State: Kentucky
Volume: 314
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): Kentucky
Source: https://static.case.law/ky/314.pdf

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Warner et al. v. Lexington Roller Mills, Inc., et al.
June 2, 1950.
As Modified and Extended on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 17, 1950.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

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R. E. Lee Murphy, P. T. ‘Clark, Yancey & Martin and Foster
Ockerman for appellants.

I. Jay Miller for appellees.
Cuay, Commissionsr—Reversing.

We have ‘before us a motion for appeal involving
the liability of the employer to. pay an attorney’s fee
allowed by the Workmen’s Compensation Board. It
presents a unique question which arises out of our
decision in Warner et al. v. Lexington Roller Mills,
Inc., 306 Ky. 142, 206 8.W.2d 471, 175 A.L.R. 722. The
lower Court adjudged that appellants were not entitled
‘to recover of appellees: the attorney’s fee allowed by
the Board. se aa :

-No question is presented regarding appellant: at-
torneys’ right to compensation. The only issue involved
is whether or not under -the peculiar circumstances of
this’ case appellees should be required to pay'it atthe
present time. : ” wet

’ In de¢iding this’ case originally we held’ that the
employee was entitled to compensation, but that’ the
‘employer was entitled to credit to the full extent of
such compensation as long .as:the latter employed the
former at a weekly--wage equal to-or in excess of the
weekly wage paid at the time of the injury. (This hold-
‘ing has often been referred to as thé ‘‘Ditty Rule,”’ and
has since been abolished by legislative enactment.) The
employer, at the time of the application for the fee, was
still paying the employee a sufficient wage to be entitled
to full credit for the weekly compensation due under
the award. te os .

KRS 342.320(2) provides that the Board may order
payment of the attorney fee directly to the attorney
“‘commuting sufficient of the final payments of compen-
sation payable under the award.to’a lump sum for that

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purpose.”? The employer contends that as long as it
furnishes employment to the employee at the requisite
wage, there is nothing at'all ‘‘payable’”’ to the employee.
Therefore, future payments under the statute cannot be
commuted because they may never actually become due.

We think there are two answers to this contention.
In the first place, the word ‘‘payable’’ as used in the
statute obviously means such amounts as will become
due in the future under the award. Otherwise, there
would be nothing to commute or accelerate. The statute
provides in effect that the last weekly payments, which
will become due under the award, shall be telescoped
to provide a fund sufficient to satisfy the full amount
of the attorney’s fee. Whether or not these final pay-
ments would ever actually be paid to the employee is
immaterial.

In the second place, the rule applied in the original
ease was an attempt to work out an equitable arrange-
ment between the employer and employee. It was not
designed to cut off any of the employee’s rights or te
destroy the rights of the attorney representing him, but
was simply substituting a credit for a weekly amount
legally payable by the employer. It did not lessen this
liability or saddle the employee with the payment of
the attorney’s fee out of his own pocket. When this
attorney’s fee is paid by the employer, it will of course
reduce the time for the running of the award and will
likewise reduce the time within which the rule in the
original case is applicable.

We conclude the trial Court committed error when
‘it determined that appellants were not entitled to the
attorney’s fee at the present time. However, it appears
the computation by the Board of the amount of the fee
was incorrect, and instead of being $438.21, it should
have been $246.30. For this reason it would not be
proper to confirm the Board’s award, but the cause
should be remanded for the entry of an award in the
correct amount. .

The motion for appeal is sustained, and the judg-
ment is reversed with directions to remand the case to
the Workmen’s Compensation Board for the entry of a
proper order allowing an attorney’s fee in the amount
of $246.30. cre ee ‘

rn

Young v. City of Morehead
McCullough v. Young
Eyl v. Young
June 20, 1950.

Rehearing denied December 1, 1950.
John J. Winn, Judge.

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Lewis A. White and Lester Hogge for L. C. Young.

George I. Cline, Phillip Ardery, Ardery & Hobson and Roger
Byron for City of Morehead.

Arthur W. Grafton, amicus curiae.
Lewis A. White, Lester Hogge and J. E. Marks for W. C. Byl.

Cumr Justicn Sims—Reversing in first case, affirm-
ing in last two cases. .

These three actions are closely related and have
been heard together and all will be disposed of in this
opinion. In Young v. City of Morehead a contract
Young had with the City to furnish it gas was held
to violate sec. 164 of the Kentucky Constitution. In
McCullough v. Young the court refused to let Me
Cullough file an intervening petition. In Eyl v. Young
a general demurrer was sustained to the petition. The
three appeals followed from those rulings.

On Feb. 27, 1936, Young and the City entered into
a written contract whereby he agreed to furnish natural
gas at certain pressure and prices to the City at its
corporate limits for ten years from the date of the
contract, with the option to Young of extending the
contract for ten additional years by giving the City
written notice at least thirty days before the expiration
of the first term of his intention to extend the contract.
While the contract does not so state, the record shows
the City owns a gas distribution system and in a pro-
prietary capacity was furnishing its inhabitants the gas
it purchased from Young. It is provided in the contract
that the City was to purchase gas exclusively from
Young unless he was unable to furnish an adequate
supply, in which event it might purchase from other
sources after taking all gas Young could supply. There

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are other provisions in the contract such as the time
of payment, meters and appliances to be furnished by
Young, but they are not involved in this litigation.

On Jan, 19, 1949, the City brought a declaratory
action where it pleaded, among other things not now
relevant, that the City nor the County advertised pub-
licly the sale of a franchise to the highest and best
bidder, and that Young never obtained a franchise and
his contract is in violation of secs. 162, 163 and 164 of
the Constitution of Kentucky; that Young has refused
to furnish gas of sufficient pressure or in adequate
quantity, and has threatened to interfere with the City’s
efforts to purchase additional gas elsewhere. The City
asks the court to declare the contract void and to re-
strain Young from interfering with it in obtaining an
adequate gas supply from other sources.

The chancellor overruled a special demurrer to the
petition and also overruled a general. demurrer to ail
parts thereof except the paragraph which averred the
contract was unconstitutional. Young refused to plead
further and the chancellor declared the contract con-
travened sec. 164 and is void. An agreed order pro-
vided Young would continue to furnish gas to the City
pending litigation and would not interfere with its buy-
ing any additional gas needed. Young appealed.

©. B. McCullough, as a resident and taxpayer of
Morehead and of Rowan County and as a consumer of
natural gas in the city, tendered an intervening peti-
tion wherein he made practically the same allegations
as were contained in the City’s petition, and in addi-
tion thereto he averred that Young had obtained no
franchise from the County permitting him to lay his
pipes along and across county roads in reaching the
eity limits. The chancellor refused to allow McCullough
to file this pleading and he appeals. We will first dis-
pose of McCullough’s appeal.

The same attorneys who represented the City also
represented McCullough. The reason McCullough at-
tempted to intervene was because the chancellor ruled
the City could not raise the question of whether Young
had obtained from the. county a franchise to lay his
pipes in the county and McCullough, as a resident and
taxpayer of the county as well as.a user of gas in the

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city, sought to inject this issue in the litigation. The
rule is that where the intervening petition raises no
issue not already involved, the court will not permit
the pleading to be filed. City of Princeton v. Princeton
Electric Light & Power Co., 166 Ky. 730, 179 S.W. 1074,
1080. Whether or not Young had a county franchise
was immaterial to his or the City’s rights under the
contract. Therefore, the chancellor properly refused
to permit the intervening petition to be filed. The judg-
ment in McCullough v. Young is therefore affirmed.

The sole question presented on Young’s appeal
against the City is whether the contract he had with
the latter attempted to grant a franchise and is void
because the city violated sec. 164 of the Constitution
of Kentucky by not selling the franchise to the highest
and best bidder after due advertisement. Appellant
insists that sec. 163 of the Constitution (relating to
public utilities using the streets, alleys or public
grounds of a city with the consent of its legislative
body) must be read in conjunction with sec. 164, and
as he did not use the streets, alleys or public grounds
of the city but connected with the city’s gas distribu-
tion system at the city limits, his contract does not
amount to a franchise. His brief cites ninety-nine
cases to sustain his point. Appellee argues that sec.
162 (unauthorized municipal contracts are void) must
be read in conjunction with sec. 164 and as the contract
was an attempt by the City to grant an exclusive privi-
lege, it was void without public advertising and com-
petitive bidding. The City cites several cases, but the
one approaching nearest the instant case is Willis v.

Boyd, 224 Ky. 732, 7 S.W.2d 216.

The term ‘‘franchise’’ is difficult to define due to
the broad sense in which it is used both in legal and
popular parlance. 23 Am.Jur. ‘‘Franchise’’ sec. 2, p.
714. But it seems to us that the word as used in sec.
164 is a grant of a right to use public property, or at
least the property over which the granting authority
has control. American Car & Foundry Co. v. Johnson
County, 147 Ky. 69, 143 S.W. 773. The contract for the
sale and delivery of gas by Young into the City’s dis-
tribution system at its corporate limits did not grant
him a franchise, but we would have a different question
-had he been authorized to use public property over

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which the city had dominion or control for the laying
of his gas lines. 38 O.J.S., Gas, sec. 9, p. 629. The right
to produce and sell gas is not a prerogative of a gov-
ernment but is a business open to all, therefore, Young
was not exercising a franchise when he contracted to
sell and deliver his gas to the City at its corporate
limits. Had the contract authorized him to use public
property under the City’s control, we would have, as
just above stated, a different question as to whether
he would have to obtain a franchise in conformity with
sec. 164. City of Princeton v. Princeton Electric Light
& Power Co., 166 Ky. 730, 179 S.W. 1074.

In Willis v. Boyd, 224 Ky. 732, 7 S.W.2d 216, Me-
Cracken County granted Boyd a 50 year privilege of
extracting sand and gravel from that part of the Ohio
River over which the county had dominion. This court
held the contract void under sec. 164 because the county
had permitted the use of public property for a term in
excess of 20 years and without selling a franchise to
the highest and best bidder after due advertisement.
The’ Willis case is distinguishable from the one at bar
because there the subject of the contract was the use of
public property over which the city had dominion, hence
a franchise therefor had to be obtained in conformity
with sec, 164. In the instant case the contract does not
involve property under the City’s control but is only
for the purchase of the commodity of gas by the City
from Young delivered to it at its corporate limits.

The judgment in Young v. City of Morehead is
reversed with directions that one be entered holding the
contract valid between Young and the City.

We now consider the appeal of Hyl v. Young.
Suing for himself as a resident, citizen and taxpayer
of the city and for all others similarly situated, Eyl’s
petition set out the contract between Young and the
City and sought to enjoin the latter from building a
gas line some 24 miles from the city limits to connect
with the line of the Tennessee Gas Transmission Com-
pany for the purpose of supplementing the gas supply
Young was furnishing the City, and to enjoin the City
from paying the proceeds of a $50,000 revenue bond
issue to the Modern Welding Company for the con-
struction of the line. - The petition as several times
amended’ averred the City had no authority to- extend

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its gas system beyond its corporate limits; that it had
obtained no franchise from the county and no certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity from the public serv-
ice commission and that the transmission company like-.
wise had no such certificate from the federal power
commission to sell gas to the City.

It is well here to note that in the case of Young v.
City of Morehead there was an agreed order entered
that Young would furnish the City all his available
supply of gas and that the City might buy from others
any additional gas it needed without interference from
Young.

Special and general demurrers were filed by the
City to Hyl’s petition and without waiving them the
City. filed answer which was several times amended.
Its answer averred Hyl was the agent and business
partner of Young, and it then pleaded the agreed or-
der between Young and the City set out in the above
paragraph and averred Eyl came into court with un-
clean hands. Hyl’s demurrer to the answer was over-
ruled and his reply admitted he was an employee of
Young and received one-sixteenth of the proceeds from
the contract between Young ‘and the City in addition
to his regular salary.

When the cause was submitted on the pleadings
the chancellor overruled the special demurrer but sus-
tained the general demurrer, and upon Hyl’s refusal
to plead further, dismissed his petition.

It is earnestly urged by Hyl that the chancellor
was correct in overruling the special demurrer to the
petition, citing such authorities as 43 C.J.S., ‘‘Injunc-
tions,’’ sec. 122, p. 661; Estill County v. Noland, 292
Ky. 698, 167 S.W.2d 707; Kentucky Utilities Company
v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148, 72 8.W.2d 738, but erred in
sustaining the general demurrer as his petition stated
a cause of action. Young insists that as these were
revenue bonds, Eyl was not concerned with the contract
as a taxpayer, therefore, the special demurrer should
have been sustained, citing, Droege v. Kenton County
Fiscal Court, 300 Ky. 186, 188 S.W.2d 320, and annota-
tions in 131 A.L.R. 1230. Young further argues that
as Eyl had admitted he was in the employ of Young,
who was bound by the agreed order not to interfere

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with the City in supplementing its gas supply, Eyl did
not possess capacity to sue.

It is not necessary for us to decide whether or not
Eyl could sue as a citizen and taxpayer to enjoin ex-
penditure of funds not ‘raised by taxation, since we are
of the opinion that as Young was barred from bringing
this action by the agreed order, his employee, Eyl, who
receives one-sixteenth of the proceeds of the business,
likewise was barred from bringing it. To allow Hyl
to maintain this action would be permitting Young to
do indirectly what Young’s agreement prevented him.
from doing directly. Young consented to the agreed
order to avoid being enjoined from interfering with
the City. Had he been enjoined, the injunction would
have applied to Byl because the -latter was in privity
with Young as his employee with an interest in the
contract. 28 Am.Jur. ‘‘Injunctions’’ secs. 331 and 332,
p. 505 et. seq. As the chancellor reached the correct
conclusion his judgment will be affirmed albeit he should
have sustained the special rather than the general de-
murrer. Landrum v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 290 Ky.
724, 162 S.W.2d 543; Lee v. Hanna, 253 Ky. 790, 70

_$.W.2d 673. :

The judgment is reversed in Young v. City of
Morehead with directions that one be entered holding
the contract valid between Young and the City; the
other two judgments are affirmed. so

Stieritz et al. v. Kaufman et al.
November 10, 1950. °*

Ray L. Murphy, Judge.

Fred M. Warren and Geo. T. Muehlenkamp for appellants.

Charles H. Lester, Jr, Lawrence Riedinger, Jr, Russell Howard
and Joseph S. Rolf for appellees,

Sranuzy, Commissionzr—Affirming.

An order has been heretofore entered affirming the
judgment because of the urgency and time was taken
for the preparation of this opinion.

The suit sought to enjoin officers of Campbell
County from holding an election to take the sense of
the voters of Newport on the question of abandoning
the present city manager form of government. KRS
89.680. .

The order of the county court recites the finding
that the petition for the referendum was signed by
voters equal to twenty-five per cent of the votes cast in
the city at the 1949 election, the last preceding regular
election, as prescribed by the statute. The circuit court
sustained special demurrers to the petition on the
ground of absence of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The plaintiffs declined to plead further. There was
no objection to the defendants’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings. Thereupon, the court considering
‘the condition of the record,’’ dismissed the petition.
The plaintiffs have appealed.

The circuit court thought he had no jurisdiction

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because, apparently, the order directing the holding of
the election was a judgment of a court of proper juris-
diction, and See, 285 Civil Code of Practice, provides
that an injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment
shall not be granted by any other court than that in
which the judgment was rendered.

An order of a county court calling an election in
an ex parte proceeding is not a judgment of a court
in the usual and ordinary sense or such as is contem-
plated by that provision of the Code; nor is it of such
a character that an appeal might be taken to the circuit
court as provided in KRS 23.030. Compare O’Neal
v. Minary, 125 Ky. 571, 101 S.W. 951. The calling of a
referendum election is a political matter rather than
judicial. More frequently than otherwise the power
of calling such an election is vested in a legislative body.
See, for example, KRS 89.240 relating to the initiative
and referendum of ordinances. In a proceeding of this
kind the county court is made the agency to find that
the petition for the election is in due form and meets
the requirements of the statute. When that is the case,
the court has no discretion in the matter other than to
determine the sufficiency of the facts stated in the
petition. Compare Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98
S.W.2d 884. The court may be compelled to conform
by a writ of mandamus or mandatory injunction. O’Neal
v. Minary, supra; Martin v. Cheek, 309 Ky. 319, 217
8.W.2d 785. Ordinarily a court of equity will not en-
join the holding of an illegal election but where it is
one in which a public office is not involved and the
election would be void and cause unnecessary and im-
proper expense, the calling of the election may be tried
in an injunction proceeding. City of Murray v. Irvan,
170 Ky. 290, 185 S.W. 859; Ginsburg v. Giles, 254 Ky.
720, 72 8.W.2d 438.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court more clearly
appears when it is considered that the petition chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the act under which the
election was proposed. See Gayle v. Owen County
Court, 83 Ky. 61.

For these reasons, we are of opinion that the special
demurrers should have been overruled.

We are of opinion, however, that the court properly
dismissed the petition upon the ground of the legal

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insufficiency of the allegations ‘of the petition, which

had been tested by general demurrers. The petition,

general demurrers and motions to strike certain allega-

tions constituted the entire record wpon which the case

was submitted without objection and upon which the °
judgment was rendered. It may be added that the

plaintiffs made no suggestion of any desire to amend:

their petition in any respect.

The petition challenged the validity of the call for
the election upon three grounds, namely, (1) KRS
89.680 is ‘‘void for want of clarity and definiteness and
the inability of any petitioner to comply therewith;’’
(2) the petition for the election was defective because
it failed to state the number of votes cast in the City
of Newport at the last preceding general election or
the number of legal voters upon the petition; and (3)
that 1,260 signatures on the petition are void and should
be stricken because (a) 1,085 are of ‘‘persons who are
not registered voters in this city;’? (b) 100 of such
signatures ‘‘appear to be forgeries,’’ and (c) 76 are
duplicated. .

We think the statute is definite enough. It re-
quires the petition for the election to be “signed by
a number of the legal voters of the city equal to twenty-
five percent of the votes cast in the city at the last
preceding general election.’’ This follows a usual form.
See KRS 67.020, 89.030, 89.300, 242.020. The condi-
tion undoubtedly means the number of persons who
voted in any or all city elections as determined by the
number of ballots cast.

The ‘allegations as to the insufficiency and invalid-
ity of the petition for the election are fatally defective.
The charge that 1,085 of the signers were of persons
‘“‘who are not registered voters in this city’? is of no
effect. The language of the statute is ‘legal voters.’’
This means that the qualification of the petitioners is
to be judged as of the day the petition was filed in the
county court, that being the day of the application re-
quired by the statute. McAuliffe v. Helm, 157 Ky. 626,
163 S.W. 1091. Moreover, the term ‘‘registered voters’’
is not the criterion’of qualification. City of Covington
v. Miller, 266 Ky. 198,.98 S.W.2d 293; Branstetter v.
Heater, 269 Ky. 844, 108 S.W.2d 1040. Likewise, clearly
defenseless is the feeble conclusion and deficient charge

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that 100 of the signatures ‘‘appear to be forgeries, they
obviously having been appended by ‘other than the
designated parties.’’ Widick v. Pursifull, 299 Ky.
778, 187 S.W.2d 447. And it has long been the rule in
election contests that the pleader must name the per- |
sons whose votes he questions as well as the ground
upon which he challenges them. ‘Widick v. Ralston,
303 Ky. 373, 197 8.W.2d 261, 198 S.W.2d 56; Johnson
v. May, 305 Ky. 292, 203 S.W.2d 37. If not timely
amended, such indefinite and general allegations must
be stricken. Jackson v. Bolt, 292 Ky. 503, 166 S.W.2d
831. We think the same rule should apply in a suit to
enjoin the holding of an election.

These allegations were not only too indefinite and
should have been stricken on that account, but they
also were demurrable as not stating a cause of action.
The effect of the decision on the pleadings and the
dismissal of the petition was the equivalent of sustain-
ing the general demurrers.

The judgment is affirmed.
Collis v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.

November 10, 1950.
‘W. Scott Miller, Judge.

—

Squire R. Ogden, Charles A. Robertson, and Ogden, Galphin &
Abell for appellant.

James W. Stites, and Doolan, Helm, Stites & Wood, for appellee.

Cuter Justicn Sims—Affirming.

This declaratory action was instituted by Harriet
Collis against the Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust
Company, trustee under the will of her grandfather,
George Gaulbert, to determine what estate she took
under the will in certain trust property. The chancellor
adjudged Mrs. Collis took a life estate in the property
with remainder in her three children, and she appeals.

Hon. W. Scott Miller, Judge of the Chancery
Branch, Second Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court
rendered a clear and logical opinion which we now
adopt. However, Judge Miller copied the entire will
in his opinion and as we think the estate Mrs, Collis
takes is determined by the construction of one para-
graph from Item 8 of the will, it will be the only part
of the will incorporated in this opinion. With this
slight change Judge Miller’s opinion reads:

“This action involves the interpretation of the will
of George Gaulbert who died in 1908. His widow also
died a number of years ago.

“Mr. and Mrs. Gaulbert had one child, Carrie
Gaulbert who married Attilla Cox in 1898 and who
died Feb. 22, 1949.

EE:
“Mr. and Mrs. Cox had one child, the plaintiff,
Harriet Cox, who was born before the death of Mr.
Gaulbert and who married John V. Collis. Mr. and

Mrs. Collis have three children all of whom were born
during the lifetime of Mrs. Cox.

“The will of Mr. Gaulbert was written for him
in 1896 by Temple Bodley, a competent member of the
Bar. At the time’ the will was written Mrs. Cox had
not yet married and Mrs. Collis had not been born.
However, at the time of Mr. Gaulbert’s death in 1908,
Mrs, Cox had been married some ten years and Mrs.
Collis was seven years old.”

The applicable part of Item 8 of Mr. Gaulbert’s
will reads: ‘‘Said net income shall be paid monthly to
the child or children of my said daughter should she
have any (and such of their descendants per stirpes as
may be born within her lifetime) until the youngest of
such children becomes twenty-one years of age and then
the principal of such half of said trust estate (subject
to said prior charges) shall vest in such children and
their said descendants in fee per stirpes. During de-
fault of such issue of my said daughter said income
shall be paid monthly to my wife for life and at her
death the principal of said one half of said trust estate _
shall pass in fee to my brother, sisters, nephews and
nieces, the descendants of any of them who may be
then dead to take their share or shares per stirpes.

‘Harriet Cox Collis, being now over twenty-one
years of age, the estate is to ‘vest’ in ‘the child’ of Mrs.
Cox ‘and such of (her) descendants per stirpes as may
be born within her (Mrs. Cox’s) lifetime.’

“Does this mean: 1. That Harriet Cox Collis takes
the fee, or 2. That Harriet takes a life estate with re-
mainder to her descendants born during the lifetime
of Mrs. Cox, per stirpes, or 3. That Harriet and such
of her descendants as were born during the lifetime
of Mrs. Cox take as a class?

“Tt is argued that Harriet Collis takes the fee on
either one of two theories: (1) The bequest to the child
of Mrs. Cox and her descendants, born during Mrs.
Cox’s lifetime, creates an estate tail in Harriet which
is by statute (KRS 381.070) converted into a fee simple.
(2) Based on the English case of Dick v. Lacy, 8 Beavan ©

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214, it is contended that the bequest to the descendants
per stirpes requires that Harriet take the fee by way of
‘substitution’ for her descendants, as the head of a
stirpes.

“Tt is obvious that the words ‘and such of their
descendants per stirpes as may be born within her
lifetime’ are limited (1) to stirpes and (2) to those
_ born during Mrs. Cox’s lifetime. It therefore follows
that they are words of purchase and not words of limi-
ation.

“In order to create an estate tail, the words of
limitation must be general and not restricted. Simpson
v. Adams, 127 Ky. 790, 795, 796, 106 S.W. 819, 32 Ky.
Law Rep. 617.

“Tt follows that there can be no estate tail in this
will. Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. (309, 16 B.Mon.) 309.

‘In the case of Dick v. Lacy, 8 Beavan 214, de-
cided in 1845, the devise was to ‘the daughters of Cap-
tain Boyce, and their descendants per stirpes, to hold
to them, their heirs and assigns forever.’ :

“The Master of the Rolls held that the use of the
words ‘their descendants per stirpes’ (a) excluded the
idea of an estate tail and. (b) likewise excluded the
children of a living parent from taking any interest
under the will. The parents took the fee as head of
the ‘stirpes’ by way of ‘substitution’ for their descend-
ants.

“One difficulty with the application of this rule to
the instant situation is that it cannot be said here that
Harriet Collis is the head of a stirpes for the only ones
of her descendants named are the descendants born
during the lifetime of Mrs. Cox. In other words, for
her to take by way of substitution might include de-
scendants born after the lifetime of Mrs. Cox which
is plainly contrary to the intention expressed in the will.

**A second and conclusive answer to this claim is
that, in the interpretation of wills, the Court of Appeals
has expressly and specifically refused to follow the Eng-
lish cases. In Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. [16 B.Mon.] 309,
a devise was ‘to Mary Baker Didlake and her children’.
The opinion points out that under the English rule this
devise would create an estate tail. In England such a

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devise would effectuate the intention of the testator
because the children would share in the estate, as was
obviously intended. However, under our law, to con-
strue such a devise as an estate tail would frustrate the,
plain intention of the testator who, beyond any ques-
tion, meant the children to take something. The opin-
ion says:

“¢ «In order, therefore, to effectuate the acknowl-
edged and manifest intent of the testator, it is obvious
that a different rule of construction must be resorted
to in this state.

“« ‘Tt has been observed that the words of the de-
vise, abstractly and literally, import an immediate gift
not only to the devisee in being, but to those not in being.
But there being no children in esse at the time of the
devise, it could not have been the intention to give an
immediate estate to them, for that were impossible.
And as the words of the devise as conceded by all the
authorities, manifest a clear intent that the children
shall take, the only consistent and rational construction
is, that the testator intended the devisee, in being at
the time, should take a life estate, remainder to the
children.’

‘“Hixactly the same principle must necessarily be
applied to the word ‘descendants’ as to the word ‘chil-
dren’. Indeed, technically the word ‘descendants’
means ‘the issue of a deceased person,’ 18 C.J. 792, and
for a stronger reason, therefore, the implication of a
remainder estate is required.

“The rationale of Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. [16 B.
Mon.] 309 is that the intention of the testator is the
controlling factor. Clearly, the testator here intended
that the descendants born during the lifetime of Mrs.
Cox should actually take something at her death and
not by way of ‘substitution’, In at least two other
clauses of the will the testator showed that he knew
how to provide for substitution when he wanted to. In
his bequest of a remainder to his ‘brother, sisters,
nephew and nieces’ he said, ‘the descendants of any’ of
them who may be then dead to take their share or shares
per stirpes’. Had he meant to do the same thing with
the child or children of Mrs. Cox it is reasonable
to assume that he would have done so.

20

“Tf the testator had intended that Harriet take by
way of substitution, he would have eliminated the
parenthetical clause ‘(and such of their descendants
per stirpes as may be born within her lifetime)’ and
have reached the same result. Obviously, he meant
something by the use of these words and they cannot
be ignored.

“Under no theory does it seem possible to conclude
that Harriet Cox Collis was intended to take the fee,

“The next question is whether or not the words
used by the testator imply a life estate in Harriet Cox
Collis with remainder to her descendants born during
Mrs. Cox’s lifetime or whether the intent was to give
her a joint estate with her descendants born during
the lifetime of Mrs. Cox.

‘* ‘Our rule is that where land is devised to a par-
ent and his or her children, nothing to the contrary
appearing in the will, the parent takes a life estate
with remainder vesting in the children.’ Prewitt v.
Prewitt’s Hx’rs, 303 Ky. 772, 775, 199 §.W.2d 435, 437.

“In Rice v. Klette, 149 Ky. 787, 149 8.W. 1019,
1021, L.R.A.1917B, 45, the Court said:.

“« «Tt will be observed that by the 7th clause of
the will in question, the property involved in this con-
troversy is bequeathed ‘‘to my said son, George D. Klette,
and to his children.’? This language brings the case
within the rule laid down in one of three lines of cases.
One class of cases is to the effect that the parent takes
a joint estate in fee simple with his children then born
or thereafter to be born. Turner v. Patterson, 35 Ky.
292 (5 Dana 292); Cessna v. Cessna’s Adm’r, 67 Ky.
516 (4 Bush 516) ; Powell v. Powell, 68 Ky. 619 (5 Bush
619) 96 Am.Dec. 372; Bell v. Kinneer, 101 Ky. 271, 40
S.W. 686, 19 Ky.Law Rep. 545, 72 Am.St.Rep. 410.
Another class of cases is to the effect that the parent
takes merely a life estate, with remainder to his chil-
dren. Fletcher v. Tyler, 92 Ky. 145, 17 S.W. 282, 13
Ky.Law Rep. 421, 36 Am.St.Rep. 584; Smith v. Upton,
13° S.W. 721, 12 Ky.Law Rep. 27; Davis v. Hardin, 80
Ky. 672. The other class of cases is where the word
‘‘ehildren’”’ is used in the sense of heirs. This con-
struction is adopted only in those cases where, upon a
-consideration of the whole will, it is evident that the

2

words were used as words of limitation and not of pur-
chase. Childers v. Logan, 65 S.W. 124, 23 Ky.Law Rep.
1289; Moran v. Dillehay, 71 Ky. 434 (8 Bush 434) ; Hood
v. Dawson, 98 Ky. 285, 33 S.W. 75, 17 Ky. Law Rep.
880; Lachland’s Heirs v. Downing’s Hx’rs, 50 Ky. 32
(11 B.Mon. 32); Williams v, Duncan, 92 Ky. 125, 17
S.W. 330, 18 Ky.Law Rep. 389.’

“The test in all cases is the intent of the testator.
The Court (in Rice v. Klette) continues:

“« ‘Under the more recent decisions of this court,
where there is nothing in a deed or will to show a
contrary purpose, the rule is to hold an estate deeded
or devised to a man and his children, or to a woman
and her children, as a life estate to the first taker, with
remainder to the children. Hall v. Wright, 121 Ky. 16,
87 S.W. 1129, 27 Ky.Law Rep. 1185; Brumley v. Brum-
ley, 89 S.W. 182, 28 Ky.Law Rep. 231.’

“Not only is there nothing here to show a con-
trary purpose but clearly the use of the word ‘descend-
ants’ rather than ‘children’ gives added force to the
thought that it was the intention of the testator to give
a life estate to the ‘child or children’ of Mrs. Cox with
remainder to their descendants per stirpes born during
her lifetime. Beam v. Shirley, 301 Ky. 326, 191 S.W.2d
248. As pointed out above ‘descendants’ technically
means the issue of a deceased person.

“Tt is presumed that every word is intended by
the testator to have some meaning, and no word or
clause in a will is to be rejected if a reasonable effect
ean be given it. McCormick v. Reinberger, 192 Ky.
608, 234 S.W. 300. This is particularly true where a
will has been prepared by a skilled draftsman. 57 Am.
Jur., ‘Wills’ see, 1150, p. 743.

“By giving to Harriet Cox Collis a life estate with
remainder to her three daughters in fee the intention
of the testator is plainly met and every word in the
devise is accorded effect and meaning.’’

The judgment is affirmed.

Blackburn v. Commonwealth.
November 10, 1950.
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

23

James W. Lambert and H. R. Denney for appellant.

A. BE. Funk, Attorney General and Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General for appellee.

Van Sanz, Commisstonsn—Reversing.

The appeal is from a judgment convicting appellant
of the crime of manslaughter and sentencing him to
serve fifteen years in the state reformatory.

The only eyewitness introduced by the Common-
wealth is Preston Moore, an uncle of the deceased, who
admitted that he was drunk at the time the affray took
place. This witness told an entirely different story
from that testified to by the other six witnesses, one
of whom was totally unrelated to either of the parties,
five being close relatives of appellant, and the sixth
being appellant himself.

Moore testified that the shooting took place in
appellant’s restaurant in the town of Livingston; that
when he arrived at the restaurant the deceased, James
Smith, was in the back room; that both he and Smith
were drinking. The witness went to the back room
where Smith and five or six other persons were con-

24. ee
gregated. Smith was trying to sell someone a suit of
clothes. Shortly thereafter, the deceased left the restau-
rant stating that he would get the suit and return,
which he did in about fifteen minutes. When he re-
turned he had a bundle under his arm. He went into
the back room, threw the bundle down and said to
appellant: ‘‘There are your clothes,’? whereupon ap-
pellant and he proceeded to the front room and engaged
in an argument. The witness quoted Smith as saying
to appellant: ‘If you want a fight I’ll fight you fair’’;
appellant, who was standing on the customers side but
at the end of a’counter, ran into another room, re-
turned with a pistol in his hand, and shot Smith when
he was about one foot and a half away from him. That
up to that time Smith had made no effort to harm
Blackburn and was standing with his hands hanging
at his side.

Appellant and Ben Thomas, the disinterested wit-
ness, testified that when Smith first came into the kitchen
of the restaurant they were seated and engaged in
a conversation; that Smith presented a bottle of whis-
key and asked them if they would like to have a drink;
both declined the invitation. Smith then took a drink
and said to appellant: “‘I think you are a god-damn
son of a bitch.”

Appellant retorted: ‘‘I know of some people who
are dirtier.”

Smith then said: ‘‘You’ve got the advantage of
me, I ain’t got a gun, but my dad has a good one and
I'll go get it.’’

Smith then walked out and returned in about an
hour. When he returned he slammed the front door,
took off his coat, threw it on a table and stated: ‘Arie,
I’m back, you god-damn son of a bitch.’’

He placed his hand in his right front pocket and
advanced toward appellant, whereupon appellant
reached under the counter for his pistol and shot Smith
who was within arm’s reach of him. The other eyewit-
nesses gave the same account commencing with Smith’s
return and ending with the firing of the shot. All
testified that Smith was drunk and that the witness
Moore was drunker and staggering. No one testified
that Smith actually was possessed of a deadly weapon.

ee 25

It is not contended that the evidence is not sufficient
to have justified the court’s action in submitting the
case to the jury; and, although we would have placed
little credence in Moore’s testimony in respect to the
details of the crime had we been members of the jury,
we are not in position to say that his testimony does
not support the verdict.

The principal ground for reversal is that the Com-
monwealth’s Attorney engaged in prejudicially im-
proper argument and the other ground is that the court
erred in the admission of incompetent evidence on
behalf of the Commonwealth and the rejection of com-
petent evidence offered by appellant. Since the ques-
tion concerning the propriety of the argument in part
addresses itself to the competency or incompetency
of evidence, we will consider the second complaint first.

The court sustained an objection to the introdue-
tion by the Clerk of the Rockeastle Circuit Court of a
judgment convicting the deceased of a felony in the
year 1947. The conviction was for the crime of store-
house breaking and appellant argues that this evidence
was competent to show that the deceased was a person
of unpeaceable disposition; and that appellant, on this
account, was faced with more than an ordinarily dan-
gerous antagonist and had cause for greater fear and
alarm at his hands. We are of the opinion that the
mere fact that one has been convicted of storehouse
breaking does not establish the fact that he would be
dangerous in the circumstances shown in this case. The
crime of storehouse breaking is a crime of stealth and
shows that its perpetrator is a person of unsavory but
not necessarily dangerous character. Undoubtedly, the
general reputation of the deceased for violence is ad-
missible in cases of this character, but, even if evi-
dence of a single act were competent, the act offered
in evidence in this case is not of the character to estab-
lish a violent disposition.

The witness, Ben Thomas, on cross-examination
was asked by the Commonwealth’s Attorney if he had
ever been convicted of a felony. He answered in the nega-
tive. The Commonwealth’s Attorney then askked him if
he had not been convicted of the crime of desertion from
the Army and if he had not served a sentence of eighteen
months in a Federal Reformatory for that crime. An

26 La

objection to this question was sustained by the court
but the court overruled a motion to discharge the jury
and continue the case.

The complaint in respect to the court’s ruling on
this question presents a question which has given us
considerable concern. Since Thomas was the only un-
biased witness, and desertion from the Army is held
in such loathsome regard, the mere asking of the ques-
tion, if incompetent, was so highly prejudicial that the
court should have set aside the swearing of the jury
and continued the case. Whether the question was com-
petent or incompetent depends on proper construction
of that part of Section 597-of the Civil Code of Prac-
tice which provides that a witness may be impeached
by a party against whom he is produced showing
the witness has been convicted of a felony. If desertion
from the Army is a felony within the contemplation
of that section of the Civil Code of Practice, the ques-
tion was proper and the witness should have been re-
* quired to answer it. On the other hand, if the crime
does not constitute a felony within the meaning of the
Civil Code of Practice, the question was incompetent,

Courts are in general accord with the statement
found in Restatement, Torts, Volume 1, Chapter 5,
Section 115, page 246 which reads: ‘‘A felony is a crime
which is declared to be so by the statutory or common
law of the jurisdiction.”

KRS 481.060 defines felony as an offense punish-
able with death or confinement in the penitentiary. To
the same effect is Section 6 of the Criminal Code of
Practice. These statutory pronouncements are in re-
spect to crimes against the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky; although, under the rule expressed in the
Restatement, supra, our courts will recognize a crime to
be a felony which is declared to be such by the statutory
law of the jurisdiction wherein the crime has been com-
mitted; provided, the crime is one exclusively against
the peace and dignity of the sovereignty in whose juris-
diction it was committed. Desertion from the United
States Army does not constitute a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is
one which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the organized military forces of the United States Gov-
ernment. Penal laws have been enacted by the Congress

| 27

in two different codes, one of which is the Military, the
other the Civil, in contradistinction to the Military. The
Civil Code does not attempt to deal with the crime of
desertion but declares the enticing of one to desert from
the Army to be a crime punishable by confinement in
the penitentiary. U.S.C.A. Title 18, sec. 1881. The
Military Code declares desertion from the Army to be
punishable by death or imprisonment in time of War
and by any punishment, except death, in time of peace.
US.C.A, Title 10, sec. 1530. U.S.0.A, Title 18, seo 1
in defining offenses reads:

“Notwithstanding any Act of Congress to the con-
trary:

“‘(1) Any offense punishable by death or imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year is a felony.’’

This definition is a part of the Civil Code; there is
no similar declaration in the Military Code. In Trask
v. Payne, 43 Barb., N. Y., 569, it was held that deser-
tion from the Army was not an offense recognized as
a felony by civil courts. Persons charged with violat-
ing the Military Code are tried by a court-martial.
The crime is not considered to be one against the peace
and dignity of the Civil Government; it is strictly one
against the peace and dignity of military authority
and is enforced primarily for disciplinary purposes.
We believe that our Legislature -intended to include
in its definition of felony only such crimes as are ' punish-
able under the civil authority of the states or the union
and not those with which the armed forces alone are
concerned. Hence we are of the opinion that the ques-
tion propounded to the witness was incompetent and,
as we have observed, was so highly prejudicial to ap-
pellant’s substantial ‘rights that the court should have

. sustained the motion to discharge the jury and continue
6 case.

The same witness was asked if the deceased had
not served in the Army for five years and five months.
He answered that he had so heard. He then was asked
by the Commonwealth’s Attorney if the deceased did
not receive ‘‘A Silver Star and three or four Bronze
Medals.’? The court properly sustained an objection
to this question; and, had an objection to this entire
line of interrogation been made, it would have -been

28 ee

proper for the court to have excluded it. We are of
the opinion that this error alone would not justify re-
versal of the case, but, since it must be reversed for
other reasons, interrogation into matters of this kind
will not be indulged on the next trial.

It is unnecessary for us to determine whether the
court erred in excluding evidence of the reputation of
the deceased for peace and quiet when offered in re-
buttal, The evidence of such reputation is competent
if the defendant chooses to open the door to this line
of investigation, but, if such is his desire on the next
trial, he will offer such testimony as evidence in chief.
We cannot agree that the testimony of the parents of
the deceased in respect to the latter’s coming to their
home immediately before he was killed for the purpose
of obtaining a suit of clothes was not competent in re-
buttal. It was appellant’s contention that the deceased
went to his home to obtain a pistol, whilst it was the
contention of the Commonwealth that he went there
for the purpose of getting a suit of clothes to sell to
appellant. Ordinarily, the Commonwealth ‘does not
know that such a fact will be placed in issue and ap-
parently it did not anticipate it in this case. Under
the circumstances, we believe the court did not abuse
its discretion in permitting this evidence to be intro-
duced in rebuttal, but since the Commonwealth now
knows that this fact may be placed in issue on the next
trial, the Attorney for the Commonwealth will introduce
such testimony in chief, if he desires to introduce it
at all.

The argument complained of consists of two parts,
the first of which is in the following words: ‘Inci-
dentally, gentlemen of the jury, the witness, Ben
Thomas, a life long friend of Arie’s admitted on the
witness stand that he was a felon and had committed
a felony.’’

This statement was in absolute contradiction of
the testimony to which we already have referred. Had
the Attorney for the Commonwealth made no other im-
proper remark, that statement would compel reversal,
although it was mild in comparison with the other re-
marks complained of, and which are: ‘‘There is an
empty chair at these old people’s table (referring to
the father and mother of deceased) and the bed has

ee 29

been made up for the last time. James Smith was on
the sands of Sicily and on the beaches of Africa fighting
while Arie was peddling liquor. The hell hole that Arie
Blackburn operated down there enticing these men in
there while Arie was getting them drunk and taking
their money and clothing, that is what Arie Blackburn
did. This is a hell hole that Blackburn operated and
is the kind of place that breeds murder. We tried six
murder cases at the last Term of the Pulaski Circuit
Court in Pulaski County three of them got life, and
none of them got less than 18 years and-you can stop
the murder in Rockcastle County like we did in Pulaski,
and I recommend that you give it to Arie Blackburn.
Arie, I want to say to you that you may have sent
James Smith to Hell, but if James Smith is in Hell, he
will put the coal on you Aire, when you get there. Arie
you ought to go to the electric chair and your bones
ought to crack and your meat ought to fry in the electrie
chair. That’s where you belong.’”’

There was no evidence that James Smith was ‘‘on
the Sands of Sicily’? or ‘‘on the Beaches of Africa
fighting” or ‘‘that Arie was peddling liquor’’; nor was
there any evidence to justify the statement that appel-
lant operated a ‘‘hell hole,’’ or that he enticed men into
his place of business, or that he got them drunk, or
that he took their money or their clothing. There was
no evidence to justify the statement that he operated
“the kind of place that breeds murder.’’ The state-
ment that six murder cases were tried at the last term
of the Pulaski Circuit Court wherein three of the de-
fendants were sentenced to life imprisonment and the
rest of the defendants were sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for minimum periods of eighteen years was dehors
the record, had nothing whatever to do with the case,
and could have been injected into the argument only
for the purpose of inflaming the jury. The closing re-
marks of the above quoted argument exemplify the
frenzy which the Commonwealth’s Attorney engendered
within himself, and his apparent endeavor to transmit
such frenzy into the minds of the jurors. The portion
of the argument complained of is inexcusable and was
extremely prejudicial to the substantial rights of ap-
pellant. If prosecuting attorneys continue to indulge in
arguments of this kind, we must continue to reverse
convictions on such account; and, in doing so, we cannot

30 es

avoid exposing and commenting on the conduct com-
plained of,

The judgment is reversed with directions that it be
set aside and that appellant be granted a new trial, to
be-conducted in conformity with this opinion.

‘Gilreath v. Gregory.
November 10, 1950.
J. B. Johnson, Judge.

G. W. Stephens for appellant.

Leonard S. Stephens for appellee.
Jvuven Cammacg—Affirming.

a at

The appellant, Willie Gilreath, purchased two
boundaries of timber in McCreary County from J. B.
Douglas, a resident of Tennessee. In payment of the
timber Gilreath executed two $750 notes to Mrs. J. Ey
Douglas. Both were dated August 6, 1947. One was
due in 60 days and the other in six months. Mrs. Doug-
las sold the notes to a brother, Levi Gregory, who in
turn sold them to another brother, Cleve Gregory. The
six months note was not due when it came into Cleve
Gregory’s hands, but the 60 day note was past due.

Previous to this transaction Douglas had sold 400,-
000 feet on one tract of timber to a partnership which,
for the purpose of this opinion, we will refer to as the
Joneses. The Joneses had quit cutting timber on sev-
eral occasions and Douglas concluded that they had
abandoned their contract with him. This conclusion
was recited in Douglas’ contract with Gilreath, so Gil-
reath was fully apprised of the Jones transaction.

After Gilreath started cutting timber the Joneses
brought an action to recover for the additional timber
due them under the contract. It developed in that ac-
tion that the Joneses had cut only approximately 248,-
000 feet of timber. Judgment went against Gilreath in
favor of the Joneses for $1528.50. This represented the
additional part of their 400,000 feet of timber calculated .
at $10 per thousand feet,

On direct examination Gilreath testified as to the
Jones suit and as to his payment of their judgment. He
said further : ‘‘I was to pay $1,500 for the timber when I
bought it, and I have already paid $1,528.50, I think it is.’?
On cross-examination it was brought out over Gil-
reath’s objection that he had cut between 65,000 and
68,000 feet of timber in addition to the 152,000 feet
for which he was forced to reimburse the Joneses at
the rate of $10 per thousand, and also that there is
still some timber standing on the land.

The court gave a peremptory instruction on the
six months note, apparently on the ground that the
appellee was the holder of it in due course. The jury
found for the appellee in the full amount on the 60
day note. We are asked to reverse the judgment on
the grounds that (1) a peremptory instruction should
have been given for the appellant because the appellee
had not listed the notes for taxation: (2) a demurrer

32 ee.

should have been sustained to the petition because the
pleadings did not allege a promise to pay the notes;
(3) incompetent evidence was admitted; and (4) the
instructions were erroneous.

It is insisted that the notes were ‘not listed for
taxation as required by KRS 132.220, and, therefore,
under KRS 132.300 they may not be sued upon. The
notes were payable at Oneida, Tennessee, and were
executed to Mrs. J. E. Douglas, who was a resident of
Tennessee. Mrs. Douglas held them from August 6,
1947 to January 10, 1948. The appellee, Cleve Gregory,
held the notes from January 25, 1948, to the date of
the institution of this action on November 3, 1948. The
pleadings did not show the residence of the appellee.
Since there was no allegation that the appellee was a
resident of Kentucky this defense must fail. Bowles
v. Gilpin, 299 Ky. 495, 185 8. W.2d 698.

The appellee alleged that for good and valuable
consideration he purchased the two promissory nego-
tiable notes executed by Willie Gilreath in the principal
sum of $750 each, payable at the First Trust and Sav-
ings Bank, Oneida, Tennessee. The petition set forth
further that the notes were payable to Mrs. J. E. Doug-
las and that they later came into the hands of the ap-
pellee and that they were not paid at the named Bank
or at any other place when due. The petition recites
also that ‘‘the said notes are filed herewith, made a
part hereof fully and completely with indorsements
and marked ‘Exhibit A and B’ for identification to the
petition.”? As said in Schewe v. Schewe’s Adm’r, 231
Ky. 808, 22 8.W.2d 259, a pleading must declare more
than that a promissory note was given, since that was
but a legal conclusion presenting no issue of fact. But
it is pointed out also in the Schewe case that no par-
ticular form of affirmation is required and, if the facts
alleged state a contract or promise, according to its
legal effect it is sufficient. In the case before us it was
alleged that the notes were executed by the appellant
and full information was given as to their execution
and place of payment. It was set forth also that the
notes were attached to the petition and made a part
thereof fully and completely. Certainly Gilreath was
fully apprised of the nature of the action he was called
upon to defend.

| 33

We do not think the testimony given by Gilreath
on cross-examination was incompetent. He stated that
he had already been called upon to pay the Joneses
$1528.50 for the timber. It was not prejudicial for the
appellee to show that, in addition to the 152,000 feet
of timber which Gilreath had cut and for which he had
reimbursed the Joneses at $10 per thousand he had
cut some 65,000 additional feet of timber and that some
timber still remained standing.

‘We do not think the instructions were prejudicial
to the appellant. Gilreath knew of the previous trans-
action between Douglas and the Joneses. There was
no proof of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of
Douglas. Gilreath admitted that he executed the notes
and the burden was upon him to assert and prove a
legal defense. This action in no way precludes any
claim which he might have against Douglas.

Judgment affirmed.

Williams v. Commonwealth.
November 10, 1950.
Edward P, Hill, Judge.

34 |

Robert S. Wellman and Hayes & Wellman for appellant.

A. B, Funk, Attorney General and W. Owen Keller, Assistant
Attorney General for appellee.

Jupen Ress—Reversing.

John Williams was convicted of the crime of grand
larceny, and his punishment fixed by the jury at con-
finement in the state reformatory for a term of two
years. The court overruled the defendant’s motion for
a new trial, but later entered a judgment reducing the
sentence to one year in the state reformatory. Grounds
urged for reversal of the judgment are: (1) Variance
between the proof and the indictment; (2) failure of
the trial court to give an instruction on petit larceny;
and (3) insufficiency of the evidence.

The indictment charged that the accused in Floyd
County on the 4th day of January, 1950, and before
the finding of the indictment, did ‘‘unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away one overcoat,
two pairs of shoes and two pairs of pants of the value
of more than twenty dollars, the personal property
of Inland Steel Company with the felonious and fraud-
ulent intent then and there to convert the same to his
own use, and to permanently deprive the said Inland
Steel Company of its property therein.’’? The evidence
appears in the bill of exceptions in narrative form.

John W. Rupe, manager of the department store
at Wheelwright, Kentucky, owned by the Inland Steel
Company, testified that he first learned that articles
were missing from the store when two pairs of pants
were returned to him one evening in December, 1949,
by either John Williams or one Robert Moseby; that
thereafter he received information that a pair of shoes
belonging to the store was at the home of Robert Mose-
by; and that he sent J. D. Lewis, janitor at the store,
to the Moseby home, and that Lewis returned to the
store with one pair-of shoes which sold for $19.95. He
further stated that Williams was in and around the
store at or about the time the pants were returned.
J. D. Lewis testified that he went to the home of Robert
Moseby and obtained a pair of shoes which he gave to

Mr. Rupe at the store. Sam Wallen, an employee of
the store, testified that a coat which he had left in
the store disappeared one evening around Christmas
time, and that it was returned to him later by his
brother, Richard Wallen. He said the coat belonged
to him and not to the Inland Steel Company. Richard
Wallen testified that John Williams offered to sell him
a brown overcoat some time in December, 1949, and
that he gave Williams $6 for the coat which he later
gave to his brother, Sam Wallen, upon learning that
the latter was the owner. This was all the evidence
introduced by the Commonwealth.

The court instructed on grand larceny only, and
told the jury to find the defendant guilty if they be-
lieved beyond a reasonable doubt that he took, stole and
carried away ‘‘two pair pants, one pair shoes, and an
overcoat, of the value of $20 or more, the personal
property of Inland Steel Company, with the felonious
and fraudulent intent then and there to convert the
same to his own use, and to deprive permanently the
said Inland Steel Company, of its property therein,
without the consent of the said Inland Steel Company.’’
It was error to include the overcoat among the articles
described, since the evidence disclosed that it belonged
to Sam Wallen and not to the Inland Steel Company.
There was a fatal variance in this respect between the
evidence and the allegations of the indictment. Lissen-
bee v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 639, 249 S.W. 782. With
the evidence concerning the overcoat eliminated, the
remaining evidence was insufficient to connect appellant
with the theft of the one pair of shoes and the two pairs
of pants. There is no evidence that the overcoat and
the other articles were stolen at the same time or on
the same day, and the only evidence concerning appel-
lant’s connection with the theft of the other articles is
that he was in or around the store at or about the
time the stolen pants were returned.

The defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal should have been sustained. If another trial
is had and the evidence is sufficient to take the case to
the jury on the question of appellant’s guilt, an in-
struction on petit larceny should be given if the evi-
dence as to value is substantially the same. Lovan v.
Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 199, 87 S.W.2d 381; Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 286, 42 S.W.2d 309.

36

The Attorney General frankly concedes that the
judgment must be reversed.

The judgment is reversed for further proceedings
not inconsistent herewith.

Couch et al. v. Vanhoose.
November 10, 1950.
S. M. Ward, Judge.

Faulkner & Faulkner for appellants,
Napier & Napier for appellee.

Pe 37

Jupex Rezes—Reversing.

Clyde Vanhoose sued Bill Couch and Alonzo Burns,
policemen of the City of Hazard, for false arrest. The
jury returned a verdict for $1,000 against each of the
defendants, and they and the two sureties on Alonzo
Burns’ bond have appealed. Appellants urge several
grounds for reversal of the judgment: (1) The evidence
is sufficient to sustain the verdict; (2) the instructions
are erroneous; (3) incompetent evidence was admitted
over their objections; and (4) the verdict is excessive.
Ground (1) is not seriously argued, but in order that
the other grounds may be clearly understood the evi-
dence will be set forth at some length.

At the time of his arrest on March 18, 1944, the
appellee, Clyde Vanhoosé, was a member of the armed
forces of the United States, and was on a visit to his
home in Perry County on furlough. Accompanied by
his uncle, Ison Vanhoose, he went to Hazard, arriving
there between 12 and1 p.m. They went to a restaurant
known as George’s Restaurant, operated by George
Charos and Hattie Charos, his wife, and remained there
until after 4 p.m. Beer was sold at the restaurant,
but no spirituous liquors. Hattie Charos testified that
appellee and his uncle sat down in a booth.on the left
side of the restaurant and drank eight or ten bottles of
beer. A girl joined them at the table, and later she
left and a second girl joined them. One of the girls
left the restaurant twice and on each occasion returned
with a quart of whisky. The crowd was boisterous,
and appellee was cursing. Mrs. Charos directed one
of her employees to call the police, and Alonzo Burns
soon arrived. He talked to appellee and his uncle, and
they left the restaurant. Mrs. Charos testified that
appellee was drunk when he left. Alonzo Burns testi-
fied that he went on duty at 4 p. m., and shortly there-
after received a call to go to George’s Restaurant. He
found appellee and Ison Vanhoose standing in the
aisle and saw a broken whisky bottle on the floor. He
asked them if they would leave and go home, and ap-
pellee said they would. Later Burns received a call
to go to Abe Turner’s Restaurant on Main Street, and,
accompanied by Bill Couch, he went to the restaurant
where he found appellee and Ison Vanhoose. Abe Tur-
ner, proprietor of the restaurant, testified as follows
as to what occurred:

38 P|

““Q. Before the officers came did the plaintiff,
Clyde Vanhoose and his uncle, Ison Vanhoose, come in
your restaurant? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Tell the jury just what they did in the way
of ordering things to eat and drink, what took place?
A. Well, when there the boy didn’t order anything to
drink neither one did. Ison ordered 15 hamburgers, I
noticed him, he went to the door and looked out. In
the meantime there was a lady sitting at the first booth,
she got the boy down in the seat beside her and bought
him a bottle of beer. I spoke to the girl about selling -
anybody anything to drink that was already intoxicated.
While I was talking to the girl about the drink, she said
‘I sold it to the lady.’ The lady got up to put some
money in the musie box, and she dropped it and while
I was reaching down to pick the money up Mr. Burns
and Mr. Couch walked in, Ison was sitting next to the
cash register. Mr. Burns walked over and put his
hands some place on his body and said ‘I thought I
told you to go home’ and Mr. Couch leaned up against
one of the booths where the lady and this boy was
sitting and Ison was across about three feet from them.
and Mr. Burns said ‘I will have to arrest you,’ this boy
says ‘you ain’t going to arrest anybody,’ Bill Couch
said ‘take it easy, soldier nobody is going to bother
you.’ About that time it started, the boy came out of
his seat and Alonzo hit the counter, I was standing by
the cash register, I grabbed the cash register to keep
it from falling. They both got hold of each arm an
took him out.’

He said Clyde Vanhoose and Ison Vanhoose were
intoxicated, and when asked if he saw anything that
happened after the policemen and Clyde left the res-
taurant, he answered: ‘‘Yes, sir. I saw them one on
each side of Clyde Vanhoose, he was using his feet to
trip them. He throwed his weight on Alonzo Burns
and then he would trip them, they did that until they
got to the curb. I did see Couch try to pull Clyde’s
hands from Alonzo Burns’ eyes, my wife came and got
me, the last I saw they were getting in the car.’’

Appellee testified that he drank three bottles of
beer at George’s Restaurant but no whisky, and that
he was sober. When a policeman arrived there and
threatened to arrest Ison Vanhoose, appellee asked if

P| 39

he could take his uncle to his home which was in the
country and the policeman permitted them to leave.
They stopped at Turner’s Restaurant to purchase sand-
wiches, and while there Couch and Burns entered. Con-
cerning what occurred then, appellee testified as follows:

“<Q. What did these officers do or say to you when
they came in there? A. He said to my uncle, you are
under arrest, this time. I asked if I could take him
home, and he said ‘you are going too,’ and hit me
across my nose with his fist.

“<Q. Were you drunk or sober? A. I was sober.

“Q. Had you done anything to Bill Couch? A. No,
sir. Not a thing.

*“Q, Had you done anything to: Alonzo Burns?
A. No, sir. Not a thing.

“Q. After Bill Couch struck you in the nose, what
did he do? A. He grabbed hold one arm and Alonzo
got hold the other and drug me up the street.

“Q. What did they do with you after they got
you out? A. After they got me to the curb my hat
came off, I said ‘let me get my hat,’ he said ‘no, some-
one else will get your hat.’ I reached down to get my
hat, we all three fell and they jerked me up and they
both threw me down again, Alonzo jumped on my
stomach and Bill hit me with a blackjack.

“Q. Did you do anything? A. No, sir. I couldn’t.’’

Ison Vanhoose testified that he and appellee went
into George’s Restaurant between 12 and 1 o’clock in
the afternoon, and while there each of them drank four
or five bottles of beer. He purchased two quarts of
whisky, but he didn’t see appellee drink any of it. He
testified in part:

“You drank something else besides beer while you
were there? A. Probably I did.
“Q. Don’t you know you did? A. I might have.

“*Q. Did you send somebody out to get some whis-
ky? A. Georgia went and got a quart of whisky.

“Q. Where did she bring it to? A. To the booth.

“Q. How many was there at that time. A. Four
of us.

40 ee

“*Q. Tell the jury, if you know, who paid for that
whisky? A. I paid for it, ,

“Q. What became of that quart of whisky? A. The
biggest part went to the back in glasses. .

“Q. All right, did you give Georgia money another
time? A. Yes, sir.

“*Q. What did she do with that? A. She went
and got whisky with it, I busted the bottle. -

“Q. You had already. opened it and some of it
had.been drunk? A. I didn’t open it somebody did.

“Q. That is two quarts, did you send for anymore?
A. No, sir.

“Q. You had a conversation with Mr. Couch or
Mr. Burns one before you and your nephew left there,
did you not? <A. Yes, sir, .

“*Q. You remember what the officer said to you?
A. As far as having talked with them when he came
in, Georgia talked to him. And showed him the first
quart of whisky she had in the poke.

“Q. What did they say to you? A. Alonzo came
in, he asked me if I would go home, I told him I would
and the boy said he would take me home. We came
to the other restaurant, and I stopped to get some sand-
wiches to take home.

“Q. Did they make sandwiches at the other place?
A. Yes, sir. .

“Q. Why didn’t you get them at the first place?
A. I never asked them, I always get them down here,
while we was waiting a woman called to Clyde and
wanted him to drink a bottle of beer and he wouldn’t.
After I got the sandwiches, I said ‘lets go,’ and she
said ‘he hasn’t drank his beer yet,’ I was setting there
waiting on him when Mr. Couch and Alonzo came in.

“<Q. Wasn’t beer served to all of you. A. No, sir.
I didn’t drink a drop.

“<Q. How long did you stay there in Turner’s Res-
taurant? A. Not but a few minutes.

“Q. Did you notice any difficulty there between
Clyde Vanhoose and Mr. Burns and Mr. Couch? A.
Burns came up to him and Couch came along by my
side and the argument started there.

a 41

“Q. Was there any difficulty, and wrestling be-
tween Burns and.Clyde? A. Not at the start.

“Q. What did Clyde say to the officers when they
undertook to arrest you? A. I don’t remember.

“Q. Was Mr. Turner there? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. After the men got out on the sidewalk and
came on up this way you didn’t see anything that hap-
pened there? A. No, sir.” .

Mrs. William Cornett, Hiram Napier and Mrs.
Hiram Napier, witnesses for appellee, testified that
they saw the two policemen, with appellee between
them, cross the street from Turner’s Restaurant. They
fell twice while crossing the street. One of the wit-
nesses described the occurrence as follows: ‘‘Burns was
trying to hold him down. They raised up from there
and came on this side and went down again, they all
three fell down on the concrete again. Burns got on
top of his stomach and was holding him by the should-
ers, and Bill walked around to the boy’s head and got
him by the hair of the head and got him by the hair
and jabbed his head up and down.’’

Burns and Couch denied that either of them struck
appellee with a blackjack. Couch described the occur-
rence from the time he and Burns entered the Turner
Restaurant as follows: ‘‘The older Vanhoose was set-
ting at the second stool. He had taken a bite of the
hamburger and his head was laying over and the ham-
burger by his mouth and Alonzo said, ‘old fellow
straighten up a little bit,’ he said ‘I thought you were
going home, and he said I am going to have to arrest
you’ and someone said you ain’t going to arrest no
God-dam person in here and I walked over there and
saw a soldier, he got up and made an attack on Mr.
Burns and pushed him over, I tried to pull him loose
and I hit him with my fist and he turned him loose and
as we came out he was kicking this way and that and he
was bucking like a bronco. He said if you sons of
bitches will turn me loose I will walk, he kicked me in
the groins, I was a little bit dazed and I got hold of
him again and we wrestled along, I couldn’t take like
Alonzo. Alonzo and he fell and they went down to-
gether. He tripped Alonzo and we got him up there
and we went on the other side. I couldn’t hold on like
Alonzo and they went down again, he seemed to be the

42 re

best man and he was on top of Alonzo and had his
hands in Alonzo’s eyes and broke his glasses. I took
hold of his hair and pulled him over this way and he
released his hold and Olin Turner got hold of him and
put him in the car,

“Q. Did you see Paul Gross there? A. Yes, sir.
He said ‘soldier why don’t you get in the car and act
like a man’ and he kicked Paul clear back on the street.’’

Mrs. F. F. Shelton, wife of a dentist, was in her
husband’s office in the Citizens Bank Building. Her at-
tention was called to the difficulty, and she testified:

“*Q. You remember the occasion when the police had
some difficulty with a soldier down the street, below your
hhusband’s office? A. Yes, sir. .

“<Q. Were you in the dentist office at the time?
A. Yes, sir.

“<Q. Was your attention called to the difficulty down
on the street by anyone in your office? A. Yes, sir.

“Q. Did you see any of the difficulty? A. Yes, sir.

_ Q. From the window of your office there? A. Yes,
sir.

“<Q, All right, tell the jury when you looked out the
window what you saw going on? A. I saw a police
lying flat on his back and a soldier boy was on top of
him, and he was pounding him in the stomach with his
knees.

““Q. Could you tell which policeman it was? <A.
_No, sir. .

“Q. What corner was it you saw them? A. They
were near this sidewalk here.

“<Q. What was their position on the street, were
they near the passage way? A. It looked like they
. blocked the passage.

“<Q. Did you see anything else? A. No, sir. I got
sick and turned away.’’

Both Burns and Couch were seriously injured in the
affray, and were treated by Dr. Paul W. Gutsche who
testified in part: ‘On the day of this difficulty or very
soon thereafter did you have occasion to treat, examine
or prescribe for Alonzo Burns? A. I did.

Le 43

“Q. State whether or not you made any X-rays or
physical examination of the man? A. He came to me
complaining of pains in his chest. I found a large area
of bruises on the left chest wall and I fluoroscoped him
and found three broken ribs. We strapped him and he
was under treatment for two or three weeks.

“Q. Did you see any lacerations on his face at that
time? A. He showed me some glasses and I told him
he was fortunate not to have his eyes injured. :

“Q. Soon after this affair on the street, were you
consulted by and did you treat the policeman, William
Couch? A. Yes, sir. I did. It was several days after
I saw Alonzo Burns.

“Q. What was his condition? A. He had quite
a bruise on his lower leg. It involved the place that was
previously injured. We had a good bit of trouble clearing
this trouble up.

“Q. Did you continue to treat Couch for a period
of time? A. Yes, sir. And referred him to Louisville
to a specialist.’’

Couch said that his hospital and medical bills
amounted to $700.

The overwhelming weight of the testimony, much of
it by disinterested witnesses, was to the effect that ap-
pellee was drunk and disorderly and resisted arrest.
Appellee, however, testified to the contrary, and an issue
was made for the jury’s determination.

In Instruction No. 1 the court submitted both the
question of false arrest and the question of unnecessary
force if the arrest was lawful. Instruction No. 2 defined
the duties of the policeman and the plaintiff, but it was
incorrect in that it failed to tell the jury that the defend-
ants, as policemen of the City of Hazard, had the right
to arrest plaintiff if they had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve, and did believe in good faith, that the plaintiff, at
the time the arrest’ was made, was drunk or disorderly
or was attempting to prevent the arrest of Ison Van-
hoose. Goins v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55 S. W. 2d 388;
Easton v. Commonwealth, 82 8. W. 996, 26 Ky. Law Rep.
960. Instruction No. 3 read: ‘‘If you find for the plain-
tiff you will find for him such a sum in damages as will
fairly and justly compensate him for such mental pain
and anguish, if any, suffered and endured by him, and

44 Ce]
for such physical pain and suffering, if any, endured
by him, on account of said arrest and imprisonment or
on account of any beating and bruising, if any, inflicted
by the defendants or’ either of them on the plaintiff; but
if you find for the plaintiff your finding in all will not
exceed the sum of $17,000.00, the amount claimed in the
petition.’’

This instruction was correct when applied to the
first paragraph of Instruction No. 1 if the jury believed
that the plaintiff’s arrest was unlawful, but standing
alone it authorized the jury, if they believed that the
arrest was lawful but unnecessary force was used, to
make a finding for all mental and physical suffering of
the plaintiff resulting from the beating and wounding of

‘the plaintiff by the defendants, Couch and Burns, where-
as it should have limited the recovery under these cireum-
stances to such mental and physical suffering as resulted
from such beating and wounding as was in excess of
what was necessary to be inflicted by the defendants,
Couch and Burns, in order to effect the arrest or to re-
tain plaintiff in their custody after the arrest or to
repel any assault by plaintiff upon them or either of them.
Romans v. McGinnis, 156 Ky. 205, 160 S. W. 928; Foster
v. Dukes, 301 Ky. 752, 193 8. W. 2d 159.

In an amended petition the plaintiff alleged that
J. W. Fouts and Ross Blondell were sureties on the
bond of the defendant Alonzo Burns. Fouts and Blon-
dell were made defendants, and they filed a separate
answer admitting that they were’ sureties on the bond.
The plaintiff introduced Miss Eleanor Jarvis, custodian
of the City records, and examined her concerning the
records in her custody showing that Alonzo Burns had
executed bond with Fouts and Blondell as sureties. Ob-
jections to most of the questions were sustained and
avowals were made, but none of this proof was necessary
or relevant and should have been omitted. There was
no issue between the plaintiff and Fouts and. Blondell.
They admitted they had signed the bond as sureties, and
it followed that their liability depended upon the outcome
of the trial between the plaintiff and the defendant
Burns. Turner v. Smith, 313 Ky. 635, 232 8.W.2d 1006;
Romans v. McGinnis, supra.

If appellee was injured in the difficulty, his injuries
were slight. He testified that he received a black eye, an

PC 45

abrasion on his cheek, and a knot on his head. There was
evidence that he had the black eye and the abrasion when
he entered George’s Restaurant, and that he received
them in a fight on the previous day. Chester Jennings,
chief of police, learned of the difficulty and visited appel-
lee in the jail about an hour after the arrest. He asked
appellee if he needed a doctor, and appellee said: ‘‘No,
somebody else might be needing a doctor.’? Drew Faulk-
ner was sent to the jail by the Defense Council to make
an investigation. He testified in part:

“Q. Just tell what took place between Mr. Van-
hoose and yourself? A. I asked the boy why he was
in there, he said the police put him in. I asked him if he
was hurt and needed a doctor and he said no. He had a
black eye and a skin place on his face.

“Q. You learn from him how long he had been in
jail? A. Yes, sir. He said he was put in that afternoon.

“Q. What was the condition of his clothing? <A.
They looked like they were soiled, like anybody’s clothes
would be from ordinary wear.’’

The only serious injuries resulting from the difficulty
were received by the defendants, Couch and Burns. In
view of all the evidence, we conclude that the verdict is
grossly excessive.

Judgment is reversed,

Powell et al. v. Childers et al.
November 10, 1950.

William J. Baxter, Judge.

Harvey T. Lisle for appellants.
R. Russell Grant and D. L. Pendleton for appellees.

Juven Latimer—Affirming.

This action grew out of these facts: Appellees, D. B.
Wilder and Fannie B. Wilder, his wife, parents of appel-
lants, Fred B. Wilder, Justine Wright, and Norma Jean
Bonino, in 1930 acquired title to the tract of land in
question. By the deed each obtained a 44 undivided inter-
est. In 1933 D. B. Wilder deeded his 4% interest to his
wife, Fannie B. Wilder. The granting clause contains
these words: ‘‘* * * unto the party of the second part,
for and during her natural life with remainder to the
heirs of the first party.’’

The habendum clause contains this language: ‘‘It is
understood that second party already owns an undivided

a 47

one-half interest in and to said real estate and first party
desires now, and has by this writing conveyed to second ,
party, his wife, his undivided one-half interest therein,
same to be and belong to second party during her natural
life, and upon her death said property, or at least the
one-half undivided interest of first party herein, and now
conveyed, shall go to the heirs of first party.”

In 1945, D. B. Wilder and his wife conveyed, by deed
of general warranty, this same property to appellees, 8.
M. Childers and his wife, Nannie Childers. Immediately
prior to the institution of this proceeding, Childers and
his wife contracted to sell this property. Upon an exam-
ination of title the deed of Wilder to his wife, containing
the granting and habendum clauses above, was discover-
ed. Childers and his wife, who had a general warranty
title, of course, complained to their grantors,

Petition was then filed under the Declartory Judg-
ment Act, Civil Code of Practice, sec. 639a-1 et seq.,
wherein appellees, joining as plaintiffs, made the children
of D. B. Wilder parties defendant. These defendants, all
of whom are adults, properly filed answer and concurred
in the allegation of their parents that their father, D. B.
Wilder, did not intend the remainder interest, as set out
in the portions of the deeds above, to be contingent, and
asked that the court adjudge that a deed joined in by
these remaindermen would cure any mistake made in
inserting the language in the granting and habendum-
clauses and convey a good fee simple title to plaintiffs,
Childers and wife. They insisted further that since they
were all the living children of Wilder, who conveyed the
property to his wife, the court should adjudge that in any
event the title should vest in the then living children of
D. B. Wilder. :

After hearing the cause, the court, in declaring the
rights of the parties, adjudged that the deed of D. B.
Wilder to his wife conveyed to her a life estate in 4 of
the property, and that at her death the fee simple title
to that portion of the land should vest in the then living
children of D. B. Wilder, or the issue of such as then
might be dead. The court then adjudged that it would be
to the best interest of all parties involved that the prop-
erty be sold for the purpose of reinvesting the proceeds
of that undivided 14 interest in other real estate to be
held under the terms and conditions of the deed with

48

reference to the rights of the remaindermen therein, It
was then ordered that the master commissioner advertise
and sell the property.

It appears that upon the sale of the property, G. B.
Powell became the purchaser. He filed exceptions to the
sale, which were overruled. The sale was confirmed and
the matter of reinvestment of that part of the proceeds
indicated above was retained for further adjudication,
to which G. B. Powell objected and excepted and prayed

an appeal to the Court of Appea!
Powell, together with the defend:
Wilder, as parties appellant.

The fact that Mr. and Mrs.
property to Childers by deed of
cates, without doubt, that they
soto do. Appellants insist that
corrected, if possible, in order to

is. Thus, we have G. B.

ants, children of D. B.

Wilder conveyed this
meral warranty indi-

e
fought they had right

this mistake should be
avoid common law ac-

tion for damages for breach of warranty. The children
of the Wilders insist that this mistake should be cor-
rected. The Wilders contend that it was only intended,
by the deed of Wilder to his wife, to create a life estate
in that % to her. It is insisted that since the children
stand ready, if necessary, to join in any conveyance that
might be required to make the title good in order to re-
lieve their parents from this situation, the court should
correct that mistake and construe the deed so as to
‘read out of it any thought of contingent remaindermen.
In support of their view, Kentucky Real Hstate Board et
al. v. Smith, 272 Ky. 318, 114 8. W. 2d 107, is cited. We
think the rule announced in that case correct based on
the circumstances therein, But, here we have no glaringly
omitted words nor confusion and uncertainty of lang-
uage. In fact, we have two clauses specifically stating
what was done. We also come face to face. with the fact
that there was no reservation, but, on the other hand, an
estate was created, first a life estate in the wife, and upon
her death the remainder to the heirs of the first party.
The persons who are to enjoy this remainder are not to
_ be ascertained at the time the life and remainder estates
are created, but upon the termination of the life estate.
Now, who will be the heirs of the first party upon the
death of the life tenant? Uncertainty therein makes this
a contingent remainder. The court properly decided this
question.

es 49

It is suggested that the sale of the property, under
491 of the Civil Code of Practice, should have been set
aside because, if there are contingent remaindermen, all
necessary parties were not properly before the court.
This raises the question of virtual representation. The
living children were before the court. Their interests are
mutual and common with contingent remaindermen. The
interests of any contingent remaindermen, therefore, are
sufficiently defended. Goff v. Renick et al., 156 Ky. 588,
161 S. W. 983.

The judgment is affirmed.

Hendricks v. Garst.
November 10, 1950.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

Meredith and Der & Logan for appellant.
Russell O’Neill for appellees.

Jupes Herm—Reversing.

50 ee

Appellee, Charles Garst, alleged that Woodrow Hen-
dricks, infant son of appellant, J. D. (Jim) Hendricks,
with the consent and permission of his father, used his
father’s Ford pickup truck, a truck permitted by appel-
lant to be used for the convenience and pleasure of his
family; that on August 23, 1947, he had parked his 1940
Packard automobile “adjacent on a publie highway in
Muhlenberg County * * * near Briar Creek Church’’;
that Woodrow Hendricks drove appellant’s truck in a

-reckless and negligent manner at an excessive rate of
speed, without keeping a proper lookout and in total
disregard of other persons, and collided with appellee’s
ear, Appellee asked for $1,000 for damages to his car,
and $150 for the loss of the use of it.

Appellant answer pleading contributory negligence;
that appellee’s car was at the time parked at night upon
the main traveled portion of the highway, not a city
street, without any lights or other danger signals. In his”
counterclaim appellant asked for $250 damages to his car.

At a trial the jury found for appellee in the sum of
$650. Appellant appeals from the judgment entered on
that verdict, urging that: (1) Woodrow Hendricks was
an adult not driving the truck on a family purpose or
mission; (2) the son was not driving the truck on the
occasion of the accident with his father’s permission;
(3) appellee’s car was parked in violation of KRS
189.450; (4) the court’s instructions as to Woodrow’s
being intoxicated were erroneous; and (5) the court
should have directed a verdict for appellant.

The evidence shows that Woodrow was born August
22, 1927, and was 20 years of age at the time of the
accident. He had. been in the armed services but: had
returned 22 days before the accident and was living with
his father at the time of the accident.

Appellant states that his son had driven his truck
on the farm, but had never driven it on the highway until
the time of the accident, and that he was not driving it
then with his consent; that he did not authorize him to
and did not know that he was going to take it out on the
highway on that occasion; that the truck was a farm
truck, used for farm hauling and for bringing supplies
to the farm. Asked what time Woodrow left home that
day, appellant said about 3:15 p. m. Asked if he made

a Bl

any effort to keep Woodrow from taking the truck away,
he answered, ‘‘I didn’t have anything to catch him in.”
He said it was about a mile from his home to the place
where the accident occurred. Asked if Woodrow had
been driving the car after he came back from the Army,
appellant answered: ‘‘He had not, unless he asked me,
and he would drive it there at home.’’ Appellee and his
father-in-law, A. P. Hill, state that appellant, on the
day after the accident, told him that ‘‘Woodrow had
been using his truck to drive places ever since he came
back from the Army.’’ Appellant denied’ making this
admission. This testimony was sufficient to take the
case to the jury under the family purpose doctrine.

Appellee states that he went to the scene of the acci-
dent shortly after the collision. Woodrow was sitting in
the sheriff’s car. ‘‘Woodrow was drunk,’ he was able
to determine that ‘‘from the way he talked.’’ The sheriff
stated that he found a whisky bottle, a ‘‘fifth,’? about one-
sixths full of whisky, in the truck. The sheriff admitted
he had testified on the examining trial of Woodrow, and
that he may have stated there, ‘I couldn’t smell any
liquor on Woodrow’s breath and I could not say he was
drunk.’’ A deputy sheriff says that on an 18-mile drive
with Woodrow to Greenville following the accident he
did not smell any odor like whisky or notice any other
symptoms of drunkenness and that he could not say he
was drunk. He admits that at the examining trial he
stated he was either drunk or knocked out.

Appellant says he had left a bottle with about three
inches of whisky under the seat of the car about four
days before the accident; he ‘‘just never had taken it
out from under the seat.’? He says he never knew of
Woodrow’s drinking before the accident. He never
drank before he went into the Army and hasn’t since
he came back. There was no proof that appellant knew
of his son’s drinking, or plea that he did. Other wit-
nesses testified that Woodrow’s reputation for sobriety
was good.

The court instructed the jury:

“1, * * * if you further believe that Woodrow
Hendricks was driving the truck at the time and place
of the accident in a reckless manner on account of being
then and there under the influence of intoxicants and

58 ee)
if you further believe he was in the habit of getting
under the influence of intoxicants for some time prior
to the accident, and that his father, J. D. Hendricks,
knew or had reasonable cause to know of the habits of
his ‘son, then he, J. D. Hendricks, is liable for the acts
of his son while running said truck under the influence
of intoxicants, * * *

“2, * * * The law places the duty on the owner
of a motor vehicle to use due care in preventing such
use when the owner knows, or has reason to know that
one who has been operating same is addicted to intoxi-
canis, * * *,

«* * * and if you further believe from the evi-
dence that J. D. Hendricks knew or had reasonable
cause to believe that his son was addicted to intoxicants,
then he owed to the plaintiff and the public the duty
of exercising due care to prevent the use of said truck
by his son, then you will find for the plaintiff,* * *.’?

These instructions seem to have been taken from
Crowell v. Duncan, 145 Va. 489, 134 S.H. 576, 50 A.L.R.
1425. See, Stanley’s Instructions, see. 137. A similar
instruction was given in Sanders v. Lakes, 270 Ky. 98,
109 S.W.2d 36. In the Sanders’ case the pleading of
Lakes‘is set out. Here there was no such pleading, and
if there had been the evidence was not sufficient to
take the case to the jury on that question. It follows
that the giving of the above instructions was in error.

Appellee admitted that the left side of his car was
parked with its left wheels on the highway—about 18
inches on the highway—the right wheels on the shoulder
of the road. For appellant it is shown that appellee’s
ear occupied about one-fourth of the road, the road
being 18 to 20 feet wide. It is shown that the parked
ear had no rear lights, or any lights or signals to warn
of its position; that it was parked at night on a state
highway, not in any city.

In Bradley v. Clarke, 219 Ky. 488, 293 S.W. 1082,
1084, in discussing KS sec. 2739-48, now KRS 189.450,
we said: ‘Apparently this section relates to the stop-
ping of a motor vehicle for the purpose of making re-
pairs or taking on or discharging passengers, but the
purpose of the statute undoubtedly was to prevent any
person from stopping a motor vehicle and leaving it

Le 53

standing on a main traveled portion of any publi¢ high-
way.??

A part of Instruction No. 3, as given by the court,
appears to have been omitted. On that account we are
unable to say whether or not the instruction as given
was correct. If there should be another trial and the
evidence on this point should be substantially the same
as on the former trial, a proper instruction should be
given in keeping with KRS 189.450 as interpreted in
Bradley v. Clarke, supra.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.

Continental Cas. Co. v. Johnson. °
November 10, 1950.
Ervine Turner, Judge.

S. H. Rice for appellant,
J. Douglas Graham for appellee.

Srantey, Commisstoner—Reversing. |

This is an action by Ramah Johnson to recover an
additional sum as indemnity for total disability. under
an accident insurance policy. The judgment was for
$740, the amount claimed.

The two provisions of the policy having relation
to the case are quoted: a

5

“Part ‘C’ Total Disability Accident Indemnity. If
injury shall not result in any of the specific losses
described in part ‘A’ but shall, while this policy is in
force, wholly and continuously disable the insured for
one day or more, the Company will pay indemnity at
the rate of the regular monthly indemnity so long as
the Insured lives and suffers said total loss of time.

“Part ‘D’ Partial Disability Accident Indemnity.
If injury shall, while this Policy is in force, wholly and
continuously disable the insured from performing one
or more important duties of his occupation, the com-
pany will pay for the period of such partial loss of time,
but not exceeding three consecutive months, indemnity
at the rate of forty per cent of the regular monthly
indemnity.”

On the night of March 31, 1947, the insured broke
both his legs in jumping to escape from a burning build-
ing. He was confined to a hospital for three months and
then to the home of his brother for two months longer.
Full payments were made by his insurer for hospital
expenses and total disability for the period of five
months up to September 1 at the rate of $50 a month.
He also received $20 a month for partial disability in
accordance with the provision of the policy above
quoted (Part ‘‘D’’) for the following three months.
The suit seeks to recover indemnity for total and con-
tinuous disability under the provision therefor above
quoted (Part ‘‘C’’) from September 1, 1947 to January,
1949.

The insured was a teacher and a preacher. He
wrote the company on August 16, 1947, that he needed
to be earning some money and if advisable, purposed
to begin work about the first of September. He in-
quired, ‘‘If I begin my full time work, I am aware that
my claim stops, but if I should begin work and find that
I am unable to continue and have to quit, can I renew
my claim for disability? Will you please advise me on
this question at your earliest convenience?’’

On September 20 he wrote the company, ‘‘On the
first of September I began performing my regular
duties again. I did not know just what the result would
be, but so far I have been able to continue.

“‘On Wednesday of this week (Sept. 17) I returned

| 55

to the hospital for a cast change and an X-ray. I will
be obliged to wear a cast for a long period of time yet,
and the X-ray reveals that there is still much infection
in the bone and almost no union of the large bone.

“My doctor, Dr, Brown, to whom you have already
been referred, says I may continue my work unless there
are further developments to necessitate my discontinu-
ing my work.

“Of course I can not walk yet—I can put no weight
whatsoever on my right foot, but I do hope it will not
be necessary for me to discontinue my work. I need to
be earning.’’

This letter fairly and quite fully describes his con-
dition, which was only elaborated by the evidence. Dur-
ing this period and until January 1, 1949, the insured
continued his work as a teacher and preacher but was
greatly handicapped by reason of having his ankle in a
brace or cast and by having to use crutches most of
the time. He was unable to stand at the blackboard
without pain, or to properly supervise the recreation of
his pupils. In his calling as a minister of the gospel
he was handicapped in his pastoral service and in his
preaching, during which he had to rest his foot on a
chair. Thus, it is shown that the insured was disabled
from performing all of his occupational duties or obli-
gations, though what he was not able to do was of
relatively minor importance.

The policy is of the ‘‘non-occupational’’ or general
type. For some time this court made no distinction
in construing that character of accident or sickness in-
surance and the ‘‘occupational’’ type. See Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Harris, 254 Ky. 23, 70
S.W.2d 949, 951. It was held the insured was entitled
to the disability benefits of his policy if he showed phy-
sical inability to follow his usual occupation. In the
Harris case, the condition of liability (in effect the same
as the instant policy) was defined as, an ‘‘inability to
do and perform in a reasonable and practical way all
material acts in the pursuit of the occupation or em-
ployment of the insured, but do not mean absolutely
helpless or entire physical disability.” But in Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588,
592, 153 A.L.R. 422, the difference in the character of
insurance or security against financial loss was recog-

—“C;sSCSCiés
nized and previous cases construing the ‘‘non-occupa-
tional’? type of policies were overruled, limited, how-
ever, to a prospective effect. (The present policy was
issued two years later.). We there declared: ‘‘In such
contracts (nonoccupational) the insured should be re-
quired to show physical inability not only to follow
his regular occupation but also any occupation for which
he may be fitted by education, training and experience,
which may yield a reasonably substantial gain or profit,
rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood.’’

This was reaffirmed in Travelers Insurance Oo. v.
Williams, 303 Ky. 703, 198 8.W.2d 797, and Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 312 Ky. 661, 229 S.W.2d
466.

The condition of recovery in the present policy is
simply ‘‘wholly and continuously disabled.’’? There is
no additional descriptive clause or effort to define the
disability, such as in the policies involved in the Bryant
and Williams cases. In its legal interpretation and ap-
plication the conditional term will be regarded as rela-
tive, depending upon the character of occupation and
the capabilities of the insured and upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. It will be liberally and
not literally construed in favor of the insured so as
to accomplish the objects and purposes of the contract.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bryant, supra. Ordinarily,
this is as the insured person supposed it would be con-
strued or as seems to have been understood by him,
having a reasonable and proper regard for the ordinary
and usual meaning of the term. Forman y. Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 173 Ky. 547, 191 S. W. 279; Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Adams, 259 Ky. 726, 83 8S, W.
2d 461. The facts of the case at bar do not bring it
within that liberal interpretation and coverage. The
insured, as he frankly and fairly recognized in his
two letters, was not ‘‘wholly disabled’? even from pur-
suing his usual occupations. He was undoubtedly partial-
ly disabled, for he was hampered in such way by his
physical condition resulting from the accident as to
make his work more difficult and less efficient. He was
not able to perform some of his duties, but the officials
of his school and church testify that notwithstanding
his disability his services were satisfactory during this.
period he now claims he was ‘‘wholly disabled.’’ It did

es BT
not affect his earning capacity, or cause any loss of
time, for he was paid his usual salaries.

‘Whatever may be the proper meaning of this policy
provision under which full indemnity may be recovered
where there is evidence that the insured was disabled
from doing any and every kind of work, or substantially
-all the necessary and material things in any occupation
he was fitted for and which required his own exertions
in the customary and usual manner, there was no evi-
dence of that character or degree of disability in the
present case. See Great Northern Casualty Co. v. Me-
Collough, 96 Ind. App. 506, 174 N. H. 103; Hasson v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 309
Mich. 331, 15 N. W. 2d 659. Here there was no contra-
diction in the direct evidence, or any different inference
therefrom that the insured was not ‘wholly and con-
tinuously disabled’’ either from performing his usual
occupation or any other. He was, as we have said, par-
tially disabled during the period and accepted the com-
pensation provided therefor. The question, therefore,
was one of law, and the court should have directed the
jury to find for the defendant.

The judgment is reversed.

Kemp v. Commonwealth.
November 10, 1950.
Ray C. Lewis, Judge.

58 eS

Lyttle & White and John D. White for appellant.

A. B. Funk, Attorney General and John B. Browning, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Jupen Cammacx—<A firming,

This appeal is from a judgment sentencing ‘Troy
Kemp to two years in prison for carrying concealed a
deadly weapon. Reversal is urged upon the ground
that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the
submission of the case to the jury without the evidence
concerning an assault and battery upon a complaining
witness,

It is true that, without the testimony of Mary
Thompson, with whom Kemp had been keeping com-
pany, there would not have been sufficient evidence to
warrant the submission of the case to the jury. Mary
Thompson said she and two other persons were sitting
in the cab of a truck when Kemp walked up and slapped
her. He then took her sister’s baby from her and put
it in her sister’s lap. He slapped her again before pull-
ing her out of the truck. She did not see Kemp with a
pistol when she got out of the truck, but when she turned
around she saw it. After she got down to the railroad
track Kemp hit her with the pistol. The other persons
in the truck did not see a pistol, but they did say that
Mary’s face was bruised when she came back to the
truck. Kemp admitted slapping Mary Thompson, but
denied being armed or that he owned a pistol. Mary
received medical treatment for her bruise.

Kemp contends vigorously that it was error to
admit the testimony relating to the assault and battery.
-As said in Jones v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 666, 198
S. W. 2d 969, it is a fundamental rule of evidence that
testimony of other offenses by a defendant is not ad-
missible unless it comes within certain well established
exceptions to the rule. One of those exceptions is that
evidence of another and distinct offense is admissible
if it was committed as part of the same transaction
and formed part of the res gestae, or where it is so

es 59

closely connected with the one for which the defendant
is being tried as to be inseparable therefrom. Jordan v.
Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 391, 42 S. W. 2d 509.

In the case before us the evidence relating to the
assault and the carrying of the concealed weapon was
so closely connected that it would have been very difficult
to have treated separately the two offenses, In brief,
the prosecuting witness said Kemp first assaulted her
with his open hand and then struck her with a pistol
after he had pulled her out of the truck. Her story was
that she did not see the pistol until after she had left
the truck.

Judgment affirmed.

Montgomery v. Whaley.
November 10, 1950.
J. Wirt Turner, Judge.

Sam Montgomery, pro se.

A. H. Funk, Attorney General and W. Owen Keller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Juven Hetm—Dismissing appeal.

On October 16, 1950, appellant, Sam Montgomery,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Oldham
Circuit Court, stating that he was being unlawfully de-

60° ee
tained at the Kentucky State Reformatory at LaGrange
on an illegal and void ‘‘mittimus commitment’? from
the Criminal Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court on
the charge of ‘‘assault with an offensive weapon with
intent to rob,’’ in violation of KRS 433.150. Appellant
alleged that he was being held in violation of his con-
stitutional rights, and prayed that a writ of habeas
corpus issue.

Appellee, R. L. Whaley, Warden of the State Re-
formatory, filed a response stating that he received the
petitioner, Sam Montgomery, into the State Reforma-
tory by ‘‘due and proper orders of the Jefferson Circuit
Court’’; that appellant was charged with a public of-
fense and convicted of that offense; that appellant’s
‘‘petition contains no cause of action ‘to issue a writ of
habeas corpus, inasmuch as no appeal has ever been
taken in this case as required by law.’’ Appellee also
filed a general demurrer to the petition. The court sus-
tained the demurrer to the petition, and dismissed
appellant’s petition, Appellant prayed and was granted
an appeal to this court,

Criminal Code of Practice, section 429-1, provides:
‘‘Any party to a trial under a writ of habeas corpus
may appeal to the Court of Appeals by filing with the
clerk of the Court of Appeals, within ten days after the
entry of the judgment, the original record and a tran-
script of the evidence, together with a notice of appeal,
“which notice shall be served on the other parties at-least
two days before the appeal is filed. *'* *”? :

The record shows that the judgment was entered
October 23, 1950. The ‘‘original record’? was filed with
the clerk of this court on October 31, 1950, but appel-
lant was also required to serve ‘‘a notice of appeal’?
on the ‘‘other parties’? at least two days before the
appeal was filed here. This he has failed to do. For
that reason his appeal must be dismissed. Donovan v.
Harrison, 299 Ky. 714, 187 8. W. 2d 280; Helsley v.
McKenzie, 299 Ky. 712, 718, 187 8. W. 24 279.

Appeal dismissed.
|

a 61

Evans v. Hill.
November 17, 1950.
R. L. Maddox, Judge.

Floyd Taylor for appellant.
Kelly Clore for appellee.

Cater Justices Srms—Affirming.

This record reached us just a few days before the
November election and on the day the case was decided
we entered an order affirming the judgment and reciting
the opinion would follow at a later date.

Qn Sept. 18, 1950, Charles Evans filed in the office
of the clerk of the Bell County Court what purported to
be a petition nominating him as a candidate for member
of the Bell County Board of Education in Educational
Division No. 4 in the election to be held on Nov. 7, 1950.
His nominating petition was signed by 101 qualified
voters of the district and met the requirements of KRS
160.220, and was filed within not less than 45 nor more

62° ee
than 60 days before the day of the election in compli-
ance with KRS 118.130 (4). Subsequently, Evans dis-
covered that by mistake his petition showed he was a
candidate in District No. 5 when as a matter of fact he
and all the signers of his petition were residents and
legal voters in School District No. 4; that instead of
filing as a candidate in District No. 4 as intended, he
had filed as such candidate for the board of education
in District No. 5.

On Sept. 29, 1950, Evans presented to Clarence
Hill, Clerk of the Bell County Court, his petition and
affidavit asking that the error be corrected and that he
be placed on the ballots as such candidate in District No.
4 instead of District No. 5. This the clerk refused to do
and Evans filed this suit in the Bell Circuit Court. to
mandamus the clerk to make the correction in Evans’
nominating petition. A general demurrer was sustained
to the petition as amended, Evans refused to plead fur-
ther, the petition was dismissed and he appeals.

In Bogie v. Hill, 286 Ky. 732, 151 8. W. 2d 765, it
was held that K. 8. sec. 4399-25, now KRS 160.220, was
mandatory in requiring that such nominating petition
be signed by the requisite number of qualified persons
and must show the district or division of the county dis-
trict and the place of residence of each person signing
it. The Bogie opinion followed Allen v. Hardin, 272 Ky.
396, 114 8. W. 2d 494.

Evans did not live in District No. 5 nor did any of
the signers of his petition reside therein but le and all
the signers of his petition lived in District No. 4. There-
fore, it is clear that the petition filed with the county
court clerk did not authorize that official to place Evans’
name-on the ballot as a candidate from District No. 4
because the petition asked that his name be placed there-
on as a candidate in District No. 5. This petition had no
more efficacy than a similar one would have had filed by
Evans in an adjoining county in which neither he nor
his signers were legal voters, or one filed in behalf of a
candidate for one office when he sought election to an-
other and different office.

Evans did not discover the nominating petition
erroneously named him a candidate in District No. 5
instead of No. 4 until Sept. 29, 1950, when he attempted
to have it corrected. It was then too late for him to do

ee

so as the date was within less than 45 days before the
election, KRS 118.1380 (4).

As Evans had no right under the nominating peti-
tion filed to have his name go on the ballot as a candi-
date from District No. 4, it is apparent we do not reach
the interesting question so ably argued in appellee’s
brief that mandamus will not lie in this instance to com-
pel the clerk to put Evans’ name on the ballot. Therefore,
we will neither discuss nor decide it.

The judgment is affirmed.
a
Tennessee Gas & Transmission Oo. v. Lawrence et al.

November 17, 1950.
K. §. Alcorn, Judge.

Jay W. Harlan and Chenault Huguely for appellant.
BH. C. Newlin and George R. Silliman for appellees.

Srawiey, Commisstoner—Affirming.

An excessive verdict is the only contention made in
this condemnation case. The right of way for a gas pipe
line runs through the front of a 36 acre farm on the
Danville and Lebanon highway. It is about 870 feet in
length and 50 feet in width except near the road where
it is 100 feet wide for a distance of 200 feet. The widest

64 |

part was or is for temporary use in storing machinery
during construction. The total area of the easement is
1.22 acres. The verdict was $510.40 as the value of the
easement and $80 for damages to adjacent land.

The property over which the easement runs is a
farm with a residence, barns, etc. The owner lives on a
much larger farm in the neighborhood. This land is all
in grass and has been used for grazing and keeping of
livestock. The estimates of value of the farm as a whole
were from $11,000 to $12,600 by the owner and his wit-
nesses and around $5,400 by others. The owner fixed the
value of the land taken for the easement at $400 and
damages at $3,600. Another witness placed the difference
in value of the farm before and after the taking at
$1,800, another at $1,500 and four others at $1,000. The
average of the seven witnesses is $1,600, Eliminating
the extravagant damages claimed by the owner, the
average is $1,200. The only basis for the estimates is
that the farm will sell for that much less because of the
pipe line easement.

For the company we have the testimony of, the
three commissioners of the county court that they ap-
praised the value of the easement at $210.40 and allowed
$85 for damages for reseeding the strip, or a total of
$295.40. They repeated their estimates of value on this
trial. Other witnesses, who appear to have been just as
well qualified as were those introduced by the owner,
placed the value of the easement from $150 to $400 and
no damage to the remaining land. The average of seven
witnesses was $265.

. The average valuation of all fourteen witnesses is,
in round figures, $900. In addition, ‘the jury viewed the
property and the condition in which it had been left
after the pipe line was put through. The verdict is only
$190.40 more than the highest estimate of value and
damages fixed by any witness for the condemnor, and
it is readily seen less than one-half the average value
fixed by witnesses for the owner.

We think the verdict is reasonable and the conten-
tion of the appellant cannot be sustained.

Judgment affirmed,

6

a

Compton v. Runyon.
November 17, 1950.
EB. D. Stephenson, Judge.

Baird & Hays for appellant.
¥F, M. Burke for appellee.

Cray, Commissionzr—A firming.

A jury awarded appellee $500 damages for an
assault and battery committed by appellant. Several
grounds are urged for reversal of the judgment.

Appellant and appellee were neighbors, but appar-
ently were not on friendly terms. Appellant had the
police remove appellee’s automobile from the street in
front of the former’s house. When appellee came home
that evening he asked his wife where his automobile
was, and she told him to find out from appellant,

The party’s versions of what happened immediately
thereafter are irreconcilably conflicting. Appellee’s story

66 ee

is: he went to appellant’s home, knocked on the door
and inquired of appellant’s wife concerning the where-
abouts of her husband. She told him he was not at home.
Appellee turned to leave, and when at the edge of the
porch, he was struck twice in the head by appellant and
knocked unconscious.

Appellant’s story is: appellee ran up to the house
in an angry mood, and when the former’s wife answered
the door, appellee cursed and threatened to beat up ap-
pellant. ‘The latter thereupon picked up a stick, pushed
appellee through the front door, and when appellee turn-
ed on. him again, he hit him one time with the stick.
While appellant claims the two parties were standing
face to face, he could not explain how it happened that
appellee’s injuries were on the back of his head.

Appellant contends the verdict was not sustained
by the evidence, and he was entitled to a directed ver-
dict. He argues that his story must be accepted as true,
and considering it alone, the blow he struck was justi-
fied. Whether or not he was entitled to a directed ver-
dict does not depend upon his evidence, but the evidence
for the other side. The testimony of witnesses for appel-
lee proved an unprovoked assault and battery. The jury
had a right to believe appellee’s story and disbelieve
that of appellant. If there ever was a case calling for a
jury determination of the true facts, this is it.

Appellant next contends the damages were exces-
sive. The proof shows appellee was struck a severe
blow; he was knocked unconscious; he required imme-
diate medical attention to have the wound sewed up;
and it did not heal for thirty or forty days. Appellee
testified he had a constant headache for over six months,
and the injury impaired his working ability. He
asked for punitive damages, and even if nothing was
awarded on this account, the sum of $500 does not strike
us as being excessive,

Appellant finally insists the Court should have in-
structed the jury to specify in its verdict whether or not
the damages were compensatory or punitive. The rec-
ord does not show appellant offered an instruction on
this proposition, and it does not appear he made any
objection to the general verdict when it was returned
by the jury. We do not see how appellant was preju-
diced by this general verdict, but if there was error, it

ee 67

was waived when appellant failed to request a separate
verdict before the jury was discharged. See Adams v.
Commonwealth ex rel. State Highway Commission, 285
Ky. 38, 146 8. W. 2d 7.

The judgment is affirmed.

Robinson v. Commonwealth.
November 17, 1950.
J S. Forester, Judge.

J. K. Beasley and W. E. Wall for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant At-
torney General, for appellee.

Van Sant, Commissionrr—Reversing.

Appellant was tried in his absence and convicted of
having whiskey in his possession for sale in Local Option
Territory and punishment fixed at a fine of $100.00 and
confinement in the County Jail for a period of sixty (60)
days. When the case was called for trial, appellant’s
attorney appeared and informed the court that on that

morning, and not before, he had learned that his client
was ill and unable to attend court, and that he desired.
to be present in person to aid in the management of his
defense; but, since appellant’s attorney had learned
these facts, he had not had tinie to prepare a motion for
continuance and to secure affidavits in support thereof.
He therefore moved the court to pass the case until
1:00 p. m, to give him an opportunity to make a formal
showing. The court overruled the motion and immediate-
ly proceeded to try appellant in his absence. In due time
a motion for a new trial was made and the error of the
court in refusing to pass the case to permit a showing
to be made and the error of the court in refusing a con-
tinuance were made grounds for a new trial. In support
of the motion for a new trial an affidavit of appellant’s
physician was filed. This affidavit stated that appellant
was confined to his home by illness on the date of the
trial and had been so confined continuously for two
weeks previous thereto; that the affiant regularly had
visited his patient and had personal knowledge that
‘appellant was physically ‘‘incapable’’ of attending court
on the date of the trial. The motion for a new trial was
overruled,

Had the showing which was made in support of the
motion for a new trial been made before the trial, the
court would have erred in overruling the motion for
continuance and such error would have been prejudicial.
Ehrlich v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 680, 115 S. W. 797.
Justice demands that a defendant be accorded reason-
able time to make a showing in respect to his substantial
rights and in the circumstances presented by this record
we are of the opinion that the court should have passed
the case as requested, in order that a showing might
have been made. In any event, when the showing was
made and the statements contended in the affidavits were
not controverted, the court abused its discretion in over-
ruling the motion and in not granting a new trial.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion.

Le 69

Molen v. Molen.
November 17, 1950.
R. ©. Tartar, Judge.

Russell Jones for appellant.
H. C. Kennedy for appellee.

Juven Cammackx—Affirming in part, reversing in
part.

Mrs. Eda Molen is appealing from the parts of a
divorce judgment which denied her alimony and directed
that she pay the costs of the action.

The parties were married in 1914, They have been
separated for more than 15 years. Their three children
are past 30 years of age. Mrs. Molen lives in Pennsyl-
vania. Mr. Molen lives in Pulaski County. He filed the
action asking that he be granted a divorce on the ground
that the parties had lived apart for more than five
years, In her answer and counterclaim Mrs. Molen asked
for a divorce on the grounds of abandonment; cruel and
inhuman treatment; and more than five years’ separa-
tion. She asked for alimony and her costs in the action.
The chancellor granted Mr. Molen a divorce and directed
that Mrs. Molen pay all the costs.

Mr. Molen now receives $30 per month from a trust
estate created under his father’s will. He owns no prop-
erty and, apparently, has not been able to support him-
self for many years. In his judgment the chancellor
pointed out that he had personal knowledge of Mr.
Molen’s ‘‘weakness’’ (addiction to narcotics) and of his

70

inability to make a living for himself. Mrs. Molen offered
proof as to the marital difficulties of the couple while
they were living together. Under the circumstances, we
think the chancellor was justified in denying Mrs. Molen
alimony. He was not warranted, however, in adjudging
the costs against her. It was not shown that she has
any substantial estate of her own. She supports herself
by her weekly earnings. The costs should have been ad-
judged against Mr. Molen.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

|
McPherson et al. v. Dukes et al.

November 17, 1950.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

71

Meredith, Mer & Logan and Frank A, Logan for appellants.

C. A. Denny for appellees.
Juver Kwienr—Reversing.

On December 30, 1947, appellant, Guy McPherson,
and wife executed a written lease to appellees, Ernest
Ray Dukes and R. L. Ford, leasing to them for one year,
with a renewal option for five years, a lot on which there
was located a two story store and apartment building
in Greenville, at the rental rate of $85.00 per month.
In addition to the provisions usually contained in such
leases, none of which are involved here, it contained
these provisions that have given rise to this controversy:
(1) The premises shall not be under-let without written
consent of the lessors; (2) The lessees shall have the
right to the joint use of a parking lot situated adjoining

72 |

the premises on the east side thereof. At the same time
appellant, Guy McPherson, executed to the appellees a
bill of sale by which he sold to them all the goods and
merchandise and all the furniture and fixtures located
in the store building, except one walk-in refrigerator.
In this bill of sale it was agreed that the grantor would
not engage in the grocery business in the City of Green-
ville during the term of the lease and that the grantees
would not engage in the poultry, feed, cream or fruit
business on the leased premises for the same term.

On August 21, 1948, this suit was filed by appellees
against appellant claiming a breach of these written
contracts and asking damages in the sum of $2300. The
breach complained of is that appellant has disturbed
appellees’ possession and free use of the house and lot
mentioned by erecting on part of the lot a store house
in which he is doing business in competition with ap-
pellees by selling groceries and provisions; that after
appellees had bought and taken possession of the store
purchased from him, appellant unlawfully and without
right carried away property of the value of $300. By
amended petition they asked additional damages of
$500 for continuation of the things complained of in the
petition and the further sum of $2000 for loss and dam-
age to the fixtures, which they were compelled to store,
and the loss sustained in moving the stock of merchan-
dise because they were not able to exercise the five year
option on the lease due to the breach of the terms of the .
two contracts by appellant. They moved out of the store
building on December 31, 1948. They prayed for total
damages of $4800.

In his answer and counter-claim, appellant denied
the allegations of the petition and set up as a further
defense that appellees had breached the terms of the
written lease by failing to pay rent as provided therein;
by selling poultry, feed, cream and fruit in their store
in competition with appellant contrary to their agree-
ment not to do so and by under-letting part of the
premises to others without appellant’s consent to their
doing so. He further pleaded estoppel contending that
appellees had stood by and watched completion of the
building on the premises without complaint.

The issues thus raised by the respective contentions
of the opposing parties were submitted to the jury which

ee 73

brought in a verdict of $750 in favor of appellees, Ap-
pellant appeals from the judgment based on that verdict,
asking reversal on two grounds: (1) appellees did not
make out a case and the lower court therefore erred
in failing to peremptorily instruct the jury to find for
the defendants; (2) that the court erred in its instrue-
tions to the jury.

The evidence on the issues involved are, as usual,
highly conflicting. On the $300 item appellees’ proof is
that when the stock of merchandise was sold to them,
nothing was reserved but, in spite of that, after the deal
was closed appellant came to the store and removed
therefrom some eggs, oranges, apples, lemons, coconuts,
onions and a box of mixed cartridges, all of the total
value of $320.30, and that these were in the store when
the trade was made. On the contrary, appellant’s proof
was that these items were not in the store but were
in the cases upstairs and that they were specifically re-
served from the sale by oral agreement between the
parties when the contract was being drawn, although no
reservation was placed in the contract because the par-
ties agreed at the time that no such reservation was
necessary. This made an issue of fact on this item which
was properly submitted to the jury under the second
instruction given by the court.

Likewise there was conflict in the testimony as to
whether appellees first breached the agreements by fail-
ing to pay the rent and by engaging in the poultry,
feed and fruit business and by sub-leasing a portion of
the premises. There was no evidence that appellees en-
gaged to any extent in the poultry or feed business, but
there was evidence that they did sell fruit at retail in
their store with the knowledge and consent of the ap-
pellant from whom they bought part of their fruits.
Appellant was engaged partly in the wholesale fruit
business and appellees’ evidence is that it was only the
wholesale fruit business that appellees agreed not to
engage in in competition with appellant. The latter’s evi-
dence is to the contrary. On the question of sub-letting
the apartment, which was above the store, appellees’
proof is that the tenant who occupied it when they took
over the property vacated it; that they found another ten-
ant, whose wife was kin to appellant, and he consented
that the apartment be rented to them and that it would

14 |

not be necessary for him to give his written consent.
Appellant’s proof is to the contrary, thus presenting an
issue of fact which was for the jury. Appellees’ proof
is that the rent was paid in accordance with the con-
tract. Appellant’s proof, though weak, was to the con-
trary. All these issues were properly submitted to the
jury under the third instruction of the court.

It is shown by all the evidence that shortly after the
lease was executed appellant did build a store room
about 16 feet by 40 feet on the east side of and close to
the store room leased to appellees and on that part of
the lot of which the lessees had the right to the joint use
as a parking lot, It is also shown by the evidence that
appellant used this store room for his business in which
he operated a restaurant and sold ice cream, cold drinks
and sandwiches, also potatoes, and perhaps some other
items of produce and fruit. He denied that he sold
groceries at this store. The evidence of the appellees is
to the contrary. This issue of fact was properly sub-
mitted to the jury as part of the first instruction given
by the court.

* There was also conflict in the testimony as to wheth-
er appellees stood by without objection while he was
constructing the building adjacent to the one he had
leased to them. Their evidence was that they did ob-
ject, while his evidence was that they raised no objections
to the building as a violation of the contract and only
raised the objection after this disagreement arose late
in August when he gave them notice to get out. This
issue of fact was properly submitted to the jury in the
fourth instruction given by the court.

There was conflict in the testimony as to the extent
of the damages appellees suffered as the result of the
erection of the building by appellant adjacent to the
leased premises. Appellant’s testimony was to the effect
that no damages resulted and at most only an incon-
venience was caused by the necessity of hauling and
unloading goods at the back end of the store or at a
side entrance which could be reached though not so con-
veniently as before the building was erected. Appellees’
evidence tended to show a steady loss of trade and a
reduction of their monthly receipts which they claim
resulted from the erection of this building, and other
acts complained of, until the receipts almost reached

Le 15

the vanishing point in December 1948 when they gave

up the lease and option to renew it for the five year

period; that they were unable to obtain another store

in which to operate and they had to move in and con-

solidate their stock with another retailer and store their
tures.

The real trouble with appellees’ case was their
failure to prove with any degree of definiteness the
monetary damages sustained by them as a result of the
breaches of the two contracts by appellant which the
jury apparently found to exist. The damages on the
$300 item were definitely and clearly proven by showing
the then market value of each of the items which ap-
pellees claimed appellant removed from the store with-
out authority. As to the damages flowing from the other
breaches complained of, there was no evidence from
which the jury could measure these damages with any
degree of accuracy. The only thing shown by appellees’
evidence was that during the year there was some de-
cline in the monthly gross receipts of the business which
was shown to have been as follows: January $3245.59,
February $2327.50, March $2459.54, April $2585.11,
May $2289.07, June $2072.87, July $1840.73, August
$2041.44, September $2256.54, October $1598.39, No-
vember $1517.07, December $601.31. There was no evi-
dence showing what profit, if any, was represented.
by these gross sales and therefore what profit—loss, if
any, was sustained by appellees. If the gross sales rep-
resented no profit, the decline in gross sales would
represent no loss. Before there can be a recovery, it is
necessary to show profits with a degree of accuracy.
Ky. Utilities Co. v. Warren Ellison Cafe, 231 Ky. 558,
21 8. W. 2d 976. It is not the amount of business done
but the gain or profit arising from it which constitutes
its value. Probst v. Hinesley, 133 Ky. 64, 117 8. W. 389;
Hinesley v. Beatty, 183 Ky. 64, 117 S. W. 389. So while
it was for the jury to determine from the evidence
whether the actions of appellant were the cause of the
loss, if any, sustained by appellees, it was appellees’
duty to show what losses they sustained and not leave
it to the jury to speculate what these losses were. There-
fore it was error for the court to submit the question to
the jury under general instruction No. 2 as given. In-
stead appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction
as‘to damages resulting from the loss of profits should

16 es

have been sustained because of failure of appellees’
proof. This is likewise true with reference to loss on
the fixtures. It is shown by appellees’ testimony that
they paid appellant $2750 for these fixtures; that when
they gave up the lease at the end of the year they sold
some of them and stored the remainder. But it was not
shown what they had obtained for those sold, what it
cost to store the rest, nor was there any other evidence
from which the jury could fix any measure of damages
except that in the opinion of appellees the remainder of
the fixtures left on hand was worth about $400. For all
the jury knew from the evidence, they may have sold
those that they did sell for as much or more than they
gave for them and, therefore, suffered no loss. This
again left the jury to guess at the loss sustained, if any.
Since the verdict of the jury was a general one, there is
no way of knowing whether part of it was for loss on
the fixtures or loss of profits or what part of it, if any,
was for the merchandise claimed to have been moved
by appellant without authority.

While it was perhaps not prejudicial and would not
justify a reversal on that ground alone, it is noted that
instruction No. 2, as given by the court, authorized a
total recovery of $5100 whereas plaintiff sought recovery
of only $4800, made up of $2300, as set up in the peti-
tion, and $2500, as set up in the amended petition. It is
true that in the prayer of the amended petition appel-
lees added up the sums to read $5100, thus misleading
the court in giving the instructions. However, it is clear
from the context and prayer of the two pleadings that
$4800 is the total amount claimed as Shown by the rec-
ord before us. Since the case must again be tried, the
error should be corrected in giving the instructions in
the next trial.

For the reasons indicated herein, the judgment is
reversed for proceedings consistent herewith.

Madden v. Madden.
November 17, 1950.
J. 8. Forester, Judge.

Ln 17
a
J. K. Beasley for appellant,
E.L. Morgan for appellee.

Juven Cammacx—Affirming.

This appeal is from that part of a divorce judg-
ment which allowed Susie Madden $25 a month as
alimony.

Grant and Susie Madden were married in 1931.
Hach of them had been married previously. Grant had
three children by his former marriage. The married
life of the Maddens seems not to have been a happy one
because they had been divorced and remarried prior to
the filing of this action. Mrs. Madden is 60 years of
age and Mr. Madden is 56. Mr. Madden’s son by his
former marriage lived with the couple and apparently
was partly responsible for much of the trouble between
them. Mr. Madden works in a coal mine making about
$l4aday. ~

Following an encounter between the couple and the
stepson, during which a pistol was fired by Mrs. Mad-
den, Mr. Madden filed this action seeking a divorce.
Mrs. Madden filed an answer and counter-claim wherein
she asked for maintenance, but stated that she did not
want a divorce. In the final judgment Mrs. Madden was
granted a divorce and the $25 monthly alimony allow-
ance toward which complaint is directed. No question

78

was raised in the lower court as to the improper grant-
ing of the divorce to Mrs. Madden. That part of the
judgment is not appealable. KRS 21.060.

Hach party charged the other with making threats.
There seem to have been many encounters and much
unpleasantness. Unquestionably, neither party was
without fault. The chancellor would have been war-
ranted in granting Mr. Madden a divorce from bed
and board, with an allowance for Mrs. Madden for
maintenance. Mrs. Madden does not question the
amount of the award. Under the circumstances we think
the part of the judgment appealed from should be and

it is affirmed,
a
Edwards v. Downing et al.

November 17, 1950.
Chester D, Adams, Judge.

Elmer Drake, Delmer D. Howard for appellant.
W. E. Darragh, Yancey, Martin & Okerman for appellees.

a 79
Jupex Latimer—Affirming.

C. E. Downing and his sister, Inez T. Downing,
appellees, obtained judgment against appellant in the
sum of $1,000 as damages for breach of contract. The
alleged breach arose in this manner. Appellant’s bid
of $16,000 for property offered by appellees at auction
was accepted. Pursuant to terms and conditions an-
nounced at sale, down payment of $1,600, or 10% of the
purchase price, was made on day of sale, the balance
to be paid upon delivery of deed. Appellant allegedly
failed to comply with the terms of the sale and con-
summate the transaction, thereby necessitating a sec-
ond sale. Appellees sought to recover the difference
between the bid price at the first sale and the sale
price at the second auction.

Appellant’s version of the transaction is that he
did bid $16,000 for the property; that on the day of the
sale he delivered his check in the sum of $1,600 as a
down payment; that he was to pay the balance of
$14,400 not later than October 1st; that a day or so
after the sale, appellee, C. EH. Downing, informed him
that a mistake had been made and that he would not
convey 188 foot frontage as advertised and announced
at the sale, but instead would convey the tract with a
frontage not in excess of 154 feet; and that because
of this declaration, appellant then stopped payment on
the $1,600 check made in down payment.

Had appellant been able to establish his version,
his cause would be well founded and meritorious. How-
ever, it must be noted that appellee, C. E. Downing,
strenuously denied making the alleged statement to
appellant regarding a change in the frontage to be
conveyed, and further testified that the property upon
the second sale was the identical property sold at the
first sale. Also, when we come to the matter of stop-
ping payment on the check, appellant destroyed his
version of the matter by testifying that he did not stop
payment on the check and that he didn’t know why
payment was stopped or that it was stopped until this
litigation. This matter, under adequate instructions,
was properly submitted to the jury. .

Appellant is insistent that before appellees should
be heard they must have tendered a deed in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the sale. This was

80 |

never done. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the
down payment check was stopped. This certainly was
a breach. It was entirely unnecessary and apparently
useless and futile for appellees to tender a deed there-
after. Johnston v. Benjamin, 219 Ky. 169, 292 S.W.
801; Kentucky Consumers’ Oil Company et ‘al. v. Gen-
eral Bonded ‘Warehousing Corporation et al., 299 Ky.
161, 184 S.W.2d 972; and Harmon v. Thompson, 119
Ky. 528, 84 S.W. 569.

The judgment is affirmed.

American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., v. Shely.
November 17, 1950.
Chester D, Adams, Judge.

John L, Davis and Stoll, Keenon & Park for appellee.
Juver Hetm—Affirming.

ee a

On April 1, 1947, appellant, American Casualty
Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, issued to appellee,
BR. S. Shely, doing business as the Shely Construction
Company, a comprehensive liability insurance policy
for the period April 1, 1947 to April 1, 1948. On or
about September 28, 1946, appellee, a general con-
tractor, entered into an agreement with the Louisville
Gas and Electric Company whereby appellee agreed
to construct an underground conduit system on the
west side of Sixth Street, between Walnut and Broad-
way, in Louisville. The construction work was com-
pleted about June 1, 1947. On September 12, 1947, dur-
ing the course of a rain storm, a tree on Sixth Street
near Broadway blew over, falling on an automobile and
resulting in the death of its driver, Joseph F. Stein-
metz, and damage to the automobile.

On February 20, 1948, actions were filed in the
Jefferson Circuit Court to recover for the death of the
driver, and damage to the automobile. The defendants
there were the Louisville Gas and Electric Company,
City of Louisville, and appellee. The petitions in each
case, filed as exhibits in this case, alleged that the de-
fendants were negligent in causing or allowing roots
from the tree located near Sixth and Broadway to be
cut while constructing and digging a ditch along the
street, thereby causing the tree to be in a weakened and
dangerous condition. Upon receiving notice of the
accident, appellee gave to appellant due and timely
notice, in accordance with the provisions of the insur-
ance policy filed with the petition. Upon receiving
notice, appellant referred the defense of the actions in
Jefferson County to its legal counsel in Louisville, who
proceeded to investigate the case. Louisville counsel
for appellant made an investigation beginning Febru-
ary 26, 1948 and continuing off and on until November
21, 1949, the date the suits were settled. They filed
demurrers on behalf of appellant on April 23, 1948;
filed answers in May, 1948, and attended the taking of
depositions on behalf of appellee in August, 1948.

In December, 1948, appellant notified appellee that
its policy did not cover this action. On January 31,
1949, appellant gave written notice, by registered mail,
to appellee that the suits were not covered under the
insurance policy, and that any action theretofore taken
or thereafter to be taken by appellant in defense of

82 eS

the suits was in full reservation of all its rights under
the policy. On February 7, 1949, counsel for appellee
wrote appellant’s counsel stating that since appellant
had undertaken the defense of the two law suits with-
out prior notice to appellee of its disclaimer of liability,
it was his position that it would be precluded on the
grounds of waiver and estoppel from thereafter avoid-
ing liability under the policy.

The two suits were assigned for trial on November
21, 1949. On that date the suits were settled, the par-
ties entering into an agreement reciting their contro-
versy concerning the coverage, as to whether the ap-
pellant was estopped to assert noncoverage, and that
$2500 advanced by appellant toward settlement of the
two suits would not be considered as an admission of
coverage or liability under the policy. It was agreed
that a final determination as to the rights of the parties
would be made by appellant’s filing a declaratory
judgment action in the Fayette Cireuit Court. Ac-
cordingly, this action was filed in that court. The ac-
tion was submitted to the court upon the petition, ex-
hibits, and stipulation of counsel. The court rendered
a judgment declaring that appellant’s policy covered the
accident, and that appellant, by its action in defending
the Jefferson Circuit Court suits, is estopped. From
that judgment appellant appeals, urging that the acci-
dent or occurrence here involved was not covered by
the insurance policy in question. Appellant says: ‘‘The
questions involved are broadly: (1) whether coverage
under appellant’s insurance policy extended to appellee
under the facts and circumstances mentioned in the
petition, and (2) whether appellant, by acts and con-
duct disclosed in the record, has waived the right to
assert lack of coverage.’’

Basically, there is no dispute about the facts of
the case. The questions before the court are questions
of law. To support its second position, appellant calls
our attention to 29 Am.Jur., page 690, section 903, and
relies upon a case cited under that section—Washington
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 130 Tex. 251, 109 S.W.2d 165,
113 A.L.R. 854. Craddock, the insured, accidently shot
himself through the knee and leg with a pistol. The
insurer’s policy excepted liability arising from gunshot
wounds. After the insured had received his wounds,
he mailed the usual report blanks to the insurance com-

es 83

pany stating the nature of his injury. The company
paid him benefits for 11 weeks before raising any ques-
iton as to coverage. After the 11 weeks it declined to
make further payments. The insured contended that
the company, by paying him benefits for an excluded
injury during a period of 11 weeks, was estopped from
denying liability, and that it had waived the question
of coverage. It was held that an accident insurer does
not, by paying disability benefits in respect of an in-
jury not within the coverage of the policy, thereby
render itself liable to contiriue to pay such benefits for
the full stipulated period, since waiver is ineffectual to
extend the coverage of a policy. The Craddock case
is annotated in 113 A.L.R. 857.

In 29 Am. Jur., 672, it is said: ‘‘The general rule
supported by the great weight of authority is that if
a liability insurer, with knowledge of a ground of forfei-
ture or noncoverage under the policy, assumes and
conducts the defense of an action brought against the
insured, without disclaiming liability and giving notice
of its reservation of rights, it is thereafter precluded
in an action upon the policy from setting g pp such ground
of forfeiture or noncoverage. *

In 81 ALR. page 1327, in an annotation on insur-
er’s assumption of, or continuation i in, defense of action
brought against the assured as waiver, or estoppel, as
regards defense of noncoverage, it is said: ‘‘Stated
in broad general terms, a liability insurer by assuming
and conducting the defense of an action brought against
the assured where with knowledge of facts taking the
accident, injury, etc, outside the coverage of the
policy,—and without disclaiming liability and giving
notice of its reservation of rights,—is thereafter pre-
eluded in an action upon the policy from setting up the
defense of noncoverage, it is held by the great weight
of authority. * * *’? Numerous cases are cited in
support of this annotation.

In 45 O.J.S., Insurance, sec. 714, page 684, it is
said: ‘‘Broadly Speaking an insurance company which
undertakes or continues the defense of an action against
insured with knowledge or means of knowledge of
grounds for avoiding its liability to insured, and with-
out due notice to insured of its disclaimer of liability,
will on principles of waiver and estoppel be precluded

84 |

from thereafter avoiding liability under the policy on
such grounds, * * *.’? Sec. 8 Appelman, Insurance
Law and Practice, sections 4692, 4693 and 4694.

There is a distinction between the type of case on
which appellant relies and the case presented here. In
the Craddock case, supra, the company paid certain
benefits under an accident policy for loss which was
not covered by the policy. An estoppel was asserted
on account of these payments. But there the person
claiming the estoppel was not prejudiced by the action
of the company against whom the estoppel was as-
serted. One of the basic elements of an estoppel is that
the person claiming it must have been prejudiced by
the action of the person against whom it is asserted.
Generally the courts hold that where an insurance com-
pany undertakes the defense of an accident case, the
loss of the right by the insured to control and manage
the case is itself a prejudice.

In Oechme v. Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N.W.
817, 821, 81 A.L.R. 1308, 1315, it is said: ‘‘If an insured
is to pay a part of the recovery which may be had, he
should not be deprived of the right to defend in person.
He should have the right to interpose his personality.
Thus in Fairbanks Canning Co. v. London, ete., 154
Mo.App. 327, 133 S.W. 664, 667, the insurer was bound
by its contract to assume the defense though the action
was groundless; and by the same contract the insured
surrendered the right to control the conduct of the ac-
tion though a person vitally interested. The insured
lost something, and the court referring to it said: ‘If
a man is to bear the burden of the result of a defense
to an action, it.is his privilege to have his own per-
sonality appear in its course. He is entitled to have
the results measured up to him, and not to some other.
* © * The loss of a right to control and manage
one’s own case is itself a prejudice.’ ’?

Here appellant had control of the investigation
and defense and did not raise any question as to non-
coverage or make any reservation of rights for almost
a year. Under all the facts and circumstances of this
case, we believe the trial court reached the correct
conclusion as to appellant’s second position. We do not
reach its first contention.

The judgment is affirmed.

Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Hensley, et al.

November 17, 1950.

J. S. Forester, Judge.

86 |
James Sampson and Hdward G. Hill for appellant.
George R. Pope for appellee.

Juvex Kwieur—Reversing.

Jobn H. Hensley alias John H. Pace was acci-
dentally killed on September 4, 1943, while employed
in one of appellant’s mines in Harlan County. Appellee,
claiming to be his widow, filed with the Workmen’s
Compensation Board on September 9, 1943 a claim for
compensation for his death. At the hearing before the
referee a stipulation was filed covering all questions
necessary to a recovery except the question as to
whether or not appellee is the widow of deceased and
was dependent upon him at the time of his death. Since
all factors essential to maximum recovery were thus
stipulated and conceded, the only question in all the
hearings before the Board was this question of legal
relationship to deceased. After hearing only the testi- |
mony of appellee and before any testimony was taken
by appellant, apparently in violation of Rule 6 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Board, the Board on Sep-
tember 5, 1944, entered an order submitting the case for
opinion and judgment.

On motion of appellant, the Board, on September
19, 1944, set aside as premature the order of submission
- of September 5, 1944. In the meantime, on September
11, 1944, appellee had taken and on that day filed as
additional evidence the testimony of three more wit-
nesses. Without any order resubmitting the case, so
far as the record shows, and without any proof having
been taken or filed by the appellant, Hon. W. B. Begley,
referee of the Board, on December 5, 1944, rendered an
opinion and award by which he awarded to appellee
$12 per week for 400 weeks, not to exceed $4800, and
burial expenses of $150. On December 8, 1944, appellant
filed its application for a full Board review and a mo-
tion to set aside the award of the referee and, on De-
cember 19, 1944, the Board entered an order setting
aside the referee’s award of December 5, 1944. After
this was done, towit on December 13, 1944, appellee
took further proof and filed the depositions of four
additional witnesses.

es

Without any testimony having been taken by ap-
pellant and without any order of submission, so far as
the record shows, the case came into the hands of a
member of the Board, Hon. Claude L. Hammons, and,
on March 20, 1945, he filed as a full Board review an
opinion and award by which appellee was again award-
ed $12 per week for 400 weeks and $150 burial expenses.
Appellant then filed a motion to re-open and set aside
the full Board review of March 20, 1945, that is, the
Hammons’ opinion and award, and, on April 3, 19465,
the Board entered an order setting aside the full Board
review of March 20, 1945, and in that order allowed ap-
pellee 30 days to complete her proof, appellant 30 days
thereafter to complete its proof and appellee 10 days
thereafter for rebuttal. This time was further extended
by agreement and all the evidence, including appellee’s
rebuttal was filed by August 20, 1945, and, on Septem-
ber 4, 1945, an order was entered submitting the case.
On December 4, 1945, with the evidence all filed, another
referee, Hon. C. H. Bruce, filed an opinion and award
in which he awarded appellee $12 per week for 400
weeks and $150 burial expenses. Within the seven day
period appellant filed its application for a full Board
review and, on February 5, 1946, the Board, this time
through Board member Hon, EH. Poe Harris, entered
an opinion and award reversing the opinion and award
of the referee and holding that ‘‘no marriage license
was ever issued to the claimant and the deceased em-
ployee; that they never went through a marriage cere-
mony; that at the inception of and throughout their
relationship the deceased had a living wife, to the per-
sonal knowledge of the claimant; that the relationship
between the claimant and the employee was adulterous.
and by them so known to be at all times.’”? The award
of the referee was withdrawn and appellee’s claim was

ened.

Within the twenty-day period appellee appealed the
case to the Harlan Cireuit Court and the case was sub-
mitted on appropriate pleadings and on the record. On
May 4, 1949, a judgment was entered reversing the last
full Board review of February 5, 1946. It is from this
judgment that appellant prosecutes this appeal.

Reversal is sought by appellant on the ground that
the last award of the Board of February 5, 1946, which

88

it contends is the only legal one, is supported by the
evidence and cannot, therefore, be disturbed by the court,

Appellee seeks to sustain the judgment on the
ground that the full Board opinion and award of March
20, 1945, the Hammons’ award, was a final order and
the Board was without authority to set it aside as it
did by its order of April 3, 1945, and that appellant’s
only remedy was by appeal to the cireuit court pursuant
to KRS 342.285. She further contends that the opinion
and award of February 5, 1946, the Harris award, fails
to comply with KRS 342.275 in that it does not contain
a statement of facts and rulings of law governing the
case and that the award is not supported by the evidence.

Taking up the first contention of the appellee, we
think KRS 342.285 applies where the award of the
Board is regular, that is, when it has been arrived at
under proper practice and application of the rules of
the Board. The record shows that when the award of
March 20, 1945 was made, the case was not under sub-
mission, the plaintiff had not announced that she was
through taking proof and none had been taken by the
defendant. Under these circumstances, when a proper
motion was made to set aside the award of March 20,
supported by the affidavit of the defendant’s attorney
which showed these facts and that the rules of the
Board had not been complied with, it was within the
power of the Board to correct that error and to set
aside the award, as it did by its order of April 3, 1945.
To hold otherwise would result in tying the hands of
the Board and preventing it from correcting its own
errors of practice when seasonably discovered. It would
result in unnecessary appeals to the courts to correct
errors which the Board itself can correct. The case of
Carr’s Fork Coal Co. v. Scott, 204 Ky. 656, 265 S.W.
19, cited and relied on by appellant, does not hold to
the contrary.

‘We think the second contention of appellee, that the
final award of the Board does not contain a statement
of facts and rulings of law, as required by KRS 342.275,
is without merit. While the opinion and award did not
make an elaborate analysis of the evidence, which had
already been done by the last referee, it did make a
finding of fact on the one factual question involved, as
shown by the quotation heretofore set out in this opin-

|

 — !

ion. It also made a ruling of law when in the opinion
and award it said, ‘‘Under the facts, therefore, this is
not an instance which calls for an application of the
rule which applies where the claimant enters innocently
and in good faith into a bigamous marriage, or in which
she is an innocent and good-faith dependent member of
the deceased employee’s household at the time of his
death; nor is it an instance which calls for an applica-
tion of the rule applicable to common-law marriage.
For the reasons indicated, * * * the plaintiff’s claim
is denied.’? We think it is immaterial that these find-
ings of fact and rulings of law were not set out in the
stereotyped form usually followed by the Board in mak-
ing its awards.

‘We now come to consider the ground upon which
appellant seeks reversal, that the award of the Board
is supported by the evidence and cannot be disturbed
by the court. The lower court did not file a written
opinion and consequently his reason for reversal of
the Board is not known. However, in the judgment the
court said, ‘‘It is ordered that this case be referred to
the Workmen’s Compensation Board with instructions
to find for the plaintiff Ada Hensley and confirm the
three (3) previous awards in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendant.’’? Of the three previous awards
referred to in this quotation, two were merely the un-
confirmed opinion’ and awards of the two referees and
one was the Hammons’ award which was premature
and was set aside by the Board. Therefore if the court
based its judgment on those awards, it was erroneous
for the reasons heretofore shown.

The judgment also contained this paragraph: ‘‘The
court after reading the entire record orders and ad-
judges as follows: the order made February 5, 1946 by
the Compensation Board is hereby reversed and the
court adjudges that the plaintiff Ada Hensley was the
wife of John Henry Hensley.’? This indicates that the
judge of the lower court read the record and reached
his own conclusion from the evidence. If so, this was
beyond the province of the lower court as it is of this
court. As has been so often held, if there is any sub-
stantial evidence of probative value to sustain the
Board’s findings of fact, its award will not be disturbed
by the courts. Ky.Digest, Workmen’s Compensation,
key 1939. With this limitation of the. court’s right of

90

review of the factual situation involved, we have read
the evidence and in our opinion there was ample evi-
dence to sustain the finding of the Board that appellee
Ada Hensley was not the wife of John H. Hensley and
that if she did go through the form of a marriage cere-
mony, which is very doubtful, it was a bigamous mar-
riage not entered into innocently and in good faith.
Certain it is from the record that she was never able
to produce any marriage certificate or other documen-
tary evidence of her marriage to deceased nor the testi-
mony of anyone authorized to perform a marriage cere-
mony that he had performed such ceremony. On the
contrary, appellant produced and filed as evidence a
marriage certificate and the minister’s return thereon
showing the marriage of John Pace, identified by other
testimony as John H. Hensley, to Cleo Houk. The evi-
dence is conflicting as to whether or not appellee knew
deceased was married to Cleo Houk, but there was
evidence produced on which the Board could find, as it
did find, that she did not enter into a bigamous mar-
riage with the deceased in good faith. This distinguishes
this case from the case of Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co.,
313 Ky. 310, 231 S.W.2d 57, in which the Board found
that Lonnie Ritchie entered into a bigamous marriage
with Everett Ritchie in good faith and we upheld the
findings of the Board. Here the Board found that if
there was a marriage between appellee and deceased,
of which there was no documentary evidence, it was not
in good faith. Likewise, we uphold the Board in this
case because there was evidence to support it. We think
it is established by the evidence that appellee and de-
ceased lived together for some years before his death
and that appellee was dependent on him for support,
but that is not sufficient in the absence of a showing that
some sort of marriage was entered into in good faith.
See Ritchie v. Katy Coal Co., supra, and cases therein
cited.

Wherefore the judgment of the lower court is re-
versed with directions to enter one upholding the final
opinion and award of the Board dated February 5, 1946.

ie

a 9

Works v. Winkle.
Winkle v. Works.

November 17, 1950.
Rodney G. Bryson, Judge.

Orie S. Ware, James C. Ware, and Frank Grofton Ware for
Works.
James R. McGarry and Ralph P. Rich for Winkle.

Vay Sant, Conrorrssronmn: Reversing in first styled
appeal; affirming in second styled appeal.

William E. Works, appellant in the first styled ap-
peal, and appellee in the second, will be referred to as
appellant; Hrnest Winkle, appellee in the first appeal
and appellant in the second, will be referred to as
appellee.

In the afternoon of December 15, 1947, appellant
was driving his station wagon easterly over a highway
in Kenton County and appellee was driving his auto-
mobile in the opposite direction. The vehicles collided
to the damage of both. Appellant instituted suit against
appellee to recover damages in the sum of $1,135; $135
of which was for the loss of use of his vehicle during
the period it was under repair. Appellee, by answer,
denied the material allegations of the petition.and by
counterclaim sought to recover of appellant damages
suffered to his own automobile and the loss of its use in
the sum of $650. The issue was completed by reply.
On the trial, verdict was rendered and, on December 1,
1948, judgment entered in favor of ‘appellant for $700.

Le 93

In due time, defendant filed motion for a new trial
and in support thereof assigned several grounds, one
of which is that, since the trial, appellee discovered
that appellant was not the real party in interest. The
motion for a new trial was overruled.

On May 6, 1949, defendant moved the court to va-
cate the judgment entered December 1, 1948, alleging
that plaintiff had obtained the judgment by fraud com-
mitted in the following manner: although in his verified
petition upon which he based his action appellant stated
that he was the owner of the station wagon involved in
the collision and that he had suffered damages to his
vehicle in the sum of $1,000, in truth, at the time of the
rendition of the judgment he had been fully paid for
the damage done by a company with whom he had a
contract of insurance and that the action was prose-
cuted for the use and benefit of the insurance company
who was and is the real party in interest; that all of
these facts were known to the plaintiff, and that as a
result of this ‘‘fraud,”’ the judgment rendered on De-
cember 1, 1948 was void. The issue on this branch of
the case was joined, and a judgment setting aside the
former judgment was entered on June 13, 1949. Motion
for a new trial was filed and overruled on the following
day and an appeal granted to this court. In the mean-
time, and within the time allowed by previous order
of court, appellee prepared and filed his bill of excep-
tions in the original case, which was approved by the
court.

Appellant has appealed from the judgment of June
18, 1949, setting aside the judgment of December 1,
1948, and appellee has appealed from the judgment
entered on December 1, 1948. Although appellee has
styled his appeal ‘‘cross-appeal,’’ we will treat it as an
original appeal and consolidate the two appeals in this
court. We first will consider the appeal from the order
setting aside the original judgment.

Section 18 of the Civil Code of Practice provides
that every action with certain exceptions not applicable
here, must be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. Section 20 of the Civil Code of Practice
provides that if a chose in action is assigned during the
pendency of the action, it may be continued in the name
of the assignor. There was no evidence taken on the

94 |

motion to vacate the original judgment, but the plead-
ings in this branch of the case show that appellant was
insured against collision by the United Mutual Fire
Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts. The
contract of insurance provided for the payment to the
insured, in the event of collision, upset, or damage to
his station wagon, the actual value of such damage not
to exceed $1,800 less the initial loss in the sum of $100.
By agreement of the insurer and the insured the total
loss sustained by appellant to his station wagon was
fixed as $900: the first $100 of which was assumed by
the owner and the remaining sum of $800 paid to the
owner by the insurance company. Upon the payment
of the $800 to appellant, he assigned to his insurer his
right to recover of the tort-feasor to the extent of $800;
but he did not assign his right to recover for the initial
loss of $100, or any amount he claimed against the tort-
feasor in excess of $900, which in this instance amounts
to the sum of $235.

Heretofore we have not been called on to determine
whether or not a judgment is void because of the failure
of an insured to make his insurer a party to an action
for a recovery where the right to a part of the recovery
has been assigned to the insurer; but such failure has
been asserted as a bar to the insured’s right to recover
in many cases. In each such case the decision was
based on the facts peculiar thereto with the result that
some confusion has developed from what might appear
to be, but actually are not, inconsistent rulings. In an
endeavor to clarify the reasoning underlying these de-
cisions, we have decided to discuss them in relation to
each other, and, if possible, to state our position that it
may be used as a guide in future litigation.

In Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Hicklin, 131
Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752, 753, Hicklin and others instituted
the action against the Railroad Company to recover
damages in the sum of $1,100 for the destruction of
their house caused by the negligence of the Railroad
Company in permitting sparks to escape from its engine
and to alight on the house. The court sustained a de-
murrer to the second paragraph of the answer wherein
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s house was
insured with a named insurance company for the sum
of $700 which was its full value, that plaintiffs had re-
ceived that amount on account of the fire which sum

|| 95

fully repaid the plaintiffs for their whole loss and by
reason of such payment the plaintiffs’ right to recover
of the Railroad Company was barred. The court held
that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer;
and, without denying that beneficial ownership is suf-
ficient to entitle one to sue, the court held that one
having the legal title to the demand may maintain the
action if the defendant will be protected in a payment
to or recovery by him, even though a third party may
be entitled to claim a portion of the recovery from
the plaintiff. The court said: ‘‘The fact, however, that
a third party might be entitled to the damages as be-
tween him and the plaintiffs is not sufficient to bar the
right of action by the plaintiffs. The legal title to the
property destroyed was in the plaintiffs. As between
the plaintiffs and the defendant the former were the
real parties in interest.’’

The court noted in that case that the defendant
(although cognizant of the situation) did not ask that
the insurance company be made a party to the action.
The writer of the opinion quoted from 30 Cye. page 78,
certain language, not applicable to the case nor neces-
sary to its decision, to the effect that the holder of the
legal title could maintain the action although a third
party might be entitled to all of the fruits of the action.
That language, being unnecessary to the decision, was
obiter dictum, for which reason and for the additional
reason assigned in the opinion in Monson v. Payne
(Smith & Harlywine v. Payne), 199 Ky. 105, 250 S.W.
799, the Hicklin case and the Monson-Smith cases can-
not be construed to be in conflict with each other.

In the Monson-Smith cases, supra, the owners of
property destroyed by fire, caused by the escape of
sparks from passing locomotives, instituted the action.
Previous to the commencement of the actions the prop-
erty owners had received full payment for the losses,
a part of which was paid by insurance companies, under
contracts between them and the property owners, and
the remainder by the defendant tort-feasor. The court
held that since the plaintiffs from two separate and dis-
tinct sources had been made whole and had given com-
lete acquitance of further liability to them, they could
not maintain the actions even for their insurance car-
riers. As we have pointed out, that decision is not in
conflict with the decision in the Hicklin case, it is ineon-

96 |

sistent only with the obiter dictum contained in the
opinion.

In Barr v. Searey, 280 Ky. 535, 133 8.W.2d 714,
the action by Barr was instituted against the tort-feasor
Searcy for $1,390.39 damages to his truck and $300 for
the loss of its-use. In paragraph four of the answer,
as amended, the defendant pleaded in bar that plaintiff
was insured against loss by reason of damage to the
truck caused by the collision, and that the insurance
company had paid her the sum of $1,200 in full settle-
ment of the claim upon receipt of an assignment of the
insured’s rights against the tort-feasor. This court
affirmed the lower court’s action in sustaining the de-
murrer to the answer, distinguishing Monson v. Payne,
supra, 199 Ky. 105, 250 S.W. 799, and relying on the
Hicklin case, which the writer of the opinion observed
was on all fours with the case then under discussion,
because the plaintiffs’ claim for loss of use of his truck
theretofore had not been satisfied.

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Hall, 292 Ky. 22,
165 S§.W.2d 838 relied on by appellee is not in point,
because the decision was based on a peculiar agreement
by which the insurer merely loaned the insured the
money upon agreement that it be repaid if recovered
in that suit. Monson v. Payne, supra, was cited in sup-
port of an abstract statement which merely conceded,
arguendo, a point made but which was not pertinent
to the decision.

In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 304 Ky. 456,
201 S.W.2d 7, Mrs. Elizabeth Frances Grundy was the
owner of an automobile damaged in an accident with
appellee, Randall Moore. At the time of the accident,
Mrs. Grundy had a policy of insurance with the Travel-
ers Indemnity Company whereby the latter agreed to
indemnify her against loss or damage to her automo-
bile by collision, and upon due demand and previous
to the institution of the action, the appellant Indemnity
Company paid her for damages to the car the sum of
$848. Thereafter Mrs. Grundy instituted action against
the tort-feasor to recover damages from him for per-
sonal injuries, not covered by her policy of insurance.
She recovered a judgment in that action. Thereafter,
the Indemnity Company sued the tort-feasor as subrogee
of Mrs. Grundy for the $848 it was required to pay

a 97

its insured under the contract of insurance. Both special
and general demurrers were filed to the petition, were
sustained by the court, and the petition was dismissed.
It appears that the court’s ground for sustaining the
demurrers was that the assignment to the Indemnity
Company did not confer on it the right of action for
damages to property, because the attempt to do so in-
volved splitting the original cause of action inherent
in Mrs. Grundy; and, since Mrs. Grundy had instituted
an action against the tort-feasor for personal injuries,
such action, although she did not seek to recover for
property damage, was a bar to another action, either
by her or her insurer, to recover further. In reversing
the judgment, this Court held that an Indemnity Com-
pany has the right to sue the tort-feasor separately
under its subrogation agreement, where, as there, the
suit by the owner of the property had"not sought to
recover for so much of the claim as was assigned to
the insurer.

The latest decision by this Court touching on the
question, rendered May 9, 1950, is York v. Cumberland
Construction Company, 312 Ky. 797, 229 8.W.2d 970.
The plaintiff in that case claimed $375 for damage to
his truck; $60 for damage to merchandise; $370 for loss
of use of the truck, aggregating total damages in the
amount of $805. In the answer, the defendant tort-
feasor alleged that the plaintiff was-insured and, under
the policy of insurance, had been paid the amount of
damages sustained by him by reason of injuries to his
truck, and upon such payment had executed to the in-
surance company an assignment or subrogation of his
right to recover for such injuries. He further pleaded
that the insurance company was the real party in
interest and asked that on this account the petition of
the plaintiff be dismissed. It appears that the insurer
paid appellant an amount representing only 80 per
centum of the actual damage to the property, but paid
nothing, because it was not liable, for damage to the
merchandise or for loss of the use of the truck. Rely-
ing on Barr v. Searcy, supra, and Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Hicklin, supra, we held that the insurance company
was not a necessary party to the action and that the
owner of the truck was the real party in interest within
the purview of section 18, of the Civil Code of Practice.

‘We adopt the following rules from those decisions:

98 ee
(1) Where an assignment of the whole cause of action
has been made previous to the institution of the action,
the action must be commenced in the name of the as-
signee, except as provided in Section 21 of the Civil
Code of Practice. (2) Where the cause of action or
any part of it has been assigned after the commence-
ment of the action, under the provisions of Section 20
of the Civil Code of Practice, the action may continue
in the name of the assignor, with the right but not the
requirement of the assignee to intervene and assert his
Tights to, the recovery. (3) Where only a part of a
claim has been assigned before the action, the assignor
may sue to recover the whole of the claim (if recovery
therein will be a bar to the insurer’s right of action),
or the part unassigned, in which latter event the as-
signee may recover for the part assigned, either in the
‘same or a separate action. (4) In no event may an
assignee maintain an action for any part of a claim
which has not been assigned to him.

It follows that under rule 3, supra, the Chancellor
erred in his determination that a fraud had been per-
petrated by appellant in securing the judgment entered
on December 1, 1948 for which reason the judgment en-
tered June 13, 1949 must be, and hereby is, reversed.
This conclusion requires a review of the complaint pre-
sented by appellee’s appeal from the judgment entered
December 1, 1948.

Appellee’s sole ground for reversal of this judg-
ment is that the evidence was not sufficient to submit
the case to the jury on the question of the negligence of
the appellee. At the time and for a great distance east
and west of the place of the accident the road was ex-
tremely slippery because of a deposit of ice or slush
on the paved portion thereof. Appellee was aware of
this condition. Appellant was travelling upgrade in
an easterly direction; appellee was travelling down
grade in a westerly direction. Appellee admitted that
in approaching the brink of the hill over which he
passed immediately preceding the accident, he was
travelling at a speed of between fifteen and twenty
miles per hour, and, when he started down hill, the
road was so slippery that. the application of his brakes
did not check his progress or lower his speed; on the
contrary, his car commenced skidding and was beyond

A

his control. This evidence alone was sufficient for the
jury to infer that appellee did not observe his duty to
keep his car under reasonable control or to exercise
ordinary care in respect to speed commensurate with
the condition of the highway over which he was travel-
ling, Head v. Lucas, 313 Ky. 356, 231 8.W.2d 81; and,
since appellee’s own testimony was as favorable to him
as that introduced by any other witness, we are of the
opinion there was ample evidence to justify the sub-
mission of the case to the jury and to support the ver-
dict and judgment.

_ The judgment entered on June 30, 1949 is reversed
in the first styled appeal, the judgment entered on De-
eember 1, 1948 is affirmed in the second styled appeal.

Gulley v. Whaley, Warden.

November 21, 1950.
Oldham Clarke, Judge.

Delmer Eugene Gulley, pro se.
A. HE. Funk, Attorney General, for appellee.

Juven Herm—Dismissing appeal.

On March 2, 1950, appellant, Delmer Hugene Gulley,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Oldham
Cireuit Court, alleging that he was being unlawfully
detained by appellee, R. L. Whaley, Warden, Kentucky
State Reformatory, LaGrange, Kentucky, ‘‘on an in-

100 ee

valid, illegal, void and unauthorized mittimus commit-
ment’? from the McCracken Circuit Court, January
term, 1948, under a judgment ‘‘in cases Nos. 6450, 6451,
and 6652, for the alleged offenses of incest.’’

From certified copies of the indictments, verdicts,
and judgments filed with the record, it appears that
appellant was charged in three cases with carnally
knowing his daughter; that he plead guilty to the
charges and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment
on each charge.

From the record it appears that the judgments were
not void, but were erroneous. Appellant’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus was dismissed in the cireuit court
on March 9, 1950.

Criminal Code of Practice, section 429-1, provides:
“‘Any party to a trial under a writ of habeas corpus may
appeal to the Court of Appeals by filing with the clerk
of the Court of Appeals, within ten days after the entry
of the judgment, the original record and a transcript of
the evidence, together with a notice of appeal, which
notice shall be served on the other parties at least two
days before the appeal is filed. * * *”’

The ‘‘original record’? was not filed in this court
until April 20, 1950, and no notice of appeal was served
on ‘‘the other party,’’ the appellee, as required. For
these reasons appellant’s appeal must be dismissed.
Wyatt v. Goodlett, 311 Ky. 583, 227 8. W. 2d 406; Don-
ovan v. Harrison, 299 Ky. 714, 187 S. W. 2d 280; Mont-
gomery v. R. L. Whaley, Warden, Kentucky State Re-
formatory, 314 Ky. 234 S.W.2d 268, decided Novem-
ber 10, 1950.

Appeal dismissed.
a
E. F. Prichard Co., Inc. v. Heidelberg
Brewing Co., Inc.
November 21, 1950.
Rodney G. Bryson, Judge.

A. E, Funk, Jr., Marion W. Moore, R. W. Keenon for appellant.
Sawyer A. Smith, Stanley Chrisman, for appellee.

102 ee)

Van Sant, Commisstoner—Reversing.

For convenience we will refer to appellant as Prich-
ard and appellee as Heidelberg. In three previous ap-
peals we have decided issues in respect to their contro-
versies. Heidelberg Brewing Co. v. BE. F. Prichard Co.,
Ine. (EH. F. Prichard Co., Inc. v. Heidelberg Brewing
Co.), 297 Ky. 788, 180 S. W. 2d 849; HE. F. Prichard Co.,
Inc. v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 307 Ky. 833, 212 S. W.
2d 293; Heidelberg Brewing Co. v. B. F. Prichard Co.,
Ine. (two cases), 309 Ky. 847, 219 S.W.2d 55. The second
appeal above cited was the first appeal in this action and
in which, declaring the rights of the parties, we upheld
Prichard’s contentions and reversed the judgment of
the lower court. In all three appeals, we held, contrary
to Heidelberg’s contention, that Prichard was the owner
of a formula for batching and brewing ale and beer;
and in the former appeal in this action we held that the
contract between the parties, which was before us for
consideration, required Heidelberg to furnish beer and
ale to Prichard in accordance with that formula, and
that Heidelberg was not entitled to increase the original
price fixed by the contract because it had failed to follow
Prichard’s formula in brewing the beer.

This action was brought, as we have indicated,
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and was com-
menced in July, 1946, following Heidelberg’s demand of
Prichard to pay a price increase. The decision in the
first appeal was rendered June 22, 1948. During that
two year period Prichard was unable to obtain beer
elsewhere under its own label; consequently, it was
compelled to accept the Heidelberg beer or to discon-
tinue supplying beer and ale to its customers under its
own label. Heidelberg refusing to deliver at the old price
and Prichard being unwilling to pay the increase until
its rights under the contract had been adjudicated, it
was agreed that Heidelberg would continue to supply
the beer and Prichard would pay for it on each delivery
with two checks, one of which was issued without pro-
test in an amount arrived at by a calculation at the
original price; the second issued and marked ‘‘paid
under protest’? for the amount of the increase in price.
A second demanded increase was paid under protest
by, and so marked on, a third check issued on each
delivery.

SS 2:

On filing the mandate issued pursuant to the opin-
ion in the former appeal, Prichard made demand of
Heidelberg for refund of all sums paid under protest,
which the parties have stipulated amount to the aggre-
gate sum of $67,139.31. Upon Heidelberg’s failure to
comply with this demand, Prichard filed motion for
judgment in the stipulated amount, which it conceived
it had the right to do under that part of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, Section 639a—4, Civil Code of Practice,
which grants a party to a Declaratory Judgment the
right to obtain further relief based on the judgment. In
overruling the motion and denying judgment in any
amount, the Chancellor in a written opinion said: ‘‘The
court is of the opinion that the defendant (Prichard)
has failed to show that it has in any way been damaged,
or sustained a loss of any kind, and waived its right to
recover by accepting the beer knowing it was not brewed
according to defendant’s formula.’’ In addition to the
reasons assigned by the Chancellor, Heidelberg urges
affirmance on the ground that the Chancellor did not
have jurisdiction to render a money judgment in the
declaratory judgment action; and since the filing of the
mandate following the decision in the first appeal, Prich-
ard has breached the contract and by reason thereof is
estopped to recover under the contract.

Prichard complains of the Chancellor’s decision
contending: (1) that the decision on the former appeal
was conclusive of the rights of the parties under Heidel-
berg’s plea of waiver, or if wrong in this contention, it
did not waive its right to recover by accepting the beer
and ale during the pendency of the litigation of the
rights of the parties; (2) it did not breach its contract,
nor did it do or fail to do anything which would effect
an estoppel in favor of Heidelberg; and (8) it was
not necessary for Prichard to show damages in order
to recover its own money which was illegally obtained
by Heidelberg.

The question raised under the plea of waiver was
presented in the petition for rehearing in the former
appeal and was decided adversely to Heidelberg’s con-
tention, although the opinion was not extended to recite
that fact. Hiven if it had not been presented at that
time, it should have been, since it could be considered
only as it might have affected the rights of the parties

104

under the contract. The doctrine of res adjudicata pre-
vents the relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent
appeal and includes every matter belonging to the sub-
ject of the litigation which could have been, as well as
those, which were, introduced in support of the conten-
tion of the parties on the first appeal. Noel v. Noel,
307 Ky. 182, 210 S.W.2d 142. The other reason assigned
by the Chancellor for denying recovery; to wit, Prichard
failed to show that he has sustained a loss entitling him
to damages, cannot be upheld. The basis for the Chan-
cellor’s conclusion is that Prichard admitted that after
paying the increased price he in turn increased the
price to his customers and thus did not suffer any finan-
cial loss. The fallacy of this reasoning is that it is based
on the erroneous premise that this action is a suit for
damages for breach of contract. There was no require-
ment in the contract that Prichard was to sell its beer
at a fixed price or that the price charged its customers
was to be regulated by the price it was required to pay
Heidelberg. Prichard’s transactions with its customers
were independent of any transaction with Heidelberg,
and the former’s rights under its contract with the
latter were not affected either way by any contract ©
Prichard had entered into with one of its customers.
The action is strictly one to recover money illegally
(as was determined on the first appeal) obtained from
Prichard and which it paid to Heidelberg under protest.
In such circumstances the law implies a contract to re-
fund which will be enforced by the courts. Ilinois
Central R. Co. v. Paducah Brewery Company, 157 Ky.
357, 163 S.W. 239.

In support of Heidelberg’s plea of estoppel it al-
leged that since the mandate following the decision on
the first appeal was filed in the court below, Prichard
breached the contract by refusing to accept beer batched
and brewed in accordance with the formula hereinbe-
fore referred to. We do not see that this can affect
Prichard’s right to a refund of money illegally collected
from him previous to the breach. If Prichard has
breached his contract since the effective date of the
declaration of, the rights of the parties under the con-
tract, Heidelberg may obtain relief based on such
breach but it cannot constitute a bar to Prichard’s
right to recover on the implied: contract to refund.
Neither can damages nor other relief for such breach

es ((

of contract be recovered in this action, because, such
right, if any Heidelberg has, would not be based on
the judgment heretofore entered declaring the rights
of the parties.

There remains for our determination the question
as to whether the court has jurisdiction to enter a
money judgment in a declaratory judgment action.
Heidelberg relies on Jefferson County ex rel. Coleman
v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 33 S8.W.2d 601; Edwards v.
Bernstein, 231 Ky. 100, 21 S.W.2d 133; Brindley v.
Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 301; Porcelain Enamel
& Mfg. Co. of Baltimore v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. 177 Md.
677, 11 A.2d 451. In the Chilton case, supra, the court
merely held that one may not file an action under the
Declaratory Judgment Act for the determination of a
question presented in a suit then pending. In the Hid-
wards case, supra, the court merely held that an action
for a declaration of rights of the parties in respect to
a ten year leasehold must be brought in the county of
the defendant’s residence. The foreign cases relied on
are decisions construing Declaratory Judgment Acts of
the states indicated and even if the Acts they construed
are substantially the same as ours and those opinions
are susceptible of the construction placed on them by
Heidelberg (which under other circumstances we would
feel called upon to question), they would not be binding
or even persuasive, because we have construed our own
statute in several cases to the effect that one may ob-
tain a money judgment as consequential relief in a de-
claratory judgment action. One of the cases so decid-
ing is Veith v. Tinnell, 306 Ky. 484, 207 S.W.2d 325.

The judgment is reversed with directions that it be
set aside and that another be entered in conformity with

this opinion.
Shoenberg et al. v. Lodenkemper’s Ex’r et al.
November 21, 1950.
W. Scott Miller, Judge.

Ce ee

Hargadon, Bennett & Lemaire, for appellants.

Ben F. Washer, for appellee, Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co., ex-
ecutor. :

James Walter Clements, for appellees, Rudy J. Bouteiller anc
others. ”

Van Sant, Commisstoner—Reversing.

Rose Lodenkemper, by will, made certain specific
bequests which are not in controversy. She disposed
of the residue of her estate in Item VI of the will which
provides: ‘‘All the rest and residue of my estate, real,
personal and mixed and wherever situated, I give, be-
queath and devise to Rudy J. Bouteiller, Lula Bouteil-
ler, Anna Sauter, Josephine Bouteiller, Pauline Rus-
terholtz, Hleanora Porteous, Rosa Buddell, Marie Ham-
lin, Ethel Higgins, 624 H. Walnut St. Louisville,
Kentucky, Mrs. Ida Schulten, 522 Hast Walnut St.,
Louisville, Ky., Mrs. Georgina McCormick, 420 Hast
Brandeis St., Louisville, Ky., and Mamie Ausbach,
Louisville, Kentucky absolutely and in fee simple, share
and share alike.”’

She nominated the Liberty National Bank and
Trust Company of Louisville executor of the will and
directed it to convert into cash all the assets of the
estate, except a specific devise to Mrs. Ida Schulten.
One of the residuary leyatees, Pauline Rusterholtz, with-
out issue, predeceased the testatrix. This action was
instituted by the executor for a declaratory judgment
construing Item VI, supra. The Chancellor, being of
the opinion that the residue of the estate was bequeathed
to the named residuary legatees as a class, decreed that.
the share of the deceased member of the class should
be equally distributed to the surviving residuary lega-
tees under KRS 394.410 which reads:

‘When a devise is made to several as a class:or
as tenants in common, or as joint tenants, and one or
more of the devisees die before the testator, and another
or others survive the testator, the share or shares of
such as so die shall go to his or their descendants, if
any; if none, to the surviving devisees, unless a dif-
ferent disposition is made by the devisor.

108 ee

“A devise to children embraces grandchildren when
there are no children, and no other construction will
give effect to the devise.’*

Appellants, who defended the action on behalf of
the maternal heirs at law of the testatrix, contend that
the bequest to the deceased residuary legatee should
pass to the heirs at law of the testatrix under the pro-
visions of KRS 394.500 which reads: ‘‘Unless a con-
trary intention appears from the will, real or personal
estate, comprised in a devise incapable of taking effect,
shall not be included in the residuary devise containe
in the will, but shall pass as in case of intestacy.’’

Before consideration of the case on its merits, we
must dispose of the motion to dismiss the appeal be-
cause the amount in controversy is not sufficient to
give this Court jurisdiction, This contention is base
on the argument that there are over twenty-three ma-
ternal and six paternal heirs at law, who, under ap-
pellants’ contention, would participate in the lapse
legacy, and since no one of them would receive as much
as $200, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review
the judgment. There is no showing of the degree of
relationship the heirs bear to the testatrix, thus we
cannot determine as an original proposition that one
of the appellants, if successful, would not be entitle
upon final distribution to receive more than the juris-
dictional amount; and under these circumstances since
the Chancellor granted the appeal, we would, if neces-
sary, presume he acted correctly. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, however, the amount in con-
troversy is not the amount to which each of the parties
may be-entitled upon distribution, it is the amount of
the fund in the hands of the executor for distribution,
which admittedly is sufficient to give this court juris-
diction to review the judgment.

KRS 394.500 is determinative of this case unless

Item VI, supra, comes under the terms of KRS 394.410°

in that the residuary legatees take as a class, joint
tenants, or tenants in common. In the absence of a
showing of a contrary intent by the will, a lapsed legacy
will not pass under the residuary clause and such in-
tent is not provided by the presumption against
intestacy. Chrisman v. Allman, 302 Ky. 144, 194
S.W.2d 175. .

es

In order to determine whether named legatees who
are to share alike in a bequest. constitute a class it is
necessary to determine whether or not it was the in-
tention of the testator to make a bequest to those named
as a group or to deal with them as specific persons.
If it should be evident from the language used that the
testator was group minded, his intent to create a class
likewise would be evident. Restatement, Property III,
chapter 22, page 1451, et seq. We cannot agree with
appellees that the failure of the testatrix to execute
a codicil after the known death of one of her residuary
legatees is of any probative value in determining the
question, Restatement, Property ITI, section 282, page
1480; nor does the mere failure to name certain heirs
in the will or the mere bequeathing of nominal sums to
others have the force of showing that the testator in-
tended to disinherit them, if preferred ‘relatives or
friends are incapable of receiving bequests’ granted
them. To so hold would be to speculate as to an intent
neither expressed nor clearly manifested.

In Horseman y. Horseman, 309 Ky. 289, 217 S.W.2d
645, 646, relied on by appellees, the testator devised
the remainder interest in his property to three of his
four sons and in Item V of the will expressed his intent
in the following language: ‘‘Item Five: I have another
son, Esten B. Horseman, I have not made any pro-
vision for him in this will. This is not because of any
lack of affection for my said son, but my three other
sons hereinabove named have worked with me to make
what I have, and I feel that it is only just and right
that I should provide for them as herein above stated.”’

In designating the devisees of the remainder, the
testator used the following language: ‘‘I give and de-
vise to my three sons, Nolan Horseman and Oren E.
Horseman and Ora Gilmore Horseman, all of the re-
mainder interest * * *,”

In that case the court concluded that the three sons
constituted a class and that the survivors of the class
were entitled to the lapsed devise under KRS 394.410.
They were not classified as his sons but as a group
which had helped him accumulate the property. He
did not include the fourth son in the group but clearly
showed that the only reason for leaving him out was
that he had not contributed anything in the accumula-

110 eS

tion of that particular part of his estate. There was
no preference of three sons over the fourth son in
the affections of the testator and they were grouped
solely on past performances in respect to the property
involved. The circumstances in that case place it with-
in the rule stated in Restatement, Property ITI, chapter
22, section 281, page 1471 wherein it is said: ‘‘the class
gift construction more fully accomplishes the manifested
intent of the conveyor (testator) to exclude designated
persons from sharing in the subject matter of this
limitation.’”? (Our emphasis)

The court could have arrived at the same result
in the finding, which is apparent, that the three sons
were. tenants in common of the real estate devised. In
the instant case, the testator has used no words show-
ing an intent that the residuary legatees be considered
as a class. They merely appear individually as pre-
ferred friends, It is obvious that the residuary legatees
cannot be construed to’ be a class.

Since there are no words of survivorship, the re-
siduary legatees cannot be construed to be joint tenants
in contra-distinction to tenants in common. Stambaugh
v. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 491, 156 S.W.2d 827. The only
remaining relationship of the residuary legatees to each
other which would entitle them to participate to the
exclusion of other heirs is that of tenants in common.
On this question the material facts of the instant case
are identical with those in McLeod vy. Andrews, 303 Ky.
46, 196 S.W.2d 473, 474. In that case the testatrix made
the following disposition of the residue of her estate:
‘then any residue of my estate which may remain, I
give and devise in equal shares to Mrs. Kate Donald-
son, John Mcleod, and George McLeod.’

Previous to the residuary clause the testetrix had
made specific bequests to a niece, Clara Andrews, and
to Mrs. Kate Donaldson, Mrs. Emmitt Waddle, and
Mrs. Ella Harp. Mrs. Donaldson, Mrs. Waddle, and
Mrs. Harp predeceased the testatrix. One of the ques-
tions involved in the case was whether the residuary
legacy to Mrs. Donaldson passed to Clara Andrews,
the only heir at law of the testatrix, or to John and
George McLeod, the surviving residuary legatees. The
contention of the McLeods that the lapsed legacy passed
to them was based on the additional contention that

es

the residuary legatees were tenants in common. The
estate in that case as well as the case before us was re-
duced to cash before distribution. The court pointed
out that to constitute a tenancy in common, the tenants
must have equal rights to the possession of the whole
and without such unity such tenancy does not exist.
The court adopted the so called majority rule found in
Page on Wills, 1941 Hdition 195 which is: ‘‘It is now
settled, by the weight of authority, that a lapsed part
of the residiuum does not in itself pass into the re-
mainder of the residiuum, but that it passes to the testa-
tor’s next of kin as intestate property.”’

This principle likewise conforms to our statute.
The right of the residuary legatees under this will is
to a distributive share, not to an undivided portion of
the whole. The argument cannot prevail that the
possession of the executor is that of the legatees. When
one dies testate and nominates an executor, the title
to the property the latter is obligated to administer
passes to him, and the devisees take no title until the
settlement of the estate or distribution by the executor.
Trent v. Griffy, 193 Ky. 124, 235 S/W. 22. For the
reasons stated, we believe the decision in the Horse-~
man case, supra, is not in point and that that of the
McLeod case is controlling in the circumstances pre-
sented by this record.

The judgment is reversed with directions that it
be set aside and that another be entered to conform
to this opinion.

Lexington Roller Mills et al. v. Thornberry.
November 21, 1950.
William J. Baxter, Judge.

Harbison, Kessinger and Lisle & Bush for appellants.
Leer Buckley and D. L. Pendleton for appellee.

Juper Kyicur—Reversing.

This suit was brought by appellee against appellant
for damage to her automobile in the sum of $500, oc-
easioned by the alleged negligent operation of a truck
owned by appellant and operated by its servants and
employees. Appellant filed a counter-claim against ap-
pellee asking damages in the sum of $2000 to its truck,
resulting from the collision, and $720 for the loss of its
use. Upon trial of the issues, the jury brought in a
verdict in favor of appellee in the sum of $485, thereby
denying appellant recovery of any sum on its counter-
claim. Appellant prosecutes this appeal from that
judgment, asking reversal on two grounds: (1) the ver-
dict of the jury is flagrantly against the evidence;
(2) erroneous instructions.

On the morning of December 1, 1947, appellee was
driving alone in her automobile frorn her home in Win-
chester to Lexington on U. S. Highway No. 60, a two-
lane concrete road about twenty feet wide. The day
was bright and the road dry. A repair crew of state
highway trucks was moving slowly in their work on

|:

the right side of the highway in the direction she was
going. The rear truck in the repair fleet had attached
to it a trailer containing the ‘“‘hot pot’? in which the
tarvia was melted and kept warm. About 150 to 200
feet in front of it was another highway truck pulling a
compressor and containing other repair materials.
‘These two trucks were about 500 feet from the brow of
a slight bill in front of them. Another highway truck,
being driven by the foreman of the crew, was some
distance away over the brow of the hill and was not at
the scene of the accident when it happened.

According to the testimony of appellee, she was
driving about 25 to 30 miles per hour, the road being
slightly upgrade at that point, when she came upon the
highway crew. She started around the rear truck, not
knowing there was any other truck in front of it. As
she started to pull around the truck, she looked up the
highway and saw nothing, but as she got abreast of the
truck she saw appellant’s truck coming over the hill.
She knew she could not get around both trucks so she
slowed up and tried to get back on her side of the roid
but was unable to do so. She stopped and was stant’-

‘ing still when appellant’s truck struck her car, turned
it completely around and over into the ditch. The truci
went into the ditch and turned over. She did not testify
as to the speed of appellant’s truck as it came over the
hill and approached her, but employees of the highway
who testified for her estimated the speed of that truck
at from 30 to 45 miles per hour. In general these em-
ployees corroborated appellee’s testimony that she
started to pull around the highway truck, saw the on-
coming truck, was unable to get back on her side of the
road, and was standing still when appellant’s truck,
coming at unslackened speed, struck her car, causing
the damage complained of. They testified that one of
the crew had placed signs, ‘‘Men working,’’ about 500
feet east and about 1000 to 1500 feet west of the scene
of the accident, the latter being the direction from which
appellant’s truck was coming.

