inadmissibility, the prose-
cutor must request a hearing and establish that: (1) the prior bad
act is relevant to the crime charged and for a purpose other than
proving the defendant’s propensity, (2) the act is proven by clear

Pe 231

and convincing evidence, and (3) the probative value of the evi-
dence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice.’’ Bigpond, 128 Nev. at 117, 270 P.3d at 1250. In addition,
the district court ‘‘should give the jury a specific instruction ex-
plaining the purposes for which the evidence is admitted immedi-
ately prior to its admission and should give a general instruction at
the end of the trial reminding the jurors that certain evidence may
be used only for limited purposes.’ Tavares, 117 Nev. at 733, 30
P.3d at 1133.

a

This court reviews a district court’s decision to admit or exclude
prior-bad-act evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.
Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 789, 220 P.3d 709, 712 (2009).

A.
L rere

Identification of an at-issue, nonpropensity purpose for admitting
prior-bad-act evidence is a necessary first step of any NRS
48.045(2) analysis. See United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 697
(7th Cir. 2012) (addressing Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), the cognate to
NRS 48.045(2)). Here, the district court ultimately declared that it
was admitting the prior-bad-act evidence involving Jacob to show
absence of mistake or accident. ‘‘The admissibility of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts to establish . . . absence of mistake
or accident is well established, particularly in child abuse cases.’’
United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir. 1981). This
is because ‘‘[p]roof that a child has experienced injuries in many
purported accidents is evidence that the most recent injury may not
have resulted from yet another accident.’’ Bludsworth v. State, 98
Nev. 289, 292, 646 P.2d 558, 559 (1982).

But Newman did not mount a conventional accidental injury de-
fense to the child abuse charge. He admitted striking Darian and
doing so deliberately. Thus, proof that Newman previously struck
Darian’s brother Jacob does not tend to disprove accidental injury,
a common defense to a child abuse charge. Neither mistake nor
accident was at issue, and the prior incidents involving Jacob
should not have been admitted for these irrelevant purposes. See
Honkanen v. State, 105 Nev. 901, 902, 784 P.2d 981, 982 (1989)
(reversing a child abuse conviction based on an error in admit-
ting evidence of prior abuse to show absence of mistake where, as
here, the parent did not claim accident or mistake explained the
injuries).

P|

The prosecution argues that, even if not properly admitted to

show absence of mistake or accident, the prior-bad-act evidence in-

232 Po

volving Jacob was admissible to refute Newman’s parental privi-
lege defense by demonstrating that Newman did not have the intent
to correct that forms the heart of that defense.

P|

A number of states have codified the parental privilege defense.
See Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 181 n.5 (Ind. 2008) (identi-
fying jurisdictions with parental privilege statutes). Nevada has
not, so in Nevada the privilege exists by virtue of common law, see
NRS 1.030; 3 William Blackstone Commentaries 120 (1862)
(‘battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who
hath authority, a parent or master, gives moderate correction to his
child, his scholar, or his apprentice,’ quoted in Willis, 888 N.E.2d
at 180-81), and by virtue of the ‘‘fundamental liberty interest [a
parent has] in maintaining a familial relationship with his or her
child [which includes] the right . . . ‘to direct the upbringing and
education of children’ ”’ Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 180 (quoting Pierce
v, Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)) (citing Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)).

This appeal does not require us to decide the exact boundaries
of the common law parental privilege defense in Nevada, because
neither side contests the instruction the district court gave on it.
See Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 181-82 (comparing the different parental
privilege formulations offered by Model Penal Code § 3.08(1)
(1985) and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147(1) (1965). At
minimum, as both sides concede, the defense required the prose-
cution to establish that Newman did not ‘‘‘intend[ ] to merely
discipline [Darian but] . . . to injure’”’ or endanger him. State v.
Hassett, 859 P.2d 955, 960 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Ed-
ward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 5:10
(1993)); see State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1981) (the
privilege is lost ‘‘at the point at which a parent ceases to act in
good faith and with parental affection and acts immoderately, cru-
elly, or mercilessly with a malicious desire to inflict pain’’).

| ere

The intent underlying parental discipline and battery are not the
same. ‘‘A parent who disciplines a child in a physical manner in-
tends to correct or alter their child’s behavior. That corrective in-
tent is lacking in a battery.’ Ceaser v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 917
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), transfer denied, 969 N.E.2d 86 (Ind. 2012).
“[O]ften the only way to determine whether the punishment is a
non-criminal act of discipline that was unintentionally harsh or
whether it constitutes the [crime] of child abuse is to look at the
parent’s history of disciplining the child’’ State v. Taylor, 701
A.2d 389, 396 (Md. 1997). In such cases, ‘‘{a] parent’s other dis-
ciplinary acts can be the most probative evidence of whether his or
her disciplinary corporal punishment is imposed maliciously, with

Po 233

an intent to injure, or with a sincere desire to use appropriate cor-
rective measures.” Id.; see People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375,
1384-85 (Colo. 1981) (recognizing that prior acts of excessive
discipline may be admissible to ‘‘negat[e] any claim of accident or
justification’’), abrogated on other grounds by James y. People,
7217 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1986), overruled by People v. Dunaway,
88 P.3d 619, 624 (Colo. 2004); Ceaser, 964 N.E.2d at 917 (“‘By
arguing that she exercised her parental privilege in disciplining
M.R., Ceaser necessarily represents that her intent was to correct
M.R’s behavior through corporal punishment, rather than to sim-
ply batter her daughter,” making admissible the defendant’s prior
conviction for battering her child); State v. Morosin, 262 N.W.2d
194, 197 (Neb. 1978) (recognizing as ‘‘peculiarly applicable to
child abuse cases”’ the principle that, ‘‘‘[w]here an act is equivo-
cal in its nature, and may be criminal or honest according to the in-
tent with which it is done, then other acts of the defendant, and his
conduct on other occasions, may be shown in order to disclose the
mastering purpose of the alleged criminal act’’’ (quoting 1 Whar-
ton’s Criminal Evidence § 350, at 520 (11th ed.))).

P|

The parental privilege defense comes down to ‘‘punishment—
was it cruel or abusive’’—or did it amount to a parent’s ‘use
[of] reasonable and moderate force to correct [his] child[ ]’*?
State v. Wright, 593 N.W.2d 792, 801 (S.D. 1999) (applying
South Dakota’s statutory parental privilege, $.D. Codified Laws
§ 22-18-5). Here, the district court should have identified the rel-
evant nonpropensity purpose for admitting evidence of the prior in-
cidents involving Jacob before weighing its probative value against
its potential for unfair prejudice. It also incorrectly held that the
prior incidents involving Jacob tended to show absence of mistake
or accident, neither of which was at issue. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence did have probative value in assessing Newman’s intent in in-
flicting corporal punishment on Darian, which Newman’s assertion
of the parental privilege defense placed squarely in issue.”

2We recognize that Honkanen v. State, 105 Nev. 901, 784 P.2d 981 (1989)
(3-2), suggests a contrary rule, Thus, after rejecting absence of mistake as a
basis for admitting prior instances of abuse in a child abuse prosecution be-
cause the parental privilege defense asserted did not raise an issue of mistake,
Honkanen also notes that, ‘‘Furthermore, contrary to the district attorney’s
suggestion on appeal, neither was appellant’s intent [in issue].”” Id. at 902, 784
P.2d at 982. This passing reference in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent
issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to in-
jure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen’s rationale
may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which ex-
pand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 360, § 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining ‘‘domestic violence’’ to
include battery on an accused’s minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes
that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non-

234 PO

B.

Identification of an at-issue, nonpropensity purpose for admitting
this evidence is only the first step of a proper NRS 48.045(2)
analysis. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d at 697. In addition, the
prosecution must establish the prior bad act by clear and convinc-
ing evidence and demonstrate that its probative value ‘‘is not sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ Bigpond,
128 Nev. at 116-17, 270 P.3d at 1249.

Judged by these standards, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence that Newman cuffed Jacob on the
back of his head at the hospital in late July or early August 2009.
Newman admitted the incident, and it had enough probative value
to justify the district court’s determination that its worth out-
weighed the risk of unfair prejudice. But the same cannot be said
of the November 2006 and February 2009 incidents involving
Jacob. These incidents were merely mentioned in a CPS report as
“‘information only’’ and ‘‘unsubstantiated.’”’ As such, they were not
established by the clear and convincing evidence required to sus-
tain their admission.

Cc.

It was also error for the district court to admit the evidence that
Newman was aggressive to hospital staff and Ewing under NRS
48.045(2). Although the district court suggested that this evidence
went toward absence of mistake or accident, it had no logical rel-
evance to Newman’s parental privilege defense. It also appears too
factually dissimilar to the battery-by-strangulation charge to have
been admissible to refute Newman’s claim that he acted in self-
defense in strangling Carmona. Specifically, neither the hospital
nor the Walmart incidents went beyond an exchange of angry
words. In neither instance did Newman physically attack a stranger
based on a mistaken belief that his life was in danger. Although
Newman claimed he was fighting for his life, he never argued that
he did not intend to hurt Carmona, accidentally grabbed his throat,
or was otherwise not at fault for Carmona’s injuries.

propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a
domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246;
see also Harris v, State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (recog
nizing that the holding in Harvey v. State, 604 P-2d 586, 590 (Alaska 1979),
a case similar to Honkanen, had been abrogated by the amendment of Alaska’s
Rule 404(6) to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an
exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence).

Pe 235
I.

NRS 48.045(1)(a) permits the prosecution to offer ‘‘similar ev-
idence’’ to rebut evidence offered by an accused “‘of a person’s
character or a trait of his or her character”’ Normally, such proof
is by ‘‘testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion,’
NRS 48.055; ‘‘when a defendant chooses to introduce character
evidence in the form of reputation or opinion evidence, the prose-
cution is similarly limited in its rebuttal evidence and can only in-
quire into specific acts of conduct on cross-examination.”’ Jezdik v.
State, 121 Nev. 129, 136, 110 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2005); see NRS
48.055(1). And, under the collateral-fact rule, extrinsic evidence,
other than a conviction, may not be offered to impeach a defen-
dant’s character evidence, NRS 50.085(3), except ‘“‘when the State
‘seeks to introduce evidence on rebuttal to contradict specific fac-
tual assertions raised during the accused’s direct examination’ ””
Jezdik, 121 Nev. at 138, 110 P.3d at 1064 (quoting 1 Kenneth S.
Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 49, at 202 (5th ed. 1999)).
But the exception is limited. It applies when the defendant ‘‘intro-
duce[s] evidence giving the jury a false impression through an ab-
solute denial of misconduct’’ and then relies on the collateral-fact
tule to ‘‘frustrate the State’s attempt to contradict this evidence
through proof of specific acts.’’ Id. at 139, 110 P.3d at 1065.

Here, the district court admitted Ewing’s testimony to rebut
character evidence from Newman. It also held that the collateral-
fact rule did not apply because the Ewing incident resembled
Newman’s confrontation with Carmona and occurred less than
two weeks earlier. We disagree for three reasons.

Le

First, Ewing’s testimony about an extrinsic event did not rebut
character evidence from Newman. The crux of Ewing’s testimony
was that Newman is a violent, aggressive man. This was not ap-
propriate rebuttal because Newman never claimed to be a peace-
loving or nonviolent man. Jezdik opened the door to a specific
rebuttal by swearing on direct examination to having never com-
mitted a crime. Jezdik, 121 Nev. at 134, 110 P.3d at 1062. On di-
rect examination, Newman stuck close to the facts and made no af-
firmative claim to good character. And under cross-examination,
he openly admitted to being aggressive and churlish, especially
when criticized for disciplining his children. Nor did Ewing’s tes-
timony negate self-defense. Whereas Newman testified that he is
capable of violence when faced with a life-threatening situation,
Ewing’s testimony only showed that Newman is confrontational
and given to swear words. Although Ewing’s testimony may have

236 Pe

been relevant if Newman had physically attacked her and then
claimed self-defense, the evidence showed that the altercation at
the Walmart store only involved words, not blows, and thus dif-
fered fundamentally from the incident with Carmona.

Second, evidence of Newman’s character was collateral. As we
noted in Lobato v. State, the use of specific acts of conduct raises
issues under the collateral-fact rule when coupled with a specific
contradiction. 120 Nev. 512, 519, 96 P.3d 765, 770 (2004). Here,
although enough evidence supported a self-defense instruction as to
the battery-by-strangulation charge, this did not make Newman’s
penchant for verbal combativeness an issue. By allowing Ewing’s
testimony, the district court improperly allowed evidence of one of
Newman’s prior bad acts—his confrontation with Ewing—for the
sole, irrelevant purpose of showing he is not a peace-loving man.

P|

Finally, Ewing’s testimony did not comply with the requirements
of NRS 48.055. She did not give an opinion or discuss Newman’s
reputation, but rather testified about a specific event. The testi-
mony was not proper because Ewing discussed a specific instance
of conduct that was not, and could not have been, previously
raised by Newman or explored by the prosecution in its cross-
examination of him. And as we held in Roever v. State, it is im-
proper to use evidence of specific acts that the accused has not pre-
viously been confronted with. 114 Nev. 867, 871, 963 P.2d 503,
505 (1998).

Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting Ewing’s rebuttal testimony. We now con-
sider whether the district court’s errors were harmless or warrant
reversal.

Vv.

“The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question
of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.’ Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). It also ‘‘promotes public respect for the
criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the
trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial
error.’ Id. A nonconstitutional error, such as the erroneous ad-
mission of evidence at issue here, is deemed harmless unless it had
a ‘‘ ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict’ ’’ Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d
1128, 1132 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946)); see also Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 776, 784-85,

Pd 237

220 P.3d 724, 729-30 (2009) (reviewing erroneous admission of
evidence, pursuant to NRS 48.045, as nonconstitutional error);
Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 934, 59 P.3d 1249, 1255-56
(2002) (reviewing the failure to exclude evidence in a Petrocelli
hearing for harmless error); Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 198,
111 P.3d 690, 699 (2005) (‘Errors in the admission of evidence
under NRS 48.045(2) are subject to a harmless error review.’’).

We have carefully reviewed the record in this case and conclude
that the error in allowing the prosecution to ask Newman about the
November 2006 and February 2009 incidents involving Jacob was
harmless. The jury heard nothing with respect to those incidents
beyond the prosecution asking Newman if he recalled either; the
prosecution accepted Newman’s answer that he did not. The jury
was instructed that it ‘‘must not speculate to be true any insinua-
tions suggested by a question asked a witness’’ and that ‘‘[a] ques-
tion is not evidence.’ We must presume that the jury followed
those instructions. Allred v. State, 120 Nev. 410, 415, 92 P.3d
1246, 1250 (2004). Under those circumstances, and given New-
man’s frank admissions and overwhelming evidence on the child
abuse charge, the error in allowing the prosecution to ask about the
November 2006 and February 2009 incidents cannot be said to
have had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

P|

In the unique circumstances of this case, we also find the error
in admitting the Ewing testimony and allowing Newman to be
questioned about his trespass from the hospital to have been harm-
Jess. Newman’s battery-by-strangulation conviction rested on his
testimony admitting that he put Carmona in a stranglehold and held
his hands around his throat for 30 seconds or more—testimony that
numerous eyewitnesses corroborated. Newman’s defense focused
on the absence of substantial bodily harm to Carmona, and only
minimally on self-defense. And the prosecution made almost no
use of the Ewing testimony. For these reasons, we are convinced
that the error in admitting the Ewing testimony and allowing the
prosecution to question Newman about his trespass from the hos-
pital did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.

The erroneously admitted evidence was a miniscule and unnec-
essary part of the prosecution’s case and merely repeated what ju-
rors already knew based on admissible evidence—that Newman is
an admittedly aggressive, obnoxious man who hits his children and
bullies anyone who criticizes his parenting. As the district court
observed, this case was only conceptually challenging, as the facts
were remarkably clear. While we will not hesitate to reverse a

238 Pe

judgment of conviction when evidentiary error taints an accused’s
right to a fair trial, such did not occur here.
‘We therefore affirm.

Harvesty, J., concurs.

Curry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The majority correctly holds that some of the episodes involv-
ing Newman’s son, Jacob, were not proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence as required by our caselaw, and that it was an abuse
of discretion to admit the testimony of surprise rebuttal witness
Connie Ewing. The analysis of these errors by the majority is out-
standing and can be considered a landmark holding in the often
contested area of NRS 48.045’s prohibition against using charac-
ter or prior-bad-act testimony to prove criminal responsibility.

My problem with the majority is the holding that these errors
were harmless and that said errors did not taint Newman’s right to
a fair trial.

I would hold that these substantial errors rooted in NRS 48.045
and the prohibition against using character or bad-act-testimony to
prove criminal responsibility are structural and require reversal of
appellant’s convictions and the granting of a new trial without the
prosecution using these structural errors of inadmissible and highly
prejudicial evidence.

It is also important to note that after appellant testified in his
own behalf and the defense rested, the trial court permitted Con-
nie Ewing to testify after she came forward after reading about the
case in the newspaper. This was not only ‘‘trial by ambush,’’ but
also was clearly inadmissible testimony. How can the majority jus-
tify this testimony as harmless error?

The majority further states that ‘‘in closing neither side argued
the prior-bad-act evidence involving Jacob’’ and that ‘“‘the Ewing
testimony was alluded to but briefly.”’ To me this justification for
concluding that the errors were harmless is not supported in the
law or the facts of this case and is not relevant to the issue of
harmless error.’

'See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001) (not-
ing that the jury was instructed that ‘* ‘[s]tatements, arguments and opinions of
counsel are not evidence in the case’’” (alteration in original); Greene v.
State, 113 Nev. 157, 169, 931 P.2d 54, 61 (1997) (reiterating the district
court’s admonishment that ‘‘ ‘arguments of counsel are not evidence, as I’ve
told you earlier, and neither are the personal beliefs of counsel as to—as to the
implications of that evidence’”’), overruled on other grounds by Byford v.
State, 116 Nev. 215, 235, 994 P.2d 700, 713 (2000); Flanagan v. State, 112
Nev. 1409, 1420, 930 P.2d 691, 698 (1996) (highlighting the jury instruction
that ‘* ‘[s]tatements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the
case’’’ (alteration in original)); Bonacci v. State, 96 Nev. 894, 896-97, 620
P.2d 1244, 1246 (1980) (reiterating the district court’s admonishment that
“*‘arguments of counsel are not evidence’ ”’).

Po 239

One last thought:

in any test of harmless error, and in any case, an appellate
court has only probabilities to go on, not certainties. Nonethe-
less, when it undertakes to evaluate the probabilities in terms
of an error’s effect on the judgment, instead of merely look-
ing at the result as the test of harmlessness, the judicial
process at the trial level as well as in appellate review stands
to make a long-term gain in fairness without any long-term
Joss in efficiency. In the long run there would be closer guard
against error at the trial, if appellate courts were alert to re-
verse, in case of doubt, for error that could have contaminated
the judgment.?

Tn light of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on a
prosecutor in a criminal case and the nature of the errors con-
firmed by the majority, I would reverse appellant’s convictions and
grant him a new trial.

TAMMY EGAN, APPELLANT, v. GARY CHAMBERS, DPM, AN
INDIvipUAL; AND SOUTHWEST MEDICAL ASSOCIATES,
INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

No. 56674
April 25, 2013 299 P.3d 364

Brent D. Percival, Esq., P.C., Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 22-23 (1970).

240

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall and L.
Kristopher Rath, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, Cumrry, J.:

In this opinion, we reexamine whether NRS 41A.071’s affidavit-
of-merit requirement applies to claims for professional negligence.’
In 2009, we considered the identical question in Fierle v. Perez,
125 Nev. 728, 219 P.3d 906 (2009). Despite the plain language of
NRS 414.071, we concluded in Fierle that professional negli-
gence actions were subject to the affidavit-of-merit requirement.
Id, at 736-38, 219 P.3d at 911-12. While we acknowledge the im-
portant role that stare decisis plays in Nevada’s jurisprudence, we
recognize that we broadened the scope of NRS 41A.071, expand-
ing the reach of the statute beyond its precise words. We now con-
clude that professional negligence actions are not subject to the
affidavit-of-merit requirement based on the unambiguous language

'NRS 41A.071 provides that:
If an action for medical malpractice or dental malpractice is filed in
the district court, the district court shall dismiss the action, without prej-
udice, if the action is filed without an affidavit, supporting the allegations
contained in the action, submitted by a medical expert who practices or
has practiced in an area that is substantially similar to the type of prac-

tice engaged in at the time of the alleged malpractice.
(Emphasis added to reflect the omission of professional negligence.)

Po 241

of NRS 41A.071 and, consequently, we overrule, in part, our
holding in Fierle. The district court therefore erred when it dis-
missed appellant’s professional negligence complaint for lack of a
supporting affidavit of merit. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s order and remand this matter to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, appellant Tammy Egan visited a physician concerning
ongoing pain she was having in her left foot and was referred to re-
spondent Gary Chambers, a doctor of podiatric medicine, for sur-
gery. Chambers, who was employed by respondent Southwest Med-
ical Associates, Inc. (SMA), performed several surgical procedures
on Egan’s left foot and ankle in July 2007. Following the opera-
tion, Egan complained of darkened skin and blisters around the
surgical areas, and after several follow-up visits, Chambers dis-
covered gangrene in Egan’s left foot. Chambers referred Egan to
another podiatric physician, who ultimately performed three addi-
tional surgical operations on her foot in August and September
2007, including amputating the left great toe and part of the left
foot. Following the procedures and follow-up treatment, the podi-
atric physician concluded that Egan would suffer permanent dis-
ability and would not be able to return to her previous employment
as a waitress.

In July 2008, Egan filed a district court complaint for profes-
sional negligence against Chambers and SMA.? Although Egan’s
complaint alleged that Chambers’ medical treatment fell beneath
the standard of care expected of a practicing podiatric physician in
Clark County, podiatrists are not considered ‘‘physicians’’ under
NRS Chapter 41A for medical malpractice claim purposes, and
thus, Egan filed the complaint without a supporting NRS 41A.071
affidavit of merit. Subsequently, Egan filed an amended complaint,
also without a supporting affidavit of merit.

2Bgan’s complaint asserted causes of action for both professional negligence
and breach of contract. However, because both causes of action were based on
Chambers’ alleged ‘‘failure to perform medical care which rose to the level of
compliance with the established care owed to [Egan],” her entire complaint in
fact sounded in tort, and issues regarding NRS 41A.071’s affidavit requirement
thus apply equally to both causes of action. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 186, 495 P.3d 359, 361 (1972) (noting that, in de-
termining whether an action is based on contract or tort, this court looks at the
nature of the grievance to determine the character of the action, not the form
of the pleadings); Stafford v. Schultz, 270 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1954) (stating that a
patient’s action for injuries based on the physician’s negligent treatment of the
patient is an action sounding in tort and not upon a contract); Christ v. Lipsitz,
160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501 (Ct. App. 1979) (‘It is settled that an action against
a doctor arising out of his negligent treatment of a patient is an action sound-
ing in tort and not one based upon a contract.’ ’’ (quoting Bellah v. Greenson,
146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542 (Ct. App. 1978))).

ma Po

While Egan’s case was pending before the district court, this
court issued its decision in Fierle concluding that an affidavit of
merit is required under NRS 41A.071 for both medical malpractice
and professional negligence complaints, including when claims
based on medical malpractice and professional negligence are as-
serted against a professional medical corporation. Fierle, 125 Nev.
at 734-36, 737-38, 219 P.3d at 911, 912. This court concluded,
therefore, that, like medical malpractice complaints, professional
negligence complaints filed without a supporting affidavit of merit
were void ab initio and must be dismissed. Jd. at 741, 219 P.3d at
914,

Relying on Fierle, Chambers and SMA? moved to dismiss
Egan’s complaint in February 2010. The district court granted the
motion and dismissed Egan’s complaint without prejudice in July
2010. At that point, absent the availability of some type of equi-
table relief, Egan admittedly was unable to file a new complaint
because the statute of limitations for her claims had expired. See
NRS 41A.097(2). This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
| ere

Applying de novo review, we take this opportunity to reconsider
whether NRS 41A.071’s affidavit-of-merit requirement applies to
professional negligence claims. See I. Cox Constr. Co. v. CH2 In-
vestments, 129 Nev. 139, 142, 296 P.3d 1202, 1203 (2013) (hold-
ing that this court reviews questions of statutory construction de
novo). When a statute is clear on its face, we will not look beyond
the statute’s plain language. Wheble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
128 Nev. 119, 122, 272 P.3d 134, 136 (2012); Beazer Homes
Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97
P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004).

NRS 41A.071 provides that the district court shall dismiss,
without prejudice, actions for ‘‘medical malpractice or dental mal-
practice’ filed without an affidavit of merit. The plain language of
NRS 41A.071 makes no mention of professional negligence. NRS
41A.071 refers expressly to ‘‘medical malpractice,’ which in turn
is defined as pertaining to physicians, hospitals, and hospital em-
ployees. NRS 41A.009. ‘‘Physician’”’ is defined as a person li-
censed under NRS Chapters 630 or 633. NRS 41A.013. Podiatrists
are not licensed pursuant to NRS Chapters 630 or 633; rather, they

As there are no allegations that SMA is a hospital, the claims against SMA
also do not fall within the definition of ‘‘medical malpractice.’ See NRS
41A.009 (including hospitals and their employees in the definition of medical
malpractice).

Po 28

are licensed pursuant to NRS Chapter 635. As such, NRS 41A.071
does not, by its plain terms, apply to Egan’s claims against her po-
diatrist. See Morrow v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 110,
113, 294 P.3d 411, 414 (2013) (‘‘[I]n the face of that plain lan-
guage, we cannot come to another construction.’’).

Although stare decisis plays a critical role in our jurisprudence,
ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev. 639, 653, 173 P.3d
734, 743 (2007), our reading of NRS 41A.071 reveals no statutory
ambiguity as previously suggested in Fierle. We now recognize that
our prior decision conflated ‘‘medical malpractice’’ with ‘‘profes-
sional negligence’? when we read NRS 41A.071 to apply to all
professional negligence claims. In so doing, our construction of
NRS 414.071 unnecessarily reached beyond its plain language.
Applying Fierle to professional negligence claims would be sub-
stantially inequitable and contrary to the plain language of the
statute. As a result of Fierle’s flawed application, we must over-
tule, in part, our holding in that case and clarify that NRS
414.071 only applies to medical malpractice or dental malpractice
actions, not professional negligence actions. See ASAP Storage,
123 Nev. at 653, 173 P.3d at 743 (stating that ‘‘ ‘[IJegal precedents
of this court should be respected until they are shown to be un-
sound in principle’’’ (alteration in original) (quoting Grotts v.
Zahner, 115 Nev. 339, 342, 989 P.2d 415, 417 (1999) (Rosg,
C.J., dissenting))); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)
(when governing decisions prove to be ‘unworkable or are badly
reasoned,’ they should be overruled). Therefore, Egan’s profes-
sional negligence action against Chambers and SMA must proceed
‘on the merits.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, we hold that the plain lan-
guage of NRS 41A.071 indicates that professional negligence ac-
tions are not subject to its affidavit-of-merit requirement, and to the
extent that our decision in Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev. 728, 219 P.3d
906 (2009), conflicts with this holding, we overrule it. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it dismissed
Egan’s professional negligence claim against Chambers and SMA.
for lack of a supporting affidavit of merit.t We reverse the district
court’s dismissal order and remand this case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and GrmBBoONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Douctas, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

“In light of our resolution of this appeal, we need not reach Egan’s re-

maining contentions.

:S

CHRISTOPHER ERIC CARTER, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 59392

April 25, 2013 299 P.3d 367

Karen A. Connolly, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, and Ryan J. MacDonald, Deputy District Attor-
ney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, Sarrta, J.:

In this appeal, we address whether a suspect who asks, ‘‘Can I
get an attorney?’’ after he has been advised of his rights under Mi-
randa y. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), unambiguously invokes his
right to counsel, and if so, whether the State can resume the in-
terrogation of the suspect by reading him a second set of Miranda
warnings and obtaining an otherwise valid waiver.

We hold that the question ‘‘Can I get an attorney?’’ is an un-
equivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement
that all interrogation immediately cease. We also hold that once a
suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further in-
terrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police,
there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the

26 Pd

aid of the counsel that he requested. For the reasons below, we
conclude that appellant’s confession was inadmissible, and be-
cause the error in admitting the confession is not harmless, we re-
verse the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion."

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Christopher Carter’s convictions stem from an inves-
tigation by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD), in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBD, into a series of robberies taking place between October 23,
2003, and February 2, 2005. Law enforcement suspected that the
robberies were related due to the similar modus operandi and rel-
atively small geographical area of the crimes, but theorized that
more than one man was responsible due to witnesses’ varying de-
scriptions of suspects’ heights and weights and reports of waiting
escape vehicles. Because the suspects’ faces were obscured in
each robbery, witnesses were unable to give any facial descriptions
and were only able to identify them as African-American males. A
lead was developed when a witness identified a black Mazda Miata
as the escape vehicle for one of the robberies. FBI agents searched
DMV records and came up with Carter as a possible suspect.

On February 3, 2005, FBI agents went to Carter’s home and ex-
amined trash bags placed outside his fence. Inside the bags, they
discovered a white T-shirt with apparent eyeholes cut out of it con-
sistent with the description of a mask worn during one of the rob-
beries. Based upon the T-shirt and Carter’s identification found in
the trash, LVMPD obtained a warrant. On February 19, 2005,
SWAT teams entered Carter’s home, handcuffed his brother and
his mother, and placed him under arrest. Once at the police sta-
tion, Carter proceeded to confess to multiple robberies, burglaries,
and possession of a firearm. Ultimately, a jury found Carter guilty
of eight counts of burglary while in possession of a firearm, twelve
counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and one count
of coercion.

Carter moved to suppress his confession prior to trial, claiming
that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. The
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing.” At the evidentiary
hearing, Detective Joel Martin testified that while escorting Carter
to the police station after his arrest, he advised Carter of his
rights under Miranda. Martin asked Carter ‘‘booking type’’ ques-

"We deny respondent's motion to strike appellant's notice of supplemental
authorities. We have considered all relevant authority provided by both parties.

2While Senior District Judge Sally Loehrer presided over Carter’s trial and
sentencing and entered the judgment of conviction in this matter, District
Judge Donald M. Mosley heard and decided Carter’s suppression motion.

Te 27

tions but nothing substantively related to the offenses. According to
Martin, during the drive, Carter expressed ‘‘concern’’ about hiring
an attorney, and although Martin could not recall exactly what was
said, he did not interpret it as a demand for an attorney. Martin ad-
mitted that Carter could have asked, ‘‘Can I get a lawyer?’’ or
“Can I get an attorney?”’

Carter testified that he asked Detective Martin, ‘‘Can I get a
lawyer?”’ and Martin replied that they could talk about it later.
Carter testified that he also could not remember exactly how
he phrased his statement but submitted that he was requesting an
attorney.

During argument, the State conceded that Carter asked either
“Can I have a lawyer?’’; ‘‘May I have a lawyer?’’; or ‘‘Can I have
my lawyer?’’; and framed the issue before the district court, stat-
ing: ‘‘This whole case, or this whole motion, comes down to one
thing: Can I have an attorney? Is that question, is that an un-
equivocal request to I’m not speaking to you unless I have my at-
torney?’’ The district court found that Carter asked ‘‘Can I get an
attorney?’’ and denied the motion to suppress his confession, con-
cluding that (1) Carter’s statement was ambiguous, and (2) there
‘was no substantive questioning until after Carter was given a sec-
ond set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his
right to counsel.

DISCUSSION

Ce

On appeal, Carter contends that the district court erred in deny-
ing the motion to suppress his confession, arguing that it was ob-
tained in violation of Miranda and was therefore inadmissible as a
matter of law. We review ‘‘the district court’s factual finding con-
cerning the words a defendant used to invoke the right to counsel’’
for clear error, and ‘“‘[w]hether those words actually invoked the
right to counsel’’ de novo. United States v. Ogbuehi, 18 F.3d 807,
813 (Oth Cir. 1994); Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 190, 111 P.3d
690, 694 (2005).

|

In Miranda, the Supreme Court determined that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against self-incrimination re-
quired that any interrogation of a suspect in custody ‘‘be preceded
by advice to the putative defendant that he has the right to remain
silent and also the right to the presence of an attorney.’ Edwards
vy. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981) (citing Miranda, 384
U.S. at 479). In Edwards, the Court added a ‘‘ ‘second layer’ ’’ of
protection. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994)
(quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)). Under
the Edwards rule, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel

248 PO

under Miranda, he cannot be subject to further interrogation and
all questioning must cease until counsel has been made available to
him. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.

|

To determine whether, under Edwards, all interrogation must
cease, a court must first ‘determine whether the accused actually
invoked his right to counsel.’”? Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (emphasis
and internal quotation marks omitted). ‘‘Invocation of the Mi-
randa right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement
that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for
the assistance of an attorney’ ’’ Id. at 459 (quoting McNeil, 501
U.S. at 178). However, ‘‘if a suspect makes a reference to an at-
torney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer
in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do
not require the cessation of questioning.” Jd. ‘‘Second, if the ac-
cused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses
to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further
discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently
waived the right he had invoked.’”’ Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91,
95 (1984) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).

Whether Carter invoked his right to counsel

Following Edwards, we must first determine whether Carter’s
statement ‘“Can I get an attorney?” is an unequivocal demand for
counsel, requiring that all questioning immediately cease until
counsel is present, or is merely an ambiguous inquiry into the ex-
tent of his rights. Having compared Carter’s reference to counsel
to that in Davis, Smith, and other cases, as well as the context in
which those words were spoken, we have no difficulty in conclud-
ing that Carter’s statement was an unambiguous and unequivocal
request for the assistance of counsel during questioning. While
“ftJhe word attorney has no talismanic qualities’’ and ‘‘[a] defen-
dant does not invoke his right to counsel any time the word falls
from his lips,’ Kaczmarek y. State, 120 Nev. 314, 330, 91 P.3d
16, 27 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), there are no cir-
cumstances here that would suggest to a reasonable officer any-
thing other than that Carter was asking for the aid of an attorney.
It is implausible that Carter was simply asking if he had the theo-
retical right to an attorney considering that detectives had just
told him that he had such a right. There were no other words mod-
ifying the statement that suggest Carter was attempting to clarify
the extent of his rights or make a temporal inquiry. See, e.g., Al-

PO 249

varez v. Gomez, 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (appellant’s
question, ‘‘Can I get an attorney right now, man?’’ was held to be
unambiguous in context (emphasis added)); People v. Harris, 552
P.2d 10, 11-13 (Colo. 1976) (appellant’s question, ‘‘When can I
get a lawyer?”’ was held to be unambiguous (emphasis added)).
Carter did not use words like ‘‘might,’ ‘‘maybe,” ‘‘perhaps,”’ or
“*should’’ or in any way suggest he was unsure of whether he
wanted an attorney. See Smith v. Endell, 860 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th
Cir. 1988). To hold that a suspect who asks ‘‘Can I get an attor-
ney?’’ does not invoke his right to counsel would suggest that no
statement phrased as a question could invoke one’s right to coun-
sel—a holding contrary to law and Jacking a fundamental under-
standing of the nature of human interaction. See, e.g., Davis, 512
U.S. at 461 (noting that under Miranda and its progeny ‘‘ques-
tioning must cease if the suspect asks for a lawyer’ (emphasis
added)); id. at 470 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring) (‘Social science
confirms what common sense would suggest, that individuals who
feel intimidated or powerless are more likely to speak in equivocal
or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity or equivocation is
meant.’’). We conclude that it is clear, not only by the words used
but also given the circumstances in which they were spoken, that
Carter expressed his desire for the assistance of an attorney, and a
reasonable officer would have understood it as such.

P|

The fact that shortly thereafter Carter communicated that he was
merely “‘concerned’’ about an attorney does nothing to alter our
decision. The Supreme Court has strongly repudiated consideration
of a suspect’s subsequent statements in order to cast doubt on the
clarity of an initial request. Smith, 469 U.S. at 100 (1984) (‘‘We
hold only that, under the clear logical force of settled precedent, an
accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be
used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request
itself”’). Once a suspect requests an attorney, Miranda and its
progeny do not allow police officers to subtly interrogate the sus-
pect under the guise of clarifying intentions that are already clear.
“In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities
through ‘badger[ing]’ or ‘overreaching’—explicit or subtle, delib-
erate or unintentional—might otherwise wear down the accused
and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his ear-
lier request for counsel’s assistance.” Jd. at 98 (alteration in orig-
inal) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983)).
Here, Carter expressed in no uncertain terms that he would like the
assistance of an attorney in dealing with the police. His words were
unequivocal and unambiguous and his request should have been
honored.

250 PE

Whether Carter’s waiver was valid

P|

We must next determine whether Carter validly waived his right
to counsel. Id. at 95. Edwards makes abundantly clear that once
counsel is requested all questioning must immediately cease, and
that the right may only be waived if the accused initiates subse-
quent communication, there is a break in custody, or he receives
the counsel that he asked for—none of which occurred here. See
Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 328-29, 91 P.3d at 26. That nothing sub-
stantive was asked until after a second set of Miranda warnings
were given and Carter waived his rights is of no consequence be-
cause his prior request for an attorney precluded any further in-
terrogation under the circumstances presented. Simply put, once
an accused expresses his desire to confer with counsel, there are
no actions that police officers can take to revive questioning other
than honoring that request. Because Carter’s confession was an un-
counseled response to questioning that occurred after he invoked
his right to counsel, it must be suppressed regardless of whether
his subsequent waiver was otherwise valid. Jd. at 329, 91 P.3d at
26 (‘If police later initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel
and there has been no break in custody, ‘the suspect’s statements
are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive
evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his
statements would be considered voluntary under traditional stan-
dards.’ ’’ (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177)).

P|

Because Carter’s confession was the linchpin in the case against
him, we cannot say that its admission was harmless. Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (noting that ‘‘ ‘before a fed-
eral constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt’ ”’ (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967),
overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 623 (1993))). Absent his confession, the entirety of the evi-
dence against Carter is his ownership of a vehicle consistent with
one seen leaving the scene of a robbery, his ownership of a firearm
consistent with one used during the robberies, and the discovery in
bags set out for garbage pickup of a white T-shirt with apparent
eyeholes cut out of it consistent with a facial covering used by the
suspect at two robberies. No other physical or testimonial evidence
placed Carter at any of the robberies.? Under the circumstances,

Because we reverse Carter’s convictions, we need not address his claims
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress physical evi-
dence seized by the police and that he was denied his constitutional right to a
fair and impartial jury.

251

we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous ad-
mission of Carter’s confession did not contribute to his conviction,
and therefore we are compelled to reverse the judgment of convic-
tion and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Douctas, and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
JERMAINE XAVIER FREDERICK, RESPONDENT.
No. 60298
April 25, 2013 299 P.3d 372

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, and Elizabeth A. Mercer, Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County, for Appellant.

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and William M. Waters,
Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether Eighth Judicial District
Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to
serve as district court hearing masters, violates the Nevada Con-
stitution. We conclude that it does not.

Article 6, Section 8 of the Nevada Constitution grants the Leg-
islature sole authority in determining the jurisdiction of justice
courts. Through NRS 3.245, the Legislature has delegated to dis-
trict courts the authority to designate district court hearing masters
and to this court the authority to approve the duties that may be as-
signed to those hearing masters. Under this delegated authority,
EDCR 1.48 allows justices of the peace to act in a separate ca-
pacity as district court hearing masters, which includes the taking
of felony pleas. Thus, when a justice of the peace who has been
appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in
EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under
EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the
peace.

Pe 258

BACKGROUND

The Nevada Constitution authorizes the Legislature to set forth
the jurisdiction of the state’s justice courts. Nev. Const. art. 6,
§ 6. The Legislature has granted justice courts jurisdiction over
misdemeanors. NRS 4.370(3). This leaves district courts with
jurisdiction over felonies and gross misdemeanors. See Nev. Const.
art. 6, § 6(1) (providing that district courts ‘‘have original juris-
diction in all cases excluded by Jaw from the original jurisdic-
tion of justices’ courts’); see also NRS 193.120 (setting forth
three classifications of crimes—felony, gross misdemeanor, and
misdemeanor).

Although a crime that is classified as a felony or gross misde-
meanor cannot be tried in the justice court, the Legislature has au-
thorized justice courts to conduct preliminary examinations in
those cases. NRS 171.196(2). But the Legislature made clear that
“fijf an offense is not triable in the Justice Court, the defendant
must not be called upon to plead.’’ NRS 171.196(1). Even when a
defendant charged with a felony or gross misdemeanor waives a
preliminary examination in the justice court, he may enter his
plea only in the district court. Id.

To help alleviate the workload of district court judges, the Leg-
islature amended NRS 3.245 to permit the chief judge of a district
court to appoint one or more ‘‘masters’’ who, in turn, are author-
ized ‘to perform certain subordinate or administrative duties’ for
the district court judges. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 47, § 1, at 409. The
amendment also authorized this court to approve the duties that
these masters may perform. Id. To utilize hearing masters as au-
thorized under the statute, the Eighth Judicial District Court pre-
sented EDCR 1.48 to this court, which approved the rule. See
DCR 5 (indicating that local rules for district courts must be ap-
proved by supreme court); In the Matter of the Amendment of
Eighth Judicial District Court Rules (EDCR) Regarding Changes to
the Rules in Compliance With NRS 3.245 to Provide for the Ap-
pointment of Criminal Masters, ADKT No. 363 (Order Amending
EDCR 1.30 and Adopting EDCR 1.48, May 11, 2004).

Among other things, EDCR 1.48 sets forth (1) who may be a
master, and (2) the duties that a master may perform. As for who
may be a master, EDCR 1.48 provides:

A criminal division master must be a senior judge or justice,
senior justice of the peace, justice of the peace, district judge
serving in the family division, or a member of the State Bar
of Nevada who is in good standing as a member of the state
bar and has been so for a minimum of 5 continuous years im-
mediately preceding appointment as a criminal division
master.

254 EE

EDCR 1.48(b) (emphasis added). As for the master’s duties,
EDCR 1.48 provides a list of 17 duties, one of which includes:

Conducting arraignments and accepting pleas of guilty, nolo
contendere, and not guilty, including ascertaining whether
the defendant will invoke or waive speedy trial rights.

EDCR 1.48(k)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, under EDCR 1.48, a
justice of the peace may be appointed as a criminal division mas-
ter in the Eighth Judicial District Court and, in that capacity, may
accept a defendant’s guilty plea to an offense that is triable in the
district court. Pursuant to EDCR 1.48, Eighth Judicial District
Court Chief Judge Jennifer Togliatti appointed Justice of the Peace
Melissa Saragosa as a district court master to accept pleas in cases
where the defendant has waived a preliminary examination.

The State charged respondent Jermaine Frederick with both
misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic vio-
lence incident. After his initial appearance, Frederick appeared for
a preliminary hearing in the Las Vegas Justice Court, with Judge
Saragosa presiding.

Frederick’s counsel informed the court that Frederick had en-
tered into a plea agreement with the State wherein Frederick would
plead guilty to one misdemeanor charge and one felony charge.
Frederick then waived his right to a preliminary examination. He
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery constituting do-
mestic violence, and Judge Saragosa sentenced him on that charge.
Immediately thereafter, she conducted a plea colloquy on the
felony charge, determined that Frederick’s plea was voluntary, and
accepted his plea to the felony charge. Frederick was then bound
over to district court where he received an 18- to 72-month prison
sentence.

Subsequently, Frederick filed a motion in the district court to
withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a
justice of the peace who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea.
Without explanation, the district court judge granted Frederick’s
motion. The State then appealed.

DISCUSSION
| el

At its core, this appeal involves a question of whether justices of
the peace may take felony pleas while serving as district court
masters. In answering that question, we address: (1) whether NRS
3.245 violates the separation of powers doctrine, and (2) whether
EDCR 1.48 falls within the Legislature’s grant of authority under
NRS 3.245. These are pure questions of law that we review de
novo. State v. Hughes, 127 Nev. 626, 628, 261 P.3d 1067, 1069
(2011).

Pe 285

NRS 3.245 does not violate the separation of powers provision of
the Nevada Constitution

Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the
Legislature from delegating certain functions to other branches of
government. Banegas v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 117 Nev. 222,
227, 19 P.3d 245, 248 (2001). However, the Legislature may del-
egate to other bodies the power to make rules and regulations sup-
plementing legislation as long as ‘‘the power given is prescribed in
terms sufficiently definite to serve as a guide in exercising that
power.’ Id. When the delegation is to the judiciary, this court has
held that the Legislature may only delegate duties and powers that
are traced back to and derived from the basic judicial power and
functions. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 20, 422 P.2d 237,
242 (1967). Such a delegation can include administrative or min-
isterial powers so long as those powers are ‘‘reasonably incidental
to the fulfillment of judicial duties.”’ Id. at 24, 422 P.2d at 245.

With these principles in mind, it is clear that NRS 3.245 is a
proper delegation of power to the judiciary to set forth the specific
duties of district court masters. The Legislature explicitly delegated
to the district court the authority to appoint masters for ‘“‘criminal
proceedings to perform certain subordinate or administrative duties
that the Nevada Supreme Court has approved to be assigned
to such a master”’ NRS 3.245. This enactment limits a district
court master’s powers to a specified subset of responsibilities in a
particular class of cases. While the Legislature left the details for
implementing NRS 3.245 to the courts, the Legislature articulated
the scope of the powers it delegated to the judiciary with sufficient
definition.

It is also clear that the powers delegated to the judiciary pur-
suant to NRS 3.245 fall within the judicial function, which is de-
fined as ‘‘the exercise of judicial authority to hear and determine
questions in controversy that are proper to be examined in a court
of justice.’ Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242. We have de-
scribed ministerial functions as ‘‘methods of implementation to ac-
complish or put into effect the basic function of each Depart-
ment.’ Id. at 21, 422 P.2d at 243. Examples of ministerial
functions that can be traced back to or derived from the basic ju-
dicial power and functions include regulating and licensing attor-
neys and ‘‘prescribing any and all rules necessary or desirable to
handle the business of the courts or their judicial functions.” Id. at
23, 422 P.2d at 244. Similarly, allowing the judiciary to determine
the subordinate or administrative duties that may be assigned to
masters is a ministerial function that can be traced back to or de-
tived from the basic judicial power and functions (e.g., it relates to

256 Po

how the business of the district courts and their judicial functions
are handled).

We conclude that NRS 3.245 is an appropriate delegation of
ministerial power to the judiciary, such that it does not violate Ar-
ticle 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution.

EDCR 1.48 falls within the Legislature’s grant of authority under
NRS 3.245

| |

Having determined that the Legislature properly delegated the
power to promulgate EDCR 1.48 to the judicial branch, we now
turn to whether allowing justices of the peace to serve as district
court hearing masters, under EDCR 1.48, is within the scope of
the Legislature’s delegation.

The State argues that EDCR 1.48 is proper because the Legis-
Jature intended to expand the justice court’s jurisdiction when it
amended NRS 3.245. We disagree, as there is no evidence that the
Legislature intended to expand, nor delegate the power to expand,
the jurisdiction of the justice courts. See Salaiscooper v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 892, 899, 34 P.3d 509, 514 (2001)
(“‘[T]he jurisdictional boundaries of Nevada’s justice courts are de-
fined by the [Llegislature.’’). Furthermore, NRS 171.196(1) un-
equivocally states that ‘‘[i]f an offense is not triable in the Justice
Court, the defendant must not be called upon to plead.’’ We must
assume that the Legislature would have amended NRS 171.196(1)
if it intended NRS 3.245 to permit justice courts to accept felony
pleas. See Hardy Companies, Inc. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev.
528, 537, 245 P.3d 1149, 1156 (2010) (‘‘ ‘The presumption is al-
ways against the intention to repeal where express terms are not
used.’ ’’ (quoting State v. Donnelly, 20 Nev. 214, 217, 19 P. 680,
681 (1888))).' The Legislature provided no limitations with regard
to who may serve as a master.”

‘For the same reasons, we reject the State’s argument that the Legislature
delegated the determination of the justice courts’ jurisdiction to the judicial
branch, thereby allowing each district court to determine its own jurisdiction
in relation to each justice court.

2While the Legislature did not specifically address the possibility of justices
of the peace serving as masters, there were repeated discussions regarding the
wide degree of deference the Legislature should give the judiciary in setting
forth the rules. See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 133 Before the Assembly Judiciary
Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., March 6, 2003) (statement of then-Judge Hardesty
asking for flexibility in allowing the judiciary to determine the rules for mas-
ters); Hearing on A.B. 133 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 72d Leg.
(Nev., March 11, 2003) (statement of Assemblyman John Oceguera) (‘I feel
that the Supreme Court would be in a position to take care of their own rule-
making process, and I think they have done so in the past. I don’t have any
problem making rules for them; however, I think, in this case that they should
make the rules for the masters.’’).

PF 257

By allowing justices of the peace to be appointed as district court
masters, EDCR 1.48 merely permits individuals who are qualified
based on their judicial experience to be appointed to serve as dis-
trict court masters. The fact that justices of the peace might also
serve as district court masters is only incidental to their roles as
justices of the peace and is not an unconstitutional judicial expan-
sion of the justice court’s jurisdiction.’ To this extent, we disagree
with our dissenting colleagues’ misapprehension that EDCR 1.48
permits justices of the peace to serve as district court masters by
virtue of their positions as justices of the peace.

In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish this case from our re-
cent opinion, Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. 580, 287 P.3d
305 (2012). In Hernandez, the appellants challenged the constitu-
tionality of a Clark County ordinance requiring the chief judge of
the local township to appoint a justice of the peace to preside over
inquests involving police officer-involved deaths. Id. at 586, 287
P.3d at 308. They argued that the ordinance violated Article 6,
Section 8 of the Nevada Constitution because ‘‘only the Legislature
has the authority to determine, by law, the jurisdictional limits of
the justices of the peace.” Id. at 593, 287 P.3d at 314. In response,
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) contended that ‘‘a
justice of the peace is acting as a presiding officer of an investiga-
tory body outside the purview of the justice court and is not act-
ing with the authority of a justice court magistrate.”’ Id. at 593 n.6,
287 P.3d at 314 n.6. We rejected the ACLU’s contention, stating:

The ACLU has pointed to no authority that allows an entity
other than the Legislature to assign duties to the justices of the
peace, judicial or otherwise; nonetheless, justices of the peace
are appointed as presiding officers of the inquest by virtue of
their positions as justices of the peace.

Id.

Hernandez is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the Legis-
lature in NRS 3.245 expressly provided for the appointment of dis-
trict court masters and gave the judiciary the authority to determine
who may serve as a district court master. In contrast, the Clark
County ordinance at issue in Hernandez usurped the Legislature’s
authority by expanding the official duties of a justice of the peace
without a grant of Legislative authority to do so. Id. at 596, 287
P.3d at 316. Second, unlike Clark County’s ordinance, which re-
quired justices of the peace to preside over inquests “‘by virtue of
their positions as justices of the peace,’ EDCR 1.48 does not ex-
pand the jurisdiction of justice courts or assign duties to justices of

*The practice of justices of the peace serving in dual judicial roles is not un-
precedented in Nevada. For example, NRS 5.020(3) allows justices of the
peace to simultaneously serve as municipal court judges.

258 Po

the peace. Hernandez, 128 Nev. at 593 n.6, 287 P.3d at 314 n.6.
EDCR 1.48 does not permit justices of the peace to take felony
pleas by virtue of their positions as justices of the peace, but
merely allows a justice of the peace to be appointed to the separate
role of a district court master. Accordingly, in this case, Judge
Saragosa did not take Frederick’s felony plea by virtue of her role
as justice of the peace. Instead, she was acting in her role as an ap-
pointed district court master under EDCR 1.48.

In conclusion, the Legislature granted this court the broad au-
thority to set forth rules providing for the appointment of district
court masters, and this very court approved EDCR 1.48 following
a public hearing. Public Hearing on ADKT No. 363 Before the
Nevada Supreme Court (Nov. 18, 2003). Given that this court did
not usurp the Legislature’s power as the county ordinance did in
Hernandez, we respectfully disagree with our dissenting col-
leagues’ opinion that our conclusion vitiates our prior holding in
Hernandez.*

Because Frederick’s guilty plea was accepted by a lawfully ap-
pointed district court master in accordance with EDCR 1.48, we
reverse the district court’s order granting Frederick’s motion to
withdraw his felony plea.

Gpsons, Douctas, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

Harpesty, J., with whom Pickgrina, C.J., and Cuerry, J.,
agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The Nevada Constitution gives the Legislature exclusive author-
ity to define the jurisdiction of our justice courts. Nev. Const. art.
6, § 8 (‘‘The Legislature shall determine the number of Justices of
the Peace to be elected in each city and township of the State, and
shall fix by law... the limits of their civil and criminal
jurisdiction . . . ”). See also Salaiscooper v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 117 Nev. 892, 899, 34 P.3d 509, 514 (2001) (‘‘[T]he ju-
risdictional boundaries of Nevada’s justice courts are defined by
the [L]egislature.’’). NRS 4.370(3) limits the criminal jurisdiction
of the justice courts to misdemeanors, ‘‘except as otherwise pro-
vided by specific statute.’ Going further, NRS 171.196(I) states,
in mandatory terms, ‘‘[iJf an offense is not triable in the Justice
Court, the defendant must not be called upon to plead.’’ (Empha-
sis added.) Together, the Constitution and statutes deny justices of
the peace authority to accept felony pleas.

‘The dissent also makes note of the fact that Judge Saragosa took the felony
plea in the same courtroom and in the same robes in which she took the mis-
demeanor plea. Beyond the incidental convenience afforded to the process, we
do not see the particular relevance of this fact to the question of whether
EDCR 1.48 allows a justice of the peace to serve separately as a district court
master,

po 259

The issue in this case is clear. Can the judicial branch, pursuant
to local district court rule, give a Nevada justice of the peace au-
thority over felony guilty pleas, when the Legislature has expressly
denied that authority?

NRS 3.245 empowers the district court to appoint masters to
hear plea negotiations in felony and gross misdemeanor cases.
While the majority maintains that NRS 3.245 permits justices of
the peace to be appointed as district court masters, they acknow]l-
edge that NRS 3.245 does not, by its terms, override the general
and express prohibitions in NRS 4.370 and NRS 171.196(1), re-
spectively. Majority opinion ante at 256 (the Legislature did not
“‘intend[ ] to expand, nor delegate the power to expand, the
jurisdiction of . . . justice courts’’ when it amended NRS 3.245).
Indeed, nothing in the legislative history of NRS 3.245 suggests or
even implies anything to the contrary.

In the absence of any ‘‘specific’’ statutory provision to expand
the authority of a justice of the peace to accept felony pleas, the
majority turns to EDCR 1.48, which permits qualified judges
to serve as masters and claims that the local rule does not uncon-
stitutionally expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace. I
disagree.

Through EDCR 1.48, the district court allows a justice of the
peace, by virtue of his or her.status as a justice of the peace, to
perform the duties granted to masters under NRS 3.245. In doing
so, the court rule grants justices of the peace jurisdiction in felony
cases that the Legislature has expressly denied them. To this ex-
tent, EDCR 1.48 expands the justice of the peace’s jurisdiction,
and it is unconstitutional. As this court recently held in Hernandez
v. Bennett-Haron, only the Legislature can expand the jurisdiction
of the justices of the peace. 128 Nev. 580, 596, 287 P.3d 305, 316
(2012) (holding that ‘‘by providing for the participation of justices
of the peace in Clark County’s inquest proceedings[,] . . . the
Clark County Board of County Commissioners has unconstitu-
tionally impinged on the Legislature’s constitutionally delegated
authority’’); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 8 (‘‘The Legislature
shall determine . . . the limits of [a justice of the peace’s} civil and
criminal jurisdiction . . . ””). As such, I conclude that the district
courts cannot expand the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace
through a local rule such as EDCR 1.48. To hold otherwise viti-
ates our holding in Hernandez.

The majority’s reliance on a justice of peace’s judicial qualifi-
cations to serve as a master ignores the facts of this case. Freder-
ick appeared in justice court before Judge Saragosa for a prelimi-
nary hearing on a misdemeanor charge and a felony charge, after
entering into a plea agreement with the State. Frederick pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor charge and was sentenced by Judge
Saragosa. Immediately thereafter, wearing the same robes and sit-

260 Po

ting in the same courtroom, Judge Saragosa conducted a plea col-
Joquy on the felony charge and accepted Frederick’s plea. After
accepting his plea, she bound Frederick over to district court for
sentencing.

In this instance, Frederick tendered his plea to a sitting justice
of the peace during the course of his criminal proceeding over
which the justice of the peace had only partial jurisdiction. It is un-
reasonable to argue that Judge Saragosa transformed from justice
of the peace to master between the time Frederick entered his plea
on the misdemeanor and, a moment later, when he entered his plea
on the felony charge.

I take no issue with the Legislature’s decision to delegate to dis-
trict courts the authority to designate district court hearing masters.
Lalso recognize the efficiency to be achieved by expanding the au-
thority of the justices of the peace to take felony-related pleas.
However, the Constitution vests the authority to make this decision
in the Legislature, not the courts.

Accordingly, I must dissent.

ALEXANDER FALCONI, aN INDIVIDUAL, PETITIONER, v. SEC-
RETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
RESPONDENT, AND MONICA ANN FARRAR, REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST.

No, 59554
April 25, 2013 299 P.3d 378

Alexander Falconi, Reno, in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and C. Wayne
Howle, Solicitor General, Carson City, for Respondent.

Fry & Berning, LLC, and Kathrine I. Berning, Reno, for Real
Party in Interest.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Curry, J.:

Monica Ann Farrar and Alexander Falconi share joint legal and
physical custody of their minor child. Farrar properly obtained,
based on evidence of domestic violence, a fictitious address from
the Secretary of State, who cannot disclose Farrar’s true address
without a court order. The question we must decide is whether Fal-
coni may seek the disclosure of Farrar’s home address. We con-
clude that, as a co-parent, Falconi may seek the disclosure of Far-
rar’s address in the district court by extraordinary writ, and in
determining whether to grant the writ, the district court must con-
sider whether Farrar can establish that Falconi was a perpetrator of
domestic violence. If established, the burden shifts to Falconi to
show that despite the domestic violence, disclosure is in the child’s
best interest. As this is not the proper court to consider Falconi’s
petition for extraordinary relief, we deny the petition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Alexander Falconi and real party in interest Monica
Farrar lived together and had a child, but troubles led to the end
of the relationship. On one occasion, Falconi called the police to
report a suicide attempt by Farrar, for which she was hospitalized
for one week followed by ongoing medical care. Another time, the

264 Po

police were called to the parties’ home to investigate a fight be-
tween Falconi and Farrar. In the police report from that incident,
Farrar asserted that Falconi had shoved her and thrown her onto
the couch. She also reported that she had grabbed his shoe and
would not let go, so he pulled her onto the couch, wrapped his
Jegs around her, and then pushed her away. Neither party was ar-
rested as a result of this incident.

Following these events, the parties separated, and Falconi insti-
tuted child custody proceedings in the district court to establish the
parties’ respective custody and visitation rights. One month later,
and five months after the aforementioned fight involving the police,
Farrar obtained a temporary restraining order from a domestic re-
Jations hearing master, which prohibited Falconi from having any
contact with Farrar or the parties’ child and which gave Farrar
temporary custody of the child. The temporary restraining order
was issued on a form stating that the court had found ‘‘that an act
of domestic violence ha[d] occurred and/or [that Falconi] repre-
sent[ed] a credible threat to the physical safety of the above-named.
Applicant.” Nothing in the record establishes the specific grounds
on which the restraining order was sought or the basis for the grant
of the order.

At a subsequent hearing regarding the possible extension of the
restraining order, Farrar testified that, at different times, Falconi
had pushed her, thrown her down the stairs, kicked her, slapped
her, and followed her home from work without her permission.
She also asserted that Falconi had ‘‘threatened to take her out”’
during a phone conversation. Falconi denied telling Farrar that he
would “‘take her out’’ and denied striking her, although he admit-
ted that he had put his hands on her on one occasion when she
tried to block him from leaving. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the district court extended the temporary restraining order for an
additional two and a half months. Thereafter, Farrar apparently did
not seek any further extensions of the temporary restraining order.

Three months after the restraining order expired, the district
court awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of their
child. In doing so, the court did not discuss the temporary re-
straining order or make any findings regarding domestic violence.
It does not appear from the record before us that any arguments or
evidence were presented to the district court regarding any do-
mestic violence issues or the temporary restraining order.

Five months after the issuance of the child custody order, Far-
rar applied to respondent Secretary of State for a fictitious address
as part of Nevada’s fictitious address program for domestic vio-
lence victims. See NRS 217.462-.471. Although it is not clear
from the record what prompted Farrar to take this action, in her
application, Farrar stated that she was a victim of domestic assault

pe 265

and stalking. In support of her application, Farrar submitted the
initial form restraining order that she had obtained a year earlier.

Based on her application and submission of the temporary re-
straining order, the Secretary of State issued Farrar a fictitious ad-
dress. Initially, Falconi attempted to challenge the issuance of the
fictitious address through a petition for judicial review in the dis-
trict court, which that court denied on the merits. On appeal from
that order, this court affirmed that denial, but did so solely on the
ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Nevada’s
Administrative Procedure Act to review the Secretary of State’s de-
cision. Falconi then filed in this court this original petition for a
writ of mandamus, seeking an order directing the Secretary of
State to remove Farrar from the fictitious address program.

In his petition, Falconi primarily argues that the Secretary of
State should have considered whether the temporary restraining
order submitted by Farrar in support of her application was specific
evidence that she had been a victim of domestic violence. He fur-
ther contends that the Secretary should have concluded that the
temporary restraining order was insufficient for this purpose, and
therefore, denied Farrar’s application. In making this argument,
Falconi also asserts that he has a fundamental liberty interest in
parenting his child that is infringed on by Farrar’s use of a ficti-
tious address.

DISCUSSION
a

Extraordinary writ relief is within this court’s discretion. See
Walker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 815, 819, 101 P.3d
787, 790 (2004). We may exercise our discretion to consider a writ
petition when the petitioner does not have an adequate remedy at
law and when ‘‘an important issue of law needs clarification”’ See
Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev.
193, 197-98, 179 P.3d 556, 558-59 (2008). Here, Falconi presents
important legal issues, regarding the fictitious address statutes and
a co-parent’s ability to seek disclosure of the other parent’s ad-
dress, that need clarification, and he does not have an adequate
remedy at law. Thus, our consideration of this writ petition is
appropriate.

As Falconi’s arguments mainly focus on the process through
which a fictitious address is obtained, we begin by examining the
process and operation of the fictitious address program before
turning to Falconi’s specific arguments.

Overview of the fictitious address program

Nevada’s fictitious address program was enacted in 1997 to help
domestic violence victims establish and maintain confidential home

266 Po

addresses. See S.B. 155, 69th Leg. (Nev. 1997) (Bill Summary).
To accomplish this goal, the fictitious address program provides
that ‘‘[aJn adult person, a parent or guardian acting on behalf of a
child, or a guardian acting on behalf of an incompetent person may
apply to the Secretary of State to have a fictitious address desig-
nated by the Secretary of State serve as the address of the adult.”
NRS 217.462(1).

In order to receive a fictitious address, an individual must sub-
mit to the Secretary of State an application containing ‘‘[s]pecific
evidence showing that the adult, child or incompetent person has
been a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking be-
fore the filing of the application.’ NRS 217.462(2)(a). The relevant
statute allows, as examples of specific evidence, ‘‘an applicable
record of conviction, a temporary restraining order or other pro-
tective order’’ NRS 217.462(4). Once an applicant submits an ap-
plication accompanied by the required evidence, the Secretary of
State must approve the application, NRS 217.462(4), making the
applicant a participant in the program, and must issue the partici-
pant a fictitious address. NRS 217.464(1)(a).

Following the issuance of the fictitious address, the Secretary of
State forwards any mail received for the participant to the partici-
pant at his or her actual address. NRS 217.464(1)(b). The Secre-
tary of State is further prohibited from making records containing
the participant’s name, confidential address, or fictitious address
available for inspection and copying unless the ‘‘address is re-
quested by a law enforcement agency . . . or [t]he Secretary of
State is directed to do so by lawful order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, in which case the Secretary of State shall make the ad-
dress available to the person identified in the order’’ NRS
217.464(2).

The Secretary of State may cancel a participant’s fictitious ad-
dress at any time if the participant changes his or her confidential
address without properly notifying the Secretary, the Secretary
determines that the participant knowingly provided false or incor-
rect information in the application, or the participant becomes a
candidate for public office. NRS 217.468(3). But after four years,
a participant’s fictitious address will be canceled by the Secretary
of State as a matter of course. NRS 217.468(1). To prevent can-
cellation based on the expiration of time, a participant must
demonstrate ‘‘to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the
participant remains in imminent danger of becoming a victim of
domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking.’ NRS 217.468(2).
The process for making such a demonstration and seeking to ex-
tend the use of the fictitious address is not set forth in the program
statutes.

es 261

Issuance of the fictitious address to Farrar was proper

Falconi argues that the temporary restraining order was insuffi-
cient to support the issuance of a fictitious address in light of the
statutory scheme set forth above. We conclude that contrary to Fal-
coni’s assertions, the Secretary of State was required to issue the
fictitious address to Farrar upon the presentation of the temporary
restraining order. The fictitious address program does not author-
ize the Secretary of State to investigate or determine whether a
protective order was issued based on a finding of domestic violence
or on a finding of a potential threat of violence before approving an
application. See NRS 217.462(4); Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399,
403, 168 P.3d 712, 715 (2007) (explaining that ‘‘when a statute’s
language is plain and its meaning clear, the courts will apply that
plain language’).

The statutes’ legislative history reveals that the Legislature
specifically declined to authorize the Secretary of State to inquire
into the circumstances underlying the evidence presented in sup-
port of an application. In fact, early versions of the bill required
the Secretary to make a determination as to whether an applicant
had actually been a victim of domestic violence, but the bill was
ultimately modified to remove any potential decision-making func-
tion from the Secretary’s role in issuing a fictitious address. Com-
pare §.B, 155(2)(4), 69th Leg. (Nev. 1997) (second reprint), with
S.B. 155(2)(4), 69th Leg. (Nev. 1997) (third reprint); see also
Hearing on S.B. 155 Before the Assembly Comm. on Ways and
Means, 69th Leg. (Nev., June 26, 1997) (expressing concern that
the earlier version of the proposed statute required the Secretary of
State to exercise judgment and make legal determinations).

a

In the present matter, Farrar completed the application for entry
into the program and attached the temporary restraining order as
evidence in support of the application.1 NRS 217.462(4). Regard-
less of Falconi’s arguments concerning the standards for obtaining
a temporary restraining order, because the fictitious address
statutes specifically provide that a temporary restraining order
constitutes sufficient evidence to support an application for a fic-
titious address, Falconi’s arguments in this regard necessarily fail.
See id.; Leven, 123 Nev. at 403, 168 P.3d at 715. Thus, upon re-
ceipt of the application with the required supporting evidence, the

‘Although we take no position on the fact that the temporary restraining
order had expired when Farrar filled out her application, we note that NRS
217.462 is silent as to whether a temporary restraining order must be active in
order to constitute specific evidence of domestic violence.

268 Pe

Secretary of State was obligated to accept Farrar into the program
and issue her a fictitious address without inquiring into the cir-
cumstances underlying the issuance of the temporary restraining
order. See NRS 217.462(4). As a result, Falconi’s argument that
the Secretary of State should have evaluated and rejected Farrar’s
application is not supported by the statute and does not entitle him
to writ relief. See NRS 34.160 (providing that a petition for a writ
of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that
the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or sta-
tion); Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124
Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (same).

Effect of the fictitious address program on custodial parenting
rights

While we conclude that the Secretary of State was required to
accept Farrar into the program, Falconi’s arguments, especially his
focus on the fictitious address’s interference with his ability to par-
ent, and the facts of this case highlight potential problems that may
arise when’ a parent who shares joint custody of his or her child is
admitted into the fictitious address program; we examine the in-
terplay between the fictitious address program and a party’s cus-
todial parenting rights.

Balancing the protection of domestic violence victims with
parental rights

Parents who share joint legal custody of a child each have a
legal responsibility for their child and for ‘making major decisions
regarding the child, including [those related to] the child’s health,
education, and religious upbringing.’ Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev.
410, 420, 216 P.3d 213, 221 (2009); see also Kirkpatrick v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 119 Nev. 66, 71, 64 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2003)
(recognizing that parents have a “‘liberty interest in the care, cus-
tody, and management of their children’’ that is fundamental but
not absolute). To make these decisions requires that both parents
be informed regarding the child’s circumstances and experiences.
See Rivero, 125 Nev. at 420-21, 216 P.3d at 221 (discussing that
parents in a joint legal custody situation ‘must consult with each
other to make major decisions regarding the child’s upbringing’).
Knowing where the child resides allows a parent to have input re-
garding the environment in which the child is being raised.

Le

When a parent who shares joint custody of his or her child en-
ters into the fictitious address program, the custodial parenting is-
sues become intertwined with the domestic violence victim’s need
for protection. Thus, in such a case, the rights of a custodial par-

es 269

ent to know where his or her child resides must be balanced
against the important state interest in protecting victims of domes-
tic violence served by the state’s fictitious address program.? See
Grant v. Pugh, 887 N.Y.S. 2d 802, 807-08 (Fam. Ct. 2009) (rec-
ognizing that it may be proper to balance an individual’s constitu-
tional rights against a state’s interest in protecting domestic vio-
lence victims).

Procedure for seeking disclosure of a co-parent’s confidential
address

P|

The Nevada Legislature recognized that such conflicting interests
may arise in certain cases, as one of the fictitious address statutes
specifically permits a court to order the Secretary of State to dis-
close a participant’s address to a specific party. See NRS
217.464(2)(b) (providing that the Secretary of State shall release a
participant’s address if ‘‘directed to do so by lawful order of a
court of competent jurisdiction”’); of. Sagar v. Sagar, 781 N.E.2d
54, 59 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (explaining that when divorcing par-
ents seek to limit each other’s custody rights, the state must act as
mediator). This statute does not delineate the procedure by which
a court could do so, however, and thus, we take the opportunity to
address this issue here. Specifically, we must determine what pro-
cedure a court should apply in resolving a request to disclose a
program participant’s confidential home address. As neither our
statutory nor our case authority sheds light on this question, we
look to extrajurisdictional authority to guide our determination as
to how Nevada courts should approach a custodial parent’s request
for release of a program participant co-parent’s confidential home
address.

A majority of states have enacted confidential address statutes,?
but only one court has addressed a situation similar to the one pre-

?When domestic violence is alleged to have occurred before the issuance of
a custody order, the district court will generally take these competing interests
into account in fashioning a custody arrangement. See NRS 125.480(4)(k) (re-
quiring a district court to consider whether either parent seeking custody
“has engaged in an act of domestic violence against the child, a parent of the
child or any other person residing with the child’). Nevertheless, the partic-
ular facts of this case demonstrate that, in light of the lack of discretion on the
part of the Secretary of State in accepting an applicant, as well as the absence
of any time limit as to when the evidence supporting the application may have
been issued, circumstances may occur where a co-parent, who was previously
the subject of a temporary restraining order that is used to support a fictitious
address application, may at some point be awarded custody of his or her child.

*These states are Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-163 (Supp. 2012);
California, Cal. Gov’t Code § 6206 (West Supp. 2013); Colorado, Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 24-30-2105 (2012); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-240c (2011);
Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 9613 (Supp. 2012); Florida, Fla. Stat.

270 po

sented here. Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A.2d 710, 714 (N.J.
2003). In Sacharow, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed a
situation in which the parties were going through divorce and cus-
tody proceedings, and while the case was pending, one party,
Cynthia Sacharow, obtained a fictitious address upon the filing of
an application attesting that she had reason to believe that she was
the victim of domestic violence and that she feared further abuse.
Id. The applicable New Jersey address confidentiality statute pro-
vides that a person may apply in accordance with the procedures
set forth by the secretary of state and on a prescribed form to the
secretary for a fictional address and that the application must be
approved if it ‘‘contains: (1) a sworn statement by the applicant
that the applicant has good reason to believe: (a) that the applicant
is a victim of domestic violence as defined in this act; and (b) that
the applicant fears further violent acts from the applicant’s as-
sailant.”’ N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:4-4(a)(1) (West 2003).

In the lower court proceedings regarding the parties’ divorce, the
Sacharows’ stipulated to joint legal custody with Cynthia to have
“‘gole residential custody,’ but left it to the district court to deter-
mine whether she would have to disclose her true residential ad-
dress as requested by her then husband, Walter Sacharow.
Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 714. On consideration of that issue, the
district court ordered Cynthia to disclose her true address to Wal-
ter. Id. Cynthia subsequently sought review of the determination
requiring disclosure of her true address. Id. at 715.

On review, the Sacharow court held that courts in general were
not bound by the fictitious address program, but concluded that
Cynthia may nonetheless have a right to keep her address a secret.
Id. at 720. In order to balance the competing interests of Cynthia

Ann, § 741.403 (West 2010); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 19-5703 (Supp.
2012); Ilinois, 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 61/15 (West 2009); Indiana, Ind.
Code Ann. § 5-26.5-2-2 (LexisNexis 2006); Kansas, Kan, Stat, Ann. § 75-457
(Supp. 2012); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat, Ann, § 44:52 (2012); Maine,
Me. Rey. Stat. tit. 5, § 90-B (2012); Maryland, Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law
§ 4-522 (LexisNexis 2012); Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 9A,
§ 2 (LexisNexis 2012); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 5B.03 (West Supp.
2013); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-47-1 (Supp. 2012); Missouri, Mo.
‘Ann, Stat. § 589,663 (West 2011); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 40-15-17
(2011); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-1204 (2004); New Hampshire, N.H.
Rey, Stat. Ann § 7:43 (2012-13); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:4-4 (West
2003); New Mexico, N.M. 2012-13 Stat. Ann. § 40-13-11 (Supp. 2008); New
York, N.Y. Exec. Law § 108 (McKinney Supp. 2013); North Carolina, N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15C-4 (2011); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 60-14
(2003); Oregon, Or. Rev. Stat. § 192.826 (2011); Pennsylvania, 23 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 6705 (West 2010); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-283
(2003); Texas, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 56.83 (West Supp. 2012);
Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann, tit. 15, § 1152 (Supp. 2012); Virginia, Va. Code
Ann. § 2.2-515.2 (2011); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 40.24.030
(West 2012); and West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann, § 48-28A-103 (LexisNexis
2009).

an

in having a confidential address and Walter in knowing where his
child was living, the Sacharow court concluded that a determina-
tion must be made as to whether disclosure of Cynthia’s address
was in the child’s best interest, and therefore, the court reversed
the district court’s order requiring disclosure of Cynthia’s address
and remanded the matter to the district court for the purpose of ad-
dressing that issue. Id. at 721-22.

The court directed that, on remand, because Cynthia was seek-
ing to curtail Walter’s parental rights, she would have the burden
of demonstrating that confidentiality was in the child’s best inter-
est. Id. at 722. To meet this burden, the Sacharow court held that
Cynthia must prove that she had been the victim of domestic vio-
lence at Walter’s hands and that she reasonably feared future vio-
lence. Id. If she did so, the burden would then shift to Walter to
establish that address confidentiality was not in the child’s best in-
terest, based, among other things, on the good faith of the parties,
their prior history of dealings, their relationship with the child, any
efforts by one parent to alienate the child from the other, the effect
confidentiality would have on their relationships, and any special
needs of the child. Jd.

We find the reasoning of the Sacharow court persuasive be-
cause it requires that any decision to compel disclosure of a pro-
gram participant’s true address take into account both the interest
of a domestic violence victim in remaining hidden from the person
who harmed him or her and the interest of a custodial parent
in making decisions regarding his or her child. We therefore adopt
this framework for Nevada courts considering a request for dis-
closure of a confidential address and adapt it to be consistent with
Nevada law.

Petition for writ of mandamus

The Sacharow court addressed the matter before it in the context
of an appeal from an order entered in the parties’ divorce and child
custody action. Had this issue arisen in the context of the Farrar
and Falconi’s custody action, Falconi may have been able to file a
motion in that action seeking an order compelling disclosure of
Farrar’s home address. But here, Farrar did not obtain the fictitious
address until after the custody order was entered, and thus, we
must address the procedure by which Falconi may seek an order
compelling disclosure of Farrar’s home address outside the context
of the custody proceeding.

| |

For a writ of mandamus to issue, the petitioner must have some
tight to relief. See NRS 34.160 (providing that ‘‘[t]he writ may be
issued . . . to compel the admission of a party to the use and
enjoyment of a right . . . to which the party is entitled and from

2 Po

which the party is unlawfully precluded by such . . . person’). In
challenging confidentiality, the petitioner is claiming that he or she
is being barred from the parental right of knowing where his or her
child lives. See Rivero, 125 Nev. at 420, 216 P.3d at 221; Kirk-
patrick, 119 Nev. at 71, 64 P.3d at 1059. Because the Secretary of
State is charged with keeping a program participant’s home address
confidential and of releasing that address only upon court order,
see NRS 217.464(2)(b), the Secretary must be made a party to the
writ petition as a respondent. And the program participant, as the
party seeking to maintain confidentiality, must be included as a
real party in interest and required to oppose the writ petition if the
petitioner establishes an initial right to relief. In this way, a petition
for a writ of mandamus allows the petitioner to give proper notice
and bring all interested parties into the proceeding.

Burden to establish disclosure

P|

When filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel dis-
closure, it is the petitioner’s burden to establish that writ relief is
warranted. See Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222,
228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). A custodial parent generally has a
tight to know where his or her child resides, even when the child
is in the other parent’s physical custody. See Rivero, 125 Nev. at
420-21, 216 P.3d at 221; Kirkpatrick, 119 Nev. at 71, 64 P.3d at
1059; see also Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 722. So, by demonstrating
that he or she shares joint legal custody, a parent may meet the ini-
tial burden of proving that he or she has a right to know the co-
parent program participant’s home address when the child is living
during his or her custodial period with that parent. See Rivero, 125
Ney. at 420-21, 216 P.3d at 221; see also Sacharow, 826 A.2d at
722.

| |

If the party seeking disclosure meets this initial burden, the
analysis discussed in Sacharow will then come into play. In par-
ticular, the party seeking to maintain the confidential address, as
the real party in interest, will have the burden of proving that the
party seeking disclosure was the perpetrator of an act of domestic
violence against him or her or against the parties’ child and that he
or she fears further domestic violence. See Sacharow, 826 A.2d at
722; cf. NRS 125.480(5) (providing that if a court determines ‘‘by
clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other per-
son seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic
violence against the child, a parent of the child or any other per-
son residing with the child,’ a rebuttable presumption arises
against that parent having sole or joint custody of the child). If the
real party in interest establishes so, the burden shifts back to peti-

Pe 27

tioner, who must then demonstrate that confidentiality is nonethe-
Jess not in the child’s best interest under this state’s best interest
factors. See NRS 125.480(4) (setting forth the factors for a court
to consider in determining a child’s best interest, including the
amount of conflict between the parents, the parents’ ability to co-
operate to meet the child’s needs, the parents’ mental and physical
health, and any previous parental abuse or neglect of the child);
see also Sacharow, 826 A.2d at 722. If the court ultimately de-
termines that, under this analysis, disclosure is in the child’s best
interest, the court should order release of the confidential address.
If not, the address may remain confidential.

Under this approach, the court addressing such a petition will
necessarily be required to make factual determinations. For this
reason, we conclude that the district court, rather than this court,
is the appropriate tribunal for seeking this relief. See Round Hill
Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d
534, 536 (1981) (explaining that ‘‘an appellate court is not an ap-
propriate forum in which to resolve disputed questions of fact,’
and that “‘[wJhen disputed factual issues are critical in demon-
strating the propriety of a writ of mandamus, the writ should be
sought in the district court, with appeal from an adverse judgment
to this court’’). And in light of the close relationship between child
custody issues and the issues implicated in this situation, we con-
clude that, to the extent possible, such a petition should be filed in
the same district court in which any child custody order has been
entered. Here, however, because the Secretary of State was re-
quired to issue the fictitious address under the program statutes,
and because we are not the proper court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the Secretary of State should be ordered to dis-
close Farrar’s confidential home address, we deny the petition for
a writ of mandamus.‘ See id.

Harpesty and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

“Our denial of this petition does not impair Falconi’s right to seek relief in
the district court. under the procedure outlined in this opinion. Also, because
the district court lacked jurisdiction over Falconi’s petition for judi
seeking to overturn the Secretary’s admission of Farrar into the fictitious ad-
dress program and we had not addressed the procedure for compelling disclo-
sure when the district court issued its previous order, the district court’s denial
of the petition for judicial review in the previous case is not binding on any fu-
ture determination of this matter.

274

THE STATE OF NEVADA, DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION,
APPELLANT, v. CHRYSLER GROUP LLC, RESPONDENT.

No, 58714
May 2, 2013 300 P.3d 713

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Deonne E. Contine,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Jedediah R. Bodger, Deputy
Attorney General, Carson City, for Appellant.

Kolesar & Leatham and Kenneth A. Burns, Las Vegas; Akerman
Senterfitt and Peter O. Larsen, Jacksonville, Florida, for
Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and Curry, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

Respondent Chrysler Group, LLC, a motor vehicle manufac-
turer, reimbursed two buyers of defective vehicles the full purchase
price, including sales tax, pursuant to Nevada’s lemon law.
Chrysler subsequently sought from appellant Department of Taxa-
tion refunds of the sales taxes that the vehicles’ retailers had col-
lected and remitted when they originally sold the vehicles to the
buyers. Although the Department had previously refunded lemon
Jaw sales tax reimbursements to manufacturers, it denied Chrysler’s
refund requests because the Nevada Attorney General’s Office ad-
vised the Department that there is no statutory authority for such
refunds. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether
Chrysler is entitled to a sales tax refund under NRS 597.630,
Nevada’s lemon law; NRS 372.630, Nevada’s sales and use tax re-
fund statute; and NRS 372.025, Nevada’s statute governing gross
receipts for retailers, or if Chrysler is otherwise entitled to a refund
because the Department previously granted such refunds. Because
Nevada law does not allow for such a refund and because the De-
partment is not required to adhere to its prior erroneous interpre-
tation of the law, we conclude that Chrysler is not entitled to a
refund.

2 |

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chrysler’s requests for refunds were based on a prior written
Department policy in effect since at least 2005 to refund to man-
ufacturers the sales taxes reimbursed under the lemon law. The De-
partment changed this policy in 2009 after being informed by the
Nevada Attorney General’s Office that refunding the sales tax was
not appropriate under Nevada’s statutory scheme. Thus, Depart-
ment auditors denied Chrysler’s refund requests because the De-
partment’s legal counsel advised the auditors that there was no
statutory authority in Nevada permitting the Department to issue
the requested sales tax refunds.

Chrysler appealed these decisions to the Department’s hearings
division, where they were considered together and reversed by an
administrative law judge. The administrative law judge found that
the tax was an overpayment to the Department because reim-
bursement of the full purchase price to the buyer resulted in a
statutory rescission of the underlying sales contract. As such, the
administrative law judge found that Chrysler was entitled to a re-
fund of the sales tax because Chrysler had borne the economic
burden of the tax by being required to refund it pursuant to the
lemon law.

The Department appealed this decision to the Nevada Tax Com-
mission (NTC), which reversed the hearing division’s decision be-
cause it concluded that neither the lemon law nor Nevada’s tax
statutes expressly authorized reimbursing vehicle manufacturers
for any taxes repaid to buyers under the lemon law. Chrysler then
filed a petition for judicial review of the NTC’s decision in the dis-
trict court. The district court granted the petition for judicial re-
view, concluding that Chrysler was entitled to a refund because,
when Chrysler repaid the sales taxes to the buyers, its repayment
statutorily rescinded the underlying sales transactions and ren-
dered the sales tax an overpayment to the Department. This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

The Department contends that the district court erred in over-
turning the NTC’s decision because there is no statutory authority
permitting it to provide vehicle manufacturers a refund of sales
taxes they reimburse to buyers under Nevada’s lemon law. Chrysler
asserts that it is entitled to a refund based on taxes it reimbursed
to buyers under NRS 597.630, Nevada’s lemon law; NRS
372.630, Nevada’s sales and use tax refund statute; and NRS
372.025, Nevada’s statute governing gross receipts for retailers.
Chrysler further argues that it is entitled to a refund given the De-
partment’s prior policy of granting such refunds. We disagree with
both of Chrysler’s contentions.

Pe

P|

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo.”’ Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. 454, 460, 282
P.3d 751, 756 (2012). ‘‘It is well established that the court must
interpret statutes consistent with the intent of the [L]egislature.’’
Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev. 295, 302, 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995).
Thus, when a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we give
that language its ordinary meaning. Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at
460, 282 P.3d at 756.

Under NRS 597.630, Nevada’s lemon law, a vehicle manufac-
turer must replace or repurchase any vehicle that fails to conform
to the manufacturer’s warranties ‘‘after a reasonable number of [re-
pair] attempts,’ when the vehicle has an irreparable defect that
“‘substantially impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle.”
NRS 597.630(1). If it elects to repurchase the vehicle, a manufac-
turer must refund the full purchase price, less a reasonable amount
to account for the buyer’s use. NRS 597.630(1)(b). The full pur-
chase price includes ‘‘all sales taxes, license fees, registration fees
and other similar governmental charges.” Id. NRS 597.630 is
silent as to whether a vehicle manufacturer is entitled to a refund
for the amount of sales tax it reimburses to a buyer.! Accordingly,
no refund is directly provided for within that statute.

Notwithstanding the lemon law’s silence on the matter, Chrysler
argues that it is entitled to a tax refund pursuant to NRS 372.630,
Nevada’s sales and use tax refund statute. NRS 372.630(1) requires
the Department to refund any amount of taxes that were ‘‘paid
more than once or . . . erroneously or illegally collected,’ and that
“‘the excess amount collected or paid must . . . be refunded to the
person [who overpaid the tax].’’ Thus, under the plain language of
NRS 372.630, the only party who can receive a tax refund is the
party that paid the tax. Similarly, NRS 372.700 states that only a
person who paid the tax may seek a tax refund from the Depart-
ment. In State v. Obexer & Son, we recognized the standing re-
quirement set forth in these statutes when we stated that Nevada’s
tax refund statutes ‘‘permit recovery only where the taxpayer him-
self has borne the financial burden of the tax,” and that “‘[i]f the
taxpayer making the claim has collected the tax from his cus-
tomers, he has suffered no loss or injury, and is not entitled to a
credit or refund.” 99 Nev. 233, 238, 660 P.2d 981, 984 (1983).

'Other state lemon laws expressly address this issue. These states either pro-
vide for such a refund, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1263(D) (2012)
(West); Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.25(a) (West 2013), or require only that manu-
facturers provide notice or forms to a buyer that assist the buyer in seeking re-
imbursement of sales taxes from the appropriate tax authority. See, e.g., Md.
Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-1503(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (the manufacturer
must instruct the consumer to seek a refund from the appropriate agency);
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 198-a(c)(2) (McKinney 2012) (same).

2
,

Here, Chrysler did not remit the sales tax that it reimbursed to
buyers to the Department of Taxation. Furthermore, Chrysler’s ob-
ligation to reimburse sales tax to buyers is a statutory obligation
imposed by NRS Chapter 597, which is wholly separate from a
taxpayer’s rights and obligations under NRS Chapter 372. Be-
cause Chrysler did not remit the sales taxes to the state, Chrysler
Jacks standing to seek a sales tax refund under NRS 372.630.

| |

Alternatively, Chrysler argues that a full reimbursement pursuant
to the lemon law statute is analogous to a full returned merchan-
dise refund in a retail transaction, for which no sales tax is due.
Specifically, Chrysler argues that when buyers return vehicles to
Chrysler and Chrysler reimburses them for the full purchase price
and sales tax, the original sales taxes are no longer considered tax-
able gross receipts under NRS 372.025 and became refundable
overpayments to the Department.

By its own terms, NRS 372.025 only applies to retailers, not
manufacturers. The amount of sales tax imposed on a retailer is de-
termined by the ‘‘‘[g]ross receipts’ . . . of the retail sales of re-
tailers”’ NRS 372.025(1) (emphasis added); see also NRS
372.105. A ‘‘retailer”’ is defined as: ‘‘{e]very seller who makes
any retail sale or sales of tangible personal property . . .”;
“‘[e]very person engaged in the business of making sales for
storage, use or other consumption .. . of tangible personal
property . . .’; or “‘[e]very person making more than two retail
sales of tangible personal property during any 12-month period.”
NRS 372.055(1)(a)-(c). As Chrysler admits, it is not a retailer, and
thus, we conclude that Chrysler cannot rely on NRS 372.025 in
conjunction with Nevada’s lemon law statute to claim a refund of
the sales taxes. Accordingly, we conclude that neither NRS
597.630, nor NRS 372.630, nor NRS 372.025 entitles a vehicle
manufacturer that reimburses a buyer with the full purchase price
of a vehicle, including sales tax, to a sales tax refund.

Our conclusion is consistent with the approach taken by the
Connecticut Supreme Court. Connecticut has a lemon law statute,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-179 (1998), containing language similar to
Nevada’s, which also does not provide manufacturers with refunds
of reimbursed sales taxes. In interpreting that statute, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court held that manufacturers were not entitled
to sales tax refunds because its lemon law contains “‘no express in-
dication that the legislature intended to permit the manufacturer to
recover any of the . . . sales tax required to be refunded to the
consumer.’ DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 937 A.2d 675, 686
(Conn. 2007). The Connecticut court reasoned that refunding the
sales tax to manufacturers does not advance its lemon law’s ‘‘con-

pe

cerns of consumer protection,’ but instead ‘‘undermine[s] the in-
centive to provide nondefective products to consumers.” Id. at
685.

We agree with the approach taken by Connecticut and note that
the legislative intent behind Nevada’s lemon law was to protect
buyers who purchase defective new vehicles. See Hearing on A.B.
59 Before the Assembly Comm. on Commerce, 62d Leg. (Nev.,
February 16, 1983); see also Milicevic v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175 (D. Nev. 2003) (noting that
Nevada’s lemon “‘law was designed to protect’’ buyers of defective
vehicles). Refunding a vehicle manufacturer for reimbursed sales
taxes will not create an incentive for the vehicle manufacturer to
manufacture nondefective vehicles. The Legislature has not in-
cluded this remedy in Nevada’s lemon law, and Chrysler provides
no evidence that the Legislature intended to refund manufacturers
for reimbursed sales tax. Accordingly, we decline to read this
remedy into the statute, and we conclude that vehicle manufactur-
ers are not entitled to a refund of reimbursed sales tax.”

Chrysler also argues, apparently in an attempt to estop the De-
partment from arguing that no refund is due, that the Department
violated the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA), NRS
Chapter 233B, when it changed its prior policy allowing sales tax
refunds for lemon law payments to its current policy denying such
refunds.? An agency violates the APA if it engages in rulemaking
without following the APA’s procedural requirements. Labor
Comm’r v. Littlefield, 123 Nev. 35, 39, 153 P.3d 26, 29 (2007).
Rulemaking occurs when an agency ‘promulgates, amends, or re-
peals ‘[aJn agency rule, standard, directive[,] or statement of gen-
eral applicability which effectuates or interprets law or policy’ ’’

Because denial of the sales tax refund is consistent with the remedial pur-
pose of the statute, we reject Chrysler’s argument that this improperly trans-
forms the lemon law into a punitive statute. We further reject Chrysler’s ar-
gument that construing the lemon law to deny manufacturers a refund violates
the Separation of Powers Clause of the Nevada Constitution. See Nev. Const.
art. 3, § 1. By denying such refunds, the Department is not taking any affir-
mative action under the lemon law, and thus, it is not improperly performing
legislative duties. See id.

3in addition, Chrysler argues that it is entitled to a refund because an ad-
ministrative law judgment granted one upon similar facts in the past and, be-
cause the statutes have not since been amended, there is no legal basis for a
different decision. We reject this argument because ‘administrative agencies
are not bound by stare decisis” Motor Cargo v. Public Service Comm’n, 108
Nev. 335, 337, 830 P:2d 1328, 1330 (1992); see also Desert Irrigation, Ltd.
v, State of Nevada, 113 Nev. 1049, 1058, 944 P.2d 835, 841 (1997) (“[NJo
binding effect is given to prior administrative determinations.”).

20

Id. at 39-40, 153 P.3d at 29 (alteration in original) (quoting NRS
233B.038(1)(a)). Generally, before an agency can engage in rule-
making, it must provide notice to interested parties and give those
parties an opportunity to oppose the proposed rule. NRS
233B.060(1)(a); NRS 233B.061(1).

A statement of general applicability is a policy or rule that ap-
plies to multiple parties in a similar manner. See Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Southwest Gas, 99 Nev. 268, 273, 662 P.2d 624, 627
(1983) (holding that an administrative order directed at one utility
company had ‘‘general applicability’? because it affected ‘‘other
gas utilities and their customers’’). Here, because the Depart-
ment’s change in policy affects all vehicle manufacturers whose ve-
hicles are sold in Nevada, it is a statement of general applicability.
However, we have previously held that ‘‘{t]here is no reason to re-
quire the formalities of rulemaking whenever an agency undertakes
to enforce or implement the necessary requirements of an existing
statute.’ K-Mart Corporation v. SHS, 101 Nev. 12, 17, 693 P.2d
562, 565 (1985).

Additionally, other jurisdictions do not require an agency to use
the formal rulemaking process when correcting a policy that is
based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. See, e.g., Amer-
ada Hess Corp. v. State ex rel. Tax, 704 N.W.2d 8, 18 (N.D.
2005) (‘‘[A]n administrative agency need not use the rulemaking
process to correct an erroneous interpretation of a statute.’’);
Firearms Import/Export Roundtable Trade Group v. Jones, 854 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that an ‘‘Open Letter’’
correcting prior policy that did not conform with a statute merely
“corrected a prior misapprehension of the statute rather than [as-
sert] new law promulgated pursuant to the agency’s rulemaking au-
thority’); Schlapp v. Colo. Dep’t of Health Care and Policy, 284
P.3d 177, 179-80, 185 (Colo. App. 2012) (holding that the agency
did not violate the APA when it corrected its interpretation of eli-
gibility requirements for Medicaid to conform with the applicable
state and federal statutes). These jurisdictions reason that requiring
administrative agencies to comply with the formal ‘‘rulemaking
requirements of the APA . . . would lock an agency into an erro-
neous interpretation of its regulations and governing statutes.’’
Schlapp, 284 P.3d at 185.

As we have concluded today, neither Nevada’s lemon law nor the
tax statutes provide for sales tax refunds to vehicle manufacturers
upon reimbursing a buyer pursuant to the lemon law. Because an
agency has no authority to act absent statutory authority, see Stock-
meier y. State, Bd. of Parole Comm’rs, 127 Nev. 243, 248, 255
P.3d 209, 212 (2011), the Department must deny these refunds.
Thus, the Department’s prior policy of allowing sales tax refunds

Se

to vehicle manufacturers was an erroneous interpretation of the law.
Upon obtaining an opinion from the Attorney General, the De-
partment noted its erroneous interpretation in a July 2009 newslet-
ter and stated that its policy change sought to bring the policy into
conformity with Nevada’s lemon law. In doing so, the Department
did not amend any existing regulations or create a new rule to im-
plement an existing statute. Rather, it sought only to correctly
implement the existing statute. Since the Department’s current
tax refund policy is consistent with NRS 597.630 and the applica-
ble provisions of NRS Chapter 372, we conclude that the Depart-
ment did not violate the APA because it was not required to un-
dertake the formal rulemaking process to correct its prior
erroneous policy.*

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we reverse the dis-
trict court’s order.

PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

‘Chrysler further argues that denial of the sales tax refunds (1) is an un-
constitutional taking and (2) results in the Department being unjustly en-
riched. We reject Chrysler’s takings argument because Chrysler has no prop-
erty right in a future tax refund. See McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122
Nev. 645, 658, 137 P.3d 1110, 1119 (2006) (‘‘An individual must have a prop-
erty interest in order to support a takings claim.’’); United States v. Dow, 357
U.S. 17, 20 (1958) (‘‘Accordingly, [the claimant] can prevail only if the ‘tak-
ing’ occurred while he was the owner.’); see also United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994) (‘Tax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has
no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.’’). We also reject Chrysler’s un-
just enrichment argument because the sales tax paid to the State never belonged
to Chrysler. See Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 763, 101 P.3d 308, 317
(2004) (‘[UInjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has and retains a ben-
efit which in equity and good conscience belongs to another.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotations omitted).

282

MARSHALL SYLVER, AN INDIvipuAL; MIND POWER, INC., A
Nevapa Corporation; CASA DE MILLIONAIRE, LLC, a
Nevapa Limirep Liapitiry ComMPaNy; AND PROSPERITY
CENTER, LLC, A Nevapa Limirep LiaBitiry COMPANY,
APPELLANTS, v. REGENTS BANK, N.A., A NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.

No. 58869
MARSHALL SYLVER, AN InpivipuaL; MIND POWER, INC., A
NevapA Corporation; CASA DE MILLIONAIRE, LLC, a
NEVADA Limitep LiaBiLiry CoMPANY; AND PROSPERITY
CENTER, LLC, a Nevapa Limirep LIABILITY COMPANY,
APPELLANTS, v. REGENTS BANK, N.A., A NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.
No. 59683
May 2, 2013 300 P.3d 718

Kolesar & Leatham, Chtd., and Bart K. Larsen, Las Vegas, for
Appellants.

Sullivan Hill Lewin Rez & Engel and Christine A. Roberts, Las
Vegas; Sullivan Hill Lewin Rez & Engel and James E. Drum-
mond, San Diego, California, for Respondent.

284

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether an arbitration award was ob-
tained through undue means. In resolving this issue, we interpret
the meaning of “‘undue means’’ under NRS 38.241 in line with the
interpretation given by other state and federal courts, whereby the
challenging party has the burden of proving that the arbitration
award was secured through intentionally misleading conduct. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly refused
to vacate the arbitration award since the appellant did not satisfy
his burden in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent secured the award through intentionally misleading
conduct.

We also consider whether the arbitrator’s refusal to void a loan
in the underlying dispute constituted a manifest disregard of the
law. Because the arbitrator did not consciously disregard the ap-
plicable legal standard, we conclude that there was no manifest
disregard of the law.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2008, respondent Regents Bank, N.A., issued two loans to
appellant Marshall Sylver. The first loan, intended as a bridge loan
to purchase a residential property in Las Vegas, was partially se-
cured by a deed of trust in another residential property located in
Las Vegas. Sylver planned to sell the first property to pay off this
Joan. The second loan was a bridge loan to purchase a commercial

pe 28s

building in Las Vegas. Sylver proposed to obtain commercial take-
out financing for the second loan with Regents’ assistance. With
the exception of recordation of a deed of trust in Nevada, all trans-
actions took place in California, where Regents is sitused.
Throughout the process of obtaining the loans and seeking long-
term financing with Regents, James Hibert was Sylver’s point of
contact.

When financing failed to materialize, the parties twice adjusted
the terms of the second loan’s maturity date. Still, Sylver did not
repay either loan.

Regents filed a complaint in district court for breach of contract
and judicial foreclosure. In his answer, Sylver alleged that Regents
breached certain fiduciary duties; that Regents made false repre-
sentations to Sylver regarding long-term financing; and that the
first loan was void because Regents engaged in mortgage banking
activity in Nevada without first seeking a certificate of exemp-
tion, as required by NRS 645E.910. The district court stayed the
proceedings and compelled arbitration as provided in the loan
documents.

Both Sylver and Regents designated witnesses who would testify
at the arbitration hearing. One witness, James Hibert, was desig-
nated by both parties. Prior to arbitration, Regents informed the ar-
bitrator and Sylver that Hibert was unwilling to go to Las Vegas to
testify at the arbitration hearing. Regents had recently terminated
Hibert and could contact Hibert only through his attorney. Because
Hibert’s counsel informed Regents that Hibert was unwilling to at-
tend the arbitration hearing in Las Vegas, Regents took Hibert’s
deposition and used it instead of his live testimony at the hearing.
Sylver cross-examined Hibert for two hours during the deposition.

On the second day of the arbitration hearing, Sylver testified that
he had a phone conversation with Hibert that morning, wherein
Hibert stated that he had never been asked to testify in Las Vegas
but would be willing to do so. Nevertheless, Sylver did not ask for
a continuance, and the arbitrator ultimately rejected Sylver’s ar-
guments and ruled in Regents’ favor.

Regents filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award with the
district court. Prior to the hearing on Regents’ motion, Sylver filed
a declaration by Hibert that, contrary to his earlier deposition tes-
timony, supported allegations that Regents made false representa-
tions and failed to help secure long-term financing, despite Sylver’s
diligence throughout the process. In opposition to the motion,
Sylver argued that Regents employed undue means in procuring the
award by misrepresenting that Hibert was unavailable, and that the
arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law in refusing to void
one of the loans. The district court confirmed the arbitration award

285 Po

and later entered an amended judgment and order of sale. Sylver
appealed from both orders.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Sylver revives the contentions he made before the
district court. Specifically, he argues that (1) Regents employed
undue means in procuring the award, and (2) the arbitrator mani-
festly disregarded the law in refusing to void one of the loans.

Standard of review
Le

‘We review a district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award
de novo. Thomas v. City of North Las Vegas, 122 Nev. 82, 97, 127
P.3d 1057, 1067 (2006). In so doing, we consider that ‘‘[s]trong
public policy favors arbitration because arbitration generally avoids
the higher costs and longer time periods associated with traditional
litigation’’ D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 120 Nev. 549, 553, 96
P.3d 1159, 1162 (2004). We apply a clear and convincing evidence
standard when parties seek to vacate an arbitration award. Health
Plan of Nevada v. Rainbow Med., 120 Nev. 689, 695, 100 P.3d
172, 178 (2004).

P|

NRS 38.241 allows a court to vacate an arbitration award pro-
cured by fraud, corruption, or undue means. A court may also va-
cate an arbitration award under the common-law ground that the
arbitrator ‘manifestly disregarded the law.’ Clark Cnty. Educ.
Ass'n v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5, 8
(2006). Sylver challenges the arbitration award on both grounds.

The arbitration award was not procured by undue means

Sylver argues that the arbitration award was obtained by undue
means as a result of Regents’ misrepresentation regarding Hibert’s
availability to testify at the arbitration hearing. Because we have
never addressed the definition of ‘‘undue means’’ under NRS
38.241, we begin by reviewing and ultimately adopting the defini-
tion used by numerous state and federal circuit courts. Applying
this definition to the circumstances raised here, we conclude that
Sylver has not satisfied his burden for vacating the arbitration
award.

Definition of ‘‘undue means’’

NRS Chapter 38 embodies Nevada’s adoption of the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act. Hearing on S.B. 336 Before the As-
sembly Judiciary Comm., 71st Leg. (Nev., April 24, 2001). NRS
38.241(1)(a) provides:

Pe 281

Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitral proceed-
ing, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitral
proceeding if... [t]he award was procured by corruption,
fraud or other undue means.

The language of NRS 38.241 closely mirrors the language of 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(1), which also addresses the standard for vacating
an arbitration award.

Numerous federal and state courts have addressed the meaning
of ‘‘undue means”’ as used in this context.' These jurisdictions, in
interpreting ‘‘undue means,’ begin with the principle of statutory
construction that ‘‘a word should be known by the company it
keeps.’ National Cas. Co., 430 F.3d at 499. Accordingly, ‘‘[t]he
best reading of the term ‘undue means’ under the maxim noscitur
a sociis is that it describes underhanded or conniving ways of
procuring an award that are similar to corruption or fraud, but do
not precisely constitute either”’ Id.; see also PaineWebber Group,
187 F.3d at 991 (‘‘The term ‘undue means’ must be read in con-
junction with the words ‘fraud’ and ‘corruption’ that precede it in
the statute.’’); Amer. Postal Workers Union, 52 F.3d at 362
(‘‘(U}ndue means must be limited to an action by a party that is
equivalent in gravity to corruption or fraud, such as a physical
threat to an arbitrator or other improper influence.’’). Thus,
“*‘undue means’ has generally been interpreted to mean something
like fraud or corruption.”’ Three S Delaware, 492 F.3d at 529; see
also PaineWebber Group, 187 F.3d at 991 (citing Amer. Postal
Workers Union, 52 F.3d at 362, and noting that courts have ‘“‘uni-
formly construed the term undue means as requiring proof of in-
tentional misconduct’’).

Typically, to prove that an award was procured by undue
means, the party seeking vacatur ‘‘must show that the fraud
[or corruption] was (1) not discoverable upon the exercise of
due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially related to
an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and
convincing evidence.’’

MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d 858 (alteration in original) (quoting
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 967 F.2d at 1404). MCI Constructors re-

'See, eg., MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849 (4th
Cir. 2010); Three $ Delaware v. DataQuick Information Systems, 492 F.3d 520
(Ath Cir. 2007); National Cas. Co. v. First State Ins. Group, 430 F.3d 492 (1st
Cir, 2005); PaineWebber Group v. Zinsmeyer Trusts Partnership, 187 F.3d 988
(8th Cir. 1999); Amer. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Service, 52 3d
359 (D.C. Cir. 1995); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 2d
1401 (th Cir. 1992); Spiska Engineering v. SPM Thermo-Shield, 678 N.W.2d
804 (S.D. 2004).

2s Po

quires the party seeking to vacate the award to prove a causal con-
nection between the undue means and the resulting arbitration
award. Id.

Sylver has not established by clear and convincing evidence
that the award was procured by undue means

| |

Adopting the above interpretation of ‘‘undue means,” we con-
clude that Sylver has not met his burden for vacating the arbitra-
tion award.

First, the conduct alleged by Sylver does not rise to the level of
intentional bad faith behavior equivalent in gravity to corruption or
fraud. See PaineWebber Group, 187 F.3d at 991; Amer. Postal
Workers Union, 52 F.3d at 362. While Sylver claims that Regents
was incorrect in its representation that Hibert was unavailable,
Sylver does not proffer any specific evidence that Regents’ conduct
was intentional, stating only that ‘‘[w]hether intentional or inad-
vertent, Regents’ misrepresentations clearly impaired [a]ppellants’
ability to present relevant evidence before the arbitrator’’?

Second, Hibert’s availability to testify was discoverable through
due diligence. See MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d at 858. Syiver re-
lied on Regents’ representation that Hibert was unavailable to tes-
tify, despite Sylver listing Hibert as a witness and deposing him for
two hours. On the second day of the arbitration hearing, Sylver
discovered Hibert was willing and available to testify, yet Sylver
did not seek a continuance of the arbitration.

Third, Sylver has not shown any causal connection between the
arbitration award and the alleged misconduct. See id. Sylver had
the opportunity to cross-examine Hibert prior to the arbitration,
and Sylver himself admitted in district court that it was only after
the arbitration that Hibert’s potential testimony became so critical
to Sylver’s case.

Accordingly, the district court correctly refused to vacate the ar-
bitration award based on undue means.

The arbitrator’s refusal to void the loan was not a manifest
disregard of the law

Sylver argues that the district court erred in confirming the
arbitration award, asserting that the arbitrator manifestly disre-
garded the law by enforcing the loan despite Regents’ violation of
NRS 645E.910, which requires a national bank to seek a certifi-

Sylver seems to insinuate that since Regents paid for Hibert to have inde-
pendent legal representation, there was collusion between Regents and Hibert’s
attorney, despite Hibert’s own willingness to testify. However, Sylver points to
no evidence of such collusion. We therefore do not address this contention. See
NRAP 28(a)(9)(A).

Pe 289

cate of exemption before engaging in mortgage banking activity in
Nevada.?

“<WJjudicial inquiry under the manifest-disregard-of-the-law
standard is extremely limited.’ ‘A party seeking to vacate an arbi-
tration award based on manifest disregard of the law may not
merely object to the results of the arbitration.’ ’’ Clark Cnty. Educ.
Ass’n, 122 Nev. at 342, 131 P.3d at 8 (quoting Bohimann vy. Printz,
120 Nev. 543, 547, 96 P.3d 1155, 1158 (2004), disapproved on
other grounds by Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 452 n.32,
134 P.3d 103, 109 n.32 (2006)). In analyzing whether an arbitra-
tor manifestly disregarded the law, ‘‘ ‘the issue is not whether the
arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether the arbitrator,
knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a particular
result, simply disregarded the law’ ”’ Jd. (quoting Bohlmann, 120
Nev. at 547, 96 P.3d at 1158); see also Health Plan of Nevada,
120 Nev. at 699, 100 P.3d at 179 (stating that manifest disregard
of the law requires a ‘‘conscious disregard of applicable law’’).

NRS 645E.200 requires corporations to receive licenses from
the State of Nevada prior to engaging in mortgage banking activ-
ity in Nevada. NRS 645E.150 exempts national banks (such as
Regents) from the licensing requirement, but NRS 645E.160 re-
quires any such foreign corporations to obtain a certificate of ex-
emption prior to engaging in certain mortgage banking activity in
Nevada, and NRS 645E.910 makes it unlawful for a foreign bank
to engage in such banking activity if it fails to obtain the certificate
of exemption.*

Because Regents is a national bank, the arbitrator determined
that Regents violated NRS 645E.910 by recording a deed of trust
in Nevada without a certificate of exemption. However, because no
civil remedy existed at the time for violations of NRS 645E.910,
the arbitrator concluded that ‘‘the unintentional violation of Chap-
ter 645E by Regents had no materiality to the issues between the
parties in the within action.’’s

*The arbitrator also found that Regents did not violate NRS 645E.900,
which makes soliciting or conducting business as a mortgage banker without
a proper license or certificate of exemption unlawful. On appeal, Sylver does
not present any legal authority or factual basis for challenging the arbitrator’s
decision besides a cursory statement alleging that Regents clearly violated NRS
645E.900. Accordingly, we need not address the arbitrator’s decision regard-
ing NRS 645E.900. NRAP 28(a)(9)(A).

4NRS 80.015(3)(d) limits the application of NRS 645E.910 to noncommer-
cial property. Thus, only the enforcement of the first loan, secured by the deed
of trust in the Las Vegas residential property, is at issue.

‘Under NRS 645E.950, conducting the business of a mortgage banker
without a license or certificate of exemption is potentially a misdemeanor.
However, prior to 2009, no civil remedies existed for violations of

290 Po

On appeal, Sylver argues that even though no statutory civil
remedy applies, Nevada courts have long refused to enforce con-
tracts that are illegal or contravene public policy. Sylver refers to
other jurisdictions that have found loans void and unenforceable
following a lender’s failure to comply with licensing requirements.
See, e.g., Klipping v. McCauley, 354 P.2d 167, 169 (Colo. 1960);
Solomon y. Gilmore, 731 A.2d 280, 289 (Conn. 1999).

Sylver appears to suggest that loans made in violation of
licensing requirements are necessarily unenforceable. While we
have previously addressed whether a contract is unenforceable on
public policy grounds, we have never addressed whether failure
to comply with a licensing requirement necessarily renders a con-
tract unenforceable. We decline to do so now, as the operative stan-
dard of review in this case ‘‘does not entail plenary judicial re-
view. . . . The governing law alleged to have been ignored must be
well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’ Graber v. Comstock
Bank, 111 Nev. 1421, 1428, 905 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1995). Ac-
cordingly, the issue before us on appeal is limited to whether the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded existing Nevada law, not whether
the common law in Nevada should be extended to conform to other
states’ holdings.

| ree)

Under existing Nevada law, a contract is unenforceable on pub-
lic policy grounds where the policy against enforcement of a con-
tract clearly outweighs the interest in its enforcement. Picardi v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 106, 112, 251 P.3d 723, 727
(2011) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (1981)).
In applying this balancing approach, we take account of ‘‘the se-
riousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it
was deliberate, and . . . the directness of the connection between
that misconduct and the term.’’ Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 178(3)(c)-(d) (1981).

Pe

On review, we begin by noting that the purpose behind NRS
645E.910 was to avoid predatory lending by out-of-state mortgage
bankers and brokers. Hearing on A.B. 490 Before the Assembly
Commerce and Labor Comm., 72d Leg. (Nev., April 4, 2003).
Here, the record indicates that Sylver solicited Regents’ business,
offering the Nevada property as security. Regents did not engage in

NRS 645E.910, and the current civil remedies were not given retroactive
effect. See 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 200, §§ 20-21, at 747-48 (enacting
NRS 645E.920 and NRS 645E.930, respectively); 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 474,
§ 84.7, at 2693 (amending NRS 645E.920).

po 291

any other mortgage banking activity in Nevada, and the property
secured a loan that Sylver freely entered into and later defaulted
upon. The arbitrator found that Regents’ violation of the licensing
statute was unintentional. Sylver does not assert that Regents’ fail-
ure to obtain a license or exemption to record the deed of trust is
in any way related to his failure to repay the loan. We conclude that
the public policy of the licensing requirement does not clearly
outweigh the interest in enforcing the loan.

Accordingly, Sylver has not overcome the very high hurdle for
showing that the arbitrator, ‘‘‘knowing the law and recognizing
that the law required a particular result, simply disregarded the
Jaw.”’ Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 122 Nev. at 342, 131 P.3d at 8
(quoting Bohlmann, 120 Nev. at 547, 96 P.3d at 1158).

CONCLUSION

NRS 38.241 provides for vacatur of arbitration awards procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means. We conclude that to vacate
an arbitration award on a theory of ‘‘undue means’’ requires the
challenging party to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the award was procured through intentionally misleading conduct.
The appellant has not satisfied his burden. We further conclude
that the arbitrator’s refusal to void one of the loans was not a man-
ifest disregard of the law.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s order
confirming the arbitration award and judgment thereon.

Harpesty and Cuerry, JJ., concur.

CITY OF LAS VEGAS, APPELLANT, v.
KEVIN EVANS, RESPONDENT.

No. 59089
May 2, 2013 301 P.3d 844

»
8

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Daniel L. Schwartz,
Las Vegas, for Appellant.

King, Gross & Sutcliffe, Ltd., and Marvin S. Gross, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

Before Gippons, Douc.as and Sartta, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Sarrma, J.:

In this appeal, we resolve issues arising from a workers’ com-
pensation action brought by respondent Kevin Evans, a firefighter
for appellant City of Las Vegas, who was diagnosed with cancer
within four years from the commencement of his employment with
the City. Evans filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits,
asserting that his cancer was a compensable occupational disease
that resulted from his work as a firefighter.

The salient issue that we address is the relationship between
NRS 617.440—a statute that, in conjunction with NRS 617.358,
delineates the requirements for establishing a compensable occu-
pational disease—and NRS 617.453—a statute that provides for a
qualified, rebuttable presumption that a firefighter’s cancer consti-
tutes a compensable occupational disease. As these statutes pertain
to this matter, we address whether the appeals officer erred in de-
termining that Evans could be awarded workers’ compensation
benefits upon satisfying NRS 617.440’s requirements despite not
qualifying for NRS 617.453’s rebuttable presumption. We also
address whether the appeals officer abused her discretion in de-
termining that Evans’ cancer was a compensable occupational dis-
ease under NRS 617.440.

Based upon the statutes’ plain meaning, we conclude that the
district court did not err in denying judicial review and upholding
the appeals officer’s determination that a firefighter, such as Evans,

294 Po

who fails to qualify for NRS 617.453’s rebuttable presumption can
still seek workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to NRS 617.440
by proving that his or her cancer is an occupational disease that
arose out of and in the course of his or her employment. We fur-
ther conclude that the appeals officer did not abuse her discretion
in determining that Evans’ cancer was a compensable occupa-
tional disease.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Evans began his employment as a firefighter for the City in
October 2004. In this capacity, he responded to over 100 fires,
which repeatedly exposed him to fire, smoke, and combustion
byproducts. Four years after beginning his employment as a fire-
fighter, Evans experienced health problems which led him to un-
dergo an MRI that revealed a brain tumor. Evans temporarily
ceased working following the MRI. He underwent surgery to re-
move the tumor, which was diagnosed as cancerous, and started
postoperative treatment. As a result of the aggressive nature of his
cancer, he continued regular follow-up treatment, which included
chemotherapy.

Evans filed a claim with the City for workers’ compensation
benefits asserting that his cancer was a compensable occupational
disease caused by his work-related exposure to toxic chemicals and
smoke. The City denied the claim.

Subsequently, Evans appealed the denial of his claim to the De-
partment of Administration Hearings Division. The hearing officer
determined that NRS 617.440, which states the requirements for
proving a compensable occupational disease, did not apply to
Evans’ claim. She further concluded that only NRS 617.453 ap-
plied to his claim, which provides that a firefighter’s cancer de-
veloped or manifested out of or in the course of employment is
presumed to be a compensable occupational disease if he or she
worked as a firefighter for five years or more and has met other
conditions. The hearing officer affirmed the denial of the claim be-
cause Evans had not been employed as a firefighter for five years.

On appeal before an appeals officer, Dr. James Melius—a doc-
tor who has studied cancer in firefighters for over thirty years—and.
Dr. Paul Michael—the doctor who treated Evans and who had
nearly eight years of experience in treating brain cancer—provided
testimony that supported Evans’ contention that his cancer re-
sulted from his employment, thereby constituting a compensable
occupational disease. The appeals officer determined that despite
Evans not qualifying for NRS 617.453’s presumption, he could
still seek workers’ compensation benefits by satisfying NRS
617.440’s requirements. Upon concluding that Evans satisfied
NRS 617.440’s requirements, the appeals officer reversed the hear-

Po 295

ing officer’s affirmation of the City’s denial of Evans’ claim and
ordered the City to provide the appropriate benefits to Evans.
The City petitioned the district court for judicial review of the
appeals officer’s decision, which the district court denied. This ap-
peal followed.
DISCUSSION

The City argues that the appeals officer (1) erred in concluding
that Evans could be awarded workers’ compensation benefits pur-
suant to NRS 617.440 and (2) abused her discretion in determin-
ing that Evans’ cancer was a compensable occupational disease.
We disagree.

The appeals officer did not err in concluding that Evans could be
awarded workers’ compensation benefits by satisfying NRS
617.440’s requirements

The City argues that the appeals officer erroneously applied
NRS 617.440 to Evans’ claim because NRS 617.453 expressly pre-
cludes Evans from seeking compensation under NRS 617.440. We
disagree.

Le

We review an administrative decision in the same manner as the
district court. Riverboat Hotel Casino v. Harold’s Club, 113 Nev.
1025, 1029, 944 P.2d 819, 822 (1997). Hence, questions of law,
such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. Id.; see also
Irving v. Irving, 122 Nev. 494, 496, 134 P.3d 718, 720 (2006).

The statutes’ plain language

P|
“When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words . . . ”’ Cromer v. Wilson,

126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010). In assessing a
statute’s plain meaning, provisions are read as a whole with effect
given to each word and phrase. Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc. ,
127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209 (2011). In the context of
Nevada workers’ compensation laws, we have ‘‘consistently upheld
the plain meaning of the statutory scheme.’’ SIS v. Prewitt, 113
Nev. 616, 619, 939 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1997).

The plain language of the statutes at issue reveals the general re-
quirements for establishing a compensable occupational disease,
which are articulated by NRS 617.440 in conjunction with NRS
617.358, and an exception to these general requirements in the
form of a rebuttable presumption under NRS 617.453.

NRS 617.440 and NRS 617.358 articulate the general re-
quirements for proving a compensable occupational disease.

296 Po

NRS 617.358(1) states that an employee cannot receive compen-
sation for an occupational disease unless he or she ‘‘establish[es]
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s occupa-
tional disease arose out of and in the course of his or her employ-
ment.’’ NRS 617.440 provides the requirements for proving that an
occupational disease arose ‘‘out of and in the course of [one’s] em-
ployment.’’ NRS 617.440(1)-(3); see Palmer v. Del Webb’s High
Sierra, 108 Nev. 673, 674, 676, 838 P.2d 435, 435, 437 (1992).

Both NRS 617.358(3) and NRS 617.440(5) express that their re-
spective requirements do not apply to claims filed under NRS
617.453, which provides for a qualified, rebuttable presumption
that a firefighter’s cancer is a compensable occupational disease.
NRS 617.358(3) states that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this section do not
apply to any claim filed for an occupational disease described in
NRS 617.453... .’ Similarly, NRS 617.440(5) provides that
“‘[t]he requirements set forth in this section do not apply to claims
filed pursuant to NRS 617.453 . . . ”’ In stating their respective
relationships to NRS 617.453, these statutes provide nothing more
than the acknowledgement that one who seeks compensation under
NRS 617.453 need not satisfy the requirements imposed by NRS
617.358 and NRS 617.440.

The plain language of NRS 617.453 creates an exception to NRS
617.358’s and NRS 617.440’s requirements by granting firefight-
ers diagnosed with cancer who meet certain conditions a qualified,
rebuttable presumption that their cancer is a compensable occupa-
tional disease that arose ‘‘out of and in the course of the[ir] em-
ployment.’’ NRS 617.453(1), (5). To qualify for this presumption,
one must have been employed as a full-time firefighter for five or
more years. NRS 617.453(1)(a)(1). If one qualifies for NRS
617.453’s presumption, then his or her ‘‘[dJisabling cancer is pre-
sumed to have developed or manifested itself out of and in the
course of the employment . . . [and] [t]his rebuttable presumption
must control the awarding of benefits pursuant to this section un-
less evidence to rebut the presumption is presented.’’ NRS
617.453(5). Pursuant to NRS 617.358(3)’s and NRS 617.440(5)’s
plain language, as addressed above, one who qualifies for NRS
617.453’s rebuttable presumption need not satisfy the require-
ments under NRS 617.358 and NRS 617.440.

NRS 617.453’s qualified, rebuttable presumption rests upon
certain conditions, the absence of which only results in the loss of
that presumption. See NRS 617.453(1), (2), (5). Contrary to the
City’s argument, NRS 617.358, NRS 617.440, and NRS 617.453
Jack language communicating that a firefighter with cancer cannot
seek recovery under the two former statutes as a result of not qual-
ifying for the latter statute’s presumption.

pe 291
Pe

Here, when Evans failed to qualify for the presumption under
NRS 617.453, he lost the benefit of that presumption but did not
lose the opportunity to seek workers’ compensation benefits for his
cancer by satisfying NRS 617.440’s requirements for establishing
a compensable occupational disease.

Accordingly, we conclude that the appeals officer did not err in
determining that Evans could be awarded workers’ compensation
benefits under NRS 617.440, and thus, the district court did not
err in denying judicial review on this issue. The plain meaning of
the statutes reveals that NRS 617.453 affords a firefighter a qual-
ified, rebuttable presumption that his or her cancer is a compen-
sable occupational disease and a firefighter who fails to qualify for
this presumption can still seek workers’ compensation benefits for
his or her cancer by satisfying the requirements under NRS
617.440, in conjunction with NRS 617.358.!

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Evans’ cancer was a compensable occupational disease pursuant
to NRS 617.440

The City argues that substantial evidence does not support the
appeals officer’s conclusion that Evans’ cancer constituted a com-
pensable occupational disease. We disagree.

*‘When a party challenges a district court’s decision to
deny a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency’s
determination, . . . [we] review the evidence presented to the
agency and ascertain whether the agency abused its discretion by

"The analysis above is congruent with our analysis in Manwill v. Clark
County, 123 Nev. 238, 162 P.3d 876 (2007). In Manwill, we articulated the re-
lationship between NRS 617.358, which implicates NRS 617.440, and NRS
617.457’s conclusive presumption that a firefighter’s heart disease is a com-
pensable occupational disease. Id. at 242, 162 P.3d at 879. The language in
NRS 617.358(3) and NRS 617.440(5) that bars the application of these statutes
to claims under NRS 617.453 also pertains to claims under NRS 617.457. In
Manwill, we stated that, generally, one seeking compensation for an occupa-
tional disease must prove that the disease ‘“‘arose out of and in the course of
employment”’ pursuant to NRS 617.358. 123 Nev. at 242, 162 P.3d at 879. We
also provided that a firefighter who qualifies for NRS 617.457’s presumption
is relieved from the burden of satisfying NRS 617.358’s requirements. Id.
‘Thus, our analysis demonstrated that NRS 617.457 is a presumption that pro-
vides for an exception to the requirements under NRS 617.358 and, by impli-
cation, NRS 617.440. See id. Similarly, in this appeal we conclude that NRS
617.453’s presumption is an exception to the general requirements under NRS
617.358 and NRS 617.440; this presumption does not serve as the exclusive
means for a firefighter with cancer arising out of or in the course of employ-
ment to seek workers’ compensation benefits.

298 Po

acting arbitrarily or capriciously.”’ Father & Sons & a Daughter
Too v. Transp. Servs. Auth. of Nev., 124 Nev. 254, 259, 182 P.3d
100, 103 (2008). We must not substitute our ‘‘judgment for that of
the agency as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact.’
Schepcoff v. SIS, 109 Nev. 322, 325, 849 P.2d 271, 273 (1993).
“We defer to an agency’s findings of fact as long as they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence.’ Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v.
Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 349, 240 P.3d 2, 4 (2010). ‘‘Substantial
evidence exists if a reasonable person could find the evidence ad-
equate to support the agency’s conclusion . . . .’ Law Offices of
Barry Levinson v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 384
(2008). Moreover, we are limited to the record that was before the
agency. NRS 233B.135(1)(b); Garcia v. Scolari’s Food & Drug,
125 Nev. 48, 56, 200 P.3d 514, 520 (2009).

NRS 617.440 provides the requirements for determining
whether a disease arose out of and in the course of employment so
as to be deemed a compensable occupational disease. NRS
617.440(1) states:

An occupational disease defined in this chapter shall be
deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment
ift

(a) There is a direct causal connection between the condi-
tions under which the work is performed and the occupational
disease;

(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of
the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature
of the employment;

(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as the
proximate cause; and

(@ It does not come from a hazard to which workers would
have been equally exposed outside of the employment.

(Emphases added.)
P|

In proving that one’s employment caused his or her disease, one
“must show, with medical testimony, that it is more probable than
not that the occupational environment was the cause of the ac-
quired disease.’’ Seaman v. McKesson Corp., 109 Nev. 8, 10, 846
P.2d 280, 282 (1993). Hence, one must show the probability of
causation. Id.

NRS 617.440(2) clarifies that ‘‘[t]he disease must be incidental
to the character of the business and not independent of the relation
of the employer and employee.’ NRS 617.440(3) further clarifies
that ‘‘[t]he disease need not have been foreseen or expected, but
after its contraction must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that
source as a natural consequence.””

Pe 299

P|

Here, the evidence of Evans’ on-the-job exposure to carcinogens
along with Doctor Melius’s and Michael’s testimony satisfied NRS
617.440’s requirements for proving a compensable occupational
disease. The evidence established a direct causal connection be-
tween Evans’ cancer and his exposure to carcinogens at work. It
also revealed that Evans’ cancer arose as a natural incident of his
exposure to carcinogens, that this exposure would not have other-
wise occurred off the job, and that his‘cancer can be fairly linked
to his job as the proximate cause.

Based on his knowledge, expertise, research, and examination of
Evans’ medical and work records, Dr. Melius testified that, in his
medical opinion, Evans’ work as a firefighter caused his cancer.
He asserted that Evans, as a firefighter, exposed himself to car-
cinogens and that studies reveal that being exposed to these car-
cinogens creates a higher risk of developing brain cancer. He also
stated that even one single encounter with such carcinogens can
cause cancer if the encounter is of an intense nature. Based upon
similar grounds, Dr. Michael testified that, in his medical opinion,
Evans’ activities as a firefighter caused his cancer. In light of
Evans’ work history, which included over 100 encounters with fire
that entailed intense exposure to carcinogens, Doctor Melius’s and
Michael’s testimony established a direct causal relationship be-
tween Evans’ cancer and his work. See NRS 617.440(1)(a).

Dr. Melius further testified that a firefighter’s brain cancer,
such as that of Evans, can be a natural incident of a firefighter’s
job. He asserted that when fighting a fire, a firefighter unavoidably
exposes himself or herself to the carcinogens that are present
within smoke and a firefighter’s use of protective gear does not
eliminate such exposure. Together with the evidence of Evans’ job-
related contact with carcinogens, Dr. Melius’s testimony showed
that Evans’ cancer resulted from his unavoidable exposure to car-
cinogens, which was a natural incident of working as a firefighter.
See NRS 617.440(1)(b), (2), (3).

Finally, Dr. Melius’s testimony provided that firefighters, such
as Evans, have a higher risk of developing brain cancer than the
general public due to the former’s uniquely intense and frequent
on-the-job exposure to cancer-causing carcinogens that are re-
leased in large amounts as a result of the combustion that occurs
during a fire. Dr. Michael provided similar testimony. Doctor
Melius’s and Michael’s testimony and the evidence of Evans’ on-
the-job exposure to carcinogens revealed that Evans’ cancer re-
sulted from his exposure to cancer-causing carcinogens as a result
of firefighting and that Evans would not have been equally exposed
to such carcinogens outside of his work. See NRS 617.440(1)(d).

The conclusion that Evans’ work as a firefighter proximately
caused his cancer is well supported by the cumulative effect of the

300 Po

evidence and testimony. Further establishing proximate cause, Dr.
Michael, who treated Evans and knew of his work and health his-
tory, expressed that, to a reasonable degree of certainty, Evans’
cancer resulted from his exposure to carcinogens as a firefighter
and not to other cancer-causing substances outside of his work. See
NRS 617.440(1)(c).

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
appeals officer’s conclusion that Evans’ cancer was a compensable
occupational disease.? See NRS 617.440(1)-(3).

CONCLUSION

The appeals officer did not err in determining that Evans could
be awarded workers’ compensation benefits under NRS 617.440.
The plain meaning of NRS 617.453 affords firefighters a qualified,
rebuttable presumption that their cancer is a compensable occupa-
tional disease, and firefighters who fail to qualify for this pre-
sumption can seek workers’ compensation benefits for their cancer
by satisfying the requirements under NRS 617.440, in conjunction
with NRS 617.358. Furthermore, the appeals officer did not abuse
her discretion in concluding that Evans’ cancer was a compensable
occupational disease pursuant to NRS 617.440. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s denial of the City’s petition for judicial
review.

Gisons and Douctas, JJ., concur.
Le!

MIGUEL JACINTO, APPELLANT, v. PENNYMAC CORP.; AND
CAL-WESTERN RECONVEYANCE CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

No. 59936
May 2, 2013 300 P.3d 724

2We have considered the City’s remaining contentions and conclude that they
are without merit.

Law Offices of Mitchell Posin, Chtd., and Mitchell Posin, Las
Vegas, for Appellant.

Pite Duncan, LLP, and Gregg A. Hubley and K. Alexandra
Cavin, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

302 Po

Before Gippons, Douctas and Sarrta, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, DoucLas, J.:

In this appeal, we address whether a homeowner whose petition
for judicial review in a Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP)
matter was granted, but whose request for a judicially imposed
Joan modification was denied, is an aggrieved party with standing
to appeal the amount and nature of sanctions. We conclude that
when the district court grants a homeowner’s petition for judicial
review, the homeowner may appeal from that final determination
under NRAP 3A(b)(1) and challenge the nature and amount of
sanctions imposed, if the type or amount of sanctions imposed ad-
versely and substantially affects the homeowner to the extent that
the homeowner is aggrieved as contemplated under NRAP 3A(a).
In this case, the homeowner was awarded monetary sanctions but
his request for a judicially imposed loan modification was denied.
Because the homeowner was denied the loan modification, the
order adversely and substantially affects his property rights, and
thus, the homeowner is aggrieved by the district court’s order. He
therefore has standing to challenge the order on appeal. Neverthe-
less, because we conclude that the district court acted within its
discretion in determining sanctions, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Miguel Jacinto attended a first FMP mediation with
Citimortgage, during which the parties reached an agreement to at-
tempt a Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) loan
modification based on Jacinto’s prequalification for a modification.
Pursuant to that agreement, Jacinto submitted financial documents
for assessment. Citimortgage then sent Jacinto a letter stating that
he could not be approved for a HAMP modification. After being
denied the HAMP modification, Jacinto filed a petition for judicial
review and sought sanctions against Citimortgage for failing to me-
diate in good faith. The district court ordered a second mediation
but declined to impose additional sanctions.

Respondent PennyMac Corp. subsequently obtained beneficial
interest in the deed of trust and promissory note through an as-
signment executed in its favor and recorded. Thus, PennyMac at-
tended the second mediation, as it was now the beneficiary of the
deed of trust.' At the second mediation, the mediator determined

"Respondent Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation is the deed of trust
trustee and did not attend the mediation. Our reference to PennyMac in this
opinion includes Cai-Western.

Po 303

that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust,
and a Broker’s Price Opinion to the mediation. The mediator’s
statement further reported that PennyMac’s representative lacked
authority to negotiate.

Jacinto filed a second petition for judicial review, requesting
monetary sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan
modification. The district court granted the petition for judicial re-
view and imposed monetary sanctions against PennyMac in the
amount of the attorney fees sought by Jacinto. The district court
declined to impose a loan modification or any additional monetary
sanctions beyond the attorney fees. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
Standing

Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must first address
whether Jacinto has standing to appeal the district court’s choice of
sanctions imposed against PennyMac. Jacinto appeals from a final,
appealable order granting his petition for judicial review. NRAP
3A(b)(1). PennyMac, however, contends that Jacinto is. not an ag-
grieved party because the district court granted the Petition for ju-
dicial review.

[|

A party has the right to appeal when the party is aggrieved by
a final, appealable judgment or order. NRAP 3A(a), (b); Valley
Bank v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994).
An order granting or denying a petition for judicial review in an
FMP matter is an appealable final judgment if it fully and finally
resolves the matters as between all parties. See Leyva v. Nat’l De-
fault Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 474 n.3, 255 P.3d 1275, 1277
n.3 (2011) (resolving an appeal from a denial of a petition for ju-
dicial review). To be aggrieved, a party must be adversely and sub-
stantially affected by the challenged judgment. Webb ex rel. Webb
v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 617, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244
(2009). In other words, a party is aggrieved when a judgment
causes a ‘‘substantial grievance,” such as the denial of some per-
sonal or property right. Jd. (internal quotations omitted).

|

Here, Jacinto is aggrieved by the district court order because the
district court declined to modify Jacinto’s home loan or to impose
monetary sanctions beyond attorney fees. In creating the Foreclo-
sure Mediation Program, the Nevada Legislature expressly created
a right to seek a judicially imposed home loan modification. NRS
107.086(5). Thus, although Jacinto’s petition for judicial review
was granted, we conclude that the denial of his loan modification
request adversely and substantially affected his property rights

304 Pe

such that he was aggrieved by the district court’s decision regard-
ing the imposition of sanctions. NRAP 3A(a); Webb, 125 Nev. at
617, 218 P.3d at 1244. Accordingly, Jacinto has standing to appeal
from the order granting judicial review to challenge the amount
and nature of the sanctions imposed against respondents.

Sanctions

As to the merits of his appeal, Jacinto argues that the monetary
sanctions imposed by the district court were insufficient, and he
requests that this matter be remanded with instructions to impose
a judicial loan modification and to award additional monetary
sanctions. PennyMac argues that any document-production errors
on its part were inadvertent, that Jacinto was not prejudiced by
PennyMac’s decision not to offer a loan modification, and that it
attempted to mitigate its failure to provide the proper documents by
completing a loan modification review for Jacinto. For these rea-
sons, PennyMac contends that the district court acted within its
sound discretion in awarding Jacinto $3,500 in monetary damages,
the amount of the attorney fees incurred in the second mediation
and the petition for judicial review proceedings.

P|

In reviewing a district court order granting or denying judicial
review in an FMP matter, this court gives deference to a district
court’s factual determinations and examines its legal determinations
de novo. Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 128 Nev. 505,
521-22, 286 P.3d 249, 260 (2012). A deed of trust beneficiary
seeking an FMP certificate must attend the mediation, participate
in good faith, bring the required documents, and if attending
through a representative, the representative must have authority to
modify the loan or have access at all times to such a person. NRS
107.086(4), (5); Leyva, 127 Nev. at 475, 255 P.3d at 1279. If the
district court finds noncompliance with these requirements, the
bare minimum sanction is that an FMP certificate must not issue.
Holt v. Reg’l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 893, 266 P.3d 602,
607 (2011). In the absence of factual or legal error, the choice of
any further sanctions in addition to withholding the FMP certifi-
cate is committed to the district court’s sound discretion. Pasillas
v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. 462, 468, 255 P.3d 1281, 1287
(2011).

Pt

In Pasillas, we set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors for the
district court to consider in weighing the appropriate sanctions to
impose when a party has violated the FMP requirements. 127 Nev.
at 470, 255 P.3d at 1287. Relevant to this matter is ‘whether the

Pe 305

violations were intentional, the amount of prejudice to the nonvi-
olating party, and the violating party’s willingness to mitigate any
harm by continuing meaningful negotiation”’ Jd. Here, the district
court found that PennyMac violated NRS 107.086(4) by failing to
bring certified copies of the promissory note and deed of trust, al-
though it did provide noncertified copies, and the district court
found that PennyMac failed to provide an appraisal, violating FMR
11’s document-production requirements. The court further con-
cluded, consistent with the mediator’s findings, that PennyMac’s
representative lacked sufficient authority to negotiate a modifica-
tion. The district court found that PennyMac was a flagrant viola-
tor of the document-production requirements, and concluded that
PennyMac had participated in the FMP process in bad faith. It
therefore granted Jacinto’s petition for judicial review, denied an
FMP certificate, and imposed additional sanctions of $3,500,
which represented the attorney fees incurred by Jacinto for the sec-
ond mediation and hearing on the petition for judicial review, but
the district court denied Jacinto’s request for a loan modification.
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’ argu-
ments, we conclude that the district court made sufficient findings
and conclusions, it properly considered the nonexhaustive Pasillas
factors, and it acted within its sound discretion in determin-
ing the amount and nature of sanctions. Pasillas, 127 Nev. at 469-
70, 255 P.3d at 1286-87. The district court found that PennyMac
acted in bad faith and violated the document-production require-
ments. Based on those findings, it ordered the FMP certificate
withheld as required, but it also imposed monetary sanctions
against PennyMac, thus imposing more than the minimum sanc-
tion. Holt, 127 Nev. at 893, 266 P.3d at 607. We perceive no abuse
of discretion with regard to the district court’s decision to decline
Jacinto’s request for the imposition of a loan modification or with
regard to the amount of monetary sanctions imposed against
PennyMac. Pasillas, 127 Nev. at 469-70, 255 P.3d at 1286-87.

CONCLUSION

Because the district court’s order granting judicial review denied
Jacinto’s request for a loan modification, Jacinto is an aggrieved
party with standing to appeal. Nevertheless, there is no basis for
reversing the judgment of the district court because the court prop-
erly concluded that PennyMac violated NRS 107.086 and exercised
its sound discretion in denying an FMP certificate and imposing
monetary sanctions. We therefore affirm.

Gipsons and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

306

JACK GALARDI, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND BIRDIE, LLC, A NEVADA
LimiTep LiaBiuiry CoMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. NAPLES
POLARIS, LLC, A NevapA Limrrep Liapiiry ComPANy,
RESPONDENT.

No. 58261

May 16, 2013 301 P.3d 364

[Rehearing denied June 10, 2013]

[En banc reconsideration denied July 18, 2013]

Armstrong Teasdale LLP and Bruce A. Leslie and Bret F. Meich,
Las Vegas, for Appellants.

Holland & Hart, LLP, and J. Stephen Peek, Timothy A. Lukas,
and Tamara Reid, Reno, for Respondent.

IM

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarria, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

This dispute arises out of a written option contract. Under the
contract, respondent Naples Polaris had the right to purchase Las
Vegas real property from appellants Jack Galardi and Birdie, LLC
(together, Galardi), for $8 million ‘‘cash.”’ The property was sub-
ject to a deed of trust securing approximately $1.3 million in debt.
The question is whether Naples or Galardi must pay off the $1.3
million debt. Specifically, does the option contract require Galardi
to deliver clear title, meaning Galardi must remove the $1.3 mil-
lion encumbrance for a net $6.7 million option price? Or does it
contemplate that Naples take title subject to preexisting encum-
brances, so that Galardi receives the full $8 million option price?

The district court granted summary judgment to Naples. Galardi
appeals and we affirm.

I.

Naples acquired its option rights by assignment from Galardi’s
lessee, French Quarter, a nonparty. The deed of trust securing
the $1.3 million debt predated the option. French Quarter was op-
erating a topless club on the property but losing money and filed

208 pe

for bankruptcy protection. We simplify the facts slightly, but what
happened next is the bankruptcy trustee lined up a fourth party
to acquire the property and Naples’ option. The price was
handsome—enough to pay off the $1.3 million encumbrance, to
give Galardi the full $8 million option price he demanded, and to
generate surplus funds for Naples and French Quarter’s creditors.

Naples and Galardi welcomed the Bankruptcy court sale. But
they could not agree on whether the $1.3 million needed to retire
the preexisting encumbrance against the property should come out
of Naples’ or Galardi’s share of the sale proceeds. They stipulated
to let the sale close, with Galardi receiving $8 million and Naples
reserving the right to sue Galardi in state court for the $1.3 mil-
lion. This suit over the proper interpretation of the option contract
followed, which the district court decided on cross-motions for
summary judgment.

The option contract is in writing and includes an integration
clause. The contract is silent as to preexisting encumbrances in
general and the $1.3 million debt in particular. It says simply:

Buyer [Naples] shall have an option to purchase the above de-
scribed real estate for the sum of $8,000,000 (Eight Million
Dollars) cash. . . . Buyer [Naples] shall pay all costs of trans-
fer and closing whereby Seller [Galardi] shall receive full pur-
chase price.

In their motions for summary judgment, both sides argued that
the option contract, as written, unambiguously favored its position.
Each focused on the phrase, ‘Buyer shall pay all costs of transfer
and closing whereby Seller shall receive full purchase price.”
Galardi argued that ‘‘costs of transfer and closing’? encompasses
preexisting indebtedness, so that he receives the $8 million ‘‘full
purchase price’’ with no deductions. Naples countered that ‘‘costs
of transfer and closing”’ refers to transaction costs such as record-
ing fees and transfer taxes, not encumbrances. In Naples’ view,
if Galardi meant for Naples to take title subject to preexisting en-
cumbrances, he needed to write the option contract to say so
specifically.

Both Naples and Galardi supported their readings of the contract
with testimonial evidence. Galardi offered excerpts from his dep-
osition, in which he testified that he understood that the deal
would net him’$8 million; that French Quarter (later Naples, as
French Quarter’s assignee) would ‘‘pick up the bank note, clean it
up, send me $8 million and I’m gone.” Naples offered an expert
affidavit from Diane Erickson, past president and current certifi-
cation chair for the Nevada Escrow Association with considerable
Nevada real estate industry experience. Addressing the contract
provision that ‘‘Buyer shall pay all costs of transfer and closing,”
Ms. Erickson opined that in the real estate industry, ‘‘{c]losing

Po 309

costs are separate and apart from the purchase price and normally
consist of the title policy fee, escrow fee, real property transfer tax,
recording fees, etc.’’ She further opined, based on her ‘‘experience
in the industry, that whenever real property is transferred, it is al-
ways given to the purchaser free and clear of any encumbrances or
liens, unless the agreement specifically states that it is to be ac-
quired ‘subject to’ the existing encumbrance, and the buyer specif-
ically agrees to take over the payments of the existing loan.’’

Galardi did not dispute the real-estate-industry usages and cus-
toms detailed in the Erickson affidavit. He argued instead that the
district court could only consider the Erickson affidavit if it
deemed the contract ambiguous and that, if the contract were am-
biguous, it would take a trial to resolve the ambiguity. The district
court disagreed. It deemed the contract unambiguous when con-
sidered in light of the trade usages described in the Erickson affi-
davit; it rejected the deposition testimony offered by Galardi as in-
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The district
court thus granted summary judgment to Naples and denied
Galardi’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

I.
| prerere

“fI]Jn the absence of ambiguity or other factual complexities,’
contract interpretation presents a question of law that the district
court may decide on summary judgment, Ellison v. Cal. State
Auto. Ass’n, 106 Nev. 601, 603, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990), with
de novo review to follow in this court. May v. Anderson, 121 Nev.
668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005). Whether a contract is am-
biguous likewise presents a question of law. Margrave v. Dermody
Props., 110 Nev. 824, 827, 878 P.2d 291, 293 (1994). A contract
is ambiguous if its terms may reasonably be interpreted in more
than one way, Anvui, L.L.C. v. G.L. Dragon, L.L.C., 123 Nev.
212, 215, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007), but ambiguity does not arise
simply because the parties disagree on how to interpret their con-
tract. Parman vy. Petricciani, 70 Nev. 427, 430-32, 272 P.2d 492,
493-94 (1954) (concluding that summary judgment was appropri-
ate because the interpretation offered by one party was unreason-
able and, therefore, the contract contained no ambiguity), abro-
gated on other grounds by Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724,
121 P.3d 1026 (2005). Rather, ‘‘an ambiguous contract is ‘an
agreement obscure in meaning, through indefiniteness of expres-
sion, or having a double meaning.’ ’’ Hampton v. Ford Motor Co.,
561 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Whiting Stoker Co. v.
Chicago Stoker Corp., 171 F.2d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1948)).

Citing Dickenson v. State, Dep’t of Wildlife, Galardi argues that
the district court erred in considering Naples’ expert evidence of

310 Pe

trade usage and industry custom because it did not first declare the
option contract ambiguous. 110 Nev. 934, 937, 877 P.2d 1059,
1061 (1994) (“‘If there is an ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence
to discern the parties’ intent, summary judgment is improper.
However, if no ambiguity exists, the words of the contract must be
taken in their usual and ordinary signification.’’ (internal citation
omitted)). Galardi argues that the district court compounded its
error, adding insult to injury, when it deemed the deposition ex-
cerpts he submitted about how he understood the deal terms in-
sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact. But see
Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 281, 21 P.3d 16, 21
(2001) (when an integrated written contract is unambiguous,
“‘parol evidence may not be used to contradict [its] terms’’).

Galardi’s arguments track the former common-law rule that
trade usage and industry ‘‘custom can only supply incidents to a
contract when the contract is ambiguous on the point to which the
party seeks to apply the custom.’ 12 Richard A. Lord, Williston
on Contracts § 34:7 (4th ed. 2012). But this rule has lost adber-
ents over time. Id. Modernly, courts consult trade usage and cus-
tom not only to determine the meaning of an ambiguous provision,
but also to determine whether a contract provision is ambiguous in
the first place.' See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 220
cmt. d (1981) (‘‘[U]sage relevant to interpretation is treated as part
of the context of an agreement in determining whether there is
ambiguity or contradiction . . . . There is no requirement that an
ambiguity be shown before usage can be shown. . . .”); 5 Mar-
garet N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.13, at 121 (rev. ed.
1998) (‘‘Seldom should the court hold that the written words of a
contract exclude evidence of the custom, since even what are often
called ‘plain’ meanings are shown to be incorrect when all the cir-
cumstances of the transaction are known; and usages and customs
are a part of those circumstances by which the meaning of words
is to be judged.’”’),

P|

Contract interpretation strives to discern and give effect to the
parties’ intended meaning. Jd. at 118-19. Words derive meaning
from usage and context. ‘‘It would be passing odd to forbid peo-
ple to look up words in dictionaries, or to consult explanatory
commentaries that, like trade usage, are in the nature of specialized

‘Although the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) does not control this
real-property-based dispute, we note that the U.C.C. expressly allows evidence
of ““‘usage of trade’? to explain an agreement's terms. United Servs. Auto
Ass'n y. Schlang, 111 Nev. 486, 493, 894 P.2d 967, 971 (1995) (quoting NRS
104.2202(1)); see Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 536-38 (th
Cir. 2011) (applying Nevada U.C.C. and citing Schlang).

po 3

dictionaries’’ in interpreting a written contract. Matter of Enviro-
dyne Indus., 29 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1994). We thus conclude,
as other modern courts have, that ‘‘[aJmbiguity is not required
before evidence of trade usage . . . can be used to ascertain’ or il-
luminate contract terms. Puget Sound Fin., L.L.C. v. Unisearch,
Inc., 47 P.3d 940, 943 (Wash. 2002); accord Metric Constructors,
Inc. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 169 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (‘Trade practice and custom illuminate the context for
the parties’ contract. . . . Before an interpreting court can conclu-
sively declare a contract ambiguous or unambiguous, it must con-
sult the context in which the parties exchanged promises.’’); Hick-
man v. Groves, 71 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2003) (‘‘[E]vidence of
usage may be admissible to give meaning to apparently unam-
biguous terms of a contract’’ even ‘‘where other parol evidence,’
such as “‘the parties’ statements of what they intended the contract
to mean[,] are not admissible.’ (internal quotations omitted)); In-
tersport, Inc. v. NCAA, 885 N.E.2d 532, 539 (Ill. App. 2008)
(‘contract terms need not be found to be ambiguous before evi-
dence of the custom and usage of the terms in the parties’ trade or
practice can be considered’’); cf. Warrington v. Empey, 95 Nev.
136, 139, 590 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1979) (‘‘custom and usage may be
used to establish the terms of a contract’’ (dictum)).

|

We recognize that, ordinarily, ‘‘[t]he existence and scope of a
usage of trade are to be determined as questions of fact.’ Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 222(2) (1981). To illustrate: If
Galardi had presented admissible evidence to contradict Ms. Er-
ickson’s statements about the Nevada real estate industry’s con-
ventions and usages, a genuine issue of material fact may have
arisen that would defeat summary judgment. Compare Den Norske
Bank AS v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 58-59 (1st Cir.
1996) (describing usage evidence held sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact and defeat summary judgment in a contract
interpretation case), with Simon Wrecking Co. y. AIU Ins. Co., 530
E Supp. 2d 706, 716 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that party ade-
quately defeated opposing party’s trade usage argument with proof
the usage claimed either did not exist or differed from that argued).
But NRCP 56(e) provides that, when a properly supported ‘‘mo-
tion for summary judgment is made,” the adverse party ‘‘must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’’
or “‘summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered.” Thus,
summary judgment may be granted in a case requiring interpreta-
tion of an integrated written contract, if supported by admissible
evidence of trade usage that is both ‘‘persuasive’’ and ‘‘unre-
butted.’ Puget Sound Fin., L.L.C., 47 P.3d at 943; see Restate-

2 po

ment (Second) of Contracts § 212(2) (1981) (‘A question of in-
terpretation of an integrated agreement is to be determined by the
trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or
on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from ex~
trinsic evidence. Otherwise a question of interpretation of an inte~
grated agreement is to be determined as a question of law.’’); see
Intersport, 885 N.E.2d at 538-40 (consulting industry usages in in-
terpreting an integrated written contract and affirming judgment on
the pleadings); 5 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 24.30, at 327.

The district court properly deemed the Erickson opinion admis-
sible and the option contract unambiguous in light of the trade
usage Ms. Erickson’s affidavit established. ‘‘A usage of trade is a
usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with re-
spect to a particular agreement.’’ Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 222(1) (1981).? In this case, Galardi did not challenge Ms.
Erickson’s qualifications or the legitimacy and relevance of her
opinions. Ms. Erickson opined that unless otherwise expressly
stated, real property is ‘‘always given to the purchaser free and
clear of any encumbrances or liens.’’ See NRS 111.170(1)(b)
(Nevada grant, bargain and sale deeds, “‘unless restrained by [con-
trary] express terms,’ include a covenant that the property con~
veyed is “free from encumbrances’’). She further opined that, in
the escrow setting, the phrase ‘‘costs of transfer and closing’’ sig-
nifies costs ‘separate and apart from the purchase price and nor~
mally consist[ing] of the title policy fee, escrow fee, real property
transfer tax, recording fees, etc.’’

Ms. Erickson’s expert opinions comport with the language of the
option contract and make sense in light of both common law and
Nevada statutes. To credit Galardi’s contrary reading that ‘‘costs of
transfer and closing’? encompasses preexisting encumbrances
would mean that Galardi could have increased the option price
at will just by borrowing against the property and passing the debt
along to the optionee, which is unreasonable. The phrase ‘‘costs of
transfer and closing”’ thus does not carry a double meaning that
renders the option contract ambiguous. See Parman, 70 Nev.
at 430-31, 272 P.2d at 493-94. Nor does the reference to ‘‘full
purchase price’’ render the contract ambiguous, particularly when
read in light of the industry usages detailed in the Erickson
affidavit.

2Galardi, French Quarter, and Naples had counsel or commercial real estate
experience or both. Thus, Galardi makes no argument that he did not know or
have reason to know of the Nevada real estate industry usages that the Erick-
son affidavit addressed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222(3)
(1981) (‘‘[A] usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the parties are
engaged or a usage of trade of which they know or have reason to know gives
meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement”).

re 31

Pe

The deposition testimony Galardi offered that he (and perhaps
French Quarter) understood the deal terms to require the optionee
to take subject to existing encumbrances would, if admitted, con-
tradict the option contract’s express terms. It thus was inadmissi-
ble under the parol evidence rule. Daly v. Del E. Webb Corp., 96
Nev. 359, 361, 609 P.2d 319, 320 (1980) (‘‘The parol evidence
tule forbids the reception of evidence which would vary or con-
tradict the contract, since all prior negotiations and agreements are
deemed to have been merged therein.’’). Allowing extrinsic evi-
dence of objective facts such as industry usage and custom does
not open the door to a party’s subjective understanding of a con-
tract’s terms, when that understanding contradicts the contract’s ex-
press terms. Cf. AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44
E3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the admissibility of ob-
jective evidence as distinguished from the subjective testimony by
the parties as to what they believe the contract means in the related
context of construing ambiguous contracts); Campanelli v. Con-
servas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838, 841, 477 P.2d 870, 872
(1970) (parties to a written contract are bound by its terms re-
gardless of their subjective beliefs at the time the agreement was
signed). The extrinsic evidence: with which Galardi opposed
Naples’ properly supported summary judgment motion was either
inadmissible or irrelevant or both, and thus insufficient to gener-
ate a genuine issue of material fact or to establish his entitlement
to judgment as a matter of law.

In.

The district court properly considered trade usage and industry
custom in interpreting the option contract, even though it also
found that the contract was unambiguous. For the option contract
to require the optionee to take the property subject to existing in-
debtedness, it needed to so state. We therefore agree with the dis-
trict court that the contract placed responsibility for the $1.3 mil-
lion debt on Galardi’s side of the ledger and affirm.

Harvesty and Sairra, JJ., concur.

LL

GEORGE P. CHAPMAN, JR.; AND BRENDA J. GULLY CHAP-
MAN, APPELLANTS, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY, As TRUSTEE, A GERMAN NATIONAL
Corporation; NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING COR-
PORATION, AN ARIZONA CORPORATION; AND HOMEQ
SERVICING CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

No. 58664
May 30, 2013 302 P.3d 1103

Terry J. Thomas, Reno; Geoffrey L. Giles, Reno, for Appellants.

Houser & Allison, APC, and Jeffrey S. Allison, Irvine,
California, for Respondents.

rr

Before the Court EN BANc.

OPINION

By the Court, PickErING, C.J.:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
certified the following questions to this court:

1. Is a quiet title action under Nevada Revised Statutes
§ 40.010, which is premised on an allegedly invalid trustee’s
sale under Nevada Revised Statutes § 107.080(5)(a), properly
characterized under Nevada law as a proceeding in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem?

2. Is an unlawful detainer action under Nevada Revised
Statutes § 40.255(1)(c) properly characterized under Nevada
law as a proceeding in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem?

Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1048
(9th Cir. 2011).

I

This dispute arises out of a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding
that respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company initiated
against a home owned by appellants George P. Chapman, Jr., and
Brenda J. Gully Chapman. Deutsche Bank purchased the home by
credit bid at the trustee’s sale. When the Chapmans did not vacate,
Deutsche Bank filed an unlawful detainer action in Reno justice
court, seeking to have them removed. The Chapmans countered by
filing a complaint in Nevada district court seeking to quiet title to
the property. They alleged that Deutsche Bank did not own the
promissory note or deed of trust and had foreclosed without proper
notice under NRS 107.080, invalidating the trustee’s sale.

The Chapmans moved the justice court to transfer the unlawful
detainer proceeding to district court so it could be consolidated
with the quiet title action. But before the justice court could decide
the Chapmans’ motion, Deutsche Bank removed the quiet title ac-
tion from state to federal district court and filed a motion to dis-
miss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A few days later,
the Chapmans moved to remand the quiet title action back to state
court on the basis that the unlawful detainer action gave the state
court exclusive jurisdiction over the real property at issue in both
suits. The federal court denied the Chapmans’ motion to remand
and granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss.

The Chapmans appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
They argued that the federal district court should not have ruled on

Po CU

the motion to dismiss because the prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doc-
trine required the federal court to abstain in favor of the earlier-
filed unlawful detainer action. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Chapmans that, “‘if both the Quiet Title Action and the Unlawful
Detainer Action are characterized as in rem or quasi in rem, then
the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine requires us to vacate the
District Court’s dismissal of the Quiet Title Action”’ Chapman,
651 F.3d at 1048.

Existing Nevada law does not specify whether quiet title and un-
lawful detainer actions are in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem,
so the Ninth Circuit certified questions concerning their proper
characterization to this court.

.
a

The prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine holds that, ‘‘when one
court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court
will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.’ Marshall
y. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006). If Deutsche Bank’s un-
Jawful detainer action and the Chapman’s quiet title action are
“strictly in personam,’’ no prior-exclusive-jurisdiction problem
arises because ‘‘both a state court and a federal court having con-
current [in personam] jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation.”
Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S.
189, 195 (1935). Similarly, if only one of the causes of action is
in rem or quasi in rem, ‘‘both cases may proceed side by side.’’
United States v. $79,123.49 in U.S. Cash & Currency, 830 F.2d
94, 97 (7th Cir. 1987). ‘‘But if the two suits are in rem or quasi
in rem, requiring that the court or its officer have possession or
control of the property which is the subject of the suit in order to
proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, the jurisdic-
tion of one court must of necessity yield to that of the other”’ Penn
Gen. Cas. Co., 294 U.S. at 195.

The character of the parties’ competing quiet title and unlawful
detainer actions thus is determinative of the Chapmans’ federal ap-
peal. Of note, we do not need to decide whether quiet title and un-
Jawful detainer actions are in personam or in rem or quasi in rem.
The prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine applies whether the ac-
tions are in rem or quasi in rem, just not if they are in personam.
See Seitz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 909 F. Supp. 2d 490, 496
(E.D. Va. 2012) (declining to determine whether quiet title actions
are in rem or quasi in rem because the distinction does not impact
the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule in a case “‘strikingly similar’
to Chapman).

Since current Nevada law does not resolve the questions certi-
fied to us by the Ninth Circuit, we exercise our discretion under

3

NRAP 5 and accept them. See Volvo Cars of N. Am. v. Ricci, 122
Ney. 746, 749-51, 137 P.3d 1161, 1163-64 (2006). We reframe the
questions, however, to ask whether the quiet title and unlawful de-
tainer actions are in personam, on the one hand, or quasi in rem
or in rem, on the other hand. This obviates the need to debate the
exiguous distinction between in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction,
which was historically significant but now is of questionable im-
portance. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a (1982);
see Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 125
Nev. 66, 72, 206 P.3d 81, 85 (2009) (this court may exercise its
discretion to reframe certified questions).

im.

“TA] proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property,
and has for its object the disposition of the property, without ref-
erence to the title of individual claimants . . . ”’ Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877), overturned in part on other grounds by
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205-06 (1977). In other words,
when an action is in rem, the resulting judgment applies against
the whole world. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 6, 30
(1982). By comparison, an in personam judgment acts upon the
persons who are parties to the suit. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199; see
also State v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 10 Nev. 47, 80 (1875) (ex-
plaining that actions in personam seek personal judgments and are
directed against specific persons), overruled on other grounds by
State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v. Barta, 124 Nev. 612, 626, -
188 P.3d 1092, 1101-02 (2008); Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 5 (1982). Quasi in rem proceedings are ‘‘a halfway house
between in rem and in personam jurisdiction,’ because the ‘‘action
is not really against the property’’ but rather is used ‘‘to determine
rights in certain property”’ 44 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1070 (3d ed. 2002).

A.
Lee

A Nevada quiet title action is predominantly in rem or quasi in
rem. NRS 40.010 governs Nevada quiet title actions and provides:
“An action may be brought by any person against another who
claims an estate or interest in real property, adverse to the person
bringing the action, for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim.” A plea to quiet title does not require any particular ele-
ments, but “‘each party must plead and prove his or her own
claim to the property in question’ and a ‘‘plaintiff’s right to relief
therefore depends on superiority of title”’ Yokeno v. Mafnas, 973

Pll US

E2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hodges Transp., Inc. v.
Nevada, 562 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D. Nev. 1983).

In Robinson v. Kind, this court held that a proceeding is sub-
stantially in rem where its ‘‘direct object is to reach and dispose of
the property of the parties described in the complaint.’ 23 Nev.
330, 343, 47 P. 977, 978-79 (1897). After rejecting the argument
that an action to quiet title necessarily invokes in personam juris-
diction because it seeks an equitable remedy and equity normally
acts upon the person, this court explained that these precepts do
not apply when the state has provided by statute for the adjudica-
tion of titles to real estate within its boundaries, which it deemed .
to be an in rem proceeding. Jd. at 340-42, 47 P. at 978. Although
we decided Robinson more than 100 years ago, its holding that
quiet title affects property and thus is in rem (or quasi in rem) re-
mains good law. See Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 10 Nev. at 80 (‘‘A judg-
ment in rem is founded on a proceeding not as against the person
as such, but against the thing or subject-matter itself whose state
or condition is to be determined.”’ (internal quotations omitted)).

By their complaint, the Chapmans seek to revest title in them-
selves based on Deutsche Bank’s alleged violation of NRS
107.080. Even though a judgment quieting title vests title in a par-
ticular claimant, and to that extent affects the interests of persons,
see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 6 cmt. a (1982), its es-
sential purpose is to establish superiority of title in property. Arndt
v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890). This is quintessentially a
manifestation of an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding. See Seitz,
909 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04 (holding that a suit to quiet title is ei-
ther in rem or quasi in rem); Jst Nat’l Credit Corp. v. Von Hake,
511 F Supp. 634, 641-42 (D. Utah 1981) (commenting on the se-
mantic differences between in rem and quasi-in-rem labels and
holding that the Utah statutory action to quiet title is an action in
rem, or quasi in rem); see also 40235 Washington St. Corp. v.
Lusardi, 976 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (“‘A quiet title action
is a proceeding in rem.’’); Neagle v. Brooks, 373 F.2d 40, 43 (10th
Cir. 1967) (quiet title is ‘‘purely an in rem action’’); Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 30 cmt. a (1982) (actions ‘‘to quiet or re-
move a cloud on title’”’ are quasi in rem because the judgments they
produce determine interests in property); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 95 cmt. f (Supp. 1989) (deeming quiet title ac-
tions quasi in rem because judgments rendered in them affect the
interests of particular persons in property).

Deutsche Bank nonetheless insists that the Chapmans’ action is
in personam because it does not seek to quiet title so much as to
establish breach of contract and incorporated foreclosure statutes.

320

As support, Deutsche Bank points to the Chapmans’ allegations of
Joan-servicing irregularities and improper foreclosure notices and
their prayer for compensatory damages. We disagree. The Chap-
mans’ claim is in rem or quasi in rem because they seek to estab-
lish title to property. The nature of their claim does not change be-
cause they request monetary damages in addition to the central
relief—quiet title—that they request. Here, as in Seitz, the Chap-
mans’ quiet title claim “‘is quasi in rem or in rem, [and] it does not
lose that nature simply because [they] seek[ ] monetary damages in
addition to title to property.’ Seitz, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 503.

B.
| eer

The primary purpose of an unlawful detainer action is to restore
the possession of property to one from whom it has been forcibly
taken or to give possession to one from whom it is unlawfully
being withheld. G.C. Wallace, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
127 Nev. 701, 708, 262 P.3d 1135, 1140 (2011); Seitz, 909 F.
Supp. 2d at 496 (citing Shorter v. Shelton, 33 S.E.2d 643, 647
(Va. 1945)). Consistent with this purpose, a person who obtains
title to property at a trustee’s sale may remove holdover tenants by
means of an unlawful detainer action under NRS 40.255(1)(c).

To initiate an action under NRS 40.255, the would-be plaintiff
must serve the property’s occupants with a notice to quit. If the oc-
cupants do not vacate the property within the time set by the no-
tice, the owner may file a written complaint for unlawful detainer,
seeking restitution of the premises. NRS 40.300. The plaintiff
must serve the complaint with summons on the occupants, id., and
provide the court with proof of service of the notice to quit as re-
quired by NRS 40.280(3) or (4).

Le

Thereafter, a trial may ensue if the parties’ pleadings demon-
strate an issue of fact. NRS 40.310. But the proceedings are sum-
mary and their scope limited. See G.C. Wallace, 127 Nev. at 708,
262 P.3d at 1140 (explaining that evidence extrinsic to the issue of
immediate possession cannot be introduced at trial). Typically,
the issues are whether the plaintiff gave the statutorily required no-
tice, Davidsohn v. Doyle, 108 Nev. 145, 150, 825 P.2d 1227, 1230
(1992), and who as between the plaintiff and the defendant has a
superior right to possession. NRS 40.320; Lachman v. Barnett, 18
Nev. 269, 274, 3 P. 38, 41-42 (1884) (holding that unlawful de-
tainer does not adjudicate title or an absolute right to possession of
property because ‘‘[t]he object of the [unlawful detainer] statute
was not to try titles, but to preserve the peace and prevent vio-
lence’’); Seitz, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 499-500 (unlawful detainer action

Se

limits court to determining possession between plaintiff and de-
fendant). Notably, a superior right to possession does not require
proof of title, although title can be evidence of the right to pos-
session. Yori v. Phenix, 38 Nev. 277, 282, 149 P. 180, 180-81
(1915) (‘‘[I]t has universally been held that title to property cannot
be an issue in such actions . . . even though such pleading and
proof may incidentally involve the question of title.’’). If after a
trial, the court determines that the occupant has no legal defense
to the alleged unlawful detainer, it will issue a summary order for
restitution of the premises. NRS 40.360(1).

Although possession of property differs from ownership of prop-
erty, possession is nonetheless a type of property interest. Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) (‘‘Property rights in a physical thing have been described as
the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it’’’ (quoting United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)));
Seitz, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 497-98. In his Commentaries on the Laws
of England, Blackstone instructed that ‘‘there are four ‘degrees’ of
title: (1) ‘naked possession, (2) ‘right of possession, (3) ‘mere
right of property, and (4) ‘complete title’ *’ Seitz, 909 F. Supp. 2d
at 497-98 (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *195-99).
Unlawful detainer actions fall into the second ‘‘degree’’ of title in
a property, ‘‘right of possession,’ and accordingly, are actions that
affect interests in a thing—real property. As such, unlawful de-
tainer is in rem or quasi in rem. See G.C. Wallace, 127 Nev. at
708-09, 262 P.3d at 1140-41 (explaining in the analogous summary
eviction setting that the key elements and defenses of unlawful de-
tainer center on possession and property rights, rather than per-
sonal rights or obligations); Seitz, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 500; see also
Hepburn & Dundas’ Heirs v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. 179, 203 n.d
(1816) (describing ejectment as a proceeding in rem); Scherbenske
y. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1052, 1057 (E.D.
Cal. 2009) (holding that the unlawful detainer action plaintiff
sought to enjoin was a quasi-in-rem action).

Thus, in response to the Ninth Circuit’s questions, we answer
that quiet title and unlawful detainer proceedings pertain to inter-
ests in a thing and are, thus, ‘‘in rem’’ or ‘‘quasi in rem’’ in na-
ture. We decline the parties’ invitation to expound on the federal
prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine, as those questions were not
certified to us and are best left to the court of origin.

GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and
Sara, JJ., concur.

322

ROBERT CUCINOTTA, an INDIVIDUAL; AND KARIM
MASKATIYA, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS, v. DELOITTE
& TOUCHE, LLP, a DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND LARRY
KRAUSE, AN INDIVIDUAL, RESPONDENTS.
No. 58727

May 30, 2013 302 P.3d 1099

Cooper Levenson April Niedelman & Wagenheim, P.A., and
Jerry S. Busby, Las Vegas; Beus Gilbert PLLC and Scot Stirling
and Leo Beus, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Appellants.

