State: North Dakota
Volume: 79
Term: 0-0
Jurisdiction(s): North Dakota
Source: https://static.case.law/nd/79.pdf

[File Nos. 7279, 7280]

HAROLD W. LOVELAND, Respondent, v. ANDREW
NIBTERS and THOMAS RYAN, Appellants, and E. M.
LOVELAND, Respondent, vy. ANDREW NIETERS and
THOMAS RYAN, Appellants.

(54 NW2d 533)

Opinion filed August 4, 1952

and James R. Jungroth, for appellant.

FP. E. McCurdy and Orrin B. Lovell, for respondent.

Cunistianson, J. This litigation arose out of a collision
between two automobiles. The plaintiff, E. M.- Loveland, was
driving a DeSoto automobile owned by his son Harold W.
Loveland, incident to business affairs in which both of, said
plaintiffs were interested. The defendant Thomas Ryan was
driving a Ford automobile owned by the defendant Andrew
Nieters. Nieters was riding in the automobile so driven by
Ryan. The two automobiles met in a head-on collision -at.a
point approximately four miles west of Regan in Burleigh
County. Both automobiles were damaged and the plaintiff
KE. M. Loveland and the defendants Ryan and Nieters ‘all sus-
tained personal injuries. E. M. Loveland brought action to
recover damages for personal injuries which he alleged that he
had sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendants.
Harold W. Loveland brought action against the defendants to
recover compensation for the injury to his automobile which was
driven by E. M. Loveland and alleged to have been caused by
the negligence of the defendants Ryan and Nieters. The defend-

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ants Thomas Ryan and Andrew Nieters interposed individual
answers denying liability and asserting counterclaims in each
of the actions. The defendant Ryan in his counterclaim sought
recovery for personal injuries which he alleged he sustained as
a result of negligence of HE. M. Loveland in the operation of
the automobile he was driving, and the defendant Nieters in
his counterclaims sought to recover damages for the injury to
his automobile, which was being driven by Ryan and also sought
to recover damages for the personal injuries which he alleged
that he had sustained as a result of the negligence of E. M.
Loveland in the operation of the car he was driving. E. M.
Loveland and Harold W. Loveland interposed replies to the
counterclaims wherein they denied all the allegations of the
counterclaims. Upon the trial of the cases it-was stipulated that
the two cases be consolidated for the purposes of trial with
separate verdicts to be rendered in cach case. The cases were
so tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff E. M. Loveland for $15,000.00 and returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff Harold W. Loveland for the
sum of $881.02. Judgments were rendered upon the verdicts.
The defendants moved for a new trial in each case. The
motions were denied and the defendants have appealed from
the judgments and from the orders denying the motions for
a new trial.

The collision occurred in the afternoon of May 3, 1950. There
was nothing to interfere with the visibility of objects within
the,ordinary range of vision. A member of the highway patrol
who came to the scene after the accident did not find it necessary
to utilize the lights on his car. The plaintiff, E. M. Loveland,
was driving in a westerly direction on North Dakota Highway
No., 36, and the defendants Ryan and Nieters were driving in
an casterly direction on such highway. The two automobiles
met in a head-on collision at a place where a cut had been made
through a snow drift for a distance of approximately 200 feet
or more. The cut was about 10 feet wide,—wide enough so that
one car could go through but not wide enough so that cars
could pass each other. The banks on the sides of the cut were
of varying depths ranging from one or two feet near each end

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and increasing to a depth of five or six feet at the middle of
the cut. Loveland testified that when he saw the car occupied
by the defendants approaching from the west he was nearing the
west end of the cut and that the car occupied by the defendants
was from 600 to 800 feet away and approaching at a rate which
he judged to be about 60 miles an hour. Loveland testified that
he was driving at a rate of about 20 miles an hour and that he
reduced the speed almost to a standstill and that he thought
“they would turn out but they came straight and hit me head-
on.” He testified that he did not travel more than 40 feet after
he observed the car approaching from the west until the collision
occurred; that the collision occurred a short distance from
the west end of the cut. The defendant Ryan testified that he
was driving at a rate of 30 miles an hour or less; that when
he first saw the car driven by Loveland approaching from the
east such car was 175 or 200 feet away. He testified also that
it seemed to him that the car driven by Loveland was going
faster than the car he was driving and when he saw the car
coming he applied the brakes and “let off the accelerator.”
The plaintiff, E. M. Loveland, and the defendants were the only
persons present at the time and place of the accident, although a
number of persons came to the scene shortly afterwards. After
the collision the two automobiles were left facing each other
about 11 feet apart. Loveland was in the car which he had been
driving and Ryan and Nieters were in the car in which they
had been riding. All three had been seriously injured and
were in a dazed condition. They were taken in an ambulance to
a hospital at Bismarck for medical treatment. No good purpose
‘would be served by any further or extended recital of the evi-
dence. We are agreed that the state of the evidence is such that
questions of negligence and proximate cause were for the jury;
and there is indeed no contention to the contrary on this appeal.

In the brief of the appellants it is said that the errors assigned
“actually present three questions for this court to decide.

“First: Was it error for the District Court to have failed
to instruct the jury on contributory negligence?

“Second: Was it- error to refuse a mistrial, when F. BE.

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McCurdy attorney for the plaintiff injected the Farmers Union
into the case, during the empanelling of the jury?

“Third: In all event, is the verdict excessive?”

(1) The defendants moved for a mistrial. The motion was
denied and error is predicated upon the court’s ruling in denying
such motion. The motion was made during the examination of
prospective jurors on their voir dire. During the examination
of Mrs. Random, the first prospective juror, on her voir dire
plaintiffs’ counsel asked, “Are either you or your husband mem-
bers of the Farmers Union?” Thereupon defendants’ counsel
stated “At this time I move for a mistrial; it is prejudicial.”
Thereupon plaintiffs’ counsel stated, “We want to know the
background of these jurors so that we may properly exercise
peremptory.” To which defendants’ counsel replied, “It has
no basis, your Honor, and we would like to be heard on this
motion in chambers, your Honor.” Thereupon the court directed
that the prospective members of the jury remain in their seats
and the court and the parties with their counsel retired to the
chambers. Arguments were presented by the counsel for the
respective parties upon the motion for a mistrial. Such argu-
ments and proceedings were all had outside of the presence
of the prospective members of the jury. After the proceedings
in chambers had been concluded the parties and their respective
counsel returned to the court room. The court thereupon made
a statement wherein he said in part:

“Mrs. Roy Random was asked the question, as a prospective
juror, as to whether or not she was a member of the Farmers
Union, . . . . I want to say to you that the Farmers Union,
so far as the Court knows, and so far as the counsel has informed
the Court, and I have tried to find out all the information that
they had, and I hope that I have, and from all the information
that I have the Farmers Union just has no interest in this lawsuit
in any way, so the jury here can disregard that statement, wipe
it out of the case and out of your memory; it is just not here.
. . + So, in reference to that statement, and that question, the
Court will just take that over and take care of it, and it is out
of the lawsuit, and you will put it out of the lawsuit. This is
just not here for consideration. The Warmers Union has no

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interest in this case, none whatever, and you will consider this
case in that fashion if you are selected on the jury.”

The court thereupon directed that the trial continue. A jury
was selected, impanelled and sworn to try the case. At the close
of all the evidence and after both parties had rested counsel for
the defendants renewed the motion for mistrial. The motion
was denied. Error is assigned upon the rulings of the court.

The laws of this state provide for an examination of prospec:
tive jurors before they are impanelled and sworn to try a case.
NDRC 1948, 28-1404. Each party to a civil action is entitled
to challenges for cause on certain specified grounds; and each
party is also entitled to a certain number of peremptory chal-
lenges. NDRC 1943, Sec. 28-1406, 28-1405.

In American Jurisprudence it is said:

“Examination into the qualifications, attitudes, and inclina-
tions of jurors, before they are impaneled and sworn to try a case,
is necessarily incident to the practice of challenging. Only
such an examination can provide the information or suspicion
to constitute a basis for the intelligent and practical exercise
of challenges to accomplish the end desired—exclusion from
the jury of those who would act from prejudice or interest or
without qualification to judge soundly.” 31 Am Jur, Jury, See
104, p 635.

“An examination of a prospective juror on his voir dire is
proper so long as it is conducted strictly within the right to
discover the state of mind of the juror with respect to the matter
in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly
influence him, and questions which go primarily to the ascertain-
ment of any probable bias or ground of incompetency, as a
basis of a challenge for cause, or possibly, of a peremptory
challenge, are permissible. However, while the scope of the
inquiry will not be confined strictly to the subjects which consti-
tute grounds for the sustaining of a challenge for cause, if it
extends beyond such subjects it must be conducted in good faith
with the object of obtaining a fair and impartial jury, and must
not go so far beyond the parties and the issues directly involved
that it is likely to create a bias, a prejudice, or an unfair attitude
toward any litigant. Nevertheless, the adverse litigants should

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be given the right to inquire freely about the interest, direct or

indirect, of the proposed juror, that may affect his final decision.

The scope of inquiry is best governed by a wise and liberal

discretion of the court, but the court should not at any time

ask, or permit counsel to ask, a prospective juror .any question

the answer to which would tend to incriminate or disgrace him.”
° 81 Am Juris, Jury, See 107, pp 636-637.

“In most jurisdictions jurors may be questioned on their voir
dire examination within reasonable limits to elicit facts enabling
the parties intelligently’ to exercise their right of peremptory
‘challenge; the nature and extent of the examination is largely
within the discretion of the trial court.” 50 CJS Juries, Sec
279, p 1066.

So far as the record shows the question which formed the
basis for the motion for a mistrial was never answered. The
record does not show whether the prospective juror to whom it
was addressed was accepted and served as a member of the trial
jury nor does it show whether any challenges were made to any
prospective juror either for cause or peremptory. There
was no request that the juror to whom the question was addressed
or any person or persons be withdrawn. It is difficult to see
how the asking of the question could possibly have created
any bias or prejudice or unfair attitude on the part of any
member of the jury toward any of the litigants. There is
no claim and obviously there would be no basis for any claim
that the question called for an answer which would tend to
incriminate or disgrace the juror.

It is inconceivable that any person who was impanelled
and sworn as a juror could have been affected or influenced
by the fact that the question had been asked. Furthermore, the
statement and admonition of the trial court operated to eliminate
and withdraw from the consideration of the jury the question
and all that took place with respect thereto. Ordinarily when
a motion is made for a mistrial it is wpon the occurrence of
some incident of prejudicial misconduct at the trial or when
incompetent matters have been brought to the attention of the
jury, the damaging effect of which cannot be removed by admoni-
tion and instructions, and when something has happened affect-

PCC ae 9
ing the propriety and validity of the proceedings. In this casé
the incident upon which the motion for mistrial is based occurred
at the very beginning of the examination of, jurors on their
voir dire. The question to which objection was made was ‘pro-
pounded at the very beginning of the examination of the first
prospective juror on her voir dire. If the motion for mistrial
had been granted it would merely have operated to terminate
the proceedings that had just begwh and set the trial over to
a future day. Bishop Code Practice, Sec 428; 53 Am Jur,
Trial, See 965, p 678. Jet

In Hoffer v. Burd, 78 ND 278, 49 NW2d 282, 292,'this Court
said: ce

_“A mistrial is granted generally'on some fundamental failure
in the proceeding, . . . . A mistrial may also be granted
‘when necessary to prevent the defeat of justice or in furtherance
of justice.’ 53 Am Jur, Sec 967, Trial, p 679.

“In such cases the trial court has wide discretion, Heiler v.
Goodman’s Motor Express Van & Storage Co., 92 NJL 415, 105
A 233, 3 ALR 336. The granting of a mistria is.an extreme
remedy and voids all proceedings taken in the case up to that
time. All the authorities agree that the practice ‘should be
resorted to only ‘when further proceedings therewith would be
productive of great hardship or manifest injustice” Usborne
vy. Stephenson, 36 Or 328, 58 Pac 1103, 1104, 48 LRA 482, 487.
Tn such cases only where something has happened: to, make it
apparent that justice will not be served by continuance of the
trial is the granting of a motion for a mistrial the proper
remedy.”

We are all agreed that no error pr ejudicial to the defendants
was committed by the trial court by the denial. of the motion
for a mistrial.

(2) It is next contended that the trial court erred in failing té
instruct the jury on the question of contributory negligence.
The record shows that the defendants served and filed an, amend-
ed answer and counterclaim in each of the cases and ‘that-each
of the cases was tried upon the issues framed by the amended
complaint of the plaintiffs and such amended answer and
counterclaim. There was no plea of contributory negligence in

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either of such amended answers or counterclaims. In most
jurisdictions, including North Dakota, it is the rule that the
defense of contributory negligence must be specially pleaded
and if not so pleaded is regarded as waived. 65 CJS p 923-
925; Carr & Erickson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co.,
16 ND 217, 112 NW 972; Welch v: Fargo & M. Street R. Co.,
24 ND 463, 486, 140 NW 680; Ignatowitch v. McLaughlin, 66
ND 132, 262 NW 352. No request was made for instruction
upon the question of contributory negligence,—indeed, no re-
quest was made for any instruction.

~The trial court committed no error in failing to instruct as
to contributory négligence.

'No error-is assigned upon any of the instructions given to
the jury. The sole error assigned upon such instructions is
that the court erred in failing to instruct upon the question of
contributory negligence. As said, the plaintiffs predicated their
right of action upon the alleged negligence of the defendants;
and the defendants predicated their counterclaims upon the
alleged negligence of the plaintiffs. In its instructions to the
jury the court instructed fully with respect to these respective
claims and informed the jury that the- plaintiffs could recover
only if the jury found that the defendants were guilty of negli-
gence as charged and that the plaintiffs were free from negli-
gence. In its instructions the court said:

“The plaintiffs, Members of the Jury, in this case seek to
recover of the defendants and base their right of recovery upon
a charge of negligence of the defendants. The defendants
seek to recover of the plaintiffs and base their right of recovery
upon a charge of negligence of the plaintiffs. . . . It is only
when one party is guilty of negligence as charged by the other,
and the other party innocent of blame, that there can be a recov-
ery; and in such event, the party who is proven to be the guilty
party. is responsible for such damage as proximately results from
his negligence so charged and proven. . . . The plaintiffs
can recover in this.action from the defendants upon no. other
theory than that the jury find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendants were guilty of negligence as charged

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“by the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs were free from negli-
gence proximately causing their injury and damage claimed.”

It is unnecessary for us either to approve or disapprove
the above quoted instruction or to express any opinion as to
the correctness thereof as no such question is presented on this
appeal. It will be noted that under such instruction the jury
is informed that “it is only when one party is guilty of negligence
as charged by the other and the other party innocent of blame
that there can be a recovery;” and that the plaintiffs in this
action can recover upon no other theory than that the jury
find by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the defendants
were guilty of negligence as charged by the plaintiffs, and (2)
that the plaintiffs were free from negligence proximately causing
their injury and damage claimed. It is apparent that the effect
of this instruction was to bar recovery on the part of the plain-
tiffs if they were guilty of contributory negligence, for obviously
a person who is guilty of negligence which proximately con-
tributes to the injury is not “innocent of blame” and is not “free
from negligence proximately causing their injury.”

(8) It is next contended that the verdict is excessive and
was given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Under
the laws of this state excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice are a ground for
anew trial. NDRC 1943, 28-1902, subd 5. A motion for a new
trial on such ground involves consideration of the evidence and
implies a duty on the part of the court to whom the motion is
addressed to weigh the evidence. “This necessarily involves
an exercise by the trial judge of the superior knowledge possessed
by him as to matters incident to the trial itself.” Reid v. Ehr,
36 ND 552, 557, 162 NW 903-905 ; Hayne, New Tr & App, Sec 95.

In Reid v. Ehr, supra, this Court said:

“There is no serious question as to the rules of law which
should guide a trial court in determining, or an appellate court
in reviewing rulings on, motions for a new trial on the ground
of excessive damages appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice. The difficulty, if any, generally
arises in determining whether the particular facts in a case bring
it within such rules.

2 es

“In ‘actions in which there is no definite or legal measure of
‘damages, as is especially true in most actions sounding in tort,
the quantum of damages is: deemed a matter of discretion for
the jury to such an extent that the verdict will not be set aside-
on this ground alone, unless-the amount awarded is so excéssive
‘as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion
‘or prejudice. The discretion of the jury in fixing damages in
such cases is not absolute, however, and-“in whatever form the
rule is stated, it always involves a reasonable discretionary
power in the court to set aside a verdict when its amount, in view
of all the circumstances, is so great as to show that the jury, in
arriving at it, must have been influenced by some improper
‘motive.’ 4 Sedgw Damages, 9th ed, Sec 1826.” .

There is a clear and obvious distinction between the duty of
a trial court and the duty of an appellate court with respect to
the decision of such questions. Green v. Soule, 145 Calif 96,
78 Pac 387, 340.

“Tt should be remembered that it is the trial, and not the
appellate, court which is vested with discretionary powers in
determining the motion for a new trial’ Reid v. Ehr, supra.

The appellate court is limited to a consideration and deter-
mination of whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting or denying a new trial. The question presented to the
appellate court is not whether a new trial should be granted or
denied, but whether the trial court abused its judicial discretion
in granting or denying a new trial as the case may be.

“¢K test of what is within the discretion of a court has been
suggested by the question, May the court properly decide the
point either way? If not, then there is no discretion to exercise.
If there is no latitude for the exercise of the power, it cannot
be said that the power is discretionary. The only limitation upon
the exercise of discretionary power is that it must not be abused.’
2 Hayne, New Tr & App, Sec 289, p 1650.

“While it may be difficult to define exactly what is meant by
abuse.of judicial discretion, and whatever it may imply as to the
‘disposition and motives of the judge, it is‘fairly deducible from
the cases that one of its essential attributes is that it must plainly

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appear to effect injustice.’ Clavey v. Lord, 87 Cal 413, 25 Pace
493; Aylmer v. Adams, 30 ND 514, 153 NW 419; State v. Cray,
31 ND 67, 153 NW 425; MeGregor'v. Great Northern R. Co. 31
ND 471, 154 NW 261, Ann Cas 1917E 141. ‘

“In reviewing the action of the trial court in granting a new
trial on the ground of ‘excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice,’ the appellate
court is not justified in reversing the order merely because it
differs with the trial court as to what would have been just com-
pensation, unless the difference of opinion is’such as to justify
the conclusion that the court abused its discretion. Hayne, New
Tr & App, Sec 95; Lee v. Southern P. R. Co. 101 Cal 118, 35 Pac
572.” Reid v. Ehr, 36 ND 552, 558, 162 NW 903, 905.

To warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of
“excessive damages appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice” the amount of the verdict
must appear to be so large as to induce the belief that the jury
were actuated by passion or prejudice. 39 Am Jur, New Trial,
Sec 144, p 150; 66 OJS, New Trial, p 244; 25 CJS Sec 196, p 910;
Umphrey v. Deery, 78 ND 211, 48 NW2d 897. . See, also, 5 CJS,
Appeal and Error, p 642 et seq. The evidence in this case shows
that the verdict returned by the jury in the case of Harold W.
Loveland v. Andrew Nieters and Thomas Ryan was: only in a
sum equal to the amount that the plaintiff in that case was
required to expend in necessary repairs on his car as a result of
the injury caused by the collision, There is no contention that
the amounts expended were in excess of what was necessary.
Obviously, so far as the verdict in that case is concerned, the
verdict is not excessive in any sense but is rather less than the
amount of damages which the evidence shows that the plaintiff
sustained.

The évidence in the case of EH. M. Loveland v. Andrew Nieters
and Thomas Ryan shows that the plaintiff in that’case was
actively engaged in the operation of grain elevators and that on ‘
the day the collision occurred he drove to the elevator at Still
and loaded a car of grain; that he did this without any assistance
and performed all the manual labor himself; that thereafter

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he drove to the depot at Regan, a station a few miles from Still,
and billed the car and that it was thereafter he sustained the
injuries in the collision. Following the accident he was taken
in an ambulance to a hospital at Bismarck and remained confined
to his bed in the hospital for 58 days. After being released
from the hospital he was taken to the home of his son where he
remained confined under the care of his son and iis son’s wife
for about two months. The attending physician and surgeon
who cared for him testified that Loveland was in shock, “that
he had no blood pressure, he was semi-conscious, and bleeding
badly.” The doctor further testified :

“Q. Go ahead and tell us what you found in your examination.

A. He was admitted in the hospital in shock; he had a severe
laceration of the scalp; fractures of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
left ribs; fractures of the Ist, 4th, and 5th right ribs; a com-
minuted fracture of the right knee; a compound, comminuted
fracture of the left radius and ulna; a pneumothorax and a
hemothorax.

Q. Doctor, will you be good enough to define those terms so
the Jury will understand them?

A. By pneumothorax and hemothorax, it pertains to the chest,
where the air is able to go into the chest wall rather than through
the mouth with the result that the left lung was completely
collapsed; the secondary to that there was hemorrhage into that
space where the lung should be. In other words, the left chest
was entirely full of blood rather than the normal expanded lung.

Q. And those other medical terms?

A. By compound, comminuted fracture we mean a fracture
where there is a bone sticking out through the skin; comminuted
means small pieces of bone, and compound is an opening of the
skin where the bone is sticking out; that was the case with the
wrist, the bone was actually sticking out of the skin; and it is
called comminuted because it was broken in many small pieces
not through the skin; and the rest were simple fractures. . . .

Q: You say there was a severe laceration of the head?

JA. Yes, sir.

a 15

What is that?

. A cut through the scalp.

How long was it?

. About 4 inches.

. How many stitches does it take?

. Oh, I suppose about 18 or 20.

. Was there anything outside of that break of the skin
where the bone was broken and out of the skin, was there any
other break in the skin?

A. The entire body was covered with abrasions; that is, inju-
ries to the skin. . .

Q. What was done by way of undertaking to cure him of
those?

A. The first 11 days he was in the hospital we were unable to
do anything as far as immediate fractures were concerned
because we were concerned with keeping him alive; we gave
him oxygen to supplant his chest so he could breathe some; his
blood pressure got better; and we tried to keep him free of
pain; we didn’t attempt to set any fractures for 11 days; in the
first place, he could not stand an anesthetic.

Q. So that the first 11 days were devoted entirely to life
preservation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And during this time what would you say would be the
natural result of those injuries relative to pain and suffering?

A. Considerable.

Q. Well, considerable is a kind of an elastic term—

A. T believe the patient was in pain constantly for the first
month—in severe pain.

Q. And you controlled that to a certain extent by anesthetics?

A. We were handicapped somewhat because the drugs that will
control pain depress respiration and had we given him adequate
drugs to kill the pain we might have put the patient in a bad
situation.

Q. In other words, you were unable to give him the drugs that
would deaden the pain to the extent you would have liked to?

A. Yes, sir.

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16 a

Q. And how long a period did that continue where ‘his pain
was partially uncontrolled? |

A. I would say about 6 weeks.

Q. About 6 weeks?

A. Yes, sir, about 6 weeks.

Q. And what was:his condition as to suffering acute pain in
those 6 weeks?

A. I-would say that he suffered considerable pain; he was
in pain almost every time I examined him; with each time he took
a breath he had pain because the fractured ribs would move a
little bit, .so he had constant pain in his chest at least 6 weeks
with every inspiration of air.

Q. What effect did that have on a full and free respiration?
, A. It definitely limits it.

Q. Now, were there any lung punctures?

A. That cannot be proved exactly because we cannot look in
the chest, but the evidence of the pneumothorax and the hemo-
‘thorax would lead us-to believe that it did happen. . . .

Q. Taking him now as he is, as far as manual labor is con-
cerned, what percentage of disability would you attribute to him
at the present time, for manual labor? I don’t mean clerical
work.

A. I don’t believe he can do any manual labor.

Q. How about doing clerical work?

A. Yes, sir, he can do that.

Q. Would he be handicapped somewhat in that?

A. He would be handicapped so far as a typewriter is con-
cerned, completely.

Q. Typewriting would be out?

A. Yes, sir. - .

Q. Now what effect, if any, has this experience had on his
general physical condition?

’ A, Whenever you have a pneumothorax or an hemothorax—a
collapse of the Iung—it always heals with considerable scar
tissue, and he is very subject to pneumonia in the future. I
mean that is something he will have to watch closely because he
will never have as good a left lung as he had originally, and he

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probably—although I can’t guarantee, I don’t know—but he may
have pleurisy pains in the future. That is something that only
time will tell.”

The doctor further testified that the plaintiff E. M. Loveland
has only about 50% use of the arm and wrist and that this condi-
tion is permanent. He also testified that as a result of injuries
sustained there was a 50% disability of the right leg and knee;
that Loveland -was unable to walk even up to the time of the
trial without the aid of a crutch because he could not fully extend
or flex the knee and that this condition was probably permanent.
He also testified that it would be necessary for Mr. Loveland
to have medical treatment for another six months.

The evidence shows that plaintiff E. M. Loveland was required
to expend for hospital service, including the ambulance service,
the sum of $955.68 and that he has expended for the services
of doctors the sum of $500.00. .

The trial court, denied the motion for a new trial. He found
that the verdict was not tainted with passion and prejudice. We
are agreed that when all the pertinent facts in this case are
considered it cannot be said that the amount of the verdict is
so large as to indicate passion or prejudice by the jury.

The judgments and orders appealed from are affirmed.

Morris, C. J. and Burks, Ganson. and Sarsae, JJ., concur.

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[File No. 7264]

IDA MIDGARDEN, Appellant, vy. CITY OF GRAND FORKS,
a municipal corporation, and N. B. KNAPP, Respondents.

(54 NW2d 659)

Opinion filed August 14, 1952

|
Day, Lundberg, Stokes, Vaaler & Gillig, for appellant.
Harold D. Shaft, for respondents.

Sarurs, J. This is an action brought by the plaintiff to
restrain and enjoin the defendants, the City of Grand Forks, and
N. B. Knapp, building inspector of the City of Grand Forks
from enforcing City Zoning Ordinance No. 457 as against the

ee 19

use as a trailer park of plaintiff’s real property described in
the Complaint. .

The allegations of the Complaint so fat as material to a
determination of the issues presented are as follows:

That the Defendant, City of Grand Forks, is a municipal
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of North Dakota.

That N. B. Knapp is the building inspector of the City of
Grand Forks.

That the Plaintiff is the owner of Lots Thirteen (13) Fourteen
(14) Fifteen (15) Sixteen (16) Seventeen (17) Highteen (18) and
Nineteen (19) Block Fourteen (14) Riverside Park Addition.

That said property is located on the northerly outskirts
of the City of Grand Forks and is situate along the Red River
at a point below the bank of the Red River and is property which
is flooded at all times in the spring when the Red River increases
to the extent of overflowing its narrower channel; that said
premises have at all times been occupied by the Plaintiff and
Plaintiffs predecessors in interest as a tourist park, with the ex-
ception of one building which has been used for living quarters;
that said premises are unfit for residence purposes.

That in the year 1928, the City of Grand Forks enacted a
zoning ordinance No. 457, designating the above described
premises as a residential area,

That the above described property owned by the Plaintiff
is licensed by the State of North Dakota, as a tourist camp and
is ideally situated for the operation of a tourist camp and trailer
park in the City of Grand Forks, in view of its location on the
outer edge of the City of Grand Forks, not in near proximity to
any residences or business district, away from the hazard of:
traffic, in a shady location and near a city park. Further that
the location and elevation is such that the only use that can be
made of the property is for the parking of vehicles which can
be moved in time of flood as it is impossible to build permanent
buildings because of depreciation and deterioration by flood
conditions and the expense in connection therewith.

That in 1949 the City of Grand Forks enacted Ordinance No.

20 Le

728 providing for the establishment and creation’ of trailer
parks, and pursuant thereto, the plaintiff made application to
the City of Grand Forks building inspector and the city council
for a trailer park permit on or about the Ist day of November,
1950. That the application of the plaintiff was denied on the
grounds that said property was located in a residential zone,
and its location objected to by residents of the vicinity.

That pursuant to the aforementioned ordinances and other
ordinances of the City of Grand Forks, the City has interfered
with the operation of the place of business by the plaintiff; has
caused notice to be served on people camping on the plaintiff's
premises that unless they remove they will be arrested; has
caused the plaintiff to be arrested for violation of the afore-
mentioned Trailer Park Ordinance and has sent agents, officers
and employees of the City on the plaintiff's premises harassing
plaintiffs guests, the plaintiff and her employees. -

The complaint further alleges that said Ordinance No. 457
establishing plaintiff's premises as part of a residential zone
of the city is void and invalid in so far as it affects plaintiff's
property, that it is not a reasonable exercise of the powers of
the city, that it is an attempt by the city to deprive the plaintiff of
her property without due process of law in refusing to permit
plaintiff to use the said premises for purposes for which they are
suited, and that plaintiff is without an adequate remedy at law.

Plaintiff then demands judgment that said Ordinance No. 457
be declared void insofar as it affects plaintiff’s premises and that
the defendant City of Grand Forks, its officers and agents, be
restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's use and posses-
sion of said premises, and that they be restrained from com-
mencing any lawsuit against the plaintiff for the purpose
of enforcing said ordinance. .

The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the grounds
that it did not state a cause of action against the defendants
or either of them. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and
the case is here on appeal from the order sustaining the de-
murrer.

The specification of error assigned is that: the trial court erred

ee 21

in sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the complaint. No ques-
tion has been raised as to the propriety or the form of the action
and the remedy of injunction.

‘The question for. determination is therefore whether the
complaint, liberally, construed, states a cause of action.

A demurrer admits all facts that are well pleaded in the com-
plaint and all intendments and inferences that. may fairly and
reasonably be drawn therefrom. Ginakes v. Johnson, 75 ND
164, 25 NW2d 368; Gilbertson v. Volden, 71 ND 192, 299 NW
250; Mutual L. Ins. Go. v. + State, 71 ND 78,298 NW 773, 138
‘ALB 1145.

“Legal conclusions or inferences of fact which are not pre-
sumed or which may not be reasonably or necessarily presumed
from the facts alleged, are not admitted by demurrer.” Tor-
gerson v. Minneapolis St. Paul & §. 8. M. Ry. Co. 49 ND 1096,
194 NW 741; 41 Am Jur 461. Sec 243.

The statutes of this State, Chapters 40-47, NDRC 1943, permit
the zoning of property in the cities of the State. Section 40-4701
provides:

“40-4701. For the, purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare of the community, the governing
body of any'city may regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the per-
centage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and
other open spaces, and density of industry, residence, or other
purposes. Such regulations may provide that a board of adjust-
ment may determine and vary the application of the regulations
in harmony with their general purpose and intent and in accord-
ance with general or specific rules therein contained.”

Section 40-4702 provides:

“The governing body may divide the city into districts of such
number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to carry
out the purpose of this chapter, and may regulate and restrict
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair,
or use of buildings, structures, or land within such districts. All
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings

22 — Eee

throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may
‘differ from those in other districts.”

Section 40-4703 provides:

“The regulations provided for in this chapter shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and shall be designated
‘to:

. Lessen congestion in the streets ;

. Secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers;

. Promote health and the general welfare;

. Provide adequate light and air;

. Prevent the over-crowding of land;

. Avoid undue concentration of population; and

. Facilitate adequate provisions for transportation, water,
sewage, schools, parks and other public requirements.

The regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration
as to the character of each district and its peculiar suitability
for particular uses with a view of conserving the value of
buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land
throughout the city.”

Plaintiff does not challenge the method of procedure of the
‘City Commission in enacting ordinance No. 457, but contends
‘that it exceeded its powers under said ordinance in including her
property within a residential area, thereby prohibiting the use
thereof for purposes for which it is suited and rendering it
worthless.

The allegations in the complaint upon which plaintiff relies
as stating a cause of action are that her property is situated
along the Red River at a point below its bank and that in the
spring when the river overflows its bank her property is flooded
and made unfit for residential purposes; that said property has
at all times been occupied by plaintiff and her predecessors in
interest as a tourist park with the exception of one building
that has been used as living quarters; that the establishing of
her property as a part of a residential district renders it worth-
less and deprives her thereof without due process of law. There
are however no allegations in the complaint of any specific in-
stances of flooding, nor how recently or how frequently or to

NOAnpPwpre

— 28

what extent the property has been flooded. The complaint al-
leges that the property involved has at all times been occupied
by plaintiff and her predecessors in interest as a tourist camp
and licensed as such by the State of North Dakota; but there is
no allegation that such use of the property has in any manner
been interfered with by the defendants. The main grievance of
the plaintiff under the allegations of the complaint is that Ordi-
nance No. 457 prevents her from enlarging the use of her prop-
erty by the additional use as a trailer camp.

Trailer camps or trailer parks have come to be known as
limited areas within city limits where a large number of people
live in portable trailers for longer or shorter periods of time,
and some times even for years. By reason of undue concentra-
tion of population, lack of proper facilities for removal of rub-
bish, disposal of waste and sewage they may create unsanitary
conditions and endanger the health and welfare of the com-
munity. Because of these conditions trailer camps or trailer
parks have become subject to municipal regulations throughout
the United States.

Under the general rule applicable to zoning ordinances the
plaintiff is permitted to use her property for the non-conforming
use as a tourist camp because it was used as such prior to the
enactment of Ordinance No. 457. However, plaintiff is not
restricted to such use alone. Under the provisions of Ordi-
nance No. 457, set out in the Complaint, the lands within the
zone in which plaintiff’s property is situated may be used for
dwellings, two-family dwellings, churches, schools, parks, play
ground, truck: gardening, nurseries and greenhouses, golf
courses, accessory buildings, and uses customarily incident to
any of the buildings and uses enumerated.

In enacting zoning ordinances the governing body of a city
is exercising a legislative function, and unless such ordinances
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable they will be upheld by
the courts. We quote the following statement from the opinion
in the case of State of Minnesota ex rel. Berry v. Houghton,
164 Minn 146, 204 NW 569, 54 ALR 1012:

“Zoning statutes are becoming common. The police power,
in its nature indefinable, and quickly responsive, in the interest

24 —

of common welfare, to changing conditions, authorizes various
restrictions upon the use of private: property as social and
economic changes come. ‘A restriction, which years ago would
have been intolerable, and would have been thought an uncon-
stitutional restriction of the owner’s use of his property, is
accepted now without a thought that it invades a private right.
As social relations become more complex, restrictions on in-
dividual-rights become more common. With the crowding of
population in the cities, there is an active insistence upon the
establishment of residential districts from which annoying oc-
eupations, and buildings undesirable to the community are ex-
eluded. . . . . 7

Finally, the exercise of the police power is legislative. Its
policy is not for the courts. Only when its exercise unconstitu-
tionally affects personal or property rights do the courts take
cognizance; and it is presumed that the legislative body in-
vestigated and found conditions such that the legislation which
it enacted was appropriate. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota,
226 US 157, 57 L ed 164, 33.8 Ct 66; Otis v. Parker, 187 US
606, 47 L ed 323, 23 S Ct Rep 168; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
US 188, 58 L ed 539, 34 S Ct Rep 281; State v. Fairmont Cream-
ery Co. 162 Minn 146, 42 ALR 548, 202 NW 714.”

And in the case of Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal2d
453, 202 P2d 38, 7 ALR2d 990, the Supreme Court of California
said:

“In considering the scope or nature of appellate review in
a case.of this type we must keep in mind the fact that the courts
are examining the act of a coordinate branch of the government
—the legislative—in a field in which it has paramount authority,
and not reviewing the decision: of a lower tribunal or of a fact
finding body. Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom. of
laws or regulations, and the legislative power must be upheld
unless manifestly abused so as to infringe on constitutional
guaranties. The duty to uphold the legislative power is as much
the duty of appellate courts as it is of trial courts, and under
the doctrine of separation of powers neither the trial nor ap-
pellate courts are authorized to ‘review’ legislative determina-
tions. The only function of the courts is to determine whether

| 25

the exercise of legislative power has exceeded constitutional
limitations, As applied to the case at hand, the function of
this court is to determine whether the record shows a reason-
able basis for the action of the zoning authorities, and if the
reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable, the legisla-
tive determination will not be disturbed. Acker v. Baldwin, 18
Cal2d 341, 344, 115 P2d 455; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City
of Pasadena, 1 Cal2d 87, 94, 33 P2d 672; Zahn v. Board of Public
Works, 274 US 325, 326, 47 S Ct 594, 71 L ed 1074.”

We quote from syllabus in Zahn v. Board of Public Works,
supra:

“Where the question: whether the determination of a city
council that a certain district of the city shall be included within
a particular classification of a comprehensive zoning plan was
an unreasonable, arbitrary, ‘or unequal exercise of power is
fairly debatable, the court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the legislative body, and the conclusion of the latter will
not be disturbed.”

In the syllabus of the case of Webber v. City of Scottsbluff,
141 Neb 363, 3 NW2d 636, the rule is stated as follows:

“Municipal corporations are prima facie the judges of the
necessity and reasonableness of ordinances, and a legal presump-
tion obtains in their favor unless the contrary appears on the
face of the ordinance or is established by clear and unequivocal
evidence.”

The allegations of the complaint in the instant case as to injury
to plaintiff because-of the designation of her property as a
residential area and prohibiting its use as a trailer camp are
general in character, and set forth no specific facts from which
it may be reasonably inferred that plaintiff will suffer ir-
reparable injury.

The general rule of construction of zoning ordinances is stated
as follows, in 58 Am Jur Section 16, page 949:

“Like all legislative enactments, a zoning law is regarded as
presumptively valid, and the burden is upon one assailing it to
overcome the presumption. Every intendment is to be indulged
by the court in favor of the validity of the measure, which will

26 Ee

not be declared invalid unless there is a plain violation of the
constitutional rights, or a clear imcompatibility between the
legislative act and the Constitution. Doubtful cases are decided
in favor of the validity of the zoning law. It is alyo a general
rule that where the language of a zoning statute or ordinance
is reasonably susceptible of different meanings, the courts will
lean to that construction which is consistent with its validity.”

In the case of Miller v. Public Works, 195 Cal 477, 234 Pac
381, 38 ALR 1479, the Supreme Court of California held:

“A large diserction is vested in the legislative branch of the
government with reference to the exercise of the police power.
Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis 591, 51 LRA NS 1009, 146 NW
882, Ann Cas 1915C 1102; State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, supra.
Every intendment is to be indulged by the courts in favor of the
validity of its exercise and, unless the measure is clearly op-
pressive, it will be deemed to be within the purview of that
power. It is only when it is palpable that the measure in con-
troversy has no real or substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, that it will be nullified by
the courts. The courts may differ with the legislature as to the
wisdom and propriety of a particular enactment as a means of
accomplishing a particular end, but as long as there are con-
siderations of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare
which the legislative body may have had in mind, which could
have justified the regulation, it must be assumed by the court
that the legislative body had those considerations in mind, and
that those considerations did justify the regulations.”

In view of the limitations which zoning ordinances may place
upon the use of land within designated areas and under the
principles of law and rules of construction applicable in deter-
mining their validity, the complaint under the most favorable
construction, does not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of
action.

The order of the District Court sustaining the demurrer is
sustained.

Morus, C.J., and Cunrtstianson, Grimson and Burxz, JJ.,
concur.

— 27
[File No. 7237]

M. C. EMERY, Appellant, v. MIDWEST MOTOR EXPRESS
ING., a domestic corporation, Respondent.
and
M. 0. EMERY, Respondent, v. MIDWEST MOTOR EXPRESS
INC., a domestic corporation, Appellant.

(54 Nwe2a 817)

ie
8S

Opinion filed August 26, 1952

J. E. Hendrickson, G. L. Dosland, for plaintiff,
Strute, Jansonius & Fleck, and Wattam, Vogel, Vogel &
Bright, for defendant.

Curistianson, J. This is an action to recover damages al-
leged to have resulted from a collision between a Ford pickup
truck owned and driven by the plaintiff and a tractor and semi-
trailer owned by the defendant and driven by its employee,
Martin Henry. It is alleged in the complaint that the collision
was caused by the negligence of said defendants’ employee.
It is further alleged in the complaint that as a result of the

30 a

collision the plaintiff sustained personal injuries and that the
Ford pickup truck driven by him was damaged all to the damage
of the plaintiff in the sum of $103,457.87. In its answer the
defendant admits that an accident occurred on September 10,
1948, within the City of Fargo in this state in which an automo-
bile driven by the plaintiff collided with the truck owned and
operated by the defendant. All allegations in the complaint
except those specifically admitted are denied. The defendant by
way of further answer alleges that if the plaintiff sustained
the injuries and the damages as alleged in the complaint, ‘such
injuries and damages and the accident causing. the same were
the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the plaintiff
and that plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the happening of
the accident. The case was tried to a jury upon the issues
framed by the pleadings. At the close of plaintiffs case and
again at the close of all the evidence and after both ‘parties had
rested, the defendant moved the court to direct the jury to return
a verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff on the
grounds that the evidence conclusively shows that the accident
and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff, if any, were proxi-
mately and directly caused by the negligence of the plaintiff and
that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the happening
of the accident. The motions were denied and the case submitted
to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for $32,500.00. Judgment was entered
pursuant to the verdict. Thereafter the defendant moved in the
alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a
new trial. After due hearing the trial court made and filed a
memorandum and order wherein he said:

“The court has reviewed the testimony taken at the trial to-
gether with the exhibits offered and received in evidence. Such
review convinces this court that, even though the plaintiff’s
contentions were uncontroverted and the defendant had con-
ceded liability for the collision and resulting damage, the amount
awarded to plaintiff by the jury is far in excess of any damages
for which said plaintiff offered competent proof at the trial. This
court is of the opinion that an award of $3250.00 would be ade-

CT

ee 31

quate compensation to plaintiff for the damages resulting from
the accident.

“It is ordered, therefore, that defendant’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict be denied; that the judgment entered
upon the verdict of the jury against the above named defendant
for the sum of $32,500.00 and costs, be reduced to $3250.00 and
costs; that in the event that plaintiff does not file a written con-
sent to such reduction on or before October 20th, 1950; this court
will enter its order vacating the judgment against said defend-
-ant, vacating and setting aside the verdict of the jury, and grant-
ing a new trial upon the motion of defendant therefor heretofore
made.”

Shortly thereafter the trial court made and entered an order
wherein itis said:

“It is ordered: Defendant’s motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict is denied.

“The Court specifically finds that the jury’s verdict of $32,-
500.00 for the plaintiff was far in excess of any competent proof
offered by the plaintiff, and that such verdict was influenced by
the passion and prejudice of the jury. The Court further finds
that such passion and prejudice did not affect the other issues
of this lawsuit. It is accordingly, .

“Ordered: In the event the plaintiff does not before October
20, 1950 file with the clerk of this court his written consent reduc-
ing the judgment herein from $32,500.00 and costs to $3,250.00
and costs, the defendant shall have a new trial herein, and the
judgment heretofore entered shall be vacated and the verdict set
aside.”

The plaintiff refused to consent to a reduction of the amount
of the judgment as provided in the orders of the court and on
October 28, 1950, the court made an order referring to its. former
orders and providing further that:

“It is, ordered:

“1. Defendant’s motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict is denied.

“2. The defendant is granted a new trial, and the judgment
herein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the

32 a

sum of $32,537.05, dated May 23, 1950, is vacated and the verdict
in this lawsuit is set aside.”

The plaintiff appealed from both of these orders. The defend-
ant alsd appealed from both orders. One of the specifications of
error on the appeal of the defendant is predicated upon the prop-
osition that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict.
The motion for a directed verdict was based upon the ground that
“the evidence conclusively shows that this particular accident
and the resulting injuries, if any, to the plaintiff were proxi-
mately and directly caused by the negligence of the plaintiff and
that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the happening
of the accident.” It seems desirable to consider and determine
the question thus raised before other specifications of error are
considered because if the evidence conclusively shows that the
accident and resulting injuries were proximately and directly
caused by the negligence of the plaintiff and that the defendant
is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, then, of
course, the other assignments of error would become immaterial.

It is admitted that a collision occurred on. September 10, 1948,
at the corner of 13th Street North (U. 8S. Highway No. 81) and
First Avenue North (U. S. Highway No. 10) in the City of
Fargo in. which a Ford pickup truck driven. by the plaintiff col-
lided with a tractor and semi-trailer truck owned by the defend-
ant and operated by one of its employees. On the morning
of September 10, 1948, shortly after 6 o’clock in the morning of
that day the plaintiff drove a 1946 half ton Ford pickup truck
in a northerly direction on said 13th Street which is also U. 8.
Highway No, 81 and he approached the- point where 18th
Street intersects First Avenue North. The plaintiff testified
that as he was approaching the intersection of such two streets
he was driving at a speed of about 20 to 22 miles an hour; that
when he had reached a point about 15 or 20 feet south of the
south curb line of said First Avenue North he'looked to the left
and saw no cars or vehicles approaching the intersection on said
First Avenue North; that after looking to the west he kept on
going north and as he was about to enter the intersection he
looked to the right or east and saw a Midwest Motor Express

ee 33

Company truck approaching the intersection from the east, and
that he estimated that the Midwest Motor Express Company
truck was about 50 or 60 feet east of the curb line on the east
side of 13th Street; that the right rear fender of his truck was
struck by the Midwest tractor; that he feels certain that his
pickup truck was rolled over; that tools and certain material he
had in the pickup truck were strewn over the street; that after
the accident the pickup truck stopped in the driveway of a Texaco
station on the west side of 13th Street and north of First Avenue
North; that it was standing on its wheels and apparently had
turned over and righted itself; that it faced toward the west;
that he thinks that the place where the pickup stopped and came
to rest was 46 feet north of the north curb line of First Avenue
North; that the defendant’s truck, that is, the front wheels of the
tractor were about a foot and a half onto the boulevard off the
street on the west side of First Avenue North, that is, that the
front wheels of the Midwest tractor were north of the north
curb line on First Avenue North and up on the boulevard; that
when his truck was hit by the defendant’s truck he was north
of the center line of First Avenue North and had already started
out of the intersection.

Martin Henry, the driver of the defendant’s truck, testified
that he had driven the truck from St. Paul, Minnesota, that it
was loaded and that his destination was Fargo; that in the
morning of September 10th he was driving in a westerly direc-
tion on First Avenue North in Fargo at a speed of about 20
miles an hour; that the stop and go signals were operating
and that at the intersection of 13th Street and First Avenue
North the stop lights “were on caution,” that there was a
flickering sign, that he was in fourth gear under because as he
was approaching he saw the light was caution, and approxi-
mately 40 or 50 feet from the entrance to the intersection he
shiftd to a lower gear,—to third under; that he looked to the
left and did uot see any vehicles traveling on 13th Street, either
north or south, that he then looked to the right when he was
approximately 20 or 30 feet away from the east curb on 13th
Street and that he could see no vehicles coming from the north;

34 a

that when he came into the intersection he looked to the left and
noticed a Ford pickup coming toward him, that this pickup
was going north, that at this time he was near the east sidewalk
in the intersection, that is, the sidewalk just cast of 13th Street
for travel in a northerly and southerly direction; that when
he saw the Emery truck he would say it was about 15 feet south
of the sidewalk and was coming very fast; that he started to
turn the truck he was driving to the right, that before that he
applied his brakes, that the brakes operated on the tractor and
trailer together, that as he came into the intersection he was
traveling at a rate of approximately 13 to 15 miles per hour;
that he did not negotiate the turn to the right, that just the
tractor part started to turn; that the left front bumper of the
tractor came in contact with the right rear fender of Emery’s
truck; that after the contact the pickup went on and hit a stop
and go signal at the northwest corner of the intersection and
then. went off up 13th Street and stopped; that the pickup
driven by Emery did not turn over; that he estimates that the
point where the pickup truck stopped on 13th Street was ap-
proximately 25 fect north of the intersection and that when it
stopped the truck was facing west; that immediately prior to
and at the time of the collision he was driving in a westerly
direction in the north lane of travel, and about four feet north
of the center line of First Avenue North.

Both Emery and Henry agree that it was a clear day, that
there were no cars parked on the streets near the intersection
and that there were no vehicles operating on either of the streets.
Vernon Jorgenson, a member of the police force of the City
of Fargo, testified that he received a radio order concerning
the collision at 6:08 that morning and that he at once went
to the scene of the accident; that he found the Midwest truck
with the right front wheel of the tractor part on the boulevard
on the northwest corner of the intersection, that the tractor and
semi-trailer were facing west, that he investigated to ascertain
whether there was any indication of brake marks and that he
found such marks and measured them; that one of the marks
was 15 feet in length and the other 16 feet in length; that they

|

ee 35

extended from the rear tires of the trailer toward the east,—
that the course was a “little bit of an angle northwesterly ;” that
the marks started a little east of the east crosswalk on 13th
Street, that such walk is approximately 8 feet east of the curb
on 18th Street, that the right front wheel of the tractor came
to rest on the boulevard over the curb on the west side of 13th
Street, that the tire marks were in the north lane of travel on
First Avenue North, that the point of impact of the collision
was north of and just past the center line of First Avenue North.
That he talked with both drivers, that he asked Henry what
had happened and that to the best of his recollection Henry said
he had not seen the pickup coming; that he made a record
of the license number of the defendant’s truck and such matters
as are reported in the investigation of an accident of this charac-
ter.

Questions of negligence and contributory negligence and
proximate cause are generally questions of fact for the jury.
They become questions of law only when the evidence is such
that reasonable minds cannot reasonably draw different con-
clusions either as to the facts or the deductions to be drawn
therefrom. Dougherty v. Davis, 48 ND 883, 187 NW 616; Fitz-
maurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 ND 191, 242 NW 526; Logan v.
Schjeldahl, 66 ND 152, 262 NW 463. After considering all the
evidence in this case we have reached the conclusion that the
questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the
jury and that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

Error is assigned by the defendant upon the admission of
testimony to the effect that after the accident Martin Henry,
the driver of defendant’s tractor and semi-trailer, said that he
did not see the pickup truck coming. This statement was made
to the policeman who had come to the scene in response to a
radio order. The policeman asked what had happened and
the driver Henry then, according to the testimony of the police-
man and a bystander Hammett, an employee of the plaintiff
Emery, said: “I did not see the pickup coming.” This occurred
within minutes after the collision took place. The parties were
still there. Their vehicles were in the positions in which they

36 a

were placed after the collision. At the beginning of the intro-
duction of testimony in the case and during the examination of
the president of the defendant company it was stipulated that at
the time of the accident Henry was employed by the defendant
company, was on the business of the defendant company and
acting within the scope of his employment. The statement by
the driver Henry was made within minutes after the accident had
oceurred. The driver Henry was still in charge of and the
operator of defendant’s truck. The task entrusted to him by
the defendant had not been completed. It was still part of his
duty to complete the journey and to deliver the loaded truck at
the terminal in Fargo. We think that the testimony as to the
statement by the driver Henry was admissible. Myers v. Hagert
Construction Co., 74 ND 435, 28 NW2d 29; Rivera v. United
Electric Rys. Co. (RI) 151 Atl 130; Barrett v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. Co., 190 Ia 509, 175 NW 950, 180 NW 670; Williams
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 138 SC 281, 136 SE 218;
‘Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Deahl, 126 Va 141, 100 SE 840;
Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Electric Corporation et al.
151 SC 391, 149 SE 111; Wilcox v. Berry et al. (Cal App) 184
P2d 939; Wilcox v. Berry ct al., 32 Cal2d 189, 195 P2d 414;
Mulich v, Graham Ship By Truck Co., 162 Kans 61, 174 P2d
98; Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co. of Oregon, 152 Ore 286,
53 P2d 1065. :

Plaintiff contends that the court erred in granting a new trial
on the ground of excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. The laws of
this state provide that the verdict may be vacated and a new trial
granted on such ground on the application of the party ag-
grieved. NDRC 1943, 28-1902, subd 5.

In its original form the statute provided that a verdict might
be vacated and a new trial granted on the application of the party
aggrieved for “excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.” CO. L. 1913,
See 7660. Under this statute the court had no authority, where
a motion for a new trial was made “on the ground of excessive
damages appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice” and it appeared to the court that a verdict

ee 37

had been so given, to require the successful party to remit the
excess or as an alternative to procecd to a new trial of the case.
If it appeared that excessive damages had been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice, the party against whom
the verdict was rendered was entitled to a new trial and the court
had no authority to require the successful party to remit the
excess or proceed to a new trial. Waterman v. Minneapolis, St.
P. &S. Ste. M. Ry. Co., 26 ND 540, 145 NW 19.

The statute was amended and reenacted by the Legislative
Assembly in 1923 to read as follows:

“Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice. Where a new trial is asked
for on this ground, and it appears that the passion and prejudice
affected only the amount of damages allowed, and did not in-
fluence the findings of the jury on other issues in the case, the
trial court on hearing the motion, and the supreme court on
appeal, shall have power to order a reduction of the verdict in
lieu of a new trial; or to order that a new trial be had unless the
party in whose favor the verdict was given remit the excess
of damages.” Laws 1923, Ch 334.

"And the statute as so amended and reenacted was embodied in
NDRC 1943, 28-1902, subd 5 without any material change.

Where a motion for a new trial is made on the ground of ex-
cessive damages appearing to have been given under the in-
fluence of passion or prejudice the duty is placed upon the trial
court to whom the motion is addressed to consider and weigh
the evidence. “T'his necessarily involves an exercise by the trial
judge of the superior knowledge possessed by him as to matters
incident to the trial itself.” A motion for a new trial based on
such ground is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the
trial court and its ruling will be disturbed only when an abuse of
discretion is clearly shown. Reid v. Ehr, 36 ND 552, 162 NW
903; Green v. Soule, 145 Cal 96, 78 Pac 387.

In Reid v. Ehr, supra, this court said:

“In actions in which there is no definite or legal measure
of damages, as is especially true in most actions sounding in tort,
the quantum of damages is deemed a matter of discretion for
the jury to such an extent that the verdict will not be set aside

38 |

on this ground alone, unless the amount awarded is so excessive
as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice. The discretion of the jury in fixing damages in
such cases is not absolute, however, and ‘in whatever form the
rule is stated, it always involves a reasonable discretionary
power in the court to set aside a verdict when its amount, in
view of all the circumstances, is so great as to show that the
jury, in arriving at it, must have been influenced by some im-
proper motive.’ 4 Sedgw Damages, 9th ed., Sec 1326.

“In this state the statute confers express authority upon
the district court to grant a new trial for ‘excessive damages
appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice,’ on the application of the party aggrieved. Comp
Laws 1913, See 7660. Or even without such application, upon the
court’s own motion, ‘when there has been such plain disregard
by the jury of the instructions of the court or the evidence in the
case as to satisfy the court that the verdict was rendered under
a misapprehension of such instructions or under the influence of
passion or prejudice.’ Comp Laws 1913, Sec 7665. These statu-
tory provisions clearly, not only vest in the trial court the power
to set aside a verdict returned under the influence of passion or
prejudice, but imply a duty on the part of the court sometimes
to set aside such verdicts.”

The evidence shows that after the collision the plaintiff com-
menced to pick up tools and other articles that had been thrown
out of his pickup truck and when one of his employees who had
arrived wanted to take him home plaintiff said he wanted to
get the things picked up. Later the employee took plaintiff to
his home in a cab and a doctor was called who sent him to St.
Luke’s Hospital in Fargo and placed him under the care of Dr.
Hall, a member of the Fargo Clinic. Dr. Hall testified that he
saw the plaintiff at the hospital at approximately 9 o’clock in the
morning of September 10, 1948, that the plaintiff complained of
pain in the region of the back and over the left lower chest.
That Dr. Hall ordered x-rays to be taken of the back. That on
examining these x-ray photographs he saw no evidence of frac-
ture or serious difficulty with the vertebrae or the back. That
he made a complete and thorough examination of the back itself,

ee 39

examined the muscles for spasm and the lower extremities for
nerve involvement. That there was no evidence of nerve injury,
that there was evidence of some muscle spasm indicating that
the plaintiff had some pain of some sort at that time. That
he called in Dr. Fortin, a specialist in orthopedic surgery, on
the day following plaintifi’s admission to the hospital and that
he (Dr. Hall) and Dr. Fortin examined the x-rays together.
That Emery was discharged from the hospital on September 13,
1948. Dr. Fortin testified that he was called in consultation
while Emery was in the hospital after the accident. That he
examined the x-rays that had been taken of Hmery’s back and
spine. Dr. Fortin said, “they thought at first he might have some
slipping of the vertebrae. But we went over them carefully and
we didn’t find any slipping forward. We found a normal x-ray
of the back.” That “he (Emery) complained of an area of
pain. . . . But to have pain as much as he stated he had, he
should have had other findings along with it, muscle spasm or
limitation of motion, which I could not make out. . . . You
can injure the low back soft tissues without injuring the bone
and still have pain, but it will show up in limitation of motion
or muscle spasm.” That Emery complained of a lot of pain but
that he (Dr. Fortin) could not find anything to justify that.

The plaintiff testified as to calls on doctors and treatments,
and that he was not receiving any relief, that he was very nervous
and in a lot of pain and that finally he called Dr. Hall on the
telephone and asked him to make an appointment for him at
Rochester. That Dr. Hall answered that he did not think this
was necessary, that thereafter about October 18, 1948, the plain-
tiff went to Rochester without an appointment and entered the
Mayo Clinic and remained there for about a week. That he was
examined by four different doctors at the Mayo Clinic and that
x-rays were taken of his back. That the doctors gave him no
treatment and told him to continue wearing a brace or belt
that had been prescribed by Dr. Fortin and to continue to sleep
on a board as Dr. Fortin had recommended and to come back to
the Clinic in approximately three months. He did not go back.
The x-rays taken at Rochester were not produced upon the trial
nor was the testimony of any of the doctors who examined

I

40. Ee

him at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester offered. About January,
1949, the plaintiff consulted one Dr. Keal, a doctor of chiroprac-
tic at Moorehead, Minnesota. Dr. Keal took some x-rays of the
plaintifi’s back and gave him some chiropractic treatments. Dr.
Keal testified that there was no fracture of any of the vertebrae
and that if he had been suspicious of a fracture he would have
referred the case to a medical doctor and that if he had found
or seen anything gravely wrong with any of the vertebrae he
thinks he would have referred the plaintiff to Dr. Fortin. He did
testify that from a chiropractic point of view there was some-
thing abnormal about the plaintiff’s cervical vertebrae, but that
a large number of cases coming to his office, probably more than
fifty percent, indicated a tilting of vertebrae one way or the
other. That there were no fractures at all. That there was “a
minute displacement, what we call in our profession a subluxa-
tion.”

After consulting Dr. Keal the plaintiff went to a chiropractic
clinic in South Dakota where he took a number of treatments.

Dr. Swanson, a specialist in orthopedic surgery in Fargo,
North Dakota, and who had been engaged in practice as such
specialist for some 22 years, was called and testified. He
testified that he examined the plaintiff Emery in March, 1950, at
the request of one of defendant’s attorneys. Dr. Swanson de-
scribed in some detail the examination made by him. Dr.
Swanson said: “He was stripped and we examined him from
head to foot especially in relation to his spine, his pelvis and
his extremities, with a checkup specially on his neurological
changes, reflexes, to see whether or not he might have some
damage to his spinal cord and nerve roots.” He further testi-
fied that certain x-rays were taken of his neck, his dorsal and
lumbar spines, and his pelvis. The doctor produced such x-ray
photographs and they were offered and received in evidence.
The doctor further testified that the x-ray photographs showed
no abnormality, that there was nothing to indicate that there
was anything abnormal or wrong with any of the vertebrae
except that one of the x-rays gave evidence of a low grade
osteoarthritis of the spine, that that condition had existed for
a long time and had existed prior to the accident in September,

ee 41

1948. Dr. Swanson said there was no evidence of any fracture
of any kind or of any dislocation of the spine or vertebrae and
that he saw nothing that would indicate a fracture or inju}
of any kind.

It will be noted there were no objective symptoms of plain-
tiff’s injuries. According to the evidence no injury was apparent.
even with the aid of x-ray photographs of the portion of the
body which it was claimed had been injured resulting in severe
pain. Proof of the extent of the injury rested almost wholly upon
the word of the plaintiff. It has been said by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota that in such circumstances a large verdict is sub-
jected to close scrutiny. Propper v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.
Co. 237 Minn 386, 54 NW2d 840, 85 ALR2d 459; Johnson v. G.
N. Ry. Co. 107 Minn 285, 119 NW 1061; Haugen v. N. P. Ry. Co.
132 Minn 54, 155 NW 1058; Levan v. C. RB. I. & P. Ry. Co. 158
Minn 69, 196 NW 673; Becker v. Megan, 204 Minn 283, 283 NW
401..

In. this case the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff for $32,500.00. This is a large verdict. It is not for
us to say whether the damages awarded were so excessive as
to appear to have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice. That was a matter for the trial judge to determine
and the function of this court is to review the ruling of the
trial court on such motion to ascertain whether the trial court
in granting a new trial abused his judicial discretion and thereby
effected aninjustice. Reidv. hr, supra. We are all agreed that
under the facts and circumstances in this case it cannot be said
that the trial court abused the discretion vested in him by order-
ing a new trial.

What has been said disposes of plaintiff’s appeal. However,
on its appeal the defendant has assigned error on certain rulings
and.presented certain questions which seem likely to arise upon
another trial. Mr. Roswick, the president of the defendant
company, was called for cross-examination under the provisions
of NDRC 1943, 31-0202, which provides that a party to the
record of any civil action or an officer of any corporation which
is a party to the record of the action, at the instance of the:
adverse party may be examined upon the trial of the action “as

42 ee

if under cross-examination and for that purpose may be com-
pelled to testify in the same manner and subject to the same
rfles for examination as any other witness. However, the
party calling for such examination shall not be concluded thereby
but may rebut it by counter testimony.” On the cross-examina-
tion Roswick was examined by plaintifi’s counsel at length ‘as
to how many trucks the defendant company was operating, how
many branch offices it had and matters of that kind. To the
admission of this testimony defendant’s counsel interposed timely
objections. The objections were overruled and the examination
permitted to continue along this line on the asserted ground that
it was cross-examination under the statute. (NDRC 1943, 31-
0202). The purpose and effect of this statute (NDRC 1943,
31-0202), was considered by this court in Whipple. v. First
National Bank, 57 ND 844, 224 NW 297; Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61
ND 389, 237 NW 915.

In Whipple v. First National Bank, supra, this court said:

“The statute means simply this: that any party to the record
may be called as a matter of right for cross-examination by the
other party to the action, where the record shows that there
is an issue between them to be tried’ . .

“The right to call any such witness existed before the enact-
ment of the statute. The only effect of the statute is to permit
him to be examined ‘as if under cross-examination’ and to re-
move from the party calling him a sponsorship that would pre-
vent him from rebutting his testimony.” 57 ND at pp 847-848.

In Hunder v. Rindlaub, supra, this Court said:

“The purpose of the statute was to permit a party to an
action to call the adverse party,—or, where a corporation is.a
party, a director officer, superintendent or managing agent there-
of,—and to examine such party as regards some -pertinent
fact involved in the controversy. It was recognized that such.
party might, and probably would, possess knowledge pertinent.
to the inquiry; that such party probably would be an unwilling.
witness; and that.his interests might, and probably would, be.
adversely affected by the testimony sought to be elicited;.so it
was provided, that he might be examined under the rules: of
cross-examination, that is, subjected to leading questions, -and-

ee 43

that his testiziony:should not be binding upon the party calling
him.” 61ND at pp 409-410.

In considering a similar statute the Supreme ‘Court of Minne-
sota said:”

“The object of the statute was to permit a party to call his
adversary at the trial, without making him his own witness, and
elicit from him, if possible, material facts within his knowledge
by a cross-examination, precisely as if he had-already been
examined on his own behalf in chief.” Suter v. Page, 64 Minn
444, 67 NW 67.

As was said by this court the purpose of the ‘statute was to
permit a party to an action to call the adverse party or where
the adverse party is a corporation to call a director, an officer,
or managing agent thereof and to examine such party “as
regards some pertinent fact involved in the controversy,” under
the rules of cross-examination so as to remove from the party
calling him a sponsorship which would prevent him from re-
butting the testimony so elicited on cross-examination. The
statute was never intended to permit an examination to elicit
‘proof as to some irrelevant collateral subject such, for instance,
as the financial ability of the defendant in an action for com-
pensatory damages as was attempted to be done in this case,

This action was brought to recover compensatory damages
only. There was no basis for the allowance of exemplary or
punitive damages. The questions in the case were whether the
plaintiff had been injured as a result of the negligence of the
defendant’s employee in the operation of the particular truck
owned by the defendant involved in the accident and, if so, the
amount that plaintiff was entitled to recover to compensate
him for such injury. If plaintiff was so injured, then he was
entitled to a verdict for the amount of his loss without regard
to whether the defendant owned and operated only the truck
that was involved in the accident or whether it owned and
operated a thousand additional trucks. “The financial condition
of the parties involved has ordinarily no bearing upon the
amount to be awarded as compensatory: damages. Hence, as
a general rule, admission of evidence as to the pecuniary condi-
tion or financial cireumstances of defendant is error where only

44 Ee

-such damages may be awarded.” 25 OJS, p 562, sec 71. The
evidence elicited on cross-examination over the objection of de-
fendant’s attorney as to the number of trucks the de-
fendant owned and operated, the number of branch offices it
maintained and the ‘extent of its business was not pertinent to
-the issues involved on the trial and it was error to allow such
evidence to be introduced. Taulborg v. Andresen, 119 Neb 273,
228-NW 528, 67 ALR 642; Washington-Virginia Ry. Co. v. Deahl,
126 Va 141, 100 SE 840; Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss 603, 7 So2d
519; Stewart v. Mutual Clothing Co., 195 Mise 244, 91 NYS2d"
338.

Defendant also assigns error upon the court’s rulings in the
admission of the testimony of the plaintiff Emery with respect
to the value of his services in the conduct of his business. The
plaintiff Emery was engaged in the excavation business,—in
excavating basements and work of that type. He operated and
conducted his own business and he owned machinery adapted
for the performance of the work and employed men to operate
the machines and to work on the various jobs. It is the claim
of the plaintiff that as the result of his injury he has been and
will be unable to perform the work which he formerly performed
and hence unable to conduct the business. On his examination
as a witness plaintiff’s counsel asked the plaintiff the following
question: “The question, Mr. Emery, is what in your opinion
was the value of your services to your business, prior to your
injury, how much per year?” Defendant’s counsel objected to
the question on the ground that it was not a proper subject of
expert testimony, that it called for a conclusion of the witness,
invaded the province of the jury, was speculative, conjectural
and uncertain, that no proper foundation had been laid and that
the evidence did not go to show a proper element of damage.
The objection was overruled and the plaintiff answered: “Well,
I would say that approximately—I don’t know how I can esti-
mate that in money. I can’t replace myself with anyone. I
would say around ten thousand dollars, maybe twelve thousand
dollars.” After the answer had been given defendant’s counsel
moved that the answer be stricken substantially on the same
grounds that were stated in the objection. The court permitted

ee 45

the answer to stand. We belicve that the objection to the ques-
tion was well founded. If the plaintiff sustained a loss to the
business conducted by him as a result of his injuries he would
have the burden of proving such loss by evidence establishing
the same with reasonable certainty so that the jury would have
evidence of facts from which they might ascertain and determine
the amount of damages. The rules to be applied in the proof
of loss of earnings or profits in such case were considered and
stated by this court in Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co. 73 ND
134, 12 NW2d 526.

We are all agreed that the testimony of the plaintiff giving
his opinion or estimate as to the value of his services to his busi-
ness was not admissible and that the court erred in admitting
such testimony. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Stephens, 75 Ohio St
171, 79 NE 235; Schwartz v. Hitel, 132 Fed2d 760; Williamson vy.
Feinstein, 311 Mass 322, 41 NE2d 185.

This disposes of such assignments of error by the defendant
as seem likely to arise upon a new trial and which may properly
be determined by this court on this appeal. The orders appealed
from are affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Sarurs, Burks, Grimson, JJ., concur.

46 a
[File No. 7308]

GLADYS ELLISON, Appellant, v. THILO 0. ELLISON, Re-
spondent..

(54 NW2d 656) °

Opinion filed August 25, 1952

Ella Van Berkom, for appellant.
McGee & McGee, for respondent.

Per Curiam. The instant appeal is from the judgment award-
ing a divorce to the defendant. The case is in this court for
trial de novo on demand of the plaintiff.

The action was originally brought in July 1949, for a decree
of separation, for maintenance and support, and for the custody
of the children of the marriage. See Chapter 14-06 NDRC 1943,
The defendant answered denying the allegations of fact on
which the plaintiff predicated her prayer for relief and by cross

De a7

complaint prayed for a divorce on the grounds of extreme
cruelty and desertion. Chapter 14-05 NDRC 1943. Thereafter,
in May 1950, the plaintiff amended her complaint praying there-
in for an absolute divorce, alimony and support money, and the
custody of the children, alleging as grounds therefor cruelty on
the part of the defendant.

The case came on for trial. Due to the patience and forbear-
ance of the trial court,-more than a week was consumed by the
trial. The transcript of the testimony consists of 1308 pages
and there are a great number of exhibits. The trial court found
for the defendant and ordered judgment for a divorce on the
grounds of cruelty and desertion; whereupon the plaintiff per-
fected the instant appeal.

It is unnecessary to state more than a brief summary of the
evidence. The parties were married in June 1938. The plain-
tiff was then 28 years of age; the defendant 33. They had no
property other than their few personal belongings, and their
cash capital was $25.00, contributed by the plaintiff. Two chil-
dren were born of this marriage—one a son, now 18 years old,
and the other a daughter, now 8., They moved about consider-
ably during the first years of the marriage but finally settled in
Minneapolis, where they lived for some time. Thereafter,
through their joint efforts they accumulated some property. In
1946 they moved to Garrison, North Dakota, where they estab-
lished a tourist court. They lived there until April 1948, build-
ing and operating the court. The defendant did a large part
of the work in its construction. The plaintiff looked after and
managed its operation.’ It was a reasonably successful financial
enterprise. Plaintiff, however, was not wholly satisfied there;
so, largely at the plaintiff’s insistence, the defendant consenting,
the parties removed to Minneapolis and advertised the court for
sale. No sale, however, was made. In Minneapolis they pur-
chased a rooming house, a building then considerably in dis-
repair. Both labored at putting it in usable condition. The
plaintiff and the children remained in Minneapolis, occupying
an apartment in this building. The defendant returned to Garri-
son to complete some of the cabins on the court there, then in
the process of construction, and to assist in the operation of

48 es

the court. For some time he frequently returned to Minneapolis
where.he and the plaintiff lived as man and wife. . He left his
clothing there and had his tools—he was somewhat of a carpén-
ter and mechanic—in the basement. But it was deemed neces-
sary for him to spend the greater part of his time at Garrison.
During the first part of 1948 when he was at Garrison, he wrote
affectionate letters to the plaintiff and the children. As time
went on, however, his interest and ardor diminished and in
December 1948 he paid his.last visit to the family in Minneapolis
and for the last time he and the plaintiff lived together as man
and wife. Thereafter he made no visits to the family. But in
March 1949 he went down to make out a joint income tax return
with the plaintiff. Their place of residence was stated therein
as North Dakota. In June 1949 the plaintiff, dissatisfied with
his failure and refusal to return, consulted a lawyer, and defend-
ant, at her request, came to Minneapolis where both parties con-
ferred with this lawyer, but arrived at no conclusion as to what
should be done. Defendant then, without notice to the plaintiff,
took the children and returned with them to Garrison. Shortly
thereafter plaintiff went to Garrison and, denied admission to
the living quarters in the court, forcibly entered the same, and
in a few days brought the action for a separation.

The trial was concluded on August 4, 1950, and apparently
before the testimony was transcribed, the court on February 8;
1951, made and signed his findings of fact and conclusions of law
and order judgment for the defendant; awarded him a divorce
on the grounds of cruelty and desertion; awarded the rooming
house to the plaintiff and the tourist court to the defendant; and
gave the custody of the son of the marriage to the plaintiff and
the daughter to the defendant. He found the value of the room-
-ing house to be $12,500.00, subject to a mortgage, and the tourist
court to be of the value of $13,125.00, subject to three mort-
gages and delinquent taxes. Judgment was entered accordingly.

The case being here for trial de novo, it must be tried anew
in this court on the record as made in the trial court. The
findings of the trial court, however, while not conclusive on this
court, are entitled to appreciable ‘consideration and weight. See
Belt v. Belt, 75 ND 723, 32 NW2d 674, and cases. cited therein.

Es 49

Viewing the record in the light of the rule stated above, this
court is of the opinion that the finding of the trial court of
eruelty on the part of the plaintiff is warranted by the record
and therefore the judgment of divorce on that ground is af-
firmed. However, in many other respects the findings of the
trial court, including that of desertion on the part of the plaintiff,
are not sustainable on the record. Both partics were at fault
and the record is such that had the court found for the plaintiff
this court would have had no hesitancy in affirming a judgment
in plaintiff's favor.

The record warrants the finding as to the value of the room-
ing house and of the tourist court, but there is no finding as
to the value of their furnishings and equipment, nor of the
other personal property, if any, of the parties. In any event,
such property as they have, both real and personal, was ac-
quired and accumulated subsequent to their marriage and
through their joint efforts.

“When a divorce is granted, the court shall make such equi-
table distribution of the real and personal property of the
parties as may seem just and proper, . . . .” Section 14-0524
NDRC 1943.

See also in this connection Ruff v. Ruff, 78 ND 775, 52 NW
2d 107. Considering all the facts and circumstances disclosed
by the record, we are agreed that the judgment as to the divi-
sion of the real property should be affirmed and the furnishings
and equipment of the rooming house awarded to the plaintiff
and those of the tourist court to the defendant. Such other
personal property as the respective partics now have in their
possession is awarded to the present possessors thereof.

This court is of the opinion that the trial court erred with
respect to the custody of the children. The defendant, who was
awarded the custody of his daughter, has no place of abode
other than the tourist court. His health is not good; his habits
are not exemplary. Other than the trial court’s finding that
the plaintiff sometimes exhibited a somewhat ungovernable
temper, there is nothing to indicate that she is not a fit and
proper person to have the custody of the children. The chil-

50 De

dren, both of whom testified, refused to state any preference
as to whether their custody should be given to the plaintiff or
the defendant. The little girl testified that she liked both of
them. The plaintiff now has the custody of both. We are of
the opinion that they should remain in her custody unless and
until otherwise ordered, subject to the right of reasonable visi-
tation by the defendant. The cost of the transcript is $817.50.
Both sides were at fault in creating a record of such magnitude.
Accordingly, the cost of procuring the transcript should be
borne equally by the parties, and the plaintiff, having procured
it, shall have judgment against the defendant for $408.75.

The plaintiff, being awarded the custody of the children, is

_ entitled to at least a part of the expense necessarily to be en-

tailed in their care, maintenance, and upbringing. Therefore,
the defendant will pay for their support and maintenance the
sum of $50.00 per month until the further order of the court.

The division of their property having been ordered as above
stated, each of the parties is directed to execute such convey-
ances to the other as may be necessary to effectuate the division.
In case such parties, or either of them, fail or refuse to comply
with this direction, the judgment entered shall stand as for and
in lieu of such conveyances. The real property awarded to the
defendant will be charged with a lien to insure the payment of
defendant’s portion of the cost of the transcript..

The case is remanded to the trial court for disposition con-
sistent with the foregoing opinion, and the judgment as thus
modified is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Burks, Sarurs, Curistianson and Grrusox,
JJ., concur.

:

a 51
[File No. 7318]

HAROLD F. ACKERMAN, Appellant, v. RICHARD
FISCHER, Respondent

(54 NW2d 734)

Opinion filed August 27, 195:

James R. Jungroth and Quentin N. Burdick, for respondent.

Morris, Ch. J. The plaintiff brought this action to recover
damages to his automobile caused by a collision with a combine
as being towed by the defendant behind a truck on state
highway 49 in Grant County. He alleges that the collision and
resultant damage were due to the carelessness and negligence of
the defendant. The defendant answered and alleged that the

Ba ee

éollision and the damage to the vehicles involved were proxi-
mately caused or contributed to by the negligence of the plaintiff
in thé operation of his automobile. ‘The defendant also counter-
claimed, alleging ownership of the combine and its damage as
the result of plaintiff’s negligence to the extent of $1200.00. To
this counterclaim the plaintiff replied by general denial and by a
reallegation of his claim of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. The case was tried to a jury which found for the defendant
for dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action. From a judgment en-
tered pursuant to this verdict, the plaintiff appeals. He also
appeals from an or der of the trial court denying a motion for a
new trial.

Shortly before six o’clock on the evening of October 20, 1950,
the plaintiff drove north from the village of’ Elgin on state
highway 49 and ‘after traveling about four miles met the defend-
ant who was driving south in a Ford truck, behind which he was
towing a combine.” The road at that point was level with a
gravel surface about 26} feet wide. The lights on both the truck
and, the plaintiffs car had been turned on, although deep dark-
ness had not yet arrived. The platform and sickle bar had been
removed from the combine and placed in the truck. There were
clearance lights on the body of the truck which is commonly
known as a grain box. There were no lights on the combine.
The grain box was seven or eight feet wide and, according to
the defendant’s testimony, the combine was about eleven feet
wide. As the vehicles were passing, the left front wheel of
plaintifi’s car struck the left wheel of the combine and sheared
off the combine axle. The axle and side of the machine dropped
to the surface of the road in which they gouged a furrow for a
considerable distance. The sheriff of Grant County was notified
of the accident and arrived on the scene at about 6:35 p.m. He
took various measurements from which he testified that the
road was 263 feet wide and that the impression in the gravel
made by thé broken axle or edge of the combine extended back
a distance of 49 feet from where the combine was then resting;
that ‘the point-at which this mark began was 12 feet from the
west side of the highway and 144 feet from the east side, and the
distance to where the plaintiff’s car had come to rest after turti-

ee 55

ing over in the west highway ditch was 228 feet. Both the plain-
tiff and the defendant were present when the measurements
were taken and the sheriff’s testimony is not seriously disputed.
The sheriff took flashlight pictures of the scene of the accident
which were admitted in evidence. One of these pictures clearly
shows the impression in the surface of the highway as described
by the sheriff. The plaintiff testified that he was traveling 40
to 45 miles an hour when he met the truck and that the defend-
ant’s lights were very bright. The defendant testified that the
plaintiff was driving about 70 miles an hour as they met. He
felt a jar when the plaintiff passed, stopped his truck, and dis-
covered that a wheel was gone off the combine and the axle or
side of the combine had dropped to the road and had made a
furrow. He also testified that he dimmed the lights on his truck
as the plaintiff approached and that he also had a three cell
flashlight with which he signaled to on-coming traffic. His truck
was traveling about 12 miles an hour.

The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. The appel-
lant assigns various errors on the part of the trial court as the
basis for seeking a new trial. These he discusses in his brief
under five points, the most important of which deal with the
court’s instructions to the jury. The transcript discloses that
counsel for the defendant made a request for an instruction to
the effect that it is immaterial who commenced the action first.
But it does not show whether the instruction was actually given
and, if it was given, whether it was in writing or oral, or whether
it was given during or after the giving of the general instruc-
tions which were in writing. The plaintiff now claims that this
instruction was given orally without his consent and is also
erroneous. However, in his motion for a new trial the plaintiff
did not challenge this instruction as to its contents or the man-
ner in which it was given. He is therefore in.no position to
urge this point in this court. In Enget v. Neff, 77 ND 356, 43
NW2d 644, paragraph 1 of the syllabus, we said:

.. “Where a motion for a new trial is made in the court below
and an.appeal.is taken from the order denying the motion and
from the judgment, alleged erroneous rulings of the trial court
which constitute proper grounds for a new trial, under See

56 |

28-1902 RCND 1943, must be presented on the motion; other-
wise they will be deemed waived, whether included in the speci-
fications of error upon appeal from the judgment or not.”

That is the precise situation here. The plaintiff seeks a new
trial in this court for giving an instruction which he did not
challenge in his motion for a new trial addressed to the trial
court. He will not now be heard on this point, having waived
his right to challenge the instruction by failing to give the trial
court an opportunity to consider and pass upon his objections.

It also appears from the transcript that after the jury had
retired, the following took place:

“BY MR. BURDICK: This is to advise the Court that in the
event counsel for the defendants are not present at the time and
in the event the jury asks for further instructions, this is to
authorize the Court to give such further instructions without
the presence of defendant’s counsel.

“BY THE COURT: There appears to be no objection on
the part of opposing counsel.”

The transcript is entirely silent regarding further instruc-
tions to the jury. The plaintiff asserts and the defendant con-
eedes that after the case had been submitted to the jury, with-
out the presence of or notice to the parties or counsel, the fol-
lowing oral instruction was given:

“You are instructed that, under the evidence, if you find for
the plaintiff, your verdict should be in the sum of $1,800.00.

“If you find for the defendant, your verdict should be in the
sum of $1,200.00.

“If you find, from the evidence, that the negligence of both
parties was the proximate cause of the collision, then your
verdict should be for the defendant for the dismissal of the plain-
tiff’s cause of action.”

In the court below and in this court the plaintiff challenges
the giving of this instruction, both as to its content and the man-
ner in which it was given. It is argued that plaintiff’s attorneys
never consented to the giving of this instruction and never
waived the giving of written instructions.

The trial court in his memorandum opinion says:

| 57

“The case went to the jury at approximately 5 o’clock in the
afternoon of' the day the trial was completed.

“Because the attorneys wished to go to their respective homes,
the matter of the possibility that additional instructions might
be asked by the jury was discussed. The attorneys present
agreed orally that the Court in such eventuality might give fur-
ther instructions in the absence of the attorneys. One of the
attorneys for the plaintiff says that he has no recollection of
such agreement. Additional instructions were given later in the
evening.”

The court also sets out in his memorandum the instruction as
quoted above and states that he gave it orally.

Section 28-1411 NDRC 1943 which is applicable in civil cases
provides:

“The instructions shall first be reduced to writing except that
with the consent of both parties entered in the minutes before
the jurors are sworn, the court may instruct the jurors orally.
In that case the oral instructions shall be taken down by the
court reporter and written out at length in typewriting, . . . .”

A somewhat similar provision applicable to criminal cases is
found in Section 29-2130 NDRC 1943, which says:

“All instructions first must be reduced to writing, unless by
consent of both parties entered in the minutes, the instructions
are given orally and taken down by the stenographer of the
court, in shorthand.”

Our civil and criminal statutes requiring instructions to be
in writing, unless the consent of both parties to oral instructions
is entered in the minutes, have a common ancestor in Chapter
84, Session Laws of North Dakota 1893. In subsequent code
revisions separate sections pertaining to civil and criminal ac-
tions were enacted but the requirement that instructions be in
writing was retained in both. In State v. Mitchell, 49 ND 726,
193 NW 310, itis said:

“This statute is clearly mandatory in its requirements that
the instructions first be reduced to writing.”

The mandatory provision that instructions must be in writing
can be waived under certain conditions, as is disclosed by the
case of State v. Hanson, 53 ND 879, 207 NW 1000. In that

58 Ee

case the main charge to the jury had been given in writing.
After retirement, the jury returned and asked for further in-.
structions.

“After referring to the jurors’ request for additional instrue-
tions the trial judge said: ‘I don’t suppose there is any objec-
tion to it not being in writing? The court can put it in writing’
The record shows affirmatively that both defendant and his
counsel were present at the time; and they made no objection
to the court’s suggestion that the additional instructions be given
orally. The trial court thereupon proceeded to give certain
additional oral instructions to the jury. All that was said by
the trial court was taken down by the court reporter and tran-
seribed as part of the record.”

This court held that there was a waiver by the defendant of
the right to have the additional instructions reduced to writing
and given as written instructions.

In State v. Myers, 73 ND 687, 19 NW2d 17, the majority
of this court held that where the statement of the case showed
that the defendant had waived written instructions, the fact that
the waiver was not entered in the clerk’s minutes of the trial
was not prejudicial error. In Ferderer v. Northern Pacific Rail-
way Co., 75 ND 139, 26 NW2d 236, we said:

“Generally the failure to comply with the provisions of a
mandatory statute in a matter of such importance as instruc-
tions to the jury and communications between the trial judge
and the jury constitutes error per se and must be deemed to be
prejudicial either as a matter of law, or unless and until it is
shown that no prejudice resulted or could have resulted from
the noncompliance.”

All interested parties and the trial court are agreed that the
main body of instructions were given to the jury in writing;
that after they had retired they were given further oral in-
structions in the absence of the parties and their counsel. The
recollection of the court and counsel for the plaintiff is not in
accord as to the agreement on the part of such counsel that the
court might give further instructions in their absence. The
determination of the appeal, however, does not depend upon
harmonizing these discrepant versions of fact. Nowhere in the

| 59

transcript or in any other portion of the settled statement of
the case, including the memorandum opinion of the court, does
it affirmatively appear that at any time plaintiff waived written
instructions, either by his conduct or his statements, orally or
in writing, or those of his counsel. Nor for that matter does
it appear that there was such a waiver on the part of the de-
fendant. The statement of Mr. Burdick at the close of the case
waives only the presence of defendant’s counsel and does not
purport to waive the giving of written instructions, should -it
be necessary for the court to further advise the jury. There
having been no waiver, it was the statutory duty of the court
to submit to the jury in writing any additional instructions that
became necessary. Failure to do so was error and under the
circumstances disclosed by this record and in thé light of the
decisions of this court above cited, we cannot say that such
error was without prejudice.

Section 28-1411 requires that when oral instructions are given
they shall be taken down by the court reporter and written out
at length in typewriting. As far as we can ascertain from this
record there was no compliance with this provision of the stat-
ute. We do not imply that the failure of the reporter to comply
with the statute would in every case necessitate a reversal, but
we point it out to further emphasize the unsatisfactory state of
this record with respect to the giving of the oral instructions.

The plaintiff, in addition to challenging the manner in which
the oral instructions were given, criticizes their contents on the
ground that they invade the province of the jury by determining
the amount to which the plaintiff would be entitled if he should
prevail and the amount that should be awarded to the defendant
if the jury should find.that he was entitled to the verdict. This
is a meritorious criticism. The only testimony as to the value
of the automobile before and after the accident was given by
the plaintiff who said that before the accident it was worth
$1950.00 and after the accident $150.00. The only testimony
with regard to the value of the combine before and after the
accident was given by the defendant who. said that before the
accident it was worth close to $2400.00 and after the accident
about $1200.00. There was no other testimony regarding the

60 ee

value of either the automobile or the combine. The injuries
which the automobile suffered and the injuries to the combine
were described in some detail and photographs of the wrecked
automobile were introduced in evidence. It is obvious that the
values testified to by the interested parties were matters of opin-
ion. The values thus given weré subject-to some modification,
if in the good judgment of the jury justice so required. In other
words, the jury was not bound by this testimony and it was error
for the court by instructions to so bind them. In point is the
case of Bolen v. Dolph, 62 ND 700, 245 NW 259, in which this
court said: :

“Where the amount of damages claimed by either party is
uncertain and based upon opinion, then it is entirely within the
province of the jury to find the amount of the damages. In such
cases it is an invasion of the province of the jury for the court
to direct the finding of a certain amount. Brookings v. Northern
P. RB. Co. 47 ND 111, 180 NW 972; Shuman vy. Ruud, 35 ND 384,
160 NW 507.” See also Butler v: Aetna Insurance Co., 64 ND
764, 256 NW 214.

_ “The court in charging the jurors shall instruct only as to
the law of the case:” Section 28-1411 NDRC 1943.

Under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case
it was error for the court to fix in an instruction a specific
amount that the jury must determine to be the damages in event
a verdict was to be returned in behalf of either party. See Burt
v. Lake Region Flying Service, 78 ND 928, 54 NW2d 339; Jans-
sen v. Kohler, 71 ND 247, 299 NW 900; Bullock v. Gay, 296
Ky 489, 177 SW2d 883; Scott v. Gardner, 187 Texas 628, 156
SW2d 513, 141 ALR 50; 20 Am Jur, Evidence, Section 1180.

The plaintiff specifies as error the sustaining by the court of
an objection to an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to testify
to the measurements of a combine other than the one involved
in the accident. The plaintiff testified that the machine being
towed behind the defendant’s truck was a Gleaner-Baldwin
Combine. He further testified: ‘They only make one kind of
a combine.” He also stated that he took the measurements of
a similar Gleaner-Baldwin Combine after the happening of the
accident. The court refused to let him testify as to those meas-

De 61

urements. The controversy is entirely over the sufficiency ‘of
the foundation for the proffered testimony. It is a narrow con-
troversy in both law and fact. The plaintiff was permitted to
testify that the combine was about twelve feet wide, while the
defendant said it was about eleven feet wide. That the plaintiff
was not familiar with the machine involved in the accident is
disclosed by this:

“Q. And do you know whether it is any particular model, year
or anything like that?
“A, No, not definitely.”

While the plaintiff testified that the company made only one
kind, he did not say that they made only one size; and while
he said that the one which he measured was similar to the com-
bine involved in the accident, he did not say it was the same.
The plaintiff was attempting to establish the exact width by
showing the measurements of a different machine. Under the
circumstances the court might properly require that the plaintiff
establish that the combine which he measured was a combine
of the same sizeas that involved in the accident and not merely
one of the same kind or similar to it. In this respect the founda-
tion was deficient and no error was commiitted in sustaining the
objection.

At the end of their brief plaintifi’s counsel take a unique
position, After asking that the judgment and order denying
a new trial be reversed, they say:

“At any event, the Defendant’s Counterclaim is no longer an
issue in the case. It was dismissed, and the Defendant has not
appealed. Hence that issue is ‘res adjudicata’, and will not be
involved in the event of new trial.”

The verdict is silent with reference to defendant’s counter-
claim ‘and states only that the jury “do find for the defend-
ant for a dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action.” The
judgment entered on the verdict, and in accordance therewith,
only purports to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action and render
judgment for costs in favor of the defendant. Again the coun-
terclaim is not mentioned. There is no adverse order or judg-

62 ee

ment with respect to the counterclaim from which the defendant
could appeal.

The plaintiff contends that under the evidence the defendant
is clearly shown to have been guilty of negligence as.a matter
of law and that the court erred in failing to direct the jury that
there could be no recovery on the counterclaim. The plaintiff
made no motion for a directed verdict. Neither did he attempt
to raise this question in his motion for a new trial, and as we
have pointed out, he cannot challenge the action of the court
in this respect for the first time on appeal. Westerso y. City of
Williston, 77 ND 251, 42 NW2d 429; Lueck v. State, 70 ND
604, 296 NW 917; Jensen v. Bowen, 37 ND 352, 164 NW 4. The
case must go back to the district court for a new trial as to
plaintiff's cause of action and defendant’s counterclaim. The
judgment and order appealed from are reversed and a new trial
is granted.

Gurmson, Curisrianson, Satire and Burge, JJ., concur.
Es
[File No. 7304]
MONA STEARNS LAPLAND, Respondent, v. JAMES W.

STEARNS, R. L. Kamins, A. R. Weinhandl, Harold
Montgomery and Lars Kleppe, Appellants.

(54 NWed 748)

Opinion filed August 28, 1952.

& McCutcheon, for appellant.

Halverson & Halstead, for respondent.

Gaimson, J. The plaintiff, as the legal heir of Lewis C. Stearns,
brought this action in the District Court of Ward County against
the men who are the executors of his last will and testament
for the avails of a life insurance policy payable to the estate
of Lewis C. Stearns. The defendant executors admit receiving
$24,496.28 on such policy. They deny plaintifi’s right thereto
and allege that the only law under which the plaintiff could
recover in this action is See 26-1018 NDRC 1943, which statute

66 es

they claim is unconstitutional. They ask for a dismissal of the
action.

The matter was submitted to the District Court on the follow-
ing stipulated facts: Lewis C. Stearns, a resident of Minot,
Ward County, North Dakota, died on Jan. 29, 1951, testate,
leaving no wife surviving him. Mona Stearns Lapland, the
plaintiff, was his legally adopted daughter and his only child
or issue and no issue or children of Lewis C. Stearns preceded
him in death. He left a will with codicil which was duly admitted
to probate. The defendants are the duly appointed executors
thereof. No creditors are involved in this controversy. At
the time of the death of Lewis C. Stearns he was possessed of
$24,496.28 worth of life insurance on his own life. The benefi-
ciary named in the policy was the Lewis C. Stearns estate. No
mention was made in the Stearns will or codicil of life insurance
or avails of life insurance. Lewis C. Stearns made no special
contract inter vivos in regard to the avails of his said life in-
surance. The defendant executors have collected the avails of
said life insurance and still hold the same in the amount of
$24,496.28. They have failed to pay said avails to anyone. De-
mand for payment of said avails was served on the defendant by
the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. All of
the defendants are interested solely as executors except James
W. Stearns who is also a legatee or beneficiary under a testa-
mentary trust created by the will of Lewis C. Stearns. The
District Court found for the plaintiff. The defendants appeal.

The sole issue raised on the appeal is the constitutionality of
Sec 26-1018 NDRC 1943. That section reads as follows:

“The avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract payable
by any mutual aid or benevolent society, when made payable to
the deceased, to the personal representatives of the deceased, to
his heirs, or to his estate, shall not be subject to the debts of the
decedent upon the death of such insured or member of such so-
ciety except by special contract. Such avails shall be inven-
toried as a part of the estate of the decedent and distributed
without deduction and shall pass to the heirs at law or legatees
of the decedent in accordance with the laws of succession or of

wills, as the case may be. The insured may transfer the avails
of such life insurance policy or contract either by will or by
contract. Nothing contained in this section shall:

1. Affect, in dny manner, any life insurance policy or benefi-
ciary certificate which is made payable to a designated person,
including the spouse of the insured, or to persons or to members
of a family designated as a class, such as ‘all children’ or ‘all
brothers and sisters,’ even though the members of such class are
not designated ‘by name; or

2. Permit any insured to dispose of the avails of a contract
by a mutual or fraternal society by will to anyone who could not
be a beneficiary in such contract under the charter or by-law of
such society.”

This section, 26-1018, supra, was originally Chapter 149 of
the 1929 Session Laws. The defendants claim that section was
an original enactment and that for that reason they have a right
to consider the title thereof in connection with their claim of
its unconstitutionality. The first ground for such claim is that
the title covers more than one subject in violation of Sec 61 of
the state constitution. That title reads as follows:

“An act to provide for the distribution of the avails of life
insurance made payable to the deceased, his personal represen-
tatives, his heirs, or estate, and exempting such avails from the
debts of the decedent.”

The subject matter of Sec 26-1018, supra, is the distribution
of the avails of such life insurance. If all the provisions of
an act are germane to the subject expressed in the title then
the act is valid as against any claim of violation of Sec 61 of
the constitution. ,

‘Referring to that principle this court in State ex rel. Weeks
vy. Olson, 65 ND 407, 259 NW 83 has said:

“This principle of law is well settled in North Dakota and in
many other states having constitutional provisions similar to
ours. Stated differently, this rule means that legislation may
include any matter naturally and reasonably connected with the
subject of the act as expressed in the title. State ex rel. Gam-
mons v. Shafer, 63 ND 128, 246 NW 874; Thompson Yards v.
Kingsley, 54 ND 49, 208 NW 949. It is also the law of this state

68 De

that the title to an act will be construed liberally and not in a
strict and technical manner. State ex rel. Poole v. Peake, 18
ND 101, 120 NW 47.” See also Great Northern Railway Co. v.
Duncan, 42 ND 346, 176 NW 992; State v. Colohan, 69 ND 316,
286 NW 888; 50 Am Jur Statutes, Secs 196, 197, pp 177-180.

The defendants claim that the method of determining succes-
sion and an exemption statute are included in the act extraneous
to the matter of the distribution of the avails. The policy makes
the heirs or estate of the decedent the beneficiaries. The law of
heirship determines the succession. The act makes no deter-
mination thereof. The provision that the avails shall not be
subject to the debts of the decedent relates merely to the safe-
guarding of the avails. Construing the act liberally it contains
only matters relative to the distribution of the avails of such
insurance which is the subject matter thereof.

Furthermore, if there should be any doubt about this, Chapter
149 SL 1929 was reenacted in the 1943 revision of the code as
Sec 26-1018 NDROC 1948 without the inclusion of the title and the
original statute, including the title, was repealed, Sec 1-0219
NDRC 1943, It has been held that a statute which fails to com-
ply with a constitutional provision requiring every act to em-
brace one subject to be mentioned in its title becomes valid
upon its incorporation in a proper code or revision duly adopted
as such. See 59 CJ Statutes, Sec 376, p 799; Schaller Co. v.
Canistota Grain Co. 32 SD 15, 141 NW 993.

“Where a section of a legislative act has been incorporated in
the Revised Codes and adopted, as a part of the complete stat-
utes of the state, the court will not inquire into or consider the
sufficiency of the original title of the act in which such section
was originally adopted by the Legislature. In such case, it is
too late to raise the sufficiency of the title to the original act,
which’ was adopted prior to the date of its incorporation and
adoption in the Revised Codes of the state.” Anderson v.
Great Northern Railway Co. 25 Idaho 433, 138 Pac 127.

“When an act is incorporated in the Code in accordance with
Const art 6, Sec 5, it becomes statutory law, without reference
to its title as originally enacted, and the objection that the sub-
ject of the act does not correspond with its title cannot be

ee 69

raised.” Park v. Laurens Cotton Mills, 56 SE 234, 75 SC 560.

The defendants urge, as the main ground for their claim that
See 26-1018 NDRC 1943 is unconstitutional, that it is really an
exemption statute and does not comply with See 208 of the
constitution which provides that:

“The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries
of life shall be recognized by wholesome Jaws, exempting from
forced sale to all heads of families a homestead, the value of
which shall be limited and defined by law; and a reasonable
amount of personal property; the kind and value shall be fixed
bylaw... .”

They claim that the language of Sec 26-1018, supra, and of its
1929 title indicates that the intent of the legislature was to place
the avails of that insurance in the estate of the deceased and to
provide for the exemption thereof without fixing any reasonable
amount contrary to Sec 208. They admit that, what they call
“a slightly similar law,” was construed by this court in the case
of Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 36 ND 225, 226, 162 NW 302
against their contention, but claim that that construction cannot
be applied to the present act because it is a new law and because
of additional language not included in the old law.

It is immaterial whether Sec 26-1018, supra, is a new law or
not. In the enactment of a statute, earlier acts on the same sub-
ject are generally presumed to have been within the knowledge
and view of the legislature which is regarded as having adopted
the new statute in the light theréof and with reference thereto.
50 Am Jur Sec 354, p 354.

It is also generally held that the construction by the courts
of former statutes is presumed to have been considered by the
legislature and may be considered by the courts in the construc-
tion of the latter statute on the same subject.

A legislature is presumed, in enacting a statute, to have in
mind court decisions pertaining’ to the subject legislated on and
to have acted with reference thereto. Merchants’ Transfer and
‘Warehouse Co. et al. v. Gates, 180 Ark 96, 21 SW2d 406; Texar-
kana Special School Dist. v. Consolidated Special School Dis-
trict No. 2,185 Ark 213, 46 SW2d 631.

“As an aid in the construction of a statute, it is to be assumed

70 |

or presumed that the legislature was acquainted with, and had-in
mind, the judicial construction of former statutes on the subject,
and that the statute was enacted in the light of the judicial con-
struction that the prior enactment had received, or in the light
of such existing judicial decisions as have a direct bearing upon
it. Such earlier decisions will accordingly be taken into con-
sideration.” 50 Am Jur Statutes, Sec 321, p 312.

In McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal2d 330, 196 P2d 787, it is said:

“A familiar and fundamental rule for the interpretation of a
legislative statute is that it is presumed to have been enacted in
the light of such existing judicial decisions as have a direct bear-
ing upon it.” See also In re Halcomb, 21 Cal2d 126, 129, 130
P2d 384; Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark 221, 205 SW2d 198, 1 ALR
2d 1092; Sandahl v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 170 Wash
380, 16 P2d 623.

In Batt’s Estate, 220 Ind 193, 41 NE2d 365, it is said:

«Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of
last resort has been reenacted in same, or substantially the
same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar
with its construction, and to have adopted it as a part of the law,
unless a contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construc-
tion is expressly provided for; and the same rule applies in the
construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate
statute has been: judicially construed. So, where words or
phrases employed in a new statute have been construed by the
courts to have been used in a particular sense in a previous
statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are
presumed, in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the
contrary, to be used in the same sense in the new statute as in
the previous statute.” 59 CJ Statutes, 1061.

It is necessary, therefore, to examine the prior statutes on
the subject and this court’s construction thereof to determine
whether the legislative policy as formerly enacted and inter-
preted has been changed by the 1929 enactment as claimed by
the defendants.

The first appearance of the subject matter contained in See
26-1018 NDRC 1943 appears in Sec 6385 of the 1895 Code which
reads as follows:

Le ban

“The avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract payable
by any mutual aid or benevolent society upon the death of a
member of such society are not subject to the debts of the de-
cedent except by special contract, but in other respects shall be
inventoried and disposed of like other property.”

This applied to all life insurance policies. This was amended
in the Probate Code, Chapter 111 SL 1897, p 192 to limit it to
life insurance policies or contracts “made payable to the per-
sonal representatives of a deceased, his heirs, or estate.” In
that amendment the: phrase “and disposed of like other prop-
erty” was changed to read: “And distributed to the heirs or
the heirs at law of such decedent.” That change indicates that
the intention of the legislators then was to make avails of life
insurance policies, payable to the heirs or estate, distributed
directly rather than going through probate “like other prop-
erty.” That change has remained in the law ever since.

In this last form the section was carried forward as See 6385
in RC 1899, as Sec 8083 NDRC 1905 and as Sec 8719 CL1913. The
next amendment of that section was by Chapter 225, SL 1927.

In the meantime many decisions have been rendered by this
court construing this law. In Anderson v. Northern ‘& Dakota-
Trust Co., 67 ND 458, 468, 274 NW 127, Judge Christianson
summarizes the holdings of such decisions as follows:

“These legislative enactments have been fruitful of litigation.
Questions as to the meaning and effect of Sec 8719, supra, had
arisen in several cases before the enactment of Chapter 149,
Laws of 1929, and it had been definitely settled by the decisions
of this court that under that section: (1) The avails of a life
insurance policy made payable to the personal representatives
of the deceased, his heirs or estate, did not become part of the
estate of the deceased but belonged to the heirs personally; (2)
that such avails passed to the heirs at law of the insured by
contract and not by descent and that the effect of the statute
was to render such insurance policy payable to the person or
persons who at the time of the death of the insured were his
heirs at law under the laws of succession the same as though
their names had been written into the insurance policy as bene-
ficiaries; (3) that the avails of such life insurance policy were

72 Le

to be inventoried in the probate proceedings of the estate of the
decedent and distributed to his heirs at law; but the distribution
was to be made by the executor. or administrator by virtue of
the statute and the distribution was not to be made by the county
court as a distribution of a part of the estate. Finn v. Walsh, 19
ND 61, 121 NW 766; Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 36 ND 225,
162 NW 302; Marifjeren v. Farup, 51 ND 78, 199 NW 181;
Maixner v. Zumpf, 51 ND 140, 199 NW 183; Re Coughlin, 53
ND 188, 205 NW 14; Talcott v. Bailey, 54 ND 19, 208 NW 549;
Cohen v. Ferguson, 56 ND 545, 218 NW 209; Jorgensen v. De-
Viney, 57 ND 63, 222 NW 464; Hafey v. Hafey, 57 ND 381, 222
NW 256.”

In the case of Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 36 ND 225, 162
NW 3802, the very question raised in the instant case was passed
upon by- this court. The argument was made that Sec 8719 SL
1913 violated Sec 208 of the constitution. It was claimed that
Sec 8719 was an exemption statute and as it failed to fix any
limit on the amount of insurance exempt from creditors’ claims
it violated See 208 of the constitution which provides that the
exemption extends merely to “a reasonable amount of personal
property.” In deciding that case this court said:

“It is quite apparent, indeed, that the constitutional provision
in question was never intended to apply to cases such as before
us. It expressly states that its purpose is that the debtor may
enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life, and that his property
may, to a limited extent, be saved from forced sale. The debtor
is dead; no forced sale can injure him. As far as his heirs are _
concerned, they are not debtors and owe none of his debts. It
may be that, before the property of the debtor’s estate may be
distributed to them, the debts of.the deceased must be paid.
They, however, have no personal liability therefor, for the debts
are not their debts.

“In the case at bar there can be no question that the contract
between the insurance company and the decedent would have
been perfectly valid, and that the plaintiff father would have
been entitled to the money if the policy had been made directly
payable to him rather than to the estate of the deceased.

“There, too, can be no question that, as the statute was in

a 73

force at the time of the taking out of the policy, the intention of
the deceased must be presumed to have been that his heirs
should take the money. Such being the case, the money at no
time became a part of the estate of the deceased or subject to
the claims of his creditors. Pace v. Pace, 19 Fla 438,

“No one would contend that during his lifetime the deceased
could not have given any sum of money to his heirs and placed
any sum of money in trust for his heirs that he chose, provided
that such gift was not at the time when given in fraud of his
ereditors. Why should he not pay that money or make that gift
in the form of insurance-premium payments?

“The only question is, Who should the policy pass to and shall
it be burdened with debts or not? If made to the heirs in name
it would certainly not have been burdened with the debts of the
deceased. All Sec 8719 provides is that if made payable to them
by the general term ‘heirs,’ or made payable to ‘the representa-
tives’ or ‘estate’ it shall in like manner be considered a trust
fund. This, of course, does not prevent one from making a
special contract either in the policy or in the will by which the
proceeds of the policy may be made subject to the debts of the
deceased and the residue only made payable to the beneficiary
or legatee.”

This court then held that See 8719 “is not in conflict with See
208 of the Constitution of North Dakota.”

That opinion was filed March 22, 1917, ten years and five ses-
sions of the legislature before any amendment to Sec 8719 was
made. It will be presumed that the legislature had knowledge
thereof and had that holding in mind when it enacted Chapter
225 SL 1927. The legislature still retained the provision that
the avails “shall not be subject to the debts of decedent” and
“shall be distributed” to the heirs upon which is based the hold-
ing in the Smith case that the avails did not become a part of
the estate of the decedent but passed to the heirs by contract so
that Sec 8719 did not become an exemption statute.

The legislature added to the provisions regarding the avails
being inventoried the phrase “as part of the estate of the de-
cedent” which this court in Anderson v. Northern & Dakota
Trust Co., 67 ND 458, 472, 274 NW 127, construed to mean “that

74 —

the avails should be inventoried in like manner as though they
were a part of the estate of the decedent.” That makes the
inventory only a special record of the avails. Then the legis-
lature added to the provision for the distribution of the avails
that it shall be done “without deduction.” That again indicates
an intent that the avails should not become liable for the debts
of the estate. Then Chapter 225 adds a new provision that the
insured may transfer the avails by will or contract life insurance
policies or contracts “heretofore made.” This court had held
in Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57 ND 63, 222 NW 464, that the insured
had a right to transfer such a policy of insurance upon his life
by will or assignment so that the legislature was merely enact-
ing the principle found by this court to be included in the act.

Finally, Chapter 225, supra, provided that Sec 8719 should
not be construed as permitting any insured to dispose by will
of the avails of such policies or contracts made payable to a
designated person including members of the family designated
by class though not by name nor to dispose by will of the avails
of a contract by a mutual or fraternal society to anyone who
could not be a beneficiary in such contract under the charter or
by-laws of such society. That does not affect the meaning of
the act.

These last two provisions are clarified in the reenacted stat-

ute, Chapter 149, SL 1929, and the law is made to apply to
policies and contracts whether made “heretofore or hereafter.”
This makes the act apply to such policies and contracts irrespec-
tive of the time when made as the law did prior to 1927.
_ The 1929 amendment also provided it should apply to policies
made payable to the deceased himself as well as to his heirs or
estate. The need for that provision was brought out by this
court’s decision in Cohen v. Ferguson, 56 ND 545, 218 NW 209.
It broadens the provision for beneficiaries but does not in any
manner change the purpose of the law.

Chapter 149 SL 1929 also adds the following: “This’ statute
is intended to apply only to life insurance policies and benefici-
ary certificates that by their terms are made payable to the
insured, to the personal representatives of the insured or his

5

heirs or estate.” That provision the codification of Sec 26-1018
omitted “as surplusage.”

Sec 26-1018 as codified also omitted the phrase “in due course
of administration” which further indicates an intent not to make
the avails a part of the estate. :

These are the main changes from the original language of
See 8719 CL 1913 brought about by Chapters 225 SL 1927 and
Chapter 149 SL 1929. Some of the changes were brought about
by the holdings of those decisions, indicating the awareness of
the legislature of those decisions. See Anderson v. Northern &
Dakota Trust Co., 65 ND 721, 261 NW 759. In the second
Anderson case, Anderson v. Northern & Dakota Trust Co. 67
ND 458, 474, 274 NW 127, Judge Christianson, after a complete
summary writes:

“As we view it, the primary purpose of the legislative enact-
ment of 1927 was to authorize the insured to dispose by will
of the avails of such insurance contract; but that the legislature
intended that unless the insured did dispose by will of the avails
of such policies that such avails should remain subject to the
same fundamental rules, both as regards status and disposition,
that heretofore prevailed under Sec 8719, supra. We are also
agreed that the legislative enactment of 1929 did not purport to
change the basic rules as regards the status and disposition of
the avails of such life insurance contract.”

After a careful comparison of Chapter 225 SL 1927 and
Chapter 149 SL 1929 as codified in Sec 26-1018 NDRC 1943,
with Sec 8719 SL 1913,-we have come to the same conclusion.
There is nothing in those amendments or the 1929 reenactment
to warrant this court in finding that the legislature intended to
change the meaning of Sec 8719 as construed by this court in its
various decisions on that section. :

The defendants, however, argue that these decisions of the
court are in error and that the intention of the legislature from
the beginning and especially since the enactment of the 1929
act was to make the avails of such insurance a part of the estate
without making them subject to the debts of the decedent. They
again contend that the result is an exemption of.the avails and

76 |

there being no limitation in the amount such exemption is con-
trary to Sec 208 of the constitution.

The defendants argue that such construction is indicated by
the use of the word “exempting” in the title of the 1929 acts and
the use of the phrases “shall not be subject to the debts of the
decedent” and “inventoried as a part of the estate of the de-
ceased” and “shall be distributed without deduction” in the body
of the different acts. All of these phrases except the word “ex-
empting” have been considered by this court in making ‘its
prior decisions. One meaning of “exempting’ is “not subject to”
(New Century Dictionary), which is the phrase used in the
body of both the 1927 and 1929 acts in connection with the debts
so adds nothing new. When these phrases are considered in
connection with the whole act, its history and purpose, they sup-
port. the construction placed on ‘the act by this court in past
decisions, rather than the contention of the defendants.

“Legislatures are presumed and deemed by the courts to have
used .statutory terms under consideration in their judicially
established meaning, in the absence of an appearance of any-
thing to indicate a different intention. Accordingly, where words
used in a statute have acquired a settled meaning through ju-
dicial interpretation, and the same terms are used in a sub-
sequent statute upon the same or an analogous subject, they are
generally interpreted in the latter as in the former, where the
object to which the words are applied, or the connection in which
it stands, does not require it to be differently understood in the
two statutes, or where a contrary intention of the legislature
is not made clear by other qualifying or explanatory terms.”
50 Am Jur Statutes, Sec 322, p 313. .

‘When the insured uses the names of his legal heirs as benefici-
aries in the policy there can be no question about the avails
passing directly to them. When, however, he uses the terms
“personal representatives, heirs or estate” it is necessary to
provide a special method by which the identification of the in-
dividual beneficiaries can be accomplished. The logical person
through whom that can be done is the executor or administrator
of the estate of the decedent who has accessible, in the files of
the estate, the names of the legal heirs as established by the

Le 7

county court. If, however, the avails become part of the estate
they might become subjected to the liabilities thereof. The
phrases used indicate the intention of the legislators to avoid
that situation. They were providing for the transfer of the
avails through the executor or administrator as a mere conduit
and without any actual connection with the probate. They pro-
vided that the avails should “pass to the heirs” without becom-
ing subject to the debts of the estate. They provided for an
inventory thereof in the same manner as the property of the
estate, (Anderson v. Northern & Dakota Trust Co., 67 ND 458,
474, 274 NW 127, 184) to keep a record of the transactions
always available and easy to find.

It was indicated in the dissenting opinion in Farmers State
Bank v. Smith, supra, and in Marifjeren v. Farup, supra;
Anderson v. Northern & Dakota Trust Co., 65 ND 721, 726, 261
NW 759; Anderson vy. Northern & Dakota Trust Co., 67 ND 458,
474, 274 NW 127, that if the avails become a part of the estate
not subject to the debts of the decedent, the constitutionality of
Sec 26-1018, supra, might become doubtful. Whenever a law is
reasonably subject to two constructions one of which sustains it
as constitutional and the other renders it of doubtful constitu-
tionality the courts, as we have done in this case, adopt that
construction which holds the law constitutional. 11 Am Jur
Constitutional Law, Sec 97, p 725; State ex rel. Eckroth v. Berge,
69 ND 1, 283 NW 521; Wood v. Byrne, 60 ND 1, 232 NW 303;
State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 ND 76, 156 NW 561, LRA 1918B
156, Ann Cas 1918A 583.

The defendants finally claim that Sec 26-1018 NDRC 1943
violates the due process clauses of the federal and state constitu-
tions. They argue that the act is an attempt to arbitrarily and
unreasonably regulate the descent of particular property. They
claim that under the construction the court lias given said act
any taxes that may be levied against the avails of an insurance
policy, the cost of determining in the proper court to whom such
avails belong and the expense of transferring the avails to the
Jegal heirs will have to be paid out of decedent’s estate. That,
they say, is taking property from the creditors and legatees

78; a

without due process-of law. That does not follow from the con-
struction we have given the act.

! When the purposes of the act are taken into consideration and
the fact that these avails never were a part of decedent’s estate
it cannot be said that the law is unreasonable or arbitrary. The
law in no way involves the descent of property. The fund is
created by contract. It is not a fund to which the creditors or
legatees have any legal or moral claim, unless the testator so
provides.

We have held that the avails of the insurance policy pass
through the executor or administrator to the heirs as through
a conduit without becoming involved in the estate in any way.
If follows that the estate does not become involved with the
avails either. Hach must be handled separately by the executor
or.administrator. The executor or administrator and not the
probate court, is concerned with the avails. The phrase, “They
shall not be subject to the debts of the decedent . . . and
distributed without deduction” for those debts indicates an in-
tention to keep them separate. If any tax is levied against the
avails, that does not become a liability of the estate. That is
an expense that must be borne by the heir to whom they are
transferred just as would be the case if the heir were named as
beneficiary. In such case the heir would have had to pay all
expenses in connection with the transfer of the avails to him.
In Talcott v. Bailey, 54 ND 19, 29, 208 NW 549, this court said:

“Clearly the effect of Sec 8719 CL 1913, is not to put the ‘heirs’
in any better position than they would have been had their names
been written into the policies as beneficiaries thereunder.”

If the heir has to sue for the avails that is his expense. The
separate inventory of the avails made by the executor or ad-
ministrator does not become a part of the gross inventory of
the'estate so does not increase the expense of administering the
estate. If the executor or administrator claims title to the
avails for the estate and forces suit to determine the title that
is-a legitimate expense of the estate just as would be the expense
of determining any title claimed by the estate.

It'is apparent, therefore, that no property is taken out of the
estate by virtue of Sec 26-1018, supra, nor are the heirs enriched

— “79

by getting the expense of transferring the avails to them paid
out of the estate.

The defendants claim that the law is not complete because
there is no provision in the law for the disposition of the avails
in the event there were no heirs of the decedent. Sec 54-0102
NDRC 1943 takes care of that. It is there provided:

“All property, real and personal within the limits of this state,
which does not belong to any person o1 to the United States,
belongs to the state. Whenever the title to any property fails
for want of heirs or neat of kin it reverts to the state.”

Plaintiff asked for interest at 4 per cent on the amount of
the avails which the executors have held pending this lawsuit.
They claim the money has been wrongfully withheld. The de-
fendants claim that they were advised by their counsel that there
was a serious question about the constitutionality of See 26-
1018 NDRC 1943 under which the money was received and that
for the protection of themselves and the estate a determination
of its title in court would be necessary. Under such cireum-
stances we can not say the money was wrongfully withheld. We
believe the defendants and their attorneys acted in good faith.
See Hill v. Hanna, 57 ND 412, 222 NW 459. The District Court
disallowed plaintiffs claim for interest. We agree’ with ‘the
District Court.

‘We have come to the conclusion that, considering See 26- -1018
NDRC 1943 as a whole, its terms, history and purposes and com-
paring it with Chapter 225 SL 1927 and Chapter 149 SL 1929,
there has been no change made to make the former decisions of
this court inapplicable. We hold it is not violation of See 208
of the constitution. We further hold that Sec 26-1018 does not
violate Sec 61 of the constitution nor the provisions of the state
and federal constitutions against taking property without due
process of law.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Curisrianson, Saturz and Burs, concur.

Morris, C. J., concurs in the result.

80 De |
[File No. 7311]

JOHN L. JOHNSON; Herbert Speigel, Herbert Phillips and
Esther Phillips substituted as parties plaintiff for and in-
‘stead of Mrs. Herbert Speigel also known as Mrs. Herbert
8. Speigel and as Myrtle E. Speigel formerly Myrtle E.
Campbell; Mrs. J. L. Kelley also known as Mary L. Kelley;
Mrs. Harold Mott also known as Alice V. Mott formerly
Alice Johnson and Alice V. Johnson; Wesley Dawe and
Ernestine Dawe, also written Westley Darve and Ernestine
Darve, respectively, as heirs and successors in interest of
Mattie E. Dawe, Appellants, v. ESTHER J. WELDY, W.
EB. Weldy.and W. C. Johnson also known as William C.
Johnson, Respondents.

(54 NW2d 829)

2
gz

Opinion filed August 13, 1952. Rehearing denied September 4, 1952.

Hyland & Foster, for appellants.

r IM. Oseth, for respondent.

Morris, Ch. J. The defendant, Esther J. Weldy, is the record
title owner of lots 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Block 86 of the Original
Plat of the City of Bismarck. This is an action to quiet title
in’ the plaintiffs to five-sevenths interest in this property, it
being conceded that the defendant, Esther J. Weldy, owns a two-
sevenths interest therein jointly with the plaintiffs.

In January 1933, and for some years prior thereto, the
property was owned and occupied by Linda Johnson, a widow.

84 De |

The contending parties are her descendants, being either chil-
dren or grandchildren. The defendant, W..E. Weldy, husband
of Esther J. Weldy, claims no interest in the property. The
defendant, W. C. Johnson, denies that he claims any interest
and alleges that such interest as he might have in the prop-
erty has been conveyed to Esther J. Weldy. On January 23,
1933, Linda Johnson executed a deed to the premises in ques-
tion to Mary L. Kelley for “One dollar and other good and valu-
able considerations.” The deed bears revenue stamps in the
amount of four dollars. It was recorded in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Burleigh County on December 29, 1934.
This deed was acknowledged on the date that it bears before
A. H. Helgeson, notary public.

On April 12, 1933, Linda Johnson executed before the same
notary public an instrument in writing, the material portions
of which are as follows:

‘TRUST ~

“I, Linda Johnson, also Inown as Mrs. Chris Johnson, of
the City of Bismarck, County of Burleigh, and State of North
Dakota, do hereby, and by these presents, in consideration of
the Love and Affection of my loving sons and daughters, namely:
Mary L. Kelley, Esther J. Weldy, William C. Johnson, John
L. Johnson, Alice V. Johnson, Mattie E. Dawe and Myrtle E.
Campbell, create and set aside in trust in the event of my de-
mise, all my real property hereinafter mentioned:

“The conditions of this Trust is Such:

“1, Reposing especial trust and confidence in the ability and
integrity of my loving daughter Mary L. Kelley, I do hereby,
and by these presents appoint her, my daughter, Mary L. Kelley,
the Trustee, in the event of my demise, to administer the trust
hereinafter reposed in her, and to receive from me a certain
deed of warranty covering lots 9 (nine), 10 (ten), 11 (eleven),
and 12 (twelve), in Block 86 (eighty-six) of the Original Plat
of the City of Bismarck, Burleigh County, North Dakota, to
be and to become operative and to be filed for record in the
office of the Register of Deeds, in and for Burleigh County, North
Dakota, in the event of my-demise; and

Dn ° 85
“2, Said Trustee. shall when this trust becomes operative
in the event of my demise, file for record said deed herein-
before described, and which she shall hold in escrow until my
demise, and shall proceed to collect all rents than owing me if
any, and to regulate, lease and let to such parties as she may
in her judgment determine to be fit and suitable tenants, and
collect rents, pay taxes that may become due from time to time
in the course of her administration of this trust, and to pay
such fire insurance as is necessary to protect the interest of
the hereinafter mentioned beneficiaries, and from the proceeds
of such rental, after first preserving the assets of the said trust,
she shall pay any and all just debts due ‘others by me, if any,
and the residue after first preserving the assets, she divide
equally, and disburse twice each year, or as many times each
year as. she may deem necessary, amongst the seven benefici-
aries above named, as follows: Mary L. Kelley, Esther J.
Weldy, William C. Johnson, John L. Johnson, Alice V. John-
son, Mattie E. Dawe and Myrtle E. Campbell, equally and
share and share alike; and
“3. Should any one of the beneficiaries named herein be taken
in death, then shall the children then living of the said deceased
beneficiary receive the share so accruing to such deceased bene-
ficiary, if living, and such, children which would be my. grand-
children shall-then receive share and share alike of such share
which if living would have acerued to any one of sons and
daughters, if living; and
“4, Should any one of the beneficiaries named herein be taken
in death, and have no living children at the time of their de-
mise, then shall the share in this trust revert to and divided
equally amongst the remaining living beneficiaries herein named,
including any and all of my grandchildren who have by the death
of their father or mother, who are beneficiaries of this trust,
receive such share; and
“5. The property hereinbefore described shall continue in
the name of Mary L. Kelley, my daughter, until such time as
the trust has been fully administered, and closed, or until such
time, as the beneficiaries hereto and herein named shall have
consented to the sale and transfer of the said property, and

“86 ee
the proceeds therefore shall have been fully disbursed and ex-
“pended, and which consent to such sale of the premises herein,
by the beneficiaries herein named, shall and must be in writing
authorizing thé trustee herein named to transfer said property
in fee simple to whomsoever may become ‘the purchaser or
owner; and said trustee shall have the right and the power to
sue and to be sued in her own name in the conduct-and admin-
istration of this trust until its conclusion; and

“6. The trustee herein named, namely Mary L. Kelley, shall
have the right to, and the power to transfer, in the event of her
demise, to Esther J. Weldy, one other of my loving daughters,
the administration of this trust, for her to administer the residue
of the said trust then that may be remaining, and such other
thing's that is herein reposed in this trustee herein appointed;
and

“7, A copy of this trust shall be delivered to each one of
my sons and daughters.that are living when and if in the event
of my demise, and this the original copy of the trust shall be
and remain with the Trustee administering the trust, and

“8, It shall be and it is my request that my sons and my
daughters whom I have reared with loving care and tolerance,
be as tolerant with each other, in the event of my demise, as I
have tried to be with them, both for the good of their own hearts
and soul, and for thé peaceful, honest and successful admin-
istration of this Trust consisting of all my earthly possessions.

“J, Linda Johnson, do hereby deliver in esevow abiding the
- vent of my demise, the deed for the property herein described
to Mary L. Kelley, my daughter and the designated trustee to
fulfill the commands herein set forth.

“In witness whereof, I have this 12th day of April, 1933 set
my hand and signed my name;

Linda Johnson”

Attached to and a part of this instrument is the following:

“Acceptance of the Said Trust And Deed.

“I, Mary L. Kelley, do hereby as evidenced by my signature
hereto acknowledge the receipt of the deed in said trust men-
tioned, to be held by me in escrow until’ the operation of the

EE 87

said trust as set forth, and I do accept said trust to be admin-
istered in my own name, for the purposes therein set forth;
“Dated this 12th day of April, 1933
Mary L. Kelley
Trustee”

The deed which had been given to Mary L. Kelley on January
23, 1933, was by her caused to be recorded on December 29,
1934, without the knowledge or consent of Linda Johnson.

On March 11, 1935, Mary L. Kelley and her husband, upon
the request of Linda Johnson, executed and delivered to her
their warranty deed for the premises expressing the same con-
sideration and bearing the same amount of revenue stamps
as did the warranty deed which had granted the premises to
Mary L. Kelley. This deed was placed of record in the office of
the Register of Deeds of Burleigh County, September 6, 1935.
On the same day, Linda Johnson executed and delivered a war-
ranty deed to Esther J. Weldy, which was recorded in the office
of the register of deeds on the following day. It too, recites
that it was given for “one dollar and other good and valuable
considerations” and bears revenue stamps in the sum of $4.00.

Linda Johnson died on February 24, 1940, and throughont all
of the time covered by the transactions herein discussed and up
until the time of-her death, remained in possession of the prem-
ises. After the execution of the deed to Esther J. Weldy, she
resided with her mother and after her mother’s death remained
in possession of the premises. Mrs. Weldy had no knowledge
of the existence of the instrument designated as a “Trust” until
after her mother’s death, when Mary L. Kelly mailed copies
to the beneficiaries named therein.

The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the warranty deed
to Mary L. Kelley, dated January 23, 1933, and the “Trust”
executed by Linda Johnson and accepted by Mary L. Kelley
on: April 12, 1933, constituted parts of one and the same trans-
actions; and that a trust was thereby expressly created with
Mary L. Kelley as trustee and the seven sons and daughters
of Linda Johnson as beneficiaries, which trust was irrevocable;
and that Mary L. Kelley had no authority to deed the subject of

bo

88 Le

the trust back to Linda Johnson, as she attempted to do on March
11, 1935; and that her deed executed on that date, being given
without the consent of the beneficiaries of the trust, is a nullity;
and that the trust still exists; and that the beneficiaries named in
the original instrument, or their successors, have an interest in
the property to the extent provided therein.

The defendant, Esther J. Weldy, contends that the warranty
deed executed by her mother on January 23, 1933, being absolute
in form, conveyed a complete fee simple title to Mary L. Kelley;
and that when the grantee in that deed again executed a similar
instrument to Linda Johnson, it reconveyed a fee simple title
to the original owner. As to the so-called “Trust,” the defendant
Weldy contends that it was testamentary in character and under
the laws of this state did not create a trust; and that no interest
in or charge upon the property was thereby created. The de-
fendant Weldy further contends that she had no knowledge
of any attempted trust; and that by the deed from her mother
on September 6, 1935, she became an innocent purchaser of the
premises for value.

The trial court determined that the instrument entitled “Trust”
was testamentary in intent, character, and purpose and was
ineffective to create an irrevocable trust with respect to the
beneficiaries. He also found that the deed from Linda Johnson
to the defendant, Esther J. Weldy, was a valid conveyance for
an adequate consideration without notice to the grantee of any
claims on the part of other parties to the action, invested ‘in
the grantee a fee simple title free of any claims of the plaintiffs
or other parties. From a judgment quieting title in the defend-
ant, Esther J. Weldy, the plaintiffs appeal.

To support their contention that the deed to Mary L. Kelley
and the subsequently executed instrument purporting to appoint
her trustee of the property so deeded were parts of the same
transaction, the plaintiffs rely heavily upon the testimony of
A. H. Helgeson, which was taken by deposition on January 17,
1951, in Douglas County, Oregon. Upon direct interrogation,
the witness stated: .

“During the month of January, 1933, I was requested to pre-
pare a warranty deed for Linda Johnson. She stated she wanted

Dn 89
to deed her property in Bismarck to her daughter, Mary. L.
Kelley, subject to a Trust declaration which we discussed at
that time, which would direct the distribution of her property
described in the deed. The deed was prepared by me and on
the 28rd day of January, 1933, Linda Johnson accompanied by
Mary L. Kelley, came to my office in the Court House to sign
the deed. I read the contents of the deed to Linda Johnson,
in the presence of Mary L. Kelley, whereupon Linda Johnson
signed the deed in my presence and in the presence of Mary
L. Kelley I notarized the deed, and handed it back to Linda
Johnson who then and there delivered the deed to Mary L.
Kelley.”

By cross interrogatory the witness was asked: .

“Did Linda Johnson, at the time of the execution of the deed,
or at the time she asked you to prepare it, make any mention
of any intention that it should be a trust deed?”

To which the witness replied:

“Yes. The deed was given subject to a Trust Declaration
that was discussed at that time, which was to be prepared by-
me.”

Helgeson testified that he subsequently prepared the instru-
ment entitled “Trust,” and concerning its execution, he says:

“TI took the completed Trust Declaration. to the home of Linda
Johnson at which time I left the completed Trust Declaration
with her unsigned, that she, Linda Johnson, might study the
contents of the Trust Declaration and familiarize herself with
the directives and conditions in the Trust Declaration. On
April 12, 1933, Linda Johnson, accompanied by her daughter,
Mary L. Kelley, came to my office in the Sheriff’s Office in Bis-
marck, where Linda Johnson stated that the Trust Declaration
was just what she wanted and was ready to sign it. After
reading the Trust Declaration to her, she signed the Trust
Declaration at that time, whereupon I notarized her signature
and at the same time, thereafter, in the presence of Linda John-
son and’ myself, Mary L. Kelley accepted the Trust Declaration.
Linda Johnson then and there delivered the Trust Declaration
to Mary L. Kelley, and it was placed in an envelope with the
deed mentioned in the Trust Declaration which Deed was un-

90 Le

recorded at that time, both to be held in escrow until such time
as the Trust Declaration would become operative.” -

At the time of his participation in these transactions the wit-
ness Helgeson was a deputy sheriff serving under Sheriff J. L.
Kelley, who was the husband of Mary L. Kelley, the grantee
and trustee of the transaction. He was not then nor had he
been generally engaged in the practice of the law, although he
was a member of the bar. -

The plaintiffs quote extensively from Reel v. Hansboro State
Bank, 52 ND 182, 201 NW 861, in the syllabus of which we state:

“Whether a trust has been created is primarily ‘a question
of intention.”

and

“A completed trust, without reservation of power of revo-
cation, can only be revoked by consent of all the cestuis; * * *.”

We are inclined to adopt the plaintiffs’ theory that while the
transaction consisted of two parts—the execution and delivery
of the warranty deed by Linda Johnson on January 23, 1933,
and the execution of the so-called trust and its acceptance by
the trustee on April 12, 1933—it, in fact, constituted a single.
act and the instruments should be given the same effect as
though executed simultaneously. No power of revocation is
reserved and, if a trust was in fact completed, the deed which
Mary L. Kelley subsequently gave to her mother without the
knowledge or consent of the beneficiaries did not revoke or
extinguish the trust. Thus we come to the prime and deter-
mining question of whether a trust was in fact created.

If a trust exists in this case it relates to real property. It
is an express trust and must be created or declared by a written
instrument subscribed by the trustee or the trustee’s agent
thereto authorized in writing. An express trust in real prop-
erty cannot be created by parol. Section 59-0303 NDRC 1943.
The writing by which it is created is generally known as a
declaration of trust and all previous declarations of the trustor
are merged therein. Section 59-0204 NDRC 1943. The declara-
tion of trust, if any there be in this case, is the instrument exe-
euted by Linda Jolmson on April 12, 1933. By its terms we de-
termine whether it was the intention of Linda Johnson to create

De 91.

a trust, as the plaintiffs contend, or whether it was her intention
to make a testamentary disposition of her property which would
become effective only at her death, as contended by the defend-
ant. This instrument cannot be valid as a testamentary dis-
position for it is not executed in the manner required by our
statute prescribing the manner in which wills other than olo-
graphic and nuncupative wills must be executéd and attested.
Section 56-0302 NDRC 1943. .

A testamentary disposition looks to the future and does not,
as of the time of its execution, divest the testator of his prop-
erty or any interest therein or vest a present property interest
in the beneficiaries.’ On the other hand, an express trust makes
a present and unequivocal disposition of the property. of the
trustor which divests him of the ownership thereof. 54 Am Jur,
Trusts, Section 34; Perry on Trusts and Trustees, 7th Edition,
page 119; Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal 323, 41 Pac 1089, 50 Am
St Rep 43; Cramer v. Hartford-Connecticut ‘Trust Co., 110 Conn
22, 147 Atl 139, 73 ALR 201. <A declaration is insufficient to
create a trust that merely shows that the purported trustor
intends to create a trust in the future. In re Wagoner’s Estate,
174 Pa 558, 34 Atl 114, 32 LRA 766, 52 Am St Rep 828; Con-
necticut River Savings Bank v. Albee, 64 Vt 571, 25 Atl 487,
83 Am St Rep 944. But if the declaration purports to make a
present conveyance of a future interest, the reservation of a
life interest in the trustor does not indelibly stamp the declara-
tion as testamentary in character. 54 Am Jur, Trusts, Section
22; Lowe v. Ruhlman, 67 Cal App2d 828, 155 P2d 671.

We now examine the purported trust declaration to determine
whether it was the intention of Linda Johnson to create a
trust, for without that intention on her part her words and acts
cannot be said to create an express trust. Section 59-0104 NDRC
1943.

Although a manifestation of intention to create a trust is
-all that is needed for its creation, it must be a manifestation
of intention to create a present trust and not merely to create
a trust to arise at some future time.” Scott on Trusts, Section
26. .

Under the premise upon which we are proceeding, Linda John-

I

92 |

son had, as a part of the same transaction in which she signed
the declaration, also executed a deed to Mary L. Kelley, absolute
in form and without reservations. The language of the declara-
tion, however, negatives the intention on the grantor’s part
to divest herself of title to her property at that'time. The re-
frain “the. event of my demise” is repeated seven times. ‘She
said that Mary L. Kelley was appointed trustee; the trust was
to’ become operative and copies of: the trust were to be de-
livered to the beneficiaries all “in event of my demise. ” With
respect to the deed, she stated that it was

“to be and to become ‘operative and to be filed for record
in the office of the Register of Deeds, in and for Burleigh County,
North Dakota, in event of my demise; 7 eR

“Said Trustee-shall when this trust becomes operative in the
event of my demise, file for record said deed hereinbefore de-
seribed, and which she shall hold in escrow until my demise,
ere .

“I, Linda Johnson, do hereby deliver in escrow abiding the
‘event of my demise, the deed for the property herein described
to Mary L. Kelley, * * *.”

Thus Linda Johnson specifically provided not only that the
deed should not become operative or be recorded until her death,
but that until her death oécurred the deed should be held .“in
escrow.” Her use of that term indicates a lack of intention on
her part to pass title prior to her dedth to Mary L. Kelley.

Section 47-0908 NDRC 1943 provides:

“& grant may be deposited by the grantor with a third per-
son to be delivered on the performance of a condition, and on
delivery by the depositary it will'take effect. While in the pos-
session of the third person and subject to condition, it is called
an escrow.”

It may be argued that under this statute a valid escrow can
be created only by delivery to a third person and not to the
grantee. However, the point now under consideration is the
intention of the grantor. Her use of the word “escrow” in
the declaration must be deemed consistent with her other com-
mands that it should neither become operative nor be recorded
until after her death. She intended that the deed should not be

be 93

operative until her death; and, by providing that the deed should
be held “in escrow” abiding that event, she was attempting to
make that intention effective.

We cannot dismiss the term “escrow” as meaningless merely
on the ground that it was misused. Cross interrogatories were
put to the witness Helgeson concerning his explanation to Linda
Johnson and Mary L. Kelley at.the time of the execution of the
declaration, or at any other time, to which the witness replied:

“I may not have explained this just in your language, but they,
Linda Johnson and Mary L. Kelley, understood that the two
instruments were to be held in escrow until.the Trust Declara-
tion would become operative.”

No inquiry was made of.the witness as to what explanation
he made, if any, as to the meaning of the term “escrow” as
used in the declaration. Whether the delivery of the instru-
ments to Mrs. Kelley. was intended to be irrevocable does not
appear from the testimony. In this respect the case is similar
to Leonard vy. Leonard, 145 Mich 563, 108 NW 985, from which
we quote:

“The instrument in question was a statutory warranty deed,
and contained the following clause :

“‘This deed is not to become operative until after the death
of the parties of the first part hereto,’

“It was executed and acknowledged by both the husband and
wife. It is admitted in the record that at the time it was made
the title of the premises was in complainant, and the husband
had no interest therein. The grantees paid no consideration
and had no knowledge that the instrument’ was made until about
four years afterwards, on the day when it was recorded. It
was put into the hands of one Leonard Piggott, to be held by him
until after the death of the parties executing it, when it was
to be delivered to the grantees. * * *

“The character of this instrument depends upon the effect
given to the sentence:

“his deed is not to be operative until after the death of
the parties of the first part hereto.’

“The words used cannot be said to apply simply to the en-
joyment and possession of the property, but to the entire force

94 ee

and effect of the instrument, and are repugnant to the creation
of a present interest. This construction is in harmony with the
conduct of the parties. There is no evidence of a delivery or
an intention’ to ‘deliver the instrument during the lifetime of
the makers.” See also Jones v. Loveless, 99 Ind 317.

In Arnegaard vy. Arnegaard, 7 ND 475, 75 NW 797, 41 LRA
258, which involved a deed ‘neither containing nor accompanied
by any provisions regarding the time at.which it should become,
operative, this court said in the syllabus:

“To make the delivery of a deed to a third person, to be de-
livered to the grantee on the death of the grantor, sufficient to
transfer title, it must appear that he intended then and there
to part with all control over the deed, and to leave it with the
third person as the agent of the grantee; * * *.”

There are many cases and many divergent holdings with re-
spect to deeds containing provisions postponing their effect or
operation until after the grantor’s death in which the court was
confronted with the question of whether the instrument was in
fact a deed or whether it was testamentary in character. See
16 Am Jur, Deeds, Section 199; Annotation in 11 ALR 67; 76
ALR 651. These authorities, dealing as they do for the most
part with deeds that have been delivered directly to the grantee
and intended to ultimately convey to the grantee a title absolute
and not in trust, bear but obliquely upon the determining ques-
tion in this case, which is the intention of Linda Johnson to
create a trust which would immediately vest an interest in the
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, they do generally deal with the
question of the present passage of title and are authority for
the proposition that the ultimate object of inquiry is the in-
tent of the maker.

The plaintiffs have quoted at length from the case of Lewis
vy. Curnutt, 130 Iowa 423, 106 NW 914, wherein it appears that
a grantor conveyed real estate to a trustee by warranty deed
for the consideration of “one dollar and the execution of the
trust hereby created.” As a part of the same transaction, the
grantor executed an instrument designating a trustee “for and
in behalf of myself to receive, acquire, take, and hold title to.

|

EE 95

the following real estate, * * * from and after my death,

and not before, to execute, transfer, and convey perfect: title
to the above real estate, * * *.” The court determined that

“Upon a fair construction of the writings as a whole, the
words ‘from and after my death’ have no reference to the time
when the title or interest shall pass under the deed, but.to the
time when ‘the trustee shall have authority to take possession
and proceed withthe active performance of his trust. That
this must be so is to be seen, not only from the language em-
ployed, but from the fact that then and’there and as a part of
the same transaction the grantor made and delivered to the
trustee an unconditional conveyance of the title.”

In that case the language by which it was sought to limit or
modify the time when title or interest passed to the trustee
under the deed was by the context at least equally applicable
to the time when the trustee should proceed with the active
performance of the trust. The court determined that the latter
was the correct construction. In the case before us, we have
not only the language with reference to the time when the deed
should become operative but also when it should be filed of
record, accompanied by the further provision that the deed
was delivered in escrow “abiding the event of my demise.” The
grantee, by signing the acceptance of the trust, acknowledged
the receipt of the deed “to be held by me in escrow until the
operation of said trust as set forth, * * *.” The limitation
“provided by the trust declaration in this case is far stronger
than the one that appears in the case of Lewis v. Curnutt, supra,
and indicates that it was not the intention of Linda Johnson to
create a trust in the spring of 1933 by which an interest in her
“real estate would vest in any of the beneficiaries of the trust
declaration, named or unnamed. This is not a case in which a
_trust is set up wherein the beneficiary acquires an interest dur-
cing the lifetime of the trustor with enjoyment postponed until
the trustor’s death. See Section 56.5, Scott on Trusts. The
whole transaction looks to the future and to a time when the
death of Linda Johnson should occur. There is no magic in the
use of the word “trust” as a background for the refrain “in

96 De

the event of my demise” which recurs in five of the eight para-
graphs of the declaration.

The property in question constituted the entire estate of Linda
Johnson. She continued to occupy the premises although she
reserved neither a life estate nor the power to revoke the trans-
action in either the deed or the declaration of trust. The omis-
sion of any assurance of her right of occupancy is wholly consist-
ent with a belief that she was not placing. the title of her prop-
erty beyond her control and with the fact that no authority with
respect to the property was vested in Mary L. Kelley until the
death of her mother.

It should also be noted that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the trust
declaration provide for distribution to children of deceased bene-
ficiaries and that if any of the beneficiaries named in the decla-
ration die without leaving children surviving them, the share
of the deceased beneficiary is to be divided among the others.
These provisions are wholly consistent with a testamentary dis-
position of the property and with an intention on the part of
Linda Johnson that no present interest in the property was
vested in the beneficiaries at the time of the execution of the
so-called trust declaration.

We can reach no other conclusion with respect to the inten-
tion of Linda Johnson than that the deed was not intended to
give the beneficiaries a present interest in the property, but was
to be held “in escrow” and unrecorded wntil the death of the
grantor. It was clearly her intention that upon her death both
the deed to Mary L. Kelley and the trust declaration should be-
‘come effective and the trustee would then record the deed ‘and
proceed to carry out the terms of the so-called trust. This ar-
‘rangement was purely testamentary and gave the beneficiaries
no interest in the property, either legal or equitable, prior to the
death of the owner. Mary L. Kelley violated the terms of the
agreement and recorded the deed which she had agreed to hold
“in escrow” until after her niother’s death. Her mother’s demand
for a reconveyance resulted in the deed by Mary L. Kelley and
her husband to Linda Johnson, dated March 11, 1935. At that
time the beneficiaries of the trust declaration had no interest
in the property whatsoever and the deed operated +o convey

ee 97
any interest that Mary L. Kelley may have acquired in it and
restore the record title to Linda Johnson, who later deeded the
premises to Esther J. Weldy in whose favor the trial court
rendered judgment.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Burks, SarHre, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur,
De
[File No. 7210]
DAKOTA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,
v. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE OF THE STATE
OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent.

(54 NW2d 745)

Opinion filed September 6, 1952

Johnson & Rausch, for appellant.

Wallace E.. Warner, Attorney General, and Robert A. Alph-
son, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Burxe, J. The defendant, Commissioner of Insurance, de-
nied the petitioning Insurance Company a certificate of com-
pliance with the laws of North Dakota relating to the organiza-
tion and qualification of insurance companies. As stated in
his letter rejecting petitioner’s application for such certificate,
the ground upon which the Commissioner’s denial was based
was, “that Mr. J. Roberts Hann, President and Treasurer and
principal stockholder of the Dakota National Insurance Com-
pany was a member of the Board and Director of Insurance
for the American Christian Mutual Life Insurance Company

ee
of Fargo, North Dakota, which company has been currently
under examination by this office. Because of this connection,
and being fully informed of the present state of affairs of the
American Christian Mutual Life Insurance Company, I do not
believe that I can conscientiously and properly issue a Certifi-
cate of Authority to the Dakota National Life Insurance Com-
pany until further developments in the affairs of the American
Christian Mutual Life Insurance Company.”

The language used by the Commissioner makes it clear that
his reason for denying the petitioner’s application was his lack
of confidence either in the integrity or business ability of the
principal managing officer of the corporation, not that peti-
tioner had not complied with the law.

Upon receipt of the letter denying its application, petitioner
initiated this proceeding, demanding a writ of mandamus direct-
ing the Commissioner to issue it a certificate of compliance.

The Commissioner demurred to the petition. The trial court
sustained the demurrer and the defendant has appealed from
the order sustaining the demurrer.

In the court below it was contended by the Commissioner,
(1) that the granting of a certificate of compliance required
the exercise of discretion on his part and mandamus will not
lie to control the discretion of an administrative officer, and
(2) that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by appeal.
The petitioner contended, (1) that since it had complied with
all the requirements preseribed by statute as prerequisites to
the issuance of a certificate of-compliance it was’ the Commis-
sioner’s ministerial duty to issue it, and (2) that petitioner
had no adequate remedy at law. The trial court sustained
the demurrer upon the ground that petitioner had an adequate
remedy at law.

We shall direct our attention first to petitioner’s contention
that it had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Concerning this issue respondent contends that petitioner had
an adequate remedy by appeal under the provisions of Chapter
28-32 NDRC 1943. Chapter 28-32 was first enacted as Chapter
240, Laws of ND 1941. The title of the act is:

“An Act to prescribe uniform rules of practice for adminis-

102 |

trative agencies from the determination of which an appeal
to the Court is provided, and to provide a uniform method of
reviewing determinations of administrative agencies by the
Courts.”

Section 1 of Chapter 240, supra, (See. 28-3201, NDRC 1943)
defines an administrative agency as “any officer, board, com-
missioner, bureau, department, or tribunal other than a court
having state-wide jurisdiction and authority to make any order,
finding, determination, award, or assessment which has the
force and effect of law and which by statute is subject to review
in the courts of this state:”

The language of the title and first section of the statute
clearly indicate that its purpose was not to grant a right of
appeal but merely to regulate the procedure in cases where a
right of review was granted expressly by other statutes. As
stated in Krueger v. American Christian Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co., 77 ND 436, 43 NW2d 676.

“The Administrative Agencies Uniform Practice Act does
not purport to provide a resort to the courts where none other-
wise exists.”

The Commissioner of Insurance has pointed to no statute
which grants a right of review of his decision refusing a certifi-
cate of compliance with the law. Our own search has revealed
none. It follows that a right of review of such decision in the
ordinary course of law does not exist.

From the fact that a right of review in the ordinary course
of law does not exist, it does not necessarily follow that the
remedy by mandamus is available. Petitioner must also show
that it has a clear legal right to the performance of the act
sought to be compelled. State ex rel. Eckroth v. Borge, 69
ND 1, 283 NW 521; Bismarck Tribune Co. v. Wolf, 64 ND
656, 255 NW 569; Strauss v. Costello, 29 ND 215, 150 NW 874.

The question then is, does the petitioner here allege facts,
which if established would demonstrate such a clear legal right.

Summarized the allegations of the petitioner are: that peti-
tioner has complied with all the statutory prerequisites to the
issuance of a certificate of compliance, including the necessary
filing of its articles of incorporation and the payment or tender

Le — 103

of payment of the fees required by law; that upon such com-
pliance, it was the clear duty of the Commissioner of Insurance
to issue to the defendant his certificate that defendant had com-
plied with the law; that the Commissioner of Insurance arbi-
trarily refused to issue such certificate in disregard of a clear
statutory mandate that he do so.

Section 26-0805 NDRC 1943, preseribes the contents of the
Articles of Incorporation of insurance corporations of the class
to which the petitioner belongs. It provides that such articles
shall be filed with the Secretary of State and a certified copy
there be filed with the Commissioner of Insurance.

Section 26-0807 NDRC 1943 provides:

“The articles of incorporation shall be examined by the at-
torney general and if found conformable to this chapter and
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of this state,
shall be certified by him to the commissioner of insurance, who
thereupon shall make an examination to ascertain whether the
company in all respects has complied with the requirements of
law according to the nature of the business proposed to be
transacted by it. If he is satisfied by such examination that
the corporation has complied with the law, he shall deliver to
it a certified copy of the articles of incorporation and a certifi-
cate to the effect that such corporation has complied with all
requirements of law, which, on being filed in the office of the
register of deeds of the county where the principal office of
the corporation is located, shall be its authority to commence
business and issue policies. Such certified copy of the articles
of incorporation and of the certificate may be used for or
against such company with the same effect as the originals
and shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of the organization
of the corporation described therein.”

This section of the code uses mandatory language. It pro-
vides that the Commissioner of Insurance shall ascertain if the
company had complied with all the requirements of law and
if he is satisfied that the company has complied with the law
he shall deliver to it the certificate which, when filed in the
office of the proper Register of Deeds, becomes its authority
to commence business.

Los Le

Giving this language its ordinary meaning, it seems clear
to us that the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner of
Insurance in the issuance of such certificates is ‘limited to a
determination of whether an insurance company has complied
with the statutes and that when such a company has complied’
with all of the statutory prerequisites, it is the Commissioner’s
duty to issue a certificate that it has so complied. This certifi-
cate certifies to nothing more than that a company has com-
plied with the law. The legislature has determined that such
a compliance authorizes an insurance company to commence
doing business.

If, as is alleged in this proceeding, the petitioner has com-
plied with all the statutes with respect to the organization
and qualification of insurance companies, and the Commissioner
has refused to issue it a certificate that it has so complied, his
refusal is clearly in violation of the duty imposed on him by
the statute and mandamus is the proper remedy to compel
performance of that duty.

The order of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the
petitioner herein is accordingly reversed.

Morzis, C.J., and Grimson and Curistianson, JJ., concur.

Sarure, J., did not participate.

PC 105
{File No. Cr. 244]

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent v. N. CLARENCE
TORZESKI, Appellant.

(54 NW2d 879)

Opinion filed September 25, 1952

106 De

Milton K. Higgins, for appellant.
E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, and George S. Register,
State’s Attorney, for respondent.

Curistianson, J. The defendant was convicted in the District
Court of Burleigh County of the crime of embezzlement and
sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. Defendant has
appealed from the judgment of conviction. On such appeal
errors are assigned upon the rulings on the admission of ‘evi-
dence and upon the court’s instructions to the jury. No specifica-
tions of the insufficiency of the evidence were served or filed.

In the information it was charged that the defendant com-
mitted the crime of embezzlement in Burleigh County, North
Dakota. That at the time and place stated the defendant, being
then and there an agent of Harry O. Berg and having in his
control property, to-wit: $150.00 good and lawful money of
the United States of America for the use of said Harry O. Berg,
fraudulently appropriated the said property to his own per-
sonal use and purpose, and not in the due and lawful execution
of his trust. That the circumstances of the embezzlement were
that said $150.00 were the proceeds of a certain check drawn
and issued by Elmer Shira, payable to the order of Nick
Torzeski, the defendant, for the sum of $150.00 drawn on the
State Bank of Burleigh County and delivered by said Elmer
Shira to said defendant for the use of said Harry O. Berg and
which said check was duly cashed by said defendant and said
proceeds fraudulently appropriated to the fraudulent use and
purpose of said defendant and not in the due and lawful execu-
tion of his trust as aforesaid; and that at the time involved the
said defendant was an agent of said Harry O. Berg.

The statutes of this state provide:

“Hmbezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property
by a person to whom it has been entrusted.” Section 12-3601,
NDRC 1943.

“Upon any prosecution for embezzlement it is a sufficient
defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowed-
ly and under a claim of title preferred in good faith even though
such claim is untenable. This- provision shall not excuse the

Le 107

retention of the property of another to offset or pay a demand
held.against him.” Section 12-3614, NDRC 1943.

The defendant requested that the court give the following
instruction:

“There can be no conviction of embezzlement, unless there
was a criminal intent at the time, on the part of the defendant;
and, that if the defendant believed he was entitled to use the
money, no matter how groundless you may find that belief was,
yet he cannot be convicted of embezzlement if you have a rea-
sonable doubt as to whether or not he believed he was entitled
to use it.”

The court endorsed upon the request the word “Given” and
affixed his signature below. . The instructions given to the jur-
ors by the court must be filed with the clerk and need not be
embodied in the statement of the case, but the same and each
of them, with the endorsements, if any, showing the action of
the court thereon, form a part of the record of the action.
Section 29-2305, NDRC 1943. The instructions in this case
were in writing and such instructions, together with the in-
structions requested by counsel showing the action of the court
thereon, were transmitted to this court as a part of the record
on appeal.

The defendant predicates error upon the following instruc-
tion:

“You are instructed, Members of the Jury, that there can
be no conviction of embezzlement unless there was a criminal
intent at the time on the part of the defendant; and, that if
the defendant believed he was entitled to use the money, no
matter how groundless you may find that belief was, yet he
‘cannot be convicted of embezzlement if you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not you believe he was entitled to use
it; that is, in the event you find and determine that the defend-
ant intended in good faith to borrow the money from Elmer
Shira, and was at the time not engaged as the agent or em-
ployer of his principal, or in his principal’s business, you
would find the defendant not guilty.”

The transcript of the evidence shows that during the times
involved in this controversy one Harry O. Berg was the pro-

108 De

prietor and sole owner of a concern known as Berg Insulation
Company. The name was later changed to Berg Home: Im-
provement. From May 1948 to November 8, 1948, the defend-
ant Torzeski was employed by Berg, under an oral agreement,
as a salesman to take orders for insulation of houses. The
defendant was furnished with forms of the company on which
the terms of an agreement for the insulation of houses were
stated. In May 1948 the defendant, in the course of his em-
ployment, procured an order from one Shira for the insulation
of his farm residence at the agreed price of $198.00. No down
payment was made and when the insulation crew went to
examine the building it was found that the bracing was ‘too
weak to permit the work to be done and the order was canceled
and no arrangement was made to do the work at a later time.
On September 30, 1948, the defendant again contacted Shira
and secured another order from him for the insulation of his
dwelling, for which Shira agreed to pay $198.00. A down pay-
ment of $48.00 was made by check, payable to the defendant
Torzeski. The order contained the provision: “Will notify
when ready.” On November 8, 1948, a written agreement was
entered into between Berg, the employer, and. the defendant
covering their relations. Under the terms of the agreement
the defendant was employed as a salesman of -insulation jobs
on a commission basis and it was agreed that.he should re-
ceive a specified commission of the gross amount paid for in-
sulation jobs. The territory fixed was the states of North
Dakota and South Dakota. The agreement provided:

“At the time of the taking of such orders for insulation by
the said salesman, he shall secure a down payment which said
down payment shall be applied by the employer on the commis-
sion herein provided for. It is agreed however, that all col-
lections of commissions shall be in the name of the employer,
and paid over to the employer, who shall then immediately pay
to the salesman such commissions as are then due. It is agreed
that the said salesman now is indebted to the employer in the
sum of $527.55 on previous transactions, and that until such
indebtedness is paid, the employer shall be authorized to with-

be 109

hold 50% of the commissions due the salesman to apply on such
indebtedness.”

Mr. Shira testified that on or about September 30, 1948, the
defendant prepared an order for the insulation of his house and
that he signed the order and gave the defendant a check for
$48.00 as an advance or down payment. The order was intro-
duced in evidencé and it recited such advance payment and
further recited a balance of $150.00 to be paid upon completion
of the job. It also contained a provision written on the order:
“Will notify when ready.” Shira testified that about a week
before January 10, 1949, the defendant came to his farm and
brought with him a $500.00 note signed by himself payable to
Shira and that he wanted to borrow that sum from Shira. Shira
testified he told defendant he was not a banker and didn’t have
so much money; that a short time later defendant came out to
his place and that at that time Shira loaned him $50.00; that
on January 10, 1949, defendant came to see him and requested
payment of the $150.00 balance due on the order for insulation
and that Shira gave him his check for that amount, which check
was payable to the order of the defendant and which check was
later cashed.. Shira denied that there was any arrangement
whereby the $150.00 paid was to be a loan to the defendant but
that, on the contrary, it was to be delivered to Berg in payment
of the balance to be paid on completion of the job under the
order for insulation. As to what-took place at the time Shira
executed and-delivered the $150.00 check-to the defendant, the
defendant testified :

“T had been negotiating a loan with Mr. Shira, and I had went
out to see him about further negotiating the loan, and he had
refused it, but he had made the suggestion that he would pay
me for the insulation job in full, and it was understood that I
would use that money as he wasn’t ready for his job for a month
or two anyway, because his house was not in condition, ‘so I
wrote up the order, and marked it paid in full, and it was under-
stood that I would use that money for my own purpose until
the time that he was ready for the job, then at that time I would
pay Mr. Berg when the job was ready to be put in.

110 De

“Q. Now, you state that this was a loan; what did Shira say.
in that regard?

“A. Well, he said, ‘I can’t let you have the $500,’ but he said,
‘Tf this will help you, I will pay you for the insulation job in
advance’; and I don’t know exactly how it was stated, but it was
understood that I would use that money as he wouldn’t be ready
for the job for a month or two, and when he was ready for the
job then I would see that the job was paid for and put in.

“Q. Have you ever refused payment of this money to any one?

“A. No, sir; I have asked Mr. Shira three or four times if
he was ready for the job, I wanted to put it in for him, and he
has always said he wasn’t ready. I didn’t know anything until I
was arrested.

“Q. Then, when you took this $150, you took—in what ca-
pacity did you take that?

“A. I took it as a loan; he couldu’t loan me the $500, he said,
and I hadn’t even thought about doing it that way, but it was
his suggestion that he pay me in advance because I had never
collected in advance before, and that is the reason I had done it
this time.

“Q. Did his suggestion lead you to believe that you would have
the use of that money until such time as Berg would have it
coming?

“A, Yes, sir; he said he wouldn’t be ready for a month or
longer.

“Q. And then, what did you do on January 10, 1949?

“A, I was still negotiating with him. I believe I had the note
that night . . . yes, I had it, and probably he had reconsid-
ered, and at his suggestion-

“Q. Just state what was said by each one of you as near as
you can recall it.

“A. Well, as near as I can recall, I had the note with me; I
still wanted the $500, but he said that he didn’t have that kind of
money, but he would pay me for the insulation job in advance
so that I could have the $150 if that would help me to use until
he was ready to put in the insulation.

“A. He said he will pay us for the insulation job in advance,’
and, ‘you can use that; I will be ready for the job in a month or.

| i

so and when I am ready, you can see that the job is put in and
paid for, .

“Q. Did Mr. Shira at that time understand that you were
entitled to this whole $150 balance?

“A. He was giving it to me to help me out asa loan.

“Q. He was giving it to you to help you out, as a loan?

“ ‘AL Yes.” .

According to this testimony Shira proposed that he would pay
the $150.00 to the defendant for his personal use, with the un-
derstanding that the defendant in turn would repay the loan by
seeing to it that the insulation was installed when Shira was
ready to have it installed and then pay Berg the $150.00 balance
on the order for installation of insulation. It is true Shira
denies that this arrangement was made. But whether the ar-
rangement was made and whether the defendant kept and
utilized the money in the good faith belief that he had a right
to so retain and use it was in any event a matter for the jury to
determine. To constitute embezzlement there must be a fraud-
ulent intent to deprive the owner of his property and appropri-
ate the same. 29 CJS p 687; Note 41 LRA NS 556; Note 87
Am St Rep p 26 et seq; People v. Heilemann, 362 Til 322, 199 NE
792; State v. Schmidt, 72 ND at p 732, 10 NW2d at p 876. If
the defendant honestly believed that he had a right to retain
and use the money personally, and that he did so retain and use
the money, then he was not guilty of embezzlement even though
his claim of right to so do was untenable. The defense of good
faith is not dependent upon the validity of the claim of title to
retain the moneys by the party charged with the embezzlement.
Under the statute it “is sufficient defense that the property was
appropriated openly and avowedly and under a claim of title
preferred in good faith even though such claim is untenable.”
NDRC 1943, Sec. 12-3614.

The instruction set forth above which the defendant requested
be “given” to the jury and which the court approved was predi-
eated upon said NDRC 1943, Sec 12-3614, but the instruction
was not given in the form requested. It was materially different.
The requested instruction was that “if the defendant believed

12 es

he was entitled to use the money, no matter how groundléss you
may find that belief was, yet he cannot be convicted of embez-
zlement if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he
believed he was entitled to use it.” This part of the instruction
as given by the court read as follows: “if the defendant be-
lieved he was entitled to use the money, no matter how ground-
less you may find that belief was, yet he cannot be convicted of
embezzlement if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not
you believe he was entitled to use it.” ‘(Italics supplied) The
court followed this by the following explanatory statement:
“That is in the event you find and determine that the Defendant
intendéd in good faith to borrow the money from Elmer Shira,
and was at the time not engaged as the agent or employer of his
principal, or in his principal’s business, you are to find the De-
fendant not guilty.” It made the deferise of the defendant that he
received and used the money in good faith in the belief that it was
given to him by Shira as a loan to the defendant personally appli-
cable only in the event the jury found that at the time he received
the money and used it he was not engaged as the agent or em-
ployee of his principal or in his principal’s business. The effect
of the part of the instruction last quoted was to deprive the de-
fendant of the defense authorized by NDRC 1943, 12-3614. Un-
der our laws, every person accused of crime is entitled to a fair
trial according to the principles embodied in the Constitution and
the laws of this state. The test is not whether certain legal forms
have been literally complied with but whether anything has been
done or left undone which prejudices the substantial rights of
the accused. If a substantial right has been prejudiced a new
trial should be had. State v. Schmidt, 72 ND 719, 734, 10 NW2d
868. In this.case it cannot be said that the substantial rights of
the defendant were not prejudiced by the instruction that was
given. Inasmuch as the error in the instructions to the jury
requires a reversal other errors assigned need not be considered

‘as the questions raiséd by such assignments ate not likely to

arise on another trial.

FT

— 113

The judgment of the comiviction is reversed and the case is
remanded for a new trial.

Morris, C0. J., and Carisrranson, Grimson, Sarsre and Burxs,
JJ., concur,

PC
[File No. 7224]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT BAUR,
Deceased, Henry ©. Baur, Respondent, v. ROBERTA
WEST, Mary Ogle, Carrie Taylor and Zoe Baur, Appellants.

(54 NW2d 891) : .

14

Opinion filed September 25, 1952

P.M. Clark, for appellants.
CG. D. Aaker, for petitioner and respondent.

C. D.. Aaker, for respondent.

Burxz, J. The petitioner, Henry Baur, petitioned the County
Court of Renville County to admit to probate the last will and
testament of his deceased brother, Robert Baur. The will named
Robert M. Baur, a nephew of the testator and a son of the peti-
tioner, as the sole devisee. The respondents, Mary Ogle, Roberta
West, Carrie Taylor and Zoe Baur, all daughters of the testator,
filed an answer to the petition, alleging; 1st, that the purported
will could not be admitted to probate because the téstator had
never published and declared to the witnesses to the instrument,
that such instrument was his last will; and 2nd, that the peti-
tioners, in any event, are entitled to share in the estate of Robert
Baur in the same manner as if he had died intéstate for the rea-
son that they, the.children of Robert Baur, were not mentioned
in the will and it did not appear that the failure to mention them
was intentional. .

116 —

After a hearing, the County Court denied the petition that the
will be admitted to probate. The petitioner appealed to the Dis-
trict Court from the order denying the petition. After a trial
anew upon-all the issues, the District Court entered judgment re-
versing the County Court and directing that the instrument in
question be admitted to probate as the last will of Robert Baur,
and directing that the daughters of the testator be excluded from
participation in the estate. The instant appeal is from that
judgment. It is contended by appellants on this appeal that the
findings of the trial court that the will was published and that
the failure of the testator to mention his children was intentional,
are contrary to the evidence. We shall consider first the law and
the evidence concerning publication.

Section 56-0302 NDRC 1943 provides:

“dy...

(2)... :

(3) The testator, at the time of subscribing or acknowledging
the same, must declare to the attesting witnesses that the instru-
ment is his will;

(4)...

(5) 2.

Section 56-0307 NDRC provides:

“No will is valid unless executed according to the provisions
of this chapter, or according to.the law of the place in which it
was made, or in which the testator at the time was domiciled.”

It is a well established rule in this state that section 56-0307,
supra, requires a compliance with the provisions of 56-0302,
supra, and if a will is executed without such compliance, it is
invalid. Moody v. Hagen, 36 ND 471, 162 NW 704, LRA1918F
947, Ann Cas 1918A 933; Collins v. Stroup, 71 ND 679, 3 NW2d
742.

The will is short. It is all contained upon one page and we
think it will be helpful to set it forth at length. It is as follows:

“LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

I, ROBERT BAUR, of Sherwood, North Dakota, being of
sound mind, memory and understanding, do hereby make, pub-’

oT

be uz

lish and declare the following as and for my last Will and Testa-
ment:

FIRST: I direct my executor hereinafter named. to pay all
of my just debts and funeral expenses as soon as ‘possible. after
my decease.

SECOND: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate,
whether real, personal or mixed, and wheresoever: situated, I
give, devise and bequeath unto ny nephew, Robert M. Baur, of
Erie, Pennsylvania, absolutely and in fee simple, for his own
use and behoof forever.

THIRD: Inominate and appoint my brother, Henry ©. Baur,
of Erie, Pennsylvania, my executor of this my last ‘Will and
Testament.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have heretnto set my hand and
seal this 1st of November, 1948. _

. Robert Baur L. 8. (signed)
Signed, sealed, published and declared by
the above named testator as and for his
last Will and Testament, in our presence,
at his request, and in the présence of each
other, we hereunto set our hands as attest-
ing witnesses:
W. A. Coutts (signed)
George Gehringer (signed)

, Filed: 9 A.M.

April 2, 1949. J. H. Foster Judge
and Ex-Officio Clerk of Dist. Court,
Renville County, North Dakota. 37°

The will is entirely in typewriting except the date of execu-
tion and the signatures. In the date, the day of the month and the
month and the year were written in with pen and ink..