The evidence produced by appellant presents a
different picture. According to the testimony of Eugene
Webb, driver of the truck involved in the accident, he
topped the hill running at between 15 and 20 miles per
hour. He saw the highway trucks on his left and‘ as
he got within 25 or 30 feet of one of the trucks, appellee

14 P|

pulled out from behind it. He immediately applied his
brakes and got over as far as he could on the shoulder
of the road, on the grass, but she kept on coming and
hit his truck at its left fender breaking his brakes, after
which he lost control, went into the ditch and turned
over. He was driving at 25 miles per ‘hour as he ap-
proached but was traveling at not over 20 miles per
hour when she hit him, having applied his brakes. He
saw no signs, ‘“Men working,’’ as he approached the
hill. He testified that after the accident appellee said
in his presence that it was her fault because she had
pulled out into the path of his truck. His testimony in
this respect was corroborated by three other witnesses.
She partially denied this on rebuttal. Mr. Sweeney,
who was riding in appellant’s truck when the accident
occurred, corroborated, in substance, the testimony of
Webb, driver of the truck. John Ham, mechanic for
appellant, testified that the governor on the truck was
set at-35 to 37 miles per hour and that was its maximum
speed, The loaded truck weighed approximately 19000
pounds. :

Other testimony introduced by the respective par-
ties related to the damage done to their respective ve-
hicles and the costs of the repairs for each.

The case was submitted to the jury on ten instruc-
tions. They were in the main erroneous because they
did not properly define the duties of appellee as driver
of the car and of Eugene Webb as driver of appellant’s
truck. Under the evidence we think appellee was guilty
of negligence as a matter of law in passing the highway
trucks under the circumstances involved and in viola-
tion of KRS 189.340(3). At the same time it was the
duty of the driver of the truck to avoid striking her
automobile if he discovered her peril, or could have dis-
. covered it by the exercise of ordinary care. As we see

it, this is a case in which the last clear chance doctrine
is clearly applicable. If the evidence is substantially
the same in another trial, the claim of the plaintiff and
the counter-claim of the defendant should be submitted
to the jury on three main instructions substantially as
‘ollows:

(1) On the claith of plaintiff, Virginia B. Thorn-
berry, against the defendants, Lexington Roller Mills
and Eugene Webb, you will find for the defendants un-

a

less you believe from the evidence that after plaintiff’s
position of peril was discovered by defendant Webb,
or should have been discovered by him in the exercise
of ordinary care, defendant Webb failed to use ordinary
care with the means at hand to avoid striking the plain-
tiff’s automobile; in which latter event you will find for
the plaintiff.

(2) If you find for the plaintiff under Instruction
No. 1, you must also find for the plaintiff on the counter-
claim of defendant, Lexington Roller Mills.

(3) If you do not find for the plaintiff under In-
structions 1 and 2, you will find for the defendant, Lex-
ington Roller Mills, on its counter-claim against the
plaintiff, unless you believe from the evidence that
defendant Webb was contributorily negligent in (1) op-
erating defendant’s truck at an unreasonable rate of
speed in view of the traffic on the highway and the con-
dition and use of the highway at or near the place of
the collision; (2) or failing to keep a proper lookout;
or (3) failing to have the defendant’s truck under rea-
sonable control; but if you believe defendant Webb
failed to perform any of the duties set out in this in-
struction and such failure contributed to, and but for
such negligence of defendant Webb the accident would
not have occurred, then you will find for the plaintiff
on defendant’s counter-claim. Unless you so believe,
you will find for defendant, Lexington Roller Mills, on
its counter-claim against Virginia B. Thornberry.

To the above will be added the necessary instruc-
tions covering plaintiff’s damages, if allowed, defend-
ant’s damages on its counter-claim, if allowed, defining
negligence and the number of jurors necessary to reach
a verdict, etc., such as were set out in Instructions Nos.
38, 7,10, and 11 in the first trial.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed for further
proceedings consistent herewith.

e
|

16
Ford v. McGregor.

November 21, 1950,
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

Taylor N. House and David S. Weil for appellant.
Taylor G. Smith for appellee.

Juper Kyicur—Affirming.

On July 26, 1947, appellant submitted to appellee a
written option contract and on that day it was accepted
by appellee and signed by both parties, The terms of the
contract, insofar as they are pertinent to this litigation,
are as follows: Appellee agrees to give an option to ap-
pellant for two weeks for the sum of $30,500 on a tract
of land in Fayette County containing about 514 acres
as described in the contract. As evidence of good faith

a nT

and to bind the contract, appellant deposited with ap-
pellee at the time of execution his check for $650: to be
applied on the purchase price on the passing of the deed
or to be refunded if this option is not accepted in two
weeks. If this option is exercised, $5850 will be paid on
passing of the deed and the balance of $24,000 will be
paid in two, four and six years with interest of 4%
annually. If the option is exercised by the proposed pur-
chaser a deed will be executed by August 20, 1947; pos-
session to be given on delivery of the deed. The seller,
appellee, agrees to pay to Luther 8S. Ford Realtor, appel-
lant, out of the deposit the regular rate of commission
prescribed by the Lexington Real Estate Board.

On August 30, 1947, appellant brought this suit
against appellee and, after setting up the substance of
the contract, a copy of which was filed with the petition,
alleged in substance that on Ji ruly 30, 1947, and two ‘sub-
sequent dates, all within the time provided for the exer-
cise of the option, he notified appellee by registered
mail that he elected to exercise the option and purchase
the property according to its terms and that he would
be ready to close the transaction on or before August
20, 1947, the date specified in the contract but which
appellee failed or refused to do, thus breaching the con-
tract, as appellant claims. He prays for specific perform-
ance of the contract and that appellee be required to
execute a deed conveying him the property in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract.

In his answer appellee denied the affirmative
allegations of the petition and set up as a further de-
fense in substance that the option contract referred to
was without consideration; that it is unilateral, lacks
mutuality of obligation and is grossly inequitable; that
after July 26, and prior to July (sic) 20, 1947, he sioti-
fied appellant. that the alleged agreement and option was
terminated and was no longer in force insofar as ‘ap-
pellee was concerned. He prayed that the option coritract
be canceled and held for naught and that the pétition
be dismissed.

The case was referred to the Master Commissioner
and, after taking proof and upon submission, the Com-
missioner filed a brief report which, after setting out
in full the option contract, said:

‘*An inspection of the writing discloses that it was

us eS

left to the plaintiff to choose whether he would proceed
or abandon it. If he abandoned it the deposit of $650.00
was to be refunded to him. The writing does not even
recite that the fiction of one dollar cash in hand was
paid for the option. A contract which is not mutually
obligatory on the parties is void and cannot be specifical-
ly enforced. Litz v. Goosling, 93 Ky. 185, 19 S. W. 527,
12 L, R. A. 127; McKnight v. Broadway Inv. Oo., 147
Ky. 535, 145 S. W. 377. A unilateral executory contract
is in law a nudum pactum and is unenforceable. Where
it is left to one of the parties to an agreement to choose
whether he will proceed or abandon it, neither can spe-
cifically enforce its execution in equity. Burry v. Frisbie,
120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W. 558. For want of equity in the
plaintiff’s case, the Commissioner concludes as a matter
of law that the petition of the plaintiff should be dis-
missed and that the defendant is entitled to recover
from the plaintiff his costs herein expended.’’

This report of the Master Commissioner was con-
firmed by the Court and a judgment was entered in ac-
cordance therewith. Appellant prosecutes this appeal
from that judgment.

Five grounds for reversal are relied on by appel-
lant but three of them are without sufficient merit to
justify consideration. Two of the grounds relied on are
the crucial points in this case and, if the judgment is
reversed, it must be on these contentions of appellant,
(1) that the contract was a valid option and was sup-
-ported by a good and valuable consideration, (2) that
the option was not withdrawn by appellee until after
it had been exercised and acted on by appellant.

We think it is clear that there was no monetary
consideration to support the option contract here in-
volved. There was no money paid for the option itself.
The $650 check was simply an advance payment on the
purchase price if the deal went through but, if not, to
be refunded. If there was a consideration, it must be
found in the mutual promises arising out of the accept-
ance of the option before it was withdrawn. These mu-
tual promises constitute a valuable consideration. As
was said in the case of Klatch v. Simpson, 237 Ky. 84,
34 9. W. 2d. 951, 953: ‘The law * * * is well settled in
this and in other jurisdictions to the effect that the offer,
though without consideration, if accepted within the

a 19

time limit and before withdrawal by the contemplated
vendor, becomes obligatory upon all parties to the op-
tion after such acceptance, and it is thereafter sup-
ported by the consideration of mutual promises; i. e., the
promise of the vendor to convey according to the terms
of the option, and the promise of the vendee, issuing out
of his acceptance, to accept the conveyance and other-
wise comply with the terms of the option.’’ (Citing
cases.)

In the more recent case of Combs v. Turner, 304
Ky. 179, 200 S. W. 2d 288, 289, it was said: ‘It is well
settled that an option is not binding as a contract where
there is no consideration, unless it is accepted within the
time limit and before the offer is withdrawn.’

It is, therefore, necessary to consider the evidence
to determine whether the option, which was given to
appellant by appellee without any money consideration,
was withdrawn by appellee before it was accepted and
acted on by appellant and by that acceptance making a
binding agreement supported by the mutual promises
of each.

It is shown by the evidence, in which there is little
or no conflict on this point, that on Monday, July 28,
following the execution of the option on the previous
Saturday, July 26, appellee went to the office of appellant
and attempted to withdraw the option and informed
him that he would not go through with it. He offered
appellant $500 for the contract, which was refused, and
offered to return the $650 check to appellant, which was
’ likewise refused, whereupon appellee obliterated the
check. In his testimony he gave as his reason for with-
drawing the option that he was not satisfied with the
4% interest which the deferred payments were to bear;
that he felt he had been ‘‘high-pressured’’ into signing
the option and felt as if he had a legal right to with-
draw. That appellee did visit appellant’s office on Mon-
day, July 28, and that he said he was not going to sell
the property and offered $500 for the contract and offer-
ed to return the check was admitted by appellant in
his testimony and by his only other witness, Mr.
Kinnaird. ;
.It is shown by the evidence that on July 30, 1947,
two days after appellee had notified appellant that he
would not go through with the contract and attempted

120

to return the check, appellant by registered letter noti-
fied appellee that he elected to exercise his option and
would be ready to close the transaction on August 20, as
called for in the written option; that again. on August
18 by registered mail appellant notified appellee that he
would meet him in the office of the latter’s attorney with
a certified check for $5850, the balance due on the first
payment; that on August 19 appellant’s attorney by
registered mail tendered this certified check to appellee
with a demand that he comply with the option contract
and convey the property to appellant in accordance with
its terms. All these notices were ignored by appellee
and on August 22, through his attorney, he returned
both the $650 check and the $5850 check to appellant’s
attorney saying that upon his attorney’s advice he de-
clined to take any further steps in the matter at this
time. It is true, as appellant points out, that in this letter
appellee’s attorney says that appellee had on August
11, 1947, advised him to prepare a deed to the property
but that he did not carry out his instruction. While this
is some indication that appellee had not withdrawn the
option, we do not think it outweighs the direct tes-
timony of all the witnesses that on the second day after -
the option was written, and two days before appellant
exercised the option, appellee had withdrawn the option
by giving notice that he would not go through with it,
had offered to return the $650 check and had obliterated
the check when it was refused. Since there was no con-
sideration to support the option contract and since it
was withdrawn before it was exercised, under the au-
thorities cited above, we think the lower court did not
err in dismissing appellant’s petition.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.

Boyles v. Walker.
November 21, 1950.
‘H. FP. S. Bailey, Judge.

Carroll W. Morrow for appellant.
L. B. Weir for appellee.

Jupex Hetm—Reversing.

On or about January 7, 1948, appellant, Tex Boyles,
and appellee, Ray Walker, entered into an oral contract
by which appellant agreed to strip mine the coal from
a small boundary leased to appellee in Hopkins County.
Appellee agreed to pay appellant for the work done.
The rate of payment and the amount of work done by
appellant is in dispute. Appellant moved his equipment
on appellee’s lease and performed the greater part of
the work. He then removed his equipment to another
location and filed this action in equity, asserting a me-
chanics’ and materialmen’s lien, and seeking to recover
a balance alleged to be $5,593.02, setting out in his pe-
tition that he stripped the over-burden from some 4,000
tons of coal and loaded some 400 tons of coal for removal
but found that the only available road from the premises
was impassable by reason of weather conditions, and
that appellee was unable to furnish a right-of-way or
road out, because when appellant began building a road
ata place indicated by appellee, it was found that it be-
longed to another person who stopped appellant from
constructing the road.

Later, appellee filed an answer and counterclaim
alleging that the balance owing by him to appellant for
the work was only $1,939.30, and seeking to recover
on his counterclaim damages in the sum wot $6,927.50,
less $1,939.30, because of alleged breach of contract re-
sulting in deterioration by exposure of coal to the ele-
ments. A reply, filed on October 15, 1948, completed the
pleadings.

°

122

Appellant’s pleadings were filed by his attorneys,
Gordon, Gordon and Moore. A judgment of May 16,
1949, recites that these attorneys withdrew from the
case prior to the February term, 1949, of the Hopkins
Cireuit Court.

At the February term, on February 25, 1949, upon
motion of appellee, it was ‘‘ordered that this action be
set for trial on the 6th day of the next regular term of
this Court, which will be May 7, 1949.’’ On May 7, 1949,
the case was heard upon oral testimony before the Judge
of the Hopkins Cireuit Court. Appellant was not pres-
ent and was not represented. No order had been entered
transferring the case to the common law docket, and no
order had been entered directing that proof be heard
orally, or taken as in ordinary actions. The above
quoted order is the only one entered from the time the
reply was filed until the trial was had and judgment
entered,

From a judgment awarding appellee $4,802.70 ap-
pellant appeals, requesting that it be set aside, and urg-
ing that: (1) Oral proof introduced in an equitable ac-
tion without a previous order directing that the testi-
mony be so taken is unauthorized and amounts to no
proof; and (2) a claim for damages cannot be taken as
confessed but must be proved.

This action was properly brought in equity to en-
force a lien. KRS 376.110. Issues were made by the
pleadings so that proof was necessary. Civil Code of
Practice, section 552 (2), provides: ‘‘Subject to the
provisions of section 708, upon any issue of fact which
arises upon the pleadings in an equitable action, unless
such issue be transferred pursuant to Title IL., or upon
the pleadings in an ordinary action, if such issue be
transferred pursuant to said title, proof shall be taken
by depositions * * * provided, further, that the court
may in any equitable action before the proof has (been)
taken order that the evidence be heard by the judge in
the same manner as testimony is introduced in ordinary
actions, in which event the parties may have the evidence
taken and transcribed as in ordinary actions.’’

This action was not transferred to the common law
docket as provided by Title II of the Code, and no order
was entered providing that the evidence be heard by

es 123

the judge in the same manner as testimony is introduced
in ordinary actions.

In Gribben v. Gribben, 227 Ky. 96, 11 8. W. 2d 998,
we held that the hearing of evidence in an equity case
orally, as permitted by Civil Code of Practice, section
552 (2), without a previous order directing that it be
so presented, was unauthorized.

Proceedings should have been had in accordance
with section 552 (2) of the Civil Code of Practice.

The judgment is reversed.

Fuson v. Helton, Sheriff, et al.
November 21, 1950.
R. L, Maddox, Judge.

Cleon K. Calvert, Robert J. Watson, for appellant.

Floyd Taylor for appellees.
Juver Cammacx—Affirming.

A local option election was held in the White Church
Precinct No. 51, in Bell County, in May, 1950. There were

124 ee

93 dry votes cast and 53 wet votes. The appellant, Elmer
Fuson, filed a petition contesting the election. He charged
that no fair or legal election was held because of the
disregard of the provisions of KRS 118.330 (1). This
statute prohibits any person other than election officers
and challengers from being closer to the polling place
than 50 feet,

It was further charged in the petition:

“VI. From the time the polls opened in said pre-
cinct on said date, till they closed, large numbers of
those favoring prohibition in said precinct congregated

- on the porch of the building in which the polls were being:
held, and immediately at and in front of the door leading
into the polling room, and harassed and intimidated.
persons presenting themselves to vote; and among other
things these are some of the things they would say and

O: .

“‘(a) They would tell the voter that if he or she
voted ‘Yes’ when they got into the polls, the good people
of said precinct would have no further association with
them.

““(b) That if they voted ‘Yes’ and had any church
affiliations they would be excommunicated from their -
ureh. :

“(¢) That if they voted ‘Yes’ they would be com-
mitting a grievous sin.

“«(d) That no man or woman who was honest would
vote ‘Yes.’

*(¢) That no man or woman, who would take a
drink of liquor, was an honest man or woman.
and many other things of like import.

‘VII. That the doings and sayings related in the
next preceding paragraph so intimidated, embarrassed
and influenced many of the legally qualified voters of
said precinct, that they failed to express their senti-
ments in said election, and some were disgusted, to the
extent that they left the voting place without registering
their answer to the question propounded to the voters
on the ballot. All these things were done and said to the
voters within less, and much less, than fifty feet of the
voting room.

Lt 125

“VIII. By reason whereof there was no legal or
valid election held in White Church Precinct No. 51,
on May 13th, 1950.”

A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and upon
Fuson’s declining to plead further his petition was dis-
missed. On the appeal it is contended that the election
was void because the violations of the statute destroyed
the secrecy of the ballot, and also that many voters were
intimidated, embarrassed and harassed so as to prevent
a full and fair expression of sentiment on the local op-
tion question.

In the case of Field v. Prewitt, 274 Ky. 306, 118
S. W. 2d 700, it was pointed out that the purpose of the
statute in question was to preserve the secrecy of the
ballot, and, if the secrecy of the election is not violated,
an election will not be set aside because of a technical
violation of the statute. It was pointed out further that
facts should have been stated showing how and to what
extent votes were affected by the alleged violation of
the statute, The allegations of the petition were sufficient
to show the manner in which the election was said to
have been influenced in White Church Precinct, but
no facts were alleged showing the extent of the alleged
violation. Of course there was the charge that the result
of the election was changed, but it was pointed out in
the Field case that a general statement of this nature
was insufficient. The names of no voters who failed to
vote because of the alleged violations of the statute were
given, nor was the number of such persons given. Since
there was a difference of 40 votes in favor of the drys,
it would have been necessary for the petition to have
set forth that a number of voters sufficient to change
the result of the election had been kept from the polls.

Under the circumstances, we think the judgment
should be and it is affirmed.

Gatewood v. Pickett et al.

November 21, 1950.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Hazelrigg & Cox, Louis Cox and John Hopkins for appellant.
Funk, Chancellor & Darnell, and Chat Chancellor for appellee.

Cur Justice Sims—Affirming.

This controversy arose over what estate the chil-
dren of R. F. Scruggs took under their father’s will in
certain real estate owned by him, and was submitted to
the chancellor under sec. 637 of the Civil Code of Prac-
tice. The chancellor in a well-reasoned opinion declared
that the children took a vested remainder subject to
their mother’s life estate, the possession and enjoyment
of which might be accelerated by her remarriage, and
adjudged that the deed executed by the widow and her
children passed a fee simple title. The purchaser appeals.

The pertinent parts of the will read:

“Second: I devise all of my property, both real,
personal and mixed of which I may die possessed to my
beloved wife, Lula K. Scruggs for and during the period
of her natural life and with the remainder to all of my
children share and share alike.

[| 127

“Third: In the event’ of the marriage of my wife
after my death, then I direct that my estate be distrib-
uted according to the laws of descent and distribution.”

The widow and her children were all sui juris at
the time the deed was executed and the only objection
the purchaser has to accepting the deed is that he con-
tends the remainder did not vest in the children at
testator’s death, but under clause 3 of the will the vest-
ing of the remainder is contingent upon the children
surviving the remarriage of their mother.

It is insisted by appellees that the whole will plainly
shows an intention on the part of testator to have the
remainder vest in his children at the time of his death
and clause 3 merely accelerates their coming into pos-
session in the event of the mother’s remarriage.

Appellant recognizes that in Weil v. King, 104 8. W.
380, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1010, the general rule was clearly
stated, and has been consistently followed, that in the
absence of a contrary intention shown in the will, a re-
mainder, following an intermediate estate, will vest at
the time of the testator’s death, Stallard v. Lambert,
236 Ky. 651, 33 S. W. 2d 682; Faulkner’s Guardian v.
Faulkner, 237 Ky. 147, 35 S. W. 2d 6. But he argues that
the word ‘‘then’’ appearing in the third clause is used
‘tas an adverb of time and not as referring to the event
of the widow’s remarriage,’’ therefore, it will postpone
the vesting of the remainder since the remaindermen
eannot be ascertained until the contingency of the wid-
ow’s remarriage is determined. Appellant relies upon
Wood v. Schoen, 216 Pa. St., 425, 66 A. 79, and Annota-
tions in 49 A. L. RB. 187, 127 A. L. R. 602, 169 A. L. R. 207.

The language in the will in the Wood case disting-
uishes it from the instant one. There, the testator said
upon the death of his wife and his three sisters his estate
should go to those then entitled to it under the intestate
laws of the state. In that will the word ‘‘then’’ was clear-
ly used as an adverb of time and did not refer to an
event. But in the case at bar it is equally clear ‘‘then’’
was not used by the testator to designate time but to
designate an event.

Appellant relies upon Robb v. Belt & Milman, 12

B. Mon. 648, 51 Ky. 648 and Roy v. West, 194 Ky. 96,
238 S. W. 167, as taking the present will out of the rule

128 ee

stated in Weil v. King, 104 S. W. 380, 31 Ky. Law Rep.
1010. However, these cases are distinguishable from the
instant one on the wording of the wills they construe,-

We glean from the annotations in A. L. R. mention-
ed in the third preceding paragraph the rule to be that
the testator’s intention, gathered from the will as a
whole, will determine whether ‘‘then’’? should be con-
strued as an adverb of time or as referring to an event.

It is elementary that the testator’s intention is
“. gathered from the will as a whole, 19 Kentucky Digest,
Wills, sec. 470. As was written in Beaem v. Shirley, 301
Ky. 326, 191 8.W.2d 248, if we but let the will before us
speak for itself instead of attempting to construe its
plain, unambiguous terms according to a set of abstruse
rules, there is not a chance to make a mistake. Here,
testator’s will shows he had but one thought in mind, his
widow was to have the property for life, with remainder
to all of his children in equal shares. The second clause
of the will clearly states this and is susceptible of no
other construction. Then by clause 3 he provides if his
wife remarries his estate should go according to the
laws of descent and distribution, which would give his
widow one-half of the personal property absolutely and
one-third of the real estate for life and would give the
balance of the estate to his children, KRS 392.020 and
KRS 391.010.

Clause three indicates testator did not look with
favor upon the remarriage of his widow and attempted
to curtail her interest in his estate in that event. Hvi-
dently, he did not desire to restrict the children’s inter-
est should their mother remarry by postponing the vest-
ing of the remainder in them until it could be determined
whether or not the widow would remarry, but it was
his plain intention to accelerate their coming into the
remainder upon their mother’s remarriage rather than
waiting until her death. This conclusion is fortified by
the rule that the law favors the early vesting of an
estate in the absence of a clear manifestation of a con-
trary intention. Winn v. William, 292 Ky. 44, 165 8. W.
2d 961; Skiles v. Bowling Green Trust Co., 294 Ky.
211, 171 8. W. 2d 235; See annotations in 61 A. L. R.
1011 and those previously referred to therein. .

We have concluded the chancellor correctly con-

ee 129

strued the will and his judgment that the purchaser took
a good title through the deed executed by the widow and
the children is affirmed.

Commonwealth v. Caudill et al.
November 21, 1950.
Sam Ward, Judge.

A. HB, Funk, Attorney General, Guy L. Dickinson, Assistant At-
torney General, A. H. Cornett, Commonwealth’s Attorney, for ap-
pellant,

French Hawk for appellees.
- Jupen Cammacx—Certifying the law.

Boyd Caudill and Hargis Cook, deputy sheriffs of
Letcher County, were indicted for arresting Tommy
Collier without authority of law. The indictment charg-
ed: ‘** * * at the time not having a warrant for the
arrest of the said Tommy Collier and not having reason-
able grounds for believing that said Tommy Collier had
committed a felony, and said Tommy Collier not having
committed a breach of peace or any offense or crime
in the presence of said Boyd Caudill and Hargis Cook,
and the said Tommy Collier having committed no felony
or any offense whatever, and did unlawfully and felon-
iouly take arrest and place in custody the said Tommy

ollier.’?

The reasons why Judge Ward sustained a demurrer
to the indictment are set forth in the following order:
“‘The defendants are indicted for arresting another
otherwise according to law under KRS 435.150, and

130 eS

they have demurred to the indictment. The indictinent
charges that the defendants as peace officers arrested
the witness without having any warrant for his arrest,
or without any offense being committed in their pres-
ence, and without having reasonable grounds to believe
that he had committed a felony. Without deciding wheth-
er the indictment sufficiently charges the facts and cir-
cumstances of the arrest, the Court is of the opinion that
the demurrer should be sustained for another reason.
The indictment charges that the defendants were peace
officers and were acting as peace officers. The statute
under which the indictment was drawn seems to be a
companion to the kidnapping statute, KRS 435.140. The
Court is of the opinion that it was not the intent of the
Legislature to have this statute apply to peace officers
while in the discharge or attempted discharge of. their
duties. If a peace officer is attempting to apprehend some
one who has committed a felony and makes a mistake
and then is subjected to a prosecution under this statute
because his grounds for believing the person arrested
were not reasonable grounds, or if a peace officer is to be
subjected to prosecution under this state when he ar-
rests one for drunkenness in a public place and the
defendant is acquitted, then peace officers may be im-
peded in the discharge of their duties. It is, therefore,
ordered by the Court that the demurrer be sustained
and the indictment dismissed, to which the Common-
wealth objects and excepts and prays an appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the purpose of having the law
certified.’’

On this appeal the Commonwealth is asking for a
certification of the law.

KRS 435.150 reads as follows: ‘‘Any person who
arrests or imprisons another or transports him, against
his will, beyond the bounds of this state, otherwise than
according to law, but under circumstances not consti-
tuting a violation of any of the provisions of KRS
435.140, or causes or in any manner counsels, aids or
abets in such an arrest, imprisonment or transportation
shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than
one nor more than twenty years.’’

We had this statute under consideration in the case
of Roberts v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 365, 144 S.W.2d
811. Roberts, an officer, was charged with arresting

SS 2:

persons without authority of law. In that case, as in
the one at bar, the language of the statute having to
do with the transportation of a person against his will
beyond the bounds of the Commonwealth was not in
question. Roberts was found guilty and his conviction
was upheld. It follows that the court improperly sus-
tained the demurrer to the indictment. See also the
cases of Commonwealth v. White, 101 S.W. 331, 30 Ky.
Law Rep. 1322; and Carroll v. Commonwealth, 164 Ky.
599, 175 S.W. 1043.

Wherefore, this opinion is certified as the law of

the case.
Whittaker et al. v. Southeastern
Greyhound Lines.
April 28, 1950,
Rehearing denied December 8, 1950.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Stanley B. Mayer for appellants.
R, W. Keenon and Joseph J. Leary for appellee.

Joven Larimen—Affrming in part, reversing in
part.

This controversy arose from the granting of a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity by the Division
of Motor Transportation to Blue Motor Coach Lines
for the operation of a bus line between Louisville and
Middletown over U. S. Highway 60, a distance of some
seven miles. The granting of the certificate was pro-
tested by Southeastern Greyhound Lines, The Louis-
ville Railway Company, and Kentucky Bus Lines,
(hereafter designated respectively, ‘‘Southeastern,’”’
“Railway,’’ and ‘‘Kentucky Lines’’),

At the hearing almost a hundred witnesses testified
before the Director. His conclusion, based in part on
his own personal knowledge of the territory to be served
as well as the testimony of witnesses, was that in the
interest of public convenience and necessity the certifi-
eate applied for should be granted.

From this decision Southeastern appealed to the
Franklin Circuit Court. There the Chancellor adjudged

EE

the certificate to be void, because Southeastern had not
been notified by the Division that its service was in-
adequate and had not been given an opportunity to
improve its service. Apparently the Chancellor’s de-
cision was based squarely on our decision in Utter et
al. v. Black, 305 Ky. 136, 202 8.W.2d 425.

Blue Motor Coach Lines (hereafter designated
‘‘applicant’’) on this appeal contends the principle of
Jaw stated in Utter v. Black is incorrect, because the
rule in that case found its support in decisions based
on a statute which has long since been repealed. We
think it unnecessary to pass upon the soundness or
unsoundness of that specific decision as the judgment
of the Chancellor with respect to applicant’s certificate
must be sustained on another ground.

There is no doubt the Division of Motor Transpor-
tation has broad discretion in determining the need for
and type of common carrier certificate it issues, and
the power of the Court to review its action is limited
in KRS 281.420. However, the Court may determine
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support
the finding of facts in issue, and whether or not the
Director acted within the scope of his statutory powers.

It is necessary for us to review briefly the evi-
dence presented by the record. Over the past several
years there has been an extensive suburban develop-
ment extending eastwardly from the city limits of
Louisville along U. 8. Highway 60 toward Middletown.
The operation sought by applicant, and authorized by
the certificate issued, is much more than an inter-city
service between Middletown and Louisville. It involves
the picking up and discharging of passengers at all
points between the city limits of Louisville and Middle-
town, including all of the St. Matthews area along this
route.

It appears that Railway has extended its city bus
service eastward, and has a heavy schedule of busses
operating to and from Hubbard’s Lane. Kentucky
Lines has several daily trips which extend beyond ‘this
point to an intersection where their busses turn off to
Anchorage and LaGrange. In addition, Kentucky
Lines operates two daily round-trip schedules directly
between Louisville and Middletown. Southeastern has
been operating 27 daily trips between Louisville and

184 ee

Middletown, although a number of their busses carry
passengers to other cities east of Middletown.

The evidence introduced by the applicant was to
the effect that the busses of Southeastern often passed
up passengers along the route or left them standing at
the stations because of crowded conditions of the busses.
Witnesses testified that they were often unable to ob-
tain seats, and that the Company was giving prefer-
ence to inter-city passengers over urban passengers.
There was also testimony that the schedules of this
Company were not convenient for the witnesses’ par-
ticular purposes. There was evidence along the same
line with respect to the crowded conditions of both Ken-
tucky Lines and Railway vehicles.

Though there is extensive proof the bus lines now
operating along this route are reasonably taking care
of the present needs of travelers, we will accept for the

. purposes of this decision the Director’s finding that
the service being rendered is inadequate. This alone
is not sufficient to establish applicant’s right to a cer-
tificate. The Director must also find a necessity for
this new service.

The significant factors the Division shall take into
consideration in granting or refusing a certificate are
set out in KRS 281.070 as follows: (our italics) ‘‘In
granting or refusing to grant a certificate, the division
shall take into consideration the effect that the pro-
posed operation may have upon public transportation
business and facilities of every character within the
territory sought to be served by the applicant, whether
existing transportation service is adequate, the public
need for the service the applicant propases to render,
the ability of the applicant efficiently to perform the
service, and the probable effect upon the highways and
upon the safety of the public using the highways.”’

In connection with this statute, we call attention
to KRS 281.090 which provides for the issuance of a
certificate if the applicant has established ‘‘that the
privilege sought by the applicant is convenient and
necessary in the public interest.”’

Considering the language used in the statutes above
quoted, it is apparent that while the convenience of the
traveling public is a major consideration, another .of

SS 2:

vital importance is whether or not there is a real
necessity for the new service which the applicant pro-
poses to render. It was long ago held that it was not
proper to grant a common carrier certificate simply
because of the public convenience, but both convenience
and public necessity must be established. See Cooper
et al. v. McWilliams & Robinson et al., 221 Ky. 320, 298
S.W. 961, and Cannonball Transit Company v. Sparks
Bros. Bus Company et al., 255 Ky. 121, 72 8.W.2d 1021.

The statute requires the Division to take into con-
sideration the existing facilities in the territory. Fa-
cilities are distinct from service. They may be said to
be the available means of furnishing the service. If
the existing carriers on the route have sufficient physical
equipment and personnel, are willing to add additional
service if necessary, and may be ordered to do go by the
Division, it is difficult to discover wherein a completely
new service is necessary. See Red Star Transporta-
tion Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines et al. 220 Ky. 424,
295 S.W. 419; Shorty’s Bus Line et al. v. Gibbs Bus
Line Incorporated et al., 237 Ky. 494, 35 S.W.2d_ 868;
Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Kentucky River
Coach Company et al., 249 Ky. 65, 60 S.W.2d 127.

The record before us shows the following facts:
Southeastern, in its protest filed in this proceeding,
stated that no additional service was necessary between
Middletown and Louisville, but if, so, it was ‘‘ready,
and willing, and able to furnish such service.’’ Its
Vice-President in Charge of Traffic testified that the
Director had never notified him or hig Company of any
need for additional service on this route, and he stated
that his Company was ready, willing and able to put on
additional service if needed, and would re-adjust its
schedules to meet such requirements as the Director
deemed necessary. This offer was reiterated by South-
eastern’s territorial traffic representative.

It further appears that Kentucky Lines had filed
with the Division of Motor Transportation, prior to
the hearing, proposed new schedules which would in-
crease its service over this route. Its President testi-
fied that his Company was ready, willing and able to
furnish the same services proposed by applicant, or
whatever service might reasonably be required by the
Division.

1:

. The protest of Railway recites that it had on file
with the Division a pending application which would
authorize it to extend its opérations to Middletown.
An officer testified that Railway would be willing to
alter its service, over the route it was authorized to
cover under its existing certificate, to conform to what-
ever directions the Director might give.

Another matter of significance in this connection
is that the certificate of Kentucky Lines requires. it to
operate with closed doors over the part of the route
served by Railway, this indicating that the Division had,
until the time of the granting of the certificate here in-
volved, considered that there was no necessity for addi-
tional service in this particular area.

We thus find the Director was confronted with the
following situation: Three established and responsible
bus companies were operating over the route, or an
important part thereof, when the application of a fourth
company was filed. Hach of the three companies then
furnishing service had by application, the filing of new
schedules, or by offers made at the hearing, expressed
a desire and willingness to render such service as the
Division deemed adequate.

KRS 281.180 specifically authorizes the Division
to require existing operators to render adequate service
along their certificated routes if it is found that the
service being rendered is adequate. In view of this
statute, and in view of the offers of the existing carriers
on the route, we cannot find any evidence of substance
that there existed a public necessity for the granting
of a certificate to a new carrier. :

It is true the type of service applicant proposes
to render may have become necessary to take care of
the suburban needs in this rapidly developing area.
However, disregarding the increased hazards that may
result from the operations on this heavily traveled
highway by a fourth bus line, it has not been shown
satisfactorily by this record that present operators,
singly or jointly, are not able to furnish such service
as is required. Until this can be established, other than
by the testimony of a few persons that they have suf-
fered inconvenience or discomfort, we do not believe
a public need for .applicant’s particular service has
been shown. Such being the case, the finding of the

.

PL

Director with regard to necessity was not supported by
substantial evidence, and the Director acted arbitrarily
in authorizing the issuance of the new certificate.

Without prejudice to applicant’s rights, we think
the entire matter should be remanded to the Division
for the purpose of having it reconsider the reasonable
needs for additional service on this route; to consider
any pending applications, proposed new schedules, or
offers to furnish additional service by Southeastern,
Kentucky Lines, and Railway; and to direct these exist-
ing certificated carriers on the route to furnish such

’ additional service, if any, as may be found to be reason-
able. The application of applicant should be continued,
and in the event the above mentioned carriers fail to
take care of the reasonable needs of the traveling pub-
lic within a reasonable time, such application may again
be entertained.

The judgment is affirmed to the extent it adjudges
invalid the certificate issued by the Division of Motor
Transportation to appellants; and is reversed insofar
as it dismisses such applicatioa, with directions to re-
mand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million et al.
June 23, 1950.
Rehearing denied December 8, 1950.
William Baxter, Judge.

oO
: at

|
oo,
o

Hazelrigg & Cox, R. Vincent Goodlett, and John Noland for
appellant.

George T. Ross for appellees.
Van Sant, Commisstonzr—Reversing.

The action was instituted by appellant,, Tennessee
Gas Transmission Company, to condemn an easement
for use and occupancy of a right of way 8,248 feet in
length, and an easement of ingress and egress to and
from the right of way through the remaining 231 acres
of appellees’ farm in Madison County. The right of
way is fifty feet in width, except for a distance of 200
feet adjacent to a county road where it widens to 100
feet. The property was condemned to provide for the
construction, patrol, and maintenance of a 26’? gas
pipe line for the transmission of natural gas from Texas
to a point in West Virginia. The same pipe line was
involved in Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v.
Jackman, 311 Ky. 507, 224 S.W.2d 660, and five other
eases from Barren County decided in January, 1949,
and in Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v. Igo,
314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W.2d 149, decided today. The opinion
in the Jackman case describes the nature of the ease-
ment and the burdens imposed by the judgment on the
remainder of appellees’ farm, which burdens constitute
some, but not all, of the elements of damage resulting
to the remainder of the farm by reason of the situation
in which it has been left by the taking of the right
of way.

Commissioners appointed by the county court
viewed the property and awarded appellees $1,806.00
for the use and occupation of the strip of land included
in the right of way, and $1,450.00 as damages to the
adjacent land of appellees. Both parties filed éxcep-
tions to the commissioners’ award and in August, 1947,

1

a: jury. trial was held in the Madison County Court,
which resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellees
“in the sum of $12,000.00. Appellant then prosecuted an
‘appeal to the Madison Circuit Court, during the pend-
ency of which, to-wit, November 1st, 1947, it commenced
construction of the pipe line. The work of construc-
tion was completed about’ July 1st, 1948, which was
_prior to the trial in the cireuit court.

In the eight months required to lay the line, appel-
lant occupied and severely damaged 10.3 acres of land
outside of, but adjacent to, the right of way condemned.
In addition thereto, it neglected to maintain existing
fences crossed by the right of way. By stipulation, it
was agreed by the parties that appellees might assert
a claim for damages for such injuries, to be tried with
the condemnation proceedings. That agreement was
carried out, resulting in consolidation of the two ac-
tions: (1) The suit by appellant to condemn the. right
.of way, and (2) the action by appellees for damages by
reason of the trespass described above.

The trial court, in instructions 1 to 4, inclusive,
covered the condemnation suit; in instructions 5 to 8,
inclusive, covered the second action; and in instruction
9 directed the jury to separate the amounts found under
the respective groups of instructions, The jury returned
the following verdict:

‘We the jury find for appellees, Q. Million and
Mary Lutie Million, his wife, Julian Million, Rhea B.
Million and Issie Million and fix the damages to the
lands of the appellees named herein and described un-
der Instructions 1 to 4 Inclusive (Instructions to the
Jury) At Three Thousand Four Hundred Fifty Hight
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($3,458.50) and $8,435.00 dam-
ages to the remainder of the land.

“We fix the damage to the lands and properties
described and referred to in Instructions to the jury,
Items 5 to 8 inclusive, at $2,051.76.

‘Albert F. Scruggs,
: “Foreman of Jury.’’

Accompanying the verdict, and as part thereof,
the jury returned a detailed report of its calculations
and methed of arriving at its findings. The report is
in words and figures as follows:

Le ED

“1. $3,458.50 For Damage to Lands Described Under Instructions
1 to 4 Inclusive
2, 10,486.76 For Damage to Properties Described under Instruc-
— tions 5 to 8 inclusive
3. $18,945.26
4, Loss of Grazing of 51 acres of Rye for two
months
At $4.00 per Acre per Mo..$204.00 per
Mo. 2 mos. $408.00
5. Loss of Grazing on Grass 179 Acres at 3.00
per Acre 9 Mos.— 510.00
6. Damage to Loss of Spring by Blasting 400.00
$1,318.00
7 1. Walnut Tree & — $50.00 Less $10.00 40.00
Poplar Tree Timber value
8 2. Locust Posts $22.50 Not Usable Damaged ~ 22.50
9. 3. Shade Trees on Hill at $50.00 ea. $150.00
Not usable — 150.00
10. 4, 5 Acres Rye Destroyed at $20 — $100.00
No Salvage 100.00
312.50
No. 6 25.00 labor to seed
12.00 fertilizer
$42.00 per acre.
$10.08
42.00
2006 00
4012
aay 421.26 for restoration of 10.08
12, Required Fencing for Sheep — $200.00
and Damage to Fence
No.4 Before Line 9.77 x $100— 977.00
9.77 Acres
300
18. 2981.00 — $2981.00 Less

$977.00 $1954.00
10.03 Acres 10.08 x $150.00
300
30.0900 -- $8,009.00
1,504.50

1,504.50 Less

142 ee

14, $1504.50 _ 1504.50
$3458.50
16. Damage Direct to Lands on Right of Way
& Lands Used Outside
$3,458.50”

di Judgment was entered in conformity with the ver-
ict.

Appellant urges three grounds for reversal: (1) The
award of $3,458.50 for the easement over the right of
way is grossly excessive; (2) the award of $8,435 as
resulting damages, is grossly excessive; and (3) the
court erred to the prejudice of appellant’s substantial
rights in admitting certain evidence over its objection.
The award of $2,051.76 for damages to trees and grow-
ing crops is not challenged.

The area embraced in the right of way comprises
9.77 acres, The calculation sheet returned with the ver-
dict shows the jury found this area to have been worth
$300 per acre initially, and to have been reduced in value
$200 per acre by reason of the servitude. The initial eval-
uation and the consequent reduction are supported by
the testimony of several qualified witnesses, indeed one
of appellant’s own witnesses placed the reduction in
value at fifty per centum of its initial worth. Thus, the
jury’s calculations show the total damages awarded for
the easement through the right of way to be $1,954.00
and not $3,458.50, as appellant contends. The difference,
$1,504.50, is revealed by the jury’s computation on line
14 to be the damages fixed for appellant’s partial de-
struction of the 10.3 acres of land off the right of way,
in the process of construction.

The testimony of competent and qualified witnesses
amply supports this finding. The wording of the verdict
itself shows $3,458.50 to have been the sum fixed for
‘damage direct to lands on right of way and lands used
outside,’’ (Our emphasis.) .The prior conclusory state-
ment in the verdict that such sum was found under in-
structions 1 to 4 is incorrect, not verified by the calcula-
tions, and manifestly is a clerical misprision. The sum
of $2,051.76 is shown by the jury’s computations to rep-
resent special damages, such as the destruction of crops,
trees, etc. and properly is included within the purview
of instructions 5 to 8 inclusive. No element of damage

De

embraced in the award of $1,504.50 is included in the
award of $2,051.76, and conversely. Appellant then cannot
prevail in its contention that the $3,458.50 is solely for
damages to the 9.77 acres in the easement right of way,
and therefore excessive.

In reviewing the award of $8,435.00 for resulting
damages to the remaining 231.23 acres, we must con-
sider the separate elements of damage which are two
in number. First, in its construction of the pipe line,
appellant dug drainage ditches along its right of way,
and extending onto the property of appellees’ outside
the limits of the right of way. The evidence for ap-
pellees shows that surface waters have been diverted
and caused to flow in unnatural quantities in these un-
natural channels from the right of way through the
drainage ditches onto the remaining lands of appellees,
thereby causing erosion of the top soil; and that this
condition will continue to exist with consequent increase
of damage. Second, appellant, in addition to its ease-
ment on the right of way, is granted the right of ingress
and egress over the entire tract to and from its pipe
line. It must pay any damage occasioned off the right
of way in the exercise of this right, and the burden is
one which by the judgment runs with the land. Such a
burden is an encroachment on the dominion, reduces the
marketable value of the property, and is a damage for
which compensation must be paid. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Company v. Jackman, supra. It is reasonable to
conclude that these burdens have reduced the market-
able value of the farm to some extent; but the majority
of the court is of the opinion that the witnesses who
testified for appellees and the jury have exaggerated
the depreciation in the value of the farm occasioned
by them; and, since no other factual reason was given
by the witnesses to support their opinions, the majority
of the court is of the opinion that the award for result-
ing damages is excessive. Petroleum Exploration v. Mc-
George et al. 225 Ky. 181, 7 8S. W. 2d 821, and cases
therein cited.

Appellant claims the court erred in permitting one
of appellees’ witnesses to testify as to the value of the
property (as high as $800 per acre) for building sites
or baby farms. Reliance is placed on Louisville & Nash-
ville R. Co. v. Cornelius, 232 Ky. 282, 22 S. W. 2d 1033,

ua es

but that case and the present one may be distinguished.
Here, the jury had before it evidence that the farm was
fronting along a county road and was adjacent to the
community of Newby, thus showing it to be strategically
located for such purposes, In Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Cornelius, supra, an award of damages based on
the property’s value as a site for a hydro-electric plant
was reversed because of the absence of evidence as to
the adaptability of the property for such purpose, ex-
cept that it was physically possible to use it for that
purpose. It is contended, upon the authority of Hoskins
v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 400, 161 S. W. 2d 169, that
as no demand was shown in the community for building
sites or baby farms, the admission of evidence as to the
property’s value therefor was reversible error. Hoskins
v. Commonwealth, supra, merely holds that it was not er-
ror to exclude such testimony in the absence of a showing
of a market or demand. Other testimony objected to was
to the effect that good tobacco land is worth a thousand
dollars per acre based on the return received on the in-
vestment; unnamed persons had told a witness that they
would give $400 per acre for appellees’ land; and that
land ‘‘on the west side of the far end”? of appellees’ farm
sold for $200 an acre in 1933. No exception was taken
to the court’s ruling on the admission of the hearsay
evidence; therefore, it is not subject to review by this
Court. We are of the opinion that the Trial Court would
not have committed error had he excluded from the
evidence all of the testimony complained of on the ground
that some was incompetent and the rest irrelevant. Never-
theless, we do not consider the admission of any of the
testimony complained of to have been prejudicial to
appellant on this trial, because the calculations of the
jury show it did not base its findings on this testimony;
however, on the next trial, the court will exclude this
testimony.

Finally, the point is urged that the Trial Court
erred in refusing to strike the testimony of a witness
for appellees relative to the value of the land in issue,
after it was disclosed upon cross-examination that the
witness was not entirely familiar with appellees’ land.
Although the testimony of this witness was weakened
on cross-examination to such an extent that it was of
meager probative value, we cannot say that it was utter-
ly destroyed as a matter of law.

Le

In the various cases before this Court instituted by
appellant and other gas transmission lines to acquire
right of ways, it has been suggested by counsel for the
property owners, and it appears in the record in this
case, that appellant is in the habit of supplementing the
statutory fees allowed commissioners to appraise land,
and of informing the commissioners of such fact. In this
instance, the fee was raised from $1.50 to $10.00. This fact
was not prejudicial to the landowner in the present pro-
ceeding, except in so far as it might have influenced
two commissioners appearing as witnesses for appellant
in the trial of the case. But in other cases instituted
under the provisions of KRS 416.230 et seq., such prac-
tice would be deemed to be prejudicial to the landown-
er’s substantial rights, because the just compensation
referred to in Sections 13 and 242 of the Constitution has
been construed to be the value placed on the property
by the commissioners. Barker v. Lannert, 310 Ky. 848,
222 S. W. 2d 659. We are happy to say that it does not
appear in any of the cases which we have reviewed that
attorneys for the Transmission Companies have been
guilty of indulging in this practice. The record in this
case shows that one of the officers of appellant informed
the appraisors that appellant had paid the extra com-
pensation to the clerk to be distributed to the commis-
sioners. The fee in cases of this character is set by law;
and, although it must be conceded that it is not adequate
compensation for the services to be performed, a party
litigant has no greater right to pay extra compensation
to a commissioner or an appraisor of property in litiga-
tion than he has to pay extra compensation to a juror
sitting in the trial of the case. Should an aggrieved party
seek reversal of a judgment entered in a case wherein
his adversary has engaged in such practice, we would
not hesitate to grant him relief; and whilst reversal of
the judgment is not sought by the landowner in this
case, we think it appropriate at this time to call atten-
tion to the matter.

Neither do we approve of the practice of using, as
witnesses, the commissioners appointed by the court, to
such an extent, that, on appointment, they may antici-
pate being engaged as such by the party who may be
favored by their appraisal and testimony.

For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed

146

with directions that it be set aside and that appellant
be granted a new trial to be conducted in a manner not
inconsistent with this opinion.

Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Igo et al.
June 23, 1950.
Rehearing denied December 8, 1950.
W. J. Baxter, Judge.

—

Hazelrigg & Cox and John Noland for appellant.
George T. Ross and G. Murray Smith, Jr., for appellees.
Van Sanr, Commisstonsr—Reversing.

The appeal is from a judgment rendered by the
Madison Circuit Court in an action to condemn a right
of way and easement over appellees’ farm for the con-
struction, operation, and maintenance of a 26’’ gas pipe
line by appellant, Tennessee Gas Transmission Com-
pany. The proceedings were instituted and conducted in
accordance with the provisions of KRS 278.500 and
416.010 to 416.080 inclusive. The jury in the. Circuit
Court awarded damages to appellees in the sum of $16,-
985.00 for the value of the right of way and resulting
damages to the remaining portion of appellees’ farm
through which appellant has obtained the right to lay
its gas pipe line. The jury did not separate the damages
for the taking from those resulting, but made a lump
sum award for both.

The farm consists of 575.92 acres, the right of way
condemned comprising 9.14 acres of this boundary leav-
ing 566.78 acres remaining, subject to the burdens here-
inafter recited, and on account of which, appellees claim
the marketable value to have been reduced. The right
of way extends for a distance of approximately one
and one-half miles lengthwise through the center of
appellees’ farm, which lies between Richmond and Lex-
ington fronting on U. 8. Highway No. 25 and bounded
in the rear by an improved county road. The top soil is
underlaid by strata of limestone, and a goodly portion

_of the land has been ‘‘in Blue Grass’? for over fifty
years. It appears from the testimony that the farm is
one of the most valuable, acre for acre, in Madison
County. Appellant introduced four witnesses and ap-
pellees eight, in respect to values and damages. We will
give a brief summary of the estimates made by some of
these witnesses.

George B. Smith, a resident of the state of Tennes-
see and employed by appellant as ‘‘ Assistant Land Su-
pervisor’’ was the first witness introduced on behalf of
appellant and testified that in his opinion the land taken
was worth $350 per acre. He visited Madison County

148 |

in the latter part of April or the first of May before
the giving of his testimony in October, 1948, and stated
that he had familiarized himself with the values of farm
Jands in Madison County by viewing the farms, attend-
ing two auction sales, and reviewing expressed consider-
ations in deeds. He stated that in his opinion the taking
of the right of way imposed no burden on the remainder
of the farm; consequently, there was no resulting dam-
age to such remainder. R. HE. Baker, a former Tax Com-
missioner for Madison County, testified that in his opin-
ion the farm was worth between $250 and $300 per acre,
the damages by reason of taking of the land amounted
to the lump sum of $3,015.00, and there was no result-
ing damage by reason of the burdens imposed on the
remainder of the land. Mr. Baker was one of the com-
missioners appointed by the county court to make an
original assessment of damages. §. H. Frazier, for ap-
pellant, testified that in his estimation the farm. was
worth $360 per acre; that the land within the right of
way was damaged in the amount of $2,747.92 only, since
the title to the land did not pass; and that’ appellees in-
curred no damage to the remainder of the farm by rea-
son of the burdens imposed. He stated that he had sold
Jand at auction in the year 1947, and that in selling land
with a right of way through it, it was the practice to
announce such fact at the sale. R. B. Baumstark, another
of the commissioners, testified that in his opinion the
land was worth $250 per acre. He stated that no damage
resulted to the remainder of the farm by reason of the -
burdens imposed on it, but he admitted under cross-
examination that he did not know whether or not an
easement through a farm affects its salable value.

James Carr, a son-in-law of appellees, and manager
of the farm, stated that in his opinion the farm was
worth $500 per acre immediately before the acquisition
of the right of way and $400 per acre immediately after
it became known to the public in general that the pipe
line was to be constructed through the farm. Jerry W.
Parrish, a farmer operating 1200 acres of farm land
owned by Mr. Arnold Hanger, testified that he had been
managing that farm for sixteen years and that he had
owned farms of his own. The Hanger land is on U. 8.
Highway No. 25 about three or four miles distant from
the farm of appellees, A 24’? gas pipe line was construct-
ed through the Hanger land almost five years before he

a !

testified. The soils on the two farms are very much alike.
Both are known in the county as ‘‘Blue Grass Land.¥ He
had tried to cultivate the land within the right of way
after the pipe line was laid, but was unable to get a crop
‘big enough to cut.’? Previous to that time he had been
able to raise approximately 1800 pounds of tobacco to
the acre. He has attempted to rebuild the land on the
right of way by fertilizing and planting it in four differ-
ent kinds of grass: Blue Grass, Timothy, Korean, and
Red Clover, but is unable to get a stand of grass except
in low places. He planted it in tobacco one year and the
land on each side of the right of way line made 1700
pounds to the acre but that planted on the right of way
yielded nothing. He stated that in his opinion the farm
was worth from $400 to $450 per acre immediately be-
fore the pipe line right of way was acquired and was
worth from $25 to $30 per acre less, after it became
known that the pipe line was to be constructed through
the farm. He stated that all purchasers and sellers of
real estate took into consideration the presence or ab-
sence of a gas pipe line; and, if present, the marketable
value of the land was reduced in accordance with the
figures recited above. M. M. Welch, lives about two and
one-half miles from appellees’ farm, is familiar with
it, having viewed it several times. He was familiar with
the values of farm lands in that vicinity from his ob-
servation of sales in that neighborhood and his general
knowledge of farm lands. In his opinion the farm was
worth $500 per acre before the gas pipe line was laid
and was worth $400 per acre thereafter. For forty-two
years previous to his engaging in farm work, he was
supervisor for the Bell Telephone company, and, as
such, had engaged in purchasing numerous right of ways
for his company. Many witnesses introduced by appel-
lees testified that on farms through which the 24’ pipe
line above referred to had been constructed, the land
along the right of way was rendered untillable. Appel-
lant complains of the testimony of three of these wit-
nesses on the ground that they made no showing of
any similarity of conditions on the farms about which
they testified, and the farm of appellees. It is true that
these witnesses did not testify expressly as to the simi-
larity of the lands but their descriptions of the lands
about which they were testifying were sufficient for the
jury to determine that they were sufficiently similar to

150 es

that of the Igo farm to render their testimony competent
for what it was worth; and other witnesses testified to
the same effect specifically stating that the lands about
which they were testifying were similar to that of the
land of the Igo farm. We are of the opinion that appel-
lant was not prejudiced by the testimony complained of.

We now will consider, in its various aspects, the
main point relied on for reversal, viz., the award is ex-
cessive, The principal argument in respect to this con-
tention is identical with that urged for reversal in
Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v. Jackman, de-
cided Jan, 11, 1949, which will be published in 311 Ky.
507, 224 S.W.2d 660. That argument is: that except
under very unusual circumstances, which it is contended
are not present in this case, there can be no damage to
the adjacent land of the owner by reason of the taking
of an easement of a strip of land for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of a gas pipe line. It is true
that the easement granted does not forbid the landowner
tilling the soil within the limits of the right of way. But
if he does so, he must assume the risk of such crops being
destroyed by appellant in its indiscriminate right to use
the right of way for maintenance and operation of the
gas pipe line; and the evidence additionally shows that
the right to till the soil within the limits of the right of
way is one of negligible value, because crops cannot be
grown thereon in sufficient abundance, or of sufficient
quality, to render them profitable. Thus the evidence
presented by appellees, although contradicted, shows a
practical destruction of the land for farming purposes,
and the jury was privileged under the evidence to find
an actual taking of 9.14 acres within the limits of the
right of way, at least to the amount testified to by Carr;
viz., $460 per acre. The 9.14 acres at $460 per acre
amounts to the sum of $4,204.40 which would
leave a balance of $12,789.60 representing damages to
the remaining 566.78 acres of land. The burdens imposed
on this acreage are the same as those imposed on the
remainder of the farm and described in the opinion in
the Jackman case, supra. Those burdens, by reason of
the judgment, are appurtenant to each and every por-
tion of the farm; and no matter into how many tracts
hereafter the farm may be divided and sold, the burdens
imposed by the judgment will run with the land of each
and-every tract. These elements of alleged damage

|

could not be considered unless it appeared in the evi-
dence that they actually affect the marketable value of
land in that vicinity. The right to enter and traverse
the land of another at any point and at any time is an
infringement on the dominion. It is a right which might
be called an estate carved out of the fee, and whilst the
owner of the land may forbid others to enter upon the
land, he cannot enforce such an edict against appellant
or its assigns. Thus the fee simple title to the land is
subject to an over-all easement, which, since it is not
opposed to public policy, runs with the land,

It is reasonable to conclude that these burdens have
reduced the marketable value of the farm to some ex-
tent; but the majority of the court is of the opinion that
the jury and the witnesses who testified for appellees
have exaggerated the depreciation in the value of the
farm by reason of this sole element of damage; and,
since no other factual reason was given by the witnesses
to support their opinions, the majority of the court is
of the opinion that the award for resulting damages is
excessive. Petroleum Exploration v. McGeorge et al.
225 Ky. 131, 7.8. W. 2d 821, and cases therein cited.

Wherefore the judgment is reversed with directions
that it be set aside and.that appellant be granted a new
trial.

Keck, Commissioner of Highways, v. Browne et al.
Tune 23, 1950.
Rehearing denied December 8, 1950.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

152

A. E, Funk, Attorney General, M. B. Holifield, Assistant Attorney
General, Jo M. Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, and C. J. Wad-
dill, Assistant Attorney General for appellant.

Elwood Rosenbaum, Clay & Rosenbaum, John L. Davis, Stoll,
Keenon & Park for appellees.

Juver Lariwer—Affirming.

This action was instituted to determine which of
three parties should bear the loss for a forgery. Ben
Browne, one of the appellees herein, who resides at 461
Woodland Avenue, Lexington, is a civil engineer. He
was employed by the Highway Department to do some
surveying and work in Greenup County. Prior to the
contract of employment, the record discloses that cor-
respondence relative to same was carried on between
him and the Department of Highways. This correspond-
ence from the Highway Department to Browne was ad-
dressed to Browne at his residence, 461 Woodland Ave-
nue, and received by him. The contract, which was
entered into pursuant to the above correspondence, does
not contain the address of Browne. Mr. Browne entered
upon the performance of his contract. In payment for

es =e

same the Commonwealth drew a check in his favor in the
sum of $3,949.92, which was mailed to him accompanied
with an enclosure showing the purpose for which the
check was drawn, and addressed to appellee at Lexing-
ton with no street address given. Somehow the Post
Office Department delivered the letter and check to an-
other Ben Brown whose address was 561 McKinley
Street, Lexington. This second Ben Brown endorsed
and presented the check to a merchant named Grall, to
whom he was indebted, in order that he might pay Grall
what he owed him and receive the difference in cash.
Grall informed the imposter, Brown, that he could not
cash a check in that amount but that they would go to
the First National Bank and Trust Company and get it
cashed. Whereupon, Grall accompanied Brown to the
Bank. They presented the check to Theodore Skidmore,
a ‘‘savings and extra teller.’? Skidmore did not know
Brown but requested the merchant, Grall, whom he did
know, to identify Brown, which he did. It seems that
about this time, Mr. Miles, vice-president of the Bank,
was passing Skidmore’s cage when Skidmore called Mr.
Miles attention to the presented check. Mr. Miles knew
Mr. Grall as a customer of their Bank. He asked Mr.
Grall if he knew this man, Brown. Mr. Grall told Mr.
Miles that he did, and that he did business with him
and had for some time. Whereupon, Mr. Miles put his
initials on the check and Mr. Skidmore then cashed it.
Brown took the money and has not as yet been found.
The Bank then sent the check through regular collec-
tion channels and the amount thereof was deducted from
the Commonwealth account in the Bank. When the
forgery was discovered the check was returned through
the Bank channels for collection but the appellee Bank
has ever since refused to pay it.

The Bank and the proper Mr. Browne insist that,
because of failure properly to address the letter to the
right Mr. Browne, the Commonwealth should sustain
the loss. The Commonwealth insists that because of the
failure of Browne to put his proper address in the con-

‘tract, that either he or the Bank, which the Common-
wealth alleges failed to exercise due diligence in identi-
fying the forger, Brown, before making payment, should
sustain the loss.

As stated above, this action was brought to deter-
mine which of three parties, namely, the drawer, payee,

154 |

or the cashing Bank should bear the loss for the forgery.
Proof was taken by deposition, and the cause submitted.
The court adjudged that Ben Browne recover of the
Commonwealth the amount of the check; that the action
against the Bank be dismissed; arid that as between the
Bank and the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth should -
sustain the loss. From that judgment and declaration of
rights, the Commonwealth appeals.

Appellants insist (1) that the rule of ‘‘comparative
innocence’’ would place the loss on either the payee or
the Bank and not on the Commonwealth; (2) that the
statute provides that a forged endorsement is wholly
inoperative; and (3) that the general rule is operative
in favor of the Commonwealth unless the latter is estop-
ped. It is maintained under (3) above that the rule
admits of no true exceptions; that the courts do not look
with favor on estoppel as against the sovereign; that
the elements of estoppel were not present in this case;
and that the burden of proof to establish estoppel was
on the Bank.

Appellee Bank and Trust Company relies entirely
on the well established rule that where one of two inno-
cent persons must suffer by the act or conduct of a
third party, the loss must be borne by | the one whose
conduct made it possible.

We recognize the correctness of the arguments con-
cerning the provisions of the statute and the decisions
thereunder relative to a forged instrument, and the
questions of estoppel as set out in the opinion cited by
appellants. The principles and rules embraced therein
do not govern here and are not controlling in the in-
stant set of facts and circumstances. Relative to the
questions of estoppel as being operative against the
Commonwealth, we need only call attention to what ap-
pears to be the universal rule, that where the Govern-
ment elects to become a party to commercial paper, it
assumes all the responsibilities of private persons un-
der the sanie circumstances. Let us observe what was
said in United States v. First National Bank & Trust
Co., D.C., 17 F.Supp. 611, 613. There the Veterans

_ Administration addressed a bonus certificate to-one
William M. Hutchins and, by mistake of the Postal De-
partment, the letter containing the certificate was re-
ceived by William M. Hutchinson, who made application

BL

for a loan thereon. Check was issued and negotiated
through the First National Bank and Trust Company.
It was argued there that there could be no estoppel as
against the United States. It was said: ‘‘The rule is
well settled that the government, in dealing with com-
mercial paper, would have the same rights as individ-
uals engaged in similar transactions.’’

In Clearfield Trust Company v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 576, 87 L.Ed. 838, it was said: “The
fact that the drawee is the United States and the laches
those of its employees are not material. Cooke v.
United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398, 23 L.Md. 237. The
United States as drawee of commercial paper stands in
no different light than any other drawee. As stated in
United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S.
527, 584, 46 S.Ct. 388, 389, 70 L.Ed. 717, ‘The United
States does business ox business terms.’ It is not ex-
cepted from the general rules governing the rights and
duties of drawees ‘by the largeness of its dealings and
its having to employ agents to do what if done by a
principal in person would leave no room for doubt.’ ”

In United States v. National Exchange Bank, 4
Cir., 1 F.2d 888, 890, it was said: ‘‘It is enough that,
when the United States elects to become a party to
commercial paper, it assumes all the responsibilities of
private persons under these same circumstances.’’

Appellants say in brief: ‘In the court below, all
parties conceded the existence of the general rule that,
where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the
acts of a third, he whose conduct enabled such third
person to occasion the loss, must sustain it.’’ Appellants
do not complain about the rule but insist that its ap-
plication to the facts of this case causes the difficulty.
This general rule is so well established that it is entire-
ly unnecessary to enter into a lengthy discussion there-
of. See Anglo-American Mills Co. v. Kentucky Bank &
Trust Co., 243 Ky. 124, 47 8.W.2d 951; Citizens’ Bank
of Shelbyville v. Mutual Trust & Deposit Co., 206 Ky.
86, 266 S.W. 875, 40 A.L.R. 1001; and Bailey v. Hoover,
233 Ky. 681, 26 S.W.2d 522. Since appellants in-
sist that the difficulty is the application of the rule to
the facts herein, let us look again at the facts. Consid-
erable ado is made about the fact that in the contract
itself no address was given of appellee, Browne. How-

156 ee

ever, it is admitted that in some of the Highway De-
partment files there was a correct address, but that its
files were kept in sections and not in a central filing
system, which possibly accounts for following the line of
lesser resistance and addressing the envelope merely
to Lexington, Kentucky. In the first place, the imposter
had to obtain possession of the check before he could
forge it. Who made this possible? Is it not obvious
that it’ was the failure of appellants properly to address
the envelope containing the check?

In the case of Citizens’ Union National Bank v.
Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60, 63, considering rights
as between a paying bank and the maker of a check, a
situation somewhat like this, in which two Joe Cun-
ningham’s were involved, it was said: ‘‘Under the first
part of the quoted section of our statutes, which is in
harmony with the general rule prevailing even before
the adoption of the statute, one who pays a check under
a forged indorsement must, as between himself and
drawer, bear the loss; but the latter part of the section
is consonant with a well-recognized exception to the
general rule which places the loss upon the drawer
where his own acts and conduct invited and made pos-
sible the forgery. The exception to the general rule
springs from the just and equitable principle recognized
in all jurisdictions that, where one of two innocent
parties must bear a loss, it must be borne by the one
whose conduct made it possible.

“Here Mr. Terrell had in his hands a fund due one
Joe Cunningham which by order of court he had been
directed to pay. He made the check out in the name of
the party entitled thereto, but by mistake mailed it to
another bearing that name and in care of the firm by
which the latter was employed. Thus he made it pos-
sible for the imposter, by whose ruse he had been mis-
led, to exhibit the envelope in which the check was
mailed and to hold himself out ‘as the true owner and
holder of the check and to be so identified by an officer
of a well-known business establishment. No matter
what the real intentions of the drawer were, he in effect
represented to the commercial world that the party into
whose hands he placed the check was the true payee,
and by his own conduct led others to believe and act
upon that representation to their prejudice.”

es

Thus, we see that appellants made it possible for
the wrong Ben Brown to get the check in his possession.
Under the circumstances here, it appears to us that the
Bank did all reasonably to be expected in cashing the
check. This is just another case of two innocent parties.
We think the facts in the Terrell case above fit sub-
stantially into the facts here; that the reasoning therein
is the reasoning that should be adopted here; and that
the general rule, that if one of two innocent parties
must bear a loss, it must be borne by the one whose
conduct made it possible, must prevail.

The judgment is affirmed.

Fitzwater et al. v. Cincinnati, Newport &

Covington R. Co. (two cases)
October 27, 1950.

Rehearing denied December 12, 1950.

a

Rodney G. Bryson, Judge.

Harry K. Aurandt for appellants.
Arthur J. Daly for appellee.
Juves Larimer—Affirming.

Two separate actions are involved in this appeal.
Pearl Fitzwater in her action sought to recover from
appellee for permanent injuries. Her husband, Wil-
liam Fitzwater, in his action sought recovery for loss
of consortium and expenses. The causes were tried
together, resulting in verdict for appellee.

Motion and grounds for new trial were filed in
each case. In the wife’s case the grounds for new trial
were: (1) The verdict is contrary to the law and evi-
dence. (2) The court erred in instructions as given. In
the husband’s case the ground was merely the verdict
is contrary to the law and evidence.

Later an effort was made to amend the motion and
grounds for a new trial by filing additional grounds.
Objection was interjected thereto and the court sus-
tained the objection. Appellants are here attacking the

ee 159

instructions as given in the Pearl Fitzwater case, and
insisting the court erred in both cases in refusing to
allow ‘appellants to file the additional grounds for a
new trial.

We consider first the question as to the additional
grounds. The question goes to the alleged misleading
answers given by a prospective juror on voir dire ex-
amination. The affidavit of appellants’ attorney in
support of the motion shows that Mr. Daly, attorney
for appellee, Railway Company, asked the panel whether
or not any of them had ever had a claim against the
Company for personal injuries. All the jurors remained
silent, and Mr. Daly said: ‘‘I take it by your silence
that you have not.’? Immediately after the noon ad-
journment, Mr. Daly called to the attention of Mr.
Aurandt, attorney for plaintiff, that one of the jurors
had settled a claim with the Company and showed Mr.
Aurandt a release signed by the juror. Together they
reported these facts to the court. Mr. Aurandt’s affi-
davit in support of the motion does not say that at that
time he filed motion to set aside the swearing of the
jury, or took any steps or made any request for a rul-
ing by the court. Appellants, in brief, say that no
ruling thereon was made but that the court indicated
a desire that the trial proceed. The affidavit of Mr.
Daly, relative to the same matter, does say that ‘‘no
motion to set aside the swearing of the jury for this
case was made at the time by either Harry K. Avrandt,
attorney for plaintiff, or this affiant.’’

It will readily be observed that the question before
the court was not merely the right to amend a motion
for new trial by setting up additional grounds. : The
cases cited, and many others, hold that to be right and
proper generally. Nor is it the question of the false
or misleading answers given by a prospective juror on
voir dire examination. ‘The question which confronted
the trial court was whether or not a party litigant, after
becoming fully aware of a situation, which obviously
would justify a motion to discharge the jury, could
stand idly by, proceed through the trial, and then, when
a verdict is adverse to him, raise for the first time
that question in an amended motion and grounds for
new trial. Certainly it was not incumbent upon the
court, even though the matter was brought to its atten-

. 160 |

tion, to discharge the jury on its own motion or take
any action in reference thereto unless requested_so
to do. In Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Blunk, 264 Ky.
673, 95 S.W.2d 244, 247, it was said: ‘‘It is the estab-

_ lished rule that a party litigant who takes his chance
on matters within his knowledge and without objections
will not be heard to complain of such matters after the
ease has been determined adversely to him.’”’

We think the court properly struck the additional
motion and grounds for new trial in both cases.

Appellant limits her attack upon the instructions
to 1, 2, and 3, although in motion and grounds for new
trial, she included 1 through 6. Instruction No. 1 reads:

“The jury is instructed that it was the duty of the
agent of the defendant company, The Cincinnati, New-
port and Covington Railway Company, in operating
the Fort Mitchell street car upon which the plaintiff,
Pearl Fitzwater, was a passenger, to observe the high-
est degree of care which a prudent person would exer-
cise under like circumstances as shown by the evidence
in this case, to transport the plaintiff to her destination
in safety.

“Tf the jury believes from the evidence that while
the plaintiff was about to alight from the defendant’s
ear, and you further believe from the evidence that as
the plaintiff was attempting to leave the car, the agents
or servants in charge of it, caused it to move with such
an unusual, unnecessary and sudden jerk, that plaintiff
was thrown to the floor of the car and injured, the jury
will find for'the plaintiff; unless you so believe, you
will find for the defendant.”” -

The complaint registered relative to Instruction 1
goes to the language: “‘* * * and you further be-
lieve from the evidence that as the plaintiff was at-
tempting to leave the car, the agents or servants in
charge of it, caused it to move with such an unusual,
unnecessary and sudden jerk, that plaintiff was thrown
to the floor of the car and injured, * * *.’? It is in-
sisted such is not applicable to passengers who are
alighting from or attempting to board a street car.
Stover v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Railway
Co., 252 Ky. 425, 67 S.W.2d 484, is cited in support of
that view. It will be noted that the cited case deals with

I

the rule applicable where a passenger is alighting from or
stepping on a stationary car, in which case the carrier
has no right to move at all. In the instant case, appel-
lant, Mrs. Fitzwater, boarded a street car owned and
operated by appellee in the City of Covington. She
alleged in her petition, and undertook to show by her
own testimony, that as she left her seat to walk for-
ward in the car as it approached the stop where she
intended to alight, the car was operated in such a care-
Jess and negligent manner as to cause her to fall and
injure herself. Thus, it will be seen that the rule, as
announced in the Stover case, does not apply. It is
ineumbent upon the complainant to show more than
ordinary movement of the car, and further show, as a
basis of her action, that the jerk which caused her
injury was sudden, violent, unusual, and unnecessary.
Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106,
137 S.W.2d 1107; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Wilder, 143 Ky.
436, 136 S.W. 892; Wilder v. Louisville Ry. Co., 157
Ky. 17, 162 S.W. 557; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Osborne,
187 Ky. 841, 163 9.W. 189; South Covington & C. St.
Rwy. Co. v. Trowbridge, 163 Ky. 79, 173 S.W. 371;
Millers Creek R. R. Co. v. Blevins, 181 Ky. 800, 205
S.W. 911; Louisville & I. R. Co. v. Roberts, 190 Ky.
744, 228 §.W. 681; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Jolly,
117 Ky. 632, 78 S.W. 476. We find no merit in the con-
tention relative to Instruction 1.

The severest criticism is directed at Instructions
2 and 3, which read:

“2 Tf the jury believe from the evidence that at
the time and place, and under the circumstances dis-
closed by the proof, plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary
care for her own safety, and was by reason thereof
caused to fall and was in said manner injured; or if
you believe from the evidence that the street car from
which the plaintiff was alighting, did not jerk or make
an unusual move while plaintiff was attempting to
alight, or that said plaintiff was caused to fall in any
other manner, or by reason of any other than the move-
ment of the car, then in any of said events the law is
for the defendant, and you should so find.

“<3 The Court instructs the jury that the defendant
was not an insurer of the safety of the plaintiff while
she was traveling as a passenger on said car, and that

162 ee

the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was presumed to have
taken upon herself all of the reasonable risks neces-
sarily incident to street car travel, by careful, prudent
operators for transportation over the street on which
she was traveling at the time of the alleged injury,
and if the jury believe from the evidence that, without
the fault of the defendant’s agent, but by an accident
arising from causes beyond the control of the defend-
ant’s agent, plaintiff was injured, the jury will find
for the defendant.’’

‘We consider these two instructions together be-
cause appellant says they are inaccurate, incomplete,
and in a sense contradictory. Appellant insists that
instruction 3 is clearly erroneous for the reason that it
is a mere abstract statement of law and in effect tells
the jury that a passenger on a street car assumes cer-
tain risks. As a matter of fact it does nothing more
than call to the attention of the jury that the Railway
Company was not an insurer of its passengers. We
think that instead of the two instructions being con-
tradictory, they are more or less explanatory of each
other. In 2, the court instructs the jury that if, at the
time and place and under the circumstances, plaintiff
failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety,
the law'is for defendant. This put on her the duty of
exercising ordinary care for her own safety, and im-
pliedly said that the Railway Company was not an in-
syrer of its passengers. Instruction 3 says plainly that
the Company was not an insurer of its passengers. The
evidence shows the traffic to have been heavy; that ap-
pellant knew this fact; and further knew that the car
was making frequent stops because of this heavy traf-
fic, yet with this knowledge signaled the motorman for
her stop, arose from her seat and proceeded toward

” the exit while the car-wag yet in motion. Under such
circumstances, we think there is justification for In-
struction No. 2. We are not by any means approving
Instruction No. 3, but under the circumstances here,
when read with No. 2, we think it not prejudicial. In-
structions 1, 2, and 3, taken together, placed on the
Company the highest degree of care and charged ap-
pellant with only ordinary care. While not in the best
form, we think the instructions as given presented fairly
the law under the circumstances of this case. To say
the least, they were not prejudicial.

ee = 163

It is further claimed that the verdict is contrary
to the law and evidence. Here we have the testimony
of appellant, Mrs. Fitzwater, alone, of a sudden jerk
of the car which caused her to fall as she was proceed-
ing toward the exit. There was testimony of another pas-
senger, who was proceeding to an exit just behind
appellant, which showed there to be no noticeable sud-
den motion or jerk of the car. This was corroborated
by others. Obviously, with this contradiction, it was
the prerogative of the jury to consider the facts,

Necessarily the husband’s cause must fall with that
of his wife.

The judgment is affirmed in each case.

Fields v. Reeves, Com’r of Revenue.
November 28, 1950,
W. B, Ardery, Judge.

‘Wilbur Fields for appellant.

A. H, Funk, Attorney General, Hal O. Williams, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Juver Herm—Affirming.

Appellant, Basil Vernon Fields, appealed from a
ruling of the Division of Income Taxation, Department
of Revenue, to the Kentucky Tax Commission, claiming
that he was exempt from income taxation by the State
of Kentucky ‘‘on pay he has received as a retired
officer in the United States Army.’’

164 De

The Division of Income Taxation had held that
retirement pay received pursuant to the provisions of
the third paragraph of Section 15 of the Act of June
16, 1942, Chapter 413, Public Law 607—77th Congress,
as set out in 37 U.S.C.A. sec. 115, does not come within
the provisions of KRS 141.080 (11), and is, therefore,
subject to Kentucky income tax. The Kentucky Tax
Commission sustained the ruling of the Income Tax
Division.

Within 15 days, the time provided by KRS 131.120
(1), appellant filed an appeal in the Franklin Cirenit
Court on ‘May 6, 1949, naming H. Clyde Reeves, Com-
missioner of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky, as
defendant. Summons was served upon H. Clyde
Reeves, Commissioner of Revenue. On September 7,
1949, the defendant, H. Clyde Reeves, Commissioner
of Revenue, Commonwealth of Kentucky, demurred
specially to the petition because:

“‘The court has no jurisdiction of the defendant
or of the subject matter for the following reasons: That
the appeal herein was from an order of the Kentucky
Tax Commission, composed of H. Clyde Reeves, Com-
missioner of Revenue, ex officio a member of the Ken-
tucky Tax Commission, Jess B. Thomas, Associate
Member, and at the time of the order complained of,
Robert A. Thompson, Associate Commissioner, now re-
signed; that the Kentucky Tax Commission is an official
statutory body with power to sue and be sued and that
it is the body corporate or government entity to which
assessments by the Department of Revenue are ap-
pealed by taxpayers who feel aggrieved, and in turn
its order may be appealed from to the Franklin Circuit
Court, as provided in subsection (2) of KRS 181.110;
that the Commissioner of Revenue is without authority
to entertain an appeal from an administrative officer’s
assessment, and that he is without jurisdiction to enter
an order overruling or sustaining such an assessment,
the sole jurisdiction being in the Kentucky Tax Com-
mission; that the only proper parties defendant to this
appeal are the Kentucky Tax Commission and its com-
ponent members.

“That there is, further, a defect of parties de-
fendant for the reasons above set out.’’

On May 20, 1950, appellant filed an amended peti-

es — 155

tion naming Jess B. Thomas, Robert A. Thompson, and
the defendant, H. Clyde Reeves, constituting the Ken-
tucky Tax Commission, as parties defendant. On June
17, 1950, defendants H. Clyde Reeves, as Commissioner
of Revenue, and Jess B. Thomas, Robert A. Thompson,
and H. Clyde Reeves, constituting the Kentucky Tax
Commission, filed their ‘‘answer and special demurrer
to the jurisdiction of the court’? on the ground that
appellant failed to file an appeal from the above order
of the Kentucky Tax Commission within 15 days, the
time allowed for perfecting such appeal as provided by
KRS 131.120; that inasmuch as no appeal was taken
from the action of the Kentucky Tax Commission within
the time provided, the court did not have jurisdiction
of the appeal.

_ The court sustained the special demurrer. Appel-
lant declined to plead further. Upon motion of ap-
pellee, the petition as amended was dismissed. The
amount being less than $500, appellant has filed his
motion for appeal in this court.

One of the functions of the Kentucky Tax Com-
mission, as provided by KRS 131.090, is to hear and
determine appeals from findings by the Department,
and to review local assessments. KRS 131.110 provides
for protest against assessment by the Department of
Revenue, and for appeals to the Kentucky Tax Com-
mission. KRS 131.120 provides for appeals from the
Kentucky Tax Commission to the Franklin Cireuit
Court. KRS 181.125(1) provides: ‘‘Unless otherwise
specifically provided by law, no appeal from or review
of any tax assessment, ruling, order or finding of the
Department of Revenue or of the Kentucky Tax Com-
mission shall be allowed except in the manner and sub-
ject to the conditions as provided in KRS 131.110 and
131.120.”’

We are constrained to hold that the finding of the
trial court is correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Fuqua’s Adm’r.
November 28, 1950.
Holland G. Bryan, Judge.

‘Wheeler & Marshall for appellant.
Earle T. Shoup, W. Pelham McMurry for appellee.

Van Sanz, Commisstonpr—Affirming,

The case was submitted to the Chancellor of the
McCracken Circuit Court on the law and facts. Since
the evidence supports his finding of facts, we will adopt
his statement of the case.

“On or about June 4, 1930, Mrs. Christine Fuqua,
wife of the plaintiff, R. H, Fuqua, and mother of the
decedent, Billie Fuqua, signed and delivered to L.
B. McGarvey, an agent of the defendant, an application
for the issuance of a policy of insurance on the life of
the said decedent. The said application contained the
following questions and answers:

EE
Question ‘‘11. Is life proposed now insured in this
. Company? If so state numbers, kinds
and amounts of policies. If infantile, state

kind and premiums.
Answer “‘Numbers Kind

69687848 BL
(Premium) 25¢’’
Question ‘‘14. Is life proposed now insured in any
other company? If so, for what amount?
If infantile, state kind and premium.
Answer “None

‘‘Although Mrs. Fuqua signed the application, she
did not fill in the blanks on the application, that being
done by the defendant’s agent, the said McGarvey.
She did not read the application after the blanks had
been so filled in, and the said agent, at the time he filled
in said blanks, did not ask Mrs. Fuqua any question
relating to the existence of other insurance on the life
of Billie Fuqua.

‘At the time said application was signed by Mrs.
Fuqua, two otker policies of insurance were in force
on the life of the said decedent, Billie Fuqua, to-wit:

“Policy No. 69 687 848 in the amount of $295.00
issued by the defendant, The Prudential Insurance
Company of America, on February 28, 1927. Policy No.
4,709,067 in the amount of $1,000.00 issued by The
American National Insurance Company on April 4, 1927.

“The said application was duly accepted by the
defendant, and on June 9, 1930, it issued a policy of
insurance on the life of the said Billie Fuqua, the same
bearing number 82,472,507, and calling for the payment
of the following amounts to the executors or adminis-
trators of the insured at the expiration of the periods
specified.

Amount payable

In Force at Death
Less than one year $300.00
One year 370.00
Two years 440.00
Three years 500.00

“All premiums on said policy were paid as they

168 ee

became due until the death of Billie Fuqua, which oc-
curred on August 17, 1937, whereupon no further pre-
miums became payable.

‘After the death of Billie Fuqua, and after the
appointment and qualification of the plaintiff as Ad-
ministrator of his estate, as aforesaid, the plaintiff
notified the defendant of such death and demanded pay-
ment of the proceeds of said policy, which notice and
demand were timely given and made, The defendant
refused to make such payment, declared the said policy
void by reason of the existence of an excessive amount
of insurance on the life of Billie Fuqua, and tendered
the premiums previously paid, plus interest at the rate
of three and one-half (344) per cent per annum, in full
settlement of its obligations under said policy. Plain-
tiff refused to accept such tender, and thereafter he
-instituted this suitto recover the sum of Five Hundred
($500.00) Dollars, plus interest at the rate of Six (6)
per cent per annum from the date of the death of Billie
Fuqua, August 17, 1937.

“The said policy issued by the defendant, number
82,472,507, contained the following provision:

«« ‘Maximum Amount of Insurance.—If the Insured
be already insured under any policy or policies issued
by this or any other company, and if the amount of in-
surance payable at the death of the Insured under such
policy or policies be less than the limit of insurance
fixed by the following table, but when added to the
insurance payable under this Policy shall exceed the
said limit, the amount payable under this Policy shall
not exceed the difference between the amount specified
in the said table of limitations and the total amount of
insurance payable under such policy or policies already
in force on the life of the Insured, but if the amount
of insurance payable at the death of the Insured under
such policy or policies already in force be equal to or ~
shall exceed the said limit of insurance, this Policy
shall be void, except as provided below:

Limit of Insurance at Age Next Birthday at Time of Death
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 it 12
$100 $200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900 $1000 $1100 $1200

Limit Between
13 14 Ages 14 and 14%

$1800 $1400 $1500

“« ‘Should the amount otherwise payable under this
Policy be reduced as hereinbefore provided, the Com-
pany will return the total premiums paid upon the
amount of such reduction, together with three and one-
half per cent. per annum compound interest.’

“The said policy also contained the following
provision :

“* ‘Policy When Void.—If at the time of the issu-
ance of this Policy there be in force upon the life of
the Insured hereunder an Industrial policy or policies
issued by this Company, this Policy shall be void unless
it contains an endorsement, signed by the President or
Secretary, permitting this Policy to be in force con-
currently with such other policy or policies previously
issued; but it-is expressly stipulated that the issuance
of this Policy without such endorsement shall not be
considered a waver of this provision should there be
then in force any Industrial insurance policy or policies
previously issued by this Company upon the life of
the Insured hereunder.

“« <Tf for any cause this Policy be or become void,
all premiums paid hereon shall be forfeited to the Com-
pany except as provided herein.’

“The following endorsement was stamped on the
said policy:

“ “In conformity with the terms of the clause
‘Policy When Void,” this policy is permitted to be
in force.’

“The said policy also contained the following pro-
vision:

“*« ‘Tncontestability—After this Policy shall have
been in force, during the lifetime of the Insured, for one
full year from its date, it shall be incontestable, except
for nonpayment of premium, but if the age of the In-
sured be mis-stated, the amount payable under this
Policy shall be such as the premium would have pur-
chased at the correct age.’

170 ee

“‘An agent of the defendant, L. L. Kimbrell, and
defendant’s Assistant District Manager, M. 0. Jett,
were informed of the existence of the American Na-
tional Insurance Company policy on or about April 18,
1927.

‘The American National Insurance Company pol-
icy and the policy written by the defendant under date
of February 28, 1927, (No. 69 687 848) remained in
force from the dates of their issuance until the death
of the said Billie Fuqua, and the full proceeds thereof
were paid to the plaintiff.

“Billie Fuqua was born January 30, 1927.’

The Chancellor came to the conclusion that appel-
lant knew that the limits prescribed in the policy sued
on had been exceeded at the time it issued the policy,
that its conduct in collecting the premiums for 7 years
thereafter led the parents of the deceased to believe
the policy was in full force and effect, and that, by
reason of such conduct, appellant was estopped from
relying on the clause providing for limited coverage.
He was of the additional opinion that the defense re-
lied on was barred by the incontestability clause, citing,
Citizens’ Life Insurance Company of Kentucky v. Mc-
Clure, 138 Ky. 138, 129 8. W. 749, 27 L.R.A., N.S. 1026.

In view of our construetion of the incontestability
clause, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the soundness
of the Chancellor’s conclusion in respect to waiver and
estoppel.

, ‘To avoid the clause in respect to incontestability,
appellant argues that itis not seeking to void the policy
or its liability thereunder; on the contrary, it admits
liability, but is relying on the terms of the policy which
fix the amount for which it is liable at the sum total of
premiums paid plus interest thereon at the rate of 344%
per centum compounded annually, and that the clause lim-
iting liability is not one for the breach of which the policy
may be voided; it is one of diminishing liability only.
It therefore concludes that since the clause in’ respect
to the existence of other insurance does not relate to the
efficacy of the contract but te the benefits due, it is not
affected by the incontestability clause. It may be noted
that the clause limiting liability provides for diminishing
benefits when the benefits of previously acquired insur-

nn

ance added to the face amount of the policy do not ex-
ceed $1000, but it provides that the policy shall be void
when the benefits of previously acquired insurance,
standing alone as they do here, exceed $1000.

However this may be, we are of the opinion that
the wording of the incontestability clause, when con-
strued most strongly against the insurer who inserted it
in the policy, renders the clause limiting or precluding
liability because of other insurance unavailable after
the expiration of one year from the issuance of the
policy for the reasons hereinafter expressed.

Whatever the rule may be as to the general appli-
cation of an incontestability clause to one providing for
diminishing benefits because of the existence of other
insurance, it cannot be doubted that the insurer legally
may contract against its right to rely on the latter after
the expiration of an agreed period of time. Ordinarily
a provision for diminishing the amount of liability to
conform to the correct age of the insured, being one for
mere adjustment of benefits, is held not to be affected
by an incontestability clause. Appleman’s Insurance
Law and Practice, Vol. 1, Section 334, page 395. Even
in that event, it cannot be doubted that the insurer
legally may contract against its right to rely on such a
provision after the expiration of an agreed period of
time. It follows that the insurer may waive its right to
diminish the benefits in the one of such instances and
preserve it in the other.

“If it be sound to argue that the incontestability
clause is inapplicable to the clause limiting liability on
account of other insurance solely because the latter is
merely a provision for adjustment of benefits, the same
argument would hold (if the contract were silent) in
respect to the one for diminishing benefits in accordance
with the correct age of the insured. That argument then
would lead us to the conclusion that, if it had been the
intention of the parties that the incontestability clause
should not affect either of the only two provisions which
would entitle the insurer to diminish the benefits there
would have been no reason for excluding from the ap-
plicability of the incontestability clause the insurer’s
right to diminish benefits in one of such instances—
but it did.

The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis based on the

172 |

maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius is: that,
where general words are used, followed by a designa-
tion of particular things or subjects to be included or
excluded as the case may be, the inclusion or exclusion
will be presumed to be restricted to the particular thing
or subject. Ballantine’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Hdition,
Page 24. Literally translated, the phrase, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, means: the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another (of the same kind).
Whilst the rule is more frequently applied to the con-
struction of statutes and wills, it equally is applicable
to other instruments of writing. HE. H. Emery & Co. v.
American Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 177 Iowa 4, 158
. N. W. 748. Under this rule of construction, by reason of
the insurer excluding from the incontestability clause
the right to diminish the amount of benefits in the event
the correct age of the insured should be greater than
that upon which the premiums were based, we must pre-
sume that it was the intention of the parties not to ex-
elude therefrom any other right the insurer might have
to adjust the amount of benefits. Thus we are constrain-
ed to hold that in the policy in question the incontestabil-
ity clause is applicable to any defense (not rendering
it void ab initio) which is not specifically excluded in the
language contained in the incontestability clause itself.

The judgment is affirmed.
a

City of Owensboro et al. v. Department of Revenue
of Kentucky et al.

November 28, 1950.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Ridley M. Sandidge, Earl S. Winter and George S. Wilson, Jr.,
for appellants,

A. BE, Funk, Attorney General, Hal Williams, Assistant Attorney
General, and Thomas F. Marshall for appellees.

Jupen Herm—aAffirming,

In 1948-49, appellant, City of Owensboro, pursuant
to KRS, Chapters 58 and 97, constructed a combination
gymnasium and auditorium with adjoining swimming
pool, In order to sell revenue bonds to finance this ‘‘pub-
lic project’’ the City, pursuant to KRS, Chapter 58,
pledged a portion of its light and water revenue to the
payment of the bonds. See, McKinney v. City of Owens-
‘boro, 305 Ky. 254, 203 S. W. 2d 24.

Appellant, City of Owensboro Recreational Com-
mission, a public corporation created by an ordinance
of the City of Owensboro pursuant to KRS 97.110 and
97.120, operates this project. Appellants, in their peti-
tion in this declaratory judgment action, set out that
after the project was put in operation in February,
1949, a controversy arose between appellants and appel-
lees with respect to whether or not admission taxes im-
posed by KRS, Chapter 138, are applicable to any events
staged in the project, or field house for the entertain-
ment of the public and for which admission charges are
made; that as of August 8, 1949, an agreement was

174 ee

reached between them and appellees that certain classes
of events held and to be held in the field house are ex-
empt from the imposition of State admission taxes; that
previous to August 8, 1949, the Commission paid to
appellee, Department of Revenue, certain sums as ad-
mission taxes in connection with events which it is now
agreed are exempt; that appellants are entitled to a
refund pursuant to KRS 134.580; that it is the position
of appellees that the amounts paid may not be legally
refunded, or that appellants are not the parties entitled
ereto,

Appellants state that there is a controversy as to
events staged in the field house which are outside the
scope of the agreement of August 8, 1949; that previous
to August 8, 1949 they collected certain sums as part of

_ the price of admission in connection with professional
basketball games and professional wrestling matches
and paid the sums to appellee, Department of Revenue,
as admission taxes; that they have collected other sums
as a part of the price of admission for such professional
events, but have not paid the amount collected to the
Department of Revenue, which it now demands.

Appellants prayed that the court enter a judgment
resolving the controversy and declaring the rights of the
parties. By amended petition appellants pleaded that the

‘ various sums of money alleged in the petition to have
been paid to appellee, Department of Revenue, or with-
held from it by appellants, were all collected from pa-
trons of the project as a part of the regular price of ad-
mission to events held therein. It was stipulated ‘‘that
the project’’ was constructed and financed pursuant to
both Chapter 58 and Chapter 97 of the Kentucky Revised

tatutes,

Appellees demurred to the petition as amended. The
Court sustained the demurrer. Appellants declined to
plead further, and the court, without declaring the rights
of the parties, dismissed the petition as amended and
granted appellants an appeal.

Appellants maintain that all fees charged for ad-
mission to the center are exempt under KRS 97.130,
which provides: ‘‘All property which a city acquires for
the establishment and maintenance of a recreational pro-
ject under KRS 97.100 to 97.240 shall be exempt from
taxation to the same extent as other public property used

'

eS «7:

for public purposes. All fees charged or collected for
the admission to or the use of such a project shall be
exempt from taxation.’’

KRS, Chapter 97, deals with parks, playgrounds
and recreation. ‘‘Recreational project,’? as used in
Chapter 97, is defined in KRS 97.100(2) as: ‘* ‘Project,’
as used in KRS 97.100 to 97.240, means golf courses,
tennis courts, bridle paths, swimming pools, bathing
pools and other similar projects made available to the
public for recreational purposes. * * *.’?

There, the recreation contemplated is that of the in-
dividual or individuals playing golf or tennis, riding
horseback, bathing in swimming pools, or like recrea-
tion, Appellants’ field house has a swimming. pool ad-
joining it. All fees charged for admission to swimming
pools or bathing places are exempt from excise taxes
under KRS, Chapters 97 and 138. But the Owensboro pro-
ject lends itself not only to recreation in its swimming
pool, but to entertainment of the public, much of it en-
tertainment by professionals. Obviously, KRS 97.130
does not apply to such entertainment unless it is ex-
pressly exempt. 1

KRS, Chapter 138, relates to excise taxes. KRS
138.010 defines places of amusement or entertainment
but does not include: ‘‘* * * athletic contests in which one
of the contesting teams is composed exclusively of rep-
resentatives of educational institutions in this state, or
public bathing places and swimming pools owned and
operated by municipalities.’’

KRS 138.020 provides: ‘‘(1) Except as provided
in subsections (4) to (6) of this section, and in KRS
97.130, an excise tax shall be paid on the sale of admis-
sion to places of amusement or entertainment at the
following rates: * * *.”

But subsection (4) exempts: ‘‘* * * dramatic or
musical productions presented by a civic organization
in a park owned by any municipal corporation, if no
pecuniary profits result to any member of the organiza-
tion, and if such pecuniary profits as may result to the
organization are used exclusively for civic, municipal,
educational, charitable or religious purposes.’’

and provides that: ‘‘No admissions shall be tax-free
under this subsection unless, prior to the sale thereof,

176 ee

application for exemption is made to the Department of
Revenue on forms and in accordance with rules and
regulations duly promulgated by it, and unless the de-
partment, after being satisfied that such admissions are
tax-free, and in accordance with such rules and regula-
tions, issues a certificate of exemption.’’

Subsections (5) and (6) provide:

*(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impose a tax upon admissions to athletic contests, plays,
concerts and other forms of amusement or entertainment
if at least seventy-five percent of the gross proceeds of
admissions are to be used exclusively for charitable, re-
ligious, or educational purposes within this state.

‘“(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as
placing a tax upon admissions to athletic contests unless
the price charged for such admissions exceeds the sum
of fifty cents, in which case the first fifty cents of such
admission shall be exempt from the tax levied under
this section.’’

Appellants do not plead that any of the events held
in the field house come within either subsection (4, 5
or 6) of KRS 138.020.

Appellants, in their brief, say that it is conceded
that no admission taxes are due in connection with
amateur basketball games in which one participant rep-
resents a state institution, or in connection with the
use of the municipal swimming pool because of the ex-
emption provided in KRS 138.010; that no taxes in
connection with such events have ever been paid or with-
held by the Commission. Clearly such events are not sub-
ject to admission taxes.

Appellants, in their brief, set out as background
facts of this controversy that the Commission made a
return to appellee of $185.64 as payment ‘‘A’’ for a pro-
fessional basketball game; $534.68 as payment ‘‘B”’ for
a musical production; $113.49 as payment ‘‘C”’ for a
musical show; $81.17 as payment ‘‘D’’ withheld for a
musical concert; $124.56 as payment ‘‘E”’ withheld for
a musical production; $197.46 as payment ‘‘F'’”’ withheld
for a professional basketball game; $12.96 as payment
“@’? withheld for a professional wrestling match, and
$418.36 as payment ‘“‘H’’ withheld for a professional
basketball game. Payment has been made to appellees

a

in the above events, A, B and O, but has been withheld
in events D, H, F, G and H.

Appellants do not, in their petition as amended, set
out any plea bringing either of the above-named events
within the provisions of the above-quoted exemptions of
KRS 138.010, or of KRS 138.020.

The events in controversy not being events for rec-
reational purposes within the meaning of KRS, Chapter
97, and not having been shown tg be events exempt
under KRS, Chapter 138, it follows that appellants
are not entitled to any refunds of payments made to
appellees for events A, B and C above, and they should
make payments for events D, H, F, G@ and H, now with-
held. We are constrained to hold that the Chancellor
properly sustained the demurrer to appellants’ petition
as amended,

The judgment is affirmed.

Pennington v. Commonwealth.
November 28, 1950.
Watt M. Prichard, Judge.

P. H. Vincent for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee. -

178 |

Cumr Justice Smms—Dismissing motion for appeal.

James Pennington was convicted in police court of
the City of Ashland on Feb. 27, 1950, of the offense of
having in his possession intoxicating liquor in local
option territory for the purpose of sale, and his punish-
ment was fixed at a fine of $100 and 30 days in jail. He
appealed to the Boyd Circuit Court and at the April
Term thereof his case was continued until the June
Term, 1950.

On the first day of the June Term he was tried in
his absence and was given a fine of $20 and 30 days in
jail. Within an hour or two after the trial, Pennington
filed motion for a new trial stating that he was not in
court that morning when his case was called because
he was not advised of, and did not know, the date of his
trial; that he was not guilty and if given an opportunity
to present his defense, would prove he was innocent of
the charge. The court denied him a new trial and he has
filed his record here with a motion asking that he be
granted an appeal.

Under sec. 347 of the Criminal Code of Practice this
court has jurisdiction to review a misdemeanor convic-
tion only where the judgment rendered in the circuit
court ‘‘was for a fine for as much as $50, or for impris-
onment exceeding 30 days.’’ Here the fine was only $20
and the imprisonment was for the exact period of 30
days, therefore we are without’ jurisdiction to review
the trial had in the circuit court. Hunter v. Common-
wealth, 238 Ky. 393, 38 S. W. 2d 206; Oaks v. Com-
monwealth, 298 Ky. 225, 182 8. W. 2d 657. Although this
question was not raised in either brief, we are compelled
to take cognizance of it since it is one of jurisdiction and
may not be waived.

The motion for appeal is dismissed because this
court is without jurisdiction to consider it.

Mullins v. Mullins.
November 28, 1950.
BH. D. Stephenson, Judge.

179

H. J. Picklesimer for appellant.

Francis M. Burke, Francis D. Burke and J. A. Runyon for appellee.
Jupcs Cammacx—aAffirming.

Harold and Patty Jane Mullins were married ‘in
1944. In June, 1947, Harold Mullins filed suit for divorce.
He asked for the custody of the couple’s two-year-old
son, In her answer and counterclaim Mrs. Mullins sought
a divorce, custody of the child and an allowance for its
support and alimony for herself. In September, 1947,
the couple entered into an agreement under which Mr.
Mullins withdrew his petition and Mrs. Mullins was
awarded a divorce on her ‘counterclaim. The agreement
provided that.each party was to have. custody. of the
child every other year until he reached the.age of 16.
Mr. Mullins was.;to:pay $50 per month for the support
of Mrs. Mullins and the child during:the time he was
with her. Visitation periods were also provided. Judg-
ment was entered. according to the agreement.

After due notice, in September, 1948, Mrs. Mullins
moved to have the judgment modified so as to give her

180 ee)

custody of the child. After hearing evidence on this mo-
tion the chancellor awarded Mrs, Mullins custody of the
child and directed that Mr. Mullins pay $35 per month
for its support. Mr. Mullins was given the right to visit
the child and to have it in his home ‘‘at reasonable times
so as not to interfere with its health and education.”

On this appeal it is contended that (1) the chancel-
lor had no right to modify the former judgment without
vedocketing the case; and (2) an agreed judgment can
not be set aside except for fraud or mistake in its pro-
curement,

The stenographic report of the evidence heard on
the motion to modify the first judgment was ordered
stricken from the record. We must assume, therefore,
that the evidence supported the modification of the
judgment. We find nothing in the record showing that
the case was ever stricken from the docket. Further-
more, this question seems not to have been raised in
the lower court, to say nothing of the fact that, under
KRS 403.070, any judgment concerning the custody of
minor children is subject to review at any time.

In Renick v. Renick, 247 Ky. 628, 57 8. W. 2d 663,
it was held that a contract between parents, made either
before or after the commencement of a divorce suit, was
not binding in respect to the custody and maintenance
of minor children so as to deprive a court of its juris-
diction under KRS 403.070. See also Harms v. Harms,
302 Ky, 60, 193 S. W. 2d 407.

Judgment affirmed.

Combs v. Combs.
November 28, 1950.
Sam M. Ward, Judge.

P| 181
Don A. Ward for appellant.

Napier & Napier, C. W. Napier, and C. W. Napier, Jr. for
appellee.

Jupen Cammacxk—Affirming.

John A. Combs and Rudell Gilley Combs were mar-
ried in October, 1946. Mrs. Combs had a 14 months old
son at the time the parties were married. In his petition
for divorce Combs stated that the couple had no children.
In her answer and counterclaim Mrs. Combs asked for
a divorce and stated that John A. Combs was the father
of the child. She sought custody of the child and an
allowance for support of herself and the child. The
chancellor granted Mrs. Combs a divorce and awarded
eustody of the child to the parents of Mrs. Combs.
The husband was directed to pay $30 per month for
the child’s support.

Combs is contending vigorously on this appeal that
he is not the father of the child, and therefore, he should
not be required to support it.

It is provided in Subsection 3 of KRS 391.090 that,
if a man who has had a child by a woman afterward
marries her, the child or its descendants, if recognized by
the man before or after the marriage, shall be deemed
legitimate.

Mrs. Combs testified positively that Combs was. the
father of the child, which was born September 15, 1945.
She said that he was in Perry County and had inter-
course with her sometime during the months of No-
vember and December, 1944. There was testimony in
addition to that of Mrs. Combs that Combs had recog-
nized the child as his own. Mrs. Combs said also that
she had not had intimate relations with any man other
than Combs. On the other hand, Combs testified that
he was not in Perry County during the months of No-
vember or December, 1944, but was there during Janu-
ary, 1945. He said that he had had intercourse with
Mrs. Combs prior to 1944, and also that he had inter-
course with her on January 18, 1945. There is much
proof as to the loose morals of both parties. However,
the recitation of that evidence would serve no useful

be

82

purpose here. We have examined the record carefully
and have reached the conclusion that the judgment of
the chancellor should not be disturbed. Certainly there
is sufficient evidence to support his refusal to bastardize
the infant child..

Judgment affirmed.
Pe
Tlari et al. v. Ewing et al.
May 30, 1950.
Rehearing denied December 15, 1950.
Sidney B, Neal, Judge.

Woodward, Hobson & Fuiton, Steinfeld & Steinfeld, Woodward,
Bartlett, Hobson & McCarroll for appellants.

T. H. Sandidge and Wilson & Wilson for appellees.

a 183

Jupen Herm—A firming.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Daviess
Cireuit Court which refused to set aside a deed from
the trustees under the will of S. R. Ewing, and denied
othe relief sought by the appellants. Appellants contend
that: (1) The deed to the “‘river farm’? executed by the
trustees and executors must be set aside because by the
terms of the will. they alone were not given power to sell;
(2) assuming that the trustees had the power to sell,
they were without authority to execute gas and oil leases
on this property; and (3) the trustees did not act in good
faith in their attempt to sell the farm.

8. R. Ewing, farmer and banker, resident of Owens-
boro, died testate March 23, 1942. Mr. Ewing left the
following surviving children: S. R. Ewing, Jr., Mary
Ewing, Katharine Leeper, Ruth Mason, Bessie Neeley,
and Robert G. Ewing, and the following grandchildren:
Catherine Lari, John Wimsatt, Louise Wimsatt, and
Genevieve Wimsatt.

After devising a sum to the St. Stephens Catholic
Cathedral at Owensboro, and after providing for the
payment of funeral expenses and just debts, Item 2 of
his will provides: ‘‘* * * I hereby will and bequeath all
of my property, real, personal and mixed, to my daugh-
ters, Mary Ewing and Bessie Neeley, and son, 8. R.
Ewing, Jr., to be held by them in trust for a period of
ten years after my death * * *.”? under named terms and
conditions. He provided that his trustees have full power
to sell his ‘‘home on Locust Street’? and his farm ‘‘sit-
uated at Stanley.’’ By clause D of Item 2 he provided:
“‘My estate shall be divided into forty-four (44) shares;
and to my four daughters, Mary Ewing, Catherine Lee-
per; Ruth Mason and Bessie Neeley, I hereby will and
bequeath eight (8) shares each; to my son, 8. R. Ewing,
Jr., four (4) shares; four (4) shares to be held in trust
by the trustees hereinafter set out for the benefit and use
of Robert G. Ewing; and four (4) shares to be held in
trust as hereinafter set out for the children of my de-
ceased daughter, Margaret Wimsatt, towit: Mrs. Cath-
erine lari, John Wimsatt, Louise Wimsatt and Gene-
vieve Wimsatt, one (1) share each.’’

Clause E of Item 2 provides: ‘‘I further will and
direct that no part of my farm, except Stanley farm
bought from Thomas, shall be sold within ten years

184 ES

after my death, unless the holders of sixty (60) per cent
of the shares above provided for shall agree to such
sale, * * *. If any sale is made of my River farm, the
holders of sixty (60) per cent of the shares in my estate
may evidence their consent and approval of such sale
by joining with the executors (or executrix or executor)
in the deed conveying the land sold; and any such deed
properly executed by said holders of sixty (60) per cent
of the shares in my estate and by my said executors (or
executrix or executor) shall convey good title to the land
so sold * * *,77

The executors named were appointed as trustees for
Robert G. Ewing, and as trustees for the children of
Margaret Wimsatt. Item 5 provides: ‘‘If any of the
above named devisees, except the children of Margaret
Wimsatt, shall died leaving issue before the trust herein
established terminates, that issue shall take the interest
or shares which said devisees would have taken if then
living; but if any one of said devisees, other than the
children of said Margaret Wimsatt, shall die before said
time, without leaving issue, then the interest or shares
given to said devisees above shall be divided among the
other devisees herein in proportion to the shares given.
them above. * * *”

Ruth Mason, distributee of 8 shares, and Robert G.
Ewing, distributee of 4 shares, died in 1946 without sur-
viving issue. The surviving shareholders were the orig-
inal distributees of 32 shares and were entitled to par-
ticipate in the redistribution of the 12 shares as above set
out. Mary Ewing, the owner of 8 shares originally, was
entitled to 8/32 of the 12 shares, or 3 shares, giving
her a total of 11 shares. Likewise, Katharine Leeper and
Bessie Neeley were entitled to 3 of the 12 shares, giving
them 11 shares each in the estate. S. R. Ewing, Jr., owner
of 4 shares originally, was entitled to 4/32 of the 12
shares, or 114 shares, giving him a total of 54% shares;
and, likewise, the grandchildren were entitled to 4/32 of
the 12 shares, or 144 shares, giving them a total of 54%
shares in trust. Mary Ewing, Bessie Neeley, and S. R.
Ewing, Jr., became the owners of 27% shares in the
estate, more than 60 per cent of the 44 shares.

Appellants, Catherine Lari, Louise Wimsatt Hollo-

way, and Katharine Ewing Leeper contend that the river
farm might be sold only when 60 per cent of those named.

a 185

as original shareholders consented to the sale. But two
of the original shareholders had died and their shares,
under the will, passed to the other holders as above set
out. After the death of the other two heirs, Mary Ewing,
Bessie Neeley, and 8. R. Ewing, Jr., became the holders
of more than 60 per cent of the entire 44 shares provided
for in the will. Under the will it is clear that the ‘holders
of 60 per cent of the shares in my estate’’ had the power
to sell the land in question, and ‘‘convey good title to
the land so sold.”

By deed of February 19, 1947, 8S. R. Ewing, Jr.,°
Bessie Neeley, and Mary Ewing conveyed what is re-
ferred to in the record as the 8. R. Ewing 1000-acre
river farm to J. W. Hicks, Trustee, of Jefferson County,
for $100,000. The deed was signed and executed by 8. R.
Ewing, Jr., Bessie Neeley, and Mary Ewing as executors
and trustees under the will, and ‘‘individually.’’ Clearly
the holders of more than 60 per cent of the 44 shares
provided by the will evidenced their consent and approv-
al of the sale by joining with those named as executors
and trustees in the deed conveying the land sold. We
are of the opinion that the deed was duly executed and
is effective under the provisions of Mr. Ewing’s will.

Appellants maintain that $100,000 was not a fair
price for the farm, and that there was not a bona fide
sale of it. The river farm is referred to in the will as.
containing ‘‘about 1000 acres.’’ It consists of land on
the south bank of the Ohio River, five or six miles west
of Owensboro, and includes a nearby island in the river.
The island appears to have some 125 acres of tillable
land, leaving about 875 acres south of the river. From
the record it appears that the 1937 flood overflowed much
of the farm; that the flood deposited white sand from &
inches to 344 feet in depth over a portion of the farm.
along the river bank. It is also stated that that part of
the farm is covered with Johnson grass, and that be~
cause of the sand and Johnson grass that part of the
farm is practically useless for cultivation. Through the
farm is what is referred to as the ‘‘cowhide slough’”
containing about 60 acres. It overflows in case of heavy
rains, and because of this it is practically waste land.
About 80 acres of the farm is woodland, covered with
undergrowth, and is not tillable. J. W. Westdecker, who.
had been the manager of this farm for some 27 years,
estimates that ‘(200 acres up and down the river is

186 |

practically ruined by white sand and Johnson grass.’’
That is, that it cannot be cultivated profitably. Appel-
lants in their brief say that the river farm, including the
island, contained approximately 916 acres.

W. J. Foster, farmer and former president of the
Farm Bureau of Daviess County, testifying for appel-
lants, valued the land, excluding the hill land and the
land covered with Johnson grass and white sand, at
$150 an acre. On cross-examination, whén asked whether
or not $100,000 was a fair price for the farm, he answer-
ed that at the time it was sold he thought ‘‘that was

-mighty close to a fair market value.’’ Charles Leeper,

husband of appellant Katharine Leeper, stated that if
the farm were subdivided into smaller farms ‘‘it should
bring around $150,000.’ S. R. Ewing, Jr., testified that
after a careful investigation he was of the opinion that
$100,000 was a fair price and that he was satisfied to sell
at that price. William Barron, farmer and tobacco deal-
er, estimated that 300 acres of the farm was covered
with Johnson grass and white sand. He fixed the fair
market value of the farm at $100 per acre, C. H, Sub-
lett estimated that 200 acres of the farm ‘‘is covered
with sand and Johnson grass.’? In his opinion the land
was worth $90 an acre. Richard L. O’Brien, farmer and
owner of some 2000 acres in Daviess County, testified
that he bid $75,000 for the farm. James OC. Ellis, present
owner of the farm, estimates the tillable acreage at
around 600 to 650 acres. He testified, ‘‘I gave $100,000
for it * * * I think that is all it is worth.”

There is considerable variation in the estimates
fixed by apparently disinterested witnesses as to the
value of the farm. The owners and holders of more than
60 per cent of the farm, who were acting as trustees and
executors, employed Joe Vittitow, real estate agent of
Owensboro, to sell the farm. After advertising the farm
and contacting possible buyers, the best offer he was able
to obtain was $100,000. From a careful examination of
all the testimony we are unable to say that $100,000 was
not a fair price for the farm.

But it is said the sale was not in good faith. The
deed was made to J. W. Hicks, Trustee. It appears that
Mr. Hicks was acting for James C. Hillis, who was the
buyer and who paid the purchase price. Mr. Ellis, asked
as to why he purchased the farm in this manner, stated

Pe 187

that he understood some of the heirs did not wish him
to have the farm, and also that he preferred to have all
possible buyers placed on an equal basis. From the rec-
ord it appears that Mr. Hillis has extensive holdings in
that part of the state, and is President of the Citizens
State Bank of Owensboro. The record discloses that
Bessie Neeley is in the insurance business at Owens-
boro, and that Mr. Ellis places a considerable amount
of his insurance with her agency; that Miss Mary Ewing
and Mr. Ellis are friends; that Mr. Vittitow is a director
in Mr. Ellis’ bank, and that Mr. Ellis places a part of
his insurance with him. From the record it appears that
S. R. Ewing was a successful farmer and business man;
that his son, 8. R. Ewing, Jr., is likewise a successful
‘armer,

Mr. Ewing, in his will, in appointing his three chil-
dren as executors and trustees under his will, said: ‘‘I
have full faith in my said executors and trustees and,
therefore, I have not required that they execute bond to
discharge their trust.’? Here the three executors and
trustees were acting not only for the other devisees but
were themselves the owners of more than 60 per cent
of the property conveyed. They were acting in their own
behalf, conveying what was a large part of the property
derived by them under their father’s will. In making this
conveyance we believe they were acting in good faith
and did what they believed to be in the best interest of
themselves and the other devisees.

The record discloses that Mary Ewing, Bessie Nee-
ley, and S. R. Ewing, Jr., executed an oil and gas lease
on the river farm to’ Mr. Morrison, and that they also
executed an oil and gas lease to Mr. Brown. It further
appears that Mr. J. C. Ellis became the owner of these
oil and gas leases. It is urged that Mrs. Neeley, Miss
Ewing and Mr. Ewing were without power to execute
the oil and gas leases. As we have shown, they were the
owners and holders of 60 per cent of the shares in their
father’s estate, including the river farm, and in accord-
ance with the provisions of their father’s will had the
power to sell the river farm. The execution of the oil
and gas leases was the conveyance of a lesser estate than

. the fee simple. Mills v. Mills, 275 Ky. 431, 121 8.W.2d

962. When it is determined that they had the power to
sell the fee simple, then it follows that they were em-
powered to convey a lesser estate, or interest in the land.

188 ee

Sammons y. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 304 Ky. 548,
201 8. W. 2d 719.

The Chancellor heard the witnesses in open court.
After hearing all the testimony he dismissed the peti-
tion of appellants Catherine Ilari and Louise Wimsatt
Holloway, and the intervening petition of appellant
Kathérine Ewing Leeper. A judgment of the Chancellor
on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed unless clear-
ly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evi-
dence. Here we find no reason to disturb the deeree of
the Chancellor.

The judgment is affirmed.

V. T. C. Lines v. Blanton.
December 1, 1950.
J. 8. Forester, Judge.

Stoll, Keenon & Park, J. K, Beasley for appellant.
J. B. Carter and Astor Hogg for appellee.
Ouay, Commissionpr—Affirming.

Appellee, an 8 year old boy, recovered a judgment
for $2,500 for personal injuries against appellant bus
company. The only issue raised on this appeal is

ee 189

whether or not the latter was entitled to a directed
verdict,

The essential facts are not in dispute. The bus
was traveling about 25 or 30 miles an hour on a straight
stretch of highway near Louellen, Kentucky. On the
right a swinging foot bridge crossed a creek. The end
of the bridge was 8 or 10 feet from the hard surface of
the road. On the afternoon of the accident one or two
cars were parked off the highway, at or near the bridge
approach. Beyond the bridge, at a distance estimated
from 50 to 150 feet, the highway makes a blind, sharp
turn to the left, which is obstructed by a store building.

The injured boy came across the swinging bridge,
passed in front of a parked car, and stepped into the
right front end of the bus. The driver at no time saw
him until a fleeting second before the impact. One pas-
senger behind the bus driver, whose seat ran lengthwise
of the bus and who would ordinarily be looking out the
right side, did see the boy on the bridge. Other pas-
sengers had not observed him.

Apparently the swinging bridge is used by a sub-
stantial number of pedestrians, although the evidence
indicates they customarily turn right at the end of the
bridge, and do not cross the road until they reach the
curve.

Under this state of facts, the question is whether
or not the jury could properly find the bus driver was
negligent. Appellee argues that he was negligent in
two respects, i. e. (1) he was not keeping a reasonable
lookout, and (2) he failed to give warning of his ap-
proach. On the other hand, appellant argues that the
condition of the highway at this point required the
driver to devote his entire attention to the sharp curve
ahead, and it was not his duty to observe persons on
the bridge or to anticipate that they would walk blindly
from behind a parked car into the bus.

Appellant relies principally on the case of Louis-
ville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Warren, 805 Ky. 861,
205 S.W.2d 695. In that case a 7% year old boy darted
from behind an automobile and ran into the side of a
taxicab which was proceeding at about 10 miles an hour
through an intersection where the traffic was heavy.
‘We held that no negligence of the taxicab driver was

190

shown because he could not have averted the accident.
even had he seen the child in a position of danger. We
think the physical conditions and the very slow speed.
of the vehicle in that case are not comparable with the
situation we have in the present case.

More closely analogous is Gretton v. Duncan, 238:
Ky. 554, 88 8.W.2d 448. There the defendant’s auto-
mobile struck a young girl as she attempted to cross
from the left hand side of the road to the right. The
scene of the accident was in a built up country com-
munity where a large number of pedestrians used the
highway. There was evidence the girl, before reaching
the highway, came across a foot log in clear view of the
defendant. Under the circumstances, we held it was
a question for the jury as to whether or not the de-
fendant was keeping a proper lookout in failing to see
the child in time to avoid the accident.

A similar case is that of Kentucky Virginia Stages,
Ine, v. Tackett’s Adm’r, 294 Ky. 189, 171 S.W.2d 4.
The physical situation in that case is very much like
the one we have here. An 11 year old girl crossed the
highway after passing between two parked cars. There
was evidence she could have been seen by the defendant
bus driver as she left a store on the side of the road
and started to cross. We said that it reasonably could
be inferred that the bus driver had failed in his duty
to keep a lookout.

In the present case the bus was traveling in an area
where the driver could anticipate the use of the high-
way by pedestrians. He had a clear and unobstructed
view of the swinging bridge. The presence of the car
or cars, parked near the approach to the bridge would
ordinarily invite more caution. Even though the driv-
er’s attention was principally concentrated on the high-
way ahead, the entire physical situation called for
alertness. ,

‘We do not determine the bus driver should have
seen appellee on the swinging bridge, or anticipated
his movements. We do decide, however, that a jury
would be reasonably justified in finding that the fail-
ure to do so, and the failure to take additional precau-
tions under the circumstances, constituted negligence.
Therefore, appellant was not entitled to a directed
verdict. : a

| 191

It is unnecessary to pass upon the question of
whether or not appellant’s driver was required to give
warning of his approach.

The judgment is affirmed.

Hollon v. Commonwealth.
December 1, 1950.

Ervine Turner, Judge.

Leebern Allen for appellant.

A, E. Funk, Attorney General and Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant
Attorney General for appellee.

Juven THomas—Reversing.

The grand jury of Wolfe County returned an in-
dictment in which appellant was accused of violating
the statutes relating to the possession of intoxicating
Hiquors. He was convicted and fined $150 and given sixty
days in jail. He has filed the Clerk’s transcript in this
court with a motion for an appeal, which is now sus-
tained and the appeal granted.

The indictment in its entirety reads: ‘‘The Grand
Jury of Wolfe County in the name and by the authority
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, accuse Harl Hollon
of the offense of unlawful possession of untaxed whis-
key. Committed as follows: That said Harl Hollon
in the county aforesaid and within one year next before
the finding of this indictment did unlawfully have in his
possession one pint of moonshine whiskey, intoxicating
liquor, upon which no tax had been paid to either the
United States, or the State of Kentucky; the said de-

192 |

fendant at that time having no license to manufacture
or possess such alcohol against the peace and dignity
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.’’

It accuses appellant with unlawful possession of
untaxed alcoholic liquors, which was moonshine whis-
key. That statement in the indictment is very con-
fusing, since neither the State nor the Federal Gov-
ernment taxes the traffic in unlawfully manufactured
alcoholic drinks. The liquor was found on a search
warrant in a pint bottle located out in the yard of
appellant’s residence near a well and covered with
an old dirty rag. The indictment does not charge and
the evidence fails to show that the moonshine liquor
thus found on the recently acquired premises without
a revenue stamp on it was knowingly possessed by the
defendant, which is the offense denounced in the statutes,
KRS 243.840.

In the case of McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 294
Ky. 857, 172 S. W. 2d 628, we held that an indictment
which failed to accuse the defendant therein of know-
ingly possessing intoxicating liquor was defective and
failed to charge a public offense. No such necessary alle-
gations are contained in the instant indictment, and the
court should have sustained defendant’s demurrer filed
thereto, but which was overruled. Further demonstra-
tion of the insufficiency of the indictment, as well as the
erroneous conviction of appellant, could be shown were
it necessary. It, therefore, follows that the judgment is
erroneous for more than one reason and that we have
no alternative, except to reverse it, which is accordingly
done, with directions to set it aside and for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Durbin v. Banks.
December 1, 1950.
William H. Field, Judge.

Pe 198

J. Walter Clements for appellant.

Davis, Boehl, Viser & Marcus for appellee.
Junezr Ress—Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the
plaintiff’s petition in an action for damages for person-
al injuries after the jury had returned a verdict for the
defendant.

Appellant, Catherine Durbin, was struck by an au-
tomobile driven by appellee as she was crossing High-
teenth Street in Louisville. The accident happened at
the intersection of Standard Avenue and Highteenth
Street. It is appellant’s contention that she was en-
titled to a directed verdict in her favor, leaving to the
jury only the assessment of damages, since there was
no evidence that the accident was unavoidable or that
she was guilty of contributory negligence.

Standard Avenue ends at Highteenth Street. Ap-
pellant left her home on La Salle Street and walked
north along the east side of Highteenth Street until she
reached the crosswalk on the north side of its intersec-
tion with Standard Avenue, According to appellant, the

194 ee)

accident happened about 7:40 a. m. when she was on her
way to St. George’s Church to attend services which
began at 7:45 a. m. She testified that before stepping
from the east curb of Highteenth Street she looked north
and south and saw no traffic-in either direction for at
least a city block. She did see appellee’s automobile in
Standard Avenue as it was about to enter the intersec-
tion. It was standing and had not moved as she ap-
proached the center of Highteenth Street. She looked
to the right to see if any traffic was approaching from
that direction, and before she saw appellee’s car again
she was struck and knocked down. The appellee testi-
fied that he drove east on Standard Avenue and stopped
at Highteenth Street. After looking in both directions
and seeing no traffic he turned to the left in Highteenth
Street and swung to the right of the center line, intend-
ing to go north on that street. Several cars were parked
along the east side of Highteenth Street, and as he ap-
proached the crosswalk appellant suddenly appeared
from between two of the parked cars and ran imme-
diately in front of his automobile. He was traveling at
a speed of less than ten miles an hour and applied his
brakes, but was unable to avoid striking her. The car
stopped almost simultaneously with the collision. Ac-
cording to appellant, she was struck after she reached
the center of Highteenth Street or on the west side of
the center line, while appellee testified that his auto-
mobile was to the right of the center line of Highteenth .
Street or on the east side of the street when appellant
was struck. Highteenth Street is 36 feet wide and Stand-
ard Avenue is 30 feet wide at their intersection. No
one except appellant and appellee witnessed the acci-
dent, and their testimony is conflicting. Appellant did
not see any cars parked on the east side of Highteenth
Street and she stated that she was walking across the
street in the crosswalk when she was struck, while ap-
pellee stated that appellant stepped from between two
parked cars and was running when he first saw her,
and that she was then only four or five feet from his
ear.

It is argued that there are inconsistencies between
appellee’s statements to police officers soon after the
accident, his statements in a deposition taken before
the trial, and his testimony on the trial. The inconsist-

encies pointed out by appellant are slight, but in any

Pe 195

event it was for the jury to determine whether his state-
ments on the trial were true. The jury may determine
the weight as between the conflicting statements of a
witness, and may believe his testimony given on the trial
despite his previous contrary statements. Cheatham v.
Chabal, 301 Ky. 616, 192 8. W. 2d 812.

If appellee’s testimony is true, appellant was guilty
of contributory negligence, and it was proper for the
court to instruct on that question, Smith v. Goodwin,
292 Ky. 37, 165 S. W. 2d 976; Wilder v. Cadle, 227 Ky.
486, 13 S. W. 2d 497. In Remmer’s Ex’r v. Mayhugh,
303 Ky. 366, 197 8. W. 2d 450, 453, a pedestrian, while
erossing a highway, was struck and killed by an auto-
mobile. In an action against the driver of the automobile
by the deceased’s personal representative, the jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant. It was argued on
appeal that the trial court should have peremptorily in-
structed the jury to find for the plaintiff, and should
not have instructed on contributory negligence. It was
held that the question as to whether the defendant was
negligent and, likewise, the question as to whether the
plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence were matters for the determination of the jury.
The court said: ‘‘The prevailing rule is to the effect that

’ the trial court is not justified in taking the case from
the jury unless facts are not in dispute, or the proof
is such that fair-minded persons might not differ about
them.’ In the present case, the’facts as to the negligence
of the: defendant and the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff were in sharp dispute, and it was for the
jury to say whose version of the accident should be
accepted.

It is argued that Instruction No. 2-D was unauthor-
ized and erroneous in that it was not only misleading
but completely neutralized Instruction No. 2-C. The
court told the jury in Instruction No. 2-C that it was
the duty of the driver of the automobile in turning into
Highteenth Street to pass immediately to the left of
the center point of the intersection and as close as pos-
sible thereto. This is in accordance with the provisions
of KRS 189.330(1). Instruction No. 2-D told the jury
that it was the duty of the driver of the automobile to
turn into Highteenth Street on the east side of the cen-
ter line of that street, to move his car at a reasonable

196 Le

rate of speed, and to have it under reasonable control.
The instructions, when read together, told the jury that
it was the duty of appellee in turning into Highteenth
Street to pass to the east side of the center line of Bigh-

* teenth Street after passing immediately to the left of
the center point of the intersection of the two streets.
There was no inconsistency between the two instruc-
tions, and they were not misleading.

Judgment is affirmed.

Vermillion et al v. Marvel Merchandising Co., etc.
December 1, 1950.
Astor Hogg, Special Judge,

C. A. Noble for appellants.
Grover C. Wilson for appellee.
Cray, Commissionrr—Reversing.

The controversy in this case arises on appellants’
counter-claim for a breach of contract. On a trial of the

case, the jury returned a verdict for the appellee com-
pany. Appellants contend they were entitled to a direct-
ed verdict, and the instructions were erroneous.

On January 23, 1947, appellants ordered through
appellee’s salesman twenty-five washing machines at
the list price of $115.50. The shipping date on the order
was noted ‘‘as ready.’? A memorandum on the order
specified: ‘If possible ship two with or without motors
at once. Balance to follow as arrival of motors permit.’”’

Two machines without motors were shipped soon
after the order was sent in, and later motors for these
machines were delivered to appellants. The other twenty-
three machines were never delivered. On February 25
appellee, by letter, advised appellants it did not have
definite information as to when motors would be re-
ceived to fill any orders for ‘washing machine less
motor,’’ but it expected to receive the following week
some machines with motors and two of these could be
delivered at the price of $127 F.0.B. Chattanooga.
Thereafter appellants insisted they were entitled to
receive twenty-three machines at the original list price
of $115.50, and appellee advised it could not furnish
them at that price.

The controlling questions on this appeal are wheth-
er or not the evidence conclusively proves the existence
of a contract to ship twenty-three washing machines at
the price of $115.50, and the breach of it.

It is clear appellants offered to buy these machines
at that price. Appellee contends that such offer was
never accepted, and therefore there was no binding
contract. The undisputed facts require a contrary con-
clusion. Soon after receiving the order, appellee began
performance by shipping the two machines needed ‘‘at
once.’? Obviously these were demonstrators to be used
in promoting the sale of the other machines ordered.
Appellants’ offer was not to buy two machines, but
twenty-five. Appellee’s compliance with an essential
part of the order was an unequivocal acceptance of it
in its entirety, and appellants had an enforceable right
to have the other machines shipped in accordance with
the terms of the order at the price specified therein.
See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Coyle, 123 Ky. 854,
97 8. W. 772, 99 8. W. 237, 8 L. R. A, N. S., 483; and

198 es

Monarch Portland Cement Company v. P. J. Creedon &
Sons, 94 Neb. 185, 142 N. W. 906.

The next question is whether or not this contract
was breached. According to its terms the machines were
only to be shipped ‘‘as ready’? and when ‘‘arrival of
motors permit.’? There is no clear showing in the record
that these conditions materialized. However, appellee
by its correspondence steadfastly refused to recognize
its obligation to ship any machines at the price specified
in the order. This was an anticipatory breach of the
contract, and it was not necessary for appellants to
show the terms of the contract had been fulfilled.
They had the right to treat the renunciation as a
breach of the entire contract. See 12 Am. Jur., Con-
tracts, Sections 391 and 392; Globe Fertilizer Co. v.
Tennessee Phosphate Co., 85 S.W. 1177, 27 Ky. Law
Rep. 636.

We conclude that a binding contract existed between
the parties, and that it was breached by appellee. Ap-
pellants were entitled to a directed verdict, and the
only issue to be submitted to the jury was the amount of
damages. Since the parties did not on this appeal dis-
cuss the measure of damages, and since we do not know
what the evidence will be at another trial, we will not
undertake to rule on this phase of the case. On a new
trial the evidence should be limited to damages, and a
proper instruction be given in regard thereto.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion.

Schultz v. Smith’s Adm’r.
December 1, 1950.
W. R. Prater, Judge.

199

‘W. W. Reeves for appellant.
D. G. Boleyn and Joe Hobson for appellee.

Curr Justice Sums—Reversing.

Mrs. Rosie Smith was struck and killed by a truck
owned and driven by Daniel Schultz. Her administra-
tor recovered $7500 damages against Schultz, who
seeks a reversal of the judgment on six grounds, the
first of which is that the court erred in not directing
a verdict in his behalf. As we have decided this ground

200 Le

is well taken, it will not be necessary to enumerate or
discuss the other five, since there is little likelihood of
additional and different evidence being introduced on
a second trial.

The accident occurred in the village of Mousie,
Knott County, between two and three o’clock on the
afternoon of Oct. 6, 1948, on Highway 80. The highway
ran in a general north and south direction through
Mousie. The store of Hager Johnson was located on the
west side of the highway and almost directly opposite
his store was the store of Frank Moore on the east side
of the highway. The highway was 20 feet wide and was
being resurfaced and had been oiled that day so it would
take a coating of black-top material referred to in the
record as Amasite.

The deceased, Mrs. Smith, a 61 year old housewife,
was standing on a porch or platform in front of the
Johnson store talking to some friends, among whom
was Frank Moore, the owner of the store just across
the highway. A Jeep was parked in front of the John-
son store, and just as a large soft drink truck (12 or
14 feet long with a cab 7 feet high) drove up and parked
near the Jeep at an angle with its front wheels off the
pavement and its left rear wheels about 2% feet on the
pavement, Mrs. Smith walked around this parked truck
onto the highway and was struck by Schultz’ truck.

Schultz was driving a large, snub-nosed dump truck
loaded with 18 tons of Amasite. He was following the
soft drink truck (referred to in the evidence as the pop-
truck) at a speed the several witnesses testified was
from 12 to 20 miles per hour. There was no other traffic
on the road except the pop-truck and the Schultz truck
and the highway was straight and clear for 500 or 600
feet. When the pop-truck parked at an angle in front of
Johnson’s store, Schultz was either travelling on his
left side of the road or else pulled to the left of the
center of the road to pass the pop-truck. Mrs. Smith, so
the evidence shows, lacked some 4 or 5 feet of reaching
the east side of the highway when she was struck.

The three eyewitnesses to the accident, Frank
Moore, Grady Combs and Dorothy Ritchie, were called
as witnesses for appellee. Moore and Combs were with
Mrs. Smith on or near the platform of the Johnson store,

Le 201

while Mrs. Ritchie was across the road sitting on Elmer
Hall’s porch, which is next to Moore’s store. The three
testified to practically the same facts. .

Moore testified the road was straight for 500 or 600
feet, had a shoulder 6 to 10 feet wide and he did not
see the Schultz truck until it hit Mrs. Smith. She had
said to him, ‘‘Frank, let’s go over to your store.’”? He
replied, ‘‘I’m ready * * *. When she started out why
I heard the noise of a car or something, I didn’t see it
for the pop-truck was between me and it, and I said,
‘Watch the car,’ and I turned my head back down the
road and when I looked back across the road why she
had started out, kinda in a run, across the road and this
truck when I saw it, it come up past this pop-truck here
and I saw the front end of it hit her * * *. I judged
that where she was standing she liked about five feet
or five feet and a half getting off the black-top over next
to my store.’”

Combs testified he was in front of the Johnson store
sitting on the bumper of Richard Church’s automobile.
He could not see the Schultz truck approaching but he
heard it. When Mrs. Smith had gotten 2 or 3 feet on the
black-top somebody hollered, ‘‘Watch the car. * * *
Well, when they began hollering at her she walked out
on it two or three feet * * * unbalanced herself when she
started with a step and they was hollering; she looked
back, unbalanced and started on across, trotting.’’? The
truck carried her about 30 feet. The witness did not see
the Schultz truck until it was within 10 or 12 feet of
Mrs. Smith. His impression was that the left front grill
of the truck hit Mrs. Smith, but testified, ‘‘It’s hard to
say anything like that because things happen in just a
thought, just like that (snaps fingers), and you don’t
have time to actually think.’? At another place in his
testimony he said the accident happened ‘‘in just a bat
of your eye,’’ and the truck travelled the 10 or 12 feet
to hit Mrs. Smith ‘‘in just a thought.’

Mrs. Ritchie testified, ‘‘Well, she started and they
was a pop-truck, a big one, and it was easing in off the
black-top to Hager Johnson’s store and she come around
in front of the pop-truck and stepped out about two
steps on the black-top and someone called and said,
‘Don’t go across.’ Well, she paused. Just paused and
then she run right into the truck. She didn’t walk in it.

202 |

She run in it and I'll tell you she—the last time I saw
her she was running, you know, running. I knowed it
was going to hit her and she held her hands up like
this (indicating), straight up and turned around, right
in front of her, and it hit her.’? Mrs. Ritchie further
testified the truck was travelling about 15 or 20 miles
an hour.

Schultz testified he was travelling in third gear at
15 or 20 miles per hour, his brakes were good, his tires
new and he was hauling 18 tons and his truck was 7% .
feet wide. When he first saw Mrs. Smith she was 10 or
12 feet in front of his truck going around the pop-
truck. ‘‘I saw a woman run out in the middle of the
road and when she ran out there instead of going one
way or another she turned right in the middle of the
road and started back the way she come.’ Schultz testi-
fied he did not have time to blow his horn, threw on his
brakes but could not stop and tried to dodge Mrs. Smith
but does not know which way he turned. Mrs. Smith was
struck'on her right shoulder by the grill on the right
front of the truck, which physical fact corroborates

chultz,

From this rather full resume of the evidence, it is
manifest Schultz was guilty of no negligence. The acci-
dent happened when Mrs. Smith came around the pop-
truck and could not and did not see the Schultz truck
coming, nor could Schultz see her, until she was some
3 feet on the highway. At that instant Schultz was on
the left of the road pulling around the pop-truck
and was just 10 or 12 feet from Mrs. Smith. When her
friends sought to warn her, she evidently became con-
fused and attempted to run across the highway in front
of the truck and in her confusion she stopped for an
instant and turned around right in front of the truck.

As Combs, a witness for appellee, testified, the
accident happened within a batting of an eye and there
was nothing Schultz could do to avert the tragedy after
he discovered Mrs. Smith’s peril, and the court should
have directed a verdict in his favor at the conclusion of
all the evidence.

Appellee insists that Schultz violated KRS 189.300
and 189.340. The first of these sections prohibits a
driver from travelling on his left side of the highway

Le 203

unless it is clear of all obstructions and presents a clear
view for 150 feet. This record shows there was no ob-
struction on Schultz’ left of the highway and‘he had a
clear view for a distance of 500 or 600 feet. The fact
that Moore and others on or near the platform of John-
son’s store had their view of the highway obstructed
by the parked pop-truck, does not make KRS 189.300
applicable, as argued by appellee. This section plainly
applies to the view of the driver rather than to one
standing on the side of the highway. The authorities
cited by appellee on this point, such as Lehman v. Pat-
terson, 298 Ky. 360, 182 S. W. 2d 897, and Webb v.
Adams, 302 Ky. 335, 194 8. W. 2d 515, have no applica-
tion to the case at bar.

The other section, KRS 189.340, provides a vehicle
overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direc-
tion shall sound its horn or other device before passing.
Clearly, this section does not apply to the passing of a
parked vehicle which had been proceeding in the same
direction as the vehicle passing it but had come to a stop.
Nor was Schultz negligent in not sounding his horn when
he first saw Mrs. Smith 10 or 12 feet in front of his
truck. At that instant she saw his truck, her friends
were shouting warnings to her and a sounding of the
horn by Schultz would have only added to the unfortu-
nate woman’s confusion. The facts in the instant case
distinguish it from Fork Ridge Bus Line v. Matthews,
248 Ky. 419, 58 S. W. 2d 615, and Cook v. Gillespie, 259
Ky. 281, 82 8. W. 2d 347, relied upon by appellee.

The instant case is strikingly like Monroe v. Town-
send, 308 Ky. 123, 213 S. W. 2d 803, where we stated
KRS 189.410 does not require a motorist to sound his
horn on every occasion when he is passing a parked
vehicle. We there pointed out that the happening of an
accident does not raise a presumpfion of negligence
and it is incumbent upon the plainti to prove the de-
fendant failed to exercise ordinary care and that such
failure was the proximate cause of the accident. The
record in the instant case shows there was no negli-
gence on the part of Schultz before Mrs. Smith ran in
front of his truck and that there was nothing he could
have done to have averted the accident upon discovering
this unfortunate woman’s peril. :

The judgment is reversed with directions to per-

204

emptorily instruct the jury to find for Schultz should
the evidence upon another trial be substantially the
same as shown in this record.

Funk v. Whitaker.
December 1, 1950.
Ray Lewis, Judge.

Hiram H. Owens for appellant.
Luker & Tooms for appellee.

Jupves Lartmer—Affirming.

a 205

Appellee, Roy Whitaker, filed this action January
14, 1947, to enjoin appellant, Charley Funk, from using
a disputed road or passway across appellee’s land. Ap-
‘pellant, by answer, denied the allegations of the peti-
tion and plead affirmatively that the disputed road is
a public road and had been used as such for more than
sixty years prior to the institution of this action. Appel-
lant also alleged, in substance, that the road was neces-
sary as a means of access to and from his farm. The
Chancellor gave judgment as prayed by appellee, from
which this appeal is taken.

Appellant apparently relies for reversal on the
theory that the evidence will not support the judgment.

The parties own adjoining tracts of land. The evi-
dence clearly shows that up to 1914 there was a road of
some type passing across appellee’s land at the approx-
imate location of the road in dispute. Several witnesses
stated that the old road was a ‘‘haul’’ road. In. any
event, in 1914 appellee and Damon Karr, the then owner
of appellant’s tract, jointly erected a rail fence across
the then existing road. Damon Karr so testified. He also
testified that no gate or bars were left in this fence.
Mr, and Mrs. Wells, who owned appellant’s land from
1919 to 1933, testified the fence remained there through-
out their period of occupancy. Mrs. Wells said that there
was no road through there and that they planted corn
up to the fence. She said, however, that one time when
one of her little girls died, her father ‘‘took her and
laid the fence down and went through that way some
way’? but that there was no road that she saw. She fur-
ther said that the public did not use any road through
this land during the fourteen years she lived there. Her
husband corroborated her testimony in saying that the
fence was still there in 1933 and that there were no
gates or bars until after he left. He said that the only
time any of the public went through this land was when
walking or hunting. He further said that at one time
some of the fence burned but that he and Whitaker re-
placed it. He said that on some few occasions he had laid
the fence down and had taken a wagon through.

In 1936, CO. F. Hamblin’ purchased the tract now
owned by appellant. Some time thereafter he opened up
the road now in dispute and began using it extensively
as a means of access to the county road. This road is

206 ee

either in, or approximately in, the same location as the
road that existed prior to 1914.

_ The Chancellor found that if in fact there had been
a road there before 1914, it had been closed for a period
of more than fifteen years and that the right to use it,
if any such right existed, was barred by the statute of
limitations. .

The testimony of the former owners of appellant’s
land, recited above, is clearly sufficient to support the
Chancellor’s judgment to the effect that the road was
closed under an adverse claim for more than fifteen
years. Such closure is sufficient to extinguish a private
passway acquired by either grant or prescription.
Jones v. Dunn, 305 Ky. 562, 205 S.W.2d 156.

.. It would be otherwise had appellant conclusively
shown the road to have been a public one prior to 1914.
The weight of the evidence, however, is to the effect
that the former road was a ‘‘haul’”’ road; and there is
not sufficient evidence of generality of use by the pub-
lie prior to 1914 to impress: that road with a public
character. Though the evidence is conflicting, the
weight of the evidence supports the judgment; and in
no event could we have more than a doubt as to the
correctness of the Chancellor’s ruling.

Appellant argues in his brief that appellee should
be estopped from closing the road now, because when
appellant purchased his land in 1946 the road was open
and in use for appellant’s tract. There is no evidence
that appellee, who was then living in Hamilton, Ohio,
knew of the road being used or that appellant acted
in any way on appellee’s acts or failure to act with
knowledge. Further, no facts on which to base an es-
toppel in this type of case were pleaded.

The judgment is affirmed.

Trimble v. Wells et al.
December 1, 1950.
Joseph D, Harkins, Special Judge.

no
Ss
a

‘Wheeler & Wheeler for appellant.
Wells & Wells for appellees.
Srantzy, Commissionsr—Affirming.

During the pendency of the case in the circuit court
from March, 1942, until February, 1948, several of the
original parties died, and the heirs or devisees carried
on, We are constrained to say the appellant’s brief has
not been helpful in our review of the evidence because
her attorneys failed to comply fully with the rules re-
quiring reference to pages of the record supporting
the assertions in the brief. Rule 1.340. This has made it
necessary to search through four volumes containing
duplication of evidence, for some of the witnesses testi-
fied both by deposition and orally, and much that is
irrelevant to the issues before this court. It may also

208 |

be said that the non-observance of the rule has delayed
the decision of the case.

The suit was brought by W. E. Trimble and two
. other accommodation endorsers of a note for $4,500
- against Elzie Trimble, the maker. The endorsers paid
the note to the bank, which had discounted it, and it was
assigned to them. An attachment was levied upon the
defendant’s property, including the contents of a safe
deposit box in a bank of Paintsville, consisting princi-
pally, if not wholly, of $1,300 in currency. Mrs. Celia
Trimble, the defendant’s wife (as alleged) filed an in-
tervening petition claiming the money as her individual
property. Before his answer was filed, Elzie Trimble
died and Mrs. Trimble, as administratrix of his estate,
and his children, as heirs, were made parties to the
_ suit. Mrs. Trimble also asserted alternatively a claim
for her exempted distributable share as widow. The
children made certain claims against her. The judgment
was against Mrs. Trimble on all her contentions and
she appeals, .

Out of the complicated issues we have four ques-
tions argued by the appellant, but as only three of them
are stated in the classification required by Rule 1.340,
we confine our discussion to them.

I The appellant pleaded accord and satisfaction.
She contends that Elzie Trimble had paid and satisfied
his obligation to the endorsers of his note by means of
two deeds of conveyance. One was of town property
made to W. H. Trimble as administrator of the estate
of J. M. Trimble, father of both men. The other was a
deed to W. E. Trimble of a 1/18th interest of a farm of
the value of $1,000. There is really no evidence on this
point except the two instruments and the testimony
that, notwithstanding the claim they were individual
transactions, all this property was regarded as a part
of the estate of J. M. Trimble and was sold as such under
order of court. We discover no evidence indicating that
the conveyances were in payment of the obligations sued
on or that any of the three endorsers of the note re-
ceived any personal benefit from them.

Wi The claim of Mrs. Celia Trimble to a distributable
share in the estate of the deceased, Elzie Trimble, par-
ticularly to the exemptions allowed a widow, was resisted

Pe 209

on the ground that she had not been legally married to
him. It was shown by a certificate of marriage and Mrs.
Trimble’s testimony that they had been married in Feb-
ruary, 1938, and had continuously lived together as man
and wife. The circuit court held it to have been a big-
amous marriage because it was not shown she had been
legally divorced from Tom Gibson, a former husband,
who was still living. Mrs. Trimble (calling her by the
name she is referred to in the record) testified that
she had been divorced from her first husband, Curt
Whitt, in 1908 or 1910, married Tom Gibson in 1914 and
was divorced from him in September, 1932. She had
entered no defense to his suit for divorce. She produced
a paper purporting to be a copy of a decree of divorce
granted by the Morgan Circuit Court, which she had
been holding as evidence of it. It was not signed and
not certified by anyone. This paper had been given her
by Jerry Slone, the County Court Clerk at West Liberty.
She had not paid any attention to the fact that it was
given by that officer instead of the Circuit Clerk and
had only recently learned that he was not the proper
officer. The records of the Morgan Cireuit Court show
that a suit for divorce was filed by Tom Gibson in June,
1932, and an order recited that it was submitted for
judgment. But the final order in the case filed it away,
subject to be redocketed. There was never any judgment
rendered. Tom Gibson was not asked specifically as to
the divorce, but he did say he had not paid his wife any
money ‘‘in settlement of property rights in a divorce
suit.”

The appellant submits that the certificate of mar-
riage to Trimble was evidence which carried the pre-
sumption of legality. These admissions of marriage by
the parties were sufficient proof of both marriages.
Bartee v. Edmonds, 96 S. W. 535; Scott v. Scott, 200 |
Ky. 153, 252 8. W.,1019. The presumption is that the
marriage to Gibson continued. But here there is evi-
dence of a second marriage by a legal ceremony with
the presumption of its legality and continuity. The
validity of marriage to Trimble may be presumed as
having been made without impediment. Rose v. Rose,
274 Ky. 208, 118 S. W. 2d 529. These conflicting presump-
tions of a legal status present a.‘‘knotty question’’ as
Wigmore says, quoted in Tharp v. Commonwealth, 241
Ky. 828, 45 8. W. 2d 480. However, the presumption of

210 ee

legality of the ceremony of marriage to Trimble is re-
butted not only by evidence of Gibson, the former hus-
band, but by proof of the effectual dismissal of a divorce
suit without judgment having been rendered and with-
out any attempt to show any other similar proceeding.
The mere parole testimony that a diverce had been
granted was incompetent, but if the incompetency be
deemed to have been waived, still the weak character
of this secondary evidence is contradicted by the record
evidence—the affirmative proof of a negative. Tharp
v. Commonwealth, supra; Payne v. Payne’s Adminis-
trator, 290 Ky. 461, 161 S. W. 2d 925. We think the
trial court properly held the marriage to Trimble to
have been bigamous and void; therefore, that the ap-
pellant was not entitled to a widow’s distributable share.

II Some depositions had been taken for use in the
case generally and then the issue as to the ownership of
the $1,300 in currency found under the attachment was
submitted to a jury, the evidence principally being oral.
The jury was unable to agree. All the record was then
considered by the chancellor, and he found that Mrs.
Trimble had not proved her ownership of the money.

The box had been: rented by Elzie Trimble in his
own name, He had been given two keys, as was custom-
ary, so that he might have one in case of loss of the
other. Mrs. Trimble says that he gave one of the keys
to her. But the fact that she had a key did not give her
any right of access to the box, and she never undertook
to have it opened. So the money was in his possession
in his own name. The burden of proof was, therefore,
upon the claimant.

We look first to the evidence concerning the source
of the money which Mrs. Trimble claims she had. We
have her definite statement that when she married
Trimble in February, 1938, she had $3,000 in custody
of her mother. She and her mother’ testified that after
the death of her father, her mother had given her $1,000
in cash when she became 21 years old. He had six chil-
dren as the fruits of this marriage and eight children
by a former marriage. The mother testified that her
husband had given her $1,500 in currency which she
had not turned over to the administrator of his estate
and nobody knew anything about it. She had given
none of the other children any part of the money except

a 211

a small sum to one of her sons. The administrator’s set-
tlement showed a total estate of only $95.00. Mrs. Trim-
ble kept this thousand dollars a few days and then gave
it back to her mother for safe-keeping in her metal box
(the descriptions of which are variable).

Mrs. Trimble testified she had also received $2,000
from her former husband, Tom Gibson, in settlement of
property rights in the divorce proceeding. This $2,000
was also promptly delivered to her mother for safe-
keeping. Her mother is very indefinite on the point.
However, she does say that she had $3,000 of Celia’s
money, which she kept in cash. In her first deposition
the appellant testified that Gibson had paid her the
money in a lump sum in cash ‘‘in front of mother.’’ She
produced for copying by the stenographer and return
to her a writing bearing date of September 1, 1932,
which recited Gibson’s agreement to pay her $2,000
“for her release of property and household goods to me
as a single man. I pay to her, Celia Gibson, $2,000 in
eash.’? This was purportedly signed by Tom and Celia
Gibson. However, on the trial before the jury she testi-
fied she received only $300 at the time, the balance hav-
ing been previously paid her. The ‘‘contract’? produced
in this testimony, while substantially the same in effect,
is an entirely different instrument and bears the differ-
ent date of August 2, 1932, This was in her handwriting
excepting his signature. The mother was not asked
anything about Gibson having paid over arly money in
her presence, She merely testified that Celia had turned
over to her $1,500 after her separation from Gibson.

Two bankers, testifying as some sort of experts,
gave their opinion that this contract or statement of
payment was much more recent than the copy of the
purported judgment of divorce, bearing the same date.
They based their conclusions upon comparison of the
two documents. The ‘‘contract’? was upon very cheap
paper and there was no wear and tear of it, such as by
creasing or coloring of the paper by age or fading of
the writing, while the copy of the purported judgment
was worn.

Tom Gibson testified that he had not given his for-
mer wife $2,000 or any sum in settlement of any prop-
erty rights, but had signed the paper sometime in the
fall of 1942 after Elzie Trimble’s death because she

212 |

asked him to do so. He stated she had gotten that much
or more of his money at different times while she was
his wife by checking out his deposits without his con-
sent, and this was What he had in mind when he signed
the paper for her.

Coming to the record respecting the ownership of
the particular $1,300 found in the lock box. Mrs. Trimble
related that she and Elzie moved to Paintsville in 1939
and he went into the taxicab business. She, he and her
niece, Mrs. Maud Hall, went to her mother’s home in
Caney, Kentucky, in May or June, 1939, and obtained
$2,500 from her. The mother was very indefinite about
this, but that may have been due to the fact the old lady
was in poor health and was not given much of an exam-
ination. The niece, Mrs. Hall, corroborated her aunt.
When they came to Salyersville, her husband, Dunk
Hall, happened to be sitting in front of the courthouse
and she called him to the automobile. She handed him
Celia’s pocketbook and he counted the money without
taking it out. He corroborated them, saying the money
was -In $20, $50 and $100 bills. We are not much im-
pressed by this testimony.

Mrs. Trimble had a bank account and it shows a
credit of $900 about this time. Deposits thereafter in
relatively small sums amounted to more than $2,000.
She testified, however, the account was in fact Hlzie’s
and he merely used her name, signing it to the checks.

We have only the uncorroborated statement of Mrs.
Trimble that she had turned over the $2,500 she got
from the custody of her mother to Elzie Trimble and
he had used it to buy an interest of his sister’s children
in his father’s estate and to pay for his taxicabs. No
record of such transactions was proved. She says he had
repaid her $1,300 in $50 bills in November or December,
1941, which at his insistence she did not return to the
custody of her mother, but she and he had gone ‘to the
bank and put it in the safety deposit box. On the other
hand, it is proved by several bank employees that it was
Trimble’s custom to change small bills and coins into
larger bills and then to go immediately to his safety
box. No one ever saw Mrs. Trimble with this money. -
There is some evidence of admissions indicating that it
was not hers. Significance may be attached to the fact
that she made no formal claim, nor expressed any own-

ership of the money, for some three months’ after' the
attachment of the box. On one occasion after this suit
was filed by the men who had paid his debt, Hlzie Trim-
ble, in the presence of his wife, boasted of being ‘‘the
smartest Trimble in the bunch’? and of how he had
“outschemed’? them, She denied the statement, but her
denial is not convincing. There is evidence of several
witnesses that the appellant’s reputation for truth and
morality was not good; however, she produced testimony
of several taxicab operators to the contrary.

In a case of this sort, things more or less intangible
are revealed in the record that leave an impression of
truth or falsity. Sometimes this is referred to as ‘‘the
lights and shadows.’? Such is the present record. The
combination of improbabilities and the burden of proof

- is outweighed by the probabilities. We have had no
trouble in reaching the same conclusion as the chan-
cellor.

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Howard v. Ader.
December 5, 1950.
James S. Forester, Judge.

214

G. G, Rawlings for appellant.
Daniel Boone Smith and Ray O. Shehan for appellee.

Juncr Cammack—Reversing,

This action was instituted by Henry C. Howard as
a taxpayer on behalf of the taxpayers of Harlan County
against Ruby Ader, Clerk of Harlan County. The third
paragraph of the petition follows:

“<3, Plaintiff states that as County Court Clerk,
defendant is responsible for the amounts of money she
collects for the County and that she now owes the
County various sums of money which she has collected
and appropriated to her own use and benefit without
turning over to Harlan County Ky. and that by reason
of such amounts being due and unpaid, he has presented
the matter to the regular qualified and acting Fiscal
Court of Harlan County Ky. in session and individually
and that they have now and refuse to maintain an action
against her for the recovery of the money, and he now
constitutes himself an agent for the taxpayers of Har-
lan County Ky. to bring said action on their behalf.””

-In subsequent paragraphs of his petition Howard ©
set forth the items which he sought to collect from the
clerk. A general demurrer was sustained to the para-
graphs relating to three of the items, There was left in
issue an item concerning charges made against the
county for recording certificates of discharge for vet-
erans. Subsequently a special demurrer was sustained
to the petition on the ground that Howard did not have
legal capacity to maintain the action. This appeal is
from an order sustaining the special demurrer and dis-
missing the petition. :

As pointed out in Land v. Lewis, 291 Ky. 800, 165
S. W. 2d 558, 555, a taxpayer may not institute an ac-
tion such as this one without first making demand upon

Le 215

the fiscal court that it sue, and that body has failed or
refused to act. No demand is necessary where it is ap-
parent that it would be futile to make one. Upton v.
Whitley County, 310 Ky. 174, 220 8. W. 2d 375.

In the Land Case there was a written demand call-
ing upon the fiscal court to recover from the clerk such
sums as had been ‘‘wrongfully, improperly or illegally
used, disbursed or withheld’? by the clerk. The notice
set out further that, in the event the action was not
brought immediately, citizens and taxpayers would in-
stitute suits. In commenting upon the sufficiency of the
notice it was said:

“This notice is far from being all that could be de-
sired. It fails to state the amount of money due by the
clerk, or to whom he wrongfully paid it, or whether he
improperly withheld for his own benefit money right-
fully going to the county, or expended the county’s funds
for illegal purposes. We are not saying that such state-
ment should be itemized, but that it should be full enough
to apprise the fiscal court upon what the taxpayer is
basing his demand so that body may determine whether
or not there is reasonable cause for the demand, as
well as reasonable grounds for’a suit upon its part
against the alleged delinquent official. Ordinarily, we
would hold this demand insufficient on account of in-
definiteness. But in view of the closeness of the official
relations existing between the fiscal court and the county
court clerk, we feel constrained to say the demand was
sufficient’?

There was no written notice in the case at bar, but
it was alleged that the matter had been presented to the
regular qualified court in session and individually and
that the court had refused to bring the action. It is the
opinion of a majority of the members of the Court that
this allegation was sufficient, it being their view that
the nature of, and the circumstances surrounding, the
demand would be a matter of proof. Circumstances sim-
ilar to those in the case at bar and the Land Case were
involved in the case of Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81,
185 S. W. 514.

For the reasons given the judgment is reversed,
with directions to set it aside and for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

216

Siegel v. Diehl Pump & Supply Co.
December 5, 1950.
Burrel H. Farnsley, Judge.

William C. Edrington for appellant.
Doolan, Helm, Stites & Wood, and S. Lloyd Cardwell for appellee.

Van Sanz, Commisstonsr—Affirming.

Appellant was severely injured November 17, 1944 -
when a jack weighing approximately 150 pounds fell on
his foot while he was engaged in his regular employ-
ment by appellee. He filed claim for compensation with
the Workmen’s Compensation Board. By agreement of
the parties, he was awarded temporary total disability
until February 5, 1945, when he returned to work. He
left appellee’s employ July 25, 1945. On May 20, 1947,
he filed motion, which was sustained, to reopen his case

es

on the ground that he had suffered a change of condition
for worse since the previous settlement. The Board
heard proof, adjudged appellant had suffered a change
of condition, and made an award for permanent dis-
ability of 25 per centum to the body as a whole. On ap-
peal to the Cireuit Court, the award was affirmed, from
which judgment this appeal has been prosecuted. Four
grounds are urged for reversal; viz., (1) the Workmen’s
Compensation Board made no finding of fact; (2) if it
did, the award on which it is based is so inconsistent as
to be irreconcilable with the finding of fact, as a conse-
quence of which the question becomes one of law for the
court to determine; (3) if incorrect in both contentions
1 and 2, there is an entire absence of evidence of com-
petent, probative, and convincing value to uphold the
award of only 25 per centum disability; and (4) ap-
pellant is totally and permanently disabled and the
award should have been made in accord with such a
finding. :

Contentions 2, 8, and 4 are but one and will be so
treated. Whilst the finding of fact may not have been
in accord with the usual practice in respect to form, it
nevertheless is a finding of fact, and, in substance, is
that appellant has an abnormal condition in his right
foot due to injuries received on November 18, 1944; such
condition at the time of the finding was worse than at
the time appellant made settlement with appellee; and
the plaintiff, at the time of the finding, was suffering
with a permanent partial disability of 25 per centum to
the body as a whole, The referee’s opinion recites that
since the testimony of the other doctors was in such irre~
concilable conflict, his finding was made from the testi-
mony of Doctor I. T. Fugate, whose technical findings
show that appellant has a union between the internal
cuneiform and the first metatarsal of the right foot and
he is suffering from ankylosis of the first metatarsal
joint. All of the bones of the right foot show a marked
rarefactive change, probably due to lack of normal use.
He found no indication of a new injury. We do not con-
sider the award for permanent partial disability to the
body as a whole to the extent of 25 per centum to be
irreconcilable with the condition described by Doctor.
Fugate and found to exist by the referee and the fulk
Board.

218 ee

Only three doctors testified in the case but all of
them are men of high repute in their profession. They
are Doctor George F'. Dwyer, Doctor H. L, Henderson,
and, as we have said, Doctor Fugate. Doctor Dwyer
testified that the arch in the foot was very well preserved
but there was extensive callous in the bones of the foot
and a good deal of arthritis in the joints. He stated that
the absorption of the callous amounted to about 50 per
cent which disabled appellant 50 per cent and that, if his
work required climbing a ladder, he was disabled 100
per centum ‘‘because he might fall off of the ladder after
he gets up there.’ He stated that the arthritis which
was of traumatic origin would get worse and the ab-
sorption of the callous would not get better and no
treatment would improve the condition. Doctor Hender-
son testified that there was no change for worse in ap-
pellant’s condition since he examined him in 1945, and
that, if he had any disabling condition, it was flat feet
not attributable to the injury because the condition was
the same in both feet. It is manifest from the medical
testimony that there was sufficient evidence for the
Board to determine (1) that the condition was no worse
than when the settlement was made, or (2) that it was
worse by as much as 50 per centum disability to the body
as a whole, or (3) any intermediate degree within the
limits of (1) and (2). Under these circumstances we
would not be justified in reversing the lower court.

The judgment is affirmed.

Ramsey v. Fontaine Ferry Enterprises, Inc.
December 5, 1950.
. Burrel H, Farnsley, Judge.

SS 21:

Finley F. Gibson, Jr. for appellant.
Woodward, Hobson, & Fulton for appellee.

Van Sant, Commisstonsr—Affirming.

The appeal is from a judgment entered upon a ver-
dict directed by the court in favor of appellee, defend-
ant below. The sole question for our determination is
whether the court erred in directing the verdict.

The defendant maintains an amusement park gen-
erally known as Fountain Ferry Park in the City of
Louisville. In this connection it operates an amusement
device commonly known as ‘‘motor scooters.’’? The
plaintiff, in company with relatives, purchased a ticket
entitling her to ride in one of the scooters. While riding
therein, she suffered certain injuries it is unnecessary
to discuss. She filed suit against the defendant to re-
cover for the injuries, alleging she sustained them as a
result of the gross negligence and carelessness of the
defendant.

Plaintiff and her witnesses testified that while plain-
tiff was riding on one of the scooters, another patron,
a boy of about 12 or 13 years of age, caused the scooter
he was operating to bump into the scooter occupied by
plaintiff; she made no complaint to the boy at the time
and the latter drove his scooter around the rink several
times thereafter before he reversed his course and
‘‘side-swiped”’ plaintiff’s scooter; she then reprimand-
ed him and the operator of the rink, observing the boy’s
conduct, required him to reverse his course and proceed
in the proper direction; shortly thereafter the boy struck
plaintiff’s scooter in the side, causing her to run into
an island in the center of the rink, and before she could
regain control of her scooter, other scooters collided
with her knocking her against the wall and injuring
her. There was no evidence that anybody connected
with the defendant collided with her or threw her against

22,

the side or mechanism 6f the motor scooter or against
the rail fence or wall of the enclosure of the amusement
attraction. These acts were committed by a total strang-
er. The only negligence relied on by appellant is that
the agent of defendant failed to stop the scooters by
throwing the switch on the electric control after dis-
covering plaintiff’s peril.

The entire device is arranged to provide thrills for
its users by bumping into or dodging each other. There
is no other lure. The game has its hazards, but one
cannot be ignorant of them. Plaintiff entered the scooter
for the purpose of engaging in the frolic. She deliber-
ately exposed herself to the contingency which occurred.
If, by the conduct of another patron, she was exposed
to an unusual hazard, no one could have been better
acquainted with the fact than she. Whilst the manage-
ment had control of the electric current used by all of
the scooters to propel their vehicles, she had. inde-
pendent control of the motion of the scooter she was
using. She could have stopped it and alighted from it,
and, by doing so, could have eliminated herself as the
target in the prankish game the youth persisted in play-
ing. We find no evidence in the transcript which would
place the attendant of the rink on notice that the plain-
tiff was encountering an unusual hazard, if indeed she
was, until it was too late for him, by shutting off the
power, to avoid the accident. Under these circumstances,
we are of the opinion that the plaintiff assented to the
engagement which brought about her injury and in such
circumstances the law will enforce the maxim volenti non
fit injuria (no legal wrong is done to him who assents).
35 Am. Jur. 715, 716, Bridgford v. Stewart Dry. Goods
Co., 191 Ky. 557, 231 8. W. 22.

Since it is apparent the court correctly directed a
verdict for the defendant on the evidence, it is unneces-
sary for us to refer to the complaint made in respect to
the variance between the pleadings and the evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.

221

Richardson v. Lainhart.
December 5, 1950.
Ray C. Lewis, Judge.

Shumate & Shumate for appellant.

Lewis & Weaver, J. R. Llewellyn for appellee.

Cuter Justice Srms—Affirming.

This action was brought by appellee, Andrew Lain-
hart, to enjoin appellant, Ben Richardson, from cutting
a white oak corner tree and to be adjudged the owner of
a wedge-shaped tract of land of 1.4 acres located in
Jackson County. The chancellor granted the relief
sought and Richardson appeals.

Both parties admit that a correct determination of
the controversy depends upon the true location of the
white oak corner appearing in the first call of appellee’s
deed, ‘‘Beginning at five chestnut oaks on a point, thence
8. 7 W. 76 poles to a white oak corner made by Thomas
Blanton and W. B. Murphy.’’ Appellant’s land adjoins
that of appellee on this line and his deed calls for ap-
pellee’s line as the boundary between their two tracts.

Although the markers are gone, the beginning cor-
ner is not in dispute since a stone has been placed where
the five chestnut oaks stood. But there is much contra-
diction in the evidence relating to the white oak corner.

Appellee testified that when he bought his land in
1890 this white oak was pointed out to him as a corner
tree, and was so marked. Josiah Collins, 83 years of

222

age, testified that when he was a boy this tree was shown
to him by his grandfather as a corner tree, and it was
so marked at that time. W. R. Blanton has lived in the
vicinity for 40 years, knew this large tree, and saw the
marks, or hacks, on it 15 or 20 years ago and at that
time they appeared to be old.

Appellant testified there had never been any marks
on this tree before 1935 and when he received informa-
tion from government surveyors that this tree was the
wrong corner, his son, Harle Richardson, hewed ‘the
marks off of it sometime in 1935. Other witnesses cor-
roborated appellant that the white oak in dispute never
had any marks on it until the government surveyors
put them there.

The testimony of N. J. Tuttle, employed to survey
appellee’s land, and that of EH. S. Williams, the surveyor
who ran the disputed line for appellant, is about as con-
flicting as is the testimony of the other witnesses who
testified as to whether this white oak was marked as a
corner tree, The line in disnute was established in a
patent 118 years ago, and Tuttle testified the proper
allowance which he made for the variation in the com-
pass was ‘‘very near 6 degrees * * * that is the varia-
tion I have always added for the last 25 years on old
lines according to the age of it.’? Running the disputed
line with a 6 degree variation, Tuttle hit the white oak
by extending the call 12 or 15 feet.

Williams testified he first used a variation of 2
degrees and missed a known corner by 10 feet; then
made his variation 3 degrees instead of 2, ran the line
in dispute 1254 feet to where a white oak was called
for, and found where a stump had been taken out or
rotted out. Williams testified this depression was the
correct corner instead of the white oak tree claimed by
appellee. However, appellee testified that this stump
which had been removed was not that of the disputed
white oak corner but was the stump of a chestnut tree
he had cut 45 years ago to make railroad ties.

This is a fact case where the evidence, although
highly conflicting, is abundant to sustain the chancel-
lor’s finding. The cases are legion in holding that we
will not disturb the chancellor’s finding of fact on con-
flicting evidence unless there is more than a doubt in our °

es 228

minds that he erred in his conclusion. See Vol. 2 Ky.
Digest, Appeal and Error, Key 1009(3).

The judgment is affirmed.

Ehlenberger et al. v. Dalhey et al.
December 5, 1950.
Holland G. Bryan, Judge.

L. B. Alexander for appellants.
Boyd, Boyd & Williams for appellees.

Juves Herm—Affirming.

224 eS

Appellants, Peter Hhlenberger and Marjorie Ehlen-
berger, and appellees, Sam D. Dalbey and Jane Dalbey
Hedges, in this declaratory judgment action, are asking
a declaration of their rights under a lease of January
25, 1945 from appellees to appellants for a building at
525 Broadway, Paducah. The period of the lease was
from July 1, 1950 ‘‘with option of renewal.’? The rental
was $175 a month from July 1, 1945 to July 1, 1948, and
$200 a month from July 1, 1948 to July 1, 1950. Posses-
sion was given May 1, 1945 that appellants might repair
and remodel the interior of the building.

Clause (c) of the lease provides:

“*(e) Possession of said building is to be delivered
to second parties on the first day of May, 1945, in its
present condition; and the said first parties shall be
required to keep only the walls and roof of said build-
ing in safe and tenantable condition and repair during
the term of the lease and/or any renewal thereof, if
renewed under the option hereinafter granted. The
parties of the second part are to have the right to re-
pair or remodel the interior of said building, including
the front and floor thereof, as may suit their needs,
installing such toilet, bar, light fixtures, heating plant,
or wall paneling as they may desire; but is not to, in
any way, damage or weaken the structure of said build-
ing either as to walls or any other part thereof; and
on the termination of this contract of lease said second
parties shall have the right to remove all articles placed
in the building by said second parties; but in removing
said fixtures the second parties hereto shall restore
said building in as near the condition received as is
possible, ordinary wear and tear excepted, leaving the
walls, ceilings and floor in a tenantable condition.’’