Morris Law Group and Rosa Solis-Rainey, Las Vegas;
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP and Charles E.
Davidow, Washington, D.C.; Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
Garrison LLP and Brad S. Karp and Andrew J. Ehrlich, New
York, New York, for Respondents.

Po

Before the Court EN BANc.!

OPINION

By the Court, Curry, J.:

In this opinion, we consider whether information divulged by a
registered accounting firm in accordance with the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, as amended by the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, is subject to an absolute privilege in a
defamation action. We conclude that an accounting firm should be
encouraged to freely disseminate information concerning alleged il-
legal acts as long as the disclosure is made pursuant to federal se-
curities law and made to the appropriate level of management. In
recognition of the reporting responsibilities delegated to accounting
firms to protect the investing public, we adopt the rule set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 592A (1977), and con-
sequently, we conclude that one who is required by law to publish
defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment albeit on
different grounds.

FACTS

In 2007, respondent Deloitte & Touche, LLP, a registered pub-
lic accounting firm, performed a third-quarter financial audit for
Global Cash Access Holdings, Inc. (GCA), a publicly traded com-
pany providing cash access services to the gaming industry. Re-
spondent Larry Krause, a certified public accountant employed
by Deloitte, served as an independent auditor for many clients in
the gaming industry, including GCA. During the course of a fi-
nancial audit for another gaming client, Krause obtained an intel-
ligence bulletin authored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) that contained information about alleged illegal acts com-
mitted by GCA and two members of its board of directors, appel-
Jants Robert Cucinotta and Karim Maskatiya. Due to the serious al-
legations in the intelligence bulletin, Deloitte’s senior management
and in-house counsel contacted the FBI and the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) to confirm the validity of the document. Although the
DOJ advised against further dissemination of the document, De-
Joitte believed it had a duty under federal securities law to disclose
the allegations within the intelligence bulletin to GCA’s Audit

'THE HonoraBLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

2

Committee, which is a subcommittee of GCA’s Board of Directors.
Deloitte’s in-house counsel prepared a script summarizing the al-
Jegations in the intelligence bulletin. Krause, along with a senior
Deloitte auditor, subsequently communicated the allegations in the
intelligence bulletin? to the Audit Committee via conference call.

The script stated, in part, that Deloitte had ‘‘learned from a
credible, confidential source that serious allegations have been
made regarding transactions and conduct involving Global Cash
Access and its principals.’’ Deloitte listed the allegations, all of
which were serious in nature. Deloitte requested that the Audit
Committee conduct an independent investigation.

GCA issued a press release announcing that it would delay fil-
ing its third-quarter report pending the conclusion of an internal in-
vestigation. The investigation performed by a national law firm
with experience in regulatory and compliance issues revealed no
evidence of misconduct on the part of GCA, Cucinotta, or
Maskatiya. GCA accepted the findings and issued a delayed third-
quarter report. GCA’s stock price significantly declined as a result
of the delay in reporting. Soon thereafter, Cucinotta and Maskatiya
resigned from GCA’s Board of Directors.

Subsequently, Cucinotta and Maskatiya filed a complaint for
defamation and tortious interference against Deloitte and Krause.?
They alleged that Deloitte published defamatory statements to the
Audit Committee and knowingly interfered with their contractual
relationships and prospective economic advantage with GCA as a
result of the defamatory statements. Upon the completion of lim-
ited pre-answer discovery, Deloitte filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that both the defamation and tortious interfer-
ence claims failed as a matter of law because its communications
with the Audit Committee were absolutely or conditionally privi-
Jeged. The district court granted Deloitte’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Deloitte’s communications to the Audit
Committee were protected by a conditional privilege as Cucinotta
and Maskatiya did not present evidence that would permit a rea-
sonable jury to conclude that Deloitte acted with actual malice.
The district court further concluded that Deloitte’s communications
were also privileged for purposes of the tortious interference
claim. Although the district court found that Deloitte had a duty
under federal securities law to disclose the allegations to the Audit
Committee in order for the Audit Committee to investigate the al-
legations, the district court found it unnecessary to reach a con-

24 New York state court later ordered Deloitte to provide Cucinotta with a
copy of the intelligence bulletin.
*For the sake of clarity, we refer to respondents collectively as Deloitte.

Ss

clusion as to whether Deloitte’s statements were absolutely privi-
leged. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

At the turn of the twentieth century, Lawrence R. Dicksee, Pro-
fessor of Accounting at the University of Birmingham and Lecturer
at the London School of Economics, advocated that auditors ought
to be granted absolute privilege in their reporting obligations.
Lawrence R. Dicksee, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors
(Robert H. Montgomery ed., American ed. 1905). He proffered
that ‘‘[iJf the Auditor is of the opinion that something which has
been done by the Directors, or by any outside persons, calls for the
attention of stockholders, he should . . . feel no hesitation in ex-
pressing his view.’ Id. at 269.

Dicksee’s theory of candid and forthright disclosure in the au-
diting profession is now being encouraged by Deloitte who argued
below and continues to argue on appeal that this court should
adopt an absolute privilege for individuals required by law to pub-
lish defamatory statements as articulated by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 592A (1977). The Restatement provides that
“To]ne who is required by law to publish defamatory matter is ab-
solutely privileged to publish it.’ Jd. We review the applicability of
an absolute privilege de novo. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual
Educ. Software, Inc., 125 Nev. 374, 382, 213 P.3d 496, 502
(2009). Although the district court did not reach a conclusion as to
whether Deloitte’s communications to the Audit Committee were
absolutely privileged, we have the discretion to address Deloitte’s
contention. See Garff v. J.R. Bradley Co., 84 Ney. 79, 81-83, 436
P.2d 428, 430-31 (1968) (resolving an issue that the district court
did not reach).

Certain communications, although defamatory, should not serve
as a basis for liability in a defamation action and are entitled to an
absolute privilege because ‘‘the public interest in having people
speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally
abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements.” Cir-
cus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 61, 657 P.2d
101, 104 (1983) (discussing the absolute privilege created by NRS
612.265(7) for communications from an employer to the Employ-
ment Security Department). While we have long recognized the ex-
istence of an absolute privilege for defamatory statements made
during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, Fink v.
Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 433-34, 49 P.3d 640, 644 (2002); Sahara
Gaming Corp. v. Culinary Workers Union Local 226, 115 Nev.

coe

212, 218, 984 P.2d 164, 167 (1999); Knox v. Dick, 99 Nev. 514,
518, 665 P.2d 267, 270 (1983); Nickovich v. Mollart, 51 Nev. 306,
313, 274 P. 809, 810 (1929), we have yet to consider whether an
absolute privilege is warranted for communications published
under the law.*

Restatement (Second) of Torts section 592A ‘“‘rests upon the
principle that one who is required by law to do an act does not
incur any liability for doing it.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 592A cmt. a (1977). Originally developed to be applied to radio
and television stations, which were required by the Federal Com-
munications Act to provide political candidates with equal oppor-
tunity to be heard without any ability to control what the candi-
dates said, section 592A now applies ‘‘whenever the one who
publishes the defamatory matter acts under legal compulsion in so
doing.’’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 592A cmt. b (1977). Ju-
tisdictions throughout the country have adopted its rationale in
cases where a party was compelled by law to publish defamatory
information. See, e.g., Hill v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412,
425 (Ky. 2010) (those responsible for complying with Kentucky’s
Open Records Act should not be held liable for releasing embar-
rassing or humiliating information prepared in the regular course
of business and placed in the appropriate file); Johnson v.
Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (those mandated
by Minnesota’s Data Privacy Act to disclose defamatory state-
ments should be afforded an absolute privilege when exercising
due care in the execution of the law); Crowley v. FDIC, 841 F.
Supp. 33, 39-40 (D.N.H. 1993) (banks should be provided with
absolute immunity from a defamation action when they obey fed-
eral financial law by reporting criminal activity).

| |

We agree with our sister jurisdictions that those who are re-
quired by law to publish defamatory statements should be ab-
solutely privileged in making such statements. However, we are
concerned that unfiltered speech to unintended persons could in-
stigate malicious conduct that would go unpunished. Therefore, we
affirmatively adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
592A, but require that (1) the communications be made pursuant
to a lawful process, and (2) the communications be made to a qual-
ified person. The class of absolutely privileged communications
recognized by this court remains narrow and is limited to those
communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
communications made in the discharge of a duty under express au-
thority of law.

‘The Nevada Attorney General opined that the Restatement approach
“appears to... . be sound legal policy likely to be adopted and followed in
Nevada.” 86-7 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 25 (1986).

 !

P|

We now determine whether Deloitte’s communication to the
Audit Committee should be subject to an absolute privilege. Reg-
istered public accounting firms are required by federal securities
law, specifically the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, to take
certain actions when, during the course of a financial audit, the
firm ‘‘becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act
(whether or not perceived to have a material effect on the financial
statements of the issuer) has or may have occurred”’ 15 U.S.C.
§ 78)-1(b)(1) (2006); see Thomas L. Riesenberg, Trying to Hear
the Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood ‘‘Illegal Act’’ Re-
porting Requirements of Exchange Act Section 10A, 56 Bus. Law.
1417, 1417 (2001) (by enacting section 10A of the Securities
Exchange Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 Congress ‘‘intended to
require auditors to blow the whistle on the fraudulent activities of
their clients’’); Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Pri-
vatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 327, 388 (2004) (section 10A “‘im-
posed a duty on a reporting company’s outside auditors to
investigate and report to corporate management information indi-
cating that an illegal act had taken place or might occur’’). When
an accounting firm becomes aware of information that an illegal act
has occurred or may occur, then it must adequately inform the ap-
propriate level of management of the issuer—in this case, GCA’s
Audit Committee—about the detected illegal acts as soon as prac-
ticable. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B) (2010).

Here, Deloitte summarized allegations of illegal acts contained
in an FBI intelligence bulletin to the Audit Committee in accor-
dance with federal securities law. See Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers,
Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 714, 57 P.3d 82, 87 (2002) (defamation occurs
when a person publishes a false statement of fact). Because De-
loitte discharged its duty pursuant to the awful process set forth in
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 and its announcement of allegedly defamatory
information was made to GCA’s Audit Committee, a qualified en-
tity, we conclude that Deloitte’s communications are subject to an
absolute privilege, precluding appellants’ defamation claim. In that
regard, we also conclude that appellants’ tortious interference
claim is precluded because Deloitte’s communications and conduct
therein is afforded an absolute privilege. Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109
Nev. 84, 87-88, 847 P.2d 727, 729-30 (1993) (‘‘absence of privi-
lege or justification’’ is a necessary element to a tortious interfer-
ence claim); Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Lines, Inc. v. Gray
Line Tours of S. Nev., 106 Nev. 283, 287, 792 P.2d 386, 388
(1990) (same). As no genuine issues of fact remain, we find no
error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment in De-
loitte’s favor. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d

MM

1026, 1029 (2005) (explaining that summary judgment is appro-
priate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law).

CONCLUSION

We adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 592A and
hold that one who is required by law to publish defamatory matter
is absolutely privileged to publish it when (1) the communication
is made pursuant to a lawful process, and (2) the communication
is made to a qualified person. Deloitte’s statement to GCA’s Audit
Committee is therefore absolutely privileged as a matter of law be-
cause Deloitte communicated information about alleged illegal
acts in accordance with federal securities law. We therefore affirm
the district court’s summary judgment, albeit for different reasons.
See Pack v. LaTourette, 128 Nev. 264, 267, 277 P.3d 1246, 1248
(2012).

GrBBons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, Douctas, and Sarma, JJ.,
concur,

LAURIE BISCH, APPELLANT, v. LAS VEGAS METROPOLI-
TAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, A LocaL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYER; AND LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE
ASSOCIATION, INC., RESPONDENTS.

No. 58810

May 30, 2013 302 P.3d 1108

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Adam Levine and Daniel
Marks, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Nicholas D. Crosby and Micah S.
Echols, Las Vegas, for Respondent Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department.

Kathryn Werner Collins, Las Vegas, for Respondent Las Vegas
Police Protective Association, Inc.

a
i

nm

Before the Court En Banc.!
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) initi-
ated an internal investigation of appellant Laurie Bisch regarding
allegations of insurance fraud after Bisch’s dog bit her daughter’s
17-year-old friend, and Bisch represented to medical staff that the
girl was her own daughter but did not use her employer-provided
health insurance. Bisch was not provided a Police Protective As-
sociation (PPA) representative during an internal investigation
meeting because she had retained a private attorney. At issue here
is whether Bisch was entitled to have PPA representation present
during an internal investigation meeting. We hold that she was not.
NRS 289.080 did not impose a duty on the PPA to provide repre-
sentation to Bisch.

Although the charges of insurance fraud were ultimately
dropped, the LVMPD issued Bisch a formal written reprimand for

'THE HONORABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

332

a violation of ‘‘[c]onduct unbecoming an employee’’ under
LVMPD Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1). Also at issue is whether
Bisch’s discipline was based on overly broad criteria or was polit-
ically motivated. We conclude that her discipline was proper be-
cause the discipline bore directly on her fitness to perform her pro-
fession. Further, despite the fact that she established a prima facie
case of political motivation, substantial evidence was presented to
rebut the presumption of discrimination. We therefore affirm the
district court’s decision.

FACTS

Bisch is a seasoned veteran of the LVMPD. In 2006, she ran un-
successfully for Clark County Sheriff, and it was well known that
she planned to run again in 2010.

In 2008, while Bisch was off duty, her dog bit her daughter’s
17-year-old friend. Bisch took the girl to an urgent care facility for
treatment. Unable to contact the girl’s mother and concerned that
the urgent care would not provide treatment without a legal
guardian present, Bisch represented to the urgent care staff that the
girl was actually her own daughter, using both her daughter’s
name and birthday. Bisch paid for the treatment with her own
funds and did not use her employer-provided health insurance.

Upon learning of the dog bite and ensuing medical treatment,
the girl’s mother filed a complaint with the LVMPD, alleging that
Bisch had committed insurance fraud by misrepresenting the girl’s
identity to the hospital.

This complaint generated an Internal Affairs (IA) investigation
into Bisch’s conduct. Although the IA investigator confirmed that
Bisch had not used her insurance to pay for the treatment, IA
nonetheless scheduled an interview with Bisch. In preparation for
this interview, Bisch informed her PPA representative that she
would bring her private attorney to the interview, but requested that
a PPA representative also be present. Bisch’s PPA representative
responded that, per the PPA bylaws, the PPA provided representa-
tion only when the member did not procure his or her own attor-
ney. The interview proceeded without PPA representation.

Approximately one week later, the IA investigator determined
that Bisch had not committed insurance fraud but still inquired to
both the LVMPD and the district attorney’s office as to whether
Bisch had violated any laws. After hearing a cursory description of
Bisch’s conduct over the phone, a deputy district attorney in-
formed the IA investigator that Bisch may have committed identity
theft, a felony under NRS 205.463.

The IA investigator concluded his investigation by generating a
report that recommended sustaining the initial complaint lodged
against Bisch on the ground that she had committed identity theft,
which, as a felony, was a terminable offense. Pursuant to LVMPD
policy, the IA investigator’s report was sent to Sergeant Ken Ro-

ee:

mane for approval. Having received mixed signals from his own
supervisor regarding the nature of the complaint against Bisch, Ro-
mane spoke with Bisch and the IA investigator directly, and de-
cided that he could not in good faith issue any formal discipline to
Bisch. Romane then contacted LVMPD’s labor relations office
and stated that the report needed to be ‘‘pulled back’’ and recon-
sidered, as he felt the identity theft charge was unsubstantiated.

A few months later, LVMPD informed Romane that the com-
plaint against Bisch would be sustained, but because Bisch could
not be found to have committed identity theft under NRS 205.463,
the complaint would be sustained for the lesser violation of
LVMPD Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1), which forbids ‘‘[c]onduct
unbecoming an employee.’’

Although Romane again sought permission to simply give Bisch
a verbal warning, his supervisor instructed him to give Bisch a for-
mal written reprimand—the lowest form of official discipline.
Eighteen months later, the written reprimand was removed from
Bisch’s employee file as required by LVMPD policy.

Following the written reprimand in 2009, Bisch filed a com-
plaint with the Employee Management Relations Board (EMRB)
against both the PPA and LVMPD. Bisch alleged that the PPA had
breached its duty of fair representation when it refused to represent
her at her IA interview. According to Bisch, the PPA’s refusal was
discriminatory because it was politically motivated by its endorse-
ment of a different candidate for sheriff in the 2006 election.
Bisch also contended that NRS 289.080, which governs peace of-
ficers’ rights during an investigation, granted her the right to have
two representatives of her choosing at her IA interview and that the
PPA’s violation of this statute constituted a separate breach of the
duty of fair representation.

With regard to the LVMPD, Bisch contended that it had imple-
mented overly broad disciplinary criteria by disciplining her for
off-duty conduct that had no actual effect on her ability to perform
her job. Additionally, Bisch argued that her written reprimand
was a politically motivated attempt to thwart her 2010 campaign
for sheriff. Following a two-day hearing, the EMRB denied Bisch’s
claims in their entirety. The district court likewise denied Bisch’s
subsequent petition for judicial review, and this appeal followed.”

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, we first address whether the current matter is
moot following the removal of the written reprimand from Bisch’s
employee file. Concluding that it is not, we then address whether

2The district court also denied declarative and injunctive relief, but since
there are no arguments regarding these issues on appeal, we do not address
them here. Powell v, Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Ney. 156, 161 n.3, 252
P3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (“Issues not raised in an appellant’s opening brief
are deemed waived.”).

6

the EMRB properly rejected Bisch’s duty-of-fair-representation
claim and determine that NRS 289.080 does not impose a duty on
Bisch’s PPA to provide a representative for an investigatory inter-
view by her employer. We then address whether the EMRB prop-
erly rejected Bisch’s claim that the discipline was politically mo-
tivated, concluding that the EMRB applied the correct legal
standard and relied on substantial evidence in upholding LVMPD’s
written reprimand.

Standard of review

This court, like the district court, gives considerable deference
to rulings by the Employee Management Relations Board. City of
N. Las Vegas v. State, EMRB, 127 Nev. 631, 638, 261 P.3d 1071,
1076 (2011); see also NRS 233B.135(3). This court reviews pure
questions of law de novo but will affirm the EMRB’s decision con-
cerning a question of fact if it is supported by substantial evidence.
City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 118 Nev. 889, 894,
59 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2002). Substantial evidence is evidence that
a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion. Jd. at 899, 59 P.3d 1219. In determining whether sub-
stantial evidence exists, this court is limited to the record as it was
presented before the EMRB. Jd. If the decision lacks substantial
evidentiary support, the decision is unsustainable as being arbitrary
or capricious. Jd.

Bisch’s appeal is not moot
P|

Prior to oral argument, LVMPD notified this court that the
issue of removing the written reprimand is potentially moot, as
LVMPD policy requires the removal of written reprimands from.
employee files 18 months after the employee signs the adjudica-
tion. LVMPD represented to this court that the 18-month period
had passed and that the reprimand is no longer included in Bisch’s
employee file.

In Nevada, ‘‘[a] moot case is one which seeks to determine an
abstract question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights.”
NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., 97 Nev. 56, 58, 624 P.2d 10, 11 (1981).
“Cases presenting real controversies at the time of their institution
may become moot by the happening of subsequent events.” Id.
Even if this issue is now moot, we may still consider this case
as a matter of widespread importance capable of repetition, yet
evading review. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602,
245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). If so, then Bisch must demonstrate that

335

(1) the duration of the challenged action is relatively short,
(2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future,
and (3) the matter is important. Id.

Despite the apparent removal of the discipline from Bisch’s em-
ployee file, the alleged political motivation of the reprimand and
the potential effect it could have on Bisch’s political ambitions
demonstrate that an actual controversy still exists. We therefore de-
cline LVMPD’s request to dismiss this appeal as moot.

The EMRB properly rejected Bisch’s duty-of-fair-representation
claim

In challenging the EMRB’s rejection of her duty-of-fair-
representation claim, Bisch contends that the PPA breached its duty
by declining to have a PPA representative appear on her behalf at
the IA interview even though NRS 289.080(1) grants her the right
to have two representatives present. We reject this argument.

Bisch contends that the PPA breached its duty of fair represen-
tation to her by refusing to provide her with a PPA representative
of her choosing at her IA interview. As detailed above, in dis-
cussing her upcoming IA interview with her PPA representative,
Bisch indicated that she would be retaining private counsel for the
interview but requested that a PPA representative also appear on
her behalf. At that time, Bisch was informed that, per PPA policy,
if she was represented at the interview by private counsel, a PPA
representative would not appear on her behalf.

Bisch maintains that the PPA’s policy ‘of not providing a repre-
sentative to appear on behalf of an officer who has retained coun-
sel and the application of this policy to her in this instance consti-
tute a violation of the representation rights provided to peace
officers under NRS 289.080(1). Bisch contends that NRS 289.080
unambiguously granted her a right to have two representatives of
her choosing at her interview and that her union’s refusal to pro-
vide her with a second representative constituted a violation of this
statute. Therefore, according to Bisch, the union’s violation of the
statute constituted a breach of its duty of fair representation.

NRS 289.080(1) provides:

[A] peace officer who is the subject of an investiga-
tion . . . may upon request have two representatives of the
peace officer’s choosing present with the peace officer during
any phase of an interrogation or hearing relating to the in-
vestigation, including, without limitation, a lawyer, a repre-
sentative of a labor union or another peace officer.
(Emphasis added.) The PPA argues that the district court correctly

concluded that the plain language of the statute does not create any
affirmative duty on the union to provide a second representative at

336

the interview, rather, it only provides a right of two representatives.
The district court then looked at the broader statutory scheme to
determine that the statute only provides a right of representation in
regards to the employer, and does not impose any duties on the po-
lice union.

| re)

The interpretation of NRS 289.080 regarding any duties it im-
poses on PPAs is an issue of first impression in Nevada. This court
reviews questions of law, such as statutory interpretation, de novo.
Nyberg v. Nev. Indus. Comm’n, 100 Nev. 322, 324, 683 P.2d 3, 4
(1984). In doing so, we apply the plain meaning of the statute and
give the words their ordinary meaning where the statute is plain
and unambiguous. Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d
788, 790 (2010). Where the statute is ambiguous, we look beyond
the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning. Jd. In
order to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, we have a duty to
consider the statute within the broader statutory scheme ‘‘‘har-
moniously with one another in accordance with the general pur-
pose of those statutes.’’’ S. Nev. Homebuilders Ass’n v. Clark
Cnty., 121 Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.3d 171, 173 (2005) (quoting
Washington v. State, 117 Nev. 735, 739, 30 P.3d 1134, 1136
(2001).

P|

Here, the statute does not expressly impose any affirmative du-
ties, but only provides the employee the right to have two repre-
sentatives of his or her choosing present at an interrogation, which
would necessarily prevent the employer from barring the employee
from having two representatives. Because the statute does not im-
pose any duty for any entity to provide a representative, we are un-
able, therefore, to conclude from the plain language of the statute
that NRS 289.080 supports Bisch’s arguments.’

Though we reject Bisch’s argument that the statute imposes a
duty on the PPA on its face, looking to the broader statutory
scheme provides further illumination. NRS 289.080 is part of
NRS Chapter 289’s ‘‘Peace Officer Bill of Rights.’ See Ruiz v.
City of N. Las Vegas, 127 Nev. 254, 256-57, 255 P.3d 216, 218
(2011) (indicating that the Peace Officer Bill of Rights is codified
at NRS 289.010-.120). In Nevada and other states with such
statutes, law enforcement bills of rights afford peace officers cer-
tain procedural protections when dealing with their employer in an

®Bisch also cites N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), for
the proposition that a union member has a “‘right’’ to have a union represen-
tative present during an employer interrogation. The Weingarten Court held
only that an employer may not force an employee to participate in an interro-
gation without a union representative. 420 U.S. at 262. It made no mention of
the union’s duties to the employee/member in such a situation.

Ss

adversarial setting. For example, NRS 289.120 provides: ‘‘Any
peace officer aggrieved by an action of the employer of the peace
officer in violation of this chapter may, after exhausting any
applicable . . . administrative remedies, apply to the district court
for judicial relief’’ NRS 289.120 provides judicial review for vi-
olations of this chapter by employers and indicates that the duties
of NRS Chapter 289 are only imposed on employers, not PPAs.

Le

We conclude, therefore, that the protection provided by NRS
289.080 is only in regard to Bisch’s employer. Because nothing in
NRS 289.080 or the rest of the Peace Officer Bill of Rights gov-
erns a PPA’s responsibility toward its members, the EMRB cor-
rectly concluded that NRS 289.080 did not impose an additional
duty of fair representation on the PPA.

The EMRB properly upheld LVMPD’s written reprimand of Bisch

After the IA investigation concluded, Bisch was issued a written
reprimand for violating Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1) by com-
mitting misconduct outside of her official duties. She challenged
this discipline before the EMRB in an effort to force the LVMPD
to remove the written reprimand from her employee file. Bisch
contended that removal was required because improper criteria
had been used in issuing the discipline under Civil Service Rule
510.2(G)(1) and because she had been improperly punished for po-
litical reasons. The EMRB rejected these arguments, and the dis-
trict court similarly declined to grant judicial review. On appeal,
Bisch reiterates these arguments in support of her position that the
written reprimand should have been removed. For the following
reasons, we conclude that the EMRB properly upheld the
LVMPD’s written reprimand.

The conduct for which Bisch was disciplined was sufficiently
related to the performance of her duties as a peace officer

P|

Bisch argues that the LVMPD disciplined her for off-duty con-
duct, which she argues is an unconstitutional application of arbi-
trary discipline criteria. The regulation under which Bisch was dis-
ciplined, Civil Service Rule 510.2(G)(1), provides a basis for
discipline as follows:

The term ‘‘misconduct’’ shall mean not only improper ac-
tion by an employee in his official capacity, but also any con-
duct by an employee unconnected with his official duties,
((1)] tending to bring the Department into public discredit
which [(2)] tends to affect the employee’s ability to perform
his duties efficiently . . . .

338

The LVMPD counters that the application of the disciplinary cri-
teria was appropriate and supported by substantial evidence. We
find Bisch’s arguments to be without merit.

Bisch cites Stevens v. Hocker for the proposition that discipline
criteria that punishes an employee for off-duty conduct is arbitrary
and capricious unless the improper conduct bears directly on the
fitness of the employee to perform his or her profession. 91 Nev.
392, 394, 536 P.2d 88, 89-90 (1975). In Stevens, an off-duty
prison guard was arrested for disorderly conduct after drunkenly
yelling at his wife. Id. at 393, 536 P.2d at 89. Despite having
never been convicted of a crime, the guard was discharged from.
his job based on a rule that forbade ‘conduct detrimental to the
good of the institution.”’ Jd. at 393-94, 536 P.2d at 89-90 (citation
omitted). This court reversed the discipline, concluding that the
language of the rule was ‘‘so illusive as to embrace an almost un-
limited area of conduct.’’ Id. at 394-95, 536 P.2d at 90. While the
court recognized that it had previously upheld the imposition of
discipline for violation of equally amorphous rules prohibiting
‘unprofessional conduct,’’ the Stevens court reasoned that in those
cases, “‘the conduct in issue bore directly upon fitness to perform
the profession involved.’’ Id. (citing Moore v. Board of Trustees,
88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605 (1972); Meinhold v. Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 89 Nev. 56, 506 P.2d 420 (1973)). Applying this rule, the
Stevens court concluded that ‘‘[appellant’s] off-duty transgression
. . . had [no] bearing at all upon his performance as an employee
of the Nevada State Prison,’ and therefore it reversed the prison
guard’s termination. Id. at 395, 536 P.2d at 90.

P|

Bisch is incorrect that Stevens renders the discipline for her off-
duty conduct improper. Like in Stevens, the language of Civil
Service Rule 510.2 is relatively broad in terms of the types of con-
duct that may be disciplined. However, like the court in Stevens,
we do not consider such language unconstitutionally vague where
the disciplinary criterion is applied to conduct that directly bears
upon an employee’s fitness to perform the profession. Our next
step, then, is to determine whether the conduct here bears directly
upon Bisch’s fitness to perform her profession. A police officer’s
job is to uphold the law, and the act of lying to the urgent care staff
in order to circumvent a perceived parental-consent law could
plausibly bear directly upon Bisch’s fitness to be an officer. Unlike
the conduct of the prison guard in Stevens, Bisch’s untruthfulness
could be used to impeach her credibility if she were called as
a witness to testify at a trial. Accordingly, protecting the integrity
of the police department is a legitimate basis for imposing dis-
cipline. A number of other jurisdictions have upheld similar

339

discipline ‘‘where the position requires high morals, control, and
discipline and the off-duty conduct is in violation of specific em-
ployment policies.’ Utah Dep’t of Corr. v. Despain, 824 P.2d
439, 446 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).* Thus, we conclude that the dis-
ciplined conduct bore directly on her fitness to be an officer.*

Substantial evidence supports the EMRB’s conclusion that
Bisch was not disciplined for political reasons

NRS 288.270(1)(f) provides that discrimination against an
employee by a local government employer or the employer’s
designated representative for ‘‘political or personal reasons or af-
filiations’’ constitutes a prohibited practice. On appeal, Bisch
maintains that the EMRB should have ordered that her written rep-
rimand be stricken from her employee file because the LVMPD
improperly disciplined her for political reasons in violation of that
statute. In particular, Bisch contends that she received this written
reprimand not as the result of a by-the-book IA investigation, but
because the LVMPD wanted to use the reprimand against her in
her upcoming run for sheriff. The LVMPD counters that the
EMRB decision to uphold the reprimand was proper because Bisch
failed to supply sufficient evidence of political motivation, she pro-
vided no evidence that the sheriff was involved in the disciplinary
investigation, and the EMRB determined that the investigation
was initiated following a complaint by the dog-bite victim’s mother,
not at the behest of the sheriff or any of the sheriff’s subordinates.

‘Despain cites a number of similar cases in other states. 824 P.2d at 446
n.16 (citing Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 564 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (af-
firming the discharge of a police officer for engaging in an extramarital affair
with another police officer because the termination ‘was clearly designed to
further the Department’s interest in its morale, discipline, effectiveness and
reputation in the community”); Puzick v. City of Colo. Springs, 680 P.2d
1283, 1286 (Colo. App. 1983) (affirming suspension of an off-duty police of-
ficer for sexual misconduct because such conduct ‘has the effect of impairing
the operation or efficiency of the department”’ or may bring ‘‘the department
into disrepute’); Millsap v. Cedar Rapids Civil Serv. Comm’n, 249 N.W.2d
679, 686 (Iowa 1977) (affirming suspension of an off-duty police officer for in-
toxication and unbecoming conduct because “‘[iJt is well established that the
image presented by police personnel to the general public is vitally important
to the police mission’”)). We further note that Despain and the cases it cites
deal with termination and suspension, whereas here the discipline was a writ-
ten reprimand, a lesser level of discipline.

sBisch also argues that the LVMPD unilaterally changed its discipline ori-
teria outside of the collective bargaining process by disciplining her for con-
duct that did not actually bring the LVMPD into public discredit or actually af-
fect her ability to perform her duties. We reject this argument, as Bisch did not
present evidence that the LVMPD ever changed the regulation outside of the
collective bargaining process, and the regulation does not require Bisch to ac-
tually bring the LVMPD into public discredit or affect her ability to perform,
only that her conduct tended to do both of these things.

P|

In Reno Police Protective Ass’n v. City of Reno, 102 Nev. 98,
715 P.2d 1321 (1986), this court adopted the framework used in
adjudicating federal prohibited-labor-practice claims under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act for use in resolving state prohibited-
labor-practice claims against employers brought under NRS
288.270. Specifically, this court concluded that

[aJn aggrieved employee must make a prima facie showing
sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was
a motivating factor in the employer’s decision. Once this is es-
tablished, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
action would have taken place even in the absence of the pro-
tected conduct. The aggrieved employee may then offer evi-
dence that the employer’s proffered ‘‘legitimate’’ explanation
is pretextual and thereby conclusively restore the inference of
unlawful motivation.

Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 102 Nev. at 101-02, 715 P.2d at
1323 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403
(1983), abrogated by Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267, 276-78 (1994); N.L.R.B. v. United Sanitation Serv., 737
F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1984)). This court adopted this test, re-
ferred to as the Transportation Management test, prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s modification of that test in Greenwich Collieries.
Under the revised federal framework, it is not enough for the em-
ployee to simply put forth evidence that is capable of being be-
lieved; rather, this evidence must actually be believed by the fact-
finder. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 276-78. Only upon
meeting this burden of persuasion does the burden of proof shift to
the employer. Jd. We find this revised framework persuasive and
adopt the federal burden of persuasion for the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination in order to shift the burden to
the employer.

It appears that the EMRB applied the Reno Police Protective
Ass’n standard, which is the pre-Greenwich Collieries standard
and required Bisch to only satisfy the burden of production. Bisch
argues that the EMRB applied the incorrect frameworks in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),
and Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 77-78
(1st Cir. 2000), in determining her employment discrimination
case. While the EMRB’s order does not clearly state which burden
of proof was applied, Bisch’s argument overstates the ambiguity in
the EMRB’s analysis. Despite citing the Padilla-Garcia test, the
EMRB aiso cited and properly applied the Reno Police Protective
Ass’n analysis. Thus, contrary to Bisch’s assertions, the EMRB did
apply the Reno Police Protective Ass’n analysis (albeit not as mod-

ified in Greenwich Collieries—which only serves to change her
burden of proof to a burden of persuasion). Further, even if
the EMRB did not apply the heightened standard of persuasion,
there is substantial evidence to support a determination that the
burden of persuasion was satisfied. We therefore proceed to
examine how the EMRB applied the Reno Police Protective
Association/Greenwich Collieries test.

Here, the EMRB first determined that Bisch had provided evi-
dence sufficient to establish a prima facie case that her discipline
was politically motivated. The EMRB noted that it was widely
known throughout the LVMPD that Bisch had run for sheriff in
2006 and was planning to run again in 2010. Further, the EMRB
noted that Romane, the supervisor assigned to administer the dis-
cipline, testified that when he asked the JA investigator about the
report, the investigator told him it was a ‘‘tower caper’’6 and that
his attempts to give Bisch a verbal warning were repeatedly met
with resistance by those higher in the chain of command. Thus, al-
though the parties contest the meaning of the phrase ‘‘tower
caper,’ the EMRB determined that Bisch established a prima facie
case of discrimination.

| eee!

Because Bisch established a prima facie case, the EMRB cor-
rectly concluded that the burden then shifted to the LVMPD to
rebut the presumption of discrimination. See Reno Police Protec-
tive Ass’n, 102 Nev. at 101-02, 715 P.2d at 1323. The EMRB then
determined that the LVMPD produced enough evidence to satisfy
its burden regarding its nondiscriminatory justification. Specifi-
cally, the EMRB’s decision provides that the complaint against
Bisch was initiated by a third party (the mother of the child bitten
by Bisch’s dog), rather than the LVMPD. It also indicates that the
TA investigator properly investigated and dropped the insurance
fraud allegation once it became apparent that Bisch did not com-
mit insurance fraud. The EMRB further found that it was not until
this phase of the investigation when the IA investigator confirmed
that Bisch misrepresented the identity of the child. The IA inves-
tigator then contacted a deputy district attorney, who advised the
LVMPD that Bisch may have committed felony identity theft.

“Both Bisch and LVMPD agree that a tower caper is a complaint that high-
ranking officials pay particular attention to. According to LVMPD, the term
refers to any complaint in which a crime has potentially been committed
and gets put on a list so that the head of IA can stay apprised of the investi-
gation into the complaint. Bisch asserts that this term refers to an investiga-
tion overseen by the high-ranking officers for political purposes. The district
court noted, however, that Bisch provided ‘no citations to any testimony or ev-
idence in the record supporting this broad and considerably more inflammatory
characterization.””

342

Based on that advice, the IA investigation initially concluded
that Bisch had committed identity theft, a terminable offense.
Upon establishing that no such felony occurred, the LVMPD lim-
ited its conclusions only to the violation of Civil Service Rule
510.2(G)(1). Ample evidence in the record supports the conclusion
that this violation actually did occur. Thus, substantial evidence
supports the EMRB’s conclusion that the LVMPD established a
nondiscriminatory reason for discipline and the burden shifted
back to Bisch. See Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 102 Nev. at 101-
02, 715 P.2d at 1323.

Bisch contends that this evidence has little to no bearing on
whether her written reprimand was the result of a politically mo-
tivated investigation, and that the JA investigator should have
closed the investigation after determining that no insurance fraud
occurred. However, Bisch’s evidence supporting an inference of
discrimination is speculative, as she provides no factual basis short
of one investigator’s reference to the investigation as a ‘‘tower
caper.’ There is no evidence on record that LVMPD officials ac-
tually directed the complaint to be given special attention besides
this secondhand assertion, and Bisch does not provide evidence
that continuing the investigation was contrary to any JA policy.
Furthermore, the facts supporting the discipline itself are not in
question. Accordingly, the EMRB was correct to conclude that
Bisch did not satisfy her burden to show that the LVMPD’s stated
reasons for discipline were merely pretextual.

P|

As this court has previously stated, we review an administrative
decision for substantial evidence and will not reweigh evidence
or witness credibility, nor will we substitute our judgment for
the administrative judge’s. Nellis Motors v. State, Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 124 Nev. 1263, 1269-70, 197 P.3d 1061, 1066 (2008).
Accordingly, we are unwilling to reverse a decision where the dis-
ciplined behavior actually occurred and the evidence of political
motivation is speculative. We therefore conclude that the EMRB
decision was supported by substantial evidence. City of Reno v.
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 118 Nev. 889, 894, 59 P.3d 1212,
1216 (2002).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court in up-
holding the decision of the EMRB.

GiBBoNs, HARDESTY, DouGLas, CHERRY, and Sarria, JJ.,
concur.

KATHERINE BROWN, APPELLANT, v.
MHC STAGECOACH, LLC, RESPONDENT.

No. 59036
May 30, 2013 301 P.3d 850

Katherine Brown, Tacoma, Washington, in Proper Person.

Jackson Lewis LLP and Elayna J. Youchah, Las Vegas, for
Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, Gipgons, J.:

This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a district
court order only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court
rule. Katherine Brown appeals from a district court form order that
statistically closed her case, even though the district court had not
yet entered a final judgment resolving Brown’s claims. The ques-
tion we must decide is whether such an order is substantively ap-
pealable. It is not, as no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal
from an order statistically closing a case and the order does not
constitute a final, appealable judgment, as none was entered. Be-
cause we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal.

FACTS

This appeal arises from a district court employment action
filed by appellant Katherine Brown against her former employer,
respondent MHC Stagecoach, LLC. Brown alleged that her su-
pervisor had violated her civil rights by engaging in discriminatory
treatment, and as a result, she was constructively terminated from
her job. Through counsel, Brown filed a complaint, and the par-
ties entered into settlement negotiations in an effort to resolve the
action. Brown initially authorized her attorney to settle with MHC
for $7,500. The parties dispute whether a settlement was ever ac-
tually agreed to, however, because Brown ultimately refused to
sign the settlement agreement that she was presented with based on
her objection to certain language in the agreement limiting the par-
ties’ ability to disclose details about the conflict and settlement.
Following the breakdown of these settlement efforts, Brown’s at-
torney requested, and was granted, leave to withdraw.

Immediately after Brown’s counsel withdrew, MHC filed a mo-
tion in the district court to enforce the settlement agreement, as-
serting that the parties had agreed on the material terms of the set-
tlement, rendering the agreement enforceable. As the basis for its
motion, MHC furnished correspondence between MHC and
Brown’s former counsel and correspondence between Brown and
her former counsel regarding the settlement terms. Brown, now
proceeding pro se, opposed the motion, but the district court

po 345

granted the motion and entered an order setting forth the terms of
the parties’ settlement. The order did not enter judgment in favor
of either party nor did it otherwise expressly resolve Brown’s in-
sistence that the parties did not reach a settlement. Brown appealed
from that order, but this court dismissed that appeal for lack of ju-
risdiction, after concluding that the order was not an appealable,
final judgment because it did not dismiss or formally resolve
Brown’s complaint.

Following the district court’s grant of the motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, and after the dismissal of Brown’s first ap-
peal, MHC issued a check to Brown for the settlement amount,
which she refused to accept and returned to MHC marked ‘‘void.”
As a result, MHC filed a motion to deposit the settlement proceeds
with the district court, which the district court granted. Like the
prior order granting the motion. to enforce the settlement, this
order failed to enter judgment in favor of either party or otherwise
resolve the case. Approximately two weeks after the district court
granted MHC’s motion to deposit the settlement proceeds, Brown
filed an untimely opposition to MHC’s motion and proposed order.
Thereafter, without addressing Brown’s opposition to MHC’s mo-
tion, the district court entered a form order statistically closing the
case on the basis that there had been a stipulated judgment. Brown
has appealed from that order.

DISCUSSION
a

This court has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the
district courts. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4. But this court’s appellate
jurisdiction is limited, Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev.
440, 444, 874 P.2d 729, 732 (1994), and we may only consider
appeals authorized by statute or court rule. Zaylor Constr. Co. v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 209, 678 P.2d 1152, 1153
(1984). No statute or court rule directly provides for an appeal
from an order statistically closing a case, see NRAP 3A(b) (des-
ignating the judgments and orders from which an appeal may be
taken); however, if the order constitutes a final judgment, then it is
substantively appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1) (permitting an ap-
peal from a final judgment in a civil action). The finality of an
order or judgment depends on ‘‘what the order or judgment actu-
ally does, not what it is called’ Valley Bank of Nev., 110 Nev. at
445, 874 P.2d at 733. To be final, an order or judgment must
“dispose[ ] of all the issues presented in the case, and leave[ ]
nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-
judgment issues such as attorney’s fees and costs.’ Lee v. GNLV
Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000). Thus, we
Jook to the text of the order statistically closing Brown’s case to
determine whether the order renders a final, appealable judgment.

346 Pe

The order statistically closing the underlying case is a form that,
like a standard district court order, contains at the top of the page
a heading identifying the court and the county, the case caption,
and the case number and department. The body of the order has a
title and instructs the court clerk to statistically close the case for
a variety of reasons:

CIVIL ORDER
TO STATISTICALLY CLOSE CASE
Upon review of this matter and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is

hereby directed to statistically close this case for the following
Teason:

DISPOSITIONS:

Voluntary Dismissal

Transferred (before/during trial)
Involuntary (statutory) Dismissal
Judgment on Arbitration Award
Stipulated Dismissal

Stipulated Judgment

Default Judgment

Motion to Dismiss (by Defendant)
Summary Judgment

Non-Jury (bench) Trial

Jury Trial

At the bottom of the form order is the date the order was entered
and the district court judge’s signature. The order contains no
other language or directives. Drawing from its language, the only
effect of the challenged order at issue in this case is that the dis-
trict court clerk has been directed to statistically close the case
based on the reason indicated by the checked box—‘‘Stipulated
Judgment.”

The language of the order seems to anticipate that a disposition
in the case has already been entered and that the previous entry of
such a disposition forms the basis for the statistical closure of the
case. But Brown still disputes the validity of the settlement agree-
ment ordered by the district court. And neither of the district
court orders entered before the order statistically closing the case—
the order granting respondent’s motion to enforce the disputed set-
tlement and the order granting respondent’s motion to deposit the
settlement proceeds—entered judgment in favor of any party or
otherwise resolved Brown’s claims. As a result, these determina-
tions do not constitute final, appealable judgments. See Valley

ooo0o0os8o0oooco

Pe 347

Bank of Nev., 110 Nev. at 446, 874 P.2d at 733-34 (concluding that
the district court’s order approving a settlement agreement was not
a final, appealable judgment because the parties’ claims were not
dismissed or otherwise resolved); St. Louis Union Station Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Discovery Channel Store, Inc., 272 S.W.3d 504, 505
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that an order granting a motion to en-
force a settlement agreement becomes final and appealable only
after a judgment on the settlement is entered and the case is dis-
missed); see also Resnick v. Valente, 97 Nev. 615, 615-16, 637
P2d 1205, 1205 (1981) (considering an appeal from an order
granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement where a judg-
ment was also entered pursuant to the motion). Thus, it appears
that there was no final judgment or disposition in Brown’s case
below to provide the basis for statistically closing the case in ac-
cordance with the listed dispositions.'

For the foregoing reasons, the order Brown challenges cannot be
construed as a final, appealable judgment within the ambit of
NRAP 3A(b)(1). See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
460 F.3d 470, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2006) (determining that ‘‘[aJn order
reciting that no further action is contemplated and directing the
clerk to mark the case closed does not become final for purposes
of appellate jurisdiction merely by reason of the execution of that
order and its entry on the docket’’); Delgrosso v. Spang & Co.,
903 F.2d 234, 236 (3d Cir. 1990) (considering an appeal from an
order that directed the clerk of the court to ‘‘mark the above cap-
tioned case closed’’ but noting that ‘‘[njothing contained in this
order shall be considered a dismissal or disposition of th[e] mat-
ter’’ and concluding that the order was not final for appellate pur-
poses). As no other statute or court rule provides for an appeal
from such an order statistically closing a case, this court lacks ju-
tisdiction to consider this appeal, and it must therefore be dis-
missed. Zaylor Constr. Co., 100 Nev. at 209, 678 P.2d at 1153.

Once the district court formally resolves the underlying case by
entering a judgment or order that finally and completely resolves
Brown’s claims based on its prior order enforcing the settlement
agreement,” if aggrieved, Brown may appeal from that disposition
to this court. See Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at 417; Valley
Bank of Nev., 110 Nev. at 446, 874 P.2d at 733-34. Further,
Brown will be able to challenge in the context of that appeal the in-

‘Because the order only serves to direct the statistical closure of a case
rather than to resolve any claims pending in that case, our conclusion would
be the same had the district court checked the box indicating that the basis for
the statistical closure was a voluntary, involuntary, or stipulated dismissal or a
default or summary judgment.

*Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we do not
reach the merits of Brown’s argument disputing the validity of the settlement.

TT

terlocutory orders entered in the underlying matter, including the
orders granting respondent’s motions to enforce the settlement
agreement and to deposit the settlement proceeds. See Consol.
Generator-Nev., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304,
1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (explaining that interlocutory
orders may be challenged when appealing a final judgment).

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Cuerry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

CITY OF SPARKS; SPARKS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
APPELLANTS, v. SPARKS MUNICIPAL COURT, RESPONDENT.

No. 59139
May 30, 2013 302 P.3d 1118

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Alice Campos Mercado,
Reno, for Appellants.

Holland & Hart LLP and Anthony L. Hall and Deanna C.
Brinkerhoff, Reno, for Respondent.

Kaempfer Crowell Renshaw Gronauer & Fiorentino and Jason
D. Woodbury, Carson City, for Amici Curiae Nevada District

349

Judges Association; the Honorable T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., in his ca-
pacity as President of the Nevada District Judges Association; the
Nevada Judges of Limited Jurisdiction; and the Honorable John
Tatro, in his capacity as President of the Nevada Judges of Limited
Jurisdiction.

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

The City of Sparks has traditionally made most personnel and
budget decisions for the Sparks Municipal Court. Following a dis-
pute between these entities over the City’s exercise of this author-
ity, the district court enjoined the City from making these decisions
in the future based on the Municipal Court’s broad authority to
manage its own affairs. We are asked to decide whether the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and the Municipal Court’s inherent au-
thority bar the City from interfering with the Municipal Court’s
control over personnel decisions. We conclude that they do, and we
therefore affirm that portion of the district court’s order enjoining
the City from interfering with the Municipal Court’s ability to
make personnel decisions. As to the parties’ budgetary dispute, we
conclude that the Municipal Court’s inherent power over its budget
must be weighed against the City’s authority over government fi-
nances. Because the parties have failed to develop the record suf-
ficiently for us to determine whether the Municipal Court properly
invoked its inherent powers on this point, we reverse the district
court’s order as to this issue and remand the matter for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Appellant City of Sparks is a municipal corporation, organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada through a char-
ter approved by the Legislature. By statute, Sparks, like all Nevada
cities, is required to have a municipal court with jurisdiction over
certain civil and criminal actions arising under city ordinances and
other matters directly involving the City. See NRS 5.010, 5.050.
The Sparks City Charter provides for respondent Sparks Munici-
pal Court in Article IV, entitled ‘‘Judicial Department.’ In addi-
tion to the judicial department, the charter separates the govern-
mental functions of the City into a legislative department, which is
made up of the Sparks City Council, see Sparks City Charter art.
I, § 2.010, and the executive department, which consists of the

Ss :

mayor, the city manager, and the city attorney, among other city of-
ficers.! See Sparks City Charter art. IM, §§ 3.010-.070. Thus, the
structure of the Sparks government mirrors the tripartite system of
government established for the state by the Nevada Constitution.
Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1. .

Historically, the City has subjected certain employees of the Mu-
nicipal Court to provisions of the Sparks City Charter and to the
Sparks Civil Service Commission’s* rules, which also govern the
City’s employees. These provisions and rules have allowed the
City to make or influence decisions regarding the selection, disci-
pline, transfer, and termination of Municipal Court employees. The
City has also routinely entered into collective bargaining agree-
ments with two labor organizations that have further affected the
terms and conditions of employment, including wages and disci-
plinary procedures, for certain Municipal Court employees.

The events underlying this appeal were set in motion when the
Sparks City Council asked the Municipal Court to reduce the
salaries of its court administrator and judicial assistant by 7.5 per-
cent beginning on July 1, 2010, and an additional 7.5 percent ef-
fective July 1, 2011, which appears to result in a 15-percent salary
reduction for those employees over a two-year period. The request
prompted the Municipal Court to question the City’s authority to
require it to reduce the salaries of these Municipal Court positions
by specific amounts when the positions are exempt from the city
charter provisions and civil service rules governing City employ-
ees. In presenting its concerns to the City, the Municipal Court
also asserted that it holds certain inherent powers, pursuant to the
separation of powers doctrine of the Nevada Constitution and by
virtue of its sheer existence. The Municipal Court contended that
those inherent powers include the authority to administer its own
budget once that budget is appropriated to it by the City and the
power to manage the two employees who would be affected by the
proposed reductions.

1As the powers of both the legislative and the executive branches of the City
of Sparks are implicated by the issues raised in this appeal, we refer to those
branches as appropriate in this opinion, although we note that the particular
government entities making up these branches have not been specifically des-
ignated as parties in these proceedings. See Sparks City Charter art. 1,
§ 2.010 (vesting the legislative power of the City in the city council); Sparks
City Charter art. II, §§ 3.010, 3.020, 3.040, and 3.050 (identifying the du-
ties of the mayor, city manager, city clerk, and city attorney, respectively, in
their roles as part of the City’s executive branch).

Appellant Sparks Civil Service Commission is a body of five Sparks res-
idents appointed by the mayor that is responsible for adopting regulations gov-
erning the selection and appointment of all employees of the City. Sparks City
Charter art. IX, §§ 9.010, 9.020.

5

The Municipal Court indicated that, as a result of these objec-
tions, it had instructed the court administrator and the judicial as-
sistant not to execute any documents required to effectuate the
salary reductions. In later correspondence, however, the Munici-
pal Court communicated its intention to satisfy the City’s budget-
cutting objectives, but the record fails to disclose how the reduc-
tion was accomplished.

While the Municipal Court purportedly complied with the
budget reductions, it continued to seek clarification from the City
as to its rights in connection with what the Municipal Court
viewed as the City’s unconstitutional interference with the Munic-
ipal Court’s inherent power to administer its budget and manage its
employees, including those who had traditionally been treated as
City employees: the court administrator, administrative assistant,
marshals, court clerk/interpreters, and court clerks I and II.? The
Municipal Court asserted that the authority to manage these em-
ployees gave it the power to make all decisions as to hiring and fir-
ing, set the terms and conditions of employment, and determine
employee wages. Further, the Municipal Court contended that it
was not bound by the collective bargaining agreements negotiated
between the City and the labor organizations, the Sparks Police
Protective Association (SPPA) and the Operating Engineers Local
Union No. 3 (OE3).

At the request of the Municipal Court, the City obtained a legal
opinion on these issues from the city attorney, but later asserted
that it could not share the opinion with the Municipal Court be-
cause doing so would violate the City’s attorney-client privilege.
Thus, it was agreed that the Municipal Court would need to retain
outside counsel to address the questions on which it sought clari-
fication. The Municipal Court thereafter engaged independent
counsel, who provided it with a legal opinion that concluded that
the Municipal Court had the authority to make its own personnel
decisions. As to its right to manage its budget, the opinion stated
only that “‘the Court has the discretion to use the budget allocated
to it by the City in the manner it sees fit.’

Pursuant to the opinion of counsel, the Municipal Court notified
the City that it would begin the process of taking control of its per-
sonnel by notifying the SPPA and the OE3 that the Municipal
Court was not subject to any collective bargaining agreements, in-
forming its employees that they would no longer be considered

In particular, Section 9.020 of the Sparks City Charter directs the Civil
Service Commission to adopt regulations regarding recruitment, promotion,
and discipline of City employees; Section 9.060 requires department heads,
including the Municipal Court judges, to fill employee vacancies from a list of
applicants created by the Commission; and Section 9.100 permits the city man-
ager or his or her representative to suspend, dismiss, or demote covered
employees.

355

civil service employees covered by the civil service rules, and ex-
plaining to its employees that it would thereafter be responsible for
making all substantive personnel decisions. The Municipal Court
also stated that it would ‘‘continue to meet the City’s budget re-
quirements, to the extent feasible to sustain the Municipal Court’s
essential functions, acknowledging the Municipal Court’s ultimate
responsibility, and control of the allocation of its budget.’ The Mu-
nicipal Court further objected to the method for establishing
its budget in the future by requiring an itemized allocation of the
appropriation.

In response to the Municipal Court’s declaration, the City ex-
pressed concern that the Municipal Court’s proposed actions could
expose both the Court and the City to liability from affected Court
employees. The City argued that the Municipal Court’s inherent
powers did not provide it with unfettered control over its employ-
ees in violation of their civil service status and any rights provided
to them under collective bargaining agreements and state law. Nev-
ertheless, the City agreed to work with the Municipal Court to-
wards reaching the goal of assuming greater control over its em-
ployees. In the months that followed, the City and the Municipal
Court engaged in negotiations in an attempt to draft mutually
agreeable proposed amendments to the Sparks City Charter provi-
sions affecting the Municipal Court’s ability to manage its em-
ployees. The City and the Municipal Court also discussed ap-
proaching the SPPA and the OE3 regarding voluntary withdrawal
of union representation of Municipal Court employees. During
this time, the OE3 withdrew any claim of representation of Mu-
nicipal Court employees, but the SPPA did not.

Ultimately, the City and the Municipal Court were unable to
reach an agreement on amendments to the Sparks City Charter.
When the negotiations failed, the Municipal Court filed a com-
plaint in the district court for declaratory and injunctive relief and
for writs of mandamus and prohibition to establish its independ-
ence from the City to make personnel and budget decisions. In
conjunction with its complaint, the Municipal Court also filed an
application for a preliminary injunction, which is the subject of
this appeal. In the application, the Municipal Court argued that it
had the inherent power to make independent decisions regarding its
personnel, as well as to determine how to use the budget allocated
to it by the City. The Municipal Court asked for an injunction pre-
venting the City from entering into collective bargaining agree-
ments purporting to cover Municipal Court employees and from
enforcing provisions of the Sparks City Charter or the civil serv-
ice rules that the Municipal Court believed interfered with its
tight to manage its employees and control its budget. Finally, the
Municipal Court asserted that the City had threatened to withhold

356

funding for the Municipal Court’s attorneys in this case and re-
quested that the City be prohibited from interfering with its right
to retain special counsel in situations such as this one.

The City opposed the application for a preliminary injunction,
arguing that the Municipal Court had not met its burden of show-
ing that it would be irreparably harmed in the absence of an in-
junction or that it had a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits in the underlying action. In particular, although the City
recognized that the Municipal Court held certain inherent powers,
the City contended that it could not exercise such powers in the ab-
sence of a showing that it was unable to perform its judicial func-
tions using established methods. Moreover, the City asserted that
the Municipal Court had failed to show that any action of the City
had impeded its ability to perform its core constitutional functions.

The Municipal Court filed a reply, asserting that it had suffered
and continued to suffer irreparable harm because, by asserting con-
trol over the Municipal Court’s management of its personnel and
budget, the City had impeded the Municipal Court’s ability to per-
form its ministerial functions. As examples, the Municipal Court
noted, among other things, that it had been required to close for
one hour each day due to budget constraints and that the City had
prevented it from using certain volunteers to ensure that ail of its
functions were fulfilled.

After a hearing, the district court entered an order granting the
Municipal Court’s application for a preliminary injunction. Con-
cluding that the Municipal Court has the inherent authority to in-
dependently manage its employees and its budget, the district court
broadly enjoined the City from asserting any control over the Mu-
nicipal Court’s employees, including their selection, discipline,
and termination, and from applying either the civil service rules or
certain Sparks City Charter provisions to the Municipal Court. The
district court also prohibited the City from entering into or at-
tempting to enforce collective bargaining agreements purporting to
cover Municipal Court employees. Although the district court
found that the Municipal Court’s employees were never properly
covered by the civil service rules or the collective bargaining
agreements, and thus, did not have any property rights under those
sources, the district court ordered the Municipal Court not to
withdraw any of the protections purportedly supplied by such rules
or agreements without giving its employees 30 days’ notice to
allow the employees to decide if they wanted to retain their em-
ployment under the new rules established by the Municipal Court.
As to the budget, the district court enjoined the City from “‘inter-
fering with the Municipal Court’s ability to use, distribute, allo-
cate, and make decisions regarding the budget adopted for it by the
City’? Finally, with regard to the Municipal Court’s retention of
special counsel, the district court enjoined the City from applying

ee!

NRS 41.0344 or Sparks City Charter art. IIL, § 3.055 in the pend-
ing proceedings. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
Standard of review
P|

A preliminary injunction is available when it appears from the
complaint that the moving party has a reasonable likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits and the nonmoving party’s conduct, if allowed
to continue, will cause the moving party irreparable harm for
which compensatory relief is inadequate. NRS 33.010; Univ. &
Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 120 Nev. 712, 721,
100 P.3d 179, 187 (2004). As a constitutional violation may be dif-
ficult or impossible to remedy through money damages, such a vi-
olation may, by itself, be sufficient to constitute irreparable harm.
See Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 715 (9th Cir.
1997). Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is within
the district court’s discretion. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 120
Ney. at 721, 100 P.3d at 187. In the context of an appeal from a
preliminary injunction, we review questions of law de novo and the
district court’s factual findings for clear error or a lack of sub-
stantial evidentiary support. Jd.

‘We begin our consideration of the issues presented in this appeal
by examining the Nevada Constitution’s impact on the parties’
dispute over whether the City or the Municipal Court is properly
vested with the authority to manage and control Municipal Court
employees, before addressing the issues concerning the budget. As
to the personnel issues, we must determine whether Article 15,
Section 11 of the Nevada Constitution authorizes the City to con-
trol the hiring, supervision, and discipline of Municipal Court
employees based on the inclusion of certain provisions to that ef-
fect in the Sparks City Charter. Because we conclude that the Con-
stitution does not confer such authority on the City, we must next
address whether the City’s exercise of such control unconstitu-
tionally interferes with the inherent powers possessed by the Mu-
nicipal Court based on the separation of powers doctrine and by
virtue of its sheer existence.

Article 15, Section 11
_

Initially, we note that the issues presented by this matter arose
out of the City’s request that the Municipal Court reduce
the salaries of the court administrator and judicial assistant. The
City concedes, as it must, that under Sparks City Charter art. IV,
§§ 4.023 and 4.025, the Municipal Court has ‘‘virtually unfettered
authority’ over the hiring and firing of its court administrator

Se

and judicial assistant. Thus, what is at issue here is whether the
Municipal Court or the City may exercise control over the re-
maining Municipal Court employees, namely, the marshals, court
clerk/interpreters, and court clerks I and II. The City claims au-
thority to control certain aspects of the Municipal Court’s person-
nel decisions based on provisions of the city charter, which it
contends give the City authority to make decisions with regard to
the hiring, supervision, and discipline of Municipal Court em-
ployees. But the charter cannot provide the City with authority that
is otherwise unconstitutional.

The City attempts to find a viable constitutional basis for the au-
thority to control Municipal Court employees, conferred by the
charter, in Article 15, Section 11 of the Nevada Constitution,
which provides that

[t]he tenure of any office not herein provided for may be de-
clared by law, or, when not so declared, such office shall be
held during the pleasure of the authority making the appoint-
ment, but the Legislature shall not create any office the tenure
of which shall be longer than four (4) years, except as herein
otherwise provided in this Constitution. In the case of any of-
ficer or employee of any municipality governed under a
legally adopted charter, the provisions of such charter with
teference to the tenure of office or the dismissal from office
of any such officer or employee shall control.

The City more specifically contends that Article 15, Section 11
permits a municipality to enact charter provisions governing the
tenure and dismissal of all city employees, including Municipal
Court employees. The Municipal Court asserts that Article 15,
Section 11 applies only to city officers, as distinguished from city
employees.*

This court has long recognized the distinction between an ‘‘of-
ficer’’ and an ‘‘employee.’’ Compare Eads v. City of Boulder City,
94 Nev. 735, 736-37, 587 P.2d 39, 40-41 (1978) (holding that a
position created and defined by law, which invested the person
holding it with a ‘‘portion of the sovereign functions of govern-
ment,’’ was an office), with Mullen v. Clark Cnty., 89 Nev. 308,
310-11, 511 P.2d 1036, 1037-38 (1973) (concluding that an indi-
vidual was an employee and not an officer when his duties were
defined by his superiors, ‘‘no tenure attached to his position,’ he
could not hire or fire other employees, and “‘he was wholly sub-
ordinate and responsible to his superiors’’); see also State v. Cole,

“The Municipal Court alternatively argues that its employees are not city
employees, Because we conclude that Article 15, Section 11 generally does not
apply to city employees, we need not reach the Municipal Court’s alternative
argument.

pe

38 Nev. 215, 148 P. 551 (1915) (determining that a party was not
an officer for the purpose of a constitutional provision prohibiting
a senator from being appointed to an office created during the term
in which the senator was elected). The parties do not dispute that
the controversy in this action involves only employees of the Mu-
nicipal Court, as opposed to officers. Thus, if Article 15, Section
11 applies only to officers, it has no application to this action. But
if Article 15, Section 11 applies generally to employees as well as
officers, the charter provisions provide a valid basis for the City to
exercise control over the tenure and dismissal of Municipal Court
employees.

Determining whether Article 15, Section 11 applies to city em-
ployees requires us to interpret that constitutional provision. ‘“The
tules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of a con-
stitutional provision.’ We the People Nev. v. Miller, 124 Nev. 874,
881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2008). Thus, we look first to the plain
language of the provision, and, if the meaning of that language is
unambiguous, we do not look beyond it, Beazer Homes Nev., Inc.
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97 P.2d
1132, 1135 (2004), unless it is clear that the ordinary meaning was
not intended by the drafters. City of Reno v. Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council of N. Nev., 127 Nev. 114, 121, 251 P.3d 718, 722
(2011). A provision is ambiguous if its language may be reason-
ably interpreted in two or more inconsistent ways. Strickland v.
Waymire, 126 Nev. 230, 234, 235 P.3d 605, 608 (2010). In order
to interpret an ambiguous constitutional provision, we consider
“the provision’s history, public policy, and reason to determine
what the voters intended.’’’ Jd. (quoting Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev.
579, 590, 188 P.3d 1112, 1120 (2008)). ‘‘The goal of constitu-
tional interpretation is to determine the public understanding of
a legal text leading up to and in the period after its enactment
or ratification.’’ Jd. (internal quotations omitted).

On its face, the relevant language of Article 15, Section 11 is
ambiguous. In particular, although the text refers to ‘any officer or
employee’ of a municipality, it also states that the charter will con-
trol as to the “‘tenure of office or the dismissal from office’’ of
those officers or employees. Nev. Const. art. 15, § 11 (emphasis
added). This creates an ambiguity because reading the provision to
apply only to officers appears to render the phrase ‘‘or employee’’
meaningless, while reading it to apply to both officers and em-
ployees seems to render the phrases ‘‘of office”’ and “‘from office”
meaningless. See Eads, 94 Nev. at 736-37, 587 P.2d at 40-41
(holding that a position created and defined by Jaw, which in-
vested the person holding it with a ‘‘portion of the sovereign func-
tions of the government,’ was an office). Additionally, as this

60

court’s cases have specifically associated ‘‘tenure’’ with officers in
discussing the differences between officers and employees, see
Mullen, 89 Nev. at 311, 511 P.2d at 1038 (concluding that an in-
dividual was an employee, rather than an officer, in part because
“no tenure attached to his position’’); Cole, 38 Nev. at 223, 148
P. at 553 (explaining that ‘‘[tJhe great weight of authority holds the
term ‘office’ to embrace the ideas of tenure, duration, fees, or
emoluments, and duties’), reading the provision to apply to em-
ployees as well as officers also would arguably be contrary to the
usual meaning of the term ‘‘tenure.’’

In the face of this ambiguity, we look beyond the language of the
provision to determine the intent of the voters in approving the
amendment that added this language to Article 15, Section 11. See
Strickland, 126 Nev. at 234, 235 P.3d at 608. Prior to 1946, Ar-
ticle 15, Section 11 provided only that

{t]he tenure of any office not herein provided for may be de-
clared by law, or, when not so declared, such office shall be
held during the pleasure of the authority making the appoint-
ment, but the legislature shall not create any office the tenure
of which shall be longer than four (4) years, except as herein
otherwise provided in this constitution.

1945 Nev. Const. art. 15, § 11, at 56. As originally drafted, Ar-
ticle 15, Section 11 plainly applied only to officers, as the provi-
sion did not even mention employees. In 1946, the provision was
amended to add the final sentence, at issue here, stating that,
“‘[iJn the case of any officer or employee of any municipality gov-
erned under a legally adopted charter, the provisions of such char-
ter with reference to the tenure of office or the dismissal from of-
fice of any such officer or employee shall control.”’ See 1943 Nev.
Stat., Assembly Joint Resolution No. 19, at 325; 1945 Nev. Stat.,
Assembly Joint Resolution No. 10, at 505; 1947 Nev. Const. art.
15, § 11, at 56.

The stated purpose of the 1946 amendment was ‘‘to except [a]
municipality from the present constitutional provision that the leg-
islature shall not create any office the tenure of which shall be
longer than four years.’’ Legal Notice, Amendment to the Consti-
tution to Be Voted Upon in State of Nevada at General Election,
November 5, 1946, Nevada State Journal, October 5, 1946, at 9.
Because the amendment was intended to create an exception to the
existing rule, it follows that only those who had been subject to the
pre-amendment provision were meant to be included in the excep-
tion. Applying this reasoning, the amendment would not have
been intended to apply to employees, as they were not subject to
the pre-amendment version of the provision.

This reasoning, however, leads to the question of why the
drafters included the term employee in the amended provision if

en

employees were not included within the rule or the exception.
The answer to this query is that it appears that the drafters believed
that certain city employees, particularly employees within the civil
service, were considered to be officers, and thus, were subject to
Article 15, Section 11. Editorial, Question No. 1, Nevada State
Journal, November 2, 1946, at 4 (stating that ‘‘[e]mployees of
cities, holding civil service status, are considered [to be] holding
office and consequently it is contended their tenure of office would
be limited to four years by strict application of the constitution’).
As a result, the drafters appear to have intended to exempt from
the provision any such employees who were subject to the provi-
sion because, in the drafter’s view, they were considered to be of-
ficers. But as is clear from our jurisprudence, officers are funda-
mentally different from employees, and thus the employees that
this amendment sought to exempt from Article 15, Section 11 were
never subject to that provision to begin with based upon the very
nature of their roles as employees rather than officers. See Eads,
94 Nev. at 736-37, 587 P.2d at 40-41; Mullen, 89 Nev. at 311, 511
P.2d at 1038); Cole, 38 Nev. at 223, 148 P. at 553. Therefore, in
seeking to clarify that employees were not subject to this provision,
the amendment instead conflated the meaning of the terms ‘‘offi-
cers’’ and ‘‘employees’’ and created the very ambiguity in Article
15, Section 11 that we must now resolve here.

In advancing a literal reading of the text of the amendment to
Article 15, Section 11, so that both officers and employees can be
constitutionally subject to the charter provisions at issue here, our
concurring and dissenting colleague ignores the purpose behind
this amendment and the fundamental misapprehension regarding
the applicability of the pre-amendment version of Article 15, Sec-
tion 11 to employees that spurred the amendment’s enactment.
Adopting the approach taken by our colleague would require us to
ignore the well-established distinctions between officers and em-
ployees and would only serve to perpetuate the conflation of these
terms created by this amendment, which we will not do.

Based on the purpose of the amendment and the apparent intent
of the drafters and voters, we conclude that, to the extent that Ar-
ticle 15, Section 11 may apply to city employees, it applies only to
employees who are also considered to be officers. In reaching this
conclusion, we recognize that, given this court’s precedent re~
garding the differences between officers and employees, it is not
clear which, if any, city employees would be deemed to fall into
this category. Nevertheless, as it is undisputed that the Municipal
Court employees at issue in this case are not considered to be of-
ficers, and thus, would not fall under the ambit of Article 15, Sec-
tion 11, it is not necessary to reach that question here. Thus, Ar-
ticle 15, Section 11 does not render the charter provisions
authorizing the City to make decisions regarding the hiring, su-

362

pervision, and discipline of Municipal Court employees constitu-
tional, and we therefore turn to whether the inherent authority and
separation of powers doctrines bar the application of these charter
provisions to Municipal Court employees.

Inherent powers

a

This court has long recognized that “‘the judiciary, as a coequal
branch of government, has the inherent power to protect itself and
to administer its affairs.’ City of N. Las Vegas ex rel. Arndt v.
Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 294, 550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976). ‘‘Inherent
judicial powers stem from two sources: the separation of powers
doctrine and the power inherent in a court by virtue of its sheer ex-
istence.’”’ Blackjack Bonding v. City of Las Vegas Mun. Court, 116
Nev. 1213, 1218, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000). Of particular im-
portance here, municipal courts, as coequal branches of their local
governments, see Daines, 92 Nev. at 295, 550 P.2d at 400, and a
part of the state constitutional judicial system,° see Nev. Const. art.
6, § 1 (authorizing the Legislature to establish municipal courts as
part of the court system vested with the judicial power of the
state); Daines, 92 Nev. at 295, 550 P.2d at 400, are protected by
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine and possess inher-
ent judicial powers to the same extent as the other courts of this
state. See Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1; Daines, 92 Nev. at 295, 550
P.2d at 400; see also Mowrer v. Rusk, 618 P.2d 886 (N.M. 1980)
(concluding that, although the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine generally does not apply to local government entities, it
does apply to the New Mexico municipal courts because they are
a part of their state judicial system).

Under the separation of powers doctrine of the Nevada Consti-
tution, each of the three branches of government is vested with au-
thority to exercise its own functions, and no branch may exercise

While municipal courts are included within the state constitutional judicial
system, they are nonetheless primarily city entities, rather than an extension of
the state. See Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas, 116 Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959,
962 (2000). Beyond this conclusion, we do not find it necessary in resolving
this appeal to delineate, as the City asks us to do, the extent to which a mu-
nicipal court is a part of the city, as opposed to a part of the state judicial sys-
tem. Although the City contends that resolving this issue will determine the
outcome of questions as to whether the Municipal Court is an employer,
whether it is subject to NRS Chapter 288, and whether it is exclusively liable
for employment-related lawsuits, we conclude that those questions are not
properly presented here, as this situation does not involve any Municipal
Court employees challenging employment-related decisions. See Personhood
Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (explaining that
“this court’s duty is not to render advisory opinions but, rather, to resolve
actual controversies by an enforceable judgment”).

363

the functions of another unless expressly permitted to do so by the
Nevada Constitution. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 19, 422
P.2d 237, 241-42 (1967) (discussing Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1).
Thus, the courts, whose judicial functions involve hearing and re-
solving legal controversies, possess the authority to take any ac-
tions that are inherent or incidental to that function. Id. at 20, 422
P.2d at 242. Furthermore, any statutory scheme that would allow
the executive or legislative branches of a municipal government to
control or exercise the inherent powers of the municipal court
would violate the separation of powers doctrine. See id. at 19, 422
P.2d at 241-42; see also Mowrer, 618 P.2d at 891.

P|

Each governmental branch also has certain inherent powers, by
virtue of its sheer existence and as a coequal branch of govern-
ment, to carry out its basic functions. Halverson v. Hardcastle,
123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439-40 (2007). This authority
is ‘‘broader and more fundamental than the inherent power con-
ferred by separation of powers.’ Blackjack Bonding, 116 Nev. at
1218, 14 P.3d at 1279. Thus, in addition to the specific powers as-
signed to the governmental branches, each branch has inherent
ministerial powers, which include ‘‘methods of implementation to
accomplish or put into effect the basic function’’ of that branch.
Galloway, 83 Nev. at 21, 422 P.2d at 243. Within these ministe-
tial functions, the powers of the branches sometimes appear to
overlap. Id. at 21-22, 422 P.2d at 243. To the extent that any du-
plication of authority can be traced back to the individual branch’s
essential functions and basic source of power, the overlapping may
be valid, but it is essential to the balance of powers that each
branch is careful not to impinge on the authority of the other two
branches, even in a small and seemingly harmless manner. Jd.

Pe

When a court’s inherent authority arises out of the court’s man-
agement of its own affairs, this court has held that the court is ‘‘en-
titled to manage [its] internal affairs without interference from sep-
arate governmental branches.”’ Nunez y. City of N. Las Vegas, 116
Nev. 535, 540, 1 P.3d 959, 962 (2000). Put differently, even apart
from any constitutional or statutory concerns, based solely on the
court’s inherent authority to manage its own affairs, the legislative
and executive branches are strictly prohibited from infringing on
the court’s ‘‘incidental powers reasonable and necessary to carry
out the duties required for the administration of justice”’ Goldberg
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 93 Nev. 614, 616, 572 P.2d 521,
522 (1977). Thus, if an action falling under the court’s inherent
authority is part of the court’s day-to-day functioning or regular
management of its internal affairs, the court is empowered to per-
form that action without the need for further justification and

TT

without interference from the legislative or executive branch. See
id. In contrast, if the court’s need to exercise its inherent author-
ity arises outside of the court’s regular management of its affairs,
the invocation of the court’s inherent powers must be justified by
demonstrating that some circumstance requires the court to invoke
such authority in order to perform its constitutional functions. See
Halverson, 123 Nev. at 263, 163 P.3d at 441.

The resolution of the controversy in this action turns on the par-
ties’ differing interpretations of the Municipal Court’s ability to in-
voke its inherent powers under the present circumstances. On one
side, the Municipal Court contends that it has the inherent power
to exercise control over its employees and the budget appropriated
to it by the City, and that the City cannot interfere with that
power. Conversely, while conceding that the Municipal Court pos-
sesses certain inherent powers, the City contends that the Munici-
pal Court may only act pursuant to those powers when it is rea-
sonable and necessary to do so, and the City denies that the
Municipal Court has demonstrated that it is reasonable and neces-
sary to use its inherent powers in this situation. The City further
argues that the Municipal Court has not established a constitutional
violation, insofar as it has not shown that any action of the City
has impeded its ability to perform its core constitutional functions.

With this background in mind, we turn to the invocations of in-
herent authority involved in this case.

Management and control of employees

| ere

The district court’s order enjoined the City from exercising any
power over Municipal Court employees, including their selection,
promotion, or termination. To the extent that both the Municipal
Court and the City claim the authority to be involved in the Mu-
nicipal Court’s personnel decisions, this purported function of the
two branches appears to overlap. See Galloway, 83 Nev. at 21-22,
422 P.2d at 243. In order to determine whether both branches
validly claim this authority, the question that follows is whether the
function can be traced back to each branch’s essential functions
and basic source of power. Id.

This court has recognized that municipal courts are the judicial
branches of their respective city governments, and they possess all
of the inherent powers enjoyed by this court, the district courts,
and the justice courts. Nunez, 116 Nev. at 539-40, 1 P.3d at 962.
As such, the Municipal Court’s express function is to decide con-
troversies and enforce judgments. See Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20,
422 P.2d at 242. It would be impossible for the Municipal Court
to exist and fulfill this role without employees to manage the
docket, process paperwork, provide administrative assistance, and
monitor compliance with its orders, among many other ministerial

Se:

duties. See Halverson, 123 Nev. at 261, 163 P.3d at 439-40 (ex-
plaining that some inherent ministerial powers arise out of the
sheer existence of the governmental branches). Furthermore, the
Municipal Court must be able to exercise control over the em-
ployees who perform these tasks in order to ensure that the ap-
propriate candidates are chosen for the jobs, the tasks are per-
formed in a satisfactory manner, and proper sanctions and rewards
are available when necessary. See State ex rel. Harvey v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 754, 770, 32 P.3d 1263, 1273
(2001) (recognizing that the provisions of the Nevada Constitution
providing for an independent judiciary ‘‘would be seriously un-
dermined if the judiciary were prohibited, under any circumstance,
from exercising direct control over the personnel who were per-
forming vital and essential court functions’’).

Thus, the Municipal Court’s claim of inherent authority to man-
age its employees relates directly to its essential functions. See
Galloway, 83 Nev. at 21-22, 422 P.2d at 243. Additionally, be-
cause the management of Municipal Court employees is a minis-
terial function that is implicated by the Municipal Court’s everyday
management of its internal affairs, we conclude that it is continu-
ously present insofar as its removal would impair the Municipal
Court’s ability to fulfill its constitutional functions. See Harvey,
117 Nev. at 770, 32 P.3d at 1273. Here, the record shows that
staffing shortages have led to the Municipal Court closing for one
hour every judicial day and that disputes have arisen between the
Municipal Court and the City with regard to the Municipal Court’s
use of volunteers, which the Municipal Court argues it needs to
use to perform certain tasks that will otherwise be severely delayed
if the Municipal Court must rely on its current employees. These
issues go to the heart of the Municipal Court’s ability to perform
its core judicial functions and demonstrate why the Municipal
Court reasonably needs to maintain control over its employees.

The City’s legislative function is to make and pass local laws
and to control the power of the purse. See generally Sparks City
Charter art. I; see also Sparks City Charter art. Il, § 2.060(1) and
(5); State of Nev. Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 108 Nev. 15, 21,
824 P.2d 276, 279 (1992); Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at
242. Its executive function is to carry out and enforce those laws
and to administer the affairs of the city. See generally Sparks City
Charter art. IN; see also Sparks City Charter art. I, § 3.020(1);
Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242. Thus, the act of man-
aging Municipal Court employees does not itself relate to any of
the City’s express legislative or executive functions. Moreover, the
City has not identified any reason why it would need to exert con-
trol over the Municipal Court’s employees in order to fulfill its
constitutional duties. In the absence of any valid basis for exercis-
ing control over these employees, the City’s imposition of its in-

fluence on the Municipal Court’s personnel decisions violates the
separation of powers doctrine because it unconstitutionally in-
fringes on the Municipal Court’s authority to manage its employ-
ees. See Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1 (providing that no branch may per-
form the function of another branch unless expressly permitted to
do so by the Nevada Constitution); Nev. Const. art. 6, § 1 (in-
cluding municipal courts in the state judicial system); see also
Goldberg, 93 Nev. at 616, 572 P.2d at 522; Galloway, 83 Nev. at
19, 422 P.2d at 241-42; Mowrer, 618 P.2d at 891.

In the underlying case, the district court enjoined the City from
interfering in any way with the Municipal Court’s personnel deci-
sions, including the hiring, firing, and discipline of employees. In
light of our conclusions herein, the district court correctly found
that the Municipal Court was likely to succeed on the merits of its
action to prevent the City from interfering with its personnel de-
cisions on the ground that doing so violated the Municipal Court’s
rights under the separation of powers doctrine. See Nev. Const. art.
3, § 1. Additionally, the harm from this constitutional violation is
irreparable, as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assign a
monetary value to remedy the violation. See Monterey Mech. Co.
v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 715 (1997). We therefore affirm that por-
tion of the district court’s injunction prohibiting the City from in-
terfering with the Municipal Court’s management of its employ-
ees.° Additionally, because Article IX of the Sparks City Charter
sets forth the civil service provisions, which authorize the hiring,
supervision, and control of employees by the City, we affirm that
portion of the district court’s order preventing the City from ap-
plying Article IX to the Municipal Court and its employees.

Charter provisions

Pe

We next address the particular provisions of the Sparks City
Charter that the district court found to be unconstitutional, specif-
ically, Sections 1.080, 3.020, 3.120, 4.023, and 4.025.”

Under Section 1.080 of the Sparks City Charter, the city man-
ager has the authority to appoint ‘‘any employee employed in a
bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity,’ ex-

“To the extent that the City has purported to enter into collective bargain-
ing agreements affecting Municipal Court employees, the issue is moot with
regard to the OE3, which voluntarily withdrew its representation of Municipal
Court employees. As for any agreements between the City and the SPPA, we
hold that such agreements are invalid because they unconstitutionally interfere
with the Municipal Court’s power to manage its employees for the reasons dis-
cussed above.

In their appellate briefs, the parties discuss the Sparks City Charter as it
read before the most recent amendments, which took effect on July 1, 2011.
As the district court entered the preliminary injunction on August 31, 2011,
this opinion analyzes the provisions in their current amended form.

po

cept as otherwise provided in the charter. Sparks City Charter art.
I, § 1.080(3). Two sections of the charter, Section 4.023 and Sec-
tion 4.025, specifically provide for the appointment of two Mu-
nicipal Court positions by the Municipal Court judges. Sparks
City Charter art. IV, §§ 4.023 and 4.025. And the Municipal
Court judges are chosen by election. Sparks City Charter art. V,
§ 5.010(6) and (7). Otherwise, the charter is silent as to appoint-
ment of Municipal Court employees. Although it is unclear
whether any other Municipal Court employee would fall under the
definition of an ‘‘executive, administrative or professional’? em-
ployee, to the extent that they do, this provision of the charter is
‘unconstitutional insofar as it permits the City to interfere with the
Municipal Court’s employment decisions. See Harvey, 117 Nev. at
770, 32 P.3d at 1273. Thus, we affirm that portion of the injunc-
tion prohibiting application of this provision to the Municipal
Court.

Next, Section 3.020 of the city charter provides that the city
manager must carefully supervise the City’s affairs, exercise con-
trol over all departments of the City government, attend city coun-
cil meetings, and recommend adoption of measures and bills to the
city council. Sparks City Charter art. III, § 3.020(1).® Generally,
this provision directs the city manager to administer the affairs of
the City, which largely do not appear to involve the Municipal
Court. Nevertheless, the portions of this provision that allow the
City to interfere with the Municipal Court’s management of its op-
erations are an impermissible infringement on the Municipal
Court’s inherent authority. See Goldberg, 93 Nev. at 616, 572 P.2d
at 522. In particular, subsection (c) requires the city manager to
“Te]xercise control over all departments of the City government
and its officers and employees,’ and subsection (f)(2) directs the
city manager to make investigations into any department of the
City. Sparks City Charter art. IM, § 3.020(1)(c) and (1)(f)(2). As
these provisions permit the City to interfere with the Municipal
Court’s management of its operations and its employees, we affirm
the district court’s issuance of the injunction in this regard.’

‘The pre-2011 amendment version of Section 3.020(1)(c) read: “The City
Manager is responsible to the Council for the efficient administration of all the
affairs of the City. He shall . . . [e]xercise control over all departments of the
City government and its officers and employees, except any department whose
chief executive officer is not appointed by the City Manager?” (Emphasis
added.) See A.B. 97, 76th Leg. (Nev. 2011). Thus, prior to 2011, the Mu-
nicipal Court would not have been included in Section 3.020(1)(c), as its chief
executive officer, the administrative judge, is elected rather than appointed by
the city manager.

°To the extent that sections of these provisions do not apply to the Munici-
pal Court, they are unaffected by the district court’s injunction, as the injunc-
tive order only restricts the City from enforcing the provisions against the Mu-
nicipal Court.

5S

Section 3.120 of the charter states that ‘‘[e]mployees in ap-
pointive positions are entitled to receive the salary designated by
the City Manager within the range established for each position by
the City Council.’ Sparks City Charter art. II, § 3.120. Addi-
tionally, Sections 4.023 and 4.025 provide the city council with the
authority to appropriate the money for the salaries of the Munici-
pal Court’s administrator and judicial assistant. Sparks City Char-
ter art. IV, §§ 4.023 and 4.025. Although the City’s budgeting
power is implicated by these provisions, the Municipal Court’s au-
thority to manage its employees is also put at issue.

As noted above, the Municipal Court’s ability to exercise direct
control over its employees is necessary to ensure its survival as an
independent governmental branch. Harvey, 117 Nev. at 770, 32

_ P.3d at 1273. Moreover, a court cannot effectively manage its em-
ployees if it is unable to determine the wages of those employees.
See Circuit Court of Jackson Cnty. v. Jackson Cnty., 776 S.W.2d
925, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that Missouri law pro-
vides the circuit court with statutory authority to fix the salaries of
its employees because, in the absence of this authority, ‘‘the leg-
islative department could determine the extent to which the judicial
department would perform its judicial function by limiting the
number of employees of the Circuit Court, or providing for no em-
ployees at all’’); see also Ottawa Cnty. Controller v. Ottawa Pro-
bate Judge, 401 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (con-
cluding that the probate court had the inherent authority to set
reasonable salaries for its necessary employees within the court’s
total budget appropriation). Thus, so long as the Municipal Court
can provide for the salaries of its employees within the budget ap-
propriated to it by the City, we conclude that it may do so consis-
tently with its power to manage its internal affairs without inter-
ference from the other governmental branches. See Nunez, 116
Nev. at 540, 1 P.3d at 962. As a result, we also affirm that portion
of the district court’s order of injunction preventing the City from
applying these charter provisions to the Municipal Court.

Control over budget

With regard to the budget, the district court enjoined the City
from ‘‘interfering with the Municipal Court’s ability to use, dis-
tribute, allocate, and make decisions regarding the budget adopted
for it by the City”’ Neither party disputes that the City has the
authority, pursuant to its legislative powers, to appropriate a budget

1As discussed in the next section, to the extent that the Municipal Court
would need additional funding to pay wages set by it, the Municipal Court
would be required to establish that such requests were reasonable and neces-
sary to allow it to carry out its constitutional functions. See Young v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, 91 Nev. 52, 56, 530 P.2d 1203, 1206 (1975).

ee!

to the Municipal Court. See Sparks City Charter art. IL,
§ 2.060(5); State of Nev. Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Daines, 108 Nev.
15, 21, 824 P.2d 276, 279 (1992). Moreover, although the Mu-
nicipal Court, in the communications leading up to these proceed-
ings, asked the City to stop itemizing its budget, the Municipal
Court has not argued in this appeal that the City was required to
provide it with a lump sum appropriation. Even if it had raised this
argument, neither the judicial function of resolving legal contro-
versies nor the Municipal Court’s power to manage its internal af-
fairs provides it with a general power to be involved with the
Sparks budgeting process. Moreover, state law requires the City to
prepare a detailed budget, NRS 354.600, and it is difficult to
imagine how the City could arrive at a general amount for an ap-
propriation without considering specific categories of expenditures
to be made by the Municipal Court.

P|

That said, the Municipal Court does have certain specific pow-
ers to influence the budget appropriated to it. For instance, if the
Municipal Court needs funds for particular items or expenses, it
can compel such funding on a showing that the requests are ‘‘rea-
sonable and necessary to carry out [its] powers and duties in the
administration of justice.’ Young v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 91
Nev. 52, 56, 530 P.2d 1203, 1206 (1975). Moreover, once the Mu-
nicipal Court’s general budget is appropriated to it by the City, the
Municipal Court possesses the power to make independent finan-
cial decisions as to how to allocate the funds within that budget
pursuant to its inherent authority to manage its internal affairs.
See Nunez, 116 Nev. at 540, 1 P.3d at 962.

While we recognize these general principles, we note that the
parties have failed to develop the record or define the scope of the
question presented by the budget issue in this case. For instance,
the record is devoid of evidence as to how the City determines the
Municipal Court’s budget, how the budget is implemented and dis-
tributed, whether the Municipal Court has attempted to use money
appropriated to it in a manner that varied from the City’s itemiza-
tion, or whether the City has prevented the Municipal Court from
making independent internal budget decisions. In particular, there
is no evidence that the City has required the Municipal Court to
administer its budget in any specific manner. Instead, the record
demonstrates only that the conflict in this case arose in response to
the City’s request that the Municipal Court reduce the salaries of

“We note that if the City makes a specific appropriation to the Municipal
Court apart from the general budget, such an appropriation must be used for
its designated purpose, so long as doing so does not interfere with the Mu-
nicipal Court’s ability to carry out its constitutional functions. See Galloway
v, Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 21-22, 422 P.2d 237, 243 (1967).

two of its employees. As the parties have not identified any other
actual conflict with regard to the budget, this requested reduction
is the only budget issue that is properly before this court. See Per-
sonhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574
(2010) (explaining that ‘‘[t{]his court’s duty is not to render advi-
sory opinions but, rather, to resolve actual controversies by an en-
forceable judgment’).

Even as to this issue, however, the parties have not sufficiently
developed the record to demonstrate whether an actual controversy
exists in this regard. Based on the timing of the request, it appears
likely that it was made in the context of the City’s preparation of
its annual budget, see NRS 354.596(2) (requiring a city’s tentative
budget under the Local Government Budget and Finance Act to be
submitted annually by April 15); NRS 354.598 (requiring a city’s
final budget under the Local Government Budget and Finance Act
to be approved annually by June 8), but the parties have not ex-
plained the circumstances surrounding the requested budget re-
duction. Moreover, the Municipal Court initially asserted that it
had instructed its employees not to execute any documents to ef-
fectuate a salary reduction, but later stated that it had complied
with the City’s budget request. Nothing in the record demon-
strates that the Municipal Court sought to reduce its budget by
means other than through the salary reduction or that the City re-
fused to allow the Municipal Court to do so.” Without this infor-
mation, it is impossible to determine whether the City impermis-
sibly interfered with the Municipal Court’s inherent authority to
manage its internal affairs by administering its budget in the man-
ner it saw fit. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s is-
suance of the preliminary injunction on budget issues was over-
broad and premature. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the
injunction prohibiting the City from interfering with the Municipal
Court’s budget and remand this matter to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On remand, the district court must initially consider whether
any actual controversy is presented with regard to the budget,
given that the Municipal Court apparently complied with the re-

"At oral argument before this court, the Municipal Court represented that
it had sought to reduce the budget other than by reducing the identified
salaries and had been precluded from doing so by the City. The City denied
that the situation had occurred as described by the Municipal Court, asserting
that as long as the budget was reduced, the manner of reducing it was irrele-
vant. This court asked the Municipal Court to supplement the briefing to iden-
tify any specific record evidence supporting its claim that the City had refused
to allow it to proceed with a budget reduction as proposed by the Municipal
Court. Although the Municipal Court filed the requested supplement, it failed
to point to any record evidence demonstrating that it had made, or the City had
denied, any such request.

Po

quested budget reductions and there is no indication in the record
as to the manner of compliance or the City’s response to the Mu-
nicipal Court’s proposed method of compliance. See Personhood
Nev., 126 Nev. at 602, 245 P.3d at 574. If the case does present an
actual controversy, the district court should then decide whether
any action the Municipal Court seeks to take would be a permis-
sible exercise of the Municipal Court’s ability to manage its inter-
nal affairs, see Nunez, 116 Nev. at 540, 1 P.3d at 962, or would be
an assertion of inherent power that would overlap with the City’s
legislative power over the budget. See Galloway, 83 Nev. at 21-22,
422 P.2d at 243. Finally, if the district court determines that the
Municipal Court’s proposed action does not fall under the man-
agement of its internal affairs, the district court must evaluate
whether the Municipal Court’s intended action is reasonable and
necessary to allow it to carry out its constitutional duty to admin-
ister justice. See Young, 91 Nev. at 56, 530 P.2d at 1206; see also
Halverson, 123 Nev. at 263, 163 P.3d at 441.

Special counsel

P|

Finally, the district court enjoined the City from applying NRS
41.0344 or Section 3.055 of the Sparks City Charter to this case.
The district court did not issue any further ruling with regard to
the Municipal Court’s ability to retain counsel or compel payment
of counsel generally.

Section 3.055 of the Sparks City Charter provides that the city
council may ‘employ attorneys to perform any civil or criminal
duty of the City Attorney.’ Sparks City Charter art. II, § 3.055.
This provision further states that counsel retained pursuant to this
provision is responsible only to the city council. Id. NRS 41.0344
permits a political subdivision’s attorney to employ special coun-
sel if he or she determines that it could constitute a conflict of in-
terest for the legal services to be rendered by that attorney. Based
on the language of these provisions, we conclude that they are not
applicable to this case, as counsel in this situation was retained by
the Municipal Court, rather than by the city attorney, and, as the
representative of the Municipal Court, counsel was responsible to
the Municipal Court and not to the city council. Thus, we affirm
the district court’s order to the extent that it found that these pro-
visions were inapplicable. Moreover, the City agreed that the Mu-
nicipal Court needed to hire independent counsel, and we conclude
that, pursuant to its inherent power to protect its ability to perform
its constitutional functions, the Municipal Court had the right to
hire the counsel of its choosing, without interference from the City.
See Nunez, 116 Nev. at 540, 1 P.3d at 962.

372

As the district court did not take any further action in regard to
the special counsel issue, we decline to issue any additional ruling
in this regard. We note, however, that to the extent that the Mu-
nicipal Court seeks any appropriation to pay special counsel’s
fees, the City, pursuant to its legislative budgetary authority, may
review the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate when deter-
mining whether to make such an appropriation, but may not make
a more specific review of the cost of the representation, as per-
mitting the City to review and question the reasonableness of par-
ticular expenditures connected with the instant action would im-
permissibly infringe on the attorney-client relationship and the
Municipal Court’s right to seek legal advice and to make decisions
regarding its legal strategy.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, as to the Municipal Court’s adminis-
trator, administrative assistant, marshals, court clerk/interpreters,
court clerks I and II, and volunteers, we affirm the portions of the
district court’s order prohibiting the City from interfering with the
Municipal Court’s management of its employees, enforcing or en-
tering into collective bargaining agreements on behalf of Munici-
pal Court employees, and applying Sparks City Charter art. I,
§ 1.080; art. ID, §§ 3.020, 3.120; art. IV, §§ 4.023 and 4.025;
and art. IX to the Municipal Court and its employees. We reverse,
however, that portion of the district court’s order preventing the
City from taking certain actions with regard to the Municipal
Court’s budget, and we remand the matter to the district court for
further proceedings. Finally, we affirm that portion of the district
court’s order permitting the Municipal Court to retain and pay spe-
cial counsel.

GiBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLas, CHERRY, and Sarma, JJ.,
concur,

PICKERING, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to the extent
that it invalidates the Sparks City Charter provisions that apply
to court employees besides the court administrator and judicial as-
sistants. In my view, the holding with respect to civil service and
union employees is inconsistent with the express terms of the
Nevada Constitution, Article 15, Section 11, and the Sparks City
Charter, which the Legislature and the City of Sparks adopted ac-
cording to the political process specified in the Nevada Constitu-
tion, Article 8, Section 8. That process, and these charter provi-
sions, induced reliance interests on the part of those involved that

373

I would not disturb, particularly not on the inadequate record thus
far presented in this case.

The Sparks City Charter vests the power to hire, fire, and dis-
cipline the court administrator and judicial assistants in the Mu-
nicipal Court’s Administrative Judge, not the City Council. See
Sparks City Charter art. IV, §§ 4.023 and 4.025. But it makes no
similar provision for other employees providing service to the
Sparks Municipal Court. Id. Sections 4.023 and 4.025 recognize,
legislatively, that employees who occupy the positions of court
administrator or judicial assistant ‘‘perform[ ] vital and essential
court functions,” and so answer to the Municipal Court directly,
not the City. State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
117 Nev. 754, 770, 32 P.3d 1263, 1273 (2001) (court clerk);
AFSCME v. Wayne Cnty., 811 N.W.2d 4, 20-21 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011) (court clerk); Barland v. Eau Claire Cnty., 575 N.W.2d
691, 702-03 (Wis. 1998) (judicial assistant). Notably, the Sparks
City Charter does not extend this status to other personnel who
provide services to the Municipal Court. Rather, such other per-
sonnel are governed by the Sparks Civil Service Commission and
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Charter. See Sparks
City Charter art. IX, § 9.020(1) and (2).

The inherent-powers doctrine allows the judicial branch ‘‘to
administrate its own procedures and to manage its own
affairs . . . when reasonable and necessary for the administration
of justice’”’ Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d
428, 440 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).! But ‘‘such inherent
powers must be exercised with discernment and circumspection.’
Angell v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 108 Nev. 923, 926, 839 P.2d
1329, 1331 (1992). Proper respect for coordinate branches of gov-
ernment limits resort to inherent judicial powers to situations in
which the judicial branch has exhausted other executive and leg-
islative avenues available and the need is such that the ‘‘efficient
administration of justice [will be] destroyed or seriously impaired’’
if left unfulfilled. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 60,
294 P.2d 366, 367 (1956). Put another way, ‘‘inherent [judicial]
power should be exercised only when established methods fail or
in an emergency situation[, and] ceases when the court’s ability to
carry out its constitutional duty to ensure the administration of jus-
tice no longer is in jeopardy.’ Halverson, 123 Nev. at 263, 163
P.3d at 441 (footnotes omitted). Also, ‘‘because inherent power
arises from the constitution’s operation, constitutional clauses may

‘Although legislatively, as opposed to constitutionally, created, Nev. Const.
art. 6, § 1, municipal courts possess the same inherent powers as constitu
tionally created courts do. City of N. Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 295,
550 P.2d 399, 400 (1976).

374

remove or modify that power’’ from the purview of the judiciary.
Id.

I respectfully submit that, under the Nevada Constitution,
the Sparks City Charter provisions control. Exercising its consti-
tutional prerogative, the Legislature approved the Sparks City
Charter. Nevada Const. art. 8, § 8. Another section of the Nevada
Constitution specifies that, when a municipality (Sparks) has a
“legally adopted charter’’ (the Sparks City Charter), the charter
controls the city’s employment relationships, certainly as to tenure
and dismissal: ‘‘In the case of any officer or employee of any mu-
nicipality governed under a legally adopted charter, the provisions
of such charter with reference to the tenure of office or the dis-
missal from office of any such officer or employee shall control.”
Nev. Const. art. 15, § 11. Since the Sparks City Charter divides
authority over Municipal Court employees between the Municipal
Court (court administrator and judicial assistants) and the Civil
Service Commission (all others), constitutionally, those provisions
“shall control.’ Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under Halverson, it
appears that the inherent-judicial-power doctrine should not apply
because another, more specific constitutional provision displaces it.

The majority argues that Article 15, Section 11 uses ‘‘officer’’
and ‘‘employee’’ to mean the same thing, such that the provision
only applies to elected or appointed officials, not employees gen-
erally. But this gives the word ‘‘employee’’ a singular meaning
unique to Article 15, Section 11. Elsewhere, the Nevada Consti-
tution distinguishes between ‘‘officers’’ and ‘‘employees.”” Com-
pare, e.g., Nev. Const. art. 15, § 10 (‘‘All officers whose election
or appointment is not otherwise provided for, shall be chosen or
appointed as may be prescribed by law.’’) with Nev. Const. art. 15,
§ 15 (‘The legislature shall provide by law for a state merit sys-
tem governing the employment of employees in the executive
branch of state government.’’). Basic rules of statutory and consti-
tutional interpretation teach that ‘‘[a] word or phrase is presumed
to bear the same meaning throughout a text,’ and that

[if possible, every word and every provision is to be given
effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None should be
ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation
that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no
consequence.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpreta-
tion of Legal Texts 170, 174 (2012) (footnote omitted) (Canons 25
and 26). Given these basic rules, I disagree that ‘‘officer’’ and
“employee”? mean the same thing—‘‘officer’’—in the Nevada Con-
stitution, Article 15, Section 11, even though they are not used in
that sense anywhere else in Article 15 or the Nevada Constitution
as a whole.

375

Nor does the legislative history support the majority’s conclu-
sion that Article 15, Section 11 has no application to Sparks civil
service employees doing work for the Municipal Court.

As the majority notes, the voters amended the Nevada Consti-
tution in 1946 to add the italicized language to Article 15, Section
11 shown below:

The tenure of any office not herein provided for may be de-
clared by law, or, when not so declared, such office shall be
held during the pleasure of the authority making the appoint-
ment, but the Legislature shall not create any office the tenure
of which shall be longer than four (4) years, except as herein
otherwise provided in this Constitution. In the case of any of-
ficer or employee of any municipality governed under a
legally adopted charter, the provisions of such charter with
reference to the tenure of office or the dismissal from office of
any such officer or employee shall control.

Nev. Const. art. 15, § 11. The majority reasons that, because the
first sentence refers to ‘‘office[s],”’ the second sentence should be
taken to apply only to “‘officers”’ not civil service employees,
when it refers to ‘‘any officer or employee of any municipality.’ As
support, it cites an editorial that appeared in the Nevada State Jour-
nal on November 2, 1946. But the Nevada State Journal editorial
on which the majority relies says the exact opposite. It notes that,
as originally adopted, Article 15, Section 11 ‘‘provide[d] that the
Jegislature cannot create any office the tenure of which shall be
longer than four years,’ and reasons that, “‘[s]ince the state con-
stitution governs, a city cannot create an office the tenure of which
[is] longer than four years.’ Editorial, Question No. 1, Nevada
State Journal, November 2, 1946, at 4. According to the 1946 ed-
itorial writer, this created problems for municipal civil service
employees that the amendment was designed to fix:

Employees of cities, holding civil service status, are con-
sidered holding office and consequently it is contended their
tenure of office would be limited to four years by strict ap-
plication of the constitution. Civil service is designed to pro-
tect employees and make permanent their tenure of office.

The proposed amendment adds the following sentence to
Section 11 of Article 15 of the constitution:

“Tn the case of any officer or employee of any municipal-
ity governed under a legally adopted charter, the provisions of
such charter with reference to the tenure of office or the dis-
missal from office of any such officer or employee shall
control.’’

The amendment simply broadens the field for municipal
charters and in no other way directs the legislature to change

the four-year provision of the constitution with respect to
state officers.

. .. [Its purpose is] to remove ambiguities from the law
which might cause unexpected trouble.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, according to the source relied on by
the majority, the final sentence of Article 15, Section 11 was
added to ensure that, when it comes to municipal civil service em-
ployees, if the city has a ‘‘legally adopted’ charter, that charter
controls their ‘‘tenure or . . . dismissal.’’ This makes inexplicable
the majority’s decision to invalidate the Sparks City Charter civil
service provisions that, by their express terms, apply to all city em-
ployees except the Municipal Court’s court administrator and ju-
dicial assistants, authority over whom is vested in the Municipal
Court.

The majority’s recitation of the history of this dispute demon-
strates that the parties’ first instinct was correct. Thus, they orig-
inally looked to the political process of amending the Sparks City
Charter to clarify the status of the employees besides the court ad-
ministrator and judicial assistants who provide service to the Mu-
nicipal Court. But they abandoned that avenue and turned to the
courts for relief instead. By means of this shortcut, the tenure and
dismissal of municipal employees whose employment, previously,
was controlled by the Sparks City Charter civil service provisions
is now controlled by the Municipal Court. Basic rules of con-
struction do not permit express constitutional terms to be overrid-
den that easily by concepts of implicit or inherent, but unwritten,
authority.

Talso note that, even if the Municipal Court could overcome Ar-
ticle 15, Section 11, the record assembled does not, in my esti-
mation, make the threshold showings of impasse and need re-
quired for the judicial branch to exert its inherent authority against
another, coordinate branch. Thus, while impasse and need are ar-
gued, the evidence does not establish such basic information as the
positions involved, the services the affected employees provide, the
impact the City Charter provisions have on their performance, or
the threat having the City Charter provisions apply to them poses
to the administration of justice in the Sparks Municipal Court.
Only a few examples are given, one dating back to 2002; the oth-
ers do not establish ‘‘the destruction or serious impairment of the
administration of justice’ and the failure of other alternatives that
our case law requires. Devine, 72 Nev. at 60-61, 294 P.2d at 367-
68 (reversing mandamus requiring the county to appoint a bailiff;
although ‘‘the court or the judge has inherent power to secure an
attendant for his court, at public expense, if the regular, orderly,
statutory methods fail, or if the officials charged by the legislature
arbitrarily or capriciously fail or neglect to provide the necessary
attendant, whereby the efficient administration of justice is de-

377

stroyed, or seriously impaired,” the record did not adequately es-
tablish impasse or need).

For these reasons, I would vacate the preliminary injunction is-
sued by the district court, insofar as it applies to Municipal Court
employees other than the court administrator and judicial assis-
tants. As to the court administrator and judicial assistants, I agree
with the majority’s reversal and remand. I therefore, respectfully,
concur in part and dissent in part.

In RE ANA J. FOX, DEBTOR.

YVETTE WEINSTEIN, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v. ANA J. FOX, RESPONDENT.

No. 59396
May 30, 2013 302 P.3d 1137

Sullivan, Hill, Lewin, Rez & Engel and Elizabeth E. Stephens,
Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Ana J. Fox, Las Vegas, in Proper Person.
Law Offices of Amy N. Tirre, P.C., and Amy N. Tirre, Reno;

Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Laury M. Macauley, Reno, for Amicus
Curiae Bankruptcy Law Section of the State Bar of Nevada.

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Cuerry, J.:

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit has certified a question of Jaw to this court relating to per-
missible exemptions claimed by judgment debtors under Nevada’s
exemption statute, NRS 21.090. In particular, the certified question
asks, ‘‘[iJn Nevada, may a judgment debtor claim exemptions
under NRS 21.090 belonging not only to herself, but also to her
non-debtor spouse?’’ In the bankruptcy case, however, only two
types of exemptions are at issue: the exemption under NRS
21.090(1)(f) for motor vehicles and the exemption under NRS
21.090(1)(z) for up to $1,000 of property not already exempted,
which is known as the ‘‘wildcard exemption.’’ See In re Newman,
487 B.R. 193, 196 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). Thus, we focus on
whether the motor vehicle and wildcard exemptions may be
claimed on behalf of a non-debtor spouse. See NRS 21.090(1)(f)
and (z); In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, L.L.C., 128 Nev.
556, 571-72, 289 P.3d 1199, 1209 (2012) (rephrasing certified
questions under NRAP 5). We adopt the plain language rationale
embraced by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Idaho in Jn re DeHaan, 275 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002), and
conclude that, based on NRS 21.090(1)(f) and (z)’s plain lan-
guage, Nevada law does not allow debtors to claim motor vehicle
and wildcard exemptions on behalf of their non-debtor spouses.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2010, respondent Ana Fox filed a petition for relief
under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Fox’s
spouse did not join in the bankruptcy petition and did not file a
separate petition for relief. Nevertheless, under bankruptcy law, the
bankruptcy estate includes all of the marital community property,

Pe 319

in addition to Fox’s separate property. 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(2); NRS
123.225; NRS 123.230. Out of the bankruptcy estate, Fox claimed
exemptions for two motor vehicles under NRS 21.090(1)(f) and
property worth over $1,400 under NRS 21.090(1)(z). Both the ve-
hicles and the other assets claimed as exemptions were community
property.

The Chapter 7 Trustee, appellant Yvette Weinstein, filed an ob-
jection on the grounds that a debtor spouse may exempt only a sin-
gle vehicle and property worth no more than $1,000 under NRS
21.090(1)(f) and (z) and a non-debtor spouse has no right to claim
any exemptions in a debtor spouse’s bankruptcy. Fox filed a re-
sponse to the Trustee’s objection, arguing that a debtor spouse may
claim exemptions under NRS 21.090(1)(f) and (z) on behalf of a
non-debtor spouse.

After a hearing, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada entered an order overruling the Trustee’s objection.
The court found that Nevada law allows a debtor to claim motor
vehicle and wildcard exemptions on behalf of a non-debtor spouse,
which, in effect, doubled Fox’s exemptions. The Trustee timely ap-
pealed to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit. Because Nevada has opted out of the federal ex-
emption scheme, Nevada’s judgment debtor exemption Jaw ap-
plies, 11 U.S.C. 522(b); NRS 21.090(3), and the Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel has sought a ruling from this court regarding whether,
under Nevada law, judgment debtors are allowed to claim exemp-
tions on behalf of non-debtor spouses. In particular, it requests a
definitive construction of Nevada’s motor vehicle and wildcard ex-
emption provisions, NRS 21.090(1)(f) and (z). The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel stayed the proceedings before it until our resolu-
tion of the certified question.’

We have decided to consider the certified question. See NRAP
5(a); Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. v. Ricci, 122 Nev. 746, 750-51,
137 P.3d 1161, 1164 (2006) (in determining whether to exercise its
discretion to consider certified questions, this court looks to
whether the ‘answers may ‘be determinative’ of part of the federal
case, there is no controlling [Nevada] precedent, and the answer
will help settle important questions of law’’ (quoting Ventura Grp.
Ventures, Inc. v. Ventura Port Dist., 16 P.3d 717, 719 (Cal.
2001))).

DISCUSSION
a

The Nevada Constitution provides that “‘[tJhe privilege of the
debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized

'The Bankruptcy Law Section of the State Bar of Nevada filed an amicus cu-
tiae brief addressing the divergent views of debtors, creditors, and trustees.

380 Po

by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property
from seizure or sale for payment of any debts or liabilities... .””
Nev. Const. art. 1, § 14; see Bero-Wachs v. Law Office of Logar
& Pulver, 123 Nev. 71, 75-76, 157 P.3d 704, 707 (2007).
Nevada’s “‘Legislature enacted what is now NRS 21.090 to fulfill
the mandate set forth in Nevada’s Constitution.’ Savage v. Pierson,
123 Nev. 86, 90, 157 P.3d 697, 700 (2007). ‘‘The legislative pur-
pose of NRS 21.090 is ‘to secure to the debtor the necessary
means of gaining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as pos-
sible to the creditor’ ’’ In re Galvez, 115 Nev. 417, 419, 990 P.2d
187, 188 (1999) (quoting Krieg v. Fellows, 21 Nev. 307, 310, 30
P. 994, 995 (1892)), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1320, 149 P.3d 40, 47
(2006); see Savage, 123 Nev. at 90, 157 P.3d at 700 (‘‘the ex-
emptions set forth in NRS 21.090 are ‘absolute and unqualified,
with few exceptions, ‘and [their] effect is to remove the property
beyond the reach of legal process’ ”’ (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Elder v. Williams, 16 Nev. 416, 423 (1882))); Sportsco Enters.
v. Morris, 112 Nev. 625, 630, 917 P.2d 934, 936 (1996) (‘In NRS
21.090, the Legislature provided express exemptions from execu-
tion for some property interests.’’).
NRS 21.090(1) states, in relevant part, that

[t]he following property is exempt from execution, except as
otherwise specifically provided in this section or required by
federal law:

(f) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (p),”! one ve-
hicle if the judgment debtor’s equity does not exceed $15,000
or the creditor is paid an amount equal to any excess above
that equity.

(2) Any personal property not otherwise exempt from exe-
cution pursuant to this subsection belonging to the judgment
debtor, including, without limitation, the judgment debtor’s
equity in any property, money, stocks, bonds or other funds
on deposit with a financial institution, not to exceed $1,000 in
total value, to be selected by the judgment debtor.

(Emphases added.)

We have yet to address whether a judgment debtor may claim
Nevada’s motor vehicle and wildcard exemptions on behalf of her
non-debtor spouse. Before examining whether Nevada’s personal
property exemptions could be claimed by a debtor on behalf of a
non-debtor spouse, we turn to the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Idaho, which recently addressed the identical

2NRS 21.090(1)(p) does not apply in the instant matter, as it pertains to a
motor vehicle ‘for a person with a permanent disability?”

Po 381

question under Idaho law. In re DeHaan, 275 B.R. 375 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2002). The bankruptcy court concluded that the Idaho ex-
emption scheme did not allow a debtor to claim a second set of
personal property exemptions on behalf of a non-filing spouse. Id.
at 381-82. Focusing on the language of the applicable state ex-
emption statute, the court held that ‘‘[t]he plain language speaks to
the right of the ‘individual’ debtor to claim exemptions within the
relevant monetary limits. It does not purport to authorize such a
debtor to claim a second set of like exemptions for another individ-
ual (i.e., his spouse).” Id. at 382; see Idaho Code Ann. § 11-605(3),
(10) (2010) (an ‘‘individual’’ debtor can claim personal property
exemptions under Idaho’s personal property exemptions).

In Nevada, we likewise concentrate on the plain language of
statutes when examining issues of statutory construction. J.E.
Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Corus Constr. Venture, LLC, 127 Nev. 72, 79,
249 P.3d 501, 505 (2011) (‘‘[w]hen the language . . . is clear on
its face, ‘this court will not go beyond [the] statute’s plain lan-
guage’ ’’ (second alteration in original) (quoting Great Basin Water
Network v. State Eng’r, 126 Nev. 187, 196, 234 P.3d 912, 918
(2010))); see Hardy Cos. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. 528, 533,
245 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2010) (we review de novo the construction
of statutes). ‘Although exemptions are to be liberally construed in
favor of the debtor, the Court must not depart from the statutory
language nor extend the legislative grant.’ In re Lenox, 58 B.R.
104, 106 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986); see In re Christensen, 122 Nev.
1309, 1314, 149 P.3d 40, 43 (2006) (this court ‘‘liberally and
beneficially construe[s] . . . state exemption statutes in favor of the
debtor’).

The Nevada statutory subsections applicable here, NRS
21.090(1)(f) and (z), refer to exempt property of the judgment
debtor. Nowhere in these provisions does it mention the non-
debtor spouse or a dependent.? Given the plain language of NRS
21.090(1)(f) and (z), we conclude that a judgment debtor may
claim exemptions for a single motor vehicle and up to $1,000
in personal property for herself; however, a debtor is not permit-
ted to claim those exemptions on behalf of a non-debtor spouse.
See DeHaan, 275 B.R. at 382.4 Thus, in accordance with the

2Non-debtor spouses are considered dependents under the Bankruptey Code.
11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (2006).

*We acknowledge that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Arizona reached a contrary conclusion in In re Perez, 302 B.R. 661, 663
Gankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (holding that a debtor may claim that property is ex-
empt from community debts under Arizona law by asserting not only his but
also his spouse’s exemptions because each spouse acts for the benefit of the
community and thus Arizona law allows one spouse to claim the other’s ex-
emptions on her behalf).

382

clear and unambiguous language of NRS 21.090(1)(f) and (z), a
judgment debtor in Nevada is limited to one motor vehicle ex-
emption not to exceed $15,000 and other personal property ex-
emptions not to exceed $1,000.

We, therefore, answer the certified question in the negative as
set forth above.

PICKERING, C.J., and GipBoNs, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Douctas, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

MARCIA BERGENFIELD, APPELLANT, v.
BANK OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

No. 58060

June 6, 2013 302 P.3d 1141

[Rehearing denied October 4, 2013]

[En banc reconsideration granted in part April 25, 2014]

Law Office of Jacob L. Hafter & Associates and Jacob L. Hafter
and Michael Naethe, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Akerman Senterfitt, LLP, and Ariel E. Stern and Heidi Parry
Stern, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

383

Before Grssons, DouGLas and Sarria, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Douczas, J.:

In Nevada, when the deed of trust to real property and the
promissory note are held by two different entities and not reunified
before mediation in the Foreclosure Mediation Program, the note
holder’s attendance at the mediation on its own behalf is insuffi-
cient to meet the statutory requirement that the deed of trust ben-
eficiary attend and participate in good faith. Here, when the me-
diation occurred, Bank of America was the holder of the note, but
it was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust because the note and
deed of trust were intentionally separated at the inception of the
Joan and were not reunified. The district court therefore erred
when it determined that Bank of America had the authority to me-
diate and when it denied Marcia Bergenfield’s petition for judicial
review. Thus, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand
this matter to the district court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Marcia Bergenfield obtained a home loan from Coun-
trywide Home Loans, Inc., and executed a promissory note in

384 Po

Countrywide’s favor. The note was secured by a deed of trust
naming Countrywide as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Reg-
istration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as beneficiary of the deed of
trust. The deed of trust specifically stated that MERS had the au-
thority to transfer the deed of trust. MERS subsequently assigned
its interest in the deed of trust to HSBC Bank USA. The assign-
ment stated that it carried the deed of trust along with the under-
lying note. Meanwhile, Countrywide endorsed the promissory note
in blank, meaning that the holder of the note could demonstrate en-
titlement to payment through possession of the note. Respondent
Bank of America later acquired Countrywide and its assets, in-
cluding Bergenfield’s promissory note.

Bergenfield defaulted on the loan and elected to participate in
Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP). A mediation
scheduling notice was issued that named Bank of America as the
deed of trust beneficiary and ReconTrust Co. as the trustee. Before
the mediation, Bank of America provided the mediator with certi-
fied copies of the note, the deed of trust, and the assignments of
the deed of trust.

At the mediation, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, appeared
through counsel, purporting to represent Bank of America and in-
dicating that it was authorized to modify the loan. HSBC did not
attend the mediation and did not send a representative. No agree-
ment was reached. The mediator’s statement indicated that BAC
failed to bring short sale estimates and that Bergenfield failed to
provide updated financial information. The report did not indicate
that any party lacked authority to negotiate or failed to attend the
mediation. Bergenfield then filed a petition for judicial review,
which the district court denied after concluding that the parties had
addressed the document production issues to the district court’s
satisfaction, and that BAC, as Bank of America’s representative,
had authority to negotiate a loan modification and participated in
good faith. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

| |

In this appeal, we address whether a party who purports to hold
a promissory note, but who is not the deed of trust beneficiary of
record, may participate in an FMP mediation and obtain an FMP
certificate permitting it to go forward with foreclosure proceedings.
Bergenfield argues that Bank of America lacked authority to ne-
gotiate a loan modification at the mediation because the documents
provided at the mediation demonstrated that the note and the deed
of trust had been assigned to two separate entities and remained
split at the time of the mediation. Bank of America contends that

pe 385

it is the lender and holder of the note and that the assignment of
the deed of trust to HSBC did not disturb Bank of America’s in-
terest in the loan and its authority to enforce the note.

P|

Nevada law permits the severance and independent transfer of
deeds of trusts and promissory notes without impairing the right to
ultimately foreclose. Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev.
505, 519-20, 286 P.3d 249, 258-60 (2012). Thus, it is possible for
Bank of America to remain the holder of the note while HSBC is
the deed of trust beneficiary. But in order to nonjudicially foreclose
a deed of trust of an owner-occupied residence, the party seeking
foreclosure must demonstrate that it is both ‘‘the current benefici-
ary of the deed of trust and the current holder of the promissory
note.’ Id. at 514, 286 P.3d at 255; see NRS 107.080.

This requirement stems from the fact that a deed of trust is a
lien on the property to secure the debt and the beneficiary of the
deed alone does not have a right to repayment on the loan. Edel-
stein, 128 Nev. at 512, 286 P.3d at 254. Rather, it is the holder of
the note that is entitled to repayment. Id. Therefore, only when the
note and deed of trust are held by the same party is foreclosure
proper under NRS Chapter 107. Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing
Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 474, 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2011). To that
end, NRS 107.086(4) mandates that a deed of trust beneficiary
must, among other things, attend the mediation itself or through a
representative who has authority to modify the loan or has access
at all times to a person with such authority. Leyva, 127 Nev. at
475, 255 P.3d at 1278. If the deed of trust beneficiary fails to at-
tend the mediation, the FMP certificate must not issue. Holt v.
Reg’l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 893, 266 P.3d 602, 606-07
(2011).

NRS 107.086(4)’s language requiring the beneficiary of the
deed of trust’s attendance clearly and unambiguously precludes the
holder of the note from attending and participating in an FMP me-
diation on its own behalf, when it is not also the beneficiary of the
deed of trust. See Webb v. Shull, 128 Nev. 85, 88-89, 270 P.3d
1266, 1268 (2012) (holding that a statute’s words will be given
their plain meaning). Thus, when a deed of trust and promissory
note have been severed, whether at the inception of the loan or by
subsequent assignment, the instruments must be reunified to es-
tablish proper authority to participate in the FMP. See Edelstein,
128 Nev. at 522, 286 P.3d at 260-61. That did not happen here.

At the underlying mediation, the recorded beneficiary of the
deed of trust, HSBC, did not attend. Accepting Bank of America’s

ee

386 Po

assertion that it is the holder of the note and consequently had au-
thority to negotiate the loan, it nevertheless was not the benefici-
ary of the deed of trust, and therefore, failed to demonstrate its au-
thority to nonjudicially foreclose and to participate in the FMP
mediation. Although the district court found that Bank of America
had authority to negotiate the loan, that finding does not overcome
the fact that Bank of America was not the beneficiary of the deed
of trust at the time of mediation, based on the recorded assignment
from MERS to HSBC. Jd. at 520-21, 286 P.3d at 260 (recogniz-
ing that on appeal this court gives deference to the district court’s
factual findings and reviews its legal determinations anew). In this
instance, no FMP certificate could validly issue, and sanctions
were mandated. Leyva, 127 Nev. at 480, 255 P.3d at 1281; see
Holt, 127 Nev. at 893, 266 P.3d at 607.

CONCLUSION

Because Bank of America was not the deed of trust beneficiary
at the time of the FMP mediation, we conclude that it failed to sat-
isfy NRS 107.086(4)’s attendance and participation requirement.
Consequently, the district court erred when it denied Bergenfield’s
petition for judicial review. We therefore reverse the judgment of
the district court and remand this matter to the district court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.’

Gsons and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

JOSEPH WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, RESPONDENT.

No. 59226
June 6, 2013 302 P.3d 1144

"Because we reverse on this basis, we do not address Bergenfield’s argument
that Bank of America’s response to her petition for judicial review wrongfully
revealed confidential information.

387

Benson, Bertoldo, Baker & Carter and Javier A. Arguello, Las
Vegas, for Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP and Daniel L. Schwartz,
Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before GiBBons, DouGLas and Sairta, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, Sarrma, J.:

NRS 616C.390(5) bars an employee from applying to reopen his
or her workers’ compensation claim after a year from its closure

388 Po

if the employee ‘‘was not off work as a result of the injury.’ Ap-
pellant Joseph Williams suffered a workplace injury in the course
of his employment with respondent United Parcel Services (UPS)
and, after receiving medical treatment, missed the remainder of his
scheduled work shift pursuant to his treating physician’s orders.
More than one year after the closure of his workers’ compensation
claim, Williams sought to reopen that claim. UPS denied that re-
quest, and its decision was affirmed by an appeals officer. In
reaching her conclusion, the appeals officer interpreted NRS
616C.390(5) as requiring that an injured employee miss five days
of work as a result of the injury to be considered ‘‘off work’’
within the bounds of that statute. But NRS 616C.390(5) does not
include any such requirement for an employee to be considered
“‘off work.’’ We therefore conclude that the appeals officer erred in
reading a minimum-time-off-work requirement into the statute and
that, because Williams missed the remainder of his shift on the day
of his injury, he was off work as a result of his injury and was
therefore not subject to the one-year limit on the reopening of
claims. Thus, we reverse the district court’s denial of Williams’ pe-
tition for judicial review and direct the district court to remand this
matter to the appeals officer for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 13, 2006, two hours into his shift, Williams was
standing on a ladder that elevated him eight feet off the ground. He
was working with live wires and received an electric shock, caus-
ing him to fall to the ground and land on his back. Within a half
hour of the accident, Williams sought medical attention, and Dr.
Allen Schwartz treated him. The C-4 form filled out by Dr.
Schwartz reveals diagnoses including a left ankle/foot contusion, a
lumbar abrasion, and electrical shock. Dr. Schwartz prohibited
Williams from working on January 13 and 14. Subsequently,
Williams missed the remainder of his scheduled shift on Janu-
ary 13. He was cleared to return to regular duty beginning Janu-
ary 15, and he returned to work on January 16. Williams was not
scheduled to work on January 14 and 15, but he claimed to be on-
call for these two days.

After his accident, the insurer for respondent UPS issued a no-
tice of claim acceptance to Williams, identifying that it would
provide compensation for Williams’ injuries to his left ankle/foot,
left lower leg, and left hand. The notice did not list any compen-
sation for Williams’ back. It provided that Williams could appeal
the claim acceptance within 70 days of the date upon which the no-
tice was mailed. Williams did not appeal the notice of claim ac-
ceptance. A few months later, UPS’s insurer issued to Williams a

fn

pO 389

notice of intent to close his claim within 70 days from the notice’s
date and of Williams’ right to appeal this determination within that
period of time. Also, the notice informed Williams of the right to
reopen his claim under NRS 616C.390. Williams did not exercise
the option to appeal the notice’s determination.

Two years after his claim’s closure, Williams experienced back
and muscle pain and fatigue in his legs. He underwent medical
procedures that revealed damage to his back. As a result, Williams
asked UPS’s insurer to reopen his claim, attributing the cause of
his back issues to his 2006 work-related accident. The insurer de-
nied the request because it deemed that there was a lack of med-
ical evidence to justify the claim’s reopening.

Before a hearing officer, Williams challenged the denial of his
request to reopen his claim. The hearing officer affirmed the de-
nial. Williams appealed the hearing officer’s decision to an appeals
Officer. After referencing NRS 616C.390’s legislative history, the
appeals officer interpreted the statute to mean that an employee
was barred from applying to reopen his or her claim after a year
from the claim’s closure if the employee did not miss at least five
days of work as a result of the injury and ‘‘did not receive a per-
manent partial disability award.’’ Because Williams did not satisfy
these requirements, the appeals officer concluded that Williams
“swas not ‘off work’ as contemplated by NRS 616C.390(5)’’ and
that NRS 616C.390(5) barred him from reopening his claim.
Williams then sought judicial review of the appeals officer’s deci-
sion, but the district court denied the petition, and this appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents the question of when an employee, who
seeks to reopen a closed workers’ compensation claim, is deemed
to have been ‘‘off work”’ as a result of an industrial injury for the
purpose of determining whether, under NRS 616C.390(5), the
employee may reopen his or her claim when more than one year
has passed since the claim’s closure. NRS 616C.390(5) provides
that:

[a]n application to reopen a claim must be made in writing
within 1 year after the date on which the claim was closed if:
(a) The claimant was not off work as a result of the injury;
and
(b) The claimant did not receive benefits for a permanent
partial disability.

(Emphasis added.) In interpreting and applying this statute to de-
termine whether Williams could reopen his claim, even though it
had been closed for more than one year, the appeals officer con-

390 Po

cluded that an injured employee must have been off work for five
or more days or have received a permanent partial disability award
in order to be considered off work as a result of the injury. And
because Williams was not off work for five days and did not re-
ceive any benefits, the appeals officer concluded that Williams was
not entitled to reopen his claim.

On appeal, Williams challenges the appeals officer’s interpreta
tion of NRS 616C.390(5)’s off-work requirement. As we have not
previously addressed this statute, we examine NRS 616C.390(5)’s
tole in Nevada’s workers’ compensation scheme before turning to
the appeals officer’s interpretation of NRS 616C.390(5).

The role of NRS 616C.390(5) in Nevada’s workers’ compensation
scheme

NRS 616C.390(5) establishes a one-year time limit from the
date of a claim’s closure for certain workers’ compensation claim-
ants to apply to reopen their claims. Under the statute’s terms, if
the claimant was off work or received permanent partial disability
benefits, then the one-year limitations period set forth in this
statute does not apply to the reopening of the claim. Jd. But if the
claimant was not off work and did not receive benefits for a per-
manent partial disability, the application to reopen the claim must
be brought within one year of the date of claim closure. Id.

|

This court has consistently treated the time limitations set forth
in Nevada’s workers’ compensation statutes as establishing a ju-
tisdictional bar to further review when the required action is not
taken within the time period delineated in those statutes. See Seino
v. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 121 Nev. 146, 150, 111 P.3d 1107,
1110 (2005) (‘‘Statutory periods for requesting administrative re-
view of workers’ compensation determinations are mandatory and
jurisdictional.’’); Reno Sparks Convention Visitors Auth. v. Jack-
son, 112 Nev. 62, 66-67, 910 P.2d 267, 270 (1996) (recognizing
that the failure to appeal an administrative determination within the
prescribed time period precluded consideration of the appeal). We
see no reason to depart from this well-established approach, and
thus, we likewise conclude that where the reopening of a claim is
subject to the limitations period set forth in NRS 616C.390(5), the
failure to apply to reopen the claim within this period acts as a ju-
tisdictional bar to the reopening of the claim. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 2 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Cal. 2000);
Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); but see Ball v. Indus. Comm’n, 503 P.2d
1040, 1042-43 (Colo. App. 1972) (concluding that a similar lim-

Ee 391

itation on the time for reopening claims constitutes a waivable de-
fense rather than a jurisdictional bar), overruled on other grounds
by Kuckler v. Whisler, 552 P.2d 18, 19 (Colo. 1976); Gragg v.
W. M. Harris & Son, 284 S.E.2d 183, 186 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)
(same). With this conclusion in mind, we now address the appeals
officer’s interpretation of NRS 616C.390(5)’s off-work requirement
and her conclusion that Williams was not off work and was there-
fore subject to the one-year time limit for applying to reopen his
claim.

The plain meaning of NRS 616C.390(5) and its effect on Williams’
application
|

Williams asserts that NRS 616C.390(5) does not preclude an
employee from applying to reopen his or her claim after a year
from the claim’s closure if the employee misses time from work as
a result of his or her injury. He argues that the appeals officer
erred in applying NRS 616C.390(5) as a bar to his application to
reopen his claim, contending that he was off work under NRS
616C.390(5) because the treating physician prohibited him from
working until two days after the accident.

UPS responds that the appeals officer correctly interpreted and
applied NRS 616C.390(5). It argues that the appeals officer
reasonably concluded, after referencing legislative history, that
NRS 616C.390(5) barred employees, such as Williams, from ap-
plying to reopen their claims if they did not miss at least five days
of work as a result of their injuries.

Le

We review an administrative decision in the same manner as the
district court. Riverboat Hotel Casino v. Harold’s Club, 113 Nev.
1025, 1029, 944 P.2d 819, 822 (1997). In that context, questions
of law, such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. Id.;
see Irving v. Irving, 122 Nev. 494, 496, 134 P.3d 718, 720 (2006).
“*When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words . . . ”’ Cromer v. Wilson,
126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010). Provisions are read
as a whole, with effect given to each word and phrase. Arguello v.
Sunset Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 370, 252 P.3d 206, 209
(2011). In the absence of an ambiguity, we do not resort to other
sources, such as legislative history, in ascertaining that statute’s
meaning. See Cromer, 126 Nev. at 109, 225 P.3d at 790; State,
Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 293-
94, 995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000). Our duty is to interpret the statute’s
language; this duty does not include expanding upon or modifying

|

392 ee

the statutory language because such acts are the Legislature’s func-
tion. Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 112 Nev. 494,
498, 915 P.2d 288, 290 (1996).

In attempting to determine the requirements for reopening a
claim after a year from its closure, the appeal’s officer erroneously
relied upon unpersuasive legislative history regarding a bill that the
2001 Legislature was considering but never voted upon. A.B. 46,
Tist Leg. (Nev. 2001). After reviewing this legislative history, the
appeals officer concluded that an employee is able to reopen a
claim after a year from its closure only if the employee missed at
least five days of work as a result of the injury or received a per-
manent partial disability award; because Williams did not satisfy
these requirements, the appeals officer determined that he could
not reopen his claim. UPS relies on similar legislative history in
advancing the same interpretation of NRS 616C.390(5).

The appeals officer erred in relying upon this legislative history
because NRS 616C.390(5) lacks an ambiguity that requires look-
ing beyond the statute’s plain meaning. NRS 616C.390(5) provides
that an employee who was off work as a result of his or her injury
is not precluded from reopening his or her claim after a year
from the claim’s closure. The statute’s language does not condition
an employee’s ability to reopen a claim on the amount of time the
employee was off work. Rather, NRS 616C.390(5) conditions an
employee’s ability to reopen a claim on either receiving a perma-
nent partial disability award or losing time from work and a causal
relationship between the injury and that time off work.

Here, Williams lost time from work on the date of his accident
and as a result of his injury. After diagnosing Williams’ injuries,
Dr. Schwartz noted on the C-4 form that he prohibited Williams
from working the remainder of his shift. Williams missed the re-
maining time of his scheduled shift on the date of his accident pur-
suant to Dr. Schwartz’s instruction not to work. Thus, Williams
was off work as a result of his injury under the plain meaning of
NRS 616C.390(5).

We acknowledge UPS’s concern that the interpretation of NRS
616C.390(5) adopted here may allow an employee to apply to re-
open his or her claim after a year from the claim’s closure if the
employee missed any amount of time from work as a result of the
injury. Regardless, our task is to interpret NRS 616C.390(5) based
on its plain meaning; we cannot expand or modify the statutory
language by imposing the requirements that the Legislature con-
templated in A.B. 46 but did not add to the statute, nor is the ap-
peals officer in a position to read language into a statute. See
Washoe Med. Ctr., Inc., 112 Nev. at 498, 915 P.2d at 290. If UPS
or other employers believe that the statute must include more re-

pT 393

quirements to limit an employee’s ability to reopen a claim after a
year from the claim’s closure, this effort to alter the statute must
be taken up with the Legislature and not this court. See id.

Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of NRS
616C.390(5) does not bar an employee from applying to reopen his
or her claim after a year from its closure if the employee missed.
time from work as a result of his injury. The statute does not con-
dition this right to apply to reopen one’s claim on losing a certain
amount of time from work. Thus, NRS 616C.390(5) does not bar
Williams’ application to reopen his claim because Williams was off
work as a result of his injury when he followed the treating physi-
cian’s order to not work the remainder of his shift on the date of
his accident.' But for his fall and injuries, Williams would not have
lost this time from work.

CONCLUSION

In light of our conclusions above, we reverse the district court’s
denial of the petition for judicial review and remand this matter to
the district court. Upon remand, the district court shall instruct the
appeals officer to reexamine Williams’ claim, considering the ap-
propriate evidence in light of NRS 616C.390(1).?

Gippons and Douc.as, JJ., concur.

"Though the parties raise arguments as to whether Williams proffered
efiough evidence to reopen his claim under NRS 616C.390(1), the appeals of-
ficer did not reach this issue upon concluding that NRS 616C.390(5) barred
Williams’ application to reopen his claim. As a result, we do not reach this
issue, which must first be addressed by the appeals officer. See Langman v.
Nev, Adm’rs, Inc., 114 Nev. 203, 206-07, 955 P.2d 188, 190 (1998) (recog-
nizing that this court’s role in reviewing an administrative decision is to de-
termine the propriety of the agency’s decision in light of the evidence presented
to the agency); Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601,
604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (noting that ‘‘an appellate court is not an ap-
propriate forum in which to resolve disputed questions of fact”).

2We have considered the remaining contentions on appeal and conclude that
they lack merit.

HALCROW, INC., Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND
FoR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE
ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ, District Jupce, RE-
SPONDENTS, AND PACIFIC COAST STEEL; AND CENTURY
STEEL, INC., REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.

No. 60194
June 27, 2013 302 P.3d 1148

[|
Backus Carranza & Burden and Leland Eugene Backus and
Shea A. Backus, Las Vegas; Lloyd, Gray, Whitehead & Monroe,

P.C., and E. Britton Monroe and Burns L. Logan, Birmingham,
Alabama, for Petitioner.

Gordon & Rees, LLP, and Robert E. Schumacher, Las Vegas;
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, and Scott R. Omo-
hundro, Craig A. Ramseyer, and Timothy E. Salter, San Diego,
California, for Real Party in Interest Pacific Coast Steel.

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, James H.
Randall, L. Kristopher Rath, and Cynthia G. Milanowski, Las
Vegas; Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, LLP, and Megan K.
Dorsey and Robert C. Carlson, Las Vegas, for Real Party in In-
terest Century Steel, Inc.

39:

&

Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP, and David R. Johnson
and Jared M. Sechrist, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Tishman
Construction Corporation of Nevada.

396

Before the Court EN Banc.’
OPINION

By the Court, Sarrm, J.:

In this opinion, we address whether the economic loss doctrine
applies to bar a claim alleging negligent misrepresentation against
a structural steel engineer on a commercial construction project.
We exercise our discretion to review this petition for extraordinary
writ relief, as our intervention will help resolve related future lit-
igation by addressing an important legal issue, which our decision
in Terracon Consultants Western, Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Group,
125 Nev. 66, 206 P.3d 81 (2009), left open. Ultimately, we con-
clude that the economic loss doctrine bars negligent misrepresen-
tation claims against commercial construction design professionals
where the recovery sought is solely for economic losses.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

This original proceeding stems from the construction of, and
subsequent litigation regarding, the Harmon Tower (the Harmon)
located within CityCenter, a mixed-use urban development in Las
Vegas owned and developed in part by MGM Mirage Design
Group. MGM retained an architectural firm and a general con-
tractor, Perini Building Company, Inc., to assist in the project’s de-
velopment. The architectural firm retained petitioner Halcrow,
Inc., to design the Harmon’s structure, prepare drawings, and per-
form ongoing structural engineering services, including observa-
tions and inspections, throughout the construction of multiple
structures in CityCenter. Perini hired real party in interest Century
Steel, Inc., to provide the steel installation. Following the con-
struction of a portion of the Harmon, Century assigned its assets,
including the contract for the Harmon, to real party in interest Pa-
cific Coast Steel (PCS).

All parties agree that Halcrow had no contract with PCS, Cen-
tury, or Perini. Nonetheless, pursuant to PCS’s and Century’s
contractual obligations to Perini, they were required to follow Hal-
crow’s design and specifications for installing reinforcing steel in
the Harmon. Problems arose when defects were discovered relat-
ing to the reinforcing steel’s installation.

After construction was stopped on the Harmon, Perini filed a
complaint against MGM for allegedly failing to make timely pay-
ments, MGM filed a counterclaim against Perini for the alleged re-
inforcing steel defects and other nonconforming work on the Har-

‘THe HONORABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

ee

mon. Perini then filed a third-party complaint against Century
and PCS, among others, asserting claims for contractual indemnity.
Century and PCS in turn filed their own third- and fourth-party
complaints against several entities, including Halcrow, alleging
claims for negligence, equitable indemnity, and contribution and
apportionment, and seeking declaratory relief.

Halcrow filed a motion to dismiss Century’s and PCS’s third-
and fourth-party complaints for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, based on this court’s holding in Terracon
Consultants Western, Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Group, 125 Nev. 66,
206 P.3d 81 (2009). Halcrow argued that Jerracon bars uninten-
tional tort claims against design professionals in commercial con-
struction projects when the claimant incurs purely economic
losses. The district court granted Halcrow’s motion and dismissed
Century’s and PCS’s claims for negligence, indemnity, contribu-
tion, and declaratory relief.

PCS then sought leave to amend its third-party complaint in
order to include a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.
Century followed suit and filed a motion for leave to amend its
fourth-party complaint against Halcrow and others, to allege a
claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow filed an opposition
to Century’s and PCS’s motions to amend their complaints, argu-
ing that Zerracon did not carve out an exception to the economic
loss doctrine for negligent misrepresentation claims, and thus,
PCS and Century should not be permitted to maintain such claims.
Century and PCS on the other hand argued that Halcrow owed
them a duty to act with reasonable care, pursuant to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 552, in communicating information
to Century and PCS about the steel installation. Specifically, they
alleged that Halcrow failed to conduct timely inspections in ac-
cordance with its representations that inspections would take place
and erroneously stated that on-site adjustments would alleviate er-
rors in its plans. Century and PCS therefore contended that as a re-
sult of their foreseeable reliance on Halcrow’s false representations
regarding the steel installation inspection and correction process,
Halcrow could be held liable for negligent misrepresentation.

Following a hearing, the district court granted the motions
to amend but stayed the proceedings pending resolution of the
legal issues by this court. This petition for extraordinary writ re-
lief followed.

DISCUSSION
Writ of mandamus

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as ‘‘a duty resulting from an office,

5

trust or station.’ NRS 34.160. Mandamus relief may also be
proper “‘to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discre-
tion.” Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124
Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008). Mandamus is an ex-
traordinary remedy, and we have full discretion to determine
whether a petition will be considered. Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008). Writ re-
lief will not be available when an adequate and speedy legal rem-
edy exists. NRS 34.170. ‘‘Whether a future appeal is sufficiently
adequate and speedy necessarily turns on the underlying proceed-
ings’ status, the types of issues raised in the writ petition, and
whether a future appeal will permit this court to meaningfully re-
view the issues presented.’ D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468, 474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736 (2007); see
also Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 113 Nev. 1343, 1344-45,
950 P.2d 280, 281 (1997) (indicating that this court will consider
a petition challenging an order denying motions to dismiss when an
important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of
sound judicial economy and administration militate in favor of
granting the petition).

We exercise our discretion to consider this petition because the
legal issue of whether a negligent misrepresentation tort claim
may be maintained against a design professional in a commercial
construction setting is one of first impression in Nevada and the
issue has resulted in split decisions in Nevada state and federal dis-
trict courts such that our clarification of this important issue now
will promote sound judicial economy and administration. D.R.
Horton, Inc., 123 Nev. at 474-75, 168 P.3d at 736.

The district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting
leave to amend in order to plead negligent misrepresentation

NRCP 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint shall be
“freely given when justice so requires.’’ However, leave to amend
should not be granted if the proposed amendment would be futile.
See Allum y. Valley Bank of Nev., 109 Nev. 280, 287, 849 P.2d
297, 302 (1993). A proposed amendment may be deemed futile if
the plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint in order to plead an im-
permissible claim. See Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 109 Nev.
78, 84, 847 P.2d 731, 736 (1993).

Negligent misrepresentation and the economic loss doctrine

a

In Terracon, we held that the economic loss doctrine applied to
preclude a plaintiff from asserting professional negligence claims
against design professionals when the plaintiff sought to recover

purely economic losses in a dispute concerning commercial con-
struction. Specifically, we concluded that:

in a commercial property construction defect action in which
the plaintiffs seek to recover purely economic losses through
negligence-based claims, the economic loss doctrine applies to
bar such claims against design professionals who have pro-
vided professional services in the commercial property devel-
opment or improvement process.

125 Nev. at 80, 206 P.3d at 90. In so holding, we explained that
the economic loss doctrine is intended to mark ‘‘ ‘the fundamental
boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the
expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a
duty of reasonable care and thereby [generally] encourages citizens
to avoid causing physical harm to others.’ ’’ Jd. at 72-73, 206 P.3d.
at 86 (alteration in original) (quoting Calloway v. City of Reno, 116
Nev. 250, 256, 993 P.2d 1259, 1263 (2000), overruled on other
grounds by Olson v. Richard, 120 Nev. 240, 241-44, 89 P.3d 31,
31-33 (2004)). We further explained that application of the doctrine
protects parties from unlimited economic liability, which could re-
sult from negligent actions taken in commercial settings. Jd. at 74,
206 P.3d at 86-87.

In this case, Halcrow contends that the clear and explicit hold-
ing in Terracon bars all negligence-based claims, including negli-
gent misrepresentation. It further argues that numerous courts
have refused to exempt negligent misrepresentation claims from the
economic loss doctrine in cases of large commercial construction
projects. In contrast, PCS and Century argue that Terracon left
open the question of whether negligent misrepresentation may be
an appropriate exception to the economic loss doctrine. Further,
both PCS and Century argue that negligent misrepresentation
should be adopted as an exception to the economic loss doctrine
because it would not lead to the type of unlimited liability that the
doctrine seeks to avoid. They maintain that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts section 552 (1977) imposes on design professionals
a duty of care, separate and apart from any duties arising from
Halcrow’s contract with the architectural firm, and because Hal-
crow breached that duty by negligently misrepresenting that it in-
spected and made corrections to the steel work, thus causing Cen-
tury and PCS financial damages, they should be permitted to
amend their complaints to assert negligent misrepresentation. We
disagree.

Although Terracon recognized that exceptions to the economic
loss doctrine exist, it answered only the specific question of
whether the doctrine applied to preclude professional negligence
claims against design professionals who provided services in the
commercial property development and improvement process, when

0

the plaintiff sought purely economic losses. In this case, Century’s
and PCS’s proposed amended complaints include a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation, based on Halcrow’s alleged mis-
representations that it would inspect and make appropriate on-site
adjustments to the steel installation, and on which representations
Century and PCS allege they relied. Terracon did not address
whether the economic loss doctrine applied to bar plaintiffs from
asserting such claims, and we resolve that question now.

P|

We have previously adopted section 552 of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts in upholding a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
That section provides:

“‘One who, in the course of his business, profession or em-
ployment, or in any other [trans]action in which he has a pe-
cuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.”

Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 94 Nev.
131, 134, 575 P.2d 938, 940 (1978) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 552 (1977)). Section 552 provides that in situations
where only pecuniary loss results, liability for negligent misrepre-
sentation is not based on general duty rules, but instead, on a ‘‘re-
stricted rule of liability.’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 cmt.
a (1977). Liability is only imposed on a party who has supplied
false information, where that information is for the guidance of
others and where the party knows that the information will be re-
lied upon by a foreseeable class of persons. Jd. cmt. b.

P|

In Terracon, we left open the door for exceptions to the eco-
nomic loss doctrine for negligent misrepresentation claims ‘‘in [a]
certain categor[y] of cases when strong countervailing considera-
tions weigh in favor of imposing liability”’ 125 Nev. at 73, 206
P.3d at 86. Liability is proper in cases where there is significant
tisk that ‘‘the law would not exert significant financial pressures to
avoid such negligence.” Jd. at 76-77, 206 P.3d at 88. These types
of cases encompass economic losses sustained, for example, as a
result of defamation, intentionally caused harm, negligent mis-
statements about financial matters, and loss of consortium. Barber
Lines A/S y. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 1985)
(citing numerous exceptions to the economic loss doctrine that have
been accepted by courts). However, in the context of commercial
construction design professionals, negligent misrepresentation

ee

claims do not fall into such a category because ‘‘contract law is
better suited’’ for resolving such claims. Terracon, 125 Nev. at 77,
206 P.3d at 89. Further, in commercial construction situations, the
highly interconnected network of contracts delineates each party’s
risks and liabilities in case of negligence, which in turn ‘‘exert sig-
nificant financial pressures to avoid such negligence.’ Id. at 77,
206 P.3d at 88.

Additionally, complex construction contracts generally include
provisions addressing economic losses. See Terracon, 125 Nev. at
78, 206 P.3d at 89. Therefore, the parties’ “‘ ‘disappointed eco-
nomic expectations’ ’’ are better determined by looking to the par-
ties’ intentions expressed in their agreements. Id. at 79, 206 P.3d
at 90 (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects,
Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57-58 (Va. 1988)). This is further supported
by the fact that design professionals supply plans, designs, and re-
ports that are relied upon to create a tangible structure; the ulti-
mate quality of the work can be judged against the contract. See id.
at 79, 206 P.3d at 90; see also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. SEC
Donohue Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (ll. 1997). The drawings,
reports, and on-site instructions are ‘‘incidental to a tangible prod-
uct.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d at 1202; see also Kuhn
Constr. Co. v. Ocean & Coastal Consultants, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
2d 519, 527-28 (D. Del. 2012). Thus, requiring parties that are
not in direct privity with one another but involved in a network of
interrelated contracts to rely upon that network of contracts ensures
that all parties to a complex project have a remedy and maintains
the important distinction between contract and tort law. See Cal-
loway v. City of Reno, 116 Nev. 250, 256, 993 P.2d 1259, 1263
(2000), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. Richard, 120 Nev.
240, 241-44, 89 P.3d 31, 31-33 (2004).

In Zerracon, we concluded that a design professional’s duty to
a party with whom it contracted is set forth in the contract, and
“any duty breached arises from the contractual relationship only.’
125 Nev. at 79, 206 P.3d at 90 (emphasis added). Based on the
foregoing discussion, we see no reason to limit our conclusion
in Terracon by imposing the extracontractual duty described in
section 552 of the Second Restatement of Torts. See Leis Family
Ltd. P’ship v. Silversword Eng’g, 273 P.3d 1218, 1224-25 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2012); 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass’n v. Mann,
Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ill. 1990);
Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark &
Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 738 (ind. 2010); Fleischer v. Hell-
muth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 993 (Wash. 1994),

Determining that design professionals have a separate and dis-
tinct duty, pursuant to section 552, to any subcontractor that must

Oe

rely on their plans would essentially allow any party to recast their
barred negligence claim into a negligent misrepresentation claim.
In the context of commercial construction projects, the evidence
that would need to be presented in order to prove a negligent mis-
representation claim is almost identical to that which would be nec-
essary in proving a claim for negligence. Allowing one and not the
other would create a loophole in Zerracon’s objective of foreclos-
ing professional negligence claims against commercial construction
design professionals and would, essentially, cause the economic
loss doctrine to be nullified by negligent misrepresentation claims.

P|

Here, PCS and Century, the subcontractors hired to install the
steel, sought to plead negligent misrepresentation claims against
Halcrow, the steel engineer. Halcrow was employed on the Harmon
as a design professional and responsible for creating the plans and
overseeing the installation of the Harmon’s steel infrastructure.
PCS and Century have never stated that they sought anything other
than economic losses. Negligent misrepresentation is an uninten-
tional tort and cannot form the basis of liability solely for eco-
nomic damages in claims against commercial construction design
professionals.? Consequently, PCS and Century cannot assert
claims of negligent misrepresentation against Halcrow. Therefore,
leave to amend should not have been granted because the amend-
ment to PCS’s and Century’s pleadings was futile. See Allum v.
Valley Bank of Nev., 109 Nev. 280, 287, 849 P.2d 297, 302
(1993); Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 109 Nev. 78, 84, 847 P.2d
Bl, 736 (1993).

CONCLUSION

We conclude that, in commercial construction defect litigation,
the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design
professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages
alleged are purely economic.* Thus, the district court was com-

%Intentional torts are not barred by the economic loss doctrine. See
Terracon, 125 Ney. at 72-73, 206 P.3d at 85-86. Thus, the economic loss
doctrine does not preclude litigants from asserting claims of intentional
misrepresentation.

Our conclusions, however, do not bar PCS or Century’s potential reliance
on Home Furniture, Inc. v. Brunzell Construction Co., 84 Nev. 309, 313-14,
440 P.2d 398, 401-02 (1968), and United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136
(1918) (providing that contractors cannot be liable for loss or damage result-
ing from defects in the plans and specifications, when the contractors simply
followed the plans as provided).

‘Because we determine that negligent misrepresentation and professional
negligence claims cannot form a basis for liability, Terracon, 125 Nev. at 80,
206 P.3d at 90, Halcrow cannot be deemed a joint tortfeasor with PCS or Cen-

— 403

pelled to deny Century’s and PCS’s motions to amend their third-
and fourth-party complaints to include claims for negligent mis-
representation against Halcrow. Accordingly, we grant Halcrow’s
petition for a writ of mandamus. The clerk of this court shall issue
a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order
granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-
party complaints and the amended complaints.

Gipsons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLas, and CHERRY, JJ.,
concur.

EMIL FREI, UI, By AND THRouGH His GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
EMIL FREI, IV, APPELLANT, v. DANIEL V. GOODSELL,
AN INDIVIDUAL; AND GOODSELL & OLSEN, A NEVADA
LimireD LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP, RESPONDENTS.

No. 58391
July 3, 2013 305 P.3d 70

Blut Law Group, APC, and Elliot S. Blut, Las Vegas, for
Appellants.

John H. Cotton & Associates, Ltd., and John H. Cotton and
Christopher G. Rigler, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

tury, Consequently, PCS and Century’s equitable claims for contribution, ap-
portionment, and indemnity necessarily fail. See Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.
v. Essex Grp., Inc., 105 Nev. 344, 345, 775 P.2d 698, 699 (1989).

3

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, appellant Emil Frei, III, challenges the district
court’s refusal to apply the doctrine of issue preclusion and its ap-
plication of the parol evidence rule in an attorney malpractice ac-
tion. Before filing the malpractice action, Frei sued the trustee
of his deceased wife’s estate, claiming that the trustee had im-
properly transferred Frei’s assets into the trust. In that trust action,
Frei successfully sought to disqualify respondent Daniel Goodsell,
the attorney who prepared the trust documents, from representing

Pe 405

the trustee, based on the district court’s conclusion that a prior
attorney-client relationship existed between Frei and Goodsell,
which created a conflict of interest.

Following resolution of the trust action, Frei sued Goodsell for
malpractice. Frei asserted, and maintains on appeal, that the doc-
trine of issue preclusion prevented Goodsell from denying the ex-
istence of an attorney-client relationship with Frei in the legal
malpractice lawsuit because he had been disqualified from repre-
senting the trustee in the previous trust action. Frei also objected
to the district court’s application of the parol evidence rule to pre-
clude evidence of Frei’s intent in executing a number of unam-
biguous documents prepared by Goodsell. We conclude that the
issue of an attorney-client relationship between Frei and Goodsell
was not ‘‘necessarily litigated’’ in the previous trust action, which
is essential for issue preclusion to apply, and that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in applying the parol evidence rule.
Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment in Goodsell’s favor.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Daniel Goodsell is an attorney who prepared various
estate planning documents for the signature of appellant Emil Frei
Ill. Goodsell prepared the documents at the instruction of Frei’s
agent, Stephen Brock, who had been appointed as both Frei’s
attorney-in-fact and as trustee to a trust for Frei’s wife. Per Brock’s
instruction, the documents were intended to correct an imbalance
between two separate revocable trusts that benefited the couple’s
children from prior marriages. The documents included assign-
ments of bank and investment accounts, a deed to Frei’s home, two
codicils to his will, an amendment to Frei’s trust, and a declination
to act as successor trustee to the wife’s trust. Goodsell did not
speak directly to Frei about the documents and delivered them to
Brock for Frei’s signature. Upon execution, the documents trans-
ferred over $1 million of Frei’s assets into his wife’s trust.

After his wife’s death, Frei sought to void the documents and
filed an action against Brock, arguing that he did not understand
the impact of what he was signing and that the documents did not
accurately reflect his intent. As litigation over the trust ensued,
Frei also filed a motion to disqualify Goodsell from representing
Brock, arguing that an attorney-client relationship existed to the ex-
tent that Goodsell prepared documents for Frei’s signature. The
district court concluded that Brock had been acting as Frei’s agent
in obtaining the documents, and it granted Frei’s motion to dis-
qualify Goodsell based on a conflict of interest. The trust action

‘We refer to respondent Goodsell and his law firm, respondent Goodsell &
Olsen, collectively as Goodsell. Appellant’s son, Emil Frei IV, has been ap-
pointed guardian ad litem in this action.

406 PT

was ultimately resolved through a settlement agreement, which was
approved in district court.

After the trust litigation settled, Frei brought the underlying
legal malpractice action against Goodsell, arguing that Goodsell
breached his standard of care by failing to verify Frei’s intentions
before preparing the documents for his signature.

Before trial, Frei filed a motion in limine to preclude Goodsell
from arguing that an attorney-client relationship did not exist.
Specifically, Frei argued that under the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion, Goodsell could not deny the existence of an attorney-client
relationship in light of the district court’s order disqualifying
Goodsell from the trust action. The district court denied Frei’s mo-
tion, reasoning that the disqualification ruling had not resulted in
a final, appealable order.

During trial, Goodsell raised a parol evidence objection in re-
sponse to questions regarding Frei’s intent in executing the docu-
ments. Goodsell argued that each document was clear and unam-
biguous, such that Frei could not testify to contradict the plain
meaning of its contents. The district court agreed that evidence of
Frei’s intent was precluded by the parol evidence rule. Following
a general jury verdict, the district court issued judgment in Good-
sell’s favor.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Frei argues that the doctrine of issue preclusion
should have precluded Goodsell from denying the existence of
an attorney-client relationship. Frei also argues that the district
court erred by concluding that the parol evidence rule barred tes-
timony regarding his intent and understanding of the documents.
We disagree.

Application of the doctrine of issue preclusion

be

Frei argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in
limine because the doctrine of issue preclusion should have pre-
cluded Goodsell from arguing that an attorney-client relationship
did not exist. We review de novo whether the doctrine of issue
preclusion applies to preclude a party from relitigating legal issues
that were addressed in a previous action. Five Star Capital Corp.
v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1052, 194 P.3d 709, 711 (2008); Univ. &
Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Sutton, 120 Nev. 972, 984, 103 P.3d 8, 16
(2004).

In order for issue preclusion to apply, each of the following el-
ements must be met:

Pe 407

“(1) the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identi-
cal to the issue presented in the current action; (2) the initial
ruling must have been on the merits and have become
final; . . . (3) the party against whom the judgment is as-
serted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the
prior litigation’’; and (4) the issue was actually and neces-
sarily litigated.

Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1055, 194 P.3d at 713 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879
P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994)); see also Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 121
Nev. 464, 474, 117 P.3d 227, 234-35 (2005) (noting that ‘‘a liti-
gant must show that an issue of fact or law was necessarily and ac-
tually litigated in a prior proceeding’).

Le

Focusing on the fourth factor—whether the issue was actually
and necessarily litigated, which is dispositive here—we conclude
that while the issue of Goodsell’s attorney-client relationship with
Frei was actually litigated in the previous trust action, cf. In re
Sandoval, 126 Nev. 136, 139-40, 232 P.3d 422, 424-25 (2010)
(concluding that a case had not been ‘‘actually . . . litigated’
without knowledge and participation of both parties and findings
of fact established by evidence); see Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 27 cmt. d (1982) (‘‘When an issue is properly raised
... and is submitted for determination, . . . the issue is actually
litigated . . . ”’), it was not necessarily litigated. Nevada law pro-
vides that only where ‘‘the common issue was... necessary
to the judgment in the earlier suit,’ will its relitigation be pre-
cluded. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. at 599, 879 P.2d at 1191 (emphasis
added). Thus, for issue preclusion to apply in this case, the is-
sue of whether Frei and Goodsell had an attorney-client relation-
ship must have been necessary for resolution of the trust action.

In resolving this issue, we look to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, which addressed a similar issue in Jarosz v.
Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482, 486 (Mass. 2002). Jarosz involved the
preclusive effect of a district court ruling in a wrongful termination
action, in which a corporate co-owner and former officer unsuc-
cessfully moved to disqualify the corporation’s attorney based on
a conflict of interest arising from the attorney’s actions in helping
the former officer acquire his interest in the corporation. Id. at
485. The former officer then filed a subsequent legal malpractice
claim against the attorney, who in turn moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that an attorney-client relationship did not exist
as a matter of law. Id. The Jarosz court declined to apply the doc-
trine of issue preclusion after concluding that ‘‘[t]he issue of [an]

408 Po

attorney-client relationship . . . was clearly not essential to a
determination of . . . wrongful termination claims against the [cor-
poration].”” Id. at 489 (reasoning that the former officer “‘could
have prevailed on those claims regardless of the outcome of his
motion to disqualify’’).

Here, resolution of the prior trust action was not dependent on
whether Goodsell had an attorney-client relationship with Frei. In-
stead, the record indicates that either party to the trust action
could have prevailed regardless of the district court’s disqualifica-
tion of Goodsell. Thus, we conclude that the issue of whether Frei
entered into an attorney-client relationship was not necessarily lit-
igated in the trust action, thereby rendering the doctrine of issue
preclusion inapplicable in the subsequent legal malpractice ac-
tion.? Five Star, 124 Nev. at 1052, 194 P.3d at 711.

Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Frei’s mo-
tion in limine or by allowing the issue of an attorney-client rela-
tionship to be determined by the jury.

Parol evidence rule

Frei argues that the district court erred in applying the parol ev-
idence rule to preclude testimony of his actual intent in executing
the documents.’ ‘‘We review a district court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will not interfere

2Frei argues that the district court erred in concluding that the disqualifica-
tion ruling did not result in an appealable, final order. Because we conclude
that the underlying issue was not necessarily litigated in the trust action—a
point contested in the parties’ briefs and at oral argument—we need not ad-
dress Frei’s argument. Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 403, 632
P.2d 1155, 1158 (1981) (stating that this court may affirm a district court’s de~
cision for different reasons than relied upon below).

We limit our discussion on this issue to the arguments raised by Frei on ap-
peal and therefore assume without deciding that the parol evidence rule is
available here. It is unclear whether the parol evidence rule applies to this type
of action, where appellant seeks recovery for legal malpractice and is not
specifically seeking to contradict the terms of the document, See Schneider,
Smeltz, Ranney & LaFond, P.L.L., v. Kedia, 796 N.B.2d 553, 555-56 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003) (concluding in a legal malpractice case that the parol evidence
rule would not preclude a client from introducing evidence that the document
prepared by his attorney included different terms than those agreed to prior to
execution); Thomson v. Canyon, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 537 (Ct. App. 2011)
(‘The parol evidence rule prevents reconstruction of the parties’ contractual
obligations; it does not immunize real estate agents, attorneys, or other pro-
fessionals from liability arising from their misconduct in drafting a con-
tract”). We do not address this issue, however, as Frei did not properly raise
this argument on appeal. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317,
330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that this court need not
consider an issue not cogently argued or supported by relevant legal authority).

po 409

with the district court’s exercise of its discretion absent a showing
of palpable abuse.” M.C. Multi-Family Dev. v. Crestdale Assocs.,
124 Nev. 901, 913, 193 P.3d 536, 544 (2008).

bee

Extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or
vary the terms of an unambiguous written instrument, ‘‘ ‘since all
prior negotiations and agreements are deemed to have been merged.
therein, ’’ Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 281, 21
P.3d 16, 21 (2001) (quoting Daly v. Del E. Webb Corp., 96 Nev.
359, 361, 609 P.2d 319, 320 (1980)).

Frei concedes that all of the documents are unambiguous on
their face, but he argues that evidence of his intent was essential
for proving that the documents did not meet his objectives. For
support, Frei primarily relies on Russ v. General Motors Corp. for
the proposition that the district court should have allowed extrinsic
evidence regarding his understanding of the documents’ effect in
order to show a unilateral mistake in execution. 111 Nev. 1431,
1438-39, 906 P.2d 718, 723 (1995) (stating that ‘ta court should
provisionally receive all credible evidence concerning a party’s in-
tentions to determine whether the language of a release is reason-
ably susceptible to the interpretation urged by the party’’). We con-
clude that Frei’s reliance on Russ is misplaced, as this court has
subsequently discredited this language as dictum. Kaldi, 117 Nev.
at 282, 21 P.3d at 22 (concluding that ‘‘Russ does not stand for a
general proposition that evidence of a party’s intent may be ad-
missible to create ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous written
contract’’).

In the alternative, Frei argues that the parol evidence rule should
not have applied because, in the context of estate planning, courts
routinely admit extrinsic evidence of a testator’s intent. See Ohan-
neson v. Lambrinidou (In re Sargavak’s Estate), 216 P.2d 850, 852
(Cal. 1950). In In re Sargavak’s Estate, the court concluded that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to show whether an allegedly tes-
tamentary instrument was intended by the testator to be effective as
a will. Id. However, the court proceeded to modify its holding by
explaining that such evidence is not admissible ‘‘for the purpose of
proving the meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of
an admitted will”’ Id.; Bowles v, Bradley, 461 S.E.2d 811, 813
(S.C. 1995) (“‘If the language of the trust instrument is plain and
capable of legal construction, that language determines the force
and effect of the instrument . . . [and] extrinsic evidence will not
be admitted to alter the plain language of the instrument.’’). Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that this argument is unpersuasive, as Frei
does not argue that he lacked testamentary intent while signing the

‘es

documents or that he failed to understand the effect of the unam-
biguous documents at the time of their execution.*

Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in prohibiting Frei from presenting extrinsic evidence
with regard to his specific intent in executing the unambiguous
documents.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court properly refused to apply the
doctrine of issue preclusion because the issue of an attorney-client
relationship between Frei and Goodsell was not necessarily liti-
gated in the previous trust action. We also conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in applying the parol evidence
rule. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

HARpESsTy and Cuerry, JJ., concur.

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA; anD MICHELE SHAFE, IN
Her OFFICIAL Capacity AS CLARK COUNTY ASSESSOR, AP-
PELLANTS, v. HOWARD HUGHES COMPANY, LLC, a For-
EIGN Liwirep LiaBitiry COMPANY AUTHORIZED TO Do Busi-
NESS IN NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 60790

July 3, 2013 305 P.3d 896

‘Finally, Frei cites Massie v. Chatom, 127 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1912), for the
proposition that the parol evidence rule only applies to actions between parties
to the contract or their privies. In rejecting this argument, we note that Cali-
fornia law wavers in this position, as recent cases have held that the ‘‘key con-
sideration in application of the parol evidence rule, whether invoked by a party
or a stranger to the contract, is whether the extrinsic evidence is being offered
to reconstruct the parties’ contractual obligations.’’ Thomson v. Canyon, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d 525, 536 (Ct. App. 2011). In any event, Nevada has never lim-
ited application of the parol evidence rule to actions between the parties to a
contract or their privies, and we decline to do so here.

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Paul D. Johnson,
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellants.

Lionel Sawyer & Collins and Max Couvillier, William J.
McKean, and Paul D. Bancroft, Reno, for Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a property owner whose
property is located outside of Carson City may file a petition for
judicial review from a State Board of Equalization property tax val-
uation in the First Judicial District Court in Carson City. We con-
clude that the First Judicial District Court is an appropriate venue
for filing a property tax valuation challenge, irrespective of the
physical location of the property, because it is a ‘‘court of compe-
tent jurisdiction in the State of Nevada’’ as required by NRS
361.420(2). We further conclude that the statutory language pro-
vides that a property owner with property located in any Nevada
county may file a property tax valuation action in any district
court in the state.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Howard Hughes Company, LLC, owns four parcels
of real property known as Summerlin West located in Clark
County, Nevada. Dissatisfied with the appraisal performed by ap-
pellant Michele Shafe, the Clark County Assessor, for the tax

en

412

year 2011-2012, Howard Hughes Company challenged its assess-

- ment before the Clark County Board of Equalization, which low-
ered the valuation. Subsequently, appellant Clark County appealed
the revised assessment to the State Board of Equalization, which
increased the valuation. Ultimately, Howard Hughes Company pe-
titioned the First Judicial District Court in Carson City for judicial
review pursuant to NRS 361.420 and NRS 233B.130.!

Clark County and the Assessor filed a motion for change of
venue, arguing that the action should be maintained in the Eighth
Judicial District Court in Clark County. They claimed that actions
against counties are to take place in the district court that embraces
that named county under NRS 13.030(1). The district court denied
the motion, holding that the petition was properly filed in the First
Judicial District Court in Carson City in accordance with NRS
361.420(2). This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
a

Protesting property owners from counties throughout the State of

Nevada have challenged their property tax assessment in the First |
Judicial District Court in Carson City. See Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, !
128 Nev. 424, 282 P.3d 719 (2012) (action initiated in Carson City
when the property was located in Washoe County); State ex rel.
Bad. of Equalization v. Barta, 124 Nev. 612, 188 P.3d 1092 (2008) |
(same); State ex rel. Bd. of Equalization v. Bakst, 122 Nev. 1403,
148 P.3d 717 (2006) (same); Mineral Cnty. v. State, Bd. of Equal-
ization, 121 Nev. 533, 119 P.3d 706 (2005) (action commenced in
Carson City when the property was located in Mineral County).
We take this opportunity to clarify that property owners whose
property is located outside of Carson City may, in fact, file a pe-
tition for judicial review from a State Board of Equalization prop-
erty tax valuation in the First Judicial District Court. Applying de
novo review, we interpret the applicable venue statutes to determine
whether the district court properly denied the motion for change of
venue. See Otto, 128 Nev. at 430-31, 282 P.3d at 724.

[|

It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that where a
specific and general statute conflict, ‘‘the specific statute will take
precedence.’’ Anderson Family Assocs. v. State Eng’r, 124 Nev.
182, 187, 179 P.3d 1201, 1204 (2008). NRS 361.420(2) provides
that a protesting property owner ‘‘may commence a suit in any
court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Nevada against the
State and county in which the taxes were paid.’ See Marvin v.
Fitch, 126 Nev. 168, 178, 232 P.3d 425, 431 (2010) (‘‘Recogniz-
ing that the State Board’s equalization process is adversarial, the

'The petition was timely filed under NRS 361.420(3).