The petitioner identified the signature of the testator. Hach
of the subscribing witnesses testified as to the genuineness of
his signature and one of them, the witness Coutts testified that
the part of the date which was written with pen and ink was in
his handwriting.

Both of the subscribing witnesses, however, testified that they

11s ee

had no recollection of the occasion upon which they signed. The
witness, Coutts, was, upon the date of the execution of the will,
County Auditor of Renville County. The witness, Gehringer, was
‘his deputy. Coutts, when asked if he was prepared to deny that
Mr. Baur brought the instrument to his office and asked him to
sign it, stated, “I don’t deny it, but I don’t recall it.” “I don’t
remember who brought it in.” When asked if Baur declared to
him that the instrument was his last will and testament, he re-
plied, “No he didn’t. I can’t remember who brought it in.” The
witness Gehringer, when asked if he knew, when or how it hap-
pened that he witnessed the will, answered, “No I don’t.” When
asked if he had any recollection whatever of Baur’s coming in
and asking him to sign as a witness, he replied “No, I haven’t.”
When asked if Mr. Baur stated that the instrument was his last
will, he replied, “No he didn’t.”

In his memorandum opinion in the case, the trial judge said,
“I am convinced that the subscribing witnesses are telling the
absolute truth when they testify they have no recollection of the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument.
They are officers in what, on November 1st of any year, would be
a busy office. . . . The answers given by these witnesses tend-
ing to impeach the attestation clause were, I believe, prompted by
their belief that answers of the kind given were necessary. Man-
ifestly if the witnesses had no recollection whatever of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument, and I
believe they had no such recollection, they could not say whether
this particular act‘or that particular thing had been done or had
taken place at the time when the instrument in question was ex-
ecuted.” Thus the trial court resolved the patent inconsistency
in the testimony of these witnesses by finding that their state-
ments that they had no recollection whatever of the transaction
were true and that therefore their statements which tended to
impeach the attestation clause were not entitled to any weight.

It seems to us that this finding of the trial court is amply sus-
tained by the evidence. It is clear from the entire record that
the witnesses’ testimony that Mr. Baur did not tell them the in-
strument was a will, was not a statement of fact but a statement
of opinion based upon their belief that if he had told them, they

be 19

would have remembered. The weight to be given to such a de-
duction is minimized by a glance at the will itself.. It is all con-
tained upon one page. It is entitled “Last Will and Testament”
set forth in underlined bold type at the top of the page.. The
attestation clause above the witnesses’ signatures is unusual in
the sense that it does not appear upon most instruments. the
county auditor and his deputy would be asked to witness. It is
almost unbelievable that men of experience, holding responsible
positions, could have signed as witnesses to this will and not have
known at the time that it was a will they were attesting. This
is- particularly true as to the witness Coutts who examined the
instrument to the extent that, he discovered it was undated and
completed the date in his own handwriting. If they knew it.was
a will at the time, it would seem to us, that whether they learned
that fact from observation or from being so informed by the
testator, would have little effect upon their subsequent recollec-
tion of the transaction. On the other hand if they were so ab-
sorbed in other matters, or so inattentive to what they were
doing that they did not notice the instrument was a will, it is
also quite likely that they would not remember what was said at
the time. We therefore adopt the trial court’s finding that the
witnesses’ testimony that Mr. Baur did not.tell them the instru-
ment was a will is not entitled to any weight.

With this testimony eliminated there is no evidence, extrane-
ous to the instrument itself, of whether Mr. Baur did or did not
publish the instrument as his will. The attestation clause of the
will is complete. It sets forth the fact of publication and the
fact that the witnesses signed at the request of the testator.
The witnesses, themselves, identified their signatures positively.
We believe it to be an unvarying rule, that where the signatures
of the attesting witnesses are established by unquestioned proof,
the recitals of the attestation clause of due execution of the will
are presumed to be true and can only be overcome by clear and
convincing testimony, In re Monks’ Estate, 48 Cal App2d 603,
120 P2d 167; Walters v. Heaton, 223 Iowa 405, 271 NW 310; In
re Wallace’s Estate, 158 Kan 633, 149 P2d 595; Poindexter’s Ad-
ministrator v. Alexander, 277 Ky 147, 125 SW2d 981 ;.Van Meter
v. Van Meter, 183 Md 614, 39 A2d 752; Morrow y. Board of Trus-

120 —

tees of Park College, 353 Mo 21, 181 SW2d 945; In re Lazzati’s
Will, 131 NJ Bq 54, 23 A2d 566; In re Akin’s Estate, 41 NM 566,
72 P2d 21; In re Wade’s Estate, 174 Or 531, 149 P2d 947; In re
Rowlands’ Estate, 70 SD 419, 18 NW2d 290; Moore v. Halber-
stadt, 246 Wis 263, 16 NW2d 819.

- Since there is here no credible-proof to impeach the attestation
clause, it follows that the facts stated therein must be accepted
as true.and that the decision of the district court, that the will
be admitted to probate, must be affirmed.

The remaining question is whether -the trial court’s finding,
that the testator’s failure to mention his children in the will was
intentional, is supported by the evidence.

Section 56-0417 NDRC 1948 provides:

“When any testator omits to provide in his will for any child
of his, or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it appears
that such omission was intentional,.such child, or the issué of
such: child, must have the same share in the estate of the testator
as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as is provided
in section 56-0416,”

The omission to provide for a child-or the issue of deceased
children in a will merely raises a prima facie presumption that
such issue-were not intentionally omitted and such presumption
is rebuttable by extrinsic evidence. Schultz v. Schultz, 19: ND
688, 125 NW 555; Hedderich v. Hedderich, 18 ND 488, 123 NW
276.

The testator was married in 1901. He was divorced in 1913.
Four daughters were born to the marriage. At the time of the
divorce there were one aged six, twins.aged eight and one aged
nine. From the record in the divorce action it appears that the
wife had moved to Missouri with the children more than a year
before the divorce action was commenced. The testator was
granted the divorce upon the grounds of extreme cruelty and
desertion. ‘There is nothing in the record to show that the tes-
tator ever saw the children from the time of the divorce until
his death.

- In September, 1914, the testator made a will in which he made
provision for his children and his brothers.. However, Para-
graph Five of this will provided:.

[| 121

FIFTH: I direct my said Trustee to use his best discretion
in applying the income and proceeds of my estate for the.sup-
port, education and maintenance of my children and I particular-
ly direct him not to use any part of the said income or net pro-
ceeds for the support, education or maintenance of any child of
mine, so long as the said child is receiving or accepting support
or maintenance, of any kind, either directly or indirectly from
my divorced wife, Amanda Baur, or any of her relatives. I
further stipulate that such of my children as shall choose to
leave. Amanda Baur and come back to me and be with me at my
death, shall participate in the distribution of my residuary es-
tate, but not otherwise, on the same basis as my brothers.”

In 1919, the testator left North Dakota and went back to Penn-
sylvania. There he lived with his brother, Henry, the petitioner
herein, until 1921, when he returned, to North Dakota. Before
returning to North Dakota,-he executed a new will in which he
named Henry Baur as the sole devisee. Robert Baur thereafter
lived alone on his farm in North Dakota. At all times the rela-
tionship between him and his brother Henry was cordial and
fraternal. During the depression years Henry helped Robert
by sending him checks from time to time and by paying his medi-
cal and hospital bills.

To a letter which the petitioner, Henry Baur, wrote tothe tes-
tator in December 1941, there was appended a postscript which
read:

“P. §. Many years ago you made a will, bequeathing all of
your property tome. You have the right to change this will any
time. If you still feel that way toward me, may I suggest that
you leave your property to my son, your namesake, Robert M.
Baur, instead of to me. What do you think?

H. OC. B.”

The testator replied to this letter in January 1942. In his
réply he stated:

“T have studied over your letter a » Tong time, for it seemed to
me that you in the east care nothing about this property, and I
had made up my mind to'put some German couple on it (as soon
as I myself was not able any more to work it) and just stipulate

122 |

that they keep taxes paid. I am feeling good but am getting
along in years, if it any use to will it to my namesake it will be
allright to do so, but I do not want any arrangement I make dis-
turbed. (I do not wish to interfere with in your business in the
east).”

When petitioner answered the foregoing letter he enclosed the
will which is in question here. In his letter dated February 7,
1942 he said:

“T enclose a will for you to sign if you approve, & return to
me. If you wish to write out just what you want done with the
farm, send it along with the will, and you may be assured your
wishes will be carried out. The will should have two witnesses.”

The testator kept this will until November 1, 1946, before he
executed it and returned it to the petitioner. He died in 1949.

We think this evidence amply supports the trial court’s find-
ing that the testator’s omission to provide for his four daughters,
was intentional. All family relationship between the testator
and his daughters was severed about thirty-five years before
the will was executed. In the will which the testator made in
1914, he clearly. expressed the intent that none of his children
should share in his estate unless they became reconciled to him
and returned to live with him. None of the children ever re-
turned. In 1921, he made a new will in which he left his entire
estate to his brother, Henry. Throughout the succeeding years
until his death in 1949, he lived alone on his farm. During those
years, the only family relationship shown by the record, was
with his brother Henry, who gave him help on many occasions.
Before the testator made. up his mind to leave his property to his
nephew he “studied a long time”, The reason for his study was
not consideration for his daughters, but consideration of whether
his nephew would derive any benefit from the will and of his
plan to turn his farm over to some German couple, possibly
in return for providing him with a home in his declining years.
After receiving the will from his brother in 1942, he kept it
almost four years before executing it. Apparently, his plans
for turning the farm over to a German couple never materialized
because according to the evidence he lived alone until his death.

We think the reasonable inference from all of the evidence

a 123

is that testator’s omission to make provision for his daughters
was intentional. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, C.J., and Curisrianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.
Saruns, J. did not participate.

PC
[File No. 7315.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FELIX GONSKY,
Deceased. Merchants National Bank & Trust Company of
Fargo, Petitioner, v. GHORGE §. REGISTER, State’s At-
torney of Burleigh County, North Dakota, and all unknown
heirs and persons interested in the Wstate of Felix Gonsky,
Deceased, United States of America, Appellant and State of
North Dakota, Respondent.

(55 NW2d 60)

Opinion filed September 25, 1952

P. W. Lanier, United States District Attorney, and Harry
Lashkowitz, Assistant United States District Attorney, for ap-
pellant.

E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, and C. E. Brace, As-
sistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Curistianson, J. Felix Gonsky, the deceased, served as a sol-
dier in the Army of the United States in World War IT and was
discharged as disabled on May 31, 1942. Thereafter and during

126 —

the year 1942 the Insanity Board of Burleigh County,.North
Dakota, declared the said Felix Gonsky, now deceased, incom-
petent, and Romanus J. Downey was appointed by the County
Court of Burleigh County, North Dakota, as the guardian of
the person and estate of said Felix Gonsky. After serving as
such guardian for a time the said Downey died and the said
County Court of Burleigh County, North Dakota, duly appointed
the Merchants’ National Bank and Trust Company as the
guardian of the person and estate of Felix Gonsky. On July 15,
1942, the said Felix Gonsky was committed to the Veterans’
Hospital at St. Cloud, Minnesota, where he was furnished care
and treatment until he died on January 1, 1950. Thereafter
the Merchants’ National Bank and Trust Company of Fargo
was in due course appointed the administrator of the estate of
said Felix Gonsky, deceased. The estate of said Felix Gonsky
consisted of United States savings bonds and cash all derived
from payments to him during his lifetime by the United States
as retirement for disability as a regular army person. . Felix
Gonsky died intestate and left no known heirs surviving him.
In due course the administrator filed the final report and ac-
count and petition for distribution. The United States District
Attorney for the district of North Dakota filed a petition on
behalf of the United States of America wherein all the foregoing
facts were set forth and it was further set forth that any and all
the property of said Felix Gonsky, deceased, was derived from
payments by the United States of America as retirement for
his disability as a regular army person and that such property
consisted of United States savings bonds and cash and it was
prayed that all the estate of said Felix Gonsky, deceased, escheat
to the United States of America less regular expenses of ad-
ministration in accordance with and in conformity to the pro-
visions of Sec 17 et seq, and Section 450(3) of Title 38, USCA.
The county court denied the petition of the United States of
America and made its final decree of distribution providing that
all the residue of the estate consisting of United States savings
bonds of the then present value of $4159.50 be paid to the Treas-
urer of the State of North Dakota under the provisions of Sec
30-2509 and Sec 30-2510 of the North Dakota Revised Codes

a lar

of 1943 to have and to hold the same for the use and benefit of
the State of North Dakota under the provisions of Sec 30-2510,
NDRC 1943. The United:States appealed to the District Court
from the decision of the County Court of Burleigh County. The
district court-rendered its decision that the decision of the county
court was correct and dismissed the appeal from the decision
of the county court. The United States of America has appealed
to this Court from the decision of the district court.

The laws of this state provide:

“When the final-report and account of the administrator of

the estate of a decedent who appears to have left no heir suc-
ceeding to such estate is filed in county court, a citation shall issue
thereon to all persons having an interest in the estate, requiring
them to appear and show cause why the estate should not be
distributed to the state of North Dakota. Such citation shall be
published in the manner prescribed by section 30-0210.” NDRC
1943, 30-2508.
- “Upon the allowance and settlement ‘of the final account, the
final decree of distribution shall. order all moneys remaining in
the hands of the administrator after the payment of the ex-
penses, debts, and ‘charges of the estate in the order prescribed
‘by section 30-1818, to be paid to the state treasurer, and the
receipt of the treasurer shall be filed in such court.” NDRC
1943, 30-2509.

“Property distributed to the state as provided in section 30-
2509 shall“be held by the state treasurer for a period of six
years from the date of the decree making such distribution, and
claim may be made therefor within the-said period of six years
in the manner in this chapter provided.” NDRC 1943, 30-2510."

“When the whole or a portion of the estate of a decédent who
appears to have left no heirs succeeding to his estate has been
paid to the state treasurer as provided in section 30-2509, any
person who is entitled to succeed to the estate and who is not a
party or privy to any proceeding had in connection with the
administration of such estate, and who has not appeared in any
such proceeding, within six years after the date of the decree
of final distribution, unless otherwise barred, may file a petition
in the district court of the county in which the estate was pro-

128 ee
bated, setting forth the petitioner’s right to share in the estate,

.or the whole or a part of the proceeds thereof. Such petition

shall be verified and shall sct forth such facts as are relied upon
to sustain the claimant’s right to share in the said estate.” ND
RC 1948, 30-2511.

“Tf there is no-one capable of succeeding under the provisions
of this chapter, and the title fails from a defect of heirs, the
property of a decedent devolves and escheats to the state and an
action for the recovery of such property and to reduce it into
the possession of the state or for its sale and conveyance may
be brought by the attorney general or by the state’s attorney
in the district court of the county in which the property is situ-
ated.” NDRC 1948, 56-0114.

~ Counsel for the State of North Dakota invokes these statutory
provisions in support of the decision appealed from, and it is
claimed that these provisions are applicable to and decisive of
the controversy. 7

The United States of America on the other hand claims that
the above quoted statutory provisions are not applicable to the
controversy, and asserts that all residue of property in the hands
of the administrator belong, and should be distributed, to ‘the
United States of America by virtue of the provisions of 38
USCA Sections 17, 17a, 17f and Sec 450(3) which read as follows:

“Bffective ninety days after December 26, 1941, whenever
any veteran (admitted as a veteran) shall die while a member
or patient in any facility, or any hospital while being furnished

- care or treatment therein by the Veterans’ Administration, and

shall not leave surviving him any spouse, next of kin, or heirs
entitled, under the laws of his domicile, to his personal property
as to which he dies intestate, all such property, including money
and choses in action, owned by said decedent at the time of
death and not disposed of by will or otherwise, shall immediately
vest in and become the property of the United States as trustee
for the sole use and benefit of the General Post Fund, ; .- «
“The foregoing ‘provisions are conditions precedent’to the
initial, and also to the further furnishing of care or treatment
by the Veterans’ Administration in a facility or hospital. The
acceptance of care or treatment by any veteran admitted as such

|

— 129

to any Veterans’ Administration facility or hospital after ninety
days from December 26, 1941, and as well the continued accept-
ance of care or treatment furnished by the Veterans’ Adminis-
tration after said ninety days by any veteran who is then receiv-
ing the same shall constitute an acceptance of the provisions
and conditions of this subchapter and have the effect of an as-
signment, effective at his death, of such assets in accordance
with and subject to the terms and provisions of this subchapter
and the regulations issued in accordance with and pursuant
thereto.” Sec17.

“The fact of death of the veteran (admitted as such) in a
facility or hospital, while being furnished care or treatment
therein by the Veterans’ Administration, leaving no spouse, next
of kin, or heirs, shall give rise to a conclusive presumption of a
valid contract for the disposition in accordance with this sub-
chapter, but subject to its conditions, of all property described
in section 17 of this title owned by said decedent at death and as
to which he dies intestate.” Sec 17a.

“Notwithstanding the crediting to said Post Fund of the as-
sets, or proceeds thereof, of any decedent, whether upon deter-
mination by a court or the Veterans’ Administration pursuant
to the provisions of section 17 of this title, any person claiming
a right to such. assets may within five years after the death of
the decedent file a claim on behalf of himself and any others
claiming with the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.” Sec 17f.

“ , , Provided further, That any funds in the hands of a
guardian, curator, conservator, or person legally vested with the
care of the beneficiary or his estate, derived from compensation,
automatic or term insurance, emergency officers’ retirement
pay, or pension, payable under said Acts, which under the law
of the State wherein the beneficiary had his last legal residence
would escheat to the State, shall escheat to the United States
and shall be returned by such guardian, curator, conservator,
or person legally vested with the care of the beneficiary or his
estate, or by the personal representative of the deceased bene-
ficiary, less legal expenses of any administration necessary to
determine that an escheat is in order, to the Veterans’ Admin-

130 Le

istration, and shall be deposited to the credit of the current
appropriations provided for payment of compensation, insur-
ance, or pension.” See 450(3).

The Constitution of the United States provides:

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound. thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” US Const,
Art 6.

Trott v. State, 41 ND 614, 171 NW 827, 4 ALR 1372. The
Acts of Congress embodied in 38 USCA, Sections 17, 17a, 17£
and Sec 450(3) are presumed to be constitutional and valid en-
actments and no question has been raised as to their constitu-
tionality.

The facts in this case clearly bring it within the provisions
of Sections 17, 17a, 17f, Title 38, USCA. Felix Gonsky was
a veteran who had been admitted to a Veterans’ Hospital on
July 14, 1942, by reason of his disability and remained in such
institution as a patient until the time of his death on January
-1, 1950. He was furnished and accepted care and treatment
therein by the Veterans’ Administration from the time of his
admission on July 14, 1942, until the time of his death on Janu-
ary 1, 1950. He did not leave surviving him a spouse, next of
kin, nor any heir entitled under the laws of his domicile to any
personal property as to which he died intestate. It appeared
to the county court in the proceedings there had for the admin-
istration of the estate of said Felix Gonsky, deceased, that he
left no heirs succeeding to his estate (NDRC 1943, 30- ~2508)
for in the final decree of distribution it is stated that,“it further
appearing, that after diligent inquiry no person can be found
who is entitled to sueceed to his property and that said decedent
appears to have left no heir or heirs.” - And in the final decree
of distribution it is ordered and adjudged and decreed that “all
and singular of the above-described personal property be paid to
the State Treasurer of the State of North Dakota under the

|

es 131,

provisions of Section 30-2509 and Section 30-2510 of the North
Dakota Revised Code of 1943 . . . forever in the following
proportions, to-wit: The Whole thereof. To have and to hold
the same . . . for the use and benefit of the State of North
Dakota under the provisions of Section 30-2510 of the NDRC
of 1943.” And it is directed and ordered “that said Administra-
tor of the estate of said deceased, shall immediately, or as soon
as conveniently can bé, pay and deliver to the State Treasurer of
North Dakota, its respective part .or portion of the residue of
the said estate as hereinbefore decreed and assigned.”

Under the express provisions of the Act of Congress the ac-
ceptance of care or treatment by Felix Gonsky in the Veterans’
Hospital by the Veterans’ Administration constituted accept-
ance of the provisions and conditions of the act and had the
effect of an assignment effective at his death of all his personal
property as to which he died intestate “including money and
choses in action, owned by said decedent at the time of death and
not disposed of by will or otherwise” and that such property did
“immediately vest in and become the property of the United
States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post
Fund.” Sec 17. The fact of death of Felix Gonsky in the hos-
pital while being furnished care or treatment therein by the
Veterans’ Administration, he leaving no spouse, next of kin or

“heirs gave “rise to a conclusive presumption of a valid contract
for the disposition” in accordance with the act but subject to
its conditions, of all property described in section 17, ‘Title 38,
USCA, owned by said decedent at death and as to which he died
intestate. Sec 17a.

The rights of the United States to property of a decedent in
eases falling within the purview of Sections 17, 17a, 17f, Title
38, USCA, do not arise because the property escheats to the
United States. No question of escheat is involved. Such rights
arise not by escheat but by virtue of the relations created under
the terms of the statute. Under the provisions of the statute,
upon the death of Felix Gonsky all the property owned by him
vested immediately in and became the property of the United
States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General Post
Fund. However, any person claiming a right to such assets

132 |

may within five years after the death of the decedent file a claim
on behalf of himself and any others claiming with the Admin-
istrator of Veterans’ Affairs. Sec 17f. :

In Title 38, Sec 450(3) USCA, it is said that “any funds i in
the hands of a guardian, curator, conservator, or person legally
vested with the care of the beneficiary or his estate, derived from
compensation, automatic or term insurance, emergency officers’
retirement pay, or pension; payable under said Acts, which un-
der the law of the state wherein the beneficiary had his last
legal residence would escheat to the State, shall escheat to the
United States and shall be returned . . . to the Veterans’
Administration, and shall be deposited to the credit of the
current appropriations provided for payment of compensation,
insurance, or pension.”

Whether the term “escheat” used in said Sec 450(3) is wholly
appropriate is not of controlling importance. (See Coakley v.
Attorney General, 318 Mass 508,.62 NH2d 659; In re Lindquist’s
Estate, 25 Calif2d 697, 154 P2d 879.) - The question is not wheth-
er more apt language might have been employed, but what was
the intention of Congress as evidenced by the provision as a
whole. As was said by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Coakley v. Attorney General, supra:

“There can be no doubt that Congress intended that in a case -
like the present the net assets in questions should revert to the
United States. The gift to the pensioner was subject to a sort
of condition subsequent to that effect. It is of no importance
that, as is contended, the reverter is not properly called an.
escheat, or thatthe common law does not recognize a limitation
over after an absolute or fee simple estate. Kelley v. Meins, 135
Mass 231, 234. .The will of Congress rises superior to the com-
mon law classification and qualities of estates. Congress may
provide new and strange rules for the devolution of pension
money, Sunderland v. United States, 266 US 226, 232, 233.
County Commissioners v. Seber, 318 US 705, 708, note. Beaver
v. Short, 300 Fed 113. The decisive thing is that the donor, the
United States, has reserved the right to lay its hand upon the
pension money or its proceeds in the very event that has hap-

EE 138

pened. The act of Congress governs, and the United States is
entitled to the property in question.” 318 Mass-at pp 510-511.

Sections 17, 17a, 17f, Title 38, USCA, make'no reference to
escheat and this case does not call for the determination of an
escheat. In American Law, “escheat signifies reversion of
property to the state in consequence of a want of any individual
to inherit.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.

The laws of this state provide:

“All property, real and personal, within the limits of this
state, which does not belong to any person or to the United
States, belongs to the state. Whenever the title to any property
fails for want of-heirs or next of kin, it reverts to the state.”
NDRC 1943, 54-0102.

If property escheats to the State, the latter takes only the title
which the party dying had, and none other. The estate passes
just as the owner held it subject to all charges, liens and en-
cumbrances. 3° Washburn on Real Property, 6th ed, p 64, see
1874. .

The property which Felix Gonsky owned at the time of his
death: was subject to an assignment which became effective im-
mediately upon his death. According to the specific provisions
of the Act of Congress, all personal property “as to which he
(Felix Gonsky) died: intestate including money and choses in
action,” owned by the said Felix Gonsky at the time of his death
immediately vested in and became the property of the United
States as trustee for the sole use and benefit of the General
Post Fund. Section 17.

The county court has “exclusive original jurisdiction in pro-
bate and testamentary matters, the appointment of administra-
tors and guardians, the settlement of accounts of executors,
administrators and guardians, the sale .of lands by executors,
administrators and guardians, and such other probate jurisdic-
tion as may be conferred by law.” N Dak Const, See 111,

“The executor or administrator is entitled to possession of all
the real and personal property of the decedent except the home-
stead and the other exempt property reserved by law to the
surviving husband or wife or children. He must protect the real
property from waste or other injury and collect the rents and

134 a

profits thereof until ordered to surrender the same, and must
collect the goods, chattels, and other effects of the decedent, and
the debts and demands of every description due to the decedent
or accruing to the estate in his right, and must safely keep and
dispose of the same according to law.” NDRC 1943, 30-1304.

The executor or administrator of an estate “must make and
return to the county court a true inventory and appraisement of
all the real and personal property of the decedent which has
come to his knowledge.” NDRC_ 1948, 30-1501. He must sign
the inventory and take and subscribe thereon an oath that the
inventory contains a true statement of :

“1, All the estate of the decedent which has come to his knowl-
edge and possession ;

2. All money belonging to the decedent;

3. All just claims of the decedent against the affiant ; and

4, Allliens, mortgages, or other encumbrances on the real and
personal property of the deceased.” NDROC 1943, 30-1503.

Our statutes provide that whenever property which is not
included in an inventory previously made comes to the knowl-
edge of an executor or administrator he must make and return
a supplementary inventory. NDRC 1948, 30-1509. It is ap-
parent that in the performance of his duties an administrator,
must ascertain and determine at least “prima facie” what prop-
erty belongs to the estate and should be inventoried as such. 1
Ross, Probate Law and Practice, sec 296, p 420; 1 Woerner, The
American Law of Administration, 3rd ed, sec 154, p 523. Such
determination must necessarily be made by the administrator in
the orderly administration of the estate. But the determination
is not final and “conclusive in another forum of the decedent’s
ownership.” 1 Ross, Probate Law and Practice, 3rd ed, sec 296,
p 420.

Our statutes authorize the county court to conduct an inquiry
and hear evidence to discover property belonging to the de-
eedent, and deeds, conveyances, bonds, contracts and other
writings which contain evidence of or tend to disclose the right,
title, interest or claim of the decedent to any real or.personal
estate or any claim or demand. NDRC 1948, 30-1307. See, also,
2 Woerner, The American Law of Administration, 3rd ed, sec

| 135

“325, at p 1026 et seq; 1 Ross, Probate Law and Practice, sec
310, at p 449 et seq. If it appears upon such inquiry that the
person accused of having in his possession or under his control
any such property or knowledge of any deeds, conveyances,
bonds, contracts or other writings which tend to disclose the
right, title, interest or claim of the decedent to any real or per-
sonal property or demand or any lost will of the decedent the
county court may make an order requiring such person to dis-
close his knowledge thereof to the executor or administrator.
NDRC 1943, 30-1308. Any person interested in the estate may
appear and file his exceptions in writing to the account of the
administrator and contest the same. NDRC 1948, 30-2013. The
petition for the distribution of the estate may be controverted
and any respondent may claim any share or interest which he
believes himself entitled to receive. NDRC 1948, 30-2108.

Upon the final settlement the court must proceed to distribute
the residue of the estate in the hands of the executor or adminis-
trator among the persons who by law are entitled thereto.
NDRC 1943, 30-2105, 30-2110; see also Sections 8846 and 8849,
CL 1913, Where “some of the original heirs, legatees or devisees
may have conveyed their respective shares to other persons,
such shares must be assigned to the persons holding the same in
the same manner as they otherwise would have been assigned to
such heirs, legatees or devisees.” NDRC 1948, 30-2122.

“Upon application for distribution after final settlement of
the accounts of administration, if the decedent was a nonresident
of the state leaving a will which has been duly proved or allowed
in the state, territory, or district of his residence, and an au;
thenticated copy thereof has been admitted to probate in this
state, and it is necessary in order that the estate or any part
thereof may be distributed according to the will, that the estate
in this state should be delivered to the executor or administrator
in the state or place of his residence, the court may order such
delivery to be made, and, if necessary, may order a sale of the
real estate and a like delivery of the proceeds.” NDRC 1943,
80-2131.

The Constitution confers upon the county court exclusive
original jurisdiction ‘im probate and testamentary matters and

136 ee

the appointment of administrators. Under the laws of the State
the administrator is charged with the duty of taking possession
of and inventorying all the properties belonging to the estate
and where necessary to conduct inquiry to ascertain the exist-
ence of properties belonging to the estate, and where properties
have been omitted to prepare a supplemental inventory. . The
authority of the county court to take into its possession and keep
and distribute property applies only to property of ‘the estate.
The court has no authority to take into its possession and keep
and dispose of property which does not belong to the estate.
The grant of jurisdiction to the county court and the duties
imposed upon it imply the incidental power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction. 1 Woerner, The American Law of
Administration, 3rd ed, sec 154, p 523 et seq; 14 Am Juris,
Courts, see 171, p 370 et seq; 21 CJS, Courts, sec 88, p 136 et
seq. And where upon final settlement and distribution it clearly
and indisputably appears that there is property in the hands
of the administrator which does not belong to the estate the
county court may order that such property be restored to the
person to whom it belongs. Such act will not be one in excess of
the jurisdiction of the county court but will be an act within its
jurisdiction in the performance of its duties in the admin-
istration of the estate.

In this case at the time of the final settlement and the dis-
tribution of the estate all the property of -Felix Gonsky in the
hands of the administrator and listed in the final account was
the property of the United States as trustee for the sole use and
benefit of the General Post Fund. No part of such property
fell within the provisions of NDRC 1943, Sections 30-2509 and
30-2510, There is no authority in law for the county court to
order that the administrator pay the same to the Treasurer of
the State of North Dakota under the provisions of these sections.
There is no dispute as to the facts, and under the Act of Con-
gress there is no basis for controversy as to the ownership of
the assets. The recitals in the final decree of distribution show
that the conditions were such that under the specific terms of
sections 17, 17a, 17f, Title 38, USCA, there was no residue in

Ee 137

the estate which might escheat to the State for want of an heir
capable of succeeding to such property under the laws of the
State of North Dakota. All such residue was the property of
the United States under the provisions of the Act of Congress
and this fact was clearly and forcibly called to the attention of
the court by the petition filed by the United States of America.
It is true that in that petition it was asked that the property be
“escheated to the United States.” This was probably due to the
fact that the petition referred to both sections 17 and 450(3) of
Title 38, USCA, and the latter section refers to escheats, al-
though as pointed out by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in Coakley v. Attorney General, supra, the term escheat
is not strictly accurate and means a reverter rather than an
escheat. But this was not important. The facts that were pre-
sented to the court by the record in the case clearly showed that
there was no property in the estate which the court had authority
to order to be paid to the State Treasurer, and the petition of
the United States constituted an objection by the United States
to any attempt to dispose of the moneys in the hands of the
administrator as assets of the estate. There was no basis under
the laws of the State for an adjudication that the moneys be paid
to the State Treasurer. The property and moneys directed to be
paid to the State Treasurer belonged to the United States and
the county court had.no authority to direct it to be paid to the
State Treasurer under NDRC 1943, 30-2509, 30-2510.

The Act of Congress provides: “If there be administration
upon the decedent’s estate such assets, other than money, upon
claim therefor within the time required by law, shall be by the
administrator of the estate delivered to the administrator of
Veterans’ Affairs or his authorized representative, as upon final
distribution; and upon the same claim there shall be paid to the
Treasurer of the United States for credit to said Post Fund any
such money available for final distribution. . . . Such pay-
ment or transfer shall constitute a complete acquittance of the
transferor with respect to any- claims by any administrator,
creditor, or next of kin of such decedent.” ‘Title 38, See 17d,
USCA. The assets in question here should be transferred and

138. a

delivered to the United States.. Coakley v. Attorney General,
supra; In re Bonner’s Estate, 192 Mise 753, 80 NYS2d 122,

The decision appealed from is reversed and the cause remand-
ed for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Morris, OC. J., and Grimson and Burks, JJ., concur.
_ Sature, J., did not participate.
De
[File No. 7228]

HERMAN WOLFGRAM, Respondent, v. J. E. HALL; Village of
Crary, North Dakota, a municipal corporation; Ernest Vel-

-, andri, et al, Trustees of the Village Board of Crary, North
Dakota; Mrs. Felix Vogel, Clerk of the Village of Crary,
North Dakota; and Jess Nicholson, Treasurer of the Village
of Crary, North Dakota, and J. EH. Hall, Appellant.

(54 NW2d 896)

a 139

Opinion filed September 25, 1952

Le .
Cuthbert & Foughty, for appellant.

Johnson & Bausch, for respondent.

Burxz, J. The appeal in this case is from a judgment decree-
ing an injunction. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that the
defendants, Ernest Velandri, Ed. Niebauer and Ingvald Alves-
tad, Trustees of the Village of Crary, Mrs. Felix Vogel, Clerk of
the Village of Crary and Jess Nicholson, Treasurer of the Vil-
lage of Crary, had issued or were about to issue to the defendant,
Hall, a license of permit to sell beer, in violation of Ordinance
No. 12 of the Village, which limited the number of beer. licenses
to one for each 750 inhabitants. He demanded judgment, (1)
enjoining. the defendant, Hall, from operating under, any beer
license which may be, or is about to be issued to him by the duly
constituted officers of the Village of Crary; and (2), enjoining
the officers of the Village of Crary from issuing a license to the
defendant, Hall, to engage in the selling of beer in the Village of
Crary. Pending the trial of the action on the merits, a temporary
injunction was issued enjoining the defendants in the manner
prayed for in the complaint. ° ;

The defendant, Hall, and the defendant village officers filed
separate answers. In so far as matters.of defense are ‘con-
ecrned, the answers are identical in substance. They alleged:
(1), that Ordinance No, 12 was invalid because it was irregular-
ly adopted and because it was repugnant to the Constitution of
the State of North Dakota; (2), that in any event Ordinance
No. 12 had been repealed prior to the commencement of this ac-
.tion; and (3), that plaintiff did not have sufficient interest to
maintain this action. In the defendant’s, Hall’s, answer there
were also included allegations of damage by reason of the tem-
porary injunction and a prayer that such damages Le assessed.
and allowed by the court. At the trial on the merits, the plain-
tiff, with leave of the court, amended his complaint by adding an

140 ee

allegation that the purported repeal of Ordinance No. 12 was
void because at the Trustee’s Meeting at which the repealing
‘ordinance was read for the first time, two of the defendants, who
participated in such meeting as trustees, had not yet qualified
by filing their oaths of office. The trial resulted in a judgment
for the plaintiff, and the defendant, Hall, -has appealed.

During the trial of the case there seems to have been some
confusion as to what the issues established by the pleadings
actually were and there was considerable testimony upon mat-
ters which were wholly irrelevant. Aside from the issue of the
sufficiency of the interest of the plaintiff to maintain the action,
there was but one ultimate issue in the case. That was whether,
at the time the action was commenced, there was a valid ordi-
nance of the Village of Crary which prohibited the officers of the
village from issuing a license to the defendant, Hall. Certainly
if there was no legal bar to the issuance of a license, the defend-
ant city officers could not be enjoined from issuing one, nor
could the defendant, Hall, be enjoined from entering into busi-
ness under any license which might be issued.

Ordinance No. 12 is.signed by the President of the Board of
Trustees and attested by its Clerk. It bears the endorsement
that it was read the first time on October 4, 1948, read a second
time on October 11, 1948,.and approved.on October 18, 1948.
The minutes of the Board show the action taken on October 4
and October 11 but there are no minutes of any meeting on Octo-
ber 18. There is some dispute in the testimony as to whether
such a meeting was held but all members of the Board, who tes-
tified, stated they had approved the ordinance. This ordinance
limited the number of beer licenses in the’ Village of Crary.to one
for every 750 inhabitants and provided for a preference in
favor of the holders of existing licenses. It is.admitted that, the
population of Crary is about 250 and that at the time of the ap-
proval of Ordinance No. 12 there was but one beer license in the
village.

The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees held on
February 21, 1950 show that the trustees present were E. Velan-
dri, F, Schall and F. Vogel. They also show the first reading
of Ordinance No. 16 and the adoption of a motion “to accept

Le 141

$25.00 Twenty-five Dollars from.J. E. Hall for a beer license.”
The trustees, Schall and Vogel, had just been elected to fill vacan-
cies on the board and at the time of this meeting had not filed
their. oaths of office. These oaths were filed on February 23,
1950. The minutes of the mecting of the Board of Trustees held
on March 1, 1950 show the second reading and adoption of
Ordinance No. 16. Ordinance No. 16 provided for the repeal of
those provisions of Ordinance No. 12 which limited the number
of beer licenses to one for every 750 inhabitants.

This action was commenced by the service of a summons on
March 2, 1950 or one day after the approval of Ordinance No. 16.
If Ordinance No. 16 was a valid ordinance it is immaterial, in
so far as this action is concerned, whether Ordinance No. 12 was:
regularly adopted or whether it was constitutional because valid
or invalid it would be wiped out by the repeal.

The only challenge to the validity of Ordinance No. 16 is that
two regularly appointed members of the Board of Trustees had
not qualified by filing their oaths of office at the time of the first
reading of the ordinance. These two officers, however, were at
that time in possession of their offices and they were discharging
the duties thereof under color of authority. We are satisfied
therefore that'they were de facto officers. Chandler v..Starling,
19 ND 144, 121 NW 198. Their failure to file oaths of office does
not deprive them of their status as de facto officers. Gulbrand-
son v. Midland, 72 SD 461, 36 NW2d 655, 24 NCCA NS 580; 43
Am Jur 235; Annotation in LRA1918B 1124. As de facto officers,
their acts were valid and effective. State-ex rel. Sathre v.
Moodie, 65 ND 340, 258 NW 558; State ex rel. Bookmeir v. Ely,
16 ND 569, 113 NW 711, 14 LRA(NS) 638; State ex rel. Butler v.
Callahan, 4 ND 48i, 61 NW 1025. It follows that Ordinance
No. 16 was'a valid ordinance, that the testrictive provisions of
Ordinance No. 12 were thereby repealed and that at the time this
action was commenced, there was no legal restriction upon the:
power of the Board of Trustees to issue a beer license to the de-
fendant Hall. Plaintiffs action should therefore have been dis-
missed.

During the course of the trial some confusion arose because of
the fact that the Village Board had approved the defendant’s,

143° a

Hall’s, application for a license before the repealing ordinance
was finally adopted. It was contended that the board had no
power to approve Hall’s application at that time. Whether the
board had such power at that time is wholly immaterial here
because no license was ever issued as a result of such approval
and the board did have the power to approve and issue a license
to Hall at the time this action was commenced.

~ There remains the question of defendant’s claim of damages.
Section 32-0605 NDRC 1943 provides:

“When no provision is made by statute as to security upon an
injunction, the court or judge shall require a written undertaking
on the part of the plaintiff, with or without sureties, to the effect
that the plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined such damages, not
exceeding an amount to be specified, as he may sustain by reason
of the injunction, if the court shall finally decide the plaintiff was
not entitled thereto. The damages niay be ascertained by a
reference or otherwise as the court shall direct.”

. It appears from the foregoing statute that a trial court, upon
the dissolution of an injunction has discretionary power to assess |
damages, to order the damages to be ascertained by reference
or in such other manner as the court may direct. Under such a
statite the court in its discretion, may “leave the injunction de-
fendant to his remedy by action at law.” 43 C. J. 8. (Injunctions
See, 283, 1060) Since all that would remain of this action upon
remand to the district court would be the strictly legal question
of damages, we think it best, and therefore order, that this action
be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
maintain an action at law for such damages as he may have suf-
fered.

Morais, C. J., and Cmristianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Sarune, J., did not participate.

De 143
[File No. 7314]

HENRY PACHL as surviving father of James Pachl, Deceased,
Appellant v. GEORGE OFFICER, I. E. Officer, also known
as I. O. Officer, Respondents.

(54 NW2d 883)

Opinion filed Aug. 26, 1952. Rehearing denied Oct. 13, 1952

P|
Lyche & Lyche, for appellant.
Degnan, Hager & McElroy, for respondents.

Grimson, J. This is a suit for damages resulting from an
automobile accident. On the evening of Sept. 9, 1949, James
Pachl, a single man, 22 years of age, together with his friend,
Donald Voiss, a young man 21 years old, left Grand Forks in
Pachl’s dark colored, Ford car to go to a dance at Ardoch. Be-
fore they left the city they bought six pints of beer, drank one
each at the time and one after leaving town. When they had

144 —

gone about eight or nine miles west on Highway No. 2 they had
a flat tire. They drew to the north side of the road, almiost if
not entirely, off the pavement. There they left the car without
lights or flares. The time was about 7:45 P.M. It was a clear
night just turning dark. They found the tire was ruined and
that the spare tire was flat. They drank a third can of beer
each and decided to take off the spare and to stop a car for a
ride into the city to have it repaired. Voiss began taking off
the tire. Pachl was standing at his right. Voiss describes it
this way:

“Well, we got some tools out of the car and started to take
the tire off the back end of the car and I was taking the tire off
as Jim was standing by my right side, and he happened to look
up and seen the lights of a car coming so he started crossing the
highway to flag it down and as he ran he said, ‘Hurry up, Don,
there is a car coming.’ Shortly after that I heard the crash....

Q. Did you hear the brakes screech just before the accident?

A. Oh, it came about all at the same time.

Q. There wasn’t any—you might say, noticeable interim be-
tween the impact as you heard it and the screech of the brakes, is
that right?

A. Not too much . . . just so close you couldn’t hardly
tell them apart.

Q. Where was Jim the first time you saw him after the im-
pact?

A. He was laying, face down, on the shoulder of the road.

Q. Did you see him before he landed on the road?

A. Yes, he was just above the car.

Q. When you heard the brakes and the impact I take it you
looked up?

A. Yes, I turned.

Q. Now, will you tell us, in your own language what you saw.

A. I tuimed around and I seen James body just coming up—
just as it was above the hood and crashed into the visor of the
car and flew about a few—couple or three feet above the car
and then lit on the highway and rested on the shoulder of the
road on the south side,

De 45

Q. Well, just so I understand it, I believe you mean to tell
us he went clear over the top of the car?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you see any part of the car strike him? -

A. Just the visor, that is all.

Q. So that you did not see the front part of the car, as shown
in Exhibit A. strike him?

A. No.

Q. So I take it the screech of the brakes and sound of the
impact and you looking up all took place just about simul-
taneously?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you move Jim or was he moved while you were there
until they put him on the stretcher?

A. Iturned him over on his back.

Q. Did he say any words at all after you came over there?

A. No.

Q. Is it your impression that he died almost instantly?

A. Yes.”

The car that thus hit James Pachl was a 1948 Chevrolet,
Tudor automobile, which had been driven between nine and ten
thousand miles. It was in good condition, with four wheel,
hydraulic brakes. At the time of the accident it was being driven
by George Officer. The two Officers with their wives and one
additional passenger, Inez Olness, had left Ryder, North Dakota,
that morning and were on their way to Grand Forks on business.
From there they had intended to go to Detroit Lakes. At the
time of the accident George Officer claims to have been driving
45 miles an hour. Regarding the accident he testified:

“Q. Now, would you explain to the court and jury how the
accident happened as you saw it?

A. I was just driving down the road and here came—I seen
this figure right in the middle of the road and he leaped—

Q. You saw the figure in the middle of the road?

A. That’s right, that is where I first seen him and he leaped
and I caught him on this fender.

146 |

Q. ‘And about how far was he from the car when you first
saw him. .

A. From his car?

Q. No, from your car?

A. From my car. Oh that would be hard to say. It was
just—when I seen him I tried to miss him and it just happened
that quick. I would say he wasn’t 15 feet. -

Q. From your car?

A. Yes.

Q. And how was he moving?

A. He was running and he leaped into the air.

Q. And from which direction was he coming and which way
was he running? .

A. He was going directly south; he was coming from the
north,

‘Q. And you hadn’t seen him prior to the time you mentioned?

A. No.

Q. ‘And where did he come from?

A. Just out of the darkness.

Q. And do you remember what you did when you saw that
figure ahead of you?

A. I slammed on my brakes.

Q. And did you do anything else that you recall?

A. I tried to swerve to the north a little bit to avoid hitting
him. If I hadn’t done that I would have got him right in the
middle of the car. .

Q. You tried to swerve to the north to avoid hitting him?

A. That’s right, yes.

Q. Now, you mentioned he leaped. You know which way
he was facing or anything about which way he was turned or
anything when he leaped like that?

A. Well, his hands were above him and—I don’t know, he
was just all sprawled out. You didn’t know what it was at
first, but he was just sprawled out. Maybe twisted himself.

Q. And do. you remember what happened after you hit him,

.to James Pachl? Do you know where he fell? I mean before

you got out could you determine what happened to the body?.
|

Le 147

A. No, I couldn’t. The hood flew up as soon as I hit him,
Q. Isee.
A. And I had all I could do to try to stop without anything
going wrong with us. *
. You recall whether or not your car swerved?
. It swerved a little after the impact.
. And you brought the car to a stop?
. [brought the car to a stop.
. And did you have your lights on?
. Yes.

rPOPOPO

Q. And in your best judgment the best way to describe it
was that he was running south from the north directly across
the highway and he made a leap?

A. He made a leap.

Q. And you saw him some 15 feet prior to that and swerved
to the north, to your left, to avoid him?

A. That’s right. ;

Q. And the impact would be towards the right part of the
car.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, what part of the highway were you on up until the’
impact took place?

A. South lane.

Q. And you weren’t off: onto the gravel shoulder of the road
at any time?

A. No.

Q. Would you be able to say which way James Pachl was
facing at the time the car struck him?

A. Well that would be hard to say. I seen him in the air
and he might have—I couldn’t say which way he was. .

Q. You don’t remember of seeing him facing you or anything
about that?

A. He seemed to be twisting like he would land like a ‘broad
jump or something. You always land, lots of times turning
the other way.

|

148
Q. Just seemed 'to be twisting? ,
A. Yes.”

Dorothy Officer, the wife of George was sitting on the right- -
hand side on the front seat. She describes the accident as fol-’
lows:

“Q. And would you tell the jury in your own words what
happened and about where it happened and the time it liappened?

A. Well, it was getting dark.and it was approximately eight
or nine miles from Grand Forks and the first I seen was this
boy that just leaped right directly in our path.

Q. Did your car strike that boy?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. And do you know about what part.of your car struck him?

A. Well, it would be the side where I was sitting more.

Q. Now, can you tell the jury about how far James was from
the front of your car when you first saw him?

A. Well, he was. right there when I saw him.

Q. And were you looking forward at that time and immedi-
ately prior thereto?

A. Yes, I believe I was.

Q. Would you be able to say how far in front?

A. Well, he was, I would say—he would be in the air when
I saw him.

Q. And did you notice what George did about that time?

A. Well he applied brakes immediately.

Q.- And did the impact take place sometime after the brakes
had been applied or—

A. No, I would say almost simultaneously.

Q. And in what way did you first see this man coming or in
front of you? Can you say which way he was going?

A. Well he was going south, directly across the road.

Q. And can you-tell from what you saw how he was travel-
ling, whether he was walking or— .

A. No, he was coming at a fast speed. It seemed like he just
made a leap thinking maybe he would make it or—

Q. So he was running?

Le 149

A. Yes.
Q. Now, how do you know where your car was when the
impact took place with reference to its position on the highway?
A. Well, wewere in the south lane of traffic,
. And did anything happen after the impact?
. Well, I couldn’t, just say. We could have—
. To the car.
. Well, from the impact there was a swerve.
. And what else happened. Anything fly up?
. The hood flew up.
. And what did George do with ‘reference to the car? Did
he continue on or bring it to a stop?
A. He brought it to a direct stop.
Q. Did you notice what happened to James Pachl right after
the impact? - Do you recall?
A. Well, sitting on the right hand side as I was, he just seemed
to land right directly down beside the pavement.

OPOoOPOoOPO

Q. I take it then that you didn’t see James Pachl running at
all; he was already in front of your car when you first saw
him?

A, Well, he was in the air in his leap in front of the car.

Q. Did you see James long enough before the inipact took
place to be able to say which way he was facing when the car
struck him?

A. Well, that—

. . . You can answer that yes.or no.

« No.

Q You wouldn’t be able’ to say which way he was 5 facing?

A. He was facing at the time of the impact? -

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would say south.

Q. And that’s your best recollection?

A. Yes.”

Inez Olness who was sitting with I. H. Officer in the. back
seat testified as follows:

150 De

“Q. Did you see the accident take place?

“A. No I didn’t.

Q. What indicated to you for the first time that an accident
was about to take place or had taken place?

A. Well, I felt the sudden stop and then the thud—or not
sudden stop; I mean thud and we swayed and then we came

to a stop. .
Q. And you-did not see the impact or the accident at all?
A. No.
Q. All you felt was the thud in the car?
“AL Yes.
Q. Were the brakes applied?
A. Yes.
Q. And then when did-the car swerve?
A. Well, the hood flew up and you couldn’t see anything in

front of you. I mean I looked up and you couldn’t see anything
and it all seemed to happen at one-time, the thud and the sway-
ing and all.
Q. And did George Officer stop the car then?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall where he stopped the car?
A.’ Well, it was on the pavement.
. Q. And do you remember which lane the car was stopped in?
A. Well, on the south lane and it was in our lane of driving.”

A photograph of the car taken after the accident was ad-
mitted without objection. It shows the right, front light bashed
in and the hood on the right side, almost straight below the
front edge of the visor, was dented. The evidence shows that
James Pachl was injured on his left side. The left side of his
face was injured..,There was a compound fracture of his left
leg, the bones sticking out through his trousers. His skull was
fractured. The evidence in the case indicates that the highway
crossed a hollow and a low ridge west of the place where the acci-
dent occurred. The defendants admit that they did not see the
Pachl Ford car at all.

Defendants claim to have ‘been driving not to exceed fifty
miles an hour. A very distinct skid mark, variously estimated

Le 151

at from fifty:to sixty-five: feet long was found back’-of ‘the
Chevrolet in the south lane about two feet from the edge of
the pavement. One witness testified that that skid mark began
east of the Pach] car and ended about 15 feet west of where the
Chevrolet stopped, still in the south lane.

Plaintiff tried to testify as to another skid mark about ten
feet long coming in diagonally off the gravelled shoulder but
that testimony is not very clear. The Chevrolet car was stopped
from 35 to 50 feet east of the body.

The plaintiff. as the surviving father of James Pachl, in
behalf of himself and his wife and Pachl’s: brother and sisters
brings this action for damages on account of the death of James.
He claims the defendants were driving at a “high, unlawful,
reckless speed and at said time and place failed to keep the
proper lookout and to keep said automobile under control.” The
defendants made a joint denial, except admitting the accident,
and plead contributory negligence on the part of the deceased,
James. At the close of the plaintiff’s case defendants moved
for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had failed
to make out a case. ‘That motion was resisted and denied.
Again, at the end of the evidence defendants made a motion
for a directed verdict in favor of the defendants on the same
grounds and on the further ground “that the decedent, James
Pachl, was himself, guilty of contributory negligence at the
time of the accident and that the same was the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the accident.” Again objection was made and
the motion denied. The whole matter was submitted to the jury
who brought in a verdict for the defendant. No further mo-
tions were made and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment.
He alleges errors in the proceedings of the trial and the admis-
sion of.testimony and alleges the insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict and that it-is against the law.

The decisive question here is. whether under the evidence the
verdict is in accordance with law.

This action is based on negligence. Negligence and contribu:
tory negligence are always questions of fact for the jury unless
the evidence is such that but one conclusion can be deduced from
the evidence by reasonable minds. - Williams v. Minneapolis,

152 Le

St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 57 ND 279, 221 NW
42; Bagg v. Otter Tail Power’ Co., 70 ND 704, 297 NW 774;
Leonard v. North Dakota Cooperative Wool Marketing Assoc.,
72 ND 310, 6 NW2d 576; Logan v. Schjeldahl, 66 ND 152, 262
NW 463; Skramstad v. Miller, 78 ND 450, 49 NW2d 652; Rokusek
v. Bertsch, 78 ND 420, 50 NW2d 657; Lostegaard v. Bauer, 78
ND 711, 51 NW2d 761.

There ‘is evidence on behalf of the ‘plaintiff to warrant the
submission of his case to the jury. Defendants admit they did
not see the Pachl car, indicating -that-there might be a question
about the lookout the driver was keeping. The driver claims
he applied the brakes as soon as he- saw the decedent come in
view of his lights, some 15 feet ahead of him. ‘The 50 to 65 foot
long skid mark is somewhat contradictory of the distance the de-
cedent was away from the oncoming car when first seen. The
skid mark may also indicaté that the Chevrolet was being driven
at more than fifty miles an -hour-so could not stop in shorter
space. So would the description of how Pachl was hit and
thrown.and the battered condition of his body. Then there is
some evidence that the’ skid mark coming in from the gravelled
shoulder of the highway might be construed as indicating loss
of control of the car. From these circumstances reasonable
minds might come to different conclusions. So clearly the evi-
dence was sufficient to submit plaintiff’s case to the jury.

Let us now consider the evidence of contributory negligence
and the effect thereof. In the case of Costello v. Farmers Bank,
34 ND 131, 157 NW 982, this court said: “While the question of
contributory negligence is usually one of fact for the jury, yet
where . . . the facts are not in dispute, it becomes a pure
question of law for the court.” In Johnson v. Mau, 60 ND 757,
236 NW 472, this court said: . . . But it is wéll settled that
when it appears affirmatively from the testimony of the plaintiff
that his contributory negligence is so ‘clear that reasonable
minds cannot differ but must conclude from the evidence that
there was contributory negligence, then it is a question of law
for the court. (Citing’ cases.)” In- Billingsley v. McCormick
Transfer Co., 58 ND 913, 228 NW 424, this court held: “Contri-
butory- negligence is a complete bar to a recovery for damages

Es 153

sustained in a collision alleged to have been caused by the negli-
gence of another.” See also Wilson v. Oscar H. Kjorlie Co., 73
ND 134, 12:NW2d 526; Ferm v. Great Northern Railway Oo.,
53 ND 543, 207 NW 39; Newton v. Gretter, 60 ND 635, 236 NW
254; Stelter v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 71 ND 214, 299 NW
310; Chase v. Thomas, et al, 7 Cal App2d 440, 46 Pac2d 200.

The books are replete with cases of injuries to pedestrians
crossing a street or a highway. If a pedestrian walks onto a
street or attempts to cross a highway without carefully observ-
ing the traffic and consequently walks in front of an on-coming
car and is injured it is generally held that he is guilty of con-
tributory negligence and cannot recover for the damages he
suffers. Bosma v. Daniels, 250 Mich 261, 230 NW 199; Rhoads
v. Herbert, 298 Penn 522, 148 A 693; Hooker v. Hancock, 188
Va 345, 49 SH2d 711; Tarter v. Wiggington’s Adm’t. 310 Ky
893, 220 SW2d 829.

The case of Bratvold v. Lalum, 68 ND 534, 282 NW 514, is
very similar to the case at bar. In that case Albert Bratvold
had been drinking. He was driving with one, John Ellingson
from Devils Lake to Harlow. As they approached Harlow the
automobile failed to function properly and they left it finally
in the ditch, Then Bratvold and Ellingson talked about hailing
acar. They met the defendant coming from the north, Ellingson
walked ahead along the west edge of the highway. The court
describes the accident as follows:

“As it passed Ellingson the car appeared to be about j in the
center of the road. Then Ellingson heard a thump and turned
around and saw the car in the ditch on the east side of the
highway. Ellingson ran over to the car as some of the occupants
got out. Bratvold had been hit and was underneath the front
bumper. He was either dead or died a few minutes thereafter.
The occupants of the car were the defendant, Olaf P. Lalum,
the owner and driver, his brother, Albert Lalum, who lives on
a farm with Olaf about five and one-half miles -southeast of
Harlow, and Andrew Olson, their hired man. They had left
Harlow about 11 o’clock that night in a 1936 Pontiac sedan that
had been driven five or six thousand miles. The brakes and
lights were in good condition, although there is testimony to

154 ee

the effect that the left front brake did not work properly after
the accident. Before reaching the point where the accident oc-
curred, they drove up a hill. At the top of the hill they were
travelling about forty to forty-five miles per hour. The south
slope of the hill is not steep. It consists of several rises with
short stretches between that are practically level. The accident
occurred at the south end of one of these levels approximately
450 feet in length: The road at this point curves slightly to the
east and back again to the section line. The road was some-
what icy. As they entered the curve the defendant saw Elling-
son first and then Bratvold. They were walking along the west
shoulder of the highway. Bratvold stepped out into the high-
way waving his hands. He then stepped back toward or near
to the west shoulder and then walked east across the highway
again still waving. The defendant was driving on the west side
of the highway when he first saw Bratvold and Ellingson. The
defendant turned to his left or to the-east to get by Bratvold,
who also kept on going east across the highway with the result
that the car struck him on the east shoulder of the highway and
continued on for sixty-five feet into the east ditch. The de-
fendant applied his brakes but did not set them hard fearing loss
of control of the car because of the icy road. Measurements
showed that the brakes had been applied one hundred feet before
the impact.”

The case was tried toa jury. At the close of the testimony de-
fendant moved for a directed verdict which was denied. The
jury failed to agree on a verdict. Thereupon the defendant
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Trial court
denied the motion and defendant appealed. This court held that
the conduct of Bratvold barred recovery and reversed the
judgment of the District Court.

The evidence as to the conduct of the decedent, James Pachl,
in the instant case has been set out in full. That evidence is
not disputed in the least. James Pachl and Donald Voiss had.
decided to hail a car so that they could take the spare tire into
Grand Forks for repairs. While Voiss was unfastening the
spare tire from the back of the Pachl Ford, Pachl was standing
beside him, All at once Pachl saw a light and telling Voiss to

SC 155

hurry he ran off, apparently to stop the car. He was a young
man of experience in driving cars and in the observation of cars
on the highway. As the driver of automobiles for some years
he, like all drivers, must have had some sense of the speed at
which cars were being driven. His eyesight and general health
were good. The weather was clear. There were no atmospheric
conditions to interfere with his judgment. They were on a good
highway. He started away from Voiss running and when the
defendants first saw him he was running south and waying his
hands. He finally seemed to jump or turn. Whether he thought
he had reached a place of safety and turned to waive the car
to a stop or whether he hadn’t yet reached across to a place of
safety but was trying to stop the on-coming car his action placed
him in the south lane of the highway in front of the on-coming
car and in a place of great danger. He did not use the precau-.
tion of the reasonably prudent man for his safety. His reck-
less actions overcame the presumption that a man will not act
in a manner to endanger his life. He may have failed to realize
the speed at which the car was coming but whether the defend-
ants were negligent in their way of driving or not the accident
would not have happened but for the actions of the decedent.
Only one inference can be drawn from the facts. We have come
to the unavoidable conclusion that his contributory negligence
was a proximate cause of the accident which bars a recovery
for his death irrespective of any negligence of the defendants,
Under such circumstances the granting of a new trial is
without avail. Even if some of the alleged errors claimed by the
plaintiff were removed on such trial the evidence regarding the
actions of the deceased would be the same. Every person in-
volved in the accident testified except Mrs. I. E. Officer, wife
of the owner of the car who was ill at the time of the trial. Plain-
tiff would still be barred from recovery. In Schnell v. Northern
Pacifie Railway Co., 71ND 369, 1 NW2d 56, 64, this court says:
“Considering the whole record we are confirmed in our opinion
heretofore expressed that it is impossible to escape the conclu-
sion that plaintiff himself was negligent and that this negligence
was a proximate cause of the accident. We are also of the opin-

156 —

ion that there is no reasonable probability ‘that any different
result could be reached should a new trial'be. had.”

In Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va 345, 49 SH2d 711, riumerous
errors were assigned on rulings of the trial court. The court
found decedent pedestrian guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law and held that conclusion rendered it unnecessary *
to consider other assignments of error. In Ude v. Fuller, 187
Mich 483, 153 NW 769, the court found the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence and held that: “In view of this con-
clusion, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions pre-
sented by the briefs.”

The errors assigned by plaintiff in- the conduct of the trial
and the introduction of ‘evidence even if sustained would have
no effect on the result. Irrespective of said alleged errors the
plaintiff could not recover because of the contributory negli-
gence of the decedent. It-is, therefore, neither necessary nor
proper for us to pass on those alleged errors as the result does
not in any way depend thereon. The sufficiency of the evidence
was challenged'by a motion for a directed verdict and the record
clearly shows that the decedent was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. -The defendants were entitled to a
verdict and judgment as a matter of law. The verdict of the
jury for a dismissal of the action was, therefore, correct.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Burxe, Sarare and Curistianson, JJ.,
concur.

PC
[File No. 7282]

E

GEORGE COPPIN AND ELLEN N. COPPIN, husband and
wife, Appellants v. ARNOLD A. PANKOW AND MAR-
. JORY PANKOW, husband and wife, Respondents.

(54 NW2d 877)

« Opinion filed Sept. 26, 1952

Clifford Schneller, for appellants.

‘158 De |

Forbes & Forbes, for respondent.

Sarurz, J. The plaintiffs bring this action against the de-
fendants for damages for trespassing and to compel them to
remove a garage and driveway alleged to extend partly on plain-
tiffs’ property.

- The complaint alleges that the defendants are the owners
of lot nine in block ten, Parkside Addition to the city of Wahpe-
ton, Richland County, North Dakota and that plaintiffs are
the owners of lot eight in block ten, Parkside Addition to the

be 159

city of Wahpeton, Richland County, North Dakota; that the
defendants constructed and built partially on plaintiffs’ said
‘lot a private garage and driveway and have taken and. used
and will continue to take and use a part of plaintiffs’ lot for the
use of a private garage for their own use and benefit; that
plaintiffs have repeatedly demanded that the defendants re-
move said private garage and driveway from the property of
the plaintiffs, but that the defendants have failed and refused
to remove said garage and driveway and that plaintiffs have
been damaged thereby in the sum of two hundred dollars. Plain-
tiffs then demand judgment that the defendants be required
to move their garage and driveway from plaintiffs’ property and
for damages inthe sum of two hundred dollars.

Defendants answered by general denial except that they admit
they are the owners of lot nine as alleged in the complaint.
By further answer they allege that George Coppin, one of the
plaintiffs, determined the property line and designated the place
where defendants’ garage and driveway should be erected and
that said George Coppin assisted in erecting said garage and
driveway at the place so designated by said plaintiff, and that
plaintiffs are estopped from now contending that said’ garage
and driveway are on plaintiffs’ property. The answer further
alleges that plaintiffs are barred by their own laches from main-
‘taining this action. ;

The action was tried to the court without a jury. The court
found for the defendants and dismissed ‘the action and the plain-
tiffs appeal. A trial de novo is demanded in the notice of appeal;
but no such demand is made in the settled statement of the case,
,and no questions of fact are specified in the specifications of
error or in the statement of the case upon which a review is de-
sired. . .

Section 28-2732 NDRC 1943 provides that “A party desiring
.to. appeal from any action (tried by the court without a jury)
shall cause a statemént of the’case to be settled within the time
-and in the manner prescribed by chapter 18 of this title, and
shall specify therein the questions of fact that he desires the
supreme court to review, and all questions of fact not so specified

160 EE

shall be deemed on appeal to have been properly decided by
the trial court.”

This section ‘was construed by this court in the recent case of
Retterath v. Retterath, 76 ND 583, 38 NW2d, 409. Referring
to said statute the court said: “This requirement is not an
idle formality in the preparation of an appeal. Its purpose is
‘to limit appeals to questions that appear doubtful and to elim-
inate all matters unessential to the consideration of such doubt-
ful questions.”

In the case of State ex rel. McClory v. McGruer, 9 ND 566, 84
NW 363, the statement of the case contained no specific questions
of.fact for review or demand for trial de novo. In that case
the court said:

“Under the language of said section (now Section 28-2732)
it is clear'that upon this record this court is without power either
to try anéw the entire case, or any particular question of fact
in the case. The statute is further explicit to the point that, in
the absence of specifications, and of any demand of a retrial in
this court, this court is compelled to hold that all questions of
fact decided below were properly decided.”

In the case of Security Imp. Co. v. Cass County, 9 ND ‘553,
84 NW 477 this court said: :

“A statement of the case embracing all of the evidence offered
at the trial was settled and allowed, and the same has been in-
corporated with the judgment roll and transmitted to this court.
The statement omits to include any demand of a retrial in this
court either of the entire case or any specified fact in.the case.
The procedure which was had in the action in the court below
was necessarily governed by section 5630 Rev. Codes, 1899
(New Section 28-2732). But the party appealing had under
said section an election, and could determine for himself whether
the entire case or some fact therein should be retried in this
court, or, on the other hand, whether this court should be pre-
cluded from retrying any question of fact in the case. By not
demanding a retrial of any fact in this court the appellant has
under the express provisions of said section, as well as under
the repeated decisions of this court, deprived this court of all

Le 161

power or right to examine the evidence or retry any question
of fact in the ease.”

A statement of the case. is in the record embracing all of
the testimony and proceedings had at the trial. The statement
of the case contains no specifications of any fact or facts which
plaintiffs desire to have reviewed, nor does it contain a demand
for a trial de novo. It follows, therefore, that under the statute,
as interpreted by several decisions, that this court cannot re-
view the evidence, but, following the language of the statute,
will deem all questions of fact as embodied in the findings of the
trial court “to have been properly decided by the trial court.”
This leaves for consideration only the judgment roll, and having
examined the same we find that it sustains the trial court’s, dis-
missal of plaintiffs’ cause of action.

We have, however, in the interest of justice to the parties,
earefully read and considered the evidence, and we are agreed
that it supports the findings of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

Morais, C. J., and Grimson, Burke and Curisrianson, JJ.,
concur.

P|
[File No. 7287]

MYRON MILLER, Appellant, v. AGNES MILLER, Respond-
ent.

(55 NW2d 218)

162 Le

Opinion filed October 14th, 1952

Lyche & Lyche, for appellant.
A.C. Bakken Jr., for respondent.

Sarunz, J. This is an action for divorce brought by the plain-
tiff Myron Miller against the defendant Agnes Miller. This
action was originally commenced July 1947. The complaint
alleged extreme cruelty. The defendant did not interpose an
answer and the plaintiff obtained judgment by default and a
decree of divorce was entered on August 12, 1947. Prior to the
entry of the default judgment the parties entered into a property
settlement giving to the defendant a small house in the city of
Finley and awarding to her the custody of their children. At
the time the default divorce decree was entered there were four
minor children ranging in ages from four to one year, and the
defendant was pregnant with the fifth child.

Thereafter and in March 1948, the defendant made a motion
to have the default decree set aside and that she be permitted
to interpose answer to the complaint. Her motion was made
upon the grounds of fraud on the part of the plaintiff and that
by reason of such fraud and through mistake and inadvertence
she failed to appear or answer. The motion was granted and
the district court made its order setting aside the default decree.
The plaintiff appealed to this court and the order was affirmed.
That case is reported in 88 NW2d 35, 76 ND 558.

Thereupon the plaintiff served and filed an amended complaint
charging defendant with extreme cruelty, alleging that she called
him vile names, swore at him, accused him of infidelity, was
jealous of him, refused to cohabit with him as husband and wife,

Le 163

and on various occasions without cause or reason left him for
considerable periods of time.

The defendant answered denying the allegations of the com-
plaint, and alleging that between November 1945 and July 1947,
the plaintiff at numerous times became angry and cursed and
swore at her, used indecent and profane language towards her
and called her vile names, and that he was of a quick and bad
temper and of a revengeful disposition. The answer further
alleged that the plaintiff deserted defendant and her minor chil-
dren during the month of July 1947, when she was pregnant
with her fifth child; that he went to Moorhead, Minnesota, ac-
companied with one Ruth Hagen and there lived with her in a
state of adultery from August 21, 1947 to March 1948 and that
plaintiff and Ruth Hagen lived in a state of adultery at various
other places until November 1948. Defendant demanded judg-
ment for dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action and that he be
required to pay the defendant $25.00 per month for her support
and maintenance and $75.00 per month for the support and main-
tenance of their minor children.

The case was tried on the amended complaint and the answer
thereto at Fargo, North Dakota on June 16, 1950 before the
Honorable W. H. Hutchinson, one of the judges of the Third
Judicial District, sitting at the request of the Honorable John
C. Pollock, one of the judges of the First Judicial District. The
court found for the defendant and held that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a cause of action for divorce and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. Judgment was entered accordingly and
plaintiff appealed, and demands a trial de novo.

The plaintiff contends that the court erred in the following
particulars:

That the court erred in ordering and entering judgment for
dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action, and that the evidence is
overwhelmingly against the conclusion and judgment of the
court, and that the court erred in weighing and passing on the
evidence; in questioning the witnesses towards the end’ of the
trial in asking objectionable and improper questions calling for
inadmissible answers; that the attitude assumed by the trial
court was dominating, and commanding and insinuating in con-

164 ee

ducting’ its examination, resulting in brow-beating and frighten-
ing the witnesses ; in refusing to grant plaintiff’s motion to strike
the allegations of recrimination in paragraphs two and three of
defendant’s answer.

The plaintiff and defendant were married November 5, 1942.
There were born to them five children, the eldest being born in
December 1942, and the youngest was born in August 1947, all
of whom are-in the care and custody of the defendant.

At the trial the plaintiff testified in substance as follows:

That he had not lived with the defendant since in the month of
July 1947; that they did not “get along” and that defendant had
a bad temper, shook her fist at him and called him bad names,
nagged him and quarreled with him; that they lived with her
parents some three years after they were married; they did not
“get along” out there and that they called him a “G— dam Ger-
man;” that defendant’s father would go out a lot of times and
get drunk and could riot drive his car and defendant would take
their car and haul him around, and that this led to trouble be-
tween them. He further testified defendant called him every
name you could think of and was domineering and commanding,
and that once she used the broom on him. They then moved away
from her parents to a farm near Finley. That many times she
threatened to divorce plaintiff and that sometimes when plain-
tiff came home she would have his suit case packed and tell him
to get out.

Conrad: Smithrud’a witness for the plaintiff testified that he
roomed with the Millers about two months in 1947 and that he
heard them quarrel a few times; that defendant had considerable
temper, and that he thought that she started the quarrels, and
that he had heard her call plaintiff bad names; that she was care-
less in her housekeeping.

Mervin Stiomme, another witness for plaintiff testified that
he worked for the plaintiff three weeks during the summer of
1946; that the defendant had a terrific temper; they did not
argue in his presence but that he heard them from his room up-
stairs; he could not hear what they said but he knew they were
arguing’; that he would ‘say defendant was sloppy in her house-
keeping ; that the plaintiff and witness would go to town evenings

[| 105,

but that plaintiff never took defendant with him; that plaintiff
would drink a little beer during evenings when they went to
town; that during the three weeks he stayed with the Millers the
plaintiff and he went to town in the evening several times and
would return home at nine or ten o’clock and one time they got
home at midnight.

The defendant, Agnes Miller, testified in her own behalf sub-
stantially as follows:

Plaintiff and defendant were married November 5, 1942; and
that they had five children and that they were in her care and
custody; that she is receiving $50.00 monthly payments from the
plaintiff; that she has to do laundry work to supplement her in-
come and ‘that she is also getting assistance from the Steele
County Welfare Board. She never had any trouble with plain-
tiff until the summer of 1946 shortly before the birth of her
fourth child and she asked him if he wouldn’t “please stay home.”
They had no quarrels until 1946, and in these quarrels plaintiff
would call her vile names; that she did not start the quarrels;
that when he went out he never would tell her where he was
going; that he had a violent temper; that in the summer of 1947
when he was working for Dr. Bekker he made a statement imply-
ing that he had been intimate with other women, and that on
June 10, 1947 he admitted he had a girl in trouble but would not
tell who she was. This was before the first divorce complaint
was served on her. She testified further that when she was
pregnant with her fourth child in the summer of 1946 plaintiff
was “running off; sometimes he would be home at midnight and
sometimes at 4 o’clock in the morning. On these occasions she
would take the truck and go to her parents in the evenings -but
she always came ‘home before he did. She denied that she re-
fused to have sexual relations with him until June 10, 1947
when he admitted to her that he had a girl in trouble, and that
up to that time their sexual relations were normal; that she did
not accuse him of going with other women until he made the ad-
mission referred to. She denied that she ever threatened to
divorce plaintiff or that she packed his suit case and ordered him
to leave.

Plaintiff and his witness testified that the defendant was-not

166 De |

a good housekeeper but do not specify any details. The evidence
shows that defendant gave birth to a child every year and that
five children were born to her between December 1942 and Sep-
tember 1947. To take care of these children would undoubtedly
require a great deal of defendant’s time and effort, and un-
doubtedly would interfere to some extent with her other house-
hold duties. It does not appear that plaintiff ever gave her any
assistance, but rather that he spent his evenings and leisure
time away from home.

Plaintiff's cause of action is based on extreme cruelty. The
general rule where cruelty is alleged, as a cause of action for
divorce is stated as follows in 17 Am Jur Divorce and Separa-
tion, Section 56, page 179.

“Tt ig universally recognized, at least theoretically, that par-
ties cannot be divorced on the ground of cruelty merely because
they live unhappily together from unruly tempers or marital
wranglings. Married persons must submit to the ordinary con-
sequences of human infirmities and of unwise mating, and the
misconduct which will be ground for a divorce as constituting
cruelty must be serious. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, or even occasional sallies of pas-
sion, if they do not threaten bodily harm or impairment of
health, do not as a general rule amount to cruelty. As has well
been said, the husband and wife are bound to exercise greater
efforts for removing misapprehension, allaying quarrels, smooth-
ing the road to concord, and effecting reconciliation than are
people in other relations of life. The marriage status is not
merely contractual so as to entitle each of the parties to demand
the strict-letter of the bond. It is a status wherein the law
operates upon the weakness as well as the strength of human na-
ture, and it will not be dissolved except for grave and substantial
causes. In short, it is not the policy of the law to grant divorces
for postnuptial causes short of marital infidelity, when such
causes do not in fact render one of the parties incapable of per-
forming the duties incident to the marriage status. The law au-
thorizes the severance of the matrimonial union only when the
conduct of one of the parties renders it impracticable for the
other further to perform the marital duties.”

[| 167

The rule thus stated is followed in Henry v. Henry, 77 ND
845, 46 NW2d 701 and Savre v. Savre, 77 ND 242, 42 NW2d 642.

The testimony of plaintiffs witnesses, Smithrud and Stromme
is not of great weight as supporting the testimony of plaintiff.
Their testimony covered only short periods of time in 1947 and
does not give any details or any specific incidents of misconduct
on the part of the defendant. The testimony of the defendant is
more reasonable and convincing than that of the plaintiff. Her
concern is not only for herself but for the welfare, comfort and
protection of her five children of tender years. In contrast
plaintiff is interested in being relieved of his marital responsibil-
ities to the defendant in order that he may be free to exploit
other matrimonial fields.. We are of the opinion therefore that
plaintiff has failed to establish by any competent evidence a
cause of action for divorce upon the grounds of extreme cruelty
as alleged in the complaint.

Since we have held that plaintiff has failed to establish a cause
of action by competent evidence it will not be necessary to con-
sider the refusal of the trial court to strike from the answer the
allegations of recrimination.

There remains to be considered the objection of the plaintiff
to the examination of witnesses by the trial court. Plaintiff con-
tends that such examination was objectionable and improper and
called for inadmissible answers.

“The general rule is that a judge presiding on a trial is not
a mere moderator, but has active duties to perform without par-
tiality in seeing that the truth is developed; and it is his duty, in
the exercise of sound discretion, to elicit the evidence upon rele-
vant and material points involved in the case.” Messer v. Bruen-
ing, 32 ND 515, 156 NW 241.

“The trial court may properly participate in the examination
of witnesses for the purpose of eliciting facts and clarifying the
testimony”. Pearce v.' Hanlon, 60 ND 231, 233 NW 840.

“A trial judge has the right to propound such questiotis to
witnesses as may be necessary to elicit pertinent facts, in order
that the truth may be established, although some reviewing
courts have declared that the practice of so doing except when
absolutely necessary should be discouraged. Accordingly, the

168 |

trial court has power to recall a witness who has been examined,
and propound questions to him. He may cross-examine a wit-
ness, or ask him leading questions. And he may elicit any rele-
vant and material evidence, without regard to its effect, whether’
beneficial or prejudicial to one party or the other. Indeed, it
has been declared to be the duty of the court to propound such
questions to reluctant witnesses as will strip them of the subter-
fuges to which they resort to evade telling the truth. The extent
to which such examination shall be conducted rests in the discre-
tion of the judge, the exercise of which ‘will not be controlled un-
less‘abused.” 58 Am Jur Witnesses, Section 557, page 310.

We have made a careful examination of the record and we fail
to find that the learned trial judge unduly participated in the
examination of witnesses or manifested a prejudicial attitude
towards the plaintiff. It clearly appears that the questions
asked were intended to elicit facts to clarify the testimony and
make it more definite. .

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, O. J., and Burks, Grimson and Cunistianson, JJ.,
concur.

be
[File No. 7235]

JOHN JACOBS, Respondent v. JOHN BEVER, Appellant.

(55 NW2d 512)

Opinion filed October 17, 1952.

raith, for appellant.

Halvor L. Halvorson and Harold Halstead, for respondent.

Novzssrz, Commissioner. This action was brought to recover
damages for personal injuries.

Stripped to its essentials, the complaint alleges that the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant to ‘do some trucking;
that while so employed he was directed by the defendant to re-
pair defendant’s automobile; that when he lay prone under the
automobile pursuant to this direction.“the defendant carelessly,
negligently and unlawfully put said car in ‘motion by disturbing
the car in trying the ignition switch or pushing it or rocking it,
to such an extent in his attempt to get said motor started, that
the car lunged forward and the‘rear whéels came to rest before
said car could be stopped,” onthe person of the plaintiff, where-
by he suffered severe permanent bodily injuries; that because
of said injuries plaintiff was subjected to great pain and suffer-

172 ee

ing, was compelled to incur large medical and hospital bills, ‘and
was unable to work at his occupation of farming, all to his dam-
age in the sum of $3,740.00, for which he demands judgment.

To this complaint-the defendant answered, denying “each and
every allegation, matter, and thing therein contained excepting
to admit that the Plaintiff did receive some injuries on or about
the date set forth in the Complaint.” ‘Defendant further alleged
“That the Plaintiff at the time referred to herein, was not in the
employ of the Defendant, and when he was doing the work re-
ferred to in the Complaint, he was doing it voluntarily and with-
out compensation and said injuries were caused by his own con-
tributory negligence and not by anything which this Defendant
did or did not do and which could have avoided said accident.”

On the issues thus joined, the case was tried to a jury.

At the close of the plaintifi’s case the defendant moved the
court.to dismiss the action on the grounds “that the plaintiff has
wholly failed to prove the material allegations of the Complaint,
in that, first, there is no evidence of a relationship of employer
and employee, no terms of employment, and no conditions of
employment, and no evidence that the plaintiff ever did or ever
was employed by the defendant to do any work for him.

“Two: That even though there were evidence of employment
. . . there is no evidence that the plaintiff at the time of the
accident or immediately prior thereto, was in the employ of the
defendant or was directed by him to fix and repair the car . . .
and that the defendant exercised no control over the plaintiff
as an employer. ;

“Three: That there is no evidence of negligénce upon the part
of this defendant, or carelessness, and that the defendant is in
no way responsible for what happéned since all of the evidence
shows that the plaintiff asked to and undertook the job of fixing
the car, and assumed whatever responsibility and risk that was
incurred therein.” This motion was denied.

“The defendant then moved the court to direct the jury to re-
turn a verdict of dismissal against the plaintiff and in favor of
the defendant upon all the grounds set forth in the motion for
dismissal. The plaintiff dbjected to and resisted this motion
and it also was denied.

Le 178

Thereupon, defendant, offering no evidence, rested his case
and renewed the motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict,
which motions were denied. The court then submitted the case
to the jury who réturned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of
$1,100.00. ‘Judgment was ordered and entered thereon.

Thereafter the defendant renewed his motion to dismiss the
action and also moved for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict or for a new trial. These motions were, in effect, predi-
cated on the same grounds as set out in defendant’s motions to
dismiss and for a directed verdict made after both sides had
rested. The motions were denied; whereupon defendant per-
fected the instant appeal.

As grounds for his appeal the defendant specified that the evi-
dence was insufficient to justify the verdict in that “There is no
evidence ‘of a relationship of employee and employer, no terms
of employment, no conditions of employment and no evidence
that the Plaintiff ever did or ever was employed by the Defend-
ant with his truck to do any work; that there is no evidence that
the Plaintiff was directed by the Defendant to fix and repair the
car but rather. the evidence shows that the Plaintiff himself sug-
gested, because he was impatient, that he should‘fix the car and
thereby assumed his own risk; that there is no evidence of negli-
gence or carelessness upon the part of this Defendant and that
the Defendant is not legally responsible for what happened since
the Plaintiff assumed the risk and assumed whatever responsi-
bility there was in connection therewith.” ;

And “That the Court erred in denying the motion of Defend-
ant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alterna-
tive, for a new trial” and further “erred in denying the motion
of Defendant for a dismissal of this action.”

The record is brief. It is undisputed that plaintiff received
the injuries of which he complains in his complaint and suffered
damages on account thereof. The defendant.concedes this and
does not challenge the finding of the jury as to the amount of
the damages. The only real conflict in the record is as to what
occurred at the time the injuries were received.

Plaintiff's testimony is that the defendant engaged.the plain-

174 |

tiff to do some trucking for him. Accordingly, he went to the
defendant’s home: Defendant owned a 1934 Ford car which
was broken down and stalled on the roadside. Plaintiff went
with the defendant to the car. Defendant said the battery cable
was broken. He got under the car and tried to adjust the cable
on the starter to the battery post. Plaintiff testified: “So I sat
on the ground, waiting for him to get it fixed. I was getting kind
of: impatient over the whole thing, so then he got out and he
asked me to finish it for him, to see if the burr was tight enough.”
Plaintiff then crawled under the car. While there, he reached
for a wrench defendant had left near the right front. wheel and
before he had a chance to touch the bolts on the self-starter he
heard the starter going or some roaring noise and the car started
and ran over and upon him, inflicting the injuries of which he
complains; that when this happened defendant was standing
beside the car while plaintiff was under it and “was bending over
by the steering wheel, trying to adjust something, or seeing if
everything was in shape.”

Defendant was called for cross-examination under the stat-
ute. He testified that his car was stalled. The battery cable
was broken off right by the battery. He got another cable and
he and the plaintiff went to the car to fix the cable. He put a
block behind the rear wheel and one in front of the front wheel
and jacked up the car on the side so he could get under to get to
the switches. He then got under the car and put the cable on
the battery on the bolt from which it had broken off. Plaintiff,
becoming impatient, said: “You are too slow, . . . get out
and let me under there.” So defendant got out and handed
plaintiff the wrench and the latter then slid under the car and
“started to screw that up there, and . . . as soon as he got it
a little tight so the juice went through, why away it went.”
Defendant was standing beside the car about three feet from it.
The door on that side was open. He jumped in, reached down—
the foot boards were all out—grabbed the connection off the bat-
tery and stopped the car. Then he got out, jacked the rear of
the car up and got the plaintiff out. He then adjusted the cable
and, using the car, took plaintiff to his home.

be 175

Thus it appears that the only conflicts in the evidence are as
to what occurred at the time of the accident. Was the plaintiff
an employee or an invitee? Did he get under the car at the re-
quest and direction of the defendant, and if he did, what caused
the car to start and run onto him? Was it because of his negli-
gence in doing what he did, or because of the defendant’s negli-
gence in doing what the latter did? The issues thus made were
as to matters of fact. The jury found for the plaintiff on all
of them. “The case is one at law, and having ‘been tried to a jury,
does not come here for trial de novo in this court.

As this court said in Gunder v. Feeland, 51 ND 784, 200 NW
909, “the issue of fact, as thus made, was for the determination
of the jury. They saw, as well as heard, the witnesses who tes-
tified. It was for them to say where the truth lay, and their ver-
dict comes to this court clothed with every presumption in its
favor. Erickson v. Wiper, 33 ND 193, 157 NW 592; Thompson
v. Scott, 34 ND 503, 159 NW 21; Jensen v. Clausen, 34 ND 637,
159 NW 30. Likewise, the trial judge saw and heard the wit-
nesses. Nevertheless, on motion for new trial on the ground of
the insufficiency of the evidence, he saw fit to sustain the verdict
and refused to exercise his discretion in the granting of the
motion. Where the evidence is in conflict and reasonable men
might draw different conclusions therefrom, this court on appeal
will disturb neither the verdict of the jury based on such evi-
dence nor the order of the trial court denying a motion for new
trial where the sole ground of attack is that the evidence is in-
sufficient to sustain the verdict. Erickson v. Wiper, supra;
Grewer v. Schafer, 50 ND 642, 197 NW 596 and cases cited.”

The court in his instructions, to which no exceptions were
taken, charged fully on all matters in issue. He defined negli-
gence and contributory negligence, told the jury where the bur-
den of proof lay, and, among other things, charged that it was
immaterial whether the plaintiff was an employee or an invitee
inasmuch as the defendant would owe a duty of due care to the
plaintiff regardless of whether he was an employee or an in-
vitee at the time of the accident and that the plaintiff could not
recover unless the defendant expressly or impliedly sought help

176 Le

and assistance from the plaintiff in repairing the car at the time
of the accident.

The court was correct in charging that it was immaterial as to
whether the plaintiff was an employee or an invitee at the time -
of the accident and that the plaintiff could not recover unless
the defendant expressly or impliedly sought help and assistance
from him im repairing the car. Defendant's obligation was the
same in’ either event and if through his negligence the accident
occurred, he was responsible for any injuries thereby inflicted.
Olson v. Kem Temple, 77 ND 365, 43 NW (2d) 385.

The question of negligence was a question to be determined
by the jury. The defendant in his motions, both for dismissal
and for a directed verdict, and his: subsequent motions for dis-
missal and judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new
trial, wére predicated upon his contention that there was not
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. But the mo-
tions, insofar as they challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the finding of negligence, were lacking in particular-
ity. It was necessary that defendant particularly specify the
-respects'in which the evidence was insufficient and not having
done so but having charged only that there was no sufficient
showing of negligence and carelessness on the part of the de-

-fendant, he left it uncertain in what particular it was insufficient.
Where a motion to dismiss is made on the ground.of insufficiency
of the evidence, the insufficiency must be particularly pointed
out. Westerso v. City of Williston, 77 ND 251, 42 NW(2d) 429
and cases cited.

"Likewise, with respect to his motion for a directed verdict,
the requirement is the same. One making and relying upon a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict
‘must specify the par’ ‘tieulars in which it is insufficient. He can-
not by a general specification ‘put upon the court the burden
of searching through the record in order to determine the qués-
tion of sufficiency: See Westerso v. City of Williston, supra, and
authorities cited therein.

The orders and judguient appealed from are affirmed.

Per Curiam. Thé foregoing opinion prepared by Honorable

a

W. L. Nuessle, a retired judge and duly appointed and qualified
commissioner of the supreme court, is adopted and made the
opinion and decision of the court.

Morris, C. J., and Grimson, CHRISTIANSON and Bunxy, JJ,
concur.
Sarure, J., did not participate.

P|
[File No. 7220]
FARMERS HOME MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MEDELIA, MINNESOTA, a Corporation, et al, Appellants

v. GRAND FORKS IMPLEMENT COMPANY, a Corpora-
tion, Respondent.

(55 NW2d 315)

Day, Lu
Lyons, for a

ft, for respondents.

180 Ee

Borxz, J. In this action plaintiffs, all insurance companies,
sought, under their right of subrogation, to recover from the
defendant losses paid for fire damage to the Poppler Piano and
Furniture Company. In their complaint plaintiffs alleged the
fire damage, the losses paid because thereof, their right of sub-
rogation and that the damage had been proximately caused by
the negligence of.the defendant. In its answer the defendant ad-
mitted all of the allegations of the complaint except those relat-
ing 1o negligence and proximate cause. The issnes of negligence
and proximate cause were therefore the only issues in the case.
Trial of the action before a jury resulted in a verdict for the
defendant. After the verdict plaintiffs moved for judgment non
obstante or in the alternative for a new trial. This motion was
denied and plaintiff has appealed both from the order denying
the motion and from the judgment.

The specifications of error relate first, to the sufficiency of the
evidence, second, to the instructions, third, to the admission and
rejection of evidence, and fourth, to the argument of counsel.
‘We shall direct our attention first to the specification that the
verdict is contrary to the evidence.

The fire started in the machine shop which was located on the
second floor of defendant’s place of business and was where de-
fendant engaged in the business of repairing tractors and tractor
parts. The dimensions of the shop were approximately 50 feet
by 100 feet with the shorter dimension running from north to
south, Located against the cast wall of the shop was what was
known as the test bench. This bench was 31 inches high and 12
feet long. On the south end of the bench was an L shaped test
panel which extended along the east wall, and then at a right
angle across the south side of the bench. This panel was 23 to
8 feet high and contained various instruments for testing elec-
trical equipment. Immediately south of. the test bench in the
southeast corner of the shop were the electrical switches, fuses
and meters. There were one 400 ampere switch, three 100
ampere fuse boxes and several 60 and -30 ampere fuse boxes.
There were three-meters, one for lights, one for power and one
for the elevator. On the test bench, immediately north of the
test panel was an electric plate which was uséd for drying arma-

De

ture and field coils ‘of electric motors and generators for the
purpose of eliminating short circuits which might be due to in-
ternal moisture. This electric plate had an exposed heating unit.
Over the heating unit, and about 14 inches above it, was a rec-
tangular piece of sheet iron which rested upon two fire bricks
which were set vertically one on each side of the electric plate.
Coils which weré to be dried ;were sét on this piece of sheet iron.
On the north end of the test bench was an are-welder, which was
connected to the electrie power line which ran above the test
bench along the east wall of the shop.

The only evidence as to the origin of the fire is the testimony
of plaintifi’s witness, Hulett. At the time of the fire Hulett
was an employee of the defendant but he had left that employ-
ment before the trial. On the day of the fire he had come to
work at about seven o’clock in the morning. His first tasks that
day were to clean a generator and a motor. The procedure,
ordinarily followed in this shop, for cleaning motors and: gen-
erators, was to take them apart, wash the parts in gasoline,
brush them during the washing with a small paint brush, dry
them with an air jet.and then place them on the metal sheet over
the electric plate to eliminate any moisture that might be within
the coils. The washing was done at the test bench in a metal
pan which was approximately 4”x4”x 12” in dimensions. In
the bottom of the pan at one end was a drain into which was
inserted threaded plug stopper. This stopper projected about
an inch below the bottom of the pan. In the test bench was a
depression into which the projecting plug was placed’ when the
pan was in ‘use. This pan therefore, while movable, always
occupied the same place on the test bench. Hulett’s testimony
as to the distance of this pan from the electric hot plate was not
always consistent but his final estimate of that distance was
that it was not less than four nor more than six feet. About
two pints of gasoline were put into the pan when parts were
to be washed. This amount filled the pan between one third and
one half full. On the morning of the fire, Hulett first washed the
parts of the motor, dried them with the air jet and placed them
over the electric hot plate. He then proceeded to clean the gen-
erator. He had just removed the parts of the generator from the

182 a

pan when he noticed the fire at the south end of the test bendh.
There was no flash or explosion. The flames moved rapidly
north along the bench. Hulett tried to remove the pan before it
caught fire but he was unsuccessful. When the pan of gasoline
caught fire, Hulett’s apron ignited and he was burned. The
question was asked: “Tell us how the fire spread from that
pan.” Hulett answered: “For a few seconds, I didn’t see much
of anything, getting the fire out on myself. It went on the bench,
and it seemed to me it went along the electric line to the are-
welder which sat on the other end of the bench.” On cross-
examination he testified: “When the fire first came there on the
bench, I noticed that, as I backed away from it after I got on fire
I noticed there seemed to have been a wire right about the wall,
and you could see smoke coming out, like it was following some-
thing.”

Q. “Smoke coming from the conduits?”

A. “It seemed to come right out of the wall, it is hard to say.”

‘With respect to the are-welder he stated: : :

“It burst into flame.”

- Q. “Before or after you attempted to remove the gas?”

A. “It was just after.”

Q. “Did you notice the are-welder at the same time or approxi-
mately the same time that you noticed the flames there to your
right?”

A. “No sir, I believe it was just a little after. I may not have
noticed when it first started though.”

Q. “But-when you did notice it-what was its condition?”

A. “It seemed to be all blue. It was not burning red flame, it
was sort of blue.”

Q. “Smoke coming from it?”

A. “Yes.”

Hulett’s fellow employee, Pound, who was in the shop when
the fire was discovered assisted him in putting out the fire on his
person. Both Pound and Hulett then attempted to extinguish
the fire with fire extinguishers, Other employees came up from
the ground floor to help. There were seven fire extinguishers in
the shop, one was a carbon dioxide extinguisher and the rest were

Pyrene. When the contents of these extinguishers were expend-
ed without checking the fire, all of the employees left the shop.
Thereafter the fire spread and caused damage to the place of
business of plaintiffs’ insured.

Upon this evidence plaintiffs contend that the fact that the
fire was caused by defendant’s negligent use of gasoline, was
established as a matter of law. On the other hand the defendant
says that the proof is legally insufficient to establish proximate
cause or to permit the submission of the issue of proximate cause
to the jury.

The plaintiffs have the burden of proving that defendant was
responsible for some negligent act and that such act was the
cause of their injury. 38 Am Jur (Negligence, see. 285) 975; 65
CIS (Negligence, sees. 208, 209) 964, 970.

Here there is no question but that the proof of a negligent act
on the part of the defendant is sufficient. The critical issue is
whether that negligence was shown to be actionable by evidence
establishing it as the proximate eause of the fire which injured
plaintiffs’ insured.

As stated in their brief plaintiffs’ theory as to causation is as
follows: The witness, Hulett, “first noticed the fire on the test-
ing bench, to his right, in the general vicinity of the hot plate
. « . the witness was soaking objects in gasoline and brushing
them off with a paint brush. We all know that the use of a paint
brush soaked in-such gasoline if brushed vigorously will cause
droplets of gasoline to fly into the air and to dissipate them-
selves as vapor. Itis common knowledge that this vapor or these
droplets of gasoline are highly inflammable. Hulett. didn’t
actually see the fire start. Therefore plaintiffs are unable to
produce actual evidence as to the cause of the fire. We could
only supply Mr. Hulett’s testimony as to the physical condition
in the actual situation which was present up to the time the-fire
was first observed. Appellants contend that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is available to the plaintiffs if in an action based
on negligence positive evidence is lacking as to the actual mo-
tivating source of the.fire, as in this instance.”

Plaintiffs are clearly i in error in their theory that the principle
of reg ipsa loquitur is available to establish proximate cause.

184 —

In proper cases, where proximate cause is established, the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play to establish prima
facie proof of negligence. The doctrine “has no application to
proximate cause and does not dispense with the requirement that
the act or omission on which defendant’s liability is predicated
be established as the proximate cause of the injury complained
of}... .” 65 CIS (Negligence, sec. 220 (8) b) 1011. In Orr v.
Des Moines Electric Light Co., 207 Ia 1149, 222 NW 560, it was
said (p. 562) “. . . The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not
raise any presumption as to what did occasion the injury, but,
after the evidence has established the thing which did occasion
the injury, then, under certain circumstances, the doctrine will
raise a presumption of negligence.” .See also Pine v. Rizzo, 186
Okl 85, 96 P2d 17; Fix v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 346
Pa 598, 31 A2d 114; National Hotel Co. v. Motley, 123 SW2d
461 (Tex Civ App); Starks Food Markets v. El Dorado Refining
Co., et al., 156 Kan 577, 134 P2d 1102; Little v. Lynn & Marble-
head Real Estate Co., 301 Mass 156, 16 NH2d 688; Stewart v.
De Noon, 220 Pa 154, 69 A 587.

In this case, as plaintiffs state, positive direct evidence as
to the cause of the fire is lacking. Such proof, however, is not
necessary. If the evidence of circumstances will permit a rea-
sonable inference of the alleged cause of injury and exclude other
equally: reasonable inferences of other causes, the proof is suf-
ficient to take the ease to the jury. 65 OJS (Negligence, sec. 244)
1091, 1092. If on the other hand, plaintiffs’ proof is such that
it is equally probable the injury was due to a cause for which
defendant was not liable a prima facie case is not established.
Meehan v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 13 ND 432, 101 NW 183;
Balding v. Andrews, 12 ND 267, 96 NW 305; Heather, v. City of
Mitchell, 47 SD 281, 198 NW 353; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Scrog-
gins, 140 2d 718; Ingram v. Harris, 244 Ala 246, 13.S02d 48;.
Law v, Gallegher, 197 A479, 9 W. W. Harr. 189 (39 Del) ; South-
ern Grocery Stores v. Greer, 68 Ga App 583, 23 SEH2d 484; Potter
v. Consolidated Coal Co., 276 Ky 404, 124 SW2d 68; Ingersoll
v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 278 NY 1, 14 NE2d 828; Buxton v.
Hicks, 191 Ok 573, 181 P2d 1015; Simpson v. Hillman, 163 Ore.

Lee — 13

357, 97 P2d 527; Houston v. Republican Athletic Ass’n., 343
Pa 218, 22 A2d 715; Talley, et al. v. Bass-Jones Lumber Co.
(Tex Civ App) 173 SW2d 276; C. D. Kenny Co. v. Dennis, 167
Va 417, 189 SH 164.

The state of this case upon the issue of proximate cause rests
wholly upon the testimony of plaintiffs’ witness, Hulett. ‘The
circumstances which are consistent with the theory that the fire
was caused by the negligent use of gasoline are: that generator
parts were cleaned in a pan containing about two pints of gaso-
line at a test bench upon which was also located, about four feet
distant from the pan, an electric hot plate with an exposed heat-
ing unit; that a brush was used in the cleaning process; that,
after the parts were cleaned with gasoline they were dried with
an air jet and then placed for further drying upon a rectangular
sheet of metal, one-eighth inch in thickness, which was supported
by bricks and was directly over, and about an inch and a half
above the hot plate; that when the witness, Hulett, first noticed
the fire, the whole south end of the bench, the part on which’ the
hot plate was located, was on fire.

On the other hand Hulett’s testimony was that there was no ex-
plosion or flash. This fact eliminates the possibility that gaso-
line vapor of ignitable density flowed along the bench, from
the pan containing gasoline, to the hot plate, for if it had, when
the vapor ignited at the hot plate, there would have been an in-
stantaneous flashback to the pan. The other theories of how
the use of gasoline might have caused the fire rest entirely on
speculation. For instance it is said that the brush that was used
in cleaning might have propelled drops of gasoline over to the
hot plate, For this to be possible it would have been necessary
for Hulett to remove the generator parts from the pan and then
brush toward the direction in which the hot plate was located.
There is no evidence in the record as to how the brush was used
and if any inference is to be made as to the manner of brushing
it would seem more probable that the parts would be brushed
while immersed in the gasoline so that the fluid would float away
the dirt dislodged by the brush. The only other theory advanced
as to how the use of gasoline might have caused the fire is that

186 Ee

the residue of gasoline remaining on the motor parts after they
had been dried with an air jet, might have been sufficient, when
the parts were placed on the square of sheet iron above the hot
plate, to volatilize into a vapor of proper density to be ignited
by the heat. Such an event would be highly improbable, for the
reason, that with a substance as volatile as gasoline the air jet
would have removed practically all if not all of the gasoline from
the parts before they were placed over the heat.

There is other testimony of the witness, Hulett, which is in-
consistent with any theory that the fire was caused by the use
of gasoline. This testimony is that as he backed away from the
bench the fire went on the bench and also went along the electric
line to the arc-welder which sat on the other end of the bench,
that “there seemed to be a wire right about the wall and you
could see smoke coming out like it was following something.
It seemed to come right out of the wall.” “The arc-welder was
burning with a blue flame.”

Thus, almost immediately after the fire was observed upon
the bench, evidence that it was already in the east wall of the
building was also observed. The fact that the smoke as it came
from the wall seemed to follow the electric power line, suggests
that the line had heated to the point where it ignited the wall.
The fact that the welder was already burning with a blue flame
when the witness first noticed it, suggests that the heating of the
wires could have been causd by a short circuit in the welder. But
whatever the cause of the fire in the wall might have been, the
important evidentiary fact is that there was fire in the wall a
few seconds after it was discovered on the bench. A fire on the
bench would have been noticed immediately and would not pene-
trate to within the wall in a few seconds. <A fire within a wall
could smoulder and spread for a considerable time before it was
noticed.. Thus it is much more probable that the bench was
ignited by the fire from the wall, than it is that the fire in the
wall came from the bench.

Taking all of the facts into consideration, that the fire did not
start at the pan of gasoline, that the fire was not a typical gaso-
line vapor fire in that there was no explosion or flash back to the

|

pan and that smoke was coming out of the east wall of the shop
within a few. seconds after the fire was noticed on the bench, we
are satisfied that it is at least as probable, if not more probable
that the fire was caused by a short circuit or some other unknown.
cause for which defendant has not been shown responsible than
that it was caused by the negligent use of gasoline. Under the
rule above stated therefore, plaintiffs have not made out a prima
facie case. Accordingly, the verdict of the jury dismissing the
action was correct.

Since under the evidence and the law the judgment entered
is the only one which properly could have been entered, there is
no need to consider the other specifications of error. The judg-
ment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mortis, C. J., and Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Burxe, J. (on petition for rehearing). Appellant has peti-
tioned for a rehearing in this case. His petition shows that he
has misconstrued the opinion heretofore filed. He states that
the decision is contrary to the rule expressed many times by this
court, “that where the facts bearing upon the issues are in dis-
pute and the evidence offers room for a reasonable difference of
opinion the issue is for the jury.”

In this case the facts are not in dispute. All of the facts which
have any bearing upon the cause of the fire upon defendant’s
premises were elicited from ‘one witness, plaintiff’s witness
Hulett. There is no basis upon which a jury could determine
that this witness’s observations and testimony were more accu-
rate in any one respect than they were in others.

Plaintiffs case must therefore stand or fall upon this witness’s
entire testimony. We have said that a reasonable inference
from this testimony is that the fire on defendant’s premises re-
sulted from a cause for which defendant was not proven re-
sponsible and that this inference is at least as reasonable if not
more reasonable than an inference the fire was caused by the
negligent use of gasoline. With the evidence in this state, a
prima facie case as to the cause of the fire was not established,

188 SS

because a verdict based upon such evidence could only be reached
by pure conjecture or guesswork on the part of the jury. The
petition for rehearing is denied.

Morris, C. J., and Grimson and COretstiansow, JJ., concur.
Sarues, J., did not participate. Se

Dt

[File No. 7252] -

GEORGE E. ENGSTROM and Ella Engstrom, Respondents
v. BETTY LARSON and C. R. Larson, Appellants.

(55 NW2d 679)

FFF 189
Opinion filed November 7, 1952 ,

Shaft & Benson, for appellants.

190 Ee

Sinness & Duffy, for respondents.

Sarr, J. This is an ‘action for accounting of partnership
property brought by the plaintiffs George E. Engstrom and Ella
Engstrom against Betty Larson and C. R. Larson.

The defendants had sold the partnership property without the
consent of the plaintiffs and mingled the proceeds with their
own funds: The issues involve accounting and division of the
proceeds of the sale and the value of.the good will of the busi-
ness. The case was originally tried before Honorable P. G.
Swenson (now retired) District Judge. A judgment was ren-
dered for the’ plaintiffs for $1900.75 and the plaintiffs appealed
on the ground that the judgment was inadequate. The case was
remanded with directions to take further testimony as to the
respective values of the partnership property and the individual
property of the defendants included in the proceeds of the sale.
That case is reported in 77 ND 541, 44 NW2d 97. The case was
thereafter tried before the Honorable John C. Pollock, District
Judge. Judgment -was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants in the sum of $6377.86. The case is here
on appeal by the defendants, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed
claiming interest on the amount found to be due the plaintiffs.

The facts are fully stated in the former opinion of this court
and it will only be necessary here to summarize them briefly.

-In October 1944, a partnership was formed between Claude P.
Stone and George E. Engstrom for the purpose of operating a
cafe in. the Columbia Hotel at Grand Forks, North Dakota.
Space in said hotel was leased to the partnership by the owners
of the hotel, Claude P. Stone and D. F. McGowan. The cafe
business was purchased by the partnership from one Alex
Argeros. The purchase price for the cafe and equipment was
$1200.00 and $555.00 was paid for merchandise on hand to be
used in the operation of the cafe,

In addition $145.00 was turned over to the plaintiff Engstrom
for operating expense, making a total investment of $1900.00.
The partners borrowed said sum of $1900.00 from Claude P.

| 191

Stone, executing their note therefor and it was subsequently re-
paid out of the partnership funds. The plaintiff Engstrom
served as manager of the cafe without compensation until
August 1946 and thereafter he was paid $200.00 per month as
manager. Stone and Engstrom operated the cafe until January
1946, at which time their wives, Betty Stone and Ella Engstrom
were taken into the partnership as full partners.

In September 1945 Claude P. Stone and Betty Stone obtained
a lease of the premises occupied by the partnership for a period
of five years at a rental of $100.00 per month to be effective from
October 1, 1945, and to expire October 5, 1950 with privilege of
renewal for another period of five years. The other two partners
George E. and Ella Engstvom had no knowledge that such lease
had been obtained by Claude P. and Betty Stone. Claude P.
Stone died in September, 1946 and his wife Betty Stone took
over his one fourth interest in the partnership and the business
was continued as before without any accounting up to the death
of Claude P. Stone. Thereafter, and in February 1947, Betty
P. Stone married C. RB. Larson, one of the defendants in this ac-
tion. The plaintiff George E. Engstrom continued as active
manager of the partnership business until April 1, 1947, when
he left to go into business at Carrington, North Dakota. When
he left Ella Engstrom, with the consent of the defendants, took
over as manager and continued as such until June 10, 1947:
There was no accounting or change in the personnel of the part-
nership when George E. Engstrom left as manager on April 1,
1947.

On June 10, 1947, Ella Engstrom was called to Valley City
because of the death of her mother. When she returned to Grand
Forks, June 19, 1947, she was told by the defendants Betty and
C. R. Larson that she had no further interest in the business;
that when George E. Engstrom left in April 1947 he was elim-
inated and that thereafter Ella Engstrom had been working for
the defendants Betty and C.'R. Larson, and had no further inter-
est in the business.

During Ella Engstrom’s absence while attending her mother’s
funeral the defendants negotiated a sale of the cafe business in-
cluding the equipment, fixtures, and dishes, to A. Russell Oliver

192 es

and Catherine D. Oliver for a consideration of $20,000.00. The
Olivers were given a bill of sale, executed by C. R. Larson and
Betty Larson. The bill of sale shows the consideration to be
“one dollar and other valuable consideration” but it is admitted
that the true consideration was $20,000.00. In addition to the
sum of $20,000.00 the Olivers paid for the inventory of supplies
the sum of $1056.74. Ten per cent of these sums was retained as
commission by the real estate broker who negotiated the sale.
There is in evidence defendants’ exhibit 7, a lease executed by
the defendants C. R. Larson and Betty Larson to A. Russell
Oliver and Catherine Oliver. The lease recites that it was made
June 21, 1947. It leases to the Olivers certain space in the
‘Columbia Hotel described therein for a period of five years
beginning July 1, 1947 and ending July 1, 1952 with privilege of
renewal at the expiration thereof. It provides that the rent for
the premises shall be $150.00 per month for the first year, pay-
_ able in advance, and for the remainder of the term the rent shall
be computed. on the basis of the percentage of the gross sales
stated in the lease. The sale by the Larsons to the Olivers in-
cluded the said lease with an option for renewal. It is contended
by defendants that the cafe business sold to the Olivers had no
good will and that one half of the purchase price of. $20,000.00
represented the value of the equipment and the other one half
thereof represented the value of the lease defendants’ exhibit 7.
There are two leases. involved in this action, exhibit 8 the lease
to Claude P. Stone and Betty Stone executed in September 1945
for five years with the privilege of renewal and exhibit 7 the
lease between the Larsons and the Olivers executed June 21,
1947:
On the second trial before the Honorable John C. Pollock, Dis-
trict Judge, it was stipulated that:
“The transcript of the testimony taken upon the former trial
of this action, together with all of the exhibits offered and re-
ceived upon the former trial, may be received in evidence in this
case, and that the testimony set forth in the transcript may be
considered. with the same force as if the witnesses had testified
im open court, and that such evidence shall be deemed to have

|

[| 193

been offered here by the party who offered that evidence or
offered the exhibits upon the original trial.”

Thereupon the plaintiff rested, and the defendants proceeded
to take further testimony.

The defendant C. R. Larson testified that in April 1947 the
plaintiff Ella Bngstrom wrote the defendants. that George
‘Engstrom was going into business at Carrington, North Dakota
and that she would. like to take over the management of the
cafe; that thereafter the defendants met with Mrs. Engstrom
and it was agreed that she should take over the management of
the cafe at a salary of $200.00 per month. Larson further tes-
tified that the business did not go too well under Mrs. Engstrom’s
management and that the business operated at a monthly
loss of approximately $400.00 to $500.00 per month; that
he told her that they could not continue in the business
further at a loss; that when Mrs. Engstrom left for Valley City
in June on account of her mother’s illness she left one of the
waitresses in charge of the cafe. With respect to the sale of the
eafe to the Olivers he stated that the good will of the cafe busi-
ness was purely nominal and that he would not “put a figure on
it”. On cross examination he testified as follows:

Q. And in your opinion was the cafe business and equipment
that was sold to Mr. Oliver worth the $20,000.00 that he paid
for it?

A. No, I don’t believe the business and the equipment was
worth $20,000.00.

Q. What do you think the business and the equipment was
worth at that time?

A. What do youmean? Do you want a gross figure for the two
items? Do you mean for the business? Do you mean for the
good will?

Q. Imean the whole thing. If you were buying the restaurant
you would get the good will and get the equipment and you would
get everything that went with it. What was the whole thing
worth? :

A. I was trying to recollect the figures that we, had on that

Dn |

194 Le

breakdown. Itis about three and a half years since I have looked
at them.

Q. I am not asking you to try to remember figures or any-
body else’s breakdown. I am just asking you, as a restaurant
man and formerly connected with it, what that business that
you listed with Boe at $20,000.00, what it was actually worth?

A. Well, we bought about six businesses and I am kind of
confused in the so-called inventories and appraisals.

Q. You are not prepared at this time to answer that question?

A. That is right.

It clearly appears from the foregoing testimony that the de-
fendant C. R. Larson did not feel that he could make a break-
down of the purchase price of $20,000.00 paid by the Olivers
and place a separate value on the good will or other items in-
cluded in the sale. : :

The defendant Betty Larson testified that her husband, de-
fendant C. R. Larson, never had any direct interest in the cafe
and that his only interest was as her husband; that she had had
no experience with any other cafes; but was well acquainted
with the operations in the Columbia cafe; she participated in
the conversation with Mrs. Engstrom as to the management of
the cafe after George Engstrom left and she agreed that Mrs.
Engstrom should continue as manager. She visited the cafe
from time to time while Mrs. Engstrom was in charge and
she thought the management was bad, that the customers did
not continue to come in the same numbers as before and that
according to the auditor’s report the business was operated at
a loss. She admitted that she did not tell Mrs. Engstrom that
they, defendants, listed the property for sale, or that they were
negotiating a sale to the Olivers. With reference to exhibit 7, the
lease to the Olivers, she stated it was made at the time of the
sale as a part of the same transaction. Upon being asked wheth-
er the business, that is the cafe business, had any good will at
the time of the sale to the Olivers, she stated: “It is a pretty
hard question for me to answer, I suppose it would depend on
who was buying it. I don’t know.”

Le 195

Upon further questioning by her counsel she said the restau-
rant was well equipped but the operation was such as not to
encourage business and new customers.

A. Russell Oliver, who with his wife purchased the Columbia
Cafe from the defendants, testified that when they made the
purchase of the restaurant there was no good will, at least so
far as they, the purchasers, were concerned, and that they were
interested principally in securing a location because there was
a possibility that they might lose the location where they operat-
ed their cafe No.1. He stated that the purchase price, $20,000.00
included the location, the business and the equipment, and that
he entered into a separate agreement to rent at a monthly rental
the premises where the business was located.

Harry Peabody, sales manager for the Grand Forks Restau-
rant Supply testified somewhat in detail as to the value of the
equipment included in the sale to the Olivers. Most of this
testimony related to the value of the property listed in exhibit
5, purchased by Stone and McGowan from the Fargo Food and
Equipment Company in 1938, and purported to fix the value
thereof as of June 1947 when the cafe was purchased by the
Olivers, and was property in which the plaintiff's had no interest.

The plaintiff George Engstrom, testified as to the value of
certain items that had been appraised by Mr. Peabody, for in-
stance, Peabody put $1500.00 as the value of the compressors
and the wires and installation, while Engstrom who had been
active manager of the cafe since 1944 placed the value on the
same compressors and equipment at not more than $300.00 or
$400.00. Peabody and Engstrom differed considerably as to
the value of the other items of equipment which were in the
cafe and in which the‘plaintiffs had no interest, that is, Peabody
placed a higher value thereon than did Engstrom. Engstrom
stated that the partnership had replaced much of the stuff that
was in the cafe when it was taken over from Argeros and that
it had been increased substantially during the time the cafe was
operated by the partnership; that more cups and saucers and
silverware had to be purchased-in order to take care of the in-
creased business. He stated further that there were three items
that were moved into the cafe from the bar at the time the

196 De

liquor divorcement law became effective, that is, a cigar counter,
a back case and a magazine rack, and that the value of thege
three items was $150.00 to $200.00.

His estimate of the value of the cafe as a going concern in
1947, taking into consideration only the equipment belonging
to the partnership, exclusive of the equipment that belonged to
the bar or the hotel, was about $7000.00 or $8000.00. He stated
further that the value of the cafe, as a going concern, including
the good will, equipment and everything that went with the sale
to the Olivers was $12,000.00 or $14,000.00, and that the value of
all the stuff in the cafe that was not owned by the partnership
was $7000.00 or $8000.00.

The defendants testified that the plaintiff George Engstrom
never told them that he was leaving the cafe, and that the first
information they had about his leaving was the letter, exhibit
12, written by Ella Engstrom to the Larsons, sometime in March
1947. Engstrom however, testified that he told the Larsons about
his leaving some time during the latter part of March 1947. Mrs.
Engstrom testified that Mr. Engstrom stayed -with her two
weeks helping her in the cafe after she wrote the letter, exhibit
12, to the Larsons:

As to the patronage of the cafe, Mrs. Engstrom said it did hold
up. There was a decrease in the business for a while because of
increase in prices. Asked whether the increase of prices was
discussed with the Larsons she stated that it was under pres-
sure from Larson that she increased the prices. She testified
further as follows:

Q. Did Mr. Larson undertake to give directions with refer-
ence to the various matters connected with the operation of the
cafe?:..,,

A. He was very grateful of what I was doing. I felt under
pressure whenever he was there. He gave some constructive
criticism, and very often criticism that was not constructive, and
I was working under abnormal conditions all the time.

Q. Did he interfere with the help in any way?

A. Well, yes, he did.

EE 197

Q. In what way?
A. He interfered with the chef, so I was forced to dismiss him.
and I got other help which was not as experienced.

The main issue in the case is as the value of the good will of
the cafe business. The plaintiffs contend that the good will is
of substantial value, while the defendants contend that it is
of no value.

. The contention of the defendants that the cafe had no good
will is based on the fact that during the period between January
1947 and June 1947 when,the cafe business was sold by the Lar-
sons to the Olivers it had been operating at a loss of $1225.00.
However the. evidence shows that substantial sums were spent
for equipment and repairs and other expenses during that
period; $528.23 was spent for a dishwasher, $368.94 was paid
for repairs on the stove and $208.70 was paid for new dishes.

The federal income tax returns of the partnership for 1945
and 1946 were introduced in evidence from which it appears that
the gross income for 1945 was $41,178.79 and the net income
$3,239.31; the gross income for 1946 was $54,979.46 and the net
income $4,524.31. The evidence further shows that the gross
income of the éafe for the first five and one half months of 1947
was $34,755.36 in addition to which there was merchandise on
hand of the value of $1056.74 as shown by the inventory taken
when :the sale of the cafe was made to the Olivers.

At the first trial the trial court expressed the view that since
the partnership had shown no profit during its operation the
first five and half months of 1947, but had operated at a loss, it
had no good will, and that there was no testimony as to the value
of good will, if there was any good will. In our former opinion
we said “The trial court was correct in holding that the value of
good will had not been proven, but we are agreed that the trial
court was in error in holding that the facts and circumstances in
this case established that no good will existed.”

At the second trial A. Russell Oliver, one of the purchasers of
the cafe from Larsons testified as follows:

198 ee

Q. So far as you are concerned, Mr. Oliver, was there any good
will for which you paid any price in that restaurant, and if so
how much?

A. So far as we were concerned, there was not.

Q. There was no good will. Were you attempting to purchase
a going business, Mr. Oliver, or was your—what was your pur-
pose in buying the place?

A. We faced the rather strong possibility of losing our loca-
tion in the Elk Building for our No. 1 and we wanted to get a
place where we could continue in business, and that.was the
only thing we were interested in.

On cross examination Oliver testified as follows:

Q. When you speak about “good will”, just what do you have
in mind?

A. Well, I ordinarily have thought it to mean that the place
has a good reputation and. people like to go there. I suppose
that would be as much as any, people like the place. ,

Q. You recognize the fact that a place which is a going busi-
ness, where people do come either to eat or to buy clothing or
buy merchandise, a place that the public is familiar with as
being able to get what they want at that spot, and where they
have been going for a period of years, that does have an asset
value. Do you not agree?

A. Yes, I expect it would.

Q. And this Columbia Cafe as a matter of fact had been operat-
ing under some designation, and I-mean there had been a Colum-
bia—a cafe in the Columbia Hotel at practically this same loca-
tion for a great many years, hadn’t there?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know that the men who work on the Great North-
ern Railroad and the traveling public who go through on the
Great Northern Railroad for a good many years patronized the
eafe in the Columbia Hotel?

A. Yes, I suppose it would.

The defendant C. R. Larson testified as follows:

Q. As a man of experience in the restaurant business what is
your opinion as to whether or not that place had a good will

Es 199

value as of the date of the sale, and if it had a good will value,
what in your opinion would that amount to?

A. Well, I don’t believe in my opinion that the good will value
amounted to very much from a point of sale.

Q. You say you don’t-believe it amounted to very much. Will
you be able to put a figure on it?

A. Well, I don’t believe I would put a figure on it.

Q. Would it be in your judgment purely nominal? Is that
what you are saying?

A. Very nominal, yes, sir.

The testimony of Oliver and Larson as to the value of the good
will of the cafe business was somewhat indefinite and appears to
be an arbitrary expression of their own conclusions rather than
a considered opinion based on a factual situation, except the fact
that the business operated at a loss during the first five mouths
of 1947, The fact that considerable expense had been incurred
during that time for necessary equipment, repairs and replace-
ments was not given any consideration.

The plaintiff George Engstrom testified as follows:

Q. You were familiar with the stuff that was in the cafe when
you took it over from Argeros?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you replace much of that stuff during the time you wére
there?

A. Well, we replaced a lot—quite a lot of silverware, and pots
and pans, and dishes, that was always a replacement.

Q. Did you increase the amount of that sort of thing during
the time you were there?

A. Very substantially, yes.

* Q. In other words, what he calls replaceable or incidental
items were increased substantially from the time that you went
in in 1944 until the time the stuff was sold in ’47?

A. Yes; the reason being that we increased our business and’
we had to buy more cups and saucers and silverware in order to
take care of the increased business.

Q. As I recall it, there was a substantial investment there in
the spring of ’47 in connection with a stove. .

200 Le

A. That happened after I left there.

Q. What, in your opinion, was the value of the cafe as a going
concern in 1947, taking into consideration only the equipment
that belonged to the partnership, disregarding now the stuff:
that belonged to the hotel or the stuff that came over from the
bar?

A. Well, I should judge the equipment that we were in part.
nership on, that we had on hand, would be about seven or eight
thousand dollars.

Q. Just the equipment, or are we talking about: the entire
business?

A. The equipment that was in there.

Q. Iam asking you what was the value of the cafe as a going
concern, including the good will, the equipment, everything that
went with the sale? .

A. Well, I should say twelve or fourteen thousand dollars.

Q. And what would you say was the fair value of all the stuff
that was in.the cafe that was not owned by the partnership?

A. Well, it should have been worth seven or eight thousand
dollars.

Q. In other words, your testimony is that the equipment in
the cafe would be worth about seven thousand, the equipment, I
mean the stuff that belonged to the partnership, the equipment
that didn’t belong to the partnership were seven.or éight thou-
sand and the business another five or seven thousand?

A. I figure the good will of the going business was worth that.

George Engstrom was more familiar with the business of the
eafe than either the defendants or Oliver. He had been the.
active manager from the time of the formation of the partner-
ship by himself and.C. P. Stone until April 1, 1947 or two and
one half months before the sale to the Olivers. The business
had been profitable during all of the time under his manage-
ment, and undoubtedly had established a good will of some value.

Section 47-0710 NDRC 1943 defines good will as follows: .

“The good will of a business is the expectation of continued
public patronage, but does not include a, right to use the name
of any person from whom it was acquired.” and

[| 201

* Section 47-0711 NDRC 1943 provides that:

“The good will of a business is property transferable i in the
Same manner as any other”.

“Sale of the assets of a firm ordinarily carries with it the part-
nership good will”. 68 CJS Partnership, page 910, ¢ Good Will
Sec. 396. ,

“The value of the good will ofa business at the death of a
partner may be estimated by the annual profits of the business
before that time. It is the right of each partner to have the
good will of the business converted into cash, if it has any value”.
2nd Rowley Modern Partnership. Sec. 660, page 895."

“The good will of a business may be defined to be the advan-
tage which it has from its establishment or from the patronage
of its customers, over and above the mere value of its property
and capital. The good will of a partnership rests in the probabil-
ity that its old customers will continue their custom and will
commend the partnership to others.” Am Jur Partnership,
page 203, Good Will See. 109.

See also MacFadden v. J enkins, 40 ND 422, 169 Nw 151.

The partnership had been operated at a profit since its organ-
ization, in 1944 to April 1, 1947. The failure of the business to
show profit or even the fact that it was operated at a loss from
April 1st, 1947 to June 15th, 1947 when it was sold to the Olivers
cannot be held to establish that it had no good will. As we-have
pointed out the gross income for the first five and one half
months of 1947. was $34,755.36 in addition to merchandise on
hand of the value of $1056.74 at the time of the:sale by the de-
fendants to the Olivers.

. The defendants -contend that in the sale to the Olivers the
one half. of the consideration of $20,000.00 was paid for the
equipment in the cafe and one half thereof or $10,000 was paid
for the opportunity to lease the premises. This lease is exhibit
7 executed by the defendants.C. R. Larson and Betty Larson to
the Olivers, covering space in the Columbia Hotel to be-used by
the Olivers for the operation of a restaurant and related activ-
ities and for no other purpose. It covered a period of five years
with option to renew it for an additional period of, five-years.

202 —

- There was another lease introduced in evidence to which refer-

ence has been made, defendants’ exhibit 8, executed in September
1945 by the owners of Columbia Hotel to C. P. Stone and Betty
Stone, leasing space in the Columbia Hotel to the Stones to be
used as a restaurant for a term of five years from October Ist,
1947 with privilege of renewal at the expiration for an additional
term of five years, at a monthly rental of $100.00. The plaintiff
George Engstrom testified that he did not know that such lease
was in existence until it was introduced in evidence. The rental
provided for by this lease was $100.00 per month, and that is
the réntal the partnership had paid from its formation in Octo-
ber 1944 until the’sale by the defendants to the Olivers in June
1947: Engstrom testified that he was of the impression that the
partnership had a written lease. ‘However the evidence does
riot establish that the partnership had a written lease, but con-
tinued to operate under an oral lease at a rental of $100.00 per
month. No action had ever been taken to terminate the oral
lease, and it was in force and effect at the time of the sale of the
cafe to the Olivers in June 1947. It was an asset of the partner-
ship, and whatever-value it had inured to the partnership.

With reference to exhibit 8, the lease to Betty and C. P. Stone,
Mrs. Stone. testified that she.did not tell either Mr. or Mrs. Eng-
strom that it was taken in the name of CO. P. and Betty Stone.
Her testimony was: “I didn’t tell them anything. I had no rea-
son to tell them anything about it.”

When the defendants sold the cafe business and executed the
lease, exhibit 7; to the Olivers, the partnership had not been
dissolved and the oral lease under which it had operated since
the formation of the partnership had never been terminated.
The rights of the partnership under the oral lease were part-
nership- assets and were included in the sale to the Olivers, and
inured to all of the partners. It was therefore the duty of the
defendants to account to the plaintiffs for the value of the lease
as part of their interest. in the proceeds of the sale to the Olivers.

: “The relations of partners are confidential. They are trustees
for, each other within the meaning of the provisions of the title
of Trusts, Usés and Powers. Their obligations as such trustees
are defined by that title.” Sec. 45-0109 NDRC 1943.

Ll 208

“The relationship of partners is fiduciary and imposes upon
them the obligation of the utmost good faith and integrity in
their dealings with one another with respect to partnership
affairs. 40 Am Jur Partnership,” Sec. 128 p. 217. See, also 47
OJ pp 771-772; Lay v. Emery, 8 ND 515, 79 NW 1053; Olivier
v. Uleberg, 74 ND 453, 23 NW2d 39, 165 ALR 974..

“A general partner is the agent-of the partnership in the
transaction of its business and has authority to do whatever is
necessary to carry.on such business in the ordinary manner.
NDRC 1948, 45-0203. But ‘a general partner as such has not
authority to do any of the following. acts, unless his copartners
have wholly abandoned the business to him or are incapable of
acting . . . . 2. To-dispose of the good will of the business;
3. To dispose of the whole of the partnership property at once,
unless it consists entirely of merchandise; 4. To-do any act
which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary busi-
ness of the partnership; . . ”. NDRC 1943, 45-0204”.

Engstrom v. Larson, 77 ND 541, 44 NW2d 97.

At the first trial the defendant O.'R. Larson testified that he
purchased McGowan’s interest in the Columbia Hotel together
with the equipment in the bar and the equipment in the cafe not
owned by the partnership and that the purchase price of the
bar including the equipment was $8000.00. This sum be divided
$4000.00 for the equipment, and $4000.00 for the good will of the
bar. There was a considerable amount of equipment in use in
the operation of the cafe by the partnership which was owned
by the cafe which was included in the sale to the Olivers. Hx-
hibit 11 Page 10 lists such equipment at its original purchase
price in 1948 at the sum of $4589.10 and the equipment-purchased
by C. R. Larson in 1947, that is the equipment in the hotel bar
at $4000.00 making a total of $7589.10 for the equipment sold to
the Olivers in which the partnership had no interest. The trial
court however was of the opinion that the testimony as to the
value of.said equipment was unsatisfactory and accordingly re-
duced it by $1000.00 and fixed it at $6589.10.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant C. R. Larson
obtained a number of partnership checks signed.in blank by

IT

1204 De

‘Ella Engstrom while she was at ‘Valley City for her mother’s
funeral and that he filled in one of these checks for $800.00 in
payment of rental for the cafe. This was an overpayment of rent
in the sum of $500.00 and was disallowed. At the time of the
sale to the Olivers there was cash ott hand and in the bank in
the sum of $138.76; ‘the defendant CO. RB: Larson had later ad-
vanced to the ‘partnership account $335.00. ‘There had been
advanced to each of the plaintiffs the sum of $250.00 which should
be deducted froth their share of the net proceeds of the sale to
the Olivers to be distributed to the members of the partnership.

The trial court made its findings as to the distribution of the
partnership assets in paragraphs XII and XIII of its findings of
fact as follows:

“That a fair ‘apportionment of the partnership assets, includ-
ing the proceeds from the sale made to the Olivers, is as follows:

Sale price of cafe and lease by defendants .......... $20,000.00
Interest owned by defendants 6,589.10
Gross share of sale price to partnership . $13,410.90
Less 10% commission paid broker 1,341.09
Net amount of sale to partnership ............4. _. $12,069.81
Sale of merchandise inventory to purchasers . . 1,056.74
Partnership bank account and cash oe 188.76
Overpayment of rent to defendants .............. 500.00
ow a $13,480.31
Less balance of amount advanced by Defts. ....... . 335.00

Amount of division between partners ...... 7 seeeee $13,430.31

Dn 205
One-half of said amount to.Betty Stone

Larson... 2. eee eee eee eee $6,715.15 |
One-fourth of said am’t to Geo Eng- :
strom . . $3357.58
Less advance to him .. 250.00
$3107.58
. $3107.58
One-fourth of said amount to Ella Eng-
StVOM 1... eee eee eee ee $3357.58
Less advance to her ......... 250.00
$3107.58
By amount of Engstrom advances ...... 500.00
$13,430.31

That of the moneys received and retained by the defendants
from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets they are
accountable to the plaintiffs for the sum of $625.16, and that ‘such
amount is held in trust for the plaintiffs.

The trial court did not allow interest on the amount found for
the plaintiffs and they have cross-appealed. They contend that.
they are entitled to interest from. the date of the sale of the
cafe to the Olivers: The question’ is thus presented whether
upon the record before us the plaintiffs are entitled to interest.

It is established by the evidence that the partnership had not
been dissolved when the defendants made the sale, and it is
further established that the defendants made the sale without
the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, and ‘in disregard of.
their rights as partners. The defendants appropriated to them-
selves the entire proceeds.of the sale without making or offerizig
to make any settlement or adjustment with the plaintiffs. Their
conduct in that respect amounted to fraud as to the rights of
the plaintiffs. _

206: —

Section 32-0305 NDRC 1943 provides:

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, inter-
est may be given in the discretion of the jury.” NDRC 1943,
32-0305.

“It is well established that a trustee who is guilty of a breach
of trust in making a loan is liable for interest. Similarly, trus-
tees are chargeable with interest if they have been negligent in
paying money over as directed by the trust instrument, and a
defaulting trustee may be charged with interest when he has had
ample opportunity to gather in the trust fund and turn it over
to the beneficiary. He may also be charged with interest if, in
the management of the trust fund, he exceeds his power or makes
unproductive investments. Where a trustee applies the money
to his own use, he may be charged with compound interest, and
nothing ‘can be allowed him for his services in caring for the
trust fund. On the other hand, if there is no unreasonable delay
in applying trust money according to the directions of the trust,
and there is no application made of it to his own use, the trustee
will not be chargeable with interest.” 30 Am Jur Interest, Sec.
27, pp. 21 et seq.

“No unbending rule can be laid down on the subject of the
allowance of interest in accounting between partners; the pro-
priety: of the allowance in a particular ¢ase must be determined
from the facts and cireumstances, and the equities, of the case.
It has been declared that the general rule pertaining to the al-
lowance of interest for the use of money does not apply in part-
nership settlements.

Ordinarily, interest is not allowed on unascertained balances
remaining in one partner’s hands after dissolution of the firm, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary; but, where the cir-"
cumstances are such as equitably to demand payment of ‘inter-
est, it will be allowed from the time when the partnership ac-
counts should have. been, settled, as where one partner has. re-
tained the money an unreasonable length of time, or where he is
wrongfully withholding it.” 68 CJS Partnership, Sec. 397, p. 913.

[| 207

The amount to which the trial court found the plaintiffs to
be entitled was ascertained to be due as of the time of the sale,
but it was wrongfully withheld by the defendants and appro-
priated to their own use. Under the record and all of the cir-
cumstances we think that the plaintiffs are entitled to interest
according to law from the date of the sale.

The judgment of the district court is modified accor rdingly « and
as modified is affirmed.

" Morris, C. J., and Cursrtanson, Burke and Gaimsor, JJ.,
concur,

208 ee
[File No. 7324]
VALBERG COULTER, Aletta Brunsvold, Jean Marie Ward-
rope, and Abigail Scott Waller, Respondents v. JOEL RAM-
BERG, Appellant.

(55 NWe2d 516)

md

Opinion filed November i0, 1952

Sinness & Duffy, for respondents.

Eugene A. Burdick, for appellant.

Grimson, J. The plaintiffs bring an action to quiet title in
themselves to the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter
of Section Twenty-nine and the Northeast Quarter of the North-
west Quarter of Section Thirty-two, all in Township One Hun-
dred Fifty-six, North of Range Ninety-five West of the 5th.
P.M. Their complaint follows the statutory form claiming own-_
ership and demanding that the defendant be required to set
forth all his adverse claims to said property and that the same
be decreed null and void. The defendant admits he claims an
interest in the land and sets up against the plaintiffs the ten year.
statute of limitations (Sec. 28-0122 NDRC 1943) and alleges
laches on the part of the plaintiffs. Then the defendant makes
a counterclaim in the form of statutory complaint to quiet title
in him alleging that he is the owner of the property and that
the claims of the plaintiffs are inferior to his rights. Plaintiffs
reply alleging that defendant’s title is based upon a void tax deed
from Williams County.

The action was tried to the court and judgment rendered quiet-
ing title in the plaintiffs. Defendant appeals and asks for a
trial de novo. :

The facts as they appear from the stipulation of counsel are
that A. A. Brunsvold became the owner of the land in contro-
versy, heretofore described, on August 2, 1925, by virtue of a
sheriff’s deed issued on the foreclosure of a mortgage given by a
prior owner of said premises, Then Brunsvold paid the taxes.

212 PO
up to 1930. For the 1930 taxes the land was sold to Williams
County and several subsequent tax sale certificates were issued
to Williams County. No redemption was made from'these sales.
Williams County in May 1939 commenced proceedings to mature
its title to said land. Such proceedings were carried to a con-
clusion by the issuance of a tax deed to Williams County (Sec.
57-2809 NDRC 1943) on March 1, 1940. Thereupon Williams
County went into possession of said land and leased it for cash
rent. A. A. Brunsvold died intestate. The plaintiffs, his two
daughters and two granddaughters are his heirs. On Nov. 8,
1940, Williams County advertised this land, appraised at $80.00
for sale at public auction, as provided by Sec. 6, Chapter 235
S.L. 1939. At that auction, held Nov. 19, 1940, there were no
bidders for this land. Thereafter this defendant, Jocl Ramberg,
made application to purchase the land in question at the ap-
praised price which application was approved by the county
commissioners of Williams County. Notice of such proposed
sale was mailed to the former owner and received by his admin-
istrator, E. S. Wardrope, who made no effort to repurchase the
land. On January 6, 1942,.the defendant, Joel Ramberg, having
paid the purchase price, received a‘deed from Williams County
for said premises in accordance with, Sec. 57- 2816 NDRC 1943.
He has since that time been in exclusive, adverse possession of
said lands, cultivated and improved the same and paid all taxes
levied against the same for the years 1942 through 1951 iriclusive.
The plaintiffs. claim title through their ancestor, A. A. Bruns-
vold by inheritance. They ask that the defendant’set forth his
claims and that it be determined whether his claim is superior
to their own. Defendant shows that this title is ‘based wpon the
deed from Williams County to defendant. Plaintiffs claim that *
that deed is void. The validity of that deédis, therefore, the
first matter for decision. If that is valid defendant has’a title
superior to that of the plaintiffs irrespective of the other de-
fenses put forward by the defendant assailing plaintiffs’ title.
The plaintiffs attack the proceedings leading up to the coun-
ty’s tax deed. First they attack the tax sale certificate which
was issued to the county. The form of certificate used’-was that’
preseribed by.Chapter ‘298: 8... 1931: and. the only form ‘prée-.

| 218

«seribed by that statute. It recited that Williams County became
-the purchaser,-“being the bidder who agreed to accept the lowest
rate of interest thereon from the date of sale on the amount
of such taxes, penalties and costs so paid by him, and that said
rate-of interest, which said purchaser so agreed to accept was
9 per cent per annum.”

», Plaintiffs claim this indicated that Williams County became a
competitive bidder at the sale contrary to law. State ex rel.
Atkins y. Lawler; 53 ND 278, 205 NW 880. Chapter 289 S.L.
1931, provided that if any tract remained unsold for want of
bidders it should be again offered before the sale closes and “If
there is no other bidder he (county treasurer) shall bid for the
same in name of the county and the same shall be struck off and
become forfeited to the county in which such sale takes place
. .. .” Said Chapter further provides that: “Whenever any
real property shall be sold to the county, the county auditor shall
make out a certificate of sale to the county in the same manner
as if sale had been made to any other person which certificate
shall be retained by the county treasurer . . . .” Thus the law
provides only one form of certificate and says that when the
land is sold to the county the auditor shall make out a certificate
“in the same manner” as other certificates of sale. (Emphasis
supplied.’ The fact that. the certificate shows 9 per cent, the
highest rate allowed by law, Chapter 289 S.L. 1931, is in
harmony with the view that there was no competitive bidding.

We hold the county auditor’s certificate of sale to Williams
County is valid.

The plaintiffs object to the sufficiency of the proof that the
notice of the expization of the period of redemption was proper-
ly served wipon the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title. The law
provides that notice shall be sent by registered mail to the owner
and lien holders of the property in question. Chapter 235 S.L.
1939 (Sec. (a)). There is stipulated in evidence a signed return
receipt of A. A. Brunsvold, plaintiffs’ predecessor in title, and
of Advian EH. Buttz, presumably a lien holder, dated May 31,
1939. A copy of the actual notice sent out, however, was not
found in the files of the auditor. The presumption is that
“official duty has been performed regularly.” Sub. Sec. 15, Sec.

214 Ee

31-1103 NDRC 1943. That presumption is supported by these
return receipts dated at the time the notice should have been
sent out and by the further fact that the receipt, which was in
the form of a post card, had a notation on the front or address
side thereof, “A. A. Brunsvold, 29-32-156-95,” indicating the
description of the land in question. A similar notation was on
the Buttz return receipt. No evidence is offered to dispute that
presumption. Even if no copy of the notice was found that
does not indicate that no notice was mailed. It will be pre-
sumed, therefore, that the notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption was enclosed in the envelope for which the owner
receipted. “

In due time thereafter the auditor published a notice of the
expiration of the period of redemption. Plaintiffs claim that
notice states an amount in excess of that necessary to redeem
and the wrong time within which redemption had to be made.
That claim is based on the contention that Chapter 227 S.L.
1939 providing for the settlement of delinquent taxes by the
payment of the original tax without any penalty or interest up
to March 1, 1940 amends Section 3 of Chapter 235 S.L. 1939
which provides that the auditor shall give notice of the expira-
tion of the period of redemption on all real estate on which the
period of redemption will expire Oct. Ist. and that the amount
necessary for redemption shall be the original tax with penalty
and interest up to that time.

The published notice of the expiration of the period of re-
demption is in evidence. That notice states as provided by
Chapter 235 that redemption had to be made on or before Oct.
1, 1939, and that the amount necessary to redeem was the orig-
inal amount of the taxes plus interest to Oct. 1, 1939. .

It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine whether Chapter
227 amends Chapter 235, both of which were passed by the same
1939 legislature as independent and separate acts.

In the construction of statutes a determination must be made
as to what was the intention of the legislature in the enactment
thereof. Such intent is the controlling factor and must be
given effect to the fullest degree. As aids in finding that intent,
the reason for the enactment of the law, evils at which the legis-

PC 215

lation is aimed, the historical background and other statutes on
related subjects may be considered. Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 77
‘ND 108, 41 NW2d 217, 19 ALR2d 1147; 59 CJ 948; 50 Am Jur
271.

It is a matter of common knowledge that a severe depression
existed in North Dakota during the period from 1930 to 1940.
The conditions as to crops and prices prevailing made the cash
resources of people very small. Very many people were unable
to pay their taxes. The local and state governments were in
difficulties for lack of tax receipts sufficient to carry on the
processes of government. A real emergency faced the ‘people
and the government. This gave rise to the attempts of the legis-
latures meeting during that time to ameliorate those tax prob-
lems as far as possible. The five sessions of the legislature
meeting in that decade passed 91 acts on tax matters.

A study of some of the acts by which the legislature attempted
to overcome the emergency may throw light on the intent with
which they passed Chapters 227 and 235 during the 1939 session,

In the 1931, 1933 and 1935 sessions of the legislature the
emphasis seems to have been to give relief to the taxpayer by
the extension of time within which the payment of taxes could
be made or land redeemed from tax sales. That would enable
the taxpayer to retain his property.

By Chapter 258 8.L. 1933 the legislature declared a public
emergency on account of the depression and extended the period
within which the owner could redeem from tax sales for two
years after the approval of the act, May 3, 1933, but made the
provision that the owner of such land “within 90 days after the
date of the notice of expiration of the period of redemption file
with the County Auditor a notice that he desires to take advan-
tage of this Act and the further provision that the “County
Auditor, in addition to the notice of expiration of the period of
redemption usually required by law and as a part thereof shall
notify such owner of his-rights under this act.” This act was re-
enacted in substance, by Chapter 280 S.L. 1935. That act was to
take effect at the expiration of Chapter 258 S.L. 1933 and to,
extend the period of redemption to July 1, 1937. Again that act
ineluded provisions that the county auditor notify the owner of

216 ee

such rights as a part of the notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption, and for notice by the owner to the auditor of his
desire to take advantage of the act. There is no extension of
that act in the 1937 session laws.

The 1935 legislature, Chapter 277, declared a moratorium on
tax sale proceedings until the 31st. day of December 1937, by
suspending the operation of Chapter 266 8.L. 1927 which pro-
vides for a notice of expiration of period ‘of redemption and
service thereof, the issuance of tax deeds on property forfeited
to the county and the sale thereof. This act was not renewed
in 1937. The suspension of Chapter 266 S.L. 1927 was, therefore,
ended on Dee. 31, 1987, after which said chapter again became
effective.

In 1987 the legislature changed its policy i in regard to the col-
lection of taxes. Instead of granting an extension‘of time for
the taxpayer and a declaration of a moratorium on tax sale
proceedings a policy was adopted of encouraging tax payments
by providing for tax settlements, waiving interest and penalty,
if payments were made within stated times and-providing for
installment payments of delinquent taxes over a period of years.
The emphasis now was laid on cash settlement of taxes and in-
ducements were held out to the taxpayer to get. on a cash basis’
of tax payments.

The 1937 legislature made provision for contract settlement of
delinquent taxes, Chapter 240 S8.L. 1937, giving the taxpayer
the privilege of entering into a contract with the county for the
payment of the taxes delinquent in 1936 and prior years without,
any delinquent interest and penalty, in six annual payments at
4 per cent interest from the date of the agreement, providing
the taxpayer made cash payment on all taxes ® Subsequent to Nov.
1, 1937.

These contract provisions are continued i in Chapter “207. S.L.
1939, which extended the time for the payment of delinquent
taxes for 1937 and prior years on paying the 1938 and subse-
quent taxes, and extended the contract payment period to ten
years. Provision is also made that on payment of.the original
tax for 1937 and prior years without interest and penalty before
Mar. 1, 1940, such. taxes shall be -cancelled. and discharged.

Le a7

There is no requirement in this act for the auditor at the time of
giving the notice of the expiration of the period of redemption
to notify the taxpayer of his rights-under this act as there had
been in the previous legislation on a deferment of tax payments.

It is contended by plaintiffs that Chapter 227, Laws of N.D.
1939, operated to extend the period of redemption from tax sales,
which under the tax sale procedure. statutes would expire Octo-
ber 1, 1939, until March 1, 1940, and to require that the amount
of money stated as the amount necessary to be paid in order to
effect a redemption in that year be reduced to the amount of
the face of the taxes, without including penalty, interest or the
costs of the sale.

We think it clear, however, from a consideration of the provi-
sions of Chapter 227, supra, and the provisions of other enact-
ments of the 1939 Legislative Assembly that such chapter does
not in any way modify the provisions of the tax sale procedure
statutes but is merely supplementary thereto.

The avowed purpose of Chapter 227, as stated in Section 5
thereof, is to provide for the settlement of delinquent taxes with-
out the payment-of penalty and interest in order to permit tax-
payers to place themselves upon a current tax paying basis.
This statute contains no réference to the expiration of periods
of redemption from tax sales or to any amount which must be
paid to redeem from a tax sale. If it is to be construed to extend
the time to redeem and to reduce the amount of money required
to be stated in the notice of expiration of redemption as the
amount necessary to effect a redemption, that construction must
be reached by inference and not from any of the express pro-
visions of the statute. Such an inference would be contrary
to the express provisions of Chapter 235, Laws of N.D. 1939
and would, therefore, amount to a repeal by implication, of these-
provisions. Repeals by implication are not favored and courts
will not find such a repeal to have been effected if there are rea-
sonable grounds to hold the contrary. City of Fargo v. Ross,
11 ND 369, 92 NW 449; State ex rel. Coghlan v. Poindexter, 49
ND 201, 190 NW 818; State v. Osen, 67 ND 436, 272 NW 783.

Chapter 235, supra, relates solely and specifically to tax deed
proceedings. It provides (section 1, subsection 2) “After notice

218 De

of expiration of period of redemption is given, a redemption of
real estate taxes may be made at any time up to October first
following the date of the notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption; and (section 1, subsection 3) “It shall be the duty
of the County Auditor on or before the first day of June of each
year to give notice of the expiration of the period of redemption
as to all tracts of real estate on which the period of redemption
will expire upon October first following.”

It is clear from a consideration of these provisions that we
cannot hold that Chapter 227, supra, by implication, extended
the period of redemption from those sales where the period of
redemption would ordinarily expire on October first 1939, to
March first, 1940,. because the authority of county auditors to
give notice of the expiration of the period of redemption is
limited to cases where the period would expire on October first.
Hither Chapter 227, supra, in no way repealed or modified the
provisions of Chapter 235, supra, or if it did, then it completely
did away with the rights of counties to mature their tax titles,
by giving notice of the expiration of the period of redemption,
from the effective date of Chapter 227 until June 1940. The
latter construction would, in our opinion, be unreasonable. It
would be inconsistent with the fact that the legislature of
1937 abandoned its policy of extension of time for payment of
taxes and moratoria on tax deed proceedings.

There are also other statutory provisions which indicate that
it was not the intent of the legislature that Chapter 227, supra,
should repeal or suspend any part of Chapter 235, supra.

Section 8 of Chapter 227 provides: “Upon the’ execution
and delivery of an extension agreement as herein provided, all
proceedings for the collection of delinquent taxes, including
any tax deed proceedings which may be pending, shall be sus-
pended.” The only reasonable construction that can be placed
on this language is that the enactment of the statute alone did
not suspend tax deed proceedings but that affirmative action
under the statue would have that effect as to the individuals
who took such action. Certainly if the enactment of this stat-
ute alone suspended tax deed proceedings, there would have
been no need to provide that such proceedings should be sus-

— 219

pended in the cases of those individuals who took advantage of
the act.

Chapter 238, Laws of N.D. 1939 provided: (Sec. 1) “Any real
estate heretofore or hereafter forfeited to the County under tax
deed proceedings, shall be subject to redemption by the owner
whose title was forfeited or by his successor in interest while the
title thereto remains in such county.” (Sec. 2.) “Any person
making redemption under this act shall be entitled to take ad-
vantage of the benefits of any tax reduction or other tax adjust-
ment terms provided for by this legislature;” and (Sec. 4).
“This act is in the natwre of supplemental emergency legislation
designed to encourage and facilitate the redemption or. repur-
chase of real estate forfeited to the counties by tax deed by
former owners and shall be liberally construed to carry out
that purpose.” .

It is apparent that the redemption referred to in Section 1
of Chapter 238 is a repurchase rather than a redemption.
Coverston v. Grand Forks County, 74 ND 552, 23 NW2d 746.
That is to say: the exercise of this right doés not prevent loss
of title, but regains a title which has been lost through fully
completed tax ded proceedings. Willard v. Ward County, 72
ND 291, 6 NW2d 566.

This statute is a further indication that the legislature did
not intend to suspend tax title proceedings, but on the contrary
intended that stich proceedings should take their normal course
and so provided how titles lost after the passage of the act,
as well as those lost before, could be recovered. This act also
shows the legislature had in mind Chapter 227, supra, or sim-
ilar legislation, and provided that a former owner might take
advantage of tax reduction statutes, passed by the same legisla-
ture in repurchasing- his forfeited land.

We think the legislative policy was to encourage tax debtors
to pay their delinquent taxes, both by the inducement of waiving
the penalty, interest and costs if payment was made within a
specified time and by compulsion of tax sale proceedings. Such
a construction is a reasonable one and reconciles all the provi-
sions of the several tax statutes enacted by the 1939 legislative
assembly,

220 a

It is only where a reasonable reconciliation of the provisions
of two statutes is impossible and inconsistency is unavoidable
that the later law will be held to repeal the earlier by implica-
tion. State v. Young, 68 ND 300, 279 NW 251; State v. Hawley,
68 ND 309, 279 NW 255.

We hold, therefore, that the notice of the expiration of the
period of redemption given by the auditor in accordance with
Chapter 235 S.L. 1939 was proper and the tax deed to Williams
County based thereon is valid.

No objections are made to the proceedings by which the
county sold the land to defendant. The deed from Williams
County to the defendant conveys to him a valid title which is
superior to the title claimed by the plaintiffs. That superior
title of the defendant determines the instant case and renders it
unnecessary and impr oper to consider the other questions raised
by the parties.

The judgment of the district is reversed and the ease is
remanded to the District Court with directions to render judg-
ment quieting title in the defendant as against the plaintiffs.

Morris, O.J., and Cmrisrranson, Sarure and Burks, JJ.,
concur,

De 221
[File No. 7307]

HELEN M. BARRETT, Respondent v. BOARD OF TRUS-
“TEES OF THE TEACHERS’ INSURANCE AND RE-
.TIREMENT FUND; Albert Jacobson, State Treasurer,
M. F. Peterson, State Superintendent of Public Instruction,

: ex officio trustees; Elroy H. Schroeder, Charles A. Sevrin-
son, Gena A. Jensen, Trustees; Gena A. Jensen, Executive

* Secretary, Appellants.

(55 NW2d 576)

Opinion filed November 14, 1952. ©

‘E. T. Cheistianson, Attorney General, and Alvin C. Strute,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. :

222, ee

Johnson & Rausch and Cox, Cox, Pearce & Eggebretson, for
respondent. .

’ Wicen, District Judge. The plaintiff, Helen M. Barrett,
brought this action against the Board of Trustees of the Teach-
ers’ Insurance and Retirement Fund of the State of North
Dakota and the Trustees thereof. The action is for an alterna-
tive writ of mandamus requiring the defendants to fix, deter-
mine and pay to the plaintiff an annuity under the provisions of
Chapter 165 SLND 1947, or to show cause why the same should
not be done. :

The matter was submitted to the court upon stipulated facts.

The Teachers’ Insurance and Retirement Fund of the State
of North Dakota was created by Chapter 251 SLND 1913. The
original enactment has been subject to amendments from time
to time. The act is now Chapter 15-39 NDRC 1943 and supple-
ment thereto.

The plaintiff is more than fifty-five years of age and has been
a teacher in the public schools of the State of North Dakota,
as the term teaching is defined in Section 15-3901 NDRC 1943,
since the year 1901.

Several years prior to July 1, 1947, she had completed twenty-

Ee 228

five years of teaching in the public schools of this State and had
paid into the Teachers’ Insurance and Retirement Fund assess-
ments upon a total salary of $30,109.82. She was then eligible
for retirement under the provisions of Section 15-3927 NDRC
1943, without further payment of assessments into the fund, but
she continued to teach.

For more than five years next preceding August 15, 1947,
she was employed as Deputy County Superintendent of Schools,
in and for Stutsman County, North Dakota. From July 1 to
August 15, 1947 she earned, in salary as acting Deputy County
Superintendent of Schools, in and for said County, the sum of
$247.50, upon which amount an assessment was paid into the
Teachers’ Insurance and Retirement Fund.

On August 15, 1947 she retired from such office of Deputy
County Superintendent and notified the Executive Secretary
of the Board of her retirement and requested that her pension
and annuity be determined and paid-to her under the provisions
of Section 15-3928 NDRC 1943 as amended by Chapter 165 SLND
1947.

The parties stipulated that the plaintiff has. complied with all
the laws of the State of North Dakota requisite to her qualifi-
cation for retirement pension and annuity as a teacher in the
public schools of the State of North Dakota.

The defendants refused to grant. the- petition of the plaintiff
for pension or annuity under Chapter 165 SLND 1947 for the
reason that she had not been employed as a teacher for a term
comprising a school year subsequent to July 1, 1947, the effective
date of such Chapter 165. The period of her teaching service
after the effective date of the new statute was from July 1st to
August 15, 1947 or approximately six weeks.

It is contended, by the defendants, that the plaintiff is entitled
to payment of pension and annuity as provided by the law in
force prior to July 1, 1947.

Section 15-3928 NDRC 1943, which was the law in force prior
to July 1, 1947, provides: .

“Hach teacher who shall have retired from service in the pub-
lie schools, or state institutions. under the provisions of section
15-3927 shall be entitled to receive an annuity as follows: .

224 —

“1. If said teacher shall have attained the age of fifty-five
years at the time of applying for the annuity, he, annually and
for life, shall be entitled to receive as an annuity a sum equal to
one-fiftieth of his average annual salary for the years of service
for which assessments were paid, multiplied by-the whole num-
ber of years of service asa teacher. Said annuity, however, shall
not exceed seven hundred and fifty dollars in any one year nor
-be less than three hundred and fifty dollars in any one year and
shall be subject to all the provisions of this chapter; . . . .”

This law was amended by Chapter 165 SLND 1947 and pro-
vides: .

“ach teacher who shall have retired from service in the pub-
lic schools, or state institutions under -the provisions of section
15-3927 shall be entitled to receive an annuity as follows:

“1, If said teacher shall have attained the age of fifty-five
years at the time of applying for the annuity, he, annually and
for life, shall be entitled to receive as an annuity a sum equal to
two percent of the total earnings as salary for the years of
teaching service for which assessments were paid. Said annuity,
however, shall not exceed twelve hundred dollars in any one year
nor be less than six hundred dollars in any one year and shall
-be subject to all the provisions of this chapter; . . . .”

The instant action was commenced in January 1951. By
Chapter 148 SLND 1949 the privileges of a teacher who had re-
tired were materially altered. Section 9 of said Chapter 148 is
now Section 15-3928 NDRC 1949 Supp. Paragraphs b, ¢, and d
of Subsection 2 thereof outline changes made in the former stat-
ute and provide as follows:

“b, A teacher who has completed all requirements for retire-
ment previous to July 1, 1947, and does not teach after July 1,
1947, must retire under the provisions of the Insurance and
Retirement Fund Act in effect prior to July Ist, 1947.

“ec, A teacher who has completed all requirements for retire-
ment previous to July 1; 1947 and continues to teach shall have
the option of electing to qualify under either the law in effect
after July 1, 1947, or the-one in effect previous to that time.

- “d. A teacher in service after July 1, 1947, who had previous
to that date completed all requirements for retirement under the

ee 225

Insurance and Retirement Fund Act may at his own option pay
into the Fund assessments on-salaries earned between the date
of completing payments and July 1, 1947. The rate of payment
shall be six percent on the total salary earned, plus 6 percent
interest on such assessments per. annum.”

The plaintiff had for more than five years next preceding her
retirement on August 15, 1947, been engaged in employment
equivalent to teaching without interruption up to date of her
retirement.

There is no ambiguity in the language employed by the Legis-
lature. The plaintiff had met all requirements of the law that
qualified her for retirement prior to July 1, 1947, but she con-
tinued to teach.

Continue is defined by Webster, “to remain in a given place
or condition.” “Thé words, ‘continue in‘ office’ imply, not: the
beginning of a new and different holding, but the prolongation
of the one already existing. To continue in office means to re-
maininit, . .. .” 9 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
166.

The secretary of the Teachers’ Insurance and Retirement
Fund determined that plaintiff would be required to pay $925.09
into the fund in order that she might receive an increased an-
nuity provided by the 1947 statute. This sum: she has tendered.
The trial court found that the present Executive Secretary of
the Teachers’ Insurance and Retirement Fund has determined
that the sum of $1,529.24 with interest thereon must be paid as
interim assessment. The correctness of this finding has’ not
been questioned and the plaintiff tenders'that amount into court.
The plaintiff contends for the privilege of paying the additional
assessment necessary to receive the increased annuity.’ She
does not seek to benefit from the provisions of the new law with-
out paying the costs in increased assessment.

The additional assessment to be paid must be determined
by the officers of the Teachers’ Insurance Retirement Fund.
The stipulation of facts does not show the amount of salary
earned prior to July 1, 1947 upon which no, assessment was paid.
When the calculated assessment shall have been ‘paid’ by. the

226 De

plaintiff she is entitled to receive an annuity as provided by

Chapter 165 SLND 1947, and it shall’be the duty of the officers

in charge of the Fund to make such payments to the plaintiff.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Morais, C. J., and Buaxs, Curisrianson and Grison, JJ.,
concur.

Sarure, J., disqualified, did not participate, Hon. J. O. Wiczn,
Judge of Sixth Judicial District, sitting in his stead.

ee
" [ile No. 7242]

JOSEPH KOHLER and Mae Kohler, Appellants v. MARTIN
L. COLE, Respondent.

(55 NW2d 589)

Opinion filed November 14, 1952

William L. Paulson, and Philip L. Scherer, for appellants.

A, F. Greffenius, for respondent.

Curistianson, J. This is an appeal from an order which set
aside a warrant of attachment. The plaintiff brought this action
under the declaratory judgment act (NDRC 1943, 32-23) to ob-
tain a declaration of the rights of the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant under a written contract for the sale of land. The com-
plaint alleges the execution of the contract and the terms thereof,
that certain payments have been made by the plaintiffs, that the
defendant before the commencement of the action demanded

228 Le

one-half ofthe 1951 crop contrary to said contract, and that
ander date of Augnst 31, 1951, defendant attempted to repudiate
the'contract and “seeks to treat the relationship of the plaintiffs
with him relative to the purchase of the land as merely a land and
tenant relationship, and refused to recognize the contract for
deed, and ‘sale of said farm, and served notice on the plaintiffs
of the termination of the ‘rental contract, with a suggestion
that they execute a new rental contract for the year 1952, all
contrary to the provisions of said contract;” and that the de-
fendant offered to return the down payment of $2,000.00 to the
plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs have duly performed all the
terms of the contract on their part and that they are willing to
carry out all the terms of the contract. Plaintiffs pray judg-
ment “that a declaratory judgment be entered, decreeing and
adjudicating that the contract for deed, as herein set forth to
the hereinbefore described premises be declared valid and bind-
ing upon the parties hereto. And for such other and further re-
lief as to the court may seem just and equitable.” And for their
costs and disbursements.

The laws of this state provide:

“In an action on a contract or judgment for the recovery of
money only, for the wrongful conversion of personal property,
or for damages, whether arising out of contract or otherwise, the
plaintiff, at or after the commencement thereof, may have the
property of the defendant attached . . . .” NDRC 1943, 32-
0801.

“At the time of applying for the warrant of attachment, the
plaintiff shall file in the office of the clerk of the court in which
the action is commenced:

“1. A verified complaint setting forth a proper cause of ac-
tion for attachment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant.

2. An affidavit setting forth in substantially the language of
the statute one or more of the grounds of attachment . . .

8. An undertaking in accordance with section 32+ 0806. 7”
NDRC 1943, 32-0805.

“The clerk must require a written undertaking ¢ on the part-of
the plaintiff with sufficient surety to the effect that if the defend-

— 229

ant recovers judgment, or the attachment is set aside by the or-
der of the court, the plaintiff will pay all costs that may be award-
ed to the defendant, and all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the attachment, not exceeding the sum named in the
undertaking, which must be at least the amount of the claim
specified in the warrant and in no case less than two hundred
fifty dollars.” NDRC 1943, 32-0806. (Italics supplied)

“The warrant must recite briefly the statutory grounds of the
attachment, but shall not set forth plaintiff’s cause of action and
must be directed to the sheriff of any county in which property
of such defendant may be, and must require him to attach and
safely keep all the property of such defendant within his county
not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be suf-
ficient to satisfy the plaintiffs demand, with costs and disburse-
ments, the amount of such demand to be stated in the warrant in
conformity with the complaint, unless the defendant delivers to
him an undertaking in favor of the plaintiff with sufficient surety
to the effect that he will pay any judgment which the plaintiff
may obtain against him in the action,” ete. NDRC 1943, 32-0807.
(Italics supplied)

The complaint of the plaintiffs was verified by one of their at-
torneys. At the time of applying for the warrant of attach-
ment, the plaintiff filed in the office of the clerk such verified com-
-plaint, also, an affidavit for attachment and a written undertak-
ing.

The affidavit for attachment was signed and sworn to by one
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs and states that the defendant
is not a resident of the State of North Dakota but is a resident
of the State of New Mexico; “that the plaintiffs are in danger of
losing their claim by reason of the facts aforesaid unless a war-
rant of attachment may be allowed and issued against the prop-
erty of the defendant according to the statute in such case made
and provided.” The undertaking for attachment recites that
the plaintiffs and the surety on such attachment do “jointly and
severally undertake, promise, and agree to and with the said
defendant to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment,
the plaintiffs will pay all costs that may be awarded to the said
defendant, and all damages which he may sustain by reason of

230 —

the said attachment, not exceeding the sum of Two Hundred
Fifty and no/100 ($250.00) Dollars.” The warrant of attach-
ment (exclusive of the title and venue) reads as follows:

“THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA TO THE SHERIFF -
OF BARNES COUNTY, GREETINGS:

“A verified Complaint in the above entitled action having been
filed in the office of the Clerk of said Court, setting forth a proper
cause for attachment in which the plaintiff demands judgment
against the Defendant for a Declaratory Judgment upon a con-
tract for the conveyance of real estate, together with costs of
the action, and, an affidavit having been filed, stating that the
claim upon which this action is commenced is founded upon a
contract for a declaratory judgment for the conveyance of real
estate, and that the Defendant, Martin L. Cole, is not a resident
of this State, and that he is a resident of the City of Portales,
Roosevelt County, New Mexico;

“And a sufficient bond having been filed in this Court and ap-
proved by the Clerk as required by law;

“Now, you are hereby commanded and required to attach and
safely keep all the property of said defendant within your
county, not exempt from execution; or so much thereof as may
be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand above stated, to-
gether with costs and disbursements, unless the defendant give
you security by the undertaking of at least two sufficient sureties,
in an amount sufficient to satisfy said plaintifi’s demand, besides
costs, in which case you will take said undertaking, and when
warrant shall be fully executed or discharged, you are required
to return the same with your proceedings to this Court.

“WITNESS, THE HONORABLE John C. Pollock,

Judge of the District Court, First Judicial District;
Barnes County, State of North Dakota, and my
hand and seal of said court, this 14 day of Novem-
ber, A.D., 1951.
Elsie Lossau
Clerk of said Court”

Lt 231

The warrant of attachment was delivered to the Sheriff of
Barnes County who executed the same by filing a notice of levy
which (exclusive of the title and venue) reads as follows:

“An action has been commenced by the above named plaintiffs
against the above named defendant and a warrant.of attach-
ment issued therein, in which the plaintiffs’ claim is for a declar-
atory judgment to effect a conveyance of real property from
the defendant to the plaintiffs, together with costs of the action,
and by virtue thereof, and of the statute in such case made and
provided, I file this notice as a levy upon the following described
real property situated in the County of Barnes, in said State,
to-wit:

“The South one-half (S$) of Section Ten (10) and the South-
west Quarter (SW) of Section Eleven (11), both in Township
One Hundred Thirty-nine (139), Range Fifty-six (56), Barnes
County, North Dakota.

Dated at Valley City, North Dakota, this 14th day of Novem-
ber, 1951. .

. Hans Solheim
Sheriff of Barnes County, N. Dak.”

Defendant’s counsel moved that the warrant of attachment
be set aside on the grounds, among others, that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on
a contract or a judgment for the recovery of money only; that
the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action for wrongful conversion of personal property, or for
damages; that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for which, and in which, a warrant
of attachment may issue as provided by statute. The trial
court granted the motion and made an order that the attach-
ment be dissolved and set aside. Plaintiffs have appealed
from such order. .

The order must be affirmed. An attachment is a proceeding
to take a defendant’s property into legal custody to satisfy
plaintiff's demand. The object of the proceeding is to hold prop-
erty so taken for the payment of a judgment in the event plain-
tiff’s demand is established and judgment rendered therefor in

232 —

his favor. 7 CJS p. 185. It is clear that under the above quoted
provisions of the laws of North Dakota attachnient is essen-
tially a legal proceeding and is confined to actions for the
recovery of money only. 7 CJS pp. 188, 196; Security Natl.
Bank of Fargo v. Bothne, 56 ND 269, 217 NW 148; Grand
Lodge of A.O.U.W. v. Wahlin, 61 ND 383, 237 NW 878, 76 ALR
1442. See, also, Smyth v. Mayer et al., 105 Mise 391, 174 NYS
197.