Clause (d) of the lease provides:

“*(d) It is understood that the second parties are
given the option to renew or extend this lease for a
period of five years after the first day of July, 1950,
under the same terms and conditions, as set out here-
in, except as to rent. * * *?

Clause (e) provides for the payment of rent for
the last six months of the five-year period in advance.

es 225

Appellants elected to renew the lease for an addi-
tional five years. The parties were unable to agree on
the rental. Arbitrators were selected; they were un-
able to agree; the three arbitrators reported:

“Pursuant to our appointment as arbitrators under
the terms of lease dated January 12, 1945, Mr. H. A.
Cave, Sr. and Mr. John B. Blackburn did meet for the
purpose of trying to arrive at a fair rental value of
the property known as 525 Broadway for a lease to
cover five year period from July 1, 1950. Being unable
to agree the two arbitrators as above set out did agree
upon Mr. Floyd Wade as the third arbitrator as pro-
vided for by the terms of said lease.

“That thereafter the three arbitrators did meet
and report as follows. Based upon the condition of the
property as of the date of the original lease, as sub-
stantiated by photographs of said property furnished
us, Mr. Cave and Mr. Wade are of the opinion that a
fair rental value for a term of five years beginning
July 1, 1950, would be $175.00 per month. Mr. John
B. Blackburn was of the opinion that $200.00 per month
would represent a fair rental value.

“It was further established that the fair rental
value of said property based upon its present condition
would be $300.00 per month for a five year lease be-
ginning July 1, 1950. Mr. Floyd Wade and Mr. John
B. Blackburn concurred in the majority view and Mr.
H. A. Cave, Sr. was of the opinion that $250.00 would
be a fair rental value under said terms and conditions
for said property.

“The arbitrators do report for advice to all con-
cerned the findings as above set out.’’

Appellants, in their petition, set out the lease, the
report of the arbitrators, and state that there is a con-
troversy between the parties, appellants claiming that
the rent, under the lease and report of the arbitrators,
is $175 per month for the renewal period, the appellees
claiming that it is $300 per month. Appellants pray
that the court construe the lease and the report, and
adjudge that the rent for the renewal period is $175 per
month.

206 es

Appellees, by answer and counterclaim, refer to
and quote from the lease; say that under the lease and
report they are entitled to $300 per month for the re-
newal period; that they are entitled to $1800 advance
rental; that appellants, under the lease, had a right to
make repairs and to remodel the building; that under
the lease appellants have a right to remove ‘‘only such
trade fixtures as are not a permanent part of said build-
ing No. 525 Broadway ;’’ that they now have a lien-on
all stock and removable fixtures to secure compliance
with the terms of the lease, and are entitled to be
adjudged a lien on all stock and removable fixtures and
other furniture located in the building to secure them
against loss for any failure on the part of appellants
to restore the building to a ‘‘tenantable condition’? when
it is vacated.

On June 23, 1950, the Chancellor adjudged that
appellants did not state a cause of action for which
relief could be granted, and dismissed their petition.
On the counterclaim of appellees, he adjudged the rights
of the parties: (1) That the arbitrators were limited by
the lease ‘‘to fix the rent’’ on the building as of July 1,
1950; that the arbitrators fixed the rent at $300 per
month from July 1, 1950 to July 1, 1955, payable month-
ly in advance; (2) that the appellants did not forfeit
their right to renew the lease, provided they tender one
month’s rent ($300) in advance, and the last six months’
rent ($1800) as provided by the original lease, on or
before July 1, 1950. Appellants, in accordance with
the Chancellor’s judgment, paid rent in advance at the
rate of $300 per month, and paid the last six months’
rent ($1800) in advance ‘‘under protest.’”

These payments having been made, it is conceded
that the only question in issue now is the amount of
the monthly rental, .

Appellees filed motion to dismiss this appeal be-
cause the judgment was entered on June 23, 1950, and
appeal was not filed in this court until August 30, 1950,
more than 60 days after June 23, 1950. From a supple-
mental record filed in this court, it appears that the
judgment entered on June 23, 1950 was not signed by
the Chancellor until September 12, 1950. In Harlan
County v. Brock, 263 Ky. 530, 92.8.W.2d 757, 758, we

es 227

said: ‘‘* * * a judgment becomes effective for the
purpose of an appeal on the day it is signed, and the
time within which the appeal must be filed is computed
from that day and not from the day the judgment was
rendered. * * * Otherwise, it would be in the power
of the lower courts to postpone the signing of the judg-
ment until the time for an appeal had expired, and thus
deprive the losing party of the right of appeal. * * *’?

In accordance with the contract of the parties, the
question of the amount of the rental was properly sub-
mitted to arbitrators. Clause (d) of the lease further
provided: ‘«* * * In event the said second parties de-
sire to renew or extend this lease, they shall give to
one of the first parties three months’ notice * * * prior
to the Ist day of July, 1950; and said renewal is to be
at a rental to be agreed upon between the parties here-
to; or, if they are unable to agree on the rental, then
© + two out of the three of said arbitrators “shall
fix the rent to be paid under said ‘extension or renewal
of said lease.’’

There was testimony for appéllants that the re-
newal lease was to be based on the condition of the
building in July, 1945. Appellees objected to this testi-
mony on the ground that it was an attempt to vary a
written lease without a plea of fraud or mistake. This
testimony was denied by witnesses for appellees. The
Chancellor appears to have disregarded this evidence
for appellants. He found:

“The Court does hereby declare and adjudge that
the arbitrators selected to arbitrate the question of
rent for the five year extension or renewal of said lease
were limited by the contract of lease to fix the rent
on said building as of July 1, 1950; and the award of
said arbitrators did so fix said rents at Three Hundred
($300.00) Dollars per month beginning July 1, 1950,
up to July 1, 1955, payable monthly in advance.’’

The judgment further provided that if appellants
pay one month’s rent of $300, and the last six months’
rent ($1800) in advance, ‘‘it is adjudged said lease is
renewed or extended for five years from July 1, 1950
to July 1, 1955 at the above adjudged rental subject to
all the terms and conditions of said original lease * * *.’’

228 Le

. We are unable to say the Chancellor did not reach
the correct conclusion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Anderson v. Shields et al.
Anderson v. Roberts et al.

December 5, 1950.
E. D, Stephenson, Judge.

Kenneth A. Howe for appellant.
” V. R. Bentley and L. D. May for appellees.
Jupes Kyicur—Reversing.

These cases, which were consolidated and tried to-
gether, arose out of the same automobile accident which
occurred at about 8:30 p. m. on November 20, 1947.
In the first case the appeal is from a judgment against
appellant for $472.64 in favor of appellee, James
Shields, and against which he files a cross appeal be-
cause he thinks the judgment is too small. The second
appeal is from a judgment against appellant in favor
of appellee, Kelley Roberts, for $157.

The two-way accident occurred on highway No. 80
in Pike county. Delmor Roberts, about 18 years of
age, driving a car belonging to his father, Kelley Rob-
erts, was returning from a high school play at Elkhorn
City, accompanied by a young lady who was his only
passenger. She lived at the home of Fred Fife on the
left side of the highway at the scene of the accident
and she was to leave the car at that place. They had
been driving at between 30 and 35 miles per hour and
behind them appellant, John Anderson, with two pas-
sengers in his car, was driving at approximately the
same speed. As the Roberts car neared the Fife house
where it was to stop, it slowed down, according to some
of the testimony, to 15 or 20 miles per hour, evidently
for the purpose of making the turn and stop. Here the
two versions of what happened begin to conflict. Ac-
cording to the testimony of appellant, in which he is
corroborated in general by the two passengers who
were with him, he had been driving behind the Roberts
car for about a mile, having also come from Elkhorn
City. As the cars neared the Fife house, appellant de-
cided he would go around appellee’s car. As appellant
started around the other car, he blinked his lights twice
and blew his horn twice, yet, in spite of this, the driver
of the Roberts car suddenly turned it to the left into
the path of appellant’s car, knocking it into the truck

280 es

of appellee, James Shields, which was sitting in front
of the Fife house about three feet off the paved road,
causing the damage to the truck for which Shields ob-
tained his judgment in this consolidated case. Accord-
ing to appellant’s testimony, the left front end of the
Roberts car hit the front end of his car, that is, his left
bumper and fender hit appellant’s right bumper and
fender. He further testified that Roberts gave no signal
at all that he was making a stop or turn, but just turned
left without signal and cut into him; that Roberts was
driving about 30 miles per hour when appellant started
around him and was making about the same speed when
he turned left in front of appellant. One of appellant’s
witnesses, who was a passenger in his car, testified that
the Roberts car had slowed down to 15 or 20 miles an
hour when appellant started around him.

The version of the accident as shown by ‘the testi-
mony of Delmor Roberts, only witness on his side of
the case as to how the accident occurred, was in sub-
stance that he had been driving at from 30 to 35 miles
per hour from Elkhorn City but had slowed down to 15
or 20 miles per hour as he approached the Fife house
where his companion, Miss Williams, lived; that as he
slowed down, he gave the stop signal, that is, the brake
signal which he says was in working order; that he
glanced into his mirror but saw no car behind him; that
as appellant started around him, appellant’s car side-
swiped his car, the cars locked together and went on
toward the Shields truck which was struck by appellant’s
ear; that he had not turned across the road or in front
of appellant’s car but was going straight ahead and was
about 15 or 20 feet from where he would have turned
to go in the Fife place; that the right front fender of
appellant’s car hit his left rear fender and the back
part of the front fender.

It will be seen from this resume of the testimony
that there are two conflicting versions of the accident
and the liability of the respective parties depends on
which side is giving the correct version of the accident.
It is, of course, the province of the jury to weigh this
conflicting testimony and, under proper instructions of
the court, to decide these questions of fact. It is the
basis of appellant’s appeal and the principal ground.
on which he relies for reversal that the instructions

2:

were erroneous in that they did not properly set out
appellee’s duty to make the signals required by KRS
189.380,

Under that section of the statute, the signal to turn
or stop may be given either by hand and arm or by
an electrical device. Both are-not required. If a left
turn is to be made, as appellant claims was done in this
case, it was appellee’s duty to so indicate by extending
his arm horizontally in the absence of an electrical de-
vice which could have been used if the car was so
equipped. Roberts admitted that he gave no hand sig-
nal and there was no proof that his car was equipped
with any electrical device which could have been substi-
tuted therefor, the only signal given being the brake
signal showing the word ‘‘stop.’’

Instruction No. 1, as given in each of the consoli-
dated cases, did not adequately point out appellee’s
duties in this respect, the instruction simply saying
“that it was his duty to give a continuous signal indi-
cating his intention to so turn for the last 100 feet be-
fore turning his said car to the left.’”? Under the evi-
dence this could have confused the jury and have led
them to believe that he had performed his sole duty by
applying his foot brake to show a stop signal. A proper
instruction would have included a sentence substantially
as follows: ‘‘that it was his duty to give a plainly vis-
ible signal to the driver of plaintiff’s car of his inten-
tion to turn by extending his hand and arm horizontally
from and beyond the left side of his car continuously
for not less than the last 100 feet traveled before turn-
ing.’? See Stanley’s Instructions, 1948 Supp., Sec. 116,
Page 43. Vinson v. Kissinger’s Adm’r, 274 Ky. 606,
119 S.W.2d 628.

Appellant also contends that the instructions were
erroneous in that they failed to set out the duty of
appellee, Roberts, relative to stopping or slowing down.
It is true that no reference to his duty in this respect
was contained in the instructions but it is a matter of
which appellant cannot here complain because the ques-
tion of whether Roberts did or did not slow down as
he neared the Fife house was an issue on which the
proof was in conflict. If appellant wanted,an instruc-
tion on this issue, it was his duty to offer one, which

232 eS

he did not do. In a civil case it is not the duty of the
court to give an instruction on a particular issue unless
requested to do so. L. & N. R. RB. Co. v. Stephens, 188
Ky. 1, 220 S.W. 746, and cases cited therein, and in Ky.
Digest, Trials, Key 255(1). If the court gives an in-
struction, it must be correct but his failure to give one
is not reversible error when not requested. If appellant
desires such an instruction, one may be offered on the
next trial. a , .

_ Although appellant also appealed from the judg-
ment against him in favor of James Shields, he appar-
ently makes no complaint as to the amount of the judg-
ment against him. The burden of his brief is that he
is not responsible for the damage done to the Shields
truck and that the responsibility for that damage, re-
gardless of the amount, rests on appellee Roberts. The
instruction as to the measure of damages for loss of
the use of the truck was more favorable to appellee
Shields than he was entitled to since it allowed recovery
for all the time he was deprived of its use, 94 days in
this case, even though’ that length of time could not
have been anticipated and was caused, according to
Shield’s testimony, by shortage of or inability to get
certain parts. He testified that the repair job would
not ordinarily have required more than four weeks at
best. We think the instruction as given, which was wide
open for recovery of the full amount asked, was er-
roneous in that it failed to give the proper measure
of damages for the loss of the truck which had been
damaged. It put no limit on the time during which
damages could be assessed other than the time fixed
by the plaintiff. A person whose automobile is dam-
aged by the negligence of another is entitled to com-
pensation for the loss of its use, if its use is neces-
sary in his business, but he is only entitled to compen-
sation for such time as may be reasonably necessary to
repair it. Towles v. Perkins, 266 Ky. 25, 26, 98 8. W. 2d
27. The instruction properly covered the damage to
the truck, it being stipulated in the record that the cost
of repair was $292.64.

For the reasons herein indicated, the judgment in
each case is reversed for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

De

Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit v. Rose.
December 5, 1950.

Ervine Turner, Judge.

234,

Craft & Stanfill, and Williams & Allen for appellant.
Grannis Bach for appellee.

Jupex Kyicnt—Affirming in part, reversing in part.

On July 2, 1947, appellee, Green Rose, entered into
a contract with E. L, Powers doing business as Powers
Brothers Contruction Co., hereinafter referred to as
Powers, whereby the latter agreed to construct two
dwelling houses on a tract of land belonging to Rose in
Jackson, Ky., at the agreed price of $11,575.00 for the
two, under specifications filed with the contract. Powers
was to furnish all labor and materials and was to com-
plete the construction by December 15, 1947, and was
to pay Rose $100 per month as liquidated damages for
each month after that date until completed. To secure
Rose, Powers was to execute bond with corporate surety
in the amount of the contract. Upon signing of the
contract, Rose’s attorney drew up a bond which was
attached to the contract and specifications and turned
over to the local agent of the Standard Accident Insur-
ance Co. of Detroit, appellant herein. All were sub-
mitted to the appellant, which would not, or at least
did not, accept the bond as drawn up by Rose’s attor-
ney but instead executed and submitted to Rose on its
regular forms used by it two bonds for $5800 each,
one titled a ‘‘Performance Bond’’ and the other, a
“Labor and Material Payment Bond.’”? After going
over these bonds with his attorney, Rose accepted them
in lieu of the bond which had been drawn up by his
attorney and upon their acceptance he turned over to
Powers the full amount called for in the contract,
$11,575, and Powers began construction. He soon ran
into financial difficulties and about October 21, 1947,
ceased work on the houses and abandoned the contracts
whereupon appellant was called upon as surety to make’

a

good on the contract. A dispute arose as to the extent
of appellant’s liability and appellee filed this suit which
in the final amended petition prayed judgment for $9000
necessary to complete the two houses in accordance
with the specifications, $1000 for deterioration of the
buildings resulting from the abandonment of the con-
tract by Powers, and $600 for loss in rental for a period
of six months from December 15, 1947, when they should
have been completed. An amended petition also set out
that Powers was indebted to certain named parties in
various named amounts totaling $691.80 for materials
used in construction of the buildings and that appellee
should recover of appellant this sum for the benefit of
those parties. After various motions and demurrers
were filed and passed on, the issues were made up and
the case was, by agreement, submitted to the judge with-
out the intervention of a jury on the pleadings, exhibits,
and the small amount of proof taken by appellee. Ap-
pellant took no proof. Whereupon a judgment was
entered in favor of appellee in the sum of $10,200, being
$9000 necessary to complete the buildings, $600 for their
rental value until the time they could have reasonably
been completed and $600 for deterioration in value of
the partly constructed buildings. He was also given
judement for $691.80 for and on behalf of the material-
men who had set up claims for materials furnished.
Admitting its liability on the performance bond, appel-
lant paid into court the sum of $5800 called for in that
bond and subsequently paid to each of the materialmen
the sums due each for materials used on the buildings
and appealed from the balance of the judgment amount-
ing to $4400 and that is the amount involved in this
appeal.

It is appellant’s contention that the two bonds
which it exeented to protect appellee are completely
separate; that it had done all it was required to do
under the performance bond by paying the full amount
of its obligation thereunder after Powers failed to live
up to his contract; that it is liable on its labor and ma-
terial payment bond only for labor and material used
on the buildings and for which the contractor failed to
pay and of which it was given proper notice under the
contract; that having paid all of these it has no further
liability under its bond and therefore the judgment

236 ee

should be reversed to the extent of $4400 involved in
this appeal.

It is the contention of the appellee that the owner
intended the two bonds to protect his payment of the
full contract since the total amount of the two about
equalled the sum paid on the contract; that appellant
Imew this and intendéd to furnish the owner with bonds
which would fully protect appellee in paying to the
contractor the full amount of the contract price and
therefore the two contracts should be considered to-
gether. He further contends that even separated and
considered alone the labor and material payment bond
should be construed as not being limited to labor and
material furnished to the contractor and used on the
job but for all labor and materials which the contractor
was to furnish to complete the contract. He further
contends that if the labor and material payment bond
is not so construed, then, that it should be reformed to
cover labor and materials which the contractor was
to furnish to complete the contract. He further con-
tends that appellant is estopped to deny that the two
bonds fully protect the owner and give him broader
coverage than the single bond submitted.

To set out the two bonds here involved in detail
would unduly lengthen this opinion. It is only neces-
sary to say that the performance bond, and denominated
as such, contains the usual provisions of that character
of bond, and the obligation of the bond is that ‘‘if the
contractor shall promptly and faithfully perform said
contract (referring to the contract between Powers and
Rose), then this obligation shall be void, otherwise it -
shall remain in full force and effect.’? We think this
bond can have but one meaning and that is the natural
one usually given to such bonds, that it guarantees that
if the contractor defaults and fails to complete the con-
tract, then the surety can itself complete the contract,
as is authorized by the terms of the bond, or pay the full
amount of its obligation thereunder of $5800, as it has
done in this case. We think it is unnecessary to further
consider this bond.

Since the principal dispute between the parties is
the construction of the labor and material payment
bond, it will be necessary to quote its more important
provisions which follow:

ee 237

“Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation
is such that if the Principal shall promptly make pay-
ment to all claimants as hereinafter defined, for all
labor and material used or reasonably required for use
in the performance of the contract, then this obligation
shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full force
and effect, subject, however, to the following conditions:

“1. A claimant is defined as one having a direct
contract with the Principal for labor, material or both,
used or reasonably required for use in the performance
of the contract, labor and material being construed to
include that part of water, gas, power, light, heat, oil,
gasoline, telephone service or rental of equipment di-
rectly applicable to the contract.

‘«2, The above named Principal, and Surety hereby
jointly and severally agree with the Owner that every
claimant as herein defined, who has not been paid in
full before the expiration of a period of ninety (90)
days after the date on which the last of such claimant’s
work or labor was done or performed, or materials
were furnished by such claimant, may sue on this bond
for the use of such claimant in the name of the Owner,
prosecute the suit to final judgment for such sum or
sums as may be justly due claimant, and have execution
thereon, provided however, that the Owner shall not
be liable for the payment of any costs or expenses of
any such suit.

“3, No suit or action shall be commenced here-
under by any claimant, — (a) Unless claimant shall
have given written notice to’ any two of the following:
The Principal, the Owner, or the Surety above named,
within ninety (90) days after such claimant did or per-
formed the last of the work or labor, or furnished the
last of the materials for which said claim is made, stat-
ing with substantial accuracy the amount claimed and
the name of the party to whom the materials were fur-
nished, or for whom the work or labor was done or
performed. Such notice shall be served by mailing the
same by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope
addressed to the Principal, Owner or Surety, at any
place where an office is regularly maintained for the
transaction of business, or served in any manner in
which legal process may be served in the state in which

238 Le

the aforesaid project is located, save that such service
need not be made by a publie officer.’’

Lifting from its context these words in the first
literary paragraph above, ‘‘for all labor and material
* * * reasonably required for use in the perform-
ance of the contract,’’ it is appellee’s contention that
they mean not just payment for those furnished to the
contractor for whom they are surety but that the intent
of the bond was to cover the owner for those materials
and the labor reasonably required to complete the con-
tract since the owner would be the only person pri-
marily interested in the payment. When these quoted
words are read in connection with the other quoted
paragraphs, it is obvious that that construction would
be a strained and unnatural one. The numbered para-
graphs define a claimant, tell how he shall present his
claim, the conditions under which he may enforce such
claim, etc., all clearly indicating that what is meant is
that the surety will guarantee the owner that all bills
for labor or materials contracted for and used by the
contractor, for whom they are surety, will be paid by
the surety if he defaults. The purpose and only pur-
pose of a labor and materials payment bond is to pro-
tect the owner against the claims of those who furnish
labor and materials to the contractor because, if he
fails to pay these bills, mechanics liens can be filed
against the owner and payment enforced even though
the owner had no direct dealing with the labor and
materialmen. Furthermore, we think the words, ‘all
labor and material used or reasonably required for use
in the performance of the contract,’? were inserted in
the bond to protect the surety against extravagant and
unnecessary use of labor and materials, as might be
attempted by some contractors. This seems to us a
more reasonable construction than the one for which
appellee contends.

We think the two bonds here involved cover dis-
tinct and separate defaults of the contractor. It only
remains to consider whether they should be reformed
in such a way as to, in effect, merge them or to reform
the labor and material bond so as to have it secure
appellant against failure of the contractor to perform
the contract. Also to be considered is the question of
estoppel. Both the attempted reformation and plea of

ee 23!

estoppel are based largely on a letter supposed to have
been written by appellant to its local agent or to the
contractor. This letter was never produced and part
of its alleged contents was shown, over appellant’s ob-
jection, by the testimony of appellee and his attorney.
The substance of their testimony was that this letter
stated that these two bonds fully protected Mr. Rose
and were broader coverage than was contained in the
bond which had been submitted to the surety. The
original letter is, of course, the best evidence of its
contents and before parole evidence of its contents is
admissible, it must be shown that the letter is lost and
that diligent efforts to locate it have been unsuccessful.
Taulbee v. Drake, 303 Ky. 487, 198 S.W.2d 50, and
cases therein cited. There was no such testimony and
the court erred in admitting parole evidence of its con-
tents over appellant’s objection.

But if the testimony of what the letter contained
was admissible, we do not think it would justify a refor-
mation of the contract. There is no showing that there
was, any misrepresentation of what the bonds covered
or any fraud practiced on appellee. When the bonds
were returned they were submitted by appellee to his
attorney and after examination of the bonds his attor-
ney advised that they be accepted. These bonds showed
plainly on their face that one was a performance bond
and the other a labor and material payment bond and
there was no representation to the contrary shown by
the evidence. At most there was a statement in the
letter, had it been admissible as evidence, that the two
bonds fully protected Mr. Rose and that there was a
broader coverage than in the submitted bond. If ap-
pellee and his attorney did not believe this after ex-
amination, they did not have to accept them. Having
done so, appellee is bound by the terms of the bonds
which are clear and unambiguous. We think there is
no ground for reformation of the bonds to show that
they were different from what they purported to be or
that appellant is estopped to deny this.

The judgment contained a paragraph which ad-
judged that the materials which the contractor had on
hand for use in the construction of the buildings and
which materials are now in the hands of appellee could
be kept by the latter and appellant was not entitled

240

to credit for these materials on its bonds or the judg-
ment against it. Since there is no appeal as to this
part of the judgment, it is to that extent affirmed. So
much of the judgment as exceeds the sum of $5800 is
reversed with directions to enter one in accordance
herewith.

Gabbard v. Commonwealth.
‘ December 8, 1950.
‘W. R. Prater, Judge.

Dan T. Martin for appellant.

A. HE, Funk, Attorney General, Squire N. Williams, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Cray, Commissionnn—A firming.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of having
carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of 18
years, and his punishment was fixed at confinement in
the penitentiary for five years. The facts in the case are
set out in Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 165, 214
S. W. 2d 87, wherein we reversed a former judgment
because of error in the instructions.

On this appeal appellant’s principal contention is
that the indictment charged only a misdemeanor because
it failed to allege appellant was over the age of 21
years, and the Court erred in giving a felony instruc-

| 241

tion. The indictment accused appellant of the crime of
rape upon a female above 12 years of age, and alleged
that he did unlawfully and feloniously commit the as-
sault ‘‘forcibly against the will and consent’’ of the
prosecutrix. The indictment was obviously framed under
the provisions of KRS 435.090. This section says nothing
about the age of the accused.

-The following section, KRS 435.100, covers the
erime of carnal knowledge with consent of a female
child under the age of 18. Different degrees of the crime
are set forth in the subsections, and subsection 2 pro-
vides a penalty by way of a fine if the accused male per-
son is between the ages of 17 and 21.

As above noted, appellant was indicted for the
crime of rape under KRS 485.090. On the former appeal
we determined that there was evidence that the prosecu-

’ trix had consented, and we held that an instruction
under KRS 435.100 should have been given. This section
simply sets forth lessor degrees of the crime of rape,
dependent upon consent and the ages of the prosecutrix
and the accused. However, it seems obvious that the
lesser degrees of the crime need not be set forth in the
indictment. The precise question we have before us was
considered and determined in Merriss v. Commonwealth,
287 Ky. 58, 151 S. W. 2d 1030. There we held that the
age of the defendant need not be alleged in the indict-
ment for rape. We think the reasoning in that opinion
and the decision in the case are conclusive.

Appellant relies on Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 216
Ky. 72, 287 8. W. 223, A reading of that case shows the
crime charged in the indictment was that of having
carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 16, appar-
ently with her consent. This indictment was obviously
based on Section 435.100, and the indictment under that
section should properly contain an allegation of the age
of the accused. This case is no authority, however, where
the crime charged is rape under Section 435.090.

Appellant makes the further contention that the
verdict is not sustained by the evidence, and was the
result of -passion and prejudice. The defense was an
alibi. Five witnesses testified concerning appellant’s
presence at other places during the afternoon when, ac-
cording to the prosecutrix’ testimony, he was with her in

242

an automobile. The prosecutrix’ identification of appel-
lant was positive. Deciding whose testimony shall be ac-
cepted as true is the important function of the jury.
There was substantial evidence both ways, and om two
oceasions juries have accepted the prosecutrix’ story.
With substantial evidence to support it, we cannot
usurp the jury’s function and reach a different conclu-
sion on this question of fact.

The judgment is affirmed.

Shaw v. Halmhuber.
December 8, 1950.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Ben Fowler for appellant.
Jamies P. Hanrahan for appellee.

Ciay, Commisstonrr—Affirming,

This is an appeal from a judgment authorizing
-appellee, as committee for an incompetent, to execute a
quitclaim deed to an interest in real estate formerly
owned by his ward. The objective of the suit is to clear
the title to property sold under a former judgment whose
validity has been brought in question.

In 1933 a petition was filed in the Franklin County
Court asking that James Shaw be declared a person of
unsound mind. The County Court so adjudged, ‘and sub-
sequently appointed J. L. Terry as Shaw’s committee.
It is apparently conceded that this adjudication and
appointment were void because under KRS 202.020
(being section 216aa-68 Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes,
at the time of the inquest) the Circuit Court, not the
County Court, had exclusive jurisdiction of such in-
quests.

In 1937 J. L. Terry, allegedly as committee, filed
suit in the Franklin Circuit Court against Shaw to sell
the latter’s one-half interest in an eleven acre tract -.of
Jand near Frankfort. Summons was served on the in-
competent and the person having his custody, and a
guardian ad litem was appointed. Proof was taken to
establish that the proposed purchase price of $6400 was
fair and reasonable. At this point in the proceedings it
was apparently discovered that the former adjudication
of incompetency and the appointment of Terry were
invalid. The Franklin Cireuit Court was thereupon pe-
titioned to hold an inquest. This was done, and the Court
adjudged Shaw a person of unsound mind and appoint-
ed Terry as committee. The propriety of these later pro-
ceedings is not in question.

Immediately after his second appointment; Terry
as committee filed an amended petition setting up the
new appointment and again asked approval of the sale.

244 |

No summons was served on this amended petition.
Thereafter the Court approved the sale.

The present suit was filed in 1950 for Court ap-
proval of a contract to quit-claim to the original pur-
chaser for $300 the incompetent’s interest in the real
estate, because after a subdivision of the land some ques-
tion was raised concerning the validity of the 1937 judg-
ment. The land has greatly increased in value since that
time, and the guardian ad litem is defending on the
ground that the incompetent is still its owner and the
payment of $300 for his interest at this time would be
unreasonable and unfair. The Chancellor, however, held
the former proceedings valid and approved the new
contract which will finally clear the title.

On this appeal the guardian ad litem contends the
judgment in 1937 was void because no summons was
served on the incompetent after the amended petition
was filed in that suit, showing for the first time the
valid appointment of Terry as committee. This conten-
tion is based on the argument that when Terry first filed
the suit in 1937, he was without capacity to sue, and
therefore no suit was actually pending. It is urged
the purported amendment was the same as bringing a
new suit which would require service of summons on the
defendant under Section 63 of the Civil Code.

The principal authority relied on is Fentzka’s Ad-
ministrator v. Warwick Construction Company et al.,
162 Ky. 580, 172 S. W. 1060. In that case the plaintiff
sought to recover for the wrongful death of another
and sued as administrator under a void appointment.
After a second valid appointment, the administrator
amended his petition showing his capacity to sue. By
that time the statute of limitations had run. The Court
held that until there was a valid appointment of the ad-
ministrator, the action attempted to be brought was a
nullity, and because there was no party plaintiff, there
was nothing to amend. It will be noted in that case that
at the time the amendment was offered, the legal rights
of the defendant had changed, and he would be seriously
prejudiced if the administrator was permitted to pre-
serve the original filing date of the suit against the plea
of the, statute of limitations.

Other cases cited by appellant relate to situations

LL)

where the proposed amendment changes the cause of
action.

Under Section 134 of the Civil Code, the Court is
given a broad discretion in permitting amendments to
pleadings. It is proper to add the name of a party or
correct a mistake in the name of a party, and the Court
is authorized to disregard any error or defect which
does not affect the substantial rights of the litigants.

In 39 Am. Jur., Parties, Section 83, it is stated as
. the general rule that an amendment changing the ca-
pacity in which a person sues is proper where it does
not change the cause of action and the defendant is al-
ready before the Court upon process issued. In Foxwell
v. Justice, 191 Ky. 749, 231 S. W. 509, we held that the
exercise of discretion by the lower Court in admitting
amendments would not be disturbed on appeal unless
there had been a manifest abuse of discretion.

In the former proceeding, it does not seem to us
the Chancellor abused his discretion by permitting the
amendment as a proper part of the action then in fact
pending. While it is true the plaintiff had no capacity
to sue at the time the suit was originally brought, the
Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the
defendant. The amendment did no more than correct a
defect in parties. The important consideration is the
fact that this pleading and subsequent proceedings did
not adversely affect any of the incompetent’s rights. To
have him again served with a second summons would
have been a useless act because he and his guardian ad
litem were already before the Court.

We therefore conclude the former judgment was
valid and proper, and the judgment appealed from is
attacked on no other ground. ~

The judgment is affirmed.

Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York v. Noe.
December 8, 1950.
Rodney G. Bryson, Judge.

Marion W. Moore, Blakely, Moore & Harrison for appellant.
O. M. Rogers and Harl Rodney King for appellee.

Joven Lavimzr—Affirming.

Appellee, Hattie Noe, was an employee of Elbert
Veach, operator of a taxicab business in South Fort
Mitchell.

Appellant had issued its policy of insurance to
Veach which was accepted by the Division of Motor
Transportation and on file there for the purpose of
meeting requirements of KRS 281.460. .

_ The facts as to the contractual relationship of the
insured, Veach, and appellee were stipulated as follows:

“That Elbert Veach, the insured, employed the
plaintiff as a dispatcher the latter part of November,
1946, Her duties were to receive and relay to the in-
sured’s taxi drivers calls for taxicab service. Her hours
of employment were from 7 A. M., to 7 P. M., twelve
hours, for which she was paid a weekly wage of $18.90
for six days. The office where she worked was located
in Kentucky Tavern Building, located on the Dixie
Highway at the end of the street car line.

‘‘When first employed, she was living on Twelfth

ee EE

Street, in the City of Covington and used the street cars
in going to and returning from her place of employment,
paying her own fare; that on or about June ist, 1947
she moved from Twelfth Street to a place on Madison
Pike about a mile south of the city, where she resided
when injured. Upon changing her residence, she inform-
ed the insured that she would be compelled to quit work-
ing for him, as it would take her too long to go to and
return from work; thereupon, in addition to her salary
the insured agreed to furnish her cab service to and
from her residence on Madison Pike to her place of
employment on the Dixie Highway and return, and this
service was to be furnished without payment of a taxi-
eab fare.

“She accepted the offer and continued in the in-
sured’s employment as dispatcher in his office in the
Kentucky Tavern Building, with the insured furnishing
her taxicab service daily to and from her work, until
she was injured on June 21st, 1947.

“On that day and some time after 7 P. M. when
her day’s work was over, one of the insured’s drivers
_¢alled at her place of employment with the Plymouth
ear described in the policy of insurance, to take her to
her home. She entered the cab and on her way home,
the driver operated the same in such a manner as to
cause it to collide with a bridge on the highway, wreck-
ing the car and severely injuring her.’’

Appellee brought suit against Veach, her employer,
and obtained judgment in the sum of $2,660.50 for per-
sonal injuries.

Appellant, denying liability under the terms of the
policy, did not undertake to defend the action on behalf
of Veach. The judgment not having been satisfied, ap-
pellee brought this action against appellant Insurance
Company to recover the amount of the original judg-
ment against Veach.

Appellant, by answer, interposed the defense that
the policy of insurance issued to Veach excludes injuries
to employees while engaged in their employment; that
the State Endorsement excludes employees of the in-
sured who may suffer injuries in the course of their em-
ployment; and further that the policy excludes any obli--

24g

gation for which the insured, or any company as his
insurer, may be held liable under any workmen’s com-
pensation law.

The court below held that appellee, at the time of
her injuries, was a passenger and, therefore, within the
protection afforded by the policy contract.

The question before us relates to the status of ap-
pellee’s relationship with appellant’s insured at the
time of her injury. If appellee was a passenger, she is
entitled to the protective benefits of the policy and the
judgment should be affirmed. On the other hand, if she
‘was an employee, and injured in the course of her em-
ployment, she did not come within the protective limits
contemplated by the insurance contract and the judg-
ment should be reversed.

The exclusions relied upon are:

“(d) under coverages A and C, to bodily injury to
or death of any employee of the insured while engaged
in the employment, other than domestic, of the insured,
or while engaged in the operation, maintenance or re-
pair of the automobile;

‘*(e) under coverage A, to any obligation for which
the insured or any company as his insurer may be held
liable under any workmen’s compensation law; * * *.’?

The portion of the Endorsement relied upon is:
“The policy to which this endorsement is attached is
written under and pursuant to the provisions of the
Motor Regulatory Acts of the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and is payable to the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky for the benefit of all persons
who may suffer personal injuries or property damage
due to any negligence of the assured, his or its agents,
servants, or employees in the operation or use of any
motor vehicle operating under the assured’s certificate,
permit or license issued by the Division of Motor Trans-
portation, except employees of the assured who may
suffer injuries in the course of their employment.’’

We have before us the benefit of splendidly prepared
briefs. Appellant commences his argument by citing and
discussing decisions relative to the legality of exclusion
clauses in insurance policies. We have no fault to find

De

or criticism to offer concerning this approach. How-
ever, there is no attack being made here upon the legality
of the exclusion clause.

Appellee takes the position that a taxicab is a com-
mon carrier; that the liability was imposed by statute
and assumed by appellant and that an employee of a
common carrier, who is being transported by his em-
ployer to and from his place of work, is to be regarded
as a passenger.

Appellant undertakes to differentiate between rail-
roads and taxicabs in the matter of furnishing trans-
portation to employees. It is insisted that this record
does not disclose the existence of a custom for taxicab
operators to give free transportation as an ordinary
passenger to employees as a part of the consideration
for their services. It is argued that the transportation
in the instant case was not gratuitous but an obligation
assumed under the contract for the mutual benefit of
both employer and employee; that there is a further
substantial differentiation in that a pass, as given to an
employee to ride upon a train or trolley car, is not limit-
ed to the period of time when the employee is going to
and from work but may be used at any time; that there
is no obligation to give such a free pass on the railroad;
that it is merely a gratuity and a courtesy to be extend-
ed or revoked at the will of the employer; that the trans-
portation in this case was incidental to, and arose out
of, the employment, and that the single purpose in
granting the transportation was to enable appellee to con-
tinue employment with the insured; and that there is
no element of a free pass as given by an employing rail-
road to its employees.

We agree with appellee that a taxicab engaged in
business of transporting passengers for hire is a common
carrier. See Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817,
51 §.W.2d 468; and Dix v. Gross, 271 Ky. 231, 111 8.W.-
2d 673. Therefore, we must consider the question as to
when and under what circumstances an employee of a |
common carrier becomes a passenger of his employer.

The authorities are not in agreement as to the
status of one employed by a common carrier and being
transported to and from his place of work by that
earrier. Appellant cites and quotes from 10 Am. Jur.,

250 |

Carriers, Section 973: ‘‘An .employee who is carried
to and from his place of employment as part of his con-
tract of service, or as a privilege incidental thereto
with no deduction from his regular wages for such
transportation, is considered by the weight of authority
to be a servant, and not a passenger.’’

It is to be noted, however, that immediately fol-
lowing the above quotation is to be found the contrary
view: ‘Those decisions which express a contrary view
hold that an employee while riding in the vehicle, must
be deemed to be a passenger while én route to or from
his place of work. In a number of instances the rela-
tionship between the employee and employer has
been viewed as carrier and passenger where it appears
that the employee received free transportation as a
part of the consideration for the services rendered by
him. Accordingly, where a person agrees with a carrier
to enter its employ at a certain place, and in considera-
tion of the interests of both a free pass is given to such
place, and in traveling on the carrier’s road to the place
of employment the person is injured by the negligence
of the carrier’s agents, such person must be regarded
as a passenger for hire and not as an employee, and
the carrier is liable for damages caused the passenger
by its negligence.’’

In the footnotes to the above quotation numerous
decisions are cited, among which is Louisville & N. RB.
Qo. v. Scott’s Adm’r, 108 Ky. 392, 56 S.W. 674, 50
LB.A., 381, a case cited and strongly relied upon by
appellee. The cases cited in the footnotes above, and
numerous other cases cited by appellee, give as reason
for adoption of the rule therein the fact that the em-
ployee performed all of his work at a fixed place and
his services did not commence until he reached that
fixed place and. ended there.

In the case of Klinck v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 262
Til. 280, 104 NB. 669, 671, 52 L.R.A., N.S, 70, the court
said: ‘Regarding the status of one in the employ of a
common carrier who is being transported upon the cars
of his employer to or from his place of work, the au-
thorities are not entirely harmonious. The great weight
of authority, however, is to the effect that when the
employee, either by virtue of his contract of employ-

ee 25

“ment or under a rule or custom of his employer, is
accorded the same means and privileges of transpor-
tation over the lines of his employer as an ordinary
passenger for hire, then, while riding upon his em-
ployer’s cars at a time when, under his contract of
employment, he is neither under the control of his em-
ployer nor obliged to perform any service for him, he
is to be regarded as a passenger, and that, under such
circumstances, it is immaterial that the employe be
either going to or coming from his place of work.’
Continuing to discuss and approve the opinions, in the
cases of Dickinson v. West End Street Ry. Co., 177
Mass. 365, 59 N. B. 60, 52 L.R.A. 326; Doyle v. Fitch-
burg R. Co., 162 Mass. 66, 37 N.H. 770, 25 L.R.A. 157;
McNulty v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 182 Pa. 479, 38 A. 524,
38 L.R.A. 524; Enos v. Rhode Island Suburban Ry. Co.,
28 R.I. 291, 67 A. 5, 12 L.R.A., N.S., 244; Indianapolis
Traction & Terminal Co. v. Romans, 40 Ind.App. 184,
79 N.E. 1068; and Harris v. City & HK. G.
Rd. Co., 69 W.Va., 65, 70 S.B. 859, 50 LRA, N.S., 706,
wherein employees were held to be passengers, the court
then said: ‘In harmony with this line of cases are
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Scott’s Adm’r, 108 Ky. 392,
56 8.W. 674, 50 L.R.A. 381; Whitney v. New York, New
Haven, & Hartford Rd. Co., 1 Cir., 102 F. 850, 50 L.R.A.
615; and Chattanooga Rapid Transit Co. v. Venable,
105 Tenn. 460, 58 S.W. 861, 51 L.R.A. 886.’”

In the Venable case, supra, the Court said: ‘‘The
weight of authority and of sound policy, we think, is
that where a servant performs all his work at a fixed
place, and the master, either by custom or as a gratuity,
carries him to and from his work, the servant doing
no service for the master on the train, he is to be treated
as a passenger.’’ [105 Tenn. 460, 58 S.W. 863.]

In the case at bar, no service was to be performed
by appellee upon the line of travel while in the taxicab
between the residence and the place of work. There
was no performance of duties for the taxicab com-
pany while riding in the taxicab. While going to and
from her work she was merely on her way to and from
the place where she took up and left her position as
servant. Her services were entirely distinct from that
of the operation of the taxicab. Her time was her own
and she owed her employer no duties until she arrived

252, |

at her place of work. She was by no means under the
_control of her employer while thus traveling to and
fro. She could go where she pleased and when she
pleased during the time before and after her work
commenced and ended. Under the contractual relation,
she was under no obligation to use the taxi, although
there was an obligation on the part of the employer
to afford the opportunity of doing so. Having availed
herself of the opportunity to use the taxi, and exer-
cised the right to which she was entitled, she obviously
became a passenger. :

The judgment is affirmed.

Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Garland et al.
December 8, 1950.
R. L, Maddox, Judge.

a
Ogden, Galphin & Abell, Patterson & Wilson for appellant,
Astor Hogg for appellee.

Srantey, Commissionen—A firming.

The judgment is for $2,000 for personal injuries
sustained by an eleven year old boy, Floyd Garland,
by electric shock and burns and a fall from a tree,
through the branches of which ran uninsulated trans-
mission wires carrying 4,000 volts. There is no sub-
stantial disagreement as to the facts. The appellant
seeks a reversal of the judgment on the ground that
it was entitled to a directed verdict.

The tree was located on a steep slope 35 feet from
the shoulder of a state highway and 26 feet on a direct
horizontal plane. Hight or ten feet beyond the tree was
an abandoned county road which was still used occas-
ionally as a public passway. A creek ran a few feet
heyond it. On the other side of the creek, some 150 to
200 yards away, was the Glendon Mining Camp in
which lived 25 families with many children, including
this boy. This was near the settlement of Arjay. The
tree was a sugar maple with low branches, and a small
stump or fallen tree beneath it made it very enticing
to small boys. The accident occurred in July, 1947,
when the tree was, of course, in full leaf. A nearby
pole to which two electric wires were strung leaned so
that the lines were brought within five feet of the trunk
of the tree. It was easy to see the wires entering and
leaving the branches of the tree, but they could not be
seen in the foliage.

The record is silent as to the ownership of this
property, but it is shown that the Utilities Company
had a right-of-way for the line of an undefined width.
There were no fences between this place and the high-
way above it or the terrain below it through which the
ereek ran, or even beyond that to the houses. It is
shown by several children and their parents that the
children of the mining camp were in the habit of play-
ing there catching crawfish, wading the creek, playing
cowboy and hide and seek along the banks, in the bushes
and up this particular tree, which was so easily climbed
and afforded such a good hiding place.

We may dispose of the argument that has the least

254 es

basis, namely, that the boy could not have been injured
by contact with the wire or by receiving an electric
shock from it. He and other children had been playing
around the tree, and he climbed it to cut a fork for his
slingshot, He had seen other boys up the tree that day,
and had climbed it himself two or three times before
then. He remembers sitting on a limb on the lower side
of the tree, holding to the trunk, getting ready and
reaching out to cut the fork. He stated, “The next thing
I knew I was at the house.’’ He had been picked up from
the ground unconscious. An experienced mine motorman
who saw the boy before his removal from the place of
the accident, described his physical condition and stated
his symptoms were the same asa number of people he
had seen shocked or killed by electricity. He had a hole
burned in his breeches and a burnt place on his leg where
he had sat. His fingers and toes were slightly burned
and his hair singed. It is shown that the boy was very
nervous, slept restlessly, vomited freely and had aches
and pains in his ears and head after this accident. The
burnt place on his head became infected and a scar and
bald spot have been left there. The injuries are not such
as would have resulted from a mere fall from the tree.
However, an engineer of the company, after examining
several photographs of the tree and considering the lo-
cation of the wires, expressed the opinion that a person
sitting on a limb on the other side of the trunk and
holding to it could not get an electric shock from the wires
if they had been in contact with the end of another
limb on the upper side of the tree. This opinion was
predicated on the conclusion that any charge of elec-
tricity would have been carried down the trunk to the
ground and not out on a limb protruding from the
other side. Hxactness in details of just where the boy
sat ought not to be demanded or expected. Whatever
may be the technical opinion, the facts themselves show
that this boy did suffer shock and burns which could
have come only from the charging of the tree with elec-
tricity. This is another situation like that suggested by
the story that the technologist says a bumblebee’s body
is too heavy for its wingspread and it is impossible for
the bee to fly; but the bee, not knowing anything about
the law of aerodynamics, goes ahead and flies anyhow.

It can hardly be questioned that to maintain high
voltage, uninsulated wires through thick foilage of a

 —(

tree creates a very dangerous condition. The defendant
company’s employees passing up and down the highway
frequently must have, or, at least, should have seen this
particular condition. -

As we'have indicated, it appears that this tree was
on the public highway or public passway or in the space
between. If it was on public property, then the injured
boy was not a trespasser, and liability, could be based
upon negligence in the maintenance of a dangerous con-
dition, the law of attractive nuisance not being applic-
able, for as said in Reynolds v. Iowa Southern Utilities
Co., 8. Cir., 21 F. 2d 958, 959, where an eleven year old
boy was killed by electricity when he climbed a tree in
a public street, in which tree the boys of the neighbor-
hood played, ‘‘The boy had a right to be in the tree.”’
Cf. City of Madisonville v. Nisbet’s Administrator, 270
4 248, 109 8. W. 2d 593. See Annotations 17 A. L. R.

This case, however, was practiced under the doc-
trine of attractive nuisance. Of course, everyone will
agree that the tree itself was harmless and by itself
cannot ‘be brought within that rule. But a tree of this
character is alluring to a boy and is ‘‘attractive’’ for
it may reasonably be expected to attract children to the
premises. The ‘‘nuisance’’ element arises from having
permitted the tree to be charged with electricity. The
combination made the alluring tree an attractive, dan-
gerous instrumentality on the defendant’s premises,
which is the basis of the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
This distinguishes such cases as Jarvis v. Howard, 310
Ky. 38, 219 8. W. 2d 958, where the instrumentality was
itself not dangerous. The question in the case is whether
there was a duty to anticipate that a boy would climb the
tree thus charged with electricity, or, extending the
thought, that one exercising the highest degree of care
should reasonably have known or have expected that
children would congregate and play at the place.

Perhaps closer to the instant case are those cases
where electric lines on public ways ran through branches
of trees located on adjacent private grounds or play-
grounds and children were hurt or killed when they
climbed the trees. The cases are brought together in
Annotations, .‘‘Duty to guard against danger to chil-
dren by electric wires’? under the captions, ‘“Wires on

256 ee

or near playgrounds.’’ ‘‘Wires reached by climbing,’’
and ‘Wires in trees.’’? 17 A. L. BR. 833, 41 A. L. B. 1887,
49 A. L. BR. 1053, 100 A. L. R. 621. The courts, whose
members were once boys (with the rare recent excep-
‘tions where the judges are women) have variously

’ stated their recognition of the nature of the little ani-
mals, their love of adventure, innocence and heedless-
ness of danger, and of the obligations of electric com-
panies and their managers to remember that nature
and to conduct their operations accordingly. Thus, in
Chickering v. Lincoln County Power Co., 1919, 118 Me.
414, 108 A. 460, 462, (note 17 A. L. RB. 837) the judges
wrote: ‘‘Human life is short enough, and its burdens
and responsibilities come soon enough, at best. To take
from boyhood the legitimate pleasures and adventures
of tree climbing would unduly restrict the confines of
that memory cherished domain, and lessen life’s joys
both there and thereafter.’? And in Temple v. McComb
Electric Light & Power Co., 89 Miss. 1, 42 So. 874, 875,
11 L. BR. A, N. S., 449, (note 17 A. L. BR. 837) the court
says: ‘‘It is perfectly idle for the appellee to insist that
it was not bound to have reasonably expected the small
boys of the neighborhood to climb that sort of tree. The
fact that such boys would, in all probability, climb that
particular tree, being the kind of tree it was, was a fact
which, according to every sound principle of law and
common sense, this corporation must have anticipated.
The argument that it did not almost suggests the query
whether the individuals composing this corporation, its
_employes and agents, had forgotten that they were once
small boys themselves. The immemorial habit of small
boys to climb little oak trees filled with abundant branch-
es reaching almost to the ground is a habit which cor-
porations stretching their wires over such trees must
take notice of. This court, so far as the exertion of its
power in a legitimate way is concerned, intends to exert
that power so as to secure, at the hands of these public
utility corporations, handling and controlling these ex-
traordinarily dangerous agencies, the very highest de-
gree of skill and care.”’

If the inherently dangerous condition was not in
fact on the public way, as it appears to be, but on the
defendant’s exclusive property, -the factor of the boy
being a trespasser passes out of the case so far as the
right to a directed verdict is concerned, for at least it

a

could be found that the situation came within the rule
of attractive nuisance. Concerning the aspect of acces-
sibility and anticipation, the law of attractive nuisance
is thus stated in 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sec. 153: ‘‘The
fact that a dangerous condition was open, exposed, and
easily accessible to children, in a place frequented by
children is a circumstance from which it may readily be
found that an injury to a child of tender years reason-
ably should have been anticipated. The accessibility of
the offending place or appliance tends directly to show
constructive knowledge that a child might sustain an
injury therefrom, and knowledge of the peril is the basis
of liability. The fact that the instrumentality was in an
unenclosed lot adjacent to the highway tends to show
accessibility.’’

In appreciation of the legal responsibility to exer-
cise the highest degree of care in distributing electricity
we cannot say as a matter of law that the defendant
was under no duty to anticipate that the many children
living so close to the point, even though it had no actual
knowledge of their habit to play around the tree, might
not get hurt by this negligent condition and that it is
not liable for the consequences. Maybe Little Lord
Fauntleroy would not have played in this rough place,
but it was a natural habitat for Huckleberry Finn and.
these vigorous, outdoor country boys, living a couple of
hundred yards away. It is not so much a question of
actual knowledge as it is of anticipation. 18 Am. Jur.,
Electricity, Secs. 72, 73. In principle, we have for appli-
cation Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lunsford, 189
Ky. 785, 225 §. W.'741; Louisville & N. v. Vaughn) 292
Ky. 120, 166 S. W. 2d 43; Deaton’s Administrator v.
Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co., 291 Ky. 304, 164 8. W.
2d 468. See also of special pertinence Stark v. Holtzclaw,
90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330, 41 A. L. R. 1823; Cooper v.
North C. Power Co., 117 Or. 384, 244 P. 671, rehearing,
Bost} 652, 244 P. 665, 666, 245 P. 317, (note 45 A. L.

The judgment is affirmed.

258

Daniels et al. v. Adams et al.
December 8, 1950.
James W. Turner, Judge.

Clyde L. Miller for appellant.
C. F. See, Jr., for appellee.

Cuter Justice Sums—Affirming.

. This action was filed by J. M. Adams and Charley
Ryan, the duly elected members of the council of the
fifth class city of Louisa, against Clyde Daniels, Hile
Fyffe and Fred Springer, whom the Governor had ap-

a 259

pointed members of the Council of Louisa on the theory
that three vacancies existed in that body of six. A gen-
eral demurrer was overruled to the petition, answer
was filed to which the chancellor sustained a general
demurrer, appellants declined to plead further and the
cause was submitted on the pleadings.

The chancellor decided there were no vacancies in
the council at the time the Governor made the three
appointments to that body and adjudged appellees were
the duly elected and qualified Councilmen of Louisa,
and this appeal followed.

The petition averred that in November 1949 mem-
bers were elected to serve on the Council of Louisa (a
fifth class city whose council consists of six members)
from the first Monday in January 1950 until the first
Monday in January 1952; that among the six council-
men elected were appellees, who qualified, took office and
ave entitled to serve the term to which they were elected;
that one of the members of the council, Leonard Comp-
ton, died, leaving five members, who on the night of
July 5, 1950, elected John Page to fill the vacancy
caused by Compton’s death; that on June 5th, Hon.
Earle OC. Clements, Governor of Kentucky, named ap-
pellants as members of the council when there were no
vacancies which the Governor could fill and his three
appointees are usurpers.

The answer as amended is a traverse, followed by
an affirmative, plea that prior to May 2, 1950, appellant
Adams delivered to the mayor of the town his resigna-
tion which was not accepted by the mayor or by the
council, although there was an item in the newspaper
giving the reason for his resignation; that in a news-
paper article on May 18th, appeared an item that C. C.
Ryan had also resigned, and, due to the death of Leon-
ard Compton, the City of Louisa was without a council;
that on June 5th, the Governor accepted the resignations
of Adams and Ryan and appointed the three appellants
to the council; that when the regular June meeting con-
vened on June 6th, appellees appeared and withdrew
their resignations but at that fime their resignations
had already been accepted by the Governor and entered
on his executive journal and appellees were guilty of
Jaches; that no council meeting was held between the

260 ee

regular May and the regular June meetings in 1950, and
appellees never requested that their resignations be
withdrawn and they assert that as their resignations
were never accepted by being entered on the council’s
minute book, they are still members of that body.

The answer further avers that Ryan holds a pass
on a common carrier, which under sec. 197 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution forfeited his office before he resigned
and he could not hold office even if restored thereto by
the court, and he comes into a court of equity with un-
clean hands. .

The qualifications of members of the council of a
fifth class city are given in KRS 87.160. Among other
things, that section provides no person shall be eligible
to hold the office of councilman unless he is a resident
and qualified voter of the city and has resided therein
for one year next preceding the date of his election or
appointment; and he must be a property holder of the
city. It will be noted the petition does not aver appellees
resided in the city one year preceding the date of their
election or that they are property holders in the city.

Appellants, relying upon Saylor v. Rockcastle
County Board of Education, 286 Ky. 63, 149 S. W. 24
770, and Rosser v. City of Russellville, 306 Ky. 462,
208 S. W. 2d 322, insist the court erred in overruling
their general demurrer to the petition, because appel-
lees as public officers seeking to recover their offices must
allege and prove every fact necessary to show they pos-
sess the required qualifications to hold the offices at the
time they took them; and this appellees failed to do.

The Saylor and Rosser opinions are distinguishable
from the instant case in that both Saylor and Rosser
had been removed from office and were seeking to re-
gain title thereto. Here, appellees were not removed
from office and insist they did not relinquish their offi-
ces by resignation, but are attempting to hold the offices
to which they had been elected. This is not an action by
appellees to recover their offices but to enjoin appellants
from usurping offices which appellees were holding and
from which they had never resigned.

In the circumstances it was not incumbent upon
appellees to allege and prove every fact necessary to

a 261.

show they possessed the required qualifications to hold
the offices at the time they took them. The averments in
their petition, that they are residents and citizens of
Louisa and the duly elected and qualified members of
its city council and entitled to serve their two year

_ terms, were sufficient. The court properly overruled the
demurrer to the petition,

‘We agree with appellants that title to an office can-
not be tried in an equity action or by the process of in-
junction, Jenkins v. Congleton, 242 Ky. 46, 45 S. W. 2d
456. But this is not such a case. It is an action by duly
elected officers to enjoin others from interfering with
them or from usurping their offices. We have written in
several cases that duly elected officers will be protected
by injunction against unlawful interference with their
possession thereof. Hollar v. Cornett, 144 Ky. 420, 138
8. W. 298; Hutchinson v. Miller, 158 Ky. 363, 164 S. W.
961; Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney,
235 Ky. 692, 32 8. W. 2d 26.

The general demurrer was correctly sustained to
the answer. There were four members of the council
when Adams attempted to resign and that body could
have accepted his resignation. As Adam’s resignation
was not accepted by the council, he was still a member
thereof when Ryan’s resignation was tendered, and as
the council then had four members it could have accept-
ed Ryan’s resignation.

It is provided in KRS 63.010: ‘‘All resignations of
office shall be tendered in writing to the court or officer
required to fill the vacancy, and received and recorded
by the court or officer in its or his records. Resignations
to the Governor shall be recorded in the Executive
Journal.’? ‘

In the instant case the council had authority to
accept the tendered resignation of Adams and to fill
the vacancy created thereby, as well as to accept Ryan’s
tendered resignation and to fill it, KRS 87.210. The coun-
cil’s failure to accept their resignations left Adams and
Ryan in office. The rule is, the resignation of a public
officer, in the absence of statute, does not become effec-
tive until accepted by the proper authority or by equiv-
alent action, such as the appointment of a successor,
Commonwealth ex rel, Wootton v. Berninger, 255 Ky.

262 ee

451, 74 S. W. 2d 932, 95 A. L. R. 213, and there can be
no vacancy until the resignation is accepted, Tabor v.
Webb, 227 Ky. 611, 13 S. W. 2d 758. As the council had
four members when each resignation was tendered, as
just above pointed out, it was the proper body to accept
the resignations. As the resignations of appellees had
never been accepted at the time the Governor made the
appointments and as there were then no vacancies, the
Governor was without authority to appoint appellants
members of the Louisa Council.

We are not impressed by appellants’ argument that
as their answer avers Ryan holds a railroad pass, he
cannot fill the office of councilman and does not come into
court with clean hands because he has violated sec. 197
of our Constitution. This court has held no proceeding
can be had to oust one from office for violation of sec.
197 of the Constitution and KRS Chapter 276 without
a prior conviction. Com. v. Hearon, 235 Ky. 681, 32 S.
W. 2d 21, and cases therein cited. The record does not
show Ryan has ever been convicted of accepting a pass
from a railroad company, and we are not now concerned
with this ground as affecting his eligibility to hold his
office of councilman.

The judgment is affirmed.

Ream v. Mullins et al.
December 8, 1950.
Watt M. Prichard, Judge. .

a 263

P. H. Vincent for appellant.
Nickell & Fanning for appellees,

Juve Rezs—Affirming.

Cynthia A. Ream brought an action against H. R.
Mullins and Louise Mullins to recover the sum of $2,000
which she alleged was loaned to the defendants on No-
vember 26, 1948. In an amended petition the plaintiff
alleged that the money was loaned to the defendants on
an oral agreement by them to repay. The defendants in
their answer denied that they borrowed the money from
the plaintiff, and alleged that plaintiff paid $2,000 on
the purchase price of a house located on Hilton Avenue
in Ashland which was conveyed to the defendants, the
purchase price being $6,750. The payment by plaintiff
was pursuant to an agreement whereby she was to oc-
cupy a room in the house during her lifetime. They
further alleged that the plaintiff selected the house, took
possession of a room therein, and occupied it until she
left of her own volition. They alleged that the room was
still ready for her use and occupancy. The affirmative
allegations of the answer were denied in a reply, and
upon a trial before a jury a verdict was returned in
favor of the defendants. It is argued on this appeal that
there was no valid contract between the parties because
of a lack of consideration and a lack of mutual agree-
ment, and, consequently, the trial court erred in failing
to direct a verdict for the plaintiff,

The evidence discloses that Mrs. Ream and Mrs.
Mullins had been intimate friends since the death of
Mrs. Ream’s husband, a period of about six years, and
Mrs. Ream was a frequent visitor in the Mullins home.
Mrs. Ream lived in a small house on 23rd Street in Ash-
land, and Mr. and Mrs. Mullins lived in a 4-room house
on 25th Street. Two daughters of Mr. and. Mrs. Mullins
lived with them. Mrs. Mullins testified that Mrs. Ream
suggested the purchase of a larger house in order that
she could have a room for her own use, and that she
agreed that if such a house was purchased to make the
down; payment. The amount of the down payment was
not specified at that time. Mr. Mullins objected to the
arrangement, but Mrs. Mullins and Mrs. Ream visited
various real estate brokers in Ashland together and
were shown several houses, Mrs. Nona Schump, a real

264 ee

estate agent, finally showed them the 6-room house lo-
cated at 1632 Hilton Avenue. It met with the approval
of both, and it was purchased. Mrs. Schump testified that
she first talked with Mrs. Ream and Mrs. Mullins con-
cerning the Hilton Avenue house on November 22, 1948.
She testified in part as follows: ‘‘* * * when I showed
them the house we discussed different ones, I don’t re-
member their names, but each one was to have a room.
They had more bedrooms so that Mrs. Ream could live
with then. * * * We discussed the terms of the house
and I was asked how much the down payment would be
and I told them approximately what the down payment
would be. Then they told me how much could be paid.
At the time, of course, I had to contact the owner, which
was Mrs. Myers, to see whether she would accept the
$2,000 down and $50.00 a month until the house was paid
for. That was when we were looking at the house the day
I met them out there.’’

The contract was signed, and the $2,000 down pay-
ment was made on November 24, 1948. A few days prior
thereto Mrs. Ream sold her house on 23d Street for
$3,400 cash and deposited the money in a bank. On No-
vember 24 she went to the bank and withdrew $2,000,
and accompanied Mrs. Mullins to the real estate office
where she handed the $2,000 to the real estate agent as
the down payment. Immediately thereafter Mr. and Mrs.
Mullins rented their 25th Street house, and they and
Mrs. Ream moved into the Hilton Avenue House. Mrs.
Ream’s furniture was placed in a room selected by her.
She lived with the Mullins family for fourteen weeks
without paying room rent or board, and she does not
complain of their treatment of her during that period.

It is appellant’s theory that Mrs. Mullins devised
a scheme to defraud her of $2,000, but there is no evi-
dence to sustain such a theory. On the other hand, there
is testimony and circumstances to sustain appellees’
version of the transaction, i. e., that appellant agreed
to make the down payment of $2,000 in return for the
right to oceupy a room in the newly purchased house
during the remainder of her life,

Judgment affirmed,

iS}
S
a

Daws v. Commonwealth.
December 12, 1950.

R. C. Tartar, Judge.

Fritz Krueger for appellant.

A. B. Funk, Attorney General, John B. Browning, Assistant At-
torney General and Russell Jones, Commonwealth Attorney for ap
pellee.

Cmer Justice Smus—Reversing.

266 |

Clarence Daws was convicted of the offense of ma-
liciously shooting at Bert Daulton with intent to kill
but without wounding Daulton, and his punishment was
fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years.
He asks that the judgment be reversed because the court
erred: (1) in the admission and rejection of evidence;
(2) in instructing the jury.

The Commonwealth’s proof is to the effect that be-
tween 5:30 and 6:00 o’clock p. m. on January 9, 1949,
Daulton while driving a truck, in which were his wife
and children, on a county road about 125 yards from
the Nazarene Church at Naomi in Pulaski County, met
Clarence Daws on the road. When the truck approached
within a few feet of Daws, he drew a pistol from his
pocket and without provocation fired at Daulton but the
bullet neither hit Daulton nor his truck. Appellant de-
nies firing the shot and proved an alibi.

Milburn Tarter testified that appellant was at the
Church and left walking along the road in the opposite
direction from his home. In a minute or two after appel-
lant left, the witness heard a pistol shot from the direc-
tion in which appellant had gone. Within ‘‘just a minute
or so, a short time’’ Daulton drove up to the Church in
his truck on the road and from the direction Daws had

taken. ‘‘About three minutes, I guess’? after Daulton
arrived at the Church the witness heard Daulton say
Daws shot at him. Appellant’s objection to this testi-
mony was overruled. Winfred Daulton, a son of Bert,
was at the Church and gave practically the same testi-
mony as did the witness Tarter, and appellant’s objec-
tion thereto was likewise overruled. :

The minister of the ‘Church, Willard Young, was
introduced before Tarter and Winfred Daulton testified
and gave practically the same testimony as they did,
except he put it, ‘‘“Bert Daulton, and his little children,
they got out of the truck and said that Clarence Daws
shot at them.’? The court sustained appellant’s objec-
tion thereto and admonished the jury ‘‘not to consider
the remark of the witness as to what these people said.’’

We are at a loss to understand why the court after
excluding Young’s testimony as to what was said at
the Church relative to the shooting, subsequently admit-
ted the same character of testimony given by Tarter and
Winfred Daulton.

Do 267

It is manifest the testimony as to what Bert Daul-
ton said three minutes after arriving at the Church,
that appellant had shot at him 100 or 125 yards down
the road, is incompetent as hearsay, unless it is a part
of the res gestae. A declaration to be admissible as res
gestae must be substantially contemporaneous with the
shooting and illustrate, elucidate, or explain the manner
in which the shooting was done. Stewart v. Common-
wealth, 235 Ky. 670, 32 S. W. 2d 29, 32. As was written
in the Stewart case, ‘‘The exclamation must be the act
talking for itself, not the person talking about the act.
It must be the apparently spontaneous result of the
occurrence operating upon the perceptive senses of the
speaker.’’

Tested by this rule, the statement of Bert Daulton
made after he had driven slowly in his truck 100 or 125
yards from the place of the shooting to the Church anid
after he had been at the Church for three minutes, is
not admissible as part of the res gestae. Certainly, it
was not spontaneous on the part of Bert Daulton. Nor
was it substantially contemporaneous with the firing of
the shot. Instead of it being the shot talking for itself,
the statement was Daulton talking for the shot.

. ‘The instant case is much like Barton v. Common-
wealth, 238 Ky. 356, 38 8. W. 2d 218, where it was said
a statement by deceased that Barton and Vittitoe had
beaten him, made to friends within three minutes and
within thirty-nine steps after they had left Barton and
Vittitoe, was not competent as part of the res gestae.

At first blush, Norton’s Adm’r v. Winstead, 218
Ky. 488, 291 8. W. 723, appears to be in conflict with
what is here said. But it is not. What was written there
is distinguishable from the instant case not as to the
point of time, but ag to the place where it was spoken
in relation to the place where the shooting occurred.
The time of the statement there, as well as here, was
about three minutes after the shooting, but in the Win-
stead case the statement was made at the place where
the shot was fired, while here it was made from 100 to
125 yards from the place of the shooting. Therein lies
the distinction.

Likewise, Roberts v. Louisville Railway Company,
168 Ky. 230, 181 S. W. 1181; and Barrett’s Adm’r v.

268 ee

Brand, 179 Ky. 740, 201 8. W. 331, relied upon by the
Commonwealth, differ from the instant case, as in
them the statement was made at the time and place of
the transaction.

While we would not be understood as saying a
statement to be admitted as part of the res gestae must
be made at the place of the occurrence of the act, since
the factual situation in each case will set its pattern,
20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 669, page 562, we do
hold the statement here made three minutes after Daul-
ton arrived at the Church, which was 100 yards or more
from the scene of the shooting, was too remote to be
admitted as part of the res gestae.

There had been much bad feeling existing between
Daulton and Daws and their families. Carl Daws, father
of appellant, was convicted of shooting and wounding
Hulan Tarter, Daws v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 362,
215 S. W. 2d 1016. Bert was convicted of shooting Carl
Daws from ambush later in the same day that Carl
shot Tarter. Daulton v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 141,
220 8. W. 2d 109. The instant case is a close one on the
facts and as the statement by Daulton three minutes
after arriving at the Church added much weight to
his identification of appellant as the one who fired the
shot, such incompetent testimony was prejudicial to
appellant’s substantial rights. Therefore, the judgment
must be reversed for the court’s error in admitting it
over appellant’s objection.

The other incompetent evidence complained of is
that when appellant proved his good moral reputation,
the court permitted the commonwealth attorney to ask
the character witnesses on cross-examination if they
had heard of apnellant beine publicly drunk, or drunk
while carrying the mail. or if his reputation was not
that of a common drunkard. This character of cross-
examination was improper since it tended to reflect
appellant’s reputation for sobriety rather than his
moral reputation.

It is urged by appellant the court erred in excluding
testimony he offered to the effect that Daulton never
attempted to get an indictment against him until after
his conviction had been affirmed for shooting appel-
lant’s father, citing page 42 of the record. That page

| 269

shows no such evidence was excluded, nor is it shown
elsewhere in the record. At another place in the evi-
dence (page 79) the court correctly permitted Daulton
to be asked on cross-examination if he had not stated
he had been convicted of shooting Carl Daws, appel-
lant’s father, and had spent $1,400 in defending the
charge and he was going to get even.

The only complaint made of the instructions is that
the court did not include one on shooting in sudden
affray. There was no evidence upon which to base such
an instruction. The eyewitnesses for the commonwealth
testified appellant shot at Daulton without a word pass-
ing between them and without provocation. The defense
was an alibi. Clearly, there was no place for a sudden
affray instruction in the case.”

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion.

Ye
Brewer v. Commonwealth.
December i2, 1950.

John J. Winn, Judge.

FP. T. Allen for appellant.

A. H. Funk, Attorney General and W. Owen Keller, Assistant
Attorney General for appellee.

Jupes Cammacx—Reversing.

0 ees

Finley Brewer was sentenced to two years in prison
on the charge of breaking into a dwelling house. On
this appeal he contends that the evidence used against
him on the trial was secured under an illegal search
warrant.

The attack upon the search warrant is based upon
the charge that the affidavit of J. S. Caudel-on which
the warrant was issued was insufficient. In his original
affidavit Mr. Candel said he was the owner of a dwelling
house; that it was broken into; and that a number of
named articles had been taken therefrom. Before the
search warrant was issued Mr. Caudel made an amend-
ed affidavit. The body of the amended affidavit follows:

“The affiant, J. S. Caudell, after being duly sworn,
says that. he is a citizen of Bath County, at Owensville,
Kentucky; and he says that he is hereby amending his
affidavit for he has same from reliable information from
several persons that his household and kitchen furniture
were taken by the said Finley Brewer, for his truck was
seen at or near my cottage about the time this merchan-
dise were taken. Said Brewer home is below Hazel Green,
Ky., and known as the Old Phillips Farm.

“This said affidavit is hereby attached to the orig-
inal affidavit, and making it a part of the original affi-
vit.’?

Mr. Caudel’s affidavit set forth facts showing the
commission of a crime. However, the basis for connect-
ing Brewer with the crime was ‘‘reliable information
from several pérsons’’ that Brewer had taken the ar-
ticles and that Brewer’s truck was seen at or near the
cottage about the time the merchandise was taken. The
affidavit did not set forth the names of the persons who
saw Brewer take the merchandise nor the names of those
who saw his truck near Mr. Caudel’s cottage.

On many occasions this Court has pointed out that
an affidavit for a valid search warrant which is based
upon information obtained from others must disclose
the names of the informants. Duncan v. Commonwealth,
297 Ky. 217, 179 S. W. 2d 899; Carroll v. Commonwealth,
297 Ky. 748, 181 8. W. 2d 259.

Judgment reversed, with directions to set it aside,
and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

2

Jefferson County Fiscal Court et al. v. Queenan.
December 12, 1950.
Lawrence F, Speckman, Judge.

Lawrence G, Duncan and Lawrence S. Poston for appellants. -

Lawrence S. Grauman for appellee.
Jupven Herm—Affirming.

Appellants, Jefferson County Fiscal Court; Boman
L. Shamburger, as Judge of Jefferson County Court,
Chairman, Mark Beauchamp, Stuart BE. Lampe, and
Robert A. Fihe, as Commissioners, composing the Jeffer-
son County Fiscal Court, filed this declaratory judgment
action against appellee, James F. Queenan, as County
Clerk of Jefferson County, requesting a declaration of
rights as to whose obligation it is to bear the expense of
repairing and keeping in good mechanical condition the
voting machines used in elections in Jefferson County.
Appellants maintain that this is the duty of the county
clerk; appellee, the county clerk, maintains that this is
the duty of the Jefferson County Fiscal Court.

Section 147 of our Constitution provides: ‘‘* * *
Counties so desiring may use voting machines, these ma-

chines to be installed at the expense of such counties.
rarer

KRS 125.020 provides: ‘‘The fiscal court of any
county may purchase * * * voting machines, * * *.”?

Jefferson County has 355 voting precincts. It owns

ara

370 voting machines, 25 of which were acquired in 1943,
325 in 1946, and 20 in 1949. KRS 125.050 provides:
‘“‘When voting machines are acquired by any county,
they shall be immediately placed in the custody of the
county clerk, and shall remain in his custody at all times
except when in use at an election or when in the custody
of a court or court officer during contest proceedings.
The clerk shall see that the machines are properly pro-
tected and preserved from damage or unnecessary de-
terioration, and shall not permit any unauthorized per-
son to tamper with the machines.’’

Since Jefferson County has had voting machines,
they have. been kept in the custody of the county clerk.
From the record it appears that the Jefferson County
Fiscal Court has provided a room at the Armory in
Louisville, under the first floor, for the storage of the
machines when not being used in an election, It develops
that there is considerable cost connected with the re-
pair and maintenance of the voting machines owned
by Jefferson County. Appellee concedes that it is his
duty to keep the custody of the voting machines without
additional compensation.

From the record it appears that appellants have
borne the expense of repairs and maintenance of the
machines from the time they were first acquired up to
March 1, 1950, when they passed a resolution stating
that the court is of the opinion these costs should be
paid by appellee, and declining to pay further costs of
repair and maintenance and authorizing this declara-
tory judgment action to determine who shall pay such
costs. The Chancellor adjudged: ‘‘That the compensa-
tion of persons who are employed by defendant, County
Clerk, both those who work throughout the year per-
manently and those who work temporarily as extras, and
who are engaged in repairing and keeping in good
mechanical condition the voting machines used in our
elections, and the cost of material necessarily used in
connection with such activities, are embraced in the
term ‘cost of elections’ within the purview of ss (2)
of KRS 118.450 and as such shall be allowed by plain-
tiffs, fiscal court, and paid by the county treasurer; that
it is the obligation and duty of plaintiffs Jefferson
County Fiscal Court to stand and pay such expense;
that such is not the expense of defendant James F.

a 213

Queenan as County Clerk of Jefferson County, nor shall
he stand such expense nor any part thereof; that de-

fendant recover of plaintiffs his costs herein expended,
rarer

The Statutes as to counties having voting machines
do not provide for repairs and maintenance of the ma-
chines, or set out who shall pay for such repairs and
maintenance. The fiscal court pays the cost of drayage
of the machines to and from the polls. This, in a county
of 355 precincts, amounts to a substantial sum each year.
No question is raised as to this.

In Fiseal Court of Jefferson County y. Louisville
Tent & Awning Co., 185 Ky. 466, 215 S.W. 88, 90, the
fiscal court- of Jefferson County declined to pay for
150 sets of curtains for the booths to be used in voting
at the elections in that county. There we said:

“Section 1540, Ky. Stats., provides:

‘«¢The costs of all elections held in any county shall
be allowed by the fiscal court of such county, and paid
by the county treasurer, except as otherwise provided
by law.’

“There is-no other provision of law for the payment
of the cost of booths.’?

The Statute quoted is now KRS 118.450 (2).

That case and that Statute are controlling here. We
believe the Chancellor reached the correct conclusion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Coleman et al. v. Lindsey et al.
December 12, 1950.
BH. D. Stephenson, Judge.

274,

V. R. Bentley for appellants.
P. K. Damron and O. A. Stump for appellees.

Juver Kwicur—Affirming.

On April 29, 1944, A. G. Woodall and Myrtle, his
wife, conveyed to appellants, Willie Coleman and Jen:
nie, his wife, a tract of land in Pike County containing
44 acres, there being excepted from the conveyance
mineral rights and privileges. Subsequently, on January
22, 1948, A. G. Woodall and-Myrtle, his wife, Lloyd Dam-
ron and Mattie, his wife, all appellees herein, executed
a written lease to W. W. Lindsey and J. C. Kindred,
also appellees herein, by which the lessors leased to the
lessees all the oil, gas and ‘‘gasoline’”’ in and under 154
acres of land. This included 110 acres belonging to Dam-
ron and wife and 44 acres which Woodall and wife had
previously conveyed to appellants, Willie and Jennie

a 215

Coleman, and from which they had reserved the mineral
rights as above set out. Subsequently Damron and wife
conveyed parts of their 110 acre tract to others and
they are parties to this litigation as appellees. The only
part of the lease which is material to this case is a pro-
vision that ‘‘lessor shall be entitled to 200,000 cubic
feet of gas per year free of cost, for domestic use in
one dwelling on said premises from any gas well there-
on so long as lessee shall operate same and the pressure
is sufficient for its use.’’ It also provided that 71.428%
of the royalties accruing hereunder be allotted to Lloyd
Damron and 28.572% be allotted to A. G. Woodall.

This suit was filed by appellants, owners of the
Woodall tract, but not of the minerals thereunder,
claiming that they were entitled to all the free gas pro-
vided for in the lease for use in their home located on
the premises which they purchased from the Woodalls.
They pray that the lessees, Kindred and Lindsey, be
enjoined from refusing to allow them to tap the gas
well which is located on their premises and to permit
them to draw therefrom the full amount of free gas
provided for in the lease.

The lessees by answer say that they have nothing
to do with the proportional distribution of the free gas
but are willing that it be distributed as the court may
determine. Lloyd Damron and wife filed an intervening
petition in which they set up their claim of and right to
71.428% of the free gas provided for in the lease. Later
other parties who had acquired part of the Damron tract
filed intervening petitions claiming a portion of this
71.428%. The case was submitted on the pleadings, ex-
hibits, the small amount of proof taken and on a stipula-
tion that ‘‘the surface contained in the 154 acre lease
is owned by the following persons: Otis Compton and
Jessie D. Compton his wife, 76 acres, Hatler Bryant
and Mary Bryant his wife, 34 acres, and Willie Cole-
man and Jennie Coleman his wife, 44 acres; that there
are two wells located on the lease, one on the Willie
Coleman tract and one on the Otis Compton tract; that
the well on the Compton tract is 600 feet from his resi-
dence and the well on the Coleman tract is 800 feet from
his residence.”

On July 11, 1949, a judgment was entered adjudging
that appellants, Willie and Jennie Coleman, are entitled

276

to 28.572% of the annual 200,000 cubic feet of free gas
to be taken from the well on their premises; that Otis
and Jessie Compton and Hatler and Mary Bryant, gran-
tees of Lloyd and Mattie Damron, two of the original
lessors, are entitled to 71.428% of the free gas to be
taken from the well on the Damron tract, to be divided
among them according to their pro rata share of the
acreage.

Appellants, Coleman and wife, appeal from that
judgment contending that they are entitled to all of the
200,000 cubic feet of free gas which the lease provides
for. We are utterly unable to see any justification for
appellants’ contention.

It appears to be well settled in this jurisdiction
that while free gas, usually provided for in oil and gas
leases, is in some respects personal to the owner of a
dwelling located on the leased land in that it is for his
use while he lives in the dwelling, yet it ceases to be
personal when he sells or transfers the land, in which
event the free gas privilege runs with the land and goes
with the dwelling located ‘thereon at the time of the
original lease. Blair v. Sturgill, 311 Ky. 622, 224 8.W.
2d 928; Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Small, 282 Ky.
347, 138 8.W.2d 488; Wagner v. Hamilton, 303 Ky. 120,
196 S.W.2d 973. In the above cases and-in most cases
where the question has arisen, there was involved only
one tract of land or, at any rate, only one lessor. In the
instant case, there were two tracts of land and two les-
sors, and the two tracts, though separately owned, were
joined together in the original lease, according to the
pleadings, ‘‘to meet government regulations which re-
quire a certain minimum acreage for the drilling of gas
wells.’? The case is further complicated by the fact
that, though there was one house on each of the two
tracts, the lease provided only that the ‘‘lessor shall
be entitled to 200,000 cubic feet of gas per year free of
cost for domestic use in one dwélling on said premises.’’
(Our emphasis.) It is this situation which has given
rise to this dispute between the present owners of the
surface, now consisting of three separate tracts, as set
out in the stipulation heretofore quoted.

In his effort to arrive at an equitable solution of
this question, ‘the Chancellor in his judgment made a
proportional distribution of the free gas on the basis

P| 27

of the acreage of the two tracts going to make up the
lease. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or not
this pro rata apportionment among the original lessors
is a correct and proper one where two lessors own two
tracts on each of which there is one dwelling and_the
lease provides for free gas for one dwelling only. How-
ever, under the facts of this case, we think there was
only one dwelling that could receive the free gas and
that was the dwelling located on the 110 acre tract
owned by the lessor, Damron. There was no ‘‘dwelling’’
on that part of the lease which the Woodalls contributed
to the original lease because their part of the lease
was only for the gas and oil under the 44 acre tract
which, with the dwelling thereon, they had four years
previously sold to the Colemans, appellants herein, re-
serving only the mineral rights. It follows that when
the Woodalls leased the gas and oil to Lindsey and
Kindred in 1948, they had no dwelling in which they
could use the free gas provided for in the lease and
that the one dwelling referred to in the lease was the
dwelling on the Damron tract. Had the lease by the
‘Woodalls preceded the sale of the surface to the Cole-
mans, then the covenant for the free gas would have
run with the land and we would then have for decision
the question of which of the two dwellings on the two
tracts was entitled to the free gas.

It is obvious that under no circumstances would
appellants, the Colemans, be entitled to all the free
gas, as they contend, and we think under the facts of
this case that they were not entitled to any since the
Woodalls had no free gas to pass on to them when, in
1944, they acquired title to the property. However,
since the lessees are making no objection to the distribu-
tion of the free gas and since the other appellees are
raising no objection to the allocation by the Chancellor
of 28.572% of the free gas to appellants and none of the
appellees have prosecuted a cross-appeal against the
judgment of the lower court, it must be and it is hereby

affirmed.
mz

278

Bussell v. Commonwealth.
December 12, 1950.
R, C. Tartar, Judge.

James W. Lambert for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, Wm. F, Simpson, Assistant Attor-
ney General, for appellee.

Van Sanz, Commisstonsr—Reversing.

The appeal is from a judgment convicting appellant
of false swearing and imposing a sentence of confine-
ment in the State Reformatory for a period of two years.
It is charged in the indictment that during a grand jury
investigation in Rockcastle County in the month of
April, 1948, appellant was called as a witness and false-
ly swore that he ‘‘was not at the home of James Barnes
on the Saturday night before Fount Phelps was killed
on the following day (Sunday).’? The principal ground
for reversal, and the only one it is necessary for us to
consider, is that the Commonwealth failed to produce
two witnesses or one witness and strong corroborating
circumstances in proof of the charge. It is conceded
that appellant was at the home of James Barnes at the
time mentioned in the indictment. The only issue is
whether, when he was testifying before the grand jury,
he made the unqualified statement that he was not there.

Every essential fact to establish the guilt of one
charged with false swearing must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the testimony of at least two wit-
nesses or one witness and strongly corroborating cir-
cumstances. Jewell et al. v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky.
718, 178 S.W.2d 415, 416, and cases therein cited- Two

es 219

grand jurors were called to prove the false statement.
One of them testified that the statement as charged in
the indictment, without qualification, was sworn to by
appellant while he was a witness before the grand jury.
Defendant testified that on ‘the night before Fount
Phelps was killed he (appellant) was so intoxicated
that he did not remember anything that happened and
that his statement to the Grand Jury was that he was
not at the home of James Barnes on the night in ques-
tion or if he was he did not remember it. The second
and only other witness on this point for the Common-
wealth, on direct examination, testified that appellant
made the statement that he was not there, but on cross-
examination admitted that appellant qualified that
statement with the further statement that if he was
there he did not remember it. The fact that appellant
was drunk was established by many witnesses. Only
one witness testified that appellant made the unquali-
fied statement charged in the indictment; the other wit-
ness corroborated appellant’s testimony and confirmed
his contention. That being true, the Commonwealth
. failed to produce sufficient evidence of guilt under the
rule of evidence hereinbefore referred to.

The judgment is reversed with directions that ap-
pellant be granted a new trial to be conducted in con-
formity with this opinion.

Chaney et al. v. Commonwealth ex rel.
December 12, 1950.
E. B, Beatty, Judge.

280

J. M. Wolfinbarger for appellants,

W. L. Kash for appellees.
Van Sant, Commissionsr—Reversing.

The appeal is from a judgment of the Hstill Cireuit
Court forfeiting to the Commonwealth a certain lot and«
store building owned by appellant Ashcraft and located
in Estill County. The basis of the forfeiture is that the
owner thereof has permitted the property to be used
for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors in dry terri-
tory and is provided for in KRS 242.310 and 242.320.
Appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the evidence
is not sufficient to show that Ashcraft knew the property
was being used in violation of the statute or that he
intentionally rented it for that purpose.

Appellant Chaney owned the property until August
23, 1947 when he sold it to Ashcraft for the sum of $900
in cash. Previous to the sale a business was being op-
erated on the premises by Hershel Marcum who had
rented the property from Chaney. In July, 1947, Mar-
cum was arrested for having liquor and a slot machine
in his possession on the property, was found guilty of
possessing liquor for sale in dry territory, and paid his
fine and served his jail sentence. While he was in jail
and until Chaney sold the property to Ashcraft one of
Marcum’s relatives operated the store. Ashcraft former-
ly lived in Estill County in the vicinity of the store but
had been living in Dayton, Ohio for nine or ten years
throughout which period of time he purchased six sep-
arate pieces of property in Hstill County, the last of
which is involved in this suit. Ashcraft would visit Estill

a 281

County on an average of once a month at which time
he collected his rentals but otherwise was more or less
inactive having continuously been incapacitated by a
severe injury to his back sustained in an accident at his
place of work. Marcum was convicted while Ashcraft
was in a hospital in Dayton and the latter did not know
of the conviction, which was attended by padlocking the
place of business for six months, until the six months
had almost expired. He then forbade Marcum to continue
to operate the business and rented it to Chris Chaney
who is a cousin of appellant, Chester Chaney. While
Chris had the property under lease, he visited friends
in Hazard for a week or ten days during which time he
engaged Ed Marcum, a brother of Hershel, to operate
the store. While acting in that capacity Hd Marcum was
arrested and convicted of having liquor in his possession
on the premises. As a result of that conviction this suit
was instituted. Asheraft did not know that Ed Marcum
was in charge of the premises and the record fails to
disclose that he had any knowledge at any time after he
acquired ownership of the property that the property
was being used for illegal purposes, although the evi-
dence is abundant that the reputation of the place and
that of its former owner Chester Chaney are bad in
respect to the laws prohibiting the sale of whiskey in
dry territory.

Chester Chaney and Ashcraft are related by mar-
riage, Ashcraft’s mother having married Chester’s
grandfather whose name was Tipton. All of the transac-
tions disclosed by the evidence would lead one to sus-
pect that Ashcraft is not as innocent as he would have
us believe, but, under all the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence, we are forced to admit that a conclusion
to that effect would be the result of mere speculation.

The forfeiture statute, KRS 242.320, is a drastic
measure, and, to avoid contravention of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States forbidding the taking of one’s property
without due process of law, the evidence in such a case
clearly must establish the existence of all the conditions
rendering the property subject to forfeiture. One of
these conditions is that the owner of the property must
know or intend that the property is being or is to be
used for the unlawful purpose charged. One sale of

282 ee

intoxicating liquor with proof of bad reputation of the
place over a period of time is sufficient to establish the
fact that the property is being used for unlawful pur-
poses, and, if the owner is shown to be acquainted with
such reputation, the evidence would be sufficient to war-
rant the submission of the case to the jury. But the
facts proven in this case fail to show clearly that appel-
lant Ashcraft knew either of the sale or of the reputa-
tion of the place. Had some official of the county or for
that matter anybody else apprised him of the facts
proven on the trial, and he had done nothing to correct
the condition, a clear and convincing case would have
been presented authorizing a judgment of forfeiture,
but we are of the opinion, in the circumstances of this
ease, the evidence was hardly sufficient to submit the
ease to the jury.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.

Commonwealth v. Funk.
December 12, 1950.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and James Park, Commonwealth's
Attorney, for appellant. .
John Y. Brown, Chat Chancellor, and Ray Holbrook for appellee.

Jupen Hurm—Certifying the law.

An indictment was returned against appellee, A. E.
Funk, Jr., as follows:

P| 283

“Fayette Cireuit Court
“The Commonwealth of Kentucky

against
“A, EH. Funk, Jr.
“Indictment for bribery of voter.

“The Grand Jury of Fayette County, in the name
and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
accuse A. EK. Funk, Jr., of the offense of bribery of a
voter,

“Committed as follows, viz: That said

on the 24th day of September, 1949, in the county afore-
said and within twelve months next before the finding
of this indictment unlawfully, knowingly and wrongfully
did bribe Adrian Solomon to vote at the City of Lexing-
ton primary election held in Lexington, Fayette County,
Kentucky, on September 24th, 1949, with good and law-
ful money of the United States, the exact amount and
description being to the Grand Jurors unknown, for Dan
Reagan, Henry Hettel, W. R. Anderson and Stanley
Saunier, Jr., who were candidates for the office of City
Commissioner at said primary election, contrary to the
form of the statutes in such cases made and provided,
and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth
of Kentueky.’’

Appellee demurred to the indictment. The trial court
sustained the demurrer.

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, in ac-
cordance with section 337 of the Criminal Code of Prac-
tice, has appealed to this court for a certification of the
law.

The trial Judge in his opinion says: ‘“KRS 89.440
and the sections following it, set out the manner of hold-
ing a primary election in cities having commission and
city manager form of government. No penalty is pro-
vided for the offense sought to be charged in the indict-
ment of unlawfully, knowingly and wrongfully bribing
a person to vote in said primary election, and the sec-
tions of the statute governing primary elections under
the commission and city manager form of government
do not provide that the regular election laws shall apply.’’

In its brief, appellant says: ‘“We * * * concede that

28, ee

there is no provision of the Kentucky Statutes making it
an offense to bribe a voter at a primary held in a city
under the city management form of government. We
submit, however, that the indictment to which the de-
murrer was sustained states a common-law offense and
that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer
thereto.’’

In its reply brief, appellant says: ‘‘* * * The in-
dictment did not allege that Adrian Solomon was a
legal voter because no such allegation could truthfully
be made. * * *””

Appellee maintains that: Common-law bribery does
not exist in relation to a primary held under the city
manager from of government; the indictment is fatally
defective because it does not allege facts sufficient to
charge a common-law offense, and it is not bribery at
common law to bribe a person who is not qualified to
vote.

In 1950, the Legislature, to supply the penalties
omitted from KRS, Chapter 89, enacted Chapter 150,
now KRS 89.980, as follows: ‘‘Any person committing
an act in connection with any election held under the
provisions of KRS Chapter 89, which act, if committed
in a regular election would subject the person to a pen-
alty under the provisions of KRS Chapters 123 or 124,
shall be subject to the same penalty provided therein for
such an act.’

Both appellant and appellee cite and rely upon the
case of Curran v. Taylor, 92 Ky. 537, 18 S. W. 232, 233.
There, defining common law bribery, we said: ‘‘* * *
Bribery is obnoxious to the common law. * * * It has
been thus defined at common law: ‘The crime of offering
any undue reward or remuneration to any public officer,
or other person intrusted with a public duty, with a view
to influence his behavior in the discharge of his duty.’
2 Amer. & Eng. Eine. Law, p. 530. * * *”? This definition
is adopted in Gregory’s Criminal Law, page 213, section
219. See 5 Words and Phrases, Bribery page 792.

The older writers define the crime of bribery as the
taking or giving of a reward to influence the actions of
a person in ‘‘judicial place,’’ thus limiting the offense
to officers engaged in the administration of public justice.
But the old definitions were extended to include legisla-

Le 285

tive and executive officials, and later to voters. See 8
Am. Jur., pages 886 and 887, and Bouvier’s Law Diction-
ary, Rawle’s Third Revision, Vol. 1, page 394,

The briefs and cases cited refer to voters or electors.
Here the charge is ‘‘bribery of a voter,’’ but Adrian
Solomon was not a public officer or other person charged
with a public duty, nor was he a voter.

Appellant admits the indictment does not charge a
statutory offense. In the light of the definition of bribery
at common law, as set out in Curran v. Taylor, supra,
we are of the opinion the indictment here does not charge
the offense of bribery at common law. This being true,
we are constrained to hold that the trial court properly
sustained the demurrer to the indictment. The law is
so certified.

7
Krisch v. Wolfson.

December 15, 1950.
William H. Field, Judge.

Hardy & Logan for appellant.
Herbert H. Monsky for appellee.

Juvez Herm—Reversing.

This forcible detainer action was instituted before
Honorable Edward J. Rehm, Justice of the Peace of
Jefferson County, on April 15, 1949 by appellant,
Herbert Krisch. He found appellee guilty. Appellant
traversed that finding. In the Cireuit Court, by agree-
ment, the case was heard by the court without the in-
tervention of a jury. No witnesses were introduced.
On September 20, 1949, the case was heard on state-
ment of counsel for appellant and appellee. The court
adjudged appellee not guilty.

On September 22, 1949, appellant filed motion re-
questing the court to file separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and on the same date filed his mo-
tion and grounds for a new trial. On October 14, 1949,
appellant’s motion and grounds were overruled and he
was granted an appeal.

On October 28, 1949, appellant tendered his bill of
exceptions which was examined and approved by the
court. The bill recites the hearing of the case and the
appointment of the official reporter to ‘‘take down’?
the facts as stipulated by counsel and transcribe the
same, and that the case was stated by counsel for the
parties.

On November 16, 1949, appellant’s counsel, by
motion, requested the court to set aside the judgment
of September 20, 1949, because the stipulation of facts

eee 287

made by the attorney for the plaintiff and attorney for
the defendant was by error omitted from the steno-
graphic record of the proceedings in this action.

At a hearing of the case on November 18, 1949,
counsel for appellee filed his motion to strike the ‘‘bill
of exceptions heretofore tendered by the plaintiff.’’
At the hearing the court overruled appellant’s motion
“for findings of law and facts,’? and overruled appel-
lee’s motion to ‘‘strike the bill of exceptions filed here-
in.’”? Appellant then ‘‘tendered a stipulation of facts,’’
to which counsel for appellee ‘‘tendered exceptions.’’

At a hearing on November 25, 1949, appellant
‘‘tendered to the court his amended and substituted
bill of exceptions, together with bystander’s affidavit’’
of the court’s reporter. The court certified, approved
and signed it, and it was filed and made a part of the
record. This bill sets out that the court’s official re-
porter was appointed to take down the facts as’ stipu-
lated by counsel and transcribe them, but that by error
this was not done. The bill then sets out that the stipu-
lation of facts was, in substance, as follows:

“1, The plaintiff, Herbert Krisch, is the owner of
a building located at the northeast corner of 38th and
Market Streets in Louisville, Kentucky, numbered 3717
West Market Street.

“2, The plaintiff’s building contains two (2) store-
rooms on the ground floor, with apartments above, and
a basement extending under the entire building.

“3. The only written lease held by the defendant,
Lester Wolfson, to any part of plaintiff’s building was
entered into between him and a former owner of the
building named Carmen on May 11, 1947. This lease
describes the property covered by it as follows: ‘A cer-
tain storeroom on the ground floor in building numbered
3717 West Market Street, being the east portion of
storeroom located at the northeast corner of 38th and
Market Streets, Louisville, Kentucky.’

“4, In addition to the property described in the
lease above, in which storeroom the defendant operates
a grocery store, the tenant defendant, Wolfson, uses
the basement of plaintiff’s building for storage of gro-
cery goods.

288 ee

“5, The basement of plaintiff’s building may be
reached from the ground floor only by means of a stair
located in a hallway, which hallway extends across the
back of plaintiff’s other storeroom, occupied at the pres-
ent time by a Drug Store. The basement is not under
defendant’s store alone, but it extends to and includes
all that portion below the adjoining store, both stores
being the property of the plaintiff. No physical barriers
separate the basement nor is there any means by which
defendant may reach that part of the basement which
he occupies without crossing that portion of the base-
ment lying below the store oceupied by the tenant of
the adjoining store.

“6, Located in the basement are the furnace and
heating system for the whole building and a toilet for
the use of the various tenants. The plaintiff has no ob-
jection to such use of the basement as is reasonable
and necessary for the enjoyment by all of his tenants
of the utilities located therein.

“7, The defendant’s occupancy of the basement,
possession of which is sought by this action, existed at
the time plaintiff purchased this property.

“8, The plaintiff has complied with the provisions
of Kentucky Revised Statutes, Section 383.140, which
requires the giving of. one month’s notice in writing.

‘The case having been stated to the court by coun-
sel for both plaintiff and defendant, counsel for plain-
tiff requested the court to presume that the defendant’s
otherwise unexplained occupancy of the premises, pos-
session of which was sought by this action, was under
a tenancy at sufferance; plaintiff’s counsel further re-
quested the court not to consider so much of the stipula-
tion of facts as pertained to defendant’s use of the
premises, possession of which was sought, antedating
the current lease under which defendant occupies an-
other portion of landlord’s building. Plaintiff’s counsel
then argued that, as the facts stipulated did not show
that the premises, possession of which was herein
sought, was omitted from the current lease by fraud
or mistake, that defendant was not entitled to hold the
subject premises by virtue of his leasehold to another
portion of plaintiff’s building.

“The plaintiff. thereupon rested.

Lee 289

“Counsel for defendant contended, in substance,
that the nature of defendant’s occupancy of the subject
premises was under a license appurtenant to the de-
fendant’s leasehold to another portion of plaintiff’s
building.

“The defendant thereupon rested.

“The opinion of the court was rendered orally in
the following words:

“*T am holding that the original’ owner and the
present owner and the tenant placed a mutual construc-
tion on the tenancy which included the use of the base-
ment. Now, if the tenant takes more than he ought to
in the use of that basement another question would
arise, but I think he is a tenant by construction of the
first floor and the use of the basement; it does not in-
terfere with other tenants, or with the fundamental
tights of the owner. I think that is, * * * the sound
solution of it. I am holding that the parties have by
mutual construction given certain meaning to that lease
which included reasonable use of the basement which
was going on at the time the present owner took hold.’

“‘Thereupon judgment of ‘Not Guilty’ was on said
day entered by the court, to the entry of which the
plaintiff at the time excepted and still excepts.’’

On this appeal appellant requests that the judg-
ment be reversed because: (1) The court erred in over-
ruling appellant’s motion to separate findings of fact
and conclusions of law; (2) the court erred in over-
ruling appellant’s motion to set aside judgment until
a stipulation of facts be made a part of the record; (3)
the facts establish that appellee is appellant’s tenant
at sufferance; (4) appellee’s written lease could not be
construed to include the basement; and (5) the descrip-
tion of the property leased is conclusive in the absence
of proof of fraud or mutual mistake.

No evidence was heard by the trial court: The facts
were stated to the court by counsel. The only record
we have of that is the foregoing summary of the stip-
ulation of facts. In it we are told that appellee’s occu-
pancy of the basement existed at the time appellant
purchased the property at 3717 West Market Street,
but under what circumstances or when that occupancy

0 I

began, or under what circumstances it continued, we
are not told. It appears that appellant is the owner of
the premises, and that appellee is the lessee of a de-
scribed storeroom on the first floor of the building, and
also that appellee occupies a part of the basement of
the building. The basement is not referred to or in-
cluded in the lease description set out in the record.

In 8 Thompson on Real Property, section 1020, it
is said: ‘‘One who enters upon land by permission of
the owner for an indefinite period even without reserva-
tion of rent is by implication of law a tenant at will,
***.2) As to the basement, the ownership and the occu-
pancy show the relationship of landlord and tenant.
‘When one is found in occupation of premises under
circumstances such as we have here, the presumption is
that the tenancy is one at sufferance or at will.

Appellee maintains the trial court properly. ruled
“that the parties have by mutual construction given
certain meaning to that lease which included reasonable -
use of the basement.’’ The doctrine of contemporaneous
construction of a written instrument is applicable only
in case of ambiguity in the language sought to be con-
strued. Murphy v. Boling, 273 Ky. 827, 117 8. W. 2d
962, 117 A. L. R. 1873, 5 West Ky. Digest, Contracts,
170(1). We find no ambiguity in that part of the lease
quoted in the record, and we find nothing in the stipula-
tion disclosing any construction contrary to the terms
of the lease.

Appellee says the use of the basement is a ‘‘license
appurtenant.’’ In 32 Am. Jur., pages 163 and 164, speak-
ing of appurtenances, it is said: ‘‘It is a settled prin-
ciple of the law of property that a conveyance of land,
in the absence of anything in the deed indicating a con-
trary intention, carries with it everything properly ap-
purtenant to,—that is, essential or reasonably necessary
to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of—the property
conveyed, and this principle is equally applicable to
a lease of premises. * * * A mere convenience is not
sufficient to create a right or easement or impose bur-
dens on lands other than those demised as incident to
the demise.” .

It is stipulated that the tenants of the building,
including appellee, have a right to use certain utilities

Lee 291

located in the basement, There is no disclosure in the
stipulation of facts which tends to show that the use
of the basement as a storage room was conveyed to
appellee. From the record presented here, we are un-
able to say that the use of the basement by appellee as
a storage room for his goods is so necessary or essen-
tial to the enjoyment of the leased premises as to con-
stitute such use an appurtenance. We conclude that
appellee’s use of the basement as a storage room was
as a tenant of appellant, and that this was a tenancy
at will or at sufferance.

The judgment is reversed with directions to enter
a judgment in conformity with this opinion.

mz
Geller v. Geller.

December 15, 1950.
R. L, Maddox, Judge.

292

Henry L. Bryant, for appellant.
B. B. Wilson, for appellee.

Cray, Commissionsr—A firming.

Appellee was riding in the back seat of an automo-
bile when it turned over on a highway near Pineville.
Appellant, her brother-in-law, was driving. Appellee re-
covered $5,000 damages against him for personal in-
juries and expenses.

On this appeal appellant’s principal contention is
that he was entitled to a directed verdict because: (1)
appellee assumed the risk of injury; and (2) there was
no proof of negligence.

Appellant and appellee were on most friendly terms,
and had made many. trips together with other members
of their families. This particular trip was from Pineville
to Louisville for the purpose of a visit to appellee’s
son, and the wreck occurred six miles out of Pineville.

Appellee testified: ‘“When we came to Pineville it
began raining a little bit like Fall rains, sprinkling it
didn’t amount to postpone our trip; when we got there
it was kind of slick, it was awfully slick.”

She was sitting in the back seat and did not know
exactly how the accident happened. She stated that the
ear was traveling no faster than 35 or 40 miles an hour
as it approached a curve in the road. Concerning the.

ba 298

accident, she stated: ‘‘Well, I don’t know, he (appel-
lant) might have turned a little fast on the curve and
the road was slick, maybe that happened, and the car
turned over.’’

Appellant did not testify, and there was no other
evidence of value concerning the cause of the wreck.

Appellant’s first contention is that appellee assum-
ed the risk of injury on this trip because she was a
member of a party with a more or less common purpose,
and because she was fully aware of the road and weath-
er conditions, and she knew the driver intended to make
a fast trip. We do not think the evidence supports the
latter statement, but we do not consider it significant.

Appellant has cited and quoted from a number of
eases where it has been held that an injured party, be-
cause of participation in some dangerous activity with
an appreciation of the danger, has been denied recovery
because the risk of injury was assumed. The rule, as
stated in Porter v. Cornett, 306 Ky. 25, at page 29, 206
S. W. 2d 83 at page 85, is that the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk denies: ‘‘the right of recovery where the
injured person with knowledge of a dangerous situation
voluntarily places himself in a position where he takes
the chance of being hurt.’?

In Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Swift, 306
Ky. 618, at page 620, 208 S. W. 2d 944, at page 945, the
principle is thus stated: ‘‘One who voluntarily subjects
himself to peril known to him or generally observable
by a person of ordinary prudence in a similar situation
cannot recover damages sustained thereby.”

It is clear the doctrine only applies where: (1) a
perilous situation exists, and (2) the plaintiff has, or
should have, knowledge of such situation. Appellant’s
theory in this case breaks down on both counts.

Rain does not create a particular peril to the mo-
torist. It may require him to exercise more care in
driving, but it does not constitute an unusual hazard.
Even if it did, appellee testified appellant was a ‘‘won-
derful driver,’’? and therefore she had complete trust in
him. If it could be said that rain on the road creates a
dangerous situation encompassed by the assumption of
risk doctrine, there is no showing in this case that such

294 Dt

danger was, or should have been, appreciated by appel-
be. ‘Therefore appellant may not avail himself of this
efense.

The next question is whether or not there was suffi-
cient evidence of appellant’s negligence to submit the
question to the jury. The manner in which this accident
occurred is not at all clear. Appellee’s testimony sug-
gests appellant lost control of the car because it skidded
while rounding a curve on a wet pavement, Assuming
this happened, is this incident itself sufficient proof of
negligence to make out a case for submission to the
jury, where the defendant fails to introduce evidence
showing a different cause or otherwise explaining it?

We have squarely presented the question of wheth-
er or not in this type of case the plaintiff may invoke’
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Appellant contends
the mere skidding of an automobile does not itself prove
negligence, and cites cases which seem to deny the ap-
plicability of the doctrine. Upon careful examination,
we do not think they may be so construed. In Tente v.
Jaglowiez, 241 Ky. 720, 44 8. W. 2d 845, the jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant whose automobile
had skidded on an icy road and struck another vehicle
in which the plaintiff was riding. We recognized an in-
ference of negligence was raised in the cage, but held
that such inference was rebutted by showing the con-
dition of the street. The decision laid down the rule that
the operator of a vehicle which skids on an icy street is
not necessarily negligent as a matter of law.

In O’Neil & Hearne v. Bray’s Adm’x, 262 Ky. 377,
90 S. W. 2d 353, 354, an ambulance skidded on a wet
road. The plaintiff specifically alleged that the defend-
ant’s employee had operated the vehicle ‘‘at an exceed-
ingly high and dangerous rate of speed.’’ While it was
stated in the opinion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
was not applicable in a skidding case, there was no rea-
son to apply it under the circumstances in view of the
specific allegation of negligence.

In Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin,
301 Ky. 867, 192 S. W. 2d 753, a passenger on the bus
was injured when it skidded on an icy street. We held
that an automobile may skid on a slippery highway
without negligence on the part of the operator, which

| 295

of course is true. We further held that where the evi-
dence conclusively showed the operator was not guilty
of negligence and the sole cause of the accident was the
slippery condition of the street, a jury could not infer
negligence from the mere fact of skidding.

Our attention has been called to annotations in 5
A. L, RB. 1240, 12 A. L. R. 668, 93 A. L. R. 1117, and 113
“A. L. R. 1014. The headnote to those annotations states
that the mere fact of skidding does not itself constitute
such evidence of negligence as to render the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine applicable. We do not think the cases
discussed in those notes clearly establish such rule, and
some of them specifically hold otherwise. Other cited
eases lay down the principle that the skidding of an
automobile is not conclusive evidence of negligence. In
still others, as in our own cases above discussed, it ap-
peared that the evidence conclusively rebutted the in-
ference of negligence.

In actions of this sort confusion often arises in con-
sidering the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of lia-
bility rather than a rule of evidence which raises a
presumption in the plaintiff’s favor and shifts to the
defendant the burden of going forward with proof. We
have recently had occasion to re-examine the subject in
Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536, 228 S. W. 2d 432. Therein
we pointed out that the principle is applicable where
the circumstances, according to common knowledge and
experience, create a clear inference that the accident
would not have happened if the defendant had not been
negligent. The rule does not raise a conclusive presump-
tion, but it does require the defendant to explain the
occurrence if he would avoid liability.

We can see no difference between a skidding case
and one where an automobile goes off the highway for
some other reason not attributable to a collision. Such
was Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S. W. 2d 690.
Plaintiff was a passenger in defendant’s automobile
when it left the traveled portion of a street in Louis-
ville and struck a utility pole. The defendant under-
took to explain the accident as having been caused by
the breaking of a front spring. Apparently the plaintiff
presented no evidence showing any specific act of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant. We there applied
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and held that the case

296 P|

was properly submitted to the jury because the mere
happening of the event raised the presumption that it
was caused by the negligence of the defendant.

The case before us is identical in principle. While
it is not negligence to operate a motor vehicle on a wet
or slippery highway, in the ordinary course of events
the motorist is bound to exercise greater caution. To
our common knowledge, a skidding of such proportions
as to overturn or wreck a vehicle, or cause personal in-
juries or property damage to others, does not normally
happen if the operator is exercising reasonable care.
Therefore, an inference of negligence arises upon proof
of the occurrence.

Any other rule in such a case ag this would be a
harsh one indeed, The plaintiff, a passenger on the back
seat, would ordinarily not know what caused this type
of accident. That fact is peculiarly within the knowledge
of the operator of the vehicle who has control of the
instrumentality. While the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove negligence, the nature of the incident strongly
suggests the want of care. The circumstances of the
accident itself are sufficient to support a jury finding
of negligence. Consequently, appellant was not entitled
to a directed verdict.

Appellant raises some question regarding two offer-
ed instructions which the Court refused to give. We
think the foregoing discussion of the principal points
raised clearly demonstrates that these offered instruc-
tions should not have been given, and the Court did not
commit error in this respect.

The judgment is affirmed.

Harry Geller v. Evelyn Goldstein.
December 15, 1950.
R. L. Maddox, Judge.

Henry L. Bryant for appellant.
B. B. Wilson for appellee.

Cray, Commisstonrr—Affirming.

297

For the reasons stated in the opinion this day hand-
ed down in the case of Geller v. Geller, 314 Ky. 291,
234 8. W. 2d 974, the judgment is affirmed.

Schum v. Lawrenceburg Nat. Bank et al.
December 15, 1950.
Lawrence F, Speckman, Judge.

298 es

M. Joseph Schmitt and Allen Schmitt for appellant.

James B. Young, Marvin Sternberg and James S. Shaw for
appellees.

Jupezn Rezs—Reversing.

Michael A. Schum died intestate June 26, 1949, a
resident of Jefferson County. He left a widow, Frances
Schum, and a child by a former marriage, Joyce Ann
Schum. He and Frances Schum were married in May,
1947, and had no children. In December, 1947, Michael
A. Schum borrowed $13,500 from the Tawreneeburg
National Bank, hereinafter referred to as the bank, an
executed his promissory note for that amount which
was secured by a chattel mortgage on several automo-
biles and trucks. He also assigned to the bank two pol-
icies of insurance on his life, oné for $10,000 issued on
March 21, 1947, and one for $2,000 issued on July 21,
1931. His father, Mike Schum, the designated beneficiary
in each policy, joined in the assignments, but did not
sign the notes or chattel mortgage. Hach policy contain-
ed a provision that the insured could change the bene-
ficiary. In July, 1948, Michael A. Schum borrowed an
additional $6,000 from the bank and executed another
note and another mortgage on additional motorized
equipment. The mortgage recited that it was a second
mortgage on the personal property described therein,
and was to secure not only the note for $6,000 but to
better secure the note for $13,500 theretofore executed to
the bank. The note recited that it was also secured by
the two life insurance policies theretofore assigned to
the bank. Schum made one payment of $1,000 on the
indebtedness, but failed to pay the first note when it
became due on December 12, 1948, On March 24, 1949,
Schum ‘and the bank entered into an agreement which
reads in part:

‘‘Whereas both of said notes are now due and un-
paid except a credit of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dol-
lars paid August 4, 1948 and it is now the desire of the
party of the first part to make his assets go as far as
they will in satisfying said indebtedness owed by him
to the party of the second part on said notes;

“Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the
premises and in order to avoid unnecessary litigation
and expense the party of the first part does now hereby

Dn

assign, sell, transfer and relinquish to the party of the
second part, its successors and assigns, all right, title,
interest and equity which he has or owns in and to (de-
seribing the mortgaged personal property).’’

The bank was to sell the property and apply the
proceeds to the debt. If any excess remained Schum was
to receive it, but if any deficiency existed he was to re-
main indebted to the bank in that amount. The bank sold
some of the equipment prior to June 26, 1949, receiving
$2,760. Michael A. Schum met his death by drowning on
June 26, 1949, and subsequent to that date the bank sold
other equipment for $323.70, and received $3,355.42 as
proceeds from equipment sold by the holder of the first
mortgage. The bank still has in its possession one piece
of heavy equipment which it is endeavoring to sell for
$3,000. The bank also received from the Insurance Com-
pany $24,416.03, the proceeds of the two assigned poli-
cies each of which provided for double indemnity in
case of accidental death. It thus appears that the bank
has in its hands far more property than is required to
satisfy the indebtedness of the deceased. Mike Schum,
the designated beneficiary in the two policies of insur-
ance, made demand of the bank that it sell all the mort-
gaged equipment of Michael A. Schum, deceased, and
pay itself first from the proceeds of the sale, and if there
was any unpaid balance on the indebtedness, after hav-
ing resorted to this method of payment, then and only
then should it resort to the proceeds of the insurance
policies. The bank was uncertain of its rights and duties
declined to make payment in accordance with this de-
mand, whereupon Mike Schum brought an action in
the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking a declaration of
rights. The Lawrenceburg National Bank, Frances
Schum and Joyce Ann Schum were made defendants.
Frances Schum, administratrix of the estate of Michael
A. Schum, deceased, filed an intervening petition asking
to be made a party to the action, and she was permitted
to defend for and on behalf of the estate. The cireuit
court adjudged that the bank should pay to the admin-
istratrix of the estate of Michael A, Schum, deceased,
the sum of $3,679.12, the amount received by it from the
sale of the mortgaged property subsequent to the death
of Michael A. Schum, and should transfer to her the
unsold item of equipment held by it. It was also adjudged
that the balance of Michael A. Schum’s indebtedness

due at the time of his death be paid from the proceeds
of the insurance policies, and that the remainder of
such proceeds be paid to the beneficiary, Mike Schum.

On this appeal the beneficiary in the two policies of
insurance insists that the bank must first exhaust the
“proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged chattels be-
fore resorting to the insurance money. It is argued that
the bank extended credit on the basis of the mortgaged
property and not the assigned insurance policies which
had a cash surrender value of only $700 at that time.
Appellant contends further that the action of the bank
and the deceased in executing the agreement of March
24, 1949, and the action of the bank in proceeding under
that agreement indicate the intention of the parties that
the mortgaged property be used in payment of the

ebt.

A leading case on the subject is Barbin v. Moore,
85 N.H. 362, 159 A. 409, 83. A.L.R. 62, where one George
Leclere assigned two policies of insurance on his life
and executed a mortgage on his real estate to a bank
to secure a loan. After Leclere’s death the bank paid
the indebtedness out of the proceeds from the insurance
policies. Thereafter the administrator sold the real
estate. It was held that the beneficiaries of the life
insurance policies were subrogated to the right of the
bank against the mortgage security, including the fund
into which that security had been converted by the ad-
ministrator. The question was before this court in the
recent cases of Kash’s Hx’r v. Kash, 260 Ky. 508, 86
8.W.2d 273; Berger v. Berger, 264 Ky. 225, 94 S.W.2d
618, and Froman v. Froman’s Ex’r, 293 Ky. 1, 168
S.W.2d 361. In each of these cases it was held that the
indebtedness should be paid from the proceeds of the
assigned insurance policy rather than from the estate,
since from the facts it appeared that such was the in-
tent of the insured. In the Froman case the assignment
provided that no person interested in the policy should,
by reason of the application of the proceeds of the policy
to the indebtedness secured by the assignment, have the
right to contribution or reimbursement from any other
party or be subrogated to the right of the assignee in
any ‘other collateral. No such provision is found in the
assignment here involved. In the Kash and Berger
cases the mortgage contained a clause providing ‘“‘if

said policy of insurance be still in force, the indebted-
ness secured hereby shall become immediately due and
payable upon the death of the insured, and the party
of the second part shall apply toward the payment
thereof the amount due from it under the terms of said
policy and pay over the balance, if any, to such person
or persons as may be legally entitled thereto.’ [264
Ky. 225, 94 S.W.2d 619.] In each of these cases the
court said that the language of the mortgage was broad
enough to convey the intention of the insured and to
establish his and the creditor’s agreement that in the
event of his death the creditor was to utilize the pro-
ceeds of the policy for the payment of decedent’s debt
before resorting to the enforcement of the mortgage.
Neither of the mortgages here involved contains any
mention of the insurance policies. All of the above cases
cite the case of Barbin v. Moore, 85 N.H. 362, 159 A.
409, 414, 83 A.L.R. 62, as setting forth the rule that the
intent of the insured decedent governs, but each case
was distinguished from the Barbin case on the facts.
In Barbin v. Moore it was said that the failure of the
insured to make his estate or the creditor the bene-
ficiary of the policies when they were assigned, or to
direct that the debt due the bank be paid from the pro-
ceeds of the policies, indicated his intent that the insur-
ance money should be resorted to only after the other
security had been applied on the indebtedness. In the
course of the opinion it was said:

“The appointment of designated beneficiaries under
the policies gave them certain rights. In order to defeat
them it must be made to appear that the execution of
the power in derogation of those rights was broad
enough to accomplish that end. Mellows v. Mellows, 61
N. H. 137. It is not to be extended upon any theory that
in some fashion or other the estate or its general
creditors have an equitable claim upon the insurance
fund. One of the prime ideas in life insurance is the
creation of a fund free from such liabilities.’’

And speaking further of the insured’s intent, the
court said:

“The policies provided a plain way to make it
effective. As before stated, the choice of another method
of giving the bank the added security is significant of
the purpose in mind. Not only could the insured have

302

provided that the insurance should be used to pay the
debt existing at his decease by making the bank the
designated beneficiary to the extent of its claim against
the estate, but a mere direction in the pledge to resort
to the insurance first would have answered the purpose
of expressing the alleged design. But one searches in
vain for any word or act indicating such purpose.’’

So, in the present case there was nothing in the
mortgages or assignments indicating an intent that the
proceeds of the policies should first be resorted to for
payment of the debt. On the contrary, the insured by
the agreement of March 24, 1949, divested himself of
all title to the mortgaged property, and directed the
bank to sell it and apply the proceeds in payment of the
debt. The test to be applied in a situation such as is
presented here was set out in Kash’s Ex’r v. Kash,
supra [260 Ky. 508, 86 S.W.2d 275], where it was
said:

«* * * the appointment of a certain beneficiary
under a policy gives him or her certain rights. And,
unless the beneficiary is changed, his rights continue,
notwithstanding the insured’s assignment of the policy,
and, upon the death of the insured, becomes absolute as
against his creditors and his estate subject to the right
of the creditors to whom it was assigned. To effectuate
the defeat of the right of the beneficiary, it must appear
that the insured, by the wording of the assignment of
the policy or the instrument evidencing the pledging it,
is broad enough in its terms to accomplish the deroga-
tion ‘of the right of the beneficiary. This result may be-
obtained by the insured designating the pledgee as the
benéliciary for the sum of his debt, or by directing the
pledgeé first to resort to the proceeds of the policy for
the payment of the debt which it is pledged to secure,
in the event of the death of the insured, while the debt
is ‘still in existence, before resorting to the enforcement
of the mortgage, where it is also secured by a mortgage
on real estate. In either case, the insurance as against
the designated beneficiary is thus made a part of the
estate of the insured.’’

The chancellor distinguished the present case from
the case of Barbin v. Moore, supra, on the ground that
a creditor does not have an insurable interest in. the life
of his debtor in this state, and on the further ground

ee 308

that the decision in Barbin v. Moore was controlled by
a statute of New Hampshire which read:

‘When a policy of insurance is effected by a per-
son on his own life or the life of another, expressed to
be for the benefit of a third person or his representatives,
the party for whose benefit such policy is so expressed
to be made shall be entitled to the sum so insured,
against the claims of the creditors or representatives of
the party effecting the same.’’? Pub. Laws 1926, ¢. 277,
sec. 2

It has been held by this court that a creditor has
an insurable interest in the life of his debtor to the
extent of the debt. DeLong’s Adm’r v. Arnold, 306 Ky.
290, 206 S. W. 2d 928; Shaw v. M. Livingston & Co., 293
Ky. 575, 169 S. W. 2d 612; Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Nelson, 170 Ky. 674, 186 S. W. 520; L. R. A. 1916F,
457; Ann. Cas. 1918B, 1182. The New Hampshire statute
referred to in Barbin v. Moore is substantially the same
as our statute on the subject, KRS 297.150(1). The
majority rule seems to be that, in a situation such as
confronts us, the intention of the insured is the control-
ling factor in determining the rights of the parties. An-
notation in 160 A. L. R. 1389, to Smith v. Coleman, 184
Va. 259, 35 S. H. 2d 107, 160 A. L. R. 1376. In order to
ascertain that intention, the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case must be examined. When the rule
is applied in the light of the facts and circumstances
of the present case, thé appellant must prevail though
sympathy, if permitted to intervene, would lead to a
different result.

The judgment is reversed with directions to declare
the rights of the parties as herein indicated.

Whitaker v. Commonwealth.
December 15, 1950,
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

304

H. K. Spear for appellant,
A. B, Funk, Attorney General and Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant At-
torney General for appellee.

Cumr Justice Srms—Reversing.

Appellant was convicted of false swearing and his
punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for
three years. Ten grounds are assigned for reversal of
the judgment, but as some of them are repeated, while
others are split into several parts, we think it may be.

es, 305

fairly stated that appellant argues the judgment should
be reversed because the court erred: 1. In overruling
his demurrer to the indictment; 2. in not directing a
verdict in his behalf; 3. in admitting incompetent evi-
dence; 4. in permitting improper conduct and argument
by the Commonwealth Attorney; 5. in improperly in-
structing the jury.

The indictment charged appellant with giving false
testimony under oath in a court held by Hon. C. I. Ross,
County Judge of Pulaski County, inquiring into the
cause of the death of Maurice Ward, in that appellant
knowingly made false statements that he did not on
Sept. 25, 1949, sell one-half gallon of whiskey each to
Ward Bullock and Russell Chaney, which statements
were pertinent to the matter under investigation. It is
urged that as the indictment did not aver Ward’s death
occurred in Pulaski County, or that the whiskey was
sold there, it was bad on demurrer, citing Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 849, 36 8. W. 2d 649; Daniels
vy. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 541, 189 S. W. 2d 849.

The indictment in the Mitchell case did not aver
that the fire marshal had authority to investigate the
matter in which it alleged Mitchell made a false state-
ment under oath. In the Daniels case a demurrer was
sustained to the indictment because it failed to aver
the court in which the action was pending had jurisdic-
tion to try the cause.

In the instant case the indictment specifically aver-
red the court of inquiry before Judge Ross had juris-
diction and authority to investigate the death of Ward
and the selling of the whiskey to Bullock and Chaney.
This averment was sufficient to show the jurisdiction of
the court in the matter under investigation, Common-
wealth v. Ransdall, 153 Ky. 334, 155 8. W. 1117.

It appears from the record Ward got drunk on the
whiskey appellant was alleged to have sold Bullock and
Chaney and was burned to death while in an intoxicated
condition. Both Bullock and Chaney testified they each
bought half a gallon of whiskey from appellant on Sept.
25, 1949. Judge Ross testified that in a court of inquiry
over which he presided appellant stated under oath he
did not sell any whiskey to either Bullock or Chaney on
that date. C. Homer Neikirk, County Attorney, gave
practically the same testimony as did Judge Ross, Ap-

306 Ce

pellant testified that he never sold the whiskey on the
date mentioned to Bullock or Chaney.

The rule is that to convict one of false swearing
the charge must be sustained by two witnesses, or one
witness and strong corroborating circumstances, Sams
v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 436, 172 S. W. 2d 44; Capps
v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 748, 172 S. W. 2d 610. In the
instant case two witnesses unequivocally testified they
bought whiskey from appellant on Sept. 25, 1949, and
although he denied the sales and was corroborated by
several witnesses, there was sufficient evidence to take
the case to the jury and to sustain the verdict.

In rebuttal the commonwealth attorney proved by
the sheriff of Pulaski County, J. B. Jasper, that appel-
lant’s general moral reputation was bad. On cross-exam-
ination the witness was asked if close neighbors ‘‘say
his character was bad’? and Jasper replied, ‘‘Any of
the neighbors in that end of the county will tell you he
has been in the liquor business.’’ Thereupon, appellant
moved to set aside the swearing of the jury and to con-
tinue the case, which motion was overruled. This ruling
was correct but the court should have excluded this in-
competent answer, as he did when the next witness,
Mary Hunter, was asked about appellant’s moral repu-
tation and replied she had heard he was a bootlegger.
In both instances the court should have admonished the
jury the purpose of such evidence was to affect only
appellant’s credibility as a witness, if it did so do. Shell
v. Commonwealth, 245 Ky. 223, 53 S. W. 2d 524.

A more serious error was committed by the court
when he permitted the commonwealth attorney to re-
peatedly ask witnesses if appellant was not engaged in
the business of illegally manufacturing and selling whis-
key. This improper question was first asked appellant
on cross-examination and the court sustained an objec-
tion thereto, yet the commonwealth attorney asked four
other witnesses for appellant on their cross-examination.
this same character of question. It seems a deliberate
and. persistent attempt was made to bring to the jury’s
attention evidence which the commonwealth attorney
knew was not only incompetent but highly prejudicial
in this character of case, and thereby to prevent appel-
lant from receiving a fair and impartial trial. Such con-
duct was condemned by us in McDaniel v. Common-

| 307

wealth, 277 Ky. 824, 127 S. W. 2d 866, and authorities
cited therein. It was said in the McDaniel opinion that
for the commonwealth attorney to persist in asking
questions the court had ruled incompetent was both
highly improper and contemptuous of the court, and
the trial judge should have seen that his rulings were |
adhered to, and if necessary, to summarily punish the
offending counsel for contempt.

The commonwealth attorney did not content him-
self with asking questions he knew to be incompetent
after the court had sustained objections thereto, but the
bill of exceptions shows he made this inflammatory
statement in his argument to the jury: ‘‘John Whitaker
ig as much responsible for the death of Maurice Ward as
if he had held a pistol to his head and blown his brains
out.’? The court correctly sustained an objection there-
to and admonished the jury not to consider this state-
ment. On another trial the attorney representing the
commonwealth should not forget he is an officer of the
court and will confine his argument to the issue present-
ed to the jury, whether appellant is guilty of false swear-
ing, and not argue he was responsible for the death of
Maurice Ward. Appellant was not on trial for murder
but for false swearing. _

The complaint of the instructions is that the sec-
ond one, ‘‘The jury should find defendant not guilty
unless it is proved by the testimony of two witnesses,
or one witness and strong corroborating circumstances,
that he swore falsely,’’ failed to include the words ‘‘be-
yond a reasonable doubt’? after the word ‘‘proved.”’
Benge v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 562, 183 8. W. 2d 631
is cited. True, in the Benge opinion we said it was error
not to include the phrase ‘‘beyond a reasonable doubt’’
in the second instruction, which was identical with the
one given in the instant case. But subsequently in
Daniels v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 541, 189 S. W. 2d 849,
it was pointed out that in the third instruction the court
told the jury if it had a reasonable doubt of defendant
having been proven guilty to acquit him; and we there
said it was not necessary to incorporate ‘‘reasonable
doubt’’ in the second instruction. Here, as in the Dan-
iels case, the first instruction also required appellant to
be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Dan-
iels opinion said the Benge case was against the weight

308 Dee)

of authority in this jurisdiction, Therefore, the Daniels
ease overruled the Benge case.

The judgment is reversed because of the misconduct
of the commonwealth attorney in repeatedly asking ap-
pellant’s witnesses if he were not engaged in the illegal
manufacture and sale of whiskey after the court had
sustained an objection to that line of cross-examination.
His improper argument is condemned but it is not neces-*
sary to determine whether we would reverse the judg-
ment on that account alone, since an objection was sus-
tained thereto and the jury admonished not to consider
the statement.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.

7
Buise v. Barklage, Police Judge.
December 15, 1950.

H. C. Kennedy for appellee.
Srantey, Commissionzr—Issuing writ.

The petition against J. H. Barklage, Police Judge
of the Town of Eubank, seeks a writ of prohibiting the
respondent from trying the petitioner, Oscar Buise,

ee

fining and committing him to jail in default of payment
upon a charge of breach of the peace under a void
ordinance. A temporary writ immediately issued and
respondent directed it to make defense. He has filed a
general demurrer but has not favored us with a brief.

The ordinance passed by the Board of Trustees of
Eubank in June of 1945 provided a penalty for the
offense of breach of the peace committed in the town
of a fine of not less than $1 nor more than $10. The
Statute provides a penalty for such an offense of a fine
of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not Jess than
5 nor more than 50 days or both. KRS 487.010.

The Constitution, section 168 provides: ‘‘No mun-
icipal ordinance shall fix a penalty for a violation there-
of at less than that imposed by statute for the same
offense. A conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.’’

It is apparent that the ordinance is invalid. Taylor
v. City of Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271, 32 8. W. 948. The
petitioner has pursued the proper course for remedy.
Meeks Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ballard, Police Judge, 283
Ky. 404, 141 S. W. 2d 569.

The prayer of the petition is sustained and a per-
manent writ will issue prohibiting the respondent from
trying or punishing the petitioner for a violation of the

void ordinance.
| Cd
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, Judge.

December 15, 1950.
Ray L. Murphy, Judge.

LeWright Browning, Browning & Gray, Odis W. Bertelsman
for petitioner.

Benton, Benton & Luedeke for respondent.
Cumr Justice Stus—Denying writ.

This is an original action in this court wherein pe-
titioner, Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, herein-
after referred to as the Company, is seeking a writ of
prohibition against Hon. Ray L. Murphy, Judge of the
Campbell Circuit Court, to restrain him from entering
a judgment he has indicated he will enter in a suit to
incorporate the town of Silver Grove in which will be
included the Stevens railroad yards of the Company,
which yards petitioner avers are unsuitable and unfit
for municipal purposes.

Silver Grove is a community in Campbell County.
where some 598 inhabitants reside, of whom 253 are
voters. Of this number of voters 213 signed and filed a
petition in the Campbell Circuit Court to incorporate
an area one-half mile square into the town of Silver
Grove, as is provided in KRS 81.040 et seq. There was
but one remonstrant, the Company, and its pleading
avers that of the 160 acres proposed to be incorporated
into the town, 64 acres constitute the railroad yards of
the Company. Filed with the Company’s pleading is a
map showing the part of its yards sought to be in-
eluded in the town. This map shows all residences, and

SS

buildings of the town, as well as all city lots, lie south
of the railroad yards, which latter extend northwardly
practically to the Ohio River. South of the proposed
town there is ample land suited for municipal purposes

which could be incorporate
aries.

The remonstrance of the

within the town’s bound-

Company avers these yards

are used solely for railroad purposes in connection with

the interchange of freight

traffic among the various

railroads entering the Cincinnati area; that no dwelling

or business house can ever
ean streets or sidewalks be

e erected in its yards, nor
constructed therein and its

yards are not adaptable to and can never be put to any
municipal use. Three large pictures filed with the Com-
pany’s pleading substantiate the foregoing allegations.
This pleading further alleges the Company maintains
its own lighting, water and sewage systems in these
yards, as well as its police and fire departments; that
the yards are located in a graded school district and
the Company pays school taxes thereon; that no benefit
will result to the Company from having its yards in-
cluded within the town, and the only purpose for so
including them is to have the Company pay the prin-
cipal portion of the town’s taxes; that the Company
will be deprived of its property without due process of
law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, and the inclusion of its yards
within the town will constitute the exercise of arbitrary
powers by the incorporators contrary to section 2 of
the Constitution of Kentucky.

A general demurrer was sustained to the remon-
strance of the Company, it refused to plead further and
respondent decided he would include these yards-in the
incorporation of the town, but held up the entry of his
judgment in order to enable the Company to seek a writ
of prohibition in this court, as was done in Engle v.
Miller, 303 Ky. 731, 199 S. W. 2d 123. The Company
promptly filed its petition in this court seeking a writ
of prohibition in which it set out practically the same
allegations contained in its remonstrance, and further
averred KRS 81.060 provides there shall be no appeal
from the judgment of the circuit court incorporating a
new town, and petitioner will suffer great and irrepar-
able injury in the event Judge Murphy enters his pro-

312 ee

posed judgment. Pending the preparation of the original
action in this court, we granted a temporary writ of pro-
hibition. The complete record in the suit to incorporate
Silver Grove was filed as an exhibit with the petition
seeking a writ of prohibition.

The first question to be determined is whether or
not the Company has an adequate remedy by appeal,
since it is familiar law that a writ of prohibition will
only be granted when the circuit court is proceeding
without jurisdiction, or is proceeding erroneously in its
jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal
and great injustice or irreparable injury will result to
petitioner unless the court is restrained or directed to
do something affirmatively. Engle v. Miller, 303 Ky. 731,
199 8. W. ad 123, 124; Farmers National Bank of Dan-
ville v. Speckman, 312 Ky. 106, 226 S. W. 2d 315. The
Engle opinion points out there is no appeal from a judg-
ment establishing a town under KRS 81.060; but an
appeal lies where there is presented in the action a
question of the constitutionality of an Act of the Gen-
eral Assembly which is ‘‘independent in its nature,
strictly judicial and one of great consequence.”’

From the petition and record in the instant case, it
appears that the respondent, Hon. Ray L. Murphy, has
followed and intends to follow in every particular KRS
81.060. Thus, so far as the statute is concerned, respond-
ent has not proceeded erroneously. Consequently, if any
fault is to be found in the proceedings, it must lie in a
constitutional objection to the statute itself, or to the
application of the statute in this particular case. In Engle
v. Miller it was pointed out that the question of the con-
stitutionality of an act of the General Assembly, when
brought into this type of case, is an issue separate and
apart from the issues to be determined by the court
under KRS 81.060 and it was held an appeal would lie
from a determination on such an issue, though not on
that part of the judgment dealing with a determination
under KRS 81.060. We think, whether the independent
question raised is one as to the constitutionality of the
act, or as to the constitutionality of a particular applica-
tion of the act, the reasoning of the Engle case should
apply. ; :

Since the petitioner has specifically brought into
the case a question as to the constitutionality of KRS

:

81.060, or a particular application of that statute and
since, as said above, this is the only ground for any
error in the proceedings, we have concluded an appeal
will lie from a determination of the circuit court on that
point, Therefore, the writ of prohibition is denied.

Kentucky-Farmers Bank v. Staton et al.
January 9,.1951.
Watt M. Prichard, Judge.

Jobn L. Smith for appellant.
W. H. Dysard, Dysard & Dysard for appellees.

Cur Justice Cammack—Affirming.

This appeal is from a judgment against the Ken-
tucky-Farmers Bank for its failure to stop payment on
a check drawn by the appellees. It is the contention of

si Sr

the Bank that a peremptory instruction should have been
given in its favor.

The appellees were doing business as the Susan
Baker Distributing Company in Ashland. They bought
merchandise from Susan Baker Products, Inc., in New
York. On July 10, 1947, they had $5580 on deposit with
the appellant. On that date Check No. 169 was drawn
against their account in favor of Susan Baker Products
in the amount of $1805 in payment of a bill of goods.
According to the business relations between the appel-
lees and Susan Baker Products, the appellees were en-
titled to a credit of $170.06 on the $1805 invoice. This
was indicated on the face of the check. However, on the
stub of Check No. 169 the deductions were properly
made and the amount of the check was shown as $1634.94.
It was the belief of the appellees from the date the check
was issued until they learned that the $1805 check had
been paid that the amount of Check No. 169 was $1634.94.

Because of a question as to credits due the appellees
for goods previously delivered to them by the Susan
Baker Products, they stopped payment on Check No.
169. They called the Bank and gave them the full partic-
ulars concerning Check No. 169 as shown by the stub in
their checkbook. The evidence is undisputed to this point.

The appellees introduced proof also showing that
they talked with Mr. Gunnell, president of the Kentucky-
Farmers Bank, about the check on which payment had
been stopped, telling him that this was the only check
they had out to Susan Baker Products, They said Mr.
Gunnell told them that payment would be stopped; that
he went to the post office himself; and that he would take
care of the matter personally. The proof showed also
that Check No. 169 was the only check outstanding to
Susan Baker Products, and that a check in a similar
amount had not been drawn in favor of that concern
for from 60 to 90 days prior to July 10, 1947. On the
other hand, Mr. Gunnell testified that when he was noti-
fied first about stopping payment on the check he put
a ‘Stop Payment’’ card with the information furnished
him on the account sheet of the appellees. This card
showed the date payment was stopped on the check, the
date of the check, the number of the check, the name of

* the payee, and gave the amount as $1634.94. Mr. Gunnell
denied, however, that he was ever told to stop payment

3

of any check made to Susan Baker Products, regardless
of the amount. He said further that had such a request
been made he would have marked the account ‘‘Pay No
Checks To Susan Baker Products.’’

The case was submitted to the jury under the fol-
lowing instruction:

“No. 1. The court instructs the jury that the stop
payment notice or notices given by the plaintiffs re-
ferred to a check in the amount of $1634.94, whereas the
true amount of the check was in the amount of $1805.00.
The jury will therefore find a verdict for the defendant,
unless the jury shall find and believe from the evidence
that the plaintiffs in ordering the bank to stop payment
did so in such way that the defendant’s president did
know or by the exercise of ordinary care should have
Imown that the check paid by the bank was the check on
which payment had been stopped, in which event the
jury will find for plaintiffs in the amount of $1805.00
with interest from July 17, 1947.

“* ‘Ordinary Care’ as used in this instruction means
such care as a person of ordinary prudence usually exer-
cises under circumstances like or similar to that proven
to have existed in this case.”’

Payment may be stopped upon a check where a bank
is given positive and unqualified notice. See Stanley on
Banking Law of Kentucky, section 128, p. 115. The ap-
pellant makes the contention, and offers proof in sup-
port thereof, that the figure named as the amount of a
eheck is controlling in giving its description. It may be
conceded that the amount of the check is of major sig-
nificance, but it does not necessarily follow that this
single item of information would be controlling in a
transaction such as the one under consideration. Here
the Bank was given correct information concerning the
date of the check, the number of the check, and the name
of the payee; but was given erroneous information as
to the amount of the check. In addition thereto there was
proof that the president of the Bank was told that the
check under consideration (Check No. 169) was the only
one which the appellees had drawn to the Susan Baker
Products, and that he was told also why they desired to
have payment stopped on it. Under the circumstances we
think the court submitted the case to the jury under a
proper instruction.

316

The appellant raises some question as to its right to
be subrogated to any right of action Susan Baker Pro-
ducts might have against the appellees. The appellees
are in agreement with this position, but contend that
the question has no place in this case. We are in accord
with that view.

Judgment affirmed.
ma
Noland et al. v. Noland et al.

January 9, 1951.
E. B. Beatty, Judge.

Hzart F. Shumate and Shumante & Shumate for appellants.

S. H. Rice for appellees,
Van Sant, Commissionzr—Affirming.

This is an action in ejectment instituted by appel-
lants against their half brothers and sisters who are the
appellees. At the conclusion of the evidence, by agree-
ment of the parties, the cause was submitted to the
Chancellor for judgment, without the intervention of a
jury. Judgment was entered dismissing the petition.

John Noland and Joseph Noland were brothers.
John died intestate in the year 1893. He was survived
by his six children, who instituted this action, and his
wife, Rosa. Approximately eighteen months after John’s

a 317

death his widow married his brother Joseph. Nine chil-
dren were born of this union all of whom, together with
their mother, were living at the time of his death in
the year 1945. Rosa Noland died in the year 1946 sur-
vived by all of the children of both marriages. The chil-
dren of Joseph and Rosa are the appellees herein.

The land in dispute originally consisted of two
tracts and was owned and possessed by John at the
time of his death in the year 1893. He had mortgaged
each of the tracts to secure separate debts which were
unsatisfied during his lifetime. After his death the cred-
itors, in separate suits, instituted actions to recover judg-
ments for the debts and to foreclose the mortgages to
satisfy the judgments. Joseph purchased one of the
tracts at the decretal sale and accepted the court com-
missioner’s deed for the property. This deed was exe-
cuted by the commissioner and examined and approved
by the court on the 25th day of June, 1896, was acknowl-
edged by the commissioner on the 12th day of December,
1899, and was lodged for record in the Estill County
Court Clerk’s Office on the 13th day of December, 1899.
The second tract was purchased at the decretal sale
by Theo Noland and J. I. West, who received the master
commissioner’s deed therefor and who sold the property
to Joseph Noland by deed executed on the 9th day of
April, 1901. These deeds likewise were recorded in the
Office of the Clerk of the Estill County Court.

Appellants contend that the judgments and orders
of sale in both of the foreclosure actions were void,
therefore, all proceedings pursuant to the judgments
were of no effect and title to neither of the tracts passed.
to Joseph, consequently, as John’s only heirs at law,
they are the owners and entitled to the possession of
the property. Appellees contend that this action in eject-
ment is not a direct attack on the judgments and that
the petition herein is not sufficient to support appellants’
contention by way of collateral attack. We find it un-
necessary to discuss these contentions for the reason
hereinafter expressed.

Joseph occupied the property in dispute from the
year 1901 until his death in the year 1945. This posses-
sion was under color of title, adverse to all the world,
open, exclusive, peaceable, notorious, continuous; and
to a well defined boundary. That being true, Joseph’s

po

318

possession ripened into title irrespective of the validity
or invalidity of the deeds clothing him with its color.
Ely v. Fuson, 297 Ky. 325, 180 8. W. 2d 90. Upon his
death the property passed to his children subject to the
widow’s dower, which in turn expired upon her death.
The Chancellor correctly dismissed the petition.

The judgment is affirmed.

Durning et al. v. Summerfield et al.
January 9, 1951.

Lawrence S, Speckman, Judge.

a a9

Simeon Jacobs and C. Maxwell Brown for appellants.
Lawrence G. Duncan and Samuel Steinfeld for appellees.

Juvcz Herm—Affirming.

Appellants, R. Lee Durning and Elizabeth Durning,
his wife, are owners of a tract of land, approximately 17
acres, having a frontage of 388 feet on the Shelby-
ville Road, U. S. Highway 60, in Jefferson County. Ap-
pellant Louis A. Rice is the General Manager of, and
appellant David Endey is the owner of Endey Bros.
Shows. From a judgment permanently enjoining them
‘from using the land mentioned in the petition or any
part of it for a carnival or any of the uses pertaining
to a carnival, including erecting show tents thereon,
parking trucks and automobiles thereon, using kitchens,
mess tents and community or sleeping quarters there-
on’? appellants appeal.

Appellants maintain: (1) The court erred in over-
ruling special demurrers; (2) the court erred in over-
ruling a general demurrer, and (3) KRS 100.068 per-
mits the continued ‘‘use of land,’’ though that use may
be nonconforming.

Title to this tract was acquired by Durning in 1939.
The tract was zoned as ‘‘A’’ one-family residential
property by the Louisville and Jefferson County Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission in 1943. It was not zoned
for carnival or show purposes. Endey Bros. Shows,
usually referred to in the evidence as a carnival, con-
sists of some 30 attractions. This ‘‘institution’’ employs
281 people. It has ‘‘barkers,’’ loud speakers and ampli-
fiers. The show travels on a railroad train of 80 cars.

The Durning tract has been used chiefly for agrieul-
tural purposes. It does not have water or sanitary facil-
ities for carnival purposes. A neighbor describes the
entrance of the show upon the tract in the early morning
of June 5, 1949, as follows: ‘At 2:00 o’clock I was
awakened by a lot of lights flashing around, a lot of
eaterpillars, the noise from’ caterpillars, air compres-
sors, sounded like air compressors, generators, men
serving orders, driving stakes, just a general commo-

320 |

tion. So I then got up and looked out the window to
see what was going on. The whole field next to my apart-
ment was covered with trucks, trailers, automobiles,
men moving about and just a general confusion, * * *.
That continued from 2:00 o’clock to about 6:00 o’clock
in the morning.’’

Other activities included the arrival of circus trail-
ers, the hammering together of the frame structure for
the erection of a mess tent and the erection of a pistol
range. The carnival is described as a very large affair,
the tract in question being ‘‘very full of equipment.’’

No permit for the use of the premises for carnival
purposes was obtained from the Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission. About 11
a. m., June 5, 1949, William C. Beatty, zoning enforce-
ment officer for the Zoning Commission, went upon the
premises, found that appellant Louis A. Rice was gen-
eral manager and in charge of the work bein; done.
Beatty served Rice with a ‘‘stop work order’ Because
no permit had been obtained. Rice declared his intention
to disregard this order, Appellees thereupon filed this
action in equity setting out the ownership of the tract
in question; that it had been zoned on May 10, 1943, and
classified in the ‘‘A’’ one-family residence district in
unincorporated territory of Jefferson County; that
Louis A. Rice is the general manager of Endey Bros.
Shows; that the show or carnival was moved on the
property without obtaining a permit as required by
KRS 100.075; that the carnival with its attractions is
a commercial enterprise not permitted in ‘‘A’’, one-
family residential districts; the refusal of Rice to obey
the ‘‘stop work order’’ and seeking a temporary and
permanent injunction.

Appellants maintain that their special demurrer
should have been sustained because this action was not
brought by the real party in interest. This action was
prosecuted in the name of the Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission, and Jeffer-
son County, by and on relation of Samuel Steinfeld,
County Attorney, and Samuel Steinfeld, County Attor-
ney. These parties were primarily interested in the
enforcement of the zoning regulations mutually estab-
lished by them. Clearly they were proper parties. KRS
100.980.

es 32

Appellants demurred to the petition because it did
not name Endey Bros. Shows or its owner as defendant,
but named Rice only. It is admitted that Rice was the
general manager in charge of operation of the carnival,
and that David Endey, the owner, was in Florida. The
special demurrer was properly overruled, Conner v.
Parsley, 192 Ky. 827, 234 8. W. 972, 43 C. J. S., Injunc-
tions, sec. 34, page 467.

Appellants demurred specially to the petition be-
cause the City of Richlawn, a municipal corporation of
the sixth class, adjoining the premises in question, was
not made a party defendant. Appellants rely on KRS
100.097. KRS 100.031 and 100.096 provide for planning
and zoning commissions for cities and counties. KRS
100.097 provides what shall be done if a county fails to
create a planning and zoning commission. But here the
City of Louisville and Jefferson County have a joint
planning and zoning commission and the premises in
question have been zoned. The land in question is not
embraced in the City of Richlawn. It was not a proper
or necessary party. The demurrer was properly over-
TU Le

Appellants maintain that their general demurrer
should have been sustained ‘‘because at that time’? KRS
100.068, respecting ‘‘Nonconforming uses of land, con-
tinuance of”? was in full force and effect. KRS 100.068
provides: ‘‘The lawful use of land for trade, industry
or residence, existing at the time of adoption of any
zoning regulation or restriction, or at the time of the
adjustment or revision thereof, or amendment thereto,
although such use does not conform to the provisions of
such new regulations or restrictions, may be continued.”’

The record shows that the premises were used by
a small carnival one week in 1941; by a small carnival
one week in 1942, and three days for a potato festival
with a small carnival in 1947. At the time the show
was moved on the tract, Durning had owned the prem-
ises some 10 years—about 520 weeks. During the 10
years it was used less than one-half of one percent of
the time for carnival purposes. Appellants cite Landay
v. MacWilliams, 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293, 114 A. L. R.
984, There the property was used as a junk shop for
some six years. That case turns on abandonment and is
not in point here.

522 ee

“Use,’”’ in this statute, means what is customarily
or habitually done or the subject of a common practice.
Under the evidence it cannot be said that the premises
were usually or customarily used for carnival purposes.
At the time ‘‘of the adoption of the zoning regulation
in 1943, the premises were being used for agricultural
purposes.’? Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson County
Board of Zoning Adjustment and Appeals, 311 Ky. 663,
224 8. W. 2d 658, cited by appellants, permit a non-
conforming use ‘‘existing at the time * * * of * * *
zoning’’ to be continued. The record fails to establish a
nonconforming use of the land in question for carnival
purposes. :

We are constrained to hold that the Chancellor
reached the correct conclusion. We do not reach the
question as to whether or not the acts of appellees con-
stituted a nuisance. :

The judgment is affirmed.

Foster’s Adm’r et al. v. Gatewood et al.
January 9, 1951.
‘W. B, Ardery, Judge.

323

Dulin Moss, and W. Owen Keller for appellants.
‘W. C. Marshall for appellees.

Jupex Henm—Affirming. | .

On July 9, 1942, Louella Foster filed Action No.
38998 in the Franklin Cireuit Court seeking to set aside
a deed, and pleading: ‘‘That her signature to said deed
was procured by the deceit, misrepresentation and fraud
of defendant, Carrie Harrod, and that she received no
consideration for said deed.’”? Luther Harrod, husband
of Carrie; James H. Foster, a brother; Hliza Clark, a
half-sister; Jim Will Clark, her husband; Ida Kelly,
a half-sister, and her husband, Burley Kelly, were named
defendants.

It is further alleged that the brother, J. W. (Pig)
Foster died intestate on March 17, 1942, a resident of
Franklin County, leaving as his only heirs the above-
named brother and sisters; that at his death he was
the owner of a described tract of land in Franklin
County; that the commission of the notary public taking
the acknowledment to the deed had expired; that Eliza
Clark, at the time she signed the deed, was married and
that her signature to the deed was of no effect because
her husband, Jim Will Clark, did not join with her in
signing the deed.

On August 18, 1942, Hazie Harrod filed Action No.

324 P|

39067 seeking to recover $715 for services alleged to.
have been furnished to J. W. (Pig) Foster.

Louella Foster died September 18, 1942. The action
was revived in the name of J. W. Foster, Administrator
of the Estate of Louella Foster. Carrie Harrod having
died on January 19, 1943, a petition for reviver of the
action against the heirs of Carrie Harrod, deceased,
was filed by John Foster, Administrator, on August 7,
1943. On August 18, 1947, Action No. 40991 was filed
seeking a settlement of her estate. On September 15,
1947, the three actions were consolidated and reféyred
to the Master Commissioner.

On September 19, 1947, John Foster, Administra-
tor, filed an amended petition in Action No. 38998 adopt-
ing all of the allegations in the original petition of Lou-

‘ella Foster. On the same day, Eliza Clark filed her
answer and cross-petition in Action No. 38998 seeking
to set aside the deed to Carrie Harrod for the reasons
set out in the original petition of Louella Foster. Ida
Kelly and her husband filed a like answer and _cross-
petition. J. W. Clark, husband of Eliza Clark, filed an
answer in the consolidated cases disclaiming any inter-
est in the estate of John (Pig) Foster, deceased. No
plea was filed by James H. Foster. From the record it
appears that all of the parties were before the court.

The testimony of John Foster, Burley Kelly, Dave
Foster, Ida Kelly, Eliza Clark, Elizabeth Thurman,
Mae E. McCoy, Mary S. Jones and Dulin Moss was
taken in case No. 38998, and also the testimony of a
number of witnesses in case No. 40991. The Commission-
er, Charles Duvall, made a report. The Chancellor ad-
judged:

«* ® * the court being sufficiently advised, it is the
judgment of the court * * * that the record herein con-
tains no competent testimony or proof that any fraud
or misrepresentation was practiced by Carrie Harrod
in obtaining the signatures of the grantors who conveyed
the property described in the petition to her by the
deed dated March 20, 1942, the original of which is 3 filed
with the record. The grantors were all sui juris; they
intended at the time to execute a valid deed to Carrie
Harrod, their acknowledgments were taken.and certified
in due form by J. W. effers, as Notary Public, and the

Le 325

fact that his bond as Notary Public has not been re-
executed by him does not affect the validity of the deed,
and the fact as shown by the record that Jim Will Clark
(reputed husband of Bliza Clark) had not lived together
for many years and the deed which she signed recited
that she was a widow and said Jim Will Clark has filed
his answer herein disclaiming any interest in the prop-
erty by reason of his marriage to Eliza Clark, cures
the infirmity, if any, and said deed is now declared to
be valid conveying to Carrie Harrod a fee simple title
to said property, which she had and owned at the time
of her death.

“Tt is now therefore adjudged by the court that the
petition of Louella Foster and the case revived by John
Foster, Administrator (No. 38998) be and the same is
now dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs. * * *’’

John Foster, Administrator of Louella Foster, Hliza
Clark, Ida Kelly and Burley Kelly appeal, urging: (1)
That much of the evidence was incompetent and appel-
lants’ exceptions should have been sustained; (2) de-
murrers should have been sustained; (3) the notary pub-
lic was without authority to take acknowledgments, and
(4) the execution of the deed by Eliza Clark is invalid.

Appellants filed numerous exceptions to the testi-
mony taken. The record does not show that appellants
requested the court to pass upon their exceptions, or
that the court did so. For these reasons appellants
waived their exceptions. Black v. Noel’s Adm’x, 240 Ky.
209, 41 S. W. 2d 1100.

Appellants filed demurrers, but the cases were sub-
mitted without having the demurrers passed upon. Ap-
pellants thereby waived the demurrers. 15 W. Ky. Di-
gest, Pleading, 212.

It appears that the notary public taking the acknowl-
edgment to the deed in question had not had his bond
renewed. A deed may not be recorded until it is properly
acknowledged. But a deed signed by the parties, al-
though not acknowledged, is binding as between the
parties. United States Trust Co. v. Frakés, 282 Ky. 683,
139 S. W. 2d 759.

It is maintained that the deed is invalid as to Eliza
Clark. The evidence shows that Eliza Clark and Jim

326 Le

Will Clark had not lived together for many years. The
deed which she executed recites that she was ‘‘a widow.’*
Jim Will Clark filed his answer disclaiming any interest
in the property. The Chancellor found that these things
cured the infirmity, if any, in the deed. We believe this
finding was correct.

The deed to Carrie Harrod was executed in 1942.
The consideration recited is the furnishing of a home,
the necessities of life, nursing and the expense of med-
ical care during the several months of J. W. (Pig) Fos-
ter’s last illness, and the assumption of the expense of
his funeral and burial, and all his other just debts. We
are told that the record was lost for some four years.
No evidence was taken until after the record was found.
In the meantime, the principals, Louella Foster and
Carrie Harrod, had died. The difficulty of obtaining com-
petent evidence is apparent.

We are requested to disregard the irregularities in
the record and decide the case on its merits. We have
read the record and all of the testimony carefully. It
may be that Carrie Harrod endeavored to over-reach
her brother and sisters. But after a careful study of the
testimony we are at most left in doubt as to this. When
we entertain no more than a doubt as to the correctness
of the Chaneellor’s conclusions, the judgment will stand
affirmed.

The judgment is affirmed.
|

Cassinelli v. Holliday.
Holliday v. Cassinelli.
Rehearing Denied January 16, 1950.
October 17, 1950.

Jean A, Auxier, Judge.

327

W. E. Faulkner, Faulkner & Faulkner for Tony Cassinelli and
Charles Cassinelli.

©. A. Noble for Tolbert Holliday.
Van Sanz, Commissionzr—Affirming.

The suit was instituted by Tolbert Holliday to re-~
cover a commission for services allegedly performed
pursuant to a contract with Tony Cassinelli and his
brother, Charles Cassinelli. At the close of all the
evidence, the Court directed the jury to find for Charles
but submitted the case as to Tony. Judgment was en-
tered upon a verdict against Tony in the sum of $7,-
700.00 and from which the latter has appealed. Holli-
day has appealed from the judgment dismissing his
petition against Charles. Holliday’s appeal against
Charles was designated ‘‘cross-appeal’’; but, since all
the parties are before the court and have presented
their contentions by brief, we will treat it as having
been filed independently, as it should have been, and
consolidated in this Court with the appeal first above
styled. Accordingly, we will dispose of the two appeals
in the one opinion.

Prior to September, 1946, certain persons residing
in the state of West Virginia and doing business under

328 Le

the firm name of Midelburg and Hyman owned a block
of business buildings in Hazard, Kentucky. These build-
ings, nine in number, were occupied by various tenants,
two of whom, as partners, are Tony and his brother
Charles Cassinelli. They operated a. motion picture
theater under the management of Tony; a second thea-
ter was operated by them under Tony’s management
in Hazard; and a third was located in Mullins, West
Virginia under the management of Charles. In Sep-
tember, 1946, appellant and Edgar A. Dixon, a tenant
of another of the buildings, were informed that Midel-
burg and Hyman intended to sell their holdings in
Hazard. They decided to attempt to purchase the
property but neither felt that he could negotiate satis-
factorily with the owner, consequently they agreed to
engage the services of Holliday, who was intimately
acquainted with the agents of the owners, to act as
their agent in an endeavor to purchase the property.
Pending negotiations, no limit was placed on the amount
to be paid for the property but there was a complete
understanding between all the parties interested in
the purchase that Holliday should be paid a commission
of three per centum of the purchase price of the prop-
erty, if a purchase should be consummated, This agree-
ment was entered into between Holliday and Tony on
Saturday, September 7, 1946, and was acquiesed in by
the others on later occasions. Mr. Holliday, by tele-
phone, arranged to meet 8. J. and A. B. Hyman, agents
of the owners, at their offices in Huntington, West Vir-
ginia on the following morning. He and Mr. Dixon
immediately drove to Huntington and conferred with
the Hymans at the time appointed. The latter, sensing
or learning that Tony was the responsible and moving
force in the proposed purchase, insisted on his presence
during the negotiations and the meeting was adjourned
until the following morning, Monday, September 9th.
Tony was present at the adjourned meeting at the con-
clusion of which, he, Dixon, and appellee (signing his
name as ‘‘agent’’) submitted a written offer to pay
$240,000.00 for the properties, and, as evidence of good
faith, paid to the Hymans, taking their receipt therefor,
the sum of $10,000.00 to be applied as a down payment
on the purchase price of the property in the event the
offer should be accepted. The $10,000.00 in its entirety
was furnished by Tony Cassinelli. In the meantime;

ee 329

to-wit, the night of September 8th, Tony enlisted two
other tenants as prospective partners in the proposed
purchase, neither of whom signed the written offer al-
though both were present and agreed to it at the con-
ference held on September 9th.

On the 12th and 13th days of September, Tony,
Charles, and 8. J. Hyman attended a convention of
operators of motion picture theaters in Charleston,
West Virginia. On the last day of the convention,
Hyman told Tony in the presence of Charles that the
offer of $240,000.00 likely would be rejected because a
higher one had been received. Thereupon Tony con-
veyed to Charles complete information concerning the
transpired transactions, and four days later, Septem-
ber 17th, Charles traveled to Huntington when and
where he conferred with Mr. Hyman to obtain permis-
sion to bid for the property. Obtaining such permis-
sion, he made an offer of $259,600.00 which was reduced
to writing October 3rd, signed by Charles on October
4th, and delivered to the Hymans on October 5th. A
carbon copy of the offer was mailed to and received
by Tony. This offer was accepted, the $10,000.00 de-
posited by Tony on his previous bid was applied as a
deposit on the bid submitted by Charles and later as a
down payment on the purchase price, and the deeds
consummating the sale were made to Charles and Tony,
jointly, who thereupon became the owners of the real
estate involved. The $240,000.00 bid was not formally
rejected until October 14, 1946, which was ten days after
Charles tendered the bid for $259,600.00. The letter
rejecting the offer is in the following language:

‘Huntington, W. Va.
“October 14, 1946
“Mr. Tony Cassinelli
“Mr. Edgar A. Dixon
“My. Tolbert Holliday, Agent
“Hazard, Kentucky

“Gentlemen:

“With reference to your offer of September 9th
addressed to me, in which you offer to purchase the
property of Midelburg & Hyman and Midelburg Bros.
& Hyman in Hazard, Perry County, Kentucky, this
offer has been rejected.

330 ee

‘As per your letter of September 14, 1946, signed
by Tony Cassinelli, Edgar A. Dixon and Tolbert Holli-
dey, Agent, I am returning the $10,000 to Tony Cas-
sinelli.

“Very Ry rea) 8 Lt
igne . J. Hyman
“SJH:BW”

The $10,000.00 deposit was not returned but was
applied to the purchase of the property under the bid
tendered by Charles. On this point Tony testified:

“Q. You directed them to apply your money on
the price which your brother had made and which had
been accepted? <A. Yes sir.

“Q. Now, it has been stated by one of the wit-
nesses in this case from recollection of the, matter that
the money was returned to you which would imply that
it was returned by check or draft, that was a mistake?
A. Yes, I never got the money at all. I knew I would
have to send it back, so I just instructed them to keep
it and apply it to my share of the purchase price.’’

He further testified that after he received the letter
dated October 14th, he ‘‘thought they would forward
the money right on. A few days went by in the mean-
time I had heard from my brother about his offer that
he had in the purchase of the property and I didn’t
request the money back, I just left it laying there, it
was applied to the purchase price.’? The letter tender-
ing the bid of $259,600.00 contained the following lan-
guage: “The $10,000.00 deposited with the offer shall
be returned to you if the offer is not accepted on or
before October 9, 1949. If the offer is accepted the said
deposit shall be credited against the purchase price.’

Charles Cassinelli testified that he talked to his
brother Tony on the third or fourth of October, at which
time Tony agreed to join him in the purchase of the
property. These discrepancies will be referred to later
in the opinion.

In support of his position that the judgment against
Tony should be affirmed, Holliday contends that all of
the negotiations commencing with his employment and
culminating in the purchase of the property were one
continuous transaction on the part of Tony; and in

es 33

support of his position that the judgment dismissing
his petition avainst Charles should be reversed, he fur-
ther contends that at all such times Charles was a silent
partner of Tony. Tony contends that his contract with
Holliday ended when the offer signed by them and
Dixon was rejected; and that Charles’ acquisition of
the property was an entirely separate and distinct trans-
action and one of which he had no knowledge until after
a binding contract had been entered into between Charles
on the one hand and Midelburg and Hyman on the
other; and since Holliday performed no service in
Tony’s negotiations with his brother, he is not entitled
to the commission agreed on.

In the circumstances above set out, Holliday was
employed by Tony Cassinelli as his agent to assist him
in purchasing the property then owned by Midelburg
and Hyman. No limit was placed on the amount to be
paid for the property. The commission to be paid to
Holliday was three per centum of whatever the purchase
price should turn out to be.

Where a person is engaged as an agent to assist
either in the sale or purchase of property and he per-
forms fully all of the obligations imposed on him by
the contract, and his principal consummates the pur-
chase of sale with the person the agent has negotiated
with, the latter is entitled to his commission. Croxton’s
Ex’rs v. Henry & Flennor, 193 Ky. 318, 235 S.W. 753,
and cases therein cited.

It is admitted that Holliday performed all services
required or requested of him by his principal. The
sole question for determination is whether Tony Cass-
inelli was associated with his brother in the purchase
of the property from the West Virginia partnership or
whether, as he contends, he purchased the property
from his brother after the latter became the owner
thereof. All negotiations culminating in ownership in
the Cassinellis were incidents of the venture Holliday
was employed to and did commence and in respect to
which he has performed his obligation in full. Charles
testified that Tony agreed to become his partner on the
8rd or 4th day of October and both admitted that
Charles would not have learned that the property was
for sale had it not been for the negotiations participated
in by Holliday. After Holliday introduced Tony as

a prospective purchaser and he had been approved by
the Hymans, it was definitely understood that Tony
could buy the property if his bid was high. Holliday
was not concerned with the substitution of persons as
partners of Tony. He wag concerned solely with the
acquisition of the property by Tony, either individually
or jointly with others whoever they might have been.
The letter containing the offer was written on the 3rd
day of October. It was signed by Charles on the 4th
day of October and received by the Hymans on the
5th day of October and the offer was accepted by the
latter on the 9th day of October. Whilst Tony did not
testify as to the specific date he bound himself for his
part of the $259,600.00 offer, Charles did; and his testi-
mony was that the date was either the 3rd or the 4th of
October. The transfer of Tony’s original deposit to
secure the good faith of ‘‘Charles’ bid’’ and the sending
of a carbon copy of the bid submitted by Charles
weighs heavily in favor of Holliday’s contention
that Tony was Charles’ partner as early as Oc-
tober 3rd. The only reasonable conclusion which can
be drawn from all the evidence is that Tony joined his
brother as a bidder for the property in the sum of
$259,600.00 previous to the communication of the offer
to the Hymans. At that time he had learned that his
bid of $240,000.00 ‘‘likely would be rejected’? but he
had not received definite notice of that fact. The effect
of Charles’ communication was merely to raise the bid
of Tony and to substitute the former for Dixon and
Tony’s other previous associates. The issue under this
contention was submitted to the jury and, as we have -
seen, there was ample evidence to support the verdict.

We think the court correctly dismissed Holliday’s
petition against Charles because there was no trans-
action between these parties and there was no evidence
that Tony was acting for Charles when he made the
agreement to pay Holliday a commission for the serv-
ices he performed. Even had Charles agreed with
Tony to recompense Tony for one-half of the commis-
sion, such was not an obligation enforceable by Holliday
as it was not a promise to him.

Both judgments are affirmed.

Smith v. Kincaid and Four Other Cases.
November 10, 1950.
Rehearing Denied January 24, 1951.
E. B. Beatty, Judge.

Jesse K. Lewis for appellants Smith, Taylor, Bowman, and Bran-
denburg.

E. B. Rose’ for appellant Hogan.
HE. B. Rose for appellee Kincaid.
Shumate & Shumate for appellees Palmer and Hurst.
Shumate & Shumate, E. B. Rose for appellee Mays.

D. C. Howell, in prosper.
Van Sanz, Commissionrr—Reversing.

On November 8, 1949, an election was held for
county and magisterial district officers in Lee County.
At the close of the polls the ballot boxes were delivered
to the county clerk who placed them in the room in the
courthouse where they were counted. On the night of
the election the first two precincts were tabulated. On
the next day thirteen precincts were counted leaving
the six remaining of the twenty-one precinct boxes to
be opened. At that time nothing had occurred to arouse
‘suspicion that any fraud had been perpetrated and on
that evening, November 9, the ballot boxes and room
containing them were placed in the custody of five
guards. All three of the keys to the ballot boxes (two
of which should have been kept by the other election

es — 335

commissioners) were in the possession of the sheriff
who was in the courthouse, and at various times in the
room where the boxes were kept, throughout the night.
Millard Lackey and Cliff Johnson were the Republican
guards, Cleveland Napier and Henry Johnson were the
Democratic guards. A fifth guard, Ray Jackson, whose
party affiliation does not appear in the record, was ap-
pointed for some reason or other. It appears that on
the night of the 9th, a good deal of drinking was en-
gaged in by the guards and others around the court-
house, that tension was rather high, and at least two
of the guards were armed with open knives which were
displayed in a flourishing manner. At any rate, ac-
cording to his own testimony, Cleveland Napier became
fearful that a fight might occur and about 2:00 o’clock
in the morning he departed from the courthouse. The
whiskey was freely distributed by two persons reputed
to be bootleggers and whose liberality in that respect
was most unusual. It appeared in evidence that Henry
Johnson was drinking considerably and that Cliff John-
* son and Millard Lackey were extremely drunk. All of
the guards were wandering about the courthouse or out-
side of it from time to time, and, on at least one oc-
casion it appears no one delegated to guard the boxes
was present in the room or on guard outside of it. On
another occasion all the guards were locked out of the
room, evidencing the presence in the room of persons
who had no right to be there. Thus matters stood when
the Board of Election Commissioners convened on Tues-
day morning, November 10, to count the ballots in the
remaining boxes. :

While the Commissioners were counting the re-
maining ballots, at least one member of the board
noticed that the ballots in two of the boxes had been
tampered with. It developed on examination during
the trial that over two hundred of the ballots had been
changed on their faces in such manner as to effectuate
an increase in the vote for the Republican nominees,
particularly in the race for county attorney. The bal-
lots in the four remaining boxes did not show on their
faces that any changes had been made, and, if they
actually had been tampered with, such tampering was
executed in a more subtle and surreptitious manner.
Before the commencement of the count on the last day,
the majorities in the races with which we are concerned

336 |

were as follows: County Judge, Kincaid’s over Smith
295 votes; County Attorney, Hogan’s over Howell 22
votes; County Court Clerk, Hurst’s over Taylor 255
votes; Sheriff, Palmer’s over Bowman 355 votes. No
precinct in the fourth magisterial district had been
counted at that time. There were 755 ballots in the re-
maining boxes. The Republican nominee in each of the
races tabulated was leading his Democratic opponent
and the final tabulation by the Board of Hlection Com-
" missioners showed all of them to be victorious. The
Democratic nominees filed these suits contesting the
elections in each of the races mentioned. On the trial,
the Chancellor found that the ballot boxes in two of the
six precincts had been entered by ‘‘hoodlums,’’ absolved
all of the candidates of any blame in respect to fraud,
and declared the Democratic nominee for County At-
torney and the Republican nominees for the other of-
. fices to be elected.