413

Legislature provided that a taxpayer may seek judicial review of a
State Board’s determination or bring a lawsuit ‘in any court of
competent jurisdiction in the State.” ’’ (quoting NRS 361.420(2))).
By contrast, NRS 13.030(1) states that “‘[aJctions against a county
may be commenced in the district court of the judicial district em-
bracing the [defendant] county.’

Here, NRS 361.420(2) answers the question of where venue
may be taken in a property tax valuation action. See State Indus.
Ins. Sys. v. Surman, 103 Nev. 366, 368, 741 P.2d 1357, 1358-59
(1987) (determining that a statue that specifically addresses a ques-
tion is specific). NRS 13.030 does not specifically address venue
as it relates to property tax valuation actions and is therefore gen-
eral. See In re State Eng’r Ruling No. 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 245,
277 P.3d 449, 457 (2012) (including NRS 13.030 in a discussion
of general venue statutes). Because NRS 361.420(2) is specific and
NRS 13.030 is general, NRS 361.420(2) is controlling and, thus,
venue in a tax valuation challenge may be taken in any court of
competent jurisdiction in this state.

The Nevada Legislature has unmistakably declared in NRS
361.420(2) where protesting property owners may file their actions
for recovery of taxes—in any court of competent jurisdiction in
Nevada. The First Judicial District Court in Carson City is an ap-
propriate venue because Howard Hughes Company’s petition for
judicial review from the State Board of Equalization’s property tax
valuation may be filed in the district court of any Nevada county.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the mo-
tion for change of venue.

HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

MOUNTAIN VIEW RECREATION, INC., psa MOUNTAIN
VIEW RECREATION CENTER, APPELLANT, v. IMPERIAL
COMMERCIAL COOKING EQUIPMENT CO.; HAR-
MONY FIRE PROTECTION, INC.; AND HERITAGE OP-
ERATING, L.P., RESPONDENTS.

No. 56193

July 3, 2013 305 P.3d 881

Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D.
Henriod, Las Vegas; McDonald & McCabe, LLC, and Thomas A.
McDonald, David R. Butzen, Michael P. Rohan, and Terry L.
Welch, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant.

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno,
for Respondent Imperial Commercial Cooking Equipment Co.

Lincoln, Gustafson & Cercos and Nicholas B. Salerno and
James M. Barrington, Las Vegas, for Respondent Harmony Fire
Protection, Inc.

Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, LLP, and Janice M.
Michaels and T. Blake Gross, Las Vegas, for Respondent Heritage
Operating, L.P.

Before the Court EN BANC.

416

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

This appeal arises from the district court’s grant of a motion
to change venue from Nye County to Clark County. The district
court granted the motion based on the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens and its findings that existing courtroom facilities in
Pahrump, located in Nye County, were inadequate to accommodate
a trial in the underlying matter. We conclude that the district court
abused its discretion by granting the motion for change of venue
because it (1) failed to cite sufficient evidence supporting a change
of venue pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens;
(2) failed to conduct a proper analysis, under NRS 3.100(2) and
Angell v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 108 Nev. 923, 839 P.2d
1329 (1992), as expanded by this opinion, regarding the adequacy
of courtroom facilities in a county; and (3) failed to consider the
docket congestion in Clark County before reaching its decision.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. ~*~

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2003, a fire destroyed the Mountain View Recreation Center
in Pahrump, Nevada. The fire allegedly started when a deep fat
fryer overheated and the building’s sprinkler system failed to ex-
tinguish the fire. In December 2005, appellant Mountain View
Recreation, Inc., which owned and operated the recreation center,
filed a complaint in Nye County against numerous defendants, in-
cluding respondents Imperial Commercial Cooking Equipment
Co., which manufactured the fryer, Heritage Operating, L.P.
(Proflame), which provided propane fuel to Mountain View and
serviced the fryer, and Harmony Fire Protection, Inc., which de-
signed and installed the building’s sprinkler system.

In February 2010, Proflame filed a motion for change of venue
from Nye County to Clark County, which was joined by Harmony.'
Proflame argued that finding an impartial jury in Pahrump was
“highly unlikely’’ in light of the pretrial publicity and the com-
munity’s connection to the recreation center,” and that a trial in Las

‘Imperial initially joined in Proflame’s motion for change of venue, but it
Jater withdrew its joinder because it intended to file a separate motion. How-
ever, nothing in the record before us demonstrates that Imperial filed a sepa-
rate motion.

To the extent that respondents rely on this argument as an alternative basis
to uphold the district court on appeal, we reject this argument as we have pre~
viously concluded that the determination of an impartial jury ‘‘is appropriate
only after jury selection efforts have been made.” See Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks, 127
Nev. 896, 901, 266 P.3d 618, 621 (2011).

es

Vegas, located in Clark County, would be more convenient for the
witnesses and would better serve the ends of justice. Without pro-
viding any evidence to support its latter argument, Proflame as-
serted that (1) the majority of the pretrial litigation and discovery,
including most of the depositions, had taken place in Las Vegas;
(2) the physical evidence, the special master, and the majority of
counsel were located in Las Vegas; (3) any experts located outside
of Pahrump would have to travel through Las Vegas to attend
court proceedings in Pahrump; (4) the majority of Mountain
View’s witnesses would not have to travel from Pahrump to Las
Vegas; and (5) the transfer would not require reassignment to a
Clark County district court judge because the Nevada Supreme
Court had appointed the currently presiding senior judge. Moun-
tain View opposed the motion, arguing that Proflame had failed to
provide any affidavits or evidence in support of its argument that
transferring the matter to Clark County would be more convenient
for the witnesses and would better serve the ends of justice.

At a hearing on the motion, the district court declined to change
venue based on the potential inability to seat an impartial jury, but
nonetheless indicated that the trial could not be held in Pahrump
because existing courtroom facilities were inadequate and NRCP
4l(e)’s five-year want-of-prosecution rule would require dismissal
of the action in December 2010. In response to the district court’s
concerns, Mountain View argued that Nye County was required to
provide facilities for trial in Pahrump and suggested substitute lo-
cations such as a banquet room or school. Mountain View alter-
natively asked that, if the trial was moved from Pahrump, it be
transferred to Tonopah, also located in Nye County, rather than to
Las Vegas. The district court ordered supplemental briefing by the
parties to address whether it was required to seek alternative fa-
cilities within Nye County instead of granting the motion to change
venue.

Mountain View argued in its supplemental brief that, under An-
gell v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 108 Nev. 923, 839 P.2d 1329
(1992), Nye County must provide adequate facilities for the district
court to conduct the trial within the county. It further argued that
the trial should be conducted in Nye County based on local private
and public interests in the matter.

Imperial and Proflame argued that Angell was distinguishable
and did not apply to Mountain View’s argument to conduct the
trial in Tonopah.’ Specifically, Imperial and Proflame contended
that in Angell (1) there was no motion to change venue; (2) the

2While Imperial failed to file a separate motion for change of venue, it did
submit a supplemental brief as ordered by the district court. However, there is
no indication in the record on appeal as to whether Harmony filed a supple-
mental brief or joined the supplemental brief of another party.

os

dicta stated that a trial is to be held within existing judicial facili-
ties and not in banquet halls or schoolhouse facilities and, further,
the judge would have to approve if such change was made, which
did not occur in this instance; and (3) the court did not require a
change of venue to Tonopah. Moreover, Imperial and Proflame as-
serted that the facilities in Pahrump and Tonopah were inadequate
to accommodate a trial of this magnitude. Imperial provided no
supporting affidavits, citing only the discovery disclosures made by
Mountain View that listed 35 potential percipient witnesses and 8
expert witnesses, with only 10 of those witnesses having Pahrump
addresses.

Thereafter, the district court entered a written order granting
Proflame’s motion for change of venue based on the convenience
of the witnesses and the promotion of the ends of justice. In par-
ticular, the court found that because Pahrump had only one court-
room in which to conduct such a large trial, the existing courtroom.
facilities in Pahrump were inadequate in light of the number of
defendants involved, the estimated length of time needed for the
trial, and the Pahrump district court’s current calendar. And
the court rejected Mountain View’s suggestion to use alternative fa-
cilities in Pahrump, finding that the proposed facilities would not
provide for adequate security or accommodate ‘‘the comfort or
simple logistics of complex litigation.’’ As a result, the court con-
cluded that the ends of justice could not be served by retaining the
case in Pahrump because doing so would result in the case being
dismissed for failure to bring it to trial within five years.

Having concluded that the trial could not be held in Pahrump,
the district court was faced with deciding whether to transfer the
case to Las Vegas or Tonopah. In making this determination, the
court generally noted that Tonopah is 167 miles from Pahrump,
whereas Las Vegas is only 63 miles from Pahrump, and that ‘‘[aJll
of the physical and documentary evidence to be admitted at trial is
in Las Vegas.’’ Without further elaboration, the district court con-
cluded that, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the trial
should be transferred to Clark County, rather than Tonopah. Thus,
while acknowledging the deference due to Mountain View’s choice
of venue, the court nonetheless granted the motion for change of
venue to Clark County. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
repel

This court reviews a district court’s grant of a motion to trans-
fer a trial based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens for an
abuse of discretion. Roethlisberger v. McNulty, 127 Nev. 559,
563, 256 P.3d 955, 957 (2011). District courts have wide discre-
tion when considering whether to grant such motions. Jd.

SS «:

Mountain View contends, among other things, that the district
court abused its discretion by granting Proflame’s motion for a
change of venue because (1) respondents failed to provide any af-
fidavits or evidence in support of its argument that transferring the
matter to Clark County would be more convenient for the wit-
nesses and would better serve the ends of justice; (2) the district
court failed to recognize the obligation of Nye County under NRS
3.100(2) and Angell v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 108 Nev.
923, 839 P.2d 1329 (1992), to provide adequate facilities for the
litigation; and (3) the district court failed to consider the conges-
tion of the Clark County district court’s docket in determining
whether it could accommodate the trial if transferred. We agree.

Forum non conveniens

Le

The doctrine of forum non conveniens is statutorily embodied in
NRS 13.050. See Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 104
Nev. 544, 547, 762 P.2d 886, 888 (1988). NRS 13.050(2)(c)
states that ‘‘[t]he court may, on motion, change the place of trial
. . . [w]hen the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of jus-
tice would be promoted by the change.’ However, a plaintiff’s
selected forum choice may only be denied under exceptional cir-
cumstances strongly supporting another forum. Eaton v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 773, 774-75, 616 P.2d 400, 401
(1980), overruled on other grounds by Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). A motion for
change of venue based on forum non conveniens must be sup-
ported by affidavits so that the district court can assess whether
there are any factors present that would establish such exceptional
circumstances. Id. at 775, 616 P.2d at 401. General allegations re-
garding inconvenience or hardship are insufficient because ‘‘[a]
specific factual showing must be made.’’ Id.

Respondents maintain that holding the trial in Pahrump or
Tonopah would be inconvenient to the witnesses and parties be-
cause a majority of the litigation and discovery, including the ma-
jority of depositions, took place in Las Vegas; the physical evi-
dence, the special master, and the majority of counsel are located
in Las Vegas; and all experts located outside of Pahrump would
have to travel through Las Vegas to attend court proceedings in
Pahrump. We conclude that these arguments lack merit because
they fail to establish the existence of exceptional circumstances
under Eaton.*

“xtrajurisdictional caselaw supports our conclusion. See Costello v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D. Conn. 2012) (‘“The con-
venience of counsel is not [an] appropriate consideration on a motion to trans-
fer"); Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 707, 709-10

420

Respondents further contend that the majority of Mountain
View’s witnesses will not be inconvenienced by transferring venue
to Las Vegas because many already live in Las Vegas, and, if the
case were transferred to Tonopah, those witnesses would have to
travel a distance of 211 miles to attend trial. However, respondents
fail to support such arguments with evidence in the record. We
conclude that this argument also provides little, if any, support for
respondents’ position even if such evidence were provided in the
record. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1336 (9th
Cir. 1984) (noting that ‘‘a district court should keep in mind that
the increased speed and ease of travel and communication . . .
makes, especially when a key issue is the location of witnesses, no
forum as inconvenient [today] as it was [in years past]’’ (first and
second alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)); May-
nard v. Oakes, 534 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (App. Div. 1988) (‘In our
mobile society, a drive of some 2% hours is not a matter of much
inconvenience.’’); see also Roethlisberger, 127 Nev. at 563, 256
P.3d at 957 (upholding a district court’s denial of a motion to
change venue from Douglas County to Washoe County, Nevada,
and stating that ‘‘difference[s] in travel times to the courts in either
county are, for many witnesses, relatively minimal’).

The record is devoid of affidavits from either percipient or ex-
pert witnesses or other evidence to demonstrate how the witnesses
would be inconvenienced if the trial were held in Pahrump. See
Eaton, 96 Nev. at 774-75, 616 P.2d at 401. Additionally, the dis-
trict court failed to articulate how changing venue from Pahrump
to Las Vegas would be more convenient for the witnesses or would
serve the ends of justice. Thus, to the extent the district court re-
lied on the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a basis for its de-
cision, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence in the record
to support such a finding.

Inadequate courtroom facilities

P|
The district court’s decision to change venue away from
Pahrump was based, in part, on its conclusion that the facilities

(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (‘The convenience of expert witnesses has little or no sig-
nificance in determining whether an action should be transferred.’”); Rothschild
y. Superior Court, 31 Cal. Rptr. 248, 249 (Ct. App. 1963) (disregarding affi-
davits from the plaintiff and the defendant’s employee because ‘‘neither the
convenience of a party nor an employee of a party is to be considered in de-
termining a [forum non conveniens] motion’? (citations omitted)); Said v.
Strong Mem’l Hosp., 680 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (App. Div. 1998) (‘“It is well es-
tablished that the convenience of the parties, their agents and employees, or
others under their control carries little if any weight’’ when considering a mo-
tion to change venue.).

Se

were inadequate, and the trial would have to be conducted else-
where. However, Mountain View contends that the court was ob-
ligated to direct Nye County to provide adequate facilities.

NRS 3.100(2) states that ‘‘[iJf a room for holding court . . . is
not provided by the county, . . . the court may direct the sheriff to
provide such room, attendants, fuel, lights and stationery, and the
expenses thereof shall be a county charge.” In Angell, the peti-
tioners sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to re-
quire Clark County to provide a sufficient courtroom and court
personnel to accommodate the underlying mass-tort litigation. 108
Nev. 923, 926-28, 839 P.2d 1329, 1331-32 (1992). This court de-
nied mandamus relief because there was no evidence in the record
before it to demonstrate that ‘‘existing County facilities [were] in-
adequate or could not, with comparatively minor expense and ef-
fort, be made adequate.’ Id. at 927, 839 P.2d at 1332. This court
concluded that Clark County ‘‘should . . . determine what facili-
ties may exist within the county that may be appropriately utilized
to accommodate the trial.’ Id. In doing so, this court further con-
cluded that Clark County had a statutory obligation to either find
existing facilities within the county that could accommodate a trial
of this magnitude, or find other suitable courtroom facilities,
noting that

{allthough . . . Clark County is generally responsible for pro-
viding a suitable and sufficient trial facility and necessary
court personnel, . . . the County may wish to seek an ac-
commodation for the [litigation] within existing judicial facil-
ities by suggesting alternative trial methods that have been
used elsewhere to accommodate mass tort litigation.

Id.
| ree!

Consistent with our holding in Angell, we conclude that Nye
County has a statutory duty under NRS 3.100 to provide adequate
courtroom facilities and support staff. We now expand our holding
in Angell and require that when considering whether a change of
venue is necessary based on a potential inadequacy of courtroom
facilities within a county, a district court must analyze and provide
specific findings regarding whether: (1) existing courtroom facili-
ties are adequate or, ‘‘with comparatively minor expense and ef-
fort, [can] be made adequate’’; and (2) if existing courtroom fa-
cilities are inadequate, whether there are alternative facilities
within the county that ‘‘may be appropriately utilized to accom-
modate the trial.’ Id.

Here, as in Angell, there is no evidence in the record to support
the district court’s findings that the courtroom facilities in Pabrump
or Tonopah were inadequate to conduct the trial or why alternative

2

facilities suggested by Mountain View were inadequate. Instead,
the district court made generalized statements regarding the exist-
ing courtroom facilities and rejected out of hand the feasibility of
alternative facilities in Pahrump and the ability of those facilities to
accommodate a trial in this complex litigation. Thus, no specific
details were provided as to what cases were currently pending in
the one available courtroom in Pahrump, how many days were free
on the court schedule, how many people the courtroom could ac-
commodate, and what size of courtroom would be needed given
the size of the trial. In addition, when the court’s order was issued,
seven months remained before the five-year deadline, but the court
did not specifically refer to the court’s schedule and, instead,
made general statements that there was no way that a trial could be
scheduled before the five years ran.

Furthermore, the district court failed to conduct any analysis to
determine whether, under Angell and NRS 3.100(2), Nye County
met its responsibility to provide adequate or alternative courtroom
facilities. Instead, the district court ruled, without any evidentiary
support or proper analysis, that alternative facilities in Pahrump
would be unaccommodating to jurors, and it thus transferred the
case to Las Vegas for trial proceedings. And, beyond its determi-
nation that Tonopah was farther in distance from Pahrump than Las
Vegas, the district court conducted no further analysis in deter-
mining whether Tonopah served as an adequate alternative facility
to conduct the trial.

Because the district court failed to conduct a proper analysis
prior to granting a change of venue in this matter, we conclude that
the district court abused its discretion.

Congestion of docket
| |

Finally, Mountain View contends that the district court failed to
consider Clark County’s court schedule and docket congestion be-
fore ordering a change of venue. At the outset, we note the Ninth
Circuit’s observation that ‘‘[t]he forum non conveniens doctrine
should not be used as a solution to court congestion.” Gates Lear-
jet Corp., 743 F.2d at 1337. When assessing docket congestion in
one venue with that of a proposed transferring venue, ‘‘[t]he real
issue is not whether a dismissal will reduce a court’s congestion
but whether a trial may be speedier in another court because of its
less crowded docket.’ Jd. (noting that ‘‘the district court . . . ob-
served only that its docket was congested; it did not determine
whether a trial would be speedier in the [proposed transferring
venue]’’).

| |

“‘A party seeking a transfer has the burden to make prima facie
proof that venue is maintainable in the county to which transfer is
sought.’’ GeoChem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes, 962 S.W.2d 541, 543
(Tex. 1998); see also Walker v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp., 477
N.E.2d 1335, 1342 I. App. Ct. 1985) (concluding that ‘ta com-
pilation of [courtroom] statistics prepared by the Administrative
Office of the Illinois Courts showing the number of cases disposed
of and the average time to trial’’ submitted by the defendant con-
vincingly demonstrated that defendant was entitled to a transfer of
the case to a different county).

Here, nothing in the record demonstrates that respondents satis-
fied their burden of proof by demonstrating that venue was main-
tainable in Clark County. Furthermore, nothing in the record or the
district court’s order indicates that the district court considered the
docket congestion of the Clark County district court system before
deciding to change venue to that county. The district court should
have properly considered the docket and the availability of court-
rooms and staff in Clark County before reaching its decision. The
district court’s failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. See
Roethlisberger, 127 Nev. at 563, 256 P.3d at 957.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order
granting the motion for change of venue and remand this matter
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.>

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLAs,
Curry, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

‘Mountain View also challenges the district court’s order denying its motion
for reconsideration. However, Mountain View filed its motion for reconsider-
ation after filing its notice of appeal before this court. Thus, we conclude that
the district court was divested of jurisdiction to decide the motion. See Foster
y, Dingwall, 126 Nev. 49, 52, 228 P.3d 453, 454-55 (2010) (‘[T]he timely fil-
ing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to act and
vests jurisdiction in this court.’ (internal quotations omitted)); Tuxedo Int’l
Inc. v. Rosenberg, 127 Nev. 11, 14 n.3, 251 P.3d 690, 692 n.3 (2011)
(“‘{A]rguments set forth for the first time in a motion for reconsideration are
only reviewable if the district court addresses those arguments on the merits in
an order entered before the notice of appeal is filed.” (citing Arnold v. Kip,
123 Nev. 410, 416-17, 168 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007))).

GIOVANNI O. RUGAMAS, Petiriongr, v. THE EIGHTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AnD THE HONOR-
ABLE ABBI SILVER, District JupGE, RESPONDENTS, AND
THE STATE OF NEVADA, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 62251
July 3, 2013 305 P.3d 887

P|
[Rehearing denied September 26, 2013]
[En banc reconsideration denied January 24, 2014]

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Jennifer L. Schwartz,
Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

raul

mT

427

Before Gispons, DouGLas and Sarria, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Sarr, J.:

The State sought an indictment against petitioner Giovanni O.
Rugamas on charges of sexual assault and lewdness involving a
child who was under 10 years of age. During the grand jury pro-
ceedings, the State presented testimony about out-of-court state-
ments made by the child-victim describing the alleged sexual con-
duct. With some exceptions, an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted is ‘‘hearsay”’ NRS 51.035.
Under Nevada law, a grand jury cannot receive hearsay. NRS
172.135(2).

In this original writ proceeding, we consider whether the child-
victim’s out-of-court statements were properly received by the
grand jury on either of two grounds: as non-hearsay because they
were inconsistent with the victim’s grand jury testimony or as ad-
missible hearsay under NRS 51.385, which provides that state-
ments about any act of sexual conduct made by a child who was
Jess than 10 years old are admissible ‘‘in a criminal proceeding”
if a court finds sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. We con-
clude that the statements were not properly before the grand jury.
Because the victim was not subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the out-of-court statements, those statements were not excluded
from the definition of hearsay under NRS 51.035(2)(a). Although
hearsay that falls within a statutory exception set forth in NRS
Chapter 51 may be considered by a grand jury, Gordon v. Eighth

428 poe

Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 216, 223, 913 P.2d 240, 245
(1996), we conclude that the exception in NRS 51.385 for trust-
worthy statements by a child-victim of sexual assault does not
apply to grand jury proceedings. Because the statements were
hearsay and did not fall within an exception that makes hearsay ad-
missible, the grand jury could not consider the statements. Absent
the hearsay evidence, there was not sufficient legal evidence to
support a finding of probable cause and the indictment cannot
stand. We therefore grant the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rugamas is awaiting trial on an indictment charging him with
one count of sexual assault of a minor under the age of 14 years
and one count of lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years.
See NRS 200.366(3)(c); NRS 201.230(1). At the grand jury hear-
ing, the State presented the testimony of four witnesses: the alleged
victim (A.C.), her sister (Y.V.), her mother (Elsa), and a forensic
interviewer with the Southern Nevada Children’s Assessment Cen-
ter (Faiza Ebrahim).

The State presented evidence that Rugamas sometimes took care
of the victim and her sisters, and that on one such occasion, he
locked himself and the victim in a bedroom and touched her vagi-
nal area both over and under her clothing. Unfortunately, A.C.,
who was six years old at the time of the hearing, was unable to re-
call significant details of the alleged sexual conduct other than
Rugamas locking her in a bedroom while she and her sisters were
in his care. She also did not remember telling the other witnesses
that Rugamas sexually abused her.

Y.V. witnessed part of the incident but not any sexual conduct.
She testified that she saw Rugamas put a blanket over A.C.’s head,
take her to a bedroom, and shut the door and that she heard A.C.
crying and unsuccessfully tried to open the locked bedroom door.
Although Y.V. looked under the bedroom door, she could not see
into the room. In addition to her observations, Y.V. testified to a
statement made by the victim. Y.V. testified that sometime after
the bedroom incident, A.C. told her that Rugamas had touched her
and she pointed to her ‘‘private.’”

Elsa did not witness any of the conduct. She testified to state-
ments that Y.V. and A.C. made to her. During a discussion with
her daughters about inappropriate touching, Y.V. told her that
Rugamas put A.C. in a room with him and Y.V. heard A.C. cry,
but Y.V. could not access the room. When Elsa asked A.C. where
Rugamas touched her, A.C. held up two fingers and pointed to-
ward her vaginal area.

a!

Ebrahim testified about her interview with A.C. and statements
that A.C. made during the interview. A.C. told Ebrahim that
Rugamas spanked her bottom with a belt and touched her vaginal
area with his hand under her clothing and that “‘it hurt’? When
asked where it hurt, A.C. indicated that it hurt inside her ‘‘pri-
vate.’ A.C. told Ebrahim that Rugamas also touched her vaginal
area on top of her clothes. A.C. told Ebrahim that the incident oc-
curred in a bedroom, she cried, and Rugamas told her not to tell
anyone. At the conclusion of the testimony, the grand jury returned
a true bill.

Rugamas filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the grand jury proceedings on several grounds, in-
cluding that the indictment was based on hearsay in violation of
Nevada law. The State responded, asserting that the subject evi-
dence was admissible under NRS 51.385. Rugamas countered, ar-
guing that NRS 51.385 does not apply to grand jury proceedings
because the statute conditions admissibility of the evidence upon a
court making a determination that the evidence contains guarantees
of trustworthiness. The district court denied the petition after a
hearing. In its written order, the district court concluded that the
victim’s statements were not hearsay because they were prior in-
consistent statements, and if they were hearsay, they were admis-
sible under NRS 51.385. This original petition for extraordinary
telief followed.

DISCUSSION

Rugamas argues that the district court manifestly abused its dis-
cretion by denying his pretrial habeas petition because the grand
jury was presented with nothing but inadmissible hearsay evidence
and therefore the indictment was deficient. In particular, he argues
that the testimony of Y.V., Elsa, and Ebrahim could not be admit-
ted under NRS 51.385 until a court conducted a hearing and de-
termined the trustworthiness of A.C.’s statements, and, because
that was not done here, the challenged evidence remained inad-
missible at the grand jury hearing. As to the district court’s con-
clusion that the evidence was admissible as prior inconsistent state-
ments, Rugamas argues that the district court’s decision was wrong
because he had no opportunity to cross-examine A.C. as required
by NRS 51.035(2)(a).!

'Rugamas also argues that the grand jury proceedings were deficient be-
cause the prosecutor failed to notify him of the time and date of the grand jury
hearing as required by NRS 172.241 and did not present exculpatory evidence
at the hearing as required by NRS 172.145(2). Because we grant Rugamas’ pe-
tition on another basis, we need not consider those challenges.

420

Availability of writ relief
Le

Rugamas seeks a writ of prohibition or mandamus. A writ of
prohibition may issue to arrest the proceedings of a district court
exercising its judicial functions, when such proceedings are in ex-
cess of the jurisdiction of the district court. NRS 34.320. Because
the district court had jurisdiction to consider Rugamas’ pretrial pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus by virtue of NRS 34.700 and
Rugamas’ petition did not challenge the district court’s jurisdiction
to proceed, prohibition is not an appropriate avenue for extraordi-
nary relief.

| ee

Rugamas’ original petition better suits the counterpart to prohi-
bition, the writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is available to
compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to con-
trol a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discre-
tion, see Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev.
601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). The writ will not issue,
however, if a petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law. NRS 34.170. Here, Rugamas has
another remedy: if he is convicted, he could appeal from the judg-
ment of conviction, see NRS 177.015(3), and seek review of the
district court’s pretrial order as an intermediate order, NRS
177.045. See generally Lisle v. State, 114 Nev. 221, 224, 954 P.2d
744, 746 (1998). But that remedy is not adequate because a con-
viction would render any error in the grand jury proceeding harm-
less. See id. at 224-25, 954 P.2d at 746-47.

Ultimately, the decision to entertain an extraordinary writ peti-
tion lies within our discretion. In exercising that discretion, we
must ‘‘consider[ ] whether judicial economy and sound judicial ad-
ministration militate for or against issuing the writ.’ Redeker v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 520, 522
(2006), limited on other grounds by Hildalgo v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 330, 341, 184 P.3d 369, 377 (2008).
“Where the circumstances establish urgency or strong necessity, or
an important issue of law requires clarification and public policy is
served by this court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction, this
court may exercise its discretion to consider a petition for extraor-
dinary relief’ Schuster v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev.
187, 190, 160 P.3d 873, 875 (2007). Rugamas’ petition raises an
important issue of law that needs clarification: the applicability of

Pe a1

NRS 51.385 to grand jury proceedings. Although we generally re-
frain from reviewing pretrial challenges to the sufficiency of an in-
dictment by way of a writ petition, see Kussman v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 544, 545-46, 612 P.2d 679, 680 (1980), we
have considered petitions when the case ‘‘involves only a purely
legal issue,’ Ostman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev.
563, 565, 816 P.2d 458, 460 (1991). This is such a case. We
therefore elect to exercise our discretion and consider the merits of
the petition.

Hearsay and grand jury proceedings

The Nevada Legislature has chosen to preclude a grand jury
from considering hearsay evidence. Under Nevada law, a ‘‘grand
jury can receive none but legal evidence . . . to the exclusion of
hearsay or secondary evidence”’ NRS 172.135(2). The threshold
question thus is whether the victim’s out-of-court statements were
hearsay for purposes of NRS 172.135(2).

We have observed that the ‘‘definition of hearsay as used in NRS
172.135(2) is the same as that found in NRS 51.035.’ Gordon v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 Nev. 216, 223, 913 P.2d 240, 245
(1996). NRS 51.035 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Excluded from
that definition, however, are certain statements made by a person
who testifies at the proceeding and is subject to cross-examination
about the statements and certain statements made or adopted by a
party-opponent or made by a party-opponent’s agent or cocon-
spirator. NRS 51.035(2), (3). Here, the district court determined
that the victim’s statements were not hearsay because they were in-
consistent with her grand jury testimony.

Le

When a witness’s out-of-court statements are inconsistent with
her testimony, those statements are not hearsay if the witness
“testifies at the . . . hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement.’’ NRS 51.035(2)(a). If these require-
ments are met, the statements are admissible as substantive evi-
dence, Miranda v. State, 101 Nev. 562, 567, 707 P.2d 1121, 1124
(1985), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Bejarano v.
State, 122 Nev. 1066, 1076 n.34, 146 P.3d 265, 272 n.34 (2006),
even in grand jury proceedings, because they are by definition not
hearsay. At least one of the statutory requirements was not met
here. Although the victim testified at the grand jury hearing, she
‘was not subject to cross-examination concerning the statements.
The statements therefore were not excluded from the definition of

432

hearsay under NRS 51.035(2)(a). The district court’s application of
the law in this respect is clearly erroneous.”

bee!

As a secondary basis for its determination that the statements
were not hearsay, the district court also observed that the state-
ments were ‘impeachment evidence of the victim.’ This is true as
a general proposition—a witness’s inconsistent statements may call
the witness’s veracity into question, thus impeaching the witness’s
credibility. Inconsistent statements may be used as impeachment
evidence consistent with NRS 50.075 (cited in the district court’s
order) and NRS 50.135. See Miranda, 101 Nev. at 567, 707 P.2d
at 1124. When used solely for the limited purpose of impeach-
ment, inconsistent statements are not hearsay because they are not
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the state-
ments. See NRS 51.035. But here the statements were used pri-
marily (if not entirely) for the truth of the matter asserted in the
statements—the statements were offered to prove that Rugamas
touched the victim’s vaginal area over and under her clothing;
there was no other evidence offered to prove that conduct. Evi-
dence that is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is being
used as substantive evidence. See Black’s Law Dictionary 640
(9th ed. 2009) (defining ‘‘substantive evidence”’ as that ‘‘offered
to help establish a fact in issue, as opposed to evidence directed to
impeach or to support a witness’s credibility’’). Inconsistent state-
ments may be used as substantive evidence only if they meet the
requirements of NRS 51.035(2)(a); otherwise, they may be used
solely for the limited purpose of impeachment. See 30B Graham,
supra, § 7011, at 123-24 (referring to parallel provisions in federal
evidence rules). The district court’s application of the law in this
respect is clearly erroneous.

NRS 51.385 and grand jury proceedings

Our conclusion that the statements were hearsay is not disposi-
tive of the petition because the statutory exclusion of hearsay in

Although A.C.’s statements to ¥.V. and Elsa about where Rugamas touched
her were nonverbal (she pointed toward her vaginal area), her nonverbal con-
duct was intended as an assertion that Rugamas touched her private area.
Those nonverbal assertions constituted hearsay. See NRS 51.045(2); see also
30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7002, at 24-25 (in-
terim ed. 2011) (‘‘Nodding, pointing, and the sign language of the hearing im-
paired are as plainly assertions as are spoken words.”).

Because the statements were not used for the limited purpose of impeach-
ment, we need not address whether the testimony about the statements was ex-
trinsic evidence of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements that would have
been inadmissible under NRS 50.135(2) because Rugamas had no opportunity
to cross-examine the victim about the statements.

433

grand jury proceedings ‘‘is subject to the hearsay exceptions’’ set
forth in NRS Chapter 51. Gordon, 112 Nev. at 223, 913 P.2d at
245; see also Phillips v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 309, 312, 565 P.2d 330,
332 (1977) (concluding that statements that fit hearsay exception
for dying declarations under NRS 51.335 may be considered by
grand jury). The district court determined that the statements were
admissible under the hearsay exception set forth in NRS 51.385(1).
That statute allows the admission ‘‘in a criminal proceeding’ of
statements by a child under the age of 10 describing any act of sex-
ual conduct or physical abuse if the child testifies at the proceed-
ing or is unavailable or unable to testify and “‘[t]he court finds, in
a hearing outside the presence of the jury,’ that there are sufficient
guarantees that the statements are trustworthy. In making the trust-
worthiness determination, the court must consider several factors,
including whether: ‘‘(a) The [child’s] statement was spontaneous;
(b) The child was subjected to repetitive questioning; (c) The child
had a motive to fabricate; (d) The child used terminology unex-
pected of a child of similar age; and (e) The child was in a stable
mental state.’’ NRS 51.385(2).

Pe

The hearsay exception set forth in NRS 51.385 is markedly dif-
ferent from other statutory hearsay exceptions. Unlike most other
statutory hearsay exceptions, NRS 51.385 attaches specific condi-
tions to the admission of evidence that necessitate a hearing and
findings by the court before the evidence is admissible. Lytle v.
State, 107 Nev. 589, 591, 816 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1991), overruled
on other grounds by Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 77, 40 P.3d
413, 420 (2002). We have described the statute as providing a set-
ting in which ‘“‘reliability may be more vigorously contested
and more accurately discerned.’’ Bockting v. State, 109 Nev. 103,
109, 847 P.2d 1364, 1368 (1993). The language in the statute
and the nature of grand jury proceedings lead us to conclude that
this statutory hearsay exception does not apply to grand jury
proceedings.

a

In deciding whether NRS 51.385 applies to grand jury pro-
ceedings, we first look to the plain language of the statute. ‘“When
a statute is facially clear, this court will give effect to the statute’s
plain meaning and not go beyond the plain language to determine
the Legislature’s intent.’’ Sonia F. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
125 Nev. 495, 499, 215 P.3d 705, 707 (2009); Speer v. State, 116
Nev. 677, 679, 5 P.3d 1063, 1064 (2000) (‘‘ ‘Generally, when the
words in a statute are clear on their face, they should be given their
plain meaning unless such a reading violates the spirit of the
act. ’’ (quoting Anthony Lee R. y. State, 113 Nev. 1406, 1414, 952

434

P.2d 1, 6 (1997))). The plain language of the statute contemplates
admission of evidence in a criminal proceeding before a court. We
conclude that a grand jury hearing is not the same as a criminal
proceeding conducted before a court. As a general matter, the
grand jury is an arm of the court and the court that impanels the
grand jury also supervises its proceedings, see NRS 172.097, but
nothing in our statutes, the Nevada Constitution, or this court’s ju-
risprudence suggests that the district court’s supervisory authority
extends to ruling on evidentiary matters or presiding over the
grand jury proceedings in the manner that a judge presides over a
trial. See In re Report of Washoe Cnty. Grand Jury, 95 Nev. 121,
126-27, 590 P.2d 622, 626 (1979) (observing that ‘‘the court pre-
sides at the impanellment of the grand jury (Art. 6, § 5, Nev.
Const.; NRS 6.110-.140), receives presentments and indictments
(Art. 6, § 5, Nev. Const.; NRS 172.255; NRS 172.285), de-
termines when a grand jury shall be impanelled (NRS 6.110,
NRS 6.130), charges the grand jury as to its authorities and
responsibilities (NRS 172.095), . . . determines when a grand jury
is to be discharged, recessed (NRS 6.145), or a juror excused
(NRS 172.275),” and ‘‘has the limited power to review reports of
grand juries within its jurisdiction prior to publication’’). Instead,
“‘fajs a practical matter . . . it is the district attorney who is con-
tinually interacting with the grand jurors.” Legislative Commission
of the Legislative Counsel Bureau, Study of the Law, Rules and
Practices Relating to the Grand Jury in Nevada, Bulletin No. 85-
17, at 8 (Nev. 1984). The district attorney ‘‘inform[s] the grand ju-
rors of the specific elements of any public offense which they may
consider as the basis of the indictment?’ NRS 172.095(2), and
presents evidence to the grand jury supporting its allegations
against the target, after which the grand jury determines whether
the allegations are supported by probable cause. And while a tar-
get may exercise his statutory right to testify at the grand jury pro-
ceeding, provided that he complies with NRS 172.241(2)(b), he
may not observe or otherwise participate in the proceeding. Simi-
larly, a target’s attorney may be present during the target’s testi-
mony, but counsel may not directly address the grand jurors or par-
ticipate in the proceedings. See NRS 172.235; NRS 172.239.
Thus, whereas NRS 51.385 contemplates notice to the defendant,
a ruling by a court as a precondition to admissibility, and a vigor-
ous contest regarding the reliability of the child-victim’s state-
ments, the structure of the grand jury proceeding allows for none
of these safeguards.

| ere

The State suggests that the safeguards contemplated by NRS
51.385 will not be obviated because the defendant can raise the ev-
identiary issue after the grand jury proceeding by filing a pretrial

435

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. See gen-
erally NRS 34.360; NRS 34.500; NRS 34.700; NRS 34.710. We
reject that argument for three reasons. First, the plain language of
the statute does not support after-the-fact review, particularly con-
sidering how grand juries work, as we have explained above. Sec-
ond, the focus of the grand jury is to determine whether the evi-
dence presented establishes probable cause. Introducing evidence
that is unrelated to proving the elements of an alleged offense but
necessary to develop a record for an after-the-fact challenge to the
admissibility of that evidence that may never be pursued is not only
a distraction to the grand jury but is irrelevant to its task. And fi-
nally, an after-the-fact determination places the burden on the de-
fendant both to challenge the evidence and to establish that it was
improperly received by the grand jury when NRS 51.385 normally
would put the burden on the State to give pretrial notice of its in-
tent to offer the statements and to establish that the statements are
trustworthy. See Felix v. State, 109 Nev. 151, 181, 849 P.2d 220,
240-41 (1993) (indicating that district court erred by placing bur-
den of challenging reliability of victim’s statement under NRS
51.385 on defense), superseded on other grounds by statute as
stated in Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 625, 28 P.3d 498, 509-10
(2001). Although we have allowed for harmless-error review on
appeal when the trial court failed to conduct a trustworthiness
hearing under NRS 51.385, Braunstein, 118 Nev. at 77, 40 P.3d at
420, the after-the-fact review contemplated by the State is not the
same. In the harmless-error context on appeal, the defendant had
an opportunity before and at trial to ensure that the district court
conducted the trustworthiness hearing before admitting the evi-
dence. The same is not true in the grand jury context. And in the
harmless-error context on appeal, we have explained that automatic
reversal does not serve a useful purpose, particularly where the
child testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. Id. at 77-
78, 40 P.3d at 420. Again, the same does not hold true in the
grand jury context. Considering the plain language and require-
ments of NRS 51.385, as well as the structure of grand jury pro-
ceedings, we conclude that NRS 51.385 does not apply to evidence
presented to a grand jury. Therefore, the testimony of Y.V., Elsa,
and Ebrahim about the victim’s out-of-court statements regarding
Rugamas’ sexual conduct was not admissible at the grand jury pro-
ceeding under NRS 51.385. The district court’s application of the
law in this respect is clearly erroneous.

a

Having concluded that the victim’s out-of-court statements de-
scribing Rugamas’ alleged sexual conduct were hearsay and could
not be admitted at the grand jury proceeding under the hearsay ex-
ception set forth in NRS 51.385, we must determine whether

CC

“* ‘there is the slightest sufficient legal evidence and best in degree
appearing in the record’’’ on which we may sustain the grand
jury’s probable-cause determination. Avery v. State, 122 Nev. 278,
285, 129 P.3d 664, 669 (2006) (quoting Robertson v. State, 84
Nev. 559, 561-62, 445 P.2d 352, 353 (1968)). The grand jury’s
probable-cause determination ‘‘may be based on slight, even ‘mar-
ginal’ evidence.’ Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d
178, 180 (1980) (quoting Perkins v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 180, 181, 547
P.2d 312, 312 (1976)). In other words, the prosecution must
merely show ‘‘ ‘enough evidence to support a reasonable inference’
that the defendant committed the crime charged.’’ Sheriff v. Bur-
cham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1258, 198 P.3d 326, 333 (2008) (quoting
Hodes, 96 Nev. at 186, 606 P.2d at 180). Aside from the victim’s
hearsay statements, no other evidence introduced at the grand jury
hearing provided sufficient description of Rugamas’ alleged sexual
conduct to satisfy the elements of the charged offenses. Left with
insufficient evidence to support the probable-cause determination,
we are compelled to conclude that the indictment is fatally defi-
cient, and therefore the district court manifestly abused its discre-
tion by denying Rugamas’ habeas petition. See State v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 932, 267 P.3d 777,
780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse of discretion as clearly erro-
neous interpretation or application of a law or rule). Therefore, we
grant Rugamas’ petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue
a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its
order denying Rugamas’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
enter an order consistent with this opinion.

Gipsons and Douctas, JJ., concur.

NEVADA POWER COMPANY, A NEVADA CORPORATION, APPEL-
LANT, v. 3 KIDS, LLC, A Nevapa Limirep Liapiiry Com-
PANY, RESPONDENT.

No. 56881
July 3, 2013 302 P.3d 1155

|

Ballard Spahr LLP and Stanley W. Parry and Timothy R.
Mulliner, Las Vegas; Reisman Sorokac and Heidi J. Parry Stern,
Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Cotton, Driggs, Walch, Holley, Woloson & Thompson and Stacy
D. Harrop and Gregory J. Walch, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

438

Before the Court En BANc.'
OPINION

By the Court, Grsgons, J.:

In this opinion, we review a jury instruction regarding the de-
termination of fair market value of condemned property, a portion
of which is located within a government setback, for the purpose
of ascertaining just compensation. Although we conclude that the
jury instruction at issue provided an overbroad reading of our de-
cision in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, 122 Nev. 527, 134
P.3d 705 (2006), we conclude that no prejudice was established be-
cause a separate jury instruction remedied the error. Additionally,
we consider whether the district court abused its discretion by al-
lowing testimony provided by respondent 3 Kids, LLC’s expert.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the expert to testify regarding her paired sales analysis.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3 Kids purchased a 3-acre parcel west of the Las Vegas Strip
(the property) for $8.65 million. The property was zoned for in-
dustrial use, but 3 Kids believed it could be re-zoned for more in-
tensive development. The northernmost 20 feet of the property is
in a county setback. The only developments a landowner may
perform in the setback relate to landscaping and parking. Nevada

"Tre HONORABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

439

Power already had an existing 10-foot-wide utility easement within
the setback.

In 2008, appellant Nevada Power Co. informed 3 Kids that it
was going to exercise two easements on the property for installa-
tion of high-voltage transmission lines: one 5-foot-wide easement
on the north side of the property located within the setback (the
Harmon easement) and a 35-foot easement on the east side of the
property (the Eastern easement). Nevada Power offered 3 Kids
$750,000 for the easements, but 3 Kids rejected the offer and the
issue of just compensation went to trial. At trial, 3 Kids argued
that Nevada Power owed $2,106,000 in just compensation based on
a theory that holding the property for a speculative rise in market
value was its highest and best use. 3 Kids’ expert, Tami Campa,
valued the property at $85 per square foot and concluded Nevada
Power was taking 90% of the rights to the land within the ease-
ments, except for the area the pole occupied (which was 100%).
Disagreement ensued over the value of the Harmon easement,
since it was within a setback and 3 Kids’ use of the property was
limited to landscaping and parking. Campa did not consider the
Harmon easement’s location within the setback because buyers pay
an average price per square foot. Campa used a paired sales analy-
sis to determine that the value of the remainder of the property was
impaired as a result of the installation of the high-voltage trans-
mission lines.”

Nevada Power’s experts disagreed with Campa and concluded
that the amount of just compensation due was only $556,000,
based on an industrial development highest and best use. Nevada
Power’s expert determined that Nevada Power was taking 10% of
the rights to the land within the Harmon easement since it was
within a setback and determined that Nevada Power was taking
75% of the rights of the land within the Eastern easement. Nevada
Power’s expert valued the property at $65 per square foot and val-
ued the easements at only $45 per square foot. This reflected the
10% decrease on the Harmon easement and the 75% decrease on
the Eastern easement. Nevada Power’s expert also opined that no
severance damages existed as a result of the installation of the high-
voltage transmission lines. Severance damages are damages
awarded to compensate for the difference between the value of the
remainder property before and after the taking.

During the reading of the jury instructions, Nevada Power
objected to Jury Instruction No. 35, which instructed the jury to
disregard the setback in its valuation of the property, on the ground

2A paired sales analysis estimates the value of the subject property based on
previous sales of comparable properties. A paired sales analysis can also be
used to isolate a particular variable—in this case, power lines—to determine
the impact of that variable on property values.

440 po

that 3 Kids’ use of the area within the setback was limited to
parking and landscaping. 3 Kids responded that this court’s hold-
ing in Robinson was broad enough to encompass the proposed in-
struction. The district court agreed with 3 Kids and included the
instruction.

After deliberation, the jury awarded 3 Kids $1.7 million in just
compensation. The jury found by special verdict that $823,000 of
the award represented compensation for the value of the easements
taken and that $894,000 of the award was for severance damages.
Nevada Power now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Jury Instruction No. 35 incorrectly stated the holding of Robinson,
but this error did not affect Nevada Power’s substantive rights

| ere

We review a district court’s approval of a jury instruction for
abuse of discretion or judicial error. FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128
Nev. 271, 280, 278 P.3d 490, 496 (2012). We review de novo
whether an instruction is a correct statement of the law. Cook v.
Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., L.L.C., 124 Nev. 997, 1003, 194 P.3d
1214, 1217 (2008). Even if a jury instruction misstates the law, it
only warrants reversal if it causes prejudice substantially affecting
the party’s rights, and ‘‘but for the error, a different result might
have been reached.’’ Jd. at 1005-06, 194 P.3d at 1219.

Jury Instruction No. 35 read:

In determining the fair market value of the land in which the
easement is sought, you are required to value the property as
a whole, and not put a lesser value on the portion of the prop-
erty to be condemned based upon any governmental restric-
tions that apply solely to that portion.

Nevada Power argues that this instruction runs afoul of this court’s
holding in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, 122 Nev. 527, 134
P.3d 705 (2006). We agree.

In Robinson, the City of North Las Vegas sought to condemn a
portion of a larger parcel. Id. at 529, 134 P.3d at 706. Absent a
taking, that portion was subject to a dedication requirement to the
City if the land was commercially developed. Jd. Both parties
agreed that the highest and best use of the property was commer-
cial, but the City’s expert valued the property based on uses that
would not trigger a dedication (open space, fencing, directional
signage, and the right to remove trespassers), given the fact that a
commercial valuation would have rendered the condemned portion
valueless by triggering the dedication requirement. Id. at 530, 134

ee

P.3d at 707. The district court gave an instruction that directed the
jury to “‘determine the value of the condemned parcel in the before
condition based upon only those uses to which the property can
be put without obtaining government approvals that would trigger
the dedication.’ Id. at 529, 134 P.3d at 706. This court held that
the instruction was inconsistent with just compensation require-
ments in Nevada because it ‘‘caused the jury to ignore the highest
and best use of the entire parcel and to improperly sever the con-
demned portion from the whole parcel.’ Jd. at 531, 134 P.3d at
707; see Cnty. of Clark v. Alper, 100 Nev. 382, 386-87, 685 P.2d
943, 946 (1984) (‘‘ ‘Just compensation’ requires that the market
value of the property should be determined by reference to the
highest and best use for which the land is available and for which
it is plainly adaptable.’’).

Ce

Here, the first portion of Jury Instruction No. 35, which in-
structed the jury to value the property as a whole, is consistent
with our holding in Robinson. But the second part, which in-
structed the jury not to ‘‘put a lesser value on the portion of the
property to be condemned based upon any governmental restric-
tions that apply solely to that portion,” is inconsistent with our lan-
guage in Robinson. In Robinson, we stated that the trier of fact is
permitted to consider ‘‘evidence of land-use restrictions that would
influence a prudent purchaser when purchasing the condemned
property.’ Id. at 532, 134 P.3d at 708. In certain situations, evi-
dence of land-use restrictions may not be considered, such as
where it causes the jury to disregard the highest and best use of the
whole parcel. Jd. at 532-33, 134 P.3d at 708-09 (citing Alper, 100
Nev. at 389-90, 685 P.2d at 947-49). As a restriction on land use,
an existing setback is generally a proper matter for the jury to con-
sider. See Alper, 100 Nev. at 387, 685 P.2d at 946 (‘‘As a restric-
tion on land use, an existing zoning ordinance is generally regarded
as a proper matter for the jury’s consideration.’’). This appeal does
not present a situation like that in Robinson where the restriction
caused the jury to disregard the highest and best use of the whole
parcel by valuing the property at a lower use in order to avoid trig-
gering the setback. Despite this fact, Jury Instruction No. 35 in-
structs the trier of fact to disregard the setback in a situation that
did not cause them to disregard the highest and best use of the
whole parcel. Therefore, we conclude that this portion of the in-
struction was erroneous.

Ye

This error only warrants reversal if it caused prejudice that sub-
stantially affected Nevada Power’s rights. See Cook, 124 Nev. at
1005-06, 194 P.3d at 1219 (holding that reversal of a district

OO

court’s judgment is warranted only where an error in the statement
of law in a jury instruction is prejudicial). Jury Instruction No. 19,
which was also read to the jury, stated, in pertinent part:

If the land subject to the easement will still have some mar-
ket value after the taking of the easement and the construction
and improvement in the manner proposed, Nevada Power is
required to pay on the decrease in market value that results
from the easement.

Thus, in determining the compensation to be awarded for
taking the easement, you must first determine the fair market
value of the land in which the easement is sought and then de-
termine the value of the same land as it will be subject to the
easement and the construction of the proposed improvement.
The difference between these amounts will be the value of the
easement.

Because Jury Instruction 19 correctly applies this court’s reasoning
in Robinson, the instruction alleviated any prejudice to Nevada
Power caused by the erroneous language in Jury Instruction No.
35. Id.

Additionally, the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial ev-
idence, and ‘‘[t]his court will not overturn a jury’s verdict if the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence unless, [considering]
all the evidence . . . , the verdict was clearly wrong”’ Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc., 125 Nev. 374, 384, 213
P.3d 496, 503 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). The jury’s con-
clusion that the easement was worth $823,290 was nearly
$400,000 lower than 3 Kids’ calculation, but about $267,000 more
than Nevada Power’s valuation, indicating that the jury did not
completely disregard the setback. The jury also valued the prop-
erty as a whole between 3 Kids’ estimate of $85 per square foot
and Nevada Power’s estimate of $65 per square foot, both for pur-
poses of the calculation of damages based on Nevada Power’s tak-
ing of the easement and for determining the proper severance
damages. Given that these numbers were within the range provided
by the experts, we cannot say that the verdict was clearly wrong.
‘We thus conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s ver-
dict. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. at 384, 213 P.3d at 503.

We suggest the following instruction, or something similar, in
cases where a jury is tasked with determining just compensation
for a piece of property burdened by a land-use restriction where
the jury does not need to disregard the highest and best use of the
Jand:

In determining the fair market value of the land in which the
easement is sought, you are required to value the land as a
whole based on its highest and best use and look to the high-

|:

est price which the property would bring in an open market
under the conditions of a fair sale. To determine the highest
price, you must not focus solely on the condemned portion,
but you may consider evidence of land-use restrictions that
would influence a prudent purchaser when purchasing the
condemned property.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing 3 Kids’
expert’s testimony

|

Nevada Power also argues that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by allowing 3 Kids’ expert, Tami Campa, to testify about
her paired sales analysis when she did not disclose certain backup
data from five property sales used to support her calculation of the
proper price per square foot for 3 Kids’ parcel. Nevada Power also
asserts that the district court should have allowed it to present maps
and reports to rebut Campa’s testimony. We disagree.

We review a district court’s decision to admit expert testimony
for a clear abuse of discretion. In re Mosley, 120 Nev. 908, 921,
102 P.3d 555, 564 (2004). NRCP 16.1(a)(2)(B) requires an ex-
pert’s report to “‘contain a complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data and other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions.”
While Campa’s analysis of the five sales in question was less thor-
ough than other areas of her 160-page report, we conclude that
these weaknesses went to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility. See Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127
Nev. 518, 530-31, 262 P.3d 360, 368 (2011) (noting that concerns
about the reliability of expert testimony went to weight, not ad-
missibility). These weaknesses were appropriate topics for cross-
examination. Nevada Power had a wide range of unused tools
available to address any issues with the report before trial, includ-
ing motions to compel production of documents, motions in lim-
ine, development of a competing paired sales analysis, and vigor-
ous cross-examination. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“‘Vigorous cross-examination, presen-
tation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence.’). Therefore, we conclude the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Campa’s tes-
timony. Mosley, 120 Nev. at 921, 102 P.3d at 564.

a

Nevada Power raises additional issues relating to Campa’s testi-
mony. First, Nevada Power argues that the district court should
have allowed it to present maps and reports during rebuttal based
on the APN numbers Campa provided during 3 Kids’ case-
in-chief. Due to Campa’s imprecise identification of the parcels

baad po

she used in her paired sales analysis, Nevada Power guessed which
sales she used when developing their own expert report. However,
once the APNs were disclosed at trial, Nevada Power realized
some of its assumptions were incorrect and attempted to provide
rebuttal information based on the actual parcels that Campa used.
‘We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by re-
fusing to allow Nevada Power to introduce information in rebuttal
that was not disclosed prior to trial. NRCP 16.1(a)(3); M.C. Multi-
Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 913,
193 P.3d 536, 544 (2008) (stating that this court ‘‘review[s] a dis-
trict court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion, and . . . will not interfere with the district court’s ex-
ercise of its discretion absent a showing of palpable abuse’’);
Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 492,
117 P.3d 219, 226 (2005) (holding that the trial court has broad
discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence). NRCP
16.1(a)(3) requires that rebuttal evidence be provided to other par-
ties at least 30 days before trial, and Nevada Power first produced
the maps and report at issue during trial.

Nevada Power also argues that Campa’s testimony violated NRS
50.285 because her paired sales analysis lacked verifiable and re-
liable data relating to the five property sales. NRS 50.285 does not
define the type of documentation or data on which experts may
rely, however, and does not support Nevada Power’s argument. We
further conclude that the district court properly denied Nevada
Power’s request to play a portion of Campa’s video deposition at
trial as Nevada Power’s counsel agreed that he could examine the
witness live instead. See Clark Cnty. v. State, 65 Nev. 490, 506,
199 P.2d 137, 144 (1948) (“‘[A] party on appeal cannot assume an
attitude . . . inconsistent with... that taken at the hearing
below.’’).

CONCLUSION

‘We conclude that the district court erred by giving Jury Instruc-
tion No. 35, but this error did not prejudice Nevada Power in light
of Jury Instruction No. 19. We also conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing 3 Kids’ expert’s tes-
timony and by excluding Nevada Power’s rebuttal evidence. We
have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude
that they are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.

HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and Sarrta, JJ.,
concur.

445

BRYAN CLAY, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE
JAMES M. BIXLER, Districr JuDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RzAL Parry IN INTEREST.

No. 61986

July 11, 2013 305 P.3d 898

Patti, Sgro & Lewis and Anthony P. Sgro, Las Vegas;
Christopher R. Oram, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

HTT

us a

Before GrBBoNs, PARRAGUIRRE and Douc.as, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Douctas, J.:

Nevada law requires a district attorney to ‘‘inform the grand ju-
rors of the specific elements of any public offense which they may
consider as the basis of the indictment.” NRS 172.095(2). In this
original writ proceeding, we consider whether the district attorney
violates this requirement when he or she seeks an indictment for
child abuse or neglect under NRS 200.508(1) based on a nonacci-
dental physical injury but fails to inform the grand jurors of the
definition of ‘physical injury’’ set forth in NRS 200.508(4)(d). We
conclude that regardless of the theory pursued under NRS
200.508(1), “‘abuse or neglect’’ is an element of the offense and
that when the alleged ‘‘abuse or neglect’’ is based on a nonacci-
dental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand
jurors of the statutory definition of ‘‘physical injury’’ because that
definition is more limited than the meaning that a layperson would
attribute to the term. Because the failure to inform the grand jurors
of the statutory definition of ‘‘physical injury’’ likely caused the
grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for
one of the two counts of child abuse, we grant the petition as to
that count.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Bryan Clay was indicted by a grand jury for two
counts of child abuse and neglect in violation of NRS 200.508(1),
for slapping and hitting his 16-year-old girlfriend on February 14,
2012 (count one), and March 15, 2012 (count three). The only
witness to testify before the grand jury about the events that tran-
spired in February and March was Clay’s girlfriend, E.F.

E.E. was pregnant with Clay’s child. The first charged incident
of abuse occurred two days after she told him about the pregnancy.
Clay slapped her across the face during an argument. The second
charged incident occurred the following month. After the couple
attended a prenatal appointment, E.F. told Clay that she did not
want to be with him anymore, and Clay told her that if she left
him, he would kill himself. As E.F. walked away, Clay walked up
behind her, grabbed her by the neck with one hand, choked her,
and threw her into a gate. When E.F. continued to ignore him, he
started hitting her with a closed fist in her face, legs, arms, stom-
ach, and back. E.F. fell to the ground and covered her stomach
with her hands. Clay then grabbed her by the hair and shoved her
face into the concrete. Clay tried to move E.F’s hands from her

449

stomach and told her that if he could not have her and his child,
then he did not want anyone else to have them either. When a
woman came over to tell him to stop, Clay took E.F’s purse and
left. By the time E.F got home, the police had already arrived.
E.E testified that she attempted to tell the police what happened,
but she still could not breathe. An ambulance took E.F. to the hos-
pital, but she did not stay. There was no testimony about the nature
of E.F’s injuries resulting from either of the altercations.

Following the return of the indictment, Clay filed a pretrial pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment on two
grounds. First, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause as to the two counts of child
abuse and neglect because there was no evidence of a nonacciden-
tal physical or mental injury and therefore the State failed to prove
that abuse or neglect occurred. Second, he argued that the State
failed to comply with the requirements of NRS 172.095(2) by not
instructing the jury on the definition of “‘physical injury’’ as used
in the applicable child-abuse-and-neglect statute. In its response,
the State argued that the ‘‘showing of physical or mental injury is
not a requirement’’ of the child-abuse-and-neglect statute; rather,
the mere possibility of physical or mental injury is sufficient. The
State did not respond to Clay’s NRS 172.095(2) argument. The
district court orally denied the petition with little analysis or ex-
planation other than observing that the child-abuse-and-neglect
statute “‘is a very liberally-written statute, and probably for good
reason’’ and summarily agreeing with the State’s argument. Like
the State, the district court did not discuss the merits of Clay’s
NRS 172.095(2) argument. Clay then filed this original petition for
a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court’s
decision.

DISCUSSION
Leal

A writ of mandamus may issue to compel the performance of an
act that the law requires ‘‘as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station,’ NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion, see Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v.
Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981).! The
writ will not issue, however, if the petitioner has a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See NRS
34.170. Here, Clay has another remedy because a violation of

‘We focus on Clay’s request for a writ of mandamus as he has not asserted
a claim that challenges the district court’s jurisdiction. See NRS 34.320 (pro-
viding that a writ of prohibition is available to halt proceedings occurring in ex-
cess of a court’s jurisdiction).

450 po

NRS 172.095(2) can be reviewed on direct appeal from a final
judgment of conviction. See NRS 177.045. Nonetheless, that rem-
edy may not be adequate because any error in the grand-jury pro-
ceeding is likely to be harmless after a conviction. Lisle v. State,
114 Nev. 221, 224-25, 954 P.2d 744, 746-47 (1998). We therefore
have recognized that ‘‘[a] writ of mandamus is an appropriate
remedy for [violations of grand-jury procedures].’’ Lisle v. State,
113 Nev. 540, 551, 937 P.2d 473, 480 (1997), clarified on re-
hearing, 114 Nev. 221, 954 P.2d 744 (1998).

Le

Mandamus, however, is an extraordinary remedy. Accordingly, it
is within the discretion of this court to determine if a petition will
be considered. See Poulos v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 98 Nev.
453, 455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982); see also State ex rel.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1338,
1339 (1983). In exercising that discretion, we must ‘‘consider[ ]
whether judicial economy and sound judicial administration mili-
tate for or against issuing the writ.’ Redeker v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 164, 167, 127 P.3d 520, 522 (2006), limited
on other grounds by Hidalgo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124
Nev. 330, 341, 184 P.3d 369, 377 (2008). ‘‘Where the circum-
stances establish urgency or strong necessity, or an important issue
of law requires clarification and public policy is served by this
court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction, this court may exercise
its discretion to consider a petition for extraordinary relief”’ Schus-
ter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 187, 190, 160 P.3d
873, 875 (2007).

Applying these considerations, we exercise our discretion
to consider the petition as to the alleged violation of NRS
172.095(2).? On that issue, the petition raises important legal
questions as to what the prosecution must inform the grand jurors
of under NRS 172.095(2) when the grand jury is considering
whether to indict a person for a violation of NRS 200.508(1).

This court has held as a general proposition that “‘it is not
mandatory for the prosecuting attorney to instruct the grand jury
on the law?’ Hyler v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 93 Nev. 561, 564, 571

?To the extent that Clay’s petition is framed as a challenge to the district
court’s conclusion that there was slight or marginal evidence supporting the
grand jury’s indictment, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the
petition. See Kussman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 96 Nev. 544, 546, 612
P.2d 679, 680 (1980) (explaining that judicial economy and sound adminis-
tration of justice generally militate against the use of mandamus to review pre-
trial probable-cause determinations). In this opinion, we address the evidence
presented and the probable-cause determination only in the context of decid-
ing whether the failure to comply with NRS 172.095(2) undermined the in-
tegrity of the grand-jury proceeding.

P.2d 114, 116 (1977) (citing Phillips v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 93
Nev. 309, 311-12, 565 P.2d 330, 331-32 (1977)). Although the
general proposition still holds true, see Schuster, 123 Nev. at 192,
160 P.3d at 876-77 (rejecting argument that prosecutor must
instruct grand jury on legal significance of exculpatory evidence),
there is a limited instance in which the prosecuting attorney is
required to inform the grand jury as to the law. Almost a decade
after our early pronouncement of the general proposition in Hyler,
the Nevada Legislature enacted NRS 172.095(2). 1985 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 367, § 6, at 1029. This statute requires the prosecutor to ‘‘in-
form the grand jurors of the specific elements of any public of-
fense which they may consider as the basis of the indictment’’ be-
fore seeking an indictment. To determine whether the prosecution
failed to comply with NRS 172.095(2) by not informing the grand
jurors as to the statutory definition of ‘‘physical injury?’ we must
first determine whether ‘‘physical injury’’ is an element of the
charged offenses under NRS 200.508(1), which involves statutory
~ interpretation.

P|

“‘We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.’’ Big-
pond v, State, 128 Nev. 108, 114, 270 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2012).
When interpreting a statutory provision, this court looks first to the
plain language of the statute. Id. ‘‘This court avoids statutory in-
terpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous and
if the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, this court will
enforce the statute as written.’ In re George J., 128 Nev. 345,
349, 279 P.3d 187, 190 (2012) (internal quotation marks and al-
terations omitted). ‘‘Likewise, this court will interpret a rule or
statute in harmony with other rules and statutes.’ Jd. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).

Interpretation of NRS 200.508(1)
| ree

Applying these rules of statutory interpretation, we necessarily
start with the statutory language. NRS 200.508(1) provides in rel-
evant part that

[a] person who willfully causes a child who is less than 18
years of age to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental
suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be placed in a
situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental
suffering as the result of abuse or neglect [is guilty of a
felony].

NRS 200.508(1) thus sets forth alternative means of committing

the offense. The first requires the State to prove that (1) a person
willfully caused (2) a child who is Jess than 18 years of age (3) to

452 Po

suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering (4) as a result
of abuse or neglect. The second requires the State to prove that
(J) a person willfully caused (2) a child who is less than 18 years
of age (3) to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer
physical pain or mental suffering (4) as the result of abuse or neg-
lect. The fourth element of both alternatives, ‘‘abuse or neglect,’
is specifically defined by NRS 200.508(4)(a). Based on NRS
200.508(4)(a) and the statutes referenced therein, NRS 200.508(1)
criminalizes five different kinds of abuse or neglect: (1) nonacci-
dental physical injury, (2) nonaccidental mental injury, (3) sexual
abuse, (4) sexual exploitation, and (5) negligent treatment or mal-
treatment. The first type of abuse or neglect—nonaccidental phys-
ical injury—is implicated in this case.> ‘‘Physical injury’’ is de-
fined in NRS 200.508(4)(d) as ‘‘[pJermanent or temporary
disfigurement”’ or ‘‘[iJmpairment of any bodily function or organ
of the body.”

Clay asserts that NRS 200.508(1) requires the State to prove that
“‘abuse or neglect’’ occurred regardless of which alternative is
charged; thus, in this case, the State had to prove ‘‘physical in-
jury.’ Relying on the second means of violating NRS 200.508(1),
the State argues that it only had to prove that Clay caused the vic-
tim to be placed in a situation where she may suffer physical pain
or mental suffering, and therefore, it did not have to prove that
“physical injury’’ occurred.

The State’s argument does not take account of the ‘‘result of
abuse or neglect’? language in both provisions under NRS
200.508(1). A plain reading of NRS 200.508(1) leads to the con-
clusion that the State must prove that ‘‘abuse or neglect’? oc-
curred under both means of violating the statute.‘ We find support
for this conclusion in the Legislature’s use of the same language—
may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse

®The grand jury was informed that ‘‘child abuse’’ is a nonaccidental phys-
ical injury to a child, and the allegations in the indictment focus on this kind
of abuse.

“This conclusion is also supported by the statute’s legislative history. As
originally codified, NRS 200.508 punished a parent or guardian for causing or
permitting eight different types of harm. See 1971 Nev. Stat., ch. 398, § 1, at
712-73. Notably, this version only required one of the eight types of harm to
be the ‘result of abuse or neglect.” In 1977, the Legislature overhauled NRS
200.508, requiring for the first time that all of the types of harm listed in NRS
200.508 be the “result of abuse or neglect” as defined by statute. See 1977
Nev. Stat., ch. 383, § 4, at 738. In that revision, the Legislature replaced
“causes . . . such a child to be placed in such situation that its life or limb
‘may be in danger or its health likely to be injured” with ‘‘causes . . . a child
to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental
suffering as the result of abuse or neglect.” Id. (Emphases added.) After this
revision, the statute required one of the defined acts of abuse or neglect to
occur regardless of which theory of liability the State pursued.

453

or neglect—in subsection 2 of the same statute. NRS 200.508(2)
punishes a person who is responsible for a child’s safety or welfare
and “‘allows’’ or ‘‘permits’’ a child ‘‘to be placed in a situation
where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the
result of abuse or neglect.’ (Emphasis added.) When the Legisla-
ture bifurcated the child-abuse-and-neglect statute in 1985 to dis-
tinguish between persons who cause abuse or neglect and those
who passively permit abuse or neglect, see generally Ramirez v.
State, 126 Nev. 203, 209, 235 P.3d 619, 623 (2010), it added the
word ‘‘allow,’ 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 88, at 1399-1400,
and included a definition of ‘‘allow’’ that assumes that abuse or
neglect has occurred, see NRS 200.508(4)(b) (‘‘ ‘Allow’ means to
do nothing to prevent or stop the abuse or neglect of a child in cir-
cumstances where the person knows or has reason to know the
child is abused or neglected.’ (emphasis added)). That definition
of “‘allow’’ supports the conclusion that the language at issue still
requires the State to prove that ‘‘abuse or neglect”’ occurred re-
gardless of the theory on which an offense under subsection 1 is
prosecuted.

It is this ‘‘abuse or neglect’’ element that in some cases will re-
sult in the State presenting evidence that shows actual physical pain
or mental suffering even though it is proceeding under the second
theory in NRS 200.508(1). The best example is where, as here, the
alleged ‘‘abuse or neglect’’ is based on a nonaccidental physical in-
jury. See NRS 200.508(4)(a). In that situation, the State must
prove that the victim suffered ‘‘[p]ermanent or temporary disfig-
‘urement’ or ‘‘[i]mpairment of any bodily function or organ of the
body.’ NRS 200.508(4)(d). Evidence that meets this definition of
physical injury oftentimes will also demonstrate that the victim suf-
fered physical pain or mental suffering. But that is a by-product of
the particular type of ‘‘abuse or neglect.’’ The fact that this type of
“abuse or neglect’’ often carries with it proof of actual physical
pain or mental suffering that otherwise is not required under the
second theory in subsection 1 does not allow us to ignore the plain
language of NRS 200.508(1), which requires ‘‘abuse or neglect’’
under both theories.

The State suggests that an interpretation that would always re-
quire it to prove physical pain or mental suffering would reduce the
second theory in NRS 200.508(1) to mere surplusage because it
would add nothing to the first theory. We agree. Our interpretation
of the statute, however, does not have that effect. The second the-
ory retains significance because, in contrast to ‘‘abuse or neglect’’
based on physical injury, other types of ‘‘abuse or neglect’’ under
NRS 200.508(4)(a) do not necessarily result in actual physical
pain or mental suffering. Although those types of abuse or neglect
could not lead to conviction under the first theory in NRS

454

200.508(1) if they did not result in physical pain or mental suf-
fering, they can support a charge under the second theory so long
as the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as a re-
sult of the abuse or neglect. A good example is abuse or neglect
based on negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child. “‘[NJeg-
ligent treatment or maltreatment of a child’ occurs if a child is
“‘without proper care, control and supervision.’ NRS 432B.140,
listed in NRS 200.508(4)(a). The definition of this kind of abuse
or neglect encompasses conduct that does not necessarily result in
actual physical pain or mental suffering. If there is no physical
pain or mental suffering as a result of the negligent treatment or
maltreatment, then the defendant cannot be charged under the first
theory of liability in NRS 200.508(1). But criminal liability will
still attach in that scenario under the second theory in subsection
1 if the defendant placed the child in a situation where the child
may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of the
negligent treatment or maltreatment. For this reason, we see no
merit in the State’s argument that an ‘‘intoxicated driver [could]
raise a ‘no harm, no foul’ defense’’ to a charge under NRS
200.508(1) when he places his child in a car and then drives with-
out an accident. A child who is placed in a car by an intoxicated
driver is without proper care, control, or supervision under cir-
cumstances which indicate that the child’s health or welfare is
threatened with harm. See NRS 200.508(4)(a); NRS 432B.140.
The driver thus has placed the child in a situation where the child
may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as a result. Our in-
terpretation of the statute gives meaning to both provisions.

P|

We conclude that NRS 200.508(1) unambiguously requires the
State to prove that ‘‘abuse or neglect,’ as defined by NRS
200.508(4)(a), occurred regardless of the theory under which the
offense is prosecuted. Because the State alleged that the nonacci-
dental physical injury kind of abuse and neglect occurred, ‘‘phys-
ical injury’? was an element of the offense for which the State
sought an indictment. We turn then to whether the district attorney
was required to instruct the grand jurors on the statutory definition
of ‘‘physical injury.””

Application of NRS 172.095(2)

NRS 172.095(2) provides that ‘“‘{bJefore seeking an indict-
ment, . . . the district attorney shall inform the grand jurors of the
specific elements of any public offense which they may consider as
the basis of the indictment.’ Clay argues that the State was re-
quired by NRS 172.095(2) to inform the grand jurors that ‘‘phys-
ical injury’’ is defined by the child-abuse-and-neglect statute as
“‘permanent or temporary disfigurement”’ or ‘‘impairment of any

455

bodily function or organ of the body.’ The State argues that it
complied with the statute because it provided instructions to the
jury, and it asked the grand jury if it had any questions about those
instructions. We conclude that the State neglected its duty under
the statute.

We have not addressed the requirements of NRS 172.095(2) in
any significant detail since its enactment. Nevada is among several
jurisdictions that require the prosecutor to instruct the grand jury
on the elements of the crime, see, e.g., People v. Calbud, Inc.,
402 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (N.Y. 1980), and cases from those juris-
dictions provide some guidance as to the scope of the prosecutor’s
duty to instruct the grand jurors here in Nevada. In New York, the
test is whether ‘‘the integrity of [the grand jury] has been im-
paired,” meaning that misleading or incomplete instructions likely
caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than proba-
ble cause. Id. (explaining that “‘it may fairly be said that the in-
tegrity of [the grand jury] has been impaired’’ ‘‘[w]hen the District
Attorney’s instructions to the Grand Jury are so incomplete or mis-
leading as to substantially undermine [its] essential function’);
People v. Ramos, 637 N.Y.S.2d 93, 93 (App. Div. 1996) (dis-
missing indictment because grand jury determination ‘‘hinged upon
the definition’ of a term and ‘‘the prosecutor’s instructions to the
Grand Jury . . . did not provide it ‘with enough information to en-
able it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed
and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to
establish the material elements of the crime’ ’’ (quoting Calbud,
Inc., 402 N.E.2d at 1143)); of. People v. Gnass, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
225, 252, 254, 258 (Ct. App. 2002) (withholding of certain in-
structions in a manner that may mislead the grand jury about an el-
ement of the crime is error and should result in dismissal where
the error is likely to have caused the grand jury to return an in-
dictment on less than probable cause).

P|

This focus on the integrity of the grand-jury proceedings is
consistent with the Nevada Legislature’s concerns in adopting NRS
172.095(2). The statute was part of a series of bills adopting var-
ious provisions of the American Bar Association’s principles of
grand jury reform. See Hearing on S.B. 107 Before the Senate Ju-
diciary Comm., 63d Leg. (Nev., March 4, 1985) (statement of
subcommittee member Senator Sue Wagner). The statute is based
on the principle that ‘‘[t]he grand jury shall be informed as to the
elements of the crimes considered by it?’ ABA Grand Jury Policy
and Model Act, Grand Jury Principles, Principle 27, at 5 (2d ed.
1982), and was intended to add an element of fairness to grand-
jury proceedings by providing instruction in complex cases so that
laypersons with no background in the law would know what to

456 Po

look for from the witnesses appearing before them, id. at 12 (com-
mentary to Principle 27); see also Hearing on S.B. 107 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 63d Leg. (Nev., March 6, 1985) (state-
ment of Principal Deputy, Legislative Counsel, Kim Morgan and
Senator Sue Wagner) (‘‘[I]t was the intent of the subcommittee
to clarify the elements of a crime to the grand jurors . . . a layman
reading a statute probably cannot pick out each specific ele-
ment... if you were not familiar with the law, the elements
would be hard to understand.’’). Consistent with those legislative
concerns underlying the statute, we agree that the focus should
be on the effect that misleading or omitted instructions on the
elements of the offense had on the integrity of the grand-jury
proceedings.

| |

Here, the grand jury was instructed that ‘‘‘[c]hild abuse’ means
physical injury of a non-accidental nature to a child under the age
of 18 years. If a person willfully causes a child who is less than 18
years of age to suffer unjustifiable physical pain as a result of
abuse, that person has committed child abuse.” The grand jury was
not informed of the statutory definition of the term ‘‘physical in-
jury’’—permanent or temporary disfigurement or impairment of
any bodily function or organ of the body. If that definition is not
technical and reflects a Iayperson’s common understanding of the
term, then the State is correct that the prosecutor’s failure to in-
struct the grand jurors on the statutory definition of this element
does not warrant dismissal. Cf. People v. Woodring, 850 N.Y.S.2d
809, 812 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming the denial of motion to dis-
miss where statutory definition of the term was ‘‘not technical and
reflects a lay person’s common understanding of the term’’). We
cannot, however, conclude that the statutory definition reflects a
layperson’s common understanding of the term ‘‘physical injury.’

| cree

The statutory definition of ‘‘physical injury’’ set forth in NRS
200.508(4)(d) is more limited than a layperson’s common un-
derstanding of the term. ‘‘[I]njury’’ is commonly defined as
“{dJamage or harm done to . . . a person’’ or “‘a particular form
of hurt, damage, or loss.’ The American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language 930 (3d ed. 1996); see also Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 644 (11th ed. 2003) (‘faJn act
that damages or hurts’ or “‘hurt, damage, or loss sustained’). The
statutory definition is more specific and narrow than the common
definition. The definition in NRS 200.508(4)(d) also is narrower
than the definition used elsewhere in Nevada statutes. E.g., NRS
432B.090 (including six additional definitions for the term ‘‘phys-
ical injury,” including ‘‘[a] cut, laceration, puncture or bite’’). We

ee 451

are convinced that the statutory definition in NRS 200.508(4)(d) is
technical and does not reflect a layperson’s common understanding
of the term ‘‘physical injury’

Despite the difference between the common understanding of the
term “‘physical injury’’ and its statutory definition under the child-
abuse-and-neglect statute, the State argues that the charges should
not be dismissed because the prosecutor provided instructions to
the grand jury and asked the grand jurors if they had any questions
about those instructions. Relying on Gordon v. Eighth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, 112 Nev. 216, 913 P.2d 240 (1996), the State argues
that this was sufficient to comply with the statute. In Gordon, we
held that the district attorney complied with NRS 172.095(2) even
though he did not provide the grand jurors with an elements in-
struction because the district attorney read the charges to the grand
jury, explained how they interrelated in layperson’s terms, and
asked the grand jurors if they had any questions. 112 Nev. at 225,
913 P.2d at 246. Here, neither the proposed indictment nor the in-
structions provided the statutory definition of “‘physical injury,’
and there was no discussion or explanation of this definition or any
of the other elements of the child-abuse-and-neglect statute in
Jayperson’s terms. Accordingly, Gordon does not control our de-
cision in this case.

Given the difference between the statutory and common defini-
tion of ‘‘physical injury,’ it was incumbent upon the prosecutor to
provide the statutory definition of this element consistent with
NRS 172.095(2). Because the prosecutor failed to provide the
grand jurors with that definition, we must determine whether this
error is likely to have caused the jury to return an indictment on
Jess than probable cause. We turn then to the evidence presented in
support of the indictment.

P|

Although there was strong evidence to support a charge of do-
mestic battery for the second altercation, see NRS 200.481; NRS
33.018, there was little evidence presented to the grand jury about
the type of injury suffered by Clay’s girlfriend. A grand jury, how-
ever, needs only slight or marginal evidence to return an indict-
ment. Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d
178, 180 (1980) (‘“The finding of probable cause may be based on
slight, even marginal evidence, because it does not involve a de-
termination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.”’ (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted)). Because a properly instructed
grand jury could have found slight or marginal evidence of
“TiJmpairment of any bodily function or organ of the body,’ NRS
200.508(4)(d)(2), based on E.F’s testimony that she had diffi-
culty breathing when she was telling police officers about the sec-
ond altercation, we cannot say that the State’s failure to inform the

458

grand jurors about the definition of ‘‘physical injury’’ caused the
grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for
this count (count three).

Le

The same cannot be said for the other child-abuse-and-neglect
count. The only evidence supporting the first count of abuse and
neglect was E.F’s testimony that Clay slapped her across the face.
E.F. did not testify to the nature or extent of any ‘‘physical injury’’
as a result of the slap. Applying a common understanding of the
term ‘‘physical injury,’ the grand jury could have concluded that
there was slight or marginal evidence of damage or harm done to
E.F. But given the limited testimony, we are not convinced that it
likely would have concluded that there was slight or marginal evi-
dence of ‘‘[p]ermanent or temporary disfigurement’’ or ‘‘[i]mpair-
ment of any bodily function or organ of the body.’ NRS
200.508(4)(d). Because the failure to instruct the grand jury on the
statutory definition of ‘‘physical injury’ likely caused the grand
jury to return an indictment on count one based on less than prob-
able cause, the violation of NRS 172.095(2) requires dismissal of
that count.

The district court’s failure to recognize these errors may not
have amounted to a manifest abuse of discretion with respect to
count three, but its failure to address the State’s violation of NRS
172.095(2) and decision to accept the State’s erroneous interpre-
tation of the child-abuse-and-neglect statute with respect to count
one was a manifest abuse of its discretion that adversely affected
Clay’s right to a grand jury determination based upon probable
cause. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127
Nev. 927, 932, 267 P.3d 777, 780 (2011) (defining manifest abuse
of discretion as clearly erroneous interpretation or application of a
law or rule). We therefore grant Clay’s petition for extraordinary
relief, in part, and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
mandamus instructing the district court to dismiss count one of the
indictment without prejudice.

GrBBons and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

459

PENNY BIELAR, APPELLANT, v. WASHOE HEALTH SYS-
TEMS, INC., A NevADA CORPORATION; AND WASHOE
MEDICAL CENTER, INC., A NEVADA CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.

No. 57924

July 11, 2013 306 P.3d 360

Durney & Brennan, Ltd., and Peter D. Durney, Reno, for
Appellant.

Lewis & Roca, LLP, and David C. McElhinney, Scott S.
Hoffman, and S. Paul Edwards, Reno, for Respondents.

460

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARpEsTy and Sarrta, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

* Under NRS 439B.260(1), hospitals generally must reduce
charges by 30 percent to inpatients who lack insurance ‘‘or other
contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third
party,’ are not eligible for public medical payment assistance, and
arrange within 30 days of discharge to pay the hospital bill.' The
predominant issue for determination in this appeal is whether a set-
tlement agreement with a third-party tortfeasor who allegedly
caused the injuries necessitating the medical services is another
“contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third
party’’ rendering the inpatient ineligible for the 30-percent statu-
tory discount. Because we conclude that a patient’s eligibility is
determined at the commencement of hospital services, a later set-
tlement agreement with a third party for the payment of such serv-
ices does not disqualify the patient for the statutory discount.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Penny Bielar was involved in an automobile accident
in 2002, and she received treatment for her injuries at respondent
Washoe Medical Center, Inc., in April 2003, May 2003, and Feb-
ruary 2005. For her treatment in April and May 2003, Bielar
signed the hospital’s Conditions of Admission and/or Treatment at
Washoe Medical Center (COA) form. By the terms of the COA,
Bielar granted a statutory lien to Washoe Medical on any settle-
ment proceeds she obtained from the tortfeasor under NRS
108.590 ‘‘to the extent of the value of medical/[h]ospital services
rendered.’’ (Emphasis added.) She also signed an Inpatient Pay-
ment Arrangements (IPA) form, agreeing to ‘‘pay the balance in
full as result of lien (in the settlement).’’ The IPA also stated that
Bielar may ‘‘qualify for the 30% discount under NRS 439B.260,”
if she made payment arrangements within 30 days of discharge and
held no insurance benefits.

'The pre-2011 version of NRS 439B.260(1) provided:

A major hospital shall reduce or discount the total billed charge by at
least 30 percent for hospital services provided to an inpatient who:

(a) Has no insurance or other contractual provision for the payment of
the charge by a third party;

(b) Is not eligible for coverage by a state or federal program of pub-
lic assistance that would provide for the payment of the charge; and

(c) Makes reasonable arrangements within 30 days after discharge to
pay his hospital bill.

In 2011, the Nevada Legislature amended subsection (a) to read: ‘Has no
policy of heaith insurance or other contractual agreement with a third party that
provides health coverage for the charge.’ 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 274, § 2, at
1523.

462

In January 2005, Bielar signed a second COA form for addi-
tional inpatient treatment she was to receive in February 2005,
granting Washoe Medical a second statutory lien. It is undisputed
that Bielar had no health insurance at the time of her treatments
and was ineligible for coverage under any state or federal pro-
grams. At trial, Bielar testified that it was her intent to pay the hos-
pital bills with the money she received from the settlement pro-
ceeds recovered from her personal injury claim.

Bielar sued the trucking company that allegedly caused her ac-
cident; the company’s insurer was Great West Casualty Company.
In May 2003 and March 2005, respondents Washoe Health Sys-
tems, Inc., and Washoe Medical? filed in the action two separate
notices of NRS 108.590 liens? against Bielar and Great West for
Bielar’s medical expenses incurred at Washoe Medical. The 2003
lien amounted to approximately $32,000, and the 2005 lien
amounted to approximately $94,000.

In May 2005, Bielar settled her case against the trucking com-
pany. Great West agreed to pay Bielar $1.3 million, and in ex-
change, Bielar ‘‘agree[d] to indemnify and hold harmless [Great
West] from any and all liens by healthcare providers, . . . known
or unknown due to the [accident].’”’ According to Great West, the
settlement payment ‘‘was to include all elements of damages’’ and
Bielar’s counsel “‘was going to resolve the liens.’”’ Great West also
understood that ‘‘$500,000 of that sum was for past, present, and
future medicals.’ Great West sent Bielar’s counsel a lump-sum
check for $1.3 million.

Subsequently, Washoe Medical sued Great West for satisfaction
of the 2003 and 2005 liens. And, because Bielar had a contractual
obligation to indemnify Great West, she tendered to Washoe Med-
ical all money that it asserted was due on the liens.

Bielar then filed a complaint against Washoe Medical, disputing
the amount of medical charges she incurred for treatment she re-
ceived at the hospital. She asserted eight claims sounding in con-
tract and tort. Her underlying arguments were twofold: first, she
claimed that Washoe Medical failed to reduce their charges by 30
percent as required by NRS 439B.260(1); and second, she claimed
that Washoe Medical charged her an unreasonable amount for the

?We will refer to Washoe Health Systems, Inc., and Washoe Medical Cen-
ter, Inc., collectively as Washoe Medical unless otherwise necessary.
3NRS 108.590(1) states, in pertinent part, that if a
person receives hospitalization on account of any injury, and . . . claims
damages from the person responsible for causing the injury, the hospital
has a lien upon any sum awarded the injured person . . . by a settlement
. . . to the extent of the amount due the hospital for the reasonable value
of the hospitalization rendered before the date of . . . settlement.
(Emphasis added.)

463

goods and services she received and/or improperly charged her for
goods and services she did not receive.

Both parties eventually filed motions for summary judgment.
Bielar sought a ruling from the district court that she qualified
for a discount of the charges under NRS 439B.260. Washoe Med-
ical contended that Bielar lacked standing to bring her lawsuit be-
cause the settlement agreement qualified as a ‘contractual provi-
sion for the payment of the charge by a third party’’ under NRS
439B.260(1)(a). Washoe Medical further argued that Bielar was in-
eligible for the discount under NRS 439B.260(1) because the two
liens attached only to the settlement proceeds paid by Great West
and Bielar failed to satisfy NRS 439B.260(1)(c) by making rea-
sonable arrangements within 30 days after discharge to satisfy her
hospital bill.

The district court denied Bielar’s motion and granted Washoe
Medical’s motion, holding that the settlement agreement was a
“‘contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third
party’’ within the meaning of NRS 439B.260(1)(a). It further held
that Bielar lacked standing to bring her lawsuit, reasoning that she
was not damaged by Washoe Medical’s refusal to discount the liens
because the debt attached to the settlement proceeds paid by Great
West and, thus, the settlement proceeds used to satisfy that debt
belonged to Great West. Bielar appealed this order.

This court entered an order reversing the district court’s order.
See Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc., Docket No. 50859 (Order
of Reversal and Remand, June 23, 2009). This court held that
Bielar had standing to assert her NRS 439B.260(1) discount claim
as she presented sufficient facts to establish a logical nexus be-
tween her and her claim and an interest in its adjudication. Addi-
tionally, this court remanded the matter for further proceedings
after determining that undeveloped issues remained concerning
“the reasonableness of the hospital lien amount’’; ‘‘whether [Great
West] and Bielar intended the gross settlement amount to pay the
entire non-discounted hospital lien’; and ‘‘whether Bielar’s as-
signment of any potential tort recovery affects the statutory dis-
count.”’ In a subsequent order, this court clarified that the unde-
veloped issues ‘‘address the statutory interpretation issue on
appeal”’ and stated that on remand ‘“‘the district court should de-
termine how these issues affect Bielar’s claim to the NRS
439B.260 discount.’’ Id. (Order Denying Rehearing and Clarifying
Order, September 2, 2009).

On remand, Bielar argued that the COA’s assignment clause was
unconscionable as a matter of law and did not affect the statutory
discount. She also argued that her eligibility for the statutory dis-
count was unaffected by the settlement agreement because she
was uninsured at the time of the rendition of her treatments.
Washoe Medical maintained that the COA affected Bielar’s ability

464 po

to request the statutory discount and that she was not entitled to the
statutory discount based on the settlement agreement.

In July 2010, the district court entered an order on remand. Al-
though it declined to address Bielar’s contention that the COA’s as-
signment clause was unconscionable, the district court did con-
clude that the execution of the assignment clause did not deprive
Bielar of eligibility for the statutory discount. Moreover, it held
that whether the parties intended for the settlement proceeds to pay
the full lien amount had no material effect regarding the applica-
tion of NRS 439B.260. Finally, it held that the reasonableness of
the lien amount was irrelevant to its determination of Bielar’s eli-
gibility for the statutory discount. However, the district court once
again reasoned that Bielar was ineligible for the statutory 30-
percent discount because her settlement agreement constituted an
“‘other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a
third party’’ under NRS 439B.260(1)(a). It also found that Bielar

as “‘clearly entitled to challenge the reasonableness of the lien
amount under NRS 108.590.”’ Accordingly, the district court dis-
missed Bielar’s claims for the statutory discount and proceeded to
trial on the remaining accounting claim challenging the general
reasonableness of the lien amount.

A jury trial was held on Bielar’s accounting claim, during which
she presented two witnesses. Dr. Gerard Anderson, a healthcare fi-
nance expert, testified that Medicare payments plus 25 percent rep-
resents the ceiling of hospital billing reasonableness. He also tes-
tified that Washoe Medical realized a 185-percent profit margin on
Bielar’s total bill, whereas the overall profit margin for the hospi-
tal industry is about 5 percent. Finally, he testified that hospitals do
not disclose their master billing files to the public, so a person can-
not determine the reasonableness of a medical charge by compar-
ing the price for goods and services offered at different hospitals.
Additionally, Paula Polek, a billing auditor, testified that Bielar was
overcharged approximately $3,800.4

At the conclusion of Bielar’s case-in-chief, Washoe Medical
moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to NRCP 50(a)(1).
The district court granted the motion and subsequently entered an
order in February 2011. It found that the evidence presented at
trial demonstrated that Bielar intended for the settlement proceeds
to pay the full amount of the medical liens and that the COA ‘‘was
valid and binding.’ Further, the court found that since Great West
earmarked $500,000 in special damages for Bielar’s past and fu-
ture medical expenses, Great West paid Washoe Medical’s liens di-
rectly. Based on its findings, the district court reasoned that ‘‘de-
creasing [Bielar’s] medical special damages would not serve to

‘It appears that Washoe Medical conceded the error during trial and later
adjusted its billing statements accordingly.

po 46

increase her general damages. Thus, as a matter of law [Bielar
could not] show that she [was] entitled to the damages she s[ought]
and no recovery may be awarded to her’’ The court also found that
Bielar did not present sufficient evidence to show that the amounts
billed by the hospital were unreasonable. Bielar appeals, challeng-
ing both the July 2010 and the February 2011 district court orders.

DISCUSSION

Because we conclude that Bielar had a right to recover from
Washoe Medical under the COA, the IPA, and the lien statute, we
must determine whether Bielar was eligible for the billing discount
under NRS 439B.260(1). We conclude that the phrase ‘‘other con-
tractual provision for the payment of the charge by a third party”
does not include a later settlement agreement with a third-party
tortfeasor, and we thus reverse the district court’s finding that
Bielar was ineligible for the statutory discount. However, we reject
Bielar’s contention that the district court erred by granting Washoe
Medical’s NRCP 50(a)(1) motion. Bielar failed, with one excep-
tion, to proffer sufficient evidence at trial to prove that the specific
amounts Washoe Medical charged for medical services and goods
were unreasonable.

The district court erred by ruling that Bielar could not recover
damages from Washoe Medical

|

The district court concluded that Bielar was not entitled to re-
cover damages because she intended to pay the full amount of
Washoe Medical’s claim from the settlement proceeds received
from Great West, and decreasing Bielar’s medical damages would
not increase her general damages under the settlement agreement.
We disagree.

P|

“*Contract interpretation is subject to a de novo standard of re-
view.’ May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254,
1257 (2005). ‘‘A basic rule of contract interpretation is that
‘[e]very word must be given effect if at all possible’ ’’ Musser v.
Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Royal Indem. Co. v. Special Serv. Sup-
ply Co., 82 Nev. 148, 150, 413 P.2d 500, 502 (1966)). ‘‘‘A court
should not interpret a contract so as to make meaningless its pro-
visions.’ ”’ Id. (quoting Phillips v. Mercer, 94 Nev. 279, 282, 579
P.2d 174, 176 (1978)).

Our examination of the language of the contracts at issue here
shows that under the IPA, Bielar agreed to pay Washoe Medical’s
liens from any settlement proceeds she recovered from her per-
sonal injury claim against the trucking company and Great West.

466 rs

By executing the COA, Bielar granted statutory liens to Washoe
Medical for the ‘‘reasonable value’’ of the medical services ren-
dered by Washoe Medical pursuant to NRS 108.590.

Thus, when Bielar executed the COAs and the IPAs, the parties
recognized she may be eligible for the 30-percent statutory dis-
count, and Bielar granted liens to Washoe Medical agreeing to
compensate the hospital for the ‘‘reasonable value’’ of the hospi-
tal charges from any settlement proceeds she derived from her per-
sonal injury claim. In fact, Bielar confirmed her intention at trial.

We conclude that the district court failed to consider the express
provisions of those agreements and NRS 108.590 when it con-
cluded that Bielar intended to pay the full amount of Washoe Med-
ical’s claim from the proceeds obtained under the settlement agree-
ment with Great West. Although Bielar did enter into a settlement
agreement with Great West in which she agreed to indemnify
Great West “‘from any and all liens by healthcare providers,” the
agreements she reached with Washoe Medical governed her obli-
gation to pay Washoe Medical’s claim and any reduction in med-
ical expenses was irrelevant to the settlement agreement with Great
West. Thus, we conclude that by the express terms of the COA and
the IPA, Bielar was entitled to seek the 30-percent, statutory dis-
count allowed under NRS 439B.260(1) and to exercise her right to
challenge the reasonable value of the hospital charges pursuant to
NRS 108.590.

The district court erred by ruling that Bielar was ineligible for
the billing discount under NRS 439B.260(1)

|

We next consider whether Bielar qualified for the statutory dis-
count under NRS 439B.260(1). Bielar argues that the district court
erred by ruling in its July 2010 order that she was ineligible for
NRS 439B.260(1)’s discount based upon the settlement agreement
she entered into with the trucking company and Great West.>
Specifically, Bielar-asserts that she satisfied subsection (a) of NRS
439B.260(1) because the settlement agreement does not qualify as
an “‘other contractual provision for the payment of the charge by a
third party,’ the lack of which is required to obtain the statutory

‘Bielar also argues that the district court violated the law-of-the-case doc-
trine in its July 2010 order. See Hsu v. Cnty. of Clark, 123 Nev. 625, 629, 173
P.3d 724, 728 (2007) (stating that the law-of-the-case doctrine requires that
“‘the law or ruling of a first appeal must be followed in all subsequent pro-
ceedings, both in the lower court and on any later appeal’’); Gonski v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 551, 557, 245 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010)
(*[Qluestions purely of law are reviewed de novo.”). We conclude that the dis-
trict court’s rulings on remand were not inconsistent with our order reversing
and remanding Bielar’s earlier appeal; thus, the district court did not violate
the law-of-the-case doctrine in its July 2010 order.

discount. Washoe Medical, however, insists that Bielar’s settlement
agreement with Great West renders Bielar ineligible to receive the
discount.

The IPA agreement Bielar executed with Washoe Medical specif-
ically provided Bielar a right to the 30-percent discount as long as
the statutory requirements of NRS 439B.260 were met. Determin-
ing whether a patient is eligible for NRS 439B.260(1)’s billing dis-
count when he or she receives hospital services and later enters
into a settlement agreement with a third party that includes an
amount for such services requires this court to interpret the statute.
“Statutory construction is a question of law, which this court re-
views de novo.’ Kay v. Nunez, 122 Nev. 1100, 1104, 146 P.3d
801, 804 (2006). In interpreting statutes, we examine the statute’s
Janguage and context to determine whether it has a plain and un-
ambiguous meaning. Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power
Co., 128 Nev. 495, 500, 285 P.3d 1059, 1062-63 (2012). If the
text of a statute is unambiguous, we need not look beyond it.
Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev.
575, 579-80, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004).

Before 2011, NRS 439B.260(1) provided that major hospitals
must provide a 30-percent discount for inpatient services when the
patient (a) ‘‘[hJas no insurance or other contractual provision for
the payment of the charge by a third party,’ (b) is not eligible for
a government public assistance program that would cover such
charge, and (c) reasonably arranges to pay the bill within 30 days
after discharge. Thus, as a noninsured patient who received hos-
pital services when this version of the statute was in effect, Bielar
was disqualified under subsection (a) only if her settlement agree-
ment constituted a “‘contractual provision for the payment of the
charge by a third-party.’’

We conclude that Bielar qualifies for the statutory discount
for two reasons. First, the plain language of the statute states in
present-tense language that major hospitals must provide the 30-
percent discount for charges to ‘‘an inpatient who . . . [Jas no in-
surance or other contractual provision for the payment of the
charge by a third party’’ NRS 439B.260(1) (emphasis added). See
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (indicating that
verb tense is significant in construing statutes). Thus, a patient’s
eligibility for the 30-percent discount is determined at the time of
the rendition of the hospital services and a later agreement with a
third-party tortfeasor for claims arising out of such services cannot

be included in the phrase ‘‘[hJas . . . other contractual provision
for the payment of the charge by a third party.”
a

Second, because a settlement agreement is a contract, see May
v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005), the

<< T

question that follows is whether a term in a settlement agreement
requiring a defendant’s insurer to pay the injured party’s medical
expenses in settlement of an ongoing action constitutes a provision
“for the payment of the charge.’ The purpose of a settlement
agreement is typically to exchange money for a release of claims.
See 53 Am. Jur. Trials 1 §§ 28, 262 (1995). By filing a claim, one
seeks damages ‘‘as compensation for loss or injury.’ Black’s Law
Dictionary 281-82, 445 (9th ed. 2009) (defining, respectively,
“claim’’ as a ‘‘demand for money”’ and ‘‘damages”’ as ‘‘[mJoney
claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for
loss or injury’). Thus, while a settlement agreement may be a
contract, and the money exchanged under a term of the settlement
agreement might include amounts for medical expenses as part of
the requested or agreed-upon damages, the purpose of such a term
is not to pay hospital bill charges, but rather to compensate a plain-
tiff or potential plaintiff for loss or injury in order to obtain a re-
lease of claims. In that regard, a settlement agreement is more akin
to a judgment than a contract to pay hospital bills. See 53 Am. Jur.
Trials 1 § 41 (1995) (‘‘A valid compromise agreement has many of
the attributes of a judgment.’’). Indeed, neither a settlement agree-
ment nor a judgment is necessarily dependent upon the hospital
charges, but rather, both are more generally set in an amount to
compensate the plaintiff or potential plaintiff for alleged injuries
and will typically encompass amounts for several types of dam-
ages, including reimbursement for past and future medical ex-
penses. Thus, a settlement agreement’s provision for medical ex-
penses is broader than, and different from, a contractual provision
directly for the payment of hospital charges.

The legislative history of NRS 439B.260(1)(a) confirms that
that provision was intended to apply to anybody receiving inpatient
services who is not insured under a health insurance policy or sim-
ilar device. See, e.g., Senate Journal, 66th Leg., at 1356 (Nev.,
June 17, 1991) (‘‘{TJhere’s a rollback of 30 percent for all of those
people who have no insurance coverage or no state coverage.”
(Senator Rawson)); id. at 1361 (‘In order to get this [30-percent]
reduction, you must (a) have no insurance.’ (Senator Cook)). In-
surance is generally a contract by which an insurer indemnifies the
insured against risk of loss, and the insured is the specific person
covered by the insurance policy. Black’s Law Dictionary 870, 879
(9th ed. 2009) (defining, respectively, ‘insurance’ and ‘‘in-
sured’’); 43 Am. Jur. 2d. Insurance § 1 (2003). Receiving insur-
ance proceeds from a third-party liability policy under a settlement
agreement does not render the recipient insured.

Further, the 2011 amendments to NRS 439B.260 and the com-
mentary surrounding them support the conclusion that the discount
is owed to any patient not covered under a health insurance or sim-
ilar policy. NRS 439B.260 now provides, in relevant part, that

pe 469

1. A major hospital shall reduce or discount the total
billed charge by at least 30 percent for hospital services pro-
vided to an inpatient who:

(a) Has no policy of health insurance or other contractual
agreement with a third party that provides health coverage for
the charge;

5. As used in this section, ‘‘third party’’ means:

(a) An insurer, as that term is defined in NRS 679B.540;

(b) A health benefit plan, as that term is defined in NRS
689A.540, for employees which provides coverage for serv-
ices and care at a hospital;

(©) A participating public agency, as that term is defined in
NRS 287.04052, and any other local governmental agency of
the State of Nevada which provides a system of health insur-
ance for the benefit of its officers and employees, and the de-
pendents of officers and employees, pursuant to chapter 287
of NRS; or

(@) Any other insurer or organization providing health cov-
erage or benefits in accordance with state or federal Jaw.
The term does not include an insurer that provides coverage
under a policy of casualty or property insurance.

Thus, under the revised version of the statute, a person is only dis-
qualified under subsection (a) if she has a health insurance policy
or an agreement with an insurer, a health benefit plan, or a public
agency that provides her with health coverage. A settlement agree-
ment with a third party’s casualty insurance company to pay dam-
ages in order to obtain a release of a claim plainly would not con-
stitute a health insurance policy or an agreement to provide health
coverage. Moreover, these amendments were enacted to specifically
negate any argument that receiving proceeds from a third-party
tortfeasor’s insurance policy could disqualify a patient from re-
ceiving the discount.®

“‘Where a legislature amends a former statute, or clarifies
a doubtful meaning by subsequent legislation, such amendment
or subsequent legislation is strong evidence of the legislative intent
behind the first statute”’ 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie

‘In the legislative history of the amendments, the commentary emphasizes
that the statutory discount is intended to apply to all uninsured persons and that
any right to payment resulting from an accident does not disqualify the patient
from the statutory discount. See Hearing on S.B. 300 Before the Assembly
Health and Human Services Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., May 16, 2011) (ex-
plaining that the bill was intended to clarify the existing statute to prevent hos-
pitals from refusing to discount the bills of a patient based on an expectation
that the patient might someday obtain payment from the automobile insurance
of a third-party tortfeasor).

470 re

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49:10, at 129 (7th
ed. 2012); see also Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep’t, 124 Nev. 138, 157, 179 P.3d 542, 554-55
(2008) (stating that when the Legislature clarifies a statute
“through subsequent legislation, we may consider the subsequent
legislation persuasive evidence of what the Legislature originally
intended’’), We conclude that the amendments to NRS 439B.260
were intended to clarify that the statute does not apply in in-
stances such as this, where a hospital claims that a settlement
agreement entitling the plaintiff to insurance proceeds as compen-
sation for her injuries disqualifies her from receiving the 30-
percent statutory discount. .

Bielar sued the trucking company for damages arising from her
personal injury claims. Bielar’s settlement agreement was entered
into ‘‘to provide for certain payments in full settlement and dis-
charge of all claims,’’ and it recited that the amounts paid ‘“con-
stitute damages on account of personal physical injuries.’ Con-
versely, the settlement agreement did not provide for Great West to
pay specific hospital charges or to generally provide Bielar with
health coverage. Accordingly, we conclude that this was not a con-
tract for the payment of Bielar’s hospital charges within the mean-
ing of NRS 439B.260(1), and Bielar was eligible for the statute’s
discount. Because we conclude that Bielar was eligible for the
statutory discount, we now turn to whether the district court erred
by granting Washoe Medical’s NRCP 50(a)(1) motion at the con-
clusion of Bielar’s presentation of evidence at trial.

The district court did not err by granting Washoe Medical’s
NRCP 50(a)(1) motion

bn

At the conclusion of Bielar’s case-in-chief, Washoe Medical
moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to NRCP 50(a)(1),
which the district court granted. Bielar argues that the district
court erroneously relied upon improper findings to conclude that
her accounting claim was meritless.

Le

This court reviews the district court’s order granting an NRCP
50(a) motion de novo. Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 223, 163
P3d 420, 425 (2007). “Under NRCP 50(a)(1), the district court
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if the oppos-
ing party has failed to prove a sufficient issue for the jury, so that
his claim cannot be maintained under the controlling law.’ Id. at
222, 163 P.3d at 424 (internal quotations omitted). “In. . . de-
ciding whether to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law,

471

the district court must view the evidence and all inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party.’ Jd. To overcome a motion brought pur-
suant to NRCP SO(a), ‘‘the nonmoving party must have presented
sufficient evidence such that the jury could grant relief to that
party.’ Id. at 222-23, 163 P.3d at 424.

The district court found that even if the hospital’s charges were
excessive, Bielar failed to demonstrate that the charges were un-
reasonable. We agree. Bielar’s medical expert, Dr. George Ander-
son, testified as to what the hospital’s profit margin should be and
the reasonableness of hospital charges in general. But, Dr. Ander-
son did not offer any testimony as to whether the specific amounts
Washoe Medical charged for medical services and goods rendered
to Bielar were reasonable. There is no other evidence in the
record—from Dr. Anderson or another source—to demonstrate
that those charges were significantly higher than, or that Bielar
would have been charged a significantly reduced rate from, another
hospital situated within the region or in Nevada.

Viewing the evidence presented at trial and all inferences in the
light most favorable to Bielar, we conclude that she failed to suf-
ficiently prove the unreasonableness of Washoe Medical’s charges
for medical services and goods rendered such that the jury could
have found in her favor. See Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 59,
227 P.3d 1042, 1050-51 (2010) (indicating that a plaintiff must
demonstrate damages to prevail on an accounting claim). Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted Washoe
Medical’s NRCP 50(a)(1) motion.? However, because Washoe
Medical conceded at trial that it overbilled Bielar $3,801.23, we
conclude that Bielar is entitled to recover that amount.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the district
court’s July 2010 order holding that Bielar assigned her rights to
Great West and that she was ineligible for the billing discount
under NRS 439B.260(1)(a), and we remand this matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, because we

"The district court also found that Bielar presented insufficient evidence
showing that the amounts Washoe Medical actually billed Bielar were unrea-
sonable. Bielar argues, for the first time in her reply brief, that this finding was
also in error. We decline to consider this argument. See Francis v. Wynn Las
Vegas, L.L.C., 127 Nev. 657, 671 n.7, 262 P.3d 705, 715 n.7 (2011) (citing
Weaver v. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 502, 117 P.3d 193,
198-99 (2005)) (“fAlrguments raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply
brief need not be considered.”’). Bielar also argues that the district court mis-
applied NRS Chapter 108 in deciding to grant Washoe Medical’s NRCP
50(a)(1) motion; however, we conclude that this argument is meritless because
the district court did not grant the motion based upon those grounds.

an Pe

conclude that Bielar failed to sufficiently prove the unreasonable-
ness of Washoe Medical’s charges for medical services and goods
rendered, we affirm the district court’s February 2011 order grant-
ing Washoe Medical’s NRCP 50(a)(1) motion, with the exception
that Bielar is entitled to recover the $3,801.23 Washoe Medical
conceded at trial that it overbilled Bielar.*

PICKERING, C.J., and Sarrra, J., concur.

AUDIE G. LEVENTHAL, APPELLANT, v.
BLACK & LoBELLO, RESPONDENT.

No. 58055

AUDIE G. LEVENTHAL, APPELLANT, v.
BLACK & LoBELLO, RESPONDENT.

No. 59671

July 11, 2013 305 P.3d 907

"In the concluding paragraph of her opening brief, Bielar requests that if this
matter is remanded, that it be reassigned to another district court judge because
Judge Flanagan’s refusal to follow this court’s directives and his impro-
per granting of Washoe Medical’s NRCP 50(a)(1) motion “‘exhibit[ed] a
“probability of bias? which . . . implicates due process considerations.’”’ We re-
ject this request. Although we have concluded that the district court improp-
erly granted Washoe Medical’s motion, the record reflects that Judge Flana-
gan’s decisions were unbiased, well-reasoned, and thorough. Thus, Bielar has
failed to demonstrate any partiality or impropriety on the part of Judge Flana-
gan, or show that her due process rights were violated. See NCJC Canon 1,
Rule 1.2 (‘A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public con-
fidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); see also Caper-
ton v. A.T: Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“‘It is axiomatic that
[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. As the
Court has recognized, however, most matters relating to judicial disqualifica-
tion [do] not rise to a constitutional Jevel.’’ (alterations in original) (citation and
internal quotations omitted)).

473

Robinson & Wood and Keith D. Kaufman, Las Vegas, for
Appellant.

Black & LoBello and Michele Touby LoBello, Las Vegas, for
Respondent.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HaRDEsTy and Sarrta, JJ.

474
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

This is an appeal from an order adjudicating a law firm’s charg-
ing lien for fees against its former client under NRS 18.015. The
firm did not serve the statutory notices required to perfect its lien
until the case was over. Under NRS 18.015(3), a charging lien
only attaches to a ‘‘verdict, judgment or decree entered and
to... money or property which is recovered on account of the
suit or other action, from the time of service of the notices required
by this section,’ (Emphasis added.) Since the decree became final
months before the lien was perfected—and no prospect of post-
perfection recovery appeared—the lien should not have been adju-
dicated under NRS 18.015(4).

L

After his wife, Jacqueline, sued appellant Audie Leventhal for
divorce, he hired respondent Black & LoBello (LoBello) to repre-
sent him. Leventhal’s answer to Jacqueline’s complaint included a
counterclaim seeking to enforce a prenuptial agreement that pro-
tected his separate property. In May 2010, a final decree of divorce
was entered based on a stipulated marital settlement agreement.
Under the stipulated decree, Leventhal retained most of his sepa-
rate property and was awarded joint custody of his son.

Some months later, Jacqueline and Leventhal returned to court
with a post-decree dispute over child custody. Still representing
Leventhal, LoBello argued that the post-decree proceeding was so
far removed from the original divorce proceeding that it was “‘re-
ally a new action initiated by Jacqueline’s most recent Motion.’’ In
January 2011, Leventhal and Jacqueline managed to resolve their
custodial differences by stipulation. From what appears in the
record, the post-decree dispute centered on child custody; its stip-
ulated resolution left Leventhal with joint custody and did not
produce any new recovery of money or property.

Leventhal paid LoBello for the firm’s work through entry of the
final decree. He did not pay LoBello, though, for the fees charged
to litigate the post-decree dispute. Eventually, LoBello filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel, along with a notice of, and a mo-
tion to adjudicate and enforce, a charging lien for unpaid attorney
fees. By then, the divorce decree had been final for months, the
decree’s property-distribution terms had been implemented, and
even the post-decree child-custody dispute had been resolved by
filed stipulation. As LoBello later acknowledged, with the case ef-
fectively over, ‘‘[o]bviously, [Leventhal] could not recover anything
further.’

Pe a5

Even so, the district court granted LoBello’s post-decree motion
to adjudicate and enforce a charging lien. It entered personal judg-
ment for LoBello and against Leventhal for $89,852.69. Leventhal
appeals, and we reverse.!

tL.
A.

be

Nevada attorneys have all the usual tools available to creditors to
recover payment of their fees. For example, a law firm can sue its
client and obtain a money judgment for fees due, thereby acquir-
ing, if recorded, a judgment lien against the client’s property.
NRS 17.150(2). An attorney also has a passive or retaining lien
against files or property held by the attorney for the client. See Ar-
gentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury &
Standish, 125 Nev. 527, 532, 216 P.3d 779, 782 (2009). Finally,
in an appropriate case, an attorney may assert a charging lien
against the client’s claim or recovery under NRS 18.015. Id.; see
NRS 18.015(5) (‘‘Collection of attorney’s fees by a [charging] lien
under this section may be utilized with, after or independently of
any other method of collection.’’).?

a :

A charging lien is ‘‘a unique method of protecting attorneys.’
Sowder v. Sowder, 977 P.2d 1034, 1037 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
Such a lien allows an attorney, on motion in the case in which the
attorney rendered the services, to obtain and enforce a lien for fees
due for services rendered in the case. See Argentena, 125 Nev. at
532, 216 P.3d at 782. A charging lien ‘tis not dependent on pos-
session, as in the case of the general or retaining lien. It is based
on natural equity—the client should not be allowed to appropriate
the whole of the judgment without paying for the services of the at-
torney who obtained it’”’ 23 Williston on Contracts § 62:11 (4th
ed. 2002).

Le

The four requirements of NRS 18.015 must be met for a court
to adjudicate and enforce a charging lien. See Schlang v. Key Air-
lines, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 666, 669 (D. Nev. 1994) (indicating that,

"Leventhal also appeals the district court’s denial of his later NRCP 60(b)
motion to set aside the judgment, Since we conclude that the district court
erred in adjudicating the lien, we do not reach the NRCP 60(b) issue.

>The 2013 Legislature amended NRS 18.015, 2013 Nev, Stat., ch. 79, § 1,
at 271; S.B. 140, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013). This appeal is governed by the pre~
amendment version of NRS 18.015. See NRS 18.015 (2012).

fn

in Nevada, a charging lien is a creature of statute). First, there
must be a ‘‘claim, demand or cause of action, . . . which has been
placed in the attorney’s hands by a client for suit or collection, or

upon which a suit or other action has been instituted”’ NRS
18.015(1); see Argentena, 125 Nev. at 534, 216 P.3d at 783 (stat-
ing that where the client ‘‘did not seek or obtain any affirmative
recovery in the underlying action, . . . there [is] no basis for a
charging lien’). The lien is in the amount of the agreed-upon fee
or, if none has been agreed upon, a reasonable amount for the
services rendered ‘‘on account of the suit, claim, demand or ac-
tion.’ NRS 18.015(1).? Second, the attorney must perfect the lien
by serving ‘‘notice in writing, in person or by certified mail, return
receipt requested, upon his or her client and upon the party against
whom the client has a cause of action, claiming the lien and stat-
ing the interest which the attorney has in any cause of action.’
NRS 18.015(2).* Third, the statute sets a timing requirement:
Once perfected, the ‘‘lien attaches to any verdict, judgment or de-
cree entered and to any money or property which is recovered on
account of the suit or other action, from the time of service of the
notices required by this section.’’ NRS 18.015(3). Fourth, the at-
torney must timely file and properly serve a motion to adjudicate
the lien. NRS 18.015(4). It is the interpretation of the third re-
quirement that is at issue here. The proper construction of NRS
18.015 is a question of law that we review de novo. Argentena,
125 Nev. at 531, 216 P.3d at 782.

476 PTT

B.

| |

LoBello argues that the favorable outcomes in the property and
child custody settlements both present recovery to which the lien
could attach and that, alternatively, a lien can attach even where no
tangible value is procured. In LoBello’s view, Argentena incor-
rectly precludes charging liens in cases that do not produce an af-
firmative recovery. LoBello further argues that Argentena uncon-
stitutionally disfavors attorneys who seek to defend or retain rights
rather than procure property. LoBello both misunderstands the na-
ture of charging liens and ignores the attorney’s ability to pursue
client fees via other means available to creditors.

?At the outset of the representation, Leventhal signed LoBello’s contract
stating that if Leventhal failed to pay LoBello’s fees, LoBello would have a lien
on all funds recovered through the case and all paperwork produced.

“Leventhal disputes the adequacy of LoBello’s service of the notice of lien;
also, it does not appear LoBello served Jacqueline, as the firm should have
under NRS 18.015(2). We do not reach these issues because they are not nec-
essary to our decision.

Po 4m

Fundamentally, NRS 18.015(3) requires a client to assert an af-
firmative claim to relief, from which some affirmative recovery
can result. A charging lien cannot attach to the benefit gained for
the client by securing a dismissal; it attaches to “‘the tangible
fruits’’ of the attorney’s services. Glickman y. Scherer, 566 So. 2d
574, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also Argentena, 125 Nev.
at 534, 216 P.3d at 783-84; Sowder, 977 P.2d at 1037. This
“‘fruit’’ is generally money, property, or other actual proceeds
gained by means of the claims asserted for the client in the litiga-
tion.5 See Glickman, 566 So. 2d at 575; see ABA/BNA Lawyers’
Manual on Professional Conduct, at 41:2114 (2002) (discussing
the types of property needed for a charging lien to attach); see also

* Mitchell v. Coleman, 868 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004).

Argentena is controlling precedent. There, the parties settled a
personal injury action, and all claims against Argentena were dis-
missed. 125 Nev. at 530, 216 P.3d at 781. Argentena’s counsel
moved to adjudicate its charging lien, but the only result obtained
in that case was that the claims against Argentena were dismissed;
Argentena did not assert any counterclaims or obtain an affirma-
tive recovery. Id. Although Argentena unquestionably benefited
from the dismissal, there was no recovery to which a charging lien
could attach. Jd. at 534, 216 P.3d at 784.

Attempting to distinguish Argentena, LoBello argues that Lev-
enthal did obtain an affirmative recovery in the underlying case,
namely the property retained in the divorce through the property
settlement and the “‘financial benefits associated with . . . child
custody,” including tax benefits and value in avoiding increased
child support.

As to the child-custody benefits, LoBello fails to identify any
tangible recovery derived from the resolution of this issue that is
appropriately subject to a charging lien. A child-custody agreement

SArgentena acknowledged that a charging lien is historically an in rem pro-
ceeding, which requires money or property over which the court has jurisdic-
tion in order to adj te a charging lien. To the extent that Argentena sug-
gests that in rem ji liction gives rise to subject matter jurisdiction, we
clarify that they are distinct and both are required in order for a district court
to adjudicate a charging lien. Other courts without statutory authorization to
adjudicate a charging lien in the client’s litigation have nevertheless done so be-
cause the court has the inherent power to supervise and regulate attorneys ap-
pearing before it, the court is likely already familiar with the relevant facts re-
lating to the attorney’s performance and services in the case giving rise to the
fee dispute, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 42 cmt. b
(2000), and it would be a waste of judicial time and resources to require a sep-
arate proceeding to adjudicate the charging lien. See Gee v. Crabtree, 560 P.2d -
835, 836 (Colo. 1977).

478 PO

wherein Leventhal retained his share of custody and the associated
benefits does not demonstrate any affirmative claim to, or recov-
ery of, money or property. Rather, LoBello preserved Leventhal’s
previously established joint custody rights against his ex-wife’s at-
tempt to revise them. This is similar to Argentena, where the at-
torney’s efforts led to the dismissal of the case but did not involve
an affirmative claim or recovery.

As to the assets distributed pursuant to the property settlement
and divorce decree,° a problem arises because the property settle-
ment took place eight months before LoBello filed and made even
a colorable attempt at perfecting its lien, see supra note 4. NRS
18.015(3) imposes a time requirement on attorneys seeking to
perfect, adjudicate and enforce a charging lien: ‘‘The lien at-
taches . . . from the time of service of the notices required by this
section.’ Although we have never expressly interpreted this sec-
tion, Nevada’s federal district court did so in Schlang v. Key Air-
lines, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 666 (D. Nev. 1994).

In Schlang, the parties settled a wrongful termination action and
their appeals were dismissed. Jd. at 667-68. Former counsel filed
a charging lien but failed to serve the notice required to perfect the
lien until the settlement was consummated. Jd. at 669-70. The fed-
eral court, citing NRS 18.015(3),” found that because the attorney
did not perfect his lien before the settlement agreement was carried
out, “there no longer existed any proceeds to which the lien could
attach.’’® Id. at 670. It therefore declined to adjudicate and enforce
the lien.

Le

We agree with Schlang, and hold that under NRS 18.015(3),
the lien attaches to a judgment, verdict, or decree entered, or
to money or property recovered, after the notice is served. This in-
terpretation harmonizes NRS 18.015(3)’s attachment provisions
with NRS 18.015(2)’s requirement that a lien be perfected by
proper notice. See Tonopah Lumber Co. v. Nev. Amusement Co.,
30 Nev. 445, 455, 97 P. 636, 639 (1908). (‘‘[A] lien can only
legally exist when perfected in the manner prescribed by the statute
creating it... ”’ (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, if an attor-

Although this court has held that a charging lien may not attach to assets
that are exempt from creditors under NRS 21.090, see Bero-Wachs v. Law Of-
Sice of Logar & Pulver, 123 Nev. 71, 75, 157 P.3d 704, 706 (2007), we have
not addressed whether a division of property in a divorce case is an affirma-
tive recovery to which a lien may attach. In light of our disposition of this case,
this question is not fairly presented, and we decline to examine it on a hypo-
thetical basis.

7The court quotes NRS 18.015(3) but incorrectly cites to NRS 18.015(2).

"The Schlang court cited in re Nicholson, 57 B.R. 672 (D. Nev. 1986) (dis-
cussing when an attorney lien attaches to property).

ee 429

ney waits to perfect the lien until judgment has been entered and
the proceeds of the judgment have been distributed, the right to the
charging lien may be lost. See Sowder, 977 P.2d at 1038.

Basic notice and fairness requirements support this interpreta-
tion. Nevada attorneys must notify their clients in writing of any
interest the attorney has that is adverse to a client. RPC 1.8(a); In
re Singer, 109 Nev. 1117, 1118, 865 P.2d 315, 315 (1993). Other
courts have found that charging liens constitute adverse interests
and applied a similar written notice rule. See Fletcher v. Davis, 90
P.3d 1216, 1221 (Cal. 2004). NRS 18.015(3) promotes these poli-
cies by requiring an attorney to serve notice and perfect a charg-
ing lien in a timely manner.

Diligent perfection of the lien under NRS 18.015(3) ensures that
the client, the client’s opponent in the litigation, and others have
notice of the attorney’s lien and may conduct the litigation and deal
with any recovery it produces accordingly. A timely motion to ad-
judicate and enforce the charging lien under NRS 18.015(4) also
enables the court to evaluate the lien while it has jurisdiction over
any affirmative recovery, while the attorney’s performance is fresh
in its mind, and before the judgment is satisfied and the proceeds
are distributed. See Weiland v. Weiland, 814 So. 2d 1252, 1253
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that notice was untimely
where the attorney waited to establish the lien until approximately
two months after the case concluded); Sowder, 977 P.2d at 1038
(holding that a Jaw firm waived its right to assert its charging lien
when it waited several months after the property was distributed to
assert its charging lien). See also Anderson v. Farmers Coop. El-
evator Ass’n, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 989, 992 (D. Neb. 1995) (quash-
ing the attorney charging lien because notice of the lien was un-
timely, made after the property had been transferred to the
opposing party); Libner v. Maine Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n, 845 A.2d
570, 573 (Me. 2004) (holding that no lien may be imposed with-
out direct and specific notice to the fund of an opposing party
or its carriers that a lien is asserted before the proceeds are
disbursed). It would be unreasonable and unfair to clients and to
third parties to allow attorneys to claim a lien on any judgment
at any time, no matter how much time has passed since the case
concluded.

Here, LoBello perfected its lien eight months after the stipulated
divorce decree was entered and the property was distributed—well
after the time a lien could have attached to any of the property gov-
erned by that settlement.’ Moreover, the custody settlement did not

°Compare Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 762, 616 P.2d 395, 397 (1980)
(the court loses jurisdiction over property divided by a divorce decree where
the parties wait for longer than six months to modify the decree), with Collins
vy. Murphy, 113 Nev. 1380, 1384-85, 951 P.2d 598, 600-01 (1997) (holding

480 PTT

modify the property distribution in the divorce decree or otherwise
bring that property back into dispute. Most importantly, LoBello
admits that all outstanding issues were resolved before it filed or
tried to perfect the lien, and it did not show that any recovery was
still pending resolution or other legal action. Cf. Fein v. Schwartz,
404 S.W.2d 210, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that where
property remained to be transferred after the conclusion of a case,
the lien was timely perfected before the transfer of property even
though notice was served after the conclusion of the case). By the
time LoBello filed and tried to perfect its lien, there was nothing
to which the lien could have attached."

This court is not unsympathetic to LoBello’s situation. But when.
an attorney seeks a charging lien—a unique lien enforced by unique
methods—the attorney must comply with the particular require-
ments of the statute. Cf. Sowder, 977 P.2d at 1038. If LoBello
wishes to pursue its claims through other means, it may do so.
However, LoBello may not rely on perfecting and prosecuting a
charging lien filed eight months after the final decree is entered,
when the case was completely concluded.

Accordingly, we reverse.

Harpesty and Sarrma, JJ., concur.

that it was unfairly prejudicial and an error to adjudicate a motion for attor-
ney fees filed after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal had passed), su-
perseded by rule amendment, In the Matter of Amendments to the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure, ADKT No. 426 (Order Amending Nevada Rule of
Civil Procedure 54, February 6, 2009).

‘Even though LoBello’s contract stated it would have a lien on any recov-
ery if Leventhal failed to pay fees, at best this evidenced an intent to claim a
charging lien if Leventhal defaulted on payment and LoBello gained recovery
on Leventhal’s behalf. See Sowder, 977 P.2d at 1038.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
KENT JOSEPH BECKMAN, RESPONDENT.

No, 57928
July 11, 2013 305 P.3d 912

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark
Torvinen, District Attorney, and Robert J. Lowe, Deputy District
Attorney, Elko County, for Appellant.

Frederick B. Lee, Jr., Public Defender, and Alina M. Kilpatrick
and Andrew M. Mierins, Deputy Public Defenders, Elko County,
for Respondent.

&
+

Before the Court EN BaNc.!

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

Respondent Kent Beckman was stopped for speeding. The high-
way patrol officer verified Beckman’s license and registration,
told him ‘‘everything checks good,’ and issued a warning. As
Beckman began to leave, the officer ordered him to remain until a
drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. When the dog ar-
rived, it alerted for the presence of drugs, which was confirmed by
the warrantless search that followed. Beckman was arrested and
charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of
Schedule I and II controlled substances.

Beckman moved to suppress the evidence of contraband be-
cause the highway patrol officer unreasonably prolonged the traf-
fie stop, unlawfully ‘‘seizing’’ him, and because exigent circum-
stances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court
granted the motion based on the warrantless search. Because the

'This matter was transferred from panel to en banc following oral argument
pursuant to IOP Rule 13(b).

484 PO

seizure presents a threshold issue that requires affirmance as a
matter of law irrespective of the warrantless search analysis, we
focus on it. See Picetti v. State, 124 Nev. 782, 790, 192 P.3d 704,
709 (2008) (district court decision will be affirmed on appeal
where court reached correct result).

| ere

A traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegiti-
mate when the officer detains the car and driver beyond the time
required to process the traffic offense, unless the extended deten-
tion is consensual, de minimis, or justified by a reasonable artic-
ulable suspicion of criminal activity. The prolonged stop in this
case met none of these exceptions and violated the United States
and Nevada Constitutions. The constitutional violation warrants ex-
clusion of the subsequently discovered evidence.

L

The essential facts of this case were recorded by videotape and
are not disputed. At 7:10 a.m. on a Sunday morning, Trooper
Richard Pickers of the Nevada Highway Patrol stopped Beckman
on Interstate 80 in Elko, Nevada, for speeding.” Trooper Pickers
asked for Beckman’s license and registration, which Beckman pro-
duced. Trooper Pickers questioned Beckman about his travels, and
Beckman answered that he had been driving since 10 p.m. and was
on his way to Omaha, Nebraska, to visit his son. At 7:13 a.m.,
Trooper Pickers told Beckman that he would verify Beckman’s
documents and issue a warning.

When Trooper Pickers returned to his patrol car, he told his pas-
senger, a new dispatch employee in training, that he suspected
criminal activity because of fingerprints on the trunk of Beckman’s
car. He added that Beckman seemed ‘‘overly nervous’’ and that he,
Trooper Pickers, would not drive continuously through the night.
When Trooper Pickers radioed dispatch to check Beckman’s doc-
uments, he asked dispatch to send a drug-sniffing dog/handler
team to the scene of the stop.

At 7:18 a.m., Beckman asked for permission to get out of his
car to stretch. Trooper Pickers assented and in turn asked for per-
mission to pat Beckman down for weapons. Beckman consented.
Beckman and Trooper Pickers then engaged in friendly conversa-
tion, largely about Beckman’s job as a wine salesperson. A minute
later, Trooper Pickers returned Beckman’s license and registration
and told him ‘‘everything checks good . . . be careful.’’ Beckman
handed Trooper Pickers a business card and walked back toward
his vehicle to leave.

"There are two additional cases before this court that involve similar stops
by Trooper Pickers—State v. Lloyd (Docket No. 56706), and Tucker v. State
(Docket No. 58690).

Po 485

Pickers then asked if he could ask Beckman ‘‘a couple of ques-
tions,’ to which Beckman responded ‘‘yes, sir’’ Trooper Pickers
asked if Beckman had anything illegal in his car and if he could
perform a vehicle search. Beckman denied having anything illegal
but refused consent to the search. At this point, approximately
7:21 a.m., Trooper Pickers told Beckman that he was no longer
free to leave and would have to wait for the canine unit to arrive
and perform a sniff search. A minute later, Trooper Pickers gave
Beckman a modified version of his Miranda rights.? While waiting
for the canine unit, Trooper Pickers and Beckman continued to
talk.
Officer Lowry and his drug-sniffing dog, Duchess, arrived at
7:29 a.m. Two minutes later, Duchess signaled the presence of
drugs near the driver’s side door of Beckman’s vehicle. Trooper
Pickers informed dispatch that the dog alerted positively, and he
would perform a vehicle search. Trooper Pickers then began a
search of the vehicle, and found what he determined to be cocaine
in the center console. Thereafter, at 7:40 a.m., Trooper Pickers in-
formed Beckman that he was under arrest, placed him in hand-
cuffs, and secured him in the back of the patrol vehicle.

An additional officer arrived as backup, followed by a tow truck
at 8:02 a.m. The three officers, with the tow truck driver’s assis-
tance, continued the search until 8:58 a.m. and found additional
quantities of cocaine, as well as methamphetamine. During
the search, Trooper Pickers was asked about a cut on his hand, and
he responded, ‘‘That’s me getting jazzed up. I don’t even feel it.
T’m on the search. I’m feeling like there’s going to be more.”
After the search ended, Trooper Pickers drove Beckman to the
sheriff’s station.

The State charged Beckman with several drug-related offenses.
Beckman filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that
Trooper Pickers unlawfully seized him by unnecessarily extending
the stop and that the officers further violated his rights by per-
forming a warrantless search. In opposition to the motion, the State
argued that Trooper Pickers had reasonable suspicion for the de
minimus continued detention and that extenuating circumstances
justified the warrantless search. After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court granted the motion in a detailed order focusing on the
legality of the warrantless search. The State appeals.

U.
| eeeeers|

“Suppression issues present mixed questions of law and fact.’’
Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 794, 59 P.3d 450, 455 (2002),

*Trooper Pickers did not read the warning from a card. Instead, he ex-
plained the rights in approximate terms.

486 Pe

overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749,
772, 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011). This court reviews findings of
fact for clear error, but the legal consequences of those facts in-
volve questions of law that we review de novo. Cortes v. State, 127
Nev. 505, 509, 260 P.3d 184, 187 (2011); State v. Lisenbee, 116
Nev. 1124, 1127, 13 P.3d 947, 949 (2000). The reasonableness of
a seizure is a matter of law reviewed de novo. Id.; United States v.
Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008).

A.
1.
[|

Using virtually identical words, the United States and Nevada
Constitutions both guarantee “‘[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’’ U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Nev. Const.
art. 1, § 18; Cortes, 127 Nev. at 514, 260 P.3d at 190-91. Tem-
porary detention of individuals during a traffic stop constitutes a
“‘seizure”’ of ‘‘persons’’ within the meaning of these constitu-
tional provisions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996); see Cortes, 127 Nev. at 510-11, 515 n.7, 260 P.3d at 188-
89, 191 n.7. ‘‘An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitu-
tional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circum-
stances.’ Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Trooper Pickers had probable
cause to believe that Beckman had violated a traffic law by driving
72 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. Thus, the initial
stop was reasonable. Id. (‘‘As a general matter, the decision to stop
an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.’’).

| reer!

During the course of a lawful traffic stop, officers may complete
a number of routine tasks. For example, they may ask for a driver’s
license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue
a ticket. See United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.
2012). Officers may also inquire about the occupants’ destination,
route, and purpose. United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 975
(8th Cir. 2005). And if necessary, law enforcement may conduct a
brief, limited investigation for safety purposes. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Dixon v, State, 103 Nev. 272, 273, 737 P.2d
1162, 1163-64 (1987).

Here, Trooper Pickers correctly tailored the initial investigation
to the circumstances justifying the stop. See 68 Am. Jur. 2d
Searches and Seizures § 90 (2010) (‘‘[T]he scope of the detention
must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”’). As
with most traffic stops, Trooper Pickers asked for Beckman’s dri-
ver’s license and vehicle registration, which he had dispatch check

Pe 487

by computer search. Although Trooper Pickers asked Beckman
questions about his travels, this inquiry was within the scope of the
lawful traffic stop and did not improperly extend the duration of
that stop. Thus, the first phase of Trooper Pickers’ investigation,
which lasted from approximately 7:10 to 7:19, satisfied the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.

2.
Lee)

But a ‘‘seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the
Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably in-
fringes interests protected by the Constitution.’ Illinois v. Ca-
balles, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); see also Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (explaining that the scope of an of-
ficer’s investigation is limited by the purpose of the investiga-
tion). In Caballes, a police officer stopped Caballes for speeding,
and one of the officer’s colleagues on the canine unit immediately
headed for the scene. 543 U.S. at 406. A few minutes later, while
the officer was still writing out a warning ticket, the dog and han-
dler walked around Caballes’s car, where the dog alerted to the
presence of drugs. After Caballes challenged the constitutionality
of the sniff, the Court explained that a dog sniff during a lawful
traffic stop does not violate the Constitution so long as the sniff
does not prolong the length of the stop. Id. at 408-09 (emphasis
added). The Court continued that the inverse is also true—if a traf-
fic stop is unreasonably prolonged before a canine is employed, the
use of the canine and subsequently discovered evidence are prod-
ucts of an unconstitutional seizure. Jd. at 407-08. Because the ca-
nine unit in Caballes arrived while the initial officer was still pro-
cessing the initial reason for the stop, the canine sniff did not run
afoul of the Constitution.

Similarly, in Gama v. State, 112 Nev. 833, 837-38, 920 P.2d
1010, 1013 (1996), this court upheld a dog sniff that occurred dur-
ing a traffic stop. There, police initiated the stop because Gama
was speeding and nearly rear-ended another vehicle. Id. at 835,
920 P.2d at 1012. A narcotics unit arrived with a drug-sniffing dog
before the officer completed a written citation. Id. at 837-38, 920
P.2d at 1013. Since the sniff did not extend the length of the traf-
fic stop, we held that Gama had not been unlawfully seized. Jd. at
838, 920 P.2d at 1013-14.

Here, unlike the officers in Caballes and Gama, Trooper Pick-
ers extended the length of the traffic stop to await a canine unit.*
The initial stop for the speeding violation ended around 7:19 a.m.
when Trooper Pickers informed Beckman ‘‘everything checks

‘Per the State, ‘“There is going to be a little bit of time when you’re going
to have to get the dog out there, especially in a large county like Elko.”

488 Po

{out]’’ and both parties started walking toward their cars. After
Beckman consensually answered a few questions regarding con-
trolled substances, Trooper Pickers seized Beckman again by in-
forming Beckman that he was no longer free to leave and would
need to wait for the canine unit to arrive and perform a sniff
search. Trooper Pickers also read Beckman his Miranda rights.
This show of authority restrained Beckman’s liberty, Terry, 392
U.S. at 19 n.16 (explaining that when an officer uses his author-
ity to detain a citizen, a seizure has occurred), and in view of these
circumstances, a reasonable person in Beckman’s position would
believe that he was not free to leave. See State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev.
398, 401, 760 P.2d 124, 127 (1988) (citing Michigan v. Chester-
nut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)) (explaining that a person is seized
if he does not believe he is free to leave). The question then be-
comes whether the prolonged traffic stop was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.

B.

“TA] traffic stop [that] extends beyond the time necessary to ef-
fectuate its purpose does not necessarily render it unreasonable.”’
United States v. Bueno, 703 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir.), vacated as
to codefendant’s sentencing determination sub nom. Gonzalez-
Zavala v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2830 (2013). A prolonged stop
may be reasonable in three limited circumstances: when the ex-
tension of the stop was consensual, the delay was de minimis, or
the officer lawfully receives information during the traffic stop that
creates a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Jd. at 1060-62.
“The ultimate determination of reasonableness . . . is a question
of law reviewable de novo.’’ United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441
E3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Everett, 601
F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010) (‘‘[w]hether a seizure is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law that we review
de novo’’).

| |

First, a prolonged traffic stop is not unreasonable if the en-
counter becomes consensual. After all, a consensual encounter is
not a seizure, and thus, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.
United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2010); see
also United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir.
2007). Here, Beckman consensually responded to Trooper Pickers’
initial questions about contraband from 7:20 until 7:21, but if
consent existed, it vanished around 7:21 when Beckman asked,
“can I please go,’ and Trooper Pickers responded, ‘‘absolutely
not.” The continued detention therefore cannot be justified based
on consent.

Pe 429

Second, a modest delay may be reasonable, depending on the
circumstances surrounding the stop. For example, other jurisdic-
tions have permitted a two-minute delay, United States v. McBride,
635 F.3d 879, 883 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chaney, 584
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009), and a four-minute delay, United States
y, Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006), as de minimis
intrusions on a driver’s liberty. Here, the State argued during oral
argument that the continued detention was de minimus and ‘‘not a
very long period out of Mr. Beckman’s life.’ It further stated that
the “‘obvious seizure’’ did not unreasonably extend the stop be-
cause Trooper Pickers ‘‘throughout the whole period act[ed] ex-
peditiously to get the dog there.’’ We disagree. The delay was not
de minimis because Trooper Pickers detained Beckman for an ad-
ditional nine minutes, doubling the length of the stop. Accordingly,
the additional delay was not permissible as de minimus.

Third, a prolonged stop is permissible if the results of the initial
stop provide an officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal con-
duct, thereby creating a new Fourth Amendment event. See, e.g.,
State v. Perez, 435 A.2d 334, 338 (Conn. 1980) (when ‘‘a police
officer’s suspicions upon a lawful stop are further aroused, the stop
may be prolonged and the scope enlarged as required by the cir-
cumstances’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Altrui, 448
A.2d 837, 846 n.6 (1982); Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56,
64 (Ast Cir. 2010) (recognizing that information gathered during a
traffic stop may provide reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct
that will justify extending the stop). Whether the officer’s articu-
lated reasons for extending the seizure were reasonable ‘‘must be
determined with an objective eye in light of the totality of the cir-
cumstances.”’ Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1128, 13 P.3d at 950.

Here, the State contended that the continued detention was jus-
tified by the suspicions that Trooper Pickers related, to wit: Beck-
man’s nervousness, the handprints on the car’s trunk lid, and
Beckman’s request to get out of his vehicle and stretch. But these
are all occurrences Trooper Pickers observed before he decided to
issue a warning and send Beckman on his way. The only notewor-
thy event that occurred after Trooper Pickers released Beckman
was Beckman’s offer of a business card.

Although an officer’s training and experiences enable him to
draw inferences that ‘“‘might well elude an untrained person,’
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), the totality of
the circumstances here would not cause a prudent person to have
an honest or strong suspicion that Beckman had committed a
crime. Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 681, 601 P.2d 407, 415
(1979). Factors such as nervousness are part of a reasonable sus-

490 Po

picion analysis but, standing alone, carry little weight because
many citizens become nervous during a traffic stop, even when
they have nothing to hide. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
275 (2002); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31
(6th Cir. 2004). Jurisdictions are divided on the value of handprints
on a vehicle. Some have recognized reasonable suspicion where
handprints were one of many factors, e.g., United States v. Thomp-
son, 408 F.3d 994, 995-96 (8th Cir. 2005), but others have not.
United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, 394-95 (th Cir. 1991)
(finding no reasonable suspicion where officers observed hand-
prints on the trunk of an automobile). Although criminals may fre-
quently check contraband in their trunks, many law-abiding citi-
zens also routinely utilize their trunks for non-suspect reasons,
such as hauling groceries (or in Beckman’s case, wine). Next, even
if Beckman’s request to stand and stretch was unusual compared to
other citizens, it made sense given the fact that Beckman had been
driving for hours. And when Beckman sought to exit his vehicle,
he requested permission from, and fully cooperated with, Trooper
Pickers. Lastly, the business card made sense given that Beckman
is a salesperson, and if anything, would likely have tended to
make a reasonable person think that Beckman had nothing to hide.
Thus, the events that occurred during the traffic stop did not pro-
vide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that made the con-
tinued detention reasonable.

a

For these reasons we conclude as a matter of law that Trooper
Pickers unreasonably seized Beckman’s person in violation of
the United States and Nevada Constitutions before the canine sniff
and warrantless search ever occurred. Although law enforcement
does not need reasonable suspicion before conducting a dog sniff,
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (conclud-
ing that a dog sniff is not a ‘‘search’’ for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment), the sniff was the ‘‘product of an unconstitutional
seizure’’ during a ‘‘traffic stop [that was] unreasonably prolonged
before the dog [wa]s deployed.’ Alexander, 448 F.3d at 1016; see
also 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Treatise on Search and Seizure
§ 9.3(b) (Sth ed. 2012) (“‘A traffic stop that has been turned into
a drug investigation via . . . questioning about drugs, grilling
about the minute details of travel plans, seeking consent for a full
roadside exploration of the motorist’s car, or parading a drug dog
around the vehicle[] is a far cry from a straightforward and
unadorned traffic stop... .’). And when the extended seizure
“*‘enable[s] the dog sniff to occur; ’’ suppression may properly
follow. United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir.
2008) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408).

po 491
IL.
[|

In these circumstances suppression is appropriate because
Trooper Pickers’ conduct raises ‘‘ ‘concern[s] about the inclination
of the Government toward using whatever facts are present, no
matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity’ ’’ United
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011)).5 Sup-
pression is not only appropriate because the extended seizure en-
abled the dog sniff, but also because of the continued seizure and
intrusive search that Beckman endured. Even though the subse-
quent search revealed contraband in Beckman’s vehicle, ‘‘ ‘no sub-
sequent events or circumstances can retroactively justify the
seizure.’ ’’ Lisenbee, 116 Nev. at 1129, 13 P.3d at 951 (quoting
State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398, 401, 760 P.2d 124, 126 (1988)).
And the government cannot benefit from evidence that officers ob-
tained through a clear violation of an individual’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (affirming
suppression of evidence where officers gathered the evidence by in-
truding on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights); Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984) (Suppression is justified
when the challenged evidence is ‘‘ ‘the product of illegal govern-
mental activity, ’’ (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,
471 (1980))).

Accordingly, the district court appropriately suppressed the ev-
idence. Although the court based its decision on the warrantless
search, its conclusion is far more compelling based on the illegal
seizure. Unlike the warrantless search that the district court ad-
dressed, which involves complex areas of law, the law prohibiting
illegal seizures is plain and easily understood. There is no justifi-
cation for the unconstitutional seizure and its aftermath, including
the search that ultimately yielded contraband.

‘We therefore affirm.

GmpBoNs, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLAS, CHERRY, and
Sarrna, JJ., concur.

sOur concerns are further heightened by the State’s candid disclosure that
“Trooper Pickers made statements that were misleading and or dishonest in his
application” to an agency in Idaho. The dishonesty was severe enough ‘‘that
[it] would have been enough to result in his termination’’ had he not left the
police force on his own accord.

492

THE STATE OF NEVADA, PETITIONER, v. THE EIGHTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AnD THE HONOR-
ABLE WILLIAM O. VOY, Districr Jupcz, FAMILY
COURT DIVISION, RESPONDENTS, AND LOGAN D., A
Minor, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No, 52477

July 25, 2013 306 P.3d 369

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan VanBoskerck, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Petitioner.

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Howard Brooks and Susan
Deems Roske, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County, for Real
Party in Interest.

Margaret A. McLetchie, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Nevada.

g

au

495

Before the Court EN BANC.

TT

OPINION

By the Court, Doua.as, J.:

In this original writ proceeding, we consider whether Assembly
Bill 579, enacted by the 2007 Nevada Legislature, providing for
the retroactive application of mandatory sex offender registration
and community notification requirements on juveniles adjudicated
for certain sex offenses, violates the Due Process and Ex Post
Facto Clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. We
conclude that registration and community notification do not vio-
late the Due Process or Ex Post Facto Clauses. We therefore grant
the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Real party in interest Logan D. was adjudicated delinquent for
one count of lewdness with a minor on October 4, 2006, for an of-
fense alleged to have occurred in August 2006 when he was 17
years old. The law in place at the time of Logan’s adjudication
provided the juvenile court with discretion to require a juvenile ad-
judicated for a sexual offense to submit to adult registration and
community notification if the court determined at a hearing that the
juvenile was not rehabilitated or was likely to pose a threat to pub-
lic safety. 2005 Nev. Stat., ch. 507, § 26, at 2873-74. Pursuant to
that law, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing for September 2009
to determine whether Logan would be required to register as an
adult sex offender. Before that hearing took place, however, the
Legislature passed Assembly Bill (A.B.) 579. That bill, codified in
relevant part in NRS Chapter 62F and NRS Chapter 179D, re-
moved the juvenile court’s discretion to determine whether a ju-
venile sex offender should be subject to registration and commu-
nity notification as an adult. The new law mandated that all
juveniles aged 14 and older who are adjudicated for certain sex of-
fenses register as adult sex offenders and be subject to community
notification; the law prohibited the imposition of these require-
ments on juvenile offenders under the age of 14. NRS 62F.200;
NRS 179D.035; NRS 179D.095(1); NRS 179D.441; NRS
179D.475. On December 28, 2007, six months before A.B. 579
was to take effect, 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 485, § 57, at 2780, Logan
and approximately 20 other juveniles filed motions asking the ju-
venile court to find the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile
sex offenders. The juveniles asserted that A.B. 579 was unconsti-
tutionally vague and violated procedural and substantive due
process as well as the Contracts, Ex Post Facto, and Cruel and/or
Unusual Punishment Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.

After full briefing and several hearings, the juvenile court
entered an order declaring A.B. 579 unconstitutional as applied

a |

Pl

to juvenile sex offenders. The juvenile court concluded that the
statutory scheme violated substantive due process because it did
not bear a rational relationship to the ‘‘rehabilitation and public
safety goals of the Juvenile Court and the Department of Juvenile
Justice nor the public safety goals of the Adam Walsh Act.’’
The juvenile court determined that prohibiting registration and
community notification for high-risk juvenile sex offenders under
the age of 14 while mandating those requirements for low-risk
juvenile sex offenders over the age of 14 was irrational because
such an approach does not serve to prevent recidivism or further
rehabilitation.

The State filed an appeal from the juvenile court’s order, and the
affected juveniles, including Logan D., filed cross-appeals. This
court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. In re Logan
D., a Minor, Docket No. 51682 (Order Dismissing Appeals, Sep-
tember 5, 2008). This original petition for a writ of prohibition or,
alternatively, mandamus followed.!

DISCUSSION
Le

A writ of prohibition is available to halt proceedings occurring
in excess of a court’s jurisdiction, NRS 34.320, while a writ of
mandamus may issue to compel the performance of an act which
the law requires ‘‘as a duty resulting from an office, trust or sta-
tion,’ NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exer-
cise of discretion, see Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. New-
man, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). This court
will exercise its discretion to consider petitions for extraordinary
writs ‘‘only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law or there are either urgent circum-
stances or important legal issues that need clarification in order to
promote judicial economy and administration.” Cheung v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).

This petition raises important legal issues potentially affecting
all persons who have been adjudicated delinquent for certain sex
offenses since 1956. And because this court previously determined
that the challenged order was not substantively appealable, peti-
tioner has no other remedy at law. We therefore exercise our dis-
cretion to consider the merits of this petition.

‘In April 2010, this court approved the parties’ stipulation to stay this pro-
ceeding pending resolution of federal litigation challenging the constitutional-
ity of A.B. 579 as applied to adult sex offenders. That tigation has now been
resolved and A.B. 579 determined constitutionally sound as applied to adult of-
fenders. ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly,
we now lift the stay of this matter.

498

Background

In 2006, the United States Congress enacted the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act, which included the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-
16962 (2006). SORNA was promulgated ‘‘to protect the public
from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response
to... . vicious attacks by violent predators.’’ Id. § 16901. SORNA
mandates, in relevant part, that each state require persons con-
victed of certain sex offenses to periodically register with author-
ities and provide specified information, id. §§ 16913-16914,
maintain a statewide sex offender registry containing specific in-
formation pertaining to each registered sex offender, id.
§§ 16912 & 16914, implement a community notification program,
id. § 16921, and provide a criminal penalty for sex offenders who
fail to comply, id. § 16913. SORNA specifically defines the term
“convicted”? as including juveniles adjudicated delinquent for cer-
tain sex offenses. Jd. § 16911(8). A state’s failure to timely com-
ply with the Act’s requirements in a given fiscal year results in a
10-percent reduction of certain funds from the federal govern-
ment. Id. §§ 16924-16925,

In response to the federal legislation, Nevada passed A.B. 579,
with an effective date of July 1, 2008. 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 485,
§ 57, at 2780. Under Nevada’s version of the law, a “‘sex of-
fender’ is defined to include any person who, after July 1, 1956,
has been adjudicated delinquent for sexual assault, battery with the
intent to commit sexual assault, lewdness with a child, or an at-
tempt or conspiracy to commit any of these offenses, so long as the
offender was 14 years or older at the time of the offense. NRS
62F.200(1); NRS 179D.095(1)(b). The ‘‘term does not include an
offense involving consensual sexual conduct if the victim was at
least 13 years of age and the offender was not more than 4 years
older than the victim at the time of the commission of the offense.’
NRS 62F.200(2).

Sex offenders are required to initially register before completing
the term of imprisonment for a crime, or if not imprisoned, no
Jater than three business days after sentencing. NRS 179D.445(2).
They must provide authorities with the following information:
name, aliases, social security number, residence address, name and
address of employer, name and address of school, and description
and license plate number of all vehicles frequently driven or reg-
istered to them. NRS 179D.443(1). Any changes in name, resi-
dence, employment, or student status must be reported, in person,
within three business days. NRS 179D.447(1). Failure to comply
is a category D felony. NRS 179D.550(1).

Sex offenders are classified into three tiers; juvenile sex offend-
ers can fall into any of these categories depending on their offense
and prior history. Juveniles adjudicated for sexual assault, battery

LLC FE

with the intent to commit sexual assault, or an attempt or con-
spiracy to commit these offenses are classified as Tier III offend-
ers. See NRS 179D.117(2), (3) & (8). Juveniles can also be clas-
sified as Tier IM offenders if they are already a Tier II offender and
commit another sexual offense or crime against a child. NRS
179D.117(6). Juveniles adjudicated for lewdness with a child or at-
tempted lewdness with a child are classified as Tier I offenders.
See NRS 179D.115 (defining a Tier II offender as a person con-
victed of a crime against a child punishable by more than 1 year in
prison); see also NRS 201.230 (lewdness is a category A felony);
NRS 193.330(1)(a)(1) (attempt to commit a category A felony is
a category B felony). Tier II assignment may also be made if a ju-
venile is already a Tier I offender and any of his ‘‘sexual offenses
constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1
year”’ NRS 179D.115(4). Finally, juveniles adjudicated for con-
spiracy to commit lewdness with a child are Tier I offenders. See
NRS 179D.113; see also NRS 193.140 (gross misdemeanor pun-
ishable by not more than one year in jail); NRS 199.480(3) (con-
spiracy is a gross misdemeanor).

Each tier has different reporting requirements. Tier DI offenders
must appear in person every 90 days and allow fingerprints, palm
prints, and a photograph to be taken, and update any required in-
formation. NRS 179D.480(1)(c). Tier II offenders are required to
appear in person every 180 days, and Tier I offenders once per
year, for the same purpose. NRS 179D.480(1)(a)-(b). Tier II of-
fenders must register for life; if, however, they are Tier II of-
fenders as the result of a juvenile adjudication, they may petition
for relief from the registration requirements after a period of 25
consecutive years without a conviction for a new felony or sexual
offense, and successful completion of any probationary or parole
terms and a certified sex offender treatment program. NRS
179D.490(2)-(4). Tier II offenders must register for 25 years and
Tier I offenders for 15 years. NRS 179D.490(2)(a)-(b). Tier I of-
fenders may, however, petition for release after 10 consecutive
years if they meet the same requirements for early release as Tier
II offenders. NRS 179D.490(3)(a). There is no early release pro-
vision for Tier II offenders.

Juvenile sex offenders are subject to both active and passive
community notification. Local law enforcement agencies are re-
quired to provide registration information to (1) every school, re-
ligious and youth organization, and public housing agency in which
the sex offender is a student, worker, or resident; (2) every child
welfare agency; (3) volunteer organizations through which contact
with vulnerable persons or children may occur; and (4) if the sex
offender is classified as a Tier III offender, members of the public
likely to encounter the sex offender. NRS 179D.475(2). Further,
any person, company, or organization may request registration in-

Poo

0

formation from the Central Repository for Nevada Records of
Criminal History. NRS 179D.475(1)().

Juvenile sex offenders’ information is also available via Nevada’s
community notification website. NRS 179B.250. Any member of
the public may perform a search by name, alias, or zip code, yield-
ing the following information about registered sex offenders: name
and aliases; physical description; current photograph; year of birth;
residence, school, and employer address; license plate number
and description of any vehicle owned or operated by the sex of-
fender; name of, and citation to, the specific statute violated;
court convicted in; name convicted under; name and location of
every penal institution, hospital, school, mental facility, or other
institution committed to; location of offense committed; and as-
signed tier level. NRS 179B.250(6)(c). The website does not con-
vey information regarding Tier I offenders unless they have been
convicted of a sexual offense against a child or a crime against a
child. NRS 179B.250(7)(b). It also does not reveal an offender’s
social security number, the name of an offender’s school or em-
ployer, arrests not resulting in conviction, and any other registra-
tion information not expressly required to be disclosed by para-
graph (6)(c) or exempted from disclosure pursuant to federal law.
NRS 179B.250(7)(c)-(g).

The public is prohibited from using information obtained from
the community notification website, except as allowed by statute,
“for any purpose related to”’ insurance; loans; credit; employment;
education, scholarships, or fellowships; housing or accommoda-
tions; or benefits, privileges, or services from any business. NRS
179B.270. Neither may registration information ‘‘be used to un-
Jawfully injure, harass or commit a crime against any person
named in the registry or residing or working at any reported ad-
dress.’ NRS 179B.250(2)(e). Misuse of information obtained from
the website can result in civil and criminal penalties. NRS
179B.280; NRS 179B.285.

The juvenile court’s holding

The juvenile court declared A.B, 579 unconstitutional as applied
to juvenile sex offenders, concluding that the bill violated sub-
stantive due process because it neither bore a rational relationship
to the public safety goals of the bill nor furthered the rehabilitation
and public safety goals of the juvenile justice system.” The juvenile

*The juvenile court rejected Logan’s contention that the bill should be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny, finding that it did not impinge upon any funda-
mental right or affect any suspect class. The juvenile court further rejected
Logan’s assertion that the bill violated the Contracts, Ex Post Facto, and Cruel
and/or Unusual Punishment Clauses of the United States and Nevada Consti-
tutions, as well as his contention that the bill violated his right to procedural
due process and was unconstitutionally vague.

501

court’s primary concern with the bill was that it required commu-
nity notification for all juvenile sex offenders over the age of 14
and adjudicated for certain offenses, regardless of their risk to re-
offend, but did not allow community notification for those offend-
ers under the age of 14, even those who represent a high risk to re-
offend. We share the juvenile court’s concerns regarding the
wisdom of this legislation. Nevertheless, we are bound to follow
the law, and A.B, 579, as applied to juveniles, easily passes ra-
tional basis review.

P|

The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law that
this court reviews de novo. State v. Hughes, 127 Nev. 626, 628,
261 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2011). Statutes are cloaked with a pre-
sumption of validity and the burden is on the challenger to demon-
Strate that a statute is unconstitutional. Jd. When undertaking a
substantive due process analysis, a statute that does not infringe
upon a fundamental right will be upheld if it is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. Bowers v. Whitman, 671 F.3d
905, 916-17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 163 (2012); see
also Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 372, 998 P.2d 166, 174
(2000). The Legislature need not articulate its purpose in enacting
a statute; the statute will be upheld if any set of facts can reason-
ably be conceived of to justify it. FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); Sereika v. State, 114 Nev. 142,
149, 955 P.2d 175, 179 (1998). A legislative choice ‘‘may be
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empiri-
cal data”? FCC, 508 U.S. at 315. And the Legislature enjoys
broad discretion to make reasonable distinctions when enacting
legislation. Allen v. State, Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 100 Nev. 130,
136-37, 676 P.2d 792, 796 (1984).

Lr

In line with the stated purpose of its federal counterpart, the
Nevada Legislature could have determined that the enactment
of A.B. 579 was required to protect the public from sex offenders,
unquestionably a legitimate government interest. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 16901 (2006) (stating that the purpose of the act was ‘‘to protect
the public from sex offenders and offenders against children’);
Nollette v. State, 118 Nev. 341, 346, 46 P.3d 87, 90-91 (2002)
(concluding that the purpose of Nevada’s previous version of sex
offender registration and community notification laws was to aid
law enforcement in solving crimes and to protect the public). To
this end, the Legislature could have determined that juveniles ad-
judicated for the enumerated offenses, which represent the most se-
rious of sexual offenses, are at a higher risk to reoffend—and thus
pose a greater danger to the public—than juveniles adjudicated for
other, less serious offenses. See Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058,

rs

1075 (Del. 2001). And consistent with the Legislature’s presump-
tion since 1911 that children aged 14 and older know the wrong-
fulness of their actions, see NRS 194.010(1)-(2) (unchanged since
enactment in 1911, see Nev. Rev. Laws § 6268 (1912)), it could
have also concluded that once a child reaches the age of 14, he or
she commits a sex offense with knowledge that it is wrong and
therefore poses a greater risk to the public than a younger child
who commits the same offense. Given these possible justifications
for the distinctions drawn in the legislation, we conclude that the
juvenile court erred by concluding that A.B. 579 did not survive
rational basis review. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d
999, 1009-10 (9th Cir.) (application of SORNA to juvenile sex of-
fenders satisfies rational basis review), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
234 (2012); In re J.R., 793 N.E.2d 687, 694-96 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) (registration and limited community notification as applied
to juvenile sex offenders survive rational basis review); In re Ron-
nie A., 585 S.E.2d 311, 312 (S.C. 2003) (registration of juvenile
sex offenders is rationally related to goal of public protection); In
re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000). But see In re
WZ., 957 N.E.2d 367, 377 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (no rational
basis for automatic registration of juvenile sex offenders at time of
adjudication where, pursuant to state law, court made a determi-
nation as to rehabilitation when juvenile turned 21).

Of utmost concern, it does not appear from the legislative his-
tory that the Nevada Legislature ever considered the impact of this
bill on juveniles or public safety. The body’s motivation for pass-
ing the bill appears to be compliance with the Walsh Act and
avoidance of the reduction in grant monies that would come with
noncompliance. See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 579 Before the As-
sembly Select Comm. on Corrections, Parole, and Probation, 74th
Leg. (Nev., April 10, 2007). Under rational basis review, however,
we ‘‘are not limited to consideration of the justifications actually
asserted by the legislature,’ Sereika, 114 Nev. at 149, 955 P.2d at
179; so long as plausible reasons for an action exist, it is ‘‘consti-
tutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the leg-
islative decision,’ U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Allen, 100
Nev. at 134, 676 P.2d at 795 (‘‘The existence of facts which
would support the legislative judgment is presumed.”’), And “‘[tJhis
is particularly true where the legislature must necessarily engage in
a process of line-drawing.”’ Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179.

Our inquiry does not end, however, with our conclusion that the
juvenile court erred by holding that A.B. 579 did not withstand ra-
tional basis review. If this court determines that the statutory
scheme is unconstitutional for any other reason presented to the ju-
venile court, we will nevertheless uphold the order declaring the

Pc lll
legislation unconstitutional. Cf. Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298,
468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (‘‘If a judgment or order of a trial court
reaches the right result, although it is based on an incorrect

ground, the judgment or order will be affirmed on appeal.’’). We
therefore examine Logan’s other constitutional challenges.

Substantive due process

| |

Logan contends that the community notification provisions of
A.B. 579 impinge on juveniles’ fundamental right to privacy and
are therefore subject to strict scrutiny review. We disagree.

The substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution recognizes certain ‘‘fundamental rights”’
upon which the government’s ability to intrude is sharply limited.
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976). A sub-
stantive due process analysis begins ‘‘with a careful description of
the asserted right.’ Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). If
the asserted right is ‘‘deeply rooted’’ in tradition and history and
so ‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’’ that “‘neither lib-
erty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed,’ the asserted
tight is a fundamental one. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), overruled on other
grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). A
Statute that infringes on a fundamental right is subject to strict
scrutiny and will be invalidated unless it is ‘‘narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.’’ In re Parental Rights as to
D.R.H., 120 Nev. 422, 427, 92 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the statute does not abridge a funda-
mental right, it is reviewed under the rational basis test and will be
upheld so long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
State interest. See Allen, 100 Nev. at 134, 676 P.2d at 794-95.

Logan contends that ‘‘[aJn individual’s right to privacy is clearly
impacted by community notification.”’ Besides this vague reference
to the right of privacy, he fails to identify the precise right asserted.
Because Logan challenges the community notification provisions of
A.B, 579, we conclude that his claim is appropriately stated as the
right to have records of juvenile adjudications for sex offenses kept
confidential. We further conclude that this is not a fundamental
right protected by the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, see U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1, or the due process clause of the Nevada Con-
stitution, see Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(5).

The Supreme Court has identified fundamental rights as includ-
ing ‘‘the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education

EE

and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use con-
traception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion”’ Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720 (internal citations omitted). Also included may be the
right to ‘‘refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.’ Id. This
court has consistently relied upon the Supreme Court’s holdings in-
terpreting the federal Due Process Clause to define the fundamen-
tal liberties protected under Nevada’s due process clause. See,
e.g., Arata v. Faubion, 123 Nev. 153, 158-59, 161 P.3d 244, 248-
49 (2007); Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 119 Nev. 66,
Ti, 64 P.3d 1056, 1059-60 (2003).

We conclude that Logan’s asserted right, while unquestionably
important, does not come within the ambit of the type of rights
deemed fundamental by the Supreme Court. Other courts have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2007); Juvenile Male,
670 F.3d at 1012-13; In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 757 (Ill. 2003);
Helman, 784 A.2d at 1073-74 (rejecting juvenile sex offender’s
contention that community notification violated his right to pri-
vacy); In re Jeremy P., 692 N.W.2d 311, 319-20 (Wis. Ct. App.
2004); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (cautioning that the
Supreme Court has ‘‘always been reluctant to expand the concept
of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible de-
cisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)). But see State v. Bani, 36 P.3d
1255, 1264-66 (Haw. 2001).

Neither is the right to the confidentiality of juvenile sex offender
records so ‘‘deeply rooted’’ in Nevada’s history as to render con-
fidentiality a fundamental right under our state constitution. Juve-
nile delinquency records have historically enjoyed general confi-
dentiality in this state. See, e.g., NRS 62H.030(2) (records of
juvenile offenders can generally be opened to the public only
through court order to those persons with a legitimate interest in
the records); NRS 62H.130 (most juvenile delinquents adjudicated
for nonsexual offenses may move to seal their records three years
after an adjudication, if they remain trouble-free).

Records of juvenile sex offenders, however, have enjoyed less
protection than records of other delinquents. Persons subject to ju-
venile community notification, or adult community notification
pursuant to delinquency adjudications, were not eligible to seal
their delinquency records. 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 206, § 192, at
1082. Most significantly, from 1997 until the effective date of A.B.
579 in 2008, juvenile sex offenders were subject to juvenile com-
munity notification, 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 451, § 90.8, at 1675 (re-
pealed by A.B. 579), which entailed almost the identical commu-
nity notification provisions as the adult version, compare Office of
the Nev. Attorney Gen., Nevada’s Guidelines and Procedures for
Community Notification of Juvenile Sex Offenders, § 8.10, at 10

505

(Rev. Feb. 2006) [hereinafter Juvenile Community Notification
Guidelines], with Office of the Nev. Attorney Gen., Nevada’s
Guidelines and Procedures for Community Notification of Adult
Sex Offenders, § 8.10, at 12 (Rev. Feb. 2006). Juvenile community
notification included distribution of a juvenile sex offender’s pho-
tograph, a description of his person, his name and aliases, a gen-
eral location of his residence and workplace, and a description and
Jicense number of all vehicles he owned or regularly operated. Ju-
venile Community Notification Guidelines, supra, § 8.10(2). If
designated as a Tier II offender, law enforcement was required to
provide this information to any camps, school districts, youth or-
ganizations, day care centers, and other religious or community or-
ganizations deemed reasonably likely to encounter the juvenile. Id.
§ 8.00(3). In addition, if a Tier II juvenile offender was adjudi-
cated for a sexual offense against a person under 18 years of age—
as it appears many juvenile sex offenders were—law enforcement
was also required to notify movie theaters and businesses catering
primarily to children and that were reasonably likely to encounter
the juvenile offender. Jd. Records of Tier II juvenile sex offend-
ers were even more broadly publicized; law enforcement was re-
quired to notify, in addition to the notification required for Tier I
offenders, any members of the community that were reasonably
likely to encounter the juvenile sex offenders and who, in law en-
forcement’s discretion, were appropriate persons to receive notifi-
cation.? Jd. § 8.00(4). And the juvenile court was vested with the
discretion to require juvenile sex offenders to register as adult sex
offenders and submit to adult community notification. 2005 Nev.
Stat., ch. 507, § 26, at 2873-74. Accordingly, no deeply rooted
right to the confidentiality of juvenile sex offender records exists in
Nevada.

We conclude that Logan fails to demonstrate that A.B. 579 im-
plicates a fundamental right. The bill is therefore reviewed under
the rational basis test, which, as discussed above, it passes.
Logan’s contention that A.B. 579, as applied to juveniles, violates
substantive due process lacks merit.*

*For Tier I offenders, the information was disseminated only to law
enforcement agencies. Juvenile Community Notification Guidelines, supra,
§ 8.00(2).

“We also reject Logan’s assertion that placing juvenile sex offenders “in the
same category as adult sex offenders” violates his right to equal protection.
Neither age nor classification as a sex offender constitutes a suspect classifi-
cation for purposes of an equal protection analysis. See Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991); Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009; Doe v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Moore, 410
E3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018,
1030 (9th Cir. 2001); In re M.A.H., 20 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. App. 2000)
(declining to apply strict scrutiny where neither juveniles nor sex offenders
constituted a suspect class); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1077 (Wash. 1994);

506

Procedural due process

P|

Logan contends that A.B. 579 denies him procedural due
process because it deprives him of a protected privacy interest
without procedural protections. We disagree. A.B. 579 imposes
registration and community notification requirements on all juve-
niles age 14 and older who are adjudicated for certain crimes; no
additional facts are relevant to the statutory scheme. Even assum-
ing A.B. 579 infringes on a liberty interest, Logan is not entitled
to procedural due process to prove a fact that is irrelevant under
the statute. See Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538
U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (‘‘[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that respondent
has been deprived of a liberty interest, due process does not enti-
tle him to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under
the . . . statute”’). But see State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 251-52
(Haw. 2004) (concluding that due process clause of state constitu-
tion required a hearing to determine risk of future dangerousness
because, although statute required imposition of registration on all
sex offenders, future dangerousness was relevant to the statutory
scheme because its purpose was to protect the public); In re W.Z.,
957 N.E.2d 367, 377-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that
fundamental fairness requires a hearing to determine whether a ju-
venile sex offender has been rehabilitated before he may be sub-
jected to registration and community notification where statute
was based solely on the offense committed).

