State: Wisconsin
Volume: 275
Term: 1957-1957
Jurisdiction(s): Wisconsin
Source: https://static.case.law/wis/275.pdf

Estate oF Fuirer: Arcwer, Plaintiff, vs. Henry and
others, Defendants. [Two appeals.]

January 9—February 5, 1957,

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For the plaintiff there was a brief by Ruediger & Joanis
and Hale, Skemp, Hanson & Schnurrer, all of La Crosse,
and oral argument by Quincy H. Hale.

For the defendants there were briefs by Bosshard & Arne-
son and Johns, Roraff, Pappas & Flaherty, all of La Crosse,
and oral argument by Daniel T. Flaherty and Philip G.
Arneson.

Brown, J. We recognize that the findings of the trial
court must be affirmed unless contrary to the great weight
and clear preponderance of the evidence and undue influence
is not to be proved but by clear, convincing, and satisfactory

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evidence. Estate of Miller (1953), 265 Wis. 420, 425, 61
N. W. (2d) 813, and cases there cited. Will of Winnemann
(1956), 272 Wis. 643, 645, 76 N. W. (2d) 616. The
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony are matters for the trial court. Will of Winne-
mann, supra. So are the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.

Many witnesses testified that they considered Miss Fuller
incompetent at times when they observed her in the hospital
both before and after the execution of the will. The hospital
records on the days surrounding July 5, 1955, have frequent
entries that Miss Fuller was disturbed or disoriented. But,
“it is elementary that the question of competency is to be
determined as of the time of the execution of the will.”
Estate of Wegner (1925), 185 Wis. 407, 414, 201 N. W.
826; Estate of Kesich (1944), 244 Wis. 374, 383, 12 N. W.
(2d) 688. The test of testamentary capacity has frequently
been stated and was recently repeated in Will of Klagstad
(1953), 264 Wis. 269, 271, 58 N. W. (2d) 636:

“., , the general rule recognizing that the test of mental
competency is whether the testator had sufficient active
memory to comprehend, without prompting, the condition of
his property, his relations to those who might be beneficiaries,
and to hold these things in mind long enough to perceive their
relations to each other and to be able to form some rational
judgment in relation to them.”

The trial court filed a memorandum opinion quoting this
test and analyzing the evidence which led him to the con-
clusion that at the time Miss Fuller executed her will, July 5,
1955, she had testamentary capacity. Significant extracts
from that opinion, which we have checked against the record,
are:

“While the testimony of the nurses on duty at other times
is not to be disregarded, nevertheless, more weight must
necessarily be given to the testimony of those of the pro-

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fessional staff of the hospital that were on duty at the time
of the execution of the disputed document on July 5th.

“In this regard, the court must therefore consider the
testimony of nurse Mrs. Genevieve Wrobel. It was the gen-
eral conclusion of the court from the testimony of this witness
that she considered the deceased at the particular time in
question competent. Her testimony was that the deceased
was alert at that time. It would seem to the court, although
not mentioned in briefs, that one of the important factors
was the fact that deceased had just rested prior to the arrival
of Judge Ruepicer and the subscribing witnesses. Shortly
after 3 p. m. July 5th, this witness had rolled down the bed
of the deceased and she had rested until shortly before the
arrival of the subscribing witnesses. This rest undoubtedly
contributed to the general mental competency of the deceased
at this very important time. She had rested and after resting,
was sitting up in bed awaiting the arrival of the necessary
people that she might transact her last business. She was so
mentally competent at that particular time that she knew
Judge RuzpicEr whom she hadn’t seen in many years... .

“Tt is true that there were some witnesses who visited the
deceased who testified that upon such visit the deceased was
incompetent. As a general proposition, however, none of
these witnesses were as closely associated with the deceased
as the subscribing witnesses and thus were not in a position
to as accurately appraise the competency of the testatrix as
were the subscribing witnesses. It is further noted that some
of these were relatives and their testimony must obviously
be considered in light of their interest in the outcome of this
contest.

“Tt is, therefore, incumbent upon the court to give con-
siderable weight to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses
in respect to mental competency of the deceased.

“The attorney who prepared the contested Exhibit No. 1
is an able, competent, experienced attorney. His extensive
practice in probate court, his drafting and execution of 1,500

. to 2,000 wills, places his testimony in a position of being
entitled to considerable weight on this question. His testi-
mony was direct and positive to the effect that at the time
the deceased executed the will in question, that she was of
sound mind and memory. She was of such sound mind that

she even recalled knowing the attorney whom she had not
seen in many years. She was also of such sound mind that
she was able to supply an apparent omission from the will
which the attorney had neglected to read to her. It would
seem ‘that with an attorney of such extended experience that
had such an attorney entertained any question as to the
mental competency of the deceased, that he was in an ex-
cellent position to call in a couple or at least one doctor from
the hospital staff where the will was executed to examine the
testatrix upon the execution of such important document in
order to have such evidence available at trial. The opinion
of the attorney as to the competency of the testatrix obviously
was so positive as to dismiss this procedure from his mind
as being unnecessary. The testimony of the other two sub-
scribing witnesses is also entitled to great weight. Both of
these witnesses were old friends of the deceased and were
_ frequently with the deceased for a period up to forty-five
years. They were in an excellent position to know the de-
ceased both during good health and compare such impres-
sions of the deceased with their impressions of the deceased
on her deathbed and at the time of the execution of the con-
tested will. They also had an opportunity, by several visits
to the hospital, to become well acquainted with the condition
of the deceased at that time. Both of these witnesses testified
that the deceased was competent at the time of the execution
of this document. It is significant that these two witnesses
were not just two people who were called in for the purpose
of witnessing a document but were instead two people who
probably, more than any other persons in the world with
the exception of Leota Archer, and the medical profession,
who could appraise the condition of the deceased. Their judg-
ment as to competency was based on the background of close
companionship of many years. It is true that an attempt at
impeachment of their testimony was made by one of the
attorneys for the contestants, and certainly this evidence is
entitled to consideration. However, the statements of the
attorney were disputed and the court is inclined to accept as
the true beliefs of the subscribing witnesses, those statements
made by such witnesses in the court while under oath. The
long and close association to the deceased, of these two sub-
scribing witnesses, their frequent visits to the hospital, and

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their lack of interest in the outcome of the lawsuit entitles
their testimony to great weight.

“The court in arriving at this opinion cannot discard the
fact that just prior to the execution of the document, deceased
had rested for a period. That at the time of the execution
she recognized the attorney whom she had not seen in years,
transacted other business with reference to her property,
corrected the attorney while he read the will to her, then
when the work was done again laid down in her bed, glad
that she had finally taken care of her affairs.”

The record convinces us that testamentary capacity was not
lacking at the time the will was executed. Certainly the
trial court’s conclusion of competency is not contrary to the
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

The next question is whether the will is the product of
undue influence exerted upon Miss Fuller by Miss Archer.

The elements necessary to be proved by clear, satisfactory,
and convincing evidence before an affirmative answer can be
given to the question are well established and have been re-
peated by this court as recently as Will of Winnemann,
supra. They were accurately stated by the trial court in its
memorandum opinion as follows:

“1, A person unquestionably subject to undue influence.

“2. A disposition to influence unduly for the purpose of
procuring improper favor.

“3. Opportunity to exercise such influence and effect the
wrongful purpose.

“4. A result clearly appearing to be the effect of the in-
fluence.”

1. As to the first element, the undisputed evidence showed
that Miss Fuller had been a teacher of Latin, an accomplished
scholar, a superintendent in the Aurora school system, and
a business woman accustomed to manage her numerous
rental properties and capable of doing so. There is no hint
that before she went to the hospital she was susceptible to
undue influence and after her entry into the hospital the

record does not disclose that her character or disposition
changed.

2. Does the evidence prove a disposition on the part of
Miss Archer to exert undue influence? Appellants regard
with suspicion amounting to conviction the efforts Miss
Archer made to validate Miss Fuller’s testamentary disposi-
tions, what they describe as Miss Archer’s failure to notify
them of Miss Fuller’s condition, and Miss Archer’s effort to
keep them away by a “No Visitors” sign on the door of the
hospital room. The “dead man’s statute,” sec, 325.16, pre-
vented Miss Archer from testifying whether or no these
activities were at the request of Miss Fuller who, surely, was
dependent on others to carry out any wishes she may have
had. The trial court could only infer whether Miss Archer’s
efforts to have a will properly executed were services in Miss
Fuller’s behalf or were persistent attempts to secure the
disposition of property which she had induced Miss Fuller to
make, In its memorandum opinion the trial court says:

“Certainly the testimony of witnesses that Leota Archer
influenced deceased is a conclusion not well founded but
rather a conclusion which is confused with the behavior
pattern of a person who is in the presence of his closest
friend and tempered with the respect and admiration each
had for such friendship. It does not seem probable that a
woman of the education and experience of the deceased would
not be aware of any undue influence being exercised upon
her by her friend after almost twenty-five years of constant
association. If such were the case, this friendship would not
have continued for such a period.

“The evidence is certainly clear that these two women were
in almost constant attendance of each other for more than
twenty years. It is difficult for the court to imagine a closer
friendship than the one which existed here between these two
women. They worked together, they lived together, they
shared expenses, they took vacations together, in fact, they
were almost constantly in presence of each other. This
friendship was so very close and strong that it even spilled

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over to the parents of these two women who also shared a
close friendship. The friendship of these two women is not
something which only developed in recent years but, instead,
existed long prior to the time that deceased had acquired the
extensive property now contained in her estate.

“The behavior of Leota Archer during the hospitalization
of the deceased, in the opinion of the court, is merely a mani-
festation of her deep love and devotion for her friend. She
behaved and acted in a manner indicative of the lives they
had spent together. It was Leota Archer who took charge
of affairs in the hospital because it was the natural thing for
her to do. She was merely fulfilling her role as devoted
friend. While most of the relatives (cousins) stated they were
on a friendly basis with deceased, the court is of the opinion
that none of them enjoyed any degree of as close friendship
but merely the acquaintanceship of cousins who have very
little in common with deceased other than such relationship.
Their ‘association with deceased was very little and almost
negligible compared to that of Leota Archer over the past
twenty-five years. This lack of close friendship on the part of
the relatives and the strong friendship of the deceased and
Leota Archer was admitted by several of the objectors.

“Can the actions of Leota Archer then be, under the cir-
cumstances, construed to constitute a disposition to influ-
ence? The court is of the opinion that the answer to this
question is ‘No,’”

In our opinion this conclusion is not contrary to the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence and it must
be sustained,

3. Opportunity to influence the testatrix is conceded but
in respect to it the trial court says:

“Certainly there was an opportunity to influence deceased.
It is to be noted, however, that there was in almost constant
attendance, both day and night, a special nurse. The oppor-
tunity to influence is thus confined to a few short intervals
each day when the special nurses were out of the room. None
of these nurses noted any such behavior on the part of Leota
Archer.”

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4, Finally, does the will itself clearly appear to be the re-
sult of undue influence? On this subject the trial court well
said:

“The result of the disposition of the property certainly does
not appear to be the effect of undue influence. The most im-
portant person in the life of deceased was Leota Archer.
Deceased then gives her property to such person. A contrary
disposition would be better evidence of an effect of undue
influence. The direct heirs of deceased had all gone before,
leaving only collateral heirs. To now give her property to
what some contestants even admit to be the person closest
to her was only the natural result of almost a lifetime of
constant companionship in both work and play.”

We must sustain the trial court’s conclusion that appellants
have failed to prove by clear and convincing and satisfactory
evidence that the Fuller will is the product of respondent’s
undue influence upon the testator.

Therefore the judgment admitting the will to probate must
be affirmed.

The trial court denied respondent’s motion for permission
to tax costs against the sixteen objectors. Sec. 324.11, Stats.,
gives the court discretion to order costs to be paid out of the
estate or by the losing party. While we are sure that the trial
court correctly determined the merits of the action, we do
not consider the objections to the probate of the will so lack-
ing in merit as to constitute the denial of respondent’s motion
an abuse of discretion. The order of denial is affirmed.

Respondent’s brief exceeds 50 pages and she has moved for
permission to tax costs for it in its entirety under sec.
251.264, Stats. Permission is granted.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed. Order denying taxa-
tion of costs in trial court against losing parties affirmed.
Permission given respondent to tax costs for her entire brief.

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Merz, Respondent, vs. Rats and another, Appellants.

January 9—February 5, 1957.

For the appellants there was a brief by Rogers & Owens
of Portage, and oral argument by Bruce J. Rogers.

For the respondent there was a brief by Hugh F. Olden-
burg of Madison, attorney, and Walker & Bieber of Portage
of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Oldenburg and Miss
Dorothy Walker.

Curriz, J. On this appeal we are confronted with the
following issues:

(1) Is there any credible evidence to sustain the jury’s
findings that the defendant Rath was guilty of causal negli-
gence as to both lookout and speed?

(2) Did the trial court err in failing to change the jury’s
answer of “No” to “Yes” to the question which inquired as
to whether the pedestrian Metz’s negligence as to lookout
was a substantial factor in causing the accident?

(3) Was Metz’s negligence equal to or greater than that
of Rath as a matter of law?

(4) Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that the
sudden-emergency doctrine was applicable as to Metz?

The accident occurred in the middle of the forenoon of a
bright clear summer day. South Leeds is a hamlet consist-
ing of a few houses, a store, and a garage fronting on U. S.
Highway 51 which runs in a general northerly and southerly
direction. This highway at the place of the accident has a
black-top pavement 23.4 feet wide. Both the store and the
garage are located on the west side of such highway. County
Trunk Highway K intersects Highway 51 at right angles

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in South Leeds, the store being to the south and the garage
to the north of such intersection.

On the morning of the accident Metz had parked his plat-
form truck loaded with tires on the east shoulder of Highway
51 facing north directly across from the garage and about
81.5 feet north of the center of the intersection with County
Trunk Highway K. To the southward Highway 51 inclined
upward in a gradual slope to the crest of a knoll some 531
feet to the south of Metz’s parked truck. The plaintiff’s key
witness was a Mrs. Lawrence Hanson, who, at the time of
the accident, was seated in the driver’s seat of an automobile
. parked in front of the store facing north. The distance from
where Mrs. Hanson was seated was approximately 234 feet
to the south of the parked Metz truck.

The material portions of Mrs. Hanson’s testimony are as
follows: She observed Metz walk from the cab back along the
west side of his truck with some papers tucked under his
arm. On arriving at the rear of the truck he took two tires
from the back of the truck and started to cross the highway.
At that instant a pickup truck was approaching on Highway
51 from the south and Metz, stepped back to let this truck
pass by. After such truck had passed, Metz again started
across the highway toward the garage. At the same instant
as Metz started to cross the highway this second time, Mrs.
Hanson saw the Rath station wagon, which was approaching
from the south. Such station wagon was then either oppo-
site to where she was seated or had arrived at the intersec-
tion. Metz had taken three or four steps onto the black-top
pavement and then “just froze in his tracks and . . . for
asecond ortwo . . . just stood that way.” He then took
a running step or jump to the west. As Metz made such
jump to the west the Rath station wagon also veered to the
west and the impact occurred. Mrs. Hanson did not see the
actual impact because the station wagon was then between her
and Metz. However, she heard a thud and saw Metz’s body

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somersault in the air and also saw the papers and one of the
tires which he had been carrying. She placed the point of
impact at about the center of the pavement.

No vehicle was in sight approaching from the north at the
time of the accident. Rath testified that one vehicle had
been traveling north ahead of him immediately prior to the
accident and estimated the distance between it and his station
wagon at 1,200 feet. This undoubtedly was the pickup truck
observed by Mrs. Hanson. The posted speed limit in South
Leeds is 45 miles per hour, and Rath testified that he was
traveling at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour as he pro-
ceeded through South Leeds. He also admitted having seen
the parked Metz truck as he came over the crest of the knoll
to the south but stated that no person was then to be seen
about the truck. According to Rath’s testimony he did not
see Metz at all until the latter suddenly appeared in the high-
way about 20 to 30 feet ahead of Rath’s station wagon.
Rath then immediately applied his brakes and swerved to the
left in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid striking Metz.

On the basis of the foregoing facts there was ample cred-
ible evidence to support the jury’s findings that Rath was
causally negligent as to lookout. The jury would be war-
ranted in concluding that Rath should have seen Metz sooner
than he did, and that, if he had, he then would have had
time to have taken effective steps to avoid striking Metz.

While there is no evidence that Rath was exceeding the
posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour, this did not preclude
the jury from finding him causally negligent as to speed.
Sec. 85.40 (2) (a), Stats., provides as follows:

“(2) (a) No person shall operate a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under conditions and
having regard for the actual and potential hazards then exist-
ing and the speed of the vehicle shall be so controlled as may
be necessary to avoid colliding with any object, person,

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vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in
compliance with legal requirements and using due care.”

The jury may well have determined that under the condi-
tions which prevailed at the time and place of this accident
a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour on the part of Rath was
negligent in view of the “actual and potential hazards then
existing.” This is because the jury may have considered that
a truck loaded with tires parked across the highway from a
public garage should in itself have brought to Rath’s atten-
tion the possibility of a pedestrian traversing the space be-
tween such truck and the garage. The first warning sign
of a speed zone ahead is posted 2,000 feet south of the inter-
section of Highways 51 and K, while the first sign reading
“45 Mile Speed Limit” is 1,000 feet south thereof. The jury
may also have deemed a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour
excessive at the point of such intersection in the heart of the
hamlet of South Leeds under conditions prevailing on the
morning of the accident.

It is, therefore, our conclusion that defendant is not en-
titled to have plaintiff’s complaint dismissed on the ground
that there is no credible evidence to support the findings of
causal negligence against the defendant Rath.

* We next will consider the question of whether it was error
for the trial court not to have changed the answer of the
jury from “No” to “Yes,” to the question, which inquired
as to whether the negligence with respect to lookout on the
part of Metz, was a substantial factor in causing the accident.
We deem that such negligence on the part of the pedestrian
Metz as to lookout in attempting to cross the highway in the
path of the oncoming station wagon, without making a suffi-
cient observation of its approach, was causal as a matter of
Jaw. Other pedestrian cases in which it was held that the
pedestrian was causally negligent as a matter of law in failing
to keep a proper lookout are Merkle v. Behl (1955), 269

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Wis. 432, 69 N. W. (2d) 459; Fessler v. Northwestern Nat.
Casualty Co. (1953), 265 Wis. 14, 60 N. W. (2d) 387;
Mertens v. Lake Shore Y. C. & T. Co. (1928), 195 Wis.
646, 218 N. W. 85; and Brickell v. Trecker (1922), 176
Wis. 557, 186 N. W. 593.

Because of the required change of the answer to this causa-
tion question there is the possibility that the jury would
have made a different apportionment of negligence than they
did in answering the comparative-negligence question of the
verdict. This would necessitate a new trial unless this court
should determine as a matter of law that the negligence of
Metz was equal to or greater than the negligence of Rath.
Counsel for the defendants strenuously contend that we
should so determine. However, this court has rather con-
sistently held that in this type of pedestrian accident case the
comparison is for the jury. See Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins.
Co. (1957), 274 Wis. 505, 80 N. W. (2d) 380, and cases
cited therein. There are no special circumstances in the in-
stant case which distinguish it from such other cases.

In charging the jury, the learned trial court gave an in-
struction on the sudden-emergency doctrine as applied to
both Metz and Rath. Inasmuch as the court had found Metz
negligent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right of
way, the jury should not have been instructed that the emer-
gency doctrine might be considered in determining Metz’s
causal negligence.

In Ackley v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1956),
273 Wis. 422, 425, 78 N. W. (2d) 744, this court stated:

“Tt was erroneous to submit the case so as to permit the
jury to give the respondent the benefit of the emergency rule,
because, upon the record before us, it appears that no emer-
gency such as would excuse the respondent’s act existed. His
driving with his left wheels over the center of the road as he
blindly ascended the hill placed him in a position which re-
sulted in his contributing toward the result. One cannot

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deliberately proceed to a point of danger, and then act within

the protection that.a sudden emergency might otherwise give
him.” (Emphasis supplied.)

We deem that the foregoing quotation is directly applicable
to the facts of this case. Metz placed himself in a position of
danger in attempting to cross the highway instead of yielding
the right of way to the oncoming Rath station wagon. A
jury should not be told in such a situation that they may
find the pedestrian free from negligence because of his having
been confronted with a sudden emergency: This is because
the emergency was of his own creation.

Furthermore, the trial court having answered the question
as to Metz being negligent with respect to yielding the right
of way, the only remaining question inquiring with respect
to possible negligence on Metz’s part related to lookout.
Failure on Metz’s part to make a proper observation for
approaching traffic coming from the south before stepping
onto the paved portion of the roadway would of necessity
contribute to produce the emergency. We consider most
pertinent the following extract from the opinion of this court
in Whirry v. Rural Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. (1954), 267 Wis.
302, 308, 64 N. W. (2d) 841:

“The appellants also contend that the defendant Arnold
Whirry was confronted by a sudden emergency and, there-
fore, he should not be held causally negligent with respect to
lookout. If his negligence in that respect contributed to the
emergency, then he is not entitled to the benefit of the emer-
gency rule.”

By the Court.—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
with directions for a new trial.

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Kreyci, Appellant, vs. Loyesxi, Respondent.

January I—February 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Baumblatt & Good-

man of Racine, and oral argument by Robert P. Goodman.
For the respondent there was a brief by Heft, Brown &

Coates of Racine, and oral argument by Carroll R. Heft.

Srrtnie, J. The trial court held that the water shutoff
valve which protruded one (1) inch above the public side-
walk was not a ntiisance as a matter of law, and that the
abutting landowner was not liable. It is that ruling which
the plaintiff challenges on this appeal.

Abutting lot owners who obstruct or interfere with a road
or sidewalk in such a way as to create a dangerous and de-
‘fective condition are guilty of maintaining a nuisance. Holl
v. Merrill (1947), 251 Wis. 203, 28 N. W. (2d) 363.

A nuisance may be based upon either negligent or inten-
tional conduct. Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co. (1956), 272
Wis. 537, 76 N. W. (2d) 355.

The trial court’s ruling which is under attack here was
predicated largely on the decision in Lindemeyer v. Milwau-
kee (1942), 241 Wis. 637, 6 N. W. (2d) 653. Plaintiff on
this appeal claims that the Lindemeyer decision was misin-

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terpreted by the trial court. An analysis of the trial court’s
opinion does not lead to such conclusion. In the Lindemeyer
Case, both the municipality and the abutting landowner were
sued for damages claimed to have been sustained by the
plaintiff when she stumbled and fell over a water box which
extended two and one-fourth (2%) inches above the side-
wall in front of the owner’s premises. It was contended that
such condition of the sidewalk constituted the maintenance
of a nuisance. This court exonerated the abutting owner of
any liability principally in view of the city’s ordinances which
required that such boxes be maintained free of defect by the
municipally operated waterworks, and prohibited all persons
from interfering with such boxes. It was said that as a matter
of law the projection of the stop box for two and one fourth
(24%) inches above the level of the sidewalk was not an
insufficiency or want of repair within the meaning of sec.
81.15, Stats., which makes a city liable for damages sustained
“by reason of the insufficiency or want of repair” of a side-
walk. There was no claim under sec. 81.15, Stats. Mr.
Justice RosenBERRY, speaking for the court, stated (p. 643) :

“To hold that the obstruction in the street does not amount
to an insufficiency and want of repair and therefore that the
street is reasonably safe for public travel and then to hold that
the obstruction amounts to a nuisance is a contradiction in
terms.” .

The rationale of the Lindemeyer Case is that since the
condition did not bear the essential marks of negligence, it
could not be a nuisance.

In the case at bar the trial court stated:

“The plaintiff contends, however, that the Lindemeyer
Case, supra, interprets the liability of the city of Milwaukee
under section 81.15, Wisconsin statutes, and because no such
duty or limitation is imposed by statute upon an adjoining
property owner, that it, therefore, is not comparable to the
situation in the case at bar, which alleges the maintenance

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of a public nuisance. We do not agree with plaintiff’s posi-
tion. To constitute a public nuisance, the sidewalk must be
found to be defective and dangerous. Holl v. Merrill, 251
Wis. 203, at page 207. First National Bank & Trust Co. v.
S.C. Johnson & Sons, 264 Wis. 404. If the protrusion of
the water valve could not, as a matter of law, amount to an
insufficiency or want of repair in a suit against the city under
section 81.15 of the Wisconsin statutes, it could not support
a finding that the sidewalk was defective and dangerous so
as to bring it within the purview of maintaining a public
nuisance.”

The trial court’s logic is sound. Manifestly, if the condi-
tion was not an insufficiency or want of repair so as to con-
stitute negligence for which the city would be liable, it cannot
be held to have created a defective and dangerous condition
so as to constitute a nuisance, for which the abutting land-
owner could be held.

It has long been recognized that any object, condition, or
occurrence, within or outside the way, which materially and
unlawfully interferes with the free and safe enjoyment of the
public easement, constitutes a public nuisance. 25 Am. Jur.,
Highways, p. 565, sec. 262.

In Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co. supra (p. 546), this court
approved of an observation in 65 Harvard Law Review, 984,
that:

“As commonly used, it [nuisance] connotes a condition

or activity which unduly interferes with the use of land or of
a public place.’ ”

“Whether inequalities in the surface of the roadway,
sidewalk, or other portion of the way constitute actionable
defects depends upon their character and extent, and the
surrounding circumstances. The test, ordinarily, is whether
they are of such magnitude or extent as to be likely to cause
injury to travelers who are proceeding with due care... .
On the other hand, slight depressions, holes, and other in-

equalities in the pavement or sidewalk, and ruts in unpaved
roads have in a number of instances been held not to consti-
tute actionable defects.” 25 Am. Jur., Highways, pp. 774,
775, sec. 488.

A municipality is not obligated to keep its streets or side-
walks at all times in a condition of absolute safety, but only
reasonable safety for travel. Kleiner v. Madison (1899), 104
Wis. 339, 80 N. W. 453.

In Pias v. Racine (1953), 263 Wis. 504, 58 N. W. (2d)
67, it was held that in determining whether a defect in a
sidewalk constituted an actionable insufficiency or want of
repair, the depth in inches of a depression or changes in
elevation is a factor to be considered, but other existing and
surrounding circumstances must also be considered. While
in that case the depression was only one and seven-eighths
(1%) inches, this court held that in view of the existence of
extensive lengthwise cracks in the squares of concrete sur-
rounding the depression, the question of insufficiency with
reference to all of the existing factors, was for the jury.

We perceive of no valid reason as to why the principles
as above pointed out, ought not to apply to physical situa-
tions of like kind and be utilized to test claims when the
maintenance of nttisance is charged against abutting land-
owners. In our opinion such principles are so applicable.

In the case at bar the projection is considerably less in
height than was that in Lindemeyer v. Milwaukee, supra.
It does not appear from the record that there were any sur-
rounding conditions or circumstances which as part of or in
connection with the shutoff valve box, created a dangerous
condition which could be held to constitute a nuisance. We
find no jury issue to exist.

We are constrained to hold that the trial court properly
granted the motion of the defendant for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint. 7

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Heng, Respondent, vs. Oswatp Jarcer Baxinc CoMPANY
and another, Appellants.*

January 9—February 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 9, 1957.

For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by
George D. Young of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
Alvin L. Zelonky of Milwaukee.

Wrncert, J. The judgment must be reversed, for the
reason that on the facts disclosed by the record, the negligence
of the plaintiff was at least as great as that of Klein as a
matter of law.

In reaching this conclusion, we accept the findings that
the double parking of the truck constituted negligence as a
matter of law, and that such negligence was a cause of the
accident, and we do not pass upon appellants’ challenge of
those findings.

Winnebago street was a busy street with streetcar tracks
in the middle, in a congested commercial area of the city.
Parking space was at a premium, and double parking was
frequent. About noon on the day of the accident, the Baking
Company’s truck driver, Klein, was driving northwest on
Winnebago street, and wished to stop to deliver bakery goods
ata grocery store near the intersection of Winnebago and
North Eighth street, on his right. He looked for a parking
space, but cars were parked all along the curb as far as he
could see, and also on the visible part of the cross street,
so he parked double near the grocery store. At that point
the right rail of the streetcar track was about 19 feet from
the curb, and the left side of Klein’s truck was about three
feet from the rail. Just before stopping, he took an observa-
tion and saw a streetcar coming slowly northwest on Winne-
bago with a motorcycle following it. When the streetcar was
about 40 feet away, Klein got out of the truck and went into
the grocery store to see how much of his merchandise was
wanted. While he was there, the accident occurred. The
back end of his truck was painted with glossy white enamel

2S
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above, and grass green below, and the truck was washed
twice a week.

Plaintiff was eighteen years of age, and was riding his
motorcycle. He had turned northwest on Winnebago street
from Juneau avenue, in a procession consisting of the street-
car, a truck, a Cadillac, and his motorcycle. Shortly the truck
passed the streetcar, and the Cadillac and plaintiff continued
to follow the streetcar up the incline on Winnebago. Pres-
ently the Cadillac slowed down and pulled to the right to
double park, and plaintiff moved to the left and around the
Cadillac, and continued to follow the streetcar, which was
slowing down, between the rails until he was about 10 feet
behind it. Then, when the streetcar was going from five to
10 miles per hour and plaintiff 15 miles per hour, plaintiff
turned to the right to pass the streetcar. By that time the
streetcar had reached defendant’s truck, and as plaintiff
swung out from behind the streetcar, which was then only
two feet or less in front of him, he could see the truck for
the first time, about 20 feet ahead of him. He was unable to
stop, and collided with the truck at about the middle of its
rear bumper, sustaining injuries. He could have swerved to
the right sooner and thus given himself an opportunity to
see whether there was a clear passage ahead, but he chose
to follow the streetcar so closely that he could not see ahead.
Plaintiff admitted that if a car had been stopped by traffic
between the streetcar and the curb, he probably would have
hit it. The reason he gave for proceeding at 15 miles per
hour, instead of reducing his speed to that of the streetcar,
was that his motorcycle was hard to balance at the slow speed
of the streetcar and that he needed the higher speed to keep
his balance while crossing over the rail as he turned to the
right.

In a congested area with heavy traffic, it is to be antici-
pated that vehicles may be slowed down or stopped by traffic
conditions, particularly when an intersection is ahead as was

the case here. The accident would have happened exactly
the same if Klein’s truck or any other vehicle had been
properly stopped in the same place by traffic conditions, or
to back into a parking space or to permit a parked car to
move out from the curb.

In the circumstances we can only conclude that plaintiff
completely abandoned his own safety and plunged reckless-
ly into a blind situation. The streetcar was moving slowly
and reducing speed, and the general traffic conditions were
sufficient to warn any prudent person that legitimate ob-
structions to the right of the streetcar might be encountered
and that great caution was in order. To rush into such a
situation on a motorcycle at 15 miles per hour without any
lookout whatever for an obstruction within the distance in
which the motorcycle could be stopped, evidenced an utter
disregard for safety. There must have been “a complete
failure on the part of [plaintiff] to give attention to the
probable consequences of his conduct.” Quady v. Sickl, 260
Wis. 348, 354, 51 N. W. (2d) 3, 52.N. W. (2d) 134.

This court has several times noted the serious negligence
of one who goes ahead on a highway without precaution
when his vision is completely obscured by blinding lights,
dust, dense smoke, or the like. See, for example, Mann v.
Reliable Transit Co. 217 Wis. 465, 468, 259 N. W. 415;
Guderyon v. Wisconsin Telephone Co. 240 Wis. 215, 227,
2N. W. (2d) 242; Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 353, 51
N. W. (2d) 3, 52 N. W. (2d) 134; Hephner v. Wolf, 261
Wis. 191, 196, 52 N. W. (2d) 390.

The same principle is applicable here. By his own elec-
tion to travel immediately behind the streetcar, plaintiff’s
vision was completely obscured with respect to the street to
the right of the car until he turned into that area blindly
and too late to stop for the obstruction. Under the conditions
then existing, it was to be anticipated that the street might
be obstructed, lawfully or otherwise.

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On the other hand, Klein’s negligence was somewhat miti-
gated by his need to cover his route and serve his patrons,
the absence of a readily available parking space, and the
frequency and toleration of double parking in that street.

While in the great majority of cases the apportionment
of negligence is for the jury, there are times when it must
be held that the jury’s determination is wrong as a matter
of law.

“Where, however, it appears that the negligence of the
plaintiff is as a matter of law greater than that of the de-
fendant, it is not only within the power of the court but it
is the duty of the court to so hold.” Peters v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. R. Co. 230 Wis. 299, 301, 283 N. W. 803;
quoted with approval in Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 351,
51 N. W. (2d) 3, 52 N. W. (2d) 134,

See, for example, Schwarz v. Winter, 272 Wis. 303, 309,
75 N. W. (2d) 447, where a jury verdict attributing
less than 50 per cent of the negligence to a driver who made a
left turn from the outside lane was set aside, and the driver
held equally negligent with the other party as a matter of
law. What we said there is applicable here:

“While we are ordinarily reluctant to change the appor-
tionment made in the lower court, under the peculiar cir:
cumstances of this case where the evidence of the plaintiff’s
negligence is so clear and the quantum so great, we feel con-
strained to do so.” Schwarz v. Winter, 272 Wis. p. 309, 75
N. W. (2d) 447.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, with directions to
enter judgment dismissing the complaint.

Broaproor, J. (dissenting). I cannot agree with the
majority of the court that the apportionment of negligence in
this case was not a question for the jury. In. two other
cases upon the same calendar and reported herewith we have

stated that, although there may be cases where the circum-
stances are such that a court can properly rule as a matter
of law that the negligence of one of the parties involved is
equal to that of the other, such cases are extremely rare and
the apportionment of negligence is almost always for the
jury. That rule was pronounced in Schmidt v. Leary, 213
Wis. 587, 252 N. W. 151, and Hansberry v. Dunn, 230
Wis. 626, 284 N. W. 556. The two cases in which the rule
of the Schmidt and Hansberry Cases is affirmed are Jeffers
v. Peoria-Rockford Bus Co. 274 Wis. 594, 80 N. W. (2d)
785, and Bell v. Duesing, post, p. 47, 80 N. W. (2d) 821.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Currte and Mr.
Justice Fatrcuiip join in this dissent.

Barnes and others, Respondents, vs. Crry or West ALLis,
Appellant.*

January 10—February 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 9, 1957.

es

For the appellant there were briefs by George A. Schmus,
city attorney, and Charles G. Panosian, assistant city attor-
ney, and oral argument by Mr. Panosian.

For the respondents there was a brief by Tilg & Koch of
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Howard A. Tilg.

Farrcuitp, J. The trailer-park owners, who were appel-
lants in the circuit court, took the position that the monthly
parking-permit fee is a property tax and invalid because not
proportioned to the value of the property. The city argued
that the fee was a valid excise tax. The park owners also
asserted that sec. 66.058 (3), Stats., is so indefinite, ambigu-
ous, and uncertain as to be incapable of application and that
in any event the amount of the monthly parking-permit fee
was determined by the common council in an unreasonable
and arbitrary manner and is in excess of the cost of services
supplied to the mobile homes. The circuit court decided

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that the statute is unconstitutional on the first ground and
did not consider the other two propositions.

The circuit court held that a flat tax of $10 per month
cannot be levied upon trailers which differ in value. Under
sec. 1, art. VIII, constitution of Wisconsin, where a prop-
erty tax is levied, there can be no classification which inter-
feres with substantial uniformity of rate based upon value.
But it is also true that as to excise taxation, the term
“uniformity of taxation” means simply taxation which acts
alike on all persons similarly situated. Beals v. State, 139
Wis. 544, 557, 121 N. W. 347.

Ts the parking-permit fee a property tax or an excise tax?

We are of the opinion that it is an excise tax on the
parking of occupied trailers and not a tax upon them as
property. The parking fee involved does not apply to a
vacant trailer which one might keep unoccupied in West
Allis, but use elsewhere on pleasure trips and the like. It
does not apply to a trailer which is held for sale in West
Allis and may later be used anywhere by a purchaser. It
does not apply to a trailer temporarily unoccupied for any
reason.

It is said that the parking of an occupied trailer is so
essential to the realization of the value of the trailer as to
constitute the tax on parking a tax on the property. Yet
we have a similar situation in exacting a uniform fee for
licensing automobiles for use on the highways and the
legislature has been permitted to draw other fine lines between
property and transactions essential to the enjoyment of it.

An inheritance tax has been upheld as an excise tax upon
the transfer of and the right to receive property and held
not to be a tax upon the property itself. Nunnemacher v.
State, 129 Wis. 190, 108 N. W. 627; Beals v. State, supra.

Is it proper to tax one citizen for occupying a house trailer
and omit to tax another for occupying an apartment or
a house?

Ss
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We are of the opinion that the classification involved may
properly be made. House trailers can be readily moved from
place to place. When a trailer is occupied, the burdens of
supplying municipal and school services are placed upon the
community in which it is located. It is difficult to levy and
collect a property tax because of the mobility of the home.
One of the advantages of living in a trailer home is that
when a move to another place becomes desirable, whether
because of a change in employment opportunities or other
reason, the move can be made with a minimum of expense
or risk of loss by having to give up accommodations in one
place and obtain new ones in another. The house trailer
is exempt from taxation as personal property. Sec. 70.112
(7), Stats. Because of its mobility and the circumstances
of its use it is proper to levy an excise tax upon use of a
trailer without levying the same tax upon occupancy of a
permanent home.

The circuit court also concluded that the statute violates
sec. 1, art I of the constitution of Wisconsin because the
right to live in a home is a natural right rather than a
privilege. The court relied upon Crawford v. Wesleyville
(Pa.), 68 D. & C. 215, a case which goes upon the theory
that the state cannot license the exercise of a natural right.
In Wisconsin it is established that a tax which does not
violate other constitutional principles can properly be laid
upon inherent or natural rights. Beals v. State, supra; page
555.

Sec. 66.058 (3) (e), Stats., provides that the parking-
permit fee shall be “equal to actual cost of services fur-
nished.” It is argued that the standard of actual cost is
indefinite, ambiguous, and uncertain. Respondents suggest
that several different formulas could be used to determine
actual cost, each supported by logical reasoning. If we fol-
low ‘the analysis made by the superintendent of schools and

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the city comptroller, it is readily apparent that there could be
differences of opinion as to the method followed. For ex-
ample, it seems logical to allocate some of the cost of
municipal services to industrial property before determining
the per capita cost on the basis of population. Yet it is
perhaps less logical to allocate the same portion of cost of
school services to industrial property before determining
a per capita cost on the basis of average school attendance.
“Actual cost” of services to a specific group of residents
is incapable of an absolute determination. The legislature
chose to use the term, however, and also provided for a
preliminary determination followed by a final determina-
tion after hearing. We are of the opinion that the statute
should be interpreted to require that a figure be reasonably
fixed after consideration of the elements of cost, and that
the figure should not be arbitrary. It cannot be said that the
legislature specified any particular formula, nor that the
formula followed in any particular municipality is the only
-one which can properly be used.

Finally, we reach the question whether the figure de-
termined by West Allis can be sustained. It appears that
with two exceptions, the determination was based upon actual
figures which pertain to West Allis and its schools, and while
some other municipality might properly follow a different
formula, based upon different reasoning, we cannot say
that the fundamental theory followed by the superintendent
and comptroller was wrong. The two exceptions are as
follows: On the basis of “a national average of 2.9 persons
occupying each mobile home” the comptroller assumed in
his computations that three persons, on the average, occupied
mobile homes in West Allis. The city superintendent of
schools assumed in his computations that there is one school
child in each house trailer. The only evidence in the record
of the actual condition in West Allis is a count taken on

00 ee
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August 3, 1954. There were 346 trailers and 815 occupants,
or an average of 2.36 persons per trailer. There were 70
school children on that day, or an average of .2 per trailer.
While the municipality is certainly not bound to recognize
a census on any particular day, the discrepancy between the
figures assumed in the computation and the figures shown
in the record is so substantial as to render the result arbi-
trary. If the August 3d count were used in place of the
assumed figures, the actual cost of school services would be
$2.03 instead of $10.14, computed by the superintendent;
the cost of municipal services would be $3.18 instead of
$4.04, computed by the comptroller, or a total of $5.21
instead of $14.18. Even after the council made its arbitrary
reduction to $10, that figure is substantially higher.

It should be emphasized that the analysis of the problem
by the city and school officials, apart from the arbitrary
assumptions we have mentioned, is not the only theory upon
which a proper determination could be made. For example,
we do not mean to imply that actual cost of school services
must be determined per school child by dividing net cost
by the number of children, as was done in West Allis,
rather than per capita by dividing net cost by the estimated
population.

Neither do we mean that the city must accept the count
of persons and school children occupying trailers in West
Allis on any particular day or made by any particular method
so long as the method used is not arbitrary. Respondents
in attacking the statute as indefinite, have suggested that it
is open to the construction that the actual cost of school
services must be determined as to each mobile home on the
basis of the number of school children occupying it or must
be determined separately as to each mobile-home park on the
basis of the number of school children present in that park
and then prorated among the mobile homes therein. The

| 41

very difficulty which such a construction would impose on
the school and municipal authorities together with the
probability that even the most accurate determination would
become inaccurate very shortly is conclusive that such was
not the intent of the legislature.

The circuit court, having concluded that the statute is
unconstitutional, entered a judgment which in form was a
declaration to that effect. This declaration must be reversed.
The judgment which should have been entered would have
set aside the determination of the council for the reasons set
forth in this opinion.

The parties did not argue in this court the question of what
disposition should be made, in the event that the statute
is valid and operative but the determination is set aside as
arbitrary, of the fees collected and deposited with the city
treasurer while this action has been pending. We, therefore,
leave that question to the further determination of the circuit
court.

By the Court—The judgment is reversed, and the cause
is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion. .

Scuwarz, Respondent, vs. Srracue and wife, Appellants.*

January 10—February 5, 1957,

For the appellants the cause was submitted on the brief of
Joseph E. Tierney of Milwaukee.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 9, 1957.

For the respondent there was a brief by Raymond H.
Kleis and Erwin F. Nell, attorneys, and Eldred Dede of
counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Dede.

Martin, C. J. In the complaint plaintiff alleged an oral
contract entered into about August 1, 1951, with the de-
fendants wherein he agreed to do certain plumbing work in
their home; the work was completed on February 11, 1952.
On June 27, 1952, plaintiff filed his claim for lien in the
amount of $1,493.90 in the office of the clerk of the circuit
court for Milwaukee county. No part of the amount claimed
was paid and on October 19, 1953, action was commenced
to foreclose said lien.

In their answer defendants denied that they entered into
a contract with the plaintiff, alleging that they had an oral
agreement with one Ed Braaz to install the plumbing; that
the reasonable value of the work and materials was not in
excess of $500; that the lien claim was not filed within six
months from the last date of performance of the work.
The answer was filed by Charles L. Goldberg, as attorney
for the defendants.

It appears from the record that a number of conciliation
conferences were had before Judge Cannon but no settle-
ment was reached. Judge Cannon suggested that a plumber
be selected to view the premises and this was agreed upon
by the parties. However, it was not until defendants were
served with an order of the court that they allowed the
inspection to be made. By that time defendants had asked
Charles F. Higgins, attorney, to represent them, Goldberg
apparently having bowed out because of his clients’ failure
to co-operate.

Trial of the case was set for April 18, 1956, and adjourned
for a month at Higgins’ request because his associate was

ee
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out of the city. It was then set for May 17th, and in the
meantime Higgins attempted, unsuccessfully, to get his re-
tainer from Strache. Strache also advised him he was
“busy on the job” and needed another week before he could
be ready for trial. On the evening of the 16th, at the court’s
request, Higgins again contacted Strache. On the 17th
Mr. Higgins stated to the court that Mr. Strache had advised
him he could not be in court because “he said he had some
important work and would take a week,” and that “he
didn’t think he would have a fair trial before you [Judge
Gorpon].” Strache had failed to get a substitution of attor-
neys and, although Higgins had asked for a retainer, Strache
had not paid him. Higgins had advised Strache he was
* going to ask to be relieved as counsel. The trial court ex-
cused Mr. Higgins from proceeding further with the case.
There was no affidavit of prejudice filed and Higgins would
not file one. Judge Gorpon could not remember having met
Strache and all the conciliation conferences were before Judge
Cannon,
Considering all the circumstances and noting that the trial
had been adjourned a month previously at the instance of
defendants’ counsel, the court stated:

“T think it is inappropriate to grant any further delays
because of this very nebulous concept that the defendant has
of other work which he considers more important. So far
as the affidavit of prejudice matter, I, of course, cannot ex-
plore into what is Mr. Strache’s basis for his concern about
my trying the case. I am not aware I ever had any dealings
whatsoever with him, but beyond that is the fact that, first
of all, there is no affidavit presented, and, secondly, there
have been proceedings before this branch, although it was by
stipulation. Primarily because there is no affidavit presented,
I don’t feel that the comment by Mr. Higgins that his client
was interested in having it heard by some other branch is
sufficient within the contemplation of the statute so that I
should step aside.

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“Accordingly, it is ordered that you be relieved, Mr.
Higgins, and it is also ordered that the answer on file be

stricken and that the plaintiff be free to proceed at this time
as a default.”

Upon the proofs offered by the plaintiff the lien was
amended to reduce the amount claimed by $106.40, that
amount being credited to the defendants for certain material
which was returned from the job when it was finished.
Judgment was thereafter entered for $1,387.50 on the
amended lien. Notice of entry thereof was served on the
defendants on May 25, 1956. Defendants then obtained an
order to show cause why the judgment should not be re-
opened on the ground that it had been obtained through
“surprise, mistake, and excusable neglect” of the defendant
Milton Strache. On July 20th the court denied the motion.

Strache stated in his affidavit supporting the motion that
he had actively participated in the defense of the action and
in the conciliatory proceedings ; that he did not know the case
was set for trial on April 18th and adjourned at Higgins’
request; that he was not advised of the trial being set on
May 17th until the previous evening, at which time he told
Higgins the time was too short to prepare for trial and that
he had a job on the 17th which he might lose if he did not
report for work; that he asked Higgins to seek an adjourn-
ment but heard nothing more of the matter until served with
the notice of entry of judgment.

In refusing to reopen the judgment the trial court called
attention to the long delay it had experienced in getting the
case on for trial and stated:

“T do not believe that all the circumstances of this case
and the history that its had demonstrate that the defendant
husband, and the same would apply to his wife, has been the
subject of inadvertence or excusable neglect. I think that the
proceedings that were held in this courtroom on the 17th
of May demonstrate how fully and exhaustively the court

6
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and counsel for both sides explored the question of the de-
fendant’s availability for trial. Mr. Higgins made statements
in that hearing which are strong statements, strong in the
sense that they make it clear that he advised his client of
my direction that the matter would come on for trial and
reported that his client declined to either co-operate with
him or to pay his fees, but, rather, gave as his reason for not
being ready to come to trial the shortness of time of notice
and his obligations in the commercial world elsewhere. . .

“While there is some differential, some variance between
Mr. Higgins’ statements and Mr. Strache’s affidavit, they
are not of such a character as to satisfy me that Mr. Higgins’
position is not basically correct.”

Strache has stated no facts establishing surprise, mistake,
or excusable neglect. If the judgment should be reopened
there is no reason to suppose that he would now exhibit a
more co-operative spirit than he has previously shown. On
the contrary, if having other work to do is considered ex-

cusable neglect, it is quite likely that Mr. Strache would be
very busy in the future. We see no abuse of discretion in the
court’s refusal to reopen.

What was said by this court in a similar situation in
Stilson v. Rankin (1876), 40 Wis. 527, 531, is appropriate
here:

“The facts do not appear to us to establish a case of sur-
prise, mistake, or excusable neglect for the respondent. And
they impress us with the belief that the ex parte trial and
judgment deprived him rather of an opportunity to post-
pone the trial and judgment, than of the opportunity of
making a valid and meritorious defense.”

One of the most-serious problems confronting courts
everywhere is the congestion caused by unnecessary delays
in the trial of cases. By May 17th this case had been
pending in the circuit court for Milwaukee county for thirty-
one months. The record shows that during that time the
court had exerted strenuous efforts to dispose of it but that

a a 47
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its efforts were constantly met by defendants’ refusal to co-
operate. To honor defendants’ position under the circum-
stances of this case would be to defeat the conscientious
attempts of the court to expedite the administration of
justice.

By the Court—Order affirmed.

Bex, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Respondents, vs.
Duesine and another, Appellants.

January 10—February 5, 1957.

For the appellants there was a brief by Dougherty, Arnold
& Philipp of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Suel O.
Arnold.

For the respondents there was a brief by Murphy, Shapiro
& Gorsky of Milwaukee, and oral argument by J. B.
Shapiro.

as

Broaproor, J. It is the first claim of the defendants that
the jury did not make a proper apportionment of the negli-
gence. They contend that the negligence of the minor plain-
tiff was at least as great as that of the defendant as a
matter of law and that the complaint should therefore be
dismissed. In the alternative they contend that this court
should grant a new trial because of the improper apportion-
ment of negligence.

This court has stated that there may be cases where the
circumstances are such that a court can properly rule as a
matter of law that the negligence of one of the parties in-
volved is equal to that of the other, but that such cases are
extremely rare and the apportionment is almost always for
the jury. The same argument made by the defendants has
been made to this court upon many other occasions, par-
ticularly where the claim is made that the negligence of each
party is of the same kind and character. The case of Schmidt
v. Leary, 213 Wis. 587, 252 N. W. 151, involved adult
drivers of two automobiles which collided at a highway inter-
section. In that case the jury found the plaintiff’s driver,
her husband, causally negligent as to speed, lookout, manage-
ment and control, and with respect to entering the inter-
section against the stop light. The jury there found the
defendant negligent as to speed, lookout, and management
and control. It was contended that as a matter of law the
plaintiff's driver was more negligent than the defendant
driver. The court there said (p. 591):

. while the three particulars in which the parties were
found negligent are designated in the same way in the
verdict, the degrees of the negligence of the parties in the
several particulars may have differed widely, and the total
negligence of the defendant may thus have exceeded that
of the plaintiff’s husband. The defendant’s want of vigilance
as to lookout may have been greater than that of plaintiff’s
husband; his speed may have been greater; his want of care

a

in controlling his car may have been greater; he may have
entered the intersection last; he was approaching from plain-
tiff’s left.”

The case of Hansberry v. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626, 284 N. W.
556, also involved two adult drivers of motor vehicles. In
that case the jury found the defendant causally negligent
with respect to speed, lookout, management and control, and
failure to yield one half the highway on meeting and passing _
the automobile driven by the plaintiff. Plaintiff was there
found to have been causally negligent in precisely the same
respects and no other. It was there argued that as each party
was found causally negligent in the same respects the negli-
gence of each was, as a matter of law, equal, and that the
jury’s finding that defendant was more negligent than the
plaintiff should not be allowed to stand. In that case this
court cited the Schmidt Case, supra, and quoted therefrom
the same excerpt that appears above. In addition the court
there said (p. 634) :

“We are satisfied, however, that the court may not adopt
a rule of thumb that will check off automatically lookout
against lookout, control against control, etc., holding these
items equal as a matter of law in every case.”

In addition to the rule cited in those cases which has been
consistently followed, we have cases where the jury has been
called upon to apportion the negligence between an adult and
a child. Such a case is Hanson v. Binder, 260 Wis. 464, 50
N. W. (2d) 676. That case involved a claim for damages
against an adult driver on behalf of a minor who was five
years, five months, and seventeen days old at the time of
the accident. The minor was a pedestrian. The jury found
the defendant was causally negligent with respect to lookout
and that the infant was also causally negligent in the same
respect and no other. The jury apportioned the negligence
62 per cent to the infant and 38 per cent to the defendant.

2
—~”d

The trial court granted a new trial in the interests of justice.
In that case we said (p. 467):

“What is ordinary care in the case of an adult, experienced
driver is different from ordinary care on the part of a child
so young that he has barely reached an age where he can
be held to any standard of care whatever. The mere fact
that, in this collision between the two, the jury found that
the child was more negligent than the adult demonstrated
to the court’s satisfaction that the jury did not appreciate
that different standards of ordinary care apply to these
different actors. There must be a comparison of negligence,
but for the reasons set forth, we agree with the learned
trial judge in holding that the interests of justice require a
new trial.”

The effect of our statement in the Hanson Case, supra,
was that in comparing negligence where one of the parties
is an infant, that fact should be taken into consideration in
apportioning the negligence. That case has been cited with
approval in Brice v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co. 272
Wis. 520, 76 N. W. (2d) 337, and in Montalto v. Fond du
Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 76 N. W. (2d) 279. Six months
prior to the accident, because of her age, the little girl could
not, as a matter of law, have been found negligent. The
jury could consider that fact.

We cannot say that the minor and the adult driver were
equally negligent as a matter of law in the present case. A
jury question was presented and we must affirm the appor-
tionment as made by the jury.

The defendants next contend that the trial court com-
mitted error in refusing to permit a police officer to testify
to the location of a spot thought to be blood. We have
thoroughly checked the record and it is apparent that no
proper foundation has been laid to permit the witness to
testify to the matters inquired about. This was admitted in
effect by the attorney for the defendants when, after an offer

a Le 53
P|

of proof in the absence of the jury, he made the following
statement :

“Now, that is what I wanted. I wanted the court to have
that in the absence of the jury, upon the basis not that we are
contending for the moment that that blood spot represents
the spot where the impact occurred but that the officer when
he came to the site of the accident saw a blood spot and he
took a measurement.”

From the record we cannot say that the court committed
error in refusing the proof offered.

The final contention of the defendants is that the trial
court committed error in refusing the request of the defend-
ants to submit to the jury the following question:

“Were the parents of the plaintiff, Christine Bell, negli-
gent in permitting the plaintiff, Christine Bell, to be in West
Hadley street?”

In drafting a special verdict the trial court must first con-
sider the issues raised by the pleadings. He should then
eliminate from the issues so raised those that are determined
by the evidence on the trial by admissions, by uncontradicted
proof, or by failure of proof. Only those remaining should
go to the jury. No issue as to the negligence of the parents,
either jointly or singly, was raised by the pleadings. The
mother of Christine Bell was not a party to the action.
Under the pleadings it would have been improper to submit
a question inquiring as to the joint liability of the parents.
Even though the question had been limited to the negligence
of the father who was a party to the action, there is nothing
in the record that would make that an issue in the case even
though the matter had been properly pleaded. There is an
entire failure of proof that the father of Christine Bell was
negligent in any respect.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Papway, Appellant, vs. Gotpperc and another, d/b/a
Papway, Gotpperc & Previant, Respondents.*

January 10—February 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs and oral argument by
Ronald A. Padway of Milwaukee, in pro. per.
’ For the respondents there was a brief by Vernon A.
Swanson, Joseph E. Rapkin, Lyman A. Precourt, and
Fairchild, Foley & Sammond, all of Milwaukee, and oral
argument by Mr. Rapkin and Mr. Precourt.

Brown, J. If there is a breach of professional ethics as
alleged in (4) above, the remedy at the time this proceeding
was instituted was prescribed by sec. 256.28 (8), Stats.
It begins with a complaint addressed to the justices of the
supreme court and initiates an investigation under the aus-
pices of that court. No private right of action against the
alleged offender lies for the restraint of mere unprofessional
practices or conduct. Considering that the professional pro-
priety of defendants’ conduct is not brought before us by the
present action we express no opinion concerning it.

An unauthorized use by defendants of the name of Joseph
A. Padway might result in injury, damage, and a right of
action to restrain such use by a party or parties who have
property in that name and whose right to use it, exclusively
or otherwise, is invaded by defendants’ unauthorized use.
Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that he is Joseph A.
Padway or that he has any right to the use of that name.

iii

If, as his brief alleges, the use of Joseph A. Padway’s name
by defendants confuses the public, and attracts business to
Padway, Goldberg & Previant because the public erroneously
believes Joseph A. Padway will serve them there, plaintiff
has not been deprived of any right and has not sustained
any legal injury thereby. Plaintiff practices under his own
name and his right to do so is not interfered with by de-
fendants’ name and style. He does not allege a right to the
business of those looking for Joseph A. Padway. If there are
any such who have been deceived to their damage by defend-
ants’ use of Joseph A. Padway’s name a right of action
may be theirs; it certainly is not his, nor has he a right to
Joseph A. Padway’s business instead of defendants getting
it. The demurrer was properly sustained.

The trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer refused
plaintiff a right to plead over. The record does not show
that plaintiff tendered an amended complaint or in any other
manner informed the trial court of any other or additional
facts which might be pleaded upon which a cause of action
might be based. But, query, whether opportunity to amend
should have been denied if plaintiff had tendered an amended
complaint pleading, for instance, that clients actually look-
ing for him had entered defendants’ office, misled by de-
fendants’ use of the Padway name, and had remained there
and thereby business intended for plaintiff had been diverted.
Plaintiff may not be able truthfully to plead such facts. In
any event the record discloses no offer by him of any facts
which would require that the opportunity to amend his
complaint be given him or that its refusal would be an abuse
of discretion. We conclude that the judgment should be
affirmed.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

STEINLE, J., took no part.

Peper, Respondent, vs. WEGEMANN and another,
Appellants.

January 9—February 5, 1957.

Q
| |

For the appellants there was a brief by Suel O. Arnold,
James T. Murray, and Dougherty, Arnold & Philipp, all of
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Arnold.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument
by Alvin L. Zelonky of Milwaukee.

Curriz, J. The defendants first seek on this appeal to
have the complaint dismissed on the ground that the two
findings of causal negligence against Wegemann should be
set aside, and, failing this, that it should be held that the
negligence of Pedek is as a matter of law equal to, or
greater than, the negligence of Wegemann. If these issues
should be decided adversely to defendants’ contentions, then

| es 61

a new trial is requested on the following grounds: (1)
Failure to submit a requested question in the special verdict
inquiring as to whether Pedek was negligent in attempting
to pass in the intersection; (2) inflammatory remarks of
Pedek’s counsel in the argument to the jury; (3) denial of
defendants’ request made during the course of trial for a
further medical examination of Pedek; (4) refusal of the
trial court to permit defendants’ counsel to show that certain
medical bills of Pedek had been paid by the city of Milwau-
kee; and (5) excessive damages.

Defendants urge that there was no duty upon Wegemann
to have signaled his intention to make a left turn because
he was not apprised of the approach of Pedek from his rear
due to absence of lights on the motorcycle. Sec. 85.175 (1),
Stats., provides, “. . . No person shall so turn any vehicle
without giving an appropriate signal in the manner herein-
after provided in the event any other traffic may be affected
by such movement.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In Swartz v. Sommerfeldt (1956), 272 Wis. 17,74. N. W.
(2d) 632, we held that a motorist is relieved from giving
a signal of intention to make a left turn unless he can or shall
have seen a car approaching from his rear. In view of the
facts of the instant case, we consider this holding requires
modification. The operator of a motor vehicle should not
be relieved from the statutory duty to signal a left turn if
he should have been apprised of the approach of a vehicle
from his rear by exercise of either the sense of sight or
sound. Wegemann testified that before attempting the left
turn he heard the roar of Pedek’s motorcycle and brought
his own car to a momentary stop in the intersection because
of it and then, not seeing anything to the rear, he started
to make his left turn. The jury would have been well
warranted in concluding that, having heard the roar of the
motorcycle, Wegemann should have been apprised that it
was approaching from his rear.

CC
ee

The testimony was in sharp conflict as to whether
Wegemann flashed a signal of intention to turn left by oper-
ating his directional lights. Defendants contend that the
finding of the jury, that Wegemann was negligent in failing
to give an appropriate signal of his intention to turn left, is
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence. This argument is entirely beside the point because
a finding of a jury must be sustained on appeal if there is
any credible evidence to support it. See Home Savings Bank
v. Gertenbach (1955), 270 Wis. 386, 392, 71 N. W. (2d)
347, 72 N. W. (2d) 697, and cases cited therein.

In addition to finding Wegemann negligent with respect

. to failing to signal a left turn, the jury also found him negli-
gent with respect to his position upon the highway immedi-
ately before turning to the left. Pedek’s testimony supports
such finding. This testimony is as follows: As Wegemann
proceeded north toward the intersection his car was eight
to 10 feet east of the yellow line marking the center of
North Downer avenue. When 10 feet south of the south
curb line of the intersection, Wegemann commenced a left
turn. Pedek attempted to bring his motorcycle to a stop
but collided with the Wegemann car within the intersection
about three or four feet to the west of the center of the
intersection.

Sec, 85.17 (2), Stats., required that Wegemann should
have made his left turn “from the traffic lane immediately to
the right of and next to the center of the highway,” and
that he should have passed “immediately to the left of the
center of the intersection, passing as closely as practicable
to the left of the center of the intersection.” On the basis
of Pedek’s testimony not only did Wegemann fail to make
the turn from the traffic lane next to the center line of the

street, but he also “cut” the corner.

Defendants advance the further argument that it was error
to have submitted such question in the verdict as to

Wegemann’s position on the highway’ because the com-

- plaint failed to allege this as one of the grounds of negligence
with which Wegemann was charged. No objection was
made to the receipt of the testimony establishing Wegemann’s
position on the highway immediately prior to the collision.
Before arguments to the jury, the trial judge called counsel
into his chambers and submitted the special verdict to them
so that counsel might voice any objections to the form of the
verdict or suggestions for change. Counsel for defendants
then made this statement :

“We will state, for the purpose of the record, we have no
objection to the form of the questions proposed by the court.
We do, however, object to any question relating to the negli-
gence of Wegemann being included in the verdict on the
ground that in our opinion, there is no credible evidence to
sustain any finding by the jury of such negligence.”

Such statement by defendants’ counsel must be deemed
a waiver of any right now to attack on this appeal the sub-
mission in the verdict of the question relating to Wegemann’s
position on the highway. Briggs Transfer Co. v. Farmers
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1953), 265 Wis. 369, 372, 61
N. W. (2d) 305. If counsel had timely objected to the
inclusion of such question in the verdict on the ground that it
was without the scope of the pleadings, plaintiff’s counsel
would have been apprised of such objection in time to have
moved that the complaint be amended to conform to the
proof adduced at the trial.

Defendants advance the further argument that the negli-
gence of Pedek must be deemed equal to or greater than
that of Wegemann. This same contention was urged on the
former appeal and decided adversely to defendants. Pedek
v. Wegemann (1956), 271 Wis. 461, 464, 74 N. W. (2d)
198. We do not consider that there was sufficient variation
in the testimony on this second trial from that given at

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the first trial to warrant a different determination on this
point.

We now pass on to consideration of defendants’ assign-
ments of error that are contended require the granting of a
new trial.

Defendants urge that error was committed by the refusal
of the trial court to include in the special verdict a question
inquiring as to whether Pedek was negligent in attempting to
pass in the intersection. It is our conclusion that the refusal
of such request was proper in the light of all of the evidence
adduced bearing on this point.

Pedek testified that, when Wegemann commenced to
make his left turn at a point 10 feet south of the south line
of the intersection, Pedek was then 75 feet to the rear of
Wegemann’s car. The width of the intersection north and
south was but 30 feet. Pedek was then traveling 40 to 50
miles per hour. Wegemann testified that he was traveling
20 to 22 miles per hour as he approached the intersection.
If both vehicles had continued at these respective speeds
through the intersection, the motorcycle would not have
overtaken and passed the Wegemann car until the latter had
cleared the intersection.

Pedek further testified that as soon as he saw Wegemann
commence to make the left turn Pedek applied his brake
and the motorcycle skidded, and that the impact occurred
three to four feet west of the center line of the intersection.
While Pedek placed the left side of the Wegemann car some
eight to 10 feet east of the yellow center line of North
Downer at the time it commenced its left turn, Wegemann
testified that as he approached the intersection the left wheels
of his car were but a foot or a foot and a half east of such
center line. Wegemann further testified that upon hearing
the roar of the motorcycle he brought his car to a complete
stop a foot or two south of the center of the intersection

while it was still east of the imaginary center line. According
to Wegemann, he then had barely started his car up to
continue the left turn when the motorcycle “flashed by”
and the two vehicles collided.

It is undisputed that a skid mark made by the motorcycle
extended back 58 feet in length from the point of impact.
The north end of such skid mark was three or four feet
to the west of the center line of the intersection while the
south end was two feet to the east of the center line of
North Downer. The greater portion of such 58 feet of skid
mark necessarily extended south of the south line of the
intersection. This clearly establishes that Pedek, before
entering the intersection, was attempting to stop his motor-
cycle and negatives any voluntary attempt on his part to
pass the Wegemann automobile in the intersection.

During the course of plaintiff’s argument to the jury the
following incident occurred :

“Mr. Zelonky: You have heard the uncontradicted testi-
mony of the doctors here, and you can rest assured that
if this man isn’t permanently disabled and crippled for the
remainder of his life, the insurance company would have had
not one, but fourteen doctors up here testifying that that
is not a fact. In fact, Doctor Schmidt who examined this
man at the request of the insurance company, never came
in and testified.

“Mr. Arnold: Object to that, if the court please, and
ask that the jury be instructed to disregard that remark.

“The Court: That is not part of the evidence.

“Mr. Zelonky: It is part of the testimony. Testimony
of Mr. Pedek was that he was examined by the doctor.

“The Court: There is nothing in the record to show
Doctor Schmidt was subpoenaed and requested to come in.
The court will instruct the jury to disregard that statement.

“Mr. Zelonky: I can assure you then, they would have
had fourteen doctors down here to testify to the contrary,
irrespective of what doctor it is.”

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Defendants urge that this was improper argument of such
a prejudicial nature as to require a new trial. Apparently
the objection voiced by defendants’ counsel at the time of
argument only went to the remark regarding Dr. Schmidt’s
failure to testify, and the trial judge instructed the jury to
disregard such remark. We can observe nothing so preju-
dicial in the nature of the argument made as to require the
directing of a new trial.

Defendants during the course of trial called to the stand
some witnesses who had observed certain facts relating to the
accident. Apparently defendants’ counsel, in his argument to
the jury, had commented upon the failure of plaintiff to sub-
poena such witnesses. Defendants charge that plaintiff’s
counsel in that part of his rebuttal argument dealing with
this matter made a highly prejudicial inflammatory remark.
So that we may consider such issue in its proper perspective
we quote from the record as follows:

“Mr. Zelonky: So what happens? You heard the testi-
mony of the witnesses here. I knew their testimony before
the trial, and I will ask you members of the jury, and I
stated this in the beginning, in my opening statement, so it
isn’t an afterthought, because Mr. Arnold said it—I said
to you there isn’t a witness who could shed any light on the
accident, and I still stand back of that statement, and that is
why we didn’t subpoena them. An insurance company with
all of its millions can subpoena as many as they want.

“Mr. Arnold: If the court please, I object to that argu-
ment as being improper. :

“The Court: Sustain the objection.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The italicized sentence appearing in the above-quoted
extract from the rebuttal argument of plaintiff’s counsel was
improper and cannot be condoned. It is unfortunate that
the trial court did not go further than merely sustaining the
objection to the remark by openly expressing the court’s
disapproval, and instructing the jury to disregard the remark.

a ee 67

However, inasmuch as such remark was only directed to a
comparatively minor side issue of no particular materiality
to the questions of the special verdict which the jury were
required to answer, we cannot believe that the same resulted
in prejudice to the defendants. We, therefore, do not consider
a new trial should be directed because of it.

During the course of the trial defendants requested the
trial court to order that Pedek submit to a medical examina-
tion by a physician of defendants’ choice, which request was
denied. The complaint alleged upon information and belief
that Pedek would be unable to pursue his usual employment
in the future because of his injuries sustained in the accident,
and that he would suffer partial permanent disability from
such injuries. Furthermore, before the first trial Pedek
had at defendants’ request submitted to a medical examination
by Dr. Schmidt. Defendants contended that they were un-
able to call Dr. Schmidt as a witness at the second trial
because of illness but no affidavit to that effect was filed.
The record fails to disclose when defendants first learned
of Dr. Schmidt’s illness. The trial court held that defendants
had failed to establish surprise as a ground for justifying
their request that Pedek be ordered to submit to a medical
examination during the course of trial. With this conclusion
we agree. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in denying the request.

There was received in evidence as an exhibit a subrogation
agreement between Pedek and his employer, the city of
Milwaukee, whereby the city was to participate in the amount
to be recovered by Pedek in the action in the event of an
outcome in Pedek’s favor. It was stipulated by counsel
that such exhibit should not go to the jury. Later, while
Pedek was on the stand, he was asked by defendants’ counsel
as to whether Exhibit 6 consisted of bills rendered by Pedek’s
attending physician and Pedek answered in the affirmative.

CC

Defendants’ counsel then asked “You didn’t pay those bills
yourself?” This question was objected to by plaintiff's
counsel. The trial court ruled in the absence of the jury
that defendants would be accorded the right to use the
subrogation agreement to show the jury that the city had
an interest in the litigation to the extent of being reimbursed
for expenditures made to or in behalf of Pedek, but that
the objection to the materiality of the question as to who
paid the particular medical bills covered by Exhibit 6 was
sustained. While defendants possessed the right to show the
interest of the city in the outcome of the litigation under
our decision in Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, Inc. (1952),
260 Wis. 341, 51 N. W. (2d) 53, a question inquiring as to
who paid a particular medical bill was not the proper way
of establishing such interest. Even if it were, the sustaining
of the instant objection certainly was not prejudicial to de-
fendants in view of the ruling that defendants might use the
subrogation agreement to establish such interest.

We come now to the issue raised that the damages found
by the jury for permanent injuries, future pain and suffering,
and future loss of earnings, in the sum of $30,000, are
excessive. |

Pedek was thirty-six years old at the time of the accident
and his life expectancy was then 31.07 years according to
the American Experience Table of Mortality set forth in
sec. 314.07, Stats. His monthly salary from the Milwaukee
police department immediately prior to the accident was
$369.60 per month. Pedek’s injuries consisted of a cranial
injury with multiple fractures of the skull, a cerebral con-
cussion, and multiple contusions and abrasions to the scalp”
and left forehead. Part of the fracture line was still visible
in an X ray taken of his skuli seven months after the accident.
Approximately four years after the accident Pedek was
experiencing headaches, dizziness, insomnia, and occasional
nosebleeds. When he bends over he becomes faint and blacks

ee 69

out easily. Sometimes these blackouts occur while straining
at stool in the bathroom. There is competent medical testi-
mony in the record that there is some permanent brain
damage that causes these disabilities. He has permanently
lost his sense of smell and his sense of taste has been perma-
nently impaired.

The attending physician testified that the only work Pedek
could undertake in the future was light work for short periods
of time which would not necessitate any bending or undue
stress or strain. During 1955 the Milwaukee police depart-
ment attempted to have Pedek do some office work at one
of the police stations but after two days he was forced to give
it up because of headaches. The department then had him
take a further medical examination and he was again certified
as being on disability.

In view of the foregoing evidence we cannot find that
the damages for permanent disability are excessive. We also
find that the figure of $13,000 for approximately four years’
loss of earnings between the date of accident and time of trial
is supported by the evidence.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Pucwier and others, Plaintiffs and Respondents, vs. RaM-
Harter, Defendant and Appellant: Carppewa County
Cuarter or NationaL FounpaTiIon For INFANTILE
Paratysis, Defendant and Respondent.

January 10—February 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Stafford, Pfiffner
& Stafford of Chippewa Falls, and oral argument by Robert
F. Pfiffner.

For the respondents Pugnier and Muska there was a brief
by Frank E. Huettner of Cadott, and Ingolf E. Rasmus of
Chippewa Falls, and oral argument by Mr. Huettner.

For the respondent Chippewa County Chapter of National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis there was a brief and oral
argument by Henry Christoffersen of Chippewa Falls.

Srzinte, J. There is no bill of exceptions, hence under
the rule we are concerned only with the question as to
whether the judgment is supported by the pleadings and the
findings. Dovi v. Dovi (1944), 245 Wis. 50, 13 N. W. (2d)
585, 151 A. L. R. 1368.

A taxpayer may maintain an action in behalf of himself
and other taxpayers to recover back into the public treasury
funds illegally extracted therefrom. Milquet v. Van Straten
(1925), 186 Wis. 303, 202 N. W. 670.

A town has only such powers as are conferred on it by
statute or are necessarily iniplied therefrom. Milton Junction
v. Milton (1953), 263 Wis. 367, 57 N. W. (2d) 186. The
officers of a town have only such powers as are conferred
upon them by statute. Whitewater v. Richmond (1931),
204 Wis. 388, 235 N. W. 773.

Sec. 60.01, Stats., treats with the corporate powers of a
town. Sec. 60.18 relates to the powers of a town meeting.

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Sec. 60.29 sets forth the powers of town boards. Nowhere
in those provisions is authority granted to expend money
from the town treasury for charitable purposes. We are
obliged to hold that the causes promoted by the several re-
spondents here are of a charitable nature, and that the con-
tributions made by the appellant and the others from the
town’s treasury for such purpose were beyond his, their, or
the town’s powers. Such acts were clearly ultra vires. Kirch-
er v. Pederson (1903), 117 Wis. 68, 93 N. W. 813; Me-
nasha Wooden Ware Co. v. Winter (1915), 159 Wis. 437,
150 N. W. 526. ,

In the absence of legislative authorization, a municipality
cannot apply its public funds to the payment of claims or
obligations which are founded upon mere moral or equi-
table considerations, and are not enforceable against the
municipality by legal process. 38 Am. Jur., Municipal Cor-
porations, p. 89, sec. 398.

Appellant contends that the appropriations to the several
relief agencies were for a public purpose. The cases cited
in support of his position treat with questions.involving the
constitutionality of statutes and the application of the “public-
purpose test” thereunder. Here the statutes do not authorize
expenditures from town funds for such purposes. The test
contended for by the appellant is not relevant. Had the’
statute provided for contributions to agencies such as here,
and had challenge been made as to the constitutionality
of such provision, we would then have been confronted with
questions such as arose in State ex rel. Wisconsin Develop-
ment Authority v. Dammann (1938), 228 Wis. 147, 277
N. W. 278, 280 N. W. 698, State ex rel. American Legion
1941 Convention Corp. v. Smith (1940), 235 Wis. 443, 293
N. W. 161, and others of like import. Such is not the situ-
ation here,

Appellant maintains that in the event it is held that the
appropriations were improper, he ought to be entitled under

the cross complaint to recover from the several relief agencies
the amounts contributed to them from the town’s funds.
There is nothing in the findings to indicate that the units
operating in the locality of the town which sponsored and
promoted the collection of funds for which the contributions
were made, were legal entities capable of being sued. We
are not at liberty to go behind the findings.

With reference to the appropriation of salary increase for
the preceding year, it does not appear from the findings, as
contended by appellant, that the purpose of such action was
to increase the annual salaries for the reason that the electors
at the town meeting were of a mind that the salaries paid
to the town officers were not adequate for the services that
they performed. There is before us only the finding that an
increase for the preceding year was voted at the town meeting
to the appellant in the sum of $202.50. Sec. 60.60 (1),
Stats., treats with the matter of compensation for town
officers. It does not expressly, and we cannot find that it
impliedly authorizes the payment of an increase in salary
for any town officer to be paid on a retroactive basis. With
reference to this matter the cases relied upon by the appel-
lant, including principally State ex rel. Holmes v. Krueger
(1955), 271 Wis. 129, 72 N. W. (2d) 734, deal with ques-
tions involving the right of a legislature to provide that a
municipal body may direct payment for salary on a retro-
active basis. Such consideration is not relevant here.