Security Natl. Bank of Fargo v. Bothne, supra, was an action
brought to set aside certain transfers of real property alleged
to have been fraudulently made. A warrant of attachment was
issued and levy made upon the real property of the defendant.
The defendant moved that the attachment be dissolved and set
aside on the ground that the plaintiffs’ alleged cause of action
“gave rise to no right of attachment under the statute.” This
court held that the ground thus assigned was well taken and that
the attachment should be dissolved and set aside. In the de-
cision in the case this court said:

“The statute, Sec. 7537, Comp. Laws 1913 (now NDRC 1948,
32-0801), provides that a warrant of attachment may issué- un-
der certain circumstances ‘in an.action on a contract or judg-
ment for the recovery of money only, for the wrongful conver-
sion of personal property, or for damages, whether arising out’
of contract or otherwise.’

“This action is one for equitable relief. Its purpose is to
avoid and set aside a-fraudulent transfer to the end that the
real property transferred shall be applied by the court in pay-
ment of the plaintiff’s judgment. While the ultimate object of
the suit is the satisfaction of the judgment, the suit is not for
the recovery of money only, for a wrongful conversion of per-
sonal property, or for damages, and so does not fall within the
purview of Sec. 7537, supra. The warrant’ of attachment was
therefore improvidently issued.” 56 ND at p. 271, 217 NW
at p. 149. ‘

Grand Lodge of A.O.U.W. v. Wahlin, supra, was an action to
foreclose a mortgage on real property. A warrant of attach-
ment was issued and levied upon certain real property. This

Dn : 233

court held that under the laws of this state an attachment pro-
ceeding did not lie. The holding in the case is epitomized in the
syllabus thus: - ,

“An action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is
not one for the recovery of money only so as to support an at-
tachment under Sec. 7537, Comp. Laws 1913 (now NDRC 1948,
32-0801); providing: ‘In an action on a contract or judgment
for the recovery of money only . . . the plaintiff at or after
the commencement thereof may have the property of the de-
fendant attached in the following cases . . . .”

In the decision in the case the court said:

“Section 7537, Comp. Laws 1913 (now NDRC 1943, 32-0801),
authorizes the issuance of a warrant of attachment in an action
on a contract or judgment for the recovery of money only, for
the conversion of personal property, or for damages, whether
arising out of contract or otherwise. It therefore follows that,
unless a foreclosure action is an action for the recovery of money
only, an attachment does not lie. . . . ‘An action for the re-
covery of money only is one where it is sought to reduce a debt
to judgment, upon which an execution may issue, and be levied
upon the property of a defendant not exempt.’” 61 ND at pp.
385-387, 237 NW at p. 879.

The warrant of attachment in question here was issued in an
action for a declaration of the rights of the parties under a
written contract. The only judgment that could be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff was a declaratory judgment, that is, a
judgment declaring the rights of the parties under such. con-
tract. Borchard Declaratory Judgments, 2nd ed, p. 25 et seq.
This is not an action for the ‘recovery of money and the com-
plaint does not set forth a proper cause of action for attach-
ment. NDROC 1943, 32-0805 (1).

The order appealed from i is affirmed.

* Monts, C. J., Sart, Grimson and Burxs, JJ., concur.

De |
[File No. 7316]

MARGARET MONGEON, Respondent v. MARY BURKE-
BILE, Domnick Leonard, John Leonard, Leo Leonard,
Katherine LeMieux,. James Leonard, Alice Leonard, Agnes,
Liere, Herman Huesgen, Helen LaFave, Mayme Stevens,
Edward McKenna, Eliza DeGrouchy, Hugh McKenna, Sis-
ter Ellen Claire, and John McKenna, Appellants.

(55 NW2d 445)

Opinion filed Oct. 30, 1952. Rehearing denied Nov. 15, 1952
C. A. Waldron, Bruce M. Van Sickle, Mack V. Traynor, and

Lawrence H. Watson, for appellants.
Clyde Duffy and Joseph P. Stevens, for respondent,

Morris, Ch. J: This is an appeal from an order of the Dis-
trict Court of Rolette County, dated October 1, 1951, reversing
-an order of the County Court of Rolette County, whereby the
county court had dismissed 'a petition of Margaret Mongeon for
the proof and probate of a purported olographic will of. her
-brother, Michael Leonard; deceased, who left no children, par-
-ents, er-spouse. All litigants are brothers, sisters, nephews, or
nieces of the deceased.

” Michael Leonard died on November 5, 1949, On November 10,
1949, Mary J. Burkebile filed in the County’ Court of Rolette
County a petition for letters of administration asking ‘that
Margaret E. Mongeon be appointed administratrix of the estate.
‘These women were both sisters of the deceased. The county
‘court fixed December 14, 1949, as the date of hearing the petition

1,236 es

cand’ issued a‘citation accordingly. » On’ November '22, 1949,
“Margaret KE. ‘Mongeon filed’ a petition for ‘proof, and probate of
a docunient purporting to be the olographie will of Michael
Leonard. Hearing on this petition was.also set for December
14. On'the date of hearing, written objections | to’the probate of
the purported will were filed by the respondents. A cross peti-
tion was filed in administrative proceedings for the appointment
of John Leonard and Domnick Leonard as administrators of the
estate. . Thus, on December 14,-the court had before it for hear-
ing the petition of Mary J. Burkebile for the appointment of
Margaret E. Mongeon as administratrix and the cross petition,
as well as the petition of Mrs. Mongeon for the probate of the
olographie will and the written objections to that probate that
were filed through their attorneys by John Leonard, Domnick W.

Leonard, Katherine LeMieux, James Leonard, Alice Leonard,
and Leo Leonard. No action was taken on December 14 regard-
ing matters before the court, other than to enter orders adjourn-
ing the hearings to December 17, 1949, when further orders were
made adjourning the hearings on the petition to probate the
will and on the petition for letters of administration until Janu-
ary-17, 1950.

On January 17, 1950, the county court entered an order which,
after reciting certain preliminary matters dealing with the filing
of the petition and prior adjournments of the hearing on the
petition for proof and probate of the olographic will, stated:

. . and now on this 17th day of January, ALD. 1950, at
i 200 AM. appeared i in Court the petitioner by Mes: Stormon
& Stormon, her attorneys, and Lawrence B. Watson, Esq., and
Bruce Van Sickle, Bsq., attorneys representing certdin respond-
ents, as appears from the records heréin, and also appeared in
‘Court personally, Dominick W. Leonard; John Leonard, Kath-
erine Lemieux, Alice Leonard, and Leo Leonard, and all parties
having now appeared ‘of record in said matter, and being now
represented in Court, the following pr oceedings were had, to-
wit:

“The petitioner by her attorneys, Messrs. Stormon & Stormon,
moved that the Petition for Proof and Probate of Will heretofore
filed herein, presenting: for probate a document purporting to

De 237°

be the Olographic Last Will of Michael Leonard, deceased, be
dismissed in all things with prejudice.

“There being no opposition to the said motion, and the Court
being fully advised,

‘IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That the
Petition for Proof and Probate of Will filed herein by Margaret
BE. Mongeon, presenting for probate a document purporting to
be the Last Will of Michael Leonard, deceased, be and the same

hereby is.in all things dismissed with prejudice.”

“On the same day the court entered another order appointing
John Leonard and Domnick Leonard administrators, and letters
of administration Were issued to them on February 10, 1950.
No appeal was-taken from either of the orders entered on Janu-
ary 17.

‘On-May 23,+1950, Margaret Mongeon filed a second petition
for proof and‘ probate of will in which she set out the same
olographic will described in her previous petition and again
sought admission of: the will-to probate, The county court set
the date for hearing’ ofthis petition on June 15, 1950, and cita-
tions were duly issued: On-June 2 counsel for all the parties
entered into this stipulation:

‘WHEREAS; there are certain: questions of law that .the
respondents intend to raise, by motion or otherwise, and it is
advisable and desirable that said questions be raised and deter-
mined prior to a hearing, if any, on said Petition & for proof and
probate of will.

«NOW, THEREFORE, IT 1s HEREBY STIPULATED,
that a hearing on questions of law may come on for‘hearing be-
fore this Court on the 10th day of June, A.D. 1950, at“eleven
o’clock A.M., at the office of W. A. Lawston, County Judge, in
Rolla, North Dakota.

“[T IS FURTHER STIPULATED, that in the event fliat all
of said questions of law are determined in favor of said peti:
tioner and that a hearing will have to be had on the said peti--
tion, then that the respondents shall have a period of five days
from the date ofthe Order of the Court overruling such objec-
tions, and which Order shall be served upon the attorneys for.

238 Le

the respondents on the same date, within which to file objec-
tions to said Petition, and serve the same.”

It was the apparent purpose of this stipulation that questions
of law might be determined prior to a trial de novo on the facts.
What questions of law were to be determined the stipulation
does not disclose.

On the date of hearing the second petition the court entered
the following order:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the hearing set by this
Court in the above entitled matter for June 15, 1950 at 2:00
P.M. be and the same is hereby adjourned until such time as
said hearing may be set by further order of this Court, or un-
til such time as may be agreed upon by stipulation of the
attorneys representing petitioner and respondents.”

On June 10, 1950, a motion was made by seven of the respond-
ents in county court to dismiss the petition upon the grounds it
is insufficient and cannot be considered as a petition for re-
hearing and that the order that had been entered on January
17 dismissing the first petition for the proof and probate of the
olographic will with prejudice was res adjudicata and the
county court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second petition
for proof and probate of the document that had been involved
in the first proceeding. On June 10, 1950, the attorneys for
Margaret Mongeon filed in the county court a motion to amend.
the order of the court dated January 17, 1950, dismissing the
original petition by deleting therefrom the words “with preju-
dice” and to grant the petitioner a rehearing upon her petition
for the probate of the will. This.motion was made upon the
following grounds:

I.
“That the words ‘with prejudice’ were inserted in said order
through inadvertence and, mistake.
“That said order was not a determination on the merits nor
was it.the result of a family settlement or compromise. .

EE 239
TIr.

“That a dismissal with prejudice was not authorized by the
petitioner and was improper and in excess of the jurisdiction
of this Court.

Iv.

“That the petitioner has discovered evidence since the dis-
missal of the original petition which will establish such: will
to be in the handwriting of the decedent and to be his own act
‘and that such evidence could not have been discovered with rea-
sonable diligence at the time set for the original hearing herein.”

This motion was based upon the files and records in the case
and attached affidavits of the petitioner, Mr. Clyde Duffy, her at-
‘torney, and Mr. Krupp, a handwriting expert.

After the county court adjourned the hearing of June 15,
1950, no further notice appears to have been given to. any at-
torneys or to the parties and no agreement or stipulation was
made with respect to a further hearing. No order appears to
have been made or time set for hearing-the petitioner’s motion
to amend the order of January 17, 1950, dismissing her original
petition for the probate of the olographic will and no hearing
appéars to have been had on this motion. Nevertheless, the
order from which appeal is taken purports to confirm the order
of January 17, 1950.

On August 8, 1950, the county court, after reciting that the
petition of Margaret Mongeon for probate of the will came on
for hearing on June 15, but making no reference to the indefinite
adjournment, entered an order stating:

“1. That said petition purports to present for probate the
same Olographie Last Will and Testament that the same peti-
tioner, to-wit, Margaret Mongeon, had previously presented
to the Court for probate on November 22, 1949; that an order
‘of this Court was entered on January 11, 1950 dismissing such
petition with prejudice,

“2. That the said order of this Court dismissing such petition
is res adjudicata insofar as the above-mentioned will is con-
cerned.

“3. That no sufficient reason has been shown this Court why

240 ee

its Order Dismissing Petition for Probate of said Will should
now be revoked.

“Now therefore it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the petition of Margaret Mongeon be, and the same
is hereby in all things dismissed, and that the order of this
Court made and entered on the 11th day of January, 1950 dis-
missing with prejudice the Petition for Probate-of Olographic
Will be, and the same hereby is confirmed.”

Margaret Mongeon appealed from this order to the district
court. The district court reversed the order and directed the
county court to revoke it and to hear the petition for probate
.of the will upon its merits. The above mentioned order of the
district court was not entered after a trial de novo therein—see
Section 30-2623 NDRG 1943—but was. entered upon the hearing
of a motion to dismiss the appeal.

‘The respondents in the proceedings below raised three ques-
tions upon which they urged that the appeal from the county
court to the district court be dismissed. Two of these questions
are purely procedural. They state that the notice of appeal
was not in proper form and, even if it were in proper form,
it was not served in time. The question of the sufficiency of
the notice of appeal is ‘closely related to the stipulation above
quoted. The objection to the form of notice of appeal is thus
stated:

: “That by Stipulation the only matters presented to the County
Court and the only matter or matters decided by such Court were
-matters or questions of law, so that the attempted appeal upon
both questions of law and fact is totally improper and ineffec-
tive, and the only appeal that could have been taken would have
been an appeal on questions of law alone and then Specifications
of Error would have had to have been filed and served, and this
was not done, as provided in Section 30-2608.”

Two types of appeals may be taken under Section 30- 2608
NDRC 1943. They are appeals on questions of law alone and
appeals upon facts and matters of law generally. The’ notice
of appeal in this case does not conform to the statutory require-
ments for appeals on questions of law alone but is ‘sufficient to
perfect a general appeal, Under appeals’ on questions of law

Le 24

alone,as provided by this statute, it is the appellant’s privilege,
where there has been a trial involving both fact and law, to
restrict the appeal to questions of law and in order to do so he
must comply with the statutory requirements as to, the contents
-of notice of appeal and must include in his notice a statement
to the effect that the appeal is on questions of Jaw-alone. He
must also include specifications of errors at law on which he relies
.and a statement of the time and place at which the appeal will
be brought on for trial. See Re Campbell, 56 ND 60,.215 NW
913. The other form of notice, which is the one used in this
case, does not restrict the appeal to questions of law ‘alone but
brings up all of the issues that were tried in the county court.
It may be that only issues of law were stipulated to be presented
to the county court, but that fact would not require the appellant
to use the form of notice prescribed for appeals on questions
of law alone. It is only where the appellant desires to exclude
from the appeal questions other than those specified that he
must use the restrictive form of notice. The notice of appeal
in this case brought to the district court all issues that were heard
in the county court involving fact, law, or both.

The next contention of the respondents in the court below
is that no appeal was effected in this case because the order
of the-county court dismissing the petition for proof and probate
of the olographic will was dated August 8, 1950, and the notice
of appeal from that order was not served within thirty days of
the date of the.order as prescribed by. Section 30-2603 NDRC
1943. This position is untenable because of. the following stipu-
lation entered into by all of the parties to this pr: oceeding through
their attorneys:

“WHEREAS, On May 23, 1950, Margaret Mongeon, filed i in
this Court a petition for the probate of a document. purporting
to be the last will of said decedent, and said petition came on for
hearing before the Court on June 15, 1950; and

“WHEREAS, The respondents by - their several attorneys
moved to dismiss such petition; and

“WHEREAS, The Court heard arguments on such motions to
dismiss and thereupon adjourned the hearing indefinitely to per-

‘242 Ee

C

mit the petitioner to file supplemental affidavits and give the
Court ample time to consider the questions involved; and
“WHEREAS, The Court did on August 8, 1950, and without
further notice to the parties, enter an order dismissing such
petition, but'notice of such order was not given to the petitioner
until on or about September 11, 1950; and
_ “WHEREAS, There is a question regarding the validity of
such order under the provisions of Section 30-0303, and a
question of the right of the petitioner to appeal therefrom
under Section 30-2603,
“NOW, THEREFORE, To avoid such questions it is hereby
stipulated |

a L

“That the hearing on the petition for probate of will and the
motions of the respondents for the dismissal of such petition
shall be deemed to have been adjourned with notice to all parties

,to September 8, 1950.

IL.

“That the order purporting to have been made on August 8,
1950, be deemed to have been entered on September 8, 1950.

III.
“That the time for appeal from such order shall begin to
run from September 8, 1950.”

We have already noted that on June 15, 1950, the court en-
tered an order adjourning the hearing on the petition for proof

‘and probate of the olographic will until the further order of the
‘court ‘or until such time as might be agreed upon by stipulation
‘of- the attorneys representing the parties. Under Section 30-

0303 NDRC 1943 an indefinite postponement operates as a post-
ponement of the hearing until further notice. No further notice
was given and no stipulation was entered into fixing a time for
the further hearing. Nevertheless, the county court entered
its order which was actually dated August 8. As we read the

a 243

stipulation, the parties all agreed that to avoid questions re-
garding the validity of the order it would be considered to have
been issued pursuant to notice as of September 8, 1950, Thus,
the questionable order was validated, by agreement, as of
September 8 and the notice of appeal was served within the
statutory time thereafter.

Stipulations which eliminate questions of fact should be en-
couraged rather than discouraged by the courts.. Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Barlow, 20 ND 197, 126 NW 233; Gelin
vy. Hollister, 222 Minn 339, 24 NW2d 496, 168 ALR 195. The
stipulation before us involves questions of fact and law. Its
purpose and result, if recognized and enforced, is to settle a
vexatious procedural controversy with respect to the order of
the county court made in a manner not conformable to statute
and to further the right of review of the action of the county
court. Both the purpose and result are in furtherance of the
ends of justice and meet with judicial favor.

‘We now come to the question of whether the county court

_ erred in making its order in this proceeding holding that its
former order of January 17, 1950, dismissing the petition of
Margaret Mongeon, proponent of the olographiec will, was res
adjudicata and confirming that former order. The order of
January 17 was entered at an adjourned hearing of the peti-
tion. All parties were present or were represented by counsel.
The proponent of the will was not present in person but was
represented by her counsel who moved for a dismissal of. the
petition with prejudice. “There being no opposition to the said
motion, and the Court being fully advised,” the petition was
“in all things dismissed with prejudice.” The ultimate contro-,
versy between the parties is whether the effect-of this order
was merely to dismiss the proceeding that was then before the
court or whether the order permanently and finally concluded
and terminated the right to have the will considered further as.
the last will and testament of the deceased as a final adjudica-.
tion against the right to probate. The dismissal of an action
or proceeding “with prejudice” commonly implies not only the,
termination of the particular action or proceeding then before:
the court but.also the right of action upon which it is based. -

244 a

Pueblo de Taos v. Archuleta, 64 Fed2d 807; Mars v. McDougal,
40 Fed2d 247; Conner v. Cornell, 32 Fed2d 581; Harris v. Moye’s
Estate, 211 Ark 765, 202 SW2d 360; De Graff v. Smith, 62 Ariz
261, 157 Pac2d 342; Lake v. Wilson, 183 Ark 180,35 SW2d 597,
88 SW2d 25; Shorten v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 182
Ark 646, 32 SW2d 304; In re Estate of Crane, 343 Ill App 327,
99 NE2d 204; Pulley v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 122 Kans
269,251 Pac 1100; Hargis v. Robinson, 70 Kans 589, 79 Pac
119; Noakes v. Noakes; 290 Mich 231, 287 NW 445; Mayflower
Industries v. Thor Corp. 17 N. J. ‘Super 505, 86 Atl2d 293;
Maib v. Maryland Casualty Co., 17 Wash2d 47, 135 Pac2d 71;
17 Am Jur, Dismissal and Discontimiance, Section 78; ‘Annota-
tion in 149 ALR 625. From these authorities we conclude that
where an order‘is entered at the request of the plaintiff, under-
standingly made, dismissing his action “with prejudice,” the
dismissal goes to the causé of action and becomes res adjudicata
with respect to the issues brought before the court by the action.
The words “with prejudice” appearing in a motion or order for
dismissal are not always conclusive against the plaintiff. Their
effect is determined by the conditions under which they are used.
Pueblo de Taos v. Archuleta, 64 Fed2d 807; Chirelstein v.
Ohirelstein, 12 NJ Super 468, 79 Atl2d 884; Goddard v. Se-
curity Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (Cal) 83 P2d 24, 14 Cal2d 47, 92
Pac2d 804.

Where there has been a voluntary dismissal “with prejudice”
something more must be shown to enable the plaintiff to.main-_
tain a second action ‘than that no actual trial on the merits
was had and that there was no compromise. Certainly, if it
appears that-the plaintiff, on the eve of the trial, acted on an
intention to abandon not only his action but his cause of action
and press no further the claim upon which he had haled the
defendant into court, the plaintiff is not entitled to change his
mind with respect to the dismissal and bri ‘ing a new action. , In
this case theie appears to be no question but that the attorney
for the petitioner by dismissing the petition with prejudice in-
tended not only to terminate the proceeding in which the peti-
tion was filed, but to terminate his client’s right to further
propose the will for probate. But the attorney’s intention,’

| 245

and his action in. accordance therewith, must, in order to bind
the client, be within. the scope of the attorney’s authority.

Under hig general authority an attorney has control of the
remedy and may discontinue the action by a dismissal without
prejudice, thus binding his client. But general authority. gives
him no right to discharge or terminate the gause of, action and
he, may not without: special authority or acquiescence,.on the
part of his client terminate the.right of .action by a dist sal
on the merits. Bacon v. Mitchell, 14 ND 454, 106 NW 129, 4
LRA NS 244; Hallack v. Loft, 19 Colo 74, 34 Pae 568; ‘Amnota-
tion in 182 Am St Rep 162; 5 Am Jur, Attorneys at Law, Sec-
tions 96 and 97; 7 CJS, Attorney and Client, Section 87. .

The proponent of the will challenges the authority of her
attorney to dismiss her first. petition with prejudice. In ‘the
affidavit attached to her motion of June 10, 1950, to amend the
order dismissing her original petition, she states that the strain
of the pending litigation caused her to suffer a complete break-
-down and that on January 17, 1950, the day set for the hearing
of the will, she was taken, to a hospital where she remained for
about two weeks. She then says:

“That while she was, under this strain “but before being
compelled to go to the hospital, and while laboring ynder. the
‘belief that it was impossible to procure evidence blishing
the validity of the said will, she signed the letter, addressed to
Stormon and Stormon, her attorneys, reading as follows: ;

“You are hereby authorized and directed to dismiss. my
Petition for Proof and Probate of Will, filed in the County Court
of Rolette County, State of North Dakota, on November 22nd,
1949, presenting for probate the olographic will of Michael
Leonard, late of the City of Rolette, in Rolette County, State
of North Dakota, Deceased, at the hearing set for. Tuesday,
January 17th, 1950.

“You are further authorized and directed i in my behalf not
to oppose the petition for letters of administration pending in
said County Court, and if in your opinion it is advisable, to
consent to the appointment of Dominick W. Leonard and John
Leonard, as administrators of the estate of said Michael Leonard,
deceased.’

“That affiant is now advised that Mr. Stormon moved for dis-
missal with prejudice but that she did not direct him to dismiss
the. proceedings with prejudice and that such dismissal was the
result of inadvertence and mistake and was not the result of a
family settlement or family compromise, and that the petitioner
received no consideration whatsoever for dismissing such peti-
tion and that no evidence whatsoever was taken upon the said
will or its validity, and that there never has been an adjudica-
tion or determination of the merits.”

It ig impossible to determine to what extent, if at all, the
county court in making the order from which the appeal was
taken took into consideration the proponent’s motion of June
"10, 1950, and the affidavits attached in support thereof. There
is no order in the record either granting or denying that motion.
‘We are also confronted with the fact that on June 2, 1950, the
parties had entered into the stipulation to submit questions of
law to the court, yet itis obvious from the record that the court
in making the order from which the appeal was taken took more
than questions of law into consideration in confirming its order
dismissing the first petition. The leapfrog procedure that was
“followed has produced a record from which we are unable to as-
certain what questions of law or fact were considered and what,
‘if any, were passed over by the court in making the order that
is under attack. The question that the parties seem to be ulti-
mately trying to reach, which is the effect of the motion and order
dismissing the first petition with prejudice, is not merely a ques-
tion of law. Its solution is dependent upon the extent of the
authority of the attorney that made the motion to dismiss with
prejudice. See Mechem on Agency, Second Edition, Sections
2159-2163 ; Jubilee Placer Co. v. Hossfeld, 20 Mont 234, 50 Pac
716. That authority is challenged by the proponent of the
will, who, in her affidavit, quotes from a letter to her attorney
which she signed. The letter was not produced. It is an im-
portant piece of evidence which may aid the court in determin-
ing whether the attorney did or did not have authority to
move for a dismissal of ‘the petition with prejudice. There
may be other evidence bearing upon this important question
that could be made available to the court.

— 247

. Section 30-0404 NDRC 1943 provides that:

“An order based upon facts within the knowledge of the
judge of the county court, or upon facts proven by the testi-
mony of a witness, must contain a statement or recital of the
existence or proof of the facts which authorize the order. When
an order is made upon matter of record, a reference to an affi-
davit, pleading, or other record upon which, such facts appear
is sufficient.” ve

The order appealed from recites two ultimate conclusions of
the county court—that the former order of January 17, 1950, dis-
missing the proponent’s petition is res adjudicata and that no
sufficient reason was shown. tothe county court why its former
order dismissing the petition for probate of the olographie will
should be revoked. On the basis of these conclusions the court
ordered that the second petition be dismissed and that the former
order of January 17, 1950, be confirmed. The order appealed
from makes no reference either to the facts or to the record
upon which the order. was made, other than to recite that a
previous order of the court dismissing the petition had been
entered. The order appealed from does not comply with Section
30-0404, supra. The importance of complying with the statute
is emphasized by the present situation in which we find that,
on this appeal, it is impossible to adequately and comprehensively
review the case because of the inadequacy of the record and
the impossibility of ascertaining with reasonable certainty what
determinations of fact and law prompted the county court to
enter the challenged order.

The district court reversed the order of the county eourt and
directed the county court to hear the petition for probate of
the will upon its merits. The district court determined that the
order of the county court of January'17, 1950, dismissing pro-
ponent’s petition was not res adjudicata, thereby reaching j a con-
clusion opposite to that reached by the county court. It appears
to us that the record is not adequate to permit a determination
of that question. Justice requires that, while the order of the
county court appealed from must be reversed because of inherent
defects in the order and the inadequate record which accom-
panies it on appeal, the case must go back to the county court

248 ee

for a re-examination by that court of the question of whether
its order of January 17, 1950, dismissing proponent’s petition
for the probate of the will, was made upon an authorized motion
of counsel to dismiss with prejudice and therefore became res
adjudicata and for the entry of an appropriate order conform-
able to Section 30-0404 NDRC 1943. The case is remanded to
the district court with directions to so modify its order dated
October 1, 1951, to the County Court of Rolette County.

Burxe, Sarure, Curisrianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

—
ph [File No. 7325]

RUTH BRURSCH LIPPMANN, formerly Ruth Bruesch, Re-
. spondent, v. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
» SATION BUREAU, 7, Appellant.

wot : * (65 NWoa 453)

Opinion filed October 30, 1952. Rehearing denied, Nov. 21, 1952

250 ee

E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, and Paul M. Sand, As-
sistant Attorney General, for appellant,
McGee & McGee, for respondent.

Cunristianson, J. This is an appeal from a judgment in a pro-
eeeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. The proceed-
ing was instituted by the claimant to recover compensation
pursuant to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law
of this state. NDRC 1943, Title 65.

The claimant had been employed as a waitress by the Rex
Cafe at Minot. On January 15, 1950, while so employed and
while in the active discharge of her duties as such employee she
was shot and severely wounded by one Aga, who at the time was
sitting at a counter where customers were being ‘served food
which they had ordered. Aga had been drinking a cup of coffee,
which had been served him by one of the other waitresses. Im-
mediately after firing the shots at the claimant Aga shot and
killed himself.

The claimant in the ordinary course of her duties would take
orders from patrons at the counter and booths as well as carry
dishes to and from the kitchen. The Rex Cafe was located close
to the bus depot and within one-half block of the depot of the
Great Northern Railway Company. The claimant testified as
follows concerning the shooting:

“Q. Can you tell us what you were doing at the time when you
were shot? .

A. I had just piled up some dishes, cups and saucers had
finished stacking them and was going back to the kitchen.

Q. At the time you were shot where were you going?

A. Going back to the kitchen to get more dishes.

Q. To get more dishes to bring out and stack?

A. Yes.

Q. And where were you with reference to Mr. Aga at the time
you were shot?

A. Right behind the counter, in front of him.”

The Rex Cafe, the employer of the claimant, had duly com-
plied with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law

DD

of North Dakota. NDRC 1943, 65-0105. The claim was dis-
missed by the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau “for the reason
that the injury did not happen in the course of the employment
or because of her employment.” Plaintiff thereupon duly ap-
pealed to the District Court from the determination of the Bu-
reau. In the specifications of error in the notice of appeal
exception was made to the finding of fact that the injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff on January 15, 1950, did not happen in
the course of employment or because of her employment and it
was also specified that the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau
erred in its conclusion of law that the injuries did not happen
in the course of employment or because of her employment.

The procedure and the scope of review on such appeal from a
determination of the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau is pre-
scribed by NDRC 1943, 28-3219, which, so far as material here,
reads as follows:

“The court shall try and hear an appeal from the determina-
tion of an administrative agency without a jury and the evidence
considered by the court shall be confined to the record filed with
the court. . . . After such hearing, the court shall affirm the
decision of the agency unless it shall find that such decision or
determination is not in accordance with law, or that it is in vio-
lation of the constitutional rights of the appellant, or that any
of the provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in
the proceedings before the agency, or that the rules or procedure
of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing, or
that the findings of fact, made by the agency are not supported by
the evidence, or that the conclusions and decision of the agency
are not supported by its findings of fact. If the decision of the
agency is not affirmed by the court, it shall be modified or re-
versed, and the case shall be remanded to the agency for dis-
position in accordance with the decision of the court.” NDRC
1943, 28-3219; Feist v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compensation Bu-
reau, 77 ND 267, 269, 42 NW2d 665, 666. :

The trial court after hearing and due consideration rendered
its decision reversing the determination of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Bureau. The court found as facts: :

252 ; Le

“That on or about the 15th day of January, 1950, Ruth. Bruesch
was working as a waitress in the Rex Cafe in Minot, North Da-
kota. That while in her employment and while on’duty she was
shot four times through the limbs and body by one Wayne Agi,
following which Wayne Aga committed suicide.

“That at the time of said shooting Ruth Bruesch Lippmann
was an employee and actually engaged in her employment.

“That at the time of the shooting the said Ruth: Bruesch
was working back of the counter in the Rex Cafe and was en-
gaged in carrying crockery from the kitchen to the front: of the
cafe. That as she passed in front of one Wayne Aga, who was
a patron sitting at the counter on a stool drinking a cup of cof-
fee, he shot her with a German Lugar Pistol. At the time of
the’shooting, she was wearing her apron and had her order books
on her person.

“That the claimant,.Ruth Bruesch, was shot four times through
the body and limbs, by a 38 Caliber Revolver, resulting in
wounds in both the right and left arm, and right leg and abdo-
men, total of fifteen bullet wounds. The ulnar and medial
nerves of the right arm having been cut, the left ulna fractured,
two holes through the stomach, laceration of the pancreas, and
laceration of the liver and gall bladder. The nerves of the right
arm are splintered and the fingers are now immovable.

“That at the time of the injury the employer had complied
with all the requirements of the North Dakota Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act and that the employee was an insured employee
under the provisions of said Act. All premiums from said em-
ployer to the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation fund
having been paid.”

From the facts found the court drew conclusions of law that
the injury sustained by the claimant was an injury arising in
the course of employment; that she was entitled to compensa-
tion as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Law and that
the order entered by the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau
should be reversed and compensation awarded to the claimant
for thé injuries sustained by her. The Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Bureau has appealed to this Court from the judgment of the

ee =| 253
District Court and demanded a review of the entire case in this
Court. - ate

In our opinion the agtermination of. the District Court is
clearly correct and the judgment appealed from. must be’ af-
firmed. ”

The North Dakota Workmen’ S Compensation Law provides: :

“8. Injury’ shall mean only an injury arising in the-course of
employment including an injury caused by the willful act of a
third ‘person directed against an employee because of his em-
ployment, but such term shall not include‘an injury caused by
the employee’s willful intention to injure himself or to injure an-
other, nor any injury caused by the voluntary intoxication of
the employee. Such term, in addition to an injury by accident,
shall include: a, Any disease which can be fairly traceable to
the employment. . . .” NDRC 1943, 65-0102(8).

_It is undisputed that at the time of the injury the’ claimant
was an employee of the Rex Cafe, that she was on the premises
where her services were to be performed and was actively en-
gaged in the performance of the work she was employed to per-
form at the time she sustained the injury; but it is contended
by the appellant that it was incumbent upon the claimant to
establish that the act of the assailant was directed against her
because of her employment, and that the claimant has failed to
establish that the assault upon her by Aga was directed against
her because of her employment.

In appellant’s brief on this appeal it is said:

“The claimant has proved only that the injury was sustained
in course of employment; that is, it happened while she was on
duty. . . . Inthe'instant case the assailant entered the prem-
ises, sought out Ruth Bruesch, (the claimant) and assaulted her
with a deadly weapon. From the testimony obtained there is
no definite motive or reason for his actions. It remains under
such situations the responsibility and burden of the claimant to
prove that the assault was sustained because of the employ-
ment. . . . ‘There is no dispute that claimant was on duty in
her regular employment—that the injury was sustained om the
premises and that the injury was inflicted by the assailant, Aga.

254 —

The burden of proof is upon the claimant. Merely alleging and
showing the injury was sustained while in employment i is not
sufficient.” (Italics supplied.)

In American Jurisprudence it is said:

“Under most of the compensation acts, subject to certain ex-
ceptions in some, it is essential, in order to impose liability upon
an employer for the payment of compensation, that there should
be some substantial causal relationship between the employment
and the injury or disability, and it is not sufficient to show mere-
ly that it occurred while the employee was in the employer’s
service. The form of expression commonly used in compensa-
tion statutes to describe this relationship is, ‘arising out of and
in the course of the employment,’ although there is considerable
variance in this respect, some of.the acts using the phrase in
the disjunctive form, ‘arising out of or in the course of the em-
ployment,’ while others employ only one of the two terms com-
posing the complete expression, or others of similar import.
Where the complete expression is used in the conjunctive form,
a double condition is imposed, both of which must be satisfied in
order to confer a right to compensation, Where the phrase is
used in the disjunctive form, the fulfilment of either of the
alternative conditions satisfies the statutory requirement in this
respect. Where only one of the terms in question is used, only
a single condition, of course, with respect to the relationship
between the injury and the employment, is imposed.” 58 Am
Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, See 209, p 716. (Italics sup-
plied.).

“The words ‘arising out of? involve the idea of causal relation-
ship between the employment and the injury, while the term ‘in
the course of? relates more particularly to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the injury occurred. The phrases
are therefore not synonymous, and it is held, accordingly, that
where both are used conjunctively a double condition has been
imposed, both terms of which must be satisfied in order to bring
a case within the act.” 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation,
See 210, p 717.

“While the interpretation of the phrase ‘arising out of the em-

ee | 255

ployment,’ as used in workmen’s compensation acts to define the
injuries compensable thereunder, has given rise to many ques-
tions of considerable difficulty, as to which the decisions are not
harmonious, there is general agreement upon the proposition
that an injury arises out of an employment when but only
when there is a causal connection between such injury and the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed;
it is not sufficient that the employee is at the place of his em-
ployment at the time of the accident and doing his usual work.”
58 Am Jur Woxkmen’s Compensation, Sec 211, pp 718-719.

“The phrase ‘in the course of the employment,’ as used in com-
pensation acts in reference to the relation of the injury to the
employment in respect of the time and. place of its occurrence,
is usually given the common-law meaning thereof, or of the sub-
stantially equivalent phrase ‘scope of the employment,’ as used
in the law of master and servant, in the absence of other lan-
guage requiring that it be given a different meaning. Accord-
ingly, it may be stated as a very general proposition that an in-
jury occurs ‘in the course of? the employment when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place where the
employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties,
and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing some-
thing incidental thereto, or, as sometimes stated, where he is
engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business.” (Italics
supplied.) 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, Sec 212, pp
720-721.

See, also, 1 Schneider Workmen’s Compensation Law, 2d ed,
See 262; 6 Schneider: Workmen’s Compensation Text, Perma-
nent ed, Sec 1542, p 19 et seq.; Michigan Transit Corp. v. Brown,
56 Fed 2d 200; Carney v. Hellar et al., 155 Kan 674, 127 Pac2d
496; McKinney v. Dorlac et al., 48 N Mex 149, 146 Pac2d 867.

In Novack v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 158 Minn 495, 498,
198 NW 290, 292, the court said: .

“The injury is received ‘in the course of? the employment when
it comes while the. employee is doing his work. It may be re-
ceived ‘in the course of the employment’ and still have no causal
connection with it. State ex rel..D. B. & M. Co. v..District Court,

256 Es

“129 Minn 176, 151 NW 912. ‘In the course of’ refers to the
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place. It may be ‘in the course of employment,’ and yet the
employee may be standing still and not physically moving in
his work, Kaletha v. Hall (Minn.) 196 NW 261. He is still in-
cluded when he does those reasonable things which his contact
with his employment expressly or impliedly permits him to do.”

In the North Dakota Workmien’s Compensation Act the Leg-
‘islature prescribed only one condition or element that must exist
in order to render an injury to aii employee compensable under
the Act, namely, that the injury must have arisen “in the course
‘of employment.” This is the only condition presctibed by the
statute and this has been recognized by the decisions of this
Court. O’Leary v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau,
62 ND 457, 243 NW 805; Moug v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compen-
sation Bureau, 70 ND 661, 297 NW 129; McKinnon v. N. Dak.
Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 71 ND 228, 299 NW 856;
Welch v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 75 ND 608,
31 NW2d 498. :

In O'Leary v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compensation Buré eau, su-
pra, this Court said:

“The North Dakota Compensation “Act provides that compen-
sation shall be paid on account of all injuries received by em-
ployees within its protection ‘in the course of’ their employment.
Section 296a10, 1925 Supplement, as amended. It does not re-
quire that the injuries shall arise ‘out of the employment as is
the case under the provisions of the compensation acts in most
other jurisdictions, See Schneider, Workmen’s Comp. Law, 2d
ed, Sec 262. “The words ‘in the course of’ employment have ref-
erence to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident re-
sulting in the injury for which compensation is claimed. (Cita-
‘tion, of authority.) And the ‘holding in England, whence our
compensation acts largely came, is that ‘an accidént befalls a
-man “in the course: of” his employment if it occurs while he is
doing what a man so employed may reasonably do with-
‘in a time during which he is employed, and at:a ‘place where
_he may reasonably be during that time to do that thing?’ (Cita-

Dr

tion of authority). And this statement has been approved and
adopted in many of: the American jurisdictions. (Citation. of
authority). The Massachusetts court in MeNicol’s Case, 215
Mass 497, LRAI916A, 306, 102 NE 697,.4 NOCA 522, said:
‘An injury is received “in the course of” the employment when it
comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed
to perform,”

In McKinnon v. N. Dak. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau,
71 ND 228, 230, 299 NW 856, 857, this Court said:

“There is a distinction between. a physical injury occurring
in the course of employment and a disease approximately caused
by the employment. A compensable injury need not arise out
of the employment, nor be caused by the employment. However,
the injury is compensable if received in the course of employ-
ment. But a disease from which a worker dies must be one
approximately caused by the employment in order to be com-
pensable.”

The undisputed facts in the present case, under the established
principles and the above cited authorities, make it clear that
the injury sustained by the claimant as a result of the attack
made upon her on January 15, 1950, in the Rex Cafe in the City
of Minot in this state was “an injury arising in the course of
employment.” At the time the injury was inflicted the claimant
was an employee in the Rex Cafe, she was at the place where her
labor was to be performed, she-was engaged in the performance
of the labor for which she had been employed.

The North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Act, (NDRC
1943, 65-0102(8)), provides that “ ‘injury’ shall mean only an
injury arising in the course of employment including an injury
caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an
employee because of his employment.” Appellant contends that
the portion which we have italicized was intended to limit the
coverage of the statute. In short, it is appellant’s contention
that an employee who at the time and place where he is required
to perform his work and while actively engaged in the perform-
ance of the very work he was employed to perform sustains “an
injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against

258 EE

him because of his employment” is deprived of the protection
of the statute and is not entitled to compensation unless and
until he establishes that such willful act of such third person
was directed against him because of his employment. In our
opinion this contention is unfortunate. We think that this pro-
vision evidences an intention to enlarge the operation and cov-
erage of the statute rather than to limit the same. The language
of the provision indicates that the legislature intended to extend
the coverage of the law and to:make certain injuries compensa-
blé which might not or would not have been compensable unless
it was provided, as the legislature did, that the term “injury”
should include “an injury caused by the willful act of a third
person directed against the employee because of his employ-
ment.”

Some compensation statutes contain provisions expressly
excluding injuries caused by the willful act of a third person
directed against an employee for reasons personal to such em-
ployee or because of his employment. 58 Am Jur Workmen’s
Compensation, p 767. But the North Dakota Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law contains no such provision. It does not say that
such injuries shall be excluded from the operation of the statute.
Neither does it say that an injury to an employee arising in the
course of employment “caused by the willful act of a third person
directed against an employee” shall be excluded from the -oper-
ation of the act. But the statute does say that the term “injury”
shall include “an injury caused by the willful act of a third
‘person directed against an employee because of his employment.”

It is a matter of history that employees may be assaulted and
injured because of their employment at some distance from the
premises where they work and while they are not actively en-
gaged in the performance of the services which they were em-
‘ployed to perform. This may be-so for instance during strikes.
Pinkerton Natl. Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga.at pp 550-
551, 122 SE at p 203, 35 ALR at p 560. Likewise, in other cases
an employee may be assaulted; injured and even killed because of
his employment while not on the premises where his services
aré to be performed and while he is not actively engaged in the

ee | 25)

performance of such services. Scholl et al. v. Industrial Com-
mission et al. 366 Ill 588, 10 NE2d 360, 112 ALR 1254. We think
it was the intention and purpose of the legislature to enlarge
and extend the coverage of the statute and to afford compensa-
tion to an employee for an injury which such employee might
sustain because of his employment even though he was not on
the premises where his actual work was to be or was being per-
formed and was not actively engaged in such work, but the in-
jury was inflicted upon him because of his employment; and that
the legislature thought it was as desirable and as proper that
the industry should carry such off-hour risk as it was that it
should carry the working-hour risk.

In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, et al., 71 App DC 160,
107 Fed2d 959, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia had occasion to deal with and construe a pro-
vision of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act, United States Statute at Large, Vol 44, pt 2, Public
Laws, 69th Congress, Chap 509, p 1424, Sec 2(2) ; 83 USCA, Sec
901 et seq (made applicable in the District of Columbia by DC
Code, tit 19, ¢ 2, sections 11, 12, 45 Stat 600), which is quite
similar to the provision involved here.

The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
reads as follows:

“Sec. 2. When used in this Act—. . . 2. The term ‘injury’
means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course
of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as
arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally.or un-
avoidably results from such accidental injury, and includes an
injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against
an employee because of his employment.” United States Stat-
ute at Large, Vol 44, pt 2, Public Laws, 69th Congress, Chap
509, p 1424, Sec 2(2).

In that case (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, et al., supra)
an employee of an insurance company who made collections of
industrial and other insurance premiums was found lying in a
dazed condition by the roadside early one morning. His face
was beaten and swollen. He died as the result of his injuries.

260 ee

The deputy commissioner sustained the claim for compensation
in favor of the decedent’s widow. The deputy commissioner
found, among other things, that the “assault and robbery were
directed against him because of the said employment; that the
injury and death arose out of and in the course of employment.”
In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia the insurer contended that the evidence did not support
such findings. In disposing-of the coritentions advanced in that
case the court said:

“The view we take of the case makes it unnecessary to rehearse
the evidence on the question whether the injury arose ‘out of and
in the course of employment,’ and we have omitted most of that
evidence. We think the evidence which we have recited sup-
ports the finding that the assault and robbery were ‘directed
against’ the employee because of his employment; and this is
sufficient. . . .

“The term ‘injury,’ the statute tells us, . . includes an
injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against
an employee because of his employment.’ Grammatically, this
final clause of Section 2(2) is unqualified; it is not cumulative
with, but independent of, the statement in the first clause that
injury ‘means accidental injury or death arising out of and in
the course of employment.’ When the facts come, as they do
here, within the final clause, we need not inquire whether the
‘willful’ injury of the final clause can be regarded as ‘accidental.’
Similarly, we need not inquire whether it can be regarded as
‘arising . . . in the course of employment.’ No logical reason
appears for distinguishing in this respect between the two parts
of the first clause, and importing the later part, though not the
earlier, into the final clause. Considerations of policy point in
the same direction. If a man’s employment exposes him to
special risk of attack not only during working hours, but during
certain off hours also, it is as socially desirable that the industry
earry the off-hour risk as that it carry the working-hour risk.
Both alike are hazards of the industry. Moreover, compensa-
tion acts ‘should be construed liberally in furtherance of the
purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to
avoid incongruous or harsh results.” 107 Fed2d 961-962.

SS —

«
’ What was thus said by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in its opinion in Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Cardillo, et al., supra, is applicable here. The claimant’s
presence at the time and place the injury was inflicted upon her
was a necessary part of her employment, and in the prevailing
circumstances she was exposed to the attack that took place.
She was performing service which she was employed to perform
at that time and place. The time when and the place where the
happening occurred and the attending circumstances, none of
which is disputed, demonstrate to an absolute certainty that the
claimant at the time of the injury was acting in the course of
her employment and consequently the injury which she sustained
did arise in the course of her employment. Gtracelli v. Franklin
Cleaners and Dyers, 132 NJL 590, 42 Atl2d 3. See, also, Louie
vy. Bamboo Gardens et al., 67 Ida 469, 185 Pac2d 712.

* The judgement appealed from is affirmed.

Morus, OC. J., and Sarare, Burks, and Grimson, JJ., concur.

a
[File No. 7297]

A. E. REICH, Appellant, v. DIETZ SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
16 of GRANT COUNTY, North Dakota, a public corpora-
tion, Respondent.

(55 NW2d 638)

Opinion filed November 21, 1952

R. J. Blodeau, for appellant.
R. G. Beede, and Strutz, Jansonius & Fleck for respondent,

Sarure, J. ‘This is an action brought by the plaintiff A. E.
Reich, against Dietz School District of which he is a resident,
to recover compensation for transporting his own children to
the district school during the school years of 1949-1950 and
1950-1951. The complaint alleges that the school district fur-
nished bus transportation to all of the children in the district
of school age, except the children of the plaintiff; that during
the school year of 1949-1950 he had one child of school age, and
during the school year of 1950-1951 he had two children of school
age; that no school was taught in defendant school district with-
in two miles from plaintifi’s residence by the nearest route, and
that neither of his said children had completed the eight grades;
that he transported his said children to the consolidated school
in said defendant school district in the village of Elgin during
said school term, and that the distance from plaintiff’s residence
to said consolidated school by the nearest route was ten miles;
that the defendant school district wrongfully discriminated
against the plaintiff and his children by providing bus trans-
portation for all other rural children in said district residing
more than two miles from said school,:but failed to furnish
vehicular transportation for plaintiff’s children; that plaintiff
has repeatedly demanded payment for transportation of his said
children to said school, but that his demands have been refused.

The complaint further alleges that during said school terms

Sf

plaintiff transported his children to and from said school for
296 days making the trip from his said residence to said school
and returning home in the morning and making the same round
trip in the afternoon in order to take his children to and from
school each day; that the reasonable amount for the transporta-
tion the plaintiff -has been required to furnish is $2400.00 for
which sum judgment is demanded against the school district.
The answer admits that plaintiff transported his children to
said school in defendant school district; that plaintiff resides
but a few feet north of the south boundary of defendant school
district and that plaintiff’s residence is separated from said
school district by an arm of the Cannon Ball River; that the
distance from plaintiffs residence to the consolidated school,
when said river cannot be crossed is 8.8 miles; the answer al-
leges further that the defendant has repeatedly attempted to
make some arrangements with the plaintiff by which the de-
mands of the plaintiff for transportation of his children to school’
could legally be satisfied and paid by the defendant, but that
plaintiff has repeatedly refused all such proposed arrangements;
that the defendant has, in its discretion and at its option, au-
thorized the payment to plaintiff of the full amount allowed by
law for transporting his children to said school in the Dietz
School District; that defendant has offered such payment to the
plaintiff, but that such payment has at all times been refused by
the plaintiff; that no demand for any such payment, so author-
ized by the defendant-and the school board of said schoo] dis-
trict, was made by the plaintiff or by the family entitled thereto
before the close of the 1949-1950 and 1950-1951 school years;
that the defendant has, nevertheless, ever since the close of the
1949-1950 and 1950-1951 school years been ready and willing
and is still ready and willing to pay plaintiff the sum of ninety
(90) cents per day for each day’s attendance of plaintifi’s chil-
dren in said consolidated school in said Dietz School District
during the 1949-1950 and 1950-1951 school.years and terms.
Defendant then demands judgment for dismissal of the action.
A jury was impaneled and sworn to try the case, but at the
close of the evidence when both sides had rested the defendant’s
counsel offered to confess judgment in favor of the plaintiff in

264 |

the sum of $294.00 being one dollar per day for each day plaintiff
had transported his children to school. The plaintiff however
contended that he was entitled to compensation on a- quantum
meruit basis under an implied contract with the school board,
and that the issue was one of fact and should be submitted to
the jury. The trial court held, however, that no issue. of fact
was involved; that under the evidence the plaintiff was entitled
only to such compensation as is provided by law under the facts
proved, and ordered judgment to be entered in accordance with
defendant’s offer and judgment was entered accordingly.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment. .

The facts are not seriously disputed and are substantially as
follows:

The plaintiff resides in the southeast corner of the southeast
quarter of section thirty-two, in Dietz School District number
sixteen, Grant County. At a point near plaintiffs residence a
bend of the Cannon Ball River enters the defendant school dis-
trict from the south, winds around the residence of the plaintiff
on the north side, then back across the section line into section .
four in the adjoining township. This bond covers about one acre
in said section thirty-two upon which plaintiff resides. ‘The
distance from plaintiffs residence to the consolidated school in
the village of Elgin in defendant School District number sixteen
is about four and one-half miles, but because there is no bridge
across the river at that point the plaintiff must drive over an-
other route to take his children to school, a distance of nearly
ten miles. The defendant school district furnished bus trans-
portation to all of the children of school age in the district; and
also offered to send a bus to the north side of the river immedi-
ately opposite plaintiff’s residence. However, there was no
bridge across the river at that point, and the plaintiff refused
the offer. The defendant district also offered board and room
for plaintiff’s children which the plaintiff refused. The district
later advertised for bids for transportation of plaintiff’s chil-
dren and received two bids; one from the plaintiff of $125.00
per month, and another bid from another party of $96.00 per
month. These bids however were rejected by the school board.

el

Thereafter the defendant offered the plaintiff $85.00 pér month
to transport his own children and a neighbor's child, or $50.00
per month for transporting his own children, but the plaintiff
refused both of these offers. :
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant school
district having furnished bus transportation for some of the
children in the district it was its duty to provide such transpor-
tation for all children in the district, and that the action of the
board was arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to law. The
defendant school district contends, however, that under the pro-
visions of section 15-3404 and 15-3405 NDRC 1948 it is disere-
tionary with the school board to provide bus trazisportation, or
pay patrons said compensation as is provided by section 15-3404.
Sections 15-3404 and 15-3405 NDRC 1943 are as follows:
“Transportation: Payment Optional with School Board;
Schedule. The school board or board of education of any school
district in the State, whether or not such school district contains
a consolidated school, may pay, in its discretion, to each family
living more than two miles from a school in the district which is
taught the required length of time, a’sum per day of each day’s
attendance of a child or children of such family, not including
children in the high school department, when transported by a
member of the family or by a conveyance furnished or paid for
by the family or when the family has paid for lodging for the
child, in proportion to the distance between the home of the
family and the school, according to the following schedule:
From 2 miles to 24 miles 15¢ per day
From 5? miles to 6 miles 60¢ per day
Each 3 mile over 6 miles, the further sum of 5¢ per day.
“Such distance shall be measured by the nearest route from
the front door of the ‘schoolhouse to the front door of the
family’s residence according to the most convenient public course
of travel. If payment is made in any district based on school
attendance, such payment shall be in the amounts provided in
this section, except in the case of a school which has been closed
for lack of a sufficient number of pupils as provided in this title.”

266 es

“Section 15-3405 of the 1943 Revised Code of the State of
North Dakota provides as follows:

“Vehicular Transportation, Lodging, or Tuition may be fur-
nished at Option of the School Board. The school board or
board .of education of any school district in the state, in its
discretion may furnish to each family living more than two
miles from a school in the district which is taught the required
length of time:

1. Vehicular transportation by public conveyance; or

2. The equivalent of the payments specified in Section 15-3404
in lodging or tuition at some other public school if the same is
acceptable to the family.

The board shall not accord the benefits of either subsection
1 or subsection 2, of this section to any family which is receiving
payment under section 15-3404.”

The defendant contends that under the provisions of the

statutes quoted the school board may in its discretion pay some
patrons compensation for transportation according to the sched-
wle provided by section 15-3404 and it may furnish other patrons
vehicular transportation or its equivalent as provided by section
15-3405.
- The plaintiff contends, however, that the school board must
operate under only one of the two sections referred to, that is,
if it furnishes vehicular transportation to some patrons under
section 15-3405 it must furnish such transportation to all
patrons entitled to compensation; and if paymient is made under
the schedule: fixed by section 15-3404 on a mileage basis, all
patrons entitled to compensation must be paid according to such
schedule. ‘In other words it is the contention of the plaintiff
that the words “to ‘each family” as used in sections 15-3404 and
15-3405, must be construed to mean every family, and that there-
fore the school board cannot pay transportation to some patrons,
of the district under section 15-3404 and furnish vehicular trans-
portation or its equivalent to other patrons under section.15-,
3405, but that all patrons must be afforded the same kind of
transportation compensation. .

To. this contention we cannot agree. ‘Webster's Intemational:

Se
Dictionary distinguishes between the words each and every as
follows: Leng

“As now used eath generally implies reference to a definite
number, group or series and emphasizes the. consideration of
them as individuals; every emphasizes the fact that all the
individuals of a class or group are included whether definite or
indefinite in number.”

The word each, must be considered in its context and as used
in the statutes quoted it cannot be given the construction con-
tended for by the plaintiff. The last paragraph of section 15-
3405 provides that “the board shall not accord the benefits of
either subsection 1 or subsection 2 of this section to any family
which is receiving payments under section 15-3404.” It is clear
therefore that construing sections 15-3404 and 15-3405 together
the school board may in its discretion pay some patrons accord-
ing to the number of miles traveled as provided by the schedule
specified in section 15-3404, and furnish to other patrons
vehicular transportation or its equivalent as provided by sec-
tion 15-3405.

The plaintiff contends that having transported his own chil-
dren he is not limited to the mileage provided by section 15-3404,
but is entitled to the reasonable value of his services on the
theory of an implied contract with the school district. In sup-
port of his contention he cites the case of Eastgate v. Osage
School District, 41 ND 518, 171 NW 96. The decision in that
case is not in point here. The law involved in that case, which
has since been repealed, made it the mandatory duty of the
school board to furnish conveyance to children of school age’ re-
siding beyond a certain distance from the nearest school. It
was held in that. case that if the board failed to execute its
mandatory duty the parent or guardian of such children could
convey them to the nearest school and recover from the school
district for such conveyance within the terms of the applicable
statutes.

Another case cited by plaintiff is the case of Parrish v. Menz
School District, 57 ND 616, 223 NW 693. In that case the school
district had made arrangements to have plaintifi’s children of
school age sent to another district at a distance from their resi-

268 —

dence which under the laws then in force entitled the plaintiff
to compensation for transportation not less than twenty-five
cents nor more than fifty cents per day. The school board re-
fused to make any payment and plaintiff brought suit. The
district court entered judgment for the plaintiff at the rate of
twenty-five cents per day and the judgment was affirmed on the
ground that it was the duty of the school board under the law
to furnish transportation or to compensate the parent furnish-
ing the transportation at not less than the minimum allowed by
law in force which was twenty-five cents per day.

It is established by the evidence that the plaintiff refused the
several offers of the defendant school district under the provi-
sions of Section 15-3405, NDRC 1943; instead he voluntarily
transported his children to the district school. The fact that he
transported his children to school did not under the law result
in an implied contract with the school district for the reasonable
value of his services. He can recover only such compensation
as is provided by Section 15-3404, NDRC 1943, that is, sixty
cents for six miles and five cents for each one-half mile over
six miles. It is admitted that the distance from plaintiff’s resi-
dence to the consolidated school of the district is approximately
ten miles which would entitle him to one dollar per day for the
two hundred ninety-four days he transported his children during
the school years involved. Under the evidence and the state of
the record there was no question of fact presented for submission
to the jury. The trial court properly ordered judgment in ac-
cordance with the offer of the defendant.

The judgment is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Curisrianson, Burke and Grimson, JJ.,
concur.

De 269
[File No. Or. 234]

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. NORMAN
ST. CROIX, Appellant.

(85 NW2d 635)

Opinion filed November 21, 1952

Paul Campbell, Herigstad, Pringle & Herigstad, for appellant.
Elmo T. Christianson, Attorney General, and Earl Walter,
State’s Attorney, for respondent.

270 ee

Grimson, J. The defendant, Norman St. Croix, was con-
victed in the District Court of Burke County of the crime of
operating a motor vehicle on the public highway while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. At the close of the state’s case
the defendant moved the court to advise the jury to return a
verdict in this case for the acquittal of defendant and the dis-
missal of the case upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evi-
dence. The court denied the motion, which was renewed at the
close of all of the evidence and again denied. The jury returned
a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged. Judgment
was rendered and the defendant sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment in the county jail and his driver’s license suspended. The
defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict
of the jury.

In support of his appeal the defendant specifies as error, (1)
rulings of the court on the admission of evidence, (2) denial of
his motions for an advised verdict, (3) insufficiency of the evi-
dence to’support the verdict, and (4) misconduct of the State’s
Attorney on the trial.

The events leading up to the arrest of the defendant took place
at the town of Flaxton in Burke County, this state, and on that
part of highway No. 5 in said county extending east from Flax-
ton a distance of approximately one and one-half miles. The
defendant had driven to Flaxton in his pickup truck. The ob-
ject of his trip was to sell ear corn. His hired man, J. C. Poppin,
accompanied him. They arrived at Flaxton about two o’clock
in the afternoon and went to the Floyd Halvorson Tavern and
had a drink of whiskey. About three o’clock that afternoon the
defendant met a Mr. Art Jacobson on the street. He, together
with Mr. Jacobson, again went into the Halvorson tavern where
he had another drink of whiskey. Defendant admits he may have
been in the Halvorson tavern the third time that afternoon. De-
fendant sold Jacobson a load of corn, In the late afternoon or
early evening defendant visited a tavern located in the basement
of the hotelin Flaxton. About six-thirty or seven o’clock he and
his hired man, Poppin, left Flaxton driving east on highway
No. 5 in defendant’s pickup truck with the defendant doing the
driving. Shortly after leaving Flaxton the defendant recalled

Es 271

that he had not told Mr. Jacobson how or when thé corn Jacob-
son had purchased was to be delivered and decided to return to
Flaxton to‘see him about it. Defendant then turned in ‘to: the
driveway of the Huttner farm to turn around and in backing up
to make the turn backed his truck all the way across the ‘highway
and into the ditch on the opposite side of the road with only the
front wheels resting on the shoulder. There was snow in the
ditch and some on the road. The truck stalled in the ditch.
Huttner saw the truck in the ditch and came out to where it was
and he and Poppin tried to push the truck out of the ditch while
the defendant drove but they were unable to get it back on the
road. Huttner then drove to Flaxton promising to send out a
wrecker but before it arrived defendant walked in to Flaxton.
The sheriff and his deputy drove to Flaxton in response to a
call from the telephone operator advising him that there was’a
drunken driver on the highway, and when he approached Flax-
ton he saw the stalled truck in the ditch, stopped and found
Poppin sitting in the cab of the truck and found a half-pint
bottle of whiskey, about half full, in the cab of the truck.which
he took into his possession. The sheriff and his deputy took
Poppin to Flaxton and on arriving there the sheriff observed
the defendant walking down the sidewalk and enter a cafe.- The
sheriff followed and after defendant had admitted that the
stalled truck was his and that he had driven it to the Huttner
farm the sheriff arrested him. He took the defendant to Bow-
bells where this charge was lodged against him.

(1) We consider first the assignments of error relating to
rulings on objections to the admission of evidence. The first
one concerns the receipt in evidence of Exhibit 1, the open bottle
of whiskey found by the sheriff in defendant’s truck. .Defend-
ant denies that the bottle was his, that he consumed any of the
contents, or that he had any knowledge whatever regarding it
until it was shown to him by the sheriff after his arrest. He
insists it was error to admit this exhibit in evidence or to permit
the sheriff to testify regarding it because he says there is no evi-
dence connecting him with it. It is true there is no evidence that
the defendant purchased the bottle or had consumed any of its
contents, but it was found in his truck a short time after he had

272 Le

driven the truck from Flaxton to the point where it was stalled
in -the ditch and the presence of the open bottle of whiskey:in
the truck at that time was a circumstance the jury had a right
to-take into consideration in connection with the other evidence
in the case in reaching a conclusion as to whether the defendant
had been under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he drove
his truck as above related. The objection was properly over-
ruled. If the proffered evidence is relevant to the issue it is
admissible. In State v. Isensee, 64 ND 1, 249 NW 898, we quote
from 1 Wharton Ev 8rd ed Sec 21, p 18: “It is relevant to put
in. evidence any circumstance which tends to make the proposi-
tion at issue either more or less improbable. . . . Whatever
is a condition, either of the existence or non-existence of a rela-
tive hypothesis may be thus shown.” And, in-State v. Heaton,
56 ND-357, 217-NW 581, there is this quotation from Thayer,
Ey 2,3: “If the evidence offered conduces in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact
in controversy it should go to the jury.” The defendant denied
having any knowledge of the exhibit until it was shown him by
the sheriff and testified that his hired man, Poppin, was a drink-
ing man and had been drinking that day, but Poppin, who could
have furnished complete information regarding the ownership
of the exhibit and defendant’s knowledge or lack of knowledge
regarding it was not called as a witness, nor was the failure to
call him in any way accounted.for. The facts here are somewhat
analogous to those in State v. Rickel, 69 ND 329, 286 NW 895,
where we said: “The issue was the condition of the defendant
when driving. If he had a bottle half full of whiskey with him
in the car at the time of the accident this could be shown.”

Other rulings-on evidence, where error has been assigned, are
of such a nature that we do not believe it necessary to refer to
each one specifically. Suffice it to say that we have examined
them all and have coneluded that none of them resulted in any
prejudice to the defendant.

(2) The-next assignment is predicated on the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s motion for an advised verdict made at
the close of the state’s case and renewed at the close of all of
the evidence. Clearly there was no error in these rulings. Our

| 278

statute, Sec 29-2137 NDRO 1943 provides that the court “may
advise the jury to acquit the defendant, but the jurors are not
pound by the advice, nor can the court, for any cause, prevent
‘the jury from giving a verdict.” We have held in numerous
cases that error cannot be predicated on the denial of such
a motion. Among the cases so holding are: State v. Wright,
20 ND 216, 126 NW 1023, Ann Cas 19120, 795; State v. Thomp-
son, 68 ND 98, 277 NW 1; State v. Dimmick, 70 ND 463, 296
NW 146; and, State v. Sech, 76 ND 473, 37 NW2d 341.

(3) It is next argued that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
the verdict. Earlier in this opinion we summarized the events
that occurred and the defendant’s connection with them during
the afternoon and early evening of the day of his arrest and
deem it unnecessary to reiterate those facts here. The defend-
ant admits he drove his truck from Flaxton to the place where
it stalled in the ditch, but maintains that he was not under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. He admits having had three
drinks during the afternoon. Mr. Bruce Baer who operates a
bank exchange at Flaxton and is well acquainted with the de-
fendant was a witness in his behalf. He saw the defendant in
Flaxton shortly before he left town and testified that the de-
fendant was not what he would call intoxicated, but that he could
tell he had been drinking. The testimony of three bartenders
who were on duty at the two taverns visited by the defendant,
and all of whom were witnesses for the state, discloses that
during the afternoon and early evening of the day in question
the defendant was served not less than seven and probably as
much as ten drinks of whiskey and that in each of the two taverns
he engaged in what the witnesses described as loud talk. Both
the sheriff and his deputy testified that when the defendant was
arrested in Flaxton he was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. The sheriff also testified that the defendant “weaved”
when he walked arid that there was the odor of liquor on his
breath. He is corroborated by his deputy. It is evident, there-
fore, that there was ample evidence from which the jury could
find that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor when he drove his truck over the highway from Flaxton to

274 Le

the point where it was found by the sheriff stalled in the ditch.
The most that can be said for defendant’s contention is that
there was a conflict in the evidence, tacitly recognized in his
motion for an advised verdict where his counsel says . . .
“that a reasonable doubt as to a question of guilt appears
+ « + 4” Nowhere do we find any claim that there is no
evidence on which the jury might base a verdict of guilty, but
merely that the evidence is insujficient to support such a verdict.
A verdict based on conflicting evidence is binding on the court
and will not be set aside on appeal. State v. Shepard, 68 ND
143, 277 NW 315 where numerous cases on this point, many of
them from this court, are cited. In considering conflicting evi-
dence in a criminal case where the defendant assigns as error
the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the ver-
sion of the evidence most favorable to the State is the one that
will. control. State v. Shepard, supra.

(4) The-last assignment relates to alleged misconduct of the
state’s attorney during the trial and argument. Under that
specification of error defendant’s counsel complains of the man-
ner and substance of the evidence presented by the state’s attor-
ney, constant leading of witnesses, asking for immaterial and
collateral evidence, parading exhibit 1 before the jury and his
failure to be fair and impartial in the conduct of the trial. The
transcript shows, however, that in the examination of witnesses
objections were made by defendant’s counsel to the questions
calling for the evidence he now objects to, and rulings were made
by the court. No motion was made by the defendant for a mis-
trial on these or any other grounds. Neither did the defendant
request the court to admonish counsel or instruct the jury re-
garding these matters. No record was made of the conduct now
complained of, nor was it in any way called to the trial court’s
attention during the trial. It was presented to the trial court in
the form of an unverified statement by counsel for the defendant
entitled “Statement of Claimed Proceedings” submitted at the
time the statement of the case was settled. The trial court
refused to consider it. We have held in a number of cases that
conduct or statements of the State’s Attorney occurring during

EE 275

the trial which are claimed to be improper or prejudicial to the
rights of the defendant will not be considered on appeal unless
they were put into the record and called to the attention of the
trial court when they occurred and an opportunity afforded the
trial court to correct them during the progress of the trial. State
v. Moeller, 24 ND 165, 1388 NW 981; State v. Glass, 29 ND 620,
151 NW 229; Beardsley v. Ewing, 40 ND 373, 168 NW 791;
Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 ND 708, 193 NW 312; Leach v. Nelson,
50 ND 538, 196 NW 755; Rains v. State, 137 Ind 83, 36 NE 532;
Erickson v. Wiper, 33 ND 193, 222, 157 NW 592.

Finding no prejudicial error in the-record the judgment is
affirmed. . .

Morris, OC. J., and Burns, Sarure and Cunistianson, JJ.,
concur.

[File No. 7319]

ADELHEID SILBERNAGEL, Respondent, v. JOHN J. SIL
BERNAGEL, Anna Kuhn, Eva Mitzel, Malonia Werlinger,
Rosa Silbernagel, Magdalena Schumacher, Ida Silbernagel,
Marianna Daschle, Jacob Silbernagel, Anton Silbernagel,
Adam Silbernagel, and John J. Silbernagel as Administrator
of the estate of Margaret Silbernagel, also known as Marga-
retha Silbernagel, Deceased, Appellants.

(55 NW2d 713)

Opinion filed Nov. 25, 1952

Hjellum and. Weiss, for appellant.

ee 277

Charles Coventry and Robert Chesrown, for respondent.

Grimson, J. This is an action brought to determine adverse
claims. The plaintiff claims ownership of the Northeast Quarter
of Section Twenty-three (NE Sec 23) Township One Hundred
Thirty-three (133), North, Range Seventy-three (73) West of
the 5th P.M. by virtue of a deed from her mother, Margaretha
Silbernagel. The defendants are -the brothers and sisters of
the plaintiff and the administrator of Margaretha Silbernagel’s
estate. Seven of the defendants answer and allege that the
deed under, which plaintiff claims was never delivered but that
it was merely a testamentary writing and invalid; that the land
in question is a part of their mother’s estate and that each of
the parties as her heirs are the owners of an undivided one-
twelfth share or interest in said land. Five of the defendants
defaulted. The trial court found for the plaintiff and quieted
title in her. The answering defendants appeal and demand a

trial de novo.
It appears from the evidence that Margaretha Silbernagel was

278 Le

a widow with twelve living children. That her husband died
in 1926; that she was the owner of considerableland in Township
Qne Hundred. Thirty-three, North, of Range Seventy-three
west. From 1926 until 1935 Margaretha, Peter, a crippled son,
and Adelheid, a daughter, the plaintiff in this action, lived on
the farm. Plaintiff was of age at the time. Adam, a son,
assisted them until 1928. All of the other children had married
and left the farm. In 1935 Margaretha, Adelheid and Peter
moved to Napoleon where Margaretha bought a house for $650.-
00 in which they lived and which she afterwards, in 1937, deeded
to plaintiff. Peter died in 1939. The plaintiff lived with her
mother until her mother died in October 1950. She took in sew-
ing and.at times worked away from home. Plaintiff claims to
have used the money she earned for the support of her mother.
On Dee. 8, 1947, Margaretha was declared incompetent and
placed under guardianship. During the last two years plaintiff
was allowed from $85.00 to $100.00 per month out of guardian-
ship funds with which to run the house and buy provisions and
clothes. . For the last three years she took entire care of her
mother, The mother, Margaretha, died intestate.

In 1939 Margaretha talked to Rudolph Hochalter, the Register
of Deeds of Logan County regarding the division of her land
among her children. On Oct. 3, 1939 she came to his office and

‘asked him to draw. up deeds for a different portion of her land
to each child. After warranty deeds were drawn up she exe-
cuted and acknowledged them before Mr. Hochalter. She then
gave them to Mr, Hochalter with instructions to keep them in a
safe place and deliver them after her death to the granteés
named in the deeds. She and her guardian had possession of
the lands until her death. There is no evidence that.she tried to
sell or encwnber any of these lands after the execution of these
deeds. It is under one of these deeds that the plaintiff claims
title.

A year or more later Margaretha Silbernagel came back to
Mr. Hochalter and asked for the deed in which plaintiff was
grantee. She took the deed with her and afterwards destroyed
it. She also had Mr. Hochalter make an alteration in two other
deeds transferring a 40 acre tract from one to the other. The

ee 279

one in which she eliminated 40 acres she took with her and deliv-
ered to her son, Jacob who accepted it and had it recorded. The
deed to which she added the 40 acres she had redrawn and re-
turned to Mr. Hochalter for safekeeping and delivery according
to the original instructions.

Our code provides, Sec. 47-09 NDRO 1943: “Although a
grant is not actually delivered into the possession of the grantee,
it is yet to be deemed constructively delivered in the following
eases . . . 2. Whenit is delivered to a stranger for the benefit
of a grantee and his assent is shown or may be presumed.”

It has been uniformly held that a deed deposited with a third
person for delivery to the grantee upon the grantor’s death, will
operate as a valid transfer of title as of the time of the deposit
with the third person provided the grantor intends irrevocably
to vest title in the grantee and surrenders control over the deed.
26 OJS, Deeds, See. 46, p 247; 16 Am Jur, Deeds, Sec. 127, p 509;
Annotation 52 ALR 1223. In Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 ND
475, 75 NW 797, 41 LRA 258, this court, speaking through Judge
Corliss, lays down the rule as follows: “It is now a thoroughly
established rule that, if the grantor parts with all control over
the deed at the time of its delivery to the third person, the de-
livery is good, and the title passes to the grantee, although the
delivery is not to take place until after the grantor’s death.” See
also McGuigan v. Heuer, 66 ND 710, 268 NW 679; Davis v. John
E. Brown College, 208 Iowa 480, 222 NW 858; Boone Biblical
College v. Forest, 223 Iowa 1260, 275 NW 132, 116 ALR 67;-
Eddy v., Pinder, 131 Me 139, 159 Atl 727; Stalting v. Stalting,
52 SD 309, 217 NW 386; Jorgenson y. Jorgenson, 74 SD 239, 51
NW2d 632; Kokomo Trust Co. v. Heller, 67 Ind App 611, 116 NE
332.

An essential element in such delivery is the intention of the
grantor which is mainly a question of fact to be determined from
all the evidence, in-each particular case. Arnegaard vy. Arne-
gaard, supra; O’Brien v. O’Brien, 19 ND 713, 125 NW 307;
Magoffin v. Watros, 45 ND 406, 178 NW 134; McGuigan v. Heuer,
supra; Perry v. Erdalt, 59 ND 741, 231 NW 888.

‘If Margaretha Silbernagel intended an absolute delivery of
the deed.to plaintiff by depositing it with Mr. Hochalter for de-

280 ee

livery to grantee after her death then the deed transferred valid
title to the land described subject only to Margaretha’s life
estate. If the deposit of the deed to plaintiff was made subject
to her change of mind and control then the deed is merely a testa-
mentary writing and ineffective as it was not executed as a will.

The intent of Margaretha Silbernagel when she executed these
deeds and deposited them with Mr. Hochalter must be deter-
mined from an analysis of the evidence and circumstances shown.

Mrs. Silbernagel had evidently been contemplating the divi-
sion of her property amongst her children. She had talked to
Mr. Hochalter, the register of deeds of her county about it.
Finally she came to his office and asked him to prepare the deeds.
There is no testimony that he was related to Mrs. Silbernagel or
in any way interested in her affairs. There is in evidence a plat
he drew at the time showing sections 14, 15, 16 and 23 in Town-
ship 133 North, Range 73 and marking the names of her dif-
ferent children on different portions of: land in those sections.
There is also listed on that exhibit the names of the children.
Mr. Hochalter testified: “Well, she came in and she told me
that she was ready to prepare those deeds and we sat down
and she figured out how she was going to divide it and I drew the
deeds accordingly. She divided it to each one of the children
and she gave a deed to each of the children, a specific piece of
land’? The deeds were all warranty deeds. In all seven or eight.
deeds were prepared. Margaretha Silbernagel then executed said
deeds and acknowledged them before Mr. Hochalter, Register of
Deeds. One of these deeds was for the Northeast Quarter
(NES) of Sec. 23, Township 133, North, Range 73 West. In that
deed the plaintiff was the grantee. Mr. Hochalter testified:
“She gave them to me and told me to keep them for her, put them
away for her. * * * She told me to deliver thé deeds to the
different children, to the grantees, after her death.” Mr. Hoch-
alter put them in an envelope and put her name onit. He further
testified: “Q.—Did you make any notation on that envelope?
A.—Just her name, just merely left for safekeeping.” With
regard to the deed to-plaintiff Mr. Hochalter testified: “Well,
I believe she said that Ida (Adelheid) was going to live with her,
stay with her. I do not remember anything else that was said.”

es 281

On examination by the court Mr. Hochalter testified: “She gave
them to me and she said, ‘You are to keep these in safekeeping,
in a safe place, until after my death, and then you are to deliver
them to each of the grantees, her children.” “Q.—That is as
near as you remember the conversation? A—Yes.” On cross
examination defendant’s attorney asked of Mr. Hochalter:
“Was anything said at the time these deeds were prepared and
left with you that Margaretha Silbernagel reserved the right to
withdraw them from your possession? * * * A.—No.”

Error is assigned because Mr. Hochalter was not-allowed to
say what was his understanding of the transaction as to whether
Mrs. Silbernagel could withdraw the deeds. Such questions
called for Mr. Hochalter’s conclusions in that regard and the
objection to them was properly sustained.

In the beginning of his testimony Mr. Hochalter said that
Mrs. Silbernagel had told him “To keep them (the deeds) for
her, put them away for her.” However, on examination by the
court Mr. Hochalter’s testimony omits anything indicating that
the deeds were to be kept for Mrs. Silbernagel. The trial court
who participated in this examination and observed Mr. Hochalter
while testifying was apparently impressed by his last statement
of Mrs. Silbernagel’s instructions to him and the court found
the facts according to that statement. If there is any conflict in
Mr. Hochalter’s testimony in this matter that was resolved by
the trial court in favor of an absolute delivery which finding we
will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous. Arnegaard v. Arne-
gaard, supra. The testimony indicates a carefully considered
transaction, deliberately planned and carried out by Mrs. Sil-
bernagel. She reserved no right of withdrawal of the deeds.
She divided her property amongst her children. That division
was to be effective after her death.

In the case of Stalting v. Stalting, 52 SD 309, 217 NW 386, the
directions to the depository were very similar to those in the
ease at bar. The grantor delivered four deeds in which his
children and grandchildren were grantees to a depository with
the instruction to “Keep these safely and deliver them to the
grantees at my death.” No conditions or reservations were in-
cluded in the directions. The court held that showed grantor’s

282 ee

intention of making a complete and irrevocable delivery of the
deeds.

After the death of Mrs. Silbernagel Mr. Hochalter testifies
that he delivered the deeds that were then in his possession
according to the direction of Mrs. Silbernagel to the grantees
therein named, to wit: John J. Silbernagel, Anna Kuhn, Anton
Silbernagel, Malonia Werlinger, Eva Mitzel, Adam Silbernagel,
and Magdalena Schumacher, all of whom are defendants in this
action.

The acceptance of these deeds by the grantees constitutes an
assent by them to such delivery and completes their title. All
of the deeds were deposited with Mr. Hochalter in one transac-
tion and the same instructions covered them all. No attempt is
being made to set aside any of the deeds so delivered.

With regard to the deed to plaintiff Mr. Hochalter testified he
gave it back to Margaretha Silbernagel a year or two after its
execution. He also gave back to her a deed to Jacob Silbernagel,
after eliminating, at her request, 40 acres from that deed and
inserting those 40 acres in a deed to Adam Silbernagel which
deed also may have been withdrawn. None of the other deeds
were disturbed. .

Answering, defendants strenuously claim that the withdraw-
ing of those deeds from Mr. Hochalter by Mrs. Silbernagel in-
dicates that she retained dominion and control over the deeds
and that, therefore, no delivery was accomplished.

Sec. 47-0910 NDRO 1943 provides that: “Redelivering a
grant of real property to the grantor, or cancelling it, does not
operate to retransfer the title.”

The authorities uniformly held that where a grantor has de-
posited a deed with a third person to be delivered to the grantee
after the death of the grantor, reserving no dominion or control
over the same, he cannot subsequently, by withdrawing or
destroying the deed, affect a delivery thus completed. Annota-
tion in 52 ALR 1257 and cases cited. In Arnegaard v. Arnegaard,
supra, this court says: “Indeed, if the deeds were once deliv-
ered to Hyde for the benefit of the grantees, it was beyond the
power of the grantor to devest the title of the grantees by regain-
ing possession thereof, or even by destruction of the same. A

ee 283

delivery passes title, and such title is thereafter as much beyond
the control of the grantor as though he had never owned the
land.” (Citing cases.) See also 26 CJS See. 43 p 244.

There is some testimony relating to statements of Mrs. Sil-
bernagel regarding those deeds made after they had been
deposited with Mr. Hochalter. Objection was made to said state-
ments as hearsay and the overruling of said objections is as-
signed as error, Statements of a grantor made after the de-
livery of a deed are admissible in a suit to enforce title thereun-
der when such statements support the deed but not when they
are against it. Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, supra; Miller v. Meers,
155 Tl] 284, 40 NE 577. Statements supporting the deed are-ad-
verse to any interest of grantor in the land and constitute an ad-
mission against grantor’s interest. Statements adverse to the
deed are self-serving declarations. Such statements do not
come within the hearsay rule. Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal App
2d 200, 184 P2d 323; Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal 2d 523, 127 P2d
530.

Regarding the deeds that were withdrawn, Jacob Silbernagel
testifies that he received and accepted from his mother (Mar-
garetha Silbernagel) the deed from which the elimination had
been made and at the same time he says that she showed him the
deed to Adelheid which she had drawn out at the same time as
his deed and which he says she then burned. Regarding that
deed he says: “Q.—Who told you it was Ida’s (Adelheid)?
You said you knew it was Ida’s quarter, who told you that?

A.—My Ma, it was made out the same deed asI gothere * * *
A.—Yes, she said that was Ida’s.”

Margaretha Silbernagel talked with some of the children about
these deeds after their execution. As to plaintiff's deed, her
daughter, Anna Kuhn, testified: “She said, my mother, that
she (Adelheid) works longer than the rest of them and she got
the deeds all made for the children, and she get this quarter of
land, she get no wages or nothing, so she give her that quarter
of land. 2

The son-in-law of Margaretha Silbernagel, Peter Schumacher
testified: “She (Margaretha Silbernagel) told me she made
the deed to the Northeast Quarter of Section Twenty-three, in

284 — Eee

Township One Hundred Thirty-three, North, Range Seventy-
three West, to give it to Ida, because she stayed there longer than
the rest of the girls did, * * * and she could not pay her any
wages and that is why she give her that quarter section of land.”

“The daughter, Magdalena Schumacher testified: “Well, she
(Margaretha) talked pretty near every time we visited her, dif-
ferent times, about her land and deeds * * * In common
about all deeds, all the children.”

These statements of Mrs. Silbernagel after the execution and
deposit of the deeds all tend to show that she intended these
deeds to be absolute. The deeds were to her children. She.gave
her reasons for the deed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had lived
with her and taken care of her more than had any of the other
children. Plaintiff also testified to having turned the money
she earned over to her mother. Objection to that testimony as
immaterial was properly overruled. That testimony indicated
an obligation by the mother to the plaintiff and was material on
the question of Margaretha Silbernagel’s motive and intent in
the disposition of the land in question. Mrs. Silbernagel was
giving the plaintiff this deed in consideration of the work she
had performed for her and the money plaintiff had advanced her.
She had talked it over-with her children and givén them the rea-
son why she was deeding this to the plaintiff. Finally when she
had, for some undisclosed reason, withdrawn the deed and
destroyed it she said, “That was Ida’s” (Adelheid) “deed. She
did not say it was a deed that she had intended to give to Ida in
the future. She said it was Ida’s deed, indicating a past delivery.
The statement indicates absolute ownership of the deed in Ida.
Margaretha executed no deed thereafter for the land described
therein.

“It is well settled that the law makes stronger presumption in
favor of the delivery of deeds in cases of voluntary settlement,
especially in favor of infants, than in the ordinary cases of
bargain and sale. Miller v. Meers, supra.

“The learned trial judge by his decision in this case determined
that it was the intention of Margaretha Silbernagel to make a
complete and irrevocable delivery of the deed to‘plaintiff by her
deposit thereof with the register of deeds. We have carefully

| 285

examined the entire record and find no prejudicial errors there-
in. We think the evidence fairly supports his decision.

Error is assigned by the answering defendants on the order
of the district court to tax costs only against the answering de-
fendants. A suit to determine adverse claims has been generally
held by the courts to be of an equitable nature. This court has
so held on numerous occasions. See O’Neil v. Tyler, 3 ND 47, 53
NW 434; Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 ND 5, 106 NW 566, 4 LRA NS
1074, 125 Am St Rep 574; Sexton v. Sutherland, 37 ND 500, 164
NW 168; Wagner v. Stroh, 70 ND 323; 294 NW 195. Allowance
of costs in an equity suit is entirely discretionary with the court.
See. 38-2610 NDRC 1943; Austad v. Dreier, 57 ND 224, 221 NW
1; State ex rel. Rusk v. Budge, 15 ND 205, 106 NW 293; 20 CJS
Costs, Sec. 10, p 271; 14 Am Jur Costs, Sec. 25, p 17. In the case
at bar only seven of the twelve defendants answered. The other
defendants defaulted and some of them testified for the plaintiff.
Certainly they were not responsible for the trial costs created
in this case and it would not be equitable to tax any costs against
them. Beattie v. Dimitry, 168 La 81, 121 So 581. The trial court
was clearly right in taxing the costs against the answering de-
fendant only.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morais, OC. J., and Curisrianson, Burke and Sarure, JJ., con-
cur.

286 Le
[File No. 7328]

ED. PHILLIPS AND SONS CO., a Corporation and Griggs
Cooper Distributing Company, a North Dakota Corpora-
tion, Respondents, v. ARNOLD ERICKSON, also known as
Arnie Erickson and Paul Pedersen, Individually and as Co-
partners Doing Business as Pete’s Bar, Arnold Erickson,
Appellant.

(55 NW2d 575, 36 ALR2d 819)

Opinion filed Nov. 14, 1952. Rehearing denied Nov. 26, 1952

Emanuel Sgutt, for respondents.
Odin J. Strandness, for appellant.

Burks, J. Ed Phillips and Sons Co. a corporation and Griggs
Cooper Distributing Company, a corporation, each commenced
separate actions against the defendants, Brickson and Pedérsen,
individually and as copartners. The actions were upon separate
and distinct accounts due to the respective plaintiffs. Because
the principal issue in each case was whether Erickson was a
partner of Pedersen, the two actions were, by stipulation, con-
solidated for trial. At the trial, in accordance with the trial
court’s instructions, separate verdicts were rendered in each

— 287

éase and, in accordance with the verdicts, separate judgments
were ordered and entered, the judgment in favor of Hd. Phillips
and Sons being in the sum of $712.69, and that in favor of Griggs
Cooper Distributing Company being in the sum of $326.66.
Plaintiffs’ attorney served a notice of entry of judgment in each
case upon the attorney for the defendants. ©

Thereafter, the defendant, Erickson moved for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial.
The notice of motion and motion are entitled, Ed. Phillips
and Sons Co. and Griggs Cooper Distributing Company v.
Arnold Erickson and Paul Pedersen individually and as copart-
ners. Thus, although the cases were consolidated for purposes
of trial only, this motion treats the cases as if they had been
consolidated for all purposes. No objection, to the form or
title of the notice and motion, was made by plaintiff’s attorney,
but when the motion was denied, separate orders, denying the
motion in each case were entered.

Defendant has attempted to appeal from these orders, en-
tered one each in two separate actions upon different catses of
action in favor of different plaintiffs, by one uiotide of aippeal.
The notice of appeal is entitled in the same manner as thé mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial
was entitled. It states that the defendant, Hiickson, appéals
from the order of the County Court of Cass County dated ‘and
docketed on the 30th day of July 1952, in the above entitled
cause, whereby a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for a new trial was denied. .

Appellant has moved to dismiss the appeal upon the grounds,
(1) that the notice of appeal was insufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion upon the Supreme Court in either or any of the causes in
the County Court of Cass County, involving the corporations
named as plaintiffs and the defendant appellant herein (2) that
no appeal has been perfected in any cases involving the corpora-
tions named plaintiffs and the defendant appellant; and (3) that
the appeal, if it can be construed to be an appeal, is duplicitous.

The motion to dismiss must be granted. The notice of appeal
refers to one order entered in a single action. It is entitled in
an action which, insofar as the records of the County Court of

288 |

Cass County are concerned does not exist. The appeal bond,
served and filed, refers to a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant in the sum of $1049.35. No mention
is made in the bond of any appeal from an order and there is
no judgment, such as is described in the bond, of record in the
County Court of Cass County. However, if we pass the inac-
euracies contained in the notice of appeal and appeal bond and
allow appellant’s contention that the entire record shows ap-
pellant’s intention to appeal from two separate orders entered,
one each in two different actions, each bearing a title different
from that borne by the notice of appeal, the appeal must then
be dismissed for duplicity.

It is true that these two actions were united for the purposes
of trial by stipulation of counsel. It is clear, nevertheless that
the separate character of the two causes, was carefully pre-
served, throughout all the proceedings, by the rendition of sepa-
rate verdicts, the entry of separate judgments and the entry of
separate orders denying the motion for a new trial in each case.
The fact that two cases were tried together is not sufficient to
consider them as consolidated so that one appeal is sufficient to
bring the orders entered in each case before the appellate court.
‘Doerr v. Huether, 49 ND 717, 193 NW 307; Williams v. Fidelity
Loan and Savings Co., 142 Va 43, 128 SE 615, 45 ALR 664;
Oerter v. Georger, 70 Wash 110, 126 P 103, Ann Cas 1914B 686.
See also Annotations in 17 Ann Cas 291, Ann Cas 1914B 687.
Appeal dismissed.

Morris, C. J., and Sarre, Curisrianson and Grimson, JJ.,
coneur. ~

Le 289
[File No. 7302]

THE CITY OF GRAND FORKS, North Dakota, a Municipal
Corporation, Respondent, v. CHRIS C. FLOM, Martha
Flom, Myrtle O. Hargrave, H. E. Walter, also known as
Harry E. Walter, Ada Walter, Florence Ridgway, J. Clif-
ton Mathews, Annie J. Mathews, Gust E. Hagert, Bertha
S. Hagert and Guri Sand, Appellants.

(56 NW2d 324)

290 —

Opinion filed December 19, 1952

Harold D. Shaft, City Attorney for respondent.
Daniel 8. Letness, for appellants.

Sarurz, J. This is an action brought by the City of Grand
Forks against the defendants for the purpose of obtaining a
judicial declaration of the status of Linden Street situated be-
tween blocks 4 and 5, and the alley in block 5 in Lincoln Park
View Second Addition, Subdivision of part of Section 10, Town-
ship'151, Range 50 in Grand Forks County, North Dakota, and
declaring the rights and status of all interested parties with
reference to said Linden Street and alley.

There are two groups of defendants. The parties in one
group own lots in block 5 in said Lincoln View Second Addition,
and while they are nominally defendants they are in fact plain-
tiffs since the relief demanded in their answer is identical with
the relief demanded in the complaint of the plaintiff.

The other group of defendants may be termed the real defend-
rants. They are owners of lots in block 4 of said Lincoln Park
View Addition. They deny the claims ofthe plaintiff and the
‘other group of defendants. For the purpose of this opinion the
Plaintiff, City of Grand Forks, and the first group of defendants
will be referred to as plaintiffs and the second group of -defend-
ants as the defendants, ;

The complaint alleges that a street 60 feet wide known as Lin-
den’ Street, between blocks 4 and 5 and the alley running
through block 5 in said Lincoln Park View Addition are open to
the public'use in accordance with a dedication to the public and
a plat thereof on file in the office of the Register of Deeds, made
in May 1916 by Martha Mae Montgomery. The answer of the
defendants admits the dedication and filing of the Montgomery
plat but alleges that in 1934 proceedings were had vacating the
alley running through said block 5, and reducing the width of
said Linden Street from 60 feet to 20 feet. :

— 291

The undisputed facts are as follows: In May 1916, one Martha
Mage Montgomery platted a certain Addition described as: Lin-
coln Park View, Second Addition, Subdivision of part of section
10, township 151, range 50 Grand Forks County, North Dakota,
of which she was the owner. The plat was recorded in the office
of register of deeds of Grand Forks County, North Dakota, in
book 65 of deeds, page 567, and in book E of plats, page 16. Said
plat declared:

“T hereby dedicate to the public use forever all streets, avenues
and alleys, and all part of streets, avenues and alleys shown
thereon.” There is shown on said plat an alley 20 feet wide
running north and south through block 5 from 13th avenue
south to 15th avenue south. There is also shown on said plat,
a street known as Linden Street or Linden Court, 60 feet wide
between blocks 4 and 5 in said Lincoln Park View Addition ex-
tending due south from a point north of 13th avenue south to
14th avenue (now 15th avenue) south in said addition. Lots
1 to 8 in said block 4 are shown to be 149 feet deep east and west.
At the time of the filing of the Montgomery plat none of the
property south of 13th avenue south was within the city limits
of the city of Grand Forks.

In August 1928 the city limits of the city of Grand Forks
were extended to include all that tract lying east of the westerly
line of said Linden Street, and north of a line parallel to and
466 feet south of the north line of 13th avenue south (said line
béing identical with the south line of lot 8, block 4) as shown in
the Montgomery plat. All of block 5 and lots 9 to 16 inclusive
in block 4 remained outside of the city limits of the city of Grand
Forks. The resolution of the city commission extending the
city limits was filed on November 23rd, 1929 and the revised city
limits were shown in the plat recorded in book B of plats on
page 1.

Tn 1934 owners of lots in said blocks 4 and 5 ‘involved in this
action petitioned: the county commissioners of Grand Forks
county to vacate the 20 foot alley in block 5 and to reduce the
width of Linden street to 20 feet, by vacating 20 feet on each
side thereof. On November 13th, 1934 said board of county
commissioners passed a resolution approving said petition and

292 ee

directing the county auditor to file said petition and a copy of
the resolution of record in Grand Forks county. Said petition
and resolution were filed and recorded in the office of the regis-
ter of deeds in Grand Forks county, July 31, 1941.

The petition for vacating said alley in block 5 and reducing the
width of said Linden Street was not acknowledged or proved by
the petitioners executing the same, and it also included lots, 1 to
8 in block 4 and that part of Linden Street abutting said lots
which previously had been incorporated into the city limits of
the city of Grand Forks.

In May 1935 one S. B. E. Seese owner of lots 9 to 24 both in-
elusive in said block 5 filed in the office of the register of deeds
of Grand Forks county a plat designated as “Rearrangement of
all.of lots 9 to 24 both inclusive, of block 5 in said Lincoln Park,
View Second Addition,” which said plat was recorded in book
97 of deeds at page 202. The said Seese plat shows Linden
Street to be twenty feet wide and eliminated the 20 foot alley
through block 5 shown in the Montgomery plat of dedication, but
shows a 10 foot alley running east and west through block 5.
After the filing of the Seese plat all of the remaining property
adjacent to or abutting on said Linden Street and the alleys
shown in both Montgomery plat and the Seese plat were incor-
porated into the city limits of the city of Grand Forks.

Prior to the filing of the said Seese plat several parties had
purchased property in block 4 and also in block 5 north of the
Seese property, and various persons had built dwellings and
outbuildings upon the property purchased in reliance upon the
prior Montgomery plat, showing the said alley to be open through
said block 5 to a width of 20 feet and showing Linden Street to
be open to a width of 60 feet from 13th avenue south to 14th
avenue south (now 15th avenue south), and none of said persons
joined in or consented to the said Seese plat.

The electric power to all residences in block 4 is carried on
poles set near the west line of block 4 at or near the edge of the
lots in said block as originally platted in Montgomery plat. The
lots in said block 4 have at all times been assessed and taxed on
the basis of their size as shown in the Montgomery plat and no

De 293

addition to the assessed value thereof was made because of the
attempt to reduce the width of said Linden Street.

The contesting defendants own lots in block 4. They have
planted and maintained lawns, shrubs, and gardens and con-
structed fences on the rear of their lots. These improvements
extend several feet into the 60 foot width of the said Linden
Street. The 20 foot alley running north and south through
block 5 has been used by garbage trucks and refuse collectors.
A garage is located partly on the south end of said alley.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff to the effect that no valid pro-
ceedings had been had to reduce the width of Linden Street
(now Linden Court) or for vacating the alley in block 5; and
that the plaintiff and the public had a perpetual easement in
said alley and street for alley and street purposes to the full
width thereof as shown by the Montgomery plat.

The defendants appealed from the judgment and demand a
trial de novo. In their brief they contend they are entitled to a
reversal of the judgment on three grounds:

First, there is no evidence of acceptance by the public of the
Montgomery Dedication.

Second, the proceedings had for reducing the width of Linden
Street and vacating the alley in block 5 were in substantial com-
pliance with the applicable statutes, and

Third, that under the principle of estoppel the plaintiff city
of Grand Forks is barred from asserting the existence of ‘Lin-
den Street and the alley running through’ block 5 under the
Montgomery Dedication.

With reference to the first specification appellants argue that
even though Martha Mae Montgomery dedicated to the public
use forever all streets, avenues and alleys described in the plat
there is no evidence in the record to prove that the dedication
was complete or that there was an acceptance by the public of
such dedication. In support of this proposition is cited the case
of Hille v. Nill, 58 ND 536, 226 NW 635. The facts under con-
sideration in that case differ materially from the facts in the
case at bar. In that case no streets or alleys were ever opened or
improved in any manner. In the case at bar it is admitted that

2904 |

the center of Linden Street has been graded to a width of from
27 to 30 feet and that it is being maintained by the city of Grand
Forks.

“An acceptance will generally be presumed where the use of
the dedicated property is shown to be beneficial; and if the
dediéation is very beneficial or necessary to the public, accept-
ance will be implied from very slight cireumstances. Acceptance
of an offer to dedicate may be also presumed from the fact that
all of the steps prescribed -by statutory provisions governing
dedication have been'taken by the owner, and this presumption
is strengthened by the fact that steps permitting revocation of
the offer of dedication have not been subsequently taken. An ac-
ceptance of dedicated property may be presumed from action
of public authorities in assigning of hands to the maintenance
and repair of such property.” 26 CJS Dedication Sec. 45, page
117. .

The subject of dedication and acceptance was before the .su-
preme court of California in the case of Sacramento County v.
Lauszus et al, 161 Pac2d 460, 70 Cal App2d 639. In that case
the court discussed the distinction between an offer to dedicate
and a complete dedication. We quote from the opinion:

“It may be conceded, as contended by appellants, that as a
general principle of law a mere offer to dedicate land to public
purposes does not become effective until same has been accepted.
(Numerous Citations) .

However, it is said in 9 Cal Jur page 53, See. 41, that ‘An im-
portant distinction is to be observed between a complete dedica-
tion and a mere offer to dedicate. In the case of a complete dedi-
cation no acceptance is required, it being presumed from the
benefits arising from the dedication,’ ”

In the case of Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal 48, 28 Pac 839,
16 LRA 145, the court said: “It (dedication) results from the
acts of the owner of the land, coupled with the intent with which
che does those acts. It may be express and completed by a single
act, as when the land is dedicated by deed; or it may be implied
from a series of acts, as when the owner subdivides a tract of
land into blocks and streets, and causes a map of such subdivi-

De 295

sion to be recorded and sells the several subdivisions which
front upon those streets.”

The Montgomery Dedication is complete and absolute in its
terms. It declares:

“T hereby dedicate to the public use forever all streets, avenues
and alleys shown thereon.”

The plat which contained the dedication was filed in the office.
of the register of deeds of Grand Forks County as required by
law, and it does not appear that any action was ever taken by
the dedicator to revoke the dedication. Furthermore if any
affirmative action of acceptance were required, such action was
in fact taken by the city in grading and maintaining the street
and keeping it open for public use. .

It is also admitted on the record that in 1946 Arthur Hegness
and wife brought action in district court against Harry D. Wood
and others to quiet title to the alley in block 5, and the west 20
feet of said-Linden Street, adjoining lot 5 of block 5 in said Lin-
coln Park View Addition. The city of Grand Forks contested
the action, and the trial court quieted title in the city. The action
of the city of Grand Forks in contesting said action and obtaining
judgment would indicate that it had not abandoned the street
and alley involved, but considered them open to public use in
accordance with the Montgomery Dedication. We are satisfied
that upon the record the Montgomery Dedication was complete
and that there was sufficient acceptance thereof by the public.

Under the second specification appellants contend that the
proceedings had for vacating the alley through ‘block 5 and re-
ducing the width of Linden Street constituted substantial com-
pliance with Sections 3962 and 3963 Compiled Laws of North
Dakota for 1913 which read as follows:

Section 3962. “Any plat of any town, village or city or addition
thereto or any subdivision of land may be vacated by the pro-
prietors thereof at any time before the sale of any lots therein
by written instrument declaring the same to be vacated, duly
executed, acknowledged or proved and recorded in the same of-
fice with the plat to be vacated; and the executing and recording
of such writing shall operate to destroy the force and effect of
the recording of the plat so vacated, and to divest all public

296 De |

rights in the streets, alleys, commons and public grounds laid
out as described in such plat, . .

Section 3963. “Any part of a plat may be vacated under the
provisions and subject to the conditions of this article; provided,
such'vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the.rights and
privileges of other proprietors in said plat; and -provided.
further, that nothing contained in this section shall authorize the
closing or obstructing of any public highways laid out according
to law.”

The statutes quoted apply to towns, villages and cities and
make no reference to any action by county commissioners. It is
admitted that the petition involved here. was neither acknowl-
edged nor proved. It included property within the corporate
limits ofthe city of Grand Forks. It was presented to the board
of county commissioners, which had no authority to act thereon.
In fact the petition and proceedings thereunder did not comply
with the provisions of the statutes quoted in any respect.

The general rule is that the rights of the public to highways
can be divested only by some method authorized by law and by
a full and substantial compliance therewith.

In the case of Ramstad v. Carr, 31-ND 504, 154 NW 195, LRA
1916B, 1160, this court said;

“The statutes of this state fix not only the-method in which
a dedication may be effected by the filing of a plat; but they also
prescribe the manner in, and conditions under, which the ‘plat
may be vacated and the dedication revoked. Compl. Laws, Secs.
3959-3966. See also Lamoure v. Lasell, 26 ND 638, 145 NW 577.

As the dedication was made by the statutory method of filing
a plat, and the sale of lots by the owner with reference thereto,
it could be withdrawn only by a vacation of the plat under the
statute. Kimball v, Chicago, 253 Ill 105, 97 NE 257, 259. See
also McQuillin, Mun. Corp. Sees. 1562 and 1592; and Burrougiis
y. Cherokee, 134 Iowa 429, 109 NW 876. In the case at bar the
owners had made no attempt ‘to withdraw the dedication by va-
eating the plat,—or in any other manner. The offer to dedicate
remained in full force at the -time of acceptance thereof by the
municipal officers.”

a 297

In the case of Shapera v. Allegheny County, 344 Pa 473, 25
A2d 566, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvauia said:

“Since, as already indicated, public highways are within the
control of the commonwealth and counties and townships do not
have any common-law power to build or improve roads, it is
well settled that the statutory directions for their creation and
abolishment must be strictly complied with.”

It is clear that the petition and the proceedings had there-
under for vacating said alley in block 5 and reducing the width
of Linden Street did not comply with the requirements of section
3962 supra and must be therefore held to be void.

Some reference is made to the plat prepared and filed by
S. B. E. Seese by which he rearranged lots 9 to 24 which he
owned in block 5. This plat shows Linden Street 20 feet wide
and the alley in block 5 eliminated. This plat appears to be
made under the provisions of section 40-5027 and on the assump-
tion that the attempted vacation proceedings by the county com-
missioners were valid. It is admitted that none of the persons
owning lots adjoining Linden Street, other than Seese, joined
in or consented to the plat as required by section 3963 Compiled
Laws of North Dakota for 1913, (now section 40-5024 NDRC
1943.) However, since the vacation proceedings were void the
Seese plat was wholly ineffective for the purpose of vacating the
alley or reducing the width of the street involved.

Finally appellants contend that the principle of estoppel ap-
plies to the cause of action of the plaintiff city of Grand Forks
upon the following grounds:

1. No proof of dedication as a highway to public use of Linden
Court or the alley in Block 5 prior to petition for vacation of
Nov. 18, 1934.

2. Long and continuous use and oceupancy of the east 20-feet
of Linden Court on the part of the owners of all the lots in Block
4 in reliance on the vacation proceedings of November 13, 1934.
8. The apparent payment of taxes on the part.of all the own-
ers of the lots in Block 4 and the added 20 feet vacated from Lin-
den Court for at least 10 years prior to. the commencement of
this action.

4. Petition for vacation of November 13, 1934, being signed

298 De

by all the owhers of all of the lots in Blocks 4 and 5, and the sub-
sequent filing of such Petition or declaration of vacation more
than 10 years prior'to the commencement of this action.” +

5. The planting of valuable flowers, shrubbery, and trees, and
the construction of permanent fences by some of the owners in
Block 4 along or near the west line of the 20 feet of Linden
Court which was properly vacated in reliance on such vacation
proceedings. * .

6. No prior action on the part of the City or any’municipal
body or official requesting the owners of all the lots in-Block 4
to move their garbage cans, shrubbery, trees, flowers’ or fences
or improvements.

7. The location of‘ permanent power and light and telephone
poles on the 20 feet of Linden Court which it is contended was
properly vacated. .

8. The failure on the part of the City or any municipal body to
open Linden Court to’ the width of 60 feet which is claimed.

9. The apparent granting of a building permit on the’ part of
the City of Grand Forks to construct a garage on. part of the
alley in Block 5 (Montgomery Plat.)

Grounds 1, 2 and’ 4 are based on the alleged vacation proceed-
ings of November 13, 1934, but are without merit since’ we have
held that said proceedings were void.’ No. 3 is without merit.
It is established by-the record that the lots in blocks 4 and 5 were
assessed and taxed upon their dimensions as sliown by the Mont-
gomery Dedication and no additional taxes were’ ever assessed’
and levied on the 20 foot strips on each'side of Linden Street:

The remaining grounds aré based upon ‘the ‘conterition that
the plaintiff city has never taken any affirmative’ action to*
asswme jurisdiction and dominion over the street and alley in
question. As we have pointed out elsewhere in this opinion the
city of Grand Forks improved and graded the street and is’
maintaining it and it is used by the public for street purposes.
In the case of MeCoy'v. Thompson, 84 Ore 141, 164 Pac 589, it
was held: :

“That neither a formal acceptance by the county nor' the: itn:*
mediate opening and improvement of a street are essential to!
complete an irrevocable dedication.”

es 299

And in McQuillin. Mun. Corp. 3rd Ed. Vol. 11, page 698, Dedi-
cation, section 33.47, the rule as to acceptance is stated as fol-
lows: ~ —

“Acceptance may be express or implied. It need not be by
formal act, unless otherwise provided by statute or character.
It may arise: (1) by express act; (2) by implication fromthe
acts of municipal officers; and (3) by implication from user by
the public for the purposes.for which the property was dedicated.
The acceptance may be by the legislature, officers: of the mu-
nicipality, or, according to the prevailing view, by the public
atlarge. It may be shown in many ways by any act with respect
to the property claimed to be dedicated that clearly indicates an
intent on the part of the public to treat the dedication as accept-
able by it, for example, assumption of jurisdiction and dominion
over it by the public authorities. There need be but little af-
firmative action. to indicate an intention to accept a dedication.
So there need not be any affirmative action on the part of the
municipal authorities.

To constitute an acceptance the property dedicated need not
be in the actual use or occupation of the public.”

And in the case of Ramstad y. Carr, 81 ND 504, 154 NW 195,
LRA1916B 1160, we said:

“As an acceptance may be accomplished either by a formal
acceptance, or may be implied from any acts on the part of the
municipality with respect to the property dedicated that clearly
indicate an assumption of jurisdiction and dominion over it;
so a rejection of the dedication may be manifested either by a
formal xejection on the part of the municipality, or may be im-
plied from acts on the part of the municipality which clearly
indicate an intention to reject the property dedicated. That
is, the:conduct of the muncipality may be such that a change
of its position would cause such injustice to private persons who
had relied upon such conduct as to warrant the courts in ap-
plying the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais against the
municipality andthe public, to prevent manifest injustice and
wrong to those who relied upon and were misled by the conduct
of the municipality and the public; but to create such estoppel
something more must be shown than a mere failure on the part

300 Ee

of the municipality to formally accept and use the property for
its intended purpose, before the growth or expansion of the
municipality has made it necessary or desirable to apply the
property to the purpose for which it was dedicated.”

We are satisfied that it is sufficiently established by the evi-
dence that the plaintiff city of Grand Forks has taken affirmative
action for the purpose of maintaining the street and alley in
question for public use, and that the judgment of the trial court
is fully sustained by the record.

The judgment is affirmed.

Morais, C. J. and Curistianson, Grimson and Burxs, JJ. con-

cur.
a

[File No. 7329]

MADS PETERSON, Respondent, v. MITCHELL BOBER, Ap-
pellant.

(56 NW2d 331)

408

Opinion filed December 19, 1952

for appellant.

G.O. Brekke and Richard H. McGee, for respondent.

304 ee

Grimson, J. This is an action to recover damages alleged
to have been sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of
the defendant in driving his automobile upon and over the plain-
tiff as he was crossing a street in the City of Minot. The de-
fendant makes general denial except he admits the accident. - He
pleads contributory negligence and that the plaintiff is not the
real party in‘interest. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case
and again at the conclusion of the entire case the defendant moved
for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant and for a dis-
nissal of the action on the ground that the plaintiff had wholly
failed to sustain the allegations of his comjlaint, and on the
further ground that the evidence showed-the plaintiff had been
guilty of contributory negligence. Both motions were denied.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant
then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a
new trial. That motion was denied. Thereafter defendant
moved for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
That motion was denied. This appeal is from the judgment and

Es 305

from the order denying defendant’s motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or for a new trial and from the order
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial upon newly dis-
covered evidence.

The evidence discloses that on a Saturday night, Oct. 21, 1950,
about 8 o’clock P.M. the defendant was driving a new Cadillac
automobile in a northerly direction on the viaduct over the
Great Northern Railway and the Mouse River ou Second Street
Northwest, in the City of Minot. He had his driving lights
turned on low beam for city driving. His car was in good order
and with four wheel brakes. “Whiteway” lights along the via-
duct, each of about 600 candle power were burning. One of
said lights was on the east side about 8 feet south of the foot
of the viaduct and another one about 150 feet further south along
the street on the east side of the viaduct. On the west side the
lights were placed to alternate with those on the east side.
The plaintiff was walking north along the sidewalk on the east
side of the driveway on said viaduct. Separating the sidewalk
from the driveway is a railing, a thin, iron wall 333 inches high.
At the foot of the viaduct Third Avenue Northwest makes a
“T? intersection with Second St. NW. That is, Third Ave.
NW branches off Second St. NW at that point towards the
west but does not extend east beyond Second St. NW. One light
post was located by the iron railing separating the sidewalk
from the driveway within about 8 feet of the foot of the viaduct.
Tt had been raining or misting earlier in the evening and de-
fendant claims the blocks in-the pavement on the viaduct were
icy. The defendant claims he had stopped his car on the top
of the viaduct intending to make a left turn down the west wing
of the viaduct on Second Ave. NW. He gave that up on account
of the oncoming traffic and continued down the incline of the via-
duct some 200 feet. When the plaintiff reached the foot of the
viaduct he turned west to his left intending to cross Second St.
NW. He claims he looked both north and south on Second St.
NW., noticing cars coming from the north but attempted to cross
before they came. When he reached almost the center of the
street he was hit by the defendant’s car, which he had not seen,

306 Ee

coming from the south. Defendant admits that he had not seen
plaintiff on the sidewalk but claims that he looked ahead and
first saw the plaintiff when he came “stumbling” out from behind
the railing on the viaduct about 12 feet ahead of him. He claims
he put on the brakes and “cramped the wheel to the right” but
he hit the plaintiff with his left, front bumper and fender, knocked
him down and injured him severely. He admits that if he could
have straightened his car out he would have had room to pass
plaintiff on the east with a few inches to spare. He claims he
had been going at a speed of 10 to 15 miles an hour and that he
got his car stopped-within two feet beyond the point of collision.
One policeman testified that defendant had claimed water on his
windshield had obscured his vision. The police and ambulance
came and took the plaintiff to the hospital where it was found
that he had sustained traumatic shock, a compound, comminuted
fracture of the lower left leg two inches above the ankle joint,
lineal skull fracture in the left temple region and had suffered a
severe concussion of the.brain. There is some conflict in the
testimony as to where the plaintiff lay after the collision. The
defendant claims plaintiff lay about 10 or 12 feet from the east
curb of the street. The police testify that he lay in the center
of the street, 15 or 17 feet from the east curb, “the feet in line
owith the bottom of the viaduct and the rest of the body upon
the viaduct on the slope itself.” There is some testimony that
the plaintiff smelled of liquor as he was picked up and that a
half-pint bottle of whiskey, partially consumed, dropped out of
his pocket as he was being taken into the elevator at the hospital.

The appellant claims the trial court erred in denying the mo-
tions for a directed verdict and for a dismissal on account of
insufficiency of the evidence and because of contribuory negli-
gence of the defendant. Before such motion can be granted the
evidence must show that the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment upon the merits as a matter of law. Negligence is ordi-
narily a question of fact and becomes a question of law only
when but one conclusion can be drawn from the facts. The
questions of negligence and proximate cause become a question
of law only when the evidence is such that different minds

Es 307

cannot reasonably draw different conclusions either as to the
facts or as to the deductions from the facts. Pachl v. Officer,
ante, 148, 54 NW2d 883; State ex rel. Brazerol v. Yellow Cab
Company, 62 ND 733, 245 NW 382 and cases cited. ‘ First State
Bank v. Kelly, 30 ND 84, 98, 152 NW 125, Ann Cas 1917D 1044.

Defendant contends that the only negligence by the defendant
alleged in the complaint is excessive speed and that there is no
evidence to sustain that allegation. The complaint contains a
general allegation that “said defendant negligently drove, man-
aged, operated and ran his said automobile upon and against
and over the plaintiff . . . .” Then follows a statement of
plaintiff's injuries and damages after which it is alleged that
“at said time and place defendant so negligently handled, man-
aged, operated and controlled his said automobile, which was
then driven by said defendant at an excessive rate of speed
and without regard for plaintiff’s safety, and so as to cause
the injuries above: set forth.’ Liberally construed that com-
plaint alleges not only excessive speed but negligence in the
operation of the automobile without due regard for plaintiff’s
safety. Under that’ complaint evidence was introduced and
admitted without objection to show the defendant’s failure to
observe the plaintiff as he walked down the sidewalk of the via-
duct which would have been necessary for the due regard to
plaintiff's safety. That may be construed to show defendant’s
failure to keep a proper lookout.

Defendant admits that he did not see plaintiff walking along
the sidewalk. He admits the pavement was wet and icy. He
wag on a down grade. There was much traffic over’ the high-
way. Defendant was well acquainted with the location and use
of that viaduct. He says he was driving 10 to 15 miles an hour.
He was unable to stop when the emergency, which well could
have been anticipated under the existing conditions, arose.

The evidence on these matters was properly received under
the complaint. From that-evidence the jury could draw infer-
ences as to whether the ‘defendant was driving at the proper
speed under the circumstances, (Sec. 39-0901 NDRC 1943)
whether he had proper control of his car and whether he
maintained a proper lookout.

308 a

The evidence on plaintiffs contributory negligence shows that
he walked into the street without noticing defendant’s car com-
ing down the viaduct incline. There is some evidence from which
the inference can be drawn that he was partially under the in-
fluence of liquor. He, however, got almost half way across the
street and there was room for the defendant to pass between
him and the east curb.

Thus there is evidence from which an inference of negligence
can be drawn on the part of both plaintiff-and defendant. We
are of the opinion different minds may reasonably draw differ-
ent conclusions as to the negligence of each of the ‘parties and
as to whose negligence was the contributory cause of the accident.

We conclude that the questions of negligence of the defendant
and of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff were matters
for the jury and that the denial of the motions for a directed
verdict and for a dismissal on the ground of the insufficiency of
the evidence was proper. Neither was there any error in the
denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial on that ground.

Defendant contends that there were two errors in the instruc:
tions of the court. He complains of the instruction given by
the court on the right of way of the pedestrian crossing the high-
way within a clearly marked cross walk or regular pedestrian
crossing. The evidence, however, shows that such a crossing
did exist at the foot of the viaduct and the jury was properly in-
structed on the pedestrian’s right of way.

Another alleged error in the instructions concerns the state-
ment of the court as to the plaintiff's complaint. The court did
not read the complaint to the jury but stated the substance
thereof. We find no error therein.

Defendant assigns several errors by the court in refusing to
give his requested instructions. He makes no argument on
such alleged errors and they may be presumed to have been
waived. We find, however, by examination of the court’s in-
structions that the subject matters of all those requests, which
he was entitled to have given to the jury, were adequately cov-
ered in the instructions.

In his answer the defendant alleges that the plaintiff was not

be . 309

the real party in interest. Defendant assigns as error the refusal
of the court to allow him to prove an assignment of this claim
on the cross examination of one of plaintiff’s witnesses. As a
part of his case plaintiff had called the public administrator
of Ward County, who had been appointed to take charge of
plaintiff’s affairs during his illness, to show the plaintiff’s hospi-
tal-and doctor bills that he had paid. On cross examination
defendant attempted to show by that witness an assignment of
a claim for damages to the Railway Retirement Board. Plain-
tiff objected to‘that question as improper order of proof and
improper cross examination.

It is clear that this was an attempt by the defendant to prove
his affirmative defense on that cross examination. The only
matter in the direct examination under which defendant claims
to have a right to cross examine along that line was the question:
“And did you look after his business”? Ans: “I did” and the
witnéss’ voluntary. statement later, “From the date of my ap-
pointment I looked after his ‘financial affairs during his illness.”
This occurred while plaintiff was laying his foundation for the
introduction of the bills. That direct examination cannot be
considered as sufficient upon which to‘base a cross-examination
of the alleged assignment of the claim to prove defendant’s
affirmative defense. Schnase v. Goetz, 18 ND 594, 120 NW 553, is
cited by plaintiff in support of his contention but in that case
the cross examination was on the same particular subject as
had been brought out on direct examination. It was also con-
cerning the conviction of the witness of a crime which is al-
ways admissible on cross examination as bearing on the.credi-
bility of the witness. -‘The cross examination and the order of
proof are clearly within the discretion of the court. La Mar v.
La Mar, 135 Cal App 693, 28 P2d 63; City of Philadelphia v.
Stange, 103 Pa Super 275, 157 A 358; Kelly v. Halox, 256 Mass
5, 152 NE 236. The defendant failed to recall the public admin-
istrator on his defense to show such an assignment in support.
of his affirmative defense. Under the circumstances. he cannot
be said to have been prejudiced by the ruling of the court.

Error is assigned on the overruling of defendant’s objection
to any further evidence on the part of the plaintiff after he

310 Dn

admitted that he did not-remember anything after the collision.
The testimony brought out after that admission was as to matters
that occurred before the collision and his general knowledge of
the viaduct and roads leading to and from his home. No attempt
was made to go into what happened after the collision with this
witness. The court instructed the jury that “In determining
the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses you will
take into consideration their intelligence, strength and weak-
ness of their recollection, the mental capacity for knowing, their
means of knowing, that about which they testify . . . .” The
continuation of the examination of plaintiff with this cautionary
instruction to tke jury could not have been prejudicial to the
defendant. .

The specification that excessive damages appear to have been
allowed by the jury under the influence of passion and prejudice
was not argued in the brief and is deemed to have been aban-
doned on appeal. Olson v. Armour & Co. 68 ND 272, 280 NW
200.

: Finally, defendant assigns error on the refusal of the trial
court to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.

This ‘court has repeatedly held that the granting of a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is a matter
largely discretionary with the trial court. Pengilly v. J. 1.
Case Threshing Machine Co. 11 ND 249, 91 NW 63; McGregor
v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 31 ND 471, 154 NW 261, Ann Cas
1917H 141; Keystone Grain Co. v. Johnson, 38 ND 562, 165
NW 977; Eckstrand v. Johnson, 40 ND 294, 168 NW 824; Farm-
ets State Bank of Cathay v. Jeske, 50 ND 813, 197 NW 854;
Security State Bank of Strasburg v. Kramer, 51 ND 20, 198 NW
679; Pace v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau,
51 ND 815, 201 NW 348; Baird v. Unterseher, 57 ND 885, 224
NW 306; Webster v. Ek, 62 ND 44, 241 NW 503; Derrick v.
Klein, 64 ND 438, 253 NW 70; Olson v. Carlson, 69 ND 732, 290
NW 243; Valencia v. Markham Co-operative Association, 210
Minn 221, 297 NW 736.

Applications for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence should be scanned carefully for a showing

|

Le sil

of diligence: Braithwaite v. Aiken, 2 ND 57, 49 NW 419; Eller
v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 230 Iowa 1255, 300 NW 535;
Shivers v. Palmer, 59 Cal App2d ‘572, 139 P2d 952; McGregor
v. G.N. Ry. Co., supra.

Judge Christianson in the opinion of this court in the case
of Aylmer v. Adams, 30 ND 514, 153 NW 419, thoroughly dis-
cusses the duties of the trial court and the principles to be con-
sidered by the court in passing on the application for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. He says:
“The discretion vested in a trial court in the determination of
such motions is based on the theory ‘that the judge who tries
a case, having the parties, their witnesses and counsel, before
him, with opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct:
during the trial, and note all incidents ‘occurring during its
progress likely to affect the result thereof, is better qualified to
judge whether a fair trial has been had and substantial justice
done than the appellate tribunal . . . . It is generally con-
sidered that no arbitrary or inflexible rule can be laid down,
but that the question of whether or not the trial court's dis-
eretion in granting or denying a new trial was properly’ ex-
ercised will largely depend upon the peculiar circumstances of
each case. .

” “Motions for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence . .. are addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and whether’ they should be granted or refused involves
the inquiry whether substantial justice has been done, the court
having in view solely the attainment of that end. Barrett v.
Third Ave. R. Co. 45 NY 632; Glassford v. Lewis, 82 Hun 46,
31 NY Supp 162. Thé-discretion to be exercised is legal and not
arbitrary. Carpenter v. Coe (NY) 67 Barb 411; Platt v. Munroe
(NY) 34 Barb 291.” Bayles on New Trials and Appeals, 2d Hd
por. .

Our statute provides: “That the newly discovered evidence
must be material to the party making the application.” 28-1902
Sub. Sec. 4, NDRC 1943. On this it is said in Aylmer v. Adams,
supra, that: “In determining the materiality and sufficiency of
the evidence, it is frequently suggested that such:evidence must
bé of such character that it will probably change the result upon

312 —

a retrial. The reason for this is obvious. A new trial should
not be granted as a mere empty ceremony. Hence, necessarily
a trial court before granting a new trial should be satisfied that
the former verdict was unjust, and that the newly discovered evi-
dence, when weighed with the evidence received at the trial,
will probably result in a different verdict upon the retrial.

The presumption is that the verdict of a jury is right,
but if the unsuccessful party discovers after trial new evidence
which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial, of such character as to convince the
court that an injustice has been done, and that a new trial
probably will change the result, then a new trial should be
granted.”

“To constitute sufficient ground for a new trial, newly dis-

covered evidence must not only be relevant and material to
the principal issues in the case, but must be sufficiently strong
to make it probable that a different result would be obtained in
another trial. . . . A dispute as to whether the new evi-
dence has this probative effect is to he determined primarily by
the trial court in its discretion. Nor will a reversal be ordered
unless an abuse of discretion is disclosed.” 39 Am Jur New Trial,
sec. 165,-p 172.
: The primary question before the Supreme Court on an appeal
from a decision of the trial court on an application for-a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying or granting the ap-
plication. Jensen v.-Clausen, 34 ND 637, 159 NW 30; Standard
Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 54 ND 31, 208 NW 555; Van Nice v. Chris-
tian Reformed Church of Hull, 59 ND 564, 231 NW-604; King
v: Consolidated Products Co. 159 Kan 608, 157 P2d 541, 158
ALR 1248; Larson v. Rustad, 66 ND 261, 264 NW 526.

“In the reviewing tribunal the weight and credibility of testi-
mony will only be considered with a view to determine whether
the order made in an inferior court, when acting within the
domain of discretion was or was not an abuse of discretion.”
Aylmer v. Adams, supra.

“While it may be difficult to define exactly what is meant by
abuse of judicial discretion, and whatever ‘it may imply as

Es 318

to the disposition and motives of the judge, it is fairly deduci-
ble from the cases that one of its essential attributes is that it
must plainly appear to effect injustice.” Clavey v. Lord, 87 Cal
413, 25 P 493.

Testing the newly discovered evidence by these principles,
can we say trial court abused its discretion in denying a new
trial?’ We have held there was evidence to support the ver-
dict. The jury could, perhaps, have rendered a verdict either
way. In neither case could we say the jury erred or that an
injustice was done.

The trial court stated that there was a serious question as
to whether due diligence had been shown in the obtaining of
the evidence. There is some merit to that conclusion. It is
doubtful if due diligence was shown. Braithwaite v. Aiken, 2
ND 57, 49 NW 419; Shivers v. Palmer, 59 Cal App2d 572, 139
P2d 952. The court, however, does not decide this motion on
that ground but on the merits of the evidence disclosed by the
affidavit of the new witness, That affidavit reads as follows:

“Fred Baehm, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that
he is a resident of Minot, Ward County, North Dakota, and
has been for approximately 20 years; that he is employed by
the Minot Roofing Company; that he is 52 years of age and
married;

That on the evening when the accident occurred between
Mitchell Bober and Mads Peterson, this affiant was walking
homeward in a northerly direction along the west side of the
Second Street Viaduct, in the City of Minot, Ward County,
North Dakota; there were many cars moving northward along
the viaduct following close to each other, and moving very
slowly, not to exceed 10 miles per hour; the cars had their
lights on and the street lights were on; the weather was nice;
this affiant was attracted to the traffic because of the unusual
number of cars, and was watching them as he walked along;
suddenly one of the cars put.on its brakes and stopped at the
foot of the viaduct and this affiant noticed a pedestrian coming
off the east sidewalk to cross over to the west side; when the
car stopped, the pedestrian stepped back on the walk; the car
commenced to move, the pedestrian stepped back again to the

‘

a4 ee

sidewalk; the pedestrian then started to walk along the side-
walk in a northerly direction and on the east sidewalk; he
walked about 15 feet, and then stepped out into the traffic again
to cross; the car was moving slowly; the pedestrian stepped
out in front of it, he went down to the pavement and rolled out
like a ball from between the front and back wheel of the car on
the left hand side of the car, and rolled away from the car in
a southerly direction, and then straightened out on the pavement
with his head toward the east; the car stopped immediately;
it was going not over five miles per hour; this affiant went over
to where the plaintiff lay; he saw that the pedestrian was a man
whom he had seen many times in beer parlors and recognized
as a man whom he had never seen in a sober condition, altho
he saw him about once a week; there was some little time
elapsed before the ambulance came; when it came someone
asked the pedestrian what hospital he wanted to be taken to,
and he said, ‘Please take me home;’ That by this time the driver
had moved the car a short distance to let the traffic go past;
when the car stopped the first time immediately after the acci-
dent, it was near the pedestrian on the pavement, and not more
than four feet from the east curb;

The pedestrian walked with a peculiar gait, sort of a stumbling
walk.” .

Regarding this affidavit trial court says: “The court feels that
the newly discovered evidence is not apt to change the result of
the lawsuit.” The court bases this in part at least,-on that
part of the affidavit where affiant says that he saw an automobile
come to a stop at the foot of the viaduct when a pedestrian had
stepped off the east sidewalk to cross to the west side; that the
pedestrian stepped back on the walk and walked along the
sidewalk in a northerly direction 15 feet while the automobile
started moving slowly; that the pedestrian then stepped again
into the street in front of the car and was run over. The
court calls attention to the fact that this is in direct conflict with
the testimony of the defendant himself, who had claimed at the
trial that he did not see anybody along the sidewalk and not
until an instant before the collision and the court says: “If
the new witness’ story is correct, the court does not understand

Le 318

at all how it would be possible for the defendant to strike and
hit the plaintiff without being careless.” On that theory the
new evidence was not material to the defendant who is asking
for a new trial to present this evidence.

‘The evidence of this new witness as indicated in the affidavit
would contradict almost every witness that testified in the case.
It places the accident in a different place from that to which
both plaintiff and defendant testified. It gives an entirely new
and different version of the action of the parties leading up to
the accident. Inference from this newly discovered evidence is
that the plaintiff stepped out from the sidewalk to cross the
street; that the defendant saw plaintiff and stopped his car;
that the plaintiff then stepped back to the sidewalk and walked
aloug for 15 feet into the intersection and then again stepped
into the street. In the meantime according to this affidavit the
defendant again started his car driving slowly, apparently
behind the plaintiff and at the end of the 15 feet overtook him
and ran over him in the intersection; that his car then was not
more than four feet from the east curb. For this to happen both
plaintiff and defendant, who moments before had taken pre-
caution to avoid a collision, and necessarily must then have
seen each other, now in travelling the short space of 15 feet
had so completely forgotten each other’s presence that the col-
lision actually occurred.

Furthermore, according to the affidavit plaintiff walked not
only the 15 feet but far enough into the street so as to be hit by
the left front fender of defendant’s car. There was apparently
a space of 4 feet between the car and the east curb. To reach
the left front fender plaintiff would walk at least 3 feet further
or 7 feet in all from the east curb. The plaintiff would then
have walked 15 feet on the sidewalk and 7 feet into the street
or 22 feet in all while defendant drove his car 15 feet at the rate
of 5 miles an hour. That seems somewhat improbable. If true,
defendant would have had a clear space of about 7 feet in which
to pass the plaintiff on the east side had he been watching.

This testimony does not seem to make the defendant’s con-
tentions any more clear. Considered with the testimony given
at the trial different minds could still reasonably draw different

316 De

conclusions as to who was to blame and whose negligence was ‘a
contributing cause of the accident. It would still be a matter for
the jury and verdict again for the plaintiff could ‘still be sus-
tained.

“Whether a new trial ought to.be granted is primarily a ques-
tion for the trial court. The function of this court on appeal
is merely to review the ruling of the trial court on the motion,
and such review is limited to a determination of whether the
trial court abused its discretion and effected an injustice by
denying a new trial. The discretion vested in the trial court
should always be exercised in the interests of justice. The
presumption is that it was so exercised.” TEckstrand v. John-
son, 40 ND 294, 297, 168 NW 824. :

Evidently the trial court was of the opinion that substantial
justice had been accomplished at the former trial and that the
interests of justice would not be served by granting a new
trial on the newly discovered evidence. We do not find that
the trial court abused its discretion in that decision.

Finding no prejudicial error in the record the orders and
judgment of the district court are affirmed.

Mornis, C. J., and Curistianson, Sarurs and Burxs, JJ.,.con-
cur.
a

[File No. 7261]

IRENE M. KNUDSEN, Respondent, v. FRANCIS ARENDT,
Appellant.

(66 NW2d 340)

Opinion filed December 19, 1952.

Day, Lundberg, Stokes, Vaaler & Gillig, for appellant.
Edgar P. Mattson, for plaintiff.

Burks, J. In this action plaintiff: sought to recover damages
sustained because of the death of-her husband in a collision be-
tween two automobiles. In her complaint she alleged that her
husband’s death was due to injuries proximately caused by the
negligence of the defendant. The defendant in his answer
denied any negligence on his part and alleged contributory negli-
gence on the part of plaintifi’s decedent. Trial of the action, re-

318 |

sulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. During the
trial defendant had moved for a directed verdict. This motion
was denied. After judgment defendant moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial.
This motion was also denied. Defendant has now appealed from
the order denying the alternative motion and from the judg-
ment.

The collision between the car driven by plaintiff's decedent
and that driven by the defendant occurred at the intersection
of two secondary highways in Wells County. The highways
intersect at right angles and both have gravelled surfaces,
Immediately prior to the collision plaintiff’s decedent was ap-
proaching this intersection from the north and the defendant
was approaching from the west. The time was two o’clock in
the afternoon. The day was clear. From a point a quarter of
a mile north of the intersection to the intersection the driver
approaching from the north had a continuous and unobstructed.
view of the highway to the west of the intersection for a distance
of a half mile west from the intersection. The drivers were
alone in their cars. Plaintiff’s decedent died as a result of his
injuries and defendant testified that, as a result of his injuries,
he has no recollection whatever of the collision or of the events
immediately preceding it. There were no other witnesses to the
collision. Both highways are section line roads. The north and
south highway has a gravelled surface 25 feet wide and the east
and west highway a gravelled surface 22 feet wide. Sheriff .
Larson of Wells County, who investigated the accident, arrived
upon the scene about a half hour after he was called. By the
time he arrived a number of cars and “quite a few people” had
gathered there. He testified that neither car had left identifi-
able tracks in approaching the intersection, that there was a
gouge in the intersection about a foot long, four or five inches
wide and about an inch deep, and that this gouge was “probably
a bit to the south of the center of the east and west road . . .
not over a foot or two at the most.” A highway patrolman, O.
W. Burgess, testified that the gouge commenced about 9 feet
south of the north line of the east and west road and about two
feet in from the west side of the north and south road. Both

a 319

witnesses agrecd as to the location of the two cars after the
accident. The car driven by plaintifi’s decedent was on its side
headed east, in the ditch of the east and west road at a point 66
feet from the gouge in the road. Defendant’s car was upright in
the southeast corner of the intersection and headed southwest
at a point 36 feet from the gouge.

Photographs of the damaged cars show that the point of
greatest damage to defendant’s car was the left side of the
front end, extending from the left side to about the center of
the grill and that the point of greatest damage to decedent’s
car was on the front end of the right side. There is evidence in
the record from which it may be inferred that prior to the acci-
dent the speed of decedent’s car was between thirty and forty
miles per hour and that of defendant’s car between forty and
fifty miles per hour. There is no evidence that either car ex-
ceeded the speed of fifty miles per hour.

Appellant’s first specification of error is that the trial court
erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. Upon a review of an order denying a motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict the question is whether the
party making the motion was entitled to a directed verdict at
the time the motion for a directed verdict was made and upon
consideration of such question this court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to opposing party. Smith v. Nortz
Lumber Co., 72 ND 353, 7 NW2d 435; Bormann v. Beckman, 73
ND 720, 19 NW2d 455; Kohler v. Stephens, 74 ND 655, 24 NW2d
64; Glaserud v. Hoff, 75 ND 311, 27 NW2d 305.

What happened in this case must be deduced by inference
from meager evidence offered. The inferences most favorable
to the plaintiff would permit a conclusion that plaintiff’s de-
cedent approached the intersection in question from the north
at a speed of between thirty and forty miles an hour; that de-
fendant approached the intersection from the west at a speed of
between forty and fifty miles an hour; that each driver had a
clear and unobstructed view of the other for a distance of a
quarter of a mile before reaching the intergection, that the time
was two o’clock in the afternoon of a bright day; that the car
driven by decedent entered the intersection a fraction of a second

320 Le

ahead of the car driven by defendant, that the left side of the
front end of the car driven by defendant collided with the front
end of the right side of the car driven by decedent just as the
front end of decedent’s car crossed the center of the intersection.
Upon this view of the evidence could the jury find that de-
fendant was negligent and that decedent was free from con-
tributory negligence?

The negligence alleged by plaintiff was (1) that defendant
failed to keep a proper lookout; (2) that he drove at an exces-
sive speed; (3) that he failed to give way when decedent entered
the intersection first. Defendant alleged that decedent negli-
gently ignored the statutory rule as to right of way and failed
to keep his car under control.

There is no evidence in the record as to the lookout kept by
either driver except such as may be contained in the inference
that the accident would not have happened if they had kept a
proper lookout. That inference is equally applicable to both
drivers and there is no basis upon which a jury could found a
conclusion that one driver kept a proper lookout and the other
did not.

Unless otherwise prescribed by the Highway Commissioner
the speed limit upon highways through open country when the
view is unobstructed is fifty miles an hour. Section 39-0902 (8)
1949 Supplement NDRC 1943. There is no evidence from which
the jury could find that either driver exceeded that limit. There
is also no evidence of special circumstances such as fog, dust,
heavy traffic or any other considerations which would require the
drivers to reduce their speeds to less than the legal limit.

With respect to right of way Section 39-1017 (1) NDRC 1943
provides:

“When two vehicles approach or enter’ an intersection at ap-
proximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left
shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right . . . .”

Defendant contends, that since decedent was approaching
from the left, it was his duty to yield the right of way. Plain-
tiff contends that subsection (1) of Section 89-1017 is inapplica-
ble since decedent entered the intersection first and relies upon
subsection 3 of Section 39-1017 which provides:

be 321

“The driver of vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield
the right-of-way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection.”

It is clear that subsection 1 of Section 39-1017 NDRC 1943
applies to all cases in which vehicles approach the intersection
at approximately the same time. Vehicles approach an inter-
section at approximately the same time when there is imminent
danger of collision at some point within the intersection if each
maintains its established course and speed. Blashfield Cyc. of
Automobile Law, § 993, n 28 (Perm ed 1951); Fester v. George,
71 SD 424, 25 NW2d 455; Gendron v. Glidden, 84 NH 162, 148
A 461; Prato v. Coffey, 135 Conn 445, 66 A2d 113; Mattfeld v.
Nester, 226 Minn 106, 32 NW2d 291, 3 ALR2d 909. The words
“at approximately the same time” do not mean “at precisely the
same instant” and in order for a vehicle entering an intersection
from the left to secure a right of way by possession under sub-
section 3 of Section 39-1017 NDRC 1948, it must enter the inter-
section, a sufficient interval of time ahead of a vehicle approach-
ing from the right, so that it may be said the vehicles did not
enter at approximately the same time. Such an interval must
be of appreciable duration. Moore v. Kujath, 225 Minn 107, 29
NW2d 883.

In the instant case if we assume the decedent’s car was travel-
ing at the minimum speed permitted by the testimony and ‘de-
fendant’s car at the maximum speed and that the gouge in the
intersection marks the point of impact, then decedent’s car en-
tered the intersection less than one fourth of a second ahead of
defendant’s car. Such an interval of time is not sufficient to
permit a jury to say that the vehicles did not approach and enter
the intersection at approximately the same time. Zettle v.
Lutovsky, 72 ND 331, 7 NW2d 180. It follows that defendant’s
vehicle had the right of way. It also follows, as an unavoidable
inference, that as decedent approached the intersection he either
failed to keep a proper lookout and did not see the defendant
approaching, or that, keeping a proper lookout, he saw the de-
fendant and failed to yield the right of way. Failure to keep
a proper lookout is negligence. Bagg v. Otter Tail Power Co.,
70 ND 704, 297 NW 774; Schaller v. Bjornstad, 77 ND 51, 40

322 |

NW2d 59; Robertson v. Hennrich, 72 SD 37, 29 NW2d 329; See
also Rattie v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. RB. Co., 55 ND 686,
215 NW 158. Failure to observe the statutory rules of the road
is evidence of negligence. 60 CJS (Motor Vehicles See 363 (b))
891. See also George v. Odenthal, 58 ND 209, 225 NW_ 323, 65
OJS (Negligence, Sec 19) 418, 421. :

Upon this record the conclusion that plaintiff's decedent was
negligent and that his negligence at least contributed proximate-
ly to cause the collision cannot reasonably be avoided. Defend-
ant was therefore entitled to judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. :

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with direc-
tions to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant for. dismissal
of the action.

Sarure, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Morris, Ch. J. I concur in the foregoing syllabus and opinion
and further comment that under the facts disclosed by the record
and set forth in the opinion, the accident was the result of the
continuing and concurring negligence of both drivers. The
negligence of each contributed proximately to the collision and
bars the relief of one against the other. Virginia Electric and
Power Company v. Vellines, 162 Va 671, 175 SE 35,

es 328
mens 0 . ' [File No. 7263]

ALVIN STEVAHN, Appellant v. FERDINAND, C. MEIDIN-
.- GER, Respondent. :

(57, NW 24 1)

Py
B
E4

ion filed October 14, 1952. Rehearing denied Dec. 20, 1952

|

Le 328

| |
John F. Lord, and Robert Chesrown, for appellant.

B. E. Kretschmar and Paul O. Kretschmar, for respondent.

Curistranson, J. Plaintiff brought this action to recover the
rental of certain lands in McIntosh County in this state for the
farming season of 1947. The trial court held. that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover only one-twelfth of the rental of the land
in question for the farming season of 1947. The plaintiff has
appealed and contends that he is entitled to recover all of such
rental and that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in
his favor for only one-twelfth thereof.

In appellant’s brief it is said: “This is an appeal from the
judgment of the District Court, upon questions of law only, the
issue on appeal being whether the District Court erred, as a
matter of law, in limiting plaintiff’s recovery to one-twelfth of
the rental of the real estate for the 1947 season. . . . Ap-

326 Le

pellant should have judgment for the full rental for 1947 as it
was found by the District Court; $2021.81, and for his :costs.”

The respondent contends that the decision of the trial court
is correct. In respondent’s brief it is said that on the basis of
the evidence and the law applicable thereto the judgment ren-
dered by the trial court is proper and .“the: judgment of the
lower court should be affirmed.”

The evidence adduced upon the trial was not embodied i ina
settled statement of the case and we have no means of knowing
what evidence was introduced. In these circumstances the facts
found by the trial court must be accepted as true. Ryan v.
Bremseth, 48 ND 710, 186 NW 818. The material facts in: the
case as so found are as follows: Andreas Stevahn, the-father
of the plaintiff, died intestate on April 9, 1941, possessed of
certain real property in McIntosh County in this state. There
survived him as his next of kin and heirs at law; his wife,
Christina Stevahn, his daughters, Lydia Ketterling, Christine
Bier,and Amanda Stevahn, and his sons, A. P. Stevahn, Ernest
Stevahn, Arthur Stevahn, A. G. Stevahn and Alvin Stevahn, the
plaintiff in this action. In due time proceedings for the admin-
istration of the estate of said Andreas Stevahn,.deceased, were
had in the County Court of McIntosh County in this state.
Christina Stevahn, the surviving widow of said decedent, -was
duly appointed and qualified as administratrix of the estate of
Andreas Stevahn, deceased, and letters of administration issued
to her on May 26, 1941. At the time of the death of said de-
cedent the real property involved in this action was encumbered
by two mortgages each bearing date November 1, 1933. There
was, a first mortgage to the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul,
Minnesota, and a second mortgage to the. Land Bank Commis-
sioner. On April 14, 1945, Christina Stevahn, the widow of the
decedent, A. P. Stevahn, a son, and Lydia Ketterling, Amanda
Stevahn and Christine Bier, daughters of said Andreas Stevahn,
deceased, and Christ Bier, Jr., the husband of Christine Bier,
for a good and valuable consideration conveyed to the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation all the right, title and interest that
each of them had in the real property in question. Default hav-
ing been made in the terms and conditions of such first mortgage

| 327

action for the foreclosure of such mortgage was duly brought
in the District Court of McIntosh County. In such action all
the above mentioned next of kin and heirs of said Andreas
Stevahn were named defendants. .Such proceedings were had
in such action that judgment of foreclosure was duly rendered
and entered in said action on August 31, 1945. Thereafter
special execution issued upon such judgment and the premises
described in the said mortgage to the Federal Land Bank and in
such judgment of foreclosure were duly sold to the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul, Minnesota, the plaintiff in such action on
October 8, 1945, and sheriff’s certificate of sale was duly issued
to the said Federal Land Bank on that same day.

‘The laws of the State provide that property sold subject to
redemption “may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successors in interest” in the manner provided by law, and that
“the judgment debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property
from the purchaser within one year after the sale.” NDRC 1943,
28-2401, 28-2402.

.No redemption was made within the period of one year as pro-
vided by NDRC 1943, 28-2402 or at all. The statutory time for
redemption expired on October 3rd, 1946. At that time the right
of redemption of all the above mentioned next of kin and heirs
of said decedent had expired with the exception of the plaintiff
in this action who was inducted into the military service of the
United States on November 23, 1945, and continued in such
service until he was honorably discharged therefrom on Feb-
ruary 10, 1947. His riglit to redeem was extended under the
provisions of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940,
as amended. 50 USCA Sce 525. On October 7, 1946, there was
executed and delivered to the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
a sheriffs deed for the premises in question. Our statutes pro-
vide that:

“Such deed shall vest in the grantee all the right, title, and
interest of the mortgagor in and to the property sold, at the
time the mortgage was executed, or subsequently acquired by
him, and shall be a bar to all claim, right, or equity of redemp-
tion in or to the property by the parties to such action, their
heirs and personal representatives, and also against all persons

328 |

claiming under them, or any of them, subsequent to the com-
mencement of the action in which such judgment was rendered.”
NDRC 1943, 32-1909.

On November 7, 1946, the Federal Land Bank sold the real
property in question to the defendant Ferdinand C. Meidinger
under a contract for deed. Under such contract the said de-
fendant agreed to pay the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul for
such premises the sum of $11,000.00 with a down payment of
$6000.00 and the balance of the purchase price payable in annual
installments of $500.00 each. The contract for deed provided
that in case of inability to furnish marketable title the Federal
Land Bank might refund all amounts paid thereunder and termi-
nate the contract. The contract provided that the purchaser
should be entitled to take possession of the premises on Novem-
ber 15, 1946. The purchaser paid to the Federal Land Bank the
sum of $6000.00 as provided in the contract for deed and entered
into possession of the premises in November, 1946, pursuant to
the provisions of the contract. The defendant Meidinger pro-
duced a crop on said premises in 1947 and the rental for the
premises for the farming season of 1947 based upon the crops
harvested and sold according to the computations of the trial
court amounted to $2021.81. The defendant Meidinger remained
in possession of the premises until December 16, 1947, when he
conveyed all right, title and interest in such premises to the
Federal Land Bank by quitclaim deed, and the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul paid to the said defendant the sum of $6735.00,
the total amount that had been paid by the defendant to said
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul under said contract for deed.

The plaintiff Alvin Stevahn was inducted into the military
service of the United States on November 23, 1945, and remained.
in such service until he was honorably discharged therefrom on
February 10, 1947.

The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 as amended
by Congress on October 6, 1942, (50 USCA Sec 525) provided:

“The period of military service shall not be included in com-
puting any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law,
regulation or order . . . nor shall any part of such period
which occurs after the date of enactment of the Soldiers’ and

Le 329

Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942 (Oct. 6, 1942) be
included in computing any period now or hereafter provided by
any law for the redemption’ of real property sold or forfeited
to enforce any obligation, tax, or assessment.”

It is stated in the findings of fact that in the negotiations with
the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul for the purchase of. the
premises the defendant was informed and knew that the plain-
tiff “because of his being in the military service had. an extended.
right of redemption upon his discharge therefrom.” On Decem-
ber 5, 1947, the plaintiff tendered to the Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul the sum of $11,505:15, the calculated amount necessary
to effect redemption from said foreclosure sale. The Federal
Land Bank accepted the amount tendered and on December 9,
1947,.the said Bank made, executed, and delivered to the plain-
tiff a deed of conveyance of said premises.

The appellant contends that under the facts found by the trial
court he was entitled to. redeem, that he has effected a redemp-
tion and. as a result became and is entitled to all the rental for
the year 1947 measured by the market value for each fourth
bushel of the grain produced, the customary rental in .1947 in
that locality. In support of his contention he cites NDRC 1943,
28-2411, which provides:

“The debtor under an execution or foreclosure sale of his,
property shall be entitled to the possession, rents, use, and beiie-
fit of the property sold from the date of such sale until the ex-
piration of the period of redemption.”

He asserts that after the expiration of the period provided
for redemption, on October 3, 1946, he alone occupied the posi-
tion of a. redemptioner, that the rights of the other heirs “to
redeem had expired” and that “after October 3, 1946, they were
no longer even cotenants and that Possession belonged to him.
alone.”

This contention is pr edicated upon an erroneous premise . and
ignores certain controlling facts. Lo
- All the’ real property owned by Andreas ‘Stevahn at the time!
of his death descended immediately to his heirs subject to the
control of the county court and to the possession of any admin-
igytrator appointed by that court for the.purposes of administra-

330 ee

tion., NDRC 1943, 56-0103. In Thompson on Real Property
itis said:

“The heirs of a deceased intestate oceupy: the place of the
ancestor as regards the taking of the interest in the ancestor’s
property, but they receive no better right to the property than
the ancestor had. The title to lands, unless otherwise devised
vests eo instante upon death in the heirs of the decedent; the
right of the personal representative being limited to selling the
land for debts.” 5 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent ed.,
See 2418, p 135.

Under the laws of this state the surviving widow of Andreas
Stevahn succeeded to a four-twelfths interest and estate in the
land owned by him at the time of his death, and each of his three
daughters and five sons succeeded to a one-twelfth interest and
estate in such land. NDRC 1948, 56-0104.

The surviving widow and children of Andreas Stevahn be-
came tenants in common. Johnson v. Brauch, 9 SD 116, 68 NW
173, 62 Am St Rep 857; Aberle v. Merkel, 70 ND 89, 291 NW
913; Hoffman v. Hoffman Heirs, 73 ND 637, 17 NW2d 903.

Corpus Juris says: “On the death of an owner of property
intestate, the descent of the property by operation of law to
the several heirs creates a tenancy in common.” 62 CJ, Sec 15,
p 416.

“Tenants in common hold by several and distinct titles, with
unity of possession. No privity of estate exists between them,”
and as between themselves their interests are several, “there
being no unity of title, each owner is considered solely and
severally seized of his share.” 62 OJ See 4, p 409.

“In accordance with the usual rules of property, it is clear
that a cotenant can deal with strangers as he will in so far
as his own undivided moiety is concerned. He can sell, lease,
mortgage, or pledge it as he can any other property that he may
own.” 14 Am Jur Sec 63, p 131.

“Any cotenant not under a disability can effectively convey
his own moiety or any fractional proportion thereof, provided
he complies with the usual rules governing transfers of prop-
erty.” 14 Am Jur Sec 85, p 150.

“A tenant in common is entitled to possession of the common

property as against all-the world save his cotenants; and.no one
ean complain of the exclusive use of the common property by
one tenant in common except his cotenant.” 62 CJ, p 424.

“Tt is a rule of general application that any co-owner of real
property has a right to enter upon the common estate and take
possession of the whole thereof, subject only to the equal right
of his companions in interest, with whose possession he may not
interfere.” 14 Am Jur Sec 23, pp 93-94.

“Hach tenant in common is equally entitled to the use, bene-
fit, and possession of the common property, and may exercise
acts of ownership in regard thereto, and so may authorize a
third person to do whatever he himself could have done, the
limitation of.his right being that he is bound so to exercise his
rights in-the property as not to interfere with the rights of his
eotenant.” 62 CJ p 421.

’ A corporation may become a cotenant and as such has the
same rights as a natural person. 14 Am Jur Cotenancy, Sec
18, p 89.

Upon the death of Andreas Stevahn his surviving widow and
children became the owners of all the land owned by him at the
time of his death. A tenancy in common was created and each
of them held a distinct and several title to his or her share and
no privity of estate existed between them and each such co-
owner was solely and severally seized of his share. 62 OJ pp
408-409. All the land was subject to a mortgage given to and
owned by the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul and the ownership
of each and all of the shares of the heirs of Andreas Stevahn
was subject to such mortgage.

Upon the foreclosure of the mortgage held by tho Pederal
Land Bank of St. Paul the heirs of Andreas Stevahn and the
grantees of the heirs that had conveyed their interests - were
cotenants and each of the cotenants including the plaintiff had
a right to enter upon the common estate subject to the equal
rights of his companions in interest with whose possession he
might not interfere. 14 Am Jur Cotenancy, Sec 23, pp 93-94.
Each cotenant had the right of possession and to his proportion-
ate share of the rental for the land until the expiration of the
period of redemption. NDRC 1943, 28-2411, The appellant was

‘832 ee

entitled to possession as a cotenant and to his share of ‘the
rental'of the land as measured by his interest in the premises,
but his cotenant or cotenants had equal rights and he had no
right to interfere with their lawful possession or to any part of
‘thie proportionate share of the rental belonging to such cotenants.
Any cotenant desiring to redeem must do so within a year after
the sale. NDRC 1943, 32-1918, 28-2402. None of the cotenants
redeemed and all right to redeem ceased on October 3, 1946,
except as to the appellant Alvin Stevahn, and as to him the
period of redemption had been extended until December 20,
1947, by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. 50
‘USCA Sec 525.

After the period allowed bythe statute for redemption had
expired sheriff’s deed was issued to the Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul which deed vested in such bank eleven-twelfths of all
‘the right, title, interest and estate of said Andreas Stevahn in
the land at the time the mortgage was executed and subsequently
acquired by him and was “a bar to all claim, right or equity of
redemption in or to the property” by all the heirs at law of said
Andreas Stevahn (except Alvin Stevahn) and their personal
representatives and against all persons claiming under them
or any. of them subsequent to the commencement of the action
‘in which the judgment was rendered pursuant to which the
premises were sold. NDRC 1943, 32-1909. After such deed was
executed and delivered all the heirs of Andreas Stevahn (with
the sole exception of the plaintiff Alvin Stevahn) had no more
interest in the premises than they would have had in case each
of them had voluntarily conveyed their respective shares in the
premises to another for a consideration. Barker v. More Bros. +9
18 ND 82, 87, 118 NW 823, 825. °

The result of the sale and the conveyance to the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul by the sheriff's deed was to vest the Federal
Land Bank with fee simple title to eleven-twelfths interest in
the premises, to discharge the indebtedness and lien of the mort-
gage and certificate of sale on the eleven-twelfths interest in the
land so conveyed to the Federal Land Bank, and to reduce the
amount of the indebtedness and lien of the mortgage and certifi-
cate of sale upon the remaining one-twelfth interest in the land

— 333

still owned by the appellant Alvin Stevahn to one-twelfth of
the amount that would have been required to redeem the whole
of the premises from the foreclosure sale if the whole of the
premises had been subject to redemption. The appellant Alvin
Stevahn still owned a one-twelfth interest in the land which |
interest was subject to the lien of the mortgage and certificate
of foreclosure sale for the amount remaining due thereon after
giving credit thereon for the amount which had been ‘discharged
by the conveyance to the Federal Land Bank of the eleven-
twelfth interest in the land. From the time the sheriffs deed
was executed and delivered to the Federal Land Bank on
October 7, 1946, until December 9, 1947, when the Federal Land
Bank sold and conveyed all its interest in the premises to the
appellant Alvin Stevahn, he was the owner of a one-twelfth in-
terest which was subject to the lien of the mortgage and the
certificate of foreclosure sale, as Alvin Stevahn’s right to re-
deem had been extended by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Re-
lief Act of 1940 until December 20, 1947. This was the only
interest and estate in the premises that was subject to redemp-
tion. The interests in the land of all the heirs of Andreas.
Stevahn, other than the appellant, had been conveyed to and
vested in the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul. The bank was
the owner of eleven-twelfths interest in the premises and the
appellant Stevahn continued to own a one-twelfth interest. That
condition continued until in November 1946 when the Federal
Land Bank sold the premises to the defendant Meidinger under
a contract for deed which specifically authorized the defendant
Meidinger to enter into possession of the premises on November
15, 1946. Under this contract for deed the Federal Land. Bank
continued to hold the legal title to the eleven-twelfths interest
in the land in trust for Meidinger, the vendee in the contract,
to the extent of his payments and he became the beneficial owner
to the extent of the payments made by him. Woodward v.
McCollum, 16 ND 42, 49-50, 111 NW 623, 626; Salzer Lbr. Co. v.
Claflin, 16 ND 601, 605, 113 NW 1036, 1037; 55 Am Jur Vendor
and Purchaser, Sections 355 and 356, pp 781-783.

The appellant was a successor in interest of Andreas Stevahn
to the real property owned by him at the time of his death, but

334: Ee

he was not the only successor in interest. He succeeded to a
one-twelfth interest only and his mother and brothers and sisters
succeeded to the other eleven-twelfths interest. The heirs of
Andreas Stevahn became tenants in common, and each of the
cotenants had the right to the use, benefit and possession of the
common property subject, however, to the equal rights of each
of his companions in interest with whose rights he might not
interfere. 14 Am Jur Cotenancy, Sec 23, pp 93-94; 62 CJ p 421.
At all times from the death of Andreas Stevahn until the convey-
anveé by the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul of all its right, title
and interest in. the premises to the appellant Stevahn on Decem-
bet-9, 1947, the appellant owned only a one-twelfth interest in
the premises; and during all this time his cotenant and coten-
ants: each had equal right to the possession and use of the
premises.

“The defendant Meidinger entered into possession of the prem-
ises under the contract for deed with the Federal Land Bank
and planted, harvested and threshed a crop on the lands in
question during the farming season of 1947. During all the time
that the crop was planted, harvested, threshed and marketed the
plaintiff owned a one-twelfth interest in the land and no more;
the Federal Land Bank was the legal owner of eleven-twelfths
interest therein and the defendant Meidinger under the contract
for deed had the right to enter upon the land and plant, harvest,
thresh and market the crop as was done. On December 9, 1947,
the Federal Land Bank for a valuable consideration made, exe-
cuted and delivered to the appellant Alvin Stevahn a deed of
conveyance to the premises. As a result the tenancy in common.
was-terminated (62 CJ Sec 18, p 418) and the appellant Alvin
Stevahn became the owner of the entire tract in fee simple.
Prior to the conveyance to him by the Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul of all its interest, right and title in the eleven-twelfths
interest in the land the appellant Stevahn owned only a one-
twelfth interest in the premises.

Plaintiff’s share in the rental for the land during the farming
season of 1947 was proportionate to and measured by his inter-
est in the land. In other words, plaintiff was not entitled to
more than a one-twelfth share of such rental, and that is what

a 335

the trial court awarded to him, The judgment appealed from
is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Grimsow, Sarre and Burke, JJ., concur.

- Curisrianson, J. (On Petition for Rehearing). The plain-
tiff has petitioned for a rehearing. In the petition it is said
that the Court erred in the following statements in the opinion:

1. “After the period allowed by the statute for. redemption
had expired sheriff’s deed was issued to the Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul which deed vested in such bank eleven-twelfths of all
the right, title, interest and estate of said Andreas Stevahn in
the land at the time the mortgage was executed and subsequently
acquired by him and was ‘a bar to all claim, right or equity of
redemption in or to the property’ by all the heirs at, law of said
Andreas Stevahn (except Alvin Stevahn) and their personal
representatives and against all persons claiming under them
or any of them subsequent to the commencement of the action in
which the judgment was rendered pursuant to which the prem-
ises were sold. NDRC 1943, 32-1909. After such deed was
executed and delivered all the heirs of Andreas Stevahn (with
the sole exception of the plaintiff Alvin Stevahn) had no more
interest in the premises than they would have‘had in case each of
them had voluntarily conveyed their respective shares in the
premises to another for a consideration. Barker v. More Bros.,
18 ND 82, 87, 118 NW 823, 825.”

2. “The result of the sale and the conveyance to the Federal
Land Bank of St. Paul by the sheriffs deed was to vest the
Federal Land Bank with fee simple title to eleven-twelfths inter-
est in the premises, to discharge the indebtedness and lien of
the mortgage and certificate of sale on the eleven-twelfths inter-
est in the land so conveyed to the Federal Land Bank, and to
reduce the amount of the indebtedness and lien of the mortgage
and certificate of sale upon the remaining one-twelfth interest
in the land still owned by the appellant Alvin Stevahn: to one-
twelfth of the amount that would have.been required to redeem
the whole of the premises from the foreclosure sale if the whole
of the premises had been subject to redemption.”

336 ee

; 8. “Plaintiffs share in the rental for the land during the fartn-
ing season of 1947 was proportionate to and meastired by his
interest in the land. In other-words, plaintiff was not entitled
-tomore than a one-twelfth share of such rental, and that is what
the trial court awarded to him.”

‘4. It is said that the error in the ‘first statement “consists in
‘this, that the plaintiff in this action, Alvin Stevahn, had a valid
‘and subsisting right of redemption, extended by a paramount
statute of the United States, and necessarily recognized by
the Coutts of North Dakota, and by statute and decision in
Notth Dakota, a mortgage upon real estate is only a lien for
the payment of the debt and no title passes to the mortgagee by
virtue ofthe mortgage, nor by virtue of the foreclosure sale,
“and the lien is extended to the end of the expiration of the period
‘of redemption. For that reason as to any debtor having a valid
‘right of redemption, which right is recognized by this honorable
Court as existing in the plaintiff-appellant in this case, the
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul and any of its successors could
have no more than a lien, and could not have title.” ,
“2. It is said that the second statement “is contrary to the
decision of this Court in Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 ND 123,
26 NW2d 187, and contrary to the express words of the Sol-
diers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 as amended October
6, 1942.” ‘

3. It is said that the third statement is “contrary to the ex-
press words of NDRC 1943, 28-2411: ‘DEBTOR ENTITLED
TO RIGHTS DURING REDEMPTION PERIOD. The debtor
under an execution or foreclosure sale of his property shall be
entitled to the possession, rents, use and benefit of the property
sold from the date of such sale until the expiration of the period
of redemption.’ ” .

The contentions thus advanced are untenable.

As pointed out in the former opinion Andreas Stevahn the
father of the plaintiff, died intestate on April 9, 1941, the owner
and possessor of certain real property in McIntosh County in
this state and left surviving him as his heirs at law his wife
and.three daughters and five sons. At the time of the death
of said Andreas Stevahn: the real propérty involved in’ this

aT 337

action was encumbered by two mortgages, a first mortgage to
the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, Minnesota, and a second
mortgage to the Land Bank Commissioner. On April 14, 1945,
the widow, two of the sons and the three daughters conveyed all
their interest, right and title in the real property in question
to the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation. Thereafter, de-
fault having been made in the terms and conditions of the first
mortgage, action for the foreclosure of such mortgage was duly
‘brought in the District Court of McIntosh County. In such
action all the heirs at law of said Andreas Stevahn including
Alvin Stevahn, thé plaintiff in this action, and including also
the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, were made defend-
ants. Such proceedings were had in such action that judgment
of foreclosure was duly rendered and entered on August 31,
1945. Thereafter special execution was duly issued upon such
judgment and the premises described in said mortgage and in
the judgment of foreclosure were duly sold to the Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul on October 3, 1945, and sheriff’s certificate of
‘sale was duly issued to the said Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
on that same day. ©

Under the laws of this state all the real property owned by
Andreas Stevahn at the time of his death descended immediately
to his heirs at law. NDRC 1943, 56-0103; Hoffman v. Hoffman’s
Heirs, 73 ND 637, 17 NW2d 903. The surviving widow ‘sue-
ceeded to four-twelfths interest and estate in fee in the land
owned by Andreas Stevahn at the time of his death, and each of
the three daughters and each of the five sons succeeded to a
one-twelfth interest and estate in fee i in such land. NDRC 1943,
56-0104.

A cotenancy was created and the surviving widow and sons
and daughters of Andreas Stevahn became tenants in common.
5 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent ed, Sec-2418, p 135;
62 CJ Sec 15, p 416.

“Ténants in common hold by several and distinct titles and
estates, independent of each other, so as to render the freehold
several also. They are separately seised, and there is no privity
of estate between them. While their possession is per my, and

338 De

not per tout, each tenant, as to his share, is to be deemed the
owner of an entire and separate estate.” 14 Am Jur Sec 17, p
88.

“A cotenant can deal with strangers as he will in so far as
his own undivided moicty is concerned. He can sell, lease,
mortgage, or pledge it as he can any other property that he may
own.” 14 Am Jur, Sec 63, p 131. And in the absence of any
prohibitory provisions in an instrument creating the relation-
ship “one cotenant can purchase the share of another just as he
would buy property from a stranger. He need not consult the
other cotenants in connection with the transaction, since no
champerty is involved, and the title acquired is in no sense
antagonistic to their interests.” 14 Am Jur, Sec 62, p 130.

“Any cotenant not under disability can effectively convey his
own moiety or any fractional proportion thereof, provided he
complies with the usual rules governing transfers of property.”
14 Am Jur, See 85, p 150.

“The interests of tenants in common are several. Each ten-
ant has the unquestionable right to alienate his interests or to
make any disposition of such interests as he may choose, re-
gardless of the wishes of the other tenants or joint owners.”
Garner et al v. Anderson, 67 Utah 553, 562, 248 Pac 496, 499.

“Where one person purchases or obtains by conveyance an
undivided share of a tenant in common, he becomes a cotenant
with the remaining owner or owners.” 62 CJ p 414,

“Purchase at judicial sale of the interest of a tenant in com-
mon makes the purchaser a cotenant of those whose interests
were not purchased.” 62 CJ p 415.

“A judgment creditor, by acquiring title through a levy on an
undivided interest becomes a tenant in common with his debtor’s
cotenants. As in the case of sales of undivided interests gen-
erally, sale on execution of an undivided portion of a larger
tract creates a tenancy in common.” 62 CJ p 416, Sec 13.

Sinée’ tenants in common hold by several and distinct titles
and no privity of estate exists between them and as their inter-
ests are several and each owner is considered solely and sever-
ally seized of his share and since there is no relationship of

Le 339

agency between the co-owners one cotenant cannot ordinarily
dispose of the interest of another unless he is duly authorized
so to do. 62 CJ Sec 4, p 409; 14 Am Jur, Sec 63, p 131. In the
absence of authorization or ratification any attempted convey-
ance by one tenant of the common property or of any part in
excess of his own interest is not binding upon the cotenants and
operates to pass title to nothing more than the seller’s own
interest. 14 Am Jur, Sec 84, p 149. Sce, also, 62 CJ Sec 224,
pode. . .

It is a general principle that a cotenant is not permitted,
without the consent of his cotenants, to buy an outstanding
adversary title to or claim in the common property and assert
the same for his own benefit or to the exclusion of his cotenants.

“Where a tenant in common purchases an outstanding title,
it is presumed to have been done for the common benefit, and
as a general rule purchase or extinguishment of an outstanding
title, encumbrance, or claim by one tenant in common inures to
the benefit of his cotenant, at their option.” 62 CJ 456-458.