Tt is the contention of appellants that such fraud
was shown as to render it impossible for the court to
determine which of the nominees for the respective
offices received the majority of legal votes cast. Ap-
pellees negative this contention, and additionally as-
sert that, with the exception of the appeal in the County
Attorney’s race, appellants are bound by the judgment
because all of the sinister influences were eliminated
by appellants through their attorney examining all bal-
lots and ‘‘agreeing’’ that certain ballots were legal and
contending that others were illegal, and upon the further
showing that all of the ballots admittedly changed, if
counted for appellees, would not change the results of
the election except in the County Attorney’s race.

We will dispose of the second contention first. Ap-
pellants’ attorney did not accept any of the ballots
as valid in any of the six precincts last counted. He
merely selected 234 ballots in two of the boxes which
showed on their faces that they had been tampered
with to prove that not only those, but all of the boxes
were open to fraud and that a fraud had been perpe-
trated. It is true that appellants’ attorney examined
all of the ballots in the six questioned boxes in the
presence of the court and did not point to more than
234 which showed fraud on their faces; but we must
bear in mind that this is an election. contest wherein

es — 237

it is charged that an inspection of the whole record dis-
closes such fraud in the conduct of the election that
neither contestant nor contestee can be judged to have
been fairly elected, consequently the court should de-
clare that there has been no election, KRS 122.080(4).
Under that allegation the ballots may be introduced as
evidence of the fraud alleged and the contestee is not
necessarily entitled to be adjudged to have legally re-
ceived all votes on ballots which do not show on their
faces that they have been changed. In Hendrickson v.
Coign, 304 Ky. 383, 200 S.W.2d 905, the evidence was
conclusive that fraud was perpetrated by ‘‘stuffing’’
the ballot box; that the fraud was perpetrated by the
election officers themselves by writing the names of
fictitious voters on 90 stubs following the stub contain-
ing the name of the last actual voter; and that each and
every one of the election officers openly worked in the
polls for the same candidates in the school board race.
Thus it was easy to ascertain and separate the 90 bal-
lots illegally cast for these candidates from the whole
and determine who was fairly elected. The case of
Johnson v. Caddell, 251 Ky. 14, 64 S.W.2d 441, 443, is
not authority in the present case, because it was a con-
test of a primary election and as stated in the opinion
the statutes governing contests in primary elections
which were in force at that time did not authorize the
court to declare that no election had been held because
of fraud rendering it impossible to ascertain who re-
ceived the majority of the legal votes cast. The court
despairingly said ‘‘they (courts) must do the best they
can in purging the illegal votes and in ascertaining who
the victor is.’? It will be noted that the writer of the
opinion declared the winning party merely to be the
victor, not to be the person who had received the most
legal votes. Frazier v. Wright, 312 Ky. 523, 228 S.W.2d
424 involved a recount merely. It was held that where
the ballots were missing from one of the boxes, they,
of course, could not be examined as evidence of the re-
sult of the election. But the court accepted the original
count made by the board of election commissioners as
the best evidence of which the case was susceptible. We
have no such situation here.

The evidence of fraud in this case is compelling,
and is such as to show conclusively that the ballots in
all six of the boxes counted on November 10th were so

* 338 |

-exposed as to have provided an opportunity for chican-
“ery. It is admitted that two of the boxes were tampered
with and the evidence does not contravene the suspicion
of substitution or change in the other boxes. In Hd-
wards v. Logan, 114 Ky. 312, 70 S.W. 852, 854, the pur-
posé for which ballots, in varying circumstances, may
be éonsidered in evidence was discussed in the follow-
ing language: ‘‘ ‘If the boxes have been rigorously pre-
served, the ballots are the best and highest evidence,
but, if not, they are not only the weakest, but the most
dangerous, evidence.’ Judge Cooley, in his work on
Constitutional Limitation (625), announces substan-
tially the same rule. Also, see People [ex rel. Dickin- -
son] v. Sackett, 14 Mich. 320; People v. Cicott, 16 Mich.
283, 97 Am.Dec. 141. The authorities are abundant that,
where ballots have been so exposed as to have offered
opportunity to be tampered with, and have not been
guarded with that zealous care which will contravene
all suspicion of substitution or change, they lose their
presumptive purity, and are no longer to be relied on
as evidence in a contest or judicial inquiry as to the
result of an election.’’ (Our emphasis.)

Applying the rule recited above to the evidence in
this case, we can consider the condition of the ballots
for the purpose of determining that fraud was perpe-
trated, but we cannot consider the ballots as evidence to
determine the result of the election.

We agree with the Chancellor in his finding that
‘‘hoodlums’’ entered two of the ballot boxes. We con-
clude further that the ‘‘hoodlums’’ had ample oppor-
tunity to enter the four other boxes and to substitute
ballots for those originally cast: thus the purity of the
ballots was destroyed. The mere failure of the remain-
ing ballots to show on their faces that they had been
tampered with does not restore the presumption of pur-
ity or erase the taint of fraud.

Appellee Howell separately contends that he should
be declared elected to the office of County Attorney be-
cause the evidence shows that the fraud was perpetrated
. primarily in the interest of his opponent and the court

determined that he was elected after the elimination of
all self evident invalid votes. His theory is that one
-should not be permitted to benefit by his own wrong.
“Assuming for the purpose of this argument that How-

a 339

ell’s opponent Hogan, was a party to the fraud (the
Chancellor found that he was not), our decision de-
claring no election to have been held cannot be construed
to be of benefit to him. If we were content to render de-
cisions on speculation, our guess would be that Howell
received the majority of the legal votes cast in the race
for County Attorney and we likewise would guess that
the Republican nominees received the majority of legal
votes cast in the other races, but courts ‘were not estab-
lished for the purpose of attempting to outguess liti-
gants or each other. We find it impossible to determine
which of the candidates in any of the involved races
received the majority of valid votes cast. It follows that
the Chancellor should have declared the election to have
been invalid in respect to the offices contested.

The judgments are reversed with directions that
others be entered in conformity with this opinion.

Smith v. Hamm.

November 17, 1950.
Rehearing Denied January 30, 1951.
Oldham Clarke, Special Judge.

J. Ballard Clark, and Clark & Manby for appellant.
Edwin O. Davis and James A. Hall for appellee.

Juvex Ress—Affirming.

The appellee, Harlan T. Hamm, was injured in an
accident on May 4, 1948, while riding in an automobile
driven by appellant, Albert Jean Smith. In a suit against
Smith for damages Hamm recovered a judgment for
$5,000, and Smith has appealed. Appellant relies upon
these grounds for reversal of the judgment: (1) He was
entitled to a directed verdict; (2) the court erred in
giving an instruction which allowed recovery for per-
manent'impairment of appellee’s power to earn money;
and (3) the verdict is excessive.

a : 341

Both appellant and appellee were Junior Petty
Officers in the United States Navy, and were stationed
at Louisville, Kentucky. They had been assigned to re-
eruiting duty, and for several months before the acci-
dent had made almost daily trips together on recruiting
missions throughout the state in an automobile driven
by appellant. The automobile was owned by appellant’s
wife. On May 4, 1948, at about 3 p. m., when they were
returning to Louisville from a reoruiting mission to
several neighboring cities, the automobile left the road
on a curve and struck a telephone pole located about
five feet from the berm of the road. The accident hap-
pened near Ballardsville in Oldham County. It had rain-
ed earlier in the day, and the surface of the asphalt
road was damp but not slick. Both appellant and appel-
lee testified that the car was traveling at a speed of 30
or 35 miles an hour as it approached the curve. The car
failed to negotiate the curve, kept straight ahead, left
the road and struck the telephone pole. Appellee was
thrown through the windshield and was severely shock-
ed. He was taken in an ambulance to a hospital in La-
Grange, Kentucky, and from there to the Veterans Hos-
pital in Louisville where it was found that he had suffer-
ed a ruptured spleen. An operation was performed on
May 5, 1948, and his spleen was removed. He remained in
the hospital about three weeks. He suffered headaches
while in the hospital, and these headaches continued
after his discharge. He was readmitted to the hospital
on June 14, 1948, for observation, and remained there
nine days.

It is argued that, assuming the case was submittable
under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the appellant, by
his own and other testimony, showed that the accident
happened without negligence on his part, and when this
explanation was given and was not rebutted it was the
duty of the court to peremptorily instruct the jury to
find for the defendant. Appellee testified that the auto-
mobile approached the curve at a speed of 30 or 35 miles
an hour; that he could see no effort made to make the
turn or to apply the brakes; and that the car went
straight ahead and struck the telephone pole. He said
there was no deviation to the left or right, and that
appellant did not try to turn the wheel either way. On
cross-examination he was asked if he knew what caused
the car to go across the road, and he answered: ‘‘Unless

aie
he was day dreaming or dozing off.’’ Appellant’s depo-
sition was taken as if on cross-examination about six

* weeks after the accident, and was read by the plaintiff
on the trial. Appellant testified that as he approached
the curve at a speed of 30 or 35 miles an hour he applied
his brakes, and the left front wheel locked and although
he tried to hold the car in the road and turn it to the
right with the curve the car went straight ahead, skidded
off the road, and struck a telephone pole. The wheel had
never locked before. The garage mechanic who exam-
ined the car after the accident testified that too much oil
and grease had gotten in the brake drum, which would
eause the left front wheel to lock. The plaintiff intro-

- duced a garageman in rebuttal who testified that oil or
grease on the brake linings would not cause the wheel
to lock, but would cause the brake to slip and would have
a tendency to cause the car to slide around.

The automobile which caused the i injury was under
the.exclusive control of the defendant Smith, and the
occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if the one having such control used
proper care. Therefore, in the absence of explanation by
the defendant, the happening of the accident afforded

- reasonable evidence that the plaintiff’s injury was
caused by defendant’s negligence. Alford v. Beaird, 301
Ky. 512, 192 S. W. 2d 180; Thompson v. Kost, 298 Ky.
32, 181 'S. W. 2d 445 ; Droppelman v. Willingham, 293
Ky. 614, 169 S. W. 2d 811; Ralston v. Dossey, 289 Ky.
40, 157 8. W. 2d 739. The explanation offered by the de-
fendant Smith was that an intervening agency, the lock-
ing of the left front wheel which was not due to his neg-
ligence, caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The facts are very
similar to those in Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205
9. W. 2d 690, where the plaintiff, a guest in the car driven
by the defendant, was severely injured when the car
left the traveled portion of a street and struck an electric
light pole. The defendant sought to explain the occur-
rence by introducing evidence to the effect that the
accident was brought about by the breaking of the front
spring on the car and was not due to his. negligence. It
was held that the jury was not compelled to accept
the defendant’s theory as to how the accident happened,
and that the court did not err in overruling his motion
for a directed verdict. In the present case the court pre-
sented the defendant’s theory of the case in an instruc-

Le 343.

tion of which no complaint is made except that no in.
struction should have been given except a peremptory
instruction to find for him. The evidence as to whether
or not the driver of the car made any effort to turn the
car to the right as he entered the curve is conflicting,
and likewise there is conflict in the evidence as to wheth-
er oil and grease on the brake lining will cause the wheel
to lock. As was said in Droppelman v. Willingham, supra
[293 Ky. 614, 169 S. W. 2d 813]: ‘‘In the present case
there was evidence of negligence in addition to the mere
facts of the occurrence from which an inference of neg-
ligence might be drawn, and, consequently, it was not
necessary to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.’’

_ The court did not err in submitting the case to the
jury.

Likewise, we are of the opinion that the court did
not err in allowing recovery for permanent injuries. The
appellee submitted to a major operation, and his spleen
was removed. He testified that he was in good health at
the time of the accident and was a member of several
athletic teams, but had been unable to engage in any
athletic activities after the accident. He had suffered
severe headaches almost continuously, and continued to
suffer in this respect at the time of the trial ten months
after the accident and his weight had declined from 165
to 140 pounds. Dr. Elmer Y. Yoeman testified that it is
generally thought by the medical profession that re-
moval of the spleen is compatible with a long and healthy
life, although it is believed it performs important func-
tions. Whether the loss of the spleen is fully compen-
sated for by other organs of the body is unknown. We -
are inclined to the view that the loss or destruction of
any important organ of the body furnishes the basis,for
finding that the injury is permanent and, consequently,
that there may be an impairment of the injured person’s
power to earn money. Here, the appellee, in addition
to removal of the spleen, had suffered severe headaches
over a long period of time and had lost considerable
weight. There was ample evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer that his injuries were permanent.

When his pain and suffering and the nature of his
injuries are considered, it cannot be said that the ver-
dict is so disproportionate to the injuries as to strike
the mind at first blush that it was the result of passion

and prejudice. Commonwealth v. Webb, 309 Ky. 93, 216
S. W. 2d 893. The verdict is not excessive.

Appellant, in his brief, discusses certain alleged
misconduct on the part of the jury, but it is conceded
that no action was taken to preserve his rights, if any,
in that respect. .

The judgment is affirmed.

P|
Commonwealth ex rel. Funk Atty. Gen.
v. Robinson.
December 12, 1950.
Rehearing Denied February 9, 1951.
Ervine Turner, Judge.

Kash C. Williams and G. C. Allen for appellant.
J. Blaine Nickell, John A, Keck and Amos H. Eblen for appellee.

Jupes Cammacx—Reversing,

This action was instituted by the Commonwealth
on relation of A. E. Funk, Attorney General, to have
Robert Robinson declared ineligible to serve as a mem-

| 345

ber of the Wolfe County Board of Education. It was
charged that he was ineligible because at the time of
his election in November, 1948, he was interested in the
sale of his services to the Board of Education in viola-
tion of KRS 160.180. Robinson admitted that he was
elected to the Board and that he entered upon the dis-
charge of his duties in January, 1949. All other allega-
tions in the petition were denied. Evidence was taken
by both parties and, upon submission of the case, the
- court ruled that Robinson was eligible to hold the
office to which he was elected and dismissed the Com-
monwealth’s petition.

Robinson held a valid teaching certificate and
taught in the Wolfe County schools in 1941-42. In Feb-
ruary, 1948, he filed an action against Emma Risner,
E. T. Kash, Jr., C. E. Cable, M. H. Lovelace, and Price
Sewell, members composing the Wolfe County Board
of Education, and Arnold Rose, Superintendent of
Wolfe County Schools and Secretary and Treasurer of
said School Board, wherein he asserted a claim for
damages for their failure to employ him during the
school term. The Board of Education demurred to the
petition. The demurrer was sustained and Robinson
was given time to amend his petition. Before the ex-
piration of this time limit Robinson dismissed his cause
without prejudice.

In April, 1948, Robinson announced his candidacy
for membership on the Wolfe County Board of Educa-
tion. On May 25th, he mailed his application to the
Board for a teaching position in the Wolfe County
schools. On June 7th, on recommendation of the county
superintendent, the Board employed Robinson as a
teacher for the school year 1948-49. On August 6th,
Robinson was notified of his employment and that he
was to teach in the Laurel School. He admits he re-
ceived the notice of August 6th; however, he did not
begin teaching when the term began on August 9th. He
did not teach any during the 1948-49 term. On August
26th, Robinson notified the Board that he would be un-
able to teach during the 1948-49 school year and that
he desired to withdraw his application and, in the event
he had been employed, he thereby resigned. On Sep-
tember 2nd, he wrote a second letter stating that he
had not entered into a contract to teach in The Wolfe

346 PO —CitsSCis
County schools; that he had rendered no services as a
teacher; and that he did not expect any compensation
for that year. The county superintendent advised Rob-
inson by letter that his resignation would not be ac-
cepted. He was further advised that a substitute teach-
er had been employed and that his position was being
held open for him. On September 17th, the county
superintendent again wrote Robinson stating that he
would be unable to recommend to the Board acceptance
of his attempted resignation. Robinson was urged in
that letter to comply with the terms of his contract.

KRS 160.180 provides that a person shall be in-
eligible to membership on the Board of Hducation:
‘*(e) Who, at the time of his election, is directly or in-
directly interested in the sale to the board of books,
stationery or any other property, materials, supplies,
equipment or services for which school funds are ex-
pended; * * *.”? Teaching services were held to come
within the scope of this statute in the case of Whittaker
v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 794, 115 S.W.2d 355.

KRS 161.780 relates to the termination of a contract
by a teacher or a superintendent. This section follows:
“No teacher or superintendent shall be permitted to
terminate his contract within thirty days prior to the
beginning of his school term without the consent of the
board; any such teacher or superintendent shall be per-
mitted to terminate his contract at any other time when
schools are not in session by giving five days’ written
notice to the employing board of education. Upon com-
plaint by the employing board to the State Superintend-
ent of Public Instruction and after investigation by him,
the certificate of a teacher or superintendent terminat-
ing his contract in any other manner than provided in
this section may be suspended for not more than one
year.’”

It is obvious from the facts set forth above that
Robinson could not terminate his contract in the manner
in which he attempted. It was he who put in motion
the steps taken concerning his teaching status.in the
Wolfe County schools by filing his application for a
position in May. He did this notwithstanding the fact
that he had announced his candidacy for a member of
the Board of Education several weeks prior to that
time. It may be that his actions were such as would

a 347

have estopped him to assert a claim for teaching serv-
ices during the school year 1948-49. But we are not
concerned with that phase of the case. Under the rul-
ing in the case of Amburgey v. Draughn, 288 Ky. 128,
155 S.W.2d 740, there was a binding contract between
Robinson and the Wolfe County Board of Education.
It is clearly shown that the Board repeatedly asserted
it did not want the contract canceled. The Board could
have asserted any rights it might have had under the
contract, to say nothing of the fact that a disciplinary
proceeding could have been filed against Robinson with
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction under
the latter part of KRS 161.780. At the time of Robin-
son’s election as a member of the Board of Education
his direct or indirect interests in the sale of his serv-
ices ‘were such as to come within the scope of KRS

‘We take the same view of the suit in which Robin-
son had dismissed his petition without prejudice. There
was no final court order disposing of that claim. He
could reassert his rights, whatever they are, at any
time within the limitation period. The contention is
made that this claim was not asserted against the Board
of Education, but rather against the individual mem-
bers of the Board. However, we fail to see how this
could alter. the situation. The basis of the claim was
that Robinson had been denied the right to a teaching
position. Actually, the School Board participated in
the proceeding by the filing of the demurrer. In any
event, we think the situation one which comes within
the scope of the provisions of KRS 160.180 quoted above.

Judgment reversed, with directions to set it aside,
and for the entry of a judgment consistent with this -

opinion.
Newsom et al. v. Greer.

January 12, 1961,
Hdward L. Allen, Judge.

ic}
on

P. K. Damron, P. B. Stratton, B. D. Stephenson and Henry O.
Damron for appellants.

J. E. Childers for appellee.

Sranutey, Commissionzr—Reversing.

This is a suit to have a deed, absolute on its face,
declared to be a mortgage or mere security for the re-
payment of a debt. The circuit court found that such
was the intention of the parties but the grantors were
estopped by their subsequent acts from the right of
having it declared to be a mortgage. The grantors or
mortgagors question the second conclusion. The grantee
or mortgagee sustains that but alternatively questions
the primary conclusion.

By inheritance and purchase of the interest of other
heirs, Sterling Newsom had title to an 8/9th interest
and Freeman Newsom to a 1/9th interest in a 35 acre
tract on which was their home where they had been born
and had lived practically continuously all their lives.
Sterling was unmarried and lived with his brother,
Freeman, who had a wife and several children. The
minerals had been previously conveyed. On December
31, 1935, Freeman and Sterling had executed an abso-
lute deed to the property to Robert Newsom to secure a
debt of $400 owed by Freeman, with the verbal agree-
ment that if the debt was not paid in twelve months,
Robert would pay them $1,000 or $1,100 and the deed
would become absolute. Sterling owed his brother-in-law,
Andy Greer, $150, which was secured by a mortgage on
his interest in the land. As the maturity of the Robert
Newsom debt was approaching, the parties were much
distressed over their inability to pay it and redeem their
property. The only testimony of the preceding negotia-

350 |

tions or transactions is that of Freeman’s wife that
Greer had offered to help them out and of Greer that
Freeman told him he had to have the money for Rob
Newsom by midnight and asked him to pay it off, and
the next morning they traded. On the night of Decem-
ber 31, 1936, Greer brought a deed to the property to
the house to be executed. It recites that for the consider-
ation of $550 Freeman and Sterling Newsom conveyed
the property absolutely to Greer. He gave Freeman $400
and regarded Sterling’s $150 debt to tim as being satis-
fied. Freeman, his wife and Sterling relate the conversa-
tions and circumstances and testify positively that this
deed was intended merely to secure the debt. Senator
Charles F. Trivette came with Greer and took the ae-
knowledgements as a Notary Public. He testified that
‘from the talk of these parties there that night *.* *
as I understood it, Andy was loaning Freeman some
money as Rob Newsom was pushing Freeman, and Free-
man had to have the money by midnight. Andy wanted
to be safe and wanted a general warranty deed that he
could hold as security on the loan; that if within a rea-
sonable length of time if Freeman did not pay it off, it
would be a bona fide deed.’” . oo,

The Newsoms continued to live on the property as
before; improved it; listed it for taxation for two years;
sold a right-of-way for an electric power line (before
Greer had the instrument recorded) ; sold twenty loads
of mine props with Greer’s knowledge, and two or three
loads of such timber to Greer himself. Greer does not
deny the former but denies he bought any props. Bennie
Johnson (who lives at Fruit Jar Junction, Kentucky)
was present when the instrument was signed, but he was
not asked about the conversation or the transaction.
However, the next morning he tried to buy the property
from the Newsoms for a third party. Sterling Newsom
testified that he had suggested to Greer at different times

‘that they divide the land and satisfy the debt, but he
would not agree to it, and that he had ‘‘lots of times”’
said he would let them have it back. This was not denied
by Greer. They have paid in different sums from time to
time a total of around $425, according to Greer. The
value of the property at the time is variously estimated
to have been as much as $2,500. The defendant, who has
been trading in property in the community for several
years, fixed-the value of $700. The property has perhaps

Pe 351

doubled in value because of the development of coal
mines nearby. :

The defendant testified he had never agreed that the
deed should be only security for a loan and stated that
the money paid him by his brothers-in-law was for rent.
He paid taxes on the property after the first two or
three years, during which the Newsoms had paid them.
At the time the deed was made, the rental value was
about $5.00 a month. They paid the rent regularly up to
1946. At the end of that year, ten years afterward, Greer
gave the Newsoms notice to vacate the premises and
this suit followed.

Millis Newsom testified he was present when the
deed was signed but did not hear anything said about
it being a mortgage or that the Newsoms had a right to
redeem the land. He added, however, that he was not
interested and that it ‘‘could have been said and he
wouldn’t have heard it.’’ Victor Greer, a son of the de-
fendant, states that he was there and nothing to that
effect was said by anybody.

It was once held in this state that parol evidence
was admissible to establish a deed to be a mortgage only
upon the pleaded ground of fraud or mistake. But it
is now settled that such proof is acceptable without such
a plea. It is a matter of doing equity to look through
the forms in which the contrivance of the lender has en-
veloped the transaction and to determine and enforce the
actual intention of the parties and adjudge the instru-
ment to be a mortgage regardless of its form if the in-
tention was only to secure the payment of a debt. Cole-
man v. Coleman, 306 Ky. 6, 206 S. W. 2d 57. Our state-
ments with respect to the degree of the burden upon the
party claiming an instrument to be only security for a
debt are not harmonious, It has been said in some opin-
ions that when there is doubt, it will be resolved in favor
of the debtor and the instrument construed to be a mort-
gage. Coleman v. Coleman, supra, is the latest of such
statements. But in some of them the distinction between
construing a writing and regarding the evidence as re-
forming it or establishing a trust seems to have been
overlooked. On the contrary, in a more consistent line
of cases, we have said that to overcome the presumption
arising from the form of the instrument as a deed, the
evidence must be clear and convincing. Stokeley v. Flan-

352 |

ders, Ky., 128 S. W. 608; Gish v. Terrell, 266 Ky. 424, 99
8. W. 2d 168; Britton v. Marcum, 278 Ky. 188, 128 8. W.
2d 553; Austin v. Napier, 292 Ky. 95, 166 8. W. 2d 49;
McManus’ Administratrix v. Kirk, 306 Ky. 606, 208 S.
W. 2d 953. Under either consideration, the burden is
upon the claimant to prove his case to the satisfaction
of the court.

There are several significant and persuasive facts
which stand out. Of most importance is the fact that
Sterling Newsom, the owner of an 8/9th interest in the
property, joined in the instrument in order that his
brother, the owner of the other 1/9th, might obtain
quickly $400 to pay off his debt. It does not appear
anywhere that Sterling was being pressed for the $150
he owed the defendant himself. It had been running
since 1929. These parties had made a deed to secure
the debt to Rob Newsom. It was then due, and they
were in imminent danger of losing their property under
the terms of that parol agreement, by which he was
to cancel the debt and pay them the balance of $1,000
or $1,100. It is not likely they would have redeemed
the land from him and conveyed it absolutely to their
prosperous brother-in-law for the same amount they
owed on it and disregarded the opportunity to satisfy
Freeman’s debt and receive $600 or $700 in addition
in cash, The price of $550 was inadequate. The grantee
withheld the deed from record for over a year. The
parties remained in possession and improved the
property, treating it just as they had done before. They
had sold a right-of-way and timber from the place with
the defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence. Then we
have the positive testimony of Mr. Trivette, a member
of the State Senate and apparently a friend of the de-
fendant, though disinterested in the transaction, sup-
porting the testimony of the three parties and another
witness over against a broad denial of the defendant
and a mere.statement of his son that such was not the
trade. The contemporaneous situation and acts and
the course of action afterward, excepting only the mat-
ter of renting of the property, are perfectly consistent
with the plaintiff’s claim. One or more of these cireum-
stances have been held to be sufficient to declare a deed
as a mortgage. Smith v. Berry, 155 Ky. 686, 160 S.W.
247; Phillips v. Phillips’ Hxecutor, 248 Ky. 268, 58 S.W.
2d 367 and cases cited; Talley v. Eastland, 259 Ky. 241,

Le 353

82 S.W.2d 368, 369 and authorities cited; Frazier v.
Frazier, 282 Ky. 405, 138 S.W.2d 506; Pennington v.
Napier, 304 Ky. 666, 201 S.W.2d 738; Coleman v. Cole-
man, 306 Ky. 6, 206 S.W.2d 57. ‘Each case must be
determined by a consideration of all the surrounding
circumstances. McManus’ Adm’x v. Kirk, 306 Ky. 606,
208 8.W.2d 953.

We turn to the question of estoppel. It is a basic
proposition that the character of the transaction is fixed
at its inception and remains so with all the incidents
thereof. Subsequent transactions and developments
only throw light on the original intention of the parties.
That, it may be said, disregards any secret intention of
the grantee not disclosed or communicated to the other
party. The rule, ‘Once a mortgage always a mort-
gage’? has become a maxim. Brown v. Spradlin, 186
Ky. 703, 125 S.W. 150; Talley v. Hastland, 259 Ky.
241, 82 8.W.2d 368; Coleman v. Coleman, 306 Ky. 6,
206 S.W.2d 57; 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, sec. 36; 36 Am.
Jur., Mortgages, Sec. 125; Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho
546, 290 P. 205, 79 A.L.R. 934.

The evidence concerning the subsequent payment
of taxes by the grantee and the execution of the lease
in 1944, and what the grantee claims was the payment
of rent throughout the years (hereinafter described),
is not sufficient, in our opinion, to overcome the con-
clusion that initially the parties intended the instrument
to be a. mortgage. There may be instances where the
nominal grantor or real mortgagor is estopped to claim
the instrument was only a mortgage, but that is where
his conduct is such that another person is induced to
rely upon the deed to his prejudice. 59 C.J.S., Mort-
gages, sec. 70.

If these matters of taxes and rents were relied
upon by the defendant, it must have been with the mind
of procuring an unjust or fraudulent advantage over
his wife’s brothers, who do not appear to be as smart
as he. The doctrine of equitable estoppel was never
intended to work a position of gain to a party, its of-
fice being to protect him from a loss which, but for the
estoppel, he could not escape. The defendant, Andy
Greer, of course, could not have claimed to have been
misled to his prejudice, so that element of estoppel is ab-
sent. Pennington v. Napier, 304 Ky. 666, 201 8.W.2d 738.

254 ee

However, the maxim does not prevent the parties
to such a transaction from subsequently entering into
an agreement, having a valid consideration, changing
the character of the instrument from a mortgage to an
absolute conveyance with the release of the right or
equity of redemption. That may be established by direct
agreement or acts evidencing such purpose to abandon
the right and to have the deed originally intended as a
mortgage to stand as an absolute conveyance. But the
burden is upon him who makes such claim to prove it.
Scholl v. Hopper, 134 Ky. 83, 119 S.W. 770; Broaddus’
Heirs v. Potts, 140 Ky. 583, 131 S.W. 510; Sauer v.
Fischer, 247 Mich. 283, 225 N.W. 518, 65 A.L.R. 766;
36 Am.Jur., Mortgages, Secs. 3, 190. We look to the
evidence under this theory of abandonment.

As stated, Freeman Newsom listed the property
and paid the taxes for 1937 and 1938. Greer testified
that the Tax Commissioner advised him he would have
to list it in his own name and he had done so and paid -
the taxes thereafter. The record title was in him. The
plaintiffs seem to have regarded the sums they paid
Greer from time to time as including a refund. .

In the matter of rentals, the evidence is conflicting.
Freeman Newsom says it was two years after the deed
was executed before Greer said anything about being
paid and then only that he ought to have something for
the use of his money. This he denied, but admitted not
to have pressed them for possession or payment. Free-
man paid him different sums from time to time. Sterl-
ing appéars never to have paid anything. He was in
the army two or three years during the period. But
they signed a writing dated January 1, 1944, evidenc-
ing the lease of the property for that year for $100,
of which $50 was recited as being then paid and the
balance payable March 1. This writing provided that
if the rent was not paid, possession would be surrender-
ed. Freeman gave Greer a $60 cow and $20 in cash
but never paid anything more under this writing.
Neither of the plaintiffs remembered ever having signed
any other lease, but Greer says there were several such
papers but that they had been destroyed by fire. It
appears that Greer regarded all payments as rents and
while the others used that term sometimes in referring
to the payments they made, they appear to have re-

De 355

garded them as interest and partial payments of their
debt. It was not until sometime in 1946, ten years after
the instrument was executed, that the defendant notified
the Newsoms to surrender possession.

Some sort of proposition was made by Freeman
Newsom in 1945 or 1946 to pay $3,500 to buy Sterling’s
8/9ths interest and settle the whole matter with Greer.
The matter was dropped when Freeman learned that
the insurance money to be received from the Govern-
ment on account of the death of his son in the war
would not be paid in a lump sum but in installments.
We do not attach much significance to all this.

- While the payment of taxes by the grantee may on
its face indicate that he regarded himself as the owner
and negative the idea of a mortgage, at the same time
payment of taxes by the grantor for two years after the
execution of the deed is further evidence that the in-
strument was intended to be only a mortgage. Jones
on Mortgages, Sec. 329. It is to be noted that the as-
sumption of payment of taxes was voluntary on the
part of Greer.

‘In Brown v. Hermance, 233 Iowa 510, 10 N.W.2d
66, the court regarded the fact that monthly payments
were called rent did not necessarily disprove the gran-
tor’s claim of equitable ownership of the property.
Considering the relative financial conditions of the
parties, the apparent inexperience of the Newsoms
and. other attendant circumstances including the
fact the grantors had exercised every prerogative
of ownership except the listing of the property for taxa-
tion after the expiration of two years, and that the
lease was not made until seven years after the deed and
that the stipulated rent of $100 was $40 more than
Greer regarded as reasonable rent, we do not think it
would be equitable to hold this instrument showed a
‘purpose to abandon the claim of a right or to divest the
parties of their right of redemption even though some
of its provisions were not consistent with the ownership
by oe Newsoms. Rogers v.. Davis, 91 Iowa 730, 59
. W. 265. . .

In Brown v. Spradlin, supra, we held that an agree-
ment which allowed the grantor in an absolute deed
to have the use of and remain in possession of the

356

property as long as the grantee desired, free from rent,
in consideration of keeping the premises in repair and
paying all taxes, did not preclude the conclusion that
the instrument was a mortgage. It was further held
that while’ the grantor was in possession he had the
right to regard the deed simply as security until such
time as the grantee or his successors in interest de-
prived or attempted to deprive him of the possession.
The statute of limitations would not begin to run or
laches be imputed to the grantor until then.

On the whole case, the equities are with the ap-
pellants. We concur in the special chancellor’s con-
clusion the deed should be construed as a mortgage,
but differ with the decision that the appellants are
barred from their right to claim it to be such.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.

Copenhaver et al. v. Hemphill.
January 12, 1951,
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

Jay W. Harlan, C. Homer Neikirk, Sam C. Kennedy, Sandusky
& Krueger, W. N, Flippin and W. B. Morrow for appellants.

Leonard ®. Wilson, Phelps & Wilson, Lilburn Phelps, and Terill
A. Wilson for appellee.

Cuay, Commissionzr—Affirming.

This case involves competing claims to a tract of
land by virtue of descent. The Chancellor adjudged
appellee, a niece of the deceased, was rightfully en-
titled to the property. Appellants are relatives claim-
ing through the father of the deceased.

William Richardson died intestate, owning land
in Pulaski County. He was not survived by any children
or direct descendants. No brothers or sisters survived
him, but appellee claims the estate as the illegitimate
daughter of his brother Albert. The principal question
is whether or not appellee was legitimized under KRS
391.100 so that she may inherit from her putative father.

There is substantial proof that Albert was the
father of appellee, who was born at Cincinnati in 1902.
Prior to, and at that time Albert was living with one
Florence Gabbard, and he continued to live with her
for several years thereafter. Sufficient facts were shown
to establish that, under Ohio law, Albert and Florence
were parties to a common-law marriage, provided they
were not otherwise incapacitated from creating this
relationship.

At the time of appellee’s birth and until 1908,
Florence Gabbard was actually married to a Ken-
tuckian. Therefore, she was legally incompetent to
marry anyone else. Such being the case, appellee was
illegitimate.

KRS 391.090 provides that a bastard shall inherit
only from his mother and her kindred. KRS 391.100,
however, after declaring the issue of incestuous or
mixed marriages shall not be legitimate, provides in
Section 2: ‘‘The issue of all other illegal or void mar-
riages is legitimate.’’

358 es

It is admitted that the common-law marriage of
Albert and Florence was void at the time of appellee’s
birth, and they were not ceremonially wedded subse-
quent to that date, even though Florence was divorced
from her former husband in 1908.

Appellants first contend that since Florence was
legally married to another at the time of appellee’s
birth, the presumption is that the former’s husband was
her father and not Albert. It is true this presumption
exists, but there is ample evidence in the record to over-
come it. Florence had left her husband several years
before appellee’s birth; she was living with Albert at
that time; the birth certificate shows Albert as the
father; and he always acknowledged appellee as his
daughter. The Chancellor was clearly justified in find-
ing that appellee was Albert’s daughter.

The more serious contention is that since the mother
was not competent to contract a marriage of any kind,
no common-law marriage relationship could exist under
Ohio law, and therefore appellee could not be legitimated
even under our statute. In Harris v. Harris, 85 Ky.
49, 2. S.W. 549, the mother of children claiming an estate
had entered into a ceremonial marriage with their father
at a time when she was married to another. The Court
held that though the second purported marriage was
void from its inception, the children were legitimate
for the purpose of inheriting from their parents,

We can see no distinction between a void cere-
monial marriage and a void common-law marriage. The
intention of the statute was to protect the innocent vic-
tims of these illegal relationships, and with two ex-
ceptions, the legislature has declared that the issue of
void marriages shall be legitimate.

If appellee’s mother and Albert Richardson had
gone through a civil ceremony of marriage in Cincin-
nati, we think there would be no question of appellee’s
right to inherit from her father. Instead of doing this,
her parents so conducted themselves as to create the
relationship of common-law marriage. While in either
ease the marriage would be void, the legislature has
declared the issue shall be legitimate. The decision of
the Chancellor to this effect was correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

359

Hill v. City of Pineville.
January 12, 1951,
R. L. Maddox, Judge.

Cleon K, Calvert and James C. Helton for appellant.

Grant F. Knuckles, W. R. Lay, Lay, Hammond & Knuckles, and
‘W. R. Knuckles for appellee,

Cur Justice Cammack—Affirming.

This appeal involves the validity of a bond issue
voted by the City of Pineville. The sole question is

360 es
whether or not the City is confronted with an emergency
within the meaning of Section 158 of our Constitution.

Pineville is a city of the fourth class. Section 158
of the Constitution prohibits a city of that class from
creating an indebtedness in excess of five per cent of
the assessment of taxable property therein next beforé
the last assessment previous to the incurring of the in-
debtedness, ‘“‘unless in case of emergency, the public
health or safety should so require.’”? Admittedly, the
proposed bond issue would exceed this authorized limit.

Pineville is situated in the upper reaches of the
Cumberland River. Straight Creek empties into the
River within the city limits. The River itself borders
the City roughly on three sides, one portion of the City

. lying on the opposite side of the River from the City
proper. The City is subjected to recurring floods, the
last major one being in 1946. In that flood it was esti-
mated that property damage was in excess of one mil-
lion dollars. There is evidence that during these large
floods over 50 per cent of the homes are submerged in
whole or in part. During the floods the sewage disposal
plant, the water system, and the streets are damaged.
Silt, debris and raw sewage are left on the streets when
the water recedes. There is testimony that these con-
ditions create a serious health menace and tend to
produce epidemics. There is danger of flash floods which
threaten directly the lives of the citizens of Pineville.
Within recent years the timber from the Cumberland
watershed virtually has been depleted. As a result
there is much erosion, causing the soil to drain to the
river, thus filling its bed, which, in turn, materially
affects the height of the flood waters. Several witnesses
testified that since the depletion of the timber there has
been a marked increase in the height and intensity of
the floods.

Confronted by this situation, the City Council
called for submission of the question to the voters as
to whether or not they desired to encumber the City
in the sum of $547,000 for use in the construction of a
proposed flood wall. This question being answered in
the affirmative, the bond issue was authorized by ordi-
nance. This suit was filed by the City against Clarence
Hill, a resident and taxpayer of Pineville, under the

es 361

provisions of the Civil Code, Section 639a—1, to test
the validity of the proposed bond issue.

The Chancellor upheld the validity of the bond
issue, declaring that an emergency existed within the
meaning of Section 158 of the Constitution. He found
that, due to the removal of the timber in the river wa-
tershed, the severity of the floods which inundate the
City have been greatly increased; that this menace has
become so great, an emergency exists; and that, unless
this emergency is relieved by the establishment of a
flood wall, the health and safety of the inhabitants of
the City will be in constant danger. The appeal is
from that ruling. . .

It is contended there is no emergency because, at
the time the suit was filed, there was no flood and the
occurrence of a flood in the future is only a possibility.
We cannot agree with this view. To so hold would
limit the definition of an emergency to a situation in
which the citizens of the City actually would be involved
in disastrous conditions, or actually in the throes of a
flood. An impending disaster may be an emergency.
Somewhere in the causation of factors leading to an
event it may be said that, based on past experience, the
occurrence of that event is a probability and not a mere
possibility. It seems to us that the City of Pineville
is faced with such a probability.

There can be no hard and fast definition of the word
“‘emergency.’? This term is discussed elaborately in
City of Marion v. Haynes, 157 Ky. 687, 164 S.W. 79, 84.
In that case it was said: ‘‘And while we will not under-
take to lay down a rule by which an emergency under
section 158 of the Constitution is to be determined in
every case, it is. apparent that such an emergency is
some sudden or unexpected occasion for action, some
unforeseen occurrence, condition, or pressing necessity
that requires immediate attention.’’? See also Hurst v.
City of Millersburg, 220 Ky. 108, 294 S.W. 788. We
think the language used in the City of Marion case is
pertinent here because there is a ‘‘pressing necessity
that requires immediate attention.’’

The second contention of the appellant is that the
situation in Pineville is no more an emergency than has
existed for several years. In the City of Marion case

362

the Court noted the fact that the alleged emergency had
existed for a number of years, but we do not have that
situation here. The’ emergency in this case does not
arise from the fact that Pineville has always been sub-
jected to floods. The chancellor found that, due to the
change in the flood situation caused by the depletion of
the timber in the river watershed, there was an emer-
gency. Army engineers testified that the City could
expect a flood of much greater height than it had hereto-
fore experienced. .

It is our opinion that the City of Pineville is con-
fronted with such an emergency as is contemplated by
Section 158 of our Constitution.

Judgment affirmed.

Riddell v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kash.
Commonwealth Attorney.

January 12, 1951.

E, B. Beatty, Judge.

es 363

J. M. Wolfinbarger for appellant.
W. L. Kash for appellees.

Juvez Smuis—Reversing.

This appeal is prosecuted by Dan Riddell from a
judgment of the Estill Circuit Court wherein the Chan-
cellor declared a forfeiture of five lots owned by, Riddell
in the town of Irvine, upon which are located a couple
of small houses and residences. The forfeiture action
was brought pursuant to KRS 242.310 and 242.320. Re-
versal of the judgment is sought on the ground that
the evidence is not sufficient to show appellant, the owner
of the property, knew it was being used in violation
of the statutes.

There is practically no contrariety in the proof.
Twelve lots were sold in Irvine and appellant bought
five of them, being numbers 8 to 12, which were con-
veyed to him in one tract. The twelfth lot was 140
feet wide, while the remaining four fronted 100 feet on
the South Irvine Road and ran back to a canal for dis-
tances varying from 300 to 800 feet. Appellant leased
to Vernon Parsons lots No. 8, No. 9 and No. 10 for $15
per month. On lot No. 8 was a small house in which
Parsons lived and he used lots No. 9 and No. 10 for a
garden and chicken lot.

Lot No. 11 had been leased to one Stone, who used
it for a sawmill. Stone built a shack of slabs on this
lot in 1948 in which he lived. Formerly, there had been
a drive-in-theater on lots No. 9 and No. 10 on which
there was a small ticket office which was skidded onto
lot No. 11 when the theater ceased to operate. The saw-
mill and one of the small houses burned and Stone left
the property. Thereupon, appellant allowed Jesse Hardy

364 |

to occupy the remaining small building on lot No. 11
free of rent.

This property is not located in a very desirable
part of Irvine and is called ‘‘Slab Town.’’? On Nov. 23,
1948, the sheriff under a warrant, searched the small
building oceupied by Hardy and found a case of whis-
key, two cases of beer and two slot machines. Hardy
was fined $50 and given 30 days in jail for having in-
toxicating liquors in his possession for the purpose of
sale in local option territory; and was fined $300 for
operating the slot machines. Previous searches had
been made of these premises occupied by, Hardy but no
contraband was found. It appears from the record
there were no other violations of the liquor laws prior
or subsequent to the above mentioned conviction of
Hardy.

Several months before the search of the premises,
appellant had moved to Speedwell, in Madison County,
where he operated a store. Speedwell is about 22 miles
from Irvine and appellant ‘seldom visited this property
in Irvine, and testified he did not know Hardy had liquor
thereon, nor did he have any notice or intimation that
Hardy was using the little house on the premises to
engage in the illicit liquor business.

The Commonwealth proved the reputation of both
Hardy and appellant was bad for dealing in illegal
liquor, as well as the reputation of the premises occu-
pied by Hardy was likewise bad. But it failed to
bring home to appellant any knowledge or notice that
Hardy was using the premises for any illegal purpose.
It is urged by the Commonwealth that as there had
been several previous searches by officers of the premises
occupied by Hardy, appellant must have known he was
using them in the illicit liquor business. The answer
to that argument is that all previous searches were
fruitless and had appellant been aware of them, they
would not have been notice to him that Hardy was keep-
ing liquor on the premises for sale.

It has been written that evidence relating to a single
sale of illegal liquor, with attendant circumstances, was
sufficient to constitute a nuisance under KRS 242.310.
Beavin v. Com., 308 Ky. 522, 215 S.W.2d 119; Chaney
y. Com., Ky., 234 S.W.2d 960. The Beavin opinion

| 365

points out that the statute should be strictly construed,
and the Chaney opinion says it is a drastic measure and
before property may be forfeited under it, evidence
must clearly establish the existence of all the require-
ments of the statute, one of which is that the owner of
the property must know, or intend, the use to which the
property is to be put is for the unlawful purpose charged.

In the instant case the evidence fails to show clear-
ly that appellant, who for several months had lived in
another county some 22 miles from this property, knew
liquor was being kept on the premises for sale, or that
the reputation of the place or of Hardy was bad. Hav-
ing reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us
to consider whether only lot No. 11 or all the property
embraced in appellant’s deed was subject to forfeiture
under what was written in Rickman v. Com., 204 Ky. 848,
265 8.W. 452 and Froedge v. Com., 289 Ky. 168, 158

“8.W.2d 426,

The judgment is reversed with directions that the
chancellor enter one dismissing the petition.

Christian v. Commonwealth.
January 12, 1951.
James S. Forester, Judge.

366 |

F, M. Jones for appellant.

A. EL. Funk, Attorney General, Walter C. Herdman, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Cray, Commissionen—Reversing.

Appellant was convicted of operating an automo-
bile without the owner’s consent, and was sentenced to
serve three years in the state reformatory. On this ap-
peal he urges: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the conviction, and (2) he was entitled to an
instruction covering his defense.

A new Studebaker car was stolen from Clarence
Coleman. About 6:30 the next morning two members
of the Fayette County Police Patrol found the car stop-
ped on a highway near Lexington. Appellant, with four
other boys, was attempting to push the car up a hill be-
cause it was out of gasoline. One of the officers testified
appellant stated he was the driver of the car. When the
officers became suspicious, appellant attempted to es-
cape. The County Judge of Harlan County testified
appellant had told him that he had taken the car.

Appellant’s defense was that one of the other boys
was driving the car and he was simply a passenger
without knowledge it had been stolen.

Appellant argues that because there was no direct
proof that he took or operated the automobile, the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. He was,
however, with the others in joint possession of a stolen
automobile. It was not necessary that he actually drive
it. Lunce v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 706, 160 8.W.2d 3.
In addition, there is testimony he admitted he was the
driver, and he was attempting to escape. This proof
was ample as a basis for the conviction.

Appellant’s defense was that he did not know the
car was stolen, and was simply a passenger. The court
did not give a specific instruction covering this defense.
In Hobbs v. Commonwealth, 156 Ky. 847, 162 S.W. 104,
and Mays v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 558, 97 S.W.2d
419, this Court has held that under similar circumstances
such instruction should be given. .

The failure of the trial court to do so constitutes
reversible error.

The judgment is reversed for a new trial.
a

Inez Lumber & Supply Co. v. Ware et al.
January 12, 1951.
Edward P. Hill, Judge.

‘W. R. McCoy for appellant.
Earle Cassady for ‘appellees.

Juver Latimer—Affirming.

This action was brought by Inez Lumber & Supply
Company against E. C. Ware and Earle Cassady to
recover for damages done to a leased private road.

It appears that Inez Lumber & Supply Company
had a contract with the Joseph Oaker Stave Company
to remove timber from a tract owned by that Company,
and as a part of the agreement, the Inez Lumber &
Supply Company was to have use of a private road own-
ed by the Oaker Stave Company for the purpose of re-
moving its timber, and for that right was to assume the
responsibility of helping to keep the road in repair.
According to the pleading and claim of the Inez Lumber
& Supply Company, it had closed down its operations
for the winter of 1948 in order to preserve the road dur-
ing that portion of the season, and posted notices that

368 es

no heavy trucks or trucks with chains were to be used
on that private road.

It appears that E. C. Ware and Earle Cassady,
drilling contractors, were drilling a well for W. H. May
on lands adjacent to the road in question. Upon com-
pletion of the well, and at a time when appellant had
ceased its operations to preserve its road, these drilling
contractors moved their rig, casing and other equipment
out over this road. As a result of this hauling, and the
use of heavy trucks, appellant claims that its road was
damaged in the sum of $457, which represents the cost
of repairing and putting the road back in usable shape.
Judgment was sought in that amount.

Appellees, by answer, denied all of the allegations
of plaintiff’s petition, and by counterclaim prayed that
they recover of the plaintiff the sum of $90 for the use
of a bulldozer furnished appellant for work on the road.

Appellant by reply to answer and counterclaim
stated that when it approached EH. C. Ware to secure
the bulldozer, Ware advised that the bulldozer was in
West Virginia, but that, if plaintiff would bring the bull-
dozer to Martin County, it could use it two or three days
for the purpose of repairing the road; that plaintiff went
to West Virginia and procured the bulldozer and brought
it to the site of the road but that instead of being able
to use it for two or three days, as agreed, it was used
for about: 4 hours when Ware came and took the bull-
dozer ; that it cost at least $42 to bring the bulldozer from
West Virginia; that by reason of being deprived of its
use, as agreed, plaintiff has been damaged at least in
the sum of $50, and prayed as in its original petition and
for the further sum of $50.

Considerable proof was taken and the matter sub-
mitted to the jury. Verdict was returned in favor of
defendants.

The court overruled motion and grounds for new
trial and granted plaintiff an appeal to this Court.

Appellees ask that the appeal be dismissed on the
ground that the court below had no jurisdiction to grant
an appeal. The basis of this contention is that the suit
for damages was for less than $500. It will be observed,
according to the pleadings, that plaintiff, in its original

Le 369

petition, asked for $457, but in its reply to answer and
counterclaim of defendant sought the further sum of
$50, which brings the total above the $500, and within
the amount giving the court below jurisdiction to grant
an appeal.

‘We now consider appellant’s claim that the verdict
is not sustained by the evidence. The record discloses
quite a bit of contradictory evidence. There was evi-
dence to show that parties other than defendants used
and hauled heavy loads over this road, and that such use
by others caused the damage. There was evidence suf-.
ficient to justify the jury in its conclusion that defend-
ants were not responsible for any damage done to the
road.

The judgment is affirmed.

Baldwin v. Commonwealth.
January 12, 1951.
Loraine Mix, Judge.

—

370

Wilson K. Beatty for appellant.

A. H. Funk, Attorney General, Carl Ousley, Jr., Assistant Com-
monwealth Attorney, and John H. Dougherty for appellee.

Jupex Larimer—A firming.

This matter is before us on appeal from lower
eourt’s denial of writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant was arrested by an officer of the Police
Department of the City of Louisville, apparently on a
number of charges, among which was the charge of op-
erating a motor vehicle without a license.’’? It appears .
that some 9 or 10 months prior to this arrest, appellant
had been convicted of a drunken driving charge in the
Police Court of the City of Louisville. Appellant, when
faced with the charges in court, admitting driving with-
out an operator’s license. It appears that all the charges
were filed away, except that of operating without a li-
cense, on which charge appellant was fined $500 and sen-
tenced to 6 months imprisonment.

ee 371

Appellant, by his writ of habeas corpus, attacks the
jurisdiction of the Police Court to try the offense for
which he was convicted.

It is insisted that the offense herein is an indictable
offense, and being such, the Police Court had no jurisdic-
tion to prosecute in the absence of an indictment.

Let us look first to the question of jurisdiction of
city and police courts. Appellant first calls attention to
Subsection 4 of Section 13 of the Criminal Code of Prac-
tice, which provides: ‘‘City and police courts shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all prosecutions and acts, for
an infraction of the by-laws or ordinances of the city
or town in which they are located, and concurrent juris-
diction with the circuit courts, and justices’ courts, of
prosecutions for misdemeanors committed in the town
or city, the punishment of which is a fine not exceeding
one hundred dollars, and, also, such jurisdiction as is,
or may be, provided by the special statutes creating or
regulating stich courts.’’

It is contended that this section is in conflict with
KRS 26.010, which provides: ‘‘Except as provided in
KRS 167.990, 199.990 and 242.990, police courts in cities
of every class have jurisdiction exclusive of circuit
courts in all penal and misdemeanor cases where the
punishment is limited to a fine of not more than twenty
dollars, jurisdiction concurrent with circuit courts of all
penal and misdemeanor cases where the punishment is
limited to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars,
or imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or both,
and exclusive jurisdiction of all violations of city ordin-
ances, occurring within the city limits.’’

It is pointed out that the section of the Criminal
Code of Practice above gives concurrent jurisdiction
with the circuit court and justices’ courts of all prosecu-
tions for misdemeanors committed in the town or city,
the punishment of which is a fine not exceeding $100;
whereas, in KRS 26.010 the police court, in cities of
every class, has concurrent jurisdiction with circuit
courts of all penal and misdemeanor cases where the
punishment is limited to a fine of not more than $500
or imprisonment not exceeding 12 months, or both.

‘We need only call attention to the latter part of sub-
section 4 of the section of the Criminal Code of Prac-

372 eS

tice above, which provides: ‘‘* * * and, also, such juris-
diction as is, or may be, provided by the special statutes
creating or regulating such courts.’’? Thus, we see that
any such supposed conflict disappears because we do
have the ‘‘and, also, such jurisdiction’? provided by
statutes. Under the provision of the statute above, the
police court had jurisdiction of the offense.

‘We must next pass to the question of whether or
not, after having jurisdiction, the police court may pros-
ecute this charge on information or warrant. KRS
455.080 provides: ‘‘In circuit court, persons charged
with misdemeanors for which the highest penalty that
may be imposed is a fine of one hundred dollars and
imprisonment for fifty days may be prosecuted by war-
rant or by information filed by the Commonwealth’s at-
torney or county attorney in the circuit court. In courts
hiferior to circuit courts, any offense within the juris-
diction of the court may be prosecuted on a warrant or
information filed before the judge or justice. The infor-
mation shall be signed by the officer filing it, and shall
state the nature of the offense charged. When the in-
formation is filed, the judge or justice shall at once
issue a warrant or summons against the offender, com-
manding him to appear, within three days, at the time
and before the court, judge or justice mentioned there-
in, and the amount of bail that he may give for his ap-
pearance shall be specified in the warrant or summons.
The warrant or summons may be directed to any peace
officer, and shall be returned by him before the court,
judge or justice mentioned in the warrant or summons.’’

It is pointed out that by the above section circuit
courts can prosecute by warrant or information only
such misdemeanors for which the highest penalty that
may be imposed is a fine of $100 and imprisonment for
50 days, and that, had appellant been tried in the circuit
court, it would have been necessary to have prosecuted
only on indictment.

It is contended that it would be a ridiculous position
to hold that circuit courts are more limited in jurisdic-
tion, with respect to prosecutions on information or
warrant, than inferior courts. However, that is precisely
the statutory provision.

It seems originally to have been the general rule
that even misdemeanors were tried in the higher courts

ee 373

of criminal jurisdiction. only on indictment, while in
inferior courts information, complaint, or warrant was
the proper form of accusation. Obviously, KRS 455.080
was enacted to expedite procedure in circuit courts by
providing for prosecution of misdemeanors on informa-
tion or warrant. This, in fact, was an enlargement on
the prevailing practice rather than a limitation. It may
appear somewhat paradoxical to limit a cireuit court’s
jurisdiction to an indictment while in the same case
an inferior court may take jurisdiction on information
or warrant. This is purely a legislative matter. The
statute creates the offense, consequently, it may au-
thorize the form of accusation, unless same be violative
of. and in conflict with constitutional provisions or guar-
anties.

Appellant calls attention to 306 of the Criminal .
Code of Practice which provides that no indictment
shall be necessary unless the punishment of the of-
fense exceeds a fine of $100 or confinement for 30 days.
It is argued that this requires an indictment if the
punishment exceeds that provision. The enactment of
306 of the Criminal Code of Practice antedates KRS
455.080 by approximately three-quarters of a century.
Consequently 306 of the Criminal Code of Practice, in
so far as there is inconsistency with KRS 455.080, stands
repealed.

In the absence of constitutional provisions, requir-
ing an indictment or prohibiting an information or war-
rant, an offense may be prosecuted by information
under statute, and such action has been universally held
not to be in violation of the Federal Constitution.

It is argued that, since the maximum penalty is a
fine of $500 and imprisonment of not more than 6 months,
this is an indictable offense within the meaning of Sec-
tion 12 of the Constitution and under Sections 13 and
306 of the Criminal Code of Practice. We have hereto-
fore disposed of Sections 13 and 306 of the Criminal
Code of Practice. It is entirely unnecessary to go into
an extended discussion of Section 12 of the Constitu-
tion. Much has been written with respect thereto and
elaborate discussions in numerous opinions have been
made as to the meaning of infamous crime and indict-
able offense.

374 CSC

We have repeatedly held that the class, of misde-
meanors, as involved herein, does not belong to that
class of crimes declared to be infamous. In the case of
‘Wackenthaler v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 316, 289 S. W.
225, the defendant was given $100 fine and 30 days in
jail, which also included imprisonment at hard labor.
It was contended that because of the hard labor attach-
tent to penalty the defendant was charged with an in-
famous crime, and that, under Section 12 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, he could be proceeded against only
by indictment. Attention was directed in that case to
the fact that the question had been decided adverse-
ly to appellant’s contention in Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky.
240, 242 S. W. 632. Hubbard v. Dorr, 204 Ky. 222, 263
S. W. 736, and Weaver v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 723,
277 8. W. 1021, holding the same, are also cited with
approval. In Weaver v. Commonwealth, the question is
rather exhaustively treated.

Since the offense is statutory in origin and statu-
tory in penalty, and not an indictable offense within the
meaning of Section 12 of the Constitution, we hold there
to be no violation of any section of our Constitution.

The court below properly denied the writ.

i
Lee et al. v. Kash et al.
December 5, 1950.
Rehearing Denied January 16, 1951.
Ervine Turner, Judge.

P| 315

Blmer C. Roberts and F, T. Allen for appellants.

J. Douglas Graham, I. M. Combs, A. E. Funk, Attorney General,
and Zeb A, Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Juves Cammack—Affirming.

In March, 1949, we refused to take jurisdiction of
three Commonwealth cases in which Swannie Coomer
was the appellant and one in which Tommie Lee was
the appellant, because none of the records contained a
judgment. Subsequently, the judge of the Wolfe Circuit
Court entered a nunc pro tune judgment in each of the
eases. In the present action Lee and Coomer sought to
enjoin the sheriff and clerk of Wolfe County from pro-
ceeding under the nune pro tune judgments, and also to
have those judgments set aside. The appeal is from a
judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition.

The petition recites the proceedings in this Court
in the Commonwealth cases. It is alleged also that the
nune pro tune judgments were entered in violation of
the Civil Code of Practice. There is no allegation of
facts, however, stating in what manner the judgments
were void, nor as to why the court was without juris-
diction to enter them. The records in the Commonwealth
eases show that those trials were regular in all respects
except for the entry of the judgments upon the verdicts
of guilty. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary
showing, there were sufficient memoranda to warrant
the entry of the nunc pro tune judgments.

Judgment affirmed.

Kreiger et al. v. Kreiger et al.
October 3, 1950.
As Extended on Denial of Rehearing December 5, 1950.
‘W. Scott Miller, Judge.

376

Albert F. Reutlinger for appellants.
Marvin J. Sternberg for appellees.

Jupen Herm—Reversing.

The question presented here is the reasonableness
of the $1500 fee fixed by the Chancellor for appellee Mar-
vin J. Sternberg’s services as warning order attorney.

In 1904 Bridget McDonough died testate, a resident
of Louisville. By her will she devised certain real prop-
erty to the Fidelity Trust Company in trust for her
daughter, Tessie Kreiger, during her natural life, with
remainder to the children of Tessie Kreiger living at
her death, share and share alike. She also devised cer-
tain real property to the Trust Company in trust for
her son, Robert E. McDonough, during his natural life,
and provided: ‘‘* * * At the death of my said son, the
property named in this clause shall go to any child or
children which my said son may have surviving him. If
my son should die without leaving any surviving chil-
dren, then said property shall go to my daughter, Tessie
Kreiger, for the term of her natural life, if she then
be living, remainder to her surviving children. If my
said daughter is not living at the death of my said son, .
then said property shall go to the surviving children
of my said daughter, share and share alike.’’

The son predeceased his sister, without issue or
descendants. Tessie Kreiger is now dead. She had four
children; a son, John E. Kreiger, who predeceased his
mother, leaving as his only issue and heir at law appellee
Joan Kreiger, an infant over the age of 14, and three

Pe aT

other children—the appellants Stewart Kreiger, Mary
Z. Paul, and Tessie C. Pearce.

Under the will of Bridget McDonough the question
as to whether or not the testatrix intended her great-
grandchildren to benefit by the terms of her will, or only
such of her grandchildren as were ‘‘living at the death’”’
of Tessie Kreiger or were her ‘‘surviving children,’’
was presented.

To settle the title to the property this declaratory
judgment action was filed in the Jefferson Cireuit Court.
Appellee Joan Kreiger, a great-grandchild of testatrix,
is a nonresident infant. Honorable Marvin J. Sternberg
was appointed warning order attorney for her. He ad-
vised appellee Joan Kreiger of the pendency of this
action and filed his report as warning order attorney.
The case was submitted on the pleadings and his report.
The Chancellor adjudged that the ‘‘facts as presented
in the record vests an undivided one-fourth interest in
the defendant, Joan Kreiger, in and to any real estate
located in the State of Kentucky passing under the
terms of said will.’’ This judgment was entered June 7,
1949. No appeal has been filed from this declaration of
rights.

On August 17, 1949, appellee, as warning order
attorney for the nonresident infant, Joan Kreiger, filed
his motion for allowance of a fee for his services render-
ed in her behalf. He set out in his motion that he was
appointed on February 3, 1949; that he notified the -
defendant of the appointment and of the nature and
pendency of this action; that he made a detailed study
of the will of Bridget McDonough; that after a careful
study of the applicable law he concluded that Joan
Kreiger was entitled to a one-fourth interest in the real
estate of her great-grandmother ; that he filed his report
to this effect; that the case was heard orally by the
Chancellor; that the value of the estate of testatrix is
$29,028.27; that Joan is entitled to one-fourth of this
amount or $7,257.07. The Chancellor allowed him $1500
for his services.

On September 15, 1949, appellants filed their motion
to set aside the order of August 17, 1949, setting a fee
for the warning order attorney. The affidavits of at-
torneys Albert F'. Reutlinger, Lawrence S.. Grauman,

378 ee

Louis Seelbach, and Gavin H. Cochran were filed in
support of the motion. The affidavits of attorneys Lovell
M. Humphrey and Richard L. Drye were filed in behalf
of the warning order attorney.

Mr. Reutlinger’s affidavit sets out that he is attorney
for appellants; that he prepared all the pleadings, except
the report of the warning order attorney, and prepared
the judgment; that before the oral hearing he furnished
the warning order attorney with citation of authority,
both for and against plaintiff’s position; that the oral
hearings, the only hearing before the court, consumed
not more than 45 minutes; that the warning order at-
torney did not furnish the court any brief or memor-
andum other than his report.

' Mr. Grauman stated that he had examined the rec-
ord carefully, including the affidavit of the warning
order attorney relative to his services, and that in his
opinion $350 would be a reasonable fee for the services
of the warning order attorney.

Mr. Seelbach stated that he had examined the rec-
ord carefully, and that in his opinion $500 would be a
fair and reasonable fee for the services of the warning
order attorney.

‘Mr. Cochran stated that he had examined carefully
the record and affidavit of the warning order attorney
and took into consideration the following facts: (1)
That appellants’ attorney furnished the warning order
attorney a list of authorities; (2) that the oral hearing
consumed only approximately 45 minutes; and (3)
that the principal purpose and result of this litigation
was simply to get an authoritative determination by
the court with respect to the title of the real estate in-
volved, and that appellants acceded to and did not intend
to appeal from the judgment of the Chancellor. In his
epinion the sum of $300 would be a fair and reasonable

ee.

Mr. Humphrey stated that Mr. Sternberg devoted
“many hours in his office and in the Louisville Law
Library in research of the law applicable to this case’’;
that he conferred with the attorney for appellants; that
he discussed the case with other lawyers, including Mr.
Humphrey ; that Mr. Sternberg concluded that the infant
appellee was entitled to one-fourth of the estate to be

a 319

distributed; that this was his duty because he was warn-
ing order attorney for an infant not represented in
court by counsel. He did not suggest the amount that
should be allowed.

Mr. Drye stated that Mr. Sternberg talked with him
about the facts and circumstances of the case; that Mr.
Sternberg spent much time in reading, studying and
analyzing the applicable cases and treatises; that after
his study and research he expressed the opinion that
Joan was the owner of an undivided one-fourth interest
in the property involved. Mr. Drye did not suggest the
amount that should be allowed.

On September 19 the court overruled the motion to
set aside the order of August 17, 1949. Appellants ap-
peal, maintaining that the fee of $1500 is greatly in ex-
cess of fees allowed in similar cases.

Our Civil Code of Practice, section 59(6), providing
for warning order attorneys, is: ‘‘The provisions of sub-
section 4 of section 38 apply with reference to the
compensation of such attorneys.’’ Civil Code, section
38(4), provides: ‘““The court shall allow to the guardian
ad litem a reasonable fee for his services, to be paid by
the plaintiff and taxed in the costs, The affidavit of such
guardian, or of another person, or other competent
evidence, is admissible to prove the services rendered,
‘but not to prove their value. The court must decide con-
cerning such value, without reference to the opinions of
parties or other witnesses.’’

In Craven’s Committee v. Tolin, 189 Ky. 544, 225
8. W. 365, Mr. Tolin, an attorney appointed guardian
ad litem for an aged widow adjudged insane, skillfully
managed a case, in which it was sought to have a renun-
ciation by the widow of rights under her husband’s will
withdrawn, so that approximately $12,000 was saved to
the widow’s estate. The guardian ad litem filed a de-
murrer to the petition, which was finally sustained. He
also filed an answer and cross-petition on behalf of Mrs.
Craven. To this answer and cross-petition a demurrer
was filed and overruled. The plaintiffs stood upon their
demurrer and appealed to this court. The judgment was
affirmed. Appellee briefed the case in this court. Upon
a return of the case to the lower court, the guardian ad
litem was allowed $1,000. Upon appeal to this court
his fee was reduced to $600,

380 ee

Section 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
the American Bar Association provides:

“In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid: charges which
overestimate their advice and services, as well as those
which undervalue them. * * *

‘In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper
to consider: (1) the “time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the
acceptance of employment in the particular case will
preclude the lawyer’s appearance for others in cases
likely to arise out of the transaction, * * * (3) the
customary charges of the Bar for similar services; (4) .
the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the services; (5) the con-

‘ tingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6)
the character of the employment, whether casual or for
an established and constant client. * * *’? See Wilhoit
v. Brown, 295 Ky. 732, 175 8S. W. 2d 529; Martin v. Mar-
tin’s Ex’rs, 311 Ky. 164, 223 8. W. 2d 345.

With the above rules in mind, and without reference
to the amounts set out in the above affidavits, under all
the facts and circumstances of this case we believe that
$500 is a fair and reasonable allowance.

The judgment is reversed with direction to allow
appellee Sternberg a fee of $500.

a
Reeves v. Fenley’s Model Dairy, Inc.
January 16, 1951.

W. Scott Miller, Judge.

|
| }
|
ws
@
rs

A. EB. Funk, Attorney General, Hal. 0. Williams, Assistant At-
torney General, for appellant.

Henry L. Brooks for appellee.

Jupven Herm—Affirming in part and reversing in
part on defendant’s appeal and affirming on cross appeal.

Appellee, Fenley’s Model Dairy, Inc., brought this
declaratory judgment action asking an exemption under
KRS 136.240(2) from payment of the utilities gross re-
ceipts tax on electric current and gas used by it in its
manufacturing and processing business. Appellee is en-
gaged in the dairy business, including the process of
preparing fiuid milk for retail and wholesale distribu-

382 ee)

tion, and the manufacturing of dairy products such as
cheddar and cottage cheese, condensed and evaporated
milk, ice cream and ice cream mix, flavored drinks and
butter. ;

Appellant demurred to appellee’s petition as amend-
ed. The parties filed a stipulation as to Regulation TL2
of the Department of Revenue. The Chancellor overruled .
the demurrer to plaintiff’s petition as amended. Appel-
lant declined to plead further. The Chancellor entered a
judgment from which appellant has appealed. Appellee
eross-appeals.

It is admitted that the exemption applies to the use
of electric current and gas used by appellee in manufac-
turing its products. The only questions here are: ‘‘(1)
Is the preparation of fluid milk for distribution ‘process-
ing’ and the utilities utilized specifically exempt from
the utilities gross receipt tax, and (2) is the regulation
of the Department of Revenue denying the tax exemp-
tion unless separate meters are installed to measure the
exempt and nonexempt use of utilities a reasonable reg-
ulation?’’

The applicable part of KRS 136.240(2) is: ‘No °
tax is imposed * * * upon the sale of electric current or
artificial or natural gas for use in manufacturing, pro-
cessing, mining or refining.’

Webster defines ‘‘process”’ as: ‘‘'T'o subject to some
special process of treatment. Specif.: (a) To heat, as
fruit, with steam under pressure, so as to cook or ster-
ilize. (b) To subject (esp. raw material) to a process of
manufacture, development, preparation for the market,
etc.; to convert into marketable form, as livestock by
slaughtering, grain by milling, cotton by spinning, milk
by pasteurizing, fruits and vegetables by sorting and
packinig.”? See, Sugar Creek Creamery Co. v. Walker,
1945, 208 Ark. 639, 187 S. W. 2d 178.

The Chancellor made a declaration of rights and
entered judgment as follows:

“*(1) An actual controversy exists between the
plaintiff and defendant. .

(2) The manufacturing of dairy products such as
cheddar and cottage cheese, condensed and evaporated
milk, ice cream and ice cream mix, flavored drinks, and

es

butter is ‘manufacturing’ and the. utilities used by the
plaintiff in manufacturing are exempt from the utilities
gross receipts tax.

(3) The preparation of raw milk by pasteuriza-
tion for retail or wholesale distribution is ‘processing’
and this includes the receiving of raw milk, inspection,
standardization, pasteurization, and/or homogenization
and the bottling and packaging of the pasturized milk,
and the use by the plaintiff of electrical current, water,
artificial, natural or mixed gas in this process is exempt
from the utilities gross receipts tax.

“(4) The use by the plaintiff of electrical current,
water, artificial, natural or mixed gas in the lighting or
ventilation of its plant, the rest rooms and office space
reasonably necessary and essential to the proper oper-
ation of the businesses of manufacturing and processing
is a part of its manufacturing and processing businesses
and is exempt from the utilities gross receipts tax.

‘«(5) The plaintiff’s use of utilities for the sale and
distribution of its products is not a part of the manu-
facturing and processing business of the plaintiff and
the utilities so used by the plaintiff in its sales office,
display room, garage, and office quarters which are used
for purposes other than those essential and germane to
the manufacturing and processing business of plaintiff
are not exempt from the utilities gross receipts tax.

(6) The regulation of the defendant, Department
of Revenue, known as TL2, approved August 29, 1949,
is as follows: ‘With respect to the exemption of electric
current and artificial or natural gas used in manufac-
turing, processing, mining or refining, * .* * it is the
opinion of this Department that the law imposes the
tax on all of the water, current, or gas furnished through
one meter, if any of the water, current or gas furnished
through that meter is taxable. In case all of the water,
current, or gas furnished through a meter is used for
exempted purposes except a part which is sold at a flat
rate to a ‘second party, the tax is imposed only on the
receipts from the flat rate sales.? This regulation is a
proper, reasonable and legal regulation within the
powers of the Department of Revenue and is binding on
the plaintiff and all others similarly situated.

a EE

‘¢(7) Electrical current, artificial, natural or mixed
gas used by the plaintiff in its manufacturing and pro-.
cessing businesses as defined herein are not exempt
from the utilities gross receipts tax unless separate
meters are provided to measure the exempt and the non-
exempt use of such utilities.’

In Items 8 and 4 of his judgment, the Chancellor
included water with electrical current and gas. In KRS
136.240(2) no tax is imposed upon sales of electric cur-
rent, water or gas for the purpose of resale, but water
is excluded from that part of that section applicable to
manufacturing, processing, mining or refining. With this
exception, we believe the Chancellor reached the correct
conclusions.

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
part on the appeal, and affirmed on the cross-appeal.

Stockdale v. Eads et al. (two cases).
January 16, 1951.

Ward Yager, Judge.

| 385

William G. Reed for appellants,
R. L, Hardin and Howell W. Vincent for appellees,

Jupes Moremun—Reversing.

The cause of action stated in the petition arose out
of an automobile collision between a 1941 Chevrolet, four
door sedan operated by appellant, Harl A. Stockdale, and
a milk truck driven by one of the appellees, C. H. Felt-
house. Appellants, Harl A. Stockdale and Bessie Stock-
dale, his wife, filed petitions seeking the recovery of
damages to person and to property. The court ordered
the two actions to be tried together. Upon the trial of
the causes, ‘at the conclusion of the introduction of evi-
dence in behalf of appellants, upon motion of appellees,
the court peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the
appellees, We are now confronted with the question as
to whether or not this instruction was properly given.

The evidence introduced by appellants discloses
that on the morning of April 16, 1948, appellant, Earl
A. Stockdale, was driving a car, owned by his wife,
Bessie Stockdale, upon a rural highway, which was
twenty feet in width and surfaced with crushed stone.
At the time he was being followed by the milk truck op-
erated by Felthouse. Stockdale testified, that when he
reached a point about one hundred feet from the ap-
proach to his garage which was situated'on the left
hand side of the road in the direction in which he was

386 |

moving, without looking backward, he extended his. hand
and gave signal for a left hand turn. Appellees’ milk
truck struck his automobile at about the left rear door
as he made the turn. Bessie Stockdale who was standing
on the right hand side of the road corroborated her
husband’s testimony.

The Trial Court explained his peremptory instrue-
tion to the jury by saying:

‘That the law provides that every person operating
a vehicle on the highway, before turning, stopping, or
changing the course of the vehicle, and before turning
the vehicle when starting it, shall first see that there is
sufficient space for the change or turn to be made in
safety. According to the proof in this case, Mr. Stock-
dale himself testified and the record will show, that he
never, at any time, looked back to see whether there
was an automobile or truck approaching him from the
rear. And it is the opinion of the Court that Mr. Stock- .
dale is charged with negligence as a matter of law * * *.’”
KRS 189.380, which has been since amended, but which
was in force at the time of the accident reads, in part:

*“(1) No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct
course upon a highway until the movement can be made
with reasonable safety * * * or after giving an appro-
priate signal as provided by subsection (2), if any other
vehicle may be affected by the movement. A signal of
intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously
for not less than the last hundred feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning. * * *

“«(2) Every person operating a vehicle on the high-
way before turning, stopping or changing the course of
the vehicle and before turning the vehicle when starting
it shall first see that there is sufficient space for the
change or turn to be made in safety, and if it appears
that the movement or operation of another vehicle may
reasonably be affected by the change he shall give plainly
visible signals to the operator of the other vehicle of
his intention to change, turn or stop. * * *””

The foregoing statute places a duty upon a driver
about to change the course of his vehicle, first, to see
that there is sufficient space for the turn to be made in
safety, and if it appears that the movement of another
vehicle may be reasonably affected, he is charged with

Le 387

the second duty to give a proper signal designating
his intention. If, as he approaches the point at which he
intends to turn, no vehicle is in sight which might rea-
sonably be affected by the change in direction, he is
under no duty to give any signal. If it appears that an-
other vehicle may be affected, he then becomes charged
with the additional duty to give a proper signal, for a
space not less than the last hundred feet traveled before
turning.

This statute, KRS 189.380, deals with signals that
a driver must give in order to warn operators of other
vehicles of his intention to change his course and defines
the circumstances under which it is mandatory that vis- -
ual warnings be given. But when the proper signal is
given under appropriate conditions it is not necessary
to look to the driver’s motive or reason why he gave
the proper signal, or to the stimuli which prompted his
action. That he gave the correct signal is enough.

We are of the opinion that the appellees were not
entitled to a peremptory instruction. This is the second
appearance of this case before this court. On the former
appeal, Hads v. Stockdale, 310 Ky. 446, 220 S. W. 2d 971,
we held that under the evidence produced at the first
trial, appellees were not entitled to a peremptory in-
struction. The facts produced at the second trial were
substantially the same as those presented for appellant
at the first trial, with the exception of testimony given
by Felthouse who when examined as if under cross ex-
amination could not remember whether he had testified
at the first trial that appellant had given a signal of his
intention to turn. However, the evidence of said witness
is not binding on appellant, and since the salient and
controlling facts shown by the testimony presented in
behalf of appellant at both trials are the same, the opin-
ion of this court on the first appeal is conclusive.

Appellees’ motion for a peremptory should have
been overruled. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse
the judgment and remand the case for consistent pro-
ceedings.

Judgment reversed.

388

Flynn v. Commonwealth.
January 16, 1951,
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

J. S. Sandusky for appellant.

A. H, Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Jupezr Morzrmmn—Reversing.

Chester Flynn was convicted of having intoxicating
liquor in his possession in local option territory for the
purpose of sale and the punishment was fixed at a fine
of $100 and costs, and imprisonment in the county jail
for a period of thirty days. He assigns three grounds
for reversal of the judgment: (1) the court erred in not
sustaining appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruc-
tion; (2) the commonwealth failed to produce the search
warrant at the trial; and (3) the affidavit upon which
the search warrant was issued was insufficient. We have
concluded that the first ground is well taken and, there-
fore, it will not be necessary to discuss the other points
raised.

Appellant, Chester Flynn, lives in the western part
of Pulaski County. On a night in November 1949, Hver-
ett Dagley, deputy sheriff, Harold Yates, J..W. Grims-

es 3e9

ley, assistant jailer, and J. S. Strunk, county policeman,
searched Flynn’s residence.

Dagley testified that when the party arrived at
Flynn’s home, he and J. §. Strunk knocked on the door
several times, and waited for appellant to get his clothes
on; in five or ten minutes Flynn came to the door. J. 8.
Strunk and Harold Yates went in, while he searched the
premises outside the house. He stated that he found no
intoxicating liquors.

Harold Yates stated that while the party was wait-
ing for Flynn to open the door, ‘‘I went on the back porch
and tried the back door and it was locked and the shade
was down on the door glass and someone was inside the
kitchen, about where the kitchen stove was, pouring out
some liquid out of a bottle or jug about the kitchen
stove* * *.’? He returned to the front door, entered the
house and, after the search warrant was read, the party
opened the reservoir to the kitchen stove, found it con-
tained one or two gallons of water which had the odor
of clorox and which had had some whiskey poured in
with it. He found within a foot or two of the stove a
bottle of clorox, a bleaching compound, and four empty
half pint whiskey bottles sitting on the floor with the
bottle caps nearby. On the floor near the stove was a
small amount of a substance which he stated was whis-

key. He reached this conclusion by smelling it. He did not
taste it.

J. W. Grimsley arrived at. Flynn’s home immediate-
ly after the other men, and was there when Yates came
out of the house with a bottle in his hand. He tasted the
contents of the bottle and was of the opinion that it
was whiskey. He also tasted the liquid on the floor and
said, ‘‘It was a bottle of whiskey on the floor, nothing
funny tasting to that but there was alcohol in that other
water.’’ It is difficult to determine from this witness’s
testimony the exact nature of the substance he believes
he found there, for example, on cross examination he
stated:

“Q. 5. You did not find any whiskey? A. Yes, sir,
found whiskey.

“Q. 6. How many gallons? A. I judge, counting the
whiskey and all, two or three gallons.

390 |

“Q. 7. Who said that was whiskey? A. I said there
was alcohol in it.

“¢Q. 8. How much clorox? A. There was liquor in
it.”

It was. proven by several witnesses that appellant’s
reputation for dealing in intoxicating liquors was bad.

J. 8. Strunk corroborated in general the testimony
given by the other witnesses and in response to a ques-
tion concerning what was found in the reservoir of the
stove, answered, ‘Well, there had been clorox poured
in there and liquor or either it smelled like it, the five
bottles went in there, it smelled like it.”? He saw a wet
spot on the floor but did not examine it.

Defendant and his wife, who testified on his behalf,
denied that Flynn took more than two or three minutes
to respond to the knock at their door and stated that
there was no liquor in their house at the time the officers
made the raid. They stated that they had jointly con-
sumed the contents of the four or five half pint bottles
that were found, which they had purchased for their
‘own personal consumption, and that the water contain-
ing clorox had been poured into the reservoir of the
kitchen stove for the purpose of cleaning it. They fur-
ther stated that they did not at any time pour into the
water reservoir of the kitchen stove any liquor nor be-
tween the time the officers knocked on the door and the
time when it was opened to them, which seems to be the
theory upon which the commonwealth based its case.

Appellant also produced a number of his neighbors
who testified to his good reputation in the community
in which he lives.

We believe that the testimony introduced in behalf
of the commonwealth fails to establish that intoxicating
liquor, possessed for the purpose of sale, was found on
the premises. At most, the evidence discloses only min-
ute traces of liquor with an accompanying odor. Hach
witness hazards his own guess as to the ingredients
which made up contents of the reservoir of the stove, but
no witness clearly and positively identifies any liquor
which might conceivably be on hand for the purpose of
sale. We believe that the proof adduced is not of the
quality that warrants conviction.

es 3a

It is true that a number of witnesses testified that
appellant was reputed to be engaged in trafficking in
intoxicating liquors, and KRS 242.390 reads: ‘‘In any
action for violation of this chapter, the general reputa-
tion of the defendant for bootlegging or being engaged
in selling, or trading in, alcoholic beverages, or keeping
or transporting them for sale, shall be admissible in
evidence against him.’’ .

But we have never held that evil reputation alone
is sufficient to sustain conviction. Cravens v. Common-
wealth, 205 Ky. 738, 266 S. W. 625; Gossett v. Common-
wealth, 274 Ky. 215, 118 8. W. 2d 528; De Attley v.
Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 112, 220 S. W. 2d 106, 107. In
the De Attley case, the arresting officer found two pints
of whiskey and a third pint bottle which was about one
third full. Evidence of defendant’s bad reputation for
trafficking or keeping alcoholic beverages for sale in
local option territory was produced in behalf of the
commonwealth. We said: ‘‘In the instant case there was
just a fraction over two pints of liquor found in appel-
lants’ possession and some empty beer bottles and cans.
The uncontradicted testimony was that the whiskey was
for Charles De Attley’s personal use and that the beer
likewise had been for the personal use of his sister-in-
law. While the jury is not compelled to accept the un-
contradicted testimony of the accused as true, Dixon
v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 469, 161 8. W. 2d 913, yet
where the surrounding circumstances tend to support
him and practically the only damaging evidence the
Commonwealth has introduced is that of the bad reputa-
tion of the accused, a verdict of guilty is not supported
by the evidence. We have many times written that a
conviction in a criminal case cannot be sustained by evi-
dence amounting to no more than a conjecture or sus-
picion, and when the evidence produces no more than
that, a verdict should be directed in favor of the ac-
cused.’?

In the De Attley case, over two pints of whiskey
were found, and the jury was required to. surmise and
speculate as to whether or not the defendant had the
whiskey in his possession for the purpose of sale. In
the instant case the jury was not only permitted to spec-
-wlate concerning whether any intoxicating liquor for
sale was found in appellant’s possession, but in addition

392 ee
was required to speculate as to whether appellant had
any intoxicating liquor in his possession at all. We held
in the De Attley case that the evidence must present
more than a suspicion that the liquor seized was in
possession for the purposes of sale. It follows that the
evidence must, first, establish that liquor was found
and, second, that it was possessed for the purpose of
sale. The evidence produced in this case fails to estab-
lish either one of the two elements which must be proved
before a conviction may be sustained.

The judgment is reversed with directions that if
another trial is had and the evidence is substantially the
same as that given on the first trial in the Cireuit Court,
the Court will direct a verdict in favor of appellant.

Travelers Ins. Co. et al. v. Carter et al.
January 16, 1951,
William J. Baxter, Judge.

D. L. Pendleton for appellants.
Redwine & Redwine for appellees.

Cur Justice Cammacx—Reversing.

The appellee, Frank I. Carter, filed this Declaratory
Judgment action against the appellants, Travelers In-
surance Company, Earl B. Whitfield, its state manager
and chief officer in Kentucky, William Beck, a field agent,
adjuster and attorney for the Company, and the ap-
pellee, David J. Huls, to obtain the production of a
certain written statement. Mr. Huls filed an answer, con-
senting to the surrender of the paper sought, but the
appellants demurred specially and generally to the pe-
tition. Upon the court’s overruling of the demurrers,
the appellants failed to plead further and judgment was
rendered as prayed, from which this appeal is taken.

The petition alleges that Carter was an employee
of the appellee, Huls, and suffered some injury, for
which he claimed compensation; that the Travelers In-
surance Company is Huls’ insurance carrier; that, when
Carter filed his claim with the Workmen’s Compensation
Board, he was informed that the Travelers Insurance
Company was refusing to pay the claim, based on a
written statement signed by Carter to the effect that his
injury existed before the date of the accident; that
William Beck, adjuster for the Travelers Insurance
Company, prepared a statement, which Carter signed
without question upon the assurance by Beck that he
would be paid for his lost time and his doctor and hos-
pital bills; that Carter did not know then, and does not
know now, the contents of the written statement; that
knowledge of its contents is necessary in order for him
to prepare and fully present his claim to the Compensa-
tion Board; that the appellants have failed and refused
to deliver the written statement or a copy of it to him;
and that he (Carter) has no adequate remedy at law.

The summary of the petition shows that a claim
has been filed and a proceeding instituted before the
Workmen’s Compensation Board. In Moore v. Louis-

394 |

ville Hydro-Electric Company, 226 Ky. 20, 10 8. W. 2d
466, it was held that, where a proceeding was pending
before the Workmen’s Compensation Board, the Court
had no jurisdiction to determine in a Declaratory Judg-
ment action matters going to the merits of the case be-
fore the Board. It is true that the Moore case did not
mention procedural.matters, but in the case of Jefferson
County ex rel. Coleman v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 33 8. W.
2d 601, 603, we held that: ‘‘* * * the act (Declaratory
J udgment) was not designed, and is not suitable, for
the determination of the procedural rules, or the dec-
laration of the substantive rights involved in a pending
suit. * * *?? In the later case of Oldham County ex rel.
Woolridge v. Arvin, 244 Ky. 551, 51'S. W. 2d 657, 659,
we said: ‘‘* * * in no event will procedural questions be
determined when they relate to and are designed to
operate upon litigation or an action, or proceedings al-
ready pending in a court having jurisdiction, since such
court possesses both jurisdiction and authority to deter-
mine such questions during the progress of the investi-
gation.’’ We are of the opinion that, under KRS 342.260,
the Workmen’s Compensation Board had jurisdiction
to compel the production of the written statement, and
that to pass on the question in this action would be an
pawazranted interference with the jurisdiction of the
joard.

For the reasons set out above,.and for the further
reason that the Court is of the opinion that Section
639a—2 of the Civil Code of Practice was not intended
to permit the determination as to the right to possession
of a paper but only rights arising out of the writing
contained in an instrument or paper, we believe that
the special demurrer should have been sustained.

Judgment reversed, with directions to set it aside,
and for the entry of a judgment in conformity with this
opinion.

Greenup et al. v. Hewett.
January 16, 1951.
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

3
a)
oO

James H. Hicks and L, C. Lawrence for appellants.
Flowers & Pritchard, Duncan & Duncan, for appellee.

Juves Herm—aAffirming.

On May 7, 1946, appellants, A. G. Greenup and Stan-
ley H. Vegors entered into a written contract, and on
August 6, 1946, entered into a written supplementary
contract with appellee, Clyde G. Hewett, for purchasing
and leasing lands and the drilling of oil wells in Clinton
County. By these contracts appellee, Clyde G. Hewett,
of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, agreed to and did, be-
tween May 7, 1946 and November 20, 1946, advance
$148,000 for these purposes. Appellants were engaged
in buying and leasing lands and drilling oil wells in
Clinton County. They were carrying on operations in
the name of A. G. Greenup, Greenup and Vegors, and
Greenup, Vegors and Beacom. The sums received from
appellee, except $33,000 paid directly to Whitton and
Sapp, were deposited in the name of appellant Greenup.
It was agreed by the parties that appellants would ren-
der an accurate accounting to appellee at anytime he
desired of how any and all money or property received
by them under the agreements had been expended.

This suit was filed by appellee against appellants
asking for an accurate accounting showing the expendi-
ture of the amounts advanced by appellee, and seeking
to recover of them the sum of $44,505.43 which appellee

396 es

claims was misappropriated and used by appellants in
the development of their own properties, and not in
the development of the Hewett, Greenup and Vegors
properties. The action was referred to a special com-
missioner, Honorable Walter Flippin, of Somerset, to
hear proof and report to the court. He heard proof and
made reports, to which appellants and appellee filed ex-
ceptions. The court sustained appellee’s exceptions 1 to
10, overruled appellants’ exceptions, and entered judg-
ment against appellants for $22,893.95. Appellants ap-
peal,

The original contract provided: ‘‘That for and in
consideration of the sum of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00)
Dollars which is to be deposited to the bank account of
A. G. Greenup in the Bank of Cumberland, Burkesville,
Kentucky, within 30 days from the date of this assign-
ment, the party of the first part, A. G. Greenup, hereby
grants, bargains, sells, transfers, assigns and conveys
unto the second party, Clyde Hewett, an undivided one-
half (44) interest and to the second party, Stanley H.
Vegors, an undivided one-fourth (14) interest in and

to the following described oil and gas leases, to-wit:
#8 # :

The eight leases described were in Clinton County.
It was agreed that in all leases acquired by Greenup in
Clinton County in the future, appellee was to be the
owner, assignee and transferee of an undivided one-half
interest and Vegors of an undivided one-fourth interest
until the $50,000 had been expended in acquiring leases,
drilling and equipping wells. Hewett was to be ‘‘paid
back’? $50,000 in oil runs before Greenup and Vegors
were to be paid anything.

It was agreed that as to the leases to be acquired
in the future, the location of wells to be drilled, and the
assignment of leases, was to be left to Greenup. By the
supplementary contract, appellants agreed to deliver to
Hewett a one-half undivided interest in a 17-acre lease
by Burchett and others. The parties agreed to supervise
the drilling and equipping, if necessary, of nine named
oil wells, and Hewett agreed, in consideration of the
assignments set out in the original and supplementary
agreements, to furnish $148,000, $128,000 of which ‘‘had
been paid in cash,’’ the balance by a note for $20,000.

It was stipulated that since May 7, 1946, four named

a 397

tracts of land ‘‘had been leased in the name of A. G.
Greenup and Clyde Hewett, and he therefore becomes
the owner of an undivided one-half interest in these
leases.’’ It was said: ‘‘It is the purpose of this agree-
ment to limit the joint operations of all parties con-
cerned to the specific lands described in the original
agreement of the seventh day of May, 1946, and lands
and wells mentioned in the supplementary agreement.
This has no relation to any leases or operations owned
by either of the parties as individuals or as joint oper-
ators with others, and it is not the intention of either of
the parties hereto to form a partnership.’’

It was provided that the $148,000 was to be expended
in carrying on the operations mentioned in the original
and supplementary agreements.

The Commissioner heard the testimony of Greenup
as if under cross-examination; the testimony of Clyde G.
Hewett and Grant Hewett for appellee, and the testi-
mony of Greenup, Vegors, and J. R. Meany, an account-
ant, for appellants. Many exhibits, showing the numer-
ous transactions, were filed. The testimony of Hewett
was for the most part clear and responsive. This is not
true of Greenup’s testimony. The Commissioner, in his
first report, said: ‘‘From this record I find it very diffi-
cult to ascertain what amount has actually been expend-
ed for legitimate expenses in behalf of this partnership.
The testimony of the defendant, A. G. Greenup, who
was in charge of the operations, and handling the money,
does not throw much light upon this question. He admits
having little or no knowledge of how much was so ex-
pended, contenting himself with referring to statements
made out by accountants. It does appear from the testi-
mony that Mr. Greenup was handling the accounts of A.
G. Greenup, individually, another account of Vegors,
Greenup and Hewett, another of Greenup and Vegors,
another of Vegors and Beacom. * * *””

In an opinion, the Chancellor, after setting out the
contract and supplementary agreement, said: ‘‘Unques-
tionably the situation created by these contracts is a
joint adventure. * * *”

After quoting from 15 R. C. L., page 501, he con-
tinues:
“eee

an obligation was placed upon the plaintiff,

398 Ce

Clyde Hewett, to furnish $148,000 for the purpose solely
of acquiring leases for the exploration for oil, drilling
and equipping wells. It was the duty of * * * A. G.
Greenup and Stanley H. Vegors to procure the leases
and pay for them out of the fund provided by their
joint adventurer, Clyde Hewett, and to make an accurate
accounting to him of the funds disbursed. * * *

“Manifestly, it would be an unjust and unfair in-
terpretation of the contract to say that no duties or ex-
penses were imposed upon the custodians of this small
fortune. * * * The record shows their bookkeeping was
bad, * * * in the parlance of the streets this whole record
looks like they took Clyde Hewett for a big ride.

«ce * * The evidence of both adventurers, A. G.
Greenup and Stanley H. Vegors is unsatisfactory * * *.
The burden of proof is on them to show the proper ex-
penditure of each item for which they claim credit,
** * 9) After discussing the report of the Commissioner,
the Chancellor continues: ‘‘* * * The records of the
defendants are in interminable confusion as they tried
to operate four different and distinct accounts in two
banks in the name of A. G. Greenup and all the common
funds of four distinct operations were mingled together. .
No qualified person had charge of the expenditures and
no qualified person kept the records.. The system of the
defendants is deceptive and capable of having the affairs
of the four operations successfully juggled to suit the
interest of the defendants. It is in proof that the code
letters which were supposed to distinguish the accounts
were not’ written on the checks and much of the evidence

.is simply guess-work. The defendants undertook the
task of expending a big sum of money with a fiduciary
relation fastened upon them by law and under the strict
‘rules of good faith and honest dealing toward the ere-
ator of the trust. The court has gone over all this record
many times and it will take a Philadelphia lawyer to
spell out of it an intelligent conclusion. The doubts are
all in favor of the plaintiff and the burden is on the de-
fendants to show that they kept the trust. * * *””

In his petition, appellee refers to the relationship
of the parties as a partnership. The Chancellor, and the
parties in their briefs, refer to the relationship as
a joint adventure. ‘It is sometimes difficult, and often
unnecessary, to distinguish in particular cases between

Le 399

joint adventures and partnerships, * * *.’? 30 Am. Jur.,
p. 697. ‘‘The relationship between joint adventurers,
like that existing between partners, is fiduciary in char-
acter, and imposes upon all the participants the obliga-
tion of loyalty to the joint concern and of the utmost
good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealings with-
each other with respect to matters pertaining to the en-
terprise. * * *”? 30 Am. Jur., p. 695. See, 48 0. J. 8., Joint
Adventures, sec. 5; Jones v. Nickell, 297 Ky. 81, 179 S.
W. 2d 195. .

In his original report the Commissioner concluded
that Hewett was entitled to recover of appellants $52,-
696.87. In his supplemental report he made a large num-
ber of reductions. The Chancellor, in his opinion, re-
ferred to numerous errors in the Commissioner’s re-
ports. We have found errors in calculation throughout
this record, including the report of the Commissioner
and the opinion of the Chancellor. This record has been
checked and rechecked by us carefully. We find that
appellee is entitled to recover from appellants as much,
if not more than, the amount allowed by the Chancellor.
There is no cross-appeal.

The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed.

Baldwin v. Baldwin.
January 16, 1951.

Ray L. Murphy, Judge.

400 es

R. Howard Smith for appellant.
Davies & Hirschfeld for appellee.

Vay Sant, Commissioner—A firming.

Appellant instituted this action for divorce from her
husband, the appellee. She alleged cruel and inhuman
treatment. Appellee did not answer nor has he filed a
brief on this appeal. In a judgment entered on the 29th
day of January, 1949, the Chancellor granted appellant
a divorce from bed and board, ordered the transfer to
appellant of certain funds she had on deposit in a bank,
and allotted appellant all the household furniture except
a stove, one table, six chairs, and a bedroom suite. He .
additionally awarded alimony to appellant in the amount
of $80.00 per month. On the 12th day of February, 1949,
appellee filed a motion to modify the judgment. After
a hearing, the motion was sustained and the award of
alimony was reduced to $60.00 per month. Appellant
has appealed from both judgments, contending that she
was entitled to an absolute divorce and that the award
of alimony is insufficient. Appellee has not filed a cross-
appeal. ue

Appellant, now 48 years of age, and appellee, 54,
were married October 2, 1926. They have a son and
daughter, both of whom are grown. The husband has
a daughter by a former marriage, who was reared from
infancy by the parties to this action, but who had mar-
ried and no longer lived with her parents at the time
the suit was instituted. The parties separated October
20, 1947, appellant taking up her residence with a sister.
She testified that her reason for leaving was ‘‘he was
so mean in his talk at all times to me and my family that
I just had enough of it.’? The testimony for appellant
consists merely of petty complaints. She related that
her husband was not pleased with the manner in which
she prepared food and ‘she would have to prepare a
“special plate’? for him. She admitted that he never
mistreated her physically; but complained that she visit-
ed no one, did not entertain any friends in her home,
and except for a picnic once or twice a year, she led a
drab life. She contends that her husband was ‘‘mean’’ to
their son Dickie and that on one occasion asked him to
work when he was ill. She said that on many occasions

eee

she cared for her husband’s mother and that on one
occasion Mr. Baldwin tried to ‘‘force’’ her to sign an
agreement whereby his brother could build a house on
their farm. She stated that reconciliation was impossible ,,
although she admitted that her husband had attempted
to induce her to return to their home after she instituted
the action. The complaint in respect to Dickie seems to
be that of an over indulgent mother concerning the con-
duct of a reasonably stern father in rearing his child.
Our consideration of the whole record does not raise
more than a doubt in our minds that the Chancellor
erred in refusing to grant appellant an absolute divorce.
This conclusion requires affirmance of the judgment in
that respect.

The husband lives approximately twenty miles from
his work and earns approximately $43.00 per week after
deductions for taxes and social security benefits. He
rides to and from his work with a group of friends and
shares the expenses of the trips. The farm on which he
resides is owned jointly by him and his wife and was
purchased from their joint earnings and savings. Appel-
lant refused to disclose the name of her employer and
would not testify as to the exact amount of her earnings
although she was forced to admit that they amounted to
at least $35.00 per week. She started to work in the year
1935 and testified that she earned $1,000.00 during one
period of six months. She claims she is unable to work
now and introduced medical testimony to the effect that
she should not be working. Nevertheless, so far as the
record shows, she continues in her employment to the
satisfaction of her employer. Under these circumstances
we are of the opinion that the award of $60.00 per month
is liberal and that the court did not err in reducing the
original award.

The judgments are affirmed.

Robbins et al. v. State Bank & Trust Co.
of Richmond et al.

January 16, 1951.
William J, Baxter, Judge.

402

George C. Robbins for appellants.

George T. Ross for appellees.
Van Sant, Commissionrr—Affrming.

This action was instituted by appellees against ap-
pellants to require them to specifically perform a con-
tract for the purchase of certain real estate in Richmond.
The sole basis for refusing to perform the contract is
appellants’ apprehension that appellees cannot pass a
marketable fee simple title to the property. The property
originally was owned by Anne B. Collins who devised
it to her husband, in trust, with power to appoint his
successor, who in turn should have the right ‘‘to sell
and convey (the property) for the purpose of reinvest-
ment in property of like kind and character.’’ Mr. Col-
lins exercised the power of appointment by will, naming °
State Bank and Trust Company of Richmond to succeed
him as trustee. It was in the exercise of the power con-
tained in the words hereinbefore quoted that the trust
company sold the property to appellants. KRS 394.530
provides:

‘Where lands are devised to be sold on special or
general trust, or are conveyed or devised to trustees or

ee 403

executors in trust to be sold generally or for any specific
purpose, the purchaser shall not be bound to look to the
application of the purchase money, unless so expressly
required by the conveyance or devise.’’

Neither the will of Mrs. Collins nor that of her hus-
band contains any words which can be construed to be
an expression that the purchaser of the property should
be bound’ to look to the application of the purchase
money. That being true, appellants would not be liable
for any misapplication, if such should occur, of the pur-
chase money and cannot refuse to accept a deed to the
property on that account. But it is insisted that if this
view be adopted by the court, the judgment should be
reversed because the Chancellor failed to direct the
trustee to invest the property in other property of like
kind and character, or, at least, to direct that the rein-
vestment be approved by the court. This argument is
specious. When appellants pay the purchase price they
have no further interest in the matter and can make no
complaint of the judgment in respect to the duties of the
trustee after conveyance is made. 7

The judgment is affirmed.

State of Ohio ex rel. Duffy, Atty. Gen. v. Arnett.
October 24, 1950.
As Extended on Denial of Rehearing December 15, 1950.
W. J, Baxter, Judge.

x

| 405

Herbert S. Duffy and Stanley Powell for appellant.
William H. Francis and George T. Ross for appellee.

Jupen Knient—Reversing.

Appellant, the State of Ohio, by its attorney gen-
eral and special counsel employed in Kentucky by him,
filed this action against the appellee to recover certain
monies allegedly owed by appellee to the Industrial
Commission of the State of Ohio as premiums for work-
men’s compensation insurance coverage extended to
appellee. The trial court sustained a general demurrer
to the appellant’s final amended and substituted peti-
tion and upon appellant’s failure to plead further en-
fered | judgment for the appellee, from which this appeal
is taken.

Appellant’s amended and substituted petition al-
leges in substance that the appellee, a resident of Ken-
tucky, was from February to June, 1938, engaged as a
contractor in‘ clearing land at the Atwood Reservoir
near Sherrodsville in the State of Ohio; that the ap-
pellee applied to the Industrial Commission of the State
of Ohio for workmen’s compensation insurance cover-
age, the application containing statements of the nature
of the work to be done, the estimated size of appellee’s
payroll as $5,000 and the estimated number of his em-
ployees; that based on this application, the Industrial
Commission assigned a premium rate to appellee and
computed the advance premium to be $1,301, which was
paid by the appellee; that appellee promised to submit
to the Industrial Commission the amount of his payroll,
in reliance on which the Industrial Commission continu-
ed the insurance coverage to the appellee to July 23,
1938; that on completion of the contract, appellee noti-
fied the Industrial Commission that his payroll was
$24,991.38; that the Industrial Commission notified ap-
pellee that he owed appellant $5,337.01 (including $135.25
interest charge) ; that in December 1938, appellee made
an additional payment of $500, leaving a balance due of
$4,701.76; wherefore the appellant prayed judgment
for SMOL76 and interest thereon at 6% from August

, 8.

The applicable statutes and code provisions of the

406 |

State of Ohio were pleaded or filed as exhibits with the
pleadings. It appears therefrom that all employers of
three or more persons in Ohio are required by law to
take out workmen’s compensation insurance with the In-
dustrial Commission of the State of Ohio unless they can
qualify as self-insurers under the rules of the Industrial
Commission and that, even though qualifying as self-
insurers, they are liable for certain contributions toward
the reserve fund.

The appellee has three grounds upon which he relies
to sustain the trial court’s ruling.

(1) The statutes of the State of Ohio which give
rise to the alleged cause of action prescribe, in effect,
that the exclusive jurisdiction shall be in the Ohio courts
and the appellant has no remedy in the courts of Ken-
tucky.

(2) The courts of Kentucky will not act as an
agency for the collection of the taxes of a foreign juris-
diction; and the claim asserted by the appellant is in the
nature and category of a claim for taxes and should be
so treated by this court.

(3) A determination of the Ohio Industrial Com-
mission is made under a ‘‘local’’ statute and is not en-
forceable in the courts of Kentucky as a judgment.

I

The first ground relied on to support the ruling of
the chancellor is based on two arguments: (a) the at-
torney general of Ohio has no authority to institute or
appear in this action and (b) the statute giving rise to
the cause of action impliedly limits enforcement to the
Ohio courts.

Section 333 of the Ohio General Code provides:
“The attorney-general shall be the chief law officer for
the state and all its departments. No state officer,
board, or the head of a department or institution of the
state shall employ, or be represented by, other counsel
or attorneys-at-law. The attorney-general shall appear
for the state in the trial and argument of all civil and
criminal causes in the supreme court in which the state
may be directly or indirectly interested. When requir-
ed by the governor or the general assembly, he shall ap-
pear for the state in any court or tribunal in a cause

Le 407

in which the state is a party, or in which the state is
directly interested. Upon the written request of the
governor, he shall prosecute any person indicted for a
erime.’’ Section 336 of the Ohio General Code authorizes
the attorney general to appoint special counsel to repre-
sent the state in civil actions, criminal prosecutions or
other proceedings in which the state is a party or di-
rectly interested, and section 336-1 authorizes the at-
torney general to employ special counsel to collect claims
due the state.

The appellee argues that the attorney general is
without authority to bring this action here because he
has not been required to do so by the governor or the
general assembly of Ohio. We think the contention is
without merit. By section 333 the attorney general is
declared to be the chief law officer of the State of Ohio.
Such a designation carries with it the authority to act
as such in any case affecting the State of Ohio unless he
is prohibited from so acting. The fact that the statute
requires him to appear in certain cases and gives the
governor or the general assembly power to require his
appearance in others does not militate against his ap-
pearing on his own motion in cases affecting the rights
of the State of Ohio. In the case of State, ex rel. Crabbe,
Atty. Gen., v. Plumb et al., 116 Ohio St. 428, 156 N.E.
457, a similar contention was apparently made, that the
attorney general did not have the authority to bring
mandamus proceedings. The Ohio court denied this
argument. See also State ex rel. Walton v. Crabbe, 109
Ohio St. 623, 143 N.E. 189.

. Section 1465-75 of the Ohio General Code provides
for the collection of unpaid premiums as follows: ‘¢ * * *
If said amount is not paid within ten days after receiv-
ing such notice, the commission shall certify the same to
the attorney general, who shall forthwith institute a
civil action against such employer in the name of the
state for the collection of such premium. * * *’? The
statute then goes on to set out what allegations shall
be sufficient, the times within which pleadings shall be
filed after the institution of the action and that the case
shall be advanced on the docket for trial. The statute
also has provisions for service on an agent or employee
of a nonresident defendant. The appellee urges that
the provisions as to procedure impliedly limit the cause

408 ee

of action to the Ohio courts. We cannot so read this
section. There is a substantive right created which is
independent of the procedure to be used in the Ohio
courts. A statutory cause of action which is otherwise
transitory should not be construed as local merely be-
cause of accompanying procedural provisions intended
to be applicable only to the courts of the state creating
the cause of action, where the remedy is not an unusual
one or one not uncommon to the law of the forum.

Ir

The second contention of the appellee, and the one
on which he principally relies in his brief, is that the
claim for which the State of Ohio is suing is one for
taxes and that one state will not allow its courts to be
used to collect taxes for another state. He cites no case
either from Ohio or any other jurisdiction which holds
that premiums due a state industrial commission for
workmen’s compensation premiums are taxes. Appellee
cites cases from various jurisdictions which almost uni-
formly hold that unemployment compensation ‘‘contri-
butions’’ are ‘‘taxes’’? and he reasons that by analogy
premiums due the Industrial Commission for premiums
on workmen’s compensation are likewise ‘‘taxes.’? As
sustaining such analogy he points out that section 1465-
77 of the Ohio General Code, gives liability for premiums
the same preference as tax claims against the employ-
er’s assets; that penalties and liens are provided as
additional means for enforcing payment; that the
Ohio Workmen’s Compensation Law provides for ob-
taining revenue for a public purpose; that the employ-
er’s contributions in the form of premiums are compul-_
sory and that even those who qualify.as self-insurers
must pay a certain amount of the premium, otherwise
payable, into a ‘‘surplus’’ fund for the benefit of work-
men having no connection with the contributing employ-
er. Recognizing the analogies thus urged, we do not
think it is incumbent on this court to become the first
one to decide the tax status of the premiums paid under
Ohio’s Workmen’s Compensation Law when even that
state has not passed on the question. Whether it is
. a tax, as appellee contends, or whether it is a mere con-

’ tractural obligation to the state, as appellant contends,
it is not necessary for us to decide.

But assuming that the claim is one for taxes, we

ee 409

are constrained to hold that the courts of this common-
wealth should act as a forum for the enforcement of tax
claims of other states of the United States. The weight
of authority is to the contrary, see Anno. 165 A. L. R.
796; but we believe that the better rule is set out in
State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers et
al., 238 Mo. App. 1115, 198 8. W. 2d 919, 165 A. L. RB.
785. After an exhaustive review of the history of the
rule that one state will not enforce the revenue laws of
another, the opinion in that casé concludes that the rea-
sons advanced to support the rule are not valid grounds
on which to deny enforcement of revenue laws as between
the states of the United States. That opinion further
points out that there is a very real difference between
revenue and penal laws and that they are similar only
in that they are both state regulations of a civic duty.

The Supreme Court of the United States has never
ruled on the question as to whether full faith and credit
apply to the enforcement of foreign tax statutes. In
Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. 8. 268, 56
8. Ct. 229, 80 L. Hd. 220, that court held that a tax judg-
ment of one state must be given full faith and credit
in the courts of other states. The reasoning of this case
was used in support of the opinion in State v. Rodgers,
supra. The question was expressly left open by the Su-
preme Court in Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. 8. 18, 50 S. Ct.
175, 74 L. Ed. 673, affirming the decision of the Cireuit
Court of Appeals, 2 Cir., 30 F. 2d 600, 65 A. L. R. 1354,
on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue.
The Circuit Court of Appeals had held that one state was
precluded from acting as a collector of taxes for a sister
state; and a concurring opinion set out the view that
it might be embarrassing for the courts of one state to
be called upon to scrutinize the relations of a foreign
state with its citizens. As pointed out in State v. Rod-
gers, supra, this objection is not valid because the foreign
state is not only not objecting but is seeking relief in
the forum, and the taxpayer may assert the same de-
fenses in the forum as he could in the taxing state.

The Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws, sec-
tion 610, Action on Foreign Public Right, formerly under
comment C set out the rule ‘‘No action can be maintained
by a foreign state to enforce its license or revenue laws,
or claims for taxes.’? In the 1948 supplement to the

410 re

Restatement, however, the American Law Institute ex-
pressly deletes comment OC and adds a caveat to the
main section to the effect that ‘‘the Institute expresses
no opinion whether an action can be maintained by a
foreign state on a claim for taxes.’? The Institute fur-
ther goes on to state that if a position were to be taken,
it would seem desirable to state a view contrary to the
former comment C, citing State v. Rodgers, supra, and
Milwaukee County v. M. H. White Co., supra. An article
. entitled ‘Conflict of Laws—Enforcing Tax Laws: of
Sister States,’ 47 Michigan Law Review, page 796,
fully discusses the question and favors the rule as fol-
lowed by the Missouri court in the Rodgers case.

In the midst of the conflicting decisions of other
jurisdictions, we take our stand with the modern trend as
enunciated by the Missouri court in the well reasoned
opinion in the Rodgers case, supra [238 Mo. App. 1115,
193 8. W. 2d 927], which after reviewing the reasons
other courts had given for the rule that foreign penal
and tax laws will not be enforced, then gave as its rea-
son for not following those decisions: ‘‘In our opinion,
the elimination of the fore-going considerations, which
are said to prompt courts to refuse to enforce foreign pen-
al laws, as reasons for excluding suits of this kind, leaves
no valid justification for not permitting a suit in this
state for a tax lawfully levied by another. The simplest
ideas of comity would seem to compel such a result, and
modern conditions demand it. The contrary doctrine
was the product of the commercial world, and arose at a
time when there was a great commercial rivalry and in-
ternational suspicion. It was applied as between wholly
sovereign states. It has no place in a union of states
such as the United States, where the interest of both
the state and taxpayer will be protected from arbitrary
power by the provisions of the federal Constitution. The
taxpayer who enjoys the protection of government should
bear his share of the expense of maintaining the gov-
ernment, and should not be permitted to escape his obli-
gation by crossing state lines.’’

If it be said that the State of Ohio, in collecting the
premiums for the administration of its Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law is acting in a proprietary rather than
a governmental capacity, then it would seem there could
be no question of its right to bring this suit against one

[| 411

with whom it has entered into a contractural relation-
ship. In its brief, appellant refers us to the case of State
of Ohio v. Wilcox Coristruction Co., City Ct., 100 N. Y.
8. 2d 508, which appears to be on all fours with the case
at bar. That was a suit filed in the city court of the City
of New York by the State of Ohio against a contractor
for $1059.16 for a balance due on premiums claimed
due the Ohio Industrial Commission by the defendant.
As his principal defense, defendant pleaded that plain-
tiff had no legal capacity to sue in the courts of the
State of New York for the claim asserted in the action,
as the sole sources of its authority were the laws of:
Ohio. Perhaps the amount involved was not sufficient for
an appeal or for some other reason the case appears
to have been reported only in a local publication, New
York Law Journal of February 21, 1950. We quote the
following excerpts from the court’s opinion in that
case, as set out in appellant’s brief: ‘‘The defendant sub-
scribed to the state fund of the State of Ohio for cover-
age in connection with a policy of workmen’s compen-
sation insurance, and agreed to pay certain premiums
therefor. The defendant failed to pay such premiums and
plaintiff now sues therefor, basing its claim on defend-
ant’s subscription contract. It is well settled law that a
State may sue in the Courts of another State on a con-
tract or proprietary claim; this does not involve a gov-
ernmental interest of the State of a kind where the
action is required to be brought in the foreign State,
nor is the claim in suit to be confused with a claim by
a foreign State to enforce its license or revenue laws
or claims for taxes or penalties; it is a simple claim on
contract which is transitory in nature, and it follows
that this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action (cf. American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law of Conflicts of Laws, sec. 610, especially com-
ment (f), and N. Y. Annotations to the same Restate-
ment, sec. 610 and cases there cited).’’

In comment (f) sec. 610, Conflict of Laws in the
Restatement referred to in the above opinion, it is said:
“f, Proprietary Claims of State. A state may sue in
the courts of another state for breach of contract made
with it by a private person, or for damages for any tort
committed by such person against its property, or to
recover its own property from such person who with-
holds it. These are not governmental interests of the

412 es

state, and are, therefore, covered by the rule stated in
Sec. 607.”

As we see it, whether this action is one to collect a
tax due a sister state or one to enforce a contractural
obligation, it is one in which appellee, a nonresident of
Ohio but temporarily doing business there, submitted
‘himself to the laws of that state for the purpose of .
carrying on that busiriess. In doing so he incurred cer-
tain obligations to that state which the state is now
suing to recover. It would be manifestly unjust to allow
him to escape his obligations by leaving the state where
it was incurred and throwing around ‘him the cloak of
nonsuability in the state of “his residence. Unquestion-
ably he could have been sued in Ohio had he been served
with process there, in which case the procedure outlined
in the Ohio code would have been followed. We think
this is a transitory action and the State of Ohio had the
right to sue him in the state of his residence, a forum
more favorable to him,.and the procedure of the forum
will, of course, control. He will not be heard to say
that since the laws of Ohio prescribe certain procedure
to be followed by its courts in this character of case,
no other method may be used in another state to collect
a debt allegedly due it. The construction of this contract
and the obligation of the parties under it will, of course,
be governed by the laws of Ohio and appellant can
enter any defenses to the suit which he may have.

Tr

The third contention of the appellee, that the de- ~
termination of the Ohio Industrial Commission is made
under the ‘‘local’’ statute and is not enforceable as a
judgment, need not be considered since there is no
question here of giving to that determination the force
and effect of a judgment. The defendant may raise any
defenses to the merits which he may have.

For the reasons set out above, it is our opinion that
the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrer to
appellant’s amended, substituted and reformed petition.
Wherefore the judgment is reversed for further pro-
ceedings consistent herewith..

On petition for rehearing, KRS 131.230 was for the
first time brought to the court’s attention. That statute,
enacted in 1938 and therefore in force when this litiga-

a 413

tion was begun, reads as follows: ‘Interstate comity.
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce
statutes concerning taxation constitutionally imposed by
other states that extend like comity.”’

A similar statute, KRS 135.190, was enacted by the
1950 legislature which was after this litigation was
begun. Both statutes command the courts of this state to
recognize and enforce the tax statutes of other states
where that state extends a like comity to Kentucky. There
is nothing in the record to show that Ohio has refused
to recognize or enforce the tax laws of this state. Appel-
lee cites the case of State of Indiana, to Use of Cone, v.
John, 5 Ohio 217, 219, as indicating that Ohio courts
would not recognize or enforce the tax laws of another
state. However, that case merely held that the Ohio
courts would not enforce the penal laws of another
state, a question not. involved in the present case. We
see a clear distinction between enforcing another state’s
penal laws and enforcing its tax laws.

Cooper v. Cooper.
May 26, 1950.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing December 15, 1950.
Joe D. Harkins, Judge.

‘W. B. Faulkner and S. S. Willis for appellant.

T. H. Moore, Jr., and Leslie W. Morris for appellee.

Jupez Lattmer—Reversing.

Mrs. Elizabeth D. Cooper prosecutes this appeal
from a judgment rendered against her in the Perry Cir-

cuit Court. Novel and difficult questions of law are
presented.

a 415

The parties to this action were married in 1921,
and lived together in Kentucky as husband and wife
until 1943. In that year appellee, in company with an-
other woman, moved to Florida and established resi-
dence there. On June 8, 1944, he instituted an action for
divorce against appellant in that state, alleging as
grounds cruel and inhuman treatment. Thereafter, on
June 16, 1944, appellant filed the present suit in the
Perry Circuit Court against appellee to have a deed to
Kentucky real estate set aside and in addition sought
permanent alimony. Certain of appellee’s realty and
personalty within the court’s jurisdiction were attached.
On August 3, 1944, appellant entered her personal ap-
pearance in the Florida suit. Then, on September 23,
1944, appellee entered his personal appearance in the
Kentucky action, answering and in addition praying for
a divorce.

The Florida case was taken to the Supreme Court
of that State, Cooper v. Cooper, 158 Fla. 519, 28 So. 2d
541, and a decree of absolute divorce. was entered in
favor of Mr. Cooper. The action was maintained upon
an in rem basis throughout. Questions of alimony and
property rights were not raised in issue nor mentioned
in the decree. Mrs. Cooper merely resisted the divorce.

Appellee then entered this Florida decree ag a
defense in bar to the Kentucky action. The Cirenit Court
adjudged that full faith and credit must be accorded
the Florida decree, and that it was res’ judicata and con-
clusive of the questions presented in this cause. The
correctness of this determination is questioned here.

The deed, which appellant asks be declared void and
set aside, was to the resident property of the parties in
Hazard. The title to the Hazard property was in the
name of appellant, but, on October 17, 1938, appellee had
her join him in a deed to himself. In 1938, when this
deed was made, Section 506, Kentucky Statutes, was in
full force and effect. It was not repealed until 1942,
KRS 382.050. The Florida decree could in no manner
determine the validity of the 1938 deed or be conclusive
in regard to it. The validity of a deed of realty is tested
by the law of the place wherein the land is located 26
C. J. &., Deeds, sec. 11. Consequently, the Cirenit Court
should have considered and ruled upon this matter.

‘We now direct our attention to the other phase of

416 ee
the action. Alimony may be recovered in Kentucky in a
specific and distinct action. In London v. London, 211
Ky. 271, 277 8. W. 287, 289, it is said: ‘‘True, a claim for

alimony is generally inclu

and any evidence properly

as to divorce may be consi

led in an action for divorce,
introduced upon the issues
lered in that action upon the

incidental issues as to alimony. It is, however, further ~

true that alimony may be

recovered in a specific and

distinct action as is sought in this case, and this may,

exist independent of any s
Hulett, 80 Ky. 364; Butler

atutory provision. Hulett v.
v. Butler, 4 Litt. [201], 206;

Lockridge v. Lockridge, 3 Dana (Ky.), 29, 28 ‘Am. Dee.
52, and the existence of this right is recognized by both
Code and statute. Civil Code of Practice, secs, 420 and
424; Kentucky Statutes, see. 2117. Not only so, but it
has been specifically held that an action for alimony is
not controlled by some of the Code provisions relating
to divorce.’’

See also Williamson v. Williamson, 183 Ky. 435, 209
8. W. 503, 3 A. L. RB. 799. The appellee was within her
rights in instituting the present action in the circuit
court. In some circumstances alimony has been allowed
in Kentucky subsequent to the dissolution of the mar-
riage relation, Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291
S. W. 42; Hanks v. Hanks, 282 Ky. 236, 188 S. W. 2d
362, 363, and denied in others, Campbell v. Campbell, 115
Ky. 656, 74 8. W. 670, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 53. Here the
action was instituted during the existence of the mar-
riage relation, and maintained concurrently with the
Florida suit.

The Perry Circuit Court then had jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject matter in a proper action.
The general rule is that the pendency of an action in
the courts of ore state is not a bar to the institution of
another action between the same parties and for the
same cause of action in a court of another state, nor is it
the duty of the court in which the latter action is brought ~
to stay the same pending a determination of the earlier
action, even though the court in which the earlier action
is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to dispose of the
entire controversy. 21 C0. J. S., Courts, sec. 548, page
855.

“Jurisdiction is generally considered to be of a
continuing nature. Where jurisdiction of the subject

— a7

matter is considered to depend on the existence of the
marital relation at the time of the institution of the
action, and the relation did exist then, the court retains
jurisdiction notwithstanding the subsequent granting of
a divoree.’’ 42 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, sec. 615,
page 219.

Under ordinary circumstances, the Florida decree
would be conclusive of the question of alimony. Hughes
v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S. W. 121. A principle pe-
culiar to Florida law, however, creates a distinguishing
feature necessitating a result contra to that obtained
in the Hughes case, supra. The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida in Cowan v. Cowan, 147 Fla. 473, 2 So. 2d 869, in-
terpreting Florida Statutes 1941, Vol. 1, sec. 65.08, F.
8. A., held that, except in cases of an adulterous wife,
permanent alimony could be granted a wife in a suit
broneht bv the husband, where the divorce was granted
for the fault of the wife. The effect of this decision is to
render the determination of fault upon the part of a de-
fendant wife inconclusive of her right to alimony. Full
faith and credit demands do not require that we give
greater force and effect to the Florida decree, and mat-
ters determined thereby, than given it in Florida. This
proposition is fundamental. Scott v. Coleman, 5 Litt.
349, 15 Am. Dec. 71. See also 31 A. J. 144. If the Florida
decree would not have precluded the appellant’s sea-
sonable demand for permanent alimony there, it should
not preclude it here.

We do not undertake to express an opinion in the
matter, but it appears to be questionable whether or not,
under the Florida law, Mrs. Cooper could have maintain-
ed an independent action for alimony, although under
the laws of Florida an independent action may be main-
tained, as in Kentucky. The Florida Statutes 1941, Vol-
ume 1, Section 65.09, F. 8. A., provides: “If any of the
causes of divorce set forth in sec. 65.04 shall exist in
favor of the wife, and she be living apart from her hus-
band, she may obtain alimony without seeking a divorce
upon bill filed and suit prosecuted as in other chancery
causes; and the court shall have power to grant such
temporary and permanent alimony and suit money as the
circumstances of the parties may render just; but no
alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife.”’

The Florida courts, in interpreting this section, have

418 ee

held that where alimony is sought without divorce, the
applicant must allege and prove that she has legally
been a resident and citizen of that state for the statu-
tory period prior to the filing of the application. Miller
v. Miller, 33 Fla. 453, 15 So. 222, 24 L. R. A. 187; Don-
nelly v. Donnelly, 39 Fla. 229, 231, 22 So. 648. Thus, it
will be observed, appellant could have found herself in
the predicament of having sought affirmative relief,
and upon the dismissal of appellee’s petition, being left
groundless, because of her inability to allege and prove
that she had been a resident and citizen of Florida for
the statutory period.

Our rule is that no appeal will lie from the granting
of a divorce. KRS 21.060(b). One will lie for the refusal
to grant alimony to a defendant wife, and alimony may
be granted in this Court to a wife found at fault in the
circuit court. Winfrey v. Winfrey, 286 Ky. 245, 150 8.
W. 2d 689. Since the Florida decree is in effect no more
binding upon the question than that of a-circuit court,
the same may be done here.

The position and conduct of the respective parties

has been consistent throughout. The appellee has sought
’ to obtain a divorce in Florida and resist the imposition
of alimony in Kentucky; the appellant has sought to
obtain permanent alimony in Kentucky and resist the
divorce in Florida. Both parties looked to the forum of
the Florida courts to adjudicate in regard to the marital
res exclusively, and looked to the forum of our own
courts to adjudicate in regard to rights in and to prop-
erty within this State and to the question of alimony.
The parties were capable to choose between equally com-
petent tribunals. Having done so, and persisted in the
choice, their substantial rights will not go in accordance
with the weight of court dockets, but by the laws of the
chosen forums.

The situation is somewhat analogous to that pre-
sented in Hanks v. Hanks, supra. Therein the wife was
allowed to recover alimony subsequent to divorce be-
cause of the change in position occasioned by the hus-
band’s suit for restoration of property, which was not
undertaken in the divorce action. There the wife relied
upon the fact that the property was in her name, and
consequently did not ask for alimony. Afterwards, when,
the husband sought to have this property restored, she

PE
raised for the first time the question of alimony, insist-
ing that she had relied upon the fact that the status quo
in regard to the property would be maintained, and,
consequently, had not asked for alimony. In the instant
ease the wife could and did justifiably and reasonably

. rely on the fact that the question of alimony was being
and would be finally adjudicated in Kentucky. To de-
stroy this accrued right would approach a brutal denial
of a basic right.

In order to give full faith and credit to the Florida
decree, we are not required to go as far as the Supreme
Court of the United States did in the case of Eistin v.
Ustin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 8. Ct. 1218, 1218, 92 L. Hd. 1561, 1
A. L. R. 2d 1412, wherein it was said: ‘‘The result of
this situation is to make the divorce divisible—to give
effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective on the issue of alimony.
It accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New
York in'this broken marriage by restricting each State
to the matters of her dominant concern.’

Our conclusion does not in any way create for the
wife any additional right, nor does it impose upon the
husband any additional obligation. These rights and
obligations were in existence at the time of the institu-
tion of both the Florida and Kentucky actions.

_. The judgment is reversed with directions to con-
sider and rule upon the question as to the deed, and to
hear proof as to the question of alimony.

Bourbon County Board of Education et al. v.
Darnaby.

December 15, 1950.
Rehearing Denied January 18, 1951.
W. B, Ardery, Judge.

qa
uw

Ps

Bradley & Blanton for appellants.
W. Owen Keller for appellee.

Jupen Larimmr—aA firming.

The members of the Bourbon County Board of Edu-
cation filed charges against Hi. H. Darnaby, Superintend-
ent of the Bourbon County Schools. The Board, after
hearing the evidence, which consisted largely of testi-
mony of members of the Board, entered an order dis-
charging and removing the Superintendent and declar-
ing the office vacant. The Superintendent then instituted
this action in the Bourbon Circuit Court praying that
the order of the County Board be adjudged invalid and
void and that the defendant Board members and L. C.
Taylor, acting Superintendent, be enjoined and directed
to disregard the order; that they be further enjoined
from interfering with plaintiff, Darnaby, in the per-
formance of his duties as Superintendent; that the Board
be directed to pay the plaintiff his salary at all times
since March 18, 1950; and that the injunction be made
permanent,

The cause was heard on the evidence produced be-
fore the Board of Education. The court adjudged that
the Board exceeded its authority in removing the Super-
intendent and directed his reinstatement and payment
of back salary. From that judgment this appeal is prose-
cuted.

Six charges were listed against the Superintendent,
upon which the Board entered its order of dismissal and
removal, They are:

(1) On numerous occasions Mr. Darnaby purchased
supplies and made contracts without the authorization
of the Board.

(2) He wrote a letter to the State Department of
Public Instruction containing a number of false. state-
ments with reference to Board Member George Wyatt.

422 |

_ __(8) As secretary of the Board, he made false entries
in the minutes, and in reading them to the Board for
approval, did not read what actually appeared on the
minutes.

_ (4) He paid bus drivers without checking their
mileage, causing a loss to the taxpayers.

(5) He attempted to dominate the Board and threat-
ened reprisal to the daughter of Board Member Shrop-
shire because Shropshire failed to vote as Mr. Darnaby

lesired.

(6) He threatened a principal with reprisal unless
he influenced Board Member Wyatt to resign from the
oard.

The court below apparently considered the evidence
carefully and has incorporated a careful and pointed
opinion in the judgment. We think it to be a proper and
correct ariswer to this salmagundi of charges. We are,
therefore, adopting it chiefly as our opinion.

“On this Appeal the record discloses that on Jan-
uary 19, 1948, the County Board of Education re-em-
ployed E. H. Darnaby for a four-year term as County
Superintendent of Schools. During the summer of 1949
charges were brought against one of the Board mem-
bers, Mr. Wyatt, by patrons of the Ruddles Mills School,
seeking his removal from office. The cause was heard,
or at least. acted on, by the State Board at Frankfort,
and Mr. Wyatt was acquitted by that body. On March
16, the Board began a hearing on the several charges the
Board had preferred against Mr. Darnaby. During that
day and the following day the Board members testified
against Darnaby on the charges they themselves had
preferred. On March 17 the Board broke Mr. Darnaby’s
contract of employment and discharged him. Mr. L. C.
Taylor was named acting Superintendent by the Board
a day later. The whole proceeding now comes before
this Court on Mr. Darnaby’s appeal from the action of
the Board. ,

‘Briefly stated, the charges brought by the Board
against Mr. Darnaby were as follows:

“That Mr. Darnaby awarded contracts for supplies
and construction, without the order or approval of the
Board; specifically, he awarded a contract for a furnace;

2:

that he bought a school bus; that he bought a steam
jenny; that he bought a bathroom for the Center Hill
school; that he paid a water-bill to the City of Paris,
before the bill was properly investigated.

“‘That he made false charges against Board Mem-
ber Wyatt, while Wyatt was being tried by the State
Board at Frankfort, by writing a letter to the State
Superintendent, and that the charges were made ma-
liciously.

“That he falsified the minutes of the Board, and did
not read to the members the false statement he had
inserted.

“That he overpaid a bus driver $500.

“That he attempted to completely dominate the
actions of the Board by threatening reprisals against
Mr. Shropshire’s daughter, who is teaching in the Bour-
bon schools.

“That he threatened Mr. Ritchey, unless he would
influence Mr. Wyatt to resign.

“On this appeal there is but a single question for
the Court to determine,—whether the evidence contain-
ed in the record is sufficient to show legal cause for the
Board to break Mr. Darnaby’s contract of employment
and deprive him of his office as Superintendent of the
Bourbon County schools.

“The first charge is that Mr. Darnaby awarded con-
tracts without the order or approval of the Board. The
evidence discloses that the present Board members, who
brought the charges against Mr. Darnaby, testified that
they believed they had awarded the contract to Mr.
Pennington for the furnace for the sum of $797.50. The
official minutes, approved and signed by the Board, shows
the contract was not awarded, but that Mr. Merringer’s
bid of $508 be investigated to see whether the Merringer
bid covered and proposed to give the same materials,
supplies and service as the Pennington bid. Mr. Darnaby
testified that the contract was not awarded to Penning-
ton, and the Board agreed to give the contract to the
lowest and best bidder, if both bidders followed the
same specifications agreed on by the Board. The con-
tract was awarded to Mr. Merringer on the same speci-
fications as Mr. Pennington’s bid covered, and the award

424

appearing in the official minutes of the Board was ap-
proved, signed and paid for by the Board. If it was Mr.
Darnaby who. saved the County School Fund $280 on
a $508 contract, then it appears to the Court that it is
not such a charge as would be legal cause for Mr. Darn-
aby’s dismissal.

“‘The purchase of the bus by Mr. Darnaby as charg-
ed by the Board was approved, paid for by the Board
and used to convey children to the Ruddles Mills school.
That also does not constitute legal cause for the dis-
missal of Mr. Darnaby by the Board.

“Tt appears from the evidence that Mr. Darnaby
secured, on approval, without the order of the Board, a
steam jenny, an instrument used in servicing automotive
equipment, in this case, school buses. The Board did
not accept jenny, or pay for her, or it. So far as the
School Board and the County School Fund is concerned,
jenny has not been approved, and the Board has no
interest in her.

- “As to the bathroom at Center Hill, Mr. Darnaby
testified he did not know it was being built until Mr.
Shropshire brought in some bills for it. Mr. Shropshire
testified he knew it was being built, but he thought Mr.
Shelton was building it. There is nothing in the record
to show that Mr. Darnaby was in any way responsible
for the building of the bathroom at Center Hill.

“Mr. Darnaby is accused of paying a $500 water
bill to the City of Paris, before the payment was au-
thorized. The bill was properly investigated, found to
be correct and paid, in order to avoid discontinuance
of the students’ water supply. The bill was approved
and paid by the Board.

‘The letter written by Mr. Darnaby is cited as an;
other legal cause for his removal. This letter, written
to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, shows
no malice either in the words used in the letter, their
fair import when judged without bias, or the intention
of doing anything except guard the good name of the
schools of Bourbon, without harm to any individual. The
evidence in the record shows his official conduct bears
out this same attitude, his attempt to guard the Ritcheys
against unfavorable and unwelcome publicity, and shows
this attitude just as definitely as it shows his disagree- -

es

ment and disapproval of the circumstances and happen-
ings that brought the charges, trial and acquittal of Mr.
Wyatt. The acquittal by the State Board could not,
and did not, change the events which led to the trial.

“The first paragraph of the Darnaby letter to the
State Superintendent states he does not know whether
the charges against Mr. Wyatt are true or false, but it
also states that the charges have profoundly disturbed
the well-being of the Bourbon County schools and the
confidence of the patrons and public in them. The re-
mainder of a long letter is taken up with Mr. Wyatt’s
dislike for him and conclusions about what Mr. Wyatt
intends to do to him. In the light of later events, some
of Mr. Darnaby’s conclusions were well drawn, while
most of the statements were of no consequence to any-
body except the two men, who dislike each other. The
letter also said Mr. Wyatt voted to hear the charges
against Mrs. Ritchey, while the great weight of evidence
shows he did not. In any event, the mistake of Mr. Darn-
aby about the vote of Mr. Wyatt certainly had no ill
effect on Mr. Wyatt or Mrs. Ritchey, nor did this state-
ment change in the least the sequence of events.

: “In the last paragraph of the letter, Mr. Darnaby
states frankly, albeit with some circumlocution, that in
his opinion, Mr. Wyatt should resign, or be thrown out
of office. Mr. Darnaby had a right to his opinion, as
well as the right to express it. He was in a position to
know more about what was going on in the schools than
any other one person.

“As stated, it appears from the record that the
recording of Mr. Wyatt’s vote on the subject of Mrs.
Ritchey was a harmless error, which resulted in no harm
to any of the parties involved, There is no evidence, only
an intimation, that the error was a wilful and malicious
forgery.

‘*As to the charge that Mr. Darnaby overpaid a bus
- driver $500, the evidence is that the Board overpaid the
driver, and that Mr. Darnaby discovered the overpay-
ment and gave the Board the information that enabled
the Board to recover the overpayment.

“‘There is no evidence to show Mr. Darnaby attempt-
ed to dominate the Board. Mr. Shropshire said Mr.
Darnaby threatened the position of his daughter as a

426 |

teacher. Mr. Darnaby denies he threatened Mr. Shrop-
shire. The record tends to show that the two men were
engaging in mutual recriminations about each having
relatives on the School Board payrolls.

“The last charge is that Mr. Darnaby threatened
Mr. Ritchey. The record discloses no such evidence. Mr.
Darnaby went to see Mr. and Mrs. Ritchey in the at-
tempt to persuade them, as close personal friends, to
use their influence to secure Mr. Wyatt’s resignation
from the School Board. There is no evidence that Mr.
Darnaby went to the Ritcheys for any other purpose
than to protect the Ritcheys from unfavorable publicity
and the schools from the breath of scandal.

‘A number of cases have been cited which correct-
ly state general principles of law. However, the case
most nearly analogous to the case at bar is Smith v.
Board of Education of Ludlow, Kentucky, 264 Ky. 150,
94S. W. 2d 321.

“Tn the Ludlow case, Smith, the Superintendent;
preferred charges against the Chairman and Members
of the School Board for interference with the duties of
the Superintendent. The charges were filed in the office
of the State Superintendent at Frankfort. The Board
members were acquitted, after a trial before the State
Superintendent, but they were reprimanded. In the case
before us, the charge filed against Mr. Wyatt was ‘con-
duct unbecoming a Board member,’ and the charge

_ was brought by patrons of the Ruddles Mills school, and
not the Superintendent. In this case, the State Board
did not reprimand Mr, Wyatt for his alleged conduct
with Mrs. Ritchey, in the presence of the pupils. After
the Board members were acquitted by the State Board,
they brought charges against their Superintendent, who
had been given a contract of employment for four years;
which term of employment had not expired, just as the
facts are in the present case. Some of the charges in the
Ludlow case are similar to the charges against Mr. Darn-
aby, and just as in the Darnaby case, the Board prompt-
ly found the Superintendent guilty and discharged him.
The Court of Appeals found that ‘neither the charges
nor evidence were sufficient to remove appellant from
his office.’ In this same case the Court took cognizance
of the fact that where malice has been put in issue, then

a (

the Court must determine whether there is evidence of
malice, and decide the question as it does all other issues.

“The following definition of ‘cause’ appearing in
22 RB. C. L., page 571, has been adopted and approved by
the Kentucky courts:

. “<The word ‘cause’? in a statute authorizing the
removal of officers for cause means legal cause, and not
any cause which the Board authorized to make such re-
moval may deem sufficient. It is implied that they can-
not be removed at the mere will of those vested with
power of removal, or without any cause. It must be a
cause relating to, and affecting, the administration of
the office, and must be restricted to something of a sub-
stantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests
of the public.’

“In passing on the right of the Board to break the
Superintendent’s contract of employment and discharge
him from office, the Court, in the Ludlow case, used the
following words: .

““*We are not unmindful of the rule that school
boards are given a reasonably wide discretion in remov-
ing teachers and other employees, when any legal cause
is charged, and supported by evidence of a substantial
nature. But this does not mean that such boards may re-
scind their contracts and discharge such employees for
some fanciful or imaginary cause, to suit their own ideas.
If such had been the intention of the Legislature, evi-
dently it would have provided for their removal at will,
or without cause, instead of ‘‘for cause.” ’

“There is no evidence in the record that Mr. L. C.
Taylor, named a defendant in this appeal, had any part
in bringing on this controversy, and that he merely dis-
charged faithfully the duties assigned to him by his
immediate superiors, without criticism from any of the
parties involved in this action.

“Now, this appeal having been submitted for judg-
ment on the charges brought by the Bourbon County
Board of Education, and on the evidence heard by the
said Board, in support of the said charges, the evidence
on behalf of E. H. Darnaby, the several exhibits, the, pe-
tition of appeal and the briefs of the parties, and the
Court being advised, adjudges as follows: ~~" ¢‘

2

“Ist. The evidence contained in the record does not
show legal cause for the removal by the Bourbon County
Board of Education of'B. H. Darnaby as Superintendent
of Bourbon County Schools.

“2nd. That the Bourbon County Board of Hduca-
tion was in error when it removed E. H. Darnaby as
Superintendent of Schools, on the evidence heard before
the Board.

“3rd. That the order of the Bourbon County Board
of Education, discharging E. H. Darnaby as Superin-
tendent of Schools, is invalid and void.

‘4th. That H, H. Darnaby is now the lawful Super-
intendent of Bourbon County Schools, and the only such
Superintendent.

“*Tt is ordered that the defendants, and each of them,

be and are now enjoined from interfering with the said
KE. H. Darnaby in the performance of his duties as Su-
perintendent of the Public Schools of Bourbon County.

“Tt.is further ordered that the Bourbon County
Board of Education pay to the said E. H. Darnaby, as
Superintendent, his accumulated salary from March 18,
1950, to the date of the entry of this judgment.

“To all of which the defendants object, except and
pray an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which is granted.
This day of , 1950. «

“WwW. B. Ardery.
“Judge Bourbon Cireuit Court”’

Appellants maintain and insist that to permit the
judgment to stand would in fact be allowing a substitu-
- tion of the court’s judgment for that of the Board. In
support of their position, Hunter v. Board of Education,
265 Ky. 162, 96 8. W. 2d 265, and Starns v. Bourbon
County Board of Education, 280 Ky. 747, 134 8. W. 2d
643, are cited. We, by no means, disagree with those de-
cisions. The rules therein are not at all inconsistent with
principles enunciated in Smith v. Board of Education
of Ludlow, Kentucky, cited and relied upon by the lower
court in its opinion above. The question goes to whether
or not ‘‘good cause or legal cause,’’ which must be the
basis of removal, is present.

We think the judgment and opinion of the lower

Pe 429

court to be correct and that it properly resolved the
matter.

The judgment is affirmed.

ma
Westerfield et al. v. Kessinger et al.

January 19, 1951.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

EB. S. Howard for appellants.
Otto C. Martin for appellees.

Juper Latmer—Affirming.

We have another action of the more or less unfortu-
nate variety involving members of a family. W. W. Royal,
father of appellant, Anna M. Westerfield, and grand-
father of appellee, Deleye Kessinger, at one time ‘owned
a 400 acre tract of land in Ohio County. This tract was
bounded on one side by what is known as the Hamilton

430 |

Ford Road and on the opposite side by a road known
as the Ridge Road. The owner’s dwelling house and
buildings were situated on the Hamilton Ford Road. It
appears that, for his own convenience, he made a pass-
way running across his land more or less diagonally from
his home on the Hamilton Ford Road to the Ridge Road,
which ran by a tenant house near the center of this 400
acre tract of land.

In 1902, W. W. Royal conveyed to his son, C. E.
Royal, a 52 acre tract of land in approximately the cen-
ter of the 400 acres, which included this tenant house.
C. E. Royal moved to and lived in this house and used
the passway to the Hamilton Ford Road.

In 1915, C. E. Royal conveyed this 52 acre tract to
I. T. Westerfield and his wife, Anna M. Westerfield. The
Westerfields, who lived across the Hamilton Ford
Road, used this passway in reaching this 52 acre tract.

W. W. Royal died in 1920. At the time of his death,
of the original 400 acrés, he owned only 71 acres fronting
on the Hamilton Ford Road and running with it, and
through which ran the passway in controversy. In the
suit for settlement of the estate, T. P. Royal, son of W.
W. Royal, and father of Deleye Kessinger, one of the
appellees herein, became the purchaser of this 71 acre
tract.

In 1923, T. P. Royal and the Westerfields agreed to
change this passway and moved it several hundred yards
westward. The Westerfields and T. P. Royal built and
maintained together a bridge on the new passway. This
new passway was closed by appellees in 1945 on the
alleged grounds that appellants’ tenants ran over and
destroyed appellees’ crops.

After appellees closed the passway, the Westerfields
brought suit seeking removal of the fence across the
passway, alleging the passway to be appurtenant to
their land; also, that it had been held adversely for more
than 15 years and that by reason of the closure they
had been damaged in the sum of $270.

The cause was heard by the court. From judgment
in favor of appellees, this appeal is prosecuted.

There are a number of preliminary questions pre-
sented by appellees seeking a dismissal of the appeal,

es 431

all of which we choose not to discuss, since we have
concluded that the judgment should be affirmed. In the
first place, the general rules controlling appurtenances
to land do not reach the matter involved herein. It is
significant that in the instant case the record discloses
that this passway was constructed, or made, for the
convenience and use of the original owner of the 400 acre
tract of land. It was not made as a necessity to any
particular portion of the land, but more as a convenience
for the owner to reach his tenant house. When W. W.
Royal sold this 52 acre tract to his son, this road was
here. True, when a tract of land within the whole of an
estate is conveyed to another, the presumption is that
there shall be a way of ingress and egress as a necessity.
The owner of this 52 acre tract could go over this exist-
» ing passway either to the Ridge Road or to the Hamilton
Ford Road, according to his convenience. It could not
be persuasively argued that at the time this 52 acre tract
was sold, if the seller desired to grant a right of ingress
and egress as a necessity, he could not have then and
there closed the Hamilton Ford Road and have left
only as the purchaser’s means of ingress and egress
the passway to the Ridge Road. It appears, however,
that nothing was said with respect thereto, and pur-
chaser was permitted to use either passway.

It will next be noted that a brother, namely, T. P.
Royal, later became the owner of the old homestead
which lay at the outlet of the Hamilton Ford Road. T.
P. Royal entered into an agreement with the Wester-
fields to construct a new road some 100 yards west of
the original road. As far as this record discloses, the
road was used thereafter pursuant to this agreement.
‘Later the Westerfields became the owner of the land be-
tween this tract and the Ridge Road, which made possible
the right of ingress and egress over their own land to
this Ridge Road. The record discloses that the tenant
house is now dilapidated and almost rotted down; that
the outhouses and barns have disappeared; that no one
has lived on this land for 12 or 15 years; that very little
of the tracts of land are in cultivation; and that prac-
tically the only use made of the road is by tenants who
cultivate what little portion there is in cultivation.

We cannot agree with appellants that, on the basis
of necessity, this Hamilton Ford Road is appurtenant

432

to the land. There is no convincing evidence. that this
‘passway has been used by the public generally, nor so
adversely by appellants as to create by adverse posses-
sion the right of user by prescription.

The chancellor not only heard the conflicting evi-
dence herein but personally viewed the premises and
lands, the roads and physical surroundings, and came
to the conclusion that appellants had no claim upon this
road, either as appurtenant to the land or by adverse
possession,

When left in doubt as to questions of fact, we have
consistently refused to disturb the findings of the chan-
eellor.

The judgment is affirmed,

PS
Hall et al. v. Gayheart

January 19, 1951.
W. R. Prater, Judge.

a 433

H. B. Noble for appellants.
Clark Pratt for appellee.

Jupes Sims—Affirming.

This action was instituted by appellee, John Gay-
heart, against William Hall and wife, Maggie, to quiet
his title to a lot in Knott County against the claim of
appellants. The answer denied appellee’s title and by
way of counterclaim appellants ask that their title be
quieted against the claim of appellee. Something over
200 pages of proof were taken by depositions and the
chancellor decided the title to the lot in controversy
was in appellee and this appeal followed.

Bryan Slone owned a narrow strip of bottom land
situated between highway No. 80 and Troublesome Creek
in Knott County about a quarter of a mile from Hind-
man. On July 28, 1941, he conveyed to his son, Willie,
from this land a lot beginning at a culvert on the high-
way; thence running 45 feet to a post; thence across
the bottom to a marked willow tree; thence up the creek
45 feet; thence to the culvert, the place of beginning.
This deed was duly recorded on Aug. 7, 1941. Then, on
Feb. 16, 1944, Bryan Slone deeded to Willie a second
lot with this description ‘‘Beginning on Sycamore tree
on line of Frank Calhoun; thence with the state high-
way 100 feet more or less to a locust post; thence straight
across the bottom to Troublesome Creek; thence up
Troublesome Creek to the beginning, containing 114
acres more or less.’’ -

The description in this second deed included the
lot first conveyed Willie by his father, but it does not
appear from the record this second. deed was recorded.

There remained another lot of the original tract
and on Feb. 5, 1946, Bryan Slone conveyed it to appel-
lants using this description in the deed: ‘‘Beginning
on a locust post at Willie Slone line at State Highway;
thence down State Highway down Troublesome Creek to
mouth of culvert in front of Bonnie Gibsons lot; thence
to Troublesome Creek; thenée up Troublesome Creek to
line of Willie Slone; thence with Willie Slone’s line

434 ee

across the bottom to the beginning, containing 1 acre
more or less.’’

On April 10, 1947, Willie Slone sold to Kendall
Conley and wife a portion of the lot his father had con-
veyed to him and used this description in the deed to the
Conleys: ‘‘Beginning at mouth of Culvert on State
Highway; thence down the creek to Bill Hall line; thence
with Bill Halls line back to the Highway to set post;
thence up the highway to the beginning, containing 14
acre, more or less.’”

The Conleys required Bryan and his wife to join
Willie and the latter’s spouse as grantors in this deed,
the reason not being clear but probably it was because
the second déed that Bryan had made to his son was not
of record.

On Nov. 8, 1947, the Conleys conveyed to John Gay-
heart the same property the Slones had conveyed them,
the description in the two deeds’ being identical.

Subsequently, some controversy arose between Gay-
heart and Hall as to the boundary line between their
properties, and the day after the former started the
-eonstruction of a house on his lot, he instituted this ac-
tion against the latter to. quiet title.

On the morning of the day Bryan Slone conveyed
the lot to Hall the two men went on the premises and
set a post next to the highway and another next to the
ereek in the line of the property Bryan Slone had con-
veyed his son Willie, and Bryan told Hall he would deed
him the lot up to these posts for $700. Hall replied, ‘‘It
looks to me like too much money for that small amount
but * * * we can go down town to the clerk’s office after
twelve and look at the record and we might trade.’’ The
parties and their wives did go to the office of the county
court clerk and that official wrote the deed. The clerk
testified he found only one deed of record from Bryan
to Willie, which conveyed the latter a lot fronting 45
feet on the highway. The clerk could not remember the
discussion between the parties in his office but recalls
there was something said about the line, also a post
was mentioned. Hall and his wife both testified that when
the clerk read the deed conveying Willie the 45 foot lot,
Hall said to Bryan, ‘‘You make me a deed to Willie
Slone’s line and I have every dollar of your money’’;

a 435

that Bryan agreed, the clerk wrote the deed and Hall
paid the $700 purchase price.

Bryan Slone, Frank Calhoun and Willie Slone all
testified that on the day Hall bought the property Hall
helped. Bryan carry and set the posts; that Hall and
Bryan established the line between the Willie Slone
property and the lot bought by Hall as running between
the two posts they set that morning. Soon after the deed
was made to Hall, Calhoun under employment by Con-
ley erected a three-strand barbed wire fence on the
line established between the two posts. Although appel-
lants then lived in sight of the fence, they made no ob-
jection thereto, except they did not like the fence being
made with barbed wire. There is other evidence that
Conley and Hall each used and cultivated their respec-
tive lots up to this division fence.

The chancellor adjudged that the line between the
parties was the one they established between the two
posts set in Willie’s boundary the day the deed was
made. We agree with him that appellee made good his
plea of estoppel by showing Hall helped to set the posts
and in establishing the line and by not objecting to the
fence being built on that line. This conduct estopped ap-
pellants from claiming their lot extended to the 45 foot
lot Bryan conveyed Willie.

Equitable estoppel applies to a situation where it
would be unconscionable to permit one to maintain a
- position inconsistent with one in which he has acquiesced

to the detriment of another who has changed his posi-
tion. Hicks v. Combs, 311 Ky. 149, 223 S. W. 2d 379, 11
A. L. RB. 2d 1393. But we do not agree with the chancel-
lor that appellants stood by and watched appellee build
his house on part of the land in dispute and for that
reason are estopped. The record shows this litigation
was instituted the day after appellee started building
and there was nothing in appellants’ action on this
score to estop them.

This is purely a fact case and the evidence, although
highly conflicting, is abundant to sustain the finding of
the chancellor. The well-settled rule is that this court
will not disturb the chancellor’s finding of fact on con-
flicting evidence where there is no more than a doubt left
in our minds as to its correctness. The cases are numer-

8

6 ee

‘ous in support of this rule and instead of citing any
specific ones, we refer the reader to Volume 2 of the
Kentucky Digest ‘‘Appeal and Hrror,’’ Key 1009(3).

The judgment is affirmed,
Sizemore et al. v. Hoskins

January 19, 1951.
S. M. Ward, Judge.

Faulkner & Faulkner for appellants.
Don A. Ward for appellee.

Sranuey, Commisstonrr—Reversing.

In this suit against a policeman of Hazard, Clarence
Sizemore and the surety on his bond for false arrest
and imprisonment, there was a verdict for $5,000 in
favor of the plaintiff, E. C. Hoskins. While the ‘motion
for a new trial was pending, the court accepted the
plaintiff’s offer of remittitur to $2,500 and judgment
was entered against the surety company and the indi-
vidual defendant jointly for $2,000, the amount of the
bond, and $500 additional against Sizemore alorie. A
reversal i is sought upon the grounds of prejudicial error
in the instructions and excessive damages.

The plaintiff is a respected citizen of Perry County,
67 years old, a farmer, a member of the fiscal court for
eleven years past, and a former deputy sheriff for sev-
eral terms. He had been a teetotaler for 17 years. At
the time of this occurrence, he was assisting the jailer
in waiting upon the circuit court. About noon one day
in February, 1948, after having waited upon the court,
he visited the police judge to intercede for a boy in
trouble. From the police courtroom Hoskins and Morris
Dickerson, a deputy sheriff, and two other friends, were
threading their way across a street under construction
when the defendant, Sizemore, grabbed hold of Squire
Hoskins, saying he was going to take him to jail be-
cause he was drunk. He and his companions insisted
with the officer that he was not drunk but was a sick
man and protested the arrest. Nevertheless, Sizemore
searched him, took him to jail and there relieved him
of his watch and Dillfold and lodged him with the pris-
oners. Hoskins had insisted that he be taken to the police
court as it was the officer’s duty to. take him there. ‘The

438 ee

police courtroom was in the same building, and they
passed it on the way to the city jail. The plaintiff was
kept in jail about an hour before being discharged with-
out having any charges preferred against him. The
plaintiff proved that he had not been drinking at all and
that he was a sick man, suffering with heart disease,
with a very high blood pressure which caused dizziness
and smothering spells. This condition made it difficult
for him to walk without some staggering. His companion,
Dickerson, had hold of his arm, helping him across the
street, when the policeman arrested him. The police
judge, whose office he had just left, testified that he
noticed Squire Hoskins’ condition and that he ‘‘acted
pretty dopey.’? Somewhat in jest he suggested that he
better keep off the ‘street as some policeman might pick
him up. And that is what quickly happened. The arrest
azid experience caused extreme nervousness, greatly in-
creased his already high blood pressure, and humiliated
the plaintiff. He at once saw his doctor, who sent him
home and told him to stay there.

The defendant, Sizemore, undertook to justify the
arrest by the fact that he saw the plaintiff staggering
with.a man holding his arm and having all the appear-
ance of being drunk. The reason he did not heed the
claim and advice that he was not drunk was ‘‘I hear
that every day.’? He did not take the prisoner to the
police judge, who was in his office at the time, because,
as he testified, his prisoner did not ask him to do so.
His sole defense in this suit was that he had acted rea-
sonably on appearances.

The plaintiff offered an instruction predicating his
right to recovery if the jury should believe that the de-
fendant had arrested him ‘wrongfully or without hav-
ing any reasonable grounds to believe the plaintiff
had committed an offense’? in his presence. But the
court prepared his own instruction, which predicated
recovery on the jury’s belief from the evidence that the
arrest and confinement in jail were made ‘‘at a time
when the said E. C. Hoskins was not drunk or intoxi-
cated.” The defendants objected to the instruction and
moved the court to modify it ‘‘to conform to the in-
struction offered by the plaintiff.’’ It will be observed
that the given instruction authorized a verdict for the

_ defendant only if the plaintiff was in fact drunk in a

| 439

public place, thereby depriving the defendant of his
only defense, namely, that he had acted reasonably and
in good faith. It was the equivalent of directing a verdict
for the plaintiff since there was no contention on the
tial iba he was in fact intoxicated or had been drinking
at all.

Drunkenness in a public place is a statutory mis-
demeanor. KRS 244.020(2). It is true that Section 36 of
the Criminal Code of Practice authorizes a police officer
to make an arrest without a warrant ‘“‘when a public
offense is committed in his presence, or when he has rea-
sonable grounds for believing that the person arrested
has committed a felony.’’ Prima facie this confines the
power of arrest to the actual commission of a misde-
meanor in the officer’s presence without the element of
good faith belief on his part. Notwithstanding the omis-
sion from the statute, beginning at least 46 years ago,
the construction of the statute, and its acceptance by
the legislature, has been that there is no liability for
false arrest if the officer acted in good faith and upon
reasonable grounds to believe that the man arrested was
drunk, and, accordingly, that instructions omitting that
defense are erroneous. Easton v. Commonwealth, 82 S.
W. 996, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 960. The cases are reviewed in
Goins v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55 S. W. 2d 388. In that
case a man visiting a friend in jail was kept locked in
by the jailer upon the belief that he was drunk, when,
as a matter of fact, he was not intoxicated but suffering
extreme pain from toothache and had been using a
liniment his dentist had given him. We held the in-
struction was erroneous because it omitted the condition
that the jailer had reasonable grounds to believe the
plaintiff to have been drunk.

In the face of this consistent and clear construction
of the statute, the trial court refused to follow it, not-
withstanding the efforts of the lawyers on both sides of
the case that he should. The error is manifest. The ques-
tion arises whether it can be deemed prejudicial to the
rights of the defendants. Section 394, Criminal Code
of Practice, preseribes the duty of all peace officers to
arrest any ‘‘drunken person whom they may find at large,
and not in the care of some discreet person, and carry
him before some magistrate of the county, city or town
in which the arrest is made.’? Even though the plaintiff

440 |

had been in fact drunk, he was in the care of a presum-
ably discreet person, namely a deputy sheriff and was
not subject to arrest. York v. Holliday, 311 Ky. 206,
223 S. W. 2d 754. The policeman further violated his
duty to him and to the people whose servant he was by
putting the man in jail instead of taking him before the
police judge or some other magistrate. “We have recog-
nized that under some circumstances and_ conditions,
even during daylight hours, that would not be practical
or possible, but that was not the condition here. We
have also recognized that where there is proof of some
affirmative act or statement on his part, a prisoner may
have waived his right to be taken forthwith before a
magistrate. In Satterly v. Thornton, 188 Ky. 553, 222
8. W. 1088, a policeman had arrested the plaintiff on a
warrant but had refused to take him before the police
judge, though they passed within eight feet of his office
on the way to the jail in which he was immediately
placed. We held the plaintiff had a good cause of action
against the officer and the surety on his bond because of
this arbitrary action. See also Gray v. McAtee, 233 Ky.
97, 25 8. W. 2d 65. The issue of liability on this account
was also considered in Goins v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55
8. W. 2d 388. Ordinarily, whether a prisoner has waived
his right is a question for the jury. In the present case,
however, the only excuse or justification offered by the
policeman was that Squire Hoskins did not ask that he
be taken before the police judge, who Sizemore admits
was in his office, which, as we have said, was in the same
building and passed by on the way to the jail. Merely
failing to ask that the officer perform his imperative
duty under such circumstances is not a waiver of the
prisoner’s right.

The defendant, Sizemore, had been a policeman
for only about six ‘weeks but had served as a military
police in the army. His zeal for enforcing the law be-
came, in the first instance, unreasonable and arbitrary
action, and in the latter an inexcusable act of police
tyranny. The court should have instructed the jury
peremptorily to find for plaintiff; hence, the error in
the given instruction was not prejudicial.

The verdict for $5,000, all that was prayed for, is
so grossly excessive it must be deemed to have been
rendered as the result of what we generally call passion

| 441

and prejudice of the jury. We cannot conceive this ex-
travagant verdict to have been caused merely by the
erroneous instruction. The question is presented whether
the court had the power to order the remission of half
of it even though it was at the voluntary instance of the

plaintiff, it not appearing that the excessive verdict was-

caused by an error of the court. The power of remittitur
under various other circumstances or conditions need
not be considered. In Merrick v. Holt, 8 Ky. Law Rep.
162, the question was considered by our former Superior
Court with some fullness. In Otte v. Otte, 259 Ky. 741,
83 S. W. 2d 42, 45, we quoted extensively and adopted
that court’s ruling. It is that where the verdict is so
flagrantly excessive as to indicate an indifference to the
rights of the parties and the justice of the case, the ob-
jection to a remittitur goes to the conduct of the jury.
The verdict is tainted and impeached by the disposition
of the members of the jury not to treat the case with
the calm consideration which the ends of justice demand.
Where that is the condition, the court may not order a
remission of any part of the verdict because ‘‘the person
so sinned against’’ is entitled to ‘‘have his case tried
by a fair, serious and impartial jury.’”? The court may
only grant a new trial. This ruling is in accord with the
authorities generally where the damages are not sever-
able because of the absence of a proper criterion, such
as where the court has committed an error or the party
has received more than he is entitled to under the law.
39 Am. Jur., New Trial, Sec. 214; 66 C. J. S., New Trial,
sees. 76d, 209a, 209d.

Therefore, in considering the point that the verdict
is flagrantly excessive we regard the amount of $5,000
rather than the judgment for $2,500. Upon this ground,
the judgment is reversed.

P|
Shockey v. Pelfrey et al.
January 19, 1951.

Ervine Turner, Judge.

Kash ©. Williams and G. C. Allen for appellant.
Allie Y. Watkins for appellees.

Jupex Srewarr—Sustaining motion, reversing judg-
ment.

On November 22, 1934, appellant, J. A. Shockey,
executed and delivered his promissory note for $273.80
to the order of W. H. Pelfrey & Sons, Inc., payable on
demand, and bearing interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from and after its date until paid. On November
8, 1948, the following petition was filed to enforce pay-
ment of this note, to-wit:

“Breathitt Circuit Court

“Eric O. Pelfrey, W. H. Pelfrey, .
and Nathan Pelfrey, Formerly W. H.

Pelfrey and Sons Theorporated, Plaintiffs,

V. Petition

J. A. Shockey, Defendant

‘Plaintiffs, W. H. Pelfrey, Eric Pelfrey and Nathan
Pelfrey, state that.defendant, J. A. Shockey, by a writing
-dated the 22nd day of November, 1934, which he executed
and delivered to plaintiffs, and ‘which is filed herewith

a

ee 443
as part hereof, marked exhibit ‘‘A,’’? promised to pay

to plaintiffs on demand with interest at 6% per annum
$273.80.

“Plaintiffs say that defendant has not paid the said
$273.80 nor any part thereof, or any interest thereon,
and same is now due and owing the plaintiffs and wholly
unpaid.

‘‘Wherefore, plaintiffs ask judgment against de-
fendant for $273.80, with interest thereon from the 22
day of November, 1934, at 6% per annum, for his costs
herein expended, and for all proper relief.’

“Allie Watkins
“Attorney”?

Appellant filed a special, then a general, demurrer
to appellees’ petition, both of which were overruled by
the lower court. Appellant next denied generally the
allegations of the petition. At a jury trial a verdict was
returned for appellees for the full amount of the note,
with interest from its date until paid at 6% per annum,
and judgment was rendered by the lower court in con-
formity with the verdict.

Appellant has moved this court to grant him an
appeal, and he seeks a reversal of the judgment below
because the lower court erred (1) in overruling the gen-
eral demurrer to the petition, (2) in overruling his
motion for a directed verdict in his behalf, and (3) in
giving erroneous instructions to the jury.

Because we have reached the conclusion that the
trial court erred in overruling the general demurrer to
appellees’ petition and because the case must be re-
manded to the court below for a new trial, we shall con-
fine ourselves in this opinion solely to the first point
raised by appellant. Adherence to proper procedure in
a new trial of this action in the lower court, if such is
had, should remove the basis for the other two com-
plaints made herein by appellant.

‘In our consideration of appellant’s demurrer our
attention must be confined solely to the petition filed
herein. The style of this pleading implies that the three
persons who sue are all of the stockholders of a defunct
corporation. However, this is purely an inference which
is unsupported by any of the allegations in the petition.

444 |

All that we know, after reading same is that three per-
sons, without any explanation of their legal right so to
do, sue as individuals to enforce payment by appellant
unto them of a note executed and delivered by him to a
corporation, which note has never been transferred by
endorsement or otherwise from the corporation to them.

Section 120 of the Civil Code of Practice provides
that a note, or other evidence of indebtedness, must be
filed as a part of the pleading, if it is within the power.
of the party to produce it; and, if it is not filed, the rea-
son for the failure to do so must be stated in the plead-
ing. :

An exhibit forms a part of the pleading by the ex-
press language of the Civil Code of Practice, and it may
aid and cure an allegation in the pleading vaguely, in-
definitely and defectively stated. Tackett v. Pikeville
Supply & Planing Mill Co., 249 Ky. 835, 61.8. W. 2d 881;
Newport & Dayton Lumber Co. v. Lichtenfeldt, 72 S. W.:
778, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1969. It cannot, however, supply
an averment which has been wholly omitted. Powers v.:
Hardesty, 250 Ky. 522, 63 S. W. 2d 616. .

It has been uniformly held by this court that when
an exhibit, filed with and made the baste of an action,
shows on its face that the pleading does nut state a
cause of action, the exhibit may be considered as a part
of the pleading in determining the insufficiency of the
latter on a demurrer. Kalfus v. Davie’s Bx’r, 164 Ky.
890, 175 8. W. 652; Standard Lumber Co. v. Colwell,
Ky., 117 8S. W. 286; Gardner v. Continental Ins. .Co., 75
S. W. 283, 25 K. L. R. 426.

In Durham v. Elliott, 180 Ky. 724, 203 8. W. 539,
540, a suit was filed under date of September 15, 1916,
among other things, to enforce payment of two notes of
$208.86 each; neither of which became due and payable
until January 1, 1917, and judgment was entered in this
suit on November 3, 1916. The only ground relied upon
for a reversal of this judgment was that the petition did
not state a cause of action, in that the two notes were
shown by the petition not to have been due when the
suit was filed and judgment was entered. Although it
was alleged in the petition in this case that the notes
were due and payable under a certain agreement claim-
ed to have been entered into by the payor and payee

P| 445

of the two notes, the court held that this allegation was
in direct conflict with certain provisions in the notes
themselves and the court, on the issue in controversy,
held as follows: ‘‘An exhibit, if in conflict with the alle-
gations of a pleading, cannot aid the pleading, but may
render it bad; and if an exhibit referred to and filed con-
tradicts an allegation of the pleading, the exhibit will
control the allegation, unless the exhibit be expressly
impeached or explained by the facts stated in the plead-
ing. Bush’ v. Madeira’s Heirs, 14 B. Mon. 212; New-
man’s Pleading and Practice (3d Hd.) vol. 1, sec. 204e;
Black v. O’Hara, 175 Ky. 623, 194 S. W. 811. In the in-
stant case, the exhibits contradict the allegations of the
petition, and being unimpeached, it follows that the
pleading setting up these two notes did not state a cause
of action, and the judgment to that extent is erroneous
and must be reversed,”

It is clear in the case at bar that there is a fatal
" variance between the allegations of appellees’ petition
and the exhibit filed with it; that the pleading just men-
tioned fails to explain or impeach the exhibit, so that
the latter controls the petition; and that, since these
facts bring into application the principle of law stated
in the Durham case, it follows that the petition, when
considered in connection with the exhibit, does not state
a cause of action and the demurrer to it should have
been sustained.

The motion for the appeal is sustained, the judg-
ment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent herewith.

. York v. Commonwealth
January 19, 1951.
R. C. Tartar, Judge.

446 ee

. Bertram & Bertram and Flowers and Prichard for appellant.

A. HE, Funk, Attorney General, and H. D. Reed, Jr, Assistant
Attorney Géneral, for appellee.

‘Cuter Justice Cammack—Sustaining motion and
‘reversing judgment.

Alvin York has filed a motion for an appeal from
a.judgment finding him and Bob Booher and Otto Lee
guilty of illegally possessing liquor and sentencing each
of them to a fine of $100 and 30 days in jail. For rea-
sons hereinafter stated we think York’s motion for an
appeal should be and it is sustained.

The evidence for both York and the Commonwealth
shows conclusively that York was collaborating with a
deputy sheriff when he took Booher in his cab to Ten-
nessee to get some whiskey. Neither Lee, who was riding
with Booher and York, nor York was arrested when
the deputy sheriff found Booher with the whiskey in
York’s car at the place where he and York had agreed
the latter would stop. Under the evidence there was no
more showing of intent to commit a crime upon the
part of York than on the part of the deputy sheriff.
Clearly this is a case of entrapment which comes within
the scope of the opinion in the case of Scott v. Common-
wealth, 303 Ky. 353, 197 8. W. 2d 774.

Judgment reversed, with directions to set it aside,
and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

True v. Shelton
January 19, 1951,
Ward Yager, Judge.