The findings are entirely silent as to the “good faith” of
the appellant in the matter of the challenged appropriations.

It is further contended that the respondent taxpayers are
barred by laches from obliging appellant to reimburse the
town for the void appropriations. The essentials of laches
are (1) an unreasonable delay in bringing the action,
Likens v. Likens (1908), 136 Wis. 321, 117 N. W. 799,
Saric v. Brlos (1945), 247 Wis. 400, 19 N. W. (2d) 903,
and (2) knowledge of the course of events and acquiescence

Ce

therein. Willard v. Comstock (1883), 58 Wis. 565, 17
N. W. 401, 46 Am. Rep. 657; Henry v. Dolen (1925), 186
Wis. 622, 203 N. W. 369. The question of laches is to be
decided on the particular circumstances of each case. Foote
v. Harrison (1909), 137 Wis. 588, 119 N. W. 291; Zlindra
v. Zlindra (1948), 252 Wis. 606, 32 N. W. (2d) 656. Here
the findings do not indicate that the respondent taxpayers
knew of the disbursements complained of until a time im-
mediately prior to the commencement of the suit. There is
no finding that the electors acquiesced in the payments, nor
that objections were raised by them. Specifically it was found
that the matter of the charitable contributions was not voted
upon after the annual town meeting in 1945, when one or
more taxpayers dissented in regard to such expenditure.
Notwithstanding that the annual printed reports of income
and disbursements of the town distributed at subsequent
meetings listed the amounts contributed for charity, it does
not appear that the taxpayers of the town generally were ap-
prised of the practice, nor that the respondent taxpayers
had notice thereof. With regard to the claim of laches, the
appellant relies strongly on the results in Frederick v.
Douglas County (1897), 96 Wis. 411, 71 N. W. 798, and
Ellefson v. Smith (1924), 182 Wis. 398, 196 N. W. 834.
The decisions in those cases were grounded principally on
facts which indicated that the units of government involved
had received direct adequate consideration or benefit re-
spectively. We are obliged to determine that neither the
respondent taxpayers nor the town are guilty of laches in the
situation presented here.

It is also contended that the claim against the appellant is
barred by the three-year limitation statute, sec. 330.20, Stats.
Sub. (1) of that statute refers only to an action against a
sheriff, coroner, town clerk, or constable for breach of duty.
A town chairman, such as was appellant, is not mentioned.
Sub. (2) of the statute relates in part to an action by a town

to recover money by reason of breach of official bond. The
claim involved in this matter is not based on breach of an
official bond. The town is not a party plaintiff, it appearing
that it was not joined as such. A statute of limitations should
not be applied to cases not clearly within its provisions. It
should not be extended by construction. 53 C. J. S., Limita-
tions of Actions, p. 912, sec. 3b. Statutes creating limita-
tions are to be reasonably and fairly construed, but should
not be extended by construction. Fish v. Collins (1916),
164 Wis. 457, 160 N. W. 163. Courts cannot ingraft upon
a general statute of limitations exceptions not clearly ex-
pressed therein. Amy v. Watertown (C. C. 1884), 22 Fed.
418, affirmed (1889), 130 U. S. 320, 9 Sup. Ct. 537, 32
L. Ed. 953.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Mewnorter, Administratrix, Plaintiff, vs. Inrecriry Mu-
tTuAL CasuaLtty Company and another, Defendants.
[Two appeals.]

January 10—February 5, 1957.

For the plaintiff there was a brief by O’Melia & Kaye
of Rhinelander, and oral argument by John F. O’Melia.

For the defendants there were briefs by Emmet J. Mc-
Carthy of Marinette, and Stanley S. Chmiel of Appleton,
and oral argument by Mr. McCarthy.

Wincert, J. We have reluctantly concluded that the
instruction to the jury relative to Mewhorter’s duty to main-
tain a lookout to the rear was erroneous, as held by the trial

a ae 81

court in the January 6th decision, and that the error may
well have been prejudicial to defendants. It follows that the
court was right on January 6th in ordering a new trial, the
subsequent order of January 19th offering options in lieu
of a new trial was erroneous whether or not timely made,
and the judgment for the plaintiff must be reversed.

There was no evidence that Mewhorter kept any lookout
to the rear, and some evidence that he did not.

The material parts of the instruction were as follows:

“A pedestrian, who is a person on foot, while walking upon
or occupying any highway ordinarily traveled by vehicles,
is also required to maintain a sufficient lookout for the pro-
tection of his own safety. A person walking upon a highway
is required under a statute to walk on the left side of the
highway . . . [here the court quoted sec. 85.44 (6), Stats].

“The deceased, Ernest Mewhorter, was required under
that statute, in walking upon the highway, to travel in the
left lane or what has been described as the east lane of the
highway... .

“With reference to maintaining a lookout to the rear,
Ernest Mewhorter had no problem with reference to look-
out to the rear, and had no duty to perform in that regard,
looking to the rear, if Ernest Mewhorter was walking upon
the left or east lane of the highway. He was required to walk
upon the left or east lane of the highway so that his oppor-
tunity for maintaining a lookout as to approaching traffic
would be greater and that he would thereby be able to avoid
a collision with approaching traffic. If Ernest Mewhorter
was occupying the west or right lane of the highway or was
in the center of the highway, it was his duty to maintain a
lookout to the front and to the rear and to maintain such a
lookout as was reasonably necessary to enable him to yield
the right of way to any vehicle upon the highway, which
included the defendant, Neddo, whose proper lane of traffic
was the west lane.”

Thus, while the instruction first charged correctly that
a pedestrian on the highway is required to maintain a suffi-
cient lookout for his safety, it proceeded, by the italicized

8

sentence, to relieve Mewhorter of that duty if he was found
to be on the east (his left) lane of the highway. The jury
was categorically told that if he was in the east lane (as the
jury found he was) he “had no problem with reference to
lookout to the rear, and had no duty to perform in that re-
gard.”

In effect, the jury was instructed that as a matter of law
Mewhorter could not be found negligent in failing to keep
a lookout to the rear if he was in his left traffic lane. This
was without qualification, whether he was at the left edge
or close to the center. The jury may have understood from
other parts of the quoted instruction that Mewhorter com-
plied fully with his duty under sec. 85.44 (6), Stats., when
he walked at any place to the left of the center line.

We do not hold that Mewhorter was negligent as a matter
of law if he failed to keep a lookout to the rear. The in-
firmity in the instruction was that it might easily have been
understood by the jury to forbid them to find him negligent
for failing to do so in the particular circumstances of the
case.

We think that on the evidence in this case, the jury might
properly have held that Mewhorter failed to exercise the
care with respect to lookout to the rear which an ordinarily
prudent man would normally exercise in the circumstances,
even though he was found to have been on the left half of
the road. It was a dark, misty night, the visibility was poor,
motorists were using windshield wipers, and the highway,
which was black-top, only 22 feet wide, was icy and slippery
in spots. The jury might have believed that Mewhorter was
not at the east edge of the road, but was nearer the center
line. In the circumstances the jury might properly have
concluded that ordinary prudence dictated a lookout to the
rear, and that Mewhorter was negligent in the premises.
Hence we cannot escape the conclusion that the instruction
was not only erroneous, but may have been prejudicial by

giving the jury to understand that there was “no problem
with reference to lookout to the rear” if Mewhorter was
found to be anywhere in the left half of the highway.

In support of the contention that a pedestrian on the left
side of the road has no duty to keep a lookout to the rear,
plaintiff cites Darus v. West, 179 Wis. 279, 191 N. W. 506,
and Hanson v. Matas, 212 Wis. 275, 283, 249 N. W. 505.
We think neither case is opposed to the conclusion we have
expressed. In Darus v. West, supra, it appears to have been
argued that pedestrians on a country highway are required
as a matter of law to look to the rear at stated intervals,
and the court merely answered:

“We are aware of no such rule of law. They must exercise
ordinary care for their safety, but such care cannot for all
cases be expressed as a matter of law, in either intervals of
time or space.” (179 Wis. at p. 280, 191 N. W. 506.)

In Hanson v. Matas, supra, the court said only that “per-
haps” pedestrians need not keep a lookout to the rear if they
are walking on the portion of the highway on which the
statute prescribes that they must walk.

Since there must be a new trial for the reasons stated, we
do not pass upon some other contentions advanced by the
parties, but we think it may be useful to comment briefly on
two matters for guidance on a retrial.

We think the court properly refused to submit a question
whether Mewhorter failed to yield the right of way to Neddo.
We have recently held that inquiries as to yielding of right
of way should be limited to cases where pedestrians are cross-
ing the highway. Wojciechowski v. Baron, 274 Wis. 364,
80 N. W. (2d) 434. The mere fact that Mewhorter was
en route from a tavern on the west side of the road to
another 429 feet distant on the east side, was not sufficient
to make it a crossing case within that rule. There was no
evidence that he was in the immediate act of crossing, rather
than walking longitudinally on the highway, when he was hit.

The trial court instructed the jury that under sec. 85.44
(6), Stats., which applies to pedestrians using those high-
ways “not provided with sidewalks,” Mewhorter could prop-
erly travel on the left side of the highway. Defendants
criticize this instruction because the evidence showed that
there was a sidewalk along the east side of the road, although
substantial parts, if not all of it, were covered with deep
snow. We think the trial court properly considered that a
highway is “not provided with sidewalks” within the mean-
ing of sec. 85.44 (6) where the only sidewalk is not reason-
ably available because of deep snow or other obstruction
making travel upon it unduly difficult,

By the Court—Judgment reversed, with directions to va-
cate the order of January 19, 1956, and reinstate the order of
January 6, 1956, for a new trial.

Waozinski and others, Appellants, vs. Crrtes Servicz Or
Company, Respondent.*

January 10—February 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 9, 1957.

For the appellants other than hereinafter noted there was
a brief by Peickert, Anderson & Fisher of Stevens Point;

for the appellant British American Insurance Company there
was a brief by Wolfe, O’Leary & Kenney of Milwaukee; and
for the appellant Central State Telephone Company there
was a brief by Reiland & Schmidt of Wisconsin Rapids, and
oral argument by Clifford Peickert, H. O. Wolfe, and Donald
E. Reiland,

for the respondent there was a brief by Toebaas, Hart,
Kraege & Jackman of Madison, attorneys, and W. J. Con-
way of Wisconsin Rapids of counsel, and oral argument by
Mr. W. L. Jackman and Mr. Conway.

Martin, C. J. The creamery building was located on
the northwest corner of an intersection in the village of
Pittsville. A gasoline tank, capacity 385 gallons, was located
underground at the southeast corner of the building about
four feet from. the building and 20 to 25 feet south of the
nearest wall of the basement. Above the tank was a gasoline
pump of the type used in filling stations, which metered the
gasoline dispensed from it.

Beneath the northern part of the building there was a 40
by 20-feet partial basement with walls of cement block and
stone. The creamery refrigeration system used methyl chlo-
ride, an explosive gas, as a coolerant for a brine tank in the

basement and a 12 by 12-feet cooler located on the first
floor.

The gasoline tank was in the ground since 1930. Between
1938 and 1946 the L. L. Bender Oil Company of Wisconsin
Rapids supplied gasoline to the tank; from 1946 until some-
time in 1951, after Wadzinski purchased the creamery, John
Tomezak and his son, Donald, supplied it. In August of
1951 Cities Service purchased the Tomczak Oil Company
and its assets, including the tank and pump at the creamery,
and Donald Tomczak became the consignee of Cities Serv-
ice. The understanding between Tomezak and Wadzinski
was that if anything went wrong with the gasoline equipment
Wadzinski was to notify Tomczak, who would have the de-
fendant’s serviceman fix it; and this was the practice followed.

The first question of the special verdict inquired: “Was
the explosion on the morning of May 15, 1954, at the Pitts-
ville Creamery a gasoline explosion?” and the jury answered,
“No.”

So
eee

Question 3 of the special verdict inquired: “Was the de-
fendant negligent in respect to ascertaining the condition of
the underground storage tank prior to the explosion on
May 15, 1954?” and the jury answered, “No.”

We have studied the record carefully and are satisfied that
the jury’s answer to question 1 must stand. But assuming it
had answered that question “Yes,” it would be necessary to
plaintiffs recovery that question 3 likewise be so answered.
We appreciate plaintiffs’ argument that the jury having
found “No” on the first question, it necessarily found “No”
on the third. In our opinion, however, it must be held as a
matter of law that there was no negligence on the part of
defendant in failing to ascertain the condition of the tank
prior to the explosion, and the trial court should have directed
the verdict on that question.

There is no dispute in the evidence on this question.
Wadzinski’s orders to Tomczak were that he keep the tank
filled. Their agreement was that if anything went wrong
with the gasoline equipment Wadzinski would notify Tom-
czak who would see that repairs were made; and this was
done on a number of occasions when the pump, the meter,
or the hose did not work properly. Tomezak lived less than
a block from the creamery and it was easy to get in touch
with him.

The gasoline pump and tank were maintained for the
convenience of the plaintiffs who needed a supply for their
five trucks. Only rarely, in cases of extreme need, was
gasoline sold to the general public. Plaintiffs’ truck drivers
filled their trucks from the tank and turned in a slip stating
the gasoline taken to Fredonna McLaughlin, Wadzinski’s
bookkeeper, whose responsibility it was to keep track of the
gasoline supply.

When Tomcezak’s driver delivered gasoline he first meas-
ured the gas in the tank with a stick to see how much it
needed and then filled it, leaving a slip with Miss McLaughlin

a ee 89

showing the number of gallons put in. Miss McLaughlin
took the pump-meter reading every night and checked it
against the slips for the day showing amounts put in and tak-
en out. On occasion when she was short she checked with the
drivers to see who had forgotten to turn ina slip. She never
found any shortage of gasoline; she never had any occasion
to become suspicious that gasoline was being lost from the
tank; she never found any discrepancies between the separate
invoices left by the defendant’s driver and the bills sent from
defendant’s office at the end of the month.

No one ever smelled gasoline within the creamery build-
ing. Nothing was ever detected which made anyone question
whether the tank leaked. Defendant was never notified of
a shortage in gasoline or of any other circumstance which
might have called for a testing of the tank.

Mr. I. F. Statz, supervisor of fire prevention for the safety
division of the industrial commission, testified that the safety
factor in the location of underground gasoline tanks is the
distance required between the tank and the basement of
adjoining buildings. It is conceded that the location of the
creamery tank was in full compliance with the rules and
regulations of the industrial commission, although it was
placed there sometime previous to the adoption of such rules
and regulations.

The tank was located at the creamery for at least twenty-
four years before the explosion occurred. Mr. Statz testified
that there is no set age at which a particular tank will leak
and there is no practical test known to determine when a tank
will leak prior to the time it begins to leak. He testified he
had seen tanks removed that were in the earth for fifty years
and had not leaked and others that leaked after two or three
years. There is no order of the industrial commission limit-
ing the time such tanks may be used and none requiring
periodic testing of underground tanks. The testimony further

0
CC“ SCC

shows that it is not the practice of oil companies to apply
tests for leakage unless a customer complains of shortages.

Mr. Statz took explosimeter tests of the creamery premises
on the day following the explosion and found that an ex-
plosive material, later identified as gasoline vapor, was pres-
ent in the soil, On the next day Mr. Statz’s deputy took
further tests with the same results and ordered the tank air
tested. The air test indicated there was a leak in the tank.

When the tank was dug up it was found to be rusted
and corroded and there were several holes in it, the largest
of which probably leaked while in the ground according to
the testimony of a University of Wisconsin metallurgist
who examined it.

Plaintiffs failed completely to prove that defendant knew
or should have known of the condition of the tank and should
have made periodic tests thereof. The evidence shows that
it did not, and would not (under the agreement), know of
such condition and it is neither the practice nor the duty of
the defendant to make periodic tests of the tank in the absence
of complaint as to shortage of gasoline. Even if periodic tests
had been made, the evidence is that no test would show when
a particular tank would leak prior to the time it actually
leaks.

The evidence is undisputed that the tank and pump were
located at the creamery at the time Wadzinski purchased the
premises and took possession. When defendant acquired
the gasoline equipment Wadzinski’s possession was in no
way changed and the agreement as to supplying and servic-
ing was continued as in the past—that defendant would keep
the tank filled and would make repairs if notified by plain-
tiffs of the need therefor. There is no claim that the tank
was defective either when installed or when defendant took
title to it. The rule is stated in 8 C. J. S., Bailments, p. 260,
sec. 25:

“Tt is the duty of the bailor not only to furnish an article
free from defect when delivered, but also to inspect and
repair it whenever called on to do so during the term of the
hiring; but in the absence of notice, the bailor is not liable
for injuries caused by defects arising subsequent to the de-
livery of the property to the bailee, unless he has expressly
undertaken the duty of inspecting and repairing the property,
and even then he is liable only to the bailee for breach of his
contract, and hence, is not responsible to the servants of the
bailee.”

In order to charge anyone with negligence, it is necessary
that he have knowledge of some duty to perform, and in order
that an act or omission may be regarded as negligent, the
person charged must have knowledge or should know from
the circumstances brought to his attention that the act or
omission involves danger to another. Weber v. Interstate
Light & Power Co. (1955), 268 Wis. 479, 68 N. W. (2d)

39. There being no evidence that the defendant knew or
should have known that the tank leaked; no evidence that it
breached its contract with the plaintiffs; no evidence that it
acted contrary to any accepted rules, regulations, or customs
in servicing and maintaining the tank—it must be held as
a matter of law that defendant was not negligent with respect
thereto.

In view of our decision on negligence, other questions
raised by plaintiffs become immaterial.

By the Cowrt.—Judgments affirmed. Respondent's appli-
cation for full costs granted.

Spane and wife, Respondents, vs. ScHRoEDER and another,
Appellants.

January 10—February 5, 1957.

ee 93
Po

For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by
John J. Schneider of Fond du Lac.

For the respondents there was a brief by McLeod, Dono-
hue & Colwin of Fond du Lac, and oral argument by Joseph
D. Donohue.

Broaproot, J. On October 4, 1955, Albert Spang,
Thomas Schroeder, and William Altman were students at
North Fond du Lac high school. Spang was a freshman and
on the date of the accident he was fifteen years, eight months,
and fifteen days of age. Schroeder and Altman were some-
what older, one being a sophomore and the other a junior in
high school. After school Spang started walking to his home.
He had reached a point on the south side of Winnebago,
street just west of the intersection of that street with Florida
avenue. Schroeder was the owner of a two-door coach-type
car of ancient vintage. Schroeder and Altman lived in the
country west of North Fond du Lac. Altman was riding
home with Schroeder. As they overtook Spang, Schroeder
drove to the south side of the street opposite Spang and
invited him for a ride. Spang lived less than two blocks
from the place he was standing when he visited with
Schroeder and Altman. He had to continue west to the
next intersection and then south one block on Maine avenue.

There was a dispute in the testimony. One witness for
the plaintiffs testified that Schroeder asked Spang if he would
like a ride home; that Spang declined, saying he just had
to go around the corner and that he did not have very far
to go; that Schroeder again asked Spang to ride and again

ee
Po

he declined; that Schroeder then stated he would let him off
on his corner or at his home. Another witness for the plain-
tiffs testified that he overheard the conversation that Spang
refused the invitation to ride because he had only a ways
to go and that Schroeder said if he would stand on the
running board he would give him a lift to his street.
Schroeder did not stop at the intersection of Winnebago
street and Maine avenue, nor did he turn south at that
intersection toward the Spang home. There is testimony
that instead of stopping he accelerated his speed and contin-
ued west. Altman testified that when they reached the
corner Spang told Schroeder he had to go to work and
wanted to get off, but that Schroeder said nothing and kept
on going. Altman further testified that some farther distance
from the corner Spang again told Schroeder he wanted to
get off. Schroeder testified that he invited Spang to take a
ride. He denied that he promised to let him off at the corner.
He admitted that when they were some distance past the
Maine avenue intersection Spang said that he had to go to
work. Schroeder said nothing but kept on going. A short
distance later Altman turned and Spang was not on the
running board: They looked back and saw him lying on the
highway. The car was stopped and they went back to where
Spang was lying. Spang died as a result of the accident.
The trial court held as a matter of law that Schroeder was
causally negligent with respect to permitting the deceased to
ride on the running board of the car. The jury found that
Schroeder was causally negligent with respect to speed. By
its further answers the jury found that Spang got on the
running board of the automobile pursuant to an agreement
that he would be let off at the intersection of Maine avenue
and Winnebago street or at his home; that Schroeder violated
the agreement; that Schroeder continued driving west from
said intersection without securing the consent of Spang; that
Schroeder continued west from said intersection contrary to

| lO

the wishes of Spang; that Spang was not negligent with
respect to the manner in which he was riding on the auto-
mobile; and that the negligence of Schroeder did not operate
to increase the risk assumed by the deceased Spang or create
a new danger. A question as to assumption of risk on the
part of Spang was included but the jury was instructed not
to answer the same unless they found Spang causally negli-
gent in respect to the manner in which he was riding on the
automobile. Accordingly they did not answer that question.

Upon motions after verdict the court changed the jury’s
answer inquiring as to whether the negligence of Schroeder
operated to increase the risk assumed by Spang or to create
a new danger from “No” to “Yes.” The special verdict was
drawn by the trial judge, who invited comment thereon by
the parties. At that time the defendants moved that the court
submit a question as to whether Spang was negligent in
riding on the running board of Schroeder’s car and that the
court answer said question “Yes.” The defendants also
moved to substitute for the question inquiring as to whether
Schroeder continued driving west from the intersection con-
trary to the wishes of Spang, a question as to whether
Schroeder was causally negligent in continuing to drive past
the intersection. Otherwise no objections to the form of the
verdict were made by the defendants. Defendants’ motions
were denied.

The defendants’ first contention is that the jury was never
given a fair opportunity to decide whether or not plaintiffs’
decedent had assumed the risk inherent in riding on the
running board of the car or whether he was contributorily
negligent. This contention is based upon a combination of
complaints as to the form of verdict and instructions given
in connection therewith.

Each side has a different conception of the law that should
be applied to the facts. It is and was the contention of the
plaintiffs that after Schroeder drove his automobile beyond

Cs

the intersection Spang was a prisoner thereon or, at best, an
involuntary passenger who had no choice as to his destina-
tion, the speed, or other actions of the driver of the car;
that Spang did not assume any risk beyond the intersection
and that he had no duty to protest. On the other hand, the
defendants contend that it was Spang’s duty, after passing
the intersection, to protest because he repented of his posi-
tion on the car or was apprehensive of the way in which the
car was being driven and should have asked to be permitted
to get off. If we understand their position correctly, his
protest should have been based upon one of those two grounds
and his protest should have been framed in that language.

We cannot agree with either contention. Sec. 85.39, Stats.,
prohibits persons to ride on any portion of a motor vehicle
not designed or intended for the use of passengers and also
prohibits the operator of a motor vehicle to operate the same
when any person is upon any portion thereof not designed or
intended for the use of a passenger when a vehicle is in
motion. When they started out both Schroeder and Spang
were violating that statute. If the accident had occurred
prior to or upon reaching Maine avenue there would have
been causal negligence on the part of each as a matter of law
and there would have been assumption of risk on the part of
Spang. Beyond that point it was not a matter of contract.
The relationship of host and guest continued and it was
definitely the duty of Spang to protest. Without such protest
he would have assumed the risk of continuing. However,
we cannot agree with the defendants that he must tell the
driver he wanted to get off because either he repented of his
position and feared danger to himself by being asked to
continue therein or that he was apprehensive of the way in
which the car was driven. Schroeder admitted that when
past the corner Spang told him he had to go to work.
Schroeder knew Spang was working after school, but he
said nothing and continued at a speed that made it unsafe for

eS 97

Spang to jump off the running board. Altman testified that,
when they reached the intersection with Maine avenue, Spang
said he had to go to work and he wanted to get off. Schroeder
did not deny that statement but said he had no recollection of
it. Under all of the circumstances and upon Schroeder’s
admission, there was a sufficient protest unheeded by
Schroeder and because of that admission no question in-
quiring as to protest had to be submitted to the jury. The
trial court was justified in changing the answer to the inquiry
as to the negligence of Schroeder in increasing the risk or
adding a new danger to Spang. When Schroeder continued
after the protest he increased the danger assumed by Spang
upon getting upon the running board. Spang was willing
to assume the risk of riding as he did for the short distance
he had to go and at the low rate of speed that must have
been maintained either to stop at the corner or to make
the left turn. The acceleration of speed at and beyond the
corner increased Spang’s danger and added a new one. Under
the circumstances, liability was clearly established.

The defendants next complain that the trial court com-
mitted error in sustaining objections to certain questions
put to Peter Spang relating to damages. That complaint,
however, was not properly preserved as the motion for a
new trial did not include it as one of the grounds therefor.

Finally, the defendants contend that the award of the jury
for pecuniary damages is excessive and is not sustained by
the evidence. The trial court passed upon this matter and
in its memorandum decision had this to say:

“Ts the allowance of $5,000, for pecuniary loss sustained
by the parents of the deceased Albert Spang excessive? The
father is approximately sixty-three years of age and is en-
gaged as an ordinary laborer by the Wisconsin Power &
Light Company, being engaged in digging ditches. The
mother is several years younger.’ They do not own an auto-
mibile. The deceased boy was their youngest child, he having
eight brothers and sisters. The defendants strenuously con-
tend that the allowance of $5,000 is excessive. According to

Se

the testimony, the boy was a good boy, was ambitious, and
probably would have finished high school, but there was no
intention of sending him to college. He was permitted to
keep his own earnings, a bank account having been opened
in the joint names of the boy and his mother; and at the
time of the death of the boy there remained $20 in the ac-
count. He had a steady job, which he had obtained in the
summer of 1955 and continued working after school and on
Saturdays after school started. He earned $1.25 an hour.
His employer testified that he could have continued working
and that it was necessary to hire another boy to take his
place. He performed the usual and customary services
around the home. His parents testified that they did not
expect him to turn over his earnings to-‘them. . . .

“In the instant case we have a boy fifteen and a half years
of age, already earning substantial amounts of money, and
who would have finished high school but had no intention
of going on to college. During the period that this boy re-
mained under twenty-one years of age, the parents would
have been entitled to have received his earnings as a matter
of right. It was for the jury to decide; and the amount of
$5,000, which they found, must be sustained if there is evi-
dence from which different inferences could be drawn; and
it was for the jury to decide what inferences were proper
under all the circumstances.

“Tt has often been stated and held as follows: ‘Damages of
this nature, unless obviously the result of passion and preju-
dice, are peculiarly within the province of the jury.’ This
court concludes that there were different inferences which
could be drawn from the evidence, and it was up to the jury
to decide what proper inferences were to be drawn under all
the circumstances. The finding of $5,000 for pecuniary loss
was within the province of the jury, and in the opinion of
this court, was not the result of passion and prejudice. Even
though the award may appear generous to this court, this
court cannot say that it is necessarily excessive, and, by rea-
son thereof, concludes that the award of $5,000 for pecuniary
loss sustained by the parents of the deceased boy must be
upheld.”

A careful review of the record shows no reversible error.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Scuutrz and wife, Respondents, vs. Rupr, Appellant.
January 10—February 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Fischer, Brunner &
Strossenreuther of Shawano, and oral argument by L. J.
Brunner.

For the respondents there was a brief by Winter & Winter
of Shawano, and oral argument by Douglas D. Winter.

Brown, J. A person named Mayme Dietzler died seized
of land in the northwest quarter of the northwest quarter of
section 30, township 27 north, range 16 east, Shawano coun-
ty. To pay debts and administration expenses the north 100
feet of this parcel was sold by one Vandree, a real-estate
broker employed by the executor of Dietzler’s will, to one
Rosenberg. The residue of the tract was assigned by final
judgment in probate to defendant Rudie (then known as
Soufal) under the description:

“The north 370 feet of the northwest quarter of the north-
west quarter of the northwest quarter, section 30, township
27, range 16 east, excepting the north 100 feet thereof.”

Mrs. Rudie wanted to sell all this land and employed Mr.
Vandree to sell it for her. He interested the plaintiffs as
purchasers but they did not have enough money to buy the
entire tract, whereupon Mr. Vandree as agent for Mrs. Rudie
offered to sell them a part of it. Vandree, Mrs. Rudie, and
Mr. Schultz stood upon the land and Vandree pointed out
to Schultz the boundaries of the parcel he was offering. This
was a tract lying to the south of a certain chicken house and
east of a highway which lay upon the north-south section
line. Vandree pointed out to Schultz that the north boundary
of the offered parcel would be a line parallel to and three
feet south of the south wall of the chicken house and the
south boundary would be parallel to the north one, 185 feet
south of it, and equidistant between two parallel rows of
apple trees. Vandree testified and it was not disputed that
he, Schultz, and Mrs. Rudie “walked out” the north and
south boundaries, as so described, at least once and possibly
three times. Plaintiffs then agreed to buy the property so
shown them and Vandree prepared an offer to purchase
which Mr. Schultz and Mrs. Rudie, then known as Mrs.
Soufal, signed. This described the property as:

“The north 370 feet of the NW %4 of NW % of NW %4,
except the north 100 feet thereof, and except the south 85
feet thereof... .”

Mrs. Rudie then had a deed prepared which she executed
and delivered to the plaintiffs purporting to be in performance
of her agreement. The description in the deed is:

“Commencing at the northwest corner of the northwest
quarter of the northwest quarter of sec. 30, in township 27
north, of range 16 east, thence south on the section line 100
feet; there shall be the place of beginning; thence east 40
rods; thence south 185 feet; thence west 40 rods; thence

north on the section line 185 feet to the place of beginning,
subject to highway on west line thereof.”

The plaintiffs accepted the deed believing it to contain a
description of the property which had been pointed out to
them by defendant’s agent. They went into possession and
shortly thereafter had a survey made according to the de-
scription of the deed. This survey located the land’s north
boundary on a course heading some six degrees north of the
boundary as pointed out by Vandree and cutting through the
chicken house on an angle, leaving most of it within the land
conveyed to plaintiffs. Likewise the south boundary, parallel
to the north one as described in the deed, does not run be-
tween the two rows of apple trees but cuts across them at an
angle leaving only a part of the north row within the land
conveyed to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs demanded a deed corrected to describe the land
with boundaries as originally shown to them. Defendant re-
fused. Plaintiffs brought this action for reformation. De-
fendant’s answer opposed reformation as demanded but in
turn alleged that the deed varied from the description in the
offer to purchase and demanded that it be made to conform.

There is no doubt that the description in the deed must be
changed to conform to the boundaries pointed out to plain-
tiffs by Mr. Vandree. The minds of the parties to the sale
met on those boundaries. They were not negotiating in
reference to compass courses but in reference to visible,
unequivocal landmarks, The difficulty arose when Mrs.
Rudie discovered later that the land which she retained was
not a rectangle but had north and south boundaries which
were not parallel. No doubt she supposed that the property
retained was rectangular but this is immaterial. The offer
of a parcel with visible boundaries was made to plaintiffs, and
negotiations were on the basis of what they were to get, not
what Mrs. Rudie was to keep. It is likewise immaterial in

this case whether the description in the deed conforms to that
in the offer to purchase. If necessary to carry out the intent
of the parties, the offer, too, would be reformed. That is
not done here because reformation of the deed is sufficient.

Defendant submits that plaintiffs intended and expected to
buy land bounded on the north by the south line of the prop-
erty sold by the estate to Rosenberg, as aforesaid, and that
such line is correctly stated in Schultzes’ deed as their north
boundary. Granted, that Schultz was told he was buying
up to the Rosenberg south line. That line was pointed out
to him as lying three feet south of and parallel to the chicken
house. Incidentally, one Domke, purchaser of the Rosenberg
tract, was a witness at the trial and testified that his south
line is where Vandree told Schultz it was. Where it actually
may be according to the original Rosenberg conveyance is
immaterial in the present controversy; the important thing
is where defendant’s agent told plaintiff it was.

The findings and judgment of the trial court seem to us
to be so clearly right that no citation of authority for reforma-
tion of a description in such circumstances seems necessary ;
but for those who prefer at least a minimum of reference to
precedent in an opinion we direct attention to Cordes v,
Coates (1891), 78 Wis. 641, 47 N. W. 949, which in
principle is like the case before us. The headnote in that
case states:

“Defendant owned a farm comprising parts of two sections
and lying on both sides of a highway which both parties
supposed to be on the section line. He sold to the plaintiff
all that part lying north of the highway, and gave him a
deed of his lands in the northern section, assuring him that
it conveyed to the highway. The plaintiff went into posses-
sion, and cultivated to the line of the highway for six years,
when a new survey showed that twelve acres of the southern
section lay north of the highway and was not embraced in
the conveyance. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to have
the deed reformed so as to include said twelve acres.”

And in Abbott v. Dow (1907), 133 Wis. 533, 537, 113
N. W. 960, citing Scheuer v. Chloupek (1906), 130 Wis.
72, 109 N. W. 1035, we said:

“Tf the minds of the parties had met on the sale and pur-
chase of a particular parcel of land and they signed a writing
which both supposed described that parcel, but which, by
clerical error, described some other, a case is presented for
a court of equity to ascertain the true agreement and inter-
pose to prevent the writing, as far as variant, being enforced
as the contract of the parties, in absence of negligence or
acquiescence.”

While we conclude that the trial court correctly decreed
reformation of the description we think its reformed de-
scription has not improved matters. This is:

“Commencing at the northwest corner of the northwest
one quarter of section 30, township 27 north, of range 16
east, thence running south along the section line 100 feet
and there shall be the place of beginning; thence north 85
degrees, 44 minutes east to the east boundary of the north-
west one quarter of the northwest one quarter of the north-
west one quarter of said section 30, thence south 185 feet;
thence westerly to the section line parallel to the north bound-
ary, thence north along the section line to the place of
beginning subject to the highway easement on the west side
thereof.”

If, starting at the designated “place of beginning” (upon
which all parties agree), a line “east 40 rods” as recited in '
the deed bears too far to the left, or north, the trial court’s
line from the place of beginning “thence north 85 degrees
44 minutes east” bears still farther north and is that much
worse. There are numerous ways of setting the desired
course. It appears to us that, having reached the place of
beginning “thence south 85 degrees 44 minutes east” would
do but we will not direct any particular modification of the

description ourselves, leaving that to the trial court upon
remittitur.

Judgment dismissing defendant’s counterclaim was correct.

By the Cowrt—Judgment decreeing reformation of the
deed to make the description conform to the boundary lines
shown plaintiffs by defendant’s agent affirmed. Judgment
reversed in so far as the north and south boundary lines
stated in the judgment do not conform to those shown by
said agent, and cause remanded for their correction as
aforesaid. Judgment dismissing counterclaim affirmed.

Heyrors, Plaintiff in error, vs. Tue Strate, Defendant
in error.

January 10—February 5, 1957.

1

Le
For the plaintiff in error there was a brief and oral argu-
ment by Donald W. Kaatz of Madison.
For the defendant in error there was a brief by the At-

torney General and William A. Platz, assistant attorney gen-
eral, and oral argument by Mr. Platz.

Curriz, J. The new criminal code (Title XLV, Stats.
1955) did not take effect until July 1, 1956, so that the 1953
statutes are applicable to the instant prosecution, Sec. 343.19,
Stats. 1953, under which Heyroth was charged, reads as
follows:

a be 107

“Any person who shall buy, receive, conceal, or aid in the
concealment of stolen money, goods, or property, knowing
the same to have been stolen, shall receive the same punish-
ment as is hereinbefore provided for the stealing of such
money, goods, or property; and in any prosecution for such
offense it shall not be necessary to aver or prove that the
person who stole the same has been convicted.”

Therefore, while value of the stolen goods received is not
an element of the crime covered by sec. 343.19, Stats. 1953,
it does determine the severity of the punishment to be im-
posed for violation of such statute. This-is because sec.
343.17, Stats. 1953, which specifies the punishment to be
imposed upon one who commits the crime of larceny, pro-
vides for different gradations of punishment depending upon
the value of the property stolen. If the value of the goods
stolen does not exceed $20 the punishment is not more than
six-months imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine not
exceeding $100. If such value exceeds $20 but is less than
$100, the punishment is imprisonment in the state prison or
county jail for not more than one year nor less than six
months, or a fine not exceeding $200. More-severe penalties
are provided where the value of the property stolen is greater
than $100.

The first question with which we are confronted is whether
the value of the stolen property alleged to have been received
by Heyroth may be determined by the trial court, where the
jury has failed to find such value in its verdict.

In Koch v. State (1906), 126 Wis. 470, 478, 106 N. W.
531, it was held in a prosecution for larceny from the person
that a verdict that was defective in two respects, one of which
was that there was no finding of the value of the property
taken, was not sufficient to sustain a conviction.

A trial court in the later case of State v. Clementi (1937),
224 Wis. 145, 272 N. W. 29, in a prosecution for larceny
of a gambling device, refused to submit the question of the

value of the device to the jury. This court, in commenting
thereon in its opinion, stated (p. 153):

“The trial court did not submit the question of value to
the jury, although requested to do so. This was error. In-
asmuch as the degree of the offense depends upon value of
the articles stolen, the jury should have been directed to
determine the value of state’s Exhibit 1 under proper in-
structions. Koch v. State (1906), 126 Wis. 470, 106 N. W.

31.”

If the instant case had been a civil instead of a criminal
case, there would be no question but that the trial court’s
action after verdict, in finding the value of the stolen goods
received by Heyroth, would have been authorized by sec.
270.28, Stats. 1953. Such statute provides as follows:

“When some controverted matter of fact not brought to

the attention of the trial court but essential to sustain the
judgment is omitted from the verdict, such matter of fact

shall be deemed determined by the court in conformity with
its judgment and the failure to request a finding by the jury
on such matter shall be deemed a waiver of jury trial pro
tanto.”

Sec. 270.28 is part of Title XXV, Stats., which is ex-
pressly limited to procedure in civil actions. However, the
state contends that sec. 357.14, Stats. 1953, makes sec.
270.28 applicable to criminal as well as civil trials. Sec.
357.14, Stats. 1953, reads as follows:

“The summoning of jurors; the impaneling and qualifica-
tions of the jury; the challenge of jurors for cause; the duty
of the court in charging the jury and giving instructions and
discharging the jury when unable to agree shall be the same
in criminal as it is in civil actions, except that section 270.18
shall not apply to criminal actions. Section 327.25 applies
to criminal proceedings.”

While such statute is entitled “Rules of civil trials” a plain
reading thereof discloses that all statutory rules of civil trials

r es 109
es

are not made applicable to criminal trials but only those
covering the subjects expressly enumerated therein. The
right of a trial court to make a finding of fact after return
of the verdict is not embraced within any of the categories
enumerated in said sec. 357.14, Stats. 1953. We, therefore,
deem that the state’s argument on this issue is without merit.

It is our considered conclusion that only the jury could
make the finding of the value of the stolen goods received by
Heyroth which is necessary to enable the trial court to im-
pose sentence based upon a value in excess of $20.

One further contention raised by Heyroth’s counsel merits
consideration, viz., that the evidence does not support the
verdict because of the alleged lack of any proof that Heyroth
knew that the two suitcases and their contents were stolen
property. Belief that the goods received were stolen has been
held to be the equivalent of knowledge. In Meath v. State
(1921), 174 Wis. 80, 83, 182 N. W. 334, Meath had been
prosecuted under the same statute as was Heyroth in the in-
stant case, and the court stated as follows:

“By the express language of this statute an essential ele-
ment of the offense is that the defendant shall, at the time
of his receiving or dealing with the stolen property, know
that such property has been stolen. It is as essential that the
jury shall, beyond a reasonable doubt, find that he had such
knowledge at the time of his transaction with the property
as they must that the property was theretofore stolen. Such
guilty knowledge, or its equivalent, guilty belief, may be
proven by civcumstantial evidence, but it is not sufficient that
such circumstantial evidence convinces the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant ought to have known
that the property was stolen; it must go a substantial step
further and satisfy them that he did know or believe.” (Em-
phasis supplied.)

We are satisfied that there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to warrant the jury in finding that Heyroth did
believe that the contents of the suitcases, if not the suitcases

0
Ld

themselves, were stolen. When Hayes and Cook offered to
sell the six new Benrus watches to Heyroth on the night of
September 20th, Heyroth asked where they had obtained
the watches. To this Hayes gave the evasive answer, “In
town.” Heyroth merely said, “Oh,” and did not pursue his
inquiry further. Then on September 26th, Cook told Hey-
roth that the police were getting hot on Cook’s trail and that
he wanted to get rid of the merchandise. It was as a result
of this conversation that Heyroth agreed to meet Cook the
next day so that the suitcases and their contents could be
taken by Heyroth.

Because of the error in not submitting a question as to
value in the verdict, we ordinarily would reverse and remand
for a new trial. However, the state in its brief requests that,
in the event we reached the conclusion that error had been
committed, because of such failure of the jury to determine
value, the cause be remanded for sentencing Heyroth under
the penalty provision for petty larceny when the value of the
stolen goods does not exceed $20. It is pointed out that the
maximum fine which could be imposed’on Heyroth under
such provision would be $100, or but $50 less than the fine
actually imposed.

If Heyroth had been originally charged with only having
received stolen property of a value of not to exceed $20,
there would have been no necessity of submitting any ques-
tion of value in the verdict. Therefore, Heyroth will not be
permitted to voice any objection if he is now sentenced on
the basis of the value of the stolen goods received by him
being not to exceed $20. Both the evidence and the verdict
are sufficient to support such a sentence. However, the pub-
lic has an interest in seeing that exact justice is meted out,
and that a guilty man does not receive a lighter sentence than
warranted after giving due consideration to all of the proper
factors to be taken into account in imposing sentence. It is
the duty of courts to properly protect the public interest in

such matters when acting upon a recommendation of the
prosecuting authorities, such as the one now before us.

While it is to the interest of the public that Heyroth re-
ceive the full penalty merited by his crime, it is also to the
public interest that the taxpayers not be put to the expense
of a second trial if nothing of an appreciable nature is to be
gained thereby. It seems to us that where only a difference
of $50 in the amount of the fine may be at issue, a court could
well conclude that the greater public interest would be served
by acceding to the state’s request and thus avoiding the ex-
pense of a second trial. However, we believe that the proper
court to exercise this discretion is the trial court rather than
the appellate court.

We, therefore, determine that the judgment be reversed,
and the cause remanded for the purpose of permitting the trial
court to exercise its discretion to either sentence Heyroth
within the authorized penalty limits for petty larceny as pro-
vided in sec. 343.17, Stats. 1953, or to order a new trial.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Srare, Appellant, vs. Pusitic Srrvicz ComMiss
Respondent.

January 11—February 5, 1957.

115

For the appellant there was a brief by the Attorney Gen-
eral and Roy G. Tulane, assistant attorney general, and oral
argument by Mr. Tulane.

6

For the respondent Public Service Commission there was
a brief and oral argument by William E. Torkelson, chief
counsel.

For the city of Madison there was a brief and oral argu-
ment by Harold E. Hanson, city attorney.

Faircuitp, J. The state asserts that the order of the
commission should have been reversed because (1) ch. 282,
Laws of 1953, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, (2) the findings of fact do not support the order of
approval, (3) ch. 282 makes a grant of a lake bed in viola-
tion of the trust under which the state owns and controls
lake beds, (4) the public purpose to be served by the project
is local and the grant is without valuable consideration.

These various challenges must fail for the reasons herein-
after set forth.

Ch. 282, Laws of 1953, is an act for a specific purpose
which is fully described. The legislature itself has deter-
mined that it is in the public interest to authorize Madison to
develop its park by the filling and use of a portion of the bed
of Lake Wingra. By the use of the phrase, “subject to the
approval of the Public Service Commission,” the legislature
has required Madison to submit the details of its project to
the commission and obtain approval.

The standards for the approval are properly implied from
ch. 282, Laws of 1953, itself and from sec. 30.02, Stats.,
which gives the commission general power to grant permis-
sion to place fills or structures on the beds of navigable
waters when satisfied that such action will not materially
obstruct navigation nor be detrimental to the public interest.

The commission, before approving the project, must be
satisfied that it complies with the limitations and purposes |
expressed in ch. 282, Laws of 1953. It has done so. It has
found the project is within the area prescribed by the legisla-
ture and will serve the purposes mentioned. Ch. 282 con-

a Le 117

templates that a portion of the lake bed will be filled.
Obviously it contemplates that navigation, in a strict sense,
will be destroyed to the extent of the fill. In enacting ch. 282
the legislature has determined that some fill and correspond-
ing destruction of navigation is in the public interest. By
requiring the approval of the commisson, the legislature re-
quired that the details of the project be considered and that
it be determined whether the manner in which Madison
carried out its authority would materially impair navigation
or be detrimental to the public interest. The delegation is
greatly limited, and clearly complies with the principles set
forth in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whit-
man, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929, and decisions following
it.

Approval also is a continuing condition of the authority
granted to Madison. Should Madison desire to make any
material change in the manner of exercising its authority,
it would be required to obtain approval of the change.

The state argues that because the commission found that
the fill would, pro tanto, destroy navigation, the findings do
not support the order of approval. Clearly the legislature
contemplated when it enacted ch. 282, Laws of 1953, that
there would be some destruction of navigation in the strict
sense of the word, and we understand that the findings of the
commission approved the project generally as not materially
impairing, and in fact improving navigation in certain par-
ticulars, while recognizing the obvious, that one could not
boat, fish, nor swim in an area where water had been replaced
by dry land.

We are of the opinion that the use of filled lake bed, to the
extent authorized in ch. 282, Laws of 1953, for park im-
provement, including a parking area and appurtenant high-
ways, as well as alterations which will aid navigation and
other enjoyment of the water, does not violate the obliga-
tions of the trust subject to which the state owns the lake bed.

1S

In reaching that conclusion, we attach importance to these
facts: 1. Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2. The
area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the
public. 3. The diminution of lake area will be very small
when compared with the whole of Lake Wingra. 4. No one
of the public uses of the lake as a lake will be destroyed or
greatly impaired. 5. The disappointment of those members
of the public who may desire to boat, fish, or swim in the
area to be filled is negligible when compared with the greater
convenience to be afforded those members of the public who
use the city park.

In Muench v. Public Service Comm. 261 Wis. 492, 499,
53 N. W. (2d) 514, 55 N. W. (2d) 40, Mr. Justice Currie
reviewed the history of the doctrine that the state holds the
beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all of its citi-
zens. (p. 501.) The trust is “for public purposes.” Illinois
Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426, 84 N. W. 855, 85
N. W. 402. Early decisions frequently spoke of navigation,
often in a commercial sense, as the purpose of the trust, but
all public uses of water have from time to time been recog-
nized, including pleasure boating, sailing, fishing, swimming,
hunting, skating, and’ enjoyment of scenic beauty.

Certainly the trust doctrine would prevent the state from
making any substantial grant of a lake bed for a purely
private purpose. Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Im-
provement Co, 93 Wis. 534, 67 N. W. 918. Even for a
public purpose, the state could not change an entire lake into
dry land nor alter it so as to destroy its character as a lake,
In ve Crawford County L. & D. Dist. 182 Wis. 404, 196
N. W. 874. But the trust doctrine does not prevent minor
alterations of the natural boundaries between water and land.

“Tt is not the law, as we view it, that the state, represented
by its legislature, must forever be quiescent in the adminis-
tration of the trust doctrine, to the extent of leaving the
shores of Lake Michigan in all instances in the same condi-

tion and contour as they existed prior to the advent of the
white civilization in the territorial area of Wisconsin.” Mil-
waukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 451, 214 N. W. 820.

The supreme court of the United States has recognized
that parcels of lake bed could even be granted by the state
to private persons where such parcels “being occupied, do
not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.” Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U. S. 387, 452, 13 Sup. Ct. 110, 36 L. Ed. 1018. Similarly,
Franzini v. Layland, 120 Wis. 72, 82, 97 N. W. 499.

Even where an artificial change in the course of a navi-
gable stream will impair the enjoyment of water by hunting
and fishing to some extent, the degree of impairment must
be weighed against the other public interests to be served
and unless the impairment so viewed is substantial, the im-
pairment is not a violation of the trust. Merwin v. Hough-
ton, 146 Wis. 398, 410, 131 N. W. 838.

“Undoubtedly, when the Houghton Case was decided,
this court was thoroughly impressed with the idea that the
trust reposed in the state was an active, administrative, and
governmental trust, and one which should be administered
to promote not only navigation but the public health and
welfare generally.” Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 452,
214 N. W. 820.

As well said by the learned trial court:

“It does not appeal to the reasoning of this court that in
exercising its duty, as trustee for the people of the state to
the lands underlying its navigable waters, that the state is
required to leave the beds of all navigable waters intact and
in the condition in which they were created by nature... .

“There must be a realistic and sane legal approach to this
problem, namely, a balancing of public need and convenience
against the interference with navigation involved.”

A similar thought is expressed by 1 Farnham, Water and
Water Rights, pp. 398, 399, sec. 84:

20
Leen!

“The question depends altogether upon the impottance
of the navigation as compared with the interests which would
be promoted by sacrificing it. . . . Therefore, the doctrine
is firmly established that when it is for the public interest to
interfere with rights of navigation, so far as the public is
concerned the legislature may do so. . . . It is primarily for
the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine between
the conflicting interests and the necessity of requiring the
navigation right to yield, and its discretion will not be
interfered with by the courts, except in cases of a plain and
gross abuse of discretion.”

There is no contention here that the purpose authorized
by ch. 282, Laws of 1953, is not public. The purpose which
is served is not local in any sense which would involve
improper use of state property. Any park is local in the
sense that it will be of greater use to those living near it
than those who are remote, but this has never been con-
sidered to prevent the state from providing a park wherever
it sees fit. The park is open to all who seek to use it.

Appellant suggests that ch. 282, Laws of 1953, is a grant
of property for which consideration must be received. The
answer is that ch. 282 is only permission to use property,
not a grant of it. It vests nothing in the city which the
legislature could not take back at will.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Brown, J. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). The
landfill in question has a reasonable relationship toward im-
proved use of the water for purposes of public navigation
and recreation and I concur in the result reached by the
majority of the court. But in so far as the majority opinion
permits use of the lake bed if only some public purpose is
served thereby, even though such purpose is opposed to, and
even inconsistent with, use of the water by the public, I dis-

121

agree, preferring to reserve decision of that question until
it is presented by the record.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice STEINLE and
Mr. Justice WincERT are of the same opinion.

Wisconsin Exectric Power Company, Appellant, vs.
Crry or Mitwauxes, Respondent.

March 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Shaw, Muskat &
Paulsen, attorneys, and John F. Zimmermann of counsel, all
of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Zimmermann,

For the respondent there was a brief by Walter J. Matti-
son, city attorney, and Ewald L. Moerke, Jr., assistant city
attorney, and oral argument by Mr. Moerke.

A brief was filed by Robert D. Sundby of Madison, for
the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, as amicus curiae.

Per CurtAm. In view of the determination made by the
United States supreme court we hold that the constructive
notice given by the defendant city by publication of the
proposed special assessments against the plaintiff’s lands did
not meet the requirements of due process. Mullane v. Central
Hanover B. & T. Co. (1950), 339 U. S. 306, 70 Sup. Ct.
652, 94 L. Ed. 865, and Walker v. Hutchinson (1956),
352 U. S. 112, 77 Sup. Ct. 200, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 178. There-
fore, it was error for the trial court to have sustained the
general demurrer interposed to plaintiff's amended complaint.

One of the reasons advanced by the defendant city for
opposing plaintiff’s motion, that judgment be entered by
this court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
city in accordance with the prayer of the amended complaint,
is that secs. 75.56 and 75.57, Stats., require a stay of pro-
ceedings until a reassessment may be made by the city. If
defendant is correct in this contention, then the judgment
to be entered determining that the assessments were void
should be an interlocutory judgment with further proceedings
stayed until the reassessment shall have been made. The

plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that secs. 75.56 and
75.57 have no application to special assessments made pur-
suant to the provisions of the defendant city’s special charter.
Because these issues were not litigated below we deem the
proper procedure to be that the cause be remanded to the cir-
cuit court to overrule the demurrer. This will accord the
city an opportunity to serve and file an answer raising
whatever proper issues still remain to be litigated.

Judgment is reversed, and cause remanded with directions
to overrule defendant’s demurrer and for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Barrows and wife, Respondents, vs. KenosHa County,
Appellant.

January 7—March 5, 1957.

r |] 125

For the appellant there was a brief by Cavanagh, Mittel-
staed, Sheldon, Heide & Hartley of Kenosha, and oral argu-
ment by William A. Sheldon.

For the respondents there was a brief and oral argument
by Joseph E. Higgins’ of Kenosha.

Srrrntz, J. Condemnation statutes are in derogation
of the common law and must be strictly construed. Union
Mig. Co. v. Spies (1923), 181 Wis. 497, 195 N. W. 326.

Ch. 32 of the revised statutes treats with procedure in
eminent domain. Nowhere in that legislation is authority
conferred upon this court to entertain an appeal ‘taken prior
to the making of an award by commissioners appointed for
such purpose.

Until the commissioners have made an award, a proceed-
ing under ch. 32, Stats., is not of a judicial nature, the
judge merely acting in an administrative capacity. Klump
v. Cybulski (1957), 274 Wis. 604, 81 N. W. (2d) 42. See
also Olen v. Waupaca County (1941), 238 Wis. 442, 447,
300 N. W. 178; Tobin v. Willow River Power Co. (1932),
208 Wis. 262, 242 N. W. 480; State ex rel. Department of
Agriculture v. Aarons (1946), 248 Wis. 419, 22 N. W.
(2d) 160. : Lo

26

Sec. 32.04, Stats., provides two separate and distinct
methods by which condemnation may be started. The first
course provides the manner in which one who seeks to ac-
quire property belonging to another shall proceed. The
other course provides the manner in which owners of prop-
erty shall proceed against anyone taking their property
without first having obtained the right to do so under sec.
32.04. See Skalicky v. Friendship E. L. & P. Co, (1927),
193 Wis. 395, 214 N. W. 388. In the matter at bar we are
confronted with a proceeding instituted under the second
of such methods as provided by the statute. In Manns v.
Marinette & M. P. Co. (1931), 205 Wis. 349, 235 N. W.
426, 238 N. W. 624, the trial court by order had denied the
motion of the defendants to vacate and set aside an order
appointing commissioners in a condemnation proceeding
begun by the owners of the property under the statute. The
appeal was from such order. This court there stated
(p. 350) :

“Where no statute authorizes an appeal to this court there

can be no appeal. Puffer v. Welch, 141 Wis. 304, 124 N. W.
406; Wildes v. Franke, 157 Wis. 189, 146 N. W. 1119.”

In the Manns Case it was also said (p. 355):

“For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to say that
whether these proceedings were judicial or not, ... the
order entered did not determine the action, nor prevent a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken. The appel-
Jants could have appealed from the award of the commis-
sioners, in which proceeding all of their rights would have
been determined, under the doctrine of Skalicky v. Friend-
ship E. L. & P. Co. 193 Wis. 395, 214 N. W. 388. Under
such circumstances the order was not appealable, even though
made in special proceedings. It was not a final order. Sec.
274.33, Stats.”

In the instant matter commissioners were not appointed
by the court and an award was not made. As a consequence

|| ee 127
P|

we are constrained to conclude that this court lacks juris-

diction to entertain the appeal from the interlocutory order

rendered by the court prior to an award by commissioners,

and that hence the appeal must be dismissed. .
By the Court.—Appeal dismissed.

Axprent, Administratrix, Appellant, vs. Spencer and
others, Respondents.*

January 8—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

6
Po

For the appellant there were briefs by Henry P. Hughes
of Oshkosh, attorney, and Genrich, Terwilliger, Wakeen,
Pichler & Conway of Wausau of counsel, and oral argument
by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Herbert Terwilliger.

For the respondents there was a brief by Welsh, Trow-
bridge, Bills, Planert & Gould of Green Bay, and oral argu-
ment by Frederick N. Trowbridge.

Sternie, J. The plaintiff contends here, as she did
below, that parol evidence is admissible to establish the true
intent of the parties, viz., that the assignment covered only
the cash surrender value; further, that there is an ambiguity
in the written instrument relating to the option of Albrent to
repurchase in event the sale of the stock to Clintonville
Transfer Lines was not consummated,—the contract being
silent as to Albrent’s right to reacquire the insurance, and
there being no provision as to disposition of the proceeds
in the event of Albrent’s death after the transfer of the
insurance, but before the cashing in of the policies. Parol
evidence, it is submitted, would be admissible with regard
to such ambiguities.

It is also the position of the plaintiff that since the only
legitimate interest which Spencer had in the insurance poli-
cies on Albrent’s life was the cash surrender value, and that

since none of the other defendants had an insurable interest
in the life of Albrent, the agreement between the defendants
to keep alive the policies on Albrent’s life was a conspiracy
to illegally speculate on a profit out of the excess, and that
the same constituted a gambling contract, which is forhidden
as a matter of public policy in this state. Plaintiff submits
that parol evidence would be admissible to show such con-
spiracy. The plaintiff also contends that the doctrine of un-
just enrichment applies to the situation as alleged in the
complaint.

The defendants maintain that since the written contract
between Albrent and Spencer was made a part of the com-
plaint, its terms cannot be varied, and that the demurrer
does not admit the construction of the contract as placed on
it by the plaintiff; further, that since there is no claim of
fraud or mutual mistake, parol evidence may not be intro-
duced as to any contemporary oral agreement, the contract
being unambiguous; further, that the contract was not illegal
as against public policy; and also, that no wrongful con-
spiracy to the damage of the plaintiff was alleged, and that
there was no unjust enrichment.

In its memorandum decision the trial court declared that
while a demurrer ordinarily admits all the facts pleaded, it
does not admit of the construction of an instrument when
the instrument itself is pleaded, and that the very object of
the demurrer in such case is to submit the question as a
matter of law for the determination of the court. The court
found that there was neither a patent nor a latent ambiguity
existing with reference to the provision in paragraph Six
of the written instrument pertaining to the absolute assign-
ment of the insurance to Spencer, and paragraph Eight of
that instrument relating to Albrent’s option which makes no
mention of reassignment of the insurance to him, and which
does not provide for disposition of the proceeds of the prin-
cipal amounts of the insurance in the event of Albrent’s death

36

after transfer and before the cashing in of the policies. The
court tested the matter under the rule laid down in Klueter
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. (1910), 143 Wis. 347, 353,
128 N. W. 43, that “The words of a contract, in themselves,
may be plain, yet when applied to the situation with which
it deals, not plain, the literal sense leading to such unreason-
ableness as to suggest that the parties probably did not so
intend.” The court was of the opinion that the language in
the paragraphs of the written instrument referred to, was
plain, and that it did not lead to a result which was so un-
reasonable as to suggest that the parties probably did not so
intend. The court was also of the view that the omission of
any provision as to reassignment or disposition of the pro-
ceeds of the insurance in the event of Albrent’s death while
the policies were still in force, was consistent with an absolute
and inconsistent with a conditional or qualified transfer, and
that hence parol evidence was not admissible with respect
to the same.

The court was also of the opinion that the agreement in
question was neither illegal nor against public policy. Such
view was predicated principally on considerations that in this
state it has heretofore been held that an assignment of a life
insurance policy to one not having an insurable interest, is
not of itself invalid, but that if made for cloaking an agree-
ment whereby the assignee is to engage in a gamble upon
the life of the insured, it is invalid. Strike v. Wisconsin Odd
Fellows Mut, Life Ins. Co. (1897), 95 Wis. 583, 70 N. W.
819, and Opite v. Karel (1903), 118 Wis. 527, 95 N. W.
948; that no facts are alleged from which the court may
properly conclude that the contract was made for the purpose
of allowing Spencer to gamble on Albrent’s life; that there
is nothing upon the face of the complaint from which the
court could properly conclude that after March 29, 1954,
Spencer any longer had an insurable interest in Albrent’s
life; that if intent on the part of Spencer and the other de-

fendants to gamble on Albrent’s life after March 29, 1954,
could successfully be established, such consideration would be
of no avail to Albrent’s estate for the reason that neither
when the policy was issued, nor when it was assigned to
Spencer, had it been tainted with a gambling interest. The
court noted that Spencer may not legally be condemned for
the reason that he made an exorbitant profit; that everyone
has an unquestioned right to enter into an improvident con-
tract, or to profit by his being more financially astute than
his fellowman, so long as fraud, illegality, or the like are
not factors in his success. The court pointed out that neither
fraud, duress, nor mutual mistake are claimed.

The contentions of the plaintiff challenge largely the con-
clusions of the trial court that parol evidence would not be
admissible in an attempt to establish that Spencer and Albrent
did not intend that any interest in the policies over and above
the cash surrender value was to be transferred under the
contract, and that parol evidence would not be receivable to
show that Albrent did not consent to or authorize any use
of the policies except as related to the cash surrender value.
Notwithstanding that it were to be held that the trial court’s
conclusions as to these and the other of the plaintiff’s con-
tentions are correct, we are of the opinion that the demurrer
must be overruled.

We consider that the case presents the issue of whether
it is against public policy for a creditor of the insured to avail
himself of an absolute assignment of a previously pledged
life insurance policy issued upon the life of the debtor, which
assignment is intended to end the creditor-debtor relation-
ship, for any other purpose than enabling the creditor to
realize the cash surrender value of the policy.

It is a well-established principle that there must be an
insurable interest present at the inception of a policy of life
insurance. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, p. 309, sec. 353. In
considering the nature of an insurable interest, and the under-

13S es

lying reason why the absence of such an interest renders
the policy void, the United States supreme court speaking
through Mr. Justice Fretp declared in Warnock v. Davis
(1881), 104 U. S. 775, 779, 26 L. Ed. 924:

“But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground,
founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either
pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or
advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured.
Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party
taking the policy is directly interested in the early death
of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a
desire for the event. They are, therefore, independently of
any statute on the subject, condemned, as being against
public policy.”

It offends one’s sense of justice that a creditor should real-
ize more out of the proceeds of the policy than the principal
and interest due on the loan for which the policy was pledged
plus any expenditure of the creditor for premiums necessary
to protect his security. To uphold the result reached below
in the instant case would be to encourage creditors to bring
pressure upon necessitous debtors to convert the rights of the
creditor from that of pledgee to that of owner in order that
he might gamble upon the life of the insured in the hope of
realizing the difference between the amount due on the loan
and the face of the policy. In the instant case it is alleged
that such difference amounted to the huge sum of approxi-
mately $90,000.

While it must be conceded that the majority rule is that,
where an owner of a life insurance policy has an insurable
interest therein he may make a valid assignment of the
policy to a third party having no such insurable interest (29
Am. Jur., Insurance, p. 313, sec. 357), it clearly is in the
interest of public policy to engraft an exception onto such
tule to cover situations such as that which confronts us here.
A desirable exception and one that we are compelled to adopt

| ee] 139
SY

is that any purported absolute assignment by a debtor to a
creditor of a policy, which had previously been pledged as
security to the creditor is only valid between the immediate
parties to the extent of enabling the creditor to realize the
cash surrender value of the policy. If the creditor after re-
ceiving such absolute assignment and the creditor-debtor re-
lationship is terminated, continues to hold the policy for the
purpose of gambling upon the life of the insured, he becomes
a constructive trustee for the benefit of the estate of the
deceased of any proceeds received upon the death of the in-
sured, to the extent that such proceeds exceed the amount
that would have been due such assignee if the creditor-
debtor relationship had not been extinguished.

A precedent for enforcing such a constructive trust is
provided by the decision of the United States supreme court
in Warnock v. Davis, supra. In that case the insured as-
signed a policy upon his life to a trust association, which had
no insurable interest, in consideration for the association
agreeing to pay the premiums due on the policy, it being
agreed that upon his death the association was to retain
nine tenths of the proceeds received on the policy. The
insured died and the insurance company paid the amount of
the face of the policy to the association and it accounted for
one tenth thereof to the widow of the insured. The court
held that it was against public policy to assign a life insur-
ance policy to one not having an insurable interest in the
insured. Therefore, the agreement between the insured and
the association whereby the latter was to retain nine tenths
of the proceeds was void. The court then went on to state
(104 U. S. at p. 781):

“Tt [the agreement] is one which must be treated as
creating no legal right to the proceeds of the policy beyond
the sums advanced upon its security; and the courts will,
therefore, hold the recipient of the moneys beyond those

40 es

sums to account to the representatives of the deceased. It
was lawful for the association to advance to the assured the
sums payable to the insurance company on the policy as
they became due. It was, also, lawful for the assured to
assign the policy as security for their payment. The assign-
ment was only invalid as a transfer of the proceeds of the
policy beyond what was required to refund those sums, with
interest. To hold it valid for the whole proceeds would be
to sanction speculative risks on human life, and encourage
the evils for which wager policies are condemned.”

Likewise, in Wagner v. National Engraving Co. (1940),
307 Ill. App. 509, 512, 30 N. E. (2d) 750, the court de-
clared:

“.. . we also assume the correctness of plaintiff’s legal
theory, namely, that when insurance is payable to a bene-
ficiary who has no insurable interest and the insurer pays
the same without raising this defense, the beneficiary will
hold the amount so paid as trustee for the estate of the in-
sured. While the precise question has not been decided in
this state, so far as we are aware, the courts of many states
of other jurisdictions have so decided. [Citing Warnock v.
Davis, supra, and other cases.]”

For other cases imposing a constructive trust upon a
creditor in favor of the estate of the deceased insured as to
proceeds collected by the creditor upon the policy in excess
of the principal and interest of the loan, and other advances
made by the creditor, see Anno. 115 A. L. R. 741, 745.

Under the principle herein declared that an absolute assign-
ment by a debtor to a creditor of a life insurance policy
which had previously been pledged as security to a creditor
is only valid between the immediate parties to the extent of
enabling the creditor to realize the cash surrender value of
the policy, it is manifest that a cause of action is asserted in
the complaint. It is the rule that if a complaint states any
facts on which the plaintiff can recover, it must be held to
state a cause of action and will not be subject to demurrer.

Nelson v. La Crosse Trailer Corp. (1949), 254 Wis. 414,
37 N. W. (2d) 63; Local 1111 v. Allen-Bradley Co. (1949),
255 Wis. 613, 39 N. W. (2d) 740. If the facts relating to
the assignment of the policies as to such cause of action, are
established at the trial, the court will be obliged to hold as
a matter of law that Spencer and the other defendants who
are his assignees are constructive trustees for the benefit of
Albrent’s estate of that portion of the life insurance proceeds
which exceeds the amount which would have been owing on
Albrent’s indebtedness to Spencer if the absolute assignment
of the policies had not been taken. If any premiums had been
paid by the defendants to continue the policies in force, such
advances would also be deductible in determining the amount
subject to the constructive trust.

Since a valid cause of action under the principle just above
stated is asserted in the complaint, the order which is the
subject of the appeal, cannot stand. The order is to be re-
versed.

By the Court.—Order reversed.

Brown, J., dissents.

Srate, Respondent, vs. Joszrsperc, Appellant.

February 4—March 5, 1957.

I eee

For the appellant there was a brief by Backus & Waters,
attorneys, and Douglas J. McClelland of counsel, all of Mil-
waukee, and oral argument by Mr. McClelland.

For the respondent there was a brief by the Attorney
General and Robert J. Vergeront, assistant attorney general,
attorneys, and Martin J. Werra of Madison of counsel, and
oral argument by Mr. Vergeront.

SrEINLE, J. No bill of exceptions was settled. The case
is before this court upon the record. The findings are com-
plete and in detail, and cover all issues raised by the plead-
ings. The findings stand as verities in this court. Davis v.
Davis (1951), 259 Wis. 1, 47 N. W. (2d) 338. We are
limited to a consideration as to whether the pleadings and
the findings sustain the judgment. Town of Madison v. City
of Madison (1955), 269 Wis. 609, 70 N. W. (2d) 249.

In so far as material, the pleadings set forth allegations as
follows: The complaint in substance alleges that the defendant
is a resident of Milwaukee county; that upon his third at-
tempt to become licensed as a practitioner of medicine and
surgery in this state, a license to so practice was issued to
him on June 30, 1927, by the board; that annual certificates
of registration were issued to him for the years 1945 through
1952; that since 1925 and continuously thereafter to the
date of the commencement of this action, ch. 147, Stats., was
in effect; that said enactment related to requirements for
license to practice medicine and surgery, and made it an
absolute condition precedent to the issuance of such license
that the applicant be a bona fide graduate of a professional
school or college, and hold a diploma duly issued by such
school; that in order to induce the board to issue the license
and each of the annual registrations to him, the defendant
fraudulently and with intent to deceive represented to the
board in his application that he was a graduate of the Medical
School of the University of Vienna, Austria, and that he had

145

received the degree of Doctor of Medicine from said school,
and that he held a diploma evidencing such degree and his
graduation from that school; that in fact the defendant never
attended, nor graduated,.nor received a diploma from said
school; that the:document which he exhibited to the board
and which was relied upon by that body when it issued
the license and the annual certificates, was spurious and a
forgery; that the defendant left and did not return to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state until 1945; that he has
heen practicing medicine in Milwaukee since 1945.

In his answer the defendant denied that he had made the
false or fraudulent representations to the board as charged
in'the complaint. He asserted that he was a graduate of the
Medical School of the University of Vienna, and that he
had received a degree of Doctor of Medicine from said
school, and that a diploma evidencing such degree and gradu-
ation was issued to him. While admitting that he was away
from this state during the period from 1928 to 1945, he
asserted that such factor did not toll the statute of limitation
against him in his proceeding; that this action is barred by
sec. 330.19 (7), Stats. (six-year statute of limitations relat-
ing to an action for relief on the ground of fraud). He
alleged further that in 1928 the American Medical Associa-
tion’s “Register of Physicians,” a semiofficial record relied
upon by various boards of medical examiners including that
of Wisconsin, contained an announcement to the effect that
said association’s information did not substantiate fully the
defendant’s graduation ; that the Wisconsin board of medical
examiners was or should. have been aware of such notice,
and ought to have made a timely investigation to ascertain
whether fraud had been perpetrated by the defendant when
procuring the license in this state. He further averred that
since the Wisconsin board had certified his credentials to
the boards in Missouri and Illinois after 1928, and that
since twenty-four years had elapsed from the time when this

6 es

state ought to have instituted proceedings against him on
information in its possession or available to it, the plaintiff
is guilty of laches in not having pursued its remedies within
a reasonable time. In support of his defense of laches, the
defendant specifically alleged that: “(a) That he is of Jewish
faith by birth and left Austria in 1925 because his activity
in resisting anti-Semitism had brought him to the attention
of certain cells of the National Socialist movement, (b) that
in the year of 1939 the German army, under the domination
of the Nazi party, entered Austria and effected the so-called
‘Anschluss’ and thereupon and thereafter were in complete
control of all military and civil institutions including the
University of Vienna, its Medical School and its records,
(c) that defendant [he] is creditably informed and believes
that administrators of the extreme Nazi persuasion and
dedicated to a campaign of violent anti-Semitism were in
control of the university and all of its records from 1939
until termination of the war in 1945, (d) that thereafter
what records remained that were not destroyed were tam-
pered, irregular, and incomplete, (e) that nevertheless the
Wisconsin board of medical examiners, as the agent of the
state of Wisconsin, failed after the termination of the war
to make any further investigation until this proceeding was
initiated.”

In the answer, the defendant also asserted that in 1945 he
submitted to the Wisconsin board of medical examiners veri-
fied statements from Dr. Karl Beck, professor of the Medical
School of the University of Illinois, and Dr. Seth Hirsch,
professor in the Medical School of Columbia Univer-
sity, both of whom were postgraduate students at the hospital
of the University of Vienna and who had personal knowledge
of the graduation of the defendant, which original documents
were left in the possession of the Wisconsin state board of
medical examiners; that both of said professors are now

| 147

deceased, and the defendant is unable to obtain additional
comparable proof.

In its findings of fact the trial court determined that the
defendant resides in Milwaukee county and practices medi-
cine and surgery there. He applied to the board for a
license to practice medicine and surgery, and that a license
for such purpose was issued to him on June 20, 1927.
Annual certificates of registration were issued to him by the
board each year from 1945 through 1952. In connection
with his application for such license, the defendant falsely
and fraudulently represented to the board that he was a
graduate of and held the degree of Doctor of Medicine from
the Medical School of the University of Vienna, and that
he presented and exhibited to the board at the time, a docu-
ment purporting to be a medical diploma from said school
dated October 27, 1919. He had actually completed only
six of the 10 semesters of medical study required for gradua-
tion at the Medical School of the University of Vienna.
On October 27, 1919, he was a fourth-semester undergradu-
ate medical student at that university, and did not graduate
there on October 27, 1919, or at any other time. The
diploma purportedly issued to the defendant by the Medical
School of the University of Vienna bearing date of Octo-
ber 27, 1919, which was presented to the board in support
of his application for the license, was a forged document.
The defendant left this state in midyear 1928 and established
a residence outside the state. He returned to this state in
1945. He procured his license and the annual certificates of
registration by fraud.

The defendant contends (1) that the action is barred by
the statutes of limitation, or (2) that the state is barred by
laches from revoking the license and annulling the certificates
of registration. The plaintiff maintains that no statute of
limitations applies to an action to revoke a physician’s license
or, in the alternative, that if any limitation statute applies,

Ss
es

it is the ten-year statute, which however, was tolled during
the absence of the defendant from this state, and had not
run in his favor when the action was commenced. The
plaintiff also submits that the defense of laches does not
apply to a situation in which the license was obtained by
fraud.

In State v. Schaeffer (1906), 129 Wis. 459, 109 N. W.
522, this court determined that the civil action brought by
the state to revoke a certificate of registration issued by its
board of medical examiners to the defendant on the basis
of his fraudulent representations, was not barred by any
general statute of limitation. Sec. 4229, Stats. 1905, was in
effect when that action was commenced. It read in part:

“Actions By state. A civil action to recover a penalty
or forfeiture accruing wholly or in part to the state must be
commenced within six years after the cause of action therefor
has accrued.

“Any action or proceeding begun by the attorney general
under the provisions of section 1214 of the statutes of 1898,
as amended by chapter 315 of the Laws of 1903, for the for-
feiture of the rights, privileges, and franchises of any rail-
road company or any person or persons operating a railroad
within this state must be commenced within six years after
such action or proceeding accrued.

“Any other action in favor of the state, whether created
by statute or otherwise, must be commenced within ten
years after the cause of action therefor has accrued.

“No cause of action in favor of the state for relief on the
ground of fraud, whether in equity or at law, shall be deemed
to have accrued until the discovery on the part of the state
of the facts constituting the fraud.”

It is to be noted that in State v. Schaeffer, supra, counsel
for the state argued that the ten-year statute of limitation
applied. Notwithstanding the statute and the position of the
state in the cause, Mr. Chief Justice Cassopay, speaking for
the court, said (p. 467) :

“In the case at bar defendant received the certificate of
registration from the board on the supposition that he was
a graduate from each of the institutions mentioned, and so,
of course, was possessed of the requisite learning, skill,
ability, and character to practice medicine or surgery. That
certificate gave to the defendant the special privilege of
practicing such profession, and he is still enjoying such
privilege. The complaint now is that he procured such
certificate by fraud, perjury, and misrepresentation, and
hence that the same should be revoked and annulled in order
to protect the public from incompetency and unfitness. The
question involved concerns not only the defendant but also
the public, and in the interest of all should be tried and
determined by an impartial tribunal.