In such case the purchasing tenant will be regarded “as hold-
ing the title or claim so acquired for the benefit of his contenants
upon seasonable contribution by them of their respective pro-
portions of the necessary expenditures. A mortgage upon the
property which is purchased by one of the cotenants does not
merge with the fee but inures to the benefit of the other coten-
ants when they contribute their proportion of the purchase
money.” 14 Am Jur, Cotenancy, pp 120-121.

“A tenant in common who purchases or discharges an out-
standing title or encumbrance for the benefit of the common
estate is, in the absence of any agreement or understanding to
the contrary, entitled in equity to contribution from ‘his coten-
ants for the expense thereof in proportion to their respective
shares and he has an equitable lien on such shares therefor.
. . . The cotenants cannot be compelled to contribute except
to the extent of their interest in the common property, and
are not liable personally.” 62 CJ pp 473-474.

In accordance with this general principle the rule is well
settled that where property owned in common is sold at a judi-
cial sale or pursuant to a power contained in a mortgage or

340 De

deed of trust for the purpose’ of satisfying an obligation which
rests alike upon all the co-owners none of them can purchase
the estate for his own sole benefit. If one of them buys it he
does so subject to the rights of the others to contribute to the
purchase price and participate in the benefits. 14 Am Jur, Sec
53, p 123. This principle is applicable where one of several
co-ownets of property acquires a tax title to the property or
bids the same in at a judicial or foreclosure sale. 14 Am Jur,
Sections 54 and 55, pp 123-126. In case a cotenant purchases
an outstanding adverse title or claim to the common property,
or pays a mortgage against-the common property, or redeems
the whole common property from the foreclosure of such mort-
gage, if the other cotenants “do not voluntarily contribute their
respective shares of the cost within the reasonable time allowed
by law, he can avail himself of the title thus acquired to compel
them either to pay or to forfeit their interests in the property.
In a proper case, he may have the amount that he has paid
beyond his just proportion ascertained and declared to be a lien
on their interests, and a decree directing such interests to be
sold in satisfaction of: the lien, or, if the claim purchased con-
stitutes a lien upon the common estate, he may be subrogated
to ‘the rights of the transferrer.” 14 Am Jur, Cotenancy, pp
129-130.

Under the above stated “general rule a redemption from a
judicial or foreclosure sale of the common property by one
tenant in common inures to the benefit of all of the cotenants,
regardless of the intent of the redeeming tenant, and the non-
redeeming cotenants may participate-in the redemption by pay-
ing their proper proportions of the expenses at the proper time.”
62 CJ Sec 92, p 465; Calkins v. Steinbach, 66 Calif 117, 4 Pac
1103. ° te

Although a mortgagee cannot be compelled to accept payment
of a part of the debt and release a corresponding interest in the
land described in the mortgage unless he has expressly agreed
to do so, as between the mortgagor or his: successors in interest
and the mortgagee, the mortgagee may accept payment of part
of the debt and release a corresponding interest in the land with-
out impairing hhis lien upon the remainder. 2 Jones on Mort-

Es 341

gages, 8th ed, p 750; 59 CJS p 757; 36 Am Jur, Mortgages, Sec
475, p 924; 20 Am & Eng Ency of Law 1070; Woodward v. Brown,
-119 Calif 283, 51 Pac 542, 63 Am St Rep 108; Hargrove v. O’Ban-
ion, 5 La App 630; Exchange Bank of Perry y. Nichols, 196
Okla 283, 164 Pacad 867. See, also, Jackson v. Pescia, 124 NYS
735.

So, likewise, if a mor rigage has been foreclosed and the prop-
erty purchased by mortgagee at foreclosure sale, although the
mortgagor or his successor in interest is not as a general rule
entitled to make a partial or proportionate redemption of the
property sold the mortgagee may consent to such partial re-
demption. The mortgagée purchaser at the foreclosure sale and
holder of the certificate of sale “may consent to the redemption
by an owner of an: undivided interest in the property of such
owner’s interest without a redemption of the entire premises.”
42 CJ See 2077, p 351. A partial release of an undivided interest
in the property covered by the mortgage or a partial redemption
from a foreclosure sale by an owner of an undivided interest
in the property of such owner’s interest discharges pro tanto
the mortgagee’s claim on the other portions of or interests in
the property, as against the mortgagor and as against any per-
son interested in any part of the remainder of the property. 2
Jones on Mortgages, 8th ed, p 758, Sec 1260. For by releasing
a part of or interest in the property which is in equity primarily
liable for the payment of the debt secured by the mortgage, the
mortgagee is not permitted to charge the other portions of or
interests in the premises with payment of the amount of the
debt described in the mortgage or the amount of the debt as
shown in the certificate of foreclosure sale, without deducting
from the amount of the then mortgage debt or from the amount
then required to be paid for a redemption of the entire premises
the amount of the indebtedness for which the portion or interest
released would have been liable if there had been no partial
release or partial redemption. 2 Jones on Mortgages, 8th ‘ed,
p 753.

“Upon the same principle, after the mortgaged premises have
passed to several devisees, if the mortgagee releases one devi-
see’s portion the others are liable only for that share of the debt

342 a

for which their’ portion would be liable had no release ‘been
made.”. 2 Jones on Mortgages, 8th ed, See 1260, pp 753-754.

The matter of the redemption by an. owner of an undivided
interest 'in the property described in the mortgage of such own-
er’s interest without redemption’ of the entire premises was
considered by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Dougherty et
al. v. Kubat et al., 67 Neb 269, 93 NW 317. The opinion in that
case was written by the distinguished jurist Roscoe Pound then
serving as Commissioner of the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
In the opinion it is said:

“A tenant in common, who . . . is entitled to redeem from
‘a foreclosure sale, may not compel the mortgagee or his suc-
cessors to accept a part of the debt, and relieve his interest only
of the burden, but must offer to redeem the whole by discharging
the entire incumbrance. 3 Pom Bq Jur Sec 1220; McQueen v.
Whetstone, 127 Ala 417, 30 So 548; Buettel v. Harmount, 46
Minn 481, 49 NW 250; Lyon v. Robbins, 45 Conn 513; Crafts
v. Crafts, 13 Gray (Mass) 360; Hiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind 571.
Nevertheless as it is equitable to allow the plaintiff in an action
for redemption to redeem his interest by paying his equitable
proportion of the mortgage debt, the defendant may, if he sees
fit, allow the plaintiff to do so. Kerse v. Miller, 169 Mass 44,
47 NE 504; Van Vronker v. Eastman, 7 Mete (Mass) 157;
Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick 146. The rule that the debt is a unit,
so that redemption of a partial interest only cannot be imposed
upon the mortgagee, is solely fer the benefit and advantage of
the latter. He cannot be compelled to accept his money in drib-
lets,.and may insist upon payment of the entire mortgage debt.
But if he so insists, and one tenant in common relieves the en-
tire estate of the incumbrance, the benefit accrues to the other
tenants in common, subject to a charge upon their several in-
terests for their respective shares of the incumbrance paid off.
3 Pom Eq Jur Sec 1220. Hence it must be evident that the re-
quirement that the whole incumbrance be discharged is merely
an incident of the right of the tenant in common to relieve his
individual share, arising from the fact that, with due regard to
the equities of others, he can relieve it in no other way. If the
difficulties arising from the rights of the mortgagee are obviated,

a 343

there is no'reason why he should be permitted or required to
redeem more than his interest. We think, therefore, that if the
mortgagee or his successors choose to accept a portion of the
debt, and allow redemption of a partial interest, and such course
is equitable under the cireumstances, the holder of such interest
cannot insist upon redeeming the whole.” 67 Neb 274-275, 93
NW at p 319.

“One tenant in common paying a general encumbrance upon
the common estate, for which neither tenant is personally liable,
has no claim for contribution against his cotenant. His only
remedy is to pay the encumbrance, and then enforce that by
foreclosure against this cotenant. He can not compel his co-
tenant to redeem his half of the land. The cotenant has his.
option whether he will redeem or let his interest go. No per-
sonal obligation rests upon him to redeem, or to pay any part
of the mortgage debt. The mortgage is a burden upon the land,
and its payment is not a personal duty; and, therefore, he may
exercise his option whether he will save his interest by paying
the debt, or let his interest be foreclosed.” 9 Thompson on Real
Property, See 5102, p 611; 2 Jones on Mortgages, 8th ed, Sec
1393, p 875.

Where a tenant in common pays a general encumbrance upon
the common property for which none of the cotenants is per-
sonally liable, or makes a redemption of the entire property on
a foreclosure of such general encumbrance the payment so made
will not result in an expansion of the interest or ownership of |
such tenant in the common property. His interest will remain
the same and he will discharge the lien or claim against his in-
terest and will acquire an equitable lien upon the interests of
his cotenants in proportion to their respective interests for the
money paid by him in discharging the lien upon, or in effecting
a redemption of, the whole of the common property. Dougherty
et al v. Kubat et al, supra; Oliver v. Lansing et al, 57 Neb 352,
77 NW 802; Calkins v. Steinbach, supra; McLaughlin v. Estate
of Curts, 27 Wis 644. .

In Oliver v. Lansing et al, supra, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska said: . .

344 |

“In Fisher v. Eslaman, 68 Ill 78, it is aid: ‘Where one tenant
in common removes an incumbrance from the common estate,
the other tenants must contribute to. the extent of their respec-
tive interests, and to secure such céntribution a court of equity
will.enforce upon such interests an equitable lien of the same
character with that which has been..removed:-by the redeeming
tenant.’ In Titsworth v. Stout, 49 Tll 78, it is said: ‘The re-
deeming tenant in common, in order to secure contribution, is
substituted to the same lien which he has redeemed.’ Other’
cases to the same effect are Rankin v. Black, 1 Head (Tenn) 650;
Gee v. Gee, 2 Sneed (Tenn) 395; Dowdy v. Blake, 50 Ark 205.
We have been referred by counsel to no case, and in the course
of a pretty thorough investigation have found none, in which it
is held that payments made by one ,co-tenant beyond, his just
proportion, to reduce incumbrances, results in.an .expansion,.of
the interest or ownership of such tenant im the common proper-
ty. On the contrary, the doctrine of all the authorities seems
to be that his interest, in such case, remains the same, but that
to the extent he has made payments beyond his share he stands:
in the shoes of the creditor to whom the payments have been-
made.” 57 Neb at pp 358-359, 77 NW at p 804. Italics supplied.

The laws of this state provide: (1) that. an-action may be
brought in the district court for the foreclosure of a mortgage
upon real property, (2) for the judgment to: be rendered in such
action, and, (8) for the sale of the mortgaged property under
the judgment of foreclosure. . NDRG,,1948, 32-1901,, 32-1906.
They further provide: _

“Whenever any real property shall be sold under judgment.
of foreclosure pursuant: to the provisions of this chapter, the.
offiéer or other person’ making the sale must give to the purchas-
er. a. certificate of. sale as provided. by section 28-2311, and at.
the expiration of the time for the redemption of such property,:
if the-same'is not redeemed, the person or officer making the
sale, or his successor in office, or other. officer:appointed by the
court, must make to the purchaser, his heirs, or assigns, or to
any person who has acquired the title of such purchaser by re-
demption or otherwise, a deed or deeds of such property., . Such.

ee 345

deed shall vest in the grantee all the right, title, and interest of
the mortgagor im and to the property sold, at the time the mort-
gage was executed, or subsequently acquired by him, and shall
be a bar to all claim, right, or equity of redemption in or to the
property by the parties to such action, their heirs and personal
representatives, and also aguinst all persons claiming under
them, or any of them, subsequent to the commencement of the
action in which such judgment was rendered.” Ttalics supplied.
NDRC 1943, 32-1909. ,

“Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser is substituted
for the judgment debtor and acquires all the right, title, interest,
and claim of such debtor to such property, and when the estate
is less than a leasehold of two years’ unexpired term, the sale
is absolute. In all other cases the real property is subject to
redemption as provided in this title. The officer must give to the
purchaser a certificate of sale, containing:

1. A particular description of the real property sold;

- 2. A statement of the price bid for each distinct lot or parcel;

8. A statement of the whole price paid; and

4, When subject to redemption, a statement to that effect.

Such certificate must be executed by the officer and acknowl-
edged or proved as may be required by law for deeds of real
property.” NDRC 1943, 28-2311.

Section 28-2312, NDRC 1943, provides that the sheriff’s certifi-
cate of sale must be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
of the county wherein the property is situated within sixty days
from the date of sale. Scction 28-2313, NDRC 1948, provides
that if the court upon the return of execution and after having
carefully examined the proceedings of the officer shall be satis-
fied that the sale has been made in all respects in conformity
to the provisions of law, “the court must make an order con-
firming the sale and directing the clerk to make an entry on the
journal that the court is satisfied of the legality of such sale,
and an order that the officer make to the purchaser a deed of
such real property, or interest therein, at the enpiration of one
year from the day of sale unless the same is redeemed.” (Italics
supplied) :

346 —

“All real property sold upon foreclosure of a mortgage by
order, judgment, or decree of court may be redeemed at any
time within one year after such sale as prescribed by chapter
24 of the title Judicial Procedure, Civil.” NDR 1943, 32-1918.

Chapter 24 of the title Judicial Procedure, Civil referred to in
Section 32-1918, supra, provides:

28-2401. “Property sold subject to redemption, or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hercinafter pro-
vided, by the following persons or their successors in interest:

1. The judgment debtor, or his successors in interest. . .”

28-2406. “... . If the debtor redeems, the effect of the
sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a re-
demption by the debtor, the person to whom the payment is made
must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption
acknowledged or proved before an officer authorized to take
acknowledgements of conveyances of real property. Such cer-
tificate must be recorded in the office of the register of deeds
of the county in which the property is situated and the register
of deeds must note the record thereof in the margin of the record
of the certificate of sale.”

28-2411. “The debtor under an execution or foreclosure sale
of his property shall be entitled to the possession, rents, use and
benefit of the property sold from the date of such sale until the
expiration of the period of redemption.”

At the time of the death of Andreas Stevahn the mortgage
which he had given to the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul was
a first lien upon the tract of land described in the mortgage.
Upon his death all the real property owned by him at the time
of his death descended immediately to his heirs at law and they
became tenants in common. The widow became the owner of an
undivided four-twelfths interest and estate in the land and each
of the three daughters and five sons succeeded to and became
the owner of an undivided one-twelfth interest and estate in the
land. NDRC 1943, 56-0104. Each of the heirs at law of Andreas
Stevahn became the owner of a distinct undivided interest in
the whole tract and the several heirs held their respective inter-
ests by several and distinct titles. No privity of estate existed

a 347

between them and as between themselves their interests were
several, Each owner was considered solely and severally.seized
of his or her share. 62 CJ Sec 4, p 409, and could “sell, lease,
mortgage or pledge it as he could any other property that he
might own.” 14 Am Jur Sec 63, p 131.

The undivided interest of each of the heirs at ‘law belonged
wholly to-him or her individually. Thus, the plaintiff became a
successor in interest of Andreas Stevahn and the owner of a one-
twelfth interest in fee simple in the land. His interest belonged
to him individually and the other heirs at law: had no share or
interest whatever in the interest which belonged to him. And,
likewise, he had no share or interest in the undivided interest
in fee to which each of the other heirs at law had succeeded.

Default was made in the conditions of the mortgage of the
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul and such mortgage was duly fore-
closed by action in the District Court of McIntosh County. In
such action all the heirs at law of Andreas Stevahn were made
defendants as was also the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation,
to whom the widow of Andreas Stevahn, one of his sons and his
three daughters had conveyed their interests. There was no
personal liability on the part of any of the heirs at law of An-
dreas Stevahn for the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or
for any part thereof. Such proceedings were had in the action
that judgment of foréclosure was duly rendered and entered on
August 31, 1945, thereafter special execution was issued upon
the judgment and the premises described in the mortgage and.
in the judgment of foreclosure were duly sold to the Federal
Land Bank of St. Paul, the plaintiff in such action on October 3,
1945, and sheriff's certificate of sale was duly issued to the said
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul on that same day. At the time
of such foreclosure sale the Federal Farm Mortgage Corpora-
tion was the owner and holder of an eight-twelfths interest and
estate in fee simple in the tract of land described in the mortgage
and sold at such foreclosure sale, and the plaintiff Alvin Stevahn
and the defendants Ernest Stevahn, A. G. Stevahn and Arthur
Stevahn were each the owner and holder of a one-twelfth inter-
est and estate in fee simple in such tract of land.

,

348 —

Upon the mortgage foreclosure sale the Federal Land Bank
the purchaser at such sale was substituted for the successors in
interest of the mortgagor and it acquired all their “right, title,
interest and claim to such property.” NDRC 1943, 28-2311.

The property was sold subject to redemption. NDRO 1943,
28-2401, 32-1918. As has been pointed out each of the cotenants
was the owner of an undivided interest and estate in the prop-
erty sold at the mortgage foreclosure sale and each of such
cotenants had a right of redemption. With the consent of the
Federal Land Bank, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, any
one of the cotenants might have redeemed only his own interest;
and if the mortgagee purchaser did not consent to such: partial
redemption then the cotenant might have redeemed the whole
property from the sale. A redemption of the whole property, as
has been pointed out, would have inured to the benefit of all the
cotenants and the redeeming cotenant would have paid and dis-
charged the lien against his own interest and acquired a lien
upon the interests of his cotenants for their proportionate share
of the money expended for the redemption. He would not by
such redemption have enlarged his interest in the common prop-
erty. The right of redemption from a mortgage foreclosure
sale is statutory and can be exercised only within the period of
time and in the manner prescribed by the law. Rist v. Andersen,
70 SD 579, 19 NW2d 833, 161 ALR 197; Banking Corporation
of Montana v. Hein, 52 Mont 238, 156 Pac 1085; Brown v. Tim-
mons, 79 Mont 246, 256 Pac 176, 57 ALR 1122; 87 Am Jur,
Mortgages, p 211, Sec 823; 9 Thompson on Real Property,
Permanent ed, pp 585-586.

In Brown v. Timmons, supra, the Supreme Court of Montana
said:

“The ‘right of redemption’ arises only after the sale of prop-
erty on execution, exists for the period prescribed by law, and
is not property in any sense, but rather a bare privilege of
statutory origin to be exercised only by the persons named in
the statute in the instances therein provided and within the time
and upon the conditions prescribed.”

No redemption was made and the statutory period for redemp-
tion expired on October 8, 1946. At that time the right of re-

De 349

demption of the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation and of
all the heirs at law of Andreas Stevahn, with the single excep-
tion of the plaintiff Alvin Stevahn, expired.. The plaintiff
Alvin Stevahn had been inducted into the military service of the
United States on November 23, 1945, and continued in such serv-
ice until he was honorably discharged therefrom on February
10, 1947. The period of time within which to exercise his right
to redeem was extended under the provisions of the Soldiers’
and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 as amended. 50 USCA
See 525. Such act provided that the period of military service
shall not be included in computing “any period now or hereafter
provided by any law for the redemption of real property sold
or forfeited to enforce any obligation, tax or assessment.” This
provision speaks for itself. It excludes the period of military
service in computing the period allowed by law for redemption
of real property sold at the foreclosure sale and thus gives the
person engaged in military service the additional time in which
to redeem. The benefit afforded by the statute is for persons
engaged in military service only. The statute does not operate
in favor of other persons who are not so engaged. The statute
does not purport to create a right of redemption, it merely pur-
ports to extend the time within which the right of redemption as
created and existing by law may be exercised. The statute does
not purport to enlarge the interest or estate which a person in
military service has in the property which may be redeemed.
Tolmas v. Streiffer et al. (La App) 21 So2d 387. It merely
grants him the additional time in which to make redemption.

In this case all steps and acts in the action to foreclose were
duly and regularly taken and had. It is undisputed that judg-
ment of foreclosure was duly rendered and the premises de-
scribed in the mortgage and the judgment were duly sold pur-
suant to the judgment of foreclosure on October 3, 1945; that
sheriff’s certificate of sale was duly issued on that same day;
that no redemption was made from the foreclosure sale, and
that on October 7, 1946, sheriffs deed was duly issued to the
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, the purchaser at the sale. Un-
der the law the court, upon the return of the execution and after
carefully examining the proceedings of the officer on being sat-

350, ee

isfied that the sale had been made in conformity with law, was
required to “make an order confirming the sale... and an order,
that the. officer make to the purchaser a deed of such real prop-
erty, or interest therein, at the expiration of one year from the
day of sale unless the same is redeemed.” NDROC 1943, 28-2312.
The law further required that “whenever any real property
shall be sold under judgment of foreclosure” the officer “making
the sale must give to the purchaser a certificate of sale and at
the expiration of the time for the redemption of such property
if the same is not redeemed, the person or officer making the
sale or his successor in office” must make to the purchaser, his
heirs or assigns or to any person who has acquired the title of
such purchaser by redemption or otherwise a deed or deeds of
such property,” and that “such deed shall vest in the grantee all
the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in and to the
property sold, at the time the mortgage was executed, er subse-
quently acquired by him, and shall be a bar to all claim, right,
or equity of redemption in or to the property by the parties to
such action, their heirs and personal representatives, and also
against all persons claiming under them, or any of them, subse-
quent to the commencement of the action in which such judgment
was rendered.” NDRC 1943, 32-1909. In this case the fee title
to the property sold at the foreclosure salé belonged to several
cotenants each of whom owned a specific undivided interest in
the property. The mortgage foreclosed was an encumbrance
upon the whole property, and all interests of the several co-
tenants were subject to the mortgage and the sheriff’s deed obvi-
ously conveyed to the purchaser at the sale all interests of all
the cotenants, with the single exception of Alvin Stevahn but
as to him the period of time within which to redeem was extend-
ed by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 as
amended, 50 USCA See 525, upon his being inducted into the
military service of the United States on November 23, 1945.

In State ex rel. Forest Lake State Bank v. Herman, 36 ND
177, 161 NW 1017, this court had occasion to consider the status
of the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale, after the period
of redemption from the sale had expired. The relator in that
case obtained a judgment against the owner of the land and

EE 351

sought to redeem from certain foreclosure and execution sales
and the certificates issued upon such sales. The period of re-
demption had expired but no sheriff's deed had been issued upon
any of the certificates. .The relator attempted to redeem by
‘paying the sheriff the amount necessary to satisfy and discharge
all liens in favor of prior redemptioners, including those. evi-
denced by such certificates of execution and foreclosure sales.
‘The sheriff executed to the relator a certificate of. redemption
but refused to issue the deeds.to the relator as a redemptioner
owing to the refusal of the holders of certificates of execution
and foreclosure sales “to receive the redemptioner’s money and
their claim of right to deed pursuant to the mortgage and exe-
cution sales.” This court held that the relator had no right to
redeem. In the opinion in the case this Court said: :
“The petitioner claims its tight to redeem by virtue of being
a creditor having a lien by judgment, but under the conceded
facts in this case more than a year had elapsed after the execu-
tion sale under the Mandan Mercantile Company judgment be-
fore. any attempt was made on behalf of the relator to redeem
from the prior mortgage-foreclosure sales. There having been
no redemption from the execution sale by the judgment debtor
or by any redemptioner within the period of a year as prescribed
by sec 7754, the right to redeem from such sale was terminated;
and any judgment creditor who did not avail himself of the
right to redeem within this period lost the lien of his judgment
as against the interest of the judgment debtor in the land sold.
This interest passed completely to the purchaser at the execution
sale, and the only thing that remained to be done was the minis-
terial: act on the part of the sheriff of executing the formal
instrument of transfer. After the failure to redeem from the
execution sale for the period of a year, it is idle to say that the
judgment creditor continued to have lien. There was no interest
of the judgment debtor to which such lien could attach. . . .
. We conclude that the lien of the relator’s judgment was extin-
guished when the equity of redemption was terminated, and that
thereafter the relator was not a redemptioner. .°. .
“Appellant argues at considerable length that the above con-
clusions are unwarranted in this case, because of the fact-that

352 ee

the sheriff’s deed has uot been given. The contention is that,
since the sheriff's deed is required to transfer the title of the
debtor, such title remains in him until the deed is executed and
delivered in conformity with the statute. We think this argu-
ment entirely untenable for the reason that the legal title of the
debtor is unavailing to him for any purpose after the period
of redemption prescribed by the statute has elapsed. The law
makes it the ministerial duty of the sheriff to execute the deed
immediately upon the expiration of the period for redemption.
This being true, the substantial rights of the debtor and of the
various redemptioners must be judged as though this ministerial
act had been performed. Liens do not inhere in mere naked legal
titles, they attach to the substantial interests of the owners of
property.” 36 ND at pp 184-185.

Tn this case a foreclosure sale was duly and regularly held and
certificate of sale issued to the-purchaser at the sale as provided
by law. None of the owners of any of the eleven-twelfths in-
terests and estates in the premises made redemption. After the
statutory period for redemption had expired sheriff's deed was
issued pursuant to the provisions of the statute.

Thé several cotenants whose interests in the real property
were sold at the mortgage foreclosure sale on October 8, 1945,
held their respective interests in the common property by several
and distinct titles, independent of each other. 14 Am Jur Sec

17, p 88. Hach cotenant had the right to redeem from the sale

but he was under no obligation to do so. The right to redeem
was granted by statute and in order to make redemption any
cotenant who desired to. redeem must do so in the’ manner and
within the time prescribed by law. The right of redemption of
all cotenants (with the exception of the plaintiff Alvin Stevahn)
expired one year after the date of the sale. Each cotenant whose
interest had been sold at the foreclosure sale had “his. option

»whether he will redeem or let his interest go.” 9 Thompson on
-Real Property, Sec 5102, p-611; 2° Jones on. Mortgages, 8th ed,
See 1398, p 875. None of the cotenants whose period of re-

demption expired one year after the date of sale elected to
redeem; they elected not to.redeem but to let their interests’ go.

‘Under the plain provisions.of the statute the purchaser. at.the

a 353

foreclosure sale was entitled to a deed and that deed conveyed
to such purchaser all the right, title and interest to the common
property and constituted “a bar to all claim, right, or equity of
redemption in or to the property by the parties” to the action
for the foreclosure of the mortgage. NDRC 1948, 32-1909.
After such sheriff’s deed had been executed and delivered to
the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale, the owners of the eleven-twelfths undivided inter-
‘ests in the premisés “had no more interest in the premises” than
they would have had if they had voluntarily conveyed their re-
spective interests in the premises to another for a consideration.
Barker vy. More Bros., 18 ND 82, 87, 118 NW 823, 825. The
lien of the mortgage upon such eleven-twelfths interest in the
land so vested in the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul by the sher-
iff’s deed was extinguished. 2 Jones on Mortgages, See 1048, p
508 et seq; 59 CJS Mortgages, Sec 437, p 672 et seq, Sections
438, 439, pp 676-677. The ownership of such eleven-twelths
interest free from the lien of the mortgage and the certificate of
foreclosure became vested solely in the grantee in the sheriff's
deed. There was no right to redeem based either on the owner-
ship of the cotenants of the eleven-twelfths interest in the fee,
9 Thompson on Real Property, Permanent ed, p 585, or on the
lien of the mortgage which had ceased to exist. State ex rel.
Forest Lake State Bank vy. Herman, supra. The mortgagee hay-
ing become the owner of such eleven-twelfths interest and estate
in fee in the premises and the lien being extinguished and merged
in the fee title vested in the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul by
the sheriff’s deed operated to discharge pro tanto the claim of
the mortgagee under its mortgage as against the owner or a
party interested in any part of the one-twelfth undivided inter-
est, the remainder of the common property. 2 Jones on Mort-
gages, 8th ed, Sec 1260, pp 753-754. The sheriff's deed conveyed
to the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul eleven-twelfths interest and
estate in fee simple in the premises covered by the mortgage, the
mortgage lien of the bank upon the interest so conveyed ceased
to exist and the remainder of the property subject to the mort-
gage was the one-twelfth interest owned by the plaintiff Alvin

354 a

Stevahn. ‘In order to redeem such one-twelfth interest, Alvin
Stevahn, the owner of such interest would-be required to pay
only the amount remaining after deducting from the whole debt
as evidenced by the certificate of foreclosure eleven-twelfths of
the amount of such debt. In short, in order to redeem the plain-
tiff would be required to pay only the proportionate amount of
the indebtedness, based upon his interest, namely, a one-twelfth
of the amount which would have been payable if there had been
no reduction from the amount of the debt as evidenced by the
certificate of sale.

It is contended that under the provisions of NDRC 1943, 28-
2411 the plaintiff, Alvin Stevabn, was entitled to recover all
the rental for the premises for the year 1947 and that it was
error to hold that he was entitled to recover no more than a
one-twelfth share of such rental. Such contention ignores con-
trolling facts and the language of the section invoked. Section
28-2411 reads: :

“The debtor under an execution or foreclosure sale of. his
property shall be entitled to the possession, rents, use, and bene-
fit of the property sold from the date of such sale until the ex-
piration of the period of redemption.”

It will be noted that the section says that the debtor under
an execution or foreclosure sale of “his” property shall be en-
titled to the possession, rents, use, and benefit of the property
sold from the date of such sale until the expiration of the period
of redemption. The property that was sold at the mortgage
foreclosure sale involved herein was not owned solely by the
plaintiff. The property was owned by several co-owners, each
of whom owned an undivided interest in the property. The
plaintiff was the owner of a one-twelfth undivided interest and
estate in fee therein and no more. “His property,” i.e. the plain-
tiffs property, that was sold at such foreclosure sale was only
an undivided one-twelfth interest and estate in fee in the whole
property. The other eleven-twelfths undivided interests and
-estate in fee were owned by his cotenants arid the plaintiff had
no interest or share in the eleven-twelfths undivided interests
owned by his cotenants. Such eleven-twelfths interests were

Es 855

not property of the plaintiff. He had no interest and estate
therein whatsoever. They were the property of his cotenants.
Hence, plaintiff was obviously not entitled to all the rent for the
whole property in which he owned only a one-twelfth undivided
interest. He was entitled to the rent only on “his property” that
was sold and the other cotenants were entitled to the rent on
the remaining cleven-twelfths interests which they owned. In
other words, plaintiff was entitled only to his ‘proportionate
share of the ‘rental as measured by his interest in the property
for which the rent was received. At the time of the foreclosure
sale the plaintiff owned only a one-twelfth undivided interest
in the land sold at said sale. That was the only interest and
estate that he had therein at any time until in December 1947
(after the rental for 1947 had been earned). when he purchased
the interest and estate of the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
which then owned the remaining eleven-twelfths interests and
estate in fee and also had a mortgage lien upon the remaining
undivided one-twelfth interest owned by the plaintiff. Under
the conveyance which the plaintiff then received from the Fed-
eral Land Bank of St. Paul he became the owner of the whole
property free from the lien of the mortgage. Such conveyance
operated to convey to him all the interest, right, and title in fee
then owned by the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul in the undi-
vided eleven-twelfths interest and estate in the premises and it
also operated to release and discharge the mortgage lien which
the Federal Land Bank.of St. Paul held upon the remaining
one-twelfth interest in the premises then owned by the plaintiff.

We adhere to and repeat what we said in the concluding para-
graph in the former opinion: “Plaintiff’s share in the rental
for the land during the farming season of 1947 was proportionate
to and measured by his interest in the land. In other words,
plaintiff was not entitled to more than a one-twelfth share of
such rental, and that is what the trial court awarded to him.”

A rehearing is denied.

Morris, C. J., and Sarure, Burxe and Grimson, JJ., concur.

356 EE
[File No. 7326]

LILLIE L. HULTBERG, Appellant, v. CITY OF GARRISON,
a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.

(56 NW2da 319)

Opinion filed November 21, 1952. Rehearing denied Jan. 8, 1953.

J.K. Murray, for appellant.

| 357

Robert Vogel, City Attorney, and Higgins & Donahue, for
respondent.

Morris, Ch. J. The plaintiff seeks to recover damages against
the City of Garrison for breach of an alleged contract to sell

}

358 ee

to her two lots in the city which she claims to have -purchased
for the purpose of erecting a moving pictuie theater thereon.
‘The city denies that it ever entered into a contract of pur:
chase and sale with the plaintiff and alleges that the only agree-
ment ever entered into between the parties was an option granted
to the plaintiff to purchase the property upon certain conditions,
and the conditions of the option were never fulfilled. The case
was tried to a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the
defendant “that the plaintiff take nothing by this action, and
that the plaintiff’s cause of action be dismissed.” From a judg-
ment entered on this verdict, the plaintiff appeals. The plain-
tiff did not move for a directed verdict. There was no motion
for a new trial. It has long been the established rule in this
jurisdiction that where no motion is made for a directed verdict
and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is-not
challenged by a motion for a new trial, the question of the
sufficiency ofthe evidence to sustain the verdict cannot be raised
in the supreme court. Morris v. Minneapolis, St Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 32 ND 366, 155 NW 861; Security National
Co. v. Sanders, 60 ND 597, 235 NW 714; State v. Van Horne,
TLND 455, 2 NW2d 1. .
The plaintiffs complaint alleges that on or about September
16, 1948, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for
the sale and purchase of Lots 9 and 10 in Block 12 of the original
townsite of the City of Garrison for the sum of $1600.00, of
which $400.00 was to be paid in cash and the balance on or
about July 1, 1949; and that the plaintiff was to commence a
substantial amount of construction of a theater upon the prop-
erty of at least five per cent of the construction thereof on or
before the latter date. It also alleges payment of the $400.00
which the defendant has retained and that as a part of the
contract the defendant agreed that the plaintiff would be given
proper permits for building a theater and for connecting it
with water, sewer, and the heating system of the city. It is
further alleged that the plaintiff, relying upon the contract, had
plans and specifications prepared for the construction of the
theater on the property and so notifiéd the defendant and. also
notified the defendant that she was able, ready, and willing to

ee 359

pay the balance of the purchase price. It is next alleged’ that
the defendant and its officers and agents maliciously and with
intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff and deprive her of the
benefits of the contract, failed and refused to perform its obli-
gations thereunder, including a refusal to execute a conveyance
of the property to the plaintiff and that the defendant sold and
conveyed the property to the Dakota Investment Company, Inc.
without taking any steps to cancel plaintiff’s contract. For the
breach of the contract thus made, the plaintiff claims damages.

The defendant answered and denied that it entered into a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of the lots with the plaintiff
and alleged that the city gave the plaintiff a written option
to purchase the lots upon certain conditions which the plaintiff
failed to perform and that the defendant at no time prevented
or hindered the plaintiff from the exercise of the option.

The option was set out in full in the answer and was intro-
duced in evidence as Exhibit 3 during the course of the trial.
It is this instrument that the plaintiff contends is a contract of
purchase and sale. It reads as follows:

“OPTION

“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That the City
of Garrison, a municipal corporation under the laws of the
State of North Dakota, for and in consideration of the sum of
Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) in hand paid, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, by Myrtle W. Hultberg, or Lillie Hult-
berg, whose postoffice address is Garrison, North Dakota, has
agreed.and does hereby agree to hold until the first day of
July, 1949, at six o’clock P.M., time being of the essence of this
agreement and option, subject to the order of the said Myrtle
W. Hultberg, the following described real property, to-wit:

“Lots Nine (9) and Ten (10) in Bloék Twelve (12), original
townsite of the village, now city, of Garrison, according to the
original plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the
Register of Deeds of McLean County, North Dakota

“and to transfer the said property at any time within the time
above prescribed, to’ the said Myrtle W. Hultberg or such per-
son or persons as she may direct for and at the price of Sixteen

360 Ee

Hundred Dollars ($1600.00), payable on or before the date
specified above, without interest, subject, however, to the further
requirement that this option shall be of no effect and no rights
shall inure to the said Myrtle W. Hultberg or any other person
or persons hereunder or by virtue of any purported exercise of
this option, unless within the time limited written notice of
exercise of this option shall be delivered to the City Auditor
of the said City of Garrison, and a substantial commencement,
amounting to at least 5% of the whole, of construction of ‘a
fireproof theater shall have been made on said property.

“Tn the event that the holder or holders of this option shall
decide to purchase the said property at the above price and terms’
within the said time, then and in that event the said amount paid
for this option shall be credited upon the said purchase price,
but in the event the holder or holders hereof do not conclude the
purchase above set forth within the time limited, or do not com-
mence construction as above set forth within the time limited,
then and in that event the said amount paid for this option shall
be retained by the undersigned in full satisfaction for holding
the property subject to the said order for the said time.”

This instrument, Hxhibit 3, is signed only by the City of Gar-
rison and in the first paragraph purports to give to the plaintiff
or Myrtle W. Hultberg, who is plaintiff's daughter, for a con-
sideration of $400.00 certain privileges with respect to the prop-
erty in question. The remaining portion of the instrument pur-
ports to deal with Myrtle W. Hultberg alone. However, at the
trial it appeared that the daughter had no real interest in the
transaction. It was the mother who paid the $400.00, who in-
tended to pay the balance of the purchase price and build the
theater, and who was the real party in interest. She was so
considered throughout the trial of the case and will be so con-
sidered in this court.

Ordinarily, the construction of an unambiguous written agree-
ment in the nature of a contract is a question of law for the
court. Whether such a written agreement constitutes a con-
tract is a question for the court. Anderson v. Bank, 6 ND 497,
72 NW 916; Bremhorst v. Phillips Coal Co., 202 Iowa 1251, 211
NW 898; Heimberger v. Rudd, 30 SD 289, 188 NW 874; Leslie

— 361.

v. Minneapolis Teachers Retirement Fund Assn., 218 Minn 369,
16 NW2d 318; Lidenberg v. Anchor Stove & Range Co., Inc.
207 Minn 341, 291 NW 512.

The trial court took the view that the instrument under con-
sideration was an option and so instructed the jury. In this
he was clearly correct. An examination of the instrument dis-
closes that the plaintiff paid $400.00 for the privilege of buying
from the city for the sum of $1600.00 two lots upon her per-
formance of certain conditions prior to July 1, 1949, at six P.M.
These conditions were written notice of acceptance, the pay-
ment of the full purchase price of $1600.00, and.the commence-
ment of construction of a fireproof theater to the extent of five
per cent of the whole construction. The provision that in event
the option was exercised the original consideration of $400.00
was to be credited on the purchase price does not make the
instrument a contract of sale and purchase. The plaintiff was
not bound to perform the conditions provided by the instrument
unless she wished to exercise her right to acquire title. She was
not bound to do anything, either by way of construction of the
theater or payment unless she notified the city of her acceptance
of the option. The choice of action rested entirely with her.
She instrument gave her no interest in the property until she
accepted the conditions of purchase. Horgan v. Russell, 24
ND 490, 140 NW 99, 43 LRA NS 1150. Until that event she had
the mere privilege of purchase for which she paid $400.00.

“An option to purchase property is a mere privilege given
by the owner to the optionee and does not constitute the optionee
a purchaser of said property nor give him any right to or in-
terest in the property until he accepts that privilege by exercis-
ang his right of option within the time specified and before it
is cancelled.” Larson v. Wood, 75 ND 9, 25 NW2d 100. Also
Kern v. Kelner, 75 ND 292, 27 NW2d 567; Larson vy. Cole, 76
ND 32, 33 NW2d 325; State v. Crum, 70 ND 177, 292 NW 392.

The instrument in question is clearly an option and not a
contract for sale and purchase. It was the duty of the trial
court to so construe it, which he did and instructed the jury
accordingly.

Not only does the instrument, Exhibit 3, appear to be an

362 Ee

option on its face, but it was so understood and so’ interpreted:
by the plaintiff on February 18, 1949, when she appeared before
the state licensing department in Bismarck to resist the granting
of an application for a theater license by the Dakota Investment
Company, Inc. At a hearing on that application. she testified
that she was planning to build a new theater and’ when asked
if she had taken any steps to secure the necessary property she
said: “I sure have. I got option for lots.” And in admitting
under cross examination that she had made that statement, she
said-she thought she had an option and further stated: “It was’
supposed to have been an option, but I find out it is a contract:
when I got to reading it.” It is clear from-her testimony that
she got the idea of claiming the instrument to be a contract of
sale and purchase some time after the hearing before the state
licensing department. .

The trial court, after instructing the jury that the instru-.
ment in question was an option and after carefully explaining
the major features of an option, advised the jury. as follows:

“The option in this case, Exhibit 3 in evidence, in’ writing,’
provides by its terms that the plaintiff, Mrs. Lillie Hultberg,
before obtaining any interest in the real estate in question or
the consummation of an enforceable contract-is required: to do
and meet the following conditions precedent: . :

“(1) Give written notice of her intention to and the exercise
of the option by delivery of such notice to the City Auditor of
the defendant ‘City of Garrison on or before 6:00 o’clock P.. M.
of the Ist day of July, 1949; and

“(2) To accomplish commencement, amounting to at. least
5% of the whole of construction of a fireproof theater made on
the property described’ in the option, that is, lots 9-and 10 of
Block 12, of the original townsite of Garrison, on or before
the date and hour aforesaid; and

“(3) Make payment to the. City of Garrison of the’ balance’
due of $1200.00 on or before‘the 1st day of July, 1949.” °

The jury, under these instructions, by finding for thé defend-
ant, undoubtedly decided that the plaintiff had not complied
with the conditions of the option. In doing so they had but to
accept her own testimony. In reply to an interrogation by the

ee 363

court, the plaintiff testified that she had-never deposited or de-
livered to the City of Garrison any writing accepting the condi-
tions of the option and that she never at any time or place de-
livered, tendered, or offered to deliver to the City of Garrison
$1200.00 or any part thereof in payment-.of the conditions of
the option, and further stated that she had not paid or tendered
more than $400.00, which was the original consideration named
in the option.

The plaintiff sought to excuse her failure to comply with the
conditions of the option by attempting to prove what she claimed
to be a breach of the terms thereof by the city prior to the
expiration of the time of performance of the conditions by the
plaintiff. Her chief complaint is that on March 7, 1949, the
City Council of the City of Garrison passed a resolution to the
effect that inasmuch as it. was planned to resurface all pave-
ment on the main street of the city, no permits to make connec-
tions to water and sewer mains located on Main Street would
be granted for a period of five years after May 15, 1949. The
plaintiff made no water or sewer connections prior to that dead-
line and claims that the prohibition contained in this resolu-
tion against making water and sewer connections on Main
Street between May 15, 1949, and July 1, 1949, the date of
expiration of the option, prevented her from performing the
conditions of the option. The city’s conduct in this respect,
the plaintiff contends, was in itself a breach of the option agree-
ment on the part of the city and excused the plaintiff from fur-
ther. tendering performance and entitles her to maintain an
action for damages. The record clearly shows that the plaintiff
is. wrong in this contention for two reasons. The option did
not include among its terms the right of the plaintiff to have
preferential treatment in making water or sewer connections
or that the city surrendered or curtailed by the option its govern-
mental function of regulating the use of its streets, including
-access through them to its water and sewer systems. Further-
more, plaintiff’s position cannot be maintained in view of the
inherent nature of the option: contract. We again point out
that it was not a contract of sale and purchase. It was a uni-
lateral agreement binding upon the city according to its terms,

364 Le

but it did not become a contract of purchase unless and until its
acceptance by the plaintiff. 55 Am Jur, Vendor and Purchaser,
Section 28; Thompson on Real Property, Permanent Edition,
Section 4573; Cyclopedia of Real Property Law, Jones, Ven-
dor and Purchaser, Section 141. This is an action to recover
damages for breach of a contract of purchase and sale. The
complaint attempts to set.forth no other cause of action. Un-
der the most liberal construction that it is possible to give the
complaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless she
shows that she has,done or attempted to do the acts required
to convert the option into a contract of purchase and sale.
According to her own testimony, she gave no notice of her
acceptance of the option nor did she tender the balance of the
.purchase price as the option required. She never placed her-
‘self in a position to be bound by a contract of purchase and
sale, or to be entitled to a conveyance. Therefore, she may
not recover damages for failure to convey. Until she elected to
perform the option herself and acted upon that election within
the time specified in the option, she never became entitled to
complain of any breach or repudiation by the city. In the
absence of an election on the plaintiff’s part whereby she be-
came bound, there was, in fact, no contract of sale which the
city could breach or repudiate and without a contract there can
be no breach of contract and no damages. Clark v. Muirhead,
245 Mich 49, 222 NW 79; Kritz v. Moon, 88 Ind App 5, 163 NE
112; Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 Pac
758, 107 Am St Rep 689; 55 Am Jur, Vendor and Purchaser,
Section 88; James on Option Contracts, Section 839. It is clear
that the trial court did not err in declining to submit to the jury
the question of whether the defendant breached its contract.
Plaintiff contends that the passage of the resolution of March
7, 1949, was part of a conspiracy to prevent her from exercising
the option. The evidence does not bear out this contention. The
resolution applied to all property abutting on the portion of
Main Street that was paved. The plaintiff made no effort to
comply with the resolution requiring connections to be made
prior to May 15, 1949. Furthermore, it appears without dis-
pute that water and sewer connections could have been made

Le 365

up the alley to an unpaved cross street and that the subsequent
purchasers of the lots in question actually did make water and
sewer connections for the lots in that manner. It is clear that
the plaintiff wholly failed to establish her contention that she
was prevented by the city from carrying out the terms of the
option. .

The judgment is affirmed.

Grimson, Cunistianson, Satare and Burs, JJ., concur.

Lt
[File No. 7257]
SOLOMENA ZIMMERMAN, and John F. Schneider as Admin-
istrator of the Estate of Gottlieb Zimmerman, Appellants,

v. EMMA. KITZAN, Hilda Kitzan Heinle, Walter Kitzan,
Florence Kitzan Metzger and Christ Kitzan, Respondents.

(56 NW2a 208)

Opinion filed Nov. 21, 1952. Rehearing denied Jan. 8, 1958

J. K. Murray, for appellants.
Milton K. Higgins, for respondents.

Per Curtam: Upon a former appeal in this case, 77ND 477,
43 NW2d 822, we affirmed an order of the district court granting
a new trial. In proceedings ‘in district court after remand, the
attorney for defendants moved the court to vacate: the order
which this court had affirmed. The district court granted the
motion and entered an order vacating the order granting a new
trial. This appeal is from that order.

366" EE

There is no question but that the order appealed from was.
beyond the power of the district court. In effect the. vacation
of an, order affirmed by this court is a vacation of an order of
this court. Unless the decisions of this court are clothed with
finality “litigation would never be ended, and the supreme tri-
punal of the state would be shorn of authority over inferior tri-
bunals.” 3 Am Jur (Appeal and Error Sec 1236) 732, see also,
5 OJS (Appeal and Error Sec 1964) 1501, 1502; Walker v. Young,
et al., 93 Fla 29, 111 So 516; Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health
and Accident Assn., 71 ND 542, 3 NW2d 239; Colter v. Dill,
49 ND 902, 193 NW 662; Weigel v. Powers Elevator Co., 50 ND
776, 198 NW 121.

The order appealed from is reversed.

Morais, C. J. and Burke, Sarure, Curistianson and Grimson,
JJ., concur.
De
: [File No. 7274] :
WILLIAM. R. CARROLL, Respondent, v. ORVILLE RYAN,
Appellant.
(66 NW2a 682)

Opinion filed January 13, 1953.

Murray & Murray, for appellant. Sullivan, Kelsch & Scanlon,
for respondent.

Burxz, J. This is an appeal from an order granting a new
trial.

_ Plaintifi’s complaint set forth two causes of action; one upon

a check and the other upon an open account. Upon trial of
the case to a jury, a verdict for the dismissal of both causes of
action was rendered. Thereafter judgment in favor of the
defendant for the dismissal of the action and for costs in the
sum of $147.60 was entered.

Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon his second cause of ac-
tion. The notice of motion for a new trial specified that the
motion would be based, (1) upon all of the original pleadings
and files in said case, (2) upon a verified transcript of all of
‘the testimony of the defendant, Orville Ryan, given upon the
trial of said cause, (3) upon the instructions of the court to
the jury, (4) upon all of the proceedings had and made a matter

368 ee

of record upon the trial relating to plaintiff's second cause of
action, and (5) upon all the grounds and reasons set forth in
the motion for a new trial of plaintiff’s second cause of action
and specifications of errors hereto attached.

Defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the court to enter-
tain the motion for a new trial upon the grounds; (1) that neither
the notice of motion or motion stated that the motion would be
based upon the minutes of the court upon a settled statement
of the case or upon affidavits; (2) that only a partial transcript
of the evidence has been furnished and (3) that plaintiff did
not ask for a new trial of the entire action.

At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff moved for leave to
amend the notice of motion. Such leave was granted and an
amended notice of motion which stated that the motion was
based upon the minutes of the court, was filed. Defendant’s ob-
jections to the jurisdiction of the court were thereupon overruled
and a new trial of the entire action was granted. Thereafter
defendant asked for a rehearing upon the motion for a new trial.
The rehearing was granted and upon such rehearing defendant
urged that the plaintiff had waived his right to move for a new
trial by paying the judgment for costs entered in the case. The
trial court found that the costs were paid in circumstances which
did not constitute a waiver and again ordered a new trial.

We shall direct our attention first to appellant’s contention
that the failure of the respondent to state in the notice of motion
or in the motion for a new trial, that the motion would be based
either upon the minutes of the court, upon a settled statement of
the case, or upon affidavits was fatal to the court’s jurisdiction.

Section 28-1904 NDRC 1943 provides:

“A motion for a new trial may be made upon the minutes of
the court, upon affidavits or upon a statement of the case. If
the motion is made upon the minutes of the court, reference
may be had to the pleadings, orders of the court, documentary
evidence, stenographic report of testimony and any and all mat-
ters that might be incorporated in a statement of the case. In
that case either party may procure and have settled a statement
of the case and may use the same upon the hearing.”

Section 28-1905 NDRO 1943 provides:

be 369

“Tt shall not be necessary in any case for a person intending
to make a motion for a new trial to serve a notice of intention
to make such motion.”

Section 28-1809 NDRC 1943 provides:

“A party desiring to make a motion for a new trial . . .
shall serve with the notice of motion . . .a concise statement
of the errors of law he complains of, and if he claims the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the verdict . . . he shall so
specify.” a

Aside from Section 28-1809, supra, the statutes do not’ pre-
sevibe either the form or the contents of a notice of motion or
motion for a new trial. Rule 4 of the District Court Rules pre-
scribes: .

“Motions, except when otherwise properly made in open court,
shall be accompanied by notice thereof, together with copies of
the affidavits or other papers in support of. the same, or other-
wise particularly specifying papers in the action that have
been served, or on file. Such motions shall concisely state the
_grounds thereof.” :

The notice of motion and motion for a new trial served upon
the appellant in this case strictly comply with the provisions of
Section 28-1904 and Rule 4, supra, in that they set forth’ the
errors of law complained of, were accompanied with specifica-
tions of the insufficiency of the evidence and particularly de-
seribed all of the papers, documents and other matters of record
in the case to which reference would be made in support of the
motion. The items set forth in the notice of motion to which
reference would be made were all items to which, by the provi-
sions of Section 28-1904, supra, reference may be made when the
motion for a new trial is based on the minutes of the court. It
is true the notice of motion does not contain the exact words
“minutes of the court,” it does, however, state, among other
things, that the motion will be based upon “all of the proceedings
had and made a matter of record upon the trial.”

The language “all proceedings had and made a matter of rec-
ord upon the trial” is a very satisfactory definition of “minutes
of the court.” We are satisfied therefore that the notice of mo-

“370 Le

tion was not-only sufficient to inform appellant that the motion
i for a new trial would:be based upon the minutes of the court but
was much more explicit and informative than-it would have been
had it contained merely thé bare statement that the motion would
. be based upon-the minutes of the court. It was clearly sufficient
to vest in the ‘court jurisdiction to hear the motion for 4 new
- trial. :
‘Appellant’s second objection to the trial court’s jurisdiction,
viz: that only a partial transcript of the evidence was furnished,
-is-clearlyfwithout merit. By the provisions of Section 28-1904,
ssupra, where a-motion for a new trial is based upon the minutes

-of.the court, either party. may refer to the stenographic report

of the testimony. If appellant wished the court to consider tes-

_timony: other than that in: thé furnished transcript, he’ could

secure a transcript of such testimony or have the reporter read
his notes to the court.

We turn next’ to appellant’s contentions that where suit was
brought upon two causes of action and there was a general ver-
dict and judgment dismissing the suit, the court was without
sjurisdiction to entertain a’motion for a-néw trial of one of the
“eauses of action, or that having entertained such motion he was
‘without jurisdiction to grant a new trial of the entire action.
Neither of these contentions can be sustained. The court had
undoubted jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a new trial of
‘one cause of action. -66 OJS (New Trial, sec. 11¢) 91. Upon con-
sideration of such.a motion “it was within the power of the court
‘to require that a new trial shall be general instead of partial;
-and a party, by iioving for a new trial as to one issue only, can-
-not restrict the exercise of this power.” 39 Am Jur (New Trial,
*sec, 22) 46. Clark v. New York, N. H. & H. RB. Co., 33 RI 83, 80
A: 406, Ann Cas 1913B 356; Annotation in LRAI915EH 248; Ann
“Cas 1912D 594; See also Fisher v. J. H. Sheridan Co., 189 SE
“356, 182.SC 316, 108 ALR 981. ©

Appellant’s néxt contention is that by paying the judement
for costs; respondent acknowledged the correctness of the judg-
ment and.waived his right to a new trial. In this case the princi-
pal judgment was for a dismissal of the action. The judgment

for costs was only incidental to the principal judgment. As was
stated in Woodward et al. v. State ex rel, Thomssen, 79 NW 164,
58 Neb 598. “This judgment consists of two parts,—one on the
merits, and the other for costs. The payment and satisfaction
of the latter is no bar to error proceeding to obtain the reversal”
of the former. To the same effect is Johnson v. Barton, 134 NW
84, a North Dakota decision which apparently through over-
sight was omitted in the published North Dakota Reports, where-
in it was said: “The costs were only an incident.of the judg-
ment.” Payment of the costs “left standing the main judgment
against appellant.” We are satisfied therefore that there was
no waiver by respondent of his right to move for a new trial.
Appellant’s final contention that the specifications of insuf-
ficiency of the evidence were defective cannot be considered for
the reason that this objection was not made upon the hearing of
the motion for a new trial in the district court. Poirier Mfg.-Co.
v. Kitts, 18 ND 556, 558, 120 NW 558; Gooler v. Hidness, 18 ND
338, 121 NW 83; Shuman v. Lesmeister, 34 ND 209, 158 NW 271.
The order granting a new trial is accordingly affirmed.

Morais, O. J., and Sarure, Curisrianson and Guimson, JJ.,
coneur. :

372 |
[File No. 7326]

PAUL GANGE and Katherine Gange, Appellants, v. GEORGE
H. GANGH, Administrator of the Estate of Karl Gange, De-
ceased, Conrad Gange, George H. Gange, Regina Stappler,
Katherine Vogel, Elizabeth Ziegler, Paul Lauinger, Frank
Lauinger, Anton Lauinger, Katherine Schiele, Regina
Lauinger, Mary Eva Hoffart, Nick Leier, Annie Merck, and
Christian Volk, Respondents.

(56 NW2d 688)

Opinion filed January 13, 1953,

Johnson & Rausch, for appellant.

‘espondents.: °

Ct 375

Morais, Ch. J. This is an appeal from an order of the District
Court of McHenry County granting a motion of.the respondents
for, a new trial. The matter involves the payment of # claim
against the estate of Karl Gange, who died January 15, 1949.
The claimants and appellamts are a son of the deceased and his
wife who filed a claim for care ‘and support of the deceased from
May 1941 to June 1948 at the rate of $50.00 per month, amount-
ing to $4,200.00. The county court allowed the claimants $440.00.
The claimants then appealed to the District Court of McHenry
County where the matter was tried before a jury and a verdict
was rendered in.favor of the claimants for $3,700.00. The re-
spondents in this appeal then moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or in the alternative for a-new trial, which
was granted. The chief reason for granting the new trial, as dis-
closed by the court’s memorandum opinion, was that the claim-
ants failed to prove the value of the services which they claimed
to have rendered.

- In the spring of 1941, Karl Gange, then about: seventy: six
years of age, was a widower living alone in his ‘house in. Karls-
ruhe. He sold the house to his son, reserving therein a-voom for
his own use. From then until about the time of his dedth'in Janu-
ary 1949 the son and his wife, claimants therein, furnished Karl
Gange care, shelter, and sustenance. In 1947 Karl Gange suf
fered a stroke and in the spring of 1948 he was placed ‘under.
legal guardianship. The claim in this case covers the period
from May 1941 to June 1948. From June.1948 to his death, his
care was paid for through the guardianship proceedings. Ap-
parently the stroke did not result:in thé.conplete disability--of
the deceased, for he was still able to get’about and went .doiwn
town frequently up to the time of his death.” There is consider--
able evidence to the effect that the deceased, particularly dur-
ing the last two years of his life, was very difficult to care for,
was addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor, frequent-
ly soiled his clothing, and otherwise rendered his surroundings
unpleasant and offensive to those about hitn: -The evidence diss
closes no express agreement that-the -sonsand his wife were to
receive pay for the services rendered to thie deceased. Recovery,
if any, must under the state: of this.record. be on the basi8 of

376 ee

implied contract. Whether facts exist which warrant such an
implication is a question to be determined by the trier of facts.

Brady v. Brady, 50 ND 114, 194 NW 938, was an action by a
daughter against the administrator of her deceased mother to
recover upon an implied contract for services rendered to the
mother during her last years and last illness. From that case
we take these pertinent quotations:

“the claimant does not establish a cause of action by proving
that the.services were, in fact, rendered, and their reasonable
value, but must rebut the presumption of gratuitousness—which .
is one of fact—by competent evidence. . . . The source of
the obligation, whether the contract be express or implied, is the
intention of the parties; the essential difference between an ex-
press and an implied contract is not.of the substance, but lies
in the form of the proof; the former is proved by direct, the
latter by circumstantial, evidence. In the case-at bar, therefore,
the verdict for the plaintiff should not be disturbed if there is
substantial evidence in the record from which the. jury could
find, under all the circumstances of the case, that it was the isi-
tention and understanding of the decedent and her daughter that
she should be paid for her services; and it.is not necessary that
such understanding should be expressed in words, but it may
be inferred from all the circumstances, the nature of the services,
the conduct, and the relations of the parties.”

In that case it was held that the services were not of such an
extraordinary, peculiar, or menial character as to justify the
jury in finding that there was an understanding between the
mother and daughter that compensation: should be made. The
jury had rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and this court or-
dered a new trial. In stating and applying the law in that case,
these former decisions were considered and relied upon: Krapp
v. Krapp, 47 ND 308, 181 NW 950; Bergerson.v. Mattern, 41 ND
404, 170 NW 877. The law in most jurisdictions is extensively
covered in an annotation to be found in 7 ALR(2d) 8, Our cases
are in accord with general authority.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a new
trial upon the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove the value
of the services which they allege were performed for the deceased

Le 377

and for which they now seek recovery. After explaining why
such evidence was omitted, the appellants argue that the jury,
having heard the testimony regarding the extent and nature of
the services performed by the plaintiffs and having a knowl-
edge and understanding of the value of such services, could de-
termine the value and base a verdict thereon, which they did.
The trial court is clearly correct in determining that there was
no evidence placed before the jury by which it could measure the
value of the services. Was that value a fact so commonly and
generally known that we must assume it to be within the knowl-
edge of every member of the jury? The appellants, in order to
avoid the impact of the presumption of gratuitousness arising
from the relationship between the appellants and the deceased,
take a position wholly inconsistent with their argument that
knowledge of the worth of these services was common to all. If
the services rendered were so extraordinary as to avoid the
presumption, it would seem that they were also so extraordinary
that they did not fall within the general knowledge and experi-
ence of members of the jury. In pointing this out, however, we
do not intend to imply that either the court or jury may deter-
mine the value of personal services such as those involved in
this case without there being presented some evidence by which
the value could be measured. As a general rule, courts will not
take judicial notice of the value of personal services in actions
to recover the value thereof. 20 Am Jur Evidence, Section 121;
Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Second Edition, Section 426,
In Tullgren v. Karger, 173 Wis 288, 181 NW 232, it is said:
“In matters outside of the field of general knowledge and in
eases where the testimony of experts or those particularly
familiar with the matters at issue is necessary, the findings of
all triers of fact, either court or jury, must be based upon testi-
mony of witnesses or other evidence made a part of the record.”
See also In Re Gudde’s Will, 260 Wis 79, 49 NW(2d) 906. The
value of the services which the claimants claim they performed
for the decedent is a matter clearly outside of the field of general
knowledge of the jury and a verdict in favor of the claimants
therefore must be based upon testimony of witnesses or other ev-

378 Ee

idence and in the absence of such evidence the verdict cannot be
sustained.

It is argued that the proof of claim which was filed in the
county court sets forth that it is for “care and support of Karl
Gange from May 1941 to June 1948 at the rate of $50.00 per
month” and being verified by affidavit as required by statute
(Section 30-1805 NDRC 1943) and being introduced in evidence,
is of itself sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. The claim
thus filed and verified is evidence only of the fact that it was
duly presented as a claim against the estate. It is not evidence
of the facts therein recited. Bancroft’s Probate Practice, Sec-
tion 894. It constitutes a pleading in the case. Tooz v. Tooz,
76 ND 492, 37 NW(2d) 493. In Hughes v. Wachter, 61 ND 513,
238 NW 776, 100 ALR 255, it was said of a verified claim that
had been filed with the executrix:

“Tt is clear however, that the verification attached to that er-
hibit had no probative force in the trial of this case any more
than the verification of the complaint. Such verification is re-
quired by statute in order to present a claim to the executrix; but
cannot be accepted in this case as proof of the truth of the
statements contained in the claim.”

The fact that in the course of probate claimants filed a verified
claim for $50.00 a month is not evidence of the value of the serv-
ices claimed to have been rendered. It is not claimed that the
record contains other evidence of value. The trial court did
not abuse his discretion in granting a new trial on the ground
that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict with
respect to the value of the services rendered.

This brings us to another question which has been raised and
is likely to again arise upon the new trial. The question is:
May the plaintiffs testify as to their own opinion of the value
of the services rendered after they have been fully described as
to extent, nature, and conditions surrounding their rendition?

In Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Section 715, we find
that:

“It would be a hard rule which would prevent a plaintiff from
informing the jury of his own estimate of the value of his serv-
ices; and the Courts seem inclined to impose no terms as to his

| : 379

general familiarity with the class of services; that he has ren-
dered them justifies listening to his opinion.”

This general statement of the law is supported by abundant
authority, among which we find these cases: Missouri Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Palmer, 55 Neb 559, 76 NW 169; Moran v. Moran, 124
Neb 379, 246 NW 711; Rizzo v. Cunningham, 303 Mass 16, 20
NE(2d) 471; Nesbit v. Shisler; 175 Mo App 565, 158 SW 419;
Citron v. Fields, 30 Cal App(2d) 51, 85 Pac(2d) 534; Coogan
Finance Corp. v. Beatcher, 120 Cal App 278, 7 Pac(2d) 695;
Millspaugh v. McKnab, 134 Kan 579, 7 Pac(2d) 51; MeGilchrist
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 138 Ore 679, 7 Pac(2d) 982; Parmalee
v. Wigent’s Estate, 189 Mich 507, 155 NW 577.

The respondents further contend that the claimants cannot
testify as to the value of services rendered to the decedent be-
cause the claimants are rendered incompetent as witnesses by
the provisions of Section 31-0103 NDRC 1948, which, in effect,
provides that they shall not be allowed to testify against execu-
tors, administrators, heirs at law, or next of kin of a deceased
as to any transaction whatever with or statement by the de-
ceased unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party.
The neat question is whether testimony as to the value of serv-
ices rendered when given by the claimants is testimony as to a
transaction with the deceased. The authorities are not in ac-
cord. See annotation in 155 ALR 995. In this jurisdiction the
statute in question has been construed and applied strictly. As
we said in McDonald v. Miller, 73 ND 474, 16 NW(2d) 270, 156
ALR 1328:

“This court has consistently refused to extend this statute by
interpretation and has confined its application to the letter
thereof.”

We deem it to be the proper rule that a party seeking to recover
for services rendered to a decedent should be permitted to testify
to the value of such services, provided that their nature and the
fact of their rendition have been first established by competent
evidence. Morrissett v. Wood, 123 Ala 384, 26 So 307, 82 Am St
Rep 127; Tuohy v. Trail, 19 App DC 79; Belote v. O’Brian, 20
Fla 126; Lewis v. Meginniss, 30 Fla 419, 12 So 19; Burrows v.

380 es

Butler (NY) 38 Hun 157; Garwood v. Schlichenmaier, 25 Tex
Civ App 176, 60 SW 573.

We have held the term “transactions” to “embrace every varie-
ty of affairs which conforms to the subject of negotiations, inter-
views, or actions between the parties, and include every method
by which one person can derive impressions or information from
the conduct, condition or language of another.” Frink v. Tay:
lor, 59 ND 47, 228 NW 459; International Shoe Co. v. Hawkin-
son, 72 ND 622, 10 NW(2d) 590. Proof of the value of services
sought to be established on a quantum meruit basis is a matter
wholly separate and apart from the transaction which involved
the rendition of the services. Once the nature and the extent
of the services are established by competent testimony, the value
of the services can be shown by expert testimony or. by the esti-
mate of the value on the part of the party who rendered the serv-
ices, or both. It seems clear to us that the plaintiffs’ opinion as
to the value of the services rendered to a decedent is no part
of the transaction with the decedent and that a plaintiff who ren-
dered the services is a competent witness with respect to their
value, The fatal defect in this record, however, is the total ab-
sence of evidence respecting the value of the services. It is
upon this ground that the trial court ordered a new trial and, in
so doing, he did not err. The order appealed from is affirmed.

Bourke, Sarure, Curisrianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Ee 381
[File No. 7322]

HILDA MATTSON, Plaintiff and. Respondent, v. EINO MATT-
SON, Defendant and Appellant.

(56 NW2d 764)

Opinion filed January 14, 1953

Ella Van Berkom, for appellant.
Stormon & Stormon, for respondent.

382 ee

Sarmre, J. This is an action for divorce brought by the plain-
tiff Hilda Mattson against the defendant Eino Mattson. They
were married in July 1929 and ever since their marriage have
resided in Towner and Rolette Counties and have been engaged
in farming. They have four children, Vida Mattson, born April
7, 1931, Jeanette Mattson, born March 17, 1934, Delmer Mattson,
born May 8, 1936, and Carol Mattson, bori May 10, 1943. .They
have been fairly successful as farmers, and own a section of
land in Towner County valued at approximately $20,000.00;
machinery and equipment of the approximate value of $20,000.-
00, a house in the City of Rolla of the value of $8000.00 or
$8500.00 and other assets of the value of $15,000.00 to $20,000.00.
The farm land is clear, but the farm machinery is encumbered
by mortgages, which together with other bills and accounts pay-
able amount to approximately $30,000.00.

The action for divorce was commenced in July 1949. The com-
plaint alleges extreme cruelty and demands judgment for an
absolute divorce, for the care and custody of the minor childy ‘en,
and for support alimony and attorney’s fees.

The defendant answered denying the allegations of extreme
cruelty and demands judgment for the dismissal of the action.

By stipulation of the parties the case was heard at Devils
Lake, North Dakota-on December 6, 1950, before the Honorable
Roy A. Ilvedson, who was designated as trial judge. The trial
continued through December 7th, when both:sides rested and an
adjournment taken until further notice from the attorneys of
the parties. It was agreed that during the adjournment the de-
fendant was to procure certain bank statements and other items
with reference to his financial affairs to be submitted to the trial
court.

Thereafter by stipulation of the parties, the case was reopened
and the trial continued at Rugby, North Dakota on October 18,
1951. The parties were permitted to serve and file amended or
supplemental pleadings. The supplemental complaint alleged
that on the 28th day of August, 1951, at Sebeka, Minnesota the
defendant committed assault and battery upon the plaintiff and
was convicted before O. F. Utternack, a justice of the peace of
Wadena County, State of Minnesota. Defendant’s supplemental

a 383

auswer adihits that he was convicted as alleged, but alleges that
in fact he was not guilty of said offense, but that he entered a plea
of guilty in order to avoid delay in returning to North Dakota to
take charge of harvesting operations on his farms.

The supplemental answer further alleges that on April 27,
1951, the plaintiff gave birth to a female child at a hospital at
Park Rapids, Minnesota and that one Edw. Seigel is the father
of said child. There is no dispute as to the truth of this allega-
tion as the plaintiff admitted it in her testimony, and it is further
admitted in the record by written stipulation by counsel for both
parties. .

The trial court held the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was
insufficient to establish extreme cruelty under the statute to war-
rant the granting of a decree of divorce, but granted to the plain-
tiff a decree of separation from bed and board, forever, from
the defendant Hino Mattson, and ordered a property settlement
between the parties in the proportion of 40 per cent to the plain-
tiff and 60 per cent to the defendant; that. according to the valua-
tion as found by the court the plaintiff was entitled to $18,830.00;
that defendant was entitled to credit upon said sum of $18,830.00
for all sums of money he paid to the plaintiff since the commence-
ment of the action at the rate of $150.00 for each $200.00 pay-
ment made by him, the court determining that $50.00 of each
$200.00 payment made was for support of the children and that
therefore the defendant was entitled to credit only at the rate
of $150.00 ‘for each $200.00-monthly installment made; that the
said sum of $18,830.00 be ‘paid in installments over a period of
years and that the section of land owned by the.defendant should
be impressed with a lien until the total sum so awarded to the
plaintiff is paid with interest at the rate of 3% per annum. The
court further held that the defendant should pay the sum of
$35.00 per month for each of the children Jeanette Mattson and
Carol Mattson until they arrive at the age of majority, subject
to the further order of the court, and should the son Delmer
Mattson later live with the plaintiff, then the defendant should
pay for his support such sums as may be awarded by the court.
The court further held that the plaintiff be awarded the care
and custody of the two minor children Jeanette and Carol Matt-

384 Ee

son and that.the defendant be awarded the care and custody of
son, Delmer Mattson, subject to further order of the court.

Judgment was entered accordingly.

The defendant appealed from the judgment directing a divi-
sion of the property and impressing a lien upon the real estate
and demanded a trial de novo.

Where an appeal is taken from a judgment in a divorce case
and a trial de novo is demanded it becomes necessary to review
all of the evidence including the conduct of the parties which it
is claimed constitutes grounds for divorce. In the case of Hoel-
linger v. Hoellinger, 38 ND 638, 166 NW 519, we said:

“It is the manifest duty of this court, upon an appeal of this
character, to review the entire record for the purpose of dispos-
ing of the case according to the provisions of the statute under
which the appeal is taken, and in divorce cases this duty rests
upon the court regardless of the desires of counsel or parties
that, if possible the case be disposed of without affecting the
judgment of divorcee . . . . Where a retrial is had to this
Court . . . and where it is not limited to specific questions of
fact the entire record is here for review for the purpose of en-
abling the court to enter such judgment as is appropriate on
the whole record.”

And in the case of Henry v. Henry, 77 ND 845, 46 NW2d 701,
‘we said: .

“While neither party has challenged that part of the decree
which granted the divorce, both have demanded a trial de novo
upon questions which require a consideration of all of the evi-
dence in the case. That is to say: a trial de novo upon the ques-
tions of custody and allowances cannot be had unless we view
all of the evidence concerning all of the acts of the parties in-
cluding those which it is claimed afford grounds for the divorce.
Such a view of necessity brings into focus all of the issues in the
case. These demands therefore open the entire judgment:.to
“review.” :

It will be necessary therefore to review the evidence-and the
entire record in-order to determine the issues involved and the
rights of the parties.

: The parties were married in 1929. They were engaged in

— 385

farming in Towner County. They were thrifty and accumulated
considerable property, real and personal. The defendant ap-
pears to have been a good provider, and the plaintiff and chil-
dren were well dressed and otherwise well provided for. He
purchased a modern house in the City of Rolla and bought new
furniture. They lived in this house during the winter months.
The house on the farm appeared to be adequate and compared
favorably with the average farmhouse in that community. Both
parties were industrious and the plaintiff assisted with the usual
farm chores.

The plaintiff was born in Minnesota and she would make visits
to her parents and relatives there once and sometimes twice a
year with the approval of the defendant.

The evidence does not disclose any serious disagreement
or trouble between the parties until sometime prior to June 1949.
On June 17, 1949 the plaintiff left the defendant, and since that
time they have not cohabited as husband and wife.

The plaintiff testified in substance as follows:

During the past five years the defendant called her vile names
and used profane and abusive language toward her both in pub-
lic and in the house; several neighbors and friends of the parties
were called as witnesses but none of them had ever heard de-
fendant call plaintiff vile names or use profane language toward
plaintiff, except a brother of plaintiff. His testimony was
rather absurd and was of little weight. The daughter Vida was
called as a witness for the plaintiff but gave no testimony of
having heard the defendant, her father, use profane and abusive
language towards plaintiff. The other children were not called
as witnesses by either party in regard to this matter.

In 1946 the defendant pushed her against a door and broke
her shoulder, she’ fainted and her daughter Vida had to
dress her. This incident was not corroborated by Vida. The
plaintiff stated that she went to see Dr. Toomey at Devils Lake
the next morning about her stomach ulcers but it does not appear
that she made any complaint about her “broken shoulder”. The
doctor was not called as a witness.

On the morning of June 17, 1949, the morning she left the de-

|

386 a

fendant, he came into the bathroom and ripped off her house
coat and “kept on tearing it”. She said their son Delmer told
the defendant to leave her alone, and that the defendant then
walked out. The house dress was not introduced in evidence, al-
though she admitted she still had it in the “rag box”; plaintiff
testified further that the defendant made excessive demands
upon her for marital relations while she was ill, that she con-
sulted doctors and was advised that she should not have inter-
course so frequently. From the evidence it appears-that the last
time she consulted a doctor in regard to this matter was in 1946.

The defendant denied specifically that he had used profane
and abusive language toward plaintiff and that he had called
her vile names. He also denied that he committed the acts of
violence testified to by the plaintiff. With reference to plaintiffs
complaint that he made excessive demands for marital relations
when she was ill the defendant testified that he talked with the
doctor whom the plaintiff had consulted in the matter and that
the doctor told him there was‘nothing to stop or prevent plaintiff
from having marital relations with the defendant. The doctor
was not called as a witness for either party.

At the second hearing held on October 18, 1951, the plaintiff
testified that on August 28, 1951, at Sebeka, Minnesota, defendant
committed assault and battery upon her and that he was con-
victed thereof in justice court. The plaintiff, her daughter
Jeanette and one Grangruth testified to the cireumstances that
culminated in the charge of assault and battery. The plaintiff
testified that the defendant threw a chair at her. The witness
Grangruth testified that on the day this incident took place the
defendant had been drinking. He followed the plaintiff about the
room and was talking to her. He reached for her several times.
The witness was of the impression that both parties were “mad”
but their conversation was in a normal tone and no shouting
except a few times. He did not even recall any swearing, but
that the defendant “touched her a few times”, and that the de-
fendant picked up a chair and threw it on the floor.. The defend-
ant finally put his arms around the plaintiff's neck. The

Lt

Le 387

defendant was not using his hands or choking her. He was
“sort of hugging her”. His arrest followed.

Defendant’s version of this affair is that he had been driving
all night having come from the farm in North Dakota, and
arrived at Sebeka about 7:30 in the morning. _He had a few
drinks, went to the barber shop and had a shave, and then went
to the house occupied by the plaintiff and then to plaintiff’s
sister’s place. Then he went to Menanga to get some medicine,
and then back to Sebeka. He took a few drinks so he could stay
awake. He intended to go back to Rolla that afternoon. He said
he did put his arms around the plaintiff and wanted to kiss her
good bye and then was arrested. He said it was all “a put
up deal”. He said he had his arms around plaintiff when the
policeman came and arrested him, and took him and put him
in jail. He was anxious to get back to his harvesting operations
and in order to get back as soon as possible he pleaded guilty.
Whatever the intention or purpose of the defendant may have
been in enacting his part of this scene, the fact is that the plain-
tiff was not harmed in any way and did not appear to have
been in any danger at any time. She had the protection of
the witness Grangruth who was present during the whole affair.
He was a young man nineteen years of age, 5 feet and 11 inches
tall and weighed 176 pounds. It may only have been a coinci-
dence but a policeman also appeared on the scene when the
defendant was leaving and had his arms around the plaintiff.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted that
he had faults, although he did not disclose what the faults were.
He stated that he still loves his wife and that “she is the best
woman in Towner County”. He wanted her and the children
to come back and live with him as they had before. The
plaintiff, however, stated she had lost all love for the defendant
and would not come back to him. Defendant stated that he
was willing to take all their children back and support and take
care of them, even though his wife was not willing to come back
and he would also be willing to make monthly payments for the
support of his-wife.

The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish
a cause of action for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty.

388 De

We have carefully considered the, entire record and we conclude
that the trial court’s findings in this respect were not erroneous.

The trial court made a further finding that the plaintiff was
entitled to a decree of separation, forever, from bed and board,
and also that she was entitled to a division of the property.
This finding was clearly erroneous. A decree of separation
from bed and board and for a division of property may not
be granted unless the evidence is sufficient to establish a cause
of action for divorce. Section 14-0601 NDRC 1943, provides:

“A decree of separation from bed and board, forever, or for
a limited time, may be decreed by a district court of this state,
upon such evidence as shall be deemed sufficient, on complaint
of a married woman or a married man, for any cause for which a
divorce might be decreed.”

Section 14-0603 NDRC 1943 provides:

“Upon decreeing a separation, the court may make such order
and decree for the suitable support and maintenance of the wife
or husband, and children, if any, out of the separate or joint
property or separate property of the husband and wife, as may
be just and proper.”

Construing said Sections 14-0601 and 14-0603 together, it is
clear that a decree of separation from bed and board may not
be granted unless the evidence would warrant the granting of
a decree of divorce. In the case of Hoellinger v. Hoellinger, 38
ND 636, 166 NW 519, we said: oo

“That portion of the judgment which distributes the property
Hinges directly upon the part which dissolves the marital status.
This action is not brought to determine the separate property
rights of the plaintiff and defendant, and there is no action
known to the law whereby one spouse may obtain a sparate
interest in the property of the other while the marriage tie
continues. While our law recognizes that there may be a suit
for alimony and separate maintenance, independent of proceed-
ings for divorce . . . the judgment, in so far as it affects the
property of the defendant, can do no more than charge.it with a
lien for the payment of such alimony or maintenance. It is
worthy of note in this connection that Section 4401 C.L. 1913
(14-0526 NDRC 1943) makes express provision for the allow-

| 389

ance of maintenance in a divorce action where the divorce is
denied, and that this section is entirely silent upon the matter
of property divisions.”

“Section 4405 C.L. 1913 (14-0524 NDRC 1943) provides ex-
pressly for a distribution of the property when the divorce is
granted. Since there is no proceeding known to the law wherein
there may be a distribution of property between a husband and
wife, based upon their inability to continue the normal marital
relations, the manifest implication of the foregoing statutes is
that there can be no property distribution, unless there be a
judgment or decree of divorce.”

And in the case of Novak v. Novak, 74 ND 572, 24 NW2d 20,
we said:

“ . . . Plaintiff sued for a divorce on the ground of -
extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant. The defendant
took issue with the allegations of the complaint, and counter
claiming, asked for separation on the grounds of willful de-
sertion and neglect. |The court found for the defendant that
there was uo cruelty on her part and that there were both
desertion and neglect on the part of the plaintiff. Though en-
titled to a divorce the defendant had conscientious scruples
against divorce and instead asked for a decree for separation,
which the court granted her.

In any event, the court could not have done other than deny
the plaintiff’s prayer for a divorce. Had the defendant not asked
for affirmative relief, the judgment which needs must have been
entered would have been final and: conclusive against the plain-
tiff though the parties forever after continue to live separate and
apart.” .

It must follow therefore that under the evidence and the law,
Section 14-0601 and the decisions cited, the trial court did not
have the right to enter a decree of separation from bed and
board and to make a division of the property.

Although under the pleadings and the evidence the plaintiff
is not entitled to a division of the property, she is nevertheless
entitled to support and maintenance for herself and minor chil-
dren. Section 14-0526 provides:

“Though a judgment of divorce is denied, the court in an

390 a

action for divorce may provide for thé maintenance of the
wife and her children or any of them by the husband.” THoel-
linger v. Hoellinger, 38 ND 636, 166 NW 519; Savre v. Savre,
77 ND 242, 42 NW2d 642.

The plaintiff i is now 39 years old and the defendant is 47 years
old. They were married in 1929, they settled on a farm -in
Towner County, North Dakota. Through their joint efforts they
accumulated considerable property which is described in detail
elsewhere in this opinion.

There are two minor children, Delmer Mattson of the age
of 16 years and Carol Mattson of the age of 9 years. It
appears that it is the wish of the son Delmer Mattson to continue
to live with the defendant at the farm home in Towner County

- and that Carol Mattson will be with her mother the plaintiff.
This arrangement is agreeable to both parties. The other two
children Vida Mattson and Jeanette Mattson are both of age
and need not be considered here. The plaintiff is living in
Sebeka, Minnesota, in a rented house for which she is paying
$33.00 per month. She has no separate property of her own and
is without any means of support. Some provision should there-
fore be made for her support and maintenance as well as for
the support of her minor daughter Carol Mattson who is in
her care and custody. The determination of there questions is
properly first to be made by the trial court. Hoellinger v.
Hoellinger, 38 ND 636, 166 NW 519; Savre v. Savre, 77 ND
242, 42 NW2d 642.

‘The record is remanded to the district court with instructions
to consider the matter of support of the plaintiff and the minor
children, Carol Mattson and Delmer Mattson, and an allowance
for attorneys’ fees in district court, upon this record and upon
such further showing as he may in the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion permit the parties to make, and order the entry of judg-
ment accordingly.

The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.

Morris, OC. J., and Burks, Grimson, and Curistianson, JJ.
concur.

a 391
{Cr. No. 251]

CHARLEY SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. O. J. NYGAARD, Warden
of the North Dakota Penitentiary, Respondent

(56 NW2d 685)

Opinion filed Jan. 23, 1953
Charley Simpson, per se.
Elmo T. Christianson, Attorney General, for respondent.

Morris, Ch. J. Charley Simpson petitions this court for a writ
of habeas corpus and alleges that he is unlawfully imprisoned
and detained in the state penitentiary under the authority of a
judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County entered on
November 19, 1951, sentencing the petitioner to be confined in the
state penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than
three years.

The substance of petitioner’s complaint is that he was con-
victed of assignation in the ‘second degree, which is punishable
by a maximum sentence of one year in the penitentiary under the
-provisions of Chapter 115 SLND 1951, and that having served
the maximum punishment provided for the crime for which he

302 a

was convicted, he is at the present time being illegally confined
in the penitentiary.

Where relief is sought from a criminal judgment through
habeas corpus, the scope of inquiry is limited to questions of
jurisdiction and we inquire into the correctness of the acts of
the trial court only to the extent of determining whether it acted
within its jurisdiction.’ Mazakahomni v. State, 75 ND 73, 25
NW2d 772; State ex rel. Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND 340, 27
Nwe2a 849; Davidson v. Nygaard, 78 ND 141, 48 NW2d 578.

The recorda of the district court in which the petitioner was
sentenced disclose these facts: On-November 16, 1951, the
State’s Attorney of Ramsey County filed an information in the
district court charging the petitioner with corihitting the crime
of assignation in the second degree as defined by Section 12-2214
NDRC 1943. The petitioner was forthwith tried by a jory. which
brought in the following verdict:

“We, the jury in the above entitled action, find the defendant
Charley Simpson, guilty of the crime of Assignation as defined
by Section 12-2214 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943.”
The court then proceeded with the pronouncement of the judg-
ment and sentence now under attack. The written sentence
signed by the judge and entered in the office of the clerk of the
district court contains the following:

“(Sentence imposed after Defendant had pleaded guilty to
additional Information showing previous conviction of a felony,
to-wit murder).”

Chapter 115 SLND 1951 provides that:

“Any person who shall be convicted of any of the offenses set
forth in section 12-2214 shall be subject to imprisonment for’
not more than one year. Any person who shall be convicted
twice in any one year period of a violation of any of the pro-
visions of section 12-2214 shall be subject upon the second con-
viction to imprisonment for not less than one year nor more.than
three years.”

The petitioner is correct in his contention that assignation in
the second degree carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment
for not more than one year. The petitioner seems to be under
the impression that because he received a sentence of from one

[| 898

to three years the sentence is for assignation in the first degree,
-which is not the crime for which he was convicted. In this he
‘is completely in error. He was convicted and sentenced -for
‘committing the crime of assignation: in the second degree, but
because that conviction was the second conviction which: the
petitioner had sustained for committing a felony the penalty was
increased in accordance with the provisions of Section 12-0618
NDRC 1943, as a transcript of the proceedings. of the court
clearly shows.

On November 19, 1951, and before sentence was passed, “the
state’s attorney filed an information sétting forth the convie-
tion of the petitioner of a second felony for which additional’
punishment is provided by Section 12-0618:NDRC 1943 ‘and
further charging that the petitioner had previously been con-
victed of murder in the first degree.

Section 12-0618, supra, provides in part that every person who
has been convicted of a felony in this state and thereafter com-
mits another crime, “If the subsequent offense is such that upon
a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for five years or any less term, then the
person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than ten years;

”

ea felony is a crime which is or may be punishable with death
or imprisonment in the penitentiary.” Section 12-0107 NDRC
1943; State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 ND 68, 256 NW 877.

. Assignation in the second degree is a crime which may be
punishable with imprisonment in the penitentiary for one year
and is therefore a felony under this definition. If it is .the
second felony of which the petitioner is convicted, it is, under
the provisions of Section 12-0618, supra, punishable by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for not more than ten years.

The record made in the district court and now before us shows
that before the petitioner was sentenced an information was
filed charging him with the commission of a second felony.
This was the proper procedure under the provisions of Section
12-0623 NDRC 1943.. That information was filed by leave of
court, whereupon these proceedings were had:

308 —

. “The court: Mr. Simpson, you are present in Court .with
your counsel and in accordance with the provisions of statute
the State’s Attorney at this time, which was set as the time for
your sentence on the. conviction had in this Court on November
16, the State files this information stating that you had previous-
ly been convicted of a felony. The information may be filed and
you may as well proceed with an arraignment on it.

“State’s attorney: State moves arraignment of the defend-
ant.

“The court: You may proceed.

“State’s attorney: Let the record show that State at this
time, hands copy of information to defendant and another copy
to defendant’s attorney and the information is read to him at
this time. ;

“The court: Mr. Simpson, you may take your seat again.
Mr. Christianson, if you will refer to Section 12-0623 you will
find a-reference to the procedure under which we are proceeding.
For the information of yourself and your counsel, Mr. Simpson,
you are adyised that the purpose of filing this additional infor-
mation is not to bring up again a crime for which you were
sentenced but merely to call to the attention of the Court the
fact that you had been convicted for such a crime and the only
effect it has is upon the range and amount of sentence that the
Court can impose. The Court wishes to advise you that under
the.terms of the statute you have a right, that is, you. have
aright and you can demand a trial upon this information. That
is, if you deny there was such a conviction you have the right
to be tried on that issue. Now perhaps you will want to consult
with your attorney, or are you ready t to enter a plea on this ques-
tion now?

“Defendant: Sure.

“State’s attorney: I think he should consult with his attorney,

“The court: Yes, you can explain to-him his rights, Mr. Chris-
tianson.

“(A short:conference had between defendant and his counsel
off record.) .

“The court: Are you ‘ready to proceed?

“Mr. Christianson: Yes.

Le 395

“The court: Are you ready at this time to enter a plea. upon
this second information, Mr. Simpson?

“Defendant: Yes, sir.

“The court: What is your plea?

“Defendant: Guilty.

“The court: Let the Clerk show by her record that a plea of.
guilty was entered by the defendant to this charge i in this second
information.”

- This transcript clearly shows that‘ the court and the attorneys
involved treated the petitioner with fairness and consideration.
The proceedings were conducted in accordance with the appli-
cable statutory provisions pertaining to increased penalties
where a former conviction is shown. The court had jurisdiction
of both the person of the petitioner and the subject matter. The
sentence and judgment pronounced by the court is valid. The
petitioner is lawfully imprisoned and is not entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus. Petition denied. -

Burs, Sarare, Curistianson and Grimson,-JJ., concur.
Lh
[File No. 7343]

in THE MATTER OF THE ESTATH OF HERMAN
HEIDEN, Sr., Deceased.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. STATE OF
NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent.

(67 Nwe2a 242)

“Opinion filed January 23, 1953

FT
William R. Mills, Assistant United States District Attorney,
for appellant.

E. T. Christianson, Attorney General, C. E. Brace, Assistant
Attorney General, and John HE. Williams, for respondent.

Per Curiatn. “According to the notice of appeal served and
filed herein, the County Court of Kidder County entered an
order .on November 30, 1950, allowing the final report and ac-
count of the administrator of the estate of Herman Heiden, Sr.,
deceased, wherein the county court determined that a claim
filed by the Public Welfare Board of the State of North Dakota
had priority over a claim filed by the United States of America
and upon appeal to the District Court of Kidder County the

a 397

latter court, by order dated August 28, 1952, affirmed the order
of the county court. The United States of America appeals
from the order of the district court.

The attorney general, as a part of the state’s brief, moves
that the order appealed from summarily be affirmed on the
ground that the record contains no specifications of error and
none were served with the notice of appeal. This motion was
renewed orally at the beginning of the state’s argument. ,
The clerk of the District Court of Kidder County has mailed
to the clerk of this court a bundle of papers consisting of sixty
documents, to which the clerk of the district court has attached
a certificate to the effect that they are all the original papers’
which were filed in the district court in the matter. Among these
papers are included the notice of appeal to this court, trial
briefs of counsel, the memorandum decision of the district judge,
and his order affirming the order of the county court. There are
also included many documents that are part of the files of the
County Court of Kidder County in the matter of the estate of
Herman Heiden, Sr., and a copy of the memorandum opinion
of the judge of the United States District Court in thé case of
the United States v. Kranich, reported in 92 Fed Supp 366.
‘We have diligently searched through this bundle of papers and
are unable to find therein any specifications of error, statement
of the case, or order settling such statement, or a demand for
trial de novo. These miscellaneous documents cannot be con-
sidered a judgment roll (Section 28-2012 NDRC 1943) or a
statement of the case (Section 28-1806 NDRC 1943). Among
them there is a stipulation which states:

“That in deciding and determining the matter, ‘the “Court
shall have and consider in its entirety all the files. and records
of the County Court of Kidder County, North-Dakota; .... .”
But this stipulation does not establish what documents or
other evidence was:actually before the court.. There is nothing
to indicate to this court the record that was presented to the
trial court.

Lest it be argued that this appeal is from an_ order of the
district court and therefore a statement of the case is not re-
quired, we would point out that Section 28- 2707, paragraph 2,

5S

requires that upon appeal from an order the record must con-
tain “the original papers used by each party on the application
therefor, the reporter’s minutes, if any, duly transcribed, and
the evidence upon which such order is based, duly certified as
correct by the trial judge. Such record shall be duly authenti-
cated and transmitted by the clerk of the district court.” A
similar provision is contained in rule 20, paragraph B, of the
rules of the supreme court.

In Solon v. O’Shea, 45 ND 362, 177 NW 757, this court dis-
missed on its own motion an appeal similar to the one here
presented for failure of the appellant to ‘produce a ‘record in
compliance’ with the above statutory provision and ‘the rule of
the supreme court. In Thorp v. Thorp, 46 ND 113, 180 NW 26,
after pointing out that it did not appear what matters were
considered by the trial court, other than those mentioned in
the’ order, it is said:

‘“This court has recently held that upon appeals of this nature
a record must be settled as the statute requires; that either
the order of the trial court must describe the papers and the
evidence upon which the same were made or the record must
be settled.” Citing Solon v. O’Shea, supra. See also Kiley’
v..Meckler, 57 ND 217, 220 NW 926.

_In this case there is nothing in the order affirming the order
of the county court to indicate what was before the district
court, and no record or statement of the case has been settled
by the court.

We are aware that Section 28-2728 NDRO 1943 contains a
provision that “It:shall not be necessary in any case to take any
exceptions or to settle a statement of the case to enable ‘the
supreme court to review any alleged error which without a
statement would appear upon the face of the record.” In this
ease there has not been pointed out to us any error appearing
upon thé face of the record as it has been made and is presented
in this court.

-FPailute to serve and file specifications of error is not fatal
to the jurisdiction of this court on appeal and that defect may
be permitted to be eured in’a proper case. Wilson v. Kryger,

Le 899

29 ND 28, 149 NW 721. In State ex rel. Harding v. Lane, .60
ND 703, 236 NW 358, syllabus 2, we said: ve oe

“Failure to serve specifications of error with the notice
of appeal is not jurisdictional though required by the provisions
of Section 7656 of the Compiled Laws (Section 28-1809 NDRC
1943) and the appellant may be relieved from his default upon
sufficient showing; but where the appellant delays such appli-
cation until the time the case is submitted in this court, and
shows no reasonable excuse for such delay the application will
be denied.”

The attorney for the appellant, the United States of ‘Ameri ‘ica,
filed a reply brief in which he states: .

“If the Supreme Court is under the impression that it cannot
and should not, decide the question of priority under the re-
cord as it now stands, Appellant moves and requests the Court
to provide such order in the interest'of the public and of jus-
tice as is necessary for them to make a determination in this
matter.

“Appellant suggests in support of its Plea for such an onde
if the same be necessary: . . . .

“That Appellant be permitted to serve a specification of error
under such terms and conditions as. may be just.”

A similar request was made orally at the’ time of argument.
No showing is made or excuse offered as.to why the record
is presented in its present condition.

The matter as submitted in this court contains two glaring
defects. They are a total absence of specifications of error
and an absence of any settled statement of the case or certificate
of.the trial judge identifying and certifying. the record upon
which he made his order affirming the order’ of the county. court.
The statements above quoted from the appellarit’s"brief make
no mention of the judge’s certificate and: only ask that permis-
sion be given to file a specification of etror after we havé-cou-
sidered the case and determine that such a specification is neces-
sary. We-cannot undertake to decide cases piecemeal and advise
counsel as to how he should remedy defects and omissions for
which he is responsible. On the record that i is now. before us,

400 De

there is nothing for us to-decide: We cannot review the order
of the trial court. The appeal is dismissed.

Monzis, O. J., and Grimson, Caristianson, Sarre and Burxs,
JJ., concur.
—

[File No. 7277]

MARY JANE DAHL, by Father and Guardian Ad Litem, San-

. ford O. Dahl, Respondent, v. HENRY NELSON, Respond-

ent and The City of Fargo, a Municipal Corporation, Ap-
pellant.

(56 NW2d 757)

Opinion filed January 26, 1953

Conmy & Coumy, appellant.

402 —

Lanier & Lanier and Wattam, Vogel & Bright, for respond-
ents.

Bure, J. In this action plaintiff, guardian ad litem for his
daughter, sought to recover damages for injuries received by
her, as the result of a collision of an automobile, in which she
was riding as a guest, with the top of a manhole encasement
inset at the center of one of the streets of the City of Fargo.
It was alleged in plaintiff’s complaint that plaintiff’s daughter’s
injuries were proximately caused by the gross negligence of the
driver of the car, Henry Nelson, and by the negligence of the
City of Fargo. Trial of the action resulted in a verdict for
the dismissal of the action as to the defendant, Nelson, and a
verdict for damages against the defendant City of Fargo.
Judgment was entered accordingly. After judgment, the de-
fendant, City of Fargo, moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or for a new trial. This motion was denied and the
City of Fargo has appealed from both the order denying the
motion and from the judgment. There are ten specifications

| 403

of error, which appellant, for purposes of the argument, has
grouped under five general headings. The first of these is that
the court erred in denying appellant’s motion for directed ver-
dict, made at the close of the trial of the case. Since we have
concluded that the defendant city was entitled to a directed
verdict upon one of the grounds urged and since that conclusion
disposes of this appeal we shall confine our discussion to the
issues arising in connection with that particular ground; namely,
that there is no proof in the record that the defendant City of
Fargo had any actual or constructive notice of the obstruction.
with which the automobile, in which plaintiffs daughter was
riding, collided.

The accident occurred at about 8:30 P.M. on May 19th on
7th Ave. N. near its intersection with 18th St. in the City of
Fargo. When dry, 7th Ave. had a gravel and cinder surface
but that evening “the streets in that area were muddy, pock
marked with water and rutty.” “There was one main traversed
rut going down the center of the road, with considerable mud
on either side of the road and in between the ruts, which were
six to eight inches deep.” The two ruts straddled the manhole
encasement set in the center of 7th Ave. and the defendant,
Nelson proceeding westward on 7th Ave. driving with his wheels
in the ruts struck the top of the encasement with: some part. of
the undercarriage of his.car. The level of the general street
surface was even with the top of the manhole, but it is clear
that at the time of the accident, because of the single track
through the mud and the depth of. the ruts, the casing of the
manhole had become an obstruction to traffic. The mere presence
of an obstruction of this type in a street and the occurrence of
an accident is not sufficient to fix liability upon a city. Before.
liability can attach to a city because of an unsafe condition of
a street, which the’ city did not itself create, it must be shown
that the city had actual or constructive notice of the condition.
Smith v. City of Yankton, 23 SD 352, 121 NW 848; Williams v.
Wessington Twp., 70 SD'75, 14 NW2d 493; Scoville v. Town of
West Hartford, 131 Conn 239, 38 A2d 681; Tillotson v. City of
Davenport, 232 Ia 44, 4 NW2d 365; Gerber v. City of Pittsburgh,
343 Pa 379, 22 A2d 721.

404 —

In this case plaintiff contends that the evidence is sufficient
to make the question of notice, either actual or constructive, a
question for the jury. The evidence he relies on is contained
entirely in the testimony, of the witness, Willits. This witness
lived in the neighborhood where the accident occurred. He
drove back and forth on 7th Ave, N. regularly. About ten days
before the accident he noticed that the cover of the manhole
with which we are concerned was “tipped over”, that is to say;
it was in place but it was-upside down.- He stopped and re-
placed the cover in its proper position. He told no one of this
incident at that time. Upon the day of this occurrence it was
more or less dry and there were no ruts in the street. Probably
the same day, but within a day or two afterwards, he noticed
that some cinders had been placed around the manhole. -On
the day of the accident, between five and six o’clock P.M. he
drove west on 7th Ave. N. When he came to the manhole he
crowded one of his front wheels against the wall of the manhole
and thus lifted his car so that’he had no trouble. When asked
for how long a time he had been crossing the manhole in this
manner he replied, “I can’t remember exactly but it was for about
one day.” The argument is made that from this evidence the
jury reasonably could have inferred that the manhole casing
had been struck by a passing vehicle ten days before the accident
with sufficient force to turn the cover upside down; that at that
time therefore, the condition of the street was dangerous to
traffic; that a street maintenance crew attempted to remove the
danger by placing cinders around the manhole, and, because
of the subsequent accident, that the maintenance work ‘had
been negligently done. The argument is not sound in that its
premises are in some respects purely speculative and in others,
contrary to positive testimony. The testimony of Willits affirm-
atively established that at the time he found the manhole cover
upside down, the street was not dangerous to traffic. He stated
that the day was more or less a dry day and that at that time
there were no ruts in the street. This testimony together with
the uncontradicted testimony that the top of the manhole casing
was even with the level of the street clearly demonstrates that
at that time the manhole casing was not an obstruction or a

a 405

potential danger to traffic on the street. In the circumstances
any conclusion as to the cause of the overturning of the manhole
cover would be nothing but a guess or speculation. It might
have been flipped over by being struck sharply by the tire of a
passing vehicle or it might have been left upsidedown by some
workmen, it could not have been overturned by being struck by
the frame: or undercarriage of a passing vehicle. The jury
might justifiably have reached the conclusion that the cinders
were placed around the manhole by city employees. But at the
time the cinders were placed, the street was relatively dry, there
were no ruts, and the manhole casing did not project above
street level. In short, there was no apparent danger of which
the city employees could take notice. It is clear therefore that
there is no proof that the city had actual notice that the manhole
casing was, or was likely to become an obstruction to traffic
in the street.

The evidence as to constructive notice is also insufficient to
submit the question to the jury. The street was relatively dry
ten days before the accident. It was very wet and muddy on the
day of the accident. Presumably the change in the condition
of the street was due to rain which fell in the ten day interval.
There is, however, not a word in the testimony as to the amount
of rain or when it fell. There is evidence that there were no
ruts in the street ten days before the accident and that there
were ruts on the day of the accident but there is no evidence as
to when the ruts started to form or first reached a dangerous
depth. The only evidence as to the duration of time the ruts
avere in the road was Willits’ statement that “for about one
day” he crowded the manhole with one front wheel in order to
lift the car over. From this statement the jury could conclude
that a potentially dangerous situation had existed in the street
all day on the day of the accident. We are satisfied that the
existence of this potentially dangerous condition, out of which
an obstruction to traffic might develop, for such a duration of
time cannot, as a matter of law, be construed to be constructive
notice. Before constructive notice of a defect in a street will be
imputed to a city, the defect must have existed for a sufficient
length of time to afford municipal authorities a reasonable

406 Ee

length of time to discover it and to take some steps to protect
the public. Maloney v. Grand Forks, 73 ND 445, 15 NW2d
769. What constitutes a reasonable length of time in any case
depends on the circumstances of that case. As. was said in
Peterson v. City of Seattle, 100 Wash 618, 171 P 657, 658:

“If the defect be one existing in a remote and sparsely popu-
lated residence suburb of the city where there is but little travel
and little occasion for diligence on the part of the city officers
looking to the care of the streets, no doubt a defect of no very
serious nature would not be presumed to be known to the city
authorities for some considerable time following its coming into
existence. And a very serious and dangerous defect in such an
isolated district it would also seem should be presumed to be-
come known to the city authorities in a shorter time. It would
also seem that, when a defect in a sidewalk exists in a dense
business section of a large city, where the city is charged with
a much greater degree of care in maintaining its streets in a safe
condition for public use, the city ought to be presumed to know of
defects therein, which are or might be reasonably expected to
endanger persons travelling thereon, very soon after the coming
into existence of such defects.”

In Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 P 481, it was said:

“The question of notice is not alone determined from the
length of time a defect has existed but also from the nature
and character of the defect, the extent of the travel, and whether
it is in a populous or sparsely settled part of the city.”

In order for the city to have had sufficient notice in the instant
ease, it would have been necessary for the city to have had
notice, first, that there was a single track down the center of the
road which straddled the manhole; and second, that the ruts
of the track were of sufficient depth so it should have reasonably
been anticipated that they would eventually become deep enough
to make the manhole casing an obstruction. Notice that the
street was wet, had an unpaved surface and that some ruts
might develop of course could be imputed to the city. From
notice of these facts, however, it cannot be said that the city
officials should have anticipated that the traffic upon the street
-would create a single track astride the manhole, rather than one

Lt 407

track for west bound traffic north of it and another -for east
bound traffic south of it, or that the ruts created by the traffic
would become of dangerous depth. To say that the existence,
for a period of one day, of ruts astride the manhole, of suffi-
cient depth to make the witness Willits consider them dangerous,
is sufficient to impute to the city notice of a defect, which was
potentially but not certainly dangerous, would be to say that
reasonable maintenance of ‘the city’s streets required those
charged with the duty of street maintenance in the City of Fargo
to make a careful inspection of all of the unpaved streets in all
of the outlying districts of the city within twenty-four hours
after every-rain, taking notice of the location of ruts, measuring
or estimating their depth and reaching an accurate conclusion as
to whether the ruts might eventually reach a depth which would
become dangerous. In other words it would burden a city with
the duty of exercising not only the highest possible degree of
care but a degree which in some instances would be impossible.
Such is not the measure of a city’s duty. A city is only required
to exercise réasonable care to discover and remedy defects in
its streets. 63 C. J. S. (Municipal Corporations Sec. 830) 170.

In other jurisdictions the existence of defects for periods of
varying length.have been held not to constitute constructive
notice, as a matter of law, as follows: Four weeks, Williams
v. Carterville, 97 ll App 160; three weeks, Colby v. Portland,
85 Or 359, 166 P 537; six days, Allen v. Hast- Buffalo Twp., 22
Pa Co 346; four days, Corey v. City of Ann Arbor, 134 Mich
376, 96 NW 477; two days, Moblo v. Lansing, 243 Mich 465, 220
NW 890; a day and a half, Brennan v. New York, 130 App Div
267, 114 NYS 578;. and one day, City of Warsaw v..Dunlap,
112 Ind 576, 11 NE 623, 14 NE 568; McKee v. New York, 135
App Div 829, 120 NYS 149.

Since, as a matter of law, the evidence in this case is in-
sufficient to establish either actual or constructive: notice of
the defect in the street which caused the injuries suffered by
plaintif’s daugliter and there appears to be no reasonable
probability that the deficiencies in the proof can be supplied
upon a new trial, the judgment of the district court against the
City of Fargo is reversed and the ease ordered dismissed.

408 ee
Morzis, C. J., and Sarure and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Cunristianson, J. I agree that the evidence in this case is
insufficient to establish notice to the City of Fargo of the defect
in the street, which resulted in injury to Mary. Jane Dahl.
However, the evidence does not establish that the city and its
employees did not have such notice. There is merely a lack of
evidence of sufficient probative force to show that they had.
The city and its employees may have had such notice but the
evidence fails to show it. The mere fact that the evidence was
such that the trial court ought to have granted defendant’s
motion for a directed verdict or ordered a new trial on the
ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict
does not alone warrant this Court in ordering such judgment.
“It must also clearly appear that there is no reasonable proba-
bility that the defects in, or objections to, the proof, necessary
to support the verdict, may be remedied upon another trial.”
First State Bank v. Kelly, 30 ND 84, 99, 152 NW 125, 129-130,
Ann Cas 1917D 1044. “The power of an appellate court, on
reversing a judgment, to order or direct final judgment is
cautiously exercised.” 5 C. J. S. p. 1428. This Court “is not
absolutely obliged to render and direct’ final judgment” be-
cause the evidence is insufficient to establish some material fact
found by the verdict, it is permitted to exercise judicial discre-
tion and judgment. Where the evidence shows to a certainty
that the plaintiff has no cause of action, and that the defendant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law then, of course,
judgment should be ordered and rendered notwithstanding the
verdict; but where the admitted facts do not show that the de-
fendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or where it
appears that the defects in the proofs may be supplied and
plaintifi’s case strengthened on another trial, this Court may
not, and I think, should not, order final judgnient, but should
instead order a new trial. McClintock v. Ayers, 36 Wyo 132, 253
Pac’ 658, 255 Pac 355; Vallavanti v. Armour & Co, 264 Mass
337, 162 NE 689; First State Bank y. Kelly, supr:

I am inclined to the yiew that final judgment should not be
ordered, but that the case-should be remanded for a new trial to

De 409

the end that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to supply the
defect in the proof as to notice to the City of Fargo of the defect
in the street, if such proof is available, and the record in this
case does not show that it is not.

|
[File No. 7312]

THOMAS JOHNSON, Appellant, v. ANNA ALBIN LARSON,
Respondent, and IDA McKOANE, MAY ANGRINSEN,
JOHN EGGEH, and TILLIE OBERG, Defendants and Ap-
pellants.

(56 Nwe2a 750)

Opinion filed January 26, 1953

410 a

— O. Burke, for appellants.

Eugene A. Burdick, for respondent.

Saruzz, J. The plaintiff, Thomas Johnson, brings this action
against the defendants to quiet title to a quarter section of land
situated in the county of Williams, State of North Dakota and
described as follows: The South half of the Southwest quarter
(S$ SW) of Section Twenty-nine (29) and the North. half of
the Northwest Quarter (N$} NW) of Section thirty-two (32)
in Township One Hundred Fifty-nine (159) North of Range One
Hundred Two (102) West of the Fifth Principal Meridian, North
Dakota, containing 160 acres, more or less.

The defendants Anna Albin Larson, Ida McKoane, May
Angrinsen, are sisters of the plaintiff and John Egge is a
brother of the plaintiff. The defendant Tillie Oberg is a daugh-
ter of a deceased sister of the plaintiff and defendants.

The complaint alleges that on the 7th day of September, 1935,
one Mathia Egge made, executed and delivered to the defendant

| 411

Anna Albin Larson a special warranty deed covering the land
described in the complaint. This deed was filed for record in
the office of the register of deeds of Williams county, North
Dakota on the 20th day of September 1935, and was duly re-
corded in Book 80-of Deeds on page 346. The complaint further
alleges that said deed was executed without any money con-
sideration whatsoever and was made, executed and delivered
with a specific understanding and agreement that the grantor
was to have the exclusive occupancy of the said premises during
her natural life and that after her death said property was to
be deeded to and divided among the children of the said grantor
Mathia Egge, share and share alike. Mathia Egge died on the
5th day of June 1940 and left surviving her as her heirs, the
plaintiff and defendants in this action.

The complaint then alleges that notwithstanding the said
understanding and agreement, the defendant Anna Albin Larson
refused’ and neglected to execute a deed covering the premises
described in the complaint and that she has collected rents and
profits from the said land ever since the death of said Mathia
Egge and that she has failed to make any accounting whatsoever
of the rents and profits which she has received from the said
land and that she has failed to account for the proceeds from
the sale of buildings situated on said lands and has failed and
neglected to pay any part of said amounts to any of the other
children of the said grantor Mathia Egge.

Judgment.is demanded that the plaintiff and the defendants
be decreed to have an undivided one sixth interest in the land and
that the defendant Anna Albin Larson be required to make an
accounting of the use and occupancy of the land and the proceeds
of the sale of the buildings.

The defendants Ida McKoane, May Angrinsen, John Egge and
Tillie Oberg filed an answer admitting all of the allegations in
the complaint.

The defendant Anna Albin Larson answered separately ad-
mitting that the said Mathia Egge was the owner of the property
described in the complaint and that as such owner she deeded
the same to the defendant Anna Albin Larson. She denied
specifically that the deed from Mathia Egge to herself was

412 a

executed without any money consideration or with any under-
standing or agreement that the grantor was to have the ex-
elusive occupancy of said premises-during her natural life, or
that said property was to be deeded and divided among the
children of said Mathia Egge, share and share alike. By way
of counterclaim she alleged that she had an estate in fee simple
‘in the property described in the complaint and that she was
~entitled to the immediate possession of said property. - She then
demanded judgment that title to the premises be quieted in her;
‘that the claims of the plaintiff and the other defendants be ad-
judged null and void and that they be decreed to have no estate
or interest in or lien or incumbrance upon said property.

The defendant Anna Albin Larson filed an amended answer

alleging laches on the part of the plaintiff in bringing the action,
and that the cause of action, if any, accrued more than ten years
prior to the commencement thereof and that the same is barred
by the statute of limitations.
* The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Roy
A. Ilvedson, Judge of the District Court at Williston in the
county of Williams, State of North Dakota-on the 13th day of
March 1951. At the close of the hearing on said day an adjourn-
ment was taken to enable the attorneys to procure further evi-
dence and exhibits to be submitted to the court at a future date.
. The hearing was resumed at Williston, North Dakota on the
11th day of June 1951. The district court held that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a cause of action and ordered judgment to
be entered in favor of the defendant Anna Albin Larson adjudg-
ing her to be the owner in fee simple of the premises described
in the complaint. The plaintiff Thomas Johnson and the other
defendants have appealed and have demanded a trial de novo in
-this court. The facts developed at the trial are substantially
as follows: : .

Mathia Egge is the mother of the plaintiff and defendants
Anna Albin Larson, Ida McKoane, May Angrinsen, John Egge
and the grandmother of Tillie Oberg, the daughter of a deceased
daughter of the said Mathia Egge. On September 7th, 1935
Mathia Egge.executed.a special warranty deed of the property
described in the complaint to her daughter Anna Albin Larson.

Le 413

She was assisted in the drawing of the deed by one Ole A. Lee,
who had the deed recorded in the office of the register of deeds in
Williams. county and thereafter mailed it to the said Anna Albin
Larson at her address at Spokane, Washington.

Ole A. Lee was not present at the’ trial, but it was stipulated
by the parties that a letter written by him to Burdick and
Burdick dated March 12, 1951, .defendant’s, exhibit “EF”, be
admitted in evidence and that if said Ole A. Lee were present
he would testify according to the tenor thereof. The letter is
as follows:

“In regard to your letter of March 2nd, 1951 about Anna
Albin Larson’s deed to the farm of her Mother’Mrs. Mathia
Egge. Mrs. Egge was staying at my place, she was worrying
about her farm, what would become of it, as there was no income
from the farm, and the taxes were piling up just the same, Anna
has-been sending her money partly for taxes, and partly for
living, and was very good to her mother.

Mrs. Egge said that Anna should have the farm, I agreed
with her on that, and offered to help her with the deed, if she
decided to do so, this was in 1934. .

I rented out my farm, the fall of 1934 so Mrs. Egge was not
staying at my place any longer in the fall of 1935 Mrs. Egge
came to my place, and had decided to give Anne, the farm as a
gift, I helped her with the deed to the farm. aa

Two other letters were introduced in evidence as defendant’s
exhibits D and E, written by the Rev. A. J. Sheldahl of Fergus
Falls, Minnesota, during the first part of March 1951. He
was well acquainted with Mathia Egge, having been her pastor
and spiritual adviser at Grenora for several years. It was.agreed
by counsel that if Rev. Sheldahl were present he would testify
in accordance with the contents of exhibits “D” and “li”. .They
are as follows:

“In regards to my contacts with Mathia Hgge of Grenora,
N. Dak. at the time she decided to deed her property, to ‘her
daughter, Mrs. Albin Larson.

As I remember Mrs. Mathia Egge at that time I believe that
she was in possession of her mental faculties. “I cannot re-

414 a

member anything that would lead me to believe that she was
not of sound mind.

She came to me for help to carry out the decision she had
made concerning her farm property. She had decided to deed
it to her daughter Mrs. Albin Larson.

This is the explanation she gave me of why she was intending
this act. For some time, (just how long I don’t remember) she
had been unable to pay the taxes on her farm property. She
also knew that it was-beyond all possibility that she would
be able to do so. May I insert here. the well known fact that
because of prevalent weather conditions at that time it was
virtually impossible to take any income from land. She fur-
ther explained that her daughter Mrs. Albin Larson had been
paying the taxes and that if the farm property was to remain
in her (Mrs. Mathia Egge’s) possession the only person who
would or could continue to pay the taxes would be Mrs. Albin
Larson.

That justice might be done to Mrs. Larson after such time
that Mrs. Mathia Egge should have died she wanted the farm
property deeded to her while she (Mathia Hgge) was still
living: She further felt that this was the only way the farm
would be kept in the Egge family.

Mrs. Egge came to me her pastor for the purpose of getting
help in how to go about effecting the transfer of deed from her-
self to her daughter. She of course knew nothing about such
proceedings. - Hence the letter I wrote-to her daughter Mrs.
Albin Larson that such proceedings might be done thru the
proper legal channéls.

As I remember our conversation Mrs. Albin Larson ‘knew
nothing of her mother’s intention. If she did Mrs. Egge did
not bring it into the things she told me.

- Ihave set down these facts based upon memory of the state-
ments made to me concerning her will with her property while
she was still alive, that is the will of Mathia Egge. That she
had carried them. out, I did not know until the letters from
Burdick came to me.”

* “Inclosed is my statement of facts as I remember them -in
the Mathia:Egge property transfer. I sincerely hope they will

De 415

keep inviolate the will and act of a good woman. As I remember
‘her she desired no injustice to any of her family. She accepted
things as they.were and acted accordingly. I have written the
facts as I remember them, not particularly to help Mrs. Larson,
who has this in her favor that she did try to help her mother
in very difficult times but rather that justice might be carried
out on behalf of a person now deceased. Mrs. Hgge was often
in our house. She surely was an honest upright person.

I thank you sincerely for relieving me of the need to come to
Williston. If it had been summer time I would have welcomed
the opportunity to come, even to the extent of assuming some
of the cost myself. You see then I could have visited my many
friends now it would have been a hardship due to weather condi-
tions and the press of daily duties.

Will you kindly say to Mrs. Larson that whatever the out come
of the trial may be it was her Mother’s will that she should
have the farm. Also that her mother fully knew what she was
doing. It grieves me deeply that this trouble has arisen. Such
a possibility never entered the heart of Mrs. Egge. So goes life
however for a generation whose mission and understanding of
life is focused almost wholly on materialism. _

I did try to refrain from prsupteous (presumptuous) state-
ments given tho I knew them to be true, that the facts given
would be acceptable to opposing counsel.”

The plaintiff, Thomas Johnson, and the defendant Ida Me-
Koane testified that on the morning of June 5, 1940, the day that
the mother Mathia Hgge, died, they ate breakfast together with
the defendant Anna Albin Larson at Williston, North Dakota.
Thomas and Ida testified that while they were eating breakfast
together the defendant Anna stated that she would divide the
land among the sisters and brothers. Anna however denied
this and stated that. she could not recall that shé ever made
such statement at that time. Ida McKoane testifying for plain-
tiff admitted that sometime prior to July 6, 1949 she received
a letter from her sister Anna, the defendant, complaining about
her brother Thomas that he was bothering her very much about
the land and was drinking heavily. Ida replied to this letter
July.6, 1949, and her letter was admitted in evidence without

416 ee

objection as defendant’s exhibit A. The part of the letter
pertinent to the matter before us is as follows: referring to her
brother the plaintiff.

“They are a funny family, Tom should have gotton a job and

-stayed put. I just cannot understand people they just want
to roam from pillar to post. -What is the matter with him? I
am going to write a letter myself. Anna take my advise and
don’t let it worry you. Don’t get upset—just look out for
Albin and Anna. If you are going to start worrying over them
all your health won’t take it. Now please cut it out and take
care of yourself. Anna to keep him satisfied give him some
of crop but tell him you will bank it for him for he will just
drink it wp. As far'as the farm, you are the one that kept it
up and spent your money and I will tell him so. It was you
that paid for the burial of mother. They kept her money. It
makes me tired to listen to them. When they never save a
penny. So please don’t bother yourself and worry take care of
Etta for I know you have always been good to him. Does he
drink a lot, Anna? Let him sell the farm and he will sure as
you live he will drink it up. Be smart and keep it. You will
see the folks.”

Plaintiff admitted the defendant Anna had sent money to
their mother but he did not know how much. He testified further
that in the spring of 1935 his mother wanted to deed the land
to him, that she intended to apply for old age assistance and
she did not want it to go against the land. He said further that
he consulted an attorney at Williston and that he was told that
it would be a fraud for him to take the deed so he did not accept
it. His mother talked to him later and said that she would deed
the land to Anna so there wouldn’t be a pension against it. That
his mother said at that time, “when I leave it in Anna’s name it
is just like mine she will divide it with the rest of us.”

Another letter written by Mathia Egge to her daughter the
defendant, Anna Larson on Feb. 15, 1939 was introduced in eyi-
dence as defendant’s exhibit C. It was written in the Norwegian
language and was translated by Lillie Oberg. The part of it
translated in the English language is as follows:

“I had Lillian write you that every thing was alright at the

De 417

court house, in Williston, so that we do every thing right for
the government, so that there won’t be any trouble. For that
can, make trouble.

Write and find out so that everything is right, so that no one
can stick there nose in.

: Ole Lee said if there was something, call on him, he can prove
that you have helped me.

He is not here but you can write to him, so that will clear me
from all talk.

I have it good with food and drink. I can board with them
and that will be the best. :

Looks as if there will be no old age pension to get.

Greetings from us all from your mother, and write.”

The defendant Anna Albin Larson testified in substance as
follows: She had never had any talk with her mother about
the land and knew nothing about the deed until she received it.
She sent money-to her mother at different times and in various
amounts of $5.00 to $20.00. She was unable to state the total
amount of money that she had sent to her prior to receiving
this deed. In regard to this matter she testified as follows:

Q. Let’s get an estimate here on your part as to how much,
do you think you sent her over a period of 20 years, from
1916 to 1935?

A. Thatis 20 years you said?

Q. Approximately 20-years?

A. Well, that’s.pretty hard for me to really say.

Q. Could you say that you sent her as much as two hundred
dollars a year?

A. I think I sent her that alright.

Q. You think you sent her that much?

A. Or close in there. Like I say, I wouldn’t commit myself, be-
cause I am really not sure what I sent her.

Q. Do you believe you sent her that much each year?

A. Icould have, yes.

Q. Do you believe you did?

A.'Iwon’t say maybe every year that amount but—

“418 Ee

Q. Do you know what your mother did with the money?
A. ‘Well, I supposed she used it for whatever she needed it
best.

In the summer of 1936 she received a letter from the county
welfare board of Williams County about the matter of her
mother getting old age assistance. The substance of this letter
was as to whether-or not she would be willing to give a mortgage
on this land to secure old age assistance for her mother since she
had received a deed to the land. In the fall of 1936 she and her
husband. signed a mortgage to the public welfare board of
Williams County ’so as to enable her mother to obtain old age
assistance. She drove to Grenora in the summer of 1937 and
visited ‘her mother and her niece Lillie Oberg accompanied her.
During this visit her mother told her that she had given her
the deed to this land because she-was the oné that had helped
her.

It was stipulated by the parties that the defendant Anna
Albin Larson paid $596.00 in taxes after she received the deed
from her mother that she paid old age assistance which. her
mother had received in the sum of $725.00, and that she paid
$150.00 for her motlier’s casket, and $35.00 costs for enbalming,
and that she put up a tombstone for her mother at the cost of
$225.00; that she sold some buildings that were on the land for
which she: received $1100.00. .The land in question was farmed
by tenants during the years 1941 to 1949 and it was stipulated
by the parties that the defendant Anna Albin Larson received
various amounts, the proceeds of sale of crops from the land
during those years.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that under the facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of the
deed to Anna Albin Larson a constructive trust was created by
operation of law and that Anna Albin Larson held the land
in trust for all of her brothers and sisters the heirs at law of
Mathia Egge. In support of this contention the plaintiff cites
the case of Arntson v. First National Bank of Sheldon, 39 ND
408, 167 NW 760, LRA1918F 1038, and McDonald v. Miller,

7

De 419

73 ND 474, 16 NW2d 270, 156 ALR 1328. The case of Arntson
v. First National Bank was decided on a state of facts entirely
different from the facts in the case at bar.

The question in that case was whether the oral agreement
between J. E. Arntson and his five sons relative to the disposi-
tion to be made of his land after his death created an implied
trust.

He called his five sons and told them that he had not much
property but that he wanted their mother to have it all and
that she had to have someone to take care of her and he wanted
the boys to deed it to her when he was gone, and that this will
be as good as a will. The five boys agreed to this and so told
their father who died a few days later, and about a month after
their father’s death, they deeded the land to their mother. In
that case the court held that a constructive trust was created.
We quote from the opinion.

“It is true as a general proposition that a mere breach of an
oral agreement to convey the interest in land is not such a
fraud as will create a constructive trust and justify thé inter-
vention of a court of equity, but ‘where confidential relations
prevail between the parties to an oral trust and the trust is
violated, the law presumes that the influence of the confidence
upon the mind of the person who confided was undue; and
a case of constructive trust arises, not, however, on the ground
of active fraud, but because of the facility. for practicing it.
Hayne v. Hermann, 97 Cal 259 32 Pae 171”

In the case of McDonald v. Miller, supra, it was held that
where it is sought to establish a constructive trust the existence
of a confidential relationship betweer. the parties is of major im-
portance.

In the case at bar, however, there is no proof whatever of
any confidential relations existing between Mathia Egge the
grantor and Anna Albin Larson the grantee prior to the ex-
ecution of the deed. Anna Albin Larson knew nothing about
the deed until she received it in the mail after it had been
executed and filed for record; nor is there any evidence that
the defendant Anna Albin Larson had any understanding or
agreement with her mother with reference to a division of the

420 a

property after the execution of the deed. The letters from Rev.
Sheldahl and from Ole A. Lee which were admitted in evidence
by stipulation of the parties, clearly establish that it was the
intention of the mother Mathia Egge to make an unconditional
transfer of the land to her daughter Anna Albin Larson and
she made such transfer by a special warranty deed, absolute in
form, and thereupon delivered it to the grantee.

The grantee Anna Albin Larson testified that she sent money
to her mother annually for many years prior to the execution
and delivery of the deed, the amounts thereof being sometimes
as high as $200.00 per year and this testimony is not contra-
dicted by the plaintiff or the other defendants.

Implied trusts are governed by section 59-0106 NDRC 1943,
which reads as follows:

“An implied trust arises in the following cases:

1. One who wrongfully detains a thing is an implied trustee
thereof for the benefit of the owner;

2. One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue
influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is,
unless he has some other and better right thereto, an implied
trustee of the thing gained for the benefit of the person who
would otherwise have had it;

8. Each one to whom property is transferred in violation of
a trust holds the same as an implied trustee under such trust,
unless he purchased it in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration;

4, When a transfer of real property is made to one person and
the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is
presumed to result in favor of the person by or. for whom such
payment is made.”

We have carefully considered the facts, circumstances and
the evidence in connection with the execution and delivery of
the deed by Mathia Egge to the defendant Anna Albin Larson
and fail to find anything giving rise to an implied trust under
the provisions of the statute quoted.

The rule is well settled that in order to establish an implied
or constructive trust the evidence must be clear and convincing.

Le 421

In the case of Bodding v. Herman, 76 ND 324, 35 NW2d 561,
this court said:

“The evidence to establish an implied trust, however, must be
clear and convincing. There must be a satisfactory showing of
a wrongful detention of the property, or fraud, undue influence,
the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act by virtue of
which the party is holding title to property which he should
not hold under the rules of equity and good conscience. The
evidence must be strong enough to lead to but one conclusion. If
the evidence is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation
upon theories other than the existence of a trust it is not suffi-
cient to establish a trust. See 35 ALR 286, 307; 45 ALR 852;
80 ALR 198 and cases cited. See also Bogert on Trusts and
Trustees 1422.”

We quote also from 54 Am Jur Trusts, Sec. 620, page 478:

“The general rule is that oral proof of an express trust in
realty or personalty which is not required to be in writing, or
of facts giving rise to a resulting or constructive trust, must
be received with caution. So reluctant are the courts to in-
graft a trust by parol on the legal title to real estate, or to
enforce an alleged parol trust in personal property, that there is
perhaps no better-established doctrine than the one which re-

. quires a high degree of proof in order to establish the trust by
parol evidence. This rule requiring an extraordinary degree or
certainty of proof in this class of cases has been applied or
recognized in practically all jurisdictions, but with a wide variety
of statements regarding the kind of testimony essential to
establish the trust. It has been said that there is perhaps no
fact which, in the trial of civil causes, is required to be so
satisfactorily proved as that which ingrafts a parol trust upon
a legal title. The courts are particularly emphatic in the
statements and application of a rule where there has been delay
in the assertion of the trust against one having legal title,
resulting in difficulty in procuring witnesses and in establishing
a defense, especially where the trust is based on communications
or transactions with a person since deceased.”

We are satisfied that the evidence is ample to sustain the
counterclaim of the defendant Anna Albin Larson under the

422 —

special warranty, deed from her mother Mathia Egge as against
the claim of the plaintiff and the other defendants. It will not
be necessary therefore to consider the defenses of laches and
the statute of limitation.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, 0. J., and Curistianson, Grimson and Burn, JJ.,
concur.

a
[File No. 7338]

GERALD FILLER, by his Guardian Ad Litem, EMANUEL
FILLER, Appellant, v. E. H. STENVICK and E. M. STEN-
VICK, Respondents.

(56 NW2d 798)

| 423

Opinion filed January 31, 1953

C. A. Waldron, for appellant, B. H. Bradford and Harold H.
Halstead, for respondents.

Gamson, J. Plaintiff brings this suit by his guardian for
injuries sustained while skating on an outdoor ice skating rink
on the Mouse River in the City of Minot. Plaintiff alleges in
his complaint that the defendants owned, controlled and man-
aged said rink; that defendants invited crowds of young people
and children to enter upon the premises and to purchase tickets
entitling the holders thereof to skate upon said rink; that thie
plaintiff upon said invitation purchased a ticket for skating
thereon; that the defendants negligently and carelessly per-
mitted the ice on said rink to become unsafe and failed to proper-
ly flood and maintain said rink; that the defendants knew or
should have known the condition of said rink; that while plaintiff
was skating on said rink on Dec. 19, 1950, the blade of one
of his skates became wedged in one of the cracks in the ice
thereby throwing him, breaking his leg and causing him great

424 Ee

pain and injury; that the negligence of the defendants was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.

The defendants who are husband and wife, filed separate
answers in which they denicd generally all of the allegations
of the complaint except that the wife admits owning the property
adjacent to the river skating rink. Management and control of
the skating rink is specifically denied by both defendants. As
an affirmative defense they allege contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.

The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence
separate motions for a dismissal of the action and for a directed
verdict were made on behalf of each of the defendants on the
ground that no cause of action had been proven against either
defendant; that the evidence was insufficient to show that they or
either of them were in control of the skating rink or responsible
for the management thereof; that they had no knowledge of
any defect in the ice and no means of ascertaining the presence
thereof, and further, that there was contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff. The motions were denied. The jury
found for the plaintiff.

Thereafter, defendants made a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial
on the grounds that the court erred in denying the motions for
a directed verdict or dismissal as made at the end of the trial.
The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
granted and judgment rendered for the defendants. This ap-
peal is from the judgment so entered. The plaintiff assigns as
specification of error on appeal that the court erred in granting
the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. He also alleges. numerous errors by the trial court in
the exclusion of testimony intended to further show manage-
ment and control of the premises by the defendants.

The order of the district court on a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict amounts to a delayed action on the
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict made at the con-
clusion of the trial and is based upon the evidence as it then
stood. he sole question before this court on an appeal is
whether or not the evidence at that time warranted the decision

| 425

made. Weber v. United Hardware and Implement Mutuals Co.,
75 ND 581, 31 NW2d 456, and cases cited.

- The evidence shows that for some years a portion of the ice
on the Mouse River, as it fows through the City of Minot, had
been used in the winter as an open air skating rink, known as the
“Bissel Rink.” A warming house had been maintained on the
bank of the river adjoining this skating rink. There the patrons
could warm up, rent skates or have them sharpened. Confec-
tions also were there kept for sale. The ice in front of this
warming house was kept free of snow and flooded. Artificial
lights were provided. About five years previous to the accident
the defendant, Elizabeth M. Stenvick, wife of the defendant, E.
H. Stenvick, became the record owner of the property adjoiming
this river ice rink and on which the warming house stood. The
maintenance of the rink and the warming house was continued.
The plaintiff contends that the maintenance was by the defend-
ants through their agents. The defendants claim they leased the
“warming house in the fall of 1950 to Glen Bissel, the man in
charge, by a written lease which they introduced in evidence,
and that they had nothing to do with the management of the
warming house or the ice adjoining their property. The view
we take of this case, however, makes it unnecessary to pass upon
that issue or upon the rulings of the court on objection -to the
admission of some testimony in regard thereto.

The plaintiff was a boy 13 years old at the time of the acci-
dent. This was his fourth year of skating. He had skated
over this ice on several occasions that fall prior to the accident.
He had skated on the ice the evening of the accident and for a
time engaged in a game called “pom-pom-pull away.” Then
he went into the warming house. On returning to the ice his
skate became wedged in a crack in the ice causing him to fall
and break his leg. The plaintiff does not contend that anything
but this crack caused his accident and the evidence affirmatively
shows that the crack was the sole cause thereof,

Before the plaintiff can recover damages for this accident
there must be a showing of actionable negligence on the part of
the proprictor of the rink, whoever he is, as the proximate cause
of the accident.

426 a

“It is a general rule, of almost universal acceptance that an
owner or proprietor of a theater or public amusement is bound
to exercise a degree of ordinary and reasonable care for the
safety and protection of his patrons—the degree of care that
would be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent man in
the same position and circumstances. Generally speaking, this
obligation is met when the owner or proprietor makes the prem-
ises and instrumentalities as little dangerous as reasonable care
can make them, having regard to the methods and contrivances
necessarily used in conducting such a place, and, it has been
said, to the activities and conduct of invitees using such place
and instrumentalities in the manner which they are ordinarily
used for the purposes for which they are designed and intended.
Such degree of care is measured by the conduct of the average
man, not that of the cautious man of more than average pru-
dence.” 52 Am Jur Theaters, Shows, Exhibitions, etc. Sec 47
P 291.

“Skating rinks are not ordinarily regarded as inherently
dangerous or of such unusual nature as to impose on the owner
or proprietor of such amusements an unusual degree of care.”
52 Am Jur Theaters, Shows, and Exhibitions. See 63 p 307.

In Oberheim v. Pennsylvania Sports & Enterprises, 358 Pa
62, 55 A2d 766, it is said that:

“As an operator of the rink for paid admission, the defend-
ant company was under a-legal duty to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe and suitable condition so that those coming
upon them at the defendant’s invitation, express or implied,
would not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger.
Robb v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. Inc., 269 Pa 298, 300, 112 A
459; Chapman v. Clothier; 274 Pa 394, 396, 118 A 356. The
logical corollary is that an occupier of property in such cireum-
stances is not liable for injuries sustained thereon by -his in-
vitees except upon proof of his causitive fault; Huey v. Gahlen-
bock, 121 Pa 238, 248, 15 A 520, 6 Am St Rep 270.” Sce also
Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. 62 Ohio App 514, 24 NH2d
837.

Before the owners or the operator of a skating rink can be held
liable for damages they must be put on notice, actual or construc-

De 427

tive, of the defect or disrepair causing the damage. 52 Am Jur
Theaters, Shows, Exhibitions, etc. Sec 59 P 303; annotations
in 22 ALR 619; 140 ALR 428.

The testimony on behalf of the defendants is that the ice was
flooded the afternoon just a few hours before the happening of
the accident and the man in charge claims to have flooded it
carefully and according to the usual custom. The plaintiff is
uncertain as to when it was last flooded. The record reveals
no showing that this river rink was not given ordinary and rea-
sonable care for the protection and safety of its patrons nor
was there any showing of affirmative acts in that connection
constituting negligence on the part of the defendants.

The plaintiff had knowledge that cracks did appear at times
for he testified to having seen a long crack in the ice a couple of
days before the accident. There is nothing to show he notified
the proprietor thereof. There is no showing that the defendants
or Glen Bissel had any actual knowledge of the crack in the
iee which caused the accident. There is only a contention that
they should have known of it.

To impute constructive notice to the owner of premises, it
must be shown that the owner should have discovered it. Norris
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.,.74 SD 271, 51 NW2d 792
(1952) ; Nole v. Sixty-five O Four, Inc., 104 Cal App2d 632, 232
P2d 288. No such showing was made in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that this crack appearing in the
ice was the result of negligence on the part of the proprietor,
plaintiff cites the following cases. An analysis of those cases,
however, shows that they are not in point under the facts in
the instant case. Noble v. Park Enterprises, 313 Mass 454, 47
NE2d 947; Bloom v. Dalu Corp. 269 App Div 192, 54 NYS2d
831; Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden, 296 Mass 168,
5 NE2d 1; Rich v. Madison Square Garden Corporation, 149
Mise 123, 266 NYS 288; Murphy v. Winter Garden & Ice Co.
280 SW 444 (Mo App 1926); Fieger v. Imperial Skating Rink,
148 Ore 187, 35 P2d 683.

In every one of these cases recovery was based on some struc-
tural defect in the rink or its appurtenances which should have
been remedied by the proprietor or reckless acts of third parties

428 ee

which the management should have controlled or a combination
of the two. No such circumstances appear in the case at bar.

On the other hand it is clear that plaintiff's fall and injury was
caused solely by the crack in the ice. This crack was described
as from 12 to 18 inches long, and about one inch deep and as
testified to by the policeman was “rough, chipped by some in-
strument.” Clearly that indicates a. crack made by a: skater
during some rhaneuvering on the ice. It is well known, even
to skaters of limited experience, that the surface of an ice rink
“becomes rutted, gouged and grooved in a short time. The sur-
face of an ice skating rink is subject to continuous, gruelling
punishment by the vigorous action of-sharp, steel blades. These
conditions are inherent in the sport of skating and are known
to everyone participating therein. Plaintiff had been skating
on-this very ice for some time before the accident and did not
notice the crack. There were others skating at the time and
even playing a form of tag in which the players make a dash
for a goal at the’signal, “pom-pom-pull away” in which the plain-
tiff himself joined. Gouging of the ice under such cireum-
stances is very liable to happen and cannot be prevented by the
proprietor or manager of a rink by the use of ordinary care
for the protection of his patrons. Those are conditions inher-
ent in the sport of skating and necessarily every skater takes
his chances on avoiding injuries caused thereby.

In 4 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Amusements and
Sports, See 647 P 1566, it is said that:

“One who participates in the diversion afforded by an amuse-
ment device accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as
they are obvious.and necessary. The same is true of one who
participates in other sports or pastimes, ‘just as a fencer ac-
cepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a
ball game the chance of contact with the ball.’”

In McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corporation, 144 Neb 92,
12 NW2d 639, a sixteen year old boy with five years of experience
in ice skating fell because of the condition of the surface of the
ice, concealed by ice shavings, and had his hand cut by the blade
of another skater’s skate, ‘The judgment he obtained in trial

De 429

court was set aside on appeal. The court outlined the duties
of an operator of a place of public amusement, and then said: .

“The duty resting on such operator requires him to warn
his patrons of any dangers known to him, or which he should
imow in the exercise of reasonable care, and not known to his
patrons, unless such dangers are observable to them in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care for their own safety.”

In Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, 14 NJ
Super 390, $2 A2d 458, it is said:

“As a general principle the proprietor of an-amusement park
is not an insurer of the safety of patrons and is not bound to
protect them from such obvious risks as are necessarily inci-
dental to the use of the premises or its amusement devices.
. . . There is nothing distinctive about the liability of owners
of skating rinks apart from the general responsibility to main-”
tain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.”

In Gover v. Central Vermont Railway Co. 96 Vt 208, 118 A
874, 877, it is held that if one, knowing and comprehending the
danger, voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not negligent in
so doing, he is deemed to have taken the risk and is precluded
from recovery for injuries resulting therefrom. ‘ That doctrine
is predicated upon the theory of the knowledge and appreciation
of the danger and the voluntary assent thereto. In Chicago,
R.1.& P. B. Co. v. Lewis, 103 Ark 99, 145 SW 898, it is said:

“The doctrine is based on the voluntary exposure to known
danger and can be.applied only when a pérson may ‘reasonably
elect’ whether or not he shall expose himself to it.”

The maxim does not apply on mere showing of knowledge of
the danger, but only where the circumstances are such as warrant
the inference that the plaintiff encountered the risk freely and
voluntarily with full knowledge of the nature and extent thereof.
Thomas v. Quartermaine (Eng) LR 18 QD Div 685—CA.

Clearly that doctrine applies in the case at bar, The plain-
tiff had full knowledge of the danger that might be caused by
cracks in the ice occurring at any time.. He chose to run the
risk of that danger without any compulsion but merely for the
sake of the sport itself. Under such circumstances he cannot

430 —

hold the. proprietor or manager of the rink liable for any dam-
age caused thereby.

The defendants were entitled to a directed verdict at the close
of the evidence as a matter of law. The court’s order granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was -correct.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morais, OC: J., and Curistianson, Saturn and Burke, JJ., con-
eur.

[|
[File No. 7317]

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, on Behalf of Itself and the Tax-
payers of the Said State of North Dakota; Ward County
and Bottineau County, Public Corporations and Counties
of Said State of North Dakota; C. B. Stenerson and A. E.
Bergman, Taxpayers of the Said State of North Dakota,
for and on Behalf of Themselves and All Taxpayers; and
Leonard F. Ward, in His Own Behalf and in Behalf of
Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. THE CALI-
FORNIA COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, The Carter
Oil Company, a Foreign Corporation, John Hippe, L. B.
Bach, J. H. C. Gilbert and Buford B. Steinhaus, Respond-
ents. ,

(66 NW2d 762)

Opinion filed January 15, 1953. Rehearing denied Feb. 3, 1953

E. I. Ch janson, Attorney General, C. H. Brace, Assistant
Attorney General et. al., for appellants.

Cow, Cox, Pearce & Engebretson, Bosard & McCutcheon,
Benson & Swanson, for respondents.

ee 433

Hureuinson, District Judge. This action was brought for
the purpose of quieting title in Ward and Bottineau Counties
in and to fifty per cent of the oil, natural gas, and minerals
found on or underlying lands acquired by such counties by tax
proceedings or otherwise and which lands have been or may he
resold. The issue is whether this court should overrule and
set aside its decisions in the following cases:

Adams County v. Smith, 74 ND 621, 23 NW2d 873;

Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 ND 932, 47 NW2d 132;

Kopplin v. Burleigh County, 77 ND 942, 47 NW2d 187.

The suit was tried to the court without a jury and resulted
in a judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. From this

judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.
|

434 EE

The complaint, other than the formal allegations, alleges
that Ward and Bottineau Counties own fifty per cent of the
gas and oil rights in 51,000 acres of land pursuant to the reser-
vation of mineral rights contained in Chapter 136 of the Ses-
sion Laws of North Dakota for 1941. Then follows the particular
description of the lands. The complaint further alleges that
Chapter 286 of the Session Laws of 1941 was not intended by
the Legislature to repeal Chapter 136, and that the court by
its decisions in the cases above cited clearly thwarted the legis-
lative intent and, in effect, promulgated judicial legislation in
violation of Section 10, Article I of the Constitution of the
United States; that a code commission, selected according to
law and pursuant to authority, codified the laws of North Dakota
in 1948, which codification was duly adopted by the Legislature,
and wherein Chapter 136 of the Session Laws of 1941 appears
as Section 11-2704, and after proclamation became a law of our
state; that the matters involved in this action are of general
interest and affect the welfare of all the people of the State of
North Dakota in that the production of oil and gas will be an im-
portant source of revenue; that the title to all mineral rights
reserved by Chapter 136 should be quieted in the owners thereof.

The answers generally deny the allegations of the complaint
and then set forth the leasehold interests of the defendants.

The plaintiffs concede that the facts in the case are the same
as in the Kershaw and Kopplin cases above cited with this
exception: The plaintiffs have here offered the testimony of
three members of the 1941 Legislature, who testified as to the
intent of the Legislative Body in the passage of Chapters 136
and 286. That this testimony was incompetent for any purpose
seems apparent. The plaintiffs have cited no authority to sustain
the competency of this testimony. They admit that such evi-
dence could not be offered to prove legislative intent or to
aid in the interpretation of any Act or to aid in the reaching
of any conclusion as to the meaning of any Act, but they argue
that such evidence shows that the members of the Legislature
did not discern any conflict between Chapters 136 and 286.
Whether the members of the Legislature discerned a conflict is

— 435

manifestly immaterial. The testimony of individual members
of the Legislature is inadmissible, whether it pertains to legis-
lative intention or motives of the members in enacting the law,
the meaning of which is being determined. Sutherland on Stat-
utory Construction, 3rd Ed., (Horack) Section 5013; United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 US 290, 41 L ed
1007, 17 Sup Ct Rep 540.

Tt is unnecessary to review the argument of counsel for plain-
tiffs in this case because it appears evident that the same argu-
ment was made in the Adams County, Kershaw and Kopplin
cases. It is not disputed that this court considered all the issues
raised in this case in the previous cases heretofore decided. The
sole contention is that this court was wrong in its former deci-
sions and therefore they should be overruled. There is no com-
plaint that those former decisions were not carefully considered
or that the conclusions were arrived at without the full expres-
sion of reasons. Only one inference can be drawn from a re-
view of the former decisions announced by this court, and that
inference is that they were arrived at after thorough delibera-
tion. The decisions heretofore rendered by this court were rea-
soned conclusions backed by authority and considered with
care. No cogent reason has been presented sustaining the plain-
tiffs’ conclusion that the former decisions were erroneous.

There is a further reason why this court should not with-
draw its approval of its former decisions. It is a matter of
common knowledge that since these opinions were announced
there has been in our state an enormous activity in the purchase,
sale and leasing of mineral rights. The former decisions of the
court have become a rule of property and under the doctrine of
“stare decisis” should be adhered to. Horton v. Wright, Barrett
& Stilwell Co., 43 ND 114, 174 NW 67; Seibert v. United States,
129 US 192, 32 L ed 645, 9 Sup Ct Rep 271; 14 Am Jur, Courts,
Section 65; 15 CJ, Courts, Section 304; and 21 CJS, Courts,
Section 187.

The judgment entered in the District Court dismissing plain-
tiffs’ complaint is affirmed.

486. EE

Morris, OC. J., and Grimson, Tuomas J. Burwe and A. M.
Curistianson, JJ., concur.

Mr. Justice Sarurn, being disqualified, did not participate,
Hon. W. H. Hurcutnson, Judge of Third Judicial District, sit-
ting in his stead.

Es

[File No. 7327]

RAYMOND RUTTEN, Respondent, v. BURTON WOOD, Ap-
pellant.

(57 NWe2d 112)

Opinion filed Feb. 13, 1953

Douglas B. Heen, States Attorney, for appellant.

Clyde Duffy, for respondent.

438 —

EL. I. Christianson, Attorney General, for Game and Fish De-
partment. . |
Sarurz, J. The plaintiff Raymond Rutten owns certain lands
in Ramsey County, this State, adjoining both sides of a section
line which is also a township line. The section line has been
opened for travel and highway purposes pursuant to the laws
of the State. During the hunting season of 1951 the plaintiff
posted the land on both sides of the section line as provided by
law. He-brings this action to enjoin the defendant from hunt-
ing along said highway.

The complaint alleges in substance that the lands on each side
of the section line referred to in the complaint are owned by
the plaintiff; that the section line has been opened for highway
purposes between plaintiff’s two tracts of land for a width of
two rods on each side of such line pursuant to statute and that
the fee title to such land so used for highway purposes is in the
plaintiff; that on the 17th day of October 1951 and at diverse
other times the defendant entered upon said highway and parked
his car along the right of way and hunted and shot geese flying
across plaintiff's land and across the said highway; that such
geese fell upon the plaintiff’s land and that the defendant there-
upon entered upon the plaintiff’s fields to take such game; that
the plaintiff has caused the lands referred to and described in
the complaint to be posted against hunting thereon in accordance
with the provisions of law; that the lands were so posted at the
time the defendant entered upon said highway and said lands
and hunted thereon, and that such hunting creates a hazardous
condition along said highway where the plaintiff frequently must
pass; that the defendant is continually trespassing upon the
lands of the plaintiff; that the defendant, so hunting along said
highway, continually tramples upon the fields of grain adjacent
to the highway in recovering the game so shot by him; that the
plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, and
that an actiori for damages would result in a multiplicity of
suits and would be wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff's
land from repeated and continuous trespassing.

He demands judgment enjoining the defendant from eritering

Le 439

upon ‘said highway for the purpose of hunting and from engag-
ing in the hunting of game along said highway and from tres-
passing upon the lands of the plaintiff.

The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the grounds
that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The demurrer was argued before the Honorable J. J. Kehoe,
Judge of the District Court of Ramsey County, North Dakota.
The demurrer was overruled with leave to answer. The defend-
ant refused to answer and elected to stand on the demurrer.

. Judgment was entered as demanded by plaintiff. The defend-
‘ant appealed from the judgment and from the whole thereof. -

The demurrer to the complaint admits the truth of every al-
legation well pleaded. The question is therefore whether thé
admitted facts state a cause of action. No question was raised
at the trial as to the propriety of the remedy sought or the form
of the action.

‘The district courts of this state are vested with original juris-
diction of all cases both at law and equity, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution and with. such appellate jurisdic-
tion as the legislature confers upon them. In the case at bar
the district court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject
matter, and the case was tried upon the issues raised by the
pleadings without objection, and those are the only issues before
us on this appeal. Minneapolis, St. P. & St. Ste. M. R. Co. v.
Stutsman 31 ND 597, 154 NW 654; Brissman v. Thistlethwaite,
49 ND 192 NW 85.

The general rule as to the fee title to highways is stated in

25 Am Jur page 426, Highways, Section 132, as follows:
* “In the absence of a statute expressly providing for the ac-
quisition of the fee, or of a deed from the owner expressly con-
veying the fee, when a highway is established by dedication or
prescription, or by the direct action of the public authorities,
the public acquires merely an easement of passage, the fee title
remaining in the landowner.” This is the rule in this state.

Donovan v. Allert, 11 ND 289, 91 NW 441, 58 LRA 775, 95
Am St Rep 720; Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Lake,
10 ND 541, 88 NW 461; Gram Construction Company v. Minne-
apolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Railway Company, 36 ND 164, 161 NW

20 ee

732; Otter Tail Power Co. v. Bank, 72 ND 497, 8 NW2d 599,
145 ALR 1343.

“It is admitted that thé plaintiff owns the land upon which the
highway is located on both sides of the section linc and that
he posted “no hunting” signs thereon as provided by law.

The statutes of this state do not cover the precise question
as to whether the public may legally hunt wild game upon the
highways of the state.

Section 20-0119 NDRC 1943 provides that any person may
enter upon legally posted land to recover game shot or killed
on land where such person had a lawful right to hunt.

Section 20-0117 NDRC 1943 makes it a misdemeanor to hunt
or pursue game or enter for the purpose of hunting or pursuing
game upon any land belonging to another which has been legally
posted, without first having obtained the permission of the per-
son legally entitled to grant the same.

The general law as to the right to hunt on the highways is
stated in 24 Am Jur, Game and Game Laws, Section 4, page 377:

“Since the title to wild game within the boundaries of a state
is vested in the people in their sovereign capacity, each of the
inhabitants thereof may be ‘said to have an equal right to kill
such game. But this equal right is subject to at least two limi-
tations. In the first place, the state may make regulations
relative to the killing and marketing of game. Sccondly, every
landowner has an exclusive common-law right to kill or capture
game on his own land, subject to the regulatory action of the
state in the preservation of all game for the common use. This
right is regarded at common law as property ratione soli, or in
other words, as property by reason of the ownership of the
soil. The state cannot, within constitutional limits, by the issu-
ance of hunting licenses which purport to give a hunter the right
to invade the private hunting grounds owned by another person,
or by any other means, authorize one to enter another’s premises,
for the purpose of taking game, without the latter’s permission.”

This question was considered by the supreme court of Minne-
sota in the case of L. Realty Co. v. Johnson, 92 Minn 363, 100
NW 94, 66 LRA 439, 104 Am-St Rep 677. We quote from the
opinion:

a 4a

“But we may safely assume that the killing of game belonging
to the adjacent premises, and found temporarily in the highway,
is in no manner connected with or incidental to the public right
of passage and transportation. While true that the title to all
wild game is in the state, the owner of premises whereon it is
located has only a qualified property interest therein, yet he
has the right to exercise exclusive and -absolute dominion over
his property, and incidentally the unqualified right to control
and protect the wild game thereon. In Lamprey v. Danz,
supra (86 Minn 317, 90 NW 578) the elementary rule on this
subject was stated as follows: ‘Every person has exclusive
dominion over the soil which he absolutely owns; hence such
an owner of land has the exclusive right of hunting and fishing
on his land, and on the waters covering it.” It necessarily follows
that, in dedicating the highway in question to the public, re-
spondent reserved to itself all of the other privileges and rights:
pertaining to the premises, which included the right to foster and
protect, for its own use, the wild game thereon, and that such
right and privilege were in no manner surrendered to the public
in granting the easement. It also follows that the public, in-
cluding appellant, in accepting the easement thus granted, ac-
quired no right to kill or molest the game inhabiting the prop-
erty while it was passing to and fro across the highway.”

The complaint alleges and the demurrer admits that hunting
creates a hazardous condition along said highway. where the
plaintiff frequently must pass and there is continuous danger
that some gun will actually discharge with injurious effects.

There is no doubt that the indiscriminate discharge of fire-
arms along the highway creates a hazardous condition and en-
dangers the safety of adjoining landowners whose usual occupa-
tion requires them to travel upon or across the highway. In
the case of Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn 386, 111 NW 295,
10 LRA NS 921, 117 Am St Rep 703, 10 Ann Cas 528, the supreme
court of Minnesota said:

“The inherent danger to landéwners from guns in the hands
of hunters, often irresponsible and reckless, and sometimes mali-
cious, must be adequately guarded against if the law is to be
more than a name. As the hazard from the use or threatened

442, Ee

use of dangerous instrumentalities increases, in all branches of
the law, the responsibility of the person employing them be-
comes stricter and may amount to insurance of safety. All
remedial resources of law and equity may be exercised to pre-
vent such peril to person or property or conduct likely also to
result in breach of peace.”

In his brief counsel for defendant and appellant argues that
even if it is conceded that hunting wild game upon the highways
is not an incident of public travel thereon nevertheless there is
no evidence in the record that the roadway through the respond-
ent’s property has ever been or ever could be posted. In support
of this argument he quotes from 20-0115 NDRC 1943 which
provides that the “no hunting” signs shall be readable from the
outside of the land and shall be placed conspiciously at a distance
of not more than 80 rods apart. He contends that under the
language of the law it would be impossible to place the signs
in such a position that they would be readable from the outside
of the land which is within the right of way. This argument is
not convincing. It is conceded upon the record as well as in
counsel’s brief that the plaintiff is the fee owner of the land
to the center of the highway, subject to the right of the public
to use it for travel and to maintain and improve it for highway
purposes. He had posted “no hunting” signs on each side of the
highway as provided by law which showed that he intended to
include the land within the highway of which he is the owner.

The judgment of the trial court was correct and is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Burks, G. Grimson and Curistianson, JJ.,
concur.

—
[File No. 7359]

CESAR MEVORAH AND MARTIN SILLS, Individually and
as co-partners doing business under the firm name and style
of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company, Respondents, v. IRVING
GOODMAN AND STANLEY GOODMAN, individually and
as co-partners, Appellants.

(57 NW2d 600)

Opinion filed March 5, 1953

445

446 |

Morris, Ch. J. This is an action for damages for breach of
contract. The defendants appeal from a judgment rendered
upon a verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum
of $9,250.00. On June 23, 1950, the plaintiffs, as purchasers,
and the defendants, as sellers, entered into a contract for the
purchase and sale to the plaintiffs, conditionally, of the business
known and operated as Irving’s Tractor Lug Company, with
branches in. Fargo, North Dakota; Portal, North Dakota; and
Wichita, Kansas. This business consisted of buying and selling
new, reconditioned, and used parts of tractors and agricultural
implements. The consideration was $100,000.00, of which $5,000.-
00 was payable in cash and the balance to be represented by
the joint and several promissory note of the plaintiffs, Martin
Sills and.Cesar Mevorah. Title to the stock of goods was re-
tained by the defendants until all of the purchase price was
paid. The contract also provided that in the event of default
or breach by the purchasers, the sellers might take immediate
possession of the property so sold and retain the same, together
with all payments previously made, as liquidated damages.
The sellers also agreed not to engage, directly or indirectly, in
the retail or wholesale business of selling new tractor and farm
implement parts in the normal trade territory of the three cities
named in the contract, or engage in the foreign export of those
items. The contract also provided:

“The sellers agree that they shall not conduct any other
business in the name Irving’s Tractor Lug Company.”
and stated that the violation of paragraph H, which included
the agreement not to compete and not to use the name of Irving’s
Tractor Lug Company, “shall subject the sellers to pay the buyers
the sum of $10,000.00 as and for liquidated damages.” Other
provisions of the contract will be referred to as they become
pertinent to the discussion of points in controversy.

The complaint sets forth five causes of action. In the first
cause of action it is stated:

“That on or about the 28rd day of June, 1950, the plaintiffs
and defendants entered into an agreement in writing wherein
and whereby the defendants sold to the plaintiffs the trade name
of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company as an outright sale, and also

Le 447
sold to the plaintiffs on conditional sale a certain stock of goods
and merchandise more specifically described in said written con-
tract.

“That under the terms of said contract the sellers, the defend-
ants herein, specifically agreed that they would not conduct
any’ other business in the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany and it was specifically provided in said written agreement
that in violation of this covenant of the contract the sellers,
the defendants herein, would pay to the buyers, the plaintiffs
herein, the sum of $10,000 as and for liquidated damages.

“The plaintiffs allege that the defendants have vidlated the
terms of the contract in this regard and have continued to use
the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company; that specifically the
defendants have.used bank drafts drawn in the name of Irving’s
Tractor Lug Company in purchasing scrap metal at Portal,
North Dakota, which said bank drafts were drawn on the Fargo
National Bank for the account of Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany and that the said defendants have used the said trade
name in various other ways and that the plaintiffs have been
damaged in this regard on account of said violation of the terms
of the contract in the agreed sum of the liquidated damages
amounting to $10,000.”

In the second cause of action it is stated:

“That under and pursuant to the terms of the contract here-
inbefore referred to it was provided that the defendants should
countersign checks drawn by plaintiffs in the conduct of the busi-
ness; and that the defendants should not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously refuse to countersign such: checks.

“The plaintiffs allege that the defendants have arbitrarily and
capriciously and constantly refused to sign checks drawn for
proper business purposes and have thus violated the terms of
the contract resulting in damage to the plaintiff in the conduct
of their business and in their credit relations in.the sum of
$10,000.”

As the third cause of action it is stated:

“Plaintiffs further allege that the defendants have constantly
in violation of the spirit, intent, purpose and provisions of the
contract continually interfered with the plaintiffs in the con-

448 De |

duct of the business so sold; in that they have among other things,
acting either personally or through agents or servants, mingled
new merchandise bought by the plaintiffs on their own account
with the old merchandise sold conditionally to those plaintiffs;
they have ransacked the plaintiffs’ records at various times and
have either taken said records or in all events caused them
to be missing or so misplaced them that the plaintiffs have
been unable to locate them; that they have constantly abused
their privilege of using space in the office upon which the plain-
tiffs are paying the rent; that they have removed a partition
placed in said office so that the plaintiffs do not have even a
semblance of privacy in the conduct of their business; that they
have used both the place of business at Fargo, North Dakota
and the place of business at Portal, North Dakota and the facili-
ties thereof for the purpose of conducting a scrap iron and
scrap metal business contrary to the terms of the contract and
that on account of the violations set forth in this paragraph
the plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $15,000.”

As a basis for a fourth cause of action the plaintiffs state:

“That under the terms of said contract it was specifically
provided that the sellers, the defendants, herein, would furnish
to the buyers, the plaintiffs herein, a written list of the names
and addresses of the creditors of Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany showing the amount of indebtedness due to each and certi-
fied by the sellers under oath to be a full, accurate and complete
list of the creditors and of their indebtedness. :

“That pursuant thereto the defendants did furnish to the
plaintiffs a list of creditors which list was made under oath
and which list the plaintiffs allege is incomplete and therefore
false.

“That incident and related to the failure of the defendants
to give to the plaintiffs a full list of their creditors, the plain-
tiffs allege on information and belief that the statement and
account of the defendants business shows bank over-drafts
in the amount of approximately $16,000; the plaintiffs also allege
on information and belief that these so called bank over-drafts
actually represent checks drawn by the defendants to creditors
not listed entitled to refunds or having other claims against

a 449

the business of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company before it was
sold to these plaintiffs, which said checks were actually never
mailed out to the creditors concerned.

“The plaintiffs further allege relative’ to the failure of the
defendant to give a true and complete list of their creditors;
that since June 23, 1950, there have been’many and in fact, a
constant stream of demands for refunds coming into Irving’s
Tractor Lug Company on account of orders given and paid for
but not filled by the defendants when they conducted such busi-
ness.

“That incident and related to the failure of the defendants
to give a full list of their creditors, there has been ‘sent to
Irving’s Tractor Lug Company various credit memos for funds
due various customers who had done business with Irving’s
Tractor Lug Company prior to its purchase by these plaintiffs
and which credit memos were issued by the defendants and there
are also letters and claims coming into Irving’s Tractor Lug
Company from:all parts of the United States and Canada be-
cause of credit on open account due to various customers of
Irving’s Tractor Lug Company on transactions arising before
the sale to the plaintitfs.

“That on account of and as a result of the failure of the de-
fendants to furnish a true and complete list of the creditors and
the amounts owing and because of the developments thereafter
and as an outgrowth thereof the plaintiffs have been damaged
in the sum of $15,000.”

In plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action it is alleged:

“That the defendants have issued numerous checks dated be-
fore June 23, 1950, drawn on the Bank of Montreal at Estevan,
Saskatchewan, Canada; that said checks were either not mailed
out to the people named therein until a later date or were not
paid for lack of funds; that since these plaintiffs acquired owner-
ship of the account of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company in the
Bank of Montreal at Estevan, Saskatchewan, Canada and have
deposited their funds therein, the said checks representing debts
owing by the defendants have been banked, cashed and charged
against the account owned by these plaintiffs and that on this

450 Ee

account the plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $5000.00.”

The defendants answered by way of general denial, and further
alleged in an amended answer:

“That prior to the alleged claim of breaches by the defendants,
the Plaintiffs breached said contract in the following respects:

“That the plaintiffs repeatedly refused to take an inventory
of. the parts at Fargo, North Dakota, and that in spite of the
insistence of the defendants ‘such inventory was never taken. ‘

“That the plaintiffs repeatedly made errors on settlement
sheets whereby they listed 60 per cent items in the 10 per cent
column.

“That the plaintiffs repeatedly refused to make an accounting
to the defendants and to turn over payments to them when the
accumulated sales had aggregated $500 or more.

“That the plaintiffs repeatedly issued checks not countersigned
by these defendants. And they went so far as to secretly and
without notice to- defendants open a special and separate ac-
count in the Dakota National Bank of Fargo, North Dakota,
under the account name of Irving Tractor Lug Company, special
account.

“That the plaintiffs refused the defendants free access to
their books and records and even went so far as to remove said
books and records from the premises at Fargo, North Dakota;
that the plaintiffs refused at all times to allow the defendants
to examine these books and accounts at Portal, North Dakota;
and that these books have never been examined to this date.

“That the plaintiffs held out hundreds of copies of sales
slips, inventory slips so as not to have to report a full accounting
to these defendants on the settlement sheets. .

“That the plaintiffs cashed checks and money orders and
used the proceeds for their own benefit rather than to deposit
them in the account at the Dakota National Bank. And then
deliberately by their bookkeeping and accounting covered up
these cashing of checks and money orders and appropriating
of the funds to their own use and benefit.

“That the plaintiffs have accepted cash checks and money
orders from customers throughout, the United States and Canada

— 451

without fulfilling and delivering ‘the merchandise purchased.
And that said cash has been expended by them with no refund
being made to the customer or goods delivered. Thereby de-
stroying the reversionary interest that the defendants have in
the trade name, Irving Tractor Lug Company. That the -plain-
tiffs at all times failed and refused to cooperate under the terms
of conditional sales’ contract herein, and have refused to fill
orders for which the defendants had merchandise on hand or
quoted such merchandise at such an exorbitant price as to dis-
courage the buyer. That the plaintiffs were in such precarious
financial condition as to endanger the security of the defendants
under the terms of the conditional sales contract.”

The transcript is voluminous and the record contains some
120 exhibits consisting of about 2,000 checks, drafts, orders,
invoices, and items of correspondence. : There are 43 specifica-
tions of error, some of which involve the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. No question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict is before us. The defendants made no motion for a
directed verdict and did not move for a new trial. Under our
practice it is well settled that in a civil case the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict cannot be raised
in the supreme court unless it has been first presented to the
trial court by a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for
anew trial. Westerso v. City of Williston, 77 ND 251, 42 NW2d
429; State v. Van Horne, 71 ND 455, 2 NW2d 1; Lueck v. State,
70 ND 604, 296 NW 917; Baird v. Stephens, 58 ND 812, 228 NW
212; Olson y. Great Northern R. Co., 56 ND 690, 219 NW 209;
Jacobson vy. Klamann, 54 ND 867, 211 NW 595; Veum v. Stef-
ferud, 50 ND 371, 196 NW 104; Rokusek v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 50 ND 123, 195 NW 300; Bailey v. Davis, 49 ND 838,
193 NW 658; Horton v. Wright, Barrett & Stilwell Co., 43 ND
114, 174 NW 67; Erickson v. Wiper, 33 ND 193, 157 NW 592;
Buchanan v. Occident Elevator Co., 33 ND 346, 157 NW 122;
Freerks v. Nurnberg, 33 ND 587, 157 NW 119; Morris v- Minne-
apolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co.; 82 ND 366, 155 NW 861.

It is undisputed that the plaintiffs assumed control of the
business of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company on July 1, 1950, and

452 De

operated it until February 5, 1951, when the business was te-
possessed by the defendants.

Defendants’ specifications of error, in'so far’as they raise
questions reviewable in this court, -fall into’ two categories—
challenges to the trial court’s rulings on-admission or exclusion
of evidence and challenges to instructions given by the court
or requested by defendants and refused by the trial judge.

The defendants specify as error the admission over their ob-
jection of plaintiffs’ exhibits 2 to 19 inclusive, being a series
of drafts issued in the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company
and drawn on the Fargo National Bank of Fargo, North Dakota,
during the period in which the plaintiffs were operating the busi-
ness. These drafts were issued at the direction of the defendants
in payment of the purchase of scrap metal by the defendants
and not as a part of the business which was operated by the
plaintiffs. These exhibits were clearly admissible on the qnes-
tion of whether the defendants violated their agreement not to
conduct business in the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company,
as claimed by the plaintiffs under their first cause of action.
The defendants argue that these exhibits, as well as others
introduced later, do not show a material or substantial breach
of the contract. This, however, is a matter of the weight of the
evidence and does not go to the admissibility of the exhibits
which were clearly relevant under the pleadings. The bank ac-
count against which these items were drawn and charged was
the account of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company, then operated
by the plaintiffs.