L. M. Ackman for appellant.
John M. Berry and L. T, Peniston for appellee.

Jupen Larmer—Reversing.

Appellant, a mail carrier, riding a saddle horse
while carrying the mail out of the Truesville Post Office
to the Beechwood Post Office in Owen County, was at-
tacked by a jack which appellee kept for breeding pur-

‘ poses but which was permitted by appellee to be at large
upon the highway over which appellant was riding. Both
appellant and his horse were considerably injured.

The cause went to trial and at the conclusion of all
the evidence, appellee’s motion for a peremptory in-
struction was sustained. From that judgment this appeal
is prosecuted.

Appellee apparently based his motion for peremp-
tory instruction upon the proposition that, since there
is no ‘“‘local option’’ stock law enforced in that partic-
ular community, the owner of a domestic animal may
lawfully permit the animal to run at large on a public
highway and is not liable for the injuries it commits to
the property and person of another, in the absence of
statutory provision, unless it is affirmatively shown that
the animal is vicious and that the owner has knowledge
of that fact. Thus, we are confronted with the question
as to whether or not the evidence, as introduced here-
in, is sufficient to show the jack to be a ferocious and
dangerous animal and that same was within the scien-

448 | |

ter of the owner. 2 Am. Jur., Animals, Section 11. See
also 54 A. L. R. 89 and 33 A. L. R. 796.

Appellee says in brief that jacks are in the same
category of domestic animals as all other species of
livestock in Kentucky. It is true KRS 259.110, 259.160,
and 259,170, direct the posting, taking up, and confine-
ment of stray horses, mules, jacks or jennets, ungelded
horses, or bulls known to be mischievous and breachy.
It will be noticed, however, that the statutory provision
relative to jacks, jennets, ungelded horses, mischievous
and breachy bulls, and stray horses is more prescribed
than that of other strays. This would indicate a recogni-
tion of the existence of some basic difference. However,
‘we feel it unnecessary to go into a discussion of that
phase of the matter since we are concerned with the
law and the facts applicable to whether or not this par-
ticular jack was a vicious animal and its owner had
knowledge of that viciousness. The law seems to be well
established that, inorder to hold the owner of a domes-
tic animal liable, in the absence of statutory provision,
it must be shown that the animal was vicious and that
the owner or keeper had knowledge of that fact.

_ Much evidence was introduced to show that the jack
was permitted to, and did, roam at large, much to the
annoyance of the neighborhood generally.

In the very early case of Abshear v. Monday, 10
Ky. Op. 88, 9 Ky..Law Rep. 382, the rule was enunciated
that the owner of a vicious horse is required so to
confine the horse as to prevent it from injuring the stock
of others. If the owner is not aware of the vicious habits
of his horse, he is bound only to use such means as an
ordinary prudent man would have used in order to have
kept a horse of like temper within his own enclosure.
If, on the other hand, the evidence shows that the horse
was known by the owner to be dangerous, it was his
duty to use extraordinary care to provide against injury
to others.

It is said in Thompson on Negligence, Volume 1,
Paragraph 849: ‘‘The tendency of the modern law to
assimilate the liability of the owner of domestic animals
for injuries committed by them to negligence in all
cases, without reference to proof of a knowledge of
vicious propensity in such animals, is illustrated in a

a 449

large class of holdings, some of them ancient, which,
however, relate chiefly to damages done by escaping
horses, cattle, etc. The result of these holdings may be
substantially stated to be that the liability of a keeper
of horses, cattle, etc. for allowing them to escape upon
the public streets, in case they there do damage to travel-
ers or others lawfully upon the streets, does not rest
upon any conception as to his knowledge or ignorance
in respect of the vicious character of the animals, but
rests upon the question whether the keeper was guilty
of negligence in permitting them to escape. And here
the same rule in regard to what is and what is not neg-
ligence obtains as in most other situations. * * * The
degree of care which the law requires depends upon the
circumstances of each case.’?

True, there must be a reasonably close, casual con-
nection between the negligence and the injury claimed.
The first simple fact we meet is that the jack was on the
highway. The evidence herein, as established by numer-
ous witnesses, is that this jack was frequently loose and
unattended on the highway and on the premises of
neighbors. This fact was well known to its owner. But,
since it is claimed that there is no ‘‘local option’? stock
law enforced in that community, we are, consequently,
thrown into that realm where such a condition must
exist as would require extraordinary care upon the part
of the owner. We are, therefore, confronted with the
question as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient
here to charge the owner with knowledge that this jack
possessed a capricious disposition, or knew something
of the vicious and mischief propensities of the jack so
as to make it dangerous to be loose and unattended on
the highway, or whether the evidence is so lacking as to
reduce the question to whether or not this owner would
be liable for a sudden act of a fierce and violent nature
contrary to the usual habits of the jack.

The evidence discloses these facts. Dr. Poe, a veter-
inarian of many years experience, testified that, from
his experience and observation extending over many
years, a jack, by its very nature, is a dangerous animal.
He stated, on cross-examination, that ‘‘He never saw a
bull or stud or jack that wasn’t dangerous at times.’’? He
further said that all male hogs, bulls, and jacks have
dangerous dispositions.

450

A Mr. Wainscott, who said he was afraid of jacks,
warned appellee about this jack. He further stated that
he heard appellee’s son say to appellee that ‘“‘he was
going to get in trouble about that jack.’

Appellee, himself, testified that during the breeding
season, which was in the spring of the year, he kept the
jack in an enclosure, but after season he put the jack
in a field with some horses. He said: ‘‘They run to-
gether, but the horses were afraid of him.’’ There is
significance to the statement that ‘‘the horses were
afraid of him.’’ Appellee knew, according to his own
statement, that horses were afraid of this jack. There
must have been something about the jack’s disposition,
or in what it did, to create this fear on the part of the
horses. Let us look at it this way. Suppose the court had
permitted this matter to go to a jury. The question, then,
would present itself to us in this fashion. Would there
be enough evidence of probative value to support a
verdict against the owner of this jack? We conclude
there would have been. After all that is the real test to
apply in the giving of a peremptory instruction on the
insufficiency of the evidence.

‘We conclude the court erred in directing the verdict
herein,

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent

herewith.
|

Rosenblatt v. Clements.
January 23, 1951.
William H. Field, Judge.

Le 451

Hughett & Hughett for appellant.
Curtis & Curtis for appellee.

Jupvexr Herm—Affirming,

Appellee, J. W. Clements, an attorney, filed this
action to recover from appellant, Nathan Rosenblatt,
$540 for legal services in four cases. By agreement of
the parties the case was heard by the trial judge with-
out the intervention of a jury. From a judgment for
$540 in favor of appellee, appellant appeals maintaining
(1) that if the incompetent evidence were ruled out
of the testimony, there would not be sufficient evidence
to support the judgment, and (2) no evidence was intro-
duced to show the ability of the defendant to pay.

In his petition appellee sought $25 in the Kelly Super
Service case; $40 in the Carl C. Allen case; $300 in the
Bernard Head case, and $175 in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky case, all cases in which appellant was de-
fendant.

At the trial it was admitted that the charges of $25
and $40 were reasonable. Head, an infant suing by his
next friend, sought to disaffirm an alleged contract for
the purchase from appellant of a restaurant and grill
in Shively for the sum of $2900. When Head threatened
action, appellant employed appellee on April 28, 1947
and gave him the details. Appellee conferred two or
three times with counsel for Head, looking toward a
possible settlement, but suit was filed pleading fraud
and seeking to disaffirm the contract and recover the
amount paid thereunder. Appellee obtained the petition
and a copy of the contract; conferred with appellant;
looked after the case on the docket; filed a motion to
elect, briefing it; prepared a demurrer and answer; did

452 ee

research on the issues raised on the pleadings; had the
case assigned for trial; had witnesses summoned; pre-
pared an affidavit and motion for a subpoena dtces
tecum; conferred with Head’s counsel, and on February
20, 1948; after extended negotiations, finally succeeded
in effecting a settlement for $500.

In the Commonwealth case a warrant was issued
against appellant in the First Magisterial District charg-
ing him with obtaining money under false pretenses.
Appellant had purchased an automobile in Indiana. He
sold the automobile to a man but for more than 60 days
did not furnish him with a bill of sale, claiming he had
lost his bill of sale. Appellant finally found the bill of
sale but a further dispute arose as to whether the auto-
mobile was a 1938 or 1939 model. The man paid some
“*$700 or $750 for it.’? The purvhaser also contended
that ‘‘the automobile had been misrepresented to him;
that it would not run.’”’ The case was set for January 20,
1948. Appellant was unable to appear. Appellee secured
a continuance until February 3, 1948. On that day, ap-
pellee appeared with appellant and his witnesses ready
for trial. On motion of the Commonwealth, the case was
continued to February 10, 1948. Appellee again appeared
with appellant and his witnesses but the Commonwealth
was not ready for trial. The case was continued until
the following day, at which time appellee appeared with
his witnesses, the Commonwealth was ready, the case
was tried from 10 a. m. until 2 p. m. when appellant was
held to the grand jury. Appellee arranged for his bond
of $500. The purchaser had agreed to accept $450. Ap-
pellant had declined to pay this amount, but he now offer-
ed to do so. Appellee, after conferring with the Common-
wealth and with the Magistrate, was finally able to per-
suade the Magistrate that under the circumstances the
warrant should be withdrawn. A new trial was granted
and the warrant was withdrawn.

Appellee testified that his charges were reasonable.
Three other attorneys placed the value of his services in
the Head case at $450 to $500; in the criminal case at
$250 to $350. Counsel for appellant testified that in her
opinion $200 was reasonable in the Head case, and $100
in the criminal case; that the $25 and $40 charges were
reasonable.

Appellant objected to appellee testifying as to com-

| 458

munications made by him to appellee. The court over-
ruled the objection, saying that he would apply the
rules of evidence in his own mind. ‘‘The rules of evi-
dence are not so rigorously applied where a case is tried
before the judge without the intervention of a jury.”
Chamberlain v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 256
Ky. 548, 76 S. W. 2d 628, 629, 631. The finding of the
court in this case must be regarded the same as a verdict
of a properly instructed jury. Appellant’s ability to pay
is not involved here. The only question then is whether
or not the conclusion reached by the trial court is pal-
pably against the evidence. 2 West Ky. Digest, Appeal
and Error, 1012(1).

Appellant objected to certain communications be-
tween appellant and appellee. If incompetent, they were
not prejudicial. The trial judge has had much experience
as a lawyer and as a judge in cases involving fees. The
amounts fixed by him are supported by the record and
are, we believe, reasonable. In the light of the rules for
the allowance of attorneys’ fees ag set out in Wilhoit v.
Brown, 295 Ky. 732, 175 S. W. 2d 529; Martin v. Martin’s
Ex’rs., 311 Ky. 164, 223 8. W. 2d 345, and the facts of
this case, we are unable to say that the trial judge did not
reach the correct conclusion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Hausman’s Adm’r v. Poehlman.
January 23, 1951.
J. Wirt Turner, Judge.

454

Lawrence S. Grauman and Bernard B. Davis for appellant.
Kinsolving & Reasor for appellee.

Cur Justics Cammack—Reversing.

The appellant, Herman Cohen, administrator of the
estate of Carl L. Hausman, deceased, filed this action
against the appellee, Colonel Frank Poehlman, to re-
cover for the death of Mr. Hausman, who was killed on
June 29, 1947, while a passenger in the appellee’s car.
The court sustained the appellee’s plea of the one year
statute of limitations, KRS 413.140, and from a judg-
ment to that effect this appeal is taken.

This action was originally filed on June 8, 1948,
and summons was served according to KRS, Chapter
188, on the Secretary of State, who sent.a registered
letter to the appellee at the address given in the petition,
811 College City, Pennsylvania. This letter was returned
to the Secretary of State marked ‘‘No such post office in
state named,’’ and was filed with the papers in the case
on June 24, 1948. The address given in the petition was.
one obtained from the Kentucky State Highway Patrol
by letter dated July 18, 1947. Sometime in June, 1948,
the appellant was in Shelbyville on another case and
inquired of the clerk as to whether any return had been
made on the summons; but the clerk informed him that
the file was not in the office. Later the appellant asked.
Mr. Bernard Davis to look after the matter. In the first
part of November, 1948, Mr. Davis talked to the appel-
lant in Louisville by phone, and, on November 9, 1948,
sent him a letter to the effect that the registered letter
had been returned undelivered and that the correct
address of Colonel Poehlman was 311 College Street,
Grove City, Pennsylvania. On January 10, 1949, the

Pe 455

appellant filed an amended petition setting out the ap-
pellee’s correct address, and, upon summons being served
on the Secretary of State, the appellee was duly notified
by registered mail. On February 7, 1949, the appellee
moved to quash the summons issued on June 8, 1948,
because it did not contain the correct address, This mo-
tion was overruled. The appellee then answered, setting
up the one year statute of limitations as a bar to the
action because the action was not commenced in good
faith until January 8, 1949. The appellant demurred to
paragraph 2 of the answer, then filed a reply controvert-
ing the allegations of the answer and affirmatively alle-
ging that the action was commenced and summons issued
in good faith on June 8, 1948.

Before a jury was impaneled the court considered
in chambers the question of law raised by the plea of
limitation, and also considered the deposition of the
appellant taken as if on cross-examination and the stipu-
lation of facts submitted by the parties. This stipulation
includes: a letter from the King’s Daughters Hospital
in Shelbyville, Kentucky, to the effect that the rec-
ords of that hospital show that the address of the
appellee was 311 College Avenue, Grove City, Penn-
sylvania; a letter from the Jewish Hospital, Louis-
ville, Kentucky, to the effect that its records gave the
address of the appellee as 1442 Cherokee Road, Louis-
ville, Kentucky; a copy of a newspaper item describing
the accident, which was fatal to Mr. Hausman, gave the
address of the appellee as Grove City, Pennsylvania, and
stated that the appellee and his wife were registered at
the Henry Clay Hotel; a letter from the Kentucky State
Highway Patrol containing the permissible information
from the accident report, which report gave the address
of the appellee as 311 College City, Pennsylvania; and
the letter from Mr. Bernard Davis to the appellant,
dated November 9, 1948, mentioned above.

The appellant argues that the facts show that the
first summons was issued in good faith. The appellee
urges that the original service was invalid and insuffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction over the person of the ap-
pellee on the court and further that the facts show neg-
tigence on the part of the appellant amounting to bad
faith.

Assuming the appellee to be correct in asserting

456 | ee

that the original service did not give the court jurisdic-
tion over the appellee, we do not think this to be the
determining point in the case. KRS 413.250 provides:
‘‘An action shall be deemed to commenice on the date of
the first summons or process issued in good faith from
the court having jurisdiction of the cause of action.’’

In the case of Rucker’s Adm’r v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 279 Ky. 707, 181 S. W. 2d 840, 843, summons was
issued and delivered to the plaintiff’s attorney. The
plaintiff’s attorney being unable to ascertain the name
of the defendant’s process agent and because of the
illness of his wife, failed to forward the process to the
sheriff for execution. A new summons was issued’ and
executed more than six weeks later and after the expira-
tion of one year from the date of injury. We held that
the action was commenced in time because bad faith in
the retention of the first summons was not shown. During
the course of the opinion it was said: ‘‘* * * Plaintiff’s
attorney was undoubtedly guilty of negligence, negli-

- gence which comes perilously near to barring his client’s
right of action, but the statute does not say that negli-
gence in the execution of a summons after it is issued
will bar the right of action. Such bar is effective only if
there was a lack of good faith—lack of intention to have
the summons presently executed when issued. * * *’’
See also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Alexander, 277 Ky. 719,
127 S. W. 2d 395; Walston v. City. of Louisville, 66 S. W.
385, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1852.

In the present case the facts fail to show that the
. first summons was not issued in good faith in spite of the
fact that by exercising greater diligence than was ex-
ercised the correct address of the appellee could have
been discovered. The appellant sought the appellee’s
address from an official agency which in the normal
course of events should have had the correct address.
The summons was issued and immediately placed in
the process of execution with an apparent intention to
have it served and notice given to the appellee in due
course.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.
a

457

Bradley v. Commonwealth.
January 23, 1951.
W. R. Prater, Judge.

Williams & Allen for appellant.

Zeb A, Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, A. E. Funk, Attorney
General, for appellee.

Jupex Moremmn—Reversing.

Appellant, Joe Bradley, was indicted by the grand
jury of Magoffin County for the crime of maliciously cut-
ting and wounding Chalmer Whitt with a knife or other
sharp instrument, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill
him, but from which cutting, stabbing and wounding,
death did not ensue. At the trial he was found guilty
and his punishment was fixed at confinement in the pen-
itentiary for two years. .

Appellant urges the following grounds for reversal:

(1) That the court erred in failing to instruct the
jury at the close of the testimony for the Commonwealth,
to find a verdict for defendant.

(2) That the court erred to the prejudice of the
substantial rights of appellant in the instruction given
to the jury and in the failure to give the whole law of
the case.

458 |

(8) That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the
Jaw and the testimony.

‘We have concluded that point one (1) is well taken,
therefore, it will be unnecessary to discuss grounds two
(2) and three (3).

On the night of June 27, 1949, Joe Bradley was very
drunk. His friends, Ben Collins and Charles Collins,
agreed to take him to his home. The automobile needed
gasoline so they drove to a store operated by Chalmer
Whitt, who had retired, but who arose, turned on the
porch lights, and sold them one dollar’s worth of gas.
Appellant handed Whitt a five dollar bill and followed
him back into the store where he purchased some chew-
ing gum. They came back to the road, where they stood
and talked until appellant seized the end of Whitt’s belt.
Whitt, thereupon, began striking appellant and knocked
him down several times. Whitt testified that Bradley did
not have time to draw a knife during this sudden affray.
After Bradley and his companions left, Whitt discovered
that he was cut on the left arm and shoulder. The tran-
seript of the testimony, which is in narrative form, does
not describe the nature of the cuts. Bradley and Whitt
had theretofore been on friendly terms and never had had
any trouble. No witness introduced at the trial testified
that he saw a knife or any sharp or deadly weapon, al-
though the evidence established that there was sufficient
light for clear vision. A!l witnesses agree that’ Bradley
was very drunk, and he testified that he remembers
scarcely anything about the occasion.

The facts of the case, as submitted to us in narrative
form in the bill of exceptions, fail to disclose éven a
spark of evidence from which it may reasonably be in-
ferred that appellant maliciously cut or wounded Chal-
mer Whitt with a knife or other sharp instrument or any
weapon. Whitt, himself, testified that the altercation
started when Bradley ‘‘took hold of the end of my belt
to my trousers,’’ and there is no evidence that Bradley
struck Whitt at any time. Bradley was the one who was
beaten. Whitt knocked him down several times.

All witnesses concur in the statement that they saw
no knife in Bradley’s hand. The seizure of the end of
Whitt’s belt with his hand may have been only a drunk-
en gesture on his part, but, in any event, there is no

a
proof that he ever held anything in his hand, except
Whitt’s belt. This court has held that hands are not
deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute. Me-
Intosh v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 126, 120 8S. W. 2d 1031.
Whitt testified that after the affray was over, and after
appellant and his companions had left, he discovered
that he was cut on the left arm and shoulder, but no
description of the nature of the cut is given and the
bare statement alone is of no value in determining what
may have been the cause of the wound.

We are of opinion that there was a total failure of
proof to sustain the allegations of the indictment, there-
fore, the judgment is reversed with directions that if
the evidence on another trial be substantially the same
as that produced at the first trial, the court will direct
a verdict for appellant.

Shamburger, Judge, et al. v. Tierney.
January 23, 1951.

Lawrence S. Grauman, Judge.

460 ee

Lawrence G. Duncan for appellant.
Edwin H. Stierle for appellee.

Juper Murien—Reversing.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court involving the construction of KRS 64.530,
which is part of the new salary law enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly at its 1950 session. The question to be de-
termined is whether the Fiscal Court of Jefferson County
is authorized, under the provisions of KRS 64.530, Chap-
ter 123, Section 9, of the Acts of 1950, to employ a num-
ber of assistant county attorneys in excess of the number
authorized by KRS 69.280. An assistant attorney gen-
eral has ruled that the new salary act repealed, by im-
plication, KRS 69.280, but the Cireuit Court decided
otherwise in the belief that by KRS 64.530, the pertinent
part of the new salary act, that all the General Assembly
had intended to do was to vest authority in the Fiscal
Court to determine the number of deputies or assistants
which any county officer could have where no other pro-
vision of the statutes had limited the number of assist-
ants.

KRS 69.280 provides as follows: ‘‘In counties hav-
ing a population of 250,000 or more the county attorney
shall appoint a first and a second assistant county at-
torney. The assistant attorneys shall be appointed for
terms of four years subject to removal at any time by the
county attorney.’’

The pertinent provisions of KRS 64.530 read as
follows: ‘‘In the case of officers compensated from fees,
or partly from fees and partly by salary, the fiscal court
-shall fix the maximum compensation that the officer may
receive, from both sources, and also shall have authority
to fix the number of deputies and assistants, and the
compensation thereof, and the maximum amount that the
officer may expend each year for expenses of his office.’’

It is our conclusion that the two acts are not irrecon-
cilable, and that it is possible to construe them in a way
that will give both of them effect. It is our opinion that
KRS 69.280 is intended to assure the county attorney of
Jefferson County at least two assistant county attorneys,
and that the pertinent provision of KRS 64.530 is in-

Pe 46

tended to authorize the Fiscal Court to grant him more
than two assistants if it deems the work of his office
requires it.

In view of the great growth of the population in
Jefferson County and the considered judgment of the
Fiscal Court by its action in authorizing the employment
of a third assistant by the county attorney, we believe -
that the construction of the statutes here involved is in
the interest of the public welfare.

Judgment reversed.

Kelley et al. v. Crowe et al.
January 23, 1951,
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

Otto C. Martin and Leo J. Stemle for appellants.
©. M. Crowe for appellees.

Jupen Herm—Reversing,

462 |

The Chancellor rendered a judgment declining to
approve an agreement for the sale of infants’ land at a
private sale, and ordered a public sale. From this judg-
ment appellants, Inez Oneda Tichenor Kelley, Guardian,
and the 20th Century Coal Company, appeal.

A. T. Tichenor died the owner of 60 acres of land
near Prentiss in Ohio County. His wife was dead. He
had two sons, Noel Tichenor and Elvis Tichenor. After
his father’s death Noel brought an action in equity, No.
10255, setting out that his brother had left Ohio. County
380 years ago, had not been heard from, and asking that
he be declared the owner of the 60-acre tract. Later he
discovered that his brother Elvis had died a resident of

_ Spencer County, Indiana, leaving his wife, Inez Oneda
Tichenor, and three infant children surviving him. The
wife had remarried. Noel filed an amended petition nam-
ing the wife, Inez Oneda Tichenor Kelley, and Elvis’
three infant children as defendants. C. M. Crowe, an
attorney of Hartford, was named guardian ad litem, not
warning order attorney as provided by Civil Code of
Practice, section 59,

After hearing proof a judgment was entered order-
ing a public sale of the tract to the highest and best
bidder. Upon the motion of all interested parties, this
judgment was set aside. It appears that in the meantime
Noel and his wife had conveyed his interest in the 60-
acre tract to appéllant 20th Century Coal Company.
Later appellant Inez Oneda Tichenor Kelley, having been
appointed guardian for the three infants by the County
Court. of Spencer’ County, Indiana, executed a deed to
appellant 20th Century Coal Company by which she con-
veyed her interest and the interest of the three children
to the Coal Company. She thereupon, as guardian of the
three children, filed an action in equity, No. 10378,naming
the three children as defendants, setting out that Noel
Tichenor had conveyed his interest in the 60-acre tract
to the 20th Century Coal Company, and that she had
agreed to convey her dower interest and the interest of
her three children to the 20th Century Coal Company
for $2500. Again C. M. Crowe was appointed, this time
as warning order attorney for the non-resident infants.

Evidence was taken showing that 12 to 20 acres of
the tract contained coal that could be successfully strip
mined. Three witnesses testified the tract was worth

a 463

from $2500 to $3000; the tract was unimproved; the soil
was worn out, and was valuable only for the coal. The
Liden Company, which had bid $3600 for the tract at the
sale under the first judgment, was permitted to file an
intervening petition in which it offered to pay $8500 for
the tract, and deposited $1000 as earnest money.

Mr. Crowe filed reports and answers stating that
the interests of the infants in the tract was worth much
more than the amount offered by the 20th Century Coal
Company. The Coal Company intervened, setting up its
interest because of the above-mentioned deeds, and offer-
ed to pay $2833.33 for the interest of the infants. Later
it filed an additional plea in which it offered to pay for
the infants’ interest any amount fixed by the Chancellor.
Mr. Crowe then asked that the interest of the infants
in the tract be sold by the Master Commissioner at a
public sale. The two cases were consolidated.

The Chancellor adjudged that the price agreed upon
for the private sale of the infants’ interest in the prop-
erty was not a fair and reasonable price; was not in
excess of 50 per cent of the property’s value, and de-
clined to approve the private sale. He then adjudged
that the property be sold by the Master Commissioner
at a public sale. Appellant Inez Oneda Tichenor Kelley,
as guardian, and the Coal Company prosecute this ap-
peal. ,

The two questions presented here are: (1) Did the
Chancellor properly refuse to approve the agreement
between the guardian and the Coal Company, and (2)
did he err in directing a public sale of the property?

The agreement is for $2500 for the guardian’s per-
sonal dower interest and the interest of the children.
The amounts to be paid for their respective interest is
not set out in the agreement. It is said that the amount
being paid for the children’s interest is approximately
$1800. These amounts should have been fixed. The Coal
Company admits that the amount agreed upon for the
infants’ interest is not sufficient by first offering to in-
crease the amount to $2833.33, and then finally offering
to pay any amount fixed by the Chancellor. The Chancel-
lor is not authorized in such cases to fix the amount.

Objection was made to the offer put into the record
by the Linden Company. However this may be, it is ap-

464

parent from the record that the offer of the Coal Com-
pany was not a fair and reasonable price for the infants’
interest. It follows that the Chancellor properly refused
to approve that agreement.

The Coal Company, as the owner of a one-half in-
terest of Noel Tichenor, and the wife and children of
Elvis Tichenor, deceased, hold the 60-acre tract as ten-
ants in common. The parties, under proper pleadings,
could have asked for a public sale, but here the pleadings
request that the Chancellor approve an agreement for
a private sale in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code of Practice 489(8). It follows that however
desirable a public sale might be under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, the Chancellor was without
power, under the pleadings here, to direct a public sale.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.

a
Hendrickson v. Commonwealth,
December 1, 1950.

Rehearing Denied February 16, 1951.
J.B. Johnson, Judge.

465

Hiram H. Owens for appellant.

J.J. Tye, V. A. Jordan, S. B. Knuckles, James Inman, A. B. Funk,
Attorney General, Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, for ap-
pellee.

Stayiey, Commissioner—Reversing.

The appellant, Herschel Hendrickson, has been con-
victed of the murder of his brother-in-law, Elmer Sevier,
and condemned to pay the extreme penalty of death. It
is rare indeed that this court finds not sufficient in law
to have even authorized the submission of the case, the
evidence which a jury believed beyond a reasonable
doubt to justify a verdict of such fatal consequences.
The deficiency is principally the absence of proof of
corpus delicti. The conviction, it would seem, may have
resulted from the introduction of evidence that the de-
fondant had been twice previously convicted of separate

elonies.

Sevier and his wife, Hthel, and the appellant with
his father and sister, lived within a few hundred yards
of each other in a remote section of Knox County. Mrs.
Sevier was Hendrickson’s sister. The families were on
intimate and friendly terms. It is not even suggested
that there had ever been any trouble between them.

About midnight of January 19, 1950, the family of
Arthur Mills, who lived about a quarter of a mile away,
saw Sevier’s small frame house on fire. When some of
them got over there, the roof and walls of the building
had fallen in, They saw the bones of a body near the
fireplace or between it and the bed. Mills described the
body as ‘‘setting up; looked like he had one of his arms
over the bedstead.’’? The conditions were described by
two other witnesses in about the same way though differ-
ing in detail. About seven o’clock the next morning the
sheriff and county attorney and many others went to
the scene. Several witnesses say there were two’ bodies
in the embers. Later, according to the Commonwealth’s

466 es

evidence, parts of two bodies were found, five or six feet
apart. Overall buckles, a pocket knife and what were
identified as Sevier’s false teeth and a breast pin, which
had belonged to his wife, were recovered from the ashes.
A coal oil or kerosene can without a cap on it was found
Close to the bodies. The Seviers had kept a five gallon
can of kerosene for their lamps and ‘‘to burn.’ After
their removal to Corbin, all the bones that could be re-
covered were examiried by some doctors, who seem to
have formed some sort of board of investigation at the
instance of the officers or Sevier’s family. Dr. Terrell
testified they were of bodies of a man and a woman.-
The Commonwealth failing to call them, the defendant
introduced Dr. Davis and Dr. Ohler. They had found no
bones they could identify as masculine and thought all
came from one body, that of a woman. Another doctor,
who was a member of this group, was not available on
the trial. Elmer Sevier and his wife have not been seen
since that night:

There was sufficient proof that one of the bodies in
the fire was that of Elmer Sevier. The critical point is
whether there is evidence that he was murdered or that
that element of corpus delicti was established. Circum-
stantial evidence and some admissions of the defendant
claimed by the Commonwealth to be incriminatory were
relied upon for the conviction. It is well recognized that
to sustain a conviction there must be proof not only that
there was a death but that that death was caused by a
criminal agency, that is, that a crime has in fact been com-
mitted. Where that factor is sought to be established by
circumstantial evidence, if the facts proven may be
reasonably reconciled with the presumption of innocence,
or are as consistent with the absence of crime as with
the perpetration, it is not sufficient to. prove corpus
delicti. Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771, 40 S. W.
2a aoa Hawk v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 217, 144 8. W.
2d 496,

It is not questionable that corpus delicti may be and
often is proved by circumstances or presumptive evi-
dence. Roberson’s Criminal Law, Sections 421, 424. The
Attorney General directs our attention to Wendling v.
Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 187 S. W. 205, 206. There
could be no question of the crime having been commit-
ted there. It was established that the body of a little

| 467

girl had been burned in a furnace. The conduct and state- _
ments of the defendant were not consistent with inno-
cence. The several other cases cited are distinguishable
on the facts also. And it may be said just here that the
evidence in this case of statements and conduct of the
accused which were introduced as being incriminatory,
as will be developed, are not, in fact, admissions but
mere circumstances which cannot, within the same rule
of measurement, be regarded as sufficient. In this con-
nection consideration must be given to the character,
habits and degree of intelligence of the accused, for,
obviously, conduct or attitude of one man may reason-
ably import innocence while the same conduct and atti-
tude in another man may reasonably import guilt.

The defendant had been employed at odd jobs here
and there and went about fixing clocks, sewing machines
and the like. He was a trapper and hunter to such an
extent that he was generally called ‘‘Rabbit.’”? On the
night his sister and brother-in-law met their death in
their mountain home, Hendrickson was alone in his, His
father was in Bell County and his sister had left two
days before to go to the home of another sister in Knox-
ville to have a baby. He is hard of hearing and had the
custom, as the Seviers had, of banking his fire in the
grate in the night. These facts are certain. We may re-
gard as only affecting his credibility, and as applying to
his explanations and denials, the fact that he had been
previously convicted of a felony, Offsetting this, how-
ever, is the testimony of several witnesses that since he
returned from the penitentiary some years before he
has borne a good reputation for peace and quiet.

Ewell Scott (whose son had deserted the defendant’s
pregnant sister) lived 400 or 500 yards in an airline on
a hill above the Sevier house. He testified that ‘‘a little
better than dusky dark’? he heard a shotgun fire once-
in that direction, apparently inside the house for it was
a muffled sound, and immediately afterward heard a
woman screaming, That appeared to be on the outside.
He did nothing about it and did not mention it to his
family until he told his wife some time later. He did not
know anything about the fire until late the next morning.
Jim Sevier, an uncle of the deceased, heard a shotgun
fire in that direction about ‘‘dusky dark’? when it was
too late to see game. He says it was very clear and dis-

468 ee

tinet but says nothing about any woman screaming.
The defendant testified that that afternoon he had been
bird hunting and visiting his traps and had gone by the
Sevier house. He had eaten supper with them the eve-
ning before. That evening ‘‘about dusky dark’? Tom
Mills, a neighbor, and Pearl Engle, went by Hendrick-
son’s home to get some cold tablets for Mill’s mother.
‘There was a little délay in answering the door. When
Hendrickson opened it, he had on a miner’s cap with ~
carbide light on it and his shotgun. The visitors sat
around about half an hour when he said something about
“thating to rush us off’? and asked us to go hunting with -
him. Mills had also seen the defendant with his rabbit
box leaving his home early that afternoon. Hendrickson
desoribes this visit and states that he had been hunting
doves that afternoon ‘‘out in the bottom,’’ but the rela-
tion to the direction of the Sevier house is not disclosed.

‘When Mrs. Delilah Mills was awakened by her son
that night, the Sevier house was ‘‘burning way high.”
She saw a light come on through the window of the
Hendrickson house, which was between her and the
burning building. Her son and Jim Sevier, an uncle of the
dead man, and his boy, on their way back from the fire
saw a shadow and heard someone walking around inside
the house. They called to Hendrickson several times, but
he did not answer. The witnesses knew that banked fires
will ‘‘flash up’’ once in awhile and it probably accounted
for the light. The defendant testified that after banking
his fire, he went to bed about eight o’clock and heard
nobody calling him. He did not get up until about seven
o’clock the next morning when the officers came.

The sheriff and the county attorney went to the
‘house that morning. Hendrickson invited them in, and
according to the sheriff, acted quite naturally. He said
he did not know about the fire but showed no concern.
After thirty or forty minutes of questioning, Hendrick-
son freely went with the officers to the scene of the fire.
He told them he had been there that afternoon between
five and six o’clock after setting his traps and that he
had fired his shotgun over there at some doves. There
were a number of shoe ‘tracks around the place. He will-
ingly took off his shoe, which fit into the tracks; but he
had told them that they would find his tracks all over
the place.

ee 469

A fired shotgun shell was found close to the house
like some shells in Hendrickson’s home, and his gun show-
ed evidence of having been recently used. The sheriff
testified Hendrickson had not asked about his sister and
her husband when he was told of their house burning
down. While on the premises, the county attorney asked
him if he could imagine what had happened to them, and
he responded he had no idea unless they were at his
sister’s home on the hill. When his attention was directed
to ‘‘a lump’? in the embers and was asked if he knew what
that was, he turned to Jim Sevier and asked, ‘‘Do you
suppose it could be somebody?,”’ or, ‘‘Uncle Jim, what do
you think of that?’? When he replied he thought it was
the bodies of his sister and brother-in-law, it seemed, ac-
cording to the attorney, ‘‘to take him back a little bit’?
and he responded, ‘‘Do you reckon that’s right???

‘When the defendant had been taken to jail, -he will-
ingly consented ‘‘to take a lie detector’? test but hesitated
about taking a ‘‘truth serum?’ until his doctor said it
was all right. He explained in his testimony he remem-
bered his brother talking about the use of some drug:by
the Germans and its bad effect. When his doctor told him
it was all right, he consented to take the truth serum.
Instead of being submitted to these so-called tests, he was
discharged from custody. Later he was rearrested. In the
meantime, all his actions were consistent with innocence.

A state policeman made an investigation. He asked
Hendrickson his opinion as to what had caused the fire,
and he said he thought his sister had gotten too close to
the fire (in the grate) and caught her clothing on fire and
that her husband, in trying to put out the fire, had ‘‘suck-
ed the flame down his neck,’ and it killed him. This can
hardly be regarded as an incriminating admission. All-of
his other responses were in accord with what he had told
everybody else and what he testified to on the witness
stand.

Notwithstanding the uncontradicted evidence that
the defendant had always been.on friendly and neigh-
borly terms with his sister and her husband, who had
helped him and his father and sister, it was sought to
establish the motive which had induced the man to mur-
der them and undertake to hide his crime by burning the
house down was the robbery of a pair of slippers and
overshoes, some sacks of flour and possibly a little money.

470

But when we look at the evidence of motive it seems to
us to be reduced to irrelevancy, either to establish corpus
delicti or culpability. Let it be remembered that motive,
though an important factual element in a prosecution
for crime, is not sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction.
Fyffe v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 165, 190 8S. W. 2d 674,
675. It is argued that there were some evasions and
unlikely explanations in the story he told the officers. It
was shown that the deceased had at this time perhaps $75
or $100, He had loaned the defendant $20 a few days be-
fore, The county attorney’s inquiries of the defendant the
morning after the fire included a question as to how
much money he had. He produced three $20: bills and
some additional funds aggregating $70.35, and told the
officer he had borrowed $20 from Sevier. On the trial the
defendant went into detail as to the source of his funds
and its use. It appears the deceased had four paper sacks
of flour in his house, having about a month before ex-
changed some wheat for eight sacks, and given four of
them away to his father ‘and brother. Afterward his
father saw three lard cans of flour at the defendant’s
home. A. police officer testified Hendrickson told him the
Seviers, seeing the need of himself, father and sister,
had given him some flour, and he had given the Seviers
two bushels of potatoes in trade. He had burned the
paper sacks and put it in the cans. In the ashes of the
burned house was ‘‘a carbon chunk”? such as burnt flour
will make. The qualitative difference between this item
is of no more probative value than that of the possession
of the money.

The testimony as to the overshoes and slippers is
quite voluminous. The deceased had bought overshoes
with four buckles on them about six weeks before, Hend-
rickson was in possession of similar shoes the morning
after the fire. It is admitted, of course, that they are in
common. use in that community. The defendant told the
officers he had bought the shoes on the 18th at Sears’
“Army Store’’ in Corbin and had taken his old shoes to
a shop near the depot for repair. He had bought the
slippers at Daniles’ store, his sister, Mrs. Sevier, “having
given him the money to buy them with. The failure of
the merchants to have a record or to remember having
sold such shoes or any others to Hendrickson proves
little or nothing. None of the witnesses know Hendrick-
son, even by sight. However, the ‘‘Army Store’’ sold a

ee 471.

different brand, but they also handled all kinds of army
shoes, Some time after being accused, Hendrickson had
asked the salesman at the store if he remembered selling
him some overshoes, and he did not. The shoe repair
shop man could not corroborate the defendant. Hendrick-
son testified he had gone there to get the shoes fixed but
found they were not worth it and took no ticket for them.

Ten days or more after the fire, the overshoes found
in possession of the defendant were sent to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in Washington for examination.
An officer of that bureau testified there was a stain of
human blood on one of the shoes but not enough to be
classified or to compare with the sample of Hendrick-
son’s blood which had been sent along. There was no
evidence of blood on Hendrickson’s clothing or gun,
which had been sent to Washington also. The defendant
testified he had stuck a barbed wire in his hand the
afternoon of the fire, and that if there was any blood
on his shoes or gun, it had come from his hand. He
showed the scar to the jury.

It seems to us that this evidence tending to estab-
lish motive falls of its own weight. But if all the ex-
treme implications of motive be accepted as true, they
do not prove murder.

We have given a very extended review of the evi-
dence. We think it justifies our conclusion of the in-
sufficiency to take the case to the jury. We have carried
along in the narrative the defendant’s denials and ex-
planations, which appear to be consistent and reasonable.
But if they be entirely disregarded and the evidence of
the Commonwealth relied upon as proof of murder alone
be considered, it is not only consistent with the absence
of a crime and with the accused’s innocence of having
any connection with the fire that destroyed the bodies of
his sister and her husband. The only testimony tending
to show that the deceased, Elmer Sevier, may have been
murdered is that of Ewell Scott and Jim Sevier that
during the late afternoon they heard a gunshot in the
direction of his house. One said it was a muffied sound
and the other clear. Only Scott heard a woman scream.
It is noted there was only one shot fired, yet the re-
mains of two bodies were found in the ashes. Can it be
said that this bit of testimony is irreconcilable with inno-
cence? Can it be said that the fact that the bodies of two

472 |

people were burned carries irreconcilable proof they
were murdered by anybody? We think not. Scarcely is
there a daily paper in which we do not read a record of
such accidental tragedies.

In the complete absence of any evidence that the
defendant murdered his brother-in-law, or indeed that
he was murdered, we can account for the verdict only
by the feeling that the evidence of the defendant’s pre-
vious convictions in Harlan County in 1929 of voluntary
manslaughter, see Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 235
Ky. 462, 31 S. W. 2d 712, and in Letcher County in 1933
of an assault with intent to rob led the jury to believe
that the suspicions in this case were well founded, and
that it would be good for society to put the man away
permanently. The local prosecuting officers must have
recognized the weakness of the case else they would not
have sought his indictment as an habitual criminal, for
if guilty, it would have been of murder and nothing else,
with the minimum penalty of life imprisonment, the
same as that imposed upon one found to be an habitual
criminal, The indictment was defective since it did not
charge that one crime was committed after the convic-
tion of the other, or in sequence, as held to be necessary
in Denham v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 320, 224 8. W.
2d 180. The defendant had demurred to the indictment
on this ground in the beginning, and had objected
throughout the trial to evidence of the prior convictions.
After it had all been let in, with what seems to us to be
undue emphasis (by a number of witnesses under the
guise of identification), the court ruled at the close of
the evidence for the prosecution that the indictment was
good as charging a second conviction but bad as to a
third and required the Commonwealth to elect which of
the former convictions should be submitted. It elected
to rely upon the Harlan County conviction of voluntary
manslaughter. The court admonished the jury that the
evidence relating to it should not be received as substan-
tive evidence on the charge of killing Sevier, and under-
took to withdraw all the evidence relating to the convic-
tion in Letcher County by telling the jury it was in-
competent and not to consider it. The court having reach-
ed the proper conclusion of incompetency of the evidence
under the defective indictment, pursued the course or-
dinarily deemed sufficient in such circumstances. How-
ever, it is quite fictional to say under almost any such

ee = oS

development that a jury does in fact disabuse their
several minds of what they hear, notwithstanding the
court’s admonition. In the present case, it is apparent
from the verdict that the jury did not steer clear of the
prejudicial testimony they had heard. Being mortals,
jurymen often succumb to the emotional factors—to the
illegal, though not always illogical, view that a man who
has been twice convicted of crime is probably guilty of
that for which he is on trial before them. By reason of
that badge of criminality, the prosecuting officers appear
to have deemed suspicious many things they would
otherwise have regarded as irrelevant circumstances,
and the net of suspicion thrown around this man became
a hangman’s noose.

We, therefore, reverse the judgment because of in-
sufficiency of evidence and guilt.

Judgment reversed.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Paul’s Adm’r (three cases)
January 23, 1951.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 8, 1950.
Further Petition for Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1951.
Wn. H. Field, Judge.

Sims, C. J., and Helm, J., dissented.

Ss
i

ee | 275

H. T. Lively, J. P. Hamilton, J. L, Lenihan and James P. Helm,
Jr., for appellant.

Henry L, Brooks for appellee.

Juvcz Latrmen—Sustaining motion and affirming
judgment.

The appeal is from judgments in favor of the Ad-
ministrator of the estates of George W. Paul for $20,000
and of his young son, George Robert Paul, for $2,000
for their respective deaths, and in favor of the guardian
of William Edward Paul, another son, for $3,000 for
personal injuries, all of which were suffered when a
truck in which they were riding was struck by a train on
a public crossing near Coral Ridge, about ten miles
south of Louisville. The cases were tried together as
one.

We first heard of the case in a petition in this Court
for a writ prohibiting the trial judge from certifying
and approving, or rather recertifying and again approv-
ing, a bill of exceptions. It is charged in that petition
that the original certification and order filing the bill
are void because there was no such document in exist-
ence at the time, the official stenographer and the court
having merely signed the certificate and order filing the
same in anticipation of the record being made; that the
court had overruled the plaintiff’s motion to cancel and
vacate the order and purposed to execute a recertifica-
tion and make another order filing the bill after the time
allowed for doing so had expired. The petition sought
to prohibit that future action. A temporary writ issued.
While that case in this Court was being developed, the
record for the appeal with the bill of exceptions bearing
the original certificate was filed. The appellees have filed
(1) a motion to strike the bill because the court was
without jurisdiction to file it since it was not tendered
within the time allowed by the Code and previous orders
of the court, and (2) another motion to consolidate the
cases, the obvious purpose being to have this Court con-
sider the evidence taken in the prohibition case in sup-
port of the motion to strike the bill of exceptions. The
appellant objects to both motions. If that evidence be

Gy

e

476 ee)

not considered, then the motion to strike must be over- ©
ruled, for on its face the record is regular in respect of
the existence of the transcript at the time and the timely
certification, approval and filing. The presumption of
regularity must prevail. Avery v. Davenport, 300 Ky.
865, 190 S. W. 2d 663. Verity is imported to such a degree
that the certification can be questioned only for fraud
or mistake. However, in its finality it would be a most
ridiculous position to presume regularity here when we
know, through the procedure before us to obtain the
writ of prohibition, that the bill of exceptions was not

-in existence at the time of the approval and filing of the

certification, a fact which is not and cannot be denied.

We have no specific rule with reference to consoli-
dating cases or hearing them together, but it is often
done. Rule 1.230 deals with records or prior appeals or
other records already filed in this Court when made part
of the record in another cause in the circuit court but
not copied into the transcript of that other case. Pa-
ducah and Illinois R. Co. v. Albritton, 174 Ky. 270, 191
8. W. 879. But we take it to be an inherent power to con-
sider together pending cases which have grown out of
the same cause and are between the same parties where
the ends of justice in the administration of the law de-
mand it. It was writteri long ago in National Bank of
Monticello v. Bryant, 18 Bush 419, 76 Ky. 419:

“This and every other court will take judicial no-
tice of its own records as far as they pertain to the case
in hand, but will not take notice in deciding one case of
what may be contained in the record of another and dis-
tinct case, unless it be brought to the attention of the
court by being made a part of the record of the case
under consideration.’’

See also Maynard v. Allen, 276 Ky. 485, 124 8. W.
2d 765. It is true, the prohibition case is against the trial
judge, who filed no response whatsoever. But, it will be
noted that this appellant intervened as the real party in
interest and became the sole respondent. To decline to
consider that record in connection with the motion to-
strike the bill of exceptions would be to let an extreme
technicality of practice prevail over the practical, and
but cause the parties to retake the evidence, for we
would be impelled to authorize that it be done in support
of the motion to strike the bill of exceptions. The re-

ee = {77

ception of evidence aliunde in support of such a motion
where the official certification of a cirenit clerk is chal-
lenged upon the ground of fraud of the party benefited
or mistake on the part of the officer, KRS 61.060, has
been recognized. Bingham v. Anderson, 199 Ky. 680, 251
S. W. 973, That is the real basis of the motion to strike
the bill, though there is no suggestion of fraud or wrong
doing on the part of the defendant in the case. It is only
a technical fraud. The contention is, in reality, that
through the failure of the official stenographer, who it is
argued was the agent for the attorney for the defendant
in this transaction, and the trial court to follow the pro-
eedural law as laid down in the Civil Code of Practice,
the court was led into the mistake of attaching a certifi-
cate of approval and entering an order filing a nonex-
istent bill of exceptions. We are of the opinion, therefore,
that it is right and proper that we hear or consider the
eases together and accept the record of what transpired
in considering the motion to strike the bill of exceptions.

The facts are not in dispute. By an order of exten-
sion the Railroad Company was given 120 days in which
to prepare its bill of exceptions. It is claimed that the
official reporter had a great deal to do in the intervening
period, during which the court was in summer vacation.
The record shows, however, that the reporter left the
latter part of June for his summer home in Michigan
and did not return until the middle of September. At-
torney for defendant below insists that he was diligent
and very persistent in his effort to see that the record
was prepared, and that the reporter continued to assure
him the record would be filed in due time, which in
fact is an acknowledgement that he knew it was his re-
sponsibility to see that bill of exceptions was filed in
time. The reporter had transcribed a portion of the
record, when he learned that the time for filing was
nearly up, which would be on September 29th. He then
prepared his certificate of accuracy and completeness
of the record and another reciting the approval of the
judge and a draft of the order filing it. The reporter
signed his certificate and presented the paper to Judge
Field, telling him what it was and asking him to sign .
it, Without comment, the Judge, who is blind and has
been for several years, though continuing his long and
eminent service on the bench, signed it. At that time the
certificates were not attached to the incomplete tran-

“78

script and it was not presented to the court. A deputy
clerk of the court stamped the paper as filed. It is as
follows:

“‘Came the defendant, by counsel and tendered to
the Court its Bill of Exceptions, and Transcript of Tes-
timony and Carbon Copy thereof, and moved the Court
for an order filing same.

‘The Court having duly examined, certified and
approved same, and the Hon. Wm. H. Field, Judge of
this Branch and Division having signed said Bill of Ex-
ceptions Transcript of Testimony and Carbon -Copy
thereof, it is now ordered by the Court that same be
.and is hereby ordered filed and made a part of the rec-
ord this action without being spread at large on the
order book of this Court.’? .

This was entered three days before the expiration
of the time for filing the document. The court signed the
order book the next day. None of the attorneys in the
case was present or had any knowledge of any of these
things.

An entry was made in regular course on the rule
docket showing that the bill of exceptions had beer
“sioned and certified and filed as of September 26,
1949.” The attorney for the defendant claims that he
relied upon this official record and its verity, and but
for that order, he would have, as he testified, protected
his client and himself by preparing a bystanders bill
and tendering it in time. Section 837, Civil Code of
Practice; Helm v. Hoke Oo., 173 Ky. 525, 191 S. W. 269.
As a matter of fact, it was not until after this Court had
issued the temporary writ of prohibition above mention-
ed, which was on October 24th, that the reporter com-
pleted the transcript and bill of exceptions. On Novem-
ber 8rd he affixed the two pages containing his own and
the Judge’s certification and approval previously sign-
ed, placed the whole within the manuscript covers which ,
had been previously stamped as having been filed in
open court on September 26th. Meanwhile, on October
21st, the plaintiffs had moved the court to vacate the
order of September 26th on the grounds appearing here-
in, and that was overruled. This is alleged and admitted
in the writ of prohibition case but the record in the
case on appeal contains no reference to such action and

EE

there is no such motion or order in either record. The
plaintiffs immediately resorted to this Court for the
writ of prohibition. The record for the appeal was filed
in this Court on November 15th.

The reporter testified he was not positive but was
of the impression that he did not disclose to the Judge
that the record was not complete or that he was signing
a paper not attached to it. Judge Field testified that
he didn’t think he knew that fact, but added, ‘‘I will say
that I don’t think that would have made much difference
had I known it. I don’t recall that I did know it was
just a skeleton.’’ He stated that his official reporter had
been very busy in recent years; that no doubt he had
signed skeleton bills; and that there had never before
been any objection or difficulty arising from the prac-
tice. Furthermore, in relation to overruling the motion
to vacate the order filing the bill, he stated:

“Here was a large verdict against the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company. They had prayed an ap-
peal to the Court of Appeals, which had been granted.
They had been given, I believe, the full time—one hun-
dred and twenty days—to prepare a bill of exceptions
and perfect the appeal. I had never had any objection
in any similar matter, and as far as I know, I had never
thought about it. If I had known definitely at the time
this was presented to me that it was a skeleton and that
we were within a few days of the time limit, I think I
would have followed my general practice and philosophy
and signed it anyhow, and, as we are doing, I would have
left the Court of Appeals to face the problem.’

Thus, we are presented with the case where it must
be said as a matter of fact that the Judge, because of his
infirmity, unknowingly approved and ordered the filing
of a nonexistent bill of exceptions. We have a remarkable
parallel and coincidence in Helm v. Hoke Co., supra, 173
Ky. 525, 191 S. W. 269, decided thirty-five years ago.
The same Judge Field had presided at a trial and the
father and partner of the present official reporter, Emory
Graham, had reported it. Within the time allowed for
filing a bill of exceptions, an order was entered reciting
that the transcript of evidence was filed with and made
a part of a bill, when, as a matter of fact, the transcript
had not been made because of the fatal illness of the re-
porter. After his death, the losing party obtained an

480 eC“ CisSS
order of the court permitting him to file certain affidavits
and depositions in lieu of the stenographer’s transcript
of evidence. This Court was impelled to strike the substi-
tuted documents. There too was a skeleton bill of excep-
tions with an essential part nonexistent, except in the
form of stenographic notes. There is a difference, how-
ever, in that in the Helm case the traziseript was never
in fact made while here we have incorporated the after-
wardly prepared transcript, which was referred to in
the premature approval and order filing it. In Noel v.
Noel, 310 Ky. 864, 223 S. W. 2d 93, the reporter informed
the attorney long in advance that it was unlikely he
would complete the record in time, yet the attorney did
nothing to protect his client; thus that case is disting-
uishable.

Appellee submits that the appellant may not escape
the consequences, for its attorney delegated to the re-
porter the duty of preparing the bill and filing the same,
and is bound by the reporter’s knowledge and act, which
squares this case with the Helm case. True, the official
court reporter is a statutory officer of the court, subject
to the control and discretion of the judge. KRS 28.410
et seq. Sebree v. Rogers, 102 8. W. 841, 31 Ky. Law Rep.
476; Marks v. Graham, 2 Ky. Law Rep. 222, 11 Ky. Opin.
27; Walker v. Burgevin, Judge, 220 Ky. 690, 295 S. W.
997; Livingston County v. Crossland, 229 Ky. 733, 17 8.
W. 2d 1018. In the performance of the duties imposed
upon the reporter by law, the character of the office is
no different from that of the clerk or other recognized
officer of the court, and a party has the right to rely upon
the proper performance of those duties. Sebree v. Rog-
ers, supra, 102 8. W. 841, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 476, The
stenographer takes notes of the evidence and transcribes
them under order of the court. The statute provides that
‘the original shall be filed among the papers to be used
in making up the bill of exceptions to the Court of Ap-
peals,’’ the carbon duplicate being filed with papers to
remain in the office of the clerk of the circuit court as a
public record. KRS 28.480, 28.470. The Civil Code of
Practice, Section 337, declares that no particular form
of bill of exceptions is required, but it seems to be con-
templated that the attorney for the litigant shall prepare
the bill of which the stenographer’s transcript will be
made a part. Section 334. It seems to be a common,
though irregular custom, in the Jefferson Cireuit Court

ee | 48)

—different from the practice followed in every other
-court in the state—for the attorneys not to prepare a
separate bill but to have the stenographer include in his
transcript the instructions, argument of counsel, and
other matters not within the official duty or responsibility
of the stenographer to record. However, when that is
done, and the transcript has been approved by the trial
judge, it may be used as a bill of exceptions. Rybolt v.
Futrell, 296 Ky. 158, 176 S. W. 2d 269. The loose and lazy
practice is made worse by the further long-prevailing
custom, at least in this branch of the circuit court of
Jefferson County, as is shown in this record, of having
the official stenographer file the same, sometimes without
submission to the attorneys, and having the order enter-
ed. In other words, he practices law for the attorney.
This is wholly outside the official duties of the stenog-
rapher.

It cannot be said that it is the judge’s duty to see
that a bill of exceptions is filed, nor is it the duty of his
official reporter. The Court granted appellant 120 days
within which to file the bill of exceptions. This extension
of time was granted appellant, not to the official reporter
for transcription of his notes. Under the Civil Code of
Practice it was the appellant’s duty, if the appeal was
prosecuted, to file the bill of exceptions, and within
the prescribed time. We have held in numerous cases
that where a party chooses the Postal Department to
transmit appeals to the Court and through delay in
the mails same is not filed within time, the appeal must
be dismissed because the party merely made the Postal
Department its agent; consequently, the delay occasioned
by the Postal Department was the delay of appellant.
Here the duty was imposed upon the party timely to
file its bill of exceptions. Instead of so doing, it chose to
adopt the method of having the entire record tran-
scribed, which it proposed to use as a, bill of exceptions.
It must be borne in mind that the subject of discussion
here is the bill of exceptions. Attorney for appellant
states that had he known the true condition he would
have prepared a bystanders bill, an admitted recognition
of responsibility of preparing the bill and seeing that
same is filed within the prescribed time. By its action
here, it constituted the reporter its agent for the filing
of the bill of exceptions, as much so as the Postal De-

482 |

partment becomes the agent of the party in transmitting
a record to the office of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.

Appellant insists that the court must give due re-
gard for its unquestioned good faith reliance upon the
verity of the judicial record that the bill was in fact
approved and filed, else the stability of such records
upon which ‘‘the rights of property and the safety of
society rests,’’ Staverson v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 216
Ky. 309, 287 8. W. 890, 891, will be destroyed. It cites us
to the many cases in Annotations in L. R. A. 1917C, page
1193, under the caption, ‘‘Reliance upon clerk or judge
for information as to time of trial or hearing as ground
for relief from judgment”’ and in Gardner v. Price, 199
Miss. 809, 25 So. 2d 459, 164 A. L. R. 532, 587, under
the title ‘‘Misinformation by judge or clerk of court as
to status of case of time or trial or hearing as relief
from judgment.’? What appellant says would be true
were it the official duty of the court reporter to prepare
and file bills of exception. The above cited cases, as the
titles of the compilations indicate, deal with the right of
a litigant to have a new trial. Many of the recited acts
or omissions would undoubtedly come within grounds
laid down in Sections 340 or 518 of our Civil Code of
Practice. See McCall v. Hitchcock, 9 Bush. 66, 72 Ky. 66.
But this is not a proceeding for a new trial. We are
dealing here with judicial procedure.

We do not regard this as an attack upon the order,
but upon what the order recites was filed. The court did
not and could not approve any bill of exceptions, for
there was none in existence. Suppose the appeal had
been filed the next day with the Clerk of this Court.
Obviously, there would have been nothing to go along
with it. Let us look at it from another angle. Suppose
appellee, pursuant to Civil Code of Practice, sec. 741,
and under the authority of Lamar et al., on Petition, 229
Ky. 258, 16 S. W. 2d 1045, in order to hasten the trial
of the appeal taken by his adversary, had filed an au-
thenticated copy of the record in the Clerk’s Office of the
Court of Appeals at any time after the expiration of the
120 days, which was September 29th, and before No-
vember 3rd, which was the day the transcript of record
and bill of exceptions was actually incorporated in the
record. What would we have before us? We would have
the certification but no bill of exceptions. Certainly, this

ee = — 43:

Court would not permit the appellant to ‘‘wheelbarrow”’
into this Court a record which was not in existence at
the time the appeal was filed. The mere fact that ap-
pellant, or the reporter of the court, ‘‘wheelbarrowed’’
same into the record after the court below had lost juris-
diction of the case does not change the situation. The fact
remains that the bill of exceptions was not filed. The re-
sponsibility to see that same was done rested on none
other than appellant. So, it must be said that what is
now brought here is not an approved bill. The trial court
and its attaches were without jurisdiction to file the
transcript subsequently prepared after the expiration
of the 120 days allowed. KRS 451.150; Nicholas v. Hook,
289 Ky. 406, 158 S. W. 2d 971.

We call attention to Knecht v. Louisville Home
Telephone Co., 121 Ky. 492, 89 8S. W. 508. A formal bill
of exceptions was but a skeleton. It read: ‘‘The plaintiff
offered the following testimony: (Said testimony will be
found in the stenographer’s transcript of testimony.)’’
The defendant’s testimony was included by a similar
reference. The bill was timely approved by the court,
and it was filed by an order. Several months later the
court, upon motion, filed the stenographer’s transcript.
This Court sustained a motion to strike the transcript
upon the ground that it had not been made a part of the
record by an order entered while the court had jurisdic-
tion of the case. It was written:

“The usual practice is to file the stenographer’s
transcript of the evidence with the bill of exceptions, and
in the bill of exceptions to simply refer to the transcript
as containing a statement of the testimony of the wit-
nesses and the exceptions to the testimony. But it cannot
be tolerated that a bill of exceptions may be filed within
the time allowed which contains no part of the evidence
given on the trial, and that then at a subsequent term,
when the court has lost jurisdiction over the case, a
transcript of the evidence may be filed and made part of
the record. The purpose of the provision of the Code is
to require bills of exceptions to be made up promptly
while-the facts are fresh in the minds of the court and
the parties concerned, so that they may be made up
correctly. If the practice were allowed which was follow-
ed in this case, the purpose of the statute would be en-
tirely defeated, and there would be no limit to the time

484 ee

for filing a bill of exceptions. Such a practice would be
attended with grave evils which it was the plain purpose
of the statute to prevent.’?

The full credence given to the certification and ap-
proval by the trial judge of the bill of exceptions rests
upon the presumption that he knows what it contains
and sanctiones it as a true and correct statement of the
evidence heard, rulings made, instructions given and
other things that occurred during the course of the trial.
The same is true as to the acceptance of the date en-
dorsed on the record as that upon which the document
was approved. When it is shown that the record is not
correct and not true and that a document has been ap-
proved as complete and filed in court, when, as a matter
of fact, part of it was not in existence at the time, (other
than as stenographic notes, readable only by the stenog-
rapher) it is the duty of this Court to reject such
‘‘wheelbarrowed’’ record. We, therefore, sustain the
motion to strike the bill of exceptions from the record.

After the appeal had been perfected and the record
in the hands of this Court, appellant obtained a nunc pro
tune order of the court below, attempting to have in-
corporated in this record the instructions as given there,
thus indirectly endeavoring to make the same a part of
the bill of exceptions, all at a time when the court below
had lost jurisdiction of the case, except in a very limited
way and at a time when there was pending against the
court below a writ of prohibition prohibiting the filing
of an after prepared bill of exceptions. As stated in 3
Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 528: ‘The general
rule is universally recognized hat a duly perfected ap-
peal or writ of error divests the trial court of further
jurisdiction of the cause in which the appeal has been
taken.’’ See also Commonwealth v. Stearns Lumber Co.,
102 S. W. 836, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 439; and Ohio River
Contract Co. v. Gordon, Judge, 172 Ky. 404, 189 S. W.
451. It has been consistently held that instructions can-
not be reviewed by us unless they are identified by or
made a part of the bill of exceptions. Where instructions
are not so identified by or made a part of the bill of excep-
tions there remains to this Court only a determination
as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to support the ver-
dict. See Gardner et al. v. Alexander, et al. 159 Ky.
718, 169 S. W. 466, and the cases cited therein; A. Downs

Dn

& Bro. et al. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 206
Ky. 316, 267 S. W. 153.

This leaves only the question as to the legal suffi-
ciency of the pleadings to support the verdict and judg-
ment, concerning which there is no doubt.

The judgment is affirmed,
Chief Justice Sims dissenting.

I cannot, in good conscience, concur in the majority
opinion, and I consider the question of such importance
as to justify a dissenting opinion.

Here is a judgment for $25,000 plus $2,500 damages
on the supersedeas bond and large court costs. By reason
of an entrapment by court officials, the appellant is de-
nied a review of the case because of what the majority
opinion truly regards as fraud and deceit perpetrated by
the court reporter and the deputy court clerk, sanctioned
by the trial judge. An innocent litigant and its lawyer
who, beyond question, have been diligent ought not to
suffer through the dereliction of officers of the court. The
successful party, who likewisé was innocent of the irreg-
ularity, ought not to be permitted to profit thereby. This
court should not deny the right of review if it can pos-
sibly be avoided within any reasonable construction of
the procedural law. Especially is this true when a cursory
examination of the record reveals what I consider an
error in the instructions so prejudicial as to be tanta-
mount to a peremptory against the defendant.

Regardless of these consequences, I think the opin-
ion is unsound and opens up the law so that any party
at any time may present evidence in this court to attack
a judgment collaterally. Time and again this court, as
all others have done, has written concerning the neces-
sity of maintaining the stability of final orders and of
the right of parties to rely upon them. We have just as
often held that such judgments are to be accepted as
true and conclusive and cannot be attacked in the appel-
late court except by an appeal where an appeal is the
proper remedy. Thus, it was said in Simpson v. Antro-
bus, 260 Ky. 641, 86 S. W. 2d 544, 545: ‘‘The general rule
is that a court of record speaks by means of its record
only, and an entry made by the clerk with the authority
of law must be regarded as a conclusive record and can-

486 |

not be explained or impeached by other evidence. In
other words, the record of a court imports verity and
cannot be contradicted by parol evidence.’’

This is a final order. It is not void. It may be void-
able, but a collateral attack on an erroneous order is
never permitted. White v. White, 294 Ky. 563, 172 S. W.
2d 72; Francis v. Sturgell’s Hx’x., 253 Ky. 261, 69 S.
W. 2d 357.

In Helm v. Hoke Co., 173 Ky. 525,191 8. W. 269,
cited in the majority opinion, and which is so like the
present case, the irregularity was shown on the face of
the record. That has always been so when we have sus-
tained a motion to strike the bill of exceptions. In none
of the cases was involved an order of court regular in
all particulars. The proper way to challenge such an
order upon some extraneous ground is by a motion in
the trial court to set it aside. There is nothing in this
record indicating that any such motion was made except
a denied allegation in the original suit for a writ to pro-
hibit the cireuit judge from recertifying and refiling the
bill of exceptions after the time for doing so had expired.
The effect of the opinion is to receive evidence in this
court and to act upon such evidence to impeach and va-
cate an order which on the record was regularly entered
and signed. It is a definite, unconditional and unequiv-
ocal statement that a completed bill of exceptions was
filed in time. But the majority say, upon evidence aliunde,
that this is not true; that what the order purported to
file was non-existent. That is usually the case in any
attack upon an order of record, that is, it is untrue.

Let it be remembered that the time of approval or
the certification of the document is secondary and not
of primary importance, for that may be done even after
the record has been filed in this court. Mann v. Moore,
112 Ky. 725, 66 §. W. 723; Allen v. Wigginton, 309 Ky.
279, 217 8. W. 2d 632. The controlling thing is the filing
and time of filing the bill of exceptions. Commonwealth
By State Highway Commission y. Castle, 293 Ky: 309,
168 S. W. 2d 1018; Kesselring v. Wakefield Realty Co.,
806 Ky. 725, 209 S. W. 2d 63. Here, the order recites ii
was filed in time. That is all the lawyer had to go by
and he had every right in the world to rely upon that
order. It is not only a dangerous thing to hold otherwise
but makes the practice of law extremely hazardous.

ee =—137

Every lawyer must now check the record to see that
every order is supported by the papers upon which it is
based. It is a common practice to enter judgments as
of the last day of a term of court which were rendered
later and were not in fact in existence on the date shown,
but that date is regarded as conclusive and cannot be
questioned in this court. Supreme Tent of Knights of
Maccabees of World v. Dupriest, 238 Ky. 352, 38 S. W.
2d 241; Crook v. Wilson, 313 Ky. 680, 232 S. W. 2d 849.
The same is true in other instances, the date shown in
the record as that on which the judgment was entered
being conclusive. Mitchell v. Demunbrum, 300 Ky. 477,
189 S. W. 2d 682; Avery v. Davenport, 300 Ky. 865, 190
S. W. 2d 663. I fear the effect of the majority opinion
is to overrule that well settled law.

A recital in a judgment of a jurisdictional fact im-
ports absolute verity and cannot be questioned collat-
erally or outside the record. Siler v. Carpenter, 155
Ky. 640, 160 8. W. 186; Wolverton v. Baynham, 226 Ky.
214, 10 8. W. 2d 837; Newhall v. Mahan, 245 Ky. 626, 54
8. W. 2d 26; Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Ward, 286 Ky.
73, 149 S. W. 2d 705. I think the recital that a bill of ex-
ceptions was approved and filed is in the same class.

In Carter Coal Co. v. Clouse, 163 Ky. 337, 173 S. W.
794, there was an order filing the transcript of evidence
in time. At a later day, beyond that fixed for filing, or-
ders were entered showing that the bill and transcript
were then examined, approved and filed. The motion was
made in this court to strike the documents because the
stenographer’s certificate bore a date later than that
fixed for filing. We held that this could not be used to
impeach the verity of the first order.

It is generally held that the trial court exercises a
discretion as to matters relating to the making and filing
of the bill of exceptions and its discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it has been abused. 5 C. J. S.,
Appeal and Error, sec. 1634, p. 545. A bill of exceptions
as approved by the trial judge is conclusive, and this
court is bound by the bill as it appears in the record.
Louisville Trust Co. v. Heimbuecher, 252 Ky. 217, 66
S. W. 2d 96; Castle v. Allen, 274 Ky. 658, 120 8S. W. 24
219. It is not subject to impeachment or contradiction by
means of affidavits either filed in the record or sent here.
Pendergrass v. Coleman, 207 Ky. 783, 270 8. W. 65;

488 |

Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Garmon, 233 Ky. 464, 26
8. W. 2d 20; Butcher v. Corbin Hdwe. & Furniture Co.,
944 Ky. 632, 51 8. W. 2d 931.

What the judge did in the instant case was to pre-
maturely approve an incomplete transcript. The authen-
ticity and accuracy of the completed transcript are not
questioned in any way. The approval and filing of a
skeleton bill of exceptions which contains only its form-
al parts at the time it is signed by the judge with a
parenthetical direction to the clerk to copy or incorpor-
ate designated evidence or documents or other parts of
the record in the bill is generally regarded as accept-
able. 4 OC. J. S., Appeal and Error, sec. 821, 826, pp.
1308-1312, .

My acquaintance with the practice is that it is cus-
tomary throughout the state for the formal bill of excep-
tions to omit the instructions or other instruments and
merely to put in it such a phrase as, ‘The clerk will here
copy”? the designated papers. This court has held this
to be a proper way of making up a bill, and what is
inserted will be accepted, at least in the absence of a
showing that instructions, embodied in the bill are not
those offered, given and refused. City of Ashland v.
Williams, 203 Ky. 300, 262 S. W. 2738, and cases cited

erein.

The original instructions given and refused in the
present case were in the file and record, Filling up blanks
in the draft of a judgment is considered clerical. So
where the judge leaves blank pages in front of his sig-
nature to be filled in by judgments or information, the
record cannot be impeached.

Now, there was in fact a record of the evidence in
existence when the order was made. Part of it was
in typewriting and the rest of it in shorthand notes. The
official record is the stenographer’s notes, at least until
they have been transcribed. KRS 28.430; Meadors v.
Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 622, 136 S. W. 2d 1066. I take
it if at the time the certificate was signed and the order
entered that all the record had been typewritten, though
it was not actually in the hands of the judge, and the
certificate had been later bound with that transcript,
the attack upon the record in this court would not be
entertained for a moment.

ee =8=—139

It is not stretching the construction of the occur-
rence to say the trial court regarded the tendering of
the certificate as the tendering of a bill of exceptions,
which he well knew, or would have known had he acted
with full knowledge of the situation, would be attached
and filed within a few days. Where a bill of exceptions is
tendered in time, the court may file it later, even after
the expiration of the time fixed for filing. Oliver v. Muncy,
271 Ky. 15, 111 8. W. 2d 392. The subsequent completion
of the work of transcribing the notes and acceptance by
the trial court through its clerk as being the official record
may be regarded as of the same character as the bill of
exceptions. Smalling v. Shaw, 144 Ky. 458, 139 S. W. 779.

In the Smalling case, a bill timely tendered in De-
cember was so defective, the judge refused to approve
or to file it. There was no order showing the disposi-
tion, either approving or disapproving or signing of the
bill, and there was nothing in the bill to show either of
those facts. But time was given to a special January term
for any motions or orders i in the case. At that term an
order recited the reason why the court had refused to
sign the bill in December. It was because it did not con-
tain the evidence and for other imperfections. The ex-
tension of time had been given to ‘‘correct [said] bill or
present a bill of exceptions.’ After the time had ex-
pired, the judge entered an order filing a new bill, re-
garding it as but a correction of the defective one, al-
though it appears to have been entirely rewritten. The
order filing the bill recited ‘‘that the judge found that
the only paper of the old bill of exceptions that was
found in the new bill was the back or outside sheet which
contained the indorsement showing that it had been
pitered and tendered to be filed in court at the December

rm.”?

This court refused to strike that substituted bill of
exceptions, saying, among other things, ‘‘When the judge
took possession of the original bill at the December term,
and failed to make some disposition of it, the appellant
was helpless. He could do nothing but wait for the court’s
action. The order entered on the fifth day of the special
January term, which attempted to operate as an order
of the sixth day of the preceding December term, and
recited what then occurred regarding the judge’s refusal
to sign the bill, was of no force or effect. It cannot be

490 ee
treated as a nunc pro tune order for that purpose, for
the reason that there was no memorandum of any kind
entered at the December term upon which a nunc pro

tune order could be based at the succeeding January
term.”’

Both documents were filed in the record of the ap-
peal. This court regarded the new bill of exceptions to
be a mere correction of the original bill and accepted
the original tender and certification and order as suffi-
cient, although there was in fact only a defective skele-
ton, and only the back or outside sheet containing the
indorsement of tender was in the new and completed

The Nebraska case of Curran v. Wilcox, 10 Neb.
449, 6 N. W. 762, is like our case of Smalling v. Shaw,
144 Ky. 458, 189 S. W. 779, in the fact that the court
reporter’s transcript was worthless. The Supreme Court
of that state held that because the attorneys had relied
on the court stenographer, the appellant was entitled
to a new trial, saying, ‘‘Were it otherwise, the proceed-
ings of the reporter would become a snare for the un-
wary. * * * The law will not permit the plaintiff to be
prejudiced in his rights by * * * the failure of an officer
of the court to do his duty.’ [10 Neb. 449, 6 N. W. 763.]

And in the Wyoming case of Richardson v. State,
15 Wyo. 465, 89 P. 1027, 1030, 12 Ann. Cas. 1048, the
stenographer upon whom the party relied was unable to
complete the transcript in time, but what had been com-
pleted was filed and withdrawn to be finished after the
time had run out. But he lost those papers as well as
his untranscribed notes. The court held the party was
entitled to a new trial because of his inability to perfect
his record on appeal. The court aptly said, ‘‘There is
no more reason for permitting a party to be deprived of
his legal rights through a failure or a refusal of the
official stenographer to perform his duties than through
the failure or refusal of the judge or any other officer of
the court to perform a duty imposed by law.’’

In Oliver v. Muncy, 271 Ky. 15, 111 S. W. 2d 392, a
party tendered a narrative form of a bill of exceptions
within the time. Before its approval and after the ex-
piration of the jurisdictional time for filing, the party
appealing produced a stenographer’s transcript of the

Dn

evidence. We held it proper for the court to approve that
transcript and file the same as being a corrected bill of
evidence. Of like effect is Turner v. Shropshire, 285 Ky.
256, 147 S. W. 2d 388. z

With reference to the general proposition that the
appellant should not be deprived of his right of review
because of the irregular action of the court, I think we
have a good and ample precedent upon which the right
may rest. In Clover Farm Dairy Co. of Memphis, Tenn.
v. Gillum, 222 Ky. 20, 299 8. W. 1065, a party had lodged
a bill of exceptions in the clerk’s office within the time
allowed but through no fault of his own, though diligent,
was unable to get a transcript of the evidence to go along
with it. Nor was he able to get an extension of time be-
cause of the illness and absence of the judge. After the
time had expired for filing, the trial court nevertheless
granted further time and the transcript and bill were
thereafter filed. Upon analogous cases, this court refused
to strike the bill or transcript.

The court has properly given a liberal construction
and application of the law respecting the time of filing
of an appeal. It is our rule that if an incomplete record
has been filed in good faith within the prescribed time
and ‘‘the ends of justice will be served by allowing an
additional or supplemental transcript to be filed”’ it will
be- permitted upon proper showing. Wilhoit v. Liles, 300
Ky. 564, 189 S. W. 2d 851, 853. And in Holmes v. Clark,
274 Ky. 349, 118 S. W. 2d 758, 759, 761, where there was a
bona fide mistake between counsel with respect to filing
an appeal in time, the court felt ‘it would be improper
to apply the strict rule of practice to the facts so devel-
oped,’’ and entertained the appeal.

In Clark v. Mason, 264 Ky. 683, 95 S. W. 2d 292,
294, ‘“by reason of the peculiar facts and’ circumstances,’’
the court treated as part of the record a bill of exceptions
not filed in time in the circuit court. Of like effect is
Gladdish v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 298 Ky. 498,
169 8. W. 2d 297.

Finally, the judiciary has a reserved inherent power
to relax the Code provisions as to its own procedure
and rules where to enforce those provisions, would re-
sult in thwarting the administration of justice. Burton
v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 263, 118 8. W. 2d 161; Commonwealth

492 ee)

ex rel. Attorney General v. Furste, 288 Ky. 631, 157 S.
W. 2d 59.

Therefore, even under the conception of the majority
opinion—that the motion to strike the bill of exceptions
is not an attack upon the order of the court and hold-
ing its recital may be ignored, but is an attack only
upon the certification and approval of the instrument
which the order recites as then being filed—I think this
court should regard what was done as being within the
discretion of the trial judge, irregular though it was, and
the motion to strike should be overruled.

- Dissenting opinion by Judge Sims on thé modified
opinion of the majority.

I think a recitation of the record and statement of
the decisions of this court, as consistent as they are nu-
merous, justify my disagreement with the modification
of the opinion relating to the nune pro tune order. It
disregards the order upon two grounds, viz. (1) the
eireuit court was without jurisdiction since an appeal
had been perfected and there was pending a writ ‘‘pro-
hibiting the filing of an after prepared bill of excep-
tions;’? (2) the plaintiff was indirectly endeavoring to
make the instructions a part of the bill of exceptions,
and ‘‘instructions cannot be reviewed by us unless they
are identified by or made apart of the bill of exceptions.”

At the time the instructions were given, this order
was entered:

“Thereupon the Court instructed the jury by writ-
ten instructions numbered 1, 2 A. B. 3, A. B. C. 4, 5, 4,
A. B.C. D. and 7, to which the parties by counsel ex-
eepted.”’

The instructions were headed, “Instructions Given
May 18, 1949,”” and the Clerk at ‘the time stamped the
document,

“Filed in Court
May 18, 1949
Karl E. Rothrock, Clerk
By RB. Curley
Deputy Clerk’

As stated in the majority opinion, the plaintiffs se-
-eured from this court a temporary writ prohibiting
Judge Field from ‘‘certifying and approving, or rather

ee = 193

recertifying and again approving”’ the bill of exceptions.
The defendant did not wait for final action of this court
in that proceeding but on November 15, 1949, perfected
an appeal by filing the record and the bill of evidence
with the attached prematurely dated certificate. On
January 21, 1950, the trial court entered an order ‘recit-
ing the above account of its record and the examinatioit
of the original and stated that of itself the record
furnished ample basis for the entry of a nunc pro tunc
order as sought by the defendant. Accordingly, an order
was entered ‘‘that said instructions numbered as above
be filed as of May 18, 1949, and as of said date made a
part of the record without being spread at large on the
order book of this court.’? This was simply supplying an
omission from the order of May 18, 1949, above quoted as
established by the document and the clerk’s endorse-
ment thereon.

I cannot agree that the trial court had lost the power
to correct the omission, The majority opinion quotes 3
Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 528, as to ‘‘general
rule’? with respect to the loss of jurisdiction as to
amending proceedings, entertaining a review of a judg-
ment and the like. I think Sec. 530 is more applicable to
this case. It reads:

“Although an appeal or error proceeding, when
properly perfected, deprives the trial court of jurisdic-
tion of the case, it is generally held that the pendency of
an appeal or writ of error does not deprive the trial
court of the power to correct its record so that it will
speak the truth and truly set forth the proceedings as
they actually oceurred. There are a few decisions to the
contrary, however. The pendency of an appeal does not
deprive the lower court of power to correct a mere cler-
ical error in the entry of the judgment, though the cor-
rection of the error deprives the appellant of his ground
of appeal.’’

_ That has always been the rule in Kentucky. Begin-
ning in the year 1810, this court has recognized that it
is the inherent and exclusive power of a trial court to
correct its own errors of record and that the corrected
record will be considered by this appellate court in its
review of the case. Boyle v. Connelly, 2 Bibb 7, 5 Ky. 7;
Keans v. Rankin, 2 Bibb 88, 5 Ky. 88; Speed’s Execu-
tors v. Hann, 1 T. B. Mon. 16, 17 Ky. 16; Gentry v.

494 es

Hutcheraft, 7 T. B. Mon. 241, 23 Ky. 241; Dodds v.
Combs, 3 Mete. 28, 60 Ky. 28, 77 Am. Dec. 150; Long v.
Gaines, 4 Bush 353, 67 Ky. 353; Williams v. Thompson,
80 Ky. 325; Cochran v. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault
Co., 62 8. W. 1038, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 221; Bowman v.
Ray, Ky., 80 S. W. 200; Mullins v. Mullins, 81 S. W. 687,
26 Ky. Law Rep. 442; Estes v. Bowman Bros, 182 Ky.
172, 206 8. W. 304; Higdon v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky.
69, 77 S. W. 2d 400; Crook v. Schumann, 293 Ky. 334,
168 S. W. 2d 1004; Simms v. Veach, 307 Ky. 226, 210 S.
W. 2d 762. There are many other cases, too innumerable
to mention, to the same effect. See notes, 10 A. L. R. 527;
67 A. L. R. 830; 126 A. L. R. 958. And this court has
recently reiterated that a supplemental record filed will
be considered on a petition for rehearing and the case
disposed of on that basis. Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Huffman, 259 Ky. 477, 82 8. W. 2d 482. In quite an
exhaustive treatment of nunc pro tune orders in Happy
Coal Co. v. Brashear, 263 Ky. 257, 92 8. W. 2d 28, it is
said that such an order will not be disturbed unless it
is proved to be void, and the presumption of a trial
court’s action in making an order book entry of an order
nune pro tune is as great as that in favor of anything
in the record.

I think the two cases cited in the majority opinion
are, clearly distinguishable. Indeed, it is held in one of
them that after an appeal, no further steps can be.taken
in the trial court, “except by way of amendment or cor-.
rection of the record.’’ Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gor-
don, 172 Ky. 404, 189 S. W. 451, 453.

Coming to the second ground which the majority
say prevents the consideration of the corrected record,
I cannot regard the motion for the nunc pro tune order
as an effort to ‘‘wheelbarrow”’ the instructions into this
court or as being an indirect endeavor, ‘‘to make the
same a part of the bill of exceptions, all at a time when
the court below had lost jurisdiction of the case, except
in a very limited way,’’ nor agree with the holding that
because the instructions are not ‘‘identified by or made
a part of the bill of exceptions’’ they cannot be con-
sidered.

The clerk’s record of the orders of the court is never
a part of the bill of exceptions. Sec. 337, Civil Code of
Practice, provides a bill of exceptions must be prepared,

ee 195

filed and authenticated showing a decision or ground of
objection only ‘‘If the decision be not entered on the
record, or the grounds of objection do not appear in the
entry.’’ In Morton v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 240 Ky.
199, 41 8S. W. 2d 1110, 1111, the court said:

“We have a long line of decisions beginning with
Goldsbury v. May, (1822) (1 Litt. 254) 11 Ky. 254, to
the effect that instructions must be made a part of the
record by order of court or by a duly authenticated bill
of exceptions.’’

This has been repeated many, many times. Later
cases which may be cited are Gibralter Coal Mining Co.
v. McCown, 242 Ky. 281, 46 S. W. 2d 96; Quisenberry v.
Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 390, 185 S. W. 2d 669, 671. In
the latter case, it is said that the provisions of the Code
of Practice

«* * * do not provide an exclusive method of au-
thenticating instructions in order to render objections
to them available on appeal. We have held in numerous
opinions that it is sufficient if they are identified by an
order of court.’’

The majority opinion cites Gardner v. Alexander,
159 Ky. 713, 169 S. W. 466, and A. Downs & Brothers v.
Fireman’s Insurance Co., 206 Ky. 316, 267 S. W. 153.
They merely say the instructions in the respective cases
could not be considered because they were not identified
by or made a part of the bill of exceptions. In the light
of the Civil Code of Practice provisions and the innumer-
able cases holding that this is not the only way in which
instruetions may be identified and brought up on appeal,
the omission in those opinions of any further statement
cannot be regarded as overruling all the cases that went
before or as destroying the force of all the cases that
came afterward which declare it is sufficient that same
be filed by an order of the court and made a part of the
clerk’s record.

It is well settled that where there is an error shown
in the record it may be considered even where there is
no bill of exceptions. Thus, it is said in Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co. v. Louisville Cotton Oil Co., 136 Ky. 843, 122
S. W. 852, 854, 125 8. W. 266:

“Tt is not necessary to put in the Dill of exceptions
the pleadings, orders of court, or any motion or paper

496 |

that is mentioned in the orders of éourt as having been
offered or filed as a part of the record, although it may
not be copied on the record book, as the fact that it is
there mentioned is sufficient evidence of its identifica-
tion to make it a part of the record for this court when
copied by the clerk accompanied by his certificate.’’

The office of a bill of exceptions is to incorporate
in the record that which has not been made a part there-
of by court order. It is not necessary for the instructions
or the exceptions thereto to be included in the bill of
exceptions where they are made part of the record by
an order of court as was done in this instance by the
nune pro tune order Judge Fields entered. The modifica-
tion of the original opinion by the majority so far mis-
conceives the purpose of a bill of exceptions that I feel
the opinion will not stand long, but that will not ameli-
orate the grave injustice done in the present case. *

I regard the instructions to be before us, They con-
tain what I consider a gross error in that they placed
upon the railroad company the duty to give warning of
the approach of the train to the crossing by both blowing
the whistle and ringing the bell. The statute only requires
that one or the other be done. KRS 277.190. If the state-
ment in the appellant’s brief be supported by the stricken
bill of evidence, there was no claim by any witness for
either party that the bell was rung, hence, the instruc-
tion was tantamount to a peremptory for the plaintiffs.
If we presume there is such evidence, the instruction

: is still prejudicial and erroneous.

Iam authorized to say Judge Helm joins me in this
dissent.

Judge Thomas was absent and did not sit in the case.
TS
Rodgers v. Commonwealth.

January 26, 1951,
William B, Ardery, Judge.

es 497

Ardery & Hobson and Henry Meigs, Il, for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb. A, Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Juver Larimer—Reversing.

Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of the
crime of malicious cutting and wounding with intent to
kill. His punishment was fixed at confinement in the pen-
itentiary for 9 years. He appeals relying on numerous
grounds for reversal.

We have concluded that the judgment will have to
be reversed on a ground wholly disconnected with the
facts and circumstances of the difficulty. Consequently,
it is entirely unnecessary to state the facts out of which
the indictment sprang.

Upon arraignment, and prior to entering a plea
thereto, appellant moved to quash the indictment be-
cause of irregularities in the selection of the grand
jurors. Affidavit was filed in support of that motion. In
substance the affidavit shows that, by order entered on
the 17th day of January 1949, the Franklin Circuit
Court appointed C. W. McGinnis, B. W. Whitaker, and
Herbert Smith as jury commissioners. Two days there-

498 Se

after, C. W. McGinnis and Herbert Smith were sworn
to perform their duties as such commissioners and en-
tered upon their duties. These two commissioners pro-
ceeded to select names for jury service in Franklin
County by taking the last returned tax commissioner’s -
book for the County. They selected 500 names and placed
them in the drum designated to contain the names of
those from which selection was to be made for grand
jury and petit jury service for the ensuing year. B. W.
‘Whitaker apparently was not sworn as a commissioner
and did not participate in the selection of these names.
On the 27th day of January, 1949, an order was entered
in the Civil Order Book of the Franklin Circuit Court
vacating the previous order appointing the three com-
missioners above, and an order was entered on that
date appointing W. P. Carter, C. W. McGinnis and Mil-
ton Mefford as jury commissioners..The order shows that
these three men were sworn as jury commissioners. An-
other order was entered on the following day which
shows that these three commissioners returned to the
court the drum containing the required number of names
for jury service, together with envelopes containing the
list for grand and petit jury service for the April term
of court, 1949. Allowance for one day’s pay was also
made to the three commissioners.

The affidavit shows that the newly appointed com-
missioners met and approved the list of names previous-
ly selected by C. W. McGinnis and Herbert Smith, and,
without removing the names placed in the drum by them,
and, without making selections from the tax books, drew
the names from the drum for grand and petit jury serv-
ice. Thus, it will be seen that C. W. McGinnis was the
only man on the acting jury commission who participated

* in the selection of names from the tax books. The allega-
tions of the affidavit, containing in substance the above,
are uncontroverted. .

At the commencement of trial, motion to quash the
indictment was renewed. Appellant insists that, because
of the above irregularities, the court erred in overruling
his motion to quash. In support of his position he calls
attention to Section 158 of the Criminal Code of Practice
which provides that substantial error in the summoning
or formation of the grand jury is a ground for setting
aside an indictment. Attention is also called to KRS

|) 499

29.050 to 29.100 which set out the procedure to be fol-
lowed in the formation and selection of a grand jury.

Appellee points out that slight irregularities and
failures to comply literally with all details set out in
the statutes are not grounds sufficient for setting aside
indictments and insists that there was a substantial com-
pliance with statutory requirements. May v. Common-
wealth, 294 Ky. 308, 171 S. W. 2d 465.

South v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky: 99, 152 S. W. 2d
295, 297, deals specifically with this question. It .was
said: ‘‘Those statutes, section 2241 et seq., Ky. Stats.,
contemplate a joint action by the commissioners in se-
lecting the names to be placed in the wheel and we un-
hesitatingly hold that a substantial compliance with
those statutes is imperative. The situation revealed here
is that one jury commissioner alone selected a major
portion of the names to be placed in the jury wheel in
the absence of the other two commissioners. Mere minor
irregularities and informalities of procedure by the
jury commissioners should not be ground for discharg-
ing the panel, substantial compliance with the statutes
being sufficient, but the irregularities complained of here
are far more than minor irregularities and are such as
to constrain us to believe that the very foundation of our
system of selecting jurors would be endangered by giv-
ing approval to them. The jury commissioners most
probably intended no wrong and may have performed
their task conscientiously as they saw it—the procedute
adopted by them was no doubt due to a misconception
of the statutory procedure and requirements. However,
we have frequently held that where there has been a
substantial violation of the method provided for the
selection of jurors it is not necessary that it be estab-
lished that such violation resulted in prejudicial error
to defendant.’’

Again we say it is not mandatory that statutes be
followed with technical or literal strictness, and no more
than substantial compliance is required. However, if
the irregularity is such as to be a substantial violation.
of the method provided for the selection of grand jurors,
as said in South v. Commonwealth, ‘‘it is not necessary
that it be established that such violation resulted in pre-
judicial error to the defendant.”’

500 |

Looking again at the affidavit, we can arrive only
at this conclusion: That W. P. Carter, C. W. McGinnis
and Milton Mefford, as jury commissioners, returned
the drum and sealed envelopes containing the list of
requisite: number of names for jury service; that C. W.
“McGinnis was the only member of that jury commission
who had anything to do with the selection of names
within the drum so returned to the court, and out of
which the jurors names were selected; and that there
was no joint action by them in selecting the names to
be placed in the drum. Approval of the names thereto-
fore selected by C. W. McGinnis and another, as far as
the acting commission is concerned, is the equivalent of
taking the selection of McGinnis, when the duty of se-
lecting must be a concerted performance by those au-
red to make the selection and return the drum.
This ‘duty cannot be delegated to others.

!-Under the facts only one member of the acting jury
commission had anything to do with the selecting and
placing the names in the drum. We think this a substan-
tial violation of the method provided rather than a sub-
stantial compliance. The court should have sustained
the motion to quash.

It. becomes unnecessary to discuss the other ques-
tions raised other than to say: That upon another trial,
the officers who testified in rebuttal as to appellant’s
reputation for peace and quietude should refrain from
making answers wholly unresponsive and calculated to
place .before the jury obviously prejudicial and incom-'
petent matters.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consist-
ent herewith.

_ Louisville Extension Water Dist. et al. v. Sloss.

January 26, 1951,
William H. Field, Judge.

501

Franklin P, Hays, Frank W. Burke, and Skaggs, Hays & Fahey
for appellants.

Lawrence §, Grauman for appellee.

Cuter Justice Cammack—Reversing.

The appellee, Robert L. Sloss, attorney at law, filed
this action against the appellants, the Louisville Exten-
sion Water District and its Board of Water Commis-
sioners, Frank J. Murphy, Ambrose Hagerman and
Arthur J. Steilberg, in their official capacity to recover
$1,000 as a fee for services rendered in organizing the
water district in 1942 and for certain services rendered
thereafter. The appellants’ demurrer to the petition
and petition as amended was overruled. The appellants
filed answer, which was traversed by a reply. Upon the
completion of the proof for both sides, the court directed
a verdict for the appellee, leaving only the amount of
recovery to the jury. From a judgment on the verdict
for $1,000, this appeal is taken.

The appellee, Mr. Sloss, is a regular practicing at-
torney of the Jefferson County Bar, with extensive ex-
perience relating to the organization and operation of
water districts in Kentucky. A number of residents of
the area now included in the Louisville Extension Water
District sought the assistance of Mr. J. H. Byrd in form:
ing a water district in order to give them a water supply.

- Mr. Byrd secured the services of the appellee as attor-
ney, acting on behalf of more than one hundred resident

502 P|

freeholders of the proposed district. The appellee pre-
pared a petition for presentation to the Jefferson County
Court. Upon objections being filed by Dr. Shacklette
and others to the formation of the water district, the
appellee secured the withdrawal of these objections and
in due time succeeded in getting the court to enter an
order establishing the district and a further order naming
the first commissioners of the district. These three com-
missioners took the oath of office before the appellee as
a notary public. Shortly after the district was organ-
ized the appellee was called into active military service,
on which duty he remained for about four years. During
that time his law partner did certain legal work with
reference to the water district for him.

There is no showing by either pleading or proof
that the Louisville Extension Water District as such
ever had an express contract of employment with the
appellee. It is urged by the appellee that the freeholders
who sought to organize the water district had the au-
thority on its behalf to bind it to a contract with the
plaintiff. It is further urged that in any event the ap-
pellants are bound to pay the reasonable value of the
services rendered, because of the acceptance of these
services which were essential and beneficial to the water

istrict.

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that no municipal
corporation may be bound on the theory of implied con-
tract. The cases stating otherwise were specifically over-
ruled in Worrell Mfg. Co.-v. City of Ashland, 159 Ky.
656, 167 S. W. 922, 52 L. R. A., N. &., 880, which was
approved and followed in Gugenheim v. City of Marion,
242 Ky. 350, 46 S. W. 2d 478. With particular reference
to attorneys, see City of Covington v. Hallam & Meyers,
16 Ky. Law Rep. 128, and City of Owensboro v. Weir,
Weir & Walker, 95 Ky. 158, 24 8. W. 115. In the case
of District of Highlands v. Michie, 107 S. W. 216, 217,
32 Ky. Law Rep. 761, we said: ‘‘* * * The trustees of a
city or other municipal corporation may not, in their
individual capacity, employ counsel to represent it in
litigation; nor does the fact that an attorney renders
services to a municipal corporation entitle him to re-
eover for such services under an implied contract..* * *””

The appellee cites the case of Farmers’ Bank of
Vine Grove v. Smith, 105 Ky. 816, 49 S. W. 810, to the

be 503

effect that a private corporation is liable for necessary
services rendered in its organization, the benefit of which
it has accepted. In that case it was said:‘‘* * * We are of
opinion that a corporation is, by an implied contract,
liable for such or any services rendered for the use of
the corporation as are necessary to its formation, or
may be necessary to be done by it, after its incorpora-
tion, in furtherance of its corporate business.’’

Since, under our law, municipal corporations may
not be bound on the theory of an implied contract, the
rule set out in the above case and similar cases so hold-
ing is not applicable to the case at bar. We find no au-
thority in either the statutes or the opinions of this Court
for allowing the organizers of a municipal corporation
to subject that corporation to liabilities not expressly
imposed by the statutes.

Since we conclude that judgment should have gone
for the appellants on the grounds stated, it is unneces-
sary to discuss other questions raised.

The judgment is reversed with directions to set it
aside and for the entry of a judgment in conformity

with this opinion.
PC
Hurt et al. v. Kendrick et al.
January 26, 1951.
Cleon K. Calvert, Judge.

504

P. B, Stratton for appellant.
J. E. Childers for appellee.

Juper Smus—Reversing.

Appellants sued appellees on a written contract to

recover a debt of $4455.24 with interest, which the peti-

tion averred amounts to $4744. Appellees insist the debt
is only $4455.24, and that sum included an overpayment
of interest by them to appellants of $696.60 which they
are entitled to have credited on the debt.

The Chancellor found the debt was $4455.24 and that
appellees were entitled to a credit of $533.88 on account.
of the overpayment of interest, after charging appellees
with $94.10 for court costs. Out of $4455.24 appellees had
deposited to appellants’ credit in bank to keep good a
tender, the judgment directed the master commissioner
to pay appellees $533.38 and pay the balance to appel-
lants. The judgment further directed the master com-
missioner to make appellees a deed to the land securing
the debt, in the event appellants failed to do so.

On Aug. 16, 1933, appellants recovered judgment
against appellees for $3582 with interest from May 20,
1930, and court costs, to secure which appellants were
adjudged a lien on certain land owned by appellees.
When the property was sold by decree of court to satisfy
the judgment, appellees’ daughter became the purchaser
for $4455.24. She was unable to pay the sale bond and
on Nov. 9, 1934, she, her husband and her parents enter-
ed into a written contract with appellants whereby they
conveyed the land securing the debt to appellants and
the latter agreed td give appellees one year within

Le 505

which to redeem the property by paying appellants
$4455.24, with 6% interest on the original debt of $3582
from Nov. 9, 1934, Under this contract providing for the
extension of the time within which the land could be
redeemed, appellees remained in possession of the prop-
erty and appellants were to reconvey it to appellees upon
the latter paying the debt.

Appellees did not redeem the land within the year
and the agreement was extended from time to time. At
first these extensions were by formal written agreements,
but as time marched on they were made by appellees pay-
ing the interest without any formal agreement being
entered into. The last written extension disclosed by the
record was dated Nov. 9, 1938, refers to the original
writing of Nov. 9, 1934, gave the debt as $4455.24 and
contains this paragraph: ‘‘Now in consideration of the
premises and the payment to the parties of the first part
of the sum of $94.88 in hand paid the receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, the parties of the first party
hereby extend the time for the payment of said principal
sum mentioned in the contract until and including March
9th, 1939.7?

The land was not redeemed by March 9, 1939, and
every four months thereafter appellees paid in advance
$94.88 to appellants until March 18, 1944, upon which
date they tendered appellants $4455.24. This tender was
refused by appellants who insisted that the debt was
$4744. Appellees paid no interest after the tender was
refused and upon appellants’ declining to accept the
tender, appellees deposited that sum to the credit of
Everette Hurt in the First National Bank of Pineville.
Appellants’ reason for refusing to accept the tender was
not because it was in the form of a check but because it
was $290 less than the sum they claimed appellees owed
them. Therefore, the tender made Hurt on March 18,
Tae Twas good. Lee v. Hendrickson, 303 Ky. 39, 196 8.

It is insisted by appellants that appellees owe them
an item of court costs of $74.10 and interest of $214.92
for one year on the original debt of $3582. Appellees
testified this $74.10 was included in the $4455.24 their
daughter bid for the land, since she bought it at the
decretal sale for the amount of the debt, interest and
cost. We are inclined to believe appellees are correct

that this item of cost was included in her bid, but as
they do not cross-appeal, the question is not before us
and we cannot disturb the chancellor’s finding on this
item of cost.

The evidence is conflicting as to whether appellees
paid interest of $214.92 on $3582 the first year the exten-
sion agreement was in force. Appellees testified they
paid this interest, and the fact that appellants permitted
them to renew this agreement for nine more years is a
strong circumstance corroborating appellees that they
paid this interest. In the circumstances, we agree with
oe chancellor that appellees do not owe this interest of

4.92.

But the chancellor erred in deciding that appellees
should have paid interest of $71.64 every four months
instead of the ‘‘interest’’ of $94.88 they paid for each
four months extension, or a difference of $69.72 a year
for nine years. True, the first contract granted a year’s
extension of the right to redeem the land in consideration
of appellees paying interest on the original debt of
$3582 for that year’s extension. But appellees failed to
redeem within the first year, and the only other written
eontract in the record is that bearing date of Nov. 9,
1938, which granted an extension of four months in
consideration of appellees paying appellants $94.88 for
the privilege. While this figure happens to be four
months’ interest on $4744, and the first contract of ex-
tension provided interest was to be paid on the original
indebtedness of $3582, and appellees contend $94.88 was
usurious, yet, after appellees failed to redeem the land
within the first year, appellants could grant them fur-
ther extensions upon different terms and increase the
consideration for the additional extensions. The writing
of Nov. 9, 1938, was a new contract, did not mention the
original debt or interest thereon, but made the consider-
ation $94.88 for a four months extension. The subse-
quent oral extensions followed the 1938 contract rather
than the 1934 contract. To the extent that the chancellor
adjudged appellees are entitled to a credit of $533.38
for overpayments in interest, the judgment is reversed
but in all other respects it is affirmed.

The judgment is reversed.

[| 507

’ Cates et al. v. Cates et al.
January 26, 1954,
William J. Baxter, Judge.

Wiggins & Wiggins for appellants.

Carl Eversole for appellees.
Jvupen Sims—Affirming.

This action involves the custody of a child, Roscoe
Cates, born in September, 1942. The chancellor refused.
the claim of each of his divorced parents and awarded
custody of Roscoe to his maternal grandfather, Roscoe
Abrams, during the school year and put the child in
the custody of his paternal grandmother, Mrs. Eliza
Cates, during the summer vacation, week-ends and holi-
days. The judgment provided the child’s father and Mrs.
Eliza Cates have the right of visitation while the boy
is with Mr. Abrams. The mother accepted the judgment
but the father appealed.

Roscoe’s parents were married in December 1941,

508 | es

separated in June 1942, and the day after he was born
his father entered the army. The evidence is conflicting
as to whether the father voluntarily made an allotment
of ‘his army pay for the support of his child and its
mother, but during the thirty months he was in the serv-
ice the mother received an allotment of $50 to $75 per
‘month for the support of herself and baby.

Cates filed suit for divorce in 1944, charging his wife
with abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment and
adultery. By answer and counter-claim she denied his
accusations and charged him with cruel and inhuman
treatment and habitual drunkenness. Hach asked the
custody of the child, averring the other was an unfit,
person to rear the boy. The judgment recites ‘‘each are
hereby divorced from each other,’’ and placed the boy,
who was then four years of age, in the joint custody of
his parents ‘‘for periods of thirty days alternating.”
Subsequently, each parent moved to Dayton, Ohio, mar-
ried another spouse and now resides there. Cates has a
regular position in the mechanical department of a large
corporation earning $250 a month and has no children
by his second marriage. Mrs. Cates’ present husband,
Pitts, was divorced but had no children during his first
marriage, but he and appellee have a baby about five
months old. Pitts is an automobile mechanic earning be-
tween $250 and $300 per month.

Cates moved the chancellor to modify the judgment.
in the divorce action and to give him custody of Roscoe.
Mrs. Pitts and her father filed a joint response to the
motion asking that she be given custody of her son, or
if that were not done, then the custody of the child should
be granted to her father.

Mrs. Pitts admits she gave birth to an illegitimate
son in her father’s home while her husband was over-
seas in the army, but she declined on the witness stand
to divulge the name of the child’s father. There were
rumors that Cates denied the paternity of Roscoe but
it was never proven that he made such statements, and
he testified that he never questioned being the father of
Roscoe. However, his former wife, Mrs. Pitts, when
asked on the stand if Cates was the father of Roscoe,
refused to answer the question. When interrogated fur-
‘her and asked if she had any doubt of Cates being Ros-
coe’s father, she replied, ‘‘I’m not saying.’’ We feel this

P| 509

was the answer of a scheming and calculating woman
who thought to weaken Cates’ claim of custody to her
son by implying he was not the boy’s father. If we are
mistaken, then it brands Mrs. Pitts as being the mother
of two illegitimate children.

The present Mrs. Cates and Pitts, the present hus- .

band of the former Mrs. Cates, each testified they want-
ed Roscoe in their respective homes and would care for
him. Pitts said his wife, before their marriage, told him
of her indiscretion, and he has her illegitimate son in
his home supporting him and plans to adopt the child.

The record shows Cates evidenced practically no
interest in his son until he made this motion to obtain
full custody of him. While overseas he wrote his wife a
vulgar letter in which he used some unprintable words
wherein he said he was through with her and was going
to marry a girl ‘‘over here,’ and advised her to get
another husband. He expressed no concern in the letter
for Roscoe and did not say he wanted custody of the

oy.

The maternal grandfather is a man of good char-
acter and habits, owns and resides on a small farm
within a few hundred yards of a good school and Roscoe
is named for him. He and his wife had the care of Ros-
coe until he was 4 years old and they have become
devoted to the child. The Abrams now have three chil-
dren in their home, two older and one younger than
Roscoe, and there can be no doubt their home is a whole-
some one. Roscoe is happy there and receives tender
love and attention. The paternal grandmother, Mrs.
Eliza Cates, is a widow who owns a large farm about
two miles from the Abrams place, on which she resides
with a grown son. The proof shows she is a splendid
woman and that her house would be a good home for
Roscoe. But there are no children there and it is a mile
and a half from a school and he would have to travel
some bad roads in attending school.

It is ever difficult for courts to determine who
should have the custody of a child of tender years. Of
course, the paramount consideration is the welfare of
the child. While courts never like to deprive a mother
of the custody of her child, and will only do so when it
clearly appears she is an unfit person to have the custody

510

of a young child, we have no hesitancy in saying Mrs.
Pitts is not a suitable person to have the custody of
Roscoe. If given to her, Roscoe would be reared with an
illegitimate brother which would likely prove embarras-
sing to him as he grows up. The father has shown in-
difference to his son, and the vulgar letter he wrote the
child’s mother, when considered in relation to the care
and devotion Mr. and Mrs. Abrams have exhibited to-
ward Roscoe for so many years, convinces us the chan-
cellor’s decision was correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

Lacy v. Higgs.
January 26, 1951,
John J. Winn, Judge.

a out

BE. M. Hogge and Lester Hogge for appellant.

Hubert Counts, Davis, Boehl, Viser & Marcus, and James M.
Graves, A. J. Deindoerfer for appellee.

Srannzy, Commisstonsr—Reversing.

The appellant, Gordan Lacy, a thirteen year old
boy, suffered severe head injuries in the collision of his
bicycle and a car of the appellee, Oran Higgs, on the
afternoon of July 31, 1948, on U. S. Highway 60 near
Pettitt’s Store east of Morehead. In the suit for dam-
ages, the court peremptorily instructed the jury to find
for the defendant.

The boy was riding his bicycle along with but just
behind three other children about the same age who were
walking on the north side of the road facing the traffic.
They had come along on the gravel shoulder of the road,
which was unusually wide before and at the point of the
collision. A bread truck was parked entirely off the pav-
ing, but headed east, the wrong way. The three children
went safely around it, but the bicycle either struck or
was struck by the car of the defendant, traveling west.

The boy testified that he.never saw the oncoming
automobile because the parked truck was in the way. The
best he could remember he turned out onto the paving
when 3 or 4 feet, maybe more, behind the parked truck.
Helen Caudill, one of the children, testified that after
she and the two others had gone around the truck, she
looked back and Gordan was even with its front door
when he was hit. From her testimony as a whole, it is
apparent that she realized the collision was inevitable,
turned and saw the boy coming around the truck, but
she says she did not see the actual striking of the bicycle.
It was shown that it is about fifteen feet from the back
end of the truck to the front door; also, that the road is
straight and clear for about 900 feet east of the point of
the accident. Lewis Fraley was traveling east on the
right side of the road and apparently was about even
with the parked truck on the other side when the colli-
sion occurred, The noise caused him to glance around or
to his side, and he saw the bicycle and boy fall, partly on
the paving at the back of the truck. The witness had

12 es

not noticed the parked car but did notice that there were
several automobiles meeting him and judged that the
Higgs car was traveling 30 or 35 miles an hour.

The plaintiff called the defendant to the starid arid
examined him as if under cross-examination. He testi-
fied he'was traveling 25 or 30 miles an hour; had first
seen the boy on the bicycle ‘‘maybe 50 yards up the road,
on the shoulder,’’ and next saw him when he started from
behind the truck about ten feet away. At that time the
front of his car was even with the front of the parkéd
truck. The boy started to come on the blacktop paving
and then his bicycle slid out under the car’s fender. He
then ran about 20 feet before he could stop. The witness
had not seen the other children walking along the side
immediately in front of the bicycle.

As a witness in his own behalf, the defendant gave
the same testimony with but little in addition or modifi-
cation. He repeated his testimony that he first saw the
boy when he was fifty yards away as he was coming in
his direction. At the time, the boy, he estimated, was
eighty or ninety feet beyond the parked truck and was
in a safe place on the shoulder of the road. He stated
emphatically that the bicycle darted out from behind the
parked truck, turned to go back and skidded, the boy
falling against and under his front fender. The defend-
ant swerved to his left, ‘‘hit the brakes and stopped as
quick as I could.’’ The defendant was corroborated by
his wife in the car with him and his brother-in-law, who -
was in another automobile following him. though their
testimony is not so.definite.

Under the state of the pleadings, there must go out
of the case whatever basis there was for the jury’s in-
ference that the defendant was negligent in failing to
apprehend when he was 150 feet from the parked truck
that the boy on the bicycle 25 or 30 feet on the other
side of it would come around it into the path of the
automobile. The question then becomes whether the
plaintiff should have his case submitted under the last
clear chance doctrine.

The defendant’s plea of contributory negligence was
not controverted by reply or of record. In a tort action
this admission of the pleading is fatal to the plaintiff’s
right of recovery and authorizes a peremptory instruc-

P| 513

tion for the defendant. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707,
134 §. W. 2d 594; City of Pineville v. Asher, 287 Ky.
503, 154 S. W. 2d 545. The question we have here is
whether that rule should apply when there is evidence
that would take the case to the jury under the doctrine
of last clear chance. In other words, may he go to the
jury under that rule where there is only a general plea
of negligence made in the petition and a traverse, the
plaintiff conceding that he was contributorily negligent?

‘We have held, though the contrary rule seems to
prevail in perhaps a majority of the jurisdictions, 38
Am. Jur., Negligence, See. 271; Shearman and Redfield
on Negligence, Sec. 182, that a plaintiff is entitled to
have his case submitted under the last clear chance
rule without having pleaded it where the evidence author-
izes such submission, Louisville & Nashville. Railroad
Co. v. Benke’s Administrator, 176 Ky. 259, 195 S. W.
417; Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Wilburn,
206 Ky. 510, 267 S. W. 1090, 1091. Notice mav be taken
of Braden’s Administratrix v. Liston, 258 Ky. 44, 79
8. W. 2d 241. An amended petition was filed admitting
the plaintiff had put himself in a place of peril and
pleading specific negligence on the part of the defend-
ant in failing to exercise ordinary care to stop or change
the course of his truck after having discovered the
plaintiff’s peril. We observed that it had not been neces-
sarv for the plaintiff to file this special pleading, as he
might have relied upon general negligence pleaded in
the petition, yet having filed the amendment and speci-
fied the particular negligence, he was bound by that
specification and could rely upon no other. We held,
therefore, that the court properly confined the instrue-
tion to that special issue.

Our attention has not been called to a case, other
than Braden’s Adm’x v. Liston, supra, where the right
of recovery of damages rested solely and alone on last
clear chance rule under concession in the pleadings of
contributory negligence. But there can be no difference
under our practice which recognizes that subsequent neg-
ligence is contained in the allegations of the petition and
traversed in the answer. The issue is still in the case
whether contributory negligence is conceded by the
pleadings or proved by the defendant. We are of opin-
ion, therefore, that when the evidence authorizes it, the

CC CC‘(‘(S
plaintiff is entitled to a submission of the issue of last
clear chance but that only.

The full consideration of the evidence in the present
case leads us to the view that it was sufficient to take
the case to the jury on that issue. Regarding the evi-
dence most favorable to the plaintiff, he had traveled
18 or 20 feet after emerging from behind the parked
truck, and was in plain view of the defendant while doing
so. It is reasonable to say from common knowledge that
these children walking and the boy on his bicycle riding
along with them were not traveling more than 3 or 3%
miles an hour. The automobile was going 30 or 35 miles
an hour, so by computation of the respective distances
and rates of speed, the automobile must have gone ten
times as far or around 180 or 200 feet after the boy
came into view. As is conceded by the pleadings, it was
contributory negligence to come from behind the parked
truck into the path of the oncoming car. The defendant
stopped his automobile in 20 feet after the collision.
‘We think it was for the jury to say in the circumstances
whether under the last clear chance rule the defendant
saw or by the exercise of ordinary care should have
seen the plaintiff in time to have avoided striking him.
Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126 S. W. 2d 448; Bright
v. McAllister, 310 Ky. 512, 221 8. W. 2d 67; Galloway v.
Patterson, 312 Ky. 862, 229 8. W. 2d 960.

The judgment is reversed.

Myers v. Land et al.
October 27, 1950.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing January 26, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

oO
i
on

James F. Clay and James Park for appellant.
George R. Smith for appellees.

Sranney, Commissionrr—Affirming.

George Land and Cecil Fox bought a new machine to
manufacture concrete blocks from J. C. Myers, doing
business as the Central Supply Company, for which they
paid $5,624.57. Some accessories or parts were later ac-
quired costing $340.00, which was not paid because of
the controversy which subsequently arose.

The suit was filed nearly a year later to recover the
purchase price upon the ground that the seller had mis-
represented the machine and its ability to do what it

—C:wsSSCis
was designed to do, namely, to manufacture merchant-
able concrete blocks. An amendment pleaded the pur-
chasers had tendered and offered to deliver back the
machinery to the seller and made demand for a refund
of the money paid, which had been refused by the de-
fendant. They also stated their continuing and present
willingness and readiness to give up possession of the -
machinery.

The defendant denied the allegations of the petition
except as to the sale and price of the machinery and filed
a contract, which consists of an order and acceptance.
He charged that the plaintiffs had been using the ma-
chinery for the manufacture of blocks without complaint
and had not offered to rescind. .

The case was submitted under an instruction which
authorized a recovery of the purchase price if-the jury
believed that the machinery had been sold to the plain-
tiffs with the knowledge of thé defendant of their pur-
pose to use it and that the defendants had ‘‘represented
and warranted that the said machine was free from
defects and was capacitated and suitable to perform the
work for which it was purchased; that the purchasers
were induced to buy the machinery by such representa-
tions and that same were untrue and the machine would
not do the work for which it was purchased and was

. without value for that purpose; and that within a rea-
sonable time after discovering that the machinery would
not do the work, the plaintiffs offered to return or ten-
dered back the machine to the defendant.’? The verdict
was for the plaintiffs. The defendant appeals and urges
as the sole ground for reversal that he was entitled to
a peremptory instruction.

In the consideration of the case, on the question of
a peremptory instruction, we ignore the substantial
contradictory evidence presented by the defendants and
assume the truth of the plaintiffs’ evidence, that is, that
in fact the machine would not manufacture a merchant-
able product and was worthless for the purpose for
which it was sold.

The appellant makes the point that the purchasers
did not elect to rescind the contract within a reasonable
time or negative laches which might have saved the time
element. We do not analyze the pleadings and the evi-

— | sit

dence upon the theory of a true rescission (see KRS
361.690) since the appellees seem to disavow that basis
and insist upon the right of recovery because they did
not get what they bargained for or damages for breach
of contract or an implied warranty of fitness.

Two sections of the statute are respectively in-
voked. :

KRS 361.150, Sec. 15, Uniform Sales Act, provides
that ‘‘there is no implied warranty or condition as to
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except’? in
certain circumstances, one of which is that the buyer
shall have expressly or by implication made known to
the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
were being required and the buyer relied on the seller’s
skill or judgment. In the latter event, there is'an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose.

KRS 361.710, See. 71 of the Uniform Sales Act,
provides that where any right or liability would arise
under a contract of sale by implication of law ‘‘it may
be negatived or varied by express agreement.’

The present contract which, as we have said, was
in the form of an accepted order, contains this provision:
‘There are no understandings, agreements, representa-
tions or warranties expressed or implied, not specified
herein respecting this order. The warranties, provisions,
terms and conditions on the reverse side hereof are ex-
pressly made a part of this agreement.’’

The provisions on the back of the order are special
warranties and limit the seller’s liability to defects in
material and workmanship which may be developed
under normal use and service, the obligation being limit-
ed to making good at its factory any defective parts. The
rest of those provisions are that the seller makes no
warranty in certain specified but quite unimportant par-
ticulars. In short, this contract undertakes to eliminate
and to avoid practically every sort of warranty except
the very limited one stated. There is no remedy provided
in case the machinery proves to be worthless. The ap-
pellant relies upon this negation of an implied warranty.

The statute is, in the particulars involved here, a
codification of the prevailing common law on the sub-

ois es

ject. This court long before its enactment recognized
the principle that it was competent for the parties to a
contract to stipulate expressly against implied or ex-
trinsic warranties and to confine the obligations of the
seller to specific terms. But we have always required
that such limitation of liability shall be plainly express-
ed. Hopkinsville Motor Co. v. Massie, 228 Ky. 569, 15
S. W. 2d 423; Graves Ice Cream Co. v. Rudolph W. Wur-
litzer, Co., 267 Ky. 1, 100 S. W. 2d 819. Though the pres-
ent disclaimer of warranty is clear in its terms, we can-
not overlook the fact that it is to be found in a long and
‘formidable document prepared by the seller and that
it was doubtless unnoticed or its import uncomprehended
by the buyer. Anyone brought up to believe that for every
wrong there is a remedy will pause before saying that
the seller will escape all liability by merely putting in
an order blank a statement to the effect that there is no
assurance that the buyer will get a machine that will
work. We have paused for the moment and have readily
concluded that the avoidance of- liability under such a
circumstance is not permitted by the law. Otherwise, one
would have no recourse where he got an automobile
without a motor or wheels.

Where there is a complete failure of a machine to
accomplish the purpose for which it was designed, that
is to manufacture a merchantable product, it is much
more than the breach of an implied warranty of suitabil-
ity or fitness for a particular purpose. It is not a mer-
chantable article if it will not do what it was intended
to do. There has been no delivery of that which was
bought. This is a breach of a covenant or condition which
by law is made a part of every contract of sale unless
such essential element shall be explicitly denied and
‘clearly understood by the buyer. We have a case in which
it was held that where the buyer, knowing little of auto-
mobiles, necessarily relied upon the recommendation of
an agent of the seller, a provision in the contract that
an express warranty contained therein should exclude
all implied warranties did not have the effect of pre-
cluding recovery where it failed to work. The disclaimer
of any warranty other than that stipulated and the stip-
ulated warranty itself (copied in the opinion) are al-
most identical with those in the present case. Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W.
549, 551. Concerning that provision, the Court said:

a o19

“Such a stipulation, relieving, as it does, the man-
ufacturer from duties imposed by law, will be conclusive-
ly presumed to have been inserted in the contract of
sale for the sole benefit of the manufacturer, the bene-
ficiary of such relieving stipulation, arid effect will not
be given to such stipulation unless its inclusion in the
contract was fairly procured.

“In the case under consideration, this stipulation
was contained in a printed form of order blank or con-
tract used by appellant company. The language of the
stipulation is extremely technical, ‘This express war-
ranty excludes all implied warranties;’ its meaning is
clear to but few persons.’’

The language of the opinion respecting the right of
recovery for mere fitness may be regarded as dictum
and is not in accord with later cases or the quite uni-
versal interpretation of the Uniform Sales Act. Graves
Ice Cream Co. v. Rudolph W. Wurlitzer Co., 267 Ky. 1,
100 S. W. 2d 819. The decision is rested upon the idea
that it would not be presumed the acceptance of the dis-
claimer had been fairly procured and that failure to
furnish a machine like that bought was not the perform-
ance of the contract. Likewise, to sell a man a machine
for manufacturing a merchantable product that will not
accomplish that purpose at all is a breach of the con-

. tract itself rather than a mere breach of warranty, al-

though were such implication of law not excluded, that
too would sustain a right of action. If the machine is
worthless for the purpose for which it was sold, there
is a failure of consideration.

We do not go so far as to say that one may keep
machinery for an indefinite time and without giving the
seller an opportunity to adjust it or remedy any defect
in it, he may then recover the purchase price on a, theory
of a breach of contract. See Frick Co. v. Wiley, 290 Ky.
665, 162 S. W. 2d 190; James v. International Har-
vester Co., 294 Ky. 722, 172 8. W. 2d 670. The plaintiffs’
evidence in the present case shows that the defendant
was advised of the failure of the machine to make mer-
chantable blocks, notwithstanding persistent attempts
to make it do so, because of what they showed to be
an inherent defect in design. They continued their efforts
to have the defendants make it work but to no avail;
nor would the defendants take the machine back.

520

It is fair to the defendants to say that their evidence
is to the contrary and shows that the trouble was due
to improper installation and operation and improper
material going into the make-up of the blocks.. That
evidence is of such character and weight that had the
jury found for the defendants, it would be sufficient to
. Sustain the verdict. We repeat.that it must be under-
stood that this opinion is based upon the proof of the
plaintifis exclusively as to the worthlessness of the
machinery and their attempts to get the seller to take
it back. That, as stated, is upon which the right to a
peremptory instruction must be determined.

The verdict and judgment are for $5,964.57 although
the plaintiff prayed for only $5,624.57, the difference
being the balance of the purchase price which was never
paid. This was a clerical misprision which may be cor-
rected at any time.

Subject to this correction, the judgment is affirmed.

Pe
Parkrite Auto Park, Inc. v. Shea et al.
December 15, 1950.
Rehearing Denied February 16, 1951.
Chester D, Adams, Judge.

521

Scott Reed, Job D. Turner, Jr., and Fowler & Fowler for appel-
lant.

Foster Ockerman for appellee,

Cuay, Commisstonsn—Reversing.

This action was brought for a declaration of rights,
and to compel the issuance of permits by certain officials
of the City of Lexington to appellant, authorizing it to
construct and operate a parking lot in the city. The
Chancellor refused to grant the relief prayed.

Appellant has leased a small parkway in front of
the Union Station on Main Street in Lexington. Under
the zoning ordinance of the city, a permissible use of
that property is the operation of a parking lot. Pur-
suant to the terms of the ordinance, appellant applied to
the City Building and License Inspector for the pre-
scribed permit. It also made application to the City
Engineer for a permit to cross the sidewalk with a
driveway into the parking lot. Apparently the proposed
use of the property involved no violation of any ordin-
ances or regulations of the city, or the statutes of the

522 |

state. However, the Inspector and Engineer refused
to issue the proper permits on the ground that the loca-
tion of the parking lot would constitute a traffic hazard
and the City Manager had requested them to withhold
the authorizations. Thereupon this suit was filed.

Appellees filed a special and general demurrer to
appellant’s petition, and the controversy was determined
on the pleadings. The Chancellor took the view that
somehow appellant had not come into court with clean
hands; that the proposed parking lot would create a
traffic hazard and constitute a nuisance; and that the
proposed use of the property would be illegal and a viola-
tion of the rights of the public. The Chancellor’s findings
and conclusions were based almost entirely upon his
personal knowledge of the physical conditions and the
traffic problems in the City of Lexington.

On this appeal appellees urge that their special
demurrer should be sustained because appellant did not
exhaust its administrative remedies before proceeding
in court. This contention is without merit since it is
clear from a reading of the applicable statutes and the
city ordinances that appellant had no right of appeal to
an administrative body, and the Chancellor correctly
so adjudged.

Appellees further argue the general demurrer should
have been sustained because appellants had not filed
proper plans and specifications with the Building In-
spector. However, the petition alleges the contrary, and
we must accept those allegations rather than appellees’
interpretation of what the law requires.

This brings us to the merits of the controversy. The
proposed location of the parking lot is near one of Lex-
ington’s busiest interestions. The’ members of this
Court, like the Chancellor, are perfectly familiar with
the site, and we can likewise take judicial knowledge of
the surrounding physical conditions. The lot in question
is on the south side of Main Street in front of the Union
Station. To the west is the Phoenix Hotel, which is
served by Hernando Street on the south side of Main.
To the east is the viaduct connecting Main Street and
High Street. Hast of the viaduct is the LaFayette Hotel,
the LaFayette-Phoenix garage, and almost directly
across the street from the proposed site is another

es

parking lot. There is no doubt but what this is a con-
gested area. One must speculate, however, concerning
the extent to which the operation of this new parking
lot would increase congestion. Even if it would material-
ly do so, we think the Chancellor went rather far in de-
termining that this factor branded appellant’s business
a prospective nuisance, which in effect should be en-
joined.

At the outset we are confronted with the fact that
the legislative body of the city, acting under its police
power and considering the public health, safety and wel-
fare, has ordained that this area may properly be used
for parking lot purposes. The provisions of the ordin-
ance in other respects have been complied with. Thus,
appellant proposes to engage in a lawful activity.

No one would say that city officials might arbitrarily
deny appellant the permits to which it is entitled under
the provisions of the ordinance. Yet that is exactly what
has been done in the present case. The facts are similar
to those in City of Pineville v. Helton, 300 Ky. 170, 188
8. W. 2d 101. There the City Clerk refused to issue a
license to a person operating a place of public entertain-
ment. The plaintiff had complied with the terms of a
licensing ordinance. He brought a mandamus proceed-
ing, which the present action might well have been. In
spite of good faith on the part of city officials who ob-
jected to this particular business, we held the plaintiff
was entitled to his license. To declare otherwise would
have sanctioned the exercise of arbitrary power by the
city, contrary to the provisions of Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution.

It is clear in this case appellant does not propose
to violate any statutory law of the state or any ordin-
ances of the city. The Chancellor’s judgment could only
be upheld if appellant’s prospective enterprise must
necessarily constitute a common law nuisance. The oper-
ation of the parking lot is a perfectly legitimate business.
Possibly it may become a nuisance. However, courts
must be most careful in condemning a business on this
ground because to do so is taking a man’s property
without compensation.

‘We have recently had occasion to reconsider the

question of enjoining an anticipated nuisance. In City
of Somerset v. Sears, 313 Ky. 784, 233 8. W. 2d 530, we

524 ee)

denied the right of a court to enjoin the erection of a
drive-in theatre. Hven though one of the objections was
that traffic congestion would be increased, the same as
in this case, the rule we laid down there was, 233 S. W.
2d at page 582: oh property owner has the right law-
‘fully to use his premises as he sees fit, unless such use
will necessarily constitute an unreasonable invasion of
his neighbor’s rights.’’

We are unable to find anything in the case before
us, including the Chancellor’s and our own knowledge
of, the. conditions existing, which would justify a find-
ing that appellant’s proposed parking lot would neces-
sarily constitute a nuisance. It may be that traffic con-
gestion or hazards will be somewhat increased in the
area. To a certain extent this would be true upon the
opening of almost any type of business on a main thor-
‘oughfare. Such possibility alone could not justify a
court in depriving one of a use of his property which
the legislative body of the city, in the exercise of its
police power, has seen fit to authorize.

. We appreciate the motives which moved the Chan-

eellor to try and protect the public from what he con-
sidered an objectionable enterprise, but they were not
sufficient in law or equity to deny appellant the relief
asked.

. . The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

Rudy et al. v. Ellis et al.
January 30, 1951.
Sidney B. Neal, Judge.

a 525

Thacker & Sweeney, Hubert Meredith and Thomas E. Sandidge
for appellants.

"HB, Anderson and David C. Brodie'for appellees.
Juvexr Hurm—Reversing in part, affirming in part..

George H. Rudy, by the seventh clause of his will,
devised a 335-acre farm in Daviess County as follows:
“I devise and bequeath to my said son during the whole
of his natural life with remainder in fee in equal shares
to his lawful issue surviving him the following real
estate, in Daviess County, Kentucky: (1) 335 acres
known as the Elza Edwards farm. * * * But if my said
son shall die without issue surviving him the lands men-
tioned in the seventh: paragraph hereof I devise and
bequeath to my said wife and to my said daughter and
to the survivor of them in equal shares for and during
their respective natural lives with remainder in fee in
equal portions to the lawful issue of my said daughter
surviving her, but if she shall die without issue surviving

526 ee

her then the lands mentioned in this the seventh para-
graph hereof I devise and bequeath in fee to my heirs
at law, they to take per stirpes.’’

After his death on September 23, 1946, James H.
Rudy and the other adults named executed an oil and gas
lease covering this farm to Rita Damron. James H.
Rudy, having been, at the suggestion of Mr. Anderson,
appointed guardian for his infant children, he, individ-
ually and as guardian, and the other adults executed an
oil and gas lease dated September 23, 1946, but actually
executed and acknowldeged on December 5, 1946, for
this tract to the D. G. & S. Oil Company and James C.
Ellis. The first lease was marked and treated as void.
The Oil Company is a partnership composed of Wallace
Damron, husband of Rita Damron, W. EH. Gary and L. N.
Savage.

On August 16, 1947, the lessees began operations on
the tract, drilling two gas wells and an oil well. About
February 1, 1948 an attorney for the vendee of the gas
from the wells discovered that the lessees, appellees
here, apparently had an invalid lease because they had
not complied with KRS 353.300 in obtaining the lease.
The vendee so advised appellees and began impounding
the monies they owed for the oil and gas as it came from
the wells.

On February 28, 1948, appellees filed this action
asking that a trustee be appointed in accordance with
KRS 353.300, and that the lease of December 5, 1946
be confirmed. The court appointed Katherine Rudy trus-
tee for the infant devisees under the will, declined to
approve the lease of December 5, 1946 to appellees, but
authorized and directed the trustee to make a private
sale of the oil and gas lease.

On October 7, 1948, Katherine Rudy, as trustee,
tendered to the court an oil and gas lease for the tract
to the Ryan Oil Company, providing, in addition to the
usual provisions, a consideration of $50 an acre, or
$16,750, and asked for approval of the court. By order
of October 18, 1948, Mrs. Rudy was directed to deliver
the lease to the lessee, Ryan Oil Company.

Appellee James C. Ellis and the partners in the
D. G. & 8. Oil Company filed intervening petitions set-
ting up their objections to the sale of the lease by Mrs.

a oa

Rudy, trustee, to the Ryan Oil Company, setting out
their lease of December 5, 1946, pleading that under
this lease they had entered upon the tract innocently
and in good faith, saying that as bona fide occupants of
the leasehold they began on August 16, 1947, exploration
of the property for oil and gas purposes and drilled
three wells on the property between August 16, 1947 and
December 11, 1947, one a small oil well, and two com-
mercial producers of natural gas; that they equipped
the wells with casing and connected them with pipe lines
in order that the oil and gas produced might be market-
ed. They alleged an expenditure of $23,434.02 in the
exploration, drilling and production of oil and gas on
the property.

They prayed that approval of the Ryan Oil Company
lease be withheld; that Mrs. Rudy, as trustee, be directed
to join in the execution of the lease of December 5, 1946
to appellees; that the court then approve the lease in
accordance with KRS Chapter 353; that appellees be
adjudged 7/8th of all the gross proceeds of the oil and
gas produced; that the enhanced vendible value of the
property be determined to be the sum of $23,434.02, and
that appellees be adjudged a lien for that amount.

Appellees filed answer and cross-petition making
C. BR. Ozier, successor to the Ryan Oil Company, a party.
Mrs. Rudy, as trustee, renewed her motion for approval
of the Ryan Oil Company lease and filed amended
answer, counterclaim and cross-petition, alleging that
she was entitled to recover as trustee ‘‘all sums of money
owing by the pipe line companies for all gas and oil
which had been produced’? and which may be produced
from the leased tract. Appropriate pleadings made up
the issues.

The court heard proof ‘‘without the intervention of
a jury,’’ and adjudged that appellees ‘‘entered * * *
peaceably and in good faith * * * to explore and discover
oil and gas, * * *’’; that the value of oil pumped from
the oil well amounted to $534.57; the value of the gas
from the two gas wells amounted to $22,925.10 as of
March 25, 1949; that appellees had expended the sum of
$20,997.37 in drilling and equipping the three wells;
that appellees did not receive any knowledge or informa-
tion as to any defect in their title as lessees until Janu-
ary 31, 1948; that the lessors by the lease of December

528 |

5, 1946 did not have the legal right and authority to
make a valid lease for the 335-acre tract; that appellees
receive, as owners, 7/8ths of the proceeds from the
sale of oil and gas to January 31, 1948, amounting to
$6,026.94; that they receive 7/8th of the proceeds from
the sale of oil and gas from January 31, 1948 to March
25, 1949, amounting to $14,520.27, to apply on their
total expenditures of $21,078.40 in developing the tract,
including $81.10 for operating the wells, and that they
receive ‘an additional $6,558.20 out of ‘‘future runs’’
of oil or gas. . :

The court adjudged that the motion of Mrs. Rudy,
trustee, for approval of the Ryan Oil Company lease
should be and is overruled, and directed that she, as
trustee, ‘‘make sale of the lease for oil and gas”’ of the
tract at a private sale, setting out in detail the condi-
tions of the lease to be executed by her; that the total
amount due Hillis and associates to March 25, 1949 was
$20,977.37, and $81.10 for operating the wells, a total of
$21,078.47. Ellis and associates were given a judgment
for an additional $6,558.20. After that payment, it was"
adjudged that all of the oil and gas runs should belong’
to the devisees of George H. Rudy, subject to the rights
of the lessee under any future lease to be executed by
the trustee and approved by the court.

Katherine Rudy, trustee, the adult lessors under
the original will; James Rudy, guardian, and C. R.
Ozier, assignee of the Ryan Oil Company lease, appeal.

The questions here are: (1) Were appellees inno-
cent or wilful trespassers; (2) what was the measure
of damages; and (8) should the offer of OC. R. Ozier,
assignee of the Ryan Oil Company, have been approved
by the court?

Appellees, in their brief, say: ‘‘The guardian’s lease
was invalid because KRS 353.300 requires a lease of
this land devised under the Rudy will to be executed
by a trustee for all the devisees rather than by a guar-
dian of the James H. Rudy children in esse.’”’ In Sum-
mers Oil and Gas, Vol. 1, sec. 23, it is said:

“One who takes oil and gas from the land of an-
other wrongfully is presumed to be a wilful trespasser
and suffers in damages as such. This presumption, how-
ever, is rebuttable, and may be overcome by evidence

a 529

showing that the defendant acted in good faith, honestly
believing his acts complained of were privileged.

“The test to determine whether one was a wilful
or an innocent trespasser is, not his violation of the law
in the light of the maxim that every man knows the law,
but his honest belief and his actual intention at the time
he committed the trespass: * * *.’?

Tt is suggested in appellants’ brief that appellees
should have examined the title and should have known
the law, and that the attorney who advised the appoint-
ment of a guardian should have known the law. But in
this state we have held that the rule of actual, not con-
‘structive, notice applies. A wilful trespasser is one who
knows he is wrong; ‘an innocent trespasser is one who
believes he is right. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky.
552, 69 S. W. 2d 1037. Ellis and his associates, Damron,
Gary, Savage and Morrison, say they had no knowledge
of any defect in the title until notified about February
1, 1948. From all the record and testimony, it is appar-
ent that appellees, under the above rule, were innocent
trespassers.

James Rudy and the other adult lessors are only
life tenants, The fee in the 335-acre farm is in infants,
some in being and some possibly unborn. KRS, Chapter
353, was enacted to protect such owners by requiring the
appointment of a trustee to protect their rights. Here
the life tenants are only entitled to income, while the
infants are entitled to have the corpus of their property
protected and preserved for them.

With the above facts in mind, we will consider the
measure of damages applicable here. In Mills and Will-
ingham, Law of Oil and Gas, sec. 22, page 32, it is said:
«<The general rule, covering the measure of damages
for the unlawful ‘appropriation of oil and gas, is that an
innocent trespasser is liable for the value of the oil or
gas at the surface, less the amount reasonably expended
in producing it; but a wilful trespasser is liable for the
full value without any credit for the cost of production.”

. In United States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440, 67 8.
Ct. 1319, 1328, 91 L. Hd. 1590, Chief Justice Vinson said:
se* * * one who ‘wilfully’ or ‘in bad faith’ trespasses
on the land of another, and removes minerals, is liable
to the owner for their full value computed as of the

530 es

time the trespasser converted them to his own use, by
sale or otherwise, but * * * an ‘innocent’ trespasser,
who has acted ‘in good faith,’ may deduct from such
value the expenses of extraction. * * *”?

In Summers Oil and Gas, Vol. 1, sec. 24, it is said:
«® * * Tn the taking of oil and gas, the severance and
improvement are accomplished by the same physical act.
On principle, the measure of damages must be the value
of the oil and gas as they existed in the earth. But the
value of these substances, in situ, because of their pe-
culiar nature and the uncertainty and difficulty of their
production, is hard to prove. The courts have therefore
resorted to an easier method of proof; that is, the value

of the oil or gas less reasonable cost of production.
”

In Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S. W. 2d
1037, 1039, an oil and gas case, we said:

««* * * those who invade the property of another in-
advertently or under a bona fide belief or claim of right
and extract of minerals are allowed credit por proper
expenditures in obtaining or producing them. While not
allowed any profits, they are not to be penalized. * * *

“The measure of damage in respect to oil leases
where the trespass or appropriation was in good faith
is by the weight of authority declared to be the value
of the oil at the mouth of the well, less the amount rea-
sonably expended in producing it. * * *”

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we
believe this rule should be applied here.

The trespassers, appellees here, are only entitled
to their reasonable expenditures as determined in the
Circuit Court. It appears from the record that the monies
impounded by the pipe line companies were sufficient to
pay these expenditures.

From the record we are not able to say the court
erred in declining to approve the Ryan Oil Company
issue, assigned to Ozler. KRS Chapter 353, provides in
detail for the leasing of oil and gas rights in cases such
as this. The provisions of that chapter should be care-
fully followed in order to protect the contingent future
interests of those involved.

Le 58L

The judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in
part, with directions for entry of a judgment in accord-
ance with this opinion.

Muth v. Muth.
January 30, 1951.
Lawrence F. Speckman, Judge.

Vincent J. Hargadon and John L. Bennett, Jr., for appellant,
Bullitt, Dawson & Tarrant for appellee.

Juves Hetm—Affirming.

Appellant filed this action September 24, 1947,
charging cruelty and seeking a divorce from bed and
board and alimony. Appellee answered and counter-
claimed, seeking an absolute divorce and restoration of
property. Proof was heard. The Chancellor granted
appellee a divorce, dismissed appellant’s petition, and
denied her alimony. She appeals. He cross appeals.

The parties were married in Newark, New Jersey,
in 1924. They moved to Lynchburg where they both
worked. She says they worked hard and saved their
money. They moved to Louisville in 1928 where he en-
tered the optical business. When they left Lynchburg

532 ee

the record shows he had $4,059.15 and she had $884.73.
These amounts were transferred from a Lynchburg bank
to Louisville. She says she put about $1,100 into the
optical business. He denies this but does not show that
she expended her savings otherwise. She worked part
time in the optical store the first seven years they were
in Louisville.

For a number of years before the filing of this ac-
tion, appellee had made her an allowance of $45 per
week, out of which she says she paid all taxes, insur-
ance, utilities, for her clothes, a part of his clothes, and
other household expenses. After the filing of the suit
she requested temporary alimony. A hearing was had
by Special Commissioner John Robsion, who suggested
$35 per week temporary alimony for her. The Chancel-
lor allowed her this amount. :

To sustain her charge of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, she testified he neglected her; drank to excess;
abused her and paid unusual attentions to other women.
She says that in June, 1946, her husband came in about
4 o’clock in the morning, awakened her, told her he had
another woman—a very beautiful woman—in whom he -
was interested; that she was divorced, had two children,
and lived in an apartment; he told her ‘‘G@— d—— you,
I am fed up with you’’; this humiliated and unnerved
her. She says in October, 1946, she was passing along
Everett Avenue about 8 p. m. when she saw her hus-
band and a Mrs. Sexton coming down the steps of the
apartment where Mrs. Sexton lived; her husband and
Mrs. Sexton got in a cab and she followed them to the
Blackstone Manor, a night spot near Iroquois Park; her
husband did not come home until the next morning about
7 o’clock; at that time he was ‘‘very defiant and very
arrogant,’’ and told her that if she did not like the way
he lived she could go back where she ‘‘came from.’? She
and her witnesses, Faulkner and Holmes, investigators,
tell of a number of occasions during June, July and
August on which appellee was making love to Mrs. Sex-
ton, and of numerous occasions on which appellee and
Mrs. Sexton went to the Post and Paddock and the Black-
stone Manor in Louisville. On one occasion they remain-
ed at the Post and Paddock until 2:30 a. m., then went
to the Blackstone Manor and had not come out two hours
later.

Le 533

For appellee it is testified Mrs. Muth spent three
or four months out of the year at Newark; that she did
not keep house and prepare his meals for him much of
the time; she kept after him all the time for money;
she ‘‘forged a check of $700 of mine’’; she kept nagging
him all the time; she called him a s— of a b—— and
other vile names on numerous occasions; she was un-
friendly with his family, did not want them at her home;
she was unkind to his mother; she came to the optical
company, would abuse him; she insisted upon examin-
ing the books, and would call him vile names where the
eustomers could hear. Appellee tells about the Wayne
incident. A friend of appellee’s came to see him, became
ill while he was waiting, lay down across the bed and
was on the bed when appellee returned to his home late
at night. No misconduct on appellant’s part was shown.
Without further summarizing the evidence, clearly both
parties were at fault.

Appellee purchased a home at 1932 Hastview, Louis-
ville, for $6,750 in 1938. He says it is now worth $14,000.
A number of years ago he conveyed this home to ap-
pellant. The consideration, she says, was her continuing
to live with him after an ‘‘adultery charge.’’ This is not
denied. She has a 1941 model automobile for which she
says she paid. He denies this, claiming that he paid for
it. She has two small rings which he gave her shortly
after they were married, She has a fur coat which cost
$780 several years ago. She has a few shares of stocks,
the exact value of which is not shown. It is not clear
who paid for the stocks. She has a small amount of
cash, about $275. She has the household furnishings in
the Eastview home.

On his cross-appeal, appellee maintains that appel-
lant should, because of KRS 403.060, be required to con-
vey the Hastview property to him, ‘‘in which event he
would not insist upon a return of’ the automobile,
jewelry, furniture, clothes, securities and cash which she
now has. He maintains that she should be required to
pay her attorneys’ fees and costs. The Chancellor found
that the present value of the property which Mrs. Muth
now has is not less than $15,000. The Chancellor allowed
her attorneys $750, to be paid by appellee. KRS 453.120
provides that the husband shall bear the cost of each
party, unless it appears that the wife is in fault and

584 es

that she has ample estate to pay the costs. Here both
parties appear to be at fault and it does not appear
that she has ample estate to pay the costs. The Chancel-
Jor found that:

“These parties were married in 1924 and at the
beginning of the marriage had practically no estate at
all and acquired it in the early stages of their married
life by diligent efforts and thrift, for which both must
share the credit. * * * According to the proof, defend-
ant was unfaithful to his marriage vows more than five
years before the filing of this action and-in considera-
tion of the plaintiff forgiving him for this misconduct
she received the property above mentioned. However,
it appears that he did not mend bis ways and the proof
shows that he has been guilty of considerable miscon-
duct with a woman other than his wife and he is not
without fault in this action.

cee * * * * * *

“It is * * * adjudged by the court that the plaintiff
be, and she shall retain and have as her own all real
and personal property now in her possession and owned
by her, and given to her by defendant, which shall include
the real property located at 1932 Hastview Avenue,
Louisville, Kentucky; the 1941 Oldsmobile automobile,
all jewelry, furniture, household goods, all her clothing,
fur coat, all stocks and bonds, and all cash. * * *

“In view of the fact that she has secured a very
liberal allowance of the property acquired during the
marriage, she is not entitled to any further alimony,
being not without fault.’?

Appellant insists that in addition to the property
allowed her by the court, she is also entitled to alimony
on the ground that he has a prosperous business with a
substantial income, while she, at her age, is not capable
of earning any substantial amount; has practically no
income, and has assisted in the accumulation of the prop-
erty, including the optical business. It is true that KRS
403.020 provides that a wife may not be granted a divorce
for cruel and inhuman treatment unless ‘‘she is not in
like fault,’’ while it provides that the husband may have
‘a divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment on.ber part
‘without any provision as to his not being in like fault.

es 585

Appellant only asked for a divorce from bed and
board. Appellant seems to rely upon our rulings in such
cases as Kreidler v. Kreidler, 301 Ky. 105, 190 8. W. 2d
1012, 1013, where we said: ‘‘The statutory provision for
the allowance of alimony does not carry any restriction
or condition based upon freedom from ‘like fault’ or
any fault. The allowance is what ‘the court considers
equitable.’ KRS 403.060,’ and Sharp v. Sharp, 302 Ky.
426, 194 S. W. 2d 835, where we held that a wife who is
not wholly at fault for disruption of the marital rela-
tionship and is guilty of no moral delinquency may be
entitled to alimony, though not entitled to divorce.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we
believe the Chancellor properly allowed appellant the
property referred to, and her costs, including a fee for
her attorneys. A majority of the members of the Court,
not including the writer, are of the opinion that the
Chancellor properly disallowed appellant alimony.

The judgment is affirmed.

LaFollette et al. v. Ovesen et al.
January 30, 1951.

T. C. Carroll, Special Judge.

J. T. Hatcher for appellants.
Dailey & Fowler and Ben F. Fowler for appellee.

Cur Justics Cammack—Affirming.

The appellants, as citizens, residents, property own-
ers and taxpayers of LaRue County who have children
of school age, filed this action for a declaration of rights
concerning (1) the validity of the merger of the Hodgen-
ville Independent School District with the LaRue Coun-
ty District; (2) the subsequent composition of the
Board of Education for the resulting district; and
(8) certain other matters, not in issue on this appeal.
The appellees are the members of the LaRue County
Board of Education; the members of the Hodgenville
Independent District Board of Education; and the La-
Rue County School Superintendent. The lower court
adjudged the merger to be valid and held that the pres-
ent LaRue County Board of Education consists of the
elected members of the County School Board and all
members of the defunct Hodgenville Independent Board,
except those members who resigned at the time of the
merger or subsequent thereto; that members of the La-
Rue County Board of Education who held office by
virtue of their election to the Hodgenville Independent
Board shall serve only until their terms expire; and
thereafter the LaRue County Board of Education shall
be constituted as provided by law.

The appellants seek a reversal of this judgment on
the grounds that (1) the merger of the two districts was
invalid due to an alleged illegal condition in the merger
agreement; and (2) even if the merger be valid the pro-
vision that two members of the Hodgenville Independent
Board serve as members of the LaRue County Board is
invalid.

The boards of the two districts effected the merger
by a series of resolutions. On January 6, 1950, the Hod-
genville Board passed a resolution proposing a merger

PC 537

with the LaRue County District purportedly under KRS
160.040. On January 11th the County Board considered
the petition of the Hodgenville Board and by resolution
adopted a counter proposal. On the same day the Hod-
genville Board adopted and approved the counter pro-
posal under KRS 160.040. The pertinent portion of the
merger agreement is as follows: ‘‘1. Mr. Morgan Mar-
cum and Mr. G. H. Patterson shall become additional
members of the LaRue County Board of Education for
the remainder of the term which they have been elected
and that the other three members, Dr. J. D. Handley,
Arthur Smith and Marvin Crady shall resign as mem-
bers of the Hodgenville Independent School District
Board to become effective date of this merger.’’

The appellants contend that the sole authority for
the merger of an independent district with a county dis-
trict is KRS 160.041, which reads:

“(1) When a board of education of an independent
school district desires to have its district become a part
of the county school district, it shall by motion so record
its desire in the minutes of the board. The board, or its
executive officer, shall convey this request to the county
board of education. At its next regular meeting, or at a
special meeting held prior thereto, the county board of
education shall pass upon this request.

“*(2) If the county board of education refuses, or
the two boards of education cannot agree upon such a
proposition of merger of the independent district with
the county district, the independent board of education
may appeal to the Superintendent of Public Instruction
and ask that its request to become a part of the county
school district be submitted to the State Board of Edu-
cation for final settlement.

“«(3) If the State Board of Education approves the
proposition of merger, it shall become effective and the
independent district shall become a part of the county
school district on the basis of the conditions of merger
as set out by action of the State Board of Education.’’

The only provision for merger which existed im-
mediately prior to the passage of KRS 160.041 in 1948
was KRS 160.040, which reads: ‘‘Boards of education
of any two or more contiguous school districts may by
concurrent action merge their districts into one. In case

538 |

of a merger the members of the boards of education of
the merged districts may serve out the terms for which
they were elected. The resulting district shall take over
all the assets and legal liabilities of the districts joining
in the merger. Tax levies authorized for the payment of
interest and the retirement of bonds or to create sinking
funds for such purposes shall continue to be levied and
collected over the same area by or for the new ‘board in
accordance with the laws under which the levies were
originally made until all bonded obligations of the old
district have been retired.’

The appellants urge that KRS 160.041 superseded
KRS 160.040; that the new statute does not permit mem-
bers of the Independent Board to serve on the County
Board after the merger; and that, since the agreement
to have members of the Hodgenville Board to so serve
was a condition of the merger without. which the merger
would not have taken place, the whole merger is invalid.
It is argued that in this type of merger no new district
is formed, but the County District is merely enlarged
and there is no reason for an amalgamation of the two
boards, because the County District already has a fune-
tioning board.

A reading of KRS 160.041 shows that it is couched
in mandatory terms. Actually it provides for two altern-
atives: (1) merger by agreement; or (2) merger by com-
pulsion of the State Board. In the case of merger by
compulsion the State Board is to fix the terms, but in
the case of merger by agreement no directions are given
as to the terms or conditions of merger.

The apparent purpose for enacting KRS 160.041
was to enable an independent board, under certain cir-
cumstances to compel a merger with a county district.
We think KRS 160.041 is supplementary to KRS 160.-
040 and not in conflict with it. KRS 160.041 does not de-
scribe any of the powers or limitations of the two boards
in reaching a merger agreement.

In the case of Board of Education of Pulaski County
v. Nelson, 268 Ky. 83, 103 8. W. 2d 691, we were faced
with the problem of deciding whether a county board
was liable for the debts of an independent district made
a part’ of the county district under the ‘provisions of
KS see. 4399-8, (Acts 1934, Chapter 65, Article 5, sub-

es

section 3) not incorporated in KRS in its original form.
We held that the second paragraph of KS sec. 4399-4
was applicable to any merger whether under that section
or another, so that the county district became liable for
the debts of the independent district which it engulfed.
When the statutes were revised KS sec. 4399-4 became
KRS 160.040, and the reviser simplified the language
and made one paragraph of the two in KS see, 4399-4.

As KRS 160.040 now reads, it apparently covers
any type of merger where the school districts are con-
tiguous. In the present case the independent district
was formerly separate from the county district, but con-
tiguous thereto. We think it proper to read KRS 160.041
in the light of KRS 160.040 and to look to the latter for
the powers of the two districts in making a merger
agreement to fix the terms of such merger. It is appar-
ent that under this construction the two boards have
the authority to agree that members of the Hodgenville
Board serve temporarily on the board of the newly
enlarged district.

Judgment affirmed.
Le
Ream v. Department of Revenue

January 30, 1951.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Allen Prewitt and David L. Thornton for appellant.

A. BH. Funk, Attorney General, Hal O. Williams, Assistant At-
torney General, and Roy H. Pennington, Assistant Attorney General,
for appellee.

Jupvez Mrirm«en—Reversing.

The appellant challenges the power of the Depart-
ment of Revenue to levy an inheritance tax on property
passing to her under the exercise of a nonresident,
general power of appointment in her favor by her hus-
band, a Kentucky testator.

Edward K. Ream died testate on September 30,.
1946, a resident and citizen of Woodford County, Ken-
tucky, and exercised in favor of his wife, the appellant,.
Nell S. Ream, a general power of appointment to be
exercised by will, given him by the will of his mother,.
Carolyn P. Ream, who died December 12, 1924, a resi-
dent of the State of Connecticut. Connecticut taxed the
entire estate of Carolyn P. Ream at the time of her
death, and now the Department of Revenue of Kentucky
has assessed an inheritance tax of $11,886.64, based on
1946 rates, against the $323,732.86 net value of the prop-
erty passing to his wife by the exercise of the power
of appointment in her favor. The property covered by
the power of appointment is in trust in the State of
New York.

It is stipulated by the parties that ‘‘Edward K..
Ream (the donee) was born September 28, 1884, was-
40 years of age and in good health at the death of Car-
olyn P. Ream. At the time of the death of the donor
(Carolyn P. Ream) in December, 1924, the total value
of both the life interest of Edward K. Ream and of the

ee

remainder which might be appointed by his will was
$315,041.19. Under KRS 140.040, 1946 Hdition, and the
opinion of the Court of Appeals in Reeves v. Fidelity
& Columbia Trust Co., Htc., 1942, 293 Ky. 544, 169 8. W.
2d 261, it has heretofore been the uniform practice of
the Department to collect the tax on appointed property
.at the death of a resident donor, and at the death of
the donee of the power to add the value of the appointed
property to the donee’s separate or own estate for the
purpose only of ascertaining the rates and exemptions
applicable to such separate estate, excluding all tax
computed on the appointed property itself from the tax
payable upon the death of the donee on his separate es-
tate. The Department has not had any case of a non-
resident donor and a resident donee of such power.’’

It is expressly stated in the pertinent provision of
the will of Carolyn P. Ream, the donor, that her trustees
and their successors shall ‘‘transfer, pay over and de-
liver the principal of said trust estate to such person or
‘persons and in such proportion to each as my said son
(Edward K. Ream) may by his last will and testament
appoint * * *.’” Edward K. Ream had been a resident
and was domiciled in Kentucky for many years before
his death, and an instrument dated at Versailles, Ken-
tucky, on September 4, 1941, and subscribed by him, was
probated as his holographic last will and testament by
-the Woodford County Court on October 3, 1946. By the
-stipulation of the parties to this litigation this Ken-
tucky will was accepted by the courts of Connecticut and
the trustees in New York as the last will and testament
-of Edward K. Ream and as his effective exercise of the
general power of appointment given him by the will
-of his mother.

In hearings before the Kentucky Tax Commission
-and the Franklin Cireuit Court, Nell S. Ream, individ-
ually and as executrix of the will of her husband, failed
to obtain acceptance of her contention that Chapter 140,
‘KRS (1946 Edition), does not authorize assessment of
-an inheritance tax upon the property passing to her
. under the exercise of the power of appointment by her
‘husband, and she has appealed.

Grounds urged for reversal of the judgment are:
(1) That it is not the intent of Chapter 140 of the Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes, 1946 Edition, to levy an inher-

542 Le

itance tax upon a transfer of property outside-the State
under a nonresident testamentary power; (2) that KRS
140.040, 1946 Edition, makes the death of the donor,
Carolyn P. Ream, the only taxable event; (3) that
KRS 140.275 expressly declares it to be the legislative
policy of Kentucky not to be a party to interstate double
taxation; and (4) that, in any event, the Department
of Revenue improperly adopted the value of the prop-
erty at the death of the donee in 1946 instead of the
Falue at the death of the donor in 1924 as the basis for
e tax.

Before discussing the grounds urged for reversal, it
may be well to recall that in 1942, in the case of Graves
vy. Schmidlapp, 315 U. §. 657, 62 8. Ct. 870, 8 L. Bd.
1097, 141 A. L. R. 948, Chief Justice Stone upheld New
York’s right to tax and cleared the way from a Federal
Constitutional viewpoint for the levy of inheritance
taxes by the states in situations analogous to the one
which we now have under consideration. Graves v-
Schmidlapp expressly overruled Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. 8. 567, 47 S. Ct. 202, 71 L. Hd.
413, and held that the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment given under the will of a nonresident donor may
be taxed for inheritance tax purposes by the state of the
donee’s residence, the court saying:

“Intangibles, which are legal relationships between
persons and which in fact have no geographical loca-
tion, are so associated with the owner that they and
their transfer at death are taxable at the place of his
domicile where his person and the exercise of his prop-
erty rights are subject to the control of the sovereign
power. His transfer of interests in intangibles, by vir-
tue of the exercise of a donated power instead of that
derived from ownership, stands on the same footing.
In both cases the sovereign’s control over his person
and estate at the place of his domicile and his duty to
contribute to the financial support of government there,
afford adequate constitutional basis for the imposition
of a tax. * * *

“In numerous other cases the jurisdiction to tax
the use and enjoyment of interests in intangibles re-
gardless of the location of the paper evidences of them,
has been thought to depend on no factor other than
the domicile of the owner within the taxing state. And

es :

it has been held that they may be constitutionally taxed
there even though in some instances they may be subject
to taxation in other jurisdictions, to whose control they
are subject and whose legal protection they enjoy. And
such interests taxable at the domicile of the owner have
been deemed to include the exercise or relinquishment
of a power to dispose of intangibles (citing cases). * * *
But if, as is assumed, the power has been effectively ex-
ercised, the New York will is the implement of its exer-
cise, made effective as a will by New York law whose aid
the decedent invoked for the exercise and enjoyment of
the property right conferred on him by the Massachu-
setts will. Its exercise is a subject over which the sov-
ereign power of taxation extends.’ [315 U. 8. 657, 62
8. Ct. 873.]

Although the parties have conceded the constitu-
tionality of Kentucky’s power to tax in the premises of
this case, we have quoted the opinion of Graves v.
Schmidlapp for the purpose of showing the evolution of
the applicable law and the theory on which it is based.

The ruling in Graves v. Schmidlapp is a modifica-
tion for state inheritance purposes of the common-law
dogma which declared, as to the operation of powers of
appointment, that the devolution of the property is frora
the donor to the appointee (from Carolyn P. Ream to
Nell 8. Ream) ; and it is the donor’s instrument which
affects the transfer and the property never belongs to the
donee (Edward K. Ream). As a matter of construction,
it is to be inferred that a Legislature intends the com-
mon-law principles to apply unless the contrary is stated
or unless the statute declares a legislative policy which
would be defeated by their application. See Restatement
of the Law of Property, sec. 333, page 1879. See, also,
41 Am. Jur., Powers, sec. 70.

Kentucky is listed in the Restatement as one of the
states whose statutes declare, in substance, that, in the
application of the inheritance tax law, an appointment
by the donee (Edward K. Ream) should be deemed a
transfer of the property by the donee taxable in the

‘same manner as if the donee had owned the property
and had devised or bequeathed it. Restatement of the
Law of Property, page 1881.

At the time of the death of the donee, Edward K.

54 ee

Ream, in 1946, KRS 140.040 declared in part: ‘‘When-
ever any person shall exercise a power of appointment
derived from any disposition of property regardless of
when made, such appointment when made shall be deem-
ed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this chap-
ter in the same manner as though the property to which
such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the
donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised
by such donee by will * * *. Provided that in the case
of such power of appointment, the transfer shall be
deemed to take place, for the purpose of taxation, at the
time of the death of the donor and the assessment be
made at that time against the life interest of the donee
and the remainder against the corpus and collection
thereof shall be made pursuant to KRS 140.230,’ The
proviso clause was enacted in 1936.

It will thus be seen that the statute expressly disre-
gards the old common-law theory and declares the exer-
cise of a power of appointment by a donee to be a, tax-
able transfer just as if the donee owned the appointed
property outright. The statute makes no distinction be-
tween powers derived from resident donors and nonresi-
dent donors, but covers the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment ‘derived from any disposition of property
regardless of when made.’’ The provision of the statute
that ‘‘in the case of such power of appointment, the
transfer shall be deemed to take place, for the purpose
of taxation, at the time of the death of the donor,” harks
back to the common-law theory. It probably was intend-
ed to cover only resident estates coming before the De-
partment thereafter (after 1936) in which future inter-
ests in property were involved, but it does not clearly
say so; it probably was intended to enable the Depart-
ment to tax the future interest at the time it taxed the
life inerest or interest in possession, and thus avoid
loss of revenue where property was removed from the
state. But since there is confusion or ambiguity in the
meaning of this portion of the statute, it should be re-
solved in favor of the taxpayer under familiar rules of
construction. Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Com-
pany, 1948, 293 Ky. 544, 169 S. W. 2d 621. The statute
declares the modern intention to tax all, but follows the
common-law theory in applying the tax.

Since the wording of the 1936 proviso of KRS

a 545

140.040 leaves its intention in doubt, that doubt should
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and the 1946 trans-
fer taxed as if ‘‘at the time of the death of the donor
(in 1924) and the assessment be made at that time
against the life interest of the donee and the remainder
against the corpus.’? Since Kentucky had no jurisdic-
tional power to tax the life interest of the donee, Ed-
ward K. Ream, in 1924, the 1924 value of that life inter-
est should be determined, deducted from the gross 1924
estate, and the remainder taxed by Kentucky at the rates
prevailing in 1924.

We are not impressed with appellant’s contention
that Kentucky did not intend to include this property
for taxation under KRS 140.010, nor do we believe the
tax levied is double taxation in the sense that it contra-
venes the spirit or provision of KRS 140.275.

The judgment is reversed for the levy of a tax con-
sistent with this opinion.

Grey v. Davidson.
December 15, 1950.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 2, 1951.
Astor Hogg, Judge.

_ 546

W. W. Reeves and C. Guthrie Yager for appellant.
Alva A. Holion for appellee.

Juver Kyicur—Afiirming.

Appellee brought this suit against appellant for
damages totaling $16,820 for personal injuries, hospital
and medical expenses, damage to her car and loss from
being deprived of its use. At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury awarded a verdict of $5000 in her favor. Appel-
lant prosecutes this appeal from a judgment based on
that verdict urging reversal on three grounds: (1) that
appellant was entitled to a peremptory instruction be-
cause it was not shown that he was owner of the car
allegedly causing the accident or that it was being driven
by his agent, servant or employee acting for him and in
the scope of his employment; (2) erroneous instructions
given to the jury; and, (3) that the verdict was exces-
sive. These will be considered in that order.

The accident occurred on August 4, 1947, on state
highway 15 at the intersection of that road with a side
road known as Pigeon Roost road in Perry county. Ap-
pellee, in a Pontiac, which was being driven by her
sixteen year old son, was proceeding in a southerly direc-
tion toward Hazard, while the other car involved, a
Plymouth, was being driven in a northerly direction by
Kelsey Jones, accompanied by several passengers, all
of whom were enroute to a funeral on Pigeon Roost
creek. The collision occurred when Kelsey Jones made
a left turn into the latter road from highway 15. The
right side of both cars was damaged and appellee’s right
arm was broken. There is conflict in the evidence as to
how the accident occurred but since it is not disputed
that ‘there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the

a sa

jury on this question, it will be unnecessary to discuss
this phase of the case.

The real issue involved on this appeal is the owner-
ship of the Plymouth car and whether or not its driver,
Jones, was acting as the agent of appellant in the opera-
tion of the car at the time of the accident. This question
will require some consideration of the evidence on that
phase of the case.

The evidence for appellant was in substance that he
formerly owned the 1942 Plymouth car involved in the
accident; that on or about January 28, 1947, he sold
the car to Harl Feltner who gave him a check dated on
that day for $1200 in payment therefor. This check, en-
dorsed by appellant and with perforations showing it
was paid on January 29, 1947, is filed as an exhibit.
He further testified that after the car was sold, he had
no further control over it and that he never employed a
driver to drive that car after he sold it.

BHarl Feltner testified that he bought the Plymouth
car here involved from appellant on January 28, 1947,
giving his check therefor, and kept it until July 5th or
6th, 1947, when he sold it to Jim Jones, father of Kel-
sey Jones, for $1200 after which he had no further con-
trol of it. On cross-examination he admitted that he
got no bill of sale when he bought the car from Zack
Grey; that it was already licensed as a taxi in the name
of Grey when he bought it and that he did not get the
license transferred; that printed on the side of the cab
was ‘‘Grey’s Cab, Hardburley, Ky.’’

Kelsey Jones, driver of the car at the time of the
accident, testified that at that time the car was owned
by his father, Jim Jones, who had owned it about a
month; that it was being driven on the day of the acci-
dent with the knowledge and consent of his father but
that it was not being used as a taxicab on that day;
that Zack Grey had no control over him on that day nor
during the month he had driven it prior thereto.

Jim Jones testified that he bought the Plymouth
ear from Harl Feltner on or about July 4th or 5th, 1947,
for $1200 cash and took possession of it at that time;
that it was being used on the day of the accident to
carry some people and members of his family to the
funeral of a relative; that he did not get a bill of sale

sag es

and he was told that the bill of sale was still in the
name of Zack Grey; that Harl Feltner said it was all
right for his son, Kelsey, to drive it and that on the day
of the accident it was being used in his business, not
Grey’s. On cross-examination he said he did not get a
bill of sale until about January 1948 at which time he
or his wife paid Zack Grey. $9 for the transfer; that he
did not have it licensed as a taxicab and left the name:
of “Grey’s Taxi’? on it.

The evidence relied on by appellee to establish that
appellant was the owner of the car and that it was being’
operated by Kelsey Jones as his agent was in substance"
as follows: Jessie Horn, deputy county clerk of Perry
county, testified that her records showed that the Ply-
mouth car in question was registered in the early part
of 1947 in the name of Zack Grey, Hardburley, Ky., and’
that it was transferred of record to Jim Jones on De-
cember 11, 1947. It was shown by the testimony of the
cireuit clerk of Perry county that a suit for damages had’
been filed against Zack Grey on July 29, 1947. This suit
by Remine Combs arose out of an accident which had
occurred on May 24, 1947. On August 5, 1947, after he
had supposedly sold the car, Zack Grey filed an answer
and counter-claim for $550 and the case was dismissed
settled on January 28, 1948. In the cross-examination of*
Zack Grey after he had given his testimony in the in-
stant case, he admitted that the accident of May 24,
1947, involved the same Plymouth involved iri the pres--
ent accident; that that suit was defended in his name
and that he signed the answer and counterclaim filed in-
that case though he thinks it was not sworn to. There
were other bits of testimony such as that of Elmer Holli--
day, a deputy sheriff, who went to the scene to invésti-.
gate the accident and said that he was told by Kelsey”
Jones that he was driving for Zack Grey. The court,
admonished the jury that this could not be considered
as substantive evidence but only for the purpose of dis-
crediting the testimony of Jones. Holliday also testi--
fied that when he was returning to Hazard after investi-
gating’ the accident he met Zack Grey going toward the
scene of the accident; that he stopped and asked about
the accident saying that he had a car in an accident
down there and was going to. see about it. There was also-
the testimony of Wayne Davidson, husband of appellee,
who said that he went to Smittie’s garage where his-

a 549

-wife’s car had been taken after the wreck and while
there he had a conversation with Grey who was there
with a 1942 Plymouth with a sign on it, ‘‘Z. Grey, Hard-
burley, Ky. Taxicab’’; that Grey said ‘‘looks like my
ear had a pretty bad accident with your car down the
road’’; that they talked about the damage to Grey’s
ear which he thought would be $200 to $300; that he
told the witness to get an estimate on the Davidson car
and he (Grey) would fix it for him; that he saw Grey
several days later sitting in his taxicab and Grey told
him at that time ‘‘you can rest assured it will be taken
care of.’? Mrs. Shackelford, superintendent of nurses
at the hospital where appellee was treated and a sister
of appellee, testified that she saw appellant, Grey, on
the same floor of the hospital where her sister was lo-
cated and, recognizing him as a taxi driver, she asked
him ‘Was it your cab?’’ to which he replied ‘“My cab,
but I wasn’t driving.’’ Appellant denied the above state-
ments attributed to him by Mr. Davidson and Mrs.
Shackelford. . .

It will thus be seen that the evidence was conflicting
as to whether the automobile involved in this accident
‘belonged to appellant at the time of the accident and
was driven by appellant’s agent and it was for the jury
to decide this question of fact. ‘The fact, admitted by
him, that after he had been sued for damages in an
accident involving this taxi, which occurred after he had
supposedly sold it, he filed an answer and counter-claim
for damages in his own name; the further fact that
-when he supposedly sold it, he made no transfer of
record title; the admissions he made against interest,
if he did make them, which was for the jury to say,
constitute substantive evidence of probative value which
to the jury may have outweighed his direct evidence that
‘he sold the car to Feltner as evidenced by the check
which the latter gave him. The lower court did not err
‘in refusing peremptory instructions on this ground.