“As indicated, this is not an action to enforce a penalty or
forfeiture, but a civil action to set aside a certificate of regis-
tration for the reasons stated. We perceive no ground for
the claim that the action is barred by the two years’ statute
of limitation, or the three years’ statute of limitation, or any
other statute of limitation.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 330.28, Stats. 1927, in part provided:

“A civil action to recover a penalty or forfeiture accruing
wholly or in part to the state must be commenced within six
years after the cause of action therefor has accrued. Any
forfeiture action or proceeding begun by the attorney general
under the provisions of section 76.04 must be commenced
within six years after such action or proceeding accrued.
Any other action in favor of the state, whether created by
statute or otherwise, must be commenced within ten years
after the cause of actions therefor has accrued. No cause of
action in favor of the state for relief on the ground of fraud,
whether in equity or at law, shall be deemed to have accrued
until the discovery on the part of the state of the facts con-
stituting the fraud.”

In 1931, sec. 330.28, Stats. 1927, was repealed and sec.
330.18 was enacted. Sec. 330.18 was in existence when the
instant action was begun. It reads in part:

150

“Within ten years: (6) Any action in favor of the
state when no other limitation is prescribed in this chapter.
No cause of action in favor of the state for relief on the
ground of fraud shall be deemed to have accrued until dis-
covery on the part of the state of the facts constituting the
fraud.”

Sec. 330.19, Stats., which was in effect when this action
was brought, reads in part:

“Within six years: (7) An action for relief on the
ground of fraud. The cause of action in such case is not
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved
party, of the facts constituting the fraud.”

For purposes under consideration there is no substantial
distinction between the general statutes of limitation (as
herein set forth), which were in effect when the instant
action was commenced, and the general limitation statute
which was effective when State v. Schaeffer was decided.
There is no special provision in the statutes barring actions
of this nature within any prescribed time. We are aware
of no valid reason for departing from the principle enunciated
in State v. Schaeffer to the effect that the general statutes of
limitation do not apply to actions brought for the revocation
of a physician’s license procured through fraud.

In overruling the demurrer, Hon. Orro H. BREDENBACE
determined that if any statute of limitation applied to the
instant situation, it was the ten-year statute as provided in
sec. 330.18, Stats. Judge Brewrnsac was of the view that
since the defendant had been absent from the state from 1928
until 1945, the statute was tolled during such period: of
absence under sec. 330.30, which treats with limitation when
a person is out of the state. In the trial of the action upon
its merits, Judge Swrertrx determined that the general
statutes of limitation were not applicable to an action of this
kind. We concur in such view. At 34 Am. Jur., Limitation
of Actions, p. 307, sec. 393, it is said: “The general principles

as to the immunity of the Sovereign from laches and statutes
of limitation, which arose in England, have been applied
in reference to the states of the American Union. Unless the
statute provides to the contrary, . . . statutes of limitation
do not apply to a state when suing in its sovereign capacity.”
‘At 53 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions, p. 940, sec. 15, 1, it
is said that “Unless it is expressly or by necessary implica-
tion provided otherwise, statutes of limitation do not run
against the United States or a state in its sovereign or gov-
ernmental capacity and in respect of public rights.” In the
instant matter the state has brought the action in its sover-
eign capacity and for the interest of the public. It has been
held that in asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign
government, a state is not bound by general statutes of limi-
tation unless the legislature has clearly manifested its in-
tention that the state be so bound. See United States v.
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. (1886), 118 U. S. 120, 6
Sup. Ct. 1006, 30 L. Ed. 81; United States v. Bartron (D.C.
1929), 35 Fed. (2d) 765; United States v. Miller (8th
Cir. 1928), 28 Fed. (2d) 846, 61 A. L. R. 405. It is
considered that the statutes of limitation which were in
effect when this action was commenced, are not applicable
here for the reason that the same do not manifest a legisla-
tive intention that the state be so bound.

The defendant’s contentions that the state is barred by
laches from revoking the license and annulling the certificates
of registration, is predicated upon the claim that the board
failed to take timely action in commencing its proceeding for
revocation after having had notice in 1927 of the question-
ability of the defendant’s credentials. The defendant submits
that the board made its own inquiry to determine his status;
that it apparently was satisfied with his credentials; that he
passed the board’s examination; that his credentials were
certified by the board to the authorities in Missouri and
Illinois, that in 1945 he requested the board to clarify his

position as a physician, and after a hearing, the board
permitted him to continue in the practice. He argues that
had a license been denied to him in 1927, or had the license
been timely revoked thereafter, he could then have trans-
ferred his six semesters of credit (found by the court to have
been acquired at the University of Vienna) to a medical
school in this country, where he may well have completed
the required schooling to enable him to satisfy the state as
to matters of. graduation and adequate credentials. Undue
hardship is claimed by the defendant because of his inability
to have presented at the trial the testimony of three doctors
who were acquainted with his status, and who have died since
1927. He points out that twenty-six years elapsed between
the time of the issuance of his license and the commence-
ment of this action; that witnesses had died, moved, or were
otherwise lost track of; that chaotic events in Europe during
the period 1939-1945 adversely affected his chances of trac-
ing witnesses, documents, and facts to support his position.
He maintains that in view of the fact that he had satisfacto~
rily passed the board’s examination before a license was is-
sued to him, the public was adequately protected in relation to
his functioning as a practitioner of medicine, and that the
permission extended to him by the board in 1945 to continue
in the practice, clearly indicates that the board was not of
a mind that the public was endangered by virtue of his prac-
tice, or that medical ethics were being violated by him.

In ruling that the doctrine of laches was not applicable to
the situation, the trial court noted that while the board in
1927 referred the matter of the defendant’s credentials to the
American Medical Association, and while that association
in turn communicated with the University of Vienna, it does
not appear of record that said association advised the board
of the result of its inquiry. The defendant left Wisconsin
in 1928 and did not return until 1945. The trial court
observed that the board took no action in 1945 to revoke

SS 153
Lo

the defendant’s license for the reason, undoubtedly, that the
evidence then before it did not justify the commencement
of proceedings. The court’s decision, however, was based on
the principle that laches on the part of the government in
bringing suit is not to be a defense in the case of a claim
which is founded on a sovereign right. The court held that
in this instance the state was acting in its sovereign capacity
for the protection of the public, and that in a matter of this
kind no omission of duty on the part of its officers or agents
is imputed to the state. We are constrained to conclude that
such determination was correct.

In support of his contention that the doctrine of laches
is applicable to a situation of this kind, the defendant relies
on Schireson v. Shafer (1946), 354 Pa. 458, 47 Atl. (2d)
665, and Pennsylvania State Board v. Schireson (1948), 360
Pa. 129, 61 Atl. (2d) 343. True, those cases recognize that
laches may apply to actions brought for the revocation of
physicians’ licenses obtained through fraud. In Schireson v.
Shafer it was said that laches is not to be imputed by the
mere passage of time, but must be determined after all of the
circumstances of the case are developed. However, in Eclec-
tic State Medical Board v. Beatty (1941), 203 Ark. 294,
156 S. W. (2d) 246, the court held that the doctrine of
laches was not applicable to a situation in which the license
was obtained through fraud. There, a physician sought to
enjoin the medical-licensing board from conducting a hearing
on a complaint to determine whether the license of the
physician should be revoked on the ground that he falsely
represented that he attended a certain medical college, and
that his diploma was illegally and fraudulently obtained;
and that his license had been obtained by fraud and deception.
The physician partly grounded his action on alleged laches
on the part of the board. The court said (p. 299) : _

“The appellee further contends that even if the law under
which this proceeding was invoked is not void for un-

P|

56

certainty, but is valid, and even if we should hold that the
charges in the complaint to ‘revoke his license were suffi-
ciently definite and constituted grounds, for revoking his
license, still this case should be affirmed for the reason that
the appellant is estopped by laches, by waiting nine or ten
years to start proceedings to revoke his license on grounds
which, if they existed at all, existed at the time he was
licensed.

“We cannot agree with the appellee in this contention.
A part of the allegations of the complaint against the appellee
seeking to revoke his license was that his diploma was
illegally and fraudulently obtained, and also that the license
or certificate which was issued to him by the Arkansas board
was obtained by fraud and deception. Since it is claimed
that the appellee was guilty of fraud not only in obtaining
his diploma, but also in obtaining his license to practice in
the state of Arkansas, we think that the appellant would have
the right to proceed after the fraud, if any, had been dis-
covered.

“In the case of State Board of Health v. Roy, 22 R. 1.
538, 48 Atl. 802, [803], the court held that where one
obtains a license from a state medical board by false or
fraudulent representations, this is a continuing offense. Every
time such person undertakes to practice under his license
he keeps up and continues the fraud initiated when he ob-
tained by false representations his pretended authority to
practice.

“In the case of Cunningham v. State, [Tex. Civ. App.],
79S. W. (2d) 180, [181], the court said: ‘The question
was whether it (the license) had been fraudulently obtained,
and the allegation that it was obtained by a series of fraudu-
lent acts, continuing from the present time back to the
original act, was sufficient. A privilege such as this, con-
ceived in fraud and procured by fraud, cannot be raised,
by continued fraudulent devices, to the dignity of a vested
right, and the state may properly invoke the aid of the courts
in withdrawing the privilege at any time the fraud is un-
covered.’ ”

At 30 C. J. S., Equity, p. 526, sec. 114, it is said:

“The doctrine of laches cannot be applied against public
rights. While the contrary has been held, by the weight of

i

authority the defense of laches is not available against the
government, state or national, in a suit by it to enforce a
public right or to protect a public interest, or, as the rule is
sometimes expressed, the laches of its officers or agents will
not be imputed to the government. This rule applies, how-
ever, only to suits brought by the government in its sovereign
capacity to enforce or to protect a public or governmental
right; if it sues for the use and benefit of an individual, or
for the enforcement or the protection of a private and pro-
prietary right rather than a public or governmental right,
laches is pleadable against it the same as against an in-
dividual.”

In 19 Am. Jur., Equity, p. 342, sec. 495, it is declared
that:

“Laches on the part of the government in bringing suit is
said not to be a defense in the case of a claim which is
founded on sovereign right. It is also observed that the
laches of the officers of the government cannot be set up
as a defense to a claim which is made by the government.”

Since this action was brought by the state in its sovereign
capacity to protect a public right, we are constrained to hold
that the doctrine of laches was not applicable to the situation
litigated therein.

The judgment of the trial court is sustained by the plead-
ings and the findings.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Farrcuitp, J., took no part.

Frankovis, Respondent, vs. Ktuc & SmirH Company
and another, Appellants.*

February 4—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

159

For the appellants there were briefs by Quarles, Spence &
Quarles, attorneys, and Edmund W. Powell of counsel, all
of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Powell.

For the respondent there was a brief by Eisenberg &
Kletzke of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Sidney M.
Eisenberg.

Wincert, J. Appellants contend that material findings of
the jury are without support in the evidence and that de-
fendants were therefore entitled to a directed verdict and
dismissal of the complaint. In the alternative they assert
errors requiring a new trial.

‘1. It is first argued that there is no evidence to support
the finding that the clamp end of the angle iron was not ade-
quately tightened; and reliance is placed on evidence that
the sole purpose of the angle irons was to support the weight
of light fixtures suspended from them vertically, and not to
resist lateral pressures.

There was other evidence which the jury might believe,
however, that the electrical subcontractor’s employees who
installed the angle irons were instructed to fasten the clamps
as absolutely tight as possible; that if the clamps had been
properly tightened they would have been very tight, tight
enough so that if somebody would touch the angle iron and
apply some weight behind it it would not fall down. As to
the looseness of the particular clamp, there was evidence
that while plaintiff braced himself against the angle iron, he

ms
Td

did not “hang” his weight on it; that it slipped off the beam
and fell to the floor when he put pressure on it; and that none
of the other angle irons on that side was tight, but all were
“absolutely loose.”

Tn the light of this and other testimony, we think the ques-
tion was for the jury, and that the trial court properly re-
fused to disturb its finding.

2. Appellants next contend that there was no evidence to
support the finding that the defendants ought, in the exercise
or ordinary care, to have reasonably known of the unsafe
condition in time to have remedied it or notified the plaintiff.
There was no evidence that any representative of either de-
fendant had actual knowledge of the defect; and there was
testimony that the electrical subcontractor, Uihlein, was sup-
posed to inspect the electrical installations, that the defend-
ants made only spot checks, inspecting here and there but
not inspecting every bolt or piece, that there are hundreds
of angle irons and some of them were thus spot-checked, that
spot checking is the practice of the industry, and it is im-
practical to inspect and test every piece that goes into a
building.

On the other hand, there was testimony from which the
jury could believe that installations in the particular area
had ostensibly been completed before Friday, that the paint-
ers were instructed by defendants’ representative to paint
them on Saturday and Sunday (the accident occurred on
Sunday), that each of the defendants maintained a staff of
inspectors to inspect work, that on the particular Sunday
morning all the clamps on “our side” were absolutely loose—
none was tight, and that painters working aloft often hold
or lean on things like the angle iron if they appear safe, to
help them reach difficult places.

While the case is a close one, we cannot say it was error
to let the jury’s finding stand, having in mind the statutory
duty placed upon the defendants to “adopt and use methods

a | 161
PO

and processes reasonably adequate to render such employ-
ment and places of employment safe” for frequenters, and to
do “every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the

. safety . . . of such employees and frequenters.” (Sec.
101.06, Stats. 1949.) Plaintiff, an employee of a subcontrac-
tor, was a frequenter within the protection of the statutes.
Williams v. International Oil Co. 267 Wis. 227, 229, 64
N. W. (2d) 817. The jury may reasonably have considered
that before sending men to paint in such a place, defendants
should have taken more precautions to see that things were
as they should have been and seemed to be, and that as it
was they virtually led plaintiff into a trap.

The most-persuasive precedent cited for appellants’ con-
tentions on this point is Williams v. International Oil Co.
267 Wis. 227, 64 N. W. (2d) 817, where it was held that a
painter who fell from a ladder leaning against a light pole
which he was painting when the pole broke under the pres-
sure of his weight, could not recover under the safe-place
statute from the owner of the premises. There, however,
there was no evidence that the owner had any notice, actual
or constructive, of any defect in the pole or indeed that it
was defective for the purpose for which it was intended;
and there was no evidence that the owner had any reason to
believe that the plaintiff would lean against it on a ladder.
We think the facts of the present case serve to distinguish it
adequately from the Williams decision and the others cited
by appellants.

3. It is next urged that plaintiff’s negligence was at least
equal to that of defendants as a matter of law. There was
evidence, however, which if believed by the jury, would war-
rant the conclusion that the angle-iron work was supposed
to be complete, that painters were not ordinarily sent in to
paint such installations until they were completed, that the
clamps if properly installed would be very tight, that the
particular clamp appeared to be tight and did not seem loose

when plaintiff tested it with his hand, that there was no way
to get the scaffold closer to the angle iron, that in such situ-
ations it is customary among painters to reach out and hold
onto things if in their judgment they can do so safely; and
that defendants ordered the painters to paint in the area, and
hence knew they would be working up among the angle irons.

Comparison of negligence is a matter peculiarly for the
jury, and here, viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff as we must, we cannot say that his negli-
gence was so flagrant, or the jury’s apportionment of
negligence so wholly without support, that the verdict must
be set aside.

4, Nevertheless there must be a new trial. The first ques-
tion submitted to the jury was as follows:

“At the time and place and under existing circumstances,
was the place where the plaintiff was working as free from .

danger to frequenters as the nature thereof would reasonably
permit in respect to the tightness or lack of tightness with
which the clamp end of the angle iron in question was at-
tached to the I beam?”

Plaintiff’s case required a “No” answer, while the answer
“Yes” would necessarily result in judgment for the defend-
ants.

The jury were instructed however, that “burden of proof”
meant the duty resting on the party having the affirmative
of the issue to convince the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence and to a reasonable certainty of the truth of that
party’s contention; and again, further on, that before any
juror can vote to answer “Yes” to any question, his mind
should be satisfied by the greater weight or convincing power
of the evidence to a reasonable certainty that the answer
should be “Yes.” These instructions put the burden 6n de-
fendants to convince the jury that the first and crucial ques-
tion should be answered in their favor “Yes,” and thus

instructed the jury to answer it favorably to plaintiff unless
satisfied to the contrary to a reasonable certainty. While
the confusion of affirmative and negative was undoubtedly
inadvertent, it was nonetheless error to place the burden of
proof on the defendants with respect to the first and basic
question in the case.

After giving those instructions and then reading the ques-
tion to the jury, the court properly charged that the burden
of proof was on the plaintiff to satisfy them by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, to a reasonable certainty, that the
question should be answered “No,” and that if not so satis-
fied, they should answer it “Yes.”

Weare unable to say that this correct instruction overcame
the vice of the two earlier ones which erroneously placed the
burden of proof on the defendants, or that the error was not
prejudicial.

“An erroneous instruction on a given subject is not cured
by the fact that the law is correctly stated elsewhere, for it
cannot be known whether the jury have been guided by the
correct rule or by the erroneous one.” Ackley v. Farmers
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 273 Wis. 422, 425, 78 N. W.
(2d) 744.

5. The special verdict is fatally defective. Having found
plaintiff negligent both with respect to the manner in which
he used the angle iron and the position which he was in just
prior to falling, the jury found that only the negligence with
respect to position was an efficient cause of the injury. There
is a patent inconsistency between the finding that plaintiff’s
negligence in the manner in which he used the angle iron
was not a cause of his injury, and the earlier finding that the
unsafe condition of the premises with respect to the tightness
or lack of tightness of the clamp was a cause of the injury.
There is no evidence that anything but plaintiff’s pressure
on the angle iron caused it to slip. If failure to have the
clamp sufficiently tight was a cause of the accident, then

1.

plaintiff's negligence as to the manner in which he used the
angle iron (putting lateral pressure on it) must necessarily
have also been a cause of the accident. The loose clamp could
not have caused any injury to plaintiff except as he put pres- -
sure on it in using it. On the other hand, if the only cause
of plaintiff's fall attributable to him was his unbalanced posi-
tion then plaintiff’s case must fail entirely, since his position,
as contrasted with his use of the angle iron, was unrelated to
the loose clamp.

This defect in the special verdict may have affected the ap-
portionment of negligence, and taken with the misleading
instruction referred to under the previous heading, requires
that a new trial be granted.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, with directions to
grant a new trial.

The following memorandum was filed May 7, 1957:

PER curIAM (on motion for rehearing). Appellants’
motion for rehearing is denied with $25 costs. Respondent’s
motion for rehearing is denied without costs. The mandate
is amended to read:

“Judgment reversed, with directions to grant a new y trial
Costs in this court shall abide the result of the new trial.” _

Perers, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Appellants, vs.
ZIMMERMAN, Respondent.

February 4—March 5, 1957.

168

For the appellants there were briefs by Reiland & Schmidt
of Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by Donald E.
Reiland.

For the respondent there was a brief by Graves, Chambers
& Nash of Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by Law-
rence R. Nash.

Farrcwitp, J. Respondent requests a review of the
court’s denial of judgment in his favor notwithstanding the
verdict and its denial of his motion to amend the verdict and
grant judgment thereon as amended. Respondent’s posi-
tion is that there was no proof of any causal connection be-
tween the jolt which occurred when Gerald was riding on
the combine and the Perthes disease which he later suffered.
There is no dispute but that Gerald did receive a blow while
riding on the combine and there is also no dispute as to his
later being afflicted with Perthes disease and suffering sub-
stantial pain and disability. The testimony of Dr. Mittelstadt

a ae 169

tends to support the proposition that the injury caused the
disease while the testimony of Dr. Mason and Dr. Jones
tends to refute that proposition. Dr. Mittelstadt has osteo-
pathic training and postgraduate study. He is licensed to
practice medicine and surgery and had practiced in Marsh-
field for seventeen years at the time of the trial. He had
treated cases of Perthes disease and testified that during
sixteen years he had at least two or three cases all the time.
He testified that Perthes disease is a breakdown of the head
of the femur in the hip joint; that it usually occurs only in
growing children between the ages of two and fifteen years;
that “I have never seen a case of Perthes disease that wasn’t
due to injury;” that in his own opinion the Perthes disease
suffered by Gerald was due to injury; that assuming that the
injury on July 30th was the only injury Gerald sustained
that summer, such injury caused Gerald’s condition. Dr.
Mittelstadt acknowledged that he knew that in the medical
profession there is a difference of opinion to a certain extent
as to what causes Perthes disease.

Dr. Mason is a doctor of medicine specializing in traumat-
ic and orthopedic surgery, practicing at Marshfield. He
testified that “My opinion is that no single injury can pro-
duce Perthes disease;” that the vast majority of cases occur
in children between three and ten. The disease occurs main-
ly in males and there are known cases of inherited tendencies
to the disease; that in the vast majority of the cases there
is no history of antecedent injury; that to date there is no
known cause of this condition; that from his experience it
would be almost impossible to explain the stages of the dis-
ease over a period of years on the basis of one single blow
or injury; that because there is no good answer to the ques-
tion as to the cause of Perthes disease the possibility that in-
jury can be the cause has to be considered. When asked
whether there are many medical authorities that do feel that

0

injury is the cause and contributing factor, he testified, “I
would say there are not many.”

Dr. Jones is a doctor of medicine specializing in traumatic
surgery. He has practiced since 1917 and has taught traumat-
ic surgery at the University of Wisconsin Medical School
for about ten years. He testified that Perthes disease is not
due to trauma; that he has treated cases of it where there
is no history of trauma; that the disease which is called
Perthes disease in the hip joint may occur wherever there is
a growing line in bone; that it is frequently bilateral; some-
times runs in families; that metabolic disturbances may be a
contributing cause and that the disease might be due to
disarrangements in ductless glands. When asked whether
a majority of authors on the subject do consider trauma as a
probable originating factor, he testified that he did not think
that the majority believed that. When asked if a lot of the
authors do believe that a severe blow is the most likely cause,
he testified, “There is a theory of trauma connected with
Perthes disease. Some doctors feel as though it is due to
trauma.” There is here a difference of opinion between
qualified experts, and the jury has resolved the issue. It
follows that the court committed no error in refusing to make
a finding on this issue as a matter of law.

The court’s ordér for a new trial cannot be given effect as
being in the interest of justice because the reasons that
prompted the court to make such order are not set forth in
detail therein. The detailed statement of reasons is required
by sec. 270.49 (2), Stats. Dowd v. Palmer, 245 Wis. 593,
596, 15 N. W. (2d) 809; Buetow v. Hietpas, 253 Wis. 64,
33. N. W. (2d) 201; Bradle v. Juuti, 257 Wis. 523, 44
N. W. (2d) 242. Even if sufficient reasons were stated in
a memorandum decision, there must be incorporation into
the order by a specific reference before there is compliance
with the statute. Guptill v. Roemer, 269 Wis. 12, on rehear-
ing, page 20a, 68 N. W. (2d) 579, 69 N. W. (2d) 571.

Ce) v7
——*+*

The order for a new trial was also based on the inconsist-
ency of two answers, one of which found that Zimmerman’s
negligence in permitting Gerald to ride was a cause of the
accident and Leon’s negligence in the same respect was not
a cause. We do not view these answers as inconsistent. It
is quite reasonable to find that the father’s negligence was not
a cause of the accident in the afternoon. Both men were
exercising some degree of control over the situation in the
morning, but the jury could properly and evidently did con-
sider that the father’s negligence was not operative in the
afternoon when the uncle had complete control.

The other ground assigned for a new trial was that the
answers to the special damage questions were not supported
by the evidence. In answer to question 7A, hospital, doctor,
and medical expenses to date were found to be $1,000. Coun-
sel had agreed that hospital and doctor bills totaled $812.50.
There was also testimony of repeated purchases of medicines.
Except, however, for a receipt for $6.50, the proof of the
cost of medicine was indefinite.

In answer to question 7B, future medical expenses were
found to be $150. The only supporting testimony was that
of Dr. Mittelstadt. He estimated future expenses as between
$75 and $100, including medication, but excluding taking
and reviewing X rays.

We are satisfied in view of the evidence that there was
some indefinite amount of expense for medicine over and
above $819 and in view of the fact that Dr. Mittelstadt’s
estimate did include some indefinite amount of expense for
future X rays, the jury’s action in giving answers which
were somewhat in excess of the amounts proved was not
evidence of perversity. “To be such a [perverse] verdict,
there must be something to warrant a finding that considera-
tions ulterior to a reasonably fair application of the judgment
of the jury to the evidence, under the instruction by the court,

2 rs
PC

have controlled the jury.” Brown v. Montgomery Ward &
Co. 221 Wis. 628, 631; 267 N. W. 292. Clearly the evidence
would support $819 as the answer to question 7A and $100
as the answer to 7B. In view of the relatively slight differ-
ence between these and the highest figures that could possibly
be sustained the matter should be disposed of by changing
the answers to these sums.

Respondent asserts that the court should not have found
him negligent as to speed because in fact the tractor was
moving slowly. It is clear, however, from the testimony of
the respondent himself that even this slow speed was too
fast under the circumstances. Respondent indicated that if
he had had the rut in mind, the safety both of his equipment
and of Gerald would have required that the speed be reduced.

Respondent also claims that the court erred in the manner
in which he submitted the issue as to the causal relation
between the injury and Gerald’s Perthes disease. Respondent
requested submission of a direct question whether the Perthes
disease was caused by the injury. The court did not submit
that question separately but considered that the jury would
necessarily answer that question in answering the three
questions as to the amount of damages resulting from the
accident. The court did instruct the jury with reference to
the damage questions that before it could include the damages
suffered as a result of the Perthes disease the burden of
proof was upon plaintiffs to show that the disease was caused
by an injury that Gerald sustained while riding on the com-
bine; that the jury must be satisfied to a reasonable certainty
not only that an injury may cause Perthes disease but that
the injury sustained by Gerald did in fact cause and produce
the disease before the damages resulting from such disease
could be included in the answers. There was no error in
submitting the issue as to the causal relationship between the
accident and the disease as an incident to the damage ques-
tion, clear instructions having been given as above outlined.

|| ee 173

By the Court——Order reversed, cause remanded with in-
structions to change the answers on special damages as
prescribed in the opinion and to enter judgment in favor of
plaintiffs upon the verdict as so amended.

Twisz, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. Astna Casuatty &
Surety Company and others, Defendants: Mitwav-
KEE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Company, Defendant
and Respondent.*

February 4—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

7 ee

For the appellant there was a brief by Reiland & Schmidt
of Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by Donald E.
Reiland.

For the respondent there was a brief by Graves, Chambers
& Nash of Wisconsin Rapids, and oral argument by Lloyd
L. Chambers.

Martin, C. J. The position of the trial court was:

“As you gentlemen all know that at the close of the testi-
mony the defendant, Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, moved the court for a directed verdict dismissing the
complaint as to the Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Com-
pany with costs. Also as you know at that time I was of
the opinion that that motion should have been granted be-
cause the defendant, Waite, was guilty of gross negligence
as a matter of law. That at the request of counsel I let the
matter proceed to a conclusion so the jury could render their
verdict and the verdict could be made a part of this record
in the event there were further proceedings. I have not
changed my mind at all about the matter. It is my opinion
that the defendant, Waite, was guilty of gross negligence as
a matter of law. After a good deal of consideration and study
that is still my opinion.”

To constitute gross negligence there must be either a wil-
ful intent to injure, or that reckless or wanton disregard of
the rights and safety of another or his property, and that
willingness to inflict injury, which the law deems equivalent
to an intent to injure. Bentson v. Brown (1925), 186 Wis.
629, 633, 203 N. W. 380, 38 A. L. R. 1417.

It has been held that the driving of a car by one intoxi-
cated fully responds to all of the elements necessary to con-
stitute gross negligence. Tomasik v. Lanferman (1931),
206 Wis. 94, 238 N. W. 857, and much is made in this case
of Waite’s beer drinking during most of the previous after-
noon and evening. But there is no evidence that Waite was
intoxicated or that his drinking had anything to do with his

operation of the automobile. Wettstein’s police report noted
“odor of liquor from occupants” of the Waite car but stated
he did not know whether Waite’s ability to drive was im-
paired; and no alcohol tests were made. Wettstein testified
that on the morning after the accident he saw Waite at the
hospital and had the following conversation with him:

“T said, what was the trouble, why were you driving so
fast. He said I don’t know, I was just mad. I said, what
were you mad about and he said, I don’t know, just mad.”

It was Waite’s testimony that as he approached the city
limits he drove about 40 miles per hour, the permissible
speed in that area; that his speed increased to 50 or 55 miles
per hour and he noticed his accelerator was stuck; he tried
to pull it up by hooking his foot under it, which he had done
successfully on previous occasions when it stuck. He testified
that he saw no reason to disengage the clutch because he
thought he had a clear road ahead.

The motor of the police car was running during the time
it was parked in front of the Weigel car, and Wayne Keunt-
jes, Weigel’s passenger, testified that the taillight on the
police car “wasn’t too bright because it was pretty cold that
night and the exhaust from the car was a kind of fog around
there.”

Calvin Powell testified that he approached Weigel and the
police car from the west before the accident and did not see
any taillights on the squad car; that at a distance of a block
or less he saw the exhaust, then noticed the cars, and had to
swerve out to avoid the squad car.

The evidence as a whole was susceptible of conflicting
inferences and thus the question of gross negligence was for
the jury. It was one o’clock in the morning; there was little
if any traffic; Waite was traveling on his own side of the
street; and the jury was entitled to infer that his failure to
see and avoid the police car was due to camouflage of the

150
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exhaust and his preoccupation with the accelerator rather
than a reckless and wanton disregard of the safety of others.
So far as the officer’s negligence is concerned, this too
was for the jury. Thé evidence is undisputed that the police
car was parked at an angle in the street with its rear extend-
ing into the lane of eastbound traffic. No emergency existed
which required the officer to park in that position; he merely
wished to get out and warn Weigel about failure to dim his
lights. Wettstein’s only explanation for his failure to use the
red dome light was that he did not consider it necessary
“When we weren’t blocking any line of traffic or obstructing
any lane of traffic.” Yet by his own measurements and
estimates the rear of the patrol car occupied a considerable
portion of the eastbound traffic lane. Weigel testified that
during the time the police car-was parked there he saw two
or three other cars coming from the west that “had to cut
out to avoid hitting the squad car,” and Keuntjes testified
to the same fact. Waite’s car struck that part of the police
car which extended into the eastbound lane; Weigel’s car,
parked parallel to the curb, was not involved. In parking as
he did, Wettstein was violating a safety statute, and he failed
to give any warning that the police car was illegally parked.
Under the circumstances the jury could properly conclude
that its position on the road was a substantial factor in caus-
ing the accident and appellant’s injuries.
. The jury apportioned the negligence 50 per cent to Waite
and 50 per cent to Wettstein. It was the trial court’s view
that the equal apportionment indicated perversity, but that
view was based on its opinion that Waite was guilty of gross
negligence. If the trial court had been correct in its opinion
that the evidence required a finding of gross negligence on
Waite’s part, we could agree that the findings on apportion-
‘mént were perverse. But, as stated above, the evidence did
not require a finding of gross negligence. It is not for us
‘to say that the ordinary negligence of Waite exceeded that

a ee 181
Pe

of Wettstein. The comparison was for the jury and, upon
the evidence we have referred to, the jury was entitled to
find that Waite and Wettstein contributed equally to the
appellant’s injuries.

It is also argued by the respondent that a covenant not to
sue given by appellant to Waite and his insurer operates to
release Wettstein and his insurer. This is a third-party
action. The jury found that the joint negligence of Waite
and Wettstein caused appellant’s injuries. Both are liable.
This and other arguments of the respondent are based on
the premise that Waite was grossly negligent. Having deter-
mined that the jury findings on negligence must stand, no
discussion of such arguments is necessary.

With respect to the award of damages, however, it is our
considered opinion that $16,500 is excessive. The evidence
shows that appellant received numerous lacerations to the
face and head which necessitated 66 stitches, and had four
teeth knocked out, requiring surgery and a denture. He also
sustained a small fracture of an anklebone which his doctor
testified resulted in “possibly three per cent” disability in
the right ankle. He was hospitalized for less than two weeks.

Appellant was not employed at the time of the accident.
He testified he lost thirteen weeks of G. I. unemployment
compensation at $26 a week, or $338, and since then has
been employed; that since the accident he engaged in all of
the activities and sports which he previously engaged in, with
the exception of playing basketball. He testified that if he
is on his feet all day doing heavy work, his ankle is painful
when he walks, but that he had gone hunting and fishing
during the summer and fall following the accident, sometimes
walking through the woods for most of a day.

With respect to the injuries to the face, the doctor testi-
fied he felt he got a very good result from the suturing and
that the scars would fade more as time went on and become
the color of the skin; that plastic surgery might possibly im-

182

prove appellant’s appearance but that he would not recom-
mend it. There is no evidence that the scarring amounted to
such disfigurement that it would impair his enjoyment of
life or ability to earn a living.

Considering the loss of $338 in unemployment compensa-
tion, the permanent denture to replace four teeth, and the
slight disability in the ankle which interfers with none of ap-
pellant’s activities except playing basketball, it is obvious
that all but a comparatively small amount of the award was
meant to compensate him for pain, suffering, and scars. In
our opinion, $7,000 is the least amount that a jury properly
instructed would probably award upon the facts shown. The
trial court is instructed to give appellant the option of ac-
cepting, within twenty days after receipt of the remittitur,
$7,000 plus $723.21 hospital and medical expenses, or a new
trial on the question of damages only.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict on the negli-
gence questions and for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.

DonowveE and others, Appellants, vs. VitLacz or Fox
. Point, Respondent.*

February 4—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

| ee] 183

For the appellants there was a brief by Eisenberg &
Kletzke of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Sydney M.
Eisenberg.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument
by Fraley N. Weidner, village attorney.

Broaproot, J. Upon this appeal three issues are pre-
sented. The first matter to be determined is whether or

es

not the Donohue proceedings were valid. From the finding
of the trial court and from the record it appears that Dono-
hue posted eight notices of intention to circulate annexation
petitions on November 19, 1954. It was discovered that one
of said notices was posted in the village of Fox Point rather
than in the town of Milwaukee. Thereafter, and on Novem-
ber 22, 1954, plaintiff Freyer posted two additional notices
thereof in the town of Milwaukee.

Both proceedings contemplated annexation to a village.
Sec. 61.185, Stats., provides that sec. 62.07, covering an-
nexation procedure to cities shall govern in the case of
villages. By sec, 62.07 the first statutory requirement is that
a notice of intention to circulate an annexation petition be
posted in at least eight public places in the town in which
the area proposed to be annexed is located. Thereafter the
petition for annexation is to be circulated. Such petition shall
not be valid unless at least ten days and not more than twenty
days before the same is caused to be circulated the notices
are so posted. A further requirement is that the notice be
published in a newspaper of general circulation within the
county at least ten days prior to the time such petition is
caused to be circulated.

The Donohue notice was published on December 2, 1954,
The first signature upon the Donohue petition was that of
Donohue himself and it bears December 16, 1954, as the
date of signing. The trial court found that the Donohue
petition for annexation to the village of River Hills was first
circulated December 16, 1954. If correct, that finding de-
termines the first issue. Whether the time within which the
annexation petition had to be circulated was calculated from
November 19th or November 22d is immaterial. If the
Donohue petition was first caused to be circulated on Decem-
ber 16, 1954, then in either event it was more than twenty
days after the posting of such notices. The plaintiffs chal-
lenge said finding upon this appeal.

The plaintiff Donohue was not consistent in his state-
ments upon this point. At an adverse examination held on
May 24, 1955, Donohue testified that he obtained the first
signature on the petition for annexation to River Hills on
November 20th. At a continuation of said adverse examina-
tion, in answer to a question as to when he circulated the
petition, he said the document speaks for itself, and that the
first signature thereon was his own under date of Decem-
ber 16th. Each side moved for summary judgment in July,
1955. In an affidavit in support of plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, Donohue stated that he first circulated
the petition “on or about December 12, 1954.” Upon the
trial Donohue testified that circulation of his petition com-
menced December 12th and that one Tyczinski had the peti-
tion first. Again he testified that Tyczinski got it after he,
Donohue, had signed it. It appears from the petition itself
that the second signature upon the petition is that of Tyczin-
ski, which was dated January 6, 1955. The trial court, in its
memorandum decision, reviewed this conflicting testimony
and then held that the Donohue petition was first circulated
on December 16, 1954. Tyczinski was not called as a witness
upon the trial. Because of the conflict in the testimony we
cannot say that the finding of the trial court is against the
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. On
the other hand, it appears that said finding is fully supported
by the record. There was no compliance with the statute,
therefore, because of the late date on which the Donohue
petition was caused to be first circulated.

The plaintiffs next attack the Nolte proceedings on the
ground that the territory annexed to the village of Fox Point
was not contiguous. Prior to these proceedings the territory
comprising the town of Milwaukee had largely been absorbed
by incorporation and annexation proceedings, until in No-
vember, 1954, all that remained of the town of Milwaukee
was an area of approximately 90 acres. This territory con-

186
Pd

sisted of something iri excess of 40 acres to the north and a
tract of approximately the same size to the south which were
connected by a narrow corridor. Donohue lived in the north-
ern section. The village of Fox Point bordered upon this
entire area on the east. On the west the remainder of the
town of Milwaukee was bordered by the village of River
Hills and the city of Glendale. The plaintiffs argue about
the shape of the remaining area of the town of Milwaukee
and contend that because the two larger portions are con-
nected by a narrow corridor the entire area is not con-
tiguous. Sec. 62.07, Stats., provides only that territory
“adjacent” to any city may be annexed to such city. From the
exhibits in the record it is apparent that the boundaries of the
village of Fox Point are adjacent to the entire tract that it
annexed. The peculiar shape of the land remaining in the
town of Milwaukee was due to other proceedings by way of
incorporation and annexation. We can find no merit in the
second question raised by the plaintiffs.

The third issue raised is one advanced by the defendant,
which claims that the Donohue proceedings were not started
in good faith or conducted and completed within a reasonable
time. The petition had not been filed with the village of
River Hills at the time of the trial. The trial court found it
unnecessary to determine this issue, and we so find.

So far as the record shows, the Nolte proceedings were
valid and the area in question has been properly annexed to
the village of Fox Point. The Donohue proceedings were
invalid because of the finding that the petition was first
caused to be circulated on December 16, 1954.

By the Court-—Judgment affirmed. .

Miter, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Appellants, vs.
BrLancer and another, Respondents.

February 4—March 5, 1957.

188

For the appellants there was a brief by Truman Q. Mc-
Nulty and Arlo McKinnon, and Ward Dunphy, guardian
ad litem, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Mc-
Nulty.

For the respondents there was a brief by Hayes & Hayes
of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Hanlin J. Hayes.

Brown, J. When John Miller, the minor plaintiff, was
about four years old he was struck by an automobile driven
by defendant Belanger. He, by his guardian ad litem, and
his father, plaintiff Joseph Miller, sued Belanger and his in-
surance carrier for their respective damages. A jury found
that Belanger was guilty of no causal negligence and judg-
ment dismissing the complaint was entered January 24, 1956,
Notice of entry of judgment was served on plaintiffs the next
day.

Sec. 270.47, Stats., provides:

“After judgment is perfected either party may serve upon
the other a written notice of the entry thereof; and service
of a proposed bill of exceptions, by either party, must be
made within ninety days after service of such notice. . . .”

The ninety days in this case would expire April 24, 1956.
On April 21, 1956, plaintiffs secured an order from the trial

| 189

court directing defendants to show cause on April 23d why
the time for serving the proposed bill of exceptions should
not be enlarged by another ninety days. Plaintiffs’ applica-
tion for the order was supported by an affidavit of the guard-
ian ad litem which informed the court that he had advised
the parents of the minor plaintiff of the merits of an appeal
and that an attempt to secure funds to finance an appeal is
being made but the funds have not yet been obtained and
more time to raise them is required; also that the court re-
porter is engaged in other work to such an extent that he
would not have been able to make a timely transcript for a
proposed bill of exceptions even if funds to pay for it had been
promptly available.. This latter allegation was denied by the
affidavit of the reporter.

The trial court took the motion under advisement. The
ninety days after service on plaintiffs of notice of entry of
judgment ran out on April 24th, but the opposing parties
continued until May 10th to procure additional affidavits and
to file them with the court, beginning with one by Miller,
Sr. This affidavit informed the court that Miller’s living
expenses and instalment payments on debts amounted to
$289.21 per month, not including $38 per month which
another affidavit shows he pays on money borrowed from
First Credit Corporation. Miller’s affidavit states that his
net income is approximately $315 per month and that First
Credit Corporation has offered to increase his loan to finance
an appeal. His affidavit does not state the terms on which
the increase could be obtained, but it says that “the only
source from which he can obtain a loan with payments small
enough to allow him to make payments would be the Butchers
Credit Union from which he possibly [our italics] can make
a loan through his employment at the Weisel Sausage Com-
pany ; that he has not as yet received approval from the credit
union,” and “that in the event that he obtains a loan he
intends to appeal” this action.

0
Td

The affidavit of the vice-president of Miller’s employer
states that in the period from January 1, 1956, to March 24,
1956, Miller’s take-home pay averaged approximately $100
per week. (This is about $435 per month instead of the
$315 alleged in Miller’s affidavit.)

The affidavit of an official of First Credit Corporation said
that on March 29, 1956, Miller, Sr., inquired about increas-
ing his loan so as to finance an appeal from the judgment
and was informed that this could be done at a cost of $51
per month. The loan was not made.

The affidavit of the treasurer of the Butchers Credit Union
states that on April 30, 1956, Miller, Sr., inquired by tele-
phone about a loan of $200 to $250 to finance an appeal but
that he has made no written application for such a loan and
has made no other inquiry.

The affidavits before the court, then, showed that Miller,
Sr., had take-home pay of $435 per month and his monthly
expenses, including payments on debts, are $327.21 and that
he considered an additional payment of $51 per month to
finance an appeal was beyond his means. They show, further,
that after the expiration of ninety days from notice of the
entry of judgment he first inquired about a loan by Butchers
Credit Union but made no written application for one. The
affidavits do not say upon what terms a loan there may be
procured, nor do they show what terms would be acceptable
to Miller, but tell the court only that there is a possibility
that Butchers Credit Union will lend to him on terms which
he can meet. He rejected the loan tendered by First Credit
Corporation as too burdensome.

On June 14, 1956, the court denied the application for
extension of time, saying:

“Under the circumstances the court fails to see good
cause in the record before it which would justify the court
in granting the motion to extend the time to serve the bill

| |) 191

of exceptions. The court is of the opinion that to grant this
motion would be a clear abuse of discretion.” (Italics ours.)

When an infant appears as a party to an action pending
before a court, he becomes a ward of the court, and it is
the duty of the court to see that the interest of its ward is
protected. Will of Jaeger (1935), 218 Wis. 1, 10, 259 N. W.
842. An order extending the time for settling a bill of
exceptions is an appealable order. Briggson v. Viroqua
(1953), 264 Wis. 40, 45, 58 N. W. (2d) 543. It is a
procedural order, not one affecting substantive rights. Id.
Power conferred by sec. 269.45, Stats. (extending time),
is highly discretionary and the determination of the trial
court is not to be disturbed except in cases where it clearly
appears that it has been abused. Greenfield v. Milwaukee
(1951), 259 Wis. 101, 47 N. W. (2d) 291. Ifa discretion-
ary order is made by a trial court as a result of an erroneous
view of the law the order may be reversed without estab-
lishing an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
Briggson v. Viroqua, supra.

The power of the trial judge to extend the time for serv-
ing a proposed bill of exceptions is found in sec. 269.45,
Stats. From 1934 to 1950 this read:

“ENLARGEMENT OF TIME. The court or a judge may,
upon notice and good cause shown by affidavit and upon just
terms, extend the time within which any act or proceeding
in an action or special proceeding must be taken (except the
time for appeal) and may do so after the time has expired.
[Supreme Court Order, effective January 1, 1934.]”

Effective July 1, 1950, by supreme court order, this sec-
tion was changed to its present reading, to wit:

“269.45 ENLARGEMENT oF TIME. (1) The court or a
judge may with or without notice, for cause shown by affi-
davit and upon just terms and before the time has expired,
extend the time within which any act or proceeding in an

2 mes

action or special proceeding must be taken, except the time
for appeal.

“(2) After the expiration of the specified period or as
extended by any previous order, the court may in its dis-
cretion, for like cause, upon notice, extend the time where
the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; except
the time for appeal.”

The court adopted these changes upon the recommendation
of the advisory committee on pleading, practice and pro-
cedure which acted under the authority of sec. 251.18, Stats.
The minutes of that committee’s meetings make it plain
that the purpose of the changes was to assure trial judges that
the supreme court would approve greater liberality in grant-
ing extensions of time than had been the case in the recent
past. The alteration of “good cause” to “cause” and the
mention of the trial court’s discretion in sec. 269.45 (2)
was designed to accomplish that purpose without encourag-
ing a belief that extensions which appeared to be granted
arbitrarily or merely for favor would be affirmed by this
court. .

No order of extension was made before the time limited
by sec. 270.47, Stats., supra, had expired. The application,
therefore, is governed by sec. 269.45 (2). This makes neces-
sary notice, cause, and requires that the applicant’s failure
to act was the result of excusable neglect. The hearing of
the order to show cause was upon notice and in any event
participation of defendants by filing affidavits in opposition
to those of plaintiffs after the expiration of time would have
waived the requirement of notice to them. We think in this
respect the demand of sec. 269.45 (2) was satisfied. But
the senior Miller’s representations concerning his prospects
of financing an appeal are so indefinite, as already pointed
out, and those sources of funds that he now says offer
possibilities were so open and obvious to him during the
entire original ninety days without inducing any activity

ee 193

regarding them on his part that an extension of time, as to
him, fails to come within the bounds of even a liberal in-
terpretation either of “cause” or “excusable neglect.”

In respect to John Miller, the minor, the trial court may
note that he has no resources of his own. He is completely
dependent’ upon his parents and neglect inexcusable as to the
father ought not, in view of his helplessness, to be inexcusable
as to him. The father’s representations, though too indefinite
and uncertain to support his own application may be some-
what helped in the son’s case by the fact that a bill of ex-
ceptions devoted only to the infant’s cause of action would
be less expensive than if it included the causes of both plain-
tiffs.

The discretion to be exercised in ruling upon the motion
for an extension of time is that of the trial court but, because
of that court’s use of the term “good cause” in denying
plaintiffs’ motion we have some doubt whether it was aware
of the change in import made by the change in statutory
language. We are particularly charged with the protection
of the infant plaintiff as a ward of the court and we have
concluded to reverse that part of the order which denies an
extension of time to John Miller, the minor, and to remand
the cause with directions to. the trial court to. permit the
guardian ad litem to renew his motion for an extension of
time, and thereafter to determine the motion as the court’s
discretion under sec. 269.45 (2), Stats., may direct.

By the Court——That part of the order which denies to
Joseph Miller an extension of time to serve a proposed bill
of exceptions is affirmed. That part which denies such ex-
tension to Johri Miller is reversed, and the cause is remanded
with directions to the trial court to entertain a renewal of the
motion made in his behalf for an extension of such time,
and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ton,

Browx, by Guardian ad litem, and others, Respondents, vs.
Mryat and others, Appellants.

February 5—March 5, 1957.

For the appellants there were briefs by Kivett & Kasdorf,
attorneys, and Clifford C. Kasdorf, Alan M. Clack, and
Bernard J. Adamkiewicz of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and
oral argument by Clifford C. Kasdorf.

For the respondents there was a brief by Quarles, Spence
& Quarles, attorneys, and Edmund W. Powell and Kurt H.
Frauen of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by
Mr. Frauen. 7 .

Curriz, J. The issues raised on this appeal are as fol-
lows: . an .
(1) Is there any evidence to support the finding that the
defendant Sylvester Mijal was negligent as to lookout?

Ss
id

(2) Was the negligent speed of Sylvester Mijal such an
overpowering factor in causing the accident as to prevent
any failure of lookout on his part from being a proximate
cause of the accident?

(3) If Sylvester Mijal was causally negligent as to look-
out, did the plaintiff Kenneth Bronk assume such negligence
as a matter of law?

(4) Are the defendants entitled to a new trial because of
the failure of the trial court to submit a question in the
verdict inquiring as to whether Sylvester Mijal operated a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor ?

The accident occurred on a pleasant summer evening when
good driving conditions, including a dry pavement, pre-
vailed.

A deputy sheriff testified that Highway 38 as it approached
the curve and bridge was posted with signs warning traffic
that the speed limit on that section of the highway was 35
miles per hour. This officer further testified that at least
300 feet to the south of the curve there was a traffic sign
giving warning of a sharp curve. This sign was on the
right-hand or east side of the highway and was visible to
traffic moving northwesterly on Highway 38. The testimony
is undisputed that the headlights of the Mijal car were turned
on as it came out of Racine and proceeded toward the curve.

There is no testimony that Sylvester Mijal suffered from
amnesia as a result of any injury sustained in the accident.
Nevertheless, he claimed in his testimony given at the trial
that he did not remember any of the details of the accident.
However, when examined as an adverse witness, the follow-
ing questions were asked him and he gave the following
answers thereto:

“Q. How about this business of not seeing the curve, do
you remember that now? A. Yes, I do.

|| ae 199
Po

“Q. You remember that you were driving along, and you
didn’t see the curve, and you missed it, is that right? A. Yes.

“Q. And you skidded just before the accident happened.
A. Yes.

“Q. And you didn’t see any signs indicating a curve, did
you? A. That’s because I didn’t remember anything.”

The skid marks made by the Mijal car clearly give rise
to the inference that Sylvester did not apply his brakes until
he was 114 feet from the bridge. The curve commences some
distance to the southeast of the bridge. Inasmuch as the
highway sign, warning of the approach of the bridge, was
at least 300 feet southeast of the commencement of the
curve, and Sylvester should have seen such sign before
drawing even with it, the jury could reasonably infer that
Sylvester did not see’such warning sign. This is because
of his failure to take any effective action to reduce his speed
until he applied the brakes hard enough to make skid marks
some 200 feet after passing the warning sign. This is cor-
roborated by the testimony of an eyewitness to the accident,
Ronald Schoeppe.

‘We deem that there was sufficient credible evidence to
sustain the finding of the jury that Sylvester was negligent
with respect to failing to keep a proper lookout. This brings
us to that which we consider to be a crucial question on this
appeal, viz., did the overpowering part played by speed in
causing the accident prevent such negligent lookout from
being a proximate cause thereof as a matter of law? Counsel
for the defendants contend that the accident would have
happened regardless of whether Sylvester had seen the curve
warning sign, and irrespective of when he saw the curve it-
self. If counsel are correct in this contention, then obviously
any negligent lookout would not have been a substantial
factor in producing the accident, and, therefore, the same
could not have been a proximate cause of the accident.

200 ee
Le

Parenthetically we might observe that this is one of those
very rare instances when negligent lookout in a motor-vehicle
accident case is not necessarily a proximate cause of the acci-
dent as a matter of law. This is because the jury reasonably
might infer that the speed of the Mijal car was so great that,
even if Sylvester had seen the warning sign at a point where
the ordinarily prudent driver would have observed it, he
would have been unable to reduce his speed sufficiently to
have negotiated the curve.

Defendants’ brief points out that Wisconsin’s Manual for
Motorists, at page 22, states that the average stopping dis-
tance of an automobile traveling at a speed of 70 miles per
hour is 347 feet, and the jury might well have inferred that
the speed of Mijal’s car as it approached the curve was in
excess of 75 miles per hour. This argument overlooks the
fact that it was not necessary for Sylvester to have stopped
his car to have avoided the accident. All that would have
been required was a reduction of speed sufficient to have
enabled him to negotiate the curve. It seems to us that the
question of whether Sylvester’s negligent lookout was a
proximate cause of the accident properly lies within the field
of the jury exercising its undoubted right to draw legitimate
inferences from the evidence presented. We, therefore, con-
clude that the jury’s finding that the negligent lookout was
causal should not be disturbed on this appeal.

It is further urged by the attorneys for the defendants
that the plaintiff Kenneth Bronk assumed the risk of Syl-
vester’s negligent lookout as a matter of law. Among the
cases cited in support of such contention is Peterson v.
Magnus (1956), 272 Wis. 461, 76 N. W. (2d) 289. In
that case the car of the defendant host-driver was struck in
the rear fender by an oncoming automobile while such de-
fendant was in the act of passing another vehicle. The de-
fendant was endeavoring to drive a distance of 60 miles

es 201
sd

over slippery, snowy roads in one hour’s time, and had
traveled the last 20 miles prior to the accident in fifteen
minutes. The jury found the defendant causally negligent
as to both speed and management and control and that the
plaintiff passenger had assumed the risk as to both. This
court held that, while a host’s negligence as to management
and control is usually of a momentary character that a guest
does not assume, the negligent management and control
under the special facts of the case could not be treated sepa-
rately from the speed which the guest had assumed.

Such holding in Peterson v. Magnus, supra, is consistent
with the prior determination of this court in the case of
Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co. (1933), 212
Wis. 403, 410, 249 N. W. 278, wherein it was declared:

“If a host is proceeding at a negligent rate of speed, which
the guest assumes, and by reason of this speed finds himself
in a situation requiring instant decision and giving him
opportunity for further negligence with respect to control,
it is impossible to isolate the subsequent negligence from the
prior negligence and to hold, in spite of the fact that the
guest has acquiesced in the former, that the momentary
character of the latter makes acquiescence impossible. In
such a situation, where the emergency itself is produced by
negligence of the host, the guest who has assumed the risk
of such negligence must be held to assume the risk involved
in the emergency produced by it.”

However, in the instant case we are not faced with any
issue of assumption of risk as to management and control,
but with one concerned with lookout. We have held that
where a guest acquiesces in a host-driver operating his car
for a considerable distance with a windshield clouded with
frost or moisture, the guest may be found to have assumed
the risk of the host’s negligent lookout. Haugen v. Wittkopf
(1943), 242 Wis. 276, 7 N. W. (24) 886, and Shrofe v.
Rural Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. (1950), 258 Wis. 128, 45

202

N. W. (2d) 76. Also, where there is evidence that the host
to the knowledge of the guest has consumed intoxicating
liquor in a quantity which might appreciably interfere with
the exercise by the host of ordinary care in the operation
of his vehicle, a jury is permitted to find assumption of risk
as to lookout. Frey v. Dick (1956), 273 Wis. 1, 6, 76
N. W. (2d) 716, 77 N. W. (2d) 609. These appear to be
the only exceptions to the general rule, that negligent look-
out is ordinarily of such a momentary character that a guest
cannot be found to have assumed the same, which this court
has heretofore recognized.

It is possible to assume a hypothetical state of facts where
the speed of an automobile might be so great that the driver
could not read highway safety signs, such as the curve warn-
ing sign in the instant case. In such a situation a guest who
assumed the negligent speed ought to be held to have assumed
the negligence of his host in not seeing such a highway
safety sign. However, we certainly cannot make such a
determination as a matter of law under the facts here pre-
sented. For example, there was no evidence presented that
the curve warning sign could not have been seen and read
by the ordinary operator of a car proceeding at a speed of
75 miles per hour. We, therefore, conclude that the jury’s
finding that Kenneth Bronk did not assume the risk of Syl-
vester Mijal’s negligent lookout must stand.

As a result of permitting the finding to stand, that there
was no assumption of risk as to lookout, the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover even though there was assumption of
risk as to speed. This is because if a host-driver is found
negligent in two respects, and the plaintiff guest is found
to have assumed the risk of only one of such two grounds
of negligence, such assumption of risk does not bar recovery
as to the ground of negligence not assumed. State ex rel.
Litzen v. Dillett (1943), 242 Wis. 107, 7 N. W. (2d) 599,
ON. W. (2d) 80.

a ee 203
Po

The last contention raised in behalf of the defendants is
that a new trial should be granted because of the alleged
error of the learned trial court in not submitting a question
in the special verdict as to whether Sylvester Mijal was
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor.

Earlier in the evening prior to the accident five boys,
including Kenneth Bronk and Sylvester Mijal, and three
girls had gone out to a quarry northwest of Racine to drink
beer and swim. The testimony is in conflict as to how many
cans of beer Sylvester drank, such quantity varying from
one and a half to four cans. Later Sylvester, Kenneth, and
a third boy had driven into Racine to take one of the girls
back to a restaurant where she had asked to be taken. The
three boys were on their way out of Racine to return to their
homes in Milwaukee when sighted and pursued by the police
squad car.

Although counsel for the defendants requested the trial
court to submit a question on intoxication in the special
verdict, they failed to move for a new trial after verdict
bottomed upon such alleged error. This failure precludes
raising the issue as a matter of right on this appeal. Wells
v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co. (1957), 274 Wis. 505, 80 N. W.
(2d) 380.

However, it is not error for a trial court in a case such as
this, where there is evidence of drinking by the host-driver,
not to include a question on intoxication in the verdict but
to cover such issue by proper instructions to the jury. Frey
v. Dick, supra. This is because operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor does not in
itself provide support for a cause of action to one who has
been injured in an accident in which such vehicle participated.
McNamer v. American Ins. Co. (1954), 267 Wis. 494, 66
N. W. (2d) 342. Such driving under the influence of in-

toxicating liquor must be combined with some phase of
negligent operation such as speed, lookout, or management
and control, in order to be actionable.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Broaproor, J., dissents.

SvaTE Ex REL. Crry or West ALLIS, Appellant, ys. ZAWER-
SCHNIK, School Clerk, and others, Respondents.

February 5—March 5, 1957.

See) 205
For the appellant there were briefs by George A. Schmus,
city attorney, and Charles G. Panosian, assistant city attor-
ney, and oral argument by Mr. Schmus.
For the respondents there was a brief by Joseph A. Barly

and Charles Thekan, both of Milwaukee, and oral argument
by Mr. Barly.

STEINLE, J. The sole question presented is whether the
defendants may be compelled by mandamus to transfer and
deliver to the school district to which all of the territory of
their school district was validly attached, the buildings and
records of the school district which they represent.

The order which created Joint City School District No. 1
of the city of West Allis, the village of West Milwaukee, the
town of Greenfield, and the town of Wauwatosa in Milwau-
kee county, and the town of New Berlin in Waukesha county
(hereinafter referred to as “Joint City School District
No. 1”), became effective January 5, 1956. State ex rel.
West Allis v. Dieringer, post, p. 208, 81 N. W. (2d) 533.
By such order, School District No. 12, of the village of West
Milwaukee was dissolved, and the territory of said dissolved

206
|

district was attached to Joint City School District No. 1.
Zawerschnik v. Joint County School Comm. (1955), 271
Wis. 416, 73 N. W. (2d) 566. This action was commenced
after the order creating Joint City School District No. 1
became effective.

Sec. 66.03, Stats., treats with the adjustment of assets
and liabilities on division of territory. It reads in part:

“(3) Real estate. (a) The title to real estate shall not be
transferred except by agreement, but the value thereof shall
be included in determining the assets of the municipality
owning the same and in making the adjustment of assets
and liabilities.

“(b) The right to possession and control of school build-
ings and school sites shall pass to the municipality in which
the same are situated immediately upon the annexation or
detachment of any school district territory to another munici-
pality becoming effective, . . .

“(5) Apportionment board. The boards or councils of
the municipalities, or committees, thereof selected for that
purpose, acting together, shall constitute an apportionment
board. When any municipality is dissolved by reason of all
of its territory being so transferred the board or council
thereof existing at the time of such dissolution shall for the
purpose of this section, continue to exist as the governing
body of such municipality until there has been an apportion-
ment of assets by agreement of the interested municipalities
or by an order of the circuit court. . . .”

There was clearly a duty upon the defendants to deliver
the buildings and the records of School District No. 12 of
the village of West Milwaukee to Joint City School District
No. 1, when said district was dissolved and its territory was
ordered attached to the reorganized district. Such duty was
ministerial and did not involve the exercise of discretion.

Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel public officers
to perform duties arising out of their office and presently
due to be performed. State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman
(1939), 233 Wis. 16, 288 N. W. 454. A writ of mandamus

a ae 207

will issue to enforce performance of plain and imperative
duties of a ministerial character imposed upon administrative
agencies. 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, p. 907, sec. 126; State
ex rel. Krause v. Jones (1928), 196 Wis. 464, 220 N. W.
373.

That mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the officers
of a school district to transfer custody and control of items
as sought here, is well established. State ex rel. Joint School
Dist. No. 2 v. Sweeney (1899), 103 Wis. 404, 79 N. W.
420; State ex rel. Manitowoc v. Green (1907), 131 Wis.
324, 111 N. W. 519. It is not a defense to a mandamus
action for the custody and control of school property after
annexation that no apportionment has been made. State ex.
rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Schriner (1912), 151 Wis. 162,
138 N. W. 633.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed, with directions to the
trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus requir-
ing the defendants to relinquish, surrender, and transmit to
Joint City School District No. 1 of the city of West Allis,
the village of West Milwaukee, the town of Greenfield, and
the town of Wauwatosa in Milwaukee county, and the town
of New Berlin in Waukesha county, possession and control
of the school buildings and sites, records, files, and proceed-
ings of School District No. 12, village of West Milwaukee.

cer, Village Clerk, and others, Respondents.
February 5—March 5, 1957.

Pe
For the appellant there were briefs by George A. Schmus,
city attorney, and Charles G. Panosian, assistant city attor-
ney, and oral argument by Mr. Schmus.

For the respondents village of West Milwaukee and
Herman C. Dieringer, village clerk, there was a brief by
Allen J. Busby, village attorney, and Maxwell H. Herriott
of Milwaukee, special counsel, and oral argument by Mr.
Flerriott.

For the respondent town of Greenfield and George L.

Luck, town clerk, there was a brief by Joseph A. Barly of
Milwaukee, and by Joseph A. Barly and Charles Thekan,

1 es
TT

both of Milwaukee, attorneys for the remainder of the de-
fendants except the village clerk and the village of West
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Barly.

STEINLE, J. The principal question presented is whether
the trial court correctly interpreted the term “territory af-
fected” as it appears in sec. 40.06 (2), Stats. 1955.

The legislature has provided two methods for the organi-
zation, reorganization, or dissolution of school districts in
this state. Under sec. 40.03, Stats., authority is vested in the
school committee to create, alter, consolidate, or dissolve
school districts. Under sec. 40.06, such power is invested
in town boards or village boards of councils of cities of the
second, third, or fourth class. Joint City School District
No. 1 referred to herein, was organized pursuant to sec.
40.03. The boards of the village of West Milwaukee and
the town of Greenfield sought to organize Joint School Dis-
trict No. 16 under provision of sec. 40.06.

Sec. 40.06, Stats., provides as follows:

“(1) Power; limitations. Upon the filing of a petition by
an elector with the municipal clerk or upon its own order,
any town or village board or council of a city of the second,
third, or fourth class may, by order, create, alter, consolidate,
or dissolve school districts. No territory shall be detached
from a district unless by the same order it is attached to
another district or districts. No district shall be created
having less than $150,000 of taxable property as shown by
the last assessment roll.

“(2) Joint actions of board. If the territory affected by
a proposed order lies in more than one municipality, the
municipal boards shall act jointly; the concurrence of a
majority of each board is necessary to a valid order. The
meeting of the several municipal boards or councils shall be
called by the clerk of the municipality with whom the peti-
tion is filed; he shall give at least five days’ notice in writing
of the time and place of meeting to each member of each
board or council.

a P| 215

“(3) Notice of proposed action. Whenever a petition for
such alteration, creation, consolidation, or dissolution is filed,
or a resolution initiating such action is adopted, the munici-
pal board or boards or council or councils shall within thirty
days meet and by resolution or joint resolution set a date for
hearing within ten days and give at least five days’ notice,
in writing, to the clerk of each district to be in any way
affected thereby of the day, hour, and place it will meet to
decide upon the proposed changes. Each district clerk shall
immediately notify the other members of his board.

“(4) Order. An order creating a district shall number
the district and mention the municipality in which it is
situated. A certified copy of the order shall be promptly filed
and recorded in the office of the clerk of each municipality
in which school districts affected by the order are situated
and one copy shall be mailed to the county superintendent
and one to the state superintendent. Such order shall be
presumptive evidence of the facts recited therein and of the
validity of all proceedings preliminary thereto.

“(5) Appeal. (a) Any person aggrieved by an order of a
municipal board or council may appeal to the state superin-
tendent within thirty days following the recording of such
order; if a board or council, when petitioned to do so, re-
fuses or neglects to issue and record an order of alteration,
dissolution, consolidation, or creation, any person aggrieved
may appeal within ninety days following the filing of the
petition.

“(b) After determining the appeal the state superintend-
ent shall enter an order affirming, modifying, or reversing
the order appealed from, or if the appeal is from the refusal
of a municipal board or council to file orders of alteration,
dissolution, creation, or consolidation when petitioned to do
so, the state superintendent may, if he finds the municipal
board or council erred in refusing to file such an order, make
such order as he deems proper under the circumstances.

“(c) An appeal from an order of the state superintendent
may be taken to the circuit court of any county in the affected
territory within thirty days from the date of said order. A
written notice of appeal stating the grounds upon which
said appeal is based must also be served on the state super-
intendent within thirty days from the date of his order.

26s

“(6) Referendum. If within thirty days after the record-
ing of an order by a municipal board, city council, or state
superintendent, 10 per cent of the electors in the proposed
district or 500 electors, whichever is smaller, file a petition
with the county clerk as provided in sec. 40.03 (6) (b),
requesting a referendum election, such order shall not become
effective until it has been approved by both a majority vote
of the resident electors within all of the territory outside
the city or village limits of any city or village involved in
the proposed reorganized district, voting at such election,
and by a majority vote of the electors residing within city
or village limits of all cities and villages involved in the
proposed reorganized district voting at such election. The
electors residing in that portion of any municipality not in-
cluded in the area proposed to be reorganized shall not vote
in such referendum. The referendum shall be conducted and
the costs allocated in the manner provided for referendums in
sec. 40.03 (6) except'as herein set forth.”

The trial court determined that the term “territory af-
fected” relates solely to that part of an existing school district
which is directly affected by the reorganization of a school
district, and that it does not refer to the entire school district.
The court was of the opinion that the term “territory af-
fected,” is plain and unambiguous, and that it is not neces-
sary to employ interpretation as contained in the attorney
general’s opinion for use in construing the statute. In reach-
ing such conclusion the court pointed out that when the
legislature decided to refer to an entire school district, it
used the word “district,” but that when it had in mind only
part of an existing district, it-used the word “territory.” The
court also referred to the referendum provided in sub. (6)
of sec. 40.06, Stats., and indicated that in its opinion, had
the legislature intended “territory affected” to be synony-
mous with “school district affected,” it would not have
limited the right to vote solely within the area directly
affected by the reorganization of a school district.

|| | 217
Po

The court also found that after Joint City School District
No. 1 was fully organized on January 5, 1956, it no longer
pre-empted the field with reference to territory within its
borders; that under sec. 40.06, Stats., the village of West
Milwaukee and the town of Greenfield were privileged to
detach territory from within the boundary of Joint City
School District No. 1 for the creation of Joint School District
No. 16; that notice was not required to be served upon the
officers of the city of West Allis and the town of New
Berlin with respect to the program to detach territory from
Joint City School District No. 1; that the action of the
municipal boards of the city of West Allis and the town of
New Berlin was not required under sec. 40.06 for the detach-
ment of territory from Joint City School District No. 1.

The city of West Allis does not contend that the provisions
in sec. 40.06, Stats., for the formation of a school district
by a town, village, or city of the second, third, or fourth class
were repealed or suspended by the enactment of sec. 40.03.
Nor does it contend that the question as to whether the
boundaries of a school district should be changed is one of
law or fact for judicial determination. It does not controvert
the contention of the defendants that such matter is strictly
for the legislature. It maintains that there is ambiguity with
reference to the term “territory affected” as such appears in
sec. 40.06 (2), and that hence an opinion of the attorney
general, which appears in 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 837, 838, and
was furnished to the state superintendent of public instruction
on August 19, 1932, with reference to a construction of that
term, and which has not been changed by the legislature in
subsequent legislation relating to the subject, bears con-
trolling weight. In part that opinion reads as follows:

“Subsec. (3), sec. 40.30 [now sec. 40.06, Stats.,] provides
as follows:

“When the territory to be affected by proposed order
lies in more than one municipality, the municipal boards

218

shall act jointly, and the concurrence of a majority of each
board shall be necessary to a valid order.’

“The territory to be affected by the proposed order in-
cludes not only the area actually detached from one school
district and attached to the other, but also the area contained
in both school districts. The territory of the school district
in town ‘A’ is affected by the detachment of the territory
and the consequent necessity of adjusting the assets and
liabilities with the district to which the detached territory
is attached by the order. The joint school district located
in part in town ‘B,’ and to which the detached area is to be
attached, is affected in a similar manner. The adjustment
between school districts caused by such an alteration of their
boundaries has a direct effect upon the taxation and liabilities
of the entire territory of each district.

“Tt is the opinion of this department that under the facts
stated the order of town ‘A’ is invalid unless concurred in by
each municipal board of the various municipalities in which
the joint school district now lies.”

Long-continued administrative interpretation and con-
struction is not controlling where the language of the statute
is so clear as not to need or to be susceptible of construction.
State ex rel. Time Ins. Co. v. Smith (1924), 184 Wis. 455,
200 N. W. 65. See also Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Fricke
(1896), 94 Wis. 258, 266, 68 N. W. 958. But, where the
language of the statute is not clear, and an ambiguity exists,
and practical construction has obtained for many years, then
it is entitled to controlling weight. State ex rel. Bashford v.
Frear (1909), 138 Wis. 536, 120 N. W. 216. See also
Wright v. Forrestal (1886), 65 Wis. 341, 27 N. W. 52.

A statute, or any sentence, clause, or word thereof, is
“ambiguous” when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses. Thompson v. Akin (1898), 81 Ill. App. 62. The
word “ambiguous” has also been held to mean “doubtful
and uncertain” and “open to construction.” 3 Words and
Phrases (perm. ed.), p. 440.

In Harrington v. Smith (1871), 28 Wis. 43, 69, this court
stated in part:

“And in this case the important fact is not to be over-
looked, that the highest law officer of the state—the attorney
general—has always been one of the commissioners, whose
duty it was to construe and carry the law into effect. Great
weight is undoubtedly to be attached to a construction which
has thus been given. During the time this uniform construc-
tion and practice have prevailed, the office of attorney gen-
eral has been filled by nine different individuals, all of them
gentlemen of learning and accomplishment in their profes-
sion; and of the other commissioners, some have been
lawyers, and four at least have since held the office of gov-
ernor. The concurrent opinion and advice of these attorneys
general and of the other commissioners, extending through

- a period of so many years, ought, it would seem, to be some
evidence of what the law is; and some persons might be dis-
posed, perhaps, to think, evidence equal to a decision of this
court. The supreme court of the United States has on more
than one occasion paid great respect to such evidence on
questions of statutory construction. . . . [Cases cited.] In
the former case the court says, speaking of the practical
construction of an act of the legislature of the state of New
York by the public officers of that state, including the attor-
ney general, that it is deserving of consideration, and al-
though it cannot be admitted as controlling, it is not to be
overlooked, and perhaps should be regarded as decisive in
a case of doubt or where the error is not plain.” (Emphasis
supplied. )

See also State ex rel. Taylor v. McKinny (1911), 146
Wis. 673, 132 N. W. 600, and Milwaukee County v. State
Dept. of Public Welfare (1955), 271 Wis, 219, 223, 72
N. W. (2d) 727.

In 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), pp. 516,
517, sec. 5105, the author points out that: “. . . interpreta-
tions by the attorney general and the legal department of a
state will have important bearing upon statutory meaning,
since the attorney general and his office are required by

law to issue opinions for the assistance of the various de-
partments of the government administering the law.” In
the same work, pp. 520, 521, sec. 5107, it is said that, “Like
all precedents, where contemporaneous and practical interpre-
tation had stood unchallenged for a considerable length of
time it will be regarded as of great importance in arriving
at the proper construction of a statute. ... One of the
soundest reasons sustaining contemporaneous interpretations
of long standing is the fact that reliance has been placed
thereon by the public and those having an interest in the
interpretation of the law.” In’sec. 5109 of the same work,
pp. 523, 524, it is said, “Where a statute has received a
contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute
as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is
accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is
regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the
law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legis-
lature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation
of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body
or executive officers charged with the duty of administering
or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the
interpretation upon re-enactment.”

In State ex rel. Koch v. Retirement Board (1944), 244
Wis. 580, 586, 13 N. W. (2d) 56, 14 N. W. (2d) 177, this
court stated:

“As we said in State ex rel. Green v. Clark, 235 Wis. 628,
630, 294 N. W. 25,—

“«. , the practical construction, long continued, given to
a statute by those intrusted with its administration is “of
great weight and is oftentimes decisive” in determining its
meaning. State v. Johnson, 186 Wis. 59, 69, 202 N. W.
319” ”

Sub. (4) of sec. 14.53, Stats., provides that the attorney
general shall “give his opinion in writing, when required,
without fee, upon all questions of law submitted to him by

OT

r |) 221
id

the legislature or either branch thereof, or by the head of any
department of the state government.”

The state superintendent of public instruction is the head
of the department that administers school matters in this
state. Sub. (6) of sec. 39.02, Stats., provides that the state
superintendent shall “by reports, bulletins, circulars, corre-
spondence, and public addresses give the public information
upon the different methods of school organization and man-
agement and the subject of education generally.”

We are not able to conclude as did the trial court that the
meaning of the words “territory affected” is clear and un-
ambiguous. That doubt and uncertainty exists with respect
thereto is apparent from the positions taken by the respective
parties in their interpretations of the term. We cannot agree
with the defendants that it appears certain from their analysis
of sec. 40.06, Stats., and specifically from their stated ob-
servations as to the terms “territory detached,” “territory
affected,” and “district to be affected” as used in the statute,
that the term “territory affected” may reasonably be con-
strued only to mean the territory which is to be detached
from an existing school district, and which will be in the
school district as it exists after an order has been made creat-
ing it. Further, the conflict of opinion as to the meaning of
the term “territory affected” as indicated in the stipulated
facts relating to the city attorney of Glendale’s declination
to follow the opinion of the attorney general shows too that
the language in question is not plain.

In effect the defendants argue that in a situation as here
the term “territory affected” means only the territory de-
tached, and does not include school districts from which it is
detached. The fact that Joint City School District No. 1 was
established under provision of sec. 40.03, Stats., would not
prevent a later detachment of part of its territory under
sec. 40.06. See School Dist. v. Callahan (1941), 237 Wis.
560, 575, 297 N. W. 407; 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 302, 303.

22s

However, exact compliance with sec. 40.06, would be re-
quired in order to effectuate valid alteration in such regard.
It is not reasonable to assume that the legislature intended,
‘when consideting the interest of good order and efficient
school administration in this state, that an existing school
district may be compelled to yield to the severance of part
of its territory without the vote of the councils or boards
of the governmental units in which such school district is
located, with reference to such alteration. In a comparable
situation, although sec, 40.13 was referred to, we recently
said in Brown Deer v. Milwaukee (1956), 274 Wis. 50, 70,
71, 79 N. W. (2d) 340:

“On general principles we should hesitate, in the absence
of clear legislative command, to hold that one constituent
municipality may destroy a joint union high-school district
by unilateral action, and thereby perhaps leave the remainder
of the district with a crippled school, an inadequate tax base,
and a heavy burden of debt. . . .

“Other statutes authorizing alteration of school districts
lying in more than one municipality contain safeguards such
as notice, hearing, action by the county school committee or
by each municipal board, right of appeal, and referendum.
See secs. 40.03, 40.06, Stats.”