A similar bank account was kept in the Bank of Montreal,
Estevan, Saskatchewan. The contract provided that until the
purchase note was paid the sellers or their agents should have
the right to countersign all checks issued by the buyers in the
conduct of the business of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company and
that “The sellers may not refuse to countersign any’ check ar-
bitrarily or capriciously so long as the check is issued for a
proper business purpose.”

The contract contains a provision that the sellers agree to fur-
nish the buyers a written list of names and addresses of creditors
with the amount of indebtedness due each. A list furnished pur-

a 453

suant to this provision was introduced in evidence. The de-
fendants claim it was error for the court to admit in evidence
exhibit 36, which was a bundle of about 160 checks for small
amounts under $35.00 issued against Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany account in the Bank of Montreal and payable to parties
not listed as creditors. ‘The defendant, Irving Goodman, testi-
fied that they had been issued mostly for refunds to customers
for indebtedness. that was outstanding prior to July 1, 1950.
This exhibit was properly admitted as being material under
plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, wherein it is contended that
the defendants failed to furnish a true and complete list of
creditors as required by the contract. Similar objections were
made to the introduction of checks and drafts issued to unlisted
creditors and to credit memorandums that had been issued in
lieu of cash refunds to customers. These memorandums en-
titled the customers to apply the amounts specified therein on
future purchases. We find no error in the admission of any ex-
hibits of this nature. If, as the defendants claim, the bank
accounts of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company were reimbursed by
the defendants for all such items charged against them, that
fact does not render the admission of these exhibits erroneous.
Reimbursement would be for the jury to consider in connection
with the assessment of damages. BExhibits 48 to 62 inclusive are
checks written for the purpose of paying the credit memoran-
dums. These checks were also admissible for reasons already
stated as being material to the issue as to whether the list of
creditors furnished to the plaintiffs by the defendants com-
plied with the provisions of the contract.

In a group of specifications the defendants assert that the
trial court erred in sustaining objections to questions asked on
cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses during the presenta-
tion of the plaintiffs’ main case. We will discuss illustrative
instances from this group of specifications.

The propriety of the examination of witnesses and the order
in which evidence is presented are matters largely within the
sound discretion of the trial court and his rulings will not be
disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.
State v. Kerns, 50 ND 927, 198 NW 698; State v. Tolley, 23 ND

454 Le

284, 186 NW 784; State v. Hazer, 57 ND 900, 225 NW 319;'People
y. Logie, 321 Mich 303, 32 NW2d 458. These are criminal cases,
but the same rule is also applied in civil actions. Ruddick w
Buchanan, 87 ND 132, 163 NW 720; Schwoebel v. Fugina, 14
ND 3875, 104 NW 848; 58 Am Jur, Witnesses, Section 631. The
rule is applicable to the cross-examination of a witness for
purposes of impeachment. State v. Kerns, supra.

The witness Alpers testified-that he formerly worked for the
defendants when they were operating Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany and continued to work for that concern after the plaintiffs
took it over and until October 1950. This witness identified a
number of drafts which he drew in the name of Irving’s Tractor
Lug Company on the Fargo National Bank. The drafts were
for the purchase of scrap iron made by the Goodmans after the
plaintiffs had taken over the company, the point of this testi-
mony being an attempt to show that the defendants used the
name of the company in violation of the contract. In an at-
tempt to impeach this witness, defendants’ counsel asked these
questions to which objections were sustained:

“Now, Mr. Alpers, at the time you left the employ of Mevorah
and Sills, did-you not receive a letter from Mr. Mevorah accus-
ing you of taking parts books out of the Portal Branch?”

“Did you ever have any other trouble with Mevorah and Sills
on not filling orders for them?”

The questions do not fall within the range of proper impeach-
ment.. They intimate that the witness had had some trouble
with the plaintiffs for whom he was testifying. This indicates
no prejudice against the defendants and the nature of the ques-
tions is not such as to indicate their answers would in any way
affect the witness’s credibility.

The defendants complain that they were unduly and erro-
neously restricted by the trial court in the cross-examination
of the plaintiff, Martin Sills. The instance having the greatest
semblance of merit grows out of this situation: The contract
provided that all money received in the course of the buyers’
business should be deposited in the Fargo National Bank “or
other bank mutually agreeable to the parties.” It appears
from the testimony of the plaintiff Sills, and from other evi-

Le 455

dence, that an account was carried in the Dakota National Bank
in the name of the Irving’s Tractor Lug Company by agreement
of.the parties. The defendants’ answer alleges that -prior to
the claim of breaches by the defendants the plaintiffs breached
the contract in a number of respects, including this: “they
went so far as to secretly and without notice to defendants open
a special and separate account in the Dakota National Bank
of Fargo;-North Dakota, under the -account name of Irving
Tractor Lug Company, special account.” In the cross-examina-
tion of Sills as a part of the plaintiffs’ main case, these ques-
tions were asked and objections thereto sustained:

: “I will ask you, Mr. Sills, did you go to the Dakota National
Bank and ‘open another bank account?”

. “All right, Mr, Sills, now from your daily receipts from your
business, Irving’s Tractor Lug Company, did you deposit them
in any other account than the account set wp in the contract?”

. Orderly trial procedure requires that a party who has not
opened his own case will not be permitted to introduce affirma-
tive defenses to the jury by cross-examination of witnesses of
the adverse party. Hogen v. Klabo, 13 ND 319, 100 NW 847.
These questions would have been proper if asked of the witness
if he had been called for cross-examination under, the statute
as a part of the defendants’ case. They appear in this record,
however, as a part of the cross-examination conducted during
the plaintiffs’ presentation of their case. The questions pertain
to a breacli of the contract by the plaintiffs, a matter which was
pleaded as a defense. It was not an abuse of discretion of the
trial judge to sustain objections thereto as improper cross-ex-
amination. In fact, he is to be commended for applying a rule
of orderly procedure in a case which involves ‘many complicated
and confusing aspects.

The contract, as construed by the parties, provided that checks
issued by the plaintiffs in the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany were required to be countersigned by one of the defend-
ants. It stated that:

+ “The sellers may not refuse to countersign any check arbi-
trarily or capriciously so long as the check is issued for a proper
business purpose.”

456 —

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action charges the defendants with
violation of this provision. The plaintiffs introduced in evi-
dence two checks drawn on the Dakota National Bank, dated
November 18, 1950, for $60.00 each, payable to C. Mevorah and
Martin A. Sills, respectively. The checks represented amounts
which the parties agreed the plaintiffs might draw personally
from the business. There is no contention that they were not
issued for a proper business purpose. Irving Goodman had
testified that he countersigned every check presented to him
when there was money in the bank to meet it. Thus it became
important to establish whether on November 18, 1950, when
Irving Goodman refused to countersign the checks to Mevorah
and Sills, there was money in the bank to meet them. The plain-
tiffs produced a letter, exhibit 77, dated November 18, 1950,
purporting to be written by A. M. Eriksmoon, cashiér of the
Dakota National Bank, which the cashier gave to the plaintiffs.
Sills testified that he showed the letter to Goodman at the time
of and in connection with his request that Goodman counter-
sign the two checks. The letter is addressed to Irving’s Tractor
Lug Company and states:

“This is to advise you that the balance of your checking ac-
count as of the close of business November 17, 1950, amounted
to $714.29. A deposit of $89.42 was made on November 18, 1950,
which will make your balance $803.71.”

This letter was admitted in evidence over the vigorous objec-
tion of defendants’ counsel that it was not the best evidence and
that it was hearsay and that no foundation was laid for it.
The further objection was made that the letter showed the
bank balance but did not show what the balance would be after
the deduction of outstanding checks. This letter was subject
to all of the objections made to it. It was not the best evi-
dence of the bank balance, the records of the bank itself being
the best evidence of that fact. If it is to be construed to state
what books of the bank showed, it is also hearsay. Further-
more, there was an entire absence of foundation in that there
is no evidence of the functions of the cashier, if any, with
respect to or knowledge of the balances of the bank’s depositors.
In fact, the letter does not purport to state that the information

— 457

therein contained was obtained from the bank records. Whether
there was money enough in the bank to pay these two checks
and any outstanding checks that might have been previously
countersigned was an important issue under plaintiffs’ second
cause of action. The trial court erred in admitting the letter in
evidence over objection.

“The witness Conoboy was called by the defendants, He was a
certified public accountant of considerable experience who had
examined the books and accounts of Irving’s Tractor Lug Com-
pany during the period it was. operated by the plaintiffs up to
the close of business February 3, 1951. He was permitted to
testify in detail as to the facts which he found during the audit.
He stated that there were 409 invoices that were missing and
unaccounted for in any manner, whereupon he was asked these
questions to which objections were sustained:

“In your long years of experience as a certified public ac-
eountant, Mr. Conoboy, will you tell me in your accounting
experience normally what that large number of missing invoices
would mean?” .

“And what would be your opinion as to why they are missing?”

At another time during this witness’s testimony he pointed out
errors or discrepancies in the books and accounts and was then
asked:

“Now, does this or does it not tend to show a juggling of
accounts?”

The defendants specify as error the refusal of the trial court
to permit these questions to be answered and cite Wishek v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 55 ND 321, 213 NW 488,
wherein this court said:

“The rule is that in those cases where it is impracticable or
impossible for the court to make an examination of a large
number of instruments, entries or records, a competent witness
may make such examination and present his conclusions thereon
to the court.”

The rule thus stated is not sufficiently broad to cover the ques-
tions propounded in this instance. It is obvious from these
questions that they were intended to draw from the witness
conclusions of intent, motive, or purpose of the persons handling

458 Ee

the books or accounts or operating the business. - Such conclu-
sions, if they are to be drawn at all, are for the jury and not for
the witness, be he ever so expert an accountant. This becomes
obvious when we consider the reason for permitting an account-
ant or auditor to give conclusions with respect to his examination.

Books and accounts are the best evidence of what is contained
therein. Dr. BR. D. Eaton Chemical Co. v. Doherty, 31 ND 175,
153 NW 966; Great Western Life Assurance Co. v. Shumway,
25 ND 268, 141 NW 479. The rule stated in Wishek v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, is one of convenience
which permits an expert to assist the court and jury by sum-
marizing and pointing out salient facts which are different to
ascertain because of voluminous figures and documents and
intricate details of accounting. Linnell v. London & Lancashire
Indemnity Co., 74 ND 379, 22 NW2d 203. The accountant or
auditor so permitted to testify does not become an expert for
the purpose of testifying to conclusions outside of the strict
scope of his business or profession. His conclusions may not
invade the province of the jury where the jury is competent
and qualified to draw its own conclusions. The testimony sought
to be elicited by inquiries here under consideration called for
determinations exclusively within the province of the jury. The
trial court did not err iri this respect. See annotations in 135
ALR 1145; 52 ALR 1268; Shreve v. United States, 77 Fed2d 2.

The witness Conoboy testified that at the end of business on
February 3, 1951, there was an overdraft of $116.76 in the bank
account of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company in the Dakota Nation-
al Bank. The plaintiffs were contending that the refusal of
the defendants to countersign checks on this account constituted
violations of the contract. On the other hand, the defendants
were contending that they countersigned all checks when they
did.not result in overdrafts. The evidence shows that the
plaintiffs maintained another account in the same bank in the
name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company which was known and.
designated as a special account. The defendants testified that
they knew nothing about this special account and it seems clear
that in any event the defendants were not required to and
did not countersign checks on this account. The witness Cono-:

Ee 7459

boy, on cross-examination, testified that there was $1074.42 in
the special account: He was then asked:

“So that, allowing for the $116.76 so-called overdraft i in » the
regular account there was at least $900 to spare to take into
account with the special account, wasn’t there?”

Over the objection that this evidence was immaterial, the
witness was allowed to answer: “Yes. There would be a
$900 net.”

The next question which the witness was 5 permitted to answer
over objection was:

“Do you know of any reason why Mevorah and Sills couldn’t
transfer funds from the special account to the general account?”

And the witness answered: “No. I know ‘of no reason.” This
testimony was clearly immaterial and improper cross-examina-
tion. The issue at this point was whether the defendants
breached the contract by refusing to countersign checks on the
regular account which the witness had testified was overdrawn.
Arbitrary or capricious refusal was a breach of the terms of the
contract. It is clear that whether or not there was money in a
special account was immaterial. The injection of evidence. of
the special account over which the defendants had no control
could only.confuse the jury.

On direct examination the witness Conoboy testified that his
audit showed that moneys to the extent of $2100.00 had been
received for parts, the parts not shipped, and the money not
refunded. The audit covered the time the business was operated
by the plaintiffs up to the close of business February 3, 1951.
The business was repossessed by the defendants on February 5,
1951. On cross-examination the fact was emphasized that,
having lost control of the business, the plaintiffs could not
fill orders after February 5, 1951. Upon redirect examination
counsel for defendants sought to counteract the implication that
the unfilled orders had been received shortly prior to the time
the business was repossessed and that the plaintiffs had not had
an opportunity to fill them. After some preliminary colloquy
between the lawyers and the court, the following took place:

“Mr. Lanier: Myr. Conoboy, from your examination of the
books of Mevorah and Sills, of the invoices, of the daily cash

TO

460 —

reports, of the letters of complaint, could you ascertain generally
speaking when these orders upon which the complaints were
made on which no money was refunded, when they came in?
Answer yes or no.

“A, Yes.

“Q. Could you tell me what period of time they covered?

“Mr, Conmy: If the court please, I object to that as not the
best evidence and entirely immaterial to the issues in this case.

“The court: I think I will sustain the objection.”

The court later permitted the defendants to introduce exhibits
513, 514, 515, and 516 containing some 1,000 instruments in the
form of orders or invoices which presumably contained the in-
formation sought to be elicited from the accountant Conoboy.
The court should have permitted the witness to answer the
question which was one of fact peculiarly within the knowledge
and experience of the witness. It called for an answer which
could be obtained only by the examination of a large volume
of papers. The question called not for a conclusion but for a
statement of fact, knowledge of which the witness presumably
had already acquired and which the jury could otherwise acquire
only by a detailed examination of numerous documents which
could not be conveniently examined in court. Sec Linnell v.
London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 74 ND 379, 22 NW2d 203.
The court erred in sustaining the objection.

The defendants complain of rulings of the trial court sustain-
ing objections to questions put to the defendant, Stanley Good-
man, on direct examination regarding a subsequent oral
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendants as to the
conduct of the scrap metal business by the defendants. We
find no error here and, if the court had erred in this respect, the
error would have been cured by testimony this defendant sub-
sequently gave, as follows:

“Mr. Lanier: After this contract was entered into and after
Mevorah and Sills took over on July 1, 1950, did you have
any further oral understanding with them?

“A, Yes, sir.

Le 461

“Q. Did you have any oral understanding with them as ‘to
your conducting a scrap metal business?

“A. Yes...

“Q. Was there any conversation between you and Mevorah
and Sills as to conducting and purchasing scrap metal in the
name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company?

“A, Yes, sir.

“Q. Where did that conversation take place and why?

“A. It took place in the office and also in the yard.”

The witness was not asked to repeat the conversation referred
to in this testimony. Counsel left the details to inference.

The defendants contend that the court erred in sustaining an
objection to this question:

“Now, Irving, at the time of entering into this agreement .
with Mevorah and Sills, was there ever any discussion and
conversation between you and Mevorah and Sills as to out-
standing credit memos?”

The court did not err in sustaining the objection. Whether
there was such a conversation or not was wholly immaterial
and, if it were sought thereby to vary the terms of the written
contract, the testimony would have been improper. Section 9-
0607 NDRC 1943 provides:

“The execution’ of a contract in writing, whether the law
requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotia-
tions or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or
accompanied the execution of the instrument.”

“Where a written contract is complete in itself, is-clear and
unambiguous in its language and contains mutual contractual
covenants agreed upon, such parts cannot be changed by parol
testimony, nor new terms added thereto, in the absence of a
clear showing of fraud, mistake or accident.” Larson v. Wood,
75 ND 9, 25 NW2d 100.

The contract contained this provision:

“The buyers shall have the right to buy out of stock parts and
parts not included in the inventory for their own account.
On the sale of all such parts, the buyers shall pay to the sellers
10% of the sales price to apply on the obligation of the promis-
sory note.”

462 —

On redirect examination of the plaintiff Mevorah it was
brought out that at the time the stock of goods was repossessed.
by the defendants there were included therein items of merchan-
dise in the inventory that had been paid for by the plaintiffs.
The witness also testified that merchandise bought on plaintiffs’
account came to the place of business after the repossession.
The witness was then asked :

“Now, how much merchandise that. you bought on your own
account with your own money, if you know in value, was there
when they kicked you out?”

Defendants’ attorney objected on the ground that the ques-
tion was improper surrebuttal and immaterial. The objection
was overruled and the witness answered:

“There was between four and five thousand dollars in mer-
chandise cost price.”

This is an action for damages for breach of contract. There
are no allegations in the complaint with reference to new
merchandise other than that, the defendants “mingled new
merchandise bought by the plaintiffs on their own account with
the old merchandise sold conditionally to these plaintiffs.” Re-
possession is not alleged and no damages are sought in connec-
tion therewith. If, as Mevorah testifies, the Goodmans, when
they repossessed the stock covered by their conditional sales
contract, also seized other goods that was the property of the
plaintiffs, the value of that property is wholly immaterial in
this action. It bore no relation to the amount of damages that
might be recovered for breach of contract. The admission of
this evidence was error that might well have misled the jury in
determining the amount of damages.

Counsel for defendants predicates error upon the denial of
two motions for a declaration of mistrial. We will consider
them together. The first motion was made following the asking
of this question of the defendant, Stanley Goodman:

“I am going to ask you, if as a matter of fact, you were ever
adjudged guilty of the crime of criminal contempt of court?”

An objection was sustained, but counsel for the defendants
nevertheless contends that it was prejudicial conduct on the part
of plaintiffs’ counsel to ask the question and the court therefore

Le “463

should have granted a mistrial. The second motion for ‘a mis-
trial grew out of this situation that developed during the cross-
examination of hiving Goodman: e

“Mr. Goodman, you were telling us about this Prankenbrivger
who was convicted with you there hack in Illinois, weren’t you?

“A, Yes. 2.

“Mr. Conmy: As a matter of fact, Mr. Goodman, after this
affair which you have chosen to explain to us this morning in
regard to this crime, Mr. Frankenburger, the cashier, committed
suicide, didn’t he?”

Defendants’ counsel then moved for a mistrial. After com-
ments by counsel for both sides, the court said:

“I will sustain the objection as to that testimony ori the cross-
examination of this witness. Because I think we are getting into
a collateral issue here which we have gone far enough into.
And I will deny the motion for a new trial.”

After further comment by counsel for the defendants, the court
“said:

“I have sustained the objection. The jury in following ‘the
instructions of the court should bear in mind that where ob-
jections are made to questions and testimony and those objec-
tions are sustained, that the jury should eliminate and withhold
consideration of such matters. It is only the admitted testimony
that should be considered by the jury. And the statements of
counsel are not testimony.”

The question was highly improper. : coe

Chapter 27-10 NDRC 1948 sets forth the acts that may be
punished as criminal contempts and those that may be punished
as civil contempts, prescribes the punishmetit in each instance,
the method of apprehension, trial, and appeal to the supreme
court. The trial procedure prescribed for civil and criminal
‘contempt is the same. Section 27-1013 NDRC 1948. No jury
trial is provided for in either case. The court alone determines
whether the accused has committed the offense.charged and
makes an order prescribing punishment within the limits pro-
vided by the statute. Section 27-1017 provides that a-person
who is punished for contempt may also be prosecuted criminally

464 Ee

for the same conduct if it is a public offense, but the court,
in such a case, is required to take into consideration the previous
punishments, Section 12-1725 NDRC 1948 provides that a
criminal act is not the less punishable as a crime because it is
also declared to be punishable as contempt. But the court,
authorized to pass sentence, may mitigate the punishment to be
imposed in its discretion. These statutes make no distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempts.

Contempt proceedings are generally classified as neither civil
nor criminal but sui generis. 17 CJS, Contempt, Section 62;
12 Am Jur, Contempt, Sections 66 and 75. This court has held
that contempt proceedings are quasi criminal in character. State
v. Babcock, 64 ND 288,.251 NW 849; State v. Harris, 14 ND 501,
105 NW 621.

In Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind 688, 51 NE2d 365, 154
ALR 115, it was held that the trial court properly sustained
an objection to the introduction in evidence of certain records
of a contempt proceeding in which it was said that the plaintiff
was convicted of contempt of court for perjury. This evidence
was offered for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the
plaintiff as a witness. The basis for the holding, as the court
stated, was that contempt of court.is not a crime, although the
same act may be a crime and may also be contempt of court.

In Farrell v. Phillips, 140 Wis 611, 123 NW 117, the court
held that it was error to admit for purposes of impeachment
the record of the prior conviction and fine of the witness for
contempt of court. One of the reasons given for this holding
is that:

“conviction of a contempt of court, either civil or criminal,
is not a conviction of a ‘criminal offense,’ as very plainly ap-
pears from the provisions of sec. 2569, Stats (1898), which
expressly provides that persons punished for contempt even
criminally shall still be liable to indictment or information for
the offense.”

It-is clear to us that the question propounded to the witness,
Stanley Goodman, in an effort to test his credibility does not
come within the rule that permits a cross-examiner to inquire
whether or not the witness has been convicted of crime. See

De 465

Engstrom v. Nelson, ‘41 ND 530, 171 NW 90; State v. Bossart,
62 ND 11, 241 NW 78, and cases cited therein,

The defendants by moving for a mistrial after the ruling of
the court in each instance took the steps to protect the record
that was approved by this court in Stoskoff v. Wicklund, 49 ND
708, 193 NW 312. The question here is whether the asking of
the questions created prejudicial error although objections to
the questions were sustained.

Every offer of improper evidence does not require a reversal.
The ultimate question is whether the offer of the evidence was
itself prejudicial despite the ruling of the court. Much depends
upon the importance and character of the evidence and the
‘cireumstances under which it was offered. A collection of cases
on the improper offer of evidence is found in an annotation in
109 ALR 1089. ‘The first question was asked upon the recross-
examination of Stanley Goodman, one of the defendants. The
question itself was a misstatement of the law in that it required
the witness to state whether he ever had been adjudged guilty
of the crime of criminal contempt of court, thus intimating that
the witness had been guilty of a crime which in law did not exist.
The second question under consideration was propounded to the
defendant, Irving Goodman. The answer could have no bear-
ing on the credibility of the witness. We do not believe that
prejudice was alleviated by the subsequent instruction and
comments of the court or the further testimony of the witness
in effect denying the suicide. We have here a situation where the
defendants, father and son, were co-partners. An improper
question was asked of one, implying that he had been guilty
of the crime of criminal contempt of court. A question was
asked of the other defendant assuming that he had been guilty
of a crime that was so heinous that another man connected
with that crime had committed suicide. These questions were
prejudicial and when considered together have the cumulative
effect of reversible error. Our conclusion that there must be a
new trial in the interests of justice is further accentuated by
other errors to which we have already referred.

The specifications of error also cover other points dealing

466 La |

with the court’s ruling on the admission of evidence, but none of
them are of sufficient merit or importance to require considera-
tion here.

Several specifications of error are based upon instructions
given by the trial court or requested instructions. by him denied.
One situation.is presented which requires discussion and clari-
fication in view of the fact that the same question is likely to
arise on a new trial.

Paragraph H of the contract contains these provisions:

“H. Sellers not to Compete.

“1, The sellers agree that they will not engage, directly or
indirectly in the retail or wholesale business of the sale of
new tractor and farm implement parts. in the buyers normal
trade territory of Wichita,. Kansas, Portal, North Dakota, or
Fargo, North Dakota, nor engage in foreign export of said items,
fora period of 15 years from the date hereof.

.“2, Tf, and at such time as the buyers may purchase the
sellers’ entire stock of usable ‘used’ parts in accordance with the
buyers option stated herein, the sellers after said sale hereby
agree that they will not engage, directly or indirectly, in the
retail or wholesale business of the sale of used and reconditioned
tractor and farm implement parts in the buyers normal trade
territory of Wichita, Kansas, Portal, North Dakota, or Fargo,
North Dakota, nor engage in the foreign export of said items,
for a period of 15 years after said sale.

“3. The sellers agree that they shall not conduct any other
business in the name Irving’s Tractor Lug Company.. .

_ “4, Violation of this covenant (Par. H) shall subject the
sellers to pay the buyers the sum of $10,000.00 as and for
liquidated damages.”

_ After quoting sections 3 and 4 of Paragraph H “above, the
trial court said to the jury:

“You are therefore instructed that if you find from the evi-
dence in this case that the defendants have conducted any
-business in the name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company since the
-eontract has been in operation, and if you-find that there. are
‘damages sustained by the plaintiffs for which it would be

| |

De 467.

impractical or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage then in
that event the plaintiffs are entitled to recover on their cause
of action claiming violation of the contract in the use of the
trade name the sum of $10,000, as and for liquidated damages
for the breach of the specific covenant concerned.”

The defendants argue that the court erred in permitting the
jury to consider the matter of liquidated damages upon the vio-
lation of the provision regarding conducting business in the
name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company. They argue that the
purpose of Paragraph H was to prevent the defendants from
entering into competition with the plaintiffs and that without
evidence of such competition the liquidated damage provision
cannot be applied. The instruction given was erroneous for
reasons akin to those urged by defendants’ counsel.

Section 9-0804 NDRC 1943 provides:

“Every contract by which the amount of damages to be paid,
or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an obligation
is determined in anticipation thereof is to that extent void,
except that the parties may agree therein upon an amount
presumed to be the damage sustained by a breach in cases where
it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual
damage.”

Of similar provisions in the South Dakota law, it is said in
International Milling Co. v. Reierson, 55 SD 139, 225 NW 218:

“It is not apparent that these sections do, or were intended
to, modify the common-law rule. If they do not, then the validity
of such provision is to be determined by its character. If the
provision can be said to provide only fair compensation for the
loss incurred by the injured party, it is valid. But if it appears
to provide a penalty in fact, although in the guise of damages,
itis void. If the damages contracted to be paid are in fact fair
and compensatory only, then the provision should be enforced.”

An examination of section 1 of Paragraph H of the contract
above quoted discloses that the sellers agree not to engage in
foreign export of certain items or engage in certain types of
business within a definite territory for a period of 15 years.
Such provisions are generally held to be a proper basis for
contracting for a reasonable and definite sum as liquidated

468 es
damages. Berghuis v. Schultz, 119 Minn 87, 137 NW 201; Kelso
v. Reid, 145 Pa 606, 23 Atl 323, 27 Am St Rep 716. The second’
section of Paragraph H is much like the first except that its
restrictions are conditional. However, it is not for a violation
of these provisions that the plaintiffs seck damages in this
action. Recovery is sought under the provision that the sellers
agree that they shall not conduct any other business in the
name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company. This provision, if
taken alone and separate from that which goes before, would
seem to give the right of recovery of $10,000.00 against the
sellers if they conducted a non-competing business in the for-
bidden name, regardless of the location, kind of business, and
the amount of damages inflicted. This appears to be the con-
struction given this provision by the plaintiffs and by the court
in his instructions. As so construed, it is a drastie provision
which bears the earmarks of a penalty rather than liquidated
damages. If section 3 is wholly independent of the two sections
which precede it and is given the construction placed upon it
by the plaintiffs and the court which permits recovery for
violation of section 3 as a separate and independent covenant,
the provision for liquidated damages is void as a gross penalty
provided for breaches of the whole of Paragraph H and of
each of its separate provisions which vary materially in import
and importance.

In Raymond v. Edelbrock, 15 ND 231, 107 NW 194, it is said:

“It will be observed that the plaintiff is seeking to recover
damages for only a partial breach of the contract. The de-
fendants sent to plaintiff within the time prescribed the required
amount of claims for collection, but failed to send the specified
number. By the terms of the contract the defendants promised
to pay $36 ‘as liquidated damages’ if they failed ‘to comply with
this agreement.’ If this language is to be construed to mean
that the stipulated sum was to be the measure of damages for
a breach of any of the stated conditions, then the pretended
liquidation of damages was a mere agreement for a penalty;
and the entire stipulation would be void for familiar reasons.
Where a contract stipulates for the performance of several
acts and fixes the same amount of damages for the nonperform-

Ss 469

ance of any single minor condition as is fixed for a total breach,
regardless of the relative detriment apt to result from such
partial breach as compared to the loss for a total breach, the
very terms. of the contract itself.demonstrate that compensation
for actual detriment was not: the thought, of the parties. If
the agreement is not for compensation it is necessarily one for
a penalty.”

In Henry v. Louisville & N. RB. Co., 91 Ala 585, 8 So 343, it
is said:

“Agreements sometimes contain more stipulations than one,
and then express a promise td pay a gross sum, on the breach
of such agreement. The sum thus expressed and promised is
treated as the agreed compensation, or recoverable damages,
for an entire breach of all the stipulations, and, hence, not
recoverable in gross for a partial breach, and consequently are
not liquidated damages; . .

In 15 Am Jur, Damages, Section 258, it is said:

“It is a rule in many jurisdictions that where a contract
contains several covenants of different degrees of importance
and the sum named is to be paid for the breach of any of them,
even the least, it will be treated as a penalty, notwithstanding
such sum is termed. ‘liquidated damages,’ and, it has been said,
the language of the parties is the strongest which could be ¢ em-
ployed to evince a contrary intention.”

In 25 CO. J. S., Damages, Section 111, we find these state-
ments:

“As a general rule a sum stated as the damages to be paid
for the breach of a contract containing several distinct and
independent covenants upon which there may be several breaches
will be considered a penalty and not liquidated damages. . .

“The rule that a stipulated sum in gross to be paid on the
breach of a contract for the performance of several conditions
is a penalty is especially applicable where the different acts to
be performed are of varying degrees of importance, although
such fact is not controlling in all cases.”

Discussions of this question may also be found in Sutherland
on Damages, 4th Edition, Section 294; Williston on Contracts,

470 — Eee

Revised dition, Section 784; Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Edi-
-tion, Section 413. See note LRAI915E 374.

Paragraph H which is headed “Sellers not to Compete” must
be construed as a whole in furtherance of the purpose expressed
in the heading. The provision for liquidated damages does not

‘purport to apply separately to each provision but to Paragraph

H generally. It refers to “violation of this covenant.” The exact
-meaning in this respect is somewhat obscure and may be said
to be ambiguous. But it may be presumed that the parties
intended to make a valid agreement and one not violative of
an express statute. The statute is not violated if Paragraph
H is construed to provide liquidated damages for the use of
the name Irving’s Tractor Lug Company in connection with
any other business in which the defendants are forbidden to
compete under the terms of the first two sections of the para-
graph. This would in effect result in liquidated damages being
applicable only in breaches involving the contract as a whole
‘and not to a breach, if so it might be termed, resulting from
the use of the name Irving’s Tractor Lug Company in a
wholly non-competing business.

In Raymond v. Edelbrock, 15 ND 231, 107 NW 194, from
which we have already quoted, the court reached the conclusion
that: :

“The stipulation fixing the amount’ of damages in case of a
total breach having no application to the partial breach shown
in this case, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
‘extent of his loss if he would recover more than a nominal
-amount.” . .

In this case the court erred in instructing the jury to return
a verdict of-$10,000.00 in event they determined that the de-
fendants have conducted any business in the name of Irving’s
Tractor Lug Company, since the contract had been in operation,
if the plaintiffs had sustained damages that would be ‘imprac-
ticable or extremely difficult to fix.

Other questions raised regarding instructions are without
merit and do not require that this opinion be further prolonged
by their consideration.

Le 471
The judgment appealed from is reversed because of the errors
herein noted and a new trial is granted.

Burxs, Sarure, Curisrianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Es
[File No. 7288]

THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION FUND OF
NORTH DAKOTA, and ELLSWORTH LA DUKE (The
Injured Workman), Respondents, v. E. W. WYLIE COM-
PANY, A Foreign Corporation, Appellant.

(58 NW2d 76)

Opinion filed March 19, 1953

Kelsch & Scanlon, for appellant.

ray and Paul Sand, Assistant Attorney General, for
respondents,

Lh 475

Guimson, J. This is a suit for damages brouglit by the State
of, North Dakota for the benefit of the Workmen’s Compensation
Fund of North Dakota and-Ellsworth La Duke against the E.
W. Wylie Company, a foreign corporation, and’Rolly Hull under
Sec 65-0109 of the workmen’s compensation act, as amended by
Chap 355 SL 1949, which provides:

“When an injury or death for which compensation is payable
under the provisions of this title shall have been.sustained under
circumstances creating in some person other than the fund a
legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured em-
ployee, or his dependents may claini compensation under. this
title and obtain damages from and proceed at law to recover
damages against such other person, . . .”

The statute then provides that the recovery in such suit, if
any, goes first to the workmen’s compensation fund to reimburse
this fund for the compensation paid and only the balance, if
any, to the injured employee.

The plaintiff alleges in its complaint that the defendant E.
W. Wylie Company is .a foreign corporation doing a motor
vehicle transportation business in this state; that the defendant
Rolly Hull was an employee of the E. W. Wylie Company, driv-
ing one of its trucks westward along Highway No. 10 in North
Dakota ‘on March 26, 1949; that one Ellsworth La Duke was an
employee of the Consolidated Freightways, Inc., driving one of
its trucks eastward at said time and place; that because of the
carelessness and negligence of said Rolly Hull a-collision oc-
curred between the two trucks, causing serious injuries to said
Ellsworth La Duke, on account of which he sustained damages
in the sum of $2,999.00; that the Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,
and Ellsworth La Duke were subject to the workmen’s compen-
sation law; that said La Duke filed a claim under’ said law. with
the workmen’s compensation, bureau which made him a partial
allowance for medical and hospital expenses in the sum of $208,-
87; that no allowance was made for his damages.

476 Ee

The defendant BE. W. Wylie Company answers making general
denial, admitting the collision, specifically denying negligence
and setting up contributory negligence by Hllsworth La Duke.
Before the case was called for trial the defendant served an
amended answer adding to its original answer Paragraph 8,
setting forth as a complete defense to the plaintifi’s cause of
action that the defendant, E. W. Wylie Company, had made
application to come within the workmen’s compensation act, re-
ported all of its employees as required, paid all premiums as-
sessed and complied.in every respect’ with the workmen’s com-
pensation act of the State of North Dakota, and by reason there-
of had brought itself within and under the provisions of the
workmen’s compensation laws and was lawfully entitled to-all
the protection afforded by the workmen’s compensation act of
North Dakota at the time said Ellsworth La Duke was injured
as alleged in the complaint. These facts defendant élaims re-
lieved him of liability for the injuries to’ Ellsworth La Duke,
the employee of the Consolidated Freightways, Iné., which was
likewise insured under: the workmen’s compensation act. No
service was made on Rolly Hull.

At the commencement of the trial plaintiff moved to strike
out Paragraph 8 from the amended answer on the grounds that
it was immaterial and that the defendant, in spite of the allega-
tions therein, was a third party under Sec 65-0109 NDRC 1943,
as amended by Chapter 355 SL 1949, p 505. The motion was
granted. During the trial an offer of proof was made to prove
the allegations of Paragraph’ 8 which was denied. The jury
brought in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $2065.-
65 which was in excess of the award made by the bureau to Ells-
worth La Duke: Judgment was entered on the verdict. This
appeal is from that judgment.

The defendant specifies as errors the granting of the plaintiff’s
motion to strike out Paragraph 8 of defendant’s amended an-
swer; the refusal to admit evidence to sustain the allegations of
that paragraph; the overruling of the defendant’s motion at the
end of the trial for a directed verdict, and submitting the issues
to the jury. No question is raised as to the amount of the verdict
or the sufficiency of the evidence to.sustain it. The only ques-

a 407
tion here argued and now before the court is whether striking
out the defense alleged in Paragraph 8 of defendant’s amended.
answer was error. A decision on that is controlling on the other
errors assigned.

The defendant, E. W. Wylie Company, -contends that since it
is an employer who has fully complied with the workmen’s com-
pensation law it is immune from liability to the plaintiff; that it
has paid into the fund the amount assessed against it and that
the contributions so made by it became a part of a common fund
from which all awards made by the bureau are paid; that said
fund is made up from premium rates computed upon classifica-
tion of employments. Sec 65-0401 NDRC 1943; that both de-
fendant and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., are engaged in the
same line of business and included in the same classification;
that both the corporations are protected by said act as against
actions for damages by the employees of either of them; that
the employees are entitled only to the compensation provided by
the fund.

Plaintiff on the other hand contends that it is only in cases
where the relationship of employer and employee exists between
the injured employee and the employer that the latter is pro-
tected under the act. Otherwise stated, it is the contention of
plaintiff that any employer other than the one employing the
injured workmen, éven though such employer complies fully with
the terms of the act, is a third person within the purview of Sec
65-0109 NDRC 1943 as amended.

The question for decision is, therefore, whether or not the
defendant, E. W. Wylie Company, is some other person than the
fund who is liable to pay damages in an action at common law
for the injuries occasioned by the ‘negligence of its employees
when the employer and the employee as well as the employer
of the injured employee are all subject to and had fully complied
with the workmen’s compensation act at the time such compensa-
ple injuries were sustained.

Two sections of our workmen’s compensation law are involved
in this controversy. The plaintiff contends that See 65-0108
NDRC 1948 controls the situation in the case at bar. That sec-
tion reads as follows:

478 De

+. “An employér securing the payment of compensation to his
employees by contributing premiums to the furid shall be relieved
thereby of all liability for personal injuries or death sustained
by his employees, and the persons entitled to compensation un-
der the provisions of this title shall have recourse therefor only
to the fund and not to the employer.”

The defendant in support of his. contention cites Sec 65-0428
as ‘amended by Chap 354 SL 1949, which reads as follows:

“Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter
shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law ‘or by
statute for injury to or death of any employee wherever occur-
ring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the
fund.”

The defendant contends that Sec 65-0428 as now amended is
plain and unambiguous and, therefore, is not subject to construc-
tion by the courts. He points out that the statute employs ordi-
nary, plain language when it says that the employer shall not
be liable for damages “for injuries to or death of any employee
wherever occurring during the period covered by the premiums
paid into the fund.”

It will be noted that there is in that language no limitation
on the term, “any employee.” It is not limited to employees of
those who: have paid their premiums to the workmen’s compen-
sation fund. The language of the section does not indicate that
the injury must occur in the course of the employment of the
employee, nor does it limit it to the place of employment. If
an employer or his employee, during the time for which his
premium was paid into the compensation fund, negligently col-
lided with any employee anywhere, he would, according to the
literal meaning of the phrase used, be relieved of liability. Such
literal meaning of the language employed would constitute abso-
lute insurance of such an employer against an action for dam-
ages by any employee. ,
- Such results as would follow the plain language of the section
would greatly enlarge the scope of the workmen’s compensation
act beyond even the intent contended for by the defendants and
would lead to uncontemplated results.

be 479

Sutherland in his work on Statutory Construction, (3d Ed
by Horack) Vol 2, See 4701, p 333, writes :

“Where the intention of the legislature is so apparent from
the face of the statute there can be no question as to the mean-
ing, there is no room for construction.’ Only in this situation
will the court in applying the words of the statute. follow the
rule of literal interpretation. For although many expressions
of approval for the rule may be found in the cases it is perfectly
clear that if the literal import of the words is not consistent with
the legislative intent, or such interpretation leads to absurd
results, the words of the statute will be modified by the intention
of the legislature. The modern cases also indicate that courts
today rather than beginning their inquiry with the formal words
of the act consider from the start the legislative purpose and
intention. This tendency is to be commended for it is more
consonant with the proper judicial use of statutory materials.”

“Where the court is satisfied that adherence to the strict letter
of the law would defeat the object or intent of the legislature it
is the duty of the court to regard the intent of the legislature
even where to do so it is compelled to restrain the letter.” Ver-
mont Loan & Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 ND 82, 49 NW 318.

In Walker v. Haley, 110 Tex 50, 214 SW 295, 5 ALR 1185, it
is said: “It is the intention of a law which is the law, and-once
truly ascertained, it should prevail, even against the strict letter
of the law.”

In Town of Clayton v. Colorado & Southern Railroad Co.,
US Cir Ct of App 10th Cir, 51 Fed2d 977, 82 ALR 417, the court
says:

“Where, however, the language is of doubtful meaning, or
where adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice or
absurdity, or result in contradictory provisions, it devolves
upon the court to ascertain the true meaning. (Citations.) The
general design and purpose of a statute should be kept in mind
and its provisions should be given a fair and reasonable con-
struction with a view to effecting its purpose and object. (Ci-
tations.)”

Our workmen’s compensation act was enacted by the legisla-
ture in 1919 as Chapter 162. Its purpose, as expressed in Sec

480 a

1, was to provide “for workmen injured in hazardous employ-
ments and for families and dependents sure and certain relief”
regardless of fault. All remedies in such cases except those pro-
vided by the act were abolished. This was done because, as the
legislature declared, “the prosperity of the state depends in a
large measure upon the well being of its wage earners.” The
act then provided for a.fund contributed by employers from
which compensation was paid for injuries to employees. For
the certainty of such compensation the employee coming under
the act surrenders his common law right of action for damages
against his employer. The employer coming under the act is
exempted from liability for damages on account of such injuries.
Thus was provided a more certain, speedy and inexpensive relief
for the injured workman than was afforded by the common law
rule of negligence. Industry was made to bear a portion of the
economic loss resulting from the employment itself in which both
employer and employee were engaged as co-adventurers, The
ultimate end is to lighten the burden imposed upon society by
reason of industrial accident and disease.

The conflict, if any, in the two sections involved arises from
the use of the term “his employees” in Sec 65-0108 NDRC 1943
and the use of the words “any employee” in See 65-0428 1949
Supp NDRC 1943 (Chapter 354 SL 1949).

The two phrases in question came into our law at the same
time and as parts of the same statute, Chap 162 SL 1919. Sec-
tion 6 of that act provided that a qualifying employer should:

“be relieved from all liability for personal injuries or death
sustained by his employees”
while Section 9 provided:

“Employers who comply with the provisions of Sections six
and seven shall not be liable to respond in damages at common
law or by statute for injury or death of any employee, . . . .”

It is the duty of the court to so construe a statute as to har-
monize apparently conflicting provisions, if possible. City of
Minot v. Amundson, 22 ND 236, 133 NW 551; State ex rel.
Erickson v. Burr, 16 ND 581, 113 NW 705. Where the statute
contains language that is seemingly contradictory, it should be

Es 481

construed, if possible, to carry out the intent of the legislature.
Ophaug v. Hildre, 77 ND 221, 42 NW2d 438. In determining
this intent the entire act must be considered and the parts there-

_ of taken and compared together. State v. Sheridan County, 72
ND 254, 6 NW2d 51; Coverston v. Grand Forks County, 74 ND
552, 23 NW2d 746; Eddy County v. Wells County, 73 ND 33,
11 NW2d 60; Harding v. City of Dickinson, 76 ND 71, 33 NW2d
626; Murie v. Cavalier County, 68 ND 242, 278 NW 243; City of
Dickinson v. Thress, 69 ND 748, 290 NW 653. One way to as-
certain the intention of the legislature as expressed by certain
words is to find, if possible, where the legislature used the same
words with other context where the legislative intent is plain.
In Gimble v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 77 ND 581, 44 NW
2d 198, we held that where a phrase used in an original act is
repeated with like context in an amendment it is presumed that
the legislature intended to use it in the same sense and with the
same effect in the amendment as in the original act.

Section 65-0429 NDRC 1943, which was formerly Section 12
of the original act, permits employers carrying on non-hazardous
employment to voluntarily comply with and be protected by the
act. Complying employers of this class “shall not be liable to
respond in damages at common law or by statute for injuries
to or the death of any employee, wherever occurring, during the
period covered by such premiums, if the injured employee has
remained in the service of such employer with notice that the
employer has paid into the fund the premiums.provided for un-
der the provisions of this title.” In that context it is clear that
“any employee” means the employee of the insured employer in
whose service the employee is injured.

The general purpose of the act is to protect the employees
coming within the act by: 1. permitting employees of comply-
ing employers to recover from the fund for disabilities suffered
in the course of employment; 2. proceeding against a non-com-
plying employer by bringing a suit for damages in which certain.
defenses are denied the employer (Sec 65-0901 NDRC 1943) or
applying to the bureau for an award of compensation (Sec 65-
0902). In the latter section it is said: “Any employee whose

482 Ee

employer has failed to comply with the provisions of chapter 4”
may apply for an award.

Section 9 of the original act, which states the exemption from
suit accorded to complying employers, uses the term “any em-
ployee” but Section 11 dealing with the liability of non-conform-
ing employers says: “Employers subject to this Act, who shall
fail to comply with the provisions of Sections six and seven
hereof, shall not be entitled to the benefits of this Act during
the period of such non-compliance, but shall be liable to their
employees for damages suffered by reason of injuries sustained
in the course of employment, . . . .”

In Catholic Order of Foresters v. State, 67 ND 228, 271 NW
670, 109 ALR 979, this court said:

“the word ‘any’ is a general word and may have a diversity of
meanings, its meaning in any particular case depending largely
upon the context and subject matter of the statute or instrument
in which it is used.”

The word “any” may generally be said to have a broad and un-
restrictive meaning but the textual exegesis may indicate a re-
stricted connotation. Dowd v. Sullivan, 217 Ind 196, 27 NE2d
82; U.S. v. Weil, 46 Fed Supp 323.

Under Sec 65-0108 the complying employer is relieved of lia-
bility for injuries or death sustained only by his employees and
under Sec 65-0428 an employer who complies with the statute
is relieved only from liability for injury to or death of any em-
ployee of that particular complying employer. This is the only
construction.that is consistent with the statute as a whole and
consistent with the use of the term “any employee” in the next
section, 65-0429, and the use of that term in Sec 65-0902.

Sec 65-0428 was Sec 9 of Chap 162, SL 1919, the original
workmen’s compensation act, and then read as follows:

“Employers who comply with the provisions.of Sections. six
and seven shall not be liable to respond in damages at common
law or by statute for injury or death of any employee, wherever
occurring, during the period covered by such premiums so paid
into the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund, provid-

a 483

ed that this section shall not apply to minors employed in viola-
tion of the law, in which case both remedies shall be applicable.”

If a minor under that proviso elected to sue rather than take
compensation, he certainly could sue only his own employer.
That indicates that the legislature had in mind the relationship
of employer and his employee when it enacted this section. The
reference to Sec 6 (Sec 65-0108) further indicates that the em-
ployer who paid premiums for the protection of his employee as
provided in Sec 6 is the employer referred to in Sec 9 (Sec 65—
0428). The proviso is the only new feature of Sec 9. Clearly
the intent of that section as a whole was that an employer was
not to be held liable in damages for an injury or- death of his
employee unless such employee was an illegally employed minor.

The only change made in Sec 65-0428 by Chap’ 354 SL 1949
was the deletion of the proviso providing that a minor illegally
employed should have either compensation or the right of action
for damages against his employer. That such was the sole in-
tent of the amendment is further shown by the amendment in
the same chapter of subsection 5 of Sec 65-0102 making a minor
“sui juris” for the purposes of the workmen’s compensation act.
That places the minor, whether or not legally employed, in the
same class as any other employee, as far as the workmen’s com-
pensation act is concerned. Clearly no change in the meaning
of See 65-0428 as regards the “employer” was made by Chap
354 SL 1949. That amendment gave the portion retained no
force or effect further than existed prior to the amendment. City
of Fargo v. Ross, 11 ND 369, 92 NW 449. Furthermore, there
was no repealing clause in Chap 354 SL 1949 and no reference
made to Sec 65-0108. Repeals by implication are not favored.
Coulter v. Ramberg, — ND —, 55 NW2d 516, 520.

This court has repeatedly held that the relationship of em-
ployer and employee must exist in order to make the provisions
of, the workmen’s compensation act applicable. See Kronick v.
McLean County, 52 ND 852, 204 NW 839; Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. State, 71 ND 78, 298 NW 773, 138 ALR 1115; Groff v. State,
72 ND 554, 9 NW2d 406; Starkenberg v. Workmen’s Compen-
sation Bureau, 73 ND 234, 18 NW2d 395.

484 |

In Ethen v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau,
62 ND 394, 244 NW 32, this court says:

“Employers making such contributions (to the fund) are not
liable to respond in damages for injuries to their employees.”

The South Dakota court has held that compensation under
workmen’s compensation law is based on relationship of employ-
er and employee. Benson v. Sioux Falls Medical and Surgical
Clinic, 62 SD 324, 252 NW 864; Roush v. Town of Esmond, 73
SD 406, 43 NW2d 547; Schumacher v. Schumacher, 67 SD 46,
288 NW 796.

“The provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are
construed liberally in favor of the workman. The fund is cre-
ated to protect the workman.” Booke v. Workmen’s Compen-
sation Bureau, 70 ND 714, 718, 297 NW 779.

There is no provision anywhere in our statute to indicate that
an employee was deprived of his common law rights to a suit
for damages against anyone except his own employer. An ex-
isting common law right is not to be taken away by statute
unless by direct enactment or necessary implication. King v.
Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass 420, 106 NEE 988, 7 NCCA 254, Ann Cas
1916D 1170. :

Defendant contends as further grounds for his position that
the premiums he pays are commingled into a common fund
“which is used for the payment of expenses of administration
and of all compensable claims of injured employees irrespective
of the amount of premiums which the employer contributes to
such fund.” The provisions of the act providing for the fund do
not support such an inference. Sec 65-0404 NDRC 1943, as
amended by Chapter 338 SL 1945, provides that the employe:
shall pay into the fund annually the amount of premium deter-
mined by the board “based on a portion of the annual expendi-
ture of money by such employer by service of persons subject to
provisions of this title. . . .” Sec 65-0403 NDRC 1943, provides
that the bureau “shall keep an account of the moneys received
from each individual employer and of the amount disbursed
from the fund on account of injuries to and deaths of employees
of each employer.” Sec 65-0417 NDRC 1943 provides that: “The
bureau may establish a system of the experience rating of risks

| 485

of employers contributing to the fund, and such system shall
provide for the credit merit ratimg and the penalty rating of
individual risks within such limitations as the bureau may es-
tablish from time to time.” Sec 65-0429 provides that any em-
ployer carrying on any employment not classified as hazardous
under See 65-0102 who complies with the provisions of the act
and pays the premiums provided “shall not be liable to respond
in damages at common law or by statute for injuries to or the
death of any employee, wherever occurring, during the period
covered by such premiums, if the injured employee has remained
in the service of such employer with notice that the employer
has paid into the fund the premiums provided for under the
provisions of this title.”

The only inference that can be drawn from these provisions
of the act is that the premiums are based upon the risk involved
by each employer and cover the protection provided for his
employees only. Hach employer pays in proportion to his pay-
roll and his accident experience shown in each case.

Defendant also contends that if See 65-0428 is construed as
contended for by the plaintiff “such construction would render
it so discriminatory as to violate the ‘equal privileges and im-
munities clause’ of the state constitution, (Section 20), and the
‘equal protection of law’ clause of the Federal constitution”
(Article 14.) Those clauses have often been passed upon by
the courts. As long as the law operates alike on all members
of a class including all persons similarly situated it is not in
violation of those sections. Classification must be based upon
such differences in situation or purposes between the persons
included in the class and those excluded therefrom as fairly and
naturally suggest the propriety of and necessity for different or
exclusive legislation in the line of the statute in which the classi-
fication appears. “The 14th. amendment does not prohibit rea-
sonable classification of persons and things for the purpose of
legislation but such classification is distinctly contemplated by
the amendment. State may classify person and objects for the
purpose of legislation if the classification is based on proper
and justifiable distinction considering the purpose of the law.”
Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 ND 452, 473,

486 es

238 NW 552, 78 ALR 1338. See also’ Vermont Loan & Trust
Co. v. Whithed, 2 ND 82, 94, 49 NW 818; Peterson v. Panovitz,
62 ND 828, 243 NW 798, 84 ALR 1290; 71 CJ Workmen’s Com-
pensation Acts, Sec 28, p 280, 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, See
552, p 1111; 12 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, Sec 478, p 144.

Sec 65-0428 when construed as contended for by plaintiff puts
all employers and employees under the act in two classes. First
is the class of the employers who pay premiums for the protec-
tion the workmen’s compensation law guarantees them with
regard to their own employees. Such premiums may differ
because of the difference in payroll and risk but each employer
similarly situated is treated the same with regard to his own
employees. In that class the employer is exempted from actions
for damages by his employees. The employees are protected by
compensation. The other class is that of employers and their
employees who are liable for negligently causing injury or death
to employees of others than themselves and thus become liable
for damage actions as a third party under Chapter 355 SL 1949.
That applies equally to all employers and employees similarly
situated. Thus the law makes a fair and justifiable distinction
between the two classes considering the purpose of the law and
gives equal protection of the law to each class.

All of the states in the union, and Alaska, Puerto Rico and
Hawaii now have workmen’s compensation acts and all but two
provide that “when compensable injury is the result of a third
person’s tortious conduct the right of action against the tort
feasor is preserved. The compensation system was not designed
to attain immunity to strangers. 2 Larson Workmen’s Compen-
sation Law. Third Party Actions, Sec 71, p 165. . . . In most

* jurisdictions the concept of ‘third persons’ against whom com-
mon law actions may be brought for compensable injuries in-
cludes all persons other than the injured persons or employer.”
2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Taw, Third Party Actions,
Sec 72, p 170.

However, by statute in some states some limitation has been
prescribed in regard to bringing suits against other-persons than
the employer. Tn Alabama a third party under the act is liable
only up to the amount of the compensation payable. 2 Larson’s

Le 487

Workmen’s Compensation Law, Third Party Actions, Sec 72.40
p 182. In Illinois the statute provides that an employee who
suffers a compensable injury under circumstances creating a
legal liability in some third person has no right of action against
such third person if the employer and third person were cov-
ered by the act. Such right is transferred by law to his employer
who may recover only the amount of the compensation paid.
Chapter 48, Sec 166 Illinois Revised Statutes, 1945 p 1659; 1
Schneider Workmen’s Compensation Law, Who Comes Under
the Act? Secs 44,45 p 339. Washington goes the furthest of all.
Neither the employer nor the employee may sue any other em-
ployer or employee subject to the compensation act. Washing-
ton Compensation Law, Sec 7675, 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law, Third Party Actions, Sec 72.40, p 182.

Minnesota has provided that if all parties, the employee, the
employer and tort feasor are under the act and if the tort feasor
and employer were engaged at the time of the injury in the
furtherance of a common enterprise and related purposes the
tort feasor’s liability is limited in damages to the amount of
compensation provided under the compensation act. The Min-
nesota decisions cited by defendant come under that, provision.
The Minnesota court has found some difficulties in defining
“common enterprise” and “related purposes.” Those provisions,
however, are not in our statute and the cases cited are, therefore,
not applicable. Court decisions from those states are not in-
point under our law. .

In former opinions of this court it is indicated that the North
Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Law was modeled on the Ohio
law. State ex rel. Woods v. Hughes Oil Co., 58 ND 581, 601,
226 NW 586; Fahler v. Minot, 49 ND 960, 977, 194 NW 695; State
ex rel. Dushek v. Watland, 51 ND 710, 720, 39 ALR 1169, 201
NW 680.

The Ohio Workmen’s Compensation Act pr ovides:

“Bmployers who comply with the provisions of Section 1465-
69 shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or
by statute, . . . for any injury,.disease or bodily condition,
whether such injury, disease or bodily condition is compensable
under this act or not, or for any death resulting from-such in-

488: ee

jury, disease or bodily condition, of any employee, wherever
occurring, during the period covered by such premium so. paid
into the state insurance fund or during the interval of time in
which such employer is permitted to pay such compensation
direct to his injured or the dependents of his killed employees as
herein provided.” Sec 1465-70 Throckmorton’s Ohio Code, 1940,
Title 3, Chap 10, p 758.

The language of our Sec 65-0428 reads much as if it had been
borrowed from the italicized part of this section. The Ohio
courts have, however, construed that section to apply only to
an employer and his employee.

In the case of Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Company v. Shachoy-
sky, 111 Ohio St 791, 146 NE 306, Shachovsky had been injured
while working on the premises of the Trumbull Cliffs Furnace
Company by the negiligence of the furnace company. He was
himself an employee of the Truscon Steel Co. Both companies
had complied with the workmen’s compensation act. Shachovsky
applied for and- accepted compensation under the act and then
brought action against the furnace company. The defendant
pleaded as a complete defense a compliance with the workmen’s
compensation act by itself and the independent contractor and
the acceptance of compensation by the employee. The court
held that the constitutional and statutory enactments did not
deprive an employee of an action against a third person whose
negligence caused him to be injured in the course of his employ-
ment even though he had accepted compensation under the act
and even though the third person sued was an employer who had
complied with the act.

This holding was confirmed in the case of Ohio Public Service
Conipany v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St 586, 160 NE 687, 27 NCCA
833. In that case an employee of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Company was fatally injured in the performance of‘ his duties
by the employee of the Ohio Public Service Co. Both companies
were insured under the Ohio Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The deceased man’s widow applied for and received compensa-
tion under the act. The administrator of the deceased man’s
estate brought an action against the Ohio Public Service Co.
Recovery was allowed.

EE 489

In Herbruck v. Burger Iron Company, 44 Ohio App 475, 186
NE 872, the court said:

“. . the injured employee who received such compensation
was not deprived of his common-law action against the party
responsible for his injury unless the circumstances were such
as to create the relation of master and servant between them,
even though the party sued had complied with the Workmen’s
Compensation Law for the benefit of his employees,-. . ”
See also Arnold v. Ohio Gas & Hlectrie Co., 28 Ohio App “434,
162 NE 765.

Other states not having the specific provision of Alabama,
Illinois and Washington regarding third party suit have also
held along the same line as the Ohio Court. In Harbour v.
Graham Mfg. Co. (Texas Civ App) 47 SW2d 700, it was held:

“Where employee of independent contractor was electrocuted
by defective light cord furnished by defendant’s employees, em-
ployee’s dependents could proceed against defendant for dam-
ages for death of employee, notwithstanding defendant was sub-
scriber to compensation law.”

In Moeser y. Shunk, 116 Kan 247, 226 Pac 784, the court, re-
ferring to a statute similar to our Sec 65-0109 SL 1949, p 505,
said:

“The statute does not attempt in any way to determine the
rights or liability of the employee in respect to a person not his
employer. It does not repeal the statute providing for an ac-
tion for wrongful death (RS 60-3203), nor does it take away
from an employee his common-law right of action for injury to
the person against one not his employer who by negligence has
caused the death or injury.” See also Bristol Telephone Com-
pany v. Weaver, 146 Tenn 511, 243 SW 299.

In Smale v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 160 Wis 331, 151 NW
803, the plaintiff, an employee of the Andrae Company, was sent
to the shop of the Washer Company to do some work, and while
doing the work was seriously injured by reason of the negli-
gence of the Washer Company. Both Andrae Company and the
‘Washer Company were under the workmen’s compensation act.
The defendant there as here contended that since it and the
plaintiff’s employer were both subject to the provisions of the

490 |

workmen’s compensation act it was not liable to an action at law.
The court in disposing of this contention said:

“The claim cannot.be sustained. The purpose and effect of
the workmen’s compensation act is to control and regulate the
relation between an employer and his employee. As between
them the.remedies there provided are exclusive when both are
under the act at the tine of the accident.”

Construing our whole act according to the rules of constrne-
tion, reconciling apparently conflicting terms in the two sections
of the law here involved and having in mind the purpose of the
act as hereinbefore expressed we believe that the legislative in-
tent was that both See 65-0108 and Sec 65-0428 apply only to
an employer and his employee. We conclude, therefore, that the
ruling of the district court in excluding the defense set forth in
Paragraph 8 of defendant’s amended answer was correct. It
follows that the court’s rulings on the motion for directed verdict
and submitting the case to a jury were also correct.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morais, Ch. J., and Burg, J., concur.

Curistianson, J. (concurring). This controversy involves the
application or construction of NDRC 1943, 65-0428 as amended.
by Laws 1949, Chapter 354, a section of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Law of this state, which reads as follows:

“Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter
shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by
statute for injury to or death of any employee, wherever occur-
ring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the
fund.”

The above section was embodied in the original act (Laws
1919, Ch.162, Sec 9), although as pointed out in the opinion pre-
pared by Judge Grimson a provision in the original act that
this section should not be applicable to minors employed in vio-
lation of law was eliminated by the amendment made by Ch 354,
Laws 1949.

The Workmen’s Compensation Law was first enacted in this
state as Chapter 162, Laws 1919. It was entitled:

|

| 491

“An Act Creating the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Fund, for the Benefit of Employees Injured and the De-
pendents of Employees Killed in Hazardous Employment; Fix-
ing the Duties and Liabilities of Employees and Employers;
Creating the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau and prescribing
its Powers and Duties; Providing for Expenditures Hereunder
and Limiting the Amount Thereof; and Making an Appropria-
tion Therefor.”

The Act provided that whenever used in the Act:

“Jazardous employment’ means any employment in which
one or more employees are regularly employed in the same busi-
ness, or in or about the same establishment, except agriculture
and domestic service, and any common carrier by steam railroad.

“ imployee’ means every person engaged in a hazardous em-
ployment under any appointment or contract of hire, or appren-
ticeship express or implied, oral or written, including aliens,
and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully em-
ployed, but excluding any person whose employment is both cas-
ual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or
occupation of his employer.” Laws 1919, Ch 162, Sec 2; NDRC
1948, 65-0102(4-5).

“It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to
employ anyone, or to receive the fruits of the labor of any per-
son, in a hazardous employment as defined in this chapter, when
such employee is not protected by workmen’s compensation in-
surance in full force and effect. The bureau, by proper applica-
tion to-the courts of this state, may enjoin the unlawful employ-
ment of uninsured workers.” NDRC 1943, 65-0105.

“An employer securing the payment of compensation by con-
tributing premiums to the Workmen’s Compensation Fund shall
thereby be relieved from all liability for personal injuries or
death sustained by his employees and the persons entitled. to
compensation under this Act shall have recourse therefor only
to the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund and not
to the employer.” Laws 1919, Ch 162, Sec 6; NDROC 1948, 65-
0108. .

- While certain changes have been made in the Workmen’s Com-

492 De

pensation Act the above provisions were contained in the origi-
nal act and have been retained without substantial change.

The Workmen’s Compensation Law in force at all times in-
volved in this controversy provided:

“‘Injury’ shall mean only an injury arising in the course of
employment including an injury caused by the willful act of a
third person directed against an employee because of his: em-
ployment, but such term shall not include an injury caused by
the employee’s willful intention to injure himself or to injure
another, nor any injury caused by the voluntary intoxication of
the employee. Such term, in addition to an injury by accident,
shall include:

a. Any disease which can be fairly traceable to the employ-
ment.” NDRC 1943, 65-0102(8).

“Where one performs service for another for a remuneration,
whether the same is paid as a salary, commission, or otherwise,
the person performing such service is presumed to be an em-
ployee of the person for whom the services are performed until
the contrary is shown.” NDROC 1943, 65-0103.

The law further provides that an employer who is subject to
the provisions of the act and who fails to comply with the provi-
sions thereof so as to secure the payment of compensation to his
employees by contributing the prescribed premiums shall not be
entitled to the benefits of the law during the period of noncom-
pliance, “but shall be liable to his employees for damages suf-
fered by reason of injuries sustained in the course of employ-
ment, and also shall be liable to the personal representatives
of such employees where death results from such injuries. The
employer shall not avail himself in such action of the following
common law defenses: 1. The defense of the fellow-servant
rule; 2. The defense of the assumption of risk; or 3. The defense
of contributory negligence. The employer shall be liable for
the premiums provided for in this title.” NDRC 1948, 65-0901.
And that any employee whose employer has failed to comply
with the provisions of the law so as to secure payment of com-
pensation to the employee under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, who shall be injured in the course of his employment, in
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action may file

| 493

an application with the Bureau for an award of compensation;
that the Bureau shall hear and determine such application for
compensation in like manner as in any other claims before the
Bureau; that.the Bureau may make an award and that if the
employer fails to pay the award then judgment may be entered
thereon in the district court for the amount of the award and
that upon such final judgment being rendered against the em-
ployer the employee shall be entitled to compensation for such
injury to be paid from the general fund of the Bureau. NDRO
1948, 65-0904.

In construing Workmen’s Compensation Acts it has been held
by the courts generally that in the absence of controlling stat-
utes to the contrary an injured person or his dependents are
entitled to compensation only if he is an employee, workman or
servant of his employer at the time of the accident or injury.
71 CJ 420. Sce, also, 58 Am Jur Workmen’s Compensation, p
665. And the holdings of this Court are to the same effect. As
said in the opinion prepared by Judge Grimson:

“This Court has repeatedly held that the relationship of em-
ployer and employee must exist in order to make the provisions
of the workmen’s compensation act applicable. See Kronick v.
McLean County, 52 ND 852, 204 NW 839; Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. State, 71 ND 78, 298 NW 773; Groff v. State, 72 ND 554, 9
NW2d 406; Starkenberg vy. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau,
73 ND 234, 13 NW2d 395.”

In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, supra, this Court said: “The
relationship of employer and employee must exist in order to
make the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act...
applicable.” In Starkenberg v. Workmen’s Compensation Bu-
reau, supra, this Court said:

“The relation of employer and employee must exist in order
to render the North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Fund
liable for compensation benefits. The Fund is not liable for in-
juries sustained by an independent contractor.”

I agree that Sec 65-0428, supra, applies only in cases between
an employer and his employee, and that the words “any em-
ployee” in such section have reference only to a person who
sustains the relationship of an employee to the person or con-

494 |

cern claimed to be the employer. Indeed, I do not see how any
other meaning can be attributed to it without ignoring the plain
purpose and design of the statute and giving to the words “any
employee” a meaning and intent inharmonious with the design
and purpose of the act as evidenced by the statute considered
asawhole. The legislative intention and purpose is to be deter-
mined from general consideration of the whole act with refer-
ence to the subject matter to which it applies and the particular
topic to which the language in question is found. 59 CJ 993;
Crawford Statutory Construction p 261.

“The act must be interpreted as a whole, and not by taking
single words here and there to determine its true meaning.”
In Re Milwaukee Chapter, Izaak Walton League of America,
et al, 194 Wis 437, 440-441, 216 NW 493, 495.

“In construing statute, court will not take detached sentences
or sections, but take statute by its four corners, the better to
ascertain intent of the lawmakers.” (Syllabus, par 6) State v.
Lee Chue, 130 Ore 99, 100, 279 Pac 285.

American Jurisprudence says:

“A statute is not open to construction as a matter of course.
It is open to construction only where the language used in the
statute requires interpretation, that is, where the statute is am-
biguous, or will bear two or more constructions, or is of such
doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable minds might be
uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. Where the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and
definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules
of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look
for or impose another meaning. In the case of such unambi-
guity, it is the established policy of the courts to regard the stat-
ute as meaning what it says, and to avoid giving it any other
construction than that which its words demand. The plain and
obvious meaning of the language used is not only the safest
guide to follow in construing it, but it has been presumed con- .
clusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute expresses
the legislative intention, so that such plain and obvious provi-
sions must control. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be
applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for

| 495

itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and
tends only to obscurity.” 50 Am Jur pp 204-207.

It seems to me that when the Workmen’s Compensation Law
is considered as a whole the meaning of the words “any em-
“ployee” in Sec 65-0428, supra, is so apparent that there can be
no question as to their meaning in the enactment.

I agree that the statute as so construed and applied is in no
sense violative of Sec 20 of the Constitution of the State of North
Dakota or Art 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.

I concur in an affirmance of the judgment.

I concur in the foregoing opinion by Judge Curistianson.

Saruze, J.

Le
[File No. 7335]

ERNEST KINNISCHTZEKE, Respondent, v. CITY OF GLEN
ULLIN, a municipal corporation, Appellant. |

(57 NWe2d 588)

Opinion filed Jan. 8, 1958, On Rehearing Mar. 25, 1953

L.J. Boutrous and Higgins & Donahue, for appellant,

498 a

J.K. Murray and W. J. Austin, for respondent.

ee 499

Morais, Ch. J. This is an action for damages against the City
of Glen Ullin based upon negligent injury to plaintifi’s property.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff owns 640 acres of
land approximately one-half mile from the City of Glen Ullin
and maintains thereon his home and residence for his family.
It is then alleged that the defendant carelessly and negligently
operates its sewer system and cesspool and by reason of such
negligence causes the city sewage and offal to be discharged
into a creek which flows through and adjacent to the plaintiff's
premises and that the sewage has polluted the water in the creek
and has piled up on the banks thereof adjacent to plaintiff's
premises and home, causing a nauseating stench that has greatly
damaged the plaintiff personally, and injured the value of the
premises; that plaintiffs livestock drink the water from said
ereek and that as a result of the pollution the plaintiff’s cattle
have become greatly emaciated and reduced in value.

The defendant answered with a general denial and further
answering the complaint admitted that it maintains arid oper-
ates a sewage system for the treatment of sewage and waste
which flows into a creek running across plaintiff's farm. It
states that in so doing it acts entirely in a governmental ca-
pacity and in the performance of a governmental function; that
it acts pursuant to the laws of the State of North Dakota and-

500 —

in accordance with approved engineering standards and in ac-
cordance with the plans and specifications approved by the state
board -of health; that the sewage passes through an Imhoff
septic tank where it is properly treated before being discharged;
and that the defendant operates the sewage system in a prudent
and lawful manner. The defendant also alleges that the plain-
tiff purchased his land with actual knowledge of the sewage
system of the City of Glen Ullin and its manner of discharge and
that the farm and lands have not decreased in value since his
purchase thereof and that by virtue of his purchase of the farm
with such knowledge he is now estopped from alleging or claim-
ing damages due to the proper operation of the defendant’s
sewage system.

The case was tried to a jury anda verdict returned in favor
of the plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered December
7,1951. On December 11, 1951, the defendant moved for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. This motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated January 15, 1952. On June 7,
1952, the defendant caused to be served on the plaintiff’s attor-
ney and filed with the clerk of the district court a notice of appeal
from the judgment entered on December 7, 1951. No appeal was
taken from the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The record in this case involves an important question of
practice which affects the scope of our review. The plaintiff
and respondent herein contends that the order denying the
defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is an appealable order and that, no appeal having been taken
therefrom and the order being now final, the sufficiency of the
evidence which was challenged by the motion cannot now be
considered by this court on appeal from the judgment.

A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict can only
be entertained when at the trial the moving party asked the
trial court for a directed verdict and was denied. A motion for
judgment notwithstanding ‘the verdict, in effect, reviews the
court’s ruling in denying a previous motion for a directed ver-
dict and thus brings before the trial court for the second time
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict

ee 501

adverse to the moving party. Bormann v. Beckman, 73. ND 720,
19 NW2d 455; Ennis v. Retail Merchants Association Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 83 ND 20, 156 NW 234; Olson v. Ottertail Power
Co., 65 ND 46, 256 NW 246, 95 ALR 418; Weber v. United Hard-
ware & Implement Mutuals Co., 75 ND 581, 31 NW2d 456.

In a number of cases prior to 1934 this court held that an
order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict is not an appealable order. Turner v. Crumpton, 25 ND
184, 141 NW 209; Houston v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 25 ND 469, 141 NW 994, 46 LRA NS 589,
Ann Cas 1915C 529; Starke v. Wannemacher, 32 ND 617, 156
NW 494, 4 ALR 167; Welch Manufacturing Co. v. Herbst De-
partment Store, 53 ND 42, 204 NW 849; Stratton v. Rosenquist,
37 ND 116, 163 NW 723; Gray v. Elder, 61 ND 672, 240 NW
477. In Welch Manufacturing Co. v. Herbst Department Store,
supra, it was held that under the provisions of Chapter 335
SLND 1923, where a motion for a directed verdict has been de-
nied and the moving party thereafter moves in the alternative
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial
and the court denies the motion for judgment but grants or
denies the motion for new trial, the moving party may appeal
from the whole order and have the ruling on the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict reviewed in the supreme
court.

In 1934 this court decided :

“A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which
is not coupled with an alternative motion for a new trial, cannot
be made after the judgment is entered.” Olson v. Ottertail Pow-
er Co., 65 ND 46, 256 NW 246, 95 ALR 418,

Following this decision, the legislature, by the enactment of
Chapter 245 SLND 1935, provided that:

“An order for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may also
be made on a motion in the alternative form asking therefor, or
if the same be denied, for a new trial. Such motion, singly or in
the alternative, may be made either before or after entry of
judgment,” thus establishing by statute that a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the yerdict might be made either be-

‘502 —— Es

fore or after the judgment was entered. This statute also pro-
vided that:

“Tf the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be
denied, the Supreme Court, on appeal from the judgment, may
order judgment to be entered, when it appears from the testi-
mony that a verdict should have been so directed; and it may also
so order on appeal from the whole order denying such motion
when made in the alternative form whether a new trial was
granted or denied by such order.”

This language also appears in Chapter 220 SLND 1945 (Section
28-1509 1949 Supp NDRC). After the enactment of this statute
we continued to hold that an order denying a motion for a judg-
ment notwithstanding a verdict is not an appealable order.
Stormon v. District Court, 76 ND 713, 38 NW(2d) 785.

It is of more than passing interest to note that in Kinney v.
Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 15 ND 21, 106 NW 44, this
court held that it is a proper and commendable practice to in-
clude in a single notice of appeal an appeal from a judgment
and an appeal from an order made after judgment denying a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new
trial.

The practice question with which we are now concerned arises
under Chapter 204 SLND 1951, purporting to amend and re-
enact Section 28-1510 NDRC 1943, as.amended by Chapter 220
SLND 1945, and Section 28-1511 NDRC 1943, so that these
sections now read as follows:

“28-1510. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT OR FOR JUDGMENT IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. In deny-
ing a motion for a directed verdict the court shall be deemed to
have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later deter-
mination of the questions of law raised by the motion. Within
ten days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has moved
for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment not-
withstanding the verdict entered in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict, or if a verdict was not returned such
party, within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may

|

ee 503

move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
may be joined with an alternative motion for a new trial. If
a verdict was returned, the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed. If no verdict was returned, the court may
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had
been directed or may order a new trial.” .

“28-1511. ORDERS SEPARATELY REVIEWABLE ON
APPEAL. The supreme court, without a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, or a motion in the alternative for
such judgment or for a new trial, first made in the trial court,
may review the ruling on the motion for a directed verdict on
appeal from the judgment, and may order judgment to be en-
tered when it appears from the testimony that a verdict should
have been so directed. It also may so order on appeal from an
order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, or on appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment
in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict if no ver-
dict was returned. On appeal from an order made upon a motion
in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
for a new trial the court shall review the whole order and may
reverse, affirm, or modify the order as to any and all parties.”
(Italics supplied.)

The meaning of the italicized language of the last section
above quoted becomes plain when we transpose the phrases so
astoread: “The supreme court on appeal from an order deny-
ing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may
review the ruling on the motion for directed verdict and may
order judgment to be entered when it appears from the testi-
mony that a verdict should have been so directed.”

‘Where a motion for a directed verdict has first been made,
the supreme court on an appeal from the judgment may review
the evidence, and when it appears therefrom that a verdict
should have been directed by the trial court, the supreme court
may order the entry of such a judgment as would have resulted
had the jury been properly directed.’ This was the law under
Chapter 220 SLND 1945. The new statute made no change in

504 —

this respect. The change comes in the provision that the su-
preme court “also may so order on appeal from an order denying
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or on appeal
from an.order denying a motion for judgment in accordance
with the motion for a directed verdict if no verdict was returned.”
This language clearly vests in the supreme court on an appeal
from an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict the same power to review the evidence and order
judgment as it has on an appeal from the judgment, provided a
motion for a directed verdict has been.properly made. The
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be made
pursuant to the provisions of the preceding section (28-1510, as
set forth in Chapter 204 SLND 1951). which now provides:

“Within-ten days after the reception of.a verdict, a party who
has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict
and any judgment entered thereon set-aside and to have judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict entered in accordance with
his motion. for a directed verdict, or if a verdict was not re-
turned such party, within ten days after the jury has been dis-
charged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion
for a directed verdict.”

The motion made by the defendant did not comply ‘with the
statute. It did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by
proper specifications thereof and madé no reference to the motion
for a directed verdict: “A motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict reviews only the court’s ruling in denying a motion
for a directed verdict, . .. .”. Westerso v. City of Williston, 77
ND 251, 42 NW2d 429. See also Weber v. United Hardware and
Implement Mutuals Co., 75 ND 581, 31 NW2d 456; Bormann v.
Beckman, 73 ND 720, 19 NW2d 455; Ennis v. Retail Merchants
Association Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 33 ND 20, 156 NW 234. The
defendant’s motion was a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in name only. It did not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence-or seek a review of the trial court’s action in deny-
ing defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. This is the view
taken by the trial court, who stated in his order denying the
motion for judgment ‘notwithstanding the verdict: “that no
challenge was made to the sufficiency of the evidence; that said

ee 505

motion embraced only errors committed at the trial and the re-
fusal of the Court to grant defendant’s ‘motion for dismissal
cand that no specifications of error were embraced in the mo-
tion showing that the verdict was contrary to law, ... .”

The only function of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is to review the ruling on the motion for directed
verdict. The defendant’s motion sought no such review and was
anullity. Its denial did not render the question of the sufficiency
of the evidence res adjudicata, as the respondent contends. The
failure of the defendant to appeal from the order denying its mo-
tion does not preclude a review on this appeal of the sufficiency
of the evidence as challenged by the motion for a directed verdict
or limit in any way the scope of this review.

At the close of the testimony and after both sides had rested
the defendant moved for a directed verdict on two grounds—
first, that the plaintiff could not recover against the city for the
negligent operation of its sewage plant, since in operating the
plant the city was engaged ‘in a governmental function; and,
second, that there was no competent evidence of damage or
detriment to plaintiff’s farm in that the evidence failed to show
the fair and reasonable market value of the farm at the time it
was acquired’ by. the- plaintiff and no evidence: showing loss in
value or detriment during the period it was owned by the plain-
tiff and up to the time of the commencement of the action. The
defendant predicates error on the denial of its motion for a
directed verdict.

In support of its contention that the plaintiff cannot maintain
an action based entirely upon negligence in the maintenance and
operation of the sewer system, defendant cites Mayer v. Studer
& Manion Co., 66 ND 190, 262 NW 925; and Hamilton v. City of
Bismarck, 71 ND 321, 300 NW 631. The former case involved
an appeal ‘from an order overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's
complaint which alleged that the county and the state highway
commission negligently directed, consented to, and permitted
the construction of a highway grade and culvert that was so
defective that it stopped the natural flow of flood waters and
caused them to back up and spread on the plaintiffs land. In

506 —

the opinion we pointed out that Section 14.of the state constitu-
tion provides that:

“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into
court for the owner, . .. .”

Then we said:

“Where the State or an agency thereof acting in a sovereign
capacity takes or damages private property for public use with-
out legal exercise of the power of eminent domain, the aggrieved’
party may recover compensation for the property thus taken
or compensation for the damage to his property thus inflicted.”
But we also said:

“The appellant further contends that the county is not liable
for negligence and that the complaint in this action is based
upon negligence and not upon an obligation arising from the
exercise by the county of its sovereign power to take or damage
private property for public use. The respondent argues that
the complaint is capable of being construed as asking for the
recovery of compensation for property damaged by the county
in its sovereign capacity and that if all allegations of negligence
be disregarded the complaint still states a cause of action. We
do not agree with the respondent. A careful reading of the
complaint impels us to hold that the cause of action sought to be
stated is based wholly upon the careless and negligent con-
struction of the highway and culvert and not upon an obligation
to compensate for private property taken or damaged for public
use. The demurrer must be sustained.”

The foregoing is in accord with the well established principle
that the state may not be sued in its own courts without its con-
sent. Dunham Lumber Oo. v. Gresz, 70 ND 455, 295 NW 500;
Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 ND 603, 200 NW 524; State ex rel, Shafer
v. Lowe, 54 ND 637, 210 NW 501; Watland v. North Dakota
Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 58 ND 303, 225 NW. 812.

In Hamilton vy. City of Bismarck, supra, after quoting from
Mayor v. Studer & Manion Co., we said:

“Thus, we distinguish between an action for damages based
upon negligence and an action based upon damage to private
property for public use within the purview of Section 14 of the

ee 807

Constitution. That section of the Constitution does not bear
upon damages resulting from negligence of public corporations
or their agents; it deals with those damages that would normally
flow from the exercise of the power of eminent domain.”

This court has taken a liberal view of the right of recovery
by one whose property has been damaged by the deliberate and
purposeful action of a municipality while engaged in a govern-
mental function. See Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 ND 568,
3 NW2d 241; Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 ND 592, 3 NW
2d 808; Conlon v. City of Dickinson, 72 ND 190, 5 NW2d 411,
142 ALR 525.

In Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, supra, we said:

“The provisions of section 14 of the Constitution are not re-
stricted to eminent domain proceedings. They are applicable
as well where private property has been taken or damaged with-
out the consent of the owner, and where no condemnation pro-
ceeding has been brought. It is well settled that in such case the
constitutional guaranty may be invoked, and the owner may
maintain an action to recover just compensation for the property
taken or the damage inflicted.”

The plaintiff relies upon our decision in Messer v. City of
Dickinson, supra, and quotes copiously from our opinion. The
majority of this court therein said:

“In this case, the city had legislative authority to empty its
sewage into the river but that authority was limited by the duty
resting upon the city to exercise its authority in a reasonable
manner and to take all reasonable precautions against damaging
private property. By casting its sewage into the river with im-
proper and insufficient treatment for a long period of time, the
city was remiss in its duty and it may not now rely upon its legis-
lative immunity to protect it from responding in damages.”

Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the syllabus, it is said:

“A legislative grant of power to a municipality to do acts
which may result in injury if improperly or negligently per-
formed does not immunize the municipality against responding
in damages for acts performed negligently or in an unreasonable
manner.” .

The action in Messer v. City of Dickinson was one for damages

“

508 Le

for maintaining a nuisance. Recovery was: sought under the
law of nuisances and not that of general negligence or general
liability of the municipality for the commission of a tort. In
addition to the cases cited in Messer v. City of Dickinson we
find similar authority in City of Temple v. Mitchell (Tex Civ
App) 180 SW2d 959; Gray v. City of High Point, 203 NC 756,
166 SE 911.

Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan 206, 53 P2d 798, in-
volved the sufficiency of a petition alleging that the city con-
structed a sewer system emptying into a stream and then so
negligently operated it as to damage the plaintiffs. The court
says:

“Assuming those facts to be proved, it would be no defense to
the city that the construction and maintenance of a sewer is a
governmental function.

“Appellant insists there is no allegation of nuisance in the
petition. The word ‘nuisance’ has been said to be incapable of
precise definition. Literally nuisance means annoyance, and
any use of property which endangers life or health, gives offense
to the senses, violates the laws of decency or obstructs reason-
able and comfortable use of property may be said to be a nui-
sance. . . . While the plaintiffs did not plead a conclusion
and state that the facts alleged constituted a nuisance, they did
allege the city had so operated the sewers, sewage-disposal
plant and the waste therefrom that the waters in the stream
bordering their property were polluted, and an obnoxious and
nauseating stench arose therefrom, etc. We think the allega-
tions of the petition were sufficient to state a nuisance existed.”

In this case the complaint alleges:

“That the plaintiff owns and operates said farm and maintains
livestock thereon, including cattle, and maintains his home and
residence thereof where he and his family reside; that the de-
fendant carelessly and negligently operates and maintains its
said sewage system and its said cesspool and by reason of such
negligence causes the city sewage and offal to flow into said
flowing creek; that said sewage and offal from said city has
polluted said flowing water in said creek which flows through
and adjacent to said premises of the plaintiff, and has caused

ee 509

sewage to pile up on the banks of said creek adjacent to the plain-
tiff’s said premises and his said home; that said sewage causes
a nauseating stench which has greatly damaged the plaintiff
personally and greatly injured the value of his said premises;
that plaintiff's livestock drink water from said creek and as a
result the said sewage as aforesaid has caused the plaintiff’s
said cattle to be greatly emaciated and reduced in value; that by
reason of such nauseating stench and odor from such sewage life
on the plaintiff’s said farm is unbearable; that by reason of the
aforesaid facts plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $10,-
060.00.”

A municipality differs somewhat in the nature of its creation
and operation from the state and its political subdivisions, such
as counties. Article X of the North Dakota Constitution pro-
vides for county organization which is set forth therein in con-
siderable detail, including provisions for the election of certain
county officials. Duties and limitations of the legislative as-
sembly with respect to counties are also prescribed. Much
greater authority with respect to municipal corporations is
vested in the legislative assembly by Article VI, which provides:

“The legislative assembly shall provide by general law for
the organization of municipal corporations restricting their
powers to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money and
contracting debts, and money raised by taxation, loan or assess-
ment for any purpose shall not be diverted to any other purpose
except by authority of law.”

The legislature has given to municipalities the authority to es-
tablish and maintain sewer systems. Section 40-2202 NDRG
1943. When necessary a municipality may conduct its sewage
beyond the municipal limits and may, by purchase or condemna-
tion proceedings, acquire private property over which to con-
struct the sewer. Section 40-2203 NDRC 1943. As we held in
Messer v. City of Dickinson, supra, the legislature, by these
provisions, did not sanction acts of a municipality resulting in
private damage where that damage was not the inherent result
of the exercise of statutory authority, but resulted from the
manner in which that authority was exercised. This is in ac-

510 — es

cordance with the general rule which is thus stated in McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, 38rd Eid Section 53.49:

“A municipality may not itself create and maintain a nuisance
which results in injury to person, or inflicts or involves damage
to private property, without subjecting itself to civil liability
for its wrongful and unlawful act. This is true, as a general rule,
regardless of the fact whether or not the thing done or omitted
resulting in the nuisance constituted negligence; and moreover
the municipality cannot escape liability on the ground that the
construction was authorized by statute, or that improvement
plans were adopted by the city engineer, or that in performing
the work the municipality was exercising a governmental func-
tion.”

Negligence may or may not result in the creation of a nuisance,
and, on the other hand, a nuisance may be created wholly without
negligence. The distinction is set out in 39 Am Jur Nuisances,
Section 4, thus: “liability for negligence is based on a want of
proper care, while, ordinarily, a person who creates or maintains
a nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to others regardless
of the degree of care or skill exercised to avoid such injury.”

In Bates v. City of Houston -(Tex Civ App) 189 SW2d 17, it is
said:

“Where negligence reaches the level that it becomes the main-
tenance of a nuisance it becomes a tort different in character
from mere negligence.”

Negligent operation of a septic tank may result in a nuisance
which renders the municipality liable. Newton v. City of Round-
up, 60 Mont 24, 198 P 441, 20 NCCA 885; City of Tecumseh v.
Deister, 112 Okla 3, 239 P 582.

MeQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed Section 53. 131,
has this to say:

“Although the authorities are in conflict upon the question
as to whether the operation of a sewage disposal plant is a
governmental or a proprietary function, the prevailing view
seems to be that a municipality may be held liable for death or
injury resulting from negligent or other tort in the operation of
such a plant. Likewise, irrespective of negligence, and even

— bil

though it is constructed and maintained under statutory author-
ity or in the performance of a governmental function, a munic-
ipal corporation may be held liable if a nuisance results from
operation and maintenance of a septic tank, or other sewage
disposal system.”

We reach the conclusion that where a municipality purposely
or negligently so operates a sewage disposal plant that it becomes
a nuisance which results in injury to property, the municipality
is liable for damages in an amount sufficient to compensate for
the injury.

Defendant’s second ground of attack upon the verdict and
judgment is based upon the contention that the plaintiff failed to
prove damages. It is claimed that there is no showing of the
fair market value of the farm at the time of its purchase by the
plaintiff and no competent evidence showing loss of value.

Plaintiff and other witnesses testified that the defendant’s
sewage disposal plant which consisted of an Imhoff tank was
located about one-half mile west of plaintiff’s land and that the
tank discharged into a ereek that ran across plaintifi’s farm.
The plaintiff bought the land November 1, 1950, and did not
notice any sewage pollution at that time. The stream runs
through plaintiff’s pasture in which, in the summer time, he
keeps nineteen cows. Plaintiff described in some détail the
pollution of the creek as the result of the discharge of sewage
from the Imhoff tank. He testified that he paid $37.00 an acre
for the farm, or about $22,000.00 in all. One of the defendant’s
witnesses testified that in October or November of 1950 the fair
market value of the farm was $37.00 an acre, or what it sold for.
The plaintiff further testified that as a result of the pollution
the farm was actually worth about one-half of that amount. The
evidence furnished the jury a measure for determining the dollar
value of the detriment to the farm, which was the difference in
value between the time of purchase and the time of trial. Neither
the correctness nor the applicability of that measure has been
questioned. The trial court did not err in refusing to direct a
verdict. Moreover, the trial court in an unchallenged instruction
with regard to the measure of damages applicable to the farm
instructed the jury as follows:

512 a

“I charge you that the measure of damages which can be re-
covered: by the plaintiff in this case cannot be greater than the
loss in market value, if any, of the farm of the plaintiff, if caused
by the operation of the sewage plant or Imhoff tank of the de-
fendant between the time when the plaintiff purchased the said
farm and the time of the commencement of this action consider-
ing the actual condition of the said farm and the manner in
which it was affected, if any, by the discharge. of the sewage
effluent into the creek across the said land both at the time of its
purchase by the plaintiff and the time of the commencement of
this action and entirely without regard to whether the plaintiff
did or did not know of the effect of the defendant’s sewage efflu-
ent, if any, at the time he purchased the said farm.”

Without expressing our approval of the measure of damages,
we point out that it was submitted to the juty and acquiesced in
by the defendant and became the law of the case. The evidence
is sufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury under the measure
of damages as submitted had the element of damages to the
cattle been eliminated. This brings us to the final point in the
case.

_ The defendant specifies as error the refusal of the trial court
to give a requested instruction to the effect that the plaintiff
failed to prove any amount of damage whatsoever to the live-
stock owned by him arising out of the operation of the city’s
sewage system or Imhoff tank and that the plaintiff was not
entitled to any damages claimed to have been suffered for detri-
ment to his cattle.

Paragraph 3 of the complaint, which we have quoted above,
sets forth that the plaintiff’s livestock drank water from the
creek and that as a result of the sewage the cattle became greatly
emaciated and reduced in value. This statement is in part the
basis upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages. The
evidence, however, shows no measurable damage to the cattle.
The plaintiff did testify that at the time he placed his cattle in
the pasture they were in better shape than when he took them out
and that because of the water situation they wouldn’t drink
enough water. Four of the cattle were milk cows and when

ee 513

asked about the effect of drinking water from the creck, the
plaintiff stated:

“There was a drop but I couldn’t tell just how much it was,
didn’t give the milk that they should have.”

There is no evidence in the record upon which the jury could
determine the amount of damage to the cattle, if any. The evi-
dence, while indicating that a detriment may have been suffered,
furnishes no measure of damages. As far as the record goes,
the jury could only speculate. The defendant was theréfore
entitled to an instruction similar to the one requested eliminating
the cattle as a basis for awarding damages. Instead of pointing
out this lack of evidence to the jury, the trial court did the oppo-
site, and instructed them as follows:

“You are further instructed that in case you find in favor of
the plaintiff in this case and find from a fair preponderance of
the evidence that there has been any depreciation in the reason-
able market value of the plaintiff’s cattle between -the time in
March, 1951 when he moved his cattle onto this said farm and
October 2nd, 1951, the time of the commencement of this action,
by reason of the careless and negligent operation and mainte-
nance by the defendant of its sewage system and cesspool, and
you find by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the sole
and proximate cause of any depreciation in the reasonable
market value of his said cattle is the careless and negligent
maintenance and operation by the defendant of its sewage sys-
tem and cesspool, then you will proceed to determine, from the
evidence, if any, the amount of such depreciation, if any, and you
may take that amount into consideration and include it in the
amount of your verdict in this case, not exceeding $2,000.00.”

Thus the court permitted the jury to find damages in favor of
the plaintiff for an item upon which there was no proof as to |
the amount of damage suffered, if any. The jury brought in a
verdict for $2,975.00, which, under the instructions, could, and
presumably did, include damages for injury to the cattle which
the jury could arrive at only by speculation, The pleadings,
proof, and instructions are such that it is impossible to tell what,
if any, amount was included in the verdict as damages for the

si

5d |

cattle. Such a verdict cannot stand. This situation leaves us
no alternative but to direct that the judgment appealed from be
reversed, and a new trial granted. Reitman v. Miller, 78 ND
1003, 54 NW2d 477.

It is so ordered.

Grimsor, Curistianson, Sature and Burks, JJ., concur.

Morris, Ch. J. On rehearing. We granted a rehearing at
which the case was reargued in behalf of both parties as to all
nonprocedural questions. The appellant challenges the correct-
ness of our decision as a departure from the rule that in North
Dakota municipalities are not liable for tort under these deci-
sions: Vail v. Town of Amenia, 4 ND 239, 59 NW 1092; Montain.
vy. City of Fargo, 88 ND 432, 166 NW 416, LRA1918C 600, Ann
Cas 1918D 826; Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 ND 502, 167 NW
717, LRAI918D 1108; Hadler v. North West Agricultural, Live
Stock & Fair Ass’n, 61 ND 647, 239 NW 736; Holgerson v. City
of Devils Lake, 63 ND 155, 246 NW 641, 34 NOCA 463. All of
these cases involve the liability of political subdivisions of the
state or municipalities for personal injuries or death. They are,
of course, grounded on negligence. In none of them was re-
covery permitted. However, they do not establish a general and
all inclusive rule that municipalities are not liable for tort.

Vail v. Town of Amenia, supra, involved damages for personal
injuries which the plaintiff contended resulted from the failure
on the part of the Township of Amenia to properly maintain a
bridge in a safe condition. The court, after pointing out that
the township was a political subdivision of the state, said:

“The care of highways and bridges devolves primarily upon
the state. It is a governmental function, but for negligence in
its performance the state is not liable, because the government
is not liable to the individual unless made so by statutory or
constitutional enactment.” (Italics suppliéd.)

In Hadler v. North West Agricultural, Live Stock & Fair
Ass’n, supra, the plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries
received while attending a fair. The court,.after discussing the

ee 515

organization of the fair association and the annual appropria-
tion provided therefor by state statute, said:

“Ordinarily such agencies of the state are not responsible on
account of the misfeasance or nonfeasance of officers through
whom they must act. This is because they are performing gov-
ernmental functions and the government is not liable to the in-
dividual wiless made so by statutory or constitutional enact-
ment.” (Italics supplied.)

In none of the cases cited above was there a statutory or con-
stitutional provision requiring the municipality or subdivision
to respond in damages for the injury inflicted. Section 14 of
the North Dakota Constitution provides that:

“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just comperisation having been first made to, or paid
into court for the owner, ... .”

Negligence constitutes no exception to this provision, nor is
tort of any kind made an exception. If private property is
taken or damaged for public use, compensation must be made
in all cases, regardless of the means employed ov the intent or
the lack of intent on the part of public officials. There may be
instances where private property is injured through the negli-
gence of municipal officials acting in a governmental capacity
which would not amount to damaging the property for public
use within the meaning of Section 14 of our constitution. See
Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 71 ND 321, 300 NW 631. But that
is not the case here. The facts set out in the complaint indicate
that damage to property resulted from a governmental activity
negligently conducted over a considerable period of time and in
such a manner that it became a nuisance.

The appellant argues that damages cannot be recovered in an
action in which the basis for recovery is primarily that of negli-
gence for that would be permitting recovery for a tort and would
be contrary to the holdings of this court in the cases above
cited. In support of this contention appellant cites Mayor v.
Studer & Manion Co., 66 ND 190, 262 NW 925, in which we held
that a demurrer to a complaint based wholly upon the careless
and negligent construction of a highway and culvert should be
sustained. It should also be noted, however, we ordered that

516 ee

the plaintiff be permitted to amend the complaint. In this case
no attack was made upon the sufficiency of the complaint before
trial. After the jury had been chosen and the first witness called,
counsel for the appellant stated:

“At this time the defendant, City of Glen Ullin, objects to the
introduction of any testimony whatsoever on behalf of the plain-
tiff in this case on the ground and for the reason that the com-
plaint alleges negligence on the part of the city in connection
with the operation of its septic tank and the disposal of the
outflow therefrom and the manner in which the said septic tank
and sewage system of the city of Glen Ullin has been managed
during the time in question, for the reason that under the laws
of this State the operation, construction, operation and main-
tenance of a sewage system, including a septic tank and of the
disposal of the outflow from the said system and tank, is purely a
governmental function and that under the’ constitution and stat-
utes of this state the city is not liable for any damage resulting
therefrom; particularly is the city not liable for any damage
resulting or claiming to result from the negligent operation, con-
struction or maintenance of a sewage disposal plant, sewage sys-
tem, to personal property.”

This objection was overruled. We think it was properly over-
ruled. It does not directly attack the complaint as failing to
state a cause of action, nor does it correctly state the law under
our constitution and statutes with respect to the liability of a
city for damage to property resulting from its performance of a
governmental function. Such an objection, coming as it does
at the beginning of the trial without warning to the court or
opposing counsel, will be construed strictly against the maker
and the pleading against which the attack is made will be most
liberally construed.

In Cannon y. Miller, 22 Wash2d 227, 155 P2d 500, 157 ALR
530, it is said:

“While the overruling of a demurrer to a complaint or the
failure to interpose a demurrer thereto does not preclude the
adverse party, at the calling of the case for trial, from objecting
to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that the com-
plaint, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-

ee 517

tion, nevertheless, if the complaint be for the first time attacked
in the last-mentioned manner, the pleading will be liberally con-
strued and, in passing upon such objection, the court will bring
to the support of the pleading every reasonable intendment and
legitimate inference that may be drawn from its allegations and
also from the evidence adduced to sustain the plaintiff’s cause.”

In Keller v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P2d 562, the court
stated:

“There is no doubt that in this jurisdiction, as in most of the
code jurisdictions, defendant may, by objection to the receiving
of evidence, raise the issue of the sufficiency of the plaintiti’s
complaint to state a cause of action. However, this is a pro-
cedure which is not looked upon with favor by the courts; it is
merely tolerated. And it has been said that where such an
objection is made, counsel has the duty of pointing out to the
court wherein he considers the complaint defective.” Sce also
James River National Bank v. Purchase, 9 ND 280, 83 NW 7.

“It does not take much of a pleading to be good against an
objection to the introduction of evidence.” Estes v. Edgar Zinc
Oo., 97 Kan 774, 156 P 758, quoted in Wallis v. Carder, 11 Cal
App2d 362, 53 P2d 787.

If we construe appellant’s objection as a belated challenge to
the sufficiency of the complaint, we must construe that complaint
with liberality and, in so doing, we find that, while it pleads negli.
gence, it does set forth certain acts of the city and alleges that
those acts “greatly injured the value of his said premises.” The
appellant, having elected to defer its attack until the taking
of testimony was reached, will not now be permitted to take ad-
vantage of a technical situation which might deprive the plaintiff
of compensation contemplated by the constitution, and since a
new trial must be granted for other reasons expressed in our
opinion to which we adhere, we deem it in the interests of justice
and orderly procedure, when the case is remanded to the dis-
trict court, that both parties be permitted to amend their plead-
ings.

We adhere to our former decision.

Grimson, Curisrtanson, Satare and Burks, JJ., concur.

518 |
[File No. 7351]

ROSELLA KEMMER, Appellant, v. SUNSHINE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

(57 NW2d 856)

HT

Opinion filed April 2, 1953

P|
Wm. L. Paulson, and Philip L. Scherer, for appellant.
Coffey, Mackenzie and Jungroth, for respondent.

Grimson, J. Plaintiff was the owner of a farm located at the
edge of Litchville in North Dakota. She lived in a house on that
farm of which only the first story had been built. That was
a basement story, four feet in the ground and four feet above
the ground. The roof was flat, covered with two layers of
heavy roofing on boards plus two or three applications of heavy
tar. The house was 32 x 40 ft., containing three bedrooms, a
sitting room, kitchen and dining room combined, and a wash
room. She had it completely furnished. On July 9, 1948, she
took out an insurance policy in the defendant insurance com-
pany to protect household goods, personal effects and other per-
sonal property located in that house, from loss by fire, lightning,
windstorm and hail to the amount of $2000.00. She paid the
premiums on that policy. In late October or in November, 1949,
she left her home and went to Corpus Christi, Texas. She was
there interested in a curio business. She did not return until
August 15, 1950. She left all her household goods, furnishings
and personal effects in her Litchville home and in good condi-
tion. She left.a key to the house with a neighbor “to go and
look over the premises and see how things are once in a while.”
About June 25, 1950, a severe hailstorm struck the premises,
followed by rain which lasted from 30 to 40 minutes. Some
45 to 80 holes were punched in the roofing by the hailstones.
Water leaked through the roof and everything in the house
became soaked with water. On June 28th a neighbor notified
the plaintiff by mail of the damage to her property. She then
notified the insurance company and made a claim for damages.
She disposed of her business interest at Corpus Christi as soon
as she could and return to Litchville on Aug. 15, 1950. The de-
fendant insurance company offered her $67.00 in payment of her
damages. The policy was in force at the time of the hailstorm.

520 |

This action is brought upon the insurance policy for the dam-
ages resulting to her household and personal effects from the
hailstorm of June 25, 1950, which she alleges in the complaint
amounted to $2000.00. The defendant answers by a general
denial, admitting the policy and alleging as an affirmative defense
that the provisions of the policy had not been complied with, that
plaintiff neglected to use reasonable means to preserve and save
the property after the losses complained of and completely aban-
doned the property. Other allegations in the answer are not
sustained by any evidence, and were apparently abandoned.

The case was tried to the jury who found for the plaintiff
in the sum of $306.25. The plaintiff made a motion for a new
trial which was denied by the court. This appeal is from the
order denying that motion.

Both in her notice of appeal and in a separate specification
the plaintiff demands a trial de novo in the supreme court. The
law does not entitle her to that. Sec 28-2732 NDRC 1943 au-
thorizes a trial de novo on appeal to the supreme court only
in cases tried to the court alone.

This court has repeatedly held that a case tried to the jury
is not triable de novo upon appeal to the supreme court. In all
cases tried to the jury a review in the supreme court is limited
to the errors assigned or apparent on the face of the judgment
roll. See Ripplinger v. Otten, 77 ND 531, 44 NW2d 60; First
National Bank, Crary v. Bremseth, 60 ND 401, 234 NW 758;
Baird v. First National Bank, 60 ND 286, 234 NW 71, and cases
cited.

With her notice of motion for a new trial plaintiff filed speci-
fications of error. All those specifications are classified under
errors in law occurring at the trial. Some questions relating
to the cause of the condition of the household goods on August
15, 1950, were objected to on the ground that no sufficient founda-
tion had been laid and the objection was sustained. We find no
reversible error in the rulings of the court on those questions.
Two of the questions on which error is assigned were answered
later. Most of those errors are assigned in connection with the
ruling of the court that evidence of the value of the household

| 52

goods on August 15, 1950, some 52 days after the hailstorm.was
inadmissible. :

The evidence showed that the plaintiff had left the premises
before Dec. 1, 1949. The premises had remained vacant there-
after. The plaintiff was allowed to testify that the property then
was in good condition, and to its value as of that time. The de-
fendant, however, showed that in the spring of 1950 some water
had seeped into that basement. A Mr. Larson with whom she
had left the key found water in the basement in early May 1930,
more than a foot deep. He had pumped it out. He again found:
water in the basement about the 4th of June, probably five.or
six inches deep. He again pumped it dry. On both occasions
he saw the furniture and a trunk standing in the water. As,
to what damage was caused thereby is not shown but the de-
fendant is not liable under its policy for that'damage, if. any.
Right after the hailstorm one John Smith examined the prop-
erty. He then found water in the basement 8 or 8% inches deep.
He found the holes in the roofing. He saw furniture in the
kitchen and a table with wet covering. He then notified ‘plain-
tiff by ordinary mail and she again by ordinary mail asked him
to get the key and show the insurance adjuster through the
house. Three weeks after the storm the adjuster came and Smith
showed him through the house. At-that time the water was. all
gone. Smith observed the veneer of the piano was loosened up
and the veneer of a violin case was coming apart. A daybed
and a chest of drawers were wet. The chest was made. of three
ply quarter inch board, glued together. A pair of shoes was
full of water. A week or ten days after the adjuster was there
Mr. Smith, at the request of plaintiff, strung clothes lines in
the middle of the living room and hung up to dry some-.of the
clothes that were in the cabinets, trunk and cedar chest. In a’
couple of days he would fold them, lay them on a table and hang
up some more clothes. _He was in the process of thus drying
out the. clothes when plaintiff came back on August 15th.

. Plaintiff was allowed to testify as to the condition and value
of her. household goods before she left for Corpus Christi in the
fall of 1949. That was proper. The property was of a kind
that would remain in the same condition under ordinary cir-

522 ee

cumstances. State ex rel. McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo 990,
144 SW2d 91. While she was not allowed to testify as to its
value on her return on August 15, 1950, she was allowed to
testify as to its condition at that time and she described some of
jt as ruined. She said the bedding and clothes were “moldy,
blue-gray, rotten” and the veneered material on the furniture
was “warped and off, the varnish and paint all off.” The ques-
tion is as to whether the court, under these conditions shown by
the evidence, was in error in ruling out her testimony as to the
value of the property on August 15, about 52 days after the
hailstorm. .

. The policy provided that the defendant should not be liable
for loss caused by the “neglect of the insured to use all reasonable
means to save and preserve the property at or after a loss.”
The plaintiff had nothing done to preserve the property for
about four weeks after the hailstorm. In the meantime the
water on the furniture had dried, some of the effects thereof
are shown. The clothing and bedding had remained wet for
some four or five weeks and mold had developed.

, This,.evidence shows that the conditions with regard to the
farniture, bedding and clothing underwent considerable change
between the time the plaintiff left in the fall of 1949 and the
time she examined her property on Aug. 15,1950. Some of those
changes may have occurred before the storm and some of them
could have been prevented if proper care had been given to these
furnishings immediately after the storm. These changes fur-
ther depreciated the value of the property and for some of
those changes the defendant was not responsible. Clearly the
ruling of the court when it refused to admit testimony of the
value of the property on August 15, 1950, was correct. This
ruling did not in any way affect the plaintiff’s right of action
against the defendant as argued by the plaintiff. It simply ex-
eluded evidence which could not be properly considered in de-
termining the amount of plaintiff’s loss. There still remained.
whatever pertinent evidence was offered on that issue and which
the jury could properly consider in determining plaintiff's
loss.

In the absence of a showing that the essential conditions. were.

| "523

the same an issue as to the existence of a particular condition
cannot be proved by evidence of the condition concerning that
issue existing at a considerably later time. 32 CJS Evidence,
Sec 585, P 439. .

In Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co., 114 Conn 108,
157 A 902, 80 ALR 441, it was held that where the situation
is transitory, evidence of condition of things a considerable
time after the event is not admissible to show condition of
time of event. In Alabama Power Co. v. Owens, 236 Ala 96,
181 So 283, 3 NCCA NS 524, the court held that. conditions
not inherently lasting or not likely to continue the same after
much lapse of time are not admissible without evidence that
they have remained unchanged. See also Boles v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 153 Ohio State 381, 92 NH2d 9; Hulett v. Great At-
lantic and Pacifie Tea Co., 299 Mich 59, 299 NW 807; Appala-
chian Stave Co. v. Pickard, 260 Ky 720, 86 SW2d 685.

“Evidence which is otherwise competent may relate to facts
ioo remote in point of time . . . to be admissible. The
admissibility of such evidence is a matter largely in the dis-
eretion of the trial court.” 20 Am Jur Hvidence, See 249, P
243.

“Generally speaking, however, the question whether evidence
of the condition of a thing or place before and after an event
is relevant and admissible to prove its condition at the time
of the event is, to a large extent, dependent upon the character
of the thing or place and the nature of the condition sought to
be proved, as constant or variable, and upon the existence of
any change during the intervening period and to some extent
upon the length of that period.” 20 Am Jur Evidence, Sec
306, P 284. .

“Whether evidence should be excluded for remoteness rests
largely in the discretion of the trial court.” Kugling v. William-
son, 231 Minn 135, 42 NW2d 534. See also Long v. Leonard,
113 Vt 258, 32 Atl2d 679.

“Whether evidence offered is too remote to be admissible upon
the trial of a case is for the trial court to decide in the exer-
cise of sound discretion; and its action in excluding or admitting
the evidence will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless

‘524 P|

it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.”
Yuneke v. Welker; 128 W Va 299, 36 SH2d 410. -

The final group of errors assigned by plaintiff relates to the
examination of the witness, John Larson. He had in his testi-
mony definitely fixed the times when he pumped out this base-
ment apartment in May and June 1950. He was asked why he
was so definite about those dates and answered that he had re-
-freshed his memory from a book where he marked down all pay-
ments he made. The plaintiff moved to strike out the answer on
the ground that it was not the best evidence. That was denied
and the ruling is assigned as error. There is no merit to that
motion. The contents of the writing in the book is not in issue.
The reference to it was only to explain why he was so definite
in fixing the time. The matter is not within the best evidence
rule.

The best evidence rule applies only when the terms of the
document are in issue. See 4 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed.
Sec 1178, P 316 and Sec 1242, P 464. In this case there was no
attempt to prove by parol the book entries. They were used only
as a reference to fix the date the witness had pumped the water
out of the basement. “The rule requiring the production of
documentary originals . . . applies only when ‘the purpose
is to establish its (a document’s) terms.’ When the purpose is
only to establish a collateral fact the rule is not applicable.
II Wig Ev Sec 1242, 1252; 5 Chamb Ev Sec 3583.” Pulsifer v.
Walker, 85 NH 434, 159 Atl 426, 81 ALR 1052.

The order of the District Court is affirmed.

Morais, C. J., and Curistiansoy, Saruru and Burxs, JJ., con-
cur,

&

5

[File No. 6354]

McLAUGHLIN OIL COMPANY, a North Dakota corporation,
Appellant v. FIRST STATE BANK OF BUFFALO, a
corporation, Respondent.

(57 NW2d 860)

Opinion filed April 1, 1953

526: ee

a

Banger! & Bangert, for appellant.

Nilles, Oehlert & Nilles and Watlam, Vogel, Vogel & Bright,
for.respondent.

Sarura, J. The plaintiff McLaughlin Oil Company is a North
Dakota Corporation having its place of business in Enderlin,
North Dakota. The defendant First State Bank of Buffalo is
a state banking corporation having its place of ‘business at
Buffalo, North Dakota. Between March 8, 1950, and April 14,
1950, the plaintiff received from its customers three checks drawn
on the defendant bank. One check was dated the 8th day of
March, 1950, drawn by Fred Paul to F. J. Decker in the sum
of $14.69 and by Decker endorsed to the plaintiff. The second
check was drawn on April 11, 1950 by Lorne Nudell to the plain-
tiff in the sum of $96.32. The third eheck was drawn on the
14th day of April 1950 to the plaintiff by one John 8. Haason
in the sum of $11.22 payable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff de-
posited these three checks to its account in the People’s & Ender-
lin State Bank, Enderlin, North Dakota. The People’s & Ender-
lin State Bank transmitted these checks to its correspondent the
First National Bank of Minneapolis for collection. The First
National Bank of Minneapolis transmitted them by cash letter
to the defendant bank at Buffalo. The defendant bank issued
drafts for the checks and other checks drawn on its correspond-
ent the Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis and for-
warded same to the First National Bank of Minneapolis, retain-
ing 5 cents from each of the two smaller checks and 10 cents from
the larger check as remittance charges or exchange. The First
National Bank of Minneapolis either forwarded drafts for the
amount of the checks less the exchange to the People’s & Enderlin
State Bank or gave it credit on its account with the said First
National Bank of Minneapolis.

The People’s & Enderlin State Bank credited the plaintiff
with the amount of these checks less the amount of exchange
which amounted to a total of 20 cents. The plaintiff brings this
action to recover from the defendant the sum of 20 cents, being
the items of remittance charges or exchange retained by the

ee 527

defendant from the total amount of these three checks, and for
an injunction perpetually enjoining and restraining the defend-
ant from withholding from the plaintiff the sums of money due
the plaintiff as part of the proceeds of checks drawn on said de.
fendant bank by its depositors.

The defendant admits the issuance of the checks referred to,
that they were deposited ‘by the plaintiff to its account in the
People’s & Enderlin State Bank; that they were sent for col-
lection to the First National Bank of Minneapolis and that said
Minneapolis Bank forwarded the same by cash letter to the
defendant bank at Buffalo and that the defendant charged the
amount thereof to the account of the drawers and made remit-
tance by draft to the Minneapolis Bank for the amount of said
checks less the exchange charged as set forth. The defendant
further alleges that for many years last past and continuing up
‘to the present time the only duty of the defendant with respect
to cashing checks drawn upon it by its customers has been and
now is to cash such checks as and when presented to it at its
counter in its banking house at Buffalo, North Dakota, and that
no duty existed to transmit the proceeds of said checks either
by mail or draft or by any other means of transmission; that
during said period of time the custom practice and usage in
said bank and other banks similarily situated has been, that
when checks are sent in by mail, and request is made to ‘cash
said checks and remit the proceeds by draft, a reasonable cliarge
is made for services rendered in the transmission of the moneys
in the form requested by the legal holder of’ such checks; the
answer further alleges that by Section 2, Chapter 71 of the
1933 Session Laws as amended (Section 6-0104 1949 Supp
NDRC 1943) the State Banking Board was granted power .to
make rules and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the
State of North Dakota and of the United States; that pursuant
to such rule-making power under said statute, said banking
board formulated rules fixing maximum charges for services
rendered in remitting on account of checks and other items
received through what are commonly known as cash.-letters in
accordance with a schedule prepared and approved by said bank-
ing board.

528 : —

The checks involved here, the plaintiff’s signature card and
deposit slips showing the deposit of these checks by the plain-
tiff, the letter of transmittal by the Enderlin Bank to the First
National Bank of Minneapolis, and the usual form of cash
letters from the latter bank to the defendant, were admitted in
evidence as exhibits.

The case was tried before the Honorable John C. Pollock,
Judge of the District Court of Cass County, North Dakota on
the 22nd day of December 1950. After due hearing the district
court ordered judgment in favor of the defendant for the dis-
missal of plaintiff's cause of action and for its costs and dis-
bursements, and judgment was entered -accordingly. From
this judgment the plaintiff has appealed and demands a trial
de novo. :

The plaintiff contends that there isa relationship of agency
beween the plaintiff and the People’s & Enderlin State Bank and
the plaintiff and:the First National Bank of Minneapolis as a
subagent; that knowledge of this agency is imputed to the de-
fendant by the provision of Sec 6-0368 NDRC 1943. The plain-
tiff further contends that when the checks arrived at the defend-
ant bank, the said bank received them from an agent of the
plaintiff and took them into its custody as an agent of the
makers of the. checks; that the relationships which are by law
presumed to exist between the plaintiff and the makers of the
checks are actually or constructively within the knowledge of
the maker’s agent the defendant, and that when the defendant
remitted to the plaintiff's agent the First National Bank of
Minneapolis it was obligated to remit either in money or by a
good draft the full amount of each of the checks.

‘The defendant contends however, that the question as to
whether the relationship of agency existed between the defend-
ant and the holder of the checks in question is immaterial, and
that the issue in this case is whether under the facts and the ap-
plicable statutes the plaintiff has a cause of action against the
defendant.

The state banks of this state are governed by Chapter 6 NDRC
1943 known as Banks and Banking. Sec 6-0101 of said Chapter
provides :

ee 529

“The State Department of Banking shall be known and desig-
nated as the Banking Department and shall be under the manage-
ment and control of the state banking board and the chief officer
designated and known as the state examiner, shall have charge
of the execution of all laws relating to state banks, savings
panks and trust companies . . . banking institutions and
other financial corporations, exclusive of the bank of North
Dakota.” .

“Sec 6-0104 NDRC 1943 provides: “the (banking) board shall
have the power to make, such rules and regulations for the
government of financial corporations mentioned in section 6-
‘0101 as in its judgment may seem wise and expedient, but such
rules and regulations shall not conflict with any law of this
state or of the United States. The board shall review all reports
made by the financial corporations and institutions under its
jurisdiction and all reports of regular and special examinations
thereof made by the state examiner, and shall approve or dis-
approve such reports. The board shall make and enforce such
orders as, in its judgment, may be necessary or proper to pro-
tect the public and the depositors or crediters of said financial
corporation and institution.” .

On April 5, 1944 the state banking board of North Dakota,
acting under the authority granted by section 6-0104, supra,
adopted certain regulations governing bank exchange, which
regulations have ever since been in full force and effect. A
certified copy of said regulations was introduced in evidence
as defendant’s exhibit A. The pertinent portions of said regu-
lations affecting the present action read as follows:

“Regulation III. Now, therefore under authority granted by
Section III Chapter 71 of 1933 Session Laws of the State of
North Dakota (Sec 6-0104 NDRC 1943 Amended by See 6-
0104 1949 Supp NDRC 1943). The following is hereby adopted’
as the order and regulation of the State Banking Board of the
State of North Dakota.

From and after May 1, 1944 no state bank organized and
operating under the laws of the State of North Dakota shall
charge, deduct, or otherwise collect exchange fees on checks

530 Ee

or other cash items received in the regular course of business
from other banks or trust companies within or without the state
for collection and remittance or collection and credit in excess
of the amounts set forth in the following schedule; provided
however that this order and schedule shall apply only to items
received in what is commonly known as regular ‘cash letters’;
and shall not be construed to apply to bills of lading, sight drafts
or other items requiring special handling.
Schedule: On items of $1.00 or under, no charge

On-items of $1.01 to $10.00 not to exceed 5¢ per
item.

On items of $10.01 to $100.00 not to exceed 10¢ per
item, .

On each item of over $100.00 not to exceed 10¢ for
each $100.00 or fraction thereof per item pro-
vided that the maximum charge for any one
item shall not exceed $1.00”.

There is no statute in this state requiring banks to clear all
checks at par. The only statute that has any reference to par
clearance is Sec 6-0913 NDRC 1943. It provides that:

“All checks and other instruments and items of exchange pay-
able on demand sent by the Bank of North Dakota to any state
bank or banking association in North Dakota, for collection,
shall be remitted for at par by such state bank or banking asso-
ciation to the Bank of North Dakota.”

It was amended by Chapter 112 of the Session Laws of 1949
and now reads as follows:

“All checks and other instruments and items of exchange issued
in payment of public bills to the State of North Dakota and its
political subdivisions or any department of either, sent. by the
Bank of North Dakota to any state bank or banking association
for collection, shall be remitted for at par by such state bank or
banking association to the Bank of North Dakota if good on
‘the day presented.”

Under the provision of Sec 6-0913 as it existed prior to 1949
all checks and other instruments and items of exchange payable

Le 531

on demand sent by the Bank of North Dakota to any state bank
or banking association in North Dakota for collection had to
be remitted for at par by such bank or banking association
to the Bank of North Dakota. But the 1949 amendment limited
par clearance only to checks and other instruments and items
of exchange issued in payment of public bills to the State of
North Dakota and its political sub-divisions or any department
of either sent by the Bank of North Dakota to any state bank
or banking association. It is cléar. that under the provisions
of said Séce 6-0913 as it existed prior to 1949 and under the
provisions of the amendment of 1949, the subject of par payment
was before the legislature; and had it intended that all checks
should be cleared at par it could have so provided in the enact-
ment of ‘this statute or-in the 1949 amendment thereto.- At no
time did this statute provide that all checks and other instru-
ments and items of exchange should be paid at par by the state
banks. It specified the kind of instruments that were to be paid
at par, and only when they were sent to other banks from the
Bank of North Dakota. The language of the original statute
as well as of the amendment is clear and specifies the particular
checks and other instruments to be cleared at par. It would
follow that all other checks and instruments not ‘mentioned
therein were excluded, and that the rule of statutory construc-
tion—“Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’—would apply in
ascertaining the legislative intention. There would be no neces-
sity for enactment of said Section 6-0913 or any amendment
thereof had there been any other statute providing for par
clearance.

It is of interest to note here that a bill was introduced in
the legislative session of 1947 which would prohibit state banks
from charging exchange but which failed to pass, and at the
general election in November 1952, before this case was. argued
in this court the electors of the state rejected an initiated meas-
ure which would have prohibited state banks from charging ex-
change.

There is therefore no law in this state requiring state banks
to clear checks at par, other than as provided in and limited by.
Section 6-0913 supra.

532 De

Section 1-0106 NDRC 1943 provides:

“In this state there is no common law in any case where the
‘law is declared by the code.”

The common law is therefore adopted by statute as the basic
law applicable to civil rights and remedies not defined by the
statute. Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 ND 265, 148 NW 654, LRA
1915D 1149. Where there is no express constitutional or stat-
utory declaration upon the subject the common law is applied.
Brignall v. Hannah et. al., 34 ND 174, 157 NW 1042.

Vest. The Par Collection System of the Federal Reserve
Banks Feb. 1940. Federal Reserve Bulletin 89 states:

“Under the common law (i. e. in the absence of statute or
agreement to the contrary), a bank is obligated to pay in cash
checks drawn upon it when presented at the bank, but is not
obligated to remit the proceeds to distant places. When checks
were sent in through the mails -from distant places, therefore,
it was generally felt that the.banks in remitting the proceeds
in cash to such places performed a service which they were not
obligated to perform and for which they- were entitled to com-
pensation. It was for this service that they deducted the so-
ealled ‘exchange charge’ ”.

In its brief plaintiff quotes extensively from 30 Virginia
Law Review page 603, and 2 Zollman Banks and Banking, page
262, note 6. These quotations discuss in a general way the
origin of exchange charges and their merits and demerits. We
cannot see however that this discussion can have any bearing
upon the issues in the instant case. The issues in this case must
be decided in accordance with the laws of the state governing
banks and banking. .

The plaintiff contends that under Sec 6-0368 NDRC 1948 it is
entitled to damages on account of defendant’s failure to remit
the full amount of the checks involved in this action, and that
such statute clarifies the duties and responsibilities of the vari-
ous agencies concerned with the issuance and collection of the
conventional bank checks. Said section reads as follows:

“Any bank doing business in this state, including the Bank
of North Dakota, which shall cash, ‘receive. for application on
an obligation, or for collection ‘or deposit and credit, any check,

| 588

note, or other negotiable instrument drawn upon or payable at
any other bank, savings -bank, trust company, or financial in-
stitution located in another city or village or which should be
presented for acceptance or payment in another city or village,
whether within or without this state, at its option, may forward
such instrument for presentment or collection directly to the
bank on which it is drawn, or at which it is made payable, or may
forward it through the Federal Reserve Bank, or other recog-
nized banking agencies, and in payment of such collection, such
bank or other agency may accept the exchange or a draft of the
collecting or payor bank. Such method of collection, in the
absence of a special agreement to the contrary, shall be deemed.
to be agreed to by the parties, and the forwarding bank and
successive agencies shall not be liable to the owner or depositor
until actual final payment is received by the collection of such
exchange or draft, and until such final collection, the depositor,
endorser, guarantor, or surety of any check, draft, or other
instrument so received, deposited, cashed, or credited, shall be
liable to the bank to the extent of any money paid out or credit
given by it on account of such instrument. However, the bank
and every other agency through whose hands such instrument
or the proceeds thereof shall pass shall be charged with ordinary
business care, and shall be liable for any lack thereof, or for
any default or negligence on its part resulting in loss, but not
for the default, negligence, or lack of care of any other agencies,
and the owner or depositor of such instrument shall have a
cause of action directly against such bank, or other agencies, for
his damage or loss on account of its default or lack of ordinary
care.

‘We find nothing in the quoted section which either forbids
or permits banks to charge exchange in remitting for checks
received in cash letters. The statute does provide that what-
ever method of collection provided for in said statute selected by
the remitting bank, in the absence of a special agreement to
the contrary, shall be deemed to be agreed to by the parties, and
the forwarding bank and successive agencies shall not be liable
to the owner or the depositor until actual final payment is re-
ceived by the collection of such exchange or draft.

534 a

The treasurer of the plaintiff testified that he did not know
that exchange had been charged on checks drawn by customers
of the defendant bank and in favor of the plaintiff and by such
plaintiff deposited to its account in the Enderlin bank. With
reference to the checks in question he stated that he first knew
that exchange had been charged some time prior to August
1950; that when checks are received he deposits them in the bank
and that he writes.part of the checks issued by plaintiff; that he
does not check the bank account to see if exchange charges are
deducted from it. This he said was done by his father who was
unable to be present at the trial because of illness. There
is no allegation and no proof that plaintiff protested or objected
to exchange charges made by defendant at any time during the
course of such business transactions.

J. W. Chapman; president of the defendant bank testified that
his bank had charged exchange on checks received by it in cash
letters ever since its organization in -1942, and continued to
make such charges in accordance with the schedule fixed by the
State Banking Department in 1944; that the cash letters with
checks drawn on defendant bank were received from the Fitst
National Bank of Minneapolis practically every business day;
that remittance in payment of these checks were made by draft
on the Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, less the
excliange; that at no time did the First National Bank of Minne-
apolis or the plaintiff protest or object to the deduction of the
exchange charges, and specifically that no protest was made with
reference to the particular checks involved in this action.

Plaintiff cites the Nebraska case of Placek et. al. v. Edstrom,
148 Nebraska 79, 26 NW2d 489,.174 ALR 856, in support of its
cause of action, The Nebraska case was brought for the pur-
pose of obtaining a declaratory judgment to construe a statute
which specifically provided that.checks drawn on any bank or
trust company organized under the laws of the state should be
cleared at par by the bank or trust company on which they
were drawn. The plaintiffs in that case contended that the
statute was repugnant to Section 14, Art. 3 Constitution of
Nebraska, and also that it was repugnant to Section 10, Art. 1,
Constitution of the United States, in that it impaired the obli-

re 535

gation of contract; and that the act was repugnant to Section 3,
Art. 1, Constitution of Nebraska, and Section 1 of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States respec-
tively, in that it deprived plaintiffs of property without due
process of law and denied them the equal protection of the law.
The supreme court of Nebraska held that in the light of the
situation the Act in question was an entirely reasonable exercise
of the police power of the state and was not repugnant either to
the Constitution of Nebraska or to the Constitution of the United
States.

Since we have no statute in this state like the Nebraska
statute, or any similar statute, the decision in the Nebraska case
is not in point and has no application to the issues in the case at
bar.

The plaintiff also cites the case of Farmers and Merchants
Bank of Monroe-v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Virginia,
262 US 649, 67 L ed 1157, 43 S Ct 651, 80 ALR 635, North
Carolina had enacted a statute authorizing banking institutions
chartered by the state to charge a fee not in excess of $ of 2%
on remittances covering checks, the minimum fee on any remit-
tance therefor to be 10 cents. It exempted checks drawn in
payment of obligations to the Federal or State government.
The enactment of this statute arose out of the effort of the
Federal Reserve Board to introduce in the United States uni-
versal par clearance and collections of. checks through Federal
Reserve Banks. The State of North Carolina was in the district
served by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. When this
statute was enacted the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond gave
notice that it considered the legislation void under the federal
constitution; that when presenting checks to North Carolina
state banks for payment over the counter, it would refuse to
accept exchange drafts on reserve banks, as required by the
North Carolina statute and that it would return as dishonored
checks for which only exchange drafts had been tendered in-
payment. The Farmers & Merchants Bank of Monroe and eleven
other state banks brought action to enjoin the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond from continuing such practice. The plaintiffs
were, not members of the Federal Reserve System. The trial

586 —

court granted a perpetual injunction. The supreme court of
North Carolina reversed the decree. The case was carried: to
the supreme court of the United States by certiorari. That
court reversed the decision of the supreme court of North
Carolina and reinstated the decision of the trial court.

In the opinion written by Justice Brandeis, the court said:

“It (par clearance) deals not with charges for collection, but
with charges incident to paying. It deals with exchange. Form-
erly, checks, except where paid at the banking house over the
counter, were customarily paid either through a clearing house
or by remitting, to the bank in which they had been deposited
for collection, a draft on the drawee’s deposit in some reserve
city. For the service rendered by the drawee bank in so remit-
ting funds available for use at the place of the deposit of the
check, it was formerly a common practice to make a small charge,
called exchange, and to deduct the amount from the remittance.
This charge of the drawee bank the Federal Reserve Board
planned to eliminate, and, in so doing, to concentrate in the twelve
Federal Reserve Banks, the clearance of checks and the accumu-
lation of the reserve balances used for the purpose. The board
began by efforts to induce the banks to adopt par clearance
voluntarily. The attempt was not successful. The board then
concluded to apply compulsion.”

The opinion concluded:

“The North Carolina statute here in question does not ob-
struct the performance of any duty imposed upon the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks. Nor does it
interfere with the exercise of any power conferred upon either.
It is therefore consistent with the Federal Reserve Act and
with the Federal constitution.”

Plaintiff cites the case of Brookings State Bank v. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 281 Fed 222. The decision in
that case supports the contention of the defendant rather than
that of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in that case, .the Brookings
State Bank, was a banking corporation in-the-State of Oregon.
The defendant Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; seeking
to make collections from the plaintiff without: the necessity of.
paying exchange maintained an agent at Brookings for making.

| 537

collections over the counter of such paper as might be trans-
mitted to him in cash letters from the Reserve Bank and its
branch bank at Portland. The agent was so maintained for
about a year and he collected over the counter during the time
something above $108,000.00 at an expense to the Reserve Bank
of $3,542.00, which included the expense of transmitting the
currency to the point of destination. This method caused the

- Brookings Bank much annoyance, and required it to maintain a
materially larger reserve than ordinarily necessary in the usual
conduct of its business.

The agent was withdrawn and the Brookings bank was noti-
fied that thereafter checks would be forwarded for collection by
mail direct to the bank with request that it pay at par and the
proceeds remitted by exchange on Portland or San Francisco.
Checks so forwarded were endorsed, “pay to Brookings State
Bank for collection only and remittance in full without deduction
for exchange or collection charges.”

These checks were returned without payment on the ground
that the bank was not required to act as agent for the Reserve
Bank to make such collections under the terms imposed. The
plaintiff Brookings State Bank then brought action to enjoin
the Reserve Bank from continuing such practice and after hear-
ing a preliminary injunction was granted. Later the injunction
was made permanent. 281 Fed 222. We quote the following
from the opinion of the District Court.

“The nonmember banks, being without the pale of the Federal
Reserve Act, have the right, if they see fit, to charge reasonable
exchange on remittances. This is aright the bank may relinquish
at its option, but it ought not to be coerced into doing so, or
agreeing to do so, and any strategy which has for its purpose
the coercion of such nonmember bank to yield its legal right in
this respect is unlawful and will not be approved by the courts.”

It is established by the record that the defendant has charged
exchange over a period of years on checks drawn on its customers
to the plaintiff as payee. The exchange thus charged was in
conformity with the schedule adopted by the State Banking
Board of the State of North Dakota in 1944. There is no show-
ing, nor do we find that the schedule prepared by the state

538 Ee

banking board conflicts in any way with the laws of the State
or with the laws of the United States.

Scction 342 of the Federal Reserve Act, USCA 12, page 723,
contains a proviso which permits nonmember banks to make
a reasonable charge for collection or payment of checks and
drafts and remission therefor or by exchange or otherwise.
Such proviso reads as follows:

“Provided further, that nothing in this or any other section
of this chapter shall be construed as prohibiting a member or
nonmember bank from making reasonable charges, to be deter-
mined and regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, but in no case to exceed 10 cents per $100 or
fraction thereof, based on the total of checks and drafts pre-
sented at any one time, for collection or payment of checks and
drafts and remission therefor by exchange or otherwise; but
no such charges shall be made against the Federal reserve
banks.”

We have carefully examined and considered the facts and
cireumstances presented by the record in this case and the law
applicable thereto and we aré agreed that the plaintiff has
failed to establish a cause of action against the defendant.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morzis, C. J., and Curisttanson, Grimson and Burxz, JJ.,
concur.

ee 539

[File No. 7365]

TOWNER COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Respondent,
y. STUTSMAN COUNTY, ET AL, Defendant; RAMSEY
COUNTY, Defendant ; PIERCE COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,
Defendant and Respondent; ELIZABETH WILSON, De-
fendant and Appellant; ROLETTE COUNTY, Defendant;
THE PUBLIC WELFARE BOARD OF NORTH DA-
KOTA, Defendant.

(58 NWe2d 470)

540 CCCs
Opinion filed May 5, 1953

C. E. Joseph, for appellant.

Paul Agneberg, respondent, Towner County.
Ray R. Friederich, for Pierce County.
Douglas B. Heen, for Ramsey County.

C. EH. Joseph, for appellant.
Paul L. Agneberg, for respondent.

Grimson, J. This is an action brought by Towner County, a
political subdivision of the State of North Dakota to deter-
mine the place of residence of one Elizabeth Wilson for poor
relief purposes. Blizabeth Wilson is made defendant. The
counties of Stutsman, Ramsey and Pierce were also made de-
fendants. Rolette County and the Public Welfare Board of
North Dakota were interpleaded. The district court; after
several hearings in the matter, found that said Elizabeth Wilson

ee Era

was not a resident of the State of North Dakota for poor relief
purposes. The trial court also held that her residence for such
purposes still remained in Minnesota. The defendant, Elizabeth
Wilson appeals.

The evidence shows that Elizabeth Wilson is a single woman,
40 years of age. She came from Cleveland, Ohio, in 1941, to
Minneapolis, Minn. to attend the North Central Bible Institute.
She completed her course there in three years. After that she
went out as an evangelist and children’s worker. She carried on
that work in various places in “Minnesota until Oct. 21,- 1946.
Then she came into North Dakota and carried on the same kind
of, work for the Central District Council of the Assemblies of
God, conducting or participating in church services and Daily
Vacation Bible Schools and as supply pastor.

Sec 50-0204 NDRC 1943, provides:

“If no type of public assistance or poor relief, whether county,
state, or federal has been received, residence in a county, for
poor relief purposes, shall be gained as follows:

1. Each male person, and each unmarried female, over the
age of twenty-one years, who has resided one year continuously
in any county in this state, shall be deemed to have residence in
such county ;

2. Each person who has resided one year continuously in the
state, but not in any one county, shall have a residence in the
county in which he or she has longest resided within such year;

8. Eiveryminor .. .”

A fourth subsection not material in this case, was added to the
section by Chapter 284 SL 1951.

Under this section this-court' has repeatedly held that before
a male or an unmarried female over the age of 21 years can
acquire a residence in the state for poor relief purposes he or
she must have a continuous, actual residence in the state for one
year. Nelson County v. Williams County, 68 ND 56, 276 NW
265; Griggs County v. Cass County, 65 ND 608, 260 NW 417;
County of Grand Forks v. Du Fault, 66 ND 518, 267 NW 136; In
re Boise, 73 ND 16, 11 NW2d 80.

“Logically, the first inquiry is whether an applicant for poor
relief is a resident of the state and has resided therein continu-

542 EE

ously for at least a year. A person who is not such resident,
or a person who has ceased to be a resident of the state at all,
is not a resident for poor relief purposes. Under See 501,
Comp Laws 1913 (See 50-0204 NDRC 1943) a person, in order
to have a ‘legal residence’ in the state for poor relief purposes
must have resided therein continuously for at least one year.”
Enderlin v. Pontiae Twp. 62 ND 105, 118 and 119, 242 NW 117.

The term residence is used in our law in two quite different
meanings. In Sec 54-0216 NDRC 1943, pertaining to residence
generally, it is defined as: “. . . a place where one remains
when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or tempo-
rary purposes, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.”
This definition has been held as synonymous with domicile and
means living in a place with the intent of making it a fixed and
permanent home. Concurrence of actual residence and intent
to remain there are necessary for the acquisition of a domicile.
Residence as used in.the poor relief statutes means dwelling
in a particular place irrespective of any intent of making it a
home. A domicile is attained as soon as a home is established
without any certain length of time passing. A residence for
poor relief purposes is attained only on actual living in a place
the length of time required by the statute.

“While domicile and residence are frequently used synony-
mously, (See 9 RCL p 540, 19 CJ 3951,) yet there is clear dis-
tinction in law between them and they are not, when used accu-
rately, convertible terms.” McEwen v. McEwen, 50 ND 662, 197
NW 862.

See also Anderson v. Breithbarth, 62 ND 709, 715, 245 NW 483.

“The term ‘legal residence’ employed by the legislature in the
poor relief laws has a meaning quite different from that which
the same term has in other laws of the state. Thus, a person is’
not required to reside for any specified length of time in order
to acquire a residence in the state within the purview of the
general laws.” Burke County v. Brusven, 62 ND 1, 241 NW 82.

“The term ‘residence’ and ‘legal residence’ employed by the
legislature in laws relating to poor relief have.reference to the
status acquired by a person within a certain county or political
subdivision so as to entitle such person to poor relief within such

— 543

county or political subdivision. . . . In our opinion the word
‘resided’ in Subd 4 of Sec 2501, Comp Laws, 1913, (Subdivisions
1 and 2, Sec. 50-0204 NDRC 1943) has reference to the actual
residence as distinguished from the legal or technical residence
of an individual, that is, it means the place where a person actu-
ally lives and stays.” Endevlin v. Pontiac Twp. 62 ND 105, 115,
117, 242 NW 117.

“The word ‘reside’ has two quite distinct meanings. The one
legal and technical; the other personal, actual or physical habi-
tation of a person. Where a person lives with his family at an
established home, the place where he ‘resides’ is clear. That is
his technical legal residence. Such residence embraces two ele-
ments: First, residence; second, the intention to remain there
permanently for an unlimited time. To ‘reside’ in such manner
gives a domicile, . . . That is also the place of his actual
or physical habitation. A person who has no such fixed place
or domicile wherein he ‘resides,’ but dwells in hotels, boarding
houses, or the homes of others as suitable to his employment
of convenience ,also ‘resides’ where he ‘actually or personally
lives. Indeed, he may with his family oceupy a rented house
and be within such meaning of the word. He simply lives at
the particular place. He has not established a domicile. Such
residence under our poor laws is temporary, and continues so,
regardless of intention until it has ripened into such domicile.
One may have a residence before he acquires a domicile.” Town
of Smiley v. Village of St. Hilaire et al, 183 Minn 533, 237 NW
416, 417.

The evidence in the instant case shows that Miss Wilson lived
and worked in North Dakota at the following places during the
time here specified:

5a Ee

Place Date Arrived Date Left No. of Days

Minneapolis, Minn. .. Nov. 17, 1941, Oct, 21, 1946, 4 yrs. 11. mo. 4 days
Williston & Crosby,

ND...
Columbus, N.D. .
Jamestown, N.D.
Egeland, ND. .
Devils Lake, N.D. .
St, Paul, Minn,
Rolette, ND. .....
Cando, N.D.
Barton, N.D.
Bgeland, N.D.

. Oct, 21, 1948, Nov. 3, 1946, 12 days
Nov. 4, 19468, Nov. 24, 1946, 20 days
Nov. 28, 1946, Dee. 31, 1946, 33
. Dec. 31, 1946,  May19,1947, 139 *
. May 19, 1947, July 12, 1947, 24 days 228 da,
. July 12,1947, July 26, 1947, 14 days 14 «
. Tuly 26, 1947, Oot. 26, 1947, 92 days
. Oct, 26, 1947, Nov. 8, 1947, 8 «
Nov. 4, 1947, Nov. 25, 1947, a1 «
. Nov. 25, 1947, May 19, 1948, 175

Devils Lake, N.D. .... May 19, 1948, July 5, 1948, 47 «.
Egeland, N.D. . July 5, 1948, July 12, 1948, 7 «,
Devils Lake, ND. ... July 12, 1948, July 16, 1948, 4 * 954 «
St. Paul, Minn. . July 17, 1948, July 31, 1948, wee ue
Williston, ND. . Aug. 1, 1948, Aug. 6, 1948, 5 5K
St, Paul, Minn. Aug. 7, 1948, Aug. 24, 1948, we we
Cleveland, Ohio ..... Aug. 25, 1948, Oct. 8, 1948, 39
Winnipeg, Canada, .. Oct. 5, 1948, Jan. 6, 1949, 95 «
Rugby, N.D. . Jan, 7, 1949, Mar. 18, 1949, 70

Minot, N.D. Mar. 18, 1949, Apr. 80, 1949, 43 «
Rugby, ND. . Apr. 30, 1949, May 8, 1949, 8 «
Cando, N.D. . May 8, 1949, May 24, 1949, 16

Devils Lake, N. . May 24, 1949, May 27, 1949, B

Minot, N.D. . . May 27, 1949, June 6, 1949, lo «

Devils Lake, N.D..,. June 6, 1949, June 23, 1949, i «
Rolette, N.D. Tune 23, 1949, Nov. 5, 1949, 135 “ 302 «
St. Paul, Minn. ...... Nov. 6, 1949, Jan. 9, 1950, 4 « 646
Minneapolis, Minn, .. Jan, 10, 1950, Apr. 6, 1950, 86 “ 86 «
Cando, ND. ........ Apr. 7, 1950, To date.

The evidence shows clearly that Miss Wilson had no intention
of returning to any of these places for the establishment of a
home or domicile. She dwelt as a guest in the parsonages or
in the homes of her church people. Her sojourn in each place
ceased when she packed her grip and went to the next place.
Her only intent was to follow her itinerary to carry out her
work. She did not obtain a residence for poor relief purposes
by her stay in any of these places.

Miss Wilson’s first sojourn in North Dakota ceased on July
12, 1947 when. she left Devils Lake to conduct a bible school in
St. Paul. That was a part of her work and absolutely broke
her sojourn in North Dakota. She had then been in this state

ee 545

for 228 days which was 137 days short of a year necessary to
gain poor relief residence in North Dakota. She testified:

“Q.—In July of 1947 you left North Dakota for a period of
approximately two weeks for St. Paul, Minn. Ans. Because I
had been holding daily vacation bible school for Rev. Gustafson
and that date I always kept open to go back and hold daily vaca-
tion bible school.

Q.—During your two weeks absence from North Dakota in
1947 you taught bible school in St. Paul?

A—Yes.

Q.—Did you get paid for teaching Bible School?

A.—Yes, but reimbursement is—well, collection—the free will
offering and the collection is taken up the night of the. program
and is divided.’ Their supplies are taken out and is divided up
with the workers. I usually have just about enough to get to
my next place.

Q.—That was your pay or remuneration in St. Paul for teach-
ing bible school?

A—Yes. .

Q.—In other words, the two weeks that you left North Dakota
in 1947 for St. Paul wasn’t for a vacation on your part or for
going down there to visit. It was for going down there for the
specific purpose of teaching Bible School?

A.—Yes, because as I said, that was the reason I held that
date open.”

Miss Wilson came back to North Dakota on July 26, 1947,
when she renewed her evangelistic work from place to place in
this state according to an itinerary laid out. On July 16, 1948,
she again went to St. Paul to conduct vacation bible school she
testified:

“Q.—In July of 1948 you were in Minnesota teaching bible
school for a period of two weeks? A. Yes, sir. That is why
they had daily vacation bible school at that late date because of
my schedule as an evangelist. You know an itinerary is made
out.”

Prior to going to St. Paul that time she had been working at a

546 a

youth camp at Devils Lake. On July 16th. her entry in her
diary is: “Last day of Youth Camp. <All packed ready to leave”
and her entry on July 17, 1948 is: “Left on 6:30 bus for St.
Paul.” She had then, been in North Dakota 354 days or 9 days
short of the year necessary to obtain poor relief residence in
North Dakota.

Then her diary proceeds to record the work she did in St. Paul.
On July 30, 1948, she records: “Last day of DVBS:* Program
this evening . . . All packed & ready to go.” Her entry on
Saturday, July 31st.is: “Left Minneapolis at 8 a.m. for Willis-
ton and Springbrook Dam Youth Camp.”

Miss Wilson then stayed in ‘North Dakota only six days from
July 31st. 1948 to Aug. 6, 1948 when she again left for St. Paul.
From there she took a vacation to her home in Cleveland, Ohio,
and later went to Winnipeg, Canada, to attend bible school. ’

“Miss Wilson’s last sojourn in North Dakota began’ when she
came to Rugby from Winnipeg Jan 7, 1949, and ended Nov. 5,
1949. During’ much of that period she was confiried to hospitals
because of illness. Such periods do not count on the time of
residence required for poor relief purposes. Sec 50-0205 NDRC
1943. That period, anyhow, lasted only 302 days even including
said hospital periods. .

When Miss Wilson was releaséd from the Rolette Community
Hospital at the end of that period on Nov. 5, 1949, she went to
St. Paul. Then on Jan. 10, 1950, she got a room in Minneapolis
and tried out a light job. She testified: “My health just wouldn’t
take it then . . . the people who promised me a home they
failed me because I took sick again.” After that.a fellow church
worker took cave of her in her room and the Minneapolis Wel-
fare Board furnished the food until April 1950. Then she was
taken to the train, the last part of the way in a wheel chair, placed
in a lower berth and given a ticket to Cando, North Dakota.
This was done by direction of The Minneapolis Welfare Board.

The evidence shows that Miss Wilson lived in Towner County
upon three different occasions. The aggregate time. she spent
in Towner County exceeded the periods she spent in any other
county. Such periods, however, were interrupted-so that she

De Bar

obtained no residence for poor relief purposes-éither in, the
county or state. The Minneapolis Welfare Board was informed
that: Towner County did not acknowledge Miss Wilson as a resi-
dént forrelief purposes. Without seeking an agreement thereon
the Minnéapolis Welfare: Board directed her transfer to Cando.
A young girl was sent along to take care of Miss Wilson on the
trip. When she arrived in Cando no arrangements had: been
made for her but she was taken by kind Samaritans to the hos-
pital where she has since remained. On her condition Dr. J. A.
McDonald of Cando testified: “The history of her case shows
that she.hada number of operations. Her troubles are multiple:
She is a-neurotic and crippled person. Since she entered Cando
Hospital she has been unable to get around on her feet alone
without the aid of somebody to help her. Her physical condi-
tion is such‘that she has been, since entering the hospital at
Cando, confined to her bed virtually all of the time.” On May
8, 1950 she’ made‘application to Towner County for relief which
she has been receiving since. That time does not count on her
residence for poor relief ‘purposes. Sec 50-0204 NDRC 1943.
The. only “property Miss Wilson has is a $1300.00 Ministerial
insurance provided by her church for its ministers. ;

These different periods of temporary sojourns in North
Dakota cannot be added together to give her the year’s residence
necessary for poor relief purposes. There was a complete break
between each period during which she worked at her regular

’ vocation in St. Paul, Minn. Each bréak was an interruption
which prevented the necessary year for poor relief purposes to
run.

Seo. 50-0204, supra, provides that to- obtain a residence for
poor relief purposes.the applicant has to have “resided one year
continuously in the state.” . Webster’s New International Dic-
tionary, 2d Hd defines “continuous:” “Having continuity of
parts; without break,-cessation, or interruption; without inter-
vening space or time; uninterrupted; unbroken; continued ; as,
a continuous road or murmur.” ..

““The residence for the required length of time must be contin-
uous, and separate periods of residence cannot be added together

548 ee

to make up the statutory time.” 70 CJS Paupers, Sec 32 ¢ 2p
59.

“To render an act continuous, its performance must be carried
on without interruption, for, when its performance ceases, the
act is complete and distinct, and, if afterwards a similar act is
performed, it cannot be regarded as a continuation of the former.
To make it continuous it must be the result of a single impulse,
and performed or carried on without intermittance.” People v.
Sullivan, 9 Utah, 195, 33 P 701, 702.

In the case of Wolfe v. State, 127 Tex Or R 213, 75 SW2d
677, the defendant was convicted of promoting a walkathon, a
physical endurance contest, continuously for more than 24 hours
in violation of law. The evidence showed that the contestants
rested 15 minutes out of every hour. The court held: “Constru-
ing the word ‘continuous’ as understood in common language the
opinion is expressed that the proof fails to support the allega-
tion that the contest continued longer than 24 hours in one con-
tinuous competitive period of endurance.” In other words each
15 minutes break prevented a continuous contest. In U. 8. ex
rel. Illuzzi v. Curran, 11 F2d 468, the court held: “This appeal
is an effort to establish that, when the prerequisite for exemption
from exclusion for illiteracy is that the applicant shall ‘have
resided (in the United States) continuously for five years,’ such
five years’ residence may be made up of two or more periods,
however short, provided the aggregate of the visits to this
country amount to five years. To this we cannot agree. It is
directly opposed to United States ex rel. Amuso v. Curran (DC)
299 F 214, and Ex parte Domenici (DC) 8 F2d 366, and to the as-
sumptions of United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Tod (CCA) 297
F 214” See also 9 Words and Phrases, Continuous, p 185.

This court agrees with the conclusion of the district court that
Miss Wilson never became a resident of North Dakota for poor
relief purposes.

Since she was a nonresident of this state, Sec 50-0113 NDRC
1943 applies:

“In case of necessity the county welfare board promptly shall
provide medical and surgical attention for any poor person in
the county who is not provided for in a public institution. Ina

ee 549

county where a county physician has been appointed on an
annual salary, such physician shall be called to attend such poor
person. The county welfare board shall cause to be furnished to
such poor person the medicines prescribed by the physician. In
all cases where, in the opinion of the county welfare board, hos-
pitalization is necessary, it shall be furnished by the county upon
approval or subsequent ratification by the county physician and
the board, or by the board in a county having no county phy-
sician. Where such poor person is a nonresident of the state,
the county furnishing such medical or surgical attention from
and after Jan. 2, 1951, shall be reimbursed from the public wel-
fare fund of the state for 80 per cent of the expenses incurred
in carrying out the provisions of this section. Such reimburse-
ment shall be made upon vouchers having the approval of the
state public welfare board.” ‘The last two sentences contain the
new matter added to See 50-0113 NDRO 1943, by Chapter 283
SL 1951.

Under that chapter it became the duty of Towner County to
take care of Miss Wilson when she was so unceremoniously
thrust upon them. Towner County has done that, and is entitled
to a refund from the Public Welfare fund of this state of 80
per cent of the amount it has expended since Jan. 2, 1951.

We find it more difficult to follow the district court in finding
that Miss Wilson’s residence for poor relief purposes still re-
mains in Minnesota and ordering the Public Welfare Board of
North Dakota to make arrangements to determine the place of
her settlement there and her removal to that place. It is true
that See 50-0219 NDRC 1943 provides that: “If any poor
person who is a legal resident of another state and who is likely
to become a public charge, is found in any county in this state,
the county in which he is found may procure an order of the
court causing his removal to the state of his legal residence.”
That presupposes, however, an admitted legal residence in an-

_ other state so that the unfortunate indigent can be returned
amicably. That does not seem to be the case here. We cannot
pass upon Miss Wilson’s residence for poor relief purposes in
another state.

The judgment of the District Court is modified so as to pro-

550 EEE

vide only that Miss Wilson has-never acquired residencein.North
Dakota for poor relief purposes, and as so modified such: judg-
ment is affirmed.

Morris, 6. J. and Cunistianson, Bunks and Sararg, JJ., con-
cur.. :

—— :
[File No. 7348]

ESTELLA M. LITTLEJOHN, Appellant, v. COUNTY JUDGE,
PEMBINA COUNTY, and THE NORTH: DAKOTA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER, Respondents.

(58 NW2d 279, 39 ALR2d 690)

: * opinion filed March 19, 1958. Rehearing denied May 7, 1953.

|

Mark J. Clayburgh, for appellant.

‘Charles Simon, Estate Tax Attorney, and Kenneth M. Jakes,
Assistant Attorney General, and Fred 8. Snowfield, State’s At-
torney, Pembina County, for respondents.

:y Morris, Ch. J. This is an appeal from an order of the District.
Court of.Pembina County entered April 30,.1952, affirming two
orders of the County Court of Pembina County, pertaining to the
taxability, as part of the estate of James Littlejohn, deceased,
of an interest in certain United States Savings Bonds. Involved
herein are two $100.00. Series EX Bonds issued December 1942,
registered in the names of James Littlejohn or Hstella Little-
john ;.one $500.00 Series E Bond issued September 1947, regis-
tered: in the names. of James Littlejohn or Estella Mac Little-
john;.and one $1,000.00 Series G Bond issued July 10, 1944,
registered in the names of James Littlejohn or Estella Mae
Littlejohn. The County Court of Pembina County, by order
dated November 19, 1951, held that one half of the appraised
value of these bonds was subject to taxation as a part of: the
estate of the deceased.. The county court, by another order
dated December 14, 1951, denied to the appellant, Estella M.
Littlejohn, the right to-a refund of tax paid under protest and
pursuant to the above order in the amount of $16.48. The facts
were stipulated or are undisputed.

‘James Littlejohn died April 23, 1951, at about eighty years of:
age, leaving as heirs and next of kin his aged wife and two adult
sons, and a daughter, who is the appellant in this action. The
daughter for some years prior to his death lived with the

562 a

decedent and his wife as a part of their household. The stipula
tion states:

“That the above described bonds were purchased by the de-
cedent, James Littlejohn; that said bonds were placed in safety
deposit box number 3,616, Grafton National Bank, Grafton,
North Dakota; that.said safety deposit box was registered in the
sole name of Estella Littlejohn; that the decedent gave posses-
sion of said bonds to Estella Littlejohn and as such they were
for her use should:she ever need them for her support.”

The daughter testified by a written statement -under oath,
stipulated to be the equivalent-of a deposition, as follows:

“That said ‘bonds were placed in Safety Deposit: Box 3,616,
Grafton National Bank, Grafton, North Dakota; that said Safety
Deposit Box was registered in my sole name; that at no time
did my father ever infer that these- bonds were to be mine only
mpon his death; that actually, he gave me possession of them
and I placed them in my Safety Deposit Box and I assumed,
as he did, that should I ever need them, they were there for
my use and my use only.”

The court filed a voluminous memorandum opinion to which
reference is made in the order appealed from. In this memoran-
dum the court stated:

“It is agreed that these bonds were purchased by the decedent,
James Littlejohn, who at the time of purchase or shortly there-
after delivered them to his daughter, Estella, who placed and
kept said bonds in her individual safety deposit box which was
registered in her name alone and that said bonds remained in
appellant’s possession, as aforesaid, up to and at the time of
the death of James Littlejohn.”

This statement is not questioned by the respondent.

The appeal from the county court to the district court is on
a question of law. Section 30-2608 NDRC 1943. See also
Mongeon y. Burkebile, ante 234, 55 NW2d 445. That question,
broadly stated and as argued to this court, is whether, under the
facts here presented, the county court erred in determining that
any part of or interest in the bonds in question became a part
of the taxable estate of the decedent.

The position of the state tax commissioner is that the appel-.

ee 553

lant and the deceased, being named in the bonds as co-owners
with right of survivorship, became joint tenants and that one
half of the value of the bonds, as of the date of the death of the
decedent, became a part of his gross estate and subject to the
estate tax under the provisions of Section 57-3706 NDRC 1943,
which provides:

“The gross estate of a decedent shall include the value of
interests in property held as a joint tenant, or deposited in
banks or other institutions in the joint names of the decedent
and any other person, and payable to either or the survivor.
In any such case the value of the decedent’s interest shall be
determined by dividing the value of the entire property by the
number of joint tenants, joint depositors, or persons interested
therein.”

The law in effect on the date of death of the decedent, Chapter
57-3702 NDRC 1949 Supp., provided that the value of the gross
estate of a resident decedent should be determined by including:

“1, All real property within this State;

“2, All tangible personal property, except that which has an
actual situs without this State;

“3, All intangible personal property wherever located;

“4, The net proceeds of all life insurance carried by the
decedent at the time of his death in excess of $25,000.00, whether
made payable to his estate, the widow, heirs, individuals, or
trusts.”

The appellant urges two propositions in support of her con-
tention that no part of the bonds is taxable. She first argues
that the terms of the bonds, the federal law and the regulations
under which they were issued constitute a contract between
the United States and the purchasers of the bonds, and that
the rights of the surviving co-owner arise solely from this con-
tract and not from the law of succession and that the state may
not interfere with the contract by taxing the transfer of the
bonds or any interest therein. The second ground urged by
the appellant is that the facts disclosed by this record show that
the transactions and events which resulted in the appellant’s
ownership of the bonds establish that the transfer of ownership
to the appellant is not taxable under the laws of this state.

554 ee

Savings bonds of the serics involved in this case may. be
registered in the names of two persons as co-owners and, during
the lives of both co-owners, a bond so issued will be paid to either
co-owner upon his request without the signature of the other.
If either co-owner dies while the bond remains a valid obligation,
the surviving co-owner will be recognized as the sole and ab~
solute owner of the bond and is entitled to payment or resissue as
though the bond were registered in his name alone. 1949
Edition, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 2, Fiscal Service,
Section 315.45. Under the same chapter of the Code of Federal
Regulations, it is provided that Series. EB and G Bonds “shall
be subject to estate, inheritance, gift, or other excise taxes,
whether Federal or State, . . . .” (Sections 316.2 and 318.2)"

The appellant’s first contention is supported by the majority-
opinion in Succession of Tanner, a decision of the Court of
Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, appearing in 24 So2d 642.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reached the opposite conclusion’
in the later case of Succession of Raborn, 210 La 1033, 29 So2d
53, in which it was pointed out that under the regulations of
the United States Treasury Department, United States Savings
Bonds, Series E and G, were made subject to estate, inheritance,
gift, or other excise taxes by the federal and state governments
and that no consideration was given to this provision in the
Tanner case. .

Questions relating to the levy of estate and inheritance taxes-
on the transfer of United States Savings Bonds have confronted
the appellate courts of other states in cases which we will briefly
discuss. :

In Hallett v. Bailey, 143 Me 1, 54 Atl2d 533, ‘War Savings
Bonds and Treasury Bonds of the United States of America had
been made payable to the decedent, his wife, or the survivor.
It was contended that to subject these bonds to thé Maine inheri-
tance tax would impair the contract made between the decedent
and the United States. The court pointed out that thé regula-
tions of the Treasury Department provided that the bonds were
subject to inheritance taxes. It was then stated that the ‘inheri-
tance tax law of Maine reached all property passing by survivor-
ship in any form of joint ownership and a petition for the

EE 556

abatement of the tax that had been assessed by the Tax Com-
missioner‘ of the State of Maine was denied. To the same
effect is Gould v. Johnson, 146 Me 366, 82 Atl2d 88. ~

Watkins v. Shaw, 234 NC 96, 65 SH2d 881, involved an
action to recover from the Commissioner of Revenue of the
State of North Carolina a sum paid under protest as inherit-
ance taxes assessed on the transfer to the survivor of certain
United States Savings Bonds, Series IH, purchased by the de-
cedent and made payable to the deceased or his wife as co-
owners. The bonds were kept in a place accessible to both the
decedent and his wife. After pointing out that there was no
claim that there was an inter vivos gift of the bonds by the
decedent to his wife, the court said:

“Therefore, the question for us to determine is simply this:
Should the cash value of United States Savings Bonds, Series
HB; issued and made payable to the- purchaser or his wife, as
co-owners, be included in the estate of the purchaser for inherit-
ance tax purposes, where the purchaser expended his own funds
in the acquisition of the bonds and kept them in a place accessible
to both the purchaser and his wife, but made no inter vivos
gift of the bonds to his wife? We think this question must be
answered in the affirmative.” .

At this point it is clear to us that United States Savings
Bonds, Series E and G, are, by the terms of the regulations
under which they are issued, subject to the operation of the
estate tax law of the state in so far as that law is applicable
under the facts presented in any given instance.

-We now come to the appellant’s second proposition that,
under tlie facts here presented, there is. no taxable transaction
which falls within the terms of the statute. In this connection
we bear in mind that the bonds in question, although purchaséd
with funds belonging to the decedent, were, at the time of pur-
chase or shortly thereafter, by him placed in the possession
of his daughter, the co-owner named in the bonds, who kept them
at all times in her exclusive possession in a place inaccessible to

‘the decedent.

' We find it helpful to continue with our examination of au-
thority from other jurisdictions. In Mitchell v. Carson, 186

556 a

Tenn 228, 209 SW2d 20, the decedent had purchased United
States Savings Bonds, some of which were payable to her
nephews and nieces at her death. Others were payable to
the decedent or the same nephews and nieces. In holding that
the bonds were subject to state inheritance tax, the court pointed
out that the decedent owned an interest in the bonds, which, at
her option, was determinable only by her death and that by
reason of the retention of possession by the decedent the posses-
sion and enjoyment of the bonds by the beneficiaries took effect
only upon her death. Thus the court concluded that the trans-
action was a transfer taking effect in possession, ownership, and
enjoyment at the death of the purchaser of the bonds and they
were therefore taxable under the Tennessee inheritance tax law.

In the case of In re Myers’ Estate, 359 Pa 577, 60 Atl2d
50, the question presented was the right of the state to impose a
transfer inheritance {ax on the full cash value of United States
Savings Bonds, Series E, purchased by the decedent and issued
in his name and that of his sister, as co-owner. The sister con-
tended that only one half of the cash value of the bonds was
taxable since she and her brother were joint tenants and co-
owners. The court pointed out that, although the bonds by
their terms were legally redeemable upon their presentation by
either the deceased or his sister, this right was incapable of
performance since the deceased retained exclusive possession
and no valid gift inter vivos of any interest in the bonds took
place. The court then stated:

“Both appellant’s possession and enjoyment of the bonds in
question were postponed until the donor’s death since no previ-
ous access to them was made available to her. To permit a
transfer inheritance tax exemption on all government bonds
issued in the co-ownership form without examining the cireum-
stances of each case, would encourage the practice of investing
one’s estate in such bonds and registering them in joint names
for the purpose of circumventing the payment of a legitimate
exaction.”

In the case of In re Rummel’s Estate, 74 SD 131, 49 NW
2d 380, the deceased had purchased United States Bonds, some
of which were payable to the deceased or his sister, and others

ee) 587

were payable to the deceased or a brother. They were purchased
with the decedent’s funds and remained in his exclusive posses-
sion until death. The court points out that the deceased had
the right to cash the bonds at any time without consent of
the co-owners who had no legal claim to possession: which they
could assert prior to death of the purchaser. It was held that
the bonds represented transactions that resulted in a transfer
of property “intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after” the death of the donor and that the bonds
were taxable as a part of the estate of the decedent. It should
be noted that in these cases the possession of the bonds was
an important factor in the decision. In each case the decedent
purchased the bonds with his own funds and kept. the bonds in
his possession until his death. All of the cases hold that the
bonds were taxable at least in part. In the case before us the
facts with respect to possession are reversed. The decedent,
who was the purchaser, transferred exclusive possession to the
person named in the bonds as co-owner. Under the terms of
the bonds and the regulations under which they were purchased,
the co-owner had.a right to cash the bonds at any time without
the consent of the decedent. Her right to possession and enjoy-
ment of the bonds, including the right to cash them, was im-
mediate, complete, and exclusive.

We find nothing in the federal statutes or regulations under
which the bonds were issued-which prohibits a gift inter vivos
as between co-owners named in a bond.

“A completed gift inter vivos is a transfer of property made
voluntarily and without consideration, effective immediately and
irrevocably on an unconditional delivery, actual or symbolical,
having regard to the circumstances and the nature of the prop-
erty.” First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 66 ND 160,
262 NW 596.

The Supreme Court of Montana has, thrown helpful light on
our problem as a result of two comparatively recent decisions.
In State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont 9, 195 Pac2d
989, the factual situation was about the same as that presented
in the cases we have discussed. The decedent had purchased
United States Savings Bonds, Series G, payable to the decedent

5B8 a

and a co-owner. The bonds were kept in the decedent’s safety
deposit box to which none of the co-owners had access. The
district court held that one half of the value of the bonds was
taxable under the state inheritance tax laws. The majority of
the supreme court held that the co-owners or alternate payees
had no rights whatsoever as long as the bonds were in the
possession of the decedent and that the bonds were taxable under
the inheritance tax laws at their full market value.

In re Brown’s Estate, 122 Mont 451, 206 Pac2d 816, discloses
that a mother authorized her daughter to draw money from the
bank and purchase United States Savings Bonds and register
them in the name of the mother and daughter, as co-owners.
The bonds were deposited in a box held jointly with the mother.
The majority of the court reached the conclusion that there’
was no gift inter vivos and that on the death of the mother the
full value of the bonds was subject to inheritance tax. Two
members of the court thought that the tax should be assessed
against one half of the value of the bonds. The majority of
the court in commenting on the case of State Board of Equaliza-
tion v. Cole, supra, made these statements which are of interest
to us under the facts presented in this case:

“We did indicate, however, that if there had been an actual
delivery of the bonds after such registration, a completed
gift would been made.”
and

“We hold that if there has been an actual delivery of the bonds
themselves it constitutes a present inter vivos gift of the bonds.”