Instructions

It is appellant’s contention that instruction 1-a,
given by the court, was erroneous because it used the
«eonjunctive ‘‘and’’ instead of the disjunctive ‘‘or.’? By
this instruction, in order to find for Grey, the jury was
required to believe that Zack Grey did not own the
automobile driven by Kelsey Jones and that Kelsey

Jones was not acting as Grey’s agent and employee.
This instruction standing alone could have been pre-
judicial. However, it was corrected when a fuller and
more complete instruction, IV-A, was given. That in-
struction, as given, reads as follows: ‘‘The court in-
structs the jury that the defendant, Zack Grey, is not
responsible for the acts or omissions of any person who
was, at the time of said act or omission, not employed
by Zack Grey as his agent or servant and not acting
under the control or direction of the said Zack Grey. If
you shall believe from the evidence that at the time and
upon the occasion mentioned in the evidence, Kelsey
Jones was not the agent or servant of the defendant,
Zack Grey, and was not employed by him, or if you shall
believe from the evidence that the Plymouth automobile
which the said Kelsey Jones was driving at the time of
the said accident was not owned by the said Zack Grey
and was not at said time and place under his direction
and control and was being operated by the said Kelsey
Jones without the knowledge or consent of the said Zack
Grey, then the law is for the defendant, Zack Grey, and
you will find for him. If you shall believe from the evi-
dence that Kelsey Jones at the time and place of the
accident mentioned in the evidence was not the agent of
Zack Grey and acting within the scope or apparent
scope of his authority, then the law is for the defendant,
Zack Grey, and you will find for him.’’

In Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, See. 32, page 29,
it is said: ‘‘The use of ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ connecting a
group of items of injuries for which damages could be
awarded is not prejudicial, especially when the error
was corrected by a later instruction in which the dis-
junctive connective was used.’?

Also in Sec. 1, page 2, of the same work, it is said:
‘‘All instructions should be read together and _consid-
ered in their entirety. Although they may be technically
erroneous from the standpoint of exact legal science
and procedure, a practical consideration such as given
by a jury of laymen may justify a decision that they
are correct. If they are correct in principle a judgment
will not be reversed on account of instructions defec-
tive in form.”’ :

We think instruction IV-A, quoted above, fully set
out the issues as to the ownership of the Plymouth anto-

a oot

mobile involved in the accident and the relationship
between Kelsey Jones and Zack Grey on the question of
agency. The use of the conjunctive ‘‘and’’ instead of the
disjunctive ‘‘or’’ in instruction 1 was, therefore, not
prejudicial and does not justify a reversal on that
ground.

Excessive Damages

There remains only to be considered whether the
verdict of the jury is excessive. It is shown by the evi-
dence of appellee that she remained in the hospital about
two weeks; that her arm remained in a cast about four
months and in a sling for an additional three or four
months; that at the time she testified, about two years
after the injury, it still bothered her and ached and
hurt a lot; that she could not raise her arm to her head
to comb her hair or to perform all her household duties;
that her hospital bill, including special nurses, and doc-
tor’s bill totaled $304.50. Damage to her automobile was
shown to be $604.47.

Dr. Snyder, who treated her, testified that she had
a comminuted fracture of the humerus, that is, it was
broken in several small fragments; that she was in the
hospital eleven days and was given about twelve treat-
ments for the next several months after her discharge
from the hospital; that she has a limitation in the move-
ment of her arm up and down and has difficulty in comb-
ing her hair and getting things off shelves. He testified
that the injury to her arm is permanent.

Under this evidence, which was not contradicted,
we cannot say that the verdict is excessive. While it is
large, it does not strike us at first blush as being ex-
cessive. Almost $1000 of the verdict was for actual costs
of repairs to the automobile and for money paid out
for hospital and medical expenses. The remaining $4000
does not appear to us to be excessive for the permanent
injury which the evidence shows appellee has sustained
as a result of the accident.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.

552 ee
Logan et al. v. Porter.

February 2, 1951.
Astor Hogg, Special Judge.

‘W. 5. Faulkner, Faulkner & Faulkner for appellants.
Don A. Ward for appellee.

Jupczr Stawart—Reversing.
Appellee, Agnes Porter, instituted this action for

a 558

false arrest and imprisonment in the Perry Circuit Court
against Robert W. Dean and Harold D. Logan, two ‘po-
licemen of the city of Hazard, and against the surety
on their bonds, namely, Standard Accident Insurance
Company. The Insurance Company filed its separate
answer admitting its liability as. surety on the bonds
of Dean and Logan up to the amount of $2000 for each.
Furthermore, it alleged that its liability to Mrs. Porter
would depend solely upon the facts developed on the
issues raised between her, on the one hand, and Dean and
Logan, on the other hand, and upon the result of. a de-
termination of those issues in a trial; and that, after a
trial and determination of.the issues between Mrs. Por-
ter and the two policemen, the Court would be able to
render a proper judgment respecting the liability, if
any, of the Insurance Company, within the limits of the
amount of the bond of each policeman on which it was
surety. .

At the conclusion of all of appellee’s testimony, the
lower court, on Dean’s motion for a peremptory instruc-
tion, dismissed the action as to him. When the trial
ended, the case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict
was returned for Mrs. Porter for $2000, to be paid by
the Insurance Company and Logan. |

Judgment was entered in accordance with the ver-
dict. Appellants then filed their motion and grounds for
a new trial, which were overruled. Mrs. Porter next
moved to remit and credit her judgment with the sum
of $1250. This motion was sustained, and an order was
entered reducing her judgment against Logan and the
Insurance Company to $750. The motion and grounds
of appellants for a new trial were reconsidered and
again overruled. -

Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court on the following grounds: (1) The instruc-
tions to the jury were erroneous; (2) the verdict of the
jury is contrary to and is not supported by the weight
of the evidence; (3) the verdict is the result of passion
and prejudice upon: the part of the jury; and (4) the
verdict is excessive in view of the short time spent by
Mrs. Porter in jail. : : :

The evidence introduced at the trial discloses that
on the night of July 11, 1948, Mrs. Porter, together with

564 ee

her husband, Taylor Porter, and two other persons, A.
D. Hickman and J. D. Combs, were traveling in a panel
truck from Seuddy, Kentucky, where they had attended
a dance, to their home at Chavies, Kentucky. In making
this trip, it was necessary for them to pass through the
city of Hazard. Arriving at Hazard they proceeded along
East Main street until they reached a spot opposite the
city jail. Here their truck broke down and Taylor Por-
ter and one of the other passengers got out to fix it.
While they were thus engaged, policemen Logan and
Dean, who claimed that the occupants of the truck at-
tracted their attention because they were making a lot
of noise, went over to investigate.

Appellee testified that the two officers first arrested
her husband and Hickman, and took them to the jail; then
they came back and got Combs and told her, and we
quote, ‘‘to come along also.’’ She also stated that Logan
made her give him her pocket book and that, when they
reached the jail, he shoved her through the door. She
remained in jail she said, from midnight to 3:00 a. m.
The jailer testified that one of the policemen booked
Mrs. Porter as a prisoner and that he afterwards placed
her in the section of the jail reserved for women. He
then went back to bed and slept until morning. When he
awoke he found Mrs. Porter had already been released
from jail by one of the policemen.

Logan and Dean testified that they first arrested
Taylor Porter and Hickman for drunkenness, They did
not see Combs at the time, but, after they had brought
the first two men to the city jail, they were told there
that some one was running away from the truck up Hast
Main street. They gave chase in their car and captured
a man who turned out to be Combs. He was also drunk
and they started walking him back to jail. In passing
the truck on the way, Mrs. Porter, who was alone, re-
quested them to allow her to accompany them to the
jail to see about her husband. They assented to her re-
quest, and she accompanied them to the jail, walking
ahead of them. There they left her in an anteroom to
the jail where her husband, Hickman, Combs and some
other prisoners were being ‘‘frisked”’ and booked pre-
paratory to their being jailed. The policemen imme-
diately left on a call to another part of the city which
occupied them about 45: minutes. In the confusion that

a 555

followed, they say, Mrs. Porter was placed in jail. They
contend they never arrested her, nor did they intend
that she become a prisoner in the city jail. No warrant
was ever procured for her.

We are of the opinion that the first ground urged
by appellants for a reversal of the herein judgment
should be sustained. Accordingly, the retrial of this ac-
tion below, with proper instructions given to the jury
after all of the testimony is in, renders it unnecessary
that we consider on this appeal the last three errors
alleged by appellants relative to the verdict.

In the trial of this action no mention was made of
the Insurance Company until the lower court, on its own
motion, gave the following two instructions to the jury:

“(C) The Court instructs you that you cannot find
a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant, Stand-
-ard Aecident Insurance Company, unless you also find
against the defendant, Harold D. Logan. If you find a
verdict for the plaintiff, your verdict against the defend-
ant, Standard Accident Insurance Company cannot ex-
eeed the sum of $2,000.00.

“((D) If you find for the defendant you will say so
in your verdict and no more. If you find for the plaintiff
you will specify in your verdict the amount you find for
the plaintiff against the defendant, Harold D. Logan,
and the amount you find against the defendant, Standard
Accident Insurance Company.’’

Counsel for appellants objected to the giving of the
above instructions and moved to set aside the swearing
of the jury and to continue the case. His objections and
motion having been overruled, he now insists that such
instructions were prejudicial to his cause.

In the case of Romans v. McGinnis, 156 Ky. 205,
160 S. W. 928, 931, which was an action by McGinnis
against Romans, a policeman, for damages for an al-
leged assault and battery, committed by Romans in ar-
resting McGinnis on a misdemeanor charge, the jury
was instructed, in part, if it found for McGinnis, the
sum should ‘‘not to exceed the amount sued for $5,000
against defendant Romans, and not exceeding $1,000
against defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company.’’ The court condemned this type of instruc-

506 rs

:+ tion, first,,because it permitted the jury to make a sep-

. arate finding against the surety company, second, be-
cause there was nothing to submit to the jury. with ref-
erence to the liability of the surety, that being fixed by
law. ‘‘The court should determine the recovery from the
surety, not the jury,’’ this opinion further declared.

: : Appellee insists that the case of Rice v. Lavin, 199
- Ky. 790, 793, 251 8. W. 990, overrules the principle of
law above stated in the Romans case. The Rice. case,
however, is distinguishable from the Romans case, be-
cause in the former decision the surety on the bond of
policeman Rice denied that he was a policeman at the
’ time mentioned in the pleadings, or, if he was, that he
was acting within the scope of his authority or that
. the bond was in full force and effect at the time com-
- plained of. By its answer the surety made a defense to
the action on its merits and introduced evidence in sup-
port of its contention; and, of course, the issues raised
- by the surety’s pleading were properly submitted to a
jury. The instruction of the lower court was not, tech-
nically correct, the Rice opinion stated, but when the
jury returned a general verdict and the lower court
entered a judgment against the surety for the amount
limited by ‘its bond this cured the defect in the instruc-
tion. -

However, should there be any doubts as’ to applic-
ability to the case at bar of the rule of law laid down in
the Romans case, the recent opinion of Turner v. Smith,
313 Ky. 635, 232 S. W. 2d 1006, cites the Romans case

‘” swith approval in deciding that it was a reversible error

for Smith’s counsel, in his opening remarks to the jury,
to state that the insurance company in that action had
been made a party defendant because it was the surety
on Turner’s bond, although the trial judge admonished
the jury that it should disregard the counsel’s state-
ment as irrelevant. The answer of the insurance com-
pany in the Turner case was substantially the same
ag the answer of the surety in the instant‘action. The
opinion of the Turner case stated that there was no
question to be submitted to the jury as to the liability
of the insurance company, but that the jury should have
returned a verdict and the court should then have order-
ed a recovery from the surety.  ~ i aa

Appellee also insists that the lower court did not

a oT

err in instructing the jury as it did, in view of the hold-
ing of this Court in Belle of Nelson Distilling Co. -v. *
Riggs, 104 Ky. 1, 45 S. W. 99. This opinion sets forth’ -
the doctrine of law, adhered to in a long line of deci- -
sions by this Court, that it is not sufficient cause to dis-
charge a jury and to continue a case in the lower court,”
nor is it reversible error in an appeal to this Court, *
when during the trial of an action incidental or’ casual
references are made to an insurance carrier of a liti-
gant, when such statements are not calculated to mis-
lead or prejudice the jury, and, when, the Court distinct-
ly admonishes the jury to disregard such as incompe-
tent. In the case at bar, the insurance question was sub-
mitted to the jury without reservation, as the instruc-
tions in question will readily show. The case of. Howard
v. Hyden, 239 Ky. 233, 39 S. W. 2d 265, merely decided
that it was proper to make the sureties parties to an
action by a widow against a policeman who had wrong-
fully caused the death of her husband, but this opinion
did not hold, as counsel for appellee contends, that,
because the sureties were co-defendants, the jury could
be ‘instructed as to their liability on their suretyship
agreement. .

Counsel for appellee in his: brief advances the argu-
ment that the Insurance Company cannot raise a ques-
tion about the instructions given by the court identifying:
it as a defendant in this action, even though the instruc-
tions might be erroneous in whole or in part, because ©
appellants failed to offer any instructions to the Court
eovering the particular phase of this case about which
it now complains. In answer to this contention, we think
the law is well settled that where the Court, on its own
motion, or at the request of either of the parties, inder-
takes to instruct the jury in civil cases, then the court
must give correct instructions upon each issue’ colcern-
ing which it undertakes to instruct, and, if an erronéous
instruction is given that prejudices the substantial rights
of the complaining party and proper exception is saved,
it will be a reversible error. Louisville, H. & St, L. Ry.
Co. v. Roberts, 144 Ky. 820, 189 S. W. 1073; Lexington
& E. Ry. Co. v. Crawford, 155 Ky. 723, 160 8. W. 267;
Fonisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Stephens, 188 Ky. 1, 220 8.

- 746.

We are of the opinion that the pleadings in the case

558

at bar left nothing to be tried by the jury concerning the
liability of the Insurance Company as surety on Lo-
gan’s bond. Therefore, instructions which mentioned the
Insurance Company, the amount of the bond it had
signed as surety for Logan,.and the extent of its limited
liability on the bond, called to the attention of the jury
an extraneous fact that was not only calenlated to con-
fuse it but which was highly prejudicial to appellants.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed and the cause
is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

Barnes v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kash,
Commonwealth’s Atty., 23rd Dist.

February 2, 1951.

E, B. Beatty, Judge.

PC 569

John W. Walker for appellant.

‘W. L. Kash for appellee.
Carr Justics Cammack—Reversing.

Mrs. Jessie Barnes is appealing from a judgment
-forfeiting her land in Irvine, Kentucky, under the pro-
visions of KRS 242.310 and 242.320. The court found
that a nuisance existed on the property because of the
possession and sale of liquor on the premises in local
option territory. For reversal the appellant urges that
the petition contains only general allegations as to the
cause of action and does not specify any particular of-
fense or any particular person who violated the local
option laws.

The petition alleges that the appellant is the owner
of the property in question, which is situated in Estill
County. It is further alleged:

«* * * that the said defendant has knowingly and
intentionally used said property and permitted same to
be used for the unlawful purpose of selling, possessing
and dealing in intoxicating liquors in violation of the
local option laws; that said Estill County at all the times
herein mentioned was in dry territory and that the local
option law was in full force and effect therein at said
times, and that defendant was thereby guilty of com-
mitting a nuisance.’’

The allegation is substantially in the terms of the
statute, KRS 242.310. It was held in Rickman v. Com-
monwealth, 204 Ky. 848, 265 8. W. 452, that a similar al-
legation, couched solely in the words of the statute, Acts
1922, Chapter 33, section 13, was not sufficient because
it did not apprise the defendant of the particular acts
on the basis of which a nuisance was claimed to exist
and for which reason a forfeiture was sought. In the
later case of Schneider v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 199,
22 8. W. 2d 587, a similar contention was made. We dis-
tinguished the Rickman case on the ground that the pe-
tition also charged a specific act of sale of intoxicating

560 |

liquor. On the basis of these two cases, the petition in
the instant case was demurrable.

A forfeiture proceeding is, though civil in form, in
the nature of a criminal proceeding. Under these cir-
cumstances, the defendant should be apprised clearly of
the charges he is called upon to defend. Forfeiture is
such a drastic remedy that it should be circumscribed
rigidly by the rules of pleading and practice.

Since we have concluded that the demurrer to the
petition should have been sustained, it is S unnecessary to
discuss other questions raised.

Judgment reversed.

Spicer et al. v. Spicer.
February 2, 1951.

W. R. Prater, Judge.

— 56

A. H. Patton for appellants.

‘Moss Noble for appellee.
Jupez Smms—Affirming.

This action was brought by appellants against their
uncle, Daniel Spicer, to quiet title to a tract of land in
Breathitt County. The land is described by boundaries
rather than by courses and distances and seems to be
located in ‘‘Wildcat Hollow.’’

Appellee by answer and counterclaim as twice
amended denied appellants’ title, pleaded title in him-
self and asked that it be quieted” against appellants’
claim. Considerable proof was taken: by depositions and
the chancellor quieted title to the property in appellee.

James Spicer, father of appellee and grandfather
of appellants, owned something over 1,000 acres on Cane
Creek in Breathitt County. James had nine children and
on Sept. 13, 1918, he executed deeds to six of his children

562 ee

conveying to each the portion of his land he desired each
to have. James was killed by his son, Ova Spicer, the
father of appellants, and Ova was convicted in 1921 of
murdering his father and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. He remained in the penitentiary until November
1927, when he was paroled and taken to the home of his
brother, appellee, where he died in May 1928.

The deed James executed to Ova contained this
clause: ‘‘T'o have and to hold the same together with all
the appurtenances thereunto belonging to second party,
his heirs and assigns forever, with covenant of General
Warranty. But the terms and conditions of this deed
are, that it is not to take effect until the death of first
party, and if second party should die before first party
then in that event it is not to take effect at all.”

This deed conveyed no present interest but was
testamentary in character and was of no force. A deed to
be valid must pass some present interest vesting in the
grantee upon delivery thereof. Ison v. Halcomb, 136 Ky.
523, 124 S. W. 813; Glocksen v. Holmes, 299 Ky. 626,
186 S. W. 2d 634. James died intestate and subsequently
his widow and the children to whom he did not make
conveyances brought suit to set aside the six deeds de-
cedent executed on Sept. 13, 1918. Judgment was enter-
ed in that action on April 12, 1924, which set aside the
six deeds and decreed James died intestate the owner of
the tract of land described in the judgment as contain-
ing 1,010 acres, and directed the allotment of dower to
the widow and a division of the lands to be made equally
among his children. This judgment recites that Dan
Spicer, since the filing of the petition had become the
owner of the interest of Ova Spicer and it directed the
commissioners to allot two adjacent tracts to Dan. The
record in the instant case shows this judgment was never
set aside or modified and no appeal was taken there-
from; also, that the entire record in that case has been
lost and cannot be found.

The proof shows that while Ova was in the peniten-
tiary he executed a deed to Dan on March 6, 1924, con-
veying to Dan all of grantor’s undivided interest in the
1,000 acre tract their father owned at the time of his
death. It was acknowledged before W. B. Fuller, a no-
tary public in Franklin County, who was then employed
as chief clerk at the penitentiary.

a 363

It is insisted by appellants that the judgment of
1924 is void because Ova was not a party defendant to
that action and the court was without jurisdiction to
set aside the deed the father had executed to Ova. Of
course, if Ova was not a party to that action, or was not
before the court, the judgment is void as to him. But
there is no record to show he was not a party to that
action or that he was not before the court. His rights
were adjudged therein and in a collateral attack after
the lapse of many years, it will be conclusively pre-
sumed that he was before the court. Berry v. Foster, 58
S. W. 709, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 745; Davis v. Tuggle’s
Adm’r, 297 Ky. 376, 178 8. W. 2d 979, 981. The legal pre-
sumption is that a judgment is valid, which presump-
tion embraces the element of jurisdiction over the par-
ties. As was said in the Davis opinion, ‘The integrity
and value of the administration of justice rests largely
upon this principle.’ In a collateral attack the court
must presume the judgment was valid and will not de-
elare it void unless that fact affirmatively appears from
the record in the case where the judgment was rendered.
Dean v. Brown, 261 Ky. 593, 88 S. W. 2d 298; McFarland
v. Hudson, 262 Ky. 183, 89 8. W. 2d 877.

Appellants can only attack the 1924 judgment in
this collateral proceeding on the ground it is void. White
v. White, 294 Ky. 563, 172 S. W. 3d 72, 74. As said in the
White opinion, ‘‘To warrant a collateral attack on a
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, want of juris-
diction must appear on the record, and a pleading that
merely alleges the absence of jurisdictional facts is not
sufficient.’? Here, the original record was lost, with the
exception of the recorded judgment, and there is noth-
ing to show want of jurisdiction, or that Ova was not
before the court, when this 1924 judgment was rendered.
Therefore, appellants fail in their collateral attack on
that judgment.

Appellants introduced proof that the signature on
the deed from Ova to Dan was not Ova’s signature. How-
ever, the notary public who took the acknowledgment
testified that Ova signed the instrument in his presence
and acknowledged it before him. Appellee insists that
as appellants did not call in question the certificate of
the notary taking the acknowledgement in a direct pro-
ceeding, nor allege frand upon the part of Dan, or mis-

564 |

take of the notary, they cannot under KRS 61.060 ques-
tion the signature or acknowledgment of Ova. We have
many times written that an officer’s certificate imports
absolute verity unless attacked in a direct proceeding
against the officer or his surety, or unless there is an
allegation of fraud in the obtention of the certificate by
the party benefitted, or mistake upon the part of the
officer. As there is no pleading attacking the certificate
or charging fraud on the part of Dan or mistake of the _
notary, the deed Ova executed to Dan must stand. Catron
v. Jones, 281 Ky. 163, 185 S. W. 2d 419; Christopher’s
Adm’r v. Miniard, 267 Ky. 484, 102 8S. W. 24,978, and
cases therein cited.

Appellants contend their plea of champerty against
Dan should be sustained as they were in possession of
the property claiming it when he obtained deeds from
some of the other heirs. However, Dan testified appel-
Jants were occupying the land not under claim of right
but with his permission, and under the state in which
we find the record we cannot say the chancellor erred
in refusing to sustain appellants’ plea of champerty. ~

The judgment is affirmed.

Morgan v. Wible et al.

Morgan v. Moore et al.
February 2, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Chancellor.

Fowler & Fowler, Earle Fowler for appellant.

Stoll, Keenon & Park for appellees.

Juvcz Smms—Affirming.

These cases spring from a single real estate trans-
action, were heard together below and both will be dis-
posed of here in this opinion.

On March 1, 1948, Fred G. Morgan, through J. P.
Moore doing business as Moore & Moore Realty Com-

‘pany, made a written offer to buy a tourist home at 1517
Richmond Road in Lexington for $33,500 from Mrs.

566 ee

Lydia Wible and Mrs. Wanda W. Swope. The sellers
accepted the offer by so stating in a written endorse-
ment thereon dated March 21, 1948. As evidence of good
faith, Morgan deposited with Moore his check for $3,350
to be applied on the purchase price, or returned to him
in the event the title proved not merchantable. Deed
was to be made not later than May 15, 1948, at which
time possession was to be given the purchaser.

Morgan owned and held a $50,000 note against some
mining property in eastern Kentucky and he was to
use the money he could borrow from a bank on the note,
along with a lien against the property he was purchas-
ing, to pay for the property, and the contract contained
this provision: ‘This contract is conditioned on the
bank handling a $50,000 note as security on this prop-
erty. If the bank fails to handle the note, this contract
becomes null and void.”

Morgan did not go through with the deal and sued
Moore to recover the $3,350 depositd with him. The
sellers sued Morgan to enforce specific performance of
the contract and tendered him a deed. Moore’s answer
and counterclaim asked to recover a commission of
$1,155 from Morgan. The consolidated cases were re-
ferred to the master commissioner, who after hearing
proof reported Morgan defaulted on his contract, and
recommended that the sellers were entitled to specific
performance of the contract. He further recommended
that Moore’s counterclaim for his commission be dis-
missed, since the sellers were to pay this commission.
The chancellor overruled exceptions to the commission-
er’s report and entered judgment in conformity there-
with.

Morgan’s sole defense was that the bank refused to
handle his $50,000 note, therefore under the terms of
the contract he was released from purchasing the prop-

erty.

The proof shows the parties met in the office of Mr.
‘A. G. Mainous, President of the Citizens Bank & Trust
Company in Lexington, some time in March 1948, the
exact date not appearing in the record. Mr. Mainous
agreed to handle the note for Morgan as additional se-
curity for a mortgage upon the property within a rea-
sonable time after a lien for $4,776.76 held by the Metro-

P| 567

politan Life Insurance Company was released. The next
day after the parties were in the bank, or at least with-
in a few days thereafter, the record not being clear
on this point, Mr. L. T. Rankin, then a representative
of the Metropolitan, received a telegram from his com-
pany that the lien would be released as soon as the debt
was satisfied. Mrs. Swope, one of the owners, testified
she was to pay the Metropolitan’s debt out of the pur-
chase money at the time the deal was closed, which fact
was thoroughly understood by Morgan.

After the meeting at the bank and before the wire
was received from the Metropolitan that it would re-
lease its lien, Morgan returned to his home in Hazard,
Kentucky. Upon receiving the insurance company’s wire,
Moore called Morgan at Hazard over the telephone and
told him the insurance company’s lien debt could be
paid and everything was ready to close the deal. He
testified that Morgan replied he would be down that
“week end. Anyway, it was in a very short time they
would be down to close it.’? When Morgan did not show
up, Moore wrote him and called him “two or three or
four times,’’ but Morgan did not come to Lexington to
close the deal. At first he said it was ‘‘pretty hard’? for
him to get away, and finally said he was “having a little
domestic difficulty’? and could not conclude the purchase.

“Morgan’s testimony is that he was ready to con-
summate the purchase when they first met in the bank
and Mainous agreed to handle the $50,000 note. But
there was a lien on the property which could not be re-
leased that day, and as the trade was to be concluded
immediately, he did not feel obligated to take the prop-
erty later. Morgan admitted notifying his attorney he
would pay $28,000 for the property, which is strongly
conducive to the thought that Morgan’s reason for not
carrying out his trade was he had offered more money
than he thought the property was worth at the time the
deal was to be consummated.

There were some other liens upon the property be-
sides that of the Metropolitan but they had all been re-
leased before the wire was received on March 15, 1948,
saying its debt could be paid and its lien released. The
testimony of J. R. Ledford, deputy county court clerk,
shows an encumbrance filed by Dr. Rankin was released

568 |

on March 8th, and the mortgage of the First National
Bank‘was released on March 11, 1948.

. We agree with the master commissioner, ‘‘The fail-
ure of the parties to consummate the sale can be attrib-
uted to the default of Morgan and to no other cause.’’
Appellant argues in his brief that the contract provided
the deed was to be made not later than May 15th and
as it was not tendered until July 8, 1948, it was not
made during the life of the contract. But Morgan had
notified Moore he would not go through with the trade,
therefore it was-not necessary for the sellers to tender
him a deed until this suit was filed, and that they did.
Blanton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., C. C.; 120
F, 318, at page 348; Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. 8. 68, 10 8.
Ct. 498, 33 L. Hd. 818. Johnson v. Benjamin, 219 Ky.
169, 292 S. W. 801.

Appellant further argues this is not the character
of action wherein the chancellor should decree specific
performance. The rule is that the remedy of specific
performance is a mutual one between the vendor and the
vendee and it is well-settled that the vendor in a con-
tract for the sale of land, when fully able, ready. and
willing to comply with his contract, may obtain a decree
of specific performance of the contract in his own favor
although the relief is a recovery of money. 49 Am. Jur.
“Specific Performance,’’ sec. 98, p. 110. The same text,
sec. 109, p. 128, says that while specific performance may
not be had if there is a lien on the property, yet if that
lien is immediately removable by the application of the
unpaid purchase money, in the absence of the contract
indicating a contrary intention of the parties, specific
performance will be decreed where the lien can be satis-
fied out of the purchase money. We have cases holding
that the existence of a lien debt which can be satisfied
out of the purchase price is not a defense to an action
for specific performance. Bean v. Brown, 202 Ky. 215,
259 8. W. 47, and authorities therein cited. See Allen v.
Riedling, 283 Ky. 90, 140 S. W. 2d 833, wherein a lien to
be satisfied from the purchase price is distinguished
from a lien to be taken care of by an indemnity bond.

While the remedy of specific performance is one
which rests within the discretion of the chancellor, yet
whenever the contract concerns real estate, is certain
in its terms and is capable of being enforced without

Le 569

hardship to either party, it is as much a matter of course
for the chancellor to decree specific performance as for
a court of law to award damages for its breach. 49 Am.
Jur. “Specific Performancee,”’ sec. 92, p. 107; Mattingly’s
Ex’r v. Brents, 155 Ky. 570, 159 S. W. 1157,

The judgment is affirmed.

Gritton et al. v. Moore.
February 2, 1951.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

570 |

Frank M. Dailey, Marion Rider for appellants.
Ardery & Hobson for appellee.

Jones Larmwer—Reversing.

Back in the summer of 1947, on the day of the diffi-
culties out of which this action arose, Walter Moore, a
Franklin County farmer, and his wife came to Frankfort
with Price Cook, a neighbor. Appellee, after admittedly
having had one drink of liquor, spent most of the after-
noon walking about the city. The evidence discloses that
late in the afternoon he approached Mrs. Leslie Hocken-
smith on the corner of Main and St. Clair Streets near
Lerman’s Store. Mrs. Hockensmith related that appellee
reached out to touch her child whom she was pushing in
a stroller. She stated that she did not like the appear-
ance of the man and undertook to move away from him
but that Moore moved to where she was and continued
to walk along beside her. She then proceeded across the
street to where Officer Gritton was standing. Moore con-
tinued by her side looking into her face. Upon reaching
Officer Gritton, Mrs. Hockensmith informed him that
Moore was following her. When the officer asked her if
she knew him, she responded, ‘‘No.’’ Gritton stated that
he observed Moore walking across the street staring into
the eyes of Mrs. Hockensmith; that he appeared to be
drunk; and that after Mrs. Hockensmith’s remarks, he
placed Moore under arrest. It appears that they pro-
ceeded on down Main Street, Gritton holding Moore’s
left arm with his left hand, with his right hand on
Moore’s right shoulder. After they had proceeded some
little distance, according to Moore, he asked Gritton
why he was under arrest. Whereupon, Gritton replied
because Moore was drunk. Moore denied being drunk
and stated that Gritton called him ‘‘a damn lying son-of-
a-bitch’’ and commenced hitting him with his club. Ac-
cording to Gritton, Moore, without warning, suddenly
broke away, simultaneously striking Gritton knocking
him against a parked car at the curb. Moore then ran
back down the street toward the intersection of Main and
St. Clair with Gritton in pursuit. Moore turned north
on St. Clair Street toward Broadway and a little dis-
tance up St. Clair Street Gritton overtook him. Where-

a wm

apon, Moore struck Gritton several times about the face
and body, knocking him down. It appears that Moore
then proceeded farther toward Broadway on St. Clair
Street. Constable Edward Dean, who was standing
“nearby, undertook to stop Moore and advised him ‘‘to
behave himself and come on with me.’’ Moore broke loose
from Dean and proceeded on down the street. Upon
reaching a point near the approach to Broadway, Dean
again tried to apprehend Moore. Moore resisted and
Dean called upon Officer Rudder, who was directing
traffic at the corner of Broadway and St. Clair Streets,
to assist him. Rudder immediately came to the assistance
of Dean, at about which time Gritton, who was still pur-
suing Moore, came up. Moore jerked away from Rudder
and again struck Gritton. Whereupon, Gritton told Rud-
der to hit Moore and stop him. Gritton states that up
to this point he had never struck Moore. The arrest was
finally effected and Moore was taken to jail. He per-
sisted in his denial that he was drunk but did plead
guilty to resisting arrest.

The above is principally the story as told by the
officers. The record discloses considerable testimony of
bystanders and disinterested people who stated that
when they saw the officers proceeding with Moore, which
was after the difficulties and encounters related above,
Moore had his head bent forward and appeared to be
‘in a dazed condition, during which time the officers con-
tinued to beat him over the head.

Moore brought action against the Officers, Rudder
and Gritton, and their bondsmen, to recover damages
for the unnecessary and unreasonable striking and beat-
ing him in undertaking to arrest him. He obtained judg-
ment in the sum of $2,500 as damages for mental and
physical suffering and mental anguish as a result of the
‘beating, and $652.63 for his medical bills incurred as the
direct and proximate result thereof.

The defendants are here asking reversal of that
jadgment upon the following grounds: (1) The court
erred in overruling appellants’ motion for a peremptory
instruction made at the conclusion of the evidence for
appellee and again at the conclusion of all of the testi-
‘mony in the case. (2) The court erred in giving instruc-
fions numbers 1 and 2 offered by appellee over the ob-
jections of appellants. (3) The court erred in instructing

a2

the jury as to the amount of medical expenses, as the
evidence discloses no expenditure for medical expenses
as a result of any injuries that may have been inflicted
upon appellee. (4) The court erred in not permitting ap-
pellants to offer evidence showing previous acts of ap-
pellee which denoted mental derangement. (5) The court
erred in reassembling the jury after it had been dis-
charged, to permit it to reform its verdict. (6) The
award of $2,500 damages is excessive.

It will be readily seen from the above facts that the
court properly overruled appellants’ motion for per-
emptory instruction.

We find considerable merit in appellants’ argument
relative to instructions. Let us look at the pertinent part
of the instruction as given: ‘If the jury believe from
the evidence that at the time and place mentioned in
the pleadings herein that the defendant, E. W. Gritton,
alone, or acting with the defendant, Lee Thomas Rud-
der, in making the arrest of the plaintiff or in retaining
custody of the plaintiff thereafter, beat, or bruised the
plaintiff beyond that which was or reasonably appeared
* * * to be necessary to effect the arrest, to retain the
plaintiff in custody thereafter, or to protect himself or
the defendant, L. Thomas Rudder, or anyone else, from
assault or attempted assault by the plaintiff; the jury
will find for the plaintiff * * *.”’

It will be noted that almost from the beginning of
the arrest there was apparent resistance. Appellee ad-
mits this fact himself and further admitted striking and
knocking Officer Gritton down. The language ‘‘to pro-
tect himself or the defendant L. Thomas Rudder, or
anyone else, from assault or attempted assault by the
plaintiff”? does not necessarily carry with it the idea of
resistance to an arrest. It could mean an assault in ab-
sence of an attempted arrest. Appellee apparently rec-
ognizes the right to arrest here. In his petition it is
alleged: ‘‘* * * and acting by virtue of his office as po-
liceman, and under the above mentioned responsibility
of law imposed upon him as a peace officer, reasonably
suspecting this plaintiff to be drunk, arrested him.’’
There is no charge of wrongful arrest. The instruction
does not incorporate the right of the officer, when there
is active resistance to the arrest, to use such force as
necessary to overcome the resistive force and for pro-

es 573
tection against the arrested man’s hands. The substance
of a correct instruction will be found in Finnell v. Bo-
hannon, 44 8. W. 94, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1587, and in Ste-

vens v. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 32, 98 S. W. 284, and
Tuck v. Beliles, 153 Ky. 848, 156 S. W. 883.

It is next contended that the court erred in its in-
struction relative to the amount of medical expenses.
We have carefully scrutinized the record relative to this
proposition and find it entirely impossible to ascertain
any definite amount of medical expenses occasioned by
the assault and battery. We cannot learn how much it
eost.to have the stitches made in the wound, or what was
paid, if anything, for emergency attention. We have the
general statement that the amount paid to Dr. Wiezel
and the Wayside Hospital was $650.55. The Wayside
Hospital, apparently, is an institution for mental pa-
tients. It appears that appellant had been suffering what
is known as a paranoid type of schizophrenia. Obviously,
appellee was cognizant of this fact as he stated in his
petition that for some time prior to the difficulty herein,
‘the had suffered from a nervous disturbance and that
he was suffering from said illness on that day * * *
and that after the defendant, Gritton, had taken the
plaintiff into his custody and the plaintiff not then being
rational, the plaintiff attempted to and finally did break
away and proceed down the street.’?

Dr. Wiezel, who attended Mr. Moore at the Way-
side Hospital, stated that the blows received from the
officers had no effect upon the mental condition of Moore
and that during his stay at the hospital he was treated
only for his mental condition, from which, according to
Dr. Wiezel, the patient had been suffering for 4 or 5
years. Thus, it will be seen that the doctor, medical, and
hospital bill as allowed was for treatment in this insti-
tution for a mental illness not caused by the beating
by the officers, although the doctor said, in substance;
such a beating might aggravate the condition. We ob-
serve, however that, according to his own pleadings, on
the day he was arrested, Moore was not rational. No
doubt, part of the medical and doctor bills were incurred
as‘a result of the-injuries complained- of. Obviously, it
was error to submit to the jury the expense of. treatment
for the mental illness, in the absence of a showing that
same was a direct result of the blows received. Upon

another trial appellee may be able to separate such ex-
penses so as to show definitely the amount incurred by
reason of the injuries.

It is next contended that the court erred in not per-
mitting appellants to offer evidence showing previous
acts denoting mental derangement. Ordinarily such evi-
dence would not be permissible and it is highly question-
able whether such would be permissible here, other tham
that as it might go to the question of treatment in the
mental hospital for an illness that had been in existence
prior to the difficulty herein.

Complaint is next made that the court erred in re-
assembling the jury after it had been discharged to
permit it to reform its verdict. The jury returned this
verdict:

“We the jury find for the plaintiff Walter Moore
against B. W. Gritton and Lee Thomas Rudder the sum
of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars $2,500.00 and amount
of Medical Bill Six Hundred fifty-two Dollars and sixty-
three cents $652.63.

“B. B. Strange, Foreman
“‘September 14, 1948.’’

The jury was then discharged. Observing that the
defendant bondsmen were nowhere mentioned in the
verdict, counsel for appellee inquired of the court re-
garding their liability. The court inquired of Mr.
Strange, the foreman, if the jury had intended to find
against the bondsmen also. Mr. Strange replied that
they did to the limit of their liability. The court then
reassembled the jury and informed it that it might
retire and reform its verdict accordingly. This was done
and the names of the bondsmen were added to the ver-
dict above. This procedure was entirely unnecessary.
The bondsmen had answered admitting that they were
sureties on the bond and the extent of their liability
thereon. This became, then, in the absence of any effort
to show that the officers acted beyond their authority,
or without authority and maliciously, a matter of law
which the court could have properly cared for without
resubmission of the case. See Romans v. McGinnis, 156
Ky. 205, 160 S. W. 928; and Turner et al. v. Smith, 313
Ky. 635, 232 8. W. 2d 1006.

Since the case must be reversed because of the im-

De 515

structions, we consider it unnecessary to discuss the
question of excessive damages.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consist-
ent herewith.

|
Shepherd et al. v. Shepherd.

February 2, 1951.
Blvis J. Stahr, Judge.

Jennings Kearby for appellant.
John C. Bondurant and James Warren for appellee.
Joven Larmer—Affirming.

Appellee, a resident of Union City, Tennessee, and
appellant, a resident of Fulton County, Kentucky, were
married in Tennessee in January, 1947. They immedi-
ately took their abode with appellant’s parents near
Hickman where appellant operated a small sandwich
shop. They lived together about 3 weeks, or until the

576 ee

11th of February, when appellee returned to her home
in Tennessee. Appellee then returned. to her husband
about March 29th and remained with him another three
weeks when she again left him. In May of that year she
filed suit for divorce alleging that she was pregnant by
her husband and asked and sought maintenance for
herself and support of her unborn child, and also ob-
tained general attachment.

Appellant filed answer and counterclaim for di-
vorce. As one of his defenses he alleged that he was
sterile and was so before their marriage; therefore, he
was incapable of being the father of a child.

On June 7th, and before the sale of the attached
property, Mrs. Lulu Shepherd, mother of appellant,
filed her intervening petition alleging that she was the
owner of the sandwich shop equipment and asked’ that
the attachment levied on the property be dismissed.

After considering the proof, the court granted ap-
pellee a divorce; determined the child, which was in
esse at the time of the judgment, to have been born to
this marriage union; and decreed that the husband pay
$30 per month for its support. The intervening petitioner
was held to be the owner of the property, but it was ad-
judged that she be given priority on the proceeds of the
sale for an amount which exceeded her hospital bill,
which her son had paid:

The two contentions raised here on appeal are, first,
that the evidence of the husband’s sterility was sufficient
to overcome the presumption that a child born. to the
wife was legitimate, and, second, that the proof. was not
sufficient to show that the payment of the hospital bill
constituted a reimbursement so as to give the husband
a claim in that amount on the sandwich shop property.

Appellant introduced the evidence of Dr: Robert-
son and Dr. Fuller, whoge.examinations of appellant
were made from 6 months to a year after the period of
his cohabitation with wife. Their testimony shows that
normally the semen should contain a million or more
sperm cells per c. c. The examination showed the pres-
ence of only 50 to 100.live, motile sperm, cells. However,
the doctors admitted that the presence of one sperm
cell.-was sufficient for fertilization. There was no proof
of entire sterility prior to the marriage. .

Pe 817

This child was born October 28, 1947. It is stipulated
that the child was normal. Nine months prior to October
28, 1947, would place the date of conception about: Janu-
ary 28, 1947. The parties were married January 22, 1947.
In the absence of a showing of complete sterility during
this period, certainly the legal presumption of the child’s
legitimacy must prevail. Williams v. Williams, 311 Ky.
45, 223 S. W. 2d 360. It will readily be seen that this
testimony is not sufficiently persuasive or convincing to
justify bastardization of this child.

As to the claim of ownership of the equipment by
intervening petitioner, we find contradictory evidence.
Apparently, the property was sold by agreement of the
parties and Mrs. Lulu Shepherd accepted the amount
allowed her. It may be that she did furnish the appel-
lant some money to pay for some of this equipment, but
it is also shown that he reimbursed her in a substantial
amount by the payment of her hospital bill.

We think the court correctly adjudicated. the matter.
The judgment is afirmed. _
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Saunders.

February 6, 1951.
R. L. Maddox, Judge.

—_f

‘Wm. Marshall Bullitt, Thomas W. Bullitt, Francis T. Goheen, and
Bullitt, Dawson & Tarrant for appellant.

Patterson & Wilson for appellee.
Jupver Muirxen—Reversing.

This is an appeal from the Bell Circuit Court where
the insured, Julian L. Saunders, recovered a judgment
for $100 a month for permanent and total disability from
November, 1947, to the time of the verdict in April,
1949, together with future benefits of $100 a month until
his disability disappeared, if it did. In its appeal the
New York Life Insurance Company asserts that the
court below erred on the instruction given and that a
peremptory instruction should have been given in be-
half of the insurance carrier.

In the policy total and permanent disability were
defined as follows: ‘‘Disability shall be considered total
whenever the insured is so disabled by bodily injury or
disease that he is wholly prevented from performing
any work, following any occupation, or from engaging
in any business for remuneration or profit, provided
such disability occurred after the insurance under this
policy took effect and before the anniversary of the
policy on which the insured’s age at nearest birthday
is sixty.’”

The policy was issued in 1929, and at that time the
insured operated a retail grocery store in Pineville,
Kentucky. His work as a groceryman and butcher in-
volved considerable heavy lifting, but he continued at
this employment until July, 1947, when the Kroger Gro-
cery & Baking Company took a lease on the building
where his store was located. Mr. Saunders testified that

he was not feeling well at the time that he gave up the
grocery business in the summer of 1947. On November
2, 1947, he took his son to be examined by a doctor, and
as an incident of the trip discovered that he himself had
high blood pressure. In August, 1948, Mr. Saunders sued
the New York Life Insurance Company for total and
permanent disability benefits under the policy begin-
ning as of November, 1947, and it is from the judgment
rendered that this appeal is taken.

The testimony offered showed that Mr. Saunders
had obtained a fourth interest in and had become presi-
dent of the Rex Motor Company which is the Chevrolet
garage and sales agency at Pineville. He had been in
this business since 1937, and was in it at the time of the
suit. In 1940 he expanded his automobile agency and
founded an independent agency for the handling of Cad-
lac sales which did business under the name of J. L.
Saunders Cadillac Company. Consequently, when his
policy was issued Mr. Saunders was a retail grocer; but
when his alleged total and permanent disability occur-
red he was, and for ten years had been, a garage execu-
tive and automobile salesman.

At the trial the New York Life Insurance Company
requested the court to instruct the jury to find for it
unless Mr. Saunders was totally and permanently dis-
abled so that he was prevented from engaging in his
occupation in the automobile business or in some oceu-
pation similar thereto. The court refused to give this
instruction, but gave the following one:

“By the words ‘totally and permanently disabled’
as hereinafter used, is meant the inability to do and
perform in a reasonable and practical way all material
acts in pursuit of the occupation of the plaintiff as a
retail grocer, but do not mean absolute helplessness or
any physical disability. By the words ‘presumably per-
manently disabled,’ as hereinafter used, it is meant a rea-
sonable expectation that such disability will continue
indefinitely and is not a condition of utter hopelessness
of recovery.

“Now, if the jury believe from the evidence that
on or about November 2, 1947, the plaintiff, Julian L.
Saunders, became totally and presumably permanently
disabled as above defined, then the jury should find for

0

the plaintiff; and unless the jury so believe,.it should
find for the-defendant.”?

The appellant’s contentions are that’ Mr. Saunders”
right to total disability benefits depend upon whether
he is wholly disabled from following his continued occu-
pation in the automobile business, and not upon whether
he is disabled’ from his abandoned occupation in the
grocery business, the oceupation he had at the time the
policy was issued. The insurance-carrier also contends
that it was entitled to a peremptory instruction because
the evidence adduced revealed clearly that Mr. Saunders.
was able to perform the material acts of his’ occupa-
tion in the automobile business. ‘

The evidence revealed that on November 2, 1947,

Mr. Saunders’ blood pressure reading was 206 which
140, °
is above the normal of 115—140 for a man of his’ age,
80—90

forty-eight years. Subsequent readings during the next
year and a half showed no improvement in Mr. Saun-
ders’ blood pressure. An electrocardiogram taken in
April, 1949, disclosed ‘‘moderate’’ damage to the heart
muscles, The rest of the medical evidence is the opinion
of various doctors as to just how much work or how
little Mr. Saunders should do in the future. Unless there
is strong corroboratory evidence, the medical evidence
offered in behalf of the appellee is not strong enough to
cause this court to sustain the submission of the case to
the jury. Medical opinion cannot overcome the facts
developed as to the activities of the insured. See Mutual
Life Ins, Co: of New York v. Dause, 256 Ky. 448, 76 S.
W. 2d 283; Davis v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
263 Ky. 568, 92 8. W: 2d 822; Barrowman v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, 266 Ky. 249, 98 S. W. 2d 912;
Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Hauser, 269 Ky. 374,
107 S. W. 2d 282.

The evidence offered as to Mr. Saunders’ activities
from: November 2, 1947, to April 22, 1949, the date of.
the trial, leaves no doubt that he was active in the auto-
mobile business either in an executive capacity, as sales-
man, or in-both capacities. Businessmen, associates, and
neighbors testified to his activities in the automobile
business..during thé period of time in question. They

a 581

testified to seeing ‘him going back and forth, to his work,
driving his automobile and. doing other. things -which
would be expected-of.a man in-his vocation.:From.a finan-
cial standpoint, he did better in the automobile. business
that he had done in the grocery business.

The policy. involved in this litigation is an n ordinary
nonoccupational life insurance policy which also provides
’ disability benefits ‘‘whenever the insured is so disabled
by bodily injury or disease that he is wholly prevented
from performing any work, from following any oceupa-
tion, or from engaging in any business for remuneration
or profit.’”? The policy is explicit as to what disability it
insures against; it defines “Total and Permanent Dis-
ability,’? and the definition is part of its contract with
the insured. It insured against total and permanent dis-
ability as defined.and not against partial disability. We,
therefore, conclude on the basis.of the evidence offered
that the appellant was entitled to have the case withheld
from the jury and its motion for a directed verdict in
its favor sustained.

Because of our conclusion that the appellant was
entitled to a peremptory instruction, we will not dis-
cuss fully the other reasons urged for reversal. Suffice
it to say that the instructions should have been governed
by the controlling oceupation or occupations of the in-
sured at the time his alleged disability began, and should
not have been confined to his occupation at the time the
policy was issued, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Raines, 1940,
281 Ky. 506, 1386'S. W. 2d 792; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Bryant, 1943, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S. W. 2d 588,
153 A. L. R. 422; Penn Mutual Life ins. Co: v. Schrader,
1942, 289 Ky. 469, 158 S. W. 2d 964.

Judgment is reversed with directions to set it aside
and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Commonwealth et al. v. Kelley et al.

February 6, 1951.
EB. B. Beatty, Special ‘Judge.

es 988

A. EB, Funk, Attorney General, and C. J. Waddill, Jo M. Ferguson,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.

Williams & Allen, G. C. Allen, and T. J. Arnett for appellees.
Cur Justice Cammack—Reversing.

This appeal presents a situation in which the Com-
monwealth is sued by an individual property holder for
injury to his land. In 1944, J. V. Kelley bought a house
and lot in Salyersville, Kentucky, on the south side of
Highway 460. Mr. Kelley conducted a funeral home -on
the premises, and also resided there. On the north side
of the highway, opposite Kelley’s house, there is a ditch
or drainway. Water drains from a hill, which slopes to
this ditch opposite Kelley’s home. A culvert runs under
the road and empties on the south side of the highway
at about the corner of Kelley’s lot. When there are heavy
rains the water overflows on the north side of the high-
way and crosses the road onto Kelley’s property. There
is conflicting evidence as to the exact cause of this flood-
ing. There is evidence that the culvert has become choked
with stones, branches and other materials. A concrete
bridge has been built over the ditch and there is testi-
mony that this narrows the water carrying capacity. of
the ditch. The water deposits mud on Kelley’s land and
there is evidence that the foundation of his house has
been damaged.

Kelley complained of this situation to employees of
the Highway Department several times. On their ad-
vice, he changed a branch ditch near his garage in an
attempt to alleviate the situation. He testified that this
only aggravated the condition. After more complaints
Kelley filed this action in the Magoffin Circuit Court
against the Commonwealth and the Highway Department
and recovered a $1000 judgment. The Commonwealth and
the Highway Department are appealing.

It may be observed at the outset that this is an ac-
tion against the Commonwealth and a governmental
agency thereof. Immunity from suit has always been an
attribute of state sovereignty. However, Section 13 of
the Constitution declares that no man’s property
shall be taken or applied to public use without the con-

_ 584 eee

sent of his representatives, and without just compensa-
tion..being previously made to him. In Kentucky State
Park Commission v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 8. W. 2d 38,
39, a distinction between this section and Section 242
of the Constitution was noted. In that case we said:

- “Section 242 of the Constitution requires that mun-
icipal and other corporations and individuals invested
with the privilege of taking private property for public
use shall pay or secure the payment of just compensation
before the taking thereof. This allows compensation
for injury or destruction of property unattended by an
actual taking. * * . * .

c# * * The distinction in the character of municipal-
ities and of counties as drawn in Wheatley v. Mercer, 72
Ky. (9 Bush 704) 704, brings the latter (referring to
governmental agencies as opposed to corporate agencies)
much closer to absolute immunity from having to answer
in the courts. The paramount object of their existence
is governmental. They are subordinate political divi-

sions and parts of the sovereignty of the state itself.
£3 8D) i.

It may be seen then that the owner of property.may
sue the State without its consent only when his property
has been ‘‘taken.’’ In Lehman v. Williams, 301 Ky. 729,
193 S. W. 2d 161, we pointed out that several cases sup-
port the rule that, where private property is taken for
public use, or where there is a trespass thereon which
amounts to such taking, the State’s immunity from suit
is waived through Sections 13 and 242 of the Constitu-
tion.

“It is contended that the appellees did not state a
cause of action and the court erred in overruling a de-
murrer to the petition. The petition, after setting forth
that the property was used for residential purposes,
continued with allegation that: ‘‘* * * the defendants
* * * have so carelessly and negligently managed and
operated the same (the highway) and its right-of-way
and ditch lines thereto as to divert the natural course
and flow of the water and to cause the same to overflow
plaintiffs’ said land to such extent and in such quanti-
ties as to render their said property untenable and: unfit
for the purposes for which it had been and is intended
to be used and has so accumulated and stood upon their

| 585

said land and under-their said buildings to such extent:
as to seriously injure-and damage their said buildings,
necessitating repair thereof at great expense; that in
addition thereto said property and premises by reason.
of the overflow upon it of said water * * * have been
rendered unsightly, unfit for occupancy: and by reason
thereof they have been damaged thereby i in the snm of,
Five Thousand Dollars. ”

The appellants argue that to show a tains” of
property, the petition must state facts from which the
court may infer a total ouster from, possession, or at.
least a substantial deprivation of all beneficial use of
the land affected. It seems to us, however, that an inter-
ference with the legally protected use to which land has
been dedicated, which destroys that use or places a sub-
stantial and additional burden on the landowner to
maintain that use, is a ‘taking’ of his property. Kelley
alleged that his residential property had been rendered
unfit for occupancy and that his buildings had been se-
verely damaged. Taking these facts as true, we believe
that, under the rule of the Lehman case, the petition
shows a ‘ Trespass amounting to a taking.” .

It is argued next that there was not sufficient evi-
dence showing a “‘taking’’ to support the verdict and
therefore a peremptory instruction should have been
given for the appellants. The appellees admitted that
the building of the road and the construction of the
culvert, sidewalks and other improvements were done
before they bought the property. We have held that a
subsequent purchaser may not recover for damages re-
sulting from a permanent structure built on adjoining
land, because it is presumed that the damages were de-
ducted from the purchase price. Pence v. City of Dan-
ville, 147 Ky. 683, 145 8. W. 385; City of Richmond v.
Gentry, 186 Ky. 319, 124 8. W. 337. In the instant case
the evidence is conflicting as to whether the ditches,
sidewalks and culvert as originally constructed were
the cause of the injury, or whether their maintenance
by the Commonwealth was the proximate cause of the
overflow of water on the appellees’ land. If the cause
of the, injury occurred or became apparent after the,-ap-
pellees’ acquisition .of title, then damages accrued to
them.rather than to. their predecessor in title. As point-
ed out above, there: was evidence showing that the im-

586 |

proper maintenance occurred during the appellees’
ownership, or at least the damage did not become appar-
ent until that time. The appellants argue that the ap-
pellees’ evidence did not show a ‘‘taking.’? The evi-
dence is vague, but some damage was done to the founda-
tion of the house. We can not say as a matter of law
that there has not been a ‘‘taking’’ when residential
property has been damaged to such an extent that to
maintain its use would require considerable expense on
the part of the landowner. A subsequent trial may re-
veal that these injuries were of such a nature as to
-amount to an appropriation of that property.

The court instructed the jury that nine of them could
return a verdict, apparently on the idea, as shown by
the entire proceeding, that the action was an ordinary
one for trespass. Basically, this is a ‘‘property taking”’
proceeding, so a twelve man verdict was necessary. See
Harlan County v. Cole, 218 Ky. 819, 292 S. W. 501. As
only eleven jurors returned this verdict the error was
not cured by a unanimous vote. Kentucky Game & Fish
Commission v. Burnette, 290 Ky. 786, 163 S. W. 2d 50.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, with direc-
tions to set it aside and for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Craig v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
February 6, 1951.
J. S. Forester, Judge.

ee

G. B. Reams for appellant.
J.C, Baker, H, L. Bryant, and ©. S. Landrum for appellee.

Juvez Moremen—Affirming.

On October 21, 1946, at about 10 o’clock p. m., Mrs.
Beckie Craig was killed when struck by a Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company’s passenger train at a pub-
lie crossing within the corporate limits of Wallins, Ken-
tucky. Frank Craig (who, herein will be called plaintiff),
administrator of the estate of Beckie Craig, seeks to
recover damages for her death.

On the first trial of this case plaintiff recovered
judgment in the sum of $5000.00. Louisville & N. R. Co.
(who will be called defendant) appealed to this court
with the result that the judgment of the Harlan Cirenit
Court was reversed. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Craig, 310
Ky. 48, 219 8. W. 2d 954. In the opinion the court gave
a detailed analysis of the evidence produced at the trial,
summarized the law applicable thereto, and concluded
plaintiff had failed to show that any negligence on part
of defendant was the proximate cause of the accident.
Only those facts which are necessary to the decision will
be restated here,

In the ease of City of Louisville v. Redmon, 282 Ky.
1, 137 S. W. 2d 350, 351, it was said: ‘‘It has been held
in numerous cases that an opinion on the former appeal
of an action, whether right or wrong, is the law of the
ease and is binding on the parties and the court in a
subsequent trial or appeal, where the facts are substan-
tially the same as those appearing on the first appeal,
and this rule applies, even though the evidence on the
latter appeal may be more in detail, if it is of a cumu-
lative nature. Saunders et al. v. Lincoln County Board
of Education, 273 Ky. 701, 117 8. W. 2d 914; Snyder v.
Snyder, 269 Ky. 540, 107 S. W. 2d 857; Finley v. Thomas,
280 Ky. 654, 134 S. W. 2d 243.”

At the second trial, plaintiff introduced only two
witnesses who had not testified at the original hearing

(in some’ instances, the testimony given at the: first trial
was réad),'and they were Miles Howard and Clyde ‘Col-
lins. Miles Howard was presented for the purpose of
establishing that the railroad had failed to maintain the
crossing ina reasonably safe condition. In the: opinion
on the first appeal, it was said: ‘‘Several witnesses testi-
fied that there were worn places and holes on'the cross-
ing, and that these defects had been there for a sufficient
period of time for the railroad company to have learned
of their presence.’’ [310 Ky. 43, 219 8. W. 955.]

- “The testimony of Miles Howard added nothing to
that which was presented by other witnesses at the first
trial and was cumulative. :

Clyde Collins was introduced in order to support
the theory that decedent had met death because her
foot had been hung in a defective place at the crossing:
‘Witnesses were introduced at the first trial on this point,
concerning whom, we said: ‘‘The case now resolves it-
self into whether appellee introduced any evidence of
probative value in support of the contention that the
deceased came to her death by reason of being caught
in a defect at the crossing and from which situation
she could not extricate herself in time to avoid the acci-
dent. The only testimony relied on in support of this con-
tention is that given by the two witnesses who testified
that they were playing cards on the side of a nearby
hill to the west of the crossing. The only competent
testimony they offered in support of this contention
shows merely that the deceased was in a stooping posi-
tion at the time she was struck by the train. Hach ven-
tured a guess which can be given no weight, that it
‘looked like she had her foot hung’ and ‘It looked like
she was trying to get her foot loose.’ The purpose of
her stooping, if she did stoop, and the witness nearest
to the deceased testified that she did not up to the time
the engine was so close as to block his vision, may have
been to tie a shoe, retrieve a lost package or bill or coin,
or to pick wp some other object which may have struck
her fancy. It is apparent, therefore, that the reason for
her stooping, if such occurred, enters into the realm of
pure speculation, upon which it universally has been
held a verdict may not be based.” ‘

In order to decide whether or not the testimony of
Clyde Collins removes plaintiff’s theory of the case

5

from the realm of speculation, it is obligatory that we
-quote from the transcript at some length. On direct ex-
‘amination ‘Collins showed a marked reluctance to ‘say
that decedent’s foot was caught. He stated:

“+ “Q. 18 Where was she when you first saw her?
8A, Itdooked to be, she was hung on the railroad cross-
ing, one foot on the rail and the other out.

“Q. 19 What was she doing at the time you saw
her which caused you to see her, she looked to have her
foot in the crossing? A. Looked to me like she was
pulling at one of her feet. I wouldn’t be safe to say.

* * * * *

“Q. 34 Did her actions indicate she had her foot
hung on the crossing? A. Yes.

" Q, 35 Did you see her feet, either one of them?
A. She was standing in this position, and she was work-
ing at one of her feet. (Witness indicates.)

,. _{Q. 86 Did you see her feet, either one of them?
A. No.

“*Q. 87 She was working with one of her feet?
-A. She looked to be.

_. Q. 88 She was working at it? A. She was stand-
ing in that position with her hand on her leg, she could
have been.

“Q. 39 Do you know of anything else that would
have caused her to be in a stooped position? <A. No sir.
I didn’t know her at the time.

“Q. 40 Did you see anything on the crossing she
wight be trying to pick up like a package? A. No, sir.
, * * * * *

. *Q. 63 You could see this woman’s hands? A.
_That’s right.

“Q. 64 If her foot had been on top of the surface

of the crossing, could you have seen her foot? Defendant

objects. A. I’m not positive.

.: “Q. 65 You didn’t see her foot? A. I’m not posi-

re I seen her foot, but she was working with one leg.’’
If we had before us only the testimony given in

590 ee
chief we would have little trouble in forming an opin-
ion, but under the lash of persistent cross examination,

the witness became considerably stronger when he made
the following statements:

1. ‘She could have got loose if she hadn’t been
hung; she could have got out of the way before the train
hit her, if she hadn’t been hung.’’

2. ‘No, sir, I don’t say that. If she hadn’t been fast-
ened some way she could have got off.’’

8. “She knew the train was coming she couldn’t
get loose.’”

The record discloses that the final questions on this
point were propounded by the court:

“Court: Do you know whether she was hung or
not? A. She was on the crossing pulling at her foot
or leg.

“Court: Do you know whether it was hung or not?
‘A. I don’t know. She didn’t get that foot on the crossing;
she was hit.’’

Counsel for appellant, in-a carefully written brief,
points out that the use by a witness of such words as
‘it looked like,’? ‘‘thought,’’ ‘‘suppose,’’ and ‘‘believe,’?
.do not always indicate a conjecture or guess at facts, and
cites (along with other cases) the case of Collier v.
Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 670, 198 S. W. 2d 974, 975,
‘wherein it said: .

“Tt has been written that: such expressions as ‘I
thought,’ ‘I suppose’ and ‘I believe’ do not always indi-
cate a conjecture or guess at the facts, but that such ex-
pressions are. often an idiomatic or colloquial way of
stating a fact according to the best judgment of the
witness. ’” , .

We agree that such is often the case, but it is equal-
ly true that such words are sometimes used to express
their exact meaning and for the purpose of conveying
the idea that the witness is giving his conclusion as
to primary physical facts which he is not sure existed,
but which he supposes to have existed. It is apparent
from a reading of the testimony of Clyde Collins that
he would have sometime during his intensive examina-
tion said, ‘Yes, I saw her foot caught in a defect in the

Es

crossing,”’ if his good conscience had not restrained and
forced him to use suppositional words.

We are of opinion that the testimony given by Clyde
Collins is of the same classification of that given by two
witnesses introduced on this point at the first trial, is at
most cumulative in nature, and that trial court was cor-
rect in instructing the jury to find for the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

Gugel’s Adm’r et al. v. Orth’s Ex’r et al.

October 31, 1950.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing February 16, 1951.
Roseoe Conkling, Judge.

592 ee

Finley F. Gibson, Jr. for appellant.
_, Lawrence §. Grauman and J. Leonard Walker for appellee.

Juper Herm—Affirming.

About 7:15 p. m., July 18, 1947, an automobile driven
by Leonard L. Gugel, accompanied by his wife, Gladys
Gray Gugel, was proceeding in a westerly direction
on Potters Lane, Clark County, Indiana. When crossing
the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks about four miles north
of Jeffersonville, the automobile was struck by a south-
bound passenger train. Mr. Gugel, 51, and Mrs. Gugel,
49, were fatally injured and did not leave issue sur-
viving.

Mr. Gugel left a will devising all of his estate to his
wife, and appointing her as executor without bond. Mrs.
Gugel left a will devising all of her estate to her hus-
band. On July 17, 1947, Thomas N. Gray, father-in-law
of Mr. Gugel, qualified as administrator, with the will
annexed, of the estate of Mr. Gugel. In the Jefferson
County Court on July 23, 1947, relatives of Mr. Gugel
filed motion to remove Mr. Gray as administrator on
the ground that the deaths of Mr. Gugel and Mrs. Gugel
were simultaneous, or that Mrs. Gugel predeceased Mr.
Gugel. The Judge of the Jefferson County Court found
and adjudged:

. “1, That there is not sufficient evidence in this pro-
ceeding to determine that either Gladys G. Gugel or
Leonard L. Gugel predeceased the other. ,

“2. The court finds that Leonard L. Gugel and
Gladys G. Gugel died simultaneously on the point of
impact with the train aforesaid on the 13th day of
July 1947.”

The court set aside the appointment of Gray and
removed him as administrator, and appointed W. How-
ard Clay, public administrator and guardian of Jeffer-
son County, as administrator, with the will annexed, of
the estate of Leonard L. Gugel, and directed that he
qualify immediately by executing bond with the court
in‘the sum of $25,000. . : oo

|

es

On November 6, 1947, a statement of appeal was
filed in the Jefferson Cireuit Court by Thomas N. Gray,
administrator, and by Thomas N. Gray and Ada A.
Gray, his wife, as the only heirs at law of Gladys Gray
Gugel. On November 24, 1947, a statement of appeal was
also filed by relatives of Mr. Gugel. At a trial in the
circuit court on February 25, 1948, the court, at the close
of all the evidence, sustained appellees’ motion for a
directed verdict that Mr. and Mrs. Gugel died simul-
taneously.

Appellants appeal, urging that: (1) The court erred
to the prejudice of the appellants in refusing to award
them the burden of proof; (2) the court erred in sus-
taining exceptions to the testimony of Edwin N. Coots,
coroner; and (3) the court erred in directing a verdict
for appellees at the conclusion of all the evidence.

U. S. Highway No. 31 runs north and south, just
west of the Pennsylvania Railroad tracks. Aurelio Liva,
only eye witness to the accident, was driving north on
U. 8. 31. As he approached the Potters Lane crossing,
an automobile was traveling west on it and another car
was following fairly close behind. The first car stopped
for him to drive by before coming out on the highway.
He saw the train coming south and wondered ‘‘why the
second car didn’t see the train, * * * I was looking for
him to turn off the road, or something, to stop himself
to keep from getting in the path of the train, and’ he
didn’t. He drove right up on the tracks, and just as he
got to the center of the tracks, just about, the train hit
him, and it seemed like an explosion, and I saw Mr.
Gugel’s body the instant the train hit. His body knock-
ed the side of the car out and he flew right through the
air and hit the ground and bounced once and he laid
still. * * * I stopped and went back and I looked at his
body there and started to walk over to the car, and I
went back and looked around a bit and then I noticed
the head of the lady, and then I knew there must be a
body somewhere, so I walked on down the track, and
then is when I saw her body.’’? He did not see Mrs.
Gugel’s body come out of the car.

The testimony shows that the train was brégeting
about 75 miles an hour, or about 110 feet a second; that
it stopped about a mile beyond the point of. collision.
A: part of the automobile was;found on the. front of.the

594 ee

eow catcher, ‘‘welded”’ to it. The other part of the auto-
mobile—the front part—was found about 50 feet south
of the crossing. The impact of the train was to the right
back part, about the back door, of the automobile, a
Pontiac sedan. Gugel’s body was lying about 50 feet
south of Potters Lane, and Mrs. Gugel’s body about 100
or 150 feet south of the lane, her head being about 10
feet north of her body. Gugel’s body was not bleeding;
Mrs. Gugel ‘‘had blood on her.’? Some blood and hair
were found on the end of a tie a few feet north of Mrs.
Gugel’s body, and her red belt was found ‘laying on
the ties * * * outside the rail.’’? Both her head and body
were found on the same side of the right-of-way, and
outside of the tracks.

Mr. Gugel sustained multiple fractures of the skull
and cervical vertebrae, with marked displacement of
the spinal column. He had a deep gash in the back part
of his head, ‘‘brains were protruding.’”? Both cheek
bones, both jaw bones, and both collar bones were broken.
He had broken ribs on the right side; his right arm
and right leg were broken. Mrs. Gugel’s back was brok-
en; both arms and both legs were broken; there was a
deep incision or tear across the abdomen in the region
of the pelvis; her ‘‘trunk was torn loose.’? She was
badly mangled, ‘‘her body was more badly mangled’?
than Mr. Gugel’s. She was ‘‘fully decapitated begin-
ning over the right ear and extending down.’’ The phys-
icians who testified stated that a body does not bleed
after heart action ceases, but say that blood would back-
flow from the large vessels of the neck in case of decapi-
tation. It was shown that ‘‘A person is dead at the
moment heart action, respiration and action of the cen-
tral nervous system jointly cease.”’

Edwin N. Coots, a funeral director who was serving
as coroner of Clark County, Indiana, arrived at the
scene sometime after the accident. His deposition was
taken. He had not been trained as a physician or sur-
geon. The trial court sustained exceptions to answers
which only medical experts could have properly given.
This was not error. The court correctly sustained ex-
ceptions to which the witness stated someone else had
told him about the accident.

Dr. Leo W. Zimmerman, called by appellants and
asked hypothetical questions, was of the opinion that

es

the impact caused Mr. Gugel’s death, and that decapita-
tion caused Mrs. Gugel’s death. Dr. Luther Fuller, called
by appellants and asked hypothetical questions, finally
answered that whether or not Mrs. Gugel was dead
before she was decapitated would be purely speculative.
Asked, ‘‘And then an honest, sincere opinion under these
circumstances as to whether she was dead after she was
decapitated or whether she was dead before she was
decapitated, would be purely speculative, wouldn’t it?”’
He answered, ‘‘It certainly would.’

Dr. Roy L. Carter, coroner of Jefferson County,
called by appellees and asked hypothetical questions as
to which of these people died first, stated that in his
opinion decapitation causes immediate death; that if
Mrs. Gugel was killed instantly by the impact of the
collision, blood would come from the large vessels. This
could account for the blood on the railroad ties, and on
Mrs. Gugel’s body. It was his opinion that ‘‘the impact
probably killed both of them at the same time.’’

Under the facts and circumstances of this case it is
at once apparent that, as the trial court said, ‘‘It is im-
possible to decide which one of these parties died first.’’
The trial court peremptorily instructed the jury to re-
turn a verdict to this effect. Judgment was entered ap-
proving and confirming the action of the Jefferson
County Court on the ground that Leonard L. Gugel and
Gladys Gray Gugel died simultaneously. We believe the
trial court reached the correct conclusion. We do not
reach the question of burden of proof.

The judgment is affirmed.
a

Fayette County Fiscal Court et al. v. Fayette
County, ex Rel., et al.

December 8, 1950.
Joseph J. Bradley, Judge.

596

J. Harry Stamper and William EH. Nichols for appellants.
Paul H. Mansfield for appellees.
Juper Larmmer—Reversing.

In order to provide for the adequate disposal of
garbage, the Fayette County Fiscal Court passed this
order;

“Motion by Commissioner J Burke and seconded by
Commissioner Gorham that the following resolution be
adopted: Be it resolved by the Fiscal Court of Fayette
County that the sum of $10,000.00 be, and is hereby
appropriated for the purpose of either ‘applying on the
purchase price of an incinerator for garbage disposal
for the county, or for a tract of land to be used as a
landfilled garbage disposal for Fayette County.

“Motion carried by the following vote: Aye, Judge
William E. Nichols, Commissioners Gorham, Burke and
McKinley.’’

In order to test the legality of the order and ap-
propriation, Paul H. Mansfield, County Attorney, ap-
pealed to the Fayette Circuit Court seeking a declara-
tion of rights and praying that the order ‘be adjudged
void on the ground that the Fiscal Court was without
right or authority to make such an appropriation.

Defendants answered admitting allegations of: fact
-and also asked for a binding declaration of rights.-

Appellant, J. Harry: Stamper, filed his interv.
petition alleging that he was a resident and taxpayer of
- Fayette County, and stating that he sought to interyene
on behalf. of himself and. all other taxpayers. He alleged

SO 597
that the Fiscal Court has the power to spend money to
dispose of garbage in order to eliminate a health men-
ace, and ‘that he and the other taxpayers are vitally in-
terested in the spending of the County’s money and in
ridding the community of the health menace occasioned
by inadequate garbage disposal. The court permitted
him to file his intervening petition.

,,, No evidence was introduced and the cause was sub-
mitted on the pleadings. The court adjudged that the
Fiscal Court was without power, either expressed or
implied, to appropriate such money, and that the order
was invalia. From that judgment this appeal is prose-
cuted.

Appellants take the position that the Fiscal Court
was acting within its power and authority pursuant to
Chapter 58 of our Statutes. They further contend that,
even though limited to 67.080 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes, which enumerates the powers of the fiscal
court, the Fiscal Court impliedly had the authority to
pass this order because same is reasonably necessary to
carry out the statutory obligations of the County and
its agencies as the guardian of the health of the people.

We have the benefit of a strong and splendidly writ-
ten opinion by the lower court. As basis for the decision,
the court said:

‘In the intervenor’s brief it is argued that Chapter
58 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (being KRS 58.010
et seq.) grants to the Fiscal Court the express power
to make this appropriation. A reading of this statute,
providing for the acquisition of public projects by gov-
ernmental agencies through revenue bonds, shows that
it.has no application to the question herein involved.

“In the absence of such express power, we must
look to the provisions of KRS 67.080 to determine wheth-
er therein lies an implied power resting in the Fiscal
Court to make such use of public funds.”

Appellants are insistent that the court is wrong in
its interpretation of Chapter 58 of Kentucky Revised
Statutes, and that the title of the Act indicates a differ-
ent legislative intent. The title of the Act reads: ‘‘An
Act authorizing the acquisition, construction, mainten-
ance, extension and improvement of public projects, and

598 es

the renting or leasing thereof, by governmental units,
agencies and instrumentalities; providing for the acqui-
sition of property for a public project by condemnation;
and.authorizing the issuance of tax free revenue bonds
for -public projects, and the use of tax revenues and
other funds for such projects.’

The title indicates that there is such power expressly
provided if it be determined that garbage disposal facil-
ities come within the definition of ‘‘public project.”? A
‘public project’? is defined in KRS 58.010 as follows:

“““(1) ‘Public ‘project’ means any lands, buildings
or structures, works or facilities suitable for and intend-
ed for use as public property for public purposes or
suitable for and intended for use in the promotion of
the public health, public welfare or the conservation of
natural resources, including the planning of any such
lands, buildings, structures, works or facilities, and shall
also include existing lands, buildings, structures, works
and facilities, as well as improvements or additions to
any such lands, buildings, structures, works or facilities.

“©(2) ‘Governmental agency’ means the Common-
wealth of Kentucky as such acting by or through any de-
partment, instrumentality or agency thereof, or any
county, city, agency or instrumentality or other political
subdivision of the Commonwealth, or agency, or instru-
mentality thereof.’’

Obviously, the definition encompasses such a project
as is involved in this case.

KRS 58.020 provides: ‘‘A governmental agency
acting separately or jointly with one or more of any
such agency, may acquire, construct, maintain, add to
and improve any public project as defined in KRS 58.010,
which public project may be located within or without
or partly within and partly without the territorial limits
of such governmental agency or agencies, and for the
purpose of defraying the cost thereof may borrow money
and issue negotiable revenue bonds.’’

‘We call attention to the provision that the govern-
mental agency may borrow money and issue negotiable
revenue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of
the public project. The use of the word ‘‘may’’ indicates
that this is not obligatory.

KRS 58.130 provides: ‘‘Any governmental agency
may use, for the purpose of acquiring, constructing,
maintaining, extending or improving a public project, or
for the payment of interest or principal on any revenue
bonds issued by the agency pursuant to KRS 58.010 to
58.140, any funds or tax revenues available for general
purposes of the agency and not required by law to be
devoted to some other purpose.’’

It will be seen from the above that the governmental
agency may, for the purpose of acquiring, constructing,
maintaining, extending or improving a public project,
use any funds or tax revenue available for general pur-
poses of the agency, and not required by law to be de-
voted to some other purpose, The Act goes so far as to
provide that in the event revenue bonds have been
issued, such funds or tax revenues available for general
purposes may be used in payment of interest or prin-
cipal on those bonds. However, we need not go into that
phase of the matter since no revenue bonds are being
issued in the instant case. The constitutionality of this
Act was upheld in McKinney v. City of Owensboro, 305
Ky. 254, 203 S. W. 2d 24. It will be noted, however, that
the Owensboro case was addressed to the question of
power to issue bonds and did not involve power to ac-
quire public projects without the issuance of bonds. See
also Dunn, et al., v. City of Murray, 306 Ky. 426, 208
§. W. 2d 309; Hill, et al. v. City of Providence, 307 Ky.
537, 211 S. W. 2d 846; Walker, et al., v. City of Mays-
ville, 310 Ky. 118, 220 8. W. 2d 96; and City of Hazard,
et al, v. Salyers, et al., 311 Ky. 667, 224 8. W. 2d 420.

It is quite apparent that the objective is the acqui-
sition, construction, maintenance, extension, and im-
provement of property for public projects. It cannot be
persuasively argued that the legislative intent was to
oblige these governmental agencies to issue revenue
bonds to pay for these projects. The provision was that
the bonds may be issued for that purpose. On the other
hand, if the cash is available, KRS 58.130 provides for
the use of funds or tax revenues available for general
purposes to pay for these public projects when such
available funds or revenues are not required by law to
be devoted to other purposes.

We think clearly this to be a public project within
the meaning of the statute above. We think also that

600

the governmental agency may pay for same out of avail-
able funds not required by law to be devoted to some
other: purpose, or it might issue tax free revenue bonds
for that purpose.

We conclude, therefore, that the court below was-
laboring under a misapprehension of Chapter 58 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes by holding same inapplicable
here. This conclusion obviates a consideration and dis-
cussion of the questions raised and authorities cited as
to implied: power under Chapter 67 of our Statutes.

‘The judgment is reversed for the entry of indgment
consistent with this opinion.

Swinney v. Haynes et al.
February 9,°1951.
E. D. Stephenson, Judge.

Francis M. Burke for appellant.

Jean L. Auxier for appellees.
Juvex Srewart—Affirming.

Little Grassy Creek in Pike County flows into Grassy
Créek; the latter empties into Russell Fork, a tributary

ee oot

of the Big Sandy River. John Swinney owns a tract of
land at the mouth of Little Grassy Creek. Then, ascend-
ing this small stream, appellant, Landon Swinney, and
his wife, Elsie Swinney, have title to 35 acres, more or
less, bought by them from Causby Swinney (a widow)
on July 26, 1947. Adjoining this last tract and above
it is the land of appellees, Clinard Haynes, Marcus Cole-
man and Clell Haynes, of 65 acres, more or less, pur-
chased by them from Causby Swinney on July 17, 1948.
Tildon Swinney once owned all of the property along
Little Grassy Creek, out of which the tracts of appellant
and his wife and appellees were carved. Other farms,
once within the boundary of the original Tildon Swinney
tract, lie farther up Little Grassy Creek. Appellant’s
wife did not join him in his appeal, and we shall refer
to their land as if it were solely appellant’s for the sake
of brevity.

-. ‘The mountain closes in steeply on each side of Little
Grassy Creek, with little or no bottom land along either
side of it. The evidence is uncontradicted, it seems to
us, that a road or passway, along this creek and often
in-the bed of it, has existed for more than 30 years, be-
ginning at the mouth of the stream and leading to the
head of it. Where this road ends on the mountain slope
a foot path begins and crosses over the mountain to the
right fork of Beaver Creek on the other side. It is also a
well-established fact that, for about the same number of
years there has been a road up the creek, a gate has been
located in a fence across the road on the lower line of
the Landon Swinney land and drawbars have been main-
tained in a fence across the road in the upper line of
appellant’s property, that is, on the boundary line be-
tween the land of appellant and appellees.

The road along Little Grassy Creek, which also tra-
verses the land of appellant, is the only means of ingress
and egress appellees have to and from their property
arid the outside world. At the mouth of the creek it con-
nects with a main highway leading on to Elkhorn City,
Kentucky.

Soon after appellees acquired their property, Lan-
don Swinney, forbade their use of the road along Little
Grassy Creek, except to travel it on foot. There is evi-
dence that Swinney threatened violence if any of appel-
lees attempted to travel it with a vehicle. Appellees filed

602 |

this suit in equity, seeking a temporary restraining
order and a permanent injunction against appellant to
prevent him from obstructing and interfering with their
use of the road as a public passway for vehicles and
other traffic. They also pray for a recovery of $2400
against appellant for damages occasioned by his acts
in wrongfully excluding them from the road.

The circuit court clerk granted a temporary re-
straining order against Landon, enjoining him from
obstructing vehicular and other traffic over the road.
By amended answer, Elsie Landon was made a party
defendant below, as a joint owner with her husband,
Landon Swinney, of the land in controversy, but, for
some reason, she is not a party to this appeal. After
an oral hearing on appellant’s motion to dissolve the
restraining order, the case was submitted for a final
judgment.

The Chancellor adjudged that a passway or road had
existed, which had been used by the people owning land
on Little Grassy Creek, including appellant and appel-
lees, for more than 30 years prior to the institution of
this litigation and to the time appellees had bought
their land; that this road, which has been used by the
public, extended from the mouth of Little Grassy Creek,
where it connected with a main highway, on to the head
of Little Grassy Creek, then across the mountain to the
right fork of Beaver Creek; and that, as between appel-
lant and appellees, both of whom were grantees of a com-
mon grantor, there was an implied grant of a reason-
able road through their land of sufficient width to accom-
modate wagons, cars and trucks. The Chancellor then
decreed that a road be established through the property
of appellant and appellees as nearly as possible over the
course of the old road and that it be wide enough for
wagons, trucks and other vehicles to travel over. Appel-
lees were charged with maintaining at their expense the
drawbars located on the dividing line between them and
appellant, and appellant was directed to keep up at his
cost the gate below him and nearer the mouth of Little
Grassy Creek.

Appellant was enjoined from interfering with appel-
Jees in the use of the road. The judgment had in it a
stipulation of an interlocutory nature, which stated that
appellant and appellees, or their heirs and assigns, could

Pe 608

apply to the Chancellor in the future for a modification
of it, should such be necessary. Later, the Chancellor,
acting under this provision, reaffirmed the passway to be’
@ public road and changed the course of the road, as
appellant had added a new room to his house, which
extended over a portion of it.

On this appeal, appellant contends that, although
there had been a road along Little Grassy Creek for
thirty or more years, it was used by Tildon Swinney, the
original owner of all the land along Little Grassy Creek
over which the road ran, and by those having business
with him, and occasionally by members of the public,
but that its travel by the public fell far short of what
was necessary to show a prescriptive right to the pass-
way. Since its enjoyment by those who traveled it had
been at all times permissive, he could close it at will.

We are of the opinion that appellant’s contention
as to his unrestricted right to control all travel on the
road cannot be upheld by this Court. It is the settled
rule of law of this state that, on the conveyance of one
of several parcels of land belonging to the same owner,
there is an implied grant or reservation, as the case may
be, of all apparent and continuous easements which may
have been created or used by him during the unity of
possession, though, before severance of his entire title,
they could have had no legal existence apart from his
general ownership. Irvine v. McCreary, 108 Ky. 495, 56
8. W. 966, 49 L. R. A. 417; Lebus v. Boston, 107 Ky. 98,
51S. W. 609, 52 8. W. 956, 47 L. R. A. 79; Powers v.
Ward, 200 Ky. 478, 255 8. W. 105, 34 A. L. B. 230.

In Hedges v. Stucker, 237 Ky. 351, 35 8. W. 2d 539,
540, a passway of many years’ use was created by a
eommon grantor over land later conveyed by him to
Hedges, as to one part, and to Stucker, as to the other
part. Neither of their deeds made any mention of a
passway, but when Stucker attempted to obstruct Hedges’
use of the easement, this court, denying his right to
do so, stated that the following law governed such a set
of facts, namely: ‘‘The authorities are agreed, and such
is the rule in this state, that where the owner of an entire
tract of land, or of two or more adjoining parcels, em-
ploys a part thereof so that one derives from the other
a benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent
nature, and sells the one in favor of which such contin-

604 ee

uous and apparent quasi easement exists, such’ easement,
being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the prop-
erty granted, will pass to the grantee by implication.’”

Assuming, however, that appellees have an easement:
over the land of appellant by implied grant, the next.
question is whether the Chancellor erred in adjudging
that the passway is a public road. There is some conflict
in the testimony, as is not unusual in litigation of this
character, but the weight of the evidence gleaned from
disinterested witnesses who testified herein is to the
effect that, for a period of 30 years or more, people have
traveled the road along Little Grassy Creek without
hindrance. Years back, logs and cross ties, and, later,
coal, were transported out of the mountain over it.
Everyone would traverse its whole length at will with-
out asking permission from the land owners. No one
had ever objected to general travel over it until appel-
lant acquired his land in 1947 over which the road ran.
Then he, if we follow his testimony, sought to limit the
travel over it to pedestrians. True enough, few persons’
used it, since one had to go over the mountain from the
head of Little Grassy Creek to reach the right fork of
Beaver Creek. It has been unimproved all along- and it
floods during the rainy season.

We believe the facts in the instant case are very
similar to those in Smith v. Pennington, 122. Ky. 355,.
91S. W. 730, 732, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1282, 8 L. R. A., N.S.,
149. Smith purchased uninclosed land over which a pass-
way ran that Pennington and others had used for 40°
years. Smith fenced the land but put up gates at the
passway on both of his outside lines. Appellees in this
case continued to use the road unmolested for 16 years,
going through the gates at will, neither asking nor re-
ceiving permission to do so. Then appellees undertook
to close the passway by placing a fence at the gates,
being induced to do so because of the frequency with
which the gates were left open. The lower court adjudged.
that appellees had acquired the right to use the road’
by adverse possession, and ordered the road opened and:
the gates removed. On an appeal, this Court decided it
was reversible error to require Smith to remove his
gates, but held that the continuous use of the passway
by Pennington and others for more than 15 years had
ripened into a dedication or grant of a passway over’

a 605

‘his land that Smith could not revoke: This opinion
further held that ‘‘* * * if the use has extended over a
‘long period of years, very slight evidence will be ‘suf-
ficient to show that it was enjoyed under a claim of right,
-and when the proprietor undertakes to close the pass-
way the burden is on him to show that the use was mere-
ly permissive, and to explain away the presumption that
its uninterrupted enjoyment for more than 15 years was
not exercised under a claim of right.’’

From a careful review of all of the testimony in
this case, we have decided not to disturb the finding of
the Chancellor who adjudged the passway in question to
“be a public road.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
| |

Goodwin v. McNeill et al.
February 9, 1951.
Elvin J. Stahr, Judge.

606

L, R. Smith for appellant.
F. B, Martin for appellees,

Jupen Lariwer—Affirming,

Harl Goodwin instituted this action in the Graves
Circuit Court against Herman McNeill and Bettie Me-
Neill charging wrongful entry on his land and cutting
trees therefrom of the value of $1,000.

After general denial, defendants alleged that they
had legal title and were in possession of the strip of land
from which the trees were cut by them; and that they
held same by deed going back to the common owner of
both tracts. They alleged an agreement with the pre-
vious owners of plaintiff’s property and further alleged
adverse possession. They alleged that plaintiff’s claim
of the strip in controversy constituted a cloud upon
their title and asked that same be quieted. Motion was
made to strike from defendants’ answer and counter-
claim everything except the general denial on the ground
that the counterclaim constituted a new cause of action.

The court overruled this motion, and upon defend-
ants’ motion transferred the case to equity. The court
adjudged that the line between the land of plaintiff and
defendants was agreed to more than 30 years ago and
that Herman MeNeill and Bettie McNeill have owned
the property openly, notoriously, continuously, adverse-
ly, and peacefully for more than 30 years up to the line
following the old fence row. It was adjudged, therefore,
that defendants did not cut any timber on the lands of
plaintiff and plaintiff’s petition was dismissed. From
that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant bases his claim entirely upon the deserip-
tion as found in the deed to lots No. 3 and 4 chaining
back to his predecessor in title, Martha L. Snyder by
a deed dated August 23, 1879.

Appellees claim that they and their predecessors
in title had, for more than 30 years, been the owners in

Le 607

open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse pos-
session of their tract of land designated as lot No. 2 in
the division of the lands of J. J. McNeill. They further
claim that the line between lot No. 2, owned by appellees,
and lot No. 3, owned by appellant, was clearly marked
and identified, agreed to and acquiesced in by all of
appellant’s predecessors since the division in 1866.

It is conceded that the lands of appellant and ap-
pellee came from a common source. Appellant, by his
deed had title to lots No. 3 and 4 and described in the
deed by metes and bounds. Appellant obtained deed to
his land in December 1940. Appellees got their land from
inheritance from J. W. McNeill, who obtained his deed
to the property from 8. A. Moore in 1890.

Appellant states a number of reasons why the judg-
ment should be reversed. It is first maintained that ap-
pellees, in seeking to quiet title, must prove legal title
and actual possession of the land in controversy at the
time the counterclaim was filed. In support thereof he
cites Leach v. Taylor, 206 Ky. 28, 266 8. W. 894, We
have no quarrel with this position. The only question is
whether or not appellees made such a showing.

It is then urged that since appellant’s deed, in its
chain, is prior in time to that of appellees, the claim of
appellee must be limited either to a claim of adverse pos-
session or to the establishment of an agreed line. Skaggs
v. Skaggs, 212 Ky. 836, 380 S. W. 150, is cited in support
of that position. There is no quarrel with that position
either. Obviously, the court had this in mind as evi-
denced by the judgment.

It is next insisted that appellees cannot have, as
against the holder of the legal title, actual possession of
the land in controversy at the time the counterclaim
was filed because the land claimed by appellees was not
enclosed by them. Cases are cited in support of that
view. That too is a matter of proof.

It is next insisted that the record shows appellees
did not occupy the land in controversy continuously for
15 years, and cannot, therefore, claim it by adverse pos-
session. That too was subject of proof.

The last point raised is that the record shows no
line or fence agreement. We shall now discuss the proof.

608 |

It appears that appellant undertook to have the land
surveyed on two occasions. Appellees were purposely not
present at either. Undoubtedly, these surveys squared
with the metes and bounds description as found in the
deed to appellant. From that description and survey it
‘is clearly shown that there was an overlapping onto the
land as described in the deed. Appellees had the land
in controversy, that_is the overlapping part which en-
croached upon the described land of appellant, surveyed.
They set up this description in their counterclaim to
quiet title and claimed an old fence row as an established
and agreed line between the properties of appellant and
appellees.

The evidence shows, first, through a Mr. Higdon,
who had known this land for a period of about 45 years
and who had lived adjoining the land for more than 20
years, that a Mr. Ed Peoples, one of the owners of the
land in the chain of the predecessors in title, had agreed
with J. W. McNeill, father of appellee, Herman McNeill,
as to the line and built a fence on the agreed line. He
stated that he heard that agreement.

A number of witnesses testified that the fence was
there; and that it had been built and rebuilt by appel-
Tees and the owners of the adjoining tract now owned
by appellant.

Mr. Goad, who bought appellant’s land in 1931, test-
ified that there was a deteriorated old fence; that it was
there when he bought the land; and that he never did
claim any land beyond that fence. :

Appellant admitted that when he purchased the land
there was evidence of an old fence although he says it
was torn down and could be driven across at any point.

Numerous other witnesses testified. Some -of the
testimony was more or less conflicting. However, the
evidence was abundantly sufficient to justify the Chan-
ceJlor in concluding the line to have been established by
agreement more than 30 years prior to appellant’s pur-
chase of the land, and that the land up to that line had
been held ‘openly, notoriously, and adversely for more
than the prescriptive period. :

The judgment is affirmed.

Le
Parker et al. v. Rash et al.
February 9, 1951.

Sidney B. Neal, Judge.

fon
|
i)

William J. Wigginton, and Bartlett, Hobson & McCarroll for
appellants.

Byron, Sandidge & Holbrook for appellee.
Cray, Commissionzr—A firming.

This suit was brought by appellees to enjoin appel-
lants from constructing an office building on Frederica
Street in the City of Owensboro, on the ground that such
use of the property involved would conflict with the gen-
eral zoning ordinance of the City. The Chancellor’ ad-
judged that a special amendatory ordinance authorizing
the structure, and a building permit issued pursuant
thereto, were invalid and void; and permanently enjoined
appellants from constructing on their property, a ‘‘doc-
tors’ office building:’’ The issues have been exceptionally
well briefed by ‘counsel for both parties. >

In 1947 the Zoning Commission of ‘Owensboro: pre-
pared a comprehensive: zoning pla, which was enacted
Into ordinance by the City. In 1949 appellants purchased
a lot with a tesidence thereon located’ at the southeast
corner of 17th and Frederica Streets. ‘This lot measures
90 feet by’ 160 feet. Under the zoning plan then in effect,
the property was in an ‘‘M-1 multiple family distiict.?”

Property located in an M-1 district may properly be
used, in addition to residential purposes, for: boarding
houses, tourist homes, public schools, churches, libraries,
and charitable institutions. Permitted uses also include a
‘hospital’ or a “professional office,’’? but the latter
must be incidental to residential occupancy.

In 1950 appellant, Dr. W. H. Parker, conceived the
idea of tearing down the residence on his lot and erecting
in its place a doctors’ office building. The contemplated
structure would have two stories and elevator service.
Adequate space and facilities were to be provided for two

be 61L

doctors on each floor. In addition, the plans call for
treatment rooms, a nurses work-room, a ‘‘recovery
reom,’’ space for secretarial assistants, and an X-ray
room. The estimated cost of the building was $100,000,
and the drawings show it to be an attractive, modern
brick building.
Appellant applied to the Planning and Zoning Com-
mission to have his lot reclassified from an M-1 zone to
a ‘Central Commercial District.’? The Commission, after
a hearing, unanimously approved the proposed change.
Thereupon the City, by ordinance, amended the original’
zoning ordinance to incorporate appellant’s lot in ‘‘zone
C2,”? “thereby authorizing ‘‘the erection and construc-
tion of a modern, well equipped doctors’ office’’ on said
premises. A permit to erect such a building was there-
after issued. Appellees attack the amended ordinance
and ‘permit as arbitrary, unreasonable and discrimina-
tory, and the Chancellor so held.

On this appeal appellant makes two principal con-
tentions: (1) the proposed office building is in reality a
‘thospital,’? and therefore its construction would con-
stitute a permissive use of his property within the M-1
zoning classification originally established in the general
zoning ordinance, and (2) the amendatory ordinance
was justified in the interest of public health, morals,
foun and welfare under the provisions of KRS

420,

. Appellant’s first contention ‘cannot be sustained.
‘What he proposes to erect is not a hospital. The term
identifies an institution which, as a general rule, has
facilities for furnishing patients more than temporary
medical or surgical treatment. It is commonly under-
stood to be a place where persons obtain complete care,
including food and shelter. It likewise has a public-char-
acter, which a private professional office does not. A
doctor’s office certainly has something in common with
a hospital, but the two are not the same in the ordinary
meaning of the terms.

The original zoning ordinance itself recognizes this
faet. Permissible uses in M-1 zones are ‘‘hospitals’’ and
‘professional (doctors’) offices.’’ If they were the same,
there would be no necessity for establishing two separate
classifications.

612 —C“(tsSSCis

Appellant himself has shown he clearly recognizes
the distinction. In a letter to the Planning and Zoning
‘Commission, he stated the purpose for which he wished.
the lot re-zoned. He*stated: ‘‘I desire that rezoning for
the sole and only purpose of building an attractive, mod-
ern and up-to-date doctors’ office. The building; if per-
mitted, will be so constructed as to be useful for that
purpose and that purpose only. * * *”

It is plainly evident that Dr. Parker’s proposed
structure will be an office building and not a hospital. *;

Appellant lays great stress on the case of Crain v.
City of Louisville, 298 Ky. 421, 182 S. W. 2d 787, wherein
we held an institution which partook of the character of
both a nursing home and a hospital was a permissible
use of property which was zoned for a ‘‘hospital’’ or a
“nursing home.’’ The fact that a proposed use may be
permissible because it has the character of two proper
uses does not authorize the erection of a structure which
in part conforms to a permissible use, but otherwise is
prohibited. We conclude, therefore, that appellant must
rely upon the amended ordinance which changed the
zoning classification of his property.

There is no question but what the amended ordin-
ance constituted ‘‘spot zoning.’? The ordinance simply
selected one lot, owned by one person, and created for
it a particular zoning classification different from that
of the surrounding property. This type of legislation
has generally been condemned. See note in 149 A. L. R.
292, wherein it is stated, page 293: ‘‘So, generally speak~
ing, it has been held that where an ordinance establishes
a small area within the limits of a zone in which are per-
mitted uses different from or inconsistent with those
permitted within the larger, such ‘‘spot zoning” is in-
valid where the ordinance does not form a part of a
comprehensive plan of zoning or is for mere private
gain as distinguished from the good of the common wel-

‘are,”? °

This subject was carefully considered by this Court
in the recent case of Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208
8. W. 2d 497, 499. There the City of Louisville by ordin-
ance attempted to convert appellant’s lot from a ‘‘two-
family district”’ to an ‘‘apartment district’? so that he
could use his residence to accommodate additional ten-

Ue 618

ants. We held the ordinance arbitrary, discriminatory
and invalid. It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish
that case from-the present one. : : °

, Dr. Parker insists, however, that the amended ordin-
ance was justified in view of the circumstances: the City
Commissioners could properly consider. He points out
that Owensboro has shown a rapid growth from 1930 to
date; that there are crowded conditions in the doctors’
offices in the City; that downtown traffic conditions are
bad; and that Frederica Street already has mixed resi-
dential and commercial zoning. We think these condi-
tions are common to most every city of any size in the
United States. They may call for substantial changes to
be made from time to time in particular areas of a zoning
plan. Their existence, however, could not justify special
regulations which have no uniformity of application,
and which single out particular pieces of property.

It is significant that the general planning and zoning
ordinance was enacted in 1947 after a comprehensive
survey of the conditions in Owensboro, and only after
plans were made for the future growth and development
of the City. The original plan would be worthless if
each individual could have it changed to suit his own in-
elinations. The imposition of restrictions upon the use
of property by legislative bodies has been recognized as
a valid exercise of the police power. It can only be justi-
fied as serving some real public interest. No such power
exists to promote particular enterprises of private per-
sons, ,

“Tt ig contended, Holwever, that the proposed use of-
appellant’s property will substantially contribute to the:
general welfare. In a sense every lawfully conducted.
enterprise, so;.contributes. A, drugstore, a grocery, a.
freight yard, a steel mill or a.shoe factory, each and:
every one tends to promote the.general welfare because
they furnish goods and services upon which the public
depends in the maintenance of its high standard of liv-
ing. Yet, just as Section 59 of our Constitution prohibits.
the General Assembly from'passing special or local acts,
accepted constitutional principles. forbid lesser legisla-
tive bodies from passing special laws to promote-private
interests, even though: ‘‘the general welfare’’ is’ some-:
how: affected. sam. Hasta. Aimahet an Share

614

The quoted phrase has become in recent years a
sort of sacred cloak covering a multitude of laws, regu-
lations, institutions and activities which cannot be justi-
fied on more specific grounds. Before too long it may be
that everything will be permitted and permissible in the
name of ‘‘the general welfare.’’ As of this writing, such
time has not quite arrived. Therefore we cannot say Dr.
Parker’s proposed contribution to society is sufficiently
in the public interest to authorize the discriminatory
classification of his property.

It is not necessary, as appellant contends, that ap-
pellees show pecuniary damage to authorize the relief
sought in this action. As pointed out in the Axton case,
referred to above, (Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 8S. W.
2d 497), appellants are entitled to the benefits which
accrue to them from the observance of the general zon-
ing regulations by their neighbors; and even though they
suffer no specific financial loss, their special damage
affords a sound basis for injunctive relief.

We think the Chancellor correctly adjudicated the
rights of the parties.

The judgment is affirmed.

Blue Diamond Coal Co. et al. v. Johnson.
February 9, 1951.
8. M. Ward, Judge.

| 615

Craft & Stanfill for appellants.
©. ©. Wells for appellee,

Juven Srewanr—Reversing.

Appellee, Walter Johnson, was injured on August
10, 1948, while in the employ of appellant, Blue Diamond
Coal Company, in an accident that arose out of and in
the course of his employment. Both the employer and
employee had accepted the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. KRS 342.001 et seq. The uncontra-
dicted evidence and the stipulations show that appellee
gave due and timely notice of this accident, and that his
average weekly wages were sufficient to entitle him to
maximum compensation, if any.

Johnson alleges that, on the above date, while in-
serting a 300 watt light bulb in one of the sockets in the
electric lighting system of the Coal Company’s mine, it
exploded near his face, and, as a result thereof, he
claimed his face and both eyes were very severely burn-
ed. He was promptly sent to the mine doctor who treated
him by applying salve to his eyes. He was unable to sleep
that night, due to the burns received by his eyes and
because of continuous headaches. He went to his job
next morning, however, and he continued to work on
thereafter in the mine. At that time, he noticed no im-
pairment in the sight of either eye. After a lapse of two
or three months, he states he first became aware of a
loss of vision in the left eye, and this condition grew
worse until it finally resulted in industrial blindness. In
addition, he says he has had unremitting headaches since
the occasion of his injury. He claims that prior to the
accident his eyes had been in good condition.

Johnson filed his application for an adjustment of
his claim before the Workmen’s Compensation Board on

616 P|

August 10, 1949, alleging industrial blindness in his left ©
eye; caused by the above described injury, which has: re-
sulted in 50% permanent partial disability to his body,
accompanied since his accident by serious and continuous
headaches. After all the proof was taken, the case was:
submitted for an award to a referee of the- Compensation
Board, who, based upon his findings of fact from: the
evidence, dismissed appellee’s claim. Subsequently, tipon
appellee’s motion, the case ‘was considered by the’ ‘full
oard and the conclusion of the refer as approved.
Thereafter, appellee filed his petition for a review of the
opinion of the full board in the Perry Circuit. Court:.On
September 30, 1950, a judgment was rendered by the
latter court remanding this cause to the Compensation
Board. directing that it make an award to appellee for
he,loss of vision of his left eye.

This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment of' the’
ower court. The sole question before this Court is-
whether the findings of fact of the Compensation Board,’
resulting in the denial of appellee’s claim, are supported’
by competent evidence of probative value. If the answer
is in the affirmative, the disposition of appellee’s case:
efore the Compensation Board is conclusive and the:
cireuit court erred in reversing it. The Board based its
findings of fact, almost entirely, upon the evidence of
the two.medical experts who testified before it. We shall,
now consider the testimony of these two doctors.

’ Dr. William W. Offutt, an eye specialist of Lexing-
ton, Kentucky, a witness for appellee, testified that he.
examined both of appellee’s eyes on September 22, 1949.
He found the right eye normal; the left eye, he says,
could detect only hand movements in front of it. This
doctor then added: ‘‘To explain this loss of vision, I
found a large and well defined atrophic scar on the left
macula around which there was some pigment prolifer-
ation. This lesion was approximately the size of a half
dollar.’? He expressed the opinion that appellee’s indus-
trial blindness could have been caused by trauma. How-
ever, on cross examination of this witness, he answered
this question as follows: :

“Q. Doctor, assuming it is true as testified by. the
plaintiff that he suffered this injury in August 1948, and
he didn’t suffer any loss of vision for from two to three
months, could the condition you found have been caused.

ee 617

from the injury he alleges he suffered in August, 1948?
A. I should think not, If he didn’t notice any reduction
in vision for two months I hardly see how the injury
could have caused it.’’

He further stated that the condition of appellee’s
eye could have been caused by a disease such as chori-
oiditis, an inflamation of the chorioid or middle layer
of the eyeball.

Testifying for the Coal Company was Dr. C. L.
Combs, an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist of Haz-
ard, Kentucky, who gave his deposition on August 2,
1949. His evidence as to the reason of appellee’s im-
paired vision agrees substantially with Dr. Offutt’s. To
this question he gave the following answer:

“Q. Was this condition caused by his alleged trau-
ma of 1948 in your opinion? A. Well, I wouldn’t—my
opinion is that it would not be. However, I do not state
it is impossible for it to have been. The reason for my
stating in my opinion it was not is that there is no evi-
dence of external injury like scars that you would find
from a burn. I found no evidence of injury externally,
so from that reason I would have to be of. the opinion
it was caused by some other condition.”

We have steadfastly adhered to the rule of law
that if the findings of fact of the Compensation Board
are supported by substantial and competent evidence,.
then such findings and the award based thereon are
conclusive and they will not be disturbed by this Court
on an appeal. Jefferson County Stone Co. v. Bettler, 304
Ky. 87, 199 8. W. 2d 986; Waegner & Co. v. Moock, 303
Ky. 222, 197 8. W. 2d 254; Coburn v. Hastern Coal Cor-
poration, 290 Ky. 679, 162 8. W. 2d 537; Black Mountain
Corporation v. Seward, 275 Ky. 177, 121 8. W. 2d 4;
Three Rivers Oil Corporation v. Harper, 258 Ky. 253,
79 8. W. 2d 972,

From our recital of the pertinent evidence in this
case, it will be seen that there is competent evidence of
a probative and very persuasive character to uphold the
findings of fact of the Compensation Board that appel-
lee’s disability did not result from his traumatic injury.
Under the circumstances of this case, the. lower court
was not authorized to, disturb the award of.the Compen-
sation Board when the latter dismissed appellee’s claim.

618

This Court said in Tackett v. Hastern Coal Corporation,
295 Ky. 422, 174 S. W. 2d 707, in quoting from Inland
Steel Co. v. Newsome, 281 Ky. 681, 136 8S. W. 2d 1077,
that the sole function of courts, so far as questions of
fact are concerned in a compensation case, is to deter-
mine whether or not the record contains any compe-
tent evidence of probative value upon which the findings
of fact of the Compensation Board may be supported,
and neither the circuit court, nor this one, is authorized
to determine the weight to be given the evidence.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed and the lower
court is directed to enter a judgment approving the
award of the Compensation Board.

Le
Harp v. Harp.

February 9, 1951.

Chester D, Adams, Judge.

Leer Buckley for appellant.
Blwood Rosenbaum for appellee. .

Joven Stms—Affirming in part, reversing in part.

On this appeal we must determine which of the di-
voreed parents is to have the custody of their daughter,
Patricia Jane Harp, born in May 1941. The proof was
heard by Hon. R. J. Colbert, Master Commissioner of
the Fayette Circuit Court, who in a concise and well-
considered report, recommended to the chancellor that
it was for the best interest of the child to put her in
the custody of her mother, who resides in League City,
Texas, upon the latter executing bond to comply with
the further orders of the court. He recommended the
child be allowed to visit her father during the month of
June each year at his home in Lexington, and that he
pay the mother $10 per week for the maintenance of.
Patricia, except while the child is visiting him. The
chancellor overruled the father’s exceptions to the com-
missioner’s report, entered judgment in conformity
therewith, and the father appeals.

For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion,
we will refer to appellant as Harl and appellee as Min-
nie. These parties were married in November 1940, when.
each was 19 years of age. Their married life was any-
thing but smooth and they separated a time or two be-
fore Minnie finally left Harl in 1944 and went to New
Jersey. She testified she did not take the child with her
because she was not able to support Patricia. The little
girl was left with the father and paternal grandmother

620

stoi’ However, Minnie appears to have’ been
, to vards the child; never communicated with

“ghe do anything for Patricia until she in-
stituted this proceeding to obtain custody of Patricia.

Earl obtained the divorce on July 5, 1947, on the
ground of’ ‘abandonment, and Patricia’s custody was
awarded to him and his "mother, Mrs. Robert L. Brat-
ton. ‘The’ ‘divorce judgment was entered on constructive
i thé warning order attorney’s letter to Minnie
“her and was returned. While working in
Connecticut, Minnie met and married her
band, E. M. Hardin. On March 11, 1948, she
filed a motion asking the chancellor to modify the judg-
ment in the divorce suit and to give her custody of
Patricia.

On the hearing before the master commissioner on
this motion; some 200 pages of proof were taken and
the record isso replete with indiscretions of both par-
ents as. to cause the commissioner to remark in his
report, ‘The parties were at equal fault and both were
sharing” their affections with persons other than his or.
her, legal spouse.’? The commissioner further said. that
if he had the duty of choosing Patricia’s parents, he
would have selected neither of these parties. It would
serve no.good purpose for us to narrate the misconduct.
of Earl and Minnie, hence we will not do it.

The child cannot be left in the custody of her grand-
mother, Mrs. Bratton, because she works and is away
from home each day and Patricia is left in the care of
her great-great-grandmother, who is too old to look after
the child. Also, Mrs. Bratton lives under crowded condi-
tions in a house of 7 or 8 rooms occupied by 11 or 12
persons, all of whom must use one bathroom. While Mrs.
Bratton did the best she could for the child, she is not
‘so. situated as to give Patricia the care and attention a
10 year old-girl requires and deserves.

Har! testified he has a traveling position which takes
him away from home two or three days a week, his wife
is employed, they occupy an efficiency apartment, and it
is not practicable for him to have Patricia in his home.
His present wife did not testify and we must ‘presume
she does not want the responsibility of caiting for
Patricia.’

: The child was not in school when the father testified
‘in. March for the reason, as he gave, 'that'she had measles
the previous August. Also, Mrs. Bratton,¢ the: grand-
mother of the child, admitted Patricia needed some
dental work but did not receive ‘it: becausé’ she
‘want to'go to a dentist and cried at the suggestio
testimony convinces us, as it must have the coimmis-
sioner atid the chancellor, that Patricia is not. receiving
proper control, care and attention at th of her
‘father and grandmother. Le, a
' Minnie’s conduct before her second marriage shows
she was not the proper person to have the custody of
het daughter. She.and Hardin were married: before she
was divorced: Although Minnie said :sli¢ thought’ she
was divorced at the time of her second ‘marriage, she
and Hardin’ both deliberately gave false: téstimony as
to the date of their marriage in an attempt'to hide the
fact they were not then legally marvied. But during the
hearing’ they were remarried dnd’ both itarily re-
tracted their false testimony. =| co

-It appears from the record that Minnie has been
living .a life of rectitude in the small town.-of League
City, Texas, since her second marriage and her physical
condition is such that she can never have another baby.
She is now a.regular attendant at church. She and Har-
din are respectable citizens and occupy a modern four
room'apartment in a nice part of town. Hardin has
regular and permanent employment with the Monsanto
Chemical Company, earning a monthly salary of $333 as
an operating engineer. He expressed a desire to take
Patricia in his home and even a willingness to adopt her.

In this character of case the chief concern of courts
is the welfare of the child. Ordinarily, the custody of a
child of tender years, especially a girl, is awarded to
the mother, unless it is shown she is a person’of unfit
character or is unable to provide a suitable liome. Bow-
man v. Bowman, 310 Ky. 509, 221 8. W. 2d 71: In several
recent opinions we have said that although a mother
has been indiscreet in her youth but was reformed after
a second marriage and is leading an upright life and
it appears it is for the best interest of the child that
she have custody, we will not let her past brand her as
an unfit person to rear her child, Ruttencutter v. Rutten-
cutter, 293 Ky. 556, 169 S. W. 2d 604; Clark v- Clark,

622 |

298 Ky. 18, 181 S. W. 2d 397; Price v. Price, 306 Ky.
aie pos 8. W. 2d 924; Hager v. Hager, 309 Ky. 803, 219
. W. 2d 10.

There is no doubt in our minds that the chancellor
did not err in placing Patricia in the custody of her
mother, with the privilege to the father of having his
daughter visit him in his home in Lexington during the
month of June each year. Also, we think the chancellor
was correct in requiring the mother to execute bond in
the penal sum of $1000, with good surety, to guarantee
her compliance with the further orders of the court.

Regardless of which parent may be at fault in a
divorce proceeding, or which is given the custody of a
-child, the father is liable for the child’s support. Creasy
v. Creasy’s Next Friend, 241 Ky. 403, 44 8. W. 2d 271.
However, since the father must defray the expense of
Patricia traveling from Texas to Lexington and return
each year, and since the mother and her husband ex-
press a willingness to support the child, we reduce to
$25 a month the $10 a week the chancellor ordered the
father to pay for the support of Patricia while she is
with her mother. In all other respects the judgment is
affirmed. In the event conditions change, of course, the
chancellor has jurisdiction to enter any future orders
relative to the custody of Patricia or her support.

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
part.

Smallwood: v. Commonwealth.

February 13, 1951.
George K. Holbert, Judge.

ee 623

J. Howard Holbert for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and John B. Browning, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Juvex Herm—Reversing.

An indictment was returned against appellant, Hrn-
est Smallwood, charging him with ‘‘unlawfully, wilfully
and unreasonably neglecting to provide for the support
of his minor children’’ under the age of 14 years. He
was found guilty and his punishment fixed at imprison-
ment in the county jail for four months.

At the trial appellant did not have counsel. The
case was argued for the Commonwealth, but not for
appellant. At the time judgment was entered appellant’s
present counsel, as a friend of the court, requested
that the sentence be probated. Appellant appeals urging
(1) that he was deprived of material evidence on the
trial of his case because the chief prosecuting witness
had his receipts in her possession and failed and re-
fused to produce them; (2) since the trial appellant has
obtained possession of the receipts and can now produce
them; and (3) the verdict is against both the law and
the evidence and was the result of passion and prejudice.

KRS 405.030 provides: ‘‘No parent shall willfully
or unreasonably neglect to provide for the support of
his minor child who is actually or apparently under
the age of fourteen years.’? KRS 405.990(1) provides:
“‘Any person who violates KRS 405.030 shall be fined not
more than twenty dollars or imprisoned for not more
than six months.’’

‘We do not have a transcript of the testimony, but
a summary of it as set out in the bill of exceptions. It
appears that appellant’s divorced wife testified appel-
lant had failed to pay her for a period of six months the
allowance of $15 per month he had been ordered to pay
for the support of Louis and Marjorie Smallwood, in-
fant children of the parties, 10 and 7 years of age. Ap-
pellant, according to the summary, testified that he had
been involved in an accident and unable to work, and

624 re

that he was behind in his payments for a period of quly
two months. .He also testified that at the. time.-of, hi
injury. his former wife, Lizzie Smallwood, took his cloth-
ing and his billfold and had the receipts. showing:-his
payments; that she had promised him not:to appear
against him on account of his physical condition and
inability to earn money. He further testified that, Lizzie
Smallwood operated a grocery store and was able to
provide for the children until he recovered from’ his
injury.

The indictment was returned Tune 28, 1949. We
find original. receipts, filed with the motion and grounds
for a new trial, in the record as follows: One dated
March 3, 1949 for $90; one dated June 15, 1949 for $15;
another dated July 17, 1949 for $30. The trial appears
to have been had on October 27, 1949. On November 26,
1949, appellant filed motion and grounds. On March 11,
1950, the court overruled appellant's motion and
grounds. :

The Cornmonwealth’s attorney no doubt argued to
the jury that’ appellant was in arrears in his payments
for a period of six months, and urged that he he properly
punished, Now it appears that the prosecuting witness
was probably mistaken as to the payments. In view,.of.
this, and taking into. consideration the testimony of:
appellant as summarized, we believe the court should
have granted appellant a new trial. :

The judgment is reversed: for Proceedings not | in-
consistent with this opinion.

Wilson v. Independence Life & Accident Ins. Co,
February 13, 1951.

Chester D. Adams, Judge.

Geo. D. Dorroh for appellant.
Stoll, Keenon & Park for appellee.

Juves Herm—Affirming. .

Appellant, William Howard Wilson, sought to re-
cover $1087.50 under an accident insurance policy from
appellee, Independence Life and Accident Insurance
Company. From a judgment entered on a directed ver-
dict, appellant appeals.

The Jolly Trolly Restaurant, ‘housed in an old
street car,’”’ is located on a parking lot south of the rail-
road tracks on Water Street and west of Limestone
Street in Lexington. There is a curb on the north side of
the parking lot, 2.6 feet from the restaurant, or Iunch
room, and 3.7 feet from the southernmost rail of the
tracks. A refrigerator compressor used by the lunch
room is in the space between the lunch room and the
curb. A utility pole is also located between the lunch
room and the curb, near the front end of the lunch room
and about 6 feet from the compressor.

Appellant, a mechanic, was called to repair the
compressor. He finished repairing it about 9:15 p. m.,
October 11, 1948; left his tools beside the compressor
and went into the lunch room by the door facing Lime-
stone Street to see if the apparatus was working. About
9:30 p, m., after receiving his pay, he came out the
front door and noticed a railroad engine passing. He
says: “‘I came out the door, and as I came out there was
an_ engine’ just passing by the corner of the building.
* * * T saw this steam and there was so much noise,
I couldn’t tell if there was another train back of that
engine or not. I stood there a minute, and when I thought
it had gone on by, * * * I stepped down from the curb

626 |

there, just like every one else does, and reached back
for my tools, and that is when I was struck.’’

He was struck by a second engine coupled to the
first ongine. He was knocked down and his left foot was
cut 0:

Photographs clearly showing the location of the
- restaurant, utility pole, compressor, curbing, railroad
right-of- -way and surroundings, and a plat of the prem-
ises are in the record. A photostatic copy of appellant’s
policy is also filed with the record. Part 3, providing
payment for certain i injuries, including loss of foot and
loss of time, is as follows: ‘‘(A) By being struck or
knocked down or run over while walking or standing in
or on a public highway, by any automobile, motorcycle
or bicycle or any vehicle propelled by steam, cable, elec-
tricity, naptha, gasoline, horse, compressed air or liquid
power, (Excluding injuries sustained while working in
a Public Highway, or while on a Railroad Right of
Way). * **”

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the trial court
directed a verdict for appellee. Appellant appeals,
urging that (1) the court erred in giving a peremptory
instruction for the defendant; (2) the decision is not
sustained by sufficient evidence; and (3) the verdict is
contrary to the law.

Appellant maintains that the exclusion set out in
the policy is ambiguous. The policy clearly provides that
injuries sustained ‘‘while working in a public highway”’
are excluded, and that injuries sustained ‘‘while on a
railroad right-of-way’’ are excluded. Here it is clear
from the evidence, and from the photographs and plat
filed with the evidence, and especially from the testi-
mony of appellant, who states that he stepped down
upon the railroad right-of-way ‘‘maybe a foot or foot and
a half from the curbing’’ and was struck by a train,
sustained injuries ‘‘while on a railroad right-of-way.”
In support of his position, appellant cites Farmers’
Mutual Equity Insurance Society v. Smith, 158 Ky. 459,
165 S. W. 675, L. R. A. 1915B, 844; General Accident,
Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Louisville Home Tele-
phone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S. W. 1031, L. R. A. 1917D,
952; and Insurance Company of North America v.
Cheathem, 221 Ky. 668, 299 8. 'W. 545,

a 627

It is true that if the language of an insurance policy
is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one construc-
‘tion, it should be construed most strongly against the
insurer who prepared it. But it is not contended that
. any part of the policy here is ambiguous except the exclu-
sion clause. Examining it we find that the first part of
the clause is set off from the second part by a comma,
and that a second ‘‘while’’ follows the word ‘‘or.’? That
being true, we have injuries sustained ‘‘while working
in a public highway” excluded, and injuries sustained
‘while on a railroad right-of-way’’ excluded. We do not
find any ambiguity in the exclusion.

‘We are constrained to hold that the trial judge prop-
erly directed a verdict for the defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

a
Andrews v. Varvel.

February 18, 1951.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

Arthur T. Iler and Meredith, Iler & Logan for appellant.
Russell O’Neill for appellee.
Van Sant, Commissionsr—Reversing.
The suit is based on a breach of warranty in respect
to the age, breeding, rated speed, and soundness of a
pacing race horse purchased by appellant, plaintiff be-
low, from appellee, defendant below.

Appellant’s brief, standing alone, shows the evi-
dence supports his contentions, viz., the horse was rep-

628 ee

--resented tobe 7 years of age, a grandson of Dan Patch,
chad a speed rating of 1 mile in 2:15, and was sound for
-racing; whereas, he was 10 years of age, not related
. to Dan Patch, had a rating of 1 mile in 2:30 which ren-
dered him ineligible for racing, and had the appearance,
‘ according to experts, of being unsound.

Appellee has not filed a brief in this Court, al-

. though appellant’s brief was filed December 22, 1949,

the appeal was submitted January 2, 1950, and appellee

was notified of his delinquency by the Clerk of this
Court on February 238, 1950.

Where the questions were of importance to the bar
‘or the public in general or the brief for appellant was
weak, we often have studied the record and assumed the
responsibility of meeting the contentions of the appel-
lant. We never have assumed this extraordinary burden
merely to protect one who has manifested his own in-
difference to the outcome of the litigation.

The questions involved on this appeal are of no
importance to anyone except the parties litigant, the
brief for appellant has been prepared with diligence
-and skill, and we have neither the time nor inclination to
dispute the apparent soundness of the argument pre-
“sented by appellant’s attorneys. Wherefore, the judg-
‘ ment is reversed with directions that it be set aside and
‘that another be entered granting the relief prayed in
appellant’s petition.

. Skaggs v. Ohio Valley Rock Asphalt Co., 292 Ky.
758, 166 S. W. 2d 1005, and cases therein cited.

Judgment reversed.
Le .
Ajax Coal Co. et al. v. Stanfill.

February 13, 1951.
S. M. Ward, Judge.

Craft & Stanfill for appellant.
Don A. Ward for appellee,

Juvez Muiixen—Reversing.
<

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Perry
Cireuit Court remanding the case to the Workmen’s
Compensation Board with directions to enter an award
allowing the plaintiff compensation for total and per-
manent disability.

The plaintiff, Elmer Stanfill, received a severe in-
jury to his right foot on May 31, 1948, and was hospital-
ized for forty-six days. He was paid the maximum amount
a week for temporary total disability from the time of
the accident to June 6, 1949. His employer also expend-
ed the maximum allowance for medical fees. A referee of
the Board found Mr. Stanfill had suffered permanent
and total disability, but upon a Full Board Review the
Board agreed with the referee in all respects except as
to. the extent of the disability; the Board found that
the plaintiff had suffered a permanent partial disability-
of 37% to the body as a whole, and applied KRS 342.-
105(18) covering the loss of a foot as its means of
gauging the extent of the injury. The foot had not been
amputated. : :

Mr. Stanfill testified that he was fifty-three years of
age at the time of the accident and,-at the time of his
testimony nearly fifteen months after the accident, he
stated that he had been unable to work on account of -
the pain in his foot; that he had attempted to do a little
gardening, to shovel dirt and to milk a cow, and those
were about the only things he had done since he -was

630 |

injured. He had the equivalent of a Fourth Grade educa-
tion, and had been employed by the defendant company
for twenty-seven years in various capacities, and at the’
time of his injury was tipple foreman. Most of the facts
were stipulated, and the only other evidence offered was
that of a physician who testified in behalf of the plain-
tiff and an orthopedic specialist of Louisville who exam-
imed the plaintiff and testified on behalf of the em-
ployer. The plaintiff’s physician testified that, in his
opinion, the plaintiff was totally disabled unless -his
right foot was amputated. On the other hand, the physi-
cian who testified in behalf of the’ employer and who
examined the plaintiff eight months after the accident
agreed substantially with the medical findings of the
plaintiff’s physician, yet concluded that the plaintiff had
suffered only a 25% permanent partial disability to the
foot. He believed that 75% of the usefulness of the foot
would be recovered if the plaintiff would attempt to
u Lo.

. im reaching its conclusion, the Full Board appar-"
ently decided to treat the plaintiff’s injury as if it were
equivalent to the complete loss of a foot. The opinion on
Full Board Review states: ‘‘Had this been done (the
foot amputated) plaintiff would have recovered only
for the loss of a foot as was held in the case of Marshall
v. Octavia J. Coal Mining Co., 252 Ky. 460, 67. S. W.
2d 697.’? The plaintiff was awarded compensation on the
basis of 87% permanent partial disability to the body
as a whole under KRS 342.110, which was nearly equiv-
alent to the loss of a foot under KRS 342.105(18). This
was a compromise between the conflicting conclusions
of the medical witnesses. The evaluation of disability is
perhaps the most difficult part of the Board’s work, and
if the plaintiff's condition has deteriorated since the
finding of the Board he may request it to reopen the
ease.

From the evidence offered different conclusions as
to the extent and duration of the disability could be
reached, but so long as the-Board has based its findings
on competent evidence it is not within the provirice of the
courts to review the findings of the Board or ‘to direct
the Board to make any specific finding of fact. Marion
v. Frank R. Messers & Sons, 306 Ky. 748, 209 8. W.
2d 321.. a 2 oO

[| 631

Wherefore the judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the opinion of the Full Board Review is
sustained.

Henkenberns et al. v. Hauck et al.
February 2, 1961.
Rehearing denied March 13, 1951.
Joseph P. Goodenough, Judge.

632

James B, Meadows for appellants.
Helm Woodward and Lawrence V. Drahman for appellees.

Cuay, Commisstonrr—Reversing.

This suit involves the title to a strip of land 110
feet in length and 25 feet in width, which was at one
time a part of Helen Street in the City of Ludlow. The
lower Court sustained general demurrers to appellants’
petition as amended, which sought relief against appel-
Jees Hauck who had entered upon the property as own-
ers, and prayed that a certain deed from appellee Hay to
appellee Ludlow be set aside.

The petition as amended states in substance as
follows: Since September 18, 1946, appellants have been,
by virtue of a contract of sale executed by Hay, the sole
owners and in possession of lot 404 of Ludlow’s Second
Partition. This lot abuts Helen Street. On October 16,
1946, the abutting portion of Helen Street was ordered
closed in a civil action brought for that purpose. On
November 26, 1946, Hay executed a general warranty
deed to appellants conveying the lot, complying with
the contract of September 18; and this deed was record-
ed soon thereafter. In 1948, Hay executed a quitclaim
deed to Ludlow in which he undertook to convey to Lud-
low the vacated portion of Helen Street abutting lot
404. Subsequently Ludlow conveyed this strip to Hauck.

Appellants’ legal theory is that since they owned
lot 404 when Helen Street was closed, title to the portion
of the street (to the center line) which paralleled this
lot was vested in them as the abutting owners. Appellees
do not dispute the principle that the fee in a street or-
dinarily goes with title to the abutting property, but
they contend: that at the time Helen Street was closed
Hay was actually the abutting owner, and when he later
conveyed lot 404 to appellants he did not intend to con-
vey anything more than the lot itself.

In their briefs both parties discuss facts developed
in subsequent pleadings filed in the case, and appar-
ently argued the merits of the controversy before the

| 633

Court below. The question on this appeal, however, is
whether or not the petition as amended states a cause
of action. It clearly does so.

The fundamental question concerns the ownership
of lot 404 when Helen Street was closed on October 16,
1946. Appellants alleged they were the owners at that
time, and filed as an exhibit the contract of September
18, 1946 executed by Hay (admittedly the prior owner)
which recited that Hay ‘‘has sold’? and the principal
appellant ‘‘has purchased’’ this lot. Appellants there-
upon became vested with the equitable title to the prop-
erty. In law they became the real owners, and Hay held
nothing but the bare legal title in trust for them, as
security for the payment of the purchase price. See Ben-
jamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. 106, 10 S. W. 2d 620.

The lot which Hay agreed to convey, and which he
subsequently deeded to appellants, abutted on Helen
Street. As stated in Williams v. Johnson, 149 Ky. 409,
at page 412, 149 S. W. 821: ‘‘It seems to be the uni-
versally recognized rule that the conveyance of land
bordering on a public highway conveys title to the cen-
ter of the highway, subject to its use by the public,-
whether it is so expressed in the deed or not; and where
a conveyance, or a bond to convey, designates the public
highway as.one of the boundaries of the tract, it will,
in the absence of language showing a contrary intention,
be construed as including the highway itself to the center
or middle thereof.’’

See also Blalock v. Atwood, 154 Ky. 394, 157 8. W.
694, 46 L. R. A., N.S., 3, and Hensley v. Lewis, 278 Ky.
510, 128 8. W. 2d 917, 123 A. L. R. 537. Since neither the
contract nor deed executed by Hay segregated the street
from the lot or reserved any interest in it, the fee in the
abutting highway, subject to the public easement, passed
to appellants.

This conclusion is confirmed by taking cognizance
of the manner in which Hay himself acquired his inter-
est in the street. It passed to him only by virtue of the
conveyance of lot 404 by his predecessor in title. When
Hay subsequently executed the deed to appellants, which
particularly described the property and referred to his
source of title, he acknowledged his intention to trans-
fer to appellants the same property deeded to him by

634 ee

Ludlow. This included the portion of the street subse-
quently closed. When the public easement therein was
extinguished, appellants were vested with a clear title to
the property. See Henderson Hlevator Company v.-City
of Henderson, 187 Ky. 453, 219 8S. W. 809, 18 A. L. R.
983. In the A. L. R. note appended to the above case, at
page 1013, the following general rule is stated: ‘‘An
unrestricted conveyance by lot or block number, or ac-
cording to a plat, has been held to pass the fee to the
center of a street on which the conveyed lands abut, so
that upon vacation of the street the land therein reverts
to the owner of such abutting lands rather than to the
original owner.’’

It is evident that appellee Hay at no time had title
to the land in Helen Street apart from his ownership of
the abutting lot 404; and, therefore, when he contracted
to sell, and did convey that lot, the abutting portion of
the street followed the title thereto as the tail goes with

he hide.

-The conclusion we have ‘reached with respect to the
record properly before us makes it unnecessary to pass
on appellants’ motion to strike the transcript of record
filed by appellees. :

From what has been said above, it seems to us the
Chancellor erroneously sustained the demurrers to ap-
pellants’ petition as amended.

The judgment is reversed for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

P|
Welch v. L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Co.

December 5, 1950.
Rehearing denied March 9, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

635

Stoll, Keenon & Park for appellant.

Wm. B. Gess for appellee.
Jupezs Hetm—Reversing.

On January 15, 1947, appellant, John D, Welch,
delivered his 1938 Chevrolet automobile to appellee,
L. R. Cooke Chevrolet Company, for repairs. On Janu-
ary 21, 1947, appellee’s garage and 33 automobiles, in-
cluding appellant’s automobile, were completely destroy-
ed by fire. Appellant instituted this action against ap-
pellee seeking a recovery of $850 for ‘‘the loss and
damage to his automobile * * * caused by the negligence
of the defendant, its agents, servants and employees
while engaged in the defendant’s business. From a judg-
ment for appellee, appellant appeals.

At a trial appellant testified that at the time he
delivered his car to appellee for repairs, it was in good
condition, except for a missing headlight, and’some dents
in the front fender and body; that it had been driven
some 90,000 miles, and that it was worth $850 at the
time it was destroyed. Appellant then rested. Appellee

636 es

introduced L. R. Cooke, president of the L. B.: Cooke~
Chevrolet Company, and several of its employees. They

testified as to the various precautions taken to prevent

fires. They had ‘‘No Smoking’ signs; furnished me-
chanics with rags to wipe up oil; cleaned the stalls each
evening; painted the stalls; had fire extinguishers;

cleaned the garage each evening with cleaning powder;

on Saturday cleaned the garage with noninflammable

cleaning solvent; had an exhaust system, tubing fasten- *
ed to the exhaust pipe of each automobile that was being
Fepaired, with over-head exhaust system to take off the
‘umes.

Several witnesses testified that the fire started in
the wash rack, or wash room, in the rear of appellant’s
garage. This room was open in front, with sheet metal
sides and walls in which cars were washed. The room
had two water heaters for heating water to wash cars.
They were heated by gas. Calvin Waits, an employee of
appellee, was working on a truck in the wash rack im-
mediately prior to the fire. He was trying to thaw ice
out of the gasoline line of the truck. William Kingsley,
a safety engineer, testified that they ‘‘okayed’’ the gas.
flames for the water heaters in the wash rack on the
idea that the room would be used only for washing ve-
hicles. It was not contemplated that the room would be
‘used for thawing ice out of gasoline lines by the applica-
tion of heat. The fire started in the wash rack on the
truck on which Waits was working. The witnesses heard
a ‘dull explosion, something like you would drop an oi
drum,’’ in the rear of the garage. They looked in that
direction; the truck in the wash rack was on fire ‘‘all
over’’; the fire spread up the walls to the ceiling and
roof, and then to the rest of the building. It was shown
that gasoline at times gives off vapor that is combustible..
None of the witnesses produced by appellee saw the fire
start, or could offer any explanation of its. origin. After
the fire was discovered, they removed all of the cars they
could from the garage, but 33, including appellant’s car,
were destroyed by the fire.

Calvin Waits, who was working on the truck in the
wash rack, was not called by appellee as a witness. It:
is shown that he worked for appellee for about three:
months after the fire, and then moved to the State of
Washington. He had a cousin, Horace Waits, who was:

re 637

working for appellee at the time of the trial. He testi-
‘fied that he had heard from Calvin about three months
previous to the trial, and that he had his address at
his home. Appellee points out that Calvin Waits could
‘not have been subpoenaed, and that his appearance
would have entailed a considerable expense. Appellee
says, ‘To be sure, Calvin C. Waits could have testified
as to his actions immediately before, during and after
the fire, but such testimony would have been merely cu-
maulative.’’

Appellant maintains that when he, as bailor, de-
Tivered to appellee, as bailee, his automobile in good
condition and it was destroyed while in appellee’s pos-
session, a prima facie case for appellant was estab-
lished and the burden of proving that the damage was
not due to its negligence shifted to appellee; that appel-
lee failed to satisfy that burden when Calvin Waits, the
only witness who could have explained how the fire
started, and who was an employee of appellee at the
time of the fire, and whose testimony was available to
appellee, was not called as a witness by appellee.

Appellant maintains that the evidence introduced
-was insufficient to overcome the presumption; that the
evidence leaves the facts open to conjecture and the
cause of the damage in doubt; that if a plaintiff estab-
‘lishes a negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur and defendant’s testimony leaves the cause of the
accident in doubt, the plaintiff is entitled to a directed
verdict; and, that if a defendant fails to produce, when
available, testimony of the only witness in position to
give direct testimony on an issue which the defendant
‘has the burden of proving, the plaintiff is entitled to a
directed verdict.

In the case of Threlkeld v. Breaux Ballard, Inc.,
296 Ky. 344, 177 S. W. 2d 157, 151 A. L. R. 708, we adopt-
ed the minority view that if a bailor makes out a prima
facie case and it appears that the bailed goods were
damaged or destroyed by fire, the bailee has the burden
-of proving that the fire resulted otherwise than from
his negligence, This court has not heretofore considered
the nature of the proof necessary to meet this burden.

The situation here is related to one giving rise to
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, though the problems

638 ee

presented are not wholly identical. In the case of Reibert
v. Thompson, 302 Ky. 688, 194 8. W. 2d 974, 976, com-
menting on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, we said:
«c# * * Tn the absence of explanation, or proof of inter-
vening agency, or contributory negligence, it affords
reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want
of care. It is true that the presumption may be overcome
by evidence showing the cause of the occurrence, or that
the cause is attributable to some intervening act or
thing, but here there are no facts which tend to support
a contradictory or inconsistent inference, nor is there
a basis in the proven facts to deduce even a probability
of some intervening cause.’’

We believe that in a case where the burden is on
the bailee to prove that the loss resulted without his
negligence, there must be some substantive proof show-
ing that the fire, as in the instant case, resulted from a
non-negligent cause. The appellee in this case has not,
in our opinion, met that burden. The appellee has in-
troduced proof of a general nature showing some pre-
cautions which it took with reference to certain fire
hazards. Appellee has, however, failed to show that it
exercised due care with reference to this particular fire;
and appellee failed to introduce the testimony, by depo-
sition or otherwise, of the one man who was closely asso-
ciated with the origin of the fire, and who might rea-
sonably be expected to know the cause of it. See Pacific
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunice Motor Co., La. App., 46 So. 2d
363, rehearing refused, La. App., 47 So. 2d 403. Under
these circumstances, we believe the appellee failed to
sustain the burden of proof. When an issue is left in
doubt by the proof in a case, so that a jury would be
required to speculate, that party must lose upon whom
the burden ultimately rests.

If upon another trial the testimony is substantially
the same as that shown in this record, the court should
direct a verdict for appellant.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.

es 639

Benjamin v. Goff.
February 13, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

Jesse K. Lewis for appellant.
Stoll, Keenon & Park and Gayle A. Mobney for appellee.

Juves Murxen—Affirming.

Jean Wallace Benjamin, as administratrix of the
estate of J. Franklin Wallace, deceased, brought this
action against Hugh CO. Goff, doing business as Puckety
Farm, and asked for a declaration of rights under

- 640 ee

Section 639a—1 of the Civil Code of Practice. The de-
fendant, Hugh C. Goff, had filed a claim with her against
the estate for $1,755 which he asserted was due him
for stallion fees and board of horses for various periods
of time from 1946 through 1949. The administratrix
questioned her right to pay the claim on the theory that
Sections 376.400 and 376.420 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes barred the claim. A general demurrer was filed
to her petition, was sustained by the trial court, and
from his ruling that the creditor was entitled to his
claim this appeal was taken.

KRS 376.400 provides in part: ‘‘Any owner or
keeper of a livery stable, and a person feeding or graz-
ing cattle for compensation, shall have a lien upon the
cattle placed in the stable or put out to be fed or grazed
by the owner, for his reasonable charges for keeping,
earing for, feeding and grazing the cattle. * * * The
lien shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions
placed upon a landlord’s lien for rent.’’

KRS 376.420(1) provides: ‘‘Any licensed keeper
of a stallion, jack or bull shall have a lien for the pay-
ment of the service fee upon the get of the stallion, jack
or bull, for one year after the birth of the progeny.’’

It is admitted by the parties that the time has now
lapsed for enforcement of any lien which the creditor
may have, and it is the contention of the administratrix
that the remedy given by these statutes is the only one
the creditor has. In support of her contention she cites
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Tafel Electric
Co., 1935, 262 Ky. 792, 91 S. W. 2d 42, 43. In that case
suit was brought under a statute by a subcontractor
against the surety on the general contractor’s perform-
ance bond. The Tennessee statute which governed the
maintenance of the action, after giving such a right of
action to a subcontractor, provided ‘‘that action shall be
brought * * * within six months following the comple-
tion of such public work, or of the furnishing of such
labor or materials.’’ In that case suit was not brought
within the six months’ period, and this court properly
held that the action could not be maintained because
the action contemplated by the statute was not known
to the common law and was wholly a creature of statute.

The creditor here makes no attempt to assert a

lien, and the only question we-have before: us is:whether
the statutes mentioned were intended to’ be ‘exchisive
remedies for,the. collection of.a-claim such asthe.one at
bar. There is. nothing about. the statutes. which suggests
that they provide an‘exclusive remedy. Section 233 of
the, Kentucky, Constitution. provides that the common
law shall be in effect in this state until: vepealed or al-
tered by the.Legislature. As stated in Ruby.Lumber Co.
v. K. V. Johnson Co., 299 Ky. 811, 187 S: W. 2d 449,
453, 166 A. LR. 1215: “Repeals by implication are not
favored -and never declared unless clearly: made to
appear. What is ‘true of statutes is true:ias to:the
common law. The Constitution provides that allcommon
law should he in.effect in this State. until:repealed or
altered by the-Legislature. * * * We are not at libérty
to ignore the common law totally. #4 *-We have ‘held
that the intention to abrogate the common law is ‘not
presumed. The intention to repeal must. be ‘clearly ap-
parent.””

See, . eso, 1 11 Am. Tir, Comnon Lew, Section: 15,
page 168.. .

The" Cirenit Cc
demurrer, and the

propstly siistattied the -gensral
gment is chereby'a affirmed, .

iii
: Noe ve O'Neil.

. February 16, 1951.
_ 5. B, Johnson, Judge.

R. L. Pope and Oscar Black for appellant.
Glenn H. Stephens, L. 0. Siler and Thomas F. Young for appellee.

Juver Sums—Affirming.

This is the second appeal of this case. Our former
opinion reported in 301 Ky. 472, 192 S. W. 2d 366, under
the style of O’Neil v. Noe, gives a clear and concise
statement of the facts involved and they will not be re-
stated here, except when necessary for an understanding
of the issues raised on this appeal.

The parties here will be referred to as plaintiff
and defendant, the positions they occupied in the trial
court. There have been four trials of the case. The first
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2500,
but that judgment was reversed for the reasons set out
in the first opinion. There was a hung jury on the second
trial. On the third trial there was a verdict of $5000 for
plaintiff but the trial judge set it aside, without indi-
cating his reasons for so doing, to which ruling plaintiff
objected and filed her bill of exceptions. A verdict was
returned for defendant on the fourth trial and the court
overruled plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, as well as
her motion to substitute the verdict on the third trial
for that rendered on the fourth and to enter judgment
for her in the sum of $5000.

At the outset we are confronted with a question of
procedure. It was on Oct. 17, 1947, when the trial court
overruled plaintiff’s motion to which we have just re-
ferred. The record was filed in the office of the clerk of
this court on Oct. 17, 1949, and the defendant asks that
the appeal be dismissed because it was not filed within
two years from the date on which the final order was
made, as required by Civil Code of Practice sec. 745,
citing Board of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v.

1644,

. of Ne ‘291 el 182; 168 8. W: 2a 4753 ‘Kudelle v.

Vizdiird ‘Tnv. ‘Co.,"194 Ky. 604, ‘240 ‘S.-W. ‘These au-,
thor: ies sustain. defendant’s ‘position
“Oodle” ‘of Practice ‘ig mandator,

an order entered on October 17,,1947, -oepirgd on Oct.-
16, 1949." 6

But plaintiff’s-attorney filed his. affidavit to which:
wag attached the receipt the express. company took, from.
the clerk of this court when it délivered to him the ree-
ord. This receipt shows the record was delivered to the
clerk’s office and receipted for by his deputy on Oct. 14,.
1949. Also attached to his affidavit is his cancelled check
dated October 12, 1949, payable to the clerk for the-

e. The affidavit shows this check was ineladed i im
the‘ express Package containing the record, ..)- ..

Ordinarily, we look only to the record on a@ niotion:
to dismiss an appeal for not having been filed in time..
But, here' plaintiff conclusively shows the record andi
his check were delivered to the clerk’s office on Oct. 145
1949. He did all the law required of him when he dé-
livered the record and his check to the clerk on Oct. 14,
1949, and should not be held:responsible for the clerk’s-
failure in not filing the record, or endorsing thereon
that it was filed, until Oct. 17th. The motion to. dismiss
the appéal is overruled. See Bobbitt v. Cundiff, 296 Ky-
802, 177 8. W. 2d 596. ° Lae

Plaintiff’s brief does not call attention to any error
made .on the fourth trial, therefore we are only con-
cerned with the one question of whether the trial judge
abused his -diseretion in setting aside the $5000 verdict
for plaintiff on the third trial, Defendant’s motion for
a new trial set out ten grounds among which were the
court erred: 1. in permitting plaintiff to file the second
amended petition; 2. in allowing plaintiff to introduce
in rebuttal testimony that defendant had repaired the
steps after the accident; 3. the verdict for $5000 was
grossly excessive.

As was said in the first opinion, the petition, though
ineptly drawn, stated a cause of action. It averred the
accident happened on Sept. 9, 1944, and was caused by

Le 645

-defendant’s negligence in permitting the lighting to get
out of repair and causing the stairway to be dark; also,
in not providing handrails. The first amended petition
-eorrected an allegation as to defendant being incorporat-
-ed and, after repeating the averments that he negligent-
ly failed to properly light the steps and hallway, stated
the ‘‘floor planks at the head of the steps was defective,
‘broken or, worn away.’’ The second amended petition
-was tendered on Oct. 18, 1946 (which was more than two
years after the accident), and was subsequently filed.
“This pleading averred the top step was ‘‘split, cracked
.and bursted * * * and had been in such condition for
:several months, and it was said defective condition which
pitched her forward and threw her down said stairway.’’
For the first time in this second amended petition refer-
-ence was made to the top step being defective. Defend-
ant argues this amendment changed plaintiff’s cause of
.action and as it was tendered and filed more than.a year
after the accident, it was barred by the one year statute
of limitation, KRS 413.140. ~

The rule is that an amendment is not barred by
‘limitation if it does not introduce a new claim or differ-
ent cause of action but merely restates in a different
form the cause of action originally pleaded, 34 Am.
Jur. ‘Limitation of Action,’? sec. 260, p. 211; Smith v.
Bogenschultz, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 305, 19 S. W. 667, 20
‘8. W. 390; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greenwell’s Adm’r.,
155 Ky. 799, 160 S.W. 479; O’Brien v. M. & P. Theatres
‘Corp., 72 RB. FE. 289, 52 A. 2d 781, 171 A. L. R. 1081. See an-
notations following the O’Brien opinion 171 A. L. RB.

87. > . :

The Smith opinion is conclusive on this point in the
‘instant case. There, a laborer was injured by molten
iron spilling from a ladle. His original petition alleged
:a fellow workman jostled him in a narrow passway
causing the metal to spill: The court gave a directed ver-
dict for defendant because plaintiff was familiar with
the passway and its width. In an amendment filed more
than a. year after the accident, plaintiff averred the
‘molten metal was spilled by reason of the defective ladle
‘in which he was carrying it. It was written in the Smith
opinion the cause of action was the spilling of the metal
-from: the ladle and the fact that plaintiff averred a dif-
ferent cause for the spilling of it in his amended peti-

646 |

tion from that set out in the original petition, did not
change his cause of action.

Nor did the court err on the third trial in permitting
plaintiff to prove in rebuttal that defendant had repair-
ed the steps subsequent to the accident, after defendant
had testified the steps at that time were in the same con-
dition they were in when the accident occurred. While
evidence of subsequent changes in conditions or repairs
to premises is not admissible to prove the owner’s negli-
gence, Ky. & W. Va. Power Corp. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325,
164 S.W.2d 537, 170 A.L.R. 1, yet where defendant testi-
fied the premises are in the same condition at the time
of trial as they were when the accident happened, plain-
tiff may rebut such testimony by showing that repairs
were made subsequent to the accident. 20 Am. Jur.
‘‘Hividence’’ sec, 282, p. 267; Smith v. Twin State Gas
& Electric Co., 83 N.H. 489, 144 A. 57, 783, 61 A.L.R.
1015, 1026.

‘We now approach the main question in the case, did
the court abuse his decretion in granting a new trial aft-
er the jury returned a $5000 verdict for plaintiff? It is
the long-established rule of this court not to interfere
with the broad discretion of a trial judge in granting a
new trial, unless it plainly appears he abused it. As
said in McLemore v. Evansville & Bowling Green Pack-
et Co., 160 Ky. 566,169 S.W. 1006, ‘‘The trial judge is
generally acquainted with the parties and the witnesses,
sees and hears them testify, and is familiar with occur-
ences upon the trial which cannot be transmitted to this
court in a written record.’? The trial judge’s discretion
is not absolute but is a judicial one. If it is clear that the
new trial was granted because the court took an errone-
ous view of the law of the case, his order granting a new
trial will be set aside by us. Norvell v. Paducah Box &
Basket Co., 157 Ky. 703, 163 S.W. 1106. .

In the instant case the record does not disclose upon
which of the assigned ten grounds the court granted the’
new trial; therefore, we cannot say he took an erroneous |
view of the law of the case in granting the new trial.
The judgment on the first trial was for $2500 and one
of the grounds upon which we reversed it was there was
no evidence upon which the court could have based an in-
struction given on permanent injury. The second trial
resulted in a hung jury. On the third trial the medical

ea

testimony shows plaintiff suffered no broken bones but
did suffer severe bruises and muscular injuries. Dr.
J. E. Parker, whose deposition was taken in behalf of
plaintiff but read to the jury by defendant’s attorney,
testified he did not know whether plaintiff’s injuries are
permanent. Dr. H. W. Terrill, testifying in behalf of
plaintiff, stated that while her injuries were muscular,
he believed them to be permanent.

From the lay and medical testimony introduced on
the third trial, it is evident that this is a border line
case on the question of whether plaintiff suffered per-
manent injuries. If her injuries are permanent, the
$5000 verdict is not excessive; if her injuries are not
permanent, the verdict is excessive. But the question
confronting us is not whether the verdict is excessive but
whether the trial judge abused his discretion in granting
a new trial. In a case as close as this we cannot say the
trial judge abused his discretion in granting a new trial
on the third hearing. In Clark v. Bean, 267 Ky. 238, 101
8.W.2d 930, it was written that when the question is
“near the border line’? we cannot hold the trial judge
abused his discretion in granting a new trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

a
Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Manns et al.

February 16, 1951.
Hdward P. Hill, Judge.

648

Howard & Combs for appellant.
Kenneth A, Howe for appellee.

Judge Latimer—Affirming.

Lillie Manns, widow of Leander Manns, filed claim
with the Workmen’s Compensation Board seeking an
award for the death of her husband. The Board allowed
maximum compensation under the Act. The award was
upheld by the Floyd Cireuit Court and the Blkhorn Coal
Corporation brings this appeal.

It is argued first that there is not sufficient proba-
tive evidence to sustain the award; and second, if there
is sufficient evidence to sustain any part of the award, it
should be apportioned using as a basis a finding that a
combination of the pre-existing condition of the em-
ployee and the breathing of the ‘‘bad air’’ caused em-
ployee’s death.

Leander Manns was employed by appellant Hikhorn
Coal Corporation. The award was based on a finding
that deceased’s death was caused by breathing bad air
im appellant’s mine. : :

” It is obvious that we are to be concerned only with
the evidence tending to show that the employee’s death
was caused by breathing ‘‘bad air.’ :

"We will look first at the circumstances under which
the deceased was working. The place of actual work
was in a room approximately 100 feet from the entrance.
His work required that he be at or near the face of the
coal, KRS 352.020 prescribes the methods of ventila-
tion. Paragraph 3 of the above section, with prescribed
exception: tequires that what is known: as_break-
throughs for air be installed 60 feet’ apart. The evi-

ees!

dence shows that a break-through was in the Process of
completion at the time of this death.

The evidence further shows that there was a lack
of proper brattices or stoppings, which according to’ the
testimony of some, was the cause of the lack of ventila-
tion and the presence of ‘‘bad air.’’

‘Manns died in the mine entry of appellant’s mine
at about 11 P.M. on the night of November 7, 1945.
He commenced work that afternoon at about 4:00 P.M.
He was a helper on a loading machine and assisted with
bringing the loading machine out to the main entry.
While at this entry he fell to the floor of the mine, gasp-
ed a few times and died. Dr. M. V. Wicker examined
the body when it was brought out of the mine and ques-
tioned the fellow employees about the conditions under
which the deceased was working. He states that these
fellow employees informed him the air was good and
none of them could assign any reasons other than nat-
ural ones for the man’s death. Dr. Wicker, who had
treated Manns for low blood pressure for some 2 or 3
years, concluded that Manns died as a result of heart
ailure.

Air tests were taken at the place of death approxi-
mately 24% hours thereafter and showed a presence of
more than 20 percent oxygen, which is regarded as the
equivalent of pure air.

The State Mine Inspector made an investigation
and reported that the mine was being operated properly.
Mitchell Watson, loading machine operator, when
asked, ‘‘Was there any smoke in the room?’ replied,
“Plenty, when I first went in for about fifteen minutes.”’

Harlan Page, the shot fireman, who was working
with Manns’ crew, testified that he was not in the room
where Manns worked after the coal had been shot; but
when he went in to prepare a shot, there seemed to be
no air in the room.

The motor man, Bill Honshell, who was in the room
intermittently in operating the motor to remove loaded
cars and place empties, stated that he noticed a lack of
ventilation and that it made him feel drowsy and tired.

Dr. J. ©. Coldiron, who testified on behalf of ap-
pellee, stated that in his opinion the death of the de-

650 |

ceased was from bad air poisoning. Complaint, howevy-
er, is made that the hypothetical question propounded to
Dr. Coldiron was improper, in that it assumed that the
deceased employee was in good health. A careful study
of the question as propounded shows that the question
was based upon the facts in this case. The apparently
objectionable portion of the question is that relative to
good health of employee. This language is used: ‘‘The
deceased, Lee Manns, at the time of his death was about
forty-two years of age, apparently in good health, who
had never been known by his wife or by the men with
whom he worked to have complained or sought medical
attention before his death, and who had worked regular-
ly for the Elkhorn Coal Corporation for a number of
years, * * * .”? The evidence supports the question as
propounded.

Although, Dr. M. D. Flannery, testifying for ap-
pellant, stated that he was of the opinion that the death
was not caused by breathing ‘‘bad air’’ and though there
is evidence in support of appellant’s position, it is readi-
ly observable that the above is evidence of substance
sufficient to support the Board’s finding of facts.

There is no basis in evidence herein to justify the
apportionment urged in 2 above with accompanying ap-
plication of the rule in Black Mountain Corporation v.
Lucas, 271 Ky. 655, 113 §.W.2d 15. In that case it was
held that both a pre-existing disease and ‘‘bad air’? con-
tributed to the death of the employee. And the evidence
supported that finding. That is not true in the instant
ease. Appellant took the position that there was no
presence of ‘‘bad air’’ and that death resulted from a
heart attack. Claimant took the position that the death
fesulted from breathing ‘‘bad air.’? The Board so

ound.

The facts herein support that finding.
The judgment is affirmed.

Smith v. Beverly et al.
February 16, 1951.
Nolan Carter, Judge.

652

Kinsolving & Reesor for appellant.
John M. Berry, L. T, Peniston and. John W. Coomes for appellees.

Judge Stewart—Reversing.

The issues to be decided by this Court are raised
entirely by the pleadings of appellant, Bert Smith, in
this appeal from a judgment adverse to him in a suit
in equity in the Henry Circuit Court against Charles
A. Beverly, W. E. Stone, H. T. Watkins and W. H.
Cravens, members of the Henry county board of educa-
tion, and Mrs. Lucille Shannon, Harold Dorsay and Roy
Dorsay, substitute principals of the New Castle high
school during the 1947-48 term.

Smith’s petition alleges that on September'2, 1947,
at a regular meeting of the Board, Mrs. J. T. Highfield,

as 658

‘the legally appointed and acting: Superintendent of the

. Board, recommended him as principal of the New Castle
high school for the school term of 9 months, beginning
September 9, 1947, and ending the latter part of May in
“1948. Appellees, Beverly, Stone, Watkins and Cravens,
who constituted a majority of the members of the Board,
“declined to act on the Superintendent’s recommendation
of Smith for the position by simply adjourning the meet-
ing and they thereafter refused to appoint him as prin-
.cipal of the high school. Although Smith’s name was
never withdrawn by the Superintendent from considera-
tion by the Board for the high school principalship, ap-
pellee Board Members, acting independently of the
Superintendent, employed Mrs. Shannon, who taught
from September, 1947, to January, 1948, and was paid
$1162.20; Harold Dorsay, who taught during January,
1948, and was paid $290.55; and Roy Dorsay, who taught
from February, 1948, to May, 1948, and was paid
$1162.20. Hach of these substitute principals, Smith
avérs, was unlawfully employed and paid by appellee
Board Members, each knowing that Smith was entitled
to thé ‘position held and the pay received by each of
them.

Smith has a standard life certificate authorizing
him to teach in any high school in Kentucky. For the
school terms 1942-43 and 1944-45, he was employed as a
teacher in the high schools of Henry county. It is not
in dispute that he is morally fit and educationally quali-
fied for the position to which he was recommended. He
says that he was unable to work and earn any sum in
his profession during the school year 1947-48, although
he wiade an effort to secure like employment. He was at
“all times ready, able and willing to perform the duties
of principal of the New Castle high school for the 1947-
48 school term. All public funds for the upkeep of the
1947-48 school year have been exhausted, he states, so
that his remedy lies solely against appellee Board Mem-
bers as individuals and against appellee substitute prin-
cipals as illegal holders of his position. :

. In his petition he asks for the following relief, name-
ly: That it be adjudged, because he was recommended
‘by the Superintendent to the Board, it was the duty of
the Board to approve him and to appoint him principal
of the New Castle high school; that he acquired a vested

654 ee

right to have his nomination recognized and approved
by the Board; that he have judgment against Mrs. Lu-
cille Shannon for $1162.20, against Harold Dorsay for
$290.55, and against Roy Dorsay for $1162.20; and that
he have judgment against Beverly, Stone, Watkins and
Oravens, jointly and severally, for $2614.95, with inter-
est thereon from June 1, 1948, until paid, to be credited
by whatever sum is recovered by him from Mrs. Shan-
non, Harold Dorsay and Roy Dorsay.

Appellees filed, first, a joint motion to dismiss the
petition, and, next, a joint demurrer to the petition.
Lastly, each appellee filed a separate demurrer to the
petition. The motion and the several demurrers were
sustained. Smith declined to plead further and his peti-
tion was dismissed.

Appellees, in their motion to dismiss, contend that
Smith’s petition is fatally defective because he did not
allege therein his right and claim to the position of prin-
cipal of the high school for the term 1947-48 had been
previously determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.in a direct proceeding thereto. Then, if appellees’
motion to dismiss is overruled, they insist upon their de-
murrers because the nomination of Smith by the Super-
intendent to the office and for the term in question on
September 2, 1947, was not timely made, so that the
Board was relieved of its statutory duty to employ him
as principal.

Our determination of the second issue raised by
appellees will dispose of the first contention urged by
them. Appellant’s rights in this litigation are governed |
solely by the statutory law set forth in KRS Chapter
160. Particularly applicable to his case is KRS 160.380
and the construction we have given to this section in
our numerous decisions.

‘We have held in our interpretation of the last men-
tioned section that it is the mandatory duty of a board
of education to elect a recommendee of its superintend-
ent, if such recommendee possesses the necessary moral
and educational qualifications; and, in passing on any
recommendations made by its superintendent, no board
has the right to arbitrarily reject a recommendee, but it
is limited in its right of rejection, in the exercise of
sound discretion, to determine whether the recommendee
is morally fit or educationally qualified for the position

| 656

to which he is recommended. Stith v. Powell, 251 Ky.
155, 64 S.W.2d 491; Hudson v. Ohio County Board of
Education, 253 Ky. 709, 70 8.W.2d 375; O’Daniel v. Mc-
Daniel, 290 Ky. 77, 160 S.W.2d 331.

In Amburgey v. Draughn, 288 Ky. 128, 155 S.W.2d
740, 742, at a meeting held on May 5, 1941, the county
superintendent submitted to the board a list of proposed.
teachers and other school employees for the ensuing
school year, all of whom were employed at a subsequent
meeting, except two teachers and a bus driver. In a
suit to have each rejected recommendee declared entitled
to the employment and the emolument of the position
to which each was recommended, this Court, in passing
on the rights of each teacher nominated by this superin-
tendent, said that ‘‘ * * * one who is legally qualified for
the position, and who has been duly nominated by the
proper officer and whose name has never been with-
drawn, acquires a vested right to teach, or perform the
duties of his employment, and to receive the emoluments
of the employment, as certainly as if a contract had been
executed with the approval of the board. * * * Thus it
will seem the law implies a contract between the parties,
specific performance of which will be enforced by the
pours and for the breach of which damages may be al-
owed.”?

Damages are not allowable against a board of edu-
cation in its official capacity because the money ap-
propriated for the payment of the salaries of the posi-
tion in dispute has been expended, and public funds may
not twice be drawn upon for services once received.
Damages will lie, however, against the members of a
board of education for their failure to perform their
mandatory legal duties, and against substitute teach-
ers for money had and received by them on contracts
which were illegal, if it be shown that they had know-
ledge of the illegal acts of the members of the board.
In such a case, as in all other suits for damages arising
out of the breach of a contract, it is the duty of the
person seeking a recovery to minimize the damage. Cot-
tongim v. Stewart, 283 Ky. 615, 142 S.W.2d 171. The
burden of: showing an effort to minimize damages is
upon the person seeking a recovery, since it is a neces-
sary element in proof of the amount of the damage he is
entitled to receive. Amburgey v. Draughn, supra.

656 |

KRS 160.380 reads as follows: ‘‘Except as provided
in KRS 160.130 and 160.430, all appointments, promo-
tions and transfers of principals, supervisors, teachers
and other public school employees shall be made only
upon the recommendation of the superintendent of
schools, subject to the approval of the board. If the
board of education cannot agree with the superintendent
as to any legally qualified person recommended by the
superintendent, the board of education may appeal to
the State Board of Education to review the case and the
decision of the State Board of Education shall be final.
All employees of the board shall have such qualifications
as aré prescribed by law and by the regulations of the
State Board of Education and of the employing board.
Supervisors, principals, teachers and other employees
may be appointed by the board of education for any
school year at any time after April 1 next preceding the
beginning of the school year.’

KRS 158.050 provides as follows: ‘The school year
shall begin on July 1 and end on June 30.”’

In our interpretation of the provision of law first
above quoted, we are unable to read into it the construc-
tion that appellees place upon it, namely, that the Super-
intendent must make all recommendations of school em-
ployees before July 1st of each year, the beginning of
the school year, or the Board may take over thereafter
and make all appointments according to its choice. If
there is a time limit to be observed, it specifically ap-
plies to the Board, for the last sentence says that ap-
pointments of school employees may be made ‘‘by the
board of education’’ after April Ist and before July 1st,
the beginning of the school year. Moreover, this sec-
tion does not state or even imply that the Board may
appoint any school employee at any time independently
of the Superintendent, or ignore after a certain date any
recommendee of the Superintendent. To hold otherwise
would impair the legislative intent so clearly revealed
in the language of this section.

In the recent case of Beverly v. Highfield, 307 Ky.
179, 209 S.W.2d 739, affecting the same Superintendent
and Board involved in this litigation, the Board, acting
without the Superintendent’s recommendation and
against her will, entered an order on its records on July
3, 1946, appointing.John W. Long as principal of the

a 6651

New Castle high school for the year 1946-47. Although
this appointment was made after July Ist, this Court
held that the Board had no right or authority to make
such an appointment, in the absence of the principal’s
nomination by the Superintendent, and that its contract
with Long was void.

Appellees cite Duff v. Chaney, 291 Ky. 308, 164
$.W.2d 483, and Beckham v. Kimbell, 282 Ky. 648, 139
8.W.2d 747, as cases that uphold their contention that a
superintendent must recommend before July Ist of each
year or forfeit his right in this respect thereafter to the
board members. We have examined each of these cases
carefully and we are convinced that neither decision sup-
ports the view advanced by appellees. Nor do the facts
in either opinion warrant any such conclusion of law.
The cases of Evans v. Bourbon County Board of Hduca-
tion, 258 Ky. 258, 79 §.W.2d 975, the Christian County
Board of Education v. Gee, 217 Ky. 561, 290 S.W. 329,
are also relied upon by appellees to bestow absolute
power upon the Board to appoint the substitute prin-
cipals after considerable time had elapsed from July 1,
and the Superintendent had not nominated a principal.
These two decisions construe Sec. 4399a-7, Kentucky
Statutes of 1930, which has since been repealed. Its
counterpart is now KRS 160.130, which applies solely
to the present method of selecting and employing teach-
ers in elementary schools of subdistricts. The opinion
of Smith v. Powell, supra, decided that the Sec. 4399a-7,
when it was in full force and effect, curtailed the right
of a county superintendent to make recommendations of
teachers and other school employees only as to grade
schools in subdistricts, just as KRS 160.130 now does.

We cannot regard seriously appellees’ insistence
that Smith should have previously established his right
and claim to the office of principal of the high school
for the term in question by a direct proceeding to a court
of competent jurisdiction. This is an attempt by anal-
ogy to compel teachers and other school employees to
proceed as a discharged municipal worker must do, who,
under a special law applying to his case, is required to
resort to court action to have his right to his position de-
termined before he can be reinstated ‘on his job.

In our opinion the law is clear that Smith’s rights
accrued to him when he was recommended by the Super-

658

intendent. Appellee Board Members could reject him
only if he were morally unfit or educationally disquali-
fied. Their independent action in employing the Sub-
stitute Principals and paying them school funds for the
term 1947-48 make them liable as individuals, jointly and
severally. The Substitute Principals are also individu-
ally liable for the money had and received by each of
them as illegal employees, if they had knowledge of
Smith’s nomination. The lower court erred in sustain-
ing the motion and the demurrers of appellees. The
judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

|
Strunk v. Perry et al.

February 16, 1951.
J. B, Johnson, Judge.

a 659

Leonard §. Stephens for appellant.
G. W. Stephens and James A. Inman for appellee.

Stanley, Commissioner—Affirming.

In 1937 Milton Perry’s heirs brought a suit for dam-
ages for trespass against a number of parties. The Ken-
tucky Land Shares Corp. intervened. The real issue be-
eame one of title to land, and it was determinable upon
the location of lines and adverse possession. In Bryant
v. Perry, 284 Ky. 698, 145 S.W.2d 1055, we held the plain-
tiffs had failed to sustain the burden of locating their
boundaries so as to show that the land in dispute was
embraced in the lines claimed by them and reversed a
judgment in their favor. Thereafter the parties agreed
upon a judgment fixing the lines.

The present suit was brought by McKinley Strunk
against Denty and Roy Perry, two of the nine children
and heirs of Milton Perry, for trespass upon a certain
150 acres known as the Doolin survey or patent. The
plaintiff acquired his title from the Kentucky Land
Shares Corporation, which was the principal party in
the above suit. The defendants set up title to a certain
190 acres. The controversy is over a parcel of 8 or 10
acres claimed by both parties. The plaintiff claimed
his tract of 150 embraced the parcel which is on the
north side of Indian Creek, the rest of his tract being
on the south side. The defendants claimed their land
extended to the ereek and embraces the parcel. Judg-
ment went for the defendants.

The state of the record confounds confusion. Build-
ing up such a record of immaterial and irrelevant matter
not only places the clients to considerable unnecessary
expense but hinders the courts in their efforts to do
justice between the parties. In a rather exhaustive ana-
lysis of the complicated record, the trial court dredged
out the ultimate facts, some of which were negative in
that the party upon whom the burden rested did not
establish to the court’s satisfaction those things for
which he contended.

One of the issues was res judicata, raised by the

660 ee
plaintiff. In the former suit the parties to this action
or ‘their itnmediate predecessors in title were parties.
The court concluded that the particular parcel involved
here was not embraced in that litigation and denied the
plaintiff’s plea under which he might have prevailed.
However, the court recognized that the agreed judgment
‘‘made some attempt to establish the property lines be-
tween the parties.’’? With respect to the line as it may
have related to the parcel, the surveyors of both parties
testify, and a consideration of other parts of the record
demonstrates abundantly that the agreed line, though
apparently clear on paper, cannot be located on the
ground without considerable arbitrary extension or
shortening of lines to reach stakes called for but not
monuments. We think the court properly ruled that the
plaintiffs did not sustain the burden of proving his title
insofar as it was described by this agreed line. It is-a
long standing rule that in construing an indefinite sur-
vey that construction will ‘‘prevail which is most against
the party claiming under’? it because he has not succeed-
ed in making it certain. Pearson v. Baker, 34 Ky. 321,
4 Dana 321. :

As perhaps upon a more certain or satisfactory
ground, the court went further and decided the question
adverse to the plaintiff upon the ground that-his deed
was champertous insofar as it may have covered the
parcel involved. The deed of the plaintiff, Strunk, from
the Kentucky Land Shares Corporation placed -him on
notice that someone else.was claiming it. The deed ex-
cepted: ‘‘such tracts as are held by older or superior ti-
tles, which includes a Jap with a William Jasper survey,
it being the purpose of this instrument to convey to sec-
ond party all that portion of the said 150 acre Doolin
Survey not covered by the 8 3/10 acre tract referred to
aiid such portions ‘as are “not held by older patented
lands ‘and’such portion not acquired by adverse clait
ants.’’ "The conveyance iticluded ‘‘all rights, claims aiid
t couldor may be enforced by reason of
trespasses on ‘said land are hereby transfer-

id ‘assigned to the’ patty of the second part, and
should patty of the’ second ‘part, his heirs'or assigns
deem it necessary or’ advisable to bring legal action on
proceedings to enforce any such claim or demand or. to
remove trespassers or. squatters. thereon hé-is ‘authorized
to use the name of the parties vendor hereto in any such

a

legal proceedings, provided same shall be done without
any expense to first parties, and first parties shall‘ be
protected any and all court cost, including attorney’s
fees in connection therewith.’’

It is to be noted that our opinion in the prior case
was rendered December 10,' 1940, Bryant v. Perry, 284
Ky. 698, 145 S.W.2d 1055; the agreed judgment entered
pursuant thereon was entered March 18, 1944; the plain-
tiff’s deed was dated June 1,'1944; and the suit filed two
years later. The defendants had acquired title and Den-
ty Perry had moved upon the land; thé description of
which embraced this parcel, in 1925. The house into
which he moved was close to the line now in controversy.
The Perry family had lived in the community 85 years
or more and had occupied and held this land or a part of
it under adverse possession or color of title nearly all of
that time. There are other significant facts. So, not only
did the plaintiff have knowledge, both actual and con-
structive, of this state of facts, but his deed itself recog-
nized that other people were claiming at least some of
the land it conveyed. This conveyance, it seems to us,
is made void by the statutes, KRS 372.070, 372.080, the
object of which, as stated in Perry v. Wilson, 183 Ky.
155, 208 S.W. 776, being to discourage litigation by pro-
hibiting one who has a doubtful title, to clear which he
is not willing to sue, from selling it to another person
and thereby encourage strife.