Manifestly, were it to be held that “territory affected”
refers only to the territory detached and does not include the
remaining portion of the school district from which the ter-
ritory was detached, the harmful and burdensome results
referred to in Brown Deer v. Milwaukee, supra, could easily
obtain.

It is also to be observed that a city school district is not
a separate governmental unit. It is an arm of the city
government. The common council votes the taxes for the
school district. Members of the school district are officers
of the city. See Huetiner v. Eau Claire (1943), 243 Wis.
80, 9 N. W. (2d) 583. Sec. 40.807 (3), Stats., provides

223

ee

Pd
that with reference to a city school district, the city council
or commission acting with the town chairmen and village
presidents of towns and villages in the district, shall have the
power to approve the school budget, levy the general prop-
erty tax for school purposes, and shall have all power with
respect to other fiscal controls. Such procedure obtains
while the district remains a city school district and unless
such officers vote to have the district become a common
school district.

In further support of their position that the legislature
did not intend that the term “territory affected” shall mean
the same as “school district affected,” the defendants point
to the provisions in sub. (6) of sec. 40.06, Stats. (enacted
in 1951), which require a referendum in which only electors
residing in the area proposed to be reorganized, shall be
eligible to vote. Actually the statute provides that, “The
electors residing in that portion of any municipality not
included in the area proposed to be reorganized shall not vote
in such referendum.” From this language the defendants
apparently seek to imply that all considerations affecting the
detached area rest entirely with the municipalities and the
residents of such area.

On the other hand, plaintiff contends that while the legis-
lature in its discretion could have provided for reorganization
without any referendum, apparently it felt that even after
jurisdiction had been secured, and all legal conditions pre-
cedent had been met by the municipal boards (including
concurrence of all boards with “territory affected”), the
order of such boards is to be subject to a legal condition
subsequent, to wit, a ratification by the electors within the
proposed new district. The plaintiff also submits that the
legislature knew that the words “territory affected” had
been consistently interpreted and construed to include the
parent territory as well as the detached territory, and that if
the legislature merely provided “the electors in the territory

22s

affected shall vote in the referendum,” the vote would be
taken beyond the boundaries of the proposed new district;
and that the legislature did not want the vote so extended
and hence carefully spelled out the area within which the
vote should be held so as to lift it out of the “territory
affected” in sub. (2) of sec. 40.06, Stats.

We agree with the plaintiff’s views in this regard. It
is not inconceivable that were all of the municipal boards in
a school district from which territory was proposed to be
detached, inclined to favor such detachment, and would
actually vote for it, the majority of the residents of the
detached area might by referendum still vote against detach-
ment. Under such circumstances, the detachment could not
validly be effectuated. On the other hand, if the majority
of such residents desired to take over the responsibility of
the proposed detached area, they could by their vote in the
referendum legally complete the processing of the detach-
ment.

Considerations other than those herein set forth were also
presented in the arguments of the parties. However, our
study of the same reveals that none of such would be con-
trolling with respect to an interpretation of the language of
the statute in question.

In view of the observations herein made, we are compelled
to determine that the term “territory affected” in sub. (2) of
sec. 40.06, Stats., is ambiguous, and that therefore the
administrative and practical interpretation of said language
as acquiesced in by the legislature for nineteen years, during
which time it made numerous amendments to sec. 40.06 must
be applied to the cause. We conclude that the terminology
“territory affected by a proposed order” as such appears in
sec. 40.06 (2), refers not only to the area actually detached
from one school district and attached to another, but includes
also the area contained in both school districts. In the instant

_ | 228
ren)

matter, territory could not validly be withdrawn from Joint
City School District No. 1 except by the concurring action
of the four municipalities having territory therein. The
action of the village board of the village of West Milwaukee
and the town board of the town of Greenfield in creating
Joint School District No. 16 was null and void for the reason
of the nonparticipation and nonconcurrence by the common
council of the city of West Allis and the town board of New
Berlin with respect to such action. *
By the Court—Judgment reversed, with directions to -

enter judgment in plaintiff’s favor and in accordance with
this opinion.

Ciry oF West Artis, Appellant, vs. VirLacz or West
MitwavKkee and others, Respondents.

February 5—March 5, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by George A. Schmus,
city attorney, and Charles G. Panosian, assistant city attor-
ney, and oral argument by Mr. Schmus.

For the respondents village of West Milwaukee and
Herman C. Dieringer, village clerk, there was a brief by
Allen J. Busby, village attorney, and Maxwell H. Herriott
of Milwaukee, special counsel, and oral argument by Mr.
Herriott.

For the respondent town of Greenfield and George L.
Luck, town clerk, there was a brief by Joseph A. Barly of
Milwaukee, and by Joseph A. Barly and Charles Thekan,
both of Milwaukee, attorneys for the remainder of the
defendants except the village clerk and the village of West
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Barly.

STEINLE, J. The issues here are substantially the same as
those in State ex rel. West Allis v. Dieringer, ante, p. 208,
81 N. W. (2d) 533.

For reasons there stated we are obliged to determine that
the order of the village board of the village of West Milwau-
kee and the town board of the town of Greenfield purporting
to create Joint School District No. 16 of the village of West
Milwaukee and the town of Greenfield was null and void and

} |) 227
Lid

of no effect. The plaintiff is entitled to the considerations
which it seeks in its complaint.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and
as may be applied for by the plaintiff under its complaint

herein.

Brom, Respondent, vs. Kumpzer and another, Appellants.

February 5—March 5, 1957.

Po |

For the appellants there was a brief by Holden & Schlosser
of Sheboygan, and oral argument by John R. Holden.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
Henry P. Hughes of Oshkosh.

Wincert, J. Appellant asserts prejudicial error in in-
structing the jury and in refusing to submit a requested
question. We consider however that the judgment should
be affirmed.

1. Instruction on right of way. The jury was instructed,
in substance, that if Blom made a full stop in response to the
arterial stop sign, then he had the right of way, and the
question whether defendant was negligent in respect to yield-
ing the right of way should be answered. Appellants contend
it was error to give this instruction without the qualification
that the stop must have been made where the driver could
make an efficient observation of traffic on the intersecting
highway, and that he should actually make such an observa-
tion. Kraskey v. Johnson, 266 Wis. 201, 207, 63 N. W.
(2d) 112, is cited.

Sec, 85.18 (4), Stats. 1953, provides that a driver who
has stopped as required by sec. 85.69 (“a full and complete
stop”) on entering the arterial, as well as drivers on the
arterial, shall be subject to the provisions of sec. 85.18 (1),
which provides that “when two vehicles approach or enter an
intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of
the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the

r |) 231
+

vehicle on the right, .. .” It is not contended that these
statutory provisions are inapplicable to an acute-angle inter-
section of the “Y” type such as that here involved, and
accordingly we treat them as applying.

In the present case Kumbier’s car was the vehicle on the
left, and as the jury found that Blom stopped at the stop
sign, Blom had the statutory right of way unless he lost it by
his conduct while and after stopping.

In Kraskey v. Johnson, 266 Wis. 201, 207, 63 N. W. (2d)
112, which involved an ordinary right-angle intersection, it
was held that sec. 85.18 (4), Stats., requires more than a
mere stop for the arterial, that it is also the driver’s duty
to observe at a point where observation would be efficient,
and that the driver on the left had the right to assume that
the one on the right would not only stop but would not
“plunge ahead into the intersection” until he had made an
observation whether he could do so safely.

In the present case there is no evidence that Blom was
not in position to make an efficient observation of oncoming
traffic from the left at the point where he stopped at the
stop sign, and the photographs in evidence indicate that he
had a clear view of the highway to the north. Neither do we
find any evidence that Blom “plunged ahead” without re-
gard to safety after stopping at the stop sign, so as to forfeit
the right of way. He testified that he came to a full stop,
looked up the road as far as he could see, waited until two
cars from the north got past, started in second gear, and was
only going 20 miles per hour when he was hit nearly 200
feet farther on. His testimony was undisputed save as it is
claimed to be inconsistent with the implications of the skid
marks. In finding that he stopped at the stop sign, the jury
must have considered the skid marks as having little weight.

Blom was concededly guilty of negligent failure to main-
tain a proper lookout as he approached the intersection of

252

the traveled portions of the highway where his path and
Kumbier’s would cross; but that fact alone would not have
warranted the jury in finding that he did not make a proper
observation when he stopped at the stop sign or that he
recklessly plunged ahead at that point without regard to
safety. Kumbier was admittedly traveling at least 50 miles
per hour and hence must have been several hundred feet
north of the intersection when Blom started from his stop
at the stop sign, more than 180 feet from the point of colli-
sion.

2. The instructions on right of way are further criticized
as assuming that the vehicles approached or entered the
intersection at approximately the same time, and not per-
mitting the jury to find that Kumbier entered the inter-
section first.

We find no error. The court clearly told the jury that if
the driver from the left is in the intersection ahead of the
driver from the right by such a margin that it cannot rea-
sonably be found that the two vehicles either approached or
entered the intersection at approximately the same time, then
neither driver has the statutory right of way.

Moreover, the evidence would not have sustained a finding
that Kumbier was in the intersection first and that Blom did
not enter at approximately the same time. The collision
occurred less than 100 feet from the north end of the inter-
section, on the interpretation of “intersection” most favorable
to Kumbier, and it is undisputed that Kumbier was traveling
at least 50 miles per hour, which is 73 feet per second.
Hence Kumbier could not have entered the intersection more
than an instant ahead of Blom, and so they entered it at
“approximately the same time.”

Criticism is also voiced of the fact that the court read
to the jury sec. 85.18 (1), Stats. 1953 (since renumbered
sec. 85.18 (5)), and then stated that the latter part of the
subsection is possibly not germane because not involving a

r ee) 233
+?

situation arising in the instant case. The last sentence of the
statutory provision is as follows:

“The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having en-
tered an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle
within such intersection and turning therein to the left across
the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle; provided,
the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly
visible signal of intention to turn as aforesaid.”

Kumbier cannot have been prejudiced by the court’s re-
marks, since there is no evidence that he gave a turning
signal.

3. Refusal to submit question. Error is asserted in the
court’s refusal to include a question, duly requested by de-
fendant, as to the position of plaintiff Blom’s car on the
highway.

A question was submitted as to whether Kumbier was
negligent in respect to his position on the highway, and was
answered “Yes.” The propriety of that question and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s answer are
not challenged. Appellant’s argument is that having sub-
mitted a question as to Kumbier’s position, a like question
with respect to Blom’s position should also have been sub-
mitted.

We are unable to find any evidence in the record which
would have warranted the jury ‘in finding that Blom was
negligent with respect to his position on the highway, and
therefore we consider that the court acted within its proper
discretion in declining to submit the requested question.
There is no evidence that Blom deviated from the continua-
tion into the intersection of the right-traveled lane of High-
way 55. In staying in that lane he was proceeding properly.
In an intersection of the type here involved, where one inter-
secting highway meets the other at a very acute angle in a
long, sweeping curve, sec. 85.17 (2), Stats., is not to be

234 es

construed as requiring the left-turning car to keep to the
left of the center of the intersection. Eberdt v. Muller, 240
Wis. 341, 354, 2. N. W. (2d) 367, 3 N. W. (2d) 763.

4. Instruction as to position on highway. The court read
to the jury the first part of sec. 85.15 (1), Stats. requiring
operation “upon the right half of the roadway,” a slow-
moving vehicle to be operated as closely as practical to the
right edge or curb; and defined “roadway” as meaning the
portion of the highway commonly used for vehicular travel.
The instruction went no further, except that the jury should
answer the question as to Kumbier’s negligence with respect
to position on the highway “Yes” or “No” depending on
where he was operating his car at the time he made his turn
into Highway 114. Appellant urges (citing Eberdt v. Muller,
240 Wis. 341, 355, 2 N. W. (2d) 367, 3 N. W. (2d) 763),
that the jury should have been told how each driver should
have properly traversed the intersection.

While the instruction might have been expanded and
thereby made more informative, it is not clear how it could
have been prejudicial to Kumbier, in the light of the evi-
dence. However, we need not pass on that question, because
the record does not disclose that a more-adequate instruction
was requested. Where instructions are incomplete, and do
not cover a point that ought to be covered, this court will
ordinarily not reverse unless a timely request for an appro-
priate instruction was made to the trial court. Madison
Trust Co. v. Helleckson, 216 Wis. 443, 456, 257 N. W.
691; Grinley v. Eau Galle, 274 Wis. 177, 179, 79 N. W.
(2d) 797. That rule is particularly pertinent here, for the
application of sec. 85.15 (1), Stats., and allied traffic stat-
utes to an acute-angle “Y” intersection raises unusual and
difficult questions which the trial court should not be ex-
pected to expound to the jury in detail without timely assist-
ance from counsel.

5. Denial of requested instruction. At the close of the
evidence defendant orally requested an instruction to the
general effect that undisputed physical facts warrant dis-
regard of contrary human testimony. The occasion for the
request was evidence of skid marks 82 feet long leading up
to the rear of Blom’s car, which appellant argues show be-
yond question that Blom’s testimony that he stopped at the
stop sign and then moved ahead slowly was incredible, since
the car would have had to be going very fast to have slid
the wheels 82 feet. The court did not expressly rule on the
request, but the requested instruction was not given, although
the jury were told generally that they should consider care-
fully such matters as measurements, skid marks, positions of
cars, photographs, etc. At the close of the instructions, the
court asked counsel if any additions or corrections were
wanted, and both counsel answered “No.”

In the circumstances, the request having been made orally
only and at the close of the testimony, and an opportunity
having been offered to renew the request, we think that it
was waived by telling the court nothing more was wanted.

In any event, we think the court acted within the bounds
of permissible discretion in not giving the instruction as
requested. The probative value of the testimony of witnesses
is not destroyed by physical facts, unless the physical facts
are irrefutably established and permit of only one deduction.
Kleckner v. Great American Indemnity Co. 257 Wis. 574,
577, 44 N. W. (2d) 560. Here there was room for the
jury to doubt that the skid marks disproved Blom’s positive
testimony that he stopped for the arterial. Hence Kumbier
was not entitled to the requested instruction as a matter of
law.

6. Finally, appellants urge that a new trial should be
granted because the verdict is against the greater weight
of the evidence and is based on passion and prejudice, and
justice has not been done. This contention is based largely

upon the asserted incompatibility between the skid marks
behind Blom’s car and the jury’s finding that he stopped at
the stop sign.

It would serve no purpose to discuss the facts in greater
detail than appears above. In his decision on motions after
verdict, the learned trial judge stated that he was in complete
accord with the special verdict and expressed the opinion
that justice was done. His considered opinion is entitled
to great weight. We have examined the record with care,
and cannot say he was wrong.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Wisconsin Power & Licut Company, Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, vs. DEANn and others, Defendant: SourHERN
WISsconsIN BREEDERS Co-oPERATIVE, Defendant and
Appellant, and one other case.

February 5—March 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Geffs, Geffs, Block
& Geffs of Janesville, and oral argument by Eli Block.

For the respondent there was a brief by Schubring, Ryan,
Petersen & Sutherland of Madison, and oral argument by
R. J. Sutherland,

Farcuixp, J. In one action, which may be called the
“state fund” case, the respondent Power Company is the
sole plaintiff. Apparently the respondent’s deceased employee
left no person dependent upon him for support and the com-
plaint alleges that pursuant to sec. 102.49 (5), Stats. 1953,
respondent paid $4,000 into the state treasury and that the
death resulted from the negligence of Dean. The cause of
action stated in the complaint is one for reimbursement for
such payment created by sec. 102.29 (2). Appellant’s answer
denies negligence on the part of Dean but as an additional
defense pleads that the collision was caused by’ the negligence
of Downing, another employee of respondent. Appellant’s
position is that the comparative-negligence statute, sec.
331.045, applies to the respondent’s cause of action for reim-
bursement. Appellant urges that if Downing’s negligence
was 50 per cent or more of the total causal negligence, re-
spondent can recover nothing, and if less than 50 per cent
respondent’s recovery must be diminished proportionally.

Sec. 102.29 (2), Stats., gives the employer or insurer,
who is required to make payment into the state treasury,
a right of action against a third party for reimbursement
for any sums so paid if the injury or death of the employee
was due to the actionable act, neglect, or default of the
third party. Sec. 331.045 substitutes the comparative-negli-
gence rule for the old contributory-negligence rule “in an
action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property.” The employer’s action is one for re-
imbursement for money paid out pursuant to statute and is
not an action for damages to which the comparative-negli-

260 ee

gence statute applies. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Shafton, 231 Wis. 1, 283 N. W. 806, 285 N. W. 408;
Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Mueller, 273 Wis. 616,
79 N. W. (2d) 246. There are only two possible distinc-
tions between the facts in the cases cited and those in the
instant case. In the Shafton Case the causal negligence at-
tributed to the deceased’s fellow employee was 10 per cent
and in the Mueller Case the negligence attributed to the
deceased employee himself was 25 per cent. Under the plead-
ings now before us Downing may have..been responsible
for 50 per cent or more of the causal negligence. In both the
Shafton and Mueller Cases the action was brought by an
insurer rather than by the employer. We can perceive no
logical reason for reaching a different interpretation of the
statute because of either of these distinctions. It is true that
in the Mueller decision this court commented that the ques-
tion of what would happen were the negligence of the em-
ployee equal to 50 per cent or more of the causal negligence
was not then before this court. It would, however, be
entirely inconsistent to hold that the portion of the compara-
tive-negligence statute which defeats recovery where the
negligence attributable to plaintiff is 50 per cent or more is
applicable to an employer’s action for reimbursement but that
the portion of the comparative-negligence statute which
provides for a reduction of recovery by reason of negligence
attributable to the plaintiff of less than 50 per cent is not
applicable to such action.

We are therefore of the opinion that under secs. 102.29
(2) and 331.045, Stats., in their present form the allegations
of negligence on the part of Downing do not state a defense
to the respondent’s cause of action for reimbursement for
money paid into the state fund.

In the other action, which may be called the “employees’
case,” respondent has joined as plaintiff along with its in-

es 241

jured employees. Its cause of action for burial expense
included in the state-fund case stands upon the same footing
as its rights in the employees’ case. Sec. 102.29 (1), Stats.,
makes it clear that the cause of action of an employee, his
personal representative, or other person entitled to bring
action against a third party for negligently causing injury
or death is not affected by the ‘making of a claim for work-
men’s compensation. Sub. (1) provides for the division be-
tween the employer or insurer and the employee of the
proceeds recovered from any such third party and regulates
the prosecution of the cause of action. In prosecuting this
claim the employer or insurer stands in the shoes of the
beneficiary to whom it has paid or is to pay compensation.
London G. & A. Co..v. Wisconsin P. S. Corp. 228 Wis.
441, 279 N. W. 76; Saxhaug v. Forsyth Leather Co. 252
Wis. 376, 384, 31 N. W. (2d) 589; Eleason v. Western
Casualty & Surety Co. 254 Wis. 134, 140, 35 N. W. (2d)
301. Downing’s negligence is not imputed to his injured
fellow employees and therefore does not constitute a defense
to the action to recover for their injuries even though re-
spondent will share in the recovery by reason of payment of
compensation benefits.

In the employees’ action appellant cross-complained against
the respondent for contribution in the event that appellant
be held liable. This court has decided, however, that a negli-
gent third party who is held liable to an injured employee
cannot require contribution from the employer even though
the employer be negligent. This holding is based upon the
proposition that the sole liability of the employer to the
employee is his liability under the compensation act and
there is no common liability of the employer and third
party to the injured employee even though their concurring
negligence caused the injury. Buggs v. Wolff, 201 Wis. 533,
536, 230 N. W. 621; Clark v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.

2s
Pd

Co, 214 Wis. 295, 252 N. W. 685. Accordingly, the circuit
court correctly sustained the: Power Company’s demurrer to
appellant’s cross complaint.

Appellant has argued in this court, raising the question
for the first time on appeal, that if sec. 102.29, Stats., is
interpreted so as to deny the appellant the partial or complete
defense which would be afforded by the comparative-negli-
gence rule and to deny appellant a right to contribution from
respondent as a joint tort-feasor, the statute discriminates
against appellant and deprives it of property without due
process of law. Appellant points out that Verhelst Con-
struction Co, v. Galles, 204 Wis. 96, 235 N. W. 556, wherein
sec. 102.29 was held constitutional, did not decide whether
that section is constitutional if the third party is deprived
of contribution from an employer who is a joint tort-feasor.
It is the rule of this court that it ordinarily will not consider
the question of constitutionality which has been raised for
the first time on appeal but will deem that any such right
which may have existed was waived by failure to raise it
early in the proceeding before the trial court. State ex rel.
Nelson v. Rock County, 271 Wis. 312, 317, 73 N. W. (2d)
564; Baker v. Leenhouts, 257 Wis. 584, 44 N. W. (2d)
544; certiorari denied, 341 U. S. 945, 71 Sup. Ct. 1019, 95
L. Ed. 1370. There is no reason for following a different
rule in this case,

Appellant argues that great unfairness may result under
some circumstances from the interpretations of these statutes
formerly adopted by this court and adhered to in this decision.
These arguments may well have merit but they are arguments
for amendment of the statutes involved.

By the Court.—Orders in each case affirmed.

Currig, J., took no part.

243

Wuire House Mitx Company, Respondent, vs. Tomson,
Attorney General, and others, Defendants: Purr MirK
Propucts Co-oPERATIVE, Proposed Intervenor and
Appellant.

February 6—March 5, 1957.

26s

Le}
For the appellant there was a brief by St. Peter & Hauer
of Fond du Lac, and oral argument by George M. St. Peter.
For the respondent there was a brief by Michael, Spohn,
Best & Friedrich, attorneys, and Kenneth K. Luce and John
K. Maclver of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument

by Mr. Luce and Mr. Maclver.

Currtz, J. Sec. 100.22, Stats., which the plaintiff seeks
to have declared unconstitutional, is a criminal statute which
prohibits a purchaser of milk, cream, or butterfat from
paying different prices for such products in different commu-
nities of the state, unless justified by a commensurate differ-
ence in quantity or quality, or in transportation charges or
other expense of marketing involved in the purchase. It is
apparent from the express wording of the statute that its
purpose is to prevent unfair discrimination in the purchase of
such dairy products between different communities or sec-
tions of the state.

The brief of the co-operative asserts that among its pro-
ducing members which it represents are 728 farmers who sell
milk, cream, or butterfat to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
interested in having sec. 100.22, Stats., declared unconstitu-
tional so that it can pay lower prices in certain communities
than would be the case if compliance with this statute were
required. On the other hand, it is to the interest of the
co-operative, and its members who sell to the plaintiff, that
sec. 100.22 be determined to be constitutional in order that
the plaintiff not be permitted to reduce the prices paid by it
for these dairy products anywhere in the state below the
highest prices, which it is forced to pay to meet competition
in any of the five communities of the state where it is en-
gaged in business.

In a common-law jurisdiction, such as Wisconsin, inter-
vention is a matter of statutory creation, it not having been
recognized at common law. 67 C. J. S., Parties, p. 975, sec.
53b. Counsel for the co-operative ground their clients
claimed right of intervention upon that portion of sec. 260.19,
Stats., which provides that “when persons not parties have
such interests in the subject matter of the controversy as
require them to be parties for their protection, the court shall
order them brought in,”

It was the conclusion of the learned trial judge, as stated
in his memorandum opinion, that while the co-operative and
its farmer members have a general interest in the outcome of
the pending action, this is not a sufficient interest to entitle
them to be made defendants. The memorandum opinion
points out that other producers of milk, cream, or butterfat,
not members of the co-operative as well as all consumers of
such products, also have this same general interest.

The attorney general is one of the three original defendants
in the action, and it is his duty to uphold the constitution-
ality of the attacked statute. In so doing he is acting in
a representative capacity in behalf of all the people of the
state, including those who are members of the co-operative.
This being so, we find it extremely difficult to perceive how
their interests “require” that the co-operative be made a
party for the protection of interests which are already being
adequately protected. 39 Am. Jur., Parties, p. 934, sec. 60,
states:

“Tt is universal that no one has any right to intervene in
any action unless he has some right to protect which is not
being protected.”

Certainly the co-operative is not a necessary party to the
controversy presented in the pending action. We hesitate
to hold that it is even a proper party, absent any allegation
in the petition for intervention that the attorney general has

2
a

failed in his duty to properly defend the action and uphold
the constitutionality of the challenged statute. Nevertheless,
even if it were conceded to be a proper party, the co-operative
cannot prevail on this appeal without demonstrating that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the application
for intervention. Schateman v. Greenfield (1956), 273 Wis.
277, 281, 77 N. W. (2d) 511; Fish Creek Park Co. v. Bay-
side (1956), 273 Wis. 89, 93, 76 N. W. (2d) 557; and
Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co. (1928), 196 Wis.
76, 98, 219 N. W. 428.

This court held in the Muscoda Bridge Co. Case that the
village of Muscoda and town of Eagle, because of being
partly liable for the construction of the bridge, possessed
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the controversy to
make them proper parties to the action. The denial of their
application for intervention by the trial court was affirmed
as not being an abuse of discretion on the ground that their
interest would be sufficiently protected by reason of the
state and counties having been made parties. We deem such
decision to be decisive of the instant appeal. Here the in-
terests of the co-operative and its members are sufficiently
protected by having the attorney general as a party defendant.

The provisions of the trial court’s order granting to the
co-operative the right to file a brief amicus curiae, and to
make an oral argumerit at the conclusion of the trial, further
negative any charge of abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court.

Counsel for the co-operative place great reliance upon the
decision of the Montana court in State ex rel. Westlake v.
District Court (1946), 119 Mont. 222, 227, 173 Pac. (2d)
896, 169 A. L. R. 827, which directed that intervention
should be granted in a fact situation very similar to that in
the instant case, where the validity of a statute was the sub-
ject matter of the controversy. However, the Montana
statute which controlled reads very differently from our sec.

260.19. Such Montana statute grants to any person “who
has an interest in the matter in litigation [or], in the success
of either of the parties,” the right to intervene in the action.
Our statute does not go that far. It is also interesting to note
that California, which has the same intervention statute as
Montana, does not construe the same as liberally as does
Montana. Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939),
13 Cal. (2d) 661, 91 Pac. (2d) 599.

The brief of Pure Milk Products also cites sub. (11) of
sec, 269.56, Stats. (the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act), which subsection provides, “When declaratory relief
is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declara-
tion.” To place the interpretation on such subsection that
is here urged by the co-operative would render the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act unworkable as a procedural de-
vice for securing a determination of the validity of a statute
or ordinance. This is because it would require joining as
parties all persons who might be affected by the outcome,
who in the instant case might be thousands of dairy farmers.
Such provision should be reasonably interpreted, keeping in
mind the objectives of the act. Therefore, we construe such
subsection as not requiring the joinder as parties, in a de-
claratory action to determine the validity of a statute or
ordinance, of any persons other than the public officers
charged with the enforcement of the challenged statute or
ordinance. Such defendant public officers act in a representa-
tive capacity in behalf of all persons having an interest in
upholding the validity of the statute or ordinance under at-
tack. For a further discussion of this point, see Blooming
Grove v. Madison, post, pp. 328, 334, 81 N. W. (2d) 713.

The co-operative is apprehensive that the attorney general
will not diligently and adequately defend the action, and, if
the action is determined adversely to the defendants, that
he will not appeal such result to this court. Such fear is

Eee e eee

250 es
SY

grounded upon a letter which the attorney general wrote
May 31, 1951, to the general manager of the co-operative.
Such letter expressed the opinion that sec. 100.22, Stats.,
was unconstitutional under the decision of the United States
supreme court in Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota
(1927), 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 506, 71 L. Ed. 893, For
this reason the attorney general at that time declined to take
action to enforce sec. 100.22. 52 Am. Jur., Taxpayers’ Ac-
tions, p. 18, sec. 26, states:

“Public officers are always presumed, in the absence of
any showing to the contrary, to be ready and willing to
perform their duty; and until it is made to appear that they
have refused to do so, or have neglected to act under cir-
cumstances rendering this equivalent to a refusal, there is
no occasion for the intervention of the citizen for the pro-
tection of himself and others similarly situated.”

This court cannot assume, because the attorney general
nearly six years ago expressed a doubt as to the constitution-
ality of sec. 100.22, Stats., and at that time declined to in-
stitute a prosecution under such statute, that he will not at
this time properly and diligently defend the action. Likewise,
-we cannot conceive of the attorney general failing to perform
his duty of appealing, if the trial court should adjudge
sec. 100.22 unconstitutional. The issue of the validity of
such statute is of such state-wide concern that he would be
derelict in his duty if he did not appeal an adverse judg-
ment. We must presume that he will perform his duty until
such time as we are presented with convincing evidence to
the contrary.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Wincert, J., took no part.

Kiura, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Respondents,
vs. Crossy, Appellant.

February 6—~March 5, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by Kaftan, Kaftan &
Kaftan of Green Bay, and oral argument by Fred F. Kaftan.

2

For the respondents there was a brief by Cohen & Parins,
attorneys, and Colburn G. Cherney of counsel, all of Green
Bay, and oral argument by Robert J. Parins.

Martin, C. J. Defendant is the owner and operator of
a garage, gasoline station, and wrecker service in the city
of Green Bay. The amended complaint alleges, among other
things, that on July 26, 1953, William Kluth, fifteen years
of age, was a frequenter and guest in defendant’s place of
business which is a place of employment ; that he was severely
burned in an explosion and fire which resulted from defend-
ant’s violation of certain orders of the industrial commission:
In the manner in which he maintained and permitted battery-
charging equipment in his premises; in that he failed to
keep drainage of crankcases in a tightly inclosed metal con-
tainer ; in that he permitted his premises to become dirty and
unsafe and that he authorized and permitted gasoline to be
used for the purpose of cleaning the premises; all in viola-
tion of sec. 101.06, Stats., and as the result of which plain-
tiffs sustained the damages complained of.

Defendant’s answer denies that his premises are a place of
employment; denies that William Kluth was a frequenter
and guest on defendant’s premises; denies the alleged viola-
tions of the industrial commission orders as set out above;
and alleges that William Kluth had knowledge of the condi-
tion of the premises in the respects referred to, voluntarily
acquiesced in the same, and assumed any risk incidental
thereto.

The motion for summary judgment was supported by an
affidavit of defendant’s attorney setting forth excerpts from
an adverse examination of William Kluth in which he testi-
fied that on the day of the fire he swept the floor of defend-
ant’s premises and scrubbed it with gasoline; that the floor
was very dirty under a bench where there was a storage
battery used as a booster battery in winter, and in order

to clean that area he grasped the battery by one of the cables,
pulled it out, and when hé let go of the cable it contacted the
other cable, producing a spark which set the fire. Excerpts
from the father’s adverse examination were also set forth
in which Bernard Kluth testified as to what his son had told
him about the fire, which testimony was to the same effect
as William’s, with the following additional statements:

“Q. You heard him testify that he was cleaning the floor
because Mr. Crosby had told him to-clean the floor? A. Yes.

“Q. And that that was the usual way they did it there?
A. That was the habit there, that’s the way I understand
it.”
' The affidavit of the guardian ad litem in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment states, in addition to the code
violations alleged in the amended complaint, that the defend-
ant specifically instructed William Kluth and his younger
brother Ronald to clean the premises with the use of gasoline
and that the boys were permitted to do so unattended by an
adult; that William Kluth was on the’ premises upon the
express invitation of the defendant. A supplemental affidavit
of the guardian ad litem sets forth certain testimony of the
defendant on adverse examination to the effect that William
Kluth was never his employee, that the boy hung around the
gas station. because his brother worked there and he was
interested in automobiles; that William would sometimes
sweep up the place, but “I never asked him to; he did it on
his own accord;” and that the defendant sometimes gave
the boy money as a gift because he felt sorry for him or
wanted to get rid of him.

Further excerpts from William’s adverse examination
were set out by the guardian ad litem, in which the boy
testified that the defendant “told us to clean, to clean it up,
which they had always did, that’s their method that they
always used,” naming the defendant’s employees and the de-

fendant himself whom he had seen using gasoline to scrub
the floor. As to whether the defendant ever told him to do
it that way, he stated:

“4, I don’t recall if he did or not, but he had said clean
up at the time.

“Q. You don’t recall that he ever told you to clean up by
using gasoline, did you? A. Well, I think at a time back, he
said use a little gas.”

He further testified that he did not know that gasoline
would catch on fire and there were no signs about the
premises warning about being careful with fire or smoke.

It is obvious that the facts appearing from the pleadings
and.affidavits give rise to a number of substantial issues on
which there are facts to be established and inferences to be
drawn therefrom, all of which are matters for a jury. De-
fendant is not entitled to summary judgment unless the
facts presented conclusively show that the plaintiffs’ action
has no merit and cannot be maintained.

In Ailas Investment Co. v. Christ (1942), 240 Wis. 114,
117, 2 N. W. (2d) 714, where the motion for summary
judgment was brought by the plaintiff, this court said:

“The purpose to be served by the summary-judgment
statute so far as it relates to motions by plaintiff, is to pre-
vent interposition of false or frivolous answers for the pur-
poses of accomplishing a delay in the securing of a just
judgment. The statute is, however, drastic and is to be availed
of only when it is apparent that there is no substantial issue
to be tried. Prime Mfg. Co. v. A. F. Gallun & Sons Corp.
(1938), 229 Wis. 348, 349, 350, 281 N. W. 697. It is not
a substitute for a regular trial nor does it authorize trial of
controlling issues on affidavits.”

While the defendant is the moving party in this instance,
the same rule applies. There are substantial issues to be
tried; they cannot be decided on affidavits.

By the Court—Order affirmed.

Brwprz, Respondent, vs. Bippie, Appellant.
February 6—March 5, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Baumblatt & Good-
man of Racine, and oral argument by L. P. Baumblatt.

For the respondent there was a brief by La France,
Thompson, Greenquist, Zahn & Dye of Racine, and oral
argument by Kenneth L. Greenquist.

Broaproot, J. Sec. 247.37 (2), Stats., provides that the
court shall have power to vacate or modify a judgment of
divorce for sufficient cause shown at any time within one

2s

year from the granting of the judgment. In her petition the
defendant alleged that she had reason to believe that the
plaintiff had committed adultery after the entry of the judg-
ment. .

The findings and the record show that the plaintiff owned
a lake cottage near Racine, Wisconsin; that on or about
December 23, 1955, plaintiff became engaged to marry a
young lady he had met prior to the entry of the judgment
of divorce; that plaintiff and the young lady of his choice
planned to marry as soon as the divorce judgment permitted ;
that during the month of April, 1956, plaintiff entertained
his fiancee at said lake cottage; that on some occasions other
persons were present; that on other occasions plaintiff and
his fiancee spent several hours alone in the cottage; that
the visits were conducted openly and without secrecy and that
friends and neighbors were in the habit of calling at the
cottage frequently, and that there was no proof from which
the court could find that the visits of the young lady were not
for a proper purpose. The court concluded that plaintiff had
ample opportunity to commit adultery but that defendant had
failed to prove any inclination of the plaintiff‘or the young
lady to commit adultery.

No useful purpose can be served in citing the evidence in
detail. However, we have carefully checked the entire record
and determine that the judge’s findings, conclusions, and
order were amply sustained by the record.

‘By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Ce) 257
Lt

Cuampeau and others, Appellants, vs. VitLacE or LITTLE
CuuteE, Respondent.

February 6-—March 5, 1957.

a ae 259

For the appellants there was a brief by Cain & Herrling
of Appleton, and oral argument by Don R. Herrling.

For the respondent there was a brief by Van Susteren &
Bollenbeck of Appleton, and oral argument by Urban P.
Van Susteren.

Brown, J. While we cannot agree with the learned trial
court in all its conclusions, we consider that it reached the
right result and its judgment must be affirmed.

In Flamingo v. Waukesha (1952), 262 Wis. 219, 55
N. W. (2d) 24, we reviewed many Wisconsin actions in
which liability was sought to be imposed on municipalities
for injuries arising out of the exercise of their governmental
functions. We concluded there that the maintenance of a
municipal dump is a governmental function and we held
(p. 224) :

“. . . Wisconsin municipalities avoid liability for damage
caused by their negligence in carrying out governmental
functions where they have not created a nuisance in fact, and
even where such a nuisance has been created, liability is not
imposed if the relationship of governor and governed exists
between the municipality and the injured party.”

From this it appears that the village of Little Chute would
be liable for William’s injuries if they were caused by the
creation and continuance by defendant of a nuisance in fact
and at the time of the accident the relationship of governor
and governed did not exist between the parties. In our view
that relationship did not exist. The two boys were using the
dump as a place to play, which is completely outside the pur-
pose of the village in establishing it. They were not availing
themselves of any of the facilities which the dump was in-
tended to provide. As in the Flamingo Case, supra, we held
that the governor-and-governed relationship did not apply
to a boy playing on a snow pile created by the city in cleaning

20

streets, so here we consider that no such relationship arose
when William played on the rubbish dump.

The evidence supports the finding that the manner in
which the village maintained and operated the dump con-
stituted it a nuisance, but that, we think, does not make the
village liable for each and every injury occurring there or
traceable to the existence of the dump. Essential to liability,
a proximate cause of the injury must be one or more of those
conditions upon which the finding of nuisance rests. We con-
sider that the “nuisance exception” to the general rule which
exempts municipalities from liability for injuries caused by
their negligence in their performance of governmental func-
tions demands a showing not only that a nuisance was cre-
ated but that those acts or defaults which caused the nuisance
to exist also had a causal connection with the injury com-
plained of.

In the present case the evidence upon which the finding of
nuisance rests shows that the dump frequently caught on fire,
litter from it blew onto surrounding private property, it
formed a haven for rats and flies, and it produced unpleasant
odors. William’s injuries are attributable to none of these
conditions. The abatement of every one of them and the
consequent abatement of the nuisance itself would not have
affected the occurrence of this accident in the least. The only
connection of the injury with the dump is that the boys found
the stove there. The very considerable labor they afterwards
went to to produce the injury demonstrates that in so far as
the dump may have been a nuisance those conditions did not
contribute to the accident. A causal connection between the
injury and the conditions creating the nuisance appears to us
to be absent. Consequently the judgment dismissing the com-
plaint was properly granted.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

261

Larson, Respondent, vs. Supertor Auto Parts, Inc.,
Appellant.

February 7—March 5, 1957.

267

For the appellant there was a brief by Johnson, Fritschler,
Barstow & Witkin of Superior, and oral argument by Bar-
ney B. Barstow.

For the respondent there was a brief by Crawford, Craw-
ford & Civilli of Superior, and oral argument by Raymond
A. Crawford.

SrEtntz, J. Challenge is directed by the defendant, Su-
perior Auto Parts, Inc., to the trial court’s determination
that the defendant’s offer as contained in the agreement of
January 30, 1947, between all of its stockholders (including.
plaintiff) to purchase the plaintiff's shares of stock, was a
continuing one, and that it was in full force and effect when
accepted by the plaintiff. The defendant submits that the
evidence conclusively indicates that no continuing offer was
ever intended. In the alternative it maintains, that if the offer
is to be construed as a continuing one, then under the evi-
dence it must be held that the offer was terminated before
there was any acceptance of it.

On the former appeal this court held that while the agree-
ment of January 30, 1947, was not enforceable as to the
plaintiff with respect to binding him to sell his stock when
he left the defendant’s employ, for the reason that contrary
to sec. 183.14, Stats., the restrictions of the contract were not
stated upon the plaintiff's certificates of stock, nevertheless
the defendant’s promise could be treated as a continuing offer
to buy, which, if accepted by the plaintiff before the offer was
revoked, would ripen into a binding contract. Specifically

2

it was said (p. 620) : “We regard the corporation’s promise
to buy as such a continuing offer. It was never withdrawn
by the corporation and was accepted by the respondent when
his employment was terminated and he demanded the stipu-
lated price for his stock.” It is to be recognized that such
observation pertained to the facts alleged in the complaint,
which were to be taken as true when the sufficiency in law
of the same was being tested on demurrer. By its answer
the defendant denied all allegations and implications that the
offer was a continuing one, and that it had not been termi-
nated prior to the acceptance by the plaintiff. Such issues
were tried and determined by the court. It is the rule that
in a trial to the court, findings of fact will not be set aside
on appeal unless they are contrary to the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence. Swazee v. Lee (1951),
259 Wis. 136, 47 N. W. (2d) 733.

The defendant contends that since this court on the previ-

“ous appeal determined that the contract was not enforceable

as to the plaintiff in respect to compelling him to sell his
stock, it may not be considered as a continuing offer to pur-
chase it. In the light of the arguments presented on this
appeal we have again considered the views expressed in the
opinion on the former appeal with reference to this subject,
and have concluded not to depart from what was there said
to the effect that the contract could be a continuing offer to
purchase the plaintiff's stock. That it was a continuing offer
has now been determined as a fact by the trial court.

It is plain that the agreement itself constitutes an offer to
purchase a stockholder’s shares in the event that his employ-
ment with the defendant company is terminated, and pro-
vided that the company has a surplus as contemplated. The
evidence indicates that Anderson, Kopito, and Larson each
recognized that the offer was a continuing one. In 1948
Anderson and Kopito expressed to the defendant their desire

ee 269
Pd

to sell their stock pursuant to the contract. Larson did so
in 1954, Anderson and Kopito, however, were not in a
position to compel a performance of the offer at the time, for
the reason that they had not severed their services with the
company. Defendant’s position that Larson did not consider
the offer as a continuing one is predicated on several bases,
viz., (a) that Larson testified he “never made any acceptance
because he was never offered any. Never made any offer
for any stock,” (b) for the reason that in a letter by Larson
to the company and Kopito dated July 9, 1954, he stated that
since his certificate did not contain the restriction in the by-
laws, he considered that he need not first offer his stock for
sale to the board of directors, (c) for the reason that in his
letter of August 9, 1954, addressed to the defendant and
Kopito wherein he demanded a purchase of his stock pur-
suant to the terms of the agreement, he made no reference
“to any acceptance of the offer, (d) his demand was in reality
an offer and not an acceptance.

With reference to the first of these items it appears that
the statements were made at a time when Larson was being
examined as a witness with reference to his demand that the
company purchase his stock. He had stated that he visited
the company’s place of business, and that in a discussion with
Kopito had advised him that he wanted book value for his
stock. Manifestly, the court construed his statement to mean
that the company was unwilling to purchase his shares in
accordance with the agreement. As to the second item, it
does not appear that Larson inferred that he was at liberty
to sell his shares to anyone. In another portion of the letter
he specifically demanded that the company purchase his stock
pursuant to the contract. As to the third item it is apparent
from the very statement itself that demand was being made
pursuant to the contract. As to the fourth item, it is con-
sidered that the acceptance of an offer need not be in any

20
Pe

particular form. The request of Larson to the company that
it purchase his stock in accordance with the terms of the
contract may well be considered an acceptance of the offer.

We find no merit to the contention that the court’s finding
to the effect that the offer was a continuing one, is contrary
to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

With respect to its position that the offer was terminated
prior to any acceptance thereof, the defendant points to the
evidence that when Anderson and Kopito made their over-
tures for the sale of their stock to the company pursuant to
the contract, the defendant took no action with regard to
purchasing the same; that when the defendant did not pur-
chase Anderson’s stock, he sold part of it to another stock-
holder; that when the company did not purchase Kopito’s
stock, he did not attempt to force the defendant to comply
with the contract; that the defendant purchased stock from
a stockholder on a basis different than book value as con-
templated by the contract. As we have already observed,
neither Anderson nor Kopito at the time when they requested
the company to purchase their stock, or sold any portion
thereof to the company, was eligible to enforce compliance
with the contract. The defendant was not required, therefore,
to accede to the demands of Anderson and Kopito. The rec-
ord indicates that Larson was the first eligible stockholder
to make a demand that the company purchase stock under the
contract.

While an offer may be revoked by a communication from
the offeror to the offeree that the offeror no longer intends
to enter into the proposed contract, providing the communi-
cation is received by the offeree before he has exercised his
power of creating a contract by acceptance of the offer,
Frank v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1938), 227 Wis. 613,
277 N. W. 643, from the evidence here it does not appear
that the defendant, its officers, or agents at any time com-

a Ce 271

municated to the interested stockholders an intention to with-
draw or revoke the offer to purchase.

. By deciding that the continuing offer of the defendant to
purchase plaintiff's stock was in full force and effect when
it was accepted by the plaintiff, the court impliedly deter-
mined that the offer had not been withdrawn or revoked.
Such determination is not contrary to the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence.

» The defendant also contends that specific performance
should have been denied for the reason that the enforcement
of the offer would produce a harsh, inequitable, and oppres-
sive result in view of the difference in the book value of the
stock and the market value of the inventory. True, one of
the general rules is that equitable relief will not be granted
if under the circumstances of the case, the result of the spe-
cific performance would be harsh, inequitable, oppressive, or
result in an unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff, even
though the complainant has no intention of taking an unfair
advantage, and even though the contract may be valid and
enforceable at law. 49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, p. 72,
sec. 58, However, a contract is to be judged as of the time
when it was entered into, and if fair when made, the fact that
it has become a harsh one or less beneficial to the party sued,
by the force of subsequent circumstances or changing events,
will not necessarily prevent its specific performance, unless
such change is in some way the fault of the party seeking its
specific execution. 49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance,
pp. 77, 78, sec. 63. The inadequacy of price which will defeat
specific performance must be an inadequacy existing at the
time the contract was made. 49 Am. Jur., Specific Perform-
ance, p. 81, sec. 65.

It clearly appears from the evidence that the contract in
question when made was not harsh, inequitable, or oppres-
sive. Parties may contract for the sale of stock at book value.

27, rms

“The weighit of authority is to the effect that a corporate by+
law which requires the owner of the; stock.to give the-other
stockholders of the corporation, or the’ corporators, in case
the ‘corporation is empowered to purchase its own stock, an.
option to purchase the same at an agreed price or the then-
existing .book value. before offering the stock for sale to an
outsider, is a:valid and reasonable restriction and binding’
upon the stockholders.” Doss v. Yingling (1930), 95 Ind.
App. 494, 500, 172 N. E. 801. Such rule manifestly applies
whether the option to purchase is granted under a by-law
or a contract. .

It appears from the evidence that on May 31, 1954, the:
defendant company had a net worth of $95,844.98, with
current assets of $105,085.79 and current liabilities of
$9,240.81, thereby making it eligible under the contract to
purchase the plaintiff's stock which according to book value
was then worth $36,450.70.

As against the claims of the defendant, the trial court was:
entitled to weigh the equities in favor of the plaintiff. It.
does not appear that there was an abuse of discretion in the
matter of the consideration and determination of the equities.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Broaproot, J., dissents.

ee 273
Pe

Wonper-Rest Corporation, Appellant, vs. Gatina, Peti-
tioner: Wisconsin EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS Boanp,
Respondent. [Case No. 202.]

Wisconsin EmpLoyMEntT RELations Boarp, Respondent,
vs. Wonper-Rest Corporation, Appellant. [Case

» No. 203.] Loe ,

February 7—March 5, 1957.

2 rs
L_—(i‘“‘(CC‘*z

For the appellant there were briefs and oral argument by
A. L. Skolnik of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief by the Attorney Gen-
eral and Beatrice Lampert, assistant attorney general, and
oral argument by Mrs. Lampert.

Wincert, J. 1. At the outset we are met by the conten-
tion that Galina’s complaint of unfair labor practice was
barred by failure to exhaust the grievance procedure provided
by the collective-bargaining contract.

Art. III, sec. 1 of the contract provided for a committee of
three employees to act as a grievance committee “in behalf
of the employees” to adjust grievances and disputes arising
under the terms of the contract, with representatives of the
company. There was no provision, however, prescribing any
procedure to be followed by an individual employee in pre-
senting a grievance, nor requiring individual grievances to
be presented exclusively through the grievance committee.
The record does not disclose whether or not a grievance
committee had actually been established pursuant to the con-
tract.

The board found as facts:

“That on October 4,°1954, following his layoff, the com-
plainant placed a call to William Kuester, his union repre-
sentative, now deceased, protesting his layoff, and requesting

r |) 27

assistance to adjust the matter; that neither Kuester nor any
other representative of the union has ever presented or proc-

essed a.grievance on behalf of the complainant concerning
his layoff.”

Galina testified that he called Kuester the next day after
he was laid off and Kuester replied, “I can’t help you with
nothing.” . .

In that situation,-nothing in the contract or in law barred
Galina from presenting his claim of unfair labor practice to
the board, or the board from entertaining it.

2. On the merits, we are constrained to hold that the board
erred in ruling that Galina’s seniority rights were violated
when he was laid off on October 4, 1954. Accordingly the
order for reinstatement and back pay must be set aside.

It is an unfair labor practice “to violate the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement” (sec. 111.06 (1) (£), Stats.
1953), and in appropriate proceedings the bodrd may order
the violator to comply with the contract. Dunphy Boat Corp.
vu. Wisconsin E. R. Board, 267 Wis. 316, 322, 323, 64 N. W.
(2d) 866.

The violation found by the board consisted in laying off
Galina while retaining the employees with less seniority. The
board held that Galina’s seniority dated from his original
employment in 1950, and that his layoff ahead of the other
two men in the department, who were hired in later years,
violated the contractual requirement that “employees will be
laid off according to seniority.”

Concededly Galina was put on sick leave when he was hurt,
and was treated by the company as on leave of absence until
the meeting of September 18, 1954. We assume that while
on such leave of absence he remained an employee and re-
tained his seniority.

The controversy turns on the effect of the occurrences at
the meeting of September 18th between Galina and his
spokesman and representatives of the company and union.

The company contends that in effect Galina was then dis-
charged for failing to maintain his membership in the union
in good standing by paying his union dues, and that there-
fore he lost all seniority rights and started at the bottom of
the seniority ladder when he returned to work on Septem-
ber 27th. On the other hand, the board stated in its memo-
randum decision that the company did not terminate the
employment status in any way, but kept Galina on the pay
roll on a leave-of-absence status; and it made a formal find-
ing of fact that he was treated as being on leave of absence
until September 25, 1954. The board concluded that he
therefore retained seniority from his original employment in
1950.

We are constrained to hold that the board’s determination
cannot stand. Giving the evidence of the transaction of
September 18th the interpretation most favorable to Galina,
and accepting* the board’s finding of fact that the company
agreed to return him to active employment only upon the
condition that he again join the union and start as a new
employee, we think the only permissible conclusion is that
his old employment was terminated pursuant to the contract
with the union, on account of his failure to pay the dues
required to maintain his membership in the union in good
standing. Any other interpretation of the company’s position
and statements at the meeting seems unrealistic. The board’s
finding that the union did not request Galina’s discharge
does not alter the case, because under the maintenance-of-
membership provision of the contract, the company was with-
in its rights in discharging the delinquent employee without
waiting for a request from the union.

This conclusion disposes of the present appeal, for it fol-
lows that when Galina went back to work on September 27th,
it was a new employment rather than a continuation of the
old one, and therefore he lost the benefit of his previous sen-
iority and was junior to the two other employees in the de-

a Ce 279
Pe

partment. Therefore no seniority rights were violated when
he was subsequently laid off.

3. Counsel for the board argues that the finding of unfair
labor practice and the order for reinstatement with back pay
are nevertheless sustainable on other grounds. It is said that
in laying off Galina on October 4, 1954, the company violated
provisions of the contract to the general effect (1) that
available work should be divided equally among all “regular”
employees “so far as is practicable,’ (2) that employees
should be laid off only when there is less than thirty-two
hours of work per week available for each- employee, (3)
that prior to any layoff, the company will “whenever possi-
ble” give a full pay-period advance notice to any employee
who is to be laid off, and (4) will consult the committee of
the union regarding the contemplated layoffs.

The board’s findings of fact were directed exclusively to
the alleged violation of seniority rights by laying off Galina
while retaining junior employees, and are inadequate to sup-
port a finding that the employer committed the unfair labor
practice of violating the contract in any of the other respects
now asserted. Indeed Galina’s petition to the board did not
assert other violations, and they were scarcely litigated. Be-
fore the order for reinstatement and back pay could be sus-
tained, there would have to be findings on such questions as
whether Galina was a “regular” employee, and whether it
was “practicable” to divide the available work so as to avoid
laying him off.

In order that the board may determine whether to proceed
further on Galina’s complaint, by way of amendment, further
hearing, additional findings, or otherwise, the lower court
will be directed to remand the case to the board for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4. Since the board’s order must be set aside in toto, we
need not consider the company’s criticism of that part of it
requiring payment of $1,000 on account of wage loss.

|

250

By the Court—The judgment in No. 202 is reversed, with
directions to set aside the order of the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board and remand the record to the board
for any-further proceedings consistent with this opinion that
may be appropriate.

The judgment in No. 203 is reversed, with directions to
dismiss the petition for enforcement.

Axzert and another, Appellants, vs. Home Fire & Marine
InsuRANCE ComMpANY oF CALIFoRNIA and others,
Respondents.

February 7—March 5, 1957.

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1
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1

256

For the appellants there were briefs and oral argument by
A. L, Skolnik of Milwaukee.

For the respondents there was a brief by Bert Cotton of
New York, N. Y., and Wolfe, O’Leary & Kenney of Mil-
waukee, and oral argument by Mr. Cotton and Mr. H. O.
Wolfe.

FaircuiLp, J. Appellants assert that the circuit court
should have received the testimony of Kaufman and Theo-
dore Albert concerning the instructions orally given by Kauf-
man. Appellants apparently concede that an oral waiver
would be ineffective under the terms of the policy, but urge
that Kaufman’s instructions set up an estoppel in pais.

Kaufman’s instructions were vague. He said to use the
“last fiscal inventory.” There was no discussion as to when
appellants’ “fiscal period” ended. On the other hand, it is
clear from the terms of the policy that the actual cash value
on the last day of the calendar month is to be reported and
that the accuracy and timeliness of the report will affect the
amount of insurance in force. Appellants interpreted Kauf-
man’s words as meaning that they should use a September
30th figure in reporting a value as of October 30th. Giving
that effect to what Kaufman said would alter the unambigu-
ous provisions of the contract. But the local agent’s oral
misinterpretation of unambiguous provisions as to coverage

re 287

cannot work a modification of the contract by estoppel or
otherwise. Cullen v. Travelers Ins. Co. 214 Wis. 467, 253
N. W. 382; Colvin’s Baking Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins.
Co. 215 Wis. 475, 480, 255 N. W. 268. Appellants cite
Spohn v. National Fire Ins. Co. 190 Wis. 446, 209 N. W.
725, but the doctrine of estoppel was invoked in that case to
prevent a forfeiture and not to alter the provisions of the
policy as to coverage. The agent had authority to validate
an assignment and had possession of the policy for that
purpose, delivered the policy to the assignee, and told the
assignee he was “protected,” but failed to validate the assign-
ment in writing. .

In Peters v. Great American Ins. Co. (4th Cir.), 177 Fed.
(2d) 773, a reporting type of policy was involved. The in-
sured claimed he had been misled by an agent’s erroneous
instructions as to computing the value of inventory. The
court stated that coverage rather than forfeiture was involved
and held there was neither waiver nor estoppel.

We conclude that the circuit court properly excluded the
offers of proof.

Appellants also assert that the provisions of the reporting
form violate sec. 203.22, Stats., reading in part as follows:

“203.22 CoINSURANCE CLAUSES. Except as otherwise
provided by law, no fire insurance company shall issue any
policy in this state containing any provision limiting the
amount to be paid in case of loss below the actual cash value
of the property, if within the amount for which the premium
is paid, unless, at the option of the insured, a reduced rate
shall be given for the use of a coinsurance clause made a part
of the policy.”

Appellants point out that the $68,039.85 awarded them
by the circuit court is less than the actual cash value of the
property lost and less than the agreed $125,000 limitation.
They point out that when the final premium was calculated,
the $63,000 value reported as of October 30th and the

258

$175,000 value reported as of November 30th were both
included in the average. Therefore they say they paid a
premium for an average of $119,000 of coverage up to the
time of the fire and that no limitation below that amount is
valid. The report of $175,000 as of November 30th was
made after the fire and was in fact an overstatement by about
$25,000.

Thus we reach the question whether the provisions of the
reporting form are forbidden by sec. 203.22, Stats.

This statute was considered in Newton v. Theresa Village
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 125 Wis. 289, 104 N. W. 107, and in
Bloch v. American Ins. Co. 132 Wis. 150, 112 N. W. 45.
These cases dealt with versions of a different type of clause,
and are helpful only as the general purposes of the statute
were discussed. In the Newton Case, this court said
(p. 297):

“This provision is not as clear in its meaning as could be
wished, but the évident intent is to guaranty that the insured

shall, under the circumstances named, receive the full benefit
of the amount of the i insurance for which he pays.”

In the Bloch C

wo years later, it was said (p. 164):

“Tt is to have application only to cases in which the in-
surer attempts by stipulation in the policy, or with the policy,
without consent-of the insured and without reduction of
premium, to liniit its liability thereon below the amount or
face of the policy upon which or for which the insured has
paid full premiuni; and where the value of the goods de-
stroyed i is within the amount of such insurance carried on the
property.”

Under the reporting form, there is nothing to prevent
the insured from mairtitaining full coverage for the value of
his stock on hand, if‘he reports the value as of the close of
each month accurately ‘and, within the thirty days allowed.
Understatement will leaye him with less coverage than the

full value of his stock, but will also reduce his premium.
Overstatement will result in his paying more premium than
required, but, as in the case of understatement, it is his own
act which gets him into the difficulty. It does not seem
reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended to pro-
hibit an insurer from writing a policy which imposes upon
the insured the type of consequences of his own failure to
determine and report the true value of his own goods which
are imposed by the reporting form.

The reporting form has been considered by several appel-
late courts. Its purpose was well described in Peters v. Great
American Ins. Co. (4th Cir.),177 Fed. (2d) 773, 774, as
follows:

“Monthly reporting insurance is a device whereby the
amount of insurance under the policy fluctuates with the
value of the changing stock of merchandise in a going busi-
ness, It is designed to afford complete coverage and at the
same time to avoid the maintenance of insurance in excess
of the value of the property insured, so that the amount of
the insurance, and the amount of the premium to be paid,
are in direct proportion to the value of the goods on hand.
Such a policy is obviously more favorable to the insured than
a policy for a specified amount where the premium is calcu-
lated on the amount of insurance named in the policy al-
though the amount of the risk may be materially less from
time to time during the life of the contract.”

At page 776 it was said:

“Tt will be perceived that, within the maximum set by the
policy, the amount of the insurance carried, the amount of
the premium to be paid, and the extent of the liability of the
company under a policy of this kind are controlled by the
policyholder.”

In Camilla Feed Mills v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
(5th Cir.), 177 Fed. (2d) 746, 749, the insured claimed

that a reporting-form policy violated a Georgia statute which
provided :

“‘All insurance companies shall pay the full amount of
loss sustained upon the property insured by them: Provided,
said amount of loss does not exceed the amount of insurance
expressed in the policy; and all stipulations j in such policies
to the contrary shall be null and void.

The court of appeals distinguished between the provisions
in the.reporting form and “a provision that arbitrarily pre-
vents the insured from recovering the full amount of his loss
up to the amount of his policy, the policy being one under
which the insurer purports to assume the entire risk of loss.”

We are of the opinion that the use of this reporting-form
policy is not forbidden by sec. 203.22, Stats., and that the
circuit court correctly limited appellants’ recovery in accord-
ance with the provisions of the policy, using the incorrect
October 30th value reported by appellants in the calculation.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

EstaTE or STECK: OTTERSON, Executrix, Appellant, vs.
Fraser, Executor, and others, Respondents.*

February 7—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

292 rs

For the appellant there was a brief by Joseph J. O’Day,
attorney, and A. W. Schutz of counsel, both of Milwaukee,
and oral argument by Mr. Schutz.

For the respondent executor there was a brief by Churchill,
Duback & Churchill of Milwaukee, and oral argument by
Paul H. Duback.

For the respondent Marine National Exchange Bank there
was a brief by Kaumheimer, Alt & Likert of Milwaukee, and
orahargument by George H. Likert, Jr.

For the respondent remaindermen, except as below en-
tered, there was a brief by Shaw, Muskat & Paulsen and
R. J. Schimmel, attorneys, and F. H. Prosser of counsel, all
of Milwaukee.

For the respondent minor remaindermen Patricia Ann
Otterson and Mary Frances Otterson there was a brief and
oral argument by O. A. Grootemaat of Milwaukee, guardian
ad litem.

Martin, C. J. Vincent Steck died February 16, 1954, at
the age of seventy-eight, leaving his widow as his sole sur-
vivor. On September 18, 1951, he had executed a trust
agreement (predated September 17, 1951) with the Marine
National Exchange Bank, transferring to said bank securities

2:

appraised at his death at $283,006.44. These assets remained
in the sole possession of the trustee. The trust agree-
ment provided that the net income therefrom was to be dis-
tributed to the donor as long as he lived, and upon his death
to the donor’s wife during her lifetime, subject to-his power
of appointment reserved therein to be exercised by his will.
It also gave the trustee the right to invade the corpus on
behalf of the widow if that should be deemed necessary to
provide for her reasonable care and support. Upon the
widow’s death the remaining trust assets were to be dis-
tributed equally to remaindermen consisting of nieces and
nephews of Vincent Steck and two grandnieces of his. wife.
The trustee was given broad powers of administration and
investment. The donor reserved the power of revocation and
modification and a measure of control over investments dur-
ing his lifetime.; The donor subsequently executed two
amendments to the trust agreement which are not material
here.
~ On Septembér’18, 1951, after éxecution of the trust agree-
ment; Vincent Steck executed his ‘last will and testament in
which he gave to.his wife certain personal property and
effects, exercised the power of appointment reserved to him
under the trust agreement to: the extent of giving her the
sum of $15,000, and specifically declined to exercise such
power with respect to ‘the balarice of the trust estate. The
remainder: of his estate was designated:.as his “residuary
estate’ and was devised to the Marine National Exchange
Bank, as trustee of the trust referred to, to be added té and
become a part of the corpus of said trust. With respect
thereto it was stated i in paragraph 4 of the will:

“Tt ig:mot miy intention that ‘my residuary estate’ shall be
received by said Marine National Exchange Bank as a testa-
mentary trustee or upon a testamentary trust, but the devise
and bequest of ‘my residuary estate’ is made to the aforesaid
trust of September 17, 1951, as a distinct legal entity al:
ready in existence at the time of the execution of this will.”

294
LT

The will was admitted to probate April 8, 1954, at which
time the widow testified as to proof of heirship and H.
Morley Fraser was appointed executor. On April 28, 1954,
Martha Steck filed her election not to take under the will.
On June 4, 1954, she filed her petition for amendment of
proof of will alleging that the trust instrument was testa-
mentary in character and should be admitted as Vincent
Steck’s last will and testament and that the will already ad-
mitted should stand as a codicil thereto.

Basically it is appellant’s contention that the trust instru-
ment was executed in accordance with the requirements of
the statute of wills and thus is a valid testamentary dispo-
sition. The question presented is not whether the trust
created by Vincent Steck may be interpreted as testamentary,
but whether it can be interpreted as an inter vivos trust,
which is what Vincent Steck expressly intended it to be.
If his intention can be carried out we must do so.

Appellant relies upon Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings &
Trust Co. (1924), 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829, where it
was held that to constitute a valid trust there must be an
alienation of the donor’s property in such a way as to cause
a benefit to accrue to a cestwi que trust unless prevented by a
condition subsequent resulting from a lawful revocation of
the trust. In that case the agreement was held not to con-
stitute a valid conveyance in trust because the donor had
retained full dominion over the trust res, the trustee being
a mere agent to hold the property.

After the decision in that case, sec. 231.205, Stats., was
enacted, which provides:

“Any instrument declaring and creating a trust shall not,
when otherwise valid, be held to be an invalid trust or an
attempted testamentary disposition of property because the
grantor or creator of the trust reserved to himself, to be
exercised by him during his lifetime, the right to revoke,
amend, alter, or modify the trust instrument in whole or in

a Le 295
PE

part, or to require that sums from the trust principal be paid
to or used for him either at his request or in the discretion
of the trustee. Nothing in this section shall be construed as
altering or changing in any way the existing law or rules of
law relating to the taxation of transfers of property in trust.”

It is argued that the statute did not have the effect of
changing the rule since the holding of the Warsco Case was
reaffirmed in 1945 by Tucker v. Simrow, 248 Wis. 143,
145, 21 N. W. (2d) 252, and appellant quotes therefrom
the following language:

“The doctrine of Koppelkam v. First Wisconsin Trust
Co. 240 Wis. 254, 3 N. W. (2d) 350, and Warsco v.
Oshkosh Savings & Trust Co. 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W.
829, is to the effect that, where substantially entire control
of the property disposed of is retained by the person making
the deposit until his death, a testamentary disposition has
been attempted and any document making such disposition
must satisfy the statute governing execution of wills.”

In that case Mrs. Simrow gave to her bank a paper con-
taining instructions to pay to specified persons, in case of
her death, the amounts in her savings and checking accounts.
There was no contention that these instructions constituted
a trust. The position of the appellant was that they con-
stituted a valid contract between the bank and Mrs. Simrow
for the benefit of third persons, in the nature of the creation
of a joint account or the deposit of certificates of deposit
jointly payable to the depositor and a third person. The
court held that the instructions did not constitute such a
contract but were attempted testamentary dispositions, in-
effective because their execution did not comply with the
statute of wills. We cannot interpret the language quoted
above as having any effect on the rules relating to trusts,
since the document in the Simrow Case was in no sense a
trust instrument and sec. 231.205, Stats., was neither in-
volved nor considered.

26

Appellant’s argument that sec. 231.205, Stats., if held to
change the rule of the Warsco Case, is unconstitutional, has
no merit. .

In creating the trust Vincent Steck reserved to himself
during his lifetime the income therefrom and the right to
revoke, amend, alter, or modify the trust instrument in whole
or iri part. The reservation of such powers is permitted by
sec. 231.205, Stats., and the trust is not to be deemed testa-
mentary on that ground. In addition the donor reserved the
power of appointment by will and the right to subject to his
approval the trustee’s recommendations with respect to the
retention, sale, or other disposition of the trust estate.

Appellant cites Restatement, 1 Trusts, p. 175, sec. 57 (2),
where it is stated:

“Where the settlor transfers property in trust and re-
serves not only a beneficial life estate and a power to revoke
and modify the trust but also such power to control the
trustee as to the details of the administration of the trust
that the trustee is the agent of the settlor, the disposition so
far as it is intended to take effect after his death is testa-
mentary and is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes
relating to the validity of wills are complied with.”

“At page 179 the following comment is made on subsec-
tion (2):

“The rule stated in subsection (2) is applicable, however,
only where the settlor reserves such power of control that
the transferee is his agent. The intended trust is not testa-
mentary merely because the settlor reserves power to direct
the trustee as to the making of-investments or the exercise
of other particular powers, or power to appoint a substituted
trustee.”

As found by the trial court, the trust agreement gave to
the trustee broad and extensive administration and invest-
" ment powers. Paragraph 9 thereof states that “The trustee
in its administration hereunder shall have full and complete

a ae 297
LE

authority to do any and all things necessary for the orderly
and efficient administration of the trust estate, and without
limiting the generality thereof by the following enumeration,
shall, to that end, be clothed with the absolute rights, powers,
and discretions:” To retain indefinitely all trust assets, to
invest and reinvest without restriction, to permit trust funds
to remain uninvested, to carry any and all of the assets in
its own name, to vote stock, to borrow money, to lease or
exchange property, to pay, settle, or compromise claims
against the trust estate, etc.

The donor required only that upon the trustee’s periodic
analyses of the assets it should communicate to him its
recommendations based thereon in writing “and the donor
may within -thirty days thereafter by notice in writing to the
trustee prescribe the investment thereof and/or instruct the
trustee in respect of the retentions, sales, and dispositions if
any so recommended.” If the donor should fail to so pre-
scribe or instruct the trustee, the trustee was to put its
recommendations into effect.

This instrument was drawn by competent legal counsel.
It would do violence to the words used therein to say that
the investment control so reserved by the donor made the
trustee his mere agent. The donor did not retain the power
to deal with the trust as he pleased; his control over the
investments was limited to approval or disapproval of the
trustee’s recommendations. Even where the powers con-
ferred on the trustees by the trust instrument were to be
exercised only upon written instructions of the settlor, in
Stouse v. First Nat. Bank (Ky. 1951), 245 S. W. (2d)
914, 918, 32 A. L. R. (2d) 1261, 1267, the validity of the
trust was upheld under the rule of the Restatement. It was
there said:

“Reservation by the settlor of power to approve invest-

ments likewise has been held not to impart testamentary
character to a trust. [Citing cases.]

298
L(t

“Both Scott and Bogert recognize that the degree of re-
served control is the determining factor in the question of
whether an instrument creates a valid trust or only a mere
agency. See Scott on Trusts, sec. 57.2; Bogert on Trusts
‘and Trustees, secs. 103, 104.

“We are of the opinion that the power reserved by [the
settlor] to control the trustees in their administration of
the trust, which power could be exercised only within the
limits and in accordance with the terms of the trust instru-
ment, was not of such a degree as to reduce the trustees to
the status of agents.”

Nor does the reservation by the donor of the power of ap-
pointment make the trust invalid. The trustee’s powers were
no more affected thereby than by the donor’s retention of
the power to revoke.

The trust created by Vincent Steck contained all the neces-
sary elements defined in Sutherland v. Pierner (1946), 249
Wis. 462, 467, 24 N. W. (2d) 883, as follows:

“(1) A trustee, who holds the trust property and is sub-
ject to equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of an-
other; (2) a beneficiary, to whom the trustee owes equitable
duties to deal with the trust property for his benefit; (3)
trust property, which is held by the trustee for the bene-
ficiary.”

Marine National Exchange Bank, an experienced corpo-
rate fiduciary, received the trust principal upon execution
of the trust agreement, accepted the duties of management
therein conferred, and exercised them for the benefit of the
donor for approximately two and one-half years before his
death. This was no mere “illusory device;” it was in every
_sense an active trust, taking effect and serving a proper pur~
pose during the life of the donor. The fact that the trust
instrument also contained testamentary provisions does not
change its character from that of an inter vivos trust to that
of a last will and testament.

|| | 299
Pe

“The mere fact that the agreement provided for disposi-
tion of the trust property upon the settlor’s death was not
regarded as a circumstance of any importance in view of the
creation of rights during his lifetime. See 1 Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees, sec. 103; 1 Scott, Trusts, p. 338, sec. 57.1.”
Koppelkam v. First Wisconsin Trust Co. (1942), 240 Wis.
'254, 257, 3 N. W. (2d) 350.

Appellant contends that because the will bequeaths the
residue of Vincent Steck’s estate to the trustee, the trust was
incorporated in the will by reference. This is exactly what
the testator did not do, expressly stating in his will that it
was not his intention that the residue should be received by
the trustee as a testamentary trustee but as the trustee of a
“distinct legal entity already in existence.” To apply the
doctrine of incorporation by reference in this situation would
be to ignore that expressed intent.

“It is further contended that to hold this trust instrument
a valid inter vivos trust is to open the door to fraud upon
the widow. The argument has no place here. As stated by
the trial court, “There has been no allegation by the peti-
tioner that any fraud existed in the execution of the trust
instrument in question and the court can find no evidence to
sustain such finding had the allegation been made.” In
establishing the trust Vincent Steck provided that his widow
should receive the entire income from its assets, almost
$12,000 yearly, and the right to invade the corpus should
her needs require it. This hardly evinces an intention to
deprive his wife of her just share in his estate, even though,
as the trial court commented, “he may have had some appre-
hension and concern as to the manner in which she was to
receive the same.”

The fact that the widow received less at his death under
the trust than she would have if he had disposed of all his
personal property by will is not in itself indicative of fraud
on her.

300
LC

“. .. the amount of proof necessary to stamp such a
transfer as fraudulent depends in every instance upon the
particular facts existing in each case.” Sederlund v. Seder-
lund (1922), 176 Wis. 627, 634, 187 N. W. 750.

There is neither allegation nor proof of fraud and the
trust being otherwise valid, the determination of the trial
court must stand.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

VANDERHE!, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Respond-
ents, vs. Cartson and others, Appellants.*

February 7—March 5, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

302
—

For the appellants there were briefs by Kivett & Kasdorf,
attorneys, and Clifford C. Kasdorf and Alan M. Clack of
counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Clifford C.
Kasdorf.

For the respondents there was a brief and oral argument
by Richard S. Hippenmeyer and William C. Callow, guard-
ian ad litem, both of Waukesha.

Broaproor, J. The defendants contend that there is no
credible evidence in the record to support the answers of the
jury. The questions as to the driver’s negligence were in the
alternative. Having found the driver negligent as to manage-
ment and control, the jury was instructed not to answer the
lookout question. From a review of the record it would have
been more logical for the jury to find the driver negligent
as to lookout. However, the jury had an option and we can-
not say that as a matter of law they were wrong.

The defendants further contend that additional inquiries
should have been made as to the negligence of the plaintiff.
Subs. (6) and (9) of sec. 85.44, Stats., read as follows:

“(6) Pedestrians to walk on left side of highway. Pedes-
trians using those highways not provided with sidewalks
shall travel on and along the left side of such highway and
the pedestrian, upon meeting a vehicle shall, if practicable,

7 |) 308

step to the extreme outer limit of the traveled portion of
the highway.”

“(9) Standing or loitering on roadway prohibited. No
person shall stand or loiter on any roadway other than in a
safety zone if such act interferes with the lawful movement
of traffic.”

The defendants had requested that inquiry be made in the
special verdict as to whether the plaintiff had violated either
of these subsections. The trial court denied their request. We
think the trial court was correct in this regard. The verdict
would have been duplicitous had three questions, all dealing
with plaintiffs position on the highway, been submitted.
Under our statutory definition the plaintiff was a pedestrian.
Under the circumstances, however, he did not violate either
sub. (6) or sub. (9) of sec. 85.44, Stats. He was not
traveling on the highway nor did he intend to do so. He was
merely waiting for the car to complete the turn. He then
planned to re-enter the car and continue with it. He was
standing upon the highway other than in a safety zone. The
question relating to his position on the highway, under
proper instructions, covered any violation of sub. (9).

A study of the record, however, requires us to invoke our
discretionary powers under sec. 251.09, Stats., and to order
a new trial. The trial court instructed the jury as to the
duty of a driver of an automobile to keep a proper lookout.
However, when instructions were given with relation to
the question about the plaintiff’s lookout, the trial court
merely stated, “I have already instructed you in regard to
that.” A pedestrian upon a highway, whether standing or
traveling, has a duty to use his senses for his own protection.
The degree of care required depends upon all of the circum-
stances, and defendants’ rights were seriously préjudiced by
the lack of adequate instructions in this case. In Merkle v.
Behl, 269 Wis. 432, 69 N. W. (2d) 459, a pedestrian cross-
ing a street along a marked crosswalk, where she had the

right of way, was found to be causally negligent as a matter
of law when she did not see the car that struck her. This is
illustrative of the care required by a pedestrian.

The defendants make other contentions that we do not
deem it necessary to answer because of the fact that'a new

trial is necessary.
By the Court-—Judgment reversed. Catise remanded with

directions to grant a new trial. Bh

Curr, J., dissents.

Hemuincway, Appellant, vs. Crry or JANESVILLE,

Respondent.
‘February 7—March 5, 1957.

J

een!