Vagueness

P|

Logan contends that the statutory scheme is unconstitutionally
vague because it grants the juvenile court continuing jurisdiction
over juvenile sex offenders and defines them as children for 25
years to a lifetime. He points out that a ‘‘child’’ is defined as
a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as
a juvenile sex offender pursuant to NRS 62F.200-.260. NRS
62A.030(1)(c). However, the juvenile court cannot end its juris-
diction over a child for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of NRS 62F.200-.260 until the child is no longer subject to regis-
tration and community notification as a juvenile sex offender, see
NRS 62F.220(2), and there is no provision allowing the juvenile
court to relieve a child of registration and community notification.
Logan contends that this statutory framework raises many ques-
tions relating to the scope of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
which court has jurisdiction over violations of the registration

State v. Linssen, 126 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). Thus, A.B. 579
is subject only to rational basis review. As discussed above, A.B. 579 with-
stands rational basis review.

CE

statute and the supervision of parole and probation, and the rami-
fications of being defined as a child for a lifetime. This vagueness
argument was not made to the juvenile court in Logan’s motion to
declare A.B. 579 unconstitutional.* See McKay v. City of Las
Vegas, 106 Nev. 203, 207, 789 P.2d 584, 586 (1990) (declining to
consider issue not litigated before or ruled upon by the district
court), overruled on other grounds by Salaiscooper v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 892, 34 P.3d 509 (2001). Neverthe-
less, we exercise our discretion to address this issue.

a

A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it is ‘‘‘so standardless
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforce-
ment.’’’ Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612, 262 P.3d 1123, 1125
(2011) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304
(2008)). To survive a vagueness challenge, a “‘law must . . . pro-
vide explicit standards for those who apply them’’ and give per-
sons ‘‘of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited.”’ In re T.R., 119 Nev. 646, 653, 80 P.3d 1276,
1280-81 (2003) (internal citation omitted). The burden to demon-
strate a statute’s unconstitutionality rests on the challenger. Ford,
127 Nev. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1126.

We conclude that Logan fails to demonstrate that A.B. 579 is
unconstitutionally vague. NRS 62F.220(2) does appear, as Logan
asserts, to give the juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over ju-
venile sex offenders.® The plain language of the statute, however,
limits the purpose of the continuing jurisdiction to ‘‘carrying out
the provisions of’’ NRS 62F.200-.260. These statutes provide, re-
spectively, the definition of a sexual offense; the juvenile court’s
duty to inform the Central Repository, the child, and the child’s
parent or guardian that a juvenile sex offender is subject to regis-
tration and community notification; and that the juvenile court may
not seal a juvenile sex offender’s records so long as he or she is
subject to registration and community notification. Read in con-
junction with NRS 62F.200-.260, NRS 62F.220(2) provides the

SLogan made a vagueness argument to the juvenile court relying upon the
same statutory provisions, but contended that the statutory scheme was vague
because it failed to clarify which governmental entity had jurisdiction to en-
force lifetime supervision and the restrictions imposed by Senate Bill 471,
which was passed during the 2007 legislative session.

‘This conclusion does not conflict with this court’s recent statement in State
v. Barren, 128 Nev. 337, 344, 279 P.3d 182, 187 (2012), that the ‘juvenile
court’s jurisdiction [is limited] to persons less than 21 years of age.’ Barren
dealt with the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate juveniles pursuant to
the general rule of NRS 62B.410, while the portions of the statutes at issue
here deal with the juvenile court’s limited continuing jurisdiction to engage in
administrative functions relating to registration and community notification
pursuant to the exception in NRS 62B.410.

508

juvenile court with continuing jurisdiction over juvenile sex of-
fenders only so that it may provide information to the Central
Repository and parents or guardians of juvenile sex offenders, and
to keep records from being sealed. Accordingly, Logan fails to
demonstrate that NRS 62F.220(2) determines which court has ju-
risdiction over a violation of the registration requirements of Chap-
ter 179D, see NRS 179D.550 (providing a criminal penalty for any
sex offender who fails to comply with the provisions of NRS
Chapter 179D), or affects the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over
delinquents who are on juvenile parole or probation.

Logan also points out that, pursuant to NRS 62A.030(1)(c)—
defining a ‘‘child’’—a juvenile sex offender could be defined as a
child for a lifetime. Although he complains that being defined as
a child for a lifetime may have some impact on individuals in the
“sunset years of their lives,’ he does not identify any vagueness in
the statute itself. Therefore, we conclude that Logan fails to
demonstrate any constitutional infirmity in this regard.

Statutory conflict

| eel

Next, Logan points to an alleged conflict between A.B. 579 and.
the existing statutory scheme, asserts that the rule of lenity should
apply, and contends that A.B. 579 should therefore be interpreted
to mean that registration and community notification are not ap-
plicable to juvenile sex offenders. Specifically, NRS 169.025(2)
provides that NRS Title 14, which includes NRS Chapters 169
through 189, does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
A.B, 579, however, requires that juveniles adjudicated of sex of-
fenses submit to registration and community notification pursuant
to NRS 179D.010-.550. Despite Logan’s failure to present this ar-
gument to the juvenile court, we elect to address it. We conclude
that this contention lacks merit because the cited statutory provi-
sions can be read in harmony; when so read, registration and
community notification do apply to juveniles and the rule of lenity
does not apply.

Le

When two statutory provisions conflict, this court employs the
rules of statutory construction, Williams v. Clark Cnty. Dist. At-
torney, 118 Nev. 473, 484, 50 P.3d 536, 543 (2002), and at-
tempts to harmonize conflicting provisions so that the act as a
whole is given effect, In re Eric L., 123 Nev. 26, 31, 153 P.3d 32,
35 (2007). Statutes are interpreted so that each part has meaning.
Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007).
Therefore, when a scheme contains a general prohibition contra-
dicted by a specific permission, ‘‘the specific provision is con-

strued as an exception to the general one.’ RadLAX Gateway
Hotel, L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071
(2012).

Here, NRS 169.025(2) is a general prohibition, preventing ap-
plication of Title 14, including Chapter 179D, to juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. On the other hand, NRS Chapter 179D con-
tains specific provisions mandating its application to certain
juveniles adjudicated delinquent—NRS 179D.035 defines ‘‘con-
victed’’ to include certain delinquency adjudications and NRS
179D.095 defines ‘‘sex offender’’ to include certain juveniles ad-
judicated delinquent. The rules of statutory construction dictate
that the specific provisions of NRS Chapter 179D be construed as
exceptions to the general prohibition of NRS 169.025(2). See also
A Minor v. Juvenile Dep’t, 96 Nev. 485, 611 P.2d 624 (1980)
(NRS 169.025(2) does not forbid application of rules of criminal
procedure to juvenile proceedings). So read, the provisions are in
harmony and none are rendered meaningless. And because they
can be read in harmony, the rule of lenity does not apply. State v.
Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 99, 249 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2011) (the rule of
lenity applies only when the other rules of statutory interpretation
fail).

Conflict with purpose of juvenile justice system

Le

Logan asserts that registration and community notification and
the resulting stigmatization of juveniles conflicts with the tradi-
tional goals of the juvenile justice system. We recognize that com-
munity notification can have lasting stigmatic effects on juvenile
offenders. Logan’s argument, however, relies upon an erroneous
factual assumption.

From their beginnings in 1899 in Illinois, juvenile courts fo-
cused only on the best interest of the child, treating delinquents not
as criminals, ‘but as misdirected, and misguided and needing
aid, encouragement and assistance.’’ In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev.
427, 431-32, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted), disapproved on other grounds as stated in In re William
S., 122 Nev, 432, 442 n.23, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 n.23 (2006). But
in 1949, Nevada’s Legislature broadened this focus by requiring
Nevada’s juvenile courts to consider the public interest (including
public protection) as well as the best interest of the child. See id.
at 431-33, 664 P.2d at 950-51. Since then, we have specifically
noted that public protection and the best interest of the child some-
times conflict, and concluded that when they do, it is the public in-
terest that should predominate. Id. at 433, 664 P.2d at 951. Thus,
while the interest of the juvenile offender remains one of the cen-
tral concerns of the juvenile system, it is no longer the only, or pri-

0

mary concern. Accordingly, based on Nevada’s long-standing
recognition of public protection as one of the dual interests of the
juvenile system, we conclude that registration and community no-
tification do not inherently conflict with the purposes of Nevada’s
juvenile justice system.

Other courts have reached analogous conclusions. For example,
the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that, given the recent ex-
pansion in the purpose of the juvenile court to include public pro-
tection and juvenile accountability, requiring juvenile sex offenders
to register for life and subjecting them to limited community no-
tification was not at odds with the policy and purpose of its juve-
nile system. In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 759 (Ill. 2003); see also
Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1008 (although SORNA’s notification
requirement conflicted with the confidentiality provisions of the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, Congress clearly intended to
limit those confidentiality provisions); In re Richard A., 946 A.2d
204, 212 (R.I. 2008) (noting that the confidentiality generally af-
forded juveniles is not absolute and must sometimes give way to
other legitimate public policies). But see In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d
367, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (community notification ‘‘ob-
scures the foundational principles upon which the juvenile justice
system was built’’).

Ex post facto

| |

Logan contends that retroactive application of A.B. 579 to ju-
venile sex offenders violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
United States and Nevada Constitutions. We conclude that Logan
fails to demonstrate that retroactive application of the legislation is
unconstitutional.

Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the passage of ex
post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 15.
This prohibition forbids the passage of laws that impose punish-
ments for acts that were not punishable at the time they were com-
mitted or impose punishments in addition to those prescribed at the
time of the offense. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981).
Accordingly, to be ex post facto, a law must both operate retro-
spectively and disadvantage the person affected by it by either
changing the definition of criminal conduct or imposing additional
punishment for such conduct. Id.

P|
For purposes of ex post facto analysis, a retrospective law is one
that ‘“‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its

S11

effective date.” Id. at 31. A.B. 579 clearly operates retrospectively
because it imposes consequences for conduct occurring before its
effective date. See NRS 179D.095(1)(b) (defining a ‘‘sex of-
fender”’ as a person who has been adjudicated for a sex offense
after July 1, 1956). A.B. 579 does not alter the definition of any
crime, or, in this case, delinquent act. Therefore, whether the bill
is an ex post facto law hinges on whether it imposes an additional
punishment for a past delinquent act.

P|

A two-part test is utilized to determine whether a given statute
imposes a punishment. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92
(2003). First, we must determine legislative intent. See id. If the
intent was to impose a punishment, the statute is a punishment. See
id. If, however, the intention of the Legislature was to create a
civil, nonpunitive regulatory scheme, we must determine whether
the statutory scheme is ‘‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Jd. (internal quo-
tation marks and brackets omitted).

Legislative intent

Logan baldly states that the legislative intent behind A.B. 579
was punitive, but does not support this assertion with any cogent
argument or citation to authority or legislative history. The intent
of Nevada’s prior version of the sex offender registration and com-
munity notification scheme was to create a civil regulatory scheme.
Nollette v. State, 118 Nev. 341, 346, 46 P.3d 87, 91 (2002). And
the legislative history indicates that the only intent behind the cur-
rent version of the scheme was compliance with SORNA in order
to avoid the loss of federal funds. As such, Logan has failed to
demonstrate that the Legislature intended A.B. 579 to be anything
other than a civil regulatory scheme. Therefore, we must proceed
to consider whether the effects of A.B. 579 are so punitive in “‘ef-
fect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.’ Smith, 538
U.S. at 92 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Effect of A.B. 579
P|

Seven factors are considered when analyzing the effects of chal-
Jenged provisions: whether the statutory scheme (1) has tradition-
ally been regarded as punishment, (2) imposes an affirmative
disability or restraint, (3) promotes the traditional goals of pun-
ishment, (4) is rationally related to a nonpunitive purpose, (5) is
excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose, (6) applies only
upon a finding of scienter, and (7) applies to behavior that is al-
ready a crime. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 97-106 (applying Mendoza-

512

Martinez factors to determine effect of state sex offender regi-
stration scheme); Palmer v. State, 118 Nev. 823, 829, 59 P.3d
1192, 1196 (2002); Nollette, 118 Nev. at 346-47, 46 P.3d at 91.
Because the Legislature’s intent is given deference, ‘‘only the
clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and trans-
form what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty’’ Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted);
Desimone v. State, 116 Nev. 195, 199-205, 996 P.2d 405, 407-11
(2000) (applying the ‘‘clearest proof’ test to determine whether
tax was punitive in effect despite contrary legislative intent); State
vy. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, 317-18, 955 P.2d 678, 680-81 (1998)
(applying the ‘‘clearest proof’’ standard in determining whether
driver’s license revocation is so punitive in effect as to override
legislative intent).

The seminal case applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to sex
offender registration and notification laws is Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84 (2003). The legislation at issue there imposed retroactive
registration requirements and community notification provisions on
convicted sex offenders. Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. It required of-
fenders to register with local authorities, provide certain personal
information, and allow the authorities to fingerprint and photo-
graph them. Jd. Depending on the number of prior convictions and
nature of the current offense, offenders were required to update
their registration information either annually for a period of 15
years, or quarterly for life. Jd. Noncompliance subjected offenders
to criminal prosecution. Jd. A sex offender’s name, aliases, date of
birth, physical description, photograph, address, place of employ-
ment, motor vehicle license and identification numbers, crime
convicted of, date, place, court of conviction, and other informa-
tion were made available to the public on the Internet. Id. at 91.
The majority in Smith concluded that the effects of the challenged
legislation did not negate the legislature’s intent to establish a
civil regulatory scheme. Id. at 105-06.

Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to A.B. 579, we con-
clude that Logan has failed to demonstrate, by the clearest proof,
that its effect negates the Legislature’s intent to create a civil reg-
ulatory scheme. An analysis of each factor follows.

Historical form of punishment
The first factor is whether registration and community notifica-
tion have historically been regarded as punishments. Id. at 97.
Logan asserts that registration and community notification are
analogous to the historical punishments of branding and placing
criminals in stocks. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
exact argument as applied to adult offenders in Smith, concluding

ee :

that, unlike historical punishments, publicity and stigma are not
“‘an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.’’ 538
U.S. at 99. And Logan does not distinguish Smith’s holding in this
regard as applied to juveniles.”

Logan also points to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Juvenile Male, 581 F.3d 977, 989 (9th Cir. 2009),
wherein the court concluded that publication of a juvenile’s delin-
quency adjudication was a historical form of punishment because
information about juvenile offenses was historically only publicized
after a juvenile was transferred to adult court for punitive pur-
poses. The opinion in Juvenile Male has since been vacated.
United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932 (2011). Further, the
factual basis for the reasoning in Juvenile Male does not exist in
Nevada; as discussed above, juvenile sex offender records had
been subject to community notification for over a decade before
A.B. 579, even when cases had not been transferred to adult
court.

Finally, we note that registration and community notification re-
quirements are of recent origin and cannot be considered a histor-
ical form of punishment. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. We conclude
this factor therefore weighs in favor of the conclusion that A.B, 579
is not a punishment.

Affirmative disability or restraint

Next, we consider whether A.B. 579 imposes an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. When inquiring into
this factor, we examine the legislation’s effect on those subject to
it. Id. at 99-100.

Logan contends that the registration requirement imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint because it requires offenders
to physically appear several times per year to register. This
contention is foreclosed by our decision in Nollette, where we
implicitly rejected this contention by concluding that the earlier
version of Nevada’s registration and community notification pro-
visions ‘‘do[es] not place an affirmative disability or restraint on
the sex offender’’ Noilette, 118 Nev. at 346, 46 P.3d at 91. The
provisions under consideration in Nollette, like those challenged
here, also required sex offenders to periodically appear in person
to update their registration information. Id. at 345, 46 P.3d at 90.
And to the extent Logan relies on Smith for the proposition that an

7To the extent Logan asserts that the juvenile court’s continued jurisdiction
over juvenile sex offenders constitutes a historical form of punishment because
it is analogous to lifetime supervision, we conclude this assertion lacks merit.
Cf. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101-02.

in-person registration requirement imposes an affirmative disabil-
ity or restraint, that reliance is misplaced because the Supreme
Court merely noted the lower court’s erroneous determination that
the challenged statute contained an in-person registration require-
ment and did not decide whether such a requirement constituted an
affirmative disability. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101; see ACLU of Nev. v.
Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2012) (the Supreme Court’s
resolution of a factual error in Smith was not a holding that the in-
person registration requirement was an affirmative disability).

Logan also asserts that the holdings of Smith and Nollette—
which are based in part on the fact that convictions are a matter of
public record—cannot be applied to juvenile offenders whose
records of adjudication are not matters of public record. Although
the question is close, we disagree for two reasons.

First, juvenile sex offender records were available to the public
prior to A.B. 579. As previously discussed, law enforcement was
required to disclose some records to certain members of the pub-
lic via juvenile community notification. And the juvenile court was
empowered to allow inspection of unsealed records by any person
with ‘‘a legitimate interest in the records.” NRS 62H.030(2); NRS
62H.170(1). Thus, juvenile sex offender records were available to
the public, albeit in limited circumstances, prior to A.B. 579. See
United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 856 (11th Cir. 2011) (re-
jecting juvenile’s attempt to distinguish Smith based on the fact that
juvenile records are not a matter of public record where juvenile
court had discretion to permit inspection of the records), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012).

Second, A.B. 579 itself does not impose an affirmative disabil-
ity or restraint on juvenile sex offenders. We are fully aware that
to the extent juvenile sex offender records were not previously ac-
cessible to the public, some negative consequences to juveniles al-
most certainly result from A.B. 579’s community notification pro-
visions. Nevertheless, the notification provisions themselves do
not impose any negative consequences; those consequences result
indirectly from the public’s response to knowledge of the adjudi-
cation. See WB.H., 664 F.3d at 856 & 857 n.5 (any negative con-
sequences resulting from community notification are ‘‘collateral
consequence[s] of a legitimate regulation’’ (citing Smith, 538 U.S.
at 99)). But see State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410, 418 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999) (finding that subjecting juvenile sex offenders to
registration and community notification imposed an affirma-
tive disability or restraint in part because it exposed previously
confidential adjudication records to public). And because the statu-
tory scheme expressly prohibits the use of information obtained
from the community notification website to discriminate, imposi-
tion of such disabilities by the community is also illegal. See

NRS_ 179B.250(2)(e); NRS 179B.270; NRS 179B.280; NRS
179B.285; NRS 179B.290. We conclude that A.B. 579 does not
impose an affirmative disability or restraint on juvenile sex of-
fenders and this factor weighs in favor of a finding that the statu-
tory scheme does not impose a punishment.

Traditional aims of punishment

Next, this court must consider whether registration and com-
munity notification promote the traditional aims of punishment.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Logan points out that in Nollette, this court
acknowledged the possibility that registration could have a deter-
rent effect but determined that, ‘‘without more,” that possibility
did not render the statute punitive. See Nollette, 118 Nev. at 347,
46 P.3d at 91. Something ‘‘more’’ is present, he asserts, when the
statutes are applied to juveniles.

First, Logan asserts that A.B. 579 is punitive in effect as applied
to juveniles because juvenile offenders are assigned to a tier based
on the offense committed rather than their individual risk to re-
offend. The Smith Court rejected the argument that the Alaska
statute was excessive because it applied to all offenders regardless
of risk of recidivism. 538 U.S at 104. The Supreme Court also re-
jected the argument that the statutory scheme was retributive be-
cause it based the length of the registration period on an offender’s
crime rather than on his risk of recidivism, concluding that the use
of broad categories to determine the length of the registration pe-
tiod was ‘‘consistent with the regulatory objective”’ Id. at 102.
Like the scheme at issue in Smith, we conclude that Nevada’s
scheme of offense-based tiering is consistent with the statute’s
goal of protecting the public from recidivist juveniles; it is rea-
sonable to conclude that juvenile offenders who have committed
the most severe offenses pose the greatest risk to the public.®

Second, Logan notes that offenders are subject to prosecution
for failure to comply with the registration requirements. He does
not explain how this fact serves a traditional aim of punishment.
The Smith Court considered the criminal penalty in regard to
whether the Alaska scheme imposed an affirmative disability or re-

sWhether risk-based tiering would be a more effective means of protect-
ing the public is beyond the scope of an ex post facto analysis. See infra at
515-16.

°Relatedly, Logan implies that the statute is retributive because it requires
all sex offenders who have been convicted of a crime against a child under the
age of 18, which includes nearly all juvenile sex offenders, to register. We de-
cline to consider this assertion because it is not supported by any cogent ar-
gument. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). For
the same reason, we decline to consider his assertion that imposition of adult
registration and community notification is punitive because the restraint on his
liberty “‘is increased from a period of approximately 3 years to a lifetime.” See
also Smith, 538 U.S. at 104.

A

straint and rejected the contention, concluding that any prosecution
resulting from failure to comply with reporting requirements was
separate from the original offense. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101-02.
Logan does not acknowledge this holding in Smith or attempt
to distinguish it as applied to juvenile offenders."° We conclude that
Logan fails to demonstrate that A.B. 579 promotes a traditional
aim of punishment as applied to juvenile sex offenders and this
factor therefore weighs in favor of a finding that the bill is not
punitive.

Rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose

The next factor is whether A.B. 579 is rationally related to a
nonpunitive purpose. Logan asserts that the statutory scheme
“‘cannot be reconciled with any legitimate public purpose’’ and is
irrational because it is not the most cost-effective means to protect
the public. We disagree.

Subjecting juvenile sex offenders to registration and community
notification has the legitimate, nonpunitive purpose of protecting
the public. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)
(public protection is a legitimate regulatory purpose). This purpose
is furthered by notifying the community of the presence of juvenile
sex offenders so that it may take any protective, nondiscriminatory
actions deemed necessary. See Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1010-11
(registration and community notification of juvenile sex offenders
satisfies rational basis review); W.B.H., 664 F.3d at 859; see also
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1015 (Alaska 2008) (considering
statutes as applied to adult offenders); accord Helman y. State, 784
A.2d 1058, 1075 (Del. 2001). And the fact that the chosen method.
is not the most cost-effective does not render it irrational. See
Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (‘‘A statute is not deemed punitive simply
because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aim it
seeks to advance.’’).

Because the Smith Court stated that a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose ‘‘is a [mlost significant”’ factor, id. at 102 (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), this factor
weighs heavily in favor of a finding that the effect of the challenged
legislation is not punitive.

Excessiveness

The fifth factor to consider is whether A.B. 579 is excessive in
relation to its nonpunitive purpose. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The

‘This court also implicitly rejected this argument in Nollette. The statutory
scheme under review there provided that noncompliance with the registration
provisions constituted a felony offense. Nollette, 118 Nev. at 345, 46 P.3d at
90. The court did not specifically discuss that provision, but did not conclude
that the statutory scheme served a traditional aim of punishment or weighed in
favor of a finding that the scheme was punitive. Id. at 346-47, 46 P.3d at 91.

inquiry into whether a statutory scheme is excessive in relation to
its regulatory purpose ‘‘is not an exercise in determining whether
the legislature has made the best choice possible to address the
problem it seeks to remedy. The question is whether the regulatory
means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.’
Id. at 105.

Logan contends that A.B. 579 is excessive in relation to its
stated purpose because it does not take into consideration juve-
niles’ low recidivism rates and is not cost-effective."'

Recidivism

Logan cites to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Smith that the
Alaska statutory scheme was not excessive because the legislature
could have reasonably concluded that sex offenders posed a
substantial risk to reoffend. Logan then points to research indicat-
ing that the rate of recidivism for juvenile sex offenders is low.
According to the literature cited by Logan, juvenile sex offenders
are highly amenable to treatment and have low rates of recidivism.
See Justice Policy Institute, Youth Who Commit Sex Offenses:
Facts and Fiction, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/08-08_fac_sornafactfiction_jj-pdf;
Justice Policy Institute, The Negative Impact of Registries
on Youth: Why are Youth Different from Adults?, available
at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
08-08_fac_sornakidsaredifferent_jj.pdf. The sources cited by Lo-
gan, however, indicate that juvenile sex offenders have between a
1.7 and 18 percent chance of conviction for another sex offense.
See also Center for Sex Offender Management, Recidivism of Sex
Offenders (May 2001), available at http://www.csom.org/
pubs/recidsexof.html (noting a 13-percent base rate of overall re-
cidivism for sex offenders but that results differ across studies);
Center for Sex Offender Management, Frequently Asked Questions
About Sexual Assault and Sex Offenders, http://www.csom.org/faq/
index.html (last visited May 16, 2012) (reoffense rates for juvenile
sex offenders are approximately 12 to 24 percent).

Logan does not provide any statistics regarding recidivism rates
for adult sex offenders. This court’s own limited research indi-
cates that adult sex offenders have similar rates of recidivism.
See Recidivism of Sex Offenders, supra (noting a 13-percent base
rate of overall recidivism for sex offenders but that results differ

"Logan also asserts that the statutory scheme conflicts with the purpose of
the juvenile court system. He does not provide any argument tying the alleged
conflict to the excessiveness of the bill. As discussed above, the imposition of
registration and community notification does not conflict with the purpose of
Nevada’s juvenile justice system.

Ss

across studies); Texas Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Council on Sex Offender Treatment, Treatment of Sex
Offenders—Recidivism, available at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/
csot/csot_trecidivism.shtm (last updated April 30, 2012) (average
13-percent recidivism rate for adult offenders); State of Connecti-
cut, Office of Policy and Management, Criminal Justice Policy
& Planning Division, Recidivism among Sex Offenders in Con-
necticut (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.ct.gov/opm/
lib/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/recidivismstudy/sex_offender_
recidivism_2012_final.pdf (sex offenders have 3.6-percent arrest
rate for new sex-related charges). And the State points to author-
ity stating that research into the rates of juvenile sex offender re-
cidivism is less than comprehensive. See Center for Sex Offender
management, Recidivism of Sex Offenders (May 2001), available
at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html; see also NRS
62H.300(2) (recognizing the need for greater statistical analysis re-
garding recidivism rates of juvenile sex offenders).

Even assuming that juveniles do have lower recidivism rates than
adults, the Smith Court flatly rejected the argument that application
of registration and notification requirements to an entire class of
sex offenders, rather than only to those offenders who posed the
highest risk to reoffend, rendered the scheme excessive in scope.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 104. We conclude that Logan fails to demon-
strate that the difference in recidivism rates is so great as to ren-
der the Legislature’s concern with recidivism of juvenile sex of-
fenders unreasonable. See W.B.H., 664 F.3d at 860 (rejecting
argument that lower rates of recidivism for juvenile sex offenders
as compared to adult sex offenders renders registration and notifi-
cation requirements excessive as applied to juvenile offenders).

Cost-effectiveness

Logan also makes a fiscal argument. He points out that A.B.
579 was passed quickly with the expectation that Nevada would re-
ceive grant monies from the federal government in return. Ac-
cording to Logan, those monies never materialized. Further, he
claims A.B, 579 will require the State of Nevada to spend precious
funds in an inefficient manner because it requires the supervision
of a large group of low-risk offenders.

Logan presents a compelling policy consideration that warrants
serious reflection by the Legislature. But policy considerations are
not material to our ex post facto analysis because they are relevant
only to whether the statutory scheme is the best manner to achieve
legislative goals, and that question is solely in the Legislature’s
purview. In our ex post facto analysis, we are limited to consider-
ing whether the statutory scheme is reasonable in light of its goals,

ST <!

see Smith, 538 U.S. at 105, and Logan has failed to demonstrate
that A.B. 579 is unreasonable in light of the goal of public safety.

Lastly, although not discussed by the parties, we find it signifi-
cant that A.B. 579 does not subject all juveniles adjudicated for of-
fenses involving sex to registration and notification. Only adjudi-
cations for three offenses—sexual assault, battery with intent to
commit sexual assault, and Jewdness with a child—and attempts or
conspiracy to commit those offenses trigger the requirements. NRS
62F.200(1); NRS 179D.095(1)(b). Conversely, adults are subject to
registration and notification for a much broader category of of-
fenses. See NRS 179D.097. And juvenile offenders are excluded
from registration and notification requirements if they were under
the age of 14 at the time of the offense or if the offense involved
consensual sexual conduct where the victim was at least 13 years
old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the vic-
tim. NRS 62F.200(2); NRS 179D.097(2)(b). These restrictions
appear to be an attempt to limit the application of A.B. 579 to only
those juvenile sex offenders who pose the highest risk of reoffense,
and thus undercut Logan’s contention that the statutory scheme is
excessive. Accordingly, we conclude that A.B. 579 is not excessive
as applied to juvenile sex offenders, and this factor weighs in
favor of a finding that A.B. 579’s effect is not punitive.”

Remaining factors

The final factors to consider in our ex post facto analysis are
whether the statutory scheme applies to conduct that is already a
crime and whether the scheme takes effect only after a finding of
scienter. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. These factors ‘‘are of little
weight.’ Id. The challenged legislation applies only to conduct that
was a delinquent act. This factor thus weighs in favor of a finding
that A.B. 579 is punitive. Just as in Smith, the statutory require-
ments are not founded on any ‘“‘present or repeated violation’’;
therefore, no finding of scienter is required to trigger the statutory
requirements. This factor weighs in favor of finding that the bill is
not punitive. Id.; Helman, 784 A.2d at 1078.

Considering all the factors, we conclude that Logan has failed to
demonstrate by the ‘‘clearest proof’’ that the effects of A.B. 579

"Logan relies heavily on the Supreme Court of Alaska’s decision in Doe v.
‘State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’
holding in State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d 410 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), and the
Kansas Supreme Court's decision in State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041-42
(Kan, 1996), wherein each court determined that registration and community
notification requirements were excessive. We are not persuaded by these cases,
particularly because they do not conform to the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Smith.

520

are so punitive as to negate the legislative intent to impose a civil
regulatory scheme. Six of the seven factors, including the one to be
given the most weight, indicate that the statutory scheme is not
punitive, while only one factor, one to be accorded little weight,
indicates a punitive effect. Accordingly, we conclude that retroac-
tive application of A.B. 579 to juvenile sex offenders does not vi-
olate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Nevada
Constitutions.*

Right to jury trial
P|

Logan next contends that the imposition of registration and
community notification on juvenile sex offenders transforms the ju-
venile system into a criminal system and implicates the right to a
jury trial. We disagree.

The fact that A.B. 579 subjects juvenile sex offenders to regis-
tration and community notification does not eliminate the many
differences between the juvenile and adult justice systems. For
example, juvenile sex offenders are not ‘‘convicted,’ cannot be
sentenced to prison, and are not subject to the civil disabilities re-
sulting from convictions. NRS 62E.010. The focus on rehabilita-
tion in the juvenile system is much greater than in the criminal sys-
tem. And when implementing the juvenile code, the child’s welfare
is a central concern. See NRS 62A.360(1)(a); In re Seven Minors,
99 Nev. 427, 432-33, 664 P.2d 947, 950-51 (1983), disapproved
on other grounds as stated in In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 442

‘In light of our conclusion here, Logan’s contention that A.B. 579 imposes
cruel and/or unusual punishment on juvenile sex offenders necessarily fails.
See U.S. Const. amend. VII; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 6; Doe v. Weld, 954 F.
Supp. 425, 436 (D. Mass. 1996) (because juvenile sex offender registration re-
quirements are probably not punishment, plaintiff could not succeed on claim
that imposition of requirements constituted cruel and unusual punishment);
People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 799 (Il. 2009) (conclud-
ing that imposition of registration requirements on juvenile offenders was not
punishment and thus does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and re-
jecting juvenile’s request to reconsider that conclusion in light of Supreme
Court's holding in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)); In re D.L., 160
$.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App. 2005) (because registration and notification are
nonpunitive, statutory scheme does not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment); see also, e.g., State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 257 (Haw. 2004) (adult sex
offender registration requirements are not punishment and thus do not violate
state constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Adams,
581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Ill. 1991) (same).

“Logan also contends that application of retroactive registration and com-
munity notification requirements violates the Contracts Clauses of the United
States and Nevada Constitutions. He does not, however, support this assertion
with cogent argument or citation to persuasive authority. See Maresca v. State,
103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). We therefore decline to consider this
contention.

521

n.23, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 n.23 (2006). There is no corresponding
concern with the welfare of adult offenders in the criminal code.

Logan points to authority from other state courts invalidating
Jaws or regulations imposed on juveniles in the absence of a jury
trial. The holdings in these cases, however, are based on the con-
clusion that the challenged legislation subjected juvenile offenders
to the same criminal punishments as adults convicted in the crim-
inal system. See In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 399-400 (La. 1998)
(invalidating statute and corresponding regulation allowing juvenile
delinquents to be housed in adult penal facilities where they were
required to perform hard labor); In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660,
674 (Wis. 1998) (holding statute providing for the transfer of ju-
venile delinquents to adult prisons in the absence of a jury trial un-
constitutional). Our conclusion that registration and community no-
tification are not punishments forecloses Logan’s argument that it
is unconstitutional to impose these ‘‘criminal punishments’’ on ju-
veniles without the protection of a jury trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012) (fact that juvenile sex offenders are
subject to the same requirements as adult sex offenders does not
transform juvenile proceedings into criminal proceedings); In re
Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 247 (Ill. 2011) (“‘[T]he fact that
in a narrow set of delineated circumstances delinquent minors face
some of the same collateral consequences as convicted adult crim-
inals does not equate a delinquency adjudication with a criminal
conviction.’’), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 102 (2012); Konetski,
909 N.E.2d at 797-98 (rejecting juvenile’s claim that imposing sex
offender registration and limited community notification require-
ments on juvenile offender in absence of a jury trial violate pro-
cedural due process where those requirements were not punish-
ment); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
(discussing due process rights of juvenile offenders and concluding
that fundamental fairness does not require a jury trial in juvenile
proceedings) (plurality opinion). But see In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d
729, 734, 748-50 (Ohio 2012) (concluding that registration and
community notification are punishment and their mandatory im-
position on juveniles is fundamentally unfair because it is contrary
to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system and the juvenile
court lacks discretion regarding imposition of an adult punish-
ment on juvenile offenders).

Despite our decision today upholding the constitutionality of
mandatory sex offender registration and community notification
for juvenile offenders, we echo the juvenile court’s concerns re-
garding this legislation. Numerous studies and commentators in-
dicate that subjecting juvenile sex offenders to registration and
community notification may not be an effective policy decision.
See, e.g., Justice Policy Institute, The Negative Impact of Regis-

522

tries on Youth: Why are Youth Different from Adults?, available
at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
08-08_fac_sornakidsaredifferent_jj.pdf (stigma resulting from
sex offender registration undermines treatment and rehabilita-
tion programs for juveniles); Justice Policy Institute, Youth Who
Commit Sex Offenses: Facts and Fiction, available at http://www.
justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/08-08_fac_
sornafactfiction_jj.pdf (noting that juveniles are especially
amenable to treatment). As noted by Logan, the registration and
notification programs are expensive, and there are doubts re-
garding the effectiveness of community notification in prevent-
ing crime. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers
(Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/10685/
section/2; Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Reg-
istration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unin-
tended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the
1990's, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 788, 855-56 (1996) (noting that com-
munity notification can impede the development of normal social
skills, which can, in turn, lead to recidivism); Britney M. Bowa-
ter, Comment, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006: Is There a Better Way to Tailor the Sentences of Juvenile Sex
Offenders?, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 817, 836-37 (2008) (noting that
the American Bar Association and Coalition for Juvenile Justice
strongly oppose requiring juvenile sex offenders to register because
of its potential to negatively affect treatment of juvenile offenders).

We agree that the prior statutory scheme, which left the decision
to subject juvenile sex offenders to adult registration and commu-
nity notification requirements to the discretion of the juvenile court
based on specified factors, was a superior method of protecting the
various interests at stake, including public safety, the welfare of ju-
venile sex offenders, and conservation of public resources. The ju-
venile court, relying on extensive information specific to the juve-
nile and the offense, is in the best position to determine whether
adult registration and community notification is necessary in a
given case. And, significantly, since passage of A.B. 579, the
United States Attorney General exercised his statutory authority
“‘to provide that jurisdictions need not publicly disclose informa-
tion concerning persons required to register on the basis of juve-
nile delinquency adjudications.’ Supplemental Guidelines for Sex
Offender Registration and Notification, 76 Fed. Reg. 1630-31,
1632 (Jan. 11, 2011). Accordingly, ‘‘[t]here is no remaining re-
quirement under SORNA that jurisdictions engage in any form of
public disclosure or notification regarding juvenile delinquent sex
offenders.” Id. Thus, it appears Nevada would suffer no loss of
funding if the Legislature removed the provisions of A.B. 579 re-
quiring all juvenile sex offenders to submit to community notifi-

523

cation. We recognize that these policy considerations are outside
the scope of our review of the challenged legislation, see, e.g., An-
thony v. State of Nev., 94 Nev. 338, 341, 580 P.2d 939, 941
(1978) (‘‘[Tjhe judiciary will not declare an act void because it
disagrees with the wisdom of the Legislature.’’), but nonetheless
invite the Legislature to reconsider A.B. 579 and its application to
juvenile sex offenders.

We grant the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the
clerk of this court to issue a writ directing the juvenile court to va-
cate its order declaring A.B. 579 unconstitutional as applied to ju-
venile sex offenders.

PICKERING, C.J., and GiBBons and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

Cuerry, J., with whom Harpesty and Sarrta, JJ., agree,
dissenting:

I would deny the petition because I conclude that the retroactive
application of mandatory sex offender registration and community
notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders violates the Ex
Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 15.

I agree that the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84 (2003), provides the appropriate framework for analysis of
this issue. I also agree that Logan fails to demonstrate that the leg-
islative intent of A.B. 579 was to punish. I conclude, however, that
the statutory scheme, when applied to juvenile sex offenders, is
“*so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s in-
tention to deem it civil.’ Jd. at 92 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted).

Initially, I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding four
of the seven factors—that the statutory scheme does not promote
the traditional aims of punishment, is rationally related to a legit-
imate state interest, is not based on a finding of scienter, and ap-
plies to conduct that is already a crime. I disagree with the ma-
jority’s conclusions regarding the remaining factors, however.

Historical form of punishment

First, I conclude that registration and community notification, as
applied to juvenile sex offenders, are akin to the historical pun-
ishments of branding and shaming. The Smith Court rejected this
argument, in part, because any resulting stigma arose from the dis-
semination of accurate information about an offender’s criminal
tecord—the majority of which was already public—not from any
public display for ridicule and shaming. Id. at 98. The Court
therefore concluded that publication of sex offenders’ records on a
website is ‘‘more analogous to a visit to an official archive of crim-

524

inal records than it is to a scheme forcing an offender to appear in
public with some visible badge of past criminality’ Id. at 99. This
analogy fails when applied to juvenile sex offenders because juve-
niles’ records are inaccessible to the general public in the absence
of a court order. See NRS 62H.030(2)-(3).

I recognize that, prior to A.B. 579, juvenile community notifi-
cation allowed the disclosure of records of Tier II and III juvenile
sex offenders. Office of the Nev. Attorney Gen., Nevada’s Guide-
lines and Procedures for Community Notification of Juvenile Sex
Offenders, Office of the Attorney General, § 8.00(3)-(4) (Rev.
Feb. 2006). This disclosure, however, was limited to persons or en-
tities who were ‘‘reasonably likely to encounter the juvenile sex of-
fender?’ Jd. That is a far cry from the notification provisions of
A.B. 579, under which any member of the public, likely to en-
counter the juvenile or not, must be provided with the juvenile sex
offender’s registration information upon request.’ NRS 179B.250;
NRS 179D.475. In my opinion, the limited disclosure of juvenile
sex offender records that existed prior to A.B. 579 does not allow
for the conclusion that the bill’s community notification provi-
sions are ‘‘analogous to a visit to an official archive of criminal
records.””

Affirmative disability or restraint

Second, I conclude that A.B. 579 imposes an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint on juvenile sex offenders. As acknowledged by
the Smith Court, the public availability of conviction information
“‘may have a lasting and painful impact on the convicted sex of-
fender’’ 538 U.S. at 101. The Court concluded that community
notification did not impose disabilities or restraints on adult of-
fenders because any adverse consequences, such as occupational or
housing disadvantages, flow not from community notification pro-
visions, but from the fact of conviction, which is a matter of pub-
lic record. Jd. The Court also noted that adverse consequences
could have otherwise occurred via the use of routine background
checks by employers and landlords. Jd. at 100.

Such reasoning cannot be applied to juvenile sex offenders,
whose records are not generally public. Because juvenile sex of-
fender records were not available to the public in the absence of a
court order, NRS 62H.030(2), routine background checks would
not reveal these records. As discussed above, A.B. 579’s commu-
nity notification requirements greatly expand the limited disclosure
of records that occurred under juvenile community notification.

‘Registration records are exempted from disclosure on the community no-
tification website if the sex offender is a Tier I offender and was not adjudi-
cated for a crime against a child. NRS 179B.250(7)(b).

525

The prior limited disclosure does not justify the conclusion that the
bill does not impose an additional affirmative disability or re-
straint on juvenile sex offenders. I conclude that any occupational
or housing disadvantages suffered by delinquent sex offenders re-
sult not from the fact of adjudication, but directly from the com-
munity notification requirement. See State v. C.M., 746 So. 2d
410, 418 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (concluding that subjecting ju-
venile sex offenders to registration and community notification re-
quirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint in part be-
cause it exposed confidential adjudication records to the public).
And I note that such discrimination is particularly burdensome on
juveniles who are newly independent and have not yet had the op-
portunity to establish themselves in the world. See In re C.P., 967
N.E.2d 729, 741-42 (Ohio 2012) (considering stigmatization and
other negative consequences of community notification on juvenile
offenders in the context of a cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim).
The majority concludes that the notification provisions them-
selves do not impose any negative consequences because those
consequences ‘‘result indirectly from the public’s response to
knowledge of the adjudication.’ See majority opinion ante at 514.
This conclusion fails to account for the real-world effect of A.B.
579’s notification provisions. But for those provisions, the public
would have no easy means to access juvenile sex offenders’
records. For these reasons, I conclude that A.B. 579 imposes an
affirmative disability or restraint on juvenile sex offenders.

Excessiveness

Third, I conclude that A.B. 579 is excessive in relation to its
purpose. I am cognizant of the fact that the excessiveness analysis
is not an inquiry into ‘‘whether the legislature has made the best
choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy.’ Smith,
538 U.S. at 105. Nevertheless, I conclude that the statutory
scheme, as applied to juvenile sex offenders, is not reasonable in
light of the Legislature’s nonpunitive objective. See id. (the exces-
siveness inquiry focuses on ‘‘whether the regulatory means chosen
are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective’).

The mandatory application of community notification require-
ments to juvenile sex offenders is unreasonable in light of the
lower recidivism rates among juveniles as compared to adult of-
fenders. See majority opinion ante at 517-18. And juvenile of-
fenders are highly amenable to treatment. Justice Policy Institute,
The Negative Impact of Registries on Youth: Why are Youth Dif-
ferent from Adults?, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/08-08_fac_sornakidsaredifferent_
ji-pdf; Affidavit of Dr. Rayna Rogers ¥ 18, Dec. 20, 2007 (noting
that “‘most youthful offenders can be fully treated’’ and their ‘‘re-

526

cidivism rate is significantly lower than adult offenders’’) (exhibit
to motion filed in district court on Dec. 28, 2007). Juveniles’
amenability to treatment is especially significant because the juve-
nile justice system is specifically designed to provide juvenile
delinquents with needed treatment. See NRS 62G.410 (‘‘It is the
policy of this state to rehabilitate delinquent children.”’); see also
NRS 62A.360(1)(a) (every child under the jurisdiction of the ju-
venile court shall receive the guidance, care, and control that is
conducive to the best interest of the State and the child’s welfare);
NRS 62E.280(1)(a) (the juvenile court may order any psychologi-
cal, psychiatric, or other care or treatment that is in the best in-
terest of the juvenile); NRS 63.180 (juvenile delinquents placed in
state facilities receive a program of treatment aimed at altering be-
havior and attitude so that the juvenile may freely function in his
or her regular environment).

Moreover, A.B. 579 imposes mandatory community notification
requirements regardless of risk of reoffense and assigns juvenile
sex offenders to a tier based solely on the offense committed. NRS
179D.115-.117; NRS 179D.441; NRS 179D.445; NRS 179D.460;
NRS 179D.475. Considering juveniles’ low recidivism rates and
amenability to treatment, it is my opinion that the statutory scheme
is grossly overinclusive and needlessly sweeps up children who
have a very low risk of recidivism. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 116-17
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Doe, 189 P.3d at 1017. Under this
legislation, even juveniles who have successfully completed treat-
ment and been certified as a low risk to reoffend will remain sub-
ject to registration and community notification requirements for a
minimum of ten years. See NRS 179D.490. Further, adults, adju-
dicated delinquent perhaps decades ago, who have been rehabili-
tated and successfully reintegrated into society, will now be subject
to its requirements. See NRS 179D.095(1).

Under the prior version of juvenile community notification,
only organizations deemed reasonably likely to encounter a juve-
nile sex offender were actively notified of a juvenile’s presence in
the community. Office of the Nev. Attorney Gen., Nevada’s Guide-
lines and Procedures for Community Notification of Juvenile Sex
Offenders, Office of the Attorney General, § 8.0 (Rev. Feb. 2006).
A.B. 579 requires that certain organizations be notified regardless
of any likelihood of encountering a juvenile offender. NRS
179D.475(2). Such a broad scope of notification is completely un-
necessary considering juveniles’ low recidivism rates and amen-
ability to treatment. A.B. 579, as applied to juvenile sex offenders,
is excessive in relation to its purpose of public protection.

_ Balancing all of the factors, I conclude that the imposition of
mandatory registration and community notification requirements

Po 527

on juvenile sex offenders constitutes a punishment. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) (explaining that harsh
conditions imposed to achieve goals that can be attained in many
alternative, less harsh ways generally supports a finding that the
purpose of the conditions is to punish). Therefore, retroactive ap-
plication of A.B. 579 to juvenile offenders violates the Ex Post
Facto Clauses of the Nevada and United States Constitutions.

I wholeheartedly join my colleagues’ invitation to the Legisla-
ture to reconsider this legislation as applied to juveniles. I urge our
legislators to give serious consideration to the concerns raised by
the juvenile court and presented in this court’s opinion today.

RONNIE DANELLE BRASS, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No, 56146
July 25, 2013 306 P.3d 393

David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and JoNell Thomas,
Deputy Special Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and David L. Stanton and Nancy A.
Becker, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, Douctas, J.:

Ronnie Brass was convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping
and murder, first-degree kidnapping, and first-degree murder with
the use of a deadly weapon. Brass timely appealed, but he died be-
fore his appeal was decided. Brass’s attorney filed a suggestion of
death and a motion for abatement—arguing that this court should
abate the conviction and remand the case to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the charging document. However, no party
has been properly substituted as Brass’s personal representative.

We consider whether an attorney may file a substantive motion
on a deceased client’s behalf in a criminal case when a personal
representative has not been substituted as a party to the appeal. We
determine that an attorney lacks authority to act on the deceased
client’s behalf in those circumstances; thus, we deny counsel’s mo-
tion for abatement. Further, we conclude that if a party dies pend-
ing a review of his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed unless the
decedent’s personal representative is substituted in as a party to the
appeal within 90 days of the decedent’s death.

DISCUSSION

Brass’s counsel raises a novel issue regarding the appropriate
remedy when a criminal defendant dies while his appeal from a
judgment of conviction is pending. There are three possible
approaches in that situation: (1) abatement of the judgment ab ini-
tio, (2) no abatement and the appeal may be prosecuted, and (3) no
abatement and the appeal may not be prosecuted. Abatement

Po 529

of State Criminal Cases by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of
Conviction—Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R. 4th 189 (1990). But we de-
cline to consider the issue at this time based on our conclusion that
the motion for abatement is not properly before this court.

P| .
Generally, counsel cannot act on a deceased client’s behalf. See
Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir. 1985)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 120(1) (1958)); United
States v. Chin, 848 F.2d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1988). Rather, only a
properly substituted personal representative of the deceased party
may bring a motion on the decedent’s behalf.! NRAP 43(a)(1) gov-
erns the substitution of parties where a party has died while an ap-
peal is pending:
If a party dies . . . while [an appeal] is pending in the
[Nevada] Supreme Court, the decedent’s personal representa-
tive may be substituted as a party on motion filed by the
representative or by any party . . . . A party’s motion shall be
served on the representative in accordance with Rule 25. If
the decedent has no representative, any party may suggest the
death on the record, and the court may then direct appropri-
ate proceedings.

As this court observed in Walker v. Burkham, ‘‘[ulpon the death of
a party... the [action] cannot proceed until someone is
substituted for the decedent...’ 68 Nev. 250, 253-54, 229
P.2d 158, 160 (1951) (interpreting former Supreme Court Rule 9,
a precursor to NRAP 43).

|

It has been almost one year since counsel suggested Brass’s
death upon the record. NRCP 25(a)(1), like NRAP 43(a)(1), al-
lows a personal representative to substitute for a deceased party;
however, NRCP 25(a)(1) establishes a limitation on the time for fil-
ing a motion for substitution. Under NRCP 25(a)(1), a substitution
motion must be filed within 90 days of the decedent’s death being
suggested upon the record, otherwise, ‘‘the action shall be dis-
missed as to the deceased party’’? An unlimited time frame for
substitution under NRAP 43 is inconsistent with Nevada’s interest

‘Tf a party to an action dies while the action is pending before any court,
NRS 7.075(1) requires the attorney who represented the decedent in the pend-
ing action to ‘file a notice of death and a motion for substitution of a party
with the court” within 90 days of the person’s death.

2We recognize that, by its terms, NRCP 25(a) only applies in civil cases and
that this is a criminal appeal. Nonetheless, criminal judgments carry civil con-
sequences. Also, the court system’s need for party input and timely adjudica-
tion is no less in criminal than in civil cases.

530 Po

in the finality of judgments. Consistent with these interests, a mo-
tion under NRAP 43 must be filed within a reasonable time after
the decedent’s death has been suggested on the record. Given the
similarities between NRCP 25(a) and NRAP 43(a)(1), we conclude
that the time limit set forth in NRCP 25(a)(1) sets a reasonable
limit on substitution motions based on a party’s death. We now
clarify that when a criminal defendant dies after a notice of appeal
has been filed, a personal representative must be substituted for the
decedent within 90 days of his death being suggested upon the
record; otherwise, this court will dismiss the appeal and the dece-
dent’s conviction will stand.

a

Here, this court’s process caused the delay in filing the motion
for substitution. So, in this instance only, we extend the time for
filing the substitution motion until 90 days after this opinion is
filed. Further, we determine the substitution motion must be filed
with the district court because the determination of a proposed per-
sonal representative’s eligibility may involve fact-finding. We are
not a fact-finding court; thus, the district court is best suited to de-
termine who can substitute for the deceased appellant. See Wade v.
State, 115 Nev. 290, 294, 986 P.2d 438, 441 (1999) (citing Zugel
y. Miller, 99 Nev. 100, 101, 659 P.2d 296, 297 (1983)).

Accordingly, we allow 90 days from the date of this opinion for
the limited purposes of determining Brass’s proper personal rep-
resentative and for the representative to file a motion for substitu-
tion with this court, pursuant to NRAP 43. If no personal repre-
sentative is substituted within the allotted time, we will dismiss the
proceedings on appeal.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Curry, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

531

JAVIER ARMENTA-CARPIO, AKA JAVIER CARPIO
ARMENTA, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA,
RESPONDENT.

No. 60371
July 25, 2013 306 P.3d 395

Benjamin C. Durham, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

w
Oo

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

Appellant Javier Armenta-Carpio went to trial facing strong ev-
idence, including his own admissions, that he had sexual contact
with a child. Under the circumstances, defense counsel made a
strategic decision to concede that there had been some sexual con-
tact between Armenta-Carpio and the victim and to concentrate in-
stead on the extent of the contact and whether the State had
charged Armenta-Carpio with more offenses than the evidence
could support. After this strategy became apparent during defense
counsel’s opening statement, the trial court sua sponte inquired
whether defense counsel had discussed the strategy with Armenta-
Carpio and whether Armenta-Carpio had agreed to the strategy.
The court received affirmative responses to both questions.

|

On appeal, we are asked whether the district court’s inquiry
about the concession strategy was sufficient given our decision in
Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. 978, 194 P.3d 1235 (2008), that
when faced with a concession of guilt by defense counsel during
trial, the district court must canvass the defendant to determine
whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the concession
of guilt. Although the district court’s inquiry here did not fully
comply with Hernandez, we conclude that the rationale underlying
Hernandez is unsound and the opinion therefore must be overruled.
‘We now hold, consistent with Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188
(2004), that a concession-of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of
a guilty plea and therefore the trial judge has no obligation to can-
vass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy; in-
stead, the reasonableness of counsel’s performance is a matter to
be determined in an appropriate proceeding based on the inquiry
that generally applies to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

Po 533

Given that holding, any deficiencies in the canvass conducted in
this case do not warrant relief from the judgment of conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Armenta-Carpio was charged with attempted sexual assault of
acchild under 14 years of age, five counts of lewdness with a child
under 14 years of age, attempted lewdness with a child under
14 years of age, and child abuse and neglect. All of the charges
involved his daughter and occurred over a five-year period. Dur-
ing opening statement at trial, defense counsel related to the jury
that “‘[t]hings happen[ed] between my client and his daughter,’
and therefore, according to counsel, the case was not about
whether Armenta-Carpio had sexual contact with the victim but
whether the State had overcharged the case. Defense counsel
explained to the jury that the victim told Child Protective Services
about three incidents—not eight as the State charged—and that
Armenta-Carpio’s police statement was “‘pretty consistent’ with
what the victim told the police. Thereafter, in a hearing outside the
jury’s presence, the district court queried Armenta-Carpio about
whether he had agreed to counsel’s strategy to concede guilt as to
some conduct while challenging the number of incidents alleged by
the State. Armenta-Carpio responded that he had. Counsel made
similar concessions during closing arguments, suggesting to the
jury that although Armenta-Carpio had some sexual contact with
the victim, it was not as extensive as the State contended. The jury
disagreed and found Armenta-Carpio guilty of all the charges.
At sentencing, the district court determined that the attempted-
sexual-assault count merged with one of the lewdness counts and
therefore did not adjudicate Armenta-Carpio on the attempted-
sexual-assault count. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

P|

Relying on Hernandez, Armenta-Carpio argues that the district
court’s canvass concerning the concession strategy was inadequate,
and therefore, his consent was involuntary and unknowing.
Armenta-Carpio acknowledges that he did not object to the district
court’s canvass. We therefore review his claim for plain error af-
fecting his substantial rights. Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 365,
23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001) (concluding that failure to object gener-
ally precludes appellate review but this court has discretion to ad-
dress any errors that are plain from record and affect defendant’s
substantial rights), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v.
State, 127 Nev. 749, 776 n.12, 263 P.3d 235, 253 n.12 (2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012).

534

Hernandez involved an appeal from an order denying a post-
conviction habeas petition. One of the ineffective-assistance claims
challenged trial counsel’s concession that Hernandez was culpable
for the victim’s murder. 124 Nev. at 989, 194 P.3d at 1242. In par-
ticular, Hernandez argued that trial counsel failed to secure his
consent to the concession. Relying primarily on State v. Perez, 522
S.E.2d 102, 106 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999), this court concluded that
“*{a] concession of guilt involves the waiver of a constitutional
right that must be voluntary and knowing.’ Hernandez, 124 Nev.
at 990, 194 P.3d at 1243. Although the issue presented involved
counsel’s performance, we went beyond that issue ‘‘to address the
proper procedure when a defense strategy at trial includes a con-
cession of guilt.’ Jd. We explained that ‘‘[a]t a minimum,’ the dis-
trict court should canvass the defendant outside the presence of the
jury and the State to ensure and make findings on the record that
the defendant understands the strategy behind conceding guilt and
advise the defendant that conceding guilt relieves the State of its
burden of proof for an offense and that he has the right to chal-
lenge the State’s evidence. Jd. at 990-91, 194 P.3d at 1243.

Our conclusion in Hernandez that a concession strategy must be
voluntary and knowing and the canvass procedures that we em-
braced find their footing in the reasoning set forth in Perez. The
Perez court reasoned that a concession of guilt is the functional
equivalent of a guilty plea because it deprives a defendant of his
rights to cross-examination, confrontation, and a trial by jury.
Perez, 522 S.E.2d at 106. Based on that analogy, the Perez court
concluded that a concession strategy, like a guilty plea, requires the
defendant’s knowing and voluntary consent ‘‘after full appraisal of
the consequences’ reflected on the record. Jd.

Significant flaws in the Perez court’s reasoning are pointed out
in a Supreme Court decision issued five years after Perez. In
Florida v. Nixon, the Supreme-Court expressly rejected the idea
that a concession of guilt at trial is the functional equivalent of a
guilty plea. 543 U.S. 175, 188 (2004). The Court explained that
unlike a guilty plea, a concession strategy preserves the rights ac-
corded a defendant in a criminal trial: (1) the prosecution is still
required to present competent, admissible evidence establishing the
essential elements of the charged crimes; (2) the defense retains the
right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and pursue exclusion
of prejudicial evidence; and (3) the defense can seek relief on ap-
peal from trial error. Jd. As the Supreme Court had observed
decades earlier, ‘‘[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession
which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a con-
viction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine pun-
ishment.’ Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). The
Supreme Court also rejected the idea that counsel is automatically
barred from pursuing a concession strategy just because the de-

SS 55

fendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects to the
course that counsel determines is the best strategy, explaining that
the issue in those cases is whether counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced the
defense. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 178-79; see also Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon was available
when we decided Hernandez, our opinion makes no mention of
it and does not discuss the reasoning underlying Perez in any
significant degree. That is not necessarily surprising as the par-
ties did not address Nixon even though it involved an ineffective-
assistance claim based on a concession of guilt. Having now con-
sidered our reasoning in Hernandez in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Nixon, we are persuaded that there are significant dif-
ferences between a concession strategy at trial and a guilty plea
such that a concession strategy does not involve the waiver of a
constitutional right that must be knowing and voluntary. A con-
cession of guilt is simply a trial strategy—no different than any
other strategy the defense might employ at trial. As such, there is
no reason to conduct a mid-trial canvass to determine a defendant’s
knowledge of or consent to that particular strategy. If a defendant
is dissatisfied with the strategy, he may challenge the reasonable-
ness of counsel’s performance. Thus, the foundation for the can-
vass requirements set forth in Hernandez is unsound. The question
is whether we are compelled to perpetuate Hernandez’s canvass
procedure despite its unsound foundation.

| eee

“TUjnder the doctrine of stare decisis, we will not overturn
[precedent] absent compelling reasons for so doing.’ Miller v.
Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) (footnote
omitted). While we are loath to depart from the doctrine of stare
decisis, we also cannot adhere to the doctrine so stridently that the
“* Jaw is forever encased in a straight jacket’ ’’ Adam v. State, 127
Nev. 601, 604, 261 P.3d 1063, 1065 (2011) (quoting Rupert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 400, 528 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1974)). In con-
sidering the canvass procedures set forth in Hernandez, there are
two reasons that our departure from the doctrine of stare decisis is
warranted. First, the part of Hernandez that prospectively adopts
procedures that the district court must undertake to ensure that a
concession is knowing and voluntary went beyond answering the
limited question that was before the court—whether counsel pro-
vided constitutionally ineffective assistance by adopting a conces-
sion strategy. That part of Hernandez therefore was dicta. See
Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury &
Standish, 125 Nev. 527, 536, 216 P.3d 779, 785 (2009) (‘‘A state-

fo

536

ment in a case is dictum when it is ‘unnecessary to a determina-
tion of the questions involved.’ ’’ (quoting St. James Vill., Inc. v.
Cunningham, 125 Nev. 211, 216, 210 P.3d 190, 193 (2009))).
Second, the reasoning underlying the canvass procedure set forth
in Hernandez is clearly erroneous, particularly viewing that rea-
soning in light of Nixon. These foundational problems with Her-
nandez reflect more than a ‘‘[mJere disagreement’’ with that deci-
sion, Burk, 124 Nev. at 597, 188 P.3d at 1124 (observing that
more than ‘‘[mlJere disagreement’’ is required to overturn prece-
dent), requiring that we depart from the doctrine of stare decisis to
avoid the perpetuation of that error. See Stocks v. Stocks, 64 Nev.
431, 438, 183 P.2d 617, 620 (1947) (‘While courts will indeed
depart from the doctrine of stare decisis where such departure is
necessary to avoid the perpetuation of error, the observance of the
doctrine has long been considered indispensable to the due ad-
ministration of justice, that a question once deliberately examined
and decided should be considered as settled.’ (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)). We therefore overrule Hernandez to the
extent that it holds that a concession of guilt is the functional
equivalent of a guilty plea, triggering the protections and conse-
quences attendant to entering a guilty plea and requiring a canvass
by the trial court.

Our decision today does not undermine a defendant’s right
to challenge the reasonableness of counsel’s concession strategy.
We are not faced with a challenge to the reasonableness of coun-
sel’s performance in this case. Although we have addressed an
ineffective-assistance claim based on a concession strategy for the
first time on appeal where the concession contradicted the defen-
dant’s trial testimony, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 110 Nev. 730, 877
P.2d 1052 (1996), Armenta-Carpio did not raise an ineffective-
assistance claim and, even if he had, the circumstances here would
not allow us to consider such a claim for the first time on appeal.'

Because we are persuaded that canvassing a defendant to ensure
knowledge of and voluntary consent to a concession strategy is un-
necessary, we conclude that Armenta-Carpio is not entitled to re-
lief on the ground that the district court’s canvass was inadequate.
We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

PICKERING, C.J., and Gissons, HARDESTY, DouGLas, CHERRY,
and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

‘Because we are not faced with an ineffective-assistance claim, we express
no opinion as to whether Nixon undermines any of our reasoning in Jones.

|

Po 537
THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
RICARDO ROBLES-NIEVES, RESPONDENT.

No. 61537
July 25, 2013 306 P.3d 399

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellant.

David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and Robert
Arroyo, Deputy Special Public Defender, Clark County, for
Respondent.

539

Before the Court EN Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

Respondent Ricardo Robles-Nieves is in custody awaiting trial
on a charge of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. He suc-
cessfully litigated a pretrial motion to suppress his incriminating
statement to police based on a claim that his statement was pro-
cured through the use of extrinsic falsehoods. While this court has
adopted a rule concerning the use of intrinsic falsehoods in elicit-
ing a confession, the issue of the coercive effect of using extrinsic
falsehoods is an issue of first impression in Nevada.

Faced with going to trial absent a key piece of evidence, the
State exercised its statutory right to appeal from the order granting
the motion to suppress. After several continuances and considering
Robles-Nieves’ repeated assertion of his speedy-trial rights, the dis-
trict court set a trial date and denied the State’s request to stay the
trial pending resolution of its appeal. The State then renewed its
motion with this court. .

The State’s motion provides the opportunity to address the fac-
tors that govern our discretionary decision on a motion for a stay
in a criminal proceeding. We conclude that the four factors that
govern our exercise of discretion in ruling on a stay motion in
a civil proceeding under NRAP 8(c) are relevant to our exercise
of discretion to grant a stay of a criminal proceeding pending res-
olution of an interlocutory suppression appeal. Those factors are:
(1) whether the object of the appeal will be defeated if the stay is

540 Po

denied, (2) whether the appellant will suffer irreparable or serious
injury if the stay is denied, (3) whether the respondent will suffer
irreparable injury if the stay is granted, and (4) whether the ap-
pellant is likely to prevail on the merits in the appeal. In the con-
text of an interlocutory suppression appeal, the first factor is the
most significant because the appeal will be rendered moot and the
State’s right to appeal effectively eliminated if the trial proceeds.
In that context, the third factor also is significant and may require
consideration of the defendant’s speedy-trial rights where the de-
fendant has asserted those rights and opposed the motion for a stay.
Having considered the relevant factors, we conclude that they
weigh in favor of granting a stay in this instance.'

DISCUSSION

The State has not always had the right to appeal from an order
granting a motion to suppress evidence. See 1967 Nev. Stat., ch.
523, § 287, at 1443-44 (adopting NRS 177.015 without provision
for interlocutory appeal from an order resolving a motion to sup-
press evidence); see also State v. Pearce, 96 Nev. 383, 609 P.2d
1237 (1980) (observing that the Nevada Legislature gave the State
the right to file an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a
motion to suppress evidence in 1971 but then deleted the provision
the following legislative session); Cook v. State, 85 Nev. 692,
694-95, 462 P.2d 523, 526 (1969) (observing that interlocutory ap-
peal from trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress evidence “‘is
not authorized’’). Part of the concern with affording the State the
right to such an interlocutory appeal was that it would cause delay
that would impede the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. See
Cook, 85 Nev. at 695, 462 P.2d at 526 (‘‘An interlocutory appeal
from the trial court’s ruling on. . . a motion [to suppress evi-
dence] is not authorized because of attendant delay and the desire
to avoid the piecemeal handling of cases.””); Franklin v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 85 Nev. 401, 404, 455 P.2d 919, 921 (1969)
(“Piecemeal review does not promote the orderly handling of a
case, and is particularly disruptive in criminal cases where the de-
fendant is entitled to a speedy resolution of the charges against
him.’’). In 1981, the Nevada Legislature adopted NRS 177.015(2),
which grants the State the right to appeal to this court from a dis-
trict court’s pretrial order granting a motion to suppress evidence.
1981 Nev. Stat., ch. 702, § 1, at 1706.

In addition to authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order
granting a suppression order, NRS 177.015(2) expressly authorizes

"We granted the motion and stayed the trial in an order entered on June 10,
2013. Although time constraints prevented us from explaining our decision in
a formal opinion at that time, we explained in our order that a formal opinion,
setting forth the grounds for our decision, would be forthcoming. Cf. Indep.
‘Am. Party v. Lau, 110 Nev. 1151, 1153 n.3, 880 B.2d 1391, 1392 n.3 (1994).

Po S41

this court to ‘“‘enter an order staying the trial for such time as may
be required’ if the court decides to entertain the State’s appeal or
if a stay ‘‘otherwise appears necessary.’ Providing for a stay
makes sense given the timing of pretrial suppression motions.
Under NRS 174.125(1), motions to suppress evidence generally
must be filed before trial and, in the largest judicial districts in this
state, the motion may be filed as little as 15 days before the trial
date, NRS 174,125(3)(a). Because the motion may be filed such a
short time before trial, it is not unreasonable to expect that a stay
would be needed if the State exercises its right to an interlocu-
tory appeal from an order granting the motion. Although NRS
177.015(2) acknowledges this situation by allowing for a stay, it
does not identify any factors that are relevant to the court’s exer-
cise of its discretion to stay the trial. In that void, we turn to Rule
8 of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, which addresses re-
quests to stay proceedings while an appeal is pending.

Unfortunately, Rule 8 has little to say about stays in criminal
cases beyond the procedural requirements for filing the motion
such as pursuing relief in the district court in the first instance
(which the State did in this case) and what must be included in the
motion. NRAP 8(a)(1), (2). When it comes to stays in criminal
cases in particular, the rule simply refers to NRS 177.095 and
unidentified statutes following it. NRAP 8(e). Those statutes, how-
ever, similarly have little to say beyond authorizing or mandating
stays in certain circumstances. None of the statutes that provide
discretionary authority to grant a stay identify factors that should
govern the exercise of that discretion. See, e.g., NRS 177.115;
NRS 177.125.

|

In contrast, Rule 8(c) provides specific factors to be considered
when a stay motion has been filed in a civil appeal. Those factors
are: (1) whether the object of the appeal will be defeated if the stay
is denied, (2) whether the appellant will suffer irreparable or se-
rious injury if the stay is denied, (3) whether the respondent will
suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is granted, and
(4) whether the appellant is likely to prevail on the merits in the
appeal. NRAP 8(c). The parties seem to agree that these factors
should guide the decision whether to grant a stay under NRS
177.015(2). Because the factors set forth in NRAP 8(c) allow us to
take into consideration the interests of both the prosecution and the
defense and the legislative concern about delay that is reflected in
the short appeal period (two days for filing a notice in the district
court and five days for filing a separate notice in this court), State
v. Loyle, 101 Nev. 65, 67, 692 P.2d 516, 518 (1985) (STEFFEN, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the reason for the short appeal period in
NRS 177.015(2)), we will look to those factors in deciding
whether to grant a stay under NRS 177.015(2).

342 Po

We have not ascribed particular weights to any of the stay fac-
tors in the civil context, but we have recognized that depending
on the type of appeal, certain factors may be especially strong and
counterbalance other weak factors. Mikohn Gaming Corp. v.
McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 251, 89 P.3d 36, 38 (2004). Our stay
analysis in the context of an appeal from an order granting a mo-
tion to suppress evidence necessarily reflects the interlocutory na-
ture of the appeal and the concerns about delay that are implicit in
NRS 177.015(2). Accordingly, the first and third factors take on
added significance in our stay analysis.

Object of the appeal
| |

The parties do not seriously dispute the first factor—whether the
object of the State’s appeal will be defeated if the stay is denied.
The object of the State’s appeal is to have the confession available
for use at trial. If the stay is denied, that object will be defeated as
the trial will proceed without the suppressed evidence. The Legis-
lature has provided for an interlocutory appeal of an order grant-
ing a motion to suppress evidence, NRS 177.015(2), which
demonstrates the intent to secure review of an order suppressing
evidence before trial. If the trial proceeds while the appeal is
pending, the State will lose the opportunity for that review. We
therefore conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favor of a stay.

Irreparable or serious harm if stay is denied

P|

The second factor is the subject of some dispute—whether the
State will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied.
The State argues that it will be injured if the trial proceeds because
its case is not as strong without that evidence and Robles-Nieves
may be acquitted as a result. Robles-Nieves suggests that the State
will not be harmed because even if it succeeds on some level in
this appeal, the district court likely will grant the motion again on
other grounds and therefore the State will still be faced with pro-
ceeding to trial without the suppressed evidence. Both arguments
are somewhat speculative. But based on the information provided
to this court, it appears that the State’s case absent the suppressed
evidence is circumstantial at best and the suppressed evidence is
particularly probative of Robles-Nieves’ guilt. Considering those
circumstances, the seriousness of the charged offense, and the ab-
sence of any recourse for the State if Robles-Nieves is acquitted,
we conclude that this factor weighs in favor of a stay.

Irreparable or serious harm if stay is granted

‘The third factor we must consider is whether Robles-Nieves will
be irreparably harmed if the stay is granted. Robles-Nieves offers

Pe sas

two arguments: he will remain incarcerated unnecessarily based on
a coerced confession, and the delay will infringe his speedy-trial
rights. The first argument is somewhat relevant but not controlling
in this case since denying the stay would not result in Robles-
Nieves’ immediate release.? The second argument gets to the heart
of this factor as the Legislature clearly was concerned about the
impact that interlocutory appeals under NRS 177.015(2) would
have on the defendant’s speedy-trial rights. See Loyle, 101 Nev. at
67, 692 P.2d at 518 (STEFFEN, J., dissenting) (observing that NRS
177.015(2)’s ‘‘short [appeal period] reflects a concern for pre-
serving the right to speedy trials for defendants who have suc-
cessfully moved to suppress evidence’’). Because this presents a
significant issue, we take this opportunity to provide some guid-
ance on the relationship between a defendant’s speedy-trial rights
and a stay during an interlocutory appeal under NRS 177.015(2).
There are two speedy-trial rights at issue: the constitutional right
protected by the Sixth Amendment and a statutory right to a trial
within 60 days of arraignment under NRS 178.556(1). We address
the constitutional right first.

Irreparable harm based on constitutional right to speedy trial

The United States Supreme Court has adopted a four-part bal-
ancing test to determine whether continuances have infringed on a
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of
the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion
of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The four factors are ‘‘related’’ and
“‘must be considered together with such other circumstances as
may be relevant.’’ Jd. at 533. The United States Supreme Court
has applied the same test ‘‘to determine the extent to which ap-
pellate time consumed in the review of pretrial motions should
weigh towards a defendant’s speedy trial claim.’’ United States v.
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986). We similarly conclude that
these factors are relevant when considering whether a stay during
an interlocutory appeal under NRS 177.015(2) will irreparably
harm the defendant by infringing on his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.

The first speedy-trial factor—length of the delay—is ‘‘a trigger-
ing mechanism.’ Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. ‘‘[TJhere must be a
delay long enough to be ‘presumptively prejudicial. ’? Loud Hawk,
474 U.S. at 314 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Here, Robles-
Nieves was arrested on the charges on November 23, 2011. Thus
far, he has been held approximately 18 months; just over 12

"It is not entirely clear from the documents before us, but it appears that
Robles-Nieves remains in custody at least in part because he is subject to an
immigration hold.

saa Pe

months since his arraignment. Of that time, approximately 8
months is attributable to this appeal (starting from October 17,
2012—the date that the district court first granted a continuance
based on the appeal).

Under the second speedy-trial factor—the reason for the delay—
different reasons are assigned different weights. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 531. For example, if the State deliberately delays the trial to
hamper the defense, that would weigh heavily against the State,
whereas delay due to overcrowded courts generally is weighed
Jess heavily. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315. The Supreme Court has
observed that ‘‘{g]iven the important public interests in appellate
review, it hardly need be said that an interlocutory appeal by the
[State] ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay’ Jd. (citation
omitted). Several factors should be considered in assessing the pur-
pose and reasonableness of an interlocutory appeal by the State:
“the strength of the [State’s] position on the appealed issue, the
importance of the issue in the posture of the case, and—in some
cases—the seriousness of the crime,’ i.e., whether it is “‘suffi-
ciently serious to justify restraints that may be imposed on the de-
fendant pending the outcome of the appeal.’’ Id. at 315, 316.
Looking at these factors, the State’s interlocutory appeal serves a
legitimate purpose and is reasonable. First, the appeal does not ap-
pear to be frivolous. That the appeal is not frivolous is reflected by
this court’s decision to exercise its discretion to entertain the ap-
peal after considering the State’s preliminary showing of good
cause. See NRS 177.015(2) (‘‘The Supreme Court may establish
such procedures as it determines proper in requiring the appellant
to make a preliminary showing of the propriety of the appeal and
whether there may be a miscarriage of justice if the appeal is not
entertained.’’). Second, the appellate issue is significant to the
case because the confession is a key piece of evidence. Third, the
charged offense, first-degree murder, is sufficiently serious to jus-
tify the restraints that may be imposed on Robles-Nieves pending
the outcome of this appeal. We therefore conclude that the reason
for the delay (the State’s pursuit of this interlocutory appeal) does
not weigh heavily against the State.

The third speedy-trial factor—Robles-Nieves’ assertion of the
tight—would seem to present no great difficulty: he promptly as-
serted his speedy-trial rights at arraignment in district court and
has been consistent in objecting to any continuances and stays
(even those that would allow the district court to rule on his sup-
pression motion before the trial). The State, however, asserts that
the motion to suppress should be treated as an implied waiver of
any speedy-trial right for the time required to finally resolve the
motion, apparently including the interlocutory appeal. In this, the

Pe 545

State equates the motion with a pretrial habeas petition, which by
statute (NRS 34.700(1)(b)) must include a waiver of speedy-trial
rights. Although the filing of the motion may be viewed as conduct
that conflicts with the assertion of the speedy-trial right, see Loud
Hawk, 474 U.S. at 314-15 (noting that although defendants as-
serted speedy-trial rights, they also ‘‘consumed six months by fil-
ing indisputably frivolous petitions for rehearing and for certio-
rari’’ and ‘‘also filled the District Court’s docket with repetitive
and unsuccessful motions’’), we are not convinced that it neces-
sarily implicates a waiver of speedy-trial rights. In this case, the
suppression motion appears to be one of the only motions filed by
the defense, it was timely filed, and it cannot be characterized as
frivolous given the district court’s order granting the motion.
Tellingly, the record indicates that Robles-Nieves wanted to pro-
ceed to trial and objected to a continuance that would have allowed
the judge who heard the suppression motion to make a decision on
the motion. Thus, at worst, the time consumed by the motion
weighs against Robles-Nieves, but we will not treat the motion as
a waiver of the right.

The final speedy-trial factor—prejudice to the defendant—is as-
sessed in light of the interests that the speedy-trial right was de-
signed to protect: ‘‘to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration,”
“to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and ‘“‘to limit
the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ Barker, 407
U.S. at 532. Robles-Nieves focuses on the first of these con-
cerns—he has been incarcerated for approximately 18 months away
from his family. We do not take this concern lightly. It is not, how-
ever, the most serious of the interests that the speedy-trial right was
designed to protect. The most serious of those interests is to limit
impairment to the defense caused by delay. Jd. There is no sug-
gestion that the delay has impaired the defense.

We must balance all of these speedy-trial factors to deter-
mine whether the stay requested by the State will irreparably harm
Robles-Nieves by infringing his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. On balance, we conclude that there has not been a speedy-
trial violation.? That balance could change because two of the fac-
tors are fluid—the length of the delay and the prejudice to the de-
fendant. By taking an interlocutory appeal and requesting a stay,
the State takes the risk that at some point the balance may tip
against it. But because the balance has not yet tipped, Robles-
Nieves has not demonstrated that granting the stay would result in
irreparable injury to him.

30f note, the district court denied a defense motion to dismiss based on a
speedy-trial violation a few weeks before the State filed its stay motion in this
court.

546 PO

Irreparable harm based on statutory speedy-trial right

P|

The asserted harm that will be suffered by Robles-Nieves if a
stay is granted also includes the statutory right to a trial within 60
days of arraignment. See NRS 178.556(1). We have recognized
that the 60-day rule set forth in NRS 178.556 is mandatory only
when there is a lack of good cause for the delay. Huebner v. State,
103 Nev. 29, 31, 731 P.2d 1330, 1332 (1987). Here, the good
cause for the delay mirrors the second of the Barker factors (the
reason for the delay). The Legislature has determined that the State
should have the right to appeal from an order granting a motion to
suppress evidence. NRS 177.015(2). That right would be severely
limited, if not effectively eliminated, were the delay attributable to
such an appeal not considered good cause for purposes of the 60-
day rule. We therefore conclude that unless the appeal is frivolous
or involves only a tangential issue, the State’s interlocutory appeal
under NRS 177.015(2) will be regarded as good cause for delay in
bringing a defendant to trial. Thus, similar to the constitutional
speedy-trial right, Robles-Nieves’ statutory right will not be ir-
reparably harmed if the stay is granted.

Likelihood of success on the merits

P|

The final consideration in whether to grant the motion for a stay
is the likelihood that the State will succeed on the merits. In some
circumstances, this stay factor is significant. But in the context of
an interlocutory appeal under NRS 177.015(2), we conclude that
it is far less significant than the first stay factor. As we have al-
ready explained, the first stay factor takes on added significance in
the context of an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a
suppression motion because denying a stay would effectively elim-
inate the right to appeal afforded by NRS 177.015(2). Because the
first stay factor weighs heavily in favor of a stay, the final factor
will counterbalance the first factor only when the appeal appears
to be frivolous or the stay sought purely for dilatory purposes. Cf.
Mikohn Gaming Corp. v. McCrea, 120 Nev. 248, 253, 89 P.3d 36,
40 (2004) (taking similar approach to stay analysis in interlocutory
appeal from order refusing to compel arbitration). We have already
observed in the context of the speedy-trial analysis related to the
third factor that the appeal here does not appear to be frivolous.
Regardless of whether we may ultimately agree with the State or
Robles-Nieves on the merits of the suppression issue, there is at
least a fair dispute as to whether our decision in Sheriff, Washoe
County v. Bessey, 112 Nev. 322, 914 P.2d 618 (1996), adopted a
tule that the use of extrinsic falsehoods in eliciting a confession is
coercive per se. As the district court observed in its order granting
the motion, Bessey adopted the rationale of another state court that

had recognized such a rule but did so in the context of the use of
intrinsic falsehoods and no Nevada case addresses extrinsic false-
hoods. Under the circumstances, we conclude that this factor does
not weigh strongly either way in the stay analysis.

Considering all of the stay factors, we conclude that the first
factor is most significant in this case. There has not been a suffi-
cient showing of irreparable harm to Robles-Nieves or that there
is not a likelihood of success on the merits to counterbalance that
factor—if a stay is denied and the trial commences, the object of
the appeal will be defeated as will the purpose of NRS 177.015(2).
We therefore grant the State’s motion and stay the trial pending
resolution of this appeal. In view of the concerns with disrupting
a criminal proceeding wherein a defendant has a constitutional and
statutory right to a speedy trial, and to the extent our docket per-
mits, we will expedite appeals from orders granting motions to
suppress evidence.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Curry, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

JOON S. MOON; anp PATTERSON LABORATORIES, INC., A
MICHIGAN CoRPORATION, APPELLANTS, v. MCDONALD,
CARANO & WILSON LLP, a Nevapa Limirep LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIP, RESPONDENT.

No. 58720
August 1, 2013 306 P.3d 406

Carl M. Hebert, Reno, for Appellants.

Piscevich & Fenner and Margo Piscevich and Mark J. Lenz,
Reno, for Respondent.

5S

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Harpgsty, J.:

The statute of limitations for a professional malpractice claim
against an attorney commences on the date the plaintiff discovers,
or through due diligence should have discovered, the material facts
that constitute the cause of action. NRS 11.207(1). The statutory
limitation period for a claim of legal malpractice involving the rep-
resentation of a client during litigation does not commence until
the underlying litigation is concluded. Hewitt v. Allen, 118 Nev.
216, 221, 43 P.3d 345, 348 (2002). In this appeal, we must de-
termine whether an attorney’s alleged negligence in representing a
creditor in the non-adversarial parts of a bankruptcy proceeding
constitutes litigation malpractice causing the so-called Hewitt liti-
gation tolling rule to apply. We conclude that it does not.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Patterson Laboratories, Inc. (PLI), operated a manu-
facturing facility in Phoenix, Arizona, and expanded its operations
with the purchase of land and a building in Goodyear, Arizona.
PLI later conveyed the Goodyear building and real property to its
president and principal shareholder, appellant Joon S. Moon. Pat-
terson West, Inc. (West), purchased PLI’s Goodyear operations;
however, Moon retained ownership of the facility and real property,
and West agreed to lease the Goodyear facility from Moon.

West executed a promissory note for $1,410,000, secured by
certain equipment, inventory, and other personal property sold to

°°

‘West and located at the Goodyear facility. West, which changed its
name to Sierra International, Inc. (Sierra), later defaulted on the
promissory note and the lease with Moon. Sierra filed a Chapter
7 voluntary petition in bankruptcy court in 2001, and appellants
hired respondent McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (MCW) in July
2002 to represent them in Sierra’s bankruptcy action.

In the bankruptcy case, appellants instructed MCW to have the
collateral removed from the Goodyear facility so that the facility
and real property could be sold without the equipment on the
premises. Allegedly, unbeknownst to appellants, MCW negotiated
with the bankruptcy trustee and counsel for Sierra to permit PLI to
take possession of the personal property secured as collateral.
Later, in November 2002, pursuant to a stipulation by the attorneys
and trustee, the lease of the Goodyear facility was terminated, and
PLI was permitted to take possession of the collateral. MCW’s
representation of appellants ended in February 2003, and on Octo-
ber 21, 2008, the bankruptcy court entered its final decree and
Sierra’s bankruptcy case was closed.

Moon also filed a district court action seeking relief for breach
of the promissory note executed by West and indemnity for an ac-
tion filed by the City of Goodyear against Moon based on a chem-
ical spill that occurred while Sierra was operating the Goodyear fa-
cility. Sierra and the other defendants in that action filed a motion
for partial summary judgment, requesting that the amount owed on
the promissory note and guarantee be offset by the value of the col-
lateral located at the Goodyear facility that had been returned to
PLI. Subsequently, on April 27, 2006, the district court issued an
order stating that upon appellants’ possession of the collateral, they
were required to dispose of the collateral in a commercially rea-
sonable manner, and all related proceeds were to offset the re-
mainder of the debt owed on the note. The district court ultimately
awarded damages to appellants, less the offset for the value of the
collateral returned to PLI. Appellants appealed, and this court
dismissed the matter pursuant to the parties’ stipulation on Febru-
ary 17, 2009.

Meanwhile, on November 3, 2006, appellants filed an action
against MCW, alleging professional negligence, breach of con-
tract, and vicarious liability (first complaint) arising from its
representation of appellants in Sierra’s bankruptcy action. In
2008, the district court dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice be-
cause appellants had failed to comply with the requirements of
NRCP 16.1(e)(2). Appellants appealed that decision, and this court
affirmed.

On October 20, 2010, appellants filed a second action against
MCW (second complaint), reasserting the claims in their first
complaint. In March 2011, MCW filed a motion to dismiss the
second complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing that the case

50

was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, NRS
11.207(1). MCW argued that NRS 11.207(1) governs appellants’
professional malpractice claim, and, based on the record, the ap-
propriate accrual date is November 3, 2006, the date of the filing
of the first complaint. In their opposition, appellants argued that
Hewitt governs the claim, and the appropriate accrual date is either
February 17, 2009, the date of the dismissal of the appeal in the
district court case, or October 21, 2008, the date of the final de-
cree in the bankruptcy case.

In April 2011, the district court granted MCW’s motion. In its
order, the district court rejected February 17, 2009, as the accrual
date because the alleged action constituting malpractice did not
occur as part of the state court case. It also rejected October 21,
2008, as the accrual date, citing Cannon v. Hirsch Law Office,
PC., 213 P.3d 320, 328 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), and holding that
Hewitt was inapplicable because a bankruptcy proceeding does not
constitute litigation. It then held that November 3, 2006, was the
appropriate accrual date because NRS 11.207(1) governed the
claim and appellants were cognizant of the material facts that
made up their current malpractice action as early as that date. Be-
cause appellants filed their second complaint on October 20, 2010,
the district court concluded that the complaint was untimely
and the statute of limitations barred its consideration. This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

“This court reviews de novo a district court’s order granting
a motion to dismiss, and such an order will not be upheld unless
it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set
of facts . . . [that] would entitle him [or her] to relief’? Munda
vy. Summerlin Life & Health Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 918, 923, 267
P.3d 771, 774 (2011) (alterations in original) (internal quotations
omitted).

The district court did not err by granting MCW’s motion to dismiss
based upon NRS 11.207(1)

NRS 11.207(1) sets forth the statute of limitations for a profes-
sional malpractice claim and contains a so-called ‘‘discovery
tule’: ‘‘[aJn action against an attorney . . . to recover damages for
malpractice . . . must be commenced . . . within 2 years after the
plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the material facts which constitute the cause of ac-
tion.” The timely filing of a professional malpractice claim may be
subject to the litigation malpractice tolling rule. In Hewitt v. Allen,
this court held that

1

[iJn the context of litigation malpractice, that is, legal mal-
practice committed in the representation of a party to a law-
suit, damages do not begin to accrue until the underlying
legal action has been resolved. Thus, when the malpractice is
alleged to have caused an adverse ruling in an underlying ac-
tion, the malpractice action does not accrue while an appeal
from the adverse ruling is pending.

118 Nev. at 221, 43 P.3d at 348 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, appellants argue that the district court erred by hold-
ing that a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litigation.
They rely on Guillot v. Smith, 998 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App. 1999),
in support of their argument.! MCW contends that, based on Can-
non, the district court properly ruled that bankruptcy proceedings
do not constitute litigation. Alternatively, it argues that appellants’
reliance on Guillot is misplaced.

Non-adversarial bankruptcy proceedings do not constitute
litigation for purposes of the litigation malpractice tolling
rule

Whether bankruptcy proceedings constitute litigation for pur-
poses of the litigation malpractice tolling rule is an issue of first
impression for this court, and we thus examine how other juris-
dictions have addressed the issue.

In Cannon, an attorney was retained to protect a creditor’s in-
terests in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action. 213 P.3d at 322. After
the bankruptcy action ended, the creditor filed a complaint against
the attorney, asserting a claim of professional malpractice based on
the attorney’s allegedly improper representation in the bankruptcy
proceedings. Jd. at 323. Like Nevada, Arizona has a general dis-
covery rule and a litigation malpractice tolling rule. Jd. at 323-24.
The trial court applied the discovery rule and dismissed the cred-
itor’s complaint as untimely. Id. at 323.

On appeal, the Cannon court recognized that bankruptcy pro-
ceedings may contain both adversarial and non-adversarial portions
and held that ‘‘an attorney’s alleged negligence while representing
a creditor in the non-adversarial portions of bankruptcy proceed-
ings does not occur in the course of ‘litigation} as that term is used.
for purposes of the accrual of an attorney malpractice action.’’ Id.
at 325, 327-28 (emphasis added). It further held that ‘‘[t]here is a
bright-line test to distinguish between the non-adversarial and ad-

‘Appellants also cite to two other cases to support their argument that other
jurisdictions have virtually all held that bankruptcy proceedings constitute lit-
igation. However, our review of those cases reveals that only one of the cited
cases supports their argument. See Kellogg v. Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley,
Banick & Strickroot, P.A., 807 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(applying the litigation malpractice rule to a professional malpractice claim
arising from bankruptcy proceedings).

rs

versarial portions of a bankruptcy proceeding: adversarial pro-
ceedings begin when a creditor files a complaint in a bankruptcy
action.’ Jd. at 328 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 (‘“‘Commence-
ment of Adversary Proceeding’’)). It then affirmed the trial court’s
decision to apply the discovery rule because, although the bank-
ruptcy action was converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding, the cred-
itor never filed a complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at
322-23, 328.

Although MCW, as counsel for appellants, rejected the unex-
pired lease, the record here indicates that the rejection of the un-
expired lease was resolved by stipulation of the parties and no ad-
versarial proceeding was filed. By definition, the proceedings are
non-adversarial. Thus, the proceeding constitutes an uncontested
matter because MCW and the appellants resolved the rejection
without the filing of a complaint in the bankruptcy action.”

We conclude that the lease rejection did not constitute an ad-
versarial proceeding. Thus, applying the Cannon court’s analysis
we adopt today to the facts of this case, we conclude that Sierra’s
bankruptcy action did not constitute an adversarial proceeding. The
district court therefore properly granted MCW’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to the discovery rule articulated in NRS 11.207(1). See
Cannon, 213 P.3d at 322-23, 328 (upholding application of the dis-
covery rule in the absence of a complaint).

Appellants rely on Guillot, arguing that the district court erred
by holding that a bankruptcy proceeding does not constitute litiga-
tion. In Guillot, the Texas Court of Appeals was not presented with
the question of whether a bankruptcy proceeding constituted ‘‘lit-
igation’’ for purposes of the litigation malpractice tolling rule.
998 S.W.2d at 632 n.2. Nevertheless, it noted that

a bankruptcy proceeding is ‘‘litigation’’ [because] . . . [t]he
client would still be forced to assert inconsistent positions in
the bankruptcy and malpractice action, and be left to either
hire new counsel or continue to allow an attorney who may
have committed malpractice to represent him in the underly-
ing action.

Additionally, appellants argue that under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure (FRBP) Sierra’s bankruptcy action was adversarial in nature, and
thus constituted litigation. Appellants refer to the rejection of the lease and
specifically contend that under FRBP 6006, “‘[a] proceeding to assume, reject,
or assign an executory contract or unexpired lease, other than as part of a
plan, is governed by Rule 9014,” and Rule 9014 sets forth the procedures for
seeking relief ‘‘[iJn a contested matter’’ We determine that these rules that ap-
pellant relies on address the procedure for bankruptcy proceedings that are
contested. However, because we determine that the rejection of the lease was
not a contested matter and thus this was not a contested bankruptcy proceed-
ing, this argument lacks merit.

 :

Id. The court held that ‘‘the statute of limitations on [the client’s]
malpractice claim against [the attorney] was tolled during the pen-
dency of [the attorney’s] representation of [the client] in an ongo-
ing bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at 633.

Appellants contend that Guillot supports their argument that
their malpractice claims were tolled until the February 17, 2009,
dismissal of the appeal in the district court case or the October 21,
2008, final decree in the bankruptcy case. We determine that ap-
pellants’ reliance upon Guillot is misplaced. The Guillot court’s
discussion of the potential application of the litigation malpractice
tolling rule in that case was based on a presumption of the attor-
ney’s continued representation of the client. It is undisputed by the
parties that MCW only represented appellants in Sierra’s bank-
tuptcy action from July 2002 to February 2003, when it was dis-
qualified from representing appellants by the bankruptcy court.
Appellants’ professional malpractice claim would therefore not be
tolled by the litigation malpractice tolling rule after February 2003,
even if this court were to conclude that the bankruptcy proceeding
in this case qualified as litigation.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did
not err by granting MCW’s motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS
11.207(1), and we thus affirm the district court’s judgment.?

PICKERING, C.J., and Sarrta, J., concur.

2On appeal, appellants also argue that the district court abused its discretion
by granting MCW’s motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. Appellants assert that MCW waived the argument of judicial estop-
pel below by raising it for the first time in its reply in support of its motion to
dismiss. See Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C., 127 Nev. 657, 671 n.7, 262
P.3d 705, 715 n.7 (2011) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in [a] reply
brief need not be considered.’’). However, we determine that MCW did not
waive the argument of judicial estoppel. Based on the record, MCW’s judicial
estoppel argument was made in response to an argument made by appellants
in their opposition to MCW’s motion to dismiss.

Regardless, we conclude that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplica-
ble to this matter because the record indicates that the district court dismissed
appellants’ first complaint on procedural grounds, and, therefore, appellants
never successfully asserted their first position. See S. Cal. Edison v. First Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 276, 285-86, 255 P.3d 231, 237 (2011) (holding
that judicial estoppel may apply only if a party was successful in asserting its
first position). Thus, we determine that the district court abused its discretion
by granting MCW’s motion to dismiss based upon the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. Nevertheless, because the district court properly granted MCW’s mo-
tion to dismiss based on NRS 11.207(1), such abuse was harmless error. See
Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 451, 244 P.3d 765, 769 (2010) (an error is
harmless if the party cannot ‘‘demonstrate that their substantial rights were af-
fected so that, but for the error, a different result may have been reached’’).

554

MUHAMMAD Q. KHAN, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND MAIMOONA Q.
KHAN, AN INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS, v. QADIR BAKHSH,
AN INDIVIDUAL, RESPONDENT.

No. 60262
August 1, 2013 306 P.3d 411

Michael H. Singer, Ltd., and Michael H. Singer, Las Vegas, for
Appellants.

Agwara & Associates and Liborius I. Agwara and George A.
Maglares, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

555

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Cuerry, J.:

At the bench trial in this case, Muhammad Q. and Maimoona
Q. Khan presented evidence of an allegedly written, but lost or de-
stroyed, agreement between the Khans and Qadir Bakhsh to pur-
chase a certain restaurant and land from Bakhsh. The district
court excluded this evidence under the statute of frauds because the
Khans failed to produce the written agreement. The question in
dispute is whether the district court erred when it applied the
statute of frauds to preclude consideration of the Khans’ evidence
regarding the existence and terms of the allegedly lost or destroyed
written agreement. We conclude that the statute of frauds does not
apply to a writing that is subsequently lost or destroyed, and oral
evidence is admissible to prove the existence and terms of that lost
or destroyed writing. Thus, we reverse the district court’s order
and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings.

FACTS

Respondent Qadir Bakhsh owned a restaurant and the real prop-
erty on which it was located, which appellants Muhammad Q. and
Maimoona Q. Khan agreed to purchase. The parties’ first buy-and-
sell agreement provided that the Khans would purchase the prop-
erty for $600,000 by paying off Bakhsh’s outstanding first and sec-
ond mortgages. Both parties agreed that subsequent second and
third agreements existed, and the third agreement set a purchase
price of $990,000, wherein the Khans would pay off the $600,000
outstanding first and second mortgages and execute a $390,000
promissory note in favor of Bakhsh. This third agreement and
promissory note proceeded through escrow and, according to
Bakhsh, was the operative agreement between the parties. The
Khans never made any payments on the $390,000 promissory

556 ee

note, and Bakhsh eventually initiated the underlying suit against the
Khans to recover the principal and unpaid interest.

At the bench trial, the Khans presented evidence that a fourth
agreement existed, which again set the purchase price for the
property at $600,000. According to the Khans, the only executed
copy of this agreement was given to a third party, Tahir Abbas
Shah, for safekeeping. After relations between Bakhsh and the
Khans deteriorated, Bakhsh’s brother allegedly stole the signed
copy of the fourth agreement from Shah. Shah testified that when
he confronted Bakhsh about the stolen fourth agreement, Bakhsh
initially agreed to return it, but never did so.

Bakhsh contended that the fourth agreement never existed, and
that the third agreement and the promissory note, under which
the purchase proceeded through escrow, contained the agreed-upon
purchase price and terms of the sale. The Khans maintained that
the fourth agreement, while stolen and allegedly destroyed
by Bakhsh or his brother, was the actual agreement between the
parties, or alternatively that the third agreement was fraudulently
induced.

In its order after the bench trial, the district court refused to
consider most of the evidence that the Khans presented. The court
found that the Khans’ evidence of the destroyed fourth agreement
was barred by the statute of frauds because it was an ‘‘unwritten’””
agreement for the purchase of property. The district court also
found that Muhammad Khan’s testimony about terms that differed
from the terms of the third agreement was barred by the parol ev-
idence rule. After declining to consider this evidence, the district
court found that the Khans breached the third agreement and en-
tered judgment in favor of Bakhsh. The district court awarded
Bakhsh monetary damages of $390,000 plus interest for the Khans’
failure to pay the $390,000 promissory note, $20,000 for Bakhsh’s
remaining interest in the restaurant, $585,000 in liquidated dam-
ages pursuant to a provision in the third agreement, and $1,359.77
in costs. The Khans appealed.

DISCUSSION

We begin our review of the issues presented in this appeal by ex-
amining the district court’s application of the statute of frauds and
the parol evidence rule, before addressing the damages award.

Application of evidentiary rules
Statute of frauds

The Khans argue that the district court erred when it applied the
statute of frauds to bar their evidence of a fourth written contract
that they alleged was later stolen and destroyed. We agree with the

Pe 537

Khans that the statute of frauds does not bar oral evidence of such
a contract.

Nevada’s statute of frauds provides that every contract for the
sale of land is void unless the contract is in writing, and thus, oral
agreements to convey real property cannot be enforced. NRS
111.205(1); see also Butler v. Lovoll, 96 Nev. 931, 934-35, 620
P.2d 1251, 1253 (1980). Because the Khans did not present a writ-
ing evidencing the fourth agreement, the district court deemed it an
“‘unwritten’’ agreement and applied the statute of frauds to bar the
Khans’ evidence of the fourth agreement. But the Khans did not al-
lege that the fourth agreement was oral or unwritten. Instead, they
presented testimony, from themselves and Shah, and documentary
evidence regarding the existence and terms of a fourth written
agreement, which was allegedly subsequently lost or destroyed by
Bakhsh. Because this evidence pertained to the existence and terms
of an allegedly written agreement, the statute of frauds is satisfied
and this evidence is admissible. See Lutz v. Gatlin, 590 P.2d 359,
361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).

P|

The admissibility of evidence concerning a written agreement is
not affected by the subsequent loss or destruction of such an agree-
ment. Its loss or destruction does not render it ‘unwritten’ and
the evidence of its existence and terms barred by the statute of
frauds. Id. Indeed, when one party allegedly stole or destroyed the
agreement, as the Khans allege Bakhsh did here, that party may
not use the statute of frauds to sanction his obliteration of the
agreement to the detriment of the other party. See Baker v. Mohr,
826 P.2d 111, 113 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). Thus, in this case, the dis-
trict court erred when it found that the statute of frauds barred the
Khans’ evidence of the existence and terms of the alleged fourth
written agreement. Edwards Indus., Inc. v. DTE/BTE, Inc., 112
Nev. 1025, 1033, 923 P.2d 569, 574 (1996) (stating that the dis-
trict court’s application of the statute of frauds is a question of law,
which this court reviews de novo). Accordingly, the Khans were
entitled to present parol or other evidence to prove the existence
and contents of the allegedly lost or destroyed fourth agreement.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Shaffer, 310 F.2d 668, 674-75
(10th Cir. 1962); Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Wash. Square,
Inc., 414 A.2d 834, 840 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980). We therefore re-
verse that portion of the district court’s judgment.

Parol evidence

The Khans also argue that the district court abused its discretion
by applying the parol evidence rule to bar Muhammad Khan’s and
Shah’s testimony regarding terms contrary to the third agreement

558 —

to show that the third agreement was induced by fraud. The parol
evidence rule generally bars extrinsic evidence regarding prior or
contemporaneous agreements that are contrary to the terms of an
integrated contract. Crow-Spieker No. 23 v. Robinson, 97 Nev.
302, 305, 629 P.2d 1198, 1199 (1981). Extrinsic or oral evi-
dence, however, is admissible to prove fraud in the inducement of
an agreement, Golden Press, Inc. v. Pac. Freeport Warehouse Co.,
97 Nev. 163, 164, 625 P.2d 578, 578 (1981), to establish a sub-
sequent alteration of an agreement, M.C. Multi-Family Dev. v.
Crestdale Assocs. Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 914, 193 P.3d 536, 545
(2008), or to prove the existence and terms of a written, but lost
or destroyed, agreement. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
310 F.2d at 674-75. Thus, the district court’s application of the
parol evidence rule to exclude testimony that was inconsistent with
the terms of the third agreement, but that was offered as evidence
that the third agreement was procured by fraud or that the subse-
quent fourth agreement was reached and memorialized in writing,
but later lost or destroyed, was an abuse of discretion. M.C. Multi-
Family Dev., 124 Nev. at 913-14, 193 P.3d at 544-45 (providing
that the district court’s application of the parol evidence rule is re-
viewed for an abuse of discretion). We therefore reverse the district
court’s order to the extent that it excluded this evidence. Because
we address only the district court’s error in excluding admissible
evidence, on remand, the district court should independently weigh
the admissible evidence and enter a new judgment accordingly.

Liquidated damages
P|

While we reverse and remand this case based upon the eviden-
tiary errors, we also address the Khans’ argument that the district
court improperly awarded liquidated damages to Bakhsh because
the liquidated damages provision was a penalty. ‘‘[L]iquidated
damage provisions are prima facie valid?’ Haromy v. Sawyer, 98
Nev. 544, 546, 654 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1982), and serve as a good-
faith effort to fix the amount of damages when contractual damages
are uncertain or immeasurable. Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268
Ltd., 106 Nev. 429, 435, 795 P.2d 493, 496-97 (1990).

In this case, the liquidated damages provision in the third agree-
ment required the breaching party to pay additional damages of
“150% of actual damages.’ Thus, by its very terms, this liquidated
damages clause requires ascertaining actual damages and imposes
additional damages as a penalty for breach. Such a penalty for
breach of an agreement is an unenforceable penalty. See Mason v.
Fakhimi, 109 Nev. 1153, 1156-57, 865 P.2d 333, 335 (1993);
Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co., 106 Nev. at 435, 795 P.2d at 497. Ap-
plying the de novo review appropriate to liquidated damages
awards, Dynalectric Co. of Nev., Inc. v. Clark & Sullivan Con-

Po 559

structors, Inc., 127 Nev. 480, 483, 255 P.3d 286, 288 (2011), we
conclude that the district court erred in awarding liquidated dam-
ages to Bakhsh because actual damages were ascertainable and the
provision here operated as a penalty. Am. Fire & Safety, Inc. v.
City of N. Las Vegas, 109 Nev. 357, 359-60, 849 P.2d 352, 354
(1993) (providing that the interpretation of contractual provisions,
including liquidated damages, are reviewed de novo unless the in-
terpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence). We
therefore reverse this determination.

CONCLUSION

The district court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds to ex-
clude evidence concerning the existence and terms of a fourth
written, but allegedly lost or destroyed, agreement. Likewise, it
improperly excluded evidence concerning whether the third agree-
ment was induced by fraud or modified by a subsequent agreement
because the parol evidence rule does not preclude such evidence.
In addition, because actual damages were ascertainable and the liq-
uidated damages provision operated as a penalty, the district court
erred by awarding liquidated damages. For these reasons, we re-
verse the judgment of the district court and remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
DELBERT M. GREENE, RESPONDENT.

No. 61674
August 1, 2013 307 P.3d 322

560

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellant.

Delbert M. Greene, Ely, in Proper Person.'

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Cuerry, J.:

The district court determined that respondent Delbert M.
Greene received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentenc-
ing hearing and granted his untimely and successive fifth post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court
also directed Greene’s counsel to draft the order granting the pe-
tition but refused to provide an explanation for its decision. We
take this opportunity to reiterate that when the district court directs
a prevailing party to draft an order resolving a post-conviction pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus, it must provide sufficient direc-
tion regarding the basis for its decision to enable the prevailing
party to draft the order. Because we also conclude that the district
court erroneously determined that Greene established good cause
sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to a consideration of his

‘Respondent Delbert Greene was assisted by counsel, Marc Picker, in the
proceedings below. After briefing by counsel was completed in this appeal, we
granted Picker’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Greene.

fT

po 561

petition on the merits, we reverse the order granting his petition
and affording him a new sentencing hearing.

I. Background

On June 7, 2002, Greene participated in the robbery of a change
attendant at a grocery store in Las Vegas, and after a three-day jury
trial, he was convicted of burglary while in the possession of a
deadly weapon (count I), conspiracy to commit robbery (count Il),
and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon (count III).? At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a prison term of 36-156
months for count I, a consecutive prison term of 18-60 months for
count II, and a prison term of 48-180 months plus an equal and
consecutive term for the deadly weapon enhancement for count II;
the court, however, erroneously ordered the sentence for count III
to run concurrently with count I but consecutively to the sentence
for count II even though the sentence for count II was ordered to
tun consecutively to the sentence for count I. Additionally, the
written judgment of conviction failed to mention the sentence im-
posed for the deadly weapon enhancement. We identified these er-
rors on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and re-
manded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.
Greene y. State, Docket No. 42110 (Order Affirming in Part and
Remanding, May 18, 2004).

On remand, the trial court imposed the prison terms for the
three counts to run consecutively and entered an amended judg-
ment of conviction. Greene appealed. We rejected Greene’s claims
and affirmed the amended judgment of conviction. Greene v. State,
Docket No. 43628 (Order of Affirmance, August 24, 2005). No-
tably, neither party at the time provided this court with the tran-
script of the resentencing hearing for review.

While Greene’s appeal from the amended judgment of con-
viction was pending, he filed his first, and only timely, post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court.?
Greene filed the petition in proper person and raised several
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and direct-appeal claims,
including an issue that he previously raised on direct appeal (the
admission of a letter that he wrote to his former codefendant),‘ but

The Honorable Valerie Adair, District Judge, presided over the trial.

3For unknown reasons, Greene filed the same petition again three days later.
This is why, in subsequent proceedings both below and in this court, there is
reference to Greene’s petitions filed on February 4, 2005, and February 7,
2005.

“The direct-appeal claims were waived. See NRS 34.810(1)(b); Franklin v.
State, 110 Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (‘{C]laims that are ap-
propriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they will be
considered waived in subsequent proceedings.”), overruled on other grounds
by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999).

Fe

562 P|

he did not raise any issues pertaining to the resentencing hearing
or amended judgment of conviction. The petition was considered
by the judge who presided over the trial. The judge declined to ap-
point counsel to represent Greene or conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing, see NRS 34.750(1); NRS 34.770, and with very little discus-
sion of the issues raised, entered an order denying his petition. We
affirmed the order. Greene v. State, Docket No. 45127 (Order of
Affirmance, September 16, 2005).

Nearly three years later, Greene filed his second post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court. Like the first
petition, this one was filed in proper person. This time, Greene
raised issues pertaining to his resentencing hearing. Among other
things, Greene claimed that his appointed counsel failed to appear
for the resentencing hearing and, instead, sent an associate who
was not prepared or familiar with his case. Greene also claimed
that his sentence was improperly increased by the amended judg-
ment of conviction. To excuse the procedural bars to the petition,
Greene claimed he was unaware that his collateral challenge to
the conviction in federal court had been resolved or that he could
proceed in state court while the federal proceeding was pending.
Once again, the petition was heard by the judge who presided over
the trial, and the judge declined to appoint counsel to repre-
sent Greene or conduct an evidentiary hearing, and denied his
petition after finding ‘‘it is time barred with no good cause shown
for [the] delay’’ or its successiveness. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS
34.810(1)(b), (2)-(3). On appeal, we agreed that Greene failed to
demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented
him from complying with the procedural default rules, see Hath-
away v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); see
also Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230
(1989), abrogated by statute on other grounds as recognized by
State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 197 n.2, 275 P.3d 91, 95 n.2
(2012), however, we also identified a clerical error in the amended
judgment of conviction. The amended judgment of conviction or-
dered “‘Count DI TO RUN CONSECUTIVE to Counts II and I’’
rather than consecutively to counts I and I. Therefore, while we
affirmed the order denying Greene’s petition, we remanded the
matter to correct the clerical error as permitted by NRS 176.565.
Greene v. State, Docket No. 52584 (Order of Affirmance and Re-
mand to Correct Judgment of Conviction, August 25, 2009).

Approximately one week later, the trial court entered a second
amended judgment of conviction clarifying that “COUNT 3 is to
run CONSECUTIVE to COUNTS 1 & 2, NOT as to Counts 2 &
3 as stated in the Amended Judgment of Conviction.’’ Sure
enough, Greene filed two more post-conviction petitions for writs
of habeas corpus in the district court raising several issues related
to the entry of the second amended judgment of conviction. Both

po 563

petitions were filed in proper person and were heard by the trial
judge who again declined to appoint counsel to represent Greene or
conduct an evidentiary hearing and summarily denied the petitions
without any discussion of the claims raised or his good cause
arguments. We consolidated the cases on appeal and affirmed
the order. Greene v. State, Docket Nos. 56013/56546 (Order of
Affirmance, November 8, 2010). We determined that Greene’s pe-
titions were untimely, successive, and an abuse of the writ, see
NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34,.810(1)(b)(2), (2), and we expressly re-
jected Greene’s good cause and prejudice arguments. We noted that
the correction of the clerical mistake did not provide Greene with
good cause. See Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. 537, 540-41, 96 P.3d
761, 764 (2004). We concluded that (1) Greene was not entitled
to counsel when the error was corrected because the proceeding
did not implicate any substantial rights, see Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 134 (1967); (2) the proceeding to correct the error did
not amount to a sentencing hearing requiring his presence and
there was no demonstration of prejudice, see Gallego v. State, 117
Nev. 348, 367-68, 23 P.3d 227, 240 (2001), abrogated on other
grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235 (2011);
and (3) the second amended judgment did not improperly increase
his sentence. We also concluded that Greene failed to demonstrate
that he was denied his right to a direct appeal from the second
amended judgment of conviction. See Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev.
956, 959, 964 P.2d 785, 787 (1998).

II. The instant petition

On April 3, 2012, more than six and a half years after we af-
firmed his amended judgment of conviction, Greene filed the in-
stant petition—his fifth post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. For the first time, the petition was filed with the assistance
of counsel. Like the three petitions that preceded it, this petition
was untimely, successive, and an abuse of the writ. See NRS
34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2), (2). The petition, however, failed
to allege good cause and prejudice to excuse those procedural
bars. Instead, the petition focused on the substantive issue of coun-
sel’s performance at the resentencing hearing, claiming that coun-
sel ‘‘sent an associate attorney who openly admitted to having no
knowledge of the case and made no argument of any kind on Mr.
GREENE’s behalf against the District Court adding an additional
twenty-eight (28) years to his sentence.’’ The petition provided no
basis for this claim or the characterization of trial counsel’s per-
formance: it did not provide a citation to the resentencing hearing
transcript or include a copy of that transcript. Even though Greene
was never represented by counsel in connection with his first four
petitions, the new petition erroneously asserted that prior ‘‘coun-
sel’’ failed to raise the issues set forth in the fifth petition. And the

564 PO

petition failed to acknowledge that the claim about counsel’s per-
formance at the resentencing hearing was raised in Greene’s sec-
ond habeas petition. Without cogent argument or citation to any
legal authority, Greene’s post-conviction counsel asserted that as a
result of the resentencing, Greene’s sentence was improperly en-
hanced by ‘‘two different offenses . . . on the basis of the same
fact of the presence of a weapon,’’ thus violating ‘the Fifth
Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.’ The gist of his
argument, it seems, was that the resentencing changed Greene’s
parole eligibility dates. In its motion to dismiss the petition, the
State argued laches and pointed out that the same issues were
raised in Greene’s second petition. In his response to the State’s
motion to dismiss, Greene extended his double-jeopardy claim to
include issues related to the correction of the clerical error and
entry of the second amended judgment of conviction. Greene also
conceded that his claims were ‘‘arguably successive.’’

I. The hearing and first appellate issue

For the first time, one of Greene’s habeas petitions would not be
heard by the judge who presided over the trial. This time, the
habeas petition was heard by the Honorable James M. Bixler, Dis-
trict Judge. When the district court held a hearing on the petition,
Greene was not present and his attorney appeared telephonically.
After the court briefly summarized Greene’s ineffective-assistance
argument and heard a few introductory remarks from Greene’s
counsel, the court immediately rejected Greene’s double-jeopardy
claim, stating, ‘‘I don’t think that’s ever going to have any legs to
it, to be honest with you.’ After further discussion, the court
noted that the untimely and successive nature of Greene’s petition
was ‘‘problematic,’’ and the good-cause argument articulated at the
hearing by Greene’s counsel—that prior counsel’s deficient per-
formance at the resentencing hearing was never ‘‘appropriately”’
addressed and is not ‘‘attributable’’ to him—was not sufficient.
Nevertheless, the court asked Greene’s counsel, ‘‘{H]ow do you
write this up so that you can defend at the Supreme Court my de-
cision that you have established good cause for the granting of the
writ?’’ Counsel answered that “‘the spin’’ would be that the delay
in filing the petition was not Greene’s fault ‘‘and that he will be
unduly prejudiced by the dismissal of this petition.’ The State ar-
gued that “‘the one thing you cannot put a spin on is the fact [that]
in order to show good cause, you have to show an impediment ex-
ternal [to the] defense,’ and ‘‘there is no way to get around’’ the
fact that ‘‘the one person throughout this entire proceeding [who]
has clearly known what his sentence was, is [Greene].””

The district court concluded, ‘‘I am going to regret this, but I
am granting your petition. . . . It is not [the] correct thing, but it

Po 565

is the right thing.’”’ The State asked the judge if he could ‘‘just ar-
ticulate the grounds under which you are granting the petition.’
The judge refused to provide a reason, explaining, ‘‘I am going to
wait to [see] the language in the order. I don’t know that I am
going to be able to articulate it sufficiently?’ The district court then
directed Greene’s counsel to draft the order, and stated, “‘[I]f I
agree, I will sign that order.’ The district court scheduled a third
sentencing hearing for Greene approximately four and a half
months later because ‘‘I have a feeling you are going to be hear-
ing more about this case before November.’

a

On appeal, the State contends that the district court erred by di-
recting Greene’s counsel to draft the order granting the petition
while refusing to explain its ruling. The State argues that “‘[t]his
was an improper delegation of the Court’s duty to articulate spe-
cific grounds for its ruling before empowering the prevailing party
to draft Findings.’’ We agree. As we stated in Byford v. State, 123
Nev. 67, 70, 156 P.3d 691, 693 (2007), ‘‘the district court should
have . . . either drafted its own findings of fact and conclusions of
Jaw or announced them to the parties with sufficient specificity to
provide guidance to the prevailing party in drafting a proposed
order.’ (Emphasis added.) Here, the district court did not make
any express findings in support of its determination and provided
no guidance for the prevailing party, and we conclude that this was
improper.

IV. The district court’s order and second appellate issue

The State contends that the district court erred by finding that
Greene demonstrated good cause and prejudice sufficient to over-
come the procedural bars to a consideration of his habeas petition
on the merits. We agree.

|

To reiterate, Greene’s petition is subject to several procedural
bars. Greene filed his fifth habeas petition more than six and a half
years after this court affirmed his amended judgment of conviction
on direct appeal and issued its remittitur. Thus, Greene’s petition
was untimely. See NRS 34.726(1). Greene’s petition was also suc-
cessive because he previously filed habeas petitions on at least four
occasions, and the instant petition seeks to relitigate claims related
to his resentencing hearing that were raised in his second habeas
petition, which itself was untimely and successive. See NRS
34.810(2). The order granting Greene’s fifth petition states that the
grounds were not previously raised ‘‘due to ineffective assistance
of prior counsel’ even though Greene filed all of his prior peti-

566 Po

tions in proper person and Greene conceded in his response to the
State’s motion to dismiss that the claims were ‘‘arguably succes-
sive.’”’ The order fails to address the successive nature of Greene’s
petition,’ the relitigation of previously raised claims,® or the State’s
argument that laches precluded consideration of Greene’s petition
on the merits, see NRS 34.800(2).

Most importantly, we conclude that the district court erred by
finding that Greene demonstrated good cause sufficient to excuse
the procedural bars to his petition. See State v. Huebler, 128 Nev.
192, 197, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (‘‘We give deference to the dis-
trict court’s factual findings regarding good cause, but we will re-
view the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo.’”’);
see also NRS 34.810(3)(a). The order based its good-cause deter-
mination on several factual inaccuracies and representations that
are not supported by or contained within the record. For example,
the order notes that Greene’s fifth petition was untimely but de-
termines that ‘‘Defendant has shown good cause . . . based upon
the ineffective assistance of prior counsel to raise these issues in
prior petitions.’ We noted in the paragraph above the errors con-
tained within this statement. The district court also found that
“several revisions to Defendant’s Judgment of Conviction have oc-
curred which is further good cause for the delay.’ That finding,
however, does not explain Greene’s failure to include issues related
to his resentencing hearing in his first, timely habeas petition, or
the fact that he waited another three years before raising those is-
sues in his second habeas petition. To the extent that ‘‘several re-
visions’ includes issues related to the entry of the second amended
judgment of conviction, we note that we already concluded in his
appeal from the denial of his third and fourth petitions that the cor-
rection of the clerical error did not provide Greene with good
cause. Our decision is the law of the case on that point. See Hall
v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 535 P.2d 797 (1975). Because Greene failed
to demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense pre-
vented him from complying with the procedural-default rules, the
district court abused its discretion by considering the merits of his

*The order only mentions Greene’s first, timely habeas petition and the
claims raised therein. There is no mention or reference to the three untimely
and successive petitions denied by Judge Adair. The order does list four addi-
tional petitions filed in federal court, three purportedly dismissed for proce-
dural reasons and one “‘being held in abeyance pending outcome of the instant
Petition.”

To the extent that any part of Greene’s argument below could be construed
as newly raised, he failed to demonstrate cause for the failure to raise the ar-
gument earlier and, therefore, we conclude that it constitutes an abuse of the
writ. See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2), (2).

es 567

claims. See Hathaway vy. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503,
506 (2003).

|

‘We also conclude that the district court erred by determining that
there was merit to Greene’s ineffective-assistance claim. There is
no indication in the record that the district court reviewed a tran-
script of the resentencing hearing, no evidentiary hearing on
Greene’s petition was conducted, therefore, no testimony from
Greene or former counsel was heard. We also note that a transcript
of the resentencing hearing was never provided to us for consider-
ation. Regardless of the merits of Greene’s claim, based on all of
the above, we conclude that the district court erred by granting
Greene’s petition and ordering a third sentencing hearing. Ac-
cordingly, we reverse the order of the district court and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

DEYUNDREA ORLANDO HOLMES, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 58947
August 22, 2013 306 P.3d 415

[Rehearing denied September 20, 2013]
[En banc reconsideration denied November 22, 2013]

w
a

8

Law Office of Richard F. Cornell and Benjamin D. Cornell,
Reno, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City;
Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Terrence P.
McCarthy, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for
Respondent.

Before PICKERING, C.J., Harpesty and Sarrta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

Appellant Deyundrea ‘‘Khali’? Holmes appeals his conviction of
first-degree murder and robbery. He argues that the fairness of his
trial was compromised by the district court’s erroneous admission
into evidence of: (1) inflammatory rap lyrics Holmes wrote while
in jail in California; (2) a coconspirator’s out-of-court statement
that Holmes ‘‘went off’’ and ‘‘just started shooting’’; and (3) un-

570 Ee

warned statements that Holmes made to the Nevada detectives
who interviewed him in California before his arrest. We reject
these and Holmes’s other assignments of error and affirm.

1

Kevin ‘‘Mo’’ Nelson was a drug dealer who operated out of a
recording studio in Reno, Nevada. Holmes plotted with Max Reed
and others, including Jaffar ‘‘G’’ Richardson, to steal drugs and
money from Nelson. The night of the robbery, Holmes and Reed
went to the studio. No one was there, so Reed called Richardson,
who regularly did business with Nelson, and asked Richardson to
call Nelson and lure him to the studio on the pretense of a
methamphetamine sale. Soon after Richardson made the call, Nel-
son arrived with a friend, Kenny Clark.

Two men wearing ski masks and black clothes (later identified
as Holmes and Reed) accosted Nelson and Clark in the studio’s
parking lot. Nelson tried to fight them off. At one point the fight
moved into Clark’s SUV, where Nelson managed to stash his
money and drugs under the passenger seat. In the fight, Nelson’s
pockets were ‘‘bunny-eared’”’ (turned inside out). His assailant
tore off Nelson’s shirt and chain necklace, pistol-whipped him, and
then tried to drag Nelson from the parking lot into the studio with-
out success. Frustrated, Nelson’s assailant removed his ski mask
and said, “‘I’m going to shoot this {@#$ing guy,’ which he did.
Nelson staggered, then fell and died. Clark managed to call 911
and flee.

The police investigated and took witness statements from Clark
and other eyewitnesses, but could not initially identify the two as-
sailants. They did find a fresh, unweathered cigarette butt near the
scene, from which the crime lab extracted a DNA sample. But the
sample did not produce a database match, so the case went cold.

Three years later, a routine database search matched the DNA
from the cigarette to a sample Holmes gave California parole au-
thorities. Nevada detectives traveled to California to interview
Holmes at his parole officer’s office. Holmes denied having been
to Reno except once for “‘Hot August Nights’’—Nelson was killed
on a snowy November night. The detectives arrested Holmes and
charged him with murder and robbery. While in jail awaiting ex-
tradition, Holmes wrote 18 rap songs, a stanza from one of which
was admitted, over objection, at his trial.

The State presented its case through detectives, eyewitnesses, in-
cluding Clark,' and various associates of Holmes and Reed. The

‘Clark identified Holmes in court as the shooter, stating that he got a clear
look at him after he removed his ski mask and shot Nelson. Holmes initially
challenged this eyewitness identification as suspect but abandoned the challenge
in his reply brief based on Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).

Pe om

evidence established that Holmes came to Reno from Oakland
two months before, and vanished right after the crime. A young
woman testified that she drove Holmes and Reed from her
brother’s house to Nelson’s studio that night. After dropping them
off, she waited for them, as requested, on a side street nearby.
When Holmes and Reed returned, they were agitated and urged her
to ‘go, go.”’ On the ride back to the brother’s house, Holmes kept
muttering, ‘‘he wouldn’t quit moving’’; she also overheard Reed
place a cell phone call and say, ‘‘come get me, something [bad]
just went down.’’ The young woman’s brother, who was on house
arrest, testified that when his sister returned with Holmes and
Reed, Holmes had a chain necklace wrapped around his hand and
a cell phone, neither of which he’d had before. The brother also
testified that he overheard Holmes call Richardson and say, ‘“‘Man
it’s all bad, I need to get up out of here.’’ Not long after, Richard-
son arrived, then left with Reed.

Richardson also testified. He did so pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, under which he was convicted of, and served time for, con-
spiring with Holmes and Reed to rob Nelson, and other, unrelated
crimes. Richardson was a generation older than Reed and Holmes.
He testified that he, Reed, and Holmes had discussed robbing
Nelson and that, at Reed’s request, he called Nelson to lure him
(and his cash and drugs) to the studio the night of the crime. Ac-
cording to Richardson, he went to the getaway driver’s brother’s
house after the murder/robbery because Reed called, said that, ‘It
went wrong,’’ and asked to talk ‘‘face to face.’ Richardson then
drove Reed past Nelson’s studio to view the scene; police and am-
bulance personnel were still there when they drove by. In the car,
Reed told Richardson that ‘‘Khali [Holmes] went off and he don’t
know what happened. Khali just started shooting him.’ Richardson
also testified that the morning after the shooting, he drove Holmes
to the Greyhound bus station and gave him money to leave town.
Richardson testified that Holmes told him not to trust Reed.

The jury found Holmes guilty of robbery and first-degree mur-
der, both with the use of a deadly weapon. Holmes timely
appealed.

0.
a

We review Holmes’s claims of evidentiary error under an abuse
of discretion standard. Lamb v. State, 127 Nev. 26, 41 n.7, 251
P.3d 700, 710 n.7 (2011). ‘‘[I]Jn determining the relevance and ad-
missibility of evidence,’ a district court’s discretion is ‘‘consider-
able.” Crowley v. State, 120 Nev. 30, 34, 83 P.3d 282, 286 (2004)
(internal quotations omitted). A decision ‘‘to admit or exclude ev-
idence will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly

5m Pe

wrong.’”’ Archanian v. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1029, 145 P.3d 1008,
1016 (2006).

A.

Holmes’s first claim of evidentiary error focuses on the district
court’s admission of lyrics from ‘‘Drug Deala,’’ a rap song
Holmes wrote in jail awaiting extradition to Nevada. The lyrics
read:

But now I’m uh big dog, my static is real large. Uh neigh-
borhood super star. Man I push uh hard line. My attitude
shitty nigga you don’t want to test this. I catching slipping at
the club and jack you for your necklace. Fuck parking lot
pimping. Man I’m parking lot jacking, running through your
pockets with uh ski mask on straight laughing.

The district court determined that the jury could reasonably view
the lyrics as factual, not fictional, and that, if it did, the jury could
find that the lyrics amounted to a statement by Holmes, see NRS
51.035(3)(a) (party statements are non-hearsay when offered
against the party who made them), that tended to prove his in-
volvement in the charged robbery. So viewed, the lyrics would be
both relevant, see NRS 48.015 (‘‘ ‘relevant evidence’ means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence’’), and presump-
tively admissible, NRS 48.025(1) (with certain exceptions, “‘[a]ll
relevant evidence is admissible’’). .
The district court acknowledged that admitting gangsta rap car-
ries the risk of it being misunderstood or misused as criminal
propensity or “‘bad act’’ evidence. See Andrea Dennis, Poetic
(In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evi-
dence, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 18, 22, 25-26 (2007) (“‘gangsta””
is a subgenre of rap that “‘purports to reflect life in the inner city,”
draws on devices such as metaphor, braggadocio, and exaggeration
for effect, and uses words that may be offensive and prone to mis-
interpretation by jurors and courts unfamiliar with rap). But it de-
termined that the ‘‘probative value’’ of the ‘‘Drug Deala’’ lyrics
was not “‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice”’ NRS 48.035(1). Partly answering Holmes’s concerns, the
district court instructed the jury that, ‘“Statements of the defendant
[that] have been admitted in evidence . . . may be confessions, ad-
missions, or neither.’ It also gave the jury a limiting instruction:
You have heard testimony about certain ‘‘rap’’ song lyrics al-
legedly written by the defendant while in custody awaiting ex-
tradition to Nevada. The evidence of these rap lyrics is not to

po 573

be considered by you to prove that the defendant is a person
of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit a
crime.”

The limiting instruction reiterated that, ““You may . . . consider if
the above lyrics are confessions, admissions, o[r] neither.”

a

We recognize, as did the district court, that defendant-authored
rap lyrics ‘‘may employ metaphor, exaggeration, and other artistic
devices,” Dennis, supra, at 14, and can involve ‘‘abstract repre-
sentations of events or ubiquitous storylines.”’ Id. at 26. But these
features do not exempt such writings from jury consideration
where, as here, the lyrics describe details that mirror the crime
charged. See United States v. Stuckey, 253 F. App’x 468, 482 (6th
Cir. 2007) (‘‘Stuckey’s lyrics concerned killing government wit-
nesses and specifically referred to shooting snitches, wrapping
them in blankets, and dumping their bodies in the street—precisely
what the Government accused Stuckey of doing [to the victim] in
this case’’; thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
deeming the lyrics relevant and admissible); Daniels v. Lewis,
No. C 10-04032 JSW, 2013 WL 183968, at *10, *12 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 17, 2013) (‘‘The details set forth in the lyrics were suffi-
ciently close to the evidence of the crimes that [they] could be
viewed as autobiographical’; they ‘‘were fairly admitted as ad-
missions because they constitute direct evidence of [defendant’s]
involvement in the crimes charged.’’ (first alteration in original)
(internal quotations omitted)); see Dennis, supra, at 8 (‘‘[o]ver-
whelmingly, courts admit defendant-composed rap music lyrical
evidence’ if direct relevance is shown). It is one thing to exclude
defendant-authored fictional accounts, be they rap lyrics or some
other form of artistic expression, when offered to show a propen-
sity for violence, as in State v. Hanson, 731 P.2d 1140 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987), on which Holmes relies. It is quite another when the
defendant-authored writing incorporates details of the crime
charged. As Stuckey notes, ‘‘If, in Hanson, the defendant’s writ-

?The district court also deemed the lyrics admissible under the permissible,
nonpropensity-purposes list in NRS 48.045(2), which provides that ‘[e]vi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove’’ bad char-
acter or criminal propensity but may be admitted ‘for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.’ This was error. The State offered the lyrics
to show that Holmes committed the charged crimes, not as evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts. See Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 87
(Ky. 2006). Also, if one or more of NRS 48.045(2)’s permissible, non-
propensity purposes applied, the district court should have identified the pur-
pose(s) in its ruling and the limiting instruction, rather than reflexively recit-
ing the full list of permissible purposes contained in NRS 48.045(2). Newman
v, State, 129 Nev. 222, 231, 298 P.3d 1171, 1178 (2013).

sm Pe

ings had stated that he robbed a 7-11 and shot the clerk in the ab-
domen (as the defendant had been accused of doing), surely the
case would have come out differently’’ 253 F. App’x at 483.

Le

Nor can we accept Holmes’s view that a trial court’s decision to
admit or exclude defendant-authored rap lyrics is so fraught with
risk of misinterpretation and prejudice that a special rule imposing
heightened admissibility requirements is needed. ‘Rap is no longer
an underground phenomenon”’ but has become ‘‘a mainstream
music genre.’ Stuckey, 253 F. App’x at 484. In this arena, as
others, courts should be

. . . unafraid to apply firmly-rooted canons of evidence law,
which have well-protected the balance between probative
value and prejudice in other modes of communication. Un-
doubtedly, rap lyrics often convey a less than truthful ac-
counting of the violent or criminal character of the performing
artist or composer. . . . [But t]here are certain circumstances
. . . where the lyrics possess an inherent and overriding pro-
bative purpose. One circumstance would be where the lyrics
constitute an admission of guilt, but others would include re-
butting an offered defense and impeaching testimony. Al-
though there is no definitive line that demarcates the amount
or content of lyrics that may be used appropriately, reason-
ableness should govern.

Hannah y. State, 23 A.3d 192, 204-05 (Md. 2011) (Harrell, J.,
concurring).

It was not unreasonable for the district court to admit the short
stanza from ‘‘Drug Deala’’ that it did. Like the lyrics in Stuckey
and Daniels, the stanza included details that matched the crime
charged. ‘‘Jacking’’ is slang for robbery, The Rap Dictionary,
http://www.rapdict.org/Jack (last visited May 23, 2013)—one of
the charges Holmes faced. The lyrics’ reference to ‘‘jack[ing] you
for your necklace’’ may fairly refer to Holmes stealing Nelson’s
chain necklace during the robbery. Police never recovered the
necklace, but Holmes had a chain necklace after the crime that he
did not have before; his knowledge of the necklace as reflected in
the lyrics suggests that he knew Nelson and may have participated
in the crime. The lyrics also discuss ski masks, a parking-lot jack-
ing of a ‘‘drug deala,’ and emptying a victim’s pockets—facts
about the crime that the State established, particularly through eye-
witness Clark.

Holmes counters that these features of ‘“Drug Deala”’ are so
clichéd that they do not distinguish the robbery his lyrics describe
from other rapped-about, garden-variety robberies. The lyrics’
lack of originality may reduce but does not eliminate their proba~

pO 575

tive value. The extent of the lyrics’ probative value was a matter
for cross-examination, argument, or even, perhaps, expert testi-
mony. See Dennis, supra, at 35-36. But so long as evidence has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence,” it is ‘‘relevant.’ NRS
48.015. Here, the similarities between the lyrics and the facts of
the charged robbery, as established by the evidence and the timing
of the composition after Holmes’s arrest, met the threshold test of
relevance.

No doubt the lyrics carried the potential for prejudice. But
“Jajll evidence offered by the prosecutor is prejudicial to the de-
fendant; there would be no point in offering it if it were not.’
United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1991). The
real question is whether the lyrics’ probative value was substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. NRS 48.035;
see Schlotfeldt v. Charter Hosp. of Las Vegas, 112 Nev. 42, 46,
910 P.2d 271, 273 (1996) (the ‘‘substantially outweigh’’ require-
ment ‘‘implies a favoritism toward admissibility’’). Evidence is
“‘unfairly’’ prejudicial if it encourages the jury to convict the de-
fendant on an improper basis. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
(Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 933, 267 P.3d 777, 781 (2011).

Holmes identifies two potential sources of unfair prejudice:
first, jurors unversed in rap may misuse the lyrics as evidence of
bad character or criminal propensity, which NRS 48.045(2) for-
bids; second, jurors may misunderstand the genre and too readily
accept artistic expression (read, exaggeration) as autobiographical
fact. Unlike Hannah, where the prosecutor examined the defendant
about a series of ten rap lyrics he had written, seemingly for no
purpose other than to demonstrate that he had a propensity for vi-
olence, 23 A.3d at 192-93, 202, only a single stanza from ‘‘Drug
Deala’’ was admitted against Holmes—and the stanza that was ad-
mitted relayed facts quite similar to the crime charged. Also, the
district court crafted and gave an appropriate limiting instruction.
Schlotfeldt, 112 Nev. at 46, 910 P.2d at 273; see People v. Wal-
lace, 873 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming convic-
tion based in part on admission of rap lyrics because the trial court
gave a limiting instruction to alleviate the potential for unfair prej-
udice). Thus, the jurors were told that they could consider
Holmes’s statements, including the ‘‘Drug Deala’’ lyrics, as ‘‘con-
fessions, admissions or neither’’ and that they could not use the
lyrics as evidence of bad character or criminal propensity. So, if
the jurors followed the instructions, as we presume they did, Lisle
y. State, 113 Nev. 540, 558, 937 P.2d 473, 484 (1997), they only
would have considered the lyrics if they found that the lyrics were

576 ee

autobiographical, like a diary or journal entry, and they would not
have allowed their feelings about rap music—good, bad, or indif-
ferent—to influence their verdict. Even though the lyrics were
prejudicial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that the risk they carried of unfair prejudice did not sub-
stantially outweigh their probative value. See Elvik v. State, 114
Nev. 883, 897, 965 P.2d 281, 290 (1998).

B.

Pe

Holmes’s second claim of evidentiary error focuses on Richard-
son’s testimony that Reed told Richardson after the crime that
Holmes ‘‘went off?’ and ‘‘just started shooting.’ Holmes con-
tends that this did not qualify as a non-hearsay statement by a co-
conspirator under NRS 51.035(3)(e), because Reed did not make
the statement to Richardson ‘‘during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy,’ as the statute requires. We reject this claim for
two reasons. First, the record does not establish that the error was
adequately preserved. Second, the record does not establish an
abuse of discretion by the district court in ruling as it did. See
Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 785, 795, 220 P.3d 709, 716 (2009) (en
banc) (‘‘whether proffered evidence fits an exception to the hearsay
rule [is reviewed] for abuse of discretion’).

Some context is helpful. The challenged testimony came toward
the end of a series of questions by the prosecutor eliciting what
Reed said to Richardson, on the phone and in person, the night of
the crime. Initially, the prosecutor asked Richardson what Reed
said when he called to see if Richardson could persuade Nelson to
come to the studio, to which Holmes interposed a general hearsay
objection. The prosecutor responded that ‘‘[t]hese are all state-
ments of a coconspirator;’ and thus not hearsay; Holmes offered
no response, and his objection was overruled. See NRS
51.035(3)(e) (a statement offered against a party is not hearsay
when made ‘‘by a coconspirator of a party during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy’’). The prosecutor next asked
Richardson, without objection, what Reed said to him when he
called him after the crime—Richardson responded that Reed said
that “‘[iJt went wrong . . . he couldn’t really talk right then, just
wanted to see me face to face.” Richardson proceeded to say that
he picked Reed up, drove him by Nelson’s studio, and talked to
him about “‘[w]hat happened at the studio.’ The prosecutor then
asked, without objection: ‘‘What did he [Reed] tell you?,’ to
which Richardson replied, ‘‘He said Khali [Holmes] went off and
he don’t know what happened. Khali just started shooting.’ After
two more questions and answers, defense counsel asked to
approach the bench. At this point, the record goes dark. It says
only: ‘‘unreported discussion at the bench between court and

PC sn

counsel.” The record resumes with a statement by the court that,
“rather than the defense attorney interposing objections through-
out the testimony we have agreed that the court will explain to you
that some of these statements are coming in under a legal theory
of a co-conspirator, [about which] you will receive further legal
instruction.”

NRS 47.040(1)(a) states that ‘‘error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a sub-
stantial right of the party is affected, and [iJn case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears
of record, stating the specific ground of objection.’ The State ar-
gues that ‘‘a timely objection’? was not made, see 2 Wharton's
Criminal Evidence § 8:32 (15th ed. 1998) (as a general rule, “‘[iJt
is incumbent on counsel to state an objection to a question before
the answer is given’’ because ‘‘the question usually indicates if the
answer is objectionable or not’’); also, that no ‘‘motion to strike
appears of record.’”’ See 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W.
Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5037.7, at 749 (24
ed. 2005) (even a permissibly delayed objection ‘‘alone does not
suffice to preserve an error’’; the objector should also move to
strike). We would probably reject the State’s argument, if the
record adequately established ‘‘the specific ground of objection,”
NRS 47.040(1)(a), but it does not. This leaves us to speculate as
to whether error, still less an abuse of discretion, occurred.

Nevada’s hearsay statute, like its federal counterpart, ‘contains
at least four possible bases for [a hearsay] objection to proffer-
ed co-conspirators’ testimony: that the declarant was not a co-
conspirator; that the party against whom the statement is offered
‘was not a co-conspirator; that the statement was not made ‘in the
course’ of the conspiracy; that the statement was not made ‘in fur-
therance of’ the conspiracy.’ United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d
666, 673 (Sth Cir, 1997) (addressing FRE 801(d)(2)(E)). All the
record shows here is that Holmes objected—even, perhaps, moved
to strike—based on hearsay. In response, the prosecution invoked
the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. We do not know
what Holmes argued to overcome the State’s invocation of NRS
51.035(3)(e), see 21 Federal Practice and Procedure, supra,
§ 5036.1, at 645 (‘‘if in response to a hearsay objection, the op-
ponent invokes a hearsay exception, the objector will probably have
to explain to the judge why the exception does not apply in order
to preserve the error for appeal’’ (interpreting FRE 103, the coun-
terpart to NRS 47.040(1)(a))), nor as in Burton, 126 F.3d at 673,
can we say whether Holmes objected that Reed’s statement to
Richardson was not ‘‘in the course’’ or ‘‘in furtherance’’ of the
conspiracy. And unless the argument made on appeal appears in
the record below, this court lacks a satisfactory basis for assessing
prejudicial error. See Fish v. State, 92 Nev. 272, 276, 549 P.2d

578 PO

338, 340-41 (1976) (objection on the grounds that a coconspira-
tor’s statements ‘‘were not made during the course or in further-
ance of the conspiracy’’ was not adequately preserved by an ob-
jection to the adequacy of the proof of the conspiracy). Our review,
therefore, is limited to plain error. Burton, 126 F.3d at 673-74; see
Fish, 92. Nev. at 276, 549 P.2d at 341.

| |

For error to be plain, the complained-of error must be “‘ ‘so un-
mistakable that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the
record.’ ’’ Saletta v. State, 127 Nev. 416, 421, 254 P.3d 111, 114
(2011) (quoting Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d
984, 987 (1995)). Holmes argues that Reed’s statements to
Richardson about the shooting could not have been made ‘“‘during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy’’ because, by the
time he spoke to Richardson, the robbery was over and Nelson was
dead. But Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 38, 46, 675 P.2d 986, 991
(1984), holds that, under NRS 51.035(3)(e), ‘‘the duration of a
conspiracy is not limited to the commission of the principal crime,
but extends to affirmative acts of concealment.”’ Thus, in Crew, we
upheld admission of statements by a coconspirator about plans to
move buried bodies in case the party against whom the statements
were admitted, who was being interviewed by the police at the time
the statements were made, divulged the bodies’ location to the po-
lice. This was deemed ‘‘in furtherance of the conspiracy to com-
mit the crime and to ‘get away with it.” ’’ Id.; see 30B Michael H.
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7025, at 289 (interim
ed. 2011) (‘Statements in furtherance of [a] conspiracy include
statements made to . . . induce further participation, prompt fur-
ther action, reassure members, allay concerns or fears, keep con-
spirators abreast of ongoing activities, [or] avoid detection,’ though
“‘mere conversations or narrative declarations of past events are
not in furtherance of the conspiracy.’’).

Richardson’s conversation with Reed occurred less than two
hours after the murder and robbery, while police and ambulance
crews were still at the crime scene. It appears that Reed was up-
dating Richardson, on whom both Reed and Holmes relied for ad-
vice and help, on the situation—though it can also be argued (it
was not, at least not on the record we have) that Reed’s remarks
amounted to self-serving blame-shifting. We know that Reed and
Holmes did not get the drugs and money they hoped for from Nel-
son and that Richardson gave Holmes money at the bus station so
he could leave town hours after he talked to Reed. But with no
record discussion of the ‘‘during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy”’ requirements of NRS 51.035(3)(e) as they might
apply to what Reed said to Richardson about the shooting, it is not

Po 579

possible to say whether the conversation was to ‘‘keep conspirators
abreast of ongoing activities [or] avoid detection’ (admissible) or
“‘mere conversations or narrative declarations of past events’’ (in-
admissible). Assuming objection, argument, perhaps an offer of
proof, a ruling could legitimately have gone either way. Given this
record, an abuse of discretion amounting to plain error does not
appear.?

1.
| eee

Holmes argues that the district court should have suppressed the
unwarned statement he made’ to the Nevada detectives who inter-
viewed him at his California parole officer’s office. This argument
fails under Howes vy. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 514-17 (2012), because
the interrogation was not custodial, see also Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984), and thus did not require a warning
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Also, the district
court’s finding of voluntariness was correct. Rosky v. State, 121
Nev. 184, 190, 111 P.3d 690, 694 (2005).

Holmes’s remaining assignments of error also fail. The detec-
tives testified about their investigation, not witness veracity, and as
such, the district court had no reason to limit the scope of the tes-
timony, Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 669-70, 6 P.3d 481, 484-
85 (2000). Finally, the statements made in the prosecutor’s closing
argument do not warrant reversal because, while improper, they
did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. Valdez v. State, 124
Nev. 1172, 1188-89, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008).

Accordingly, we affirm.

Harpesty, J., concurs.

Sart, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. In my view, the district court abused its
discretion in admitting the lyrics from Holmes’ song ‘‘Drug
Deala’’ because the lyrics were of limited, if any, probative value
and their limited probative value was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. I further conclude that the error was
not harmless and therefore I would reverse the judgment of con-
viction and remand for a new trial.

*Holmes also argues that the admission of Reed’s statement to Richardson
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. This argument fails, since
coconspirator statements to one another or even to a governmental informant
are ‘‘nontestimonial statements that fall[ ] outside the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing and discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

580 PE

Admission of the lyrics

Relevant evidence is inadmissible when ‘‘its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”’ NRS
48.035(1). I suggest that the lyrics were not probative for two rea-
sons: they are not clearly an admission rather than artistic expres-
sion, and they are not sufficiently specific as to be relevant to the
charged crimes.

First, the lyrics appeared more a product of artistic expression
consistent with the “‘gangsta rap’’ genre of music than an admis-
sion. ‘‘Gangsta rap’’ describes a variation of rap music that ad-
dresses gang culture, race conflict, and poverty. Leola Johnson, Si-
lencing Gangsta Rap: Class and Race Agendas in the Campaign
Against Hardcore Rap Lyrics, 3 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev.
25, 25 n.1 (1994). In an attempt to broaden the audience for early
rap music, the recording industry exploited the fascination of the
suburban middle class with inner-city life by promoting music
that ‘‘afforded a glimpse into a dark world of violence, crime,
poverty and death.’’ Sean-Patrick Wilson, Comment, Rap Sheets:
The Constitutional and Societal Complications Arising from the
Use of Rap Lyrics as Evidence at Criminal Trials, 12 UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 345, 349-50 (2005). Companies responded to audience de-
mand by promoting images for signed artists that featured ever-
increasing depictions of violence and criminal activity. See id. at
350-52. ‘As demand for more coarse lyrics grew, rappers were
compelled to latch onto any negative image that would sell
records.”’ Id. at 353. Because the perception of an artist’s authen-
ticity was also correlative to commercial success, ‘‘[mJany rappers
present[ed] themselves as gangsters, drug dealers, or pimps be-
cause it help[ed] sell.’ Jason E. Powell, Note, R.A.P.: Rule
Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 Rutgers L.J. 479, 516
(2009); see Andrea Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics
as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 16
(2007) (‘‘Artists’ images are constructed and marketed for maximal
financial profit.’). While many artists maintain that their lyrics ac-
curately represent their lives, the depictions may be something
from their past or whole or partial fabrications. Dennis, supra, at
17-19; see also United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 456 (7th
Cir. 1991) (ecognizing that rap lyrics may portray a fictional
character). Therefore, even an amateur artist such as Holmes
would feel compelled to mimic more successful artists. See Den-
nis, supra, at 17 (‘‘Aspiring artists will model their more success-
ful counterparts. It is fair to say that few in the rap industry want
to be starving artists.’”’).

The majority relies on the Sixth Circuit’s decision, United States
v. Stuckey, 253 F. App’x 468 (6th Cir. 2007), in which the federal

Pe Ea

district court admitted lyrics after observing, ‘‘[y]ou can certain-
ly not say when somebody writes about killing snitches, that it
doesn’t make the fact that they may have killed a snitch more prob-
able.’ Id. at 482 (internal quotations omitted). This reasoning is
troublesome as it does not account for the nature of the artistic ex-
pression or of the market forces that act upon it. See Dennis,
supra, at 17 (‘‘One consequence of commercialization is that artist
images and lyrical narratives are not necessarily truthful—whether
in whole or in part.’’). Violent imagery finds its way into lyrics be-
cause that is what the audience craves and the industry rewards,
not necessarily because the artist has a propensity to engage in the
acts depicted. As the premise upon which the federal district court
based its conclusion is mistaken, this court should not rely on the
Stuckey court’s decision to affirm that conclusion.

Second, the lyrics are not sufficiently specific as to suggest that
the description contained therein was that of the charged crime.
See Brooks v. State, 903 So. 2d 691, 699-700 (Miss. 2005) (con-
cluding rap lyrics discussing murder with firearm not sufficiently
probative to trial for murder conducted with a meat fork). Holmes
was tried for a single robbery and murder in the parking lot of a
recording studio and was alleged to have stolen a necklace and ri-
fied through the victim’s pockets. Conversely, the lyrics seemingly
describe two robberies: the theft of a necklace in a night club and
a masked robbery in a parking lot. In neither robbery do the
lyrics reference any sort of shooting. While both of the described
robberies share similarities with the charged crime, they also de-
scribe rather routine criminal behavior that is frequent fodder for
rap lyrics. See, e.g., 2BRoy, Parking Lot Jacking, on Belizean Girl
(ah Bless Music & Films 2011) (describing assailant robbing club
patrons of jewelry and other property in parking lot); Ya Boy, Rob-
bery, on The Best of #1 (Indie Music Group 2010), lyrics avail-
able at http://www.cloudlyrics.com/ya-boy-lyrics-robbery.html (de-
scribing armed robberies by a masked assailant where jewelry and
other property taken); 50 Cent, Ski Mask Way, on The Massacre
(Shady Records/Aftermath Records/Interscope Records 2005),
lyrics available at http://rapgenius.com/S0-cent-ski-mask-way-
lyrics (similar).

As the lyrics were not appreciably probative, any unfair preju-
dice would render them inadmissible. Gangsta rap lyrics are prone
to unfairly prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury, see Pow-
ell, supra, at 517 (‘‘Part of rap’s charm is its ability to produce
discomfort.”’), and several courts have made note of how coarse
and violent lyrics may prejudice a defendant, United States v.
Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir.) (recognizing rap video was
very prejudicial because it contained ‘‘violence, profanity, sex,

582 PO

promiscuity, and misogyny and could reasonably be understood as
promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle’’), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 826, 826 (2011); Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco, 576
B3d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that lyrics advocating
prostitution were unfairly prejudicial); State v. Cheeseboro, 552
S.E.2d 300, 313 (S.C. 2001) (holding that admission of lyrics was
unfairly prejudicial as they included only a vague reference to the
criminal acts at issue but otherwise described the defendant’s
propensity for violence). In a study conducted by Dr. Stuart
Fischoff, participants found a hypothetical defendant who wrote
gangsta rap lyrics more likely to have committed murder than a hy-
pothetical defendant who did not write such lyrics. Wilson, supra,
at 371-73. The study further revealed ‘‘that potential jurors were
‘significantly inclined’ to judge a gangsta rap lyricist not accused
of murder more harshly and with more disdain than a non-gangsta
rapper who was accused of murder.’ Jd. The study findings indi-
cate that the music industry has been successful in marketing rap
artists as criminals. As the industry and its artists translate this ap-
pearance of authenticity into record sales, they have no financial
interest in debunking this myth. The reactions reflected in the
Fischoff study demonstrate the kind of unfair prejudice that may
result from consideration of rap lyrics. See State v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 933, 267 P.3d 777, 781
(2011) (explaining that unfair prejudice includes decisions based on
improper grounds, such as emotion, bias, sympathy, anger, or
shock, rather than proof specific to the charged offense).

The Stuckey court overlooked this potential for unfair prejudice
from the admission of rap lyrics. In affirming the failure to give a
limiting instruction for the admission of the lyrics, the court ob-
served that ‘‘[r]ap is no longer an underground phenomenon and is
a mainstream music genre. Reasonable jurors would be unlikely to
reason that a rapper is violent simply because he raps about vio-
lence.’’ Stuckey, 253 F. App’x at 484. The court failed to consider
that much of the public, even the district court judge who observed
that Stuckey’s lyrics demonstrated that it was more likely that he
engaged in the behavior described, see id. at 482, is not aware of
lore that the recording industry perpetuates in marketing its artists,
see Dennis, supra, at 13 (‘‘Despite the present-day ubiquity and
popularity of rap music, the existence and use of methods govern-
ing the composition of lyrics are not part of the public’s everyday
learning and experience.”’); Wilson, supra, at 352 (‘‘Whatever
ties existed between rap music and the real inner-city, suburban
America perceived them as gospel truths.’’). In light of its failure
to fully appreciate the potential for unfair prejudice in the ad-
mission of such lyrics, this court should not rely on the Stuckey
decision.

Po 583

I conclude that although the district court made a thorough
evaluation of and gave careful consideration to the admission of the
lyrics here, the court nonetheless abused its discretion in admitting
the rap lyrics at trial. The lyrics were not sufficiently probative as
the crimes depicted in the lyrics were dissimilar from the crime al-
leged. The lyrics did not reflect knowledge of the specific event
any more than they describe routine criminal behavior. Moreover,
the scant probative value of the lyrics was far outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice that they presented.

Harmless error

I further conclude that admitting the lyrics was not harmless.
See Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 776, 784-85, 220 P.3d 724, 729
(2009) (reviewing erroneous admission of evidence for harmless
error). In considering whether the erroneous admission of evidence
had a ‘‘ ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing the jury’s verdict; ’’ Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 732, 30
P.3d 1128, 1132 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)), this court considers ‘‘whether the issue of
innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error,
and the gravity of the crime charged.”’ Big Pond v. State, 101 Nev.
1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). This case is impacted heavily
by two of the factors. The character of the error was significantly
damaging. As noted in the Fischoff study, an individual who writes
violent rap songs is viewed with more distaste than an accused
murderer who did not write violent rap songs. While the question
of guilt or innocence is not exceptionally close in this case, the
purported confession in the form of a disparaged and often mis-
understood form of expression likely had a significant impact on
the jury’s determination of guilt. Lastly, Holmes was charged with
first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, which ex-
posed him to two possible consecutive life sentences, and robbery
with the use of a deadly weapon, which exposed him to two pos-
sible consecutive sentences of 15 years. See 2003 Nev. Stat., ch.
470, § 4, at 2944-45 (NRS 200.030(4)(b)); 2003 Nev. Stat., ch.
137, § 7, at 770-71 (NRS 200.030(4)(b)); NRS 200.380(2); 1995
Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 1, at 1431 (NRS 193.165).

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and re-

mand for a new trial.

w

84.

GEANIE BRADFORD, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FoR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HON-
ORABLE SANDRA L. POMRENZE, District JupcE,
RESPONDENTS, AND KEVIN BRADFORD, REAL Parry IN
INTEREST.
No. 61129

August 29, 2013 308 P.3d 122

Abrams Law Firm, LLC, and Jennifer V. Abrams and Vincent
Mayo, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

James M. Davis Law Office and James M. Davis, Las Vegas, for

g
y
II ey
Ee
i=]
&

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sarrta, JJ.

po 58s
a
a

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

In this original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition,
petitioner Geanie Bradford challenges a district court order finding
that she and real party in interest Kevin Bradford were never
Jegally married. Although it appears that the district court may
have been in error, Geanie never appealed the court’s order. We
must determine whether Geanie’s failure to timely appeal the order
precludes writ relief. In doing so, we must consider whether the
validity of the parties’ marriage is an issue that we would have an
opportunity to meaningfully review on appeal. We conclude that it
is and that an appeal would have been an adequate legal remedy.
Accordingly, writ relief is precluded.

FACTS

Geanie and Kevin were married on December 27, 2008, by
newly elected district court judge Bryce Duckworth. Although
Judge Duckworth had sworn his oath of office four days earlier, on
December 23, 2008, he was not authorized to take the bench until
January 5, 2009. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 5.

Geanie filed for divorce from Kevin in 2011. In her divorce
complaint, she sought custody of the couple’s minor child born on
September 18, 2007. At the divorce hearing, the district court sua
sponte questioned whether Judge Duckworth had authority to sol-
emnize the marriage and thus whether the parties were legally
married. Although the parties neither briefed this issue nor were
given an opportunity to formally argue it before the district court,
the district court concluded that a judge does not have authority to
solemnize a marriage until his or her term actually starts because
simply being sworn in does not confer any actual authority. Be-
cause the court found as a result that there was no valid marriage,
the court dismissed Geanie’s divorce complaint as moot. Although
the record is unclear as to when a separate custody case was initi-
ated, the district court’s dismissal order stated that the custody is-

sas Po

sues would be resolved in a separate companion custody case.
Geanie did not appeal the district court’s dismissal order, and she
failed to seek any other relief until one year later, when she filed
her writ petition with this court.

DISCUSSION

This court has discretion to entertain a petition for extraordinary
writ relief. Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008). But we have con-
sistently recognized that writ relief is available only ‘“‘when there
is no plain, adequate and speedy legal remedy.’’ Pan v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004);
see Cnty. of Washoe v. City of Reno, 77 Nev. 152, 155, 360 P.2d
602, 603 (1961); State ex rel. Brown v. Nev. Indus. Comm’n, 40
Nev. 220, 225, 161 P. 516, 517 (1916); see also NRS 34.170;
NRS 34.330. Generally, the right to appeal is an adequate legal
remedy that precludes consideration of a writ petition. Pan, 120
Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 840-41. Moreover, a writ petition is not a
substitute for an untimely appeal. Id. at 224-25, 88 P.3d at 841
(citing Rim View Trout Co. v. Dep’t of Water Res., 809 P.2d 1155,
1156-57 (Idaho 1991); State ex rel. Hulse v. Montgomery Circuit
Court, 561 N.E.2d 497, 498 (Ind. 1990); State ex rel. Boardwalk
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga Cnty., 564
N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1990).

Geanie argues that writ relief is appropriate because the district
court’s order dismissing her complaint as moot was not appealable
as a valid, final judgment. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) (stating that final
judgments are appealable). She contends that the order was not
valid because the district court reached the wrong legal conclusion
and that it was not final because a companion custody case is on-
going and addresses issues that were involved in the divorce case.
We disagree.

It appears that the district court’s conclusion that Geanie and
Kevin were never legally married may have been in error. Both
NRS 122.090 and the de facto officer doctrine provide that a mar-
riage performed by a person without actual authority to solemnize
the marriage is nevertheless valid if both parties shared a good-
faith belief that the person had the required authority. NRS
122.090; State ex rel. Busteed v. Harmon, 38 Nev. 5, 6-7, 143 P.
1183, 1184 (1914). Regardless, an incorrect legal conclusion does
not render a judgment invalid or void. See generally State ex rel.
Smith v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 63 Nev. 249, 256-57, 167 P.2d

Pe 587

648, 651 (1946) (noting that a judgment rendered when jurisdic-
tion exists may be valid even though erroneous), overruled on
other grounds by Poirier v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 81 Nev. 384,
387, 404 P.2d 1, 2-3 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Pen-
gilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass’n, 116 Nev. 646, 648-
49, 5 P.3d 569, 570-71 (2000); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 29 (2006) (‘‘A judgment is not void simply because it is erro-
neous.’’). A judgment’s validity depends on whether the district
court had jurisdiction, not whether it reached the correct legal re-
sult. State Tax Comm’n of Utah v. Cord, 81 Nev. 403, 407, 404
P.2d 422, 424 (1965). Here, the district court had jurisdiction to
consider the divorce complaint before it.! NRS 125.020.

| |

In addition, the pending separate custody suit does not render
ongoing the issues involved in the divorce proceeding. The custody
case is a separate action, not a continuation of the divorce case.
Thus, the district court order dismissing the divorce complaint was
a final, appealable judgment. See Simmons Self-Storage Partners,
L.L.C. v. Rib Roof, Inc., 127 Nev. 86, 87, 247 P.3d 1107, 1108
(2011) (stating that ‘‘[a] final judgment is generally defined as one
that resolves all of the parties’ claims and rights in the action, leav-
ing nothing for the court’s future consideration except for post-
judgment issues’’).

P|

Because the district court’s order was a valid, final, and ap-
pealable judgment, we must determine whether an appeal would
have constituted an adequate legal remedy. To determine whether
an appeal is an adequate legal remedy, this court considers
“**whether [an] appeal will permit this court to meaningfully re-
view the issues presented.’ ’’ Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 129 Nev. 394, 398, 302 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2013) (quoting
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 123 Nev. 468,
474-75, 168 P.3d 731, 736 (2007)). Although this court will not
consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal, In
re AMERCO Derivative Litigation, 127 Nev. 196, 217 n.6, 252
P.3d 681, 697 n.6 (2011), the validity of the parties’ marriage was
raised sua sponte by the district court below and was the ground
for dismissal of the divorce complaint. We see no reason why
Geanie would not have been able to argue, and we would not have

1We reject Geanie’s argument that mandamus relief is required because the
district court refused to take jurisdiction over Geanie’s divorce complaint. The
district court did not dismiss Geanie’s divorce complaint on jurisdictional
grounds; it dismissed the complaint as moot because it found that the parties
were never validly married and thus could not obtain a divorce.

588

been able to consider, the validity of her marriage on appeal.
Therefore, we conclude that writ relief is inappropriate because an
appeal would have been an adequate legal remedy.

‘We recognize that Geanie’s failure to timely appeal or move to
set aside the district court’s order leaves her without legal recourse
to challenge the district court’s conclusion. However, as noted,
“writ relief is not available to correct an untimely notice of ap-
peal,” Pan, 120 Nev, at 224-25, 88 P.3d at 841, and her failure to
timely challenge the district court’s order by appeal, NRCP 60(b)
motion, or otherwise has resulted in both parties relying on the va-
lidity of the order in their subsequent pursuits. Accordingly, we de-
cline to exercise our discretion to entertain this writ petition, and
it is thus denied.

PICKERING, C.J., and SarrTA, J., concur.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR’S
LICENSING BOARD, APPELLANT, v. DWAYNE TATA-
LOVICH anp TATALOVICH & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

No. 58803
September 19, 2013 309 P.3d 43

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Jeffrey D.
Menicucci, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Appellant.

Arrascada & Arrascada, Ltd., and John L. Arrascada, Reno,
for Respondents.

589

Before the Court EN Banc.
OPINION

By the Court, PickErInG, C.J.:

On this appeal, we consider whether investigative work under-
taken for the purpose of developing and giving expert opinion tes-
timony in a Nevada civil court case requires a Nevada private in-
vestigator’s license. We agree with the district court that it does not
and therefore affirm.

I.

Respondent Dwayne Tatalovich was hired as an expert witness
in two Nevada civil court cases. The plaintiffs in each case sought
damages for injuries due to criminal acts that allegedly would
not have occurred but for the property owner’s negligent failure to
provide adequate premises security. To prepare for the first case,
Tatalovich inspected the crime scene and took measurements and
photographs. For the second case, he again examined the crime
scene, then reviewed all security measures and devices and recon-
structed the crime. Tatalovich holds an Arizona private investiga-
tor’s license. From his office in Arizona, he ran background
checks on federal and state Internet databases. Tatalovich used his
research to formulate his expert opinions for each case.

Based on this work by Tatalovich, appellant State of Nevada,
Private Investigator’s Licensing Board (Board) cited him for en-
gaging in the business of a private investigator without a Nevada li-
cense in violation of NRS 648.060. The district court dismissed

590 Lt

the citation. It held that Tatalovich’s investigative activities were in-
cidental to his formation of expert testimony and, as such, fell out-
side NRS Chapter 648’s licensing scheme.’

I.

P|

This court defers to an agency’s findings of fact, as well as to its
conclusions of law, where those conclusions are closely related to
the agency’s view of the facts. State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Bokelman,
113 Nev. 1116, 1119, 946 P.2d 179, 181 (1997). However, if the
petitioner’s substantial rights have been prejudiced by the agency’s
decision and that decision rests on an error of law, exceeds its pow-
ers, or is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion, this court may set it aside. NRS 233B.135(3); Cable v.
State ex rel. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 122 Nev. 120, 126, 127 P.3d.
528, 532 (2006); Dredge v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Prisons, 105
Nev. 39, 43, 769 P.2d 56, 58-59 (1989). In construing a statute,
this court considers the statutory scheme as a whole and avoids an
interpretation that leads to absurd results. City Plan Dev., Inc. v.
Office of Labor Comm’r, 121 Nev. 419, 434-35, 117 P.3d 182,
192 (2005).

Our analysis begins with the text of the licensing statutes.
NRS 648.060 provides that ‘‘no person may: (a) Engage in the
business of private investigator, private patrol officer, process
server, repossessor, dog handler, security consultant, or poly-
graphic examiner or intern or (b) Advertise his or her business as
such, . . . unless the person is licensed pursuant to this chapter.”
NRS 648.060(1) (emphasis added). ‘‘Private investigator’’ is de-
fined by NRS 648.012, which reads as follows:

[AJny person who for any consideration engages in business
or accepts employment to furnish, or agrees to make or
makes any investigation for the purpose of obtaining, infor-
mation with reference to:

1. The identity, habits, conduct, business, occupation,
honesty, integrity, credibility, knowledge, trustworthiness, ef-
ficiency, loyalty, activity, movement, whereabouts, affiliations,
associations, transactions, acts, reputation or character of any
person;

2. The location, disposition or recovery of lost or stolen
property;

"The Board also cited Tatalovich for working without a license as a security
consultant under NRS 648.0155, but the district court overruled the Board be-
cause it found that Tatalovich merely gave opinion testimony and did not en-
gage in any of the statutorily enumerated activities. Because the Board does not
appeal this finding, we do not address it.

PO 591

3. The cause or responsibility for fires, libels, losses, ac-
cidents or damage or injury to persons or to property;

4, Securing evidence to be used before any court, board,
officer or investigating committee; or

5. The prevention, detection and removal of surreptitiously
installed devices for eavesdropping or observation.

The question presented is whether these statutes vest the Board
with the authority to regulate expert witness work. The Board
maintains that the statutes encompass a wide range of activities and
that expert witnesses may not personally investigate facts in Nevada
unless they hold a Nevada private investigator’s license. By exten-
sion, the Board argues that conducting any activity in Nevada that
is investigatory in nature constitutes a private investigation for
which NRS 648.060 requires a license. Tatalovich counters that, as
a matter of law, expert witnesses need not hold a Nevada private
investigator’s license to research their cases.

The Board’s reading of the licensing statutes gives them greater
reach than their text and evident purpose allow. To be sure, the
language ‘‘engage in the business of,’ NRS 648.060(1)(a); see
NRS 648.012, is neither defined nor self-limiting. But NRS
648.060(1)(b)’s reference to ‘‘[a]dvertis[ing one’s] business as
such’’ suggests that the statute regulates those who solicit and ac-
cept employment for the purpose of providing the professional
services named, not just anyone who incidentally undertakes ac-
tivities also commonly performed by those professionals en route
to providing a different service—here, forensic consulting or expert
opinion testimony.

Licensing requirements ‘‘protect the public safety and general
welfare’’ of the public by restricting the activities of unlicensed or
unqualified individuals who claim but do not possess the skills re-
quired of a professional in that field. NRS 648.017; see also NRS
622.080 (regulating an occupation or profession is for the ‘‘bene-
fit of the public’’). NRS Chapter 648 governs professionals pro-
viding a primary service to clients who either rely or act upon that
service for their own safety or welfare or that of their clients, pa~
trons, or families.? Given this focus, it makes sense for these pro-
fessionals to be licensed and regulated by the Board. However, no
similar purpose is achieved by extending the licensing requirement
to expert witnesses such as Tatalovich, the validity of whose qual-
ifications and work is tested—and contested—in court.

*For example, a private patrol officer provides security to protect others and
their property, prevent property loss or theft, or recover lost or stolen property.
NRS 648.013. A person who hires a repossessor relies on the person to re-
cover personal property subject to a security interest. NRS 648.015. And an
employer relies on a security guard for personal and property protection.
NRS 648.016.

592 ee

Kennard y. Rosenberg, 273 P.2d 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954), is on
point. In Kennard, an attorney hired a retired fireman and two
chemists—none of whom held a private investigator’s license—to
testify as experts in a lawsuit over the cause of a fire. Jd. at 840.
The experts inspected the site of the fire, took samples, ran chem-
ical tests, reviewed photographs, and conducted chemical experi-
ments. Id, at 840-41. The court concluded that the California pri-
vate investigator’s licensing statute, which closely resembles
Nevada’s, did not apply to experts employed ‘‘to make tests, con-
duct experiments and act as consultants in a case requiring the use
of technical knowledge.” The object of the experts’ activities was
to gather information to form their opinions, not private investiga-
tion. Id. at 842.