We reach the conclusion that the bonds in question might
properly be made the subject of a completed gift inter vivos
as between the co-owners thereof. This is consistent with the
contract with the United States of America under which they
were issued that permits either co-owner to apply for and re-
eeive payment of the value of the bonds without consent of
the other. The bonds were delivered voluntarily and uncon-
ditionally by the deceased to his daughter over three years prior
to his death. From the time of delivery the decedent had no
right to or interest in the bonds which he might legally .en-
force. No interest therein passed to the appellant upon his

a 559

‘death, his interest having vested in her upon the completion of
the gift. Section 57-3701 NDRC 1943 imposes a tax upon a
transfer of the net estate of every decedent. The bonds not
‘being a part of the estate of the decedent and no interest in
the bonds having passed to the appellant upon the death of
the decedent, no estate tax can be imposed. The order of the
district court appealed from is reversed and the case is re-
manded with instructions to the district court to enter ap-
propriate orders reversing the orders of the county court from
which the appeal to the district court was taken.

Bourxe, Sarure, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Morris, Ch. J. (On petition for rehearing.) In a courteous
and carefully prepared petition for rehearing the respondents
question our determination that Series E and G Bonds payable
to co-owners may be made the subject of a gift inter vivos be-
tween the co-owners and it is argued that such a determination
is contrary to federal regulations, particularly Section 315.17
of the 1941 Supplement to the Code of Federal Regulations,
which provides: : ,

“The ownership of a savings bond or interest therein may be
transferred or established through valid judical proceedings:
Provided, however, That no such proceedings will be recognized
if they would give effect to an attempted voluntary transfer
inter vivos of the bond or would defeat or impair the rights of
survivorship conferred by the regulations in this part upon
co-owners and beneficiaries.”

As we read this and other federal regulations, when a: bond
of the co-owner type is issued, each co-owner becomes vested
with a present interest in the bond, and the bond itself and
the regulations confer the right of survivorship upon the co-
owner. There is nothing in these regulations to prohibit the
transfer from one co-owner to the other of his interest in
the bond. It is true, of course, that such a transfer cannot in
arly way impair the right of the United States to discharge its
obligation under the bond in the manner provided by the bond
and regulations: By making payment to the survivor, but the
preservation of that right in the government does not result

560 —

in the abrogation of the right of one co-owner to transfer to the
other co-owner, by gift inter vivos or otherwise, his interest in
jointly owned property and the transfer of such an interest by
one co-owner to another is not a violation of the regulatory
provisions prohibiting transfer of United States Savings Bonds.

“This question, in a case coming to our attention since the
filing of our fornier opinion, has been considered by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, In re Hendricksen’s Estate, 156 Neb 463, 56
NwW2d 711, in which it is said:

“The primary purpose of the Treasury Department regula-
tions is to prevent the government from being involved in suits
between claimants to government bonds. Thesé Treasury De-
partment regulations refer to the bonds themselves, provid-
ing protection to the government if its agents pay the named
owner or co-owner. . . . It seems clear that the federal laws
and regulations are not intended to interfere with the positive
act of two co-owners of bonds by which one conveys her interest
in them to the other.”

We also find that the Supreme Court of Montana in a case
more recent than those cited in our opinion has said:

“Tf the person who advanced the consideration for the pur-
chase of the bonds relinquishes dominion and control over
them, they are treated as a gift and taxed as a transfer in
contemplation of death. After the expiration of the presump-
tive period and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the gift
is an absolute inter vivor gift and not taxable. If there is no
delivery of the bonds’ by the purchaser to the cotenant whose
name appears thereon, the transfer is one to take effect at or
after death and taxable as such.” In re Marsh’s Estate, 125
Mont 239, 234 Pac2d 459.

Our decision is in accord with these cases and is neither con-
trary to nor does it interfere with the regulations of the Treas-
ury Department pertaining to the purchase, transfer, and pay-
ment of Series EZ and G Bonds. We adhere-to our opinion as
written.

Grimson, Curistianson, Sarpre and Burxs, JJ., concur.

Let
[File No. 7341]

MADELINE FLECK, Appellant, v. MARCUS FLECK, Re-
spondent.

(58 NW2d 765)

561

562 ee

Opinion filed May 15, 1953

& Foster, tor appellant.

on, for respondent.

Grmsoy, J, This is an action for divorce. Plaintiff asks
for a divorce from her husband on the grounds of cruel and
inhuman treatment and for support and division of property.
The defendant denies the cruel and inhuman treatment generally
and filed a cross complaint asking for a divorce on the grounds
of cruel and inhuman treatment on the part of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff makes reply denying defendant’s cross complaint gen-
erally. The district court denied divorce to both parties and
denied support to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals and asks for a
trial de novo.

The plaintiff and defendant were married at Wibaux, Mon-
tana, on Jan. 25, 1947. Both are citizens of the United States
and bona fide residents of the State of North Dakota for more
than one year next preceding the commencement of the action.
Both had been married and divorced. No children were born’
to this marriage.

At the time of the marriage the defendant owned a building
located on West Main. St., Mandan, North Dakota, in which
he conducted a bar. ‘After the marriage the main room of
that building was divided along the center and a restaurant
established on one side while the bar was maintained on the
other, The plaintiff operated the restaurant while the defendant:
operated the bar. The plaintiff kept the books. In 1948 de-
fendant bought lots on East Main St.; in Mandan .and the
parties cooperated in the construction and operation of a motel.
court thereon. he

The testimony by the plaintiff and in her behalf shows that
trouble soon arose between them. In September 1947 plain--
tiffs father was ill in a Minneapolis Hospital:. The family de-

564 es

cided to go down to see him. Plaintiff wanted to go along.
The defendant. refused to give her permission. She went any-
how. When she, in 1949, wanted to go to see her father who
was again in the hospital, defendant again refused and said:
“If you go, don’t come back.” She went anyhow and when she
eame back he said: “What do youwant . . . I told you not
to come back.” He aceused her mother of immoral conduct and
called her bad and indecent names. The defendant forbade the
plaintiff to associate with her people. He called them “hill-
billies” and other derogatory names. He did not want her to
allow them to come to their home and at one time after defendant
had seen her mother coming from their home he said: “If I ever
catch her up here I will throw her down the stairway and break
her — — neck.” He repeatedly told plaintiff when she was
going with her people: “If you go, don’t come back.” He
made her wash the telephone when her sister had used it.
He refused to let her go home for Father’s Day until a friend
intervened. At the time of one of the Minneapolis trips when
her sister, Mrs. Chadwick, was urging defendant to let her go
and on his. refusal called him a “slave driver” he got mad,
called her a bad name and said: “Are you going to get out of
here?” This attitude of the defendant towards plaintiff's people
seems to have continued throughout their entire married life.
This is not only the plaintifi’s testimony but is corroborated by
her sisters and by a maid who worked in the motor court. De-
fendant’s own testimony is somewhat of an indirect admission
along that line. He says: “We didn’t quarrel so much about
them but what I wanted was reasonable visiting. . . . Qu
Now you heard Mrs. Chadwick testify that you told your wife
that she could not go up to the bars to slut around or words to
that effect? Ans.— I did.not say that, not that word.”

It is clear that the defendant had a strong antipathy towards
plaintiff's relatives and used every effort to keep her from any
association with them. Plaintiff, on the other hand, seems to
have had a strong attachment for her relatives and desired their
company. The conduct of the defendant in that regard was
unreasonable: In Gratz v. Gratz, 137 Fla 709, 188 So 580, it is
said: ‘“There seems to have been an abundance of testimony to

Le 565

show-repeatéd declarations by the appellant execrating appel-
lee’s parents and applying to them humiliating and profane
epithets. These expressions, at a time when the domestic atmos-
phere was far-from tranquil, were obviously intended: to.injure
her sensibilities and cause her mental distress.” The court held
such conduct warranted granting the wife a divorce on the ground
of extreme cruelty. In Donald v. Donald, 21 Fla 571, it is said
that abuse and mistreatment of her relatives far exceed the
effect of a blow in their damaging effect upon the health and
happiness of a woman. See also 17 Am Jur Divorce and Sep-
aration, Sec 71, p 185.

Apparently defendant was jealous of her. When she went
out alone he admits he watched her to see where she went and
what she did. _He frequently accused her of being with other
men. He claimed she continually flirted with the customers
at the restaurant and visited barrooms with some of them. Of
defendant’s testimony on these claims the trial court found that
“The evidence discloses that it is based mostly on conjecture
and suspicion and is not corroborated in any manner,” Plain-
tiff claims defendant accused her of infidelity, which he admits,
and that he called her the most indecent names possible indicat-
ing infidelity. Her sisters and a maid testify they heard him
do that. Defendant admits calling her a “chippy.” Defendant
offered no evidence to justify such charges.

“Unfounded accusations of infidelity may inflict such grievous
mental suffering as to amount to extreme cruelty.” Buf v. Ruff,
78 ND 775, 52 NW2d 107 and cases cited.

“As a general rule, unfounded accusations of miscondnet,
tending to degrade and humiliate the accused spouse may war-
rant a divorce for cruelty.” 27 CJS, Divorce, See 28 b p 555.
See also 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation, Sec 66, p 183.

The handling of their finances and her management of the
restaurant seem to have been matters of continual bickering
between them. Plaintiff claims she could never do anything
to please him. Both drank some intoxicating liquor which made
matters worse. Plaintiff claims defendant abused her for want-
ing to go to church. When she at one time went anyhow he be-
came so angry over it that he pounded his. desk, broke a glass

"566 a

and threw 4 shoe at her. Another time when she came back
from’ Bismarék ‘with some friends and was drinking beer with
them in her homé he slapped her in the face, leaving a little mark
and pushed her off the chair. Hor glasses were knocked off.

In a proposed written agreement for a condonation, which
defendant signed and unsuccessfully sought’ to have plaintiff
sign, itis stated:

“Whereas, the parties hereto have had some serious marital
difficulties during the time of their marriage, which have been
occasioned by and’ are due: “(1) to occasional quarrels during
which the party of the second part (the defendant) called the
party of the first part, (the plaintiff) vile and insulting names;
(2) to conduct towards each other which at times has been un-
kind, unfair and cruel; (3) to the use of force by the party of
the second part (the defendant) on the party of the first part
(the plaintiff) on one occasion when he slapped her in the face.”

Thus defendant admits calling plaintiff names and slapping
ler. On his part he admits unkind, unfair and cruel treatment
towards plaintiff. She refused to sign this document.

“It is generally held that where occasional acts of physical
violence are resorted to by a spouse in connection with the con-
tinued use of vile and offensive language, the entire course
of conduct will constitute cruelty although the physical violence
is not sufficient standing alone to warrant a divorce.” 17 Am
Jur, Divorce and Separation, Sec 62, p 181; Doolittle v. Doolittle,
78 Iowa 691, 43 NW 616, 6 LRA 187. See also annotation in
Ann Cas 1918B 489 and cases cited.

Plaintiff claims this conduct on the part of the defendant
continually upset her, caused her mental worry and distress;
that it made her nervous and that she suffered continual head-
aches therefrom for which she had to take medicine. She claims
to have been in fear of him and was corroborated on that by a
maid. All this conduct on defendant’s part would naturally tend
to afféct plaintiff’s health and happiness. Plaintiff's evidence
establishes a cause for divorce.

Defendant argues that there is not sufficient corroboration
of plaintiff's evidence. This court has held that the statute
requiring corroboration must be interpreted in the light of its

a : Bird
purpose. The reason for that statute is said to be for. the pre-
vention of collusion. Clopton v. Clopton, 11 ND 212; 219, 91
NW 46. In Tuttle v. Tuttle, 21 ND 503, 518, 131 NW 460,
Ann Cas 1913B 1, this court approves that conclusion in Clopton
v. Clopton and holds that: “Where the whole-case precludes any
possibility of collusion, the corroboration need be slight.” See
also Thompson v. Thompson, 32 ND 580, 156 NW.492.. Clearly
there was no collusion in the case at bar.’ We find the evidence
sufficiently corroborates plaintiff’s testimony.

Plaintiff had left defendant three of four times. In spite
of his injunction to her on such occasions not to come-back she
had come back. The Jast of these occasions was in December
1950. She went to her folks. In a few days defendant persuaded
her to come back. She-then lived with him as his wife until
August 24, 1951. It is.claimed and the district.court found:that
this amounted to condonation of all past causes for divorce.

-Section 14-0513 NDRC 1943 provides:

* “Condonation is the conditional forgiveness of a ‘matrimonial
offense constituting a cause of divorce. The following require-
ments are necessary to condonation:

1. A knowledge on the part.of the condoner of the facts

constituting the cause of divorce;

2. Reconciliation and remission of the, offense. by the i in.
. jured person; and

3. Restoration of the offending party to all marital rights.
.. “Condonation implies a condition subsequent that the. for-
giving party must be treated with conjugal kindnessi When
the cause.of divorce consists of a.course of :offensive.acts of ill
treatment, which aggregately may constitute the offense, cohabi-
tation or passive endurance, or conjugal kindness shall not bé
evidence of condonation of any of the acts constituting such
cause, unless accompanied by an express agreement to: condone.
In such cases, condonation can be made only after the cause
of divorce has become complete as to the acts complained of. A
fraudulent concealment by the condonee of facts-constituting a
different cause of divorce from the one condoned’and existing
at the time of condonation. avoids such condonation. ”? " Ctalies
supplied.) wet

568 a

This statute was considered in Taylor v. Taylor, 5 ND 58,
63 NW 893, and the court reached this conclusion, stated in the
syllabus :

“In an action for divorce on the ground of cruelty, cohabita-
tion after‘such cruelty does not establish condonation, in the
absence of an express agreement to condone.”

In this case the evidence establishes a ground for divorce on
behalf of the plaintiff that comes squarely within the italicized
portion of the above statute. The defendant over a period of
several years pursued a course of cruel and offénsive conduct
toward the plaintiff which constituted grounds for divorce under
Sections 14-0503 and 14-0505 NDRC 1943.

The trial court found as a fact: .

“That the defendant upon cross-examination of the plaintiff
established the fact that the plaintiff-had left the defendant just
before Christmas in 1950, that she returned to him during the
holidays, and lived and co-habited with him from January
Ist, 1951 to August 24th, 1951, when she left him and lived
separate and apart from him; that from January Ist, 1951 up to
the time she left him on August 24th of the said year, the
parties did not have any serious trouble, and the Court finds
that during said time the plaintiff with knowledge of the de-
fendant’s. conduct towards her and all of the acts and things
which she has complained of condoned such acts and conduct
of the defendant committed prior thereto, upon which she has
relied for divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty, and that
the plaintiff and the defendant became reconciled and thereafter
lived and co-habited together from January 1st, 1951 to August
24, of said year when she left him to live separate and apart
from him.”

The court then reached this conclusion of law:

. “That the conduct and acts of the defendant upon which the
plaintiff ‘relied for a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty
were condoned by the plaintiff with full knowledge of all of
the material facts and attending circumstances, that the parties
became reconciled during the Christmas holidays of December,
1950, and that they lived and co-habited together as husband
and wife from January Ist, 1951, to August 24th, of the same

| 569

year when plaintiff left the defendant, and has lived separate
and.apart from him since said time.”

In reaching his conclusion, it is apparent that the trial court
overlooked our statutory declaration with respect to condona-
tion in cruelty cases. There is no evidence of an express agree-
ment to condone. Under cross-examination to which the court
refers, the plaintiff testified that shortly before Christmas in
1950 she went to’ the home of her parents after the defendant
had told her to get out. Shortly thereafter the defendant came
out to see her. On one occasion he was alone and on the other
he was accompanied by his attorney. On the first visit she
refused to return with the defendant. On the second visit she
returned after the defendant and his attorney made a lot of
promises. She does not say what the promises were, but says:
“I, didn’t believe it but I thought I would try it.” -After the
holidays she came back to live with the defendant and lived with
him up until August 24, 1951. During. that time they had a
“Jot of arguments” over: her relatives. She left again after a
quarrel on August 24, 1951, as a climax of repeated arguments
and continual nagging all that summer.

Condonation of cruelty resulting from a course of conduct over
a considerable period of time stands on a different basis than
coridonation of grounds for divorce consisting of a single act,
as, for instance, adultery.. 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation,
Sec '210, p 257; Annotation in 14 ALR 933. A number of states
have statutes the same or similar to our Section 14-0513 NDRC
1943 requiring an express agreement to establish condonation
in certain cases of cruelty. Under a California statute very
similar to ours an express agreement to condone is held neces-
sary to support a finding of condonation. Shaingold v. Shain-
gold, 191 Cal 438, 216 Pac 603; Whinnery v. Whinnery, 21 Cal
App 59, 130 Pac 1065; Hunter v. Hunter, 132 Cal 473, 64 Pac
772; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal 183, 48 Pac 730, 51 Pac 183; Morton
v. Morton, 117 Cal 443, 49 Pac 557; Johnson v. Johnson, 4 Cal
Unrep 446, 35 Pac 637. “In an action for divorce on the ground
of cruelty: there can be no condonation unless there is a recon-
ciliation between the parties, a remission of the matrimonial

570 De

offenses, and an express agreement to condone.” Morton y.
Morton, supra. :

In Saville v. Saville, 103 Ore 117, 203 Pac 584, it is said:

In this state condonation of a matrimonial offense,- except
adultery, cannot be established by-implication from the volun-
tary co-habitation -of the parties after, knowledge thereof. To
constitute a bar for any of the causes of divorce named in the
statute, except adultery, the offense must have been expressly
forgiven, . . . :

“The defendant did not allege, or attempt to prove, that plain-
tiff had expressly forgiven the acts of cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, which he admitted he inflicted upon her; he relied en-
tirely upon forgiveness which he urged the court to-imply from
the fact of marital cohabitation continuing for some time after
the acts of cruelty were committed. This the court is not per-
mitted to do in view of the statute, and accordingly plaintiff.
was not barred from obtaining a decree of divorce based on the
acts claimed by defendant to have been condoned.” <

That case was later cited with approval in Claude v. Glande,
180 Ore 62, 174 Pac2d 179; Brennan v.-Brennan, 183 Ore 269, 192
Pac2d 858; and Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 191 Ore "314,
229 Pacdd 956. , a

Without referring to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, in Cudahy v. Cudahy, 217 Wis 355, 258 NW 168,
has this to say:

“While cruel and inhuman treatment may be condoned, there
is quite a difference between cruel and inhuman treatment con-
sisting of a long succession of relatively trivial incidents, the
whole pattern of which may constitute a ground for divorce, and
single acts such as adultery or assault which, taken alone, may
constitute grounds for divoree. By hypothesis, the conduct of
defendant would not in any of its single instances constitute a
ground for divorce. It was the continuity and the persistence
of this conduct that ultimately gave plaintiff a cause.of action.
If marital intercourse or continued living together is to be treat:
ed as condonation, then a spouse who hopes for improvement
in conduct, and continues marital relations in the hope, that
things may eventually. straighten out, is, by the very act of toler-

Le bri

ance, barred from securing a divorce. On the other hand; should
the spouse, after one or two instances of such conduet, sue for
divorce, he or she would be met with the argument that one or
two instances of this sort do'not constitute grounds for divorce.
The doctrine of-condonation was not intended to create such a
dilemma. It has no application here. ‘ Even if it did have, it
would. be a conditional forgiveness and subject to the implied
condition that the conduct shall not be repeated and that the
cause of action shall be revived by conduct much slighter than
that which preceded it.’ See also Bickford v. Bickford, 94
Mont 314, 22 Pac2d 306; Quient v. Quient, 105 Wash 315, 177
Pace 779; McCarthy v. McCarthy, 123 Conn 409, 195 Atl 607.

In the case at bar condonation was not pleaded and does not
seem to have been relied upon as a defense. The defendant gave
no testimony tending to establish an express agreement in com-
pliance with our statute and no such-agreement is established
by the testimony of the plaintiff, either on direct or cross-exam-
ination, or by any other evidence. The trial court was clearly
in error in disregarding the requirements of the statute and in
finding that plaintiff's cause of action for a divorce was destroyed
by condonation which was neither pleaded nor established by
the evidence.

> We have concluded that the plaintiff has proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that she has suffered continued cruel
and inhuman treatment at the hands of the defendant. The
legitimate ends and objects of this marriage have been de-
stroyed.. This is indicated by the fact that both are seeking
divorce upon identical grounds, towit: cruel and inhuman treat-
ment. It is further shown by clauses 4 and 5 in the proposed
agreement of condonation, heretofore referred to, which said the
difficulties existing between them were occasioned by and due:
“(4) to mutual accusations and.distrust of each other’s inten-
tions; (5) to the fact-that the party of the first part has left
the home of the parties on several occasions for a short period
of time by reason of' the difficulties they had, after which she
returned again to assume the marriage relationship.” Here de-
fendant admitted, by signing this document, his accusations
and distrust of plaintiffs intentions and that the occasions when

572, a

plaintiff had left home were caused “by reason of the difficulties
they had.” While in the instant case violence was resorted
to only once, defendant’s conduct with the plaintiff in regard
to her family, his use of abusive and vulgar language, his con-
tinual criticism of plaintiff’s actions and his unfounded accusa-
tions of infidelity.on her part were such that would necessarily
cause any woman grievous suffering. While the plaintiff may
not have been free from all fault the evidence does not justify
defendant’s conduct towards her. In Thompson y. Thompson, 32
ND 530, 156 NW 492, this court held that:

“Any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband
or wife which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the
other as to seriously impair bodily health, or utterly destroy
the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes ex-
treme cruelty within the meaning of the statute, although no
physical or personal violence may be inflicted.” See also Ruff
v. Ruff, supra.

Plaintiff in her complaint asked that the defendant be re-
quired to pay “a suitable sum for plaintiff’s support and that
the property of plaintiff and defendant be divided into an amount
to be decreed by the court . . . to be the property of this
plaintiff.” The defendant in his answer prayed “that the court
determine the amount which the defendant, (1) should pay to
the plaintiff as permanent alimony or for her support and main-
tenance and fix the time of payment, or (2) the amount which
plaintiff should pay, in a lump sum, in full discharge of all his
obligations arising out of the marriage relationship.” These
prayers were after each party had asked for a divorce. The
district court made an order for the defendant to pay the plain-
tiff for her support during the pendency of the action, $25.00 per
week. During the trial both parties fully submitted their evi-
dence on the property owned by the parties at the time of their
marriage and up to the time of the trial. After consideration
of the whole case the court in its conclusions and order for
judgment directed that this. order for support be “in all things,
annulled, vacated and set aside” and made no allowance whatever
for the support of the plaintiff although she was then living
separate and apart from the defendant. The appeal was taken

ST

Le 573

from the judgment and the whole thereof. In the briefs and .
on the argument the matter of property division was fully argued
and submitted to this court: Plaintiff’s request to this court
is “that the plaintiff be awarded . . . division of the prop-
erty.”

In his brief the defendant states:

“The defendant concedes that if the court grants a divorce
that then it has the power to make an equitable division of the
property under the provisions of Section 14-0524 RC 1943.
On this issue the defendant contends: (1) That the property
which the defendant owned prior to his marriage to plaintiff
is his own separate property and is not community property
or subject to equitable distribution. (2) That the rents and
profits or income derived from the rental of the property that
he owned prior to his marriage to the plaintiff are not com-
munity property nor subject to distribution in this action. (3)
That the income and money earned by the defendant since
August 24, 1951 when plaintiff left him and during which time
the parties have lived separate and apart is the separate prop-
erty of the defendant and not subject to distribution. (4) That
only the Motel Court, furnishings and appliances and Buick
automobile constitute community property. (5) That only the
equity in the community property: (a) after deducting the
debts and obligations chargeable against it, and (b) after deduct-
ing the contribution which the defendant made from his separate
property to the acquisition thereof, is subject to the equitable
distribution by: the court should a divorce be granted.”

This court has under somewhat similar circumstances passed
upon property rights in a divorce action. Henry v. Henry, 77
ND 845, 46 NW2d 701. See also Christianson v. Warehouse
Association, 5 ND 438, 67 NW 300, 32 LRA 730.

In Ruff v. Ruff, supra, this court says:

“When a divorce is granted the court is required to make
such equitable distribution of the real and personal property
of the parties as may seem just and proper. Sec 14-0542 NDRC
1943, the distribution to be made depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Agrest v. Agrest, 75
ND 318, 27 NW2d 697. There is no rigid rule for the division of

574 —

property but the ultimate object to-be sought is'an equitable
distribution. Byrne v. Byrne, 315 Mich 441, 24 NW2d 173;
Casciola v. Casciola, 317 Mich 485, 27 NW2d 65; Jensen v.
Jensen, 144 Neb 857, 15 NW2d.57; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 58 SD
472, 237 NW 568.”

The evidence shows that.at-the time of the marriage of the
parties the defendant was the owner of the.property described
as Lot 10 in Block 10 of the original townsite‘of Mandan, upon
which was located a building in which he conducted a liquor
business. :

This building, the bar and the furnishings as’ well as th
income therefrom are entirely the property of the defendant.
The plaintiff did nothing in reference thereto to give her a share
in that property or its income. Except for necessary support
the wife has no interest in the property of her husband. Sec
14-0704 NDRC 1943. In Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal App2d 682, 187
Pac2d 28, the Supreme Court of California held, in effect, that
the property which the husband acquired before his marriage
remained his separate property, and since the wife had made
no contribution thereto she was not entitled to receive a part
thereof. In Burch v. Rice, 37 Wash2d 185, 222 Pac2d 847, the
Supreme Court of Washington said:

“The rule is well settled in this state that the status of property
as community or separate is to be determined as of the date
of its acquisition, and that if it is separate property at that time:
it will remain separate property through all of its changes
and transitions as long as it can be traced and identified; and,
further, that its rents, issues and profits remain separate prop-
erty.” (And cases cited.) See also Schlak.v. Schlak, 51 ND.
897, 201 NW 832; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 69 ND 208, 285 NW 75;
McLean v. McLean, 69 ND 665, 290 NW 913.

After their marriage defendant’s barroom was divided so
that plaintiff operated the restaurant on one side and he operated
the bar on the other. The defendant sold the bar and fixtures
for $11,000.00 and then rented the barroom to the purchaser
for $125.00 per month. The fixtures and furniture of the restau-
rant were purchased and paid for out of the proceeds of the
business. Plaintiff claims the cost thereof to have been $5000.00,

Es 515

When the plaintiff ceased to operate the restaurant it was rented,
together with furniture and fixtures, for $250.00 per month,
There is no testimony as to what portion of that rent was for
the building and what was for the furnishings. Defendant can,
therefore, not claim any of that rent as separate property and
it will all be treated as going into the building of their joint
property—the motel court. The barroom rental is the property
of the defendant without any right therein by the plaintiff.

In 1948, the parties jointly planned and constructed the motel
court on Hast Main St. in the City of Mandan. Except what was
contributed by the defendant as proceeds from the incréase in
the mortgage on the bar building and proceeds from the sale
of the bar business and income from the rental of the barroom,
the building of the motel court was mainly financed by loans and
the credit of the defendant.

The evidence as to the value of the motel court is not very
definite. The plaintiff claims that it cost $76,000.00 and basing
the value on the net income in 1950, defendant claims that it
was worth more than $100,000.00 at the time of the trial. De-
fendant claims that it cost about $64,000.00 and presented a
statement in the evidence claimed to have been made from de-
fendant’s books to support that. He, however, admits that it
was worth $70,000.00 at the time of the trial. We have come
to the conclusion that the reasonable value of the motel court was
$75,000.00. Another item on which there is a dispute in the
evidence was on the value of the furniture and fixtures of the
restaurant. Defendant claims that plaintiff’s estimate of $5000.-
00 is too high. Moreover, the property had been used almost
four years at the time of the trial and such property depreci-
ates fast.’ The court, therefore, finds the value of that property
to be $2500.00 at the time of the trial.

On that basis the evidence shows the following as the value of
the joint property of the parties at the time of the trial:

576 a

Value of the Motel Court, $75,000.00
Indebtedness and deductions: :
Bal. due on first mortgage, $18,833.00
Bal. due on ‘second mortgage, 5,000.00
- Due Kennelly Furniture Co. 1,650.00
Due Montgomery Ward Co. 195.00
Real estate taxes due, 1,708.10
Personal property taxes, 222.60
U. 8. Government tax liens, 8,181.00
Interest on income taxes, 228.30
Proceeds from increase in
mortgage on bar building, 7,500.00 '
Proceeds from sale of
bar business, 11,000.00
Income from barroom rental, 1,190.00
“Total, $55,708.00 55,708.00
Net value of Motel Court, $19,292.00
Furniture and fixtures of
restaurant, $2,500.00
Other joint property, 1,410.00 8,910.00
Total, $23,202.00

On this basis the net value of plaintiff and defendant in their
joint property is $23,202.00. The question then arises what
is an equitable division thereof according to the facts and cir-
cumstances in this case?

As to the plaintiff the evidence showed that she is a young
woman of 36 years of age; that since her separation from the
defendant she has recovered her good health; that she is a good
cook and trained’ for the management of a restaurant, of fair
earning ability and is capable of earning her- own living; that
she has been working ina restaurant since the commencement
of this action; that there are no children; that although about
30 years, of age at the time of this marriage she had nothing to
contribute to the accumulation of the property except her labor

| 577

and help in planning and management. There is also the fact
that this marriage has lasted less than five years and that the
plaintiff is not entirely blameless for its failure.

On the other hand the evidence shows that defendant is a
middle aged man in good health; that he owned property at the
time of the marriage from the proceeds of which, together with
defendant’s credit the parties were enabled to construct this
motel court; that his work and his credit standing have been
worth considerable more in the building of the motel court then
everything plaintiff contributed; that the motel court is heavily
encumbered on which indebtedness there are installments of
over $1100.00 due each month; that the project still needs his
credit standing to succeed; that for his actions against plain-
tiff he had some provocation on her part.

All these matters enter into a determination of what is an
equitable division of the property. See Ruff v. Ruff, supra;
Agrest v. Agrest, 75 ND 318, 27 NW2d 697; Holmes v. Holmes,
152 Neb 556, 41 NW2d 919; Ristow v. Ristow, 152 Neb 615, 41
NW2d 924.

The court is of the opinion that under the circumstances
of this case the division of the joint property of the plaintiff
and defendant should be made on the basis of one-third to the
plaintiff and two-thirds to the defendant. The property cannot
be divided so that it is the conclusion of this court that the de-
fendant in lieu of all support and alimony pay to the plaintiff
the sum of $7,734.00, being one-third of the net value of the joint
property, with interest at 4 per cent from the date of the final
judgment herein and payable, $534.00 within thirty days of the
date of the final judgment, $1200.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1953,
$2000.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1954, $2000.00 on or before Oct. 1,
1955, and $2000.00 on or before Oct. 1, 1956, with interest at 4
per cent on all deferred payments. It is further directed that
said sum be a lien on all the property of the defendant including
the motel court and his bar property. Sec 28-2013 NDRC 1943.
Upon payment of said sum plaintiff shall have no further interest
in this property.

The trial court awarded plaintiff the sum of $100.00 as attor-

a

878 Ee

ney fee at the beginning of this action. The trial in district
court occupied three days and on appeal two appearances have
been made in the Supreme Court. We are of the opinion that
the defendant should pay -to the plaintiff an additional $500.00
for attorney fees and the taxable costs of this action in district
court and on appeal.

The judgment of the district court is reversed arid the ¢ case
is remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance
herewith.

Morris, C. J., and Sarure, J., concur.

Curistianson, J. (Dissenting) I dissent.
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce against the defendant
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The statute (NDRC 1943, 14-
0505) declares “extreme cruelty is infliction by one party to the
marriage of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering
upon the other.” The defendant answered in denial and also by
way of counterclaim alleged extreme cruelty on the pait of plain-
tiff. After a prolonged trial and the examination of a large
number of witnesses including both plaintiff and defendant all
of whom appeared in person and testified before the court, the
trial court found that the allegations of extreme cruelty were
not proven by either side, also, that acts testified to by the plain-
tiff had been condoned and the court ordered.a dismissal both
of the complaint and of the counterclaim. The plaintiff appeals
and asks for a trial anew in this Court. The original legislation
providing for such appeal was enacted by the Legislative Assem-
. bly in the early history of the State. Laws 1893, Chapter 82.
In Christianson et al v. Warehouse Association, 5 ND 438, 67
NW 300, 82 LRA 730, it was contended the statute was uncon-
stitutional in this that it attempted “to confer upon this Court
, a jurisdiction not conemplated or permitted by the Constitution.”
This Court sustained the constitutiondlity of the act and in so
doing considered what this Court was required to do under.

the statute. In its opinion in the case this Court said: *
. “Broadly stated, the objections urged against this law is
|

Le 579

that it attempts to confer original jurisdiction upon this court,
while, under the constitution, our jurisdiction is appellate only,
except in certain specified cases.” 5 ND at p 442.

“That statute says that this court ‘shall try the case anew.’
This language, it is apparent, was not used with exact accuracy.
The case is not tried anew. There is no new evidence or any
evidence adduced in this court. The case must be decided
upon a record already prepared by a judicial tribunal. This
court simply reviews the record, and the practical and necessary
result of such review is to correct the errors, if any, either of
the law or fact into which the:court below may have fallen.
« .. Lhe judgment of the trial court upon the facts must still
have weight and influence with this court, especially whén based
upon the testimony of witnesses who appeared in person before
that court.” 5 ND at pp 443, 444. (Italics supplied)

The rule announced in Christianson et al v. Warehouse Asso-
ciation, supra, that on a trial de novo on appeal “the judgment
of the trial court upon the facts must still have weight and
influence with this court, especially when based upon the testi-
mony of witnesses who appeared in person before that court,”
has been adhered to and applied by this Court in many-subse-
quent cases. See Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Sack, 50 ND
381, 385, 195 NW 969, 970; Doyle v. Doyle, 52 ND 380, 389, 202
NW 860, 863; Coykendall v. Briggs et al, 60 ND 267, 270, 234 NW
74, 75; Horner v. Horner, 66 ND 619, 620, 268 NW 428; Donovan
v. Johnson, 67 ND 450, 455, 274 NW 124, 125; Buchanan v. Bu-
chanan, 69 ND 208, 285 NW 75; Funk v. Baird, 72 ND 298, 309,
6 NW2d 569, 575; Klundt v. Pfeifle, 77 ND 182, 41 NW2d 416.

In Doyle v. Doyle, supra, this Court said:

“On a trial de novo the findings of the trial court are not
clothed with the same presumptions in their favor as in other
eases. But, on the other hand, in such a case as this, we must
take into consideration the fact that we have here but a cold
and lifeless record. We are called upon to determine the mental
capacity, the state of mind, the knowledge and intent of Ellen
Doyle at the time she executed and delivered the deed. We have
not the advantage of seeing her, of noting her demeanor, of hear-
ing her voice; of the innumerable intangible indicia that are so

580 De

valuable to a trial judge in determining questions of this char-
acter. The trial court had the advantage of all of these things
and, breathing the air of the trial, he was in an immeasurably
better position to find the real facts in the case. Therefore, not-
withstanding that the case is here for trial de novo, we must give
some appreciable weight to the determination of the trial court.”
52ND at p 389. ;

In Buchanan v. Buchanan, supra, this Court said:

“The means by which an appellate court may measure the
credibility of witnesses are exceedingly limited. There are,
however, ‘many indicia of truth and falsity, of exaggeration
and of recklessness in testimony, which enter into the atmos-
phere of a trial of this character and which can not be preserved
for the benefit of a reviewing court. Of these, the trial judge
had the benefit. His decision is entitled to appreciable weight.”
69 ND at pp 209, 210. .

In this case the judgment rendered by the trial court was
based upon the testimony of the parties and witnesses who ap-
peared in person before the court. The transcript of the testi-
mony so taken occupies some 438 pages. There is conflict in
the testimony as to the conduct of the defendant which forms the
basis for the charge of extréme cruelty.

The plaintiff and defendant were married on. January 25,
1947, both parties had been previously married to other persons
and divorced. At the time of their marriage the plaintiff was
31 years of age. The record does not show the age of the de-
fendant. The defendant had a son by the prior marriage who
at the time of the trial was attending St. Thomas College and
the defendant has been making substantial contribution to en-
able the son to pursue his studies at St. Thomas. It does not
appear whether the plaintiff had any children by her previous
marriage but apparently she did not. In the majority opinion
reference is made to the building and operation of a motel by
the parties at Mandan. The evidence shows that the construe-
tion of the present motel was commenced in 1948 and completed
in 1949, One Johnson who built the motel testified that the de-
fendant personally assisted in such construction. Such -builder
testified that-in 1949 he commenced construction in the early

[| 581

part of April 1949 and continued the work until the early part
of October 1949. During this time the defendant was there
and in addition to operating the motel assisted in the construc-
tion. The builder testified that at no time during such construc-
tion was the defendant under the influence of intoxicants. He
testified that the defendant paid him his wages promptly each
week.

A Mrs. Mann testified that she worked at the motel in clean-
ing and caring for the cabins from May 3, 1949, to September
9, 1949; that she worked in the afternoons; that the defendant
was working at the motel and was nearly always there; and that
during all this time she never saw him under the influence of
intoxicants; that the plaintiff was seldom there and that on
one occasion when she was there she had been drinking.

The manager of one of the principal lumberyards in Mandan
testified that he sold building material for the motel to the
defendant amounting in the aggregate to over $18,900; that all
the arrangements were made with the defendant and that the
bill for material was promptly paid; that the defendant in
various dealings with him had always paid his bills and that
he furnished the material to the defendant in confidence that pay-
ment would be made. The manager of the Mandan Sheet Metal
Works testified that he sold and furnished certain material for
the construction of the motel. He testified that the defendant’s
credit rating was excellent and that payment was promptly made
for the supplies furnished. Similar testimony was given by the
plumbing contractor. The plaintiff testified that she drew a
sketch or plan of the motel and that she conferred with John-
son, the builder, about the construction; that he came to the
house and discussed the matter with her and the defendant.
Johnson, the builder, testified that he at no time discussed the
matter with the plaintiff or talked to her at all. That he only
saw her a couple times while the motel was being constructed,
as shé was going to or coming from the motel.

In the majority opinion reference is made to a statement
alleged to have been made by the defendant concerning plain-
tiff’s mother. The, defendant denied that he made any such
statement.

582 Le

In the majority opinion reference is also made to an incident
which is said to have occurred in July 1950 when it is said that
the defendant slapped or struck the plaintiff... The evidence
is to the effect that this incident happened after the plaintiff
and defendant had returned from Bismarck where they had
viewed a parade at the Elks’.Convention, that the plaintiff and
the defendant and a man named Delzer, who had been doing.some
concrete work at the motel, and his wife came to the home of
the plaintiff and defendant in Mandan; that the-men went to a
bar and procurred some beer and that the four of them drank
the beer; that thereupon the plaintiff and Mrs. Delzer went to
obtain, and did obtain, some more beer. The defendant testified
that they did not return promptly; that both he and Delzer
telephoned them at the bar where they were but that they did not
return and were gone about three hours. A maid who was pres-
ent testified that when the plaintiff and Mrs. Delzer returned
defendant complained because they had been absent so long.
The plaintiff testified that the defendant struck her and called
her a vile name. She further testified that this was the only
time during their married life that he in any manner inflicted
any personal injury on her. A maid who was present and was
called as a witness by the plaintiff stated that the defendant
slapped the plaintiff with the open hand. When plaintifi’s coun-
sél asked if he (defendant) gave her a black eye she answered
“a little mark here.” The testimony shows without dispute that
later that evening all four went to the Dome, one of the night
clubs between Bismarck and Mandan, and had dinner there;
that thereafter plaintiff and defendant returned to their home;
that the plaintiff and defendant continued to live together as hus-
band and wife until shortly before Christmas; and that there was
no serious quarrel between them from that time until shortly
before Christmas when they had an argument concerning her
expressed desire to go home for Christmas; that the plaintiff
did go home for Christmas; and that the defendant went to see
her and sought to have her come back home; that eventually she
did come back about the latter part of December or the first of
January; and that the plaintiff and defendant lived together as

| 583

husband and wife from the time the plaintiff returned about
January 1, 1951, until August 24, 1951. :

Reference is made in the majority opinion to a proposed
agreement for condonation. This proposed agreement was pre-
pared by defendant’s counsel in an effort to obtain a reconcilia-
tion of the parties. Changes were made in an attempt to make-
the recitals agreeable: to the plaintiff. A conference was, had
between plaintiff and defendant and defendant’s counsel on
September 12, 1951, and again on September 13, 1951. At the
latter, conference defendant signed the proposed agreement,
plaintiff did not, but after defendant had ‘signed the agreement
she picked it up and put it in her purse. She stated that she’
would think it over and let him know at 10°or 11 o’clock the next
morning. The plaintiff never came back and did not notify de-
fendant as she had promised but kept the proposed agreement
which he-had signed and on September 19, 1951, brought this
action for divorce and introduced the proposed agreement in
evidence on the trial.

The status in life and sensibility of the parties are regarded
as inevitable factors where the’ conduct complained of is the
infliction of grievous mental suffering. 1 Nelson on Divorce,
2d ed, p 209. The decree of intelligence, refinement and delicacy
of health and sentiment, are matters for the court to weigh
with others in determining whether conduct complained of was
cruel. 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, pp 242-263.

“Cruelty, as ground for divorce, is a composite of cause and
effect. It implies not only misconduct on the part of the spouse
against whom a divorce is sought, but also injury to the mental
or physical well-being of the one who seeks the relief.” ” 1 Nel-
son on Divorce, 2d ed, p 234.

“The decisions defining mental cruelty employ such a, variety
of phraseology that it would be next to impossible to reproduce
any.generally accepted form. Very often, they do not purport
to define it ag distinct from physical cruelty, but combine both
elements ina general definition of ‘cruelty,’ physical and mental.
The generally recognized elements are:

(1) A course of abusive and humiliating treatment;

584 ee

(2) Calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discom-
mode, or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse; and

(3) Actually affecting the physical or mental health of such
spouse.” 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 220.

The statute (NDRC 1943, 14-0505) declares “extreme cruelty
is the infliction by one party to the marriage of grievous bodily
injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other.” Under
this statute it is essential that the complaining party prove
not only the acts, words and conduct of the other party to the
marriage which he or she claims inflicted grievous bodily injury
or grievous mental suffering, but must also prove that the acts,
words or conduct complained of in fact did inflict grievous bodily
injury and grievous mental suffering or both upon the com-
plaining party. Mahnken v. Mahnken, 9 ND 188, 82 NW 872;
Jolmson v. Johnson, 46 ND 606, 180 NW 794; Johnson v. John-
son, 50 ND 696, 197 NW 773. In determining whether circum-
stances show extreme cruelty the court sitting as a trier of fact
should keep in view the intelligence, apparent refinement and
delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party. 1 Nelson on
Divorce, 2d ed, p 209, pp 242-263; 17 Am Jur, Divorce and
Separation( Sec 55, p 178; Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wash2d
78, 182 Pac2d 734; Jackson v. Jackson, 70 RI 333, 38 Atl2d 637.

In its memorandum opinion the trial court said:

“On cross examination by defendant’s counsel, she admitted
that there was no serious trouble between them from January,
1951 up to the time she left in August, 1951 and that they lived
and cohabited together during that period from January Ist,
1951 to August 25, 1951.”

In its findings of fact the court said:

“That the plaintiff had left the defendant just before Christ-
mas in 1950, that she returned to him during the holidays, and
lived and co-habited with him from January Ist, 1951 to August
24th, 1951, when she left him and lived separate and apart from
him; that from January Ist, 1951 up to the time she left him
on August 24th of the said year, the parties did not have any
serious trouble, and the Court finds that during said time the
plaintiff with knowledge of the defendant’s conduct towards
her and all of the acts and things which she has complained of

| 385
condoned such acts and conduct of the defendant committed
prior thereto, upon which she has relied for divorce upon the
ground of extreme cruclty, and that the plaintiff and the defend--
ant became reconciled and thereafter lived and co-habited to-
gether from January Ist, 1951 to August 24th, of said year when
she left him to live separate and apart from him.”

The fact that the plaintiff lived and cohabited with the de-
fendant as his wife from January 1, 1951, to August 24, 1951,
even though it does not amount.to a legal condonation, does
have a bearing upon whether the defendant had inflicted upon
her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. It
is hardly likely that she would have so lived and cohabited if
the defendant had previously inflicted, or was then inflicting,
upon her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering.
McKee v. McKee, 107 NJ Hq 1, 151 Atl 620; see, also, Maranto
v. Maranto, 192 Md 214, 64 Atl2d 144.

In Mahnken v. Mahnken, supra, this Court said:

“Tt is claimed, and there is evidence in the record tending to
show, that the language used by defendant towards his wife
caused a nervous sickness on three several occasions, so serious
that the visits of the family physician were necessary. We can-
not, however, regard this as proven. The family physician
who is also the family physician in plaintiff’s father’s family,
testifies that he has no recollection of ever treating plaintiff
for any nervous disorders, or ever treating her except at con-
finement, and that her general health is good. It is quite clear,
we think, that the use of the offensive language did not inflict
grievous bodily injury upon plaintiff. But under the later
and better construction of statutes similar to ours it is held
that the grievous mental suffering may be sufficient to warrant
a divorce under the statute, and yet may be productive of no
perceptible bodily injury. Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal 171, 30 Pac
Rep 298, 16 LRA 660; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal 183, 48 Pac Rep
730, 51 Pac Rep 183; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan 744, 2
Pac 122. But whether or not this grievous mental suffering
has been inflicted in any particular case is purely a question of
fact to be determined from a consideration of all the circum-
stances of the case, including the mental characteristics of the

586 —

party complaining so far as they may be developed. Fleming v.
Fleming, 95 Cal 430, 80 Pac Rep 566. But il is very evident
that courts here tread wpon delicate, and perhaps uncertain
grounds. The differences in mental characteristics are as varied
as the difference in facial expression. The effect wpon two
minds of the same act or language may be entirely different,
and the effect upon one may be incomprehensible to the other.
It is clear, then, that no standard can be erected, no measure-
ments given, and no criterion established by which to gauge
mental suffering. This is a point upon which this court would be
inclined to give much weight to the views of the trial court. The
complainant was before that court, and was examined at great
length. All her mental characteristics would be much more
apparent there than they can be from a study of the record.
- + + We find no evidence in this case of the infliction of
that grievous mental suffering that the law requires to justify
the granting of a divorce. No doubt the language used by de-
fendant would produce anger in a proud-spirited woman. But
it is not for that cause that the marriage contract can be an-
nulled. That contract, while it imposes upon the parties thereto
the imperative obligation never to unnecessarily anger or wound
each other, yet it also imposes the duty of forgiveness of all
those weaknesses, ‘imperfections, and peculiarities to which
humanity is ever prone. . . . The statutory grounds for
divorce in this state are broad, and courts may not multiply
divorces by granting them in cases not clearly within the stat-
ute.” 9 ND at pp 191, 192. (Italics supplied)

In Johnson v. Johnson, supra, the charge that the defendant
inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the plaintiff was predi-
cated largely upon evidence that the defendant had “exhibited
to his wife lewd pictures, lascivious compositions, and para-
phernalia evidencing a depraved moral nature, and that these
acts or some of them took place at a time when, owing to the
delicate condition of her health, she was subjected to extreme
mental suffering on account thereof.” In its opinion the Court
said:

“Tt is not necessary in this opinion to describe the character
of the matter so exhibited by the defendant. These acts deserve

[| 587

the condemnation which counsel for the appellant has given
them, but they do not necessarily amount to extreme cruelty.
However much they are inclined to shock the moral sensibilities
of persons of refinement, it is obvious that their effect in the
particular case depends upon the manner in which they are re-
ceived. The testimony of the plaintiff herself, aside from her
direct statements, does not disclose that she was extremely
shocked by these vile exhibitions. . . . There is nothing in
the testimony of the plaintiff which evidences extreme shock
at these matters. On the other hand, we would not be justified,
from her testimony, in saying that she chose to live on the same
moral plane as her husband. There is no reason to believe that
this girl of tender years had so far abandoned her natural mod-
esty and inherent feminine virtue as to initiate such indecent
subjects of domestic intercourse; but it does not follow that
they were necessarily so abhorrent to her as to cause grievous
mental suffering. This depends so largely upon the sensibility of
her moral nature, which could only be known to others as re-
flected by her presence and demeanor, that we who have only
the cold record of the testimony are at a disadvantage. The trial
judge, who had a superior opportunity to observe the parties
and who held that obscenity of the character complained of
might constitute extreme cruelty, did not feel warranted in find-
ing that the plaintiff was shocked to the point of grievous mental
suffering by the attitude and conduct of the defendant in rela-
tion to the matters that he exhibited to his-wife. In the light of
this record, we do not feel justified in overturning the findings
of the trial court.” 46 ND at pp 609, 610.

In Swanson vy. Swanson, supra, this Court said:

“Whether the acts of the plaintiff have inflicted grievous
mental suffering upon the defendant is a question of fact to be
determined from all of the circumstances of the case. Mahnken
.v. Mabnken, 9 ND 188, 82 NW 870; Rindlaub v. Rindlaub, 19
ND 352, 125 NW 479. In this case there is merely evidence of
acts which it is now said caused grievous mental suffering.
There is no direct evidence that the acts did cause such suffering.
Facts, of course, may justify inferences and certainly it is a
legitimate inference in this case that plaintiffs acts did cause

588 —

the defendant annoyance and humiliation, but whether they
caused grievous mental suffering is another question. Grievous
means ‘severe or intense.’ Webster’s International Dictionary.”

Thorndike-Barnhart’s Dictionary defines grievous as mean-
ing “hard to bear; causing great pain or suffering; flagrant;
atrocious.”

In its findings of fact the trial court found:

“That the plaintiff failed to prove that the acts and conduct
of the defendant has caused her grievous bodily injury, grievous
mental suffering or that the defendant’s conduct seriously im-
paired her health or endangered her life. It is true that plaintiff
testified that the defendant’s conduct caused her to have ‘head-
aches’ but there is no substantial corroboration that the de-
fendant’s acts and conduct caused her grievous mental suffering
because her physical appearance, demeanor as she testified, and
her actions at the time of the trial disclosed that she was ap-
parently in the best of health.”

In this case there is no evidence of any grievous bodily injury.
1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 240; Thacker v. Thacker, 125 W Va
103, 23 SEH2d 64; Johnson v. Johnson, 80 NH 15, 112 Atl 399.
See, also, Johnson v. Johnson, 50 ND 696, 197 NW 773. Nor
is it shown that any grievous mental suffering has been inflicted
upon the plaintiff. The only evidence relating to plaintiff having
headaches and taking medicine therefor is her own testimony
which is wholly uncorroborated. Whether she had headaches,
whether she took medicine and, if so, what medicine she took is
not referred to in the testimony of any other witness. It ap-
pears from the testimony without dispute that in June 1949 the
plaintiff went to the Quain and Ramstad Clinic at Bismarck for
a medical examination or checkup; and that in September 1949
she went to Minneapolis for a medical examination. What the
purpose of these examinations were is not shown. If her health
had been adversely affected by the conduct of the defendant the
medical testimony, if any, would have been available to her. She
had available services of medical experts whose testimony could
readily have been obtained either as a result of the examinations
that had been made or upon further examination. The plaintiff
testified that she was in good health and no longer had any

[| 589

headaches, and as the trial court states in his findings her physi-
cal appearance and demeanor upon the trial disclosed that she
was apparently in the best of health. The plaintiff was a woman
of experience in life. She had operated a restaurant for some
time and had assisted in operating a bar. There is nothing to
indicate either frailty or unusual sensitiveness of character.
Theré is nothing in her testimony to indicate that she was in any
manner embarrassed or shocked or had been caused any mental
suffering by the alleged misconduct of the defendant. She did
not seem at all embarrassed in reciting the language which she
attributed to the defendant and her testimony indicates rather
a state of anger than one of grievous mental suffering because
of what was said or done. What was said by this Court in
Mahnken v. Mahnken, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, supra; and
Swanson v. Swanson, supra, is applicable here. The trial judge
who heard and saw these parties and their witnesses determined
that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant had
inflicted upon her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental
suffering. As pointed out in our former decisions the trial court
was in a far better position than this Court to form an accurate
judgment as to these matters, and this Court should “give much
weight to the views of the trial court.” (Mahnken v. Mahnken,
supra.) The decision of the majority in this case ignores the
views of the trial court.

The trial court found that a cause of action for divorce had not
been established. Consequently the trial court made no deter-
mination concerning the division of the joint property. In view
of the determination of the court that the evidence was in-
sufficient to establish any “cause for which a divorce might be
decreed” the trial court was without authority to make any
determination concerning the division of the joint property.
NDRC 1943, 14-0601, 14-0603; Mattson v. Mattson, ante, 381,
56 NW2d 764, Although evidence had been taken relating to the
joint property all questions concerning the division of the joint
property remained undetermined. Our laws provide:

“Upon an appeal from a judgment or order, the supreme court
may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order as to any
and all of the parties, and if necessary or proper, may order a

590 a

new trial of the entire cause or of some specific issue or issues,
.... If, in the consideration of any appeal, it becomes apparent
to the supreme court that some issue involved in the case has not
been tried, or if tried has not been determined by the trial court,
and that tt is necessary or desirable to proper disposition of the
case on appeal that such issue be determined, the supreme court
may remand. the case to the district court for the determination
of such issue, without relingwishing jurisdiction of the appeal,
and the supreme court may hold the determination of the appeal
im abeyance until such issue hus been determined by the trial
court and the determination certified to the supreme court. In
such case the proceedings had and the determination made in
the trial court, upon remand, shall be deemed part of the record
on appeal in such cause.” (Italics supplied) NDRC 1948, 28-
2729.

In this case the question as to the division of the joint property
was not determined by the trial court. The determination of that
question was not merely a matter of computation, it involved
the consideration and weighing of much evidence. The majority
assume the power to decide all questions concerning the division
of the joint property in the first instance and ignore the trial
court which is vested “with power to determine in the first in-
stance all questions of law and fact” in any such action. Upon
the record here the question concerning the division of the joint
property should not be determined by this court in the first in-
stance, but the action should be remanded to the district court
for adjudication and determination thereof by the trial court as
prescribed by NDRC 1943, 28-2729.

Burxz, J. (dissenting). I coneur in the dissenting opinion
filed by Judge Christianson in so far as it holds that the trial
court’s finding that no cause of action for divorce has been
established, should be sustained. It is my opinion that the judg-
ment of the district court should be affirmed and a proper al-
lowance decreed for the support of the plaintiff.

ee 591
[File No. 7356]

NATHANIEL C. STARK AND ALICE STARK; DONALD W.
INGALLS AND EVELYN C. INGALLS; NANCY HEN-
DRICKSON AND CARL HENDRICKSON; JOHN
CHRISTIANSON; HUGO RASK AND EDITH RASK,
Respondents, v. HEART RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
A BODY CORPORATE, Appellant.

(58 NW2d 623)

Opinion filed May 23, 1923

Sullivan, Kelsch & Scanlon, for appellant.
Strate, Jansonius & Fleck, for respondents.

I. A. Acker, Special Assistant Attorney General for State
Water Conservation Commission, appearing Amicus Curiae.

Netson, District Judge. The controversy to which this pro-
ceeding relates first came before this court on motion by respon-
dents to dismiss the appeal taken by, the defendant, Heart River
Irrigation District, from an adverse judgment of the district
court of Morton County, North Dakota. Stark et al. v. Heart
River Irrigation District, 77 ND 827, 47 NW2d 126. The motion
was denied and the case was thereafter heard and decided on
its merits. Stark et al. v. Heart River Irrigation District, 78
ND 302, 49 NW2d 217. The judgment of the district court was
modified and the case remanded to the district court with direc-
tions to enter judgment in conformity with the opinion. The

592 |

facts are set out fully in the opinion and will not be restated here.

In remanding the case with directions we said:

“The judgment of the district court is modified and the case
remanded with directions to exclude from the district the lands
of respondent Rask stipulated to be excluded therefrom and to
enter judgment retaining in the district all class I, IZ and JI
lands and such portions of class V and VI lands as constitute
ten-acre tracts containing substantial irrigable acreage as es-
tablished by the order of the board, exhibit 1.”

Upon the return of the remittitur counsel for the appellant, the
irrigation district, prepared and presented to the trial court
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judg-
ment. The trial court declined to sign the same claiming that it
was impossible to determine from the decision of this court just
what lands were to be retained in the district and what lands
were to be excluded therefrom and certified to this court four
questions of law for clarification of the final determination of
this court, the four questions so certified being as follows:

“(1) Shall all 10-acre tracts of land that contain any Class I,
II or IIT lands, no matter how small in area, be retained within
the boundaries of the Heart River Irrigation District?

“(2) Shall only such 10-acre tracts of land which contain a
‘substantial portion’ or a ‘substantial irrigable acreage’ of Class
I, II or III lands be retained within said district?

“(8) Shall only such 10-acre tracts of land which contain a
‘substantial portion’ or a ‘substantial irrigable acreage’ of Class
V lands be retained within said irrigation district?

“(4) If only such 10-acre tracts of land as contain a ‘substan-
tial portion’ or a ‘substantial irrigable acreage’ of Class I, II and
III or V lands shall be retained in the district, what area in
determining the required acreage of irrigable or potentially ir-
rigable land shall be established as the criterion for the exclu-
sion or inclusion of such 10-acre tracts of land in said irrigation
district?”

The Heart River Irrigation District is governed by a board of
directors and after its creation a number of persons owning
lands within its borders petitioned the board as authorized by
law that their lands be excluded from the district for the various

ee 593

reasons stated in the several petitions filed with the board. The
statute provides that in petitions for such exclusion the descrip-
tion of the lands sought to be excluded need not be more partic-
ular nor certain than is required when the lands are entered in
the assessment book by the township assessor. The unit of
assessment of rural real property in this state is the quarter
section, or a legal subdivision thereof. See 57-0238 NDRC 1943.
The board, in passing upon the several petitions for exclusion
subdivided the land of each petitioner into ten-acre tracts, each
consisting of one-fourth of a quarter-quarter section, designat-
ing the method employed as the ten-acre formula, which was ap-
proved by the court in the case cited and so referred to in the
opinion. We held that class I, II and III lands were irrigable
and class V lands potentially irrigable. It is evident that
throughout the opinion we were dealing with tracts of land con-
taining irrigable or potentially irrigable acreage. We said:
“In designating the lands to be retained in the district the
board adopted what it terms a ten-acre formula, by the applica-

tion of which the land in each quarter-quarter section was sub-
divided into four squares of ten acres each and each ten acre
tract containing a substantial amount of irrigable land was re-
tained in the district, although such ten acre tract might also
contain some class V or non-irrigable lands. All tracts of ten
acres or more containing little or no irrigable acreage were ex-
cluded from the district.”

“We are satisfied from an examination of the whole record
that class I, II and III lands are irrigable and that the cost of
leveling is not so high as to make it economically unsound or pro-
hibitive.”

“The rule adopted by the board in this case is certainly a rea-
sonable one, reducing as it has the government subdivisions to
ten acre tracts which are both describable and definable and
capable of identification. Where land has been reduced to de-
scribable and definable rectangular tracts of ten acres each the
established irrigability of a substantial portion of a tract makes
the entire tract an irrigable. tract within the contemplation of

504 De

our statute and it may be lawfully included or retained in the
district.” (Emphasis ours.)

The district court had reversed the decision of the board and
held that all of the lands of the petitioners should be excluded
from the district. We determined that the board by its order,
exhibit 1, included a part of the petitioners’ lands within the
district and excluded other parts of petitioners’ lands; that in
doing so the board adopted a plan of using ten acre tracts in
determining the lands excluded or included and that such a rule
was reasonable and that in applying the rule the board included
within the district only such ten acre tracts as contained a sub-
stantial portion of irrigable land. This application of the rule
we also approved. Thus we upheld the order of the board in all
respects except as to that portion of the Rask lands which had
been excluded by stipulation. But because it was necessary to
provide for the exclusion of these lands we could not enter a
straight affirmance of the order of the board. For that reason,
the last varagraph of the opinion, which is quoted above, was
written directing a modification of the judgment of the district
court. *

This is strictly in accord with the last paragraph of the syl-
labus, which reads:

“In a proceeding to exclude lands from an irrigation district
under the provisions of Chapter 61-10, NDRC 1943, where it ap-
pears that the board of directors of an irrigation district has
divided the legal subdivisions into rectangular ten acre tracts,
the refusal of the board to exclude those tracts containing a sub-
stantial portion of irrigable land was not erroncous, it not being
imperative that irrigable areas retained within a district be de-
seribed by metes and bounds.”

Under our decision the district court was not required to retry
any of the issues in the case as all controverted issues, both of
law and of fact, had been decided and determined. Its duty is
to order the entry of a modified judgment excluding from the
itrigation district the Rask lands covered by the stipulation, and
retaining therein all and only such other lands as were retained
in the district by the board of directors in its order, exhibit 1.

Le 595

What we have said above: makes it unnecessary’ to answer the
certified questions. .

Morris, C. J., and Burxu and Grimson, JJ., and Txom, Dist.
J., concur.

Curistianson and Sature, JJ., disqualified, did not partici-
pate. . .
Pe

[File No, 7363]

BETHEL ANN KNUDSEN, Respondent, v. JAMES W. LYONS,
JR.; James W. Lyons, Jr., as Executor of the Last Will and
Testament of James William Lyons, Deceased; Jean Maude
Lyons; Marguevite G. Hvidston; and Hazel L. Franz, Ap-
pellants.

(58 NW2a 845)

Opinion filed May 27, 1953

iel S. Letnes, for appellants.

598 es

Philip R. Bangs, for respondent.

Curisrtanson, J. This controversy originated in the County
Court of Grand Forks County and involves a proceeding for
the probate of a will, The material facts are as follows: On
November 21, 1950, James W. Lyons, Jr., Jean Maude Lyons,
Ethel Ann Knudsen, Marguerite G. Hvidston and Hazel L. Franz
filéd with the County Court of-Grand Forks County in this state
a petition denominated “Petition. for Proof and Probate of
Will.” Said James W. Lyons, Jr., Jean Maude Lyons, Ethel
Ann Knudsen, Marguerite G. Hvidston and Hazel L. Franz were
also named as respondents. According to the allegations of the
petition the petitioners and respondents were the son and daugh-
ters of and all the heirs at law of James William Lyons, deceased.
In the petition it was alleged that said James William Lyons
died on or about November 15, 1950, and was at the time of his
death a resident of the City of Grand Forks, State of North
Dakota, and that said decedent “left a Last Will and Testament
which is herewith presented in this Court for probate; that your
petitioners are all of the children of said decedent, all of the
legatees and devisces in said Last Will and Testament.” The
instrument referred to and designated as the Last Will and Tes-

Le 599

tament of said James William Lyons, deceased, is dated Jan-
uary 2, 1945, and is made a’part of the petition. It is further
alleged that said Last Will and Testament was prepared in
accordance with the specific instructions of the decedent and in
accordance with his wishes. That the same was prepared by
respondent Hazel L. Franz, one of his daughters, prior to Jan-
uary 2, 1945, but that the decedent did not sign such instrument
at the time it was prepared. That the instrument is dated in the
hand writing of the decedent and “witnessed apparently by Nor-
man Nelson and Frank Penwarden whose signatures appear
affixed to such instrument; that through apparent oversight the
decedent neglected to sign the will in his own handwriting but
that said identical Will and Testament was found in the :de-
cedent’s safety deposit box” in a bank at Grand Forks after his
death. It is stated in the petition that the petitioners petition
and request the court to construe such instrument as the Last
‘Will and Testament of said decedent and to give effect to all of
its terms and provisions and that the petitioners individually
and jointly waive any and all defects and irregularities contained
in said Last Will and Testament dated. January 2, 1945, insofar
as the execution thereof does not comply with the laws of wills
and succession of the State of North Dakota and agree to abide
by all of its terms and provisions and not object to a final de-
cree if and when the same shall be entered. On the same day
that the Petition for Proof and Probate of Will was filed with
the County Court of Grand Forks County the county court ap-
parently received the testimony of the two attesting witnesses on
blank forms entitled “Proof of Will.” Such testimony was signed
by the respective witnesses and sworn to before the judge of the
county court. Such testimony was taken on a printed form and
the words in such form stating that the instrument was “signed,
sealed, executed” by the said James William Lyons were stricken
out so that the testimony is merely to the effect that on the 2nd
day of January, 1945, the said instrument was acknowledged,
published and declared by the said James William Lyons, de-
ceased, to be his Last Will and Testament. The instrument de-
nominated Last Will and Testament of James William Lyons
was not signed by the decedent or by anyone on his behalf. The

600 ee

instrument was ‘unsigned and the allegations in the petition “for
proof and probate of will” show affirmatively that it was not
signed or executed by said decedent. On the same day that the
petition for “Proof-and Probate of Will” was filed with the
county court, namely on November 22, 1950, the county court
executed a certificate of probate reciting that the instrument
was duly proved before the county court and admitted to probate
by said court as the Last Will and Testament of said James
William Lyons, deceased, and on the same day the county court
also issued letters testamentary to the respondent James W.
Lyons, Jr. On February 13, 1951, petitioner Ethel Ann Knud-
sen filed with the county court a document entitled Petition for
Rehearing dated February 10, 1951, praying that upon due no-
tice and citation a rehearing be granted the petitioner and that
upon such rehearing “the Order and Decree Admitting Will to
Probate be set aside, vacated, and annulled.”

The first ground set forth in the petition for a rehearing why
the order and decrée admitting the will to probate should be set
aside, vacated and annulled is as follows:

“1, That the pretended will as admitted to probate was not
and did not purport to have been signed or subscribed by the
testator; that the witnesses thereto did not testify that the said
instrument was signed or subscribed by the deceased, but testi-
fied only that it was published and declared by him to be his last
will and testament; that there was before the Court no evidence
of any nature that said will was signed, subscribed or otherwise
authenticated by the decedent; and that in the absence of any
subscription and competent evidence thereof, there was uo will,
as that term is defined by law, before the Court, and the Court
was therefore without jurisdiction to admit the said instrument
to the probate as the last will and testament of deceased.”

A hearing was had upon the petition for a rehearing at which
the parties introduced evidence. On March 5, 1951, the county
court entered its order dismissing the petition for a rehearing.
On March 14, 1951, the petitioner Ethel Ann Knudsen appealed
to the district court from the order of thé county court dismissing
the petition for a rehearing. When the matter came on to be
heard before the district court, the respondents on such appeal

De 601

objected to the jurisdiction of the district court to hear and
determine the appeal on the grounds that Ethel Ann Knudsen
by joining in and filing the petition for Proof and Probate of
Will conferred jurisdiction upon the County Court of Grand
Forks County to’ admit the will to probate and that the appellant
is estopped from appealing to the district court and is estopped
on such appeal to raise the question of jurisdiction of the county
court to hear the petition for Proof and Probate of Will and to
admit the proposed will to probate; the district court reserved
rulings on the objections and heard the appeal on its merits.
After due consideration the district court rendered its decision
overruling the objections to the jurisdiction of the district court
to hear and determine the appeal and further ordered that the
order of the county court dismissing the petition for a rehearing
be vacated and set aside and that the county court make and
enter an order setting aside, vacating and annulling the order
and decree of the county court entered on November 22, 1950,
which established and allowed the document involved in the pro-
ceeding as the Last Will and Testament of the decedent, James
W. Lyons; that the county court also make and enter an order
vacating the certificate of probate which admitted such docu-
ment to probate; and that the county court proceed to appoint
an administrator of the estate and issue appropriate letters of
administration in lieu of the letters testamentary which had been
issned on November 22, 1950, to James W. Lyons, Jr.

The respondents on the appeal from the county court to the
district court have appealed to this court from the order of the
district court.

The district court was clearly right in overruling the objec-
tions to the jurisdiction of the district court to hear and deter-
mine the appeal from the county court and in affirming the
decision of the district court ordering that the order of the county
court dismissing the petition for rehearing be vacated and set
aside and that the county court make and enter an order setting
aside, vacating and annulling the order and decree of the county
court entered on November 22, 1950, which established and al-
lowed the document presented as the Last Will and Testament
of James W. Lyons, deceased, and in directing the county court

602, |

to make and enter an order vacating the certificate of probate
which admitted such document to probate.

The laws of this state provide:

“No will is valid unless executed according to the provisions
of this chapter, or according to the law of the place in which it
was, made, or in which the testator at the time was domiciled.”
NDRC 1948, 56-0307.

“fivery will, other than a nuncupative will, must be in writ-
ing.” NDRC 1943, 56-0301.

“Hivery will, other than an olographic will and a nuncupative
will, must be executed and attested as follows:

1. It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator him-
self, or some person, in his presence, and by his direction, must
subscribe ‘this name thereto; . . . .” NDRC 1943, 56-0302.

“A& nuncupative will is not required to be in writing nor to be
declared or attested with any formalities. To make it a valid
will and to entitle it to be admitted to probate, the following
requisites must be observed:

1. The estate bequeathed must not exceed in value the sum
of one thousand dollars;

2. It must be proved by two witnesses who were present at
the making thereof, one of whom was asked by the testator at
the time to bear witness that such was his will, or to that effect;

38. The decedent, at the time,

a. Must have been in military service in the field in actual

> contemplation, fear, or peril of death, or

b. Doing duty on shipboard at sea in actual contemplation,
fear, or peril of death, or

.. Must have been in expectation of immediate death from an
injury received the same day.” NDRC 1943, 56-0303.

“An olographic will is one that is entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. . . . ”. NDRC
1943, 56-0304. .

“A rehearing in county court may be granted for one or more’
of the following causes:

1. Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of the
party making the application; ....

Le 603

4, The nonexistence of any fact necessary to jurisdiction.”
NDRC 1948, 30-0308.

“A decree which grants the probate of a will is conclusive if
the court had jurisdiction, unless reversed on appeal or vacated.
on a rehearing applied for within one year, saving to minors
and persons of unsound mind or otherwise incompetent a like
period of one year after their respective disabilities are re-
moved.” NDRC 1943, 30-0524.

- The above quoted statutory provisions of this state are specific
and mandatory. There can be no will under the laws. of this
state other than a nuncupative will except by an-instrument in
writing and subscribed at the end thereof by the testator him-
self or by some person in his presence and by his direction. The
document presented for probate as the Last Will and Testament
of James W. Lyons clearly was not a nuncupative will. Hence,
the petition for Proof and Probate of Will was fatally defec-
tive in matter of substance. It not only failed to show that the
document presented had been executed and subscribed by the
-testator himself or some person in his presence and by his di-
rection, but it showed affirmatively. that it had not. In other
words the petition failed to state facts constituting any cause
whatsoever for the probate of the document as a will and “nei-
ther consent, nor waiver, nor estoppel” could make it a will, or
give the county court jurisdiction to admit it and to adjudicate
rights under it as such. Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 Fed
2d 334, 97 ALR 1081; 19 Am Jur, Estoppel, See 74, pp 712-713;
41 Am Jur, Pleading, Sec 390, pp 560-561; 57 Am Jur, Sec 942,
p 619; Goodin v. Casselman, 51 ND 543, 549, 200 NW 94; Gjer-
stadengen v. Van Duzen & Co., 7 ND 612, 76 NW 233, 66.Am
St Rep 679; Gjerstadengen v. Hartzell, 9 ND 268, 83 NW 230,
81 Am St Rep 575; Finn et al. v. Walsh et al., 19 ND 61, 121
NW 766, 769.

In Goodin v. Casselman, supra, this Court said:

“The jurisdiction of the probate court does not extend to the
determination of the rights in property left by a deceased, where
such right does not depend upon heirship or will but upon con-
tract.” 51 ND at p 543.

“Obviously, the jurisdiction of the county court in probate

“604 ee

matters is a jurisdiction, so far as wills are concerned, to deter-
mine whether or not a will that is offered for pr obate has been
executed in the manner required by statute, by a person who at
the time had testamentary capacity, and that such person had.
exercised his right to make a will without being unduly influ.
enced by others.” 51ND at p 549.

American J urisprudence says:

“Where judicial tribunals. have no jurisdiction of the subject
matter on which they assume to act, their proceedings are abso-
lutely void in the strictest sense of ‘the term; and a court which
is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction in a.given case may
determine that question at any time in the proceedings of the
cause, whenever that fact is made to appear to its satisfaction
either before or after judgment. Accordingly, an objection for
want of jurisdiction, if it exists, may be raised by answer or at
any subsequent stage of the proceedings; in fact, it may be
raised for the first time on appeal. A court will recognize want
of jurisdiction over the subject matter even if no’ objection is
made. Therefore, whenever a want of jurisdiction is suggested,
by the court’s examination of the case or otherwise, it is the duty
of the court to consider it, for if the court is without jurisdiction,
it is powerless to act in the case.” 14 Am Jur, Courts, Sec 191,
p 385.

“The doctrine of waiver as applied to pleadings has well-
established limitations. It cannot be invoked in respect to all
faults in the pleading, irrespective of their gravity, for there
are some defects and omissions so vital and radical that want of
objection cannot cure them since they go to the very substance
of the matter in litigation. Of such character is an objection
that the pleading discloses a want of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter of the suit, as distinguished from jurisdiction over
the person, or that it-wholly fails to state a cause of action which
will support a judgment. Failure to state a cause of action is
never waived unless aided or cured by the answer or subsequent
proceedings.” 41 Am Jur, Pleading, Sec 390, pp.560-561. See,
also, NDRC 19438, 28-0709.

In the order appealed from the district court directed that the
county court proceed to appoint an administrator of the estate

ee 605

and issue appropriate letters of administration in lieu of the
letters testamentary which had been issued on‘ November 22,
1950,. to James W. Lyons, Jr. The county court, of course, has
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for letters of administration
for such property as James W. Lyons may have left in this state
which had not been disposed of by will, NDRC 1943, 30-0801;
but an administrator may be appointed only as provided by: the
laws relating to administration of estates of intestates. Hence,
the district court is directed to modify its order by eliminating
therefrom the direction to the county court that it proceed to
appoint an administrator of the estate of James W. Lyons, de-
ceased, and as so modified the order appealed from is. affirmed.

Morais, C. J. and Sarurs, Burxe and Griuson, JJ., concur.
[|
[File No. 7364]

UNION STORAGE AND TRANSFER COMPANY, a Corpora-
tion, Respondent, v. DONALD H. SMITH, Appellant, and
HAROLD G, REED, d/b/a Reed Cleaners, Garnishee and
Appellant.

(58 NW2d 782)

ee

Opinion filed May 28, 1953

Paul Thonn, for plaintiff.
George E. Duis, for defendant and garnishee.

" Morats, Ch. J. On January’ 19, 1952, Roy G. Froling made
personal service on Donald H. Smith of a summons in an action
entitled “In County Court, County of Cass. Union Storage and
Transfer Co. a corp., Plaintiff v. Donald H. Smith, Defendant.”
By this instrument defendant was

“summoned to answer the complaint in this action, a copy of
which is or will be filed in the office of-the Clerk of Court, in and
for the County of Cass and State of North Dakota, and to serve
a copy of your answer upon the subscriber within twenty days
after the service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day
of service, ... .”

The summons and the complaint referred to therein were filed
in the office of the Clerk of County Court, Cass County, North
Dakota, March 28, 1952, which it will be noted was considerably
more than twenty days after the service of the summons. On
March 24, 1952, Paul G. Thonn, attorney for plaintiff, subscribed
and swore to an affidavit before Roy G. Froling, reciting:

“that the summons and complaint in said action were served
upon the defendants, therein in Cass County, on the 19 of Jan.
1952, as appears by the affidavit of one Roy G. Froling; that
more than twenty days have elapsed since the service of
said Summons and Complaint as aforesaid and that no answer

608 Ee

or demurrer has been served upon affiant nor has appearance
been made in any manner by defendants.”

This affidavit is erroneous in that no complaint was served
upon the defendant and at the time of the execution of the affi-
davit no complaint had been filed in the office of the clerk of
court as recited or promised in the summons. On March 28,
1952, this affidavit, together with a sworn statement of account,
a motion for judgment, and an order for judgment signed by
the judge of the County Court of Cass County were filed in the
office of the clerk of the county court and judgment was by him
that day entered in favor of the plaintiff and against Donald
H. Smith for the sum of $435.00, principal, interest, and costs.

On April 4, 1952, the plaintiff caused to be served upon the
defendant and upon Harold G. Reed, dba, Reed Cleaners, a de-
mand for payment prior to garnishment. On April 9, 1952, the
plaintiff caused to be served upon Smith, the defendant, and
upon Reed, as garnishee, a garnishment summons and affidavit
for garnishment. The affidavit shows that this proceeding was
brought in aid of an execution issued upon the judgment previ-
ously entered in the main action. The original papers and proof
of service in the garnishment proceeding were filed in the office
of the Clerk of County Court of Cass County on April 30, 1952.
On the same day Paul G. Thonn executed an affidavit of default
of the garnishee and filed it, together with a motion for judg-
ment against the garnishee by default, whereupon the judge of
the county court signed an order for judgment against the gar-
nishee and judgment was forthwith entered against him.

On May 23, 1952, the defendant Smith made a motion to va-
cate the judgment entered in the original action supported by
his affidavit stating that upon the day after the service of sum-
mons he employed an attorney, one R. N. Pritchard, to interpose
an answer and that the defendant first learned that the plaintiff
had taken judgment against him by default on May 9, 1952, and
- thereafter immediately consulted and retained his present attor-
ney, George E, Duis, to take proceedings to have the default
opened and a defense interposed, and that he is advised by his
sattorney that he has a valid and substantial defense upon the
merits. The defendant also proffered a proposed answer which

ee 609

was a general denial. The original complaint and the sworn
statement of account upon which the default judgment was ren-
dered show that it was based upon a claim for handling cartage
and storage of goods, wares, and merchandise by the plaintiff
for the defendant on and between January 2, 1948, and Febru-
ary 2,1952. In resistance to this motion to vacate the judgment
the plaintiff presented the affidavit of Roy G. Froling to the
effect that he was called several times by Pritchard, attorney for
defendant Smith, and that Pritchard told him that he could not
get Smith to come to the office to sign an answer and demand
for bill of particulars. The plaintiff also presented the affidavit
of Pritchard, who stated that he could not get Smith to sign an
answer and that if there was any neglect in the matter, it was
entirely on Smith’s part and not the neglect of the attorney
Pritchard. .

In addition to the affidavits submitted on the motion to vacate
and set aside the judgment, oral testimony was taken on May
23, 1952, wherein Smith testified that when the summons was
served upon him it had no complaint attached to it and he took
it to Pritchard the same day it was served and gave Pritchard
$25.00 to file an answer and that he believed an answer had been
filed. He produced Pritchard’s receipt for the amount paid.
Later he had trouble in finding Pritchard and said that “when
I did find him, why, he said that he had been to the Courthouse
and found that there was no complaint and that we could disre-
gard it, would not even have to be answered.” Smith did not
know that a judgment had been taken against him until Froling
called him and told him that a judgment had been taken by
default. The matter was continued until June 3, 1952, when a
further hearing was had which consisted of the presentation of
affidavits of resistance above mentioned and arguments by coun-
sel. At the close of this hearing the court ordered that the mo-
tion to vacate and set aside the judgment in the main action be
denied. No appeal was taken from that, nor was a rehearing
asked thereon.

On June 9, 1952, the defendant Smith and the garnishee Reed
joined in a notice of motion entitled in the garnishment action

610 —

to vacate the judgments in the main action and in the garnish-
ment action. The motion made pursuant to this notice came on
for hearing before the court on June 20, 1952. At this hearing
garnishee filed an affidavit denying liability on the ground that
he had no property or moneys belonging to the defendant Smith
under his control at the time he was served with the demand.
He filed another affidavit explaining why he failed to answer the
garnishment summons, the main portion of which indicates that
he is a very busy businessman; that he is ignorant of the pro-
cedure in garnishment matters; and that due to the pressure of
business he forgot all about the garnishment proceedings and
did not know that a judgment had been taken against him until
June 3, 1952, and did not realize he was required to make a dis-
closure when he was not indebted to the defendant. The showing
of the defendant Smith at this hearing is substantially the same _
as it was on the hearing of the former motion, except that he
filed a proposed answer of considerable length setting forth
that the goods, wares, and merchandise upon which the original
storage claim was based were not the property of the defendant
but the property of a Mr. Limon Brown.

An examination of the original complaint shows that it is
dated January 18, 1952, and is signed by Paul G. Thonn, attorney
for plaintiff, Fargo, North Dakota, but is not verified. At the
bottom of the complaint appears this notation in the handwriting
of R.N. Pritchard:

“Time of filing waived

Reed copy 2/11/52
R.N. Pritchard
Atty. for defendant,
2283 Broadway,
Fargo, N. D.”

On August 4, 1952, the court entered an order denying the
motion to vacate and set aside the judgment made by the de-
fendant and garnishee. The reasons stated in the order are
that the Union Storage and Transfer Company, a corporation,
is the real party in interest and that the service of summons

ee 611

made by Roy G. Froling is a valid service. The court also deter-
mined that the notation in the handwriting of R. N. Pritchard
who was then attorney for the defendant showed that the filing
of the complaint was waived and that the attorney had authority
to waive such filing. He also concluded that defendant’s then
attorney was furnished with a copy of the complaint and was
thus informed as to its contents and that the defendant was not
prejudiced by failure to file a complaint. He further reached
the conclusion that the matters presented by this motion had
already been presented by the former motion made by the de-
fendant and that no new facts were presented upon this motion
which was made without leave of court and therefore it could
not be properly presented-by the defendant. He also reached
the conclusion that although the garnishee was not a party to

the first motion, the question of the validity of the original.

judgment had already been decided against the defendant and
could not be reexamined at-his instance on the second motion;
and that the garnishce could not come in and resurrect an issue
that had already been decided against the defendant in the main
action. .

With respect to the judgment rendered against the garnishee,
the court points out that the garniyhment summons was regu-
larly served by the sheriff’s office of Cass County and that the
garnishee’s excuse that he did not read the summons carefully
because he was interrupted by a telephone call by a customer
and that after the call he forgot about the garnishment procced-
ings, is not sufficient to warrant setting aside the judgment by
default that was rendered against the garnishee.

The motion now under consideration is made by the defendant
and the garnishee in the garnishment action. We will first con-
sider the motion as it applies to the contentions of the defend-
ant. He would have both judgments set aside upon the grounds
that the judgment in the main action was rendered without
jurisdiction and is void and that the garnishment judgment
depending thereon in a proceeding in aid of execution issued
under the judgment in the main action must fall. Although gar-
nishment proceedings are deemed an action under the provisions
of Section 32-0924 NDRC 1943, they are dependent upon the

612 es

rendition of a valid judgment in the main action and the juris-
diction of the court to render judgment in the main action may
be attacked in the garnishment action. Atwood v. Tucker (At-
wood v. Roan) 26 ND 622, 145 NW 587, 51 LRA (NS) 597;
Citizens State Bank v. Smeland, 48 ND 466, 184 NW 987.

The defendant’s testimony clearly shows that he employed
attorney R. N. Pritchard to act for him in this matter. The filing
of the complaint was not within the time prescribed by statute,
Section 27-0824 NDRC 1943. Pritchard was the duly authorized
attorney for the defendant and as his attorney waived the timely
filing of the complaint and acknowledged receipt of a copy there-
of. Waiver of the filing of the complaint and the acceptance of
a copy in behalf of the defendant Smith was a matter that came
within the general authority of the attorney who had control
over matters of procedure with respect to the remedy and such
a waiver is binding on the client. Mongeon v. Burkebile, ante,
55 NW(2d) 445; O’Brien v. Lashar, 273 Fed 520; 5 Am Jur,
Attorneys at Law, Section 91; 7 CJS, Attorney and Client,
Section 100. The trial court was correct,in holding that the
defendant Smith could not attack the jurisdiction of the court
to render judgment against him on the ground that the complaint
was not filed with the clerk of the county court within twenty
days after the date of the service of the summons as required
by Section 27-0824 NDRC 1943. The judgment was not void
for failure of the court to obtain jurisdiction. The service of.a
summons may be waived and process that is amendable cannot
be regarded as void, nor can it be attacked collaterally. James
River National Bank v. Haas, 73 ND 374, 15 NW(2d) 442, 154
ALR 1005; Coman v. Williams, 78 ND 560, 50 NW(2d) "494;
Howe v. Lisbon Savings Bank and Trust Co., 111 Vt 201, 14
Atl(2d) 3. In this case the summons was regularly served and
the time of filing the complaint waived. The judgment at most
was only voidable.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the
judgment in the main action upon the further ground that a
previous motion had been made by the defendant for the same
relief and upon the same grounds as were pr esented by him in
the second motion.

os

The defendant had a full hearing upon the first motion. In
this proceeding he ignores the first order made by the court and
without leave sought to have the court reconsider and reappraise
the identical record upon which his former order was based.

In Clopton v. Clopton, 10 ND 569, 88 NW 562, 88 Am St Rep
749, this court held:

“that a second hearing of a motion upon the same state of facts
is a matter resting in the discretion of the court, and in such
cases leave must be obtained.”

The court further said:

“that the right to apply for an order a second time upon the
same grounds is not a strict legal right, and leave to do so should
be sparingly granted to prevent abuse and vexatious litigation.”

In Enderlin State Bank v. Jennings, 4 ND 228, 59 NW 1058,
it was said:

“There is no good reason why a defendant who has a right
to so full a hearing on a motion should be allowed, when he is
defeated, to renew the'same motion, on the same facts, without
presenting any proof to entitle him to a rehearing, unless the
same judge grants the rehearing to correct some error in his
former decision.”

The Supreme Court of South Dakota reached substantially
the same conclusion in Olson v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co.,
43 SD 90, 178 NW 141. The position of the trial court is further
strengthened by the fact that his first order denying the defend-
ant’s motion to vacate the judgment was an appealable order.
It was based in part at least on discretionary grounds and such
an order is appealable under Section 28-2702, paragraph 2,
NDRC 1948. Boyd v. Lemmon, 49 ND 64, 189 NW 681; Boshart
v. National Benefit Association, Inc. 65 SD 260, 273 NW 7; State
v. Hammerquist, 67 SD 417, 293 NW 539.

‘We next turn to the attack made by the garnishee upon the
judgment in the main action. Void judgments may be attacked
collaterally, but voidable judgments may not. Nichols,& Shepard
Co. v. Paulson, 10 ND-440, 87 NW 977; Shane v. Peoples, 25
ND 188, 141 NW 737. See note 1 Annotated Cases 923.

“In order to strike down a judgment of a court of record of
this state by collateral attack jurisdictional defects must appear

614 De

on the face of the record.” Rasmusson v. Schmalenberger, 60
ND 527, 235 NW 496.

In this case the judgment was entered by default, put this fact
does not render it more susceptible to collateral attack than had
‘it been entered in a contested action. Erker v. Deichert, 57 ND
474, 222 NW 615.

This being a proceeding in garnishment in aid of execution,
Reed, the garnishee, was not a party to the proceeding in the
original action. In Atwood v. Tucker (Atwood v. Roan), 26
ND 622, 145 NW 587, 51 LRA NS 597, garnishee defendants
moved to vacate a judgment taken against the defendant and
themselves in the garnishment action, basing the motion upon
an affidavit reciting the alleged invalidity of the service of.
summons by, publication in the main action, contending that
the entire proceeding was void on the ground that no jurisdiction
was ever obtained upon the defendant or the subject matter.
The court reached the conclusion that the affidavit of publica-
tion was void and consequently no valid proceedings were ever
had in the main action and that

“If for any reason the court fails to get jurisdiction of the
principal suit, the garnishment must inevitably fall with it.”

The garnishee was permitted to challenge the judgment in the
main action on jurisdictional grounds and his attack was sus-
tained.

“Inasmuch as a valid judgment against the principal defend-
ant is essential both as a foundation for a judgment against the
garnishee and for his protection, the garnishee is entitled to as-
sert any defenses or objections to the proceedings against the
principal defendant which are of a jurisdictional character or
which render the judgment void.” Mares v. Schuth, 38 NM 101,
28 P2d 527, 92 ALR 567.

In this case the judgment is not void. The attack upon it by the
garnishee is not in the action in which the judgment was ren-
dered but is in the garnishment action, and as to the judgment
in the main action it is a collateral attack which the garnishee
may not maintain, Schnur v. Bernstein, 309 Ill App 90, 32 NE
2d 675; Olton State Bank v. Howell (Tex Civ App), 105 SW2d
287; Rowoldt v. Gook County Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 305 Il

ee 615

App 93, 26 NE2d 903. We have reached the conclusion that in
an action in garnishment in aid of execution an attack by the
garnishee upon a judgment rendered in the main action is a
collateral attack which may not be maintained against a judg-
ment that is merely voidable.

The final question is whether the court abused his discretion
in refusing to vacate the judgment rendered by default against
the garnishee. Section 28-2901 NDRC 1943 vests in the trial
court discretionary power upon such terms as may be just at
any time within one year after notice of entry of judgment to
relieve a party from a judgment taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, ‘surprise, or excusable neglect. An ap-
plication for the exercise of this power is addressed to the sound
judicial discretion of the court and his disposition thereof will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it plainly appears that the
court abused his discretion. -Miller v. Miller, 76 ND 558, 38 NW
2d 35; Beery v. Peterson, 58 ND 273, 225 NW 798; Mantel v.
Pickle, 56 ND 568, 218 NW 605; First State Bank of Crosby v.
Thomas, 54 ND 108, 208 NW 852.

The sheriff’s return in this proceeding shows that a deputy
sheriff of Cass County served upon the defendant and the gar-
nishee, each of them personally, a copy of thé garnishment sum-
mons and affidavit for garnishment and that at the time of the
service the deputy: sheriff paid the garnishee two dollars, the
statutory disclosure fee. Both the garnishment summons and
affidavit for garnishment are in the form required by statute.
Sections 32-0906 and 32-0907 NDRC 1943.

The affidavit of the garnishee in support of his application
to vacate the default judgment states that he is in no manner
indebted to the defendant Donald Smith; that never to his rec-
ollection was he previously served with a garnishment sum-
mons; that he did not realize the seriousness of the matter and
thought that it really only affected Donald Smith, the defendant;
that he operates a large dry cleaning establishment employing
ninety to one hundred people and has many business distrac-
tions. He did not read the summons closely because he was in-
terrupted by a patron calling on the telephone over a business
matter; and that through business pressures he forgot about

616 ee

the garnishment proceeding; and that his neglect was not inten-
tional and that his failure to make a disclosure was caused by
mere oversight and by the reason of the fact he had been told
that if an employer’s employee was ever garnished the employer
would be brought into court and would be notified by the sheriff
when to appear and that he accidently forgot all about this
proceeding.

In Cook v. Davis, 57 SD 82, 230 NW 765, an order of the trial
court vacating a default judgment was reversed on the ground
that it was vacated without sufficient cause. The supreme court
stated: .

“Respondent was personally served, and she ought to have
known the import of the papers served or to have consulted
counsel to find out. Mere inconvenience in consulting counsel
could not excuse her. Furthermore, she was advised suit would
be commenced, and it is hardly believable that she did not think
she had been sued. Attachment process is sufficiently formid-
able to attract more than passing attention. A person of ordi-
nary intelligence by mere reading must learn enough to put
him on guard, and neglect to take such steps as might be neces-
sary in making defense is not excusable.”

In this case the trial court in the exercise of his discretion
has. denied the garnishee’s application on the ground that his
neglect was not excusable. In view of the record here presented
we cannot say that the court abused the discretion vested in
him by statute. The order appealed from is affirmed.

Guumson, Satune, Cunisrianson and Burks, concur.

Ce 617
[File No. 7344]

REINHOLD WERRE, Appellant, v. BOWMAN COUNTY,
NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent.

(58 NW2d 792)

Opinion filed May 28, 1953

F. E. McCurdy, for appellant.
Elmer V. Morland, for respondent.

Sarurs, J. On December 3rd, 1941 the plaintiff and appellant
in this action filed his debtor’s petition in proceedings under
Section 75 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. In the schedules ac:
companying the petition he listed all of his property, encum-
bered and unencumbered, including certain lands in Bowman
County, North Dakota. Listed also were all creditors secured
and unsecured, including Bowman County, North Dakota, with
the amount due and owing to each.

A meeting of the creditors was held on January 20, 1942 for
the purpose of effecting an extension or composition agreement.

61s es

This however failed. He then filed his “Amended Debtor’s peti-
tion under subsection S of Section 76 of the Acts of Congress
relating to Bankruptcy. A stay was then ordered by the Federal
District Court and the bankrupt was permitted to continue
his farming operations, under the supervision of M. S. Byrne,
the. conciliation commissioner for Bowman County, North
Dakota. At the meeting of the-creditors the State’s Attorney
of Bowman County appeared and made a motion that the lands
listed by the Bankrupt in his schedule be stricken. This motion
to strike. was presumably made upon the ground that Bowman
County was the owner of the said lands.

The order granting the’ motion recited that the debtor had
conceded in open court that he had no right, title or interest in
or to the said described lands at the time of filing his petition
and schedules.

On October 25th, 1946 after due notice as required by the
Bankruptcy Act, and upon recommendation of the Supervising
Coneiliation Commissioner, the Federal District Court made its
order discharging-the said Reinhold Werre, Bankrupt, from all
debts and claims. which are made provable by the Bankruptcy
Act against his estate and which existed on the 26th day of
January, 1942, on which day his petition for adjudication was
filed, excepting such debts as are by law excepted from the opera-
tion of discharge in bankruptcy.

There are in the record three notices of expiration of period
of redemption, defendant’s exhibits 13, 14 and 15, dated May 17,
1950, issued by the county auditor of Bowman County, North
Dakota, directed to the plaintiff and appellant, Reinhold Werre.
Exhibit 13 covers lot-1, See 6, Twp 130, Rge 101 showing the
total amount of taxes due $16.50 of which $4.48 is: real estate
taxes and the remainder of said sum of-$12.02 is‘personal prop-
erty taxes, penalty and interest forthe year 1944 entered against
said lands. Exhibit 14, covers the SWi of Sec 5, Twp 130, Rge
101 showing the amount necessary for. redemption to be $296.16;
$22.68 of which is real estate taxes for tlie year 1944 and per-
sonal property taxes entered’against said land for the years
1930, 1931, 1932, and 1933 in the sum of $273.48 making a total
of $296.16.. Exhibit 15 covers the SE4 NW and Lots 3 and 4,

ee 619

Sec 5, Twp 130, Rge 101 showing the amount necessary for re-
demption to be $155.90, $15.48 being real estate taxes for the
year 1944, and the remainder personal property taxes of the
said bankrupt entered against said land for the years 1934, 1935,
1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, The lands described in the notices
of expiration of period of redemption are the lands which were
listed in the bankruptcy schedules and later stricken on motion
of Bowman County.

On June 12, 1950 Reinhold Werre made application to the
county commissioners of Bowman County for abatement of the
taxes that had been extended against the said described lands
of which he states that he is the owner. In his application he
states that he filed his petition in bankruptcy on August 14, 1943
under Chapter 75 of the amended Bankruptcy Act; that the taxes
due Bowman County were listed in his schedules; that in due
time he was adjudicated a bankrupt; that Bowman County was
given notice to file its claim for taxes as required by the Bank-
ruptey Act and that the officers of Bowman County wholly failed
to file proof of its claim for taxes and that said Bowman County
thereby waived its claim. The county commissioners of Bow-
man County rejected the application for abatement and plaintiff
appealed to the district court. The case was tried before the
Hon. J. O. Wigen, one of the District Judges of the Sixth Ju-
dicial District, and after hearing the court denied plaintiff's
application and affirmed the action of the Board of County Com-
missioners. Judgment was entered accordingly and the plain-
tiff appealed to the Supreme Court, and demanded a trial de
novo on all issues of law and fact.

It is conceded that no formal proof of claim was filed on
behalf of Bowman County of any taxes due to it from the bank-
rupt Reinhold Werre. Appellant contends therefore that since
no proof of claim was filed by Bowman County, its claim was
barred when the final order of discharge was entered by the
Federal District Court.

Appellant further contends that the county is now estopped
from asserting any claim for the unpaid taxes. It is not claimed,
however, that the taxes are illegal or excessive; but the main

620 De

-contention is that the county having failed to file its claim it
waived all its right to collect such taxes.": .

At the trial in district court exhibits 1 to 20 both inclusive
were by stipulation introduced in evidence. Exhibit 17 is a copy
of Bowman County Pioneer dated. February 23, 1950, and con-
tains the official proceedings of the board of county commission-
ers of Bowman County, North Dakota, in regular session
January 10, 1950. ‘This exhibit contains the following resolu-
tion adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Bowman
County. .

“That WHEREAS the delinquent personal property taxes of
Reinhold Werre were extended against his-real estate on the
3rd day of January 1945, but that inadvertently the same was
omitted in the minutes’ of this Board, this Board does .hereby
ratify and confirm the extension of said personal property taxes
of Reinhold Werre against his real estate, by said officers, and
hereby orders and directs the proper officers of Bowman County,
if said extension of said personal property taxes, was not proper,
to now extend said personal property taxes of Reinhold Werre
against any and all real estate held in the name of said Rein-
hold Werre. All members voted ‘Aye’ ”.

“Following is a list of the personal property taxes of Reinhold
Werre giving the year, the amount of tax and the real estate
against which the tax is extended:

1930 $50.35 Swi 5-130-101
1931 61.89 Swi 5130-101
1932 46.51 SWi 5-130-101
1933 41.66 SWs 5-130-101
1934 42.84. SEINW# Lots 2-3 of 5-130-101
1935 24.96 Lots 3-4 SEINW{ —_5-130-101
1936 7.86 Lots 2-83-SE{NWt 5-130-101
1937 19.42 Lots 2-3 SEINW4 5-130-101
1938 5.59 Lots 3-4 SEZNW4 5130-101
1939 2.23 Lots 3-4 SEINW¢ 5-130-101
1940 3.70 Lot 1 of Sec. 6-130-101

1941 4.23 Lot 1 of See. 6-130-101.”

ee 621

This resolution was passed in accordance with the provisions
of Section 57-2221 NDRC 1943 which provides that at its Janu-
ary meeting in each year, the board of county commissioners
shall declare by resolution that all unpaid or uncancelled per-
sonal property taxes from and after the date of. the extension
and entry thereof as provided in this chapter, shall constitute
a lien on any and all real estate owned by the tax debtor, or which
he may thereafter acquire, and shall make such taxes a specific
lien on particular descriptions of real property owned by the
tax debtor as of the date of the extension and entry of such lien.

The lands against which the delinquent personal property
taxes were extended are the same lands that had previously
been stricken from the schedules of the bankrupt as not being
his property ‘at.that time. It is not clear as to when the bank-
rupt acquired title to the said described land and the only ref-
erence thereto in the. transcript is certain ‘testimony given by
M. S. Byrne the conciliation Commissioner. This testimony is
as follows:

Q. At the time that this order was entered do you, according
to your best.recollection, kriow whether there was any testimony
offered as to.whether Reinhold Werre-owned the land.

A. I think there was testimony to the effect that he just pur- .
chased it, under a contract for deed. This is to the best of my
recollection,

However, in his application for abatement and settlement of
the taxes in question made by the bankrupt, Reinhold Werre,
on June 12, 1950, he asserts that he is the record owner and
holds deeds to the lands in Bowman County, North Dakota,
described as set forth in the foregoing resolution adopted by the
county commissioners of Bowman County, on January 10, 1950.

The plaintiff and appellant contended in the court below as
he does here, that the failure of Bowman county to file proof
of its claim for taxes constituted a waiver and estoppel and that
it was barred from asserting its claim by the order of discharge
made by the bankruptcy court October 26, 1946,

In his application for abatement appellant states that he is
selling the said lands to one George Izzler and desires to convey

628 a

clear title to such lands and for that reason makes the applica-
tion to have the said taxes abated so that he can transfer good
title to the purchaser. Bowman County contends however that
formal proof of its claim for taxes is not a prerequisite to pay-
ment thereof.

8 Corpus Juris Secundum, Bankruptcy, page “1285 See 425
states the rule as follows:

“It is generally held, however, that a tax claini entitled to
prior payment under the terms of Bankruptcy Act Sec 64 (a)
(11 USCA Sec 104 (a),), in accordance with the rules discussed
in Sec 454 infra, need not be regularly and formally proved as
required by.the provisions relating to proof, since taxes are
not debts of the bankrupt within the meaning of these provi-.
sions, and it is the trustee’s duty to pay them whenever they are
brought to his attention. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court will
pass upon a claim for taxes and its legality and amount without.
a proof of claim having been filed, but the taxes must in some
manner be brought to the attention of the court or the trustee
before the assets of the estate have been distributed in order to
have a right.of action for the nonpayment thereof.”
and in 31 CJS Estoppel page 412, Sec 140 it is stated:

“When acting in its sovereign or governmental capacity, the
United States or a state ordinarily is not estopped. The doc-
trine of estoppel will not be applied to deprive the government
of the due exercise of its police power, or to affect public reve-
nues or property rights, or to frustrate the purpose of its laws
or thwart its public policy.” .

We quote further from the Michigan case of Lovett v. City.
Treasurer of Detroit, 281 NW 576, 286 Mich 159:

“The collection of duly levied taxes for goverhmental purposes
is a governmental function and the collection officer cannot, by
mistake or misinformation, work an estoppel, enforceable in a
court of equity. The fact, and not the misinformation, controls.
The treasurer was serving in a governmental capacity and the
right of the municipality in the particular at bar is not to-be
measured by his mistake of fact. No matter how innocently
done the treasurer could not, because of lack of authority, by

— 623

any representation, make unenforceable a duly levied tax in his
official hands for collection.”

“Subdivisions 2 and 8 of See i 0240 NDRC 1943 provide as
follows:

2. Taxes upon personal property shall not be affected by any
general statute of limitation.

8. A tax lien shall include the principal of the tax, and all
costs, penalties, interest, charges, and expenses which by law
shall accrue, attach, or be incurred.

See 35 of the Federal Bankruptey Act USCA Vol 11 provides:

(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part
except such as are . . . due as a tax levied by the United
States, or any state, county, district or municipality.”

See also In re Gould Manufacturing Co., District Court, ED
Wis 11 Fed Supp page 644.

In the case at bar the plaintiff and appellant listed in his
schedules in bankruptcy as his obligation the taxes due and ow-
ing to Bowman County. Under the authorities cited herein the
fact that no-proof was made-of such taxes in the bankruptcy
court does not invalidate them. Under the state law they are
not affected by or subject to the statute of limitations. Under
the bankruptcy statute Sec 35, supra, a discharge in bankruptcy
does not’ release the bankrupt from valid taxes due and delin-
quent. ‘The plaintiff and appellant admitted in his application
for abatement of the taxes involved here that he was the owner
of the lands described therein. The county commissioners of
Bowman County acting under the authority of Sec 57-2221 ex-
tended the delinquent taxes against the said lands owned by the
plaintiff and appellant. As pointed out herein appellant does
not challenge the validity of these taxes. He listed them in the
schedule as valid obligations payable out of the assets in the
hands of the trustee in bankruptcy.

Plaintiff's exhibit 11 is a certified copy of the bankrupt’s
transactions with reference to the property of the estate which
was in his possession during the stay of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings; also a certified copy of the order of the supervising
conciliation commissioner approving said report. In the report

624 |

the bankrupt states that through arrangement and agreement
with the mortgagees he sold all of the mortgaged property and
paid the proceeds of the sale to the mortgagees to apply on their
claims and that this was done by permission and under the su-
pervision of the conciliation commissioner of Bowman County.
However, in his testimony at the trial in. the district court he
‘stated that he paid the proceeds of the sale to the conciliation
commissioner and that the commissioner paid the money to the
mortgagees. On cross examination by counsel for Bowman
County he was asked the following question:

«What I am getting at is the property that you sold (Inter-
rupting) Yes. (Continuing) was the identical property that
was assessed for which this personal property tax was assessed?
Answer, yes.”

There is nothing in the record to indicate that any action was
taken by the bankruptcy court or by the conciliation commis-
sioner either allowing or disallowing the taxes claimed by Bow-
man County.

The lands against which the county commissioners of Bowman
County extended the taxes involved here are the same lands
which appellant listed in his original schedules as part of his
assets. The fact that he was served with notices of expiration
of period of redemption would indicate that Bowman County
held tax certificates to said lands. He therefore had the right
to make redemption and this was an interest in the land at least
of some potential value. Evidently he is now in position to
redeem from the tax sale. Under these circumstances and upon
the whole record the county commissioners rightly extended the
delinquent personal property taxes of the appellant against
these lands.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Curistianson, Grimson and Burxs, JJ.,
concur. :

Es
[File No. 7293]

ANNA HAYASHI and Harry T. Hayashi, Respondents, v.
CLAIRE IHRINGER, Delores Thringer, Leo Krenz and
Polly Krenz, Appellants.

(58 NW2da 788)

Opinion filed May 28; 1953

Sinness & Duffy, for appellants.

Ritigers, Hjellum & Weiss, for appellants.

“Burks, J. In May 1948, plaintiffs and the defendants entered

into an option contract. By the terms of this contract defend-

| 627

ants secured an option to purchase from the plaintiffs within
the time limited therein, “blocks sixty-nine and seventy-six -in
the West Side Addition to the City of Carrington . . . to-
gether with all personal property of every kind, nature and
description, now uscd in the buildings situated on the above
described real.estate, and used in connection with the business ~
thereon operated as Rainbow Gardens and including all beds,
bedding and furniture, in the tourist cabins, and all furniture,
fixtures, kitchen utensils and equipment contained in the build-
ing operated as a restaurant and dance hall on said premises.”
The purchase price was fixed at forty-five thousand dollars, of
which twenty-five thousand was payable upon the exercise of
the option, and the balance at the rate of $500.00 per month with
interest at five per cent per.annum..

Defendants exercised this option. They received from the
plaintiffs a deed to the real property and a bill of sale to the
personal property therein described, and they executed and
delivered to plaintiffs a mortgage upon the real property con-
veyed as security for the payment of the balance due-according
to the terms of the option contract. In July 1948, defendants
took possession of the property and began the operation of the
varied businesses thereon located. Thereafter payments of
principal and interest were made each month in accordance with
the terms of the contract until December 19, 1949.

Thereafter defendants made no further payments and early
in March 1950, plaintiffs served upon defendants notice of in-
tention to foreclose the mortgage. On March 17, 1950 defend-
ants served upon the plaintiffs a notice of rescission of the
purchase agreement. As set forth in this notice, the ground for
rescission was the assertion that plaintiffs specifically agreed
not to reenter the cafe business at Carrington, that they had
violated this agreement and that by entering into active compe-
tition with the defendants, they had substantially destroyed the
value of the property sold to the defendants.

This action to foreclose the purchase money mortgage was
commenced on April 6, 1950. The complaint sets forth the exe-
cution of the mortgage and the defaults in payment. Defend-
ants’ answer admits.the execution of the mortgage and the al-

628 ee

leged defaults. As an affirmative defense it sets forth “That
in consideration of the purchase of said property and as a part
of the same transaction, the plaintiffs sold to the defendants
the good will of the Rainbow Gardens, including the good will
of the restaurant business and they agreed not to engage in the

- restaurant business at Carrington in competition with defend-
ants; that within a few months after selling said property to
defendants, the plaintiffs commenced to remodel their building
at Carrington, converted the same into a restaurant and there-
upon advertised their services to provide catering for banquets,
parties and special events of the same character and nature as
the specialty of the Rainbow Gardens; that they advertised that
such services would be under the personal direction of the plain-
tiff, Harry T. Hayashi and that plaintiffs, have continued to
operate such restaurant, specializing as aforesaid in direct com-
petition with the business carried on by defendants; that the
good will and agreement of plaintiffs not to engage in business
in competition with defendants was of the value of not less
than $15,000.00 and that defendants paid to plaintiffs $15,000.00
more than the tangible value of the aforesaid property in con-
sideration of the transfer of the good will and the agreement by
plaintiffs not to compete with defendants.” In their prayer for
relief defendants asked that plaintiffs be required to accept a
return of the property conveyed and that they be required to
repay the defendants the payments heretofore made, together
with the reasonable value of the permanent improvements made
by the defendants, and for such further relief as to the court
shall appear just. The plaintiffs replied, denying that they had
ever entered into any agreement not to compete with the de-
fendants.

Upon the trial of the case, the trial court found that defend-
ants’ attempted rescission was not made within a reasonable
time after discovery of the alleged breach of contract and there-
fore could not be allowed and that whether the defendants had
a cause of action for damages against the plaintiffs for breach
of contract was not before the court under the pleadings, and
was therefore not decided. Defendants have appealed and have
demanded a trial anew in this court.

— 629

There is one basic issue in this case and that is whether there
is sufficient competent evidence in the record to establish a con-
tract by which the plaintiffs agreed not to compete with the
defendants in the restaurant business. If there is no such evi-
dence the defense of the defendants fails and the judgment of
the district court must be affirmed.

At the trial the defendants contended that the plaintiff, Harry
Hayashi, had agreed orally, immediately before the option con-
tract was signed, that he would not compete with them in the
restaurant business in Carrington and that such agreement was
one of the considerations which induced them to execute the
option contract. All evidence relating to this alleged agreement
was objected to by plaintiffs upon the ground that the written
contract superseded all oral negotiations or stipulations which
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument and
that parol evidence of such negotiations was not admissible to
vary the terms of the written contract. The trial court noted
the objection, reserved, his ruling thereon and permitted the
defendants to testify as to all of the conversations they had with
the plaintiffs concerning this matter. All of the evidence which
defendants claim establishes the existence of the contract not
to compete is therefore in the record. We have considered this
evidence and have reached the conclusion that, if competent, it
would still be insufficient to establish a contract not to compete.

The defendants all testified as to statements made by the
plaintiffs, Harry Hayashi and Anna Hayashi. Claire Ihringer
testified: “We were led to believe on account of ill health on
the part of Mr. Hayashi, that he was unable to continue with
the restaurant business.”

Q. “You say you ‘were led to believe—did they tell you that?”
A. “They told us that.”
Q. “Was there any discussion during these negotiations with

reference to him going into a competing line of business?
A. “Yes, there was.”

Q. “Tell us what conversation you had with them regarding
that.”

A. ‘T can’t recall exactly but I believe it was about May 18th.

630 De

We had agreed on the price and we were to take over and I
asked him, Mr. Hayashi, if he was, going to start-a restaurant.
I mentioned the Miami Grill. He told me ‘No’, that if he want-
ed to continue in the restaurant business, he would keep the
Rainbow Gardens.”

Delores Ihringer’s testimony is as follows:

Q. “Did you hear any specific statement by him with refer-
ence to his going into the restaurant business or not going into
the restaurant business?”

A. “He definitely did not want to go into the restaurant busi-
ness. He had been in so long he was tired and he wanted to
get out, and his health would not permit.”

Q. “Did you hear the conversation that your husband had?
Something about he asked him if he might be going back in the
restaurant business after selling Rainbow Gardens?”

A. “Yes.”

Q. “Tell us what took place.”

A. “He laughed and said, it would be silly for me to go into
another restaurant, or I would keep the Rainbow Gardens. I am
too sick to carry on and stand on my feet all those long hours.”

On cross examination she was asked:

Q. “You never pinned him down to a promise?”

A. “We didn’t think it was necessary. If it was between a
party we didn’t know, or a stranger, someone who was not a
relative, we would have hired a lawyer and had it legalized but
it was strictly family . . . and we placed too much trust.”

Defendant, Leo Krenz’s testimony concerning the conversa-
tion with Harry Hayashi is as follows:

“We had discussed the price. There was a discussion of Five
Thousand Dollars. We wanted to get the price down Five
Thousand Dollars. We discussed it forth and back and finally
we came to the conclusion of the price. He wanted Forty-five
Thousand Dollars. Then I say, ‘If we pay him that price that
he would retire from that business in this town—that he would
not start that business in this town.’ He said, ‘that is the reason
Tam selling out because I want to retire’ ”

The testimony of Claire and Delores Ihringer evidently re-

— 631

lates to one conversation and that of Leo Krenz to another. The
Ihringers testified to a question put by Claire Ihringer and
Hayashi’s answer. Krenz testified to a question put by himself
and Hayashi’s answer. The question put by Ihringer, after
they had agreed on the price and were ready to take over, was
simply whether Mr. Hayashi planned to go into the restaurant
business. Mr. Hayashi’s answer was that if he wanted to con-
tinue in the restaurant business he would keep the Rainbow
Gardens. Delores Ihringer corroborated this testimony and add-
ed that Hayashi gave as his reason for not wanting to start
another restaurant, “I am too sick to carry on‘and stand on my
feet all those long hours.” We do not see how an-agreement
not to compete in.the restaurant business ean be spelled out of
this conversation. Mr. Ihringer asked Mr. Hayashi what his
intentions with respect to the restaurant business were at that
time and Hayashi replied that he did not intend to-go into that
business. There was no request that Hayashi agree not to go
into the business and no promise by Hayashi that he would for
all future time stay out of that business in Carrington.

A mere statement of an intention to act in a certain way is
not a promise upon which a contract can be predicated. 17
CJS (Contracts Sec 46) 388; In re McKeon’s Estate, 227 Ia
1050, 289 NW 915; Van Camp v. Van Camp, 291 Mich 688, 289
NW 297; In re Sickmann’s Estate, 207 Minn 65, 289 NW 832;
Broad St. Nat. Bank v. Collier, 112 NJ Law 41, 169 A 552, at
firmed 113 NJ Law 303, 174 A 900.

In Carlson v. Krantz, 172 Minn 242, 246, 247, 214 NW 928, 929,
930, 54 ALR, 545, the court said:

“,. . in such a case, it is easy for an interested party, in
retrospect, to give a mere expression of intention a promissory
and contractual effect. . . . Care should be taken not to at-
tach promissory and contractual effect to what was at the time
merely an expression of intention concerning future action.”

Mr. Hayashi’s answer to Mr. Krenz’s question, viz: “That is
the reason: I am selling out, because I want to retire.” is also
but an expression of intention or desire on his part. Further-
more, it is clear that neither Krenz’s question nor Hayashi’s
answer related to the restatirant business, but to the businesses

632 Dt

for which the defendants agreed to pay forty-five thousand dol-
lars which included a tourist court, a filling station, a dance hall
and a restaurant.

It was also contended by defendants that, if the evidence was
insufficient to establish an express contract, a contract not to
compete would be implied from the sale of a business and its
good will, This contention is subject to several infirmities: In
the first place the good will of the business was not expressly
sold. In the second place the competition complained of related
to only one phase of a multiple business enterprise. Lastly, the
clear import of Section 9-0806 NDRC 1943 which provides:

“One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the
buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a
specified county, city or village, or a part of either, so long as
the buyer or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him
earries on a like business therein;” is that a sale of good will
does not imply a contract not to compete but that such a con-
tract may be expressly agreed to in cases where good will is
sold. :

We are of the opinion therefore that defendants’ evidence, as
a matter of law, is insufficient to establish the alleged contract
not to compete. The judgment of the district court is therefore
affirmed. .

Morris, C. J., and Sarurz, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ.,
concur,

be
" [File No. 7353]

CLARENCE DIXON and ELIZABETH DIXON, Appel-
. lants, v. W. C. KAUFMAN, JR., United States Smelting,
Refining and Mining Company, Andrew H. Gay, Cyrus B.
Frost, Sabine Royalty Corporation, Union Oil Company of
California, a corporation, Los Nietos Company, a corpora-
tion, Phillips Petroleum Company, a corporation, and The
California Company, a corporation, Respondents.

(58 NW2da 797)

2

Filed May 7, 1953. Rehearing denied June 19, 1953

Paul Campbell, for appellants.

Cox, Cox, Pearce & Engebretson and Traynor & Traynor, for
respondents.

Morais, Ch. J. This is a statutory action to quiet title (Chap-
ter 32-17 NDRC 1943) wherein Clarence Dixon alleges that he
is the owner of and has an estate and interest in the real prop-
erty involved in the action which, for convenience of discussion,
will be separated into two tracts, the first being the Southeast
Quarter (SE{) of Section Thirty-six (36) in Township One
Hundred Sixty (160) North, of Range Highty-three (83) West,
which will be hereinafter known as the school land because it
was acquired by Clarence L. Dixon from.the State of North
Dakota through the.Board of University and School Lands by
patent dated October 29, 1945. The second tract consists of
the East Half (B3); Hast Half of the Southwest Quarter (EH
SW) Lots Three and Four (3-4) of Section Thirty-one (31)
Township One Hundred Sixty (160) North, of Range Highty-
two (82) West, except Soo Railway right-of-way and except
7.73 acres released for highway. This tract will be hereinafter
identified as bank land because it was acquired through the Bank
of North Dakota by state treasurer’s deed on December 8, 1943.
It is alleged that the plaintiffs are husband and wife, make
their home on one’quarter section of this land, and have done so

- for many years past.

The school land was purchased by Clarence Dixon at a public
sale held in Bottineau County on August 28, 1945, and pursuant
thereto he entered into a contract with the State of North Da-

638 a

kota, through the Board of University and School Lands, which
contained the following provision:

“The grantor, however, reserves to itself fifty (50) per cent
of all oil, natural gas, or minerals which may be found on or
underlying such land as required by Chapter’149 of the Session
Laws of North Dakota for 1939 as amended by Chapter 165 SL
of North Dakota for 1941 (See 38-0901, Code 1943), together
with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose
of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said
land for oil, gas, and other minerals, and storing, handling,
transporting and marketing the same therefrom with the right
to remove from said land all of Grantor’s property and improve-
ments.” :

After providing for the issuance of patent upon payment of
full purchase price, it was further provided:

“said patent, however, shall contain the reservation required
by Chapter 149, Laws of 1939, as amended as aforesaid by Chap-
ter 165, SL1941. (Sec 38-0901, Code 1943.)”

Section 38-0901 NDRC 1943 provides:

“In every transfer of land, whether by deed, contract, lease,
or otherwise, by the state of North Dakota, or by any depart-
ment thereof, fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals
which may be found on or underlying such land shall be reserved
to the state of North Dakota. Any deed, contract, lease, or other
transfer of any. such land made after February 20, 1941, which
does not contain such reservation shall be construed as if such
reservation were contained therein. The provisions of this sec-
tion shall apply to all lands owned by this state or by any depart-
ment thereof regardless of how title thereto was acquired.”

The patent under which Dixon claims title recites that he has
complied with his contract of purchase and is entitled to a patent
“subject, however, to all legal reservations and exceptions made’
by law.” And the grant recited in the patent provides: “re-
serving and excepting from the operation of this grant all rights
and privileges vested in the State of North Dakota under the
provisions of the constitution and laws of said state.”

~The history of the acquisition of the bank land by Clarence
L. Dixon shows that on January 26, 1942, he entered into a con-

| 639

tract with the state treasurer, as trustee for the State of North
Dakota, which contained the. provision “That vendor hereby -re-
serves to the State of North Dakota fifty per centum (50%) of
all oil, natural gas and minerals which may be found on or un-
derlying saidland . . . .” The state treasurer’s deed issued
to him pursuant to this contract provided:

“Reserving and excepting, however, to the State of North
Dakota, fifty per centum (50%) of all oil, natural gas and min-
erals which may be found on or underlying said lands, pursuant
to the provisions of Chapter 165, of the 1941 Session Laws of
North Dakota, and further reserving and excepting title to all
archaeological materials, whether found upon or below the sur-
face of said lands, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 223
of the 1939 Session Laws of North Dakota, and further excepting
all minerals, including oil, gas and coal, and all mineral rights
not now owned by the party of the first part according to the
records in the office of the Register of Deeds of said County and
State, ....”

The instruments of title by which Clarence L. Dixon has estab-
lished his right, title, and interest which he originally acquired
in the property were subject to the reservation, among others,
of fifty per cent of all.oil, natural gas, or minerals that may be
found on or underlying the land. The issues revolve around
the ownership of oil, gas, or minerals on or underlying the land,
the validity of certain oil leases, and the right of some of the
defendants to enter upon the surface for the purpose of exploit-
ing that which lies underneath.

The answering defendants present claims to or interests in
the property in question that fall into two categories—one, fee
simple title to a fractional part or a percentage of all the oil,
gas, and other minerals on or under the land; two, a leasehold
interest in and to oil, gas, and other minerals lying on or under
said lands or specifically described portions thereof. We will
first consider the issues presented by the claims of those defend-
ants who assert that they are owners in fee simple of an interest
in the oil, gas, and other minerals. Neither the State of North
Dakota nor any of its agencies or departments are parties to
this action’ There is, consequently, no issue with respect to

640 ee

the ownership of the fee simple title to fifty per cent of all oil,
natural gas, or minerals under any of these lands reserved in
and by the patent and the treasurer’s deed issued in behalf of
the state by its duly constituted officials. The trial court prop-
erly rendered no judgment herein affecting the interests of the
state reserved in the conveyances to the plaintiff Dixon.

The defendant Kaufman claims no present. interest adverse
to the plaintiffs. He nevertheless answered and alleged that
the plaintiffs sold to him on December 22, 1949, an undivided
one-half interest in all oil, gas, and other minerals on and under
the land involved in this action; that the plaintiffs executed and
delivered to him a mineral deed conveying such interest, which
deed was duly recorded on December 23, 1949, in the office of
the Register of Deeds of Bottineau County. He then alleges
that thereafter and on December 24, 1949, he conveyed by min-
eral deed in writing an undivided one-fourth interest in all of
the oil and gas and other minerals under the land to the United
States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company of Salt Lake
City, Utah. He further alleges that on the seventh day of Jan-
uary, 1950, he sold to and gave a mineral deed to Sabine Royalty
Corporation of Dallas, Texas, for an undivided one-eighth in-
terest in.all the oil, gas, and other minerals under the land;
and on the sixth day of April, 1950, he gave a similar deed to
CO. B. Frost for an undivided one-eighth interest in all of the
oil, gas, and other minerals. Thus it appears by these convey-
ances Kaufman divested himself of all ownership.

Kaufman’s answer also shows that on March 24, 1950, he gave
to Andrew H. Gay of Sheridan, Wyoming, an oil, gas, and min-
eral lease covering the Southeast Quarter (SE}) of Section
Thirty-six (36), the school land, for a term of ten years. This
lease we will consider further when we discuss leasehold
interests.

The answer of the United States Smelting, Refining and Min-
ing Company alleges that it is the owner of an undivided one-
fourth interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals
under all of the land herein involved by virtue of a mineral deed
from W. CO. Kaufman, Jr., dated December 24, 1949, and that it
was an innocent bona fide purchaser relying upon ‘the record

De 641

title as disclosed in the office of the Register of Deeds of Bot-
tineau County, and that no privity existed between this defend-
ant and W. C. Kaufman, Jr. The defendant Sabine Royalty
Corporation pleaded that it became the innocent purchaser from
W. CG. Kaufman, Jr., on January 7, 1950, of a one-eighth interest
in all the oil and gas and other minerals, and the defendant
Cyrus B. Frost likewise alleged that he became the owner in
fee simple of an undivided one-eighth interest in the oil and gas
by virtue of a deed from W. C. Kaufman, Jr., on April 6, 1950,
and that he was an innocent bona fide purchaser. Counsel for
plaintiffs declined to file a reply to any of the answers although
urged to do so by the trial court at a pretrial conference. No
question was raised as to the sufficiency of the pleading of bona
fides.

The plaintiffs, over objection of defendants’ counsel, were
permitted to testify to facts tending to show that the deed exe-
cuted by Clarence L. Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon to W. C. Kauf-
man, Jr., dated December 22, 1949, conveying a one-half interest
in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals underlying all
of the lands involved herein, was obtained by fraud. At the
close of the case, a motion was made to strike the testimony of
the plaintiffs with reference to the issue of fraud, the ground
for both the earlier objection and the motion being that fraud
had not been pleaded and, therefore, could not be proved. The
trial court granted the motion striking this testimony and it is
now urged on the part of the plaintiffs that the action of the
trial court in this respect was erroneous and that fraud, though
not pleaded, might properly be shown in this action.

The complaint, being approximately in the statutory form pre-
scribed by Section 32-1704 NDROC 1943 in actions for the deter-
minations of adverse claims, pleads no particulars with respect
to the title of the plaintiffs or the anticipated claims of defend-
ants. Such a complaint is sufficient and is not vulnerable to
attack the demurrer. While the action is one of statutory form,
its nature is essentially equitable. Axt v. Bank of America, 72
ND 600, 10 NW(2d) 480; Wagner y. Stroh, 70 ND 328, 294 NW
195; Northwestern Mutual Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Hanson,

o42 —

72 ND 629, 10 NW (2d) 599. The defendants, the United States
Smelting, Refining and Mining Company, Cyrus B. Frost, and
the Sabine Royalty Corporation, all answer separately and set
up a deed from the plaintiffs to Kaufman and conveyances from
Kaufman by way of a deed to each of these defendants. Hach
answer alleges the defendant to be an innocent bona fide pur-
chaser for value in reliance on the record title. By way of
affirmative relief, each asks that the interest obtained through
the deed to Kaufman be adjudged superior to the interest of the
plaintiffs. These answers, under decisions of this court, con-
stituted counterclaims. Jester v. Jester, 76 ND 517, 87 NW(2d)
879; Robertson v. Brown, 75 ND 109, 25 NW(2d) 781; Goss
v. Herman, 20 ND 295, 127 NW 78; Betts v. Signor, 7 ND 399,
75 NW 781; Power v. Bowdle, 3 ND 107, 54 NW 404, 21 LRA
828, 44 Am St Rep 511.

Without further pleading, either by amendment to the com-
plaint or by reply, the plaintiffs sought to attack the deed which
the plaintiffs had given to Kaufman by offering testimony tend-
ing to show that it was obtained fraudulently by Larson who
was the agent of Kaufman. The case was tried to the court
without a jury and is now here for trial anew.

The question now confronting us is whether it was necessary
for the plaintiffs to reply to the defendants’ answers and coun-
terclaims and to plead fraud by way of reply in order to entitle
them to attack the Kaufman deed on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud. The rule applied, in some states at least,
is that in an action to quiet title fraud must be pleaded in order
to be available to overcome the effect of a written instrument.
See 44 Am Jur, Quieting Title, Section 79. We cannot apply
that rule in this case because of the definite statutory declara-
tion to be found in Section 32-1709 NDRC 1943, which provides:

“No reply shall be necessary on the part of the plaintiff, except
when the defendant in his answer claims a lien or encumbrance
upon the property which, prior to the commencement of the
action, was barred by the statutes of limitation, or which shall
have been discharged in bankruptcy, or which constitutes only

— 643

a cloud, the plaintiff may reply setting up such defense and .
availing himself of the benefit thereof, . . . °”

This appears to be a unique statutory provision to be found
only in this state. It has its origin in Chapter 5, SLND 1901,
which was an extensive revision of our statutory law regarding
actions to determine adverse claims to real estate, wherein it
was provided that no reply should be required on the part of
the plaintiff except when he sought recovery for the value of
improvements. The law was further amended by Chapter 3,
SLND 1909, to include the language above quoted. It has been
suggested that this statute, obviating the necessity for a reply,
refers only to cases where the defendant has set up a lien or
encumbrance and that it has no application to latent claims,
particularly those dependent upon parole evidence, that are
urged against the validity of an instrument set up by a defend-
ant, the validity of which is challenged by the plaintiff on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation. We cannot give this
statute such a restricted construction. It is one of the provisions
made by the legislature for conducting a statutory proceeding
to quiet title. The legislature having eliminated the necessity
for a reply, except in four enumerated instances, this court can-
not, by construction or otherwise, create a fifth exception. It is
a general principle of statutory interpretation that the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Nome State Bank v. Brendmoen, 70 ND
391, 295 NW 82; State v. Walla, 57 ND 726, 224 NW 211; 50
Am Jur, Statutes, Section 244; Dickinson v. Thress, 69 ND
748, 290 NW 658. In this case the legislature has declared that
no reply on the part of the plaintiff is necessary, with four ex-
ceptions, none of which directly or by implication includes fraud.
Fraud not being within the scope of any exception is provable
against a title set up in a counterclaim without being pleaded
in areply.

The defendant Kaufman no longer has any interest in the
premises, having executed deeds to the United States Smelting,
Refining and Mining Company, Cyrus B. Frost, and Sabine
Royalty Corporation. These grantees claim to be bona fide pur-
chasers without notice and for value. They bought their respec-

644 a

tive interests from the defendant Kaufman after his deed was
of record. That deed was regular on its face and bore an ac-
knowledgment in proper form. A certificate of acknowledgment
regular on its face is presumed to state the truth. McCardia v.
Billings, 10 ND 373, 87 NW 1008, 88 Am St Rep 729; Patnode v.
Deschenes and Leistikow, 15 ND 100, 106 NW 573; Severtson v.
Peoples, 28 ND 372, 148 NW 1054. The minéral deed from the
plaintiffs to the defendant Kaufman, appearing to be regular in
every respect, was presented to the Register of Deeds of Botti-
neau County on December 23, 1949, and by him recorded in
Book 27 of Miscellaneous at page 515.

The grantees of Kaufman were bona fide purchasers to the
extent that they acquired the property described in their deeds
for value and in good faith without knowledge of the claim on
the part of the Dixons that the deed from them to Kaufman had
been acquired fraudulently. The plaintiffs argue, however,
that their possession of the surface of the property constituted
constructive notice regardless of what the records in the register
of deed’s office showed. They would invoke the rule that open
and notorious possession and occupancy of real property by
another than his grantor is sufficient to charge the purchaser
with knowledge of the rights of the occupant. Harnest v. First
National Bank, 56 ND 309, 217 NW 169, and cases cited. How-
ever, this court has also held that this rule does not apply where
the possession is entirely consistent with the record title. Red
River Valley Land and Investment Co. v. Smith, 7 ND 236, 74
NW 194; Ildvedsen v. First State Bank, 24 ND 227, 139 NW 105.
In this case we have possession of the surface by the plaintiffs
which is entirely consistent with the record in the register of
deed’s office which shows that they deeded to Kaufman one-half
interest in the minerals. There being nothing inconsistent be-
tween the occupancy of the plaintiffs and the deed to Kaufman,
who is the grantor of the subsequent purchases, the occupancy
of the plaintiffs cannot be said to give constructive notice that
they questioned that deed. Squarely in point is the case of
Logue v. Von Almen, 879 Ill 208, 40 NH2d 73, 140 ALR 251, to
which we later refer at greater length, in which the court holds
that where the grantors conveyed an undivided one-half interest

Le 645

in oil and gas with the right to the grantees to enter upon the
surface and remove it, and retained the other undivided one-
half interest, the possession of the grantors did not serve as
notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers. See also Busby v.
Smith (Tex Civ App), 53 SW2d 138.

‘We now turn to the evidence of fraud and its effect upon the
titles held by the grantees of Kaufman as bona fide purchasers.
The testimony of the plaintiffs, which was first admitted and
later stricken on the ground that fraud had not been pleaded,
is to the effect that’on December 22, 1949, or thereabouts, one
Don Larson drove into the farmyard of the plaintiffs, was in-
vited into the house, and told the plaintiffs that he was with an
oil company. He did not mention Mr. Kaufman. Plaintiffs’
testimony is disconnected, fragmentary, and unsatisfactory, but
from it we gather that they claim they understood that Larson
wanted to obtain an oil lease on their land from which he said
they would get “an eighth royalty or to make it plain a barrel
out of every cight.” Both of the plaintiffs were present. and
their testimony substantially agrees. They claim that Larson
then asked them to sign some papers and the plaintiff Dixon
testifies:

“He gets some papers out of his brief case over here and he
fetches them around like this and he asks me to sign them, and
I steps up, he handed me a pencil and I signed them and I put
on my mittens again and went out.”

He further states that the papers were so folded that he could
not see the words “Mineral Deed” at the top. Plaintiff testified
that his eyes were not good and that he did not read much.
Larson left some papers with the plaintiffs which Dixon did not
read. Later his wife read them to him. One was a copy of
the mineral deed to Kaufman ‘and the other a draft for $200.00
which was never cashed. Dixon understood that he was to get
$200.00 which Larson said was a gift. The testimony of Mrs.
Dixon corroborates that of her husband. She states that they
never had a chance to read the papers they signed, which were
an original and a copy of the mineral deed. After Larson left,
she put the papers in a buffet drawer and neither of plaintiffs
read them until at least two weeks after the transaction was had.

646 De

Larson’s testimony directly contradicts that of the plaintiffs as
to the manner in which the mineral deed was obtained.

After Don Larson left the Dixon residence on December 22,
1949, he took the mineral deed bearing the plaintiffs’ signatures
to a notary public who had previously taken acknowledgments
for the Dixons and was familiar with their signatures. The
notary filled out and signed the certificate of acknowledgment
attached to the deed. The Dixons were not present. The notary
testifies that before executing the acknowledgment he called up
Mrs. Dixon on the telephone and asked her if she and her hus-
band signed the instrument and she answered in the affirmative.
He did not talk to Mr. Dixon. Mrs. Dixon denies that the notary
ealled her.

An estate in real property may be transferred by an instru-
ment in writing subscribed by the grantor and the instrument
need not be acknowledged or witnessed in order to be valid as
between the grantor and grantee. Sections 47-1001 and 47-1006
NDRC 1943, Bumann v. Burleigh County, 73 ND 655, 18 NW
2210. An exception to this rule, however, is to be found in the
statutory provisions regarding the transfer of title to a home-
stead.

The question next to be considered is, assuming that Larson
perpetrated a fraud upon the plaintiffs when he obtained the
mineral deed by leading them to believe they were signing an
oil lease instead of a deed, whether the grantees of Kaufman
who purchased in good faith without notice of the fraud, for
value and relying upon the record in the office of the register of
deeds which was in all respects regular, became bona fide pur-
chasers.

This court has held in an early case that:

“Tt is only where a duly executed and recorded conveyance is
absolutely void that the record fails to give constructive. notice,
and in such case neither constructive nor actual notice could aid
the void instrument.” Roby v. Bank, 4 ND 156, 59 NW 719, 50
Am St Rep 633.

A deed that is absolutely void passes no title. It gives no
constructive notice and a claim of bona fides may not be based
upon a void instrument, even when placed of record in the man-

a 647

ner prescribed by statute. 45 Am Jur Records and Recording
Laws, Section 106; 26 CJS Deeds, Section 68. A deed obtained
by fraud is sometimes void but more often is merely voidable,
depending upon the facts on which the claim of fraud is based.
55 Am Jur, Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 666 and 667; 16 Am
Jur, Deeds, Section 35; 45 Am Jur, Records and Recording
Laws, Section 106 ; 26 CJS, Deeds, Section 68b. Uniformity docs
not prevail among the courts as to the circumstances of fraud
which will render a deed void and inoperative as against the
claims of an innocent purchaser. It would seem, however, that
in such cases the innocent purchaser should be protected unless
the fraud is clear, unequivocal, and its force undiminished by a
lack of care on the part of a mentally competent, defrauded
grantor,

“Where the rights of an innocent purchaser may be affected
by holding the deed inoperative to pass title, only unusual cir-
cumstances, such as misreading the instrument to a blind or
illiterate person, fraud on a mentally defective person, the sur-
reptitious substitution of one instrument for another, or repre-
sentation of its contents by a person in whom the grantor is
entitled to place confidence, will support a plea of fraud as to
the character of the instrument.” 16 Am Jur, Decds, Section 35,
page 458.

The plaintiffs were literate people of seeming normal mentali-
ity. They had engaged in a number of previous business trans-
actions, including the acquisition of titles to land and the exeeu-
tion of oil leases. If we accept the version of the plaintiffs as
to what happened at the time the mineral deed was executed,
a fraud was perpetrated. As an aftermath, inriocent purchasers
paid valuable considerations for other mineral deeds based on
the one obtained by fraud. If a loss results to parties ignorant
and innocent of the fraud, it must fall on those whose lack of
care and attention made the fraud possible rather than upon
those who were wholly unconnected with the fraudulent trans-
action. If the plaintiffs, or either of them, had read or even
looked at the mineral deed before they signed it, they would
have known what they were signing. The words “mineral deed”
in black capital letters three-eighths of an inch high appear on

648 Ee

the face of the instrument and also on the back. Not only did
they fail to read before they signed, but they did not read the
mineral deed until some two wecks later. Their misplaced con-
fidence in Larson resulted in a loss for which they must bear
responsibility as against bona fide purchasers with respect to
their non-homestead lands. Pure Oil Co. v. Swindall (Tex Com
App), 58 SW2d 7; Busby v. Smith (Tex Civ App), 53 SwW2d
138; McArthur v. Johnson, 61 NC 317, 93 Am Dec 593; Lanier
v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 177 NC 200, 98 SH 593.

The situation is entirely different with respect to the plaintiffs’
homestead, the Southwest Quarter (SW) of Section Thirty-
one (31). A conveyance of a homestead must not only be signed
by the husband and wife but must be acknowledged by each of
them. Section 47-1805 NDRC 1943. A conveyance of a home-
stead that is not executed and acknowledged by both the hus-
band and wife is void. Nichols v. Schutte, 75 ND 207, 26 NW2d
515; Acklin v. First National Bank, 64 ND 577, 254 NW 769;
Hazlett v. Mathieu, 57 ND 57, 220 NW 647; Rasmussen v. Stone,
30 ND 451, 152 NW 809; Conlon v. Dickinson, 72 ND 190, 5
NW2d 411, 142 ALR 525; Engholm v. Ekrem, 18 ND 185, 119
NW 35; Severtson v. Peoples, 28 ND 372, 148 NW 1054; Silander
v. Gronna, 15 ND 552, 108 NW 544, 125 Am St Rep 616; Helgebye
v. Dammen, 13 ND 167, 100 NW 245. The evidence shows that
the mineral deed was never acknowledged by the husband and
there is a dispute as to whether it was acknowledged by the
wife over the telephone. We need not here determine whether
an acknowledgment so taken is valid. The failure of one spouse
to acknowledge cither a conveyance or encumbrance of a home-
stead renders the instrument invalid. Hazlett v. Mathieu, supra;
Rasmussen v. Stone, supra. We reach the conclusion that the
mineral deed, in so far as it purports to convey the homestead,
is absolutely void.

The case of Logue v. Von Almen, 379 Ill 208, 40 NE2d 73, 140
ALR 251, is in point here. Seven plaintiffs who were tenants in
common of 120 acres of land brought the action to remove cer-
tain mineral deeds as clouds upon their title. A deed purporting
to convey an undivided one-half interest to all of the oil, gas,
and other minerals in the tract of land was executed by all but

EE 649

one of the plaintiffs. The grantee was Von Almen, who, shortly
after obtaining the deeds, conveyed fractional interests to other
parties who were bona fide purchasers. The transaction was
handled by one Smith who testified he was working for Von
Almen. It was claimed that the deed executed by the cotenants
to Von Almen was void for lack of consideration and fraud in
its execution and for failure of the deed to carry a valid acknowl-
edgment. The acknowledgment was void because taken by Smith
who had a financial interest in the deed. With. respect to the
defendants who claimed to be bona fide purchasers it is said:

“The proof shows each of them paid a valuable consideration
for their respective interests and that they did not participate
in any way in procuring the deed from plaintiffs. There is no
evidence that any of them had notice of any character that the
deed had been procured through the fraud of Smith. In dispos-
ing of their contentions the distinction must be kept in mind
between the effect of a void deed and one that is voidable.. A
void deed passes no title and can not be made the foundation of
a good title even under the application of the equitable doctrine
that protects bona fide purchasers.”

It is then pointed out that Willie Logue had a homestead inter-
est and that as to him the deed was absolutely void because it
failed to carry a valid acknowledgment, although the acknowl-
edgment was regular on its face. It was also held that the de-
fective acknowledgment did not make the conveyance void as
to those grantors who had no homestead interest and that the
deed as to them was only voidable because the fraud practiced
upon them was fraud in the inducement which did not make it
void as against innocent purchasers. The situation in that case
with respect to the homestead interest of Willie Logue is similar
to the case at bar. The mineral deed to Kaufman was absolutely
void as to the homestead because it was not acknowledged as
the statute prescribes and the bona fide purchasers from Kauf-
man obtained no title with respect to the homestead minerals.
As to the remainder of the land, the deed was voidable and sub-
ject to being set aside as to Kaufman but it is valid and en-
forceable as to the rights of those defendants who are innocent
purchasers for value.

650 a

At this point we have determined that the title to the property
described in the complaint, subject to valid outstanding leases,
is as follows: 1. Clarence Dixon, all of the surface; 2. Blizabeth
Dixon, a homestead interest in the Southwest Quarter (SW4) of
Section Thirty-one (31), subject to a reservation of one-half of
all oil, natural gas, and minerals which may be found on or un-
derlying the property in the State of North Dakota; 3. Clarence
Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon, one-half of all oil, natural gas, and
minerals which may be found on or underlying the property, the
Southwest Quarter (SW4) of Section Thirty-one (31) (home-
stead); 4. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Com-
pany, one-fourth of all oil, natural gas, and minerals which may
be found on or underlying the property, except the Southwest
Quarter (SW4) of Section Thirty-one (31); 5. Sabine Royalty
Gorporation,- one-eighth of all oil, natural gas, and minerals
which may be found on or underlying the property, except the
Southwest Quarter (SW) of Section Thirty-one (31); 6. Cyrus
B. Frost, one-cighth of all oil, natural gas, and minerals which
may be found on or underlying the property, except the South-
west Quarter (SW+) of Section Thirty-one (31); 7. The State
of North Dakota, one-half of all oil, natural gas, and minerals
underlying or found on the property. .

The State of North Dakota, through the state treasurer as
trustee, on September 28, 1949, leased to the defendant, the Cali-
fornia Company, an undivided one-half interest in all the oil,
gas, and other minerals underlying the bank land by which the
state was to get, in addition to other considerations, the equal
of one-eighth part of the oil produced and saved from the prem-
ises.

On July 22, 1949, the State of North Dakota, through the
Board of University and School Lands, entered into a similar
lease with the defendant Union Oil Company of California as
lessee. This lease was later and on December 1, 1949, assigned
to the defendant Los Nietos Company.

The plaintifis challenge the validity of these leases issued by
the state and particularly the right of the state or its lessees
to enter.upon the surface of the land to explore for or exploit the
oil, gas, or other minerals which it has reserved. The points

Es “651

which the appellants attempt to raise with respect to these leases
cannot be determined without prejudice to the-rights of the-state,
which is not a party to the action. Obviously, they cannot be
determined and no binding judgment can be entered with re-
spect to them. This action must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice as to those defendants who hold oil and gas leases
derived from the State of North Dakota. Underwood State
Bank v. Weber, 49 ND 814, 193 NW 602. ,
The interest of the defendant Phillips: Petroleum Company in
the subject of the action arises in this manner: On April 7,
1949, the plaintiffs, Clarence Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon, exe-
euted and delivered to the Carter Oil Company an oil’and gas
lease on the bank land, which was recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bottineau County, on April 20, 1949: On
December 1, 1949, the Carter Oil Company assigned to the
Phillips Petroleum Company an undivided one-half of all of its
right, title, and interest in the lease. It will be noted all of these
transactions and the recording of the instruments took place
prior to December 22, 1949, which was the date of the mineral
deed from the plaintiffs to W. C. Kaufman, Jr. The Carter Oil
Company is not a party to this action. No attack is made by any
of the parties upon the validity of the Carter Oil Company lease
or the assignment to the Phillips Petroleum Company. .
There remains to be considered the leasehold interest of
Andrew H. Gay to whom W. C. Kaufman, Jr. executed and de-
livered an oil and gas lease on March 24, 1950, covering all of
the Southeast Quarter (SE4) of Section Thirty-six (36), which
is the school land. At the time this lease was executed, the
lessor held the questioned mineral deed from the plaintiffs pur-
porting to convey to him one-half of the oil, natural gas, and
other mincrals on or ‘under this land. At the time of executing
this lease Kaufman had already deeded a one-fourth interest
to the United States Smelting, Refming and Mining Company
and a one-eighth interest to the Sabine Royalty Corporation,
leaving in himself the remaining one-eighth interest. The lease
therefore could become effective only as to that interest. After
executing the lease and on April 6, 1950, Kaufman deeded his
remaining one-cighth interest to Cyrus B. Frost,-thus divesting

652 Ee

himself of all interest in the property. As we have previously
‘determined, the deeds conveying the school land from Kaufman
to these grantees are valid as against the plaintiffs. Thus the
plaintiffs have-been divested of all interest in the property
‘eovered by. the lease from Kaufman to Gay and are in no posi-
tion to question its validity. Neither has the lease been ques-
tioned by’ any of the defendants.

- The trial court determined that the defendant Gay has a valid
leasehold interest covering an undivided one-eighth interest in
the oil,,2as, and other minerals on and under the Southeast
Quarter (SE) of Section Thirty-six (36). This determination
‘is correct,as is his determination with respect to the interests
‘of the California Company and Phillips Petroleum Company.
The trial court rendered judgment decreeing that Clarence
Dixon is the owner of the surface of the land, subject to the out-
standing leases that we have discussed and also subject to the
ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals as follows: State
of North Dakota, one-half interest; United States Smelting, Re-
fining and Mining Company, one-fourth interest; Cyrus B. Frost,
one-eighth interest; Sabine Royalty Corporation, one-eighth in-
terest. We have determined that the deed dated December 22,
1949, from Clarence L. Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon to W. C.
Kaufman, Jr., purporting to convey an undivided one-half in-
terest in all of the oil, gas, and other minerals on and under the
‘land-herein involved is void as to the Southwest Quarter (SW4)
of Section Thirty-one (31) in Township One Hundred Sixty
(160) Range Highty-two (82), being the homestead of the plain-
‘tiffs, and that none of the grantees of W. 0. Kaufman, Jr., ac-
quired an interest therein. The plaintiff Clarence Dixon is en-
titled to have title quieted in him as to W. C. Kaufman, Jr., and
all persons claiming an interest in the Southwest Quarter (SW4)
of Section Thirty-one (31) by or through him, The judgment
appealed from will be modified to so provide, and will further
provide as to the defendants holding leases from the state, being
‘the California Company and the Los Nietos Company, that the

Le 653

action, including the counterclaims of these defendants, be dis-
missed without prejudice.

Burge, Sarare, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.

[|
[File No. 7358]
IRVING GOODMAN AND STANLEY GOODMAN, d/b/a

IRVING’S TRACTOR LUG COMPANY, Appellants v.
OSCAR MEVORAH AND MARTIN SILLS, Respondents.

(59 NW2d 193)

654

4: EE

Opinion filed May 4, 1953. Rehearing denied June 20, 1953

a 655
P|

Lanier, Lanier & Knox, and Aaron Aronson, for appellants.
Burnett, Bergesen, Haakenstad & Conmy, for respondents.

Cunistianson, J. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover the
possession of a stock of automobile and tractor parts and other
merchandise. In the complaint it is alleged that the plaintiffs
are the owners and entitled to the immediate possession of such
property; that their title is based upon a contract between ‘the
plaintiffs and defendants under which the defendants agreed to
purchase said merchandise from the plaintiffs and to pay there-
for in installments ; that such contract is in default and has been
terminated by due notice to the defendants; that said property
is in the possession of the defendants in the City of Fargo, Cass
County, North Dakota; that possession thereof has been de-
manded by the plaintiffs and that such demand has been refused;
that said personal property has not been taken for a tax assess-
ment or fine pursuant to statute or seized.under an exccution
or attachment against the property of either the plaintiffs or
defendants, and that the value of such property is $3000.

Ancillary to such action the plaintiffs instituted a proceeding
of claim and delivery as provided under NDRC 1943, Chapter
32-07, and by an endorsement in writing upon the affidavit in
such proceeding required the sheriff of the county of Cass where
the property was located to take the same from the defendants
and deliver it to the plaintiffs. NDRC 1943, 32-0703. Accord-
ingly the property was taken by the sheriff from the defendants
and delivered to the plaintiffs in this action. The defendants
interposed an answer and counterclaim. In such answer they
specifically denied that the plaintiffs are the owners of or en-
titled to the immediate possession of the stock of automobile and
tractor parts and other merchandise described in the complaint
and they alleged that the defendants purchased such property
on their own account and that the same constituted no part of
the stock of goods sold to the defendants by the plaintiffs on a
conditional sales contract. In their counterclaim the defendants
allege that on June 23, 1950, they entered into a contract in writ-
ing wherein and whereby they purchased outright the trade

656 —

name of Irving’s Tractor Lug Company and thereafter filed a
certificate in the office of the Clerk of the District Court of Cass
County showing them to be co-partners doing business under
such trade name; that under the said contract the stock of goods
then owned by the plaintiffs was sold to the defendants condi-
‘tionally; that under said contract the defendants were author-
ized to purchase and did purchase additional merchandise and
that the merchandise so purchased is not covered by the condi-
tional sales agreement and that the plaintiffs have no right and
title thereto and no right to the possession thereof; that the
stock of automobile and tractor parts and other merchandise
described in the complaint was purchased by the defendants
from third parties within the last month and is contained in
the original packages of shipments and that the defendants are
the owners of said property; that by reason of the unlawful seiz-
ure and detention of such property by plaintiffs in this action
the defendants were unable to resell such property, that their
credit is harmed and their business destroyed and that they have
been and are subjected to disturbance, annoyance and expense
in defending their title to said property, all to their damage in
the sum of $6,000. The plaintiffs interposed a reply to the
counterclaim denying each and every allegation thereof except
as the same admitted allegations in the complaint. The case
was tried to a jury upon the issues framed by these pleadings.
At the close of all the evidence defendants moved the court to
dismiss plaintiffs’ action on the grounds that it appears from
the undisputed evidence and as a matter of law that the plain-
tiffs have no right or title to the possession of the goods con-
cerned in the action, thereupon plaintiffs’ counsel stated: “May
the record show that that motion is not resisted under the present
state of the record, but that the plaintiff enters his agreement
with this motion and does so, not waiving any of his rights to
appeal from assigned errors under rulings of evidence during
the course of the trial.” Thereupon the court stated, “That, of
course, then is agreed upon as far as that motion is concerned.”
To which plaintiffs’ counsel replied, “That is correct, your
honor.” Thereupon the court ruled that the motion to dismiss
the action be granted. Immediately thereafter the defendants’

a 657

counsel moved that the court direct a verdict for the defendants
on “the counterclaim in such sum as they (the jury) determine
is proper under the instructions as to damages.” The attorney
for the plaintiffs stated, “that motion is not resisted with the
same reservation on right to appeal on assigned errors on rul-
ings and instructions.” The court ruled that the motion be
granted. Thereafter the case was submitted to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants for
$4600.00. On February 5, 1952, judgment was entered pursuant
to the verdict. After the entry of the judgment plaintiffs moved
for a new trial. In the notice of motion and in the motion for
a new trial plaintiffs specified as grounds for the motion for a
new trial: insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict and
that it is against law; errors in law occurring at the trial and
excepted to by the plaintiffs; errors in instructions to the jury.
In the specifications attached to the notice of motion and motion
it is stated that the court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiffs
to introduce certain testimony relating to alleged breaches of
the conditional sales contract between the parties and testimony
under an offer of proof made by the plaintiffs; that the court
erred in admitting testimony as to the resale value of the mer-
chandise in question over the objections of the plaintiffs; that
the court erred in its instructions to the jury as to the measure
of damages and erred in refusing to give to the jury certain in-
structions requested by the plaintiffs. The motion for a new
trial came on to be heard pursuant to notice on March 24, 1952.
On March 26, 1952, the district court made an order denying the
motion for a new trial. Such order was filed and entered in the
office of the clerk of the district court on April 1, 1952. On July
30, 1952, the plaintiffs took and perfected an appeal from the
judgment which was entered on February 5, 1952.

The appellant has the burden of presenting a record affirma-
tively showing error. It is a rule of general application that
an appellate court will indulge all reasonable presumptions in
favor of the correctness of a judgment from which the appeal was
taken. “Indeed error is never presumed on appeal, but must be
affirmatively shown by the record; and the burden of so showing

658 a

it is ‘on the party alleging it, or, as sometimes stated, the burden
of showing error affirmatively is upon appellant.” 4 CJ 731-733
(— CIS —); Erickson v. Wiper, 33 ND 193, 222, 157 NW 592;
Ramage v. Trepanier, 69 ND 19, 26, 283 NW 471; State v. Van
Horne, 71 ND 455, 457, 2 NW2d 1.

What errors are presented for review by the record presented
on this appeal? Generally speaking a party aggrieved by an
‘adverse verdict has a choice of remedies: he may move that
the verdict be vacated and a new trial granted for any of the
causes prescribed by law, or he may appeal from the judgment
rendered and entered upon the verdict. The two are independent
remedies and the party aggrieved may invoke one or the other or
both at his election provided he does so in the time and in the
manner provided by the statute. King v. Hanson, 13 ND 85,
99 NW 1085; McCann v. Gilmore, 42 ND 119, 172 NW 236;
Chaffee Bros. Co. v. Powers Elevator Co., 41 ND 94, 97, 170
NW 315. The laws of this state (NDRC 1943, 28-1902) provide:

“The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a
new trial granted on the application of the party aggrieved for
any of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of such party:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or ad-
verse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial;

2. Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any juror has been
induced to assént to any general or special verdict or to a finding
on any question submitted to the jurors, by the court by a resort
to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved
by the affidavit of. any one of the jurors;

8. Accident ‘or surprise which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against;

4. Newly discovered evidence material to the party making
the application, which he could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial;

5. Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice, but when a new trial is asked
for on this ground and it appears that the passion and preju-

Le 659

dice affected only the amount of damages allowed and did not
influence the findings of the jury on other issues in the case, the-
trial court, on hearing the motion, and the supreme court, on
appeal, shall have power to order a reduction of the verdict in
lieu of a new trial, or to order that a new trial be had unless the
party in whose favor the verdict was given remits the excess of
damages;

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or that it is against law;

7. Errors in law occurring at the trial and excepted to by the
party making the application; or

8. Loss or destruction, without fault on the part of the party
aggrieved, of the official shorthand minutes taken at the trial
containing the testimony offered and the instructions of the
court when given orally to the jury, or either, before a trans-
eript thereof has been made.”

The motion of the plaintiffs for a new trial in this case was
based upon the sixth and seventh grounds of NDRC 1943, 28-
1902, and the particular rulings specified in the specifications

_ attached to the notice of and motion for a new trial all fell with-
in these subdivisions. In the specifications attached to the notice
of appeal the plaintiffs specified as errors of law of which they
complained, insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict,
and errors in law occurring at the trial, consisting of rulings
on the admission and exclusion of evidence, and on instruc-
tions to the jury. So the questions and issues sought to be pre-
sented on the appeal from the judgment are the same as those
which were presented for determination and determined on the,
motion for a new trial. . .

It is well settled that “where there is a motion for a new trial,
rulings of the trial court which constitute proper grounds for
a new trial under the statute must be presented upon such mo-
tion; otherwise they will be deemed waived.” Syl 1, Larsen v.
Friis, 48 ND 507, 185 NW 363; O'Dell v. Hiney, 49 ND 160,
190 NW 774; Zimbelman v. Lah, 61 ND 65, 287 NW 207. See,
also, State ex rel. Storm v. Hought, 59 ND 301, 304, 229 NW
871. Where a motion for a new trial is made and denied before
judgment is rendered and entered the order denying a niew trial

660 De

is reviewable on an appeal from the judgment. Keyes v. Basker-
ville, 42 SD 881, 175 NW 874; Vivian Ind. Consol. School Dis-
trict v. Boyles, 56 SD 524, 229 NW 390. Sce, also, Ellingson
v. Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, 58 ND 754, 227 NW
360; In Re Bratcher, 74 ND 12, 24 NW2d 54; In Re Bratcher’s
Estate, 76 ND 194, 34 NW2d 825. An order denying a motion
for a new trial made after the entry of judgment is an appeal-
able order, NDRC 1943, 28-2702(4), and where an order denying
a motion for a new trial is made and entered after judgment
is rendered and entered an appeal from the judgment alone does
not bring up for review the order denying a new trial. Paulsen
v. Modern Woodmen of America, 21 ND 235, 130 NW 231;
Chaffee Bros. Co. v. Powers Elevator Co., supra; Morris v. Niles,
67 Wis 341, 830 NW 353; Aultman, Millor & Co. v. Becker, 10
SD 58, 71 NW 753; Bank of Iowa and Dakota v. Oliver et al,
11 SD 444, 78 NW 1002; Irwin et al v. Lattin et al, 29 SD 1, 185
NW 759, Ann Cas 1914C 1044; Outjes v. Thomas, 44 SD 542,
184 NW 795; Gade v. Collins, 8 SD 322, 66 NW 466.

The motion for a new trial involved here was not an ex parte
or summary application. A motion for a new trial after the
entry of judgment can be made only pursuant to notice to the
adverse party as prescribed by law. Such motion can be made
only on one or more of the grounds specified in: the statute and
the parties must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. In
this case the required notice of motion was given. The par-
ties appeared and a full hearing was afforded and had. The
trial court had unquestioned jurisdiction of the parties and of
the subject matter. The court had jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine all questions submitted to it on the motion. It did hear
the parties upon such questions and made its determination in
the manner prescribed by law and that determination was sub-
ject to appeal. Sec, Weber et al v. Tschetter et al, 1 SD 205,
212, 46 NW 201, 203; Wilson County v. McIntosh et al, 30 Kan
234, 238, 1 Pac. 572, 575; Dwight v. St. John, 25 NY 203. The
trial court had authority to grant the motion for a new trial or
to deny it. In either case the order of the trial court was ap-
pealable. Unless an appeal were taken within the time allowed
by law the order became final. If the trial court had granted

a 661

a new trial and defendants had taken no appeal from the order
‘within the time’ allowed by law, the order granting a new trial
would have been final and binding upon the parties. In this
case the court made an order denying the motion for a new
trial. “There was no appeal from such order nor was there any
renewal of the motion or application for leave to renew the same
or for leave to make another motion, or that the order denying
a new trial be vacated, modified or changed. The determination
made by the trial court-of the questions and issues submitted
to it on the motion for a new trial was no longer subject to re-
view when the appeal-from the judgment was taken. The time
allowed for an appeal from the order denying a new trial had
expired more than three months before the appeal from the judg-
ment was taken and such order became final and binding upon
the parties. All questions and issues sought to be determined
on the appeal from the judgment were involved and presented
for determination on the motion for a new trial and such ques-
tions and issues were determined against the plaintiffs by the
order denying a new trial. By the motion for a new trial plain-
tiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the court to pass upon the ques-
tions and issues presented by such motion. The object of the
motion and the relief asked for was vacation of the verdict and
the judgment rendered thereon and a new trial of the action.
The object of the appeal from the judgment and the relief sought
to be obtained is precisely the same, namely a vacation of the
verdict and a reversal of the judgment rendered upon the ver-
dict and a new trial of the action, all upon the same basic grounds
as those which had been presented to and determined by the
court on the motion for a new trial. The order denying the mo-
tion for a new trial was made and entered by-a court vested with
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and consti-
tuted an adjudication of the questions and issues presented for
determination on the motion for a new trial. Such adjudication
is binding upon the parties to this action, and determinative of
the questions and issues sought to be presented by the plaintiffs
-for determination.on this appeal. Gade v. Collins, 8 SD at p
325, 66 NW at p 467; Foss v. Van Wagenen, 20 SD at p 41, 104
NW at p 606; Irwin et al v. Lattin et al, 29-SD at pp 4-5, 185

662 Ee

‘NW at p 761, Ann Cas 1914C 1044; Dick et al v. Williams et al,
87 Wis 651, 58 NW 1029; Enderlin State Bank v. Jennings, 4
ND 228, 230-233, 59 NW 1058, 1059; Weber v. Tschetter, 1 SD
205, 46 NW 201, 203; Dwight v. St. John, 25 NY 203; Wilson
County v. McIntosh, 30 Kan 234, 1 Pac 572; 2 Freeman on Judg-
ments, 5th ed, 1401, 1405. See, also, Schulenberg v. Long, 57
‘ND at p 264, 221 NW at p 69; Stimson v. Stimson, 30 ND 78, 152
“NW 132; Lookabaugh v. Cooper, 5 Okla 102, 48 p 99.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Saturn, Burks and Grimson, JJ., concur.

Curistranson, J. Plaintiffs have petitioned for a rehearing.
‘It is asserted in the petition that this Court overlooked the de-
cision in Hedderich v. Hedderich, 18 ND 488, 123 NW 276, where-
in it was said that an appeal from the judgment presents to the
Supreme Court alleged errors of law occuring at the trial as
preserved in the judgment roll although such errors were also
-urged as grounds for a new trial in the court below and the order
denying such new trial was not appealed from. The decision
cited was not overlooked but we did not deem that it had any
application under the facts in the case and the law of this state
as established by legislative enactment and repeated decisions
of this Court subsequent to the decision in Hedderich v. Hed-
derich.

Law is a rule of property and of conduct prescribed by the
sovereign power. NDRC 1943, 1-0102. The will of the sov-
ereign power is expressed by the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State; by treaties made under
the authority of the United States; by statutes enacted by the
Congress; by the statutes of the State; and by decisions of the
‘tribunals enforcing those rules, which, though not enacted, form
what is known as customary or common law. NDRC 1943, 1—
0103.

In this case the motion for a new trial was fully submitted to
the trial court by the parties and determined by the trial court
as provided by law. The statute specifies the grounds for a new
trial. NDRC 1943, 28-1902, The grounds so specified are ex-

a 663

élusive and a new trial may be granted only for causes so pre-
seribed by the statute. Higgins v. Rued, 30 ND 551, 153 NW
389. The statute also prescribes the mode of review of an order
either denying or granting a motion for a new trial, namely, by
an appeal to the supreme court. There was no request for leave
to make another motion for a new trial, nor was any such motion
made. Plaintiffs simply ignored the determination that had
been made by the district court on the motion which they sub-
mitted, which the opposite parties were required to litigate and
did litigate, and which the trial court heard and determined. The
statute did not provide that the order, denying a new trial might
be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment. On the contrary
an unbroken line of decisions of this Court rendered both before
and after the decision in the Hedderich case is to the effect that
an order denying a motion for a new trial made after judgment
is not reviewable on an appeal from the judgment but is review-
able alone on an appeal from the order.

In this case the motion for a new trial was made pursuant to
notice and based on certain specified grounds which under the
applicable statute constituted grounds for a new trial. The
motion was submitted to the trial court by the parties and de-
termined by that court as provided by law by written order duly
made and entered denying the motion for a new trial. The stat-
ute specifically prescribed the remedy for review of an order
denying.a new trial. (1 Spelling New Trial and Appellate Prac-
tice, See 400, pp 730-731; Rogers v. Hoenig, 46 Wis 361, 1 NW
17; Coombs v. Hibbard, 43 Cal 452; People v. Center et al, 61
Cal 191, 9 Pac Coast Law J 765; Carpenter et al v. Superior
Court, 75 Cal 596,19 Pac 174), namely by appeal to the supreme
court. NDRC 1943, 28-2702(4).: The defendants did not appeal.
The time for appeal from the order had expired, the order had
become final and was no longer subject to review by the supreme
court on appeal when the appeal from the judgment was taken.

Hedderich v. Hedderich, supra, was decided in September 1909
under the then existing law. In 1913 the legislature enacted a
statute (Laws 1913, Chapter 131) providing for rules of practice
in the district courts and in the supreme court whereby the for-
mer law was changed in many respects. Laws 1913, Chapter

664 —

131. The 1913 enactment related to motions for a new trial and
to appeals from the district court to the supreme court. It pro-
vided:

“A party desiring to make a motion for new trial or to appeal
from a judgment or other determination of a district court or
county court with increased jurisdiction, shall serve with the
notice of motion or notice of appeal a concise statement of the
errors of law he complains of, and if he claims the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict or that the evidence is of that
character that the verdict should be set aside as a matter of dis-
cretion, he shall so specify. . . .” Laws 1913, Chapter 131,
See 4; CL 1913, Sec 7656; NDRC 1943, 28-1809.

It will be noted that the requirement that there be served with
the notice of motion and notice of appeal a concise statement of
the errors of law and of the insufficiency of the evidence is pre-
cisely the same both as to a motion for a new trial and as to an
appeal. No such provision was contained in the law in force
prior to the enactment of Chapter 131, Laws 1913. Under the
law in force prior to the time such law took effect an appeal was
taken by serving a notice of appeal and filing the same in the
office of the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order
appealed from was entered. ROND 1905, Sec 7205.