For the appellant there was a brief by Jeffris, Mouat,
Oestreich, Wood & Cunningham, and oral argument by
Louis D. Gage, Jr., all of Janesville.

For the respondent there was a brief by Dougherty, Ryan
& Campbell of Janesville, and oral argument by Glen R.
Campbell and William H. Dougherty.

Brown, J. After parking his automobile the plaintiff
went on foot up the ramp to the upper level and then fell off
the edge of that to the level of the roadway. He contends
in so constructing and maintaining these premises the city
has violated the safe-place statute and that he is within the
protection afforded the public by that statute. The applicable
statutory provisions are:

Sec. 101.01 “(11) The term ‘safe’ or ‘safety’ as applied
to an employment or a place of employment or a public build-
ing, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health,
safety, or welfare of employees or frequenters, or the public,
or tenants, or firemen, and such reasonable means of notifi-
cation, egress, and escape in case of fire, and such freedom
from danger to adjacent buildings or other property, as the
nature of the employment, place of employment, or public
building, will reasonably permit.

“(12) The term ‘public building’ as used in sections
101.01 to 101.29 shall mean and include any structure used
in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging,
trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or
more tenants.”

“101.06 EmpPLoyver’s DUTY TO FURNISH SAFE EMPLOY-
MENT AND PLACE. Every employer shall furnish employ-
ment which shall be safe for the employees therein and shall
furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for em-
ployees therein and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish
and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt and
use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render
such employment and places of employment safe, and shall
do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the

a a 307
Po

life, health, safety, and welfare of such employees and fre-
quenters. Every employer and every owner of a place of
employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed
shall so construct, repair, or maintain such place of employ-
ment or public building, and every architect shall so prepare
the plans for the construction of such place of employment
or public building, as to render the same safe.”

Appellant does not contend that the area where he was
hurt is a place of employment but rests his argument upon
the proposition that such area is a public building within
the definition given by sec. 101.01 (12), Stats., supra. There
is little for us to say except that our prior decisions in appeals
presenting analogous facts bring us now to a contrary con-
clusion.

In Hanion v. St. Francis Seminary (1953), 264 Wis. 603,
60 N. W. (2d) 381, a deputy sheriff patrolling defendant’s
grounds fell over the edge of a retaining wall and landed in
a driveway several feet below. The wall was attached to a
garage and was intended to keep dirt from the adjoining
higher ground from washing into the driveway. While the
wall was clearly a structure we said that the character of the
use or intended use made or to be made of the structure is
the determining factor. The wall was not a structure used
or intended to be used by three or more tenants or by the
public as a place of resort, occupancy, etc., and we held that
it was not a public building.

In the instant case neither the retaining wall nor the
ramp was intended for public use or so used. The ramp
led only to the boiler room and the coal bunkers, both of
which were closed to the public. “The duty of the owner of a
public building under the provisions of that chapter [the safe-
place chapter] to maintain it in safe condition extends only
to such portions as are used or held out to be used by the
public. . . .” Bauhs v. St. James Congregation (1949), 255
Wis. 108, 110, 37 N. W. (2d) 842.

S08 ee
Po

Although the physical facts concerning the ramp belie a
contention that the ramp was actually used or held out for
use by the public as a sidewalk or thoroughfare, which is
what appellant was using it for, an acceptance by the court
of that use would merely bring before the court the numerous
cases in which it has been held that sidewalks and structural
approaches to public buildings which lie outside the lines
of such buildings are not structures constituting them public
buildings within the terms and intent of the safe-place statute.
See Meyers v. St. Bernard’s Congregation (1954), 268 Wis.
285, 67 N. W. (2d) 302; Moore v. Milwaukee (1954), 267
Wis. 166, 65 N. W. (2d) 3. In Lawver v. Joint District
(1939), 232 Wis. 608, 612, 288 N. W. 192, we stated:
“Clearly, the school grounds and the sidewalk area cannot
be considered a public building by any stretch of the imagina-
tion.”

* We conclude that no duty of the defendant to the plaintiff
imposed by the safe-place statute was breached by the con-
struction or maintenance of the ramp and elevated level.
We acknowledge the help we have had from the briefs of the
parties and particularly from the comprehensive study of the
subject contained in the memorandum decision by the learned
trial judge.

By the Court-—-Judgment affirmed.

309.

Dovcras County and another, Appellants, vs. InpustRraL
Commission and another, Respondents.

February 8—March 5, 1957.

For the appellants there were briefs by Quarles, Spence &
Quarles, attorneys, and Edward H. Borgelt, Edmund W.
Powell, and Anton Motz of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and
oral argument by Mr. Powell and Mr. Motz.

For the respondent Industrial Commission there was a
brief by the Attorney General and Mortimer Levitan, assist-
ant attorney general, and oral argument by Mr. Levitan.

For the respondent Eva Alenius there was a brief by
i Roberts, Roe, Boardman, Suhr & Bjork of Madison, and

oral argument by Walter M. Bjork.

Curriz, J. The issue before us on this appeal is the
validity of the retroactive repeal by ch. 397, Laws of 1953,
of the right existing under sec. 66.908 (2) (aa), Stats. 1951,
to offset against the workmen’s compensation death benefits,
due the widow, the amount of the benefits payable to her
from the Wisconsin retirement fund. The appellant county
and its insurance carrier contend that such retroactive repeal
violates sec. 10, art. I of the United States: constitution,

a ae 313

prohibiting a state from passing any law impairing the obli-
gation of a contract; the due-process clause of the Fourteenth
amendment to the United States constitution; and the cor-
responding prohibitions of the Wisconsin constitution found
in secs. 1 and 12 of art. I thereof. They base such contention
upon the ground that such repeal impairs the obligation of
a contract and deprives appellants of vested rights in the
nature of property rights without due process of law.

It is the position of the appellants that the widow’s rights
to workmen’s compensation benefits are grounded upon con-
tract. Several past decisions of this court are cited in support
of such contention, including Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron
Co. (1919), 169 Wis. 106, 115, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W.
935; and Sheban v. A. M. Castle & Co. (1924), 185 Wis.
282, 287, 201 N. W. 379. However, in the Anderson Case
the court made clear the connotation in which the court em-
ployed the word “contract,” as applied to rights and liabilities
arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, by stating
that the provisions of such act became a part of every contract
of hire “not as a covenant thereof, but to the extent that the
law of the land is a part of every contract.”

Tf the right of the county to the offset here at issue arises
not by reason of any covenant of the employment contract
on the part of the employee, but solely from legislative fiat,
the question arises as to whether the legislature cannot with-
draw such right of offset at any time without impairing the
obligation of the employment contract. However, for the
purposes of this opinion we find it unnecessary to pass on
such issue. This is because of our conclusion that neither
the impairment-of-contract nor the due-process-of-law pro-
visions of the federal and state constitutions have any appli-
cation to the act of the legislature in retroactively taking
away from the county its right of offset.

Counties, like other municipal corporations, are mere in-
strumentalities of the state, and statutes confer upon them

4
PT

their powers, prescribe their duties, and impose their liabil-
ities. Frederick v. Douglas County (1897), 96 Wis. 411,
417, 71 N. W. 798; and Commissioners v. Lucas (1876),
93 U. S. 108, 114, 23 L. Ed. 822. Because of this, the legis-
lature may, with the consent of the other party, revoke any
contract entered into by a county or other municipal corpo-
ration in performance of a governmental function, and in so
doing there is no violation of the constitutional prohibition
against a state taking action to impair the obligation of a
contract. This rule is stated in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal
Corporations, pp. 699, 700, sec. 89, as follows:

“A contract to which a municipal corporation is a party,
relating to a public and governmental matter, may, however,
be revoked by the legislature with the consent of the other
party without thereby violating the right of the munici-

pality.”

The foregoing rule was clearly enunciated by the United
States supreme court in Worcester v. Worcester Consol-
idated Street R. Co. (1905), 196 U.S. 539, 25 Sup. Ct. 327,
49 L. Ed. 591. In that case the question before the court was
whether a state legislature could abrogate the provisions of
a contract between a city and a railroad company with the
assent of the latter, and provide for a different method for
the paving and repairing of city streets through which the
tracks of the railroad were laid. The city endeavored to
enforce the original contract, contending that the act of the
legislature in abrogating it violated the impairment-of-con-
tract clause of the United States constitution. The court
in its opinion held that the legislature had the power to
abrogate the contract with the consent of the railroad com-
pany, and pointed out that municipal corporations are mere
instrumentalities of the state. Therefore, the state had the
same right to terminate the contract with the consent of the
railroad compaity that the city itself possessed.

a a 315

This court as recently as 1951 cited with approval Wor-
cester v. Worcester Consolidated Street R. Co., supra, in
Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Committee (1951),
260 Wis. 229, 247, 50 N. W. (2d) 424.”

In Trenton v. New Jersey (1923), 262 U. S. 182, 43
Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 937, the United States supreme
court made this significant statement (262 U. S. at p. 188):

“The power of the state, unrestrained by the contract
clause or the Fourteenth amendment, over the rights and
property of cities held and used for ‘governmental purposes’
cannot be questioned.”

In keeping with this principle this court stated in Holland
v. Cedar Grove’ (1939), 230 Wis. 177, 189, 282 N. W.
111, 282 N. W. 448:

.““Municipal corporations have no private powers or rights
as against the state. They may have lawfully entered into
contracts with third persons which contracts will be pro-
tected by the constitution, but beyond that they hold their
powers from the state and they can be taken away by the
state at ‘pleasure. Richland County v. Richland Center
(1884), 59 Wis. 591, 18 N. W. 497; Frederick v. Douglas
County (1897), 96 Wis. 411, 71 N. W. 798.”

The contract rights arising under an agreement entered
into by a municipality, acting in a governmental capacity,
and third persons, which are protected by the constitution
against impairment by the legislature, are those of the third
persons, not those of the municipality. Worcester v. Wor-
cester Consolidated Street R. Co., supra. This is because
whenever a municipal corporation makes a contract in its
governmental capacity with a third party it is the same as if
the state itself were one of the two contracting parties, the
municipality being but an arm of the state.

The appellants further contend that irrespective of whether
there has been any impairment of a contract by the repeal of
the offset, the county possessed’ a vested right, as of the time

6 es
Pd

that the fatal accident to the employee occurred, to pay only
such workmen’s compensation benefits as the statutes then
in effect provided.

The extract hereinbefore quoted from the opinion of the
United States supreme court in Trenton v. New Jersey,
supra, makes it crystal clear that a municipality acting in its
governmental capacity can possess no vested right as against
the state. This court has on numerous occasions held to the
same effect. Among cases so holding are Madison Metro-
politan Sewerage Dist. v. Committee, supra, and Bell v.
Bayfield County (1931), 206 Wis. 297, 302, 239 N. W.
503.

Appellants advance no contention that the county here
acted otherwise than in a governmental capacity. Any work-
men’s compensation benefits it might be required to pay
directly, as well as any premiums due to provide workmen’s
compensation insurance coverage, would necessarily be pay-
able from its tax revenues. Moneys acquired by a munici-
pality from taxes collected are held in its governmental, and
not its proprietary, capacity. Bell v. Bayfield County, supra,
and Will of Heinemann (1930), 201 Wis. 484, 230 N. W.
698.

The appellants place great reliance upon Kleiner v. Mil-
waukee (1955), 270 Wis, 152, 70 N. W. (2d) 662. A city
of Milwaukee fireman was killed in the course of duty on
November 8, 1952. Milwaukee has its own pension fund
for its firemen, the “firemen’s annuity and benefit fund.”
Sec. 102.07 (2), Stats. 1951, provided that there should be
deducted from any workmen’s compensation benefits due a
fireman the benefits due under such a pension fund. An
award of workmen’s compensation death benefits was made
by order of the commission dated April 23, 1953, which
order contained this provision, “there shall be deducted from
the sums herein ordered to be paid to the applicant such
amounts as have been or shall be paid to the applicant each

fT

r |) 317
Cd

month from the firemen’s annuity and benefit fund.” There-
after, the legislature enacted ch. 397, Laws of 1953, which
was published July 8, 1953, and by its terms took retroactive
effect as of July 6, 1951. The widow then commenced an
action for a declaratory judgment against the city of Milwau-
kee in which she asserted that ch. 397, Laws of 1953, retro-
actively repealed the provision of the 1951 statutes, pursuant
to which the industrial commission, in its award, had offset
her pension benefits against the workmen’s compensation
death benefits awarded to her. The trial court entered an
order sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint, and
this court on appeal affirmed such order.

In Hagenah v. Lumbermen’s Mut, Casualty Co. (1942),
241 Wis. 226, 235, 5 N. W. (2d) 760, it was held that an
award of-the industrial commission “not appealed from has
all the legal consequences of a judgment except that no exe-
cution can be issued upon it.” Our opinion in the Kleiner
Case was based upon the principle that ordinarily the legis-
lature cannot retroactively affect rights which have beconie
vested by judgment. This was equivalent to determining that
the plaintiff widow could not make use of a subsequently
enacted statute, which she contended had retroactively re-
pealed the city’s right of offset, as the basis for collaterally
attacking a prior judgment which gave effect to such offset.

Neither of the briefs in the Kleiner Case raised the issue,
which confronts us here, of whether a municipal corporation,
acting in a governmental capacity, possesses any vested rights
against the state. In the instant case, unlike in the Kleiner
Case, no award, providing for an offset, was in effect when
the legislature enacted ch. 397, Laws of 1953. In the first
place, the award of the examiner in the present case awarded
full workmen’s compensation benefits to the widow with no
offsetting of the benefits due from the Wisconsin retirement
fund. Secondly, by reason of the employer county and its
insurer having timely moved for a review of such examiner’s

ee
Pe

award, such award ceased to have any effect whatsoever
until such time as the commission took affirmative action
with respect thereto. Sec. 102.18 (3), Stats., and State v.
Industrial Comm. (1940), 233 Wis. 461, 465, 289 N. W.
769.

In the Kleiner Case an extract from 16 C. J. S., Consti-
tutional Law, p. 1190, sec. 225, is quoted to the effect that
rights and obligations under a workmen’s compensation law
become fixed at the time of the occurrence of the accident
so as to be beyond the power of the legislature to change
them. It is apparent from the authorities hereinbefore cited
that this is not true as to employees of a municipal corpora-
tion. The able memorandum opinion of the learned trial
judge in the case at bar analyzes the three cases cited in the
footnote of C. J. S. in support of such extract quoted in our
opinion in the Kleiner Case. Such analysis demonstrates that
such cases are not authority for any such broad principle.

The appellant Insurance Company contends that, even if
the retroactive provision of ch. 397, Laws of 1953, is not
unconstitutional as to the county, it is as to such company.
In order to pass on this contention it is necessary to review
the pertinent statutes applicable to workmen’s compensation
insurance, viz., secs. 102.28 and 102.31 (1) (a), Stats. 1951.

Sec. 102.28 (2), Stats. 1951, requires that any employer
liable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act to pay com-
pensation “shall insure payment of such compensation in
some company authorized to insure such liability in this
state unless such employer shall be exempted from such in-
surance by the industrial commission.” Sec. 102.31 (1) (a),
Stats. 1951, provides that the insurance contract “shall be
construed to grant full coverage of all liability of the assured
under and according to the provisions” of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.

This court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm.
(1929), 198 Wis. 202, 211, 221 N. W. 747, 223 N. W. 444,

ee 319
po

was called upon to determine the nature of the liability of an
insurance company, under its policy of workmen’s compensa-
tion insurance, in the light of these same statutory provi-
sions. The conclusion reached, stated in the words of Mr.
Justice (later Chief Justice) RosENBERRY, is as follows:

“Therefore, when an insurance company undertakes to
write workmen’s compensation insurance it assumes the em-
ployer’s obligation to pay compensation. The measure of its
liability wnder its policy and the statute is the employer's
liability to the injured employee.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Under these statutes, as so interpreted, we cannot conceive
of a situation where the employer would be liable to pay
benefits for which the insurance carrier would not also be
liable, unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise,
such as in the case of the imposition of a penalty payment
to be borne solely by the employer. Therefore, when an
insurance company issues a policy of workmen’s compensa-
tion insurance to a municipal corporation, such as a county,
its obligation is to discharge the full liability of the insured
municipality for workmen’s compensation benefits, not mere-
ly such hypothetical benefits as may have been due under
the statutes as they stood at the time the policy was issued
or when some accident occurred. In other words, the com-
pany’s contract under its policy is to pay whatever workmen’s
compensation benefits the legislature may have seen fit to
impose upon the insured municipality. When the policy
of coverage is so construed, there is no question of inter-
ference with vested rights, or impairment of the obligation
of a contract, presented here.

Appellants also raise a question of statutory construction
with respect to the wording of ch. 397, Laws of 1953. We
have duly considered the same and find no merit in the
contention advanced with respect thereto.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Drorr Tractor Company, Respondent, vs. KEHREIN,
Appellant.

February 8&—March 5, 1957.

323

For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by
Bernard F, Mathiowetz of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief by Houghton, Bull-
inger, Nehs & Houghton, attorneys, and Albert F. Hough-
ton of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Albert
F. Houghton.

STEINLE, J. The defendant, Arthur Kehrein, challenges
the court’s findings (1) that the defendant was negligent in
failing to give notice to the plaintiff of the defendant’s in-
tention to excavate along the plaintiff's property line, (2)
that the plaintiff did not have actual knowledge prior to the
excavation of the defendant’s intention to excavate along
the south line of West Bluemound road which adjoined the
plaintiff's property, (3) that the defendant excavated in a
careless and negligent manner in not properly shoring or
backfilling the trench, thus removing plaintiff’s lateral sup-
port and causing damage to plaintiff's property.

It is well established that findings of a trial court are not
to be disturbed on appeal unless they are contrary to the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Swazee v.
Lee (1951), 259 Wis. 136, 137, 47 N. W. (2d) 733.

With respect to the defendant’s first contention it is to be
considered that one who intends an excavation which may
endanger adjoining structures, should notify the owner
thereof as an exercise of the ordinary care required of an
excavator, unless the adjoining owner has the full knowledge
of the excavation a notice would impute. 2 C. J. S., Adjoin-

ing Landowners, p. 13, sec. 13 a. See also 1 Am. Jur., Ad-
joining Landowners, p. 523, sec. 28. The notice of an
intention to excavate should give the adjoining owner full
knowledge of the intended excavation in time and at a time
to enable the adjoining owner to take the necessary measures
to protect his property. In addition to being timely, the
notice should be correct and complete. 2 C. J. S., Adjoining
Landowners, p. 14, sec. 13 b. See also 1 Am. Jur., Adjoin-
ing Landowners, p. 523, sec. 28. In Christensen v. Mann
(1925), 187 Wis. 567, 577, 204 N. W. 499, it was said:

“In order that the owner of property who excavates his
soil in close proximity to his neighbor’s building may be
immune from a claim for damages, the law also imposes upon
him the duty of giving reasonable and timely notice to his
neighbor, so that the latter may use such means as he may
deem proper to protect his own structures, and a failure to
give such notice, in the absence of knowledge on the part of
the neighbor, would be negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.)

From the record it appears that on an occasion about a
month prior to the cave-in, the defendant asked the plain-
tiff’s general manager for the plans of the plaintiff’s building.
When said general manager inquired as to what need the
defendant had for the plans, he said: “‘You never know what
might be protruding on the abutments out into the road.”
The defendant did not advise the plaintiff’s representative
that he was going to excavate near the wall. Manifestly, a
sufficient notice as required under the rules above referred
to was not given, and the court’s finding in this regard is not
contrary to the evidence.

It is next contended that the evidence adduced at the trial
clearly established knowledge by the plaintiff of the defend-
ant’s intention to excavate alongside its property. The plain-
tiff’s president testified that previous to the cave-in he had
observed that a sewer trench or ditch was being constructed
west of plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff's general manager

also testified that he had noticed.sdme excavation equipment
parked down the alley before the cave-in; that while he no-
ticed the trench at the North Thirty-Ninth street intersection,
he did not observe that it was being dug in a southerly di-
rection across that intersection; that the north side of
plaintiff's building was blocked off during the progress of
the project; that his first knowledge that something had
happened to the wall was when his brother told him about it.
The defendant submits that this evidence conclusively estab-
lishes that the plaintiff was well aware of the situation as the
work of excavation progressed, and that therefore it is
chargeable with “knowledge.” He also urges that since the
excavation was visible to the plaintiff’s representatives,—had
they looked, they would have seen the situation as it existed
alongside the plaintiff's property, and that by closing their
eyes for the purpose of preventing knowledge of what was
occurring, they brought thentselves within the field of knowl-
edge as that term is sed in the law. We cannot agree that
for the reason alone that some excavating was being done
‘in the vicinity, the plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge of
‘the intended development alongside its property. We concur
in the’ observation expressed in Smith v. Howard (1923).
201 Ky. 249, 258, 256 S. W. 402, where it was said:

“Tt is conceded in this case that no notice was given, but
defendants rely upon the knowledge the plaintiff had of the
work. Manifestly such knowledge, to be available as a de-
fense to defendants, must have been such as a lawful notice
would have imputed to the plaintiff. The mere fact that he
knew the work was going on was in itself insufficient ; mani-
festly he must have known, also, not only the proximity of
the excavation to his own property, and the extent thereof
on the surface as proposed, but he must have known the
depth, particularly along or near to his own property line, in
order to determine the necessity for precautionary measures
on his part.”

526 es
| CCCs”

In Jamison v. Myrtle Lodge (1913), 158 Iowa, 264, 271,
139 N. W. 547, and McGrath v. St. Louis (1908), 215 Mo.
191, 114 S. W. 611, the courts held that the knowledge of
the complainants involved, dispensed with formal notice of
the intended excavations. Those cases, however, are dis-
tinguishable in their facts from the case at bar. In the Jami-
son Case one of the complainants testified that he “ ‘saw the
excavation going on probably every day, and my attention
was called to the crumbling and caving condition of the north
wall prior to the caving of the building. The building caved
on Monday, and I noticed the caving in of the wall of the
excavation, the previous Sunday.’” In the McGrath Case it
appeared that the plaintiffs lived in a house adjoining an
alley which was being excavated, and that two weeks before
the work reached their end of the alley they knew that the
entire alley up to their wall would be excavated. The plain-
tiff’s evidence in the case at bar is to the effect that it did
not know of the intention of the defendant to construct the
trench alongside its property. An issue of fact for the court
was presented. There is ample evidence to sustain the court’s
finding that the plaintiff did not have actual knowledge prior
to the excavation of the defendant’s intention to excavate
alongside its property. Such finding is not contrary to the
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

With reference to the challenged finding of the court that
the defendant was negligent in the construction of the excava-
tion in the area of plaintiff’s retaining wall, particularly in
relation to removing the lateral support, it appears that the
evidence was in dispute,—the defendant having testified that
his bracing or shoring up of the trench was done according
to method established, accepted, and approved by the indus-
try,—the plaintiff's witnesses, its president and general man-
ager, having testified to the contrary. At the trial the
defendant objected on the ground that the plaintiff's wit-

| |) 327

nesses were not sufficiently qualified as experts to testify
as they did to the effect that the method employed by the
defendant in relation to re-enforcing the ground and the
trench in the vicinity of the retaining wall, was not in accord-
ance with standards employed by sewer contractors or other
contractors in circumstances as here, and that the trench
caved in because of lack of sufficient bracing.

Plaintiff's president testified that he had studied engineer-
ing for two years, and that he was one of the plaintiff com-
pany’s engineers; that plaintiff is engaged in the business of
manufacturing, selling, and servicing construction machinery,
including road-building equipment; that while he was in the
plaintiff's employ from 1935 to 1949, the plaintiff dealt with
many sewer and other excavating contractors, and that he
personally had observed at least a hundred sewer-excavating
jobs. Plaintiff's general manager testified that he had spent
four years in the study of chemical engineering at college,
and that in such course and under the head of civil and
electrical engineering, he had studied construction in excavat-
ing; that he had been active in the plaintiff company’s busi-
ness from 1935 until 1949 with the exception of two years
while he was serving in the navy; that on at least 50 to 100
occasions he had observed the work of sewer contractors in
excavating; that it was his business to deal with such con-
tractors and recommend equipment for their needs.

On the basis of these stated qualifications the trial court
received in evidence the expert testimony of these witnesses.
The question of whether a witness possesses sufficient knowl-
edge to qualify as an expert is generally one for the trial
court, and unless it appears that in its determination the court
is guilty of an abuse of discretion, the court’s ruling will
stand. Morrill v. Komasinski (1950), 256 Wis. 417, 41
N. W. (2d) 620. Obviously the court was of the opinion
that based upon their studies and practical experience, these
witnesses had acquired the peculiar skill and knowledge

52s
Po

necessary to qualify.them as expert witnesses with reference
to the matter of proper standards to be employed by sewer
contractors under circumstances as here. We are not able
to conclude that the court’s determination in this regard
constituted an abuse of discretion.

The testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses in n regard
to the proper manner of shoring a trench under circumstances
as here, is sufficient to sustain the court’s finding that the
defendant was negligent in not. properly shoring or back-
filling the trench and thereby causing the damage complained
of.

A careful review of the facts satisfies us that the chal-
lenged findings are all sustained by the proof. The most that
can be said is that on some of the contested issues of fact,
the proof might have sustained a finding contrary to that
made by the court. Upon such a state of the record this court
may not disturb the findings of the trial court.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Town or Broomine Grove, Respondent, vs. Crry oF
Manson, Appellant.*

February 8—March 5, 1957.

% Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 7, 1957.

331

For the appellant there were briefs by Harold E. Hanson,
city attorney, and Leon E. Isaksen, special counsel, attorneys,
and Thomas, Orr, Isaksen & Werner and Trayton L. Lath-
rop, all of Madison of counsel, and oral argument by Mr.
Hanson, Mr. Leon E. Isaksen, and Mr. Lathrop.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
Earl I. Cooper, attorney, and William J. P. Aberg and Paul
C. Gartgke of counsel, all of Madison.

Wincert, J. At the outset we confront a number of
preliminary and procedural objections to the propriety of
deciding the case on the merits, which are advanced by the
city. We consider, as did the circuit judge, that none of
them is well taken and that the merits are properly before us.
On the merits, we hold that the annexation ordinance is void
because of failure to comply with the requirements of sec.
62.07 (1) (b), Stats. 1953, relating to publication of the
proposed ordinance in advance of its adoption.

1. The city contends that the interest of the town had
ceased to exist before judgment, and therefore it was im-
proper to enter a judgment. It is argued that a town has no
interest in the alteration of its boundaries except as provided
in sec. 66.029, Stats.; that that statute permits the town to
test the validity of the proceedings only in so far as necessary
to resolve uncertainties which will hamper the town in its
planning; that such uncertainties cease after the time has
expired within which residents of the annexed territory can
attack the validity of the annexation, which period is ninety
days after adoption with respect to nonjurisdictional defects
and a reasonable time with respect to jurisdictional defects;
and that a reasonable time had expired before the decision

332
TT

below, which came some twenty-six months after the ordi-
nance was adopted; and therefore the case had become moot
before decision so far as the town is concerned.

This contention gives too limited effect to sec. 66.029,
Stats. That section is an unqualified declaration that in an-
nexation proceedings “the town is an interested party,” and
it authorizes the town board to maintain an action to test
the validity of the proceedings, without qualification as to
time or ground of attack. The present action was commenced
seventy-nine days after the ordinance was adopted, and thus
within the ninety-day period specified by sec. 62.07 (3) for
the commencement of such actions. It would obviously be
impossible to obtain a final judicial determination within the
ninety-day period after passage of the ordinance, and there
is nothing to show that the town was guilty of any want of
diligence in the prosecution of its action.

The city points to certain language in Town of Madison
wv. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 616, 70 N. W. (2d) 249,
in which this court stated arguendo that the town has an
interest in compliance with the required procedure for an-
nexation, since an invalid annexation would hamper and
prejudice the planning and operation of the town’s govern-
mental affairs. It was not meant to intimate that the interest
of the town, recognized and implemented by sec. 66.029,
Stats., would cease as soon as it was too late for any other
party in interest to commence an action to test the validity
of the annexation; and we do not think that such an inter-
pretation of the court’s language is warranted.

In short, we construe sec. 66.029, Stats., as authorizing
the town not only to commence the action, but also to see it
through to a conclusion.

2. It is argued that the action must fail because the resi-
dents in the area are the real parties in interest and no resi-
dent is joined as a party to the action.

C—O 333

“If there was a defect of parties, it was waived by failing
to: assert it by answer or demurrer. Sec. 263.12, Stats.;
Brown Deer v. Milwaukee, 274 Wis. 50, 69, 79 N. W. (2d)
340: A motion for summary judgment goes to the merits
and does‘not take the place of a demurrer. Fredrickson. v.
Kabat, 260 Wis. 201, 204, 50.N. W. (2d) 381; McLoughlin
v. Malnar, 237 Wis. 492, 495, 297 N. W. 370. Here the
court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.
Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 616, 70
N. W. (2d) 249.

We prefer, however, to deal with this contention on its
merits, and we hold that the action may be maintained by
the town without joining any resident of the annexed area.
Sec. 66.029, Stats., recognizes that the town may “maintain”
an action to test the validity of the annexation. Sec. 260.15
authorizes “a person expressly authorized by statute” to sue
“without joining with him the person for or against whose
benefit the action is prosecuted.” “Person” includes bodies
politic (sec. 990.01 (26)). The two statutes, secs. 66.029
and 260.15, furnish ample authority for.the maintenance of
the present action by the town as representative of like-
minded residents in the affected area, without joining any of
such residents as parties.

Fish Creek Park Co. v. Bayside, 273 Wis. 89, 76 N. W.
(2d) 557, and Schateman v. Greenfield, 273 Wis. 277, 77
N. W. (2d) 511, cited by the city, hold that residents in the
annexed area may maintain an action to challenge the validity
of the annexation, and in such an action the town is not a
necessary party; but they do not hold that residents are in-
dispensable parties in an action by. the town itself under sec.
66.029, Stats. Ch., White House Milk Co: v. Thomson, ante,
p. 243, 81 N. W. (2d) 725.

It is urged that since no resident is a party to the action,
the judgment will not settle anything, because it will not be

336

binding on the residents of the affected area. The judgment
will certainly settle the rights of the town and the city in the
premises, and since under secs. 66.029 and 260.15, Stats., it
is in substance a statutory representative action, the adjudica-
tion will, in practical effect, bind the residents as well. Af-
fected residents wishing to assert rights at variance with the
claims of either town or city may protect themselves by in-
tervention or prompt commencement of a separate action.
They cannot sit by, do nothing, and avoid being bound by
the judgment in the town’s action.

3. The declaratory feature of the judgment is challenged
as improper because residents of the annexed area, who are
said to be necessary parties, have not been joined. Reliance
is placed on sub. (11) of the Declaratory Judgments Act,
sec. 269.56, Stats., which provides that “when declaratory
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declara-
tion, and no declaration shall prejudice the right of persons
not parties to the proceeding.”

As pointed out under section 2 of this opinion, any defect
of parties has been waived by failure to assert it by answer
or demurrer. However, we think it well to dispose of the
contention on the merits.

We do not construe the statute as requiring that where a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute or ordi-
nance is sought, every person whose interests are affected
by the statute or ordinance must be made a party to the
action. If it were so construed, the valuable remedy of de-
claratory judgment would be rendered impractical and indeed
often worthless for determining the validity of legislative
enactments, either state or local, since such enactments com-
monly affect the interests of large numbers of people. See
White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, ante, p. 243, 81 N. W.
(24) 725.

|| a 335
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The above-quoted provision of sec. 269.56 (11), Stats.,
must be read in the light of other provisions of the same
statute. Sub. (2) authorizes any person whose rights are
affected by a statute or municipal ordinance to have deter-
mined any question of validity arising thereunder. (The
town is a “person” within the meaning of that provision,
secs. 66.029 and 990.01, (26).) Sub. (11) provides that in
any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
ordinance (here the annexation ordinance), the municipal-
ity shall be made a party. Sub. (12) declares the Declara-
tory Judgments Act to be remedial, and that it is to be
liberally construed and administered. These provisions,
which so clearly show the purpose to make declaratory relief
available in proper cases for those aggrieved by uncertainties
as to the validity of municipal ordinances and even state
statutes, should not be nullified by an inconsistent and unduly
literal interpretation of the provisions of sub. (11) relative
to the joinder of parties.

With sub. (11) should also be read sec. 260.15, Stats.,
permitting an action by “a person expressly authorized by
statute,” without joining the person for or against whose
benefit the action is brought, and sec. 66.029 authorizing
the town to challenge the validity of an annexation.

We hold, therefore, that declaratory relief may be granted
in an action brought by a town pursuant to sec. 66.029,
Stats., to challenge the validity of a city ordinance purporting
to annex territory within the town, without joining residents
or taxpayers in the affected area. We consider applicable
the principle stated by a text writer as follows:

“Where public officers are engaged in litigation to protect
public rights and their proceedings and procedure maintain
public interests, private persons are not necessary parties
because they do not have any rights to protect which are not
being protected.” 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d
ed.), p. 297, sec. 154.

336
SY

4. The city asserts that it was error to grant injunctive
relief, because the complaint contains no allegation of ir-
reparable injury and no showing of such injury is made on
the motion for summary judgment. It is argued that the
town has no interest in the alteration of its boundaries and
cannot be injured by the annexation, since detachment of
territory reduces its burdens as well as its tax base, and the
public assets and liabilities will be apportioned. In re Village
of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 167, 221 N. W. 856, and other
cases are cited.

Injunctive relief may be granted in aid of a declaratory
judgment, where necessary or proper to make the judgment
effective. Morris v. Ellis, 221 Wis. 307, 315, 266 N. W. 921.
The granting or refusal of an injunction lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Christie v. Lueth, 265 Wis. 326,
334, 61 N. W. (2d) 338. We see no abuse of discretion in
the present case.

As long ago as 1910 it was held in Lutien v. Kewaunee,
143 Wis. 242, 244, 245, 126 N. W. 662, that an injunction
suit is a proper remedy to test the validity of an annexation,
certiorari being inadequate to reach defects not appearing
on the record before the common council (as for example the
sufficiency of the number of signatures on the petition for
annexation, which is challenged in the present action), and
quo warranto being “manifestly inappropriate ;” and as re-
cently as the present term injunctional relief has been held
proper without question in a hard-fought case. Brown Deer
v. Milwaukee, 274 Wis. 50, 72, 73, 79 N. W. (2d) 340. It
is now too late to question the well-established rule of Lutien
v. Kewaunee, supra.

While the city seeks to distinguish Lutien on the ground
that irreparable injury was alleged by the plaintiff land-
owners in that case, the want of such explicit allegation is
not fatal to the town in the present action. Sec. 66.029,
Stats., declares categorically that “the town is an interested

a De 337
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party” and “grants to towns the right to compel and enforce
a strict compliance with the required procedure.” Town of
Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 615, 70 N. W.
(2d) 249, Thus the pertinent legislation recognizes that
unauthorized dismemberment of the town is an injury to the
town’s interest. Such injury is of course irreparable.

“An injury will be enjoined as irreparable if its nature be
such that it cannot be adequately compensated in damages or
cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.”
Butterick Publishing Co. v. Rose, 141 Wis. 533, 539, 124
N. W. 647.

Moreover, under secs. 66.029 and 260.15, Stats., the town
may act in part in a representative capacity, and may assert
injury to its residents. “The right to live in a particular
municipal unit is an important right and should be protected
by all the safeguards that the law provides.” Blooming
Grove v. Madison, 253 Wis. 215, 218, 33 N. W. (2d) 312.
Thus unlawful transfer from one municipal unit to another
may be an irreparable injury to residents in the annexed
area.

Injuries of the sort above mentioned being inherent in an
annexation sought to be accomplished without compliance
with the procedure required by law, the omission of an ex-
plicit allegation of irreparable injury in the complaint is not
fatal to the action, nor does the omission to assert such injury
specifically in the motion papers invalidate the summary
judgment.

5. It is next contended that the action is a collateral attack
on the validity of the annexation, and is barred by that pro-
vision of sec. 62.07 (3), Stats., which reads:

The validity of the proceedings shall not be col-
tateraly attacked, nor in any manner called in question in any
such court unless the proceedings therefor be commenced
before the expiration of either of the ninety-day periods
herein provided for.”

While the present action was commenced seventy-nine
days after the enactment of the annexation ordinance, the city
contends that the ninety-day period for commencing action is
available only to direct attacks and does not apply to the first
clause of the quoted provision, that “the validity of the pro-
ceedings shall not be collaterally attacked.” It is said that
collateral attacks are absolutely prohibited, at any time, and
that the present action is a collateral attack, only certiorari
and quo warranto being direct attacks.

We consider, however, that the attack on the annexation
ordinance by the present action is direct, not collateral, since
the primary and indeed only purpose of the action is to obtain
an adjudication that the ordinance is invalid and incidental
injunctive relief against attempts to enforce it. Challenge of
the annexation is the main objective, not a side issue, and
the action moves directly to that end.

In ve Incorporation of Village of St. Francis, 208 Wis.
431, 243 N. W. 315, relied on by the city, is not to the con-
trary. There the primary objective of the proceeding was to
obtain incorporation of a village, and the validity of a neigh-
boring city’s prior proceedings for annexation of territory
sought to be incorporated into the village was incidentally
challenged in order to save the village incorporation. In-
corporation of the village being the direct objective of the
proceeding, inquiry into the validity of the annexation was
treated as collateral.

It is worthy of note that the above-quoted provision of
sec. 62.07 (3), Stats., with respect to collateral attacks was
in the annexation statute in substantially equivalent language
when the leading case of Lutien v. Kewaunee, 143 Wis. 242,
126 N. W. 662, established that an action in equity for in-
junctive relief is a proper method of challenging the validity
of an annexation, and was referred to by the court in that
case (143 Wis. at p. 246).

r |) 339
SY

6. What has been said with respect to the direct character
of the present attack on the validity of the annexation an-
swers the city’s next point, that by virtue of sec. 328.20,
Stats., the court in the present action cannot review errors
in the official proceedings of the city’s common council, the
proper remedy being certiorari.

Sec. 328.20, Stats., provides that “any charter .. . and
every amendment in any form, of the charter .. . of any
corporation, filed or recorded . . . and a duly certified copy
of any such document . . . shall be received as conclusive
evidence . . . of the due amendment of the charter . . . in
all cases where such facts are only collaterally involved. . . .”
Assuming without deciding that this statutory provision
applies to an annexation ordinance, as being a charter amend-
ment of a corporation, it gives conclusive effect only where
the facts are only collaterally involved. In the present case the
annexation ordinance is being directly challenged and the
facts pertinent to the question of validity are directly, not
“only collaterally involved.”

7. Coming now to the merits, we are constrained to hold
as did the lower court that the annexation ordinance is void
for want of compliance with the statutory requirement for
publication in advance of adoption.

The applicable statute, sec. 62.07 (1) (b), provides that
after the filing of a petition for annexation an ordinance
annexing the territory shall be introduced at a meeting of the
council and “‘shall . . . be published once each week for four
successive weeks in the official paper and thereafter be
adopted at a regular or special meeting by two thirds of all
the members of the council.”

In the present case the petition for annexation was filed on
April 22, 1954, and the proposed ordinance was introduced
at a meeting of the city council on the same day. It was
thereafter published in the official newspaper on April 30th
and May 7th, 14th, and 21st, under a notice that it would be

0

acted upon by the council “‘at its next regular meeting follow-
ing publication hereof.” On May 25th the ordinance was
adopted at a special meeting of the council. Thus the ordi-
nance was adopted on the 25th day, being less than four full
weeks, after the first publication.

In 1873 it was held that where a statute provided that
notice of tax sale should be published “once in each week for
four successive weeks prior to the sale,” a sale held twenty-
six days after the first publication was invalid for want of
compliance with the statutory requirement as to publication.
Eaton v. Lyman, 33 Wis. 34, 37. Other decisions to the
same effect followed. Chase v. Ross, 36 Wis. 267, 274;
McCrubb v. Bray, 36 Wis. 333, 339; Kopmeier v. O’Neil,
47 Wis. 593, 3 N. W. 365. By 1883 it was considered as
settled in this state that under such a statute the prescribed
number of weekly publications is insufficient unless the spec-
ified number of full weeks has elapsed between the first
publication and the event. Collins v. Smith, 57 Wis. 284,
286, 15 N. W. 192.

Later cases are in accord. Thus where a statute provided
for advertising of bids “‘ ‘by publishing a notice . . . not less
than once a week for two successive weeks,’” it was held
“reasonably clear” that the legislature required a full two
weeks of publication before opening bids and was violated
when the bids were opened immediately after the second
publication. Bechthold v. Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 544, 552,
277 N. W. 657. See also Behling v. Milwaukee, 190 Wis.
643, 644, 209 N. W. 762.

Diligent counsel have not referred us to any decision to
the contrary in this state, although a different rule has ap-
parently been adopted in some other jurisdictions. A recital
in the statement of facts preceding the court’s opinion in
Roehrborn v. Ladysmith, 175 Wis. 394, 396, 185 N. W. 170,
that an ordinance which appears elsewhere to have been
adopted only twenty-six days after the first publication “was

a ee 341
Pod

published as required by statute” cannot be considered a
decision that such publication was sufficient, since the court
held the ordinance void because adopted before the expiration
of the thirty-day period which the statute then required to
elapse after the first publication.

The city urges us to limit the decisions above cited to
cases where the purpose of the publication is to give notice of
an event, such as for example a sale, and to apply a different
tule in the present case on the theory that the purpose of the
publication required by sec. 62.07 (1) (b), Stats., is merely
to give notice that the ordinance is pending and not to give
notice of the meeting at which it will be considered by the
council. Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 269 Wis.
609, 617, 70 N. W. (2d) 249.

We do not feel at liberty to draw such a distinction. When
the legislature used the language “published once each week
for four successive weeks . . . and thereafter be adopted,”
in the presence of the long line of Wisconsin decisions above
mentioned, it must be held to have used the words with the
significance so uniformly given to similar words in previous
enactments, and thus to have required that four weeks must
elapse between the first publication and the adoption of the
ordinance.

Tt cannot be said that the length of time between first
publication and council action is unimportant. After a peti-
tion for annexation is filed, objectors have the right to
persuade signers to withdraw their signatures, while pro-
ponents may add new signatures; and it is necessary to the
validity of the annexation that there be a sufficient number
of unwithdrawn signatures on the date of adoption of the
ordinance. Town of Brookfield v. City of Brookfield, 274
Wis. 638, 80 N. W. (2d) 800. Since such activities on the
part of objectors and proponents necessarily take time, no
one can say that the adoption of the ordinance twenty-five
days instead of four weeks after the first publication is an

insignificant deviation or that rights will not be prejudiced
thereby.

Since the city council purported to adopt the ordinance
hefore the required time had elapsed after the first publica-
tion of notice, the attempted annexation was voidable at
best. Roehrborn v. Ladysmith, 175 Wis. 394, 396, 185
N. W. 170. Appropriate action having been timely com-
menced to avoid it, the circuit court properly declared it
void.

8. Since the decision that the ordinance is void for want
of sufficient publication necessarily results in affirmance of
the judgment, we need not consider the merits of the circuit
court’s determination that the ordinance is also invalid by
reason of inaccuracies in the description of the territory to
be annexed. :

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Town or Broomine Grove, Respondent, vs. City oF
Maotson, Appellant.

February 8—-March 5, 1957.

w
) ase

For the appellant there were briefs by Harold E. Hanson,
city attorney, Leon E. Isaksen, special counsel, attorneys,
and Thomas, Orr, Isaksen & Werner and Trayton L. Lath-
vop, all of Madison of counsel, and oral argument by Mr.
Hanson, Mr. Leon E. Isaksen, and Mr. Lathrop.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
Earl I. Cooper, attorney, and William J. P. Aberg and Paul
C. Gartake of counsel, all of Madison.

Farcuixp, J. Appellant raises a number of objections
to the right of the town to bring this action. They are the
same objections which appellant raised in Blooming Grove v.
Madison, ante, p. 328, 81 N. W. (2d) 713, and are disposed
of adversely to appellant in that decision.

It has been frequently assumed that an annexation would
be invalid if it caused the portion of a town not previously
included within a village or city to be divided into two or
more parts. The circuit court so held.

No provision of the constitution nor applicable statutes
expressly forbid such division. The authority most fre-
quently cited on the point is Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.
Oconto, 50 Wis. 189, 6 N. W. 607. In that case this court
considered orders of the board of supervisors of Oconto
county organizing and changing the boundaries of the town
of Oconto so that it would consist of two areas separated by
parts of other towns. It was decided that by reason of the

a Le 345
Po

connotations of the word “town,” as well as reasons of public
policy, practical convenience, and public welfare, a town must
consist of contiguous territory and the orders organizing
and changing the boundaries of Oconto were void. The de-
cision appears to be an interpretation of the constitution.

The Oconto Case deals directly with the original organiza-
tion of a town, but does not necessarily decide whether once
a town has been validly organized it is improper for the
boundaries of cities and villages to be so drawn that incorpo-
rated territory shall completely separate one unincorporated
portion of a town from another unincorporated portion of
the same town. Counsel have assumed such impropriety,
and so, probably, has this court, in three cases. In each of
these cases, while the matter of division was raised, the
portions of the town were in fact connected by slim “cor-
ridors” of unincorporated town land so that it was never
necessary to decide whether the annexation or incorporation
would have been valid if the corridor had not existed. Lake
v. Milwaukee, 255 Wis. 419, 39 N. W. (2d) 376; In re
Village of Elm Grove, 267 Wis. 157, 64 N. W. (2d) 874;
Greenfield v. Milwaukee, 273 Wis. 484, 78 N. W. (2d) 909.

The only decision called to our attention in which this
court has said that division of a town by annexation would
be improper was Milwaukee v. Sewerage Comm. 268 Wis.
342, 359, 67 N. W. (2d) 624. One question in the case
was whether a particular annexation posting had been valid.
The trial court had determined the posting to be void upon
its face upon four grounds. There was an issue of fact as to
one, but this court stated that there were three other suf-
ficient grounds in any event. One of these remaining grounds
was “isolation” of part of the town, but it is evident that a
decision of whether or not such isolation was improper was
not essential in view of the remaining grounds.

An assistant city attorney of the city of Milwaukee who is
thoroughly familiar with annexation matters expressed the

366
id”

opinion that a town cannot be divided into separate parcels
by annexation. Maruszewski, Legal Aspects of Annexation,
1952 Wisconsin Law Review, 628.

We would be persuaded to give great weight to a rule
which has been so widely assumed except for a matter of
legislative construction which has been brought to our at-
tention.

Only eight years after the adoption of our constitution,
the legislature incorporated the city of Madison by ch. 75,
Laws of 1856, That act interposed the incorporated area of
Madison between portions of the town of Madison. In fact
there were five such separated portions of the town. As a
result of subsequent annexations to Madison, there was in
1954 a total of nine such separated portions of the town of
Madison and three unincorporated areas of the town of
Burke which are separated from each other.

Appellant argues that annexation and incorporation do
not change town boundaries and that all parts of a town
therefore remain contiguous to one another even though some
of them are also parts of cities or villages. Texts and de-
cisions from other states are cited supporting the concept of
a town as a political subdivision of a county the existence
and boundaries of which remain unaffected by the incorpo-
ration of cities and villages just as is the case with counties.
2 McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), pp. 271, 272, sec. 7.08;
52 Am. Jur., Towns and Townships, p. 477, sec. 7.

Some weight is given to this proposition by statements in
the separate opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Lyon in State ex
rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 521, 51
N. W. 724. Sec. 4, art. IV of the Wisconsin constitution
provides that assembly districts shall be bounded by county,
precinct, town, or ward lines. Mr. Chief Justice Lyon ex-
plained that “the lines of cities and villages are not specified
as such boundaries, because it would be necessary to disregard
them and dismember such municipalities in order to.prevent

a P| 347
Po

the dismemberment of counties and towns.” He also stated
that when the constitution was adopted there were villages
with town lines passing through and dividing them into two
parts. In sec. 12, art. XIV of the original constitution there
appeared the first apportionment of legislative districts. No
villages were mentioned therein. Although the village of
Madison was then in existence, only towns were mentioned
in describing the district in which the village of Madison was
located. Since the earliest days, however, apportionment
acts of the legislature have listed villages as well as wards,
cities, and towns when dividing counties into assembly dis-
tricts.

Appellant has cited a number of statutes and cases in which
there is language referring to villages as being within a town.
An example is sec. 61.187 (2), Stats., providing that in the
event of dissolution of a village, “. . . the territory em-
braced in the village shall revert to and become a part of the
town or towns from which it was taken or in which it is
then located... .”

Evidently under early statutes, towns might continue to
perform certain functions within villages incorporated within
them. In Green County v. Monroe, 55 Wis. 175, 180, 12
N. W. 472, the court held that in case the county had not
adopted the county system of supporting the poor, liquor-li-
cense money collected in a village “shall be paid to the town
treasurer of the town in which such village is situated.”

It can be said that town boundaries have at least potential
significance notwithstanding incorporation and annexation
within them, or stretching across such boundaries. It is clear,
however, that most, if not all, powers and duties of town
government are restricted to areas outside of incorporated
areas.

Relying largely upon the early construction of the con-
stitution by the legislature in incorporating the city of Madi-
son and thereby separating portions of the town, and also

58 ee
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upon the fact that the legislature preserves for a few limited
purposes a relationship between incorporated areas and the
towns within the borders of which they lie, we reach the
conclusion that the constitution does not prohibit the annex-
ation or incorporation of territory within a town, once valid-
ly organized, in such a way as to divide the unincorporated
area of the town into separate parts. The statute regulating
annexation, sec. 62.07, does not express nor imply such
prohibition.

Sec, 4.04 (2), Stats., provides that under certain condi-
tions territory annexed to a city becomes a part of the as-
sembly district of which the ward in which it is incorporated
forms a part. The fifteenth ward of Madison is part of the
first assembly district and the town of Blooming Grove is
part of the fourth. Questions as to the validity or effect of
sec. 4.04 and other questions which may arise concerning the
composition of the assembly and senate districts are not now
before the court. The town cannot raise such questions.
Greenfield v. Milwaukee, 273 Wis. 484, 78 N. W. (2d) 909.

We therefore conclude that the judgment entered upon
respondent’s motion for summary judgment should be re-
versed.

The circuit court denied appellant’s motion for summary
judgment, evidently for the sole reason that the matter must
be decided in favor of respondent upon the issues of law
relating to apportionment and division of the town. We re-
verse the denial, but only to leave the appellant’s motion open
for consideration upon the merits. We express no opinion
on issues raised by the pleadings other than those relating
to apportionment and division of the town. Appellant’s brief
asserts that an issue has been raised by respondent as to
sufficiency of the signatures on the petition at the time it was
filed; that this issue is raised too late. This question also
has never been considered by the circuit court and we express
no opinion.

a | 349

By the Court—Judgment and order reversed, cause re-
manded for further proceedings according to law.

Broaproor, J. (dissenting). I cannot agree with the
majority opinion in this case which holds that a town can be
dismembered by annexation proceedings. The word “town”
has different meanings in different parts of the country. In
the colonies, and later in the New England states, a town
was a large unit of local government. In fact towns there
constituted the original units of local government before
counties were formed. In our territorial legislature and in
our constitutional convention there were many people who
had come from eastern states and without a doubt they
brought with them some idea of the town as it existed there.
However, in Wisconsin counties were set up as the original
units of local government and the counties were later divided
into towns.

The authorities cited in the majority opinion are all tinged
by the early idea, but early in our history the town was
created not only as a political division but as a territorial
division as an agency of the state for the exercise of portions
of the political power of the state. At one time villages and
cities were referred to as “municipal corporations” while
towns and counties were referred to as “quasi-municipai
corporations.” That distinction has largely disappeared and
it is now customary to refer to all of them as “municipali-
ties.” Each town in Wisconsin is by statute a body corporate
with many statutory privileges and duties. To hold that there
can be two municipalities occupying the same territory with
like authority and privileges will, as a practical matter, lead
to public confusion and disorder rather than to the promo-
tion of good government. Certainly the city of Madison and
the town of Blooming Grove cannot both govern the same
territory.

350

In the absence of statute, it was held in Chicago & N. W.
R. Co. v. Oconto, 50 Wis. 189, 6 N. W. 607, that a town
must be of limited territorial extent, compact and contiguous,
and its boundaries clearly defined. The appellants contend
that this applies only in the case of the original organization
of a town. I cannot agree. The same logic and practical
application of the statutes require that a town be compact and
not split into parcels if it is to efficiently operate as a politi-
cal division of the state. The idea has been prevalent for
many years that a town as such a political division could not
be dismembered by annexation proceedings. No cases can
be cited where it has been permitted. For practical considera-
tions I would not permit it now.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice STEINLE joins
in this dissent.

ConTINENTAL CasuaLty Company, Respondent, vs. Pocor-
zELsKt, Appellant.

March 4—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Bendinger, Hayes
& Kluwin of Milwaukee, and oral argument by John A.
Kluwin.

For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief
of Shaw, Muskat & Paulsen, attorneys, and John F, Zim-
mermann of counsel, all of Milwaukee.

Martin, C. J. Sec. 269.57 (1), Stats., reads:

“The court, or a judge thereof, may, upon due notice and
cause shown, order either party to give to the other, within
a specified time, an inspection of property or inspection and
copy or permission to take a copy of any books and docu-
ments in his possession or under his control containing evi-
dence relating to the action or special proceeding or may
require the deposit of the books or documents with the
clerk and may require their production at the trial. . . .”

Orders contemplated by the statute are discretionary, and
we see no abuse of discretion in this matter. It was the
opinion of the trial court that the document sought to be
inspected is a privileged communication between respondent
and its attorneys.

It is provided by sec. 325.22, Stats. :

“An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to
disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of his professional em-
ployment. This prohibition may be waived by the client, and
does not include communications which the attorney needs
to divulge for his own protection, or the protection of those
with whom he deals, or which were made to him for the ex-
press purpose of being communicated to another, or being
made public.”

The statute is but a re-enactment of the common law
(Estate of Smith (1953), 263 Wis. 441, 57 N. W. (2d)
727); and the privilege extends to:

all communications made to a legal adviser duly
qualified as such, and employed and acting in that capacity,

a | 353

where the object of the party is to obtain a more exact and
complete knowledge of the law affecting his rights, obliga-
tions, or duties relative to the subject matter to which such
communications relate.” 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, p. 270,
sec. 483.

Referring to the privilege of secrecy in communications
between attorney and client, this court said in Koeber v.
Somers (1901), 108 Wis. 497, 504, 84 N. W, 991:

“The rule of the common law and of this statute within
its proper limits is most salutary. It is essential to the ends
of justice that clients should be safe in confiding to their
counsel the most secret facts, and to receive advice and advo-
cacy in the light thereof without peril of publicity. Dis-
closures made to this end should be as secret and inviolable

_ as if the facts had remained in the knowledge of the client
alone. Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625.”

In Hickman v. Taylor (1947), 329 U. S. 495, 510, 511,
512, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451, the United States
supreme court stated:

“Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is
bound to work for the advancement of justice while faith-
fully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In per-
forming his various duties, however, it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he as-
semble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan
his strategy without undue and needless interference. That
is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to
promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests. This
work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memo-
randa, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal
beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways—
aptly though roughly termed by the circuit court of appeals
in this case as the ‘work product of the lawyer.’ Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much

of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be
his own. Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the

preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal pro-
fession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the
clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. . . .
the general policy against invading the privacy of an attor-
ney’s course of preparation is so well recognized and so
essential to an orderly working of our system of legal proce-
dure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that
privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production
through a subpoena or court order.”

It is appellant’s contention that the institution of this suit
constitutes a waiver of the privilege between attorney and
client, but in our view of the matter we do not reach the
question of waiver. Appellant has failed to establish that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to a defense of
the respondent’s claim. The claim is for reimbursement of
“attorneys’ fees to Shaw, Muskat & Paulsen for assisting
in the defense of said matter, in the amount of two hundred
($200) dollars,” and the only issue which arises therefrom
is whether such fees were reasonable.

As stated in Will of Willing (1926), 190 Wis. 406, 413,
209 N. W. 602:

“No rule of thumb can be laid down which will enable
an amount to be fixed in every case which constitutes reason-
able and just compensation. It is well established that in
determining the amount of reasonable compensation there
may be taken into account the amount and character of serv-
ices rendered, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and na-
ture and importance of the litigation or business in which
the service was rendered, the responsibility imposed upon
the attorneys, the value of the subject matter of the con-
troversy, the skill and experience called for in the perform-
ance of the service, the age, experience, professional character
and standing of the attorney, the result of the litigation, and
whether or not the fee is certain or contingent. 9 A. L. R.,

a | 355

note, p. 237; 6 Corp. Jur. sec. 331, p. 748 et seq., and cases
cited.”

The factors determinative of reasonableness do not include
the substance of the advice given. In establishing its claim
on the trial respondent will be required to prove the factors
relating to reasonableness, as set forth in the Willing Case,
and appellant will have every opportunity to cross-examine
with respect thereto. He is in no way prejudiced by the
denial of inspection and he has shown no prejudice. His
argument is that the denial “works an injustice” to him and
cites cases to the effect that a testator who requests an at-
torney to act as a witness to his will waives objection to
the competency of the witness to testify in relation to the will
and its execution. Such cases fall within the exclusion made
in sec. 325.22, Stats., of communications which are made
for the express purpose of being made public, and have no
application to the situation in the instant case.

Appellant relies on Thompson v. Roberts (1955), 269
Wis. 472, 477, 69 N. W. (2d) 482, where damages were
sought for personal injuries received in an autdmobile acci-
dent. Adverse examination of the plaintiff before trial dis-
closed that the claim was based on aggravation, allegedly
attributable to the accident, of a prior susceptibility to bron-
chitis and a prior condition of nervousness. Upon applica-
tion for an order for inspection under sec. 269.57, Stats., the
trial court permitted the inspection of only such records as
were pertinent to the pre-existing condition of bronchitis
and refused to allow inspection of records pertaining to
plaintiffs prior nervous condition. In holding that the denial
of the inspection of psychiatric and neurological records was
error, this court stated that defendants “should not be forced
to trial and compelled to defend against claims for psychiatric
and neurological injuries while the plaintiff withholds from
them available recorded information concerning his previous
psychiatric and neurological condition.”

356

It is apparent that in an action arising out of personal in-
juries the damages sought are based on the injuries sustained
and the contents of medical records have a direct bearing
on the claim. In an action for reimbursement of attorneys’
fees, however, the claim is not dependent upon the substance
of the advice given but on the pertinent factors relating to the
rendering of the services, factors which may be inquired into
and determined without the production of privileged com-
munications.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

GuarpIaNnsHip oF Barnes: GaLstEr, Executrix, Appellant,
vs. First Nationa, Bank or Kenoswa, Guardian,
Respondent.

March 4—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by Lucareli & Lucareli
of Kenosha, attorneys, and m J. H. Evans of Racine
of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. V. J. Lucareli and
Mr, Evans.

a | 359

For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief
of Cavanagh, Mittelstaed, Sheldon, Heide & Hartley of Ke-
nosha.

Broaproot, J. The guardian has moved to dismiss the
appeal for the reason that the notices of appeal were not
served until September 18, 1956, which was in excess of
sixty days from the date of the entry of the order appealed
from.

Sec. 324.04, Stats., provides that an appeal to this court
from any order or judgment of the county court is limited
to sixty days from the date of entry thereof, unless an ex-
tension of time is granted by the county court as provided.
in sec. 324.05. No such application appears in the record.
The executrix contends that the appeal is proper under the
provisions of sec. 269.51 (1) for the reason that the guardian
accepted and retained the appellant’s notice of appeal and the
briefs in the instant case before the motion was made to
dismiss, and that this constituted such participation in the
proceedings in this court as to waive all objection to the
jurisdiction of this appeal. The motion to dismiss was made
returnable on the date the case was set for argument in this
court. The guardian not only accepted and retained the
briefs of the appellant but filed its own brief that contained
arguments upon the merits.

In Maas v. W. R. Arthur & Co. 239 Wis. 581, 586,
2 N. W. (2d) 238, this court said:

“Estate of Fish, 200 Wis. 61, 227 N. W. 272, is cited
by respondent to the point that where notice of appeal has
not been timely served this court does not acquire jurisdiction
although the respondent stipulates waiving the want of serv-
ice and affirmatively requests that the court take jurisdiction.
It is urged that if the party cannot waive by stipulation he
cannot waive by conduct under a statute. There is a differ-
ence. The effect of a waiver by conduct creating a statutory

30

waiver is in effect a conferring of jurisdiction by the statute,
not by action of the court dispensing with timely service.”

In Estate of Sweeney, 247 Wis. 376, 19 N. W. (2d) 849,
this court cited with approval the Maas Case, supra, when it
said (p. 381):

“The parties not served, except the bishop of La Crosse,
have in no way appeared in this court. What other parties
have done cannot in any event be held to be a waiver of the
rights of those parties who have not appeared and who have
not participated. Sec. 269.51, Stats., can only apply where
there has been a service of a notice within the time prescribed
by statute, unless a party has participated in a proceeding in
this court. Then the right of appeal does not come from the
extension of time but from the statute itself. Maas v. W. R.
Arthur & Co. (1942), 239 Wis. 581, 586, 2 N. W. (2d)
238.”

In the Sweeney Case some necessary parties had not been
served. There was still time for the appellants to make ap-
plication to the county court for an extension of time to
take the appeal. This court remanded the record to permit
the appellants to apply for such extension under the provi-
sions of sec. 324.05, Stats., stating that it was a matter for
the trial court to pass upon and that it was within its dis-
cretion. This same rule was followed in Estate of White,
256 Wis. 467, 41 N. W. (2d) 776, in the following lan-
guage (p. 471):

“Sec: 269.51 (1), Stats., provides that a respondent waives
all objections to the regularity and sufficiency of an appeal
or to the jurisdiction of the court if he participates in any
proceedings in the appellate court before moving to dismiss
the appeal. The record shows that respondent, White, by his
attorneys, Donovan, Gleiss, Goodman, Breitenfield & Gleiss,
admitted service of appellants’ brief and appendix on Decem-
ber 7, 1949, and on the same day respondent Austin, by the
same attorneys, admitted like service. No motion was made
to dismiss the appeal until December 22, 1949, when respond-

ent administrator so moved. The record does not show that
the briefs were ever returned or that the service was repudi-
ated or that White has done anything herein after counsel
admitted service of the brief as his attorney. Such acceptance
and retention of briefs was held to be a participation in pro-
ceedings in the appellate court in Maas v. W. R. Arthur &
Co. (1942), 239 Wis. 581, 2 N. W. (2d) 238. There the
respondent also took part in settling the bill of exceptions,
but that is a proceeding in the trial court (Kttchenmaster v.
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1946), 248 Wis. 335, 338, 21
N. W. (2d) 727), and as such has no influence on the ques-
tion. The participation in the appellate court before moving
to dismiss was the same in the Maas Case as it is at present
and we follow the rule that we applied then, that objection
to jurisdiction was waived and thereby sec. 269.51 (1) con-
ferred upon the supreme court jurisdiction of the appeal. See
also Estate of Sweeney (1945), 247 Wis. 376, 19 N. W.
(2d) 849.”

Upon the authority of said cases the motion to dismiss the

appeal is denied.

Upon the merits, the record shows several instances in
which the guardian was derelict in its duty. It has never
filed an inventory, although with its petition filed in Janu-
ary, 1955, it attached a document called “A Statement for
Inventory ;” it never requested the appointment of appraisers,
nor were any ever appointed; no annual accounts were filed.
At the time the guardian was appointed its ward was the
owner of land in joint tenancy with a Miss Albert, upon
which was located a cottage. This property was near a lake.
The cottage contained some personal property. No attempt
was made to inventory the personal property within the
cottage nor to find out to whom it belonged. After the death
of Mr. Barnes the bank acted as Miss Albert’s agent for the
rental and sale of the lake property. The personal property
was not removed but was delivered to the purchaser of the
cottage. The guardian was derelict in its duty in that respect.
Mrs. Galster made no attempt to include in the record any

3. es
es

proof as to the amount or value of that property but cites
the matter as another dereliction of duty on the part of the
guardian.

Upon examination of the vice-president, and a trust officer
of the bank, he admitted that a guardian’s powers cease upon
the death of the ward. In spite of that knowledge the bank
sought an order determining the rights of other persons,
some of whom it represented, to property in its hands.

The appellant seeks to have the guardian removed because
of these and other alleged derelictions. Such relief would be
futile. Whether discharged or not the bank’s sole duty is to
settle its accounts.

The appellant also seeks the removal of the guardian’s
attorneys. This we cannot do. The guardian has a right to
select its own attorneys. Whether all of its attorneys’ fees
can be charged to the trust in its hands is another matter.

It is next contended that the guardian should not be
credited with any compensation or attorneys’ fees. The
compensation of guardians is regulated by sec. 319.37, Stats.,
which reads as follows:

“Every guardian shall be allowed the amount of his reason-
able expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and he
shall also have such compensation for his services as the
court in which his accounts are settled shall deem to be just
and reasonable. The court may allow the sum paid by the
guardian for his bond, as provided in section 271.14.”

The rules for determining the amount of compensation
under that section are outlined in Guardianship of Messer,
which was before this court twice. The first decision was
reported in 242 Wis. 66, 7 N. W. (2d) 584, and the second
in 246 Wis. 426, 17 N. W. (2d) 559. In each decision this
court quoted with approval the rule from Restatement,
1 Trusts, p. 741, sec. 242, as follows:

“In the absence of a statute providing a definite rule fixing
the amount of the trustee’s compensation, the usual practice

Ss 363

is to allow the trustee a percentage of the amount of the
annual gross income and a percentage of the principal. Where,
however, under the circumstances such percentage would be
more or less than a reasonable compensation, the court may
vary it. Among the circumstances to be considered in deter-
mining the amount of compensation are: (1) The amount
and character of the trust property; (2) the extent of the
risk and responsibility of the trustee; (3) the character of
the services rendered by the trustee; (4) the degree of dif-
ficulty in administering the trust; (5) the skill and success
of the trustee in administering the trust; (6) the statutory
rates of compensation for executors and administrators.

“In so far as compensation is determined upon a percentage
basis, the commission upon income is ordinarily upon gross
income received by the trustee, and the commission upon
principal is ordinarily upon the net value of the principal at
the time the compensation is fixed.”

It will be noted that one of the tests in determining the
compensation of a guardian is the character of the services
rendered by the trustee. Where a guardian has been derelict
in its duty, as here, that is to be taken into consideration in
determining its compensation. If losses had occurred such
derelictions could result in a forfeiture of compensation. The
record discloses no proof of the reasonableness of the fee
charged by the guardian. The determination of a reasonable
fee is within the discretion of the county court upon a proper
record.

The appeal from the order of February 8, 1955, which
came to this court, was made necessary by the unwarranted
and unauthorized act of the guardian in failing to comply
with the statute by accounting to the court and turning over
all of the property in its hands to the personal representative
of its ward. The expenses incurred in defending its unwar-
ranted and unauthorized action, including attorneys’ fees,
should be surcharged to the guardian in its final account.
Upon remand of the record the county court shall determine
what, if any, compensation should be credited to the guardian.

This is also true as to the attorneys’ fees incurred by the
guardian. The guardian is entitled to the services of an
attorney when reasonably necessary and it is to be credited
with a reasonable amount charged for such services.

Finally it is contended that the attorney’s fees incurred by
Mrs. Galster should be allowed and paid out of the funds in
the hands of the guardian. With that we cannot agree. It
is apparent that the services were rendered for Mrs. Galster
individually or in her capacity as executrix of the last will
and testament of George W. Barnes, deceased. Reasonable
attorneys’ fees will be a proper charge against that estate.

By the Court.—Order reversed. Cause remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Peyer and others, Respondents, vs. Jacoss, Appellant.
March 4—April 9, 1957.

a Le 365
Lo

For the appellant there was a brief by Johnson & DeBaufer
of Whitewater, and oral argument by Easton Johnson.

For the respondents Peyer there was a brief and oral argu-
ment by Philip Weinberg of Milwaukee.

For the respondent Thornton Realty Corporation there
was a brief by Edgarton & Hobbs of Fond du Lac.

Brown, J. Jacobs, the defendant and appellant, owned
a farm and wished to sell it. He listed it for sale with one
Hamilton, a salesman employed by defendant Thornton
Realty Corporation. Hamilton approached Mr. and Mrs.
Peyer, the plaintiffs, and interested them in the purchase.
After talking over the terms on which Peyer would be willing
to buy, Hamilton prepared an “Offer to Purchase” which
the Peyers signed and which was then presented to Jacobs.
On June 23, 1953, Jacobs accepted it in writing and so did
Thornton Realty Corporation. The material provisions of
this offer were:

The price is $30,000, $2,000 down payment, $13,000 on
or before March 1, 1954, and a mortgage of $15,000 “to be
secured by Thornton Realty Corp.” Sale to be completed
on or before March 1, 1954. Possession to be given March 1,
1954. The owner is to furnish an abstract of title showing
merchantable title free and clear of all incumbrances except
as noted.

The $2,000 down payment was duly made by the Peyers
to Jacobs. On March Ist the parties met. The Peyers then
had $8,100 in cash and testified that they were able to raise
the balance of the $13,000 then payable but neither Thornton
Realty Corporation nor anyone else had procured a mortgage

36
———*'

of $15,000. Jacobs did not then tender performance but
extended “for a week or ten days” the time in which the
required cash and mortgage might be found. Jacobs testified,
further, that he gave additional extensions of the time of
performance until well into April. There is no testimony
that these extensions had any definite termination dates and
it is evident that the parties just let matters run. While the
deal was pending Jacobs asked the Peyers to lay a concrete
cowyard which they did, and Jacobs, himself, painted and
otherwise improved the farmhouse. On or about August 1,
1954, without notice to the Peyers nor demand on them to
perform, nor tender of a deed to the Peyers, Jacobs sold the
farm for $30,000 to a third party upon land contract. He
refused the Peyers’ demand to return the $2,000 down pay-
ment and the Peyers brought this action against both Jacobs
and the Thornton Realty Corporation. Jacobs counter-
claimed against the Peyers for damages of $3,000 allegedly
sustained by reason of the Peyers’ failure to perform their
contract.

Trial was to the court. The judgment dismissed with
costs the Peyers’ action against Thornton Realty Corpora-
tion, dismissed Jacobs’ counterclaim, and awarded to the
Peyers from Jacobs their down payment of $2,000 with
interest and $86.25 as compensation for the cowyard con-
structed by the Peyers at Jacobs’ request.

Jacobs has appealed from all of the judgment but his
prayer for relief in this court asks only that the complaint
be dismissed as to him. The Peyers ask that the judgment be
affirmed. Since no party opposes the dismissal of the action
as to Thornton Realty Corporation, we affirm that part of
the judgment as a matter of course.

Appellant submits that judgment in favor of the Peyers
should be reversed because the Peyers were not prepared to
pay the purchase price of $30,000 at any time within the
extended period of the contract; that the Peyers told appel-

r |) 367
Ss

lant they could not perform and that this was an anticipatory
breach of the contract which justified Jacobs’ rescission with-
out tender of performance; that the contract did not obligate
Jacobs to procure a mortgage of $15,000 for the plaintiffs
and he did not agree to do so. Appellant also contends that
Thornton Realty Corporation was the Peyers’ agent, not his,
in the undertaking to effect a mortgage. The testimony on
these issues was in conflict and, in general, the trial court’s
findings of fact were contrary to appellant’s contentions.
Affirmance of the judgment might be ordered on the ground
that the findings are sufficiently supported by the evidence
but, more certainly, there is an issue of law, arising from
undisputed testimony, which must be resolved in plaintiffs’
favor. It determines the controversy and makes the other
contentions immaterial.

By granting extensions of time to perform the contract,
which extensions were without specified termination date,
Jacobs waived the contractual date of performance. The
contract was thus kept alive by Jacobs’ own action. While so
alive Jacobs was required to be ready and able on reasonable
notice to perform his part of the contract if the Peyers should
perform theirs. Jacobs could, of course, bring this situation
to an end by giving the Peyers reasonable notice of a date
beyond which further delay would not be excused, but in
the meantime the contract remained in force, binding upon
both parties. When Jacobs sold the property to others, he
put it out of his power to perform his obligation. Since the
Peyers’ breach, if there was any, had been waived by Jacobs’
extension of the contract, the sale by Jacobs, without notice
to the Peyers, without tender of performance on his own
part and without demand by him for performance by the
Peyers, was the first material breach. He may not profit
from his own breach by retaining the down payment. His
contention that the Wisconsin authorities, such as Pierson v.
Dorff (1929), 198 Wis. 43, 223 N. W. 579, and Woodman

v. Blue Grass Land Co. (1905), 125 Wis. 489, 103 N. W.
236, 104 N. W. 920, permiit him to do so are not in point
because in those cases, as well as in Schwartz v. Syver
(1953), 264 Wis. 526, 59 N. W. (2d) 489, it was the payer
and not the receiver of the down payment who defaulted or
who repudiated the contract.

In Lockit Cap Co. v. Globe Mfg. Co. (1930), 158 Wash.
183, 186, 290 Pac. 813, 814, the court considered such a
situation and said:

“A waiver of past failures does not necessarily constitute
a waiver of future defaults; and, while there can be no arbi-
trary forfeiture where delays have been acquiesced in, still
a party, who by his conduct has not insisted upon a timely
performance and has thereby waived performance within the
time specified in the contract, may, nevertheless, thereafter
declare a forfeiture or cancellation of the contract for delay,
provided he first makes demand for performance and grants

avreasonable time therefor.” (Italics ours.)

The court then quoted 1 Black, Rescission and Cancella-
tion (2d ed.), p. 623, sec. 219, as follows:

“yen where time is made the essence of the contract,
this provision may be waived by the party for whose benefit
or protection it is inserted, either expressly or by extending
the time for payment or performance or by granting indul-
gence to the other party in this regard; and when such a
waiver has been made, he cannot arbitrarily and summarily
declare a forfeiture of the contract for delay, but must first de-
mand payment or performance and give the other party a
reasonable time and opportunity, after such demand, to
comply.’ ”

Black illustrates the above quotation by the following
example:

“Thus, although a purchaser of land has made default
in paying agreed instalments of the price, yet if the vendor,

by his subsequent course of dealing, has led the purchaser to
believe that a forfeiture will not be insisted on, he cannot

a a 369
LE

suddenly declare a forfeiture without giving notice and an
opportunity to pay the balance due.”

We consider the trial court correctly determined that in
these circumstances Jacobs must place Mr. and Mrs. Peyer
im statu quo ante by returning the down payment and compen-
sating them for the improvements they had made to the
farm at Jacobs’ request. °

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Hatz, Respondent, vs. Hate and another, Appellants.
March 5—April 9, 1957.

370
Ld

For the appellants there was a brief by Giffin & Simarski
of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Edward J. Simarski.
For the respondent there was a brief by Lowry & Hunter,

attorneys, and Willis J. Zick of counsel, all of Waukesha, and
oral argument by Mr. Zick.

Currie, J. The issue on this appeal is how the two-year
period is to be computed which is prescribed by sec. 330.19
(5), Stats., for either giving written notice of injury or serv-
ing the complaint, where the cause of action is one to recover
for personal injuries. If the day on which the accident oc-
curred is to be excluded, but the day on which the complaint
was served is to be counted, then the service of the complaint
in the instant case was timely.