The Board notes that, in Kennard, the experts held California li-
censes in their fields of specialty, just not private investigator’s li-
censes. It characterizes Tatalovich’s activities, by contrast, as pure
private investigation, not subject to other licensing schemes. But
this distinction does not diminish Kennard’s persuasiveness. In the
first place, the Board ignores the fact that Tatalovich ran the back-
ground checks in Arizona, where he holds a private investigator’s
license.> Second, an expert may well need a professional license in
a particular field to testify credibly—or at all—in a particular
area. See also Wright v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 102 Nev. 261,
720 P.2d 696 (1986) (noting that NRS 50.275 does not impose a
licensing requirement on expert witnesses). But the question is
whether experts must also have a private investigator’s license to
gather information needed to develop or support their testimony. It
may be, as the Board argues, that the risk of illegal or unethical ac-
tivities does not vanish just because it is the predicate for expert
opinion testimony, as opposed to more direct use.* Nonetheless,
work by forensic experts, even work not subject to other profes-
sional licensing requirements, is not unregulated. It is limited by
the rules of the court, the judge’s approval of the expert’s qualifi-
cations to provide the opinion, and the judge’s determination of
what testimony, if any, to allow. Cf. Baggerly v. CSX Transp.
Inc., 635 S.E.2d 97, 104 (S.C. 2006) (‘‘We refuse to endorse an

*The Board argues that the background check effectively occurred in Nevada
because it accessed information from Nevada databases. But an Internet search
that utilizes a Nevada database open to anyone with appropriate access does
not, by itself, subject the user to the Board’s control.

‘The Board notes but does not develop the argument that NRS 648.012(4)
refers to ‘‘[s]ecuring evidence to be used before any court, board, officer or
investigating committee,’ as work requiring a private investigator’s license.
The 2013 amendments to NRS 648.012 convince us that this subsection ap-
plies to work undertaken for the purpose of gathering direct evidence, not work
undertaken by an expert witness as the basis for his or her opinion testimony.
See infra note 6.

Pe 593

interpretation of the [local] professional engineer licensing statute
which has the potential of either preventing out-of-state experts
from testifying in South Carolina courts or imposing the unrea-
sonable burden of getting licensed in the State simply to be per-
mitted to provide forensic testimony.’’).

The Board’s reading of NRS 648.012 and NRS 648.060 would
capture conduct far afield from private investigation. For ex-
ample, a journalist who searches public records for a news story
on a politician could be acting as a private investigator by obtain-
ing ‘‘information with reference to [a person’s] identity, habits,
conduct . . . honesty, integrity.’ NRS 648.012(1).° Is a plumber
who inspects a drain to determine whether a lost wedding ring is
lodged in a sink’s pipe acting as a private investigator by obtaining
information about “‘[t]he location . . . of lost . . . property’? NRS
648.012(2). What about a prospective employer who calls past em-
ployers to learn an applicant’s work history? See NRS 648.012(1)
(acting as a private investigator includes obtaining ‘‘information
with reference to... [t]he . . . honesty, integrity, credibility,
knowledge, trustworthiness, efficiency, loyalty . . . reputation or
character of any person’).

The Legislature has not endorsed the Board’s expansive view of
what constitutes private investigation. NRS Chapter 648 contains a
growing list of exemptions. See NRS 648.018. And in 2013, after
the Board cited Tatalovich and this litigation ensued, the Legisla-
ture amended NRS 648.012 to create a specific exception for ex-
pert witnesses who are ‘‘retained for litigation or trial. . . and
who perform[ ] duties and tasks within his or her field of expert-
ise that are necessary to form his or her opinion’’ related to a pos-
sible crime or tort.6 These amendments appear to clarify, not

‘In 2009, the Legislature conducted hearings on whether NRS Chapter 648
regulates all investigative activities, without regard to purpose or scope. Some
of the examples in the text are drawn from those hearings. See Hearing on S.B.
265 Before the Assembly Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 75th Leg. (Nev.,
May 15, 2009) (statement of Assemblywoman Barbara E. Buckley, Member of
the Assembly Committee on Commerce and Labor, indicating that ‘‘[i]t seems
unbelievable that somebody looking through public records could be accused
of being a private investigator”); see also Hearing on $.B. 265 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Commerce and Labor, 75th Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2009)
(statement of Senator Maggie Carlton, Chair of the Senate Committee on
Commerce and Labor, noting that it ‘‘was not anyone’s intention’’ that the li-
censing requirement be extended to journalists investigating public records for
commercial purposes).

‘The amendment was signed on June 1, 2013, and takes effect October 1,
2013, A.B, 306, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013). Of note, the 2013 amendments leave
intact NRS 648.012’s reference to ‘‘[s]ecuring evidence to be used before any
court, board, officer or investigating committee,’ as requiring a private inves-
tigator’s license. To the extent an individual works to unearth facts to be used
as direct evidence, as opposed to information to be used as the basis for expert
opinion testimony, NRS 648.060’s licensing requirements may apply.

594 Pt

change, the law, correcting a ‘‘doubtful [agency] interpretation’ of
a controlling statute. Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep’t, 124 Nev. 138, 156-57, 179 P.3d 542, 554
(2008) (internal quotations omitted); see In re Estate of Thomas,
116 Nev. 492, 495, 998 P.2d 560, 562 (2000) (construing amend-
ment as clarifying a doubtful interpretation of an earlier statute).

| |

For these reasons, we reject the Board’s position. NRS 648.012
regulates those employed or acting as private investigators to pro-
tect public safety and welfare and the consumers of their services.
Its licensing requirement does not apply to experts employed
to give an opinion on some aspect(s) of a case where the expert
witness performs duties and tasks within his or her field to verify
or obtain information necessary to form the basis for the opinion
testimony.

a

Tatalovich was hired as an expert witness, and in forming his
testimony he visited the crime scenes, took photographs and meas-
urements, examined security measures, and reconstructed events.
He also ran background checks on one of the accused in order to
form an opinion concerning the soundness of a hiring decision.
These tasks were necessary to form the basis of his opinion testi-
mony. And Tatalovich’s Arizona license granted him access to the
relevant databases for the background checks. His actions therefore
fell outside the Nevada licensing requirement.

We affirm.

GisBoNS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLas, CHERRY, and
Sarrta, JJ., concur.

PF 595

ALEX LOEB, DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF UNIVERSAL
TRAVEL GROUP, Petirioner, v. THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND
FoR THE COUNTY OF CARSON CITY, anp THE HON-
ORABLE JAMES TODD RUSSELL, Disrricr JupcE, RzE-
SPONDENTS, AND JLANGPING JIANG; JING XIE; HUJIE
GAO; JIDUAN YUAN; LIZONG WANG; WENBIN AN;
LAWRENCE LEE; YIZHAO ZHANG; LIQUAN WANG;
AND UNIVERSAL TRAVEL GROUP, A Nevapa CorPors-
TION, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.

No. 60242
September 19, 2013 309 P.3d 47

The O’Mara Law Firm, P.C., and David C. O’Mara, Reno;
Robbins Umeda LLP and Kevin Seely and Christopher L. Walters,
San Diego, California, for Petitioners.

McDonald Carano Wilson LLP and Matthew C. Addison, Reno;
Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP and Richard H. Zelichov, Los An-
geles, California; Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP and Bruce G.
Vanyo, New York, New York, for Real Parties in Interest.

HT

Pe 597

Before the Court EN BaNc.
OPINION

By the Court, HARpEsTy, J.:

The Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Ex-
trajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague
Convention)! sets forth the procedures to be followed when ‘‘there
is occasion to transmit a judicial . . . document for service
abroad.’” Hague Convention art. 1, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T.
361. Under the terms of the Hague Convention, a party in a for-
eign country may be served (1) ‘‘through the central authority
of the receiving country,’ (2) ‘‘through diplomatic or consular
agents that the receiving country considers non-objectionable;’ or
(3) ‘‘by any method permitted by the internal law of the receiving
country.’ Dahya v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 208,
212, 19 P.3d 239, 242 (2001) (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Hague Convention art. 5, 8-11, 19, 20 U.S.T. at 362-65).

| |

In Nevada, NRCP 4(e)(1) permits service on a defendant who
resides outside of this state by publishing the summons in a Nevada
newspaper and mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to
the defendant’s residence, if it is known. In this proceeding, we are
asked to decide whether a party residing outside of the United
States whose foreign address is known may be served by publica-
tion pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(1)(i) and (iii), rather than under the
terms of the Hague Convention. Based on the plain language of
the applicable provisions, we conclude that a party residing outside
of the United States whose address is known must be served
according to the terms of the Hague Convention, and we deny the
petition.

‘Because several different treaties have been signed at Hague Conventions,
we note that the term ‘the Hague Convention’’ in this opinion refers specifi-
cally to the Hague Service Convention.

598 PO

FACTS

This writ petition arises from a shareholder derivative suit
brought by petitioner Alex Loeb on behalf of real party in interest
Universal Travel Group, a company incorporated in Nevada,
against the officers and directors of Universal Travel Group, real
parties in interest Jiangping Jiang, Jing Xie, Hujie Gao, Jiduan
‘Yuan, Lizong Wang, Wenbin An, Lawrence Lee, Yizhao Zhang,
and Liquan Wang (collectively, the Jiang parties). The Jiang parties
all reside in China. After filing the complaint, Loeb unsuccessfully
attempted to locate the Jiang parties in Nevada and subsequently
sought their addresses from Universal Travel Group, which ini-
tially refused to disclose the addresses. Universal Travel Group
also declined to accept service on behalf of the Jiang parties. As a
result, Loeb moved the district court pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(1) to
permit service by publication. Universal Travel Group opposed
Loeb’s motion, arguing that he was required to comply with the
terms of the Hague Convention, which would not permit service by
publication under the circumstances of this case.

After Loeb filed his motion to permit service by publication,
Universal Travel Group’s counsel provided Loeb with the Jiang
parties’ addresses in China. Thereafter, the district court denied
Loeb’s motion to permit service by publication on the ground that
such service is not allowed by the Hague Convention when a de-
fendant’s address is known. Thus, the district court ordered Loeb
to serve the Jiang parties in compliance with the terms of the
Hague Convention.” This petition for a writ of mandamus or pro-
hibition followed. While Loeb concedes that he never mailed
copies of the summons or complaint to the Jiang parties in China,
he argues that the terms of the Hague Convention do not apply be-
cause the mailing of the summons and complaint under NRCP
4(e)(1)@) and (iii) is not an element of service.

DISCUSSION
L rere

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of

2Prior to the district court issuing its order, Universal Travel Group provided
Loeb with addresses in China for all of the Jiang parties except for Yizhao
Zhang. The district court thus directed Universal Travel Group to provide
Zhang’s address to Loeb as well, or it would permit service by publication
upon Zhang if Zhang’s address could not be provided. At oral argument before
this court, Loeb acknowledged that Universal Travel Group provided him with
Zhang’s address after the district court issued its order.

Pe 599

discretion.’’? Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnotes omitted);
see also NRS 34.160. Generally, writ relief is not appropriate if
the petitioner has a speedy and adequate legal remedy. See NRS
34.170; Mineral Cnty. v. State, Dep’t of Conservation & Natural
Res., 117 Nev. 235, 243, 20 P.3d 800, 805 (2001). This court may
consider a petition for extraordinary relief if ‘‘an important issue
of law needs clarification and public policy is served by this court’s
invocation of its original jurisdiction.’ Mineral Cnty., 117 Nev. at
243, 20 P.3d at 805 (internal quotations omitted). This case pres-
ents an important issue of law that needs clarification, specifically,
whether a party residing outside of the United States may be
served by publication pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(1)(i) and (iii), rather
than under the terms of the Hague Convention, when the party’s
address is known. And in light of the early stage of the proceed-
ings and the need for efficient judicial administration, an appeal
would not be a speedy and adequate legal remedy in this case. See
Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559. As a result,
we will exercise our discretion to entertain this writ petition. See
Mineral Cnty., 117 Nev. at 243, 20 P.3d at 805.

Loeb must comply with the terms of the Hague Convention to
Properly effectuate service of process on the Jiang parties

Le

Interpretation of an international treaty is a question of law that
we review de novo. Garcia y. State, 117 Nev. 124, 127, 17 P.3d
994, 996 (2001). Nevada’s Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to
the same rules of interpretation as statutes. Webb v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 618, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009).
Statutory interpretation is also a question of law subject to de novo
review. Consipio Holding, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. 454, 460, 282
P.3d 751, 756 (2012). When a statute’s language is plain and un-
ambiguous, this court will give that language its ordinary meaning.
Id.

P|
The purpose of the Hague Convention is to facilitate service of
process on defendants who are located outside of the United

*Because Loeb argues that the district court was required to grant his mo-
tion for service by publication, rather than that the court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order regarding service, a writ of prohibition is not the appropriate
vehicle for considering whether Loeb is entitled to extraordinary relief. See
NRS 34.320 (explaining that a writ of prohibition is available to arrest district
court proceedings when the district court acts without or in excess of its ju-
tisdiction); see also Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677,
818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991) (same).

Po

600 ee

States.* Hague Convention pmbl., 20 U.S.T. at 362. The Hague
Convention only applies when the address of the person to be
served is known. Jd. art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362. Under the Hague
Convention, ‘‘[s]ervice of process refers to a formal delivery of
documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with
notice of a pending action,’ as determined by the otherwise ap-
plicable state rules governing the method of service. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988). In
other words, the Hague Convention applies if the state’s service
rules require ‘‘the transmittal of documents abroad’’ in order for
service to be deemed complete. Id. Conversely, it does not apply
if service of process is ‘‘valid and complete’’ domestically under
the applicable state rules, so long as the service satisfies due
process. Id. at 707.

| el

If the Hague Convention applies, any inconsistent state law
methods of service are preempted. Id. at 699; Dahya v. Second Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 117 Nev. 208, 211, 19 P.3d 239, 242 (2001).
Under the terms of the Hague Convention, a party residing in a
foreign country may be served in three ways: (1) by sending serv-
ice ‘‘through the central authority of the receiving country,’ (2) by
sending service ‘‘through diplomatic or consular agents that the re-
ceiving country considers ‘non-objectionable, ’’ or (3) by serving
the party in any other “method permitted by the internal law of the
receiving country.’ Dahya, 117 Nev. at 212, 19 P.3d at 242 (quot-
ing 20 U.S.T. 361 at art. 8-11).°

||

Here, it is undisputed that the Jiang parties reside outside of the
United States and that Loeb knows their addresses in China. As a
result, the question that follows is whether, under these circum-
stances, Nevada law requires judicial documents to be transmitted
abroad in order for service to be complete. See Hague Convention
art. 1, 20 U.S.T. at 362; see also Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at

“Both the U.S. and China are signatories to the Hague Convention. See The
Hague Convention Relative to the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361.

SLoeb does not argue, and we do not decide, whether service of process by
publication would be permissible under either the Hague Convention or ap-
plicable Chinese law. However, we note that service by publication may only
be done in China when the party’s address is unknown or service cannot be ef-
fected in any other authorized manner. Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., August 31, 2012, effective Janu-
ary 1, 2013), art. 92. Other authorized manners of service in China include:
(1) personal service on a party or its delegated representative, (2) service at the
party’s residence, and (3) service via a court or the internal Chinese mail sys-
tem. Id, art. 85-88.

Pi oo

699. If the laws of this state do require transmittal abroad, then the
Hague Convention applies.

Neither party disputes that the summons and complaint are ‘‘ju-
dicial documents’’ within the scope of the Hague Convention. See
Black's Law Dictionary 923 (9th ed. 2009) (providing that a judi-
cial document is ‘‘[a] court-filed paper that . . . has been both rel-
evant to the judicial function and useful in the judicial process’).
Loeb argues that service under NRCP 4(e)(1) is complete upon the
act of publication and that the mailing of the summons and com-
plaint to the defendant’s address is merely ‘‘follow up’’ to the act
of service. Thus, he argues that the mailing requirement does not
implicate the Hague Convention.

Under NRCP 4(e)(1)(i), a plaintiff may serve process on any
party who ‘‘resides out of the state”’ who ‘“‘cannot, after due dili-
gence, be found within the state?’ or who ‘‘seeks to avoid the serv-
ice of summons’’ by publishing the summons in a Nevada news-
paper. When a plaintiff serves a party by publication and the
party’s address is known, a copy of the summons and complaint
must also ‘‘be deposited in the post office, [and] directed to the
person to be served at the person’s place of residence’”’ NRCP
4(e)(1)Gii). If the address is known, service is not complete until
“the expiration of 4 weeks from such [mailing].’’ Id.

| eee

Loeb’s interpretation of the rule is contrary to its plain language.
Under NRCP 4(e)(1)(iii), if the defendant’s address is known, the
party serving process must both complete publication and mail the
documents to the defendant’s address. Service is not complete
based on the publication alone. Indeed, the necessity of the mail-
ing is reflected in the portion of the rule providing that service is
not complete until four weeks after a copy of the summons and
complaint is deposited in the post office. See NRCP 4(e)(1)(iii).
Thus, if a defendant whose address is known resides outside of the
United States, the summons and complaint must be transmitted
abroad in order for service to be effective, triggering the require-
ment that the party serving process comply with the provisions of
the Hague Convention.*® See Hague Convention art. 1, 20 U.S.T.
at 362.

“Because the language of these provisions is plain and unambiguous, it is not
necessary to resort to the rules of construction or other sources to interpret its
meaning. Nevertheless, we note that our interpretation is supported by extra-
jurisdictional authority requiring a party to mail a document abroad in addition
to performing an act of service domestically in order to complete service on
a defendant residing outside of the United States. See, e.g., Froland v. Yamaha
Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (D. Minn. 2003) (holding that the
Hague Convention applied because, while Minnesota law permitted a foreign
corporation to be served with process through the secretary of state’s office,

2

In summation, the plain language of NRCP 4(e)(1)Gii) requires
a party serving process by publication to mail the summons and
complaint to any defendant whose address is known. Thus, as
Loeb knows the Jiang parties’ addresses, we conclude that, under
Nevada’s rules, Loeb would be required to mail copies of the
summons and complaint to the Jiang parties before service by
publication could be deemed complete. But because the Jiang par-
ties live in China, doing so constitutes the transmittal of judicial
documents for service abroad. As a result, the district court cor-
rectly determined that Loeb was required to comply with the terms
of the Hague Convention to effectuate service of process on the
Jiang parties.”

Accordingly, we deny the writ petition.*

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Cuerry, and Sait, JJ., concur.

VANGUARD PIPING SYSTEMS, INC., nKa VG PIPE,
LLC; VIEGA, LLC; INDUSTRIES, INC.; anp VIEGA,
INC., Petitioners, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE
SUSAN JOHNSON, Disrricr Jupcz, RESPONDENTS, AND
AVENTINE-TRAMONTI HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
A Nevaps NonpROFIT CORPORATION, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 61747
September 19, 2013 309 P.3d 1017

the applicable statute also required the secretary of state to mail a copy of the
summons to the foreign corporation before service was effectuated); Quinn v.
Keinicke, 700 A.2d 147, 154 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (where Delaware’s non-
resident motor vehicle statute permitted service of process on the secretary of
state, the Hague Convention was applicable because service was not complete
under the statute until a copy of the summons was mailed to the foreign
defendant),

"The Jiang parties also argue that service by publication alone is unconsti-
tutional because it does not satisfy due process. In light of our conclusions
herein, it is not necessary for us to reach this issue. See Miller v. Burk, 124
Ney. 579, 588-89, 188 P.3d 1112, 1118-19 (2008) (explaining that this court
“will not decide constitutional questions unless necessary’).

"In issuing this opinion, we make no comment on the effectiveness of serv-
ice of process by publication on a party residing outside of the United States
when that party’s address is not known.

603

Lincoln, Gustafson & Cercos and Nicholas B. Salerno, Las
Vegas; Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, LLP, and Alexander P.
Imberg, San Francisco, California, for Petitioners.

Canepa Riedy & Rubino and Scott K. Canepa, Terry W. Riedy,
and Bryan T. Abele, Las Vegas; Carraway & Associates and James
D. Carraway, Las Vegas; Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J.
Randall Jones, Las Vegas; Lynch, Hopper & Salzano, LLP, and
Francis Lynch, II, Las Vegas; Maddox, Isaacson & Cisnernos and
Robert C. Maddox, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.

8
&

Before the Court EN BANc.'
OPINION
By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires a party in litigation to produce for
the opposing party any agreement where an insurance company

'Tue HonorABLs Ron D. PARRAGUIRRE, Justice, did not participate in the
decision of this matter.

po

may be required to pay all or part of any judgment entered in the
action. Here, petitioners, defendants in the action below, disclosed
certain insurance policies, which they contend are more than suf-
ficient to satisfy any judgment that may be entered against them.
Thus, they assert that disclosure of any other primary or any sec-
ondary insurance policies is unnecessary unless the previously
disclosed policies are exhausted. The district court ordered the pe-
titioners to produce all previously undisclosed policies, and this
writ petition followed. In it, we are asked to determine whether
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) compels disclosure of all insurance agree-
ments, regardless of whether the policy limits exceed the amount
of potential liability or whether the policies provide secondary cov-
erage. We conclude that it does because the plain language of
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insurance agree-
ment that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment. Therefore,
we deny the petition.

FACTS

In the district court, real party in interest Aventine-Tramonti
Homeowners Association filed construction defect actions against
petitioners Vanguard Piping Systems, Inc.; Viega, LLC; Industries,
Inc.; and Viega, Inc. (collectively, Vanguard), and Vanguard’s Ger-
man parent companies Viega GmbH and Viega International
GmbH. In June 2012, this court entered a stay of the district
court proceedings as to the German parent companies, which, to
date, has not been lifted. The stay order did not stay or otherwise
limit any pending proceedings against Vanguard.

During discovery in the present case, Vanguard disclosed some
of its primary insurance agreements to Aventine-Tramonti, pur-
suant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D). Aventine-Tramonti subsequently
learned that additional undisclosed policies covering Vanguard may
have been purchased by the German parent companies and sought
the disclosure of any such agreements. The special master or-
dered Vanguard to disclose these agreements after it initially re-
fused to do so.

Vanguard objected to the special master’s order and sought re-
lief from the district court on the grounds that producing the in-
surance agreements would violate the stay of proceedings against
the German parent companies and that it had already complied
with NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D)’s requirements by disclosing its primary
insurance agreements that were sufficient to cover any judgment
against it. The district court affirmed the special master’s order,
finding that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of any insur-
ance agreement that may be used to satisfy a judgment. This writ
petition followed.

es

DISCUSSION
| peer

Vanguard petitions this court for a writ of mandamus or prohi-
bition.? “‘A writ of mandamus is available to compel the perform-
ance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an of-
fice, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion.’’ Int’l Game Tech. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote
omitted); see also NRS 34.160. Because writ relief is an extraor-
dinary remedy, this court ‘‘will exercise [its] discretion to consider
such a petition only when there is no ‘plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law” ’’ Cheung v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005) (quot-
ing NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330). The right to an appeal is generally
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Pan v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224, 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004).
Thus, this court typically will not exercise its discretion to review
a pretrial discovery order unless the order could result in ir-
reparable prejudice, such as when the order is a blanket discovery
order or an order requiring disclosure of privileged information.
Valley Health Sys. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 167,
171, 252 P.3d 676, 678-79 (2011).

Although Vanguard concedes that the insurance agreements at
issue are not privileged, it argues that the production of those
agreements would violate the stay entered by this court in regard to
the German parent companies. The referenced stay temporarily
halted the district court proceedings as to the German parent com-
panies only. See Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (La
Paloma Homeowners’ Ass’n), Docket No. 60015 (Order Granting
Motions for Stay, June 13, 2012). It did not stay production of doc-
uments relevant to the proceedings against Vanguard. Thus, even if
the insurance policies were purchased by, and are in the possession
of, the German parent companies, we reject the conclusion that
disclosure of those agreements violates the stay of proceedings
against the German parent companies. The question that remains
is whether the order requiring Vanguard to produce the policies
nevertheless would result in irreparable prejudice warranting writ
relief.

Even if petitioners’ arguments were meritorious, a writ of prohibition
would not be an appropriate remedy as petitioners have not alleged that the dis-
trict court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order at issue. See NRS 34.320 (ex-
plaining that a writ of prohibition is available to arrest district court proceed-
ings when the court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction).

Pe
P|

Vanguard argues that it should not be required to disclose these
agreements because Aventine-Tramonti’s counsel seeks their dis-
closure for an improper purpose, i.e., to use in other pending con-
struction defect litigation against Vanguard. But there is nothing in
the record indicating that these insurance agreements will later be
used for an improper purpose, and there is no prohibition against
the use of discovery in later, unrelated litigation provided that dis-
covery is relevant to the current litigation. See Dove v. Atl. Capi-
tal Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (‘*{Wyhere the discovery
sought is relevant[,] ... the mere fact that it may be used in
other litigation does not mandate a protective order.’”); Duling v.
Gristede’s Operating Corp., 266 F.R.D. 66, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (holding that ‘‘it is well established that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure[ ] create no automatic prohibition against using
discovery obtained in one litigation in another litigation’’). Here,
whether the special master’s order requires disclosure of irrelevant
information depends upon whether NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires
disclosure of additional insurance agreements when a party has
already disclosed proof of insurance coverage in excess of the
claimed damages. Thus, we exercise our discretion to consider this
writ petition.

NRCP 16.1 (a)(1)(D) requires disclosure of the additional insurance
agreements

Nevada’s Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to the same rules
of interpretation as statutes. Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 125
Nev. 611, 618, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009). ‘‘Statutory interpre-
tation is a question of law that we review de novo.’ Consipio Hold-
ing, BV v. Carlberg, 128 Nev. 454, 460, 282 P.3d 751, 756
(2012). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the
plain meaning of the words, without resort to the rules of con-
struction. Id.

NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) states that the parties ‘‘must’’ disclose

any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on
an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify
or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment and
any disclaimer or limitation of coverage or reservation of
rights under any such insurance agreement.

The plain language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) states that ‘‘any insur-
ance agreement”’ which ‘‘may be liable to satisfy part or all of a

oT

judgment’’ be disclosed. (Emphasis added.) The rule does not
mention agreements with policy limits sufficient to satisfy a judg-
ment, nor does it distinguish between primary and secondary in-
surance policies. See Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at 460, 282 P.3d
at 756 (explaining that this court will give words their ordinary
meaning when a statute is clear and unambiguous). In addition,
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) states that a party ‘‘must’’ disclose any in-
surance agreement, The use of the word ‘‘must’’ means that the
tule’s requirements are mandatory. See Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128
Nev. 424, 432, 282 P.3d 719, 725 (2012). Therefore, we conclude
that the plain language of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires disclosure
of any and all insurance agreements that may be liable to pay
a portion of a judgment regardless of whether the party has already
disclosed policies with limits that exceed that party’s potential
liability.

P|

Our interpretation is consistent with the interpretation that fed-
eral courts have given to FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), Nevada’s federal
counterpart, which requires parties to disclose ‘‘any insurance
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to sat-
isfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify
or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.’’ Because
of the similarity in the language, federal cases interpreting FRCP
26(a)(1)(A)(iv) ‘‘are strong persuasive authority.’ Exec. Mgmt.
Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 46, 53, 38 P.3d 872, 876
(2002) (internal quotations omitted).

Federal courts have broadly interpreted FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv).
For example, some federal courts have interpreted this rule as re-
quiring disclosure of reinsurance agreements, which are even far-
ther removed from primary liability than a secondary insurance
agreement.* See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 244
ER.D. 638, 641 (D. Kan. 2007). These courts also maintain that
the federal rule’s language is mandatory. See id. (applying FRCP
26(a)(1)(D) (2007), the predecessor to FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), and
stating that the language “‘is absolute . . . and does not require any
showing of relevance’’). Thus, federal courts reject efforts to limit
disclosure of insurance agreements to only those agreements that a

*We decline to address Vanguard’s argument that the district court should
have used its discretion to limit the insurance information requests pursuant to
NRCP 26(b)(2)(iii) as being unduly burdensome because Vanguard did not
present any evidence to the district court, or to this court, demonstrating how
disclosure of these policies would be burdensome.

“Reinsurance is purchased by insurance companies to insure their liability
under policies written to their insureds.” N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Rein-~
surance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995).

Pe

party deems to be relevant. See In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II,
L.P, 151 ER.D. 37, 41 (D. Del. 1993) (discussing FRCP 26(b)(2)
(1993), the predecessor to FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), and summarily
rejecting arguments from certain defendants that additional insur-
ance policies need not be disclosed because those defendants had
sufficient personal assets to satisfy any judgment against them);
Sierrapine v. Refiner Prods. Mfg., Inc., 275 F.R.D. 604, 613
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (requiring a defendant to locate and disclose all
insurance agreements that may be liable to pay a judgment despite
the defendant’s argument that it had already disclosed all of the in-
surance agreements it was ‘‘able to identify or locate, or [that it]
had knowledge of’’).

We agree with the approach taken by the federal courts. Van-
guard is involved in several other pending cases. Permitting it to
determine which insurance agreements are relevant for disclosure
overlooks the fact that it is impossible to foresee all possible cir-
cumstances in which the primary insurance policies will be subject
to liability and potentially exhausted by other judgments. Further,
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires that more information be disclosed
than FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Specifically, in addition to requiring
disclosure of insurance agreements and indemnification or reim-
bursement agreements, as required by FRCP 26(a)(1)(A)(iv),
NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) also requires disclosure of disclaimers and
limitations of coverage. See NRCP 16.1 drafter’s note (2004) (not-
ing that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) ‘‘expands on the federal rule’’).
Therefore, we conclude that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires that
any insurance agreement which may be liable to pay a portion
of the judgment must be disclosed. Accordingly, we deny the writ
petition.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and SaITTA,
JJ., concur.

0

McKNIGHT FAMILY, LLP, AppELLant, v. ADEPT MANAGE-
MENT SERVICES, INC.; NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERV-
ICES, INC.; TORREY PINES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIA-
TION; AND DESIGN 3.2 LLC, RESPONDENTS.

No. 56527

ADEPT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., A NEVADA
Nonprorir Corporation; NEVADA ASSOCIATION SERV-
ICES, INC.; AND TORREY PINES HOMEOWNERS AS-
SOCIATION, APPELLANTS, v. MCKNIGHT FAMILY, LLP,
RESPONDENT.

No. 57182
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 555

James S. Kent, Ltd., and James S. Kent, Las Vegas, for
McKnight Family, LLP.

Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner, Senet & Wittbrodt LLP and Rich
Haskin, Becky A. Pintar, and Airene Haze, Las Vegas, for Adept
Management Services, Inc., Nevada Association Services, Inc.,
and Torrey Pines Homeowners Association.

Design 3.2 LLC, in Proper Person.

cry

612
Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Douczas, J.:

After unsuccessful settlement negotiations regarding a dispute
over unpaid property assessments, respondents/appellants Torrey
Pines Homeowners Association, Adept Management, and Nevada
Association Services (collectively, TP HOA) sold appellant/
respondent McKnight Family, LLP’s properties at a trustee sale.
Design 3.2 purchased one of the properties.

McKnight filed a complaint naming TP HOA and Design 3.2 as
defendants and a motion to set aside the sale based on improper
notice. The district court entered a default judgment against Design
3.2 for failing to timely answer McKnight’s complaint; however,
the court later set aside the default.

The district court denied McKnight’s motion to set aside the
sale, determining that TP HOA properly served McKnight. Fur-
ther, the district court dismissed McKnight’s complaint because the
court determined that, pursuant to NRS 38.310, the claims should
have been submitted to a form of alternative dispute resolution be-
fore being brought in district court.

While the district court was correct in determining that most of
McKnight’s claims were subject to NRS 38.310, we conclude that
the district court erred to the extent that it dismissed McKnight’s
claim for quiet title because that claim was not subject to NRS
38.310. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of McKnight’s quiet
title claim. In light of this determination, we also reverse the dis-
trict court’s order denying the motion to set aside the trustee’s sale.

FACTS

McKnight owned two properties in a housing community man-
aged by TP HOA. TP HOA placed a lien on McKnight’s proper-
ties under NRS 116.3116 after a dispute over allegedly unpaid as-
sessments. In response, McKnight filed a complaint and an ex
parte application for a temporary restraining order. McKnight al-
Jeged seven claims in its complaint, including one for injunctive
relief. The district court granted the temporary restraining order
and set a preliminary injunction hearing. However, the parties
agreed to engage in settlement negotiations and signed a stipulation

Po

to halt all litigation and foreclosure proceedings for 30 days. As a
result, the preliminary injunction hearing was taken off the court’s
calendar.

The settlement negotiations were unsuccessful, and TP HOA
sold the properties at a trustee’s sale. In response, McKnight filed
ari amended complaint alleging seven claims: (1) preliminary/
permanent injunction, (2) negligence, (3) breach of contract,
(4) violation of NAC 116.300,’ (5) violation of NAC 116.341,?
(6) violation of NRS 116.1113 and NRS 116.3103, and (7) slan-
der of title/wrongful foreclosure/quiet title. All seven claims were
alleged in the original complaint; the only difference in the
amended complaint was McKnight’s addition of Design 3.2, LLC,
as a defendant because Design 3.2 purchased one of the properties
at the trustee’s sale.

The district court entered a default judgment against Design 3.2
for failing to timely answer McKnight’s complaint but later set
aside the judgment. The parties briefed and argued the default
judgment issue at an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Design
3.2 argued that the district court should set aside the default judg-
ment because McKnight did not properly serve it with the
amended complaint. The district court determined it would set
aside the default judgment due to the Nevada Supreme Court’s
“‘Jiberal’’ attitude regarding setting aside a default if the motion
to set aside the default is brought within ‘‘the six-month time
frame.’ The district court later issued an order granting Design
3.2’s motion to set aside the default, but did not determine whether
McKnight properly served Design 3.2.

Additionally, McKnight requested that the district court set aside
the trustee’s sale due to improper notice. McKnight alleged that TP
HOA did not send notice of the sale via certified or registered
mail, as Nevada law requires. In response, TP HOA filed a notice
of compliance with the district court, which included two notices
of delinquent assessment, two notices of default and election to
sell, and two notices of sale. Additionally, the document contained
several receipts for certified mail and sworn affidavits stating that
each notice was sent to McKnight via certified mail. In light of the
evidence TP HOA presented, the district court determined that TP
HOA provided McKnight with proper notice of the sale and denied
McKnight’s motion to set aside the trustee’s sale.

Further, the district court dismissed McKnight’s amended
complaint because it determined the parties were required to par-
ticipate in alternative dispute resolution under NRS 38.310 before
McKnight could bring the claims in district court.

'The Nevada Administrative Code has since been revised. This provision
was recodified at NAC 116A.320.

?Recodified at NAC 116A.345,

 —

After the district court dismissed McKnight’s complaint, TP
HOA moved for attorney fees. The district court denied the motion
without prejudice, pending the resolution of this appeal.?

DISCUSSION
The district court erred in dismissing McKnight’s entire complaint

|

The district court’s decision to dismiss McKnight’s complaint
pursuant to NRS 38.310 involves an issue of statutory interpreta-
tion; thus, we review this issue de novo. See Hamm v. Arrowcreek
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 124 Nev. 290, 295, 183 P.3d 895, 899
(2008).

NRS 38.310 states:

1. No civil action based upon a claim relating to:

(a) The interpretation, application or enforcement of any
covenants, conditions or restrictions applicable to residential
property...

may be commenced in [state court] unless the action has
been submitted to mediation or arbitration pursuant to the
provisions of NRS 38.300 to 38.360, inclusive . . . .

Under NRS 38.300(3), a civil action includes ‘‘an action for
money damages or equitable relief,’ but not ‘‘an action in equity
for injunctive relief in which there is an immediate threat of
irreparable harm, or an action relating to the title to residential
property.’

McKnight argues that NRS 38.310(2) prohibits the district court
from dismissing a complaint once it commences, irrespective
of whether the complaint violates NRS 38.310(1). NRS 38.310(2)
states that ‘‘[a] court shall dismiss any civil action which is
commenced in violation of the provisions of [NRS 38.310(1)].”’
McKnight’s argument is meritless because NRS 38.310(2)’s lan-
guage does not determine when a court can dismiss a civil action;
rather, it mandates the court to dismiss any civil action initiated in
violation of NRS 38.310(1). Therefore, the district court had the
authority to dismiss the complaint. The only remaining issue re-
garding the complaint is whether the district court erred in dis-
missing every claim. To make such a determination, we must an-
alyze each claim under NRS 38.310.

An action is exempt from the NRS 38.310 requirements if the
action relates to an individual’s right to possess and use his or her

3Our decision to reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings ren-
ders the attorney fees issue moot. See Personhood Ney. v. Bristol, 126 Nev.
599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010).

Po

property. In Hamm, this court determined that a lien on a property
does not present an immediate danger of irreparable harm nor is it
related to an individual’s title to property for NRS 38.310 purposes
because a lien exists separate from the property, and the right to
use and dispose of the property remains with the owner until the
lien is enforced at foreclosure proceedings. 124 Nev. at 298-99,
183 P.3d at 901-02. Contrarily, this court determined that a threat
of foreclosure constitutes a danger of irreparable harm because
land is unique. Jd. at 297, 183 P.2d at 901. With these principles
in mind, we now analyze the claims McKnight alleged in its
amended complaint.

Injunctive relief claim

|

The injunctive relief claim was properly dismissed because
McKnight did not face an immediate threat of irreparable harm.
The amended complaint superseded all claims for relief alleged in
the original complaint. See Las Vegas Network, Inc. v. B. Shaw-
cross & Assocs., 80 Nev. 405, 407, 395 P.2d 520, 521 (1964).
McKnight filed its amended complaint after TP HOA sold the
properties at the trustee sale; thus, McKnight no longer faced the
foreclosure threat. Without some immediate threat of a future ir-
reparable harm, the injunctive relief claim is subject to NRS
38.310, Therefore, the district court properly dismissed it. See
Hamm, 124 Nev. at 297-98, 183 P.3d at 901.

Negligence, breach of contract, NAC, and NRS claims

Ye

The negligence, breach of contract, NAC, and NRS claims are
civil actions as defined in NRS 38.300. Therefore, the district
court properly dismissed these claims. The negligence claim does
not affect the title to the properties, rather it concerns payments
McKnight made to TP HOA. The breach of contract claim is re-
lated to obligations and duties set forth in the CC&Rs, and the al-
Jeged NAC and NRS violations required the district court to inter-
pret regulations and statutes that contained conditions and
restrictions applicable to residential property. Thus, these claims
fell under NRS 38.310’s purview. Additionally, McKnight sought
money damages for its NRS claims, so those claims are civil ac-
tions as defined in NRS 38.300(3).

Slander of title
Slander of title involves false and malicious communications that

disparage a person’s title in land and cause special damages. Hig-
gins v. Higgins, 103 Nev. 443, 445, 744 P.2d 530, 531 (1987).

os

Slander of title is an NRS 38.300(3) civil action because it exists
separate from the title to land. Similar to the lien in Hamm, slan-
der of title may cloud an individual’s title, perhaps resulting in a
lower sale price. See Hamm, 124 Nev. at 298-99, 183 P.3d at 901-
02. However, slander of title does not infringe upon an individual’s
right to use or dispose of his or her property. Thus, the district
court correctly dismissed this claim because the claim is subject to
NRS 38.310 and must be submitted to alternative dispute resolu-
tion prior to being brought in district court.

Wrongful foreclosure

Wrongful foreclosure is a civil action subject to NRS 38.310’s
requirements because deciding a wrongful foreclosure claim
against a homeowners’ association involves interpreting covenants,
conditions, or restrictions applicable to residential property. See
Long v. Towne, 98 Nev. 11, 14, 639 P.2d 528, 530 (1982) (find-
ing no impropriety where “‘the lien foreclosure sale was conducted.
under authority of the CC&Rs and in compliance with NRS
107.080’’). A wrongful foreclosure claim challenges the authority
behind the foreclosure, not the foreclosure act itself. See Collins v.
Union Fed. Sav. & Loan, 99 Nev. 284, 304, 662 P.2d 610, 623
(1983). To determine whether an individual violated any conditions
or failed to perform any duties required under an association’s
CC&Rs, a court must interpret the CC&Rs to determine their ap-
plicability and enforceability regarding the individual. This type of
interpretation falls under NRS 38.310. Therefore, the court acted
properly in dismissing the wrongful foreclosure action.

Quiet title claim

[|

Unlike McKnight’s other causes of action, the quiet title claim
is exempt from NRS 38.310. A quiet title claim requires the court
to determine who holds superior title to a land parcel. See NRS
40.010. Such a claim directly relates to an individual’s right to
possess and use his or her property. Therefore, it is not a civil ac-
tion as defined in NRS 38.300(3) and, accordingly, is exempt
from NRS 38.310. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the
quiet title claim, and we reverse the dismissal of this claim.

Motion to set aside the sale of the properties

In light of our decision regarding McKnight’s quiet title claim,
we also reverse the district court’s order denying McKnight’s mo-
tion to set aside the sale of the properties. While we disagree with
McKnight’s assertion that the district court erred in its findings of
fact in its order denying the motion to set aside the trustee’s sale,

Se

we nevertheless reverse the district court’s order denying the mo-
tion, because depending on the quiet title claim’s outcome, the
question of whether the sale should be set aside is still open. On
remand, the district court should reconsider the motion to set
aside once it resolves the quiet title claim.

Default judgment
Le

A court’s decision regarding a motion to set aside a default judg-
ment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Minton v.
Roliff, 86 Nev. 478, 481, 471 P.2d 209, 210 (1970). A trial court
may abuse its discretion when it acts ‘‘in clear disregard of the
guiding legal principles.’’ Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674,
856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993).

In Moseley v. Eighth Judicial District Court, this court deter-
mined that it could not resolve a writ petition in its entirety be-
cause the district court failed to find whether a party—in seeking
relief from a motion to dismiss—established excusable neglect. 124
Nev. 654, 668, 188 P.3d 1136, 1146 (2008). The factual issue of
excusable neglect was critical to whether the party was entitled to
relief from the dismissal; thus, without the issue resolved, this
court could not properly review the petition. See id.

| |

We cannot determine whether the district court abused its dis-
cretion in setting aside the default judgment against Design 3.2 be-
cause the court did not make the necessary findings of fact. The
motion to set aside the default judgment was based on the alleged
fact that McKnight failed to serve Design 3.2. However, McKnight
maintains it properly served Design 3.2, and McKnight supports
its assertion with the process server’s affidavit. Under NRCP
60(c), a district court may set aside a default judgment if a defen-
dant is ‘‘not personally served with summons and complaint.”
Thus, similar to the factual issue of excusable neglect in Moseley,
the issue of whether McKnight served Design 3.2 is critical to
whether Design 3.2 is entitled to relief from the default judgment.
Further, this court cannot ‘‘resolve disputed questions of fact.’
Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604,
637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (internal citations omitted). Conse-
quently, we vacate the district court’s order granting Design 3.2’s
motion and remand the issue to the district court to determine
whether McKnight properly served Design 3.2.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of all of McKnight’s
claims other than the quiet title claim. We reverse the district
court’s decisions to dismiss McKnight’s quiet title claim, and to

618

deny McKnight’s motion to set aside the foreclosure sale, we va-
cate the district court’s order to grant Design 3.2’s motion to set
aside the default judgment, and we remand this matter to the dis-
trict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and GipBons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Cuerry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

NEVADA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT BOARD,
AND ITS BOARD MEMBERS; SUE DEFRANCESCO;
CHARLES SILVESTRI; ELIZABETH FRETWELL;
PURISIMO HERNANDEZ; DAVID F. KALLAS; GEORGE
STEVENS; AND WARREN WISH, APPELLANTS, v.
DOUGLAS E. SMITH, RESPONDENT.

No. 56801
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 560

[Rehearing denied November 22, 2013]

Woodburn & Wedge and W. Chris Wicker and Jessica H.
Anderson, Reno, for Appellants.

Chuck R. Gardner, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

0

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

On this appeal we consider NRS 286.541(2), governing retire-
ment by members of the Public Employees’ Retirement System
(PERS). PERS interprets NRS 286.541(2) as limiting retire-
ment eligibility. In its view, a member who goes from one PERS-
eligible job to another without a break in service and retiring
from PERS may not thereafter retire and receive benefits from
PERS, until the member effectively retires from his or her new
PERS-eligible job. A contrary interpretation, PERS maintains,
would allow in-service distributions, violating NRS 286.541 and
the Internal Revenue Code plan-qualification provisions on which
PERS depends.

The district court disagreed. In its view, NRS 286.541(2) de-
termines retirement benefit dates, not retirement eligibility. Thus,
the district court held that PERS should have allowed respondent
Douglas Smith to retire and receive benefits from PERS based on
his prior public service, even after he was sworn in as a district
court judge, another PERS-eligible position. The district court
also held that, under NRS 286.190(3)(a), PERS could and should
have equitably excused Judge Smith’s noncompliance with NRS
286.541, and allowed him to reverse his eventual election to trans-
fer from PERS to the Judicial Retirement System (JRS), despite
NRS 1A.280(6), which makes such an election irrevocable.

The district court erred in its interpretation of the controlling
statutes and in reviewing the PERS Board’s decision de novo,
rather than deferentially. We therefore reverse and reinstate the
PERS Board’s determination that Judge Smith is not eligible to re-
ceive retirement benefits at this time.

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Public Employees’ Retirement System members may not re-
ceive PERS retirement benefits until they effectively retire from
PERS. NRS 286.541.! Under NRS 286.520(1)(a)(2), benefit pay-

‘Judge Smith disputes PERS’s use of the word “retire,” claiming it muddies
the difference between retirement from a place of employment and retirement

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ments ordinarily cease if a retired employee resumes work for
a PERS-eligible employer. But NRS 286.520(5) provides an ex-
ception for ‘‘a retired employee [who] is chosen by election or
appointment to fill an elective public office.’ Such a retired em-
ployee may continue receiving PERS benefits, so long as the new
office is not the same as the office in which the employee earned
the benefits.

In this case, respondent Douglas Smith meant to avail himself of
NRS 286.520(5). A sitting justice of the peace with 23 years of
creditable PERS service, Judge Smith ran for and was elected to
the Eighth Judicial District Court in November of 2008. He
planned to retire as a justice of the peace, start receiving benefits
(reduced for early retirement) from PERS, take office as a district
court judge, and then elect to participate in JRS rather than PERS.?
Judge Smith believed that this would allow him to receive PERS
retirement benefits, in addition to his district judge salary, while
accruing a second set of retirement benefits under JRS, eventually
receiving benefits under both PERS and JRS.?

Judge Smith consulted PERS staff in November and December
2008 about retirement options. He received estimates based on dif-
ferent scenarios, using an expected retirement date of Decem-
ber 31, 2008. PERS staff also provided Judge Smith with materi-
als explaining how PERS determines effective retirement dates
and the implications of taking other public employment before
and after retiring from PERS. The PERS Preretirement Guide in-
cludes a section, “‘Some Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them,’’ which
cautions: ‘‘As we have stated before, your effective date of retire-
ment is the day after your last day of employment, the day your ap-
plication is received [by] PERS . . . , or the date requested on the
application, whichever is later. . . . You must take the initiative.
No one will automatically do it for you, and no one, including your

from PERS membership. As indicated in NRS 286.401, “{a] retired em-
ployee” is a person who has terminated his or her membership in PERS, and
we will use the statutory meaning of “retire” here, with the understanding that
“retiring from PERS”? is a more efficient way of saying “effectively retire for
the purpose of collecting benefits from PERS.”

Under NRS 286.293(1), most public employees must enroll as members of
PERS. In 2001, the Legislature formed the Judicial Retirement System to tran-
sition retirement benefits for certain judicial officers, including district court
judges and some justices of the peace, from PERS to JRS. NRS 1A.100(1).
The PERS Board administers JRS. NRS 1A.170.

3NRS 1A.280(7) states that, ‘‘No justice of the Supreme Court or district
judge . . . may receive benefits under both this chapter [JRS] and chapter 286
[PERS] of NRS.’”’ We requested and received supplemental briefing from the
parties on the impact of this statute on Judge Smith’s plan to participate in both
JRS and PERS. Because we decide this case by reinstating the Board’s deter-
mination, which rested on NRS 286.541(2) and NRS 286.190(3)(a), we do not
reach, and express no opinion on, how NRS 1A.280(7) may have impacted
Judge Smith’s plans,

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public employer, can file your retirement paperwork.”’ Public Em-
ployees’ Retirement System of Nevada, Preretirement Guide 13
(March 2008 revision).

Separately, Judge Smith consulted Clark County about health in-
surance. Justices of the peace are paid by the County, while district
judges are paid by the State, and Judge Smith faced a gap between
plans. Judge Smith learned that he could extend his and his fam-
ily’s County-paid health insurance up to February 1 if he contin-
ued as a justice of the peace into January. Under the Nevada Con-
stitution, Article 6, Section 5, Judge Smith’s term as a district
judge began, and he was sworn in, on January 5, 2009, the first
Monday in January. To maximize his insurance coverage, Judge
Smith provided a resignation letter to Clark County designating
Sunday, January 4, 2009, as his last day as justice of the peace.
Clark County reported Judge Smith’s termination date as Janu-
ary 4, 2009, and afforded him insurance coverage through Janu-
ary 31, 2009. Judge Smith received his last Clark County paycheck
on December 19, 2008.

Judge Smith waited until January 8, 2009, to file the papers re-
quired to retire from PERS.‘ By then, he had been sworn in as a
district court judge. In that capacity, he was employed by a PERS-
eligible employer and earning creditable service with PERS. After
research, PERS staff determined that, consistent with NRS
286.541(2), Judge Smith could not retire from PERS while em-
ployed in a PERS-eligible position. PERS therefore denied Judge
Smith’s application for retirement benefits.

Judge Smith appealed staff’s determination to the PERS Board.
At the PERS Board hearing, Judge Smith cited NRS 286.190(3)(a)
and asked for an equitable exception to NRS 286.541(2). He ac-
knowledged that PERS staff made no misrepresentations to him but
argued that it was unduly harsh to deny him early retirement ben-
efits because he filed his paperwork three days late. The Board de-
bated whether it could make an exception to NRS 286.541(2) and,
if so, whether it would be allowing an in-service distribution and
deviating from operational guidelines, which could jeopardize
PERS with the IRS.

The Board denied Judge Smith’s appeal in its written findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and decision. It held that ‘‘[t]he applica-
ble provisions of the Retirement Act [NRS 286.541(2)] clearly pro-
hibit a member from retiring while he is actively employed and re-
ceiving service credit”’ Addressing Judge Smith’s request for
equitable relief, the Board first determined that NRS 286.190(3)(a)
did not apply, since ‘Judge Smith could not point to any erroneous

“Judge Smith suggested to the PERS Board that he faxed these papers to
PERS on January 5. The Board rejected this claim, since the papers were not
notarized until January 6 and bore a fax date of January 8.

—

representation by [PERS] upon which he reasonably and detri-
mentally relied.’ Second, the Board concluded that ‘‘allowing a
‘retired’ member to be employed and accrue service credit, with
no clear break from service, violates the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice’s ‘in service distribution’ rule and could jeopardize the entire
retirement fund[’]s status as a qualified retirement plan.”

Under NRS 1A.280(3)(a), Judge Smith had until March 31,
2009, to give written notice that he intended to withdraw from
PERS and participate in JRS. See supra note 2. If he did not, he
would automatically remain in PERS. NRS 1A.280(5). Judge
Smith signed and faxed his JRS election form on March 31. The
form states, ‘‘I, Douglas E. Smith, hereby elect to withdraw from
the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) and become a
member of the Judicial Retirement System (IRS) pursuant to NRS
1A.280. I understand that this election is irrevocable and that I
may not reestablish my service in PERS under any circumstances.’
Judge Smith transmitted the election form under a letter stating that
he was doing so ‘‘under protest as there is an open appeal process
on going.” Pursuant to Judge Smith’s election, PERS calculated its
retirement benefits liability to him at more than $1 million. On
June 15, 2009, PERS transferred that sum to JRS, which has in-
vested and managed it since. The PERS Board’s denial of Judge
Smith’s retirement application has not cost Judge Smith a loss of
creditable service or any associated benefits.

Judge Smith petitioned for judicial review. After discovery, he
and PERS stipulated to submit the dispute to the district court on
the depositions taken and documents produced during discovery
and the PERS Board hearing transcript and record. The district
court thereafter entered its written findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order. It reversed the PERS Board’s decision to deny
Judge Smith’s retirement application, declared a retroactive retire-
ment date of January 8, 2009, and ordered PERS to pay all re-
tirement payments due retroactive to January 8, 2009. PERS
timely appealed.

IL.
A.

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Although not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,
“‘ftJhe decisions of the PERS Board are reviewable by the courts
on the basis of the same standard of review applied to other ad-
ministrative actions.’ State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Emps.’
Ret. Sys., 120 Nev. 19, 23, 83 P.3d 815, 817 (2004). The court
may not “‘ ‘substitute its judgment of the evidence for that of the
administrative agency.’ Jd. (quoting United Exposition Serv. Co.
y. SIS, 109 Nev. 421, 423, 851 P.2d 423, 424 (1993)). ‘“When

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the factual findings of the adminisuative agency are supported by
{substantial] evidence, they are conclusive, and the district court is
limited to a determination of whether the agency acted arbitrarily
or capriciously’’ Mishler v. Nev. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 109 Nev.
287, 292, 849 P.2d 291, 294 (1993). ‘‘Substantial evidence is ev-
idence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion.’’ Schepcoff v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev.
322, 325, 849 P.2d 271, 273 (1993).

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On appeal, this court ‘reviews questions of statutory construc-
tion and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo.’’ I. Cox
Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., L.L.C., 129 Nev. 139, 142, 296 P.3d
1202, 1203 (2013). ‘However, an administrative agency charged
with the duty of administering an act is impliedly clothed with the
power to construe the relevant laws and set necessary precedent to
administrative action, and the construction placed on a statute by
the agency charged with the duty of administering it is entitled to
deference.’’ Elliot v. Resnick, 114 Nev. 25, 32 n.1, 952 P.2d 961,
966 n.1 (1998). ‘‘[W]hen an agency’s conclusions of law are
closely related to its view of the facts, those conclusions are enti-
tled to deference, and we will not disturb them if they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence.’’ Fathers & Sons & A Daughter Too
v. Transp. Servs. Auth., 124 Nev. 254, 259, 182 P.3d 100, 104
(2008).

B.

NRS 286.541(2) defines when a PERS member’s. retirement
becomes effective. It reads in its entirety:

Except as otherwise required by NRS 286.533," retirement
becomes effective on whichever of the following days is the
later:

(a) The day immediately following the applicant’s last day
of employment;

(b) The day the completed application form is filed with the
System;

(c) The day immediately following the applicant’s last day
of creditable service; or

(d) The effective date of retirement specified on the appli-
cation form.

SNRS 286.533 states that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
every distribution to a member must be made pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tion 401(a)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(9), that apply
to governmental plans.”

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To retire from PERS, NRS 286.541(1) requires the member to
file a completed application for service retirement allowances with
PERS. NRS 286.541(2) defines the effective date of retirement
from PERS. It is the later of the four listed conditions. It can be
the day after the employee’s last day of employment, if the other
three conditions have been met. NRS 286.541(2)(a). It can be the
day the completed application form is filed with PERS, if the other
three conditions have been met. NRS 286.541(2)(b). It can be the
day after the employee’s last day of creditable service, if the other
conditions have occurred. NRS 286.541(2)(c). Or it can be the ef-
fective date specified on the application, again if the other three
conditions have been satisfied. NRS 286.541(2)(d). Even if an em-
ployee has met all the other conditions of NRS 286.541(2), para-
graphs (a) and (c) preclude that employee from effectively retiring
until the day after the employee’s last day of creditable service,
whichever is later. Together, paragraphs (a) and (c) thus prevent an
in-service distribution.

But the district court held that NRS 286.541(2) sets a retirement
date only for purposes of calculating benefits, thus allowing Judge
Smith to retire from PERS even after going to work for a PERS-
eligible employer. It reasoned that the statute is codified in the ben-
efits section of NRS Chapter 286 and that PERS’s retirement ap-
plication states retirement benefits are effective on whichever event
listed in NRS 286.541(2)(a)-(d) occurs last. This interpretation is
surely wrong. It contradicts the plain language of the statute, and
“*[w]ords may not be supplied in a statute where the statute is in-
telligible.”’ 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 47:38 (7th ed. 2007).

Here, the statute conveys in no uncertain terms that retirement
from PERS becomes effective when the last of the four specified
events occurs. The statute does not establish a retirement date for
a limited purpose, and it never uses the word ‘‘benefits.’”” Al-
though the district court is correct that NRS 286.541(2) is codified
in the benefits section of Chapter 286, the statute defines eligibil-
ity to receive benefits. It would not make sense if NRS 286.541(2)
applied solely to calculating benefits because other sections, such
as NRS 286.495 and NRS 286.510, explain credit for service and
how a member’s designated retirement date affects his or her ben-
efits. But there is no other statute that defines what conditions
must be met before a member can effectively retire.

“While not controlling, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is
persuasive,’ State v. Morros, 104 Nev. 709, 713, 766 P.2d 263,
266 (1988), when the statute is one the agency administers. Elliot, /
114 Nev. at 32 n.1, 952 P.2d at 966 n.1. The PERS Board governs |
PERS. See NRS 286.120. It has interpreted NRS 286.541(2) so as
to comport with the statute’s language and PERS’s overarching ob-

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ligation to comply with the Internal Revenue Service provisions ap-
plicable to governmental retirement plans. PERS indicates in its
Preretirement Guide and its briefs that it does not limit NRS
286.541 to the calculation of benefits. Instead, PERS determines a
member’s effective retirement date based on information the mem-
ber provides and which of the four events listed in NRS 286.541(2)
occurs last. Thus, we conclude that an employee cannot effectively
retire from PERS until the day when the last of the four enumer-
ated requirements is complete.

Cc.
| rere)

Here, Judge Smith remained an active PERS member until
March 31, 2009, when he elected to transfer to JRS. The Board
decided that the earliest Judge Smith could have effectively retired
would have been January 8, 2009, ‘‘[t]he day the completed ap-
plication form [was] filed with the System.’ NRS 286.541(2)(b).
But because Judge Smith took his elected office on January 5,
2009, PERS received the application while he was employed in
a PERS-eligible job. Under paragraphs (a) and (c) of NRS
286.541(2), a member still employed in a PERS-eligible job may
not receive retirement benefits. After all, a person who continues
PERS-eligible employment has not yet reached an effective ‘‘last
day of employment’’ or ‘‘last day of creditable service”’” NRS
286.541(2)(a), (c).

Judge Smith’s JRS election further complicates matters since he
no longer has a PERS account from which he could draw benefits;
all PERS contributions and liabilities have been transferred to
IRS. The district court held that Judge Smith could revoke his IRS
election because ‘‘{hJis hand was essentially forced.’’ We recognize
that Judge Smith’s dispute with the PERS Board affected his deci-
sion to join JRS, but NRS 1A.280 plainly does not allow an em-
ployee to revoke his decision. Pursuant to NRS 1A.280(6), a judge
who exercises the option to switch from PERS to JRS ‘‘may not
re-establish the service for which the liabilities were transferred.’’
Accordingly, after the Board transferred Judge Smith’s accrued
benefits from his PERS account to his new JRS account, be can no
longer participate in or receive benefits from PERS.

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Judge Smith next argues that, even assuming his failure to retire
from PERS before becoming a district court judge disqualified him
from thereafter retiring and receiving benefits from PERS, the
PERS Board should have granted him equitable relief under NRS
286.190(3)(a). This statute provides that the PERS Board:

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May:

(a) Adjust the service or correct the records, allowance or
benefits of any member, retired employee or beneficiary after
an error or inequity has been determined, and require repay-
ment of any money determined to have been paid by the Sys-
tem in error, if the money was paid within 6 years before de-
mand for its repayment.

NRS 286.190(3)(a) (emphasis added). NRS 286.190(4) defines
“error or inequity’’ as ‘“‘the existence of extenuating circum-
stances, including, but not limited to, a member’s reasonable and
detrimental reliance on representations made by the System or by
the public employer pursuant to NRS 286.288 which prove to be
erroneous, or the mental incapacity of the member.’

Citing NRS 286.190(3), the district court held that the Board
was required to grant Judge Smith equitable relief. But this read-
ing ignores the statute’s use of the permissive ‘‘may.’ “‘It is a well-
settled principle of statutory construction that statutes using the
word ‘may’ are generally directory and permissive in nature, while
those that employ the term ‘shall’ are presumptively mandatory.”
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. JMA/Lucchesi, 110 Nev. 1, 9-10, 866
P.2d 297, 302 (1994). The district court’s reading contravenes the
presumption that every word, phrase, and provision—here, the
word ‘“‘may’’—in a statute has meaning. Law Offices of Barry
Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 366-67, 184 P.3d 378,
386-87 (2008); In re Prosole, 32 Nev. 378, 383, 108 P. 630, 632-
33 (1910).

Pe :

“A statute’s express definition of a term controls the construc-
tion of that term no matter where the term appears in the statute,”
so NRS 286.190(4)’s definition of ‘‘error or inequity’’ controls.
Williams v. Clark Cnty. Dist. Attorney, 118 Nev. 473, 485, 50 P.3d
536, 544 (2002); 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 20:8 (6th ed. 2002). Under NRS 286.190(4), error
or inequity signifies extenuating circumstances, such as detrimen-
tal reliance or mental incapacity of the member. Although its use
of ‘‘including, but not limited to’’ makes NRS 286.190(4)’s list of
extenuating circumstances nonexhaustive, it is significant that none
of the examples involves employee fault or neglect.

Judge Smith and our dissenting colleagues cite Nevada Public
Employees Retirement Board v. Byrne, 96 Nev. 276, 607 P.2d
1351 (1980), arguing that ‘‘our courts have the inherent power to
seek and to do equity’ This is a true statement but the circum-
stances in Byrne were much different from Judge Smith’s. In
Byrne, PERS incorrectly told an employee he would receive

oa es

$725.35 a month upon retirement, but when the employee retired,
he received a mere $86.78 a month. Jd. at 278, 607 P.2d at 1352.
Here, PERS gave Judge Smith accurate ‘‘Estimated Calculations”
every time he requested information about his retirement options.
Unlike Byrne, nothing suggests that the Board falsely or incor-
rectly recorded Judge Smith’s information or gave him inaccurate
information on which he detrimentally relied. In fact, as the Board
noted, Judge Smith acknowledged that PERS staff made no mis-
representations. It appears that he chose to delay sending his re-
tirement notice so as to ensure no gap in health insurance coverage
as he changed jobs; this was his choice, not one PERS recom-
mended. Judge Smith admitted that he did not read the materials
PERS provided him. He failed to file his PERS retirement appli-
cation before January 5, 2009, because he assumed that timing did
not matter. Judge Smith relied on his own assumptions to his
detriment.

The dissent would remand this matter back to the PERS Board
with instructions ‘to make specific findings of fact and conclusions
of Jaw under its equitable powers set forth in NRS 286.190(3).’”’
But the PERS Board has already done so. Thus, its written find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision consider and reject
application of Byrne because in Byrne, unlike this case, PERS
made the error in calculation, on which the employee relied to his
detriment. In this case, by contrast, the Board found that Judge
Smith ‘‘has not alleged any error in his records, or the calculation
or amount of his benefit.’ He asks ‘‘the Board [to] change the ‘ef-
fective date of his retirement.’’’ This the Board declined to do,
because it would ‘‘violate[ ] the Internal Revenue Service’s ‘in
service distribution’ rule and could jeopardize the entire retirement
fund[’]s status as a qualified retirement plan.’’

NRS 286.190(3)(a) permits the Board to ‘‘[a]djust the service or
correct the records’’ of a member or retired employee after ‘an
error or inequity has been determined.’ By definition, ‘‘adjust’’
means to bring something into a proper state, and ‘‘correct’’ is to
make something true, accurate, or right. Concise Oxford English
Dictionary 16, 321 (11th ed. 2008). But as the Board found, its
records and calculation of Judge Smith’s service were accurate.
What Judge Smith sought was to have the Board rewrite its records
to establish an earlier retirement date than the true record and ap-
plication of NRS 286.541(2) would dictate. According to the
Board, this placed the plan as a whole at risk, because it amounted
to an improper in-service distribution. Such calculated risk avoid-
ance—involving a subject within the expertise of the Board, not the
courts—is something a court should not lightly second guess. See

‘Judge Smith did not meaningfully contest the PERS Board’s assessment of
the IRS risk associated with in-service distributions.

ee!

In re State Eng’r Ruling 5823, 128 Nev. 232, 238-39, 277 P.3d
449, 453 (2012). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude
that the PERS Board abused its discretion when it determined
that Judge Smith must wait until he retires from his current em-
ployment to collect his service benefit, none of which he has lost
by reason of the Board’s determination in this case.

We therefore reverse.

HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, and Douczas, JJ., concur.

Gpsons, J., with whom Curry and Sarrta, JJ., agree, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part:

While I concur with the majority that NRS 286.541(2) deter-
mines the effective date of retirement, I disagree that the Board
may not grant equitable relief pursuant to NRS 286.190(3) and (4).

As a deputy public defender, as a deputy district attorney, and as
an elected justice of the peace, Judge Smith was required to be en-
rolled as a member of PERS. In 2001, the Legislature created the
Judicial Retirement System (JRS) for supreme court justices and
district judges. In 2005, the Legislature adopted NRS 1A.285 to
allow a justice of the peace or municipal judge to participate in
JRS.

The district court found that, after his election to the Eighth Ju-
dicial District Court in November 2008, Judge Smith advised
PERS that he intended to retire from PERS prior to taking office
as a district judge on January 5, 2009. Judge Smith would then be-
come a member of the JRS on that date.

PERS sent the necessary paperwork to Judge Smith to complete
for his retirement. The district court found that Judge Smith retired
as a justice of the peace on December 31, 2008, and Judge Smith
ceased having contributions made to PERS on his behalf as of that
date. As set forth in the majority, PERS received Judge Smith’s re-
tirement application on January 8, 2009, or three days after he
commenced his service as an elected district judge.

NRS 286.190 sets forth the general powers of the PERS Board.
NRS 286.190(3)(a) provides in part that the Board ‘‘may adjust the
service or correct the records, allowance or benefits of any mem-
ber, retired employee or beneficiary after an error or inequity has
been determined . . . ”’ NRS 286.190(4) defines error or inequity
as ‘‘the existence of extenuating circumstances, including, but not
limited to, a member’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on
representations made by the System.’’ Contrary to the majority’s
conclusion, this statute does not limit the Board’s authority to grant
equitable relief to PERS members who make inadvertent mis-
takes. After he retired on December 31, 2008, Judge Smith should
have delivered his fully executed retirement application to PERS
prior to January 5, 2009. The application required a notarized sig-

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nature by Judge Smith’s wife consenting to the terms of his retire-
ment option. There was a delay in obtaining this notarization.

In Nevada Public Employees Retirement Board v. Byrne, 96
Nev. 276, 607 P.2d 1351 (1980), we affirmed the judgment of the
district court estopping the PERS Board from altering the amount
and calculation of retirement benefits it had originally represented
to Mr. Byrne and ordering the payment of those retirement bene-
fits. The PERS Board argued in part that because it had the in-
herent power to correct mistakes, any reliance on its representa-
tions was barred. Id. at 279, 607 P.2d at 1353. We disagreed and
concluded that our courts have the ‘‘inherent power to seek and to
do equity.’ Id. at 280, 607 P.2d at 1354.

In the present case, the district court found and determined that
“PERS is equitably estopped from denying Judge Smith his PERS
retirement benefits.’ The district court found and concluded that in
response to reasonable inquires made by Judge Smith, PERS ‘‘at
no time informed [Judge Smith] of a deadline for submitting his
application. Neither was this deadline explained in the application
packet or the applicable statutes.’’ The district court further found
and concluded that Judge Smith enrolled in JRS only because of
the unresolved status of this litigation. Finally, the district court
noted that the enrollment was made under protest and was hardly
voluntary. Based on these findings and conclusions, the district
court properly determined that the Board could not fairly deny
benefits and thus should have turned to its own powers under NRS
286.190 to do equity.

Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s stringent interpretation
of NRS 286.190(3) and (4). The PERS Board does have the power
to remedy an ‘“‘error or inequity’’ based upon a mistake of the
PERS retirement applicant. Otherwise, a minor error may reduce
significant retirement benefits which the applicant has earned over
many years of service. The PERS Board has the equitable power to
rescind the enrollment by Judge Smith in the JRS. Since we do not
make factual findings, I would reverse the judgment of the district
court with instructions to remand this case to the PERS Board to
make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law under its eq-
uitable powers set forth in NRS 286.190(3) and (4) regarding the
extenuating circumstances in this case.

pe ss
IN THE Marrer OF DISCIPLINE OF RONALD N. SEROTA,
Bar No. 7904.
No. 57960
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF RONALD N. SEROTA,
Bar No. 7904.
No. 59551
IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF RONALD N. SEROTA,
Bar No. 7904.
No. 60719
October 3, 2013 309 P3d 1037

Ronald N. Serota, Las Vegas, in Proper Person.

David Clark, Bar Counsel, and Glenn Machado, Assistant Bar
Counsel, Las Vegas, for the State Bar of Nevada.

Before PICKERING, C.J., GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Dovcas, Cuerry and Sarrta, JJ.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

These bar matters, though separately docketed, all involve the
same attorney, Ronald N. Serota, Bar No. 7904. They are not con-
solidated; however, we have elected to resolve them in a single
disposition."

Docket No. 57960 is an automatic review of a Southern Nevada
Disciplinary Board hearing panel’s recommendation that Serota be
disbarred from the practice of law in Nevada. See SCR 105(3)(b).
Serota misappropriated $319,000 in client funds that were to
be used to satisfy a judgment in a Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) action against the client. He asks us to impose a
lesser sanction, contending that because of mitigating factors, we
should merely suspend him from the practice of law and/or refer
him to a diversion program. On de novo review, we conclude that
disbarment is the proper sanction and therefore approve the panel’s
recommendation.

Docket No. 59551 is an original petition by bar counsel advis-
ing us that Serota has been convicted of a felony for the same con-
duct underlying the disciplinary matter. See SCR 111(4). Docket
No. 60719 is an original petition by Serota seeking dissolution of
our prior order temporarily suspending him from the practice of
law.? See SCR 102(4)(d). We conclude that the petitions in Docket

"We originally decided these matters in an unpublished order filed May 24,
2013. Bar counsel subsequently filed a motion pursuant to NRAP 36() to reis~
sue our order as an opinion. We grant the motion and therefore issue this opin-
ion in place of our prior order.

?We previously temporarily suspended Serota from the practice of law pend-
ing the outcome of the instant disciplinary proceedings. In re Discipline of
Serota, Docket No. 54856 (Order of Temporary Suspension, November 18,
2009).

Po 633

Nos. 59551 and 60719 have been rendered moot as a result of our
decision in Docket No. 57960 that Serota be disbarred from the
practice of law.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Docket No. 57960

Serota represented a client in an action by the SEC. The SEC al-
leged that the client engaged in accounting practices that were vi-
olative of federal law. On August 3, 2009, Serota’s client signed a
consent to entry of judgment, which was filed with the federal
court on August 27, 2009.

In anticipation of this negotiated outcome, the client paid Serota
all of the monies necessary to satisfy the judgment in advance, by
way of 14 checks totaling $319,901.59 written between July 2 and
July 24, 2009. The checks were deposited into Serota’s client
trust account. Each check contained a notation indicating that it
was for some aspect of the SEC action.

Meanwhile, on July 16, 2009, a check from Serota’s client trust
account was written to Beverage Plus, a company in which Serota
had an ownership interest, for $225,000. Despite this misappro-
priation, Serota continued to accept additional checks from the
client until the client had paid him the entire amount of the antic-
ipated judgment in the SEC action. On July 28, 2009, a check
from Serota’s trust account was written to Clean Path Resources,
another company in which Serota had an interest, for $94,000.
Thus, Serota had misappropriated virtually the entire amount of the
judgment prior to having his client sign the consent to entry of
judgment on August 3, 2009.

Pursuant to the signed consent, final judgment was entered
against Serota’s client in the SEC action on September 25, 2009.
The final judgment ordered the client to, among other things, pay
a total judgment of $319,901.59 within 10 business days. On
October 7, 2009, just two days before the judgment was to be paid,
Serota admitted his misappropriations to the State Bar.

Consequently, the State Bar filed a complaint against Serota al-
leging that his conduct violated RPC 1.15 (safekeeping property),
RPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel), and RPC 8.4
(misconduct). Thereafter, a formal disciplinary hearing was held,
at which the State Bar put on evidence of Serota’s misappropria-
tions and of aggravating circumstances it alleged were present in
this matter; the defense focused primarily on mitigating circum-
stances that it alleged were present.

The disciplinary panel found unanimously that Serota had vio-
lated RPC 1.15 and RPC 8.4. It recommended, by a 4-1 vote, that
Serota be disbarred and ordered to pay the costs of the proceed-

a Pe

ings. Consequently, Serota’s disciplinary matter was forwarded to
us for automatic review pursuant to SCR 105(3)(b).

Docket Nos. 59551 and 60719

Bar counsel subsequently filed an original petition pursuant to
SCR 111(4), Docket No. 59551, informing this court that Serota
was convicted in the Eighth Judicial District Court of one count of
theft, a category B felony pursuant to NRS 205.0832 and NRS
205.0835, for the same conduct underlying the disciplinary pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Serota filed an original petition pursuant to
SCR 102(4)(d), Docket No. 60719, seeking dissolution of our
November 18, 2009, order of temporary suspension entered in
Docket No. 54856.

DISCUSSION
[ree

We review a decision of a hearing panel recommending disbar-
ment automatically. SCR 105(3)(b). The panel’s findings must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. SCR 105(2)(e); In re
Discipline of Drakulich, 111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715
(1995). Although persuasive, the panel’s findings and recommen-
dations are not binding on us. In re Discipline of Droz, 123 Nev.
163, 168, 160 P.3d 881, 884 (2007). Our review is conducted de
novo, requiring us to exercise independent judgment to determine
whether and what type of discipline is warranted. SCR 105(3)(b);
In re Discipline of Stuhff, 108 Nev. 629, 633, 837 P.2d 853, 855
(1992). The paramount objective of attorney disciplinary proceed-
ings is ‘‘to protect the public from persons unfit to serve as attor-
neys and to maintain public confidence in the bar as a whole.”
State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 129, 756 P.2d 464,
473 (1988). In determining the proper disciplinary sanction, we
consider four factors: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s men-
tal state, (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s
misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances. In re Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197
P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008).

The panel’s findings are supported by clear and convincing
evidence

P|

We conclude that the panel’s findings are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Serota concedes that he violated RPC 1.15,
which requires a lawyer, among other things, to safekeep clients’
property in the lawyer’s possession. Serota’s client turned over
money to him that was to be paid to the SEC to satisfy a judgment
against the client, but instead of safeguarding those funds, Serota

pe 63s

misappropriated them for his own purposes. He therefore failed in
his duties to safekeep his client’s property. Serota also concedes
that he violated RPC 8.4(c), which states that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In addition to misappropriating
the client’s funds for his own purposes, Serota allowed the client
to sign the consent to entry of judgment despite knowing that he
had already misappropriated the money intended to satisfy the
judgment. He therefore engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. We conclude that clear and
convincing evidence supports the panel’s findings that Serota vio-
lated RPC 1.15 and 8.4.3

Disbarment is the appropriate discipline

Ce

We further conclude that, considering the four Lerner factors,
disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction in this case.
Serota’s conduct in this matter violated duties to his client, the pro-
fession, and the public. We conclude that his conduct was inten-
tional and caused actual injury to his client. The egregiousness of
his actions alone justifies disbarment. See generally American Bar
Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Com-
pendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, at 455
(2013 ed.) (disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly converts client property causing injury or potential
injury).

The presence of aggravating circumstances further supports this
conclusion. See SCR 102.5(1) (listing examples illustrative of ag-
gravating circumstances). One such circumstance is that Serota has
a prior disciplinary offense.* SCR 102.5(1)(a). In addition, we
agree with the State Bar that his conduct evinces a dishonest or
selfish motive. SCR 102.5(1)(b). Furthermore, there was a pattern
of misconduct where, prior to each misappropriation, Serota ac-
cepted several payments from the client beforehand, and hid his
misconduct afterwards until its discovery was imminent. SCR
102.5(1)(c). Finally, Serota concedes that he committed multiple
offenses. SCR 102.5(1)(d). Even assuming arguendo that Serota’s
conduct did not by itself warrant disbarment, the presence of these

3Because clear and convincing evidence supports the panel’s findings re-
garding these rules of professional conduct, we need not consider the parties’
remaining arguments regarding RPC 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and coun-
sel) or subsection (d) of RPC 8.4 (conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice).

“On August 18, 2008, Serota received a letter of reprimand for violating
RPC 1.1 (competence), RPC 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), and
RPC 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law).

636 pe

aggravating circumstances would justify an increase in the degree
of discipline to be imposed. See SCR 102.5(1) (aggravating cir-
cumstances are ‘‘any considerations or factors that may justify an
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed’’).

We further conclude that, although there are some mitigating
circumstances present in this case, they do not justify a reduction
in the degree of discipline to be imposed. See SCR 102.5(2) (list-
ing examples illustrative of mitigating circumstances). To begin,
Serota’s contention that there is an absence of a dishonest or self-
ish motive is belied by his conduct. SCR 102.5(2)(b). In addition,
though his medical condition may have contributed to personal or
emotional problems, we conclude that these mitigating circum-
stances are insufficient to warrant a reduction in discipline in light
of the egregiousness of his misconduct. SCR 102.5(2)(c), (h). We
further conclude that his claimed mental disabilities are largely un-
corroborated and, in any event, he failed to establish a causal con-
nection between them and his misconduct. SCR 102.5(2)(i)(2). Al-
though he was cooperative and self-reported, SCR 102.5(2)(e),
discovery of his misconduct was imminent, and thus this does not
warrant a reduction in discipline. We conclude that Serota’s
claimed rehabilitation is not supported by the record. SCR
102.5(2)(k). We further conclude that he failed to demonstrate gen-
uine remorse; instead, on appeal he attempts to blame the victim.
SCR 102.5(2)(m). Finally, his claims of having done pro bono and
other work to benefit the profession and the community are largely
unsubstantiated, and even if established would not warrant a re-
duction in discipline in light of the seriousness of his misconduct.
SCR 102.5(2). Under the circumstances presented here, we con-
clude that disbarment is the only viable option. We agree with the
panel’s recommendation in Docket No. 57960 that Serota be dis-
barred from the practice of law in Nevada.

In light of this disposition, we conclude that the other bar mat-
ters pending before us regarding Serota have been rendered moot.
Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574
(2010) (court’s duty is not to render advisory opinions but to re-
solve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment); NCAA v.
Univ. of Nev., 97 Nev. 56, 57, 624 P.2d 10, 10 (1981) (duty of ju-
dicial tribunal is to decide actual controversies by a judgment that
can be carried into effect, not to give opinions on moot questions
or abstract propositions or to declare principles of law that cannot
affect the matter at issue). We therefore deny as moot the State
Bar’s petition in Docket No. 59551 regarding Serota’s felony con-
viction. Likewise, we deny as moot Serota’s petition in Docket No.
60719 for dissolution of our order temporarily suspending him
from the practice of law. .

Pe 61

CONCLUSION

We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the
panel’s findings that Serota failed to safekeep his client’s property,
a violation of RPC 1.15, and that he engaged in misconduct, a vi-
olation of RPC 8.4. Moreover, the egregiousness of misappropri-
ating $319,000 in client funds warrants disbarment. The presence
of aggravating circumstances provides further support for the con-
clusion that disbarment is the only appropriate discipline in this
case. In light of our conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate
disciplinary sanction, bar counsel’s petition regarding Serota’s
felony conviction, and Serota’s petition for dissolution of our order
temporarily suspending him from the practice of law, are denied as
moot.

Accordingly, Serota is hereby disbarred from the practice of law
in Nevada.’ If he has not already done so, Serota shall pay the
costs of the disciplinary proceedings in the amount of $2,142.75
within 30 days from the date of this order. If they have not already
done so, Serota and the State Bar shall comply with SCR 115 and
SCR 121.1.

‘Serota’s motion to set aside the recommendation of disbarment by the
board, filed July 7, 2011, in Docket No. 57960 is denied. The State Bar’s mo-
tion to strike or, in the alternative, opposition to Serota’s motion to set aside
the recommendation of disbarment by the board, filed July 20, 2011, in
Docket No. 57960 is therefore denied as moot.

Serota has communicated to this court by way of several letters addressed
to the clerk of the court. He is admonished that any request for relief from this
court must be presented by way of a formal, written motion, not by way of a
letter addressed to the clerk of the court. Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. 645,
652 n.8, 261 P.3d 1080, 1085 n.8 (2011). In addition, Serota’s briefs in
Docket No. 57960 contain numerous factual assertions not supported by ref-
erences to the record and references to facts that are outside the record alto-
gether. This is improper, and we disregard such references. See NRAP
28(€)(1); SCR 105(3)(b); Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev.,
97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981). In addition, Serota has improp-
erly attempted to supplement the record in Docket No. 57960 with exhibits not
before the disciplinary panel, which we cannot consider. See NRAP 10;
NRAP 30(b); SCR 105(3)(b); State, Dep’t of Taxation v. Kelly-Ryan, Inc., 110
Nev, 276, 282, 871 P.2d 331, 336 (1994). We direct the clerk of this court to
return, unfiled, the document entitled “‘Appellant’s Exhibit Supplement to
Reply Brief,” provisionally received on October 19, 2011, in Docket No.
57960; we further direct the clerk of this court to strike Exhibits 1-6 from
“‘Appellant’s Reply Brief’’ filed October 21, 2011, in Docket No. 57960.

Finally, on August 4, 2011, Serota filed an opposition to the State Bar’s
motion to extend the time in which to file the answering brief in Docket No.
57960. At the time the opposition was filed, the extension of time had already
been granted; however, it would appear that the documents may have crossed
in the mail. Under these unique circumstances, we elect to treat Serota’s op-
position as a motion for reconsideration of our order granting the requested ex-
tension of time, and we deny it. See NRAP 31(b)(3)(B); SCR 105(3)(b).

638

NEWMAR CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
APPELLANT, v. ALLISON McCRARY, AN INDIVIDUAL,
RESPONDENT.

No. 58174

NEWMAR CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
APPELLANT, v. ALLISON McCRARY, AN INDIVIDUAL,
RESPONDENT.

No. 59045
October 3, 2013 309 P.3d 1021

Morris Law Group and Robert McCoy, Rex D. Garner, and
Raleigh C. Thompson, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Alverson, Taylor, Mortensen & Sanders and Kurt R.
Bonds, Alan V. Mulliner, and Eric W. Hinckley, Las Vegas, for
Respondent.

Before the Court EN Banc.!

OPINION

By the Court, Curry, J.:

In this opinion, we consider whether a purchaser of a motor
home may revoke acceptance and recover the purchase price from
the motor home’s manufacturer under the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). We hold that a purchaser is entitled to revoke ac-
ceptance of the motor home against its manufacturer where, as
here, privity exists between the manufacturer and the buyer be-
cause the manufacturer interjected itself into the sales process and
had direct dealings with the buyer to ensure the completion of the
transaction. We also conclude that the district court properly
awarded incidental and consequential damages but that it abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees. Thus, we affirm the judgment
but reverse the award of attorney fees.

'THE HonorABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

640 Po

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Allison McCrary purchased a luxury motor home
manufactured by appellant Newmar Corporation from Wheeler’s
Las Vegas RV. The purchase included Newmar’s two-year ex-
press warranty for repair and service. After purchasing the motor
home, McCrary let it remain in Wheeler’s possession for repairs,
due to some issues noticed during the test drives. A week later,
McCrary returned to inspect and pick up the motor home. Notic-
ing continued problems with the motor home during the inspec-
tion, McCrary met with a Newmar factory representative. She
stated that she would not take possession of the motor home un-
til the representative assured her that Newmar would take care of
any problems and that there was a full, bumper-to-bumper war-
ranty. After receiving the sought-after reassurances from Newmar,
McCrary took possession of the motor home.

Shortly thereafter, the motor home experienced significant elec-
trical problems, making it unsafe to drive and resulting in re-
peated delays and canceled vacation plans for McCrary. After nu-
merous repairs at the Newmar factory and other repair shops,
McCrary attempted to revoke her acceptance of the motor home
from Newmar, but Newmar rejected the revocation. McCrary then
filed the underlying action asserting, inter alia, causes of action for
revocation of acceptance, breach of contract, and breach of war-
ranty against Newmar.”

Prior to trial, both parties made offers of judgment. Neither
offer was accepted. Following a bench trial, based on the particu-
Jar facts of this case, the district court concluded that McCrary did
not take possession of the motor home when she signed the con-
tract and would not have completed the purchase and eventually
taken possession except for the interactions with and assurances
made by Newmar’s representative to McCrary. Ultimately, the dis-
trict court found in favor of McCrary and awarded her $406,500 in
damages—the $385,000 purchase price for the motor home based
on the revocation of acceptance, but required McCrary to return
the motor home as part of the revocation, $12,500 for the cost of
insuring the motor home, and $9,000 for storage fees—plus
$44,251.40 in prejudgment interest and $107,581.50 in attorney
fees. The court entered judgment accordingly, and these appeals
followed.

DISCUSSION

‘We must first determine whether revocation of acceptance is an
available cause of action against a manufacturer before we can
reach the issues of damages and attorney fees.

*McCrary also asserted claims against Wheeler’s. Wheeler’s was subse-
quently removed from the litigation during the summary judgment stage be-
cause McCrary attempted to revoke acceptance only from Newmar.

Pe oat

Revoking acceptance from Newmar

Newmar argues that, under Nevada’s applicable UCC provision,
NRS 104.2608, a buyer can only revoke acceptance from a seller,
and while it manufactured the motor home, it was not a seller of
the motor home. Thus, Newmar contends that Wheeler’s is the
only entity from whom McCrary can revoke acceptance and that,
because McCrary revoked acceptance with the wrong entity, she
alone must bear the consequences of that mistake.

McCrary contends that the district court correctly determined
that Newmar was a co-seller based on Newmar’s exclusive
warranty and its employee’s participation in the sales process.
McCrary asserts that Newmar should be held to its actions.

The UCC provision governing revocation of acceptance was
adopted and codified in Nevada as NRS 104.2608. It allows a
buyer to revoke her acceptance of a purchased good if the item suf-
fers from a ‘‘nonconformity [that] substantially impairs its value to
the buyer’’ and the buyer accepted the item on the understanding
that the seller would cure the nonconformity or was induced into
accepting a nonconforming item ‘‘either by the difficulty of dis-
covery before acceptance or by the seller’s assurances.’” NRS
104.2608(1)(a), (b);? see also NRS 104.2608(2) (requiring notifi-
cation to the seller of the defect and timeliness for revocation).
Under the UCC, ‘‘ ‘[sJeller’ means a person who sells or contracts
to sell goods.’? NRS 104.2103(1)(c). Here, there is no question as
to the motor home’s nonconformity, and thus we turn directly to
whether the manufacturer can be considered a ‘‘seller’’ under the
ucc,

We have previously addressed revocation of acceptance against
the immediate seller, but we have not yet determined whether rev-
ocation of acceptance is available against a manufacturer. See Wad-
dell v. L.V.R.V., Inc., 122 Nev. 15, 125 P.3d 1160 (2006) (af-
firming judgment for revocation against the dealer that sold the
subject motor home); Havas v. Love, 89 Nev. 458, 459, 514 P.2d
1187, 1188 (1973) (allowing revocation against the defendant who
sold a motorbus to the plaintiff). The Legislature has given some
guidance, directing our courts to liberally construe and apply the
UCC to ‘‘make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”
NRS 104.1103(1)(c). However, the jurisdictions are split as to
whether revocation of acceptance is proper against a manufac-
turer, giving us the opportunity to decide the issue de novo. See
Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 460, 244 P.3d 765, 775 (2010)
(‘‘[I]ssues involving a purely legal question are reviewed de
novo.’’).

*The legislative history of NRS 104.2608 does not indicate whether the
Legislature intended that the buyer may revoke only against the immediate
seller or may return the goods to a remote seller such as the manufacturer.

642 Po

In revocation of acceptance cases, the term ‘‘seller’’ has been
restricted to the immediate seller by a majority of jurisdictions but
has been inclusive of the manufacturer by a minority of jurisdic-
tions. A majority of jurisdictions have determined that revocation
is not available against a manufacturer because the manufacturer is
not a “‘seller’’ under the UCC. See, e.g., Seekings v. Jimmy GMC
of Tucson, Inc., 638 P.2d 210, 214 (Ariz. 1981) (following “‘the
Jogic as well as the letter of the U.C.C.’’ to require privity and
hold that a motor home ‘‘manufacturer who does not sell to the
purchaser [directly and for whom the seller was not agent] cannot
be liable for revocation and attendant damages’’); Griffith v.
Latham Motors, Inc., 913 P.2d 572, 577 (idaho 1996) (determin-
ing that the manufacturer could not be liable under a revocation
claim because it did not sell the vehicle to the plaintiffs); Hender-
son v. Chrysler Corp., 477 N.W.2d 505, 507-08 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991) (rejecting revocation against nonselling manufacturer when
there was no privity and leaving plaintiff with remedies under a
warranty); Neal v. SMC Corp., 99 S.W.3d 813, 816-18 (Tex.
App. 2003) (noting that because ‘‘[t]he nature of a revocation
claim logically requires privity of contract[,] . . . revocation is
available to the buyer only against the immediate seller’; the
motor home manufacturer, ‘‘in the absence of a contractual rela-
tionship with the consumer, is not a seller’ by virtue of a manu-
facturer’s express warranty); see generally Fedrick v. Mercedes-
Benz USA, L.L.C., 366 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1200 (N.D. Ga. 2005);
Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 150 (Conn.
1976); Hardy v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 706 A.2d 1086, 1091
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Ayanru v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1023 (Civ. Ct. 1985); Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc., 184 S.E.2d 727, 731 (W. Va. 1971). According
to these courts, revocation is not available against the manufacturer
unless there is a direct contractual relationship between the manu-
facturer and the buyer or an agency relationship between the man-
ufacturer and the seller. The rationale behind this position is that
revocation is intended to return the buyer and seller to their orig-
inal positions and that because the manufacturer does not own the
goods or receive the purchase price when the goods are sold, it
cannot be involved in restoring the parties to their former posi-
tions. See, e.g., Seekings, 638 P.2d at 214; Griffith, 913 P.2d at
5717; Henderson, 477 N.W.2d at 507-08; Neal, 99 S.W.3d at 817-
18; Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., Inc., 313 S.E.2d 384, 390
(Va. 1984).

Conversely, a minority of states have held that revocation of ac-
ceptance can be had against entities further removed from the
transaction than the immediate seller, such as the manufacturer.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1126
(8th Cir. 1982); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262 N.W.2d

Pe 648

349, 357-58 (Minn. 1977); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Novak, 418
So. 2d 801, 804 (Miss. 1982); Fode v. Capital RV Ctr., Inc., 575
N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (N.D. 1998); Gochey v. Bombardier, Inc.,
572 A.2d 921, 924 (Vt. 1990). As explained in Gochey, this de-
cision is based on the viewpoint that traditional privity is not nec-
essary, but that the relationship established based on a manufac-
turer’s warranty is sufficient:

“Under state law the right to revoke acceptance for defects
substantially impairing the value of the product and to receive
a refund of the purchase price are rights available to a buyer
against a seller in privity. Where the manufacturer gives a
warranty to induce the sale it is consistent to allow the same
type of remedy as against that manufacturer. Only the privity
concept, which is frequently viewed as a relic these days, has
interfered with a rescission-type remedy against the manufac-
turer of goods not purchased directly from the manufacturer.
If we focus on the fact that the warranty creates a direct con-
tractual obligation to the buyer, the reason for allowing the
same remedy that is available against a direct seller becomes
clear.”

572 A.2d at 924 (quoting Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433 A.2d
801, 811-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (citations omitted)).

In assessing these two positions, we find the majority position to
be too inflexible in its adoption of a strict, literal interpretation of
privity and in defining what constitutes a ‘‘seller.”’ This position
ignores the UCC’s mandate for liberal application. We perceive in-
stances where, as here, revocation of acceptance against a manu-
facturer might be appropriate.

‘We also have concerns with the minority view, based on the
fact that the jurisdictions taking this approach have expressly elim-
inated privity, enacted relevant statutory definitions, or eliminated
privity from consideration. See, e.g., Novak, 418 So. 2d at 803-04
(determining that based on the Mississippi Legislature’s ‘‘abol-
ish{ment of] privity of contract for breach of warranty claims in-
cluding actions brought under the [UCC],”’ the sales contract and
the accompanying manufacturer’s warranty were ‘‘so closely linked
both in time of delivery and subject matter, that they blended into
a single unit at the time of sale’”); Harper, 671 F.2d at 1126 (de-
clining to limit relief as it would be ‘‘contrary to the Code’s man-
date to administer its remedies liberally?’ even though the UCC
“eliminates the defense of privity in suits for damages for breaches
of warranties, [but remains] silent as to revocation of accept-
ance’’); Durfee, 262 N.W.2d at 357-58 (concluding that because
plaintiff could have sued under a warranty theory, when ‘“‘the ab-
sence of privity would not bar the suit despite the language of the
pertinent Code sections[,]’’ the same logic should be applied to

ou Pe

revocation as ‘‘[t]he remedies of the Code are to be liberally ad-
ministered’); Fode, 575 N.W.2d at 687-88 (determining that the
buyer could revoke acceptance from a nonprivity manufacturer
based on the merger of the warranty with the contract); Gochey,
572 A.2d at 924 (concluding that an express warranty creates a
contract with the ultimate buyer, pointing out that ‘‘[w]hen the
manufacturer’s defect results in revocation by the consumer, the
manufacturer must assume the liability it incurred when it war-
ranted the product to the ultimate user’’). Our Legislature thus far
has been silent on the issue of privity. As a result, we are hesitant
to completely eliminate any requirement of privity, particularly be-
cause doing so may result in too broad an application of the revo-
cation of acceptance cause of action.

While we have concerns with both positions, because of the
unique circumstances of this case, we need not choose between the
two at this point. The direct interactions and representations made
by Newmar to McCrary expanded the relationship between the two
parties and created privity.* Newmar, even though it was the man-
ufacturer, interjected itself into the sales process and through its
representations assisted in the completion of the sales transaction.
Under the unique facts of this case, we conclude that this direct in-
volvement on the part of the manufacturer in the sales process cre-
ated a direct relationship with the buyer sufficient to establish priv-
ity between the manufacturer and the buyer. See Alberti v.
Manufactured Homes, Inc., 407 8.B.2d 819, 824 n.4 (N.C. 1991)
(stating that the prerequisite for revocation of acceptance that there
be a direct contractual relationship between the parties can include
the manufacturer when the buyer and manufacturer have direct
dealings with each other); Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. Eu-
ropean X-Ray Distribs. of Am., Inc., 444 So. 2d 1068, 1072 & n.4
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that privity can exist between.
the manufacturer and buyer even though there is an intermediate
seller when there are direct contacts between the two parties in
completing the sale). This resulting relationship is sufficient to in-
clude the manufacturer within the definition of ‘‘seller’’ under
NRS 104.2103(1)(c), and, as a result, allow for revocation of ac-
ceptance against the manufacturer. When the manufacturer is ulti-
mately responsible for the defect that resulted in the breach to the
consumer and has directly involved itself in the transaction to en-
sure the sale, it can be the entity that is held responsible to the

“Black's Law Dictionary defines privity as “‘{tJhe connection or relationship
between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in the same sub-
ject matter (such as a transaction, proceeding, or piece of property); mutual-
ity of interest.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1320 (9th ed. 2009).

po 645

consumer. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision that
McCrary was entitled to revoke acceptance from Newmar.

Award of incidental and consequential damages

[|

Newmar next argues that its single-page warranty explicitly and
clearly disclaims liability for incidental and consequential damages.
Newmar further contends that revocation cancels only a contract of
sale and that the warranty from a manufacturer is still intact, pre-
venting the collection of those damages. However, Newmar’s re-
peated failed attempts to repair the motorhome under the expanded
warranty resulted in the frustration and deprivation of McCrary’s
benefit of the bargain to the point that no remedy was available to
her. NRS 104.2719(2) provides that ‘‘[w]here circumstances cause
an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, rem-
edy may be had as provided in this chapter.’ Because McCrary’s
remedy failed to serve its purpose, she was entitled to pursue
remedies available under the UCC. The pertinent UCC provision,
NRS 104.2715, explicitly provides for the award of incidental and
consequential damages. See also Clark v. Int’l Harvester Co., 581
P.2d 784, 797, 802 (Idaho 1978) (noting that ‘‘other courts have
uniformly held that where a party limits its warranty obligation to
the repair and replacement of defective parts failure to fulfill that
obligation, if such failure operates to deprive the other party of the
substantial value of the bargain, causes the limited remedy ‘to fail
of its essential purpose’ within the meaning of that section and en-
titles the party to pursue the remedies otherwise available under the
UCC”? including incidental and consequential damages (quoting
Idaho Code § 28-2-719(2))); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 262
N.W.2d 349, 357-58 (Minn. 1977) (awarding the purchase price
plus incidental damages and determining that because “‘[t}he exis-
tence and comprehensiveness of a warranty undoubtedly are sig-
nificant factors in a consumer’s decision to purchase a particular
automobile[,] . . . [w]hen the exclusive remedy found in the war-
ranty fails of its essential purpose and when the remaining defects
are substantial enough to justify revocation of acceptance, we think
the buyer is entitled to look to the warrantor for relief’’); Koper-
ski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 302 N.W.2d 655, 664, 666 (Neb.
1981) (noting that ‘‘ ‘[rlepair and replacement’ clauses, . . . have
become the basic mechanism by which manufacturers limit or
avoid liability in actions for breach of warranty,’ and explaining
that when the car is so defective that the repair and replace war-
ranty fails in its essential purpose, the buyer may sue for breach of
warranty and may, in some cases, sue for incidental and conse-
quential damages); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d
157, 161 (S.D. 1975) (determining that respondent was entitled to

4 Pe

incidental and consequential damages under the warranty when the
available remedy failed its essential purpose due to a breach caused
by unreasonable delays in the vehicle’s repairs). Accordingly, be-
cause incidental and consequential damages may be awarded pur-
suant to the revocation claim, we affirm the district court’s award
of those damages. See NRS 104.2715; Novak, 418 So. 2d at 803;
Fode, 575 N.W.2d at 689.

Award of attorney fees

Newmar also challenges the award of attorney fees. We conclude
that the award of attorney fees to McCrary was an abuse of dis-
cretion, as the award was not authorized under the plain language
of NRCP 68(£) and NRS 17.115(4). See McCarran Int'l Airport v.
Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 673, 137 P.3d 1110, 1129 (2006). We con-
clude that the district court properly declined to award attorney
fees under NRS 18.010 because Newmar’s defense against revo-
cation was not unreasonable given the split in jurisdictions on this
issue. Additionally, attorney fees were not proper under NRS
17.115(4) because McCrary did not receive a larger award at trial
than she would have under the pretrial offer of judgment.

CONCLUSION
Lee

For the reasons articulated above, we conclude that when a ve-
hicle has substantial, irreparable defects, a purchaser is entitled to
revoke acceptance of the vehicle from the manufacturer when the
manufacturer interjected itself into the sales process and made di-
rect representations to the buyer, thereby creating privity. Further-
more, under the UCC, the purchaser is permitted to receive the
purchase price along with incidental and consequential damages.‘
We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding attorney fees. Thus, we affirm the judgment but reverse
the order awarding attorney fees.

GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DoucLas, and SaITTA, JJ.,
concur.

SIn light of our resolution of this appeal, we need not reach Newmar’s re-

maining contentions.

SHA’KAYLA ST. MARY, APPELLANT, v.
VERONICA LYNN DAMON, RESPONDENT.

No, 58315
October 3, 2013 309 P.3d 1027

Accelerated Law Group and Joseph Timothy Nold, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and Bradley S.
Schrager, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Sarrma, J.:

This appeal concerns the establishment of custodial rights over
a minor child born to former female partners, appellant Sha’Kayla
St. Mary and respondent Veronica Lynn Damon. The couple be-
came romantically involved and decided to have a child. They
drafted a co-parenting agreement, and eventually, St. Mary gave
birth to a child through in vitro fertilization, using Damon’s egg
and an anonymous donor’s sperm. Thereafter, their relationship
ended, leading to the underlying dispute concerning the parties’
custodial rights over the child.

The district court, apparently relying on a previous order that
recognized Damon as the child’s legal mother and granted her the
right to be added as a mother to the child’s birth certificate, con-
cluded that St. Mary was a mere surrogate. The district court re-
fused to uphold the parties’ co-parenting agreement or consider
whether St. Mary was a parent entitled to any custodial rights.
St. Mary appealed, challenging the district court’s conclusion that
she was a surrogate and its refusal to uphold the co-parenting
agreement.

Po 649

We first conclude that the district court erred in determining,
without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue, that St. Mary
was a surrogate lacking any legal rights to parent the child. The
version of NRS 126.041(1) that existed at the time of the district
court’s determinations, as well as the version that exists now, pro-
vides that a mother-child relationship may be established by ‘‘proof
of [the mother] having given birth’! See NRS 126.041(1) (2009);
2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213, § 34, at 812. Here, the parties agree that
St. Mary gave birth to the child but disagree about whether they
intended for St. Mary to be a mother to the child or a mere sur-
togate. Nothing in either Nevada law or in this case’s record, in-
cluding the birth certificate order, conclusively demonstrates that
NRS 126.041(1) does not apply to St. Mary’s relationship with the
child. Accordingly, a factual issue exists regarding whether St.
Mary was a legal mother to the child or was a surrogate or gesta-
tional carrier without legal rights to the child, and we remand this
matter for an evidentiary hearing on that issue.

Second, we conclude that St. Mary and Damon’s co-parenting
agreement is not void as unlawful or against public policy. When
two parents, presumptively acting in the child’s best interest, reach
an agreement concerning post-separation custody, that agreement
must not be deemed unenforceable on the basis of the parents
being of the same sex. In this matter, the parties’ co-parenting
agreement stated that if their relationship ended, they would con-
tinue to share in the responsibilities and privileges of being the
child’s parent. Thus, if the district court determines on remand that
both St. Mary and Damon are the child’s legal parents, the district
court should consider the co-parenting agreement and its enforce-
ability in determining custody.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Approximately one year after entering into a romantic relation-
ship with each other, St. Mary and Damon moved in together.
They planned to have a child, deciding that Damon would have her
egg fertilized by a sperm donor, and St. Mary would carry the fer-
tilized egg and give birth to the child. In October 2007, Damon’s
eggs were implanted into St. Mary. Around the same time, Damon
drafted a co-parenting agreement, which she and St. Mary signed.
The agreement indicated that Damon and St. Mary sought to
“jointly and equally share parental responsibility, with both of

‘Our opinion implicates NRS Chapter 126, which the Legislature revised in
2013 after the district court made its determinations. See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch.
213, §§ 1-36, at 805-13. These amendments do not change our conclusions
about the issues on appeal. However, we review the district court’s determi-
nations under the law that was in effect at the time of its determinations. When
citing to a statute that was amended after the district court’s determinations, we
identify the amendments and the version of the statute that was in effect at the
time of the proceedings below.

650 Po

[them] providing support and guidance.’’ In it, they stated that they
would ‘‘make every effort to jointly share the responsibilities of
raising [their] child,’ including paying for expenses and making
major child-related decisions. The agreement provided that if their
relationship ended, they would each work to ensure that the other
maintained a close relationship with the child, share the duties of
raising the child, and make a ‘‘good-faith effort to jointly make all
major decisions affecting’ the child.

St. Mary gave birth to a child in June 2008. The hospital birth
confirmation report and certificate of live birth listed only St.
Mary as the child’s mother. The child was given both parties’ last
names, however, in the hyphenated form of St. Mary-Damon.

For several months, St. Mary primarily stayed home caring for
the child during the day while Damon worked. But, nearly one
year after the child’s birth, their romantic relationship ended, St.
Mary moved out of the home, and St. Mary and Damon disagreed
about how to share their time with the child. St. Mary signed an
affidavit declaring that Damon was the biological mother of the
child, and in 2009, Damon filed an ex parte petition with the dis-
trict court to establish maternity, seeking to have the child’s birth
certificate amended to add Damon as a mother. The district court
issued an order stating that St. Mary gave birth to the child and
that Damon ‘‘is the biological and legal mother of said child.’ The
2009 order also directed that the birth certificate be amended to
add Damon’s name as a mother.

Thereafter, St. Mary instituted the underlying case by filing a
complaint and motion, in a separate district court case, to establish
custody, visitation, and child support. In response, Damon con-
tended that, due to her biological connection, she was entitled to
sole custody of the child. Damon attached the 2009 order to her
opposition.

During a hearing on St. Mary’s complaint, the district court
orally advised St. Mary that she had the burden of establishing her
visitation rights as a surrogate, and the court scheduled an evi-
dentiary hearing regarding her visitation. In a subsequent hearing,
the district court ruled that the issues surrounding the parties’ co-
parenting agreement would be addressed at the evidentiary hearing.

Damon filed a motion to limit the scope of the evidentiary hear-
ing to the issue of third-party visitation, excluding any parentage
and custody issues. She asserted that the district court had already
determined that St. Mary must establish her visitation rights as a
surrogate and, as a result, there was no need to provide evidence
to determine parentage. St. Mary opposed the motion, arguing that
she was entitled to a full evidentiary hearing because limiting the
hearing’s scope to third-party visitation would, in effect, deny her
parental rights without any opportunity to be heard on the matter.

Pe 6st

The district court held the evidentiary hearing. Before taking ev-
idence, the district court considered Damon’s motion to limit the
hearing’s scope. Apparently looking to the 2009 birth certificate
order and believing that Damon’s status as the sole legal and bio-
logical mother had already been determined, the court decided that
it would only consider the issue of third-party visitation. The lim-
itation of the hearing’s scope was significant. The district court
barred consideration of St. Mary’s assertion of custody rights,
which concern a parent’s legal basis to direct the upbringing of his
or her child, Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 420, 216 P.3d 213,
221 (2009), and limited the hearing to a lesser right of third-party
visitation. See NRS 125C.050.

The hearing moved forward with the parties focusing on the vis-
itation issue. St. Mary and Damon gave conflicting testimonies
regarding their relationship, the co-parenting agreement’s purpose,
and their intentions in using in vitro fertilization to produce
the child. St. Mary testified that she and Damon intended to cre-
ate the child together, wanted the child to be their child, and fer-
tilized and implanted Damon’s eggs into St. Mary so that both
women would be ‘‘related’’ to the child. But Damon testified that
she and St. Mary orally agreed that St. Mary would be a mere sur-
rogate. St. Mary further testified that she and Damon created the
co-parenting agreement together, believing that it would be re-
quired by the fertility clinic as a prerequisite for the performance
of the reproductive procedure. St. Mary indicated that despite the
fertility clinic not asking for the agreement before the procedure,
she and Damon completed the agreement after the procedure.
Damon asserted that she and St. Mary did not intend to create an
enforceable co-parenting agreement but created the agreement to
satisfy the fertility clinic’s requirements and to seek insurance
coverage for the pregnancy.

Following the bearing, in March 2011, the district court issued
an order providing that St. Mary was entitled to third-party visita-
tion but not custody. The court reiterated that the scope of the ev-
identiary hearing had been limited to the issue of third-party visi-
tation and noted that St. Mary could not be awarded custody of the
child because previous orders determined that she ‘‘has no bio-
logical or legal rights whatsoever under Nevada law.’ Relying on
NRS 126.045, which was repealed by the 2013 Legislature, the
court also concluded that the co-parenting agreement was null and
void because under that statute ‘‘a surrogate agreement is only for
married couples, which only include one man and one woman.’
See Nev. Stat., ch. 213, § 36, at 813 (repealing NRS 126.045).
The 2011 order further provided that although St. Mary gave birth
to the child, she ‘‘was simply a carrier for [the child],’ and that
she must ‘‘realize that [Damon] is the mother’’ As a result, St.

6s2 Po

Mary was granted third-party visitation rights and denied any
rights as a legal mother. This appeal from the 2011 order followed.

DISCUSSION

St. Mary argues that the district court erred in determining
that, legally, she was a surrogate and not the child’s legal mother
and in deeming the co-parenting agreement unenforceable as a
matter of law. As a result of our de novo review of these legal
questions, we agree. See State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. United Exposition
Servs. Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30, 846 P.2d 294, 295 (1993) (‘‘Ques-
tions of law are reviewed de novo.’’).

‘St. Mary may be the child’s legal mother
Le

To determine parentage in Nevada, courts must look to the
Nevada Parentage Act, which is modeled after the Uniform Parent-
age Act (UPA). The Nevada Parentage Act is ‘‘applied to deter-
mine legal parentage.’’ Russo v. Gardner, 114 Nev. 283, 288, 956
P.2d 98, 101 (1998). Absent an ambiguity, we focus on the statu-
tory language and ‘‘give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning
of the words.’ Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d
788, 790 (2010). Our ultimate goal in interpreting the Nevada
Parentage Act “‘is to give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Salas
v. Allstate Rent-A-Car, Inc., 116 Nev. 1165, 1168, 14 P.3d S11,
513 (2000).

As the Legislature’s adoption of the UPA recognizes, the rela-
tionship between a parent and a child is of fundamental societal
and constitutional dimension. Willerton v. Bassham, State, Dep’t of
Human Res., 111 Nev. 10, 19-20, 889 P.2d 823, 828-29 (1995)
(explaining that the model act and Nevada’s adoption of it were in
response to constitutionally unequal treatment of children born
out of wedlock and compelling social policies); see also In re
Parental Rights as to Q.L.R., 118 Nev. 602, 605, 54 P.3d 56, 58
(2002) (discussing the relationship between parental rights, society,
and the United States Constitution). In Nevada, all of the ‘‘rights,
privileges, duties and obligations’? accompanying parenthood are
conferred on those persons who are deemed to have a parent-child
relationship with the child, regardless of the parents’ marital sta-
tus. NRS 126.021(3); see NRS 126.031(1) (‘“The parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, re-
gardless of the marital status of the parents.’’). Surrogates who
bear a child conceived through assisted conception for another, on
the other hand, are often not entitled to claim parental rights. See
NRS 126.045 (2009) (defining ‘‘[sJurrogate’’ as ‘‘an adult woman
who enters into an agreement to bear a child conceived through as-
sisted conception for the intended parents,’ who are treated as the
natural parents); 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213, §§ 10, 23, 27 at 807-

po 653

08, 810-11 (replacing the term ‘“‘surrogate’’ with ‘‘[g]estational
carrier’’ and defining such as a woman ‘‘who is not an intended
parent and who enters into a gestational agreement,’ wherein she
gives up ‘‘legal and physical custody’’ of the child to the intended
parent or parents and may “‘relinquish all rights and duties as the
parent[ ] of a child conceived through assisted reproduction’);
Black’s Law Dictionary 1036 (8th ed. 2004) (defining surrogate as
“Ta] woman who carries out the gestational function and gives
birth to a child for another’). Accordingly, whether St. Mary is
treated as someone other than a legal mother, such as a surrogate,
is of the upmost significance.

The multiple ways to prove maternity

Given the medical advances and changing family dynamics of
the age, determining a child’s parents today can be more compli-
cated than it was in the past. To this end, although perhaps not
encompassing every possibility, the Nevada Parentage Act pro-
vides several ways to determine a child’s legal mother: a mother
with a parent-child relationship with the child ‘‘incident to which
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obliga-
tions.’’ NRS 126.021(3). Under the pre-2013 and current versions
of NRS 126.041(1), a woman’s status as a legal mother can be es-
tablished by ‘‘proof of her having given birth to the child.’ See
NRS 126.041 (2009); 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213, § 34, at 812. In
maternity actions under NRS Chapter 126, the statutes under
which paternity may be determined apply ‘‘[iJnsofar as practica-
ble”’ NRS 126.231. Paternity may be established in a variety of
ways, including through presumptions based on marriage and co-
habitation, NRS 126.051(1)(a)-(c), presumptions based on receiv-
ing the child into the home and openly holding oneself out as a
parent, NRS 126.051(1)(d), genetic testing, NRS 126.051(2), and
voluntary acknowledgment, NRS 126.053. Hence, a determination
of parentage rests upon a wide array of considerations rather than
genetics alone. See Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 578, 959 P.2d
523, 527 (1998) (providing that the Nevada Parentage Act ‘‘clearly
reflects the legislature’s intent to allow nonbiological factors to be-
come critical in a paternity determination’).

This case presents a situation where two women proffered evi-
dence that could establish or generate a conclusive presumption of
maternity to either woman. St. Mary testified that she gave birth
to the child, thereby offering proof to establish that she is the
child’s legal mother. See NRS 126.041(1) (2009); 2013 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 213, § 34, at 812. Damon showed that her egg was used to
produce the child, demonstrating a genetic relationship to the child
that may be a basis for concluding that she is the child’s legal
mother. See NRS 126.051(2) (providing a conclusive presumption
that a man is the natural father upon unrebutted evidence of a ge-

6s Pe

netic relationship between the father and the child); NRS 126.231
(stating that the statutes under which paternity may be determined
apply ‘‘{iJnsofar as practicable’’ to maternity actions); see also
KLM. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 678 (Cal. 2005) (noting that, under
a statutory scheme based on the UPA, evidence of genetic rela-
tionship could be a basis for a determination of maternity). By di-
viding the reproductive roles of conceiving a child, St. Mary and
Damon each assumed functions traditionally used to evidence a
legal maternal relationship. Hence, this matter raises the issue of
whether the Nevada Parentage Act and its policies preclude a child
from having two legal mothers where two women split the genetic
and physical functions of creating a child.

The law does not preclude a child from having two legal
mothers

P|

When the district court apparently referenced the 2009 birth cer-
tificate order to conclude that Damon’s status as the exclusive legal
and biological mother was determined and that, as a result, it
would not consider St. Mary’s assertions of maternity or custody
at the evidentiary hearing, it impliedly operated on the premise that
a child, created by artificial insemination through an anonymous
sperm donor, may not have two mothers under the law.? However,
contrary to this premise, the Nevada Parentage Act and its policies
do not preclude such a child from having two legal mothers.

Although NRS 126.051(3) contains procedures for rebutting pa-
ternity presumptions by clear and convincing evidence or ‘‘a court
decree establishing paternity . . . by another man,’ (emphases
added), and while NRS 126.051(3) arguably applies in maternity
cases, we decline to read this provision of the statute as conveying
clear legislative intent to deprive a child conceived by artificial in-
semination of the emotional, financial, and physical support of an
intended mother who ‘actively assisted in the decision and process
of bringing [the child] into this world.’ In re T.P.S., 978 N.E.2d
1070, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). In Nevada, as in other states, the
best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining
the custody and care of children. See NRS 125.480(1) (in custody
disputes, the child’s best interest is the ‘‘sole consideration of the
court”’); NRS 125.500(1) (allowing custody to be awarded to a
nonparent if ‘‘an award of custody to a parent would be detrimen-
tal to the child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve

2Before being repealed in 2013, NRS 126.061(2) provided that a sperm
donor was treated as if he were not the child’s legal father, at least when that
sperm is used to artificially inseminate a married woman. Under the 2013 ver-
sion of NRS Chapter 126, a sperm donor ‘‘relinquishes all present and future
parental . . . rights and obligations to any resulting child.’’ 2013 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 213, § 6, at 806.

Pe 655

the best interest of the child’’); NRS 127.150(1) (providing that the
court may grant adoption upon finding that it is the child’s best in-
terest); NRS 128.105 (providing that a parent-child relationship
may be severed upon findings of parental fault and that such sev-
erance would serve the child’s best interest). Both the Legislature
and this court have acknowledged that, generally, a child’s best in-
terest is served by maintaining two actively involved parents. See
Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 62-65, 930 P.2d 1110, 1117-18
(1997). To that end, the Legislature has recognized that the chil-
dren of same-sex domestic partners bear no lesser rights to the en-
joyment and support of two parents than children born to married
heterosexual parents. See NRS 122A.300(1) (indicating that NRS
Chapter 125 applies to registered domestic partners terminating
their relationship); NRS 122A.300(3)(b) (recognizing former do-
mestic partners’ custody agreements). Certainly, the Legislature
has not instructed that children born to unregistered domestic part-
ners bear any less rights to the best-interest considerations set
forth in these statutes than children born to registered domestic
partners, married persons, and unmarried persons. Ultimately,
“the preservation and strengthening of family life is a part of the
public policy of this State’ NRS 128.005(1).

Of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of maternity
between two women who created a child through assisted repro-
duction, California is highly instructive. California, like Nevada,
enacted statutes modeled after the UPA. See K.M., 117 P.3d at
678. The California Supreme Court has determined that its laws do
not preclude two women from being the legal mothers of a child.
See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005)
(providing that, under the California UPA, there is ‘‘no reason why
both parents of a child cannot be women’’); see also K.M., 117
P.3d at 675. In K.M., the California Supreme Court dealt with a
maternity case that presented facts analogous to the instant case.
There, K.M.’s eggs were implanted in E.G., her lesbian partner
who gave birth to twins. 117 P.3d at 676. Thereafter, K.M. and
E.G-s relationship ended, and K.M. sought custody and visitation
of the twins, but the trial court denied her request, determining
that she had relinquished her parental rights. Id. at 677. On ap-
peal, the California Supreme Court agreed with K.M.’s contention
that she was the twins’ legal mother because her eggs were used
for the twins’ birth. Id. at 678. It concluded that because ‘‘K.M.’s
genetic relationship with the twins constitutes evidence of a mother
and child relationship under the UPA,” and ‘“‘[tJhe circumstance
that E.G. gave birth to the twins also constitutes evidence of a
mother and child relationship[,] . . . both K.M. and E.G. are
mothers of the twins under the UPA.” Id. at 680-81. The court
held that when a woman provides her eggs to her lesbian partner
so that the partner can bear children by in vitro fertilization, both
women are the child’s legal mothers. Id. at 675.

656 Po

California’s precedent is highly persuasive because it pertains
to a statutory scheme that is substantially similar to Nevada’s and
advances the policies that underlie the Nevada Parentage Act—
preventing children from ‘‘becom[ing] wards of the state,’ Willer-
ton v. Bassham, State, Dep’t of Human Res., 111 Nev. 10, 20, 899
P.2d 823, 829 (1995), minding a child’s best interest, see NRS
125.480(1); NRS 125.500; NRS 127.150; NRS 128.105, and
serving a child’s best interest with the support of two parents. See
Mosley, 113 Nev. at 62-65, 930 P.2d at 1117-18. As other juris-
dictions have acknowledged, recognizing two legal parents, such as
two legal mothers, supports these policies. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117
P.3d at 669 (concluding that a woman was a legal mother with an
obligation to pay child support to her former lesbian partner; al-
though the woman was not a genetic or gestational mother, she
held the children out as her own, and concluding otherwise
“‘would leave [the children] with only one parent and would de-
prive them of the support of their second parent’’); Chatterjee v.
King, 280 P.3d 283, 292 (N.M. 2012) (explaining that a child can
have two legal mothers under the New Mexico UPA because ‘‘the
state has a strong interest in ensuring that a child will be cared for,
financially and otherwise, by two parents’’); Miller-Jenkins v.
Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006) (determining that
two women were both legal mothers of a child where, among
other things, concluding otherwise ‘‘would leave [the child] with
only one parent’’).

Hence, there is no legal or policy-based barrier to the estab-
lishment under NRS Chapter 126, as it existed at the time of the
district court’s determinations and as it exists now, of a legal par-
ent and child relationship with both St. Mary and Damon. Rather,
the Nevada Parentage Act and its policies permit a child created by
artificial insemination, where one woman had her egg fertilized by
a sperm donor and implanted into her female partner, to have two
Jegal mothers.

Nonetheless, the district court determined that St. Mary was not
the child’s legal mother. The court appears to have grounded this
conclusion on the 2009 order, which provided that Damon was the
child’s legal mother and required Damon’s name to be added to
the child’s birth certificate. But while that order stated that Damon
was “‘the biological and legal mother’ of the child, it in no way
purported to undo or deny St. Mary’s parent-child relationship
with the child. The order did not require the removal of St. Mary’s
name from the birth certificate or provide that St. Mary was not
the child’s legal mother. Rather, it acknowledged Damon’s rela-
tionship with the child without denying the same of St. Mary.
Moreover, whether St. Mary had rights to the child was not an
issue that Damon’s 2009 petition sought to resolve because it re-

Pe 657

quested that ‘‘maternity be established’’ and ‘‘[tJhat the birth cer-
tificate be amended to add the biological mother’s name of . . .
Dfamon].’””

Further, the district court’s finding that St. Mary was a mere
surrogate went beyond the limited scope of the hearing, which the
district court prefaced by confirming that it would not consider
parentage. Because this argument was not resolved by the 2009
order or any other prior determination, and since the Nevada
Parentage Act did not bar a consideration of the evidence regard-
ing St. Mary’s claims for maternity and custody rights, the district
court erred in refusing to consider the parentage issue and limiting
the scope of the evidentiary hearing based on its conclusion that St.
Mary was a surrogate—which was a conclusion that was made
without an evidentiary hearing on that issue.

St. Mary asserts that she is a legal mother of the child in addi-
tion to Damon, not instead of Damon. This claim must be given
consideration under the Nevada Parentage Act, which does not pre-
clude the child from having two legal mothers. Because the district
court erroneously concluded that St. Mary was a mere surrogate
and limited the scope of the evidentiary hearing to third-party vis-
itation issues, the district court did not consider the parentage
statutes with respect to St. Mary’s and Damon’s testimonies re-
garding their intent in creating the child and the nature of their re-
Jationship to one another and the child. Although St. Mary’s
parentage can be established by virtue of her having given birth to
the child, see NRS 126.041(1) (2009); 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213,
§ 34, at 812, the parties dispute whether they intended for St.
Mary to be the child’s parent or simply a surrogate or gestational
carrier who lacked a legal parent-child relationship to the child.
Therefore, upon remand, the district court must hold an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether St. Mary is the child’s legal
mother or if she is someone without a legal relationship to the
child, during which the court may consider any relevant evidence
for establishing maternity under the Nevada Parentage Act.

The co-parenting agreement was not a surrogacy agreement and
was consistent with Nevada’s public policy

|

St. Mary asserts that the co-parenting agreement demonstrates
the parties’ intent regarding parentage and custody of the child and
that the district court erred in determining that the co-parenting
agreement was an unenforceable surrogacy agreement under NRS
126.045. Damon responds that, because the agreement was be-
tween an unmarried intended parent and a surrogate and purported
to resolve issues of parentage and child custody, the district court
correctly deemed that the co-parenting agreement was prohibited
by NRS 126.045 (2009).

ose Pe

At the time of the district court’s determinations, NRS 126.045
(2009) governed contracts between two married persons and a
gestational carrier, or surrogate, for assisted reproduction. It re-
quired such contracts to specify the parties’ rights, including the
“‘[pJarentage of the child,’ the ‘‘[cJustody of the child in the event
of a change of circumstances,” and the ‘‘respective responsibilities
and liabilities of the contracting parties.’ NRS 126.045(1)(a)-(c)
(2009). Additionally, the statute defined a ‘‘[s]urrogate’’ as ‘‘an
adult woman who enters into an agreement to bear a child con-
ceived through assisted conception for the intended parents,” and
‘‘fiJntended parents’’ were defined as ‘‘a man and woman, married
to each other,’ who agree to ‘‘be the parents of a child born to a
surrogate through assisted conception.’” NRS 126.045(4)(b), (c)
(2009). Here, St. Mary and Damon’s co-parenting agreement was
not within the scope of NRS 126.045. The agreement lacked any
Janguage intimating that St. Mary acted as a surrogate, such as Jan-
guage indicating that she surrendered custody of the child or re-
linquished her rights as a mother to the child. Rather, the agree-
ment expressed that St. Mary would share the parental duties of
raising the child and would jointly make major parenting decisions
with Damon.?

Nevertheless, Damon insists that, because the agreement covered
issues of parentage and child custody, it necessarily addressed is-
sues contemplated by NRS 126.045 and, as a result, is void for
failing to meet the statute’s other terms. In other words, Damon ar-
gues that outside of NRS 126.045, agreements (at least those with
a non-parent) concerning parentage, custody, and responsibilities
over a child are void. But, as explained above, parentage is gov-
erned by NRS Chapter 126. In the event that both parties are de-
termined to be the child’s parents, nothing in Nevada law prevents
two parents from entering into agreements that demonstrate their
intent concerning child custody.

Leer

“Parties are free to contract, and the courts will enforce their
contracts if they are not unconscionable, illegal, or in violation of
public policy”’ Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 216 P.3d 213,
226 (2009). It is presumed that fit parents act in the best interest
of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
Thus, public policy favors fit parents entering agreements to re-

3In 2013, the Legislature repealed NRS 126.045, substituted the term “‘sur-
rogate’’ with ‘‘gestational carrier’ and defined ‘‘[glestational carrier’’ as
one ‘who is not an intended parent and who enters into a gestational agree-
ment’’ under which she ‘‘{sJurrender[s] legal and physical custody’’ of the
child to the intended parent or parents and may “relinquish all rights and
duties as the parent[ ] of a child”? 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 213, §§ 10, 23, 27, 36,
at 807-08, 810, 813. The language of St. Mary and Damon’s co-parenting
agreement does not appear to be within the scope of this new statute.

Pe 659

solve issues pertaining to their minor child’s “‘custody, care, and
visitation.’’ See Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564, 569, 257 P.3d
396, 399 (2011); Rivero, 125 Nev. at 417, 216 P.3d at 219 (per-
mitting parents to create their own custody agreements, which are
generally enforceable); see also Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695,
701, 120 P.3d 812, 816 (2005) (providing that a child’s best in-
terest is the primary concern in custody matters).

When a child has the opportunity to be supported by two loving
and fit parents pursuant to a co-parenting agreement, this oppor-
tunity is to be given due consideration and must not be foreclosed
on account of the parents being of the same sex. See Kristine H.
v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 696 (Cal. 2005) (stating that, in the con-
text of a child being parented by two women, ‘‘public policy
favor[s] that a child has two parents rather than one’’); E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Mass. 1999) (engaging in an
analysis that indicated that a same-sex couple’s co-parenting agree-
ment could be enforceable insofar as it was in the child’s best in-
terest); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)
(finding that child visitation provisions of a co-parenting agreement
between two women are enforceable if they are in the child’s best
interest). To bar the enforceability of a co-parenting agreement on
the basis of the parents’ genders conflicts with the Nevada Parent-
age Act’s policies of promoting the child’s best interest with the
support of two parents. See Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 62-
65, 930 P.2d 1110, 1117-18 (1997).

St. Mary and Damon’s co-parenting agreement was aligned with
Nevada’s policy of allowing parents to agree on how to best pro-
vide for their child. Within their co-parenting agreement, St. Mary
and Damon sought to provide for their child’s best interest by
agreeing to share the responsibilities of raising the child, even if
the relationship between St. Mary and Damon ended. The agree-
ment’s language provides the indicia of an effort by St. Mary and
Damon to make the child’s best interest their priority. Thus, in the
event that St. Mary is found to be a legal mother, the district court
must consider the parties’ co-parenting agreement in making its
child custody determination.

CONCLUSION

The district court, in issuing its 2011 order, erred in determin-
ing that St. Mary lacked “‘legal rights’’ to the child because it mis-
interpreted the 2009 order, which recognized Damon’s relationship
to the child without affecting the same of St. Mary. The Nevada
Parentage Act does not preclude St. Mary and Damon from both
being legal mothers of the child. Hence, the district court abused
its discretion in limiting the evidentiary hearing to the issue of
third-party visitation. The district court also erred in deeming the

0

co-parenting agreement unenforceable under NRS 126.045. The
agreement’s plain language indicated that it was not a surrogacy
arrangement within the scope of that statute. Moreover, the parties’
co-parenting agreement aligns with Nevada’s policy of encouraging
parents to enter into parenting agreements that resolve matters
pertaining to their child’s best interest.

As a result, we reverse the 2011 order. We remand this matter
to the district court for further proceedings to determine the child’s
parentage, custody, and visitation.‘

PICKERING, C.J., and GrBons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Douctas, and CuErry, JJ., concur.

WARREN MARKOWITZ, An InpIvipuAL; AND JACQUELINE
MARKOWITZ, an INDIVIDUAL, APPELLANTS, v. SAXON
SPECIAL SERVICING; anpD DEUTSCHE BANK
NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

No. 58761
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 569

[Rehearing denied January 24, 2014]

Law Office of Jacob L. Hafter & Associates and Jacob L. Hafter
and Michael K. Naethe, Las Vegas, for Appellants.

McCarthy & Holthus, LLP, and Kristin A. Schuler-Hintz, Las
Vegas, for Respondents.

‘In light of this opinion, we decline to address St. Mary’s remaining argu-
ments. We note that, as addressed in the parties’ supplemental briefs, upon re-
mand, it may be necessary to join the child as a party to this action under NRS
126.101(1).

661

LA

Before PICKERING, C.J., GIBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Doucias, Cuerry and Sart, JJ.

OPINION

Per Curiam:

Under Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program Rules, the
deed-trust beneficiary must submit an appraisal and/or a broker’s
price opinion prepared ‘‘no more than 60 days before the com-
mencement date of the mediation’’ that provides a valuation for the
home that is the subject of the mediation. Saxon Special Servicing
attended the underlying mediation and provided a broker’s price
opinion that was 83 days old at the time of mediation. We are
asked to decide whether the mediation rule requiring an appraisal
or broker’s price opinion that is no more than 60 days old at the
time of the mediation mandates strict or substantial compliance.
We conclude that because a current appraisal or broker’s price
opinion is intended to facilitate good-faith mediation negotiations,
the rule’s content-based provision governing the appraisal’s age is
directory rather than mandatory, and thus, substantial compliance
with the 60-day provision satisfies the mediation rule. Because the
broker’s price opinion here contained a recent appraisal of the
home’s value adequate to facilitate negotiations, and the home-
owners did not demonstrate that they were prejudiced by the 23-
day age differential between the price opinion provided and the
tule’s age provision, Saxon Special Servicing substantially com-
plied with the foreclosure mediation rule requiring a current ap-
praisal, and we therefore affirm the district court’s order denying
the petition for judicial review.

L

Appellants Warren and Jacqueline Markowitz obtained a home
loan from Fremont Investment & Loan, for which they executed a
promissory note in Fremont’s favor. The note was later assigned to
respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and serviced
on Deutsche Bank’s behalf by respondent Saxon Special Services.

ee:

After the Markowitzes stopped making payments to Saxon, a no-
tice of default was recorded. The Markowitzes then elected to me-
diate in Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP).

The mediation occurred on December 28, 2010. Warren at-
tended the mediation in person along with counsel, and Jacqueline
attended by telephone. Saxon, purporting to represent Deutsche
Bank, appeared through counsel. Saxon provided all of the re-
quired documents for the mediation, including an 83-day-old bro-
ker’s price opinion (BPO).' During the mediation, the Markowitzes
raised concerns about Saxon’s authority to participate. Saxon’s
counsel explained that she had the authority to negotiate a loan
modification. The mediator spoke by telephone with a representa-
tive of Saxon who confirmed that Saxon was the servicer of the
loan. Despite this confirmation, the Markowitzes were not con-
vinced that Saxon had authority to negotiate a loan modification,
and they elected to terminate the mediation.

The mediator issued a statement indicating that the Markowitzes
failed to provide certain documents for the mediation and that
Saxon failed to bring a current BPO. The mediator’s statement did
not indicate that any party lacked authority to negotiate or failed to
attend the mediation. The Markowitzes filed a petition for judicial
review, which, after briefing and argument, the district court de-
nied, concluding that the parties had negotiated in good faith with
valid authority and that there was no reason to withhold the FMP
certificate. This appeal followed.

18
A.
The primary issue in this appeal concerns the 83-day-old BPO

that Saxon provided for the mediation. The relevant foreclosure
tule in place at the time of this dispute required that

[t]he beneficiary of the deed of trust or its representative
shall produce an appraisal done no more than 60 days before
the commencement date of the mediation with respect to the
real property that is the subject of the notice of default and
shall prepare an estimate of the ‘‘short sale’’ value of the res-
idence that it may be willing to consider as a part of the ne-
gotiation if loan modification is not agreed upon.

FMR 8(3) (2010). The rule also permitted the mediator, in his or
her discretion, to ‘‘accept a broker’s price opinion letter (BPO) in
addition to or in lieu of the appraisal.’ FMR 8(4) (2010). These

‘A broker’s price opinion is a ‘‘written analysis, opinion or conclu-
sion . . . relating to the estimated price for a specified parcel of real property.”
NRS 645.2515(8).

<< ——_

rules have since been amended,? but the amendments do not
change our analysis.

While the mediator here reported that Saxon failed to provide an
“appraisal within 60 days of mediation,’ the district court, in its
de novo review, concluded that although the BPO was not prepared
within 60 days of the mediation, neither party acted in bad faith
and there was no reason to withhold the FMP certificate. The
Markowitzes maintain that document production at mediation re-
quires strict compliance and that a BPO prepared beyond the 60-
day limit precludes the issuance of an FMP certificate and man-
dates the imposition of sanctions. Respondents counter that the
purpose of providing a BPO or appraisal is to ‘‘substantiate the
short sale value’’ that the parties may agree to in the event that a
loan modification cannot be reached. Respondents insist that the
BPO provided at mediation set forth the value of the property that
they would accept in a short sale, and that the Markowitzes were
not prejudiced by the age of the BPO. In any case, respondents
argue that because no short sale was ever discussed, as the
Markowitzes elected to terminate the mediation, the BPO’s age
was of no relevance.

La

To determine if a rule’s provisions require strict or substantial
compliance, this court looks to the rule’s language, and we also
consider policy and equity principles. Leyva v. Nat’l Default Serv-
icing Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 475-76, 255 P.3d 1275, 1278 (2011).
A rule may contain both mandatory and directory provisions. See
Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 408 n.31, 168 P.3d 712, 718 n.31
(2007); see also Einhorn v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 128
Nev. 689, 696, 290 P.3d 249, 254 (2012); 3 Norman J. Singer,
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 57:19 (6th ed. 2001), Gen-
erally, a rule is mandatory and requires strict compliance when its
language states a specific ‘‘time and manner’’ for performance.
Leven, 123 Nev. at 407 n.27, 408, 168 P.3d at 717 n.27, 718.
Time and manner refers to when performance must take place and
the way in which the deadline must be met. See Village League to
Save Incline Assets, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 124 Nev.
1079, 1088, 194 P.3d 1254, 1260 (2008) (discussing statutory
deadlines); Leven, 123 Nev. at 407-08, 168 P.3d at 717-18 (ad-
dressing three-day recording statute’s deadline). “‘[FJorm and con-
tent’’ provisions, on the other hand, dictate who must take action
and what information that party is required to provide, Einhorn,
128 Nev. at 696, 290 P.3d at 254 (stating that “‘who brings which
documents . . . is a matter of “form’’’). Because they do not im-

2FMR 8 was renumbered to FMR 11, and the relevant portion of the rule
currently provides that the trust-deed beneficiary or its representative must pro-
vide an ‘Appraisal and/or Brokers Price Opinion (BPO) not more than 60 days
old (prior to the date of mediation).”’ FMR 11(7)(e) (2013).

ee:

plicate notice, form and content-based rules are typically directory
and may be satisfied by substantial compliance, id., “‘sufficient to
avoid harsh, unfair or absurd consequences.’’ Leven, 123 Nev. at
407, 168 P.3d at 717 (quotation omitted). When substantial com-
pliance is sufficient, a party’s literal noncompliance with a rule is
excused provided that the party complies with ‘‘respect to the
substance essential to every reasonable objective’ of the rule.
Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 372 P.2d 649, 652 (Cal. 1962); see
also 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:26 (7thed. 2012).
When a party accomplishes such actual compliance as to matters
of substance, technical deviations from form requirements do not
tise to the level of noncompliance. Stasher, 372 P.2d at 652.

Le

Deciding whether a rule is intended to impose a mandatory or
directory obligation is a question of statutory interpretation. See
Village League, 124 Nev. at 1088, 194 P.3d at 1260 (interpreting
a statutory time limit); see also Marquis & Aurbach v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1147, 1156, 146 P.3d 1130, 1136
(2006) (applying rules of statutory construction to the interpreta-
tion of a court rule). We review de novo issues of statutory con-
struction. Leven, 123 Nev. at 402, 168 P.3d at 714. Our objective
when interpreting a rule is to determine and implement its pur-
pose. Village League, 124 Ney. at 1088, 194 P.3d at 1260; see
Leyva, 127 Nev. at 476, 255 P.3d at 1278-79.

1.

FMR 8(3)’s language embraces both a mandatory time provision
and a directory content provision related to the age of the appraisal
used for negotiation purposes at the mediation. The rule states that
the deed of trust beneficiary or its representative ‘‘shall prepare
such papers and provide to the mediator, and exchange the items
required to be exchanged with each other party . . . at least 10
days prior to the mediation.’’? FMR 8(1) (2010). One such paper
is an appraisal and/or a BPO, which the deed-trust beneficiary
“‘shall produce,’ and in so doing, ‘‘shall prepare an estimate of the
‘short sale’ value of the residence that it may be willing to consider
as a part of the negotiation if loan modification is not agreed
upon.” FMR 8(3) (2010). The word ‘‘shall’”’ is generally regarded
as mandatory, Leyva, 127 Nev. at 476, 255 P.3d at 1279. Here, the
tule provides that the deed-trust beneficiary or its representative
“‘shall produce an appraisal’’ and ‘‘shall prepare an estimate of the
‘short sale’ value,’ FMR 8(3) (2010), and it ‘‘shall’’ do so ten

*The current rule provides that [t]he beneficiary of the deed of trust must
prepare and submit, at least 10 days prior to the mediation” various documents
to be provided to the homeowner and mediator. FMR 11(7) (2013).

en

days in advance of the mediation. FMR 8(1) (2010). The purpose
of FMP mediation is to bring the parties “‘together to participate
in a meaningful negotiation’’ to resolve the dispute. Einhorn, 128
Nev. at 691, 290 P.3d at 250 (citing Holt v. Reg’l Tr. Servs.
Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 893, 266 P.3d 602, 607 (2011)). As the rule
explains, the value of the home is key to the negotiation, FMR 8(3)
(2010), and providing the appraisal is one indicator that the trust-
deed beneficiary participated in the mediation in good faith. Pasil-
las v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. 462, 466, 255 P.3d 1281, 1284
(2011). Thus, the rule’s mandatory language weighs in favor of re-
quiring strict compliance, as the appraisal is a necessary document
for the mediation and good-faith negotiations therein.

2.

But the rule also provides that the appraisal or BPO shall be pre-
pared ‘‘no more than 60 days before the commencement date of
the mediation.”” FMR 8(3) (2010). Separating the rule into its
procedural and substantive parts, the ‘‘shall prepare such papers
. . . at least 10 days prior to the mediation’ language refers to the
time when the deed of trust beneficiary is required to give the me-
diator and the homeowners the appraisal or BPO. This provision
governs the time and manner for the deed of trust beneficiary to
perform one of its duties to negotiate in good faith. Such provi-
sions generally must be complied with strictly. Leven, 123 Nev. at
408, 168 P.3d at 718. The rule’s ‘‘no more than 60 days’’ old Jan-
guage, however, refers to the age of the appraisal or BPO, so that
the parties may negotiate based on the home’s present value, and
thus, addresses form and content. Such requirements may generally
be satisfied by substantial compliance. Id.

The policy behind providing a recent appraisal and/or BPO at
the mediation is to ensure that the fair market value of the property
is known to both parties to the mediation at the time when they are
negotiating a potential loan modification or determining whether a
short sale would be appropriate. FMR 8(3) (2010). This allows for
fully informed negotiations to occur and ensures that offers made
are based on the present economic reality concerning the property
and are consistent with the FMP’s purpose of bringing the parties
together for meaningful negotiation. Einhorn, 128 Nev. at 691, 290
P.3d at 250 (citing Holt, 127 Nev. at 893, 266 P.3d at 607).

Requiring an appraisal or BPO to be no more than 60 days old
facilitates informed negotiation based on accurate information, and
this purpose may be met through substantial compliance, as a
slightly older BPO may be just as accurate as a 60-day-old BPO.
See Leyva, 127 Nev. at 475-76, 255 P.3d at 1279. By contrast, a
200-day-old BPO would likely reflect very different market valua-
tions than a BPO that was reasonably close to the FMR’s 60-day
valuation window. Providing a BPO that is so old that it has be-

Se

come inaccurate frustrates the FMP’s goal. Therefore, the policy
concern regarding the age of an appraisal or BPO is a matter of
content, which is directory, and the requirement may be satisfied
by substantial compliance. Leven, 123 Nev. at 408, 168 P.3d at
718.

3.
| |

In terms of equity concerns, despite the fact that the underlying
83-day-old BPO was beyond the 60-day limit, the Markowitzes
made no effort to demonstrate that it was inaccurate. As such,
there appears to be no prejudice or harm to the Markowitzes in
having an 83-day-old BPO from which to negotiate a loan modifi-
cation, see Einhorn, 128 Nev. at 697, 290 P.3d at 254, and the
goal of providing accurate information to ensure meaningful nego-
tiations was accomplished. Id. at 691, 290 P.3d at 250. Thus, in
weighing the equities, where the Markowitzes have not shown any
prejudice in their ability to negotiate a loan modification based on
the BPO age, and respondents would be denied the ability to ex-
ercise their contractual remedy of foreclosure for want of a strictly
compliant 60-day or younger BPO, we conclude that withholding
the FMP certificate would be an inequitably harsh consequence,
and equity favors reviewing the BPO for substantial compliance.
See Holt, 127 Nev. at 893-94, 266 P.3d at 606-07 (recognizing
consequences of denial of the ability to foreclose).

We therefore hold that an appraisal or BPO older than 60 days
may nevertheless substantially comply with the FMR sufficient to
avoid the imposition of sanctions when there is no evidence that the
BPO is so old that it would impair the FMP’s policy of facilitating
good-faith negotiations or the BPO’s content is inaccurate to the
extent that the homeowners would be prejudiced. Such is the situ-
ation in the present matter, and thus, the district court therefore
correctly declined to impose sanctions and denied judicial review
based on respondents’ stale BPO. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, 128 Nev. 505, 521, 286 P.3d 249, 260 (2012).

B-
P|

One other issue remains for our consideration: whether respon-
dents properly participated in the mediation session with the req-
uisite authority to negotiate a loan modification. The Markowitzes
argue that the mediation was flawed because Saxon did not estab-
lish valid authority to negotiate the loan. Respondents contend that
Saxon, as Deutsche Bank’s servicer, is a valid representative of
Deutsche Bank for purposes of participating in the FMP and that
the Markowitzes were aware of the relationship between Saxon and
Deutsche Bank.

es

The deed-trust beneficiary may participate in the FMP media-
tion directly or through a representative with proper authority to
negotiate a loan modification. NRS 107.086(5). The record before
us establishes Saxon’s status as Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer
and its authority to modify the loan in its capacity as Deutsche
Bank’s representative. The record contains the publicly recorded
substitutions of trustee, which the Markowitzes included as exhibits
to their petition for judicial review, and which demonstrate Saxon’s
status as the loan servicer and Deutsche Bank’s status as the ben-
eficiary of the deed of trust. Further, the evidence submitted in
their judicial review proceeding shows that, until the Markowitzes
ceased paying their mortgage, they made payments to Saxon, and
thus, they recognized Saxon’s role as the loan servicer. And before
the Markowitzes defaulted on the loan, they entered into a stipu-
lation that specifically recited that Saxon was the servicing agent
for Deutsche Bank. Saxon therefore properly attended the media-
tion as Deutsche Bank’s representative. See NRS 107.086(5); see
also Edelstein, 128 Nev. at 521 n.11, 286 P.3d at 260 n.11 (stat-
ing that a servicer is a valid representative under NRS 107.086(5)).

The Markowitzes also contend that respondents lacked authority
to participate in the FMP because MERS was incapable of acting
as a beneficiary of the deed of trust, and thus, it could not have
validly transferred the mortgage note to Deutsche Bank. This court
rejected this argument in Edelstein, 128 Nev. at 521, 286 P.3d at
260-61 (holding that a MERS assignment of the deed of trust
validly transfers the note), and based on the record in this matter,
we conclude that through the valid MERS assignment, Deutsche
Bank was the beneficiary of the deed of trust and holder of the
promissory note, with authority to participate in FMP mediation
and modify the loan.‘ The district court therefore did not err in de-
termining that respondents validly appeared at the mediation with
authority to negotiate a loan modification. Id. at 521-22, 286 P.3d
at 260 (explaining that the district court’s factual and legal con-
clusions are reviewed for error, while the choice of sanction is
committed to the district court’s discretion).

Iv.

‘We discern no violation that would preclude the FMP certificate
from issuing, and we therefore affirm the district court’s order.

“Appellants also argue that the MERS assignment is invalid because it was
executed in March 2009, but not notarized until June 2009. Appellants do not
cite to any Nevada authority that requires an assignment of a deed of trust to
be acknowledged in front of a notary on the date it is generated. See Einhorn,
128 Nev. at 694 n.4, 290 P.3d at 252 n.4.

ee!

In RE CITYCENTER CONSTRUCTION AND
LIEN MASTER LITIGATION.

THE CONVERSE PROFESSIONAL GROUP, ppA CONVERSE
CONSULTANTS, Petitioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONOR-
ABLE ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ, District Jupce,
RESPONDENTS, AND CENTURY STEEL, INC., AND PACIFIC
COAST STEEL, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.

No. 61130
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 574

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, and Michael
M. Edwards and J. Scott Burris, Las Vegas, for Petitioner.

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, L. Kristopher
Rath, and Cynthia G. Milanowski, Las Vegas; Koeller, Nebeker,
Carlson & Haluck, LLP, and Megan K. Dorsey and Robert C.
Carlson, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest Century Steel, Inc.

Gordon & Rees, LLP, and Robert E. Schumacher, Las Vegas;
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, and Scott R.
Omohundro, Craig A. Ramseyer, and Timothy E. Salter, San
Diego, California, for Real Party in Interest Pacific Coast Steel.

WET

Before the Court EN BaNc.!

OPINION

By the Court, Sarra, J.:

“(IJ an action involving nonresidential construction,’ the com-
plainant’s attorney ‘‘shall file [an affidavit and expert report] con-
currently with the service of the first pleading”’ NRS 11.258(1);
see NRS 11.258(3). An ‘‘[a]ction involving nonresidential con-
struction’’ concerns the construction (and related activities) of a
nonresidential building and is against a ‘‘design professional.’’
NRS 11.2565(1). The district court ‘‘shall dismiss [the] action’’
if NRS 11.258 is violated. NRS 11.259(1). In Otak Nevada,
L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 127 Nev. 593, 260 P.3d
408 (2011), we held that an amended pleading must be dismissed
when it followed an initial pleading that was void ab initio—of no
legal effect—because it was filed without the affidavit and expert
report required by NRS 11.258. Id. at 593, 599, 260 P.3d at 409,
411-12.

Petitioner Converse Professional Group relied on Otak in filing
motions to dismiss amended complaints that real parties in inter-
est Century Steel, Inc., and Pacific Coast Steel (PCS) filed against
it. Century and PCS were subcontractors whose work Converse
had inspected. After being brought into commercial construction
litigation as defendants, Century and PCS filed third- and fourth-
party complaints and amended complaints against Converse to re-
cover damages that allegedly arose from the deficient performance
of its services. Converse filed motions to dismiss the amended
complaints. It asserted that it was a design professional and that the
initial pleadings were void ab initio and could not be cured by the
amended pleadings because Century and PCS failed to file the at-

‘THE HONORABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, and THE HONORABLE
Ron D. PARRAGUIRRE, Justice, voluntarily recused themselves from participa-
tion in the decision of this matter.

OM

torney affidavit and expert report that NRS 11.258 requires for ac-
tions involving nonresidential construction. After expressing con-
cern that NRS 11.259(1) may require dismissing the entire litiga-
tion, the district court denied the motions.

Converse brings this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the dismissal of the amended pleadings. We conclude that Cen-
tury’s and PCS’s initial causes of action brought actions that were
within the scope of NRS 11.2565(1)’s definition of an action in-
volving nonresidential construction. As a result, because their
pleadings identified Converse’s services that implicated the practice
of professional engineering, see NRS 625.050(1)(a), their plead-
ings were against a design professional, see NRS 11.2565(2)(b),
thereby subjecting them to NRS 11.258’s attorney affidavit and ex-
pert report requirements. We further conclude that the Oak court
correctly construed NRS 11.259(1) as requiring the dismissal of an
amended pleading—not an entire action—that followed an initial
pleading that was filed without adhering to NRS 11.258. Thus, the
district court must dismiss the amended pleadings against Converse
as they were void ab initio for their failure to comply with NRS
11.258. Accordingly, we grant Converse’s petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Century, and its successor in interest PCS, subcontracted to
perform the steel installation on a new building, the Harmon
Tower, which was to be part of a large-scale, mixed-use develop-
ment in Las Vegas known as CityCenter. Converse was hired
by the project’s owner to render third-party quality control and
assurance inspections. According to Century’s and PCS’s plead-
ings, Converse’s services included inspecting their work for
quality assurance and compliance with construction plans and
specifications.

After alleged defects were discovered in the Harmon Tower,
construction stopped, and litigation between the project’s owner,
general contractor, and subcontractors began. Century and PCS
filed third- and fourth-party complaints against Converse for con-
tribution and/or indemnity allegedly warranted by Converse’s neg-
ligent inspection work. When these claims were dismissed, Cen-
tury and PCS were granted leave to file amended complaints
against Converse alleging negligent and intentional misrepresenta-
tion, contribution, and equitable indemnity. Century and PCS did
not file an affidavit or expert report regarding the basis for their
claims when the initial complaints or the amended complaints
were served. In response, Converse moved to dismiss the amended.
pleadings pursuant to NRS 11.259(1), arguing that Century and
PCS failed to file the attorney affidavit and expert report with their
initial complaints, as is required by NRS 11.258 for actions against
design professionals involving nonresidential construction.

Se:

During a hearing on the motions, the district court expressed its
concern that if it agreed with Converse’s position, then NRS
11.259(1) may require dismissing the entire action, including
pleadings by parties other than Century and PCS. Relying on
Otak—where only an amended pleading was dismissed because the
initial complainant violated NRS 11.258—Converse argued that
only Century’s and PCS’s amended pleadings must be dismissed.
See Otak, 127 at 599, 260 P.3d at 411-12. The district court sum-
marily denied Converse’s motions, and this petition for a writ of
mandamus followed.

DISCUSSION
Leer

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires . . . or to control an arbitrary or capri-
cious exercise of discretion.’ Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008);
see NRS 34.160. Here, Converse argues that the law requires that
Century’s and PCS’s amended pleadings be dismissed as a result
of their failure to file the NRS 11.258 attorney affidavit and expert
report at the time the initial complaints were served. Because the
determination of this issue is not fact-bound and involves unsettled
issues of law that will likely recur, and because resolving this issue
at this early stage of the underlying litigation promotes judicial
economy, our consideration of Converse’s writ petition is war-
ranted. See NRS 34.330 (providing that a writ of mandamus is
available only when no adequate legal remedy exists); Buckwalter
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 200, 201, 234 P.3d 920,
921 (2010) (recognizing that we may consider a petition for writ
relief contesting the denial of a motion to dismiss when ‘‘the issue
is not fact-bound and involves an unsettled and potentially signif-
icant, recurring question of law’’); Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at
197-98, 179 P.3d at 558-59 (noting that the right to appeal from a
final judgment is not always an adequate legal remedy that bars
writ relief, such as when a case is at an early point in litigation
and writ relief advances judicial economy).

The amended pleadings must be dismissed

[re

Resolving the issues raised in this writ petition requires our de
novo review of the statutes that govern actions involving nonresi-
dential construction. See Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792 (2006)
(providing that de novo review applies to issues of law such as
statutory interpretation). The ultimate goal of interpreting statutes
is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Cromer v. Wilson, 126
Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010). We interpret clear and

I

unambiguous statutes based on their plain meaning. Jd. But when
a statute is ambiguous, we consult other sources, such as legisla-
tive history, reason, and policy to identify and give effect to the
Legislature’s intent. State, Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins, Co., 116 Nev. 290, 294, 995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000).

For actions ‘‘involving nonresidential construction,’ NRS
11.258 requires the complainant’s attorney to file, when the first
pleading is served, an affidavit and expert report attesting to a rea-
sonable basis for the action.? NRS 11.258(1), (3). If the attorney
fails to do so, then the district court ‘shall dismiss [the] action.”
NRS 11.259(1); see Otak Nev., L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 127 Nev. 593, 598, 260 P.3d 408, 411 (2011). An action
“involving nonresidential construction’’ is defined, in pertinent
part, as an action ‘‘against a design professional’ that pertains to
the ‘‘design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping”’ of
a nonresidential building. NRS 11.2565(1).

Thus, as Converse asserts, because Century and PCS did not
submit an NRS 11.258 attorney affidavit and expert report con-
currently with the initial pleadings, the amended pleadings against
Converse must be dismissed if Converse is a design professional
and the claims against it contained in the initial pleadings involved
the design, construction, manufacture, repair, or landscaping of the
Harmon Tower, which concededly is a new nonresidential building.
See Otak, 127 Nev. at 599, 260 P.3d at 411-12. Century and PCS
argue that Converse is not a design professional and that their ini-
tial pleadings did not involve the design, construction, or manu-
facture of the Harmon Tower but, rather, involved Converse’s de-
ficient performance and representations about its inspections. We
now address whether Century’s and PCS’s initial pleadings con-
stituted actions “‘involving nonresidential construction’’ requiring
them to comply with the requirements of NRS 11.258.

Century’s and PCS’s initial pleadings involved the
construction of a nonresidential building

P|
Under NRS 11.2565(1), an “‘ ‘[a]ction involving nonresidential
construction’ ’’ is

an action that:

(a) Is commenced against a design professional; and

(b) Involves the design, construction, manufacture,
repair or landscaping of a nonresidential building or
structure... .
The term includes, without limitation, an action for profes-
sional negligence.

2NRS 11.258(2) provides for a late-filed affidavit under certain circum-
stances not applicable to this case.

BT

Pe

NRS 11.2565’s definition of an action involving nonresidential
construction is expansive; the claims do not have to be directly
based on the design, construction, or manufacture of a nonresi-
dential building, but merely ‘‘involve[ ]’’ those activities. Id.
Hence, an action involving nonresidential construction includes any
cause of action against a design professional that concerns the con-
struction of a nonresidential building. Construction of a building
involves inspection of the ongoing construction activity, and claims
that a quality control and assurance inspector made misrepresen-
tations about the construction’s quality or was at fault for defective
conditions concern the construction of the building. Thus, Cen-
tury’s and PCS’s claims within their initial pleadings against Con-
verse ‘‘[iJnvolve[d]’’ the construction of a nonresidential building.
But in order to conclude that they brought actions involving non-
residential construction that triggered NRS 11.258’s requirements,
Converse must also have been a design professional.

Converse is a design professional

P|

A design professional is someone who holds ‘‘a professional li-
cense or certificate issued pursuant to chapter 623 [Architecture,
Interior Design and Residential Design], 623A [Landscape Archi-
tects] or 625 [Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors] of NRS
or a person primarily engaged in the practice of professional engi-
neering, land surveying, architecture or landscape architecture.”
NRS 11.2565(2)(b). Relevant here, ‘‘‘[t]he practice of profes-
sional engineering’ includes, but is not limited to . . . [a]ny pro-
fessional service which involves the application of engineering
principles and data, such as . . . consultation, investigation, eval-
uation, planning and design, or responsible supervision of
construction . . . wherein the public welfare or the safeguarding of
life, health or property is concerned . . . “” NRS 625.050(1)(a). It
also includes services that are ‘‘necessary to the planning, progress
and completion of any engineering project or to the performance of
any engineering service.’ NRS 625.050(1)(b).

a

To determine whether Converse is a design professional, we ac-
cept the allegations within Century’s and PCS’s pleadings as true.
See Buzz Stew, L.L.C. v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-
28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008) (providing that, in reviewing an
order that pertains to a motion to dismiss, we accept the nonmov-
ing party’s factual allegations in the complaint as true). PCS al-
leged that Converse was required to inspect the steel work for ir-
regularities and deficiencies and make certain that the installation
of the steel comported with construction plans and specifications.
Century alleged that Converse’s services included, but was not

|

limited to, inspections of the steel, conducting tension tests, and
quality assurance services. Both of their amended pleadings refer-
enced the agreement that governed Converse’s services, under
which Converse was responsible for the sampling and testing of
materials as they were being installed and the performance of ten-
sile strength tests on the steel, which involves engineering princi-
ples to determine how the steel responds to various amounts of
stress.? These services implicate the practice of professional engi-
neering as they involve the observation and supervision of a por-
tion of the Harmon Tower’s construction. By virtue of engaging in
the practice of engineering, as gleaned from the services that were
identified in Century’s and PCS’s pleadings, Converse is a design
professional.

Century’s and PCS’s initial pleadings brought actions involving
nonresidential construction against Converse, a design profes-
sional, which required Century and PCS to comply with NRS
11.258’s attorney affidavit and expert report requirements. Their
failure to comply with these requirements rendered their initial
pleadings against Converse void ab initio and, therefore, not sub-
ject to cure by amendment. See Otak, 127 Nev. at 599, 260 P.3d
at 411-12.

NRS 11.259(1) and the dismissal of Century’s and PCS’s
amended pleadings

NRS 11.259(1) provides that the district court ‘‘shall dismiss an
action involving nonresidential construction’’ where the com-
plainant fails to comply with NRS 11.258’s attorney affidavit and
expert report requirements. In this matter, the disagreement be-

3Although we generally do not consider matters outside the pleading in re-
viewing an order denying a motion to dismiss, see Witherow v. State, Bd. of
Parole Comm’rs, 123 Nev. 305, 307-08, 167 P.3d 408, 409 (2007), in this
matter, where the pleadings explicitly referred to the agreement that governed
Converse’s services, the agreement is within the scope of our review. See Bed-
dall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1998) (pro-
viding that, with respect to a motion to dismiss, the district court could con-
sider an agreement that the complaint discussed, that was in the record, and
that the parties did not contest as being unauthentic); Branch v. Tunnell, 14
F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘“[DJocuments whose contents are alleged in a
complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not phys-
ically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.”), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of
Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002); Greene v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 115 Nev. 391, 393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999) (providing that
federal court interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are per-
suasive authority). Also, PCS contests that Converse’s appendices that ac-
company the petition include documents that were not before the district
court. The issues in this petition limit our review to the pleadings and the
agreement governing Converse’s services, which were before the district court.

tween the district court and Converse about the meaning of the
term ‘‘action’”’ in NRS 11.259(1) reveals an ambiguity. The district
court appears to have concluded that an entire case must be dis-
missed under NRS 11.259(1) based on a strict reading of the term
‘action,’ which has been defined by this court in a different con-
text as ‘‘includ[ing] the original claim and any crossclaims, coun-
terclaims, and third-party claims.” United Ass’n of Journeymen &
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. Manson, 105
Nev. 816, 820, 783 P.2d 955, 957 (1989) (discussing NRCP
41()’s language giving parties five years to bring an action to
trial). Suggesting another reasonable, less restrictive interpretation
of the term, in Otak we applied NRS 11.259(1) to require the dis-
missal of an amended third-party complaint only because the first
complaint was void ab initio and thus could not be amended. See
Otak, 127 Nev. at 598-99, 260 P.3d at 409, 411-12. Because ‘‘ac-
tion’? for NRS 11.259 purposes could be reasonably read either
way, it is ambiguous. See McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors of Carson
City, 102 Nev. 644, 649, 730 P.2d 438, 442 (1986) (providing that
a statute is ambiguous if it is ‘capable of being understood in two
or more senses by reasonably informed persons’).

a

Although we often rely on legislative history to resolve statutory
ambiguity, State, Div. of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
116 Nev. 290, 294, 995 P.2d 482, 485 (2000), the legislative his-
tory behind NRS 11.259(1) does not clarify what the Legislature
meant in requiring the dismissal of an ‘‘action.”’ Thus, we resort
to other rules of statutory construction. See Cromer v. Wilson, 126
Nev. 106, 109-10, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010).

Le

‘We interpret statutes to ‘‘conform[ ] to reason and public pol-
icy’’ Great Basin Water Network v. State Eng’r, 126 Nev. 187,
196, 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010). In so doing, we avoid interpreta-
tions that lead to absurd results. City Plan Dev., Inc. v. Office of
Labor Comm’r, 121 Nev. 419, 435, 117 P.3d 182, 192 (2005).
‘Whenever possible, [we] will interpret a rule or statute in har-
mony with other rules or statutes.’ State Farm, 116 Nev. at 295,
995 P.2d at 486 (concluding that a statutory ambiguity may be re-
solved by referring to related statutes); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon,
109 Nev. 990, 993, 860 P.2d 720, 723 (1993); see also 2B Nor-
man J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction § 51:1, at 183 (7th ed. 2012) (‘‘[S]tatutes dealing with
the same subject as the one being construed... are... [an]
aid . . . [for] interpretation.’’).

In this instance, considering the way in which the Legislature
uses the term “‘action’”’ in conjunction with other relevant statutes
reveals that the term is used synonymously with ‘‘pleading.’’

OC

Under NRS 11.258(3)(e), the required expert report must include
“‘fa] statement that the expert has concluded that there is a rea-
sonable basis for filing the action.”’ (Emphasis added.) Other pro-
visions in NRS 11.258 use the verb ‘‘filing’’ with the term ‘‘ac-
tion.’ See NRS 11.258(2), (4). The Nevada Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, do not provide for the filing of an action. In-
stead, they provide for the filing of a complaint, which is a plead-
ing, to initiate an action. NRCP 3; NRCP 7(a). Hence, the term
“‘action’”’ in NRS 11.258 and NRS 11.259 is used in a fashion that
is synonymous with ‘pleading.’

Moreover, when litigation includes several parties’ pleadings, it
is unreasonable to dismiss all the parties’ pleadings because two
parties filed void complaints. Doing so hinders judicial economy
by precluding resolution of the causes of action within the plead-
ings that are free of procedural or substantive defects. We refuse to
construe NRS 11.259(1) in a way that reaches this result. As
gleaned from the statutory language, the apparent intent of NRS
11.259(1) and NRS 11.258 is to advance judicial economy and
prevent frivolous suits against design professionals by requiring a
complaint to include an expert report and attorney affidavit re-
garding the suit’s reasonable basis. In light of this intent, we con-
clude that the Otak court correctly applied NRS 11.259(1) to re-
quire the dismissal of a pleading—not the entire action. Otak Nev.,
L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 593, 599, 260
P.3d 408, 409, 411-12 (2011). Accordingly, the district court must
dismiss Century’s and PCS’s amended pleadings that pertain to
Converse because their initial pleadings against Converse were
void ab initio and of no legal effect for the lack of the attorney af-
fidavit and expert report required by NRS 11.258.

CONCLUSION

We grant Converse’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the dismissal of the amended pleadings. We direct the clerk of this
court to issue a writ of mandamus that instructs the district court
to vacate its orders denying Converse’s motions to dismiss Cen-
tury’s and PCS’s amended pleadings and to grant these motions by
dismissing the amended pleadings that pertain to Converse.‘

Gissons, Harpesty, DoucLas, and Cuerry, JJ., concur.

4In light of our disposition, we need not address the additional issues that
Converse raises in its petition that were premised on the initial pleadings not
being deemed void ab initio. Additionally, we have considered the parties’ re-
maining contentions and conclude that they lack merit.

lf

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., APPELLANT, v. DEWEY S.
O’BRIEN; AND RENEE D. O’BRIEN, RESPONDENTS.

No. 61650
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 581

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., and Gregory L. Wilde and Kevin S.
Soderstrom, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Mark L. Mausert, Reno, for Respondents.

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION
By the Court, CuErry, J.:

This appeal raises a threshold jurisdictional question: is a district
court order granting a petition for judicial review of a foreclosure

0

mediation and remanding the matter for additional mediation final
and appealable, or is it not final and, thus, not appealable? To pre-
serve and promote the interests of judicial economy and efficiency,
we conclude that an order remanding for further mediation gener-
ally is not final and appealable, and we thus dismiss this appeal.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At an NRS 107.086 foreclosure mediation, respondent home-
owners Dewey S. O’Brien and Renee D. O’Brien and representa-
tives of appellant lender Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., agreed that
foreclosure proceedings would be halted for three months while the
O’Briens were being considered for a loan modification. Several
months later, the O’Briens petitioned the district court for judicial
review, asserting that Wells Fargo breached the parties’ agree-
ment. The district court found that Wells Fargo had violated the
agreement and granted the O’Briens’ petition for judicial review,
awarding them sanctions and attorney fees. Significant to our ju-
risdictional analysis, the district court also directed Wells Fargo
to participate in and pay for ‘‘further mediation.’ Wells Fargo
appealed.

‘We ordered Wells Fargo to show cause why this appeal should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, asking it to address
whether, given the remand for additional mediation, the order was
final and appealable. Both Wells Fargo and the O’Briens timely re-
sponded, arguing, respectively, that the order resolved all of the is-
sues before the district court and thus was final and appealable,
and that the order did not resolve the ultimate question regarding
the status of the O’Briens’ home and consequently was not final
and appealable.

DISCUSSION
a

To promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding piece-
meal appellate review, appellate jurisdictional rules have long re-
quired finality of decision before this court undertakes its review.
NRAP 3A(6)(1); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416
(2000); see Reno Hilton Resort Corp. v. Verderber, 121 Nev. 1, 5,
106 P.3d 134, 136-37 (2005) (‘‘The general rule requiring
finality . . . is not merely technical, but is a crucial part of an
efficient justice system. . . . [Flor the appellate court, it prevents
an increased caseload and permits the court to review the matter
with the benefit of a complete record.’’); Valley Bank of Nev. v.
Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 444, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (recog-
nizing that the finality rule ‘‘seeks to . . . promot[e] judicial econ-
omy by avoiding the specter of piecemeal appellate review’’).
Thus, in the administrative context, a district court order remand-

—!

ing a matter to an administrative agency is not an appealable order,
unless the order constitutes a final judgment on the merits and re-
mands merely for collateral tasks, such as calculating benefits
found due. Bally’s Grand Hotel & Casino v. Reeves, 112 Nev.
1487, 1489, 929 P.2d 936, 937 (1996); see State Taxicab Auth. v.
Greenspun, 109 Nev. 1022, 1024-25, 862 P.2d 423, 424-25
(1993); Clark Cnty. Liquor & Gaming Licensing Bd. v. Clark, 102
Nev. 654, 657-58, 730 P.2d 443, 446 (1986); Pueblo of Sandia v.
Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The same reasoning applies to orders arising from, and re-
manding for further mediation to, the Foreclosure Mediation Pro-
gram. Here, the district court considered the matter under Fore-
closure Mediation Rule 21 and remanded for the parties to attend
mediation again. The second mediation will readdress the merits of
the foreclosure matter, and, if appropriate, any party will then be
able to petition for judicial review of that mediation. Consequently,
we conclude that the appealed order was not the final resolution of
this matter. Because it is not final, the order is not appealable.
NRAP 3A(b)(1). As recognized by the federal court of appeals in
Pueblo of Sandia, deferring appellate review until the completion
of significant ongoing proceedings not only avoids the possibility of
considering two appeals but ‘‘also leaves open the possibility that
no appeal will be taken in the event the proceedings on remand sat-
isfy all parties”’ 231 F.3d at 880. Accordingly, we conclude that
we lack jurisdiction, and we dismiss this appeal.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DoucLas, and
Sata, JJ., concur.

Harvesty, J., dissenting:

As acknowledged by the majority, an order that resolves, on
their merits, all of the substantive issues before the court is final
and appealable, even though it also remands the matter for further
proceedings collateral to the issues before the court. See Bally’s
Grand Hotel & Casino v. Reeves, 112 Nev. 1487, 1488-89, 929
P.2d 936, 937 (1996); State Taxicab Auth. v. Greenspun, 109 Nev.
1022, 1024-25, 862 P.2d 423, 424-25 (1993) (indicating that the
district court’s consideration of the merits of a petition for judicial
review can render its order final, even if the court also remands
that matter). That is exactly what happened here.