A party intending to move for a new trial was required to
serve a notice of his intention to so move and designate in such
notice of intention the statutory grounds upon which the motion
would be made. Revised Code N Dak 1905, Sec 7065. The serv-
ice of such notice of intention was a prerequisite to the motion
for a new trial, but did not dispense with notice of the motion
for a new trial. In Anderson vy. Bank, 5 ND 80, 88, 64 NW 114,
this Court said: “The notice of intention and the notice of mo-
tion are two distinct and utterly different notices, and it is not
good practice to embrace both elements in one paper.” The
rules of this Court provided that in cases not to be tried anew
on appeal the statement of the case must contain a specification
of the errors of law upon which the appellant intended to rely.
Supreme Court Rule VII, 10 ND at p XLI. Such rules further
provided that in cases not to be tried anew on appeal the appel-
lant’s brief should contain, (1) a concise and trie statement of

EE 665

the facts in the case which are material to the points of law to
be argued with proper references to the pages and folios of the
abstract which sustain them, (2) an assignment of errors point-
ing out the errors objected to and in the body of his brief the
appellant shall present his reasons in support of each error as-
signed. Rule XIV, 10 ND XLVI-XLVII. The 1913 Practice Act
eliminated the provision in the former law requiring that a party
intending to move for a new trial must serve a notice of inten-
tion to so move and specify therein the particular errors of law
of which he complained. The 1913 Practice Act provided that
with all orders granting or refusing a new trial the judge should
file a written memorandum stating the different grounds on
which his ruling was based and unless the insufficiency or unsat-
isfactory nature of the evidence was expressly stated in such
memorandum as the reason for granting the new trial, it should
be presumed on appeal, that the new trial was not granted on
that ground. Laws 1913, Chap 131, See 8; NDRC 1943, 28-1906.
Under the law in force before the 1913 Practice Act became effec-
tive a party moving for a new trial was not required to serve
with the notice of motion for a new trial a statement of the errors
of law of which he complained; but the 1913 Practice Act spe-
cifically provided that a statement of the errors of law com-
plained of must be served with the notice of motion for a new
trial. Where a motion for a new trial is made after rendition
of judgment it is not a mere incident or episode in the course of
the trial, it is an independent proceeding after judgment inaugu-
rated by the motion for a new trial and the statement required
to be attached constitutes not only the grounds for the motion
but constitutes a basis for the inquiry and review by the trial
court on such motion and the basis for the scope of the review
on appeal from the order made by the trial court on the denial
of the motion for a new trial. The 1913 Practice Act clearly
evidences an intention that proceedings on an appeal from a
judgment and proceedings on appeal from an order denying a
new trial made after the rendition of judgment are wholly sepa-
rate and independent proceedings, although an appeal from the
judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial
or an alternative motion for a new trial or for judgment not-

666 Ee

withstanding the verdict may be included in one notice of appeal.

The decision in Hedderich v. Hedderich, supra, was rendered
September 5, 1909. The 1913 Practice Act took effect July 1,
1913. In Jensen v. Clausen (decided August 10, 1916) 34 ND
637, 159 NW 380, this Court had occasion to consider the effect
of the determination of the trial court denying a motion for a
new trial. That was an action for damages for alleged wrongful
acts of the defendant. The case was tried to a jury and the
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant
moved in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict or for a new trial. On such motion the defendant specified
as grounds of the motion for a new trial alleged errors of law
but no error was predicated on the court’s instructions to the
jury, and error in the instructions was not enumerated as one
of the grounds of the motion for a new trial. The motion was
denied and the defendant appealed to this court from the judg-
ment and from the order denying his motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The appeals from
the judgment and from the order denying the motion were in-
cluded in one notice of appeal. On appeal the defendant assert-
ed that the trial court had erred in its instructions to the jury
and attempted to assign such alleged errors in the giving of in-
structions as error on the appeal. In the opinion in the case this
Court said: .

“Under the laws of this state misdirection is an error in law,
and constitutes one of the statutory grounds for a new trial.
Comp Laws 1913, Sec 7660.

“The statute requires that a party who makes a motion for a
new trial shall serve with his notice of motion a concise state-
ment of the errors of law of which he complains. Comp Laws
1913, See 7656.. In the case at bar defendant made a motion for
new trial upon several grounds, but no error was specified in
the court’s instructions to the jury. . . .

“Tt is true that in absence of a motion for new trial, errors in
instructions are reviewable on an appeal from the judgment.
But when a party moves for a new trial, he is required to em-
brace in such motion all errors complained of, which under the

— 667

statute constitute proper grounds for a now trial; otherwise
they will be deemed waived.” 34ND at p 643.

The decision in Jensen v. Clausen, supra, was unanimous. All
the members of the Court including Chief Justice Fisk, who was
the author of the opinion in Hedderich v. Hedderich, supra,
joined in the decision. The decision in Jensen v. Clausen, supra,
has never been overruled or disapproved but the rule announced
therein has been approved and followed by this Court in many
cases.

Such rule was considered and applied by this Court in Enget
v. Neff, 77 ND 356, 43 NW2d 644. That was an action to recover
damages for personal injuries. The case was tried to a jury
and a verdict returned in favor of the defendant. Judgment
was entered pursuant to the verdict and after rendition of judg-
ment the plaintiff moved for a new trial. The motion was denied.
Thereafter plaintiff appealed from the judgment and from the
order denying a new trial. On appeal plaintiff specified errors
which constituted proper grounds for a new trial under the stat-
ute but which had not been so specified in the motion for a new
trial. This Court held that consequently such grounds had been
waived and could not be presented by the appellant on appeal
from the judgment. The rule announced in the case is set forth
in paragraph 1 of the syllabus thus:

“Where a motion for a new trial is made in the court below
and an appeal is taken from the order denying the motion and
from the judgment, alleged erroneous rulings of the trial court
which constitute proper grounds for a new trial under See 28-
1902, RCND 1943, must be presented on the motion; otherwise
they will be deemed waived, whether included in the specifica-
tions of error upon appeal from n the judgment or not.” 43 NW
2d at 644-645,

The question was again considered by this Court in Morton
v. Dakota Transfer & Storage Co., 78 ND 551, 50 NW2d 505.
That also was an action to recover damages for personal in-
juries. The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned
in favor of the defendant. Judgment was entered pursuant to
the verdict and after rendition of judgment the plaintiff moved
for a new trial. The motion was denied. Thereafter plaintiff

668 Le

appealed both from the judgment and from the order denying
the motion for a new trial. In the opinion in the case this Court
said:

“Plaintifi’s remaining specifications of error relate to the
judge’s instructions to the jury and his refusal to give certain
requested instructions. Some of the instructions specified as
error upon appeal were not specified as error upon the motion
for a new trial and no error was specified upon the motion for
new trial because of a refusal to give requested instructions. It
is well settled that where a motion for a new trial is made, errors
of law, including errors in instructions, not specified in the mo-
tion for a new trial ave waived. Redahl v. Stevens, 64 ND 154,
250 NW 534; Braun v. Martin, 70 ND 216, 293 NW 317; Enget
v. Neff, 77 ND 356, 43 NW2d 644. We shall therefore consider
only those specifications asserted both on the motion for a new
trial and upon this appeal.’ (Italics supplied) 50 NW2d at p
508.

In the petition for rehearing plaintiffs cite the decision of this
Court in Blackstead v. Kent, 63 ND 246, 247 NW 607, as support-
ing their contention that alleged errors of law based upon in-
structions to the jury are reviewable on appeal from the judg-
ment notwithstanding that a motion for a new trial was made
and denied, and no appeal was taken from the order denying
anew trial. That was an action to recover damages for personal
injuries. The case was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict
in favor of the defendant for a dismissal of the action. After
judgment had been entered plaintiff moved for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or for a new trial which motion was
denied. Thereupon the plaintiff appealed from the judgment of
dismissal and from the order denying the motion for a new
trial. The appeal from the order denying the new trial was not
made within the time prescribed by law and this Court held that
error assigned upon the insufficiency of the evidence could not
be considered an an appeal from the judgment, that such alleged
errors were passed upon by the trial court and were conclusive
in the absence of an appeal from the order denying a new trial.
Thereafter reference is made to certain alleged errors assigned
on the instructions. The question whether such assignments

Le 669

might or might not be reviewed was not considered or discussed.
But the court said that the instructions were not erroneous and
that the judgment should be affirmed. The practical result was
the same as if the court had ruled that the assignments of error
based upon the instructions were not reviewable. In either case
there would have been no cause for reversal. Nothing was said
in the opinion to indicate any intention to modify or overrule
anything that had been said in Jensen v. Clausen, supra, or the
decisions which had applied the rule announced in that case.
Even if it be conceded that the decision in Blackstead v. Kent,
supra, is contrary to the rule announced in Jensen v. Clausen,
supra, and the cases which followed and applied the principle
announced in the decision in that case, it does not operate to
abrogate the rule announced in Jensen v. Clausen and the cases
which approved and applied the rule announced in that case.
The result is merely one of conflict in the decisions.

Corpus Juris Secundum says:

“In case of a conflict in the decisions of a court, the latest deci-
sion is generally regarded as controlling, as against prior de-
cisions and should be followed in determining the same ques-
tion.

“According to some decisions, where conflicting decisions have
already been made by inadvertence or otherwise, and the posi-
tion of the court is therefore uncertain, the rule of stare decisis
does not apply, and in such event, it has been held that it is the
duty of the court to follow the decision which it conceives is
based on the sounder reasoning. By the weight of authority, how-
ever, it is generally considered that in case of a conflict the last
expression of the court is controlling as against prior opinions.”
21 CJS, Courts, pp 320-321.

Under either of the rules so stated the views expressed in the -
former opinion in this case must prevail. The rule announced
in the original decision in this case is in accord with the latest
decisions of this Court. Enget v. Neff, supra; Morton v. Dakota
Transfer & Storage Co., supra. And we are all agreed that such
rule is based on sounder reasoning than the rule contendéd for
by appellants.

In Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice it is said:

670 —

“Generally, where the proceeding for a new trial is inaugu-
rated by petition, or notice of intention, in many respects the
commencement of an action, the rule of res adjudicata is applied
with reference to the original order.” 1 Spelling p 730.

In Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata it is said:

“When a matter in controversy between parties has been sub-
mitted to a competent judicial tribunal, its decision thereon is
final between the parties until it has been reversed, set aside,
or vacated; and the rule of res adjudicata applies not only to
the judgments of courts, but to all judicial determinations,
whether made by courts in ordinary actions or in summary or
special proceedings, or by judicial officers in matters properly
submitted for their determination.” 1 Herman on Estoppel and
Res Judicata p 42.

“All motions affecting the substantial rights of parties are
appealable, and, therefore, final, unless reversed or modified by
an appellate tribunal, and are placed upon the same basis as any
final judgment. Whenever a motion admits of ‘grave discussion
and deliberation, and are made part of the record in a cause and
subject to review in another court,’ the decision by a court upon
such motion is generally regarded as a final judgment or adjudi-
cation, and the rule of res judicatae applies.” 1 Herman on
Estoppel and Res Judicata, p 569.

In American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, (24 Am &
Eng Eucycl of Law, 2d ed, p 820) itis said:

“As, a general rule, it makes no difference under what form,
whether by petition, exception, rule, or intervention, a question
is presented; whenever the same question recurs, even under a
different form of procedure, the doctrine of res judicata applies.
Although the proceeding is special or summary and not an ordi-
nary action or suit, if it is a recognized judicial remedy, admit-
ting of the deliberate consideration and investigation of the
claim or demand, and if the order or judgment rendered therein
affects substantial rights, is in its nature final and may be re-
viewed on appeal, the decision rendered is final and conclusive
between parties and privies.” 24 Am & Eng Encyel of Law, 2d
ed, p 820.

Le 671,

In Bank v. Jennings, 4 ND 228, 59 NW 1058, this Court said:

“The general rule may be stated in the following terms: Where
there is an opportunity for a full and fair hearing on a motion,
and a right of review in an appellate tribunal, the decision of
that motion is res judicata whenever, on the same facts, the de-
feated party, by motion or otherwise, seeks to secure the object
for which he made the motion, subject to the possible exception
that, where the same judge entertains a new motion on the same
facts, it will be presumed that his object was to rehear the case
to correct any error he may have made.” 4 ND at p 232.

“The form which the decision assumes is unimportant. The
material inquiries are: Has there been a full and fair investi-
gation? Has the defeated suitor a right to review the decision
in a higher court? When these questions can be answered in the
affirmative, some of the cases hold that the decision of the motion
not only bars another similar motion (unless, of course, a rehear-
ing is properly granted) but also settles the general manner
(matter) in controversy on the motion, whenever it again arises
in any form between the same parties or their privies.” 4 ND at
p 233,

The legislature has provided by law that a motion for a new
trial may be made on certain specified grounds. A motion for
a new trial after the entry of judgment can be made only pur-
suant to written notice to the adverse party as prescribed by
law. Such motion can be made only on one or more of the
grounds specified in the statute and there must be attached to
the notice of motion a statement specifying the errors of law of
which the moving party complains. In this case the required
notice of motion was given, the parties appeared and a full hear-
ing was afforded and had. The trial court rendered its decision
in the manner prescribed by law and such decision was duly
entered, and the decision of the trial court became final so far
as that court was concerned. Dubs v. N. P. Ry. Co. 47 ND 210,
181 NW 606; Carpenter v. Superior Court, 75 Calif 596, 19 Pac
174; Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac 1023, Ann Cas 1913B
483; 1 Spelling on New Trial and Appellate Practice, Sec 400,
pp 730-731. The only mode provided by law for the review of
an order of the district court granting or denying a motion for

era es

a new trial is by appeal to the supreme court. NDRC 1943, 28-
2702(4). This mode of review was available to the plaintiffs in
this ease. They do not avail themselves of such review, and
there is no claim that they were prevented from doing so. The
order denying a new trial became final and was no longer subject
to review either in the trial court or in the supreme court by
appeal. The order of the district court denying the motion for
a new trial was made and entered in a judicial proceeding where
the court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject mat-
ter. The order was subject to review by'an appeal to the supreme
court. No such appeal was taken. The plaintiffs waived their
right to have the order reviewed in the manner provided by law
or at all. For the reasons heretofore set forth the decision of
the district court evidenced by the order denying the motion
for a new trial is determinative of the questions and issues
sought to be presented by the plaintiff for determination on this
appeal.

We adhere to the views expressed in the former opinion. A
rehearing is denied.

Morris, C. J., and Burxs, Sarure and Grimson, JJ., concur.

ee 67:

3

[Cr. No. 248]

THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, EX REL. CITY OF
MINOT, ET AL., Petitioners vy. HONORABLE A. J.
GRONNA, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, WARD
COUNTY, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, IN AND FOR
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF NORTH DAKOTA, ET AL., Respondents.

(59 NW2d 514)

Ee er?

Opinion filed June 5, 1958, Rehearing denied June 20, 1953

Bosard & McCutcheon, for petitioners.
Duane R. Nedrud, for respondents.

Cunistiansoy, J. The City of Minot, the Chief of Police of
the city and the Police Magistrate of the city have applied to this
Court for a supervisory writ to review and annul the action of
the Honorable A. J. Gronna, Judge of the District Court of Ward
County, in issuing writs of habeas corpus upon the. petition of
Arthur Helland and upon the petition of Thomas Smith-for such
writ and the making of orders discharging and releasing the
said Arthur Helland and. Thomas Smith from the custody of
the Chief of Police of the City of Minot.

The material facts ave undisputed. In the evening of August
11, 1952, Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith were arrested by
an- officer of the police department of the City of Minot and
charged with disorderly conduct, an offense under the ordi-
nances of the'City of Minot. On the morning of August 12, 1952,
the police officer having them in charge brought them before the
police magistrate of the City of Minot.

The entries in the docket of the police magistrate recite that
on the 11th day of August, 1952, verified complaints were filed
before such police magistrate against Arthur Helland and
against Thomas Smith; that the complaint against each of them
alleged “that on the 11th day of August, 1952, the above named
defendant did commit the offense of Disorderly Conduct in viola-
tion of Sectiom No. 201, Chapter No. 9 of the Revised Ordinances
of the City of Minot. Warrant issued and delivered to Police
Officer of said city for service. August 12, 1952, Defendant. be-
fore me in custody. The complaint was read to defendant and

678 De

he was informed of his rights. Defendant plead guilty. Where-
upon it is ordered and adjudged that said defendant be confine
in the City Jail in the city of Minot, ND, for a period of 10 days
and pay a fine of $5, and the costs of this action taxed at the
sum of $5, and in default of the payment of said fine and costs,
that he be imprisoned in the City jail at the City of Minot, ND,
for a term of 10 days at labor on the public streets or any public
works in said City of Minot, commencing at 9:00-o’clock in the
forenoon this 12 day of Aug. 1952, and that he stand committed
to the custody of the Chief of Police of the City of Minot, ND,
until this sentence is complied with or until he is legally dis-
charged.”

After such sentences had been pronounced and judgments
rendered Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith were at once in-
earcerated in the City Jail of the City of Minot. On that same
day each of them petitioned the Honorable A. J. Gronna, Judge
of the District Court of Ward County, for a writ of habeas
corpus. Writs were issued and hearings had before the said
Judge Gronna on that day. On such hearings it was established
without dispute that each of the said petitioners, Arthur Helland
and Thomas Smith, was only sixteen years of age. It was the
contention of said Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith that they
were illegally restrained; that the police magistrate was without
authority to render judgment of imprisonment against either
of them and that the jurisdiction over both of the defendants
was vested in the juvenile court of said Ward County. The
City of Minot and the chief of police contended that under the
provisions of Sec 113 of the Constitution of North Dakota the

. police magistrate was vested with power and authority to pro-

nounce sentence and render judgment against each of the de-
fendants. The district court held that the police magistrate had
no authority to try the cases against Arthur Helland and
Thomas Smith and to pronounce sentence and render judgment
of imprisonment in the city jail and that consequently they were
illegally imprisoned and deprived of their liberty and issued
orders commanding the chief of police to discharge them from
custody. Thereupon the City of Minot, the chief of police of
the city and the police magistrate applied to-this Court for the

| 679:

exercise ofits power of superintending: control over inferior
courts vested in it by Sec 86 of the Constitution of the State.
State ex rel. Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND 340, 27 NW2d 849.
And the matter came on to be heard before this Court pursuant
to an order to show cause why the orders made by Judge Gronna
directing the discharge of Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith
should not be set aside. The district court made its return, and
arguments were presented.in behalf of the relators and in behalf
of. Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith. Upon such hearing there
wag submitted the record of the proceedings: had before the
police magistrate and there was also submitted an affidavit of
the police magistrate wherein it is said: “That on the 12th day
of August,-1952, Arthur Helland, Thomas Smith and Charles
Miller appeared before said Police Magistrate pursuant to for-
mal complaint filed -with such magistrate by which Complaints
they and each of them were charged with Disorderly Conduct,
to-wit: «The breaking of a plate glass window in the Goldberg
Furniture Company in the City of Minot; that Charles Miller
was alleged-to be twenty (20) years-of age, Arthur Helland
Sixteen (16) years of age and Thomas Smith sixteen (16) years
of age; that each of the said Defendants were separately charged
and each was separately advised of his rights under the law and
thereupon and thereafter each of the said Defendants pleaded
guilty to the said charge and each was adjudged to serve a term
of ten (10) days in the City Jail, paying a fine of Five Dollars
($5.00) and costs in the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) ; in default
of the payment of such fine and costs that the said Defendants
and each of them would serve a term of ten (10) days in the
City Jail.” to

The juvenile court law of this state was originally enacted as
Chapter 177, Laws 1911. “As originally introduced, the bill
creating the court, conferred jurisdiction of delinquent juveniles
upon the county court. In the course of passage, the bill was
amended so as to continue this jurisdiction in the district court,
sitting and acting as a juvenile court.” (See State ex rel. Neville
v. Overby; 54 ND at p 304, 209 NW at p 556.) Such change was
made after objections had. been made-to the bill as originally
written on the ground that the bill called for the exercise of

680 De

equity powers, that the county court was not vested with such
powers but that such powers were vested in the district court.
This view was later vindicated by the decision of this Court in
Mead v. First National Bank of Lansford, 24 ND 12, 138 NW
365. In the decision in that case this Court held that the provi-
sion in Sec 111 of the Constitution of North Dakota that “said
county court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the dis-
trict courts in all civil actions” did not operate to confer upon a
county court with increased jurisdiction jurisdiction in equity
eases. The holding in the case is epitomized in the syllabus
which reads as follows:

“Section 111 of the state Constitution construed, and held,
that county courts of increased jurisdiction are not vested with
equity powers, but that their jurisdiction is restricted to actions
formerly cognizable at law wherein the amount in controversy
does not exceed $1,000.” (Italics supplied)

In the course of the codification of the laws. of this state
(NDRC 1943), the juvenile court law was rewritten and re-
enacted as Laws 1943, Chapter 212. The bill for the enactment
was introduced ‘in the Senate by Senators Striebel and Kehoe,
the Senate members of the Interim Commission on Code Revi-
sion which had been created by the Legislative Assembly. See
Senate Concurrent Resolution H, Senate Journal 1941, p 147 et
seq; Laws of North Dakota 1941, pp 608-609; Senate Journal
1941, p 922. The measure was entitled “A Bill for an Act Relat-
ing to the Juvenile Court and the Protection, Control, and Cus-
tody of Children; and amending and re-enacting Chapter 23 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, consisting of Sections 11402
to 11427, inclusive, of the Compiled Laws of North Dakota of
1913; Sections 11412a, 11428a1, 11428a2, 11428a3, 11428a4 and
11428a5 of the Supplement to the 1913 Compiled Laws of North
Dakota; and Chapter 113 of the Laws of 1929.” The measure
contained a general repeal clause that “all acts and parts of
Acts in conflict with the provisions of this chapter are hereby
repealed.” Said Chapter 212, Laws 1943, was embodied in the
North Dakota Revised Codes of 1943 as Chapter 27-16 and such
chapter constitutes the present juvenile court law of this state.
Such law provides:

| 681

“The district court of the several counties of this state shall
have original jurisdiction in all cases coming within the provi-
sions of this chapter. The court for convenience shall be called
‘the juvenile court.’ As far as possible, said court shall be held
at chambers.” NDRC 1948, 27-1601.

The law provides for the appointment by the judges of each
judicial district of juvenile commissioners and the powers of
such commissioners (27-1602); for the compensation of such
commissioners (27-1603) ; for reports of juvenile commissioners
(27-1604) ; for records to be kept by the juvenile commissioner
(27-1605) ; that the clerk of the district court shall be clerk of
the juvenile court, shall keep all papers including findings and
shall enter all final orders in a book known as the juvenile court
record, and that the records and papers shall be subject to ex-
amination by the clerk, the judges of the court and the juvenile
commissioner, but that others may examine such records and
papers only upon the written order of one of the Iudges (27-
1606).

27-1607. “In this chapter, unless the context or subject mat-
_ter otherwise requires:

1. ‘The court’ means the juvenile court;

2. ‘The judge’ means one of the judges of the juvenile court;

8. ‘Child’ means a person less than eighteen years of age;

”

21. ~1608. “Except as otherwise provided by law, the court
shall have original jurisdiction in all proceedings:

1. Concerning any child residing in or who is temporarily
within the county: a. Who has violated any city or village
ordinance or law of this state or of the United States; .. .

2. Concerning any person under twenty-one years of age re-
siding within the county charged with having violated any city
or village ordinance or law of “this state or of the United States
prior to having become eighteen years of age;

38. Concurrent jurisdiction with the district court, county court
with increased jurisdiction, and justice or police magistrate
court, over any person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one years residing within the county charged with having vio-

682" —

lated any city or village ordinance or any law of this state or
of the United States; ... .”

27-1609. “If any child is arrrested with or without a warrant,
such child instead of being taken before the justice, police magis-
trate, or county court of increased jurisdiction shall be taken
immediately to the juvenile court where all proceedings with
reference to said child shall be conducted as provided by this
chapter.”

27-1610. “All children within the provisions of this chapter,
for the purposes of this chapter only, shall be considered ‘wards
of the state’, and their persons shall be-subject to the care,
guardianship, and control of the court as provided in this chap-
ter. At the discretion of the court, such care, guardianship, and
control may be continued until the ward shall have attained the
age of twenty-one years. The provisions of this chapter shall
not change the age of minority for any purpose other than that
of awarding the custody of the child.”

27-1613. “When any child, fourteen years of age or older,
is charged with commission of an offense, a judge of the juvenile
court, in his discretion, may permit such child to be proceeded
against in accordance with the laws or ordinances which may be
in force governing such offense.”

27-1621. “If the court shall find that the child is within the
provisions of this chapter, it shall so decree and, by order duly
entered, may proceed ag follows:

1. Place the child under supervision in his own home or in the
custody of a relative or other proper person, upon such terms
as the court shall determine;

2. Commit the child to a suitable public institution or agency
or to any private institution or agency for the care of children
approved and licensed by the duly authorized state board, or
place such child in a suitable private home; or .

3. Order such further care and treatment as the: court may
deem to be for the best interests of the child, except as otherwise
provided in this chapter.

No adjudication upon the status of any child within the juris-
diction of this court shall operate to impose any of the civil
disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction,'nor shall any:

ee 683

child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor
shall such adjudication be deemed a conviction. . The disposi-
tion of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be
admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceed-
ing in any other court, nor shall such disposition or evidence
operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examina-
tion, appointment, or application. Whenever the court shall
commit a child to any institution or agency, it shall transmit,
with the order of commitment, a summary of all of its informa-
tion concerning such child.”

27-1625. “In any proceeding brought under the provisions of
this chapter, the court, in any case where the child is not repre-
sented by any person, may appoint a guardian ad litem to appear
and act on behalf of said child.”

27-1631. “No publication of the name of any child under the
jurisdiction of this court shall be made by any newspaper ex-
cept as contained in process of the court and published by order
of the court. Any violation of the provisions of this section
shall subject the news reporter and publisher of any newspaper
so violating the same to be cited for civil contempt and to be
punished therefor.” NDRC 1943, 27-1631.

27-1633. “The judges of the judicial district may appoint
juvenile officers to assist in carrying out the provisions of this
chapter, and may require any child under the jurisdiction of this
court to report regularly to a juvenile officer. . . . NDRC
1943, 27-1633.

In Encyclopaedia Britannica it is said:

“The juvenile court as a distinct organization originated in
America but takes its root in legal and philosophical assump-
tions current in the 19th century. Its immediate aim was to
preserve children from the abuses of criminal procedure. Its
principles involve a revolutionary change of attitude. . . .
At first there was no thought of modifying court procedure. The
idea was stressed that after conviction the confinement should
be apart from adult criminals. . . . In 1899 the first juvenile
court was organized (Cook County, Chicago, Ill.). It brought
under one jurisdiction children who violated laws and dependent
children, provided identical procedure for both, established pro-

684 a

bation, decreed that adjudication be deemed not a conviction of
crime, but the placing of the child in the relation of ward to the
State. The care for the delinquent child was to ‘approximate as
nearly as may be that which should have been given by the
parents.’ Instead of warrant of arrest, examination by a police
judge, bail, indictment, jury trial and sentence, there was sub-
stituted complaint, investigation’ by probation officer, petition,
informal hearing and commitment. Fines, imprisonment and
penal treatment were abolished. The movement spread with
rapidity. By 1904 ten States had juvenile courts; after the first
ten years, 1914, 30 States; and in 1928 only two States (Wyom-
ing and Maine) were without juvenile courts.” .

“The juvenile court principle is, first, that the child is not an
ungrown adult, but a distinct being, physicially, mentally, emo-
tionally and socially; the child’s response to life is different;
secondly, that the State should not proceed against the child as
prosecutor, but exercise the chancery power of parens patriae to
protect the child.” 5 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed., (Chil-
dren’s Courts), pp 477-478. (Since the above was written both
Maine and Wyoming have provided for Juvenile Courts, Rev
Stat Maine 1944, Ch 133; Comp Stat Wyoming, 1945, 58-601,
58-602).

The history of this state discloses that what is said in the
Encyclopaedia Britannica applies-to the legislation that was en-
acted in this state relating to children charged with the commis-
sion of acts which would render an adult subject to punishment.

In the Constitution of this state, adopted in 1889, provision
was made. for the establishment of a State Reform School in
the City of Mandan. ND Const, Sec 215. Section 215 of the
Constitution was amended by constitutional amendment ap-
proved by the electors of the State.at the General Election on
November 2, 1920, to change the name of the State Reform
School to State Training School. Laws of. North Dakota 1919,
Chapter 94; Laws of 1921, Constitutional Amendments, Art 38,
pp 259-260. In the Enabling Act provision had been made for
a grant by the United States of America of 40,000 acres of land
for the support of such school. Enabling. Act, Sec 17. At the
first session of the First Legislative Assembly in the State of

ee 685

North Dakota provision was made for the government and
operation of such Reform School. Laws 1890, Ch 164. The pro-
visions of said Chapter 164 were codified and embodied in. the
Revised ‘Codes. of North Dakota 1895. Certain provisions of
the law were embodied in Sec 8582 of the Revised Codes of North
Dakota 1895 which read.as follows:

“Whenever any person under the age of eighteen years shall
be convicted of any crime or public offense before a justice of the
peace or court other than a district court of the state, or of
being a disorderly person, such justice of. the- peace or other
court, must forthwith send such person together with all the
papers relating to the charge on file in his office, and a-certified
transcript of his docket entries in the action, under the charge
of some peace officer, to the judge of the district court of the
county. The judge shall thereupon issue an order to the parent
or guardian of the accused, or to such person as may have had
him in charge, or with whom he last resided, or to some person
nearly related to him, if known.or if there is no such person
known, then to some person to. be designated in the order to
act as guardian for the accused for the time being, requiring
such parent or other person to appear at a time and place stated
in such order and show cause why the accused should not be
committed to the reform school. . . .” Revised Codes of North
Dakota, 1895, Sec 8582.

The above quoted provision was embodied in Sec 8582 Revised
Code of North ‘Dakota’ 1899 and again in See 11283, Compiled
Laws of North Dakota for 1913. However, in the decision in
State ex rel. Neville v. Overby, 54 ND 295, 209 NW 552, in con-
struing the juvenile court act enacted in 1911, this Court said
that this section “is probably superseded by the provisions of
the juvenile court law, which deprive justices of the peace and
police magistrates of jurisdiction to try and sentence offenders
under eighteen years of age.” .54 ND at p 305, 209 NW at p 556.
And such provision was not included in NDRC 19438, but was
omitted because. it was deemed to have been superseded. See
Vol 6, North Dakota Revised Code of 1948, pp 4493, 4598.

The Juvenile Court Law enacted in 1911 (Laws 1911, Ch 177)
provided that “all dependent, neglected and delinquent children

686 ee

under the age of eighteen year's, shall, for the purpose of this
act only, be considered wards of ‘this state and their persons
shall be subject to the care, guardianship and control of the
court as hereinafter provided.” (See 1) The Act further pro-
vided that “the word ‘delinquent child’ shall mean any child
who while under the age of eighteen years violates any law of
the state; . . . .” (Sec 2) That “the district courts of the
several counties in this state shall have original jurisdiction in
all cases coming within the terms of this act.” (Sec 3) That
“the court may for convenience, be called the ‘Juvenile Court,’
and as far as possible the said court shall be held in chambers.”*
(See 4) That “the court may in its diserction in any case of a
delinquent child permit such child to be proceeded against in
accordance with the laws that may be in force in-this state
governing the commission of crimes or violation of city, village,
or town ordinances; . . . .” (See 11) It further provided:
“Sf any child under the age of eighteen years is arrested with or
without warrant, such child shall instead of being taken before
a justice of the peace or police magistrate, be given into the
care of a juvenile officer of said county, and the officer having
the child in charge shall take the child before such juvenile court,
and in any case the county (district) court may proceed to hear
and dispose of the case in the same manner as if the child had
been brought before the court upon petition as herein provided.
+ . . .” (See 15) The act contained the following repealing
clause: “This act shall be construed to repeal existing laws in
conflict with this act under and by which dependent, neglected
and delinquent children as defined by this act might be arrested,
complained against, committed, confined or taken into or placed
in custody, in justice courts or police courts, but as to all other
laws it shall be construed as cumulative and not as exclusive.”
(See 27)

Aside from a minor change made in 1913, relating to depend-
ent, and neglected children (Laws 1913, Chapter 68), the juvenile
court law as enacted in 1911 remained as enacted and the above
quoted provisions remained in force and were embodied in the
Compiled Laws of North Dakota for 1913. CL 1913, Sections
11402-11428. As has been said, thereafter, in the course of

Ee 687

codification of the laws of this state (NDRC 1943) the juvenile
court law was rewritten and enacted as Chapter 212, Laws 1943.
‘That act was entitled “An Act Relating to the Juvenile Court and
the Protection, Control, and Custody of Children; and amend-
ing and re-enacting” (following this the then existing provisions
of the laws of the State of North Dakota relating to juvenile
courts are specifically enumerated). Chapter 177, Laws 1911,
provided that “all dependent, neglected and delinquent children
under the age of eighteen years, shall, for the purpose of this
act only, be considered wards of this state,” (Sec 1), and defined
the terms “dependent child,” “neglected child,” and “delinquent
child.” Chapter 212, Laws 1943, eliminated any reference to
delinquent, dependent and neglected children and provided in-
stead that within the terms of that act “ ‘child’ means a person
less than eighteen years of age,” and provided that the juvenile
courts “shall have original jurisdiction in all proceedings; (1)
concerning any child residing in or who is temporarily within
the county: a. Who has violated any city or village ordinance
or law of this state or of the United States ;” or who has commit-
ted any of the other acts or is in any of the situations specified
in the act. Chapter 212, Laws 1948, Sec 8; NDRC 1943, 27-
1608(1).

Said Chapter 212, Section 8(3) further provided that the
juvenile court shall have “concurrent jurisdiction with the dis- -
trict court, county court with increased jurisdiction, justice or
police magistrate court, over any person between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one years . . . charged with having
violated any city or village ordinance or any law of this State
or of the United States.” Laws 1943, Chapter 212, See 8(3) ; ND
RC 1948, 27-1608(3). No similar provision was contained in the
former law. The former law provided that the juvenile court
“may in its discretion in any case of a delinquent child permit
such child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws
that may be in force in this state governing the commission of
crimes or violation of city, village, or town ordinances; ... .”
Laws 1911, Chapter'177, See 11. Chapter 212, Laws 1943, pro-
vided that “when any child, fourteen years of age or older, is
charged with the commission of an offense, a judge of this court

688 EE

may, iti his discretion, permit such child to be proceeded against
in accordance with the laws or ordinances that may be in force
governing such offense.” Laws 1943, Chapter 212, Sec 18; NDRC
1943, 27-1613. . The former law provided that “if any child under
the age of eighteen years is arrested with or without warrant,
such child shall instead of being taken before a justice of the
peace or police magistrate, be given into the care of a juvenile
officer of said county, and the officer having the child in charge
shall take the child before such juvenile court, and in any case
the county (district) court may proceed to hear and dispose of
the case in the same manner as if the child had been brought
before the court upon petition” as provided in the act. Laws
1911, Chapter 177, Sec 15. Chapter 212, Laws 1943, provided
“Gf any child is arrested with or without a warrant, such child
instead of being taken before the justice, police magistrate, or
county court of increased jurisdiction shall be taken immediate-
ly to the Juvenile Court where all proceedings with reference
to said child shall be conducted as provided by this chapter.”
Laws 1943, Chapter 212, See 9; NDRC 1943, 27-1609. Chapter
212, Laws 1943, did not contain a repeal clause such as that con-
tained in Chapter 177, Laws 1911,—and later embodied in Sec
11428, CL 1913,—but said chapter 212 contained a general re-
pealing clause that “all acts and parts of Acts in conflict with
the provisions of this chapter are hereby repealed.” Laws 1943,
Chapter 212, Sec 34.

In State ex rel. Neville v. Overby, supra, this Court had occa-
sion to construe the original juvenile court law of this state.
In that case a criminal complaint was filed with the police mag-
istrate of the City of Grand Forks charging one Neville with
commission of the crime of grand larceny. A warrant was is-
sued and Neville was arrested thereunder, brought before the
police magistrate, and given a preliminary examination and held
to answer in the district court. He was admitted to bail which
was furnished. Later a criminal information was filed in the
district court of Grand Forks County by the State’s attorney
of that county charging Neville with the crime of grand larceny.
He was arraigned and entered a plea of guilty. Thereupon he
was sentenced by the presiding judge of the district court and

EE 689

committed to the State Training School. Neville through his
parents petitioned the judge of the district court of Grand Forks
County for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the proceed-
ings in which he had been arrested, tried and sentenced were
void for the reason that at the time such proceedings were had
he was under the age of eighteen years. The district judge
denied the petition and thereupon the parents of John Neville
petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
at the time the proceedings were had against Neville before the
police magistrate and in the district court and at the time sen-
tence was pronounced and judgment of conviction rendered in
the district court he was under the age of eighteen years. That
at the time of the arrest and at the preliminary examination the
police magistrate and the chief of police knew that he was under
the age of eighteen years and that the State’s attorney who
prosecuted the action against him in the district court and the
judge of the district court who presided and pronounced sentence
and rendered judgment knew that he was under the age of
eighteen years; and that consequently the proceedings had, the
sentence pronounced and the judgment rendered were without
jurisdiction and void. This court held that the repealing clause
in Chapter 177, Laws 1911, evidenced a legislative intention not
to repeal but to leave in force the provisions of law in existence
when said Chapter 177, Laws 1911, was enacted, conferring
jurisdiction on the district court of criminal offenses and trials
of persons charged with the commission of felonies including
persons under the age of eighteen years; that the unusual terms
of the repealing clause and the history of the enactment evi-
denced a legislative intention.to leave unimpaired the jurisdic-
tion of the district court under such former laws. That errors in
the proceedings did not operate to deprive the district court of
jurisdiction. In the original opinion in that case this Court said:

“The district court has jurisdiction over all criminal offences
and exclusive original jurisdiction over all felonies, and of all
persons brought therein, charged with the commission of crime.
The juvenile court act does not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction in criminal causes; it specifically states in the re-

690 — Es

pealing clause that it is cumulative and not exclusive as to all
law, excepting only the law as administered in justice and police
courts.” 54ND at p 300.

“Section 11,416, which required the officer making the arrest
to give into the care of a juvenile officer all children arrested
under eighteen years of age, is to prevent children of tender
years from being thrown into jail with hardened criminals and
is in harmony with the object and purpose of the juvenile act.

“The juvenile court is not a criminal court and it is the pur-
pose of the law to treat juvenile offenders under eighteen years
of age not as criminals, but as far as practicable to give them
the paternal care of the home, to save them from the stigma
attaching to crime, to guard and protect them against them-
selves, and all evil-minded persons.

“We are not concerned with the question of the jurisdiction
of police magistrate and justices of the peace over juvenile of-
fenders against the law. The persons in whose behalf the writ
of habeas corpus is prosecuted, are not held by virtue of a com-
mitment issued by the police magistrate or justice of the peace;
they are held by virtue of a judgment of conviction of a felony
in the district court which has exclusive jurisdiction over such
offenses.” 54ND at p 302.

In the opinion on petition for rehearing this Court said:

“The legislative intent, with respect to the arrest of juvenile
offenders, is so clearly expressed in Sec 11,416, Comp Laws
1913, that no comment seems necessary. To bring a juvenile,
under the age of eighteen years, before a justice of the peace
or a police magistrate for the purpose of a preliminary exami-
nation is in manifest defiance of the statute. The act specifically
provides that a child under eighteen years, if arrested, shall not
be taken before such an officer, but shall be ‘given into the care
of a juvenile officer of said county.’ In the cases before us, as
said by the counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings before
the magistrate were wholly irregular and contrary to the stat-
ute; and it was the plain duty of the officers, including the state’s
attorney, who had any connection with their arrest, to give the
bays ‘into the care of the juvenile officer of’ Grand Forks county.

Ee 691

The fact remains however, that errors in these respects do not
amount to such jurisdictional defects as justify the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.

“Primarily, jurisdiction over juvenile offenders is in the dis-
trict court, sitting as a juvenile court. Of this, all police officers
and state’s attorneys should take notice. The juvenile court has
the discretionary power to order a criminal prosecution in the
usual course. Comp Laws 1913, See 11,412.” (Ttalies supplied)
54.ND at p 306.

“The legislative purpose is clearly evidenced by the repeal
clause. There the intent to divest justice courts and police courts
of all jurisdiction is made unmistakably clear; on the other hand
the purpose not to divest the district court of jurisdiction is
equally manifest. All statutes giving the police and the justice
courts jurisdiction over juvenile offienders are expressly de-
clared to be repealed; but as to all other laws, like for example,
See 11,281, supra, the juvenile act is supplementary and not a
repeal—cumulative and not . . . exclusive.” (Italics sup-
plied) 54 ND at p 307.

What was said by this Court in State ex rel. Neville v. Overby,
supra, with respect to the want of jurisdiction of a police magis-
trate over a delinquent child under the age of eighteen years,
and the duty of a policenian, who has arrested such child either
with or without a warrant, instead of taking such child before
the police magistrate to give such child into the care of a juve-
nile officer of the county, is applicable in this case under the:
present juvenile court law. The present law provides that if
any child is arrested with or without a warrant such child in-
stead of being taken before the police magistrate shall be taken
immediately to the juvenile court where all proceedings with
reference to said child shall be conducted as provided in said
juvenile court law. NDRC 1943, 27-1609. As has been pointed
out the title to the present juvenile court law (Laws 1943, Ch
212) recited that it was “An Act Relating to the Juvenile Court
and the Protection, Control and Custody of Children; and amend-
ing and re-enacting” all the then existing provisions of the juve-
nile court laws of this state. Presumptively, said Chapter 212,
Laws 1943, was enacted with knowledge of, and in the light of,.

692 a

the décision in State ex rel. Neville v. Overby, supra; and the
language of the act indicates that the legislature had no inten-
tion. to depart from the construction that had been given to the
former law by this Court in State ex rel. Neville v. Overby. The
lawmakers indicated their approval of such construction and
their intention to reenact the statute as so construed. 59 CJ See
618, pp 1036-1037. The language of said Chapter 212 leaves no
doubt as to the legislative purpose and intent to forbid that a
“child” as defined in the act should be brought before a police
thagistrate for trial or sentence for violation of an ordinance of
the city but that if any such child is arrested for such violation
“with or without a warrant, such child instead of being taken
before the . . . police magistrate . . . shall be taken
immediately to the juvenile court where all proceedings with
reference to said child shall be conducted as provided by this
chapter.” NDRC 1943, 27-1609. In the next section the law
provides that “all children within the provisions of this chapter,
for the purposes of this chapter only, shall be considered ‘wards
of the state’, and their persons shall be subject to the care, guard-
ianship, and control of the court as provided in this chapter.”
NDRC 1943, 27-1610. (Italics supplied)

Indeed, there is no contention that there was any intention
on the part of the legislature to vest the police magistrate with
jurisdiction to try and sentence a child who has violated a city
ordinance or to render judgment of conviction or pronounce sen-
tence upon such child. On the contrary it is conceded that the
juvenile court law prohibits a police magistrate from perform-
ing such acts and it is contended that the prohibition of the police
magistrate from performing such acts renders the statute un-
constitutional. In short, the contention of the petitioners is that
the juvenile court law contravenes the provisions of See 113
of the Constitution of the State which section so far as material
here provides that “the legislative assembly shall provide by law
for the eleétion of police magistrates in cities, incorporated
towns, and villages, who in addition to their jurisdiction of all
cases arising under the ordinances of said cities, towns and vil-
lages, shall be ex officio justices of the peace of the county in
which said cities, towns and villages may be located.” There is

ee 693

no. contention that the juvenile court, law violates any other con-
stitutional provision. On the contrary it is asserted that the
law is unconstitutional only insofar as it purports to interfere
with and deprive the police magistrate of jurisdiction to try and
determine cases where a child under the age of eighteen years
of age is charged with violating an ordinance of a-city and to
pronounce sentence-and render judgment of conviction in such
cases.

In the petitioners’ brief it is said that “petitioners allege that
the statute relied upon by the attorney for the respondents is
unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to invade the jurisdiction
of police magistrate in violations of municipal ordinances.” It
is further said: “It should be borne clearly in mind that the
petitioners in this action do not challenge the constitutionality
of the Juvenile Act in any way except in as it is applied to
municipalities and the police magistrate thereof. We believe
that this law is unconstitutional in part but that such unconsti-
tutionality does not affect the remainder of the statute; that if
the unconstitutional .portion is deleted nevertheless the re-
mainder of the statute is sufficient and complete to operate with-
in the areas wherein it may operate.” It is also said that the
“respondents (petitioners) do not contend that Sec 27-1601 et
seq of the NDRC 1943 is unconstitutional in any other respect
except as applied to municipalities and police magistrates there-
of.”

It is a general principle that cities hold and exercise their
powers.subject to legislative control and the legislative author-
ity over the political and governmental powers of a city is su-
preme except as limited by the State and Federal Constitutions.
87 Am Jur p 689.

“In general, the functions, powers, and privileges of municipal
corporations may be changed or modified at the discretion or
pleasure of the legislature creating them; they may be increased
or extended, or, on the other hand, they may be restricted,
diminished, or withdrawn.” 62 CJS 340, 341.

The Constitution of this state contains no provision for what
is commonly known as a “home-rule” charter, or any grant of
right of self-government to cities. On the contrary the Consti-

b04 es

tution prohibits the legislative assembly from passing any local.
or special laws for the incorporation of cities, towns or villages
or changing or amending the charter of any city, town or village.
N Dak Const, See 69, subd 33. The Constitution further pro-
vides: “The legislative assembly shall provide by. general law
for the organization of municipal corporations restricting their
powers as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money
and contracting debts, and money raised by taxation, loan or
assessment for any purpose shall not be diverted to any other

“purpose except by authority of law.” N Dak Const, Sec 130.

Under the Constitution of this state cities “are creatures of
the statute and of the statute alone.” State ex rel. Shaw v.
Frazier, 39 ND 430, 444, 167 NW 510. . And the legislature has
the power to define the powers of cities and to prescribe the
manner of their exercise. Stark v. City of Jamestown, 76 ND
422, 448, 37 NW2d 516, 530.

“The state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and priv-
ileges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere of action,
it remains the creature of the State exercising and holding
powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will.” Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 US 182, 187, 67 L ed 927, 941, 43 S Ct 534,
29 ALR 1471. <A city “is the creature of the legislature, and
its rights, powers and duties are fixed by the will of its creator.”
North Fargo v. Fargo, 49 ND 597, 605, 192 NW 977, 979. In
Waslien v. City of Hillsboro, 48 ND 1118, 1118, 188 NW 738,
this Court said:

“In this state, cities are incorporated through general law of
the legislature. They are mere creatures of the statute. State
ex rel. Shaw v. Frazier, 39 ND 430, 434, 167 NW 510. They
are political subdivisions of the state, auxiliaries for purposes
of local government exercising a part of the powers of the state.
They may be created, or, after creation, their powers may be
restricted or enlarged or altogether withdrawn at the will or
discretion of the legislature. . . . This legislative power is
primarily plenary; the constitution is not a grant of, but a re-
striction upon, that-power.” See, also, Sitte v. Paulson, 56 ND
146, 216 NW 344.

In: Fargo v. Sathre, 76 ND 342, 36 NW2d 39, this Court had

| 695

oecasion to consider the validity and effect of a statute.adopted
pursuant to initiative petition prohibiting cities from establish-
ing and maintaining parking meters requiring the deposit there-
in of coins where automobiles were parked on the strects of a
city and invalidating ordinances previously enacted providing
for parking meters. The City of Fargo had expended consider-
able sums of money in establishing parking meters, and the
validity of the statute was challenged on many grounds. This
Court held (Syl 6, 76 ND at p 343) that “the initiated statute

- . is a valid enactment and its effect is to void and nullify
all ordinances of cities inconsistent with its provisions.” In
the opinion in the case this Court said in part:

“Cities and other political subdivisions of the state are merely
agencies of the state. Such powers as they have are conferred
upon them by the people of the state either by way. of legislative
enactment or through the initiative. Having been thus conferred
they may be modified or taken away. See State ex rel. Linde.v.
Taylor, 33 ND 76, 156 NW 561, LRA1918B 156, Ann Cas 1918A
583, where this court quoted with approval from the case of
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 US 207, 48 L ed 148, 24 S Ot 124, as follows:

“Such corporations are the creatures, mere political subdi-
visions, of the state, for the purpose of exercising a part of its
powers. They may exert only such powers as are expressly
granted to them, or such as may be necessarily implied from
those granted. What they lawfully do of a public character is
done under the sanction of the State. They are, in every es-
sential sense, only auxiliaries of the State for the purposes of
local government. They may be created, or, having been
created, their powers may be restricted or enlarged or alto-
gether withdrawn at the will of the legislature; the authority
of the legislature, when restricting or withdrawing such powers,
being subject only to the fundamental condition that the col-
lective and individual rights of the people of the municipality
shall not thereby be destroyed.’

“See also Lang v. Cavalier, 59 ND 75, 228 NW 819 and cases
cited; State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brekke, 75 ND 468, 28 NW2d 598.
Plaintiffs’ challenges of unconstitutionality must. be considered

696 LT

in the light of this relationship between the State of North Da-
kota and its cities.”

It is apparent that the legislative assembly has full control
over any ordinance that may have been enacted by any of the
cities in this state. Under the constitution a city has no inher-
ent power to enact any ordinance. It has no authority to enact
an ordinance‘unless and until authority to do so has been grant-
ed by law and the grant of power to cities to enact ordinances
does not operate as a surrender of legislative power. 62 CJS
p 359. The legislature may at any time it sees fit so to do with-
draw the power it has granted to enact such ordinance or it may
enact a general law in conflict with the provisions of an ordi-
nance which has been enacted by the city under the former grant”
of power and in such case the provisions of the ordinance in
conflict with the statute are superseded and rendered invalid.

In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations it is said:

“A general statute relating to matters of state-widé concern
ordinarily repeals, and is construed to repeal, previously exist-
ing local ordinances in conflict with it.” 6 McQuillin on Munici-
pal Corporations, 3rd ed, p 246.

“It is a general requisite to the validity of an ordinance that
it conform to, and not violate, general statutes, and, consistently,
a general statute repeals an earlier ordinance with which it is
repugnant, unless contrary legislative intention is manifested.
Conversely, an ordinance does not and cannot supersede an
earlier general statute. In other words, in case of conflict the
ordinance is void. Indeed, attached to every statute, every char-
ter, every ordinance or resolution affecting, or adopted by, a
municipality is the implied condition that the same must yield
to the predominant power of the state, when that power has been
exercised. . . .

“Unquestionably, within its constitutional powers the legis-
lature may modify or repeal municipal ordinances. Such re-
peals need not be in express terms. If the intention to repeal
clearly appears, the ordinance must give way to the legislative
act so far as it is in conflict with it. Thus an ordinance is im-
pliedly repealed by a later valid statute on the same subject

| 697

which is incompatible with it.” 6 McQuillin on Municipal Corpo-
rations, 3rd ed, Sec 21.32, p 287 et seq. .

“It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and’
state-wide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that munici-
pal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt
ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or are re-
pugnant to the general policy of the state.” 387 Am Jur, pp
787-788.

There is no contention that the ordinance of the City of Minot
involved in this case or any ordinance of the city contains any
provision fixing the age above which a person shall be deemed
capable of committing an offense by violation of an ordinance
or be responsible for such violation and liable to punishment
therefor and presumptively the ordinances of the city did not
and could not contain such provision.

As has been pointed out, the legislative assembly has full
control over what ordinances may be enacted and over ordi-
nances that have been enacted by the cities in this state. The
constitution provides that “the legislative assembly shall provide
by general law for the organization of municipal corporations
restricting their powers as to levying taxes and assessment, bor-
rowing money and contracting debts.” ND Const, Sec 130. Or-
dinances of a city would naturally relate to matters of local
concern within the city. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has
said: “The true purpose of all municipal ordinances is to regu-
late local affairs.” State v. Mandehr, 168 Minn 139, 209 NW
750. See, also, Fargo v. Glaser, 62 ND 673, 244 NW 905. Em-
ployment of children (43 CJS 65) and the care and treatment of
neglected and delinquent children are matters of statewide con-
cern and the legislature under the police power may enact such
laws with respect thereto as it deems necessary provided they
do not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the State
or of the Constitution of the United States. 2 McQuillin, Mu-
nicipal Corporations, 3rd ed, Sec 4.94, p 57; Tiedeman’s Limi-
tations of Police Power, Sec 2, p 5 et seq. The age of criminal

698 — Es

responsibility or capacity of an infant to commit a crime (43.
CJS 217) and the age at which an infant may make a binding
contract (48 CJS 160) are matters of statewide concern. The
administration of justice is obviously a state affair rather than
a municipal affair. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd
ed, Sec 4.95, p 158; State ex rel. Dann v. Hutchinson, 206 Minn
446, 288 NW 845. The subject matter of the juvenile court law
of this state is not a local affair, it concerns all the people of
the State and is a matter of statewide concern.

The constitution contains no provision granting to a city the
power to enact any ordinance or ordinances nor does it contain
any provision or direction that the legislature shall grant such
power or powers to a city. Hence, itis obvious that under the
constitution of this state a city has no power to enact any ordi-
nance or ordinances unless it is authorized by legislative enact-
ment so to do, and the authority so granted by legislative en-
actment may thereafter be qualified or withdrawn and if the
legislature enacts a statute which clearly conflicts with ordi-
nances that have been enacted the statute prevails and the con-
flicting ordinances are superseded and rendered invalid.

The juvenile court law was enacted under the police power. of
the State. State ex rel. Kronschnabel v. Isenhuth, 34 SD 218,
148 NW-9; Re Johnson, 173 Wis 571, 181 NW 741; Re Hook,
95 Vt 497, 115 Atl 730, 19 ALR 610; State ex rel. Foot v. District
Court, 77 Mont 290, 295, 250 Pac 973, 975.

The police power is an attribute of sovereignty inherent in the
states of the American union, “and exists without any reserva-
tion in the constitution, being founded on the duty of the state
to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order
of society.” 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, See 175, pp 539-540;
11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, Sec 245, pp 966-968. The con-
stitution “supposes the pre-existence of the police power, and
must be construed with reference to that fact.” 11 Am Jur,
Constitutional Law, p 969; 16 CJS p 541; Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 326 Ill 625, 158 NEE 376,
55 ALR 654; Borden v. La. State Bd. of Edu., 168 La 1005, 123
So 655; 67 ALR 1183; Carthage v. Frederick, 122 NY 268, 25 NE
480, 10 LRA 178, 19 Am St Rep 490.

| 699

“Tt is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that in
matters relating to the police power each successive legislature
is of equal authority. A legislative body cannot part with its
right to exercise such power; it inherently has authority to use
the power again and again, as often as the public interests may
require.” 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law, Sec 254, p 983.

In Neer v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, this Court said:

“ ‘The police power’ is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals; and general welfare of society. Such
power, as pointed out by: Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 US 104, 55 L ed 112, 32 LRA NS 1062, 31 Sup Ct
Rep 186, Ann Cas 1912A, 487, may be said, in a general way, to
extend to all the great public needs, and ‘it may be put forth in
aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality, or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare.’ As applied to the
powers of one of the states of the Union, the term ‘police power’
is also used to denote those inherent governmental powers
which, under the system established by the Constitution of the
United States, are reserved to the several states. 12 CJ 905.
Of course, there is no such thing as a police power which is above
the Constitution, or which justifies any violation of express or
manifestly implied constitutional prohibitions. State “ex rel.
Milwaukee Medical College v. Chittenden, 127 Wis 468, 107 NW
500. - And, ‘however broad the scope of the police power, it is
always subject to the rule that the legislature may not exercise
any power that is expressly or impliedly forbidden to it by the
state Constitution.” 12 CJ 929. But where a subject is within
the police power, it is for the legislature to say what the remedy
shall be, and a police enactment will be upheld unless it con-
travenes some constitutional restriction. American Linseed Oil
Co. v. Wheaton, 25 SD 60, 41 LRA NS 149, 125 NW 127.” 40
ND at pp 369-370.

The legislature has power to define what acts shall constitute
criminal offenses and what penalties shall be imposed on offend-

rs} “and generally to enact all laws deemed ‘expedient for the

700 Le

protection of public and private rights and the prevention and
punishment of public wrongs, the expediency of making any
such enactment being a matter of which the legislature is the
proper judge. It may impose penalties for a violation of its
statutory requirements. It may take life, liberty, or- property
for crime, as long as it keeps within the bounds of the Constitu-
tion. So long as its. enactments do not infringe constitutional
rights and privileges, express or necessarily implied, its will
is absolute.” 14 Am Jur, 766-767. The legislature has the
power to fix the age of criminal responsibility. It, also,. has
power to say that an act done by a child shall not be a crime.or
punishable as such even though the same act constitutes crime
if done by an adult, People v. Lewis, 260 NY 171, 183 NE 353,
86 ALR 1001.

The Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Dakota fixed
the age of criminal responsibility and provided that every child
under the age of seven years is conclusively presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime but that “children of the age
of seven years, but under the age of fourteen years, in the ab-
sence of proof that at the time of committing the act or neglect
charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness,” are also
deemed incapable of committing a crime. Penal Code, Dakota
Territory 1877, Sec 16(2). This statutory provision was retained
in force after statehood (CL 1913, Sec 9207, NDRC 1943, 12-
0201) and was construed by this Court in State v. Fisk, 15 ND
589, 108 NW 485, 11 Ann Cas 1061. In the decision in that case
this Court said:

“Under the above section, a child under the age of 7 years is
conclusively presumed to -be incapable of committing a crime.
In this respect it is the same as the common law, both of England
and this country. Between 7 and 14, called the dubious age of
discretion, the child is still presumed to be.incapable, but the
presumption is not conclusive. The state may overcome the
presumption, but to do so, it must show by clear proof that the
accused knew the wrongfulness of the act when he committed
it. In. the absence of such proof.the presumption of incapacity
must prevail. The burden is upon the state -in such cases to
prove knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act.as .an independ-

| 701,

ent fact. In this respect the rule is the same as at common law.”
15 ND at p 591.

Obviously, the legislature might change the age of criminal
capacity or responsibility. As was well said by a noted jurist
and legal writer :

“Tt would seem to be obvious that, if the common law could
fix the age of criminal responsibility at seven, and if the legis-
lature could advance that age to ten or twelve, it can also raise
it to sixteen or seventeen or eighteen, and that is what, in some
measure, has been done. Under most of the juvenile-court laws
a child under the designated age is to be proceeded against as
a criminal only when in the judgment of the judge of the juve-
nile court, either as to any child, or in some states as to one over
fourteen or over sixteen years of age, the interests of the state
and of the child require that this be done.” The Juvenile Court,
Judge Julian W. Mack, 23 Harvard Law Review, 104.

By the juvenile court law of this state the legislature has pro-
vided that the juvenile court shall have original jurisdiction in
all proceedings concerning any child “who has violated any city
or village ordinance or law of this state or of the United States ;”
(NDRC 1943, 27-1608) that for the purposes of the juvenile
court act all children within its provisions “shall be considered
‘wards of the state’ and their persons subject to the care, guard-
ianship and control of the court as provided” in the juvenile
court act. NDRC 1948, 27-1610. That “when any child four-
teen years of age or older is charged with the-commission of an
offense,” a judge of the juvenile court “may in his discretion,
permit such child to be proceeded against in accordance with
the laws or ordinances that may be in force governing such
offense.” NDRC 1943, 27-1613. The obvious purpose and ef-
fect of these provisions is to make every “child” less than
eighteen years of age, who has violated any ordinance of a city
or village or law of the state or of the United States, or who has
committed any other act, or is in any situation specified in NDRC
1948, 27-1608, subject in the first instance alone to the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court; but when any such “child,.fourteen
‘years or older, is charged with the commission of an offense”
the judge of the juvenile court is vested with discretionary pow-

702 es

er to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and “permit
such child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws or
ordinances that may be in force governing such offense.” NDRC
1943, 27-1613. See, also, 31 Am Jur, Juvenile Courts and Of-
fenders, p 801, Sec 33; 43 CJS pp 234-235,

If the legislature had power to fix the age of criminal capacity
or responsibility absolutely, it also had power to fix it condi-
tionally as it did in CL 1913, Sec 9207; and it also had power
to provide that when a child who has committed an offense
against the laws of the State or of the United States or the ordi-
nances of a city and thus become a ward of the juvenile court
the judge of the juvenile court in his discretion may waive the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and permit the child to be pro-
ceeded against in accordance with the laws or ordinances which
may be in force governing such offense. NDRC 1943, 27-1613;
31 Am Jur, Juvenile Courts and Offenders, See 33, p 801; 43
OJS pp 234-235,

In enacting the juvenile court law the legislature was not con-
cerned with fixing the age at which an offender should be deemed
capable of committing a crime under a criminal statute or an
offense under a penal ordinance. It was not the aim of the act
to provide for punishment of such minors but instead “to treat
such minors not as criminals but as wards of the state.” It was
clearly the legislative purpose and intent to provide that acts or
conduct of such minors which if committed by an adult would
constitute a violation of a criminal statute or a penal ordinance
and render the perpetrator subject to prosecution and punish-
ment in proceedings in a court exercising criminal or penal ju-
risdiction shall not render a “child” as defined in the act subject
to such prosecution and punishment but shall instead constitute
such offender a ward of the state and as such subject to the
jurisdiction of a court vested with and exercising chancery or
equity powers. In short, by the juvenile court act the legislature
intended to establish and did establish a new system and method
of dealing with juvenile offenders and invoked the jurisdiction
of a court exercising equity powers to deal with such offenders.

American Jurisprudence says:

“The early criminal law did not differentiate between the adult

— 703

and the minor who had reached the age of criminal responsibility
—seven at common law and in some of our states, ten in others,
with a chance to escape up to twelve, if lacking in mentality and
moral maturity. The fundamental thought in our criminal ju-
.tisprudence was not, and in most jurisdictions is not, reforma-
tion of the criminals, but punishment; and this applied to chil-
dren as well as to adults. Today, however, the thought is that
the child who has begun to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who
has broken a law or ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the
state, not as an enemy, but as a protector, as the ultimate guard-
ian, because either the unwillingness or the inability of the nat-
ural parents to guide him toward good citizenship has compelled
the intervention of the public authorities.” 31 Am Jur, See 1,
p 784.

“Statutes creating courts having jurisdiction of juvenile de-
linquents, and providing for the procedure therein and the care
and discipline of such delinquents, have been characterized by
the courts as progressive, humanitarian, and beneficial, and
have been referred to as paternal and benevolent. They have
for their object not the punishment of juvenile offenders for
misconduct, criminal or otherwise, but their removal from the
path of temptation and their direction into the paths of rectitude
by preventive and corrective means. Their operation is in-
tended to check the criminal tendency in its inception, and pro-
tect the unformed character in the facile period from improper
environment and influences, to give to the weak and immature
a fair fighting chance for the development of the elements of
honesty, sobriety, and virtue essential to good citizenship, and
to prevent them from growing up to lead idle, dissolute, or
immoral lives. In other words, the welfare of the child lies at
the very foundation of the statutory scheme. A statute of this
nature is an assertion of the state’s power as parens patriae and
its right to exercise proper parental control over those of its
minor citizens who are disposed to go wrong.” 31 Am Jur, p 785.
” “It is not the purpose of the statutes creating juvenile courts
to provide additional courts for the punishment of crime. The
purpose is to establish special tribunals having jurisdiction,
within prescribed limits, of cases relating to the moral, physical,

704 De

and mental well-being of children to the end that they may be
directed away from paths of crime.”

“The basic conceptions which distinguish juvenile courts from
other courts can be briefly summarized. Children are to be
dealt with separately from adults. Their cases are to be heard
at a different time and preferably in a different place; they are
to be detained in separate buildings, and if institutional guid-
ance is necessary, they are to be committed to institutions for
children. Through its probation officers the court can keep in
constant touch with the children who have appeared before it.”
31 Am Jur, pp 788-789.

In this state there was no attempt to create a separate court
but the juvenile court jurisdiction established by the act was
conferred upon an existing court, namely, upon the district
court, which court by the Constitution of the State is vested
with original jurisdiction in all matters in equity. N Dak Const,
Sec 103; Mead v. First National Bank, 24 ND at p 14, 138 NW
at p 366. See, also, 30 CJS, Equity, Sec 7, pp 324-325; 31 Am
Jur, Juvenile Courts and Offenders, Sec 9, p 789. In so doing
the legislature followed the example of a number of other states.
The jurisdiction of a court of equity over the person of an in-
fant has long been recognized and firmly established. 19 Am
Jur, Equity, p 145, See 152. Note: 14 ALR p 308 et seq; 4
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed, Sec 1304; In Re San-
tillanes, 47 N Mex 140, 138 P2d 503; 17 McQuillin’s Municipal
Corporations, 8rd ed, Sec 47.16, p 43 et seq; 31 Am Jur, Juvenile
Courts and Offenders, Sec 33, p 801; 1 Wharton’s Criminal
Law, 12th ed, Sec 366, p 480 et seq; 43 CJS pp 50-55; New York
Life Ins. Oo. v. Bangs, 103 US 435, 26 L ed 580.

In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations it is said:

“Laws, especially statutes, establishing and conferring juris-
diction upon juvenile courts and empowering such courts to
take custody and control of the persons of children have been
considered by the courts of last resort in many states. . . . .
That the state is the ultimate parent of all its dependent inhab-
itants, especially infants, is an old and familiar legal conception.
‘It is essential to every well-ordered social system that there
should be some judicial authority by which protection may be

| 705

afforded to those who cannot protect themselves; . . . that
there should be some tribunal whose duty it is to supervise the
care of the persons and estate of infants.’ For two centuries at
least the English courts of chancery have exercised jurisdiction
for the protection of the child when deemed necessary, and this
jurisdiction was not based alone on the fact that the child pos-
sessed property. In this country from the beginning, equity
courts have exercised the same jurisdiction for the like purpose
of protecting minors. . ...

“ «There has been considered to exist in England a prerogative
in the Crown, as parens patriae, to be exercised by the Court of
Chancery, for the protection of any infant residing temporarily
or permanently within its jurisdiction.” ” 17 McQuillin, Munici-
pal Corporations, Sec 47.16, pp 43-44, 45.

In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs, supra, the Supreme Court
of the United States speaking through Mr. Justice Field said:

“The general authority of courts of equity over the persons
and estates of infants, upon which counsel have so much dwelt,
is not questioned. It may be exerted, upon proper application,
for the protection of both. This jurisdiction in the English
courts of chancery is supposed to have originated in the preroga-
tive of the Crown, arising from its general duty as parens patriae
to protect persons who have no other rightful protector. But
partaking, says Story, as the prerogative does, more of the na-
ture of a judicial administration of rights and duties in foro
conscientiae than of a strict executive authority, it was very
naturally exercised by the court of chancery as a branch of its
original general jurisdiction. ‘Accordingly,’ he adds, ‘the doc-
trine row commonly maintained is, that the genera] superintend-
ence and protective jurisdiction of the court of chancery over
the persons and property of infants is a delegation of the rights
and duty of the Crown; that it belonged to that court and was
exercised by it from its first establishment; . . . . The
jurisdiction possessed by the English courts of chancery from
this supposed delegation of the authority of the. Crown as parens
patriae is more frequently exercised in this country by the courts
of the States than by the courts of the United States. It is the

706 es

state and not the Federal Government, except in the territories
aud the District of Columbia, which stands, with reference to
the persons and property of infants, in the situation of parens
patriae.”

“In this country the several states stand, with reference to the
persons and property of infants, in the situation of parens
patriae. No such jurisdiction is vested in the United States
except as to territories and the District of Columbia. The state,
as parens patriae, is authorized to legislate for the protection,
care, custody, and maintenance of children within its jurisdic-
tion.” 27 Am Jur, Infants, p 823.

In Corpus Juris Secundum it is said:

“A minor, deprived of parental care and control, is a ward of
the state, over whom the state may exercise its sovereign power
of guardianship; and to effect such power ‘the legislature may
make reasonable regulations for the minor’s protection and wel-
fare.” 43 CJS p 50.

“By whatever court the jurisdiction is exercised, it generally
is of the same character as that exercised by the court of chan-
cery over the persons of infants, and the power may be implied
from a general legislative or constitutional grant of chancery
powers.” 43 CJS p 52.

In construing and applying the juvenile court law of Wiscon-
sin the Supreme Court of that state speaking through Chief
Justice Winslow (State v. Scholl, 167 Wis 504, 167 NW 830)
said:

“The proceedings under this law are in no sense criminal pro-
ceedings, nor is the result in any case a conviction or punishment
for crime. They are simply statutory proceedings by which
the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power, or, in
other words, its right to preserve its own integrity and future
existence, reaches out its arm in a kindly way and provides for
the protection of its children from parental neglect or from
vicious influences and surroundings,-either by keeping watch
over the child while in its natural home, or, where that seems
impracticable, by placing it in an institution designed for the

| 707

purpose.” 167 Wis at p 509, 167 NW. at:p 831. See, also, In
Re Johnson, 173 Wis 571, 181. NW 741.

In a proceeding under the juvenile court law of Kansas the
Supreme Court of Kansas said:

“In a general way, it may be said that these statutes, instead
of attempting to punish juvenile offenders for misconduct, crim-
inal or otherwise, try to remove them from ‘the path of tempta-
tion, and by preventive and corrective means seek to direct them
in the paths of rectitude. It is an assertion upon the part of the
state of its right to exercise its power as parens patriae for the
welfare of such of its minor citizens as are deprived of proper
parental control and oversight, and are disposed to go wrong.
These words, meaning ‘Father of his country,’ were applied
originally to the king, and are used to designate the state, refer-
ring to its sovereign power of guardianship over persons under
disability. When this country achieved its independence, the
prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the states.
‘The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enact-
ment. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. . .
(Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 US 369, 384, 15 US (L ed) 80.)” In
Re Turner, 94 Kan 115, 145 Pac 871, Ann Cas 1916E 1022.

. In construing and applying the juvenile court act of Rhode
Island in Givardi v. Juvenile Court of Sixth Judicial Dist., 49 RI
336, 142 Atl 542, the Supreme Court of that state said:

“The general purpose of the act is plain. It was intended
to humanely deal with minors of the ages specified in the act,
who have violated some ordinance of a city or town, or who have
committed an offense against the laws of the state, or who from
various specified causes are tending towards an immoral, vicious,
or criminal life. The aim of the act is to treat such minors, not
as criminals, but as wards of the state.”

What was said by the Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Kansas
and Rhode Island is quite applicable with respect to the juvenile
court law of this state.

.As has been pointed out the juvenile court law was first en-
acted in 1911. It was reenacted with certain changes in 1943.
Laws 1943, Chapter 212. The law enacted in 1911 provided that
the act “shall be construed to repeal existing laws in conflict

708 [|

with this act under and by which dependent, neglected and de-
linquent children as defined by this act might be arrested, com-
plained against, committed, confined or taken into or placed in
custody, in justice courts or police courts, but as to all other laws
it shall be construed as cumulative and not as exclusive.” Laws
1911, Chapter 177, Sec 27. The law was construed by this Court
in State ex rel. Neville v. Overby, supra. This Court held that
all former statutes giving police magistrates and justice courts
jurisdiction over juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen
years were repealed and that police magistrates and justice
courts were divested of such jurisdiction, but that the district
court was not divested of criminal jurisdiction over such juvenile
offenders. The Court said:

“The legislative purpose is clearly evidenced by the repeal
clause. There the intent to divest justice courts and police
courts of all jurisdiction is made unmistakably clear; on the
other hand the purpose not to divest the district court of juris-
diction is equally manifest.” 54 ND at p 307.

And again:

“The legislative intent, with respect to the arrest of juvenile
offenders, is so clearly expressed in See. 11,416, Comp Laws 1913
(Laws 1911, Chapter 177, Sec 15), that no comment seems nec-
essary. To bring a juvenile, under the age of eighteen years,
before a justice of the peace or a police magistrate for the pur-
pose of a preliminary examination is in manifest defiance of the
statute.” 54 ND at p 306.

The original juvenile court law contained the provision that
the juvenile court “may in its discretion in any case of a delin-
quent child permit such child to be proceeded against in ac-
cordance with the laws that may be in force governing the
commission of crimes or violation of city, village or town ordi-
nances.” Laws 1911, Chapter 177, Sec 11. It will be noted, this
provision applied to children of all ages within the provisions
of the law. In Laws 1943, Chapter 212, this provision was
changed so as to provide that “when any child fourteen years of
age or older, is charged with commission of an offense, a judge
of the juvenile court may in his discretion, permit such child to
be proceeded against in accordance with the laws or ordinances

ee 709

that may be in force governing such offense.” Laws 1943, Ch
212, Sec 13.

Chapter 212, Laws 1943, was intended to embody and did
embody all the provisions of law relating to juvenile courts.
The title of the act stated that it is “An Act Relating to the
Juvenile Court and the Protection, Control, and Custody of
Children” and amending and reenacting certain statutory enact-
ments that are recited in the title and which constituted all the
then existing provisions of law relating to juvenile courts. In
main said Chapter 212 followed the plan of the original juvenile
court act of 1911. Many of the provisions were identical. Cer-
tain changes were made but the changes did not detract from the
purpose, the efficacy or scope of the law and in some particulars
vather strengthened and enlarged the scope. Said Chapter 212
expressly repealed all acts and parts of acts in conflict with
the provisions thereof. It was a complete measure. The juve-
nile court law as originally enacted in 1911 established a new
plan or system for dealing with infants falling within the provi-
sions of the act. Chapter 212, Laws 1943, adhered to such plan
or system. It provides that children who fall within the provi-
sions of the law shall be considered wards of the state for the
purposes of such act, invokes the equity jurisdiction vested by
the constitution in the district court to deal with such children
and provides that “their persons shall be subject to the care and
control of the (juvenile) court” as thereinafter provided. The
act created new rights and remedy and affords to children falling
within the provisions of the act immunity from prosecution for
erime or for violation of penal ordinances to which they had
formerly been subject. The law imposes upon the district court
certain specific duties. It provides what shall be done and what
shall not be done with respect to children within the provisions
of the law. The statute is clearly mandatory, Crawford Statu-
tory Construction, Sec 264, p 526; 3 Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction, 3rd ed, Sec 5812, p 95; 59 CJ Sec 582, p 984. The lan-
guage of the law indicates a clear intention that the provisions
thereof are to be applied in all cases of children falling within
its provisions. 59 CJ Sec 633, p 1076. As has been pointed out
the state may assume direction, control and custody of the per-

710 Dt

son of an infant (43 CJS Sec 7, p 55) where the infant seems
likely to go wrong as where he has been engaged in the commis-
sion of lawless acts or habitually associates with dissolute, vi-
cious or immoral persons. “It is not the province of the courts to
determine generally what conditions or exigencies will warrant
the state in assuming control of infants, as this is a legislative
function.” 43 CJS Sec 7, p 55. In considering the constitution-
ality of the juvenile court law of Illinois, which in a large meas-
ure formed the pattern and basis for the juvenile court act of
this state the Supreme Court of Illinois in Lindsay v. Lindsay,
257 Ill 328, 100 NE 892, 45 LRA NS 908, Ann Cas 1914A 1222,
said:

“The prerogative of the state, arising out of its power and”
duty, as parens patriae, to protect the interests of infants, has
always been exercised by courts of chancery.” 257 Ill at p 334,
100 NE at p 894, 45 LRA NS at p 915.

“Tt is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every
enlightened government, in its character of parens patriae, to
protect and provide for the comfort and well-being of such of
its citizens as, by reason of infancy, defective understanding, or
other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to take care of them-
selves. The performance of this duty is justly regarded as one
of the most important of governmental functions, and all con-
stitutional limitations must be so understood and construed as
not to interfere with its proper and legitimate exercise.’” 257
Ill at p 336, 100 NE at p 895, 45 LRA NS at p 916.

By the juvenile court law the legislature invoked the equity
jurisdiction of the district court, which court is vested by the
constitution with original jurisdiction of all causes in equity,
and is the only court vested with such jurisdiction by the consti-
tution. ND Const Sec 85, Sec 103; Mead v. First National Bank,
24 ND at p 14, 138 NW at p 366. See, also, Kronschnabel v.
Isenhuth, supra. The police magistrate was not vested with
equity powers and jurisdiction in equity matters could not be
conferred upon him. Mead v. First National Bank, supra.

In McDermont v. Dinnie et al, 6 ND 278, 69 NW 294, this
Court said:

“It will be observed that police magistrates and their courts

ee 71

are provided for and established by the constitution. This being
the case, the legislature is powerless to legislate the one or the
other out of existence. . . . The term ‘police magistrate’ or
‘police justice’ has a definite and well-understood meaning.
Allen, J., in Wenzler v. People, 58 NY 530, thus defines it: ‘A
police justice is a magistrate charged exclusively with the duties
incident to the common-law office of a conservator or justice of
the peace, and the prefix “police” serves merely to distinguish
them from justices having also civil jurisdiction.’ A police
magistrate is an inferior judicial magistrate, whose jurisdiction
in the absence of constitutional or statutory extensions, is con-
fined to criminal cases arising under the ordinances and regula-
tions of a municipality.” 6 ND at p 281.

As has been pointed out, the juvenile court law was enacted
under the police power. The police power “is an inherent attri-
bute of sovereignty, and exists without any reservation in the
constitution, being founded on the duty of the state to protect
its citizens and provide for the safety and good order of society.”
16 CJS pp 539-540. The juvenile court law is “an assertion
upon the part of the state of its right to exercise its power as
parens patriac,” for the welfare of such children as fall within
the provisions of the act and to treat such children “not as crim-
inals but as wards of the State.” In Re Turner, supra; Givardi
vy. Juvenile Court of Sixth Judicial District, supra. The police
power and the power as parens patriae and the right of the state
to exercise such powers for the welfare and protection of infants
who are in need of such protection are inherent in the state. In-
deed, it has been said that the “constitution supposes the pre-
existence of the police power and must be construed with refer-
ence to that fact.” 11 Am Jur 969; 16 CJS p 541. The
constitution of this state contains no provision purporting to
limit the right of the state to enact legislation under the police
power or to exercise its right and duty as parens patriae. It is
elementary that every reasonable presumption is in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute and that this presumption is con-
clusive unless it is clearly shown that the enactment is prohib-
ited by the constitution of the state or the constitution of the
United States. State v. First State Bank, 52 ND 231, 244, 202.

712 —

NW 391. As was said by the great chief justice: “Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited but consistent with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” M’Culloch v.
Maryland (US) 4 Wheat 316, 421, 4 L ed 579, 605. The attack
upon the constitutionality of the juvenile court act is predicated
solely upon the contention that the act violates Sec 113 of the
Constitution of North Dakota which section so far as material
here provides:

“The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the election
of police magistrates in cities, incorporated towns, and villages,
who in addition to their jurisdiction of all cases arisitig under
the ordinances of said cities, towns and villages, shall be ex
officio justices of the peace of the county in which said cities,
towns and villages may be located.”

In support of this contention petitioners cite the decision of
this Court in McDermont v. Dinnie et al, 6 ND 278, 69 NW 294.
The facts involved in the case cited are so wholly different from
those involved in this case tliat the decision there has no applica-
tion here. That case involved a statute establishing a municipal
court in each incorporated city of the state having a population
of 5000 inhabitants or over. Such statute expressly provided
that such municipal court shall have “exclusive jurisdiction over
all violations of ordinances of the city in which it is established
and from the time of its creation all the jurisdiction and the
powers heretofore exercised by police magistrates in such citics
shall cease.” 6 ND at p 279. It is obvious that the municipal
court established by the statute involved in that case was in-
tended to supersede the police magistrates in all cases arising
under the ordinances of a city in which such new court was
established and in effect abolish the police magistrates’ court.
As was said by this Court in its decision in that case “by the
language of the statute the magistrates of the constitution are
swept out of existence.” 6 ND at p 283. Obviously no such
situation is created or sought to be created by the juvenile court
act. The juvenile court act does not purport to confer upon the
juvenile court jurisdiction in any cases arising under the ordi-

— 713

nances of a city, town or village or authorize the juvenile court
to render judgment and pronounce sentence for the violation of
any of such ordinances. Proceedings under the juvenile court
law are in no sense a criminal action or an action arising under
an ordinance to punish one who has violated the ordinance. The
proceedings under the juvenile court act are simply proceedings
“by which the state in the legitimate exercise of its police power,
or, in other words, its right to preserve its own integrity and
future existence, reaches out its arm in a kindly way and pro-
vides for the protection of its children” who are in need of such
protection. State v. Scholl, supra.

It is well settled that all doubt as to the constitutionality of a
statute including doubts and uncertainties arising from the con-
stitution as well as the statute “should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the statute” and that the statute will be upheld
by the courts unless it clearly appears that it violates the con-
stitution. 16 CJS p 264 et seq; People v. McBride, 234 Ill 146,
84 NE 865, 123 Am St Rep 82, 14 Ann Cas 994; People v. Guagli-
ata, 362 Ill 427, 432, 200 NE 169, 171, 103 ALR 1035, 1039. In
ascertaining the intent “and general purpose, as well as meaning,
of a constitution or a part thereof, it should be construed as a
whole.” 16 CJS Sec 23, p 62; 11 Am Jur Constitutional Law,
See 53, p 661 et seq; State ex rel. Germain v. Ross, 39 ND 630,
637, 170 NW 121, 124; Goughnor v. Brandt, 47 ND: 368, 371, 182
NW 309, 310.

Considering the constitution as a whole, the scope of the law-
making power of the legislature and the relationship between.
the state and cities under the constitution there could have been
no intention on the part of the framers of the constitution that
the provision in See 113 of the Constitution that the police
magistrate shall have jurisdiction of all cases arising under the
ordinances of the city should in any manner restrict or impede
the general law-making power of the legislature. When the
framers of the constitution referred to “cases arising under the
ordinances of said cities” they knew that the cities would have
no inherent right to enact ordinances; that ordinances could be
enacted only pursuant to authority conferred upon cities by law.
That such ordinances naturally would relate to matters inci-

Oo

714 a

dental to municipal government and of local concern. 16 CJS
pp 839-340. That no question could arise under the ordinances
of any city except as the legislature had made that possible by
authorizing ordinances to be enacted. That no punishment could
be imposed for the violation of any ordinance except as the legis-
lature had prescribed by law, or as the legislature had authorized
the city to prescribe by ordinance. That the legislature, at any
time it saw fit to do so, might withdraw the authority to cities
to enact ordinances, and supersede and invalidate ordinances
that had been enacted under such authority. It seems clear that
the lawmaking power of the legislature was not affected or lim-
ited by any ordinances cities might have enacted. That the
legislature was not required to ascertain whether any city had
enacted any ordinance that would conflict with a statute which
the legislature was enacting. That the legislature at any time
might enact any law it saw fit to enact unless it contravened
some provision of the State or Federal Constitution. That in
event the statute was in conflict with an ordinance that had been
enacted by a city the statute would prevail and the ordinance or
parts of ordinances in conflict with the statute would be super-
seded and rendered invalid. The juvenile court law relates to
matters of statewide concern,—matters concerning which the
legislature had broad powers. Such powers were not: affected
or restricted by any authority the legislature might have granted
to cities to enact ordinances, or by any ordinances that a city
might have enacted pursuant to such authority.

When Chapter 212, Laws 1943, became effective it operated
to repeal the provisions of any former statute, and to supersede
and invalidate the provisions of any ordinance of any city which
conflicted with the provisions of said Chapter 212. Homer v.
Fall River, 326 Mass 673, 96 NH2d 152; Geneseo v. Illinois
Northern Utilities Co., 363 Ill 89, 1 NE2d 392, 394; Pipoly v.
Benson, 20 Cal2d 366, 125 P2d 482, 147 ALR 515; Richards v.
City of Pontiac, 305 Mich 666, 9 NW2d 885; Ex Parte Loving,
178 Mo 194, 77 SW 508; 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
8rd ed, Sec 4.05, pp 18-19. By said Chapter 212, the legislature
declared that when any child under cighteen years of age has
committed an act or is in any of the situations or conditions

ee 715

specified in Laws 1943, Chapter 212, See 8(1), (NDRC 1943, 27-
1608(1)), the child shall be considered a ward of the state and
his person shall be subject to the care, guardianship and control
of the juvenile court as provided in the juvenile court law. The
state thus asserted its right to guardianship and its power as
parens patriae over all children who fall within the provisions
of the juvenile court law, and delegated its authority of guard-
ianship over the person of such child to the juvenile court and
thus invoked the equity jurisdiction of such court and consti-
tuted the child-a ward of the court. 43 CJS See 7, p 55; 17 Me-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed, p 46; 4 Pomeroy’s
Equity Jurisdiction, 5th ed, Sections 1304, 1305.

Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith were 16 years‘of age. Un-
der the terms of the juvenile court law they must be considered
wards of the state and their persons were subject to the care,
guardianship and control of the juvenile court, and all proceed-
ings concerning them on account of the violation of a city ordi-
nance were required to be initiated in the juvenile court and
conducted as provided in the juvenile court law. The policeman
.who arrested them held them in custody for the purpose of
taking them, or having them taken, immediately to the juvenile
court. Ags Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith were only 16
years of age the juvenile court might have waived jurisdiction
and permitted them to be tried before the police magistrate but
no such permission was given. Whether the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court should be waived and said Arthur Helland and
Thomas Smith permitted to be proceeded against in accordance
with the ordinance it was charged that they had violated was a
preliminary question exclusively for the juvenile court. 43
CJS pp 234-235. The juvenile court had no opportunity to de-
termine such question. The juvenile: court did not waive its
jurisdiction and grant such permission. Hence, Arthur Helland
and Thomas Smith continued to be and were within and subject
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and the police magis-
trate was without authority to try the cases against them for
violating the ordinance and to render judgment of conviction and
pronounce sentence upon them for such violation.

Accordingly they were illegally restrained of their liberty by

716 es

the Chief of Police of the City of Minot and the district court
was correct in so holding and directing that they be discharged
from his custody. Entries made in the docket of the police
magistrate show that said Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith
were released to the district court pursuant to the writs of
habeas corpus on the day the application for the writs was
heard. It follows from what has been said that no cause has
been shown in this proceeding for disturbing the decision of the
district court in the issuance of such writs of habeas corpus and
in ordering that Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith be released
from the custody of the Chief of Police. The application of the
petitioners for a supervisory writ directing that such action of
the district court be set aside is denied.
:

Grimson and Sarure, JJ., concur.

Morris,'Ch. J. Dissenting. This is an original proceeding in
the supreme court wherein the Chief of Police of the City of
Minot and the Police Magistrate of the City of Minot seek a re-
view, by a supervisory writ of this court, of the action of Honor-
able A. J. Gronna, Judge of the District Court of Ward County,
in issuing writs of habeas corpus and upon hearings thereunder
discharging ‘from custody of the chief of police, Arthur Helland
and Thomas Smith. .

Arthur Helland and Thomas Smith are sixteen years of age.
They were arrested on the evening of August 11, 1952, by an
officer of the police department of the City of Minot and charged
_with disorderly conduct, an offense under the ordinances of the
City of Minot. They pled guilty to the offense charged before
the police magistrate of the city who sentenced each of them to
_be confined to the city jail for a period of ten days and to pay
a fine of $5.00 and the costs of the action, amounting to an addi-
tional $5.00, and in default of the payment of fine and costs, each
was sentenced to an additional ten days in jail. On the day of
sentence, upon application of the offenders, Honorable A. J.
Gronna, Judge of the District Court of Ward County, issued
writs of habeas corpus directing the chief of police to deliver
the offenders to the district court. At the hearings on these

| TT

writs, the district court determined that the offenders were
illegally imprisoned and issued orders commanding the chief
of police to discharge them from custody.

A petition was filed in this court by the officers of the City of
Minot invoking the power of general superintending control
over inferior courts, and we, deeming this a proper case for the
exercise of the jurisdiction vested in this court by the constitu-
tion, (See State ex rel. Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND 340, 27
NW2d 849) issued an order to the district court to show cause
why his orders, directing the discharge of the offenders should
not be reviewed and set aside. The district court accordingly
made his return, upon which a hearing was had and arguments
presented on behalf of the officers of the City of Minot and on
behalf of the offenders.

The facts with respect to the offense, arrest, and sentence of
the offenders are the same in each case and the problems of law
are identical. The boys in petitioning for writs of habeas corpus
and the district court in granting the writs took the position
that because of certain provisions of Chapter 27-16 NDRC
1943, commonly known as the juvenile court law, the police
magistrate of the City of Minot was wholly without jurisdiction
to sentence juvenile offenders for violations of ordinances of
the city. There is no question as to the ages of the offenders or
the commission of the offenses.

The juvenile court is in fact the district court functioning
under a special statute (Section 27-1601 NDRC 1943). Section
103 of the North Dakota Constitution provides: *

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, except as
otherwise provided in this constitution, of all causes both at
law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be con-
ferred by law. They and the judges thereof shall also have
jurisdiction and power to issue writs of habeas corpus, quo war-
ranto, certiorari, injunction and ‘other original and remedial
writs, with authority to hear and determine the same.”

Section 111 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:

“The county court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
in probate and testamentary matters, ne

718 —

The authorities of the City of Minot rely on Section 113 of the
North Dakota Constitution, which provides:

“The legislative assembly shall provide by law for the election
of police magistrates in cities, incorporated towns, and villages,
who in addition to their jurisdiction of all cases arising under
the ordinances of said cities, towns and villages, shall be ex
offidio justices of the peace of the county in which said cities,
towns and villages may be located. And the legislative assembly
may confer upon said police magistrates the jurisdiction to hear,
try and determine all cases of misdemeanors, and the prosecu-
tions therein shall be by information.”

It is contended that under this section the police magistrate
has jurisdiction of all cases involving offenses by juveniles, as
well as adults, arising under the city ordinances and that, inso-
far as-the juvenile court act may deprive a police magistrate
of the jurisdiction thus constitutionally vested in him, it is void.

In McDermont v. Dinnie, 6 ND 278, 69 NW 294, after quoting
Section 113 of the North Dakota Constitution, this court said:

“It will be observed that police magistrates and their courts
are provided for and established by the constitution. This being
the case, the legislature is powerless to legislate the one or the
other out of existence. This proposition is admitted in terms
by the counsel for respondents, and, being elementary, no au-
thorities need be cited. The term ‘police magistrate’ or ‘police
justice’ has a definite and well-understood meaning. Allen, J.,
in Wenzler v. People, 58 NY 5380, thus defines it: ‘A police jus-
tice is a magistrate charged exclusively with the duties incident
to the common-law office of a conservator or justice of the peace,
and the prefix “police” serves merely to distinguish them from
justices having also civil jurisdiction.’ A police magistrate is
an inferior judicial magistrate, whose jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of ‘constitutional or statutory extensions, is confined to
criminal cases arising under the ordinances and regulations of
amunicipality. Hence a court presided over by such magistrate
was never a court of record, never had a seal, or was entitled to
aclerk, It will be observed, also, that Section 113 of the con-
stitution confers absolutely upon police magistrates a certain
jurisdiction, to-wit: jurisdiction of all cases arising under the

Ee 79

ordinances of said cities, towns, and villages, and also the juris-
diction of county justices of the peace.”

Under Section 85 of the North Dakota Constitution “The ju-
dicial power of the state of North Dakota shall be vested in a
supreme court, district. courts, county courts, justices of the
peace, and in such other courts as may be created by law for
cities, incorporated towns and villages.” Concerning this sec-
tion, it is said in McDermont v. Dinnie, supra:

“Undoubtedly, the legislature, under Section 85 of the consti-
tution, might create additional courts for cities, incorporated
towns, and’ villages; but it cannot abolish those established by
the constitution.”

In Becker County Sand and Gravel Co. v. Wosick;:62 ND
740, 245 NW 454, in an opinion written by Judge Christianson,
after quoting Section 86, this court said:

“This constitutional provision inhibits the legislature from
abolishing any of the courts enumerated therein or from dimin-
ishing or increasing their jurisdiction . . . .” (Citing Me-
Dermont v. Dinnie, supra.)

In Espeland v. Police Magistrate’s Court of City of Grand
Forks, 78 ND 349, 49 NW2d 394, this court again spoke through
Judge Christianson and in the syllabus by the court, consisting
of all the present members, we said: ©

“A police magistrate is ex officio justice of the peace of the
county in which the city in which he holds office as police mag-
istrate is located. As police magistrate he has exclusive juris-
diction to hear, try and determine all cases arising under the
ordinances of the city; as ex officio justice of the peace he has
concurrent jurisdiction with, the justices of the peace of the
county in all civil actions and in all criminal actions for offenses
against the laws of the state committed within the county. ND
Const, Sec 113; NDRC 1948, 40-1801.”

In Section 40-1801 NDRC 1943 it is said:

“The police magistrate within a city and the village justice of
the peace within a village each shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of, and shall hear, try, and determine, all offenses against the
ordinances of the city or village, as the case may be.”

720 |

* Section 40-1110 NDRC 1948 provides: .

“Any action brought to recover any fine, to enforce any pen-
alty, or to punish any violation of an ordinance of any ‘munici-
pality shall be brought in the corporate name of the municipality
as plaintiff.” -

In Village of Litchville v. Hanson, 19 ND 672, 124 NW 1119,
we find that:

“City or village ordinances, though penal in character, are not
criminal laws. Prosecutions under city or village ordinances are
not covered by that section of the Constitution which reads: ‘All
prosecutions shall be in the name and by authority of the state
of North Dakota.’ Cases under city or village ordinances, while
resembling criminal cases in being penal proceedings, are not,
strictly speaking, criminal proceedings.”

These are the cases over whicli Section 113 vests jurisdiction
in police magistrate courts.

Under Section 103 of the constitution the district courts are
given general original jurisdiction, except as otherwise pro-
vided. It was otherwise provided by Section 111 in which the
county courts were given exclusive jurisdiction in probate mat-
ters. It was also otherwise provided in Section 113, which, as
we ‘have stated in the quotations above, confers wpon police
magistrates jurisdiction in all cases arising under the ordinances
of cities, towns, and villages. It may be noted that Section 113
uses the word “cases,” while Section 103 uses the word “causes.”
These words as used in these two sections of the constitution are
synonymous and import a state of ‘facts which furnishes oc-
casion in each instance for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
court. Buell v. Dodge, 68 Cal 553.

It is pointed out that cities are incorporated through general
law of the legislature and that they are creatures of statute
subject to the legislative will. See State ex rel. Shaw v. Frazier,
39 ND 430, 167 NW 510; North Fargo v. Fargo, 49 ND 597, 192
NW 977; Sitte v. Paulson, 56 ND 146, 216 NW 344; Fargo v.
Sathre, 76 ND 341, 36 NW2d 39. In none of these cases was a
municipal court or its jurisdiction involved. It is fallaciously
assumed that the legislative authority over the governmental
and proprietary powers of cities extends to the jurisdiction of

Ee 721

police magistrates. An examination of pertinent constitutional
provisions makes the error apparent.

Article VI deals with municipal corporations and consists
only of Section 130, which reads:

“The legislative assembly shall provide by general law for
the organization of municipal corporations restricting their pow-
ers as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money and
contracting debts, and money raised by taxation, loan or assess-
ment for any purpose shall not be diverted to any other purpose
except by authority of law.”

This article and section is wholly silent regarding the creation
or organization of courts within municipal corporations. This
silence is significant and in itself becomes cloquent when we turn
to Article IV dealing with the judicial department and consist-
ing of Sections ’85 to 120 inclusive. By this article the constitu-
tion itself sets up a complete judicial system from the supreme
court of the state down to and including the courts of police
magistrates. The creation of police magistrates courts was not
left to the discretion of the legislature. Neither could the legis-
lature determine their jurisdiction by general law, nor could the
jurisdiction thereof be increased or diminished by a legislative
enactment. See Becker County Sand and Gravel Co. v. Wosick,
supra. The question here is not one of the power of the legis-
lature over cities, but one of the power of the legislature over
the judicial system of the state. The prevailing decision views
the court of the police magistrate as a mere incident of municipal
government. "To me this court is an integral part of the coor-
dinate judicial branch of the state government created not by the
legislature but by the constitution and made a component part
of the judicial system,

It is of interest here to note that the legislature itself has
shown reluctance to assume responsibility for the creation of
courts and the determination of their jurisdiction beyond that
now prescribed by the constitution. At'the recent Thirty-third
Legislative Assembly. of North Dakota. the assembly itself re-
jected Senate Concurrent Resolution C which, if submitted to
and approved by the electorate, would have amended or repealed

722 ee

various sections of the constitution, including Section 113 pro-
viding for municipal courts, and would have provided that “The
judicial power of the State of North Dakota shall be vested in
a Supreme Court, District Courts, and such other courts as may
be created by law.” The rejection of this resolution indicated a
desire on the part of the legislature to permit the courts and
their jurisdiction to remain as presently provided for in the
constitution.

Section 113 is a plain and direct mandate to the legislature
to provide for the election of police magistrates in cities, incor-
porated towns, and villages “who in addition to their jurisdic-
tion of all cases arising under the ordinances of said cities,
towns and villages, shall be ex officio justices of the peace... .”
The conclusion is inescapable that the legislature cannot dimin-
ish the jurisdiction of police magistrates by transferring a part
of it to another court. The power here in question is primarily
judicial, not municipal and may not be curtailed or abolished
by general law.

The books contain many cases dealing with procedure in juve-
nile courts under myriad and divergent statutes. Diligent search
has revealed no constitutional’ provision such as our Section 113
and none has been cited to us. Neither search nor citation re-
veals a single case where the legislature has been permitted to
impinge upon constitutionally conferred jurisdiction. An anal-
ogous situation was presented in People v. Lattimore, 362 Il
206, 199 NE 275, wherein it is said:

“Article 6 of the Constitution of 1870 created our judicial
system. By section 26 of that article the criminal court of Cook
county was established and its jurisdiction defined. While the
cireuit court is a court'of general jurisdiction, yet the juris-
diction of the circuit court of Cook county is not necessarily
the same in all respects as the circuit courts.of other counties of
the state. It does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the
criminal court of Cook county: of criminal causes, but jurisdic-
tion of criminal cases is by section 26 of our Constitution placed
in the criminal court of Cook county. People v. Feinberg, 348
Ill 549, 181 NE 437; People v. Warren, 260 Ill 297, 103 NE 248.

|

| 723°

The juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The Legis-
lature is without authority to confer upon an inferior court the
power to stay a court created by the Constitution from proceed-
ing with the trial of a cause jurisdiction of which is expressly
granted to it by the Constitution. Nor, in our opinion, was it the
legislative intent to attempt to confer such power upon the
juvenile court.” See also People ex rel. Malec v. Lewis, 362 Tl
229, 199 NE 276.

In this state, while cities are creatures of statute created by
the legislature under authority of and within the limits pre-
seribed by the constitution, most of our courts, including those
of the police magistrates, are creations of the constitution itself
and, wherever the jurisdiction of these courts is provided by
the constitution, it may not be abrogated or altered by legisla-
tive action, and in this respect the same rule applies to the courts
of police magistrates that applies to the district court and the
supreme court.

“In the constitutional form of government the three depart-
ments—legislative, executive, and judicial—depend for their
powers on the organic law of the state. Hence, the Constitution
is the common source of the power and authority of every court,
and all questions concerning jurisdiction of a court must be
determined by that instrument, with the exception of certain in-
herent powers which of right belong to all courts: Therefore,
unless the power or authority of a court to perform a contem-
plated act can be found in the Constitution or the laws enacted
thereunder, it is without jurisdiction and its acts are invalid.
Thus, while the legislature may, within proper bounds, prescribe
rules of practice and procedure for the exercise of jurisdiction
by the courts, it cannot abridge or enlarge powers conferred on
them by the Constitution or take away jurisdiction thereby vest-
edin them.” 14 Am Jur, Courts, Section 163.

“xcept in so far as authorized by the constitution, the legis-
lature cannot. abolish, divide, reorganize, or consolidate consti-
tutional courts, nor alter or diminish the essentials of the juris-
diction, functions, or judicial powers conferred on such courts.”
21 CIS, Courts, Section 122.

I can reach no conclusion other than that the district court act-

24 Le

ing as a juvenile court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of
a police magistrate court which has obtained jurisdiction of a
person over fourteen years of age’ and under cightcen years of
age ina case arising under a city ordinance. This opinion would
end here but for the fact that much has been written and said
which tends to obscure rather than clarify the jural issues. The
history of the development of juvenile courts in America shows
a noble shift in the administration of justice with respect to
children from punishment to rehabilitation. This movement
sprang from the prerogative of the state as parens’ patriae to
protect the interests of children. But like all other powers of
the state, it must be exercised in accordance with the provisions
of the constitution. The question here is-not one of social policy
but of constitutional powers. The people first and finally speak
through their constitution which is the supreme law of the state
to which the doctrine of parens patriac must yield in event of
conflict. This is still “a government of laws and not of men.”

The proponents of the writs scek solace in obiter dicta to be
found in the case of State ex rel. Neville v. Overby, 54 ND 295,
209 NW 552, The opinion in that case must be read in-the light
of the issues then before the court which involved only the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the district court’ versus the jurisdiction of
the district court acting as a juvenile coutt. The case concerned
state criminal statutes and not city ordinances. There was no
question of constitutional law and no question of the jurisdiction
of police magistrates under Section 113 of the constitution. This
is thus clearly stated by the court in its opinion as follows:

“We are not concerned with -the question of the jurisdiction
of police magistrate and justices of the peace over juvenile of-
fenders against the law. The persons in whose behalf the writ
of habeas corpus is ‘prosecuted, are not lield by virtue of a com-
mitment issued by the police magistrate or justice of the peace;
they are held by virtue of a judgment of éonviction of a felony |
in the district court which has exclusive jurisdiction over such-
offenses.”

It is argued that the legislature has power to fix the age at
which children may be held to be criminally responsible and that
it follows that the age-may be fixed either-absolutely or condi-

ee 725

‘tionally. This may.be true in’ some respects, depending, how-
ever, upon the conditions. . The ‘legislature has. fixed the age of
criminal responsibility in this state by Section 12-0201 NDRC
1943 which provides that:

“All persons are capable of committing crime except those
belonging to the following classes: -

“4, Children under the age of seven years;

“2, Children over the age of seven years but under the age
of fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the time
of committing the act or neglect charged against them they knew
its wrongfulness; . . .

The rules thus stated are ve applicable to all courts. Our juvenile
law, Chapter 27-16 NDRC 1943, does not purport to change or
modify the rules of capacity to commit crime. But according
to the views of the proponents of the writs, it vests in the juve-
nile court jurisdiction superior to that of police magistrate
courts over child offenders against city ordinances. It does not
purport to make a child incapable of committing the offense. It
strongly infers just the opposite when it says:

“When any child, fourteen years of age or older, is charged
with commission of an offense, a judge of the juvenile court, in
his discretion, may permit such child to be proceeded against
in accordance with the laws or ordinances which may be in force
governing such offense.” Section 27-1613 NDRC 1943.

Thus the law recognizes that a child fourteen years of age or
older is capable of committing an offense. But it is claimed that
the judge of the juvenile court, not the statute, not the consti-
tution, deterniines whether the offender may be proceeded
‘against in accordance with a city ordinance governing the of-
fense. The power which the statute thus purports to vest in
the juvenile judge collides directely with the jurisdiction of the
police magistrate, under Section 113 of the constitution. The
constitution being supreme, the statute must yield. In this case
the judge of the.district court, relying upon the powers the
statute purports to give him as judge of the juvenile court,
erroneously reached the conclusion that he had the power to
divest the police magistrate court of the jurisdiction which it
had ‘acquired over the two offenders against the ordinances of

726 a

the City of Minot. Relying upon the statute, he improvidently
issued writs of habeas corpus freeing the proponents of the writs
from custody.

Burxz, J., concurs.
|

[File No. 7346]
ED KNELL, Respondent, v. SAMUEL CHRISTMAN, Defend-
ant and Appellant. .
(59 NW2d 293)

Opinion filed May 29, 1958, Rehearing denied July 7, 1953.

27

Floyd B. Sperry, for appellant.
Thorstein Hyland, for respondent.

Curistianson, J. Plaintiff brought this action against the de-
fendant to recover damages for assault and battery. He de-
manded $2000 for compensatory damages and $2000 for punitive
damages. The defendant interposed an answer and counter-
claim. He denied the allegations of the complaint except as ad-
mitted, qualified and explained. He alleged-that on or about
August 4, 1950, he took up certain horses owned by the plaintiff
and then in the defendant’s grain fields and causing damage
thereto, that defendant was holding said horses in a pasture
owned by him and that on August 5, 1950, the plaintiff wrong-
fully tore down defendant’s fences and removed said animals
from defendant’s possession and that while in the act thereof the
defendant approached the said plaintiff “whereupon the said
plaintiff undertook to take the defendant down on the ground for
the purpose of inflicting bodily injury upon him, the said plain-
tiff having rushed at the defendant, and having caused the latter
to fall to the ground, whereupon the plaintiff held the defendant
to the ground, in the course of which, and while the defendant
was attempting-to free himself, said parties engaged in a fight,
during the course of which the plaintiff scratched and bruised
the defendant, and that the said defendant only used sufficient
force to defend himself against said action of the plaintiff.”

The same facts are also alleged in the counterclaim. In such
counterclaim it is also alleged “that immediately after the said
plaintiff had destroyed said fences and removed said animals,
the defendant approached the scene where the plaintiff had
taken down the defendant’s fences, for said purpose, whereupon
the plaintiff attacked the defendant, by rushing upon him and
by taking the defendant down on the ground; that thereafter, the
plaintiff proceeded to scratch and bruise the defendant, said de-
fendant thereafter having fought back in his self defense, for
the purpose of freeing himself from the plaintiff’s hold upon
him, and that in the course of said affray, the said plaintiff
scratched the defendant upon the face, the plaintiff having also

728 a

struck and bruised the defendant upon his body, causing him
severe pain, and that after the defendant succeeded in getting
away from the plaintiff, the said plaintiff then wrongfully and
maliciously caused the defendant to be arrested in an assault and
battery proceeding, without any justification, and for the pur-
pose of further annoying, harassing and injuring the defend-
ant; that all of the acts described in this counterclaim arose out
of the same affray and took place at the same time, that is de-
scribed in the plaintiff’s complaint, and that as a result thereof,
the defendant was caused damages, by the plaintiff, in the sum of
$2,500.00.” The defendant prayed that plaintifi’s action be dis-
missed and that defendant have judgment against plaintiff for
$2500 for actual damages and for $2500 for punitive and ex-
emplary damages. The plaintiff interposed a reply denying
all the allegations of the counterclaim. When the case came on
for trial in the district court the parties agreed that a trial to a
jury be waived and that the case be tried to the court without
a jury. .

The case was so tried upon the issues framed by the pleadings.
The trial court made findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order for judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The court found
that “the defendant Samuel Christman did willfully and malici-
ously, beat and strike the plaintiff on the head and body and
thereby causing the plaintiff great injury and causing him great
pain and suffering and that it became necessary by reason there-
of for plaintiff to be treated by a physician and surgeon at a
hospital, all to plaintifi’s damage in the sum of Four Hundred
Highteen ($418.00) Dollars.” The court also found “that de-
fendant has failed to prove the material allegations in his coun-
terclaim.” From the facts found the court drew the conclusions
of law “that plaintiff is entitled to Four Hundred Highteen
($418.00) as actual damages and One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars
as exemplary damages, making a total judgment of Five Hun-
dred Highteen ($518.00) Dollars and for the-costs and disburse-
ments in the action; and that defendant’s counterclaim ‘be dis-
missed, with prejudice.” Judgment was entered accordingly
and the defendant has appealed to this court from the judgment
and demands a review and retrial of the entire case in this court.

729

The plaintiff and defendant are neighboring farmers in the
vicinity of Hazen in Mercer County. A railroad of the Northern
Pacific Railway Company running approximately east and west
separates their lands. There are fences along each side-of the
railroad right-of-way. The defendant Christman testified that
he lived on a farm about, but not quite, a mile from Hazen; that
the plaintiff lived about a quarter of a mile from him; that both
of them lived at such places in August, 1950; that about 1:30 in
the afternoon of August 4, 1950, he found two of plaintiff’s
horses in his (defendant’s) wheat field. When asked what he
did with the horses he said, “I drove them out and drove them
into my pasture” and turned them loose in my pasture. They
stayed in the pasture until the following morning and were taken
out about 4:30 that morning. That the plaintiff Ed Knell lived
“about, not quite, a quarter of a mile from my place.” He testi-_
fied:

“Q. And between the time that you took up the horses and the
time that they were taken out, you had no talk with Mr. Knell,
did you?

A. No. .

Q. And you didn’t send him any notice, did you?

A. No,

Q. So the first time when you saw Mr. Knell on the fifth was
in the morning, was it?

A. Yes.

Q. And then the horses were on the railroad tracks, weren’t
they? oO oO

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Knell was on the railroad «track?

A. He was down‘off the track. He wasn’t on the track.

Q. Well, the horses were on the track?

A. The horses was down, too.

Q. Well, it was on the railroad right-of-way?

A. Yes.”

He testified that at one time he had paid Knell for damages
caused by some of his (defendant’s) cattle “that got into his
(Knell’s) crop,” that he settled this by talking with Knell and

730 Le

there was no lawsuit or anything of that kind. It was settled
by talking. The testimony does not show at what time or what
year this former incident occurred. He testified that he dis-
covered that the horses were missing from the pasture “about a
quarter to five on the 5th of August.” That when he got up that
morning about 4:30 he could not see the horses but heard the
plaintiff calling them, that he walked over to the place where
Knell bad taken them out, that Mr. Knell was chasing them
home along the right-of-way. Defendant testified:

“Q. Did you speak to him first that morning or did he speak
to you first?

A. Ispoke to him first.

Q. What did you say to him and what did he say to you?

A. Just said, ‘Why are you stealing the horses out? Why
don’t you come arid ask for them?’ And he said ‘I am not steal-
ing them out, and he came towards me. He threw me on the
ground... ..

Q. Well, then, just how did he throw you on the ground; that
is, how did he grab you?

A. Well, when he came rushing toward me, (I) put my hand
up like that to protect my face and he grabbed me around the
waist and pushed me down across the track, across the rails.

Q. Then you were over the rails and your back was in between
the two rails, was that where it was?

A. Yes.

Q. And he was on top of you?

A. Yes. He come rushing up along the track from the south-
west. 2...

Q. And then you say that he rushed you and through the
force with which he struck you, you went down on your back on
the railroad track?

A. Yess...

Q. Where did he have both of his arms when you first went
down? As you were going down?

A. Around my waist... .

Q. And how did you get out from under him?

A. Well, we just scuffled around and I did have my right

— 731

hand free, which I poked him inthe ribs then and I managed to
“hold him off the side then.

Q. Then you rolled him over south of the south rail of the
track, is that the way it was?

A. That’s right, yes... .

Q. And was anything said by Mr. Knell to the boy about help-
ing?

A. Well, Mr. Knell never said anything, but Mrs.—

Q. What did she say?

A. She said to Ervin, ‘Go ahead. Go after him.’

Q. What did Ervin do then?

A. Well, he come right toward me then, too.

Q. And what did you do?

A. I just put my hand out and pushed him on the nose and
pushed him back, and then I walked through between them and
wenthome. ...

Q. Well, then after you rolled Mr. Knell over the rail and—

A, Well, he got up again and he hit at me.

Q. Did you try to hold him down after you got out from under
him and turned him?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. He got up then and tried to hit you?

A. Yes...

Q. Did you hit him then?

A. Idid, yes. . . . Well, he hit at me, that’s why I hit him
then; after he struck atme . . .

Q. How many times did you hit him?

A. Well, he come back twice. I hit him twice for sure.

Q. And the first time you struck him after you had gotten up
there, you say he went down?

A. Well, he just slipped down the track.”

The plaintiff Knell testified that about five o’clock in the
morning of August 5th he went to fix his mower and to, “set
up hay,” that he had the mower “over to the railroad tracks
right-of-way,” that he was over there fixing the mower, that he
saw his horses in the defendant’s pasture, that there was only

732 |

one wire, a telephone wire on the fence, that the barbed wires
were down on the ground, that he pulled out the staple on the
wire and let his horses out, that they came on the railroad track
and were there eating sweet clover when the defendant came
over, that when he (Christman) came his son and wife were about
100 feet away “something like that.” He said that after “he
(Christman) come around like a steamer around the wheat
field, they (the horses) beat it over the fence.” He testified that
when they met the defendant was running and the plaintiff
was walking. ‘He said “He (Christman) run up the track. I
walked up the track towards the home.” When asked what
the defendant said to him he answered, “he asked me I stole
those horses. Say, Did I? What about your calves? How
did they get out? And then he started hitting me.” He testified:

“Q. How many times did he hit you?

A. Gosh, I don’t know. I went down three times.

Q. Did you fall down? :

A. Fall down my knees.

Q. Did he ever notify you that he held your horses for dam-
ages?

A. No.

Q. When he hit you, what did you do? Did you fall down?

A. I fall down, yeah.

Q. How many times did he hit you? How many times did he
hit you? .

A. I really don’t know. I—three times sure, I know that
much... «

Q. And who struck first, you or him? - Did you hit first or
did he hit you?

A. He hit me.

Q. And when he hit you, did you fall down or what?

A. Yeah, I went kind of down.

Q. And while you were falling down, did you clinch with him
or did you both go down together? When.you fell down, did he
fall, too?

A. I think kind of. I must: have been ‘against him, dropped
against him whenIfall. .. .

ce "988

Q. You were walking north’ and’ he was walking south?
A. He was southwest there. fe os
_ Q. And when he hit you, you fell?
A. Yeah; one . :
Q. And when you fell you grabbed him around the feet?”
A. That might be; I don’t remember. Not on the waist, I

know that much.” , , ;
On cross examination he testified:
“Q. Well, you took the horses out of the fence, did you?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the fence there?
A. One-wire fence there. Some was laying there torn off.
Q. Was there telephone wire? ,
A. Yes, that was telephone wire. That fence was just about
down for two years already.”

(The defendant Christman and his wife testified that they
had a good three-wire fence; two barb wires and one smooth
wire at the place where the horses were taken out.)

Plaintiff testified that they (he and defendant) were not on
the railroad track and that the defendant could not have been
down on his back between the rails because they “were not
up on the track yet.” He also’ testified he was not on top of
him “but maybe on the side.” He testified that when he got-up
the first time the defendant came from the back and hit him
on the top of the head, that when he was knocked down the
last time they (his wife and son) helped him up, that after
defendant hit him he ran after his son.

«Q. And where did you go from the railroad track?
Home.

Went home.’ And was your wife home then?

. She went along withme. °:

And what did you do when you got home?
Washed up and patched up alittle. . 2°.

. And then what did you do after that?

I went down to the doctor in the hospital there.
. Doctor Anders? vt

Yeah.” . the

rererererd

734 es

Dr. Anders testified that he examined the plaintiff Knell and
treated him fora scalp laceration. He testified:

“Q. And what kind of treatment did you administer to him?

A. The man was treated by cleansing the scalp, examination
to satisfy myself that there was no skull fracture, suturing the
laceration and the man was discharged for dressing.”

Dr. Anders said he took four stitches in the laceration and
that he removed the stitches approximately a week later. He
testified further:

“Q. In your examination of the wound on his head there,
would you say that it was caused by a hard object?

A.Iwould....

Q. How many of these lacerations did he have?

A. He had one major laceration, which I repaired, and along
the edge of it were minor lacerations which did not require
suturing. More abrasions than true lacerations.

Q. And by abrasions you mean minor breaks in the skin at
some point, do you not?

A. Breaks in the skin approximately less than inch deep.

Q. Where was the major laceration?

A. Across the area of the skull, approximately centered. . . .

Q. Did you determine through those means whether or not
this man was in pain at the time? ;

A. He did, at the time, appear to be in sufficient pain to
require checking of those factors.

Q. Then you would say that he wasn’t suffering a great deal
of pain at the time?

A. The pain-associated with laceration would be the extent
of the pain that I was able to judge.”

Mrs. Knell testified that her husband left home about 5
o’clock in the morning on August, 5th, that she and their son
Ervin followed a short time after, that they went down to the
railroad track, that she saw the defendant Christman there, that
she saw the fight there between Sam Christman and her husband,
that Christman started it by striking and knocking her husband
down, that he hit him about three times, that her husband went
down the first time “right away he (Christman) knocked him

Le 735

down,” that the horses went home and into their pasture. That
when her husband got up “he'(Christman) knocked him down
again; hardly can get up,” that he was down three times, ‘that.
when the fight ended he could hardly see, “his face was all full
of blood.” She testified that the defendant ran after her son
“who was fifteen years old and hit him pretty hard.” That after
the fight she took the plaintiff to their house and washed his
sores, that after he had been cleaned up plaintiff went to see
Dr. Anders at Hazen. She testified:

“Q. Did you tell your son to get into this fight and help his
father? . .

A. Yes. I says, ‘Ervin, go and help daddy. He going ‘to kill
him,’ I said.

Q. Your husband had Sammy down on \ the railroad track
there at one time, didn’t he?

A. No, he hasn’t. He got no chance to.

Q. Your husband was on topof Sammy, wasn’t he?

A. No, he wasn’t. He got no chance.

Q. You claim that he wasn’t on top of Sammy when they were
fighting on the railroad track?

A. No, he wasn’t. How can he? He was knocked down. He
was knocked down right away.

Q. Were you there when the fight started then?

A. Yes.” .

She testified that the defendant had.a hammer in his hand.
(The defendant denied that he had a hammer.)

“Q. Now, as I understand.it, you claim that’ Sammy struck
your husband and knocked him down and your husband got
up and then Sammy hit him again, is that right?

A. That’s right.

Q. And you claim that they weren’t fighting on the ground
at allat any time?

A. Well, he try to get up, you know, but he can’t. He
knocked him down. The face was all full of blood. He can’t
see out of his eyes.”

Ervin Knell testified that he is the son of the plaintiff and
that in August, 1950, he was fifteen years of age; that on the

736 De

morning of August 5th about 5 o’clock his mother told him that
his father was chasing the horses and that he and’ she went
over there; that when he got near the place he noticed the de-
fendant Christman. coming. When he first saw him he was
walking across the corner of the plaintiff’s wheat field and then
cut across the pasture and went in the direction of his father,
that he (defendant) was approximately seyenty-five feet from
his father and that Christman was approximately 150 feet away
from Ervin Knell; that he saw the plaintiff and defendant when
they met and was only a short distance away from them. He
“testified: :

- “Q. Would you tell us what happened when they met?

A. Well, they just—I mean, they come close together, about
four feet apart, and then Sam told my dad, he says, ‘Why did you
steal the horses out?”

And then dad says, ‘Did I? And then he says, my dad
says, ‘Well, how about those calves?

And then Sam hit him:

. Q. What did your father do, if anything, that you could see
at the time? 7

A. He went down. I—as soon as he hit him, then he went

down, ...
. And when he got up, what happened?
. Then he hit him again.
Who hit him?
. Sam Christman.

‘Sam Christman here? 1

Yeah.

What happened to your dad? Dia he go down again?
. Well, he went down again, yes.
How many times did you see him hit him?

. Icouldn’t say for sure. . . :
Did you hear Sam Christman say anything at that time?
Yes. .

What, if anything, did he say?
. Before or after the fight?. .
. Before or after. .

ererere peperere

es 187

A. Which one?

Q. Both.

A. Before. He said, well, he says, ‘How come you stole the
horses? And then after the fight he told him, he said, ‘Well,
next time it’s going to be worse.’

Q. Sam Christman said that to your dad?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear that, did you?

A. Yes.”

(The defendant Christman denied that he made the statement,
“Well, next time it’s going to be worse.”)

He testified that after the fight he went over and “helped his
father up” and that he and his mother helped him to go home;
that he was bleeding and after his sores had been washed he
went to see a doctor. He testified that when he first saw the
defendant Christman he was about 150 feet away and that “then
he (Christman) started running and I just kept on walking slow,
and I was about twenty-five feet away from both and they was
close together, . . . Q. And how far were you away from
the place where they were talking at that time? A. About
twenty-five feet.” He testified that they were not scuffling at
the time the first blow was struck, that Christman was still
standing, that they were out on the south side of the railroad
track but that after the second blow they were both on their
sides and that nobody was on top, that when they did get
up Christman again hit his father, that his father did not even
get all the way up, “he wasn’t even standing” when Christman
struck him again, that his father did not get all the way up
when he was struck and knocked down again. He said that the
defendant then “went after me and hit me.” He testified:

“Q. How did he strike you?
A. With his fist.

Q. Where did he hit you?

A. My arm.

Q. Well, isn’t it a fact that he just pushed you away?
A. Ican’t get no black and blue arm from a pushing.

738 De

Q. And it’s because you got a black and blue arm that you
say he struck you with his fist, is that right?
- A. Yes. Well, then I felt it, too.”

There is no evidence to show that the defendant used any
instrument in striking the plaintiff, although the doctor testified
that he would say that the wound was caused by a hard object.
The fact remains that the plaintiff did sustain severe lacera-
tions. In the counterclaim it was alleged that the plaintiff after
“taking the defendant down on the ground proceeded to scratch
and bruise the defendant” and “that in the course of said affray
the plaintiff scratched the defendant upon the face, the plain-
tiff having also struck and bruised the defendant upon his
body.” Defendant’s wife and father testified as witnesses upon
the trial. The-wife testified her husband complained about his
neck, backache and wrist. She did not testify that she saw
any scratches or bruises on his face or on his arms or back or at
all. The defendant’s father testified that on the morning of
August 5th his son (the defendant) called him on the telephone
and told him about the trouble between him and the plaintiff
Knell and asked him to come to defendant’s home and that in
response to this telephone call he went there, that ‘when he
arrived it was between 7 or 8 o’clock in the morning, and the
defendant and his wife were sitting at the table eating break-
fast, that the defendant did not seem to eat.and that tears were
running down his face, that he looked “shook up” and had his
hand down, that he thought it was his right hand that was down
and that he asked the defendant what was the matter and that
the defendant showed him his hand and told him what was
the matter. (The defendant elsewhere testified that he struck
the plaintiff with his right hand.) There is no further descrip-
tion of the appearance of the hand and there was no claim or
testimony that he observed any scratches’ or lacerations on his
face or on his wrist or arm or any other part of his body.

On this appeal the defendant demanded a trial anew of the
entire case in this Court. The rule is well established that on
such appeal the judgment of the trial court upon’ the facts
must “have weight and influence with this Court, especially

i

739

when based upon the testimony of witnesses who appeared in
person before that court.” Christianson et al. v. Warehouse
Association, 5 ND 438, 67 NW 300; Bingenheimer Mercantile Co.
v. Sack, 50 ND 381, 385, 195 NW 969, 970; Doyle v. Doyle, 52 ND
380, 389, 202 NW 860, 863; Coykendall v. Briges et al, 60 ND
267, 270, 284 NW 74, 75; Horner v. Horner, 66 ND 619, 620, 268
NW 428; Donovan v. Johnson, 67 ND 450, 455, 274 NW 124, 125;
Buchanan v. Buchanan, 69 ND 208, 285 NW 75; Funk v. Baird,
72 ND 298, 309, 6 NW2d 569, 575; Klundt v. Pfeifle, 77 ND 132,
41 NW2d 416.

In this case the parties and their witnesses appeared in person
and testified. The trial court had an opportunity to hear the
testimony as it fell from their lips and to observe their denieanor
and: the various incidents of the trial which are not shown by
the cold and lifeless record. “The trial court had the advantage
of all of these things and, breathing the air of the trial, he was
in an immeasureably better position to find the real facts in the
case. Therefore, notwithstanding that the case is here for trial
de novo, we must give some appreciable weight to the determina-
tion of the trial court.” Doyle v. Doyle, 52 ND 380, 389, 202
NW 860, 863.

In Buchanan v. Buchanan, supra, this Court said:

“The testimony of the parties is in direct conflict. , . . The
means by which an appellate court may measure the credibility
of witnesses are exceedingly limited. There are, however, many
indicia of truth and falsity, of exaggeration and of recklessness
in testimony, which enter into the atmosphere of a trial of this
character and which can not be preserved for the benefit of a
reviewing court. Of these, the trial judge had the benefit. His
decision is entitled to appreciable weight.” 69 ND at pp 209-2110.

After due consideration the trial judge announced his decision
in a-memorandum opinion. In such opinion he referred to and
briefly summarized the evidence. Thereafter he said:

“While the testimony of the’ respective parties is in direct
conflict, that of the plaintiff is corroborated by his wife and
son. Then, too, there is the fact that ill feeling had -existed
between the parties for some time; that: the defendant went to
the plaintiff while upon his own premises immediately after the

740 —

horses were released but while in plaintiffs possession. De-
fendant said that he wasn’t mad, but his opening remark, charg-
ing plaintiff with theft of the horses, would indicate otherwise.
He is a young man, twenty-four, weighs 162 pounds and-agile.
The plaintiff is fifty-two, weighs 200. and slow in action.

“When defendant went to plaintiff he did not demand a return
of the horses, but went for the evident purpose of picking a
fight. Their relations in the past had been-unfriendly and the
alleged wrongful act of plaintiff in releasing the horses did not
improve his feelings. He had no olive branch to present. De-
fendant had no right to take ‘the law into his own hands and
mete out punishment, notwithstanding the. plaintiff may not
have been within his legal rights in releasing his horses.”

He concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $400
for personal injuries, $18 for hospital and doctor bills, and
$100 for punitive damages and a dismissal. of plaintiff’s counter-
claim with, prejudice. Thereafter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in conformity with the views expressed in the
memorandum opinion were duly signed by the judge and filed
with the clerk of the distridt court and judgment entered ac-
cordingly.

The findings of fact of the trial court and the views expressed
in his-‘memorandum opinion are well sustained by the evidence.
A majority of the Court, however, are of the view that the con-
clusions of law should be modified so that punitive damages are
not allowed. Accordingly the judgment appealed from will be
modified by eliminating the award of $100 for punitive damages
and as so modified the judgment is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Sarurs, J., concur.

Burxs, J. (dissenting). Plaintiff and defendant are neigh-
boring farmers. Defendant’s farm buildings are about one-half
mile southeast of plaintiff’s buildings. A-railroad right of way
‘which runs approximately east and west separates their lands.
The undisputed testimony discloses that plaintiff went to de-
fendant’s premises, at approximately five o’clock on an August
morning for the purpose of releasing some of his horses which

| 741

defendant had impounded because of damage the horses had
done to his wheat crop. To accomplish the release plaintiff
proceeded along the railroad right of way to the pasture in
which the horses had been placed. According to his own testi-
mony, he extracted a staple by which the top wire of the fence,
énclosing the pasture, was affixed to a fence post, let the wire
down and called his horses out through the gap he had thus made
in the fence. He had already started to drive his horses home
along the railroad right of way, when defendant came through
the gap in the fence. Plaintiff testified, “He (defendant) said
I stole that‘horses. And I told him, ‘Did I? I say, ‘What about
your calves? How did they get in and out of my fence?” And
he started coming after me.” Plaintiff also testified that as
defendant came toward him-he went. toward the defendant.
There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to what happened
when the two met. Plaintiff said that defendant hit him and
as he fell forward he grabbed the defendant around the legs and
they both fell to the ground. Defendant says that plaintiff
grabbed him around the waist, threw him to the ground and
fell on top of him and that no blows were struck until they were
both.on their feet again. In my opinion it is immaterial which
version of the beginning of the fight is aecepted as true. It is
evident from the.xecord that bad blood had existed between the
parties for some time. On two occasions plaintiff had impounded
livestock of the defendant. On one of these, defendant had paid
fifty dollars damages to secure their release. On the other, they
either escaped or were released without the knowledge of plain-
tiff. On this occasion when defendant appeared and charged
plaintiff with stealing the horses, plaintiff countered by charg-
ing the defendant with stealing the calves. At that time the
plaintiff was between the defendant and plaintiff's home. For
him to go towards the defendant, as he stated he did, it was
necessary for him to turn around and move in a direction away
from his home. No conclusion other than that the gauntlet was
thrown and readily accepted seems reasonable to me in the cir-
cumstances. It was a mutual combat.

Each person injured in a mutual combat may recover from the
other all damages for injuries received. McCulloch v. Goodrich,

742 ee

105 Kan 1, 181 P 556, 6 ALB 386; Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okl 278,
292 P 356, 71 ALR 179; Colby vy. McClendon, 85 Okl 293, 206 P
207, 30 ALR 196.

In this: case, the defendant counterclaimed for damages for
injuries received by him in the fight. In his memorandum opin-
ion the trial judge stated his conclusion that defendant had re-
eeived injuries but dismissed ‘the counterclaim on the ground
that the responsibility for the fight rested upon the defendant
alone.. In this I believe the trial court was in error. If the de-
fendant was injured, as the trial court found, he was entitled to
have his damages assessed and allowed. For this reason I
believe a new trial should be granted.

Garmson, J., concurs. .
|
[File No. 7330]

KENNETH SODERFELT, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF
DRAYTON, a Municipal Corporation, Arthur N. Fleckten,
as Mayor of said City, and Donald T. Dryden, Edwin Raney,
Donald Halerow and Dean Brousseau, as Members with said

Mayor of the City Council of said City of Drayton, Re-
spondents.

(69 NW2d 502)

‘ing denied July 22 3

- Day, Stokes, Vaaler & Gillig, for appellant.

744 Ee

Harold D, Shaft and R. H. McEnroe, for respondents.

Sarure, J. The plaintiff in this action, Kenneth Soderfelt, is a
resident of the City of Drayton, North Dakota and is the owner
of the north 25 feet of Lot 24 on the west side of Main street
original townsite of Drayton, North Dakota upon which is
located a certain frame building erected some time prior to 1903.

The defendants are the city of Drayton, a municipal corpora-
tion, Arthur N. Fleckten, as mayor of said city and Donald T.
Dryden, Edwin Raney, D.: M. Halerow and Dean Brousseau, as
members with said mayor of the city council of said city of
Drayton. In 1946 the city council of the city of Drayton, enacted
ordinance 114 providing for the demolition, repair or removal
of any building or structure which is or threatens to be, a fire
hazard or which is or threatens to be dangerous to the safety
of the occupants or persons frequenting such premises, or which
is in a dilapidated condition, and providing for written notice
of hearing to the owner and for appeal from any final order of
the city council and providing a penalty for violation thereof.

The ordinance defines as substandard buildings or structures,
buildings that are in such state of disrepair as to be a menace’
to the health, morals and safety and general welfare of those
living within the city. Under the powers granted by the ordi-

746 es

nance to the city council it may require the owners and others
interested in the property which is found to be substandard to
repair such property if the same is reparable, and if not, to
destroy the same after due notice given and hearing had before
the city council. If after such notice and hearing the owner is
dissatisfied with the findings and order of the city. council he
may appeal to the district court within forty days after such
findings and decision.

The provisions of the ordinance pertinent to the issues in the
case at bar are as follows:

“Section 1. All buildings or structures which have any or all
of the following defects shall be deemed sub-standard buildings
or structures:

(a) those whose interior walls or other vertical structural
members list, lean or buckle to such an extent that a plumb line
passing through the center of gravity falls outside of the middle
third of its base.

(b) those buildings which, exclusive of the foundation, show
33% or more of damage or deterioration of the supporting mem-
bers or member, or 50% of damage or deterioration of the non-
supporting enclosing or outside walls or covering.

(d) those which have been damaged by fite, wind or other
causes so as to have become dangerous to life, safety, morals, or
the general health and welfare of the occupants or the: “people ‘of
this city.

(e) those which have become or are so dilapidated, decayed,
unsafe, insanitary or which so utterly fail to provide the ameni-
ties essential to decent living that they are unfit for human
habitation, or are likely to cause sickness or disease, so as’ to
work injury to the health, morals, safety, or general welfare of
those living therein.

(h) those that have parts thereof which are so attached that
they may fail and injure members of the public or property.

(i) those which because of their condition are unsafe, unsani--
tary, or dangerous to the health, morals,: safety or general wel-
fare of the people of this city. ww

Section 2. All sub-standard buildings or structures within the
terms of Section 1 of this-ordinance are hereby declared to be

ee TAT

public nuisances, and shall be repaired, removed, or demolished
as hereinbefore-and hereinafter provided.

The ordinance provides for election bythe city council of one
of its members as building commissioner and provides also for
the appointment of a building inspector. It is-the duty of the
building inspector among other things to inspect any public
building, wall or structure about which complaints are filed by
any person that a building, wall or structure is or may be exist-
ing in violation of the ordinance; to notify in writing the owner,
oecupant, lessee, mortgagee or agent, and all other persons hav-
‘ing an interest in said building as shown by the records in the
office of the Register of Deeds of Pembina county. The notice
must require the owner to remove, repair or demolish said build-
ing or structure in accordance with the terms of the notice and
the ordinance. He must further report to the building commis-
sioner any non-compliance with such notice and appear at all
hearings conducted by the building commissioner of the city
council and report the condition of sub-standard buildings or
structures which he has inspected or examined.

In March 1903 the city commission of Drayton enacted what
is known, as fire’ ordinance No. 39. This ordinance specifies the
class of buildings which may be erected within the fire limits,
the material for such buildings, and other requirements.

On June 11th, 1949, the building inspector of the city of Dray-
ton served upon the plaintiff, Kenneth Soderfelt the following
notice:

“You are hereby notified that the undersigned building in-
spector of the City of Drayton, North Dakota acting: pursuant
to Ordinance 114 and upon the direction of the City Council of
said city has made an inspection of the following described build-
-ing in which you are, or appear to be, interested in, to-wit:

A frame store building situated upon the South 22 feet of the

Northerly 25 feet of Lot 34, on the West side of Main Street in
the original Townsite of the City of Drayton.
- “You are further notified thatthe undersigned building in-
spector deems the foregoing described building to be sub-
standard within the meaning of Section 1 of Ordinance 114 in
the following particulars:

748 Le

1. Interior walls and vertical structural members list, lean or
buckle to such an extent that a plumb line passing through the
center of gravity falls outside of the middle third of its base.

2. Supporting. members show more than 33% deterioration
and enclosing walls show in. excess of 50% deterioration.

8. Building in such a dilapidated, decayed, unsafe, insanitary
condition that it is unfit for human habitation.

4, That parts of said building are so attached that they may
fall and injure members of the public or property.

5. That said building, because of its condition is unsafe, in-

-sanitary and dangerous to the health, morals, safety and general

welfare of the people of the City of Drayton.

6. That said building is more than 50% damaged, decayed
and deteriorated from its original value and structure.

You are therefore ordered to move or- demolish the said build-
ing before July 20, 1949.

Dated June 11, 1949.”

This notice was served.upon the plaintiff in the manner and
form provided by the ordinance. On July 25, 1949 the building
inspector wrote to D. M. Halerow the city building commissionér
that the plaintiff Kenneth Soderfelt had failed to comply with
the notice of June 11, 1949, and on September 7, 1949, D. M.
Halcrow the building commissioner of the city of Drayton served
the following notice upon the plaintiff Kenneth Soderfelt:

“To: Kenneth Soderfelt, Drayton, N. D.
and Alvin Thompson, Argyle, Minn.

The undersigned Building Commissioner of the City of Dray-

.ton, North Dakota is in receipt of a report from John P. R.

Holler, Building Inspector of said city stating that there has
been no compliance with the Notice and Order of said Building
Inspector of date June 11, 1949.

You are therefore ordered to show cause, if any you have, be-
fore the Building.Commissioner of the City of Drayton, at the
City Hall of said City of Drayton, on Thursday, September 15,
1949, at 10:00 o’clock A.M. why the frame store building situated
upon the South 22 feet of the Northerly 25 feet of Lot'34, on the
West Side of Main Street, in the Original Townsite of the City

| 749
of Drayton should not be removed or demolished in accordance
with the statement of particulars set forth in the aforementioned

Building Inspector’s notice dated June 11, 1949.
Dated September 7, 1949.”

Said notice was served and posted in the manner and form
provided by the ordinance. At the hearing on September 15,
1949, the plaintiff Kenneth Soderfelt filed a written “showing of
cause” in which he set forth his reasons why the building should
not be demolished and that it was in such condition that it could
be repaired and placed in a safe condition. In substance he pro-~
posed to do the following:

Put in complete concrete foundation along: the south side.
rear and front with suitable concrete base to join sidewalk.
Complete conerete floor after filling in old basemént remains
and providing gravel mat according to standard construction.
Repair and rebuilt front as already indicated to city council,
with concrete cement blocks and glass-brick according to basis
of drawing already submitted with stucco or other covering
of front above first story. A general overhauling of the exterior
of the building to a neat and well kept appearance and a cover-
ing of the same with fire resistant or firé proof material; that
the cost of the materials necessary for such repairs would be
from $500.00 to $700.00 or not to exceed $1000.00, and that he
had experience in carpenter work and would do the work himself.

The plaintiff also submitted a statement in the form of an
affidavit by Charles E, Adamson a contractor. of Grafton, N. D.
who claimed to have more than 20 years experience as a con-
tractor and builder. He stated that the building under consid-
eration was reparable and that its condition was such that from
a practical and business point of view it was feasible to repair
and reconstruct it. He went somewhat into detail as to what
was required to be done to put the building in standard: condi-
tion and stated that the value of the material in the building in
its present condition would be from $2000.00 to $2500.00, and
that such building was of a class that would normally be re-
paired by owners rather than dismantled.

Two contractors and builders Stanley Ramon and Thomas

750" ee

Jordan presented sworn statements in behalf of the city of
Drayton. Stanley Ramon stated that he had made an inspec-
tion of the building in question and he found that in his estima-
tion it had deteriorated more than 75%. He further made.a
detailed statement of the material necessary to repair the build-
ing or place it in good repair and that the cost of material for
same would be $6760.95. Thomas Jordan the other contractor
went into detail and stated that the floor joists had deteriorated,
50%, foundation and sills had deteriorated 100%, walls had de-
teriorated 75%, interior studdings 35%, window deterioration
100%, roof 25%, exterior sheeting 100% and electric wiring
100%, chimney 100% and that the north wall was impossible of
proper repair because of the proximity to an adjoining building
and would have to be completely replaced. His conclusion was
that the building considered in its entirety had depreciated
70%. That the cost of fully repairing the building would almost
reach the cost of building a similar structure new. The build-
ing commissioner, after reviewing the testimony given at the
hearing, made his findings of fact to the effect that the building
was more than 50% damaged, decayed and deteriorated from
its original value and structure and was beyond repair.

Thereafter and on October 3, 1949, the building commissioner
D. M. Halerow issued an order directed to the plaintiff Kenneth
Soderfelt reciting that same was based upon all of the testi-
mony and evidence heard before the commissioner and that the
same was issued with the approval of and pursuant to the diree-
tion of the city council upon all of the files and proceedings in
said matter and it provided as follows: .

“It is ordered that that certain frame building situated upon
the south 22 feet of the north-25 feet of lot 34 on the west side.
of Main street in the original townsite of the city of Drayton,
North Dakota, be removed or demolished within 30 days of the
date of the service of this order upon you exclusive of the day
of service.”

This order was served upon the plaintiff Kenneth Soderfelt
and posted in the manner and form as provided for in Or dinance
114.

| "751

The issuance of the foregoing order and service thereof upon
the plaintiff Kenneth Soderfelt was approved by the city council
of the city of Drayton on the 3rd day of October, 1949 at a regu-
lar meeting of said council.

The plaintiff brought an action for an injunction to restrain
and enjoin the defendants, their servants and agents forever
from in any way entering or interfering with his freedom to re-
pair the property involved, and that the proceedings had by the
defendants under said ordinance be declared void and of no
effect and further declaring the purported ordinance or portions
thereof under and by means of which the defendants claimed to
have authority be declared void and of no effect.

The defendants answered admitting that the plaintiff was the
owner of the property involved and that action had been taken
ordering the demolition of the building, but denied every other
allegation and by way of cross complaint demanded that plain-
tiff’s action be in all things dismissed and that he be restrained
and forever enjoined from repairing or rebuilding or attempt-
ing to repair or rebuild the building described in the complaint
and demanding-a mandatory injunction requiring the plaintiff
to remove or demolish said building within a time to be fixed
by the court and providing that if the plaintiff failed to comply
with such order within said time that the sheriff of Pembina
county be directed to do so.

The case was tried before the Honorable Harold P. Thomson,
Judge of the District Court of Pembina County, at Grafton,
North Dakota on the 27th day of October 1949, and judgment
was rendered in favor of the defendants for a dismissal of plain-
tiff’s cause of action and that he be restrained and enjoined
from repairing or rebuilding or attempting to repair or rebuild
the building described in the complaint, and requiring the plain-
tiff on or before September 15th, 1950 to remove or demolish
the building described in the complaint.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment and demanded a
trial de novo.

Numerous specifications of error are assigned but they may
be considered under two heads namely: First, that the ordi-
nance under which the defendants were acting in the proceed-

752 —

ings taken is unreasonable, unconstitutional and void in so far
as the same permits or authorizes defendants to interfere with
plaintiffs repair of his property. Second, even if the ordinance
is valid, the action of the city council thereunder was arbitrary,
unfair, unreasonable and so discriminatory as to be in excess of
the authority granted by such ordinance.

We shall discuss these propositions in the order stated. Chap-
ter 252, Session Laws of 1945 being Sec. 40-0502, 1949 Supp.
NDRC 1943, grants to cities definite powers to provide by ordi-
nance regulations relative to the construction, maintenance, re-
pair and demolition of buildings within their limits for the pur-
pose of protecting the safety, health, morals and general welfare
of the public, and reads as follows:

“The governing body of any city shall have the authority to
provide by ordinance for the demolition, repair or removal of
any building or structure located within the limits of such city
or other territory under its jurisdiction, which creates a fire
hazard, is dangerous to the safety of the occupants or persons
frequenting such premises, or is permitted by the owner to re-
main in a dilapidated condition. Any such ordinance shall pro-
vide for written notice to the owner of a hearing by the govern-
ing body before final action is taken by such body. It shall also
provide a reasonable time within which an appeal may be taken
by the owner from any final order entered by such governing
body to a court of competent jurisdiction. This Act (subsection)
shall in no way limit or restrict any authority which is now or
may hereafter be vested in the state fire marshal for the reg-
ulation or control of such buildings or structures.”

The appellant has taken no exception to the procedure of the
council in enacting the ordinance involved here; it is presumed
therefore that the council complied with all of the statutory
requirements in the enactment of such ordinance. Statutory
enactments and municipal ordinances having for their purpose
the protection of the publie health, safety, morals and public
welfare are founded upon the police power inherent in the state.
In passing upon the constitutionality of such statutes or ordi-
nances the courts will not declare them unconstitutional and thus
substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body charged

ee 753

with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the
question where the question is fairly debatable, that is; unless
the statute or ordinances are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or public welfare. State ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Com-
pany v. Roberge, 144 Washington 74, 256-Pac. 781; Radice v.
New York, 264 US 292, 44 Sup Ct 325, 68 L ed 690.

In the case of City of Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 ND 838, 208
NW 711, the question before the court was as to the reasonable-
ness of a zoning ordinance. The defendant Hughes contended
that the State Enabling Act which authorized the enactment of
the ordinance and also the ordinance were unconstitutional in
that they would take private property for public use without
compensation; that they violated the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States by depriving the owner of
property without due process of law. In the course of the
opinion the court said:

‘Hach ordinance must stand or fall on its merits, but every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and the question to de-
termine is not, does the ordinance meet with the approval of the
court, but, can the courts say that it is an unreasonable, arbitrary
exercise of power?”

While the ordinance involved in the instant case is not a zoning
ordinance, nevertheless we think that the rule of construction
announced in the case of City of Bismarck v. Hughes supra ap-
plies equally to the ordinance under consideration here since
it relates to the public health, safety and welfare.

In the case of State v. Lawing, 164 NC 492, 80 SE 69, 51 LRA
NS 62, the validity of certain fire ordinances was before the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina. In that case the court held that
a town ordinance forbidding the erection of a building within
the fire limits unless the outer walls were brick, stone or con-
erete, and providing that no person shall repair, add to, change
or improve any existing building not so constructed, was vio-
lated by placing a metal roof on a wooden building, even though
this made. the building less dangerous since, while the ordinance
did not prohibit slight repairs, it not only prohibited building of

P|

754 —

wooden buildings, but also substantial repairs making the build-
ing habitable, and thereby insuring its continuance.

In-the case of Russell v. City of Fargo, 28 ND 300, 148 NW 610,
the plaintiff brought action to obtain a decree adjudging the
building ordinance of the City of Fargo, known as Chapter 13
of the Consolidated Ordinances as amended, null and void. The
particular feature of the ordinance which was challenged pro-
vided that

“It shall be unlawful to repair any frame building within the
fire limits of the city, when such building shall have been dam-
aged by the elements or decay to the extent of 50% of such build-
ing exclusive of the foundation thereof.”

This court held that the ordinance in question was valid. We
quote from the opinion:

“The constitutionality of this 50 per cent test ordinance is
questioned, but we are satisfied that, for the purpose for which it
was intended, it is a valid enactment. The authorities indicate
that there must be some method of determining whether changes
made in an old structure are sufficient to constitute a rebuilding
or the erection of a new structure, and such provisions are based
on the supposition that there is a point somewhere between a
perfect or safe building and one which cannot be made safe as
to fire, ete, without complete demolition, and a rebuilding.
Both the legislature and the city council have fixed that point at
50 per cent deterioration above the foundation, evidently taking
the view that, where it has deteriorated more than half in value,
that is, has so deteriorated that, on a reconstruction, the building
will be more new than old, it is the erection of a new building,
rather than the repairing of an old one (First National Bank v.
Sarls, supra), but an arbitrary prohibition is invalid. We can-
not pronounce this an unreasonable test.”

With reference to fire ordinances—Subdivision 34 of Sec. 40-
0501 NDRC 1943 provides as follows:

“The governing body of a municipality shall have the power
to prescribe fire limits in which wooden buildings shall not be
erected, placed, or repaired without permission; to provide that
when a building within such limits has been damaged by fire,

ee 755

decay or otherwise to the extent of fifty percent of its valuation,
it shall be torn down and removed; to prescribe the manner of
ascertaining such damage; to provide for the removal of any
structure or building erected contrary to the prescribed rules
to declare each days continuance of such building or structure
a separate offense and to prescribe the penalties therefor; and
to define fireproof material.”

Appellant cites the Ohio case of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 US
365, 71 Law Hd 303, 47 Supreme Court Reporter 114, 54 ALR
1016. The village of Euclid had adopted an ordinance estab-
lishing a comprehensive zoning plan for regulating and restrict-
ing the location of trades, industries, apartment houses, two-
family houses, single-family houses, etc; the lot area to be built
upon, the size and height of the building etc. The defendant
challenged the validity of the ordinance on the grounds that it
was in derogation of the 14th amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution in that it deprived it of liberty and property without
due process of law, denied it equal protection of the law and that
it offended against certain provisions of the constitution of the
State of Ohio. The prayer of the bill was for an injunction
restraining the enforcement of the ordinance and all attempts to
impose or maintain as to the defendant’s property any of the
restrictions, limitations or conditions of said ordinance. The
Federal District Court held the ordinance.to be unconstitutional
and void and enjoined its enforcement. An appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court of the United States. In an exhaustive
opinion written by Justice Sutherland the constitutionality and
validity of the statute was sustained in its general scope. We
quote the following from the opinion:

“The relief sought here is of the same character, namely, an
injunction against the enforcement of any of the restrictions,
limitations or conditions of the ordinance. And the gravamen
of the complaint is that a portion of the land of the appellee can-
not be sold for certain enumerated uses because of the general
and broad restraints of the ordinance. What would be the effect
of a restraint imposed by one or more of the innumerable provi-
sions of the ordinance, considered-apart, upon the value or
marketability of the lands is neither disclosed by. the bill nor by

756 * Ee

the evidence, and we are afforded no basis, apart from mere
speculation, upon which to rest a conclusion that it or they
would have any appreciable effect upon these matters. Under
these circumstances, therefore, it is enough for us to determine,
as we do, that the ordinance in its general scope and dominant
features, so far as its provisions are here involved, is a valid
exercise of authority, leaving other provisions to be dealt with

as cases arise directly involving them.” ,

It is trué that some of the ordinances considered in the cases
cited herein were fire ordinances rather than building ordi-
nanees; but whether it be a fire ordinance or a building ordi-
nance that is being considered, it is enacted under the police
power of the state and its political subdivisions for the protection
of life, safety, morals, general health and general welfare of the
public. The purpose of the enactment of ordinances in both
classifications is therefore the same and it would follow that the
same rule of construction and interpretation would apply to
both. The provisions of the ordinance challenged are stated in
clear and concise language and the enactment thereof by the city
council was a valid exercise of the police power.

We shall next consider the proposition whether the proceed-
ings of the city council of the city of Drayton were so arbitrary,
unfair and unreasonable as to be illegal and void, and in excess
of the authority granted by the ordinance.

Plaintiff's building is old. It was constructed prior to 1903
and had not been occupied for several years.

The evidence presented at the hearing before the city council,
ineluding several photographs of the building admitted as ex-
hibits, established that the foundation had disintegrated, the
walls were warped and cracked, and the lower ends of the up-
right studdings were rotten and would have to be replaced. The
pbuilding was out of plumb, and leaned or listed considerably
more than permitted by the ordinance. All of this is shown by
the sworn statements of the contractors, Thomas Jordan and
Stanley Ramon presented at the hearing before the city council.
the substance of which we have set out herein.

All of the parties admit the substandard condition of the build-
ing. The plaintiff and his witnesses, however conterid that the

Es 87

building is reparable, while the defendants and their witnesses
contend that it is beyond repair.

The written statement presented by appellant ‘at the hearing
before the city council as to the repairs he proposed to make,
and the affidavits of the three contractors, Jordan, Ramon and
Adamson, were by stipulation admitted in evidence at the trial
in district court. The plaintiff testified in his own
behalf. All of the members of the city council were called by
plaintiff for cross examination under the statute. Their testi-
mony was to the effect that plaintifi’s building had deteriorated
to such an extent as to be beyond repair.

I. Steenson, former mayor and former city attorney of the
city of Drayton testified in behalf of the plaintiff to the effect
that appellant’s building in its present condition, that is without
any repairs, would probably be of the value of $2000.00. He
testified also that if it were repaired and put in the condition pro-
posed by the plaintiff Mr. Soderfelt the rental value would be
$75.00 per month. He testified further that in his opinion the
building in its present condition was not a menace to public
health and safety but on cross examination admitted that there
were no other buildings in town in the condition of disrepair as
was the appellant’s building.

Mr. Soderfelt the appellant testified in his own behalf substan-
tially in accordance with his statements made at the hearing
before the city council. He testified further that if the building
would be removed and demolished it would be a loss to him of
$2000.00 to $2500.00.

From the testimony taken before the city council as well as
the testimony taken in the district court there is no doubt that
the building of the defendant was substandard and that it was
more than 50% deteriorated in all respects.

The question is thus presented whether the evidence at the
hearing before the city council was sufficient to warrant the city
council in concluding that the building had deteriorated to such
a degree that it was beyond repair, or whether the city council
abused its discretion in ordering its removal and demolition.

The general rule is that the courts will not substitute their
judgment for that of the governing body of a municipality in

758 ee

the matter of enforcement of ordinances unless it is clearly
shown that it abused its diseretion.

28 Am Jur 852, Injunctions, Sec. 162, states:

“Where a public officer essays to exercise the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon him, his errors, although subject to subsequent cor-
rection, cannot he enjoined as an arbitrary exercise of his author-
ity. Particularly will courts hesitate to interfere by injunction
where the acts complained of are essential to the health and com-
fort of the people at large. In fact, it may be stated as an estab-
lished rule that injunction will issue against public officers only
to prevent a breach of trust affecting public franchises, or some
illegal act under color or claim of right injurious to the property
or other rights of individuals or the public, or where serious in-
jury will result to private individuals without corresponding
public benefit. A mandatory injunction may be an appropriate
remedy to compel affirmative acts by public corporations and
officers where the urgency for such relief is great and the legal
remedy inadequate, but it will not issue to control the exercise of
discretionary acts.”

Also 28 Am Jur 373, Injunctions, Sec. 185; states:

“Injunctions against the enforcement of municipal ordinances,
passed by the corporation in the exercise of its delegated power,
are governed by much the same rules as those which apply in
the case of statutes. Certainly, where the ordinance or resolu-
tion is valid, equity will not interpose to prevent its enforcement,
unless, perhaps, it is in an illegal and wrongful manner, causing
irreparable injury to the property or civil rights of the complain-
ing party. There are statutory provisions in some states that no
injunction shall issue to restrain the enforcement of a pénal
ordinance, which have been construed to mean that no writ of
injunction shall issue to restrain the judicial enforcement of such
ordinance. Ordinarily, too, the injunctive aid of a court of
equity may not be invoked to prevent the enforcement of a valid
and reasonable police regulation which has been passed pursu-
ant to authority conferred by ordinance. Courts do not look
with favor on proceedings to restrain the enforcement of mu-
nicipal ordinances having for their object the preservation of
the health or good order of society and the elevation of its

| 759

moral tone, and they require that a clear case be made out be-
fore this extraordinary relief will be granted. Therefore, if it
should happen that acts prohibited in an ordinance are a pub-
lic nuisance, the court will not perpetuate their continuance by
granting an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance,
regardless of its validity. Nor will a court of equity concern
itself with the question whether the city authorities have selected
the best means within the proper exercise of their power, to ac-
complish a purpose.”

The appellant in the case at bar contends that the defendants
violated subdivision (a) of Sec. 3 of the ordinance -in question.
This subdivision provides:

“If the substandard building or structure can reasonably be
repaired so that it will no longer exist in violation of the terms
of this ordinance it shall be ordered repaired.”

However subsection (c) of Sec. 3 provides:

“In any ease where a substandard building or structure is
50% damaged or decayed, or deteriorated from its original
value or structure, it shall be demolished and in all cases where a
building cannot be repaired so that it will no longer exist in vio-
lation of the terms of this ordinance it shall be demolished.”

As pointed out the city council made findings that the build-
ing in question was more than 50% deteriorated. In refusing to
order such building to be repaired the city council acted in con-
formity with subdivision (¢) of Section 3, quoted above which
provides that if the building is found to be 50% deteriorated
from its original value or structure it shall be demolished. While
the appellant offered to make certain repairs to the building as
referred to herein, and proposed to do the repair work himself
the city council evidently was of the opinion that the materials
which the appellant proposed to furnish would be wholly. in-
adequate to restore the building to a state of repair which would
comply with the requirements of ordinance 114.

The evidence presented before the city council was conflicting
and was such that there could be an honest difference of opinion
as to whether the building in question had deteriorated to such
a degree that it could not be repaired.so as to comply with ordi-
nance,114 and fire ordinance 39. We cannot say under the evi-

760 —

dence and the record that the action of the city council in order-
ing the removal and demolition of appellant’s building was ar-
bitrary, discriminatory and such an abuse of discretion as to
warrant equitable relief of injunction.

In his reply brief the appellant argues for the first time that
the provision in ordinance 114 requiring the owner of a building
to file a bond in the sum of $500.00 on appeal from an order of
the city council renders the ordinance invalid. However, there
is no allegation in the complaint challenging the ordinance on
that ground, nor is there any specification in the assignments
of error that the ordinance is invalid because of the requirement
of a bond on appeal. The only allegation in the complaint as to
the invalidity of the ordinance is‘ as follows:

“the purported ordinances under and by virtue of which it is
pretended that the defendants are acting in the proceedings
taken in this matter are unreasonable, unconstitutional, and void
insofar as the same purportedly permit or authorizes the de-
fendants to interfere with plaintiffs repair on his property and
the defendants are adopting unreasonable, unfair, discrimina-
tory and capricious construction of the terms of said purported
ordinances, all to the injury and loss passed, present and per-
spective of this plaintiff.”

It will be noted that the ordinance is challenged only on the
ground that it permits the defendant to interfere with appellant’s
right to repair his building.

The general rule is that one who relies on the invalidity of
an ordinance must allege facts to establish such invalidity. 62
CJS Municipal Corporations, page 388, Sec. 207 states the rules
as follows:

- “Since an ordinance which is not void on its face is presumed
to be valid, one who relies on the invalidity of such an ordinance
must plead this fact at the first opportune moment, and must.
allege facts showing it to be invalid and wherein it is invalid, and
a general allegation that it is illegal and void is insufficient. So,
where a municipal ordinance or regulation may be unreasonable
by reason of particular facts or circumstances, one challeriging
the validity of-such ordinance or regulation must give the par-
ticular facts rendering it unreasonable, ‘and they must be suf-

— 761

ficiently pleaded to enable ‘the opposite party to meet the objec-
tion. . . . Invalidity on one grourid is not properly pre-
sented for consideration by a pleading challenging the validity
on another ground.” :

In the case of Benson. v. City of Andalusia, 195 So 443, 240
Ala 99, it was held that:

“one claiming that an ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary
or discriminatory, has the burden of alleging and proving facts
to support the claim.”

In the case of Village of Grand View v. McElroy et al. 318 Mo
135, 298 SW 760, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:

“Not only was the alleged constitutional question not properly
raised, but it was not timely raised. It must be raised at the
earliest possible moment, or it will be’ deemed to be waived. lt
must be raised in the pleadings, if due to be raised there. State
v. Hale (Mo.Sup) 248 SW 958; Miller v. Connor, 250 Mo 677,
loc cit 684, 157.SW 81; Lohmeyer v. Cordage Co. 214 Mo 685, loc
eit 690, 113 SW 1108.”

The issue raised: by the appellant is not within the pleadings
and was not before the trial court. It was raised for the first
time before this court, and therefore cannot be considered here.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Curisriansoy, Burks and Grimson, JJ.,
concur,

Per Curiam. (On petition for rehearing.) The appellant has
petitioned.for rehearing upon several grounds. All of them
have been fully discussed and disposed of in the original, opin-
ion, with one possible exception to which we will devote some
consideration. The appellant points out that the building in-
volved in this action was legally constructed prior to the enact-
ment of the statute, Section 40-0502 NDRC 1949 Supp. (Chapter
252 SLND 1945), and prior to the enactment of the ordinance
‘under which-the city acted. It is then argued that the appellant
has at all times been willing to repair the building and follow
the requests of the city with respect thereto and that the action

762° a

of the city in ordering the building destroyed is.a violation of
the appellant’s constitutional and vested property rights.

In the case of Russell v. City of Fargo, 28 ND 300, 148 NW
610, in considering an analogous statute providing for the enact-
ment of ordinances.designating fire limits of cities, this court
said:

“When the law gives city officials the power to remove a build-
ing erected within the fire limits in violation of the statute or
ordinance, the power to compel the removal of the building
grows solely from the fact that its erection’ was in violation of
the ordinance, and not because it is a nuisance; and the power to
abate nuisances does not warrant destruction of valuable prop-
erty, which was lawfully erected,-or anything which was erected
by lawful authority; and the power to do so, when given by the
legislature, is held to be inoperative and void, unless the thing is
in fact a nwisance, or was created or erected after the passage
of the ordinance, and in defiance of it. This is the distinction
between the rights of the city regarding buildings erected before
the fire limits were established and those subsequently built.”
(Italics supplied.) :

The statute, Section 40-0502 NDRC 1949 Supp., authorizes
the governing body of a city, among other things, to provide by
ordinance for the demolition of any building “which creates a fire
hazard, is dangerous to the safety of the oceupants or persons
frequenting such premises, or is permitted by the owner to xe-
main in a dilapidated condition.” This statute we have held in
the main opinion to be constitutional aud Ordinance No. 114 of
the City of Drayton to have been enacted in accordance there-
with. Section 3 (c) of this ordinance, in part, provides: :

“In any case where a ‘sub-standard building or structure’ is
50 percent damaged or decayed, or deteriorated from its orig-
inal value or structure, it shall be demolished, and in all cases
where a building cannot be repaired so that it will no longer exist
in violation of the terms of this ordinance it shall be demolished.”

A similar fifty per cent provision was held to be constitutional
in Russell v. City of Fargo, supra. .

In Behrend v. Town of Pe Ell, 186 Wash 364, 240 Pac 12, it is
said: :

| ‘763

“Tn the ordinance under consideration, the standard is set at
fifty per cent of the value of the building. It seems to be argued
that this leaves the discretionary power with the council, but
we think.no discretion is granted by the ordinance. All persons
are treated alike under its provisions. The standard having
been fixed at fifty per cent of the value of the building, all per-
sons applying for permits are entitled to them as a matter of
right if the repairs do not exceed fifty per cent of the value of
the building. The council has no discretion but must grant the
permit if the value of the repairs is less than fifty per cent; and
‘if more than fifty per cent, must refuse. This ordinance sets a
standard, operates upon all alike, and we think the failure to
provide a detailed method of procedure cannot render it uncon-
stitutional.”

In that case a permit to repair was refused and the refusal up-
held by the court.

In this case the building in question, although built before the
enactment of state or city legislation authorizing its destruction,
nevertheless.-has been permitted by its owner to reach such a
state of dilapidation that the city was well within its authority
in determining that it should be demolished because it had de-
teriorated to a degree that placed it in the category termed “nui-
sances” by Section 2 of the ordinance, which provides:

“All ‘sub-standard buildings or structures’ within the terms of
Section 1 of this ordinance are hereby declared to be publie nui-
sances and shall be repaired, removed or demolished as herein-
before and hereinafter provided.”

We reach the conclusion that the record shows that appellant’s
building was, under the ordinance and in fact, a nuisance which
the city might properly abate by ordering its demolition. The
fact that the building, when. built, was not a nuisance and was
not unlawful does not prevent its destruction as a building that
has become a nuisance under the ordinance and its maintenance
unlawful. The city council having, after a full and fair hearing,
determined that the building in question was substandard under
the fifty per cent rule provided by the ordinance, the council
of the City of Drayton, like that of the Town of Pe Ell, had no
discretion but to order the removal or demolition. This order

764 ee

being lawful, the district court properly declined to interfere.
Rehearing denied.

Morais, C. J., and Sarmrs, Curisrianson, Burke and Grimson,
JJ., concur.

P|
[File No. 7357]

C. J. FERCH, on behalf of himself and all others similarly sit-
uated, Appellant, v. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
CASS COUNTY, NORTH DAKOTA, and The City of
Southwest Fargo, North Dakota, Respondents.

(59 NW2da 849)

19
Ss
i

So
g

ee 767

Opi

ion filed July 22d, 1953

TE ell W. Fraase, for appellants.

768 EE

Ohnstad & McCauley, for respondents.

770 EE

Dean Winkjer, Amicus Curiae.

Grimson, J. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other tax-
payers similarly situated, sought an injunction in district court
to have the defendants restrained from completing arrangements
with the Public Housing Administration, a federally owned
corporation, for the purpose of effecting a slum clearance and
low rent housing program in the City of Southwest Fargo. The
district court found in favor of the defendants and plaintiff ap-
peals.

The following facts are admitted: The plaintiff is a.citizen,
resident, taxpayer and owner of real estate in the City of South-
west Fargo, a municipal corporation. The defendant, the Hous-
ing Authority of Cass County, hereinafter referred to as the
Authority, was organized in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter 23-11 NDRC 1943 and 1949 Supplement, the North
Dakota Housing Authorities Law, by a resolution of the Board
of Commissioners of Cass County on April 5, 1951, and claims
all the powers, duties, rights and privileges provided therein.
The defendant City of Southwest Fargo is a duly incorporated

‘city under the laws of North Dakota. The Public Housing Ad-
ministration is a federal corporation organized under the U. 8.
Housing Act of 1937, 42 USCA Sec 1401-1430, as amended, for
the purpose of aiding local public housing agencies in the de-
velopment and operation of slum clearance and low rent housing
projects. On April 10, 1951, the Housing Authority of Cass
County and the City of Southwest Fargo entered into a “cooper-
ation agreement” as required by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration providing for the cooperation of the two bodies in slum
clearance and in the development of a low rent housing project.

| 77

On the 16th day of May, 1951, the Housing Authority of Cass
County applied to the Public Housing Administration for a
program reservation for 36 dwelling units of a proposed low
rent and slum clearance housing project in the City of South-
west Fargo and for a loan of $7200.00 for the purpose of pre-
liminary surveys and planning. On July 6, 1951, the Public
Housing Administration approved such program for 24 dwell-
ing units. The Housing Authority of Cass County has applied
for a preliminary loan of $4800.00 of which $960.00 has been
received. The Housing Authority of Cass County now intends
to enter into a further contract with the Public Housing Admin-
istration for a loan of $200,000.00, being 90 per cent of the cost
of the proposed project, and plans to go on with the project
under the federal and state housing laws.

The plaintiff claims that the defendants should be enjoined
from proceeding further along this line on the grounds that the
State Act, Chap 23-11 NDRO 1943 and 1949 Supplement, under
which they are acting, is unconstitutional and that the coopera-
tion agreement is ultra vires and void.

It is a well established rule in this jurisdiction that a statute
enacted by the legislature is presumed to be constitutional. This
presumption is conclusive unless it is clearly shown that the
enactment is prohibited by the constitution of the state or of
the United States. The burden of showing unconstitutionality
is upon him who alleges that some particular -provision of the
state or federal constitution has been violated. Stark v. City
of Jamestown, 76 ND 422, 37 NW2d 516; State ex rel. Sathre
v. Board of University & School Lands, 65 ND 687, 262 NW 60;
State.ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 ND 76, 85, 86, 156 NW 561, LRA
1918B 156, Ann Cases 1918A 583.

“All statutes must be construed, if possible, so as to give them
validity, force and effect, and carry out the will of the legislator.
In doing this respect must always be had to the language of the
statute, the plain and obvious meaning of the words used, and
. . . their objects and purposes.” People v. Sweetser, 1
Dak 295, 46 NW 452.

“The courts invariably give the most careful consideration
to questions involving the interpretation and application of the

‘772 ee

Constitution and approach constitutional questions with great
deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the
greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should
never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their
judgment, beyond reasonable doubt.” 11 Am Jur, Constitutional
Law, Sec 91, p 718.

The first contention of the plaintiff is that “The State Act is
unconstitutional and void in that the purposes authorized are
not public or governmental purposes within the meaning of:
Article I, Section 14 of the state constitution and thus the power
of eminent domain cannot be exercised.”

The purpose of the State Act must be determined in view of
the situation that now exists. The changes in North Dakota
since the constitution was enacted must be taken into considera-
tion. The constitution is unchanged but the needs over which
it may control have changed.