The provisions of sec. 990.001 (4) (a) and (d), Stats.
1955, control and are decisive of this appeal. These two
paragraphs provide as follows:

“(a) The time within which an act is to be done or pro-
ceeding had or taken shall be computed by excluding the
first day and including the last; and when any such time is
expressed in hours the whole of Sunday and of any legal
holiday, from midnight to midnight, shall be excluded.

“(d) Regardless of whether the time limited in any statute
for the taking of any proceeding or the doing of an act is
measured from an event or from the date or day on which
such event occurs, the day on which such event took place
shall be excluded in the computation of such time.”

| 371

a

PE
The defendants contend that our decision in Siebert v.
Jacob Dudenhoefer Co. (1922), 178 Wis. 191, 188 N. W.
610, requires that we reverse the trial court. However, that
case was decided prior to the adoption by the legislature of
any statute for computing time expressed in years. There-
fore, in that case the common-law rule was applied under
which the day of the event is counted and not excluded. On
this point, see Pick Industries v. Gebhard-Berghammer
(1953), 264 Wis. 353, 356, 59 N. W. (2d) 798, 60 N. W.
(2d) 254. Because of the enactment of the statutes quoted
above, Siebert v. Jacob Dudenhoefer Co., supra, is no longer
of any value as a precedent on the issue of how to compute
the two-year period prescribed by sec. 330.19 (5), Stats.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.

PutverMACHER, Plaintiff, vs. SHARP and another, Defend-
ants and Appellants: Sratz Farm Mutua Avtomo-
BILE INSURANCE Company, Impleaded Defendant and
Respondent.*

March 5—April 9, 1957.

*See Behringer & State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., post,
p. 586; Laughnan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 1 Wis. (24) 113;
Henthorn v. M. G. C. Corp. 1 Wis. (24) 180.

373

For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by
Frank M. Coyne of Madison.

For the respondent there was a brief by Kopp & McKichan
of Platteville, and Roberts, Roe, Boardman, Suhr & Bjork
of Madison, and oral argument by M. A. McKichan.*

Curriz, J. The memorandum opinion of the learned trial
court so well covers the issues presented on this appeal that
we adopt the same as the opinion of this court:

This is a motion by the impleaded defendant State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for summary judg-
ment dismissing on the merits the amended complaint of the
plaintiff and the cross complaint of the original defendants
as to said movant. Subsequent to the filing of this motion
the original defendants made settlement of plaintiff’s claim,
reserving, however, their rights as to their cross complaint
for contribution against the impleaded defendants and pur-
stant thereto plaintiff's amended complaint was dismissed on
the merits. This leaves for disposition the cross complaint
of the settling (original) defendants for contribution against
the impleaded defendants and it is this issue which State
Farm Mutual presently seeks to determine, so far'as it is
concerned, by its motion for summary judgment.

* A brief was also filed by Edwin Conrad and George McD.
Schlotthauer, both of Madison, as amici curiae.

ee __
Pd

There is attached to the moving papers a stipulation of
facts signed by counsel for all parties which, in the view of
such counsel, sets forth all of the agreed facts which are
necessary to a determination of this motion and which stipu-
lation specifically recites that “there are no facts in dispute
on the issues raised by this motion for summary judgment.”

From this stipulation and the pleadings herein the follow-
ing facts appear which the court believes are material to a
determination of the problem at hand:

(a) The plaintiff sustained personal injuries as a result
of an automobile accident which occurred on March 2, 1954,
while he was riding as a guest in his own automobile and
which automobile was then being driven by the impleaded
defendant Jay Anderson with the plaintiff's permission and
consent. This action was brought by plaintiff to recover
damages for such personal injuries.

(b) There was in existence at the time of said accident
an automobile liability policy issued by the impleaded de-
fendant State Farm Mutual to the plaintiff as named in-~
sured therein, which policy described the vehicle above
mentioned and which policy contained an omnibus coverage
clause extending coverage to the said Jay Anderson as an
additional insured.

(c) Said policy further contained a general “exclusion
clause” providing that the policy did not apply to injury to
or death of the named insured (plaintiff) therein.

(d) On April 8, 1954, upon completing its investigation
of said accident, State Farm Mutual, for the purpose of
complying with the provisions of sec. 85.09 (5) (d), Stats.,
filed with the motor vehicle commissioner of the state of
Wisconsin an SR-21 form to which no limitations, restric-
tions, or conditions were attached and which contained the
usual information required by said commissioner in such
cases and which was in the usual form required by him.
This SR-21 was signed and filed on behalf of said insurance

company by a person who had actual authority to so sign
and file the same and was not filed as a result of any
mistake on the part of said company. This SR-21 contained
the following:

“The company signatory hereto gives notice that its policy
numbered 347-820-D27-49 issued on the date of Jan. 25,
54, and issued to Howard Pulvermacher, 996 Central Ave.
Richland Center is an automobile liability policy as defined
in section 85.09 of the Wisconsin statutes, affording limits
of $10,000/$20,000 bodily injury and $5,000 property dam-
age, which policy was in effect on the date of the above-
described accident.

“Does this policy apply to the above owner in the above
accident? Yes.

“Does this policy apply to the above operator in the above
accident? Yes.”

(e) State Farm Mutual did not withdraw or revoke said

SR-21 at any time.

(£) Because of the filing of said SR-21 neither the oper-
ator’s license of Jay Anderson nor the registration cer-
tificate and plates of plaintiff have been suspended by the
commissioner of motor vehicles.

(g) State Farm Mutual, at the time of the filing of said
SR-21, had knowledge that the plaintiff (named insured)
was the sole person injured in said accident.

On the facts State Farm Mutual contends that it is not
liable for contribution because of the “exclusion clause” above
mentioned which prevents the plaintiff (named insured)
from recovering under his policy for his own personal in-
juries and hence there is no common liability between the
cross-complaining (original) defendants and State Farm
Mutual upon which a judgment for contribution could be
based.

The original defendants contend, however, that the filing
of the SR-21 by State Farm Mutual precludes the granting

of its motion for summary judgment for the following
reasons:

(1) Under the rule of Laughnan v. Griffiths, 271 Wis.
247, 73 N. W. (2d) 587, and Prisuda v. General Casualty
Co. 272 Wis. 41, 74 N. W. (2d) 777, State Farm Mutual
has made itself liable by the filing of an SR-21 pursuant to
sec.'85.09 (5) (d), Stats.

(2) The automobile liability policy required by secs.
85.09 (5) (b) and 85.09 (5) (c), Stats., in order to prevent
the suspension of the operator’s license of Anderson and
the registration of plaintiff must cover any judgment which
may be recovered against Anderson to the extent of the limits
prescribed by said sub. (5) (c) and cannot validly contain
the “exclusion clause” above mentioned.

(3) The filing of the SR-21 by the insurer constituted a
waiver of the “exclusion clause” contained in said policy.

The court is of the opinion that the rule of the Laughnan
and Prisuda Cases does not require the denial of this motion
for summary judgment. Those cases do not hold that an
insurer, by the filing of an SR-21, thereby absolutely pre-
cludes itself from relying on any and every defense it might
have under the terms of the policy. They merely hold that
under certain circumstances an SR-21 becomes admissible in
evidence as an admission against interest on the part of the
insurer with respect to the issue as to whether the insurer
assumed and acknowledged liability for the operation of the
vehicle in question.

In both of those cases the insurer claimed, after the filing
of an SR-21, that its policy afforded no coverage or pro-
tection of any kind to the person operating the vehicle at
the time of the collision involved therein, that he was not
an additional insured under the terms of the policy. In both
of those cases the insurer claimed that the SR-21 was filed
through mistake and in the Laughnan Case it was further
claimed that the SR-21 was not signed nor filed by a person

_ De 377

who had either actual or ostensible authority to so file or
sign the same. In the instant case the insurer claims no mis-
take or error in the signing or filing of the SR-21 and admits
that this was effected by a person who had actual authority
to so act and further admits that its policy applies to the
operation of plaintiffs car by Anderson and affords such
coverage and protection to Anderson as is required by the
laws of this state. Under the rule of those cases this SR-21
becomes admissible in this case as an admission against
interest with respect to the issue as to whether State Farm
Mutual acknowledged and assumed liability to the plaintiff
for Anderson’s driving of the plaintiff's automobile. (See last
paragraph of Mr. Justice STEINLE’s opinion in the Prisuda
Case.)

What does this SR-21 admit against the interest of State
Farm Mutual? It admits that it issued to the plaintiff an
automobile liability policy as defined in sec. 85.09, Stats.,
affording limits of $10,000/$20,000 bodily injury, that such
policy was in effect on the date of the accident involved
herein and that the policy applies to the operator (Anderson)
of the vehicle involved in said accident. It does not contain
an admission that the policy applies to the claim of this
specific plaintiff nor under the provisions of sec. 85.09 is it
required to contain such a statement or admission.

What is an “automobile liability policy as defined in
sec. 85.09, Stats.” which State Farm Mutual has admitted,
by filing of an SR-21, it issued? It is merely an automobile
liability policy which can be validly issued under the laws
of this state and which contains the prescribed monetary
limits of liability. It clearly is not a policy of absolute cov-
erage for all claims arising out of an accident. Subs. (5) (b)
and (5) (c) of this statute provide that the provisions of
sec. 85.09 as to deposit of security and suspension of license
and registration shall not apply to an owner or operator
who had in effect an automobile liability policy with respect

7S es

to the vehicle involved in the accident with limits of not
less than $10,000 because of bodily injury to or death of
one person in any one accident and $20,000 because of bodily
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one acci-
dent. Neither of these subsections prohibit the policy from
containing a clause which excludes coverage for injuries to or
death of the named insured. No other statute of our state
prohibits an automobile liability policy from containing such
a general exclusionary clause. Such a clause has been held
valid and binding in the recent cases of Havlik v. Bittner, 272
Wis. 71, 74 N. W. (2d) 798; Musselman v. Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. 266 Wis. 387, 63 N. W. (2d) 691; and
Frye v. Theige, 253 Wis. 596, 34 N. W. (2d) 793, 50
A. L. R. (2d) 124; in which latter case the court at page
601, stated: .

“The only statutory limitations upon the powers of the
parties to contract are those contained in sec. 204.30 (3),
Stats., which requires the omnibus coverage clause, and
sec. 204.34 (2), which forbids general exclusion of cov-
erage on the basis of relationship to the assured. We see no
ground upon which this court can properly limit the power
of contract beyond the prescriptions of the statutes. The fact
that the foregoing limitations have been put by statute upon
the power to contract indicates a legislative view that public
policy calls for no other limitation.”

Subs. (5) (b) and (5) (c) of sec. 85.09, Stats., do not
require that there be in effect at the time of the accident a
policy of absolute coverage for payment of any tort judg-
ment which might be obtained against the operator or
owner; they only require that there be in effect an auto-
mobile liability policy which can be validly issued in the
state of Wisconsin and which contains the monetary limits
of liability prescribed by those subsections. (See 35 Op.
Atty. Gen. 210.)

By the voluntary filing of the SR-21 by a person with
actual authority so to do, intending to be bound thereby

a a 379
Pd

(4. e., for the purpose of complying with the provisions of
sec. 85.09 (5) (d), Stats.), State Farm Mutual only ad-
mitted that it had a valid policy of automobile liability insur-
ance in effect which applied to the operation of the vehicle
described in said SR-21, which provided the necessary limits
of liability and which met the requirements of secs.
204.30 (3) and 204.34 (2), and which therefore extended
all the coverage required by the laws of this state and the
decisions of our court relating to such policies issued in this
state. It did not thereby certify or admit that such policy did
not contain a valid exclusionary clause preventing the named
insured from recovery thereunder.

The present denial by State Farm Mutual of coverage as
to plaintiff’s claim is perfectly consistent with the ‘“‘admis-
sions against interest” contained in the SR-21 and is based
on an exclusion contained in its policy of insurance which
does not violate the statutory limitations imposed by secs.
204.30 (3) and 204.34 (2), Stats. As stated in Frye v.
Theige, supra (p. 601):

: “The fact that the foregoing limitations have been put by

statute upon the power to contract indicates a legislative
view that public policy calls for no other limitation.”

Therefore, as.to the first and second contentions of the
original defendants in opposition to the instant motion it is
the conclusion of the court that (1) State Farm Mutual did
not, admit, assume, or acknowledge liability to the plaintiff
by the filing of an SR-21, and (2) that the automobile lia-
bility policy required by secs. 85.09 (5) (b) and (5) (c),
Stats., may validly contain a clause excluding coverage for
personal injuries to the named insured.

As to the third contention of said original defendants,
it is the opinion of the court that the filing of the SR-21 did
not constitute a waiver of the exclusion clause contained in
the contract. A waiver is an intentional act, an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Callaway v. Evanson, 272

Wis. 251, 75 N. W. (2d) 456. There is nothing in the

SR-21 which indicates that State Farm Mutual intended to

forego its contractual right to rely on the exclusion clause

contained in its policy in the event the named insured at-

tempted to recover thereunder for his own personal injuries.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Estate or Knutson: GutpHauc, Appellant, vs. Martin,
Executor, Respondent.

March 5—April 9, 1957.

| es 383
Pd
ee

For the appellant there was a brief by Harry D. Clarke of
Stoughton, and Frederick F. Hillyer of Madison, and oral
argument by Mr. Hillyer.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
D.V.W. Beckwith of Madison. .

Wincert, J. In a careful and thorough opinion the
county court held that on the date the will was executed
testatrix possessed testamentary capacity to make a will, that
the will was not the result of undue influence, and that it
was properly executed. Formal findings of fact to that effect
were made. On examination of the record we are satisfied
that none of the essential findings is contrary to the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, and that
therefore the judgment admitting the will to probate must
be affirmed. Indeed we consider that the trial court’s findings
are clearly supported by the evidence.

1. Testamentary capacity. There was testimony by the
head nurse at the Skaalen Home, and by a cousin of testatrix
who had looked after her financial affairs for some time prior
to the making of the will, to the general effect that testatrix
was senile, forgetful, confused, suspicious, unable to reason,

38

and did not understand what property she had or who her
relatives were, and that her deterioration was progressive.
None of that testimony was based on observation of the
plaintiff on the day she gave instructions for the will or
at the time she signed it. On the other hand, Attorney
Knudson, who discussed the subject matter of the will and
other affairs with testatrix on May 19th and also was present
at the execution of the will on May 20th, testified that she
discussed the disposition of her estate intelligently, discussed
her relatives, and gave him the names and addresses of the
beneficiaries, that her knowledge of her property was correct,
and that he was satisfied that she was competent and had
no doubt about it. Several other witnesses also testified
that she was competent, including her physician, who wit-
nessed the will, her pastor, another physician who examined
her three weeks after the will was made in anticipation of a
proposed guardianship, an experienced lawyer who inter-
viewed her the following December at the instance of the
court when she was under guardianship, and other witnesses.

The weight to be given to this conflicting testimony was
for the trial court, and its finding of testamentary capacity
is amply supported. Contestant had the burden of proving
incapacity by clear and satisfactory evidence. Estate of
Scherrer, 242 Wis. 211, 216, 7 N. W. (2d) 848.

The testimony of the witnesses who observed the condi-
tion of testatrix at the very time she made the will is entitled
to great weight as compared with the evidence of mental
infirmity at other times, since it is elementary that the
question of competency is to be determined as of the time
of the execution of the will; and in cases of senility or illness,
mental capacity may differ greatly from time to time, even
from day to day. Estate of Fuller, ante, pp. 1, 5, 81 N. W.
(2d) 64; Estate of Radel, 248° Wis. 558, 564, 22 N. Wi
(2d) 475. Here the testimony of the scrivener was prop-
erly" given’ gréat weight, since he discussed the affairs of
testatrix with‘her at length and. with professional under-

a De 385

standing when she gave the instructions for the will, and
he was present at its execution. Estate of Kesich, 244 Wis.
374, 383, 12 N. W. (2d) 688.

The infirmities of old age, such as forgetfulness, inco-
herence, eccentricity, and occasional inability to recognize
acquaintances, do not necessarily establish want of testa~
mentary capacity. Will of Washburn, 248 Wis. 467, 474,
22 N. W. (2d) 512; Will of Grosse, 208 Wis. 473, 479,
243 N. W. 465. The appointment of a guardian for testatrix
two months after she made the will is not of controlling
weight, not only because of the time difference, but for the
further reason that a finding of incapacity to manage prop-
erty sufficient to warrant guardianship does not necessarily
negative testamentary capacity.

Contestant places great emphasis on a series of letters
written by testatrix to him at frequent intervals during the
first half of 1953, in which she constantly complained of
forgetfulness, nervousness, and want of knowledge of her
affairs, indicated that something unmentioned was upsetting
her, and showed friendship for and confidence in contestant.
Without going into detail, we do not consider that these
letters demonstrate lack of testamentary capacity. Special
emphasis is placed on one written by testatrix to contestant
on May 28th, nine days after Mr. Knudson had drawn the
will, in which she said she had not had anything to do with
Knudson for a long time. A week later, however, she wrote
Mr. Knudson asking him to keep the will in his possession,
“and don’t let Clarence know anything about it.” The in-
ference is permissible that instead of being completely con-
fused, testatrix was deliberately trying to keep Clarence from
suspecting that she had made a will.

2. Undue influence. Contestant argues that the will was
the product of undue influence exetted by Marie Lageson and
her husband. In her 1951 will, testatrix had given contestant
preferred treatment and had excluded Mrs. Lageson. It is

356
es

claimed that the Lagesons were unfriendly to contestant, and
persuaded testatrix to believe ill of him and cut him out and
give them a share of the estate.

The ultimate facts to be proved in order to establish undue
influence are (1) a person unquestionably subject to undue
influence, (2) opportunity to exercise such influence and
effect the wrongful purpose, (3) a disposition to influence
unduly for the purpose of procuring improper favor, (4) a
result clearly appearing to be the effect of the supposed in-
fluence. Will of Winnemann, 272 Wis. 643, 647, 76 N. W.
(2d) 616.

The trial court found, with support in the evidence, that
testatrix was unquestionably subject to undue influence, and
that Mrs. Lageson had an opportunity to exercise undue
influence; but considered that such opportunity was too
remote in time from the actual conferences with the scrivener
to meet the test. We do not pass upon the question of
opportunity, for this branch of the case is amply disposed
of by the court’s remaining findings.

The trial court further found that there was insufficient
evidence of a disposition on the part of the Lagesons to
exercise undue influence on the testatrix, and that the will
does not clearly appear to be the result of undue influence.
Those findings were well warranted.

The evidence on the question of disposition to use undue
influence hardly rises above the level of suspicion. There is
no evidence that either of the Lagesons or anyone else
attempted to persuade testatrix to make a new will or
made any suggestions as to the terms of such will. Evidence
that in the winter of 1953 and thereafter the Lagesons
showed more interest in testatrix than formerly, visited her
at the Skaalen Home (which seemed to upset her), invited
her to visit them at their home, and on two occasions after
the will was made went to a cousin’s home and demanded
papers belonging to testatrix, does not show a disposition to

| | es 387
Cd

influence her with respect to her will, let alone exercise im-
proper influence. Undue influence is akin to fraud and an
objector asserting it cannot prevail unless the proof thereof is
clear and satisfactory. Will of Winnemann, 272 Wis. 643,
645, 76 N. W. (2d) 616. “Disposition” in the sense here
used means something more than a mere desire to obtain
a share in another’s estate. It implies a willingness to do
something wrong or unfair, and grasping or overreaching
characteristics. Will of Schaefer, 207 Wis. 404, 415, 241
N. W. 382.

The fact that contestant, who had been included in former
wills, was left out of this one while Mrs. Lageson, a sister,
was reinstated as a beneficiary, is not a result clearly ap-
pearing to be the effect of undue influence. Neither the
cutting out of an heir nor the giving of a share of the
estate to the alleged influencer is ipso facto an unnatural
disposition. Will of Faulks, 246 Wis. 319, 364, 17 N. W.
(2d) 423; Estate of Fuller, ante, pp. 1, 11, 81 N. W. (2d)
64.

Where no fiduciary relation is involved, influence, to be
“undue,” must be such as to destroy the free volition of the
testator to the extent that the will is more the offspring of
another’s will than his own. Will of Wallace, 197 Wis. 323,
326, 222 N. W. 255. Here the evidence shows that testatrix
was displeased with certain activities or attitudes of the
contestant, desired to leave him nothing, and so instructed
the scrivener. She may also have felt that she had done
enough for contestant by loaning him $8,000 without security,
rejecting interest on the debt, and giving him $1,000 cash.
We need not appraise the justice of her attitude toward him.
As the trial court trenchantly remarked, “It is not the func-
tion of the court of probate to require a testatrix to show
cause why her will was drafted as it was.”

3. Execution of will. Three persons testified as to the
execution of the will. Mrs. Martin, one of the attesting wit-

oo ee
P|

nesses, testified positively that she did not see testatrix sign
the will, that Dr. Unterholzer was not even present when she
signed, and that she did not see him sign. The doctor’s
memory was faulty, and his testimony contributed little.
Attorney Knudson, who was present at the signing, testified
positively and in detail that all formalities required by statute
were complied with; that the testatrix, Mrs. Martin, Dr.
Unterholzer, and he were all present together in the same
room, that he, the attorney, made a statement as to the re-
quired formalities, that testatrix then signed the will in the
presence of the other two witnesses, and that they then
signed in her presence and in the presence of each other.

On this directly conflicting testimony as to facts essential
to valid execution, the trial court found that the will was
properly executed by the testatrix in the presence of both
witnesses, who signed in her presence and in the presence of
each other. That finding is fully supported by the testimony
of Mr. Knudson, and is not against the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence. It must therefore stand.

Contestant argues that the proponent of the will failed
to meet his burden of proof that the will was properly
executed, since he produced only one witness who testified
to the necessary facts, while another witness testified with
equal positiveness that the necessary facts did not exist. It
is said that Mrs. Martin’s testimony should be preferred
because she was completely disinterested, whereas Mr.
Knudson has a professional interest in having the will sus-
tained.

The weight to be given to the conflicting testimony of
the two witnesses was for the trial court. That court was
warranted in believing Mr. Knudson, a prominent lawyer of
thirty-four years’ experience, as against Mrs. Martin, whose
testimony contradicted recitals of the attestation clause which
she signed, and was therefore to be received with caution.
Will of Frederiksen, 246 Wis. 263, 271, 16 N. W. (2d) 819.

a 389
PO

Having produced one witness whose testimony covered all
essential points positively, and whom the trial court reason-
ably believed, proponent met his burden of proof. In the
situation we have here, sufficiency of proof is not a matter
of counting heads. It is not the number of witnesses that
counts, but rather the quality of their testimony as weighed
by the trier of fact.
By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

DeEpaRTMENT oF Taxation, Appellant, vs. ALUMINUM
Goops Manuracturinc Company, Respondent.*

March 5—April 9, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, without costs, on June 26, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by the Attorney General
and Harold H. Persons, assistant attorney general, and oral
argument by Mr. Persons.

For the respondent there was a brief by Fairchild, Foley
& Sammond and Theodore C. Bolliger, all of Milwaukee,
and oral argument by Mr. Bolliger.

Faircuizp, J. The statute involved is sec. 71.07, Stats.
1947, which reads as follows:

“71.07 SITUS OF INCOME; ALLOCATION AND APPORTION-
MENT. (1) For the purposes of taxation income from mercan-
tile or manufacturing business, not requiring apportionment
under section 71.07 (2) shall follow the situs of the
business from which derived. Income derived from rentals
and royalties from real estate or tangible personal property,
or from the operation of any farm, mine, or quarry, or from
the sale of real property or tangible personal property shall
follow the situs of the property from which derived. All other
income, including royalties from patents, income derived
from personal services, professions, and vocations and from
land contracts, mortgages, stocks, bonds, and securities or
from the sale of similar intangible personal property, shall
follow the residence of the recipient, except as provided in
section 71.08.

“(2) Persons engaged in business within and without
the state shall be taxed only on such income as is derived
from business transacted and property located within the
state. The amount of such income apportionable to Wis-
consin may be determined by an allocation and separate
accounting thereof, when, in the judgment of the department
of taxation, that method will reasonably reflect the income
properly assignable to this state, but otherwise in the follow-
ing manner: There shall first be deducted from the total net
income of the taxpayer such part thereof (less related ex-
penses, if any) as follows the situs of the property or the
residence of the recipient ; provided, that in the case of income
which follows the residence of the recipient, the amount of
interest and dividends deductible under this provision shall
be limited to the total interest and dividends received which

a Le 393

are in excess of the total interest (or related expenses, if any)
paid and allowable as a deduction under section 71.04 during
the income year. The remaining net income shall be appor-
tioned to Wisconsin on the basis of the ratio obtained by
taking the arithmetical average of the following three ratios :”

Sub. (1) of sec. 71.07, Stats., separates income into three
classes. The first has the situs of the business from which
derived; the second the situs of the property from which
derived, and the third follows the residence of the recipient.
The first two classes are, in form, specifically defined and
the third is “all other income.” While certain types of income
are specified as included within the third class, we conclude
that the specification does not exclude types not named, nor
detract from the literal meaning of “all other income.”

There is no claim that the interest on tax refunds falls
into the second class, and since all income not within the
first or second classes falls into the third, the sole question is
whether these interest-_payments are “income from mercantile
or manufacturing business.” Respondent’s business in Wis-
consin is clearly manufacturing, so that the question narrows
down to whether the interest payments are income from the
business.

We think it clear that they are not. Interest accrued to
respondent not because of or out of, the operation of its
business, but because the statutes of the state and the United
States cause interest to accrue when a taxpayer has paid
more than he owes. We do not see that it makes any differ-
ence that the adjustments of tax liability which gave rise
to the refuids resulted from recomputation of respondent’s
income from business rather than from investment securities.
Both the tax obligations which were overpaid were imposed
upon the respondent by reason of its. being a person or
corporate entity. Neither was a tax on particular property
nor upon transactions”identified with a particular property
or business. ° .

3930 re
re

Because these interest payments are not income from the
business, they fall into the third class and follow the resi-
dence of respondent, which is outside this state. Under sub.
(2) of sec. 71.07, Stats., they must be deducted from the
total net income before applying the apportionment formula.

We agree with the circuit court that the statute is not
ambiguous and that the construction previously followed
by the department is erroneous. An administrative construc-
tion is not to be given force if inconsistent with an unam-
biguous provision of law. Plain v. Harder, 268 Wis. 507, 68
N. W. (2d) 47.

The attorney general points out that the importance of
this case lies in, establishing the correct rule for the depart-
ment and not in any material gain or loss of revenue to the
state. If the department be prevented from collecting a tax
on a portion of tax-refund-interest payments received by non-
resident taxpayers, it will be enabled to collect a tax on all
of similar interest payments received by resident taxpayers.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

The following memorandum was filed June 26, 1957:

Per Curtam (on motion for rehearing). Appellant’s
motion for rehearing is denied.

In support of its motion appellant calls attention to our
statement that under sec. 71.07 (1), Stats., interest received
on refunds of income and privilege dividend taxes is not
income from business ; and appellant says that it has construed
sec. 71.04 (2) as permitting a corporation to deduct interest
paid on income-tax deficiencies from its gross income as
“Gnterest . . . paid during the year in the operation of the
business from which its income is derived.” Appellant urges
that secs. 71.04 (2) and 71.07 should be construed con-
sistently in this regard and that appellant’s treatment of in-
terest paid on tax deficiencies under sec. 71.04 (2) discloses

a De 393b
PT

an ambiguity in sec. 71.07 with regard to treatment of
interest received on tax refunds. If there be such ambiguity,
appellant says that we should then construe sec. 71.07 as the
appellant has construed it.

We deem that the correctness of appellant’s interpretation
of sec. 71.04 (2), Stats., need not be decided in the case
before us. Whether correct or not, it requires no change in
our interpretation of sec. 71.07 set forth in the opinion.

394

Spatpine, Administrator, Respondent, vs. WILLIAMS,
Appellant.

March 5—April 9, 1957.

ee

36 ee

Po
|
For the appellant there was a brief by Field, Rikkers &
Brickhouse and John B. Brickhouse, all of Madison, and
oral arguinent by John B. Brickhouse.
For the respondent there was a brief by Rogers & Owens
of Portage, and oral argument by Phillip Owens.

Martin, C. J. Doris Williams and Raymond Spalding
were married August 17, 1950. Doris, then a minor, brought
nothing but her clothes and a few personal effects; she
earned nothing during the three years of the marriage. In
September, 1953, the property of the parties, having a value
of $950, consisted of an equity in a home, an automobile, a
camera, the two life insurance policies, household items, and
savings, and their personal effects. The two insurance
policies, acquired by Raymond before the marriage, were
each in the amount of $1,000. Upon the marriage he named
his wife beneficiary. On the New York Life policy Charles
Spalding, Raymond’s father, was contingent beneficiary.
Both policies provided for double indemnity in case of acci-
dental death and both policies reserved to the insured the
right to change the beneficiary upon notification to the
company in writing.

On September 25, 1953, the parties were divorced in an
action commenced by Raymond. A stipulation was entered
into for the division of property and incorporated into the
judgment of divorce in the following language:

“That as a full, final, and complete settlement of property
between the parties, in lieu of alimony to either of them, the
defendant be, and she is hereby awarded her clothes and
personal effects and the dresser she brought to the home of
the parties upon their marriage and the plaintiff be, and he
is hereby awarded, all the rest of the property and the plain-
tiff shall pay the indebtedness to Charles Spalding, Bremner

a | 397
Po

Auto Company, and Sears Roebuck, together with the sum
of six hundred twenty-five ($625) dollars to the defendant.
Such payment of six hundred twenty-five dollars ($625)
shall be made immediately upon the entry of this judgment
whereupon the defendant shall execute and deliver to the
plaintiff a quitclaim deed of the homestead of the parties.
The parties shall each pay their own attorneys’ fees and the
plaintiff shall pay the clerk’s fees. Neither shall have
alimony.”

No specific mention of the insurance policies, or of any
of the property awarded to the husband (with the exception
of the reference to the homestead), was-made in the stipu-
lation. Appellant executed and delivered her quitclaim deed
of the home, accepted the cash and personal items awarded
to her in the judgment, and made no claim to the insurance
policies or any other items owned by the parties.

Raymond Spalding died on October 11, 1953, as the
result of injuries received in an automobile accident the pre-
vious day. His father testified that Raymond had kept the
insurance policies in a folder at his, the father’s, home and
on the day before the accident Raymond took them with him.
They were found in the glove compartment of his car after
the accident; the named beneficiary had not been changed.
Releases were sent to Doris, through her attorney in the
divorce action, for the release of any claims under the policies
and assignment of their proceeds to Charles Spalding, but
she refused to execute them. Thereafter this action was
commenced,

Appellant’s main contention and the basis of her appeal,
both from the order and from the judgment, is that the only
way in which a wife may be divested of her interest in her
husband’s life insurance policies is by change of beneficiary
in accordance with the terms of the policies.

It has been held that under sec. 246.09, Stats., a married
woman named beneficiary in the life insurance policy of her

2S

husband takes a vested interest in the policy subject to be
divested only in the manner reserved in the policy. Christman
vu. Christman (1916), 163 Wis. 433, 157 N. W. 1099; Hoit
v. Warner (1954), 268 Wis. 264, 67 N. W. (2d) 370.

In the Christman Case the husband owned a policy in
which his wife was the named beneficiary and which pro-
vided for change of beneficiary upon written notice to the
company; the parties were divorced and eight months later
the husband died leaving a will in which he bequeathed the
proceeds of the policy to persons other than the wife. This
court held that the husband’s attempt to dispose of the
proceeds by will failed because “he was limited to the terms
of such reservation in making an effectual disposition”
thereof.

In Hott v. Warner, supra, when the parties were divorced
a stipulation for the division of property recited that the
wife would make no claim “in connection with any and all
other property that he may own.” The court stated (p. 266) :

“He had no interest whatever in her property in the policy.
Accordingly her stipulation cannot be said to affect any prop-
erty which ‘he may own.’ ”

Here, the property stipulation incorporated in the judg-
ment of divorce provided that “‘As a full, final, and complete
settlement of property between the parties,” Doris was
awarded specified personal effects and $625, and Raymond
was awarded “all the rest of the property.” It must be pre-
sumed that the property with which the judgment dealt was
all such property as is subject to the court’s authority under
sec. 247.26, Stats. :

“.. . the court may finally divide and distribute the estate,
both real and personal, of the husband and so much of the
estate of the wife as shall have been derived from the hus-
band, between the parties and divest and transfer the title
of any thereof accordingly, . . .”

a ee 399
Po

It is obvious that “so much of the estate of the wife as
shall have been derived from the husband” includes the wife’s
interest in her husband’s life insurance policies, since she
acquires it through his act of naming her as beneficiary
and retains it only so long as he does not exercise his right
to change the beneficiary if, as here, he reserves that right
in the policy.

Appellant makes the following argument on the basis of
the provisions of sec. 247.35, Stats.: “Since the court has no
jurisdiction to dispose of the wife’s property without her
consent, it must be concluded that the parties were contract-
ing concerning the husband’s property alone.” The section
provides:

“No judgment nullifying a marriage or for a divorce of
any kind shall in any way affect the right of a wife to the
possession and control of her separate property, real or per-
sonal, except as provided in this chapter; . . .

The wife having derived her interest in the policies from
the husband, and such property of the wife being expressly
placed within the jurisdiction of the-court by sec. 247.26,
Stats., the language “except as provided in this chapter”
makes sec. 247.35 inapplicable. It is the judgment of the
court which divided and distributed the property, divesting
and transferring the title thereof; and when the court used
the words “all the rest of the property” in the judgment, the
phrase could only mean all that property which the court had
the authority to divide. Under sec. 247.26 that included the
insurance policies.

The rule of the Christman Case, supra, is that the only
way the insured may divest his wife of her interest as bene-
ficiary of his life insurance policy is by changing the benefi-
ciary according to the policy terms. As stated on rehearing
in National Life Ins. Co. v. Brautigam (1916), 163 Wis.
270, 274, 157 N. W. 782:

$00 es

“. . . the rule of the Hilliard Case [137 Wis. 208, 117
N. W. 999] should be adhered to; and that sec. 2347, Stats.
1915, should be held to permit the insured, where the right
to change the beneficiary is reserved, to change the bene-
ficiary though a married woman, in conformity with the
terms of the reservation, but not otherwise.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

But that is not the only way the wife may be divested of
her interest. Under certain circumstances she may divest
herself (sec. 246.11, Stats.), and, as here, a court having
jurisdiction of such property in a divorce action under sec.
247.26, may so divest her.

Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to
admit parol evidence to explain the phrase “all the rest of
the property,” since no ambiguity was shown. Any error in
the admission of parol evidence is immaterial since the testi-
mony admitted merely confirmed the presumption that all the
property of the parties, including the policies, was dealt
with in the divorce judgment. Doris testified only that she
could not remember anything which was discussed about the
property settlement.

It being our conclusion that the court effectually divested
Doris of her interest in the policies pursuant to its authority
under sec. 247.26, Stats., we deem it unnecessary to discuss
at length appellant’s argument with respect to Raymond’s
failure to change the beneficiary. It could be held that her
interest was reinstated only under circumstances from which
it could be inferred that Raymond intended she should receive
the proceeds of the policies. Such an intention cannot be in-
ferred from the facts presented. The situation in this case
differs greatly from those in the cases cited by appellant,
Wolfe v. Jebe (1943), 242 Wis. 650, 9 N. W. (2d) 124,
and Hott v. Warner, supra, where the husband, for thirteen

a es 401
Po

years after the divorce in the Wolfe Case and for seven years
in the Hott Case, neglected to exercise his right to change the
beneficiary. In the instant case Raymond Spalding died six-
teen days after the divorce was granted. Moreover, the evi-
dence that he had removed the policies from the place where
he kept them and put them in the glove compartment of his
car compels the inference that he did so with the intention
of changing the beneficiary.

The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant contends that the complaint was demurrable on
the ground that it failed to allege that the beneficiary was
changed according to the terms of the policies. We cannot
agree, It alleged in effect that the policies were included in
the property dealt with in the divorce judgment and since,
as discussed above, the law permits a wife to be divested of
her interest in such policies other than by change of bene-
ficiary under the terms of the policies, the complaint stated
a cause of action, apprising the appellant of the issues she
would have to meet.

In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to discuss other
questions raised on the appeal.

By the Court.—Order and judgment affirmed.

Otson, Administrator, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Mrz-
WAUKEE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Company and an-
other, Defendants and Respondents: GrrpEN and
another, d/b/a Gerpen Truckinc Company, and
another, Defendants and Appellants. [Two cases.]

March 5—April 9, 1957.

For the appellants Robert Voshell and Gerden Trucking
Company there was a brief by Engelhard, Snodgrass &
Goerdt of La Crosse, and oral argument by Lawrence M.
Engelhard.

0

For the respondents there was a brief by Donovan, Gleiss,
Goodman, Breitenfield & Gleiss of Sparta, for Melvin E.
Olson, administrator, and by Hale, Skemp, Hanson &
Schnurrer of La Crosse, for Blaine Welch and the Milwaukee
Automobile Insurance Company, and oral argument by
William M. Gleiss and Thomas H. Skemp.

STEINLE, J. On this appeal the defendants-appellants,
Wilfred and Wilmer Gerden d/b/a Gerden Trucking Com-
pany and Robert M. Voshell apply for reversal of the judg-
ments, and for a new trial limited to the issue of contribution
under the cross complaints. Their position is based on
grounds that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
findings that Voshell was causally negligent with respect to
speed and as to management and control, and (2) the court
erred in permitting counsel for plaintiff Olson to participate
in the retrial of the issues, such retrial having been directed
by this court in its mandate on the former appeal.

Counsel for these defendants-appellants on the former ap-
peal had urged that this court find as a matter of law that
upon the evidence of record, Voshell was not guilty of causal
negligence. We did not agree with such contention and
expressed our views with respect thereto in the opinion as
reported. The evidence at the second trial was substan-
tially the same as that produced at the original trial regard-
ing the issue of causal negligence on the part of Voshell,
and hence there can be no question as to the merits of such
matter on this appeal. Williams v. Monroe County (1955),
271 Wis. 243, 244, 73 N. W. (2d) 501. At the retrial
it was for the jury to determine whether Voshell’s rate of
speed under the unusual conditions prevailing both before
and after the tractor-trailer unit entered the ditch, was ex-
cessive; and also whether the operation of the unit by
Voshell under the circumstances was in violation of his

| |) 405

duty to exercise ordinary care regarding management and
control. The trial court was of the opinion that the findings
of the jury were substantiated by credible evidence, and
from our analysis of the evidence, we are not able to arrive
at a contrary conclusion.

In the original mandate on the former appeal, this court
directed a new trial only upon the issues raised by the cross
complaints of the defendants. Upon rehearing that mandate
was changed for reasons indicated in our memorandum
opinion, and the cause was remanded for a new trial only
upon the issues as to the causal negligence of Voshell. We
were not aware then, as it now appears, that the coverage of
the Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company’s liability
policy on the automobile owned and driven by Blaine Welch
was limited to an amount of $10,000 as to the plaintiff
Olson’s claims. At the commencement of the retrial the court
was advised that Welch’s carrier had paid to the plaintiff
Olson the sum of $10,000, which represented the maximum
limit of the policy in so far as it affected one person, and
that there was still due under the judgments against Welch
and his carrier the sum of $2,050.20. Counsel for plaintiff
Olson maintained that he was entitled to participate in the
retrial for the reason that Olson’s complaints had alleged
causes of action against Voshell and the Gerdens d/b/a
Gerden Trucking Company, as well as against Welch and his
carrier, and that Olson was not to be precluded from attempt-
ing to establish causal negligence on Voshell’s part, and if
such attempt was successful, to obtain a judgment against
Voshell and his employer for the balance due Olson. The
court was also advised that the judgment of the plaintiff,
Eugene Schaller, which amounted to less than $10,000, had
been paid in full by the defendant Welch’s carrier, Milwaukee
Automobile Insurance Company. Voshell and his employer
contended that the plaintiffs, Olson and Schaller, had their

$0 es

day in court and were not entitled to further representation in
the retrial with reference to the issue of Voshell’s causal
negligence. As to the Schaller judgment, the trial court
ruled that since the Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, on behalf of Welch, had paid the judgment to Schaller
in full, Schaller no longer had an interest in the case, and that
the only remaining consideration was the matter of con-
tribution in the event that Voshell’s causal negligence was
established. As to the Olson actions, the trial court ruled
that the plaintiff Olson had a right to appear by counsel as
a plaintiff at the retrial for the reason that he had not been
paid in full, and that he had originally sued the defendants
Welch and his carrier and Voshell and his employer, claim-
ing negligence on the part of the drivers, Voshell and Welch.
The court pointed out that had no error been committed at
the original trial with respect to the instructions of the court
to the jury, the plaintiff Olson would have been entitled to
have judgments entered against all of the defendants, and
that Olson’s right to attempt to establish causal negligence on
Voshell’s part could not be and was not defeated by the
action of this court in remanding the causes for a determina-
tion of Voshell’s causal negligence. The court at the time
was also of the view that if causal negligence on the part of
Voshell was established, then judgment would be entered
against all of the defendants, with the exception of the
Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company which had dis-
charged its obligations; and that a right of contribution
would exist between the respective defendants.

The court permitted counsel for plaintiff Olson to actively
participate in the retrial of the cases. The jury found that
Voshell was causally negligent as to speed and as to man-
agement and control, and the trial court determined that
such findings were sustained by the evidence. The judgment

“ordered by the court in favor of plaintiff Olson against the
defendants Voshell and the Gerdens d/b/a Gerden Trucking

a | ee 407

Company and Blaine Welch in the sum of $2,050.20 was
based upon the amount of the two original judgments in
said plaintiff's favor, viz.: $12,050.20 with a deduction of
$10,000 paid to Olson by Milwaukee Automobile Insurance
Company. The court directed that upon the filing of proof
that Voshell and the Gerdens d/b/a Gerden Trucking Com-
pany had paid the amount of this judgment to the plaintiff
Olson, then a supplementary judgment for such contribution
was to be entered against the defendant Welch in favor of
Voshell and the Gerdens d/b/a Gerden Trucking Company,
or either of them, for one half of the amount of such sum paid
in excess of any sum paid by Welch. In the actions com-
menced by Olson, judgment was also entered in favor of
Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company and against
Voshell and the Gerdens d/b/a Gerden Trucking Company
for $5,189.06. This sum represented one half of the amount
of damages and costs paid to Olson by Milwaukee Auto-
mobile Insurance Company. In the action commenced by
the plaintiff Schaller, judgment was entered in favor of
Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company against Voshell
and the Gerdens d/b/a Gerden Trucking Company for
$4,296.98. This sum represented one half of the amount
of Schaller’s judgment,—the full amount representing dam-
ages and costs in the sum of $8,593.96 which was paid to
Schaller by the Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company.

The modified mandate on the former appeal did not re-
strict the court at the retrial to a consideration only of mat-
ters pertaining to contribution by the defendants. When
confronted with the motion to bar counsel for plaintiff Olson
from participating in the retrial, the trial court properly
considered the effect of a possible finding at the retrial of
causal negligence on Voshell’s part as the same would relate
to Olson’s claims in the actions which were left undetermined
when this court upon the first appeal set aside the finding
of Voshell’s causal negligence. Such consideration was not

$0. es
CCS

outside the purview of the modified mandate. Olson’s com-
plaints had charged causal negligence on Voshell’s part.
When the finding to such effect was set aside on the first
appeal, Olson did not forfeit his right to have that issue
adjudicated at the retrial, nor could he properly be deprived
of such right. Olson’s right in such regard was not altered
by virtue of the existence of the issues as between the defend-
ants only. For the reason particularly that Olson had not
been paid in full for the damages which he claimed resulted
from Voshell’s negligence as-well as Welch’s negligence, he
would have been seriously prejudiced had he been precluded
from protecting the interests asserted in his complaints. The
permission to Olson’s counsel to participate in the retrial of
the issue of Voshell’s causal negligence, was not error under
the circumstances.
By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.

CurriE, J. (dissenting in part). I cannot agree that
under our mandate on the former appeal (Olson v. Milwaukee
Automobile Ins. Co. 266 Wis. 106, 62 N. W. (2d) 549, 63
N. W. (2d) 740), the plaintiff Olson had any right to
participate in the second trial or to seek any relief therein
against the appellants.

We concluded upon the first appeal that both plaintiffs
had valid judgments against the defendant Welch and his
insurance carrier for the full amount of their damages and,
therefore, that it would be unfair to delay their realization
upon such judgments by making the plaintiffs parties to the
second trial. For that reason the original mandate provided
“for a new trial only upon the issues raised by the cross
complaints of the defendants.” The plaintiffs filed no motion
for rehearing or to correct the mandate, apparently being
satisfied at that time with such disposition of the appeal.

However, the defendant Voshell and his insurance carrier
moved for a rehearing. In their brief in support of such

motion they pointed out that the cross complaint of the de-
fendant Welch sought recovery of damages against Voshell
and his employers for the damages to Welch’s automobile and
it would be unfair to permit Welch to again litigate such
cause of action inasmuch as he had not appealed from the -
judgment which had dismissed such cross complaint. Our
memorandum opinion, rendered in disposing of such motion
for rehearing, recognized the justice of such contention and
provided for the amendment of the mandate so as to confine
the new trial to the issue of Voshell’s negligence.

It is clear that the amended mandate was not entered for
the purpose of enlarging the scope of the issues to be tried
in the new trial but rather in order to narrow the same and
eliminate Welch’s cross complaint. Nevertheless, the trial
court at the new trial erroneously construed the amended
mandate as having enlarged the scope of the issues to be
retried so as to permit the plaintiff to come in and secure a
judgment against Voshell and his employers.

The fact that this court, in view of the new fact brought
to light on this appeal that Welch’s insurance policy con-
tained a policy limit which prevented full recovery of the
plaintiffs’ judgment against the Insurance Company, may
have made a mistake in its mandate did not accord the trial
court the right to correct the same. Only this court upon
timely motion could have done that.

For this reason, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff
Olson against Voshell and his employers should be reversed.

Curcaco, Mirwauxer, St. Paut & Pactric RAtLRoap
Company, Appellant, vs. BLurmounp Or Company,
Respondent.

March 5—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by Bender, Trump,
McIntyre, Trimborn & Godfrey, attorneys, and Rodger S.
Trump of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by
Rodger S. Trump.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
John E. Krueger of Milwaukee.

Broaproor, J. The plaintiff contends that where a sole
trader incorporates and the corporation takes over all of his

assets and continues the same business at the same place
with substantially the same name and under substantially
the same ownership equitably, the corporation takes over the
liabilities as well as the assets of the sole trader. It cites as
its authority the case of Blumenthal v. Schneider, 186 Wis.
588, 203 N. W. 393. In that case one Schwartz bought
goods of H. Kamber, a sole trader doing business as H:
Kamber & Company, and paid for them. Some of the goods
were not delivered. Thereafter Kamber incorporated as H.
Kamber & Company, Inc. Schwartz testified that he was in
New York and conferred with Kamber, previously the sole
trader and then president of H. Kamber & Company, Inc.;
that Kamber assured Schwartz that if he would continue
to buy goods from the new company it would pay his loss
on the goods paid for but not received, and that on the
strength of such assurance he bought more goods. This was
denied by Kamber. Schwartz did buy goods from the corpo-
ration in approximately the amount of his claim and when
he failed to pay, suit was brought. Upon the trial the jury
found that the corporation assumed the liabilities of Kamber,
the sole trader. In its decision in that case this court said
(p. 590) :

“We have a case where a sole trader incorporates and the
corporation takes over all his assets, continues the same
business at the same place with substantially the same name
and under substantially the same ownership equitably. Under
such circumstances a strong inference arises that it assumes
the liabilities of the sole trader. Pratt v. Oshkosh Match Co.
89 Wis. 406, 62 N. W. 84; Ziemer v. C. G. Bretting Mfg.
Co. 147 Wis. 252, 133 N. W. 139. In the present case the
inference is made certain by the testimony of Schwartz that
for a valuable consideration actually received by the corpora-
tion it agreed to assume such liability. From the verdict and
the probabilities arising from the uncontradicted facts in the
case we can say that H. Kamber & Company, Inc., promised
to pay the loss.”

Co 413

The majority view in this country is that the mere fact
that a corporation is organized to take over a business for-
merly conducted by a firm or individual is not of itself suffi-
cient to render it liable for a debt or liability incurred by
such firm or individual in conducting such business prior to
incorporation. A corporation under those circumstances may
be liable for the debts of the individual when it has expressly
or impliedly assumed them. Anno. 15 A. L. R. 1126; Anno.
149 A. L. R. 787.

In many cases the courts state that there is a presumption
that the corporation assumes the liabilities of the sole trader.
In the Blumenthal Case, supra, the court used stronger lan-
guage and said that there is a strong inference that the corpo-
ration assumes the liabilities of the sole trader. However,
in Wisconsin, as in a majority of the jurisdictions, it is held
that there must be an agreement on the part of the corpora-
tion to assume the liabilities of the sole trader, which agree-
ment may be express or implied. Ziemer v. C. G. Bretting
Mfg. Co. 147 Wis. 252, 133 N. W. 139. In the Blumenthal
Case, supra, the jury’s finding was supported by evidence of
a definite agreement by the corporation to assume the liabil-
jties of the sole trader based upon a valuable consideration,
which was paid. This is the rule where the sale is for an
adequate price without fraud or attempt to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors. Unless there is an agreement, express or
implied, there is no liability on the part of the corporation
to assume the debts and liabilities of the seller except liability
under the Bulk Sales Law. (Secs. 241.18 to 241.21, Stats.)

Here Holz was paid for his interest in the assets transferred
to the corporation with the stock thereof. The plaintiff lost
nothing by the transfers, for Holz continued liable to them
as before and with presumptively as much net worth as
before. Under the allegations in its complaint it was the
duty of the plaintiff to show that the corporations took over
all of the property of Holz and that the defendant assumed

the debt to the plaintiff. Holz testified upon the trial that
he did not transfer to the defendant corporation all of his
accounts receivable nor did the corporation agree to,assume
all of his accounts payable. His testimony is supported by
schedules showing in detail cash, inventory, accounts, and
notes receivable, and the equipment transferred to the de-
fendant. The schedules also show in detail the accounts
payable that were assumed by the defendant. The name of
the plaintiff does not appear in the lists of accounts payable
assumed by the corporation. Holz testified that there was a
dispute with the plaintiff as to the charges and that he did
not transfer to the defendant any of his accounts receivable
upon which there was a dispute, nor did the corporation
assume any of his accounts payable upon which there was
a dispute. There was a question of fact to be resolved by
the trial court, from the record, and the court’s finding that
the defendant did not assume the obligation in controversy
was supported by the evidence and the record.

The plaintiff contends that the testimony of Mr. Holz
should be disregarded as it consists of self-serving declara-
tions and that in the interests of justice the corporation
should be held liable. If Mr. Holz were a party defendant
it might be contended that he had a moral obligation to pay
the charges claimed by the plaintiff, but legally he is entitled
to plead the statute of limitations as a defense. The sainie
argument canriot be directéd to the- corporation. ”

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

| 415

Wirtic, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. KrpLer and another,
Defendants and Appellants: Wisconsin Pusiic SERv-
IcE CorporaTion, Defendant and Respondent.*

Romenesko and others, Plaintiffs and Respondents, vs.
Wisconsin Pusiic SERVICE Corporation, Defendant
and Respondent: Kepier and another, Defendants and
Appellants.*

March 6—April 9, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs. on June 4, 1957.

r | 417

Po

De

For the appellants there were briefs by Everson, Ryan,
Whitney & O’Melia of Green Bay, and oral argument by
E. L. Everson and James L. Everson.

For the respondent Clara Wittig there was a brief by
Kaftan, Kaftan & Kaftan of Green Bay, and oral argument
by J. Robert Kaftan.

For the respondent Wisconsin Public Service Corporation

there was a brief by Welsh, Trowbridge, Bills, Planert &
Gould of Green Bay, and oral argument by Lloyd J. Planert.

Brown, J. The appeal challenges only the finding that
the negligence of the bus driver was not causal. On such an
appeal the appellate court must adopt that view of conflicting
testimony and the inferences reasonably to be drawn from
the evidence which best support the finding under attack. If
there is credible evidence to support the finding it should not
be disturbed. Bush v. Mahlkuch (1956), 272 Wis. 246, 248,
75 N. W. (2d) 283; Pedek v. Wegemann, ante, p. 57, 81
N. W. (2d) 49.

Respondent corporation does not contend that the bus
driver drove onto the right shoulder of the highway before
stopping. The evidence most favorable to it in respect to the
bus’ position on the highway is that the right side of the bus
was at the right, west, edge of the pavement. The bus is
7 feet 9 inches wide. The only evidence concerning the
point of contact between the two vehicles is that of the county
traffic policeman who came to the scene immediately and
who made observations and took photographs. He testified:

‘1S

“Q. Now, from your recollection and looking at the photo-
graph, can you tell me where the damage was with respect
to the center of the bus? 4. Well, the damage to the center—
from the center of the bus was to the left only.

“Q. Only to the left? A. That’s right.

“Q. No damage to the right? A. No damage to the right.”

Omitting portions of sec. 85.19 (1), Stats., which are not
applicable here, that section provides ‘. . . in no event shall
any person park, stop, or leave standing any vehicle, whether
attended or unattended, upon any highway unless a clear
and unobstructed width of no less than 15 feet upon the
roadway of such highway opposite such standing vehicle
shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles thereon,

. .” This is a safety statute and its violation constitutes
negligence as a matter of law. Since the roadway at this
place was 18 feet wide and the bus, which was entirely
upon the roadway, was 7 feet 9 inches wide, no more than
10 feet 3 inches was left for the free passage of other vehicles,
thus establishing negligence respecting the bus’ position. On
the subject of causation: According to the traffic officer there
was no damage to the right of the center of the bus’ rear end.
This center stood one half of the bus’ width of 7 feet 9 inches
or 3 feet 10.5 inches east of the west edge of the pavement,
and the contact between the vehicles was east of that. The
same measurements put the right edge of Kepler’s car no
closer to the west edge of the roadway than 3 feet 10.5 inches,
that is to the center line of the bus’ rear end. The above stat-
ute commanded the bus driver to leave 15 feet of clear road-
way; he left 10 feet 3 inches. To obey the statute, then, the
bus was required to be 4 feet 9 inches farther to the west.
If it had been so placed the figures show that there would
have been a clearance of 10.5 inches between the left. side
of the bus and the right side of Kepler’s automobile. Stated
differently, if the right side of Kepler’s car was 3 feet 10.5
inches from the west edge of the roadway it was likewise

5 419
iL tid

14 feet 1.5 inches from the east edge, the roadway being
18 feet wide. Under the statute Kepler was entitled to 15
feet of clear passage, or 10.5 inches more than he was
occupying, and the bus driver was bound to give it to him.
Had the bus done so there would have been 10.5 inches
clearance between the vehicles.

By finding that the negligent position of the bus was not
a cause of the collision the jury, in effect, found that the
collision would have occurred even if the bus had stopped
in accord with the statute. No evidence supports such a
conclusion. Kepler’s tire marks at the point of collision
were angling slightly to the east, increasing the clearance
between the vehicles which clearance was already sufficient
if the statutory clear roadway to the left of the bus had been
preserved. Of course, it is not the duty of the corporation,
initially, to prove that the negligence of its employee was
not causal; the plaintiff or codefendant who seeks to hold the
corporation liable has the burden of proving that it was. But
the burden was met when the evidence showed that at the
moment of impact Kepler’s automobile was entirely within
the 15 feet of roadway which the statute reserved for his use.
Unless, then, there was further evidence that Kepler would
not have remained within that space and would have struck
the bus in the area within which the bus might legally stop,
the illegal occupancy by the bus of Kepler’s share of the road
must be held a substantial cause of the collision as a matter
of law. There was no such evidence. The figures are close
but they, with the traffic officer’s testimony, constitute
the only evidence there is on this issue. The finding that the
position of the bus on the highway was not a cause of the
collision is contrary to the evidence and is based only on
conjecture. It cannot be sustained. On this record the con-
trary appears as a matter of law.

Tt has been suggested that the negligence of stopping the
bus as was done here, preceded the various negligences of

420 ee

Kepler and the latter superseded the negligence of the corpo-
ration in causal effect. We do no think the suggestion has
merit. There was concurrent, not successive, causal negli-
gence on the part of both drivers.

The plaintiffs-respondents seek only to avoid a new trial
involving them.

By the Court.—Judgments reversed. Causes remanded
with directions to enter judgments for damages as found by
the jury in favor of plaintiffs and against all defendants with
right of contribution between defendants.

VANDENACK and another, Appellants, vs. Crospy and others,
Respondents.

March 6—April 9, 1957.

2 es

For the appellants there were briefs by Everson, Ryan,
Whitney & O’Melia of Green Bay, and oral argument by
E. L. Everson and James L. Everson.

For the respondents Burton L. Crosby and Yorkshire In-
demnity Company there was a brief by Kaftan, Kaftan &
Kaftan of Green Bay, and oral argument by Fred F. Kaftan.

For. the respondent Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany of the Town of Herman there was a brief by Holden &
Schlosser of Sheboygan, and oral argument by Wayne W.
Schlosser.

Curriz, J. The first question which confronts us on this
appeal is whether the trial court was correct in ruling as a
matter of law that Clausen, the operator of the wrecker, was
not causally negligent in parking or stopping the wrecker
on the left side of the highway.

The authority cited by the trial court, in its memorandum
opinion in support of the conclusion reached on this point, is
Walton v. Blauert (1949), 256 Wis. 125, 40 N. W. (2d)
545. In that case one car was towing another at night and
came to a stop on the left side of the highway. While so

|} ee) 427

stopped they were struck by an automobile coming from the
opposite direction. The jury found the operators of the
towing and towed vehicles causally negligent with respect
to parking their vehicles without leaving 15 feet of clearance,
and such finding was upheld by the trial court. Upon appeal
this court reversed on the ground that the negligence of the
driver of the oncoming vehicle was an intervening cause.
This result was later criticized in McFee v. Harker (1952),
261 Wis. 213, 222, 223, 52 N. W. (2d) 381. It is im-
possible to reconcile the determination in Walton v. Blauert,
supra, with our more-recent decisions dealing with interven-
ing cause such as Ryan v. Cameron (1955), 270 Wis. 325,
331, 71 N. W. (2d) 408. We, therefore, are of the opinion
that there is no issue of intervening cause present in the
instant case. If Clausen were negligent in stopping the
wrecker on the left side of the highway, such negligence
constituted a concurring cause of the accident the legal effect
of which was not superseded by any intervening negligence
of George Vandenack.

The reason for Clausen stopping the wrecker on the left
side of the highway was because this was the only practical
way that he could pull the Derks car out of the ditch. Inas-
much as the drum of the winch was located at the rear of
the wrecker, it was necessary that the wrecker be backed
into position so as to have its rear toward the rear end of
the vehicle to be rescued.

Sub. (9) of sec. 85.19, Stats., provides, “No vehicle shall
be parked or stopped on the left side of the highway. . . .”
Sub. (8) of this same section contains an exception applicable
to the other subsections of sec. 85.19, including sub. (9),
in favor of disabled vehicles, but there is no express exemp-
tion from the prohibition of sec. 85.19 covering wreckers
rescuing disabled vehicles. However, we deem such an ex-
ception must be implied in order to avoid an absurd and
unreasonable result.

2S
es

The facts present in Kastler v. Tures (1926), 191 Wis.
120, 124, 210 N. W. 415, bear a striking similarity to those
in the instant case, except that the owner of the wrecker was
the plaintiff, having brought suit for the damages sustained
to the wrecker. The court therein had before it the prohibi-
tions of the then parking statute, sec. 85.02, This was later
repealed by ch. 454, Laws of 1929, which chapter enacted
sec. 85.19 to take the place of such repealed statute. It was
held that the owner of the wrecker was making “a proper
and necessary use of the highway under an emergency,” and,
therefore, the prohibitions of the parking statute did not
apply. While it is possible to distinguish the wording of
sec. 85.02, Stats. 1925, from that of present sec. 85.19, the
reasoning of the court which was employed in the Kastler
Case for exempting the wrecker from the provisions of the
statute, because it was engaged in a rescue operation in an
emergency, applies with equal force to both statutes.

In Cooper v. Teter (1941), 123 W. Va. 372, 376, 15
S. E. (2d) 152, 155, the West Virginia court had before
it the question of whether certain safety rules promulgated
by the state road commission relating to “motor vehicles
which are stopped, parked, or left standing on the highway”
applied to a wrecker engaged in rescuing a disabled vehicle.
The court held that they did not, and declared:

“Wrecking trucks are necessary, and their placement and
operation on the traveled portion of a highway are sometimes
imperative. 2 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac-
tice, sections 1200 and 1579; Bowmaster v. DePree Co., 258
Mich. 538, 242 N. W. 744; Henry v. Liebovitz & Sons, 312
Pa. 397, 167 A. 304; Shearer v. Puent, 166 Minn. 425, 208
N. W. 182. It was not necessarily unlawful, therefore, for
the defendant to place his wrecking truck on the traveled
portion of the highway.” (123 W. Va. 376.)

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that it was not a
violation of sec. 85.19 (9), Stats., for Clausen to have stopped

es 429

the defendant Crosby’s wrecker on the left side of the high-
way in carrying on the emergency-rescue operation of pulling
the Derks car out of the ditch. Therefore, the jury’s finding
that Clausen was causally negligent in so doing cannot be
permitted to stand.

This leaves, as the only remaining ground for imposing
liability upon the defendants, the finding of the jury that
Clausen was causally negligent in failing to place out burning
fusees, burning pot torches, or lighted red lanterns, to warn
approaching traffic of the position of the wrecker. If the
provisions of sec. 85.06 (18), Stats., were applicable to the
wrecker after it was stopped on the left side of the highway,
then the jury’s finding of negligence must stand. The ma-
terial portions of sec. 85.06 (18) read as follows:

“No person shall during hours of darkness permit a truck
. . . to stand upon any traveled portion of a highway outside
of the corporate limits of any incorporated city or village,
unless there is displayed three of any one of the following
lighting devices: Burning fusees, burning pot torches, lighted
red lanterns. One shall be placed 10 feet to the left rear side
of the vehicle, one placed approximately 125 feet to the front,
and one placed approximately 125 feet to the rear of the
vehicle to clearly indicate the location of such vehicle on the
highway. Such lighting devices shall be so displayed during
the entire time such vehicle is left standing. Every truck
. operated upon a highway outside of the corporate limits
of any incorporated city or village shall carry in a place
readily accessible to the driver the lighting device so re-
quired... .”

Clausen testified that three or four minutes or “possibly
longer” elapsed between the time he backed the wrecker into
position on the north side of the highway and the time of
the occurrence of the accident. In Robinson v. Briggs Trans-
portation Co. (1956), 272 Wis. 448, 76 N. W. (2d) 294, a
truck was being towed on a cold winter morning in order to
start the truck’s engine and both vehicles came to a stop on

0 ee
Pe

the paved roadway. The driver of the towed truck intended
to inject ether into the motor to start it, which operation
would have taken not to exceed two minutes. The trial
court had refused to submit any question in the verdict as
to whether the truck driver was negligent in failing to comply
with the provisions of sec. 85.06 (18), Stats., on the ground
that such statute did not apply to a momentary stop of this
nature. We reversed and held that the provisions of sec.
85.06 (18) were applicable. Therefore, the fact, that the
intended stationary position of the wrecker in the instant
case was only to continue for approximately four minutes, is
insufficient to excuse failure to place out fusees or other
warning lights in compliance with the statute.

The fact that the wrecker was engaged in an emergency-
rescue operation does not excuse the failure to place out
fusees, burning pot torches, or red lanterns. It was held in
both Kastler v. Tures, supra, and Cooper v. Teter, supra,
that a wrecker, which is stopped on a highway conducting a
rescue operation, must exercise ordinary care to warn other
traffic of the obstruction of the highway by the wrecker.
We deem that under the facts that existed in the present case
the exercise of ordinary care by Clausen required that he
place out fusees, torches, or lanterns 125 feet in front and to
the rear of the stopped wrecker as required by sec. 85.06
(18), Stats.

We consider that the case of Hisaw v. Hendrix (1950),
54.N. M. 119, 215 Pac. (2d) 598, supports our determina-
tion in this respect. There the operator of a wrecker stopped
the same partly on the roadway for the purpose of walking
across the highway to inspect the disabled car he came to
rescue. The court held that he was negligent in failing to
comply with the New Mexico statute requiring a truck
to place out flares when it stops on a highway.

The trial court relied upon a statement appearing in the
opinion of this court in Miles v. General Casualty Co.

a De 431

(1949), 254 Wis. 278, 287, 36 N. W. (2d) 66, in deter-
mining that Clausen was not negligent in failing to place
out fusees or other warning lights. We quote such state-
ment:

“To require flares to be put out as required by statute and
order, while a truck was actively engaged in a wrecking oper-
ation would be unreasonable. Moving about constantly it
would be impossible for a truck driver to comply with the
statute. Both the statute and the rule were clearly intended
to apply to a vehicle that has come to rest, and not to a
truck which in the course of moving the obstacle from the
highway, stops a moment or two to attach a chain to a dis-
abled truck.”

In the first place such statement was obiter dictum because
unnecessary to the result reached, which was that the plain-
tiff’s appeal as against the defendant operator of the wrecker
be dismissed for failure to serve the notice of appeal on such
defendant. Secondly, Clausen’s wrecker in the instant case
was stopped for more than “a moment or two.” This is not
a case where, one vehicle stopped momentarily to hitch a
chain onto a disabled one intending to tow it to safety.
Robinson v. Briggs Transportation Co., supra, is authority
for the rule that a stop intended to last no more than two
minutes is still within the purview of sec. 85.06 (18), Stats.

Counsel for the defendants argue that it was unnecessary
for Clausen to put out fusees or other warning lights, as re-
quired by sec. 85.06 (18), Stats., because of the lights burn-
ing on the wrecker and the presence of Peterson waving the
flashlight. In addition to the spotlight heretofore described,
the wrecker had two lights turned on in front. However,
Clausen testified that he was uncertain whether such lights
were on high beam, or deflected beam, or whether it was
the dimmers and not the headlights which were turned on.
Furthermore, there was testimony that the wrecker faced
partly to the southeast, in which case the beam would have

‘es
PY

been off the road to the southeast instead of parallel with
the highway. Peterson testified that he was standing so as
to obscure plaintiffs’ vision of the left of these two lights.
Clausen claims that in addition to the lights mentioned, a
light was burning which was at the top of the A-frame at the
rear of the wrecker.

The best argument against the contention, that it was
unnecessary to put out fusees, torches, or lanterns, because
of the lights on the wrecker, is the following testimony of
Peterson:

“Well, at the time that I came through I had seen no
precautionary measures used on the front of the vehicle to
warn of the hazard and I figured with people coming home
from the taverns that time of the morning it was kind of a
bad situation to be in at that time of the morning, so I
stopped and volunteered my services.”

In Miles v. General Casualty Co., supra, the testimony as
to the location of the disabled truck being rescued by the
wrecker was in dispute, but it was at least on the shoulder
jf not on the traveled roadway. One of the issues was
whether the driver of such truck was causally negligent in
failing to place out fusees or other warning lights. The same
argument was advanced, as here, that the burning lights of
the wrecker would have rendered the placing of such fusees
or warning lights useless. In reply to such argument this
court stated (254 Wis. at p. 287):

“While the headlights of the wrecker were lighted and the
wrecker was facing partly in the direction from which Kern
came (the east) the wrecker was at the point of danger, while
the fusees, if put out as required by statute and rule, would
have been 125 feet to the east and west of the wrecker and
opposite it. Both the position of the fusees or lanterns and
the color of the lights would have warned any observant
traveler that there was danger ahead.”

een 433

The arguments based upon the burning lights on the
wrecker, and on the presence of Peterson waving his red
flashlight 30 feet ahead of the wrecker, go to the issue of
whether Clausen’s negligence in failing to place out fusees
or other warning lights, as required by sec. 85.06 (18),
Stats., was causal. This presented a jury issue, and should
not be disposed of as a matter of law by the court.

We thus have a situation where the jury found the de-
fendant Crosby’s employee, Clausen, causally negligent in
two respects, one of which must be set aside for reasons here-
tofore stated. This in itself would require a new trial be-
cause of the possible effect such erroneous finding may have
had on the comparison of negligence.

Because a new trial is necessary.on this ground, it be-
comes unnecessary to consider some of the grounds for a
new trial urged by the defendants and interpleaded defend-
ant in the event we should reach the conclusion which we
have, that it was error to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. How-
ever, for the guidance of the trial court at the new trial, we
deem it advisable to consider the contentions that questions
should have been submitted in the special verdict as to pos-
sible contributory negligence and assumption of risk on the
part of the plaintiff Laura Vandenack. Questions on these
issues were requested to be included in the verdict, which
requests were denied.

There was three tenths of a mile of straight comparatively
level highway extending eastward from the place of collision.
Mrs. Vandenack testified that as the Vandenack car ap-
proached along this stretch of highway she was looking “in
front,” which we interpret to mean straight ahead. Both she
and her husband saw the red flashlight held by Peterson
but mistook it for the taillight of another motor vehicle
proceeding in the same direction that they were traveling.
Mr. Vandenack realized his mistake too late to avoid the
accident although he slammed on his brakes hard. His

testimony was that he was driving at a speed of 45 to 50 miles
per hour before so applying his brakes. There is nothing in
the testimony that indicates that Mrs. Vandenack saw the
wrecker or its lights before her husband.

In Goehmann v. National Biscuit Co. (1931), 204 Wis.
427, 429, 235 N. W. 792, this court held that it is a general
rule that passengers in an automobile must exercise due care
for their own safety, and that this requires that they keep a
proper lookout to warn the driver of approaching danger.
For other cases holding to the same effect see Krause v.
Hall (1928), 195 Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290; Tomberlin v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. (1932), 208 Wis. 30, 238
N. W. 287, 242 N. W. 677, 243 N. W. 208; Hahn v. Smith
(1934), 215 Wis. 277, 254 N. W. 750; and Teas v. Eisen-
lord (1934), 215 Wis. 455, 253 N. W. 795. A guest is
not held to the same degree of care with respect to lookout
that is required of the driver, and one sitting in the rear
seat is held to a lesser degree of care than one sitting in the
front seat. Krause v. Hall, supra. In almost all instances
the issue of the contributory negligence of a guest is for the
jury to determine.

On the basis of the foregoing authorities, it was error not
to have submitted questions inquiring as to the causal con-
tributory negligence of Mrs. Vandenack.

The issue of assumption of risk is not material as to the
Vandenacks’ causes of action against the defendants Crosby
and his insurance carrier, but is as to the cause of action for
contribution set forth in the cross complaint of these defend-
ants against the interpleaded defendant insurer of the Van-
denack automobile.

Mr. Vandenack was uncertain as to the time when Mrs.
Vandenack and he arrived at the tavern on the night of the
accident. Mrs. Vandenack had testified upon her adverse
examination before trial that it was eight o’clock. Mr.
Vandenack testified that he had “a couple of beers” at the

a ee 435

tavern before starting to play cards and after playing cards
he had “three small beers,” making in all five glasses of
beer he admits having drunk there. Mrs. Vandenack testified
that she drank four or five glasses of beer at the tavern.
They left the tavern at midnight or shortly after. A traffic
officer, who arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after
.it had occurred, testified that he determined that Mr. Van-
denack had been drinking but that it “didn’t seem to be any-
thing excessive.”

Evidence of drinking intoxicating liquor by the driver of
a motor vehicle, which may be far too weak to support a
criminal conviction for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, may nevertheless be material on the issue
of assumption of risk by a guest passenger. This is because
the jury may draw the legitimate inference that the drinking
was sufficient to appreciably interfere with the driver’s oper-
ation of the vehicle. Frey v. Dick (1956), 273 Wis. 1, 9a,
76 N. W. (2d) 716, 77 N. W. (2d) 609. It is common
knowledge that the consumption of alcoholic beverages does
have a tendency to dull the senses of perception, although
the quantity of alcohol sufficient to produce such result in
one individual may have no apparent effect on another. In
the instant case the operators of several cars, which had
preceded the Vandenacks, had approached from the east while
the wrecker was engaged in its rescue operation, and had
perceived the danger in time to turn to the left and proceed
in safety around the wrecker. If these drivers were able to
see the lights of the wrecker, or of Peterson’s lighted flash-
light, in time to take effective action to avoid a collision, why
had not George Vandenack done likewise? It would be
permissible for the jury to draw the inference that Van-
denack’s failure of lookout was not due to some momentary
lapse but rather to the effect of the five glasses of beer he
had drunk at the tavern. Mrs. Vandenack had accompanied
her husband to the tavern and had been with him when he

436

did this drinking. She, therefore, must be deemed to have
assumed any risk resulting from his failure to maintain a
proper lookout due to the drinking.

We are of the opinion that a jury issue was presented
as to whether Mrs. Vandenack assumed the risk of her
husband’s negligent lookout, and that a question as to her
assumption of risk should have been included in the verdict.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Costs shall abide by the result of the new trial, the plaintiffs
presently to pay the clerk’s fees.

Wisconsin Exectric Powrr Company, Appellant, vs.
Crry or Mitwavuxez, Respondent.

March 6—April 9, 1957.

3
ee

For the appellant there were briefs by Shaw, Muskat &
Paulsen, attorneys, and John G. Quale of counsel, all of
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Quale.

For the respondent there was a brief by Walter J. Matti-
son, city attorney, and Ewald L. Moerke, Jr., assistant city
attorney, and oral argument by Mr. Moerke.

Srrinte, J. The principal questions involved are: (1)
Whether a property owner who appeals from a special assess-
ment for street improvements under the statutory appeal
provisions contained in sec. 11.22, Milwaukee city charter,
1934 compilation, must pay the amount of the assessment
within twenty days from the commencement of such appeal
pursuant to sec. 75.62 (1), Stats., as a condition of maintain-
ing such appeal proceeding, (2) whether a property owner
who appeals from a special assessment for street improve-
ments under the statutory appeal provisions contained in
sec, 11.22, Milwaukee city charter, 1934 compilation, must,
as a condition precedent to taking such appeal, first have paid
such assessment, filed a claim for refund, and have allowed
the common council sufficient time in which to act on the
claim, and (3) whether the provisions of sec. 24.40 of the
Milwaukee city charter are applicable to a situation such as
that at bar.

Sec. 11.22 of the Milwaukee city charter, 1934 compila-
tion (ch. 184, Laws of 1874, ch. VII, sec. 11), provides:

“The owner of any lot, or tract of land, or tenement, who

feels himself aggrieved by such assessment, as confirmed by
the common council, as to the amount of benefits thereby

a a 439

adjudged to accrue to him by reason of any improvements
charged against his lot or parcel of land, or the amount of
damages, costs, and charges, arising to such owner from an
alteration of grade, may, within twenty days after such con-
firmation by the common council, appeal therefrom to the
circuit court of Milwaukee county; and such appeal shall
be taken, tried, and determined, and bonds for costs shall
be given, and costs awarded therein, in like manner as in
cases of appeals to the said circuit court provided for in
chapter six of this act. Such appeal shall not affect the
rights of the contractor, or the proceedings in reference to
his contract, but the certificate against the lot or parcel of
land in question, shall be given as if no appeal had been taken;
and in case the appellant shall succeed, the difference be-
tween the amount charged in the certificate and the amount
of the benefit finally adjudged, shall be paid by the city out
of the proper ward fund [since 1907, the general city fund]
.to the appellant, but not until he shall have done the work in
question, or have paid the certificate issued for doing the
same. The amount assessed by the commissioner of public
works, or finally adjudged on appeal, for damages, costs, and
charges arising from an alteration of the grade, in excess of
the amount charged against property deemed benefited, shall
be paid by the city out of the proper ward fund, to the person
or persons thereto entitled, within one year after the con-
firmation of the assessment by the common council, or after
final adjudgment therefor rendered by the court on appeal,
as aforesaid; provided, that the time during which an appeal
from such judgment may be pending in the supreme court
shall not be deemed part of the year so limited.”