A full consideration leads us to the conclusion that
the chancellor’s decision is correct.

The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
. Li
Evansville Morris Plan, Inc. v. Howard.
February 16, 1951:

Sidney B. Neal, Judge.

662

John ¥. Wood for appellant.

J. H, Thomas for appellee.
‘Sraniey, Commissroner—Reversing.

The question is priority of liens on a truck. The
suit was instituted by the appellant for an order of de-
livery of the truck from the appellee, John Howard, who
operates a garage in Livermore and who had obtained
its possession under a claim of a garageman’s lien. The
possession, however, was not obtained by any legal pro-
cess. The bank asserted it was the owner of the truck.
The jury found for the defendant under an instruction
so to find if the jury believed that the bank had consent-
ed and acquiesced in the truck being brought into Ken-
tucky from Indiana by Ernest M. Whobrey, the purchas-
er under a conditional sale contract. The court there-
upon adjudged Howard to have a lien superior to the
conditional sales lien or title of the bank to the extent of
its claim, $81.96, and ordered the truck sold to satisfy
it. KRS 376.270 et seq.

In July, 1948, Whobrey had bought the truck in
Evansville, Indiana, under a conditional sales contract
securing the payment of a balance of $444.00. A few
days later that instrument was assigned to the appellant.
It appears the Indiana law in respect to such transac-
tions was complied with. After using the truck in Indi-
ana for two or three weeks, Whobrey brought it to Liv-
ermore, Kentucky, where it was used principally by his
father in general hauling until seized by Howard. The

a

charges for gasoline and work on the truck were made
against Lawrence Whobrey, the father, because he had
told Howard it was his truck. He had taken out a city
license for its operation in his name.

We recognize that a conditional sale contract made
in Indiana, in which the vendor keeps title to an auto-
mobile until the installment payments have been made
in full, is valid and enforceable and that an assignee or
transferee has all the rights of the original vendor.
Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209 8.
W. 2d 846. At least to the extent that such a contract is
the equivalent of a chattel mortgage, it is superior to
a Kentucky garageman’s statutory lien. C. I. T. Corp.
v. Studebaker Sales of Kentucky, 251 Ky. 349, 65 S. W.
2d 84; Denkins Motor Co. v. Humphreys, 310 Ky. 344,
220 S. W. 2d 847. But if it was contemplated by the par-
ties that the machine would be taken into and used in
Kentucky and the instrument is not recorded here, the
rights of an innocent Kentucky lienor cannot be pre-
judiced and to that extent his rights are superior. Amer-
ican Loan Co. v. See, 298 Ky. 180, 182 8S. W. 2d 644;
Denkins Motor Co. v. Humphreys, supra. There is no
claim in the present case of any such contemplation or
understanding. The instruction to the jury was given
upon the theory that if the holder of title under the
conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage had con-
sented to or acquiesced in the removal of the car to
Kentucky, it was estopped from claiming priority. In
American Loan Co. v. See, supra, we observed that it
had never been definitely decided by this court that mere
consent of a foreign mortgagee to the removal of a chat-
tel to this state affects the rule of superiority of his
lien over Kentucky statutory lien. It was not necessary
there to determine the question, it being found that
there was no evidence of such consent. The conclusion,
therefore, was that the Ohio mortgage was on the same
footing as a recorded Kentucky mortgage. In that re-
spect, that is the present case. See also Tennessee Auto
Corp. v. American National Bank, 205 Ky. 541, 266 S.
Wy. og United Construction Co. v. Milam, 6 Cir., 124

In November, 1948, after Howard had taken the
truck into his possession to be held until the account of
Lawrence Whobrey was paid, Ernest Whobrey went to

664

Evansville and informed Gorman, the bank’s credit
manager, that he could not continue his installment pay-
ments because Howard had tied up the truck. Thereupon,
Gorman talked with Howard on the telephone and insist-
ed that he had tied up the wrong car as Ernest Who-
brey did not owe him anything. According to Howard,
Gorman said, ‘‘We know the boy is using the truck, but
he don’t owe you.’? However, Gorman did not say how
long he had known the truck was in Kentucky. Both
Gorman and Ernest Whobrey testify that until his visit
to Evansville, the bank had no knowledge whatever that
the truck was in Kentucky. Howard’s version of the con-
versation is not inconsistent. It does not prove the ad-
mission of consent or even of previous knowledge. We
are of opinion, therefore, the evidence did not author-
ize a submission of the case to the jury on the issue of
consent or acquiescence. The court should have directed
a verdict for the plaintiff, Evansville Morris Plan Bank.
The-evidence was not sufficient to show the Bank sus-
tained any damages because of the seizure and retention
of the truck by Howard, or any damages claimed by
Howard.

The judgment is accordingly reversed.
|
In re Kenton County Bar Ass’n.
February 16, 1951.

I

665

Approving opinion.

The Kenton County Bar Association is requesting
that we review certain advisory opinions prepared by
the Board of Bar Commissioners of the Kentucky State
Bar Association. The request is made under Rules of
the Court of Appeals, Rule 3.590. This rule follows:
‘Any member of the Bar who is in doubt as to the pro-
priety of any contemplated professional act or course
of conduct may in writing petition the Board for an
advisory opinion thereon. In response to such petition
for an advisory opinion the Board shall as promptly as
possible furnish the petitioner a written opinion on the
propriety of the act or course of conduct in question,
and shall promptly furnish a copy of that opinion to the
Registrar and to the Secretary. Such opinion may be
prepared on behalf of the Board by a committee pro-
vided for that purpose in the By-Laws or appointed by
the President, but if so prepared the opinion shall be
submitted to and approved by the Board before being
released by the committee. If the member of the Bar who
sought the advisory opinion is dissatisfied with the opin-
ion rendered by the Board, he may file in the office of
the Clerk a transcript of the record, and, upon motion
and reasonable notice in writing to the Secretary, obtain
a review of the Board’s opinion by the Court. The
Court’s final action thereon shall, by the Clerk, be
promptly and in writing reported to the member of the
Bar who sought the advisory opinion, and to the Regis-
trar and the Secretary.’’

The questions we are asked to review and the
answers promulgated by the Board follow: .

666 ee

“The following questions raised before the Hxecu-
tive Committee of the Kenton County Bar Association
and framed by its Advisory Committee on Legal Bthies
have been formally submitted to the Board of Bar Com-
missioners of the Kentucky State Bar Association for
advisory opinions under the provisions of Section 3.590
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals.

“The questions are related to the general problem
of practice by judges and others having special respon-
sibilities and public duties. This problem may have been
created by the fact that the legislature has prohibited
or limited the practice of law in certain situations thus
fostering the assumption that practice under other sit-
uations not expressly prohibited by statute is proper.
This is not true. The ethics of the profession are estab-
lished by its traditions which are based on considera-
tions of public and professional good. The power to pre-
scribe and regulate the conduct of lawyers is inherent in
the courts as is recognized by KRS 30.170(b). The leg-
islature may, in the exercise of its police powers, limit
or prohibit the practice of law in certain situations, and
these regulations are recognized and enforced by the
courts, but the legislature cannot render ethical that
which is inherently unethical. The frequency with which
the Kentucky Legislature has dealt with the problem in
many of its various aspects, indicates its importance
and the public policy involved. However, these different
statutes do not purport to be a code of ethics nor is the
absence of statutory prohibition of the practice of law
under certain circumstances to be taken as legislative
approval or as making such practice proper and ethical.
A lawyer must be guided not only by the statutes but
also by the ethics of his profession.

“The specific questions asked have been duly con-
sidered by the Board and are answered as follows:

“Question 1. May a Lawyer Engaged in the Gen-
eral Practice of Law, Who, at the Same Time Holds a
Publie Office Requiring as a Condition of Such Tenure,
That He Take an Oath to Enforce the Laws of the Com-
monwealth Engaged in the Defense of Any Person
Charged with the Commission of a Crime or Misde-
meanor?

“Advisory Opinion: An Oath to Enforce the Laws

a

of the Commonwealth is Not Violated by the Proper and
Ethical Defense of a Person Accused of Crime.

“The right of a person accused of crime to a fair and
impartial trial before a jury of his peers was one of the
fundamental protections of individual rights and liber-
ties guaranteed by the Magna Charta and has become a
pillar of democracy everywhere. This right is recogniz-
ed in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the
United States and by Section 7 of the Constitution of
Kentucky. It has been consistently held that this right
necessarily includes the right to be represented by
counsel. The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, being part of the American Bill of Rights,
reads in part as follows: ‘In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury * * * and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defense.’

“Every member of the Kentucky Bar has taken an
oath to support the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and it is
the duty of every lawyer to preserve and advance the
constitutional guarantee of human rights and liberty.
These acts, if properly performed, could not be a viola-
tion of the laws of the Commonwealth.

““We have assumed that this question does not raise
any problem of a possible conflict between public office
and the practice of law. If it does, the answer must
necessarily depend on what office and what practice.

‘Question 2. May a Judge of a Subordinate Court,
Not Restricted by Statute to Engage in the General
Practice of Law, Ethically Represent Defendants in
Criminal Cases, in His Own or Other Courts?

‘(Advisory Opinion: It Is Improper for a Judge
of a Subordinate Court to Represent Defendants in
Criminal Cases in the County in Which He Serves as
Fudge.

“Any practice of law by one holding a judicial posi-
tion is undesirable and is forbidden by statutes in many
states. By such acts, he utilizes or seems to utilize his
judicial position to further his professional success. It
is especially undesirable for a judge to represent defend-
ants in criminal cases as there is the further objection

668 ee

that he thereby lends the prestige of his office to the de-
fense of an alleged criminal and there is an apparent
inconsistency of employment and conflict of- interest.
It is essential that public confidence in the administra-
tion of justice be maintained. The General Assembly
of Kentucky has enacted:from time to time many sta-
tutes restricting or prohibiting this practice of law by
holders of judicial offices and those connected with
them, all having the common purpose of preserving the
appearance as well as the substance of impartiality in
the trial of cases and of freeing the courts of the infer-
ence or fact of official influence and pressure. We rec-
ognize this sound public policy of separation of judicial
office and the practice of law.

“We realize that the remuneration of a judge of a
subordinate court may not be sufficient to induce a com-
petent attorney to accept the position if he is thereby
precluded from all practice of law. However, the re-
linquishment of practice in criminal cases is a burden
which he voluntarily assumes upon the acceptance of a
judicial office and is more than compensated for by the
benefits of the office. Public policy and the traditions
of the profession require him to accept the thorns with
the roses. ’

“Question 8. In Kentucky What Are the’ Public
Offices Required to be Held by Lawyers and Requiring
as a Condition of Tenure That The Office Holder Give
An. Oath to Enforce the Laws of the Commonwealth?

“This question does not concern the propriety of
any contemplated professional act or course of conduct

as required by RCA 3.590 and is probably immaterial in

view of our answer to Question 1. .

“Question 4(a). Is it Improper for a Lawyer to
Practice in a Court Over Which He Occasionally Pre-
sides as a Judge Pro Tempore?

“This question is too general for a definite answer
as the propriety of such conduct depends on the nature
and incidence of appointment. If there is a continuing
appointment with more or less permanent tenure of of-
fice, although subject to the pleasure of the judge or city
legislative body as is true in regard to judges pro tem
of police courts in cities of the first, fifth and sixth
classes and of county judges pro tem, it is improper for

‘

es

the appointee to practice any case in the court over
which he may preside, and until a reasonable time after
he has severed his official connection with that court.
In other cases, where the services are in the nature of
a special judge and the appointment limited to a particu-
lar trial or short period of time, the appointee is not pre-
eluded from practice in that’ court after the expiration
of his appointment. However, if a lawyer accepts such
temporary appointments frequently so that he may be
identified in the minds of some people with the judicial
position, he thereby disqualifies himself for further
practice in that court until that impression has been ‘re-
moved. .

“Question 4(b). Is it Improper for an Assistant
Prosecutor to Defend a Client in a Criminal Case?

‘Advisory Opinion: It is Improper for an Assistant
Prosecutor to Defend a Client in a Criminal Case,

“KRS 30.140 restricts the practice of a law partner
of a Commonwealth’s Attorney and KRS 69.020 pro-
vides that a Commonwealth’s Attorney shall not act as
defense counsel in any criminal prosecution. The same
policy would necessarily make it improper for an as-
sistant prosecutor to engage in such practice. There
would be an undesirable inconsistency of employment
and a representation of conflicting interests, prohibited
by Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Mthies adopt-
ed by the Court of Appeals for the regulation of profes-
sional conduct. .

“Question 4(c). Is it Improper for a Partner of
a Judge to Practice in the Court Over Which: He -Pre-
sides, or for the Partner of an Assistant.Prosecutor to
Defend a Criminal Case?. Would a Law Clerk-or Hm-
ployee be Subject to the Same Restriction, if. any?

”“ Advisory Opinion: It is Improper for a Partner of
a Judge to Practice in the Court Over Which the Judge
Presides or for the Partner of an Assistant Prosecutor
to Defend a.Criminal Case in that Jurisdiction. The
same Restrictions Apply.to Members or Employees of
the Firm. -

“KRS 30.130 prohibits partnerships between an
attorney and a judge of any court’ éxcept police judges
in cities of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth classes.

670 P|

ERS 30.140(2) provides that no law partner of a police
judge shall practice law in any case pending in the court
presided over by that judge. Canon 33 of Professional
Hthics requires that the name of a partner who becomes
a judge be dropped from the firm name. In regard to the
part of this question concerning the defense of alleged
criminals by the partner or law clerk of an assistant pros-
ecutor, we refer to our answer to question 4(b) and ap-
prove the many opinions of the Committee on Profess-
ional Hthics of the American Bar Association that
neither a law firm nor a partner thereof can properly
accept employment which any member of the firm can-
not properly accept.’’

Our reaction to the opinions expressed by the Board
of Bar Commissioners is favorable. Therefore, we ap-
prove them in substance. This approval, however, is
not to be considered as an exclusive treatment of the
questions dealt with, but rather as interpretative of the
Canons of Professional Ethics referred to in RCA 3.170
and other Rules of the Court or Statutes dealing with
the subjects.

Gross v. Kelly.
February 20, 1951.
‘Watt M. Prichard, Judge.

Dysard & Dysard for appellant.
B. Poe Harris for appellee.

a ort

Jupes Muixen—Reversing.

On January 18 or 19, 1948, Mrs. Zella Kelly, a prac-
tical nurse about fifty-nine years of age, submitted to a
beauty treatment at the hands of Mrs. Maysie Manning
Gross, an experienced beautician. The treatment was
intended to remove skin blemishes and wrinkles on Mrs.
Kelly’s face and neck, but according to her petition
the beauty preparation Mrs. Gross applied was so potent,
powerful and dangerous ‘‘that as a direct and proximate
result the plaintiff’s (Mrs. Kelly’s) kidneys were in-
juriously affected and blocked, her entire system ren-

dered toxic, and her health permanently impaired.’’°

After a hearing of the evidence offered, a jury returned
a verdict in favor of Mrs. Kelly for $1,580, and it is from
this verdict and judgment that this appeal is taken.

On a Sunday evening three or four hours after her
evening meal and three or four days after the beauty
treatment aforesaid, Mrs. Kelly became quite ill, suffered
nausea and vomiting, and, because she was living alone,
was removed to a hospital by her physician. A working
diagnosis of acute indigestion was made. The physician
also noted on the hospital record first degree chemical
burns on the face and neck and chemical conjunctivitis.
The first degree burns obtained in the beauty treatment
were admitted to be analogous to light sunburn. Labor-
atory tests at the hospital revealed that Mrs. Kelly’s
kidneys functioned normally, that her blood pressure
was nomal, blood count normal, and heart essentially
normal. Her physician stated that Mrs. Kelly was suffer-
ing from nervous tension, but that the cause of it was
indeterminate.

The preparation used on Mrs. Kelly was a mixture
of gum tragacanth, citric acid, bay rum and peroxide
according to the testimony of the defense, was designed.
to remove the epidermis and to bleach and draw the
skin, Mrs. Kelly offered no testimony to establish that
these ingredients were harmful nor that the use of them
caused the plaintiff’s illness several days later. The
plaintiff intimated the preparation contained carbolic
acid because she thought she smelled it, but admitted
that she did not actually know what it contained.

The gist of Mrs. Kelly’s evidence is that she became
ill three or four days after a beauty treatment at the

672 ee

hands of Mrs. Gross, and from this sequence of events
she implies that Mrs. Gross was negligent and that the
beauty treatment caused the illness of which complaint
was made.

‘We conclude that the evidence of causation as well
as negligence was insufficient to sustain the burden: of
proof. ‘Evidence merely furnishing the basis of con-
jecture, surmise, or speculation does not establish proxi-
mate cause, with certitude sufficient upon which to rest
a verdict of a jury. * * * A plaintiff is never entitled
to rest a verdict in his favor on mere supposition or con-

» jecture; that is, on the possibility the thing could have
happened, or on an idea or notion founded on the prob-
ability that a thing may have occurred, without proof
that it did occur, from the acts of negligence upon which
his recovery is based.’? Wigginton’s Adm’r v. Louis-
ville Ry. Co., 256 Ky. 287, 75 S. W. 2d 1046, 1050, See
Shearman-Redfield on Negligence, Section 46; Ky. Di:
gest, Negligence, Key 26, 134 and 136 for collection of
cases.

We conclude that the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered illness is not of itself alone proof of negligence
upon the part of the defendant, and that the trial court
erred in overruling defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict. Donoho v. Rawleigh, 230 Ky. 11, 18 8. W. 2d
311 at page 314, 69 A. L. R. 1135. ,

Judgment reversed for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.
a ;
Cole’s Adm’r v. Cole’s Adm’r et al.

February 20, 1951.
Noel ¥. Harper, Special Judge.

ee 673

Wilson & Wilson for appellant. .
Paul Greer, Terry L. Hatchett for appellees.

Juver Herm—Affirming.

“Theodore Cole, referred to in the record as Dore,
and his wife, Mary Willie Collins Cole, referred to as
May; ‘‘substantial’’ colored people, lived in a two-story
frame home on their 83-acre farm in the southwest part
of Barren County. On the night of October 7, 1948, the
hhorhe burned and May lost her life in the fire. On Oc-
tober 11, 1948, Dore committed suicide by shooting him-
self with a shotgun.

This action is prosecuted by the administrator of

the estate of Mary Willie Collins Cole against the ad-

- ministrator of the estate of Theodore Cole, alleging that

“Theodore Cole * * * wrongfully brought about the

death of Mary Willie Collins Cole,’’ thereby damaging

her estate in the sum of $20,000. At a trial before a jury,

the Special Judge, at the close of the testimony, directed

a verdict for appellee, defendant below. Appellant is

here maintaining that the court erred in directing a
verdict for appellee.

-_ Dore and May had been married about 22 years.
They had no children. Frank Payne, a witness for ap-
pellant, lived about 500 yards from the Cole home. He,
Dore and Veachel Richey were fox hunting the night of
the fire. They each returned to their homes about 11
p. m. Payne says, ‘‘about one a. m. the light shining in
the window waked me up.’’ He saw that the Cole house
was ‘‘burning up.’? He put on his clothes and went over
there. Payne found Dore outside the rapidly burning
house; he ‘‘just had on underwear.’’ Dore was going up
to the windows around the house looking for his wife;
he was excited. Dore asked Payne if May was at his
house. When Payne said she was not, Dore told him
about dragging May to the back door; said, ‘‘the door
was contrary about undoing sometimes, he had grabbed
her in the bed, he had got her around the neck and under
this arm and-drug her to the back door, said he didn’t
know whether she was awake or still asleep, said him
scared and trying to get this door undone, and the place
caving in, he turned her loose to take his other hand to

674 |

get this door undone, and about the time he got it un-
done, she said ‘I can’t go out there without a dress on,
Thave got to get me a dress,’ said that was the last words
he ever heard her say. He got the door undone about
that time and run out into the well porch and then out
the end door, * * * said, like anybody would, he was
walking around the house looking at the fire, said he
went around some three or four times, said he noticed
he didn’t see May no where, then he began to call her,
** * couldn’t raise her, and so he goes out to Mr. Rich-
ey’s on the hunt of her, and she wasn’t out there, then
he come back, and it wasn’t so long until I come, and he
asked me if May was at my house, and I told him, ‘No,
I haven’t seen her,’ and he said, ‘Lordy merey, she is
in there burning up,’ * * *.’? Whit Beckham, who heard
Dore ‘‘hollering,’? went to the Cole home. He says,
‘‘When I walked up, Dore was between the garage and
the corner of the house down on the ground, just rolling
and hollering, ‘Lord have mercy, * * *’ and I walked up
and said, ‘Dore, what is the matter?’ and he jumped up
and said, ‘Everything I got is burning up, and I don’t
know where the old lady is. I got her to the door and I
don’t know whether she went back or come out,’ and I
said, ‘Maybe she went up to Mr. Richey’s,’ and he said,
‘No, I have been up there, and she wasn’t up there.’ ’’

The Cole house was ‘‘weather boarded’? and ‘‘ceiled
inside.’’ It had four rooms on the first floor, with a front
and back porch, and had an upstairs. One of the front
rooms was a bedroom; behind it was the kitchen; the
other back room was the dining room, the northeast
room. During the course of the fire an electric refriger-
ator, located in the southeast corner of the dining room
next to the outside wall and front room, exploded, mak-
ing a noise ‘‘about like dynamite.’? When the house had
almost completely burned, Dore discovered the burned
body of his wife just under the outside window of the
dining room.

The door of the refrigerator was blown off of its
hinges—was blown several feet across the room. When
May was found, the charred remains of a part of one
lee was under the refrigerator door and one over it.
The body was face down. Some ‘‘buttons off her dress,
three buttons in a row, and a belt buckle’? were lying
near the body.

es 67s

The witnesses, including the coroner who was called,
describe the body. After the house had fallen in, the body
was lying in the embers. All the flesh was burned from
the body, and the bones were charred. The top of her
head was ‘‘burned white, like chalk.’? The front part of
the face and skull was gone. There was a hole in the back
top part of the skull about the size of a dollar. The cor-
oner and witnesses did not notice any other caved in or
cracked places, just ‘‘the nicked skull,’’ looked like ‘‘it
had been bored in there with an auger or something.”
The bones were placed in a tub and removed by the
undertaker. No one made a careful examination of the
body. No autopsy was had.

It appears that Dore and his wife were well thought
of by their neighbors, both white and colored, a number
of whom testified.

After the fire was over, Payne found the metal
portion of a shotgun in the ashes of what had been the
bedroom. The metal part of a shell was in the barrel of
the gun. Payne says, ‘‘I am most sure it wasn’t snapped
on.”

The testimony of an insurance agent, who had con-
ducted an investigation sometime after the fire, was
that his company had two policies on the life of Dore;
that later Dore took out a policy on May for $500 natural
death, $1000 for accidental death, with Dore as bene-
ficiary. The record does not disclose whether or not
May knew about the policy.

May’s relatives testified as to marital difficulties
between Dore and May; that in the summer of 1948 the
parties had agreed to a settlement of property rights
and to the bringing of divorce action, but they had later
become reconciled and no divorce action had been filed.

After the fire, Dore’s truck was near the garden
with the switch key in the truck. Dore said, ‘‘ ‘I have
always made it a rule since I got this new truck, if I
wasn’t going but ten feet from it, to take the keys out.
Today I left my keys.in that truck for the first time.
I don’t know what made me do it.’ ’’ In the eary morn-
ing after the fire the neighbors sent to a store and
bought a shirt, trousers, socks and shoes for Dore, as
he was dressed only in underwear. After he put on the
trousers he felt in his pockets and said, ‘‘ ‘This is the

676 es

first time in my life I have been without a penny in my
pockets,’ ’? and added, ‘‘ ‘over $200 burned up in there
besides all my other things and my. wife.’ ”’

Dr: Paul York, who had not made an examination of
the body, was called by appellant. He was asked ques-
tions embracing the facts of the record, including the
fact that the house had burned with the body in it, had
fallen in, and the body was found among the embers on
the ground, face down, with a hole in the back top part
of the skull. Asked if there was any way of telling what
happened to the skull, he answered that there wasn’t,
unless there had been an examination by a trained man
at the time. The evidence of Dr. Rex Hayes, called by
appellant, was not any more satisfactory.

In his brief, appellant sets out fully the law appli-
cable to directed verdicts. It is urged that the evidence
was sufficient to take the case to the jury. In the brief
it is said, ‘‘The test is whether or not any evidence has
been submitted sufficient to sustain the cause of action.’’
The scintilla rule has been abandoned in this state. Nu-
gent v. Nugent’s Ex’r., 281 Ky. 263, 135 S.W.2d 877.

We have made a careful examination of all of the
record. We do not find any evidence of substance in
the record upon which a verdict could be based. In our
opinion, the cause of May Cole’s death, and the origin
of the fire which destroyed the Cole home, is a matter
of conjecture and speculation. It follows that the trial
court properly directed a verdict for appellee.

The judgment is affirmed.
Pe

Wilson v. Molter et al.
February 20, 1951.
J. Ward Lehigh, Judge.

a 677

Ollie James Cohen and Theodore Wurmser for appellant.

Davis, Boehl, Viser & Marcus for appellees.
Juven Herm—aAffirming.

Appellant, William Bennett Wilson, 26, filed this
action against appellees, Ralph A. Molter and Theresa
Molter, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile
accident on February 29, 1948, on West Jefferson Street
in Louisville. Appellant seeks a reversal, maintaining
(1) if only one conclusion can be reached from the physi-
cal facts of an accident, that theory of the case which
supports those facts should control the verdict, other-
wise the verdict would be contrary to the evidence and
law; (2) it is prejudicial and improper to instruct a jury
to find against a pedestrian simply because he crossed
a street at a place other than at a regular crosswalk;
and (3) appellant was entitled to a last clear chance
instruction.

Appellant testified that after attending a picture

678 |

show at the Lyric Theatre he was walking west on the
south side of Jefferson Street. He lived at the corner
on the north side of this street at No. 1033. He walked
to the intersection at Hleventh Street; he noticed a car
parked in front of 1038 or 1036 on the south side of
Jefferson; he started from south to north near a sewer
and at or near the crosswalk; he looked both ways.
Helpful diagrams and photographs are filed with the
record. Bleventh Street is 36 feet wide; West Jefferson
at this location is a well-lighted street, 60 feet wide. At
that time it was a two-way street, with two east bound
and two west bound driving lanes. He states that when
he was about the dividing line between the east bound
driving lanes, he saw an automobile with ‘‘its lights on’’
coming east at ‘“‘a high rate of speed,’’ about 60
miles per hour; it was from ‘‘three-quarters to a
quarter of a block away’’; he continued walking toward
the north side of the street; he tried to get out of the
way of the car but it struck him and knocked him uncon-
scious, and he remembered nothing more until he came
to himself at Nichols General Hospital. He suffered
fractures of his left leg.

Ruth Young, who says she was walking alone about
50 or 60 feet behind appellant, says she saw him walk
to the corner, ‘‘look both ways,’’ and start across at the
corner. She saw a car coming east about a quarter of a
block beyond the intersection, going about 50 or 60 miles
an hour; she heard a screech of its brakes when it was
‘tat the intersection’’; she saw the accident; appellant
was struck at the intersection; his body was carried
along the street to about the back end of Charlie Wood-
son’s car; she had been to the Woodson home.

Appellee Ralph Molter, 21, is a son of appellee The-
resa Molter. At the time of the accident he was em-
ployed as an oiler at Canal Street for the Louisville Gas
and Electric Company. He had worked for the Compa-
ny before he went to the army, and had been working
about a year and a half after getting out of the army. He
had driven a car since he was 16. He was 20 years of age
at the time of the accident and was driving his mother’s
ear. Herman Ooslow and R. M. Humphrey, fellow work-
men of Molter, were riding in the car with him. Molter
says his hours at work were from 3 to 11 p.m. He left
his place of work just after 11 p. m. and drove south

Le 679

to Jefferson Street and was driving east on Jefferson
in the right driving lane, a short distance from the curb,
at about 25 miles an hour; he had crossed the Hleventh
Street intersection and was about 80 feet beyond it when
appellant stepped out from the east end of an automo-
bile parked at the curb on the south side of the street
and walked directly into the path of his car; when he
first saw appellant as he stepped out, he was only about
15 feet from him; he cut his wheels to the left and ap-
plied his brakes in an effort to avoid colliding with ap-
pellant but he continued to walk into the path of his car
and was struck by his right front fender and knocked
toward the center of the street; he stopped his car with
the left front wheel about the center line of the street.

Coslow and Humphrey corroborated the testimony
of Molter. Coslow was sitting in the front seat with
Molter. He says that Molter was traveling at about 25
or 30 miles an hour in the traffic lane nearest the eurb-
ing, and about three or four feet from the left side of a
car parked in front of 1038 West Jefferson Street;
that appellant stepped out from behind this car into the
path of Molter’s car. Humphrey corroborated the state-
ments of Molter and Coslow.

Officers Clarence Prince and Joseph Graves, of
the Accident Prevention Squad of the Louisville Police
Department, arrived at the scene of the accident a few
minutes after it occurred. They found appellant lying
on or near the yellow line in the center of the street at
a point which, from the testimony and a diagram filed
with the evidence, appears to be about opposite No. 1038
West Jefferson Street, and about 90 feet east of the
Eleventh Street intersection. The officers testified
there was a car parked at the south curb in front of
1038 West Jefferson Street. The officers found one
skid mark about 30 feet in length. It began about the
line between the two east bound driving lanes and ‘‘an-
gled to the left’’ to the northeast toward the center line.
The skidmark ‘‘ended at a point some 10 or 12 feet * * *
west of the body”’ lying almost on the center line of the
street.

In his brief appellant maintains that if the evidence
and physical facts are undisputed, only one conclusion
can be reached. That is true. But the evidence here is
in sharp conflict, and the physical facts do not support

880 |

appellant’s contention. Clearly under all the facts and
testimony of this case, it was one for the jury.

Appellant contends that the court, in effect, in-
structed the jury to find against appellant ‘‘simply be-
cause he crossed the street at a place other than at a
regular crosswalk.’? We do not find this to be correct.

The court, in substance, instructed the jury that it
was the duty of appellee to exercise ordinary care to so
operate his automobile as not to cause it to come into col-
lision with other persons using the street at that time and
place; that this included the duty to have his automobile
under reasonable control, and to operate it at a rate of
speed that was reasonable, having regard for traffic
conditions; to operate it at a rate of speed not greater
than 25 miles per hour, unless considering the traffic
conditions and use of the street at that time and’ place
such greater speed was not unreasonable, and to keep a
lookout ahead for persons in front of him, or so near
thereto as to be in danger. The court instructed the
jury that if they believed from the evidence appellant
was crossing Jefferson Street in the regular crosswalk
provided for pedestrians, then it was appellee’s duty
to yield the right-of-way to appellant, and, if necessary,
to slow down or stop in order that appellant might cross
the street in safety. The jury was instructed that if ap-
pellant failed to perform any one or more of these duties
and by reason thereof his car came into collision with
appellant and he was thereby injured, then the law is
for appellant. In a second instruction the jury was told
that it was the duty of appellant to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety, and this included the duty to
cross the street in the regular crosswalk provided for
pedestrians; that if they believed from the evidence he
crossed the street at a place other than at the regular
crosswalk provided for pedestrians, it was his duty
to yield the right-of-way to east bound and west bound
traffic on Jefferson Street, including the automombile of
appellee, and to exercise for his own safety such in-
creased care as was commensurate with the increased
danger, if any. The jury was told that if they believed
from the evidence he failed to perform any one or more
of these duties and by reason of such, if any, he helped
to cause or bring about the accident and injuries of
which he complains, then the law is for appellee. These

[| 681

instructions as to yielding the right-of-way are based on
KRS 189.570.

The second instruction as to the duty of appellant,
provided that if he did not use the crosswalk but crossed
between the intersections, then he should yield the right-
of-way to east and west traffic, including appellant’s
car. This instruction, while not artfully drawn, could
not have misled the jury.

Appellant contends that he should have been given
a last clear chance instruction, citing Nowak v. Joseph,
275 Ky. 470, 121 S.W.2d 939. Here the first instruction
fully covers the theory of appellant under his evidence.
According to the testimony for appellee, he was within
15 feet of appellant when he stepped out from behind
a parked car. Appellee used the means at hand to avoid
striking appellant but was unable to do so because ap-
pellant continued to walk into the path of his car. In
Settle v. Haynes, 312 Ky. 285, 227 S.W.2d 193, 195, in
refusing a last clear chance or discovered peril doctrine
instruction, we said: ‘‘ * * * The record fails to show
how defendant could have avoided the accident by the
exercise of ordinary care and the means at hand after
he saw plaintiff lunge or dart in front of his car. Peak
v. Arnett, 233 Ky. 756, 26 S.W.2d 1035; Runge v. Haller,
236 Ky. 423, 33 S.W.2d 317.’? See Swift and Company
v. Thompson’s Adm’r., 308 Ky. 529, 214 8.W.2d 758.

After a careful consideration of all the facts and
circumstances of this case, we believe the trial court did
pot err in declining to give a last clear chance instruc-

on.

The jury saw and heard the witnesses. “They are
the judges of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Appellant’s difficulty is that the jury obviously believed
appellee and his witnesses, and the police officers who
were introduced by appellant. The finding of the jury
is supported by the weight of the testimony.

The judgment is affirmed.

682

Schuler v. Getzendaner.
February 20, 1951.
Joseph P. Goodenough, Judge.

Charles H. Dunn for appellant.
Orie S. Ware and William 0. Ware for appellee.
Jover Mirixm—Affirming.

This action is brought under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, Section 639a-1 et seq., Civil Code of Practice,
for the construction of a will devising real estate and,
if the desired construction is obtained, it is prayed that
the court will direct the specific performance of a con-
tract for the purchase of land.

Eugenia Getzendaner has claimed ownership of
the land under the will of Eugenia Williams Bristow
which was probated November 18, 1889, and recorded in
Will Book No. 2, page 86, of the Kenton County records
at Independence, Kentucky. Mrs. Getzendaner has con-
tracted to sell the real estate in question to the ap--
pellant, Henry H. Schuler, and he is willing to comply
with his contract providing he is assured the fee simple
title to the real estate has passed to Mrs. Getzendaner
under the aforesaid will. The chancellor concluded that

ee 683

the will passed the fee simple title to Mrs. Getzendaner,
decreed specific performance of the contract, and it is
from this judgment that this appeal is taken.

The opinion of the chancellor reads in part:

“The facts are that Eugenia Williams Bristow died
in November, 1889, and by her will dated May 2nd, 1889,
and probated November 18th, 1889, she devised sixty
acres of land to her husband, Ben Frank Bristow, for
life, and at his death to her foster granddaughter, Hu-
genia Bristow, now Eugenia Getzendaner, plaintiff in
this action. Eugenia Williams Bristow and Ben Frank
Bristow, her husband, had reared a foster child named.
Mary J. Bristow, and she married Leonard Bristow of
the same name, and they had a child Eugenia Bristow,
who is the plaintiff, Hugenia Getzendaner.

“Ttem 3 of the will of Eugenia Williams Bristow
is as follows:

“¢ ‘Ttem 8. My husband shall have the remaining
sixty acres of land to hold and use to his interest during
his life. At his death it shall be deeded to Eugenia Bris-
tow (daughter of Mary J. Bristow) and her children.
In event that she should die before coming into posses-
sion of said land it shall go to my sisters, Carrie B. Dud-
ley, Stella J. Williams, and my brother Charley Wil-
liams to be equally divided between them.’

“Bugenia Bristow (now Eugenia Getzendaner) was
born April 9th, 1887, and was 24% years of age at the
time of the death of her foster grandmother, Eugenia
Williams Bristow. By this item of her will Eugenia
Williams Bristow devised sixty acres of land, 51.45 acres
of which is included in the sale of the 101.45 acres de-.
scribed in the petition, to her husband, Ben Frank Bris-
tow, during his life, and at his death it shall be deed-
ed to Eugenia Bristow and her children, and in the
event Hugenia Bristow should die before coming into pos-.
session of said land it should go to her (Eugenia Wil-.
liams Bristow’s) sisters and brother. The life tenant,
Ben Frank Bristow, died December 30th, 1927, and at.
that time Eugenia Bristow (plaintiff) was forty years.
of age, and came into possession of the property and has.
enjoyed and used it as her own since that time, and in,
the interim has sold some of-it,-on which improvements;
have been made. . Eugenia Bristow Getzendaner is now;

684 ee

a widow, sixty-three years of age, and without issue.
She survived the life tenant and came into possession of
the property upon his death, December 30th, 1927. * * *

“The legal question presented involves a-construc-
tion of the will of Hugenia Williams Bristow, which is
filed with and made a part of the petition, and particu-
larly Item 3 of said will. It is perfectly clear that under
the language of Item 3 of the will, it was the intention
‘of the testatrix to give Eugenia Bristow (now Eugenia
Getzendaner) a fee simple estate if she survived the life
tenant,’ Ben Frank Bristow. The will was obviously
drawn by an unskilled person and to some extent pre-
sents the question as to whether or not the words ‘her
children’ were words of limitation or of purchase. The
will provides that after the death of the life tenant it
should be deeded to Eugenia Bristow (Mrs. Getzendaner)
and her children, and, had she stopped there, it might pre-
sent some question as to the interpretation-of the words
‘her children’ and whether they were words of limitation
or words of purchase. However, in the last sentence of
Item 3 she very clearly enlarges the quantum of the
estate devised to Bugenia Bristow (Mrs. Getzen-
daner), and makes certain and definite the intention,
of the testatrix. She provides in the event Eugenia
Bristow (Mrs. Getzendaner) should die before coming
into possession of said land, that is, during the life of
her foster grandfather, Ben Frank Bristow, it should
go to the two sisters and brother of testatrix. Hvidently
the word ‘deeded’ is equivalent to ‘devised’ and it is
also perfectly evident that the word ‘possession’ refer-
red to the future enjoyment of the estate devised if she
survived Ben Frank Bristow, life tenant. Certainly if
she did not intend Eugenia Bristow (Mrs. Getzendaner)
to have-the fee she would have provided that in event of
the death of Eugenia Bristow without issue, it would
pass to her two sisters and brother, but since she pro-
vided that if Eugenia Bristow (Mrs. Getzendaner) alone
died before the life tenant it should pass to others, she
must have intended to vest Eugenia Bristow (Mrs. Get-
zendaner) with the fee simple title, if shé survived the
life tenant. This plain language of Item 3 of the will
authorizes this conclusion. In view of this language,
as a converse proposition, if Eugenia Bristow (Mrs. Get-
vendaner) ‘had died during the life of the life tenant,
with issue, could such issue have successfully contended

a 685.

they*had any interest in the property? It would seem
not. This fortifies the conclusion that the word ‘chil-
dren’ in the first part of Item 8 of the will was-intended
as a word of inheritance or limitation and not of pur-
chase, and it also makes certain that Hugenia Bristow
(now Getzendaner) took a defeasible fee, subject to be-
ing defeated if she died during the lifetime of Ben Frank
Bristow, and since she survived Ben Frank Bristow, her
fee simple estate in the land devised became absolute.

“However, it is the opinion of this court that the
unambiguous language of Item 3 of this will settles the
question here presented and that the plaintiff, Hugenia
Getzendaner, having survived the life tenant, her defeas-
ible fee became absolute and she is now the owner of a
good marketable fee simple title.’’ .

vt
We concur in the opinion of the chancellor because
we believe it accurately reflects the intention of the tes-
tatrix. Since it is axiomatic that ‘‘no will has a broth-
er,”’? we do not believe the citation of cases would be
helpful. .

Judgment affirmed.
a
Howard v. Howard.

February 20, 1951.
James C. Carter, Jr., Judge.

Paul Carter for appellant.
Abe P. Carter for appellee.

Juver Morsmen—Affirming.

This suit was instituted by appellant, Ollie Howard
against appellee, Carlos Howard, for divorce and ali-
mony upon the ground that appellee had been guilty of
such cruel beating and attempted injury of appellant
as indicated an outrageous temper in him and probable
danger to her life, or great bodily harm, from remaining
with him. The petition was subsequently amended to
include an allegation of cruel and inhuman treatment.
Appellee counterclaimed upon the ground of cruel and
inhuman treatment, and sought an absolute divorce. The
court entered a judgment granting to appellant an ab-
solute divorce and awarding to her alimony in the sum
of $400. Appellant, believing the amount to be insuf-
ficient, appealed from that part of the judgment which
fixed the amount of alimony.

The parties to this suit were reared on adjoining
farms owned by their respective parents, and their
friendship began in high school. Appellee was in the
army for a period of three and one-half years, and,
after his discharge from the service, he returned to his
father’s farm. He renewed his acquaintance with appel-
lant and for about a year before they were married on
June 28, 1948, they kept steady company. At the time
the marriage ceremony was performed, he was 27 years
old and she was 23 years old. They lived together about
76 days; separated, and appellant filed suit for divorce
on November 8, 1948.

In view of the fact that appellant was granted a di-
vorce, and the only question before us is whether or not
the amount of alimony awarded is sufficient, we will not
review the events that led up to the dissolution of this
marriage.

Appellant insists that in addition to the lump sum

P| 687

alimony, which she believes to be too small, appellee
should be required to pay a fixed sum monthly for her
support.

Before his marriage, appellee had accumulated the
following property: about $1800, which he had saved
from his pay while in the army; three cows, and a 1940
Pontiac automobile. His gross income was shown to
be: a monthly allotment of $67.50 from the United States
Government under the Farm Training Program, which
was increased by $26.25 per month after marriage; about
$80 every four weeks from the sale of milk, and a share
in the proceeds of his father’s farm, the amount of which
was not definitely shown, except that appellee testified
he received $500 for his share of the tobacco crop for
the preceding year.

In the case of Turner v. Hwald, 290 Ky. 833, 162
S.W.2d 181, 186, we approved the practice of lump sum
alimony settlements, saying: ‘‘In this jurisdiction a
lump-sum award in lieu of a periodical allowance is fa-
vored where the husband owns sufficient property to
permit such a settlement of alimony claims fairly to both
parties.’”

In the case of Lewis v. Lewis, 204 Ky. 5, 263 S.W.
366, it was written: ‘“We have never adopted a fixed
rule for determining the amount of alimony or the per-
centage of her husband’s estate to which a wife is en-
titled upon securing a divorce. That is a matter which
is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor to be de-
cided in the light of the facts of each particular case, and
the decision of the chancellor thereon will not be dis-
tarbed by this court unless it is manifestly erroneous.’’

‘We have indicated, however, that in fixing lump
sum alimony, an allowance of one-third of the husband’s
estate, in many cases, is equitable. Ahrens v. Ahrens,
313 Ky. 55, 230 S.W.2d 73. However, each case must be
decided by the consideration of its peculiar facts with
weight given to their exclusive quality.

Both parties here are young and in good health.
Their family circumstances are similar. They have had
about the same amount of formal education. Both will be
able to labor and earn money in the future if they so de-
sire. It is true that appellee had accumulated some pro-
perty, but there is no showing that his wife had helped

688

him in its accumlation during the brief period they lived
together. In fact, it was shown that the amount of cash
decreased from about $1800 to approximately $1400.

In view of the ephemeral nature of this maritial
union, we are of opinion that the chancellor properly
looked only to the amount of property which appellee had -
at the time of separation, and made the award from that
property. His refusal to award future monthly pay-
ments of alimony was proper under the facts here pre-
sented, and we believe that he did not abuse the sound
discretion vested in him.

Judgment affirmed.

Bowman et al. v. Hibbard et al.
February 20, 1951.
Ray C. Lewis, Judge.

as 689

Cleon K. Calvert and J. M. Lyttle for appellants.
Hiram H. Owens and Clay Bishop for appellees.

Juven Morrman—Reversing.

Appellants filed a petition in the Clay Circuit Court
by which they sought to recover damages from appellees
for the alleged wrongful action of appellees in entering
upon and under land belonging to them and mining and
converting to their own use coal owned by appellants.
The appellants specifically waived the cause of action
sounding in tort for the alleged trespass and sued upon
the averred implied promise of appellees to pay the rea-
sonable market value of the coal alleged to have been
converted. Appellees’ answer as amended consisted of
a traverse and (inter alia) the following affirmative de-

‘enses :

(a) That appellants had sold land, from which coal
was said to have been converted, to Autho Sizemore who,
with others, traded under the firm name of Radar Creek
Coal Company, and, at the time of said sale, they knew
that the trespass had been committed and the coal re-
moved, and, in order to perpetrate a fraud upon the
purchaser, said fact was concealed.

(b) That appellants sold said boundary of coal em-
bracing 16 acres at $500 per acre or a total amount of
$8000, thereby selling it as if no part of the coal had
been taken from under the land prior to the sale and by
reason of which appellants were estopped from asserting
claim against the appellees. °

(ce) That subsequent to these transactions, the Radar
Creek Coal Company, for a valuable consideration, sold
and agreed to execute a good and perfect title to the coal
area to the appellees, and, that since the deed to the
Radar Creek Coal Company was to a fictitious name, it
was necessary that Sizemore require appellants to exe-
cute a deed to appellees conveying the entire coal area
embraced in said deed, which was alleged to have been
done, and, because of said action, it was averred that ap-
pellants continued the perpetration of the fraud and
were thereby estopped from maintaining suit against
appellees. .

690 — eee

(d) That on account of the alleged fraudulent con-
duct on part of appellants, should appellants be per-
mitted to recover any sum from appellees, the same
should be set off against the $8000 paid by the appellees
and received by the appellants for the entire boundary
of coal,

(e) It was also denied that any coal had been taken
from said boundary intentionally in excess of 33 tons. *

(£) By supplementary answer appellees admitted
that through error 264 tons of coal had been removed
from the area and they offered to confess judgment in
the sum of $26.40,

Upon the trial of this case and at the conclusion of
all evidence offered on behalf of appellants, the Court
directed the jury to return a verdict for the appellees.
It will be necessary, therefore, to discuss at some length
the evidence produced in behalf of appellants in order
that it may be determined whether or not a directed ver-
dict was properly given.

Appellants are the widow and children of D. B.
Bowman who died intestate and from whom they in-
herited a tract of land in Clay County adjoining the min-
ing property of the Sidell Coal Company. Sidell Coal

ompany is a trade name under which appellees Oscar
Hibbard, Hubert Johnson, and Gib Thompson conduct
a coal mining operation.

Sidell Coal Company invaded the land owned by ap-
pellants and removed coal belonging to them. Clifton
Bowman, who was the principal representative of ap-
pellants, warned Oscar Hibbard of the Sidell Coal Com-
pany to keep off appellants’ land. He stated that an
engineer ran the boundary line of the mine on the sur-
face of the ground in his presence and in the presence
of Oscar Hibbard.

At a time not shown to be certain by the evidence,
Oscar Hibbard entered into negotiations for the pur-
chase of a tract of land comprising about 16 acres, which
adjoined the mining property of the Sidell Coal Com-
pany, and these negotiations progressed to the stage
where a deed was prepared. Irwin Bowman, one of the
appellants, undertook to have the deed acknowledged by
the other heirs. There is some indication in the evidence
that all the heirs signed this deed and some testimony

| 691

to the effect that the deed was burned up, but the wit-
nesses are unanimous in the statement that the deed was
never delivered to Oscar Hibbard and that they received
no money from him as the purchase price. It was shown
that in this deed no reference had been made to the fact
that some coal had been removed from the land which
the deed purported to convey. Thereafter Autho Size-
more, who, with others, did business under. the trade
name of Radar Creek Coal Company, purchased from
appellants by deed dated November 2, 1948, this same
tract of land which had been the object of negotiations
between appellants and Hibbard, and paid therefor the
sum of $8000, and in this deed no mention is made of the
fact that some coal had been removed from under a por-
tion of the land conveyed. Since it is important to the
decision in this case, we copy from the deed a descrip-
tion of the tract of coal conveyed, which is as follows:

“A certain tract of coal lying and being in Clay
County and State of Kentucky on the Robert Ponder
Branch, waters of Little Goose Creek, waters of Big
Goose Creek, waters of South Fork of the Kentucky
River and bounded as follows:

“Beginning at an on a bunch of Sourwood and Ma-
ples, thence running up said Robert Ponder Branch to
the falls, thence continuing up to the bridge, thence run-
ning with the road to the William Sandlin Line to a
stone, thence Southeast to the top of point, thence with
the top of the ridge to the Daniel Ponder line, thence
running a west course to Ira Wells line, thence with
conditional line made between Tipton Bowman and J.
C. Sams to the beginning.’’

The original deed was filed in evidence and bears
the notation that it was recorded in Deed Book 95, Page
283.

Autho Sizemore testified that he purchased the coal
for himself and that no member of the Sidell Coal Com-
pany contributed any part of the purchase price. He
stated that at the time he purchased the property he knew
that the Sidell Coal Company had gone across the line
and had taken coal out of appellants’ land. He further
testified that the Radar Creek Coal Company ‘‘gave’’
to the Sidell Coal Company the coal which he had pur-
chased from appellants because he himself had got over

692 ee

on the Sidell Coal Company property and had worked out
some of their coal. It appears that a suit grew out of
this encroachment by Radar Creek Coal Company upon
the property belonging to the Sidell Coal Company, and
the transfer of the coal together with a payment of about
$2700 was in settlement of that suit. The record is not
clear as to whether or not the Radar Creek Coal Compa-
ny made a formal deed to the property to the Sidell
Coal Company, and no deed, nor evidence concerning
the deed, was produced at the trial. Appellees, in their
briefs, based their argument in part upon the supposi-
tion that after the settlement of the suit, appellants con-
veyed the same boundary of coal to appellees which they
had previously conveyed to the Rader Creek Coal Com-
pany, but we find nothing in the evidence contained in
the bill of exceptions to support this statement. The
only positive statement we find anywhere in the record
concerning a deed executed by the Bowman heirs and de-
livered to appellees is a statement to that effect contain-
ed in appellees’ answer.

After all evidence had been produced in behalf of
appellants, the trial court peremptorily instructed the
jury to find for appellees on the grounds: (1) that he
was of opinion that appellants could not sell this bound-
ary of coal, not tell anyone that part of the coal was
gone, receive payment for it, and then in turn sue to re-
cover for the value of part of the coal; (2) that ap-
pellants had not discovered the shortage of coal until
four months after they had sold it for $8000; (3) that
the deed calls for coal under the land described and ap-
pellants had received $500 per acre for it, when in fact
about two acres were gone.

It must be remembered that this is a suit upon an
‘implied contract for coal belonging to appellants al-
leged to have been removed by appellees. However, the
general rule seems to be that in order for a person to
maintain an action of trespass, he must show only that
he had actual or constructive possession of the real prop-
erty in question at the time the alleged injury occurred
.and the fact that plaintiff transfers the title ‘to the
. property. after the trespass does not divest him of his
‘wight to recover damages if the injury was. inflicted
during ‘the time of his control of the property. 52 Am.
-Jur.; Trespass, Section 28.

PC 698

We believe that the proof adduced by appellants
was ample to show that appellants knew long before
a survey was made that coal was being removed from
their property. There is an inconsistency in charging
appellants with failure to tell the purchaser that some
coal had been removed and at the same time denying
that any appreciable amount of coal had been taken.
Appellant, Clifton Bowman, testified that he warned
the Sidell Coal Company to stay off their land, and the
survey which was completed after the sale of the prop-
erty was only had for the purpose of establishing in
an accurate manner the amount of coal which had been
removed. As we understand the evidence, there was no
party to any of these transactions who did not know
that the coal had been removed from a portion of the
boundary of coal which had been conveyed. Clifton Bow-
man testified that he knew it and had warned the Sidell
Coal Company to stay off the land belonging to the Bow-
man heirs. Autho Sizemore testified that he knew it, at
the time he purchased the property, and if the Sidel Coal
Company did in fact remove the coal from the Bow-
man’s land they certainly should have known it. No
one else was interested.

We are of opinion that the fact that all parties
kmew or should be charged with the knowledge that coal
had been removed is sufficient to dispose of appellees’
contention that appellants were estopped to complain
that coal had been removed, and that they should have
informed both Sizemore and appellees of the fact.”

The trial court’s opinion and a portion of appellees’
brief seem to be based upon the assumption that the
sale was made on the basis of a unit price of $500 per
acre of coal for each acre lying under the boundary
conveyed. We have above copied the particular descrip-
tion contained in the deed from appellants to Rader
Creek Coal Company. This deed calls for no specified
number of acres. It purports only to convey a tract of
coal lying under specified boundaries. There is no rep-
resentation as to the number of acres conveyed. The
consideration is ‘‘$8000 (eight thousand dollars) cash
in hand paid.’’ This was not a sale by acreage for a
unit price and we believe the trial court was in error
in assuming that it was. .

In the case of Shell v. Town of Evarts, 296 Ky. 602,

604

178 S. W. 2d 32, 36, it was said: ‘‘The direction of a
verdict for the defendant is not authorized unless after
admitting the testimony offered by the plaintiff, and
every reasonable inference to be deduced from the facts
proved to be true, his cause of action is yet unsupported
in any degree.”

We believe that the cause of action stated by appel-
lants in the petition was supported by sufficient proof
introduced in their behalf which, when assumed to be
true for the purpose of passing on the correctness of
the directed verdict, sustains appellants’ theory of the
case.

We are of opinion that the trial court erred in’ di-
recting the jury to find for appellees. The judgment is,
‘therefore reversed, and the case remanded for pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Newman v. Black Mountain Corp. et al.
February 20, 1951.

James S. Forester, Judge.

Doyle & Doyle for appellant. ;
Sampson & Sampson and James Sampson for appellees,

Cur Justicn Cammacx—Affirming.

Mrs. Mary E. Newman is appealing from a judg-
ment affirming an order of the Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Board denying her compensation for the death of her
husband; I. A! ‘Newman.’ For reversal it is contended

— ::

that the Board failed to resolve all doubts in favor of
Mrs. Newman and that its finding of fact is not support-
ed by the evidence.

Mr. Newman died on June 14, 1947, at the age of
85. Dr. S. L. Andelman, who filed the death certificate,
stated that his death was due to ‘‘myocarditis, arterios-
clerosis, Parkinson’s disease and senility.” The deced-
ent worked in the blacksmith’s shop at the mine of the
appellee, Black Mountain Coal Corporation. On Decem-
ber 26, 1946, he was injured when a mine car jumped its
track and ran into him at a low speed. As the car hit
him on the legs, he fell back into it, with his legs hang-
ing over the end. After the car hit him it traveled
about three feet. The car was only 14 inches deep and
he did not strike his head in falling because he ‘“‘sat
back bowed up * * *.’?. First aid was applied to a skin-
ned place on Mr. Newman’s leg or ankle, and he worked
out the shift, but was unable to work thereafter.-

Dr. Robert S. Howard treated Mr. Newman and
found a swelling and limitation of motion of the left
ankle. He did not complain of any back injury at that
time. Dr.. Howard said it was possible for this injury
to have caused Mr. Newman’s death, but that he had no
knowledge of the cause of death.

Dr. Phillip J. Begley examined Mr. Newman on
January 24, 1947, when the decedent requested authori-
zation to return to work. At that time he found no
swelling or evidence of injury, except the history given
by Mr. Newman. An X-ray taken at the time of the
injury showed no fracture or discoloration of the ankle
joint but did show some swelling around that joint. Dr.
Begley reported Mr. Newman able to work as follows:
‘Patient now able to resume usual light duties. He is
a bad risk for employment due to his age.’? Mr. New-
man returned to work, but fell down and felt too weak to
get up. He complained of having weak and dizzy spells.
Dr. Begley made a general physical examination of him
on January 28, 1947,-and a later examination on Febru-
ary 7, 1947. Mr. Newman’s blood pressure was 140 over
80. He complained of general weakness and nervous-
ness. In both examinations he showed the characteristic
findings of Parkinson’s ,disease, consisting of tremor
and nervousness. Dr. Begley described Parkinson’s di-
sease as a condition usually going with old age, consist-

696 CSCS
ing of a tremor of the hands and of the head and usually
a general wealmess. He said it was caused primarily by
arteriosclerois, resulting in degenerative changes in the
brain. He said also the condition is purely a general one
and has no connection with trauma, though trauma might
precipitate symptoms from this existing condition. He
stated that, in his opinion, the decedent’s injury had
nothing to do with his death. The appellant had theoriz-
ed that an embolism from the injury could have caused
Mr. Newman’s death, but Dr. Begley said there were no
symptoms of embolism in this case.

Dr. S. L. Andelman discussed the nature and effects
of Parkinson’s disease and concluded that it is not caus-
ed by trauma.

Dr. W. K. Howard, testifying for the appellant, stat-
ed that he saw Mr. Newman in November, before the in-
jury, and took his blood pressure, and he saw no out-
ward evidence of Parkinson’s disease at that time. He
did not examine Mr. Newman’s reflexes. He said the
fact that Mr. Newman was able to carry on his regular
work at the mines would indicate that he was in good
health. Mrs. Newman testified that, after the injury, the
decedent's left leg was swollen and he complained of his

ack.

Other witnesses for the appellant testified that
symptoms of tremor and nervousness did not appear be-
fore the injury and that the swelling was present in Mr.
Newman’s leg until his death. The appellees’ witnesses
gave testimony to the effect that Mr. Newman had shown
shakiness and nervousness and had complained of his
head being ‘‘too big and that he pitched on his head.”

The referee found that Mr. Newman’s death was
caused by his injuries of December 26, 1946. The full
Board found that Mr. Newman’s death did not result

from those injuries. From
parent that there was amp

the recitals above it is ap-
le evidence to support the

finding of the Board. Tacke'

+ v. Eastern Coal Corpora-

tion, 295 Ky. 422, 174 S.W.2d 707.

Judgment affirmed.

en =o”
McCarter v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.

February 23, 1951.
‘R. L, Maddox, Judge.

G. E .Reams and James W. Smith for appellant,
HH. L. Bryant, C. S. Landrum and ©. E. Rice, Jr,. for appellee.

Jupce Sims—Affirming,

698 |

O. H. McCarter, sued the Louisville & N. R. Compa-
. ny to recover $2,950 for personal injuries and damages
to his truck which was struck by a train of appellee at a
private crossing in Bell County not far from Middles-
boro. At the conclusion of appellant’s evidence the
court sustained appellee’s motion for a directed ver-
dict. While the record does not show the reason given
by the trial judge, it is apparent his ruling was based
upon appellant’s contributory negligence.

Appellant owned and was driving a large Reo
tractor-truck attached to a trailer in which he was haul-
ing 14 tons of coal. He was coming from the tipple of
the Premier Coal Company and the road he was trav-
eling was straight and was about ten feet from the rail-
road tracks. The truck and trailer were of such length
as to make it necessary for appellant to pull out and
make practically a 90 degree turn to go over the cross-
ing. Both the railroad tracks and the road were straight
and parallel to each other for a distance of 475 or 480
feet from this crossing towards the tipple. In the other
direction from the crossing, the railroad was straight
for 600 or 700 feet. There was nothing to obstruct ap-
pellant’s view of the train when he looked into his rear
view mirror while traveling the road from the tipple to
the crossing, or to obstruct his view of the train as he
turned to drive onto the crossing.

The accident happened about 12:30 p. m., on Feb.
10, 1948, which was a clear day. Appellant testified he
was driving slowly, looked in his rear view mirror sev-
eral times, saw the railroad tracks but did not see the
train which was approaching from his rear. The train
consisted of a’ boxcar, caboose, tender and engine, with
the engine pushing the caboose and boxcar, the latter
being the first car in the train. The proof for appellant
is to the’ effect that the train was traveling 25 or 30
miles an hour and gave no signal for the crossing, which
was used by 600 to 1,200 people in the course of 24
hours. Just as it struck the truck, or immediately there-
after, the train sounded the distress signal consisting of
two blasts of the whistle and ringing the bell.

Appellant further testified he was driving from 3
to 5 miles per hour ais he went on the crossing and could
have stopped ‘‘imriiédiately, ‘in a foot or two.’’ It took
him 8 or 10 seconds to make-the turn onto the crossing.

Le

He turned left onto the crossing, had the glass in the
left door of the cab of his truck rolled all the way down
and he looked both to his left and to his right as he
drove onto the crossing and did not see the train.
‘When his front wheels were about the middle of the
track the boxcar of the train hit the left door of the
truck and this was the first time he saw the train. .

When asked to explain why he did not see the
approaching train, appellant answered: ‘‘Well, for the
reason as I came down the track I looked in both direc-
tions and there was no train coming either direction;
I got upon the track, I glanced in the rear view mirror
several times as I approached the crossing and I was
going approximately three to five miles an hour, and
just as I started across the crossing and got the front
wheels on the track the train hit me, but it never made
any sound or blew a whistle or rang the bell, and it was
only a matter of a few seconds from the time, at the rate
of speed it was going, from the time it came in view
until it was at the crossing.’’

We lift this from appellant’s testimony:

“ And you looked out for the train and never

did see it? A. No, sir; didn’t see it,

“Q. Can you account why you didn’t see it? A. It °

was going too fast, it didn’t make any sound or give
any warning.

‘Q. Sounding a warning wouldn’t have prevented
you from seeing it? A. At the rate of speed it was
coming it came within a few seconds.

“Q. You could see the train in a second? A, If I
had time, but I didn’t have time to see it.’?

No reasonable man can give any credence to ap-
pellant’s testimony that he was looking in his rear view
mirror driving along the highway which paralleled the
railroad tracks for 475 or 480 feet and saw the tracks
but did not see the train’ approaching behind him; or
that he looked both ways as he drove on the crossing
and failed to see the train, Had appellant looked in
his rear view mirror while traveling the road parallel
to the tracks, or had he looked as he drove onto the
crossing, it would have-been impossible for him not
to have seen the train. The fact that the train hit the

700 es

front of the truck is indisputable proof that it must
have been close upon him and in plain sight as he turned.
to drive on the crossing. As we said in Nashville C.
St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stagner, 305 Ky. 717, 205 S.W.2d 493,
495, ‘Where the facts make it certain that a traveler
could have seen or heard an approaching train in time
to avert a collision had he looked and listened properly,
he will not be heard to say that he looked for but did
not see, or listened for and did not hear the train.’’
Also see Tarter v. Wigginston’s Adm’x, 310 Ky. 393,
220 8.W.2d 829.

Even when it is not the sole cause of an injury,
contributory negligence is a complete defense. Contri-
butory negligence need not be the proximate cause of
the accident and resulting injury, it is sufficient if it
contributes thereto so that but for same the accident.
would not have occurred. Contributory negligence is us-
ually a question for the jury but where there is no con-
trariety in the facts and they show plaintiff was guilty
of such negligence and the injuries would not have
occurred, otherwise, then there is nothing to submit to
the jury. Where but one conclusion can be drawn from
the uncontradicted evidence by fair-minded men, then
the question of contributory negligence is one of law
for the court. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 307 Ky-
386, 211 S.W.2d 154.

Admitting arguendo that appellant’s proof estab-
lished it was the custom of appellee to give warning
signals as its trains approached this crossing, Illinois:
Cent. Ry. Co. v. Applegate’s Adin’x, 268 Ky. 458, 105
§.W.2d 153, or that the use of the crossing was such as
to require a lookout and the giving of the warning sig-
nals, Louisville & I. R. Co. v. Morgan, 174 Ky. 633, 192
S.W. 672, and that it failed in such duties, yet appel-
Jant’s own testimony shows beyond cavil that he was:
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and.
the trial judge correctly directed the jury to find for ap-
pellee at the conclusion of appellant’s evidence. Nash-
ville OC. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stagner, 305 Ky. 717, 205
S.W.2d 493.

The judgment is affirmed.
P|

Pe 701
Bolen et al. v. Koons et al.

February 23, 1951.
Jean Auxier, Special Judge.

D. G. Boleyn for appellants.
Edward L, Allen for appellees.

Caer Justice Cammacx—Affirming.

The appellants are the owners of the surface of a
tract of land in Floyd County. Their title stems from
a title bond executed in 1904 wherein the mineral rights
in the property were reserved to the grantor. The title
‘bond provided that the mineral privileges were excepted
‘im the same manner as the Northern Coal & Coke Com-
pany had deeds made to it for the oil, gas and mineral,
‘with all the easements and privileges. There was the
further provision that the owner of the surface was to
‘have the right to use all the coal that he might need for
‘his own domestic use. The Northern Coal & Coke Com-
pany deeds provided that it had the right to remove all
pillars and other lateral and subjacent supports with-
out leaving pillars to support the roof or surface. Sub-
sequently, the Standard Hilkhorn Coal Company leased.
some of the coal rights underlying the appellants’ prop-
erty and mined coal therefrom for several years.
dispute arose between the Company and the surface
owners about timber rights. In the case of Standard
Elkhorn Coal Company v. Bolen, 193 Ky. 342, 236
S.W, 241, 242, the rights of the parties under the title
‘bond and subsequent deed were discussed. During the
course of the opinion it was said: ‘A consideration of
‘the deed in connection with its origin and the previous
agreement which it was executed to effectuate leads to

702 ee

the conclusion that its purpose and intent was to grant
to Bolen the title to all of the surface, including the tim-
ber, reserving to the Koons heirs the right to enter upon
the land and take the coal or other minerals, and to use
at that time and for that purpose such timber, not ex-
‘ceeding 12 inches in diameter, as might be necessary.
Any other construction of the exception would be re-
pugnant to the ‘spirit and purpose of the conveyance. ”

After the Standard Elkhorn Coal Company. ceased
operations the appellants began mining some coal. Dis-
putes also arose when the lessees of the appellees start-
ed removing the pillars and supports from the old mines.
The action was instituted by the appellees to enjoin the
appellants from interfering with the mining operations
of the lessees and their employees. The appeal is from
a judgment upholding the contentions of the appellees.

The appellants have filed no brief, but we are con-
vinced from our examination of the record that the judg-
ment is proper. Therefore, it is affirmed.

Ramsey v. Commonwealth.
February 23, 1951.
James S, Forester, Judge.

J. K. Beasley and W. H. Wall for appellant. .
A. H. Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant At
torney General, for appellee. ars

a  —C

‘Cray, Commissioner—Reversing.

Appellant was convicted of possessing beer for the
purpose of sale in local option territory.

No evidence was introduced by the Commonwealth
to show that the place of the crime was in territory
where prohibition was in effect. We have held-on sev-
eral occasions this constitutes reversible error. See
. Burton et al. v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 655, 120 S.W.2d
213, and Sipple v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 725, 190
S.W.2d 354.

The Commonwealth argues, however, that in view
of the fact this Court has upheld a local option elec-
tion in Harlan County (where appellant was convicted)
in Jackson et al. v. Bolt, 292 Ky. 503, 166 S.W.2d 831,
we should take judicial notice that Harlan County is
dry. However, that case was decided in 1942, and we
do not have any notice, by our records, that Harlan
County is still dry territory.

Since a proper indictment in this type of prosecu-
tion must include an allegation that the local option
law is in force, it is necessary for the Commonwealth to

‘ prove this fact at the trial.

The appeal is granted, and the judgment is reversed
with directions to grant appellant a new trial.

C. C. Leonard Lumber Co. v. Reed et al.

February 23, 1951.
Holland G. Bryan, Judge.

704

Wheeler & Marshall for appellant.
David R. Reed for appellee,

Jouve Larimer—Affirming.

Appellee, Roscoe Reed, sought and obtained can-
cellation of a deed conveying his lumber yard together
with all machinery, tools, office equipment, fixtures, sup-
plies, trucks, and other personal property situated on
the premises and used in connection with his lumber
business. It appears that Reed for many years prior to
the execution of the deed operated a retail lumber
business and had become involved in financial difficul-
ties to the point of apparent insolvency. In December
1945 in order to extricate himself from these difficulties
and for the apparent mutual interest of both parties,
Reed and his wife executed the deed above.

As explanatory of the consideration, they simul-
taneously entered into a contract with the grantee. The
consideration may be divided into three parts. 1. The
grantee agreed to pay bills due on mortgages against
the property and any amounts due on account of taxes
and special assessments. 2. Issue to Helen R. Reed,
wife of: Roscoe Reed, 25 percent of the capital stock of
the grantee or a total of 60 shares; but explanatory of
that, it was stated that only 30 shares of stock had been
issued by. the first party and that as soon as any addi-
tional. stock is issued, 14 of the same will be issued to

ee

Helen R. Reed until 60 shares of stock have been issued
to her. 3. Commencing on January 1, 1947 Roscoe
Reed was to be employed by grantee in grantee’s office
at a salary of $200.00 per month.

Apparently the C. C. Leonard Lumber Company,
at least in a measure, carried out its responsibility under
one above by paying the creditors or by composition.
No great deal of complaint is made about provision 2
above although it is alleged in the petition that the C. C.
Leonard Company has failed and refused to issue the
60 shares of stock as agreed. The chief complaint cen-
ters around 3 above. Reed charges that the C. C. Leon-
ard Lumber Company has breached an important part
of the consideration in its failure and refusal to employ
him pursuant to the contract above.

Ordinarily rescission of an executed contract for
nonperformance or breach will not be allowed for a
slight or casual breach of the contract. It will not be
allowed even for substantial breach unless the former
status of the parties can be restored. See Beattie v.
Friddle, 229 Ky. 361, 17 S.W.2d 246.

Upon the question of restoration we are not particu-
larly concerned since the Chancellor’s judgment with
respect thereto has substantial support in the facts. The
court disposed of that question in this language.

‘Helen R. Reed, having tendered to defendant, C.’
C. Leonard Lumber Company, her shares of capital
stock:

“IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that she is
divested ‘of ownership thereof and same is owned by C.
C. Leonard Lumber Company.

“THE COURT FINDS AND ADJUDGES that the
reasonable rental value of and rents collected on the
above: described: property is equal to the indebtedness
assumed and paid by defendant, and each is set off
against the other.’’

The serious question presented to us is whether or -
not: there was such a breach of the contract of employ-
ment as to justify a rescission. .

We note the pertinent wording of the contract: (‘In
further consideration of the conveyance of said real and-
personal property, it is agreed that.on January 1, 1947:

Roscoe Reed, second party, will be employed by first
party in first party’s office at Paducah, Kentucky, at
a salary of Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars per month.’’

The above is all that is said in the contract con-
cerning the employment of Reed. No mention is made
as to the duration of the employment.

It is now necessary that we examine the admission
of extrinsic evidence to explain the contract. The Chan-
eellor permitted a former employee of the plaintiff and
later an employee of defendant to testify as to a conver-
sation between plaintiff and defendant before the con-
tract was entered into, the substance of which was that it
was understood and agreed that if Reed and wife would
make the conveyance, Reed would be employed at $200.00
per month by the Leonard Lumber Company as long as
Reed was able to work.

It is contended by appellant that this evidence was
clearly incompetent and should not have been heard to
vary the terms of the writing.

Appellant advances and relies on the familiar prin-
ciple of law that under so-called parol evidence rule, any
agreement made prior to or contemporaneously with a
written contract must be included in the writing to be
considered a part of the contract, and that all agree-
ments must be merged in the writing. See Ross Seed
Co. v. Sturgis Implement & Hardware Co., 297 Ky. 776,
181 S.W.2d 426.

Our attention is called to Bullock v. Young, 252 Ky.
640, 67 S.W.2d 941, 946, wherein we said: ‘‘Hivery con-
tract must stand as written, in the absence of a plea of
fraud or mutual mistake, until reformed on proper
pleading and clear and convincing evidence.’’

Appellant contends that the proper remedy would
necessarily be by way of a pleading to reform the’con-
tract to express the intent of the parties, and that since
there was no such pleading here, and since the contract
does not appear to be ambiguous on its face, parol or
extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to vary its terms.

The last sentence in KRS 371.010 reads: ‘‘The con-
sideration need not be expressed in the writing, but it
may be proved when necessary or disproved by parol or
other evidence.’? KRS 371.030 provides: ‘‘The consid-

Re

eration of any writing, with or without seal, may be
impeached or denied by pleading verified by oath.”’

Our later decisions are consistent in showing that
it was not the intent of the legislature to do away with
the parol evidence rule with this statute. Most of the
eases under this statute involve an explanation of the
nominal consideration stated in deeds. Under a broad
interpretation, as is pointed out in several of the cases,
consideration can be taken to mean any term of the
contract. The parol evidence rule is very salutary and
one of the foremost rules making for certainty in the
Jaw of contracts. To do away with it under a very lib-
eral construction of this statute would have a very dis-
astrous result. No written contract would be certain
and under the guise of proving consideration all sorts of
added bargains could be brought before the court.

In MeNeill’s Adm’x v. Riley et ux, 256 Ky. 170, 75
S.W.2d 1068 it was held that true consideration of deed
may be shown by parol without allegation of fraud or
mistake although it contradicts written instrument. We
have a number of cases dealing pro and con with the
question of parol evidence as being competent to vary
the terms of a written contract. Drane v. Louisville Ry.
Co., 279 Ky. 490, 181 S.W.2d 439; Apple et ux. v. Me-
Cullough et ux., 239 Ky. 74, 38 S.W.2d 955; Hazelwood
v. Woodward, 277 Ky. 447, 126 8.W.2d 857; Ashland Oil
& Refining Co. v. Dorton, 300 Ky. 385, 189 8.W.2d 394;
Castleman-Blakemore Co. v. Pickrell & Craig Co., 163
Ky. 750, 174 8.W. 749; Wilson et al. v. Mitchell et al.
245 Ky. 55, 53 S.W.2d 175; McKenna et al. v. Culton, 258
Ky. 333, 80 S.W.2d 18; Johnson v. Johnson, 297 Ky.
268, 178 S.W.2d 983.

It will be noted, however, that each of the above
eases rests upon the particular facts and circumstances
of the individual case. The cases holding to the con-
trary can be easily distinguished from the instant case
on the facts.

Let us look again at the whole picture. We have a
deed conveying a lumber yard, fixtures and other per-
sonal property used in the business. As a consideration
for that conveyance we have, first, an agreement to pay
the indebtedness of the grantor, which was done in part
although the rental on the property equaled to or was

708 ee

in excess of the indebtedness so paid. Second, the gran-
tee as to‘issue to the wife of grantor 14 of the stock of
the grantee company not to exceed 60 shares. The
grantee did issue 380 shares of stock. Third, the grantee
was to employ the grantor in its lumber business at a
wage of $200.00 per month. In fact the grantee had
leased the whole of its property for a period of five
years with a lessee’s option to purchase the property.
Grantee had apparently put itself in a position so that:
it could not perform its contract of employment.

There is conflict in the evidence as to what actually
happened about the employment of Reed. At any rate
the grantee took the position that the contract for em-
ployment was terminable at will since no mention was
made as to the duration of employment. Let us see then -
what we have if appellant is correct. Pursuant to the
contract of employment appellant could have hired Reed
on January 1, 1947 and have fired him the following day
or could have hired for one month only and terminated
the contract.’ All that appellant says relative to varying
the terms of the contract by parol agreement would be
true if this were merely a contract of employment.

Let us look again at the contract: “NOW, THERE-
FORE, in consideration of the premises, and in order to
state the actual consideration for the conveyance of the
real estate and personal property described in said deed,
it is.agreed:’’

Following the above and appearing as second para-
graph is the employment agreement heretofore set out.

It ‘will be noted that this contract is not merely a
contract of employment but founded on a consideration .
extending beyond the services called for under the con-
tract.. It goes to a very substantial part of. the consid-
eration for the conveyance of the lumber yard and the
personal property and takes on the characteristics of -
monetary consideration.

We think the court under the facts properly ad-
mitted the parol evidence, not as a guise, but as a proper
method of ascertaining the true consideration for the.-
deed of conveyance. Under the facts and circumstances .
herein we think the court properly adjudged the whole.
matter.

The: judgment is affirmed.

Blue Bird Mining Co, et al. v. Litteral.
February 28, 1951.
‘W. R. Prather, Judge.

710 |

M. B. Fields for appellant.
C. C. Wells for appellee.

Jupen Sims—Affirming.

This appeal involves the construction of KRS 342.-
200 concerning notice by an injured employee to his em-
ployer as a condition precedent to asserting a claim under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The referee in a
rather elaborate opinion held the employer did not have
“due and timely notice of the accident and injury,’’ and
denied compensation. On a review by the full Board the
findings of the referee were sustained. On an appeal
to the Knott Circuit Court the chancellor found that as
the accident happened in the presence of a foreman and
as the injured employee was treated by the company’s
camp physician, the statute did not require appellee to
give notice of the accident and his resultant injuries,
and remanded the case to the Board to determine the
extent and duration of disability and to fix an award to
which appellee is entitled.

There is no conflict in the testimony as to the acci-
dent and injury occurring in the presence of appellant’s
foreman (if he was a foreman), or as to appellee being
treated by the company’s camp physician a few days
after the, accident, therefore, the findings of fact by the
Board that the company did not have notice of the acci-
dent and injuries in reality is a finding of law which may
be reviewed by the courts. Bates & Rogers Const. Co.
v. Allen, 183 Ky. 815, 210 S.W. 467; Chatfield v. Jellico
Coal Mining Co., 205 Ky. 415, 265 S.W. 948; Diamond
Block Coal Co. v. Sparks, 209 Ky. 73, 272 8.W. 31.

On the afternoon of Oct. 7, 1948, while loading coal
from a chute, Litteral was struck on the head by a lump
of coal ‘‘about the size of your fist,’’ which jumped over
a protective screen when a load of coal was dumped into
the chute. -_He was wearing a helmet but the coal fell
from a height of over twenty feet and knocked the hel-
met from his head. Litteral was asked by Sam Me--

es

Intosh, who was in charge of the crew, if he was hurt,
and he made this reply, ‘‘No more than just about
knocked my brains out.’

McIntosh then asked appellee if he wanted a doctor,
but the latter declined saying the doctor was never in
camp when an accident happened. Litteral finished his
shift but the next morning found a bloody discharge
from his right ear and went to the office of J. R. Aker,
the company’s camp physician, for treatment. The doc-
tor was not in but appellee did see Dr. Aker Sunday
morning following the accident on Thursday, and re-
ceived from him some headache tablets. Some three
weeks later appellee started losing his hearing and now
is probably deaf in one ear, with partial impairment of
the other.

In April 1949, Dr. Aker sent appellee to Dr. O. L.
Combs, an ear, eye, nose and throat specialist. Upon re-
ceiving information from appellee of the lick on his
head the preceeding October, Dr. Combs had X-rays made
and the doctor testified they revealed no evidence of a
fracture. He was unable to do anything medically for
the patient and advised him to wear a hearing aid. How-
ever, Dr. J. Campbell Thompson, of Lexington, who
specializes in roentgenology made five X-rays on Sept.
22, 1949, and found ‘‘an old incompletely healed frac-
ture of the left temporal and occipital bone.’? Dr. D. V.
Sublett, an ear, eye, nose and throat specialist of Lex-
ington, saw the X-rays made by Dr. Thompson and he
examined appellee on Sept. 22, 1949, and attributed his
deafness to an old fracture but could not say when the
trauma. occurred.

McIntosh testified, ‘‘I was the gang leader, * * * I
taken the car numbers and stuff like that. * * * I had
to know what kind of cars and what kind of preparations
were in these cars and the kind we loaded. * * * I had no
authority over the tipple. * * * Well, I guess I was the
head man. I went ahead, that’s right, they followed
me.’? When asked, ‘‘They followed your directions’’?
He answered, ‘‘Well, they went along. We all worked
together.’”

Appellant argues that McIntosh could not be a fore-
man because he belonged to the union. It may be that
union rules and those of industry forbid a union mem-

T12 ee

ber to become a general foreman. But certainly, a union
man could be the foreman of a small crew like the one in
which Litteral was working at the time of his injury.
Webster’s New International Dictionary, second edition,
defines ‘‘foreman’’ as ‘‘a leader; one in front; the chief
workman in a crew; the person in authority over a
group of workmen.’ Applying this definition to the
testimony of McIntosh, we have no difficulty in finding
that he was appellee’s foreman and the representative
of the company on the occasion and at the time of this
accident. .

It is provided in KRS 342.200, ‘Want of notice or
delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings
under this chapter if it is shown that the employer, his
agent or representative had knowledge of the injury or
that the delay or failure to give notice was occasioned
by mistake or other reasonable cause.’? Appellant ar-
gues if it should be held that McIntosh was the foreman
over this crew, his knowledge of the accident was not
knowledge of the injury, since an injury to appellee
would not necessarily follow such an accident as he
sustained, citing, Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Allen, 183
Ky. 815, 210 S.W. 467, 472. But we have written that
notice of a physical injury carries with it notice of all
those things which reasonably may be anticipated to re-
sult from it. Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Emmons, 205
Ky. 21, 265 S.W. 447; Dawkins Lumber Oo. v. Hale,
221 Ky. 755, 299 S.W. 991. It is common knowledge that
a severe lick on the head may be followed by serious in-
jury, therefore we hold that when the foreman knew of
Litteral being hit on the head with a lump of coal, he had
notice of his injury.

In addition to McIntosh knowing of the accident, ap-
pellee visited the camp physician on Sunday following
the injury on Thursday. Appellee testified he went
several times to see the company’s manager, but could
not get to see him, and he wrote the manager a letter in
June 1949. In the circumstances presented by this rec-
ord, we hold as a matter of law there was no want of
timely notice to the company of the accident and the re-
sultant injury to appellee.

Appellant puts much reliance on the Allen case, 183

Ky. 815, 210 S.W. 467, and Northeast Coal Co. v.
Castle, 202 Ky. 505, 260 S.W. 336. The Hale opinion,

a 113

221 Ky. 755, 299 S.W. 991, in discussing the Allen case
on the question of want of notice said that if one looks
at what was decided in the Allen opinion and not at what
was said there, it would be found the Allen opinion sup-
ported Hale’s contention that notice to the employer
of the injury is not necessary where a representative
of the employer had knowledge the employee had suf-
fered a serious accident.

The Castle opinion, 202 Ky. 505, 260 S.W. 336, is
easily distinguished from the instant case. There, the
injured workman sent word of his injury to his em-
ployer by his brother, who never delivered the méssage.
The injured workman did not exhibit enough interest to
inquire of his brother if his message had been delivered.
Then too, his injury, if any, was of such a nature that a
prompt medical examination would have disclosed
whether his condition was the result of a pre-existing
disease or of traumatic injury. Hence, the failure to
give notice was necessarily prejudicial to the employer.

The judgment is affirmed

Shillings v. Jones.
February 28, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

714

J. A, Edge, for appellant.
Hldon S. Dummit and Weldon Shouse for appellee.

Srayiey, Commissionrr—Affirming.

This suit was instituted in September, 1945, in the
name of Mrs. Sophia Shillings to set aside a deed to
property in Lexington which she had made in October,
1941, to her niece, Mary L. 8. Jones, on the ground of
undue influence and fraud; also, to cancel a power of
attorney to draw upon a bank account and for an ac-
counting of money withdrawn by the defendant. An-
cillary relief was also prayed of the First National Bank
and Trust Co. of Lexington.

The case has had a stormy career, it having been
claimed that the plaintiff did not authorize the suit and
did not authorize an appeal of a judgment adverse to
her. Two previous appeals have been dismissed. One
was upon a communication duly signed by the appellant,
asking that it be done. We pass by several such ques-
tionable matters and determine the case upon the merits.

The chancellor ruled the deed should not be can-
celled and that the grantee had fee simple title to the
property, subject, however, to the charge of maintaining
and supporting the grantor the remainder of her life.
The court was of opinion that Mrs. Shillings wanted her
niece to have what, if anything, remained of her estate
after her death and accomplished her purpose by a deed
rather than a will. He further adjudged that the petition
with respect to the bank account be dismissed. Before
the present appeal was filed, Mrs. Shillings died and
the action was revived by the administrator of her estate
with will annexed.

The grantor was about 80 years of age when she con-
veyed her home to her niece for a nominal consideration

P| 15

and love and affection. She was a bedfast invalid for*
several years, but except some normal infirmities due

to her age, her mental faculties at the time were appar-

ently good. Mrs. Shillings had no children and her only

relatives were a number of nieces and nephews, some of
whom lived nearby and others in distant states. The

ease seems to have been instigated and promoted under

questionable circumstances.

The grantee, Mrs. Jones, lived in Covington. She
was always faithful, loyal and diligent in seeing that her
aunt was cared for. In short, she was the favorite niece
. and appears to have deserved that relationship. In her
first deposition, taken shortly after the suit was filed,
Mrs. Shillings gave somewhat equivocal testimony to the
effect that she had not wanted to ‘‘sell’? her home. In
another deposition taken by the defendant in the ab-
sence of plaintiff’s counsel, she stated quite positively
and clearly that she had given the property to her niece
and wanted her to have it. She denied having made the
statements contained in the transcript of her former de-
position. The defendant has insisted they were errone- .
ously or improperly transcribed. There is other evi-
dence both supporting and refuting the allegations of
fraud and undue influence.

The law in case of this kind, particularly where the
grantor was an old and infirm person, is well settled.
To recite it would be but to repeat what has been writ-
ten many times. See as typical cases: Hoeb v. Maschi-
not, 140 Ky. 330, 131 S.W. 23; McDowell v. Edward’s
Administrator, 156 Ky. 475, 161 8.W. 534; Moore’s
Administrator v. Edwards, 248 Ky. 517, 58 8.W.2d 915;
Chiles v. Major, 266 Ky. 594, 99 S.W.2d 761; Newman
v. Hall, 278 Ky. 88, 128 8.W.2d 201; Murphy v. Lester,
280 Ky. 51, 182 S.W.2d 542; Rose v. Rose, 298 Ky. 404,
182 S.W.2d 977; Cook v. Hagen, 301 Ky. 346, 192
8.W.2d 97. This is a matter of fact case involving no
new principles of law. A lengthy recitation of the evi-
dence will avail nothing. Though falling into a familiar
pattern each case of this kind has its own individuality.
‘Whether under the circumstances the relationship be-
tween the parties was of such close confidence and trust
as to cast the burden upon the niece to establish fairness
and freedom of will on the part of the grantor it is not

“116
necessary to declare. We concur in the finding of the
chancellor irrespective of the burden.

Concerning the bank account, it is shown that it be-
game a joint one under authority of Mrs. Shillings.
‘The power given the niece was simply that she should

. countersign checks drawn by the depositor. The proof
shows that what was drawn out, equal to about $95 a
month, was for the sole use and benefit of Mrs. Shillings.

’ We find nothing to disprove the accounting.

The judgment is affirmed.
. a
Ratliff et al. v. Cubbage et al.

February 23, 1951.
E. D. Stephenson, Judge.

Pe 17

"Vy. R. Bentley, for appellant.
“Glyde R. Levi, for appellee.

Sraniey, Commissioner—Affirming.

The sole question is whether or not the Workmen’s
Compensation Board had any evidence upon which to
base its finding that the death of Dick Ratliff from a
heart attack was not the result of an industrial accident.
The circuit court affirmed the finding, expressing the
view, however, that as an original determination the
court would have found otherwise.

The employee was seriously injured in, the mine
of the appellee, Caudill-Ward Coal Co., by d run-away
train of cars on August 26, 1946, twenty-two months
before his sudden death on a street of Elkhorn City on
July 2, 1948. He had suffered a double fracture of one
leg and the laceration of the other and the destruction
of an artificial foot.. He suffered such severe shock
that it was necessary to postpone surgical operations for
eight or ten days. The man was of temperate habits,
of good health and with no symptoms of heart disease
ever having appeared prior to his falling dead. Com-
pensation benefits had been paid Ratliff from the begin-
ning but later a difference arose as to the degree of
permanent disability, and the case was opened up for
further proof upon that issue. He died before a decision
was rendered. After his death; the claim was revived
by his widow and child.

The Board confirmed the finding of its referee that
compensation for total permanent disability should be
allowed to the date of the employee’s death but nothing
for the death as having any causal relation to the acci-
dent. The Board rejected the finding of the referee that
compensation of $280 should be allowed for the loss of
the employee’s artificial foot. He had suffered the loss
of .his foot above the ankle in 1929, for which injuries
compensation had been paid. The Board also declined
to increase compensation because of an alleged failure
of the employer to install certain safety devices on the
cars which caused the injuries. As stated, the appeal
does not involve any question but that of casual death,
and liability for the value of the artificial foot.

TAS |

_ In weighing the evidence, the Board was guided by
the rule that the burden was upon the claimant to show
that the employee’s death was the natural or direct
result of the accident or of a disease directly caused
by the accident. Fannin v. American Rolling Mill Co.,
284 Ky. 188, 144 8. W. 2d 228; Wallins Creek Collieries
Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 8. W. 234; Streipe v.
Hubbuch Bros. & Wellendorf, 233 Ky. 194, 25 S. W. 2d
358; Aden Mining Co. v. Hall, 252 Ky. 168, 66 S. W. 24
41. It was recognized that whether death is the proxi-
mate result of an injury can ordinarily be established
only by the testimony of physicians and surgeons deem-
ed to be experts qualified to express such professional
opinions; however, that such opinions are not conclu-
sive and that uncontradicted sequences of events may
be entitled to greater weight. Hllis v. Litteral, 296 Ky.
287, 176 S.W.2d 883. 7

The sum and substance of the testimony of several
doctors (none of whom is a heart specialist) is that. the
sudden death of the employee could have been caused
or aggravated by the shock to his nervous system caused
by his harrowing experiences in the accident. The opin-
ions are based upon the conclusion that the consequen-
tial sedentary life following an active career had caused
an inerease in the man’s weight from 170 to 200 pounds.
As Dr. Henderson expressed it, ‘‘A clincial condition of
this type could be expected to carry with it a certain
amount of malcordial degeneration and most likely fatty
in origin. People carrying a fatty malcordial heart are
frequent suspects of sudden, fatal heart attacks.’? A
shorter explanation was that one of the symptoms of
what laymen call a ‘‘fatty heart’? is ‘“‘sudden picking
up of weight.’? Although some of these doctors had ex-
amined the man within two months of his death, the
most they could say was that he might then have had
heart trouble without it having been detected by them.
There is also the fact that the employee had died sud-
denly while totally and permanently disabled within the
terms of the Compensation Act, although it appears
that he had been able to do certain limited work.

. On the other side of the issue, the Board had the
fact that before and during the period of nearly two
years since the accident there had been no complaint
or symptom of heart trouble. The deceased’s personal

as 119

doctor in his home town of Praise saw his body before it
was removed from the place where he fell dead. He
thought Ratliff had suffered a sudden heart attack or a
hemorrhage of the brain though no autopsy was per-
formed to verify his conclusion. Dr. Newsome, who knew
Ratliff intimately, saw him just a moment before he
breathed his last. He testified he had died ‘‘of heart
failure; acute dilation of the heart.’? Dr. Vernon and
Dr. Osborne, surgeons at Pikeville, had testified con-
cerning the degree of Ratliff’s disability. Upon a re-
taking of their depositions after his death, both testified
they found no relationship between the injuries sus-
tained and his death by heart attack. They did not
attribute it to those injuries.

It seems to us that there was ample evidence for
the finding of the Board. The case is not like some that
have come before us where professional or technical
testimony was outweighed by realistic, factual sequences
or consistent and continuous effects. In the present case
the developments and factual, practical conditions them-
selves are consistent with the professional opinions that
there was no causal relationship between the accident
and the death. Indeed, over against that evidence the
Board had no more than opinions of a possibility. The
judgment confirming the finding of the Board is sustain-
ed by many cases, among which may be noted: Wallins
Creek Collieries Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 8. W.
234; Furnace Coal Mining Co. v. Carroll, 212 Ky. 1,
2978'S. W. 171; Aden Mining Co. v. Hall, 252 Ky. 168,
66 8. W. 2d 41; Agsten v. Brown-Williamson Tobacco
Co., 272 Ky. 20, 113 S. W. 2d 829; Inland Steel Co. v.
Newsome, 281 Ky. 681, 136 8. W. 2d 1077.

We think the Board properly denied recovery of the
value of the employee’s artificial foot destroyed in the
accident. The statute current at that time made no pro-
visions for the furnishing of such an artificial member
of the body as part of the compensation. An amend-
ment of 1948 does provide that the employer ‘‘shall
initially furnish’’ such an instrumentality. KRS 342.020.
Whether or not this would apply in the very unusual
situation we have here need not be decided. See Pacific
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 215
Cal, 461, 11 P. 2d 1, 82 A. L. R. 1170 and annotations to

720

the effect that loss of an artificial limb is a property
loss and ‘is not recoverable as compensation for- personal ~
injuries:

“The judgment is affirmed.

a
Lockard v. Lockard.

February 27, 1951.
William Gardner, Special Judge.

Leebern Allen for appellant.
J. Douglas Graham for appellee.

Vay Sat, Commisstonzr—Affirming.

The Chancellor sustained appellee’s motion for an
allowance to her for the support and education of the
infant children of the parties and entered judgment
thérefor in the sum of $25.00 per month commencing
October 1, 1948, the date on which the motion was filed.
Almost: two years prévious to the filing of the motion,
the court had rendered judgment in favor of appellee

7a

against appellant for divorce, alimony, and custody of
the infant children, but was silent on the issue of main-
tenance for the children, despite the fact that such is-
sue had been raised by the pleadings.

We adhere to the rule heretofore established that
a judgment against a father for the maintenance of
his minor children, being a mere determination of the
amount of an obligation imposed on him by law, may
be rendered retroactive to the time of the commence-
ment of the obligation. Miles v. Miles, 203 Ky. 431,
262 S.W. 576. .

We also have held, without exception, that a judg-
ment wherein a divorce was granted, alimony awarded,
and custody of minor children placed with the mother,
does not preclude the mother from instituting or main-
taining a subsequent action or motion to require the
father of such children to support them. KRS 403.070.
Keith v. Keith, 270 Ky. 655, 110 S,W.2d 424 and cases
therein cited. Pennington v. Pennington, 294 Ky. 84,
171 8.W.2d 10.

No other question is presented on this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

Daggit v. Commonwealth.
February 27, 1951. - ~
John B. Rodes, Judge.

Paul R. Huddleston, Charles Huddleston and M. Harl Huddleston
tor appellant,

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and W. Owen Keller, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Van Sant, Commissionen—Reversing.

Under an indictment charging him with the crime
of being an accessory before the fact to the willful
murder (committed by Edward Kilgore) of Doctor C.
B. Martin, appellant was convicted of manslaughter
and sentenced to serve 11 years in the Kentucky State
Reformatory. Appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment on the grounds (1) the verdict was not sustained
by sufficient evidence, (2) the instructions were er-
roneous and prejudicial, and (3) the verdict was the
product of the prejudice of the jury.

The principal question for our determination is
whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate
the testimony of the accomplice Kilgore. Sections 241
and 242 of the Criminal Code of Practice provide:

“Section 241. A conviction can not be had upon
the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by
other evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
is not sufficient if it merely show that the offense was
committed, and the circumstances thereof.

728

“Section 242. In all cases where, by law, two wit-
nesses, or one witness with corroborating cireumstances,
are requisite, to warrant a conviction, if the requisition
be not fulfilled, the court shall instruct the jury to ren-
der a verdict of acquittal, by which instruction they are

ound, ’?

In Williams v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 175, 77
S.W.2d 609, 611, reference is made to the apparent con-
flict in previous opinions of this Court in respect to
the quality of evidence necessary for the Common-
wealth to produce in corroboration of an accomplice’s
testimony, in order to sustain a conviction. It was there
pointed out that the language of the Code ‘‘other evi-
dence tending to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the offense’? does not require such evidence
as, standing alone, would support conviction but only
such evidence as, standing alone, would have the ten-
dency expressed in the Code. In other words, the evi-
dence need not produce every link in the chain of con-
nection of the defendant with the crime; but, on the
other hand, standing alone, it must place the defendant
in pursuit of a course which indicates he is connected
with the commission of the crime. We now will look
to the evidence pertinent to the question.

At about 7:00 o’clock on the morning of June 30,
1948 the bodies of Doctor and Mrs. C. B, Martin were
found in the front bedroom on the first floor of their
home, approximately one mile from the ¢ity of Bowling
Green. Doctor Martin’s body was lying on the floor
between the bed and the door and that of Mrs. Martin
was lying on the bed. A great quantity of blood had
been spilled on and near the bodies. A blood-stained
ribbon was found on Doctor Martin’s cliest.’ There
were particles of sand on the bed and bits of glass from
a broken flashlight lens were found near the body of
the Doctor. The room otherwise was not disarranged.
An examination of Doctor Martin’s body disclosed three
pistol shot wounds in the head, a ‘‘scratch or two’’ were
observed on the body, and there were contusions and
abrasions on the head. The coroner testified that death
was caused by the pistol shot wounds. 7

Later in the day or early in the night a Deputy
Sheriff of Warren County and a member of the Police

724 |

Force of the City of Bowling Green, acting on informa-
tion, went to Glasgow in Barren County in search of
Edward Kilgore, whom they found seated in an auto-
mobile in front of his mother’s home. They asked him
to accompany them to Warren County for questioning,

“which he agreed to do. The officers found a flash-

light with a broken lens, keys, pocket knives, a small
keyhole flashlight, wire, a woman’s shoulder bag, some
boots, and overshoes. Part of these articles were found
in the riding compartment and part in the trunk com-
partment of the automobile. They also found three
or four cartridges in a top covering which had been
removed from an old thermos bottle. The cartridges
were for use in a .32 Caliber Revolver. No pistol or
other firearm was found. After returning to Bowling
Green, Kilgore was questioned and confessed to the com-

‘mission of the crime. In his confession, he did not

implicate anyone else.

Several months after the crime was committed, an
inquest was held to determine the sanity or insanity
of Kilgore. The jury found him to be capable of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong, thus paving the
‘way for the criminal prosecution. He remained in jail
until his trial, at which he pleaded guilty to two indict-
ments for murder, the one of Doctor Martin, the other
of Mrs. Martin. His punishment was fixed at life im-
prisonment in each case. After his conviction and while
in) jail he made a statement implicating appellant,
George Melvin Daggit. This statement was made four-
teen months after the crime was committed. On Kil-
gore’s testimony, the indictment herein was returned

by the grand jury. .

‘We will not detail all of Kilgore’s testimony ‘be-
cause of its sordid character. Suffice it to say that it
was a virtual autobiography. of a person whose de-
pravity all but destroys his reliability and his integ-
rity as a-witness. It is important to note however that
Rileore’s ‘urge to’ kill-.divérs and sundry persons, in-

: eluding Doctor ‘and Mrs)’ Martin, attended -in’ one ‘in-
“Starice: by ‘an obséssion to feel the plood of ‘his intended

victim run a course over | v
years prior to his acquaintancéship with appellant,
whom he now accuses of. influencing him to kill Doctor

‘his own body, commenced many

:Martin,and who he contends aétually participated in

es 135

the commission of the crime itself. He related his own
motive for the crime to be that he was in love with a
young girl from Bowling Green, who, a short time be-
fore the murder, married a son of Doctor and Mrs.
Martin. Kilgore thought that his victims were respon-
sible for alienating the affections of this young lady
from him to their son. The motive he ascribed to Dag-
git is fantastic to say the least. He and Daggit were
to kill Doctor and Mrs. Martin, whose estates then would
be inherited by their son; they then planned to kill the
son, whereupon the estate would pass to the son’s
widow; Kilgore then would marry the widow and Dag-
git thereafter would live with them and enjoy a life
of ease. The entire testimony of Kilgore indicates
that he is a person lacking in mental stability, even
though he may know right from wrong. On this ac-
count, the evidence, which it is contended corroborates
his testimony, must be viewed with a great deal of
scrutiny. ‘

The Commonwealth points to the shattered lens of
the flashlight, to the sand on the bed, and to the bullet
holes in the body of Doctor Martin and his wife as
showing the crime was committed by more than one
person, thus corroborating the. testimony of Kilgore.
‘We do not think that this physical evidence leads ts the
conclusion drawn but, if it did, or if it had been such
as to show the crime was committed by a hundred men,
there is nothing in this evidence to even poiut a finger
of suspicion at Daggit.

Kilgore testified that the Martins were killed with
a revolver stolen from the home of Max Nahm, Esq., of
Bowling Green, with whom Daggit roomed at one time.
Mr. Nahm testified that a revolver was stolen from ‘his
home, but the theft was committed four months after
Daggit had moved his place of residence and six months
before the crime was committed. The revolver was not
produced on the trial and there is no evidence, except
Kilgore’s testimony, even to indicate that Mr. Nahm’s
revolver was used in the commission of the crime. The
mere fact that a revolver was stolen from a house where
Daggit formerly roomed and from which he had moved
many months prior to the theft does not connect either
the revolver or Daggit with the crime.

Two witnesses testified that Daggit and Kilgore

726 ee

were close companions and were seen on many occasions
together. This evidence does not tend to connect ap-
pellant with the crime.

Daggit himself testified that he and Kilgore spent

a great deal of time together—a part of almost every
day for many months—previous to the commission of
the crime. That during World War II he was em-
ployed as a music therapist to treat mental patients
at a hospital in Hartford, Connecticut. Daggit was a
musician and he treated the patients by playing music
to soothe their disturbed and distorted minds. He
fpined the Music Faculty of Western State College in
eptember 1945 and retained that position until his
resignation in September 1949. Kilgore was one of his
students and because he had great promise in the field
of music, Daggit gave him extra attention. Daggit first
noticed Kilgore’s ‘‘mental aberrations’? during the
spring of 1946. They first were manifested by a brood-
ing nature. Kilgore’s musical preferences were of the
melancholy and funereal type. Daggit tried to inter-
est him in lighter and more cheerful melodies. He
testified that his student revealed an unhappy and un-
balanced state of mind and often spoke of committing
suicide and of the facts attending his father’s suicide.
He related that Kilgore was obsessed with the thought
of destroying other people, especially girls who rebuffed
his attentions; and, because of fancied insults or in-
juries, Kilgore devised fantastic plots to murder a num-
ber of persons, including Daggit’s own mother and sis-
ter-in-law. Daggit worked with him to lead his mind
into other lines of thought and to endeavor to restore
him to a normal attitude toward life. Kilgore testified
as to all these obsessions and desires, but related that
Daggit and he together were plotting the crimes, al-
though he admitted such obsessions obtained in his mind
for a long time previous to meeting Daggit. Daggit
testified that on the night of June 29, 1948 Kilgore came
to his apartment in a ‘“‘distraught’’ state of mind and
requested Daggit to return to the studio and play for
him. Daggit was very tired but reluctantly agreed and
they left his apartment about 10:30 p m., driving to the
Western State College music building where they notic-
ed lights in Dr. Hart’s office. Daggit refused to go in
for fear it would disturb Dr. Hart, and Kilgore accept-
ed this excuse. They then drove down town and re-

es a

turned to Daggit’s apartment where they talked a few
minutes and Daggit bade Kilgore good night and enter-
ed his apartment about 11:15 or 11:30 p. m. He did
not leave the apartment until 7:30 o’clock in the follow-
ing morning, when he went to the college to teach an
early class. The Commonwealth points to Daggit’s tes-
timony as being corroborative of Kilgore’s testimony,
but we think it to be diametrically opposed to it. The
killing, according to the doctor who examined the body,
could not have occurred before 1:00 or later than 2:30
on the morning of June 30th, and all of the evidence
points more nearly to its having occurred between 2:00
and 2:30. Thus, Daggit does not place himself with
Kilgore for at least an hour and one-half and more prob-
ably two and one-half hours before the crime was com-
mitted. A person who listens to insane delusions cannot
be charged with participating in the fabrication of a
plot to consummate the insane desire of the person to
whom he is listening, nor can one who is attempting to
soothe a distorted mind be suspected of agreeing with
the delusions expressed by the afflicted person.

Kilgore’s mother, sister, and uncle testified that
after the crime was committed Daggit told them that
he was with Kilgore until around midnight. This evi-
dence does not contradict Daggit’s testimony that he
left Kilgore between 11:15 and 11:30, because for prac-
tical reference that is around midnight. Kilgore’s moth-
er additionally testified that Daggit stated to her ‘‘I
love that boy. If anything happens to him I cannot
bear it. If he is in prison, I want to be in prison too.’’
Although other inferences reasonably could be drawn
from this statement, it is not susceptible of the inference
that Daggit was connected with the murder.

We are of the opinion that Kilgore’s testimony is
without support of any corroborative testimony, on
which account appellant’s motion for a directed verdict
of acquittal should have been sustained. But since there
may be another trial, and that we may not overlook the
remote contingency that the Commonwealth may intro-
duce sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury,
it is necessary for us to pass on the complaint made of
the instructions.

The circumstances and Kilgore’s confession of the
homicide characterize it as murder. Therefore, appel-

728

lant is guilty of murder or nothing. Nevertheless, the
court instructed the jury under the law of manslaughter
and it was under this instruction that appellant was
found guilty and sentenced to 11 years in the state re-
formatory. This was error and extremely prejudicial.
Johnston v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 766, 186 8.W. 655.

The judgment is reversed.

Cheshire v. Wright et al.
February 27, 1951.
W. B. Ardery, Judge.

— 739

R. Vincent Goodlett and William Todd Cheshire for appellant.
Leslie W. Morris for appellees.

Jupen Moremen—Reversing.

Appellees, Charles F. Wright and Stella R. Wright,
his wife, defendants below, owned a certain tract of
land known as ‘‘Big Eddy Beach,’’ located in Franklin
County, Ky. on the south bank of the Kentucky River
about two miles from the city of Frankfort, Ky. On
April 16, 1947, appellees entered into a written agree-
ment with appellant, William T. Cheshire, whereby the
lessor leased to the lessee said tract of land. This lease
is written on both sides of a single sheet of paper and
both sides of the paper are signed by the lessors and
the lessee. On the front side of the paper, after a formal
statement, these provisions are set forth:

“Tn consideration for the said property, Big Eddy
Beach, we the lessees do promise the leasor one-third
(1/3) of all the profits from said beach; and we the
lessees assume all liabilities and work connected with
operation for consideration aforesaid.

“We the lessees also guarantee the said lessor

730 |

$200.00 (per year) as minimum profit to be derived
from said transaction.

__ ‘This lease will extend for one year from this date,
with an option for two years thereafter.’’ The reverse
side of said sheet of paper contains these stipulations:

“*(1) Said lease extends from May 15, 1947 to Sep-
tember 15, 1947.

“«(2) Lessee reserves right to use parking lot ad-
jacent to beach and customary roadway to and from
the beach.

*(3) Liability of lessee extends only from May 15,
1947, to September 15, 1947.

“«(4) Lessee promises to give an accounting of all in-
come and expenses on the 15th day of June, July and
August and September and to pay lessors their one-
third (1/3) interest on said days.”’

It will be noted from the above that on the front
of the page it is provided that the lease will extend
for one year from date with an option for two years
thereafter, while on the back of the page it is expressly
stipulated that said lease extends only from May 15,
1947, to September 15, 1947.

It was alleged in the petition that after the execu-
tion of the said written lease lessee took possession of
the leased premises on or about May 15, 1947, and con-
tinued in possession until on or about September 15,
1947. It was also averred that on or before April 15,
1948, lessee notified lessors of his exercise of option
under the terms of the lease to extend said lease for a
period of two years. It was further stated in the peti-
tion that after May 15, 1948, and prior to June 3, 1948,
lessors refused to permit lessee to enter upon or use the
leased premises, and lessee prayed damages for loss of
profits which he would have made from the operation of
the beach. Appellees demurred to the petition which was
not passed on at the time; answer was filed; appellant
filed a general demurrer to the answer and, without
waiving same, filed a reply, and thereupon the cause was
submitted on demurrer to the petition and also upon
demurrer to the answer of defendants. The court sus-
tained the demurrer of appellees to the petition; ap-

es 731

pellant declined to plead further, and the court dismissed
‘the petition.

The appellant contends there is no conflict between
the provisions of the contract that provide that the
lease extends from May 15, 1947, to September 15,
1947, and the provision which provides that the lease
extends for one year from the date of the lease with an
option for two years thereafter, while it is the conten-
tion of appellees that the provision on the back of the
paper that the lease extends from May 15, 1947, to Sep-
tember 15, 1947, is conclusive and that the lease ex-
pired on the latter day.

A lease is ordinarily construed most strongly
against lessor if there is an ambiguity in the terms of
the lease. Otting v. Gradski, 294 Ky. 779, 172 8.W.2d
554, 148 A.L.R. 580; Raff v. Freiberg, 207 Ky. 246, 268
S.W. 1110. It is also a rule of construction in the inter-
pretation of lease contracts that all apparently incon-
sistent clauses should be reconciled if possible. In the
ease of Black Star Coal Corporation v. Napier, 303 Ky.
778, 199 S.W.2d 449, 451, we said: ‘‘In construing con-
tracts there are certain familiar rules which guide
courts. The primary rule is to ascertain and give ef-
feet, if possible, to the mutual intention of the parties.
IY OJ.S., Contracts, sec. 295, p. 689. Words will be
construed in the sense they are employed by the parties,
and unless a contrary intention appears, they will be
given their ordinary meaning, 17 C.J.S., Contracts, sec.
300 and sec. 301, pp. 717 and 718. If the contract con-
tains inconsistent clauses, they should be reconciled if
possible, but the clause contributing most essentially to
the contract is entitled to the greater consideration;
if they both cannot stand, the first will ordinarily pre-
vail over the second.”

We find no irreconcilable conflict between the terms
of this lease. The operation of a swimming beach in
this section of the country is necessarily seasonal, and
that operation is confined to the warm portion of the
year. It is reasonable that a person may desire to con-
tract for the use of property for only that part of a
year in which the compulsions of nature permit its use
in his business, and, at the same time, assure to himself
the right to obtain that property during the favorable
season for a number of successive years.

The first provision of the contract, here involved,
defines the term of lease as being for one year from the
date of the contract, and grants the privilege of extend-
ing the term for two additional years.

The second provision fixes the period for the opera-
tion of the beach from May 15, 1947 to September 15,
1947. It is during this period that lessee is required. to
operate the beach and account for the profits earned
during that period. This lease does not provide for
the payment of a fixed sum as rental. The rental con-
sists of a portion of the profits; not profits made from
one day’s operation, but profits earned as the result of
an operation of the beach from May to September.
By the force of another provision of the contract, lessee
is relieved of responsibility in connection with the lease
for the other months of the year, which provision furth-
er fortifies our opinion that the parties agreed that the
beach operation would be only for a specified portion of
each year the lease was in force, although the term of
the lease was for a period of one year with an option
to extend it for two additional years.

The fact that the compensation of the lessor is stat-
ed-to be a part of the profits received by the lessee from
the operation of a business on the premises does not pre-
vent the transaction from being considered a lease. 32
Am. Jur., Landlord & Tenant, Section 9. Neither does
the fact the business from which those profits are de-
rived is performed during only a part of a year trans-
form a lease for the term of a year into a lease for the
seasonal business period alone.

Appellee also contends that lessee failed to exercise
his option to extend the lease during its original term.
This argument is based on the assumption that the ori-
ginal term expired on September 15, 1947. In view of:
our interpretation that the lease was for a term of one
year from April 16, 1947, the allegation in the petition
that on or before April 15, 1948, appellant notified
appellee of his exercise of his option, is sufficient.

The judgment is, therefore, reversed and the case
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Pe 733
Hall v. Hall et al.

February 27, 1951. °
Henry L. Brooks, Special Judge.

T. ©. Carroll for appellant.
Appellees not represented by an attorney.

Cumr Justics Cammacx—Affirming.

: This appeal involves the construction of the will
of H. H. Hall, who died in June, 1950. The will, which
was made in 1933, follows:

This is my will, Iam in good health and sound
-maind. I want my wife Lena R. Hall if she is the longest
liver to have all-of my. belongings and. at-her death if
. my: brothers.Bert Hall.and Tom Hall-are still living: it
canbe divided between the two families, and if she Lena
RB. Hall wants to make any change she is at liberty'to ‘do
50.”?

The appeal is from a judgment holding ‘that Mrs,
Hall ‘‘was bequeathed and devised the entire estate of
.H..H. Hall and given the possession, management, con-
trol and-right-of disposition of-same: during her-lifetime
~ and was-further-given:the right to dispose of any: and all
of-said property. by will: aie

‘a will dispésing

734 |

of all or any part of said estate then in that event such

estate remaining shall pass under the will of H. H. Hall

to Bert Hall if he is living but in the event Bert Hall

should predecease Lena R. Hall, then the remainder

of said estate or any portion thereof shall pass under the

jews. ot descent and distribution to the heirs of Lena
Hall.”

We think the chancellor properly disposed of the
ease. Mr. Hall’s intent is gathered readily from the
one sentence in which he disposed of his estate. The
ease comes clearly within the scope of the opinion im
the case of Berner v. Luckett, 299 Ky. 744, 186 8.W.2d

Judgment affirmed.

P|
Arnold v. Arnold’s Ex’x.

February 27, 1951.
J. ©. Dedman, Judge.

x
we
a

Swinford & Sims for appellant.
John P. Lair for appellee.

Jvupee Monemen—Reversing.

On July 7, 1937, Clarence Arnold filed a suit for
divorce from his wife, Mary Arnold. On July 16, 1937,
she filed an answer and cross-petition seeking a divorce

736 ee

from bed and board. On November 11, 1937, a child was
born to this union, and he was named Harry Kent Arn-
old. Thereafter, Mary Arnold filed an amended answer
and counterclaim and prayed an absolute divorce, ali-
mony, custody of the child and maintenance for it. On
March 26, 1938, a judgment was entered awarding Mary
Arnold an absolute divorce, custody of the child, and
the sum of $20 per month as maintenance. The judgment
also contained this provision: ‘‘It is ordered and ad-
judged by the Court that each party hereto shall restore
to the other such property not disposed of at the com-
mencement of this action as either may have obtained
directly or indirectly from or through the other during
marriage, or in consideration or by reason thereof, ex-
cept that any property that the defendant, Mary Arnold,
disposed of prior to the entering of this judgment or the
proceeds thereof which might have belonged to the de-
fendant, Clarence Arnold, shall be awarded to the said
Mary Arnold as alimony and no restitution therefor
need be made.’’ :

Clarence Arnold paid the maintenance award until
he died, testate, in the month of June 1948. Under the
terms of his will, he bequeathed the sum of $1000 to his
son; $500 to the Cynthiana Methodist Church, and the
residue of his estate was devised and bequeathed in
equal shares to his father, John Arnold, and sisters and
brother, with directions for the disposition of their
shares in the event of death. His sister Gladys Kitchen
bind Gaamed executrix. The alleged value of the estate is

On February 24, 1949, Harry Kent Arnold, by his
next friend, filed a petition in the’ Harrison: Circuit
Court, in which he prayed that the estate of Clarence
‘Arnold ‘be finally settled; and after the paymerit of
décedent’s just debts, the remainder’ of ‘testator’s estate
be delivered to plaintiff’s guardian. This suit was ap-
parently based upon the theory that a father’s éstate
was liable for maintenance payment through the entire
period of his son’s infancy. The court under the-author-
ity of the rule announced in the case: of Sandlin’s Adm’x
v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90.8. W. 2d 350, 353 where this
court said: ‘Without a divorce, the father is only bound
to support. his infant:children so long ashe lives, and
:it-would be ilogical'to ‘hold“that, by:reason of*a'divoree

Le 137

decree, a child is in a better position in respect to his-
father’s estate. than he would be without the decree
for divorce,’ sustained a demurrer to the petition.

.; Thereafter by two amended petitions, it was averred’
that after. Harry Kent Arnold was born and while the
divorce suit was pending his father and mother, for. ap-
pellant’s use and benefit, entered into a contract by the.
terms of which decedent agreed to:

(a) Pay to appellant’s mother for his benefit, a sum
not less than $20 per month and more, if his financial
circumstances permitted, and,

+ (b) If he, decedent, died before appellant reached
his majority, then he would leave to him his entire
estate. .

In consideration for which it was alleged that the
mother agreed to:

. (1) Settle the suit then pending between them.
. (2) Accept for appellant, the allowance of $20 re-
ferred to in the judgment of divorce.

. (3): Withdraw.her claim for alimony and proceed on
her-cross-petition seeking a divorce and in effect giving
to decedent a divorce. '

_ It was also alleged the contract was for ‘‘other
good and valuable considerations not herein recited.”’

The trial court was of opinion that the three con-
siderations set out seriatim above were insufficient to
support the contract and sustained a demurrer to the
petition as amended, which was dismissed.

The trial court based his action on the grounds:
that the amount of maintenance to be awarded is one
for the court alone, and may be raised or lowered at any
time, therefore, the mother parted with nothing of value
when she agreed to the sum of $20 per month; that the
consideration for the promise to withdraw her claim for
alimony failed because she was, in fact, awarded alimony.
by the judgment of divorce, and that the alleged con-°
sideration that she would proceed on her cross-petition
for a divorce was a part of a contract intended to facili-
tate the procurement of a divorce and, therefore, void.

We have copied above that portion of the divorce

738 Pe)

decree which contains the restoration provision requir-
ed by the statute to be in.such judgments. We cannot
agree that this clause constitutes an award of alimony.
The word alimony is used, but the effect of this provi-
sion is only to leave the parties as they were insofar as
restoration of property by the wife was concerned. It
is true that our statute, KRS 403.060, requires restora-
tion of property not disposed of at the commencement
of the action and this provision has the effect of ex-
tending the time to the day of judgment, but we are
of opinion that this change in the cut off day may not
properly be regarded as an alimony award. We have
only the judgment before us, but there is no intimation
in the record that the mother obtained any additional
property directly or indirectly by reason of the marri-
age or in consideration thereof, between the time suit
for divorce was filed and judgment was entered.

The trial court based his decision that the agree-
ment to proceed on the cross-petition for divorce was
void, on the opinion in the case of Bishop v. Bishop, 238
Ky. 702, 88 S.W.2d 657, 659. In that case the husband
instituted an action against his wife in which he charged
her with infidelity. The wife filed answer and counter-
claim, and asked for alimony and custody of the chii-
dren. Thereafter the parties entered into a contract
which provided that the petition and the cross-petition
be dismissed and that the wife should later institute an
action for divorce on grounds of abandonment and prose-
eute same to final judgment, and that, upon her failure
to do so, it is provided the husband might file action for
divorce on the same ground and prosecute it to final judg-
ment. Although the challenge to the legality of this agree-
ment had been withdrawn from the pleadings in the case,
the court commented that the agreement upon its face
appeared to be a collusive agreement that one party will
sue for divorce with at least a tacit understanding that
the other party will not resist the suit, but, on the con-
tary, will promote the efforts of the one asking relief
at the hands of the court, and quoted from 9 R.C.L.
254, a discussion wherein the rule was summarized as
follows: ‘“A contract between a man and wife as to the
support of their child, however, is not void as against
public policy because it is entered into pending divorce
proceedings between them, where neither its purpose
nor effect in any way facilitates the granting of the di-

Le 739

yorce. Though there is authority to the contrary, the
better view seems to be that the public interest demands
disclosure of the true cause of divorce, so that where a
spouse has a good ground, his or her agreement to con-
ceal it and allege another is against public policy.’’

That rule may have been applicable to the facts in
the Bishop case, but it has no proper application here.
There is no indication that the true cause of divorce was
not disclosed, nor that either spouse concealed any fact
concerning the real reason for divorce. Nor do we be-
lieve that the author of the text above quoted intended
the expression, ‘“‘in any way facilitates the granting of
the divorce,’’ to mean any agreeable act by the parties
however harmless was sufficient to vitiate the entire
proceedings. There must be some element of fraud or
‘bad conduct present. We do not find that in this case,
from the facts alleged in the petition, as amended.

The petition also alleges that there were ‘‘other
good and valuable considerations’? for the contract.
Although this allegation is not specific, the relationship
of father and son is plainly stated and we have held in
the case of Doty v. Dickey, 96 S.W. 544, 29 Ky. Law Rep.
900, that love and affection is a sufficient considera-
tion to uphold either an executed or an executory con-
tract between parent and child.

We are of opinion that the petition, as amended,
contained sufficient allegations concerning considera-
-tion.

Although this case was decided by the trial court
upon the pleading, the parties, by agreement, submitted
the question of competency of testimony of the mother
im the event she was presented as a witness upon the
trial of the case upon its merits. This was done by
means of presenting to the court an avowal concerning
the facts which she would testify to if she were pre-
sented in court for that purpose. The court was of
opinion ‘‘that the mother of the plaintiff, Mary Arnold,
las a direct, pecuniary interest in the outcome of this
litigation, adverse to the estate of Clarence Arnold, her
former husband now deceased, and for that reason is
imeompetent to testify under See. 606 of the Civil Code
of Practice of Kentucky, as to a transaction she had
with a dead man.’’ It is argued by appellee that, since

740 ee

upon the death of the father, the duty of supporting a
minor child ordinarily falls upon the mother that, if the
infant were permitted to prevail in this case and .ob-
tain an estate of his own, the personal liability of the
mother would be transferred to the estate received from
the decedent and therefore the mother would be re-
lieved of her responsibility and, because of this fact, she
had a direct, pecuniary interest in the recovery.

In the case of Stowers v. Hollis, 83 Ky. 544, 7
Ky. Law Rep. 549, we held that the mother of a bastard
is a competent witness for the child to prove a contract
between the father and her for the support of the child,
although he was dead when she testified. And in the
case of Doty’s Adm’r v. Doty’s Guardian, 118 Ky. 204,
80 S.W. 803, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 63, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 718,
we held, in a case involving similar facts, that the
mother was a competent witness even though she had an
additional interest in that she was a guardian of the
infant and a party to the suit. And in this case it was
pointed out that recovery would be the infant’s and
not the mother’s. Although in this case it is conceivable
that the mother too, would be benefited in a remote
sense by the fact that the child would have some estate,
we see no reason why the legitimacy of the child should
deny to the mother the right to testify when she could
have testified had the child been illegitimate, and we
are of opinion that the remote benefit which she might
receive in this case, in the event the child establishes
a contract, is not such a direct, pecuniary interest in
the action as would disqualify her as a witness. Furth-
ermore, we have held that ordinarily the parent must
provide: support for the infant child, without regard to
the child’s estate, if the parent is able to do so, Hamil-
ton Adm’r v. Riney, 140 Ky. 476, 131 S.W. 287, so it is
entirely possible that the mother will not be relieved of
her duty to support the child even though he comes into
some estate.

We are of opinion that the petition, as amended,
alleges a cause of action based on contract, and the.
judgment is therefore reversed and the case remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ©

“TAL

American Fidelity & Casualty Co. etal. v.
Patterson et al.

“February 27, 1951.
Kindrick S. Alcorn, Judge.

Robert M. Odear, Stoll, Keenon & Park and James Clay for appel-
lants,

Ralph G Stone, Albert Reutingler and George Silliman for ap-
pellees,

Juves Hutm—Dismissing appeal.

. On December 7, 1947, appellee, Helen E. Patter- ~
son, accompanied by Kathryn Allen and Jennie V. Pat-
terson, was driving an automobile belonging to Ken-
neth J. Patterson on a highway in Boyle County. It was
raining, the road was slippery, the car skidded and
overturned. A bus of Indianapolis & Southeastern
Trailways, Inc. was proceeding some distance behind
the Patterson car. The driver, in going down a hill
toward the overturned car, was not able to control his
bus because of the slippery condition of the road. The
bus collided with the overturned car. The car’ was
pushed several feet, resulting in the death of Louis
Robards Currens, and severe injuries to William Whit-
lock. After suits were filed, appellant American Fideli-
ty & Casualty Company, insurance carrier for the bus

‘742 re

company, settled with the administrator of Currens for
$8,104, and with William Whitlock for $5,000.

In this action appellants seek a contribution of 50
per cent of the amount, including costs, expended by
appellants in settlement of the cases, on the ground that
appellees were jointly and concurrently negligent with
the driver of the bus.

In their statement of appeal, appellants set out that
the judgment appealed from appears on page 78 of the
record. On pages 73 and 74 of the record we find am
order of trial showing that a jury was selected; proof
was offered by both parties; appellees, at the conclu-
sion of all the evidence, moved for a directed verdict;
the court sustained that motion and directed the jury to
find for appellees, to which ruling appellants excepted ;
that ‘‘in obedience to the instructions of the court the
jury returned the following verdict: “We the jury pur-
suant to the peremptory instruction of the court find
for the defendants.’’’ But the record does not show
that any judgment was entered at that time.

Appellants filed motion and grounds for a new
trial. An order of September 28, 1949, provides: ‘‘This
cause coming on to be heard upon plaintiff’s motion
and grounds for a new trial herein; the court being ad-
vised overrules said motion, to which ruling the plain-
tiff objects and excepts and prays an appeal to the Court
of Appeals which is granted.’? This order assumes that
a judgment had been entered.

. Here appellees insist that ‘‘there is no judgment
in the record from which appellants may prosecute an
appeal. Therefore, appellants’ cause may not be heard
here for want of jurisdiction.”

Civil Code of Practice, sec. 734, and KRS 21.060
provide for appeals from final orders and judgments in
civil cases. If a judgment had been entered following
the verdict of the jury dismissing appellants’ petition,
appellants, by filing motion and grounds, would have
suspended proceedings on the judgment until the motion
was disposed of. A judgment so suspended is not final
for the purposes of appeal, and an appeal should not be
prayed in the lower court until after the judgment be-
comes final by the overruling of the motion. But here
we have no judgment. Not having a final judgment in

ee 743

the record, we are without jurisdiction of the appeal in
this case. Civil Code, sections 368 and 734; 4 O.J.S.,
Appeal and Error, sec. 123, page 244; Miller’s Appellate
Practice and Forms, sec. 63; Newman’s Pleading, Prac-
tice and Forms, Vol. 2, p. 1477; Coomer vy. Common-
wealth, 309 Ky. 575, 218 S. W. 2d 393; Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 303 Ky. 411, 197 8.W.2d 923.

The appeal is dismissed.

Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Cox et al.
February 27, 1951.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

Woodward, Bartlett, Hobson & McCarroll for appellant.
Fox & Gordon for appellees,

Juver Muur«ey—Affirming.

While convalescing at home from a comminuted
fracture of his left leg, an injury which arose out of
and in the course of his employment, Levi Cox slipped
and fell breaking his leg again just an inch above the
original fracture. He was taken to the hospital and

“Tad ee

his leg again placed in a cast. When it-failed to:heal
properly it was discovered that the cast had.-slipped,
and: that a radical operation was necessary to secure
proper alignment of the bone. This operation was :suc-
cessfully effected, but within fifteen minutes of - its
completion Mr. Cox suddenly complained of pain: in-his
chest and, despite all efforts to relieve him, died within
a few minutes. No autopsy was made, but it was the
opinion of the surgeon that a blood clot had hit the
lung and caused Mr. Cox’s death. The Workmen’s
Compensation Board awarded the claimant, Hattie Cox,
widow of the deceased, Levi Cox, full compensation for
the death of her husband, and this award was approved
by the Cireuit Court. The principal question we have
before us is whether the second injury can be considered
a natural outgrowth of the first injury and, as such,
compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation ‘Law.

_ “Tn this class of cases the decisions are sustaitied
and justified ordinarily by reference to the doctrine, of
proximate cause. The general rule is that compensation
must be.allowed for all of.the injurious consequences
flowing from the original injury, and not attributable to
an independent, intervening cause.”? 58 Am. Jur.,
Workmen’s Compensation, Section 198, page’706. The
difficulty comes in applying the principle to the par-
ticular situation. In the case at bar, Levi Cox had been
at home and had coniplied with the instructions of his
physician in moving about, first on crutches, then'on a
cane and a-erutch,.and- finally he had: graduated:to the
use of a cane alone. This course of conduct was pre-
’ seribed in order’ to expedite healing ‘by’ stimulating
circilation, reducing stiffness of the knee ‘and ankle
joints, and restoring the general muscle tone. There
was some question whether Mr. Cox had acted wisely
in walking in his back yard on the June morning of
his second injury because the ground was’ somewhat
slippery from moisture. It is sufficient answer to his
possible lack of judgment on that occasion to say that
his physician did not warn him not to venture out in
such circumstances. In other words, no detailed instruc-
tions were given in that respect. The surgeon testified:
“Tt is my opinion that he, Levi Cox, would have been
much less likely to have fallen and fractured the bone
the second time had his joints not been stiff from the
treatment of the first fracture.’? While the X-ray. re-

145

vealed no physical connection between the first and sec-
ond fracture an inch above it, we believe that the Work-
men’s Compensation Board was justified in concluding,
as did the surgeon, that the handicap the man suffered
from his first injury was a highly contributing factor
in causing the second injury.

The injured man had been paid full compensation
until the time of his death, and further payments were
stopped upon the theory that the second injury was not
a compensable one. Since the tenor of all the evidence
indicates that Mr. Cox had complied fully with the in-
structions of his physician—that he had been a good
patient—it would hardly seem just to penalize his wid-
ow by denying recovery in this case. Certainly, had
Mr. Cox failed ‘‘to submit to or follow any competent
surgical treatment or medical aid or advice,’? KRS
342.035(2), no compensation would have been paid for
either his disability or his death. Conversely, when he
made every effort to comply with the instructions of
his physician, his widow should not be penalized because
of the unfortunate outcome.

Judgment affirmed.
|
Gregory v. Commonwealth.
February 27, 1951.
A. J. Bratcher, Judge.

C. A. Denny for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General and Zeb A, Stewart, Assistant At-
torney General, for appellee.

Cur Justices Cammack—Dismissing appeal.

Paul Gregory was sentenced to prison for one year
on a charge of grand larceny. At the-outset we are

746

confronted with a motion to dismiss the appeal because
no judgment appears in the record. As stated in Lee
yv. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 771, 218 S.W.2d 945, there
is nothing from which an appeal may be prosecuted
when there is no judgment in the record.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed.
a
Louisville & N. R. Co. et al. v. Bordoffsky’s Adm’r.

November 28, 1950.
Rehearing denied March 23, 1951.

Roscoe Conklin, Judge.

Edward P. Humphrey for appellants.

Stanley B. Mayer for appellee.
Van Sanz, Commissionsr—Affirming.

Appellee, Stanley J. Bordorf, administrator of the
estate of Samuel Bordoffsky, filed this action against
the Louisville & Nashville and Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
way Companies to recover damages for the wrongful
death of his decedent and for the destruction of his
car. Upon the trial the jury found for appellee, award-
ing him $19,500.00 for the fatal injury and $575.00 for
damage to the car. From a judgment on the verdict
this appeal has been taken. Appellants urge two
grounds for reversal: (1) Error in the instructions to
the jury, and (2) the failure to give a peremptory in-
struction for appellants.

The fatal injury of the decedent arose out of a
collision between an east bound O. & O. train
and the decedent’s automobile at a point where the
L. & N. tracks cross Birchwood Avenue near its inter-
section with Frankfort Avenue in Crescent Hill, Louis-
ville, on October 5, 1945 about 6:30 p.m. The decedent
was driving his car south on Birchwood toward Frank-
fort Avenue, accompanied by his wife and her niece,
who were sitting in the back seat of the car. In ap-
proaching the crossing he brought his car to a halt north
of the electrically operated gates installed to warn of the
approach of oncoming trains. At that time the gates
were closed for the passing of a west bound L. & N.
freight train over the northerly of two railway tracks.
After the freight train passed, the gates ascended and
the decedent proceeded to cross the tracks. Before he
had completed the crossing, the gates descended again
and decedent stopped his car just inside the southerly
gates, the rear wheels of his car resting across the

es

rails of the southerly track on which an east bound
C. & O. passenger train was approaching. The deced-
ent’s wife and his niece alighted from the car on the
right or westerly side which was free of danger from
the impact. The deceased left the car from the driver’s
(east) side in the path along which the car was propelled
when struck. His lifeless body came to rest approxi-
mately fifty feet east of the crossing, while his car
was carried beyond.

The gates which protect the crossing are automati-
cally operated in circuit with flasher lights and warning
bells. "When a train passes over the rails 1650 feet
west of the crossing, bells commence ringing and the
lights start flashing four seconds later the gates begin
to descend and fourteen seconds later they come to rest
parallel with the ground. Thus eighteen seconds tran-
spire from the time the train starts the circuit until the
gates are closed. The gates are of a type which will
swing both inward and outward, and on their inside fac-
ing the words, ‘‘Push—Gates Will Swing’’ are painted
in letters 2 3/4 inches high. The testimony shows that
the train which struck the decedent’s car was traveling
at approximately forty miles per hour, which was the
maximum speed authorized by the railway company.
A train traveling at that speed would reach the crossing
approximately twenty-eight seconds after striking the
grout which puts into operation the gates and warning

levices.

The testimony for both parties and the exhibits fil-
ed show that there is a slight curve of approximately
two degrees to the right for an east bound train, extend-
ing from some distance west of Birchwood between Hite
and Bayly Avenues to a point thirty feet east of Birch-
wood. The testimony also shows that just south of the
fence which marks the boundary of the railroad right
of way, shrubbery and trees had been planted by the
Crescent Hill Woman’s Club to beautify the area, the
branches and foliage of which extended to some extent
into the right of way. The engineer testified that he
saw the car on the track when he was from 150 to 200 feet
away, and that he did not see the car previously because
the curve threw the beam of his headlight off of the
track. As soon as he saw the decedent’s car, he set the
emergency brake, released sand, and closed the throttle.

SS 7°

He travelled 785 feet from that point before coming to a
full stop. The engineer had been ringing his bell con-
tinuously since leaving Hast Louisville and had sounded
the whistle of his train between Bayly Avenue (one
block west of Birchwood) and Hite Avenue (two blocks
west of Birchwood) as he passed the freight train trav-
elling on the west bound track.

Deceased, according to his widow’s testimony, was
accustomed only to gates operated manually by a keep-
er, and, in an apparent effort to draw attention of such
a gate keeper, he blew his horn several times after stop-
ping inside the gates. Mrs. Bordoffsky testified that
he got out of the car, but her niece was unable to state
whether he got out of the car or not. A policeman and
newspaper reporter testified, however, that immedi-
ately after the accident both Mrs. Bordoffsky and her
niece said that they begged the deceased to leave the car
but he refused to do so. The physical facts bear out
Mrs. Bordoffsky’s testimony since hair matching that
of the deceased was discovered on the outer surface of
the left rear door near the top hinge.

It is appellants’ theory that neither of the rail-
roads was shown to be negligent; but that, even if
shown to be negligent, the decedent had the last clear
chance to avoid the injury. It is appellee’s theory that
the L. & N. railroad was negligent in the operation of
its gates by trapping: the decedent inside the gates and
failing to give timely warning of the approach of the
train; and, the C. & O. was negligent in operating the
train at an unreasonable rate of speed in approaching
the crossing in question. Appellee further contends that
the decedent was not bound to use the best means at his
disposal to avoid injury, but only to use such care and.
judgment as might be fairly expected of a person of
ordinary prudence under the circumstances. ~~

The measured distance between the southerly rail
of the track and the southerly gates of the crossing is
but nine feet. The distance between the south gates and
Frankfort Avent is approximately 14 feet. Vehicular
traffic on. Frankfort Avenue is extremely heavy and
the approach thereto must be made with extreme cau-
tion and at a very slow speed. The rear end of an automo-
bile sixteen feet long necessarily would extend. over both
rails of the track if a car is brought to rest short of the

750 ee

south gates. At the speed the train was travelling, the
deceased had but ten seconds to discover the gates were
down, the train was approaching, and known means of
escape were cut off. Thinking the gates were operated
by a watchman, he first tried to attract attention by
blowing his horn. He could not be expected to look for or
take the time to read and digest printed instructions for
an otherwise unknown method of escape. He was un-
acquainted with the peculiar feature of the gate by the
use of which he could have escaped. He was trapped,
or so he believed, and had to resort to his own ingenuity
to attempt to escape. He was confronted with an avenue
of dangerous traffic before him and the onrush of a
monstrous instrument of death approaching at high
speed to his right and rear. He had the legal right to
choose what appeared to him to be the safest course to
extricate himself from danger, even though he was killed
in following the course he chose. The railroad company
had invited him into danger by raising the gates and so
far as he knew, held him in the place of danger by lower-
ing them. The crossing was inherently dangerous, of
which fact the railroad companies could not have been
ignorant. It is obvious that it cannot be determined,
as a matter of law, that appellee’s decedent had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident.

- The C. & O. had authorized those in charge of the
train to proceed at 40 miles per hour. Such ‘speed un-
der such conditions was sufficient evidence to support
a verdict based on negligent operation; and the fact that
the gates were so geared that their lowering so closely
preceded the arrival of the train, which, in turn, so close-
ly followed the open invitation to cross was sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury’s verdict based on negligence
of the L. & N. in operating its gates.. The evidence of
negligence on the part of both appellants was sufficient
to support a verdict of joint liability.

The complaint made of the instructions is that it re-
quired the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company to
keep its train under reasonable control at the time and
place of the accident. Appellants argue that this duty
would delay the operation of the passenger train to such
an extent that much time would be unnecessarily lost.
They do not cite any authority for this position other
than to say ‘‘the law does not require that this be done.”’

Ss 7

We are of the opinion that the law does require it to be
done, although the speed at which a train may be oper-
ated reasonably may vary with varying conditions. In
Kentucky and Indiana Railway Company v. Cantrell,
298 Ky. 743, 184 8.W.2d 111, virtually the same argu-
ment was made in complaining of an instruction in re-
spect to the speed of one of the railway company’s
trains. The court pointed out that it was not dealing
with crossings generally but with the one described in
the petition which, as here, was inherently dangerous,
and in that case the court observed that the jury reason-
ably could have concluded that any speed which was so
great that the train could not be stopped within 230
feet was evidence of excessive speed and negligence.
In the case before us, the engineer admitted that he was
traveling at such a speed (40 miles per hour) as to be
paable to bring the train to a stop in a distance less than
eet.

The cause of action stated in the petition was based
on a general allegation of negligence in respect to the.
construction of the crossing and right of way and the
operation of the gates on the part of the L. & N., and
upon a general allegation of negligence in respect to
the operation of the train by the C. & O. An amended
petition was filed withdrawing ‘‘all allegations of
specifie negligence.’? It is contended that by this
amendment the plaintiff withdrew all material allega-
tions of the petition except that in respect to the opera-
tion of the train. We believe the original pleading not
to be susceptible of the construction placed on it. An
allegation charging negligence in the operation of cross-
ing gates is no less general than an allegation charging
negligence in the operation of a train, which appellants
rightfully concede was not withdrawn by the amended
petition. .

The judgment is affirmed.

752

Stephens et al. v. Horn.

December 8, 1950.
Rehearing ‘denied March 23, 1951.

Edward P. Hill, Judge.

a 758

Joe Hobson for appellants.
Combs & Combs for appellee.

Juven Rezs—Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment for $900 in an
action for breach of contract.

On October 13, 1947, the appellants, D. C. Stephens
and Dora Stephens, entered into a contract with the ap-
pellee, Donald Horn, whereby Horn agreed to construct
a coal loading chute for appellants. The contract was re-
duced to writing and was signed by appellants but not
by appellee. However, it is conceded that the writing
sets forth the terms of the contract correctly. Appellee
agreed to construct a coal chute on appellants’ lease in

ott County at a point to be selected by them, and they
were to furnish all materials in the construction of the
chute. Appellee was to furnish all the labor re-
quired, and appellants agreed to pay him the sum of
$60 for each and every 1,000 board feet of lumber used
in constructing the chute. The concluding paragraph
of the contract reads: ‘‘Parties of the first part further
agree to advance to party of the second part the sum of
$200.00 per week for the purpose of paying the employees
of second party engaged in doing such work, for which
sum the parties of the first part shall be entitled to
eredit on the final settlement to be made by them and
party of the second part for said work, but no further
advances of any kind shall be made by parties of the
first part, and in no event shall parties be required to
pay to party of second part any sum in excess of the
amount due him under this contract for the amount of
lumber which he places in said coal chute.’”’

A plan of the proposed structure was prepared for
appellants by J. A. Hager, a civil engineer, and it was
given to appellee for his guidance during the construc-
tion work. Appellee, with six or seven men employed by
him, began work on the construction of the coal chute,
and each week for three weeks appellant D. C. Stephens
gave him $200, advance pay provided for in the con-
tract, for the purpose of meeting his pay roll. Stephens
refused to make the fourth weekly payment, claiming that
‘appellee did not have enough lumber in the chute to
justify the payments that had theretofore been made.

754 re

According to appellee, Stephens appeared at his home
on the following day, Sunday, and informed him that
no more advancements would be made and that another
man had been employed to finish the job. Donald Horn
was 19 years of age, and on November 12, 1947, he
brought an action by John Horn, as his next friend,
against appellants to recover $1,740 for the alleged
breach of the contract. On the trial of the case the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $900.
On this appeal it is argued that the contract was termin-
able at will since it failed to fix any definite time within
which the work was to be done, the court erred in ad-
mitting and rejecting evidence, the instructions are er-
roneous, and the verdict is excessive.

Appellants cite and rely upon Duff v. P. T. Allen
Lumber Co., 810 Ky. 439, 220 S.W.2d 981, in support of
their contention that the contract was terminable at will
since no definite time was fixed for completion of the
work. In the Duff case two laborers were employed
to cut trees above 12 inches in diameter on a 952-acre
tract of land, and they were to receive for their labor
the sum of $20 per 1,000 feet of timber cut. It was held
that the contract did not contemplate that the laborers
employed should cut all the timber on the 952-acre tract;
that it was merely a contract for services, and, since it
specified no time for its performance but was indefinite
in that respect, either party had the right to abandon
it at any time. Ordinarily this is the rule in regard
to contracts for personal services and contracts of ten-
ancy. Western Union Telegraph Company v. Ramsey,
261 Ky. 657, 88 S.W.2d 675, 103 A.L.R. 541; Louisville
& N. BR. B. Co. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S.W.2d 749;
Morgan v. Morgan, 309 Ky. 581, 218 S.W.2d 410. Here,
the contract was for a definite amount of work, the con-
struction of a coal chute according to certain plans.
Where there is no provision in such a contract as to
the time for performance, the general rule is that the
contract must be performed within a reasonable time.
Martin Oil & Gas Co. v. Fyffe, 251 Ky. 517, 65 S.W.2d
686; Carhart Holding Company v. Mitchell, 261 Ky.
297, 87 8.W.2d 360.

The alleged error in the admission of evidence of
which complaint is made was the admission of the plans
prepared by a civil engineer. The plans are referred

a 755

to in the evidence as a ‘‘white print map,’’ and appellee
testified that the map was made by J. A. Hager at the
direction of D. C. Stephens, and that the chute was to
be constructed according to it. This is not denied. It is
argued that the map should have been introduced and
identified by the engineer who made it. The correctness
of the map was not in issue. It was introduced to show
the nature and extent of the structure to be erected and
the amount of work that had been done, and its admis-
sion was proper.

Complaint is made of the statement of appellee that
he needed the $200 to pay his workmen, but the contract
obligated appellants to make the advancement for that
purpose and appellee’s testimony was material and
relevant. In his original petition appellee alleged that
at the time of the breach he had used 1,400 board feet
of lumber which entitled him, under the contract to
$840 for his services. In an amended petition he with-
drew this allegation. His proof showed that he had used
more than 14,000 feet of lumber when the alleged breach
occurred, Appellants offered to read the allegation in
the original petition, and the court sustained an objec-
tion and properly so since the amount stated in the
pleading was papably a stenographic error. Further-
more, the allegation had been withdrawn.

Complaint is made of the admission or rejection of
other evidence, but we have pointed out the most mer-
itorious objections.

Appellants finally contend that the verdict is ex-
cessive, and that the excessive verdict was probably in-
duced by the court’s failure to direct the jury in In-
struction No. 2 to credit any finding with the sum of
$600 advanced by appellants. The suit was for lost
profits only. Appellee’s proof showed that the heavy
and expensive portion of the work had been completed
when the contract was canceled. At that time he had
expended $1,170 for labor and had received advance-
ments amounting to $600. The remaining part of the
work would have proceeded rapidly and profitably.
More than 47,000 feet of lumber in all would have been
used in the construction of the chute, which would have
entitled appellee to more than $2,800 for his services,
and since his total labor costs, according to him, would
have amounted to between $1,800 and $1,900, his profit

156

--would have exceeded $900. According to appellee’s
proof he had paid out for labor $570 more than he had
received. Accordingly, his profit, after the verdict is
considered, will amount to $330. In view of the evi-
dence, the verdict is not excessive.

Judgment is affirmed.
Hofgesang et al. v. Crawford.
January 9, 1951,
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1951.

H. M. Denton, Special Judge.

es 187

Bwing L. Hardy for appellants.
‘Wilbur Fields for appellee,
Van Sant, Commissioner—Affirming.

The appeal is from a judgment based on a jury’s
verdict awarding appellee recovery for a commission
in the sum of $2850.00, allegedly earned by him pursuant
to a verbal contract in a transaction involving the sale
of certain real estate in Louisville owned by appellants.
Both appellants seek reversal on the ground that the
Court erred: (1) in refusing to direct a verdict in their
favor; (2) in refusing to give the second and third in-
structions offered by them, and, (3) in giving instruc-
tion No. 1 on its own motion. Mrs. Hofgesang seeks re-
versal of the judgment as against her on the additional
ground that she is not legally bound by the contract
prade by her husband, whatever its terms may have

een.

The principal issue between the parties was clear-
ly cut. Appellee, a real estate broker, contended below
and still contends that Mr. Hofgesang, himself a real-
estate broker, agreed to pay the commission when the
sale was consummated if appellee should produce a
purchaser, but without the requirement that appellee
should, or the expectation that he would, actually close
the deal. Appellants contended below and still con-
tend that, under the contract, appellee was: required to
close the deal as agent for appellants. The parties
are agreed that appellee introduced the property to
the eventual purchaser, went with him to view it, and
on that occasion and on the site, introduced Mr. Hofge-
sang to the prospect, as such, in person. They likewise
are agreed that appellee did nothing further to consum-
mate the sale. Thus, the ultimate fact for determina-
tion was, and is, whether these acts on the part of ap-
pellee fulfilled his obligation under the contract. This
fact can be determined only by a prior determination of
the dispute between the parties in respect to the terms
of the contract.

Mr. Crawford testified that he was employed by
Mr. Hofgesang as a ‘‘birddog,’’ an expression used in

758 |

real estate circles to designate a person who merely
finds a prospect for another real estate agent to negoti-
ate with. He stated that Mr. Hofgesang, being a li-
eensed real estate broker, indicated that he was de-
sirous of closing the deal in person but did not have
time to look wp a prospective purchaser; he therefore
offered to pay Mr. Crawford the full real estate com-
mission if he would locate a purchaser. Two witnesses
corroborated Mr. Crawford’s testimony concerning the
terms of the contract. Mr. Hofgesang alone testified
to the contrary. Thus the evidence was conflicting and
the court did not err in overruling appellants’ motion
for a peremptory instruction.

In instruction No, 1 the Court told the jury: ‘‘If the
jury believe from the evidence that the defendant,
Joseph C. Hofgesang, agreed orally with the plaintiff,
B. M. Crawford, that if he would find a purchaser for
the property of the defendants, concerning which you
have heard evidence, that he would pay said Crawford
a regular real estate commission for finding said pur-
chaser, and if you further believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff, B. M. Crawford, did bring to the de-
fendant, Joseph OC. Hofgesang, the party who pur-
chased said property, and as a result of the bringing
of the said purchaser and the defendant, Joseph C. Hof-
gesang, together said property was sold to said _pur-
chaser, then the jury will find for the plaintiff, B. M.
Crawford.

“But unless you so believe, you will find for the de-
fendants, Joseph C. Hofgesang and Myrtle S. Hof-
gesang.”’

The second instruction offered by appellants and
refused by the Court is in the following words: ‘2. If
you further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff,
B. M. Crawford, abandoned his efforts to sell said
property before any agreement was made between the
purchaser and the defendants, then the law is for the
defendants and you will so find.’’

_ The third instruction offered by appellants recites:
«3. If you further believe from the evidence that the
sale of said property was brought about by the sole ef-
forts of another broker, even though you may believe
from the evidence that such sale was made to the pur-

es 159

chaser theretofore produced by the plaintiff, then the
law is for the defendants and you will so find.’’

Appellants did not affirmatively plead abandon-
ment, or that the sale of the property.was brought about
by the sole efforts of another broker; therefore, they
were not entitled to a specific instruction on either of
these theories. Moran v. Choate et al., 253 Ky. 470, 69
S.W.2d 994. Under the converse contained instruction
No. 1 the jury was required to find for appellants if it
believed that appellee under the contract was required
to follow through after introducing the prospect to ap-
pellants or if it believed the sale was brought about by
the sole efforts of another broker.

The cases cited by appellants are not in point be-
cause in each the contract of employment embodied the
requirement that the broker perform duties other than
those required of a ‘‘bird-dog,’’ as appellee in this
case would be termed in the language of the trade. We

are of the opinion that instruction No. 1 covered the
issue clearly.

Finally appellant Myrtle S. Hofgesang, complains
of the judgment on the ground that there is no evidence
to support the verdict against her. Her reasoning is
that the contract was made by her husband and co-ap-
pellant, and there was no proof that he was her agent or
that she had such knowledge of the agreement as would
render her liable for the commission by executing the
deed to the purchaser. This question was raised for the
first time in the motion and grounds for a new trial.
Throughout the trial, appellants proceeded on the theory
that both were bound by the contract, if either of them
was. Instruction No. 1, offered by appellants, was bas-
ed upon this theory; and, although it was refused in its
offered form, it was given in substance. If the case
was erroneously submitted as to Mrs. Hofgesang, the
Court was led into the error by the instruction she of-
fered, which fact precludes her from relying on the
alleged error as a ground for reversal; and, in no
event, could she originate the issue after the trial of
the case. Nichols v. Board of Councilmen, ete, 111
8.W. 706, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 918.

The judgment is affirmed.

760

Jenkins Independent School Dist. et al. v. Hunt et al.
March 2, 1951.
Sam Ward, Judge.

Harry L. Moore for appellants.
LeRoy W. Fields for appellees.
Cuter Justicn Cammacx—Reversing.

Jenkins is now a city of the fourth class. The
boundaries of the City extend beyond those of the Jenk-
ins Independent School District. The school district is
authorized under KRS 158.120 to charge tuition for non-
resident pupils. Elmer Hunt lives within the part of
the city which lies beyond the boundaries of the school
district. A controversy arose between Hunt and the
School Board as to his right to send his children to
school in the Independent District. The School Board
instituted this action seeking to enjoin Hunt from send-
ing his children to school until the tuition was paid. In
defending the action Hunt asserted that he had a legal
Bight to send his children to school in the Independent

istrict.

The chancellor disposed of the case in the following
manner:

“‘The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs are
not entitled to an injunction because, First: No great

Le} 761

or irreparable injury is shown which would authorize
the issual of an injunction, and Second, Because, if the
defendants are not permitted to attend that school, the
plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. The teach-
ers and the school authorities ought to be able to pre-
vent these children from attending that school if they
do not want them to attend.

“‘As to the right of the defendants to attend that
school the Court is of the opinion that they do not have
this right unless this particular territory where defend-
ants live is made a part of the Jenkins Independent
School District, and this may be be done by following
the procedure outline in KRS 160.045.”

We think the School Board is entitled to the relief
sought. It had a legal right to charge tuition for non-
resident pupils. The Letcher County School District
maintains a school which Hunt’s children could attend
without paying tuition. When he was notified that his
children could not attend school unless the tuition was
paid, considerable disturbance was créated by Hunt and
his friends which disrupted the school activities. Clear-
ly, this is a case warranting injunctive relief.

Judgment is reversed, with directions to set it aside,
and for the entry of a judgment consistent with this
opinion.

Rose v. Rose et al.
March 2, 1951.
‘W. R. Prater, Judge.

. 762

Moss Noble for appellant.

Leeburn Allen for appellees.
Cua, Commisstonzr—Affirming.

The Chancellor enjoined appellant from interfering
with appellees in burying their dead, conducting me-
morial services, and maintaining a graveyard located on
property owned by him. Appellant has failed to file a
bill of exceptions with the record on appeal, and con-
sequently we cannot consider the transcript of evidence,
which was not certified by the lower Court.

The petition alleges that appellees are brothers of
appellant. Prior to his death, their father conveyed a
tract of land to appellant. Included in the boundary
was a graveyard of about one acre.

The petition alleges appellant knew of this grave-
yard; knew that it was being used for the burying of
dead; and that the father and mother of the parties,
with many friends and relatives, are buried there.

It was further alleged that appellant within the last
five years, has prohibited and prevented appellees from
entering the graveyard for any purpose.

We think the petition alleges sufficient facts to
show the graveyard had been dedicated for family use,
and that appellant had full knowledge of its dedication
when he acquired the property. The pleadings were suf-
ficient to support a finding by the Chancellor that ap-
pellees had a right to use this graveyard for its proper
purpose, and that appellees were entitled to the relief
granted.

‘The judgment is affirmed.

763

Smallwood et al. v. Boyd et al.
March 2, 1951.
Ervine Turner, Judge.

Redwine & Redwine and M. C. Redwine, Jr., for appellants.
J. Douglas Graham for appellees.

Cray, Commissionsr—Reversing.

Appellee, as administratrix of the estate of Cecil
Smallwood, brought this action against her father-in-
law to recover an indebtedness of $1,130. The Court
entered judgment as prayed.

In asking reversal, appellant first contends that ap-
pellee was not legally appointed as administrator. She
filed a copy of her order of appointment, but the evi-
dence indicates she had not filed a proper application
in the County Court. We do not think the failure to

764 re

comply strictly with the statute makes the order of ap-
pointment void. Such being the case, it may not be
collaterally attacked in this proceeding. See Cunning--
ham v. Clay’s Adm’r, Ky., 112 S.W. 852; Well’s Admin-
istratrix v. Heil, 243 Ky. 282, 47 S.W.2d 1041.

On the merits of the controversy, the following facts-
appear; Cecil Smallwood married appellee in 1939, and’
they had two infant daughters when he joined the army”
in March 1944. At that time he owned two mules and’
an interest in a truck. In September this property was-
delivered to appellant, and the latter either agreed to
pay $1,130 for it or to realize that amount by selling’
it to others. Subsequently appellant did sell the mules.
and truck, and on July 10, 1947, he deposited $1,130 im
a bank. This account was in the name of appellant.
“as trustee’? for Cecil Smallwood’s infant children.

Prior to the time this deposit was made, Cecil:
Smallwood had died in Germany in 1945. The contro--
versy in the case is whether or not this fund should’
properly be held in trust for the children or should
be paid over to Cecil Smallwood’s estate.

The substance of appellee’s testimony is simply that
the mules and truck were sold to appellant, and he
promised to give the son his note for $1,130. Her proof
seems to be based entirely upon what her husband told
her and wrote to her in letters. This evidence was all’
incompetent under Section 606, subsection 2, of the Civil’
Code of Practice. Clearly appellee was testifying for
herself concerning verbal statements of and transactions-
with the deceased out of the presence of appellant. Ev--
en though some of appellee’s testimony was not objected’
to, it does not appear inconsistent with the arrangement:
which appellant says was made regarding this money.

Appellant produced a writing signed by him which
reads as follows:

“Rosslyn, Kentucky
“September 5th, 1944

“This is to certify that on this date, I, HE. C. Small-
wood, received of Lonnie Cecil Smallwood, the sum of
Eleven Hundred and Thirty ($1130.00) to be used for”
my-own benefit until his return from the Army, and in
ease he should not return, then this money is to be-

es 765

placed in some good bank on saving account, in the
Name of his Two Children, Janeth and Donald Small-
-wood, said amount is not (to) be drawn out or used
until the infants are of legal age.

“Given under my hand this October 19, 1944
**s/ EH. C. Smallwood’?

Appellant testified that he deposited the money in
the bank to comply with the obligation he assumed in
the above instrument. The delay in not making the de-
posit until 1947 is explained as having been occasioned
‘by his inability to collect the sale price of the truck and
mules.

We have recently upheld the validity of a trust simi-
lar to the one here involved. In Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky.
344, 231 S.W.2d 2, we recognized the ‘‘tentative trust’?
doctrine. That is, a person may make himself a trustee
-of a bank deposit even though he reserves the right to
withdraw or otherwise dispose of the fund during his
‘lifetime. The beneficiary is entitled to whatever is left
‘in the fund upon the trustee’s death.

Under this rule, Cecil Smallwood could himself
“have placed the money in the bank as a trust for_his
-children, contingent upon his failure to return. ‘The
only significant evidence in the case is that he turned
“his property over to his father to be converted to a
fund for use in the furtherance of such purpose. The
-son then created a tentative trust, and the terms of it
“have been complied with by his father acting as his
agent. Since we recognize such a trust, we will protect
the interest of the beneficiaries therein. Appellee’s
‘petition should have been dismissed.

_ The judgment is reversed for consistent proceed-
“ings.

Le
Curtis v. Traders Nat. Bank.

March 2, 1951.
John J. Winn, Judge.

766

Wn. C. Clay, Jr., Thomas M. Edwards, Jr., and Lloyd E. Rogers
for appellant.

Lewis A. White for appellee.

Sraniey, Commissronrr—Affirming.

Mrs. Mary Jameson Curtis, 60 years of age, fell'on
a slippery marble floor of the vestibule of the appellee’s
bank, of which she was a customer, and suffered a brok-
en hip with consequences of permanent injury and.an
expense of about $1,000. The accident happened De-
cember 15, 1948, about ten o’clock in the morning. The
court instructed the jury to find for the defendant in
her suit for damages.

The vestibule was paved with marble. It had been
raining all morning. Mrs. Curtis had come in out of
the rain and noticing the water on the floor, had ‘‘step-
ped very gingerly.’? She had a purse under an arm
and carried an umbrella, which may have been open but

Pe 767

not raised overhead. She testified, ‘‘As I stepped into
the foyer I stepped into water and started slipping.
tried to reach for something. The next thing I knew I
was flat on the floor in the main bank. I crashed full
length on the floor.’? Apparently, however, she fell in
the vestibule and not in the main room, for it is shown
there were double doors, with an automatic closing de-
vice, which opened outwardly or towards her. She
stated she had no recollection of whether the door was
open or not although she might have pulled it open
as she fell. There was a rubber mat inside the inner
doors but none in the vestibule. The exact place where
the plaintiff fell is not important. The material fact is
that she was caused to fall by the wet, slippery, marble
floor in the vestibule where the water had been tracked
and blown in by the wind when the outer door was open-
ed.

The appellant relies principally upon Lyle v. Meg-
erle, 270 Ky. 227, 109 S.W.2d 598, 599, 600. In that case
a customer fell on a tile floor made slippery by snow
and slush tracked in during the day. We held a direct-
ed verdict for the defendant was error, saying: ‘‘The
smooth surface and impervious quality of tile makes
the accumulation of such substance as described in this
case a situation from which such an accident should have
well been anticipated. It would be an extreme view to
take that reasonable men could not have foreseen the
possibility of a customer slipping on slushy snow on a
smooth tile floor.’? That accident occurred well inside
the store and not in a vestibule or passageway from
the street. We took note in the Lyle opinion of the dis-
tinction. In the instant case the plaintiff fell in the
vestibule where the floor had been made slick by the
rain water blowing and being tracked in by the patrons
of the bank. The very purpose of the vestibule was to
take care of the water or snow and wind. The condition
was to be expected. It is not much different in this re-
spect from outside steps or an entrance area with no
outer doors.

It is quite generally held that there is no liability to
a customer who slips because of water, mud, etc. in such
places and is injured by the fall, the floor being proper-
ly constructed and not inherently dangerous. Kresge
Co. v. Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N.E, 174, 58 ALL.R.

768 ee

182; Bell v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 288 Pa.
160, 185 A. 607; Murray v. Bedell Co., 256 Ill. App. 247;
Heidland v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 233 Mo. App. 874, 110
S.W.2d 795; Battles v. Wellan, La. App., 195 So. 663;
Lander y. Sears Roebuck & Co., 141 Me. 422, 44 A.2d
886. But there are cases to the contrary. Gordon v.
McIntosh, Tex. Civ. App., 54 §.W.2d 177; Belzer v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., Mo. App., 76 8.W.2d 701; Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., v. MeLravy, 6 Cir. 71 F.2d 396.

There is no evidence that the bank did anything
or omitted to do anything which proprietors of buildings
of ordinary care and prudence generally, under similar
circumstances, do or omit to do for the protection of
their patrons. The floor of the vestibule was standard
and customary, without incline or defect. The absence
of such inherently dangerous condition, causing or con-
tributing to the customer’s fall, takes the case out of
such as Schmidt v. City of Newport, 184 Ky. 342, 212
gw U8; Majestic Theater Co. v. Lutz, 210 Ky. 92, 275

Negligence in the maintenance of premises, like in
all other cases, is to be measured by the danger to be
apprehended to persons of average intelligence who are
exercising ordinary care and prudence for their own
safety. Accepting the predicate that the bank was
chargeable with knowledge that water on the floor made
it slippery, since that is known to everybody, yet we
must likewise accept the proposition that it is a common,
usual and proper arrangement and that it is not foresee-
able that a patron, coming into the vestibule during a
shower of rain, will not also take cognizance of the slip-

ery condition. Bridgford v. Stewart Dry Goods Co.,
191 Ky. 557, 231 S8.W. 22.

The only possible negligence we can conceive is the
_ failure of the bank to have a rubber mat in this vestibule
or to have frequently mopped up the water. Certainly
such a mat would have made it safer, but it is not shown
that that was a common practice or precaution usually
taken by proprietors under similar circumstances to
~keep access through their vestibules in a safe condition
‘for their customers. However, if either of these omis-
sions should be regarded as acts of negligence (a point
- we do not decide), the court is met with the plea of con-
tributory negligence, so we may repeat what was said in

ss 769”

Bridgford v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., supra, 191 Ky.
557, 231 S.W. 22, 23. ‘But, if mistaken in that [ab-
sence of negligence], we are quite sure that one who uses
such a floor with full knowledge of its condition assumes
any and all risks incident to its use.’’ Of like effect is
Cornwell v. 8. S. Kresge Oo., 112 W. Va. 237, 164 S.H.
156.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
|
Stephens et al. v. Allen et al.

March 2, 1961.
Edward P. Hill, Judge.

x

So

Joe Hobson for appellants.
Combs & Combs for appellees.

Srantey, Commissioner—Affirming.

Pe m7

This appeal is from judgments entered in 14 con-
solidated suits denying the removal of John Allen as
agent or trustee for the owners of operating and pro-
ducing gas wells.

The plaintiffs, D. C. Stephens and his wife, Mrs.
Dora Stephens, own fractional minority interests in the
several leases. There were 69 individual defendants,
some owning interests in one or more of the properties.
The defendant, Allen had acted as agent or trustee for
all the projects. None of the defendants participated in
the litigation except to join in Allen’s answers. The
grounds upon which Allen’s removal is sought are that
he had been negligent in conducting the operations so
as to cause loss or reduced production and had failed
to keep proper accounts and records. There is no claim
for damages or demand for an accounting or recovery
of money.

It appears that Allen and others had secured a num-
ber of oil and gas leases and promoted their development
by disposing of fractional interests in order to obtain
necessary capital. If not from the beginning, Allen later
became the managing and operating partner, he having
substantial interest in all of the operations involved in
these cases. In some of them Allen had no interest part
of the time and in them and perhaps others another per-
son acted as the agent for a relatively brief period. As
such managing agent of his associates, Allen looked after
the maintenance and production in a general way, re-
ceived the proceeds of the sale of gas under contracts
with Warfield Natural Gas Company (succeeded by the
United Fuel Gas Co.), paid the expenses, and distributed
the net amounts to the several partners in the ratio of
their fractional ownership.

It is charged that Allen had been designated by ‘‘a
few of the former owners’? to act in this capacity, but
the plaintiffs had not consented thereto. We think the
proof shows that Allen was chosen or at least has acted
at all times by and with the consent if not the actual
formal designation by a majority of the owners. More-
over, during the period in which these plaintiffs have
been members of the groups, they acquiesced in and.
ratified his agency for the past period. For the future,
the fact that he is accepted or appointed by a majority
of the interests binds the plaintiffs. Therefore, the point

772 |

and contention of the absence of authority is not welk
taken. Hudson v. Outram, 203 Ky. 78, 261 S. W. 847.

It is well to understand that a mining partnership
is an association of joint owners of mineral property
in which, by express stipulation or by implication de~
duced from the acts of the parties, they unite and agree
to develop the premises or operate the lease in order to
extract the minerals. It is a partnership of a special
type, partaking of the nature of a tenancy in common
and a partnership proper. It is, therefore, different in
many respects from an ordinary or trade partnership:
because of the need of an association not subject to the
same rules. Though governed by many rules relating to
ordinary commercial partnerships, at the same time
there are some rules peculiar to itself. Among the differ-
ent characteristics are (1) there is no delectus personae
or right of choice of a partner; (2) the death of a part-
ner or the conveyance of the interest of a member in
the lease or business does not dissolve the partnership ;
and (8) no partner without special or necessary author-
ity has the power to bind the partnership such as in a
commercial or trade partnership. Thornton Oil and Gas,.
Sees. 658, 664, 672; Outram v. Paintsville National Bank,
220 Ky. 253, 294 S. W. 1067; Outram v. Hudson, 218:
Ky. 15, 290 8. W. 1031; 36 Am. Jur., Mines and Mining,
Sees. 157, 158, 166; 58 C. J. S., Mines and Minerals, Sees.
245, 246. The distinction was recognized in general by
this court 75 years ago in Judge v. Braswell, 13 Bush
67, 76 Ky. 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185. One of the essential
elements is joint operation, and an association merely’
for the purchase and sale of mineral lands is not such
but is an ordinary partnership or venture, so the death
of one member dissolves the relationship where opera-
tions have not previously been begun. Diederich v.
Dempsey, 298 Ky. 323, 182 S.W.2d 393; 386 AmJur.,
Mines and Mining, See. 157; 58 C. J. S., Mines and Min-
erals, sec. 245. Since the property can be used and oper-
ated only as an entirety, it is indispensable that those
persons who own the major portions or majority in-
terests have the power to control the conduct of the
business in the absence of agreement by all. Outram v..
‘Paintsville National Bank, supra, 220 Ky. 253, 294 8. W..
1067; 36 Am. Jur., Mines and Mining, sec. 159, 162.

It seems to have been held by some courts that:

Pe 13

equity should not decree an accounting between the.
members of a mining partnership without appointing
a receiver and dissolving the association, but the weight
of authority seems to be, as it should according to our
view, that a court upon a showing of mismanagement or
failure to act, may afford appropriate relief. The rela-
tionship between a managing partner and his associ-
ates is fiducial and there is a consequent duty of acting
in good faith and with honesty and diligence. Such
obligation demands that the managing agent render a
true account of his transactions, and a court should re-
‘quire it. Stephens v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 638, 183 S.W.2d
822; Thornton Oil and Gas, Secs. 680, 687; 36 Am.Jur.,
Mines and Mining, Secs. 163, 167.

The principal evidence introduced by the plaintiffs
was by H. T. Dorton, a mining engineer. It is, in short,
that some of the gas wells showed evidences of water
or, in a few instances, oil, which reduced production in
a very substantial amount. He was of opinion that this
could have been remedied by certain technical and me-
chanical appliances. It appears there was a meeting of
some of the groups of partners at which Allen was
present and Dorton reported the conditions and made
certain recommendations with respect to the install-
ment of siphons or drips or the taking of other steps
to correct the conditions. These omissions and others,
such as the failure to have the wells ‘‘blown”’ to in-
rease production, constitute what appellants say was
negligent management.

On the other side, the evidence of the defendants
is that all these wells were properly equipped and main-
tained with standard and sufficient drains, where need-
ed, ete. and were operated in accordance with the general
eustom and recognized manner or in some instances
better ; also, that they were operated in accordance with
the terms of the sales contracts to the purchaser of the
gas production. It is certain that depletion and varia-
tion in production are normal and unavoidable. The
reasons, therefore, are often speculative.

The case was developed extensively. The record
exhausted both the subject matter and doubtless the
eourt in trying the case. He found upon conflictin;
evidence that Allen, the managing partner, had acte
in good faith and with diligence in performing his duties

774 ee

and that he had operated the properties in the way
deemed by those familiar with such management and
work to be proper. In fact, his decision seems to be
supported by the preponderant weight of the evidence.

The agent followed the very simple course of de-
positing the receipts in a special account, drew checks
for taxes and the expenses of maintenance, and dis-
tributed the proceeds. He kept no records or books and
made no statements to the several participating owners.
Indeed, it seems that he had destroyed the statements
which the purchaser of the gas had sent him from time
to time with the remittances. However any owner at any
time had access to these bank records and the appellants
on several occasions made such examinations. As stated,
there is no charge of a failure to properly account for
the receipts. The method was very loose and we can
understand was unsatisfactory to the appellants and per-
haps to other interested parties. But it is shown to be
the custom and practice of such agents in this gas
field. It does not appear that prior to these suits any
demand was made upon Allen for statements of the
transactions. We cannot say under the circumstances
the court abused a discretion in declining to remove the
trustee on this account.