During foreclosure mediation, the O’Briens and Wells Fargo
reached an agreement to forestall foreclosure for three months
upon certain terms. Several months later, after being notified that
their house was once again in foreclosure status, the O’Briens
filed a petition for judicial review, seeking enforcement of their
agreement with Wells Fargo and sanctions. The district court con-
cluded that Wells Fargo had breached the parties’ agreement and

OO

awarded sanctions, as requested. Instead of enforcing the agree-
ment, which at that point had ostensibly expired, the district court
remanded for additional mediation, giving the parties an opportu-
nity to reach a new or extended agreement, but not necessarily to
resolve issues directly related to the first one. This finally re-
solved all of the issues before the court. Cf. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Ad-
ministrative Law §§ 574 and 575 (2004) (recognizing that remands
typically are to allow the decision-maker to reconsider the original
matter in light of additional evidence or a corrected standard, or
for additional factual findings). And because the remand was es-
sentially for a new mediation, if an appeal is not allowed immedi-
ately, Wells Fargo may be denied an opportunity to challenge the
district court’s decision at a later date. Moreover, this court’s de-
cision to decline jurisdiction over appeals from these types of re-
mand orders invites the possibility of endless back-and-forth be-
tween the Foreclosure Mediation Program and the district court,
without any direct and nondiscretionary avenue for review of the
district court’s decisions by this court. Thus, I would hold that the
district court’s order finally resolved the merits of the petition for
judicial review, rendering the district court’s order appealable as a
final judgment, NRAP 3A(b)(1); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev.
424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000), and proceed to consider the
merits of this appeal. For these reasons, I dissent.

NORTH LAKE TAHOE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Ap-
PELLANT, v. WASHOE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; Anp TAMMI DAVIS, WasHoz CouNTY
TREASURER, RESPONDENTS.

No. 60395
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 583

Reese Kintz, LLC, and Devon T. Reese, D. Geno Menchetti, and
Ryan W. Herrick, Incline Village, for Appellant.

Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and David C.
Creekman, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for
Respondents.

684

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Cuerry, J.:

This case arises out of actions taken by respondents Washoe
County Board of County Commissioners and Washoe County
Treasurer Tammi Davis to provide refunds to Incline Village and
Crystal Bay property owners who paid excessive property taxes as
a result of improper appraisals. To cover the cost of the refunds
plus interest, respondents withheld amounts from property tax dis-
tributions made to the various county taxing units that had previ-

 «:

ously benefited from the excessive property taxes, essentially off-
setting the refunded amounts against the distributions. Those tax-
ing units from which distribution amounts were withheld include
appellant North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District (FPD), which
petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus compelling re-
spondents to cease withholding portions of the distributions.

The district court denied relief, and on appeal, we are asked to
consider the propriety of these withholdings under our current
statutory scheme. We must also consider whether judicial inter-
ference in this matter is precluded by the political question doc-
trine. To assist with this latter assessment, we take this opportunity
to adopt the factors set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962). In applying these factors, we conclude that because re-
spondents were within their authority to withhold distributions, and
because the manner in which they did so was discretionary, the po-
litical question doctrine precludes judicial review. We thus con-
clude that the district court properly denied writ relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

FPD provides all emergency and nonemergency fire services,
along with emergency medical services, to the Incline
Village/Crystal Bay area. It was formed under NRS Chapter 474
(County Fire Protection Districts) and is funded pursuant to the re-
quirements set forth in NRS 474.190. Like other taxing units, in-
cluding Washoe County, the Washoe County School District, the
State of Nevada, the Incline Village General Improvement District,
and the supplemental city/county relief tax account, FPD obtains
funding from property tax distributions. Slightly more than half of
FPD’s budget is made up of its bimonthly distributions of the real
property taxes.

Pursuant to our decision in Berrum v. Otto, 127 Nev. 372, 381,
255 P.3d 1269, 1274-75 (2011), in which we held that the Washoe
County Treasurer had a duty under NRS 360.2935 to refund, with
interest, unconstitutionally imposed and collected property taxes in
Incline Village and Crystal Bay, the County Commissioners con-
sidered various ways in which the refund and interest payment
could be funded. The County Commissioners ultimately decided to
pay for the refund and interest by reducing future property tax dis-
tributions proportionately among the various taxing units. Thus, in
August 2011, the County Commissioners directed Treasurer Davis
to make the refunds and interest payments and to withhold corre-
sponding proportionate amounts from the county taxing units’
property tax distributions over the next 18 months. Doing so re-
duced FPD’s property tax distribution significantly.

Consequently, FPD filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
with the district court, seeking to prevent respondents from con-

6 _—

tinuing to withhold any portion of FPD’s tax revenues. After a
hearing, the district court determined that writ relief was not ap-
propriate. The district court determined that, to address FPD’s
concerns, it would have to interject itself into the internal political
decisions of another branch of government, which it could not do.
The court further pointed out that a writ may not be used to pre-
scribe the manner in which political officers should exercise dis-
cretion unless the officers’ actions are arbitrary and capricious,
which was not the case here. Thus, the district court denied the ap-
plication for writ relief. FPD subsequently appealed.

On appeal, FPD argues that the writ of mandamus exists to
allow a court to compel compliance with a statutory mandate such
as that contained in NRS 474.200. NRS 34.160. FPD points out
that NRS 474.200 is not discretionary—it requires respondents to
collect and then distribute a portion of the real property taxes to
FPD. FPD thus argues that the district court erred in refusing to
issue a writ of mandamus to compel the County Commissioners
and Treasurer to distribute the full amount due based on the cur-
rent year’s property tax base. FPD further contends that the district
court’s reliance on separation-of-powers-based justiciability re-
quirements was misplaced, as issuing a writ would not intrude on
respondents’ decision-making authority. In so arguing, FPD chal-
lenges the withholding of monetary distributions to fund the tax re-
funds. Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the issue pre-
sented here is completely nonjusticiable and, thus, the district
court properly denied FPD’s requested writ relief.

DISCUSSION

The political question doctrine stems from the separation of
powers essential to the American system of government. Nevada’s
separation of powers doctrine, contained in Article 3, Section 1 of
the Nevada Constitution, provides that ‘‘no persons charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to [another branch] shall
exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others.” This
doctrine exists for one very important reason—‘“‘to prevent one
branch of government from encroaching on the powers of another
branch.’ Comm’n on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. 285, 292, 212
P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009). Recently, we stated that ‘‘[t]his separation
is fundamentally necessary because ‘[w]ere the power of judging
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the legis-
lator: Were it joined to the executive power the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor. ’’ Berkson v. LePome, 126
Nev. 492, 498-99, 245 P.3d 560, 565 (2010) (second alteration
in original) (quoting Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 19, 422

 «

P.2d 237, 242 (1967)). ‘‘The division of powers is probably the
most important single principle of government declaring and guar-
anteeing the liberties of the people.’ Galloway, 83 Nev. at 18, 422
P.2d at 241.

The Nevada Constitution specifically delineates the power be-
longing to each branch of government in this state. Berkson, 126
Ney. at 498, 245 P.3d at 564. The Legislature enacts laws, and in
turn, the executive branch is tasked with ‘‘carrying out and en-
forcing th[ose] laws.’’ Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242
(‘The executive power extends to the carrying out and enforcing
the Jaws enacted by the Legislature.’’); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional
Law § 354 (2005) (‘‘The adoption of administrative regulations
necessary to implement and carry out the purpose of legislative en-
actments is executive in nature’’); see Nev. Const. art. 4 (provid-
ing the Legislature with the ability to enact laws); Nev. Const. art.
5, § 7 (‘‘[The Governor] shall see that the laws are faithfully exe-
cuted.’’). On the other hand, ‘‘ ‘ ‘‘Judicial Power’’ is the authority
to hear and determine justiciable controversies,’ ’’ State v. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 953, 962, 11 P.3d 1209, 1214
(2000) (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242), ‘‘‘[t]o
declare what the law is[,] or has been’’’ Berkson, 126 Nev. at
499, 245 P.3d at 565 (first alteration in original) (quoting 1
Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 191 (8th ed.
1927)).

“In general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases
properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid. ’” Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194 (2012) (quoting
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). The political ques-
tion doctrine, however, provides for a narrow exception limiting
justiciability. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195; Pershing Cnty. v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 43 Nev. 78, 89, 183 P. 314, 315
(1919). Under the political question doctrine, controversies are
precluded from judicial review when they ‘“‘revolve around policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for
resolution to the legislative and executive branches.’ 16A Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 268 (2013); see generally Hardy, 125
Nev. at 296, 212 P.3d at 1106; Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416,
424, 131 P.2d 516, 519 (1942); Pershing Cnty., 43 Nev. at 89, 183
P. at 315.

More specifically, the United States Supreme Court has identi-
fied certain features that characterize a case as being nonjusticia-
ble under the political question doctrine:

Sa

“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy de-
termination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by var-
ious departments on one question.”

United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-90 (1990)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). A determina-
tion that any one of these factors has been met necessitates dis-
missal based on the political question doctrine. See id. To clarify
and expand our limited jurisprudence in this area, we take this op-
portunity to adopt the Baker factors to assist in our review of the
justiciability of controversies that potentially involve political ques-
tions. With these factors in mind, we examine FPD’s arguments
concerning NRS 474.200 and the County Commissioner’s and
Treasurer’s withholding decisions.

NRS 474.200
Lerma!

FPD argues that the political question doctrine does not apply
here because NRS 474.200 contains a clear funding mandate, and
mandamus is available to compel governmental compliance with a
clear statutory mandate. As noted, once the Legislature has made
policy and value choices by enacting statutory law, that law’s con-
struction and application is the job of the judiciary. Moreover, a
writ of mandamus may indeed be available ‘‘to compel the per-
formance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station.’ Int’! Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); see
NRS 34.160. Thus, if a clear statutory directive found in NRS
474.200 were being violated, the political question doctrine would
not prevent court review. But we do not read NRS 474.200 to re-
quire a full distribution to FPD of all taxes received regardless of
previous overpayments.

NRS 474,200 provides, in relevant part, that
1. At the time of making the levy of county taxes for that
year, the boards of county commissioners shall levy the tax
established pursuant to NRS 474.190 upon all property, both

SS  «°

real and personal, subject to taxation within the boundaries of
the district... .

2. When levied, the tax must be entered upon the assess-
ment rolls and collected in the same manner as state and
county taxes. . .

3. When the tax is collected, it must be placed in the
treasury of the county in which the greater portion of the
county fire protection district is located, to the credit of the
district.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, pursuant to this statute, the taxes col-
lected on behalf of a fire district must be credited to the fire dis-
trict’s funds. NRS 474.200(3). Plainly, funding FPD through its
portion of the collected taxes is not discretionary. Wheble v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 119, 122, 272 P.3d 134, 136 (2012)
(explaining that in our de novo review of a statute, we will not look
beyond the plain language when it is clear on its face). However,
this statute does not contemplate or provide guidance when a re-
fund is due of overpaid, unconstitutionally collected taxes. And
while not directly on point, NRS 354.240 allows for the with-
holding of distribution credit from county taxing units for the pur-
pose of issuing tax refunds necessitated by overpayments. Under
NRS 354.220-.250, an applicant may request a refund from the
County Commissioners or the Treasurer where ‘‘the applicant for
refund has a just cause for making the application and the grant-
ing of the refund would be equitable”’ NRS 354.220(4). Once
NRS 354.220 has been implicated, ‘‘[t]he county may withhold
amounts refunded from its subsequent apportionments of revenues
from property tax to the other taxing units in the county”’ NRS
354.240(2). Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in NRS
474.200 precludes the withholding method followed by the County
Commissioners and Treasurer here.

Nevertheless, FPD further contends that Golconda Fire Protec-
tion District v. County of Humboldt, 112 Nev. 770, 774, 918 P.2d
710, 712 (1996), is instructive, because in that case, we deter-
mined that taxes collected for fire districts must be deposited into
a county treasury and used only for fire protection purposes. Gol-
conda dealt with the assertion that Humboldt County wrongfully
credited the interest earned on taxes that it collected for the fire
protection district to the county’s general fund. 112 Nev. at 771,
918 P.2d at 710. The district court determined that Humboldt
County’s actions were discretionary and thus immune from chal-
lenge. Jd. We determined that because ‘“‘NRS 355.170 did not con-
fer authority to Humboldt County with respect to the apportion-
ment of [the fire protection district]’s tax proceeds and the interest
earned thereon,” and ‘‘NRS 355.175 does not convey any author-

0

ity to counties for the investment of government funds,’ Humboldt
County did not retain discretion over the interest due to the fire
protection district. Id. at 773, 918 P.2d at 711-12. We determined
that NRS 474.200 creates a constructive trust that places ‘‘fidu-
ciary duties on Humboldt County to administer the taxes collected
on behalf of [the fire protection district].”’ Jd. at 774, 918 P.2d at
712. Accordingly, we reversed the dismissal order and remanded
for an accounting of the tax funds. Id. at 775, 918 P.2d at 713.

Golconda is distinguishable from this case because it concerns
unauthorized apportionment and improper use of interest legiti-
mately owed to a fire protection district. While Golconda states
that ‘‘taxes collected by fire districts must be deposited into a
county treasury and used only for fire protection purposes,’ it does
not state that improperly collected taxes may not be recovered at a
Jater time. Id. at 774, 918 P.2d at 712. Nor is there any argument
here that the withholdings were improperly apportioned among the
various taxing entities. Moreover, Golconda is consistent with the
County Commissioners’ decision to reclaim the unconstitutionally
collected tax distributions. In stating that NRS 474.200 creates a
constructive trust that places fiduciary duties on the County to
“‘administer’’ the taxes collected on behalf of FPD, we acknowl-
edged the County’s need to manage the tax distributions. Gol-
conda, 112 Nev. at 774, 918 P:2d at 712. Thus, the County Com-
missioners did not violate NRS 474.200 or act outside of their
authority here.

The withholding decision
Pe

County commissioners have the power to budget, spend, and
levy and collect property taxes, NRS 244.150; NRS 244.1505;
NRS 244.200-.255, and to ‘‘do and perform all such other acts
and things as may be lawful and strictly necessary to the full dis-
charge of the powers and jurisdiction conferred on the board.’
NRS 244.195. In this, county commissioners perform various
functions of executive dimension. See Queen Anne’s Conservation,
Inc. v. Cnty. Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s Cnty., 855 A.2d 325, 335
(Md. 2004); Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth,
64 A.3d 611, 615 n.8 (Pa. 2013); see also Ball y. Fitzpatrick, 602
So. 2d 873, 878 (Miss. 1992) (citing numerous jurisdictions and
explaining that ‘‘official functions of local governments frequently
overlap and local governments may perform executive, legislative,
and judicial functions’’). The executive power also includes the
general power to, among other things, administer appropriated
funds, so long as doing so does not conflict with legislative pur-
pose. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 354 (2005). Particularly, as

 «:

noted in Golconda, while the amounts collected on FPD’s behalf
belong to FPD, it is the County’s duty to administer those col-
lected taxes. Id. at 774, 918 P.2d at 712.

Here, under the basic powers set forth above and NRS 354.240,
the County Commissioners had administrative authority to with-
hold distributions from the taxing entities and, within that author-
ity, to decide the precise manner in which to furnish the tax re-
funds. NRS 474.200 does not govern or impact the refund process,
and FPD has pointed to no other authority compelling a different
manner of funding. The second Baker factor reasons that a court
should relinquish a case for nonjusticiability if there is ‘‘‘a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving’ ”’
the issue. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 389 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217). And the third Baker factor limits justiciability if it is
impossible to decide the issue ‘‘ ‘without an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.’ ’’ Jd. (quoting
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). Aside from NRS 354.240, there appears
to be no standard or rule for the courts to follow governing how the
County Commissioners must handle tax refund liability. Thus, it is
up to the County Commissioners to determine how to satisfy the
refund and corresponding budgeting obligations, so long as their
determination does not conflict with a legislative purpose. FPD
points to no conflict, and we thus decline to interject ourselves into
the administration of the tax distribution and refund process. See
Montano v. Cnty. Legislature of Suffolk, 891 N.Y.S.2d 82, 89
(App. Div. 2009) (‘‘In the absence of any allegation that constitu-
tional rights have been violated, or that a governmental body’s ac-
tion contravenes an applicable statute, Jaw or ordinance, a legisla-
ture’s governance of its internal affairs . . . should not be subject
to court oversight.” (internal quotations omitted). Once it is con-
cluded that the County Commissioners had authority to withhold
the disbursements in this case, the precise manner in which they do
so must be decided based on policy and economics. ‘‘ ‘Courts exist
solely to declare and enforce the law, and are without authority as
to matters of mere governmental policy. ’’ State ex rel. Meshel v.
Keip, 423 N.E.2d 60, 70-71 (Ohio 1981) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Grogan v. DeSapio, 83 A.2d 809, at
611-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1951)); see generally Fletcher v.
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Ky. 2005) (‘‘[T]he judicial
department should neither inject itself nor be injected into the de-
tails of the executive department budget process.”’).

In sum, if the court system undertook resolution of this case, it
would supplant the County Commissioners’ legislative and execu-
tive powers. The ‘‘ ‘lack of judicially discoverable and manageable

692 ee

standards’ ’’ and “‘ ‘the impossibility of deciding [this case] with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion’ ’’ remove this case from our judicial purview. Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. at 389 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). Ac-
cordingly, the district court correctly concluded that FPD’s petition
presented a nonjusticiable political question.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the County Commissioners’ decision to with-
hold collected property taxes from FPD was within its authority in
general, and that the precise manner in which it undertook that
task is outside of our purview. Consequently, further judicial re-
view is precluded by the political question doctrine.' The district
court’s order denying extraordinary writ relief is affirmed.

Harvesty and ParRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN DANIEL P., A Minor CHILD.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
STEVEN DANIEL P., A MINOR CHILD, RESPONDENT.

No. 61068
October 3, 2013 309 P.3d 1041

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City;
Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Lori L. Plater,
Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County,-for Appellant.

1In light of the resolution of this appeal, we decline to reach the parties’ re-
maining contentions.

693

Jennifer L. Lunt, Alternate Public Defender, and Krista D.
Meier and Cynthia Lu, Deputy Alternate Public Defenders,
Washoe County, for Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that respondent
Steven P., a juvenile, committed unlawful acts that would be felony
and gross misdemeanor charges if committed by an adult. Without
the district attorney’s written approval, the juvenile court dis-
missed the State’s petition and referred Steven to the probation of-
fice for informal supervision. In this appeal, we are asked to de-
termine whether the juvenile court has authority under NRS
62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juve-
nile for informal supervision pursuant to NRS 62C.200 without the
written approval of the district attorney, and whether the juvenile
court’s discretion in overseeing a juvenile matter is limited by the

694 —

authority granted under the Nevada Revised Statutes. We conclude
that NRS 62C.230(1)(a) grants the juvenile court authority to dis-
miss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only
when the requirements of NRS 62C.200 have been met, including
the requirement that the district attorney give written approval for
placement of the juvenile under informal supervision where the
acts alleged in the petition would be a felony or gross misde-
meanor if committed by an adult. Further, we conclude that the ju-
venile court is limited by the provisions of NRS Title 5 when ex-
ercising its authority to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile
justice matters.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State filed a delinquency petition on September 12, 2011,
alleging that Steven P., a juvenile, committed burglary (a felony)
and conspiracy to commit burglary (a gross misdemeanor). The
parties negotiated a dismissal of the burglary allegation in ex-
change for Steven admitting the conspiracy allegation and agreeing
to adjudication on that allegation.

On January 9, 2012, the juvenile court accepted the plea bargain
and dismissed the burglary allegation. The probation officer as-
signed to Steven specifically recommended in a risk and needs as-
sessment report that Steven be placed on formal probation. Based
on this report, the State requested at the hearing that Steven be
made ‘‘a delinquent ward of the court’’ and placed on probation.
The court reserved ruling on the State’s petition and on Steven’s
probationary ‘status because of concerns with ordering formal
probation.

Approximately one month after the dispositional hearing, no de-
cision on the status of Steven’s case had been made. The State filed
a motion for adjudication, contending that pursuant to NRS
62D.310(1), a final disposition of the case was required within 60
days of the filing of the petition on September 12, 2011.! In its mo-
tion, the State reasserted its request that the juvenile court adjudi-
cate Steven on the conspiracy allegation. Additionally, the State in-
dicated that Steven ‘‘could earn a deferred status and dismissal of
the charge if he successfully complete[d] probation and ha[d] no
further delinquent referrals.’ The State contended that pursuant to
NRS 62C.200-.230, deferred adjudication required approval from
the district attorney prior to the juvenile court allowing informal
supervision.

The juvenile justice statutes provide for informal supervision.
When a complaint alleges a juvenile is delinquent or in need of su-
pervision, a probation officer conducts a preliminary inquiry and
makes a recommendation whether a petition for delinquency

'Steven’s counsel did not oppose the State’s motion.

Pd 695

should be filed or whether the interests of the juvenile would be
better served by placing the juvenile under informal supervision
pursuant to NRS 62C.200. NRS 62C.100(1). If the probation of-
ficer recommends informal supervision following a complaint,
NRS 62C.200(1)(b) provides that a juvenile may be informally su-
pervised by a probation officer if “‘[t]he district attorney gives
written approval for placement of the child under informal super-
vision, [and] if any of the acts alleged . . . would have constituted
a gross misdemeanor or felony if committed by an adult.” If, how-
ever, a petition for delinquency is filed, ‘‘the juvenile court may
. . . refer the child to the probation officer for informal supervi-
sion pursuant to NRS 62C.200.’’ NRS 62C.230(1)(a). Addition-
ally, NRS 62C.230(1)(b) provides that a juvenile may be placed
under supervision ‘‘pursuant to a supervision and consent decree,
without a formal adjudication of delinquency, if the juvenile court
receives: (1) [t]he recommendation of the probation officer;
(2) [t]he written approval of the district attorney; and (3) [fhe writ-
ten consent and approval of the child and the parent or guardian of
the child.”

Here, a petition had been filed. Thus, NRS 62C.230 addresses
the availability of informal supervision. Without the district attor-
ney’s written approval, the juvenile court dismissed the State’s pe-
tition and referred Steven for informal supervision. The juvenile
court reasoned that NRS 62C.230(1)(a) did not require written ap-
proval from the district attorney. Based on this interpretation of the
statute, the juvenile court determined that it could dismiss the
State’s petition and refer Steven for informal supervision. The
State now appeals the juvenile court’s order.

DISCUSSION

| rr

The State argues that the juvenile court erroneously dismissed its
delinquency petition and referred Steven to the juvenile probation
office for informal supervision because the district attorney’s writ-
ten approval is required pursuant to NRS 62C.230(1)(a). The State
further asserts that the juvenile court has limited authority under
the Nevada Revised Statutes and, accordingly, its power to dismiss
the State’s delinquency petition is subject to statutory authoriza-
tion. We agree with both of the State’s contentions.

The juvenile court does not have authority under NRS
62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a
juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of
the district attorney
P|

Whether the juvenile court has authority pursuant to NRS
62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juve-

696 PO

nile for informal supervision without the district attorney’s written
approval is a matter of statutory interpretation. ‘‘Statutory inter-
pretation is a question of law subject to de novo review.’ State v.
Eric A.L. (In re Eric A.L.), 123 Nev. 26, 31, 153 P.3d 32, 35
(2007). ‘‘When construing a statute, this court looks to the words
in the statute to determine the plain meaning of the statute, and this
court will not look beyond the express language unless it is clear
that the plain meaning was not intended.’’ Hernandez v. Bennett-
Haron, 128 Nev. 580, 595, 287 P.3d 305, 315 (2012); see also In
re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. at 31, 153 P.3d at 35 (acknowledging that
“this court must attribute the plain meaning to an unambiguous
statute’). ‘“This court ‘avoid[s] statutory interpretation that renders
language meaningless or superfluous, and ‘[iJf the statute’s lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, [this court will] enforce the
statute as written” ’’ George J. v. State (In re George J.), 128 Nev.
345, 349, 279 P.3d 187, 190 (2012) (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011).
Additionally, we construe ‘‘statutes to preserve harmony among
them.’ Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 808,
814, 265 P.3d 673, 677 (2011).

NRS 62C.230(1) (a)
NRS 62C.230(1)(a) states that “‘[iJf the district attorney files a
petition with the juvenile court, the juvenile court may . . . [d]is-

miss the petition without prejudice and refer the child to the pro-
bation officer for informal supervision pursuant to NRS 62C.200.”
(Emphasis added.) The State focuses on the language ‘‘pursuant to
NRS 62C.200”’ and argues that it is restrictive—it requires the ju-
venile court to determine whether the requirements of NRS
62C.200 are met before dismissing the petition and referring the
juvenile for informal supervision. Steven contends that NRS
62C.230(1)(a) provides only that the juvenile court ‘‘may’’ dismiss
the district attorney’s petition without prejudice ‘‘and’’ consider re-
ferring the juvenile for informal supervision as defined under NRS
62C.200. In his view, the reference to NRS 62C.200 serves only
to define the informal supervision, not to restrict when the juvenile
court may exercise its discretion under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) to dis-
miss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision. To re-
solve this dispute, we must interpret the phrase ‘‘pursuant to.’
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term ‘‘pursuant to’’
means “‘[iJn compliance with; in accordance with; under . . . [a]s
authorized by; under . . . [iJn carrying out.’”’ 1356 (9th ed. 2009).
Other jurisdictions have construed the term ‘‘pursuant to’’ to hold
a restrictive effect. For instance, in Stocker v. Sheehan, the New
York appellate court stated that ‘‘[t]he term ‘pursuant to’ in the
Connecticut statute limiting exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to de-

ee 697

terminations made ‘pursuant to’ another referenced statute is a ‘re-
strictive term[,]’ meaning that the referenced statute must be the
‘legal mechanism’ under which the determination was made.” 786
N.Y.S.2d 126, 131 (App. Div. 2004) (citation omitted). See also
John Allan Love Charitable Found. v. United States, 540 F. Supp.
238, 244 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (discussing ‘‘pursuant to’’ language as
used in trust documents and stating that ‘‘the issue really is
whether the trust instrument was the legal mechanism under which
the payments were made’’); Knowles v. Holly, 513 P.2d 18, 23
(Wash. 1973) (holding that the term ‘‘pursuant to”’ is a ‘‘restric-
tive term’’ (internal quotations omitted)).

Here, under the plain language of NRS 62C.230(1)(a), we con-
clude that the juvenile court may dismiss the State’s petition and
refer a juvenile for informal supervision only upon the juvenile
court’s determination that the requirements of NRS 62C.200 have
been met. See Stocker, 786 N.Y.S.2d at 131.

NRS 62C.200

NRS 62C.200 includes preconditions for a juvenile to be placed
under informal supervision of a probation officer. It states, in
pertinent part, that,

1. When a complaint is made alleging that a child is delin-
quent or in need of supervision, the child may be placed
under the informal supervision of a probation officer if:

(a) The child voluntarily admits participation in the acts al-
Jeged in the complaint; and

(b) The district attorney gives written approval for place-
ment of the child under informal supervision, if any of the
acts alleged in the complaint are unlawful acts that would have
constituted a gross misdemeanor or felony if committed by an
adult.

NRS 62C.200(1) (emphases added).

Based on the plain language of this statute, we conclude that
written approval is required from the district attorney before the ju-
venile court can place a juvenile under informal supervision when
the juvenile has allegedly committed an unlawful act that would be
a gross misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult.

Steven contends that the statutory language of NRS 62C.200
does not specify who is required to seek written approval from the
district attorney prior to referring a juvenile for informal supervi-
sion. Relying on NRS 62C.100(1),? he asserts that the juvenile

2NRS 62C.100(1) states, in pertinent part, that
[w]hen a complaint is made alleging that a child is delinquent or in need
of supervision[,] . . . [the complaint must be referred to a probation
officer . . . to determine whether the best interests of the child or of the

698 |

court construed NRS 62C.200 as requiring the probation officer—
not the juvenile court—to obtain such written approval from the
district attorney and therefore it does not limit the juvenile court’s
authority.

Although NRS 62C.100(1) includes the restrictive term ‘‘pur-
suant to NRS 62C.200,” it applies to a probation officer’s deter-
mination upon a preliminary inquiry after a complaint is made al-
leging that a juvenile is delinquent. (Emphasis added.) Therefore,
a probation officer is required to comply with NRS 62C.200 if the
officer recommends placing a juvenile under informal supervision
rather than filing a delinquency petition. See NRS 62C.100(1)(b).
However, we determine that NRS 62C.100(1) is not relevant to the
juvenile court’s statutory obligation under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) to
ensure that the requirements of NRS 62C.200 have been met (in-
cluding that the district attorney gives written approval) before the
juvenile court dismisses the State’s petition and refers a juvenile
for informal supervision. See Canarelli, 127 Nev. at 814, 265 P.3d
at 677 (noting that this court construes ‘‘statutes to preserve har-
mony among them’’). To hold otherwise would render the restric-
tive language in NRS 62C.230(1)(a) meaningless. See In re George
J., 128 Nev. at 349, 279 P.3d at 190 (stating that this court
‘*‘avoid[s] statutory interpretation that renders language meaning-
less or superfluous’ ”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Hobbs, 127
Nev. at 237, 251 P.3d at 179)).

Therefore, we conclude that the plain language of NRS
62C.230(1)(a) and NRS 62C.200(1) required the juvenile court to
obtain the written approval of the district attorney before dismiss-
ing the State’s delinquency petition and referring Steven for infor-
mal supervision because Steven had been charged with unlawful
acts (conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary) that would be a
gross misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult.>

NRS 62C.230(1)(b) does not eliminate the requirement of written
approval from the district attorney

Steven argues that NRS 62C.230(1)(b) supports his contention
that the juvenile court is not required to seek written approval from
the district attorney prior to referring a juvenile for informal su-
pervision under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) because unlike paragraph
(a), which has the restrictive reference to NRS 62C.200, paragraph

public . . . [rlequire that a petition be filed{ ] or . . . [would better be
served by placing the child under informal supervision pursuant to NRS
62C.200.

(Emphasis added.)

Although the district attorney later dismissed the burglary allegation, the
conspiracy-to-commit-burglary allegation remained at the time that the juvenile
court entered its order.

ee 699

(b) expressly states that the juvenile court is required to obtain the
approval of the district attorney when ordering a ‘supervision and
consent decree.’ Steven basically posits that because paragraph
(a) does not include the same language, the Legislature did not in-
tend to require the district attorney’s approval for the juvenile
court to act under paragraph (a).* We cannot agree with this inter-
pretation because it would require that we ignore the express lan-
guage in paragraph (a) that incorporates NRS 62C.200.

The United States Supreme Court has held that ‘‘‘[w]here one
statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and
descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect
is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been
incorporated bodily into the adopting statute.’ ’’ Hassett v. Welch,
303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938) (quoting 2 J.G. Sutherland & John
Lewis, Statutes and Statutory Construction 787 (2d ed. 1904)); see
also State ex rel. Walsh v. Buckingham, 58 Nev. 342, 349, 80 P.2d
910, 912 (1938) (“‘A statute by reference made a part of another
law becomes incorporated in it and remains so as long as the for-
mer is in force”’). Because NRS 62C.230(1)(a) refers to, and
thus incorporates the statutory language of, NRS 62C.200, com-
pliance with the latter statute’s provisions is necessary in order
for the juvenile court to exercise its authority under NRS
62C.230(1)(a). See In re George J., 128 Nev. at 349, 279 P.3d at
190 (‘‘[T]Jhis court ‘will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with
other rules and statutes’’’ to avoid rendering any part of a statute
meaningless (quoting Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 122
Nev. 409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006))). Conversely, NRS
62C.230(1)(b) includes in its statutory language the specific re-
quirements for placement of a juvenile under a ‘‘supervision and
consent decree,” and the juvenile court need not look to other
statutory provisions in order to take action under that provision.

Thus, we reject Steven’s argument that the statutory language of
NRS 62C.230(1)(b) supports his contention that the juvenile court
is not required to seek written approval from the district attorney
before exercising its discretion under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) to dis-
miss a petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision.

4NRS 62C.230(1)(b) provides:
[i]f the district attorney files a petition with the juvenile court, the
juvenile court may:

(b) Place the child under the supervision of the juvenile court pursuant
to a supervision and consent decree, without a formal adjudication of
delinquency, if the juvenile court receives:

(1) The recommendation of the probation officer;

(2) The written approval of the district attorney; and

(3) The written consent and approval of the child and the parent or
guardian of the child.

700 Po

The juvenile court’s authority is statutorily limited

Finally, the State contends that the juvenile court’s discretionary
power to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for in-
formal supervision is limited to the authority granted under the
Nevada Revised Statutes, and the juvenile court cannot usurp the
legislative and executive power provided under the separation of
powers doctrine. Steven argues that the juvenile court maintains
broad judicial discretion in deciding the matters before it and is
tasked with serving as an appropriate check on prosecutorial con-
duct under the separation of powers doctrine.

In State v. Barren, this court held that ‘‘ ‘the juvenile court sys-
tem is a creation of statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction
expressly provided for it in the statute’ ’? 128 Nev. 337, 341, 279
P.3d 182, 184 (2012) (quoting Kell v. State, 96 Nev. 791, 792-93,
618 P.2d 350, 351 (1980)); see also State v. Bill, 91 Nev. 275,
277, 534 P.2d 1264, 1265 (1975) (‘‘The Juvenile Court Act’s
grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction is limited... .”).

Title 5 of the Nevada Revised Statutes encompasses Nevada’s Ju-
venile Justice Code. NRS 62A.360(1) declares that the title should
be construed liberally to ensure all juveniles receive appropriate
care and guidance. And one of the purposes behind the title is to
“promote the establishment, supervision and implementation of
preventative programs that are designed to prevent a child from be-
coming subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ NRS
62A.360(2).

NRS 62B.010(4) states that ‘‘a judge of the juvenile court has all
the powers and duties set forth in this title”’ and under NRS
62B.300(2), the juvenile court must exercise its ‘‘jurisdiction pur-
suant to the provisions of’’ Title 5. Therefore, the juvenile court’s
discretion to dismiss the State’s delinquency petition and refer
Steven for informal supervision was expressly limited by statute as
we discuss above, and we conclude that the juvenile court exceeded
its statutory authority here.

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the juvenile court’s
order and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

PARRAGUIRRE and Curry, JJ., concur.

701

HEATHER SHARMAYN PALEY, Petitioner, v. THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, IN AND FoR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE; AnD
THE HONORABLE FRANCES DOHERTY, Districr
JUDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND THE STATE OF NEVADA, REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 61029
October 3, 2013 310 P.3d 590

Jennifer Lunt, Alternate Public Defender, Washoe County, for
Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Daniel M.
Roche, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondents.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson
City; Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Lori L.
Plater, Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Real Party in
Interest.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and SAITTA, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner Heather
Sharmayn Paley seeks an order directing the juvenile court to va-
cate its order holding her in direct contempt of court based on a
positive drug test that was taken outside of court, immediately be-
fore her court appearance. The respondent district court judge va-
cated the contempt order while this original proceeding was pend-
ing, acknowledging that Paley’s actions did not constitute direct
contempt.! Respondents argue that this renders the petition moot.
An exception to the mootness doctrine allows judicial review when
the contested issue is likely to arise again but will evade review.
We conclude that this exception to the mootness doctrine does not
apply because it is clear that a positive drug test alone will not

‘We originally denied this petition in an unpublished order filed on Sep-
tember 27, 2012. Paley subsequently moved for publication of our disposition
as an opinion, and real party in interest the State of Nevada joined in the mo-
tion. See NRAP 36(f). Cause appearing, we grant the motion and publish this
opinion in place of our prior unpublished order.

Po 7083

support a finding of direct contempt under NRS 22.010. Thus, the
issue presented is not likely to recur.

FACTS

Paley tested positive for methamphetamines immediately prior to
a hearing before the juvenile drug court.? The test was adminis-
tered outside of the court and outside of the presence of the judge.
Based on the positive drug test, the judge held Paley in direct con-
tempt of court for being under the influence of methamphetamines
and ordered her to be immediately remanded to the Washoe
County Detention Facility for a period of 25 days. A video of the
hearing reveals that Paley was polite, coherent, and respectful, and
that she did not cause any disturbance in the presence of the court.

Paley moved to stay the contempt order and requested an order-
to-show-cause hearing. At the hearing, Paley argued that she could
not be held in direct contempt because she did not cause any dis-
turbance in the immediate view and presence of the court or vio-
late any court order. The juvenile court concluded that it would not
change its ruling that Paley’s positive drug test was a direct con-
tempt of court. However, it did suspend the remainder of Paley’s
sentence after she had already served seven days. Paley then filed
a writ petition with this court. Approximately one month after
Paley filed the petition, the juvenile court vacated its order finding
her in direct contempt.

DISCUSSION
a

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion.’ Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote omitted);
see also NRS 34.160. But the writ generally will not issue if the
petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. NRS 34.170. Because ‘‘[nJo rule or statute author-
izes an appeal from an order of contempt,’ we have held that
“‘contempt orders must be challenged by an original petition pur-
suant to NRS Chapter 34.’’ Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Home-
owners Ass’n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000). Man-
damus, however, is an extraordinary remedy, and it therefore is in
this court’s discretion to determine whether a petition will be con-
sidered. See Poulos v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 98 Nev. 453,

2The juvenile court obtained jurisdiction over Paley, who is not a minor,
pursuant to NRS 62B.350 because Paley’s daughter agreed to participate in ju-
venile drug court. NRS 62B.350 extends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to
“adults to the extent that such jurisdiction is incidental and necessary to its ju-
risdiction over children?

704 Po

455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982); see also State ex rel. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 360, 662 P.2d 1338, 1339
(1983). This court may exercise that discretion where ‘‘‘an im-
portant issue of law needs clarification and public policy is served
by this court’s invocation of its original jurisdiction” ’’ Mineral
Cnty. v. State, Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 117 Nev.
235, 243, 20 P.3d 800, 805 (2001) (quoting Bus. Computer
Rentals y. State Treasurer, 114 Nev. 63, 67, 953 P.2d 13, 15
(1998).

P|

Because the juvenile court vacated the order of contempt, there
is no longer an actual controversy for this court to adjudicate. As
the parties acknowledge, this renders the petition moot. We gen-
erally will not exercise our discretion to consider a moot case be-
cause our duty is ‘‘to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable
judgment.’ Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245
P.3d 572, 574 (2010). However, ‘‘we will exercise our discretion
to adjudicate a moot case when (1) the contested issue is likely to
arise again, and (2) the challenged action is ‘too short in its dura-
tion to be fully litigated prior to its natural expiration.’ ’’ Stephens
Media, L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 125 Nev. 849, 858,
221 P.3d 1240, 1247 (2009) (quoting Jason S. v. Valley Hosp.
Med. Ctr. (In re Guardianship of L.S. & H.S.), 120 Nev. 157,
161, 87 P.3d 521, 524 (2004)). :

We conclude that Paley’s petition does not fall under an excep-
tion to the mootness doctrine. This issue is not likely to arise again
because it is abundantly clear that ‘‘a positive drug test result alone
is not a sufficient basis to sustain a finding of direct contempt.’’ In
re J.H., 213 P.3d 545, 549 (Okla. 2008). While being under the
influence may sometimes result in behavior that disrupts court
proceedings, direct contempt requires that the contemptuous con-
duct actually occur in the ‘immediate view and presence’’ of the
judge. NRS 22.030(1).3 And ‘‘when we say immediate view and

Pursuant to NRS 22.010 the following conduct constitutes contempt:

1. Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while the judge is holding court, or engaged in judicial duties at cham-
bers, or toward masters or arbitrators while sitting on a reference or ar-
bitration, or other judicial proceeding.

2. A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance
in the presence of the court, or in its immediate vicinity, tending to in-
terrupt the due course of the trial or other judicial proceeding.

3. Disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, order, rule or
process issued by the court or judge at chambers.

4, Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn
or answer as a witness.

5. Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of such court or judge at chambers.

Pe 10s

presence of the court we mean in the ocular view of the court.’ Ex
parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 374, 90 P. 737, 744 (1907) (empha-
sis added).

be

Absent evidence of conduct that actually disrupts the court pro-
ceeding, a positive out-of-court drug test is not a sufficient basis
for holding a party in contempt of court because no contemptuous
conduct occurs in the ‘‘immediate view and presence’’ of the
judge. See NRS 22.030(1); see also Cameron v. State, 650 A.2d
1376, 1381-82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (reversing a finding of
direct contempt against a party who appeared drunk in court be-
cause ‘‘[hje was in no way disruptive of the proceedings” and
“was not rebellious or insubordinate’’ or ‘‘willfully disobedient or
openly disrespectful’); In re J.H., 213 P.3d at 548-49 (reversing
a finding of direct contempt against parties who tested positive for
cocaine prior to appearing in court because the parties were not
“disorderly or insolent’? and did not ‘‘disturb[ ] or willfully
obstruct[ ] the judicial proceedings’).

P|

Here, the juvenile court held Paley in direct contempt because
she tested positive for methamphetamines prior to the hearing.
However, a positive drug test for methamphetamines prior to a
court proceeding is not an act or omission that constitutes con-
tempt under NRS 22.010. And the record reveals that Paley was
polite, coherent, and respectful at the hearing and did not engage
in any disorderly, insolent, boisterous, or violent conduct, nor did
she commit a breach of peace. NRS 22.010(1)-(2).

The district court rectified its error when it vacated its contempt
order. This rendered the proceeding moot, and no applicable ex-
ception to the mootness doctrine applies. Accordingly, we deny the
petition as moot.*

PICKERING, C.J., and SairTA, J., concur.

6. Disobedience of the order or direction of the court made pending
the trial of an action, in speaking to or in the presence of a juror con-
cerning an action in which the juror has been impaneled to determine, or
in any manner approaching or interfering with such juror with the intent
to influence the verdict.

7. Abusing the process or proceedings of the court or falsely pre-
tending to act under the authority of an order or process of the court.

‘Paley further argues that she was unconstitutionally deprived of counsel and
a due process hearing because the juvenile court’s direct contempt order was
criminal in nature. However, we do not address constitutional questions unless
it is necessary to do so, Cortes v. State, 127 Nev. 505, 516, 260 P.3d 184, 192
(2011), and it is not necessary to reach this issue because we deny the petition
as moot.

3
&

WALTER TRUJILLO, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 58937

October 10, 2013 310 P.3d 594

Michael H. Schwarz, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Eee |
708 Po

Before Grspons, Douctas and Sarria, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Douczas, J.:

Appellant Walter Trujillo was convicted of a felony in 1996 and
was honorably discharged from probation the following year. More
than a decade later, he filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in
district court seeking relief from the judgment of conviction be-
cause he was not informed by his trial counsel of the immigration
consequences of his plea. At issue is whether the common-law writ
of coram nobis may be used in Nevada. We hold that the common-
Jaw writ of coram nobis is available under Article 6, Section 6(1)
of the Nevada Constitution, which grants district courts the power
to issue writs that are proper and necessary to the complete exer-
cise of their jurisdiction, and NRS 1.030, which continues the
common law under some circumstances. But we further hold that,
consistent with NRS 34.724(2)(b) and the exclusive remedy created.
by the Legislature for post-conviction challenges to a judgment of
conviction, the writ may only be used by a person who is no
Jonger in custody on the judgment of conviction being challenged.
And to be consistent with NRS 1.030, we further hold that the writ
is limited to the scope of the common-law writ and therefore may
be used only to challenge errors of fact outside the record that
could not have been raised earlier and that affect the validity and
regularity of the decision itself and would have precluded the judg-
ment from being rendered. Because the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim raised by Trujillo is not within that limited scope, we
affirm the decision of the district court to deny the petition for a
writ of coram nobis.

"This opinion has been circulated among all justices of this court, any two
of whom, under IOP 13(b) may request en banc review of a case. The two
votes needed to require en banc review in the first instance of the question of
overruling Bigness v, State, 71 Nev. 309, 289 P.2d 1051 (1955), were not cast.

Po 709

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

-On April 12, 1996, Trujillo, a citizen of Venezuela, was con-
victed of attempted burglary and sentenced to serve a term of
12 to 30 months in prison. The sentence was suspended, and a pe-
riod of probation not to exceed 2 years was imposed. Trujillo did
not appeal his conviction and never sought post-conviction relief
from his conviction. He honorably discharged probation on
December 31, 1997.

The conviction had immediate deportation consequences for
Trujillo. Shortly after sentencing, he was taken into federal cus-
tody, and a federal judge ordered him deported to Venezuela. Tru-
jillo successfully challenged the deportation order and was issued
a green card and given permanent-resident status. He took no fur-
ther action regarding citizenship until 2010.

Learning in 2010 that he could not become a United States cit-
izen because of his 1996 conviction, Trujillo filed a petition for
a writ of coram nobis attacking the validity of his conviction. In
the petition, Trujillo claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his
conviction, contrary to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
Trujillo asserted that a petition for a writ of coram nobis was the
only available remedy to challenge his 1996 conviction.

The State argued that the writ of coram nobis was abolished by
NRS 34.724(2)(b), which provides that a post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for challenging
a judgment of conviction. Responding to that argument, Trujillo
argued that the legislative history for NRS Chapter 34 does not in-
dicate that a petition for a writ of coram nobis was one of the
common-law remedies replaced by a habeas corpus petition under
NRS 34.724(2)(b). Trujillo asserted that the provision was only in-
tended to eliminate the post-conviction relief petition under NRS
Chapter 177.2

The district court construed the petition for a writ of coram
nobis to be a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
determining that a common-law petition for a writ of coram nobis
was not available because the writ was superseded by the exclusive-
remedy language in NRS 34.724(2)(b) and because the claim
raised by Trujillo was a legal claim that exceeded the scope of the
common-law writ. Deciding that the petition was timely filed from
the decision in Padilla and that Padilla applied retroactively, the
district court nonetheless denied relief because Trujillo had not
demonstrated that counsel’s failure to inform him of the immigra-

?The history of post-conviction relief in Nevada is set forth in detail in Pel-
legrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 870-73, 34 P.3d 519, 526-28 (2001).

m9 Po

tion consequences prejudiced him as he was an undocumented, il-
legal immigrant.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we conclude that the district court incorrectly
treated the petition as a post-conviction petition for a writ of
habeas corpus because Trujillo was not in custody at the time he
filed his petition. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1); NRS 34.724(1);
Jackson v. State, 115 Nev. 21, 23, 973 P.2d 241, 242 (1999). As
a result, the question this court is then tasked to answer is whether
the writ of coram nobis exists in Nevada. To answer that question,
we must address two interrelated issues: the sources of authority to
recognize the writ and the scope of the writ. To set the stage, we
briefly examine the history of the writ.

Historical overview of coram nobis

The writ of coram nobis is an ancient writ that developed in six-
teenth century England. Judge Stanley H. Fuld, Zhe Writ of Error
Coram nobis, 117 N.¥.L.J. Nos. 130-132, at 2212, 2230, 2248
(1947); James MacPherson, Comment, Coram nobis: ‘‘The Wild
Ass of the Law,” 11 Loy. L. Rev. 100, 101 (1961-62); Richard B.
Amandes, Coram nobis—Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 Hastings L.J.
48, 49 (1955-56). At the time, errors of law could be raised to Par-
liament and the Exchequer, but errors of fact were excluded from
their review. Fuld, supra. The writ of coram nobis was devised as
a means of reviewing errors of fact outside the record that affected
the validity and regularity of the decision itself and would have
precluded the judgment from being rendered had they been known.
Id. The ancient writ, quae coram nobis residant (‘‘let the record
and proceedings remain before us’’), was directed to the Court of
the King’s Bench and was issued in the King’s name.? Jd. The writ
was sought before the same court that had entered the judgment
and could only be used to address an error of fact not known to the
court and not negligently concealed by the defendant. Amandes,
supra, at 49. Some examples of the kinds of errors of fact that
were reviewed through a writ of coram nobis include clerical er-
rors, the infancy of the defendant and nonrepresentation by a
guardian, the common-law disability of coverture (the married
woman’s disability to appear on her own in court), the death of a
party before the verdict, the insanity of the defendant at the time
of trial, a guilty plea procured by extrinsic fraud, and a valid de-

3Contrast the writ of coram vobis (‘before you’), which was directed to the
Court of Common Pleas. Fuld, supra. When the writ arrived in America it
generally retained the name of coram nobis, the writ brought before the Court
of the King’s Bench.

Po mu

fense that was not made because of fraud, duress, or excusable
neglect. See People v. Hyung Joon Kim, 202 P.3d 436, 445-47
(Cal. 2009); see also Fuld, supra; Amandes, supra, at 49. The
writ of coram nobis was rarely used, and by the time of Black-
stone, it was considered to be obsolete. Fuld, supra.

In America, the writ developed slowly. It was acknowledged as
early as 1834 when the United States Supreme Court recognized
that its counterpart, the writ of coram vobis, might be available in
state court to challenge an error of fact relating to a defendant’s
immunity from suit. Davis v. Packard, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 312, 324
(1834). Despite this early acknowledgment, over the next century,
the writ of coram nobis, at least federally, remained a rather ar-
chaic vehicle for relief; it was acknowledged as a common-law writ
but was not utilized by the courts. See Bronson v. Schulten, 104
U.S. 410, 416-17 (1881) (recognizing the availability of the writ at
common law but questioning its modern availability and determin-
ing that the court did not have the power to set aside, vacate, and
modify a final judgment after the end of the term during which the
judgment was rendered); United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 68-
69 (1914) (recognizing the availability of coram nobis at common
Jaw, but expressing no opinion as to whether coram nobis existed
because the errors complained of, prosecutorial misconduct and
juror bias, would not have been the type of errors reviewable
under the common law).

_

This quiet period ended in 1954 when the United States
Supreme Court reinvigorated the writ of coram nobis in the sem-
inal case United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). Morgan
sought to challenge a federal conviction that was being used to en-
hance a subsequent state conviction on the ground that he was de-
nied the right to counsel in the federal proceeding. 346 U.S. at
503-04. The Supreme Court determined that a motion in the nature
of coram nobis could be sought in a criminal case based on the all-
writs language in 28 U.S.C § 1651. Jd. at 505-11. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), then and now, provides that the federal courts ‘‘may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective ju-
risdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
Without any analysis as to how the writ of coram nobis was nec-
essary and appropriate to the jurisdiction of the courts, the Morgan
majority appeared to indicate that its usage was agreeable based on
the writ’s common-law history and its use in the various states and
circuits. Jd. at 507-10. While the Court acknowledged that at
common law the writ was limited to errors of fact, the Court ob-
served that the writ had been used more broadly in various states
and lower courts. Jd. at 507-08. The Court explained that, to
achieve justice, a motion in the nature of coram nobis would be

na po

available to correct errors of the most fundamental character under
circumstances where no other remedy was available and sound rea-
sons existed for failure to seek relief earlier. Id. at 511-12. Ina
breathtaking expansion of the common-law writ, the Morgan Court
indicated that a motion in the nature of coram nobis was of the
same general character as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255—
meaning it would be available to correct violations of the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States. Id. at 505 n.4. This expanded
version of coram nobis is followed today in the federal courts for
persons challenging a federal conviction.’ See, e.g., Chaidez v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013); United States v. Denedo,
556 U.S. 904 (2009); United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249 (Ist
Cir. 2012); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir.
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356;
Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1989).

Unlike the uniform recognition of coram nobis in the federal
courts, coram nobis is a rarer creature in state courts. Only
12 states recognize coram nobis, and a slim majority of those
states follow the common-law definition and limit the writ to
claims of factual error.> The writ of coram nobis is not available in
a majority of states because those states have enacted uniform
post-conviction acts that provide a streamlined, single remedy for

4A federal petition for a writ of coram nobis cannot be filed by a person
seeking to challenge a state conviction because it is a writ used by a court to
correct its own errors, not errors of another jurisdiction. See Finkelstein v.
Spitzer, 455 F.3d 131, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2006); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d
716, T18 (3d Cir. 2003).

SSeven states strictly follow the common-law definition of the writ. People
y, Shipman, 397 P.2d 993, 995 (Cal. 1965); State v. Grisgraber, 439 A.2d
377, 378-79 (Conn. 1981); State v. Diaz, 808 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Neb.
2012); Gregory v. Class, 584 N.W.2d 873, 877 (S.D. 1998); State v. Sinclair,
49 A.3d 152, 154-57 (Vt. 2012); Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d
514, 516-17 (Va. 2007); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-677 (2007) (coram vobis);
Jessen v. State, 290 N.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Wis. 1980).

The remaining five jurisdictions that recognize the writ fall somewhere on
the continuum between the common-law approach and the federal approach.
Skok v. State, 760 A.2d 647, 654-60 (Md. 2000) (following federal approach);
Mad. Rules § 15-1201-07 (West 2013); Smith v. United States, 20 A.3d 759,
763 (D.C. 2011) (following federal approach); Grant v. State, 365 S.W.3d
894, 896 (Ark. 2010) (allowing for four types of claims to be raised: “‘insan-
ity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the
prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime during the time between
conviction and appeal’’); People v. Bachert, 509 N.E.2d 318, 319 (N.Y.
1987) (permitting coram nobis for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel); Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-26-105 (2012) (allowing newly-discovered-
evidence claims to be raised in coram nobis). In West Virginia, the issue of
coram nobis is still an open question, but if recognized, West Virginia appears
to follow the common-law approach. State ex rel. McCabe v. Seifert, 640
S.E.2d 142, 147 n.9 (W. Va. 2006).

es m3

obtaining relief from a judgment of conviction, and that remedy is
available to petitioners who are no longer in custody.®

Nevada has addressed coram nobis only once in any significant
fashion in its criminal jurisprudence—Bigness y. State, 71 Nev.
309, 289 P.2d 1051 (1955).7 In Bigness, a recidivist criminal filed
a petition for a writ of coram nobis to challenge a 16-year-old
Nevada conviction, which was being used to enhance a sentence in
New York, on the ground that he had been deprived of the right to
counsel. Id. at 310-11, 289 P.2d at 1051-52. In affirming the de-
nial of the petition, this court observed that Nevada statutes did not
provide for coram nobis, and that even if such a writ were recog-
nized, the petition under consideration admittedly exceeded the
scope of the common-law writ by raising a claim of error that was
on the record and was an error of law, not fact. Id. at 311, 289
P.2d at 1052. The Bigness court rejected the argument that the writ
must be recognized in order to provide a corrective judicial rem-
edy because another such remedy (habeas corpus) was available
during the petitioner’s period of confinement on the Nevada con-
viction, and its present unavailability was due to his inattention to
his rights. Jd. at 312, 289 P.2d at 1052.

The writ is available in Nevada for persons who are not in custody
on the conviction being challenged

While the Bigness court correctly observed that no specific
Nevada statute addresses the writ of coram nobis, the Bigness de-
cision ignored two important sources of authority that may sanction

See, ¢.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.1; Alaska Stat. § 12.72.010 (2012); Atiz.
R. Crim. P. 32.1; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-410 (2012); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850;
Haw. R. Penal P. 40(a)(1); Idaho Code Ann, § 19-4901 (Supp. 2013); Ind. R.
Post-Conviction P. 1; Iowa Code § 822.2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2124 (2003 & Supp. 2012); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30; Mich.
Ct. R. 6.502(C)3); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.01 (West 2010); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-5 (2007 & Supp. 2012); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-101 (2011); N.J.
R. Crim. P. 3.22-1 (2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 154-1411 (2009); N.D. Cent.
Code § 29-32.1-01 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann, § 2953.21 (LexisNexis
2006); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1080 (West 2003); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138,510
(2011); R.L. Gen, Laws § 10-9.1-1 (2012); $.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20
(2003); Utah Code Ann, §§ 78B-9-102, -104 (LexisNexis 2012); Wash. R.
App. P, 16.4(b).

"The only other reference to coram nobis in a Nevada criminal case oc-
curred in Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. 298, 429 P.2d 549 (1967). In Peters, the
court briefly noted that coram nobis was available at common law to correct
a mistake of fact discovered after the judgment and that some states allowed re-
lief in the nature of coram nobis even after the writ had been abolished. Id. at
301, 429 P.2d at 551. The writ of coram nobis was not used in Peters or rec-
ognized as a currently available remedy.

The writ of coram nobis was abolished in 2005 in civil cases by NRCP
60(b). See NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 650 n.1, 218 P.3d 853,
856 n.1 (2009).

na Po

use of the writ of coram nobis in Nevada: NRS 1.030, which rec-
ognizes the applicability of the common law, and the all-writs lan-
guage in Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution.

NRS 1.030 provides that the ‘‘common law of England, so far
as it is not repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, or the Constitution and laws of this State,
shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this State.’ Thus,
to apply the common law, two requirements must be satisfied
under NRS 1.030: (1) that coram nobis be a common-law writ,
and (2) that coram nobis not be repugnant to or in conflict with the
Constitution and laws, both federal and state. The first requirement
is rather easily met: coram nobis certainly was a common-law writ
even though it became obsolete in England. The second require-
ment is more complicated and requires an examination of the
United States and Nevada Constitutions and post-conviction laws of
the United States and Nevada.

Nothing in the federal system prohibits the recognition of coram
nobis in Nevada. The United States Constitution makes no mention
of coram nobis and does not present any obstacle to recognizing
coram nobis in Nevada. Nothing in federal Jaw prevents a state
from recognizing the writ of coram nobis in state proceedings. In
fact, as discussed previously, when it comes to challenges to a fed-
eral conviction, coram nobis has been recognized under the all-
writs language of 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides federal courts
with the power to “‘issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.”’ Thus, neither the United States Constitution nor
federal laws restrict us from recognizing coram nobis.

a

Turning to Nevada law, whether the writ of coram nobis is re-
pugnant to or in conflict with the Nevada Constitution actually
leads to the second source of authority for recognizing the writ:
Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 6. Article 6, Section 6 of
the Nevada Constitution contains Nevada’s version of an all-writs
clause:

The District Courts . . . have power to issue writs of Man-
damus, Prohibition, Injunction, Quo-Warranto, Certiorari,
and all other writs proper and necessary to the complete ex-
ercise of their jurisdiction.

The writ of coram nobis is constitutionally authorized, and there-
fore not repugnant to or in conflict with the constitution, if the writ
is proper and necessary to the complete exercise of the jurisdiction
of the district courts. When posed a similar question regarding
coram nobis and the federal all-writs language set forth in 28

ee 713

U.S.C. § 1651, the United States Supreme Court determined that
coram nobis was authorized by § 1651 for a person who was not
in custody on the conviction being challenged because at common
law coram nobis was a step in the criminal case. United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954). We reach a similar con-
clusion. In Nevada, original jurisdiction over a criminal case, ex-
cept as provided by law, is vested in the district courts. Nev.
Const. art. 6, § 6; NRS 171.010; Walker v. State, 78 Nev. 463,
472, 376 P.2d 137, 141 (1962). And we have previously recog-
nized that the district courts have continuing jurisdiction to correct
certain types of errors. See Warden v. Peters, 83 Nev. 298, 301,
429 P.2d 549, 551 (1967). We conclude that an important compo-
nent of the district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case is to
correct mistakes of fact that would have prevented a conviction and
for which there is or was no other available legal remedy. This is
so even after the defendant has completed serving the sentence im-
posed and is no longer in custody on the conviction being chal-
lenged. Thus, coram nobis is not repugnant to or in conflict with
the Nevada Constitution.

Lee

Whether the writ of coram nobis would be in conflict with
Nevada law is a more complicated question. The State argues that
the writ of coram nobis was abolished by the exclusive-remedy lan-
guage set forth in NRS 34.724(2)(b), and thus, the writ would be
in conflict with that Nevada statute. The issue, however, is not that
clear-cut. NRS 34.724(2)(b) provides that a post-conviction peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus ‘‘[c]omprehends and takes the
place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which
have been available for challenging the validity of the conviction or
sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them.’’ But un-
like the majority of other states that have similar provisions in their
post-conviction relief statutes and therefore have refused to recog-
nize the writ of coram nobis, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text, the exclusive remedy adopted in NRS 34.724(2)(b) is not
available to all persons who have sustained a conviction in Nevada.
A prerequisite to the constitutional authority to grant habeas relief
is the custodial status of the petitioner: the petitioner must be in
actual custody or have suffered a criminal conviction and not
completed the sentence imposed pursuant to the judgment of con-
viction. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1). A post-conviction petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is further limited to a person who is

§Section 1651 provides that the federal courts ‘‘may issue all writs neces-
sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law’”

16 po

“under sentence of death or imprisonment.’ NRS 34.724(1).
These two provisions thus require a habeas petitioner to be under
a sentence of imprisonment for the conviction he challenges at
the time the petition is filed. Jackson v. State, 115 Nev. 21, 23,
973 P.2d 241, 242 (1999). For a person who is not in custody,
Nevada’s post-conviction habeas corpus scheme does not apply and
would not preclude a writ of coram nobis.? Conversely, if a person
is in custody on the conviction being challenged, a writ of coram
nobis is not available and habeas corpus must be sought as the ex-
clusive remedy to challenge the conviction.'° This distinction be-
tween persons who are under sentence of imprisonment and those
who are not for purposes of the writ of coram nobis does not vio-
late any constitutional or legal rights as the writ of coram nobis is
not proper and necessary to the jurisdiction of the district courts
where another legal remedy, a post-conviction petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, is available to challenge the conviction.

|

Thus, we hold that Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitu-
tion and NRS 1.030 authorize the common-law writ of coram
nobis for a person who is not in custody on the conviction being
challenged. To the extent that our decision in Bigness suggested
that the common-law writ did not exist in Nevada, we overrule that
decision.

The writ of coram nobis is limited in scope

‘We turn then to the scope of the writ. As stated earlier, juris-
dictions recognizing the writ have adopted different approaches to
its scope. Two approaches may be said to be in the majority—the
common-law approach and the federal approach adopted in Mor-
gan. Given the sources of authority for recognizing the writ in
Nevada, as discussed above, we conclude that the writ in Nevada
has the same scope as the common-law writ. We decline to follow
the Morgan Court and expand the writ beyond its common-law
scope because we can find no authority, and none is offered by the
parties, that would allow this court to create a new substantive

°We recognize that the writ of coram nobis has been abolished in civil cases
under NRCP 60. However, we conclude that NRCP 60 would not preclude the
writ of coram nobis in a criminal case. When faced with a similar suggestion,
the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that language in FRCP
60 abolishing coram nobis in civil cases also ended the writ in criminal cases
because the writ of coram nobis served as a step in a criminal case. Morgan,
346 U.S. at 505 n.4. We agree and conclude that NRCP 60 does not preclude
use of the writ in criminal cases,

"There are limited exceptions that are not relevant here. See generally
NRS 34.724(2)(a) (providing that habeas corpus is ‘‘not a substitute for and
does not affect any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial
court or the remedy of direct review of the sentence or conviction’’).

Po n7

remedy out of whole cloth, appending only the name of coram
nobis to this new creation. Such a remedy as created by the Mor-
gan Court could only be created by our Legislature, and we leave
it in its hands to fashion. At common law, the writ of coram nobis
existed to correct errors of fact, and to the extent that it exists in
Nevada, it exists as a common-law writ.

Consistent with the common law, the writ of coram nobis may
be used to address errors of fact outside the record that affect the
validity and regularity of the decision itself and would have pre-
cluded the judgment from being rendered. At common law, many
of these errors of fact involved personal jurisdiction—errors re-
garding the status of the party which would prevent a judgment
from being entered against the party. The common-law examples of
coverture and infancy have been eliminated through the evolution of
legal principles relating to women and children, but the compe-
tency of the defendant at the time of the plea or trial is an exam-
ple that still has relevance today. See NRS 178.405(1) (requiring
the suspension of proceedings when a doubt rises as to the com-
petence of the defendant). Although we do not attempt to precisely
define the realm of factual errors that may give rise to a writ of
coram nobis, that realm is limited to errors involving facts that
were not known to the court, were not withheld by the defendant,
and would have prevented entry of the judgment. For example, a
factual error does not include claims of newly discovered evidence
because these types of claims would not have precluded the judg-
ment from being entered in the first place. See Hyung Joon Kim,
202 P.3d at 453; Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 506
(Va.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 825 (2011). And legal errors fall en-
tirely outside the scope of the writ. See, e.g., Hyung Joon Kim,
202 P.3d at 446; State v. Diaz, 808 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Neb. 2012).
A writ of coram nobis is the forum to correct only the most egre-
gious factual errors that would have precluded entry of the judg-
ment of conviction had the error been known to the court at the
time.

be

A writ of coram nobis is not, however, the forum to relitigate
the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. We have long emphasized
the importance of the finality of judgments, and we are gravely
concerned that recognizing this writ, even in the very limited form
that we do today, will result in a proliferation of stale challenges to
convictions long since final. See Jackson v. State, 115 Nev. 21, 23
n.2, 973 P.2d 241, 242 n.2 (1999); Groesbeck v. Warden, 100
Nev. 259, 261, 679 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1984). Given these concerns,
we hold that any error that was reasonably available to be raised
while the petitioner was in custody is waived, and it is the peti-

ng Po

tioner’s burden on the face of his petition to demonstrate that he
could not have reasonably raised his claims during the time he was
in custody.

Le

Having recognized that a writ of coram nobis may be filed in
district court by a person who is no longer in custody to challenge
a judgment of conviction based on errors of fact, we necessarily
must determine whether the district court’s order resolving such a
petition is appealable.'' Generally, this court has appellate juris-
diction only where a statute or court rule provides for an appeal.
Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990).
As the State points out, there is no specific statute or court rule ap-
plicable to criminal cases that authorizes an appeal from an order
resolving a petition for a writ of coram nobis. However, NRAP
3A(b)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken from a final judg-
ment in a civil action. Coram nobis, much like habeas corpus, can-
not be strictly characterized as civil or criminal for all purposes.
See Hill v. Warden, 96 Nev. 38, 40, 604 P.2d 807, 808 (1980).
Thus, although the writ is a step in the criminal process, for pur-
poses of determining the appealability of an order resolving a pe-
tition for a writ of coram nobis, we are guided by the approach in
the federal courts to classify the writ proceeding as a civil action.
FRAP 4(a)(1)(C), since 2002, provides that coram nobis is ap-
pealable as a civil judgment. Even before that provision was added
to FRAP 4(a)(1), federal courts had determined that the writ
should be treated as civil for appeal purposes. See, e.g., United
States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1193-94 (5th Cir. 1989), overruled on
other grounds by Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992); United
States v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 751, 754 (6th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 655-57 (7th Cir. 1990), amended at
919 R2d 57. Thus, we conclude that the writ of coram nobis
should be treated as a civil writ for appeal purposes and a final
judgment resolving a petition for a writ of coram nobis therefore
is appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(1).

Application to Trujillo

Having decided that a petition for a writ of coram nobis exists
in limited circumstances, we must determine whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying the petition. See Hyung
Joon Kim, 202 P.3d at 448 (recognizing that “‘a lower court’s rul-
ing on a petition for the writ is reviewed under the abuse of dis-

"At common law, the writ was filed in the court alleged to have made the
error of fact preventing entry of the judgment of conviction. This necessarily
means that the writ of coram nobis is not available in an original proceeding
in this court.

es n9

cretion standard’’); Jessen, 290 N.W.2d at 688 (recognizing that
coram nobis is ‘‘a discretionary writ’’). Consistent with our deci-
sion today, the remedy of coram nobis was available to Trujillo be-
cause he was no longer in custody on the judgment being chal-
Jenged when he filed his petition. We turn then to the merits of the
petition.

In his petition, Trujillo claimed that he received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to inform him
about the immigration consequences of his conviction. This claim
fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a petition for a writ
of coram nobis. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in-
volves legal error. See Hyung Joon Kim, 202 P.3d at 454; Diaz,
808 N.W.2d at 896; Morris, 705 S.E.2d at 507-08. While there is
undeniably a factual underpinning to a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, the ultimate issue is the legal question of whether
the representation was constitutionally adequate: whether the per-
formance of counsel fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness and whether there was resulting prejudice such that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the out-
come of the proceedings would have been different. See Strickland
vy. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons,
100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test
in Strickland). Because Trujillo’s claim was not properly raised in
a petition for a writ of coram nobis, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition. See
Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (hold-
ing that a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is
based on the wrong reason).

CONCLUSION

In discussing the writ of coram nobis, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals has indicated that the writ should be ‘‘hen’s-teeth rare.”
United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 2012). We
echo that sentiment. Coram nobis, where recognized, is an extra-
ordinary remedy; one necessary only to achieve justice. The
common-law writ of coram nobis is available in Nevada only for
petitioners who are no longer in custody on the judgment being
challenged and only to address errors of fact outside the record that
were not known to the court entering the judgment, could not have
been raised earlier, and affect the validity and regularity of the de-
cision itself in that they would have precluded the judgment from
being rendered.

Grppons and Sarria, JJ., concur.

ee

720

DAVID ROY STILWELL, Apreiiant, v. CITY OF NORTH
LAS VEGAS anp CITY OF BOULDER CITY, RESPONDENTS.

No. 59735,

DAVID ROY STILWELL, Appetyant, v. CITY OF BOULDER
CITY anp CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, RESPONDENTS.

No. 59736

October 31, 2013 311 P.3d 1177

Gallian, Welker & Beckstrom, LC, and Travis N. Barrick, Las
Vegas, for Appellant.

David R. Olsen, City Attorney, Boulder City; Marquis Aurbach
Coffing and Craig R. Anderson and Micah S. Echols, Las Vegas,
for Respondent City of Boulder City.

Sandra Douglass Morgan, Acting City Attorney, and Sharon
Y. Dockter, Deputy City Attorney, North Las Vegas; Marquis
Aurbach Coffing and Craig R. Anderson and Micah S. Echols, Las
Vegas, for Respondent City of North Las Vegas.

Before the Court EN BANC.

721

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

Appellant David Stilwell was twice ticketed and twice convicted
in nonrecord municipal courts of riding a motorcycle without wear-
ing proper headgear in violation of NRS 486.231, a misdemeanor.
He appealed his convictions to the district court for trial anew as
provided by NRS 5.073(1) and NRS 266.595. Rather than try the
charges de novo in district court, the prosecution dismissed them
with prejudice. It also refunded the fines and costs Stilwell had
paid to exonerate bail and appeal his convictions. Thereafter, the
district court issued remittiturs, returning the cases to their mu-
nicipal courts of origin.

Stilwell moved the district court for his attorney fees and court
costs, citing NRS 176.115,? which reads in full as follows:

1. Inall cases of criminal prosecution where the defendant
is not found guilty, the court may require the complainant, if
it appears that the prosecution was malicious or without prob-
able cause, to pay the costs of the action, or to give security
to pay the same within 30 days.

2. If the complainant does not comply with the order of
the court, judgment may be entered against the complainant
for the amount thereof.

3. Such judgments may be enforced and appealed from in
the same manner as those rendered in civil actions.

Stilwell argued that Nevada’s helmet law is unconstitutionally in-
determinate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without
probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney
fees as ‘“‘costs of the action’? under NRS 176.115. The district
court disagreed. In its view, the municipal court convictions pro-
vided prima facie evidence of probable cause, see Chapman v. City
of Reno, 85 Nev. 365, 369, 455 P.2d 618, 620 (1969), and malice
was not independently claimed. Because the district court denied
Stilwell’s motion for fees on this basis, it did not answer the statu-
tory construction questions of whether NRS 176.115° authorizes

"We originally dismissed these appeals in an unpublished order. Respondents
moved to publish the order as an opinion, and appellant joined the motion. We
grant the motion and publish this opinion in place of our earlier order. See
NRAP 36(.

2He simultaneously brought suit in federal court. The federal cases are not
relevant to this appeal.

2Acknowledging Stilwell’s request for an evidentiary hearing on entitlement
to fees, the district court invited him to make an offer of proof. Stilwell’s offer
of proof focused on the prosecution’s dismissals following appeal, not on the
specifics of the charged offenses themselves.

ma Po

attorney fees to be awarded as a subset of ‘‘costs of the action,’ or
who the “‘complainant’’ is. The district court also rejected Stil-
well’s argument that dismissing the charges after they were ap-
pealed itself evidenced malice and lack of probable cause. From
these orders, Stilwell appeals.

Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution states that dis-
trict courts ‘‘have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising
in. . . inferior tribunals as may be established by law.’ This court
has repeatedly held that ‘‘[d]istrict courts have final appellate ju-
risdiction in cases arising in municipal courts,’ such that a mu-
nicipal court conviction, once appealed to and decided by the dis-
trict court, “‘is not subject to further review by appeal to this
court.” Tripp v. City of Sparks, 92 Nev. 362, 363, 550 P.2d 419,
419 (1976); see Waugh v. Casazza, 85 Nev. 520, 521, 458 P.2d
359, 359-60 (1969) (noting appeal to Supreme Court from district
court’s review of justice court decision is improper, though there
may be an exception if such an appeal is provided for by statute).
This rule applies even when the district court reverses the munic-
ipal court, meaning its decision escapes direct appellate review.
Compare City of Las Vegas v. Carver, 92 Nev. 198, 198, 547 P.2d
688, 688 (1976) (rejecting appeal by city from district court judg-
ment reversing municipal court conviction and holding, ‘‘[w]e
have no jurisdiction for appellate review of a district court judg-
ment, which has been entered on an appeal from a municipal
court”’), with Tripp, 92 Nev. at 363, 550 P.2d at 419 (holding this
court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal by defendant whose munic-
ipal court conviction was upheld by the district court).

Nevada’s Constitution and these cases are directly controlling
here. Stilwell’s cases originated in the municipal courts and were
heard by the district court on appeal. The district court’s appellate
jurisdiction is final, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to
hear them.

Stilwell argues that the above cases do not apply because in
each, the inferior court and then the district court decided the issue
on the merits, whereas here the municipal courts convicted Stilwell
and so did not entertain his fee requests. But this is a distinction
without a difference. If Stilwell had established that his ticketing
and prosecution lacked probable cause and were malicious, NRS
176.115 would have been equally available to him in municipal as
district court. While the prosecution’s dismissal of the charges in
district court may have strengthened Stilwell’s claim to fees and
costs, it did not change his fundamental position that the charges
lacked probable cause and were malicious—claims he asserted
both in municipal and in district courts. Exercising its appellate ju-
risdiction, the district court rejected these claims based on the mu-

ee 723

nicipal court convictions and Stilwell’s offer of proof. Here, as in
Carver, “‘[w]e have no jurisdiction for appellate review of a district
court judgment, which has been entered on an appeal from a mu-
nicipal court,’ and, as for Stilwell’s constitutional claims, his
“remedy, if any, would have been to timely petition for certiorari,
under NRS 34.020(3).”” 92 Nev. at 198-99, 547 P.2d at 688.

As a fallback, Stilwell argues that NRS 176.115(3) licenses this
appeal. But this argument is clearly wrong. Subsection 1 of NRS
176.115 authorizes an order directing ‘‘the complainant’’ to pay
the ‘‘costs of the action . . . within 30 days’’ if the defendant is
“not found guilty’’ and it appears ‘‘the prosecution was malicious
or without probable cause’’; subsection 2 provides that, if ‘‘the
complainant’’ does not timely comply with the order, ‘‘judgment
may be entered against the complainant for the amount thereof”’;
and subsection 3 provides that ‘‘[s]uch judgments may be enforced
and appealed from in the same manner as those rendered in civil
actions.” (Emphasis added.) ‘‘Such judgment ]’’ in subsection 3
refers back to its antecedent in subsection 2—the judgment sub-
section 2 says can be entered against a complainant who flouts an
order entered pursuant to subsection 1 to pay the ‘‘costs of the ac-
tion’’ within 30 days. As written, NRS 176.115 does not create an.
additional right of appeal in favor of a defendant who unsuccess-
fully seeks costs and has already been afforded a right of appeal.
See Blackburn v. State, 129 Nev. 92, 95, 294 P.3d 422, 425
(2013) (in interpreting a statute, “‘[o]ur analysis begins and ends
with the statutory text if it is clear and unambiguous’).

This court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Accord-
ingly, these consolidated appeals are dismissed.

GiBBons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and

Sarrra, JJ., concur.

LALAINE V. BLANCO, APPELLANT, v.
MARIO L. BLANCO, RESPONDENT.

No. 60153
October 31, 2013 311 P.3d 1170

3

George R. Carter, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Carol A. Menninger, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Amber Robinson, Las Vegas; Kristine Brewer, Las Vegas;
Silverman, Decaria & Kattelman, Chtd., and Michael V.
Kattelman, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Family Law Section of the
State Bar of Nevada.

Ii

Before the Court EN BANc.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

In this divorce case, the wife was representing herself and failed
to comply with several of the husband’s discovery requests. As a
consequence, the district court entered a default divorce decree
against her as a sanction. We must decide the propriety of such
case-concluding discovery sanctions in divorce proceedings, par-
ticularly in those cases involving child custody. We hold that it is
not permissible to resolve child custody and child support claims
by default as a sanction for discovery violations because the child’s
best interest is paramount and compels a decision on the merits.

As for the division of community property and debt, we con-
clude that the court must make an equal disposition as required by
statute. Regarding all other claims, the court may enter a default,
but only after a thorough evaluation and express findings of
whether less severe sanctions are appropriate. Here, because the
district court did not make any express findings as to appropriate-

pd RI

ness of less severe sanctions before entering the default, we reverse
the default divorce decree and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mario and Lalaine Blanco were married in 1989, and they have
four children. Lalaine filed a complaint for divorce, and Mario
filed an answer and counterclaim. By their pleadings, the parties
requested resolution of child custody and support, spousal support,
property division, and attorney fees. Lalaine sought primary phys-
ical custody and $600 in monthly child support, while Mario re-
quested joint physical custody and $2,552 in monthly child sup-
port. Lalaine’s complaint requested that neither party pay spousal
support, whereas Mario sought $1,000 in monthly spousal support
for ten and one-half years. Both parties sought the division of the
parties’ community property, an award of attorney fees, and the
permission to claim the children as exemptions on their respective
income tax returns. Mario also asked that Lalaine maintain health
insurance for the children and for him until he could obtain his
own coverage.

Child custody was, for the most part, resolved through media-
tion. The parties entered into a stipulation and order for custody on
June 3, 2011 (June custody order). Under that order, the parties
agreed to joint legal custody of their two children, who were still
minors at that time. As to physical custody, Mario was to have vis-
itation at least three days each week, with those three days being
spent in a row every other weekend from Friday afternoon until
Monday. That order referred the parties back to mediation to re-
solve the holiday visitation schedule. Without any agreement as to
the holiday visitation, it is questionable whether the June custody
order resolved all custody issues with finality.

Aside from child custody, the remaining matters were not re-
solved with any finality before trial. The court ordered Lalaine to
pay temporary child support to Mario of $1,127 per month.
Lalaine, who worked as a nurse, historically earned significantly
more income than Mario, but had reduced her work days from five
to two days per week, claiming that she suffered an injury that
made it difficult to work. Mario sought to prove that Lalaine was
willfully underemployed, which was the subject of Mario’s unan-
swered discovery requests that ultimately led to the sanctions.
Spousal support, property division, and attorney fees also re-
mained unresolved before trial.

Discovery violations leading up to the default divorce decree

Shortly before trial was to commence, Lalaine’s attorney with-
drew from representation on the basis that Lalaine was uncooper-
ative. Lalaine proceeded to represent herself. When Lalaine failed

728 Ce

to respond to Mario’s discovery requests, Mario filed a motion to
compel her responses to his second set of interrogatories and sec-
ond request for production of documents, and for attorney fees.
Mario sought discovery related to Lalaine’s personal injury, her
claim for lost wages, and her payments on the marital residence.
Lalaine did not appear at the hearing before the discovery com-
missioner, and the commissioner recommended that Lalaine be or-
dered to comply with the discovery requests and pay $1,500 in at-
torney fees. No objection was filed and that recommendation
became a court order.

Mario moved to continue the trial, and at a hearing on that mo-
tion, the district court addressed the issue of Lalaine’s compliance
with Mario’s discovery requests. Although Lalaine was present at
the hearing, she was often unresponsive and uncooperative, and the
court’s marshal had to verbally intervene on multiple occasions to
produce a response to the judge’s questions. Lalaine asserted that
the discovery requests were given to her former attorney and that
she had not seen them until a few days before the hearing. The dis-
trict court continued the trial, allowed Lalaine two weeks to re-
spond to Mario’s discovery requests, and strongly suggested that
Lalaine retain new counsel. Lalaine was specifically advised that if
Mario did not receive the responses by the two-week deadline, then
Mario’s attorney was to submit an order to the court striking
Lalaine’s pleadings and granting the relief requested in Mario’s
counterclaim by default. The court also awarded attorney fees to
Mario but deferred until trial a determination as to the amount.

At the following calendar call, Lalaine was present and ex-
plained to the court the extent of her compliance with discovery.
The court determined that, while Lalaine had provided some in-
formation to Mario by the deadline, the responses were not full
and complete. Concluding that discovery sanctions were warranted,
the court ordered that Lalaine’s pleading be stricken from the
record and that a case-resolving default be entered that was con-
sistent with prior orders and Mario’s counterclaim.

The district court clerk proceeded to enter a default, and Mario
requested a summary disposition. Without conducting any prove-up
or evidentiary hearing, the district court entered the default divorce
decree. Under that decree, the court awarded the parties joint
Jegal and joint physical custody of the children in accord with the
June custody order, but included a holiday visitation schedule vir-
tually identical to the one set forth in Mario’s counterclaim. The
court ordered the temporary child support to stand and granted
Mario’s request that Lalaine provide health insurance for him and
the children. Mario also received his requested $1,000 in monthly
spousal support for ten and one-half years, as well as permission
to claim both children as tax exemptions every year.

pd 79

Turning to the division of the parties’ community assets and li-
abilities, Lalaine was awarded the marital residence, which appar-
ently had no equity, and the associated debt that was not specified
or offset. Each party received a car and a one-half interest in
Lalaine’s retirement and bank accounts, although the values were
not identified. Lalaine was ordered to assume the entire credit card
debt, and to pay the $21,729.25 of attorney fees requested by
Mario. Lalaine now appeals from the default divorce decree.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, we must decide whether a default judgment as a dis-
covery sanction in a divorce proceeding is appropriate. Lalaine
contends that the case-concluding sanction was unduly harsh.
She asserts that the district court should have considered a less
severe sanction, or at least conducted a prove-up hearing to take
evidence on matters such as spousal support and the monetary
value of the parties’ property, and provided findings of fact to sup-
port the decision. In response, Mario argues that some of the
claims had already been resolved by agreement or otherwise, and
to the extent that they had not, Lalaine’s remedy was to file a mo-
tion to modify.

In Nevada, NRCP 37(b)(2)(C) provides the district court with
authority to impose case-concluding sanctions for noncompliance
with its orders. Under that rule, if a party fails to obey a court
order, the court may strike pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter
a default. Id. In addition to this rule-based authority, the court has
the inherent equitable power to enter defaults and dismiss actions
for abusive litigation practices. Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg.,
Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 777, 779 (1990). While the dis-
trict court enjoys broad discretion in imposing discovery sanc-
tions, when the sanction imposed is dismissal with prejudice, a
heightened standard of review applies. Id. Procedural due process
considerations require that such case-concluding discovery sanc-
tions be just and that they relate to the claims at issue in the vio-
lated discovery order. Young, 106 Nev. at 92, 787 P.2d at 779-80;
see also Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048
(2010).

Lee

Moreover, the sanction must ‘‘be supported by an express, care-
ful and preferably written explanation of the court’s analysis’’ of
certain pertinent factors that guide the district court in determining
appropriate sanctions. Young, 106 Nev. at 93, 787 P.2d at 780.
These nonexhaustive factors may include the extent of the offend-
ing party’s willfulness, whether the nonoffending party would be

730 Ee

prejudiced by the imposition of a lesser sanction, whether dis-
missal is too severe for the particular discovery abuse, the feasi-
bility and fairness of less severe sanctions, the policy favoring ad-
judication of cases on their merits, and the need for deterring
similar abusive conduct. Jd. Dismissal or default should only be
used in the most extreme cases. See Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill.,
108 Nev. 638, 645, 837 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1992).

When the district court enters a default as a discovery sanction,
the nonoffending party still has an obligation to present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case, and the court may conduct
a prove-up hearing to determine, among other things, the amount
of damages to be awarded for each claim. Foster, 126 Nev. at 66-
67, 227 P.3d at 1049-50; see also Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev.
863, 867, 963 P.2d 457, 459 (1998). Although the typical divorce
case does not involve a claim for damages, an evidentiary hearing
may be necessary to take factual evidence and decide the issues in
accordance with the relevant law.

| |

Divorce proceedings encompass numerous issues including child
custody, child support, spousal support, property division, and at-
torney fees, with each being governed by a different legal standard.
Consequently, the appropriateness of a case-concluding sanction
depends on the particular claim involved.

Child custody and child support

With regard to child custody and child support, we determine
that a case-concluding discovery sanction is simply not permissi-
ble. These child custody matters must be decided on their merits.
It is well established that when deciding child custody, the sole
consideration of the court is the child’s best interest. NRS
125.480; Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1148, 865 P.2d 328, 330
(1993). Child support awards are guided by certain formulas as ap-
plied to the parties’ income. See NRS 125B.070 (setting forth a
child support formula as applied in primary physical custody
cases); Wright v. Osburn, 114 Nev. 1367, 1368-69, 970 P.2d 1071,
1072 (1998) (calculating child support in joint physical custody
cases based on the parties’ gross incomes).

In other contexts, we have held that a court may not use a
change of custody as a sword to punish parental misconduct, such
as refusal to obey lawful court orders, because the child’s best in-
terest is paramount in such custody decisions. See Sims, 109 Nev.
at 1149, 865 P.2d at 330; see also Dagher v. Dagher, 103 Nev. 26,

pT

ee 731

28, 731 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1987). Moreover, child custody deci-
sions implicate due process rights because parents have a funda-
mental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also
Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100, 105, 787 P.2d 785, 788 (1990) (stat-
ing that the policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is
heightened in domestic relations matters), disagreed with on other
grounds by NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 651 n.3, 218
P.3d 853, 857 n.3 (2009). Other courts have similarly held that be-
fore rendering a default judgment on child custody and support is-
sues as a discovery sanction, the lower court must conduct an ev-
identiary hearing or consider other evidence in the record as to the
child’s best interest. See Fenton v. Webb, 705 N.W.2d 323, 327
owa Ct. App. 2005); Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 652 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997).

Of course, the district court may still consider alternative sanc-
tions, such as contempt, monetary sanctions, and attorney fees, to
punish noncompliance with discovery or disobedience of court or-
ders. See Sims, 109 Nev. at 1149, 865 P.2d at 330; Dagher, 103
Ney. at 28 n.3, 731 P.2d at 1330 n.3; Rolley v. Sanford, 727 A.2d
444, 448 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (suggesting civil contempt as
an alternative sanction to dismissal for a discovery violation in a
child support matter). But given the statutory and constitutional di-
rectives that govern child custody and support determinations, res-
olution of these matters on a default basis without addressing the
child’s best interest and other relevant considerations is improper.

Property division, spousal support, and attorney fees

Aside from child custody and support, we determine that case-
concluding discovery sanctions are permissible on other claims, but
that any such sanction must comply with the procedural due
process requirements of Young and Foster. The court must deter-
mine whether a case-concluding sanction is warranted or whether
the imposition of a less-severe sanction would suffice. Young, 106
Nev. at 92-93, 787 P.2d at 779-80; Foster, 126 Nev. at 67, 227
P.3d at 1048-49. The sanction must relate to the claims at issue in
the violated discovery order and must be supported by an expla-
nation of the pertinent factors guiding such determination. Young,
106 Nev. at 92-93, 787 P.2d at 779-80; Foster, 126 Nev. at 67, 227
P.3d at 1048-49.

P|

With property division in particular, however, we conclude that
community property and debt must be divided in accordance with
the law. NRS 125.150(1)(b) requires the court to make an equal

732 Po

disposition of property upon divorce, unless the court finds a com-
pelling reason for an unequal disposition and sets forth that reason
in writing. The equal disposition of community property may not
be dispensed with through default. Even jurisdictions that have per-
mitted the entry of a default divorce decree as a discovery sanction
require the district court to make independent findings on the di-
vision of property in accordance with the applicable law. In
Dethloff v. Dethloff, 574 N.W.2d 867, 872 (N.D. 1998), the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that a default judgment against the
husband was an appropriate sanction in a divorce proceeding,
however, the lower court could not simply accept the wife’s pro-
posed property division, but was required to make independent
findings as to the value of the marital estate and give some expla-
nation as to why the division was equitable under the law. Like-
wise, in Draggoo v. Draggoo, 566 N.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the husband
could be denied participation in the adjudication of the property di-
vision as a sanction for his discovery abuses when the trial court
nonetheless entered findings on the value of the marital property
and made an equitable division in accordance with the law. We find
these authorities persuasive.

Before making the factual determinations to support the dispo-
sition of property, it may be necessary for the court to hold an ev-
identiary hearing. At such a hearing, the district court has broad
discretion to limit the offending party’s presentation of evidence in
line with the discovery violation. See Foster, 126 Nev. at 67-68,
227 P.3d at 1050; see also Draggoo, 566 N.W.2d at 648-49. Al-
lowing evidence that the offending party refused to produce during
discovery, for instance, has been recognized to be inequitable. See
Hamlett, 114 Nev. at 867, 963 P.2d at 459.

| reel

Finally, as for spousal support and attorney fees, we conclude
that no prove-up hearing is required and the court may render a de-
cision without it.! The decision whether to grant spousal support
and attorney fees is, by statute, purely discretionary with the dis-
trict court. See NRS 125.150(1)(a), (3). NRCP 37(b)(2) limits an
award of attorney fees to those incurred because of a discovery vi-
olation. Nev. Power Co. v. Fluor Ill., 108 Nev. 638, 646-47, 837

‘Our holding in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev. 993, 998, 13 P.3d 415,
418 (2000), that marital misconduct may not be considered in awarding spousal
support, does not compel a different result. Rodriguez involved misconduct
within the parties’ marital relationship and did not implicate the sanction
power of the court.

es 733

P.2d 1354, 1360 (1992). Therefore, any additional attorney fees
may be granted in accordance with the law governing awards of
reasonable attorney fees in divorce cases. See NRS 125.150(3)
(providing for an award of reasonable attorney fees in a divorce ac-
tion); Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat’l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455
P.2d 31, 33 (1969) (setting forth factors that govern the reasonable
value of an attorney’s services).

Application of these principles to the facts of this case

In the case before us, child custody was mostly resolved by
agreement of the parties through the June custody order. We rec-
ognize the strong public policy favoring the resolution of child cus-
tody matters by agreement. See Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564,
569, 257 P.3d 396, 399 (2011). Nevertheless, because Lalaine ar-
gues that the June custody order did not contain sufficient partic-
ularity as to Mario’s visitation rights, that issue must be addressed
by the district court. See NRS 125C.010(1). The district court
must also make a determination as to child support in accordance
with the law, as that claim should not have been resolved by default
through the mere adoption of the temporary support order.

| eee

As for the remaining claims, the district court did not conduct
any analysis under Young and Foster as to whether a default di-
vorce decree was an appropriate sanction for Lalaine’s discovery
violation, including an analysis of the relevant factors and whether
a less severe sanction was warranted. If, on remand, the district
court determines that a case-concluding sanction is warranted, it
may be necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing. Any resulting de-
fault divorce decree must comply with the standards set forth
herein. Consequently, we reverse the default divorce decree and re-
mand this matter to the district court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Cuerry, and Sait, JJ., concur.

734
WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC, aka WYNN CASINO LAS VEGAS,
APPELLANT, v. DANIEL BALDONADO; JOSEPH CESARZ;
AND QUYNGOC TANG, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, RESPONDENTS.
No. 60358

October 31, 2013 311 P.3d 1179

Kamer Zucker Abbott and Gregory J. Kamer and Bryan J.
Cohen, Las Vegas; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and Eugene
Scalia and Porter Wilkinson, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.

Leon Greenberg Professional Corporation and Leon M.
Greenberg, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.
Arguello, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Am-
icus Curiae State of Nevada, Department of Business and Industry,
Office of the Labor Commissioner.

Gabroy Law Offices and Christian J. Gabroy, Henderson, for
Amici Curiae Progressive Leadership Alliance of Nevada, Amal-
gamated Transit Union Local 1637, Churches of Southern Nevada,
Interfaith Worker Justice, Assemblyman Paul Aizley, Assembly-
woman Maggie Carlton, Assemblyman Joseph M. Hogan, and
Assemblyman James Ohrenschall.

Lemons Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno,
for Amicus Curiae Don Laughlin’s Riverside Resort Hotel and
Casino.

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D.
Henriod, Las Vegas, for Amici Curiae Nevada Resort Association
and Nevada Restaurant Association.

P35

McCracken, Stemerman & Holsberry and Richard G.
McCracken, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Local Joint Executive
Board of Las Vegas.

Urban Law Firm and Michael A. Urban and Shannon M. Gallo,
Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Transport Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 721.

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, Douczas, J.:

In this appeal, we must determine if Nevada law allows em-
ployers to require employees to pool their tips with other employ-
ees of a different rank. After considering the parties’ arguments
and the applicable provisions in NRS Chapter 608, we conclude
that Nevada law permits the tip-pooling policy at issue here.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant, the Wynn Las Vegas, restructured its table-games de-
partment and implemented its current tip-pooling policy for its
table-games employees. The Wynn eliminated several positions in
the table-games department, including the vice president of table-
games operations, shift manager, assistant shift manager, pit man-
ager, and floor supervisor. After the restructure, the table-games
department consisted of casino managers, assistant casino man-
agers, casino service team leads (CSTL), boxpersons, and dealers.
Under the current tip-pooling policy, all tips are gathered and di-
vided among the dealers, boxpersons, and CSTLs,

PO

Respondents Daniel Baldonado, Joesph Cesarz, and Quyngoc
Tang (the Dealers) filed a class-action complaint with the Labor
Commissioner claiming that the Wynn’s restructured tip-pooling
policy violated NRS 608.160, NRS 608.100, and NRS 613.120,
which govern compensation and employment practices, because it
required the dealers to share their tips with employees of different
ranks. The Labor Commissioner denied the Dealers class-action
status and dismissed all unnamed complainants from the action,
citing noncompliance with NAC 607.200’s requirements for filing
an administrative complaint. But, the Labor Commissioner ac-
cepted all named complainants. After conducting an investigation,
the Labor Commissioner determined that the Wynn’s new tip-
pooling policy did not violate Nevada law.

The Dealers petitioned the district court to review the Labor
Commissioner’s decision, pursuant to NRS 233B.130. The district
court granted the petition and set aside the Labor Commissioner’s
decision, finding that the new tip-pooling policy violated NRS
608.160 because the policy directly benefited the Wynn. Further,
the district court determined that the Labor Commissioner erred in
dismissing the unnamed complainants because the Commissioner
had the power to hear a class-action suit. The district court de-
clined to review the Labor Commissioner’s decisions regarding
NRS 608.100 and NRS 613.120 because the court determined that
its decision regarding NRS 608.160 was completely dispositive of
the parties’ dispute. The Wynn appealed.

We hold that the district court erred in overturning the Labor
Commissioner’s decision because the Wynn did not keep any of the
tips from the pool; rather, the Wynn distributed the money among
its employees.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews an administrative agency’s decision for an
abuse of discretion. Langman v. Nev. Adm’rs, Inc., 114 Nev. 203,
206-07, 955 P.2d 188, 190 (1998). However, when the case con-
cerns statutory interpretation, this court reviews the agency’s de-
cision de novo. Id. at 207, 955 P.2d at 190.

The Wynn’s tip-pooling policy was lawful under NRS 608.160
The Wynn argues that the district court erred by imposing a
“‘direct-benefit’’ test onto its NRS 608.160 analysis, asserting that
the statute contains no such language and that prior opinions,
while mentioning the benefits that an employer may gain from a
tip-pooling policy, never indicated that the policy must be invali-
dated on the basis of those benefits. In opposition, the Dealers as-
sert that this court has applied the ‘‘direct-benefit’’ test in previous

ee

opinions; therefore, the district court did not err in applying the
test to this matter.
NRS 608.160 states:

1. It is unlawful for any person to:

(a) Take all or part of any tips or gratuities bestowed upon
the employees of that person.

(b) Apply as a credit toward the payment of the statutory
minimum hourly wage established by any law of this State any
tips or gratuities bestowed upon the employees of that person.

2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prevent such employees from entering into an agreement to di-
vide such tips or gratuities among themselves.

In Moen v. Las Vegas International Hotel, Inc., 402 F. Supp.
157 (D. Nev. 1975), a federal district court interpreted NRS
608.160’s purpose, and this court adopted the federal court’s in-
terpretation in Alford v. Harolds Club, 99 Nev. 670, 674, 669 P.2d
721, 723 (1983). In Moen, the court determined that NRS 608.160
was enacted to prevent an employer from taking its employees’ tips
for the employer’s benefit. 402 F. Supp. at 160. Nevertheless, the
court determined that an employer can collect employee tips and
distribute them among other employees. Jd. Applying this ration-
ale, the Moen court found that a tip-pooling policy requiring a
table dealer to share his tips with other dealers, boxpersons, casino
cashiers, and floormen was valid. See id. at 158, 160.

The Dealers and the district court appear to believe that, in Al-
ford, this court created a ‘‘direct-benefit”’ test which invalidates
any tip-pooling policy that directly benefits the employer. We take
this opportunity to clear up any confusion surrounding this issue.
Alford did not create a ‘‘direct-benefit’’ test, nor do we believe that
Moen created such a test, either. Moen mentioned an employer’s
benefit in a passing remark; however, the benefit the court ap-
peared to reference was the keeping of the employee tips. The
Moen court determined that NRS 608.160 ‘‘specifies that only the
employees can benefit [from a tip-pooling agreement].’’ Id. at
160. After reviewing Moen, we framed the issue in Alford as
whether an employer can impose a tip-pooling policy on its em-
ployees, even though the employer did not keep the tips or “‘reap
any direct benefit from the pooling.’ This description was not
inadvertent—it is possible that an employer, while not keeping
the tips, could take them for use in a manner impermissible under
the statute. However, nothing in either opinion suggests that a
‘‘direct-benefit’’ test should be imposed to determine whether a
tip-pooling policy violates NRS 608.160. Further, if the Moen
court intended to create the purported ‘‘direct-benefit’’ test, we
expressly reject it. Such a test is unworkable because every tip-
pooling policy directly benefits the employer in some manner.

BO
Pe

The district court erred in determining that the Wynn’s tip-
pooling policy violated NRS 608.160 because the Wynn distributed
all the tips to its employees. NRS 608.160 prohibits an employer
from taking and keeping his or her employees’ tips, but the statute
does not prohibit a tip policy that splits the tips among the em-
ployees. Similar to the casino in Moen, the Wynn distributes the
tips among its employees, keeping none for itself. This policy is in
accordance with NRS 608.160 and Moen; thus, the district court
should not have disturbed the Labor Commissioner’s decision.

The Dealers’ claims under NRS 608.100 and NRS 613.120 require
judicial review

Under NRS 233B.130, ‘‘(1) [aJny party who is: (a) [iJdentified
as a party of record by an agency in an administrative proceeding;
and (b) [a]ggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, is en-
titled to judicial review of the decision. . . .” (Emphasis added.)

In light of its decision that the tip-pooling policy violated NRS
608.160, the district court declined to review the Labor Commis-
sioner’s decisions regarding the Wynn’s tip-pooling policy under
NRS 608,100 and NRS 613.120. The Labor Commissioner’s de-
cision aggrieved the Dealers; thus, the dealers were entitled to ju-
dicial review of all of the Commissionet’s decisions.' In accor-
dance with NRS 233B.130, we remand this matter for the district
court to review the Labor Commissioner’s decisions regarding
NRS 608.100 and NRS 613.120.

The district court should have deferred to the Labor
Commissioner’s decision declining to grant the Dealers class-
action status

This court defers to an ‘‘agency’s interpretation of its governing
statutes or regulations if the interpretation is within the [statute’s
or regulation’s language].’’ Dutchess Bus. Servs. v. State, Bd. of
Pharm., 124 Nev. 701, 709, 191 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2008). Under
NAC 607.200, a complaint filed with the Labor Commissioner
must include ‘‘[t]he full name and address of [all] complainant{s].””

The Labor Commissioner’s conclusion that NAC 607.200 does
not permit class actions was within the regulation’s language; thus,

'The aggrieved party must satisfy certain procedural requirements to receive
judicial review. See NRS 233B.130. The record suggests that the Dealers sat-
isfied these requirements, and the parties do not argue otherwise.

Po 79

the district court should have deferred to the Labor Commis-
sioner’s interpretation. The Labor Commissioner dismissed all
unnamed complainants because they did not comply with NAC
607.200’s name and address requirements. This interpretation is
within the regulation’s language because the regulation explicitly
requires a complainant to provide his or her full name and address
in his or her complaint. Further, Nevada Jaws do not require the
Labor Commissioner to grant class certification under any cir-
cumstances. Accordingly, the district court erred in failing to defer
to the Labor Commissioner’s decision to decline class certification
in this matter.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s order concluding that the Wynn’s
tip-pooling policy was invalid under NRS 608.160 and that the
Labor Commissioner should have granted the Dealers class certi-
fication. Further, we remand the matter for the district court to re-
view the Labor Commissioner’s decisions regarding the validity of
the Wynn’s tip-pooling policy under NRS 608.100 and NRS
613.120.

PICKERING, C.J., and Gippons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Cuerry, and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
JETHRO RAY LLOYD, RESPONDENT.

No. 56706
October 31, 2013 312 P.3d 467

~
BN
Ss

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Mark
D. Torvinen, District Attorney, and Robert J. Lowe, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, Elko County, for Appellant.

Frederick B. Lee, Jr., Public Defender, and Roger H. Stewart,
Deputy Public Defender, Elko County, for Respondent.

‘mn

TAL

Before the Court EN BaNc.!

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

A highway patrol officer saw respondent Jethro Lloyd run a red
light and followed him into a shopping center parking lot to issue
him a ticket. While the ticket was being processed, a drug detec-
tion dog was summoned. The dog alerted for the presence of
drugs in Lloyd’s car. This led to a warrantless search that uncov-
ered illegal drugs. Lioyd was arrested and charged with trafficking,
possession for sale, and possession of schedule I and II controlled
substances.

Lloyd moved to suppress, arguing that the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 18 of the
Nevada Constitution prohibited the warrantless search. The district
court granted Lloyd’s motion. It determined that the drug dog’s
alert provided probable cause to search Lloyd’s car for contraband.
But it concluded that, for a warrantless automobile search to pass

"Pursuant to IOP Rule 13(b), this matter was transferred after oral argument
before a three-judge panel to the en banc court.

ma Pe

muster under Nevada law, both probable cause and exigency, be-
yond that inherent in a car’s ready mobility, must be shown. Since
the State showed nothing in the way of exigent circumstances be-
yond the car’s mobility, the district court invalidated the search and
suppressed the drug evidence.

| el

Consistent with federal constitutional law, we hold that exigency
is not a separate requirement of the automobile exception to the
constitutional warrant requirement. Thus, because the drug detec-
tion dog’s alert gave the officers probable cause to search Lloyd’s
car, which was parked in a public place and readily mobile, we
Teverse.

L

The essential facts were established through officer testimony
and videotape from the patrol car’s camera. Trooper Richard T.
Pickers of the Nevada Highway Patrol stopped respondent Jethro
Lloyd in a shopping center parking lot in Elko, Nevada. It was a
Sunday morning, and the courts were closed. The trooper saw
Lloyd make a right turn at a red light without coming to a com-
plete stop. By the time Trooper Pickers activated his lights and
caught up to him, Lloyd had parked and gotten out of his car to go
into Starbucks.

Lloyd denied running a red light. Still, he cooperated with the
trooper’s request that he produce his driver’s license, insurance,
and registration. When Trooper Pickers called dispatch to report
the traffic stop and confirm Lloyd’s paperwork, he asked dispatch
to send a drug detection dog and handler team. The K9 unit ar-
rived a few minutes later, before Trooper Pickers finished pro-
cessing the traffic violation. Nothing suggests that the dog sniff
prolonged the traffic stop.?

The dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Lloyd’s car. Based
on the dog’s alert and without getting a warrant, Trooper Pickers
proceeded to search the vehicle. On opening Lloyd’s car door,
Trooper Pickers remarked that he smelled an illegal substance. He

The district court found that, ‘The stop up to and including the arrival of
the drug dog and the sniff, did not appreciably lengthen the purpose of the
original stop, which was for the possible issuance of a traffic ticket for running
a red light,” and ‘‘the dog sniff occurred prior to the conclusion of the traffic
stop.’ This case thus differs from State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 305 P.3d
912 (2013), where Trooper Pickers unlawfully detained a car and driver be-
yond the time needed to process the traffic stop, to give a dog and handler
team time to arrive. See Illinois v, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (a
dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Constitution so long
as the sniff does not prolong the length of the stop); Gama v. State, 112 Nev.
833, 837-38, 920 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1996) (same).

Pe 3

arrested Lloyd, handcuffed him, and secured him in the back of
the patrol vehicle.

The vehicle search yielded psilocybin mushrooms and seven
pounds of marijuana. Trooper Pickers transported Lloyd to the po-
lice station, and the State charged him with several drug-related of-
fenses. It is unclear what became of Lloyd’s vehicle after the
search.

0.
a

A motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact.
State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. at 485, 305 P.3d at 916. On appeal
from an order granting a motion to suppress, ‘‘[t]his court reviews
findings of fact for clear error, but the legal consequences of those
facts involve questions of law that we review de novo.’’ Id. at 486,
305 P.3d at 916. A district court’s legal conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of a challenged search receives de novo review.
See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 2010).

A.

|

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that ‘‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated,’ and that ‘‘no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause.”’ Article I, Section 18 of the Nevada
Constitution similarly provides, ‘‘{tJhe right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreason-
able seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant

shall issue but on probable cause... .’ Under these cognate
provisions of our federal and state constitutions, warrantless
searches ‘‘are per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Hughes v. State, 116
Nev. 975, 979, 12 P.3d 948, 951 (2000). One such exception is the
“automobile exception.” Id.

The automobile exception was first recognized in Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). A Prohibition-era case, Car-
roll approved a warrantless automobile search where the police had
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained alcohol being trans-
ported in violation of the National Prohibition Act. In an extensive
opinion, the Supreme Court ruled:

On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search
and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause,
that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances

4s pe

known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other ve-
hicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and de-
struction, the search and seizure are valid.

Id. at 149 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court justified this rule
by the inherent mobility of automobiles, which often makes it im-
practical to obtain a search warrant before the contraband is put
out of reach:

. . . the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, prac-
tically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the ve-
hicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

Id. at 153. Later cases added a second justification for the auto-
mobile exception: A person has a lower expectation of privacy in
a vehicle than in a home or office. See California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 391 (1985).

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), upheld a warrant-
Jess automobile search that occurred after the accused had been
taken into custody and his car driven to the police station. Id. at
47. Differentiating vehicles from houses because of their mobility,
the Supreme Court explained that the circumstances that furnish
probable cause to search a vehicle are often unforeseeable and the
opportunity to conduct a search fleeting. Id. at 48, 50-51. So, for
Jaw enforcement to search a vehicle effectively, they must either
seize the vehicle while awaiting a warrant or search the vehicle
without a warrant. Jd. at 51. The Court found no constitutional dif-
ference ‘‘between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate [for a warrant]
and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant.’’ Id. at 52. ‘Given probable cause’ to believe the vehi-
cle contains contraband, ‘‘either course is reasonable.’ Id.

As Chambers suggests, Carroll did not establish exigency as a
separate requirement of the automobile exception. To be sure,
Carroll cites exigency as a reason for its holding, 267 U.S. at 153,
but it is the exigency inherent in an automobile’s ready mobility
that, with probable cause, justifies a warrantless automobile
search. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)
(describing Carroll as ‘‘based on the automobile’s ‘ready mobility,
an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant

po 14s

once probable cause to conduct the search is clear’’). So long as
the vehicle for which probable cause to search exists is readily mo-
bile, the requisite exigency is conclusively presumed. See Carney,
471 U.S. at 391 (‘‘The mobility of automobiles . . . ‘creates cir-
cumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous
enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.’ ’’ (quoting
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976))); Navas,
597 F.3d at 498-500; United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 417
(9th Cir. 2012).3

In 1999, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Supreme Court made this
point unmistakably clear:

[T]he automobile exception does not have a separate exigency
requirement: “‘If a car is readily mobile and probable cause
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without
more.”

527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Labron, 518 U.S. at 940).

B.

Nevada has historically followed ‘‘the United States Supreme
Court on most, if not all, of its interpretations and applications of
the law governing searches and seizures.’’ Thomas B. McAffee,
John P. Lukens & Thaddeus J. Yurek Il, The Automobile Excep-
tion in Nevada: A Critique of the Harnisch Cases, 8 Nev. L.J.
622, 630-31 (2008); see Cortes v. State, 127 Nev. 505, 515 n.7,
260 P.3d 184, 191 n.7 (2011). Initially, Nevada automobile-
exception law conformed to this trend. Thus, in Wright v. State, 88
Nev. 460, 472, 499 P.2d 1216, 1224 (1972), we applied Carroll
and Chambers to validate the warrantless search of a car parked in
a motel parking lot where the police had probable cause to believe
the car contained evidence of a crime. The car’s inherent mobil-
ity—even though the defendant’s ‘‘arrest rendered [the car tem-
porarily] nonmobile,” id. at 471, 499 P.2d at 1224—satisfied Car-
roll’s *‘standard of continuing ‘exigency, ”’ id., such that probable
cause to believe the car contained contraband or evidence of a
crime justified the warrantless search, without more.

Twenty-five years after Wright, this court handed down three
cases—State v. Harnisch (Harnisch I), 113 Nev. 214, 931 P.2d

2Whether and how the automobile exception applies when the vehicle is
parked on private, residential property is an open question, see Robinson v.
Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 31 n.4 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting issue and collecting cases);
United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 250 (1st Cir. 2011), implicating
trespass as well as privacy search-and-seizure concerns, of. Florida v. Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561 (1999); State v.
Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285-86 (ind. 2010).

746 Po

1359 (1997); Barrios-Lomeli v. State, 113 Nev. 952, 944 P.2d 791
(1997); and State v. Harnisch (Harnisch I), 114 Nev. 225, 954
P.2d 1180 (1998)—that called a ‘‘startling halt’ to Nevada’s re-
liance on United States Supreme Court automobile-exception
precedent. McAffee et al., supra, at 633.

The seminal case, Harnisch I, upheld the suppression of evi-
dence found in a search of the trunk of a car parked in an apart-
ment complex parking lot. The police had a warrant authorizing
them to search the defendant’s apartment, but the warrant did not
mention the car. On appeal, the State argued that, since the car had
been parked inside the apartment’s curtilage, the warrant extended
to the car. This court disagreed. Since “‘the State only raised the
curtilage issue and did not raise [any] warrant exception issue,’
Harnisch I, 113 Nev. at 222 n.4, 931 P.2d at 1365 n.4, the State’s
appeal could and should have ended there. But we continued, sua
sponte, to raise and reject the automobile exception as a possible
alternative basis for the State’s appeal. Citing Carroll and Cham-
bers, but repudiating Wright’s accurate reading of them, we de-
clared: ‘‘For the automobile exception to apply, two conditions
must be present: first, there must be probable cause to believe that
criminal evidence was located in the vehicle; and second, there
must be exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the need
for a warrant.’ Id. at 222-23, 931 P.2d at 1365. Since the police
arrested the defendant when he arrived home, ‘‘the car was not
readily movable by the defendant,’ defeating exigency. Id. at 223,
931 P.2d at 1365.

Harnisch I misstated federal Jaw, which contains no separate ex-
igency requirement. This we acknowledged in Barrios-Lomeli, 113
Nev. at 957, 944 P.2d at 794, and Harnisch I, 114 Nev. at 227,
954 P.2d at 1182. But ‘‘[rJather than conceding its mistake and
conforming to federal precedent, the court quickly changed direc-
tion.’ McAffee et al., supra, at 634.

Harnisch II denied rehearing in Harnisch I. In doing so, it re-
cast Harnisch I’s flawed automobile-exception analysis as rooted in
state, not federal, constitutional law: ‘‘[W]hile the federal consti-
tution may not require the presence of exigent circumstances to val-
idate a warrantless search of an automobile, Nevada may adhere to
this requirement.’ 114 Nev. at 228, 954 P.2d at 1182. Continuing,
Harnisch IT held: ‘‘We now conclude . . . that the Nevada Con-
stitution requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances in
order to justify a warrantless search of a parked, immobile, unoc-
cupied vehicle.’’ Id. at 228-29, 954 P.2d at 1183.

Comparing Barrios-Lomeli with Fletcher v. State, 115 Nev.
425, 990 P.2d 192 (1999), demonstrates how little real guidance
Harnisch I and II offer. In Barrios-Lomeli, we invalidated a war-
rantless search of a car that police officers, on a drug-buy stakeout,
saw the defendant park in a shopping center parking lot. Probable

po m1

cause existed to believe the car contained contraband, 113 Nev. at
956, 944 P.2d at 793, and the car was fully operational, the de-
fendant having driven there and gone inside for a McDonald’s
meal with his girlfriend. 113 Nev. at 954, 944 P.2d at 792. In
Fletcher, by contrast, we upheld the warrantless search of a car
that police officers pulled over on a roadside stop. As in Barrios-
Lomeli, probable cause existed to believe the car contained con-
traband, and the car was fully operational, the defendant having
been driving it before being pulled over. Fletcher, 115 Nev. at
430, 990 P.2d at 195. And in both, the police detained the defen-
dant before conducting the warrantless vehicle search, Barrios-
Lomeli, 113 Nev. at 958, 944 P.2d at 794; Fletcher, 115 Nev. at
430, 990 P.2d at 195, and the defendants’ privacy interests were
equivalent—Barrios-Lomeli’s car was parked in a shopping center
parking lot and Fletcher’s by the side of a public road.

But we found insufficient exigent circumstances in Barrios-
Lomeli and sufficient exigent circumstances in Fletcher to justify
the warrantless automobile search. The difference? Fletcher’s ar-
rest left his vehicle ‘‘on the roadside subject to a police inventory
search and later impoundment, creating what we conclude to be a
sufficient exigent circumstance distinct from the parked, [immobile
and] unoccupied vehicles’? in Harnisch and Barrios-Lomeli.
Fletcher, 115 Nev. at 430, 990 P.2d at 195; see Hughes v. State,
116 Nev. 975, 980, 12 P.3d 948, 951 (2000) (‘Fletcher con-
cerned a roadside search, as opposed to a search of a parked and
unoccupied vehicle’’). ‘‘It would be unreasonable to require the
police to remain at the scene of the [roadside] arrest pending the
arrival of a warrant.’ Fletcher, 115 Nev. at 430, 990 P.2d at 195.
This begs the question, though, why it was reasonable to require
the same commitment of time and resources to detain the defen-
dant and his car in a shopping center parking lot pending arrival of
a warrant in Barrios-Lomeli. See Camacho v. State, 119 Nev.
395, 75 P.3d 370 (2003) (no exigency where vehicle was parked in
a grocery store parking lot, the vehicle’s owner was detained,
and police subsequently towed the vehicle).* Hughes suggests an
additional distinction—that the pre-Fletcher cases (Harnisch and
Barrios-Lomeli) arose ‘‘in the context of an automobile that was
‘parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the police first en-

‘Barrios-Lomeli cites NRS 171.123, which authorizes the police to detain
a person “‘whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably
indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a
crime,’’ but the detention may not last ‘“‘longer than is reasonably necessary to
effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes,”
and suggests that an hour’s detention pending application for a warrant is
preferable to an immediate search. 113 Nev. at 958, 944 P.2d at 794, Cham-
bers rejects this logic, 399 U.S. at 51, and neither Fletcher nor Hughes alludes
to this aspect of Barrios-Lomeli.

48 Po

countered it; ’’ whereas in Fletcher, the police pulled the car over,
Hughes, 116 Nev. at 980, 12 P.3d at 951 (quoting Harnisch H, 114
Nev. at 228, 954 P.2d at 1182)—but this is not true of Barrios-
Lomeli, where the officers saw the defendant park and alight from
his car, Barrios-Lomeli, 113 Nev. at 954, 944 P.2d at 792.

_

These cases draw perplexing distinctions that do not square
with the reasons for them. To begin with, Harnisch II’s ‘‘parked,
immobile and unoccupied”’ standard sounds like more than it is;
when do the police search cars that are moving and occupied? A
person’s residence differs from a parking lot or public road, see
supra note 3, but the latter two do not differ meaningfully from.
each other as to privacy or risk of pillage. If anything, a car left
unattended in a shopping center parking lot probably carries a
more immediate risk of loss of evidence than one left by the side
of a road. And as the facts of this case illustrate—Trooper Pickers
saw Lloyd run a red light and followed him into a shopping center
parking lot—traffic stops occur both in parking lots and at the side
of the road. Finally, what drew police attention to the defendant
and his car in the first place may legitimately bear on the scope of
the search incident to arrest when the automobile exception does
not apply. E.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350-51 (2009);
Camacho, 119 Nev. at 399-400, 75 P.3d at 373-74. But where
probable cause exists to believe the car contains contraband or ev-
idence of a crime, a vehicle that is readily mobile presents the
same risk of loss of evidence, or exigency, regardless of what’
caused it to stop. See McAffee et al., supra, at 646-48 (distin-
guishing ‘‘automobile exception’’ from ‘‘search incident’’ to arrest
cases and suggesting that the Harnisch cases and their progeny
conflate the two).

After analyzing our automobile-exception decisions, the district
court did not—and likely could not—determine whether Lloyd’s
situation was more like Harnisch, Barrios-Lomeli, and other
parked car cases, or Fletcher and Hughes, the roadside stop cases.
After all, before the search, Lloyd alighted from his car to walk
into Starbucks, but there was also evidence that Trooper Pickers
was in pursuit when Lloyd pulled into the parking lot. If Lloyd had
seen the trooper’s lights before he pulled into the shopping center
and stopped by the side of the road, Fletcher and Hughes would
control. Yet, because Lloyd continued into the parking lot and got
out of his car, Barrios-Lomeli seems more applicable. Even this is
not clear, though, since Barrios-Lomeli suggests that if the police
cannot get a warrant after 60 minutes of trying, sufficient exigency
might materialize; here, since it was a Sunday with the courts

Pe 19

closed, it seems likely that waiting an hour would have accom-
plished little, if anything.

c.
a

Nevada’s automobile-exception caselaw has been criticized as
“producfing] confusion, while doing little to enhance the protec-
tion of individual privacy interests.’ McAffee et al., supra, at 624.
The criticism is fair. The constitutional protection in the federal
automobile-exception caselaw lies in the requirement of probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a
crime and the car’s inherent mobility, not the peripheral factors
identified in the Harnisch cases and their progeny. And the con-
fusion in our caselaw not only makes it difficult for district courts
to apply the law, it also makes it difficult for police to comply with
the law in the field. Compare Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Fed-
eralism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22
Rutgers L.J. 863, 865-66 (1991) (explaining that police confusion
undermines laws meant to protect constitutional rights), with Her-
ring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (the exclusionary
tule applies to ‘‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct,
or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence,’ not
every error that occurs).

a

In the 80 years since Carroll articulated the automobile ex-
ception, the Supreme Court ‘‘has slowly and cautiously developed
this narrow exception to the warrant requirement into a balanced
doctrine that protects privacy concerns while providing clear guide-
lines for effective law enforcement.’ McAffee et al., supra, at
623. Given that the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 18
of the Nevada Constitution use virtually identical language, in-
dependently deriving a different formulation to protect the same
liberty that the United States Constitution secures—and paying
for that difference with confusing rules and unpredictable, oft-
litigated results—cannot be justified. James A. Gardner, State Con-
stitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Func-
tional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1059
(2003); see also Latzer, supra, at 864 (‘“There is nothing improper
in concluding that the Supreme Court’s construction of similar text
is sound.’’). We now conclude, as a number of sister states have,
that our state constitution compels no different automobile excep-
tion to its warrant requirement than the Fourth Amendment does.
See, ¢.g., State v. Reyna, 71 P.3d 366, 369 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(‘‘{T]he decisions concerning the scope of allowable vehicle

750 Po

searches under the federal constitution are ‘well on point’ in de-
ciding cases under the Arizona Constitution.”’); Berry v. State, 843
A.2d 93, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (‘‘We therefore apply the
law as it exists in Maryland, which calls for us to follow in this
case the Supreme Court’s law on the subject.’’); Commonwealth v.
Motta, 676 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Mass. 1997) (‘‘[W]e have also fol-
lowed the Supreme Court in the area of the automobile excep-
tion.”’); State v. Zwicke, 767 N.W.2d 869, 873 (N.D. 2009) (over-
ruling prior case establishing exigency as a separate requirement of
the automobile exception); State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207
(Tenn. 2009) (‘‘the automobile exception does not require a sepa-
rate finding of exigency under the Tennessee Constitution’);
McKenney v. State, 165 P.3d 96, 99 (Wyo. 2007) (the automobile
exception does not require a separate finding of exigency under
Wyoming law); see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.2(b), at 557 n.79 (4th ed.
2004) (listing jurisdictions that have dispensed with a separate ex-
igency requirement for automobile searches based on probable
cause).

|

We therefore disapprove of Harnisch II and its progeny to the
extent that they establish exigency as a separate requirement of the
automobile exception under the Nevada Constitution. We do not
take this step lightly. ‘‘[S]tare decisis plays a critical role in our ju-
risprudence;’ Egan v. Chambers, 129 Nev. 239, 243, 299 P.3d
364, 367 (2013), but “‘when governing decisions prove to be ‘un-
workable or are badly reasoned? they should be overruled.” Jd.
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).

The dissent argues that allowing a police officer who has prob-
able cause to search a readily mobile vehicle to do so without a
warrant carries too great a cost. We cannot agree. Our Constitu-
tions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; see Nev. Const. art. I, § 18. In the automobile-
exception context, a police officer who has probable cause to be-
lieve the car contains contraband or evidence of a crime must ei-
ther seize the vehicle while a warrant is sought or search the
vehicle without a warrant. Given probable cause, either course is
constitutionally reasonable. See Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52. ‘‘Al-
though it is elementary that states may provide greater protections
than required by the federal Constitution, it is at least as funda-
mental that such decisions should be carefully reasoned and
grounded in a strong public policy”? McAffee et al., supra, at 648.
Harnisch I and its confusing progeny do not meet these criteria.

Po 751

“The federal automobile exception is rooted in good policy that
balances private interests with the collective good, even as it pro-
vides law enforcement with clear and unequivocal guidelines for
doing their jobs.’ Id.

Mm.
| re

The district court correctly found that the drug detection dog’s
alert gave the officers probable cause to believe controlled sub-
stances were in Lloyd’s car. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,
1057 (2013) (“‘[A] court can presume (subject to any conflicting
evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to
search.’’); Latham y. State, 97 Nev. 279, 280, 629 P.2d 780, 780-
81 (1981) (upholding issuance of a search warrant based upon a
trained drug detection dog’s alert). The car was readily mobile and
parked in a public place. Thus, the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment and the
Nevada Constitution’s cognate provision justified the search. We
therefore reverse the district court’s order granting Lloyd’s motion
to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Grpsons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, and Douctas, JJ., concur.

Curry, J., with whom Sarrta, J., agrees, dissenting:

Lrespectfully disagree with my colleagues in the majority. The
majority holds that in order to have a warrantless search of an au-
tomobile, the police need only probable cause and need not show
exigent circumstances. Their decision to reverse the trial court is
not supported by our own stare decisis, State v. Harnisch, 114
Nev. 225, 228-29, 954 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1998), and is not con-
sistent with but is in fact violative of Article 1, Section 18 of our
Nevada Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches. In
this day of modern technology and the allowance of telephonic
search warrants, NRS 179.045(2), there is no plausible reason why
an Officer, after bringing a drug dog to establish probable cause,
should fail to attempt to obtain a telephonic search warrant. More
importantly, if the officer had attempted to obtain a telephonic
search warrant, he would have been put under oath as to Lloyd’s
alleged traffic violation. The majority infers that the officer did not
attempt to get a warrant because it was a Sunday morning, the
courts were closed, and a telephonic warrant was not available. As
a former district court judge who served in that capacity for eight
years, I cannot accept that argument. There were many occasions
when officers came to my home on a Saturday or Sunday to obtain

182 pe

a search warrant, and even more on point are the numerous tele-
phonic warrants that I granted in the middle of the night and at
other “‘inconvenient”’ times. It is not out of the ordinary for police
officers throughout our state to have the home phone numbers and
cellular numbers of members of the judiciary.

I do not see the ‘‘confusion’’ that the majority alleges in
Nevada’s automobile exception caselaw, which requires probable
cause and exigent circumstances for a warrantless search. I see no
reason not to give the people of our state more protection from
warrantless searches of automobiles than is afforded by the United
States Constitution and existing federal caselaw.

In the instant case, the officer sees the respondent run a red
light. The officer follows the respondent into a shopping center
parking lot to issue him a ticket. The respondent is out of his car,
and while the ticket is being processed, a drug dog is summoned
in accordance with State v. Beckman, 129 Nev 481, 305 P.3d 912
(2013), and establishes probable cause. There is no sound reason
at this stage that the officer could not telephone a judicial officer,
be put under oath, and obtain a search warrant. This makes sense
to me and should be the correct constitutional procedure in our
state.

For the above reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of
the motion to suppress evidence.

CIVIL RIGHTS FOR SENIORS, A NevADA NonpROFIT CORPORA-
TION, APPELLANT, v. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, RESPONDENT.

No. 60945

October 31, 2013 313 P.3d 216

{Rehearing denied February 24, 2014]
Philip A. Olsen, Tahoe City, California, for Appellant.

Allison, MacKenzie, Paviakis, Wright & Fagan, Ltd., and Alicia
G. Johnson, Carson City, for Respondent.

754

Before PICKERING, C.J., GiBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE,
Douctas and Curry, JJ.!

OPINION

Per Curiam:

This appeal presents novel issues regarding the scope of public
access to certain records maintained by the Administrative Office
of the Courts (AOC) and whether the AOC is a ‘‘[g]overnmental
entity’ within the meaning of NRS 239.005(5).”

Appellant Civil Rights for Seniors (CRS) filed a request with the
AOC pursuant to Nevada’s Public Records Act (the Act), seeking
access to a variety of documents related to Nevada’s Foreclosure
Mediation Program (FMP). The AOC offered to provide some of
the documents in redacted or statistical form but refused to dis-
close other information as either confidential or privileged. CRS
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in district court to compel
the AOC to produce all of the requested documents in their origi-
nal form. The district court denied CRS’s petition, reasoning that
the AOC, as a judicial entity, is not subject to the Act and that the
requested documents are otherwise confidential as a matter of law.

On review, we conclude that the district court properly rejected
access to the requested information based on the confidentiality
provisions set forth in the rules of this court. Accordingly, we af-
firm the district court’s order.

‘THe HoNorABLE NANcy M. Sarrta, Justice, voluntarily recused herself
from participation in the decision of this matter.

2At the time of the relevant events in this case, NRS 239.005(5) was num-
bered NRS 239.005(4). The subsection was renumbered effective October 1,
2013. See A.B. 31, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013). For consistency, all citations refer
to the subsection number of the 2013 version of the statute.

Po 155

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beginning in 2009, the Foreclosure Mediation Program has
provided Nevada homeowners the opportunity to attend loan-
modification mediation with the beneficiary of the deed of trust or
a qualified representative before a nonjudicial foreclosure sale can
occur. Holt v. Reg’! Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. 886, 888, 266 P.3d
602, 603 (2011). When a homeowner elects mediation, the home-
owner and the beneficiary of the deed of trust must participate in
mediation in good faith and produce certain documents and infor-
mation. See Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 127 Nev. 462, 469, 255
P.3d 1281, 1286-87 (2011). After mediation has concluded, the
mediator issues a statement that may recommend sanctions and
must include any agreement reached by the parties. FMR 17. If ei-
ther party fails to comply with the statutory requirements, the
other party can request judicial review to determine whether sanc-
tions are warranted for bad faith. See Holt, 127 Nev. at 893, 266
P.3d at 606. Ultimately, the beneficiary must obtain an FMP me-
diation certificate to exercise a valid nonjudicial foreclosure sale
under NRS 107.080. NRS 107.086(2)(c)? (a ‘“‘trustee shall not
exercise a power of sale . . . unless the trustee . . . [cJauses to be
recorded [an FMP certificate stating either] that no mediation is re-
quired [or that] mediation has been completed in the matter’’).

Under authority delegated by the Legislature, NRS 107.086(8),
this court appointed the AOC as Mediation Administrator, which is
charged with the general duties for administering foreclosure me-
diations. FMR 2(1). As Administrator, the AOC may appoint a
manager and support staff and may enter into contracts with third
parties for mediation-related services. FMR 2(2). The AOC main-
tains a list of court-approved available mediators and selects me-
diators for assignment. FMR 3(2), (3).

In 2011 and 2012, CRS twice sought access to information
contained in FMP records maintained by the AOC in its capacity
as Mediation Administrator. CRS sought copies of all mediator
statements and FMP certificates issued since July 2009, as well as
copies of all mediator assignments, all correspondence between
AOC employees, any recommendations of sanctions, the minutes of
various meetings conducted by the AOC or the supreme court, law
firm billings, legal agreements, and all written comments received
by the AOC from FMP participants. The AOC denied many of
CRS’s requests, contending that the requested documents were ei-
ther confidential pursuant to Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Rules
or subject to the attorney-client or government deliberative process

5NRS 107.086 was amended effective July 1, 2013. See S.B. 278, 77th Leg.
(Nev. 2013). The amendments do not affect the quoted paragraph.

156 po

privileges. In doing so, the AOC offered to provide many records
in statistical or redacted form so that CRS could receive the ben-
efit of the information without compromising the confidentiality of
the FMP records. Dissatisfied with this response, CRS filed a pe-
tition for a writ of mandamus with the district court to compel the
AOC to grant access to the requested documents in their original
form.

During the district court’s mandamus hearing, CRS explained
that it was requesting the information in order to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the FMP and to increase administrative transparency.
CRS also clarified that although the AOC had offered to provide
the records in statistical or redacted form, this was insufficient be-
cause CRS would be unable to track a particular case or contact
homeowners for additional information. The AOC responded that
it was not a government entity as defined in NRS Chapter 239, and
therefore CRS could not rely on the Act to compel disclosure. The
AOC further argued that disclosure of homeowners’ identifying
information would inappropriately reveal highly personal and
sensitive financial information. Additionally, according to the
AOC, FMP participants had previously been assured that certain
aspects of the FMP process would be confidential. The AOC also
objected to disclosure of the mediator statements and trustee affi-
davits regarding negotiation terms, as it might discourage future
FMP participation.

The district court denied CRS’s petition, concluding that the ju-
dicial branch of government is not included in NRS 239.005(5)’s
definition of ‘‘[glovernmental entity,’ and thus the Act did not
apply. The district court further determined that the FMRs prohibit
disclosure of the requested documents, which include the identify-
ing information of FMP participants, until a petition for judicial re-
view is filed. CRS now brings this appeal.

DISCUSSION

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station[,] or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of discretion.’ Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote
omitted); see NRS 34.160. ‘‘‘A district court’s decision to grant or
deny a writ petition is reviewed by this court under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard.’ However, questions of statutory construction,
including the meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law,
which this court reviews de novo.’’ City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-
Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003) (quoting DR

pe 751

Partners v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465,
468 (2000)). ‘‘Generally, when ‘the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous . . . the courts are not permitted to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself.’ ’’ Chanos v. Nev. Tax Comm’n,
124 Nev. 232, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680 (2008) (quoting State, Div.
of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 293, 995
P.2d 482, 485 (2000).

The requested records are confidential under the Act

|

Under the Act, ‘‘unless otherwise declared by law to be confi-
dential, all public books and public records of a governmental en-
tity must be open at all times during office hours to inspection by
any person.’’ NRS 239.010(1).* On appeal, CRS argues that the
Act compels disclosure because ‘‘governmental entity’ necessarily
applies to the judiciary and the requested information has not oth-
erwise been declared confidential. However, we need not decide
whether the Act applies to the judiciary in general, or the AOC in
particular, because we conclude that even if the Act does apply to
the judiciary, the records in question are confidential as a matter of
Jaw.

[|

In assessing claims of confidentiality under the Act, we presume
that all government-generated documents are open to disclosure un-
less they are explicitly declared confidential by law or the state en-
tity proves that the private or law enforcement interests in confi-
dentiality clearly outweigh the general policy in favor of open
government. Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 127 Nev. 873,
880, 266 P.3d 623, 628 (2011). ‘Court rules, when not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution or certain laws of the state, have the ef-
fect of statutes.’’ Margold v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev.
804, 806, 858 P.2d 33, 35 (1993) (citing Lauer v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 62 Nev. 78, 85, 140 P.2d 953, 956 (1943)).

Under NRS 107.086(8)(d), the Supreme Court is to carry out
the FMP statutory provisions by ‘“‘[e]stablishing procedures to
protect the mediation process from abuse.’’ Accordingly, we en-
acted the FMRs under power delegated by the Legislature and
under our inherent power to provide for the efficient administration
of justice. FMR 1(1).

The FMRs provide for confidentiality of many FMP documents.
Most important here, the rules state that ‘‘[aJ1l documents and dis-

‘The quoted language reflects NRS 239.010(1) as amended effective Octo-
ber 1, 2013. See A.B. 31, 77th Leg. (Nev. 2013). The pertinent part of the
previous version of NRS 239.010(1) contained substantially similar language.

158 Po

cussions presented during the mediation shall be deemed confi-
dential and inadmissible in any subsequent actions or proceedings,
except in an action for judicial review”’ FMR 19. In addition,
FMR 7(3) provides that ‘‘{aJny program-issued certificate is con-
sidered confidential until recorded.’’>

Thus, the FMRs plainly state that any documents or discussions
presented at mediation, as well as any unrecorded certificates, are
unequivocally confidential unless and until a participant files a pe-
tition for judicial review or the certificate is recorded.° FMR 7, 19.
Because all discussions during the mediation are confidential,
post-mediation documents memorializing or relating to those dis-
cussions are also confidential as a matter of law. See FMR 19.

Here, CRS is requesting various documents dating back to July
2009, including all mediator statements, all certificates, all as-
signments provided to the mediators, all petitions for sanctions,
and all trustee affidavits. The AOC refused to release these docu-
ments in their original form, explaining that they contain the names
and other identifying information of FMP participants. We con-
clude that regardless of whether the requested documents contain
identifying information, they are documents presented at media-
tion, documents that embody the discussions and negotiations that
took place therein, and certificates without regard to their record-
ing status. We further conclude that these documents are confi-
dential according to FMR 7 and FMR 19, and thus are confiden-
tial as a matter of law.

The requested documents are not court records

In the alternative, CRS argues that the records are subject to dis-
closure as court records. As a separate branch of government
under the Nevada Constitution, the judiciary has the inherent au-
thority to manage its own affairs, make rules, and carry out other
incidental powers when ‘‘reasonable and necessary’’ for the ad-
ministration of justice. Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245,

‘The court also notes that the version of FMR 11 in effect both when CRS
made its requests and when the district court denied CRS’s petition explicitly
provided confidentiality for certain materials, FMR 11(8)-(9). Amendments re-
moving these subsections became effective January 1, 2013. In re Adoption of
Rules for Foreclosure Mediation, ADKT No. 435 (Order Amending Foreclo-
sure Mediation Rules, December 6, 2012).

‘Similarly, because the requested information relates to the FMP, a confi-
dential and voluntary mediation program, and does not relate to a public ju-
dicial proceeding, we reject CRS’s argument that the First Amendment guar-
antees the public’s right to access. Del Papa v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 369, 374, 915
P.2d 245, 248 (1996) (recognizing First Amendment rights of access to crim-
inal and civil judicial proceedings, as these places are ‘traditionally open to
the public”’),

re 159

260-61, 163 P.3d 428, 439-40 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).
In exercising this power, we have adopted rules declaring that
“fajil court records in civil actions are available to the public,
except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.” SRCR
1(3). ‘Court records’’ are then defined to include ‘‘informa-
tion . . . that is maintained by a court in connection with a judicial
proceeding.’ SRCR 2(2)(a). This ‘‘does not include data main-
tained by or for a judge pertaining to a particular case or party,
such as . . . working papers; or information gathered, maintained,
or stored by a government agency or other entity to which the
court has access but which is not entered in connection with a ju-
dicial proceeding.’ SRCR 2(2)(b).

We conclude that the requested documents are not maintained in
connection with a judicial proceeding. Indeed, the FMP process is
completed before, and often in lieu of, the initiation of a proceed-
ing in any court. Thus, the requested records are not court records
subject to disclosure pursuant to SRCR 1(3).

The common law does not mandate disclosure

|

Because the requested documents are not court records and
are not otherwise open to the public, we also reject CRS’s argu-
ment that disclosure is required pursuant to principles of the com-
mon law right to inspect public records. See Nixon v. Warner
Comme’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 588, 597-98 (1978) (holding that the
public’s ‘‘general right to inspect and copy public records’ is not
absolute and courts have inherent authority to deny public access
to its records when justified). Even if this court were to conclude
that, the requested documents were public court records, however,
the AOC’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of participant
information is justified, given the personal and sensitive nature of
the information involved. This is particularly true in this case,
where CRS admitted it sought the information in order to contact
homeowners directly. To hold otherwise would expose highly sen-
sitive personal and financial information to the public and thus
have a chilling effect on open and candid FMP participation, un-
dermining the Legislature’s interest in promoting mediation.

CONCLUSION

Because the FMRs plainly provide that the requested informa-
tion is confidential, and given the judiciary’s inherent authority to
manage its own affairs, we hold that the information is explicitly
declared confidential by law and the AOC acted within its power
by maintaining the requested documents as confidential in order to
protect the privacy of FMP participants. As to the remaining doc-
uments, the AOC has asserted the attorney-client and government

760

deliberative process privileges in denying CRS’s requests. Because
CRS has never argued that these privileges do not apply, we con-
clude that CRS has waived any argument against the AOC’s as-
serted privileges. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52,
623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (‘‘A point not urged in the trial court,
unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have
been waived and will not be considered on appeal.’’).

Thus, we conclude that the district court properly rejected ac-
cess to the requested information based on the confidentiality pro-
visions set forth in the rules of this court, and we therefore affirm
its decision.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
A GOVERNMENT ENTITY; AND JARED WICKS, AN INpIvip-
UAL, APPELLANTS, v. ELIZABETH YEGHIAZARIAN, AN
InpivipuaL; ELIZABETH YEGHIAZARIAN, AS THE PER-
SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RAYMOND
YEGHIAZARIAN; CHRISTINA YEGHIAZARIAN; NA-
TALIA YEGHIAZARIAN; anp ANDREW YEGHIAZAR-
IAN, RESPONDENTS.

No. 59382
November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 503

Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Craig R. Anderson, Micah S.
Echols, and Chad F. Clement, Las Vegas, for Appellants.

Saggese & Associates, Ltd., and Marc A. Saggese, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

: |
:
:_ |
_
;
Pe

mi

Before Gipsons, DoucLas and Sarria, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Grszons, J.:

In this appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs in a wrongful
death action, we consider whether evidence of the deceased’s
blood alcohol content (BAC) may be admitted to show his com-
parative negligence. We conclude that admission of a person’s
BAC requires additional evidence suggesting intoxication from ei-
ther a percipient witness or an expert who can testify regarding
that person’s commensurate level of impairment.

We also consider three other issues: (1) whether the district
court abused its discretion by allowing an expert to testify based on
an allegedly unreliable report, (2) whether the district court erred
in reducing the jury verdict based on the deceased’s comparative
negligence before imposing NRS 41.035’s mandatory cap on an
award of damages against a public entity, and (3) whether the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees that in-
cluded charges for nonattorney staff. Based on our analysis of
these issues, we affirm the district court’s judgment; however, we

po 163

vacate in part the award of attorney fees and costs and remand this
case to the district court for further analysis of the claims for at-
torney fees from counsel, paralegals, and office staff pursuant to
the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85
Ney. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Raymond Yeghiazarian was traveling westbound on Sahara Av-
enue and attempted a left turn at a permissive green light in order
to proceed southbound on Fort Apache Road. At the same time,
appellant Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD)
Officer Jared Wicks was driving his patrol vehicle eastbound on
Sahara Avenue approaching Fort Apache Road. The speed limit on
Sahara was 45 mph, but Officer Wicks was traveling between 58
mph and 74 mph. Officer Wicks did not have his police siren or
lights activated. Raymond apparently did not realize how fast Of-
ficer Wicks was approaching and entered the intersection without
enough time to clear it. Officer Wicks slammed on his brakes, but
the two cars collided. As a result of the accident, Raymond suf-
fered multiple internal injuries and trauma to his brain stem. After
spending three weeks in a coma, Raymond died. A blood sample
drawn from Raymond hours after the crash revealed that he had a
BAC of .049 percent. Officer Wicks’ blood was not drawn or
tested for alcohol or other substances after the crash.

Raymond’s wife Elizabeth, individually and as the representative
of her husband’s estate, as well as her son and two daughters (col-
lectively, the Yeghiazarian family), filed a complaint against
LVMPD and Officer Wicks (collectively, LVMPD) alleging negli-
gence resulting in Raymond’s death. LVMPD asserted that Ray-
mond’s injuries were caused by his own negligence, which was
comparatively greater than any negligence of Officer Wicks. Before
trial, LVMPD attempted to exclude testimony from the Yeghiazar-
ian family’s expert, Dr. John E. Baker, P.E., because his conclu-
sion that Officer Wicks was traveling 74 mph was allegedly based
on speculation and generalization. The district court denied the
motion, stating that the discrepancies and purported weaknesses in
Dr. Baker’s report went to the weight of his testimony, not its ad-
missibility. The Yeghiazarian family sought to exclude evidence
of Raymond’s BAC because it was unfairly prejudicial. The district
court agreed, citing LVMPD’s lack of other evidence suggest-
ing intoxication, either by way of a percipient witness or expert
testimony.

The subsequent jury trial lasted five days. It was undisputed that
Officer Wicks was speeding without his warning lights or siren on
at the time of the accident, but the expert witnesses disagreed re-
garding how far over the speed limit he was going. All of the ex-

764 Po

perts agreed, however, that if Officer Wicks had been driving the
posted speed limit, Raymond would have made it through the in-
tersection with time to spare. The jury deliberated for three hours
before returning with a $2 million verdict in favor of the Yeghi-
azarian family. Regarding the parties’ comparative negligence, the
jury found that Officer Wicks was 75-percent negligent and Ray-
mond was 25-percent negligent. The district court applied the
comparative negligence reduction before imposing the mandatory
$50,000 limitation on awards for damages in tort actions against
state entities under NRS 41.035.! Therefore, the district court is-
sued a judgment against LVMPD for $250,000, representing
$50,000 for each of the five plaintiffs. After trial, the Yeghiazar-
ian family requested attorney fees and costs under NRS 17.115 be-
cause LVMPD had rejected their $200,000 offer of judgment four
months before trial. The district court awarded the Yeghiazarian
family $88,104.75 in attorney fees and $9,631.53 in costs and de-
nied LVMPD’s motions for a new trial and to alter or amend the
judgment.

LVMPD now appeals, arguing that the district court (1) should
not have excluded evidence of Raymond’s .049 percent BAC,
(2) should not have permitted Dr. Baker to testify, (3) incorrectly
calculated damages, and (4) abused its discretion in awarding at-
torney fees. We examine each argument in turn.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence
of Raymond’s BAC

LVMPD first argues that the district court abused its discretion
by excluding evidence of Raymond’s alcohol consumption prior to
the accident. LVMPD maintains that the evidence was relevant and
was not so unfairly prejudicial as to substantially outweigh its
probative value. The Yeghiazarian family responds that the district
court correctly excluded the BAC evidence because LVMPD lacked
a percipient witness to testify regarding Raymond’s level of intox-
ication or an expert to testify as to the possible effects of a .049
percent BAC on an individual of Raymond’s age and weight. Here,
we agree with the Yeghiazarian family.

Le

We review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. M.C. Multi-Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale
Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 913, 193 P.3d 536, 544 (2008). The
district court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed ‘‘absent

'The version of NRS 41.035 in existence at the time of the accident pro-
vided for a maximum damages award of $50,000 per claimant. The current
version provides for a maximum damages award of $100,000 per claimant.
2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 512, §§ 3.3, 3.5, at 3024-25.

Po 765

a showing of palpable abuse.’”’ Jd. All relevant evidence is admis-
sible at trial unless otherwise excluded by law or the rules of evi-
dence. NRS 48.025. Evidence is relevant if it has ‘“‘any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” NRS 48.015. Relevant evidence may be ex-
cluded if, among other things, its ‘‘probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the
issues or of misleading the jury.’ NRS 48.035(1).

We recently addressed the admissibility of evidence of alcohol
consumption in FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. 271, 278 P.3d 490
(2012). In that slip-and-fall case, the district court excluded evi-
dence that Giglio, the plaintiff, had consumed two alcoholic drinks
and that a key witness had consumed four alcoholic drinks in the
hour before Giglio’s slip and fall. Id. at 276, 278 P.3d at 493. We
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ex-
cluding evidence of Giglio’s alcohol consumption when no ‘‘causal
link [was demonstrated] between the alleged impairment and the
injury’’ because the evidence was insufficient to show intoxication.
Id. at 285, 278 P.3d at 499. But we concluded that the district
court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that the key wit-
ness consumed alcohol because it was relevant to the reliability of
his perception of the circumstances surrounding Giglio’s slip and
fall. Id.

|

Here, LVMPD attempted to introduce Raymond’s alcohol con-
sumption as substantive evidence, not for impeachment purposes,
and therefore a causal connection between the alleged intoxication
and the accident was necessary. See id. But LVMPD failed to
present any evidence of Raymond’s intoxication other than Ray-
mond’s BAC, which was under the legal limit. Admission of Ray-
mond’s BAC on its own would have required the jury to speculate
as to its effects on Raymond’s reaction time and judgment at the
time of the accident. Thus, Raymond’s BAC alone reflects the fact
that he consumed alcohol but does not establish his level of intox-
ication or impairment at the time of the accident. His BAC is in-
admissible because it is substantially more prejudicial than proba-
tive without other evidence suggesting Raymond’s intoxication or
an expert who can explain to a jury how his BAC, ascertained
hours after the accident, would have affected him at the time of the
accident. Lock v. City of Phila., 895 A.2d 660, 665-66 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2006); see Holderer v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 114
Nev. 845, 852-53, 963 P.2d 459, 464 (1998) (holding that evidence
of driver’s ingestion of a ‘‘strong dose’’ of sleeping pills and anti-
depressants was improperly admitted because the causal connection
between the medication and the accident was mere speculation).

766 Pe

Certainly, if Raymond was-intoxicated at the time of the accident,
that information would have been relevant. See Lock, 895 A.2d at
664-66 (affirming a district court’s admission of evidence of alco-
hol consumption in a factually similar scenario when supported by
evidence of intoxication including slurred speech, glassy eyes, al-
cohol odor on the breath, defendant’s admission of the amount of
alcohol consumed, and testimony from a forensic toxicologist on
the effects of a .134 percent BAC). Since LVMPD lacked other ev-
idence suggesting Raymond’s intoxication at the time of the acci-
dent, we conclude that the district court properly excluded evi-
dence of his BAC.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
Yeghiazarian family’s expert to testify
P|

LVMPD next argues that the Yeghiazarian family’s expert, Dr.
John Baker, should not have been permitted to testify because his
expert report was based on unsound methodology. The Yeghiazar-
ian family responds that Dr. Baker’s opinions were based on a re-
liable methodology, not speculation. We review a district court’s
decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. In re
Mosley, 120 Nev. 908, 921, 102 P.3d 555, 564 (2004). We will
only grant a new trial if LVMPD’s substantial rights were affected
by error. Brown v. Capanna, 105 Nev. 665, 672, 782 P.2d 1299,
1304 (1989); see NRS 47.040 (‘‘[E]rror may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a sub-
stantial right of the party is affected.’’”). Here, we agree with the
Yeghiazarian family.

NRS 50.275 provides that ‘‘[i]f scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or educa-
tion may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge.”
This court has distilled this statute into three main requirements for
admissible expert testimony: (1) qualification, (2) assistance, and
(3) limited scope. Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189
P.3d 646, 650 (2008). The assistance requirement asks whether the
proposed expert’s testimony is relevant and the product of reliable
methodology. Id. at 500, 189 P.3d at 651. In determining whether
the testimony is a product of reliable methodology, the district
court considers whether the opinion is ‘‘(1) within a recognized
field of expertise; (2) testable and has been tested; (3) published
and subjected to peer review; (4) generally accepted in the
scientific community . . . ; and (5) based more on particularized

161

facts rather than assumption, conjecture, or generalization.’”’ Jd. at
500-01, 189 P.3d at 651-52 (footnotes omitted).

LVMPD argues that Dr. Baker’s opinion was unreliable under
the fifth factor because it was based on speculation and conjecture.
LVMPD contends that Dr. Baker did not examine the scene of the
accident or inspect the vehicles after the collision and relied ex-
clusively on reports and photographs. LVMPD also argues that Dr.
Baker should have relied on the shorter measurement of skid marks
instead of the longer measurement when discrepancies existed be-
tween the reports. LYMPD contends that Dr. Baker should have
compared his findings to eyewitness accounts and Officer Wicks’
deposition testimony.

‘We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Dr. Baker’s testimony was the product of reliable
methodology under Hallmark. Dr. Baker, like LVMPD’s expert,
was not retained until years after the accident. Dr. Baker relied on
reports, diagrams, and pictures produced by LVMPD. The fact that
Dr. Baker chose to use the longer measurement instead of the
shorter measurement for the skid marks was an appropriate topic
for cross-examination. Further, the disagreement among Dr. Baker
and others regarding Officer Wicks’ pre-braking speed was
founded on whether the figures from the “‘black box’’ in Officer
Wicks’ patrol car or from the airbag accelerometer were more re-
liable in determining impact speed—also an appropriate topic for
cross-examination. The record indicates that Dr. Baker was able to
calculate to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty the vehicles’
starting positions, their pre-braking and impact speeds, and the
general angle at which the vehicles collided. Therefore, we cannot
say the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Baker to
testify. .

The district court correctly calculated damages under NRS 41.035.

After the jury’s verdict, the district court applied comparative
negligence to reduce the jury’s $2 million verdict to $1.5 million
prior to reducing the jury award to the statutory maximum of
$50,000 for each of the five plaintiffs under NRS 41.035, for a
total award of $250,000. LVMPD argues that this method of cal-
culation failed to take into account the 25-percent reduction in
damages for Raymond’s comparative negligence. The Yeghiazarian
family responds that the district court correctly reduced the $2 mil-
lion verdict by 25 percent to reflect Yeghiazarian’s comparative
negligence before reducing the amount to the statutory maximum.
As a question of law, we review issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. State, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Taylor-Caldwell, 126 Nev.
132, 134, 229 P.3d 471, 472 (2010). We agree with the Yeghi-
azarian family.

768 Po

NRS 41.141(1) provides that a plaintiff's comparative negli-
gence does not bar recovery so long as his or her negligence was
not greater than the negligence of the defendants. The jury is
required to return a general verdict with the total amount of dam-
ages the plaintiff is entitled to recover without considering com-
parative negligence, plus a special verdict indicating the respec-
tive percentages of negligence attributable to each party. NRS
41.141(2)(b)(1), (2). The version of NRS 41.035(1) that was in ef-
fect at the time of the accident provided that awards for damages
in tort actions filed against state entities ‘‘may not exceed the sum
of $50,000.” This ‘‘statutory cap on the damages the state must
pay for its tortious conduct furthers a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the state treasury.’ Arnesano y. State ex rel. Dep’t of
Transp., 113 Nev. 815, 819, 942 P.2d 139, 142 (1997), abrogated
in part on other grounds by Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev.
433, 168 P.3d 720 (2007). We have previously defined ‘‘damages”’
under NRS 41.035(1) as:

“A pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be re-
covered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or
rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of
another. A sum of money awarded to a person injured by the
tort of another. Restatement, Second, Torts, § 12A. Money
compensation sought or awarded as a remedy for a breach of
contract or for tortious acts.’”

Arnesano, 113 Nev. at 821, 942 P.2d at 143 (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 389 (6th ed. 1990)). An ‘‘award’’ is ‘“‘[a] final judg-
ment or decision, esp. one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing
damages.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary 157 (9th ed. 2009).

| |

The jury’s award in this case encompassed the amount of the
general verdict minus the percentage of comparative negligence
that the jury noted on its special verdict form—in this case the $2
million general verdict less Raymond’s 25-percent fault rendered a
final jury award of $1.5 million. Under NRS 41.035(1), the jury’s
award could not exceed $50,000 per plaintiff, so the district court
correctly interpreted the statute to reduce the award after adjusting
for Raymond’s comparative negligence. See State v. Eaton, 101
Nev. 705, 709-11, 710 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (1985) (holding that
the district court properly subtracted the amount the plaintiff re-
ceived for releasing other co-defendants before reducing the jury
verdict to the statutory maximum), overruled on other grounds by

es 769

State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Hill, 114 Nev. 810, 818, 963 P.2d
480, 485 (1998). Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly applied comparative negligence and NRS 41.035(1).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney
fees

The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Yeghi-
azarian family because LVMPD rejected the Yeghiazarian family’s
$200,000 offer of judgment and the Yeghiazarian family
obtained a judgment of $250,000 against LVMPD. NRS
17.115(4)(d)(3) provides that if a party who rejects an offer of
judgment fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the district
court may order that party to pay the “‘reasonable attorney’s fees’’
that the other party incurs from the date of service of the offer to
the date of entry of the judgment. See also NRCP 68(f)(2) (stating
that ‘‘[i]f the offeree rejects an offer [of judgment] and fails to ob-
tain a more favorable judgment, . . . the offeree shall pay the
offeror’s post-offer costs . . . and reasonable attorney’s fees’’).

LVMPD argues that $34,034.75 of the $88,104.75 attorney fees
award was for the work of “‘office staff?’ and that the Yeghiazar-
ian family should therefore only be able to recover $54,070, the
amount charged by attorneys Marc Sagesse and his associate
Robert Flummerfelt. LVMPD urges us to adopt the dissenting
opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 295-98 (1989)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), which opined that nonattorney staff
charges are not part of a ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fee.” The Yeghi-
azarian family argues that nonattorney staff costs are recoverable
because they are part of a reasonable attorney fee and promote
cost-effective litigation. We agree with the Yeghiazarian family. We
review an award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discre-
tion. Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, 125 Nev. 556, 562, 216 P.3d 788,
792 (2009).

We decline LVMPD’s invitation to adopt the dissenting opinion
in Jenkins. Rather, we agree with the majority opinion in that case,
which stated that

[A] ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fee’? cannot have been meant to
compensate only work performed personally by members of
the bar. Rather, the term must refer to a reasonable fee for the
work product of an attorney. Thus, the fee must take into ac-
count the work not only of attorneys, but also of secretaries,
messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor con-
tributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her
client . . . . We thus take as our starting point the self-evident

70 Pe

proposition that the ‘‘reasonable attorney’s fee’’ provided for
by statute should compensate the work of paralegals, as well
as that of attorneys.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285. Further, the use of paralegals and other
nonattorney staff reduces litigation costs, so long as they are billed
at a lower rate. Id. at 288. The Ninth Circuit and other jurisdic-

tions have also adopted this position. See Richlin Sec’y Serv. Co.

v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 580-83 (2007) (reaffirming Jenkins);

Trs. of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Red-

land Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (‘‘[Flees for
work performed by nonattorneys such as paralegals may be billed
separately, at market rates, if this is the prevailing practice in a
given community’? (internal quotations omitted)); U.S. Football
League v. Nat'l Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir.

1989) (‘‘Paralegals’ time is includable in an award of attorney’s
fees.’”’); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.

Programs, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1976) (‘Paralegals can
do some of the work that the attorney would have to do anyway
and can do it at substantially less cost per hour’’); Guinn v. Dot-

son, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 413 (Ct. App. 1994) (reasonable at-

torney fees include necessary support services for attorneys). As.
NRS 17.115(4)(4)(3) and NRCP 68(f)(2) both refer to ‘“‘teasonable
attorney’s fees,’’ we conclude that this phrase includes charges for
persons such as paralegals and law clerks. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by including
charges for these services in its calculation of attorney fees.

P|

But while the district court analyzed whether the hourly rate
charged by Mr. Saggese was reasonable, it failed to evaluate
whether Mr. Flummerfelt’s, the paralegals’, or the office staff’s
hourly rates were reasonable under the circumstances. We there-
fore vacate the attorney fees award and remand this case to the dis-
trict court for further analysis of the claims for attorney fees from
Mr. Flummerfelt, the paralegals, and the office staff pursuant to
the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85
Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and con-
clude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s judgment, affirm in part and vacate in part the district
court’s post-judgment order, and remand this matter to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Douctas and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

T

HALEY BROOKSBY; TYSON BROOKSBY; anp TREY
BROOKSBY, APPELLANTS, v. NEVADA STATE BANK, A
NEVADA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

No. 58006

November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 501

Steven W. Shaw, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Appellants.

Gordon Silver and Erika A. Pike Turner and Joel Z. Schwarz,
Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and Curry, JJ.

™ po

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

A judgment creditor may garnish only a debtor’s funds that are
held in a joint bank account, not the funds in the account owned
solely by the nondebtor. In post-judgment proceedings below, a
judgment creditor garnished the funds in bank accounts held by the
judgment debtor jointly with her nondebtor children. The children,
claiming that the garnished funds belonged to them alone, objected
and petitioned the district court for relief, but the district court
summarily denied their petition. Because the children’s claims to
the funds were timely and properly made, we reverse the district
court’s decision and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the garnished funds actually belong, and thus
must be returned, to the nondebtor children.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants Haley, Tyson, and Trey Brooksby are the children of
judgment debtors who, as guarantors of a commercial loan, owe
respondent Nevada State Bank on a $4.1 million post-foreclosure
judgment. Nevada State Bank executed on the judgment through
writs of execution and garnishment of the judgment debtors’ Wells
Fargo bank accounts. Although the writs and instructions did not
mention the Brooksby children’s Wells Fargo bank accounts, those
accounts were held jointly with their mother and thus were levied
as well. According to the Brooksby children, their Wells Fargo
bank accounts were established when they were minors and held
funds that belonged to them alone—money given to them as birth-
day presents, college scholarships, and wages they earned from odd
jobs while in high school.! The Brooksby children were not served
with the writs of execution and garnishment, but upon noticing that
their funds had been seized, they began corresponding with Wells
Fargo and Nevada State Bank.

When their use of informal means failed to result in the return
of funds, they made verified claims for wrongful execution and pe-
titioned the district court for a hearing in the deficiency/guarantor
action between their parents and Nevada State Bank. The verified
claims were not served on the constable who had served the writs
of execution and garnishment, however, and upon Nevada State
Bank’s objection, the children made renewed verified claims one
month later, which were mailed to the constable. The next month,
without a hearing, the district court denied the Brooksby children’s
petition and claims; the district court minutes indicate only that the
pleading was improper. Unclear on why their petition and claims

‘At the relevant time, Haley, Tyson, and Trey were 19, 17, and 15 years old,
respectively.

Se

Pe m™

were denied but presuming that it was based on Nevada State
Bank’s objection to lack of proper service on the constable, two
days later, the Brooksby children filed renewed claims and, shortly
thereafter, another petition for the return of their account funds
under NRS 21.120 (third-party claims concerning writs of gar-
nishment in aid of execution) and NRS 31.070 (third-party claims
statute). Again without holding a hearing, the district court denied
their claims and petition, this time stating that the claims were un-
timely. The Brooksby children appealed.

DISCUSSION

In their appeal, the Brooksby children argue that bank account
funds held jointly by a judgment debtor and a nondebtor are sub-
ject to levy by a judgment creditor only to the extent that they are
owned by the judgment debtor and thus do not constitute property
belonging solely to the nondebtor. We agree.

Le

Only property owned by the judgment debtor is subject to gar-
nishment, and questions regarding title to that property as be-
tween the judgment creditor and a third party are properly deter-
mined by the court having jurisdiction under NRS 31.070. NRS
31.249(2); Kulik v. Albers, Inc., 91 Nev. 134, 137, 532 P.2d 603,
605-06 (1975); see also NRS 21.120 (referring third-party claims
concerning writs of garnishment in aid of execution to the NRS
31.070 process). In line with this ownership rule, a majority of
courts, under a variety of theories, have held that a judgment
creditor is not entitled to joint bank account funds that truly belong
to someone other than the judgment debtor. See, e.g., Maloy v.
Stuttgart Mem’! Hosp., 872 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Ark. 1994) (noting
that this appears to be the majority view and citing Traders Travel
Int’l, Inc. v. Howser, 753 P.2d 244 (Haw. 1988)); Triplett v. Brunt-
Ward Chevrolet, Inc., 812 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001); Jemko, Inc. v. Liaghat, 738 P.2d 922, 924-25 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1987); Union Props., Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 N.E.2d
638, 641 (Ohio 1949); Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 439 P.2d
468, 469 (Utah 1968); Martha A. Churchill, Annotation, Joint
Bank Account as Subject to Attachment, Garnishment, or Execu-
tion by Creditor of One Joint Depositor, 86 A.L.R. 5th 527
(2001). We agree that, under Kulik and the authority cited above,
Nevada State Bank is not entitled to retain any funds owned solely
by the Brooksby children and garnished from their joint bank ac-
counts with the judgment debtors.

Nevada State Bank argues, however, that the Brooksby chil-
dren’s claims were properly denied because they were untimely
made under NRS 31.070, after the constable delivered the funds to

m4 Po

the judgment creditor. NRS 31.070(1) provides that, if a third-
party claim is served upon the sheriff (or constable), the judgment
creditor has seven days in which to give the sheriff an undertaking,
or else the sheriff must release the property.to the third party. If no
verified third-party claim is served on the sheriff, the sheriff is not
liable for taking or keeping the property. Jd. The NRS 31.070 time
limits—both to make a verified claim while the property is still in
the sheriff’s hands and to make an undertaking—are designed to
protect the sheriff from liability, but nowhere does that statute in-
clude an absolute deadline for making a third-party claim to the
property before a court, especially when, as here, the third party
is not served with notice of the writs of execution and garnishment.
See Kulik, 91 Nev. at 138, 532 P.2d at 606 (noting that the un-
dertaking portions of NRS 31.070 provide for interim relief; they
do not affect the district court’s jurisdiction). The Brooksby chil-
dren sought return of the funds within a few days of their accounts
being garnished, first informally and then, when that proved un-
successful, by filing claims and a petition for relief about three
months later. Therefore, it appears that the Brooksby children
timely sought relief in the district court. Further, the Brooksby
children do not assert that the joint bank accounts were exempt
from garnishment, but that the funds therein are not available to
satisfy the demands of their parents’ judgment creditors because
the funds do not belong to their parents. Thus, Nevada State
Bank’s argument that joint bank accounts are not exempt from gar-
nishment is irrelevant. Nor do we see any procedural impediment
to the district court’s resolution of the Brooksby children’s renewed
verified claims and petition.?

Because the Brooksby children appear to have made proper and
timely claims asserting ownership of the garnished funds, they
should have an opportunity to demonstrate, in an evidentiary hear-
ing, that the funds are owned by them, not the judgment debtors,
and thus are not subject to garnishment by Nevada State Bank. See
Maloy, 872 S.W.2d at 402 (explaining that all funds in joint bank
accounts are presumptively subject to garnishment by the judgment
creditor of one of the account holders, but that the account hold-
ers may rebut that presumption in an evidentiary hearing by show-
ing that a nondebtor actually owns some or all of the funds). For
these reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying the
Brooksby children’s petition for a hearing and claims concerning
the return of the bank account funds and remand this matter to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Harpesty and Cuerry, JJ., concur.

4p light of this conclusion, we need not reach the parties’ arguments con-
cerning the first order denying the Brooksby children’s original petition.

715

THE STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION,
APPELLANT, v. MASCO BUILDER CABINET GROUP ppa
QUALITY CABINETS OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 60342
November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 475

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Blake A. Doerr,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Appellant.

Justice Law Center and Bret O. Whipple, Las Vegas, for
Respondent.

|

716

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Harpzsty, J.:

In 2011, this court affirmed a district court order granting re-
spondent Masco Builder Cabinet Group a tax refund for overpaid
taxes. Thereafter, appellant State of Nevada Department of Taxa-
tion refused to pay interest on Masco’s tax refund, arguing that
(1) Masco failed to demand interest in its initial refund claim, thus
waiving its right to interest; and (2) NRS 372.665 permits the De-
partment to withhold interest on tax refunds owed due to the tax-
payer’s intentional or careless overpayment, and because no deter-
mination as to the applicability of that provision had been made by
the Department, no refund is due at this time. We reject both ar-
guments and affirm the district court’s order awarding interest.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Masco filed a claim with the Department for a refund of over-
paid taxes. The Department denied Masco’s claim, and Masco lit-
igated the matter before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who
concluded that Masco was entitled to a refund. The Department
appealed the decision to the Tax Commission, which reversed the
ALI’s decision. Masco then filed a petition for judicial review in
the district court, and the district court reversed the Tax Commis-
sion’s decision, resulting in a refund award. The Department then
appealed to this court. In State, Department of Taxation v. Masco
Builder Cabinet Group, 127 Nev. 730, 265 P.3d 666 (2011), we

ee

affirmed the district court’s order concluding that Masco was en-
titled to a tax refund as initially granted by the ALJ.

According to Masco, after this court’s decision it sought the sta-
tus of the tax refund and interest from the Department. Without a
response from the Department, Masco filed a motion in the district
court for judgment on the refund. In that motion, Masco also ar-
gued that it was entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest pursuant
to the general tax statutes of NRS Chapter 360 and the sales and
use tax statutes of NRS Chapter 372. The Department opposed
Masco’s motion, contending that Masco failed to request interest
prior to this court’s final ruling, thus waiving its right to do so.
Additionally, the Department argued that any interest allowed
under the tax statutes was limited by the Department’s right under
NRS 372.665 to deny interest if it determined that an ‘‘overpay-
ment [of taxes] has been made intentionally or by reason of care-
lessness.’’ NRS 372.665. Because the Department had not had an
opportunity to determine whether interest was barred by intentional
or careless overpayment, the Department asserted that the district
court could not award interest at this point.

The district court granted Masco’s request for pre- and post-
judgment interest, finding that the taxpayer is not required to af-
firmatively request interest. The district court also found that the
Department should have made a determination of whether Masco
acted intentionally or carelessly under NRS 372.665 when it was
finally determined that Masco was entitled to a refund, and be-
cause no such determination was made at that time, Masco was
now entitled to interest upon its post-judgment motion request. The
Department appeals.

DISCUSSION
| ee)

We are asked to determine whether Masco waived its right to
seek interest because it failed to demand interest in its initial tax
refund claim, and whether NRS 372.665 permits the Department
to withhold interest on the tax refund until it determines whether
Masco’s ‘‘overpayment [of taxes] has been made intentionally or
by reason of carelessness’? under NRS 372.665. Whether and
under what circumstances interest is required on a tax refund is a
question of law, and this court reviews questions of law de novo.
Schettler v. RalRon Capital Corp., 128 Nev. 209, 214, 275 P.3d
933, 936 (2012); see also Hardy Cos., Inc. v. SNMARK, L.L.C.,
126 Nev. 528, 533, 245 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2010). We conclude, as
a matter of law, that Masco did not waive its right to seek interest
and that the interest is due and must be calculated at the time when
the amount of the tax refund required to be paid is determined, un-

| rs

less the Department determines at that time that interest is barred
under NRS 372.665. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
order.

Masco did not waive its right to seek interest by failing to demand
interest in its initial refund claim

P|

The Department argues that Masco did not request interest on
its overpayment in its petition for redetermination before the ALJ,
and that failure to do so prevented a determination of whether in-
terest was barred under NRS 372.665. Masco contends that it re-
quested interest before the Tax Commission when it specifically re-
quested that the Tax Commission grant Masco’s refund ‘‘along
with statutorily mandated interest.’ Masco further argues that, re-
gardless, the tax statutes, specifically NRS 360.2937 and 372.660,
generally mandate interest on all refunds of overpayments, includ-
ing the one awarded to Masco.