Ch. VI, sec. 14 of the act referred to in sec. 11.22 of the
Milwaukee city charter, provides:

“Any person or persons owning or having any interest in
any property affected by such assessment, may, within twenty
days after the confirmation of such assessment by the
common council, appeal therefrom to the circuit court of
Milwaukee county, by filing with the clerk of said circuit
court his notice of appeal, setting forth therein his interest
in the premises and the grounds of his appeal, together with

a bond to the city of Milwaukee in the penal sum of $500,
conditioned for the payment of all costs that shall be ad-
judged against him on such appeal; which bond shall be
signed by at least two sufficient sureties each of whom shall
make affidavit, indorsed upon such bond, that he is worth
$500 over and above all his debts, in property not exempt
from execution ; and said bond and sureties, if objected to by
the city attorney, shall also be approved by the judge of the
said court. Such appeal shall be ineffectual unless the appel-
lant shall also, within twenty days, serve a copy of his notice
of appeal and bond upon the city attorney.”

Sec, 75.62 (1), Stats., provides:

“Conditional payment. Whenever any action or special
proceeding is hereafter commenced to set aside any sale of
lands for the nonpayment of taxes, or to cancel any tax
certificate, or to restrain the issuing of any tax certificate
or tax deed, or to set aside any tax, for any error or defect
going to the validity of the assessment and affecting the
groundwork of such tax, within twenty days after the com-
mencement of such action the plaintiff in such action or
special proceeding shall pay or cause to be paid to the county,
town, city, or village officer entitled to receive the same, the
amount of taxes, interest, and charges levied against the said
lands involved in such action, as a condition of maintaining
said action.”

Sec. 74.73 (1), Stats., provides:

“Any person aggrieved by the levy and collection of any
unlawful tax assessed against him may file a claim therefor
against the town, city, or village, whether incorporated under
general law or special charter, which collected such tax in
the manner prescribed by law, for filing claims in other cases,
and if it shall appear that the tax for which such claim was
filed or any part thereof is unlawful and that all conditions
prescribed by law for the recovery of illegal taxes have been
complied with, the proper town board, village board, or com-
mon council of any city, whether incorporated under general
law or special charter, may allow and the proper town, city,
or village treasurer shall pay such person the amount of such

r] Se eee

claim found to be illegal and excessive. If any town, city, or
village shall fail or refuse to allow such claim, the claimant
may have and maintain an action against the same for the
recovery of all money so unlawfully levied and collected of
him. Every such claim shall be filed; and every action to
recover any money so paid shall be brought within one year
after such payment and not thereafter.”

Sec. 24.40 of the Milwaukee city charter provides:

“No person shall be permitted to institute any action or
proceeding to set aside any assessment or special tax here-
after levied or assessed upon any lot or tract of land, or to
set aside any deed executed in consequence of the nonpay-
ment of such taxes and of the premises therefor, unless such
person shall first pay or tender to the proper party, or de-
posit for his use with the treasurer, the amount of all state,
county, and city taxes that may remain unpaid on such lot
or tract, together with the interest and charges thereon.”

It appears without dispute that Wisconsin Electric Power
Company has not paid the amounts of the special assess-
ments in question. Appended to’ the. motion to dismiss the
appeal was an affidavit of the city treasurer which recited
that the special-improvement assessments in question were
placed on the 1953, 1954, and 1955 tax rolls, each repre-
senting an instalment of taxes as levied against the property
of appellant, and that the same were not paid, and that the
tax certificates were sold by said treasurer to the city of
Milwaukee and are due, delinquent, and outstanding.

With reference to the first question presented it is to be
hoted that while in the city charter a complete system is
‘provided for the assessment, financing, and collection of
‘special benefits flowing from street improvements, and for
appeal t therefrom by aggrieved taxpayers (ch. 11, Milwaukee
‘city charter, 1934 compilation), nevertheless, the legislature
made no provision therein requiring payment of the amount
assessed as a condition of maintaining an appeal from an

I reer

|

assessment of such benefits to the land of a taxpayer. The
legislature properly could have provided for such requirement
in the charter if in its wisdom it had determined to do so.
In sec. 62.16 (6) (Ik), Stats., which provides for appeals
from special assessment of benefits in cities of the state other
than Milwaukee, the legislature likewise does not require
payment of assessments as a condition for making an appeal.
The city of Milwaukee maintains here, as it did in the court
below, that the provisions of sec. 75.62 (1), are applicable
to an appeal taken pursuant to sec. 11.22 of the Milwaukee
city charter. Such contention, however, is without merit.
Sec. 75.62 (1) applies only to actions or special proceedings
wherein there is challenge of error or defect going to the
validity of the assessment and affecting the groundwork of
the tax, whereas sec. 11.22 of the Milwaukee city charter
relates only to challenges of assessment of special benefits,—
a subject substantially different than that referred to in sec.
75.62 (1).

In Bekkedal v. Viroqua (1924), 183 Wis. 176, 196 N. W.
879, 197 N. W. 707, this court distinguished challenges of
amounts of special benefits on appeal from those going to
the groundwork of the tax. In that case this court was treat-
ing with provisions in sec. 75.59, Stats., which related to
actions brought to set aside special-assessment certificates,
special-improvement bonds, tax sales, or tax-sale certificates.
Sec. 75.62 (1) by its very terms pertains to actions brought
to set aside sales of land for nonpayment of taxes, or to
cancel tax certificates, or to restrain the issuance of tax
certificates or tax sales, or to set aside taxes. Both secs. 75.59
and 75.62 (1) refer to situations arising after taxes have
been levied. Sec, 70.01 provides in part: “Real-estate taxes
shall be deemed to be levied when the tax roll on which they
are extended has’ been delivered to the local treasurer with
his warrant for collection.” Under provisions of ch. 11,

a ee 443

Milwaukee city charter, 1934 compilation (sec. 11.11), the
assessment is entered upon the annual tax roll against
the property assessed, and the assessment is collectible by the
city treasurer in manner as other taxes are collected by him.
In the instant situation the special-assessment taxes were
not levied until December, 1953. The principles declared in
Bekkedal v. Viroqua, supra, deal with provisions of sec. 75.59
in relation to those in sec. 62.16, and apply with equal force
and effect to those in sec. 75.62 (1) in relation to sec. 11.22
of the Milwaukee city charter.

Neither sec. 62.16, Stats., nor sec. 11.22, Milwaukee city
charter, requires the payment of taxes under protest before
the levy. The payment of taxes under protest is, however,
provided for in other legislation. See sec. 9.30, Milwaukee
city charter, 1934 compilation (Kline Law). It is also to be
observed that in sec. 66.60, Stats., which is an alternative
method relating to special assessments and charges, pay-
ments of instalments of assessments appealed from are re-
quired as a condition of continuing the appeal. In the light
of such provisions, the absence of any requirement of pay-
ment of assessments for special benefits in sec. 62.16, Stats.,
and sec. 11.22, Milwaukee city charter, is significant. We
are obliged to conclude that the legislature had not intended
such requirement.

In principle, the method of appeal as provided in sec.
11.22, Milwaukee city charter, does not differ substantially
from that provided in sec. 70.47 (13), Stats., relating to
an action of certiorari from a determination of the board of
review of the city of Milwaukee from an assessment of gen-
exal property taxes, nor from that as provided in sec. 70.85
pertaining to appeals from determinations of the department
of taxation. It is noted that in neither of such prescribed
methods is payment of taxes required as a condition for
maintaining the appeal. Sec. 75.62 (1), would undoubtedly

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be applicable in an action in equity to set aside an assessment
for invalidity, arbitrariness, or fraud and to restrain the
issuance of a tax-sale certificate or deed in relation thereto.

With reference to the other questions presented, it is the
contention of Wisconsin Electric Power Company that
neither sec. 74.73, Stats., nor sec. 24.40, Milwaukee city
charter, is applicable to an appeal under sec. 11.22, Mil-
waukee city charter, for the reason that both of such
statutory provisions relate only to actions or proceedings
commenced after a levy of taxes has been made. Sec. 74.73 by
its terms applies to claims for taxes that have been levied
and collected. As indicated in sec. 24.40, Milwaukee city
charter, that enactment applies only to actions or proceedings
commenced in cases where the taxes, interest, and charges
remain unpaid. Manifestly, sec. 24.40, Milwaukee city
charter, applies only to situations in which the taxes have
been levied.

Since ch. 11 of the Milwaukee city charter, 1934 compila-
tion, contains a complete method for the assessment, fi-
nancing, and collection of taxes assessed for special benefits,
and since it specifies procedure for appeal therefrom as therein
set forth, which procedure does not require payment before
proper levy of the tax, the attempt to reach over to secs.
75.62 (1) and 74.73, Stats., and sec. 24.40, Milwaukee city
charter, and appropriate provisions therefrom relating to
payment of taxes as a condition precedent to instituting or
maintaining an appeal from an assessment of benefits, for
incorporation into sec. 11.22, Milwaukee city charter, cannot
have judicial sanction.

We are obliged to conclude that neither secs. 75.62 (1)
nor 74.73, Stats., nor sec. 24.40 of the Milwaukee city
charter is applicable to the provisions relating to an appeal
under sec. 11.22 of the Milwaukee city charter.

By the Cowrt——Order reversed, and cause remanded
with directions for further proceedings according to law.

Hates, Appellant, vs. Crry or Wauwatosa, Respondent.*
March 6—April 9, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on June 4, 1957.

447

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For the appellant there was a brief by Meldman & Kahn,
attorneys, and Edward H. Meldman and Clifford K. Meld-
man of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by
Clifford K. Meldman and Edward H. Meldman.
For the respondent there was a brief by Milton F. Bur-

master, city attorney, attorney, and Herbert L. Mount of
Milwaukee of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Mount.

Wincert, J. The judgment of the circuit court must be
reversed, and that of the civil court reinstated.

The action is founded on sec. 81.15, Stats., the material
part of which provides:

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“If damages happen to any person or his property by
reason of the insufficiency or want of repairs of any highway
which any town, city, or village is bound to keep in repair,
the person sustaining such damages shall have a right to
recover the same from such town, city, or village .. .” up
to a maximum of $5,000.

While the terms of the statute suggest absolute liability,
it is established by decisions of this court that an action under
the statute is in legal contemplation an action for negligence,
and accordingly the Comparative Negligence Act applies.
Trobaugh v. Milwaukee, 265 Wis. 475, 487, 61 N. W. (2d)
866; Morley v. Reedsburg, 211 Wis. 504, 511, 512, 248
N. W. 431. Failure to build a safe street in the first place
is negligence as a matter of law; failure to make repairs
when needed presents a question whether there has been a
failure to exercise ordinary care in the circumstances. Morley
v. Reedsburg, 211 Wis. 504, 511, 512, 248 N. W. 431.

The civil court made findings sufficient to support judg-
ment for the plaintiff. On appeal to the circuit court, the
findings of the civil court are not to be disturbed unless they
are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. Wald v.
Mitten, 229 Wis. 393, 396, 282 N. W. 634; Barkdoll v.
Wink, 238 Wis. 520, 525, 300 N. W. 233.

Depth of hole. The civil court’s finding that the hole
was four and one-half to five inches in depth was supported
by the testimony of plaintiff’s son-in-law that he had meas-
ured it the morning after the accident and found it almost
five inches deep at one spot and four inches at another,
with an average of about four and one-half inches, and with
an area of three to three and one-half inches in diameter
being four and one-half inches or more deep. While there
was also persuasive evidence of a depth of only about two
inches, the conflict was for the trial court to resolve.

Of the cases dealing with holes of small depth or minor
differences in surface elevation in a sidewalk or street, Mc-

Cormick v. Racine, 227 Wis. 33, 36, 277 N. W. 646, prob-
ably goes the farthest in holding that such defects are non-
actionable as a matter of law. There a difference of two and
three-eighths inches in height between adjoining squares of
acement sidewalk was held not actionable. In Pias v. Racine,
263 Wis. 504, 507, 58 N. W. (2d) 67, we pointed out that
liability under sec. 81.15, Stats., is not a matter of inches
only, and that other conditions and circumstances must be
considered. In Hansen v. Green Bay, 218 Wis. 644, 646,
261 N. W. 746, recovery was allowed where the hole was
one to three and one-half inches deep, and so shaped that
a pedestrian’s foot might become jammed in it. In the present
case it could be inferred that plaintiff's shoe caught in the
hole, and the trial court so found. Generally speaking, in-
sufficiency or want of repair is a question for the trier of
fact. Here we cannot say that the trial court was wrong as
a matter of law in finding that the hole in the street was of
such character and depth as to constitute an actionable “in-
sufficiency or want of repair” within the meaning of sec.
81.15. For a collection of cases on the subject, see note in
38 Marquette Law Review, 211.

Location of hole. We cannot agree with the circuit
court’s holding that the defect in the street was not actionable
under sec. 81.15, Stats., because off the course of travel.

While the statute in terms does not restrict its application
to any particular part of a highway which the municipality is
bound to keep in repair, this court’s decisions have limited
liability to pedestrians to cases where the offending defect
was within the region where a pedestrian would reasonably
be expected to travel. Kuchler v. Milwaukee, 165 Wis. 320,
326, 162 N. W. 315. We have recognized, however, that the
common use of the automobile has enlarged the area in which
people may be expected to walk or step, and accordingly that
a hole in a curb in front of a sidewalk leading to a residence
may be actionable and presents a jury question, being at a

‘50 es

point where a person would be likely to step in alighting
from an automobile. Gotélieb v. Racine, 234 Wis. 343, 291
N. W. 335. See also First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. S.C.
Johnson & Sons, 264 Wis. 404, 408, 59 N. W. (2d) 445.

We think the reasoning of the curb cases applies to the
present one. In this day automobiles are commonly parked
at the curb, and people are constantly entering or alighting
from cars on the left side and walking around the front or
rear of the car to or from the curb. This may be particularly
true in residential districts as in the present case, where the
street traffic is not so great as to inhibit use of the door
on the left side of the parked car. The hole in the present
case was in front of the sidewalk coming out from the house
where plaintiff visited and thus in a most likely place for
a visitor there to step. In short, we cannot say that the
defect in the street was nonactionable as a matter of law
because of its location.

While the alternatives of keeping such portions of the
street in repair or paying damages to persons injured by
defects therein may impose burdens on the municipal treas-
ury, it is equally true that inability to collect damages in such
cases might impose serious hardship on the injured persons.
In waiving municipal exemption from tort liability to the
extent of $5,000, sec. 81.15, Stats, manifests legislative
concern for the users of the streets as well as for the tax-
payers.

Contributory negligence. The city argues that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
She admitted that she stepped off the curb into the street
without looking at the surface of the street, and hence did
not see the hole. It was dusk at the time. The street had
been in rather poor condition for a long time, the hole had
been there more than six weeks, and plaintiff visited her
daughter often. She had noticed “open spots” and cracks in

|_| ae 451

the pavement on that street, but had not noticed any holes in
front of her daughter’s house.

We cannot say that plaintiff's failure to scrutinize the
area where she stepped off the curb was negligent as a matter
of law.

. the plaintiff was not bound at all times, by day or
by night, when passing over the walk, to bear in mind the de-
fect in it, and think of it, though he knew it was there and
considered that it was dangerous.” Crites v. New Richmond,
98 Wis. 55, 60, 73 N. W. 322. See also Zoellner v. Fond
du Lac, 147 Wis. 300, 305, 133 N. W. 35.

Here plaintiff did not know of the particular defect, and
in the circumstances she was not bound as a matter of law to
inspect that part of the street before stepping on it. The
trial court’s finding that she acted as a prudent and careful
person of her type and age would act under the same or
similar circumstances, must therefore be sustained.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, with directions to
affirm the judgment of the civil court.

Martin, C. J., and Browy, J., dissent.

Estate or Bozo: Bozo, by Guardian ad litem, and another,
Appellants, vs. Kewosna NationaL Bank, Adminis-
trator, Respondent.

March 6—April 9, 1957.

4
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For the appellants there was a brief by Kellstedt & Young
of Peoria, Illinois, attorneys, and Cavanagh, Mittelstaed,
Sheldon, Heide & Hartley of Kenosha of counsel, and oral
argument by William A. Sheldon.

For the respondent there was a brief by Julius Grotsky,
attorney, and Vaudreuil & Vaudreuil of counsel, all of
Kenosha, and oral argument by Mr. Grotsky.

Faircuip, J. The first question is whether the appeal
from the order of October 6, 1955, must be dismissed. It
was late, and although appellants applied for an extension
of time, no extension was secured. This court has con-
cluded that when a respondent does not move for dismissal
of a late appeal but participates in it, sec. 269.51, Stats.,
vests jurisdiction here, notwithstanding the tardiness.
Guardianship of Barnes, ante, p. 356, 82 N. W. (2d) 211.
Respondent has participated in this appeal without first
moving to dismiss.

Appellants argue that the county court should have
vacated the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. They assert
that the petition for administration was fatally defective
because not made by the widow or heir. The petition did,
however, assert the fundamental jurisdictional facts of death
and residence. Estate of Sargent, 62 Wis. 130, 135, 22

a ee 457
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N. W. 131. Even if made by one who was not entitled to
administration, the appointment would be revocable, but the
proceeding would not be void. Estate of Eannelli, 274 Wis.
193, 80 N. W. (2d) 240; Steinberg v. Saltzman, 130 Wis.
419, 426, 110 N. W. 198. In any event, the petition here
shows upon its face that it was made by the general guardians
of the sole minor heir, and a minor may appear by general
guardian of property. Sec. 324.29, Stats.

Appellants also challenge jurisdiction because no notice of
the hearing on the petition was mailed to Shelby Jean or her
mother. We do not deem that a petitioner is entitled to
notice of a hearing upon her petition and Shelby Jean, by
guardian, was the petitioner. Her mother was not an in-
terested person.

Appellants also point out that Guardian ad litem Kennedy
did not appear at the hearing on April 19, 1955, and it
does not affirmatively appear that he had notice. This
Jack of notice did not render the entire proceeding void,
whatever effect it may have had upon the validity of the
choice of administrators who were appointed. Those ad-
ministrators have resigned and a successor has been ap-
pointed.

The county court correctly declined to vacate the pro-
ceeding, and the order of October 6th should be affirmed.

Appellants assert that the bank must employ the attorneys
designated by Mrs. Barton. Sec. 310.25, Stats., applies
whenever a firm or corporation is named administrator.
It permits the beneficiary who is nearest of kin to name
the attorney who shall represent the estate in all proceedings
“unless good cause be shown before the court why this
should not be done.” It provides that where the next of kin
is an infant, the natural guardian shall act in behalf of the
infant.

We conclude that the record supports the recital in the
order of June 27, 1956, that “good cause” had been shown.

So

Mr, Grotsky had been attorney for deceased. He had been
attorney for the Fennels during the five months they were
administrators and for the bank ever since. Mrs. Barton
wanted to assert a claim against the estate and to obtain
an allowance from the guardianship for support of Shelby
Jean, notwithstanding the allowance received from social
security. She had requested her attorneys to file a claim
and seek such allowance. Her attorneys were the same she
asked the bank to employ. There appears to be a conflict
of interest between Mrs. Barton and the estate and Shelby
Jean and it appears that the attorneys she selected now owe
a duty to her which might well conflict with the duty they
would owe the administrator. Judge Davis’ decision sug-
gests that it appeared that the change of attorneys was being
requested because of the “feelings of the divorced wife.”

There has been no motion to dismiss this appeal nor
any challenge here of Mr. Sheldon’s authority to act on the
ground that he was appointed guardian ad litem in August,
1955, without notice to a guardian ad litem previously
appointed. Such challenge has been made in the county
court, but not disposed of. For the purpose of this appeal
we have treated Mr. Sheldon as guardian ad litem, but make
no determination which would foreclose further considera-
tion of his status by the county court.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

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Nirarpy and others, Appellants, vs. Tuaver, Respondent.
March 7—April 9, 1957.

For the appellants there was a brief by Dempsey & Robin-
son of Whitewater, and oral argument by Clark Dempsey
and Robert Robinson.

For the respondent there was a brief by Kenney, Korf &
Pfeil of East Troy, and oral argument by Francis J. Korf.

Martin, C. J. Respondent owned a marsh area in
Jefferson county and in 1954 he invited the appellants to
join him in building a pond therein to improve duck and
goose-hunting conditions. A written agreement was entered
into on September 22, 1954, after work had been commenced
on the pond, and thereafter appellants expended $2,576.50
on the improvements. The agreement provided that the
appellants pay $160 per year for lease of the marsh for
hunting, and it further provided:

“This lease is to run indefinitely from year to year unless
the party of the first part sells the real estate, in which
event the party of the first part will reimburse parties of
the second part for the amount of money spent in the creation
of the pond, less 20 per cent per year for each year the pond
has been in existence, starting in 1954.

| a 461
Po

In November, 1954, respondent sold the marsh to one
Richard Gumz, who had knowledge of the lease before he
purchased the property and was willing to be bound by
the terms thereof. Respondent gave appellants no notice of
the sale. They learned of it in the spring of 1955 and advised
respondent they desired to terminate the lease. Although no
one prevented them from hunting there after the sale, they
did not hunt the marsh during 1955. Appellants brought
this action for reimbursement of their expenditures, claiming
the lease was terminated by the sale.

The trial court held that the clause relating to the term
of the lease was not a limitation but a condition subsequent
and that it was waived by the respondent when he sold the
land. .

In52L. R.A. (N.S.) note, p. 718, it is stated:

“The distinction between a ‘condition subsequent’ and a
‘special limitation’ is that, in the former, the words creating
the condition do not originally limit the term, but merely
permit its termination upon the happening of the contingency,
while in the latter the words creating it originally limit the
term to the time of the happening of the contingency, hence,
when the contingency happens, the estate is terminated as if
the term had expired.”

In Restatement, 1 Property, p. 59, sec. 24, it is stated:

“The term ‘condition subsequent’ denotes that part of
the language of a conveyance, by virtue of which upon the
occurrence of a stated event the conveyor, or his successor
in interest, has the power to terminate the interest which
has been created subject to the condition subsequent, but
which will continue until this power is exercised.”

While the trial court made a point of the distinction be-
tween the word “unless” used in the clause in question and
such words as “until” which specifically connote time, we
do not consider the distinction controlling since—

“

. . the great weight of authority now is that whatever
the form of language used, whether adapted to the creation

2s
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of a special limitation or a condition subsequent, the pro-
vision will be construed as the latter unless a contrary intent
is clearly expressed.” 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant,
p. 702, sec, 825.

Since a lessor has an absolute right to sell his reversion
subject to a lease without notice to or consent of the lessee
(see Anno. L. R. A. 1915C, 192 et seq.), the more-reasonable
construction of a provision for termination of the leasehold
estate in case of sale is that it is enabling and not restrictive
of the lessor’s legal rights. Anno. L. R. A. 1915C, 236
et seq. Such a construction, while in favor of the lessor, in
no way impairs the rights of the lessee who has what he
contracted for regardless of the sale. In the instant case
Gumz knew of the lease and continued it. Appellants have
not been prevented from entering upon the land and exer-
cising their hunting privileges. They are deprived of nothing;
they have the full benefit of everything for which they con-
tracted. See Ecke v. Fetzer (1886), 65 Wis. 55, 26 N. W.
266.

There is some argument that a conflict exists between the
clause dealing with termination in case of sale and the clause
that the agreement is to be binding upon the respective par-
ties, their heirs and assigns. We see no conflict. Under the
“condition subsequent” interpretation of the termination
clause, the lessor has his option to terminate and pay the
improvements. If he does not exercise that option, his
grantee is bound by the lease.

Appellants also argue that there is a contradiction between
the two clauses:

“This agreement shall be binding upon the respective
parties, their heirs and assigns.” and

“Tt is further herein agreed that the interest of the parties
of the second part, and each of them, is not assignable.”

a P| 463

which is not resolved by construing the termination clause
as a condition subsequent. The argument has little merit.
The first of these two clauses refers to all of the terms and
conditions of the contract. The second is simply for the pro-
tection of the lessees; it is explained by, and must be read in
connection with, another clause which provides as follows:

“Hunting rights shall be restricted to the parties to this
agreement, except as herein modified. In the event that
any one of the parties of the second part shall die or desire
to withdraw, the remaining parties of the second part hereby
agree to reimburse the party who so withdraws, less 20 per
cent of his investment for each year that he has belonged to
the hunting group.”

In agreeing that their interests were not assignable, each
of the lessees protected himself against the assignment of the
lease to a stranger.

With respect to appellants’ contention that they intended
the lease to terminate on sale, Dr. Nitardy testified that the
agreement was not in accordance with the preliminary nota-
tions he had given the attorney, but that he knew this when
he signed the lease; and it was stipulated on the trial that
the testimony of Nitardy should stand as the testimony
of all the appellants. Under these circumstances we must
hold that appellants having had the opportunity to read
the contract and knowing that what they were signing did
not set forth their previous intentions, the interpretation
placed upon it by the trial court is correct. No weight can
be given to their argument that they considered it to be a
Jease that would terminate automatically upon sale of the
land. This is not an action for reformation of the contract.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

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First Wisconsin Trust Company, Plaintiff and Respond-
ent, vs. Perkins and wife, Defendants and Appellants:
Bacu and others, Defendants and Respondents.

March 7—April 9, 1957.

&
a

For the appellants there was a brief by Clifford C. Kasdorf
and Stephen C. deVries, both of Milwaukee, attorneys, and
Carl Hoppe of San Francisco, California, of counsel, and oral
argument by Mr. Hoppe and Mr. deVries.

For the respondent First Wisconsin Trust Company there
was a brief and oral argument by Keith Frey of Waukesha.

For the respondents there was a brief by Schubring, Ryan,
Petersen & Sutherland of Madison, for E. G. Bach, Frances
Bach, and Bonnie Bach Ferris, and by Collins H. Ferris of
Madison, guardian ad litem, for Craig Fenton Ferris, Martha
Lou Ferris, and Carey Belle Ferris, and oral argument by
Floyd A. Brynelson of Madison.

Broaproot, J. Although the appeal is from the whole
judgment, the appellants did not attack the trial court’s con-
struction of paragraph 17 of the trust instrument either in
their briefs or oral argument. We have, however, given
the matter consideration, and it is our determination that

a De 467
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the trial court’s construction of paragraph 17 is correct, and
that part of the judgment is hereby affirmed.

In their briefs and argument the appellants contended that
the trust instrument did not empower the trustee to make
discretionary investments of funds of the trust corpus beyond
the limitations of ch. 320, Stats. On the other hand, the
remaindermen contend that the trust instrument, properly
construed, does empower the trustee to make investments
beyond the limitations of said chapter.

Paragraph 4 of the trust instrument authorized the trustee
to hold the assets and securities originally assigned to it by
the donor whether or not the same conformed to the rules
prescribed by the laws of Wisconsin for the investment of
trust funds. The appellants contend that the trust instrument
expressly authorizes the trustee to retain nonlegal invest-
ments but does not expressly direct reinvestment in nonlegal
securities, and that the express mention of said discre-
tionary power precludes an extension to other broader
powers by implication. They cite many cases from this
jurisdiction and also from foreign jurisdictions. They seem
to rely upon two recognized rules of construction denomi-
nated ejusdem generis and expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The doctrines so expressed are to be used as an
aid in construction but are not to be followed to the extent
of overriding a different intent expressed in the instrument
being construed. The real test to be applied is expressed in
Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 306, 290 N. W. 758, as
follows:

“In construing a trust, whether created by a will or by
another instrument, the language thereof should be so con-
strued as to give effect to the intention of the testator or
settlor, if that intention may be ascertained from the lan-
guage of the will or other instrument, considered in the light
of the surrounding circumstances. That rule repeatedly stated
in connection with the construction of wills, has become

5

elementary. It has also been stated in connection with the
construction of a trust not created by will. Miller v. Douglass,
192 Wis. 486, 492, 213 N. W. 320.”

The rule was cited with approval in First Nat. Bank in
Oshkosh v. Barnes, 237 Wis. 627, 298 N. W. 215. The in-
tention of the donor which determines the terms of the trust
is his intention at the time of the creation of the trust. Re-
statement, 1 Trusts, p. 403, sec. 164. At the time of the
execution of the trust instrument sec. 231.32, Stats. 1931,
controlled the investment of trust funds. The pertinent pro-
visions of that section are as follows:

“(1) (a) Every executor, guardian, or trustee, except
where it is otherwise expressly directed by the will or in-
strument of trust, if any, may invest trust funds in bonds
or interest-bearing notes or obligations of the United States,
and also in the bonds or interest-bearing obligations of any
state of the United States, except the states of Nevada and
Wyoming, and except also the present territories of the
United States (and such territories shall continue to be
excepted after admission to statehood) ;”

“(3) Nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect
the power or jurisdiction of any court of the state of Wis-
consin in respect to trusts and trustees, nor to affect any pow-
ers or authority as to investments conferred by will or other
instrument of trust.”

In dealing with the construction of a trust instrument
executed while said statute was in effect this court said in
Estate of Allen, 218 Wis. 349, 353, 259 N. W. 848:

“The responsibilities of a trustee require an administra-
tion of the trust with the sole object of serving the trust
estate and guarding the interests of the beneficiaries. The
mere direction to the trustee to use his best skill and judg-
ment and a permission to invest in one particular form of
investment, in addition to those specified by law, does not
enlarge his powers and discretion so as to permit the invest-
ment of the funds of the estate in securities beyond those
directly approved. Estate of Fouks, 213 Wis. 550, 252 N. W.

J ae 469

160. Unless otherwise expressly directed by the will or
instrument of trust, the trustee is to invest the funds in
obligations described in sec. 231.32, Stats.”

By the terms of the instrument under consideration a
successor trustee was given the same powers as those held
by the initial trustee. The remaindermen rely in particular
upon paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 of the trust instrument,
which read as follows:

“12. In the event that by the exercise of any discretion
herein vested in the trustee, any loss or damage shall accrue
to the trust estate, such loss or damage shall not be charged
or imputed to the trustee, excepting only for bad faith shown
in the exercise of its discretion.

“13. The retention, sale, and disposition of the assets and
securities of such trust and the investment and reinvestment
of the funds thereof, shall be exclusively directed by the donor
so long as he shall live and shall so elect and so long and to
stich extent as the donor shall live and retain such control,
the trustee shall be charged with no responsibility therefor,
excepting only to execute with reasonable diligence and care
the directions of the donor.

“14, After the donor’s death the powers, duties, and
responsibilities so reserved to the donor, shall vest in the
trustee, except as above directed.”

It is their contention that by paragraph 13 the donor re-
served to himself the power to direct the investment and re-
investment of the trust corpus; that the reservation was valid
and that the donor intended to grant to the trustee the
same powers by the provisions of paragraph 14.

We have given serious and careful consideration to the
three paragraphs last quoted, as well as all of the language
in the instrument. The donor had knowledge of the fact
that there was a statute controlling the investment of trust
funds and he made reference thereto with respect to the
retention of securities originally placed in the trust. That
statute provided that except where otherwise expressly di-

SA remem
Po

rected by the instrument of trust the trustee should invest
trust funds as there provided. It is a simple matter for a
donor to give clear direction if it is his intent to give to his
trustee broader powers of investment. The first duty of a
trustee is to preserve the‘corpus of the trust. The legislature
has indicated that the best way to guard the safety of the
corpus of the trust is to confine investments to the list thereof
prescribed by statute. Express direction and clear intent
should not be supplied in an instrument by deductions, in-
ferences, or implications. If any such are to be indulged in,
it is more reasonable to suppose that a donor intended that
his trustee should invest the funds intrusted to him according
to statute.

Paragraph 14 is very indefinite. The donor had reserved
several rights and powers, including the right to withdraw
funds from the trust, which in effect made the trust revocable.
He certainly did not intend that the trustee should have all
of the powers that he had reserved to himself. We could
only infer by way of elimination or deduction that the donor
intended by the language of paragraph 14 to give the trustee
broad powers of investment. In fact, it would be necessary
to assume that the donor was referring to the power of
investment in paragraph 14.

In view of all of the language in the trust instrument we
cannot determine that the donor expressly directed that the
trustee should be empowered to make discretionary invest-
ments beyond the limitations of ch. 320, Stats. Therefore,
the judgment should be amended in that respect.

By the Court—The judgment, so far as it construes para-
graph 17 of the trust instrument, is affirmed. That part of
the judgment holding that the petitioner as trustee is not
required to comply with the provisions of ch. 320, Stats.,
in the investment of trust funds is reversed. Cause remanded,
with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with this
opinion.

r an
SY

Curriz, J. (concurring). The trust instrument does ex-
pressly provide for one exception from the requirements of
ch. 320, Stats., that investments must be made in “legals” in
the absence of provisions in the instrument conferring wider
investment powers. This is the provision in paragraph 4
which authorizes the trustee to retain as trust investments
“the assets and securities now comprised in said trust . . .
whether or not the same conformed to the rules prescribed
by the laws of Wisconsin for the investment of trust funds.”

While the rule of construction of “expressio wnius est
exclusio alterius” (the expression of one thing excludes an-
other) is not to be blindly followed in all cases, its invocation
in the present instance seems particularly appropriate. This
is because the quoted wording from paragraph 4 discloses
that the scrivener was well versed in the proper language to
be employed in stating an exemption from the requirements
of ch. 320, Stats. Thus the inference is inescapable that he
would have used like specific language to express a general
dispensation of all compliance with the provisions of such
chapter. Such inference is further confirmed by the fact that
the lawyer who drafted the trust instrument was the late
Harvey J. Frame of Waukesha, who had had long and
extensive experience in drafting wills and trust instruments.

The case of Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader (1934), 20
Del. Ch. 278, 174 Atl. 132, holds that a specific grant by the
will of the testatrix of discretion to a trustee of a testa-
mentary trust to invest in real estate, a “nonlegal” in Dela-
ware, is to be construed as evidencing a desire that other
“nonlegals” be avoided on the principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. This case also lays down the principle
that where there are two possible constructions of a trust
instrument, under one of which investment in “nonlegals”
would be permitted and under the other excluded, that con-
struction should be adopted which opposes the existence in
the trustee of a wide discretionary power.

I errr
Pd
Maopison Arrte No. 623 FraTERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES,
Inc., Appellant, vs. Crry or Mapison, Respondent.

March 7—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by McAndrews & Melli,
and oral argument by William K. Chipman and Joseph A.
Melli, all of Madison.

For the respondent there was a brief by Harold E. Han-
son, city attorney, and Henry B. Buslee, assistant city attor-
ney, and oral argument by Mr. Buslee.

Brown, J. The appellant submits that both the assessor
and the board of review failed to make an apportionment
between taxable and exempt values in the manner prescribed
by sec. 70.11 (8), Stats., resulting in a gross overassessment.

“The courts do not have jurisdiction to disturb the find-
ings of a board of review except where the board acts in
bad faith or exceeds its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Pierce v.
Jodon (1924), 182 Wis. 645, 197 N. W. 189. In the ab-
sence of bad faith, if the evidence presented to the board of
review is sufficient to furnish a substantial basis for the
valuation found by the board, its decision will not be dis-
turbed. Wisconsin Malting Co. v. Manitowoc (1937), 225

a | 475

Wis. 393, 274 N. W. 288.” State ex rel. Enterprise Realty
Se v. Swiderski (1955), 269 Wis. 642, 644, 70 N. W. (2d)

Clear errors of law, however, may be corrected by the
courts upon certiorari. Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel
(1872), 29 Wis. 444, 451. The appellant contends that the
board’s alleged violation of sec. 70.11 (8), Stats., in appor-
tioning the nonexempt use brings relief within the scope of
certiorari.

The record shows that in their clubhouse the Eagles
operate a dining room, bar, bowling alley, and numerous
meeting rooms and halls. These facilities are served by the
heating and ventilating systems and kitchen which occupy
other portions of the building. The dining room is open to
and used by the public from 11:30 a. m. to 2 p. m. daily and
to members and their guests, only, from 5 p. m. to midnight
on weekdays and 12:30 a. m, on week ends. During the
public hours many of the patrons are Eagles. The bowling
alley is open to and used by the public on Saturday and
Sunday. On Monday it is used at certain hours by the
Gisholt League and the Industrial League, on Tuesday by
the Workmen’s League and the Sportmen’s League, on
Wednesday afternoon by the Industrial League. Only Eagles
and their guests use the alleys on other days. Many members
of the various league teams are Eagles and on Saturdays
and Sundays many of the bowlers are Eagles. Compensation
is paid for the use of the alleys by the bowlers whether Eagles
or not. The bar is used by nonmembers during the hours
when they may patronize the other departments of the club-
house. The meeting halls and other rooms are used prima-
rily by Eagles, their families, and guests, but there is a fairly
constant and regular rental of these spaces to outsiders for
dances and receptions. Appellant supplied the board of re-
view with figures tending to show the proportion of mem-
bers and their guests, compared to nonmembers, who used

the clubhouse at the times it, or part of it, was open to
nonmembers, and contends that the statute demands that the
nonexempt use be determined by this comparison. For ex-
ample, if during the time the dining room is open to the
public one half the patrons are Eagles the taxable value of
the dining room for that time is an undivided one half of
the actual value, the other undivided one half being exempt
because the customers served are Eagles. The city, on the
other hand, submits that during the hours when the public
is served the whole dining area, with its kitchens, heating
and ventilation is a public, not a fraternal facility, and no
proportion of its. value is exempt, regardless of the number
of Eagles who may be dining there compared to the diners
who are not Eagles.

Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be
strictly construed and all doubts are resolved in favor of its
taxability. To be entitled to tax exemption the taxpayer
must bring himself within the exact terms of the exemption
statute. These principles are so well established that specific
citation is unnecessary. Those who doubt them may refer
to 16 Callaghan’s Wisconsin Digest, Taxation, p. 59, sec. 98.

As we read sec. 70.11 (8), Stats., it does not confine the
board of review to the per capita standard urged by appellant
but contemplates the employment of “all other factors tend-
ing to measure the extent of such [. e., nonexempt] use.”
We consider it is quite reasonable, and not in conflict with
sec. 70.11 (8), for the board to conclude that during public
hours the dining room is a public dining room whose tax-
ability is not reduced by the presence of Eagles who get
there nothing not equally available to nonmembers, while
such nonmembers, in turn, get everything available to the
most eminent Eagle. For the time being the Eagles are en-
joying facilities which the clubhouse offers the public for
compensation and it is neither dishonest nor arbitrary nor,
we think, contrary to the statute to measure and tax the

a | 477

facility as one so devoted to public, not fraternal, use. In
like manner we regard the bowling alleys. At the times when
the various leagues mentioned above are bowling, the board
of review is neither dishonest nor arbitrary nor violating
any clear command of the statute in recognizing that the
bowlers are present not because they are Eagles but because
they are league members. If they are Eagles that is inci-
dental and immaterial in measuring the nonfraternal use of
an alley, or at least the board of review may so determine
and be sustained. And so it goes, with the bar and those
other parts of the clubhouse which are used at times ex-
clusively for members and at other times nonexclusively for
compensation and pecuniary profit.

Appellant submits that the board of review measured the
nonexempt use by the availability of part of the clubhouse
for nonexempt use and that the availability standard was
disapproved by this court in Trustees of Clinton Lodge v.
Rock County (1937), 224 Wis. 168, 272 N. W. 5. That
case differs radically upon its facts from the present one.
The Lodge owned a building whose ground floor was oc-
cupied by a store and whose upper floor was used for
fraternal purposes. The store tenant moved out. Shelving
and other fixtures suitable for business remained in the
premises and the Lodge held that portion of the building
ready and available for a new tenant when one should be
found. None was immediately forthcoming and in the in-
terim the Lodge used the space for a game room to which
none but members were admitted. We held that the avail-
ability of the ground floor for nonexempt use did not render
it taxable while the actual use was fraternal. In the case at
bar there was both availability of club property for public use
plus use by the public; an offer to and an acceptance by the
public. Appellant’s argument seems to us to involve the
untenable proposition that if the Clinton Lodge had set up

7

a public barroom in the vacated store where it served all
comers the exemption would continue, being diminished only
by the proportion of patrons who did not belong to the Lodge.
We see no conflict with the Clinton Lodge Case, supra, in
a present affirmance of the action of the board of review based
on the consideration that the Eagles’ offer to the public
followed by the public’s acceptance, manifested by its use
of the facilities, for the time being created the facility a
public one and destroyed the entire exemption during the
period of such use.

‘We do not intend to say that the method advocated by
appellant would not be permissible under sec. 70.11 (8),
Stats., nor that the board of review might not have used it
in the honest belief that it provided a measurement of the
extent of nonexempt use. But we also consider that the
method adopted by the board is permitted by the statute and
both the board’s theory and its application of the theory in
relation to the evidence concerning the values of the facilities
and the proportion of their public and compensated use is
within those limits which cannot be reached by certiorari.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing ap-
pellant’s petition and sustaining the action of the city board
of review. .

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

NortHern Paciric Rar-way Company, Respondent, vs.
Wise, Secretary of State, Appellant.

March 7—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by the Attorney Gen-
eral and Robert J. Vergeront, assistant attorney general,
attorneys, and Martin J. Werra of Madison of counsel, and
oral argument by Mr. Vergeront.

For the respondent there was a brief by H. Maswell
Manzer of Madison, and Robertson, Hoebreckx & Davis of
Milwaukee, attorneys, and M. L. Countryman, Jr., of St.

a De 481

Paul, Minnesota, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr.
Manger and Mr. Clark M. Robertson.

Curriz, J. The question at issue on this appeal is whether
the filing fees due for filing the 1954 amendment to plaintiff's
charter converting its common capital stock from shares hav-
ing a par value of $100 each to shares having no-par value,
and increasing the number of authorized shares from
2,500,000 to 2,600,000, is determinable under sec. 180.87
(1) (b), Stats. 1953, or sec. 182.214 (2), Stats. 1953. The
former statute provides for a filing fee of 2¢ per share while
the latter statute requires a filing fee of 5¢ per share for
no-par-value capital stock. If sec. 180.87 (1) (b) applies,
then no additional filing fee is due from plaintiff over and
above the $10 required for filing any amendment to articles
of a business corporation. This is because the previous filing
fee paid by plaintiff as to its 2,500,000 shares of common
par-value stock was more than sufficient to cover the fees
due for the new capitalization set forth in the amendment.

The present controversy between the parties arises over
the enactment by the 1951 legislature of the new business
corporation code entitled the “Wisconsin Business Corpo-
ration Law.” For a brief history of the enactment of this
business corporation code see Strong v. Fromm Laboratories
(1956), 273 Wis. 159, 77 N. W. (2d) 389.

Prior to the enactment of such new code the filing fees
due the secretary of state for filing both original articles and
amendments thereto of business corporations, having par-
value capital stock, were prescribed by sec. 182.002, Stats.,
while such filing fees for business corporations having no-
par-value capital stock were set forth in sec. 182.214 (2).
Ch. 190, Stats. 1953, covers the organization and manage-
ment of railroad corporations, and sec. 190.01 (2) provides
that the fees for filing the articles and amendments thereto
of railroad corporations “shall be as provided in section

‘ss
Td

182.002.” While the plaintiff was incorporated by special
act of the legislature the provisions of ch. ‘190, Stats. 1953,
were applicable to it. State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Northern Pacific R. Co. (1914), 157 Wis. 73, 147 N. W.
219,

For many years prior to the enactment of the new busi-
ness corporation code in 1951 the secretary of state had ruled
that filing fees for original articles, or amendments thereto,
of railroad corporations providing for no-par-value capital
stock were governed by sec. 182.214 (2), Stats., because
sec. 182.002 covered merely par-value stock and not no-par-
value stock. Such administrative interpretation was based
upon the following grounds: (1) Sec. 182.214 was the only
statute covering no-par-value stock, and (2) sec. 190.02
provided that “Every public railroad corporation shall have
the powers conferred on corporations in ch. 182... .” The
attorney general argues that such administrative interpreta-
tion by the secretary of state extending over many years is
conclusive of the present controversy. However, when the
1951 legislature enacted the new business corporation code
it expressly specified in sec. 180.87 thereof the filing fees
due for filing articles of incorporation, and amendments there-
to, of business corporations having no-par-value common
stock. Furthermore, sec. 180.97 of such new code provided
as follows:

“After June 30, 1953, chapter 180 shall apply to all
domestic corporations with capital stock, regardless of when
they were organized and whether for profit or not, but any
domestic corporation organized under provisions other than
those in chapters 180 and 182 and corresponding prior gen-
eral corporation laws shall be subject to chapter 180 only to
the extent that it is not inconsistent with such provisions.”

Because the new corporation code as set forth in ch. 180,
Stats. 1951, was not to be effective until June 30, 1953, it
was necessary for the 1951 legislature to continue ch. 182 in

a ee 483
Pd

effect to that date, which it did. However, the 1951 legis-
lature enacted sec. 182.23 (4), which read: “After chap-
ter 180 has become applicable to any corporation, this
chapter shall not be applicable to such corporation except
as provided in subsection (3).” The exceptions provided
in sub. (3) of sec, 182.23, Stats. 1951, are not material to
the instant controversy.

The 1953 legislature again looked to the bar association
committees which had drafted the original business corpora-
tion code for recommendations as to needed changes in the
code. Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, supra. Included
among such recommendations was the following:

“.. . the retention of chapter 182 of the 1951 statutes
for another two years so as to permit its use by nonstock
corporations, and to permit further study by the revisor of
statutes to determine what parts thereof should be repealed
as obsolete, or should be transferred to other chapters of
the statutes or otherwise retained in some form.”

The 1953 legislature followed such recommendation and
continued ch. 182, Stats., in effect. However, such legis-
lative history clearly demonstrates that ch. 182 was not
continued in effect for any purpose having to do with rail-
road corporations. .

In view of the changes enacted by the 1951 and 1953 legis-
latures, the prior administrative interpretation by the secre-
tary of state, that the provisions of sec. 182.214 (2), Stats.,
should govern the filing fees to be exacted from railroad
corporations having a capital structure consisting of no-par-
value stock, is no longer applicable.

The attorney general invokes our attention to the provi-
sions of sec. 190.01 (3), Stats. 1953, which had originally
been enacted in 1941. This section provides for a 5¢ per
share filing fee for filing the articles, or amendments thereto,
of a railroad corporation organized to take over the property
ofa railroad sold in judicial proceedings, or of one organized

484

in reorganization proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.
We consider the failure of the 1951 and 1953 legislatures
to amend this statute so as to provide a 2¢ per share filing
fee is more consistent with the theory of legislative oversight
than with the hypothesis that the legislature intended to have
the filing fees prescribed by sec. 182.214 (2), Stats. 1951
and 1953, retained so as to be applicable to railroad corpora-
tions.

It is our conclusion that the learned trial court correctly
interpreted the legislative intent, and that the judgment be-
low must be affirmed.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

Esrate of Hoyt: First Nationa BANK in OsHKOSH,
Trustee, and others, Respondents, vs. MicHaEL and
another, Appellants.

March 7—April 9, 1957,

io]
+

| es 489
es

For the appellants there was a brief by Keefe, Patri,
Stillman & Nolam, and oral argument by William E. Crane,
all of Oshkosh.

For the respondents there was a brief by Thompson &
McCarthy of Oshkosh, for the Ladies Benevolent Society of
Oshkosh, by Barnard & Allen of Oshkosh, for the Oshkosh
Campfire Girls, by Williams, Williams & Meyer of Oshkosh,
for the Twin Lakes Council Boy Scouts of America, by
William Gengler of Oshkosh, for the Crippled Children’s
Auxiliary, now the Curative Workshop of Oshkosh, Inc., and
by D. E. McDonald of Oshkosh, for the Elizabeth Batchelder
Davis Children’s Home, and oral argument by Mr. Harry
E, Meyer and Mr. Gengler.

Srernte, J. Appellants’ principal contentions are that:
(1) The bequest of the annual payments in monthly instal-
ments to testator’s aunt, Sarah E. MacAllister, under the
terms of the Fifth paragraph of the will is an annuity and a
legacy; (2) the only period of limitation contained in the
express words of the testator’s will as to the payments to be
made under the trust, is the period of the life of the testator’s
sister, Blanche E. Hoyt; and (3) that since the annuity is
for the period of the life of another, to wit, testator’s sister,
the antilapse statute, sec. 238.13, is applicable, and hence the
appellants, as children of the deceased annuitant and legatee,

$50

Sarah E. MacAllister, are entitled to the share bequeathed to
their mother with the right to payment thereunder to con-
tinue in them until the death of the testator’s sister, Blanche
E. Hoyt.

It is the position of the respondents that: (1) The will
clearly evidences an intent to limit the annuity to the life of
the aunt, Sarah E. MacAllister, and because she predeceased
the testator, the annuity terminated upon the death of said
aunt, and the fund out of which it was created became a
part of the corpus of the trust to which respondents are
entitled upon the death of testator’s sister, Blanche E. Hoyt;
(2) that the will does not evince an intent that the annuity
shall continue during the lifetime of the testator’s sister;
(3) that under the antilapse statute, sec. 238.13, the appel-
lants, as children of the annuitant, Sarah E. MacAlister,
would have taken the annuity bequeathed to their mother
had such annuity not been for her lifetime, but had it con-
tinued beyond that period providing no different disposition
of the annuity had been intended by the testator. However,
a different disposition was made by the testator.

The gift to the testator’s aunt, Sarah E. MacAllister, under
the trust provided in the Fifth paragraph of the will, was an
annuity. Ordinarily an annuity, if unlimited as to time, is
presumably (apart from other indications of intention) in-
tended to continue during the life of the annuitant. 2 Am.
Jur., Annuities, p. 821, sec. 8. A simple annuity generally
ceases with the life of the annuitant when no time is limited
for its duration. 3 C. J. S., Annuities, p. 1378, sec. 3, b, 1.
If the testator does not specify in his will the time for which
the annuity is to be paid, it is then a question of the con-
struction of the whole will for the purpose of determining
testator’s intention. The weight of authority and of sound
reason is that unless it appear otherwise from the context, the
annuity is payable during the life of the beneficiary. The
context may, however, show that the annuity was to last for

r es 491
TS

some time other than the life of the annuitant. 3 Page, Wills
(lifetime ed.), pp. 481, 482, sec. 1174.

If there is no evidence of an intention to the contrary, the
general rule is that where an annuity is given to a named
person, to terminate at a stated time, it does not cease upon
the death of the annuitant before that time but passes to
his estate during the remainder of the period. See Anno.
112 A. L, R. 582. It has frequently been held that where a
will provided for the payment of an annuity to a named
beneficiary during the life of a third person, the death of the
annuitant before that of the cestui que vie did not terminate
the annuity, but that the payments thereafter accruing should
have been made to the beneficiary's personal representatives.
See Anno. 112 A. L. R. 582.

By express language the will provides for an annuity for
the aunt only. Absent is any statement of duration of the
annuity. The aunt’s heirs or descendants are not designated
as recipients of the annuity. That the testator could validly
have designated the aunt’s heirs or descendants as recipients
of the annuity upon her death, cannot be gainsaid. Under
the rules noted above, the annuity expired upon the aunt’s
death unless it can be determined from provisions in the will
that it was to cease upon the happening of some event oc-
curring after her death. The appellants’ contention that the
annuity to testator’s aunt was to continue until the death
of his sister is based on considerations (a) that the trust
created by the Fifth paragraph of the will does not expire
until the death of testator’s sister; (b) that the language of
the Fifth paragraph of the will which follows immediately the
gift of the annuity to the aunt, limits the payment of the net
income of the trust provided for the sister to a period “during
the term of her natural life,” whereas, the annuity to the
aunt is not limited by express language as to duration, and
that hence it is to be assumed that the annuity to the aunt
did not terminate until every provision of the trust in para-

9. es

graph Fifth of the will expired, and (c) that the testator by
his codicil ratified and confirmed the arrangement for the
aunt under the will, notwithstanding that he had knowledge
of the aunt’s death when the codicil was executed.

The fact that the sister’s interest under the Fifth paragraph
of the will is limited to the period of her own life does not in
itself limit or extend the duration of the annuity to the aunt.
Since the will is silent as to the duration of the annuity to the
aunt, it follows as a matter of law that the same terminated
upon the death of the aunt. Thus, under the will the aunt was
given an interest in the estate for the duration of her own
life. Such life estate cannot be extended by provisions of the
antilapse statute, sec. 238.13, which in part reads:

“When a devise or legacy shall be made to any .. . or
other relation of the testator and the devisee or legatee shall
die before the testator, leaving issue who shall survive the
testator, such issue shall take the estate so given by the will
in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have
done if he had survived the testator unless a different dis-
position shall be made or directed by the will.”

There is no indication in the will itself that the testator
intended that payment of the annuity to his aunt was to be
related to the period of the life of his sister. Nor is such
intention manifest from the circumstances that surrounded
the testator when the will was made.

The trial court correctly determined that had the aunt
outlived the sister, she would have been entitled to the an-
nuity until her own death. Paragraph Fourth of the will
provides that in the event that the sister did not survive the
testator, her one-third share of the residue of the estate was
to be added to the corpus of the trust from which the annuity
payments to the aunt were to be made. Such arrangement
in itself indicates that the annuity to the aunt was not to
terminate upon the death of the sister. Manifestly the only
purpose in having the trust continued under such circum-

| be 493
Le

stances would be to provide the annuity for the aunt. From
the language of the will and the circumstances of the testator
when he executed it, the trial court determined that the
testator had intended to provide the aunt with an annual
income of $1,500 from the corpus of the trust as long as she
lived; that he further intended that the income from any
balance of such corpus plus any unused part of the corpus
as might be necessary in the discretion of the trustee, be used
for the sister during her lifetime, and that upon her death
the remainder of the corpus and undistributed income was to
be divided equally amongst the respondent charitable organ-
izations. The trial court also determined that a lapse would
not occur in view of the bequest to the several organizations
of the balance of the corpus of the trust fund and the un-
distributed income.

With reference to appellants’ contention that by ratifying
and confirming under the codicil that provision of the will
relating to the annuity for the aunt when aware of her demise
previously, the testator thereby intended the duration of the
annuity payments to be for the life of the testator’s sister, the
court noted that:

“What the testator had in mind at the time he made the
codicil to his will cannot ever be definitely established. What
conversation he may have had, if any, with the scrivener
will never be established since the scrivener too is now dead.
It may be presumed that the testator either thought or was
advised, or both, that since the aunt was dead that that
provision as to her was no longer in effect. It can further
be argued that had he wanted the children of the aunt to
receive that portion of his legacy bequeathed to the aunt he
could have so stated in either the will, or the codicil made
after the aunt’s death.”

Such observation is clearly compatible with the established
principle as set forth with citation in 2 Page, Wills (lifetime
ed.), pp. 30, 31, sec. 556:

SI eee
eT

“Tf a devisee or legatee has died after the will is made, and
the gift would lapse for that reason, a subsequent codicil
which brings the will down to date does not prevent lapse,
and does not cause the gift to pass to the heirs or issue of the
deceased devisee or legatee. On the other hand, if a devisee
or legatee has died before testator leaving issue to whom such
gift will pass under the statute which prevents lapse, a sub-
sequent codicil prima facie leaves the legacies and devises of
the same legal force and effect as they were before the codicil.”

The trial court’s decision as to the issues above discussed,
was not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.

Sec. 238.13, Stats., was enacted to remedy inequities of
the common law and to provide for lineal descendants of a
devisee or legatee the benefits which their parents would have
derived had not death intervened. It was not designed, how-
ever, to nullify the right of a testator to select the objects of -
his bounty. In determining the nature of an estate created
by will, the will itself is to be first consulted, and afterwards
the statute. The operations should not be reversed. The aid
of the statute cannot be invoked where the intent of the will
is manifest. The statute is ineffective when a different dis-
position shall be made or is directed by the will. See Estate
of Stewart (1955), 270 Wis. 610, 612, 613, 72 N. W. (2d)
334. The purpose of the antilapse statute is to prevent a
lapse, and is not designed to have any further effect. Estate
of Hoermann (1940), 234 Wis. 130, 134, 290 N. W. 608.

Since, as clearly appears, it was the intention of the testa-
tor that the annuity to the aunt would terminate upon her
death, and further, since the will specifically provided that
the trust fund was to pass to the charitable organizations with
a vested interest in it, postponed in the use and enjoyment
thereof only during the lifetime of the sister, the trial court
properly did not invoke the aid of the antilapse statute in an
attempt to ascertain an intent different from that manifested
by the testator in his will and from the circumstances sur-

| 495

rounding him when he executed the will, in order to prevent

the annuity from lapsing, and to preserve it for the issue
of the annuitant.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

PatrENcE and others, Respondents, vs. WacNER Iron
Works, Appellant.

March 7—April 9, 1957.

8g 7
g

os

CE
For the appellant there were briefs by Morris Karon and
Karon & Weinberg, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument
by Morris Karon,
For the respondents there was a brief by Max Raskin, and

oral argument by Mr. Raskin and by Mr. Leonard S.
Zubrensky, both of Milwaukee.

Wrncert, J. 1. The plaintiffs’ action is not barred by
the fact that the asserted right to vacation pay arises under
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract to which the
plaintiffs are not parties. The weight of authority, and the
trend of the more-recent cases, permits an individual em-
ployee to maintain an action to enforce provisions of a
collective-bargaining contract which are for his individual
benefit, as contrasted with provisions which are for the
benefit of the union. See Anno. 18 A. L. R. (2d) 361, 365;
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 348 U. S. 437,
460, 75 Sup. Ct. 489, 99 L. Ed. 510; Hudak v. Hornell
Industries, 304 N. Y. 207, 214, 106 N. E. (2d) 609; 31
Am. Jur., Labor, p. 880, sec. 119, and 1956 cumulative
supplement, p. 112, sec. 119. In the present case we need go
no further than to hold that the employee may sue on a
specific money claim which has accrued to him under the
terms of the collective-bargaining contract.

The provisions of the contract for vacation pay are clearly
for the benefit of the individual employees rather than for
that of the union as such. In the absence of something in the
contract to the contrary, vacation pay is in the nature of
additional compensation for services rendered. In re Wil-
Low Cafeterias (2d Cir.), 111 Fed. (2d) 429, 432, and
see Anno. 30 A. L. R. (2d) 352. An action by individual
employees to recover vacation pay provided by a collective-

| ae 499

bargaining contract was entertained on the merits without
question in Skibb v. J. I. Case Co. 255 Wis. 447, 39 N. W.
(2d) 367.

2. In- such a case it is not necessary that the union be
joined as a party to the action. In legal effect the employee
sues on his individual contract of hire, into which the
applicable terms of the collective-bargaining contract which
are for his benefit are imported by law. See J. J. Case Co.
v. National L. R. Board, 321 U. S. 332, 335, 336, 64 Sup.
Ct. 576, 88 L. Ed. 762.

3. The action is not barred or subject to abatement because
of failure to exhaust, or even invoke, the grievance and
arbitration procedure set up by the collective-bargaining
contract.

We may assume for present purposes, without deciding,
that the company’s refusal to pay vacation pay to the plain-
tiffs constituted a grievance within the meaning of the con-
tract, and that the facts that the contract terminated on July
1st and that plaintiffs had ceased to be employees would not
have barred them from access to the grievance procedure
specified by the contract.

The contract is explicit that where available the grievance
procedure “shall be the sole means of disposing of griev-
ances.” Nevertheless we consider that in the special circum-
stance of the present case, plaintiffs were not bound to invoke
the grievance procedure or arbitration in lieu of an action
at law.

The contractual grievance procedure consisted of three
steps before arbitration. The first step specified an effort
to settle the grievance by the complaining employee, the shop
steward and the “squad leader” or foreman. The second
and third steps required conferences between union repre-
sentatives and company representatives, to which the com-
plainant was not made a necessary party. Obviously the
union would dominate those proceedings on the complain-

500

ant’s side, it doubtless having been contemplated that in the
normal case the union would act as the employees’ agent and
advocate.

We do not construe the contract or the law as requiring
an individual employee to invoke this grievance procedure to
assert an accrued pecuniary claim in circumstances where it
is reasonably apparent that the union is hostile to him and
will not give him adequate representation. To do so would
place the employee’s accrued rights against his employer more
or less at the mercy of an unfriendly union. Both congress
and the Wisconsin legislature have shown solicitude to pro-
tect employees from such consequences, by the provisions
of the 1947 Federal Labor Management Act, 61 U. S. Stats.
at L., p. 143, sec. 9 (a), and the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act, sec. 111.05 (1), that any individual employee
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to the
employer. See discussion and authorities cited in Lenhoff,
The Effect of Arbitration Clauses upon the Individual, 9
Arbitration Journal, 3, and Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley,
325 U.S. 711, 733, 736, 65 Sup. Ct. 1282, 89 L. Ed. 1886.

Here the plaintiffs were CIO sympathizers, engaged in a
revolt against the AFL union. They were striking in sympa-
thy with some of their leaders in the CIO faction, who had
been discharged earlier. They were notified by the AFL
union on June 20th that if they did not go back to work,
the company would be justified in permanently replacing
them. The union business agent testified that he had in-
structions from the president and board members of the
union to refuse to arbitrate the differences between the
management and the discharged leaders. The AFL union
did nothing to represent the strikers in any grievance or
arbitration growing out of their discharges. It was war
between the unions, and from the AFL union’s standpoint,
and that of the company, plaintiffs were with the enemy.
Plaintiffs could reasonably believe that no sympathy or

a a 501
P|

help could be expected from either the AFL union or the
company.

In a proceeding arising out of this same interunion fight,
the national labor relations board held that the dis-
charge of the present plaintiffs was an unfair labor practice
and the company was ordered to reinstate them with back
pay. The board also held the AFL union guilty of the unfair
labor practice of coercing employees and contributing to
the employer’s discharge of two of the plaintiff leaders of
the movement to the CIO union.

The court of appeals of the Seventh federal circuit sus-
tained the board’s findings on these matters and entered
judgment enforcing its orders against the employer and the
AFL union, National L. R. Board v. Wagner Iron Works
(7th Cir.), 220 Fed, (2d) 126. The court made the follow-
ing comments pertinent to the present case (pp. 136, 137):

“Failure of the McMahons, Gould, and Steffes, to arbitrate
the question of the validity of their discharges can be of no
avail to the company. As the procedures of the contract
including arbitration were set up in the agreement with
AFL, it is extremely doubtful that that union would object
seriously to the discharge of CIO adherents, in the course
of an all out battle between two unions for representation.

” ““Substantial evidence on the record as a whole adequately
supports the findings that the company supported and fostered
AFL.”

Following the provisions for attempted settlement of
grievances between union and company representatives, the
contract provided that any dispute not satisfactorily settled
in accordance with the first three steps “shall, upon the
written request of either party to this agreement” be sub-
mitted to arbitration. The individual employee was not a
party to the contract and hence arbitration was not available
to him unless either union or company requested it. The
company did not seek to arbitrate. The trial court found

502

as a fact “that a request for arbitration by the plaintiffs, or
any one thereof, would have been unavailing.” The finding
has support in the evidence.

Since plaintiffs had abundant reason for not invoking
the grievance procedure, because of the union attitude, and
since they could not demand arbitration as a matter of right,
it follows that their court action was not barred or subject
to abatement by their omissions in those respects.

In a recent New York case, a wrongfully discharged
employee was permitted to sue the company at law for breach
of a provision of a collective-bargaining contract in his
favor without recourse to arbitration as provided by the con-
tract, where the union did not champion his cause and had
no dispute with the employer, and where as here the in-
dividual employee could not demand arbitration as a matter
of right. Hudak v. Hornell Industries, 304 N. Y. 207, 214,
106 N. E. (2d) 609.

We intimate no opinion as to whether the plaintiffs’ action
would have been barred or subject to abatement by reason
of failure to invoke grievance and arbitration procedures if
there had been no reason to doubt that the union would repre-
sent them zealously in the advocacy of their claims.

4. We come now to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim for
vacation pay. One of the contractual conditions of eligibility
for vacation pay was that the employee must have been “in
the continuous service of the company for at least twelve
months next prior to June Ist, the eligibility date.” All
but four of the plaintiffs clearly met this test. Plaintiff Gust
Gould was discharged on May 28, 1951, but his discharge
was held unlawful by the national labor relations board,
and by the court of appeals on review of the board’s findings.
As those tribunals had jurisdiction of the subject matter
under applicable federal law, the trial court properly held
that Gould’s discharge did not prevent him from becoming

| SS 503

eligible for vacation pay on June Ist. See Zwolanek v.
Baker Mfg. Co. 150 Wis. 517, 525, 137 N. W. 769.

The trial court found as facts that plaintiffs Roy Mc-
Mahon, Roger Kearns, and David Perry were hired on
June 6, 12, and 26, 1950, respectively. Hence, apparently,
they had not been in the continuous service of the company
for at least twelve months next prior to June 1, 1951, and
did not meet that requirement of eligibility for vacation pay.
As to them the judgment must be reversed as not sup-
ported by the findings; but since appellant did not challenge
the eligibility of these three men on that ground, in either
its brief or argument, and there may conceivably be some-
thing in the record to vindicate their claim of eligibility
which we have overlooked, we shall remand their cases to
the trial court for appropriate disposition without an abso-
lute direction to dismiss the complaint as to them.

Appellant contends that plaintiffs violated the no-strike
clause of the collective-bargaining contract by going on
strike, that therefore they were discharged for good cause,
and that since their claim is founded on the same contract,
their breach of contract forfeited their right to vacation pay.
We think a sufficient answer to that contention is provided
by section 17 (E) of the contract, which provided that “any
person who has become eligible for a vacation . . . shall be
entitled to receive his or her vacation pay, if at any time
before receiving the vacation or pay, his or her employment’
relations with the company have been severed for any rea-
son.” All of the plaintiffs except the three hired after June 1,
1950, had become entitled to vacation pay on June 1, 1951,
and hence were entitled by explicit terms of the contract to
receive such pay, regardless of the reason for which they
were discharged.

The appropriate federal tribunals have held that since
the strike was motivated by the company’s unfair labor

506

practices it was not a breach of the no-strike clause of the
contract. National L. R. Board v. Wagner Iron Works (7th
Cir.), 220 Fed. (2d) 126, 140, 141. In the light of provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act applicable to
this industrial unit, the United States supreme court has
construed a comparable no-strike clause in a collective-
bargaining contract as not waiving the right of employees
to strike solely against unfair labor practices of their em-
ployer. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National L. R. Board, 350
U. S. 270, 279-284, 76 Sup. Ct. 349, 100 L. Ed. 309.

In the circumstances, we consider that plaintiffs did not
forfeit vacation pay for which they had already become
eligible, by going on strike.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed with respect to all
of the plaintiffs but Roy McMahon, Roger Kearns, and
David Perry. As to them, the judgment is reversed, and
the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Appellants shall pay the costs in this court.

Massacuusetts Bonpine & Insurance Company and an-
other, Appellants, vs. InpusTriaL Commission and
another, Respondents.

March 8—April 9, 1957.

a Le 509

For the appellants the cause was submitted on the brief
of Brennan, Brennan & Brennan of Milwaukee.
For the respondent Industrial Commission there was

a brief by the Attorney General and Mortimer Levitan, as-
sistant attorney general, and oral argument by Mr. Levitan.

Faircuitp, J. The award which appellants challenge was
made under sec. 102.61, Wis. Stats., which provides in part:

“An employee who is entitled to receive and has received
compensation pursuant to this chapter, and who is entitled
to and is receiving instructions pursuant to the provisions
of the act of congress known as the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act, and amendments thereto (Public Law 113-78th
Congress) as administered by the state in which he holds resi-
dence or in which he resided at the time of becoming phys-
ically handicapped, shall, in addition to his other indemnity,
be paid his actual and necessary expenses of travel and, if
he receives such instructions elsewhere than at the place of
his residence, his actual and necessary costs of maintenance,
during rehabilitation, subject to the following conditions
and limitations: . . .

“(3) He may not have expenses of travel and costs of
maintenance on account of training for a period in excess of
forty weeks in all. .

‘10

“(4) The commission shall determine the rights and lia-
bilities of the parties under this section in like manner and
with like effect as it does other issues under compensation.”

It is clear that Klees was entitled to workmen’s compensa-
tion and received it; and that at the time of the hearing
his tuition at the university was being paid by the state board
of vocational and adult education. If he is entitled to that
benefit under the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act
(29 USCA, secs. 31 to 42), it will follow from the provi-
sions of sec. 102.61, Wis. Stats., that expense of travel and
costs of maintenance up to forty weeks must be paid by his
employer and insurer. Appellants point out that Klees has
been gainfully employed during several periods since his
injury. They argue that he is not entitled to the type of:
education he is being furnished because he is not so in-
capacitated as to be unfit to engage in a remunerative occu-
pation. In essence they dispute the interpretation placed upon
the federal act by the state board in considering that Klees
is entitled to aid.

The federal act (29 USCA, sec. 31) makes an appropria-
tion: “For the purpose of assisting the states in rehabilitating
physically handicapped individuals so that they may prepare
for and engage in remunerative employment to the extent of
their capabilities, thereby increasing not only their social
and economic well-being but also the productive capacity of
the Nation.” Sec. 32 provides for allotment of money to
states for expenditure under an approved plan. Sec. 35 pro-
vides for the approval of a state plan for vocational-rehabili-
tation services by the secretary of health, education, and
welfare if the plan meets specific requirements. Sec. 41
defines the term, “vocational rehabilitation services” so as
to include, among other things, “training . . . for physically
handicapped individuals.” The term “physically handicapped
individual” is defined as “any individual who is under a
physical or mental disability which constitutes a substantial

Ce) sil

handicap to employment, but which is of such a nature that
vocational-rehabilitation services may reasonably be expected
to render him fit to engage in a remunerative occupation.”

Sec. 41.71, Wis. Stats. 1953, is designated the Rehabilita-
tion Law. By it the state accepts the benefits of the federal
act and authorizes the state board to co-operate with the
federal agency in carrying out the purposes of the federal act.
“Handicapped person” is defined in sub. (3) (a) as “any
person who, by reason of a physical or mental defect or in-
firmity, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury,
or disease, is or may be expected to be totally or partially
incapacitated for remunerative occupation, and who may
reasonably be expected to be fit to engage in a remunerative
occupation after receiving vocational-rehabilitation service.”
The board is required to acquaint handicapped persons with
rehabilitation facilities and counsel them regarding the selec-
tion of a suitable location and prescribe such training as may
be necessary to insure their vocational rehabilitation.

The question which arises at the outset is the scope of any
review by the Industrial Commission (acting under sec.
102.61, Wis. Stats.) of the action of the state board in fur-
nishing Klees with tuition for university training. It must
be presumed that the state board, before spending public
funds for that purpose, concluded that such action was au-
thorized by the federal and state rehabilitation laws and the
state plan, The duty of administering those laws has been
imposed on the state board. Necessarily the performance of
that duty involves the interpretation of those laws. The,
Industrial Commission has not been given any general power
to review the acts of the state board. If, under sec. 102.61,
it should determine that Klees, who is receiving benefits, is
not entitled to them, it would be determining that the state
board, another administrative agency, was making an un-
authorized expenditure of public funds. Such a determination
would not under the statutes have any legal effect upon the

2. es
ee

continued expenditure by the state board but would only have
the effect of relieving the employer of the obligation to pro-
vide the expense of travel and maintenance for forty weeks.

Under these circumstances it does not seem that the
legislature intended to give the Industrial Commission any
power to interpret the rehabilitation laws. We conclude that
any power of review given to the Industrial Commission is
limited. Unless it is shown before the commission that
highly material facts were misrepresented to or withheld from
the state board or that the state board has applied an inter-
pretation of the rehabilitation laws which is entirely outside
the reasonable scope of interpretation and hence a clear
abuse of administrative power, the Industrial Commission
must find that any applicant who is receiving aid from the
state board is also entitled to it.

One in appellants’ position does not have the right to
a hearing before the state board, but has had a hearing before
the Industrial Commission on the occurrence of the injury
and other facts making him liable for payment of compensa-
tion. He must accept the further liability for travel and
maintenance in connection with a rehabilitation program on
which the state board is willing to spend public funds unless
he can demonstrate at the hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission that there has been fraud or the type of abuse of
power above referred to.

There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that
the state board was not apprised of all material facts. As
‘previously stated, the challenge made by appellants goes to”
the interpretation by the state board of the rehabilitation
laws. This interpretation is more liberal in favor of appli-
cants whose capacities for employment have been only im-
paired than the appellants think proper. We cannot say,
however, that this interpretation is so clearly wrong that
Klees is not entitled to the aid which the state board is
furnishing him. Accordingly the award by the Industrial

ee) 513

Commission was properly confirmed by the circuit court and
the judgment must be affirmed.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

SrEINLE, J. (concurring). While agreeing that the judg-
ment must be affirmed, I am not able to concur in the view
that the Industrial Commission is bound by the determina-
tion of the state vocational board that the employee, Bernard
Klees, is a handicapped person entitled to the vocational-
rehabilitation training, and that when proof of the state
vocational board’s determination with respect to such matter
was presented to the commission, there could be no challenge
of it except for misrepresentation or fraud. Further, I
cannot agree that when the Industrial Commission had proof
before it of the vocational board’s determination, the Indus-
trial Commission was obliged as a matter of course to direct
the employer or his insurer to pay the employee’s expenses
of travel and maintenance on account of training for a period
of forty weeks.

In my opinion the trial court correctly held that it was
the duty of the Industrial Commission to make its own de-
termination as to whether the employee was a “handicapped
person” entitled to vocational rehabilitation. It seems clear
that under sec, 102.61 (4) and (3), Wis. Stats., it was
the duty of the Industrial Commission also to determine the
period for which the expenses of travel and costs of mainte-
nance were to be paid.

The trial court’s analysis of the duty and right of the
Industrial Commission to determine whether the employee
was entitled to the vocational-rehabilitation training, is in
part as follows:

“As to whether or not Klees was entitled to take a re-
habilitative course in probation and parole, we agree with
plaintiffs that this is a question of fact to be determined by
the commission. Sec. 102.61 (4) provides: ‘The commission

5 es
ee

shall determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under
this section in like manner and with like effect as it does other
issues under compensation.’ Admittedly, the commission does
not determine an employee’s rights with respect to the train-
ing itself, cost and payment therefor. That is done by the
state vocational board pursuant to sec. 41.71. However,
when it comes to the travel and maintenance expenses pro-
vided for in 102.61, the commission must then make the
finding of entitlement supported by credible evidence as pro-
vided in 102.61 (4) (supra).

“After all, the employer is not liable for the expenses
of the actual training program under 41.71—only travel
and maintenance costs under 102.61. As to such expenses
he is entitled to a proper finding by the commission based
on credible evidence. The employer cannot be bound by
the determination of the state board at a proceeding where
no notice of which was given the employer and from which
employer has no right to seek a review.