We cannot refrain from observing that this record
of eight volumes contains much unnecessary copying,
duplication and padding. However, the schedule of the
appellants, who must bear the costs, called for coping
the entire record. To the extent that the clerk did so, they
cannot complain. But there was certainly no need for
copying in full each of the 72 different summons. Civ.
Code Prac. Sec. 737 (1, 8, 11); Rule 1.210, Court of
Appeals.

In making up the records in the many consoli-
dated cases, the clerk repeated the style for each order.
In many instances he styled all 14 cases for one order.
Some of these orders consisted of only three or four
lines, but the clerk used a full page to present them.
Though the compensation of the clerk is based upon
the number of words (1 cent for each 10 words when
this record was made but now 2 cents, KRS 64.010) yet
the charges were probably by the page. As to these fea-
tures, unnecessary copying and padding, we take no
action in the absence of a motion for a retaxation of

a 176

the costs. KRS 28.120; Bowens v. Amburgery, 289 Ky.
763, 160 S.W.2d 169.

However, the clerk has not endorsed on the record
the amount of the fee for making it as required by Rule
1.250. For this dereliction, $10.00 will be deducted from
the clerk’s fee. Kentucky Cardinal Coal Corp. v.,Ben-
nett, 218 Ky. 679, 291 S.W. 1060.

The several judgments are affirmed.

Pugh v. Commonwealth.
March 2, 1951.
Astor Hogg, Special Judge.

Francis M. Burke for appellant.

A. BE, Funk, Attorney General, ,and Guy L. Dickinson, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Jupven Srms—Reversing.

Dave Pugh was convicted of grand larceny and his
punishment was fixed at confinement in the peniten-
tiary for one year. He assigns two grounds for reversal
of the judgment; 1. The court should have directed
the jury to acquit him; 2. incompetent evidence was
admitted over his objection.

Willie Riddle and his son, Bill, resided ‘‘two miles
up Shelby Creek’? in Pike County. On Saturday night,
Dee. 31, 1949, some person stole three hives of honey

776 ee

bees from their yard worth $20. The next morning they
discovered the theft and noticed the tracks made by the
vehicle which hauled away the bees showed it had mud-
grip tires on the rear wheels and slick tires on the front
wheels. The Riddles got into their automobile Sunday
morning and drove over the dirt roads in the vicinity of
theirshome to try and find mud-grip tire tracks leading
off the road to some person’s premises. They were un-
successful.

On Monday morning they renewed their search and
while in the Coal Run community, some thirty miles
from their home, they saw a half ton truck parked on
the side of the road which had mud-grip tires on the
rear wheels and what they described as two slick tires
on the front wheels. Dave Pugh soon appeared and they
ascertained from him his name, where he lived and that
he owned the truck. Pugh, who was a trader, said he was
out to buy some calves. The Riddles started in the di-
rection of Pugh’s home and before driving a great dist-
ance notice his truck was following them. They drove
across the river, sat in their parked car 200 yards from
Pugh’s home where they could watch his premises.

They testified that Pugh soon drove up to his home,
loaded three bee hives into his truck, put an old rug
over them and drove away. They immediately obtained
a search warrant but no bees were found on Pugh’s prem-
ises. Just as the officers finished their search Pugh drove
up with two bee hives in his truck. The Riddles testi-
fied the hives Pugh had in his truck upon returning
home were not the same hives he had hauled away a few
hours before. Pugh only had two hives upon his return,
one of which was painted and the other weather-beaten,
while according to the Riddles the three hives Pugh load-
ed into his truck were ‘‘new lumber and had never been
weather-beaten.’’

Mrs. Laura Cantrell and Mrs. Ervine Damron,
neighbors of Pugh who had seen the hives in his garden
from a distance of 200 feet, stated in their judgment
the hives Pugh brought back were not the ones he form-
erly had in his garden, that ‘‘the ones he took away
were new looking stands and the ones he brought back
were old looking.’’

Pugh testified he bought three hives of bees

|} m1

from his brother-in-law, Kerry Miller, for $15 on Dee.
27, 1949. He took them to his home and first put them
under the house because it was raining, and when the
weather cleared he set them out in his garden. The bees
in one hive were dead and Monday afternoon, Jan. 2nd,
he loaded the three hives in his truck, put an old rug
over them ‘‘to steady them’ and drove by his barn and
left the dead hive. The two remaining hives he took to
the home of Junior Hunt at Big Creek, Kentucky, to
trade for a calf. Hunt wanted $15 ‘‘to boot,’? so they
did not trade and he brought the bees back home just
as the officers finished their search of his premises.

Pugh proved by Virgil Blair that the universal
joint on his truck broke while he was hauling coal for
him on Dec. 28th. He and Blair were repairing the truck
and it could not be operated from Saturday morning
until Sunday afternoon. Furthermore, he proved by his
rother-in-law and sister, Proctor May and wife, that
they visited Pugh and his family from Saturday after-
noon until Sunday afternoon; That Pugh never left
home Saturday night; that his truck was broken down
and would not run.

In rebuttal the Commonwealth proved by Willie
Riddle and Mrs. Frank Dotson they heard Mrs. Kerry
Miller say on Jan. 2nd, the day Pugh was hauling bees
in his truck, that he had that afternoon bought three
hives from her husband.

Appellant insists the Commonwealth never proved
he hives the prosecuting witnesses testified they saw him
put in the truck were identified as the hives which were
stolen, and the jury should not have been allowed to
speculate or guess they were. The Commonwealth argues
these hives were identified by the Riddles, therefore it
was for the accused to satisfactorily explain to the jury
why he had stolen property in his possession. The fam-
iliar rule in criminal law is the possession by the accused
of stolen property is sufficient to take the case to the
jury and to sustain a conviction. Tibbs v. Com., 273 Ky.
356, 116 S.W.2d 667, and cases therein cited.

However, in the instant case the hives which the
Riddles saw Pugh load in his truck were never identified
as the stolen property. The Riddles were 200 yards from
these hives when Pugh was loading them. The father

778

testified they were not close enough to the hives to
identify them and he could not say they were his hives.
The son, who was the same distance away from Pugh’s
home as was his father, testified they looked like his
father’s hives, but he based that assertion on the fact
that the ones Pugh was loading had never been painted
and his father’s hives were likewise unpainted. Since
the evidence did not place the stolen property in the
possession of accused and the circumstances only point-
ed the finger of suspicion at him rather than unerring-
ly to his guilt, there was not sufficient evidence to take
the case to the jury and a verdict of acquittal should
have been directed. Meyers v. Com., 194 Ky. 523, 240
S.W. 71; Tibbs v. Com., 273 Ky. 356, 116 S.W.2d 667.

The incompetent evidence complained of was of but
little importance and could not have been prejudicial.
However, it is now of no moment since we have con-
cluded the Commonwealth’s evidence was not sufficient
to take the case to the jury, therefore we will not
take the time and space necessary to discuss the
question of incompetent evidence.

The judgment is reversed for procecdings con-
sistent with this opinion.

Charles v. Big Jim Coal Co. et al.
March 2, 1951.
R. L, Maddox, Judge.

®B. B. Wilson for appellant.
James W. Smith for appellees.

Jupes Srewarr—Affirming.

Appellant, W. N. Charles, was injured on August
27, 1947, while working for appellee, Big Jim Coal Com-
pany, in an accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment. Both parties had accepted and were
working under the provisions of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, KRS Chapter 342, sec. 342.001 et seq.
The Coal Company voluntarily paid appellant compen-
sation up to and including December 10, 1947, at which
date all compensation payments ceased. On December 11,
1947, Charles was reemployed by the Coal Company as
a night foreman, performing the same duties at sub-
stantially the same wages after his reemployment as
before his accident. Because of his disability, he states,
he was prevented from earning extra income, as he
had done prior to his injury. His employment as just
mentioned has continued until the present time.

Charles filed his application for adjustment before
the Workmen’s Compensation Board on December 10,
1948. The referee adjudged appellant to be 50% per-
manently disabled as to his body and allowed a recovery
in his favor against appellee Coal Company of payments
at the rate of $6 per week, for a period not to exceed 420
weeks, beginning August 28, 1947, subject to a credit
for 21 weeks of compensation awarded appellant for
temporary total disability and subject to a further credit
for those weeks he has been, or will be, paid by the Coal
Company a wage equal to or in excess of the weekly pay
received by appellant at the time of his injury, to-
gether with 6% interest on all past due installments.
Charles was also allowed a recovery for medical expen-

780 ee]
ses not to exceed $400, less whatever ‘sums had been paid
for ‘such services by the Coal Company.

Upon a full Board review, the decision.. of the
referee was overruled and appellant’s claim was ad-
judged barred by limitations and dismissed, The Bell
Circuit Court sustained the opinion and order of the full
Board, and appellant prosecutes this appeal from the
“judgment adverse to him in cireuit court.

As we have concluded that the Coal Company’s
plea of limitations precludes a recovery by appellant
on his claim, we give our consideration only to this point.

KRS 342.185 provides, in part, as follows: ‘If
payments of compensation as such have been made vol-
untarily the making of a claim within such period shall
not be required, but shall become requisite following
the suspension of such voluntary payments.’’

The rule in this forum is that when the computa-
tion of time is to be made from an act done, the day on
which the act is done must be included, but when the
computation is from the date itself, rather than from
an act done, then the day on which the act was done must
be excluded. This rule was announced in the case of
Chiles v. Smith’s Heirs, 13 B. Mon. 460, as follows: ‘‘The
rule in regard to the computation of time seems to be,
that when the computation is to be made from an act done,
the day in which the act was done must be included, be-
cause, since there is no fraction of a day, the act re-
Jates to the first moment of the day in which it was done.
But when the computation is to be from the day itself,
and not from the act done, there the day in which the
‘act was done must be excluded.’’

In the case of Elkhorn Collieries Co. v. Robinson,
234 Ky. 24, 27 S.W.2d 393, 394, we held as follows:
«There is no question that voluntary payments were
made and they were made as compensation. This obvi-
ated the necessity of making any claim for compensation
on the part of appellee. But if such voluntary payments
ceased, then the making of the claim at once became re-
quisite, and it must have been made within one year after
the voluntary payments ceased.’

’ The samé ruling was’ laid down in Fiorella v. Clark,
298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W.2d 208. In Webb v. Montgomery

es

Ward & Co., 303 Ky. 152, 197 S.W.2d 90, this Court held
that the 20 days provided by KRS 342. 285 of the Work-
men’s Compensation Act for filing a petition for review
in the circuit court of a final award of the Board shall be
computed from the act of rendition of the award, not
from the day of the award, and that the day the award
was entered must be included in the 20-day period.

As only one day bars appellant’s right of action,
and as 1948 was a leap year and had one more day than
the ordinary year, the question arises whether this fact
would differentiate his case from the usual one. In
Genéva Cooperage Co. v. Brown, 124 Ky. 16, 98 S.W.
279, this exact point was involved and this Court held in
that case that an action for injuries sustained on Sep-
tember 19, 1903, was barred by limitations on September
19, 1904, notwithstanding the fact that the year 1904
was a leap year.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is af-

firmed.
a
Harvey Coal Corporation v. Morris et al.
March 2, 1961. :

8. M. Ward, Judge.

—I

782

Craft & Stanfill for appellant.
Alva A, Hollon for appellees.

Juper Suus—Affirming.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment of the
Perry Cireuit Court affirming an award of $3 a week
for 420 weeks, subject to a certain credit not necessary
to mention here, and for medical expenses incurred not
to exceed $400, made to Leonard Morris by the Work-
men’s Compensation Board to compensate him for a
hernia resulting from an accident on June 14, 1948. The

a :

company urges two grounds for reversal: 1. Morris failed
to prove that either he or his employer had accepted and
were operating under the terms of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, KRS 342.001 et seq., at the time he claims
he was injured; 2. the hernia was pre-existent and was
not the result of the accident.

There was no stipulation entered into between the
parties that both had accepted the terms of the Act and
were working under it at the time of the accident, and
the company insists there is no evidence in the record
to sustain the Board’s finding that both employer and
employee were operating under the Act, However, the
record shows that on May 22, 1948, the company re-
ported to the Board Morris had signed the register on
April 22, 1948, accepting the terms of the Act, and he
suffered an accident in its mine on May 14, 1948, and
the company was carrying its own risk. Also, in the
record is the receipt of Morris showing on June 9, 1948,
the company paid him ‘‘$7.71 in settlement of compen-
sation under the Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation
Law * * * on account of injuries suffered by myself on
or about the 14th of May 1948, while in the employ of
Harvey Coal Corporation, subject to review and approv-
al by the Workmen’s Compensation Board.”’

The accident wherein Morris suffered a hernia oc-
curred on June 14, 1948, and was a separate and distinct
accident from the one he suffered on May 14th of that
year. It is provided in KRS 342.405 that either party
after electing to operate under the Act may withdraw
such election; the employer by filing written notice with
the Board and giving such notice to the employee; the
employee by filing written notice with the employer.
When this statute is considered in conjunction with the
report made by the company to the Board on May 22,
1948, of an accident suffered by Morris, and the receipt
of this same employee filed with the Board on June 9,
1948, acknowledging payment for that accident, it cannot
be said the Board’s finding that both parties were oper-
ating under the Act on June 14, 1948, was not supported
by any evidence of substance and relevant consequence
having fitness to induce conviction. What is here said
does not militate against Taylor v. Cornett Lewis Coal
Co.; 281 Ky. 366, 136 S. W. 2d 21. Here, there was sub-

784 ee

tantial proof.the parties were operating under the Act,
while in the Taylor case there was no such proof.

The opinion of the Board recites both parties prac-
ticed the case before it without any question being raised
as to whether they had accepted and were operating
under the provisions of the Act. In a petition for review
filed in the circuit court the company raised the ques-
tion for the first time that there was no proof the parties
were operating under the Act. We have held in at least
three cases that the question whether the parties were
under the Act cannot be raised for the first time in this
court. McCombs Coal Co. v. Alford, 234 Ky. 42, 27 S. W.
2d 430; Harlan Gas Coal Co. v. Laws, 234 Ky. 654, 28
8. W. 2d 990; Creech Coal Co. v. Smith, 234 Ky. 166, 27
8. W. 2d 686. If it is too late to raise the question for
the first time here, likewise it is too late to do so in the
circuit court, which KRS 342.285 makes an intermediate
appellate court in Workmen’s Compensation cases. No
new or additional evidence may be introduced in the
circuit court, except as to fraud or misconduct of some
person engaged in the administration of the Act. The
statute sets out specifically just what ‘the cireuit court
may review and provides it may affirm, set aside, or mod-
ify an award, or remand the case to the Board for fur-
ther proceedings. Thus it is seen the circuit court has
only appellate jurisdiction in such cases and does not
give a trial de novo. It is unconscionable for the parties
to practice their case before the referee and then before
the full Board without raising the issue as to whether the
parties were under the Act, as was done here, and then
on review before the circuit court raise the question for
the first time.

Morris testified that while at work in the company’s
mine on June 14, 1948, he was dragging a heavy rail and
suddenly experienced a “catch”? or pain in his side and
stopped work for a few minutes. The pain. soon sub-
sided and he resumed work and finished his shift..Upon
arriving home he took a bath and observed a protru-
sion in his side. He immediately went to Dr. McLucas,
who was substituting for the regular camp physician,
Dr..Bouchillon, while the latter was on vacation. Dr.
McLueas testified he had no record of examining Mor-
ris but that it was possible Morris came to him for an
examination on or about June 14, 1948, since he did not

ees:

keep a record of every patient he saw. Dr. Lucas fur-
ther stated he would have recognized an inguinal
hernia and would have made a report of it to the com-
pany had he made such an examination and finding.

Dr. Coldiron, a witness for appellee, stated he ex-
amined Morris on Feb. 18, 1949, and found him suffering
from an inguinal hernia, which in his opinion perman-
ently impaired the patient 25%. Dr. Wagers, testifying
for the company, stated he examined appellee on Aug.
27, 1947, when the patient was employed by the Blue
Diamond Coal Company and found he had ‘‘enlarged
rings’? which the doctor considered ‘“‘a beginning
hernia.’’

It is provided in KRS 342.025(1) (b, ¢) that for the
employee to be compensated he must show the hernia ap-
peared suddenly and immediately following the injury
and that it did not exist in any degree prior to the in-
jury. The company insists the testimony of Dr. Wagers
shows the hernia here antedated Morris’ injury. We
have two cases holding the statute just mentioned should
not be given such a narrow meaning as to embrace a
congenital weakness, and that a predisposition to such
an injury was not enough to deny compensation. Amer-
ican Rolling Mill Co. v. Leslie, 302 Ky. 601, 194 S.-W.
2d 643; Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Adams, 309 Ky. 302,
217 S. W. 2d 637.

Here, Morris might have gone through life with
“enlarged rings’? and never have suffered a hernia had
he not been trying to drag a 300 pound rail. He was im-
mediately stricken with a pain and when he bathed after
work that evening he noticed a protrusion. Dr. Coldiron
diagnosed this as a hernia. The facts presented in this
record are sufficient to support the Board’s finding that
Morris suffered a hernia in dragging this heavy rail on
June 14, 1948, and that the hernia was not pre-existent.

The judgment is affirmed.
be

786

Specht et al. v. Stoker.
March 2, 1951,
J. Ward Lehigh, Judge.

Henry I. Fox and William H. Crutcher, Jr. for appellants.

Robert P. Hobson, John P. Sandridge, and Woodward, Hobson
& Fulton for appellee. °

Super Larrmmr—Affirming.

In the summer of 1946 appellants entered into a
written lease with appellee, by the terms of which they
leased to appellee for a period of five years a portion
of premises which they owned. We are particularly
concerned with the following provisions in the lease:
“The premises shall not be underlet, or the term, in
whole or in part, assigned, transferred, or set over by.
the act of the lessee, by process or operation of law, or
in any other manner whatsoever, without the written
consent of the lessor, and for a violation of this stipula-
tion, in addition to the forfeiture provided in the ninth
elause, the rent shall be doubled while the default con-
tinues.’’

And the ninth clause provides: ‘‘This lease, at the
option of the lessor, shall be void and forfeited in case
of any violation of any covenant herein contained.”’

as 78

Appellants’ claim for judgment below was based on
a violation of the covenant not to sublet without written
consent and their right under clause nine to declare a
forfeiture. :

On October 25, 1947, appellee executed to Harnest
Neal a written sublease of a portion of the premises
which was to run from November 1, 1947 to December 31,
1951. No written authority to sublet the premises was
ever obtained from appellants. The Spechts obtained a
writ of forcible detainer against Charles HE. Stoker in
county court. Judgment was entered in favor of Stoker.
The Spechts filed a traverse and sought review of the
proceeding in the Jefferson Cireuit. Court. In the cirenit
court the matter by agreement was tried without the
intervention of a jury. Plaintiffs requested a separate
finding of facts and conclusions of law:

In its finding of facts, the court found that the lease
provided the premises should not be sublet or assigned
without written consent of the lessors; that the defend-
ant Charles Ei. Stoker did sublet the premisés to Earnest
Neal without the written consent of the Spechts; that
before the premises were sublét the Spechts through
their attorney, Judge Henry I. Fox, orally agreed that
if defendant would make certain ‘repairs they would
consent to the sublease; that these repairs were made
by the defendant; and that in November 1947 the plain-
tiff, Louise E. Specht, knowing’ that Hariiest Neal was
Stoker’s subtenant in part of the leased premises, each
month thereafter accepted the -monthl
premises in accordance with the terms,

As to the law the court’ found that:even though
there was no written consent for the. subletting that
since plaintiffs through their attorney andagent orally
consented to the subletting, it was valid: Thei court fur-
ther found that the plaintiffs, since they:;with knowl-
edge of the subletting received and accepted the monthly
rental each month beginning with November: 1947 and
continuing to the trial of the case waived any right they
may have had to cancel the lease because of. defend-
ant’s failure to obtain the written ‘consent, ‘and are
estopped from asserting the forfeiture’ provide: i
the lease. cose

Appellants are here insisting first that the court
erred in permitting appellee to introduce verbal evidence

788 ee

in the support of contention that-appellants had verbally
wwaived the forfeiture provisions of the lease since both
the original lease between. the parties, which was vio-
lated, and the sublease contract by appellee with the
third party are within the statute of frauds. In support
of this position a number of cases are cited among which
is Murray v. Boyd, 165 Ky. 625, 177 8. W. 468, 471.in
which is found this language: ‘If the contract is re-
quired to be in writing, evidence will not he admitted to
prove a subsequent parol agreement which materially
modifies the writing; that is, if the subsequent agree-
ment is itself within the statute of frauds, and of a na-
ture required by law to be in writing.’’ See also Wilson
v. Adath Israel Charitable & Educational , Ass’n’ 's Agent,
262 Ky. 55, 89 S. W. 2d 318.

Apparently appellant is taking the position that the
subsequent agreement as mentioned in the quotation
above in the instant case would be the sublease agree- i
ment between appellee and the third party. In this, ap-
péllants are in, error. The subsequent agreement would
be.the oral agréement to waive the provision. requiring
written consent to sublease. There is nothing in the
statute of frauds which requires consent of the lessqr
to sublease to be in writing. It becomes apparent, there-
fore, that the cases cited and relied upon by appellants
are not in point. In Khourié Bros. v. Jonakin, 222. Ky,
277, 300 S. W. 612, 614 it is said: ‘* * * it must be con-
coded that, as the provision that the notice should be
in writing was for the benefit of the party who wished
to rely on a writing, such party could waive the require-
ment * * *,

In Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. 2d
165, 170 it is said: ‘‘There is no rule of ‘law which pre-
vents the mutual annulment of a written contract,
though it relates to a land transaction, or that hin-
ders a supplement, even by parol.”

See also Cities Service Oil Co. v. Taylor, 242 Ky.
157, 45 S. W. 2d 1039, 79 A. L. R. 1874; Rich v, Rose,
124 Ky. 669, 99 S. W. 953; ‘Wilson v. ‘Adath Israel Char-
itable & Educational. Ass’n’s Agent, 262 Ky. 55, 89 8.
W. 2d 318.

Appellee’s evidence shows that appellants through
their attorney, Judge Fox, orally consented to this sub-
letting. This. evidence stands undenied by appellants. .

a z. . 789

The court on the basis of that evidence found as a
matter of fact that:appellants orally agreed and con-
sented for the sublease. We conclude that this finding
was justified under the proof and that the court correct-
ly.and properly applied the law. We deem it unneces-
sary to go into a discussion of the acceptance of rent
with the knowledge of the sublease, as working an estop-
pel-as the above alone is sufficient to support the Chan-
cellor’s findings.

The judgment is affirmed.

Bates et. al v. Bates et al.
December 1, 1950.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 9, 1951.

W. R. Prater, Judge.

_ Napier & Napier, C. W. Napier and C. W. Napier, Jr., for appel-
lants.
John Chris Cornett and Clark Pratt for appellees.

Srantzy, Commisstonrern—Affirming.

790 es

In 1908 T. G. Bates conveyed a half acre of land to
the trustees of a public school for the recited considera-
tion of $15. The deed contained this provision: ‘‘T. G.
Bates is to have the land at the same price when it
ceases to be public property as school house property.’’
Otherwise, a fee simple title was conveyed.

In 1910 T. G. Bates conveyed 500 acres to his sons
W. J. Bates and J. W. Bates. It included the school
Jot. In 1925 T. G. Bates joined his two sons in convey-
ing the 500 acres to C. B. Bates. No mention was made
in either deed to the fact that the school lot had there-
tofore been conveyed out of the tract. About the year
1947 the half acre ceased to be used for public school
purposes. J. W. and W. J. Bates gave notice to the
Knott County Board of Education of their election to
repurchase the school lot and tendered the recited con-
sideration of $15. It was refused. The right to acquire
the property was denied and the Bates sued to en-
force the provision. The lot had been taken for a rail-
road right-of-way, and the railroad company and the
construction company were made parties to the suit
and damages for trespass were asked of them. The
circuit court sustained a demurrer to the petition on
the ground that whatever interest T. G. Bates had, ‘‘re-
yersionary or otherwise,’? had been conveyed by his

leeds.

The contention of the appellants, J. W. Bates and
W. J. Bates of a right to repurchase the lot for $15
rests upon the idea that the provision was not a true re-
version but a possibility of reverter, which is not alien-
able but is descendable. They sue as heirs of T. G.
Bates.

We think the ruling was proper. We construe the
option to have been personal to the grantor, T. G.
Bates, and to have terminated with his death. But if
it be regarded as unlimited as to the individual or to
time for its exercise, as appellants argue, then the pro-
vision was void ab initio for it violated the rule against
perpetuities or restraint on alienation. KRS 381.220;
‘Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W.2d 568, 162
ALR. 578; Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230
8.W.2d 918.

The judgment is affirmed.

Hill et al. v. United Public Workers Union
of America et al.

October 27, 1950.
Rehearing Denied March 16, 1951.
‘W. Scott Miller, Judge.

791

a
©
i}

Charles B. Zirkle, for appellants.

Morris & Garlove, Charles W. Morris and Herbert H. Monsky
for appellees.

Sranizxy, Commissionen—Reversing.

This is a controversy between labor unions and
former members as to the authority and right to re-
present the employees of the Louisville Water Com-
pany for the termination of an agreement made with
the employer respecting wages, working conditions, ete.

The Louisville Water Company, as one party, and
the United Public Workers of America, affiliated with
the Congress of Industrial Organizations, for and with
its affiliate, Waters Workers Section of Local 620, as
the other parties, made an agreement as of January
1, 1949, that these labor organizations should be the
exclusive representative of the employees for the pur-

es 7!

pose of collective bargaining, adjustment of grievances,
ete. There had been similar employer-employee rela-
tions since 1946. The 1949 contract contained this pro-
vision for continuance and termination: ‘‘This Agree-
ment shall remain in full force and effect until January
1, 1950, and thereafter it shall renew itself for successive
one (1) year periods, provided, however, that either
party hereto may reopen same for one (1) year periods
unless cancelled by consent of the parties, or by the
procedure hereinafter set out in this section. Should
either party desire to terminate or modify this Agree-
ment at the expiration of any calendar year, it shall
give notice in writing of such intention to the other
party not less than sixty (60) days prior to the expira-
tion date. * * *” ;

Such provision seems to be quite common in col-
lective bargaining agreements. No notice of termina-
tion was given by the union.

The suit, filed by the unions against the Water
Company and its officers, seeks a judicial declaration
that the agreement was automatically renewed for 1950
and for certain other rights in relation thereto. An
injunction was sought to prevent the defendants from
withholding from the union the dues which the Com-
pany had retained from the wages and salaries of its
members.

Before answer, an intervening petition was filed by
Lewis Hill and thirteen other persons ‘‘individually and
as members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
and in behalf of all other members of said union having
and holding interests in common.’’ They state ‘‘these
intervening petitioners and a majority of the employees
of the defendant corporation, Louisville Water Com-
pany, became dissatisfied with their bargaining agents,
the plaintiff labor organizations, and they desired to
terminate said contract as of December 31, 1949, and
to execute a new one; that they and a majority of said
employees designated the Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, as their new bargaining agent to notify
the defendant corporation that said contract would ter-
minate on December 31, 1949, that on Oct. 28, 1949 in
its capacity as bargaining agent for the majority of
the employees, the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, by its Regional Director, W. B. Taylor, notified

794 ee

the defendant corporation that an overwhelming ma-
jority of said employees had designated it as their col-
lective bargaining agency and of their desire to negoti-
ate a new contract between said employees through their
new collective bargaining agent and the defendant corp-
oration; that said notification was received by the de-
fendant corporation more than sixty days prior to De-
cember 31, 1949, the expiration date of the old contract.’’
The communication referred to, addressed to the presi-
dent of the Water Company, is in part as follows:

“This is to formally notify you that the over-
whelming majority of the employees of the Louisville
‘Water Company have signed cards designating the
Congress of Industrial Organizations as their collective
bargaining agency.

“You are, of course, aware of the controversy
that exists within the ranks of CIO; and your employees,
who are desirous of remaining within the ranks of this
organization, are taking the necessary legal steps to
notify you in the period of time pursuant to Section D
of Article 7 of the contract now in existence between
your Company and the United Public Workers of
America-CI0.’’

The letter further stated, ‘‘We are prepared to
show proof of our majority upon demand.’’ Certain
methods for ascertaining the fact were suggested. The
letter requested an immediate conference of representa-
tives of the Company and of ‘‘your employees who are
members of the CIO, so that negotiations may be start-
ed that will result in a collective bargaining agreement’’
between them.

It is further alleged that a majority of the em-
ployees had notified the company they had not author-
ized any assignment of wages to the union as dues
after December 31,.1949; that if the company considered
the agreement to have been automatically renewed and
continued to recognize the unions as bargaining agents,
the petitioners and a majority of the employees would
be arbitrarily and unjustly dismissed from their em-
ployment and suffer irreparable injury. An amend-
ment stated that they had notified the plaintiff union,
United Public Workers of America, that a majority of
the employees had designated the CIO as their agent.

ee — 75

The plaintiffs filed objections to the intervention
upon a number of grounds. These include the absence
of right and capacity of the intervenors to terminate
the agreement with the Company, and that the state-
ment that the parties are not and cannot be members
of the Congress: of Industrial Organization (commonly
ealled the CIO), as they describe themselves to be, since
the CIO is not itself a labor union but a confederation
or organization of labor unions or organizations, which
must speak for themselves in matters relating to em-
ployers.

At the time the agreement was made, the plaintiff,
United Public Workers of America, was one of the
components of the CIO and its co-plaintiff, Water
Workers Section of Local 620, was an affiliate of the
United Public Workers. But there is an unchallenged
statement in the brief for the Company that subsequent
to the execution of the agreement the United Public
Workers had been expelled from membership in the

A later or supplemental intervening petition was
filed by Hill and associates, individually and as mem-
bers of ‘‘Louisville Water Workers Local Industrial
Union 1683, an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial
Organization, in behalf of themselves and other mem-
bers of that union.’’ This is substantially the same as
the original intervening petition with the additional
statement that the individuals and others (stated to be
a majority) had formed and organized this new union,
and had authorized the C.I.0. to act for and represent
them in their relations with the Company; and that it
was as such representative that the Regional Director of
CIO had written the letter to the company of October
28, 1949. However, the pleading shows that the C.L.O.
had not approved the application of the new union for
affiliation, or granted it a charter, until December 8, 1949.

In short, the record is that a majority of the em-
ployees had withdrawn from the unions which had made
the bargaining agreement for the year 1949 and had
collectively, though not as a unit of any labor organiza-
tion, designated another representative to speak for them
and notify the company of their desire that the 1949
agreement should not be continued into 1950, and there-
after, within the sixty day period and before January

0

1, 1950, these employees had organized and become mem-
bers of a labor unit affiliated with the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations and were proceeding as such.

The employer is neutral in the controversy, but asks
a directory declaratory judgment.

We have set forth the pleadings at some length,
though it is only of the more important portions, be-
cause the circuit court decided the case on them. The
court’s opinion was that the notice to the company of
termination of the agreement should have been by the
proper officers of the unions; that individual members
of a labor union who have designated it or its represent-
atives to negotiate an agreement may not later act in-
dividually, or collectively but independently of their
labor association, in relation thereto; that the letter of
October 28, 1949 (the only communication more than
sixty days before the end of the fixed period) was not
notice by the two labor unions which were parties to
the contract. Therefore, the court held the agreement
renewed itself for an additional one year period, and
rendered a consistent judgment.

. We may say that as a general proposition, the view
of the trial court is well supported, and the provision
respecting termination of the bargaining agreement is
indeed part of the contract. But we cannot overlook the
fact that the provision is wholly prospective in force and
was executory at the time; furthermore, that by its letter
it binds in theoretical perpetuity each and every indi-
vidual who was a member of the union notwithstanding
a vast majority, or all of them, may have withdrawn.
Indeed, according to the record, an ‘‘overwhelming ma-
jority’’ had done so, and, acting collectively, had chosen
another representative for the future, and it had given
proper notice thereof both to the employer and to the
union. -

The'case must be determined by our decisional law,
for the only statute having any application is that part
of KRS 336.130 which recognizes the right of employees
freely to ‘‘associate collectively for self-organization
and designate collectively representatives of their own
choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment to effectively promote their own rights and
general welfare.’’

ee | 77

It was contemplated a majority of these employees
would remain members of the affiliated unions. We think,
therefore, there is an implication of law that so far as
prospective action is concerned, the provision for con-
tinuance of the agreement for another year, or annually
thereafter, was dependent upon the fundamental prin-
ciple that the union should represent the majority of the
employees. A trade union can no more become a bargain-
ing agent for one who has ceased to be a member than
for one who does not choose to become a member in the
first instance. So the law cannot sanction the continuance
of an involuntary agency any more than it could sane-
tion its creation for a workman who was never a member
of the union.

Perhaps the injustice of the situation would more
clearly appear if the provision were reversed so as to
provide that the agreement would terminate on Decem-
ber 31, 1949, unless the union should give notice of a
desire to continue it. It would readily strike one as op-
pressive to say that where a majority of the employees
no longer belonged to the union and had spoken collec-
tively to the contrary, yet they are nevertheless bound
ad infinitum by action of the officers of the union and.a
remaining minority of its members in giving such affirmy
ative notice. It would be an artificial distinction to say
that mere silence may legally have the same effect. .:

The principle of majority representation is basic,
as it is in our political system, and underlies all federal
and state legislation and judicial pronouncements con-
cerning labor unions. Membership in an organized trade
union is not the exclusive test of a right to bargain col,
lectively. Following comment as-to the unanimity with
which it is held that employees have the right to bar-
gain collectively, we said in Hotel, Restaurant & Soda
Fountain Employees Local Union .v. Miller, 272 Ky.
466, 114 S. W. 2d 501, 503: ‘This right of unified action
includes the privilege of selecting those who shall speak -
for the collection. As has been said by the Supreme
Court: ‘Such collective action would be a mockery if
representation were made futile by interference, with
freedom of choice.’ ’? The-case involved the right of. em-
ployees.to act as a group without membership in a trade
union connected with a national organization, which was

798 ee

interfering with them, and it was held they had such
right.

We readily agree that members of a union acting
individually, or as an independent group outside the
body, may not be heard to change or violate an agree-
ment made when they were members insofar as it relates
to its current operation. These parties have not sought
to do that. But, again we point out that the question is
the right of the majority who have severed their con-
nection with the union, the contracting party, to take
action under the provision of an executory part of the
agreement relating to its future renewal or continuance,
or to aét independently of the agreement.

There are two cogent considerations other than
the mere fact_that a majority of the employees have
taken action..One is the character of the provision and
the other is.the right of revocation of agency.

These several labor unions, which are voluntary
unincorporated associations, are entities for limited con-
tractual purposes only. They are clothed with power by
their members to make agreements with employers re-
specting wages, working conditions and related labor
questions, and within their legitimate scope such con-
tracts are binding upon the union as an entity and the
members thereof. Saulsberry v. Coopers International
Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S. W. 1018, 39 L. R. AN. S.,
1203. The necessity of stability demands that. Without
it there would be no security or permanency. But the
union may not act in any particular way so as to affect
injuriously the personal rights of its members. A mem-
ber does not have to submit to the determination of the
union in any question involving his personal rights.
Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 198 Ky. 477,
248 8. W. 1042; 83 A. L. R. 322; Compare Hudson v.
Cincinnati & T. Pp. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 8. W. 47,
47L. RB. A, N.S, 184, Amn. Cas. 19158, 98; McGregor
v. Louisville &N. RB. RB. Co., 244 Ky. 696, BL S. W. 2a
958. As recently expressed in Louisville Railway Co. v.
Louisville Area Transport Workers Union, 312 Ky. 656,
657, 228 8. W. 2d 652, 654, the union is the agent and
servant of its members and membership does not exist
for the benefit of the union; hence we held that a ma-
jority of the members acting within the union had the _
right to transfer its property to a newly organized union

ee = — 7

which they had formed. We furthermore held that the
individual authorizations for checkoff of dues was for
the limited period and did not constitute an irrevocable
agreement to remain members of the local union; on
the contrary, we recognized, as we had done before, that,
“It is a fundamental principle that an employee joining
a voluntary labor union for an indefinite period may
resign therefrom at will.’’? Otherwise, that case is not
in point here. There the railway company’s employees
had acted as a majority within the union and had it to
speak for them, while in the instant case the Water Com-
pany’s employees had withdrawn before they spoke. So
far as continuing the agreement into the future is con-
cerned, it seems to us to be within the personal rights of
the individuals to choose another representative to speak
for them collectively. To say that such majority of the
employees are yet bound by a future bargaining agree-
ment made by an agent they had repudiated, and whose
authority they had specifically revoked, and also be
compelled to pay dues to that union, is as astonishing
as it is violative of constitutional freedom of contract.
Even within its own body, a trade union can employ no
power as a means of oppression and injustice in respect
of its members or deprive any of them in the form of
contractual surrender or otherwise of their fundamental
rights when the public interest will not be thereby serv-
ed. Such assumed power cannot deprive any one of his
constitutional right of liberty and property. Cameron
v. International Alliance, ete. 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 A.
692, 97 A. L. R. 594, It is charged in the pleadings, as
stated, that if the contract be continued or renewed, the
intervening parties and other employees would be dis-
missed from their employment because they are not
members of the bargaining union. The right to.earn a
living is property within the concept of constitutional
rights, and a trade union in the service of its own inter-
ests may not deprive a person of .such constitutional
right. DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Artists,
31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P. 2d 769, 175.A. L. R. 382, certiorari
denied, 333 U. S. 876, 68 S. Ct. 906, 92 L, Ed. 1152.

Some courts regard a bargaining agreement as one
made by the union for the benefit of third persons, its
members; but we are committed to the concept of agency.
Aulich v. Craigmyle, 248 Ky. 676, 59 S. W. 2d 560; Labor

800

Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Teller, sec. 167, 168;
Notes, 95 A. L. B. 40-43.

The provision of the present agreement as to ret
newal, as we have said, was unexecuted at the time the
majority of the employees designated another agent, who
proceded to act for them. It is, of course, elemental
that when an agency is not coupled with an interest and
no third party’s rights are involved, the agency, so long
as it remains unexecuted, may be revoked by the prin-
cipal and the agent deprived of further authority to act.
2 Am. Jur., Agency, sec. 37. This is so although the au-
thority is expressed as being irrevocable, a liability for
damages for wrongful termination being, however, cre-
ated. Am. Law Inst. Agency, sec. 118; White Co.-y. W.
P, Farley & Co., 219 Ky. 66, 292 8. W. 472, 52 A. L. R.

We take note that under federal and state labor
statutes, whose térms afte perhaps more restrictive than
the common law, as a general proposition’ if a union
at any time ceases to represent the majority of the
employees in the appropriate unit, it loses its power to
bargain for the unit, Note 144 A. LR. 454, and that it
was held in Triboro Coach Corporation v. New York
State Labor Relations Board, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. H. 2d
315; 287 N. Y. 647, 39 N. E. 2d 276, 14 ALL. R.
410, that employees who have selected a labor union’ as
their bargaining representative and have allowéd it to
enter into such an agreement, binding for a fixed period
of time, are, while the contract is in force, free to select
another union as their bargaining representative for the
purpose of entering into further contracts with the em-
ployer upon the expiration of the existing agreement.

Our conclusion of the whole matter is that the ,pro-,
vision for continuing the bargaining agreement by inac-,
tion on the part of the trade unions did not, in its pros-
pective effect, legally bind members of the union who.-
had withdrawn, and that where a majority of the em-.
ployees of an industry have served their membership
and acting collectively have chosen another agent, and
authorized their new agent to terminate the agreement
according to its terms, it may be done. The termination
of that particular agreement, of course, carried with it.
the cessation of the authority to the employer to pay,
the check off dues to, the union in the future. That, aur

Le

thority, it may be added, was also specifically withdrawn
by each of these employees. 7

The point is argued by the appellee labor unions
that, because of its nature, there is no legal power in
the C. I. O. to act for the employees. At the time the
notice was given, the employees were apparently unor-
ganized as a union, but before the end of the year they
had become organized as a local and chartered as an
affiliate of the C. I. O. and such union confirmed and
ratified the action theretofore taken. We do not think
the appellees can be heard to raise the question of ultra
vires. The salient fact and controlling point is that the
majority of the employees had revoked the agency of the
unions to continue the agreement.

The issue before us being upon the demurrer to the
intervening petitions, the courts, of course, must accept
as true the well-pleaded allegations. We are of the opin-
ion the trial court should have overruled the demurrer
and permitted the parties to take proof on the issue of
whether in fact a majority of the members and former
members of the union acted in revoking the agency and
chose the new agent which represented them in this
matter,

We are not advised what the situation has been
during the long interim between the institution of the
litigation in January, the decision of the trial court in
April, and submission of the case here on September
26th. As the year 1950 will have drawn to a close, or
nearly so, before a final judgment can be entered, we
suppose the principal if not sole question will be as to
who is entitled to the impounded dues retained from the
employees, for doubtless a new bargaining agent will
have been chosen for 1951 or the authority of the plain-
tiff unions exercised, if it be found not to have been
legally revoked.

The judgment is reversed.

802

Mason v. Redwine et al.
January 12, 1951.
Rehearing denied March 16, 1961.
R. ©. Littleton, Judge.

H. R. Wilhoit for appellant.
Marcus ©. Redwine, Virgil H. Redwine and Hugene Siler for
appellees.

Juvex Sims—Affirming.

On Feb. 24, 1944, Marcus C. Redwine, joined by
other heirs of A. T. Redwine, conveyed a farm of 169
acres located in Elliott County to Matthew Mason in
consideration of $1,000. The deed reserved to the grant-
ors ‘‘one-half of all minerals, of every kind, especially
oil and gas, found upon or under said land.’? From cer-
tain negotiations leading up to the sale and execution
of the deed, Mason, who could neither read nor write,
was of the impression the deed only reserved one-half
of the oil and gas, and that all other minerals were con-
veyed to him. Hence, he brought this action on Feb. 23,

Le 803

1949, to reform the deed on account of mutual mistake
of the parties thereto, and on the further ground that
the agent of Redwine had made false representations
to Mason as to the reservation in the deed.

The chancellor heard the evidence, which is here
on a, bill of exceptions, and in a clear and concise opin-
ion he dismissed the petition because there was no evi-
dence of mutual mistake, nor any showing of misrepre-
sentations upon the part of Redwine’s agent, Appellant
argues in his brief the judgment should be reversed be-
cause of mistake upon his part and the unconscionable
and inequitable conduct upon the part of Redwine; while
appellee takes the position that appellant is estopped,
since he did not bring suit until five years after accept-
ing the deed.

There is but little conflict in the evidence, which
substantially shows these facts. Appellant, an illiterate
man, had lived upon this farm for a number of years
and was a tenant of Marcus C. Redwine, who resided
in Winchester. On Nov. 30, 1948, appellant through his
wife wrote Redwine he would like to buy the farm. Red-
wine replied by letter that he would sell it but wished
to retain one-half of the oil and gas, stating ‘‘If you
owned the land and the timber and coal that would give
Fou a mighty good farm.’? Redwine wanted $1,200 for
the place and Mason only offered $800, saying in another
letter written by his wife on Dec. 15, 1948, ‘“We desided
the land timber cole and haf of the oil and gas is worth
about $800 it that about rite if it hant make me a price

#8 8

.. Redwine met Roscoe Skaggs in Cattletsburg at fed-
eral court. As Skaggs had been superintending some
lands for Redwine, he asked Skaggs what was a fair
price for this land. Skaggs thought the land was worth
$1,000 and recommended to Redwine that he sell it to
appellant for this:sum, which Redwine agreed to do.

othing was said in the conversation between Skaggs
and Redwine relative to the reservation of the minerals.

On Feb. 24, 1944, Redwine wrote Mason he was mailing
the deed to Skaggs, who would deliver it to Mason and
for the latter to sign and mail to Redwine the note for
the balance of the purchase price. In that letter Red-
wine told Mason to read the deed over carefully ‘“‘to see

604 eS

if we have the right farms described and if there is any
mistake, and send it back.’ . .

Skaggs’ testimony was that the deed was sent to
Mason, who brought it to him (Skaggs) to look over
while the latter was digging coal; that he did not read
the instrument carefully but thought it was all right
and so informed Mason, The testimony of Mason is that
Skaggs looked over the deed and said, ‘‘He-didn’t see
anything wrong with it.’? Both Skaggs and Mason were
of the impression that. Redwine was reserving only one-
half of the oil and gas and Mason was getting all other
minerals. Redwine testified that when he reduced the
price of the land from $1,200 to $1,000 he decided to
reserve one-half interest in all the minerals and he pur-
posely and intentionally incorporated such a reservation
in the deed.

It is apparent under the evidence there was no
mutual mistake, and it is just as apparent no misrepre-
sentations were made by Skaggs to Mason. Appellant
in his brief argues with much force and some persuasion
that he was laboring under the mistake the deed reserved
only one-half of the oil and gas, and that Redwine’s
conduct was inequitable and unconscionable in not call-
ing to his specific attention the fact the deed reserved
one-half of all the minerals, and in such circumstances
equity will grant the relief appellant seeks. He cites such
eases as Scott v. Spurr, 169 Ky. 575, 184 8S. W. 866;
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Oakley Improved Bldg. &
Loan Co., 6 Cir., 80 F. 2d 717; Hiliott v. Sackett, 108 U.
S. 182, 2 8. Ct. 875, 27 L, Eid. 678. .

These authorities support appellant’s legal propo-
sition. However, they are not applicable to the instant
ease because Mason’s petition seeks a reformation of
the deed on two grounds: 1. mutual mistake; 2. misrep-
resentations by the agent, and there is no ‘averment in
the petition that Redwine’s conduct was unconscionable
or inequitable. The last paragraph in the Scott opinion
states the petition there, although awkwardly drawn,
did plead mistake of one of the parties‘and unconscion-
able and inequitable conduct by the other when thé aver-
ments are taken as’a whole. As was said in Mannington
Fuel Co. v. Ray’s Adm’x, 250 Ky. 736, 63 8S. W. 2d 933,
one may not plead facts constituting a cause of action
and then make out his case by introducing proof estab-

| 805

lishing a different cause of action to that pleaded. So
here, Mason may not obtain a reformation of this deed
by proving a mistake upon his part’and what he claims
is unconscionable and inequitable conduct upon the part
of Redwine when his pleading asked for a reformation
of the instrument on account of mutual mistake, or mis-
take upon his part and misrepresentations upon the
part of Redwine’s agent.

Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unneces-
sary to consider the contention of Redwine that Mason
by accepting the deed and living on the property was
estopped from bringing this action five years thereafter.

The judgment is affirmed.
a

Messick v. Powell et al.
January 26, 1951.
Rehearing denied March 16, 1951.
Chester D. Adams, Judge.

J. Owen Reynolds and Robert H. Hays, for appellant.

Rouse & Hammond, Harbinson, Kessinger, Lisle & Bush, and
W. B. Martin for appellee.

Srantey, Commissroner—Reversing.

The suit was initiated by the former owners of a
farm in Woodford County, Sam. H. Powell and Kitty
Reed Powell, seeking a declaratory judgment as to
which of two real estate agents they are liable to for
commission upon its sale. The two defendants, D. R.
Messick and A. C. Chinn, respectively, responded with
an answer and counter-claim against the plaintiffs and
a cross petition against each other. Chinn merely prayed
that the court declare and adjudge that the plaintiffs

Le 807

were indebted to him in the sum of $1,786.50 interest
and costs. Messick prayed judgment against the plain-
tiffs for the same amount. The circuit court sustained
the plaintiffs’ demurrer to Messick’s pleading, overruled
their demurrer to Chinn’s pleading, and upon Messick
declining to plead further, dismissed his counter-claim
and cross petition. The court declared the plaintiffs were
liable for the payment of only one commission and that
was to Chinn since the sale had been closed by him and
Messick’s exclusive agency had terminated before the
sale was made. The plaintiffs having paid the money
into court, the clerk was directed to hold it subject to
further order. Messick prosecutes an appeal against
the Powells and Chinn. There is no appeal by either ap-
pellee. The decision must rest upon the contracts and
uncontradicted facts pleaded.

On July 6, 1949, the owners signed and delivered to
Messick an agency contract. It describes the property,
including the crops, to be sold and states the price to
be $375 an acre. It continues: ‘‘We hereby grant to D.
R. Messick for a period of 4 months from this date, the
(exclusive) agency or right to sell the above described
property and agree to pay you a 3 per cent commission
on the price obtained or upon any price exchange or
terms which I shall accept, and said commission to be
paid you when the purchaser agrees to the terms men-
tioned herein. You shall be entitled to your commission
if the above property is sold to any person’or persons
with whom you have already had negotiations for the sale
of this property, and upon deposit of 10% cash when
contract of sale is signed and delivered.’’

It is of pertinence that on September 24 in a letter
to Messick Mr. Powell referred to the contract as ex-
piring on November 6, stated that all parties had be-
lieved the property would sell quickly, that the crops had
matured and some other stated changes had occurred,
that the original price of $375 an acre was reduced to
$350 ‘‘with the understanding that an attractive offer
would be considered.’’? The letter continued: ‘‘Please,
therefore, go ahead and make your best efforts to dis-
pose of the property during what time remains on the
contract made on July 6. The contract will not be re-
newed for the reason that we must set up our program

808 ee

for next year. We cannot afford to have the property
vacated and with no one in charge.’’

On December 9, 1949, Chinn submitted an offer of
Mitchell Brothers to buy the property for $59,550, the
equivalent of $300 an acre. As evidence of good faith
and to bind the contract, $6,000 had been deposited with
Chinn to be applied on the purchase price. Other terms
were stated. The owners signed the following accept-
ance: ‘The above proposition is hereby accepted this
9th day of December, 1949, and the seller agrees to pay
the regular rate of commission as prescribed by the
Lexington Real Estate Board.’’

The essential part of Chinn’s affirmative pleading,
other than relying upon the accepted offer, is that he
had brought the buyer and sellers together and induced
them to enter into the contract of sale.

The essential part of Messick’s affirmative pleading
is that pursuant to the terms of his agency contract, he
had advertised the property for sale, devoted time and
labor and incurred considerable expense in interesting
various persons in buying it, including Mitchell Brothers,
with whom he had negotiated. He alleges he had suc-
ceeded in getting them to offer $275 an acre, which he
had reported to the plaintiffs while the agency contract
was in full force and effect and before the contract
of December 9 was made with Chinn. Continuing,
he alleges: ‘‘Defendant states that on December 9th,
1949 after he had had the above negotiations with Mitch-
ell Brothers and had reported them to plaintiffs the said
Mitchell Brothers came to his office for the purpose of
raising their offer for said property to $300 per acre,
but not finding this defendant, they then went to the
office of the defendant, A. C. Chinn, and made the offer
of said amount through him which was accepted by plain-
tiffs.’’ Messick sets forth the sale to Mitchell Brothers
and charges that the plaintiffs are indebted to him as
above. He relies particularly upon this provision in his
contract of agency: ‘‘You shall be entitled to your com-
mission if the above property is sold to any person or
persons with whom you have already had negotiations -
for the sale of this property.”’

We first dispose of the argument of the appellees,
the Powells, that Messick’s contract is unenforceable

as 809

because unilateral or only an offer to enter into‘a con-
tract since it was not signed by him and he made no
promise to do anything; in short, as they.express it,
“there is not so much as a peppercorn of consideration”’
moving from him to the owners. It seems to us the ques-
tion is settled by 'T. M. Gilmore & Co. v. W. B. Samuels
& Co., 135 Ky. 706, 123 8. W. 271, 21 Ann. Cas. 611, which
reaffirms the decisions that the undertaking by a broker
to perform such a contract and his efforts to effect a-
sale constitutes the consideration which may not have
been expressed in the instrument. The appellees seek to
escape thé force of the opinion by pointing out that in
the case the broker had fulfilled his contract and had in
fact produced a purchaser and accomplished a sale, so
the statement that the ‘‘undertaking’’ by the agent was
sufficient consideration was obiter dictum. But in the
later case of Carter v. Hall, 191 Ky. 75, 229 S. W. 132,
the ruling is certainly not dictum, for the owner, in vio-
lation of the rights granted the broker, sold the land
himself. As stated in American Law Institute, Restate-
ment Agency, Sec. 445, Comment c, ordinarily in the
employment of a broker there is no bilateral contract
but merely an offer on the part of the principal to pay
commissions in consideration that the broker produce a
customer ready and willing to contract upon the prin-
eipal’s terms and able to perform such a contract; hence,
the broker does not earn the commission unless his ef-
forts are successful. But further Comment e as to a
condition expressed in a contract of agency that a sale
must be executed, it is stated to be the law that the
agent is entitled to his commission if the principal is
responsible for the non-performance of the condition.
Carter v. Hall, supra, is in accord. The case particularly
relied upon by the appellee, Stensgaard v. Smith, 43
Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669, 19 Am. St. Rep. 205, is not at
variance. The opinion clearly and logically states the
proposition of a unilateral instrument and reaches the
tight conclusion in denying the broker his commissions
for it appears that though he made an effort to find ‘a
buyer, he produced none, so he could not complain be-
cause after his unexecuted authority was revoked, the
owner sold the land himself without the aid of the
broker. The distinction between that and our Carter case,
as well as the instant one, is that in the Minnesota case
there was no default on the part of the owner.

810 ee

We think this contract comes within the elementary
principle that where a party makes an offer and another
acts upon it, the party making the offer is bound to
perform his promise. We think the contract became
clothed with a valid consideration which rendered the
promisors liable. Our decision rests upon the considera-
tion-of the patently ambiguous provision that the agent
would be entitled to his commission if the ‘‘property is
sold to any person or persons with whom you have al-
ready had negotiations’? was put in the contract for
some purpose and must be given some effectual mean-
ing. The word ‘‘already’’ means ‘‘Prior to some speci-
fied time, either past, present or future.’? Webster. (1)
Did the parties mean to speak as of the date of the con-
tract and intend to refer to Messick’s past efforts or
negotiations which ‘‘you have already had?’’ (2) Did
they mean that Messick should be entitled to the com-
mission if the owners themselves sold the property dur-
ing the four months period? (3) Did they intend the
phrase to speak as of the end of the definitely fixed
period of four months exclusive agency and to mean
that if after its termination the property should be sold
by the owners to any person or persons with whom Mes-
sick had had negotiations? (1) It is illogical to say the
specified time referred to the past, or negotiations prior
to the execution of the contract of agency. That assumes
an unlikely activity and such negotiations would, of
course, have become merged into a consummated sale.
(2) The argument for the interpretation that it refers
to a sale made by the owners themselves presently, or
during the four month period loses force when it is noted
that where there is an exclusive agency for a specified
time, the owner is liable for the commissions if he sells
the property himself. Murphy v. Sawyer & Warford, 152
Ky. 645, 153 8. W. 991; Carter v. Hall, supra, 191 Ky.
75, 229 8. W. 132. Some courts draw a distinction be-
tween an exclusive agency and an exclusive right to
sell and give greater force to the latter term. 8 Am.
Jur., Sees. 57,,192, 195. The present contract confers
both an agency and a right. (3) It seems to us the
most logical interpretation is that the time specified
was the future, or at the termination of the exclusive
agency and right. ‘‘You have already had’’ negotia-
tions recognizes that during the period he would have
solicitated and interested prospective purchasers. This

P| su

is indicated by the fact that the agreement immediately
follows the sentence which grants “the agent the ‘‘exelu-
sive agency and right to sell,” > and defines his commis-
sions. Furthermore, real estate brokerage is a highly
competitive business and it is a logical conclusion that
the provision was intended to protect the agent beyond
the duration of the exclusive ‘‘agency or right’’ to sell
the property in order that he might not be deprived of his
compensation for finding and presenting a purchaser
during that period should the owner sell to him. With-
out such protection, it would have.been an easy mat-
ter for the owners to cireumvent his right by postpon-
ing acceptance until the definite time had expired.. Be-
ing silent as to the duration of this conditional exten-
tion of a right to commissions, under general rules a
reasonable time will be imported. A month and three
days was a reasonable time under the circumstances.

In EB. A. Strout, Co. v. Hubbard, 104 Me. 366, 71
A. 1020, 1023, a provision in a contract was to the effect
that if the farm should be sold by the agent after with-
drawal of the exclusive agency to a customer he had
recommended or who had learned through him that it
was for sale, the owner would pay a commission. After
withdrawal of the exclusive agency, a sale had been
made by the owner to a person who had been reco!
mended by the agent. In holding the agent entit] ed
to the commission, the court said: ‘‘“By the contract it
was sufficient to show that the plaintiff sowed seed,
and the defendant reaped his harvest, where the seed
had been sown. It was not incumbent on the plaintiff
to trace the development of the seed and the growth of
the plant. It was not necessary to show even that the
harvest came from the plaintiff’s seed; for such was
not the contract.’?

In Moore v. Holman Real Bstate Co., 129 Ark.

465, 196 8.W. 479, a real estate broker was given the
exclusive agency for a period of three months. That

_ provision was followed by the statement that the com-
mission would be paid if the property should be sold
‘no matter by whom” during the period or afterward
‘ton information secured through this agency.’? Dur-
ing the existence of the agency, the agent interested a
prospective buyer and endeavored, without success, to
bring the parties together. After the definite period

812 ee

had expired, negotiations between the owner amd ‘the
prospect produced by the agent resulted in a contract
of sale upon different terms. The court held the sale
had been made on information received through the
agent, and, recognizing that the proper construction of
the provision required that to be effective the sale’ must
have been made within a reasonable time after the ex-
piration of the definite period, held that two months was
reasonable and that a directed verdict for the broker was
proper, although the owner testified that he had acted
in good faith and would not have consummated the sale
had he ‘known the agent would claim or was entitled
to the commissions.

Of like effect is Williams v. Leslie, 111 Ind. 70, 12
N.E. 102; Wells v. Andreas, 185 Wis. 319, 115 N.W. 792.

The Georgia Court of Appeals gave a different
construction to a similar provision. It was that ‘‘should,
after the expiration of 120 days [the owner], sell said
property to the [agent’s] customer or client, direct: or
through any one else,’’ the agent should, nevertheless,
have his commission. The court held that time was of’
the essence of an exclusive agency contract and that
in the absence of bad faith or fraud upon the part of the
owner in selling the property after the expiration of
the term to a person with whom the agent had been
negotiating prior thereto, the agent was not entitled
to the commission stipulated notwithstanding the pro-
vision of the contract. Morris v. Jackson, 9 Ga. App. ©
848, 72 S. Ey 444. ;

We are not willing to follow the Georgia case. It
is not in accord with the weight of authority. We agree
with the reasoning and the conclusions of the other
courts.

It does not seem to us that the various cases in-
‘volving a contest between two or more real estate
agents, all of whom had authority to make a sale, are
in point, the issues there being which agent was the.
procuring or efficient cause of the consummated trans-
action. Of such are Kice v. Dugan, 143 Ky. 676, 137
S.W. 240, and the cases cited therein; Al Koch Real
Estate Co. v. Durrett, 214 Ky. 162, 282 S.W. 1079;
Watts v. Barber, 275 Ky. 411, 121 8.W.2d 59. And
the exclusive agency provision goes out of the case”
except as being that upon which Messick’s rights de-

es 813

pend under the provision defining them. after. its ter-
mination.

Messick had had ‘‘negotiations’? with Mitchell
Brothers and had in fact presented an offer which was
not acceptable to the owners. The fact that Mitchell
Brothers subsequently made a better and an acceptable
‘offer through another agent cannot deprive Messick
of the right to the commission which the Powells had
agreed to pay him if he can prove the allegations of
his counter-claim. This is to hold that the demurrer
to his pleading should have been overruled as it states
a cause of action in our opinion.

Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.

|
Greenwell v. Nova. et al.
February 6, 1951.
Rehearing denied March 20, 1951.
George K. Holbert, Judge.

Haynes Carter, for appellant..
Faurest & Montgomery, for appellees.

814 es
Juven Herm—aAffirming, :

Appellant, C. R. Greenwell, filed this action against
appellees stating that his wife, Mattie Lee Greenwell,
died testate February 11, 1948. She left surviving her
appellant and appellees, children and grandchildren of
appellant and his wife. Appellant sets out that his wife
left certain property; a farm deeded to her and to him,
with survivorship clause; a farm deeded to his wife,
in which he, by the terms of her will, had a life estate
with certain provisions for the children. of the parties
during their lifetime; U. S. savings bonds in the amount
of $2,307.50 payable to appellant and the decedent;
other personal property listed in an appraisement. The
will, the two deeds, and the appraisement are referred
to as exhibits but are not in the record. |

Appellant states that appellees, Robert Lee Green-
well, Martha Vee Greenwell, and Mary Ruth Dearing,
are infants and that ‘‘neither has any guardian.’? Ap-
pellant asked that the court construe the will; that the
“rieht of all the parties under the will be adjudged
and determined’’; that the court construe the deed re-
ferred to as Exhibit B; that the court construe, deter-
mine and adjudge the rights of the parties under the
deed referred to as Exhibit C; that the ‘‘rights of all
the said parties be determined and adjudged in and
to the said estate.’’

Appellees, Ritchie Lee Terra Nova; John Terra
Nova, her husband; Paulella Bogue; B. L. Bogue, her
husband; Mary Ruth Dearing, by her guardian Howard
E. Dearing; Howard BH. Dearing, her husband; Robert
Lee Greenwell, by D. W. Routt, his guardian; and Martha
Vee Greenwell, by Mrs. J. W. Compton, her guar-
dian, filed answer and counterclaim alleging that
‘‘after the institution of this action, the plaintiff and
the defendants signed and delivered a writing under and
by which they settled all disputes between the parties
hereto as to the construction of the will of Mattie Lee
Greenwell, the proper distribution of her property, and
what property was owned by her at the time of her
death.’’ They alleged that ‘a dispute exists between
the plaintiff and the defendants,’’ and they pray that
the court ‘‘declare the rights of the parties.’’

Appellant filed reply asking that the answer and

es 815

counterclaim of appellees be dismissed, Demurrer was
sustained to the reply. Appellant filed an amended
reply. Appellees filed a rejoinder. The court heard
the testimony of appellant and his witnesses, and the
testimony of some of the appellees and ‘their witnesses.
The court rendered an opinion and judgment declaring
the rights of the parties, reserving certain matters for
future determination.

Appellant. excepted and was granted an appeal. The
judgment was entered March 8, 1950. Appellant filed
motion and grounds for a new trial. The motion was
overruled March 9, 1950. He was given until June 17,
1950 to file his bill of exceptions. The bill of exceptions
was tendered June 16, 1950, and filed August 12, 1950.
Fig spPent was not filed in this court until August 21,

Appellees. filed motion -to dismiss appellant’s ap-
peal because (1) this is a declaratory judgment action;
and (2) the appeal was not filed within 60 days after
the judgment declaring the rights of the parties be-
came final.

Appellant maintains that this is not a declaratory
judgment action, saying ‘‘no provision is made for ob-
taining a declaratory judgment except by petition on
part of the plaintif’, and no effort was made upon the
part of the plaintiff to obtain a declaratory judgment.
Civil Code of Practice, sections 639a-1 and 639a-2.”’

Appellees sought a declaration of rights in their
counterclaim. Civil Code of Practice, section 639a-1,
provides: ‘In any action * * * wherein it is made to
appear that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff
may ask for a declaration of rights, either alone or with
other relief; and the court may make a binding declara-
tion of rights, whether or not consequential relief is
or could be asked.’’ Civil Code of Practice, section 639a-
2, provides:.‘‘Any person interested under a deed, will
or other instrument of writing, or in a contract, written
or parol; * * * or who as fiduciary, or beneficiary is in-
terested in any estate, provided always that an actual
controversy exists with respect thereto, may apply for
and secure a declaration of his rights or duties, * * *.’”

Here an actual dispute or controversy existed, and
a declaration of rights was requested as provided by the

816 ee

above sections of the Code. Civil Code of Practice, sec-
tion 732(36) provides: ‘‘The word ‘plaintiff? embraces
a defendant who demands a set-off or counter-claim;.the
word ‘defendant’ embraces a plaintiff against whom
such demand is made; and the word ‘petition’ embraces
an answer or reply in which such demand is made, and
also embraces cross-petitions.’?

In Jefferson County v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614; 33 8.
W. 2d 601, 603, we said: ‘‘The Supreme.Court of the
United States suggested in the case of Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Co-op. Marketing
Ass’n, 276 U. 8. 71, 48 S. Ct. 291, 294, 72 L. Hd. 473, that
‘apparently the (Kentucky) declaratory judgment stat-
ute authorizes plaintiffs only to ask for judgments.’ * * *
‘We have decided, however, that other relevant and not
inconsistent provisions of the Civil Code are not repealed
by the act, and it may be that a defendant could set up
his side of the controversy in a counterclaim, or other
parties be allowed to intervene. * * *””

In Borchard’s Declaratory Judgments, p. 26, that
authority says: ‘‘The moving party may be the defend-
ant, either by way of answer or counterclaim.’’ At pages
181 and 182 the author refers to the Liberty Warehouse
Company case saying:

“«* * * McReynolds, J., then went on to remark:
‘Apparently the declaratory judgment statute author-
izes plaintiffs only to ask for judgments.’ * * * the Court
proceeds: ‘This court had no jurisdiction to review a
mere declaratory judgment.’

“The two quoted sentences in this paragraph have
been refuted by the event. The first statement involves
a misapprehension, for defendants very frequntly in
answer or counterclaim demand a declaratory judgment
on their own behalf, whether or not the plaintiff asked
for one. The second statement, which raised an issue not
briefed by counsel or necessary to the decision, has been
squarely overruled by Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
‘Louis Ry. v. Wallace.??

The author adds: ‘‘This dictum, it is submitted, -is
without support, notwithstanding that the action must
be instituted by petition. Defendants’ requests for dec-
larations are common. * * *”?

a 817

At pages 26 and 182 the author cites numerous cases
in support of this statement.

In the light of these decisions and authority, and
the provisions of our Civil Code of Practice, seetion 732
(36), we conclude that the appellees properly asked for
a declaration of rights in their counterclaim. The appeal
here was not filed within 60 days from the time the judg-
ment became final.

The appeal is dismissed; the judgment is affirmed.

a
Whalen v. Boles et al.

February 9, 1951.
Rehearing denied March 20, 1951.
Lawrence F, Speckman, Judge.

18 ee)

Louis H, Jull and Joseph W. Cambron for appellant.
Brent ©. Overstreet, for appellees.

Cumr Justice Cammacx—Reversing.

This appeal is taken from a judgment rendered Au-
gust 10, 1949, awarding the custody of Patricia Ann
‘Whalen, now eight and a half years old, to the appellee,
her maternal grandmother, Mrs. Cornelia Kassens. The
child’s father is the appellant, Mr. Wilbur Robinson
Whalen, Jr., and the mother is the appellee, Mrs. Anita
Whalen Boles.

The appellant and the appellee, Mrs. Boles, were
divorced on December 29, 1944, when the child was only
two years old. The mother was awarded custody of the
child and $75 per month as alimony for herself and
maintenance for the child. Two weeks later the mother
married Edward Boles, who was then in the Army, and
moved temporarily to Texas. Mrs. Boles placed the
child with her mother, who is about 50 years old and
lives in Louisville, Kentucky. Patricia Ann has contin-
ued to reside with Mrs. Kassens since early 1945. In
March, 1945, Mrs. Boles returned to Louisville and
signed an agreement with the appellant that the ali-
mony payments be discontinued, but that $6.00 a week
be paid for the maintenance of the child, and that, in the
event Mrs. Boles departed from the state, the child
would be left with Mrs. Kassens. The appellees charge
that this agreement was signed under duress of threats
made by the appellant to have the mother, Mrs. Boles,
charged with child desertion. The father denies this
and his denial is supported by the statements of the
attorney who drew the agreement and the attorney’s
secretary. After Mrs. Boles’ husband left the Army in
June, 1946, the couple moved to St. Paul, Minnesota,
where Mr. Boles is employed by Swift & Company at a
salary of $75 per week. The Boleses have another child,
born during the pendency of this action. They live in a
comfortable, modern five-room home.

The appellant entered the armed services on March
24, 1945, and was separated therefrom on July 29, 1947.
He filed this action on December 12, 1947, seeking a modi-
fication of the original custody award. The appellant

Le 819

has also remarried and has a child by his second wife.
They have a comfortable five-room house in a good
neighborhood in Louisville. Whalen earns about $300 a
month at the Reynolds Metal Company. :

Whalen alleged that the home of Mrs. Kassens was
not a proper environment for raising Patricia Ann, due
to the advanced age of the occupants. He further charged
that Mrs. Boles has neglected the child. by leaving her
in the care of the grandmother, and that she rarely
visits her. .

The case was referred to a commissioner to hear
proof, He recommended that the child be taken from
Mrs. Kassens and placed in the custody of the appellant
from June 15th to September 1st each year, and in
the custody of the appellee, Mrs. Boles, for the remain-
der of the year. No exceptions were taken to this report,
and all parties moved to have it confirmed. The chan-
eellor, however, decided ‘that the best interests, of the
child would be served by placing her in the custody of
her grandmother, Mrs. Kassens.

From the record it appears that all three parties
to this action are fit persons to have the custody of the
child, in that they all have comfortable homes in re-
spectable neighborhoods, are regular attendants at
church and are financially able to provide for the child’s
needs. The chancellor’s opinion was based primarily on
the ground that he considered it bad for the child to be
reared under a divided custody system. There is testi-
mony showing that the child is nervous and stutters,
and that this affliction was due to emotional insecurity.
There is some disagreement as to the cause of the emo-
tional insecurity, but a doctor stated that it probably
came from conflicting emotional backgrounds, due to
the split family.

We have consistently held that, in the absence of
a showing that the parents are unfit for the custody of
a child, they are entitled to its custody as against third
parties, such as grandparents. Stupp v. Gross, 301 Ky.
84, 190 S. W. 2d 869; Setser v. Caldwell, 300 Ky. 356,
188 8. W. 2d 451; Matlock v. Elam, 262 Ky. 631, 90 S.
W. 2d 1015.

The father seems very anxious to rear and care for
Patricia Ann. He filed this action within five months

820 |

after his release from the armed services and after he
had acquired a suitable home. The mother testified that
she would like to have the child and has visited her reg-
ularly. It appears, however, that, though having legal
eustody of the child, she has never given serious
thought to having the child live with her. She did not
object to Mrs. Kassens’ custody of the child before this
action was commenced, and she does not now complain of
the judgment to that effect. The appellant has always
manifested a fatherly interest in the child, and she has
spent some time each week in his home since he left
the Army. The child and the appellant’s present wife
apparently share a mutual affection. Under these cir-
cumstances, we believe the father has shown the better
right to the child. See Sanders v. Felzman, 308 Ky. 25,
213 S. W. 2d 428.

We have concluded that the father should have the
custody of Patricia Ann during the school months, from
September 1st to the following June 15th each year,
and that the mother, Mrs. Boles, should have her custody
during the summer months, from June 15th to Septem-
ber ist, if she so desires; the father to pay $6.00 per
week for the child’s maintenance during the mother’s
actual custody.

In reaching the views expressed herein we are not
unmindful of the attitude in which the chancellor ap-
proached this case. At the beginning of his opinion he
said: ‘‘This is one of the most unfortunate and difficult
eases a chancellor is called upon to decide, a child cus-
tody case. * * *”? Often such cases are more difficult for
us to decide than for a chancellor. Furthermore, it is
with great reluctance that we disturb a finding of Judge
Speckman on such a question. We feel, however, it will
be better for Patricia Ann to be reared by one of her
natural parents.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to set it
aside and for the entry of a judgment in conformity

with this opinion.

a
Zogg v. O’Bryan (three cases).

January 23, 1951,
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

March 23, 1951,
Sidney B. Neal, Judge.

Anderson & Anderson and David C. Brodie for appellants.

Robertson & James, Woodward, Hobson, Bartlett & McCarroll
for appellees.

John W. Beard and John B. Anderson, guardians ad litem for
infant, Joseph Franklin Zogg.

Van Sanz, Commissionsr—Reversing.

These appeals are from a single judgment entered
in three consolidated actions arising out of a collision
between an automobile owned by Mary Martin Zogg and
driven by her seventeen-year-old son, Joseph Franklin
Zogg, and one owned and being driven by Robert Pres-
ton O’Bryan, at the intersection of Frederica and 18th
Streets in Owensboro, on November 26, 1948 at about
11:30 o’clock p. m. Zogg was proceeding north and
O'Bryan south on Frederica. Commencing with the north
curb line of 18th Street, Frederica narrows in width.
At that point and north thereof it is approximately 45
feet; south of that point it is approximately 70 feet in
width. Zogg intended to continue his northerly course
but was required to veer to the left because of the nar-
rowing of the street. O’Bryan changed his southerly
course by turning left or east into 18th Street. Zogg testi-
fied he was traveling at approximately 30 miles per hour
as he approached the intersection; O’Bryan estimated
the speed at not less than 50. The speed at which O’Bryan
was traveling does not appear in evidence but he testi-
fied that he came to a full stop north and west of the
center point of the intersection when he was struck by
the Zogg car. Zogg testified that he was proceeding

824 ee

northerly on the east side of the medial line of Frederica
Street and the cars collided. when O’Bryan drove directly
in his path. O’Bryan’s wife and three of their children
were passengers in his car. Both Mr. and Mrs. O’Bryan
as well as Zoge were injured.

The first of these actions was instituted. against
O’Bryan by Joseph Zogg, who sued by his father, Frank
Zogg, as his next friend. In that action O’Bryan filed a
cross-petition against Mrs. Zogg and a counterclaim
against the plaintiff. The court did not, nor was he re-
quested: to, appoint a guardian ad litem to defend the
plaintiff in the counterclaim. Defense to the counterclaim
on behalf of the infant was made by the attorneys who
filed the suit. The next suit was instituted by Mrs.
O’Bryan against Joseph Zogg and his mother, Mary
Martin Zogg, to recover for personal injuries sustained
in the accident. In that action Honorable John W.-Beard
was appointed guardian ad litem for the infant defend-
ant and filed answer for him. The third suit was filed by
Mary Martin Zogg against O’Bryan to recover for in-
juries sustained to her automobile in the collision. On
the 13th day of June, 1949, an order was entered direct-
ing the three cases to be ‘‘consolidated and tried to-
gether.’’ On the 16th day of June, an order was entered
in the second suit, appointing Honorable John B.. An-
derson guardian ad litem, in addition to the guardian ad
litem theretofore appointed, with directions that the
guardians ad litem ‘‘represent and defend this-action
for and on behalf of the said infant defendant.’’ No ad-
ditional .pleading was filed on behalf of the infant be-
fore the trial. The cases were tried together, resulting in
verdicts for the O’Bryans against the Zoggs and pur-
suant thereto judgment was entered allowing Robert
Preston O’Bryan to recover the sum of $1222.65 of
Joseph Zogg and Mary Martin Zogg on the counterclaim
and cross-petition in the action first herein referred to
-and allowing Frances Elizabeth O’Bryan to recover the
sum of $4996.65 of Joseph Zogg and Mary Martin Zogg
in the second action. These awards and dismissal of the
petition in the third action were entered in a single
judgment, from which the Zoggs have appealed.

. Appellees contend that none of appellants’ com-
plaints hereinafter set out should be considered, be-
cause they were entitled to a peremptory instruction

PF 825
under the evidence. From what we have said at the out-

set of this opinion, it is obvious that this contention
cannot be sustained.

The first complaint is that the court erred in the
instruction which required Zogg to yield the right of
way to O’Bryan, if the jury believed from the evidence
that O’Bryan first reached and entered.‘‘the intersec-
tion of 18th Street”? with Frederica Street. It is the con-
tention of appellant that the words ‘‘beyond the center
point’? should have been inserted after the word ‘‘inter-
section’’ in this instruction. Reliance is had on the opin-
ions of this Court in Walton v. Grant, 302 Ky. 194, 194
8. W. 2d 366, and Bridge Transit Co. v. Le Seuer, 304
Ky. 403, 200 S. W. 2d 942. Appellees contend that the
instruction is correct and those approved in Walton v.
Grant, supra, and Bridge Transit Co. v. Le Seuer, supra,
are erroneous because the O’Bryan car would never
lawfully reach the center point of the intersection since
by another instruction it was required to change its
course short of the center point. It is true, as appellees
contend, that following the course required of him by
the other instructions, O’Bryan would not have reached
the center point of the intersection of 18th and Frederica
Streets in a north-south direction; but, in making the
turn from a southerly course to an easterly course, he
passed or would have passed the center point of the
street in a west to east direction. Thus, from the time
O’Bryan commenced the turn into 18th Street, he was
traveling-a course which inevitably would intersect the
course being traveled by Zogg; and, since Zogg was or
would have been on O’Bryan’s right when the cars ar-
rived, or should have arrived, at the intersection of their
paths, Zogg was required to yield the right of way only
if O’Bryan first reached such point of intersection, KRS
189.330(2). The respective rights and duties of the parties
under this section of the Statute however are secondary
to Zogg’s right and O’Bryan’s duty under the provisions
of KRS 189.380(2) which reads: ‘‘(2) Every person
operating a vehicle on the highway before turning, stop-
ping or changing the course of the vehicle and before
turning the vehicle when starting it shall first see that
there is sufficient space for the change or turn to be
made in safety, * * *.’?

A proper instruction under this section was given

826 |

by the court in instruction (a) under ‘‘the further duty
of said Robert Preston O’Bryan’’ and is identical to
instruction No. I(5) in the Walton case, supra. De-
spite this fact, we can appreciate the possibility of con-
fusion arising in the minds of the jurors in reading
these instructions, unless their attention is called to the
fact that O’Bryan must comply with the duties imposed
on him in making a left turn before he has the right
to proceed toward the intersection of his and Zogg’s
respective paths. Since the judgment must be reversed
for other reasons and in order to eliminate the possibil-
ity of confusion, we have prepared an instruction to
be given on the next trial, in lieu of instruction (c) which
was given by the court under the designation ‘‘further
duties of Joseph Franklin Zogg.’”? This instruction will
be given with those reciting the duties of O’Bryan in-
stead of those reciting the duties of Zogg, and will read:

(It was the further duty of O’Bryan)

“To yield the right of way through the intersection
to Zogg unless the jury shall believe from the evidence
that O’Bryan, after having observed the duties imposed
on him by instruction (a) under ‘the further duty of
O’Bryan,’ first reached the intersection of the respective
paths of the O’Bryan and Zogg automobiles to the east
of the center point of the intersection, in which event
only, it was the duty of Zogg to yield the right of way
through the intersection to O'Bryan.”

Appellants next contend the court erred in refusing
to permit evidence of injuries sustained by Joseph Zogg
in a fall which occurred on a stairway while he was
convalescing from the injuries he received in the acci-
dent. He originally sustained injuries to his knee which
required an operation in which holes were drilled in the
larger fragments of the bones through which a silver
wire was inserted for the purpose of pulling and fixing
the bones in close proximation. The leg was then placed
in a cast for approximately seven weeks. Upon removal

- of the cast the knee was fitted with a brace to assist the
patient in walking. When he fell on the stairs, the wire
was torn loose and the operation had to be performed
over again. There was no showing that the second fall
was in any way attributable to the injury sustained in
the automobile accident. Zogg testified merély that he
missed the step and fell. His missing the step might

a ear

have been the result of his own negligence or he might
have been defying his doctor’s orders in using the steps.
In the absence of showing that the second injury was
the direct result of a mishap traceable to the injury
sustained in the automobile accident, the evidence was
not competent and the court did not err in sustaining
the objection to its introduction. Hast Tennessee Tele-
phone Oo. v. Jeffries, 153 Ky. 133, 154 8. W. 1112; 9 A. L.
R, 260. Compare other annotations starting at 9 ALR.
255. Wagner v. Mittendorf, 282 N. Y. 481, 134 N. Ei. 539,
20 A. L. R. 520 and annotations 20 A. L. B. 524,

The next complaint is in respect to the court’s re-
fnsal to permit appellant Joseph Zogg, in the cireum-
stances we will relate, to read certain questions and
answers from the deposition given by him as on cross-
examination previous to the trial. On cross-examination
in the trial, counsel for O’Bryan confronted Zogg with
a statement contained in the deposition which appeared
to be in conflict with his direct testimony. It is con-
tended that a reading of five questions and answers
contained therein, would clarify and reconcile his direct
testimony with the answer he gave to the particular
question in the deposition. We are of the opinion the
court erred in refusing this evidence under the rule
that where a party seeks to impeach a witness by the
introduction of a portion of a former deposition, the op-
posing party may introduce the entire deposition or as
much of it as contains matters which will clarify and
reconcile the evidence given on the trial and that given
in the portion of the former deposition introduced. Black-
erby v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 832, 255 8. W. 824.
O’Donnell’s Adm’r v. Louisville Electric Light .Co., 55
8. W. 202, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1362.

The court refused to permit Mary Martin Zoge to
qualify as a witness concerning the values of automo-
biles. Since no avowal was made, this point may not be
raised as a basis for reversal, nevertheless it was com-
petent and should be admitted if offered at the next
trial.

The complaint in respect to the exclusion of testi-
mony of Mrs. Zogg concerning the suffering of her son
from the injuries he sustained is well taken. Ordinarily,
laymen may not give opinion evidence unless they testify
to the facts or circumstances upon which they base their

828 eS

opinions or conclusions. There is another rule however
which seems to be an exception to the general rule and
that is: that ‘a layman may testify to opinions or infer-
ences drawn from what he has observed while in at-
tendance upon the injured person concerning the degree
of physical suffering which the injured has endured.
The reason for the rule is that one who has had an op-
portunity to observe the injured person cannot portray
to the jury, in a clear and perfect manner, the scene in
the sick room as it presented itself to him and upor
which he has based his opinion or inference. The tones
of voice, movements of the body, and facial expressions,
all. of which portray pain and physical suffering, mani-
fest themselves to the observer in a natural picture, but
they cannot be reproduced by the witness so as to im-
press the jury to the extent that their original produc-
tion impressed the witness. See annotations in 28 A, L.
R. commencing at page 362. This rule has been followed’
in this jurisdiction. Kentucky Midland Coal Co. v. Vin-
cent, 159 Ky. 100, 166 S. W. 800; Lawson’s Adm’r v.
Brandenburg, 240 Ky. 68, 41 8. W. 2d 201. We are of
the opinion that the testimony was competent.

Mr. O’Bryan’s testimony that his wife was unable
to perform her household duties after the accident was-
so superfiuous that, if incompetent, it should not be
noticed. She was confined to her bed four months with
a broken leg which is conclusive evidence that she was
unable to do her household work and her husband’s-
testimony to that effect added nothing to the evidence.
If there had been some question concerning her ability
to do her household work, we would have a different
situation and a different question.

On direct examination, Mr. O’Bryan testified to cer-
tain facts concerning the happening of the accident
which were in sharp dispute and in conflict with his-
recitation concerning the same matters given in a state—
ment signed by him before the trial. Counsel for appel-
Jant offered the written statement given by Mr. O’Bryar
in evidence to contradict his testimony at the trial. The:

- Court sustained an objection to the introduction of the
signed statement. We do not know the basis for this rul--
ing, but it seems to liave been that the written statement
discloses the fact that Mr. O’Bryan has a contract with
an insurance company indemnifying him for certain ex—

a 29

penses incurred as a result of injuries sustained in the
accident. We are of the opinion that the court should
not have sustained the objection to the statement as a
whole; but if the objection had been confined to that
portion referring to insurance, he should have striken
therefrom the objectionable portion and have permitted
the statement so deleted to have been read and intro-
‘duced in evidence. Ham v. Miss C. BH. Mason’s School,
‘The Castle, Inc., 249 Ky. 478, 61 8. W. 2d 7; Harrod v
Armstrong, 177 Ky. 317, 197 8S. W. 816; Madden v. Com
monwealth, 237 Ky. 703, 36 S. W. 2d 346, and cases there-
in cited. Appellee relies on Smith v. Blue Ribbon Lines,
Ine., 312 Ky. 246, 227 8. W. 2d 185. In that case the only
part of the letter which was competent and relevant to
the issue was read to the jury and admitted by the wit-
ness, but, because the remainder of the letter was in-
competent or irrelevant, the court properly refused to
let it be introduced. In the instant case, O’Bryan denied
making statements contained in the writing he admitt-
edly signed. Such statements were pertinent to the issue,
were admissions against interest, and contradicted his
testimony on the trial.

The final ground for reversal relied on by both
appellants is that counsel for appellees injected into the
record incompetent references to the fact that the Zoggs
were indemnified by an insurance company for any
amount they might be required to pay under a judgment
against them. Robert Milby investigated the accident
-and obtained the statement signed by Mr. O’Bryan to
which we previously have referred. Appellees intro-
‘duced him as a witness in rebuttal of the testimony of
Mr. O’Bryan. He was then asked whom he represented.
‘when he took the statement and he testified that he rep-
resented the Travelers Insurance Company. He was
then asked if the Travelers Insurance Company carried
an indemnity policy issued to Mrs. Zogg which, at the
time of the accident, covered the operation of Mrs. Zogg’s
automobile which was involved in the accident. Over
objection of appellants, he was permitted to answer
the question in the affirmative, but the court admonished
the jury to accept this evidence only ‘‘under the circum-
“stances to show his (Millby’s) business relation and em-
ployment or interest in the transaction: anything that
‘might be calculated to influence the witness in giving
testimony and can be considered for no other purpose.”

830 ee

‘Whilst this admonition was not in the usual form, we
are of the opinion it was in substantial compliance with
- the requirements of an admonition of this sort, and the
evidence was competent under the admonition given. The
rule is that testimony to the effect the defendant in an
action for damages is indemnified by an insurance com-
pany is incompetent, where such testimiony sheds no
light upon the issues being tried and it is introduced
solely for the purpose of creating prejudice in the minds
of the jurors to induce them to render a verdict for plain-
tiff. But where, as here, the representative of the insur-
ance company has investigated the accident and testified
for the insured, testimony showing his connection with
the company indemnifying the defendant is competent
solely for the purpose of establishing a basis for the
witness’s bias or prejudice. Coral Ridge Clay Products
. Co. v. Collins, 181 Ky. 818, 205 S. W. 958; Cadle v. Me-
Hargue, 249 Ky. 385, 60 8. W. 2d 973; Silver Fleet Motor
. Express v. Gilbert, 291 Ky. 696, 165 S. W. 2d 541. The
introduction. of this evidence, however, did not justify
the type of argument complained of. In his closing re-
marks, counsel did not argue the evidence concerning
_Milby’s employment in the light of its effect on the
_ credibility of his testimony; he argued the testimony as
if it were competent as substantive evidence, thus to
show the Zoggs would not be required to pay the judg-
ment. On the next trial, if Milby is introduced as a wit-
ness, evidence of his connection with the insurance com-
pany may be shown under a proper admonition and, if
reference is made to it in the closing argument, it should
be only by way of attack on the credibility of the wit-
ness. :

One of the errors we have discussed was not pre-
judicial to appellants in the action instituted by Mrs.
O'Bryan, but the exclusion of the former statement of

Mr. O'Bryan, the exclusion of the former testimony of
Joseph Zogg, and the closing argument were. These
errors alone require reversal of the judgment in all of
the consolidated cases.

One question remains which affects only so much of
. the judgment as permits appellee to recover of the
infant, Joseph Zogg, on the counterclaim in the action
first herein referred.to. As we have stated, no guardian
ad litem was appointed to defend the counterclaim on

a as

behalf of the infant. It is true that the attorneys who
filed the petition for the infant defended the counter-
claim, and ably so. It so happened that one of such
attorneys was appointed as the ‘‘additional”’ guardian
ad litem to defend the second action hereinbefore re-
ferred to, which is the one by Mrs. O’Bryan against the
infant and his mother. The guardian ad litem first ap-
pointed in that case filed answer for the infant on the
day the cases were consolidated for trial and before the
appointment of the second guardian ad litem. The infant
was not a party to the third action. It is contended that
the judgment is erroneous because the infant was not
before the Court on the counterclaim which was the basis
of the judgment against him. In Ambrose v. Graziani,
197 Ky. 679, 247 S. W. 953, the court held that the office
of next friend of an infant is confined to the bringing of
an action in the name, and for the benefit, of the infant
and he cannot even collect the judgment for his protege.
Under subsection 3, Section 36 of the Civil Code of Prac-
tice, no judgment shall be rendered against an infant
until the regular guardian or the guardian ad litem of
such infant shall have made defense or have filed a re-
port stating that after a careful examination of the
case he is unable to make defense. In Smith v. Ferguson,
60 Ky., 3 Metc., 424 and Whalen et al. v. Hopper’s Guar-
dian et al., 152 Ky. 727, 154 8. W. 40, it was held that
this section of the Code applies to the defense of a
counterclaim as well as to one asserted in the petition
of an original action; and in several cases it has been
held that a decree against an infant will be reversed
where a person other than his regular guardian or guar-
dian ad litem defends for the infant. See 11 Ky. Digest,
Infants, Key 78(1). The consolidation of a case in which
a guardian ad litem has been appointed with one or
more in which neither a guardian appears nor a guardian
ad litem has been appointed to appear does not cure
the omission, so as to permit a judgment to be entered
against the infant on the cause asserted in either of the
latter cases, whether the cause be asserted by petition
or counterclaim. Smith v. Smith, 255 Ky. 191, 72 S. W. 2d
425. It follows that Joseph Zoge was not before the
court on the counterclaim upon which judgment against
him was rendered.

The judgment is reversed with directions that it be
set aside and that appellants be granted a new trial in

832 |

each of the actions. The actions may be tried together
under the original order of consolidation and shall "be
conducted in a manner not inconsistent with this opin-

jon.

London Bucket Co., Inc. v. Stewart.
January 26, 1951.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 23, 1951.
J. B, Johnson, Judge.

Murray L, Brown and Robert B. Bird for appellant.
W. L. Rose ‘and 4H, H. Owens for appellee.
Sranzey, Commasstonur—Reversing.

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing spe-
cific performance of a contract to properly furnish and
install a heating system for a large motel. The basic
contention of the’ appéllant, . London Bucket Company,

|:

ig that the remedy of specific performance will not lie
for breach of this type of contract.

‘ The chancellor overruled a demurrer to the petition
and this is the first assignment of error. Stewart’s peti-
tion set out the contract, the pertinent parts of which
are as follows: ‘The parties of the first part agree and
bind themselves to furnish and install (subletting in-
stallation) in said building the following equipment
** *? The only standard as to the quality of work to
be performed was that the defendant was to ‘‘guarantee
to heat this said court to 75 degrees in winter, and to
supervise all work,’’ etc. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant ‘‘soon thereafter and within one year install-
ed a plant in an incompleted, unskilled, unworkmanlike
manner, never finishing same, and of such size, type and
inferior quality of materials that same does not to a
reasonable degree perform the purpose contemplated.”’
The petition further states: ‘‘ Plaintiff here now demands
of the court of equity that defendant be compelled to
specifically perform the terms of said contract and com-
plete said installation and furnish the type of furnace
provided in said contract and all the things necessary
to properly heat said building and rooms and same to
be done forthwith, before the’ fall of cold weather.’’

The plaintiff prayed that ‘‘immediate specific per-
formance be adjudged’’ and also asked $8,250 damages
for faulty and negligent construction and resulting ex-
pense, loss of business, etc. On being required to elect
his remedy, he chose specific performance and dismissed
without prejudice his action for damages.

The defendant, among other defenses, pleaded there
had been a mutual cancellation of the contract insofar
as it covered the completion of the job. Upon sharply
conflicting evidence, but with some documents strongly
supporting the plaintiff’s contention, the court found
asa fact that there had been no such cancellation. This
was an issue necessary to be decided before deciding
there could be a decree of specific performance.

The court decreed: ‘‘The defendant is hereby mand-
atorily ordered and directed to comply with the terms
of said contract, in its entirety. He shall proceed dili-
gently so to do and continue its obligation, assumed by
it under the said contract, therein specifically set out.””

34

No matter what the evidence may have been, the
plaintiff’s legal right could be no greater than that
which the basic facts pleaded authorized. So if the de-
murrer should have been sustained to his pleading which
undertook to state his whole case, that is all the court
need consider. In other words, if the plaintiff did. not
state a'cause of action for -specific performance, the de-
murrer should have been sustained instead of over-
ruled. That is the way the. trial. court treated the case
except to find that the work done was defective, the heat-
ing system was not properly functioning, and the job
was incomplete. In his opinion, the court recognized the
difficulty of the question whether the contract and the

- conditions were such as required specific performance..
He considered the familiar principle that: such an equit-.
able decree will not be adjudged unless the ordinary
common law remedy. of damages for a breach of contract
is an inadequate arid incomplete remedy for injuries
arising from the failure to carry out its terms. Hdelen
v. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 103 ‘8. W. 360. The court
concluded, nevertheless, that this case was within
Schmidt y. Louisville & N. B. Co. 101 Ky. 441, 41 8. W.
1015, 19 Ky. Law.Rep. 666, 38 L. R. A. 809, and Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co. v. City of Louisville, 277 Ky. 402,
126 S. W. 2d 840.

It seems to us the two cases are not altogether apt.
In the Schmidt case it was held a decree of specific per-
formance to operate the railroad under the terms of
the lease for the benefit of both holders was proper since
there was no adequate remedy at law. The Pennsylvania
Railroad Case was a suit to declare the rights of the
parties and to require several railroad companies to
proceed with the elimination of grade crossings as they
had contracted to do. Both cases involve matters of

great magnitude and were of public interest and welfare.:

In each case the court in effect said, ‘‘Proceed to do what
you contracted to do.’? There was no question of partial
or incomplete or faulty performance of a building con-
tract. The Schmidt case is distinguished in the leading
ease of Hdelen v. Samuels & Co., supra. In the present
case the decree was in effect to direct a building con-
tractor to go back, correct defective work. and complete
its job. It is the general rule that contracts for building
construction will not be specifically enforced because

ordinarily damages are an adequate remedy and, in part,’

a

because of the incapacity of the court to superintend the
performance. 9 Am. Jur., Building and Construction
Contracts, sec. 124; 58 C. J. 1046, The case at bar is not
within. the exceptions to the rule or of the class: wheré
specific performance should be’ decreed. 49 Am. Jur.,
Specific Performance, sec. 12. That there may be diffi-
eulty in proving the damages as appellee suggests, is
not enough to put the case within the exceptions.

Under our ‘conclusion that ‘specific performance
should not have been decreed, the decision on the issue
of cancellation of the contract must follow it."This will
leave the question open in the common-law action for
damages should it be filed.

‘Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.
Kentucky-Virginia Stages, Inc. v, Senter.
February 9, 1951. =
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 23, 1961:°

E. D. Stephenson, Judge.

Stoll, Keenon & Park and’Baird & Hays for appellant.
J. B Childers for appellee. .

Oe

Cuay, Commissionpr—Affirming.

Appellant appeals from a judgment awarding per-
sonal injury and property damages in a motor ve-
hicle collision case. The controlling question is wheth-
er or not we may consider a so-called ‘‘Bystanders Bill
of Exceptions’? filed in this Court.

The action was tried on June 24, 1949. It resulted:
in a verdict for appellee. Appellant was given until
the last day of the September term within which to pre-
pare.and file its bill of exceptions. ‘The last day of
the term was October 1, 1949. On that day the official
stenographer presented to the clerk ‘‘a few sheets’”
of the purported bill of exceptions, and the clerk mark-
ed one of the pages thereof, ‘‘tendered and offered to
be filed.’? As a matter of fact, the bill of exceptions-
had not been completed, and was not filed at that time..

Subsequently, on October 24, appellee moved to
set aside the order showing the bill of exceptions had
been tendered. The Court took proof on this motions
later sustained the motion; and refused to sign the bill
which had in the meantime been completed. Appellant
has attempted to file in this Court what is designated’
as ‘‘Bystanders Bill of Exception,’ and insists if must.
be ‘considered in passing on the merits of this appeal.

Appellant’s contentions are in the alternative. It
first says that’the bill of exceptions was properly filed
in the lower Court, and it was the duty of the Cireuit
Court to approve it. This is not true because the com-
pleted bill was not tendered in time. Appellant argues,
however, that the Court had no jurisdiction to set
aside the order showing it had been tendered on Oc-
tober 1, 1949. Whether or not the Court had jurisdic-
tion to correct this entry as a clerical misprision under
Section 519 of the.,Civil Code of Practice, see Citizens
Bank & Trust. Co. .v. McHuen, 281 Ky. 113, 134 8.W.2d
1012, it is unnecessary to decide, Even if the Court did
not have jurisdiction to enter this order, the bill
of exceptions was never signed and approved, and con-
sequently cannot be considered by this Court.

Appellant’s' contention that we must treat the ten-
dered document as a bystanders bill is equally without.
merit. ‘Where -the: bill would have been signed by’ the
Judge of the Circuit Court if it.had been tendered in

time, which is the case here, it may ‘not be considered
as a bystanders bill. Asher v. Asher, 203 Ky. 540, 262
WW. 941,

Since we cannot consider the evidence i in the case,
the only remaining question is whether or-not the plead-
ings support, the judgment. Careful examination indi-
cates clearly that allegations of the plaintiff’s petition
justified the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Bates et al.
February 13, 1951.
Rehearing Denied March 28, ‘1951.
: S. M. Ward, Judge.

838 ee

Craft & Stanfill for appellant.
Harry M. Caudill for appellee.

Juper Moremen—aAffirming.

Appellee’s decedent, Henry Bates, was injured
while working for appellant corporation, Elkhorn Coal
Company, on the 13th day of May 1948. Both parties
had accepted the provisions of the Workmen’s Compen-
‘sation Act. Henry Bates was the operator of a motor
used for hauling coal from the mine, and on the day of
the accident, while making a trip in the mine, slate fell
upon him with the result that he was partially knocked
from the motor with his leg caught against the starter
box and he was dragged a distance of about 110 feet
before the motor was stopped. He was treated for his in-
juries and was paid temporary total compensation by
the appellant for 7-5/7 weeks at the end of which time
he signed Form No. 18, a final settlement receipt. He
worked for a period of about three months, and there-
after was unable to work longer.

On the 25th day of March, 1949, Henry Bates filed
an application for adjustment of claim on form No. 11,
which was duly verified by the applicant. On April 12,
1949, appellant filed a pleading which was styled, ‘‘Re-
sponse to plaintiff’s motion to re-open,’’ in which it was
stated that Bates fully understood at the time-he signed
Form No. 18 that he was making a complete and full set-
tlement for the injury he had sustained, and further
stated that Bates had made no showing of change of con-
ditions, mistake or fraud. The Board treated dedecent’s
application as a motion to re-open the case, sustained
the motion, and referred the cause to a referee for the
reception of proof.

Henry Bates died on May 20, 1949, and his widow
‘filed an amended application. A hearing was held be-
fore the referee on the Ist day of July 1949, at which
time appellee introduced four witnesses, three of whom
-were workmen at or near the scene of the accident at
the time of decedent’s injury, and the fourth was Dr.
B. F. Wright, a physician who operated the Seco Hospi-
tal at Seco, Ky. Thereupon appellee closed her case in
chief and appellant was given forty-five days in which

— $39

to complete its case by depositions. During the forty-
five day period appellant took no depositions, nor did
it give any notice of its intention to take depositions,
and on August 18, 1949, appellant filed response to ap-
pellee’s motion to submit in which it was stated that it
had not been able to prepare its case within the time al-
‘lotted-by referee’s order and the board thereafter over-
ruled said motion and ordered the case. submitted for
final opinion and judgment on September 20, 1949.

We will quote from appellant’s brief a statement of
subsequent, procedural developments:

‘““The appellant then moved the Board to set aside
its order of submission of September 20th, due to the
fact that the decedent, Henry Bates, was examined by
one Dr. J. P. Hurd of Louisville General Hospital, and.
later died in the Louisville General Hospital. The ap-
pellant requested Dr. Hurd to furnish it with
a statement of the cause of death of the decedent, Henry
Bates, but the doctor refused to give such a report un-
less the written consent of the appellee, Ida Bates, was
furnished to the doctor. On August 22nd, 1949, at the
request of the attorneys for appellant, the attorney for
appellee wrote a letter in which he authorized Dr. Hurd
to give to the appellant the necessary reports. Upon
presenting this letter to Dr. Hurd, he again refused to
give the appellant a written report, or to testify.

“The appellee, Workmen’s Compensation Board,
again overruled defendant’s motion for an extension,
giving as their reason, that the aforesaid letter was not
filed or made a part of the record. Thereupon, the ap-
pellant again renewed its motion and filed and made a
part of the record the aforesaid letter, and also filed a
subpoena which was served upon Dr. J. P. Hurd and
Edith Fry, the Librarian for the Louisville General. Hos-
pital, together with an affidavit of the deputy sheriff
who served the subpoena, and further stated that neither
Dr. Hurd, nor Edith Fry appeared at the time called
for in the subpoena, and again refused to divulge the
records or testify.”

“The Board again overruled the appellant’s mo-
tion without: giving any reason for so doing. - This cause
was then submitted to a referee and an opinion was
handed down by the Hon. J. Keller Whitaker, in which

840 |

he held that Henry Bates’ death was the direct and
proximate result of the injury, and ‘that the plaintiffs
were totally dependent upon the deceased.

“<The appellant then moved the Board, within sev-
en days, for a Full Board review of the opinion, and
also filed a motion requesting that the Board require
Dr. J. P. Hurd of Louisville, Kentucky, to testify be-
fore it, A Full Board opinion was handed down by Al-
len P. Cubbage, the Chairman of the Board, in which
he overruled: the appellant’s ‘motion to have Dr. Hurd
appear and testify, and.in so holding, stated that steps
could have been taken within the period ‘allowed by the
Board to compel his attendance, and these steps were
not. taken. Within twenty days after the rendition of
the Full Board award, the appellant filed petition for
review in the Letcher Circuit Court. That Court sus-
tained the opinion of the Workmen’s Compensation
Board; exceptions were saved, and an appeal to this
Court was requested and granted.’?

Appellant contends, first, that the Board erred in
treating Form No. 11 as a motion to reopen the case
under ‘S 342.125, and insists that in the absence of
a motion supported by the affidavit of a physician. or
his own affidavit in which it is alleged that there had
been a change of condition brought about by the acci-
dent, that this cause should have: been dismissed by the
Board. KRS 342.125 reads: ‘‘Upon its own motion or
upon’ the application of any party interested and a show-
ing of change of conditions, mistake or fraud, the board
may at any time review any award or order, ending,
diminishing or increasing’ the compensation previously
awarded, within the maximum and minimum provided
in this chapter, or change or revoke its previous order,
sending immediately to the parties a copy of its sub-
sequent order or award. Review under this section
shall be had upon notice to the parties interested and
shall not affect the previous order or award as to any
sums already paid thereunder.’’

In support of its contention that the requirements
of this statute were not met, appellant relies upon the
ease of W. E: Caldwell Co. v. Borders, 301 Ky. 843, 193
S. W. 2d 453, 454, wherein it was held that where a claim-
ant filed a motion to reopen a case, accompanied with an
affidavit of a'physician (Dr. Johnson) who had never

ee 841

treated claimant, on the ground of a change in condi-
tion which was denied by defendant, burden was on
claimant to prove not only a change in condition but also
that such change was a direct and proximate result of
the injury theretofore received.

In the Caldwell case, the Board overruled claimant’s
motion to reopen the case, but we find nothing in the
opinion which indicates it is incumbent upon claimant to
prove his case by affidavits attached to his motion to
reopen, which seems to be the theory advanced by ap-
pellant. We said: ‘‘Looking at the Board record alone
it will be perceived that, notwithstanding defendant de-
nied the grounds for a review set out in plaintiff’s mo-
tion, no evidence whatever was introduced before the
Board save the affidavit of Doctor Johnson; the plain-
tiff’s affidavit being no more—even if it contained
matter authorizing a review—than a pleading by him
which defendant’s denial put in issue, thereby casting
the burden on plaintiff to prove, not only a change in
condition, but also that such change was a direct and
proximate result of the injury he received.’’

In the case at bar, claimant filed Form No. 11,
which was verified by him, and the Board treated it
as a motion to reopen the case. Form No. 11 is a print-
ed form, entitled ‘Application for Adjustment of
Claim,’’ and contains suitable blank spaces within which
limitations the applicant may supply information ger-
mane to his particular case. After furnishing formal
facts, Henry Bates made the following statements: Un-
der paragraphs,

TI—The employer has paid plaintiff compensa-
tion in the sum of $138.85. The employer (defendant) de-
nies all further liability whatever. Plaintiff claims he
is totally and permanently disabled and claims compen-
sation therefor.’’

TlI—‘‘Severely crushed chest; injured lower left
extremity and right hip; lower spine badly injured and
crushed; severe heart condition has resulted from acci-
dent. Plaintiff can perform no labor.”

— ‘Plaintiff is totally disabled from all labor
solely as a direct and proximate result of the injury
complained of herein. Said accident occurred during
regular course of plaintiff’s employment. ‘Plaintiff

842 ee

worked regularly and enjoyed excellent health prior to
said injury.’’

The Board believed this affidavit by Bates to be
sufficient to cause an inquiry to be made concerning
whether or not the award should be diminished or in-
creased under KRS 342.125, and entered the following
order:

“It is ordered and adjudged by the Board, that the
motion to reopen filed herein March 30, 1949 be, and
the same is hereby sustained.

“Tt is further ordered that the above styled action
be referred to a Referee for the reception of proof.’”’

It is plain this order did not increase or diminish
or end a previous award. It set into operation the ma-
chinery by which it might be determined whether or not
the award should be made. We reiterate, the statute
provides that the Board: ‘‘Upon its own motion or upon
the application of any party interested and a showing
of change of conditions * * *,’? may change the award
previously made.

After the inquiry began and at a hearing before
the referee, appellee by competent proof showed that
there had been a change of condition and that it resulted
directly from the accident.

We have heretofore pointed out that the initial
order under KRS 342.125 (4902) may be only an inter-
locutory order. In the case of Black Star Coal Co. v.
Powers, 252 Ky. 736, 68 S.W.2d 30, 32, motion was
made to set aside an award and for a full Board re-
view. On September 6, the Board sustained the motion
for a full Board review. Additional proof was taken,
and in its final order the Board set aside its order of
September 6, under all the proof before it, and sustained
the award by the referee. Of this method of proced-
ure, we said: ‘‘Section 4902 (now KRS 342.125) has no
application to the facts presented here. The order of
the Full Board on September 6 was simply an order
opening the case and permitting additional evidence to
be introduced. This was simply an interlocutory order,
and, when it was subsequently shown that this new evi-
dence would have no effect upon the case, it was within
the power of the Board to set it aside and enter judg-
ment upon the whole case.’’

ee 943

We are of the opinion that the Board was well with-
in the channel of its power when it treated Form No, 1t
as a motion to reconsider the award.

Appellant contends, second, that the Beard erred
in not allowing appellant additional time in which to
complete its case ‘by deposition.

In the case of Searcy v. Three Point Coal Co., 280
Ky. 683, 134 S.W.2d 228, 231, we defined the broad pow-
er of the Board to control the proceedings before it,
saying: ‘Necessarily the Workmen’s Compensation
Board, or any other tribunal, in which is vested by law
the power to hear evidence and make decisions thereon,
has the power to compel the taking of evidence before it
within reasonable limits of time and this power should
not be subject to the control of courts unless such tri-
bunal acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner such
as to indicate an abuse of discretion. One of the cardinal
purposes of the compensation act is to facilitate the
hearing of those claims speedily and in an informal
manner and in carrying out this purpose of the Act
the Board is necessarily vested with authority to re-
quire proof to be taken promptly. By section 4933, Ken-
tucky Statutes, the Board is authorized to hear the par-
ties and ‘determine the dispute in a summary manner.’ ’”

In the instant case, the appellant was allowed forty-
five days within which to prepare and preseni its case
to the referee. During that period appellant made no
attempt to take proof, produce witnesses, or to coerce
the attendance of any witnesses. There is nc showing
that casualty or misfortune prevented the preparation
of appellant’s case. We are of the opinion that the
Board did not act unreasonably in refusing ta grant ad-
ditional time or in its failure to. coerce the attendance
of Dr. Hurd, when no attempt to obtain his testimony
had been made during the forty-five day period allowe:
appellant for the purpose of presenting its case.

Judgment affirmed.

Wrenn v. Burch (two cases).
February 18, 1951.
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1951.
W. J. Baxter, Judge.

D. L. Pendleton for appellant.
Harvey T. Lisle and Shumate & Shumate for appellee.

Van Sanz, Commisstonuz—aAffirming.

Broadway Street, a boulevard in the city of Win-
chester runs east and west. Highland Avenue runs
; north and south and intersects Broadway. At about
6:30 p. m. on December 18, 1947, appellees, Henry Burch
and his wife, Mattie Burch, the former driving, were
proceeding west on Broadway. Appellant, J. T. Wrenn,
- was driving his automobile south on Highland. The
« ears collided at the intersection. . At the moment of col-
. lision the Burch car was being steered in a.south-west-
- erly course. It was struck on its right side between -the
door and bumper. It came to rest on Highland headed
east, The Wrenn car was struck on the left front light,
. fender, and wheel, and came to rest on Broadway headed
. in a westerly direction. The Burches filed separate ac-
tions against Wrenn for recovery of damages sustained
dn the accident. The jury found for them-and. pursuant
to the verdict, judgment was entered in favor of Mr.
. Burch in the sum of $18,832.60 and Mrs. Burch. in. the
. sum of $18,341.55. Wrenn has appealed from both judg-
ments and the appeals have been consolidated for re-
view in this court. - . : .

Appellant contends (1) he was entitled to a directed
verdict at the close of the evidence, because the physical
_ facts establish the negligence of Henry Burch as beihg
_ the sole cause of the accident; (2) the verdicts ‘are éx-
cessive ; and (3) the court erred in his instructions. to the
jury. . : '
*-On Highland, 54’ north of the intersection, a stop
‘sign had been erected as a warning to persons driving
‘thereon to bring their cars to a stop beforé entering the
intersection. Wrenn admits he did not stop before: enter-
ing the intersection, but attempts to excuse himself by.

846 ee

claiming that he was unfamiliar with the city, having
resided there but a short time before the accident, and
that he did not see the sign. He testified, however, that
as he approached the intersection he slowed the speed
of his car to 12 or 15 miles per hour, looked both ways
but did not see the Burch ear except as a blur at the
moment of the collision, although admitting there was
no obstruction to his view. Mr. Burch was knocked un-
conscious as a result of which his memory of events at
the time of the accident and for several minutes before
was entirely obliterated. He had been blind in his right
eye from infancy and the Wrenn car was approaching
him from his right side. Mrs. Burch testified that when
she saw the Wrenn car enter the intersection she warned
her husband of its approach but he had already swerved
to his left in an apparent effort to avoid the accident.
The Burch car proceeded in its changed course, striking
a telephone pole and coming to rest approximately 75’
from the point of impact. Mr. and Mrs. Burch were
thrown from the car when it struck the pole and both
were knocked unconscious. The Wrenn car came to rest
about 30’ from the point of impact and facing at right
angle to its original course. Sidney Epperson, a Deputy
Sheriff of Clark County, testified that he was a City
Policeman on the day of the accident. He was driving a
pickup truck and traveling on Highland in the same
direction as Wrenn at a speed of 15 or 20 miles per hour.
About 200’ before he arrived at the intersection Wrenn
overtook and passed him, traveling at a speed of 35 to
40 miles per hour. He stated that Wrenn entered the
intersection without slowing, and at which time the
Burch car was in the intersection in full view. Jesse
Gravitt operated a filing station at the corner of Broad-
way and Highland and saw the cars as they struck. He
testified that Burch was traveling at a speed of 15 or 20
miles per hour and Wrenn at 45 to 50. Edward A. Baber,
who worked at the filling station, stated the Burch car
was traveling from 15 to 20 miles per hour and estimated
the Wrenn car at a speed of approximately 40 miles per
hour. James Scott was standing at the corner of High-
jand and Broadway and saw the accident. He stated the
Bureh car was traveling 15 or 20 miles per hour and
estimated the Wrenn car was traveling at approximately
80 miles per hour at the time of the accident. He stated
that the Wrenn car did not slow up from the time he first

Pe 847

saw it until it entered the intersection and struck the
Burch car.

The physical facts merely. show that the Burch car,
having swerved to its left, continued its course for a dis-
tance of approximately 75’, during which time it struck,
and was deflected to the east by a telephone pole. The
top of the car is the only portion thereof which came in
contact with thé pole. We think the physical facts not
only fail to contradict, they actually support, the wit-
nesses whose testimony we have related. The force of
the impact could have been sufficient to have driven the
Burch car the distance it traveled after the accident.
It was struck in such a manner as to increase its speed
in the direction it was turned. The impact caused the
Wrenn car to travel a course at right angle to its orig-
inal course. Whereas the impact knocked the Burch car
forward, it necessarily slowed the speed of the Wrenn
car and would have halted its progress altogether had it
not been traveling at an excessive speed.

The jury separated its findings for Mr. Burch as
follows:

For loss of time, $ 2,970.00
For physical pain and mental suffering, 5,

For permanent reduction of earning capacity, 6,175.00
Damages to automobile, 400.00
For loss of services and society of wife, 3,500.00

For doctor, hospital, nursing and medical bills 787.60

Total $18,832.60

The verdict in favor of Mrs. Burch was not item-
ized. Her prayer for damages was for $5,000.00 for loss
of time and $30,000.00 for permanent injuries.

Mr. Burch was earning approximately $50 per week
at the time he was injured. He had been unable to work
for sixteen months previous to the trial. It is obvious
that $2,940.00 is not excessive for loss of time. He was
unconscious for a period of three weeks after the acci-
dent. He remained a month in the hospital and didn’t
remember just how long he was confined to his bed at
home but ‘‘he was up and down for quite a while.’? He
testified that he has lost his energy and strength, his back
constantly aches, and he is not getting better. His arm
gave him considerable trouble but was better at the time

848 |

of the trial. His memory has been impaired. He fails to
remember meeting people and cannot calculate or figure
accurately nor as fast as he could before the’ accident.
His head feels like it ‘‘wants to expand and swell.’”? His
attending physician testified that he sustained a frac-
tured shoulder, lacerations on his scalp and ankle, con-
tusions on his shoulder and arm, multiple bruises and
abrasions on his body, and that he is permanently in-
jured. Under this evidence it is obvious that $5,000.00
is not excessive for physical pain and mental suffering.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Burch was 46 years.of
age. His life expectancy was 23.62 years. $6,175.00 for °
the permanent reduction of his earning power, in our
opinion, is conservative. The $400.00 allowed for dam-
ages to his automobile is within the limits of the evidence,
and no question is or can be made concerning the doc-
tor, hospital, nursing, and medical bills. Nor do we think
that $3,500.00 was excessive for the loss of services and
society of his wife, as will be seen when we detail her
injuries.

‘Mrs. Burch testified that she received a deep cut
on the side of her head from halfway above her ear to
the top of her head. There was a large skinned place
over her left eye. The right eye was tender and blue,
and dirt was buried in the right cheek, which was skin-
ned. She received severe injuries to the flesh and bones
at her elbows. Her right hand was damaged badly at
every knuckle. Her right eye gave her considerable pain
for quite a while but has about healed. Her vision was
affected for a good while and she has had constant head-
aches. Her right hand is very sore and she is unable to
use it efficiently. She cannot type as fast as she previous-
ly could. Her pelvis was broken in three places and has
constantly-hurt her, especially in cold weather and when
she is walking. The end of her spine gives her pain
when she sits on anything hard. Her hip was thrown out
of alignment and has remained so with no curvature in
it, Both of her knees were injured and one has a long
pone on it; they pain her constantly. Flesh was gouged
out of her left foot and it now pains her as if the arch
had been broken. Both of her ankles pain her but her
right one is the worse: it received a deep ragged cut
and was crushed at a place she displayed to the jury.
For many months she could not hold her toes up but
they are better now. She previously walked like a nor-

Le 849

mal person but now is unable to do so: her leg seems
to drag, and she loses her balance, as a result of which
she has been caused to fall. Her nervous system has
been shocked and she is unable to do her usual house-
hold chores or even to dress without assistance. After
she left the hospital she was sick at her stormach and
could not retain water for several days; a long time
expired before she had any appetite. She was not ,work-
ing at the time of the accident but previously had work-
ed, at which time she earned approximately $2,000.00
per year. Her life expectancy was 22.51 years. Her doc-
tor related that the injuries she sustained and related
were caused by the accident and he was of the opinion
that she would not improve ‘‘in any appreciate amount
after this length of time.’’ He stated that her power to
earn money has been permanently impaired. We are of
the opinion that the evidence supports the jury’s award.
to Mrs. Burch and that the extent of her injuries sus-
tain the award to Mr. Burch for the loss of her services
and society to the amount assessed.

But it is insisted by counsel for appellant that the
husband should not be allowed to recover for the loss
of services of his wife ‘‘if the wife is allowed damages
for the impairment of her services to earn money.’’
This argument is ingenious but, we believe, unsound.
A wife, earning relatively large sums of money in the
business world, may, and usually does, render to her
husband services and social comfort totally unrelated
to her outside activities. The loss or curtailment of her
power to earn money in the business world operates to
her damage, whilst the loss to her husband of her serv-
ices and society operates to the damage of the husband.
Thus it will be seen that an award to her for permanent
injuries does not ‘‘overlap’’ the award to her husband
for the loss of her services and society; consequently,
the two recoveries do not constitute a double allowance
for the same loss.

Finally, complaint is made that the court erred in
drafting and presenting to the jury with the instruc-
tions a form for returning a verdict, in the event the
jury should find for the plaintiff. The form merely set
out the items of damage allowable with blank spaces op-
posite each item to be filled in by the jury, in the event
the jury found for the plaintiff. It is argued that the

850

schedule so prepared by the court and placed in the
middle of the instructions was a suggestion to the jury
that the court was of the opinion the verdict should be
for the plaintiff. We do not agree with this contention.
The instructions plainly stated that the schedule was to
be used only if the jury, from the evidence, found for the
plaintiff. It was a mere suggestion of the court as to
how the jury should make separate findings for the vari-
ous items of damage, in the event, but only in the event,
the jury should find for the plaintiff. We find no error
in the record.

The judgment is affirmed.

Smith v. Shamburger, Judge.
January 26, 1951.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1951.
. Boman L. Shamburger, Judge.

Walter B. Smith for petitioner.
Lawrence G. Duncan for respondent.

Joven Srewarr—Denying writ and dismissing pe-
tition.

Petitioner, Mrs. Patricia R. Smith, seeks a writ of
mandamus in this Court against Hon. Boman L. Sham-
burger, Judge of the Jefferson County Court, to compel
him to require the Louisville Trust Company and the
Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Co-admin-
istrators with the will annexed of the estate of John
A. O’Brien, deceased, to file a final settlement of said
estate and to cause certain acts mentioned hereafter
to be performed.

On June 21, 1950, the Co-administrators filed in
the County Court what they style as ‘‘An Account and
Final Settlement of the Execution of Their Trust’? ‘of
the O’Brien estate, in which they state that they have
paid all debts, taxes, legacies and other claims against
this estate, except the following items: (1) Compensa-
tion to and expenses of the Co-administrators for their
services; (2) fees to various lawyers for representing
the Co-administrators in several litigations affecting
the O’Brien estate; and (3) legacies of $1,000 to the
College of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University
of Washington, D. C., and of $5,000 to the Catholic
Bishop of the Diocese of Kentucky. The accounting,
we shall call it, further shows that all of the assets of
the estate, which consisted entirely of personal prop-
erty, have been disbursed, except the sum of $36,455.14,

852 ee

now invested by the Co-administrators in United States
bonds and retained by them to pay the unliquidated
claims above described; and the Co-administrators ask
that they recover from petitioner any sum in excess of
$36,455.14 if this amount should be insufficient to satisfy
the unliquidated claims set forth in the accounting.

We do not have before us the record showing the
proceedings of the County Court in the interim between
the filing of the settlement and the application of peti-
tioner for this writ. The briefs of petitioner and respon-
dent, however, do recite certain significant details as
to what occurred during this period of time, and we here
mention those facts that we deem important to furnish
a background for this case.

On August 7, 1950, at a hearing regularly set, pe-

titioner objected to the confirming, or approving, or
hearing by the County Court, or any commissioner ap-
pointed by it, of any proof on any item contained in
. the accounting; and, on the same date, she moved the
County Court to require the Co-administrators, and
we employ her words, ‘‘to file a final settlement of the
estate of John A. O’Brien, deceased, in compliance with
the Kentucky Revised Statutes and the rulings of the
Court of Appeals on the settlement of this estate, and
that both of the Co-administrators be required to sign
a sworn affidavit thereto.’? On August 22, 1950, petition-
er filed a motion to strike from the record of this estate
in County Court, and we quote her, ‘‘a 37 page historical
brief or petition, containing many unfounded and un-
warranted statements. It does not comply with the Ken:
tucky Revised Statutes for the final settlement of an
estate in County Court, and it is prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the sole beneficiary, Patricia R. Smith,
and was not verified by .one of the Co-administrators,
the Louisville Trust Company.’’

On this last date, the County Court overruled all
of petitioner’s objections to and motions concerning the
filing of the accounting, and then, acting under the au-
thority of KRS 25.180 and KRS 25.190, ordered the
accounting referred to A. Scott Hamilton, Special Com-
missioner, to hear proof on any pleas, objections and
exceptions filed thereto and to make such recommenda-
tions back to the County Court that the Commissioner
might deem advisable relative to it. On September 8,

es

1950, the Commissioner set October 4, 1950, as a héaring
date upon the accounting, at which time exceptions to
it must be filed and all preliminary questions presented
with reference to it.

On October 3, 1950, petitioner filed her petition here-
in against Hon. Boman L. Shamburger, Judge of the
Jefferson County Court, to compel him officially to re-
quire the Co-administrators to file, as she contends, ‘‘a
final settlement’’ of the O’Brien estate that should in-
elude: All costs of administration of the O’Brien estate,
and specifically set forth all compensation claimed by
the Co-administrators and all fees claimed by the law-
yers for representing the Co-administrators, for services
rendered by them to the estate from March 1, 1934, to
the date of a final settlement thereof, all claims to be
proven as debts against a decedent’s estate are required
by law:to be proven. Petitioner further asks that the
County Court be required to issue an order to A. Scott
Hamilton, Special Commissioner, to prevent him from
approving or hearing or confirming any proof for or
against any item contained in the accounting of the
Co-administrators until, as she insists, ‘‘a final settle-
ment of the above estate, as above requested, is filed in
the Jefferson County Court and this petitioner, the sole
beneficiary, be given ample time in which to file excep-
tions thereto.’’ At the time the petition was filed herein,
petitioner moved for, and was granted, a stay of all pro-
ceedings in the County Court until this Court should
pass upon this proceeding on its merits, pursuant to Sec.
476 of the Civil Code of Practice.

Under Section 110 of the Kentucky Constitution
this Court has absolute power to issue writs against any
other Kentucky Court in such instances ‘‘as may be
necessary to give it a general control of inferior juris-
dictions.’? However, it has consistently adhered to the
principle of law that it will issue a writ (a) only when
the inferior court is acting without jurisdiction, or (b)
it is acting within its jurisdiction, but erroneously, and
great and irreparable injury will result therefrom and
the petitioner is without adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise. Smith v. Burnett, Judge, 300 Ky. 249, 188
8. W. 2d 480; Henneberger Co.’s Assignee v. Price,
Judge, 252 Ky. 402, 67 S. W. 2d 471; Frain v. Applegate,
Judge, 239 Ky. 605, 40 8. W. 2d 274.

854 ee

We must, therefore, decide whether the County Court
is exceeding its jurisdiction, or, if not, whether it is
proceeding erroneously on the issues involved in this
petition in such a manner that petitioner may suffer
great and irreparable injury without any adequate rem-
edy as a result thereof.

In Com. v. Peter, Judge, 186 Ky. 689, 124 S. W.
896, 898, the Commonwealth sought a mandamus against
the respondent, a judge of the Jefferson County Court,
to compel him to require the Fidelity Trust Company,
as executor, to file inventories of certain decedents’
estates, and to make settlements of its accounts of those
estates where the executor had failed to make such set-
tlements for more than two years. This Court, although
stating in its opinion the view that the county judge
should have required the Trust Company to file the in-
ventories and to make the settlements demanded, refused
to compel the county judge to perform these acts, stating
its reason as follows: ‘‘The only question left for de-
termination is: Should this court, if it has the authority,
issue the writ? This question was before this court in
the case of Montgomery v. Viers, 130 Ky. 694, 114 8S. W.
251, and the court said: ‘Although section 110 of the
Constitution may confer ample authority upon this court
to issue the writ in such a case, the rule here is that, if
the applicant has an adequate remedy elsewhere, we
refrain from acting under our original jurisdiction.’
The effect of this is that the circuit court, a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction, should have been applied to for the
writ; that this court would not act in the matter, even
if it had the power, when the applicant had other ade-
quate means for relief.’’

‘  Petitioner’s main contention herein is that the Co-
administrators have not filed, according to her interpre-
tation, ‘‘a final settlement.’? She is in the anomalous
position of asking this Court to require the County
Court to file ‘‘a final settlement’? when, in fact, the
County Court has judicially determined the accounting
filed by the Co-administrators on June 21, 1950, to be
‘a final settlement.’’ When a court, exercising the juris-
diction and discretion granted to it by law, enters a
judgment of record, we cannot place our own construc-
tion on that judgment, unless it is properly before us
on an appeal. It is a familiar concept of law that a

ee 655

mandamus will lie to compel the trial of an issue, or the
hearing of a motion, but it cannot be used to control
how such shall be tried, or what order shall be entered
in any case in which discretion may be exercised by a
court or a judge. Union Trust Co. v. Garnett, Judge, 254
Ky. 578, 72 8. W. 2d 27.

Petitioner complains that the County Court, unless
compelled to do so, will not require the Co-administra-
tors to discharge the statutory duties imposed upon
them by Sections 25.175, 25.180, 396.010 and 396.020 of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Generally, the provi-
sions of law just mentioned specify the requirements
for making and filing fiduciary settlements in county
courts and describe how claims against decedents’ estates
are to be proven before presentation to a personal rep-
resentative for payment. We cannot assume and ex-
ercise supervisory powers over proceedings in an in-
ferior court. In the very nature of things, the County
Court has jurisdiction to pass on these issues. It is
counter to all law on the subject that this Court will
compel a court or judge to decide pending questions in
a particular way. Hargis v. Swope, Judge, 272 Ky. 257,
114 S. W. 2d 75. We are also of the opinion that the
County Court had ample authority, under Sections
25.170, 25.180 and 25.190 of the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes, to refer the accounting of the Co-administrators to
a Special Commissioner who should hear proof on any
pleas, objections and exceptions made to it and report
back his recommendations thereon to the County Court.
Any rulings of the Commissioner will be of an inter-
loeutory nature and are not subject to interference by
mandamus, Shipp v. Stoll, Judge, 200 Ky. 646, 255

In The Louisville Trust Company v. Smith, 313 Ky.
15, 230 8. W. 2d 64, a recent decision of this Court affect-
ing this estate, we ruled as follows as regards this
estate: ‘It is the duty of the administrator to settle.
One of the purposes of settlement in the county court
is to give the parties interested an opportunity to file
objections seasonably and properly. There is no reason
why an exception should prevail in Jefferson County
(for these co-administrators). This matter has been
unreasonably prolonged.’’

In petitioner’s argument in her briefs, the fact is

856 ee

disclosed that there are two litigations relative to the
O’Brien estate pending in the Jefferson Circuit Court:
(1) A'settlement suit, filed April 21, 1949, and (2) an
appeal.from the County Court; filed May 26, 1946. The
appeal is from an order of Hon. Horace M. Barker, for-
mer judge of Jefferson County Court, directing the Co-
administrators to settle the estate. There has been no
financial disposition of cither of these cases. It would
seem, however, that the filing of the accounting of the
Co-administrators in the County Court bestows upon
the latter complete jurisdiction to finally ‘determine
all issues now in dispute. If those items now the subject
of this controversy had been liquidated in advance of
the filing of the accounting, and we believe this should
have been done, then in truth and in fact the accountin;

would have been a final settlement. .

Admitting, for the sake of argument, but by no
means concluding that the County Court is acting er-
roneously in this case, it cannot be said that petitioner
will suffer irreparable damage, or any damage, as a
result of any order entered by or about to be made
by the County Court. However, assuming that certain
errors have been or will be committed by the County
Court in winding up this estate, petitioner can obtain
adequate relief therefrom by an appeal to the Cireuit

ourt.

Wherefore, the motion is denied and the petition
is dismissed.

,
Farmers State Bank et al. v. Owsley County et al.
January 26, 1951,
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1951.
H. B, Beatty, Judge.

Funk, Chancellor & Darnell for appellants.
‘W. Clay Robinson, John W. Walker and S. H. Rice for appellees.

Juven Larrimer—Reversing.

Appellant, Charles A. Hinsch & Company, had pro-
cured, by assignment from the original holders, certain
warrants issued by the Owsley County Fiscal Court, and
certain judgments against Owsley County, all of which,
at the time of the procurement, were outstanding and
past due.

Action was filed by the assignee in the Owsley Cir-
euit Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Code
of Civil Practice, sec. 639a-1 et seq., seeking an order
adjudging the warrants to be valid outstanding claims
against the County, and further seeking a mandatory
order directing the Fiscal Court to levy and collect a
sufficient tax to pay the interest upon the indebtedness
as it becomes due and to pay the principal thereof with-
in not more than 40 years. In addition to Owsley County,
J. M. King, the Judge thereof, the magistrates, and
the Budget Commission, the State Local Finance Officer
in and for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the
Attorney General were named as parties defendant. The
Attorney General and the State Local Finance Officer
filed special demurrers to the petition on the ground
that they were not proper parties to the action. The de-
fendant, Owsley County, filed special demurrer on the
grounds that plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue and
that the assignors of the judgments and warrants were
necessary parties. The assignors, by intervening peti-
tion, became parties to the action.

Apparently, the case remained on the docket with-
out any further action until in November ‘1947, when
plaintiffs filed an amended and substituted petition,
wherein so much of the action as involved the validity
of the County warrants was dismissed without preju-
dice. The action as against the defendants, Attorney

ee

General and State Local Finance Officer, was also dis-
missed.

Consequently, the amended and substituted peti-
tion left for consideration only those judgments origin-
ally obtained by Charles A. Hinsch & Company, assignee,
through Farmers State Bank of Booneville, escrow
agent for Hinsch & Company.

It was pleaded in the amended and substituted pe-
tition, as the actual controversy, that it was the duty
of the Owsley Fiscal Court to levy a sufficient tax to
establish the sinking fund required by Section 159 of
the Constitution of Kentucky, even though the rate
should be in excess of 50¢ on each $100 of the assessed
valuation of the taxable property, while the defendants
contend that under Section 157 of the Constitution, the
Fiscal Court cannot levy more than 50¢ on each $100
of the assessed valuation.

The court refused to direct the levy of any tax
greater than an amount of 50c on each $100 of the assess-
ed valuation and dismissed plaintiffs’ petition. From
that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellees insist that the court properly dismissed
the action, and, no doubt, are here reiterating the
grounds and propositions urged below. We shall first
discuss those propositions. The position is taken that the
assignments to Charles A. Hinsch & Company are not
legal assignments. The pertinent part of the assign-
ments, all substantially in the same form, reads: ‘‘In
eonsideration of the services to be rendered by the
Charles A. Hinsch & Company * * * through necessary
eourt action * * *. The condition of the foregoing
assignment is this, to-wit: Within sixty (60) days after
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky renders an opinion
favorable to the validity of the indebtedness so above
evidenced * * *, then in that event the said Charles A.
Hinsch & Company obligates itself to pay to said Bank,
for my (our) account, the sum of $1,394.87, which being
done, the Bank is hereby authorized to transfer the said
evidence of debt to the Charles A. Hinsch & Company
above named. This assignment is made on the further
condition that all eapenses connected with the court
procedure necessary to establish the validity of the in-
debtedness against Owsley County, and the tax to pay
same, is borne by the Charles A. Hinsch & Company,

860. |

without recourse on the undersigned assignor; and to
pay the above named amount as agreed net without de-
duction to the Escrow Agent, Farmers State Bank * * *
for my (our) account.’

It is insisted that the purported assignments show
on the face that there is no complete assignment; that
the transfer is not a present one and is nothing more
than a mere agreement to assign; and that actually the
holder of the fund retains control of it. It is argued
that, where those elements are present, there is no
assignment and such a situation is fatal to the claim
of the assignee. In support of that position the gen-
eral law is cited. 4 Am. Jur., Assignments, Section 80.

The record discloses that, in addition to what
might be termed the ‘‘long’’ assignment above, there
is also a ‘‘short’’ assignment. The pertinent part of
the ‘‘short’’ assignment, after a recitation of the con-
sideration, which was the amount of the judgment to
be paid by the Charles A. Hinsch & Company in ac-
cordance with an agreement entered into theretofore,
reads: ‘‘* * * I (we) do hereby sell, assign, transfer
and set over the above stated judgment, interest and
costs, to the said Charles A. Hinsch & Company of
Cincinnati, Ohio, heirs and assigns, without recourse,
and direct the Clerk of the Cireuit Court to enter this
assignment of record.’’

It will be noted that in the long assignment of the
judgments is to be found the time, place, and manner
of payment of a sum certain which constitutes the con-
sideration flowing to the assignor. In the short one
the assignment and transfer are absolute and without
recourse, and direction is made to the Clerk of the Cir-
cuit Court to enter same of record. Thus, it will be
seen that the fatal elements mentioned by appellees
above are not present.

It is insisted that since all expenses connected with
the court procedure necessary to establish the validity
of the indebtedness are to be borne by Hinsch & Com-
pany, the attempted assignments are champertous and
maintenous and, therefore, void. Both appellants and
appellees cite 10 Am. Jur. on the subject of champerty
and maintenance. We deem it unnecessary to go into
an elaborate discussion of the subject since much has

a

been written thereon in available texts and in court de-
cisions. In order that we might: see the moving and
prime consideration in the more modern approach to
the law of champerty and maintenance, we quote from
10 Am. Jur., Champerty and Maintenance, Section 1:
“The early law rigorously guarded the conduct of liti-
gation, and there is authority for the proposition that
maintenance was an unlawful upholding of the plaintiff
or defendant in a cause pending in suit by word, writing,
countenance, or deed. Modern authority, however, has
introduced the idea that maintenance is not committed
unless something is done which tends to obstruct the
course of justice, or is against good policy in tending
to promote unnecessary litigation, and is performed
under a bad motive. * * * A definition in consonance
with the modern view, and often judicially stated, is
that maintenance means the act of one improperly, and
for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, en-
couraging others either to bring actions or to make
defenses which they have no right to make, * * *.’?

KRS 372.060, dealing with this question, reads:
“tAny contract, agreement or conveyance made in con-
sideration of services to be rendered in the prosecution
or defense, or aiding in the prosecution or defense, in
or out of court, of any suit, by any person not a party
on record in the suit, whereby the thing sued for or in
controversy or any part thereof, is to be taken, paid or
received for such services or assistance, is void.’’

Thus, we have a codification of the common law
upon the subject of champerty and maintenance. In the
light of the above, let us look at the facts in this litiga-
tion. It cannot be consistently maintained that the per-
sons who obtained judgments in the Owsley Cireuit
Court could not assign them. It follows, if they had a
right to be assignors, someone, as a correlative right,

‘could be assignee. This assignment was made before
this action was brought. It is further to be noted that
the proceeds of the assignments are not to be divided
between assignors and assignees; that before the com-
mencement of the action, assignors’ entire rights in the
judgments sought to be enforced in this action, had been
assigned; and that the amount to be paid therefor was
fixed. It will thus be seen that the elements entering
into and calling for the early law, which so rigorously

862 ee

guarded the conduct of litigation, are not present here.
‘We think the assignments are valid and binding in every
respect.

It is further insisted that Charles A. Hinsch &
Company is not the present owner of the right to be
enforced, and, therefore, not the real party in interest.

It is insisted that, since the assignments as exhibits,
are at. variance with the allegations of ownership as
found in the petition, the exhibits must prevail. Kessler
v. Grasser, 300 Ky. 89, 187 S. W. 2d 1012;-Woolery v.
Smith, 302 Ky. 725, 196 S. W. 2d 115. The answer to
that is that all these assignors entered appearance,
either as plaintiffs or as intervening petitioners, where-
in they disclaimed any right of control in or over the
assignments and stated that they had assigned all right,
title, and interest that they had in and to the judgments.

It is next contended that there were other holders
of judgments or warrants, which were of the same ap-
proximate date and of equal dignity with the judgments
sued on, who should have been made parties to the ac-
tion, and failure so to do was proper ground for sus-
taining special demurrer to the petition. In support of
this position, Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky,
et al., 288 Ky. 532, 156 S. W. 2d 498, is cited. The Morgan
ease is not controlling in this situation since it has to
do with bonding and bonded: indebtedness under the
County Debt Act, KRS 66.280 et seq., wherein there was
a possibility as a practical matter of prejudicing the
rights of prior bondholders. Here there can be no pre-
judice to the rights of those who have valid debts against
the County. In no way would they be foreclosed, nor
would the decision here be res adjudicata as to them.

There remain two questions to be disposed of: (1)
Can appellees now go behind a valid judgment and at-
tack its validity? (2) Can the Fiscal Court. of Owsley
County be required to levy a tax in excess of 50c on each
$100 of the assessed valuation, where it is shown that
a 50¢ levy will not produce sufficient monies to pay the
necessary governmental expenses of the county and to
create a sinking fund for the retirement of its debt
within 40 years? ‘

‘We are not content to state as a mere abstract tru-
ism that appellees cannot at this late date: attack these

a «:

judgments as being void at their inception because vio-
lative of Sections 157 and 158 of our Constitution. True,
we held in City of Catlettsburg et al. v. Fabric Fire
Hose Co., 264 Ky. 594, 95 S. W. 2d 285, and in Perry
County et al. v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 268
Ky. 78, 103 S. W. 2d 689, that the limitation on the rate
of taxation fixed by Section 157 of the Constitution can-
not be avoided by permitting obligations to take the
form of judgments. However, the answer is the decision
in Griffin et al. v. Clay County, et al., 304 Ky. 592, 201
8. W. 2d 733, 737. Appellees undertake to distinguish
the Clay County case from this one and set it up not so
much in contrast to but in distinction from. It will be
noted that the action in the Clay County case involved
two classes of indebtedness and that one form of the
indebtedness was a floating debt made up of claims which
had been adjudged to be valid and binding obligations of
Clay County by a judgment of the Clay Circuit Court.
The latter class of indebtedness is such as we have here.
Consequently, the Catlettsburg and Perry County cases
must yield to the later Clay County case. ~

We now approach the question as to whether or
not Owsley County can be required by Section 159 of
the Constitution to levy a sufficient tax to service the
debt, even though the rate exceeds the 50c on each $100
of the assessed valuation as mentioned in Section 157.
This would lead us directly to a consideration of those
two sections of the Constitution. We think it unneces-
sary to burden this opinion with further discussions of
those sections since we-have an elaborate and exhaus-
tive treatment of them in the Clay County case. We yet
think that the construction therein is neither strained
nor artificial. The two sections should not be considered
as irreconcilably pitted against each other. A meaning
should be given to each in its relation to the other. We
think the facts and the pleadings in the instant case
are so nearly identical to those in the Clay County case
as to require an application of the same rule. The court
below, under ‘the authority of the Clay County case,
should have required the Owsley County Fiscal Court
to levy the tax, even though in excess of 50¢ on each
$100 of the assessed valuation, and create a sinking fund
for the retirement of its debt within forty years. How-
ever, we desire again to reiterate our position as taken
in the Clay County case, and call attention to. the fact

864 ee

that ‘‘The public generally is now on notice that this
court will henceforth adopt a sound and healthy construc-
tion of our Constitution, and credit extended to taxing
districts in disregard of our Constitution and the com-
ments herein, and in Payne v. City of Covington [276
Ky. 380, 123 8. W. 2d 1045, 122 A. L. R. 321], will be
at the creditor’s risk.’ In order to avoid further en-
tanglement in apparent contradictions and to be cer-
tain that our position, as to the questions involved here-
in, will not be left in such a nebulous state as to create
immeasureable confusion and uncertainty, we insist
there will be no judicial relaxation. This opinion, to-
gether with the Clay County case, must not in any way
serve as a soporific to encourage lethargy and indiffer-
ence or lead to a conclusion that some chimerical plan
to side-step the specific constitutional provisions will
be countenanced.

_ This conclusion obviates a discussion of the ques-
tion of champerty and maintenance raised by the inter-
vening petitioners on their cross-appeal.

_ , The judgment is reversed with directions to enter
judgment consistent herewith.

_ For the reasons stated_in the dissenting opinion
in the Clay County case, Judges Helm and Stewart
dissent herein.

Watts v. Yeary et al.
January 30, 1951.
Rehearing Denied May 8, 1951.
Wm. J. Baxter, Judge.

a 865

Redwine & Redwine and M. C. Redwine, Jr., for appellant.
William O. Hays for appellees.

Van Sanz, Commissioner—Reversing.

The appeal is from a judgment dismissing ‘‘the
plaintiff’s petition and the petition as amended and
reply’? and cancelling, setting aside and holding for
naught ‘‘all orders heretofore entered overruling the
demurrer of defendant to the petition, petition as amend-
ed and to the reply.’’

In the petition originally filed, appellant based his
cause of action upon the breach of a written contract
which he filed with the petition. A demurrer was sus-
tained to this pleading. Appellant amended his petition
in which he sought to reform the written contract, alleg-
ing that by mutual mistake certain material provisions
were omitted from the writing. He then prayed judg-
ment on the contract as he alleged it should be reformed.
He then filed a second amended petition in which he
alleged that the agreement as set out in the petition
and amended petition if reduced to writing ‘‘should be
as follows.’? He then composed a draft of the contract
in the words and figures he alleged should have been
used in the drafting of the writing executed by the par-
ties. The demurrer to this pleading was overruled. At
the next term of court the defendants filed motion to
strike from the petition as amended all allegations and
claims in respect to an alleged breach of contract of a
transaction which occurred September 21, 1947, because
the contract sought to be reformed related to the breach
of a contract dated August 8, 1947. Defendants filed a
second motion to strike, which was directed at numerous
allegations contained in the petition as amended. They
gave no reason for striking any of the allegations
quoted in the motion. They then filed a motion to strike

866 ee

from the petition as amended ‘‘all the inconsistent alle-
gations contained therein.’? Defendants then filed a mo-
tion to paragraph the petition as amended. All motions
to strike were overruled by the court, whereupon de-
fendants filed a motion to require the plaintiff to elect
whether for his cause of action he would rely on a breach
of the alleged written contract or on a breach of the
alleged oral contract. This motion was sustained and
plaintiff elected ‘‘to stand on the oral contract alleged
in the petition as amended.’? Defendants then moved
the court to strike all allegations seeking reformation
of the alleged written contract. The court sustained de-
fendants’ motion to require the plaintiff to paragraph
the petition as amended, whereupon plaintiff numbered
the paragraphs, to which defendants objected on the
ground that the ‘‘alleged causes of action are not dis-
finetly stated in separate paragraphs.’’ This objection
was overruled. Plaintiff then filed a third amended pe-
tition whereby he appears to have reasserted his cause
of action for breach of the written contract as it should
be reformed. A motion to strike the last amended pe-
tition because it was inconsistent with plaintiff’s election
to rely upon an oral contract was overruled.

Defendants then answered setting forth their ver-
sion of the transactions between the parties. Plaintiff
moved to strike certain allegations from the answer
without assigning any reason therefor; and, without
waiving the motion, filed a general demurrer to the
answer as a whole and to each paragraph thereof and
‘*to each line and sentence of each paragraph thereof.’’
On the same day, without waiving the motion to strike
and without waiving the demurrer, plaintiff filed a reply
wherein he denied the alleged effect of certain written
‘“trip lease contracts’? upon the contract sued on. A
demurrer was filed to the reply. The judgment appealed
from was then entered.

The pleadings in this case are so confused and con-
fusing that it is impossible for us to arrive at a decision
in respect to the correctness of the Chancellor’s judg-
ment in sustaining a demurrer to the petition as amend-
ed. At the time judgment was entered the Chancellor
should have required the parties to reform the pleadings
so that the cause of action would be set out in a peti-
tion, the defense in an answer, and denial of the affirm-

Le 867

ative allegations of the answer, or avoidance thereof, in
a reply. Two years transpired between the filing of
the petition and the entry of the judgment. In that period
of time the parties should have been able to come to
some conclusion in respect to the controversy; and, hav-
ing come to their individual conclusions, they should
have been able to have asserted them in the pleadings
we have suggested. We are of the opinion that out of
this mass enough facts can be selected to state a cause
of action which will stand the test of a demurrer. For
this reason, we are inclined to give the plaintiff an op-
portunity to do so. On return of the case, the judgment
dismissing the petition will be set aside and an order
will be entered striking all pleadings from the record
but allowing plaintiff to assert his cause of action, if
any he has, in one petition. The case will then proceed
to a final determination.

The judgment is reversed and remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

a
Yates et al. v. Kurtz.
February 9, 1951.
Rehearing Denied May 8, 1951.
K. 8. Alcorn, Judge.

James G. Begley and Henry Jackson for appellants.
James F. Clay for appellee.

868 ee
Juve Larmer—Reversing.

Suit was instituted by Robert C. Kurtz against Mar-
shall Yates and Thomas Curtsinger seeking damages
in the sum of $950 to his truck. The action arose out of
an accident involving an automobile belonging to Mar-
shall Yates and_ being driven by Thomas Curtsinger.

. The defendant Marshall Yates, after joining his co-
defendant in denial, counterclaimed against Robert C.
Kurtz and Lillian Kurtz, his wife, for damages to his
automobile in the sum of $1100. In the absence of Judge
Alcorn, ‘by agreement Honorable Chenault .Huguley
presided as special judge. Upon trial the jury. returned
a verdict in favor of plaintiff, R. C. Kurtz,.in the sum

- of $5600. Defendant, Marshall Yates, prosecutes this
appeal.

The accident happened on State Highway 35 ‘be-
tween Danville and Hustonville at or near the: point
where the Grubbs Lane Road, a road inferior in. class,
intersects Highway 35. There was a stop sign on the
Grubbs Lane Road near the intersection.

Appellant’s automobile, a 1940 Lincoln, was being
driven by Thomas Curtsinger. He was traveling in a
northerly direction toward Danville. _

Kurtz’ truck, a.1941.GMC pickup, was being oper-
ated by his wife, Lillian Kurtz, who was driving i
‘easterly direction approaching Highway 35:
intention to turn north on Highway 35 tow: nvill
Mrs. Kurtz states that she was driving about 15 ‘to’ 20
miles an hour and that about 30 or 35 feet before the
_intersection, she slowed up to about 2 or 3 miles per
hour but did not stop. before entering Highway 35, She
stated that she looked both ways before driving, on_to
the highway and that she saw the Yates car about 500
or 600 feet away, and, believing she had-plenty of time
to enter Highway 35 and make ‘the left hand ‘turn,
changed to low gear, picked up speed, and was traveling
about 10 miles per hour when the Yates crashed
into her. She stated that’ she did not realize there would
‘be a crash until aftér, it happened, and that at the time
of the accident she had crossed to. the right-side-of the
road going north, with the front right tire of her truck
over on ‘the berm about 'a foot and the back left tire
about a foot to the right of the center line. = **

a 869

Appellee’s proof showed that Curtsinger, who was
driving the Lincoln, was traveling about 25 or 30 miles
an hour at the time and that when he first saw thé
Kurtz’ truck he was about ten feet from it; that the
fart? truck was travelling about 10 to 15 miles an

our. :

There was evidence to the effect that two or three
witnesses heard Mrs. Kurtz say that her brakes failed.

Motion for peremptory instruction was made at the
close of plaintiff’s testimony and again at the close of
all the evidence. Hach was overruled.

Appellant’is here insisting that the court erred in
two propositions; one, in refusal peremptorily to in-
struct the jury as the verdict was not sustained by suf-
ficient evidence. Two, because of misconduct of the
jury during the trial of the case.

A proper consideration of proposition one requires
that we look at both the law and the facts respectively:
KRS 189.330, subsections 4 and 5 provide: ‘‘The driver
of a vehicle shall stop at the entrances to a through
highway * * *.’? ‘The driver of a vehicle shall likewise
stop in obedience to a stop sign at an intersection * * *.’”

Thus we see it was the statutory duty of Mrs. Kurtz
to stop before entering Highway 35. She states that she
did not stop although she did slow down to 2 or 3 miles
per hour and observing the approaching Lincoln, be-
lieved she had time to move on to the highway and make
her left turn. ‘“There’s the rub of it.’? She thought the
approaching car was 500 or 600 feet away and thought
she had time to enter the highway and make the turn.
In this she was mistaken. In fact the car was so close
as to create an immediate hazard.

Her indifference to the stop sign and disobedience
to the law as to stopping before making an entrance to
a through highway, coupled with her mistaken belief
that she had time to enter the highway, were the causes
of this accident. Had she stopped, it is obvious that the
accident would not have happened.

We think the court should have given the peremp-
tory instruction as asked.

It becomes unnecessary to relate the facts sur-
rounding the: second proposition. Doubtless upon an-

870 ee

other trial, there will not be a recurrence of the unjusti-
fiable indiscretion on the part of one of the jurors, in
the absence of the court and the attorneys, of interrog-
ating a witness, while on the stand, relative to insurance
in the case.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent
herewith, and if the evidence is substantially the same
on another trial, the court will instruct peremptorily

for the defendant.
Davis v. City of Jenkins et al.
February 13, 1951.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1951.
Sam Ward, Judge.

Sanders & Hyden for appellant.

Francis M. Burke for appellees.
Cumr Justice Cammack—Affirming.

In 1948, the General Assembly changed the classi-
fication of the City of Jenkins from sixth class to fourth
class. At the regular election in November, 1949, Harold
Davis was elected Mayor of Jenkins. At the time Davis
entered upon the duties of his office there was no ordin-
ance in effect in Jenkins fixing the salary of the mayor
or any of the other officers of the city. KRS 86.180(2)
provides that the mayor of a fourth class city shall be

es ar

allowed an annual salary, to be fixed by the city council.
KRS 86.070(3) provides that the mayor of a fourth
class city shall preside at all meetings of the council
and shall decide all points of order. That section pro-
vides, also that the mayor may vote only in the case of
a tie, or when his vote is necessary to make a quorum.

At a regular meeting held on February 6, 1950, the
salary for the Mayor of Jenkins was fixed at $300 per
month. Three of the councilmen voted in favor of the
proposition and three against it. Mayor Davis cast the
deciding vote in favor of the proposition. For three
months Mr. Davis was paid a salary of $300 per month.
Thereafter, over the Mayor’s veto, the Mayor’s salary
was fixed at $50.00 per month. Davis instituted this
action to have his salary fixed as provided in the ordin-
ance of February 6th. The appeal is from a judgment
in favor of the City.

If there had been an ordinance in effect fixing the
Mayor’s salary at the time of Davis’ election in the
fall of 1949, the question would have been a simple one
coming within the scope of Section 161 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that the compensation of any city,
county, town or municipal officer shall not be changed
after his election or appointment, or during his term
of office. However, the facts in the case present the nar-
row question of whether it was legal for the Mayor to
cast_a vote in fixing his own salary. In the case of Hurt
v. Morgan County, 166 Ky. 364, 179 S. W. 255, and cases
cited therein, we said that an officer should not sit in
his own case, or act in a matter affecting the public
when he has a direct, pecuniary interest therein. In
Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N. C. 461, 101 8. Bi. 15, it was
pointed out that it was against the public policy of the
state, well founded in the statutes and judicial decisions,
for an officer to sit in judgment on his own cause, and
that the principle was one of common law which had
existed for hundreds of years. In McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Edition, Vol. 4, section 12.178, p. 22,
it is pointed out that public policy forbids one to sit as
a ‘‘judge of his own case.’’ It is pointed out in McQuillin
also that, while a statute might confer power on the
members of a local legislative body to fix their own
salaries, such a grant would be construed strictly, and
it would be necessary that the power be couched in ex-

PO

872

press terms. Therefore, we do not think that the pro-
vision of KRS 86.180(2), authorizing the city council
to fix the Mayor’s annual salary, is sufficient to validate
the act of Mayor Davis in casting the deciding vote on
the question of his own salary.

Since the judgment of the lower court is consistent
with the views expressed herein, it is affirmed.

PC
Dean et al. v. Dean.

February 23, 1951.
Rehearing Denied May 4, 1951.

William J. Baxter, Judge.

M. ©. Redwine, Jr., and Redwine & Redwine for appellants.
J. Smith Hays, Jr, for appellee.
Cray, Comissronpr—Affirming in part, reversing
in part.

Ct 873

Appellant sought an absolute divorce from her hus-
band on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment.
This relief was denied, but appellee was ordered to pay
$16 a week for the maintenance of his two infant chil-
dren. Appellant contends she was entitled to a divorce
and alimony; that the allowance for the children is
inadequate; and her attorneys request an increase in
the amount of their fee.

The parties were married in 1938. In the summer
of 1948 appellant moved from their home in Louisville

to Winchester. She states
ne had been behind on
e
children were born as long
money from their banks to

as her reason for leaving:
he rent a number of times,

idn’t work more than ten days—I worked before the

as I could. I even took their
pay the rent one time when

we were two months behind, and our landlord told us
when I came home in June unless we could pay the
back rent and keep it up that he would have to ask for
the apartment, and that is what happened, he didn’t
pay up and he attached our furniture and gave us a
week to pay our rent or get out.”

When asked about the trouble between them, she
stated: ‘‘The main thing he didn’t work regularly and
support us. I had to borrow from different ones, my
family sent help. All the savings I put away for the
children when I was working while the little girl was
small I had to use that.’

Appellant’s principal complaint seems to be that her
husband was lazy, would not find steady employment,
and for that reason he did not support his family as
well as he could. He is a carpenter by trade, but also
has done gardening work. He did not belong to a union,
but on some occasions had earned as much as $60 or
$70 a week. He appears to have been constantly har-
assed by indebtedness of one kind or another. However,
it appears that he did not spend his earnings on any-
thing but his family.

The ground for divorce alleged by appellant was
cruel and inhuman treatment. We think the Chancellor
was fully justified in finding that the evidence was
insufficient to show cause for divorce. The bonds of mat-
rimony should not be severed simply because one or the
other spouse has certain shortcomings. The case of Pur-

-

874 ee

eell v. Purcell, 197 Ky. 627, 247 8. W. 760, is directly
in point, and the facts are quite similar to those before
us. The opinion states, 197 Ky. at page 631, 247 S. W.
at page 762: ‘‘Summing up the whole evidence on this
issue, we find only that the husband, being in very mod-
erate circumstances and having a very small income
with a growing family, possibly at times was not as
generous with or considerate of his wife as a man of
different nature and temperament might have been.
But this falls short of cruel and inhuman treatment
within the meaning of our statute.”

The Court went on to say, 197 Ky. at page 632, 247
S. W. at page 762: ‘It is only persistent, studied, and
habitual misconduct which, if persisted in, will eventu-
ally be treated as cruel and inhuman treatment, there
being no physical violence or attempted violence.’’

On the facts shown, appellant was not entitled
to a divorce.

On the question of maintenance for the two infant
children, ages six and two, appellant introduced evi-
dence to show that $16 a week was not sufficient to care
for them. The mother is working, and it will be neces-
sary for her to employ some one to look after the young-
est child when she is away from home. The food and
clothing costs will be substantial. We think the allow-
ance for the children should be $25 a week.

Apparently the Chancellor fixed this allowance as
Jow as he did because of some question concerning ap-
pellee’s financial condition. It is shown, however, that
he is a relatively young man, in good health, and capable
of earning between $200 and $300 a month. He has a
very positive responsibility to maintain his own chil-
dren, At the present day and time, with a proper will-
ingness to work on his part, he can amply furnish them
their minimum needs. The allowance should be increased
as indicated.

The Court allowed appellant’s attorneys $75. This
is a small fee, but little evidence was taken in the case,
and it presented no unusual difficulties. Ordinarily a
higher fee would be justified, were it not for the fact
that we must consider appellee’s ability to pay. Addi-
tional expenses have been imposed upon him as the
result of this law suit, and his financial condition, as

a

shown by the record, is not too sound. We believe under
the circumstances the Chancellor’s judgment in this.
matter should be accepted.

The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in: .
part for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

Luzerne-Graham Min. Corp. v. Tanner et al.
March 2, 1951.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1951.
A. J. Brateher, Judge.

Duncan, Humphrey, Peabody & Oldham, Andrew W. Duncan,
and Jarvis & Ross for appellant.
Fox & Gordon, B. N. Gordon and Laurence Gordon for appellee.

Joupes Latmr—Affirming.

The sole issue is whether or not there is sufficient
evidence of probative value to support the Workman’s
Compensation Board in its finding that the death of
James Tanner resulted from the injuries he received
while employed by appellant.

6 Es

James, Tanner, a man 59 years of age, had been
employed and worked in coal mines from the time he
‘was 14 years of age. The Company operated what is
known as a shuttle car in its mine. This car is made of
iron or steel and weighs several tons. It was equipped
with rubber tires and was operated in the mine some-
what like an automobile.

Tanner had left the place in the mine where he
had been working and was approaching a point where
the men assembled their tools to be placed in the car
for the purpose of transporting them outside. This
point was something like a mile from the main opening.
This shuttle car was passing through at this time and
James Tanner was caught between the side of the car
and the rib of the coal, and it rolled Tanner between
the side of the car and the rib of the coal for a distance
of about 12 or 15 feet. It appears there was a slight de-
pression in the rib of coal and when this point was
reached and the pressure released, Tanner fell to the
ground seriously injured. He was immediately taken
to the hospital where he remained for 21 days under
the care of Dr. G. L. Simpson, apparently the company
doctor.

In testifying about his injury, Dr. Simpson said,
«Well his injuries were confined primarily to the upper
trunk of the left, and the significant finding, consisted
of a fracture of the left shoulder blade, the left collar
bone and a compressed fracture of the eight thoraci¢
spine—that is the vertebra, the eighth.’’

On October 28, 1947 Tanner was taken from the
hospital to his home. On December 26th, he was taken
to Louisville in an ambulance and while there the cast,
he had worn home from the hospital, was replaced
by a brace made of metal and straps. He returned
home the same day. A few days after the brace was
put on, Mr. Tanner was able to walk around some by
use of a cane.

Dr. Simpson states, ‘‘He was making a normal
recovery from his injury.”
On February 26th between one and two o’clock in

the morning he commenced hemorrhaging much blood
from his mouth and died in a few minutes.

3

. The appellant takes the position that this hemorr-
haging had no casual connection with the injury. Ap-
pellee takes the converse view. The Board held for the
elaimant, widow of the deceased, and gave her the full
death amount plus funeral expenses. The Muhlenberg
Circuit Court upheld the award of the Workman’s Com-
pensation Board,

Appellant directs attention to this statement of
the Workman’s Compensation Board in its opinion
and award: ‘‘From the evidence it is impossible to tell
what brought about the hemorrhaging which caused
Mr. Tanner’s death.’’ It is insisted that the above state-
ment constitutes a factual conclusion which is entirely
inconsistent with the finding that the hemorrhaging
had a causal connection with the injury. It is argued
that inability to ascertain the cause of the hemorrhage
throws the matter into the realm of entire speculation.
However, attention might be called to the remainder
of the paragraph above which reads: ‘‘It is shown con-
clusively that the deceased was in good health and
performed work which required an able-bodied man.
It is also shown by Dr. Simpson’s evidence that -the
deceased did not have diseased lungs. While it appar-
ently was never brought to the attention of the doctor,
it is shown by undisputed evidence here that Tanner
did bleed from the mouth from the day of the injury
and had never done so before the injury. It would not
take a medical man to know that when Tanner was in-
jured, there was some injury produced in his body
which caused this bleeding and later a fatal hemorrhag-
ing. Even though the doctor did not discover this con-
dition or afterward Imow what it was, there is no
doubt that it existed, was a result of the injury, and
brought about Tanner’s death.’?

There are two or three principal contentions ad-
vanced by appellant that must be considered. Dr. Simp-
son was rather positive in his statement that he did
not know what caused the hemorrhaging and that he
could not know without a post mortem examination. It
appears that in the earlier developments of the case
it was agreed that the question of the cause of the hem-
orrhaging would be submitted for arbitration to three
doctors, Dr. Gaither selected by claimant, Dr. G. L.
Simpson selected by appellant and Dr. J. P. Walton

878 ee

selected by the two named doctors. It was agreed in
substance that if these three doctors decided that the
accident did not in any way cause the hemorrhage, then
Mrs. Tanner would make no further claim. On the
other hand if they should decide that the accident was
the cause of the hemorrhage, then the mining company
was to pay in accordance with that finding. The doc-
tors then took the matter under consideration and
came to this conclusion, ‘‘After thorough considera-
tion, this group of physicians unanimously felt that
without a post mortem examination of the body, there
would be no way of determining the cause of death
and whether or not it was in any way connected with
the mine injury * * *.’? Mrs. Tanner declined permis-
sion for the post mortem.

While frankly admitting that she had a right to
refuse; that it was entirely a personal matter with
her; and should in no way reflect upon her, appellant
seriously contends that it was she who closed the door
to an ascertainment of the truth and thus left the cause
_of the hemorrhage in the field of speculation.

* The other element of contention is based around
the evidence as to bleeding during the period of hos-
pitalization and afterwards up to the time of the death
of Tanner. Appellee objected seriously to Dr. Simp-
son’s use of the hospital record in his testimony rel-
ative to this question. Dr. Simpson said that he knew
nothing of or heard nothing of any spitting of blood;
that the records in the hospital did not show the pres-
ence of any spitting of blood; and further stated that
if there had been such, it would have been of such
significance that the attending nurse would have indi-
eated same on the chart. Appellee objected to the intro-
duction of the chart as testimony because Dr. Simpson
did not make the chart. The nurse who made the chart
was not introduced. Dr. Simpson states that the first
he had heard of any spitting of blood was possibly a
week before proof was taken in the matter. However,
Mrs. Tanner and numerous others, some closely and
some more distantly related to the Tanners, state that
on numerous occasions, both at the hospital and while
at home, Mr. Tanner would spit up blood and complain-
ed of constant pain in his left lung or side.

The weight of the evidence is that-he was a well

De 879

and able-bodied man, who worked continuously through
many years with a minimum apparent illness.

To require claimant to disprove numerous theories
as to possible causes for the hemorrhage would be
burdening her too greatly. The evidence ‘substantially
shows: that there was a serious injury to the deceased
Tanner; that he was confined in the hospital for 21
days immediately following the injury; that he was
taken to the hospital in Louisville and there placed in
metal brace; that there was a continuous spitting up
of blood, although this was disputed and contradicted
in a negative way; that Tanner complained of contin-
uing pain in left lung; that he was an able- bodied man
who worked continuously for many years prior to this
injury. The above facts fit into and show a continuing
something directly connected with the injury. We con-
elude it to be such evidence of substance as to support
the findings of the Board.

The judgment is affirmed.

Bernard BROTHERTON, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of
Kentucky, Appellee.

> November 17, 1950.

H.C. Kennedy for appellant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and Guy L. Dickinsonj Assistant
Attorney General for the Commonwealth.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Application of ALLEN.

November 17, 1950.

John Darnell for petitioner.
PER CURIAM.

Leebern Allen was suspended from the practice of law from June
25, 1948 to June 25, 1949, 807 Ky. 855, 212 S. W. 2d 828. He began
practicing immediately after the expiration of his suspension period.
Complaint was made that he engaged in the practice of law during
the period of his suspension and that he began practicing without
making application for reinstatement. There was also a groundless
charge that he had exacted an unwarranted fee in one case. After
the matter was brought to the attention of this Court and the State
Bar Association Mr. Allen made application for reinstatement. The
question was referred to a Trial Committee and it is now before us
on the recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners that Mr.
Allen be reinstated to the practice of law.

According to Mr. Allen’s interpretation of Rule 8.530, he had a
right to begin practicing after the expiration of his period of sus-
pension. He says that he brought this matter to the attention of the
judge of the Wolfe Circuit Court. On the other hand, the complain-
ants take the position that under Rule 3.560 a member of the Asso-
ciation who has been disbarred or suspended cannot begin practic
ang until he has made application for reinstatement.

The Rules in question follow in part:

ee 882

“3.530. When it comes to the attention of the Board that any
person who has been disbarred, or who has been suspended from
practice and whose period of suspension has not expired, is under-
taking directly or indirectly to practice law, the matter shall be re
ferred to the President of the Board’s committee on unauthorized
practice of law or such other appropriate committee as may be pro-
vided for in the By-Laws or appointed by the President. * * *.”

“3.560. Any member of the Association who has been disbarred
or who has been suspended from practice for any cause other than
failure to pay dues may apply for reinstatement. All applications for
reinstatement, whether the applicant has been disbarred and whether
or not, if suspended, his time of suspension has elapsed, shall be
made in writing to the Court, and shall contain the information re-
quired to be contained in an application made under RCA 3.550,
saan

It is apparent at once that there is some confusion in these
Rules. They should and will be redrafted, with the view of removing
the inconsistency. Under the circumstances we think the Board of
Bar Commissioners properly recommended that Mr. Allen be rein-
stated to the practice of law, and it is so ordered. He should not
be censured for having engaged in the practice of law after June 25,
1949, the date his period of suspension ended. Therefore, this order
shall be construed as becoming effective June 26, 1949.

Howard COLE v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky.
December 15, 1950.
ee
John G. Prather for movant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal denied, Judgment affirmed.

882

Elmer DENHAM, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky,
Opposed.

December 15, 1950.

Fritz Krueger for movant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, H. D. Reed, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Lawrence WILKINS, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky,
Opposed.

December 15, 1950,

‘W. J. Myre for movant.

A, E. Funk, Attorney General, and Guy L. Dickinson, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Allen HERRIN, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed,
January 9, 1951.

Fritz Krueger for movant.

A. H. Funk, Attorney General, H. D. Reed, Jr., Assistant Attor-
ney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

ae 883
J. B, OSBORNE, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.
January 12, 1951.

Hiram H. Owens for movant.

A. E. Funk, Attorney General, and W. Owen Keller, Assistant
Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Mary NAPIER, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.

January 12, 1951.

Burnish Martin for movant.

J. C. Cornett, Commonwealth’s Attorney, A. E, Funk, Attorney
General, and Zeb, A. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, for the
Commonwealth, opposed.

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Delno SPEARS, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.
January 12, 1951.

Fritz Krueger for movant.

Russell Jones, Commonwealth’s Attorney, A. E. Funk, Attorney
General, and Zeb. A. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, for the
Commonwealth, opposed,

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

884 ee

James ALLEN, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed
January 16, 1951.

Haynes Carter for movant,

A. H Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb. A. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.
Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Virgil BOLLING, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky,
Opposed.

January 23, 1951.

Sanders & Hyden for movant.

A. H. Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb A. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Pike Circuit Court. Judgment of
conviction for malicious striking and wounding another with intent
to kill and imposing sentence of $500 fine and six months in jail.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Herbert COLLINS, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky,
Opposed

January 23, 1951.

J. M. Wolfinbarger for movant.

A. BE. Funk, Attorney General, and Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant
Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal-from a judgment of the Estill Circuit Court
convicting movant of selling whiskey in Local Option Territory and
imposing a fine of $100 and confinement in the County Jail for thirty
days. The motion is overruled, appeal denied, and the judgment is
affirmed.

Le ‘ 885
A. D. JONES, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.
February 18, 1951.
0. H. Brooks for movant.

A. EB. Funk, Attorney General, and Zeb. A. Stewart, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Marshall Circuit Court. Judg-
ment of conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor for sale in local
option territory and imposing sentence of $50 fine and 30 days in jail.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.

Hannah WILLIAMS, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky,
Opposed.

February 16, 1951.
Leebern Allen for movant,

A. E, Funk, Attorney General, and Wm. F. Simpson, Assistant
Attorney General, opposed.

PER CURIAM. .

Motion for an appeal from the Wolfe Circuit Court. Judgment of
conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor for sale in dry territory
and imposing sentence of $100 fine and 60 days in jail.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.