P|

To determine whether Masco waived its right to interest by fail-
ing to demand it in its original refund request, we conduct a statu-
tory analysis of the applicable tax statutes. This court looks to the
plain language of a statute when interpreting its meaning and leg-
islative intent. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fackett, 125 Nev. 132, 138, 206
P.3d 572, 576 (2009). Statutory language that is unambiguous ‘‘is
given ‘its ordinary meaning unless it is clear that this meaning was
not intended.’ ’’ State Tax Comm'n v. Am. Home Shield, 127 Nev.
382, 386, 254 P.3d 601, 603 (2011) (quoting Dep’t of Taxation v.
DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., L.L.C., 121 Nev. 541, 543, 119
P.3d 135, 136 (2005).

P|

Tax statutes must explicitly state their meaning and will not be
stretched beyond what is stated. Id.; State, Dep't of Taxation v. Vi-
sual Comme’ns, Inc., 108 Nev. 721, 725, 836 P.2d 1245, 1247
(1992). *‘Statutes must be construed as a whole, and phrases may
not be read in isolation to defeat the purpose behind the statute.’”’
Am. Home Shield, 127 Nev. at 386, 254 P.3d at 604; see also S.
Nev. Homebuilders v. Clark Cnty., 121 Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.3d
171, 173 (2005). ‘‘A specific statute controls over a general
statute.’ Am. Home Shield, 127 Nev. at 388, 254 P.3d at 605.

Here, construing these unambiguous statutes as a whole, we
conclude that NRS 360.2937 and NRS 372.660 grant interest upon
the final determination by the Department of overpaid taxes. NRS
360.2937 provides in pertinent part that ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise
provided . . . interest must be paid upon an overpayment of any
tax provided for in. . . [NRS Chapter] 372.’ (Emphasis added.)
Within the NRS Chapter 372 sales and use tax statutes, NRS

7

372.660 states that ‘‘{e]xcept as otherwise provided in NRS
360.320 or any other specific statute,” interest must be paid upon
any overpayment of any amount of tax at the rate set forth in, and
in accordance with the provisions of, NRS 360.2937.’ (Emphasis
added.) There is nothing in these statutes requiring Masco to af-
firmatively request interest on its overpayment before the ALJ or
even before the Department. Therefore, we conclude that Masco
was not required to make this request, and thus did not waive its
sight to seek statutory interest by failing to do so before seeking re-
lief in the district court.?

The Department may not withhold interest on tax refunds when it
has failed to timely make a determination under NRS 372.665

NRS 372.665 provides that ‘‘[i]f the Department determines that
any overpayment has been made intentionally or by reason of care-
Jessness, it may not allow any interest on it.’ The Department ar-
gues that, even if Masco’s failure to raise the interest issue ad-
ministratively did not bar its right to seek interest, the award of
interest by the district court was premature under the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine. In other words, the Department
argues that because it has not yet determined whether an exception
to the interest statutes applies under NRS 372.665, the district
court lacked authority to award interest. We reject this argument
for two reasons.

a

First, the exhaustion doctrine provides that, before seeking ju-
dicial relief, a petitioner must exhaust any and all available ad-
ministrative remedies, so as to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to correct mistakes and perhaps avoid judicial inter-
vention altogether. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565,
571-72, 170 P.3d 989, 993-94 (2007). While the exhaustion doc-
trine applies in this matter because the Department statutorily
maintains original jurisdiction in all claims for tax refunds, see
NRS 372.680 (addressing the administrative process), we have
concluded that interest is due on any overpayment with no need to
file a separate claim. Thus, Masco fully complied with the doc-
trine in this case.

Second, NRS 372.665 is silent as to when the Department must
make its determination that the overpayment was made intention-

'NRS 360.320 governs offset calculations and is not relevant here. The only
asserted exception is NRS 372.665, which is discussed later in this opinion.

For the same reason—that no ‘‘claim’’ is required—the interest is not
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. See Five Star Capital Corp. v.
Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1052, 194 P.3d 709, 711 (2008).

780 Po

ally or carelessly. Because the statute provides a basis for cancel-
ing the Department’s obligation to pay statutory interest and
the issues of intentional or careless overpayment are inextricably
intertwined with the reasons for the claim, we hold that the De-
partment’s: determination under NRS 372.665 should be made
during the administrative review of the taxpayer’s claim, and no
later than the date that the refund amount is determined. It is at
that time that the interest is due under NRS 360.2937 and NRS
372.660 and the full refund amount must be calculated. See gen-
erally NRS 360.320 (explaining that interest must be computed and
used in calculating offsets of certain overpayments).

While NRS 372.665 provides a basis for the Department to
avoid paying interest, the burden rests on the Department to timely
make the necessary determination under that statute. Here, the De-
partment failed to timely determine whether Masco acted inten-
tionally or carelessly. The Department should have made this de-
termination during the administrative process, at the time that the
ALJ was considering the evidence and arguments concerning the
claim. Thus, we determine that the district court did not err in
awarding Masco statutory interest on its overpayment. With regard
to the amount awarded, we decline to consider the Department’s
argument that the district court applied the wrong rate, because the
Department failed to contest the requested rate in the district court.
See In re AMERCO Derivative Litig., 127 Nev. 196, 217 n.6, 252
P.3d 681, 697 n.6 (2011) (‘‘[Wle decline to address an issue
raised for the first time on appeal.’”’). Accordingly, the judgment of
the district court is affirmed.

PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

CARLOS R. ELIZONDO, AppELLANT, v. HOOD MACHINE,
INC.; AND EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NEVADA, RESPONDENTS.

No. 61229
November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 479

Po 781
PO

Evan B. Beavers, Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers, and

Mary Bartell, Deputy Attorney for Injured Workers, Carson City,
for Appellant.

Beckett, Yott, McCarty & Spann, Chtd., and James A.
McCarty, Reno, for Respondents.

782 Po

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the appeals
officer’s conclusory order in a workers’ compensation matter failed
to meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125, and whether
the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion apply to require dis-
missal of Carlos Elizondo’s fourth request to reopen an industrial
injury claim under NRS 616C.390. We conclude that the appeals
officer’s order was procedurally deficient and that the appeals of-
ficer erred by applying the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion
to bar Elizondo’s request to reopen his claim. Therefore, we re-
verse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While employed by respondent Hood Machine, appellant Carlos
Elizondo sustained an abdominal injury in 2000 and filed an in-
dustrial injury claim. Hood Machine’s insurer, respondent Em-
ployers Insurance Company of Nevada (EICON), accepted the
claim at least partly based upon a CT scan that indicated a poten-
tial left inguinal hernia.! The record is not entirely clear as to what
then transpired, but it appears that after evaluation and treatment,
no evidence of a hernia was found. In 2001, Dr. Susan Ramos con-
cluded that Elizondo was stable and ratable. Thereafter, the physi-
cian who conducted Elizondo’s permanent partial disability (PPD)
examination gave him a zero-percent disability rating, and EICON
closed his claim later that same year.

Prior requests to reopen claim

On three prior occasions, Elizondo requested that his claim be
reopened, all of which requests were denied. In 2002, his request
to reopen was based upon opinions from physicians, including Dr.
Ramos, that he should have further testing because of the contin-
ued abdominal pain he was experiencing. After that claim was de-
nied, he again sought to reopen the claim in 2004, this time using
the report of a different doctor, which stated that he did in fact
have a left inguinal hernia. However, this doctor could not state

'The record in this case does not contain the supporting documents for the
original claim, and subsequent claims and denials. Furthermore, the appeals
officer’s decision at issue in this case made no findings of fact as to what tran-
spired concerning the original and prior claims. Therefore, this court must rely
on statements made by the parties in briefs and motions for the majority of
these facts.

a 789

whether the hernia was related to the injury suffered in 2000, and
the claim was again denied.

In 2007, Elizondo again sought to reopen his claim. This time
he presented a new opinion from Dr. Ramos where she stated that
the small hernia originally was not easily found but was now eas-
ily identifiable. Dr. Ramos provided her belief that the hernia re-
Jated back to the original injury in 2000. The claim was again de-
nied, and Elizondo petitioned the district court for judicial review
of the denial. In denying Elizondo’s petition, the district court rea-
soned that Elizondo had ‘“‘failed to produce any evidence that the
primary cause of the change of circumstances [was] the injury for
which the claim was originally made,’ and that ‘“‘no doctor has
stated that the hernia is a result of the injury that occurred in
2000,’’ and thus, substantial evidence supported the appeals offi-
cer’s determination.

Elizondo appealed the district court’s order, and this court af-
firmed the denial of judicial review, explaining, similarly to the
district court, that ‘‘none of the medical reports that were properly
before the appeal[ Js officer concluded that [Elizondo]’s original
injury in 2000 was the primary cause of the hernia,’ and therefore,
substantial evidence supported the determination.

Fourth request to reopen claim

In 2011, Elizondo filed a fourth request to reopen his claim. In
this request, Elizondo included a letter dated July 19, 2011, from
Dr. Ramos. In her letter, Dr. Ramos opined that Elizondo ‘‘has a
definite left inguinal hernia,’ and ‘‘that this hernia is a result of
the original injury[,] and the claim should be reopened[,] and he
should have the hernia fixed.’ Elizondo’s fourth request was again
denied by EICON.

Elizondo again administratively appealed the denial of his re-
quest, and the hearing officer affirmed the denial. The hearing of-
ficer explained that ‘‘[t]he medical reporting from Dr. Ramos is a
reaffirmation of her prior opinion regarding causation and does not
meet the requirements of NRS 616C.390. The standard required
for admissibility of an expert opinion regarding causation is a
‘reasonable degree of medical probability’ ’’ Elizondo then ad-
ministratively appealed from the hearing officer’s decision. Before
the appeals officer, EICON moved to dismiss, arguing that Eli-
zondo was precluded from reopening his claim under the doctrine
of res judicata. In a short order, without providing any factual and
legal explanation, the appeals officer granted EICON’s motion to
dismiss, summarily concluding that:

The Employers Insurance Company of Nevada (EICN) filed
its Motion to Dismiss on January 9, 2012. The Claimant filed
his Opposition on January 27, 2012. EICN filed its Reply on
February 6, 2012.

784 Po

After careful consideration of all of the pleadings and papers
on file, and for good cause, the Appeals Officer adopts the ar-
guments of the Insurer, and therefore, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED.

Elizondo filed a petition for judicial review and argued before
the district court that the appeals officer’s order failed to meet the
statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 and that it was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. EICON contended that Elizondo
had repeatedly failed to state a new cause of action allowing him
to withstand application of the doctrine of res judicata and to re-
litigate his request to reopen his claim. In denying the petition, the
district court concluded that because ‘‘Elizondo has not stated a
new cause of action that can withstand the application of res judi-
cata, whether applying issue or claim preclusion, as both of those
theories preclude the re-litigation of his request for reopening,”
there was no error of Jaw in the appeals officer’s decision. Eli-
zondo now appeals.

DISCUSSION

P|

On appeal, ‘‘[t]he standard for reviewing petitions for judicial
review of administrative decisions is the same for this court as it is
for the district court.’ City of N. Las Vegas v. Warburton, 127
Nev. 682, 686, 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011); see also City of Reno v.
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of N. Nev., 127 Nev. 114, 119,
251 P.3d 718, 721 (2011) (‘“We do not give any deference to the
district court decision when reviewing an order regarding a petition
for judicial review.’) ‘We review an administrative agency’s fac-
tual findings ‘for clear error or an arbitrary abuse of discretion’
and will only overturn those findings if they are not supported by
substantial evidence.’ Warburton, 127 Nev. at 686, 262 P.3d at
718 (quoting Day v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 121 Nev. 387, 389,
116 P.3d 68, 69 (2005)). ‘‘Substantial evidence exists if a reason-
able person could find the evidence adequate to support the
agency’s conclusion.”’ Law Offices of Barry Levinson v. Milko, 124
Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 384 (2008). This court ‘‘will ‘not
reweigh the evidence or revisit an appeals officer’s credibility de-
termination’ ”’ City of Las Vegas v. Lawson, 126 Nev. 567, 571,
245 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2010) (quoting Milko, 124 Nev. at 362, 184
P.3d at 384),

A de novo standard of review is applied when this court ad-
dresses a question of Jaw, ‘‘including the administrative construc-
tion of statutes.’ Holiday Ret. Corp. v. State, Div. of Indus. Rela-
tions, 128 Nev. 150, 153, 274 P.3d 759, 761 (2012); Sierra Nev.

Po 785

Adm’rs v. Negriev, 128 Nev. 478, 481, 285 P.3d 1056, 1058
(2012). ‘‘Like the district court, [this court] decide[s] ‘pure legal
questions without deference to an agency determination. ”’ City of
Reno, 127 Nev. at 119, 251 P.3d at 721 (quoting Jones v. Rosner,
102 Nev. 215, 217, 719 P.2d 805, 806 (1986).

The appeals officer’s order failed to meet the statutory’
requirements of NRS 233B.125

Elizondo argues that the appeals officer’s order fails to meet the
statutory requirements of NRS 233B.125 because the order sum-
marily dismissed Elizondo’s claim and does not include any spe-
cific findings of fact or citation to the law that the appeals officer
zelied on in reaching her conclusion. Furthermore, Elizondo as-
serts that the order fails to support its final determination by ap-
plying the facts to the law. We agree.

NRS 233B.125 governs adverse written orders in administrative
proceedings and states, in pertinent part, that ‘‘a final decision
must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately
stated.’ (Emphasis added.) As we have consistently recognized,
“factual findings not only help ensure that the administrative
agency engages in reasoned decision making, but they also facili-
tate judicial review.’ Dickinson v. Am. Med. Response, 124 Nev.
460, 469, 186 P.3d 878, 884 (2008). Factual findings enable the
courts to evaluate the administrative decision without intruding on
the agency’s fact-finding function. Id.

Here, under the plain and unambiguous language of NRS
233B.125, the appeals officer’s order should have ‘‘include[d]
findings of fact and conclusions .of law, separately stated.’ See
Warburton, 127 Nev. at 686, 262 P.3d at 718 (stating that this
court will not look beyond statutory Janguage that is plain and un-
ambiguous). Instead, the appeals officer’s order made reference to
and generally adopted EICON’s arguments as pleaded in its motion
to dismiss. There is no indication in the record that EICON in-
tended for its motion to dismiss to serve as ‘‘proposed findings of
fact,’ and even if such intended purpose existed, the appeals offi-
cer failed to ‘‘include a ruling upon each proposed finding,’’ as re-
quired by NRS 233B.125. Without any findings, it is not clear
upon which facts the appeals officer relied in determining that
claim or issue preclusion applied here.

Therefore, we conclude that the appeals officer’s order fails to
meet the statutory requirements of NRS 233B,125 and is thus pro-
cedurally deficient. Because the appeals officer’s order is deficient,
it precludes adequate review on appeal and prevents this court from
determining whether Elizondo’s substantial rights were violated.

786 Po

See NRS 233B.135(3) (stating that remand may be necessary ‘‘if
substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced’).

The appeals officer erred in applying the doctrines of claim and
issue preclusion to bar Elizondo’s request to reopen his workers’
compensation claim pursuant to NRS 616C.390

Elizondo argues that his statutory right under NRS 616C.390 to
request a reopening of his claim cannot be defeated by the appli-
cation of res judicata—either claim or issue preclusion’—because
such application has been rejected by this court in Jerry’s Nugget
y. Keith, 111 Nev. 49, 888 P.2d 921 (1995). EICON contends that
the application of preclusion principles in an administrative pro-
ceeding does not violate any statutory or procedural law and does
not constitute an error of law.

NRS 616C.390 governs the reopening of industrial injury
claims. Upon written application, the insurer is required to reopen
a claim if:

(a) A change of circumstances warrants an increase or re-
arrangement of compensation during the life of the claimant;

(b) The primary cause of the change of circumstances is the
injury for which the claim was originally made; and

(c) The application is accompanied by the certificate of
a physician or a chiropractor showing a change of circum-
stances which would warrant an increase or rearrangement of
compensation.

NRS 616C.390(1). In Jerry’s Nugget, this court considered
whether an employee’s request to reopen his workers’ compen-
sation claim under this statute could be barred by the doctrines
of issue and claim preclusion. 111 Nev. at 54-55, 888 P.2d at
925. This court specifically addressed the application of NRS
616.012(3),* which provides that the provisions of the workers’

*Res judicata encompasses two doctrines: (1) claim preclusion and (2) issue
preclusion. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1051-52, 194
P.3d 709, 711 (2008). “{C]laim preclusion may apply in a suit to preclude
both claims that were or could have been raised in a prior suit, while issue
preclusion would not preclude those issues not raised in the prior suit.” Id. at
1056, 194 P.3d at 714. This court has adopted the terms of claim preclusion
and issue preclusion, over the use of ‘“‘res judicata.’ Id. at 1054, 194 P.3d at
713.

*The court in Jerry’s Nugget was interpreting NRS 616.545, which was
renumbered as NRS 616C.390, the statute at issue here. However, the language
of NRS 616.545, the statute pertinent to the analysis in Jerry’s Nugget, was
not altered in the enumeration to NRS 616C.390.

4NRS 616.012 has also been renumbered since the decision in Jerry’s
Nugget and is now NRS 616A.010, but the language remains the same.

Po 781

compensation statutes “‘ ‘are based on a renunciation of the rights
and defenses of employers and employees recognized at common
law’ ”’ Id. at 55, 888 P.2d at 925 (quoting NRS 616.012(3), which
has been renumbered as NRS 616A.010). While we questioned the
Legislature’s intent to completely bar issue and claim preclusion in
the workers’ compensation context, we nevertheless concluded
that the Legislature intended the terms of the workers’ compensa-
tion statutes to control the awarding or denial of benefits, which
prevents use of the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion as de-
fenses to reopening a claim if an employee can show a change in
circumstance. Id.

|

Issue and claim preclusion are common law doctrines used as
defenses to bar the relitigation of claims or issues previously liti-
gated. See Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054,
194 P.3d 709, 712 (2008) (defining the test in Nevada for when
claim and issue preclusion may serve as a defense); see also Migra
v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 82 (1984);
Quintana v. Baca, 233 ER.D. 562, 566 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Argus
Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 608
(Colo. 2005); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 931 (2009). Thus, given the
statutory bar to the common law defenses discussed above, the
court in Jerry’s Nugget correctly rejected the use of issue and
claim preclusion doctrines as defenses in a workers’ compensation
case.°

Pe

As such, to the extent that the district court rejected Elizondo’s
request to reopen his claim based on the doctrines of issue and
claim preclusion, it committed error. The proper analysis under
Jerry’s Nugget is whether there is a change of circumstance. Be-
cause the district court failed to provide any findings of fact or con-
clusions of law, this court cannot properly review the appeals offi-
cer’s determination that there was no change of circumstances
warranting reopening under NRS 616C.390. Therefore, we re-
verse the district court’s order denying Elizondo’s petition for ju-
dicial review and direct the district court to remand the matter to

‘This court recognizes that other jurisdictions have determined that issue
and claim preclusion can apply to the reopening of a workers’ compensation
claim. See, e.g., Stainless Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 695
P.2d 261, 264 (Ariz. 1985); Feeley v. indus. Claim Appeals Office of State,
195 P.3d 1154, 1156 (Colo. App. 2008); AMP, Inc. v. Ruebush, 391 S.E.2d
879, 881 (Va. Ct. App. 1990). However, those courts do not identify or ref-
erence a statutory scheme similar to the one in Nevada, where the Legislature
expressly abrogated common law rights and defenses in the workers’ com-
pensation context. Nevada’s law is therefore distinguishable.

PO

the appeals officer so that findings of fact and conclusions of law
may be properly made.*

PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

CAREY HUMPHRIES, An INDIVIDUAL; AND LORENZA
ROCHA, II, AN INDIVIDUAL, PETITIONERS, v. THE EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL VILLANI, Disrricr Jupce,
RESPONDENTS, AND NEW YORK-NEW YORK HOTEL
& CASINO, LLC, a Nevapa Limitep Liapitiry ComMPANY
DBA NEW YORK-NEW YORK HOTEL & CASINO, REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 61690
November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 484

Craig W. Drummond, Las Vegas; Hofland & Tomsheck and
Joshua L. Tomsheck, Las Vegas, for Petitioners.

Kravitz, Schnitzer, Sloane & Johnson, Chtd., and Martin J.
Kravitz and Kristopher T. Zeppenfeld, Las Vegas, for Real Party in
Interest.

Given our disposition in this matter, it is not necessary for us to reach the
merits of Elizondo’s argument that the protection of his substantial rights re-
quires that EICON’s motion to dismiss be treated as a motion for summary
judgment. Nor do we consider the merits of EICON’s argument that the ap-
peals officer correctly applied the law-of-the-case doctrine in taking judicial
notice of the prior decisions related to this matter and correctly relied on prior
findings in those appeals.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In the underlying premises liability action, the premises owner
successfully moved the district court to order the plaintiffs to join
the plaintiffs’ assailant as a defendant to the action, on the ground
that the assailant is a party necessary to the litigation. NRCP 19
provides that a person must be joined as a party if the court can-
not afford complete relief in that person’s absence. We conclude
that the assailant was not a necessary party under NRCP 19 be-

Oe

cause the district court can afford complete relief to the parties, the
defendant is able to implead the assailant as a third party under
NRCP 14, and creating a per se joinder requirement would un-
fairly burden plaintiffs. Accordingly, we grant the petition for a
writ of mandamus.

FACTS

In April 2010, petitioners Carey Humphries and Lorenza Rocha,
IL, were involved in an altercation with Erik Ferrell on real party
in interest New York-New York’s casino floor. Security officers
and police stopped the altercation and detained Ferrell. He was ar-
rested and subsequently convicted of one count of attempted bat-
tery with substantial bodily harm.

In May 2011, Humphries and Rocha filed a complaint against
New York-New York, alleging various causes of action for negli-
gence based on its duty to protect. The complaint did not include
any claims against Ferrell. New York-New York’s answer asserted
Humphries’ and Rocha’s comparative negligence as an affirmative
defense.

Following Humphries’ and Rocha’s complaint, this court issued
an opinion in Café Moda, L.L.C. v. Palma, 128 Nev. 78, 272 P.3d
137 (2012), in which we interpreted Nevada’s comparative negli-
gence statute, NRS 41.141. In Café Moda, the plaintiff sued two
defendants, one as an intentional tortfeasor and the other as a neg-
ligent tortfeasor, and the negligent tortfeasor asserted that it was
only severally liable under NRS 41.141. Id. at 79, 272 P.3d at
138. We clarified that, in a case alleging comparative negligence,
an intentional tortfeasor’s liability is joint and several, but a merely
negligent cotortfeasor’s liability is several, even if the injured
party is not ultimately found to be comparatively negligent.

In light of Café Moda’s holding on the apportionment of liabil-
ity between intentional and negligent cotortfeasors in comparative
negligence cases, New York-New York moved to compel
Humphries and Rocha to join Ferrell, arguing that Ferrell was a
necessary party under NRCP 19(a). The district court granted
New York-New York’s motion, explaining that ‘‘[jJoinder of Fer-
rell is necessary to ensure [New York-New York] is afforded full
protection under the Café Moda case.’ The district court fur-
ther determined that joinder was feasible, since Ferrell resides in
Nevada and his identity is known. It thus compelled Humphries
and Rocha to join Ferrell.

Humphries and Rocha have petitioned this court for a writ of
mandamus. They seek to vacate the order compelling joinder, ar-
guing that the district court erred in compelling them to join a new
party defendant when the complaint does not allege a cause of ac-

ee

tion against that defendant. They further argue that joinder of a
necessary party is infeasible when the statute of limitations has run
on the possible causes of action against the new defendant and that
Ferrell is not an indispensable party.

DISCUSSION

We begin by addressing whether writ relief is appropriate. De-
termining that it is, we then consider whether the district court
properly concluded that Ferrell was a necessary party under NRCP
19a).

Writ of mandamus

a

Article 6, Section 4 of the Nevada Constitution gives this court
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. “‘A writ of mandamus is
available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.’ Int’l Game Tech.,
Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d
556, 558 (2008) (citing NRS 34.160). A writ will not issue where
there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law. NRS 34.170; Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197,
179 P.3d at 558. It is within this court’s discretion to determine
whether to consider petitions for this extraordinary remedy. Smith
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849,
851 (1991).

In this case, Humphries and Rocha do not have a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. This case
is in the early stages of litigation, and the district court’s order
forces Humphries and Rocha to join Ferrell and assert causes of
action against him, despite the running of the statute of limitations,
or have their action dismissed. See Lund v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 127 Nev. 358, 363, 255 P.3d 280, 284 (2011) (citing In re
Simons, 247 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918) (concluding that extraordi-
nary writ relief was warranted because a legal error affected the
course of the litigation and the party aggrieved should not have to
wait until the final judgment was entered to correct the error)).
Moreover, this petition identifies confusion and uncertainty sur-
rounding Café Moda and NRS 41.141, highlighting the need to
clarify an important legal issue of which this court’s review would
promote sound judicial economy and administration. Int’! Game
Tech., 124 Nev. at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 559. Accordingly, we will
exercise our discretion and consider this petition to address
whether NRS 41.141 and Café Moda render Ferrell a party nec-
essary to the underlying action under NRCP 19(a).

2

The district court erred in compelling Humphries and Rocha to
join Ferrell as a necessary party

_

Humphries and Rocha argue that plaintiffs have the right to de-
cide whom to sue, and that the district court erred by interpreting
Café Moda as creating a per se rule that intentional tortfeasors are
necessary parties in premises liability actions. New York-New
York responds that in order for it to be afforded the protection of
several liability under NRS 41.141(4), Ferrell is a necessary party
and must be joined to the action.

Considering these arguments, we first review whether tortfeasors
who were jointly and severally liable under the traditional appor-
tionment of liability were considered necessary parties under
NRCP 19 before examining apportionment of fault under Nevada’s
comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141, and our interpreta-
tion of it in Café Moda and Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 100 Nev.
703, 692 P.2d 1282 (1984), superseded on other grounds as stated
in Countrywide Home Loans v. Thitchener, 124 Nev. 725, 740-43
& 0.39, 192 P.3d 243, 253-55 & n.39 (2008). We then consider
the effect of NRS 41.141 upon apportionment of liability in this
case, as compared with traditional joint and several liability, and
the policies behind apportionment of fault to cotortfeasors. Finally,
given New York-New York’s ability to implead Ferrell as a third-
party defendant and assert a cause of action for contribution
against him, we decline to disturb the traditional view that, when
plaintiffs have sued a tortfeasor who is jointly and severally liable
or severally liable, cotortfeasors are not necessary parties under
NRCP 19(a).

P|

This court reviews a district court’s interpretation of the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure and statutory construction de novo, even
when considered in a writ petition. See Lund, 127 Nev. at 362,
255 P.3d at 283; Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 198, 179 P.3d at
559. NRCP 19(a) provides that a person must be joined in an ac-
tion if that person is necessary to the action. A person is necessary
to the action if (1) in his absence, the court cannot accord com-
plete relief among the existing parties; or (2) he has an interest in
the action and his absence will impair his ability to protect his in-
terest or subject one of the existing parties to inconsistent obliga-
tions. NRCP 19(a)(1)-(2). If that person is not a party to the ac-
tion, the court must order that person be made a party, if feasible.
NRCP 19(a). If joinder is not feasible, the court must determine,
in equity and good conscience, whether the action should proceed
or be dismissed. NRCP 19(b) (providing a four-factor test to de-
termine whether a necessary party is indispensable).

Ce

Humphries and Rocha cite McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d
466, 470 (6th Cir. 1960), for the proposition that Ferrell is not a
necessary party and argue that New York-New York cannot force
Ferrell’s joinder upon them because ‘* ‘[jJoint tort[ ]feasors have no
right to determine whether they shall be jointly or separately sued
for their wrong. This right rests with the party aggrieved...”
Id. (quoting Detroit City Gas Co. v. Syme, 109 F.2d 366, 369 (6th
Cir. 1940)). This court cited to McPherson and held that ‘‘the
plaintiff has the right to decide for himself whom he shall sue,”
and that a defendant may not use NRCP 14 to offer a third party
as a defendant, even though the third party may ultimately be li-
able to the defendant for any damages assessed against the defen-
dant. Reid v. Royal Ins. Co., 80 Nev. 137, 141, 390 P.2d 45, 47
(1964). Reid and McPherson involve instances in which the de-
fendant and nonparty tortfeasor were subject to joint and several
liability.

Under the traditional doctrine of joint and several liability,
courts allowed plaintiffs to seek the entirety of their damages from
a single tortfeasor. Restatement (First) of Torts § 875 (1939). This
allowed plaintiffs to recover all damages caused jointly by multiple
tortfeasors, even in the presence of a contributing cause or cotort-
feasor from which no recovery was available. Id. at cmt. a. Since
liability required that each tortfeasor be a proximate cause of a
plaintiff's injury, each tortfeasor was entirely liable for the full
measure of damages. Mahan v. Hafen, 76 Nev. 220, 225, 351 P.2d
617, 620 (1960). Thus, under the traditional rule, no injustice oc-
curred when only one of several possible defendants was held li-
able for a plaintiff's damages; the plaintiff was fully compensated,
and the defendant held liable could seek contribution, if any was
to be had, from his cotortfeasors. Courts have acknowledged the
nature of joint and several liability in the context of NRCP 19 by
recognizing that cotortfeasors are not necessary parties under
NRCP 19(a) because complete relief can be afforded to a plaintiff
from a jointly and severally liable defendant, or a severally liable
defendant, without the presence of other possible cotortfeasors.
See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990) (noting
that ‘‘‘a tortfeasor with the usual ‘‘joint-and-several’’ liability is
merely a permissive party to an action against another with like li-
ability; ’”? and not a necessary one (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 ad-
visory committee’s notes to Rule 19(a) (1966 amendment))); Gen.
Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 306, 313-19 (3d
Cir. 2007) (determining that other possible obligors were not nec-
essary parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 when a defendant was
jointly and severally liable); UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co., 896 F. Supp. 389, 392-96 (D.N.J. 1995) (determining that

OM

other possible obligors were not necessary parties under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19 when a defendant was severally liable).!

As we recognized in Café Moda and Warmbrodt, however, the
Legislature has supplanted the traditional, common-law functioning
of joint and several liability by enacting NRS 41.141. Café Moda,
128 Nev. at 80, 272 P.3d at 139; Warmbrodt, 100 Nev. at 707-08,
692 P.2d at 1285-86. As currently enacted, NRS 41.141(1) and
(2)(a) abolish contributory negligence and allow a plaintiff to re-
cover damages if his comparative negligence is not greater than
that of a defendant (if the plaintiff has sued only one defendant) or
the combined negligence of multiple defendants (if the plaintiff has
sued multiple defendants). NRS 41.141(4) alters joint and several
liability by permitting apportionment of fault and providing for sev-
eral liability amongst negligent defendants ‘‘[wJhere recovery is al-
Jowed against more than one defendant.’’ NRS 41.141(5) specifies
certain theories under which defendants will remain jointly and
severally liable.

In Café Moda, a case involving multiple defendants, we exam-
ined the interaction between NRS 41.141(4) and (5). Café Moda
stemmed from an altercation between Palma, the plaintiff, and an-
other patron on the premises of Café Moda. 128 Nev. at 79, 272
P.3d at 138. Palma, who was stabbed by the other patron, sued the
assailant on a theory of intentional tort and Café Moda on a the-
ory of negligence. Id. Café Moda asserted an affirmative defense
of comparative negligence. The jury apportioned 80% of the fault
to the assailant, 20% of the fault to Café Moda, and no fault to
Palma. Jd. The district court entered a judgment holding each of
the defendants jointly and severally liable for 100% of Palma’s
damages based on the district court’s reading of NRS 41.141. Id.

On appeal, we determined that NRS 41.141(4), in addition to
eliminating joint and several liability between two defendants in a
negligence action where a defendant asserts comparative negli-
gence as a defense, also abolishes joint and several liability be-
tween an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor where the
negligence theory of liability arises from the same injury as the in-
tentional tort. Jd. at 83, 272 P.3d at 141. Accordingly, we con-
cluded that the assailant was jointly and severally liable for 100%
of Palma’s damages, while Café Moda was only severally liable for
20% of the total damages. Id.

In Warmbrodt, a case involving one defendant, we examined the
effect of NRS 41.141(4) upon the defendant’s liability in light of
an absent tortfeasor. Warmbrodt arose from the alleged malpractice
of accountants and attorneys. 100 Nev. at 705, 692 P.2d at 1284.

"We may consult the interpretation of a federal counterpart to a Nevada Rule
of Civil Procedure as persuasive authority. Coury v. Robison, 115 Nev. 84, 91
n.4, 976 P.2d 518, 522 n.4 (1999),

ee

The attorneys were dismissed from the action at summary judg-
ment, and the case against the accountants proceeded to trial. Id.
at 706, 692 P.2d at 1284. The jury was instructed to compare and
assign the negligence of the plaintiffs, the accountants, and the at-
torneys. Jd. The jury apportioned 90% of the fault to the account-
ants, 10% of the fault to the attorneys, and no fault to the plain-
tiffs, and the judge deducted 10% from the total damages in the
award given to the plaintiffs against the accountants. Id.

On appeal, we determined that the district court erred when it
instructed the jury to consider the negligence of the attorneys and
assign fault to them. Id. at 707-09, 692 P.2d at 1285-86. In par-
ticular, we construed the “‘plain language’’ of NRS 41.141(4) as
“‘requir[ing] apportioning of liability “among the defendants, and
then only ‘[wJhere recovery is allowed against more than one de-
fendant’ in an action.” Id. at 708, 692 P.2d at 1286 (quoting NRS
41.141(4)). Thus, we noted the Legislature’s contrasting use of
“‘defendant’’ and ‘‘defendants’’ and held that where recovery was
not allowed against more than one defendant, ‘‘the statute did not
limit the liability of a sole defendant.’ Id. Accordingly, we con-
cluded that the district court erred when it instructed the jury to
apportion fault between the attorneys and accountants, and we
held that the accountants were jointly and severally liable for
100% of the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. Id. at 709, 692
P.2d at 1286.

Thus, Café Moda, Warmbrodt, and NRS 41.141 indicate that a
negligent defendant-should be held severally liable only for the per-
centage of fault apportioned to: it where a plaintiff has sued multi-
ple tortfeasors and recovery is allowed against more than one de-
fendant. See Café Moda, 128 Nev. at 83, 272 P.3d at 140 (noting
that the amendments to NRS 41.141 that returned several liability
to multiple defendants was ‘‘designed to prevent the deep-pocket
doctrine’’ (internal quotations omitted)); Warmbrodt, 100 Nev. at
707-08, 692 P.2d at 1285-86 (holding that liability could not be ap-
portioned when recovery was allowed against only one defendant).
While allowing a plaintiff to pursue an action against only one neg-
ligent defendant for the entirety of the plaintiff's damages is con-
trary to the policy of applying several liability to a deep-pocket de-
fendant, the statutory scheme in NRS 41.141(4) applies several
liability only when there is ‘‘more than one defendant,’ and here,
there is only one defendant. Thus, as illustrated in Warmbrodt,
without Ferrell as a party, NRS 41.141(2)(b)(2) does not permit
the fact-finder to apportion fault between Ferrell and New York-
New York, and without Ferrell as a defendant, NRS 41.141(4)
does not permit the district court to apply several liability to New
York-New York. 100 Nev. at 708-09, 692 P.2d at 1286. Accord-
ingly, NRS 41.141 encompasses the circumstances here, wherein
the plaintiff has sued one tortfeasor amongst multiple cotortfeasors,

[CO

and the statute does not change the result reached under the tradi-
tional joint and several liability analysis: the defendant is still
jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment against it.?

In light of NRS 41.141(4)’s apportionment of fault and NRS
41.141(2)(b)(2)’s limitation on assignment of fault to parties to the
action, we are not persuaded to alter the traditional analysis of
whether cotortfeasors are necessary parties under NRCP 19(a)
when a jointly and severally liable defendant is sued. Under NRCP
19(a)(1), a plaintiff may still be afforded complete relief against
the liable defendant(s) he sues, regardless of the existence of other
cotortfeasors. See Potts v. Vokits, 101 Nev. 90, 92, 692 P.2d 1304,
1306 (1985) (holding that absent parties would not preclude com-
plete relief from being accorded to the plaintiff and defendant); see
also Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 701, 705 3d.
Cir. 1996) (‘“Completeness is determined on the basis of those per-
sons who are already parties, and not as between a party and the
absent person whose joinder is sought.’”); Makah Indian Tribe v.
Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (‘‘[T]he court must de-
cide if complete relief is possible among those already parties to
the suit. This analysis is independent of the question whether re-
lief is available to the absent party”’). That a defendant may have
a cause of action for contribution against a cotortfeasor does not
preclude complete relief between the plaintiff and defendant. Sim-
ilarly, under NRCP 19(a)(2), a cotortfeasor’s ability to dispute his
liability to the plaintiffs will not be impacted by an action to
which the cotortfeasor is not a party, and the defendant will not be
subject to inconsistent obligations. See Gen. Refractories Co., 500
EB3d at 318-19 (determining that the defendant would not be sub-
ject to inconsistent obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)); Jan-
ney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399,
406-13 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). Accordingly, a cotortfeasor is not a
party necessary to a plaintiff’s action against another cotortfeasor.

Policy considerations also militate against a per se rule requir-
ing a plaintiff to join cotortfeasors to an action as necessary par-
ties. For example, if a plaintiff is unable to join a tortfeasor be-
cause the tortfeasor is unknown, immune from liability, or outside

2Although the Legislature enacted several liability for negligent defendants
“to prevent the ‘deep-pocket doctrine, ’” Café Moda, 128 Nev. at 83, 272 P3d
at 140 (quoting Hearing on A.B. 249 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 65th
Leg. (Nev., March 8, 1989)), the Legislature did not indicate that several lia~
bility should be applied in cases such as this where the plaintiff sued only one
defendant. We decline New York-New York’s invitation to construe NRS
41.141(4) as doing so, and we leave it to the Legislature to consider the poli-
cies behind Nevada’s comparative negligence statute and alter the law if they
deem it advisable to do so. See Berkson v. LePome, 126 Nev. 492, 503, 245
P.3d 560, 568 (2010) (leaving alterations of the statutes of limitations to the
Legislature).

Po

the court’s jurisdiction, dismissal for failure to join the tortfeasor
as a necessary and indispensable party would prevent a plaintiff
from recovering any damages and force a plaintiff to bear the en-
tire burden of the damages, regardless of the original defendant’s
availability or fault. Indeed, for a negligent tortfeasor to accrue any
liability at all, the tortfeasor must be the proximate cause of the in-
jury and thus is not without fault. NRS 41.141(1) and (2)(a) fur-
ther protect a negligent tortfeasor who is the sole defendant in an
action by eliminating the tortfeasor’s liability where the plaintiff’s
percentage of fault is greater than the tortfeasor’s percentage of
fault. Placing the risk of an unknown, immune, or unavailable in-
tentional tortfeasor on an available and at-fault tortfeasor is more
equitable than dismissal for failure to join a necessary party. Thus,
policy considerations behind the apportionment of liability do not
support treating cotortfeasors as necessary parties under NRCP
19(a).

Finally, we note that New York-New York has the ability to im-
plead Ferrell on a theory of contribution, which will afford New
York-New York some relief without requiring joinder of a cotort-
feasor as a necessary party under NRCP 19(a). Pack v. LaTourette,
128 Nev. 264, 268, 277 P.3d 1246, 1249 (2012). In Pack, the orig-
inal defendant, a taxicab driver who injured the original plaintiff
in an automobile accident, discovered that the third-party defen-
dant, a doctor, might have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries
through negligent treatment and sought to implead the doctor to as-
sert a claim of contribution. Id. at 266, 277 P.3d at 1247-48. This
court held that under NRCP 14(a), a defendant ‘‘may implead a
third-party defendant based on an inchoate claim for contribution.”
Id. at 269, 277 P.3d at 1249. This court further held that this in-
cludes ‘‘the possibility of joining a third-party defendant ‘against
whom a cause of action has not yet accrued””’ Id. (citing 6
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1451 (3d ed. 2010)). A right to contri-
bution exists ‘‘where two or more persons become jointly or sev-
erally liable in tort for the same injury to [a] person . . . even
though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of
them.’ NRS 17.225(1).3 Furthermore, contribution claims are not
limited to original defendants, as the third-party defendant in Pack
also was not a defendant in the plaintiff’s original claim. 128 Nev.
at 265-66, 277 P.3d at 1247.

3In contrast, some states only permit a defendant to implead a third-party
defendant for a contribution claim where there is a joint judgment against the
two defendants. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 875 (West 1980); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 1401 (McKinney 1997). This precludes contribution claims where the tort-
feasor from whom the defendant seeks contribution is not a defendant in the
original action. However, under Nevada law, such an interpretation of NRCP
14(@) would be inconsistent with NRS 17.225(1).

0

While Nevada law allows a defendant to implead a third-party
defendant, it does not require the original plaintiff to accept the
third-party defendant as a defendant in the plaintiff’s case. Reid v.
Royal Ins. Co., 80 Nev. 137, 141, 390 P.2d 45, 47 (1964). Im-
pleader thus provides an avenue to apportion fault when the plain-
tiff chooses not to pursue a claim against a potential tortfeasor. By
not requiring the plaintiff to join a cotortfeasor while permitting
the defendant to implead that tortfeasor, we place the burden of
joining a nonparty onto the party that has an incentive to bring that
nonparty into the litigation.

If New York-New York impleads Ferrell as a third-party defen-
dant, the district court should apply those provisions of NRS
41.141 that are applicable to the action. NRS 41.141(1) and (2)(a)
require that the plaintiffs fault not be greater than the defen-
dant’s. Humphries and Rocha cannot recover against New York-
New York if their percentage of fault is greater than New York-
New York’s, even if their percentage of fault is less than New
York-New York’s and Ferrell’s combined percentages of fault.
NRS 41.141(2)(a). If Humphries and Rocha can recover, then the
jury should render a special verdict ‘‘indicating the percentage of
negligence attributable to each party remaining in the action,” in-
cluding the third-party defendant, Ferrell. NRS 41.141(2)(b)(2).
As the only ‘‘defendant’’ that Humphries and Rocha sued, New
York-New York will be jointly and severally liable for the entire
judgment, NRS 41.141(4), but it will be able to seek contribution
from Ferrell for the portion of fault that the jury attributed to him.

Thus, we conclude that the district court’s order compelling
joinder of Ferrell as a necessary party under NRCP 19(a) was in
error. Impleader of Ferrell by New York-New York under NRCP
14 provides a mechanism to apportion damages. Requiring joinder
under NRCP 19(a) is premised on the notion that without com-
pelling joinder of Ferrell as a necessary party, complete relief
cannot be afforded to the parties. However, complete relief may be
afforded between Humphries and Rocha and New York-New York
without Ferrell’s joinder, and New York-New York can pursue ap-
portionment of fault without Ferrell’s joinder through impleader
under NRS 17.225(1) and NRCP 14(a), even though New York-
New York cannot avail itself of several liability apportioned
amongst multiple defendants under NRS 41.141(4). See Clark
Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., Inc., 123 Nev. 382, 388
n.4, 168 P.3d 87, 91 n.4 (2007) (noting that the purpose of a con-
tribution claim is to apportion damages between cotortfeasors).

Accordingly, Ferrell is not a necessary party under NRCP 19(a),
and the district court erred by compelling Humphries and Rocha to

Pe

join Ferrell. We therefore grant the petition and direct the clerk of
this court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district
court to vacate its order compelling Ferrell’s joinder and to enter
an order denying New York-New York’s motion to compel Ferrell’s
joinder as a necessary party.

Harvesty and Curry, JJ., concur.
[|

OTAK NEVADA, LLC, Peritioner, v. THE EIGHTH JUDI-
CIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN
AND FoR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AnD THE HONOR-
ABLE DOUG SMITH, District JuDGE, RESPONDENTS, AND
PACIFICAP CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC; PACIFI-
CAP PROPERTIES GROUP, LLC; PACIFICAP HOLDINGS
XXIX, LLC; CHAD I. RENNAKER; JASON Q. REN-
NAKER; CHEYENNE APARTMENTS PPG, LP; AND
CHRISTOPHER WATKINS, REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.

No. 59050
November 7, 2013 312 P.3d 491

Morris Polich & Purdy, LLP, and Nicholas M. Wieczorek, Las
Vegas, for Petitioner Otak Nevada, LLC.

2

00

Bauman Loewe Witt & Maxwell, PLLC, and Whitney C.
Wilcher, Las Vegas, for Real Parties in Interest Chad I. Rennaker
and Jason Q. Rennaker.

Christiansen Law Offices and Peter S. Christiansen, Richard E.
Tanasi, and Kristina Weller, Las Vegas; Law Office of Daniel S.
Simon and Daniel S. Simon, Las Vegas; Lewis & Roca, LLP, and
Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D. Henriod, Las Vegas, for Real
Party in Interest Christopher Watkins.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, and Josh C. Aicklen,
Mark J. Brown, and Stephanie J. Smith, Las Vegas; Sterling Law,
LLC, and Beau Sterling, Las Vegas, for Real Parties in Interest
Cheyenne Apartments PPG, LP; Pacificap Holdings XXIX, LLC;
Pacificap Properties Group, LLC; Chad I. Rennaker; and Jason Q.
Rennaker.

Thagard, Reiss & Brown, LLP, and Thomas Friedman, Las
Vegas, for Real Party in Interest Pacificap Construction Services,
LLC.

802

‘hi

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

Under NRS 17.245(1)(b), a defendant who enters into ‘‘a re-
lease or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment . . . in
good faith”’ is ‘‘discharge[d] . . . from all liability for contribution
and for equitable indemnity to any other [defendant].’’ The ques-
tions we are asked to decide in this original writ proceeding are:
(1) Ifa defendant settles in good faith, does NRS 17.245(1)(b) bar
“de facto”’ claims for contribution and/or equitable indemnity?;
and (2) Are the contractor’s third-party claims in this matter con-
sidered ‘‘de facto’’ contribution and/or equitable indemnity claims
that may be barred under NRS 17.245(1)(b)? We conclude that, re-
gardless of the claim’s title, NRS 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims that
seek contribution and/or equitable indemnity when the settlement
is determined to be in good faith. Because we conclude that the
contractor’s remaining third-party claims in this matter are ‘‘de
facto’’ contribution claims, and are thus barred by NRS
17.245(1)(b), we grant this petition for writ of mandamus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This petition arises from underlying litigation concerning a fatal
automobile accident that occurred at a construction site in Las
Vegas, Nevada. Real parties in interest Cheyenne Apartments PPG,
LP; Pacificap Holdings XXIX, LCC; Pacificap Properties Group,
LLC; Chad I. Rennaker; and Jason Q. Rennaker (collectively,
P&R) are the owners and developers of the site; and real party in
interest Pacificap Construction Services, LLC (PCS), was the gen-
eral contractor.’ Petitioner Otak Nevada, LLC, an architecture
firm, entered into an agreement with P&R to design a multifamily
housing project. Otak hired subcontractor Orion Engineering and
Surveying to design and implement necessary off-site road con-
struction. Pursuant to the agreement, Orion was to design four
traffic medians to be installed in the intersection adjoining the con-
struction site and to replace traffic markers to alter the flow of traf-
fic. However, one median was not installed, and the traffic mark-
ers were not replaced. These omissions allegedly caused the fatal
automobile accident.

Following the accident, the plaintiffs and/or their estates filed
complaints against, among others, PCS and P&R. After the plain-
tiffs amended their complaints to add Otak as a defendant, Otak
and the plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement in which the
plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all of their claims against Otak in ex-
change for $45,000, and assignment of Otak’s experts. Otak filed
in the district court a motion for approval of good-faith settlement
based on NRS 17.245. The district court denied the motion be-
cause it found that a $45,000 settlement was not a fair settlement
amount for the plaintiffs, and thus, was not in good faith. After ad-
ditional settlement negotiations, Otak and the plaintiffs agreed to a
new settlement in the amount of $210,000, plus the assignment of
Otak’s experts. Otak filed an amended motion for good-faith set-
tlement, which was opposed by PCS and P&R on the basis that the
proposed amount of the settlement was far less than Otak’s poten-
tial liability or its insurance policy limits .and would unfairly shift
Otak’s liability to the remaining defendants. The district court
granted the motion.

After determining that Otak’s settlement with the plaintiffs was
made in good faith, the district court granted P&R leave to file a
third-party complaint against Otak.? P&R’s third-party complaint

"PCS has not appeared in this writ proceeding.

2At the time the district court granted P&R’s motion to file a third-party
complaint against Otak, a writ petition challenging, on other grounds, PCS’s
third-party complaint and P&R’s cross-claims against Otak was already pend-
ing before this court. This court subsequently concluded that those pleadings
were void ab initio. See Otak Nev., L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Otak
D, 127 Nev. 593, 599, 260 P.3d 408, 412 (2011). As a result of that opinion,

A

against Otak asserted claims for breach of contract, express in-
demnity, express contribution, breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, professional negligence, and punitive damages.?
Otak moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the claims
were all barred by NRS 17.245. It argued that NRS 17.245 bars all
claims that are ‘‘de facto” contribution and/or equitable indemnity
claims. Although the district court declined to dismiss P&R’s
third-party complaint in its entirety, it did dismiss P&R’s claim
for professional negligence. This petition for a writ of mandamus
followed.

DISCUSSION
Lr

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion. NRS 34.160; Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Sec-
ond Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558
(2008). Whether a petition for extraordinary relief will be consid-
ered is purely discretionary with this court. Smith v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).
Petitioner bears ‘‘the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary
relief is warranted.’ Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev.
222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

Pe

Mandamus is not appropriate if the petitioner has ‘‘a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law”’ NRS
34.170. Generally, an adequate legal remedy is afforded through
the right to appeal. Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. Thus,
we ‘‘ ‘will not entertain a writ petition challenging the denial of a
motion to dismiss [unless] . . . the issue is not fact-bound and in-
volves an unsettled and potentially significant, recurring question
of law. ’’* MountainView Hosp., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 128 Nev. 180, 185, 273 P.3d 861, 864-65 (2012) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Buckwalter v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 126 Nev. 200, 201, 234 P.3d 920, 921 (2010)). Here,

the district court dismissed PCS’s third-party complaint and denied P&R leave
to amend its answer to assert a cross-claim against Otak. PCS has not filed any
other claims against Otak.

2P&R’s third-party complaint alleges claims against petitioner Otak, as
well as five other third-party defendants. Because the only claims challenged
in this petition are the third-party claims brought against petitioner Otak, we
do not address the third-party claims brought by P&R against the five other
third-party defendants.

‘Although Otak’s motion was alternatively one for summary judgment,
Otak’s petition only challenges the district court’s refusal to dismiss all of
P&R’s third-party claims against Otak, not its denial of Otak’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. Accordingly, we treat Otak’s motion as a motion to dismiss.

Se «:

whether P&R’s remaining third-party claims should be dismissed
depends on whether NRS 17.245 bars ‘‘de facto’’ claims for con-
tribution and/or equitable indemnity, and whether P&R’s claims
constitute ‘‘de facto”’ claims. Because this issue of law is a matter
of first impression and may be dispositive of the case, we exercise
our discretion to entertain this writ petition.*

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Otak’s
motion for approval of good-faith settlement

J

Because our determination of whether P&R’s third-party claims
are barred by NRS 17.245 is contingent upon whether Otak settled
in good faith with the plaintiffs in the underlying action, we first
examine the district court’s determination of good faith. We review
the district court’s determination of good faith for an abuse of dis-
cretion. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Davidson, 107 Nev. 356, 357,
811 P.2d 561, 561 (1991). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
district court’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Finkel v. Cashman Prof’l, Inc., 128 Nev. 68, 72-73, 270 P.3d
1259, 1262 (2012). ‘‘ ‘Substantial evidence has been defined as
that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’ ’’ Jd. at 73, 270 P.3d at 1262 (quoting McClanahan
v. Raley’s, Inc., 117 Nev. 921, 924, 34 P.3d 573, 576 (2001)).

Under NRS 17.245(1)(b), a defendant cannot be liable to co-
defendants in a tort action for contribution or equitable indemn-
ity if the defendant settles with the plaintiff in good faith. We
have previously declined to define ‘‘good faith’? under NRS
17.245(1)(b), and have left this determination ‘‘to the discretion of
the trial court based upon all relevant facts available.” Velsicol
Chem., 107 Nev. at 360, 811 P.2d at 563. But we have recognized
the following factors as being relevant, though not exclusive, cri-
teria for this determination: ‘‘ ‘[i]he amount paid in settlement, the
allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, the insur-
ance policy limits of settling defendants, the financial condition of
settling defendants, and the existence of collusion, fraud or tortious
conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants.’ ””
Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 651-52, 98 P.3d 681, 686

‘Otak’s arguments as to PCS’s third-party complaint and P&R’s cross-
claims are now moot because the district court dismissed PCS’s third-party
complaint and denied P&R leave to amend its answer to add cross-claims
against Otak based on this court’s opinion in Orak I, 127 Nev. at 599, 260 P.3d
at 412. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574
(2010) (holding that this court will not consider issues where an actual con-
troversy is not present throughout “all stages of the proceeding”). But, Otak’s
writ petition is not moot in its entirety because the issue of whether NRS
17.245 bars “‘de facto” claims for contribution and/or equitable indemnity is
still an actual controversy between the parties due to the district court’s refusal
to dismiss all of the claims in P&R’s third-party complaint.

A

(2004) (alteration in original) (quoting In re MGM Grand Hotel
Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913, 927 (D. Nev. 1983)). In addition,
the district court may consider the merits of any contribution or
equitable indemnity claims against the settling defendant. Id. at
652, 98 P.3d at 687.

| errs!

Relying on these factors, P&R argues that Otak’s settlement was
not in good faith because Otak paid less than its potential liability,
and much less than the amounts paid by the other defendants. In
Velsicol Chemical, however, we noted that a settlement is in good
faith so long as it is not “‘disproportionately lower than [the settling
defendant’s] fair share of damages.’’ 107 Nev. at 361, 811 P.2d at
564. Thus, a settlement for less than what the other defendants
paid will generally be in good faith when the settling defendant’s
potential liability is minimal. See Bay Dev. Ltd. v. Superior Court,
791 P.2d 290, 299 (Cal. 1990) (upholding a settlement of $30,000
in a case seeking damages in excess of $1 million because there
was evidence that the settling defendant ‘‘bore only minor respon-
sibility”’ for the plaintiffs’ injuries).

Under such an analysis, a settling defendant would not be re-
quired to pay the full amount of its potential liability, as such a re-
quirement ‘‘would unduly discourage settlements.’ Tech-Bilt, Inc.
vy. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 698 P.2d 159, 166 (Cal. 1985).
Furthermore, because a defendant with minimal liability to the
plaintiff will also have minimal liability for contribution or equi-
table indemnity to co-defendants, permitting a smaller settlement
does not prejudice the nonsettling defendants. Cahill v. San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 101 (Ct. App. 2011).

| |

Here, the evidence in the record indicates that Otak’s potential
liability is minimal. Although P&R’s expert opined that Otak
breached a contractual duty owed to P&R by failing to warn P&R
of the hazardous roadway condition, Otak’s experts refuted that
opinion in their reports by stating that Otak was not contractually
required to frequent the site in order to report unsafe conditions,
and that it was not customary for architects to do this. In addition,
although the contract between Otak and P&R contained a clause
requiring Otak to periodically visit the site, it also contained a
clause stating that Otak was not responsible for ‘‘safety precautions
and programs.’’ Finally, experts opined that Otak exercised rea-
sonable care in all of its duties and was not involved in or respon-
sible for the road construction. Accordingly, there is substantial ev-
idence in the record to suggest that Otak’s potential liability is
minimal, thus supporting the district court’s finding of good faith.

Pe

Pe

P&R also argues that Otak’s settlement was not in good faith be-
cause the settlement was a tactical decision designed to cut off
P&R’s equitable indemnity and contractual rights and was for sub-
stantially less than Otak’s insurance policy limits. But ‘‘[a] settle-
ment is not considered made in bad faith simply because its pur-
pose is to eliminate third-party liability’’ Dixon v. Nw. Publ’g Co.,
520 N.E.2d 932, 937 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); see also Doctors Co.,
120 Nev. at 652, 98 P.3d at 687 (providing that the district court
may consider the strengths and weaknesses of any known contri-
bution or equitable indemnity claims); Vertecs Corp. v. Fiberchem,
Inc., 669 P.2d 958, 961 (Alaska 1983) (holding that ‘‘it could
hardly be correct to say that a settlement prompted by a party’s
wish to avoid contribution is necessarily in bad faith’’). And we
have declined to treat insurance policy limits as exclusive criteria
in determining whether a settlement is in good faith. See Doctors
Co., 120 Nev. at 652, 98 P.3d at 686. Because the district court is
vested ‘‘with considerable discretion’’ in approving good-faith set-
tlements, id. at 652, 98 P.3d at 687, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Otak’s settlement to be
in good faith given the substantial evidence in the record of Otak’s
minimal potential liability.*

The district court erred when it declined to dismiss P&R’s
third-party complaint
[|
Otak argues that the district court erred by declining to dismiss
P&R’s third-party complaint in its entirety because P&R’s re-
* maining third-party claims are all ‘‘de facto’’ contribution and eq-
uitable indemnity claims that are barred by NRS 17.245(1)(b).7 We

°P&R asserted, during oral argument, that the plaintiffs had no viable
claims against Otak because the statute of limitations ran before the plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed their claims against Otak. We decline to address this
issue because this argument was not articulated before the district court or in
P&R’s answer to Otak’s writ petition. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden
Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to
address arguments where a party fails to cogently argue or cite to relevant au-
thority in support of his arguments). We further decline to consider P&R’s ar-
gument that the district court abused its discretion by approving the settlement
when Otak allegedly concealed discovery because P&R fails to cite to any rel-
evant authority in support of this contention. See id.

7Otak argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant P&R leave to
file a third-party complaint while Orak I was pending before this court. We do
not address this issue because Otak does not provide any argument or author-
ity in support of this assertion in its petition or reply. See Edwards, 122 Nev.
at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.

5S

review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Buzz Stew,
L.L.C. v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670,
672 (2008).

NRS 17.245(1)(b)
a

In the context of a writ petition, we review issues of statutory in-
terpretation de novo. Int’! Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008). ‘‘It is
well established that the court must interpret statutes consistent
with the intent of the legislature.’ Steward v. Steward, 111 Nev.
295, 302, 890 P.2d 777, 781 (1995). NRS 17.245(1)(b) provides
that a good-faith settling defendant cannot be liable ‘‘for contribu-
tion and for equitable indemnity to any other’’ nonsettling defen-
dant. It does not state whether ‘‘contribution’’ or ‘‘equitable in-
demnity’’ only include claims titled as such, or whether NRS
17.245(1)(b)’s bar encompasses all theories of recovery that seek
contribution or equitable indemnity, regardless of the claim’s actual
title.

According to the Uniform Contribution Act Among Tortfeasors,
the purpose for barring contribution claims against a settling de-
fendant is to permit plaintiffs to sever a joint tortfeasor from the
case without needing to first reach a global settlement with all of
the defendants. See Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4,
12 U.L.A. 284-85 cmt. b (2008). When originally enacted, NRS
17.245 barred a nonsettling defendant from seeking contribution
from a settling defendant, but still permitted claims for equitable
indemnity. See Hearing on A.B. 421 Before the Assembly Comm.
on Judiciary, 69th Leg. (Nev., May 21, 1997). In 1997, the Leg-
islature amended NRS 17.245 to also bar equitable indemnity in
order to address the fact that a settling defendant was not com-
pletely released from a case so long as potential claims for in-
demnity still existed. See Hearing on A.B. 421 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, 69th Leg. (Nev., June 6, 1997). The leg-
islative amendment included equitable indemnity in order ‘‘to
eliminate that defense and promote and encourage settlements
among joint defendants.” Jd. We conclude that allowing a nonset-
tling defendant to seek contribution or equitable indemnity dam-
ages under the guise of a differently named cause of action would
defeat the legislative intent behind NRS 17.245—to promote and
encourage settlements among joint defendants.

Our conclusion is consistent with the approach taken by other
jurisdictions. See Cal-Jones Props. v. Evans Pac. Corp., 264 Cal.
Rptr. 737, 739 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that claims between tort-
feasors are for indemnity regardless of the language used if the
claims are identical to those made by the plaintiff or if the damages
sought are those that the court would consider in determining the

Se

proportionate liability of the tortfeasors); Herington v. J.S. Alberici
Constr. Co., 639 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (dismiss-
ing a claim for “‘partial indemnity’’ because the court concluded
that it was really a claim for contribution); Westchester Cnty. v.
Welton Becket Assocs., 478 N.Y.S.2d 305, 314-15 (App. Div.
1984) (dismissing a claim for indemnity because the claim was ac-
tually one for contribution); Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. &
Ass’n y. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1067 (Wash. 1993) (dis-
missing claim that was ‘‘simply an indirect attempt to obtain con-
tribution’’); Grant Thornton, L.L.P. v. Kutak Rock, L.L.P., 719
S.E.2d 394, 405 (W. Va. 2011) (dismissing claims that essentially
sought contribution). These jurisdictions looked to the claim’s
substance, rather than its label, to determine whether the claim is
barred by their good-faith settlement statute. See Gackstetter v.
Frawley, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 333, 344 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
“‘claims for indemnification can include other claims not labeled as
indemnity claims, but that in reality are ‘disguised’ indemnity
claims’’); Herington, 639 N.E.2d at 911 (holding that ‘‘[tJbe legal
effect to be given an instrument is not determined by the label it
bears or the technical terms it contains’’).

Likewise, this court has consistently analyzed a claim according
to its substance, rather than its label. See Rolf Jensen & Assocs. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 441, 453, 282 P.3d 743, 751
(2012) (analyzing claims for breach of contract, breach of war-
ranty, and negligent misrepresentation, and concluding that these
claims were preempted by the American Disability Act because
they were ‘‘de facto claims for indemnification’’); Alsenz v. Clark
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 109 Nev. 1062, 1066, 864 P.2d 285, 288 (1993)
(holding that a personal injury claim asserted by a decedent’s es-
tate was actually for wrongful death ‘‘[rlegardless of the cause of
action’s legal name’’). This approach is persuasive, and we now
hold that once a trial court determines that a defendant has settled
in good faith, NRS 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims against the settling
defendant that in effect seek contribution and equitable indemnity,
regardless of the claim’s title.

| |

To determine if a claim in effect seeks contribution or equitable
indemnity in contravention of NRS 17.245(1)(b), trial courts
should consider whether (1) the claim arose from the same basis
on which the settling defendant would be liable to the plaintiff, and
(2) the claim seeks damages comparable to those recoverable in
contribution or indemnity actions. See Cal-Jones Props., 264 Cal.
Rptr. at 739; Grant Thornton, 719 S.E.2d at 405. We used a sim-
ilar test to determine whether state-law claims were preempted by
the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act’s bar against claims
seeking indemnity. See Rolf Jensen, 128 Nev. at 453, 282 P.3d at
751. In Rolf Jensen, we concluded that Mandalay Corporation’s

A

claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligent
misrepresentation against its construction consultant were de facto
indemnity claims because the ‘claims and requested damages de-
rive[d] solely from [the claimant’s] first-party liability”’ Id. We
now take this opportunity to extend the application of the Rolf
Jensen test to a determination of whether a claim in effect seeks
contribution or equitable indemnity in contravention of NRS
17.245(1)(b).

P&R’s remaining claims seek contribution

With this test in mind, we examine whether NRS 17.245(1)(b)
bars P&R’s remaining third-party claims for express indemnity,
contribution, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and punitive damages.

P|

First, Otak argues that P&R has no claim for express indemnity
because the indemnity clause is actually a contribution clause, re-
covery under which is barred by NRS 17.245(1)(b).° A review of
the clause at issue shows that Otak’s argument is correct. Contri-
bution ‘‘is an equitable sharing of liability,’ whereas indemnity “‘is
a complete shifting of liability to the party primarily responsible.”
Medallion Dev., Inc. v. Converse Consultants, 113 Nev. 27, 32,
930 P.2d 115, 119 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Doctors Co., 120 Nev. at 654, 98 P.3d at 688; NRS
17.245, The contractual provision at issue here states that:

[Orion] shall indemnify, hold harmless, and defend [Otak],
[Cheyenne] and its respective representatives, officers, direc-
tors, and employees from any loss or claim made by third par-
ties including legal fees and costs of defending actions or
suits, resulting directly or indirectly from [Orion’s] perform-
ance or nonperformance of this Agreement, where the loss or
claim is attributable to the negligence or other fault of
{Orion], its employees, representatives, or its subcontractors.
If the loss or claim is caused by the joint or concurrent neg-
ligence or other fault of [Otak] and [Orion], the loss or claim

*We reject Otak’s argument that P&R is not a third-party beneficiary enti-
tled to enforce the indemnity clause in the contract between Otak and Orion
because Cheyenne is clearly an intended third-party beneficiary, and P&R
is raising this argument on behalf of Cheyenne. See Canfora v. Coast Hotels
& Casinos, Inc., 121 Nev. 771, 779, 121 P.3d 599, 605 (2005) (‘Whether an
individual is an intended third-party beneficiary, however, depends on the
parties’ intent, gleaned from reading the contract as a whole in light of the cir-
cumstances under which it was entered.’ (internal quotations omitted)). Fur-
thermore, contrary to Otak’s assertion, P&R raised Cheyenne’s third-party
beneficiary status below when it alleged that Otak breached the indemnity pro-
vision ‘‘covering Cheyenne” in its third-party complaint.

SS

shall be borne by each in proportion to the degree of negli-
gence or other fault attributable to each.

The only part of the provision attributing liability to Otak is the
last sentence of the clause, which apportions liability according to
fault rather than shifting liability to the primarily responsible party,
making the contractual clause one for contribution rather than in-
demnity.° Because NRS 17.245(1)(b) bars ail contribution claims,
P&R’s cause of action titled as a claim for express indemnity
should have been dismissed."

| |

Second, as to P&R’s express contribution claim, although NRS
17.245 distinguishes between equitable indemnity and contract-
ual (or express) indemnity, see NRS 17.245(2), it does not distin-
guish between equitable and contractual contribution. See NRS
17.245(1)(b). The Legislature could have chosen to make this dis-
tinction when it amended NRS 17.245 in 1997 and distinguish be-
tween equitable and contractual indemnity claims. Thus, it appears
that the Legislature intended for NRS 17.245(1)(b) to bar all con-
tribution claims regardless of whether contribution is equitable
(implied) or contractual (express). Other jurisdictions have simi-
Jarly reasoned that allowing a contractual-contribution claim when
a common-law or statutory-contribution claim is barred by a good-
faith settlement statute, contravenes public policy considerations
encouraging settlement. See Herington, 639 N.E.2d at 911; Pierre
Condo. Ass’n vy. Lincoln Park West Assocs., 881 N.E.2d 588, 596
(il. App. Ct. 2007). Therefore, we conclude that P&R’s express
contribution claim is also barred by NRS 17.245(1)(b).

Finally, P&R argues that its claims for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings are not

*Even if the contractual provision at issue could be read as an indemnity
clause, it would not require Otak to indemnify P&R. Indemnity clauses must
be strictly construed. Reyburn Lawn & Landscape Designers, Inc. v. Plaster
Dev. Co., 127 Nev. 331, 340, 255 P.3d 268, 274 (2011). Because the clause
does not specifically state that Otak is required to indemnify Cheyenne, the
clause only requires indemnification from Orion. See id. at 340-41, 255 P.3d
at 275 (interpreting an indemnity clause to only cover the negligence of the in-
demnitor because the clause did not explicitly state that the indemnitor had a
duty to indemnify absent negligence on its part); George L. Brown Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Star Ins. Co., 126 Nev. 316, 325, 237 P.3d 92, 97 (2010) (stating that
“indemnification ‘provisions are strictly construed and will not be held to pro-
vide indemnification unless it is so stated in clear and unequivocal terms’ ’”
(quoting GKN Co. v. Starnes Trucking, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003))).

‘Because we conclude that the contractual provision at issue in P&R’s ex-
press indemnity claim is a contribution clause, we do not reach the issue of
whether NRS 17.245(1)(b) bars claims for contractual indemnity.

2

barred by NRS 17.245(1)(b) because these claims are based on
Otak’s alleged breach of the contract between Otak and P&R. The
allegedly breached provision, however, required Otak to periodi-
cally inspect the construction site and report deficiencies to P&R.
But this breach is one of the reasons that the plaintiffs allege the
accident occurred in the first place, and is thus not independent of
P&R’s liability to the plaintiffs. Furthermore, P&R seeks to re-
cover the damages it has suffered from defending itself in the
lawsuit and settling with the plaintiffs ‘‘for injuries and damages
allegedly caused by roadway conditions arising directly from
OTAK’s various breaches of contract.’ Notably, P&R does not
seek any damages that are unrelated to the plaintiffs’ accident, nor
does P&R allege that Otak breached a duty that resulted in liabil-
ity to P&R on a basis other than that Otak was potentially re-
sponsible for the plaintiffs’ accident. We therefore conclude that
P&R’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing are barred by NRS 17.245(1)(b) be-
cause these claims seek contribution.

As no causes of action remain on which to base an award of
damages, we conclude that P&R’s punitive damages claim must
also be dismissed."

For the reasons discussed above, we grant the petition and direct
the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the
district court to dismiss P&R’s remaining third-party claims
against petitioner Otak Nevada, LLC.

PIcKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, PARRAGUIRRE, DouGLas,
Cuerry, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

UOtak argues that the district court’s ruling violated Otak’s equal protection
rights under the United States and Nevada Constitutions because the district
court’s decision was opposite to a decision entered by a different district
court judge in a similar case. Although parties are guaranteed equal and uni-
form application of the law, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Nev. Const. art. 4,
§ 21, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the contention that incon-
sistent judicial rulings from lower courts are grounds for equal protection chal-
lenges. See Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 100, 106
(1920) (holding that ‘‘the Fourteenth Amendment does not, in guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws, assure uniformity of judicial decisions””). There-
fore, we reject Otak’s argument. See Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 1509,
908 P.2d 689, 698 (1995) (holding that this court applies the same standards
to equal protection challenges as the federal courts), overruled on other
grounds by Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 17, 174 P.3d 970, 980 (2008).

Se :

SANDPOINTE APARTMENTS, LLC, A Nevapa Limirep L1a-
BILITY COMPANY; AND STACY YAHRAUS-LEWIS, an INDI-
VIDUAL, PETITIONERS, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE
ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ, Disrricr JupGE, RE-
SPONDENTS, AND CML-NV SANDPOINTE, LLC, A FLORIDA
Limitep LiABILiry COMPANY, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 59507
November 14, 2013 313 P.3d 849

as
[Rehearing denied January 24, 2014]

Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Frank M. Flansburg, II, and
Candice E. Renka, Las Vegas, for Petitioners.

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas;
Cotton, Driggs, Walch, Holley, Woloson & Thompson and Richard
F. Holley, Victoria L. Nelson, and William N. Miller, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.

Holland & Hart LLP and Jeremy J. Nork and Frank Z. LaForge,
Reno, for Amicus Curiae Branch Banking and Trust Company.

Legislative Counsel Bureau Legal Division and Brenda J.
Erdoes, Legislative Counsel, and Kevin C. Powers, Chief Litiga-
tion Counsel, Carson City, for Amicus Curiae Legislature of the
State of Nevada.

es

The O’Mara Law Firm, P.C., and David C. O’Mara, Reno, for
Amicus Curiae Nevada Bankers Association.

Sylvester & Polednak, Ltd., and Jeffrey R. Sylvester and Allyson
R. Noto, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae RADC/CADC Venture
2010-2, LLC. .

Alfred M. Pollard, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Fed-
eral Housing Finance Agency.

Joseph Brooks, Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.

2

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, Sarrta, J.:

In this opinion, we address NRS 40.459(1)(c), a statute limiting
the amount of judgments in instances where a right to obtain a
judgment against the debtor, guarantor, or surety has been trans-
ferred from one person to another. NRS 40.459(1)(c) was added to
Nevada’s law by Assembly Bill 273, which provided that NRS
40.459(1)(c) would ‘‘become effective upon passage and ap-
proval.”” 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 311, §§ 5, 7, at 1743, 1748. We con-
clude that NRS 40.459(1)(c) would have an improper retroactive
effect if applied to the facts underlying this writ petition. Because
the language of the enrollment section does not overcome the pre-
sumption against retroactivity, NRS 40.459(1)(c) only applies
prospectively. We therefore conclude that the limitations in NRS
40.459(1)(c) apply to sales, pursuant to either judicial foreclosures
or trustee’s sales, occurring on or after the effective date of the
statute.' We further conclude that in cases where application of
NRS 40.459(1)(c) would not have a retroactive effect, it applies to
any transfer of the right to obtain a deficiency judgment, regardless
of when the right was transferred. Accordingly, we deny extraor-
dinary writ relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, Silver State Bank loaned $5,135,000 to petitioner
Sandpointe Apartments, LLC, for the construction of an apartment
complex. Sandpointe obtained the loan by executing a promissory
note in favor of Silver State Bank,-secured by, among other things,
a deed of trust to the real property acquired with the loan funds.
The deed of trust contained a power of sale provision. Petitioner
Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan.

In 2008, the Nevada Financial Institutions Division closed Sil-
ver State Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) as receiver. In 2009, Sandpointe’s loan matured,
and Sandpointe defaulted by failing to repay the loan in full. In
2010, pursuant to a large structured sale, the FDIC sold the loan

"Trustee’s sales are colloquially referred to as nonjudicial foreclosures.
However, we will use the more precise term—trustee’s sale.

po

and the guarantee to Multibank. Multibank, in turn, transferred its
interest in the loan and the guarantee to its wholly owned sub-
sidiary, real party in interest CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC, a single
purpose entity created by Multibank to facilitate and pursue col-
lections on the loan. In early 2011, CML-NV elected to pursue its
rights under the deed of trust’s power of sale provision, and a
trustee’s sale was held at which CML-NV purchased the property
securing the loan for a credit bid of $1,440,000.

Shortly thereafter, the Nevada Legislature unanimously passed
Assembly Bill 273, which, in relevant part, limits the amount of
a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who ac-
quired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who
held that right. On June 10, 2011, the Governor signed Assembly
Bill 273 into law, and the relevant provision was codified as NRS
40.459(1)(c).

On June 27, 2011, CML-NV filed a complaint in district court
against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of
guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis later moved for partial summary judg-
ment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation con-
tained in NRS 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV’s action. CML-NV op-
posed the motion and filed a countermotion for partial summary
judgment, arguing that NRS 40.459(1)(c) could not apply retroac-
tively to the action.

The district court held a hearing on the motion and countermo-
tion, at which time the court granted CML-NV’s countermotion
for summary judgment, concluding that NRS 40.459(1)(c) only
applies to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Arguing that
the district court incorrectly determined that applying NRS
40.459(1)(c) in this instance would constitute retroactive operation
of the statute and that, even if the court was correct, the statute al-
lows for retroactive application, Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis
now petition this court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition di-
recting the district court to apply the limitation contained in NRS
40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV’s deficiency judgment.

DISCUSSION
Loree

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion.”’ Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); NRS 34.160. ‘‘A
writ of prohibition is appropriate when a district court acts with-
out or in excess of its jurisdiction. . . . Because both writs of pro-
hibition and writs of mandamus are extraordinary remedies, we
have complete discretion . . . whether to consider them.’’ Cote
H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 P.3d 906,

2

907-08 (2008). We have long recognized that writ relief is not ap-
propriate when there is an adequate and speedy remedy at law
available. Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558; see
NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330. Therefore, ‘‘[w]e generally will not ex-
ercise our discretion to consider petitions for extraordinary writ re-
lief that challenge district court orders denying motions for sum-
mary judgment, unless summary judgment is clearly required by a
statute or rule, or an important issue of law requires clarification.’
ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 862, 867, 192
P.3d 738, 742 (2008).

This petition arises from the Legislature’s recent amendments to
the statutes governing deficiency judgments. As noted by the dis-
trict court, the interpretation of the amendments raises important
issues that affect many people in this state. Given the current eco-
nomic climate of this state, these issues will undoubtedly recur,
and they have already created considerable confusion in the lower
courts. Indeed, although NRS 40.459(1)(c) was enacted less than
two years ago, its application has already resulted in conflicting de-
cisions in the district courts. Because there are important issues of
Jaw with statewide impact requiring clarification, and because an
appeal from the final judgment would not constitute an adequate
and speedy legal remedy, given the urgent need for resolution of
these issues, we elect to exercise our discretion to entertain the
merits of the petition.

Policy underlying Assembly Bill 273 and NRS 40.459(1)(c)

The recent recession severely affected Nevada’s real estate mar-
ket. As a result, a large secondary market emerged wherein vari-
ous entities, including collection companies, would purchase dis-
tressed loans at deep discounts. These entities would then exercise
their power of sale or judicially foreclose on the collateral secur-
ing the loans and seek deficiency judgments against the debtors and
guarantors based upon the full indebtedness. See Hearing on A.B.
273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th
Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2011).

In response, following the 2011 legislative session, Assembly
Bill 273 was signed into law. It is codified, in pertinent part, in
NRS 40.459, which is entitled ‘‘Limitations on amount of money
judgment.’”’ Subsection (1)(c)—the subject of the present litiga-
tion—provides that “‘[i}f the person seeking the judgment acquired
the right to obtain the judgment from a person who previously held
that right,’ then the person seeking the judgment may only recover

the amount by which the amount of the consideration paid for
that right exceeds the fair market value of the property sold at
the time of sale or the amount for which the property was ac-
tually sold, whichever is greater, with interest from the date
of sale and reasonable costs[.]

8!

During a committee hearing on Assembly Bill 273, Assembly-
man Marcus Conklin, primary sponsor of the bill, described the
intent of Assembly Bill 273 as follows:

We are preventing a creditor from profiting from a judgment
in excess of the amount the creditor paid for the right to
pursue such a judgment.

. . » [The bill prevents a person who has purchased the rights
to a loan from receiving a judgment for more than what he
paid plus interest.

{1]f a bank chooses to pursue someone for a deficiency judg-
ment in a situation where a house was purchased for
$200,000 and the value dropped to $100,000—and the bank
decided to pursue the homeowner for the $100,000 and then
sold it to a collection agency for $20,000—all the collection
agency could collect is the $20,000 plus interest and fees. If
the bank was willing to accept $20,000, then why did the
bank not negotiate with the homeowner for the $20,000? The
homeowner’s credit is being destroyed for $20,000, but it ap-
pears on his credit report as $100,000. Why not have the dis-
cussion take place between the original lender and the home-
owner for the true amount the bank is willing to accept in the
first place?

Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor
Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2011).

In other words, NRS 40.459(1)(c) was designed to prevent prof-
iteering and to encourage creditors to negotiate with borrowers. To
accomplish these goals, the statute greatly limits the amount of a
deficiency judgment that a successor in interest can recover,
thereby discouraging these entities from purchasing notes or mort-
gages “‘for pennies on the dollar’’ Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., May 3, 2011). More
specifically, NRS 40.459(1)(c) limits the amount of a judgment
that a successor in interest can recover to the difference between
the fair market (or actual sale) value of the property that is fore-
closed upon and the amount that the successor paid to acquire an
interest from the original creditor.

NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s retroactive effect

Le

Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis argue that applying NRS
40.459(1)(c) to deficiency judgments arising from sales, pursuant
to either judicial foreclosures or trustee’s sales, that occurred
before the statute took effect would not constitute retroactive op-

2

eration of the statute and that, even if it did, the Legislature so in-
tended. Whether applying a statute in a particular instance consti-
tutes retroactive operation is a question of law that we review de
novo. See Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Po-
lice Dep’t (PEBP), 124 Nev. 138, 146, 179 P.3d 542, 548 (2008).
Further, even in the context of a writ petition, ‘‘[s]tatutory inter-
pretation is a question of law that we review de novo.’’ Int’l Game
Tech., 124 Ney. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559.

Le

Substantive statutes are presumed to only operate prospectively,
unless it is clear that the drafters intended the statute to be applied
retroactively. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273
(1994); PEBP, 124 Nev. at 154, 179 P.3d at 553; Cnty. of Clark
v. Roosevelt Title Ins. Co., 80 Nev. 530, 535, 396 P.2d 844, 846
(1964). The presumption against retroactivity is typically explained
by reference to fairness. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. As the
Supreme Court has instructed, ‘‘[e]lementary considerations of
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly;
settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” Id. at 265.
Moreover, “‘[iJn a free, dynamic society, creativity in both com-
mercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives
people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.”
Id. at 265-66.

a

“[D]eciding when a statute operates ‘retroactively’ is not always
a simple or mechanical task.’’ Jd. at 268. ‘‘Any test of retroactiv-
ity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely
to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect
philosophical clarity.”’ Id. at 270. Broadly speaking, courts ‘‘take
a ‘commonsense, functional’ approach”’ in analyzing whether ap-
plying a new statute would constitute retroactive operation. PEBP,
124 Nev. at 155, 179 P.3d at 553 (quoting Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001)). Central to
this inquiry are ‘‘fundamental notions of ‘fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations.’ ’’ Jd. at 155, 179 P.3d at 554
(quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321). Ultimately, a conclusion re-
garding retroactivity ‘‘comes at the end of a process of judgment
concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the
degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a
relevant past event.’” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.

“All laws have connections with the past,’ however. 2 Norman
J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Con-

Po

struction § 41:2, at 390 (7th ed. 2009). As such, a statute does not
operate ‘‘retrospectively’’ merely because it ‘“draws upon past
facts,’ PEBP, 124 Nev. at 155, 179 P.3d at 553, “‘or upsets ex-
pectations based in prior law.’ Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269. Rather,
“**fa] statute has retroactive effect when it ‘‘takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obli-
gation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect
to transactions or considerations already past.’’’’ PEBP, 124
Nev. at 155, 179 P.3d at 553-54 (alteration in original) (quoting St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269).

“NRS 40.459(1)(c) attaches a new disability and would impair
vested rights if applied to deficiencies arising after trustee
sales that took place before the statute became effective

Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis contend that applying NRS
40.459(1)(c) here would not affect any of CML-NV’s vested rights
because (a) it simply clarifies existing law, as provided in NRS
40.451, rather than creating a new obligation; and (b) CML-NV’s
tight to a deficiency does not vest until the entry of a deficiency
judgment, which has not yet occurred.

NRS 40.451

NRS 40.451, which was enacted in 1969 and amended in 1989,
reads:

As used in NRS 40.451 to 40.463, inclusive, ‘‘indebtedness’’
means the principal balance of the obligation secured by a
mortgage or other lien on real property, together with all in-
terest accrued and unpaid prior to the time of foreclosure sale,
all costs and fees of such a sale, all advances made with re-
spect to the property by the beneficiary, and all other amounts
secured by the mortgage or other lien on the real property in
favor of the person seeking the deficiency judgment. Such
amount constituting a lien is limited to the amount of the con-
sideration paid by the lienholder.

(emphasis added); 1969 Nev. Stat., ch. 327, § 3, at 572-73; 1989
Nev. Stat., ch. 750, § 8, at 1769. The amount of ‘‘indebtedness”’
is then used in determining the amount of a deficiency judgment
against the borrower under NRS 40.459(1)(a) and (b), which allow
for judgments no greater than the amount by which the indebted-
ness exceeds the fair market value or the actual sale amount,
whichever results in the lesser judgment.”

2Although NRS 40.459(1)(a) and (b) were renumbered in 2011, no sub-
stantive changes were made to those provisions. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 311, § 5,
at 1743,

2

P|

In arguing that NRS 40.451 already limits deficiency judgments
to the amount of consideration paid and thus that NRS
40.459(1)(c) does not effect a substantive change to the law, Sand-
pointe and Yahraus-Lewis misread NRS 40.451. “‘ “Where the lan-
guage of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear
and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and [we] are
not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.’ ’’
Walters v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 723, 727, 263
P.3d 231, 234 (2011) (quoting Madera v. SIS, 114 Nev. 253, 257,
956 P.2d 117, 120 (1998)). When read as a whole, as it must be,
Int’l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 200-01, 179 P.3d at 560, NRS
40.451 defines a successor lienholder’s ‘‘indebtedness’’ as the
amount the successor paid for the mortgage or lien, as well as ‘‘all
interest accrued and unpaid prior to the time of foreclosure sale, all
costs and fees of such a sale, [and] all advances made with respect
to the property by the beneficiary.’ NRS 40.451. The statute’s last
sentence—limiting a lien amount to the amount of consideration
paid—plainly does not purport to limit the total amount of the
judgment that may be awarded in a deficiency judgment action. In-
stead, it limits only the lien amount, and as set forth in that
statute, the lien amount is only one factor among several in deter-
mining the total amount of indebtedness, which is then used to de-
termine the deficiency judgment amount. NRS 40.459(1)(a) and.
(b). Therefore, NRS 40.459(1)(c), which limits the total judgment
amount, is different from NRS 40.451, which places a limit only
on the first variable in the equation used to fix the amount of
indebtedness.

On the other hand, NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s plain meaning creates a
new limitation on the amount a person may recover in a deficiency
action whenever there has been a transfer of the right to obtain a
deficiency judgment. See Walters, 127 Nev. at 727, 263 P.3d at
234. For purposes of applying NRS 40.459(1)(c), a holder of the
promissory note and deed of trust may transfer that right to obtain
a deficiency judgment as a bundle of rights secured in a promis-
sory note and deed of trust. See Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon,
128 Nev. 505, 522, 286 P.3d 249, 260 (2012) (determining that
when a person holds the note and a beneficial interest in the deed
of trust securing the note, the person may proceed with a judicial
foreclosure or trustee’s sale). However, NRS 40.459(1)(c) now
provides that if such a transfer occurs, the successor holder will be
limited in the amount that he will be able to recover in a deficiency
action.

Se:

Further, even if NRS 40.459(1)(c) had not changed the Jaw as to
deficiency judgments against borrowers, it clearly changed the law
as to judgments against guarantors following a sale, pursuant to a
judicial foreclosure or a trustee’s sale. See NRS 40.465 (stating
that its definition for indebtedness applies to NRS 40.495). NRS
40.465 provides a separate and distinct definition of indebtedness
that applies in an action against a guarantor. For purposes of the
guarantor statutes, NRS 40.465 provides similarly to NRS 40.451
that indebtedness ‘‘means the principal balance of the obligation,
together with all accrued and unpaid interest, and those costs, fees,
advances and other amounts secured by the mortgage or lien upon
real property.’ This definition of indebtedness lacks the final sen-
tence of NRS 40.451, however, and thus pre-2011, guarantors of
a note were not protected by any consideration-amount limit in the
factors used to determine indebtedness. The 2011 changes to NRS
40.459(1), however, apply to guarantors, and thus guarantors are
now afforded the same protections as borrowers when the right to
obtain a judgment has been sold to a successor. NRS 40.459(1)(c).
Therefore, NRS 40.459(1)(c) creates a new limitation on the
amount recoverable against guarantors, when the successor elects
to judicially foreclose or conduct a trustee’s sale.

Thus, contrary to Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis’s claims, nei-
ther NRS 40.451 nor any other pre-2011 statute or rule limits the
amount of the judgment that a successor in interest may recover in
a deficiency judgment action to the amount the successor paid to
acquire the interest in the obligation. To suggest otherwise is to
confuse the intent of NRS 40.459(1)(c). Following the enactment
of NRS 40.459(1)(c), a successor holder is now limited in its re-
covery, in a deficiency action or suit against the guarantor, to the
sum by which the amount paid for the ‘‘right to obtain the judg-
ment’’ exceeds the greater of the fair market value or the actual
sale price. Under NRS 40.459(1)(c), no award may be made for
other amounts that the successor in interest may have incurred fol-
lowing the acquisition of the right to obtain the judgment, such as
accrued interest, costs and fees, and any advances, as provided in
NRS 40.451 and NRS 40.465. Thus, NRS 40.459(1)(c) attaches a
new disability to a successor lienholder’s ability to obtain a defi-
ciency judgment.

We therefore conclude that NRS 40.459(1)(c) is not simply a
clarification of existing law, but is rather a new limitation on the
amount that may be recovered in a deficiency judgment.

The right to a deficiency judgment is a vested right

Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis next argue that even if NRS
40.459(1)(c) changed existing law, applying its limitation here

2

would not impact any of CML-NV’s existing rights because CML-
NV’s right to a deficiency judgment only vests upon entry of the
judgment, which has not yet occurred. They point out that in
order to obtain a final deficiency judgment, CML-NV must first
abide by several statutory requirements and overcome any defenses
that may be raised. Thus, they insist, CML-NV merely has a
“contingent remedy for a potential deficiency.’ Relying primarily
on a passage from Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.), Sandpointe
and Yahraus-Lewis assert that applying NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s limi-
tation here would not be retroactive because ‘‘it has generally
been the law for more than half a century that ‘no right to a defi-
ciency judgment vests until Plaintiff satisfies equity that it would
be equitable, in light of the sale price, to authorize a deficiency
judgment. ’’ (quoting 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 778, at 1474 (1949)).
Notably, however, that very ‘‘assertion stated in the C.J.S.
encyclopedia . . . is supported by no law.’ Hartman v. McInnis,
996 So. 2d 704, 722 (Miss. 2007) (Dickinson, J., concurring and
dissenting) (explaining that the two cases cited in Corpus Juris Se-
cundum arose in states that relied on equitable principles rather
than on specific deficiency statutes).

In Nevada, the sale of the secured property is the event that vests
the right to deficiency. Following the trustee’s sale, the amount of
a deficiency is crystalized because that is the subject date for de-
termining both the fair market value and trustee’s sale price of the
property securing the loan. See NRS 40,459(1); In re Filippini, 66
Nev. 17, 22, 202 P.2d 535, 537 (1949) (defining a ‘“‘vested
right[ ],’ in relevant part, as “‘some interest in the property that
has become fixed and established’’). In other words, the fair mar-
ket value of the property is determined on the day of the trustee’s
sale, and that value can be used in a future deficiency action. Fur-
ther, NRS 40.462(1), which governs the distribution of foreclosure
sale proceeds, provides that the right to receive proceeds from the
sale vests at the time of the foreclosure sale; it is logical that the
right to a judgment for the amount not received in a foreclosure
sale would arise on the same date as the right to receive amounts
received from the sale. The trustee’s sale marks the first point in
time that an action for deficiency can be maintained and com-
mences the applicable six-month limitations period. See NRS
40.455(1) (providing that an application for deficiency judgment
soust be filed ‘‘within 6 months after the date of the foreclosure
sale or the trustee’s sale’’). Accordingly, we conclude that the right
to deficiency vests upon the sale pursuant to a judicial foreclosure
or trustee’s sale, and thus, applying NRS 40.459(1)(c) to defi-
ciencies arising from sales that took place before that provision was
enacted would affect vested rights.

Se:

Application of NRS 40.459(1)(c) in this case would have
@ retroactive effect

In reaching our conclusion, we rely on Holloway v. Barrett, 87
Nev. 385, 487 P.2d 501 (1971). Holloway arose from the Legisla-
ture’s enactment of a statute that limited the amount of a deficiency
judgment to the difference between the total amount owed on the
loan and the fair market value of the property securing the loan.
Id, at 387 n.1, 487 P.2d at 502 n.1. The borrowers in Holloway ar-
gued that this limitation should be applied to a loan that was exe-
cuted prior to the effective date of the statute but that had resulted
in a foreclosure sale after the statute’s effective date. Id. at 386-88,
487 P.2d at 502-03. The district court agreed, determining that ap-
plying the limitation under those circumstances did not constitute
retroactive operation. Id. at 387-88, 487 P.2d at 503.

The creditor challenged this determination by petitioning this
court for a writ of mandamus. Jd. at 389, 487 P.2d at 503. In
denying the petition, the Holloway court characterized ‘‘the argu-
ment about retrospective and prospective application of [the
statute]’’ as ‘‘purely academic.”’ Jd. at 390, 487 P.2d at 504. The
court reasoned as follows:

There is no attempt upon the part of the trial court to give
[the statute] retrospective effect. It is being applied to a defi-
ciency occurring as a result of a trustee’s sale held after the
effective date of the statute. The only retrospective aspect
arises from the fact that the promissory note and the deed of
trust were executed prior to the effective date of the statute
and may for that reason affect rights already in existence.

Id. at 390-91, 487 P.2d at 504 (emphasis added).

The court drew a distinction based upon this fact, expressly not-
ing that it was not considering ‘‘foreclosure and trustee’s sales
completed prior to the effective date of the statute[ ]}’ thereby
foreshadowing the scenario presented here. Id. at 392 n.4, 487
P.2d at 506 0.4; see Paradise Homes Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 87 Nev. 617, 619 n.1, 491 P.2d 1277, 1279 n.1 (1971).

Subsequently, in Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fiscus,
this court characterized Holloway as concluding that ‘‘the trial
court’s order did not constitute retroactive application of a statute,
but rather, that the deficiency judgment in question arose after the
effective date of the statute.’ 102 Nev. 371, 376, 725 P.2d 234,
237 (1986). Therefore, this court explained, ‘‘[t]he statute in
question in Holloway did not . . . impair preexisting obligations
. . . since the [trustee’s sale] on the property occurred after the ef-
fective date of the statute.’ Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Holloway
and Farmers, read together, demonstrate that statutes affecting de-

ficiency judgments operate prospectively when the sale, pursuant to
a judicial foreclosure or trustee’s sale, occurs after the enactment
of the statute. In contrast, when, as here, the trustee’s sale occurs
before the effective date of an antideficiency statute, application of
the statute will generally be deemed retroactive. In re Mathiason,
129 B.R. 173, 175-76 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (reasoning that be-
cause the mortgage was foreclosed before the effective date of the
statute, the statute could only apply if it operated retroactively);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Furgerson, 104 Nev. 772, 776, 766 P.2d 904,
907 (1988) (applying a new statute of repose to an action for con-
struction defects substantially completed before the effective date
of the statute would constitute retroactive operation because the
“cause of action accrued before the effective date of the revised
[statute]’’); see also Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas
Metro. Police Dep’t (PEBP), 124 Nev. 138, 155, 179 P.3d 542,
553 (2008) (stating that courts ‘‘take a ‘commonsense, functional’
approach”’ in analyzing whether applying a new statute would
constitute retroactive operation (quoting Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001))).

NRS 40.459(1)(c) may only apply prospectively

Having concluded that applying NRS 40.459(1)(c) here would
constitute retroactive operation of the statute, we now turn to
whether it may, nonetheless, be applied retroactively. Although
Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis do not concede that NRS
40.459(1)(c) is subject to the presumption against retroactivity,
they argue that applying the statute here is consistent with the Leg-
islature’s intent.

The United States Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘the pre-
sumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our ju-
risprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than
our Republic.’ Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265. And, from this court’s
inception, it has viewed retroactive statutes with disdain, noting
that such laws are ‘‘odious and tyrannical’ and ‘‘have been almost
uniformly discountenanced by the courts of Great Britain and the
United States.’ Milliken v. Sloat, 1 Nev. 573, 577 (1865). Not sur-
prisingly, once it is triggered, the presumption against retroactiv-
ity is given considerable force. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314
(1908) (‘‘The presumption is very strong that a statute was not
meant to act retrospectively, and it ought never to receive such a
construction if it is susceptible of any other.’’). Thus, as we have
observed, a statute will not be applied retroactively

unless [(1)] the Legislature clearly manifests an intent to
apply the statute retroactively, or [(2)] “‘it clearly, strongly,

and imperatively appears from the act itself”’ that the Legis-
lature’s intent cannot be implemented in any other fashion.

PEBP, 124 Nev. at 154, 179 P.3d at 553 (quoting In re Estate of
Thomas, 116 Nev. 492, 495-96, 998 P.2d 560, 562 (2000).

The Legislature did not clearly manifest an intent to
apply NRS 40.459(1)(c) retroactively

In support of their argument, Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis
principally rely on a passage from the Legislative Counsel Digest,
providing that the relevant provisions of Assembly Bill 273 will
“become effective upon passage and approval and thus apply to a
deficiency judgment awarded on or after that effective date.’ 2011
Nev. Stat., ch. 311, Legislative Counsel’s Digest, at 1741. CML-
NV responds that the Legislative Counsel’s Digest cannot be con-
sidered in assessing whether the Legislature intended to apply
NRS 40.459(1)(c) retroactively. It argues that the Legislative
Counsel is an unelected body and that the above-quoted passage
conflicts with the text and legislative history of NRS 40.459(1)(c).

“* ‘Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and
its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for con-
struction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its mean-
ing beyond the statute itself’’’ Walters v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 127 Nev. 723, 727, 263 P.3d 231, 234 (2011) (quoting
Madera, 114 Nev. at 257, 956 P.2d at 120). Therefore, it is only
appropriate to consult the Legislative Counsel’s Digest to ascertain
the intent of the Legislature ‘‘[i]f the language of a statute is am-
biguous.”’ Cal. Teachers’ Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Cent. Union
High Sch. Dist., 190 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457 (Ct. App. 1983). Stated
differently, ‘‘[iJf a law is clear the Legislative Counsel’s Digest
must be disregarded.”’ Id. at 458.

Here, the Legislature simply provided that NRS 40.459(1)(c)
““becomefs] effective upon passage and approval.’ 2011 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 311, § 7, at 1748. As the district court determined, this state-
ment does not even begin to approach the type of express legisla-
tive command necessary to rebut the presumption against retroac-
tivity. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257 (‘‘A statement that a statute
will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably sug-
gest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an ear-
lier date.”’); PEBP, 124 Nev. at 155, 179 P.3d at 553 (‘‘(W]hen
the Legislature intends retroactive application, it is capable of stat-
ing so clearly.”’). And, although this statement is cursory, it is not
ambiguous. There is clearly no evidence in the enactment language
that shows the Legislature’s intent to apply NRS 40.459(1)(c)
retroactively. Resort to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest or other

os

legislative materials is therefore unnecessary. Even if we were to
determine that the effective date language of NRS 40.459(1)(c) is
ambiguous, such a determination would necessarily compel a con-
clusion that the Legislature did not clearly manifest an intent to
apply the statute retroactively.

Nothing in NRS 40.459(1)(c) clearly, strongly, and
imperatively shows that the Legislature's intent can only
be implemented by applying the statute retroactively

NRS 40.459(1)(c) would certainly have a broader impact if it
were applied retroactively. That does not mean, however, that the
Legislature’s intent can only be implemented by applying it
retroactively. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285-86 (‘It will
frequently be true . . . that retroactive application of a new statute
would vindicate its purpose more fully. That consideration, how-
ever, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactiv-
ity’’). NRS 40.459(1)(c) imposes a dramatic limitation on the
amount of a deficiency judgment that a successor in interest can re-
cover, and even if the statute is applied prospectively, it could still
reach a large portion of the secondary mortgage market for dis-
tressed loans. Therefore, it does not clearly, strongly, and impera-
tively appear from the language of NRS 40.459(1)(c) that the Leg-
islature’s intent can only be implemented by applying the statute
retroactively and, as a consequence, the presumption against
retroactivity has not been rebutted.

Any lingering doubt regarding whether the Legislature intended
NRS 40.459(1)(c) to apply retroactively is quickly put to rest by
reference to its legislative history. Although the language of the en-
actment provision is clear and unambiguous, and reference to leg-
islative history is therefore generally not needed, Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 257; PEBP, 124 Nev. at 155, 179 P.3d at 553, in this case
it simply clarifies that there was no intent that NRS 40.459(1)(c)
was meant to apply retroactively. Throughout the various commit-
tee hearings, Assemblyman Conklin, the author of Assembly Bill
273, stated that the provisions could not be applied retroactively.
See Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th
Leg., at 2-3 (Nev., May 3, 2011); Hearing on A.B. 273 Before
the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th Leg., at
12-13 (Nev., March 28, 2011); Hearing on A.B. 273 Before the
Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 2011 Leg., 76th Leg.,
at 7 (Nev., March 23, 2011).? Given the above points, NRS

3Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis contend that the statements made by As-
semblyman Conklin no longer apply because the language of the provision was
changed. We find no merit in this assertion. Although some changes were
made to the provision regarding the effective date of the statute, the Legisla-
tive intent against retroactive application is still relevant for our consideration.

Ss

40.459(1)(c) cannot be applied retroactively.‘ In determining that
NRS 40.459(1)(c) cannot apply retroactively, we necessarily also
conclude that NRS 40.459(1)(c) is not applicable to the factual cir-
cumstances in this petition.>

CONCLUSION

We conclude that NRS 40.459(1)(c) is a new statute that impacts
vested rights. If a statute affects vested rights, it may not apply
retroactively unless such intent is clearly manifested by the Legis-
lature. We conclude that pursuant to the language in Assembly Bill
273, regarding the effective date of NRS 40.459(1)(c), the statute
may not apply retroactively. Additionally, there is no clear or
strong evidence that supports application of this statute retroac-
tively. Therefore, because the trustee’s sale in this petition occurred
before the statute became effective, the limitations in NRS
40.459(1)(c) cannot apply here. Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in either
denying Sandpointe’s and Yahraus-Lewis’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment or in granting CML-NV’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment. We, therefore, deny the petition for extraordinary
relief.

PICKERING, C.J., and Gispons, HarpEsty, and Douc.as, JJ.,
concur.

Cuerry, J., with whom PARRAGURRE, J., joins, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from my colleagues in the majority. I
would grant the original petition for a writ of mandamus or pro-
hibition because, to date, the real party in interest has not obtained
a deficiency judgment. I believe that when a deficiency judgment
is lawfully obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction, it is at
that time that NRS 40.459(1)(c) would apply. This is, of course,
contrary to the majority holding that the limitations in NRS
40.459(1)(c) apply to foreclosure or trustee’s sales occurring on or
after the effective date of the statute.

“We also note that the presence of several potential constitutional and pro-
cedural issues, including the Contracts Clause and federal preemption by the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, weighs against
retroactively applying NRS 40.459(1)(c) here. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267
n.21 (‘In some cases, . . . the interest in avoiding the adjudication of consti-
tutional questions will counsel against a retroactive application.”). Because
NRS 40.459(1)(c) is inapplicable in this case, we need not reach these issues.

SCML-NV contends that NRS 40.459(1)(c), which contemplates
“‘acquir[ing] the right to obtain the judgment from a person,’”’ cannot apply
under these circumstances because the FDIC is not a person as defined by
NRS 0.039. However, we need not determine this issue because we conclude
that NRS 40.459(1)(c) does not apply here, where the trustee’s sale occurred
before NRS 40.459(1)(c) became effective.

0

Although I am deeply troubled by the majority’s rejection of
Sandpointe’s and Yahraus-Lewis’s argument that NRS 40.459(1)(c)
merely clarified existing limitations on a creditor’s recovery set
forth in NRS 40.451, even if I were to accept this determination,
in my view, NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s protections would nonetheless act
to limit the amount of CML-NV’s recovery. Before a final defi-
ciency judgment can be obtained, a creditor must comply with the
various requirements of Nevada’s deficiency legislation and over-
come any defenses asserted by the borrower and/or the guarantor.
As Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis correctly assert, until such a
judgment has been obtained, a creditor merely has a ‘‘contingent
remedy for a potential deficiency,’ not a vested right to a defi-
ciency judgment. As a result, the application of NRS 40.459(1)(c)
in cases, like the one presented here, in which a deficiency judg-
ment had not yet been obtained by the statute’s effective date can-
not be viewed as having a retroactive effect on a creditor’s right to
recover. See Pub. Emps.’ Benefits Program v. Las Vegas Metro. Po-
lice Dep’t (PEBP), 124 Nev. 138, 155, 179 P.3d 542, 553-54
(2008) (concluding that ‘‘ ‘[a] statute has retroactive effect when it
takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already
past’ ’’ (alteration in original) (quoting Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001))).

That the Legislature intended NRS 40.459(1)(c) to operate in
this fashion is made clear by the Legislative Counsel Digest’s pro-
nouncement that the relevant provisions of Assembly Bill 273
would not only ‘““become effective upon passage and approval’’ but
would also ‘‘apply to a deficiency judgment awarded on or after
that effective date.’’ 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 311, Legislative Coun-
sel’s Digest, at 1741. This statement is instructive in that it con-
firms that it is the act of obtaining a deficiency judgment, not the
holding of a foreclosure or trustee’s sales, that triggers the appli-
cation of NRS 40.459(1)(c). The majority declines to consider this
language because they conclude that resorting to legislative intent
is unnecessary. The Legislature, however, concerned that this court
might improvidently interpret this statute in light of the arguments
advanced by real party in interest, unequivocally emphasized and
declared in its amicus curiae brief its clear intent that NRS
40.459(1)(c) ‘‘apply to every deficiency judgment awarded on or
after its effective date”’ (Emphasis added.) But in resolving the im-
portant issues presented here, the majority fails to acknowledge the
Legislature’s participation in this matter, much less address the
statement of intent contained in its brief as to the statute’s correct
operation.

While the Great Recession from which our state has only just
begun to emerge began in 2008, it was not until June 10, 2011,

ee

that the Governor signed Assembly Bill 273 into law, codifying the
limitation on deficiency judgment recoveries at issue here as NRS
40.459(1)(c). This statute was specifically designed to put a stop to
profiteering activities brought on by the emergence during the
Great Recession of a secondary market for distressed loans in
which third parties swooped in to purchase these loans at deeply
discounted prices, exercised their power of sale or judicial fore-
closure on the property securing the loans, and then sought defi-
ciency judgments against the debtors and guarantors with the blind
hope that there still may be a solvent target. See Hearing on A.B.
273 Before the Assembly Commerce and Labor Comm., 76th
Leg. (Nev., March 23, 2011). In order to encourage creditors to
negotiate with the borrowers of these loans, rather than sell them
to third parties for ‘‘pennies on the dollar,’ Hearing on A.B. 273
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 76th Leg. (Nev., May 3,
2011), NRS 40.459(1)(c) greatly limits the amount of a deficiency
judgment that a successor party can recover.

This court has long recognized that ‘“Nevada’s deficiency legis-
Jation is designed to achieve fairness to all parties to a transaction
secured in whole or in part by realty.’ First Interstate Bank of Nev.
vy. Shields, 102 Nev. 616, 618, 730 P.2d 429, 431 (1986). In
Shields, we explained that for obligors, fairness was accorded by
ensuring that ‘‘creditors in Nevada may not reap a windfall at an
obligor’s expense by acquiring the secured realty at a bid price un-
related to the fair market value of the property and thereafter pro-
ceeding against available obligors for the difference between such
a deflated price and the balance of the debt.” Jd. To that end,
Shields recognized that ‘‘[i]t is irrefutably clear that the salutary
purposes of the legislative scheme for recovering legitimate defi-
ciencies would be attenuated, if not entirely circumvented . . . by
denying guarantors, or any other form of obligors, the protection
provided by the deficiency statutes.” Id. at 618-19, 730 P.2d at
431. This is so, the Shields court concluded, because in Nevada
lenders are not permitted to ‘‘manipulate sources of recovery in
order to realize debt satisfaction in amounts substantially greater
than the balance of the debt due.’’ Jd. at 619, 730 P.2d at 431.

While the creditor activities at issue here are obviously differ-
ent than those addressed in Shields, the policy rationale underlying
Nevada’s deficiency legislation, including the newly enacted NRS
40.459(1)(c), remains the same—achieving ‘‘fairness to all parties
to a transaction secured . . . by realty.” Id. at 618, 730 P.2d at 431
(emphasis added). But in denying the petition for extraordinary re-
lief brought by Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis, the majority turns
this policy on its head. By limiting NRS 40.459(1)(c)’s protections
so that they apply only when a foreclosure or trustee’s sale had not
taken place prior to the statute’s effective date, rather than allow-
ing their application in cases where a deficiency judgment had not

MM

been obtained by that date, the majority denies these protections
not only to Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis, but to innumerable
similarly situated borrowers and guarantors, the individuals and en-
tities that this statute was specifically designed to assist.

In essence, the majority’s decision serves to produce a windfall
for collection agencies and other third-party purchasers of dis-
tressed loans through the very activities—the sale and purchase of
such loans for pennies on the dollar, followed by the sale of the
property securing the loans and efforts to recover the full indebt-
edness through a deficiency judgment—that the Legislature sought
to address with the passage of Assembly Bill 273. And in so
doing, the majority abrogates the clear intent of Nevada’s Legis-
lature in passing Assembly Bill 273 (NRS 40.459(1)(c)), which
was to encourage lenders to negotiate with the borrowers and, by
extension, the guarantors of these loans, rather than sell them to
collection agencies and other third-party purchasers for far less
than their original value.

The facts of this case are illustrative of why it is so important
that the act of obtaining a deficiency judgment be the trigging event
for the application of NRS 40.459(1)(c). Here, the original lender,
Silver State Bank, was closed in 2008, with the FDIC appointed as
receiver. As a result, when Sandpointe’s loan matured and subse-
quently went into default in 2009, the FDIC was effectively the
lender for this loan, meaning that, rather than having a local
lender to negotiate with, Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis had only
the negligible prospect of reaching out to this monolithic govern-
ment entity. The FDIC, however, quickly shuttled the Sandpointe
loan off to Multibank in 2010, and Multibank then transferred it to
its wholly owned subsidiary, CML-NV, which foreclosed on the
loan and sold the collateral securing it at a trustee sale in early
2011. Under the position adopted by the majority, the occurrence
of the trustee sale at this point meant that Sandpointe and Yahraus-
Lewis would not receive the protections afforded by NRS
40.459(1)(c), even though the prospect of negotiations on their
loan had been all but eliminated by the failure of their original
Jender and the resulting scenario in which three separate entities,
including the FDIC, had control of the loan over the course of a
few years.

And one last thought. Even if NRS 40.459(1)(c) was applied, as
I believe it should be, to limit a successor’s recovery to the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property and the
amount the successor paid to acquire its interest, Sandpointe and
Yahraus-Lewis, along with similarly situated borrowers and guar-
antors, would still be liable for a great amount of money to the
successor to the loan.

For the above reasons, I dissent.

833

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF NEVADA,
A PUBLIC AGENCY, APPELLANT, v. RENO NEWSPAPERS,
INC., RESPONDENT.

No. 60129
November 14, 2013 313 P.3d 221

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Kimberly
Okezie, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City; Woodburn
& Wedge and W. Chris Wicker and Joshua M. Woodbury, Reno,
for Appellant.

Burton Bartlett & Glogovac, Ltd., and Scott A. Glogovac and
David S. McElroy, Reno, for Respondent.

Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, and Adam P. Segal and
Bryce C. Loveland, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae Clark County
Association of School Administrators.

Smith Law Firm and James C. Smith, Reno, for Amicus Curiae
Retired Public Employees of Nevada.

a4 Po
mi
Po

Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
In this appeal, we discuss the applicability of Nevada’s Public
Records Act (the Act) to information stored in the individual files

835

of retired employees that are maintained by appellant Public Em-
ployees’ Retirement System of Nevada (PERS). Specifically, we
address the scope of confidentiality set forth in NRS 286.110(3),
which states that ‘‘[t]he official correspondence and records, other
than the files of individual members or retired employees, . . . are
public records and are available for public inspection.’ (Emphasis
added.)

Although we conclude that the individual files have been de-
clared confidential by statute and are thereby exempt from re-
quests pursuant to the Act, other reports that PERS generates
based on information contained in the files are not similarly pro-
tected by NRS 286.110(3). However, information contained in
such other reports may still be declared confidential, privileged, or
protected by other statutes, rules, or caselaw, and therefore not
subject to disclosure under the Act. Accordingly, we affirm in part
and vacate in part the district court’s order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2011, respondent Reno Newspapers, Inc., doing business as
the Reno Gazette-Journal (RGJ), submitted a public records re-
quest to PERS seeking the following pension information: the
names of all individuals who are collecting pensions, the names of
their government employers, their salaries, their hire and retire-
ment dates, and the amounts of their pension payments. RGJ’s re-
quest originated as part of an investigation concerning govern-
ment expenditures and the public cost of retired government
employee pensions. PERS denied RGJ’s request, asserting that
the information was confidential pursuant to NRS 286.110(3),
which states that the files of individual retired employees are not
public records, and NRS 286.117, which requires a personal
waiver from the member to review and copy such records.

RGJ filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in district court
seeking the requested information, which it asserted is not confi-
dential because it is generated from public records and easily ac-
cessible through an electronic search of the PERS system. PERS
opposed the petition, arguing that it strictly maintains the re-
quested information as confidential and that the privacy interests
involved outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure.’ For support,
PERS submitted a declaration from its executive officer explaining
that all information related to the individual files is maintained as

‘Clark County Association of School Administrators (CCASA) filed a mo-
tion to intervene and a proposed opposition to RGI’s writ petition, and Retired
Public Employees of Nevada (RPEN) filed a motion for leave to file an ami-
cus brief in support of PERS, both arguing that production of the requested in
formation would subject retired employees to thé risk of identity theft and elder
abuse. These organizations have also filed amicus curiae briefs on appeal.

836 Po

confidential but that PERS provides an annual valuation of its sys-
tem in aggregate form as a public record.

The district court granted RGJ’s petition, concluding that neither
NRS 286.110(3) nor NRS 286.117 declared the requested infor-
mation confidential and that privacy concerns did not clearly out-
weigh the public’s right to disclosure. The district court ordered
PERS to produce a report for RGJ containing the requested infor-
mation, subject to appropriate fees under NRS 239.052 and so
long as the home addresses and social security numbers of the re-
tired public employees remained confidential.? PERS now brings
this appeal.

DISCUSSION

PERS argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting
RGJ’s petition because the Legislature, by enacting NRS
286.110(3), has explicitly declared that information contained in
the individual files of retired employees is confidential. Alterna-
tively, PERS argues that the privacy interests in nondisclosure
clearly outweigh the public’s interest in accessing that information.

Standard of review

|

“A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station[,] or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise
of discretion.’ Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (footnote
omitted); see NRS 34.160. This court reviews a district court’s de-
cision to grant or deny a petition for a writ of mandamus under an
abuse of discretion standard. City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal,
119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003). Questions of statu-
tory construction, however, including the meaning and scope of a
statute, are questions of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id.

Application of Nevada’s Public Records Act

At the outset, the Act establishes that ‘‘all public books and pub-
lic records of governmental entities must remain open to the pub-
lic, unless ‘otherwise declared by law to be confidential.’’’ Reno
Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 127 Nev. 873, 877, 266 P.3d 623,
626 (2011) (quoting NRS 239.010(1)). The Act’s purpose is to
promote government transparency and accountability by facilitating

The district court also carved out an exception prohibiting the disclosure of
the names of retired employees in sensitive Jaw enforcement positions where
public access to those names could jeopardize their personal safety.

po 837

public access to information regarding government activities. Id.
“Generally, when ‘the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, . . . the courts are not permitted to search for its
meaning beyond the statute itself.’ ’’ Chanos v. Nev. Tax Comm’n,
124 Nev. 232, 240, 181 P.3d 675, 680 (2008) (quoting State, Div.
of Ins. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 Nev. 290, 293, 995
P.2d 482, 485 (2000)). Moreover, in order to advance the Act’s
public access goal, the Act’s ‘‘provisions must be liberally con-
strued to maximize the public’s right of access,’ and ‘‘any lim-
itations or restrictions on [that] access must be narrowly con-
strued.”” Gibbons, 127 Nev. at 878, 266 P.3d at 626 (citing NRS
239.001(2)-(3)). Accordingly, this court begins its analysis of
claims of confidentiality under the Act with a presumption in favor
of disclosure. Id. at 880, 266 P.3d at 628. The state entity bears
the burden of overcoming this presumption of openness by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records are
confidential. Jd. The state entity may either show that a statutory
provision declares the record confidential, or, in the absence of
such a provision, “‘that its interest in nondisclosure clearly out-
weighs the public’s interest in access.” Jd. Within this context, we
now address the district court’s order granting RGJ’s petition for
access to the requested information.

The Legislature has declared the files of individual members
confidential

P|

As noted, pursuant to NRS 239.010(1), all public books and
public records of government entities must remain open to the pub-
lic unless ‘otherwise declared by law to be confidential.’ Appli-
cable here, the Legislature has declared the following limitation
with regard to what PERS information constitutes a public record:

The official correspondence and records, other than the files
of individual members or retired employees, and, except as
otherwise provided in NRS 241.035, the minutes, audio
recordings, transcripts and books of the System are public
records and are available for public inspection.

NRS 286.110(3) (emphasis added). This exception to disclosure
must be construed narrowly. NRS 239.001(3).

On appeal, PERS argues that all information contained in an in-
dividual’s file is protected by NRS 286.110(3)’s scope of confi-
dentiality and that disclosure of such information is only proper
following waiver by the retired employee pursuant to NRS
286.117. RGJ responds that PERS’s construction is overly broad
and would include information that merely relates to a retired em-
ployee’s file, regardless of the information’s origin, such as other-

a8 Pe

wise nonconfidential information derived from third-party payroll
records relating to individuals.

PERS’s position exceeds the plain meaning of NRS 286.110(3)’s
restrictions, which must be narrowly construed to protect only in-
dividuals’ files. NRS 239.001(3). In concluding that only individ-
uals’ files have been declared confidential as a matter of law, we
specify that NRS 286.110(3)’s scope of confidentiality does not ex-
tend to all information by virtue of it being contained in individu-
als’ files. Where information is contained in a medium separate
from individuals’ files, including administrative reports generated
from data contained in individuals’ files, information in such re-
ports or other media is not confidential merely because the same
information is also contained in individuals’ files.? Rather, it is the
individuals’ files themselves that are confidential pursuant to NRS
286.110(3).

This narrow construction of NRS 286.110(3) is consistent with
Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Haley, where we concluded that al-
though NRS 202.3662 unambiguously protects the applications
for concealed firearms permits as confidential, the statute’s scope
of confidentiality must be narrowly construed and does not extend
to protecting the identities of permittees or any post-permit records
of investigation, suspension, or revocation.‘ 126 Nev. 211, 217,
234 P.3d 922, 926 (2010). Similarly, NRS 286.110(3) only pro-
tects as confidential the individuals’ files held by PERS, not all in-
formation contained in separate media that also happens to be
contained in individuals’ files.

This is not to say, however, that information contained in sepa-
rate media that is otherwise confidential, privileged, or protected
by Jaw may be disclosed. While we hold that NRS 286.110(3) pro-
tects only the individuals’ files maintained by PERS, other statutes,
rules, or caselaw may independently declare individuals’ informa-
tion confidential, privileged, or otherwise protected. The court in
such an instance must review the requested information in camera
to ensure that appropriate confidentiality is maintained. At this
point, PERS has not identified any statute, rule, or caselaw that
would foreclose production of the information requested by RGJ.

Because we conclude that only the individuals’ files are protected as con-
fidential, we decline to address the parties’ arguments with regard to NRS
286.117’s waiver provision, as access to separately generated reports is not
subject to NRS 286.117.

‘In reaching our conclusion in Haley, we clarified that any confidential in-
formation within the unprotected post-permit files should be redacted pursuant
to NRS 239.010(3). 126 Nev. at 219, 234 P.3d at 928. The same rationale ap-
plies here. However, we reiterate that information maintained in a medium sep-
arate from individuals’ files is not made confidential merely because the same
information can also be found in the individuals’ files.

Balancing of interests

In the alternative, PERS argues that the district court erred in
concluding that the government’s interests in nondisclosure did not
clearly outweigh the public’s interests in access to the requested in-
formation. See Donrey of Nev., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 106 Nev. 630,
634-35, 798 P.2d 144, 147 (1990) (explaining that balancing the
interests involved is necessary when evaluating whether certain re-
ports must be disclosed). The government bears the burden of
showing ‘‘that its interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the
public’s interest in access.’ Gibbons, 127 Nev. at 880, 266 P.3d at
628; see also NRS 239.0113(2). Further, the governments inter-
ests in nondisclosure are interpreted narrowly, whereas the public’s
interests in openness and accessibility are interpreted liberally.
Haley, 126 Nev. at 217, 234 P.3d at 926.

PERS argues that disclosure of the requested information would
subject retired employees to a higher risk of identity theft and elder
abuse. RGJ asserts that such concerns are hypothetical and specu-
lative and thus do not outweigh the presumption in favor of dis-
closure. The record indicates that the only evidence presented in
the district court to support PERS’s argument was a PowerPoint
presentation with statistics showing that Nevada is the third lead-
ing state in the number of fraud complaints to the Federal Trade
Commission and the sixth leading state in the number of identity
theft complaints.

In Nevada, ‘‘[a] mere assertion of possible endangerment does
not clearly outweigh the public interest in access to . . . records.”
Haley, 126 Nev. at 218, 234 P.3d at 927 (internal quotations omit-
ted). Because PERS failed to present evidence to support its posi-
tion that disclosure of the requested information would actually
cause harm to retired employees or even increase the risk of harm,
the record indicates that their concerns were merely hypothetical
and speculative. Therefore, because the government’s interests
in nondisclosure in this instance do not clearly outweigh the pub-
lic’s presumed right to access, we conclude that the district court
did not err in balancing the interests involved in favor of disclo-
sure. Id.; see also San Diego Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass’n v. Superior
Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 479, 492-93 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding
the potential for elder abuse and financial crime did not outweigh
the public’s interest in disclosure of pension information).

Accordingly, the district court correctly interpreted NRS
286.110(3)’s scope of confidentiality and did not abuse its discre-
tion in ordering PERS to provide the requested information to the
extent that it is maintained in a medium separate from individuals’
files. We therefore affirm in part the district court’s order granting
the writ of mandamus.

#40 Po

However, to the extent that the district court ordered PERS to
create new documents or customized reports by searching for and
compiling information from individuals’ files or other records, we
vacate the district court’s order. NRS 239.010(1) (permitting ‘‘in-
spection’’ and copying by the public); NRS 239.055(1) (permitting
a government entity to charge an additional fee for extraordinary
resources necessary to comply with ‘‘a request for a copy of a pub-
lic record’’ (emphasis added)); see also State ex rel. Kerner v.
State Teachers Ret. Bd., 695 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ohio 1998) (con-
cluding Ohio public records laws impose ‘‘no duty to create a new
document by searching for and compiling information from [a
government agency’s] existing records’’).

PICKERING, C.J., and Gippons, HARDESTY, DouGLAS, CHERRY,
and Sairta, JJ., concur.

BENJAMIN JAMES CLANCY, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 59571
November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 226

po san

The Weiner Law Group, LLC, and Jason G. Weiner and Nathan
Sosa, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CHERRY, JJ.

Po 843

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In Nevada, a driver who has been involved in an accident must
stop and remain at the scene until he has provided certain infor-
mation and rendered reasonable assistance to any person injured in
the accident. NRS 484E.010-.030. If the accident resulted in bod-
ily injury or the death of a person, a driver’s failure to stop and re-
main at the scene is a felony. NRS 484E.010(3). In this appeal, we
must determine whether the State is required to prove that the
driver had knowledge that he had been involved in an accident.
Holding that such knowledge is required and that the knowledge
may be actual or constructive, we conclude that sufficient evidence
was presented to support the jury’s finding that appellant knew or
should have known that he was involved in an accident before leav-
ing the scene. Thus, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

FACTS

Appellant Benjamin Clancy was charged with a felony for leav-
ing the scene of an accident that resulted in bodily injury. The ac-
cident involved a vehicle driven by Clancy and a motorcycle oper-
ated by Barry Robinson. Robinson was traveling southbound on
Interstate 15 through Las Vegas early in the morning with his girl-
friend, Erica Norris, as a passenger. A vehicle merged in front of
him and struck the front tire or fender of his motorcycle, causing
him to lose control. Robinson and Norris fell off the motorcycle,
which hit the center divider and then skidded across the freeway,
stopping in the far right emergency lane.

A passenger in a minivan traveling ahead of Robinson’s motor-
cycle witnessed the accident. Diane Camacho saw a silver SUV
strike Robinson’s motorcycle and then accelerate, overtaking the
minivan on the right side. Camacho saw the driver of the SUV,
whom she later identified as Clancy, looking in the rearview mir-
ror and over his shoulder at the crash behind him. The silver SUV
exited the freeway at the next off-ramp but did not pull over. Ca-
macho dialed 911 and gave the dispatcher the license plate number
for the silver SUV.

Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper George Thaw arrived on scene
to conduct an investigation. After taking photographs of the mo-
torcycle, he interviewed Robinson and Norris in the hospital while
waiting for his dispatcher to run the plate numbers taken by Ca-
macho. Thaw learned that the silver SUV belonged to Clancy, and
he drove to Nellis Air Force Base, where Clancy was stationed, to
question him. While there, he inspected Clancy’s car and saw
damage to the vehicle’s right rear panel, which Thaw estimated

wu Po

was the same height as the front fender of Robinson’s motorcycle.
Thaw arrested Clancy for leaving the scene of an accident that re-
sulted in bodily injury to a person. Clancy denied having any
knowledge of the accident.

At trial, Clancy called an accident reconstruction specialist as an
expert witness. Based on scrutiny of the two vehicles and the na-
ture of the markings on Clancy’s SUV, the defense expert opined
that there was no evidence of a collision between Clancy’s SUV
and Robinson’s motorcycle. The State did not call an expert to
rebut this testimony, but it did cross-examine the defense expert as
to whether there could have been contact between the two vehicles
that could have resulted in the motorcycle’s crash without causing
significant damage to the SUV.

At the close of evidence, Clancy argued in favor of a jury in-
struction stating: ‘“You must find Defendant not guilty of Leaving
the Scene of an Accident unless you find that the Defendant had
actual knowledge of the accident at the time it occurred.’’ (Em-
phasis added.) The district attorney, however, sought the following
instruction: ‘In order to find the Defendant guilty of Leaving the
Scene of an Accident, you must find that the Defendant knew or
should have known that he had been involved in an accident prior
to leaving the scene of that accident.’ (Emphasis added.) The
court ultimately adopted the district attorney’s proposed instruc-
tion. The jury returned a guilty verdict.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Clancy argues that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by instructing the jury that it must find that a defendant
knew or should have known that he was involved in an accident in
order to find the defendant guilty of leaving the scene of an acci-
dent because actual knowledge is required. We disagree and hold
that NRS 484E.010 requires the State to prove that the driver ei-
ther knew or should have known that he was involved in an acci-
dent. We further conclude that NRS 484E.010’s phrase ‘‘involved
in an accident”’ is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous and
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict.

NRS 484E.010 requires knowledge that an accident occurred

The district court has broad discretion in determining the ap-
propriate jury instructions. Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013,
1019, 195 P.3d 315, 319 (2008). We have declined to disturb a dis-
trict court’s refusal of a jury instruction absent an abuse of dis-
cretion or judicial error. Id. The question presented is whether the
defense instruction on knowledge should have been given because

Po 4s

it was a correct statement of the law. See Nay v. State, 123 Nev.
326, 330, 167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007) (‘‘[T]he defendant ‘is not en-
titled to an instruction which incorrectly states the law or that is
substantially covered by other instructions.’ ”’ (quoting Barnier v.
State, 119 Nev. 129, 133, 67 P.3d 320, 322 (2003))). We review
de novo whether an instruction is a correct statement of the law. Id.

Le

To determine whether the defense instruction was a correct
statement of the law, we must look to the statute defining the of-
fense. NRS 484E.010 provides in pertinent part:

1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident on a
highway or on premises to which the public has access re-
sulting in bodily injury to or the death of a person shall im-
mediately stop his or her vehicle at the scene of the accident
or as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to
and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident
until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of NRS
484B.030.

3. IN person failing to comply with the provisions of sub-
section 1 is guilty of a category B felony... .

| rere!

The statute does not contain any express language regarding the
driver’s knowledge that he had been involved in an accident. Be-
cause strict liability offenses generally are disfavored, the simple
omission of appropriate terminology does not end our inquiry. See
Ford y. State, 127 Nev. 608, 614, 262 P.3d 1123, 1127 (2011)
(‘‘many ‘cases interpret[ ] criminal statutes to include broadly ap-
plicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms
does not contain them’”’ (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994). Our
primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent in enacting it. Moore v. State, 117 Nev. 659, 661, 27 P.3d
447, 449 (2001). ‘‘[W]here the language of the statute cannot di-
rectly resolve the issue standing alone, we consider the context and
spirit of the statute in question, together with the subject matter
and policy involved.’’ Id. at 661-62, 27 P.3d at 449 (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted).

P|

The purpose behind NRS 484.010 is to require drivers in-
volved in an accident to stop and provide identifying information
and render reasonable assistance to injured persons for the benefit
of any person who may have been injured in the accident. See gen-
erally State v. Feintuch, 375 A.2d 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (discussing purpose of offense of leaving the scene of an ac-

846 Pe

cident). It imposes an affirmative course of action on the driver.
State v. Wall, 482 P.2d 41, 45 (Kan. 1971). “Implicit therein
must be the element of recognition or awareness on the part of that
driver of the fact of [an accident].” Jd. The statute’s purpose is not
served where the driver is unaware of the event requiring him to
stop and provide identifying information and render assistance—the
accident. In that situation, the statute does nothing to encourage
the driver to stop and provide information and render assistance;
the driver did not stop because he was not aware that there was a
reason to do so. As the Washington Supreme Court has observed
in addressing this issue, ‘‘It is inconceivable that the legislature in-
tended that punishment would be imposed for failure to follow the
course of conduct outlined [stop, exchange information, and render
aid], if the operator of the vehicle was ignorant of the happening
of an accident.’ State v. Martin, 440 P.2d 429, 436 (Wash. 1968).
Rules of statutory construction require us to avoid such an absurd
result. Accordingly, we construe NRS 484E.010(1) to require proof
of knowledge of involvement in an accident.!

Having concluded that knowledge of involvement in an accident
is required for criminal liability under NRS 484E.010, we must
determine whether that knowledge must be actual knowledge. We
agree with the State that actual knowledge need not be proven to
satisfy the knowledge requirement.? Imposing an actual knowl-
edge requirement would encourage drivers not to stop so as to
avoid gaining actual knowledge of an accident or to avoid further

We acknowledge that we have declined to impose a similar knowledge re-
quirement with respect to the bodily-injury-or-death element of the statute.
Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 594, 97 P.3d 586, 590 (2004) (holding that
“actual or constructive knowledge of injury or death is not an element of the
felony offense of leaving the scene of an accident””). There is good reason for
this distinction. As explained in this opinion, omitting a knowledge require-
ment as to the accident element would defeat the purpose of the statute. In con-
trast, adding a knowledge requirement as to the bodily-injury-or-death element
would defeat the purpose of the statute because doing so would encourage driv-
ers involved in an accident to leave the scene in order to avoid gaining any
Knowledge of potential injury or death or to avoid an arrest for other crimes,
such as driving under the influence. Jd.

Clancy suggests that we approved of an actual knowledge instruction in
Dettloff. In that case, we merely observed that the district court had instructed
the jury that ‘‘to find Dettloff guilty of leaving the scene of an accident, he
must have known he was involved in an accident.” 120 Nev. at 593, 97 P.3d
at 589. Our opinion does not reproduce the exact language of the instruction.
Even assuming that the instruction required actual knowledge that Dettloff was
involved in an accident, our decision in that case does not address whether that
part of the instruction was a correct statement of the law. We were asked to de-
termine whether the instruction was a correct statement of the law to the ex-
tent that it did not require knowledge of injury, and we addressed the instruc-
tion only as to that issue. Jd. at 593-95, 97 P.3d at 589-90.

po 847

criminal liability, which defeats the purpose of the statute. Cf.
Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588, 594, 97 P.3d 586, 590 (2004) (de-
clining to require knowledge of injury). In contrast, focusing on
whether the driver knew or should have known that he was in-
volved in an accident is more consistent with the duty to stop and
render aid imposed by NRS 484.030. The Kansas Supreme
Court, for example, provides a sound rationale for adopting such
a standard:

Direct evidence of absolute, positive, subjective knowledge
may not always be obtainable. We think it sufficient if the cir-
“cumstances are such as to induce in a reasonable person a
belief that collision has occurred; otherwise a callous person
might nullify the humanitarian purpose of the statute by the
simple act of immediate flight from an accident scene without
ascertaining exactly what had occurred.

State v. Wall, 482 P.2d 41, 45 (Kan. 1971) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, we conclude that the jury instruction given by the
district court correctly informed the jury to determine whether
Clancy knew or should have known that he was involved in an ac-
cident, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion
by giving that instruction.

NRS 484E.010 is not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous
P|

Clancy argues that the phrase ‘‘involved in an accident’”’ in
NRS 484E.010(1) is unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous be-
cause it is not clear whether the phrase requires actual contact with
the vehicle, or also includes a motorcycle swerving to avoid a ve-
hicle without any physical contact.

a

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, presuming
that a statute is constitutional. State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478,
481, 245 P.3d 550, 552 (2010). The party challenging a statute’s
constitutionality “has the burden of making a clear showing of in-
validity.’ Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A statute
is unconstitutionally vague ‘‘(1) if it ‘fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited’; or (2) if it
‘is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously dis-
criminatory enforcement. ’’ Id. at 481-82, 245 P.3d at 553 (quot-
ing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18, (2010)).

Although the constitutionality of the phrase ‘‘involved in an ac-
cident’’ as used in NRS 484E.010(1) has never been addressed in
Nevada, a number of other jurisdictions have determined that very
similar language is not vague or ambiguous. In State v. Carpenter,
334 N.W.2d 137 (lowa 1983), the Iowa Supreme Court held that

os Po

such language was not vague or ambiguous because such terms
were easily defined by reference to their common dictionary defi-
nitions. Jd. at 139-40. The Texas Court of Appeals has held the
same. Sheldon v. State, 100 S.W.3d 497, 500-01 (Tex. Ct. App.
2003)).

Pe

The word ‘‘accident’’ is commonly defined as ‘‘[aJn unintended
and unforeseen injurious occurrence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 16
(9th ed. 2009). Webster’s dictionary defines ‘‘involve’’ as ‘“‘to
draw in as a participant’’ or ‘‘to require as a necessary accompa-
niment.’’? Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191
(3d ed. 2002). These definitions do not require direct physical im-
pact between two vehicles in order to be ‘‘involved in an acci-
dent.’ Other jurisdictions have concluded that similar language
does not require actual contact between vehicles. See, e.g., People
y. Kroncke, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493, 501 (Ct. App. 1999) (interpret-
ing ‘‘accident’’ as used in California’s hit-and-run statute broadly
to include a passenger jumping out of a moving car); State v. Car-
penter, 334 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Lowa 1983) (‘‘[lowa’s hit-and-run]
statute does not require a collision between the driver’s vehicle and
another vehicle or person’’ in order to be deemed to have been
‘involved’? in an ‘‘accident’’); State v. Hughes, 907 P.2d 336, 339
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (‘‘[W]e conclude the Legislature did not
intend that the duty to stop, identify and render aid in an injury ac-
cident be interpreted so narrowly as to attach only to the driver of
a vehicle which collided with another.’).

Applying the dictionary definition of the words ‘‘involved”’ and
“‘accident,’”’ and following the construction of such language as
used by other jurisdictions in their hit-and-run statutes, we con-
clude that NRS 484E.010 gives fair notice of what is prohibited
and does not encourage discriminatory enforcement, thus is not un-
constitutionally vague. See Castaneda, 126 Nev. at 483, 245 P.3d
at 553.

Evidence was sufficient to support the verdict

Next, we address Clancy’s argument that the evidence at trial
was insufficient to establish that a collision actually occurred or
that Clancy knew that there had been an accident.

a

In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this court determines
whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State,
124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). ‘‘This court will
not reweigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses be-
cause that is the responsibility of the trier of fact.’ Id.

Po 9

|

At trial, Camacho, the witness in the vehicle in front of Clancy
and Robinson, stated that she saw Clancy’s silver SUV strike
Robinson’s motorcycle. On cross-examination, Clancy attempted to
show that from the angle Camacho viewed the vehicles, she could
not have seen the rear corner of Clancy’s SUV and only inferred
that the SUV actually made contact with the motorcycle. Another
witness, Cary Pierce, was driving behind Robinson at the time
of the accident and saw a light-colored SUV or van make contact
with Robinson’s motorcycle. Pierce, distracted by the motorcycle
crash, was unable to positively identify the vehicle he saw strike
the motorcycle.

Clancy’s expert testified that the marks on Clancy’s car are
not consistent with such an accident. However, the State’s cross-
examination attempted to raise the possibility that the nature of the
particular accident could have resulted in minimal markings on
Clancy’s SUV.

As we have concluded, actual physical contact between two ve-
hicles is not required for a person to be involved in an accident
under NRS 484.010. Accordingly, Camacho’s observation that
Clancy merged into Robinson’s motorcycle immediately followed
by the motorcycle crashing, Pierce’s observation from behind that
a light-colored vehicle actually struck the motorcycle, and Robin-
son’s observation that a vehicle actually struck his motorcycle pro-
vide sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Clancy’s SUV was involved in an accident with Robin-
son’s motorcycle, even if Clancy’s expert raised doubts about
whether actual contact between the vehicles occurred. See
Mitchell, 124 Nev. at 816, 192 P.3d at 727.

[|

The State’s evidence was also sufficient to support the jury
finding that Clancy either knew or should have known that an ac-
cident occurred. Specifically, Camacho testified that immediately
following Robinson’s crash, she saw Clancy looking over his shoul-
der and at his rearview mirror before he accelerated away and ex-
ited the freeway at the next off-ramp, despite having entered the
freeway just over a mile earlier and still being well short of Nellis
Air Force Base, his destination. Thus, we hold that sufficient evi-
dence supported the jury’s guilty verdict.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by
the district court.

HARDESTY and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

NOE ORTEGA PEREZ, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 55817
November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 862

David Phillips, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, and James R. Sweetin, Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County, for Respondent.

Robert Arroyo and Amy Coffee, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae
Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

Richard A. Gammick and Terrence P. McCarthy, Reno, for Am-
icus Curiae Nevada District Attorneys Association.

8

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, we are concerned with the admissibility of expert
testimony related to sex offender grooming behavior and the effect
that behavior has on a child victim. ‘‘Grooming’’ generally de-
scribes conduct or actions by an offender that are undertaken to de-
velop a bond between the victim and offender and, ultimately,
make the victim more receptive to sexual activity with the of-
fender. In particular, we address whether (1) the district court
abused its discretion in concluding that the State’s expert was
qualified to offer grooming behavior testimony, (2) the expert’s tes-
timony improperly vouched for the complaining witness’s testi-
mony, and (3) the expert witness notice was insufficient.

| |

As a general matter, we hold that whether expert testimony on
grooming behavior is admissible in a case involving sexual conduct
with a child must be determined on a case-by-case basis, consid-
ering the requirements that govern the admissibility of expert tes-
timony. Those requirements include whether the particular expert
is qualified to testify on the subject, whether the testimony is rel-
evant and the product of reliable methodology such that it will as-
sist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, and whether the testimony is limited in scope to matters
that are within the expert’s specialized knowledge. Applying those
considerations, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the expert testimony in this case. We fur-
ther conclude that the expert’s testimony did not improperly vouch
for the complaining witness’s testimony and that the State’s pre-

854 Po

trial notice was sufficient. We therefore affirm the judgment of
conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Noe Perez was convicted of six counts of lewdness
with a minor under 14 years of age and two counts of sexual as-
sault of a minor under 14 years of age, involving his niece. At
trial, the victim testified that her relationship with Perez began to
change after she turned 13. He began calling her more and com-
plimenting her, as well as winking at her when they attended the
same parties. After driving her and a couple home one evening,
Perez kissed the victim and touched her thigh when they were
alone. He later called her and told her about a dream he had about
undressing her and said that he was uncomfortable when she was
close to other boys.

In September 2008, Perez invited the victim to accompany him
and his wife, Maria, to Las Vegas, Nevada, for a concert. Perez’s
own children did not come on this trip. On the first evening,
Perez played with the victim’s feet under the table at dinner,
hugged her while they walked along the street, and kissed the vic-
tim while Maria was in the shower. The next day, Perez again
played with the victim’s feet while she was swimming in the hotel
pool, and the victim indicated that she wanted to spend time alone
with Perez.

In the hotel room, Perez began kissing the victim after Maria
had entered the bathroom and turned on the shower. Perez un-
dressed the victim, kissed her breasts, rubbed her vaginal area, and
penetrated her vagina with his fingers and tongue. Maria emerged
from the shower and began screaming at Perez and the victim and
slapping the victim. Hotel security arrived shortly thereafter, and
the victim told them that Perez had pinned her down and touched
her. The victim testified that she told security that Perez forced her
down because she feared Maria would leave her in Las Vegas.
While Maria’s reports to hotel security and responding officers
were consistent with the victim’s testimony, Maria testified that she
only saw Perez kissing the victim, who was fully clothed.

Dr. John Paglini testified that the grooming relationship is a de-
ceptive relationship with the intent of sexual contact. Dr. Paglini
testified that an uncle touching his niece’s foot under a table,
winking at her, calling her‘and talking about how pretty she was,
pulling her close while walking, touching her feet and arm in a
swimming pool, touching her thigh, kissing her, showing concern
for her spending time with other suitors, telling her about a dream.
in which he undressed her, and inviting her to attend an out-of-
town concert with him could be construed as grooming behavior.
In particular, he noted that showing concern for her spending time

Pd 855

with other boys acts to isolate her from other intimate relationships
and telling her about the dream is a method of probing her resist-
ance to engaging in sexual behavior. The ultimate goal of such be-
havior is to establish a trusting relationship that lowers the child’s
resistance to engaging in sexual activity. Dr. Paglini also testified
that whether a victim discloses abuse ‘‘is based upon the relation-
ship to the perpetrator, the impact on the family and also the per-
ceptions of the alleged victim regarding the people they’re being
interviewed on.”’ Dr. Paglini noted that grooming typically results
in lower rates of abuse disclosure.

DISCUSSION

The issues raised in this appeal involve expert testimony on
“*grooming’’ behavior.' The term ‘‘grooming’’ describes when an
offender prepares a child for victimization by ‘‘ ‘getting close to
[the] child, making friends with the child, becoming perhaps a
confidant of the child, [and] getting the child used to certain kinds
of touching, [and] play activities” ’’ State v. Stafford, 972 P.2d 47,
49 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting trial expert testimony). It can
also include gifts, praises, and rewards, id.; State v. Hansen, 743
P.2d 157, 160 (Or. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in Powers y. Cheeley, 771 P.2d 622, 628-29 n.13 (Or.
1989), as well as exposure to sexual items and language, People v.
Ackerman, 669 N.W.2d 818, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). This
conduct is undertaken to develop an emotional bond between the
victim and offender, Hansen, 743 P.2d at 160; Morris v. State, 361
S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), and may even lead the
victim to feel responsible for his or her own abuse, Stafford, 972
P.2d at 49 n.1. The offender engages in grooming activity to re-
duce the child’s resistance to sexual activity and reduce the possi-
bility that the victim will report the abuse. Ackerman, 669 N.W.2d
at 824-25.

Expert qualification

Perez contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence
of Dr. Paglini’s qualifications to testify as an expert. He therefore
argues that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr.
Paglini to testify as an expert on grooming activity.

“The threshold test for the admissibility of testimony by a qual-
ified expert is whether the expert’s specialized knowledge will as-

1We invited the participation of amici curiae’ Nevada Attorneys for Criminal
Justice (NACJ) and Nevada District Attorneys Association (NDAA) concern-
ing the relevance and applicability of expert testimony about sex offender
grooming.

856 PE

sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue.’ Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 117, 734 P.2d 705,
708 (1987); see NRS 50.275 (‘If scientific, technical or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the ev-
idence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education
may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge.’’). Ex-
pert testimony is admissible if it meets the following three re-
quirements, which we have described as the ‘‘qualification,” ‘‘as-
sistance,’ and ‘limited scope’’ requirements:
(1) [the expert] must be qualified in an area of ‘‘scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge’ (the qualification
requirement); (2) his or her specialized knowledge must ‘‘as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue’’ (the assistance requirement); and (3) his
or her testimony must be limited ‘‘to matters within the scope
of [his or her specialized] knowledge’’ (the limited scope
requirement).

Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev. 492, 498, 189 P.3d 646, 650
(2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting NRS 50.275); see
also Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 18, 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010). We
review a district court’s decision to allow expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion. Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 498, 189 P.3d at 650.
As explained below, we conclude that Dr. Paglini’s testimony sat-
isfied the three requirements identified in Hallmark.

Qualification requirement

| |

Perez argues that there was nothing to indicate that Dr. Paglini
had sufficient training or experience to assert an opinion as to the
effect of grooming behaviors on the young victim. Further, Perez
complains that this was the first time that Dr. Paglini had testified
regarding grooming behaviors and he failed to establish that his
findings were subjected to peer review or that he had received spe-
cialized training in the area of sex offender grooming behaviors.
Amicus NACI asserts that the record is insufficient to support a
conclusion that Dr. Paglini was qualified to testify to grooming
techniques as he had not published any scholarly articles or testi-
fied regarding grooming techniques in any proceeding prior to
Perez’s trial.

We have identified several nonexclusive factors that are useful in
determining whether a witness “‘is qualified in an area of scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge’”’ and therefore
may testify as an expert. Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 499, 189 P.3d at

Po 857

650. Those factors include ‘‘(1) formal schooling and academic de-
grees, (2) licensure, (3) employment experience, and (4) practical
experience and specialized training.’ Id. at 499, 189 P.3d at 650-
51 (footnotes omitted).

We conclude that Dr. Paglini’s academic career and professional
experience were sufficient to qualify him to testify as an expert on
grooming behaviors and the effects of such behaviors on victims of
sexual abuse. Dr. Paglini was formally educated in psychology. He
held a bachelor’s degree in psychology and a doctorate degree in
clinical psychology. For the ten years prior to trial, Dr. Paglini
“‘worked with family courts [conducting] child custody evaluations,
dealing with the issues of domestic violence or sex abuse allega-
tions.’ During the eight years prior to trial, he conducted over
1,000 psychosexual evaluations on sex offenders. In conducting
those evaluations, Dr. Paglini considered ‘‘variables like sex of-
fending history, substance abuse problems, previous criminal
problems . . . [and] the relationship of the offender and the vic-
tim.’ Thus, he spent the better part of his career studying the re-
lationships between victims and offenders. In looking at these re-
lationships, Dr. Paglini studied whether grooming by the offender
occurred. Based on his formal schooling and academic degrees and
his employment and practical experience, Dr. Paglini possessed the
knowledge or experience necessary to render an opinion on groom-
ing behaviors and the effects of such behaviors on victims of sex-
ual abuse. See Morris, 361 S.W.3d at 666-67 (‘‘A person can,
through his experience with child-sex-abuse cases gain superior
knowledge regarding the grooming phenomenon.”’); see also Peo-
ple v. Atherton, 940 N.E.2d 775, 783, 790 (il. App. Ct. 3d
2010) (child welfare supervisor who had worked as a sexual abuse
therapist for over six years qualified to testify about child-sexual-
abuse-accommodation syndrome); Ackerman, 669 N.W.2d at 824,
825 (psychotherapist with master’s degree in social work and who
works with sex offenders and victims qualified); State v. Quigg,
866 P.2d 655, 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (expert with 13 years’
experience in victims services unit, degree in child abuse and
neglect, and numerous hours in intensive training and specialized
workshops on child abuse, who had also conducted interviews
with 3,000 victims qualified to testify about grooming). Other ju-
risdictions have concluded that witnesses with less academic prepa-
tation, see Haycraft v. State, 760 N.E.2d 203, 210-11 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (detective with experience investigating sexual abuse
cases and who attended training on sexual abuse was qualified as
a ‘“‘skilled witness’’ to discuss grooming); People v. Petri, 760
N.W.2d 882, 888 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (detective with 15 years
of law enforcement experience and who received training in foren-
sic interviews of children would have qualified to offer testimony
about grooming), or less experience than Dr. Paglini, see Atherton,

858 Pe

940 N.E.2d at 790, were sufficiently qualified to offer expert tes-
timony on grooming or the effect of abuse on child victims.

We next examine whether Dr. Paglini’s grooming testimony sat-
isfied the ‘‘assistance’’ requirement of NRS 50.275.

Assistance requirement

_

The ‘‘assistance’’ requirement asks whether the expert’s ‘‘spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the ev-
idence or to determine a fact in issue.” NRS 50.275. The ‘‘assis-’
tance’’ requirement has two components: whether the testimony is
(1) relevant and (2) the product of reliable methodology. Hallmark,
124 Nev. at 500, 189 P.3d at 651 (‘‘An expert’s testimony will as-
sist the trier of fact only when it is relevant and the product of re-
liable methodology.’ (footnote omitted)). Although Perez only
challenged Dr. Paglini’s qualifications, at our invitation, amici
briefed the relevance of expert testimony about sex offender
grooming.

Relevance

_

Evidence is relevant when it tends “‘to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
or less probable.’ NRS 48.015. Generally, all relevant evidence is
admissible. NRS 48.025. However, relevant evidence is not ad-
missible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury, or if it amounts
to needless presentation of cumulative evidence. NRS 48.035.

Amicus NACI contends that Dr. Paglini’s testimony was not par-
ticularly probative because the issue for the jury to decide was
whether Perez committed the charged acts, not his intent during
the purported grooming activity. Further, NACJ argues, what pro-
bative value the testimony may have had was outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice as the testimony compared Perez’s be-
havior to the known behavior of sex offenders and created a dis-
tinct impression that Perez was a sex offender.? Amicus NDAA ar-
gues against a broad rule that would prohibit expert testimony
about sex offender grooming and instead urges a case-by-case
approach.

*The NACJ also contends that the State should not have been able to intro-
duce an expert opinion as to Perez’s mens rea. We disagree. See NRS 50.295
(‘Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact’); Townsend, 103 Nev. at 118, 734 P.2d at 708 (noting that an expert
may give an opinion on issues that embrace the ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact so long as it is within scope of expertise).

ee 859

‘We conclude that expert testimony on grooming behaviors and
its effect on child victims of sexual abuse may be relevant de-
pending on the circumstances of the case. Dr. Paglini’s testimony,
under the circumstances in this case, was relevant. The victim tes-
tified that Perez engaged in seemingly innocuous flirtatious be-
havior and sexual discussions that finally escalated into more overt
sexual contact, which is not unlike a dating relationship. This tra-
jectory of behavior seems to indicate even to the lay juror a defi-
nite design on engaging in sexual conduct with the victim and may
suggest that expert testimony would be unnecessary to explain his
designs. See United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142,
150-51 (D. Me. 2010) (‘‘ ‘Expert’ testimony about matters of
common sense is not helpful to a jury and carries the risk of unfair
prejudice . . . ””). However, it was not immediately apparent how
Perez’s behavior affected the victim. Notably, the victim appeared
to acquiesce to the abuse and later gave inconsistent reports about
that abuse. The victim’s conduct leading up to the abuse and her
inconsistent reports after the abuse could have been influenced by
Perez’s prior fawning, the fear of Maria’s reaction to the conduct,
and later counseling. Therefore, Dr. Paglini’s testimony that the
goal of grooming is to reduce the resistance to the abuse as well as
the likelihood of disclosure was beneficial to the jury in evaluating
the evidence of abuse and assessing the victim’s credibility. See
United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 158-59 (Sth Cir. 2006) (find-
ing no abuse of discretion by district court admission of expert
grooming testimony to explain ‘‘return-to-the-abuser behavior’);
Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 978 (D.C. 2010) (“The tes-
timony helped to explain not only how a child molester could ac-
complish his crimes without violence, but also why a child victim
would acquiesce and be reluctant to turn against her abuser.’’);
Howard v. State, 637 S.E.2d 448, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (ad-
mitting evidence of grooming, even if it incidentally places defen-
dant’s character in issue, to explain victim’s unwillingness to dis-
close abuse); Ackerman, 669 N.W.2d at 825-26 (recognizing that
most jurors lack knowledge of the conduct of sexual abusers and
thus expert testimony regarding grooming behavior was helpful);
State v. Berosik, 214 P.3d 776, 782-83 (Mont. 2009) (admitting
expert testimony about grooming as relevant to assessing victim
credibility); see also Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 572-73, 688
P.2d 326, 327 (1984) (holding that expert testimony about family
dynamics related to sexual abuse is relevant to help the jury un-
derstand ‘‘superficially unusual behavior of the victim and her
mother’’).

As to unfair prejudice, Dr. Paglini’s testimony did not stray be-
yond the bounds set by this court and other jurisdictions for expert

860 Po

testimony. Dr. Paglini generally addressed how grooming occurs
and its purpose. He then offered insight in the form of hypotheti-
cals that were based on Perez’s conduct and indicated that such
conduct was probably grooming behavior. See Shannon v. State,
105 Nev. 782, 787, 783 P.2d 942, 945 (1989) (providing that ex-
perts can testify to hypotheticals about victims of sexual abuse and
individuals with pedophilic disorder). He did not offer an opinion.
as to the victim’s credibility or express a belief that she had been
abused. See Townsend, 103 Nev. at 118-19, 734 P.2d at 708-09.
Dr. Paglini’s testimony therefore meets the first component of the
“‘assistance’’ requirement.

Reliability of methodology
be
This court has articulated five factors to use in evaluating the
second component of the ‘‘assistance’’ requirement—whether an
expert’s opinion is the product of reliable methodology. These
factors include

whether the opinion is (1) within a recognized field of ex-
pertise; (2) testable and has been tested; (3) published and
subjected to peer review; (4) generally accepted in the scien-
tific community (not always determinative); and (5) based
more on particularized facts rather than assumption, conjec-
ture, or generalization.

Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 500-01, 189 P.3d at 651-52 (footnotes
omitted). These ‘‘factors may be afforded varying weights and may
not apply equally in every case.’’ Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 20,
222 P.3d 648, 660 (2010).

Considering the applicable factors, we conclude that Dr.
Paglini’s opinion was the product of reliable methodology. In par-
ticular, Dr. Paglini practices in a recognized field of expertise, see
Ackerman, 669 N.W.2d at 824, 825 (noting that psychotherapist
who works with sex offenders is ‘‘clearly qualified in a recognized
discipline’); Morris, 361 S.W.3d at 656 (recognizing study of be-
havior of sex offenders to be a legitimate field of expertise), and he
testified about a phenomenon that courts have recognized as gen-
erally accepted in the scientific community, see Morris, 361
S.W.3d at 668 (concluding that grooming as a phenomenon exists);
see also State v. Stafford, 972 P.2d 47, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting that observations about grooming behavior not drawn from
testing or scientific methodology but derived from personal ob-
servations made in light of education, training, and experience con-
stituted admissible evidence based on specialized knowledge);
Bryant v. State, 340 $.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (same).
Although he testified about the general nature of grooming, his tes-

Pe 861

timony indicated that he had based this on specific facts observed
in his practice and applied it to the specific circumstances of this
case. However, the record does not indicate that Dr. Paglini’s
opinion had been subject to peer review or was testable or had
been tested. While Dr. Paglini’s methodology did not meet two of
the Hallmark factors, those factors are not as weighty given the na-
ture and subject matter of his opinion testimony. See Higgs, 126
Nev. at 20, 222 P.3d at 660.

Finally, we must determine if Dr. Paglini’s expert opinion was
limited to the area of his expertise. Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 498,
189 P.3d at 650.

Limited scope requirement

| ee

Perez argues that Dr. Paglini’s testimony about neurological de-
velopment was outside the scope of his proposed testimony and
that the State failed to show that he had received neurological train-
ing. We agree. Dr. Paglini’s testimony, for the most part, pro-
ceeded within the scope of his expertise. He testified about the
phenomenon of grooming and its effect on the victim. However,
during a digression, Dr. Paglini testified regarding adolescent neu-
rological development. As Dr. Paglini had not demonstrated any
specialized knowledge in neuroscience or adolescent neurological
development, this part of his testimony exceeded the scope of his
specialized knowledge. See Kelly v. State, 321 S.W.3d 583, 600-01
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding that expert who lacked med-
ical training was not qualified to testify about grooming when her
testimony was predicated on detailed medical information). How-
ever, Perez did not object to this digression on the basis that it ex-
ceeded the scope of Dr. Paglini’s qualifications. Because Dr.
Paglini’s digression was brief, as compared to the whole of his tes-
timony, we conclude that it did not amount to plain error. See Gal-
lego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 365, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001) (re-
viewing for plain error where party fails to object at trial),
abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749,
776 0.12, 263 P.3d 235, 253 n.12 (2011).

Vouching
P|

Perez also contends that Dr. Paglini’s testimony impermissibly
bolstered the victim’s testimony and therefore the district court
abused its discretion in admitting it. We disagree.

A witness may not vouch for the testimony of another or testify
as to the truthfulness of another witness. Lickey v. State, 108 Nev.
191, 196, 827 P.2d 824, 827 (1992). Although an expert may not

862 Po

comment on whether that expert believes that the victim is telling
the truth about the allegations of abuse, Townsend, 103 Nev. at
118-19, 734 P.2d at 709; see also Lickey, 108 Nev. at 196, 827
P.2d at 827 (noting that expert commentary on the veracity of the
victim’s testimony invades the prerogative of the jury), Nevada law
allows an expert to testify on the issue of whether a victim’s be-
havior is consistent with sexual abuse, if that testimony is relevant,
see Townsend, 103 Nev. at 118, 734 P.2d at 708; NRS 50.345 (‘In
any prosecution for sexual assault, expert testimony is not inad-
imissible to show that the victim’s behavior or mental or physical
condition is consistent with the behavior or condition of a victim
of sexual assault.”’).

Dr. Paglini did not vouch for the victim’s veracity. He offered a
general opinion about the effect of grooming on a child victim of
sexual abuse. He did not offer a specific opinion as to whether he
believed that the victim in this case was telling the truth. ‘‘[TJhe
fact that such evidence is incidentally corroborative does not ren-
der it inadmissible, since most expert testimony, in and of itself,
tends to show that another witness either is or is not telling the
truth.’ Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991); see Townsend, 103 Ney. at 118-19, 734 P.2d at 709 (ac-
knowledging that ‘expert testimony, by its very nature, often tends
to confirm or refute the truthfulness of another witness’’ but that
relevant testimony by a qualified expert within that expert’s field of
expertise is admissible ‘‘irrespective of the corroborative or refu-
tative effect it may have on the testimony of a complaining wit-
ness’’ so long as the expert does not ‘‘directly characterize a pu-
tative victim’s testimony as being truthful or false’’); Bryant, 340
S.W.3d at 10 (‘‘The information about grooming could have in-
fluenced the jury’s credibility determinations, but only in an indi-
rect fashion.’’). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in admitting the testimony.

Sufficiency of expert witness notice
| ee}

Last, Perez contends that the State’s notice of expert testimony
was inadequate and therefore the district court should have pre-
cluded the State from calling Dr. Paglini. We disagree.

The State filed its notice of witnesses over one month before the
start of trial. See NRS 174.234(2) (requiring State to provide no-
tice of expert witnesses at least 21 days prior to trial). To comply
with NRS 174.234(2), the notice had to include: ‘“‘(a) A brief
statement regarding the subject matter on which the expert witness
is expected to testify and the substance of the testimony; (b) A
copy of the curriculum vitae of the expert witness; and (c) A copy

Pe 363

of all reports made by or at the direction of the expert witness.”
The State’s notice in this case indicated that Dr. Paglini would
“testify as to grooming techniques used upon children’’ and in-
cluded his curriculum vitae. Dr. Paglini’s curriculum vitae indi-
cated that he had conducted sexual offender assessments on adult
offenders and sexual offense and violence risk assessments on ju-
veniles. The State did not submit any reports produced by Dr.
Paglini because he did not prepare any reports related to the liti-
gation. Perez’s brief argument does not allege that the State acted
in bad faith or that his substantial rights were prejudiced because
the notice did not include a report or more detail about the sub-
stance of Dr. Paglini’s testimony. See Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev.
807, 819, 192 P.3d 721, 729 (2008). Under the circumstances, we
discern no abuse of discretion in allowing Dr. Paglini to testify. See
id. (‘This court reviews a district court’s decision whether to
allow an unendorsed witness to testify for abuse of discretion.’’).
Having rejected Perez’s challenges to the admission of Dr.
Paglini’s testimony, we affirm the judgment of conviction.?

Gippons, HarpDesty, and Sairta, JJ., concur.

Douaas, J., with whom PICKERING, C.J., and Cuerry, J.,
agree, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the admissibility of
expert testimony about grooming should be decided on a case-by-
case basis under NRS 50.275 and Hallmark v. Eldridge, 124 Nev.
492, 189 P.3d 646 (2008). However, such testimony should be
admitted in rare circumstances, and I disagree that this case war-
rants its admission. The State did not introduce sufficient specific
evidence that Dr. Paglini was qualified to discuss grooming of
child victims by sex offenders, and his testimony did not assist the
jury in understanding the victim’s actions and unfairly prejudiced
Perez. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
expert-witness notice was sufficient.

Admission of expert testimony

Expert testimony is admissible if it meets three requirements,
which we have described as the ‘‘qualification,’” ‘‘assistance,”’
and “‘limited scope’’ requirements:

(1) [the expert] must be qualified in an area of ‘scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge’’ (the qualification
requirement); (2) his or her specialized knowledge must ‘‘as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

3We deny Perez’s motion to strike NACJ’s request for a remand for addi-
tional supplementation of the record as moot.

a fact in issue’’ (the assistance requirement); and (3) his or
her testimony must be limited “‘to matters within the scope
of [his or her specialized] knowledge’’ (the limited scope

requirement).

Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 498, 189 P.3d at 650 (second alteration in
original) (quoting NRS 50.275); see also Higgs v. State, 126 Nev.
1, 18, 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010). As I explain below, the State
failed to put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Dr.
Paglini was qualified to offer expert testimony and the testimony
that he provided failed to assist the jury.

Expert qualifications

The majority concludes that Dr. Paglini’s academic career and
professional experience were sufficient to qualify him to offer the
testimony on the grooming phenomenon. It notes that Dr. Paglini
is a clinical psychologist who had conducted child custody evalu-
ations, pretrial competency evaluations, death penalty evaluations,
and psychosexual evaluations. However, Dr. Paglini did not identify
how many of his prior evaluations involved child victims of sexual
abuse or grooming, and he had not written any treatises or articles
on the phenomenon.

Dr. Paglini’s principal qualification, according to his testimony,
was his work preparing ‘‘risk assessments’’ for use in sentencing
convicted sex offenders. ‘‘[I]t’s my job as a psychologist . . . to
educate the judge on the history of the defendant, what their vio-
lent history and sex offender history is’’ so the court can ‘‘under-
stand what the risk of reoffending is towards a community’’ in sen-
tencing. Continuing, Dr. Paglini testified, ‘‘You’re looking at
certain variables like sex offending history . . . . Was there groom-
ing involved, and what was the grooming?’’ Notably absent from
Dr. Paglini’s testimony about his qualifications was any reference
to work with victims of grooming. Rather, the focus was—and re-
mained—on what sex offenders do that can constitute grooming.

Grooming testimony is permissible in certain child-sex-abuse
cases, normally to explain the impact the grooming had on the vic-
tim’s behavior in terms of delayed reporting and the like. See
NRS 50.345 (‘‘expert testimony is not inadmissible’’ in sexual as-
sault cases when offered to show ‘‘the behavior or condition of a
victim of sexual assault’’). But here, the record does not show Dr.
Paglini’s qualification to address the impact on the victim of
grooming activity. He thus did not demonstrate with sufficient
specificity that his formal schooling, employment experience, or
practical experience qualified him to testify about grooming and its
impact on the victim in this case. See Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 499,
189 P.3d at 650-51; see also NRS 50.275; Jones v. United States,
990 A.2d 970, 975, 978-80 (D.C. 2010) (former FBI agent who

ee 865

studied 400 to 500 cases of sexual abuse involving teenage victims
as well as published writing in manuals on sexual abuse and the
behavior of child molesters qualified); Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d
649, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (recognizing that law enforce-
ment officer ‘‘with a significant amount of experience with child
sex abuse cases may be qualified’’ to discuss grooming).
Although this court has not specified the requirements for ad-
mitting expert testimony about grooming, I would have preferred a
more thorough record for reviewing the district court’s exercise of
discretion, including the link between his expertise and the subject
matter of the testimony being offered to assist the jury in this case.

Assistance

The record further fails to demonstrate that Dr. Paglini’s testi-
mony was sufficiently relevant to have assisted the jury. See NRS
50.275 (requiring that expert testimony assist the jury to ‘‘under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’’); Hallmark, 124
Nev. at 500, 189 P.3d at 651 (requiring that expert testimony be
“relevant and the product of reliable methodology’ (footnote omit-
ted)). The majority notes that Perez’s behavior and conduct with
the victim began as mildly flirtatious and escalated to the point of
being overtly sexual. I agree with the majority that Perez’s actions
needed no expert explanation in and of themselves as his designs
for engaging in sexual conduct with the victim were evident from
the escalating nature of his actions. However, I part from the ma-
jority’s conclusion that expert testimony was necessary to explain
the effect of Perez’s actions on the victim.

The testimony was not of assistance because the victim could,
and in fact did, explain how Perez’s conduct allayed her resistance
to his abuse. The victim, who was 14 years old at the time of trial,
testified about events that occurred only the year before, described
how the grooming activity made her feel, and acknowledged that
she developed feelings for Perez. Further, she did not resist Perez’s
physical advances because of these feelings. In addition, she ex-
plained her hesitance to fully and accurately disclose the nature of
Perez’s abuse. Remarkably, her resistance to disclosing the abuse
turned on fear of her aunt’s reaction, not the effects of Perez’s
grooming. Because the victim explained during her testimony that
Perez’s conduct ingratiated himself to her and, to some extent, be-
guiled her, see Morris, 361 S.W.3d at 652, 667 (describing groom-
ing behavior as ‘“‘really no different from behavior that occurs in
high school dating’’), the expert testimony was unnecessary, see
United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Me.
2010) (noting that expert testimony on motivation of child vic-
tim is not required when victim can testify about her motiva-
tions); State v. Braham, 841 P.2d 785, 790 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)

866 Pe

(‘‘Surely, expert opinion is not necessary to explain that an adult
in a ‘close relationship’ with a child will have greater opportunity
to engage in the alleged sexual misconduct.”’). While this court tol-
erates expert testimony that incidentally bolsters another witness’s
testimony, see Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118-19, 734 P.2d
705, 709 (1987) (recognizing that expert testimony may have a cor-
roborative effect on the complaining witness’s testimony), the tes-
timony here primarily served to augment the victim’s testimony.
As the expert testimony was not probative with regard to the vic-
tim’s actions, it became unfairly prejudicial in how it characterized
Perez’s behavior. Unnecessary expert testimony carries the risk of
unduly influencing the jury:
Expert testimony on a subject that is well within the bounds
of a jury’s ordinary experience generally has little probative
value. On the other hand, the risk of unfair prejudice is real.
By appearing to put the expert’s stamp of approval on the gov-
ernment’s theory, such testimony might unduly influence the
jury’s own assessment of the inference that is being urged.

United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 784 (Ast Cir. 1994); see also
Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (noting that expert witness tes-
timony about matters in the jury’s common sense ‘invites a toxic
mixture of purported expertise and common sense’’). Although ex-
pert insight into the effect of grooming behavior, i.e., the victim’s
emotional dependence on the abuser, may have appeared relevant
to understanding the victim’s reluctance to come forward, testi-
mony about the defendant’s prior bad acts, which may have fos-
tered that emotional dependence, did not explain the victim’s be-
havior and carried a significant risk of unfair prejudice to the
defendant by characterizing his prior actions as similar to those of
other sex offenders. See State v. Hansen, 743 P.2d 157, 160-61
(Or. 1987), superseded on other grounds by Or. Evidence Code R.
103, as stated in Powers v. Cheely, 771 P.2d 622, 628 n.13 (Or.
1989). Thus, where expert testimony addresses a defendant’s prior
bad acts, ‘‘[c]are must be taken in order that prior acts evidence is
not bundled into an official-sounding theory and coupled with ex-
pert testimony in order to increase its apparent value in demon-
strating a ‘plan’ or malevolent intent by the defendant.’’ State v.
Coleman, 276 P.3d 744, 750 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012).

Apart from his testimony about the impulsivity of adolescents
due to lack of cortical function in the frontal lobes of the brain—
testimony the majority correctly concludes Dr. Paglini was not
qualified to give—Dr. Paglini said very little about grooming’s im-
pact on victim behavior that, left unexplained, would confuse the
jury. Rather, Dr. Paglini was asked to define grooming and then to
answer a series of purported hypotheticals, such as, ‘“You have a
situation of a 13-year-old niece who had known her 33-year-old

po 867

uncle her whole life and had seen him on a regular basis, would
the following conduct over about a three and four month period po-
tentially constitute grooming activity? First touching the niece’s
foot under the table at family parties or winking at the niece.’
There follows a series of hypothetical questions, each one identi-
fying something the defendant did in relation to the victim, such as
calling her, objecting to her having boyfriends, and concluding it
might be grooming. Such testimony

‘exceeded permissible bounds when the prosecutor tailored
the hypothetical questions to include facts concerning the
abuse that occurred in this particular case. [It] went beyond
explaining victim behavior that might be beyond the ken of a
jury, and had the prejudicial effect of implying that the expert
found the testimony of this particular claimant to be credible.