“Views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary
with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of govern-
ment, . . .. As governmental activities increase with the
growing complexity and integration of society, the concept of
‘public use’ naturally expands in proportion.” Dornan v. Phil-
adelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa 209, 200 A 834. See also,
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis 327, 183 NW 209, 215, 216, 87 LRA
NS 489, 3 NCCA 649.

During the last twenty years much attention has been given to
the evils caused by the lack of adequate housing for people of:
low incomes and their congregation into slum areas. The hous-
ing division of the Public Works Administration undertook the
clearance of slum areas and the construction of low rent hous-
ing projects. Then two world wars have created the problem of
aiding needy veterans in obtaining housing. Favorable loans to
veterans for that purpose were provided. These activities have
been continued by the Federal Government in various forms
and are now authorized by the 1937 Federal Housing Act, 42
USCA, Sees 1401-1430, as amended, hereinafter referred to as
the Federal Act. The avowed purpose of that Act-is to lend
financial assistance to cities’ seeking to remove slum areas and
to substitute therefor low cost housing for persons of low in-

| 773

come, preference being given to veterans. This act has been held
to be for the promotion of general welfare and therefore con-
stitutional. See Cleveland v. United States, 323 US 329, 65
§ Ct 280, 89 Law ed 274; United States v. Boyle, 52 F Supp 906
(ND Ohio) ; Oklahoma v. Sanders, 94 F2d 323, 115 ALR 363 (10th
Cir).

The first attempt in North Dakota along that line was the
enactment in 1919 of the law providing for the Home Building
Association of North Dakota, to encourage home building and
home ownership in this state. The Act authorized the State, as
the Home Building Association, to build homes for individuals
on certain conditions. That Act was, in Green v. Frazier, 44
ND 395, 176 NW 11, aff’?d 253 US 233, 64 L ed 878, 40 S Ct 499,
declared to be for a public purpose and constitutional. That,
however, proved an unsuccessful business undertaking and
was abandoned. There was no great need for new housing then.
Now it is a matter of common knowledge that housing is scarce,
that slum conditions have appeared in our larger cities and that
there is need for housing for people of low income at rentals
they can afford to pay.

The North Dakota Housing Authorities Act, hereinafter called
the State Act, Chapter 23-11 NDRC 1943, as amended in the
1949 Supplement, was first passed in 1937 to enable municipali-
ties to take advantage of the Federal Act. It creates in each city
of more than 5000 population and in each county of the state “a
public body corporate and politic to be known as the ‘housing
authority’ of the city or county, as the case may be.” Such hous-
ing authority comes into existence when the governing body of
the city or county by a proper resolution declares the need for a
housing authority. As a basis for such declaration the govern-
ing body must find “(1) That insanitary or unsafe inhabited
dwelling accommodations exist in the city or county; or (2)
That there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling accommo-
dations in such city or county available to persons of low income
at rentals they can afford to pay.” See 23-1103 NDRC 1943.
That section further provides that in making such resolution
the governing body may take into consideration “the degree of
overcrowding, the percentage of land coverage, the light, air,

774 Le

space, and access available to the inhabitants of such dwelling
accommodations, the size and arrangement of the rooms, the
sanitary facilities, and the extent to which conditions which
endanger life or property by fire or other causes exist in such
buildings.” A favorable action by the local authoritics is to be
taken only if it is found that such conditions exist.

The primary object of all government is to provide for the
welfare of its citizens. For that purpose laws are enacted to
foster the health, morals and safety of the people. To carry
that out taxes are levied. One of the fields in which there is need
for the enactment of a law for that purpose is in the ever grow-
ing slum districts in our cities. It is generally recognized that
in such districts the living quarters of the unfortunate, who have
not the means of living in better quarters, are congested. Heat-
ing, ventilation, sunlight and sanitary conditions are meager.
Such places become breeding places of disease, immorality and
crime. The character of the houses in such districts makes them
a fire hazard. The government is often put to great expense in
combating disease, crime and conflagration originating in such
quarters. They menace not only the health, safety and morals
of those living there, but since disease, crime, immorality and
fire can, with difficulty, be confined to points of origin, these
districts become a menace to the whole community and to the
state. In See 2, Chapter 102, SL 1937, the legislature has de-
clared that these conditions exist in this state.

Under the State Act it is proposed that the housing authorities
cooperate with the municipal authorities in slum clearance, and
with the aid afforded by the Federal Act build sanitary low
vent dwellings. The legislature has declared that this is for
“public uses and purposes for which public money may be spent
and private property acquired . . . .” Sec 2, Chap 102, SL
1937.

The declaration of our legislature that such projects are de-
voted to the public use, while not necessarily binding or conclu-
sive upon the courts, is entitled to great weight. This declara-
tion also has the support and the concurrence of the Congress
of the United States and of the legislatures of at least 32 states
which have enacted similar legislation. It is not the duty of the

Oe

courts to interfere with such legislative finding unless it clearly
appears to be erroneous and without reasonable foundation. In
Rutherford v. City of Great Falls, 107 Mont 512, 86 P2d 636,
itis well said:

“The public nature of slum clearance projects having been
recognized and passed upon by -the legislature, as was their
right, it is not now our duty or prerogative to interfere with
that legislative finding in the absence of a clear showing that
the determination of that body was wrong. ‘Their findings, while
not conclusive, are entitled to much weight.”

In all of the states which have enacted similar legislation for
the purpose of cooperating with the Federal Act, where its con-
stitutionality has been challenged, the courts have found the
legislation to be for a public purpose and in furtherance of a
proper governmental function.

In Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal2d 487, 94 P2d
794, the court said:

“However, aside from the respect to be accorded the legisla-
tive declaration of the public purpose underlying the statutes
here challenged, it is our view, and we are’satisfied that both
reason and authority support us, that the proposed elimination
of slums and the orection of safe and sanitary low-rent dwelling
units for persons of the prescribed restricted income will do
much to advance the publie welfare and to protect the public
safety and morals and are in fact and law public purposes.”

In Allydonn-Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304
Mass 288, 23 NWi2d 665, 668, the court said:

“The elimination of slums can be found to be a direct benefit
and advantage to all of the people, to be a matter not readily
approached through private initiative but demanding coordi-
nated effort by a single authority, to be in line with the purposes
of promoting the public safety, health and welfare for which the
government of the Commonwealth was established, and to re-
quire for its successful accomplishment the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. It may well be deemed to rise to the
dignity of a public service.”

In Chapman y. Huntington Housing Authority, 121 W Va
319, 3 SH2d 502, the court says:

776 ee

“In these modern times, it can scarcely be gainsaid that slums
are areas having insanitary and substandard housing, and are
a menace to the health, welfare and morals of any community in
which they exist. Slum areas, because of the congestion, filth
and insanitary conditions which are their ever-existing qualities
are the breeding places of crime, immorality and disease. These
evils necessarily and inevitably strike at the heart of the hap-
piness and well being of all the people of the community. They
cannot run rampant in any part of a community without stretch-
ing their tentacles menacingly throughout its entire length-and
breadth. Thus the eradication of slum areas would seem to
rest upon the firm foundation of the police power which inher-
ently resides in the legislative branch of every state government.
Any purpose leading toward that end is a public purpose.”
(Cases cited.)

In McNulty v. Owens, 188 SC 377, 199 SE 425, the court says:

“. , . An cxamination of the juvenile delinquency in Colum-
bia during the year 1937 shows that practically all of these cases
come from bad housing areas. A similar check indicates that
bad housing is a very material factor in our high infant mortal-
ity rate.

“Experience in other parts of the country and in England in-
dicate a very substantial improvement in health and in morals
where sanitary housing has been provided for persons of low
income... .

“Considering all of these matters, including the obvious need
for low-cost housing, the apparent inability of private capital
to supply such housing, and the satisfactory solution of: the
problem afforded by similar governmental programs of slum
clearance and low-cost housing here and elsewhere, we conclude
that the slum-clearance and low-cost housing project planned
by the Columbia Housing Authority is an exercise of a proper
governmental function for a valid public purpose.”

In our Housing Authorities Law, as in the laws of other states,
special provisions are made for veterans, Sec 23-1131 1949
Supplement, but that also is for a public purpose.

In the Opinion of the Justices, 320 Mass 773, 67 NE2d 588,
165 ALR 807, itis stated:

ee WT

“That the expenditure of public money in recognition of mili-
tary services, even long after such-services have been rendered,
though such expenditure of money is directly for the private
benefit of the persons rendering such services, is a public purpose
has been held or stated in decisions of this court or in opinions
of its Justices. (Citing cases.) . The constitutionality of statutes
providing for preferences to veterans in the classified civil
service has been sustained upon somewhat analogous principles.
. . . (Citing authority.) In the decisions and opinions treating
expenditures of money in recognition of military servicesas ex-
penditures for a public purpose, the form of the expenditures
considered was different from the form of the expenditure au-
thorized by the pending bill. We perceive no difference, how-
ever, with respect to the nature of the purpose as a public pur-
pose between the expenditures there considered and expenditure
in the form authorized’ by. the pending bill to provide housing
for the benefit of service men, veterans and their families in the
existing condition of an acute shortage of housing. It is not
for-us to express any opinion upon the expediency of expendi-
ture of public money in the form authorized in the pending bill.
Clearly, it is not so unreasonable as to preclude that purpose
being a public purpose.”

Plaintiff cites Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v.. Koochiching
Co., 97 Minn 429, 107 NW 405, 5 LRA NS 638, 7 Ann Cases
1182, as holding that the public benefit of a project is not suffi-
cient to constitute a public use. That case, however, is distin-
guished in the later case of Thomas v. Housing & Redevelop-
ment Authority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d 175, where it is pointed
out that the use of the project in the cited case was mainly for
private purposes. In the Thomas case the Minnesota Court
holds that:

“The fundamental purpose of the state in the enactment of
the Municipal Housing and Redevelopment Act . . < is to
protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.
The elimination of slums and the erection of safe and sanitary
low-rent dwelling units for persons of the prescribed restrictive

-incomes referred to in the act will do a great deal to advance the
public welfare and protect public safety and morals and will

778 |

result in a direct benefit and advantage to all the people. The
contemplated taking of property for low-rent housing under the
facts and circumstances here, as provided in the act, constitutes
a taking for public use, and the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, as provided in the act, is not a violation of Minn Const
art 1, sec 13.”

The appellant quotes Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass 624;
98 NE 611, 42 LRA NS 221, to the effect that a prior Massachu-
‘setts law providing for housing at public expense was held un-
constitutional as not being for a public purpose. That case,
however, is distinguished in the later case of Allydonn Realty
Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass 288, 23 NH2d
665. The court there said that the law involved in the former
case “. . . wasnotaslum clearance law. It did not eliminate
unsafe or unsanitary dwellings. .. . Any effect that it might
have in preserving the public safety, health, and morals was’ in-
cidental, remote and doubtful.” The Massachusetts Court in
this later case had for consideration the Massachusetts Housing
Authority Law, similar to our statute and said: “The real pur-
pose of the statute is therefore the elimination of slums and un-
safe and unsanitary dwellings, and the provision by public funds
of low-rent housing:is only a means by which the main object
is to be accomplished. The statute as a whole is designed to
serve a public need, and the money expended for low-rent hous-
ing, as well as that expended for slum clearance, is for a public
use.”

In United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78
.F2d 684 (6th Cir 1935), cited by plaintiff, it was held that the
federal government could not condemn private property for low
cost housing and slum clearance and to reduce unemployment,
and that the NIRA was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized
such condemnation since it was not for a public use. However,
the decision admitted :

“What is a public use under one sovereign may not be a public
use under another. . . . The state and federal governments
are distinct sovereignties, . . . . In the exercise of its police
power a state may do those things which benefit the health, mor-

| 779

als, and welfare of its people. The federal government has no
such power within the states.”

This case was decided by a divided court and the decision con-
tains a strong dissent by Judge Allen. In more recent cases,
courts of equal dignity have considered the use to be public,
Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F2d 323 (10th Cir 1938); Keyes
v. United States, 73 App DO 278, 119 F2d 444, (1941), and have
upheld the constitutionality of the present federal act, Keyes v.
United States, supra; Cleveland v. United States, 323 US 329,
65 S Ct 280, 89 L ed 274.

Other cases cited by the appellant are not in point. They do
not involve slum clearance projects.

The real purpose of both the State and Federal Acts is to
combat slum conditions and overcome them for the protection,
not only of the inhabitants therein but the public at.large. That
is a public purpose.

With that in view the State Act authorizes the Housing Au-
thority to construct sanitary buildings with the aid afforded
under the Federal Act and declares such property to he “public
property used for essential public and governmental purposes

.” See 23-1129. We find that declaration correct.

The following cases deal generally with the purpose and con-
stitutionality of our housing laws and support our decision
thereon: Knoxville Housing Authority v. City of Knoxville,
174 Tenn 76, 123 SW2d 1085; State ex rel. Porterie v. Housing
Authority of New Orleans, 190 La 710, 182 So 725; Allydonn
Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass 288, 23
NE2d 665; Opinion to the Governor, 76 RI-249, 69 Atl2d 531;
State ex rel. Helena Housing Authority v. City Council of City
of Helena, 108 Mont 347, 90 P2d 514; Dornan v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 331 Pa 209, 200 Atl 834; Williamson v.
Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga 673, 199 SEH 43; Mc-
Nulty v. Owens, 188 SC 377, 199 SE 425; Marvin v. Housing
Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla 590, 183 So 145; Thomas v.
Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d
175; New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 NY 333,
1 NE2d 153, 105 ALR 905; Blakemore v. Cincinnati Metropoli-
tan Housing Authority, 74 Ohio App 5, 57 NE2d 397; Nashville

780 : |
Housing Authority v. City of Nashville, 192 Tenn 103, 237 SW2d
946.

Since thé purpose for which the housing authorities would take
property by right of eminent domain is public it follows that
the provisions of the State Act, Sec 23-1111 (14) and Sec 23-
1117, giving the authorities such power is not contrary to Ar-
ticle I, See 14 of the state constitution nor the 14th amendment
of the U. 8. Constitution. See Thomas v. Housing & Redevel-
opment Authority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d 175.

The plaintiff complains that the condemnation of land for new
housing outside the slum-area as in the instant case could not
be held to be for a public purpose and therefore violates said
sections of the State and Federal Constitutions. If that were
so, the purpose of the Act would in many instances be thwarted.
There may be many reasons why the new project should not be
built in the slum area, such as the topography, drainage and
lack of space. In the case of Chapman v. Huntington Housing
Authority, 121 W Va 319, 3 SH2d 502, the court says:

“The projects may be built in‘any area within the exercise of
sound discretion of the federal- and state authorities and the
council of the City of Huntington, whether slum or not slum.
They are simply low-cost-housing projects, incidental to slum
clearance. In some cities it is quite conceivable that slums exist
in low-water areas. Equally, it is quite inconceivable that pub-
lic moneys in large amounts should be expended to build modern
dwelling units where they will be subject to and endangered by
rising waters.”

In Riggin v. Dockweiler, 15 Cal2d 651, 104 P2d 367, the court
said:

“In working out the problem of low-cost housing, it may ap-
pear that the clearance of a slum area is desirable because the
dwellings in use are insanitary, or present fire hazards or are
‘maintained under such conditions that their removal would be
in the interest of the public welfare. Also, the location may be
an undesirable one for dwellings. Where: such circumstances
exist, it would be folly to require the new buildings to be con-
structed at the old location, and compel the new units to be
crowded into the space taken up by those cleared away. Such

| 781:

an interpretation of the housing act would thwart the very pur-
poses for which it was passed and effectively block dam clearance
in districts where the problem is most acute.” See also Thomas
v. Housing & Redevelopment Authority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW
2d 175, 188; Keyes v. United States, 73 App DC 273, 119 F2d
444, 314 US 636, 86 L ed 510, 62 S Ct 70.

Plaintiff also claims the housing proposed will be in compe-
tition with his rental properties in the neighborhood and in that
manner deprive him of income and property without due proc-
ess of law contrary to the 14th amendment of the United States
Constitution. There is no merit to the contention. It has been
held that governmental competition with owners of private bus-
iness does not constitute legal damage even though it may injure
their business. Neither the Federal nor ‘State Constitution
grants any right to plaintiff to be free from competition. Wood-
worth v. Gallman, 195 SC 157, 10 SH2d 316, 321; Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 US 464, 82 L ed 374, 58 S Ct 300; Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 US 118, 83 L ed 543, 59 S Ct
366; Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky 97, 103 SW2d 651.

Plaintiff contends that the act delegates legislative power to
the Housing Authority contrary to Article II, Sec 25 of the con-
stitution. This court has repeatedly held that the legislative
power cannot be delegated. State ex rel. Rusk v. Budge, 14
ND 532, 105 NW 724; State ex rel. City of Fargo v. Wetz, 40
ND 299, 168 NW 835, 5 ALR 731. It must clearly appear, how-
ever, that the power attempted to be delegated is legislative.
Wilder v. Murphy, 56 ND.436, 440, 218 NW 156, and cases cited.
However, the determination of the facts upon which the law
becomes operative may be delegated. :

“The legislature . . . may confer discretion in » the admin-
istration of the law, and the constitution has never been regard-
ed as denying to the legislature the necessary resources of flexi-
bility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function
in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving
to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which
the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply, and the
legislature may make a law to delegate a power to determine,

782 EE

some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends
to make its own action depend. The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an au-
thority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law; the first cannot be done, to the
latter no valid objection can be made. 16 CJS, Constitutional
Law, Sec 133, pages 340-341.

In a very thorough discussion of this subject in Picton v.
County of Cass, 13 ND 242, 100 NW 711, 3 Ann Cas 345, Judge
Young quotes with approval from Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa 491, 13
Am Rep 716, as follows:

’ “The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but
it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and use-
ful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-
making power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation.”

In the case of Enderson v. Hildenbrand, 52 ND 533, 204 NW
356, involving the finding by a city council of the facts required
for the exclusion of farm land from a city, this court said:

“The legislature has prescribed certain general, definite rules
applicable in all cases as to what territory is to be excluded from
cities; and authorized the city council (or commission) to as-
certain and determine in each case whether it does or does not
fall within the rule established by the legislature. “This does
not constitute a delegation of legislative powers in contraven-
tion of the constitutional inhibition. 6 ROL pp 175,176. For it
is competent for the legislature to pass a law, the ultimate oper-
ation of which may, by its own terms, be made to depend on a
contingency.” (Cases cited.)

In the case of Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal2d 437,
94 P2d 794, the court in passing on a housing authority law al-
most identical with the North Dakota act, says:

“The standards specified in the act are sufficiently definite.
. . . The statute is complete in itself. While the legislature

ee 783

cannot delegate the power to make a law, it cannot now be seri-
ously disputed that it may delegate to administrative boards and
agencies the power and authority of ascertaining and determin-
ing the facts upon which the laws are to be applied and enforced.”
See also Chapman v. Huntington Housing Authority, 121 W Va
319, 3 SE2d 502.

An anlysis of the State Act shows that it creates a housing
authority but leaves to the local authorities the finding of the
facts upon which the law can be activated. It makes provisions
for the organization of the housing authority arid defines its
powers. It provides that in the operation-and management of
the housing projects no profit, shall’be made and that the rentals
be kept as low as possible consistent with safe and sanitary
dwellings. The authority shall select as tenants persons of low in-
come but with ability to pay the rentals fixed, and definite rules
for fixing the rentals, Sec 23-1113 NDRC 1943, and for the selec-
tion of tenants, Sec 23-1114 NDRC 1948, are laid down. The law
provides adequate guides for its administration but delegates no
legislative power to local authorities. See Anderson v. Peter-
son, 78 ND 949, 54 NW2d 542.

It is next claimed that these provisions for the administration
of the Act grant special privileges to a limited class, violating
Article I, Sec 20 of the Constitution, which provides:

“No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative
assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not
be granted to all citizens.”

This constitutional provision does not prohibit appropriate
legislative classification where proper facts justify such action
as long as the act applies uniformly to all those within the class
under similar circumstances. Any classification is permissible
which has a reasonable relation to some permitted end of gov-
ernmental action.’ Thomas v. Housing & Redevelopment Au-
thority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d 175, 189, and cases cited. Abil-
ity to pay appears to the courts to be proper consideration to
justify classification. Reed v. Bjornson, 191. Minn 254, 253 NW
102, 108.

784, —

In the case of Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 ND
82, 94, 49 NW 318, this court said:

“The legislature has power to classify persons and subjects
for the purpose of legislation, and to enact laws applying special-
ly to such classes, and, while the laws thus enacted operate uni-
formly upon all members of the class, they are not vulnerable to
the constitutional inhibition under consideration. But this pow-
er of the legislature is circumscribed. It is not an arbitrary
power waiting the whim of the legislature. Its exercise must
always be within the limits of reason, and of a necessity more or
less pronounced. Classification must be based upon such differ-
ences in situation, constitution or purposes, between the persons
or things included in the class and those excluded therefrom, as
fairly and naturally suggest the propriety of and necessity for
different or exclusive legislation in the line of the statute in
which the classification appears.” Sce also State ex rel. Amer-
land v. Hagan, 44 ND 306, 175 NW 372; Klein v. Hutton, 49 ND
248, 191 NW 485.

In the case of Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 135 Texas
158, 143 SW2d 79, 1830 ALR 1053, the Texas Court, having a
housing law similar to ours under consideration, says on this
subject:

“The Legislature in the instant law under attack has made no
attempt to grant special privileges to any man or set of men,
but has made a réasonable classification of the members of the
public and has provided that such low rent dwelling accommo-
dations shall be available to all members of the public who pres-
ently or in the future fall within the classification made by the
Legisature. Such class legislation has been uniformly upheld
in this State, provided there is any reasonable basis which would
justify the classification.” (Cases cited.)

In Williamson v. Housing Authority, 186 Ga 673, 199 SE 43,
47, the court said:

“The argument is that the actual benefits to be derived from
the proposed slum-clearance and low-cost housing project arc
limited to those individuals or families ‘who lack the amount of
incorne which is necessary to enable them, without financial as-
sistance, to live in safe and sanitary dwellings without over-

SE

crowding, and that thus the housing act provides special privi-
leges and advantages for a particular group to be selected from
persons occupying a certain economic and financial status, to the
exclusion of other citizens who by arbitrary standards occupy
a different situation. It might also be claimed that the actual
benefits derived from maintaining the . . . Academy for the
Blind are limited to blind children; or that the actual benefits of
the . . . State Sanitarium are limited to those mentally dis-
eased; or that adults are denied the actual benefits of the public
school system because the schools are maintained only for chil-
dren between certain ages; and that therefore, since they pro-
vide privileges and advantages only for a particular group, their
maintenance by the State is contrary to our organic law. It is
no violation of the constitutional guaranty here invoked for the
State to provide direct benefits for a certain group, to the ex-
clusion of other citizens, unless done by arbitrary standards.
The governing authorities were well justified in limiting to those
of modern income the benefits of the legislation under discussion.
The statute makes a classification and states the basis thereof,
which can not be said by this court to be unreasonable.”

The State Act is enacted for the benefit of people of low in-
come. It prescribes rules for determining the limit of income
under which the benefits are available. The benefits of the act
are open to all people under that limit. The act grants no privi-
leges to a favored few. All persons similarly situated are given
the same opportunity under the State Act to the extent of the
facilities provided. See also Fradet v. City of Southwest Fargo,
post, 799, 59 NW2d 871, currently decided.

It is next contended by the plaintiff that the State Act is a
special law in contravention of the Constitution, Article II, See
69 (33), which provides that the legislature shall pass no special
law for the “incorporation of cities, towns or villages, or chang-
ing or amending the charter of any town, city or village.”

The State Act creates in each city of more than 5000 popula-
tion and in each county of the state a public body corporate and
politic to be known as the Housing Authority. Under the law
such Housing Authority exists in every such city and every

786 ee

county by the legislative mandate and is available whenever the
local authorities find the facts necessary for its activation.

This court in Vermont Loan & Trust Co, v. Whithed, 2 ND
82, 49 NW 318, has pointed out the distinction between a general
and a special law as follows:

“‘A statute relating to persons or things as a class is a general
law; one relating to particular persons or things of a class is
special’ . . . ‘Special laws are those made for individual
cases, or for less than a class requiring laws appropriate to its
peculiar condition and circumstances.” . . . A ‘general law,’
as the term is used in this constitutional provision, is a public
law of universal interest to the people of the state, and embrac-
ing within its provisions all the citizens of the state, or all of
a certain class or classes of citizens. It must relate to persons
and things as a class, and not to particular persons or things of
a class. It must embrace the whole subject, or a whole class, and
must not be restricted to any particular locality within the state.
. . . The uniform operation required by this provision does
not mean universal operation. A general law may be constitu-
tional, and yet operate in fact only upon a very limited number
of persons or things, or within a limited territory. But, so far
as it is operative, its burdens and benefits must bear alike upon
all persons and things upon which it does operate, and the stat-
ute must contain no provision that would exclude or impede this
uniform operation upon all citizens, or all subjects and places,
within the state, provided they were brought within the relations
and circumstances specified in the act.”

Certainly the Housing Act operates alike on all places and
persons that come within its provisions and is not a special law.
2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 5. See Humphrey v. City
of Phoenix, 55 Ariz 374, 102 P2d 82; Williamson v. Housing
Authority, 186 Ga 673, 199 SH 43; Krause v. Peoria Housing
Authority, 370 Ill 356, 19 NE2d 193; Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky
97, 103 SH2d 651; In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich
313, 289 NW 493; Rutherford v. Great Falls, 107 Mont 512, 86
P2d 656; New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 NY
333, 1 NE2d 153, 105 ALR 905; Dorman vy. Philadelphia Hous-

ee 787

ing Authority, 331 Pa 209, 200 Atl 834; Housing Authority v.
Higginbotham, 135 Tex 158, 143 SW2d 79 and 95.

Plaintiff further contends that the State Act in establishing
a “public body corporate and politic’ empowered to exercise
public essential governmental functions is in violation of Article
VI, Sec 130 of the Constitution, which provides:

“The legislative assembly shall provide by general law for the
organization of municipal corporations restricting their powers
as to levying taxes and assessments, borrowing money and con-
tracting debts, and money raised by taxation, loan or assessment
for any purpose shall not be diverted to any other purpose ex-
cept by authority of law.”

Under this section of the Constitution the legislature provides
for the organization of municipal corporations and fixes their
powers. There is nothing in the wording of this section of the
constitution restricting the legislature in the exercise of that
duty. It may limit such powers or withdraw any power vested
in the municipality and place it with another public agency if it
so desires. It may provide that two such agencies carry out the
same powers in conjunction. People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of
Chicago, 399 Ill 551, 78 NHi2d 285. In Monaghan v. Armatage,
218 Minn 108, 112, 15 NW2d 241, 243, the court said:

“A municipality is merely a department of the state, a political
subdivision created as a convenient agency for the exercise of
such governmental powers as may be entrusted to it. ‘City of
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 US 182, 43 S Ct 534, 67 L Hd 937,
29 ALR 1471. Absent constitutional restriction, the legislature
may at its pleasure modify or withdraw any powers so entrusted
to a city, hold such powers itself, or vest them in other agencies,
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 178, 179, 28 S Ct 40,
46,52LEd 151,159, .. . .”

This is cited with approval in the case of Thomas v. Housing
& Redevelopment Authority, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d 175. The
housing authority is activated by action of -the municipal au-
thority to carry on specific public projects in cooperation with
the municipal authority. There is no conflict between them nor
any conflict with the constitution.

738 Le

Plaintiff claims the State Act violates Article XI, Sec 178 of
the Constitution of North Dakota, which provides: “The power
of taxation shall never be surrendered or suspended by any
grant or contract to which the state or any county or other
municipal corporation shall be a party,” and Article II, Sec
69, which provides: “The legislative assembly shall not pass
local or speciallaws . . . (29) Exempting property from tax-
ation,” and finally, Article XI, Sec 176, which requires that “Tax-
es shall be uniform upon the same class of property . . . .”

Plaintiff bases all these objections on the grounds that the
purposes of the housing act are private rather than public and
that all the property of the Housing Authority is private prop-
erty. We have found to the contrary so that his argument fails.

The Housing Authority is created “a public body corporate
and politic.” See 23-1102 NDRC 1943. It is a public corpora-
tion for public purposes. Article XI, Sec 176 of the State Con-
stitution provides, in part:

“The property of the United States and of the state, county
and municipal corporations and property used exclusively for
schools, religious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes
shall be exempt from taxation.” (Emphasis added.)

Sec 57-0208 (3) NDRC 1943 provides: —

“All property, real or personal, belonging to any county, city,
village, park district, township, school district, or to any other
municipal corporation” shall be exempt from taxation.

Sec 23-1129 NDRC 1943 provides: ,

“The property of an authority is declared to be public prop-
erty used for essential public and governmental purposes and
shall be exempt from all taxes and special assessments of the
city, the county, the state or any political subdivision thereof.

»

It is clear that the legislative intent is that any property held
by a housing authority, a public corporation, for public purposes
shall be exempt from taxation.’ The constitutional and legisla-
tive declarations are definite that property held exélusively for
“public purposes” shall be exempt from taxation. State ex rel.
Linde v. Packard, 35 ND 298, 317, 160 NW 150, LRA1917B 710.

ee 789

In Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal2d 487, 453, 94
P2d 794, 802, the court says:

“Section 4 of the Housing Authorities Law, ... defines an
authority as ‘a publie body, corporate and politic,’ Such an au-
thority is not unlike an irrigation district which, though held not
to be a muncipal corporation within the meaning of the quoted
constitutional provision, has been held to be a public corporation
for municipal purposes whose property is exempt from taxation.
(Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. White, 186 Cal 183, 198 P 1060, 17 ALR
72; Anderson-Cottonwood Irrig. Dist. v. Klukkert, 13 Cal2d 191,
88 Pac2d 685.) Similarly reclamation districts have been de-
clared to be public agencies whose properties are likewise ex-
empt from taxation. .'(Reclamation Dist. v. County of Sacra-
mento, 134 Cal 477, 66 Pac 668.) In Laguna Beach Water Dist.
v. Orange Co., 30 Cal App2d 740, 87 Pac2d-46, 47, it is stated
that ‘It must be conceded that it has always been the policy of
the law in California since the adoption of the present Constitu-
tion, to exempt from taxation property of the state and state
agencies generally classified as publie corporations.’ Moreover,
while provisions exempting private property from taxation are
to be strictly construed, the rule is otherwise as to public prop-
erty which is to be taxed only if there is express authority there-
for. (Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles, 182 Cal 171, 174, 187
Pac 418.)”

Plaintiff argues that paying ten per cent of the shelter rents
to the local government is an invalid attempt to compromise
taxes for an amount less than the full taxes, in violation of the
constitutional requirement that “taxes shall be uniform,” and
also an attempted suspension of the power of taxation, in viola-
tion of Article XI, Sec 176 of the State Constitution. These con-
tentions are pyramided upon prior contentions that the purpose
is not public and that the tax exemption is-invalid. Since both
those points have been denied against the plaintiff, there is no
base upon which to uphold this contention. The property of the
Housing Authority is expressly exempted from taxation. Hence,
there can be no question of the surrender or suspension of the
power to tax on the part of the City. Furthermore, the payment
of a percentage of the shelter rents has no bearing, either ex-

790 —

‘pressly or by implication, on the subject of tax exemption of
property of the Authority. The payment of a percentage of the
shelter rents.to the municipality is merely reimbursement for
the services which: the municipality must necessarily render to
the project. See Thomas v. Housing & Redevelopment Author-
ity, 234 Minn 221, 48 NW2d 175; McNulty v. Owens, 188 SC 377,
199 SE 425.

In Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa 329, 54 A
2d 277, itis said:

“The provision of the Redevelopment Cooperation Law that
any city, borough, town, township or county may contract with
a Redevelopment Authority with respect to any sums which the
Authority may agree to pay for special improvements, services
and facilities to be provided by such city, borough, town, town-
ship or county for the benefit of the redevelopment, does not,
either expressly or impliedly, have any bearing on, or relation
to, the subject of tax exemption of property within the redevel-
opment area.” .

Plaintiff then attacks the provision that no lien shall attach
to the project or its assets upon failure to make the agreed pay-
ment.

Since the housing authority is a public body, its officers are
public officers. This court will not assume that public officers
will not do their duty, such as refusing to make payment for
services. Furthermore, should the housing authority’s officers
fail or refuse to make the agreed payments, they could be com-
pelled to do so through mandamus, or mandatory injunction
buttressed by contempt proceedings. A lien cannot attach to
housing authority property any more than it could to any other
public property.

Since the purpose is public, and the property publicly owned,
there is no ground for the argument made by plaintiff that the
Housing Act results in taking property off the tax rolls. Cox
v. City of Kinston, 217 NC 391, 8 SE2d 252, 257. On the other
hand, it is contended that the removal of, the slum area and its
contaminating effects will cause a rise in property values and
tax income at all levels of government.

Although he did not seriously urge it on appeal, plaintiff al-

ee 791

leged in his complaint that the housing authority bonds would
constitute debts of the county in excess of the constitutional
limitation in Article XII, Sec 183, and would also contravene the
prohibition in the same section against increasing the bonded
indebtedness of the county without a majority vote, to acquire a
“revenue producing utility.” See 23-1120, NDRC 1943, expressly
provides three alternative methods by which the housing author-
ity can pay off the bonds and interest thereon, and then un-
equivocally and explicitly states that “The bonds and other obli-
gations of the authority shall not be payable out of any funds or
properties other than those of the authority.” By the terms of
this statute no liability for the project can be imposed upon the
county or city. Redmon v. Chacey, 7 ND 231, 73 NW 1081. In
jurisdictions having substantially the same constitutional pro-
visions and housing-slum clearance statutes as in the case at
bar, it has been held unanimously that the bonds of housing au-
thorities do not constitute an indebtedness of the local govern-
ment within the meaning of the Constitution. With these we are
in full agreement.

Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that the city is pledging its
credit in support of the housing project contrary to Article XII,
See 185 of the State Constitution, which provides that “. . .
neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall other-
wise loan or give its credit or make donations to or in aid of
any individual, association or corporation except for reason-
able support of the poor, . . .” The housing project is financed
by federal government aid and by the issue of bonds for neither
of which the city’s credit is pledged, nor is the city in any way
liable. Redmon v. Chacey, supra; Rutherford v. City of Great
Falls, 107 Mont 512, 86 P2d 656; Dornan vy. Philadelphia Hous-
ing Authority, 331 Pa 209, 200 Atl 834; State ex rel. Porterie
v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La 710, 182 So 725;
Marvin v. Housing Authority of Jacksonville, 133 Fla 590, 183
So 145; McNulty v. Owens, 188 SC 377, 199 SE 425; Williamson
v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga 673, 199 SE 43; Hous-
ing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14 Cal2d 437, 94 P2d 794; Edwards
v. Housing Authority of Muncie, 215 Ind 330, 19 NE2d 741;
Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority, 370 Ill 356, 19 NH2d 193;

792 ee

Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa 329, 54 Atl2d 277;
Humphrey v. City of Phoenix, 55 Ariz 374, 102 P2d 82; Mc-
Laughlin v. Housing Authority of Las Vegas, 68 Nev 84, 227
P2d 206; Mumpower v. Housing Authority of Bristol, 176 Va
426, 11 SH2d 732, and others.

Plaintiff also contends that the State Act violates Article IV,
See 85, of the Constitution’ providing that the judicial power
shall be vested in the courts and Article I, Sec 22, providing the
courts shall be open and every man for any injury done him
shall have a remedy by due process of law. In support of that
he cites See 23-1104 NDROC 1943 providing that in any proceed-
ing involving the validity or enforcement of any contract of
the authority, “the authority shall be conclusively deemed to
have become established and authorized to transact business and
exercise its powers hereunder upon proof of the adoption of a
resolution by the governing body of the city or county declaring
the need for authority.” This provision he claims gives the city
or county board judicial power and shuts anyone questioning
the organization of the authority out of court.

The legislature determined by See 23-1103 NDRC 1943 the
method of activating the housing authority created by See 23-
1102 NDRC 1948. It delegated to the governing body of a city
or county the finding of the facts necessary for the activation
of the housing authority. That body finds the facts but passes
no judgment thereon. It is given no judicial power. Then by
See 23-1104 NDRC 1943 the legislature declared that, on the
proof of the adoption of the resolution containing the finding of
the facts necessary under Sec 23-1103 NDRC 1943 for the activa-
tion of the authority, the authority shall be conclusively deemed
to-have been established and authorized to transact business.
The legislature declared that the proof of the resolution con-
clusively presumed that the necessary facts were found by the
governing body. ,

Generally the legislature alone determines ‘the facts upon
which legislation is passed. The mere passing of the legislation
is taken as the proof of such finding. Usually the presumption
of the correctness of such facts is regarded as conclusive unless

ee 798

an abuse of discretion is shown. In 11 Am Jur, Constitutional
Law, See 142, p 820, it is said:

“As a general rule it may be stated that the determination of
facts required for the proper enactment of statutes is for the
legislature alone, that the presumption as to the correctness of
its findings is usually regarded as conclusive unless an abuse of
discretion can be shown, and that the courts do not generally
have jurisdiction or power to reopen the question or make new
findings of fact.” See also State ex rel. Sullivan v. Dammann,
227 Wis 72, 277 NW 687; Ex parte Yun Quong, 159 Cal 508, 114
P 835, Ann Cases 1912 C 969.

In the instant case the legislature made a determination of
the existence of slum conditions in this state when it passed the
Housing Authorities Act. It had the power to make that finding
conclusive for every authority established. Instead it delegated
to the city or county authorities, who may be presumed to have
better knowledge thereof, the final finding of the facts in each
locality and made their findings conclusive. It had the authority
to do that. The findings so made cannot, under the cireum-
stances shown in this case, be questioned in the courts. This
provision in the law is not violative of Article IV, Sec 85 or
Article I, Sec 22 of the State Constitution.

In the case of Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 NO 391, 8 SH2d
252, 257, the court had for consideration a similar feature of
the law creating the North Carolina Housing Authority. The
court came to the same conclusion as we have, although for some-
what different reasons. The court said:

“The statute provides: ‘In any suit, action or proceeding in-
volving the validity or enforcement of or relating to any contract
of the Authority, the Authority shall be conclusively deemed to
have been established in accordance with the provisions of this
article upon proof of the issuance of the aforesaid certificate by
the Secretary of State” We regard this as a perfectly legitimate
provision, and similar provisions for the purpose of quieting
litigation have often been sustained by the Court. It does not
assume judicial power by preventing or curtailing its exercise
by the courts. It simply bars an attack on the procedure after
a certificate of incorporation has been obtained from the Secre-

794 Ee

tary of State. . . . It was, therefore, competent to cure un-
essential defects in the procedure which the law-making body
might have seen fit to omit imprimis.”

A similar rule was followed in the cases of Woodworth v. Gall-
man, 195 SC 157, 10 SH2d 316, and Knoxville Housing Author-
ity v. City of Knoxville, 174 Tenn 76, 123 SW2d 1085.

The plaintiff claims that the title to the Housing Authorities
Act as enacted in Chapter 102 SL 1987 violates Article 2, Sec 61
of the constitution which provides that: “No bill shall embrace
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, ...”
His contention is that the provision of the state act conferring
upon the housing authorities the power of eminent domain is
not expressed in the title of the said act.

On examining the title of the original act, Chapter 102 SL
1937 we find that the purpose expressed in the title is the crea-
tion of housing authorities, defining their powers and providing
for the exercise of such powers “including acquiring property.”
Eminent domain is certainly germane to the acquiring of prop-
erty and is, therefore, within the title according to the decisions
of this court. Sce State ex rel. Weeks v. Olson, 65 ND 407, 259
NW 83; State ex rel. Gammons v. Shafer, 63 ND 128, 246 NW
874; Thompson Yards v. Kingsley, 54 ND 49, 208 NW 949;
State ex rel. Kol v. North Dakota Children’s Home Society, 10
ND 493, 88 NW 273.

In this case, however, the question raised becomes immaterial
because the original act, Chapter 102 SL 1937, together with its
title was repealed by the enactment of the North Dakota Re-
vised Code 1943, See 1-0219. In the Code that chapter was re-
enacted as Chapter 23-11 under the proper title for the whole
code. We have held that a statute, even if it fails to comply
with the provision of See 61 of the Constitution becomes valid
upon its incorporation in the North Dakota Revised Code duly
adopted as such. Lapland v. Stearns, ante, 62, 54 NW2d 748;
59 CJ Statutes, See 376 p 799; J. P. Schaller Co. v. Canistota
Grain Co., 32 SD 15, 141 NW 993.

“Where a section of a legislative act has been incorporated
in the Revised Codes and adopted as a part of the complete stat-
utes of the state, the court will not inquire into or consider the

| 795

sufficiency of the oviginal title of the act in which such section
was originally adopted by the Legislature. In such case, it is
too late to raise the sufficiency of the title to the original ‘act,
which was adopted prior to the date of its incorporation and
adoption in the Revised Codes of the state.” Anderson v: Great
Northern Railway Oo., 25 Idaho 433, 188 P 127, 128, Ann Cas
1916C 191.

Plaintiff contends that the housing authorities act grants spe-
cial privileges. It was enacted in 1937 as an emergency measure.
Therefore plaintiff claims that the act violates Article II, Sec
67 of the constitution which provides that no act of the legisla-
tive assembly shall take effect until July 1st after the’close of
the session unless the legislature by a two-thirds vote shall de-
clare an emergency and then continues: “Provided, however,
that no act granting a franchise or special privilege, or creating
an invested right or one other than in the state, shall be declared
an emergency measure.”

That section of the constitution relates only to the time when
an act goes into effect. Even if that emergency clause is at-
tached to a law’ granting special privilege that does not affect
the act but only the validity of the emergency clause. As the
time has long passed for the act to go into effect without the
emergency clause the question of the validity of the emergency
clause is not in issue here. Strange v. Levy, 134 Md 645, 107 Atl
549; Dinneen v. Rider, 152 Md 348, 136 Atl 754; State ex rel.
Pierce v. Coos County, 115 Ore 300, 237 P 678.

Furthermore, we have held that the state housing authorities
act is not legislation granting any special privilege so that the
emergency clause cannot effect it anyhow. There is no conflict.
with Article II, Sec 67 of the constitution.

It is finally claimed that there is no specific provision in the
state housing act granting authority to the city to cooperate
with the housing authority and that, therefore the cooperative
agreement is beyond the power of the city and void.

In the original housing authority law, Chapter 102 SL 1937
there is no specific provision for the: cooperation of the city with
the authority. Such cooperation, however, is implied and cer-
tainly can be exercised in as far as the general powers granted

796 Le

the city cover'the matters upon which cooperation is désired.
That the legislature so intended is shown by the amendments to
the original housing authority act when it was extended to cover
the building of sanitary dwellings for persons engaged in na-
tional defense and veterans of World Wars I and II. Chapter
217 SL 1941 (Now Sec 23-1133, NDRC 1949 Suppl) and Chapter
191 SL 1949. Those amendments granted the same right and
power to the city, county or other public body to cooperate with
the housing authority which they had for the purpose of assist-
ing the development or administration of slwm clearance or hous-
ing projects. Sec 23-1133 1949 Supplement and Chapter 191
SL 1949. See Fradet v. The City of Southwest Fargo, post, 799,
59 NW2d 871 currently decided.

See 40-0501 NDRC 1948, provides that the governing body
of the municipality shall have the following amongst other
powers:

(8) To lay out, establish, open, alter, repair, clean, widen,
vacate, grade, pave, park or otherwise improve and regulate the
use of streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crossings and public
grounds, ... and

(35) To prevent and provide for remedying any dangerous
construction or condition of any building, inclosure, manufac-
tory.creating a fire hazard; to prevent a deposit of ashes or
refuse in unsafe places; and to require all buildings and places
to be put and kept in a safe condition.

(44) To declare what shall constitute a nuisance and to pre-
vent, abate and remove the same.

(45) To make regulations necessary or expedient for the
promotion of health or for suppression of disease.

(59) To accept aid from, cooperate and contract with, and to
comply with and meet the requirements of any federal or state
agency for the establishment, construction and maintenance of
public works . . . and in furtherance thereof to.acquire by
purchase, lease, gift’ or condemnation the necessary lands,
rights-of-way and easements for such projects, and to transfer
and convey to the state or federal government or any agency
thereof such lands, rights-of-way and easements in consideration
of the establishment and construction of, and the public benefits

See

which will be derived from any such project. (Chapter 284 SL
1947.) oo

Gities shall have the additional powers:

(18) To Adopt a Zoning Ordinance... .

40-4701 NDRC 1943. For the purpose of promoting health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, the
governing body of any city may regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts,
and other open spaces, the density of population, and the loca-
tion and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, in-
dustry, residence, or other purposes. Such regulations may
provide that a board of adjustment may determine and vary
the application of the regulations in harmony with their general
purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific
rules therein contained.

Sec 40-0501 NDRC 1949 Suppl 1. Ordinance. To enact or
adopt all such ordinances, resolutions, not repugnant to the con-
stitution and laws of this state, as may be proper and necessary
to carry into effect the powers granted to such municipality or
as the general welfare of the municipality may require, and to
repeal, alter, or amend the same. The governing body of a
municipality may adopt by ordinance the conditions; provisions,
and terms of a building code, a fire prevention code, a plumbing
code, an electrical code, a sanitary code, or any other standard
code which contains rules and regulations printed as a code in
book or pamphlet form by reference to such code or portions
thereof alone without setting forth in said ordinance the condi-
tions, provisions, limitations and terms of such code. . . .

In connection with the objection to the cooperation agreement
plaintiff first raises the question of the authority of the city to
agree that it will not tax the property of the housing authority.
That, however, is merely in accordance with the law. We have
found that property of tlie authority is not subject to taxation.

The plaintiff then claims that the agreement violates Article
12, Sec 185 of the state constitution prohibiting the extension of
credit or making donations in aid of any individual, association

798 De

or corporation. That is without merit since the local housing
authority is a public corporation engaged in publie work.

The plaintiff then objects to the provision that the city agrees
to “vacate such streets, roads and alleys within the area of such
project as may be necessary in the development thereof and
convey without charge to local authority. such interest as the
municipality may have in such vacated areas.” The authority
for that, however, is-provided in Section 40-0501, (8) and (59).

The North Dakota Housing Authorities Law is constitutional.
A city can enter into a cooperation agreement with a housing
authority on matters which are within the general powers
granted the city.

We have considered all of the objections to the cooperative
agreement presented by the plaintiff. None of them are well
taken... The plaintiff has failed to present any valid challenge
to that agreement in this case. Other challenges have been con-
sidered and held to invalidate portions of the agreement in
Fradet v. City of Southwest Fargo, currently decided. The
plaintiff not being entitled to prevail on any points presented
in this case, the judgment appealed from, in so far as it holds
that the North Dakota Housing Authorities Law is constitutional
and denies the plaintiff injunctive relief is affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Curistianson, Satune and Burke, JJ.,
concur.

P| 799
[File No. 7374]

LAWRENCE FRADET, Florence Fradet, Clarence Drenth
and Eleanor Drenth, on behalf of themselves and all
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants v.
CITY OF SOUTHWEST FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA,
a municipal corporation, The Housing Authority of
Cass County, North Dakota, and Don Brekke, Joe Farrell,
J. M. Dahle, Howard Potter, Jr., and Wayne Ostlund, as
commissioners of The Housing Authority of Cass County,
North Dakota, Defendants and Respondents.

(59 NWe2d 871)

ry

00

Opinion filed July 22, 1953, Rehearing denied Sept. 16, 1953

Cupler, Tenneson, Serkland & Leahy, for appellants.

Ohnstad & McCauley, for respondents.

802 a

Morris, Ch. J. The plaintiffs are citizens, residents, taxpayers,
and owners of property in the City of Southwest Fargo and
bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated. The defendant City of Southwest Fargo was incor-
porated as a city under the laws of North Dakota on or about
January 25, 1947, and according to the federal census of 1950
then had a population of 1,032.

The Housing Authority of Cass County, North Dakota, was
created by Section 4, Chapter 102 SLND 1937 (Section 23-1102
NDRC 1943). On April 5, 1951, the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Cass County adopted a resolution, in form and content
complying with Section 23-1103 NDRC 1943, declaring that there
was need for a housing authority in the County of Cass and on
the same day by another resolution appointed five persons as
commissioners of the authority created for Cass County as
prescribed by Section 23-1105 NDRC 1943. These five com-
missioners, the Housing Authority of Cass County, and the City
of Southwest Fargo are made defendants in this action in which
the plaintiffs allege the performance of various illegal acts on
the part of the defendants in connection with the creation and
activation of a slum clearance and housing project within the
City of Southwest Fargo, including the execution of a contract
known as a cooperation agreement entered into between the
Housing Authority of Cass County and the City of Southwest
Fargo on April 10, 1951. The plaintiffs ask the court to restrain
the defendants from continuing the alleged illegal acts and from
carrying out the terms of the cooperation agreement.

In the course of their attack the plaintiffs challenge the con-
‘stitutionality of the State Housing Authorities Law, Chapter
23-11 NDRO 1943, as amended by the 1949 Supplement to
NDRC.

ee 803

Ferch v. The Housing Authority of Cass County and the City
of Southwest Fargo, ante, 799, 59 NW2d.849, currently decided,
involves the same facts, including the cooperation agreement;
the same housing authority; and the same city as are involved
in this action. We there considered at length the constitutional-
ity of the Housing Authorities Law as against the same chal-
lenges that are raised herein. These challenges will not be
further considered here, with one exception, upon which the
plaintiffs lay great emphasis. They contend that the provisions
of the State Housing Authorities Law granting preference ‘fo
persons of low income is contrary to and in violation of Section
20 of the state constitution. This section provides:

“No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the legislative
assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not
be granted to all citizens.”

The Housing Authorities Law definitely favors persons of
low income. This term is defined by Section 23-1101 as follows:

“Persons of low income’ shall mean persons or families who
lack the amount of income which is necessary, as determined by
the authority undertaking the housing project, to enable them,
without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe, and sanitary
dwellings without overcrowding; ... .”

Section 23-1114 NDRC 1943 authorizes the housing authority.
to rent or lease dwelling accommodations only to persons of
low income, and further prescribes:

“Tt shall not accept any person as a tenant in any housing proj-
ect ifthe person or persons who would occupy the dwelling ac-
commodations have an aggregate annual income in excess of five
times the annual rental of the quarters to be furnished such per-
son or persons.”

The plaintiffs argue that the privileges thus conferred upon
persons of low income constitute an unconstitutional classifica-
tion by the legislature and that the classification is artificial,
capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable and renders the State
Housing Authorities Law void. In support of their contention
the plaintiffs cite Herr v. Rudolf, 75 ND 91, 25 NW2d 916, 169

804 Ee

ALR 1388, and State ex rel. Mitchell v. Mayo, 15 ND 327, 108
NW 36. In the latter case the constitutionality of a statute per-
taining to the distribution of the interest and penalty collected on
taxes was involved. The statute was ‘held in part unconstitu-
tional on the ground it was unreasonably discriminatory because

“The city taxpayers are to be given the exclusive enjoyment
of the interest and penalties collected at the expense of the
county from city taxpayers, but the county taxpayers must share
the interest and penalties on taxes in the rural district with the
city taxpayers.”

In that case the classification; if such it may be called, was
purely arbitrary and bore no relation to any reasonable or law-
ful purpose which the act might be said to accomplish. This
court stated the proper rule in Herr v. Rudolf, supra, as follows:

“Where a statute creates a classification of citizens to be dif-
ferently affected by the same general rule, the classification must
be natural and not artificial, reasonable and not arbitrary. or
capricious, and must rest upon some difference which bears a
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the
classification is proposed.”

In Section 2 of the original State Housing Authorities Act,
Chapter 102 SLND 1937, we find a declaration of necessity which,
in part, says:

“Tt is hereby declared: (a) that there exist in the State in-
sanitary or unsafe dwelling accommodations and that persons
of low income are forced to reside in such insanitary or. unsafe
accommodations; that within the State there is a shortage of
safe or sanitary dwelling accommodations available at rents
which persons of low income can afford and that such persons
are forced to occupy over crowded and congested dwelling ac-
commodations ; that the aforesaid conditions cause an increase in
and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the State
and impair economic values; that these conditions necessitate
excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for
crime prevention and punishment, public health and safety, fire
and accident protection, and other public services and facilities;

,

| 808

Tn view of the declared purpose of the State Housing Authori-
ties Law, which we have already held in Ferch v. The Housing
Authority of Cass County and the City of Southwest Fargo,
supra, to be a proper public purpose, it is clear to us that the
favored classification of “persons of low income”. is neither arti-
ficial, capricious, arbitrary, nor unreasonable and is not viola-
tive of. Section 20 of the North Dakota Constitution.

The housing authority.acts of other states have faced similar
challenges which were rejected in these cases: Thomas v. Hous-
ing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth, 234 Minn 221, 48
NW2d 175; McLaughlin v. Housing Authority of City of Las
Vegas, 68 Nev 84, 227 P2d 206; Housing Authority of Los
Angeles v. Dockweiler, 14 02d 437, 94 P2d 794; Humphrey v.
City of Phoenix, 55 Ariz 374, 102 P2d 82; Spahn v. Stewart, 268
Ky 97, 103 SW2d 651; Housing Authority of City of Dallas v.
Higginbotham, 135 Tex 158, 143 SW2d 79, 130 ALR 1053; Denard
v. Housing Authority of Fort Smith, 203 Ark 1050, 159 SW2d
764; Franco v. City of New Haven, 133 Conn 544, 52 A2d 866;
Williamson v, Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga 673, 199
SE -43; New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 NY
333, 1 NE2d 153, 105 ALR 905; Benjamin v. Housing Authority
of Darlington County, 198 SC 79, 15 SH2d 737; Krause v. Peoria
Housing Authority, 370 Ill 356, 19 NE2d 193; In re Brewster
Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313, 289 NW 493.

The plaintiffs assert that the State Housing Authorities Law
has no application and contains no authority for the establish-
ment of housing projects in cities having a population of less
than five thousand. This argument is based on the title to the
original Housing Authorities Act, Chapter 102 SLND 1937, and
on the provisions of the law itself. The title to the original act
states that it is

“An-Act to declare the necessity of creating public bodies
corporate and politic to be known ‘as housing authorities to un-
dertake slum clearance and projects to provide dwelling accom-
‘modations for persons of low income; to create such housing
authorities in cities having a population of more than 5,000 in-
habitants and in Counties; . . ..”

Section 23-1101 NDRC 1943, subsection 2, provides:

806 De

“Qity’ shall mean any city having population of more than
five thousand inhabitants according to the last federal or state
-census and ‘the city’ shall mean the particular city for which a
particular housing authority is created; . . . .”

Subsection 3 provides:

“<County’ shall mean any county in this state and ‘the county’
shall mean the particular county for which a particular housing
authority is created; . . . .”

Subsection 7 states that the area of operation shall include:

“In the case of a housing authority of a county, all of the
county except that portion which lies within the territorial
boundaries of-any city; ... .”

It is argued that: the latter provision excludes from the area
of operation of a county housing authority all territory lying
within a city; that a city housing authority only includes cities
having more than five thousand inhabitants; and that therefore
cities having populations of five thousand or less may not be
included either in a city-housing authority or a county housing
authority. It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature in-
tended any such result, We conclude that the legislature in-
tended that all areas of population other than cities of more than
five thousand inhabitants were to be included within the area of
operation of the county housing authority. Any possible doubt
as to the meaning of the legislature is dispelled by reference to
the original act. Chapter 102 SLND 1937, section 3 (f) states:

“‘Area of Operation’ . . . in the case of a housing au-
thority of a County, shall include all of the County except that
portion which lies within the territorial boundaries of any city
as herein defined.” (Italics supplied.)

The act having defined cities as those having a population of
more than five thousand inhabitants, it is clear that the area of
a county housing authority was intended to include all territory
of the county not lying within cities of the prescribed popula-
tion. The change in wording wrought by the omission of the
phrase “as herein defined” was made by the code commission
and in the original reviser’s notes it is stated that this section
“was revised in form for clarity and brevity without change in
meaning.” It is apparent that the legislature, in the original

EE 807.

act and in adopting the code, had no intention of omitting from
the operation of the Housing Authorities Law cities having a
population of five thousand or less.

The plaintiffs contend that the Housing Authority of Cass
County was never legally created and seek to show that the res-
olution of April 5, 1951, adopted by the Board of County Com-
missioners of Cass County declaring that there was a need for
a housing authority in Cass County was arbitrary and amounted
to an abuse of power. We will pass over the question of whether
the plaintiffs as private parties have a right to challenge the
existence of a public body corporate and politic, such as the
one here involved, and discuss the merits of the contention.

It should be noted that Section 23-1102 NDRC 1943 creates a
housing authority in each county of the state whether there is
need for it or not. Although thus created, it lies dormant until
the governing body of the county, by resolution, declares that
there is need for the authority to function in the county.

“The determination as to whether there is such need may be
made by the governing body on its own motion and shall be made
upon filing of a petition signed by twenty-five residents of the
city or county, as the case may be, asserting that there is need
for such authority to function in such city or county and re-
questing that the governing body so declare.” ,

In this case the determination was made by the board of
county commissioners on its own motion. According to the tes-
timony of a member of the board of county commissioners, a
group of probably a half dozen citizens of Southwest Fargo and
their attorney appeared before the board of county commis-
sioners. The witness says:

“They asked us if we were in favor of a housing unit for
Southwest Fargo and we told them as far as we were concerned
we had no objection, because we knew the housing situation was
short and we. had no objection.”

The witness also testified that the county commissioners did
not make any independent investigation or survey of the hous-
ing conditions in Southwest Fargo. From that it is argued that
the action of the board of county commissioners was arbitrary
and that the passage of the resolution of necessity was an abuse

808 De

of discretion. We do not agree. The law does not require the
board of county commissioners to hold a hearing, nor does it
prescribe to what extent an investigation, independent or other-
wise, must be made. The statute permits the board to make the
determination of necessity upon its own motion. This it did.
The fact that the members of the board did not conduct an in-
dependent investigation does not establish that they were un-
familiar with or incompetent to make a determination with
respect to the housing necessities in Cass County. The members
of the board undoubtedly believed in good faith that there was
such a need. We do not conclude from the mere fact that they
did not make an independent investigation that their determina-
tion was arbitrary and their action in passing the resolution is
void. Woodworth v. Gallman, 195 SC 157, 10 SH2d 316.

We would further point out that Section 23-1104 NDRC 1943
provides that:

“In any suit, action, or proceeding involving the validity or
enforcement of, or relating to, any contract of the authority, the
authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become estab-
lished and authorized to transact business and exercise its
powers hereunder upon proof of the adoption of a resolution
by the governing body of the city or county declaring the need
for the authority. Such resolution shall be deemed sufficient if
it declares that there is need for an authority and finds that
either or both of the conditions enumerated in section 23-1103
exist in the city or county, as the case may be.”

Section 23-1103 NDRC 1943 provides that the resolution must
contain a finding:

“1. That insanitary or unsafe inhabited dwelling accommoda-
tions exist in the city or county; or

“2, That there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling ac-
commodations in such city or county available to persons of low
income at rentals they can afford to pay.”

The resolution in question finds that both of these conditions
exist in Cass County. The plaintiffs’ challenge to the legality
of the creation and establishment of the Housing Authority of
Cass County is not well taken.

| 809

The final and perhaps the most difficult question confronting
us grows out of Exhibit A, an instrument known as a “Coopera-
tion Agreement” entered into on April 10, 1951, between the
Housing Authority of Cass County, designated as the “local
authority,” and the City of Southwest Fargo, called the “munic-
ipality.” The plaintiffs vigorously assert that this agreement
is wholly beyond the powers of the city to execute or carry out
and is ultra vires and void. In a two pronged attack the plain-
tiffs contend that the execution of such a contract in general is
wholly ultra vires and that in any event certain specific provi-
sions therein contained pledge the city. to do certain acts that
it has no power or authority to do.

With respect to the general contention of ultra vires, the
plaintiffs cite Stern v. City of Fargo, 18 ND 289, 122 NW 403, in
which this court said:

“It is well settled that incorporated cities have only the follow-
ing powers: (1) Those granted in express words; (2) those
necessarily implied or incident to the powers expressly granted;
(8) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
eorporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable; (4) that
doubtful claims of power, or doubt or ambiguity in the terms
used by the Legislature, are resolved against the corporation.”

In a number of subsequent cases we have adhered to the gen-
eral rule that cities are agencies of the state and have only the
powers expressly conferred upon them by the legislative branch
of the government or such as may be necessarily implied from
the powers expressly granted. The Village of North Fargo v.
Fargo, 49 ND 597, 192 NW 977; State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brekke,
75 ND 468, 28 NW2d 598; City of Fargo v. Sathre, 76 ND 341,
36 NW2d 39; James v. Young, 77 ND 451, 48 NW2d 692.

In Chapter 40-05 NDRC 1943 we find-a general enumeration
of the powers of all municipalities and in Section -40- “0501 NDRO
1943 it is stated that:

“The governing body of a municipality shall have the power:

“oy To enact or adopt all such ordinances, resolutions,
and regulations, not repugnant to the constitution and laws of
this state, as may be proper and necessary to carry into effect
the powers granted to such municipality or as the general wel-

810 Ee

fare of the municipality may require, and to repeal, alter, or
amend the same.”

The plaintiffs argue that there is no express legislative au-
thority vesting in the city power to enter into a cooperation
agreement with a county housing authority and that the doctrine
of implied powers cannot be expanded to justify such authority
upon the ground that the legislature assumed that cities had
power to cooperate in the housing program because the Housing
Authorities Law expressly gives such power to the housing au-
thority. Their assertion of the absence of express authority is
correct. Its absence does not impel us to the conclusion. that no
implied authority can exist.. The question is not whether the
legislature assumed that the cities had such power but whether
the legislature intended them to have it. The ultimate search
therefore is to ascertain the legislative intention in enacting the
housing authorities law. Cities already had the power to enact
or adopt all such ordinances, ‘resolutions, and regulations not
repugnant to the constitution and laws of the state as the gen-
eral welfare of the municipality may require when the legisla-
ture provided for a public body corporate and politie in each
county in the state which, when activated by the governing body
of the county, had authority to function throughout the county,
both in and out of municipalities, except in cities having a popu-
lation of more than five thousand inhabitants. The county
housing authority, by Section 23-1111 NDRC 1948, was given
thirty-four enumerated‘ powers, among them being:

“7, To prepare, carry out, acquire, lease, and operate housing
projects within its area of operation.

“8. To provide for the construction, reconstruction, improve-
ment, alteration, or repair of any housing project, or any part
thereof, within its area of operation;

“9, To arrange or contract for the furnishing by any person
or any public or private agency of services, privileges, works,
or facilities for, or in connection with, a housing project or the
occupants thereof; .. . .”

The original Housing Authorities Law contained no ‘direct
reference to a cooperation agreement’ between the housing au-
thority and the municipality in which a particular housing pro-

a sit

ject was located but it is clearly implied by Section 23-1129
NDRC 1948 that the housing project could obtain normal gov-
ernment services and the use of normal facilities from the city
in which the project was located. That section, after providing
that the property of the authority was public property and
exempt from all taxes and special assessments: of the city,
states:

“In lieu of such taxes or special assessments, an authority
may agree to make payments to the city, county, state, or any
such political subdivision for improvements, services, and facil-
ities furnished thereby for the benefits of a housing project, but
in no event shall such payments exceed the estimated cost to
such city, county, or political subdivision of the improvements,
services, or facilities to be so furnished.”

‘When we take into consideration the general welfare clause
already in the municipal law and the finding and declaration of
necessity contained in Section 2 of Chapter 102 SLND 1937,
which we have already quoted, emphasizing the necessity for
and the purpose of the law, which was to relieve the shortage
of safe and sanitary accommodations available at rents which
persons of low income could afford and to thereby combat the
increase in the spread of disease and crime and alleviate condi-
tions which cause a menace to health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare of the people, it is the clear implication of the sections of
the Housing Authorities Law to which’we have referred that
cities should cooperate with the local housing authorities in
the creation and development of housing projects within their
borders by making available to them the services and facilities
commonly and normally furnished to other residents of the
municipality. Both the housing authority and the city are
agencies of the state. The legislature intended that they would
cooperate with and deal with each other within the respective
spheres of their powers, either express or implied. This con-
clusion is strengthened by the act of the 1941 legislature which
extended housing authority activity into the realm of national
defense by furnishing housing for persons engaged in national
defense activities. This was a new and separate purpose which
may, at least in some instances, have fallen beyond the scope

12 |

of general welfare’ of cities. In order to make certain of the
power of cities and other public bodies to cooperate with housing
authorities in this new field it was provided by Section 4, Chap-
ter 217 SLND 1941; Section 23-1133 NDRC 1948 that:

“Any city, county, or other public body shall have the right and
power to cooperate with housing authorities, or with the federal
government, with respect to the development or administration
of projects to assure the availability of safe and sanitary dwell-
ings for persons engaged in national-defense activities which
such city, county, or other public body has for the purpose of
assisting the development or adnvinistration of slum clearance or
housing projects for persons of low income.” (Italics supplied.)

The enactment of this legislation clearly reveals that in the
opinion of the legislature any city, county, or other public body
had the right to cooperate with housing authorities in the de-
velopment of projects for the purpose of housing persons of
low income or in aid of slum clearance and that power was by
Section 23-1133 extended to make available housing for per-
sons engaged in national defense activities. That the legisla-
ture was still of the same mind eight years later is disclosed by
Section 8, Chapter 191 SLND 1949 whereby the power of cities,
counties, or other public bodies to cooperate with housing au-
thorities was further extended so as to assure the availability
of safe and sanitary dwellings for veterans of World Wars I
and II.

Construction of statutes is a judicial and not a legislative
function but the construction given toa statute by the legisla-
ture is entitled to weight in determining the legislative intention.
Finlayson v. Peterson, 5 ND 587, 67 NW 953. In construing
statutes the courts frequently refer to subsequent legislation
as indicating or at least aiding in the determination of the inten-
tion of the legislature at the time of the adoption of the original
act. 50 Am Jur Statutes, Section 337; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Third Edition, Section 5110; 59 CJ, Statutes, Sec-
tion 612.

In Cordes v. Board of Supervisors of Hamilton’ County, 197
Iowa 136, 196 NW 997, a challenge was made to the authority
of the board of supervisors to establish a drainage district with-

ee 818

in the limits of the incorporated town of Kamrar. It appears
that the statutes of Iowa did not expressly authorize the estab-
lishment of a drainage district wholly within the limits of a
town. After citing two pertinent statutes, the court said:

“It is contended that neither of these enactments amounts to
a direct grant of power to establish a drainage district wholly
within the limits of a town. They are, however, an unequivocal
recognition by the legislature that the power already existed.
These acts were in force at the time the proceedings in question
were begun. While a legislative construction of a prior statute
is not binding upon the courts, it is entitled to consideration.
Prime v. McCarthy, 92 Iowa 569; Elks v. Conn, 186 Iowa 48;
Slutts v. Dana, 188 Iowa 244. The rule is even more broadly
stated by the United States Supreme Court, which holds that,
if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia,
what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former
statute, it will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning,
and will govern the construction of the first statute. United
States v. Freeman, 3 How (US) 555 (11 L ed 724).”

In this case our legislature has twice spoken-in a manner
that can leave no doubt as to legislative interpretation, in sup-
port of the existence of the power of cities to cooperate with
housing authorities. Under the circumstances here presented,
this interpretation is highly persuasive. .

For purposes of. comparison and argument the plaintiffs cite
the provisions of the Municipal Housing and Redevelopment Act
of Minnesota, Section 462.581 Minnesota Statutes Annotated,
where the powers of municipalities relating to redevelopment
projects are set forth in detail. The Minnesota legislature has
conferred upon municipalities authority that undoubtedly is in
some instances broader than that intended to be conferred by
our legislature in ‘enacting the State Housing Authorities Law.
The Minnesota law presents an instance’ of express powers
while we are here considering the implied authority of a city to
agree to exercise and to exercise its general powers in coopera-
tion with a county housing authority in the development of a
housing project within the city. The comparison does not weigh
against the authority to be implied from our statutes. In Hum-

814 |

phrey v. City of Phoenix, 55 Ariz 374, 102 P2d 82, contracts
between the city and the housing authority were attacked on the
ground that they were beyond the powers of the city-to execute.
The court said:

“Plaintiff attacks the contracts (Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’ to the
complaint) between the USHA and the city as ultra vires the
powers of the city. These contracts concern the duties of the
city and the Housing Authority as to water rents, maintenance
of streets, ete. As is said in McNulty v. Owens, 188 SC 377, 199
SE 425, 430, supra:

«e, , An examination of the contract will show that the
City is merely obligating itself to furnish municipal services and
facilities for these tenants of the same character as those fur-
nished other tenants in the City of Columbia. A municipal cor-
poration is so obligated and this provision in the contract is
merely an acknowledgment of the -existing law on this point.
Since the property is for a public purpose and totally exempt
from taxation under the provisions of the statute, the City and
Housing Authority may agree on a payment in lieu of taxes, and
it is within the power of the City of Columbia to agree to such
payment.’ ”

‘We reach the conclusion that the City of Southwest Fargo has
authority to enter into a cooperation agreement in the general
form of Exhibit A, with the exception of certain paragraphs
which we will discuss.

The cooperation agreement contains a provision whereby the
city agrees that it will not levy or impose any real or personal
property taxes on the project. This is in accordance with the
exemption from taxation provided by Section 23-1129 NDRC
1943. See Ferch v. The Housing Authority of Cass County and
the City of Southwest Fargo, currently decided. The agreement
also provides for an annual payment in lieu of taxes which
amount is not only in lieu of taxes of the municipality but of
those of all other taxing bodies. The agreement then provides:

“The Municipality shall distribute the Payments in Lieu of
Taxes among the Taxing Bodies in the proportion which the real
property taxes which would have been paid to each Taxing Body
for such year if the Project were not exempt from taxation bears

ee 815

to the total real property taxes which would have been paid
to all of the Taxing Bodies for such year if the Project were
not exempt from taxation; Provided, however, that no payment
for any year shall be made to any Taxing Body in excess of the
amount of the real property taxes which would have been paid
to such Taxing Body for such year if the Project were not ex-
empt from taxation.”

This paragraph of the agreement clearly places upon the cty
the burden of collecting and distributing among the taxing
bodies the payment made by the county housing authority in
lieu of taxes on the project within the City of Southwest Fargo.
A municipality is in no sense a tax collecting and distributing
agency under the general laws of the state, nor is collection and
distribution of other funds belonging to political subdivisions a
municipal function. The State Housing Authorities Law does
not, either directly or by implication, impress these duties upon
the municipality. The only provision bearing upon the question
is contained in Section 23-1129, which says:

“In lieu of such taxes or special assessments, an authority
may agree to make payments to the city, county, state, or any-
such political subdivision for improvements, services, and facil-
ities furnished thereby for the benefits of a housing project,

Under this section it is clearly the duty of the county housing
authority to make separate payments to the respective taxing
bodies. The municipality has no authority to assume the burden
of collection and disbursement and the attendant expense and
responsibility.

‘Paragraph 4 of the cooperation agreement provides that:

“The Municipality agrees that, subsequent to the date of initi-
ation (as defined in the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended) of each Project and within five years after the com-
pletion thereof, or such further period as may be approved by
the PHA, there has been or will be elimination (as approved: by
the PHA) by demolition, condemnation, effective closing, or
compulsory repair or improvement, of unsafe or insanitary
dwelling units situated in the locality or metropolitan area in
which such Project is located, substantially equal in number to

816 ee

the number of newly constructed dwelling units provided by
such Project; Provided, that, where more than one family is
living in an unsafe or insanitary dwelling unit, the elimination
of such unit shall count as the elimination of units equal to the
number of families accommodated therein.”

We can find nothing in the State Housing Authorities Law
that indicates an agreement between the housing authority and
the municipality containing such a provision is contemplated.
Section 23-1111, enumerating the powers and duties of the
county housing authority, includes the following:

“22. To make studies and recommendations relating to the
problem of clearing, replanning, and reconstructing the slum
areas within its area of operation and the problem of providing
dwelling accommodations for the persons of low income, and to
cooperate with the city, county, or state, or any political sub-
division thereof, in any action taken in connection with such
problems; ... .”

According to this provision the housing authority is to do the
cooperating and the city is the dominant agency in determining
what shall be done. This section of the law contains the further
provision:

“26. To make available to appropriate agencies, including
those charged with the duty of abating or requiring the correc-
tion of nuisances or like conditions, or of demolishing unsafe or
JAnsanitary structures within its area of operation, its findings
and recommendations with regard to any building or property
where conditions exist which are dangerous to the public health,
morals, safety, or welfare; .. . .”

Here again the city is the dominant agency and it must act
within the powers vested in it by a general law pertaining to
municipalities. No additional powers in this respect are given
to municipalities by the State Housing Authorities Law, either
directly or by implication.

It should be noted here that the only express authority given
to cities with respect to the demolition, repair, or removal of
buildings is provided by Section 40-0502 NDRC 1949 Supp
which was originally enacted as Chapter 252 SLND 1945. This
section provides notice and hearing to the owner of the struc-

ee 817

ture involved and prescribes a right of appeal. The constitu-
tionality of an ordinance enacted under it was recently sustained
in Soderfelt v. The City of Drayton, ante, 742, 59 NW2d 502.
Section 4 of the agreement attempts to bind the municipality to
subject its authority to act under this statute to the approval
of the PHA. The agreement in this respect is clearly ultra vires.

We reach the conclusion that a city is authorized to contract
with the county local authority with respect to the exercise of
powers that have been granted to the city by the legislature,
either expressly or by necessary implication. A city having a
population of five thousand or less may enter into an agreement
to cooperate with the county housing authority in the perform-
ance of functions arising from the powers so granted. The State
Housing Authorities Law grants to the city no new and inde-
pendent powers and in entering into a cooperation agreement
with the county housing authority the obligations of the city
must be limited to the performance of functions falling within
the framework of the powers possessed by the municipality un-
der other statutes.

We determine that paragraph 3c of the cooperation agree-
ment imposing on the municipality the duty to collect and dis-
tribute payments in lieu of taxes among other taxing bodies is
ultra vires and void. Paragraph 4 of the agreement is also ultra
vires and void in so far as it subjects the municipality to the
exercise of discretion on the part of the PHA with respect to
the “elimination . . . by demolition, condemnation, effective
closing, or compulsory repair or improvement, of unsafe or in-
sanitary dwelling units situated in the locality or metropolitan
area in which such Project is located, . . . .” The power of
determination with respect to these matters rests in the govern-
ing body of the city and cannot be delegated to or made subject
to approval by the PHA. The two objectional paragraphs con-
tain important provisions. They cannot be stricken without a
material alteration of the agreement. This court cannot write
a new agreement for the parties either by addition or deletion.
The plaintiffs are entitled to have performance of the agreement
in its present form enjoined. The judgment appealed from is

818 ee

reversed and the district court is directed to enter a judgment
restraining the defendants from further execution of the cooper-
ation agreement, Exhibit 4, entered into on the 10th day of April,
1951, between the Housing Authority of Cass County and the
City of Southwest Fargo.

Burge, Saturn, Curistianson and Grimson, JJ., concur.
Es

[File No. 7336]

JOHN J. SEHER, Respondent v. WOODLAWN SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT NO. 26, of Kidder County, State of North Dakota,
a public corporation, Appellant.

(59 NW2d 805)

Opinion filed August 4, 1953,

Orrin Lovell and Day, Stokes, Vaaler &
pellant.

Sullivan, Kelsch & Scanlan, for Respon

822 a

Growna, District J. This is a trial de novo of an action by an
employee, employed for a particular term, at stipulated wages,
against his employer for breach of contract, namely, wrongful
dismissal before the expiration of such term.

Defendant is a common school district. On April 11, 1950,
its three-member board voted 2 to 1 to re-employ plaintiff, who
held a legal teacher’s certificate, and who had been employed
by the district for about seven years under separate annual con-
tracts. The next day, April 12,'a written contract was entered
into, wherein plaintiff was employed as superintendent of
schools, and as a teacher, for the public school of the city of
Steele, an elementary and secondary school of twelve grades,
employing ten teachers, including plaintiff. The contract stip-
ulated a term of nine months commencing September 5, and an
annual salary of $4,416 payable in nine equal installments of
$490.67.

In July, 1950, there was a change in the personnel of the school

ee 823

board. A director, Mrs. Ruth Schoenhard, who was president
of the board and had voted for Seher’s re-employment, retired,
and the vacancy was filled by a former clerk of the board, Mrs.
Josephine Ryder, who was openly opposed to the plaintiff, as
were the new president, Mrs. Margaret Smith, a member since
July, 1948, and the newly appointed clerk, Mrs. Leah DeWall.
The third director of the board, Mr. Theodore J. Braa, was
favorable to plaintiff. Hereafter, the “board” will have refer-
ence to this “divided” board.

The plaintiff performed his contractual obligations up until
December 2, 1950, when he was suspended, and thereafter he
remained ready, able and willing to perform, but was prevented
by the suspension, and later, dismissal.

On December 2 a notice of dismissal and detailed charges or
accusations were served upon plaintiff. These were signed by
the two women directors and the clerk. The hearing of the
charges was held at Steele, the president of the board presiding,
on December 15 and 16, and on January 10, 1951. The whole of
the statute, with reference to the dismissal of school teachers,
and upon which the “charges” were based, is as follows:

“The school board . . . may dismiss a teacher at any time
for plain violation of contract, gross immorality, or flagrant
neglect of duty . . . .” 1949 Suppl 15-2508 (RC 1895, s. 695).

On January 17 this motion was carried by a majority vote:

“ . , that the board finds the charges have been sustained
and that said J. J. Scher has been guilty of plain violation of
contract, gross immorality and flagrant neglect of duty and has
refused to obey the lawful orders of the board or to cooperate
with the school board; that the said J. J. Seher should be and he
is hereby dismissed as such superintendent and teacher.”

Since no findings of fact were made by the board, said con-
clusions of law and order of dismissal were not based upon or
supported by findings of fact.

On February 14, 1951, the teacher brought this action in the
District Court of Kidder County, against his employer, thé dis-
trict, for breach of his contract of employment. The trial was
held at Steele, the county seat, on September 27, 1951, before
the judge without a jury, a jury having been waived by stipu-

824 —

lation. - In addition to the testimony taken and exhibits intro-
duced at the trial, it was stipulated that a transcript of the ex-
hibits introduced at the hearing before the school board, should
be received in evidence on the trial of this action, subject to the
objections of counsel thereto.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for
Judgment of the District Court, read in part:

FINDINGS OF FACT

“7, That no evidence was offered to support the written
charges preferred by the majority members of the school board
of the defendant school district against the plaintiff to warrant
the suspension and dismissal of the plaintiff as superintendent
of schools and teacher, and that there is no competent evidence
to sustain the determination of the school board that the plain-
tiff was guilty of plain violation of contract, gross immorality
or flagrant neglect of duty, as charged by the defendant school
district.

“10. That the sum of $2502.18 is the unpaid balance upon plain-
tiff’s contract after allowing for the amount earned by the plain-
tiff from other gainful employment from the time of his dismissal
to the end of his school term and is the amount of damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff by reason of the breach of his contract.

“Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the
following Conclusions of Law:

“4, That the plaintiff has performed his contract in part and
was ready, able, and willing to perform the terms of said con-
tract on his part to be kept and performed, and that he was pre-
vented from fully performing the same by the wrongful and
unlawful suspension and dismissal by the school board of the
defendant school district. That there was no evidence to sus-
tain the determination of the school board that the plaintiff was
guilty of plain violation of contract, gross immorality or flagrant
neglect of duty, as charged by the defendant.”

ee 825

THE ISSUES

Before reviewing the evidence to see if it supports the Find-
ings and Conclusions of the District Court, we shall determine
two preliminary questions, both procedural:

(1) Did the dismissed teacher have an administrative appeal
to a superior officer and if so was such appeal (a) his exclusive
remedy, and, if not, was it (b) a condition precedent to the
commencement of this action for damages?

(2) Is the school board’s decision concerning “cause” for dis-
missal controlling upon the courts in a teacher’s action for breach
of his contract of employment?

DECISION

1. Although no appeal to a judicial tribunal is provided from
the action of the board in dismissing a teacher, the district (de-
fendant) contends that NDRC 1943, sections 15-2217 and 15-
2107 provided the teacher with an administrative remedy of
appeal, and having failed to pursue such remedy, the order of
dismissal is final. Such statutes read as follows:

“15-2217. The county superintendent of schools shall decide
all matters in controversy arising in his county in the adminis-
tration of the school laws or appealed to him from decisions of
school officers or boards. An appeal may be taken from his
decision to the superintendent of public instruction. In such
case, a full written statement of the facts, together with the
testimony and the decision of the county superintendent of pub-
lic instruction for his decision, and such decision shall be final,-
subject to appropriate remedies in the courts.”

“15-2107. The superintendent of public instruction shall coun-
sel with and advise county superintendents of schools and boards
of education in special or independent school districts upon all
matters involving the welfare of schools, and on request, he shall
give them written answers to all questions concerning school
laws. He shall decide all appeals.from decisions of county su-
perintendents of schools, and, for the consideration of such ap-
peals, he may require affidavits, verified statements, or testimony
under oath as to the facts in issue. He shall prescribe, and cause

826 ee

to be enforced, rules of practice and regulations pertaining to
the hearing and determination of appeals and such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to render effective the school
laws of the state.”

The method of review of the decisions of school officers or
school boards prescribed by these sections has no application
to the action of a school board in dismissing a teacher. Leaving
wholly on one side all questions as to the power of the legislature
to confer upon the school board the power to determine ques-
tions affecting the rights of the contracting parties arising under
a contract to which the school board is a party, it seems to us
that the reading of the sections clearly shows that there was no
intention that the method of review provided in the sections
cited should or could be made applicable to obtain a review of a
decision of a school board dismissing a teacher. It has been
generally recognized that a teacher who claims to have been dis-
missed without cause has a remedy by action for damages for
the injuries sustained. Clark v. Wild Rose Special School Dis-
trict, 47 ND 297, 182 NW 307; Mootz v. Belyea, 60 ND 741,.
236 NW 358, 75 ALR 1347; MeWithy v. Heart River School Dis-
trict, 75 ND 744, 32 NW2d 886.

2. Is “cause” for dismissal of a teacher an administrative ques-
tion or a judicial question? Should the school board or the
jury, in the first instance, determine the question of “cause”?
Under our statute, 15-2508, authorizing a school board of a com-
mon school district to dismiss a school teacher for certain speci-
fied causes, is the board’s decision controlling upon the courts
in a teacher’s action for breach of his contract of employment?

No decision of our own involving these precise questions has
been cited. However, counsel for the school district has cited
a number of cases from other states (but none from this state)
supporting the rule that the school board, rather than a jury,
must in the first instance determine the issue of “justifiable
cause” for dismissal of a teacher; and the board’s decision is
final and controlling upon the courts in a teacher’s action for
breach of contract of employment, and is not subject to judicial
control, unless the board acted corruptly, in bad faith, or in
clear abuse of its powers, Finch v. Fractional School District,

ee 827

225 Mich 674, 196 NW 532; Anderson v. Consolidated School
District, 196 Minn 256, 264 NW 784; State v. Board of Hduca-
tion, 213 Minn 550, 7 NW2d 544; Kelsey v. School District, 84
Mont 453, 276 P 26, cited in State ex rel. Howard v. Ireland, 114
Mont 488, 138 P2d 569.

However, the case ‘at bar, like all cases, must be decided in
accordance with the statutes and decisions of our own State.

Our statute, 15-2508, supra, expressly provides that the school
board of a common school district “may dismiss a teacher at
any time,” for certain causes. This statutory provision became
a part of the teacher’s contract. The laws in existence when a
contract of employment is entered into become a part of the
contract, as though written therein. Cf. State ex rel. Clever-
inga v. Klein, 63 ND 514, 520, 249 NW 118, 86 ALR 1523.

So, in this, as in the Finch case, supra, 225 Mich 674, 196 NW
532, the school board had the power, under the contract, to
dismiss a teacher at any time even though he was employed for
a particular term. Clearly, this gave the board authority to
terminate the employment. However, the question here is not
whether the board had the power to terminate the employment,
but whether the board had the power to terminate the contract.
That is to say, does the school board by an act of its own, and
without the’consent of the teacher, have the power and authority
to abrogate an existing contract (ie, a property right) which
the teacher has not violated, and stands ready to perform, so
as to deprive the teacher of his remedy for a breach of contract?

Inasmuch as public school education is a governmental, rather
than proprietary, function, the legislature may declare that the
question of fact as to whether there is “cause” for dismissing a
teacher, shall be an administrative, rather than a judicial, ques-
tion. In recognizing this elementary principle, we find a sug-
gested answer to our problem, namely, it is determined by the
extent of the board’s statutory power.

In North Dakota, this court has made it clear that school
boards have no common-law powers. The public schools of the
state are under legislative control, and school boards have no
power except those conferred by the statutes upon them. Mc-
Withy v. Heart River School District, supra, 75 ND at 749,

828 |

82 NW2d at 889; Batty v. Board of Education, 67 ND 6, 269
NW 49; State ex rel. Mannes v. Alquist, 59 ND 762, 231 NW
952, 72 ALR 494; Gillespie vy. Common School Dist., 56 ND 194,
216 NW 564; Pronovost v. Brunette, 36 ND 288, 162 NW 300;
Rhea y. Board of Education, 41 ND 449, 171 NW 103; State ex
rel. School Dist. v. Tucker, 39 ND 106, 166 NW 820; Kretchmer
vy. School Board, 34 ND 403, 158 NW 993. “School officers have
and may exercise only such powers as are expressly or impliedly
granted by statute.” Gillespie v. Common School Dist., supra,
56 ND at 198, 216 NW at 565; State ex rel. Mannes v. Alquist,
supra, 59 ND at 767, 231 NW at 954, 72 ALR at 498. “And in
defining these powers the Rutz or Sraror Construction ap-
plies and any doubt as to their existence or extent must be re-
solved against it. See Lang v. Cavalier, 59 ND 75, 228 NW
819, 71 ALR 373, and cases cited; . . . .” Batty v. Board of
Education, supra, 67.ND at 9, 269 NW at 50.

Under a private (as distinguished from public) contract of
employment, the employer may dismiss the employee at any
time for plain violation of contract or any other cause, but the
employer has no power whatsoever to determine the question of
“cause” for dismissal in so far as the employer’s liability for
breach of the contract of-employment is concerned. An em-
ployer has the power to dismiss with or without cause, an em-
ployee hired for a particular term, and the employee has no
judicial remedy for reinstatement even though the dismissal
constitutes a breach of the contract of employment. But, hav-
ing the power to dismiss, even without cause, and even where
the contract is for a definite term, the employer thereby subjects
himself to liability for breach of contract unless good cause for
dismissal exists. The fact of dismissal is, of course, no evidence
that it was justifiable. All this is elementary and fundamental.

“Tt must not be forgotten. that the right of private contract
is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and that the usual
and most important function of courts of justice is to maintain
and enforce contracts, unless it clearly appears they contravene
public policy or express law.” State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein,
supra, at p 536 of 63 ND.

So, the employer has the absolute power of dismissal, which

| 829
power is not subject to judicial control with respect to the mat-
ter of reinstatement. But, the employer has no power whatso-
ever to determine the question of “cause” for dismissal insofar
as the employer’s liability for breach of the contract of employ-
ment is concerned. Should the same rules govern a teacher’s
contract? Yes, our statute NDRC 1943, 9-0701 so provides :—

“All contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted
by the same rules, except as otherwise provided by the laws of

‘this state.”

“Ousting the jurisdiction of the courts” is expressly forbidden
in NDRC 1943, See 9-0805, which renders such provisions in a
contract void. Dinnie v. U.C.T., 41 ND 42 at 47, 169 NW 811
at 813. See 12 Am Jur, Contracts, sections 458 note 20, and 186
note 3; 17 GJS Contracts, Sec 229.

NDRC 1943, 9-0805 reads :-—

“Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any
party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the
contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals
or which limits the time within which he thus may enforce his
rights is void, except as otherwise Srzcrricanuy permitted by
the laws of this state.”

“. . . where such a condition goes to the very foundation
of the action, and operates to oust the jurisdiction of the courts,
it is void as being against the policy of the law, and an action
may be brought without offering to comply with the condition.”
‘VI Wait’s Actions and Defenses (1879 ed) 516.

A common school district is not “specifically” permitted, by
the statutes or decisions of this state, to insert a stipulation or
condition in a teacher’s contract that a dismissed teacher is re-
stricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the
usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals. And there is
no such stipulation or condition in the contract herein.

Another point to remember is that in North Dakota, the rela-
tionship between the teacher and the school district is purely
contractual. There is no fixed tenure of employment other than
the provision for it in the contract. The relation of the distriet
and the teacher is that of employer and employee. And even
though a teacher is a public employee, he is not a public official,

830 — Es

not even a subordinate officer. Mootz v. Belyea, supra, 60 ND
741 at 744, 236 NW 358 at 359, 75 ALR 1347 at 1348 and 1349.

We conclude that (1) “cause” for dismissal of a teacher is an
administrative question which the school board must determine
in the first instance (Clark v. Wild Rose Special School District,
supra), and this determination is not subject to judicial control
insofar as the question of reinstatement is concerned. (Mootz
v. Belyea, supra) (2) On the other hand, since the determination
of liability, if any, for breach of contract is not an administra-
tive or executive function, but a judicial function, therefore, the
school board has no power or authority whatsoever to determine
the question of “cause” for dismissal insofar as the school dis-
trict’s liability for breach of the contract of employment is con-
cerned. So, under our statute, 15-2508, authorizing the board
to “dismiss a teacher at any time” for certain causes, the board’s
decision dismissing the teacher is neither final nor controlling
upon the court in a teacher’s action for breach of contract. In-
stead, the burden of proof is upon the defendant district to
prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that its board
had justifiable cause for such dismissal. And the fact of dis-
missal is no evidence that it was justifiable. Briefly, in a teach-
er’s action for damages, “cause” is a jury question.

DAMAGES

With respect to the question of damages, the District Court
observed the correct measure of damages, namel; Where a
teacher is dismissed without cause before the expiration of his
term of employment, and has been paid to the date of his dis-
missal, he may sue for breach ‘of contract of employment, and
if the suit is not commenced or is not tried until the term of
employment has expired, he may recover the contract price, less
what he has earned, or by reasonable diligence could have earned
subsequent to his discharge. 78 CJS, Schools and School Dis-
tricts, Sec 216; 47 Am Jur, Schools, Sec 145; annotation in 150
ALR 100.

Ee 831
CONGLUSION

We have reviewed all of the evidence and have considered the
findings of fact of the trial judge, which are entitled to appre-
ciable weight. And since a review of the evidence clearly and
plainly reveals a failure of proof on the part of defendant school
district as to its affirmative defense of “dismissal for cause,” it
is therefore Held, that the findings and conclusions of the trial
judge to the effect “that there was no evidence to sustain the
determination of the school board that the plaintiff was guilty
of plain violation of contract, gross immorality or flagrant
neglect of duty, as charged by defendant,” are correct. Judg-
ment for the plaintiff is affirmed.

Morais, C. J., and Grimson, and Burrs, JJ., concur.

Sarurz, J., disqualified, did not participate, Hon. A. J. Growma,
Judge of the Fifth Judicial District, sitting in his stead.

Cunistranson, J. (concurring specially). I concur in an af-
firmance of the judgment. The defendant is a common school
district, and the laws of this state provide that the school board
of such district :

“Shall employ the teachers of the district and may dismiss a
teacher at any time for plain violation of contract, gross immor-
ality, or flagrant neglect of duty. . . . No person shall be
permitted to teach in any public school who is not the holder of
a teacher’s certificate or a permit to teach, valid in the county or
district in which the school is situated. Every contract for the
employment of a teacher shall be in writing, . . .” 1949 Suppl
NDRC 1948, 15-2508.

It will be noted the statute empowers the school board of any
such district, (1) to employ the teachers of the district, and (2)
to dismiss a teacher. But the statute places certain conditions
both upon the power to employ teachers and upon the power
to dismiss a teacher. The statute provides that “every contract
for the employment of a teacher shall be in writing” and that
“no petson shall be permitted to teach in any public school who
is not the holder of a teacher’s certificate or a permit to teach,

832 Le

valid in the county or district in which the school is situated.”
Hence, the board has no power to employ a teacher who is not
the holder of such certificate or permit and a contract made by
the board with a teacher not holding such certificate or permit
is void. Hosmer v. School District, 4 ND 197, 59 NW 1035, 50
Am St Rep 639, 25 LRA 383; Goose River Bank v. Willow Lake
School Township, 1 ND 26, 44 NW 1002, 26 Am St Rep 605;
Hardy v. Purington, 6 SD 382, 61 NW 158.

The statute says the school board “may dismiss a “teacher at
any time for plain violation of contract, gross immorality, or
flagrant neglect of duty.” Thus the power to dismiss a teacher |
“is conditioned upon the existence” of one or more of the causes
specified in the statute. Clark v. Wild Rose Special School Dis-
trict, 47 ND at p 298, 182 NW at p.308. See, also, Miller v.
Horton, 152 Mass 540, 548, 26 NE 100, 10 LRA 116, 23 Am St
Rep 850, 857; Neer v. State Livestock Sanitary Board, 40 ND
340, 870, 168 NW 601, 18 NCCA 1. |

The power to dismiss a teacher does not become operative
because charges have been filed against such teacher. The essen-
tial basis for a dismissal is that the condition or conditions that
are prescribed in the statute as a cause for removal actually
exist. In short, the right to dismiss is conditioned upon the
existence of the.fact that the teacher sought to be dismissed
actually has committed or failed to commit acts, the commission
or non-commission of which, constituted a plain violation of -
duty, gross immorality, or flagrant neglect of duty. The school
board has authority to dismiss a teacher only upon the existence
of one or more of the grounds specified in the statute. It has
no authority to dismiss a teacher unless a cause for dismissal
actually eaists. Clark v. Wild Rose Special School District, 47
ND at p 298, 182 NW at p 308. The existence of facts constituting
such cause is the very basis for the exercise by the school board
of its power of dismissal and a dismissal without the existence
of such ground is an act wholly beyond the power and juris-
diction of the board and obviously a teacher who is dismissed
has a right to challenge the action taken, on the ground that
no cause existed authorizing the board to dismiss, and this being
so that the board acted without any authority whatsoever, and

es 833

that consequently the dismissal was wrongful and violative of
the teacher’s rights under the contract of employment. While
the specific question has never been raised in this Court it has
been generally recognized that in this state a teacher who has
been dismissed without cause may maintain an action against
the school district for the breach of his contract of employment.
Such-actions have been brought and recovery had and the right
to maintain such action has never been questioned. Clark v.
Wild Rose Special School District, 47 ND 207, 182 NW 3807;
Mootz v. Belyea, 60 ND 741, 236 NW 358, 75 ALR 1347; Mc-
Withy v. Heart River School District, 75 ND 744, 82 NW2d
886. Cf. Bogert v. Board of Education of City of New York,
44 Mise 10, 89 NYS 737; Ransom v. Boston, 192 Mass 299, 78
NE 481, 7 Ann Cas 733; School District No. 94, v. Gautier, 13
Okla 194, 73 P 954.

I fully agree that the method of review of decisions of school
officers and school boards by appeal to the county superintendent
of schools provided by NDRC 1943, 15-2217 has no application
to the action of a school board dismissing a teacher.

The plaintiff in this case had a valid contract. He could be
dismissed only if one of the causes for dismissal prescribed by
the statute existed. Unless such cause did exist the board was
wholly without power or jurisdiction to dismiss him. The trial
court found that the evidence in this case showed that no cause
for dismissal existed, and that consequently the dismissal was
wholly without authority and that as a result of the wrongful
dismissal the contract was breached and plaintiff’s rights there-
under violated to the injury of the plaintiff. The findings of
the trial court are entitled to weight; however, the evidence in
this case has been examined by all the members of this Court
and the members are all of the mind that the findings of the trial
court are correct and that the judgment rendered by the trial
court should be affirmed.

834 ee
[File No. 7303]

JERRY REUTER, Appellant, v. HARLAND E. OLSON,
Respondent

(69 NW2d 830) -

Ws

“Opinion filed August 4, 1953,

Robert Vogel, for appellant.
Ella Van Berkom, for respondent.

Burs, J. This action arose out of a collision between two
motor vehicles. Each party sought a recovery for injuries al-
leged to have been caused by the negligence of the other and

836 es

each denied any negligence on his own part. Upon the trial’ of
the case the jury returned a verdict for dismissal of the action
and judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. Plain-
tiff thereafter moved for judgment notwithstanding the ver:
dict or, in the alternative, for a new trial... This motion was
denied in both its phases and plaintiff has appealed both from
the order denying the motion and from the judgment. The
specifications of error challenge several of the instructions and
the sufficiency of the evidence.

The collision occurred at the intersection of Highway 37 and
a street of the City of Garrison. Immediately prior to the colli-
sion plaintiff was proceeding westward on Highway 37 and
defendant was moving in a southeasterly direction on the city
street. As the two vehicles neared the intersection the angle
between their lines of approach was about 135 degrees. Ve-
hicles entering the highway from the street were required first
to come to a full stop and there was a stop sign at the intersec-
tion notifying drivers of that fact. It is undisputed that de-
fendant proceeded onto the highway without stopping and that
thereafter the collision occurred. Defendant’s testimony is to
the effect that as he approached the highway he applied pres-
sure to his brake pedal in order to bring his car to a stop, that
then he discovered that his brakes were not in working order,
that he shifted into second gear to hurry across the highway
in front of the plaintiff; that he was successful in this maneu-
ver ; that he crossed the highway to its south lane and was headed
east when plaintiff drove diagonally across the highway and
struck his car. Plaintiff testified that he noticed defendant’s
car first when it was one hundred or one hundred fifty feet
from the intersection, that the next time he noticed it, it was
right in front of him, that he tried to turn left to avoid it, but
collided with it in the north lane of the highway. Plaintiff's
contention is the defendant was negligent in driving onto the
highway without stopping; that he (plaintiff) had a right to
assume that defendant would stop and a right to rely on that
assumption, that in these circumstances he was not obliged to
keep a continuous lookout and that there was therefore no ‘negli-
gence on his part. Defendant’s contentions are; first, that he

| 837

had safely crossed the center line of the highway before the
collision and that the collision was caused by plaintiffs negli-
gence in leaving his proper lane and crossing to the south or
left hand (to the plaintiff) lane; and second, that in any event,
when plaintiff saw the defendant in a position of peril, he had
an opportunity to take the easy turn to the right and avoid the
collision,

The first specification of error is that the court erred in read-
ing the complaint and answer in stating the issues in the case
to the jury. Error is predicated on the fact that the answer
alleged a version of the facts which was contrary to defendant’s
testimony and also on the fact that after the complaint and
answer had been. read the court failed to read plaintiff’s reply.
On several occasions we-have held that it is bad practice for the
court to:read the pleadings to the jury. Branthover v. Monarch
Elevator Co., 33 ND 454, 156 NW 927; Elliot Supply Co. v.
Green, 35 ND 641, 160 NW 1002; Black v. Smith, 58 ND 109,
224 NW 915; Voter v. Newsalt, 58 ND 154, 225 NW 74; Hoffer
v. Burd, 78 ND 278, 49 NW2d 282. Though the practice is gen-
erally disapproved it is not reversible error unless it appears
that a party to the action has been prejudiced thereby. Voter
v. Newsalt, supra; Hoffer v. Burd, supra. Here the unsupport-
ed allegation of the answer which was read to the jury was:
“That said plaintiff left his lane of traffic and drove his auto-
mobile across the center line of said highway and into the left
hand lane of traffic contrary to law, in which said lane of traffic
plaintiff was driving his automobile, that wpon seeing the ap-
proaching car of the defendant, plaintiff drove his automobile
over and upon the extreme right shoulder of said highway and
slowed down to a stop; and while thus proceeding the plaintiff
drove his automobile against, upon, and into the front left side
of defendant’s automobile.”

It is clear that this paragraph of the answer uses the word
“plaintiff” in two instances where the word “defendant” was
intended. No doubt defendant intended to allege that plaintiff
left his proper lane of traffic and drove into the left hand lane
in which defendant (not plaintiff) was driving and that defend-
ant (not plaintiff) drove his automobile over and upon the ex-

838 ee

treme right shoulder of said highway and slowed down to a stop.
If we consider that the jury understood this paragraph as the
defendant intended it to be understood, it contains an allegation
not supported by any evidence. The defendant did not testify
that he “drove upon the extreme right shoulder of the road and
slowed down to a stop” before the collision. His testimony was
that he had reached the south lane of the highway and was
headed east before the collision. and that his car was still in
motion at the time of the collision. In view of the fact that the
jury dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim, we do not see how
the reading of this allegation could have been prejudicial to
plaintiff. To reach such a verdict the jtiry must have found that
defendant had not driven upon the extreme right shoulder of
the road and stopped before the collision. On the other hand if
we assume that the reading of this paragraph of the answer was
merely confusing to the jury, there would still be no prejudice to
the plaintiff for the confusion would exist in connection with the
contentions of the defendant and not those of the plaintiff.

The second specification of error is that the court erred in in-
structing the jury as follows:

“I charge you that even though you fnd that the defendant
failed to stop at the stop sign, yet, if such failure to stop was
not the proximate cause of the collision, that is, if the collision
did not occur by reason of the failure to stop and that such
failure to stop was not the proximate cause of the injuries which
plaintiff's automobile sustained, then such failure to stop did
not proximately cause the damage to plaintiffs car.”

This instruction is not challenged upon the ground that it is an
incorrect statement of the law or that it is not applicable to the
evidence and issues in the case. It is objected to because “It is
repetitive, the Court having already instructed in general on
proximate cause, that it is specific instead of general, and that it
was unduly emphasized.” We see no merit in these contentions.
The instruction merely pointed out the applicability of the gen-
eral instructions to the evidence in the case.

The third specification of error is that the court erred in giv-
ing the following instructions:

“It is the law that a driver of a motor vehicle must drive on

be 839

the right hand side of the road. If you find that the plaintiff
failed to drive on said right side of the road, and that his failure
to do so was negligent, and that such negligence proximately
caused the, damages to defendant’s automobile then plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover.”

It is said that this instruction is error “for the reason that it
stated the law to be applicable only to the plaintiff and ignored
the rule of law as to crossing the center line in order to avoid
accidents if possible.” There is no merit in this specification.
Under the evidence the instruction could apply only to the plain-
tiff. There is evidence that plaintiff drove on the wrong side
of the road, but no evidence that the defendant did. With re-
spect to avoiding an accident the trial judge in another part
of the instructions, charged, “In an emergency a driver of a
vehicle is required only to act in the manner of a reasonable,
prudent man, and is not to be held liable for failure to choose
the wisest course of action, if the course he did choose is such
as a reasonably prudent man might choose.” This instruction
applied to any action which the plaintiff might have taken to
avoid a collision, including crossing the center line of the high-
way. The instructions must be considered as a whole. Froh v.
Hein, 76 ND 701, 39 NW2d 11; Burkstrand v. Rasmussen, 77 ND
716, 45 NW2d 485.

In his fourth specification of error plaintiff asserts that it
was error for the court to instruct upon the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence since neither party pleaded contributory
negligence on the part of the other. Each party did, however,
plead primary negligence on the part of the other party and
offered evidence which tended to establish such negligence.
Thus the question of negligence of both parties was in issue.
Whether the collision was caused solely by the negligence of one
party, or by the concurrent negligence of both parties, or by
the primary negligence of one party and the contributory negli-
gence of the other, were issues which arose upon the evidence
in the case. The instruction was therefore proper. 65 CJS
(Negligence Sec 293) 1245.

Plaintiff's fifth specification of error is that the court erred
in instructing upon the doctrine of last clear chance. It was

840 a

defendant’s contention, that, even if defendant were negligent
in proceeding through the stop sign without stopping, plaintiff
still had an opportunity to avoid the collision by turning to the
right and proceeding up the street by which the defendant had
approached the intersection. In support of this theory defend-
ant offered testimony that the turn was one which could have
been safely negotiated at fifty miles an hour. Plaintiff's testi-
mony was that when he first saw the defendant after he had
passed through the stop sign, defendant’s car was right in front
of him. Whether the question of a last clear chance on the part
of the plaintiff was properly at issue under the evidence, may be
a close question, but whether the issue was properly submitted
or not, its submission was not prejudicial to the plaintiff, since
the jury in dismissing defendant’s counterclaim must have found
that plaintiff did not have the last clear chance of avoiding the
collision. A party cannot complain of the giving of instructions
on an issue upon which the jury found in his favor. Interna-
tional Soe. v. Hildreth, 11 ND 262, 91 NW 70.

Plaintiff’s sixth specification of error is that the trial court
erred in prefacing one of his instructions with the remark,
“At the request of counsel, I instruct you”. As to the circum-
stances in which the remark was made, the record shows that
upon completing his instructions the court asked: “Is there
anything else that counsel desires for the jury?” The attorney
for the defendant replied, “I think that covers it.” The attor-
ney for plaintiff said, “I believe there is one, your Honor.” He
then presented a requested instruction to the Court and the
Court said: “I think this instruction here is okay. At the re-
quest of counsel, I instruct you.” Section 28-1412 NDRC 1943
provides:

“ . . All instructions given by the court to the jurors
must be read or given to them orally by the court without dis-
closing whether such instructions were requested or not.”

Ordinarily it would be prejudicial error for the court to violate
the mandatory provisions of this statute. 'Ferderer v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., 75 ND 139, 26 NW2d 236. However, the purpose
of the statute is to keep from the jury knowledge that any in-
struction was requested in order that all instructions may stand

Le ‘841

on the some footing authoritatively as the instructions of the
court. Here the jury acquired knowledge that the instruction
was requested, in the first instance, not from the statement of
the-court but from the statements and actions of the attorney
for the plaintiff. The question of the court, set forth above, the
replies by counsel, and the presentation of the instruction to. the
court by counsel for the plaintiff all took place in the presence
of the jury. Counsel cannot complain because the trial court
informed the jurors that the instruction was requested when his
own statement and acts had previously made that fact perfectly
clear to them. . :

Plaintiff’s seventh specification of error is that the court erred
in instructing the jury upon the theory of unavoidable accident.
“The issue of unavoidable accident is raised-when there is evi-
dence tending to prove that the injury resulted from some cause
other than the negligence of the parties.” Orange & N. W. R.
Oo. v. Harris, 89 SW2d 973, 975, 127 Tex 13;. Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co. v. Darden (Tex Com App) 88 SW2d 777. There
is evidence in this case that defendant proceeded through the
stop sign because of an unaccountable failure of his brakes: He
testified that his brakes had been in operating order when he
had last previously used them only a few minutes earlier. This
evidence raised the issue of unavoidable accident and it was ac-
cordingly not error for the court to submit the issue to the jury.

.Plaintifi’s eighth specification of error is that the court erred
in instructing that contributory negligence in any degree as
the proximate cause of the accident on the part of either party
would bar a recovery by that party. Plaintiff’s counsel states
his objection to the instruction as follows: “The use of the
words in any degree in such a context is prejudicial error because
it ignores the essential element that negligence on the part of
the plaintiff must have contributed proximately to his injury
in order to bar his recovery.”

There is no merit in this specification, The instruction did
not ignore the element of proximate cause, it specifically re-
ferred to it and limited the negligence which would bar a re-
covery to “contributory negligence as the proximate cause.”
While the language used by the trial court was not legally

842 a

precise, nevertheléss in view of the fact that elsewhere in the
instructions contributory negligence and proximate cause were
adequately defined, we do not sce how the jury could have been
confused or misled.

Likewise there is no merit in the plaintiff’s contention that,
under the evidence he was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. As has been heretofore set forth in this opinion, the evi-
dence is conflicting. ‘Defendant testified that he had safely
crossed the north lane.of the highway and was proceeding east-
ward in the south lane when plaintiff turned out of his proper
lane and ran into him. If this testimony is true, plaintiff could
not recover.

The credibility of witnesses and the probability of their testi-
mony are questions for the jury and not for an appellate court.
Mikkelson v. Snider, 43 ND 416, 175 NW 220; Nimmins v. Fors-
berg, 70 ND 417, 294 NW 663. And where the evidence is con-
flicting and different conclusions may reasonably be drawn
therefrom, The Supreme Court on appeal will not disturb the
verdict nor the order of the trial court denying motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial on
the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. Jacobs v. Bever,
ante, 168, 55 NW2d 512.

- The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

; Morris, ©. J. ., and Grimson, Curistranson, Saruar, JJ., concur

a : 843
[File No. 7370]

ARTHUR W. DOLL, Administrator of the Estate of Paul G.
Doll, Deceased, Respondent, v. JOSEPH STAHL AND
MRS. JOSEPH STAHL, Appellants. .

(59 NW2d 721, 41 ALR2d 1317)

{ Opinion filed July 22, 1953, Rehearing denied Aug. 13, 1953.

‘S44 ee

_ Thompson & Duffy, for respondents and appellants.
_A F. Gr reffenius, for petitioner and respondent.

Morris, Ch. J. This is an appeal to the supreme court from
an order of the District Court of Griggs County, dated February
9, 1953, reversing an order of the County Court of Griggs County
enying a petition for the appointment of an administrator of
the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased. The matter was pre-
sented to the district court upon the pleadings, a stipulation of
facts, and the files and records of the County Court of Griggs
County. .

The record discloses that on April 7, 1949, Paul G. Doll
deeded to Joseph J. Stahl a quarter section of land in Nelson
County, North Dakota, in return for a thousand dollars in’ cash
and a Taylorcraft airplane. On June 23, 1949, the County Court
of Griggs County declared Paul G. Doll to be an incompetent
person and appointed his son, Arthur W. Doll, as guardian of his
person and estate. The'guardian immediately qualified under
a bond of six thousand dollars. On August 30, 1949, Arthur W.
Doll, as guardian of Paul G. Doll, incompetent, instituted an ac-
tion in the District Court of Nelson County to set aside the deed
to Joseph J. Stahl, above described; and on September 27, 1949,
filed a notice of lis pendens in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Nelson County. Subsequently, and on April 5, 1950, Joseph
J. Stahl conveyed the land to one Adolph Lysne.

Joseph J. Stahl died on April 29, 1950. The action to set
aside the deed then was, and still is, pending. On July 17, 1950,
Arthur W. Doll, guardian of the person and estate of Paul G.
Doll, incompetent, filed in the County Court of Griggs County
a petition for the appointment of an administrator in the matter
of the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased, wherein the peti-
tioner alleged that he is a creditor of the decedent and asked
that letters of administration be issued to Joseph Stahl, the
father of the decedent, or some other competent person. To
this petition Joseph Stahl and Mrs. Joseph Stahl, parents of the
deceased and respondents in that proceeding, answered denying
that the petitioner was a creditor and stating: “The only estate

| 845

of said decedent is a small amount of personal property and
respondents do not believe that any probate proceedings is
necessary; . . . .” On November 29, 1950, after a hearing,
the County Court of Griggs County denied the petition for the
appointment of an administrator.

On December 6, 1950, Arthur W. Doll, guardian of the person
and estate of Paul G Doll, incompetent, served and filed in the
County Court of Griggs County a notice of appeal from the
order denying the appointment of an administrator in the
estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased, that had been entered on
November 29, 1950. To the notice of appeal the appellant at-
tached the following:

“You will please take further notice; that section 30-2605 of
the revised Codes of North Dakota 1943 provides that if a
guardian has given an official Bond he may appeal from a decree
or order made in any proceeding in County Court without filing
an undertaking. Whenever he appeals in that manner the Bond
stands in place of such an undertaking.

“Take further Notice that Arthur W. Doll guardian of the
estate and person of Paul Doll, Deceased, the petitioner and ap-
-pellant has on file a Surety Bond for $6000.00 which was filed to
qualify him for letters of guardianship.

“Dated this-5th day of December, 1950,'at Valley City, Barnes
County, North Dakota.”

This notice was signed by the attorney for the appellant i in
that proceeding.

The incompetent, Paul G. Doll, died during the pendency. of
the appeal to the.district court. After his death the son, Arthur,
W. Doll, was appointed administrator of the estate of Paul G.
Doll, deceased, and was discharged as guardian of the person
and estate of Paul G. Doll, incompetent. He then served a no-
tice of motion to substitute Arthur -W. Doll, as administrator,
in place of Arthur W. Doll, as guardian, as the appellant in the
appeal to the district court in the matter of the estate of Joseph
J. Stahl, deceased. The respondents in the county court, Joseph
Stahl and Mrs. Joseph Stahl, resisted the motion for substitu-
tion and also made a motion to, dismiss the appeal upon the
ground, among others,

846 —

“That the petitioner and appellant has failed to give or file
an undertaking for appeal as required by Chapter 30-26 of the .
NDRC 1943.”

After a hearing the district court granted the motion for sub-
stitution and denied the motion for dismissal of the appeal.
After a further hearing was had on the merits the court made
findings in which he reviewed the entire record and reached the
conclusion that the County Court of Griggs County erred in dis-
missing the petition for letters of administration in the matter
of the estate of Joseph J. Stahl; whereupon the district court
ordered the matter remanded to the County Court of Griggs
County with directions to vacate the order entered therein deny-
ing the petition for letters of administration and directing the
county court to appoint an administrator of the estate of Joseph
J. Stahl, deceased. From this order Joseph Stahl and Mrs.
Joseph Stahl appeal to the supreme court.

The respondent in the appeal to’ the supreme court contends
that the question of the sufficiency of the undertaking on appeal
from the county court to the district court is not now before the
supreme court. He points out that the sufficiency of the under-
taking was challenged by the motion to dismiss the appeal to
the district court and according to the stipulation of facts “That
on the 30th day of June, 1952, notice of hearing on a motion to
dismiss the appeal from the County Court was served on ap-
pellant but which motion was denied by the District Court and
such order served on respondents on August 28, 1952.” It is
then urged that the order denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal was an appealable order, was never appealed from, and
the time for appeal has expired. From that it is argued that
the questions determined -by that order cannot be raised in the
present appeal to the supreme court, which is an appeal from
the final order of the district court, dated February 9, 1953, de-
termining the matter on,the merits. He is wrong in his con-
tention that the order denying the motion to dismiss the appeal
from county court to district court is appealable. That question
is. settled by our decision In ré Bratcher’s Estate, 74 ND 12, 24
NW2d 54, wherein we held:that such an‘order was not appeal-
able.

lt 847

. It is next contended that if the order of the district court
denying the motion to dismiss the appeal is not appealable it is
nevertheless not reviewable on the present appeal to the su-
preme court because this appeal is from an order and not from
a judgment and that, according to the provisions of Section 28-
2728 NDROC 1943, intermediate orders can only be reviewed
where the appeal is from a judgment.

Reference to Chapter 30-26 NDRC 1943 providing appellate
procedure in probate matters discloses that the determination
of the district court upon an appeal from the county court,
while not made in the form of a formal judgment, is not an ordi+
nary order. It is referred to more frequently as.a “decision”
which must be given in writing and filed with the clerk of the
district court and by him entered in the record. Section 30-2627
NDRC 1943. This “order or decision” is the final determination
of the district court upon the appeal. Unless a ‘stay has been
granted, it is required to be transmitted without, delay to the
county court, where it is also entered upon the docket of that
court. An appeal to the supreme court for such a determination
brings to this court for review the final pronouncement of the
district court and the essential determinations-of the district
court resulting in that pronouncement which are not, in them-
selves, appealable and which have been properly specified as
error. The order denying the motion to dismiss the appeal is an
intermediate order. The questions determined by it are such
that they necessarily affect the final decision of the district
court from which the appeal to this court was taken. The ap-
pellants specify as error the denial of the motion for dismissal.
The correctness of that order is necessarily involved in a deter-
thination of the correctness of the order appealed from and
properly falls within the scope of our review. In re MeAllister’s
Estate, 191 Iowa 906, 183 NW 596; In re Graham’s Mstate, 294
Pa 498, 144 A 427; 4 CJS, Appeal and Error, Section 433;
8 Am Jur, Appeal and Error, Sections 429 arid 915.

The determinative issue on this appeal is whether Arthur W.
Doll, guardian of the person and estate of. Paul G. Doll, might
appeal from the order of the County Court. of Griggs ‘County
denying his petition for,the appointment of an administrator in

848 |

the matter of the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased, without
furnishing an undertaking on: appeal. He contends that the
bond which he has given as guardian of Paul G. Doll stood in
place of the undertaking on appeal, while Joseph Stahl and Mrs.
Joseph Stahl contend that a separate undertaking on appeal
must be furnished in order to make the appeal effective,

Chapter 30-26 NDRC 1943 ‘provides: for appeals from the
county court to the district court in. probate matters. Section
30-2603 requires the appellant to cause a notice of appeal to be
served and filed within thirty days from the date of the order
or decree appealed from.

Section 30-2606 NDRC 1948 provides:

“When an appellant from a decree or an order of a county
court seasonably and in good faith serves a notice of appeal on
some of the parties, but through mistake or excusable neglect
fails to obtain service.on all, or in like manner omits to do any
other act necessary to perfect the appeal or effect a stay, the
county court, upon proof of the facts by affidavit, may extend
the time for-perfecting the service or other act and may permit
an amendment accordingly upon such terms as justice requires.”

Section 30-2605 NDRC 1943 provides:

“In a case in-which an executor, administrator, or guardian
has given an official bond, he may appeal from a decree or order
made in any proceeding’in county court without filing an un-
dertaking. Whenever he appeals in that manner the bond stands
in place of such undertaking.”

In this case the appellant to the district court served a notice
of appeal within the thirty day: period prescribed by Section
30-2603 NDROC 1943. He did not serve or file an undertaking
on appeal but did attach to the notice of appeal a notice to the
effect that he had filed a surety bond for six thousand dollars as
guardian of the estate and, person of Paul G@. Doll and calling
attention to Section 30-2605, supra. No application was ever
made by the appellant under Séction 30-2606 to extend the time
for filing a bond. He stands squarely on Section 30-2605, supra,
and contends that thereunder the bohd which he gave as guard-
ian in the estate of Paul G. Doll, inconipetent, stands in place

be 849

of the otherwise required undertaking on appeal in the matter
of the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased.

" Section 30-2605 had its origin in Section 331 of the Probate
Code of the Territory of Dakota, 1877, which then provided:

“When an executor or administrator who has given an official
bond appeals from a judgment, decree or order of the probate
court or judge, made in the proceedings had upon the estate of
which he is administrator or executor, his said bond stands in
the place of an appeal bond, and the sureties therein are liable
as on such appeal bond.”

This provision, without change, became Section 5981 of the
Compiled Laws of Dakota Territory, 1887. It was made more
specific and broadened to include guardians by Section 6258,
Revised Codes of North Dakota, 1895, which provided:

“An executor, administrator or guardian may appeal without
filing an undertaking from a decree or order made in any pro-
ceeding in a case in which he has given an official bond; and
when he appeals in that manner the bond stands in place of
such undertaking.”

. This provision was carried through various revisions and
compilations of the laws of the state without change, including
the Compiled Laws of North Dakota, 1913, where it appears as
Section 8603. In that form it came before this court in Richard-
son v. Campbell, 9 ND 100, 81 NW 31. In that case a plaintiff
secured a judgment in justice court against the estate of W. L.
Richardson, deceased, upon a claim that had been rejected by
the administrator. The administrator attempted to appeal to
the district court. He served a notice of appeal and no under-
taking. He contended that as administrator he was not re-
quired to give an undertaking and that his official bond stood in
place of the undertaking otherwise required by statute. The
court in rejecting this contention held that an appeal bond was
necessary to perfect the appeal from justice court to district
court, despite the fact that the administrator was appealing in
his official capacity and in behalf of the estate. The provision
in question was changed to its present form in the North Dakota
Revised Code, 1943, where it appears as Section 30-2605. The

850 a

change that was made was not intended to and does not change
the effect of the statute.

In Richardson v. Campbell, supra, the ‘administrator at-
tempted to appeal in his official capacity, and in behalf of the
estate that he represented, in a case that was an entirely separate
judicial proceeding from the case in county court in which he
was appointed administrator. There the case in which he sought
to appeal was in a different court. In the situation now before
us there are also two separate cases. One is the estate of Paul
G. Doll, incompetent, in which the guardian’s bond is given.
The other is the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased. They are
both in the county court but they are unrelated judicial proceed-
ings, although the guardian in one case is petitioner in the other.

In Bancroft’s Probate Practice, Section 92, it is said:

“Where the appeal is taken by one other than the executor or
administrator in his official capacity, it is usually required that
a bond or undertaking be filed as an incident to perfecting the
appeal. Such a bond or undertaking must be filed in the county
court. Where, however, an executor or administrator who has
given an official bond appcals in proceedings had upon the estate
of which he is administrator or executor, such bond stands in
the place of an appeal bond and the sureties therein are liable
as on an appeal bond.”

This statement implies that the effectiveness of the bond of the
personal representative as an undertaking on appeal is con-
fined to appeals in the estate in which he has been appointed.

In Section 30-0102 NDRC 1943, which defines various terms
of probate procedure, it is said:

“Tn this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise
requires: |

“1, ‘Case’ refers to a subject matter which by the provisions
of this title is cognizable in a county court and includes every
proceeding therein maintained im relation to the same matter or
estate;

“2, ‘Proceeding’ includes every step taken upon a petition for
the determination of a particular claim or the enforcement of a
particular right within a case; . . . .” (Italics supplied.)

[| 851,

It is clear that the guardianship of Paul G. Doll, incompetent,
is one case and the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased, is another
case and that the bond given by the guardian may stand in place
of an appeal undertaking in connection with any proceeding had
in the Doll case, but the guardian’s bond cannot stand in place
of an appeal undertaking in the Stahl case. This appeal is from
an order of the county court denying a petition for letters of
administration in the Stahl case. A bond therein is required
as provided by Section 30-2603 NDRC 1943 in order to make
the appeal effective. No such bond has been given. Its absence
is fatal to the right of the appellant to be heard upon the merits
of his appeal to the district court. The trial court erred in
denying the motion to dismiss the appeal and in reversing the
order of the county court denying the petition for the appoint-
ment of an administrator in the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, de-
ceased. The order appealed from is reversed and the trial court
is directed to enter an order dismissing the appeal {o the district
court.

Grimson, Cunistianson, Sarure and Burs, JJ., concur.

Morris, Ch. J. On. Petition for Rehearing. In our original
opinion we compared Section 30-2605 NDRO 1943 with its
predecessor, Section 8603 Compiled Laws of North Dakota, 1913,
and reached the conclusion that ‘The change that was made was
not intended to and does not change the effect of the statute.”
In a petition for rehearing the respondent challenges our con-
clusion by asking: “If it was intended not to change the effect
of this section, then why. was it re-written when the 1943 Revised
Code NDRC was made?” That question can be best answered
by quoting the reviser’s note of the code commission which was
presented to the legislature at the time the code was presented
for adoption. “REVISER’S NOTH: This section has been
revised by transposition for clarity. ‘In county court’ was added
after ‘any proceeding’ to express the meaning given to the. sec-
tion by the supreme court in Richardson v. Campbell, 9 ND 100,
81 NW 31.” It is clear from this note that while the revisers
made a change in wording there was no intent on the part of

852 ee

either the revisers or the legislature to change the meaning or
effect of the section.

Under either version of this section the provision excusing the
executor, administrator, or. guardian from giving an appeal
bond applies only to proceedings in the case in which the official
bond was given. In the instant litigation that case is the Estate
of Paul G. Doll, incompetent. The Estate of Joseph J. Stahl,
deceased, is another case. The bond that was given as an official
bond by the guardian in the Doll estate would stand in place of
an undertaking on appeal by the guardian inthe case of the
Doll estate but is not effective for any purpose in connection
with the probate of the estate of Joseph J. Stahl, deceased, which
is wholly a different case.

In State ex rel. Johnson v. Broderick, 75 ND 340, 27 NW2d
849, paragraph 15 of the syllabus, this court said:

“In the codification of statutes the general presumption ob-
tains that the codifiers did not intend to change the law; and
mere changes of phrascology or punctuation, or the addition or
omission of words, or the rearrangement of sections or parts
of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a
single section in separate sections, does not operate to change
the operation, effect or meaning of the statute unless the changes
are of such nature as to manifest clearly and unmistakably a
legislative intent to change the former law.”

Rehearing denied.

Burs, Grimson, Curistianson and Sarure, JJ., concur.

g

[File No. 7323]

BALTHAUSER & MOYER, Inc., Respondent, v. MERLE HAY-
DEN, Appellant.

(59 NW2d 828)

Opinion filed August 14, 1953

Franklin E. Molland, for appellant.

Maxhof, Kellogg, a é Kirby, for respondent.

 Bukxz, J. In this action plaintiff obtained judgment against
defendant for damages for the breach of a contract for the pur-
chase of cattle. The case was tried to the court without a jury
and upon appeal the defendant has demanded a trial de novo
in this court.

There are but two issues for consideration. First, does the
evidence support the trial court’s finding that defendant breached
his contract? Second, if the finding that defendant breached

EE 855
his contract is sustained, does the evidence support the trial
court’s finding as to the amount of damages?

By the terms of a written agreement, executed by the parties
on August 8, 1950, plaintiff agreed to buy and defendant agreed
to sell twenty to twenty-five two year old steers at twenty-five
cents a pound. The defendant agreed to deliver the steers F. O.
B. cars at Medora, on September 15, 1950, or as soon thereafter
as cars were available, the exact date being at the buyer’s op-
tion. The steers were to be weighed “without shrink” and were
to be paid for in full at the time of delivery. At the time of
the execution of the agreement plaintiff advanced to defendant
$750.00 in part payment of the purchase price.

On September 6th, plaintiff wrote to defendant, “Please have
strs. in the morning of September 15 as we load on the stock
pick up due at 9:15 A. M. at Medora.” Defendant did not de-
liver the steers as directed and made no effort to inform plaintiff
of his reasons for non-delivery. On September 16th, plaintiff
again wrote to defendant, this time directing: defendant to de-
liver the steers on the morning of September 20th. In the
ordinary course of the mails this notification would have reached
defendant’s mail box on September 17th. Defendant stated that
he took the notice from his mail box on September 19th at 4:30
P.M. The next day, September 20th, defendant loaded up the
steers and transported them to Medora, arriving there, not in
the morning, but between 1:30 and 2:00 o’clock in the’ afternoon
just as the only train upon which the steers could be shipped
that day was pulling out of town. He drove to the stockyards.
There he was unable to find plaintiff’s agent. After waiting
about an hour and a-half he drove back to his ranch. He testi-
fied that he made inquiries of two people in his effort to locate
plaintiff’s agent, but made no inquiry at the office of the rail-
road company’s agent. Meanwhile plaintifi’s agent had arrived
at the stockyards in Medora at 7:00 A. M. on September 20th.
He had waited there for defendant until the train pulled out at
1:30 or for more than six hours. He then went to a funeral at
Sentinel Butte and returned to Medora at 4:00 P. M. or shortly
after defendant had left town. The next day plaintiff's agent
saw defendant at his ranch. His object was to arrange a new

pe

856 |

delivery date for the steers. There the defendant told him “You
ain’t got anything more to do with those cattle, I delivered them
and you weren’t there.” Two days later defendant sold the
cattle to another buyer at an increase of three cents a pound over
his contract price with the plaintiff.

We think that the record amply supports the trial court’s find-
ing that defendant breached the contract. Defendant had agreed
to deliver the cattle at a time to be fixed by the plaintiff. On
two occasions he failed to make delivery in accordance with
plaintiff’s instructions. When he failed to deliver on Septem-
ber 15th, he did not inform plaintiff as to the reasons for his
failure, nor did he make any attempt to notify plaintiff that
delivery on September 20th would be late. Defendant offered
testimony which tended to show.that delivery in accordance with
plaintiffs instructions was impossible, not because of any un-
reasonable demand on-the part of the plaintiff, but because of
the condition of the roads on September 15th, and because he
didn’t go to his mail box the 18th and thus failed to receive
the notice to have the cattle in Medora on the morning of the
20th until late in the afternoon on the 19th, at which time it was
too late to round up the cattle for morning delivery the follow-
ing day.

Whatever may have been defendant’s excuses. for not making
delivery in accordance with plaintiffs instructions and whether
such excuses might justify his failure to deliver at the time
specified, it is certainly clear that the transportation of the cattle
to the place of delivery at a time other than that specified by
the plaintiff, when plaintiffs agent was not present to receive
them, was not a sufficient tender of delivery to put the plaintiff
in default. It is only the neglect or refusal of a buyer to ac-
cept delivery of goods properly tendered that will place him in
default in this respect. Section 51-0152 NDRC. In this case
there was neither refusal to accept delivery nor neglect on the
part of the buyer’s agent. He had no opportunity to refuse and
there could be no neglect on his part because he was at the place
specified ready to accept delivery during all of the time within
which delivery was to be made and he had had no notice that
the delivery would be attempted at a later time.. “

857

When defendant thereafter refused to discuss the fixing of
another time for the delivery of the steers and sold them to
another buyer, he clearly breached the contract.

The trial court found, that because of this breach of contract,
plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $1170.00. Of this sum,
$750.00 represented the advance payment made by plaintiff to
defendant on the purchase price, the balance represented the
damages sustained by plaintiff because of an advance in the
price of beef cattle. There can, of course, be no question of
plaintiff’s right to a return of his advance payment on the pur-
chase price. In computing the additional damages the trial
court took the minimum number of steers called for by the con-
tract, namely 20 steers, the average weight of the steers at 700
pounds and the advance in price at three cents a pound. The
computation resulted in a finding that the additional damages
were $420.00.

Defendant challenges this computation solely upon the ground
that the evidence does not warrant a finding that the average
weight of the steers was 700 pounds.

Plaintiff's agent testified that he saw defendant’s steers on
August 6th; that altogether defendant had about 34 steers; that
about 8 or 9 of these steers were below standard, that he esti-
mated that the weight of the 20 to 25 better steers, which he
bought, would have averaged 700 pounds on September 20th.
This estimate was based upon his judgment that the steers av-
eraged 670 pounds when he saw them and that there would be
an average gain of thirty pounds per animal between that time
and September 20th. As foundation for this testimony the wit-
ness stated that he had been in the business of raising and buying
cattle for thirty-five years and was experienced in judging the
weight of cattle on the range. He conceded that his estimate
was not based upon a close inspection but was made while riding
through the pasture in an automobile. Opposed to this testi-
mony is the actual scale weight of the 34 steers at the time they
were sold, At that time the average for the 34 was 567 pounds.
It is clear that the estimate of plaintiff’s agent is too high, even
if we make allowance for the fact that 8 or 9 of the steers were
considerably below standard. Thus if we were to assume the

858 —

top 25 steers averaged 700 pounds apiece, and the average
weight for the whole lot was 567 pounds the poor nine would
have averaged less than 200 pounds apiece. On its face, such
a result is improbable. It is true, that the top steers averaged
more than 567 pounds, but how much more, we cannot say with-
out indulging in pure speculation. In our judgment the finding
of the trial court as to average weight must be reduced to the
average shown by the actual scale weights. This has the effect
of reducing the additional damages from $420.00 to $340.20 and
the total judgment for damages from $1170.00 to $1090.20.

The judgment of the district court will be modified accordingly
and as modified, affirmed.

Morris, C. J., and Cmristranson, Grimson and Sarurs, JJ.,
concur,

Es
[File No. 7394]

VERN CLAUSON, Respondent, v. OSCAR OLSON; PETER
C. OLSON; HJALMER S. OLSON; CLARA ABELSON;
Tillie Olson; Wilhelm Olson; Unknown heirs of Carl Olson,
deceased; Unknown heirs of Christine Olson, deceased ; Citi-
zens State Bank of Stanley, a corporation; State Examiner ;
Mountrail County, a municipal corporation; Stanolind Oil
and Gas Company; and all other persons unknown, claim-
ing any estate or interest in or lien or encumbrances upon
the real estate described in the Complaint, whether as the
heirs, devisees or personal representatives of Carl Olson,
deceased and Christine Olson, deceased, or otherwise, De-
fendants, and CLARA ABELSON, Appellant.

(60 NW2d 198)

859

Opinion filed Sept. 29, 1953.

Q. R. Schulte, for appellant.
Swendseid & Bekken, for respondent.

Cunistiansoy, J. This is a statutory action to determine ad-
verse claims to a quarter section of land in Mountrail County
in this state. The complaint is in the form prescribed by law
in such actions, (NDRC 1943, 32-1704), and alleges that the
plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession
of the land described in the complaint and that the defendants
claim certain estates or interests in and liens or encumbrances
upon the real property adverse to the plaintiff. Plaintiff prays
judgment that the defendants be required to set forth all their
adverse claims to the property described in the ‘complaint and
that the validity, superiority and priority thereof may be.de-
termined; that the same be adjuged null and void and that the
defendants be decreed to have no estate or interest in, or lien
or encumbrance upon the said real estate or any part thereof;
that plaintiffs title be quieted as to such claims, and that the
defendants and each and all of them be forever debarred and
enjoined from asserting the same.

The defendant Clara Abelson interposed an answer wherein
she denied that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to posses-
sion of the real property and admitted certain allegations relat-
ing to the corporate character of the defendants, Citizens State
Bank of Stanley, Stanolind Oil Company and Mountrail County

860 a

and also admitted an allegation in the complaint that Carl Olson
is deceased and that his estate was filed for probate in the
County Court of Mountrail County and his entire estate decreed
to his widow Christine.Olson; that Christine Olson is also de-
ceased and that her heirs at law are Oscar Olson, Peter C. Olson,
Hjalmer §S. Olson, Clara Abelson, Tillie Olson and Wilhelm
Olson. The plaintiff interposed a reply to the answer of Clara
Abelson wherein he denied the allegations of the answer that
the defendant Clara Abelson had never lost title to the real
property, that she is entitled to the immediate possession thereof
and that the plaintiff is wrongfully in possession and has with-
held rents and profits from the land. The reply further alleged
that if the defendant Clara Abelson ever had title to or interest
in the land the same was lost through laches and abandonment,
that no taxes have been paid on.said land by the defendant Clara
Abelson since 1928 or at all. That Mountrail County acquired
tax title to the land on October 1, 1940, that this was well known
to the said defendant, and that she has made no effort to redeem
said land until subsequent to.the bringing of this action, That
the defendant Clara Abelson has not been in possession of or
claimed any ownership of or interest in the land for the past
thirty years. That the defendant Clara Abelson’s cause of ac-
tion, if any she has, accrued on or about October 1, 1940, and is
barred by the statute of limitations. That the defendant Mount-
rail County acquired title to the land through tax deed proceed-
‘ings and conveyed the same to the plaintiff. The case was tried
to the court without a jury, as prescribed by NDRC 1943, 28-
2732.

‘The plaintiff and the defendant Clara Abelson and three other
witnesses were sworn and testified. The trial court made: find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to the plaintiff.
From the facts found the trial court concluded that the plaintiff
was estopped by laches to assert any claim to the premises and
that she had wholly abandoned the premises. The court also
found that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and entitled
to the immediate possession of the land against the defendants
and that the defendants and no one of them have-any rights or
title to or interest in said land or any part thereof, and that

plaintiff is entitled to the'dectee prayed for in his complaint.
Pursuant to the findings of fact and conclusions of law the court

ordered judgment to be rendered arid entéred and judgmient was
rendered and entered,—“‘it is hereby .

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

I

That the Plaintiff Vern Clauson is the owner of and entitled to
the immediate possession of the following described real prop-
erty, to-wit:

Northeast quarter . (NE)

Section twenty-four (24)

Township One Hundred Fifty four (154)

Range Ninety One (91)
Ir

That said plaintiff is the owner in Fee Simple and entitled to
the immediate possession of said lands and premises as against
the defendants, above named, and each and all of them; and that
said defendants have no rights, title or interest in or to said
lands and premises or any part thereof, adverse to the Plaintiff.

Tir

That said defendants, and each and all of them, and all persons
claiming or to claim the same, by or through the said defend-
ants, be and they are hereby forever enjoined and debarred from
ever asserting any rights in or to said lands and premises, or
any part thereof, adverse to the Plaintiff.”

The defendant Clara Abelson attempts to appeal from a part
of the judgment. In the notice of appeal it is said: “the above
named defendant, Clara Abelson, hereby appeals to the Supreme
Court of the State of North Dakota from that part of that cer-
tain judgment, including the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order for judgment, made and entered in this action and
filed in the office of the Clerk of the District Court of Mountrail
County, North Dakota on the 2nd day of March, 1953, and that

862, —

said appeal.is taken from that part of the said finding of facts,
conclusion of law and order for judgment and judgment wherein
the trial Court found and gave judgment that Section 28-0122,
NDRC, 1943, is applicable in suits to Quiet Title to establish
validity of tax deed, based on possession under tax deed, and
that laches is a bar to the claim of title by the former owner.

“That the appellant, Clara Abelson, demands a re-trial in the
Supreme Court of that part of said cause upon the merits, inso-
far as pertaining to the applicability of Section 28-0122, NDRC,
1943, and estoppel through laches, in actions of this nature,
based wpon the transcript of evidence and the judgment roll
herein.

“That said appeal is made and based upon the specifications
of error and upon all the records, files and exhibits in the case
and upon the statement of the case to be allowed and settled by
order of the trial court.”

None of the specifications ask for the retrial of a question of
fact and no specification is predicated upon an alleged error in
the determination of a question of fact. Hach of the specifica-
tions of error recites, “the court erred as a matter of law” and
follows this with referring to a particular holding complained
of. The statement of the specifications of error concludes, “upon
such specifications of error and upon all of the records and files
in said action and the statement of the case to be certified,. set-
tled, and allowed by the trial court, the defendant herein, on
this appeal, demands a new trial as to said specifications of er-
ror by the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota.”

The judgment in this case is set forth above. Such judgment
is an entirety. It is single and indivisible and clearly is not
severable into parts. It adjudges that the plaintiff is the owner
in fee simple of the land in controversy and that none of the
defendants have any estate or interest therein or lien thereon.
The notice of appeal states that the defendant Clara Abelson
appeals from a part of the judgment in this case, which judg-
ment was filed in the office of the Clerk of the District Court,
of Mountrail County on March 2, 1953, “including the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and ‘order for judgment.” By com-
paring the statement in the notice of appeal purporting to iden-

Le 868

tify the part of the judgment appealed from with the judgment
that actually was entered as set forth above it will be noticed
that the notice of appeal does not specify any portion of the
judgment that was entered in the case. One who seeks to appeal
from a final judgment may appeal only from the judgment, and
‘where the law permits an appeal to be taken from a part of the
judgment it must be taken from a part of the judgment and not
from a finding (Cottier v. Sullivan, 47 Wyo 72, 82, 31 P2d 675,
677), or from a reason or ground for the decision. (Woods v.
Pollard, 14 $ Dak 44, 49, 84 NW 214, 216).

The only authority possessed by the Supreme Court to try
cases anew is that conferred by NDRC 1943, 28-2732. Littel v.
Phinney, 10 ND 351, 87 NW 593; Mapes v. Metcalf, 10 ND 601,
88 NW 718; Tronsrud v. Farm Land and Finance Co. 18 ND
417, 121 NW 68. That statute provides that a party desiring
to appeal from a judgment in any such action shall cause a
statement of the case to be settled “and shall specify therein the
questions of fact that he desires the supreme court to review,
and all questions of fact not so specified shall be deemed on
appeal to have been properly decided by the trial court.” See,
Lunde vy. Irish, 50 ND 312, 195 NW 825. The statute further
provides “only such evidence as relates to the questions of fact
to be reviewed shall be embodied in this statement.” But “if the
appellant shall specify in the statement that he desires to review
the entire case, all the evidence and proceedings shall be em-
bodied in the statement.”

" In this case there is no demand for a review of the entire case
or specifications of questions of fact that the appellant desires
to have reviewed, and the notice of appeal and specifications
served therewith disclose clearly that there was no intention to
appeal from the entire judgment and have the entire case pre-
sented to the Supreme Court for review, but that there was an
intention to appeal only from what is denominated a part of the
judgment and to have the review restricted to the part so speci-
fied. In the circumstances the attempted appeal presents noth-
ing to review. Douglas v. Glazier, 9 ND 615, 84 NW 552; Mar-
“quette National Fire Insurance Co. v. McCutcheon, 54 ND 596,
211 NW 433; Tronsrud v. Farm Land ‘and Finance Co., supra;

864 a

Prescott v. Brooks, 11 ND 93, 90 NW 129; Crane v. Odegard,
11 ND 342, 91 NW 962. In Mapes v. Metcalf, supra, this Court
said:

“It is clear that Sec. 5630, Rev. Codes 1899, (NDRC 1943, 28-
2732) only authorizes appcals to this court for the purposes of
a retrial thereunder in cases where the entire case is presented
to this court for review and final determination. <A retrial of
a part of the issues or of a fragment of a case by this court would
not only be contrary to the spirit of the statute, but in violation
of its express language.” 10ND at p 605.

In Prescott v. Brooks, supra, this Court in referring to the
statute providing for a retrial in this Court (RC 1899, Sec 5630)
said:

‘Does this section authorize or permit a retrial upon an ap-
peal from a part of a judgment, ie., a retrial of a part of a case
in this court? We are of the opinion that it does not. By ex-
press language the appeal therein referred to is an appeal from
a judgment, and no reference whatever is made to an appeal
from a portion of a judgment. We think the express language
of the section plainly excludes such an appeal and retrial.” 11
ND at p 101.

The question was again considered by this Court in Marquette
National Fire Insurance Co. v. MéCutcheon, supra. The holding
of the Court in that case is thus summarized in the syllabus:

“The supreme court has no jurisdiction to review or retry an
action.tried and appealed under sec 7846, Comp Laws 1913, un-
léss the entire judgment appealed from is before it for final
disposition.”

In the Opinion in the case the Court said:

“It is clear that the judgment as entered was a single and in-
divisible judgment granting relief to both the plaintiff and de-
fendant. Plaintiff has seen fit to take advaritage of that part
of the judgment which was favorable to it. This appeal is from
only that part with which it is dissatisfied, and it seeks a review

_in this court of only so much of the case as pertains to that part
of the judgment. It has long been settled that this court has
no jurisdiction to review or retry an action tried and appealed

Es 865

under see 7846, unless the entire judgment appealed from is
before it for final disposition.” 54 ND at p 599.

It follows from what has been said that the appeal must be
dismissed and it is so ordered.

Morris, C. J., and Sarure, Burke and Griuson, JJ., concur.
a
[File No. 7372]

ROBERT E. GUST, Respondent, v. SAM A. WILSON and A.
Y. MORE, Defendants, and A. Y. MORE, Appellant

(60 NW2d 202, 38 ALR2d 1371)

866

« Opinion filed September 30, 1958

Burnett, Bergeson, Conmy & Whittlesey, Pare, for Appel-
lant.

Roy K. Redetzke, Fargo, for Respondent.

868

Grimson, J. Plaintiff brings this action to recover $500.00
from the defendants. In his complaint he alleges that the de-
fendant, More, was a real estate broker employed by the defend-
ant, Sam A. Wilson, to sell certain real estate; that a, contract
was entered into between the plaintiff and Wilson for the pur-
chase of said real estate; that plaintiff deposited with More
$500.00 as part of the purchase money that Wilson was to fur-
nish abstracts of title showing merchantable title to said prop-
erty in Wilson; that upon examination of the abstracts certain
encumbrances and defects in the title were found; that Wilson
failed to remedy such defects; that plaintiff was ready and
willing to go on with the agreement but on the failure of Wilson
to cure the'defects in the title he cancelled the contract and de-

| 869

manded the return of the $500.00 which was still in the posses-
sion of More and asks for judgment against both defendants.

Both defendants answer. More admits the contract and claims
he acted only as agent for Wilson; admits the receipt of the
$500.00; claims he credited Wilson therewith and applied it on
his commission due from Wilson for making the sale to the plain-
tiff; admits that Wilson was to furnish abstracts showing mer-
chantable title but claims he has no knowledge of the dispute
between the plaintiff and Wilson; that plaintifi’s | cause of action,
if any, is against Wilson.

Wilson makes a general denial but admits the contract with
-plaintiff for the purchase of certain lands and the deposit with
More by the plaintiff of the $500.00. Wilson claims he furnished
the abstracts, showing clear title except for some encumbrances
which he agreed to take care of out of the purchase price and
claims to have been willing and able to perform under. the terms
of his contract but that plaintiff said he was unable to sell a
certain North Dakota farm and requested that the deposit be
returned to him, Wilson claims further that he so informed
defendant More who has failed to repay the $500.00 but diverted
the same to his own use and “without the scope of his authority.”

When the case came up for trial counsel for all parties waived
a jury and agreed in open court to stipulate the facts and after-
wards a written stipulation was filed from which “this law suit”
was “to be decided.” :

From the stipulations it appears that A. Y. More was a real
estate agent employed by the defendant, Wilson, to find a pur--
chaser for certain real estate. He induced the plaintiff to be-
come such purchaser. On Oct. 21, 1948 the plaintiff signed an
offer to defendant More to purchase said premises on certain
terms which offer was accepted by defendant Wilson. Plaintiff
paid to defendant More $500.00 which according to the contract,
Exhibit A, was “to be applied as a part of the purchase price.”
Regarding this payment the stipulation of counsel provides:

“That the said plaintiff, as a security, as well as for the per-
formance of said agreement on his part and to secure the per-
formance thereof on the part of the said defendant, then and
there deposited in the hands of the defendant, A. Y. More, for

870 De

said defendant, Sam A. Wilson, the sum of Five Hundred Dol-
lars ($500.00) cash, as part of said purchase money, in accord-
ance with the terms and conditions of said written agreement
and identified as plaintiff’s Exhibit ‘A’ herein.”
The $500.00 deposit still remains in the hands of defendant More.

The contract stipulated that Wilson was to furnish an abstract
of the title to the premises described in the contract showing
merchantable title free and clear of encumbrances, including
taxes. The contract provided the transaction was to be com-
pleted on or before Nov. 10, 1948. The defendant, Wilson, fur-
nished such abstracts but upon examination by plaintiff's attor-
ney defects in the title were found of which the defendants were
informed. Defendant Wilson made no effort to perfect the title.
Plaintiff was ready to make payments according to the contract
if defendant would remedy the defects enumerated. Defendant
More notified defendant Wilson that unless title was cleared so
the deal could be closed he, More, would bring suit for his com-
mission. Finally, on Feb. 22, 1949, plaintiff cancelled the con-
tract on account of defendant’s failure to furnish title and de-
manded return of the $500.00 payment. Defendant Wilson
advised defendant More to return the $500.00 to the plaintiff.
More refused, claiming to have applied that $500.00 on his com-
mission due from Wilson for his services as Wilson’s agent in
securing plaintiff as purchaser of the premises involved.

Thereafter this action was commenced against both Wilson
and More for the return of the $500.00 as money had and re-
ceived, The case was tried to the court on the stipulation of
facts. The court found for the plaintiff and ordered judgment
against both defendants. Defendant More appeals from the
judgment assigning as errors that the court erred in determining
“the defendant A. Y. More was liable in any amount to the plain-
tiff in this action” and in awarding “judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant A. Y. More,” and in refusing
to award a “judgment dismissing the action on its merits as to
defendarit A. Y. More.” Further, the defendant, More, assigns
as error that the court erred in not rendering and entering
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

There exist in this State two types of appeal for review in

a sr

the Supreme Court of judgments of a district court or a county
court with increased jurisdiction. One type of appeal provides
for the review of the rulings of the trial court upon assignments
or specifications of error;'and the other type provides for what
is known as a trial de novo in the Supreme Court. The first
type of appeal was in effect under the Laws of-the Territory of
Dakota and came into effect in the State upon the establishment
of the government of the State of North Dakota. The second
type of appeal came into being in 1893. See Laws 1893, Ch 82;
Christianson v, Farmers Warehouse Ass’n, 5 ND 438, 67, NW
300, 32 LRA 730. Said Chapter 82 was amended in 1897 (Laws
1897, Ch 5), and was embodied in subsequent codifications and
revisions and is embodied without material change in Sec 28-
_ 2732 NDRC 1943: :

. “On appeal in any action tried by the court, without a jury,
whether triable to a jury or not, if it appears to the supreme
court, that any material evidence was excluded, the supreme
court may issue a mandate to the trial court to take such evi-
dence without delay and to certify and return it to the supreme
court, and all proceedings in the supreme court shall be stayed
pending the return of such evidence. A party desiring to appeal
from a judgment in any such action shall.cause a statement of
the case to be settled within the time and in the manner pre-
scribed by chapter 18 of this title, and-shall specify therein the
questions of fact that he desires the supreme court to review,
and all questions of fact not so specified, shall be deemed on
appeal to have been properly decided by the trial court. Only
such evidence as relates to the questions of fact to be reviewed
shall -be embodied in this statement. If the appellant shall
specify in the statement that he desires to review the entire case,
all-the, évidence and ‘proceedings shall be embodied in the state-
ment. - The supreme’ court shall try anew the questions of fact
specified in the statement or in the entire case, if the appellant
demands a retrial of the entire case, and shall finally dispose
of the same whenever justice can be done without a new trial,
and; shall either affirm or modify the judgment or direct a new
judgment to’be entered in the district-court. However, the su-
preme court, if it deems such course necessary to the accomplish-

872 —

ment of justice, may order a new trial of the action. In actions
tried under the provisions of this section, failure of the court
to make findings upon all the issues in the case shall not ‘con-
stitute a ground for granting a new trial or reversing the judg-*
ment.”

A party to an-action aggrieved by a judgment rendered
against him in an action tried to the court without a jury is
not required to take an appeal under the statute providing for
a trial.anew in the Supreme Court. He may if he desires
take an appeal and assign such errors as arise upon the judg-
ment roll. Thus, he may appeal and assert that the findings of
fact do not justify or support the judgment. If he desires to
have the entire case reviewed, all the evidence and proceedings
must be embodied in the statement of the case and all that is
required is that he specify in his statement that he desires a
review of the entire case. If he desires to have the Supreme
Court review certain questions of fact, he may have such ques-
tions reviewed and in such case only the evidence relating to
such questions of fact are required to-be embodied in statement
of case. The authority of the supreme court to try a case de
novo on appeal is derived solely from the statute. Littel v.
Phinney, 10 ND 351,'87 NW 593. See, also Tronsrud v. Farm
Land & Finance Co., 18 ND 417, 121 NW. 68.

In this case the notice of appeal states “You will please take
notice that the appellant demands a trial de novo im the Su-
preme Court and a retrial of said cause and the whole thereof
in the Supreme Court upon the merits and upon the specifica-
tions of error served herewith.” In the order settling the state-
ment of case certain documents and.papers including a stipula-
tion of facts entered into by the attorneys for the plaizitiff and
defendants; a transcript of the trial proceedings. Plaintiff’s ex-
hibits A, B, C, and D, inclusive are identified and settled as a
statement of the case. The order states that the judge of said
court does “further certify and identify the following exhibits,
to-wit: Plaintiff’s Exhibits A, B, C and D inclusive and de-
fondants’ exhibit 1, 1A, 2A, and 3A, inclusive and he does hereby
make and constitute said records and exhibits, including demand
for trial de novo as the statement of the case herein including

| 873

the judgment roll.” While the pleadings in the action and the
judgment and order for judgment are part of the judgment roll
and need not be included in the statement of the case this does
not affect the order settling the statement of the case. So it
seems clear that the appeal here is one under NDROC 1943, 28-
2732 for a trial de novo in the Supreme Court and that the ap-
peal is governed by the provisions of law applicable to an appeal
of that type.

It is obvious that there are certain rather fundamental differ-
ences between the effect of findings of fact on an appeal triable
anew in the Supreme Court and on an appeal where the review
in the Supreme Court is predicated upon assignments of error.
On an appeal for a trial de novo the Supreme Court is not bound
by the findings of the.trial court either as to the law or the facts.
Englert v. Dale, 25 ND 587, 142 NW 169. Where a'new trial is
demanded in the Supreme Court specifications of error are not
required. In Plott v. Kittelson, 58 ND 881, 885-886, 228 NW
217, this Court said:

“In such case the following provision of the statute applies,
‘but if the appellant shall specify in the statement that he de-
sires a review of the entire case, all the evidence and proceedings
_shall be embodied in the statement.’ In such case, appellant does
not specify any particular facts, but complies with the statute
when he specifies in the statement that he desires to review the
entire case. It is then incumbent upon the supreme court to
review the entire record and try anew all the questions of fact
in the entire case and dispose of the same whenever justice can
be done without a new trial. Since the appellants demand a re-
trial of the entire case, the specifications of error were not nec-
essary.”

On an appeal where a new trial is demanded in the Supreme
Court (NDRC 1943, 28-2732), “the Supreme Court has the power
and it is made its duty to review and weigh’ the evidence that
was adduced upon the trial and transmitted to the Supreme
Court as a part of the record on appeal, and to ‘find the facts
for itself? (Doyle v. Doyle, 52 ND 380, 389, 202 NW 860, 863),
‘independently of ‘the trial court’s findings.’ Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Collard, 833 ND at p 565, 157 NW at p 491.” Belt v.

874 De

Belt, 75 ND at p 732, 32 NW2d 674. “The failuré ‘of ‘the trial
court-to make findings upon all the:issues in the case shall not
constitute a ground for granting a new trial or reversing the
judgment.” See 28-2732 NDRC 1943.

In Chaffee-Miller Land Co. v. Barber, 12 ND 478, 97 NW 850,
this Court had occasion to consider assignments of error predi-
cated upon the alleged refusal and failure ‘of the trial court to
make findings of fact of all issues in an action tried to the court
without a jury. In the opinion in the case this Court said:

“We are of opinion that none of the assignments of error is
well founded. The judgment must therefore be affirmed.

“The first and second assignments are based upon the assump-
tion that the alleged refusal and failure of the trial court to make
findings of fact upon all of the issues raised by the pleadings in
an action tried under section 5630, Rev Codes 1899, constitutes
reversible error. This is a mistake. This section, among other
things, expressly provides that, ‘in actions tried under the provi-
sions of this section, failure of the court to make findings upon
all the issues in the case shall not constitute a ground for grant-
ing a new trial or reversing the judgment,’ Findings of fact
are not abolished by this section, but it declares that the failure
of the court to make findings upon all the issties shall not consti-
tute reversible error. The chief purpose ofthe practice created
by section 5630 is to secure a speedy and final determination of
cases. To accomplish that purposé, a party who is aggrieved
because of the failure of the trial court to find upon any issue is
deprived of the power of securing a'reversal upon appeal or a
new trial in the district court, and is compelled to avail himself
of the right given by this section to bring up the evidence on his
appeal, and have the error corrected in this court, where a new
and final judgment may be ordered without the delay incident
to a new trial in the district court.” 12 ND at pp 483-484.

The judgment rendered in-this case was specific and certain.
Tt adjudged that the “Deféndants and each’ of them are indebted
to the plaintiff in the sum of $500.00” and it is further ordéred
and adjudged “that the - ‘plaintiff have judgment against the de-
fendants and each of them in the sum of $500.00.” “The judg:
ment was entered irregularly because of the failure of the court

[| 875

to make and file findings of fact. But the judgment was subject
to appeal. The defendant More chose to appeal from the judg-
ment and demanded a trial anew in the Supreme Court. He
thus evoked the power of the. Supreme Court to review the evi-
dence and determine the facts.and also to determine what judg-
ment should be entered. We will proceed to do so.

This action is brought for money had and received. It is not
based on the contract but. upon the implied agreement, arising
from the circumstances regarding the deposit, to return the
deposit if conveyance could not be made. The rule is that an
action for money had and received will lie whenever one person
has possession of money which in equity belongs to another and
which he should in equity and good conscience restore. Miller
v. Shelburn, 15 ND 182, 186, 107 NW 51. See also Kicks v.
State Bank of Lisbon, 12 ND 576, 98 NW 408; Norris v. Cohen,
223 Minn 471, 27 NW2d 277, 281, 171 ALR 178; Zapf Realty
Company v. Brown, 26 Ga App 443, 106 SE 748; Simmonds v.
Long, 80 Kan 155, 101 P 1070, 23 LRA NS 553; Jensen v. Miller,
162 Wis 546, 156 NW 1010; If the contentions of the plaintiff
are confirmed an action for money had and received will lie.

The only question for the determination on this appeal is
whether defendant More is liable for the return of -the $500.00
deposit. . .

Counsel for defendant More contends that More is not liable
in this case because he was the known agent of defendant, Wil-
son, and that he cannot be held liable for the earnest: money paid
by plaintiff because of: the failure of Wilson to carry out the
contract.for the purchase and sale of property to which contract
defendant More was not a party. 12 CJS Brokers, Sec 144 P
357. That seems,to be the general rule in cases where the.agent
acts solely as an agent; where the principal has an absolute right
to the money after it has been paid to the agent; where the de-
posit has in good faith been paid by the agent to his principal;
where the agent is not in any way personally involved in the
contract. Huffman v. Newman, 76 NW 409, 55 Neb 713; Cohen
v. Barry, 108 NYS 573; Yentis'v. Mills, 299 Pa 25, 148 A 909;
Beeman v. May, 193 Mise 684, 85 NYS2d 122; Bogart v. Crosby,
80.Cal 195, 22 Pac 84; Levine v. Field, 114 NYS 819; Garrison

876 ee

v. Edward Brown & Sons, 25 Cal2d 473, 154 P2d 377; Ware v.
Frank Meline Co. (Cal App) 53 P2d-1033; Kraus v. Campe, 328
Tl App 87, 65 NH2d 127; Brunetto v. Ferrara, 167 Pa Super
568, 76 A2d 448; Walter v. Four-wheel Drive Auto Co. 213 Wis
559, 252 NW 346; Wright v. Merritt Realty Co. 148 Wash 380,
268 P 873.

There are, however, many circumstances in connection with
such a transaction where the agent has been held liable. See
McKeen y. Boothby, 129 Me 324, 152 A 53; Zapf Realty Com-
pany v. Brown, 26 Ga App 443, 106 SE 748; Kenney v. Walden,
28 Ga App 810, 113 SE 61; Pancoast v. Dinsmore, 105 Me 471,
75 A 43, 134 Am St Rep 582; Hearsey v. Pruyn (NY) 7 Johns
179; Mead v. Altgeld, 136 Ill 298, 26 NE 388; Read v. Riddle,
48 NJL 359, 7 A 487; Smith v. H. B. Orr Co. 147 P 1, 84 Wash
561.

In all these cases the agent or broker was held liable for
earnest money which has not been turned over to the principal
when the principal has been unable to complete the contract
for sale or rescinded the contract. Hach case is controlled by
its particular facts. :

In the case at bar the evidence shows that the defects in the
title of the property involved existed at the time that the deposit
was made. The abstracts of title show that there were encum-
brances against the premises involved and that defendant Wil-
son’s title to some of the land was through a tax deed from the
State of Minnesota. Upon the tax deed matter the parties had’
stipulated “that title to real property located in the State of
Minnesota is not merchantable if said title is based upon tax
sale proceedings.” Such being the case it was impossible for
Wilson to meet the terms of that contract at that time. He was
not in position to pass merchantable title to plaintiff and conse-
quently could not claim'the deposit. The most ‘he had was an
inchoate right to the money. Before that would ripen into an
absolute right he had to be able to perform his part under the
contract by making the title merchantable. In 2 Am Jur Agency,
Sec 335, p 264, it is said: “An agent to whom money has been
paid for his principal through error, or wnder other circum-
stances ewisting at the time of payment that would entitle payer

ee 72

to recover it back from the principal, is individually liable to
the payer for the money go received so-long as it remains in his
hands and there has been no alteration in the situation of the
agent towards his principal with relation to such payment.
(Emphasis supplied.) In 12 CJS Brokers, See 144, p 356, the
rule is laid down that “A purchaser may recover from the
broker a payment which has not been turned over to the prin-
cipal where the latter is unable to complete his contract of sale.”
See also McKeen v. Boothby, supra; Pancoast v. Dinsmore,
supra. .

The Am. Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law on Agency,
See. 33, p 745, puts it this way:

“An agent who has received things from another for a dis-
closed or partially disclosed principal has a duty to return them
or their proceeds if the other rescinds the transaction by which
they were received for a cause existing at the time of their re-
ceipt, to the extent that the agent has not, before notice of re-
scission and in good faith, changed his position.”

In 3 O.J.8. Agency, See. 217 p. 126, it is said “. . . If the
money still remains in the hands of the agent it may ordinarily
be recovered back from him where there is proper ground for
its recovery as against principal although some authorities dif-
ferentiate between the cases in which the ground for recovery
existed at the time of payment and those which arose later.”

It seems to be well established that where money is paid to an
agent to which his principal is not in fact entitled at the time
the agent is liable for its return as long as the agent stands in
his original position. 2 Am. Jur. Agency, Sec. 335, p. 264.

In the case at bar the cause of the rescission of the contract
was the defect in the vendor’s title. That defect existed at the
time of the payment of the deposit to More. The title to the
property More was trying to sell was not merchantable so that
the vendor, Mr. Wilson, could not pass title. He never per-
fected the title. He never became entitled to the $500.00 deposit
with More. The plaintiff would have been entitled to recover
the deposit from Wilson had it been turned over to him. He is
now entitled to recover it back from More since More never paid
it over to his principal.

878 |

‘There is another circumstance in the case at bar which differ?
entiates it from the cases holding the agent not liable. The con-
tract provides that‘ the $500.00 is “to be applied as part of the
purchase price.” That indicates some future time. Then the
stipulation says: “That the said plaintiff, as a security, as well
as for the performance of said agreement on his part and.to
secure the performance thereof on the part of said defendant,
then and there deposited in the hands of the defendant, A. Y.
More, for said defendant, Sam A. Wilson, the sum of Five
Hundred ($500.00) Dollars in cash as a part of said purchase’
money, in accordance with the terms and conditions of said
written agreement, and identified as plaintiff’s Exhibit A here-
in.” (Emphasis supplied.) The reasonable construction of the
contract and stipulation is that the $500.00 was deposited as
security for the performance of the contract by Wilson as well
as plaintiff. That does not give the defendant, Wilson, any
right to that money until he was ready to perform his part of the
contract. Not until then is it contemplated by the parties that
the title to the money passes to Wilson. In the meantime More
is merely a stake holder. After the contract was rescinded be-
cause of Wilson’s failure to perform More was holding that

’ fund as trustee for the plaintiff and became liable for the refund
thereof to the plaintiff who had deposited the money. At that
time no one else had any right to that money. In Martin v.
Allen, 125 Mo App 636, 103 SW 138, 139, the court says:

“An agent, by the express or implied agreement of himself
and the parties to a contract, may assume the position of trustee
with relation to money or property involved in the transaction,
. . . Itis trae that the sum thus deposited, in the contingehoy
stated, is to be treated ‘as part of the consideration of the sale;
but the clear intent and purpose of the entire ar. tangement re-’
quired defendant to hold the deposit in his custody: “until the
time came for paying it'over to the party entitled to reccive it:
See also Read v. Riddle, 48 NJL 359, 7 A 487; ‘Kenney v. Wal-
den, 28 Ga App 810, 1138 SE’ 61; Murrah v. Shirley, Texas Civil
Appeals (1922), 237 SW 307; White v. Taylor, 113 Mich 543, :
71 NW 871; 1 Mechem on ‘Agency, See 445, p 1070.

One of the defenses of defendant, More; is his ‘claim that’he™

Es 879

applied the $500.00 on the commission due him from Wilson for
bringing him the plaintiff as a purchaser ready, willing and
able to buy the land. The evidence shows clearly, however, that
he did not attempt to make such application until after Wilson
had failed to perfect the title and plaintiff had rescinded the
contract. A letter to him dated Jan. 13, 1949, was sent to him
notifying him thereof and making a demand on him for the re-
fund. On March 17, 1949, about a month before this suit was
brought and some six months after he received the $500.00 his
attorney wrote Wilson that “Unless you see to it that the title
is cleared so that the deal may be closed, Mr. More has instruct-
ed us to bring suit against you for the commission.” It appears,
therefore, that More had notice of the inability of Wilson to
deliver title before he made any attempt to apply the $500.00 on
the commission. It was too late then for him to change his
position with regard to this fund. He may be entitled to a com-
mission from defendant Wilson. Neff v. Schrader, 49 ND 213,
191 NW 466. That, however, is a question between him and
Wilson. Wilson claims that More diverted the $500.00 to his
own use “without the scope of his authority” and directed More
to return the deposit of $500.00 to the plaintiff. Not only did
More lack authority from Wilson to appropriate this money to
his own use, but, as we have found, Wilson himself, never had
clear title to the money. More was holding it in trust for this
plaintiff and had no right to apply it for any purpose than to
return it to plaintiff when Wilson failed to perform his part of
the dgreement. Clearly the attempted application by More of
the $500.00 to this commission from Wilson is no defense to this
action.

‘Wilson, the vendor, never became entitled to the deposit. The
title to the money never passed to him. More, the agent, never
obtained any more right to the money than his principal. As
stake holder or trustee he is liable to the purchaser, the plaintiff,
who has never lost title to the fund conditionally deposited with
More.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Monrzis, C. J., and Curistianson, Sarre and Burxs, JJ., con-

cur. *