People v. Williams, 987 N.E.2d 260, 263 (N.Y. 2013); see State
vy. McCarthy, 283 P.3d 391, 394-95 (Or. App. 2012).

Here, Dr. Paglini focused on Perez’s uncharged bad (and, in
some instances, perhaps innocent) acts and characterized them as
motivated purely by his intent to sexually abuse his niece. The tes-
timony carried a significant risk that the jury would ‘‘make the
quick and unjustified jump from his expert testimony about be-
havioral patterns to guilt in a particular case that shows similar pat-
terns.’’ Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 150; see also Hansen, 743
P.2d at 161 (noting that where probative value is lacking, ‘‘the
danger of unfair prejudice to defendant from the unwarranted in-
ference that, because defendant engaged in acts that sexual child
abusers engage in, she, too, is a sexual child abuser is simply too
great’). Thus, even if the testimony had some limited probative
value, NRS 48.015, that value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, NRS 48.035(1).

Considering that the State failed to elicit sufficient information
regarding Dr. Paglini’s qualifications and the victim was able to ar-
ticulate how Perez’s prior conduct affected her, I would conclude
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this testi-
mony. I reiterate that I am not opposed to the use of expert testi-
mony on grooming in all cases. It certainly becomes more relevant
where the grooming activity in question is not clearly apparent or
the child witness is of such an age that he or she could not plainly
express how that activity affected him or her. Nevertheless, in that
situation, the State must make a sufficient showing that the expert
has sufficient academic or professional experience specifically re-
lated to grooming of child sexual assault victims.

Expert-witness notice

I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the expert-
witness notice was adequate to inform the defendant of the extent

868 Po

of testimony that the State sought to elicit. NRS 174.234(2) re-
quires pretrial disclosure of experts in cases involving gross mis-
demeanor or felony charges. The disclosure must, at minimum,
give “‘[a] brief statement regarding the subject matter on which the
expert witness is expected to testify and the substance of the tes-
timony.” NRS 174.234(2)(a) (emphasis added). The State’s expert-
witness disclosure designated Dr. Paglini and stated he would
“‘testify as to grooming techniques used upon children,’’ nothing
more. This notice was far too brief, and while it identified the sub-
ject matter of the testimony in the broadest of terms, it did not suf-
ficiently address the substance of that testimony. As noted above,
most of Dr. Paglini’s direct testimony involved his opinion of hy-
pothetical scenarios posed by the prosecutor that mirrored the spe-
cific facts of this case. The notice did not inform Perez that the
State sought Dr. Paglini’s opinion on these matters. Further, the
notice did not inform the defense that Dr. Paglini had reviewed ma-
terials specific to this case, including the victim’s statements, re-
ports, and transcripts of other hearings. Therefore, Dr. Paglini’s
testimony about the specific conduct at issue in this case am-
bushed Perez with expert testimony he was not warned to be pre-
pared to defend against.

Harmless error

I further conclude that the error in admitting Dr. Paglini’s testi-
mony was not harmless. See Fields v. State, 125 Nev. 776, 784,
220 P.3d 724, 729 (2009) (reviewing erroneous admission of evi-
dence for harmless error). In considering whether the erroneous
admission of evidence had a ‘‘ ‘substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict, ’’ Tavares v. State, 117
Nev. 725, 732, 30 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2001) (quoting Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)), this court considers
“‘whether the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the quantity and
character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged.’ Big
Pond v. State, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985).

This case is impacted by all three factors. First, the question of
guilt or innocence is close. The testimony supporting the charges
was inconsistent. The victim’s testimony was inconsistent with
her initial reports to hotel security and the police. Perez’s wife,
whose initial reports to hotel security and the police supported the
allegations of abuse, testified consistently with Perez’s admission
that he kissed the victim. No physical evidence supported the al-
legations. Second, the character of the error was particularly dam-
aging in this case. Expert testimony which rationalized the incon-
sistencies in the victim’s testimony had a significant impact on the
jury’s determination of guilt. The problem was exacerbated by the

ee 869

emphasis Dr. Paglini and the State placed on Dr. Paglini’s work
conducting ‘‘risk assessments’ on known sex offenders. Proceed-
ing act by act through hypothetical questions concerning the flir-
tations that preceded the Las Vegas assault portrayed Perez as a sex
offender, on a par with the 1,000 other convicted sex offenders of
risk to the community Dr. Paglini had evaluated. But Perez was not
on trial for grooming over a three to four month period in Cali-
fornia. The charges he faced involved a single incident in a Las
Vegas hotel room that occurred in the space of time it took Perez’s
wife, the victim’s aunt, to take a shower in the room’s adjacent
bathroom. Lastly, Perez was charged with serious sexual offenses
against a minor, for which he has been sentenced to multiple life
sentences, with the possibility of parole after 35 years. See NRS
200.366(3)(c); NRS 201.230(2).

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and re-
mand for a new trial.

a
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ARLAN
EDWARD BETHUREM, DECEASED.

INES CARAVEO, APPELLANT, v. ANITA HERRERA PEREZ;
SANDRA KURTZ; AND VICKI S. PRESTON, RESPONDENTS.

No. 57749
November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 237

Hawkins Folsom & Muir and Gordon R. Muir, Reno, for
Appellant.

Holland & Hart LLP and Richard L. Elmore, Tamara Reid, and
J. Robert Smith, Reno, for Respondents Anita Herrera Perez and
Sandra Kurtz.

John F. Kirsch, Reno, for Respondent Vicki S. Preston.

J. Douglas Clark, Reno, for Amicus Curiae State Bar of
Nevada, Probate and Trust Law Section.

871

Before the Court EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this appeal, the beneficiary of a will challenges a district
court order invalidating the will as the product of the beneficiary’s
undue influence. A rebuttable presumption of undue influence is
raised if the testator and the beneficiary shared a fiduciary rela~
tionship, but undue influence may also be proved without raising
this presumption. As a matter of first impression in Nevada, we
hold that in the absence of a presumption, a will contestant bears
the burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of the
evidence. Because we conclude that the respondent-will contestants
failed to meet this burden of proof, we reverse the district court’s
order invalidating the will as the product of undue influence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Arlan Bethurem died in December 2008. The special adminis-
trator of his estate petitioned to have the estate set aside without
administration according to Arlan’s' 2007 will. Arlan’s step-
daughters opposed the petition, arguing that a beneficiary of the
2007 will had unduly influenced Arlan. The testimony before the
probate commissioner revealed the following facts.

Arjan married his wife Bertha in 1971, and the couple resided
in Reno. Bertha had three children from a prior marriage, respon-
dents Sandra Kurtz and Anita Herrera Perez, and a son who is not
a party to this action. Bertha and Arlan raised the three children
together. In 2004, Arlan executed a will bequeathing his estate to
Bertha. In the event that Bertha did not survive him, Arlan’s will
divided his estate equally between his three stepchildren and a
granddaughter.

{For clarity and to be consistent with the parties” briefs, we use individuals?
first names throughout this opinion.

372 ee

In late 2005, Bertha became ill and Arlan sought assistance with
her care. Bertha’s sister, appellant Ines Caraveo, traveled to Reno
from her home in Texas to help care for Bertha. Upon arrival in
Reno, Ines asked Sandra and Anita to assist with Bertha’s care, ei-
ther physically or financially. Neither was able to do so. Ines be-
came angry with Sandra and Anita for failing to care for Bertha.
Sandra and Anita both testified that Bertha said in telephone con-
versations that she did not like how Ines was speaking to Arlan
about their inability to provide care.

Bertha died in May 2006. Ines accompanied Arlan to make fu-
neral arrangements with a priest. The priest testified that Arlan
was grief-stricken but lucid at the time of this meeting, and that
Arlan expressed disappointment that Sandra and Anita had not
been more supportive during Bertha’s illness. Sandra and Anita at-
tended Bertha’s funeral, where they felt ostracized by family mem-
bers and other funeral attendants. After Bertha’s funeral, Ines re-
turned to Texas but stayed in contact with Arlan through daily
telephone conversations. Arlan did not speak to Sandra for several
months or to Anita for more than a year. Although Arlan was dev-
astated by the loss of his wife, he continued to drive, go to work,
and otherwise provide for his own daily needs.

In April 2007, Arlan contacted his friend and accountant Vicki
Preston to prepare a new will. Preston testified that Arlan came to
her office alone and appeared in good mental condition. Preston
suggested that Arlan speak with an attorney, but he declined to do
so and instead provided Preston with handwritten changes to a
prior will. Preston testified that these changes were made in
Azlan’s handwriting. These changes named Ines and Arlan’s sister
as beneficiaries and expressly disinherited his stepchildren. Preston
further testified that she did not speak to Ines about the will and
prepared the will according to Arlan’s written instructions. After
Preston prepared the will, Arlan picked up Preston and Preston’s
friend in his truck, and they drove to a bank to execute the will be-
fore a notary. Preston and her friend served as witnesses to the
will. Both witnesses testified that Arlan expressed disappointment
that Sandra and Anita had not helped care for Bertha and that he
said he wanted to change his will because of their treatment of
Bertha while she was ill. Arlan also conveyed title of his home in
Reno to himself and Ines as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and added Ines to some of his bank accounts.

A month later, Sandra visited Arlan. She later testified that he
was very depressed during her visit. After Sandra’s departure,
Arian attempted suicide. Sandra then invited Arlan to stay with her
in Oregon, and he did so for over two weeks. During his time in
Oregon, Arlan called Ines from Sandra’s home nearly every day.
After spending approximately two weeks in Oregon, Arlan re-
turned to Reno for work.

ee 873

In October 2008, Arlan lost his job. He decided to sell his home
and move to Oregon to be with Sandra. Ines did not want her name
removed from the property’s title but was willing to sign any doc-
uments related to the sale. Around the same time, Arlan expressed
regret to Sandra about changing his will. Arlan told Sandra that he
changed the will because he was angry with her. Sandra testified
that Arlan had a history of changing his will when he was angry
with family members. Arlan named Sandra and Ines as benefici-
aries to a savings account of approximately $84,000.

About two months later, Arlan committed suicide. Arlan’s home
was in escrow at the time of his death, and after closing, Ines re-
ceived the sale proceeds. Ines and Sandra received equal shares of
the $84,000 savings account. Following Arlan’s death, Preston
was appointed special administrator and petitioned to set aside
Arlan’s estate without administration to Ines and Arlan’s sister as
provided in the 2007 will. Sandra and Anita opposed the petition,
arguing that Ines had unduly influenced Arlan.

After hearing the testimony summarized above, the probate
commissioner found that (1) Preston confirmed Ines made state-
ments to Arlan about Sandra and Anita failing to care for Bertha,
(2) Ines ‘‘enlisted’’ Preston to prepare the 2007 will, (3) ‘Ines
mounted a campaign to turn Bertha and Arlan against Bertha’s
daughters . . . by telling Arlan that the children were not doing
enough to help their gravely ill mother,’ and (4) ‘Ines took every
opportunity to remind Arlan and Bertha that Bertha’s children
were unwilling to help.’’ The probate commissioner concluded
that Ines had unduly influenced Arlan by fostering ill will between
him and his stepdaughters and the 2007 will was the product of
this undue influence. The probate commissioner recommended
that the 2004 will be admitted to probate.

On review, the district court found that no evidence supported
the probate commissioner’s finding that Preston confirmed Ines
made statements to Arlan about Sandra and Anita. The district
court also concluded that the probate commissioner’s finding that
Ines enlisted Preston to prepare Arlan’s 2007 will was clearly er-
roneous. However, the district court found these errors harmless.
The district court affirmed the probate commissioner’s recom-
mendation, explaining that the evidence supported the commis-
sioner’s findings that Ines mounted a campaign to turn Arlan
and Bertha against Sandra and Anita by telling Arlan that his step-
daughters were unwilling to help care for Bertha. Ines now
appeals.

DISCUSSION

Below, we describe the current status of Nevada’s undue influ-
ence law, discuss the appropriate burden and quantum of proof in
a will contest on the grounds of undue influence, and address

874 Po

whether the evidence supports a finding of undue influence in this
case.”

Undue influence law in Nevada

In order to establish undue influence under Nevada law, ‘‘it must
appear, either directly or by justifiable inference from the facts
proved, that the influence . . . destroy[ed] the free agency of the
testator”’ In re Estate of Hegarty, 46 Nev. 321, 326, 212 P. 1040,
1042 (1923). The influence that may arise from a family relation-
ship is only unlawful if it overbears the will of the testator. Jd. at
328, 212 P. at 1042. Moreover, the fact a beneficiary merely pos-
sesses or is motivated to exercise influence is insufficient to es-
tablish undue influence. Jd. at 326, 212 P. at 1042. Finally, a will
cannot be invalidated simply ‘‘because it does not conform to
ideas of propriety.’ Id. at 327, 212 P. at 1042.

We have held that ‘‘[a] presumption of undue influence arises
when a fiduciary relationship exists and the fiduciary benefits
from the questioned transaction.’ In re Jane Tiffany Living Trust
2001, 124 Nev. 74, 78, 177 P.3d 1060, 1062 (2008) (addressing
undue influence in the context of an attorney receiving an inter
vivos transfer from a client). Once raised, a beneficiary may rebut
such a presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 79,
177 P.3d at 1063. Undue influence may also be shown in the ab-
sence of a presumption. See generally In re Estate of Hegarty, 46
Nev. at 327, 212 P. at 1042. However, we have not previously de-
termined the appropriate burden and quantum of proof required to
establish undue influence in the absence of a presumption. Because
neither the probate commissioner nor the district court found that
a presumption of undue influence was raised in this case, we now
discuss the burden and quantum of proof necessary to establish
undue influence in the absence of a presumption.

Burden and quantum of proof for establishing undue influence

P|

It is well-recognized that the burden of proving undue influence
in a will contest is on the party contesting the will’s validity. Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Wills & Donative Transfers § 8.3

In addition to these issues, Sandra and Anita argue we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal because the district court’s order only invalidated Arlan’s 2007
will, rather than setting aside an estate less than $100,000 or distributing prop-
erty. See NRS 155.190(1)(c), (2. However, the commissioner recommended
admitting the 2004 will to probate, and the district court affirmed the com-
missioner’s recommendation. Therefore, we have jurisdiction pursuant to NRS
155,190(1)(b).

875

emt. e (2003); 79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 392 (2013); Rice v. Clark,
47 P.3d 300, 304 (Cal. 2002) (‘‘[A] person challenging the testa-
mentary instrument ordinarily bears the burden of proving undue
influence.”’); see also In re Estate of Hegarty, 46 Nev. at 328, 212
P. at 1042 (explaining that ‘‘the evidence in this case fails to es-
tablish undue influence,’ suggesting the will contestant bears the
burden of proof).

As to the necessary quantum of proof, Ines urges us to require
a will contestant to establish undue influence by clear and con-
vincing evidence because “‘undue influence . . . is a species of
fraud.’ In re Estate of Peterson, 77 Nev. 87, 111, 360 P.2d 259,
271 (1961) (quoting with approval a jury instruction given by the
district court); see also Heck v. Archer, 927 P.2d 495, 499 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1996) (holding that ‘‘[uJndue influence is a species of
fraud’’ and that ‘‘[f]raud is never presumed but must be shown by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence,” even in regard to tes-
tamentary transfers).

Because this is an issue of first impression, we examine other ju-
risdictions’ treatment of this issue. It appears that the majority of
other jurisdictions require undue influence be proved only by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Todd, 585 N.W.2d
273, 276 (Iowa 1998) (recognizing that proving undue influence by
a preponderance of the evidence ‘‘appears to be the majority rule”’
and is the rule in Iowa); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Waters, 629
P.2d 470, 472 (Wyo. 1981) (‘The burden of proof on the issue of
undue influence, which burden most courts say rests upon the con-
testant, is carried, in general, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Estate of Gar-
rett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of
Wiltfong, 148 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. App. 2006); In re Estate of
West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1264 (Del. 1987); Howe v. Palmer, 956
N.E.2d 249, 254 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); In re Will of Elmore,
346 N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (App. Div. 1973); Caranci v. Howard, 708
A.2d 1321, 1324 (R.I. 1998); In re Estate of Duebendorfer, 721
N.W.2d 438, 446 (S.D. 2006); In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d
169, 175 (Tenn. 1987); Cobb v. Justice, 954 S.W.2d 162, 165
(Tex. App. 1997).

In addition, this court has previously alluded to a preponderance
of the evidence standard for proving undue influence in cases in-
volving testamentary transfers. See, e.g., In re Estate of Peterson,
77 Nev. at 111, 360 P.2d at 271 (approving of a jury instruction
stating the presumption of undue influence could be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence); In re Estate of Abel, 30 Nev. 93,
103, 93 P. 227, 230 (1908) (explaining a finding of undue influ-
ence will not be overturned if supported by substantial but con-
flicting evidence). We have also recognized the importance of pro-
tecting an ‘‘ ‘alleged donor [who] is lacking in such mental vigor

876 Po

as to enable him to protect himself against imposition even though
his mental weakness is not such as to justify his being regarded as
totally incapacitated.’ ’’ Ross v. Giacomo, 97 Nev. 550, 556, 635
P.2d 298, 302 (1981) (quoting with approval a jury instruction
used by the district court), abrogated on other grounds by Winston
Prods. Co. v. DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 524, 134 P.3d 726, 731
(2006).

a

We now hold that in the absence of a presumption, a will con-
testant must establish the existence of undue influence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In order to meet this standard, the
contestant must show that the disposition of property under the will
was “‘more likely than not’’ the result of undue influence. See
Aguilar y. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 507 (Cal. 2001) (dis-
cussing the preponderance standard generally). This approach most
closely aligns with our prior decisions alluding to but not ex-
pressly stating such a quantum of proof. See In re Estate of Peter-
son, 77 Nev. at 111, 360 P.2d at 271; In re Estate of Abel, 30 Nev.
at 103, 93 P. at 230. This approach also provides the best protec-
tions to vulnerable alleged donors by making it easier for will con-
testants to establish undue influence. See Ross, 97 Nev. at 556, 635
P.2d at 302; see also Caranci, 708 A.2d at 1324 (‘‘Because the
perpetrator of such covert coercion generally applies the forbidden
pressure in secret, one seeking to set aside such a will is often un-
able to produce direct evidence of the undue influence to the
factfinder but rather must rely on circumstantial evidence.’’).

Having determined that the preponderance of the evidence is the
quantum of proof necessary to establish undue influence in the ab-
sence of a presumption, we now address whether substantial evi-
dence supported the district court’s finding that Sandra and Anita
met this standard.

Substantial evidence did not support the district court’s order

Le

This court will not disturb a district court’s findings of fact if
they are supported by substantial evidence, and we review a district
court’s legal determinations de novo. Clark Cnty. v. Sun State
Props., Lid., 119 Nev. 329, 334, 72 P.3d 954, 957 (2003). ‘‘Sub-
stantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’ Winchell v. Schiff, 124 Nev.
938, 944, 193 P.3d 946, 950 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Here, the record indicates that before Bertha’s death, Ines made
statements to Arlan about Sandra and Anita failing to care for
Bertha, and these statements upset Bertha. While Ines and Arlan
had almost daily contact by telephone after Bertha’s death, Sandra

PO 877

testified that Arlan made the calls at least some of the time, and
there was no testimony regarding the contents of these telephone
conversations. Neither the probate commissioner nor the district
court indicated what evidence supported the inference that Ines
“mounted a campaign’’ or “‘took every opportunity to remind’’
Arlan that Sandra and Anita had not helped care for Bertha, and
we find none in the record.

Nevertheless, the district court affirmed the probate commis-
sioner’s recommendation, concluding there was sufficient evidence
that the probate commissioner could reasonably conclude that
Arlan’s 2007 will was the product of undue influence exercised by
Ines. The district court did not explain how the facts actually sup-
ported by the record led the court to conclude Arlan’s free agency
had been destroyed, despite correctly stating such a requirement
for establishing undue influence. See In re Estate of Hegarty, 46
Nev. 321, 326, 212 P. 1040, 1042 (1923).

While Ines may have influenced Arlan through frequent tele-
phone conversations, influence resulting merely from Ines and
Arlan’s family relationship is not by itself unlawful, and there is no
indication in the record that any influence Ines may have exercised
prevented Arlan from making his own decisions regarding his
will. See id. at 328, 212 P. at 1042. Moreover, the fact that Ines
may have possessed influence does not amount to undue influence
unless her influence destroyed Arlan’s free agency. See id. at 326,
212 P. at 1042.

The record shows Ines was angry with Sandra and Anita for fail-
ing to care for Bertha, she expressed her anger before Bertha’s
death, Arlan shared that sentiment, he changed his will in re-
sponse, and he later regretted doing so. From these facts, no jus-
tifiable inference could be drawn that’ Ines destroyed Arlan’s free
agency as to the will. See id. Arlan’s decision to disinherit his
stepchildren may “‘not conform to ideas of propriety,’ but this does
not justify invalidating his will. Id. at 327, 212 P. at 1042.

Given ‘‘the long-standing objective of this court to give effect to
a testator’s intentions to the greatest extent possible,’ In re Estate
of Melton, 128 Nev. 34, 51, 272 P.3d 668, 679 (2012), and the
complete lack of evidence indicating Arlan’s decision to change his
will was anything but his own, we conclude that the district court’s
order affirming the probate commissioner’s recommendation is
not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we. reverse the
district court’s order and remand this matter to the district court.
On remand, the district court shall order distribution of Arlan’s es-
tate according to the 2007 will.

PICKERING, C.J., and Gispons, Harpesty, DouGLas, CHERRY,
and Sarrta, JJ., concur.

es

ASPEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., A NEVADA CoRPORA-
tion; ASPEN FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, A NEVADA
Limirep LiaBiLiry CoMPANY; AND JEFFREY B. GUINN, AN
INDIVIDUAL, PETITIONERS, v. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; anp THE HONORABLE
ALLAN R. EARL, District Jupce, RESPONDENTS, AND
DANA GENTRY, AN INDIVIDUAL, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

No. 59894

November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 875

Bailey Kennedy and John R. Bailey, Joseph A. Liebman, and
Brandon P. Kemble, Las Vegas, for Petitioners.

Campbell & Williams and Donald J. Campbell, Las Vegas, for
Real Party in Interest.

McLetchie Law and Margaret A. Mcleschie, Las Vegas, for
Amici Curiae.

ry
&
Ss

Before the Court EN BANc.!
OPINION

By the Court, Douatas, J.:

In this opinion, we address whether a district court properly
quashed a subpoena based on Nevada’s news shield statute, NRS
49.275, which protects journalists from being required to reveal in-
formation gathered in their professional capacities in the course of
developing news stories. We conclude that a request for protection
under NRS 49.275 may be raised, as it was here, by a reporter’s
attorney in a motion to quash a subpoena, without the need to file
a supporting affidavit, so long as the motion demonstrates that the
information sought by the subpoena is facially protected by the
news shield statute. Here, the privilege was properly asserted, and
petitioners have failed to identify any circumstances to overcome its
application. Accordingly, we deny the petition for extraordinary
writ relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioners Aspen Financial Services, Inc., and Aspen Financial
Services, LLC (collectively, the Aspen entities), are Nevada busi-
nesses specializing in mortgage brokerage and loan servicing, and
petitioner Jeffrey Guinn is the majority owner of the Aspen enti-
ties.? Aspen was sued in the district court by investors alleging that
Aspen had breached various statutory, contractual, and fiduciary
duties.? Aspen denied the allegations and filed numerous counter-
claims, including claims of defamation, disparagement of business,
and breach of contract. As relevant here, Aspen claimed that Dana
Gentry, a local television reporter who was not a party to the ac-
tion below, but who is the real party in interest to the writ petition,
helped the investors investigate and prepare their lawsuit in order
to manufacture news stories intended to embarrass Aspen. Aspen
also alleged that Gentry received personal favors from the in-

‘THE HONORABLE KRISTINA PICKERING, Chief Justice, voluntarily recused
herself from participation in the decision of this matter.

?For ease of reference, the Aspen entities and Guinn will be collectively re~
ferred to throughout this opinion as Aspen.

*The investor plaintiffs are not a party to this writ petition.

lL

vestors and their associates in connection with these news stories.
During discovery in the investor litigation, Aspen served a sub-
poena on Gentry requesting information relating to alleged gifts
provided to Gentry by the investors, work performed on Gentry’s
home by the investors, and the circumstances leading to Gentry’s
news station employing the son of two of the investors.

After being served with the subpoena, Gentry filed a motion in
the district court to quash it. Gentry argued that the information
sought was protected by Nevada’s news shield statute, NRS
49.275, which protects journalists from being required to reveal
certain information gathered in the course of preparing news sto-
ties. Aspen opposed the motion by making two arguments. First,
as a threshold matter, Aspen argued that the district court erred in
granting Gentry’s motion to quash because Gentry failed to support
her motion with an affidavit demonstrating the applicability of the
news shield statute to the information sought. Second, Aspen as-
serted that Nevada’s news shield statute only applies to a reporter
acting in his or her professional capacity and that the subpoena did
not request any information gathered by Gentry in preparation for
a news story, as Gentry had never run a story regarding her per-
sonal relationship with the investors. In referring to the subpoena,
however, the opposition indicated that Aspen believed that the gifts
referenced in the subpoena were provided to Gentry in exchange
for favorable news coverage. Gentry filed a reply to the opposition,
contending that the information was within the scope of the statute.

The district court granted the motion to quash, concluding that
the information at issue fell within the protection of the news
shield statute. The court noted, however, that Aspen may be enti-
tled to some of the information if it could prove in a private evi-
dentiary hearing that such information was ‘‘absolutely neces-
sary’’ to Aspen’s case. The court further indicated that it was
concerned with the potential of the subpoena to harm Gentry’s
credibility. Aspen now requests that this court issue a writ of man-
damus or prohibition directing the district court to vacate its order
quashing the subpoena.

DISCUSSION
Le

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
discretion. See NRS 34.160; Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008).
A writ of prohibition may be used to arrest the proceedings of a
district court when it has exceeded its jurisdiction. Mineral Cnty.
vy, State, Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 117 Nev. 235,
243, 20 P.3d 800, 805 (2001). Both mandamus and prohibition are

os

extraordinary remedies that are unavailable when a petitioner has
a “‘plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law,” and both are issued at the discretion of this court. Id.; see
also NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330.

| ree

Extraordinary relief is generally unavailable to review discovery
orders because such orders may be challenged in an appeal from
an adverse final judgment. Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116
Nev. 88, 93, 993 P.2d 50, 54 (2000). But, in certain cases, con-
sideration of a writ petition raising a discovery issue may be ap-
propriate if ‘‘an important issue of law needs clarification and
public policy is served by this court’s invocation of its original ju-
tisdiction,”’ such as when the petition provides ‘‘a unique oppor-
tunity to define the precise parameters’’ of a statutory privilege
that this court has not previously interpreted. Jd. (internal quota-
tions omitted). Here, the challenged order focuses on the parame-
ters of Nevada’s news shield statute, raising issues that have not yet
been addressed by this court. Accordingly, we elect to exercise our
discretion to entertain the merits of this petition.

Gentry met her burden of asserting the news shield privilege

| caer)

In considering a writ petition, this court gives deference to a
district court’s factual determinations but reviews questions of law
de novo. Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 551,
557, 245 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010). Construction of a statute is a
question of law subject to our de novo review. Kay v. Nunez, 122
Nev. 1100, 1104, 146 P.3d 801, 804 (2006). If a statute is clear
and unambiguous, we will apply its plain meaning. Id. at 1104,
146 P.3d at 804-05.

Nevada’s news shield privilege

The Nevada news shield statute states in pertinent part that

[nJo reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of
any radio or television station may be required to disclose any
published or unpublished information obtained or prepared by
such person in such person’s professional capacity in gather-
ing, receiving or processing information for communication to
the public, or the source of any information procured or ob-
tained by such person, in any legal proceedings, trial or
investigation:

1. Before any court, grand jury, coroner’s inquest, jury or
any officer thereof.

OT

883

NRS 49.275. As this court has previously explained, the statute
“confers upon journalists an absolute privilege from disclosure of
their sources and information in any proceeding’’ in order ‘‘to en-
hance the newsgathering process and to foster the free flow of in-
formation encouraged by the First Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution.’ Diaz, 116 Nev. at 94, 99, 993 P.2d at 54, 57.

No affidavit requirement

As a threshold matter, Aspen argues that the district court
abused its discretion in granting Gentry’s motion to quash because
Gentry failed to support her motion with an affidavit demonstrat-
ing that the news shield statute applied to the information sought
by the subpoena. In support of its argument, Aspen primarily re-
lies on Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 104
Nev. 508, 761 P.2d 849 (1988), overruled on other grounds by
Diaz, 116 Nev. at 100-01, 993 P.2d at 58, in which the court noted
its concern that no party claiming the privilege in that case had
sworn to the facts supporting the claim in an affidavit. Stating that
the privilege of nondisclosure should not be upheld in the absence
of ‘‘compliance with the statutory requisites,’ the Las Vegas Sun
court cautioned the parties that ‘‘[aJny further claims [of privilege
under NRS 49.275] should be supported by sworn affidavits, iden-
tifying the news gatherer and attesting that the information was ob-
tained or produced during the news gathering process in that per-
son’s professional capacity.’ Jd. at 515, 761 P.2d at 854.

Regardless of the language in Las Vegas Sun, nothing in the text
of NRS 49.275 requires a party claiming the privilege to file an af-
fidavit in support of a request for protection under the statute. See
Kay, 122 Nev. at 1104, 146 P.3d at 804-05 (explaining that when
the language of a statute is clear, this court will not go beyond it).
Nor does NRCP 45(c)(3)(A)Gii), which provides that a district
court shall quash or modify a subpoena on motion if the subpoena
“requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter,’ re-
quire an affidavit to support a claim of privilege. Thus, to the ex-
tent that Las Vegas Sun can be read as requiring a party to submit
an affidavit in support of an assertion of the news shield statute, we
overrule that case, and, instead, conclude that a request for pro-
tection under NRS 49.275 may be raised, as it was here, by a

“To the extent that the parties rely on cases from the federal courts of ap-
peals in support of their respective positions, see Chevron Corp. y. Berlinger,
629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995), we
conclude that such cases do not apply to this analysis, as they relate to a qual-
ified journalistic privilege developed under the federal common law, which is
distinct from the state statutory privilege at issue here.

884

party’s attorney in a motion to quash a subpoena, without the need
to file a supporting affidavit, so long as the motion demonstrates
that the information sought by the subpoena is facially protected by
the news shield statute.

The requested information is covered by Nevada’s news shield
privilege
P|

Having determined that no affidavit was required, we now turn
to whether the information sought was within the scope of the
statute’s protection. Aspen contends that the subpoena at issue did
not seek information that was gathered in Gentry’s professional ca-
pacity as a news reporter, and thus, that the information was not
protected by NRS 49.275. We disagree.

| |

In order to determine what information falls under the news
shield statute, we must look to the language of the statute itself.
See Kay, 122 Nev. at 1104, 146 P.3d at 804-05 (explaining that
when the language of a statute is clear, this court will not go be-
yond it); see also Diaz, 116 Nev. at 97, 993 P.2d at 56 (recogniz~
ing that the language of the news shield statute is plain and unam-
biguous). As noted above, the statute protects from disclosure
“any published or unpublished information obtained or prepared.
by [a reporter] in [his or her] professional capacity in gathering,
receiving or processing information for communication to the pub-
lic, or the source of any information procured or obtained by [the
reporter].’’ NRS 49.275. Thus, the statute broadly protects any in-
formation that is gathered in the course of preparing a news story,
as well as the sources of such information. See id.

While Aspen asserts that it has only sought information relating
to Gentry in her personal capacity, the record demonstrates that
this is not accurate. In particular, Aspen’s claims in the action
below allege that the investors improperly influenced Gentry to
produce news stories favorable to them and unfavorable to Aspen.
Thus, it appears from the face of the subpoena that, when read in
the context of Aspen’s claims, Aspen has requested the information
sought in order to affirm its suspicions about Gentry’s motivation
for producing those news stories. Indeed, Aspen’s arguments in the
opposition to the motion to quash and in its writ petition confirm
that this is its reason for serving Gentry with the subpoena.’ In
other words, although Aspen claims that it is not seeking Gentry’s
sources because it already knows who those sources are, the cir-

STo the extent that this is not Aspen’s purpose, Aspen has not explained how
the information sought might be relevant or lead to relevant information re-~
garding its claims or defenses in the action below.

SS

cumstances of this case demonstrate that Aspen actually is effec-
tively seeking to confirm the identities of Gentry’s sources. As the
identity of a reporter’s source is information that is protected
under the plain language of the news shield statute, see NRS
49.275 (protecting from disclosure ‘‘the source of any information
procured or obtained by’’ a reporter), we conclude that the infor-
mation sought was facially protected under the news shield statute.

Aspen failed to overcome the news shield privilege

Our conclusion that the information was facially protected does
not necessarily end our inquiry, as we have previously recognized
“‘that although the news shield statute provides an absolute privi-
lege to reporters engaged in the newsgathering process, there may
be certain situations, e.g., when a defendant’s countervailing con-
stitutional rights are at issue, in which the news shield statute
might have to yield so that justice may be served.’’ Diaz, 116 Nev.
at 101, 993 P.2d at 59. We need not consider whether this case
presents such a situation, as Aspen has not identified any particu-
lar circumstances that would take this case outside of the usual ap-
plication of the statute. Instead, Aspen has only argued that the in-
formation was not within the statute’s protection in the first place.
Thus, because the information was facially protected and Aspen
has not identified any circumstances to overcome the application of
the news shield statute, we conclude that the district court properly
quashed the subpoena duces tecum.®

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Gentry’s motion to quash the subpoena prop-
erly asserted the news shield privilege and that Aspen failed to
overcome this privilege. We, therefore, deny the petition for ex-
traordinary relief.

GiBBONS, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, CHERRY, and SaiTt, JJ.,
concur.

‘Because we conclude that the information sought was within the statute’s
protection, we need not address Aspen’s contention that the district court’s
concern for Gentry’s reputation was an improper basis for quashing the
subpoena.

FRANKIE ALAN WATTERS, APPELLANT, v.
THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.

No. 59703

November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 243

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Audrey M. Conway,
Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven
B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Nancy A. Becker, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANc.

Pe
OPINION

By the Court, PickeRING, C.J.:
We consider whether the State’s use of a PowerPoint during
opening statement that includes a slide of the defendant’s booking
photo with the word ‘‘GUILTY’’ superimposed across it consti-
tutes improper advocacy and undermines the presumption of inno-
cence essential to a fair trial.!

L

Frankie Alan Watters was charged with and convicted of pos-
session of a stolen vehicle, grand larceny of a vehicle, and failure
to stop on the signal of a police officer. The charges grew out of
a crime spree in which Watters allegedly stole a car, got in a
wreck, fled, stole another car, became involved in a high-speed
chase, ditched the second car, ran into a store, and was finally ar-
rested after being knocked to the ground and bitten several times
in the leg by a police dog.

At trial, the State used a PowerPoint to support its opening
statement to the jury. The presentation included a slide showing
Watters’s booking photo with the word ‘‘GUILTY”’ written across
his battered face.

Figure 1. Prosecutor’s opening statement PowerPoint slide.

1Watters also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s verdict. We conclude that the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. See NRS 205.228(1); NRS
205.273(1)(b); NRS 484B.550(1); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). We decline to consider the other issues raised on appeal.

Po 889

The prosecutor used the PowerPoint first to display the booking
photo, then to add the word ‘‘GUILTY,’ while she wrapped up:
“So after hearing the evidence in the case, we’re going to ask you
to find the Defendant guilty on possession of stolen vehicle, guilty
on grand larceny auto, and guilty on failure to stop on a police of-
ficer’s signal.”

The defense reviewed and objected to the booking-photo slide
sequence before opening statements began. The district court over-
ruled the objection. It observed that such slides are used ‘‘all the
time. . . . They’re asking based upon the evidence to find Defen-
dant guilty and [then] they have [guilty] pop up.”

Watters had not been in court when the objection was made.
After opening statements, defense counsel made a record that Wat-
ters was “‘very upset’’ when the prosecution ‘‘showed the picture
and wrote the word[ ] guilty”’ The court assured Watters that his
“lawyer did object strongly to that [but] PowerPoints under the
case[s are] allowed—both sides are allowed to express where they
believe the evidence will take them and the ultimate conclusion that
the jury should reach, and that’s all that photograph does.””

I.

|

“A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial se-
cured by the United States and Nevada Constitutions.” Hightower
v. State, 123 Nev. 55, 57, 154 P.3d 639, 640 (2007) (citing U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8). ‘““The presumption
of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a
basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal jus-
tice”’ Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). ‘‘Central
to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, is the principle that ‘one accused of a crime is
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the
basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of
official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circum-
stances not adduced as proof at trial.’’? Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
485 (1978)).

Le

The booking-photo slide sequence declared Watters guilty before
the first witness was called and should not have been allowed. An
opening statement outlines ‘‘what evidence will be presented, to
make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to
relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an

2The prosecution did not refer to the picture as a booking photo. Cf. United
States v. Simmons, 581 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir. 2009) (‘‘the use of mug shots
is disfavored and usually impermissible” unless specific need is shown).

890 Po

occasion for argument.”’ United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
612 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Garner v. State, 78
Nev. 366, 371, 374 P.2d 525, 528 (1962) (‘‘The purpose of the
opening statement is to acquaint the jury and the court with the na-
ture of the case.”’). In a criminal case, ‘‘[t]he prosecutor’s opening
statement should be confined to a statement of the issues in the
case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the
prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible.”
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and De-
fense Function, Standard 3-5.5 (3d ed. 1993). It is not ‘‘an op-
portunity to poison the jury’s mind against the defendant or to re-
cite items of highly questionable evidence.’’ United States v.
Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995), as stated in United States v.
Chen, 131 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 1997).

The State contends that State v. Sucharew, 66 P.3d 59, 63-64
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and Dolphy v. State, 707 S.E.2d 56, 58
(Ga. 2011), support its PowerPoint-supported opening statement to
the jury. But in Sucharew, the prosecution’s PowerPoint ‘‘was es-
sentially a slide show of photographic exhibits’ and ‘‘was not prej-
udicial or inflammatory.’ 66 P.3d at 63-64. And in Dolphy, the
trial court sustained the defendant’s objection to the prosecution’s
use in opening statement of PowerPoint slides that read “‘Defen-
dant’s Story Is a Lie’’ and ‘‘People Lie When They Are Guilty.’
707 S.E.2d at 57. The question in Dolphy was whether the trial
court’s ‘immediate corrective action, ordering that the slides be
taken down’”’ and curative instructions defeated Dolphy’s argument
that ‘‘the trial court . . . deprive[d him] of a fair trial by failing to
declare a mistrial sua sponte.’’ Id.

De

As these cases suggest, PowerPoint, as an advocate’s tool, is not
inherently good or bad. Its propriety depends on content and ap-
plication. A prosecutor may use PowerPoint slides to support his or
her opening statement so long as the slides’ content is consistent
with the scope and purpose of opening statements and does not put
inadmissible evidence or improper argument before the jury. See
Sucharew, 66 P.3d at 63-64. But a PowerPoint may not be used to
make an argument visually that would be improper if made orally.
See Dolphy, 707 S.E.2d at 58. Compare Allred v. State, 120 Nev.
410, 419, 92 P.3d 1246, 1252-53 (2004) (upholding State’s use of
annotated photographs as demonstrative exhibits in closing argu-
ment where the photographs were in evidence and the district
court ordered the argumentative annotations removed), with In re
Glasmann, 286 P.3d 673, 676, 678-79 (Wash. 2012) (reversing

ee 891

convictions where the State used a PowerPoint presentation in
closing argument that included slides featuring the defendant’s
“‘unkempt and bloody’’ booking photo with the word ‘“‘GUILTY”’
being superimposed in different directions to declare him
“GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY” of the multiple crimes with which
he was charged; ‘‘the prosecutor’s modification of photographs by
adding captions was the equivalent of unadmitted evidence’’ that
improperly expressed the prosecutor’s ‘‘personal opinion of guilt’’
and deprived Glasmann of a fair trial).

Here, the prosecutor orally declared that she would be asking
the jurors to find Watters guilty. But the PowerPoint that accom-
panied her declaration displayed Watters’s booking photograph
with a pop-up that directly labeled him “‘GUILTY.’” These are not
just two different ways of saying the same thing, as the State sug-
gests. While the oral statement told the jurors that they could ex-
pect the prosecutor to ask for a guilty verdict at the end of the
trial, the PowerPoint slide directly declared Watters guilty.

P|

The prosecution could not orally declare the defendant guilty in
opening statement. Doing so would amount to improper argument
and the expression of personal opinion on the defendant’s guilt,
which is forbidden. See Collier v. State, 101 Nev. 473, 480, 705
P.2d 1126, 1130 (1985) (a prosecutor should not express her per-
sonal opinion on the defendant’s guilt; ‘‘[b]y stepping out of the
prosecutor’s role, which is to seek justice, and by invoking the
authoiity of . . . her own supposedly greater experience and
knowledge, a prosecutor invites undue jury reliance on the con-
clusions personally endorsed by the prosecuting attorney”’ (citation
omitted)), Making this improper argument ‘‘visually through use of
slides showing [Watters’s] battered face and superimposing . . .
capital letters’’ spelling out GUILTY ‘‘is even more prejudicial’
than doing so orally. Glasmann, 286 P.3d at 680 (emphasis added).
“* With visual information, people believe what they see and will
not step back and critically examine the conclusions they reach,
unless they are explicitly motivated to do so. Thus, the alacrity by
which we process and make decisions based on visual information
conflicts with a bedrock principle of our legal system—that
reasoned deliberation is necessary for a fair justice system. ”’ Id.
(quoting Lucille A. Jewell, Through a Glass Darkly: Using Brain
Science and Visual Rhetoric to Gain a Professional Perspective
on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 237, 293 (2010));
see Mary Susan Weldon & Henry L. Roediger, III, Altering Re-
trieval Demands Reverses the Picture Superiority Effect, 15 Mem-
ory & Cognition 269, 269 (1987) (research shows that pictures are
typically remembered better than words). We therefore conclude

892 Pe

that it was error, and an abuse of discretion, for the district court
to allow the prosecutor’s booking-photo slide sequence in opening
statement.

a

The error undermined the presumption of innocence, see NRS
175.191; State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 642, 200 P.2d 657, 685
(1948), overruled on other grounds by In re Wheeler, 81 Nev. 495,
499, 406 P.2d 713, 716 (1965), which is a basic component of
“‘[the] fair trial’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment ‘‘under
our system of criminal justice.’ Williams, 425 U.S. at 503. Court-
room practices that undermine the presumption of innocence are
unconstitutional unless they serve an essential state interest. Flynn,
475 U.S. at 568. A courtroom practice undermines the presump-
tion of innocence when ‘‘an unacceptable risk is presented of im-
permissible factors coming into play’’ in the jury’s evaluation of
the evidence. Williams, 425 U.S. at 505. Routinely allowing pros-
ecutors to use booking photos with ‘‘guilty’’ written across them
during opening statement does not serve an essential state interest
and poses an unacceptable risk that the jury’s mindset will be
tainted and the fairness of its fact-finding function impaired. See
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 512 (1978) (‘‘An improper
opening statement unquestionably tends to frustrate the public in-
terest in having a just judgment reached by an impartial tribunal.
Indeed, such statements create a risk, often not present in the in-
dividual juror bias situation, that the entire panel may be tainted.”
(footnote omitted)).

| |

A presumption-of-innocence error is of constitutional dimension,
so we review for harmless error under the Chapman v. California
standard and will reverse if the State fails to prove, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict ob-
tained. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Valdez v. State, 124 Nev.
1172, 1188-89, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008).

| |

Here, the State argues that the error was harmless because the
PowerPoint was not admitted into evidence; the jury was instructed.
on the presumption of innocence at the beginning and end of trial;
the slides were displayed only briefly; and the evidence of Wat-
ters’s guilt was overwhelming. All this may be true. But in the
presumption-of-innocence context, “‘[t]he actual impact of a par-
ticular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully
determined,’ and the Supreme Court ‘‘has left no doubt that the
probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for
close judicial scrutiny.’’ Williams, 425 U.S. at 504.

po 893

Routinely allowing prosecutors to use PowerPoint slides during
opening that label the defendant guilty carries a genuine risk of
unfair bias, of. Washington, 434 U.S. at 512, in part because
“‘[hlighly prejudicial images may sway a jury in ways that words
cannot.’ Glasmann, 286 P.3d at 679. If the district court
had promptly ordered the prosecution to remove the booking-
photo slide sequence and given the jury an immediate curative
instruction, as in Dolphy, 707 S.E.2d at 57, this would be a much
different case. Cf. United States v. Dougherty, 810 F.2d 763,
768 (8th Cir. 1987) (a curative instruction that adequately identi-
fied the prosecutor’s improper comment during opening statement
and instructed the jury to disregard it was sufficient to mitigate
prejudice); but see Washington, 434 U.S. at 513 (instructing the
jury to disregard an improper opening statement “‘will not neces-
sarily remove the risk of bias that may be created by improper ar-
gument’’). But here, the court had already deemed the slide se-
quence permissible. Hence, the slides remained up and no
instruction to disregard them was given. And the presumption-of-
innocence instructions the jury received had no connection to the
booking-photo slide sequence. Watters’s principal defense was that
he was not the man who stole the cars, just someone the police
happened to find who matched the suspect’s description whose
face had been bloodied, not by an airbag deploying, but by a po-
lice dog. Whether a reasonable jury would have found in Watters’s
favor based on this defense is not for this court to say. But the State
has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the booking-photo
slide sequence did not affect the jury’s determination of Watters’s
guilt. This requires that we reverse and remand this case for a new
trial.

Grsons, Harpesty, DoucLas, CHErry, and Sarria, JJ.,
concur.

PARRAGUIRRE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result only.

894

MICHAEL A. CARRIGAN, FourtH Warp City CouNcIL
MEMBER OF THE CITy OF SPARKS, APPELLANT, v. THE COM-
MISSION ON ETHICS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
RESPONDENT.

No. 51920

November 27, 2013 313 P.3d 880

Griffin, Rowe & Nave LLP and John W. Griffin and Matthew M.
Griffin, Reno; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP and Rachel M.
McKenzie and Mark S. Davies, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.

Nevada Commission on Ethics and Yvonne M. Nevarez-Goodson,
Carson City; Vinson & Elkins, LLP, and Jeremy C. Marwell,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANC.!

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

This case returns to us from the United States Supreme Court,
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117 (2011), which
reversed our decision in Carrigan v. Comm’n on Ethics, 126 Nev.
277, 236 P.3d 616 (2010) (5-1). Where we held that Sparks City
Councilman Michael Carrigan’s vote on the Lazy 8 hotel/casino
project constituted protected speech under the First Amendment,
126 Nev. at 284, 236 P.3d at 621, the Supreme Court held the op-
posite. 564 U.S. at 121. ‘‘[T]he act of voting’’ by an elected offi-

‘After oral argument, THE HONORABLE ALLAN R. EarL, Judge of the Eighth
Judicial District Court, was designated by the Governor to sit in place of THE
HONoRABLE RON D. PARRAGUIRRE, Justice, who voluntarily recused himself.
Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4.

en

cial on a local land-use matter, the Supreme Court held, ‘‘sym-
bolizes nothing’; it is ‘‘“nonsymbolic conduct engaged in for an in-
dependent governmental purpose.” Id. at 126-27. Since Carrigan’s
vote on the Lazy 8 project did not constitute protected speech, the
Supreme Court reversed our decision that the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine invalidated the conflict-of-interest recusal pro-
vision in Nevada’s Ethics in Government Law. Id.

On remand, Carrigan makes two additional arguments. First, he
contends that the conflict-of-interest recusal provision in Nevada’s
Ethics in Government Law is unconstitutionally vague, violating
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;
second, that it unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment
freedom-of-association rights shared by Nevada’s elected officials
and their supporters. Because Carrigan did not raise these argu-
ments in his brief in opposition to the Commission’s petition for a
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court did not address them. 564
U.S. at 128-29. We do so now.

L
A.

This proceeding challenges the constitutional validity of NRS
281A.420(2)(c) and NRS 281A.420(8), the core conflict-of-
interest recusal provisions in Nevada’s Ethics in Government Law.?
The lead-in section to the Ethics Law reminds us that ‘‘[a] public
office is a public trust and shall be held for the sole benefit of the
people.’ NRS 281A.020(1)(a). And it emphasizes that an elected
public officer ‘‘must commit himself to avoid conflicts between his
private interests and those of the general public whom he serves.”’
NRS 281A.020(1)(b).

NRS 281A.420(2)(c) prohibits public officers from voting on
matters as to which they have a conflict of interest. It states that ‘‘a
public officer shall not vote upon. . . a matter with respect to
which the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in his
situation would be materially affected by,’ inter alia, ‘‘[h]is com-
mitment in a private capacity to the interests of others.’ A dis-
qualifying ‘‘commitment in a private capacity to the interests of
others’? means a ‘‘commitment to a person’’ who is a member of
the officer’s household; is related to the officer by blood, adoption,
or marriage; employs the officer or a member of his household; or
has a substantial and continuing business relationship with the of-

*Jo maintain consistency with prior opinions, all citations are to the 2007
version of the Nevada Ethics in Government Act. 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 538. Al-
though the Act was amended in 2009 and 2013, the amendments are not rel-
evant here.

897

ficer. NRS 281A.420(8)(a)-(d). Paragraph (e) adds a loophole-
closing catchall: ‘Any other commitment or relationship that is
substantially similar’’ to one of those listed in the preceding para-
graphs (a)-(d).

The Ethics in Government Law offers an advisory opinion op-
tion. Under NRS 281A.440(1), a public officer may request and
receive an Ethics Commission opinion regarding ‘‘the propriety of
his own past, present or future conduct as an officer,’ including,
specifically, whether a conflict of interest exists that requires the
officer to abstain from voting on a matter, NRS 281A.460. The
Ethics Commission must render an advisory opinion ‘‘as soon as
practicable or within 45 days after receiving a request, whichever
is sooner’’ NRS 281A.440(1). The request is confidential, NRS
281A.440(5), and the advisory opinion final and authoritative.
See NRS 281A.440(1).

Nevada’s Ethics Law distinguishes between willful and nonwill-
ful violations. The distinction does not affect the determination
of whether a violation has occurred, only the sanction to be im-
posed. If the Commission deems the violation willful, it “‘may’’
but is not required to ‘‘impose . . . civil penalties’? of up to
$5,000 for a first violation, together with attorney fees and costs,
NRS 281A.480(1) & (2) (emphasis added). If the Commission be-
lieves the violation may also constitute a crime, it must refer the
matter to the Attorney General or the district attorney ‘‘for a de-
termination of whether a crime has been committed that warrants
prosecution.’ NRS 281A.480(7).

NRS 281A.170 defines ‘‘[w]illful violation’’ to mean ‘‘the pub-
lic officer or employee knew or reasonably should have known that
his conduct violated’’ the Ethics Law. By law, the Commission
cannot deem a violation willful if the public officer

. . . establishes by sufficient evidence that he satisfied all of
the following requirements:

(a) He relied in good faith upon the advice of the legal
counsel retained by the public body which the public officer
represents . . . ;

(b) He was unable, through no fault of his own, to obtain
an opinion from the Commission before the action was taken;
and

(c) He took action that was not contrary to a prior pub-
lished opinion issued by the Commission.

NRS 281A.480(5).

B.

The Ethics Commission censured Sparks City Councilman
Michael Carrigan for voting to approve the Lazy 8 hotel/casino

0

project despite a disqualifying conflict of interest. The conflict of
interest grew out of Carrigan’s relationship with Carlos Vasquez,
Carrigan’s longtime friend and campaign manager. For the six
months leading up to the Lazy 8 vote, Vasquez was managing Car-
rigan’s reelection campaign free of charge—the third such cam-
paign Vasquez had managed for Carrigan—and placing Carrigan’s
campaign ads at cost. At the same time, Vasquez was receiving a
$10,000-a-month retainer from the Lazy 8’s principals, Red Hawk
Land Company and/or Harvey Whittemore. Vasquez openly lob-
bied the Sparks City Council to approve the Lazy 8 project and
testified before the body as a paid consultant.

Several citizens complained to the Commission that Carrigan
should not have voted on the Lazy 8 project because of a conflict
of interest. An evidentiary hearing followed, at which both Carri-
gan and Vasquez testified. After deliberation, the Commission
issued a written opinion, which included findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Commission’s findings of fact included
findings that Vasquez ‘‘has been a close personal friend, confidant
and political advisor’? to Carrigan “‘throughout the years’’; that
Carrigan “‘confides in Mr. Vasquez on matters where he would not
confide in his own sibling’; and that ‘‘[t]he sum total of their
commitment and relationship equates to a ‘substantially similar’ re-
lationship to those enumerated under NRS [281A.420(8)(a)-(d)],
including a close personal friendship, akin to a. . . family mem-
ber, and a ‘substantial and continuing business relationship. ’’ See
NRS 281A.420(8)(e).

In its conclusions of law, the Commission opined that ‘‘com-
mitment in a private capacity to the interests of others?’ NRS
281A.420(2)(c), includes ‘‘close relationships which rise to such a
level of commitment to another person’s interest that the inde-
pendence of judgment of a reasonable person in the public officer’s
position would be affected.’ In the Commission’s view, ‘‘[iJnde-
pendence of judgment means a judgment that is unaffected by that
commitment or relationship.”” NRS 281A.420(2)(c)’s recusal re-
quirement, the Commission emphasized, is an objective, ‘‘reason-
able person’’ standard. Regardless of Carrigan’s subjective belief
that he was unbiased, ‘‘[a] reasonable person in Councilman Car-
rigan’s position would not be able to remain objective on matters
brought before the Council by his close personal friend, confidant
and campaign manager, who was instrumental in getting Council-
man Carrigan elected three times.’’ “‘[U]nder such circumstances,”
the Commission wrote, ‘‘a reasonable person would undoubtedly
have such strong loyalties to this close friend, confidant and cam-
paign manager as to materially affect the reasonable person’s in-
dependence of judgment’’ on the Lazy 8 hotel/casino project.

899

Carrigan attempted to raise an ‘‘advice of counsel’’ defense be-
fore the Commission. Thus, he testified that the Sparks City At-
torney advised him that his relationship with Vasquez did not cre-
ate a disqualifying conflict of interest because he, Carrigan, did not
personally stand to reap financial gain or loss from the Lazy 8
project. Carrigan admitted that, before he voted on the Lazy 8
project, he knew he could have asked the Commission for an ad-
visory opinion—and that he had ample time to do so—but chose
not to.

The Commission unanimously found that Carrigan violated NRS
281A.420(2)(c) by not abstaining from voting on the Lazy 8 mat-
ter. While it publicly censured him, it imposed no civil penalty or
fine because it deemed his violation not willful.

OL.
A.
mz

We first consider—and reject—Carrigan’s contention that NRS
281A.420(2)(c)’s recusal provision is void for vagueness where, as
in his case, the disqualifying ‘‘commitment in a private capacity to
the interests of others’’ is based on NRS 281A.420(8)(e)’s ‘‘sub-
stantially similar’ provision, rather than one of the four relation-
ships specified in NRS 281A.420(8)(a)-(d).

Le

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. State v. Cas-
taneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550, 553 (2010). A law may
be struck down as impermissibly vague for either of two inde-
pendent reasons: ‘‘(1) if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary in-
telligence fair notice of what is prohibited’; or (2) if it ‘is so stan-
dardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.’ ”’ Id. at 481-82, 245 P.3d at 553 (quoting Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010)). ‘‘The degree
of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative
importance of fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on
the nature of the enactment.’’ Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). Civil laws are
held to a less strict vagueness standard than criminal laws “‘be-
cause the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less se-
vere.’’ Id, at 498-99, Even so, when a statute ‘‘interferes with the
right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness
test’’ applies. Jd. at 499.

Carrigan’s vagueness challenge focuses on language culled from
this court’s prior opinion, rather than statutory text as applied to

00

the facts of his case. This leads his analysis astray. In the first
place, our prior opinion rested on the First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine. Unlike overbreadth challenges, ‘‘a Fifth Amend-
ment vagueness challenge does not turn on whether a law applies
to a substantial amount of protected expression.’ Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. at 20. Second, our prior opinion held that
Carrigan’s vote on the Lazy 8 project constituted protected speech
under the First Amendment—a proposition the Supreme Court
unanimously rejected. Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 121. While laws
that ‘‘touch upon ‘sensitive areas of basic First Amendment free-
doms’’’ may raise ‘‘‘special’’’ vagueness concerns because of
their “‘ ‘obvious chilling effect, ’’ FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997)), the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
Carrigan’s vote on the Lazy 8 did not constitute protected speech
dispels such ‘‘special’’ vagueness concerns. Thus, we analyze
Carrigan’s vagueness challenge under the relaxed standards appro-
priate to a due process challenge to a civil statute not affecting the
challenger’s First Amendment freedoms.

Carrigan acknowledges that the four enumerated bases for re-
cusal in NRS 281A.420(8)(a)-(d) are clear. His claim is that NRS
281A.420(8)(e), which requires recusal for relationships ‘‘sub-
stantially similar’? to the four enumerated ones, is “‘hopelessly
vague.’’ But he incorrectly reads NRS 281A.420(8)(e) in isolation
from the rest of NRS 281A.420. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 65 (1st Cir. 2011) (‘“Terms claimed to be
vague must be interpreted in light of their precise statutory con-
text.”); Comm’n on Ethics v. Ballard, 120 Nev. 862, 866, 102 P.3d
544, 546 (2004) (this court interprets the ethics laws ‘‘in the con-
text of the entire statutory scheme’’).

NRS 281A.420(8)(e) is not free-standing. It draws meaning
from the rest of NRS 281A.420, which first explains when dis-
qualification is required (situations in which ‘‘the independence of
judgment of a reasonable person in [the public officer’s] situation
would be materially affected by . . . [h]is commitment in a private
capacity to the interests of others,’ NRS 281A.420(2)(c)); then
identifies the types of relationships that are disqualifying (house-
hold, family, employment, or business, NRS 281A.420(8)(a)-(d));
and finally, under those headings, provides for disqualification
based on “‘{a]ny other commitment or relationship that is substan-
tially similar’’ to those listed, NRS 281A.420(8)(e).

2We reject Carrigan’s First Amendment right of association argument infra
in section IL.B.

“Where general words follow an enumeration of two or more
things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general
kind or class specifically mentioned.’ Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199
(2012). Thus, paragraph 8(e) does not sweep in entirely new types
of relationships. Rather, it closes potential loopholes in the Ethics
Law by giving the Commission the flexibility to address relation-
ships that technically fall outside the four categories enumerated in
paragraphs 8(a)-(d) yet implicate the same concerns and are sub-
stantially similar to them, such as a relationship with a domestic
partner or fiancée.

The legislative history of NRS 281A.420(8)(e) confirms that it
encompasses the relationship between Carrigan and Vasquez. This
is evidenced by the testimony given by Scott Scherer, General
Counsel to Governor Guinn, during the 1999 legislative session.
To fall within NRS 281A.420(8)(e), Scherer testified, ‘‘it has to
actually be shown that the relationship is substantially similar to
one of the four other relationships listed, including a member of
one’s family, member of one’s household, an employment rela-
tionship, or a business relationship.’ Hearing on S.B. 478 Be-
fore the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm., 70th Leg. (Nev.,
April 7, 1999). When asked by Senator Titus how campaign man-
agers fit into the statute, Scherer stated that if “‘the same person
ran your campaign time, after time, after time, and you had a sub-
stantial and continuing relationship, yes, you probably ought to dis-
close and abstain in cases involving that particular person.”’ Hear-
ing on S.B. 540 Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm.,
70th Leg. (Nev., March 30, 1999) (discussing S.B. 478).

“There are limitations in the English language with respect
to being both specific and manageably brief’’ U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79
(1973). The Supreme Court’s opinion in this case examines the
history of recusal rules, dating back to 1791, and gives example
after example of provisions considerably less definite than NRS
281A.420(2)(c) and NRS 281.420(8) that nonetheless have with-
stood the test of time. Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 120-23. Given the
long common-law history of disqualifying local officials from vot-
ing on matters when they have conflicts of interest—a history that
offers no satisfactory, one-size-fits-all definition of “‘conflict of in-
terest’’—the statute could have ended with the general proscription
in NRS 281A.420(2)(c) and been unexceptionable. Id. at 122
(‘The Nevada Supreme Court and Carrigan have not cited a
single decision invalidating a generally applicable conflict-of-
interest rule—and such rules have been commonplace for over
200 years.”’); see 4 Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning

2

§ 38:2, at 38-5 (Sth ed. 2013) (while ‘‘[s]ome state statutes pro-
vide specific guidance as to what constitutes a conflict of interest
in the land use context . . . most states are silent on this issue
[while still others] simply provide a catch-all phrase stating that
even if the complained of conduct does not violate another specific
section of the law, where the conduct gives an ‘appearance of im-
propriety’ it may be prohibited’’); 2 Sandra M. Stevenson, Antieau
on Local Government § 25.08[1], at 25-43 (2d ed. 2012) (‘‘The
decision as to whether a particular interest is sufficient to disqual-
‘ify [a public official] is necessarily a factual one and depends on

. the circumstances of the particular case. No definitive test has been
devised.” (emphasis added)). We are disinclined to invalidate a
civil statute addressing conflicts of interest by public officials on
the grounds that, in some cases, it poses problems of application
that require case-by-case elaboration, in common law fashion. See
Vrijicak v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1060, 1063 (7th Cir. 2012).

| ree!

Carrigan’s claim that he did not have fair notice that he risked
censure under NRS 281A.420(2)(c) if he voted on the Lazy 8 proj-
ect, despite Vasquez’s dual role as paid lobbyist and campaign
manager and close friend, ignores the Ethics Law’s advisory opin-
ion option. ‘‘When a statute is accompanied by an administrative
system that can flesh out details, the due process clause permits
those details to be left to that system.’’ Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d
704, 716 (7th Cir. 2010). In rejecting a vagueness challenge to
parts of the Hatch Act in Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 580, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court deemed it ‘‘important . . . that the
Commission has established a procedure by which an employee in
doubt about the validity of a proposed course of conduct may seek
and obtain advice from the Commission and thereby remove any
doubt there may be as to the meaning of the law, at least insofar
as the Commission itself is concerned.’’ See Vill. of Hoffman Es-
tates, 455 U.S. at 498 (vagueness concerns diminish when the reg-
ulated person has ‘‘the ability to clarify the meaning of the
regulation . . . by resort to an administrative process’’); Groener
v. Or. Gov't Ethics Comm’n, 651 P.2d 736, 742-43 (Or. Ct. App.
1982) (upholding Oregon’s Ethics Law against vagueness challenge
and: noting that the ‘‘fair warning’’ test was satisfied by the statu-
tory procedure ‘‘by which a public official in doubt about the pro-
priety of proposed conduct may petition for and obtain the Com-
mission’s opinion, which is binding on the Commission as to that
petitioner’’ (citing Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 580)).

a
Vasquez was receiving a $10,000-a-month retainer from the
Lazy 8 project proponents. While lobbying for the project before

Pe

the Sparks City Council, Vasquez was simultaneously serving as
Carrigan’s campaign manager free of charge and placing media ads
for Carrigan at cost. Carrigan recognized the problem his rela-
tionship with Vasquez posed, and he testified that he knew that he
could ask the Ethics Commission for an advisory opinion on
whether it required him to abstain on the Lazy 8 project vote. And
as the district court expressly found, Carrigan had ‘‘ample time
and opportunity’’ to request an opinion from the Ethics Commis-
sion: NRS 281A.440(1) provides for the Commission to issue its
opinion as soon as practicable or within 45 days after receiving a
request; Vasquez “‘became . . . Carrigan’s [reelection] campaign
manager 6 months or more before the City Council meeting’’ at
which the Lazy 8 matter came to a vote.

Instead of requesting an opinion from the Commission, Carrigan
sought private advice from the Sparks City Attorney, who told him
he did not need to abstain. That Carrigan received mistaken legal
advice led the Commission to deem his violation nonwillful, jus-
tifying censure with no penalty or fine. But on this record, Carri-
gan cannot claim that he lacked fair notice that NRS
281A.420(2)(c) and NRS 281A.420(8)(e) could require his re-
cusal on the Lazy 8 matter.‘ While Carrigan may disagree with the
Commission’s interpretation of NRS 281A.420(2)(c)—preferring
the private legal advice he obtained—he in fact had notice of the

“The dissent argues that the Commission’s finding that Carrigan should not
be assessed a civil penalty because it deemed his violation “not willful’’ some-
how establishes that, as to him, the Ethics Law is unconstitutionally vague. Of
note, after years of briefing before the Commission, the district court, this
court, the Supreme Court, and again this court, Carrigan has never advanced
this argument. Cf. City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, L.L.C., 129
Nev. 1, 7 n.2, 293 P.3d 860, 864 n.2 (2013) (issue preclusion claim waived if
not timely raised). And with good reason: The Commission found that, viewed
objectively, Carrigan violated the Ethics Law. Thus, the Commission stated
that it declined to find a willful violation because Carrigan ‘‘reasonably relied
on his counsel’s advice, and because he did not consider his relationship with
Mr. Vasquez a relationship that falls under the statute.” Carrigan did not sub-
jectively mean to violate the law; he just relied on faulty legal advice from the
Sparks City Attorney. See also NRS 281A.170(5), reprinted supra section ILA
(the Commission may not deem a violation ‘‘willful”’ if the officer meets three
requirements, the first of which is that he ‘‘relied in good faith upon the ad-
vice of the legal counsel retained by the public body which the public officer
represents’’). However, the fact the Commission absolved Carrigan of willful-
ness even though NRS 281A.170(5) did not require it to do so does not excuse
the violation itself, much less constitute an admission by the Commission that
the conflict-of-interest recusal provision is unconstitutionally vague as to Car-
tigan. See United States v. Nasir, No. 5:12~CR-102-JMH, 2013 WL 5373625,
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2013) (rejecting vagueness challenge to the federal
Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act and noting that a defendant
who by his inquiries acknowledged that his activities fell ‘‘within a gray area
of legality’’ is hard-pressed to claim an unconstitutional lack of fair notice).

0

statute, its potential application to his vote on the Lazy 8 project,
and the Ethics Commission’s willingness to provide him a defini-
tive ruling in advance of the vote. Cf. United States v. Zhen Zhou
Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting claimed lack of
fair notice by challengers who had concerns about the law’s appli-
cation to them yet failed to pursue an available, official answer on
the matter).

Analyzed on an as-applied basis, see United States v. Jones, 689
E3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2012) (‘‘Vagueness challenges are nor-
mally evaluated in light of the particular facts of the case, not in
general.’’),> Carrigan’s claim that NRS 281A.420(2)(c) and NRS
281A.420(8)(e) are so lacking in standards as to authorize or en-
courage “‘ ‘seriously discriminatory enforcement, ’’ Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. at 18 (quoting United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)), also fails. Nothing in the record sug-
gests that the bipartisan Commission harbored an improper motive
or failed to sanction other similarly situated persons. On the con-
trary, the Commission evenhandedly sanctioned another council
member for his vote against the Lazy 8 project because of an
undisclosed business relationship with the Nugget, a competing
casino that opposed the Lazy 8. See In re Salerno, No. 08-05C
(Nev. Comm’n on Ethics, Dec. 2, 2008). And, as the Supreme
Court noted, the recusal statute Carrigan challenges is ‘‘content-
neutral and applies equally to all legislators regardless of party or
position.’ Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 125.

The recusal provisions in NRS 281A.420(2)(c) and NRS
281A.420(8)(e) use qualitative terms such as ‘reasonable’ and
“‘substantially similar.’’ Although terms of degree, these terms
are objective and do not require the kind of ‘‘untethered subjective
judgments’’—such as whether a defendant’s conduct was ‘‘annoy-
ing’’ or ‘‘indecent’’—that the Supreme Court has invalidated as
unconstitutionally vague. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at
20-21; Williams, 553 U.S. at 306. ‘‘[P]rotean words such as ‘rea-
sonable’ are ubiquitous in law. Think of the reasonable-person
standard in tort law’’ or ‘‘the phrase ‘good cause’ that peppers’’
the rules of civil procedure. Vrljicak, 700 F.3d at 1062. Objective
standards such as these may require case-by-case evaluation, but
they do not call for the wholly subjective, unreviewable judgments
that invite seriously discriminatory enforcement, in violation of the
due process clause. Id.

‘Although Carrigan insists that he ‘‘has raised both a facial and an as-
applied challenge,” be acknowledges that ‘“‘he is seeking only to set aside the
censure and that his claim and the relief that would follow accordingly apply
only to him.”’ (internal quotation marks omitted).

Pe
B.

On remand from the Supreme Court, Carrigan now argues, for
the first time,® that the Commission’s censure of him under NRS
281A.420(2)(c) and NRS 281A.420(8)(e) violates the First
Amendment right of association that Carrigan and his political sup-
porters share. This afterthought argument does not fit either the
facts or the statutory text. As a paid lobbyist, Vasquez had a pri-
vate, pecuniary interest in the Lazy 8 project, and Carrigan, the
Commission found, had a commitment in a private capacity to
Vasquez’s interests. If Carrigan’s wife were a lawyer whom the
Lazy 8 hired for $10,000 per month to advocate for it before the
Sparks City Council, Carrigan would have had to recuse. His
“commitment in a private capacity”’ to her private, pecuniary in-
terests would be disqualifying. From a right-of-association per-
spective, Carrigan’s disqualification based on Vasquez’s retention
is no different.

The recusal provisions expressly renounce association as the
basis for recusal. Thus, NRS 281A.420(2)(c) states the general
tule that a public officer shall not vote on ‘‘a matter with respect
to which the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in
his situation would be materially affected by . . . [h]is commit-
ment in a private capacity to the interests of others.’ But the
statute follows that rule with an exception: It presumes that ‘‘the
independence of judgment of a reasonable person would not be
materially affected by . . . his commitment in a private capacity to
the interest of others where the resulting benefit or detriment ac-
cruing to him or to the other persons whose interests to which the
member is committed in a private capacity is not greater than that
accruing to any other member of the general business, profession,
occupation or group”’ concerned. Jd. (emphases added). This pre-
sumption did not save Carrigan’s relationship with Vasquez from
requiring Carrigan’s recusal precisely because ‘‘the resulting ben-
efit or detriment accruing’ to Vasquez from the vote on the Lazy
8 project was greater than that accruing to other concerned citi-
zens, given the pecuniary benefit to Vasquez of his employment
by the Lazy 8 developers. The statute as applied to this case thus

‘Arguments not raised before the appropriate administrative tribunal and in
district court normally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Val-
ley Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist, Court, 127 Nev. 167, 173, 252
P3d 676, 679 (2011); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. 565, 571, 170
P.3d 989, 993 (2007). We have, on occasion, departed from this rule where,
as here, the issue presents a constitutional question that can be resolved as a
matter of law. See Levingston v. Washoe Cnty., 112 Nev. 479, 482-83, 916 P.2d
163, 166 (1996).

06

does not penalize ‘‘simple association or assembly,’ and the right-
of-association cases on which Carrigan relies are inapposite. Hu-
manitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.

NRS 281A.420 serves to ensure that its public officers ‘‘avoid
conflicts between [their] private interests and those of the general
public whom [they] serve[ ].’ NRS 281A.020(1)(b). Even accept-
ing arguendo that the recusal provision somehow burdens Carri-
gan’s associational rights, the burden is scant when compared to
the state’s important interest in avoiding conflicts of interest and
self-dealing by public officials entrusted with making decisions af-
fecting our citizens. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586-
87 (2005) (a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation that im-
poses an incidental burden on associational rights- is acceptable
when justified by a state’s important regulatory concerns).

We therefore affirm.

Gupsons, Harpesty, and Sarrta, JJ., and EArt, D.J., concur.

Douczas, J., with whom Curry, J., agrees, dissenting:

While I agree with parts of the majority’s opinion, I disagree
with their conclusion upholding the Commission’s censure of Car-
rigan for violating NRS 281A.420(2)(c) (2007) (amended 2009), in
light of the Commission’s additional finding that the violation was
not willful under NRS 281A.170 (2007) (amended 2009).

NRS 281A.420(2)(c) states that ‘. . . a public officer shall not
vote upon . . . a matter with respect to which the independence of
judgment of a reasonable person in his situation would be
materially affected by . . . [h]is commitment in a private capacity
to the interests of others.”’ In its decision, the Commission ex-
plained that ‘‘ ‘commitment in a private capacity to the interest of
others’ . . . contemplated close relationships which rise to such a
level of commitment to another person’s interests that the inde-
pendence of judgment of a reasonable person in the public officer’s
position would be affected.’’ Ultimately, the Commission found
that Carrigan had a commitment in a private capacity to the inter-
ests of Vasquez. Then, as the majority notes, in applying its inter-
pretation of NRS 281A.420(2)(c) to Carrigan, the Commission
found that “‘[a] reasonable person in Councilman Carrigan’s posi-
tion would not be able to remain objective’? under the citcum-
stances. Based on this reasoning, the Commission determined that
Carrigan violated NRS 281A.420(2)(c) by voting on the Lazy 8
matter.

The Ethics in Government statutory scheme also contains pro-
visions for the imposition of civil penalties based on willful viola-
tions of its provisions. See NRS 281A.480 (2007) (amended 2009).
In finding that Carrigan violated NRS 281A.420(2)(c), the Com-

eee

mission determined that no civil penalty would apply because Car-
rigan’s violation was not willful. Under the statute, the Commis-
sion could determine a violation was not willful based on two pro-
visions. First, an action by a public officer would not be a willful
violation if, inter alia, ‘‘[hJe was unable, through no fault of his
own, to obtain an opinion from the Commission before the action
was taken.’’ NRS 281A.480(5)(b) (2007). Here, as the majority
points out, and supported by the Commission’s decision, Carrigan
was aware that he could have sought an advisory opinion,' and he
had ample time to do so. Accordingly, the Commission’s determi-
nation that Carrigan’s violation was not willful could not be based
on NRS 281A.480(5).

The second potential statutory basis for determining Carrigan’s
violation was not willful is found in NRS 281A.170 (2007)
(amended 2009), which provides that ‘‘ ‘{w]illful violation’ means
the public officer or employee knew or reasonably should have
known that his conduct violated this chapter”’ Because NRS
281A.480(5) is precluded, the Commission’s determination must
arise from NRS 281A.170. Thus, the Commission made two rel-
evant conclusions: Carrigan violated NRS 281A.420(2)(c), and
that violation was not willful (knowingly) under NRS 281A.170.

As the majority indicates, a law is impermissibly vague ‘‘if it
‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited.’ ’’ State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245
P.3d 550, 553 (2010). Here, in determining that Carrigan’s viola-
tion was not willful, the Commission inescapably concluded that
he did not know and should not have reasonably known that his
conduct would violate NRS 281A.420(2)(c). In this lies the dis-
positive contradiction: the Constitution requires that laws be of a
nature that a person reasonably should know what is prohibited;
yet, here, the Commission concluded that Carrigan should not have
reasonably known that his conduct was prohibited. Thus, the Com-
mission’s determination that Carrigan did not willfully violate the
statute equates to a legal conclusion that NRS 281A.420(2)(c) is
vague as applied to Carrigan. Accordingly, this court should vacate
the Commission’s censure of Carrigan.”

‘It should be noted that, although Carrigan did not obtain an advisory opin-
ion from the Commission, he did obtain one from the Sparks City Attorney.

?Note that the provision defining ‘‘willful violation’ was amended in 2009,
presumably to avoid this inherent contradiction—a problem that would neces-
sarily arise in each Commission decision finding a nonwillful violation under
the 2007 language of the statute. The fact that the Commission was forced to
work with imperfect language is of no importance. However, it is of great im-
portance that this court considers Carrigan’s as-applied challenge with the ut-
most fidelity to the statute’s plain language, even when its natural import is
problematic under the circumstances.

908

The majority opinion does not directly address the ‘fair notice”
test for vagueness as it relates to the aforementioned contradiction
and Carrigan’s as-applied challenge. While acknowledging that
the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that an advisory opinion
option diminishes vagueness concerns, here, the majority treats it

* as though it disposes of them entirely.* This eager embrace of a
new idea seems premature given the unique context here and
should be tempered to a salutatory handshake. However, the ma-
jority concludes that, under the circumstances, any vagueness
problems are cured by the statute’s advisory opinion option found
in NRS 281A.440(1) (2007) (amended 2009).

While the advisory opinion option might lend support to the ma-
jority’s conclusion that the challenged statutory provisions are not
facially vague, it is clearly insufficient to quell Carrigan’s as-
applied challenge. Here, the Commission made a finding that Car-
rigan knew about the advisory opinion option. Despite this, the
Commission still found that Carrigan’s violation was not willful
and that he did not know and should not have reasonably known
that his conduct would violate NRS 281A.420(2)(c). The majority
reasons that, because Carrigan had notice of the statute, of its po-
tential application, and of the ability to obtain an advisory opinion,
he had fair notice of what was prohibited at law. This determina-
tion runs directly against the Commission’s conclusion that Carri-
gan’s violation was not willful. The anomaly recognized in this
opinion cannot justifiably be ignored or overcome. For these rea-
sons, I dissent in part and believe that the Commission’s censure
of Carrigan should be vacated.

°The U.S. Supreme Court opinion referenced only peripherally addresses
the impact of an advisory opinion option and does so only in the context of
economic regulation. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). The impact of adopting a similar conclusion
in the political context might merit an independent analysis considering the po-
tential restraint it imposes on elected officials in their representative capacity.

909

COUNTY OF CLARK, NEVADA, AND MARK SCHOFIELD, In
His OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLARK COUNTY ASSESSOR, APPEL-
LANTS, v. LB PROPERTIES, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORA-
TION, RESPONDENT.

No. 57082

December 12, 2013 315 P.3d 294

Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Paul D. Johnson,
Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellants.

Lionel Sawyer & Collins and William J. McKean, Reno; Frazer
Ryan Goldberg & Arnold LLP and Douglas S. John, Phoenix,
Arizona, for Respondent.

Before the Court EN BANC.
OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, C.J.:

In this appeal we consider whether a regulation promulgated by
the Nevada Tax Commission to value remainder parcels of real
property for tax abatement purposes applies retroactively.

1

In 2005, the Legislature enacted NRS 361.4722, which caps
real property taxes by providing partial tax abatements calculated
with reference to assessed valuations for the preceding fiscal year
on, as relevant here, remainder parcels of real property.? The
abatement statute generally requires a remainder parcel’s prior-year
assessed valuation to be determined as if it ‘“‘had been separately
established for that property for that prior fiscal year based upon
all the assumptions, costs, values, calculations and other factors
and considerations that would have been used for the valuation of
that property for that prior fiscal year.’ NRS 361.4722(2)(a)(1).
The Legislature did not provide additional specifics. Instead, it del-
egated authority to the Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) to adopt

"We originally resolved this appeal in a nonprecedential order of reversal.
Appellant filed a motion to publish the order as an opinion. We grant the mo-
tion and replace our earlier order with this opinion. See NRAP 36(().

2« (RJemainder parcel of real property’ means a parcel of real property
which remains after the creation of new parcels of real property for develop-
ment from one or more existing parcels of real property, if the use of that re-
maining parcel has not changed from the immediately preceding fiscal year.”
NRS 361.4722(6).

ee

implementing regulations. See NRS 361.4722(5) (‘‘The Nevada
Tax Commission shall adopt such regulations as it deems appro-
priate to ensure that this section is carried out in a uniform and
equal manner.’’).

Exercising its delegated authority, the NTC promulgated NAC
361.61038, effective March 23, 2007, which sets forth an appor-
tionment formula for calculating remainder-parcel property values
for purposes of NRS 361.4722. Both the regulation’s valuation
method and the assessor’s prior approach are complex, but they
can be summarized as follows: The regulation adopts an appor-
tionment formula and calculates taxable value by determining the
percent of value the smaller parcel contributed to the larger parcel
during the fiscal year, thus assigning a pro-rata share to the re-
mainder parcel. The assessor’s prior approach had been to deter-
mine taxable value by calculating what the property would have
been worth had it existed as a separate piece of land during the rel-
evant tax year, and included consideration of factors such as size,
shape, topography, and the value of comparable parcels.

The parcel at issue is owned by respondent LB Properties, Inc.
It was divided from a larger piece of land before the regulation’s
enactment and, the parties concede, is properly characterized as a
“‘remainder parcel’? under NRS 361.4722(6), reprinted supra note
2. Appellant, the Clark County Assessor, valued the land under the
multifactored approach he used before NAC 361.61038 was en-
acted. Seeking application of the new regulation’s apportionment
formula, LB Properties appealed to the NTC. The NTC assigned
an administrative law judge to the case, who determined that NAC
361.61038 should apply. The NTC disagreed. It upheld the As-
sessor’s valuation and declined to apply its new regulation retroac-
tively. LB Properties petitioned for judicial review. The district
court reversed the NTC and directed it to apply NAC 361.61038 to
LB Properties’ remainder parcel.

I.

[|

The parties primarily dispute whether NAC 361.61038 applies
retroactively and, if so, whether it conflicts with the Nevada Con-
stitution, Article 10, Section 1, and is void as a result.? Because
the regulation does not apply retroactively, this court need not
reach the Assessor’s challenge to its constitutionality. We also re-
ject LB Properties’ constitutional challenge to the Assessor’s pre-
regulation, multifactor approach.

2Article 10, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution declares that “[t]he Leg-
islature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of all property, real, personal and possessory.””

A.

P|

“Retroactivity is not favored in the law.’ Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Thus, regulations gener-
ally only operate prospectively “‘unless an intent to apply them
retroactively is clearly manifested.’ State ex rel. State Bd. of
Equalization v. Barta, 124 Nev. 612, 622, 188 P.3d 1092, 1099
(2008); accord Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208 (statutory ‘‘enactments
and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result’’).

Le

There are two types of regulations: legislative and interpretive.
Fmali Herb, Inc. v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983).
Interpretive regulations construe, but do not expand upon, the
terms of a statute. Legislative regulations, by contrast, are adopted
under power delegated by the Legislature to an agency and estab-
lish substantive rules that create standards of conduct and impose
new rights or duties. See, e.g., Jerri’s Ceramic Arts, Inc. v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 874 F.2d 205, 207 (4th Cir. 1989)
(“{A] substantive or legislative rule, pursuant to properly dele-
gated authority, has the force of law, and creates new law or im-
poses new rights or duties.’’); Slippery Rock Area Sch. Dist. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 983 A.2d 1231, 1236 (Pa.
2009) (‘‘[A] legislative regulation establishes ‘a substantive rule
creating a controlling standard of conduct.’”’ (quoting Borough of
Pottstown v. Pa. Mun. Ret. Bd., 712 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1998))).

Ye .

Despite the general rule against retroactivity, if a regulation is a
first-time interpretive regulation, application to preexisting issues
may be permissible. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 744 0.3 (1996). Thus, in Smiley, the Supreme Court ap-
proved application of an interpretive regulation that clarified an
ambiguity the Legislature left for the agency to resolve, namely the
definition of ‘‘interest.’ Id. at 740-41. Compare Pauly v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 348 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
first-time interpretive regulations are not generally retroactive and
where the new regulation is an explicit break from prior practice
or the agency has expressly stated application would be impermis-
sibly retroactive, it may not be retroactively applied), with Pope v.
Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an agency
pronouncement that ‘‘simply clarif[ies] an unsettled or confusing
area of the law . . . does not change the Jaw’’ and hence may be
applied without having impermissible retroactive effect), overruled
on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.
1999).

ee

LB Properties argues that NAC 361.61038 constitutes an inter-
pretive regulation that should be accorded retroactive effect. We
cannot agree. NAC 361.61038 was promulgated by the NTC at the
express direction of the Legislature in NRS 361.4722(5). It estab-
lishes a substantive rule for assessing and valuing remainder prop-
erties; it does not merely construe the meaning of the statute.
Thus, NAC 361.61038 is legislative, not interpretive. NAC
361.61038’s apportionment formula for valuing remainder parcels
represents an explicit break from the approach taken by the As-
sessor, which, in the absence of the regulation, considered gener-
ally applicable factors such as land size and shape and looked
at the separate value of the individual piece. Finally, NRS
361.4722(5) does not authorize, and NAC 361.61038 does not pro-
vide for, retroactive application. Indeed, the NTC ruled against LB
Properties’ contention that NAC 361.61038—a regulation that the
NTC itself promulgated—applies to this matter.

Because NAC 361.61038 was not enacted until 2007 and the
valuation at issue occurred prior to that time, application of the
regulation would be impermissibly retroactive. The district court
therefore erred by ordering the NTC to follow the administrative
Jaw judge’s initial recommendation and value the land according to
the apportionment formula set forth in the regulation.

B.

In the absence of an applicable regulatory method of assessment,
the question becomes whether the method the Assessor used was
proper or whether it was itself in violation of Nevada law.

LB Properties argues that the Assessor’s valuation method vio-
lated the holdings in Barta and State ex rel. State Board of Equal-
ization v. Bakst, 122 Nev. 1403, 148 P.3d 717 (2006), because it
was an ‘‘ad hoc standard’ rather than a method formally promul-
gated by the agency. The district court determined, without analy-
sis, that the Assessor’s method of calculation was in violation of
Bakst. We disagree, because the pre-2007 method does not inher-
ently lend itself to inconsistent application.

Bakst and Barta dealt with a county assessor’s authority under
NRS 361.260 to substantially deviate from statutorily mandated
methods of assessing land. See Bakst, 122 Nev. at 1414-15, 148
P.3d at 725; Barta, 124 Nev. at 620-21, 188 P.3d at 1098. In
Bakst, the assessor used a unique method to adjust property val-
ues—one not consistent with others used throughout the state. 122
Nev. at 1406, 1411, 1414, 1416, 148 P.3d at 719, 722-23, 725-26.
In deeming the assessor’s methods unconstitutional, this court
held that our Constitution requires ‘‘that the methods used for as-
sessing taxes throughout the state must be uniform.’ Jd. at 1413,

PO

148 P.3d at 724 (internal quotations omitted); see also Barta, 124
Nev. at 624, 188 P.3d at 1100 (citing Bakst and stating that ‘‘meth-
ods used to value taxpayers’ properties play a material role in en-
suring that the constitutional guarantee of a uniform and equal rate
of assessment’ exist in property valuations).

But Bakst and Barta also recognize that the wide and varied dif-
ferences in each property make it impossible to devise an ab-
solute formula to determine value. Bakst, 122 Nev. at 1412, 148
P.3d at 723; see also Barta, 124 Nev. at 622, 188 P.3d at 1099
(upholding Bakst generally). Moreover, NRS 361.228(3) encour-
ages consideration of property attributes ‘‘such as zoning, location,
water rights, view and geographic features’’ in valuing a property,
suggesting that valuations should account for all relevant attrib-
utes—perhaps even where consideration of a particular attribute is
not codified by statute or regulation.

In contrast to Bakst and Barta, the record here supports the
conclusion that the Assessor’s method did not lead to unequal
taxation—to the contrary, both the administrative law judge and the
NTC recognized that it likely led to more equitable taxation than
did the method set forth in NAC 361.61038. Indeed, the Asses-
sor’s method appears to be the one generally used prior to the
regulation’s enactment and appears in harmony with NRS
361.4722(2)(a)(1). Neither Bakst nor Barta states that only formal
regulations may establish methods for assessing value. Since the
Assessor’s approach did not conflict with existing statute or prac-
tice, we conclude that the Assessor’s methods did not violate the
Constitution.

‘We therefore reverse.

GipBons, HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS, CHERRY, and
Sarrta, JJ., concur.

Po 915

IN THE MATTER OF THE MICHAEL ABOUD AND BETTY JO
ABOUD INTER VIVOS TRUST DATED JANUARY 5,
1979, AS AMENDED.

LC.A.N. FOODS, INC.; KENDALL SWENSEN, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BETTY JO ABOUD;
AND DAVID BRAHEEM ABOUD, APPELLANTS, v.
MICHELLE RAE ABOUD SHEPPARD anp MICHAEL
ABOUD, RESPONDENTS.

MICHELLE RAE ABOUD SHEPPARD, Cross-APPELLANT,
v. I.C.A.N. FOODS, INC.; KENDALL SWENSEN,
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
BETTY JO ABOUD; anp DAVID BRAHEEM ABOUD,
Cross-RESPONDENTS.

No. 55303
December 19, 2013 314 P.3d 941

[Rehearing denied February 26, 2014]

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg and Tiffinay B. Pagni, Robert L.
Eisenberg, and Douglas R. Brown, Reno, for Appellants/
Cross-Respondents.

J. Douglas Clark Attorney at Law, Ltd., and J. Douglas Clark,
Reno, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant Michelle Rae Aboud
Sheppard.

Michael Aboud, Sun Valley, in Proper Person.

Before PICKERING, C.J., HARDESTY and Sairta, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, Harpesty, J.:

This appeal and cross-appeal concern trust property that was
transferred from the trust to a limited partnership for consideration
and by consent of all of the trust beneficiaries. Subsequently, the
partnership transferred the property to a third-party business. We
must now determine whether the in rem jurisdiction over trust as-
sets conferred upon a district court by NRS 164.010(1) and NRS
164.015(6) permits that court to impose a constructive trust on this
previous trust property based on the alleged improper transfer
made by the partnership to the third party. We also must address
whether the district court erred by entering a personal monetary
judgment against the former trustee and the third party holding for-
mer trust assets based on the district court’s in rem jurisdiction.

Because in rem jurisdiction only extends to property and the dis-
puted assets were no longer trust property after they were trans-
ferred to the limited partnership, we conclude that NRS 164.010(1)
and NRS 164.015(6) did not confer jurisdiction upon the district
court to enter a constructive trust on those assets and a personal
monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party com-
pany. Because the claims against the former trustee arose from al-
leged breaches of fiduciary duties to the limited partnership and
not to the trust, the district court erred by entering a personal judg-
ment against the former trustee in a trust accounting action.

FACTS

In 1979, Betty Jo and Michael Aboud, a married couple, created
an inter vivos trust, which they amended in 1983 and again in

Po 917

1993. The inter vivos trust’s assets consisted of various real prop-
erty and a restaurant known as The Griddle.

Michael Aboud died in 1998, and, pursuant to the trust’s terms,
the trust assets were divided and distributed into a survivor's
trust and an irrevocable residual trust. The residual trust named
as beneficiaries the couple’s four adult children: appellant/
cross-respondent David Braheem Aboud, respondent Michael J.
Aboud, respondent/cross-appellant Michelle Rae Aboud Sheppard,
and Robin Maureen Aboud Gonzales.' Betty Jo and Michael Shep-
pard, Michelle’s husband, were the successor co-trustees of both
trusts.

On the advice of estate planning counsel, Betty Jo and the
Aboud children created the Aboud Family Partners Limited Part-
nership in 1999. Its primary purpose was to own, develop, lease,
manage, and sell real property. The partnership agreement named
Betty Jo, Michael Sheppard, and the survivor’s trust as general
partners. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the general part-
ners had exclusive authority to transfer and control the partnership
assets. The residual trust and the other Aboud family members,
including Michelle, were limited partners who did not have the
right to participate in partnership business. Notably, the partnership
agreement also contained a clause requiring binding arbitration
for “‘[aJny controversy or claim arising under this Partnership
Agreement.”

In December 2000, Betty Jo and Michael Sheppard, as co-
trustees of both the survivor’s trust and the residual trust, trans-
ferred all of the trusts’ assets to the partnership, including
The Griddle restaurant. In exchange for the transfer, the residual
trust received a 49.18% share in the partnership, and the sur-
vivor’s trust received a 28.62% interest in the partnership. All of
the beneficiaries to the trusts, including Michelle, consented to this
transaction.

In 2001, Michael Sheppard resigned as co-trustee of the trusts
and as general partner of the partnership. The partnership agree-
ment was amended to name Betty Jo and the survivor’s trust as
general partners with the ability to control the partnership assets.

In September 2005, Betty Jo, acting as general partner both in-
dividually and as successor trustee of the survivor’s trust, trans-
ferred all of the Aboud Family Partners Limited Partnership’s as-
sets, with the exception of The Griddle restaurant, to I.C.A.N., a
Nevada corporation formed by David Aboud, who was the sole
shareholder. I.C.A.N. Foods, Inc., paid for the assets by executing
two promissory notes and David’s renunciation of his beneficial in-
terest in the residual trust. The transfer occurred without the

‘Robin Maureen Aboud Gonzales is not a party to this appeal.

ars es

knowledge or consent of the remaining residual trust beneficiaries.
That same year, Betty Jo, again acting as general partner, also
transferred The Griddle from the partnership to I.C.A.N. for no
monetary consideration.

In 2006, Betty Jo resigned as trustee of the residual trust and
Ashley Hickey, David’s girlfriend, became the sole successor
trustee. Shortly thereafter, Michelle filed a petition in the district
court requesting that the court assume jurisdiction of the residual
trust and require Ashley to perform an accounting of trust assets.
The district court assumed jurisdiction of the trust and ordered an.
accounting. Ashley performed an accounting for the trust for 1999
through 2005, noting that the transactions occurred before she be-
came successor trustee.

After Ashley performed the accounting, Michelle filed a petition
to remove Ashley as trustee on the grounds that Ashley did
not properly perform the accounting, had a conflict of interest, and
had breached her fiduciary duties to the trust by engaging in self-
dealing. Michelle sought to have Michael Sheppard appointed as
trustee and for Michael Sheppard to perform an accounting. In re-
sponse, Ashley argued that Betty Jo, not Ashley, was trustee dur-
ing the time period in which Michelle claims that the alleged self-
dealing occurred. Michelle acknowledged this fact in her response
and alleged that Betty Jo may have breached her fiduciary duties to
the residual trust by failing to properly account for trust property.

Before the district court ruled on this motion, Michelle filed an-
other motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a prelim-
inary injunction to protect the residual trust’s assets. She argued
that Ashley had also allegedly breached her fiduciary duty to the
trust by failing to disclose that I.C.A.N. had recently used some of
the former partnership assets to secure a loan. Michelle requested
that the district court freeze both the trust assets and the partner-
ship assets, remove Ashley as trustee, audit the residual trust’s fi-
nances, and impose a preliminary injunction.

In Ashley’s opposition, she argued that Michelle, ‘‘as a limited
partner, simply has no grounds for seeking judicial review’’ of
Betty Jo’s decision as general partner to transfer The Griddle to
.C.A.N. because the terms of the partnership agreement prohib-
ited limited partners from participating in partnership affairs. Ash-
ley further argued that Michelle was clearly attempting to seek ju-
dicial review of Betty Jo’s business decision and that Michelle
“may be seeking to avoid the arbitration provisions of the part-
nership agreement by styling her action as a trust case.’’ Betty Jo
joined in this opposition. In response, Michelle argued that Betty
Jo owed a fiduciary duty to the residual trust because the residual
trust was a limited partner in the Aboud Family Partners Limited
Partnership.

PO 919

At the hearing on this motion, the district court noted that it had
statutory authority to order an accounting of trust assets. Thus, it
entered a preliminary injunction. In relevant part, the district court
enjoined Ashley, Betty Jo, and David from transferring, encum-
bering, or releasing trust assets. The district court also ordered
Betty Jo to provide a summary accounting of the partnership.

Following the injunction, Michelle filed a motion for summary
judgment that sought removal of Ashley as trustee, appointment of
Michael Sheppard as successor trustee, and for a constructive trust
to be placed on all of the partnership assets that were transferred
to I.C.A.N. until the court could ascertain the amount of money
owed to the residual trust. The district court granted Michelle’s
motion for summary judgment, in part, suspending Ashley as suc-
cessor trustee and appointing Barry Solomon as an independent
successor trustee.” It also ordered Solomon to perform an ac-
counting of the trust.

Solomon’s initial accounting report concluded that Betty Jo had
breached her fiduciary duties to the partnership because the sale of
the partnership assets to I.C.A.N. was undervalued and unreason-
able. In response, Betty Jo, David, and Ashley each filed a proper
person objection to the report. Conversely, Michelle, without fil-
ing a complaint or serving a summons, filed a motion in support
of Solomon’s report, in which she argued that Betty Jo, Ashley,
and David had all breached their fiduciary duties. She also
requested that the district court: (1) remove Betty Jo as general
partner of the partnership, to be replaced by Solomon; (2) remove
Ashley as trustee, to be replaced by Solomon; (3) transfer the part-
nership assets and The Griddle back to the partnership; (4) cancel
the promissory notes executed by I.C.A.N. to the partnership in
exchange for the partnership assets; (5) charge I.C.A.N., Betty Jo,
David, and Ashley for the difference between the debt owed to the
partnership before the sale of the partnership assets to I.C.A.N.
and the present debt against the assets; (6) surcharge I.C.A.N.,
Betty Jo, David, and Ashley for all sums found to be unaccounted
for; (7) charge I.C.A.N., Betty Jo, David, and Ashley for the costs
of obtaining an accounting and getting assets diverted from the
partnership to the trust; (8) authorize Solomon to continue his ac-
counting of the trust; and (9) retain jurisdiction to order more
charges against I.C.A.N., David, Betty Jo, and Ashley. ‘Michelle

2The parties do not argue, and therefore we do not address, whether
Michelle was the proper party to bring a claim against Betty Jo, David, and
LC.AN. after the district court appointed Solomon as the successor trustee.
‘See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 294 cmt. a (1959) (“‘[If a third person
commits a tort with respect to the trust property the trustee and not the bene-
ficiary is ordinarily the proper party to bring an action against the third
person.”).

920

mailed a copy of this pleading to Ashley, Betty Jo, and David, but
she did not mail a copy to I.C.A.N.

The district court held a hearing to review Solomon’s report. At
the conclusion of this hearing, the district court entered an order
in which it adopted, in relevant part, the report’s findings and con-
clusions. Thus, the district court implicitly determined that Betty
Jo breached her fiduciary duties to the partnership by transferring
the assets from the partnership to I.C.A.N. for unreasonable
terms. The district court also ordered I.C.A.N. and David to pay
delinquent property taxes on the real property that I1.C.A.N. had
purchased from the partnership, and for Solomon to complete his
accounting. A copy of this order was mailed to Ashley, Betty Jo,
and David, but not to I.C.A.N.

In Solomon’s second accounting report, he again determined
that Betty Jo breached her fiduciary duties to the partnership by
transferring The Griddle to I.C.A.N. for no monetary considera-
tion. Relying on his determination, Michelle requested, again
without the filing of a complaint or service of summons, that
Betty Jo, David, I.C.A.N., and Ashley be held jointly and sever-
ally liable for any monetary damage to the residual trust. She ar-
gued that Solomon’s report proved that Betty Jo had breached her
fiduciary duties by transferring The Griddle to I.C.A.N. for no
consideration, transferring partnership assets to I.C.A.N. for nom-
inal consideration, failing to keep adequate books and records of
the partnership, permitting I.C.A.N. to use The Griddle to secure
a loan, and failing to default I.C.A.N. for not paying property
taxes. At the hearing, the district court noted that while someone
had clearly breached his or her fiduciary duty, it was unclear who
was responsible and whether the parties were properly before the
district court.

Regardless, the district court entered judgment against Betty Jo
and I.C.A.N. that provided in relevant part as follows:

1. That Judgment hereby is entered in favor of Barry
Solomon, as Independent Successor Trustee of the Decedent’s
Trust of the Michael Aboud and Betty Jo Aboud Inter Vivos
Trust, against Betty Jo Aboud and I.C.A.N. Foods, Inc., a
Nevada corporation, jointly and severally, for the sum of
$782,078.98.

2. That a constructive trust hereby is imposed upon the assets
of I.C.A.N. Foods, Inc., a Nevada corporation, until the
judgment entered herein is paid in its entirety.

The district court based its judgment on its conclusion that
Betty Jo had breached her fiduciary duties as both general partner
of the Aboud Family Partners Limited Partnership and as trustee of
the residual trust by transferring The Griddle from the partnership

po 921

to L.C.A.N. for no monetary consideration, and by transferring the
remaining partnership assets to I.C.A.N. for nominal considera-
tion, without the knowledge or consent of the residual trust’s ben-
eficiaries. A copy of the district court’s order was mailed to both
Betty Jo and I.C.A.N. This was the first time anything in the un-
derlying litigation was mailed to I.C.A.N.

Betty Jo, David, and 1.C.A.N., now with counsel, filed a mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment, or in the alternative, for re-
lief from the judgment. They argued, in pertinent part, that the dis-
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the transfer of the
assets from the partnership to I.C.A.N. and disregarded the bind-
ing arbitration clause in the partnership agreement.> The district
court denied the motion. This appeal followed, and Michelle has
cross-appealed the district court’s order declining to hold David
jointly and severally liable for the monetary judgment.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the parties dispute whether the district court.had ju-
risdiction to impose a constructive trust on I.C.A.N.’s assets and
enter a judgment for money damages against Betty Jo and
1.C.A.N. individually. Michelle argues that NRS 164.010(1) and
NRS 164.015(6) conferred jurisdiction on the district court to
enter these judgments. We disagree.

P|

We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Baker v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 527, 531, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023 (2000). Ju-
risdiction can take the form of either in rem or in personam juris-
diction. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S.
440, 453 (2004). When a court has in rem jurisdiction, in per-
sonam jurisdiction is not necessary to enter a judgment. Jd. In rem
jurisdiction permits a court to enter judgment against specific
property; in contrast, in personam jurisdiction permits the district
court to enter judgment against a person. Chapman v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 129 Nev. 314, 318, 302 P.3d 1103, 1106
(2013).

NRS 164.010(1) confers in rem jurisdiction on the district court
over trust property in all trust administration actions. In addition,
NRS 164.015(6) provides that a district court’s order in a trust ad-
ministration action is “‘binding in rem upon the trust estate and
upon the interests of all beneficiaries.”

*The Aboud Family Partner’s Limited Partnership’s agreement required
that ‘‘[alny controversy or claim arising under this Partnership Agree-
ment . . . shall be determined and settled by arbitration.” Betty Jo argues that
the district court failed to determine whether Betty Jo’s alleged breach of fi-
duciary duty should have been submitted to binding arbitration. Given our dis-
position, we do not reach this issue.

on2 Pe

Michelle’s argument that these two statutes conferred jurisdic-
tion upon the district court is premised on the theory that the as-
sets that were transferred by the partnership to 1.C.A.N. remained
trust assets. It is well recognized that when a trustee breaches his
or her fiduciary duty by improperly transferring trust assets to a
third party, those assets are held pursuant to the trust if the third
party purchasing the trust assets had notice of the trust and a
breach of duty by the trustee.* See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Sa-
lomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250 (2000); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 284(1) (1959). However, when a trustee
transfers trust assets with authority or the consent of all of the ben-
eficiaries, the transfer ‘operates to pass the legal and equitable
title to the purchaser”’ 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 500 (2005); see
generally Williams v. Jackson, 107 U.S. 478, 482 (1883). Here,
all of the beneficiaries, including Michelle, consented to the sur-
vivor and residual trusts’ transfer of all the trust assets to the part-
nership in exchange for an ownership interest in the partnership.
Michelle does not argue, nor did Solomon or the district court
find, that Betty Jo breached her fiduciary duty to the trusts in mak-
ing this transfer. Therefore, the only assets now remaining in the
trusts are the trusts’ respective ownership shares in the Aboud
Family Partners Limited Partnership. The property that Betty Jo,
acting as general partner, transferred to I.C.A.N. was the property
of the partnership and not the trusts. Thus, we conclude that the
district court’s in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010(1) and
NRS 164.015(6) over the trust assets did not extend to the assets
LC.A.N. acquired from the partnership.

“A valid and final judgment in an action based only on juris-
diction to determine interest in a thing . . . [dJoes not bind anyone
with respect to a personal liability’ Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments § 30(2) (1982). The district court held Betty Jo and
LC.A.N. personally liable for the judgment of $782,078.98. Be-
cause the district court’s order was a judgment against Betty Jo and
LC.A.N., and not against any trust property, it exceeded the in
rem jurisdiction over trust assets provided by NRS 164.010(1)
and NRS 164.015(6) and is void. To impose personal liability on
Betty Jo and I.C.A.N.—and a constructive trust on assets
LC.A.N. acquired from a third-party partnership—required the

“Because the property in this case was not a trust asset at the time of the
transfer by the partnership to a third party, we do not address the appropriate
procedure for recovering trust assets inappropriately transferred to a third
party.

ee:

court to acquire ‘‘personal jurisdiction over [them as] part[ies],
normally through appropriate process based on contacts with the
jurisdiction or through his general appearance therein to defend on
the merits.’ Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 30(2) cmt. c;
see Young v. Nev, Title Co., 103 Nev. 436, 442, 744 P.2d 902, 905
(1987) (“‘A court does not have jurisdiction to enter judgment for
or against one who is not a party to the action.’’). But here, the
pleading that initiated the action and gave the court jurisdiction was
brought under NRS 164.010(1) and NRS 164.015(6). This gave
the court in rem jurisdiction but not jurisdiction to impose personal
judgments against Betty Jo and I.C.A.N. under the circumstances
present here. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order de-
clining to enter judgment against David, and reverse the district
court’s order imposing a constructive trust and entering a judgment
against Betty Jo and I.C.A.N., and remand the case to the district
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.*

PICKERING, C.J., and Sairta, J., concur.

JOHN ALLEN LYTLE anp TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as TRUSTEES
OF THE LYTLE TRUST, APPELLANTS, v. ROSEMERE ES-
TATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA
NONPROFIT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

No. 60657
JOHN ALLEN LYTLE anp TRUDI LEE LYTLE, as TRUSTEES
oF THE LYTLE TRUST, APPELLANTS, v. ROSEMERE ES-

TATES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, A NEVADA
NONPROFIT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

No. 61308
December 26, 2013 314 P.3d 946

SBecause we reverse the district court’s order on appeal, we do not address
the parties’ remaining arguments.

Sterling Law, LLC, and Beau Sterling, Las Vegas, for
Appellants.

Leach Johnson Song & Gruchow and Sean L. Anderson and
Ryan W. Reed, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE and CuErry, JJ.
OPINION

Per Curiam:

NRCP 59(e) allows a party to move the district court to alter or
amend a ‘‘judgment.’’ The timely filing of an NRCP 59(e) motion
may toll the period in which a notice of appeal from the judgment
must be filed until the motion is resolved. NRAP 4(a)(4). Here,
however, appellants filed a motion to alter or amend a post-
judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees. We asked the
parties to address whether an NRCP 59(e) tolling motion is prop-

lr

erly directed at a post-judgment order or whether that rule is lim-
ited to final judgments.

NRCP 54(a) defines judgment to include ‘‘any order from which
an appeal lies.” Based on this definition, we conclude that tolling
under NRAP 4(a)(4) applies to an NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or
amend directed at an appealable special order after final judgment.
As a result, the notice of appeal from this order was timely filed
and the appeal may proceed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In a dispute concerning unpaid homeowners’ association (HOA)
dues, the district court concluded that the HOA fees were proper,
dismissed appellants’ claims to the contrary, and awarded respon-
dent HOA the unpaid fees and attorney fees. Although appellants
prematurely filed a notice of appeal before the district court’s
final judgment was entered, their appeal from that order was
deemed timely and proper once the order was filed. NRAP
4(a)(6). Thus, there is no jurisdictional issue as to the appeal
from the final judgment.

Meanwhile, however, respondent moved for and was awarded
supplemental attorney fees for its counsel’s additional services in
the court below. The supplemental attorney fees award’s notice of
entry was served by mail on August 14, 2012. Appellants did not
immediately file a notice of appeal, but instead timely filed an
NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend the order. After the district
court denied the motion to alter or amend in a written order en-
tered on January 16, 2013, appellants filed a notice of appeal from
the supplemental attorney fees award on January 30, 2013, well
beyond 30 days from the supplemental attorney fees award’s notice
of entry. Because it was unclear whether appellants’ motion to alter
or amend the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney
fees tolled the period for filing the notice of appeal, this court is-
sued an order to show cause whether the notice of appeal was
timely filed. The parties timely responded.

DISCUSSION

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days following serv-
ice of the notice of entry of the judgment or appealable order.
NRAP 4(a)(1). An additional 3 days are added to the 30-day ap-
peal period under NRAP 26(c) to allow for service of the notice of
entry, unless the paper is delivered on the date of service.

P|

Here, the district court’s order awarding supplemental attorney
fees qualifies as a special order after final judgment, and is there-
fore an appealable order. NRAP 3A(b)(8); Winston Prods. Co. v.

a

DeBoer, 122 Nev. 517, 525, 134 P.3d 726, 731 (2006). As serv-
ice of the order’s notice of entry was by mail, appellants had only
33 days from August 14, 2012, to file their notice of appeal, un-
Jess the appeal period was tolled. NRAP 4(a)(1), 26(c). Generally,
the time for filing a notice of appeal may be tolled if one of sev-
eral different enumerated motions is filed, including a motion to
alter or amend the judgment under NRCP 59. NRAP 4(a)(4). But
because NRCP 59 provides for a motion to alter or amend the
judgment, it is unclear whether the motion was properly applied to
a post-judgment order. See, e.g., Ex parte Troutman Sanders,
LLP, 866 So. 2d 547, 550 (Ala. 2003) (stating that a motion to
alter or amend ‘‘may be made only in reference to a final judg-
ment or order’’ (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, the question in
this appeal is whether the rule allows only for motions directed at
final judgments, or whether a party can move to alter or amend
other orders entered by the district court as well.

|

In resolving this issue, we turn to the definition of judgment as
outlined in NRCP 54(a), which states that ‘‘ ‘[jJudgment’ as used
in these rules includes . . . any order from which an appeal lies.”
See also Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426-27, 996 P.2d 416,
417 (2000) (recognizing that this definition pertains to the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure). As this definition specifically states that
it applies whenever the term ‘‘judgment”’ is used in the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure, we must apply this definition when con-
struing the language of NRCP 59(e) allowing for a ‘‘motion to alter
or amend the judgment.’ Applying the definition that judgment in-
cludes any appealable order, a motion to alter or amend is per-
mitted as to any appealable order, not just final judgments. And,
as a result, a motion to alter or amend any appealable order will
generally toll the time to appeal from that order.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached this same conclu-
sion when it addressed the issue under the federal rules of civil and
appellate procedure, which are similar to Nevada’s rules in this re-
gard. Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (10th
Cir. 1986); see also Moseley v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124
Nev. 654, 662-63, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2008) (recognizing that
this court may look to the interpretation of similar federal rules
when construing a Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure). In Autorama

"In Winston Products Co., 122 Nev. at 525-26, 134 P.3d at 731-32, this
court held that a tolling motion directed at a final judgment could also serve
to toll the time to appeal from a special order after final judgment. Our hold-
ing in Winston Products does not resolve the jurisdictional issue raised here,
however, as the tolling motion in the present case was not directed at a
final judgment, but instead was directed solely at the special order after final
judgment.

Se

Corp., the court faced the same circumstances that exist in the
present case, as the appellants there had filed a motion equivalent
to a motion to alter or amend directed at a post-judgment order
denying attorney fees. 802 F.2d at 1286. The Autorama Corp.
court held that the tolling provision under the federal counterpart
to NRAP 4(a)(4) applied to the motion to alter or amend, even
though it was directed at a post-judgment order, and therefore the
time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled until after the lower
court resolved the motion. Jd. at 1286-87; see also Marie v. Allied
Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 6-8 (Ast Cir. 2005) (addressing
the federal rules analogous to NRCP 54(a) and NRAP 4(a)(4) in
the context of a party filing a motion to alter or amend directed at
an independently appealable interlocutory order); Lichtenberg v.
Besicorp Grp. Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). In
Marie and Lichtenberg, the courts applied the definition of ‘‘judg-
ment’’ provided in the federal counterpart to NRCP 54(a), which
recognizes that ‘‘judgment’’ includes any appealable order, to de-
termine that a motion to alter or amend could be directed at an ap-
pealable interlocutory order and that, as a result, the period for fil-
ing a notice of appeal provided under the federal counterpart to
NRAP 4(a)(4) applied to toll the appeal period, even though the
motion to alter or amend was not directed at a final judgment.
Marie, 402 F.3d at 6-8; Lichtenberg, 204 F.3d at 400.

bee

Accordingly, we conclude that NRAP 4(a)(4) tolling applies to
appellants’ NRCP 59(e) motion to alter or amend that was directed
at the post-judgment order awarding supplemental attorney fees.
The supplemental attorney fees order is independently appealable
as a special order after final judgment, and thus, falls under the
definition of judgment provided in NRCP 54(a). As a result, the
notice of appeal was timely filed, and these appeals may proceed.
We reinstate the briefing schedule as follows. As appellants’ open-
ing brief was due at the time we issued our order to show cause
and appellants had already received extensions of time to file the
opening brief, appellants must file and serve their opening brief
and appendix within 30 days of the date of this opinion. No more
extensions of time will be granted. Thereafter, briefing shall pro-
ceed in accordance with NRAP 31(a)(1).

928

MICHAEL TAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
RESPONDENT.

No. 61241
December 26, 2013 314 P.3d 949

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Daniel Marks and Adam
Levine, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Shannon C.
Richards, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City, for Respondent.

Ee

Before Gspons, Douctas and Sairta, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, Douazas, J.:

In this appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
judicial review, we review a State Personnel Commission hearing
officer’s decision in a state employment matter. We conclude that
the hearing officer did not err or abuse her discretion in deter-

mining that, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of
NRS Chapter 284, while hearing officers may determine the rea-
sonableness of disciplinary actions and recommend appropriate
levels of discipline, only appointing authorities have the power to
prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified
state employees. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant Michael Taylor was employed by respondent State of
Nevada, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), in
the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), in a permanent
classified position as a group supervisor at Caliente Youth Center.
As part of his duties there, Taylor participated in a room search
due to allegations of youths stealing food. During the search, there
was an incident involving Taylor and one of the youths. As a result
of this incident, Taylor was issued a specificity of charges docu-
ment that recommended his termination from employment. There-
after, Taylor was dismissed from employment.

Taylor administratively appealed his dismissal pursuant to NRS
284.390, and following an evidentiary hearing, the State Personnel
Commission hearing officer issued a decision setting aside Taylor’s
dismissal and remanding the case to DCFS to determine the ap-
propriate level of discipline for Taylor’s infraction. In her decision,
the hearing officer recommended that DCFS impose a suspension
and require remedial training concerning the use of force. Taylor
sought reconsideration of the decision, arguing that the hearing of-
ficer, as opposed to the employer, should determine the appropri-
ate amount of discipline where modified discipline is required. The
hearing officer denied reconsideration, and Taylor subsequently
filed a petition for judicial review to have a district court decide the
issue of who determines the appropriate level of discipline in his
situation. Following briefing by the parties, the district court de-
nied Taylor’s petition for judicial review, concluding that hearing

0

officers are not required to determine the appropriate level of dis-
cipline after finding that dismissal was unreasonable. This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Taylor argues that the statute governing hearings to
determine the reasonableness of employee discipline, NRS
284,390, does not expressly address the situation where a hearing
officer determines that dismissal from state employment is too se-
vere, but that some amount of discipline is warranted for an em-
ployee’s misconduct. He claims that some hearing officers remand
the matter back to the employer, while other hearing officers de-
termine the appropriate level of discipline themselves. Taylor as-
serts that the hearing officer should make the decision about the
appropriate level of discipline because the hearing officer is the
“‘fact finding tribunal’’ and doing so is consistent with the statu-
tory and regulatory scheme adopted under NRS Chapter 284. We
disagree and hold that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous lan-
guage of NRS Chapter 284, while hearing officers may determine
the reasonableness of disciplinary actions and recommend appro-
priate levels of discipline, only appointing authorities have the
power to prescribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent
classified state employees.

“When reviewing a district court’s denial of a petition for judi-
cial review of an agency decision, this court engages in the same
analysis as the district court.’ Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v.
Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 349, 240 P.3d 2, 4 (2010). Specifically,
this court reviews an administrative agency’s decision for an abuse
of discretion or clear error. See id.; see also NRS 233B.135(3). In
doing so, this court defers to the agency’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence; however, questions of law are
reviewed de novo. Rio, 126 Nev. at 349, 240 P.3d at 4. Although
statutory construction is generally a question of law reviewed de
novo, this court ‘‘defer[s] to an agency’s interpretation of its gov-
erning statutes or regulations if the interpretation is within the lan-
guage of the statute.’ Dutchess Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 124 Nev. 701, 709, 191 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2008).
Accordingly, if the hearing officer’s interpretation of NRS Chapter
284 and its associated regulations is ‘‘within the language of the
statute,’ this court will defer to that interpretation.

On appeal, Taylor challenges the hearing officer’s decision to re-
mand this matter to DCFS for a determination of appropriate dis-
cipline and her conclusion that NRS 284.390 ‘‘does not grant the

931

hearing officer authority to determine the discipline to be imposed
should he find the employer’s decision unreasonable.” In deter-
mining whether this interpretation of a hearing officer’s authority
is “‘within the language of the statute,’ several statutory and reg-
ulatory provisions must be addressed. NRS 284.385 expressly em-
powers appointing authorities to dismiss, demote, or suspend per-
manent classified employees. NAC 284.022 provides that an
“*Talppointing authority’ . . . [is] an official, board or commis-
sion having the legal authority to make appointments to positions
in the state service, or a person to whom the authority has been
delegated by the official, board or commission.” Here, DCFS is an
appointing authority and, as such, may dismiss, demote, or sus-
pend its permanent classified employees.

Notably absent in the definition of appointing authority, how-
ever, is any reference to a hearing officer. See NAC 284.022. This
is because the role and authority of a hearing officer is distinct
from that of an appointing authority. While the appointing author-
ity may dismiss, demote, or suspend an employee, ‘‘[an] employee
who has been dismissed, demoted or suspended may request . . .
a hearing before the hearing officer . . . to determine the reason-
ableness of the action.’ NRS 284.390(1); Knapp v. State ex rel.
Dep't of Prisons, 111 Nev. 420, 424, 892 P.2d 575, 577 (1995).
The section further provides that:

If the hearing officer determines that the dismissal, demotion
or suspension was without just cause as provided in NRS
284.385, the action must be set aside and the employee must
be reinstated, with full pay for the period of dismissal, de-
motion or suspension.

NRS 284.390(6). These provisions grant the hearing officer the
power to review for reasonableness, and potentially set aside, an
appointing authority’s dismissal, demotion, or suspension decision;
however, they do not make hearing officers appointing authorities
or provide them with explicit power to prescribe the amount of dis-
cipline to be imposed. Moreover, ‘‘[a]t the conclusion of the
hearing, the hearing officer . .’. shall notify the parties... of
the hearing officer’s findings and recommendations.’? NAC
284.818. At best, then, a hearing officer’s only influence on the
prescription of discipline in a matter on administrative appeal
comes from his or her ability to determine the reasonableness of
the disciplinary decision, see NRS 284.390(1), and to recommend
what may constitute an appropriate amount of discipline, see NAC
284.818.

Based on the clear and unambiguous language of these statutes
and regulations, while hearing officers may determine the reason-
ableness of disciplinary actions and recommend appropriate levels

932 Pe

of discipline, only appointing authorities have the power to pre-
scribe the actual discipline imposed on permanent classified state
employees. The hearing officer’s interpretation of her authority is
within the language of NRS Chapter 284 and its associated regu-
lations, and we therefore do not disturb that interpretation on ap-
peal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying ju-
dicial review.

Gisons and Sarrra, JJ., concur.

MELINDA BOOTH DOGRA anp JAGDISH DOGRA,
APPELLANTS, v. JANE H. LILES, RESPONDENT.

No. 59381
December 26, 2013 314 P.3d 952

933

Law Office of William R. Brenske and William R. Brenske, Las
Vegas; Raleigh & Hunt, P.C., and John A. Hunt, Anastasia L.
Noe, and Bert E. Wuester, Jr., Las Vegas, for Appellants.

Barron & Pruitt, LLP, and Peter A. Mazzeo and Jared G.
Christensen, North Las Vegas; Lewis & Roca, LLP, and Daniel F.
Polsenberg, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

934

Before the Court En BANc.!

OPINION

By the Court, FLANacAN, D.J.:

This case arises from a personal injury action filed by appellants
Melinda and Jagdish Dogra. They sued respondent Jane H. Liles
and her daughter Susan Liles, both California residents, for dam-
ages stemming from a car accident in Nevada. The accident oc-
curred when Susan was driving Jane’s car.

The central issue in this appeal is whether Jane, a nonresident
defendant, is subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada by virtue of
the accident. Additionally, we address whether Jane’s filing of a
motion to consolidate in a Nevada court waived her right to object
to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over her. Finally, we
examine whether an interpleader action filed by Jane’s insurance
company subjects its insured—here, Jane—to personal jurisdiction
in Nevada. ~

We hold that a nonresident defendant is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Nevada when the sole basis asserted is his or her
adult child’s unilateral act of driving the defendant’s vehicle in
Nevada. Secondly, because the consolidation motion did not im-
plicate the parties’ substantive legal rights, we conclude Jane’s fil-
ing of it did not amount to a request for affirmative relief sufficient
to constitute a waiver of the right to object to the court’s exercise

‘THE HONORABLE Patrick FLANAGAN, District Judge in the Second Judici:
District Court, was designated by the Governor to sit in place of Taz Honor-
ABLE MICHAEL L. DoucLas, Justice, Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4, who voluntarily
recused himself from participation in the decision of this matter.

of personal jurisdiction over her. Finally, we conclude that the in-
terpleader action could subject Jane to jurisdiction in Nevada _
courts if the insurance company was acting as Jane’s agent in fil-
ing the action. But because the issue surrounding the interpleader
action was not adequately addressed in the district court, we re-
mand so that it can be analyzed under principles of agency.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jane, a California resident, purchased and registered, in Cali-
fornia, a Scion for her daughter Susan to use as Susan’s primary
means of transportation while attending high school and college in
that state. Jane made all of the payments on the vehicle, registered.
it in California in her own name, and placed it on her insurance
policy. On the policy, Jane named Susan as the primary driver.

While in college, Susan drove the Scion to Nevada for a week-
end trip. While traveling in Nevada on Interstate 15, she lost con-
trol of the vehicle and swerved in front of another car. The second
car swerved to avoid a collision but crashed into the interstate’s
median, which caused it to flip over the median and land on the
Dogras’ car.

As a result of the accident, Jane’s insurance company filed an
interpleader action in Nevada, leaving the injured parties to settle
their respective rights to any money due under the insurance pol-
icy. Thereafter, the Dogras and three other sets of plaintiffs sepa-
rately sued Susan and Jane for negligence and negligent entrust-
ment for damages caused during the accident. In the Dogras’
action, Jane moved under NRCP 12(b)(2) to dismiss the complaint
due to lack of personal jurisdiction. The Dogras opposed Jane’s
motion, arguing that Nevada could properly exercise personal ju-
risdiction over Jane because she had sufficient contacts with
Nevada. The district court scheduled a hearing for the parties to
present their arguments.

Following the hearing, the district court granted Jane’s motion to
dismiss. Six days later, Jane and Susan moved to consolidate all
lawsuits stemming from the accident, including the Dogras’ action.
The Dogras then asserted that, by filing the motion to consolidate,
Jane became subject to Nevada’s jurisdiction. The district court
granted the consolidation motion and concluded that the motion
did not subject Jane to Nevada’s jurisdiction.

Susan and Jane were subsequently deposed. At Susan’s deposi-
tion, she testified that Jane did not prohibit her from driving the
Scion to Nevada. At Jane’s deposition, she testified similarly about
the no-restrictions policy. She also testified that she did not re-
member whether she knew about Susan’s trip to Las Vegas before
the accident. After obtaining the transcript of Susan’s deposition
testimony, the Dogras filed a motion for reconsideration and, al-
ternatively, a motion to certify the dismissal order as final pursuant

936 Po

to NRCP 54(b). The Dogras claimed that Susan’s deposition tes-
timony constituted new and previously unavailable evidence prov-

ing that Jane was subject to Nevada’s jurisdiction because she
placed no restrictions on Susan’s use of the vehicle. After full
briefing and a hearing, the district court denied the Dogras’ motion
for reconsideration, determining the statements Susan made in her
deposition were not new and substantially different evidence. The
district court granted the Dogras’ motion to certify the dismissal
order as final pursuant to NRCP 54(b), and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Dogras contend that the district court erred in
determining it lacked personal jurisdiction over Jane. They assert
three theories in support of their position: (1) Jane has sufficient
minimum contacts with Nevada to subject her to suit here based on
the fact that she let Susan use her car in this state; (2) Jane sought
affirmative relief in Nevada courts by filing the motion to consol-
idate, which subjects her to suit here; and (3) Jane acquiesced to
the jurisdiction of Nevada courts over this matter when, through
her insurer, she filed an interpleader action here.

P|

We review a district court’s order regarding jurisdictional issues
de novo when the facts are undisputed. Baker v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 527, 531, 999 P.2d 1020, 1023 (2000). We
review a district court’s factual findings regarding a personal ju-
tisdiction issue for clear error. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660,
668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009).

Minimum contacts

The Dogras assert that Susan’s act of driving the Scion in
Nevada subjected Jane to Nevada’s jurisdiction because she en-
trusted the vehicle to Susan and did not place any restrictions on
Susan’s use of the vehicle, which resulted in injury in Nevada. Put
more directly, the Dogras argue that Jane, by placing no restric-
tions on Susan’s use of the Scion, specifically authorized Susan to
drive to Nevada, thereby creating sufficient minimum contacts
with Nevada from which the claim arose. As explained below, we
disagree.

P|

Nevada may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant only if doing so does not offend due process. Trump v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 698, 857 P.2d 740, 747
(1993). Due process in this context is rooted in a defendant’s
“contacts”’ with the forum state—here, Nevada—and reflects his or
her reasonable expectations about the litigation risks associated

po 937

with those contacts. See id. at 699, 857 P.2d at 748 (‘‘The defen-
dant must have sufficient contacts with [Nevada] such that he or
she could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”’). As
it is classically understood, therefore, due process requires a non-
resident defendant to have sufficient ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the
forum state “‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Absent the defendant’s acquiescence
to a forum state’s jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction occurs in two
forms: general and specific. Trump, 109 Nev. at 699, 857 P.2d at
748. Because the Dogras do not argue that Nevada has general per-
sonal jurisdiction over Jane, we focus exclusively on specific per-
sonal jurisdiction.

Le

Unlike general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is proper only
where “‘the cause of action arises from the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.” Jd. Nevada may exercise specific jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant if the defendant ‘‘purposefully avails”
himself or herself of the protections of Nevada’s laws, or pur-
posefully directs her conduct towards Nevada, and the plaintiff’s
claim actually arises from that purposeful conduct. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Thus,
“the mere unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of con-
tact with the forum State.” Jd. at 298 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Importantly, ‘“‘{w]hether general or specific, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction must also be reasonable.” Emete-
rio v. Clint Hurt & Assocs., Inc., 114 Nev. 1031, 1036, 967 P.2d
432, 436 (1998) (citing Trump, 109 Nev. at 703, 857 P.2d at
750).

In this case, Jane’s act of buying the Scion and placing no re-
strictions on Susan’s use of it did not amount to purposeful avail-
ment of Nevada’s laws or purposeful conduct toward Nevada. In
car accident cases involving a nonresident’s vehicle, courts have
determined the nonresident defendant is subject to a forum’s ju-
risdiction when the defendant actually knows his or her car is
being operated in the forum state. For example, in Tavoularis v.
Womer, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that New Hamp-
shire’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defen-
dant was reasonable because he ‘‘specifically authorized’’ his
friend’s use of his vehicle in New Hampshire. 462 A.2d 110, 114
(N.H. 1983). In Stevenson v. Brosdal, a Florida court held that a
nonresident defendant created sufficient minimum contacts with
Florida to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction when he
loaned his car to his son knowing that he (the son) would regularly

938 Po

use the car in Florida. 813 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002). Additionally, in Trump (not a car accident case), this court
found that Nevada could reasonably exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant where the defendant (and his agent)
actively pursued a future employee who lived in Nevada, negoti-
ated an employment agreement with the employee over a period of
months while the employee lived in Nevada, and set up a trust in
Nevada as part of the agreement. 109 Nev. at 701-02, 957 P.2d at
749-50.

Unlike all of those cases, Nevada does not have specific personal
jurisdiction over Jane in this matter because she did not purpose-
fully avail herself of Nevada’s laws or direct her conduct towards
Nevada. Jane did not specifically authorize Susan to drive the
Scion to Nevada, as the defendant did in Tavoularis. She did not
loan the vehicle to Susan knowing she would regularly use it in
Nevada, as the defendant did in Stevenson. And she did not pur-
posefully direct her conduct toward Nevada or a Nevada resident,
as the defendant did in Trump.

Further, to the extent Jane’s no-restrictions policy amounted to
“‘allow[ing]’’ Susan to drive the Scion in Nevada, as the dissent
observes, it must also be the case that Jane ‘‘allowed’’ Susan to
drive anywhere in the United States a highway could deliver her.
Under this logic, Jane ‘‘allowed’’ Susan to drive to Nevada, and to
Maine, or Alaska, or Florida. And if Susan happened to cause an.
accident in any of those states or in any state in between, Jane
would be subject to specific personal jurisdiction therein. Such a
result would be unreasonable and would offend due process be-
cause it would, in effect, ‘‘appoint’’ the vehicle Jane’s ‘‘agent for
service of process.’’ World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296. To
be sure, Jane’s only ‘‘contact’’ with Nevada in this case is her pur-
chase of the Scion for Susan, and her failure to place any restric-
tions on Susan’s use of it. She had no other contact with Nevada.
To allow Nevada to exercise personal jurisdiction over Jane on
these facts would undermine the degree of predictability the Due
Process Clause provides to the legal system, which ‘‘allows po-
tential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not ren-
der them liable to suit.’ Id. at 297.2

Therefore, because Susan’s act of driving to Nevada was a uni-
lateral act unsanctioned by Jane and of which Jane had no specific

*Moreover, this case is readily distinguishable from Budget Rent-A-Car v.
Eighth Judicial District Court, 108 Nev. 483, 835 P.2d 17 (1992), upon which
the dissent relies. In that case, the nonresident defendant (Budget Rent-A-Car)
expressly prohibited the lessee-driver from traveling outside of California
without its written permission. 108 Nev. at 485, 835 P.2d at 18. Jane gave no
such express prohibition to Susan in this case.

939

knowledge, Nevada’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over her
pursuant to specific jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

Affirmative relief
a

The Dogras also contend the district court erred in determining
it lacked personal jurisdiction over Jane on the basis of her filing
a motion to consolidate in the Dogras’ case. They argue that, by
filing the motion, Jane sought affirmative relief from Nevada’s
courts and thereby waived her right to object to Nevada’s exercise
of jurisdiction. We disagree.

We assume without deciding that seeking affirmative relief from
a court subjects a litigant to that court’s jurisdiction and cannot si-
multaneously be done while the litigant objects to the court’s ex-
ercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130,
1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (‘‘[A] party cannot simultaneously seek af-
firmative relief from a court and object to that court’s exercise of
jurisdiction.’’). Ordinarily, a litigant seeks affirmative relief when
he or she alleges wrongful conduct against another and seeks dam-
ages or equitable relief thereon, or defends against an action by
denying or asserting defenses to allegations made against him or
her. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1404 (9th ed. 2009) (defin-
ing ‘‘affirmative relief’’ as ‘‘[tJhe relief sought by a defendant by
raising a counterclaim or cross-claim that could have been main-
tained independently of the plaintiff’s action’).

Jane’s consolidation motion did none of these things. A re-
view of the record below shows the motion was essentially a case
management device employed by Jane (and Susan) to promote ef-
ficiency in resolving the various cases, including the Dogras’ ac-
tion, arising from the accident. None of the parties’ substantive
rights were implicated by the motion. On these facts, we cannot
conclude that Jane’s consolidation motion amounted to a request
for affirmative relief that waived her right to object to personal
jurisdiction?

Further, Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827 (9th Cir.
2005), cited by the dissent, is not persuasive on this point. In that
case, which involved a declaratory judgment action brought by
Dow Chemical Company against more than a thousand Nicaraguan
citizens, the Ninth Circuit found ‘‘personal jurisdiction exists
where a defendant also independently seeks affirmative relief in a
separate action before the same court concerning the same trans-

3In addition, Local Rule 2.50(a)(1) of the Bighth Judicial District Court re-
quires a consolidation motion to be ‘*heard by the judge assigned to the case
first commenced.” Here, the case first commenced out of the several arising
from the accident was the Dogras’ case. Thus, Jane was required to file her
motion to consolidate in the Dogras’ case.

o40 Po

action or occurrence.’’ 422 F.3d at 834. The court arrived at this
ruling by ‘‘assum[ing] without deciding’ that it would follow the
holdings in two out-of-circuit decisions, General Contracting &
Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1991), and In-
ternational Transactions Ltd. y. Embotelladora Agral Regionmon-
tana S.A. de C.V., 277 F. Supp. 2d 654 (N.D. Tex. 2002). Id.

First, Interpole and Embotelladora are distinguishable from the
instant case. In each of those cases, the relevant conduct was per-
formed by plaintiffs. In Interpole, the court found that the party
contesting personal jurisdiction waived its right to do so because it
“elected to avail itself of the benefits of the New Hampshire
courts as a plaintiff’’ in filing suit against Interpole, Inc., in New
Hampshire. Interpole, 940 F.2d at 23. Similarly, in Embotelladora,
the court found that the party contesting personal jurisdiction
waived its right to do so because it had previously filed two law-
suits as a plaintiff in the same judicial district in which it was con-
testing jurisdiction. Embotelladora, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 668. The
court also found those lawsuits arose from the same nucleus of op-
erative facts underlying that case. Id.

By contrast, here, Jane is a defendant, not a plaintiff. She had
not filed a lawsuit against the Dogras or anyone else involved in
this case. The ‘‘affirmative relief rule’’ established in those cases
cited in Dow Chemical v. Calderon, supra, therefore, is inappli-
cable to this case.

Second, the Ninth Circuit in Dow Chemical did not conclusively
adopt the holdings in those cases. Rather, it ‘‘assume[d] without
deciding”’ that the circuit would follow the holdings. Thus, even
though federal authority is relevant here because NRCP 12 is con-
sistent with its federal counterpart, see Fritz Hansen A/S v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 650, 655, 6 P.3d 982, 985 (2000);
Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 834, 122 P.3d 1252, 1253 (2005)
(‘‘[Flederal decisions involving the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide persuasive authority when this court examines its
tules.’””), Dow Chemical provides no persuasive authority relevant
to this case for us to adopt.

Interpleader

Pe

Finally, because the Dogras did not argue the issue on appeal
adequately, we directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs as
to whether the interpleader action filed by Jane’s insurance com-
pany in Nevada subjected her to personal jurisdiction herein. After
considering the supplemental briefs and other authorities, and be-
cause we anticipate the need for clarity in this area of the law, we
find this question is properly analyzed under an agency theory. Cf.
Tweet v. Webster, 596 F. Supp. 130, 133 (D. Nev. 1984). In
Tweet, the plaintiff alleged that Nevada had personal jurisdiction

es 941

over a nonresident defendant because the defendant’s insurance
company negotiated a settlement agreement on defendant’s behalf
in Nevada. The court enumerated three factors crucial to the de-
termination of whether an agency relationship existed arising from
the insurance company’s actions, thereby subjecting the defendant
to Nevada’s jurisdiction: (1) whether the insurer had complete
control over settling the claims against the defendant; (2) whether
the defendant could ‘‘control the method, means or place of set-
tlement negotiations’’; and (3) whether the insurer could act in a
dual capacity, ‘‘the principal purpose of which [was] to protect its
own contingent liability under the contract.”’ Id. at 133.

The Tweet factors are of assistance in resolving this issue. The
district court, however, should be the first to analyze the factual
question of the control dynamics between insured and insurer,
i.e., whether Jane had an agency relationship with her insurance
company. See, e.g., Polo Ralph Lauren, L.P. v. Tropical Shipping
& Constr. Co., 215 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating “‘de-
termination of the existence of an agency relationship is a factual
question’ and declining to resolve an agency issue by making an
“exception to the general rule that matters must be presented be-
fore the district court in the first instance’’). Accordingly, we re-
mand to the district court to address this issue in the first instance
under the analytical framework of an agency theory.*

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we hold that Jane is not subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Nevada by virtue of Susan’s unilateral use of
the Scion in Nevada and the accident arising from her use, or be-
cause she moved to consolidate the several cases stemming from
the accident. But Jane might be subject to jurisdiction in Nevada
based on her insurance company’s filing of the related interpleader
action in Nevada. Accordingly, the district court’s order granting
Jane’s motion to dismiss is reversed, and we remand this matter to
the district court for consideration of whether, under the principles
of agency set forth in Tweet v. Webster, the interpleader action
filed in Nevada by Jane’s insurance company subjected Jane to per-
sonal jurisdiction.

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

“In addition to whether the Dogras adequately raised the interpleader issue
on appeal and whether the question was properly analyzed under an agency
theory, our order directing supplemental briefing ordered the parties to discuss
the applicability of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Methwold International Fi-
nance Co. v. Manfredonia, 481 F. App’x 363, 365 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012), to thi
question. After a careful review, we conclude the analysis
applicable to the interpleader issue. It is merely dicta interpreting dicta; thas
no precedential value and therefore should have no persuasive force in any
case, including this one.

942 Pe

Gpsons, J., with whom Cuerry and Sarria, JJ., agree, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part:

Iconcur with the majority that this case should be remanded re-
garding the issues surrounding the interpleader action. However, I
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Jane Liles as a defendant
in the Dogras’ negligent entrustment action for two reasons. First,
Jane acquired minimum contacts with Nevada when she (1) gave a
car registered and insured in her name to her daughter, Susan
Liles; and (2) allowed Susan to drive it in Nevada, thereby invok-
ing the benefits and protections of Nevada law. Second, Jane im-
pliedly consented to Nevada’s jurisdiction when she filed the mo-
tion to consolidate and when her insurance company filed an
interpleader action on her behalf. Therefore, I would reverse the
district court’s order dismissing the action against her based upon
lack of personal jurisdiction because the district court obtained per-
sonal jurisdiction over Jane.

Jane established minimum contacts with Nevada when she allowed
her daughter to drive her car in Nevada

Specific personal jurisdiction may be exercised over an individ-
ual who purposefully avails herself of Nevada’s laws or directs her
conduct towards Nevada, ‘‘and the cause of action arises from that
purposeful contact” with Nevada. Budget Rent-A-Car v. Eighth Ju-
dicial Dist. Court, 108 Nev. 483, 835 P.2d 17 (1992); Price &
Sons v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 108 Nev. 387, 390, 831 P.2d
600, 602 (1992).

A. The Dogras made a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction to the district court

When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff
may meet his or her burden in one of two ways. Trump v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 692, 857 P.2d 740, 743
(1993). The first way requires the plaintiffs to make a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction prior to trial with ‘‘competent ev-
idence of essential facts,” and then prove jurisdiction by a pre-
ponderance of evidence at trial. Jd. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The plaintiff must produce some evidence in support of all
the facts necessary for a finding of personal jurisdiction, and the
district court must accept properly supported proffers of evidence
as true. Id. at 692-93, 856 P.2d at 744. When factual disputes
arise, ‘‘those disputes must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.”
Id. at 693, 856 P.2d at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The second way to show personal jurisdiction is for the trial
court to hold a full evidentiary hearing on the personal jurisdiction
issue prior to trial. Jd. In such a situation, the plaintiff must prove

pe 949

personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and does
not receive the same presumption of credibility that it would in a
prima facie analysis. Jd. at 693-94, 856 P.2d at 744-45.

Here, the Dogras used the first method to establish personal ju-
tisdiction. This is evidenced by Jane’s motion to dismiss and the
subsequent hearing transcripts. The district court’s order further
confirms this. Therefore, the district court should have resolved
factual disputes in favor of the Dogras and accepted all properly
supported proffers of evidence as true.

B. Jane established minimum contacts with Nevada

Specific jurisdiction exists over a defendant when ‘‘the cause of
action arises from the defendant’s contacts with Nevada.’ Budget
Rent-A-Car, 108 Nev. at 486, 835 P.2d at 20. Further, specific ju-
risdiction exists when the defendant ‘‘purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of . . . enjoying the protection of the laws of the
forum, and the cause of action arises from the purposeful contact
with the forum.” Id. at 487, 835 P.2d at 20.

Specific jurisdiction does not exist over a defendant when the
unilateral activity of another person creates the contact between the
defendant and the forum state. Id. In Budget Rent-A-Car, the rental
agreement provided that the renter could not take a rental car out
of California without Budget’s written permission. Id. at 485, 835
P.2d at 18. The renter did not obtain permission to take the car
outside of California, and got in an accident while driving in Las
Vegas. Id. at 487, 835 P.2d at 20. This court determined that
Nevada did not have jurisdiction over Budget because Budget did
not give permission for the renter to drive the car in Nevada. Id.
Thus, the unilateral activity of the renter created the contact with
Nevada, which was insufficient to invoke specific jurisdiction over
Budget. Id.; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (‘‘the mere unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot sat-
isfy the requirement of contact with the forum State’’).

A forum state will have jurisdiction over a defendant if the al-
leged injury occurred there and the defendant authorized the ac-
tivity that caused the injury. Tavoularis v. Womer, 462 A.2d 110,
112 (N.H. 1983). In Tavoularis, the defendant authorized his
friend to drive defendant’s car in New Hampshire to visit family.
Id, at 111. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire had specific jurisdiction over the defendant because
(1) “‘it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant would be
sued in New Hampshire for negligently entrusting [his car] to [his
friend],”’ and (2) it was not ‘‘fortuitous’’ that the injury occurred
in New Hampshire because the defendant ‘specifically authorized
[his friend] to drive in New Hampshire.’ Id. at 113-14.

oa Pe

However, a defendant can implicitly authorize the activity that
causes the injury. Stevenson v. Brosdal, 813 So. 2d 1046, 1048
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). In Stevenson, the defendant, who
owned the car, gave his son a car to use. Jd. The defendant did not
specifically authorize the defendant to only use the car in a certain
state. Jd. The defendant knew that his son was living and driving
the car in Florida. Id. The court found that Florida had jurisdic-
tion over the defendant because the owner was aware the car was
in Florida and impliedly consented to his son’s use of the car in
Florida. Id.

Here, Jane purposefully availed herself of Nevada’s laws and es-
tablished minimum contacts with Nevada when she purchased a
car for Susan and admittedly did not place any restrictions on
where Susan could drive it, thereby allowing Susan to drive the car
to Nevada. Similar to Tavoularis, Jane authorized Susan to drive to
Nevada when she did not place any restrictions on where she
could drive the car. Also, like in Stevenson, Jane gave Susan a car
and knew that she would likely use it if she was to travel anywhere
by car. Thus, Jane implicitly consented to Susan’s use of the car in
Nevada. However, there is a crucial factual dispute as to whether
Jane knew about her daughter’s trip to Las Vegas. Specifically,
Jane did not deny actual knowledge of her daughter’s trip to Las
Vegas for her friend’s birthday party that had been planned for five
months. Rather, Jane stated that she could not remember. Susan
also could not recall if she told her mother about the trip, even
though they talked a number of times before Susan left for Las
Vegas. Resolving this factual dispute in favor of the Dogras, the in-
ference arises that Jane must have known about the trip and her
failure to disallow Susan from driving the car in Nevada on the day
of the accident could be seen as specific authorization for her to do
so. By giving the car to Susan with authorization to drive it in
Nevada, Jane established minimum contacts with Nevada such that
it is reasonable to subject her to a negligent entrustment suit here.

Further, it was foreseeable that Susan would drive to Las Vegas
and does not constitute a ‘‘mere unilateral activity’’ Unlike in
Budget Rent-A-Car, where Budget restricted where the renter could
drive without permission and did not give the renter permission to
drive out of state, here, Jane did not place any restrictions on
Susan’s use of the car.' Further, Jane never told her daughter she
needed permission to take the car out of state, and Susan did not
act directly against her mother’s instructions. Additionally, when
resolving the factual disputes in favor of the Dogras, this further

'T agree with the majority that Budget Rent-A-Car is “readily distinguish-
able.” As the majority states, ‘‘Jane gave no such express prohibition to Susan
in this case.” However, as noted above, Jane impliedly authorized Susan to
drive the car out of state, purposefully availing herself of Nevada’s laws.

Po os

shows that (1) it was foreseeable that Jane could be sued in
Nevada, (2) it was not fortuitous that the injury occurred in Nevada
because Jane authorized Susan to drive to Nevada, and (3) Susan’s
driving the car to Nevada was not a ‘‘mere unilateral activity’’ See
Tavoularis, 462 A.2d at 114.

Additionally, the majority claims that this interpretation ‘‘would
be unreasonable’’ and ‘‘undermine the . . . predictability [of] the
Due Process Clause’’ because Susan would have been allowed
“‘to drive to Nevada, and to Maine, or Alaska, or Florida”’ The
majority further argues that ‘‘it would, in effect, ‘appoint’ the ve-
hicle Jane’s ‘agent for service of process’ ’’ and undermine the de-
gree of predictability (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
296). However, it would be reasonable to conclude that Jane au-
thorized Susan to drive to Nevada, and this interpretation would
not result in an unpredictable outcome because of the close prox-
imity of Las Vegas to California, the factual inference that Jane
likely knew about the trip, and Jane’s failure to prohibit Susan
from driving to Nevada.

I would hold that these facts take this case out of the realm of
mere foreseeability and provides sufficient facts to establish a
prima facie case in favor of exercising personal jurisdiction over
Jane. The Dogras would still have to prove specific personal juris-
diction by a preponderance of evidence at trial, with the aid of
cross-examination to determine Jane’s actual knowledge.

Jane consented to Nevada's jurisdiction when she filed a motion to
consolidate the four district court cases arising from Susan’s car
accident

Personal jurisdiction, like other rights, can be waived. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 F.3d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 2005). In
Dow Chemical, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a defendant can
give explicit or implied consent to a forum’s jurisdiction over her
when ‘‘a defendant . . . independently seeks affirmative relief in a
separate action before the same court concerning the same trans-
action or occurrence.’ Jd. A request for affirmative relief may
occur before the suit is filed, at the time the suit is brought, or
after the suit starts. Id.

After the district court dismissed her from the case, Jane filed
a motion in the Dogras’ action to consolidate all four Nevada dis-
trict court cases arising from her daughter’s car accident. This mo-
tion submitted Jane to personal jurisdiction of Nevada courts be-
cause it was a request to the court for affirmative relief and clearly
concerned the same transaction or occurrence, the car accident.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings on the merits.

§

IN RE: DAVID ORRIN NILSSON, Desror.

WILLIAM A. VAN METER, APPELLANT, v.
DAVID ORRIN NILSSON, RESPONDENT.

No. 61070
December 26, 2013 315 P.3d 966

Woodburn & Wedge and John F. Murtha, Reno, for Appellant.

Christopher P. Burke, Reno, for Respondent.

Ml

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, Gipgons, J.:

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada
has certified a question of law to this court regarding the ability of
a debtor to claim Nevada’s homestead exemption. The certified
question asks:

Can a debtor properly claim a homestead exemption for his
interest in real property under NRS 21.090(1)() and NRS
Chapter 115 when debtor himself does not reside on the
property but his minor children do? Put another way, does a
debtor have to actually reside on the property that is the sub-
ject of a claimed homestead exemption under NRS
21.090(1)() and NRS Chapter 115, or is it sufficient that a

debtor’s minor children reside on the property in order to

qualify for the exemption?

In re Nilsson, No. BK-11-52664-BTB (Bankr. D. Nev. May 7,
2012). We conclude that a debtor must actually reside on real
property in order to properly claim a homestead exemption for that
property.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent David Orrin Nilsson (David) and his ex-wife, Kelli,
married in 1990. They have three children. In 1994, David and
Kelli purchased property in Reno as joint tenants and built a home
on it a year later (the Reno property). David and Kelli lived to-
gether in the house with their children until 2006, when David
moved out of the Reno property and began living in a travel trailer
in Sparks. Kelli filed for divorce that same year.

The Nilssons’ divorce decree provided that Kelli would reside at
the Reno property with the children until it sold. Although the de-
cree provided that the Reno property would be listed for sale on
July 1, 2008, or as otherwise agreed, it does not appear that the
property was ever listed for sale. Thus, David and Kelli each hold
a half interest in the property as tenants in common.

In early 2011, over three years after the final divorce decree was
filed, Kelli recorded a homestead declaration with Washoe County,
listing the Reno property as her individual homestead. David did
not join in the declaration, although Kelli noted that his name was
on the Reno property’s title. Subsequently, David filed for Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy, which was eventually converted to Chapter 13.
On his schedule of real property assets, he claimed an interest in
the Reno property as half-owner with Kelli. On his schedule of
personal property, he listed the Sparks travel trailer and noted that
he lived in it.

After a series of amendments, David claimed the Reno property
as exempt from inclusion in his bankruptcy estate based on, among
other things, the homestead exemption. Appellant William A. Van
Meter, the bankruptcy trustee, objected to David’s claimed ex-
emption of the Reno property insofar as he had not resided on it
since 2006. David responded that, even though he had not lived on
the Reno property for several years, he could nonetheless claim the
exemption in order to protect his interest in the Reno property for
the benefit of his children. The bankruptcy court certified the
question to this court without ruling on the trustee’s objection. We
subsequently accepted the question and directed briefing.

The trustee argues that David cannot claim a homestead ex-
emption on the Reno property because he does not reside there, he
did not record a declaration of homestead, and he cannot now
record a valid declaration of homestead on the Reno property.
David responds that he can claim a homestead exemption on the

— 949

Reno property even though he does not reside on it, and that he
can exempt the Reno property through constructive occupancy be-
cause his children still live there and by tracing the homestead back
to his family’s residency there.

DISCUSSION
The homestead exemption

“T]he homestead exemption can only be extended or limited by
the statutes or constitutional provision that created it.’ Savage v.
Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 90, 157 P.3d 697, 699 (2007). The home-
stead exemption was intended to protect ‘‘the family home despite
financial distress, insolvency or calamitous circumstances,’’ Jack-
man vy. Nance, 109 Nev. 716, 718, 857 P.2d 7, 8 (1993), as the
preservation of the home was ‘‘deemed of paramount importance
as a matter of public policy”’ I.H. Kent Co. v. Miller, 77 Nev. 471,
475, 366 P.2d 520, 521-22 (1961). Nevada construes homestead
Jaws liberally in favor of the debtor and his or her family. Jackman,
109 Nev. at 718, 857 P.2d at 8. Nevertheless, we have made clear
that the ‘‘laws exempting the homestead are not based upon prin-
ciples of equity”’ I.H. Kent Co., 77 Nev. at 475, 366 P.2d at 521-
22. Thus, while the statutory provisions relating to homesteads
should be liberally construed, this liberal interpretation ‘‘can be
applied only where there is a substantial compliance with [the
homestead] provisions.” McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, 40, 116 P.2d
581, 583 (1941).

| eres!

Determining whether a debtor must reside on real property in
order to claim a homestead exemption requires us to interpret sev-
eral constitutional and statutory provisions. See Nev. Const. art. 4,
§ 30; NRS Chapter 115; see also Jackman, 109 Nev. at 718, 857
P.2d at 8 (‘‘The homestead exemption, unknown to the common
law, was given birth as a constitutional and statutory response to
public policy and sentiment.’’). In interpreting constitutional and
statutory provisions, we look first to the provision’s language. See
MGM Mirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 125 Nev. 223, 228, 209
P.3d 766, 769 (2009). If the constitutional or statutory language
“is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistak-
able, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not per-
mitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself’ Hamm
v. Arrowcreek Homeowners’ Ass’n, 124 Nev. 290, 295, 183 P.3d
895, 899 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
| |

Under the United States Bankruptcy Code (Code), a debtor
who files for bankruptcy may exempt certain assets from his or her
estate, thus preventing creditors from reaching the exempted assets

950 Pe

to satisfy outstanding debts. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2006). The
Code provides that states may opt out of the federal exemption
scheme and instead provide for state law exemptions. Jn re Viris-
simo, 332 B.R. 201, 203 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005); 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2) (2006). Nevada is an opt-out state and lists its property
exemptions in NRS 21.090. NRS 21.090(1); In re Christensen,
122 Nev. 1309, 1314, 149 P.3d 40, 43 (2006). Under Nevada law,
the ‘‘homestead as provided for by law, including a homestead for
which allodial title has been established and not relinquished and
for which a waiver executed pursuant to NRS 115.010 is not ap-
plicable’ may be exempted from the bankruptcy estate.! See NRS
21.090(1)(); see also Nev. Const. art. 4, § 30 (stating that ‘‘[a]
homestead as provided by law, shall be exempt from forced sale
under any process of law’’).

Nevada law requires that a debtor must reside on real property in
order to exempt that property as a homestead

Because the Nevada bankruptcy exemption provisions do not de-
fine ‘‘homestead,’”’ but instead refer to the ‘‘homestead as provided
for by law,’ we turn to Chapter 115 of the Nevada Revised
Statutes, which governs homesteads in this state. Savage, 123 Nev.
at 90-91, 157 P.3d at 700. As relevant here, NRS 115.005(2)(a)
defines a homestead as property consisting of ‘‘[a] quantity of
land, together with the dwelling house thereon . . . to be selected
by the husband and wife, or either of them, or a single person
claiming the homestead.’ Thus, the statutory definition of ‘‘home-
stead’’ does not expressly state whether a party must reside on his
or her homestead.” It does, however, require that the property ‘‘be
selected’’ as a homestead by the party or parties. This requirement
is governed by NRS 115.020, which provides that ‘‘[t]he selection
must be made by either the husband or wife, or both of them, or
the single person, declaring an intention in writing to claim the
property as a homestead.’’ NRS 115.020(1).

P|

When married persons select their homestead by declaration, the
declaration must state that they are married and that one or both of
them are, ‘‘at the time of making the declaration, residing with

'The word allodial is defined as ‘‘[hJeld in absolute ownership.”’ Black’s
Law Dictionary 88 (9th ed. 2009).

*However, the Legislature’s use of the term ‘‘dwelling house’’ suggests an
intent that the party must reside on his or her homestead. See Black’s Law
Dictionary 582 (9th ed. 2009) (defining dwelling house as “‘{t]he house or
other structure in which a person lives; a residence or abode’’); see also Smart
v. State, 190 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (Ind. 1963) (holding that a rural summer
cottage was not a dwelling house within the meaning of Indiana’s burglary
statute because it was not the owners’ primary residence and the owners only
“‘spent a two or three weeks’ vacation and weekends there’’).

Fi 951

their family . . . on the premises.”’ NRS 115.020(2)(a)-(b). Al-
though the statute does not require that a single person declaring
an intention to claim a property as a homestead must declare that
he or she resides on the property, it does require such a person to
specify that ‘‘he or she is a householder’? NRS 115.020(2)(a).
This court has defined the term householder as ‘‘one who keeps
house,’”’ further stating that a householder ‘‘must be in actual pos-
session of the house’? and must be ‘‘the occupier of a house.”
Goldfield Mohawk Mining Co. v. Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leas-
ing Co., 31 Nev. 348, 354, 102 P. 963, 965 (1909). Therefore,
based on the language of NRS 115.020(2)(a), a single person de-
claring an intention to claim a property as a homestead must be
“in actual possession of the house.’’ Id.

In addition to declaring his or her residence or householder sta-
tus, any claimant selecting property as his or her homestead must
state “‘that it is their or his or her intention to use and claim the
property as a homestead.’’ NRS 115.020(2)(c). David argues that
under NRS 115.020(2)(c), a single person, as ‘‘any claimant,’
may file a declaration of homestead for a parcel of real property
that he does not reside on because this subsection does not contain
its own residency or householder requirement. But this reading of
the homesteading statutes ignores the requirement in NRS
115.020(2)(a) that single individuals selecting a homestead must
declare that they are householders. Thus, based on the language of
the statute, we conclude that in order to select property as a home-
stead, an individual must reside on that property. See NRS
115.020(2)(a); Goldfield Mohawk Mining Co., 31 Nev. at 354, 102
P. at 965.

David may not exempt the Reno property as a homestead under the
doctrine of constructive occupancy

P|

David argues that he should be able to claim constructive occu-
pancy of the Reno property because he originally resided on the
property and only moved because of the divorce. Further, he ar-
gues that he should be able to claim constructive occupancy in
order to protect his children who still reside on the property.
David cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions in support
of his proposition that he can claim constructive occupancy. See In
re Thomas, 27 B.R. 367, 370-71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding
that a debtor driven from her residence by domestic violence may
still claim an exemption in the home); see also Beltran v. Kalb, 63
So. 3d 783, 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (applying Florida’s
constitutional provision that allows homestead exemptions for ‘‘the
residence of the owner or the owner’s family,’ thus ruling that an

952 PO

owner of a house may claim a homestead as long as his family re-
sides there).? We do not find these cases persuasive.

P|

In Nevada, ‘‘[i]t is axiomatic there can not be a homestead
absent residence[,] . . . when a declaration of homestead is filed
the declarant must be residing on the premises with the intent to
use and claim the property as a homestead.”’ In re Sullivan, 200
B.R. 682, 685 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996), aff'd, 163 F.3d 607 (9th
Cir. 1998). While the statutory provisions relating to homesteads
should be liberally construed, this liberal interpretation ‘‘can
be applied only where there is a substantial compliance with [the
homestead] provisions.” McGill, 61 Nev. at 40, 116 P.2d at 583;
see Maxwell v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 327, 330, 849 P.2d
267, 269 (1993) (‘‘Where the language of the statute is plain
and unambiguous[,] . . . a court should not add to or alter
[the language] to accomplish a purpose not on the face of the
statute... .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

‘We conclude that under NRS 115.020(2), a homestead declara-
tion must concern the claimant’s ‘‘bona fide residence.’ See Jack-
man, 109 Nev. at 721, 857 P.2d at 10 (concluding that a building
used partly as a business could be claimed as a homestead, so long
as the property remained the family’s ‘‘bona fide residence’’);
McGill, 61 Nev. at 39-40, 116 P.2d at 583 (requiring proof of ac-
tual bona fide residence at the time the homestead declaration is
filed). As such, we conclude that David may not validly file a
homestead declaration on the Reno property because it was not his
bona fide residence, and we decline David’s invitation to extend
Nevada homestead law based on constructive occupancy.*

David’s reliance on these cases is misplaced because they are distinguish-
able from this situation for a number of reasons. First, many deal with situa-
tions in which a debtor spouse left the marital residence but was still awaiting
final resolution of the pending divorce—thus each spouse’s possessory right to
the property had yet to be determined. See In re Moulterie, 398 B.R. 501, 505
@ankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008). In these situations, many courts have found that the
debtor spouse was entitled to a homestead because the possessory right to the
preexisting homestead was not yet finalized in state court. Id. That is not the
case here. Additionally, several of the cited cases apply homestead statutes that
allow for a much more liberal scrutiny of the homestead residence require-
ment. See Beltran, 63 So. 3d at 787.

“We note that David may still be able to file a homestead declaration after
he filed his bankruptcy petition, since we have held that a declaration may be
filed at any time before the actual sale under execution. See Myers v. Matley,
318 U.S. 622, 627-28 (1943); In re Zohner, 156 B.R. 288, 290 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1993); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Childress, 89 Nev. 272, 272, 510 P.2d
1358, 1358 (1973). However, such a declaration would still be invalid due to
the fact that the Reno property is not David’s bona fide residence.

Pe 953

We therefore conclude that a debtor must actually reside on real
property in order to properly claim a homestead exemption for that
property.>

PICKERING, C.J., and HARDESTY, PARRAGUIRRE, DOUGLAS,
Cuerry, and Sarria, JJ., concur.
|

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
MICHAEL ALAN KINCADE, RESPONDENT.

No. 61262

THE STATE OF NEVADA, APPELLANT, v.
MICHAEL ALAN KINCADE, RESPONDENT.

No. 61263
December 26, 2013 317 P.3d 206

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Daniel
M. Hooge, District Attorney, Lincoln County, for Appellant.

Dylan V. Frehner, Public Defender, Lincoln County, for
Respondent.

SWe have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit.

954

Before the Court EN BANc.
OPINION

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:

In this case, we consider whether the district court properly ex-
cluded evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant where the war-
rant did not comply with NRS 179.045(5)’s requirement that a
warrant include a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit
upon which probable cause was based attached. Recognizing that
a state may provide broader protections to its citizens than provided
by the U.S. Constitution, we reaffirm our decision in State v.
Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 69 P.3d 232 (2003) (Allen II), and conclude
that failure to comply with NRS 179.045(5) triggers exclusion de-
spite the U.S. Supreme Court’s contrary holding in United States
y. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006).

Po 955

FACTS

The Lincoln County Sheriff’s Department initiated an investi-
gation of respondent Michael Kincade following reports that he
was sexually abusing minor relatives. In the course of the investi-
gation, a detective filed an affidavit for a warrant to search Kin-
cade’s residence for evidence related to the allegations. A justice
of the peace issued a warrant, but when it was served on Kincade,
the warrant did not include a statement of probable cause and the
affidavit setting forth the basis for probable cause was not at-
tached to the warrant. The subsequent search revealed images of
child pornography on Kincade’s computer and external hard drive.
The State pursued numerous charges against Kincade for sexual as-
sault and possession of child pornography.' Kincade moved to sup-
press the evidence found on his computer, which the district court
granted. The district court concluded that the affidavit did not sup-
port a probable cause finding and that the execution of the warrant
violated NRS 179.045(5), which requires a warrant to either in-
clude a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit support-
ing the warrant attached. The State now brings this appeal.

DISCUSSION

The State argues that the district court erred by excluding evi-
dence under NRS 179.045(5), which requires the warrant to in-
clude a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit upon
which it is based attached, because the omission was merely a
ministerial violation. The State also argues that the district court
erred in suppressing the evidence because the detective relied in
good faith on the validity of the warrant issued by the justice of the
peace.

The search warrant’s failure to comply with NRS 179.045(5)
mandates exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant

|

NRS 179.045(5) provides that a warrant must either include a
statement of probable cause or have the affidavit upon which prob-
able cause is based attached. NRS 179.085 provides that a person
may move to suppress evidence on the ground that ‘‘[t]he warrant
is insufficient on its face”’ NRS 179.085(1)(b). In a case factually
similar to this one, we held that failure to include a statement of
probable cause or to attach a valid affidavit to a search warrant in
violation of NRS 179.045 triggers exclusion under NRS 179.085.
State v, Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 168, 69 P.3d 232, 233 (2003) (Allen
I, modifying State y, Allen, 118 Nev. 842, 60 P.3d 475 (2002)

"The sexual assault charges and child pornography charges were bifurcated
into separate cases.

956 —

(Allen I). In Allen IT, a deputy conducted a home search pursuant
to a warrant, but the warrant did not include a statement of prob-
able cause and the deputy did not leave a copy of the affidavit with
the warrant following the search as required by NRS 179.045. 119
Nev. at 168, 69 P.3d at 233-34. We held that exclusion is proper
upon failure to leave a copy of an affidavit with a warrant where
the warrant does not itself include a statement of probable cause,
even if the affidavit is incorporated by reference into the warrant.
Id, at 171-72, 69 P.3d at 235-36.7

The State argues, however, that United States v. Grubbs, a more
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, abrogates Allen II. 547 U.S. 90,
97 (2006). In Grubbs, the Court considered the issue of whether
a triggering clause, which was part of the basis for the magistrate’s
probable cause determination, was required in a warrant that an-
ticipated the future presence of contraband at a defendant’s resi-
dence. Id. The Grubbs court held that the Fourth Amendment does
not require an anticipatory warrant to include a triggering condi-
tion. Jd. Instead, the Court narrowly construed the Fourth Amend-
ment to only require that a warrant state with particularity the
place to be searched and the items subject to seizure. Id. Indeed,
the Court confirmed that ‘‘the Fourth Amendment does not require
that the warrant set forth the magistrate’s basis for finding proba-
ble cause, even though probable cause is the quintessential pre-
condition to the valid exercise of executive power.’ Id. at 98 (in-
ternal quotations omitted).

| |

However, states are permitted to provide broader protections and
rights than provided by the U.S. Constitution. Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008); Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 326, 44
P.3d 523, 525 (2002). Thus, to the extent that Allen IJ promulgates
a statutory rule of criminal procedure, the more permissive stan-
dard of Grubbs does not vitiate this court’s holding in Allen II.

Regardless, the State argues that this court should adopt Grubbs
because Allen II was an application of the Fourth Amendment
and not of Nevada statutory or constitutional law. The State is in-
correct. In Allen I, we determined that NRS 179.045 is plain
and unambiguous and held that failure to comply with NRS
179.045 warrants exclusion. Jd. at 168, 170, 69 P.3d at 233, 235.
The Legislature established these requirements for a valid warrant
in Nevada and has provided for suppression of evidence obtain-

2The requirement that the affidavit must be attached does not apply to
sealed warrants or to telephonic warrants issued pursuant to NRS 179.045(2).
See Allen II, 119 Nev. at 167-68, 69 P.3d at 233; State v. Gameros-Perez, 119
Ney. 537, 541, 78 P.3d 511, 514 (2003).

es 957

ed based on a warrant that is insufficient on its face. NRS
179.085(1)(b). Thus, the holding of Allen I need not necessarily
be affected by developments in federal Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Moore, 553 U.S. at 171; Osburn, 118 Nev. at
326, 44 P.3d at 525. Accordingly, we decline to depart from Allen

I’s holding that failure to comply with NRS 179.045 mandates
exclusion.

Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply
a

The State next argues that the district court excluded evidence
without first determining whether suppression would further the
purposes of the exclusionary rule under the balancing test of
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).

The U.S. Constitution does not provide for exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995). Instead, the exclusionary rule is a
judicial remedy designed to deter law enforcement from future
Fourth Amendment violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Accord-
ingly, ‘‘suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those
unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the
exclusionary rule.’ Id. at 918. However, exclusion is warranted
without engaging in a case-by-case analysis where (1) the probable
cause determination is based on misleading information in the af-
fidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was
false absent a reckless disregard for the truth, (2) the magistrate
wholly abandoned a detached or neutral role, (3) the warrant is so
facially deficient that the officers executing it cannot reasonably
presume its validity, or (4) the supporting affidavits are so lacking
in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence en-
tirely unreasonable. Jd. at 923. Outside of those four exceptions, a
search based on a deficient warrant is not unreasonable where the
officer executing the warrant has an objective good-faith belief that
the warrant is valid.

In Allen II, this court held that failure of a police officer to fol-
low the requirements of NRS 179.045(5) rendered reliance on
the warrant unreasonable, thus the warrant in question did not trig-
ger Leon’s good-faith exception. 119 Nev. at 172, 69 P.3d at 236.
‘We see no reason to disturb our holding in Allen II that exclusion
is the appropriate remedy when a warrant does not comply with
the statute. Thus, as the instant warrant similarly does not com-
ply with NRS 179.045(5)’s requirements, the Leon exception is
inapplicable.

958 Po

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Allen IZ is still controlling law despite Grubbs be-
cause this court may grant broader protections to its citizens than
required by the U.S. Constitution, and Leon’s good-faith exception
will not apply where statutory requirements are not followed.
Thus, failure to comply with NRS 179.045 justifies the exclusion
of evidence obtained in a search pursuant to a defective warrant.
See Allen I, 119 Nev. at 171-72, 69 P.3d at 235-36.3

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

PICKERING, C.J., and GIBBONS, HARDESTY, DouGLAS, CHERRY,
and Sarma, JJ., concur.

*Although we affirm the district court’s order solely on the ground that the
warrant did not comply with NRS 179.045, we also note with approval the dis-
trict court's determination that the affidavit was ‘‘wholly insufficient” and did
not provide a substantial basis for the justice of the peace to find probable
cause that would justify issuing a search warrant.