“Tt is the opinion of this court that the simple issue here
presented is as follows:

“Is there any credible evidence in this record to support
the commission’s finding that Klees was entitled to rehabilita-
tion treatment under 41.71 and therefore entitled to travel
and maintenance expenses under 102.61? I£ so, this court
is bound by such finding. Gallenberg v. Industrial Comm.
(1955), 269 Wis. 40, 43 [68 N. W. (2d) 550]; Giant
Grip Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm, (1956), 271 Wis. 583,
585 [74.N. W. (2d) 182]... .

“As previously indicated, we feel that plaintiffs are not
bound by the determination of the state vocational board
that Klees was entitled to vocational-rehabilitative training.
Such a finding is mere hearsay in so far as it affects the
rights of the plaintiffs in this proceeding. However, we
fee] there is ample credible evidence in the record to support,
independently of any determination by the state vocational

a ee 515

board, a finding that Klees was a handicapped person within
the meaning of sec. 41.71 (3) (a).”

To require an employer or his insurer to pay an employee’s
expenses of travel and costs of maintenance on account of
vocational training, without affording notice and a hearing
to such employer to challenge the alleged handicapped status
of the employee and the reasonable need for such training,
and his entitlement thereto, would, in my opinion, present
a serious question of deprivation of property of such employer
or insurer without due process of law in violation of sec. 1,
art. XIV of the United States constitution. We should not
adopt a construction of sec. 102.61, Stats., which gives rise
to serious doubt of its constitutionality where, as is the
case here, a different construction which will avoid such
doubt, is permissible under the terms of the statute. Swanke
v. Oneida County (1953), 265 Wis. 92, 99, 60 N. W. (2d)
756, 62 N. W. (2d) 7.

Since the Industrial Commission made an express finding
on sufficient evidence that the employee Klees “is entitled to
and is receiving instructions pursuant to the provisions of
the act of congress,” the question discussed by the majority
as to the binding effect of the state vocational board’s deter-
mination of eligibility is not necessary to the decision of this
appeal. In my opinion, therefore, we ought not to pass on
the question at this time.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Broaproor and
Mr. Justice WincERT join in this concurring opinion.

Norruwest Bank & Trust Company, Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, vs. Mrwor (Luther F.), Defendant: Mrvor
(Yvonne A.), Impleaded Defendant and Respondent.

March 8—April 9, 1957.

| ae 517

For the appellant there were briefs by Rice, Rice & Rice
of Sparta, and oral argument by James W. Rice.

For the respondent there was a brief by Donovan, Gleiss,
Goodman, Breitenfield & Gleiss of Sparta, and oral argument
by D. L. Goodman.

Martin, C. J. Luther F. Minor is the owner of a 1952
Ford automobile. He is absent without leave from the
United States army and his whereabouts is unknown. At the
time of the attachment the automobile was in the possession
of the wife and used by her in going to and from her work,
the earnings of which enable her to support herself and her
three minor children. The debtor has made no financial con-
tribution to his family since he has been AWOL.

Sec. 272.18, Stats., so far as material, provides:

“No property hereinafter mentioned shall be liable to
seizure or sale on execution or on any provisional or final
process issued from any court or any proceedings in aid
thereof, except as otherwise specially provided in the stat-
utes: ...

“(6) . . . any automobile used or kept for the purpose of
carrying on the debtor’s trade or business, not exceeding four
hundred dollars in value, . . .”

In the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions all
of the property of a debtor may be subjected to the payment
of his debts. Williams v. Smith (1903), 117 Wis. 142, 93
N. W. 464; Gillette State Bank v. Knaack (1938), 229 Wis.
179, 281 N. W. 913. The right of a debtor to hold his
property free from the claims of creditors is not a common-
jaw right but a right created by constitutions and statutes.
22 Am. Jur., Exemptions, p. 5, sec. 3. As stated in p. 14,
sec. 13:

“.. . the right itself is the creature of express constitu-
tional or statutory provisions, so that in their absence, no

one is entitled to exemptions. It follows that any inquiry

1S

concerning the persons, or classes of persons, who may claim
exemptions in any particular state must be directed to the
constitution and statutes of such state. Unless the debtor
claiming an exemption is one of the persons or classes of
persons therein named, his claim cannot prevail. Nor does
the rule of liberal construction of exemption laws permit a
plain disregard of the legislative mandate by extending ex-
emptions to those not embraced in the acts.” (Emphasis
supplied.)

From a reading of sec. 272.18, Stats., it is evident that
the exemption of the automobile is personal to the debtor.
Sub. (5) creates the exemption for wearing apparel “‘of the
debtor and his family;” sub. (7) for the “provisions for
the debtor and his family;” sub. (9) for sewing machines
“owned by individuals and kept for the use of themselves
or families.” If such had been the intention of the legisla-
ture, it would have framed the language of the automobile
exemption in similar terms, but it did not do so. It may
be that the statute is somewhat outmoded, that changing
times have made the automobile a more important factor in
the wage earning of a wife and family than it was at the time
the section was enacted, but such observations would be
more fruitfully addressed to the legislature than to the court.

There is no showing in the record, and no finding of the
lower court, that the automobile in question was “used or
kept for the purpose of carrying on the debtor’s trade or
business.” The only proof is that the debtor’s wife used the
car in her business. No exemption is afforded her by the
statute. Sec. 272.18 (30), Stats., gives to the wife of a
debtor the right to select, but the selection is limited to
those articles the statutory exemption of which is granted
to the debtor. In the absence of any showing that Luther
Minor was entitled to exemption of the automobile, it cannot
be considered property to which respondent’s right of selec-
tion under sub. (30) applies.

_ De 519

Respondent argues that this court has consistently held
that the exemption laws must be given a liberal construction,
and quotes extensively from Connaughton v. Sands (1873),
32 Wis. 387. The case is not in point, since the section of
the statute there involved was that which exempted the pro-
visions of the “debtor and his family.” Since the debtor was
the adult son of a widowed mother and the sole support of
her and his brothers and sisters, the court held that they
were his family and as head of the family he was entitled
to the exemption. The court pointed out that ordinarily it is
the husband, father, or mother who provides for those con-
stituting the “family” whose care is the obligation of the
debtor ; but where the son and brother had taken that obliga-
tion upon himself, he became, in legal contemplation, the
head of the family.

The distinction between such a case and this is that here
we are dealing with a statutory exemption extended to an
individual, not to a class of persons. Luther Minor is the
only person to whom the statute would grant the exemption
if it were shown that the automobile was used in carrying
on his business. The principles of liberal construction cannot
be employed to extend the exemption to anyone other than
those expressly embraced in the statute. See 22 Am. Jur.,
Exemptions, p. 14, sec. 13, supra.

By the Court.—Order reversed, and cause remanded with
directions to disallow the interpleaded defendant’s claim for
exemption.

Gour (Ernst), Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. SparTe and
others, Defendants: Gour (Carl) and wife, Defendants
and Respondents.

March 8—April 9, 1957.

For the appellant there were briefs by S. P. Rigler of Rice
Lake, and Daniel I. D’ Amico of Cumberland, and oral argu-
ment by Mr. D’Amico.

For the respondents there was a brief and oral argument
by Francis R. Parks of Rice Lake.

_ ee 521
PE

Broaproor, J. This case presents another chapter in an
unfortunate quarrel between two brothers. This is the third
time they have appeared before this court in actions con-
cerning the title to 80 acres of land in Barron county. Our
prior decisions are reported in Beranek v. Gohr, 260 Wis.
282, 50 N. W. (2d) 459, and Gohr v. Beranek, 266 Wis.
605, 64 N. W. (2d) 246. The facts will not be repeated.

The first action was brought to quiet title to the premises
as against Carl Gohr, who counterclaimed and contended
that he was the owner of the premises by virtue of an oral
agreement which had been sufficiently performed to warrant
specific performance. We held that there had been insuf-
ficient performance therefor, leaving title to the premises in
one Beranek subject to Carl Gohr’s mortgage and a second
mortgage to Ernst Gohr.

The second action was to foreclose the second mortgage
given by the Beraneks to Ernst Gohr. Upon remand of the
record in the first case Ernst Gohr, by motion, asked for
leave to try his claim for an accounting for rents and
profits against Carl Gohr. This motion was denied by the
trial court. In the second action, which was brought to fore-
close the Beranek mortgage, there was an attempt to inject
the question of an accounting with Carl Gohr. That relief
was denied and this court affirmed the determination of the
trial court.

In the present action the defendant Carl Gohr sets out the
decisions in the first two cases and alleges as a defense that
because thereof the subject matter of the present action
has been fully adjudicated and that the prior actions are a
bar to the commencement of this action under the doctrine
of res judicata, The order appealed from determined that
the question of accounting for rents and profits was res
judicata, Because of the way in which the issue was pre-
sented in the first two cases the matter of an accounting

es

has become res judicata to the date of the judgment in the
second action, which was September 15, 1953.

Although the defendant Carl Gohr has not so pleaded, it
seems evident that he is a mortgagee in possession. Citizens
Savings & Trust Co. v. Rogers, 162 Wis. 216, 155 N. W.
155; Schwartaburg v. Rahtjen, 227 Wis. 525, 279 N. W.
19; 59 C. J. S., Mortgages, p. 391, sec, 305. If pleaded and
proven, that fact would be a defense to this action in eject-
ment. However, as such mortgagee in possession, it would
be the duty of Carl Gohr to account for the rents and profits.

In order to bring this matter to a final conclusion and to
avoid further litigation we recommend that the following
procedure be followed upon remand of the record: That the
plaintiff amend his complaint so as to permit him to seek a
declaratory judgment under the provisions of sec. 269.56,
Stats. The rights of the plaintiff could then be determined
under the provisions of his deed and the rights of the defend-
ant Carl Gohr could be determined under his mortgage. If
Carl Gohr pleads and proves that he is a mortgagee in
possession, the plaintiff will be entitled to an accounting for
rents and profits from and after September 15, 1953. Since
Carl Gohr will not be required to account for rents and
profits before that date, he will be entitled to interest only
after that date.

By the Court.—That part of the order appealed from is
reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.

ee 523
Le

Ross and another, Appellants, vs, Esrrt and others,
Respondents.* 7

March 8—April 9, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on June 4, 1957.

es 525

For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument
by James W. Dorsey of Milwaukee.

For the respondents there was a brief by Padway, Gold-
berg & Previant, attorneys, and Saul Cooper, David Leo
Uelman, and Hugh Hafer of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and
oral argument by Mr. Uelman and Mr. Hafer.

Brown, J. Appellants’ first contention is that the circuit
court had jurisdiction to order the Bricklayers Union to
admit appellants to membership. For support of this con-
tention they rely principally on sec. 9, art. I, Wis. Const.,
reading as follows:

“Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries, or wrongs which he may ¢eceive in his
person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice

5 es
Ld

freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely
and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably
to the law.”

This constitutional provision has frequently been con-
strued to declare that the wrongs contemplated by this
language are those resulting from an invasion of a party’s
legal right. Not long ago this court so stated in Scholberg
v. Itnyre (1953), 264 Wis. 211, 58 N. W. (2d) 698. Unions
in the past and at present in this state (unless we now decide
differently) are voluntary associations to which members
may be admitted by mutual consent but into which applicants
either by their own efforts or by the aid of the courts cannot
force themselves against the will of those already members.

“Conditions as to Membership—Like other associations,
trade unions may prescribe qualifications for membership.
They may impose such requirements for admission and such
formalities of election as may be deemed fit and proper.
Moreover, they may restrict membership to the original
promoters, or limit the number to be thereafter admitted.
No person has an abstract or absolute right to membership.”
31 Am. Jur., Labor, p. 861, sec. 58.

“Generally—Membership in a voluntary association is a
privilege which may be accorded or withheld, and not a right
which can be gained independently and then enforced. The

* courts cannot compel the admission of an individual into such
an association, and if his application is refused, he is entirely
without legal remedy, no matter how arbitrary or unjust
may be his exclusion. The acceptance of, or intention by the
person in question to accept, membership in an unincorpo-
rated association is necessary to make him a member of the
organization.” 4 Am. Jur., Associations and Clubs, p. 462,
sec. 11.

It may be disadvantageous to an individual not to be
chosen for membership in a voluntary association but the
courts hitherto have been powerless to compel the association
to receive him. His exclusion has not been a wrong of which

a De 527
Ld

the courts have cognizance by virtue of sec. 9, art. I, Wis.
Const.

Appellants, however, have some reason to say that the
Fair Employment Code, secs. 111.31 to 111.36, Stats.,
first enacted in 1945, has altered matters and that exclusion
from a labor union because of the applicant’s color deals him
an injury which the state recognizes as a legal wrong for
which there must be legal redress. The language of the
statute from which appellants strive to draw such a con-
clusion is found in sec. 111.31 (1), thus:

“The practice of denying employment and other oppor-
tunities to, and discriminating against, properly qualified
persons by reason of their race, creed, color, national origin,
or ancestry, is likely to foment domestic strife and unrest,
and substantially and adversely affect the general welfare
of a state by depriving it of the fullest utilization of its
capacities for production. The denial by some employers
and labor unions of employment opportunities to such persons
solely because of their race, creed, color, national origin, or
ancestry, and discrimination against them in employment,
tends to deprive the victims of the earnings which are neces-
sary to maintain a just and decent standard of living, thereby
committing grave injury to them.’ (Our emphasis.)

If ch. 111, Stats., stopped there perhaps appellants might
have something. But it does not; in sec. 111:31 (3), Stats.,
it continues :

“In the interpretation and application of this subchapter,
and otherwise, it is declared to be the public policy of the
state to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable
the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless
of their race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry. All
the provisions of this subchapter shall be liberally construed
for the accomplishment of this purpose.”

Racial discrimination in employment, so far, is not de-
clared to be illegal. It is pronounced undesirable and the
announced public policy of the state is to encourage and

52 ee

foster employment without such discrimination to the fullest
extent practicable. “Encourage and foster;” no slightest
reference to “require” or “compel.” In the matter of racial
discrimination in public accommodations the discrimination
is declared to be illegal and penalties are provided for the
innkeeper, barber, or public carrier, for instance, who dis-
criminates. Sec. 340.75, Stats, (now sec. 942,04). Nothing
of the sort is found in secs. 111.31 to 111.36. Reading secs.
111.31 to 111.36 in their entirety we are unable to find
that the legislature created a new right,—one giving to a
colored applicant an enforceable right to union membership
over the objection, on racial grounds, of the members al-
ready there. But if such right was created we must look to
the statute to see if the remedy or penalty for a violation is
provided. If it is, that remedy is exclusive. State ex rel.
Russell v. Board of Appeals (1947), 250 Wis. 394, 397, 27
N. W. (2d) 378; LeFevre v. Goodland (1945), 247 Wis.
512, 516, 517, 19 N. W. (2d) 884. Where the law gives
a new remedy to meet a new situation, the remedy provided
by the law is exclusive. In re Jeness (1935), 218 Wis. 447,
450, 261 N. W. 415.

So looking, we discover that one believing that he is the
victim of racial discrimination in matters affecting his em-
ployment may apply to the industrial commission which may
then investigate the complaint and give publicity to its
findings. The commission may also make recommendations
to the interested parties. Secs. 111.35, 111.36, Stats. The
complaint alleges that the commission held hearings in this
matter, found that the union, or its responsible officers, the
respondents, had discriminated against appellants because of
their color, and the commission had given publicity thereto
and had recommended to the union that it accept the two
appellants as members. Investigation, publicity, and a com-
mission recommendation are what the statute provides in
consequence of racial discrimination practiced by an em-

r] PO ) 529
~*~”

ployer or a union. Wé grant it is cold comfort to appellants
but it is all the legislature saw fit to provide. Evidently
it was the opinion of that body that the public policy declared
by sec. 111.31 (1) and (3) is better served by peaceful
persuasion and moral pressure than by force for the statute
did not in this code even give the industrial commission the
power to make orders directing compliance with the declared
public policy. The commission may only recommend. We
must conclude, then, that moral force, aroused by the find-
ings, publicity, and recommendations of the commission, is
consistent with the intent of the legislature in this enactment
and compulsion of a union (or of an employer if he is the
discriminator) under a decree of a court, is not.

We are confirmed in this conclusion when we note that
the first enactment ,of sec. 111.31 to sec. 111.36, Stats.,
was by the legislature in 1945. The bill, as introduced
(Senate Bill No. 131, S.), gave power to the industrial
commission to order violators to cease and desist and gave
the courts power to review and to enforce such orders. That
is what appellants ask the court to do now. Before passage
the bill was amended and the powers to order and to enforce
were removed. As so amended the bill was enacted into law.
By Assembly Bill No. 357, A., in 1951 and Assembly Bill
No. 390, A., in 1955 amendments restoring the compulsory
features were introduced in the legislature but both failed
of passage. In the recent “right of privacy case,” Yoeckel v.
Samonig (1956), 272 Wis. 430, 434, 75 N. W. (2d) 925,

we said:

«

. . . particularly because of the refusal of the legislature
at two sessions to recognize even a limited right to protection
against invasion of the right of privacy, we are compelled to
hold again that the right does not exist in this state.”

We are convinced that the legislature purposely denied
enforcement provisions in the Fair Employment Code and

30

for us to restore what the legislature struck out would be
legislation, not interpretation or construction of the statute.
And here there could be no pretense that the court is reading
into the statute something consonant with the intent of the
legislature but left out through inadvertence or lack of fore-
sight. The statute’s history up to the last legislative session
emphasizes that there is more to contend with here than
an inadvertent omission. The principle of compelling com-
pliance with the purpose of the legislation has been three
times intentionally rejected. A clearer declaration of a non-
compulsory public policy is hard to imagine. For the court to
read into the statute that which the legislature has thrice
refused to include would be not only a reversal of the legisla-
tive intent but a gross invasion of the legislative field in
order to do so. a

So far we have considered the issue from the standpoint
of the state constitution and statutes. In addition to alleging
that they have been violated, the complaint alleges that this
discrimination against appellants by the union is a violation
of sec. 1 of the Fourteenth amendment to the constitution
of the United States. The pertinent part of that amendment
is:

“. . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.””

From this language alone it would seem to be clear that
only discrimination by state action is within its contempla-
tion; and the supreme court of the United States has so
interpreted it, saying, in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 334
U.S. 1, 13, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, “ . . the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth amend-
ment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of

the states. That amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” Ap-
pellants’ citations referring to the amendment are Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896), 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41
L. Ed. 536, and Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347
U. S. 483, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873. The former
opinion approved segregation and the latter disapproved it,
but both cases arose from discrimination directed by the
state or its agency. In Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, the United
States supreme court held that the enforcement by a state
court of a covenant between private parties discriminating
against Negroes in the occupancy or ownership of land was
state action denying equal protection of the laws and, hence,
a violation of the Fourteenth amendment. But the court
went on to say, 334 U. S. 1, 13, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed.
1180, “So long as the purposes of those agreements are
effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would
appear clear that there has been no action by the state and
the provisions of the amendment have not been violated.”
The instant complaint does not allege any state action in
aid of the discrimination practiced here. On the contrary,
the state deplores it and through the good offices of its
industrial commission has sought to end it. The state with-
holds no benefits from Negroes which it grants to Caucasians
or others. They are as free as other citizens are to form
labor unions with all the rights and privileges of other labor
unions, and as free, so far as the state is concerned, to join
any existing unions which will have them. The present dis-
crimination is by private persons acting privately. It cannot
fairly be said to be the action of the state and therefore its
practice is not prohibited by the Fourteenth amendment.
Instructive, too, are the words of the United States su-
preme court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
(1944), 323 U. S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173.
The federal Railway Labor Act constituted the Brotherhood

of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, an unincorporated
labor organization, the exclusive bargaining representative
of the whole craft, whether members of the Brotherhood or
not. Many firemen were Negroes. They were not members
of the Brotherhood and by its constitution were not eligible
to membership. The Brotherhood negotiated agreements
with certain railroads which deprived Negroes of employ-
ment and filled their places with white men. The court said,
at page 204, that “While the statute does not deny to such a
bargaining labor organization the right to determine eligi-
bility to its membership,” it does require the union in collec-
tive bargaining to represent nonunion members of the craft
without hostile discrimination. It is noteworthy that the
constitution of the Brotherhood barred Negroes from mem-
bership, yet the court recognized the legal right of a volun-
tary association so to discriminate. In like manner we find
nothing in Wisconsin law denying to a labor union a legal
right to determine the eligibility of its membership, nor can
we find this court charged with a duty, or a right, to compel
such a union to take in applicants who are unacceptable for
any reasons, color among them, and thereby turn voluntary
associations into involuntary ones.

We do not attempt to say what effect the union’s racial
discrimination against the two appellants, as found and
publicized by the industrial commission, in defiance of the
announced public policy of the state, might have in the union’s
enjoyment of rights to state assistance in maintaining statu-
tory benefits given labor organizations. The only question
before us now is what, if any, relief can be given appellants
by the state courts in response to their complaint. We must
reply that the measures already taken by the industrial
commission provide the entire remedy given by law in the
premises and their complaint did not state a cause of action
which the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

| | ee 533
Pd

Faircuitp, J. (dissenting). I respectfully disagree with
the majority.

The crucial question is whether members of a union are
the sole arbiters of those with whom they desire to associate
and can exclude applicants against whom the members have
no grievance except that the applicants belong to a different
race or creed.

The majority of the court consider the union as a volun-
tary association with no more restriction upon its power to
admit or reject applicants than would be imposed on a
group of people associated for purely social or fraternal
purposes.

Tam of the opinion that a difference should be recognized
in this respect between unions and other voluntary associa-
tions and that the courts should give substance to a principle
that members of unions do not have the right to exclude
people from the enjoyment of the benefits of membership
solely on grounds of race or religion. °

We are engaged in a struggle to make equality and free-
dom realities for all Americans. In addition to political
equality, the full availability to everyone of education and
full opportunity for employment to the extent of his capacity
are generally considered the basic essentials in order to erase
from America anything which could be termed “second
class” citizenship.

The disadvantage to an otherwise qualified applicant who
is excluded from membership in a union is clearly substantial.
In the eyes of many people in the community, a stigma
attaches to him because he is nonunion. Unions properly
strive for and often attain for their members advantages in
gaining or retaining employment. Persons indifferent to the
principles of organized labor nevertheless often prefer to
employ union labor because of the attitude of others toward
employers who do not. Of course there are a multitude of
reasons why a union might validly exclude an applicant.

UY

There may be applicants whose conduct or views demonstrate
that they would not be good members. Some applicants will
fail to meet proper objective standards germane to the pur-
poses of the union. In the nature of things, union members
and officers should enjoy wide discretion and presumptions
that they act in good faith. Such latitude should not only
be tolerated but should be protected because it may be
generally assumed that the members of a union act in good
faith to achieve their legitimate purposes. Exclusion of per-
sons from membership solely because of their race cannot,
however, possibly contribute to the advancement of the
legitimate causes of the union. Where an applicant meets
every reasonable standard and is excluded solely because
he is a Negro or belongs to some other racial or religious
group, the injustice done him is obvious and it is great.

To be the butt of social discrimination is unpleasant in
high degree, but to be denied the economic opportunity to
work out one’s destiny as best he can, solely because of a
racial or religious difference, impairs the very substance
of citizenship itself. Perhaps the degree of the impairment
is so great and the character of the rights impaired so funda-
mental that the wrong must be recognized and remedied by
the judicial branch even in the absence of action by the
legislature.

But there is another reason, in any event, for denying
members of a union the right to exclude people of a different
race or creed. Plaintiffs have an unquestioned constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws of this state. Fourteenth
amendment, United States constitution. If it be proved that
defendant union is excluding plaintiffs because of their race,
then the union is denying them the equal protection of the
laws of the state concerning the right of organization and
collective bargaining in employment relations. This is a
wrong which a court of equity ought to prevent.

eS 535
Ld

Ch. 111, subch. I of our statutes, the “Employment Peace
Act,” creates duties and obligations as well as an administra-
tive agency for the purpose of protecting the rights of em-
ployees in the matter of employment relations. It expressly
recognizes the interest of the employee in regular and ade-
quate income and that this right, among others, is largely
dependent upon the maintenance of fair, friendly, and mutu-
ally satisfactory employment relations and the availability
of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of what-
ever controversies may arise. The act expressly recognizes
the importance of voluntary agreement between employer and
employees as to terms and conditions of work and recognizes
the right of an employee to associate with others in organ-
izing and bargaining collectively through representatives of
his own choosing.

The act further makes available to those employees who do
desire to organize, a state agency which has the duty of
protecting them in their activities both in the matter of
organization and collective bargaining. It is implicit that the
protection which is thus made available to employees is
considered by the legislature to be valuable both to the em-
ployees and to the general public. The act provides that
certain activities on the part of employers are unfair and
gives resort to the employment relations board in order to
prevent the continuance of those practices. Granted that
restrictions are also imposed upon employees; that some
or all of these restrictions might not legally exist except for
the act; and that there are vigorous differences of opinion
as to whether a law which imposed fewer of such restrictions
might be more just, nevertheless, it is clear that the right of
individual employees to organize is a substantial and valuable
one and that the laws regulating employment relations have
given greater substance and value to these rights.

Does any voluntary organization of employees enjoying
these rights and the protection of the Employment Peace Act

PEE

6s
Lt

have the right to exclude from the enjoyment of such pro-
tection persons of a different race solely for that reason?
My answer is “No.”

Under the Fourteenth amendment the state must not deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. Obviously the state could not include in its
regulatory laws any provision making Negroes ineligible
for membership in labor unions.

It has now been made clear by the supreme court of the
United States that a state court must not enforce a private
contract to exclude persons from the ownership or enjoyment
of property because of their race. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d)
441; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031,
97 L. Ed. 1586. It seems clearly to follow that if a union
had a constitution which restricted its membership on the
grounds of race the courts could not enforce that restriction.

It may also follow that when a state court denies relief
to persons excluded from the equal protection of the law
by a labor union, such denial is itself a violation of the
Fourteenth amendment. In any event, however, the granting
of relief to plaintiffs by a court would protect their rights
under the Fourteenth amendment and that fact alone is a
sufficient basis for such action by the court.

It may be said that the plaintiffs could form a new union
and that they would then gain for themselves the same legal
rights of the members of defendant union, but the plain facts
of economic life demonstrate that the possibility of so small
a minority forming an effective organization when the de-
fendant is already established in the field is illusory.

As the case now stands it has not been heard upon the
merits. Except for the apparent fact that the industrial
commission was satisfied that the rejection of plaintiffs was
solely by reason of their race, it has not yet been established
with finality that the charges made by the plaintiffs are true.

a a 537
Le

In my opinion the order sustaining the demurrer should be
reversed, and the case sent back for hearing upon the merits.
If it be proved, as charged, that the rejection of plaintiffs
was solely because of their race, defendants should be ordered
to accept plaintiffs into membership. In doing otherwise the
court is permitting (if the charges are true) the present mem-
bers of defendant union to exclude other people, merely be-
cause of their race, from the full protection afforded by our
employment statutes and the agency which administers them.

Hermann and wife, Appellants, vs. Crry or Laxe Mits
and others, Respondents.

March 8—April 9, 1957.

For the appellants there were briefs and oral argument
by Robert Hartman of Juneau, and Horace W. Wilkie of
Madison.

For the respondents there was a brief and oral argument
by H. A. Schmidt, city attorney.

Curr, J. The city having decided that the parcel in
question was no longer needed for park purposes, secs.
62.22 (1) and 62.23 (17) (b), Stats., authorized it to make
sale of such property. In making sale of such parcel, the
council was not required to solicit bids and sell to the highest
bidder, and, therefore, necessarily is vested with considerable
discretion in the matter.

The defendants contend that, if the council acted in good
faith in making the instant sale to the corporation in the
belief that this was in the best interests of the city, such exer-
cise of discretion is beyond the power of the courts to dis-

_ Leer! 541

turb. Inasmuch as such good faith of the council was
asserted in defendants’ affidavits in support of their motion
for summary judgment, and not negatived by any counter-
affidavits or other proof of the plaintiffs, we must assume the
same as a verity upon this appeal. Laughnan v. Griffiths
(1955), 271 Wis. 247, 251, 73 N. W. (2d) 587. While
proof that the council acted in bad faith in making the sale
would be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ cause of action,
it does not necessarily follow that the converse of this is
true, and that plaintifts have failed to make out a case when
it appears that the council acted in good faith.

This brings us to the crucial question on this appeal, viz.,
what are the grounds upon which taxpayers of a city may
successfully attack a sale of municipal property authorized
by vote of the common council? We deem the proper answer
to be that the plaintiff taxpayers must establish illegality,
fraud, or clear abuse of discretion on the part of the govern-
ing board of the municipality, which has authorized the sale,
before a court will void the sale. Quackenbush v. Cheyenne
(1937), 52 Wyo. 146, 70 Pac. (2d) 577; Schatz v. New
England (N. Dak. 1953), 61 N. W. (2d) 423, 428; 64 C. J.
S., Municipal Corporations, p. 958, sec. 2142; and 18 Mc-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), p. 103, sec. 52.38.

It is the plaintiffs’ contention in the instant action that
the common council of the defendant city in effect made a
gift of part of the value of the property it authorized be sold
to the corporation, the underlying motive being to promote
the industrial growth of the city. If on a trial had on the
merits this should be established by proof, then there was
a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the council which
would require voiding of the sale. The law is well established
in this state that a city or village may not make a gift of
municipal property to an industrial corporation for the
purpose of aiding the industrial growth of the community.
Kiel v. Frank Shoe Mfg. Co. (1942), 240 Wis. 594,

es

4N.W. (2d) 117, and Suring v. Suring State Bank (1926),
189 Wis. 400, 207 N. W. 944. It necessarily follows that
a transfer of municipal property to a manufacturing corpora-
tion in return for a payment representing only part of the
fair market value of the property, which is knowingly made
for the purpose of promoting industrial expansion, is equally
beyond the power of the municipality.

However, the consideration to be received by a munici-
pality necessary to support a sale of municipal property does
not have to be money. This is well illustrated by the case of
Schatz v. New England, supra. There only part of the
consideration the city was to receive from the public-utility
corporation, to whom the city agreed to sell its electric public-
utility property, was money, and the other part consisted
of an agreement of the purchaser to extend its natural-gas
mains to the city and construct a natural-gas distribution
system within the city. Such sale was upheld by the North
Dakota court against attack in a taxpayers’ suit. In its
opinion the court stated (61 N. W. (2d) at p. 428):

“|. . the question of the value to the city of the extension
of gas service thereto is one which was peculiarly within
the knowledge of the municipal authorities and the elector-
ate.”

A somewhat parallel situation was before this court in
Gilman v. Northern States Power Co. (1943), 242 Wis.
130, 7 N. W. (2d) 606, but there a decision on the merits
was avoided by grounding the result upon the statute of
limitations.

If in the instant case the affidavits in support of defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment had disclosed a binding
commitment on the part of the purchaser corporation to
devote a portion of the purchased parcel to the continuance
of a municipal parking lot, we would have no hesitancy in
affirming the judgment below. However, such affidavits

a a 543
Le

clearly show that no such binding commitment was obtained.
Thus the purchaser at any time legally could devote the
parking area to some other purpose. Furthermore, it is
apparent from these affidavits that the purchaser did not
intend to extend parking privileges to the general public
but only to its own employees. To provide parking space for
the employees of a specific industry and not the general
public serves a private rather than a public purpose. We,
therefore, do not consider that the facts of the instant case
bring it within the rule of the Schatz v. New England Case.

The defendants urge that the allegations of the complaint
are not sufficient to allege that the parcel being sold had a
greater value than the $4,500 purchase price for which it is
proposed to transfer it to the corporation. The allegations
relied upon by plaintiffs to establish a greater value are:
(1) Original cost plus improvements of $7,579.44; (2) the
Seward appraisal of $8,000; and (3) the plaintiffs’ own offer
to purchase in the sum of $7,500. There can be no doubt
that such allegations were intended for the purpose of
alleging that the parcel had a greater value than the agreed
purchase price of the sale under attack. If defendants deemed
that such allegations failed to allege such greater value, then
they should have entered a general demurrer. As was pointed
out in Fredrickson v. Kabat (1951), 260 Wis. 201, 203,
50 N. W. (2d) 381, a motion for summary judgment is not
a substitute for a demurrer and may not be used for such
purpose. This is because where a demurrer is sustained the
plaintiff, except in exceptional situations not necessary to
be considered here, is given an opportunity to plead over,
which right is denied when a summary judgment dismissing
the complaint on the merits is entered. If plaintiffs’ com-
plaint is defective in the respect urged, it is because eviden-
tiary facts tending to bear on value were pleaded instead
of alleging the ultimate fact that the fair market value of the
parcel greatly exceeded $4,500. These allegations of the

6

complaint as to value were not negatived by defendants’
affidavits.

The brief of defendants cite the recent cases of Kranjec
v. West Allis (1954), 267 Wis. 430, 66 N. W. (2d) 178,
and Smith v. Wisconsin Rapids (1956), 273 Wis. 58, 76
N. W. (2d) 595. However, these decisions dealt with the
power of municipal authorities to lease municipal real estate
and not with any issue of the adequacy of the consideration
agreed to be paid by the lessees.

It is our considered judgment that there is at least one
contested material issue of fact to be litigated which made
it error to enter summary judgment. This is the issue of
determining the fair market value of the parcel being sold.
Mere inadequacy of the sales price is not sufficient ground
in itself to void a sale of municipal property, but it does have
a bearing on the issue of abuse of discretion on the part of
the common council in voting authorization of the sale.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Macxowski, Respondent, vs. MitwauKeE AUTOMOBILE
Murtuat Insurance Company, Appellant.

April 8—May 7, 1957.

a P| 549

mma
For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by
James L. McMonigal of Berlin.
For the respondent there was a brief by Milton Spoehr
of Berlin, and Lehner & Lehner of Princeton, and oral argu-

ment by Mr. Spoehr and Mr. Philip Lehner.

Wincert, J. We find no error and therefore affirm the
judgment for the plaintiff.

1. The jury’s finding that Stollfus was negligent with
respect to speed is abundantly supported in the record. Refer-
ence need only be made to the testimony of the witness
Kemnitz as summarized in the foregoing statement of facts.

It is contended that Kemnitz’s observation of Stollfus’
speed was too remote from the time and place of the accident,
and hence the testimony should have been excluded or strick-
en. Kemnitz testified that Stollfus passed him at well above
95 miles per hour at a point about three miles west of the
place of collision and gradually drew away from him, and
that the last he saw of the Stollfus car was when it rounded
a curve three quarters of a mile west of the place of the acci-
dent. Reference is made to Neumann v. Evans, 272 Wis.
579, 76 N. W. (2d) 322, where speed at an intersection was
in issue, and we held that a trial court had not abused its
discretion in excluding testimony that the driver had been
seen going 50 miles per hour at a point one quarter of a mile
before the intersection.

‘The present case is very different than Neumann v. Evans,
272 Wis. 579, 76 N. W. (2d) 322. There the excluded
testimony was of a momentary observation of speed on an
open road, whereas the question in issue was the speed at an
intersection, a substantially different situation. In the pres-
ent case, the Kemnitz testimony showed a continuous pattern
of utterly unreasonable and unlawful speed for some ten miles

550 ee

(interrupted at the village of Green Lake), and the point of
collision was still open country road. In such circumstances,
the jury might reasonably infer that the consistent pattern
of speed adopted over 10 miles of open road was not aban-
doned in the 11th mile. We think the trial court was well
within the bounds of reasonable discretion in allowing the
jury to consider the testimony.

Appellant attacks the testimony of Kemnitz as inherently
incredible, and argues that the speeds of 95 and 105 miles
per hour to which he testifed would have been impossible to
maintain on a highway with as many curves, albeit minor
ones, as were shown to exist in Highway 23 for several miles
west of the place of the collision, at several of which were
signs advising maximum speed of 50 or 55 miles per hour.
Serious conflicts are also pointed out between the testimony
given by Kemmnitz at the trial and a statement made by him
ten days after the accident. It is also said that the jury, in
giving a negative answer to the question whether the boys
were racing at or immediately preceding the collision, must
have disbelieved Kemnitz’s testimony on that point.

We consider, however, that the weight to be given to the
Kemnitz testimony was for the jury. While some features of
it strain one’s credulity, and Kemnitz was a smart-aleck wit-
ness, we cannot say as a matter of law that he was so com-
pletely unworthy of belief that his testimony should have
been excluded or stricken from the record, or that the jury
could not properly believe most of it. Whether his testimony
at the trial was closer to the truth than the story he told in
his statement to the investigator a few days after the accident
was for the jury to determine. The jury could make a large
allowance for exaggeration in the testimony as to the con-
tinuous 95 and 105 miles per hour speed, and still find that
Stollfus was going much faster than the permissible maxi-
mum of 55 miles per hour. On such a matter, suspected
exaggeration does not necessarily deprive testimony of all

| | 551
ee

weight as a matter of law. Indeed, wilfully false testimony
on one point does not require the jury to reject all of the
witness’ evidence. Mercer v. Wright, 3 Wis. *645, *647;
Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 82, 83, 119 N. W. 850.

The inference of terrific speed at the point of collision
was supported by photographs in the record showing an
extraordinary degree of demolition of the two cars, and thus
evidencing exceptional force of impact.

2. The finding of the jury that Stollfus was negligent
in failing to yield one half of the main-traveled portion of
the highway to Mackowski is supported by the testimony
that shortly after the accident debris such as glass, dirt, and
pieces of metal was lying in the north lane of the concrete
highway, between the two wrecked cars, and that there was
a fresh gouge in the concrete in the north lane and a mark
or marks leading from that lane toward the wrecked Stollfus
car. The left side of the Mackowski car was practically
demolished, as was the left front portion of the Stollfus car.
From the facts that Mackowski had been seen in Ripon a‘
few minutes before the accident, that his home was in Berlin,
and that a main route to Berlin led westward on Highway 23
at the place of the accident, it could reasonably be inferred
that Mackowski was headed west at the time of collision.
Being dead, he is presumed to have exercised due care in all
respects (Weber v. Mayer, 266 Wis. 241, 249, 63 N. W.
(2d) 318), and hence to have been driving in the north lane.
There was no evidence of any want of due care on his part to
rebut that presumption. In the circumstances, and in the ab-
sence of any other satisfactory explanation of the location of
the debris and marks, the jury could properly infer that the
cars collided in the north lane, the left front of the Stollfus
car hitting the side of the Mackowski car just after Stollfus
had turned a little to his right to negotiate the curve in the
road at that place.

55 ee

3. Since the findings of negligence on the part of Stollfus
with respect to speed and failing to yield one half of the road
are sufficient to sustain the verdict, we need not consider the
finding that he was negligent with respect to management
and control. It may be noted that evidence permitting the
inference that in rounding a curve to the right the driver
swung over the line into the left traffic lane would support
a finding that he failed to exercise ordinary care in the
management and control of his car. Leiner v. Kohl, 261 Wis.
159, 162, 52 N. W. (2d) 154.

4. Appellant challenges the jury’s finding that the negli-
gence of Stollfus with respect to speed was a substantial
factor in causing the collision, and relies on a statement in
Clark v. McCarthy, 210 Wis. 631, 635, 246 N. W. 326, that
where two cars proceeding on a highway in opposite direc-
tions collide, speed alone cannot cause a collision in the ab-
sence of some other contributing factor. That proposition
has no relevance in the present case, for here there was evi-
dence not only that Stollfus was driving at an excessive
speed, but also that he invaded Mackowski’s proper lane of
travel, which sufficiently distinguishes Clark v. McCarthy
(see East Wisconsin Trustee Co. v. O’Neil, 255 Wis. 528,
532, 39 N. W. (2d) 369). In Clark v. McCarthy it was
recognized that excessive speed may cause a head-on colli-
sion if it contributes to the speeder’s presence on the wrong
side of the road. (210 Wis. at p. 635.) In the present case
the jury may have believed, and properly, that Stollfus’ ex-
cessive speed caused him to swing over the center line and
into the left lane as he rounded the rather pronounced curve
just west of the point of collision.

5, When the testimony of Kemnitz with respect to speed
was offered and objected to on the ground of remoteness, the
trial judge said in chambers that he would sustain the objec-
tion were it not for the question of a speed contest or race,
but with that in the picture, he would have to overrule the

a P| 553

objection. At the close of the trial, the court, on its own
motion, submitted a question in the special verdict as to
whether the two boys were racing. The jury having an-
swered that question in the negative, appellant now contends
that it should have judgment or a new trial, because the
jury’s finding showed that the basis on which the court
admitted evidence of speed was unfounded.

We find no error. The court was warranted in receiving
the testimony on speed, whether or not there was a race, The
ruling was not vitiated by a remark in chambers. Moreover,
the jury’s negative answer to the question whether the boys
were racing “at or immediately preceding the collision” does
not necessarily indicate that disbelief of Kemnitz’s testimony
that they had been racing most of the way from Princeton.
He testified that when he lost sight of Stollfus’ taillight, he
slowed down, and in effect abandoned the contest. Thus the
jury’s finding that they were not racing “at or immediately
preceding the collision” is not inconsistent with a belief that
they had been racing for many miles.

6. The special verdict was not invalidated by the fact that
while the jury found that Mackowski was negligent with re-
spect to lookout but that such negligence was not a substan-
tial factor in causing the collision, they also found that 20
per cent of the total causal negligence was attributable to
Mackowski. There was no evidence to support the finding
that he was negligent. The answer to the question on com-
parison of negligence was properly stricken as surplusage.
Statz v. Pohl, 266 Wis. 23, 29, 62 N. W. (2d) 556, 63
N. W. (2d) 711.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

Wisconsin Power & Licur Company, Appellant, vs.
Bertin Tanninc & Manuracrurine Company, Re-
spondent.

April 8—May 7, 1957.

558

For the appellant there was a brief by Schubring, Ryan,
Petersen & Sutherland of Madison, and oral argument by
William Ryan.

For the respondent there was.a brief and oral argument
by James L. McMonigal of Berlin.

Faircuitp, J. The complaint in essence states a cause
of action for a quantity of gas service furnished which at
applicable rates was worth $26,361 and for which defendant
has only paid $3,440.79. The answer sufficiently raises an
issue of fact as to the plaintiff’s claim of the amount of gas
furnished. The form of the denial in the answer is not in
the exact language of the statute but is a form widely used
and in substance amounts to the same thing. With respect
to the allegations of the complaint which form the gist of the
plaintiff's cause of action, the answer “alleges that defend-
ant does not have sufficient knowledge or information upon
which to form a belief . . . therefore denies the same and
puts plaintiff to its proof thereof.” Sec. 263.13 (1), Stats.,
provides that the answer must contain a specific denial of an
allegation or “of any knowledge or information thereof suf-
ficient to form a belief.”

Plaintiff claims that denial of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to some of the allegations such
as the filing of rate schedules was an insufficient denial be-
cause the truth of the allegations was a matter of public
record or otherwise readily ascertainable by defendant.
Plaintiff's point is well taken. Goodell v. Blumer (1877), 41

a P| 559

Wis. 436, 444; Elmore v, Hill (1879), 46 Wis. 618, 624,
1N. W. 235; Mineral Point v. Davis (1948), 253 Wis. 270,
274, 34 N. W. (2d) 226. Denials of other allegations, how-
ever, sufficiently raise an issue as to the amount of gas the
plaintiff furnished. .

Sec. 270.635, Stats., permits the entry. of summary judg-
ment upon the affidavit of a person with knowledge setting
forth such evidentiary facts as shall establish plaintiff's cause
of action sufficiently to entitle him to judgment. Plaintiff
did not file any affidavit setting forth evidentiary facts as
to the amount of gas actually furnished and the applicable
rates. The affidavits did nothing to eliminate the fundamental
issue of fact: Was the amount furnished in excess of the
amount billed and paid for? Accordingly, plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment was properly denied and the order
appealed from must be affirmed in that respect.

Defendant attempted to plead certain setoffs. Whether
tested as causes of action or as defenses, it would perhaps
require more than liberality of construction to say that they
sufficiently plead injury or damage resulting from defend-
ant’s reliance upon the correctness of the bills rendered. The
same is true of the separate defense of laches.

We are, however, required by statutes relating to the
business of public utilities, plaintiff being one, to hold that
these counterclaims and defenses are insufficient in any event.
Sec. 196.22, Stats., makes it unlawful for any public utility to
receive a greater or Jess compensation for its service than
is specified in its rates schedules. If defendant’s pleas are
recognized either as setoffs or defenses, defendant will have
paid less for gas than the proper rate. This means that it
will have paid less than other like users were required to pay
for like service.

Most of the decisions dealing with mistake in quotation of
rates or mistake in billing have involved the Interstate
Commerce Act but in all material respects, that statute is

wu
|
3

similar to sec. 196.22, Stats. Misquotation of rates by a
railroad does not estop the railroad from collecting the cor-
rect rate. Mellon v. Johnson Co. (1928), 196 Wis. 64, 68,
219 N. W. 352. Under the Federal Motor Carrier Act
prohibiting receipt of less compensation for service than the
tariff rates, neither the doctrine of waiver nor estoppel can be
invoked when the application thereof would result in such
violation. Hanaman v. Liberty Trucking Co. (1943), 242
Wis. 92, 97,7 N. W. (2d) 609. The obligation to pay the
applicable rate is statutory and is not a matter of contract.
Northern Wisconsin P. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
(1931), 203 Wis. 549, 234 N. W. 726. In Chicago & N. W.
R. Co. v. J. I. Case Plow Works (1921), 173 Wis. 237,
180 N. W. 846, defendant ordered goods on which the
freight was to be prepaid and when the goods arrived, the
railroad gave defendant an expense bill which showed
the freight had been paid. In reliance thereon defendant paid
for the goods without deducting any freight charge. It
developed that the freight charge had not been paid and the
railroad sued the defendant. It was decided that the rail-
road was not estopped by its own negligence in informing
defendant that the freight had been paid. At page 240, the
court quoted New York, N. H., & H.R. Co. v. York &
Whitney Co. (1913), 215 Mass. 36, 102 N. E. 366, as fol-
lows: “ ‘The public policy thus declared supersedes the ordi-
nary doctrine of estoppel, so far as that would interfere with
the accomplishment of the dominant purpose of the act. It
does not permit that inequality of rates to arise indirectly
through the application of estoppel, which it was the aim of
the act to suppress directly.’ ”

Defendant points out that it has not pleaded that plaintiff
is estopped by reason of plaintiffs negligent error in billing
and defendant’s reliance thereon and resulting injury. De-
fendant asserts that the cases above referred to are inappli-
cable because defendant has pleaded a cause of action for

|_| es 561
PT

damages resulting from negligence. We do not see any
important difference between reducing the amount to be paid
plaintiff by a defense of estoppel arising out of negligent
billing and reducing the amount by setting off damages aris-
ing from negligent billing. In two railroad cases the United
States supreme court denied recovery on a similar claim. In
Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Mugg (1906), 202 U. S. 242, 26
Sup. Ct. 628, 50 L. Ed. 1011, the shipper sued the railroad
in the courts of Texas alleging that the railroad had mis-
quoted a rate; that the shipper relied on it in quoting a price
at which it would sell goods on a freight prepaid basis; that
the shipper suffered loss when required by the railroad to
pay the correct freight rate which was higher than the one
quoted. Recovery was permitted in the-state courts but the
decision reversed in the United States supreme court. In
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co. (1913),
226 U. S. 441, 33 Sup. Ct. 176, 57 L. Ed. 290, a similar
case arose. The Kentucky court granted recovery but its
decision was reversed.

Accordingly, we reach the conclusion that defendant can
base neither a counterclaim nor a defense upon negligent
underbilling by plaintiff.

By the Court——Order affirmed in so far as it denied
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; order reversed in
so far as it overruled plaintiff's demurrer to counterclaim
and affirmative defense; cause remanded with directions to
sustain the demurrer and for further proceedings according
to law.

Wisconsin Power & Licur Company, Appellant, vs.
Bertin Launpry Company, Inc., Respondent.

April 8—May 7, 1957.

a ee 563
— EEE

For the appellant there was a brief by Schubring, Ryan,
Petersen & Sutherland of Madison, and oral argument by
William Ryan.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
James L. McMonigal of Berlin.

Farrcuixp, J. In all respects the issues in this case are
present in the Tanning Company Case, and are disposed of
in accordance with the opinion in that case.

By the Court—Order affirmed in so far as it denied
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; order reversed in
so far as it overruled plaintiff's demurrer to the counter-
claim; cause remanded with directions to sustain the de-
murrer and for further proceedings according to law.

Estate or Brappury: Gorces, Appellant, vs. ANTHONY,
Administrator, Respondent.

April 8—May 7, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Lehner & Lehner
of Princeton, and Earl F. Kileen of Wautoma, and oral
argument by Philip Lehner, Sr.

For the respondent there was a brief by R. E. Johnson of
Waupaca, and oral argument by Mr. Johnson and by Mr.
Gad Jones of Wautoma.

Martin, C. J. Janette Bradbury died October 17, 1955,
at the age of eighty-six years. Her estate consisted of a 39-
acre tract of land in Waushara county. She also had, during

565
Ld

her lifetime, a life estate in 240 acres of land; the claimant,
Irma Gorges, was remainderman.

Claimant, a niece of the decedent, testified that from 1941
to 1945, while Janette Bradbury lived alone on her life-
estate property about a quarter mile from the claimant’s home,
she made the decedent’s meals, did her laundry, and stayed
with her overnight; that in 1945 Miss Bradbury came to live
with the claimant, occupying two separate rooms in the
Gorges home; she remained there until her death.

After Miss Bradbury’s death Mrs. Gorges filed a petition
for administration of her estate, stating in effect that the
decedent owned no property except real estate of the prob-
able value of $5,000 and that she left no debts. Thereafter
Mrs. Gorges filed three claims against the estate: One for
taxes paid by her on the life-estate property and tax certifi-
cates purchased by her on the Jand held in fee by decedent
(allowed by the court) ; one for the reasonable value of the
care of decedent by Mrs. Gorges and her husband (disal-
lowed) ; and one for $5,000 on a note introduced in evi-
dence as Exhibit G and reading as follows:

“Apr. 18, 1955
“After my death I promise to pay my niece Irma Gorges
the sum of $5,000 five thousand dollars for value received.
“Janette Bradbury.”

It is not disputed that the note is in the handwriting of
Irma Gorges and the signature is that of Janette Bradbury.

In disallowing the last claim, it was the trial court’s
opinion that claimant failed to prove execution and delivery
of the note.

It was the testimony of Irma Gorges that Miss Bradbury
had no money and that she was the only one of the relatives
who ever did anything for her; that she wrote the note at
the request of the decedent and placed it in the family Bible
which she kept in the dresser in her own bedroom; that she

566
TY

never told anyone about the note; that the Bible was acces-
sible to and used by all the family, but was used most by
Miss Bradbury, who was the most religious member of the
family. Three other papers, the property of Miss Bradbury,
were also kept in the Bible; these related to family history
and information of interest to the decedent.

Other than the self-serving testimony of the claimant,
Mrs. Mildred Kohl was the only witness who testified with
respect to the execution of the note. She testified that she
made a number of friendly visits to the decedent, and Miss
Bradbury told her she appreciated the care and kindness of
Mrs. Gorges and her husband; that on one occasion in May
of 1955, Miss Bradbury went to Irma’s bedroom and brought
out the note which she asked her to read, saying, “Mrs. Kohl,
I have done what I wanted to do for a long time and I want
to show it to you;” that Irma had been very good to her for
years and she felt she owed her a big debt and she had made
it right.

At a hearing on March 23, 1956, claimant’s counsel
showed Mrs. Kohl Exhibit I, which was a typewritten car-
bon copy of the writing contained in Exhibit G. She was
asked :

“Q. I show you Exhibit I and ask you to read it and”
tell us whether that is a copy of the note that Janette Brad-
bury showed to you. A. No, it is not. That she was going
to leave her $5,000 but there was a note of other writing on
the note. It was in longhand you know.

“Q. But this is the substance of the note? A. Yes. Ex-
actly.

“Q. Do you know what else was on the sheet? A, Well,
just for her kindness and for doing things up on the place
where she lived... .”

She gave the following testimony on cross-examination:

“Q. So that we understand each other then, Mrs. Kohl, it
is your testimony that the note would make mention of some

_. P| 567

things that they had done in connection with the buildings
and also did it make mention of the care that they had
provided for her? A. Yes, that it did.

“Q. And those were specifically mentioned in the note
that you saw? A. Yes, I am sure that it did.”

The hearing was adjourned to April 12, 1956, at which
time Mrs. Kohl testified as follows:

“Q. I show you Exhibit G. Look that over carefully and
Task you is that the note that Janette Bradbury showed to
you? A. That’s the note.

“Q. Are you sure of that? A. I am very sure.”

On cross-examination she admitted that Exhibit I was a
copy of Exhibit G and stated that she was mistaken and
confused on the occasion of her previous testimony because
“there was so much going on there that day;” that she mis-
understood the question put to her; that in recalling the
occasion on which Miss Bradbury showed her the note she
had thought the note recited some of the things that the
decedent had said to her.

In the opinion of the trial court, “The testimony of Mrs.
Kohl which was produced in an effort to substantiate the
execution of the note, was confused and, in the opinion of
the court, does not meet the degree of proof required to
substantiate execution.”

The credibility of the witness was for the trial court.
Graham v. Zellers (1931), 205 Wis. 542, 238 N. W. 385;
Estate of Evans (1946), 248 Wis. 456, 22 N. W. (2d)
497. Mrs. Kohl’s testimony was contradictory and confused
and the court was entitled to regard it as unreliable. As
stated in Caballero v. Litchfield Wood-W orking Co. (1956),
246 Minn. 124, 129, 74 N. W. (2d) 404, 408:

“Clear, positive, direct, and undisputed testimony by an
unimpeached witness, which is not in itself contradictory or
improbable, cannot be rejected or disregarded by either
court or jury, unless the evidence discloses facts and cir-

5S

cumstances which furnish a reasonable ground for so doing.
Such testimony can be rejected only when doubt is cast
upon its truthfulness by contradictory or discrediting facts
or circumstances. The testimony of a witness may be disre-
garded if it contains inherent improbabilities or contradic-
tions which, alone or in connection with other circumstances
in evidence, furnish a reasonable ground for concluding that
the testimony is not true.”

The trial court further stated that, “A review of the
testimony does not reveal adequate proof of delivery of the
note to the claimant, Irma Gorges.”

Appellant urges that the evidence shows the note was
always in her possession, a fact that is prima facie evidence
of delivery, citing Sheldon v. Blackman (1925), 188 Wis. 4,
205 N. W. 486. The evidence is that the note was kept in
the Gorges family Bible along with other papers kept by the
decedent. The Bible, though owned by the claimant and kept
in her bedroom, was used by all the members of the family -
and, indeed, was most frequently used by Miss Bradbury,
who had access to it at all times and permission to use it for
as long as she desired. She could have removed the note
from the Bible at any time; she could have destroyed it. But
it remained in the Bible, along with other papers personal to
Janette Bradbury which it is not claimed were given to
Irma Gorges.

The evidence gives rise to a number of inconsistencies and
contradictions in the conduct of the claimant. Five thousand
dollars is a rather large sum of money; it was, in fact, the
amount of the total valuation she placed upon the estate.
In her petition for administration she stated that the dece-
dent left no debts; yet she obviously regarded the note as
evidence of a debt. If, as she says, the note was given to
pay her for care and services to Miss Bradbury, why the
delay in presenting it to the court? And, again, if it was
meant to be payment for care, why file a separate claim for

a ee 569"
Pod

the reasonable value of such care? She maintains the note
was in her possession at all times; then why the secrecy
about it; why keep it in a place where others, and particu-
larly the maker, had constant access to it?

Considering all the circumstances which the evidence dis-
closes, the trial court was entitled to conclude that delivery
had not been adequately proved.

By the Cowrt—That part of the judgment appealed from

is affirmed.

BEHLING, Plaintiff, vs. Wisconsin Hypro ELectric Com-
PANY, Defendant and Appellant: Unrrep PrTroLeuM
Company, Interpleaded Defendant and Respondent.

April 8—May 7, 1957.

a 571

For the appellant there was a brief by Stafford, Pfiffner
& Stafford of Chippewa Falls, and oral argument by Robert
F. Pfiffner.

For the respondent there was a brief by Gwin & Fetzner
of Hudson, and oral argument by John W. Fetaner, and for
the plaintiff there was oral argument by Wm. Bradford
Smith of Madison.

Broaproor, J. The defendant relies on sec. 262.09 (4),
Stats., which provides:

“Tf the defendant is a foreign corporation (including one
created by or under any act of congress) and (a) is doing
business in Wisconsin at the time of service, or (b) the cause

572

of action against it arose out of the doing of business in
Wisconsin, service may be made in accordance with the pro-
visions of s. 180.825 or by delivering within or without the
state a copy of the summons to any officer, director, or
managing agent of the corporation.”

Sec. 180.825, Stats., referred to in sec. 262.09 (4), pro-
vides that under certain circumstances service of process may
be made on a foreign corporation by service on the secretary
of state. No attempt was made to make service under this
particular statute.

The issue to be determined in this case is whether the
interpleaded defendant was doing business in Wisconsin at
the time of service. The defendant contends that it was. The
interpleaded defendant contends that it was not so doing
business in Wisconsin; that its business was entirely inter-
state in character in that orders were subject to acceptance
at its home office in Minnesota, and that all of the goods
which it contracted to deliver were shipped in interstate
commerce.

The trial court first held that the service on Robert J. Bell
was ineffective for the reason that he was not an officer,
director, or managing agent of the interpleaded defendant;
further, that the activities of the interpleaded defendant on
the date of service on F. T. Carpenter, its president, con-
stituted interstate commerce and therefore the foreign corpo-
ration was not doing business in Wisconsin as that term
is used in sec. 262.09 (4), Stats.

Except for the fact that the Wisconsin statutes relating
to service of process must be complied with, the issue in-
volves a question of federal law. Questions of jurisdiction
acquired by the service of process on a foreign corporation
depend upon whether or not there has been compliance with
the due-process provision of the federal constitution.

a De 573

One general rule as to whether or not a foreign corpora-
tion is doing business in a state is given in 20 C. J. S.,
Corporations, p. 167, sec. 1920, as follows:

“Solicitation of business aided by other manifestations of
corporate presence will warrant the conclusion that a foreign
corporation is doing business in the state notwithstanding
none of such manifestations is singly capable of carrying the
weight of such inferences. Some statutes which are held to
be constitutional render a foreign corporation soliciting
business or a particular kind of business amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts.”

That rule has been followed in Wisconsin in Tetley,
Sletten & Dahl v. Rock Falls Mfg. Co. 176 Wis. 400, 187
N. W. 204, where there was a continuous course of business
in the solicitation of orders in this state in response to which
defendant’s product was from time to time shipped into this
state, plus the fact that the soliciting agent collected money.
The foreign corporation was held to be doing business here
and subject to the service of process out of our courts as
provided by the statute then in effect.

In Petition of Northfield Iron Co. 226 Wis. 487, 277
N. W. 168, where orders were solicited by a resident agent,
we said (p. 492):

“Tt is our conclusion that so far as the question of state
power is concerned, the International Harvester Co. Case,
supra, must be taken to make valid a statute by a state pro-
viding for service upon the soliciting agent of a foreign
corporation whose only activity aside from a solicitation of
orders within the state is the filling of these orders through
the instrumentality of interstate commerce.”

In both cases the soliciting agent resided in Wisconsin,
orders had to be approved at the home office of the foreign
corporation, and all orders were shipped in interstate com-
merce. Both cases were based on the decision of the United

ee
Pe

States supreme court in International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479,

In Meyers v. Matthews, 270 Wis. 453, 71 N. W. (2d)
368, the plaintiffs, who claimed to be independent contractors,
sought to test the validity of sec. 218.04, Stats. Plaintiffs
were nonresidents. They proposed to come into the state
of Wisconsin for extended periods in accordance with the
business available to solicit offers of assignments of accounts
from merchants, doctors, hospitals, and other creditors under
a contract with Metropolitan Finance Corporation, a foreign
corporation. Plaintiffs proposed to do no collecting but
merely to procure on a commission basis offers of assign-
ments. The foreign corporation collected accounts only by
mail. In that case we stated (p. 468) :

“Metropolitan unquestionably is doing business, and it is
doing that business with the aid of its solicitors. Therefore
when its solicitors are present in Wisconsin, Metropolitan
is present and doing business in Wisconsin. The true rela-
tion shown by the evidence to exist between Metropolitan
and its solicitors is one of principal and agent. It does not
matter for the purposes of this case whether the respondents
may be a type of independent contractor or not. We are not
concerned here with tort liability or workmen’s compensa-
tion. What is important here is that the solicitors are agents
of Metropolitan.”

The controlling federal case is International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95.
In that case there was service upon an agent of the shoe
company, together with mailing by registered mail to the
home office of the company. The shoe company had agents
within the state of Washington who solicited orders which
were subject to acceptance at its home office in St. Louis,
and all goods were shipped in interstate commerce. Perti-
nent paragraphs from the opinion are as follows (pp. 319,
320):

a De 575
PO

“It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the
boundary line between those activities which justify the sub-
jection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not,
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not
merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activ-
ity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. St.
Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander, supra, 228; International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 587. Whether due process
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due-process
clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contracts, ties, or relations. Cf., Pennoyer v. Neth supra;
Minnesota Commercial Assn. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140.

“But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privi-
lege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the
benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise
of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state, a procedure which requires the
corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can,
in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.” .. .
(p. 319.)

“Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to
appellant by registered mail at its home office was not reason-
ably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit.” (p. 320.)

The record discloses that Bell had worked for the inter-
pleaded defendant for two years prior to moving to La
Crosse on February 1, 1953. In Minnesota he worked as a
carburetion engineer but claimed that he was merely a sales-
man in Wisconsin. Prior to that time another agent, who
resided at Davenport, Iowa, called on Wisconsin customers
and prospective customers of the interpleaded defendant. It
appears that the Minnesota company has accounts all over
the state of Wisconsin to whom it sells equipment and pro-
pane gas. Bell has no authority to sign contracts for his

principal. He carries with him a printed form of the con-
tract used and can explain its provisions to customers and
prospective customers. At least in the case of new customers
he gets a financial statement from the prospective purchaser
which he forwards to the company so that it can pass on the
credit standing. He calls on old customers sixty days before
the expiration of their annual contracts and determines
whether they wish to renew. For renewals or new contracts
he sends the required information to the Minnesota office.
There a number of copies of the contract are prepared, signed
by the company, and mailed to the customer. The customer
then signs the copies, retains one for his own use, and re-
turns the others to Minneapolis. Bell spends full time for his
employer and in 1955 traveled 35,000 miles in its business.
It is also a paft of his job to give technical advice.

Under the rules laid down in the International Shoe Co.
Case, supra, which have not been changed or modified to
our knowledge, the interpleaded defendant had a continu-
ous course of business involving contacts, ties, and relations
with many people in the state of Wisconsin. The cause of
action arises out of its activities within the state. In the
conduct of its activities within the state it enjoys the benefits
and protection of our state laws. In an annotation appear-
ing in 146 A. L. R. 961, the editors stated the following rule
and cite many cases in support thereof:

“While it is a generally accepted proposition that the fact
that an office is maintained in a state for the facilitation of
the sales of a foreign corporation, at least in the sense of
making it more convenient for its salesmen to solicit orders
for outside goods, will not, of itself, make the corporation
amenable to service of process, very little more is needed,
according to the cases, to establish that the corporation is
‘doing business’ within the state, for this purpose. (And
some of the courts have indicated that an aggregate of activ-
ities, no one of which would in itself be sufficient to subject
the corporation to state jurisdiction, may do so, particularly

r ] |) 57

if the volume of corporate business in the state is continuous
and substantial, principally upon the authority of Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Kentucky... .)”

Bell maintained an. office in his home in La Crosse for the
facilitation of sales. Although the record is not complete as
to whether Bell was authorized to collect money, or where
the contract was to be performed, it does disclose a continuous
solicitation of sales here, together with the gathering of credit
information, the giving of technical advice with reference to
laying out piping, all by the agent, and the making of con-
tracts in Wisconsin by the interpleaded defendant: These
activities in addition to the continuous solicitation of sales in
Wisconsin constitute doing business within the state, as that
term is used in sec. 262.09 (4), Stats., by the interpleaded
defendant.

In the International Shoe Co. Case, supra, service by regis-
tered mail was held reasonably calculated to apprise the
foreign corporation of the suit. In Travelers Health Asso. v.
Virginia, 339 U. S. 643, 70 Sup. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed. 1154,
it was held that service by registered mail upon the foreign
corporation at its home office was sufficient where all of its
solicitations and sales activities were by mail rather than by
paid agents. Personal service upon the president of the
interpleaded defendant in Minnesota complies with our stat-
ute and certainly constitutes due process if service by regis-
tered mail without the state does.

By the Court—Order reversed.

Omer, Plaintiff, vs. Riscu and another, Defendants and
° Respondents. [Case No. 242.] *
Poptesny and another, Plaintiffs and Appellants, vs. Riscu
and another, Defendants and Respondents. [Case No.
243.] *

April 9—May 7, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on June 26, 1957.

For the appellants there were briefs by McCue & Regan
of Milwaukee, and Crosby H. Summers of Janesville, and
oral argument by Mr, Summers.

a a 581
CL

For the respondents there were briefs by Jeffris, Mouat,
Oestreich, Wood & Cunningham, and oral argument by
Louis D. Gage, Jv., and by Roy E. Berg, all of Janesville.

Brown, J. We consider first Podlesny’s action against
Risch. The evidence showed that just before the collision
Risch was driving south, towing a manure spreader, intend-
ing to turn into a farm driveway on the east side of the
highway. At the same time Podlesny was driving north,
unaware of Risch’s intention and expecting to meet and pass
him. Risch began his turn by a gradual invasion of Pod-
lesny’s side of the road, not noticing Podlesny and without
making a signal indicating his purpose. When Risch noticed
Podlesny’s presence he turned back to his own right side of
the road but Podlesny, in an effort to avoid a collision, was
then turning to that side also. The collision occurred on the
west half of the highway, causing injuries to Podlesny’s
guest, Omer, and other damages to Podlesny. The jury
found Risch causally negligent in lookout but not negligent
in management and control, and found Podlesny causally
negligent in management and control but not in lookout. As
we have said, the comparison was 80 per cent to Risch and
20 per cent to Podlesny.

On this appeal Podlesny argues that there is no evidence of
any negligence on his part. The evidence did not differ in
any material way from that received in the first trial, and
reviewed in our opinion in the first appeal in 269 Wis. at
pages 66 and 67, in which the jury found Podlesny causally
negligent both in speed and in management and control. By
approving the order for a new trial to reapportion causal
negligence, we affirmed the finding that Podlesny was causal-
ly negligent; otherwise we would have had to reverse the
order and direct the dismissal of the cross complaint which
sought contribution from him.

Podlesny contends that, at the most, his negligence was
only in excessive speed, and speed, alone, cannot be the

Se
P|

cause of an accident. The evidence shows more than mere
speed. After applying his brakes Podlesny skidded along the
highway toward Risch’s automobile, part of the time side-
ways, and ended by smashing the right side of his car into
the front of Risch’s. This physical fact, we think, warrants
the jury’s conclusion that there was negligence in Podlesny’s
management and control. In Young v. Nunn, Bush &
Weldon Shoe Co. (1933), 212 Wis. 403, 410, 249 N. W.
278, we said that a driver may proceed at a negligent rate
of speed and, by reason of this speed may find himself in
a situation requiring instant decision and giving him oppor-
tunity for further negligence with respect to control. Such
a situation was presented here. The court charged the jury
that it might consider Podlesny’s speed in answering the
question on management and control. There was ample evi-
dence that at the time of the collision Risch, heading south
had returned to the west lane of travel. The finding that, in
order to strike him there, Podlesny was negligent in the
management and control of his automobile, must be sus-
tained.

Podlesny contends that the trial court should have granted
his request to include in the special verdict a question asking
whether Risch was causally negligent in turning left when
such a turn could not be made with reasonable safety to
other users of the highway and in so turning without giving
an appropriate signal. There was: evidence in the record
to support affirmative answers. “It has long been the rule
in this state that where specific acts of negligence are charged
in the complaint and litigated upon the trial a special verdict
should contain specific questions covering those alleged acts.”
Cook v. Wisconsin Telephone Co. (1953), 263 Wis. 56, 62,
56 N. W. (2d) 494. On the first trial, on the same evidence
the trial court answered as a matter of law that Risch turned
left when such turn could not be safely made, and that this
was causal negligence. The trial court’s action was approved

es 583
Ld

by our opinion in that appeal. In the second trial the court
attempted to cover this issue only in the charge to the jury
on the issue of management and control. Nevertheless, the
second jury found Risch not guilty of causal negligence in
management and control. We think the law of the case re-
quires the court to answer, as it did in the first trial, that
the turn constituted causal negligence; and, as in the first
trial, the court should have submitted the requested question
on the failure to give a signal of the intention to turn. The
absence of such questions and answers in the verdict, par-
ticularly the omission of a finding, as a matter of law, that
under the cirumstances the left turn constituted causal negli-
gence, made the comparison of negligence incomplete and
was prejudicial to Podlesny. His motion for a new trial on
these grounds should have been granted.

We turn now to Podlesny’s appeal from the judgment
requiring him to contribute to Risch one half of the amount
Risch has had to pay Omer. Our mandate in the first appeal
directed this judgment to be held in abeyance pending the
second trial and then “disposed of on the basis of whether
or not Podlesny is found causally negligent therein.” Omer
v. Risch (1955), 269 Wis. 61, 67, 68 N. W. (2d) 541.
Podlesny has now been found causally negligent and the
trial court has entered a new judgment commanding him to
contribute.

Podlesny’s contention here is that the trial court com-
mitted error in overruling all of his many attempts to litigate
the question of Omer’s assumption of the risk of Podlesny’s
negligent driving. The learned trial court considered that
issue was excluded by our mandate ordering disposition of
the contribution question in accordance with Podlesny’s
causal negligence. Podlesny submits that assumption of risk
has never been determined and until it has been there can
be no determination that he has any liability to Omer; con-
sequently, there can be no determination of a common lia-

58
Le

bility by both drivers to Omer with rights of contribution
between drivers.

In the first trial Podlesny’s answer to the cross complaint
in the Omer case alleged that Omer assumed the risk of
Podlesny’s driving. The special verdict contained the ques-
tion, “Did Andrew Podlesny fail to exercise the skill and
judgment which he possessed with respect to the manage-
ment and control of his automobile?’ The answer was
“Yes.” This question had no part in the verdict except to
aid in the determination of assumption of risk. If Podlesny
wanted a specific answer to the question “Did Omer assume
the risk?” or its equivalent, it was his duty to request a
question to which that answer might be given, but there was
no such request nor did his motions after verdict bring this
issue to the attention of the court. The judgment granted
Risch contribution by Podlesny, thus implying a negative
answer to any contention that risk had been assumed. Sec.
270.28, Stats., provides :

“SUBMISSION TO JURY; OMITTED ESSENTIAL FACT. When
some controverted matter of fact not brought to the attention
of the trial court but essential to sustain the judgment is
omitted from the verdict, such matter of fact shall be deemed
determined by the court in conformity with its judgment and
the failure to request a finding by the jury on such matter
shall be deemed a waiver of jury trial pro tanto.”

We agree with the trial court that the issue of Omer’s
assumption of the risk was determined in the first trial
unfavorably to Podlesny and under our mandate was not to
be relitigated upon remand.

Podlesny also asks for a new trial in the interest of justice.
Except for the new trial on the issue of comparative negli-
gence, as already expressed, we consider the interest of
justice would not be advanced by an additional trial.

By the Court.—The judgment in case No. 242, Omer v.
Risch, and Podlesny, interpleaded defendant, is affirmed.

a | 585

The judgment in case No. 243, Podlesny v. Risch et al., is
reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial solely to
determine the issues of negligence, causation, and comparison.
The result of such trial shall affect only the proportion by
which, if any, the recovery of damages to Podlesny as al-
ready found shall be reduced by reason of his own contribu-
tory negligence.

Farrcuitp, J. (dissenting). In my opinion there was
no prejudicial error which requires a new trial in Podlesny
v. Risch. There may appear to be an inconsistency between
the ruling on the first trial that Risch was causally negligent
in turning left and the verdict on the second trial that he was
negligent as to lookout but not management and control.
Such inconsistency seems to me, however, to be one of form
but not substance. Risch invaded Podlesny’s lane in the
process of making or beginning to make a left turn. That
action of Risch was certainly the dominant cause of the colli-
sion. Evidently Risch started to make his turn because he
did not see Podlesny approach. The jury answered that
Risch was negligent as to lookout but not negligent as to
management and control, apparently reasoning that he made
the turn in ignorance of danger and that it was the lack of
attention which caused the ignorance which was the real cause
of the difficulty. Risch was charged by the jury with 80 per
cent of the responsibility. In my opinion the record does not
require us to say that the jury’s reasoning was wrong.

586

Beurincer, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Starz Farm
Mutvuat Avtromosite Insurance Company and
others, Defendants and Respondents: RincLE and an-
other, Defendants and Appellants.

April 9—May 7, 1957.

589

For the appellants there were briefs by Genrich, Terwil-
liger, Wakeen, Pichler & Conway of Wausau, and oral argu-
ment by Walter H, Piehler.

For the respondent Ella Behringer the cause was sub-
mitted on the brief of Smith, Okoneski, Puchner & Tinkham
of Wausau.

For the respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company as insurer of Henry Leffel there was a brief
by Roberts, Roe, Boardman, Suhr & Bjork of Madison, and
oral argument by Walter M. Bjork.

For the respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Company as insurer of Robert Behringer there was
a brief by Schmitt & Wurster of Merrill, and oral argument
by C. B. Wurster.

For the respondents Arden Leffel and Henry Leffel there
was a brief by Krueger & Fulmer of Wausau, and oral
argument by Burton E. Fulmer.

Curriz, J. It is contended by Universal Underwriters
that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary
judgment conclusively establish that the SR-21 was filed

590
i”

by it through mistake which renders the SR-21 ineffective
for any purpose of imposing liability upon it. Such mistake
consists of its assumption, based upon the information at
hand when it filed the SR-21, that the sixteen-year-old Arden
Leffel possessed a driver’s license at the time of the accident
instead of merely an instruction permit.

Under the provisions of sec. 85.08 (7), Stats., Arden was
restricted to driving only during daylight hours with but one
other passenger in the car, such other passenger being a
licensed driver seated beside him. Therefore, Arden was
operating the Ringle car illegally at the time of the accident
because it was at night and the car was occupied by more
than one other passenger. Universal Underwriters maintains
that the principle of Quin v. Hoffmann (1954), 265 Wis.
636, 62 N. W. (2d) 423, applies and voids any coverage
under its policy. This is because the permission by Arden’s
father to drive was an illegal permission.

The briefs of counsel raise certain issues with respect to
the application of Quin v. Hoffmann, supra. One of such
issues is whether Quin v. Hoffmann should not be recon-
sidered and repudiated because of the amendment made to
sec. 204.30 (3), Stats., by the 1955 legislature. A second
is whether the instant case cannot be distinguished from
Quin v. Hoffmann on the ground that here the minor driver
actually possessed a license or permit to drive, while in the
Quin Case he possessed neither. Because of the disposition
that we make of the appeal we find it unnecessary to pass on
such issues. We will assume for the purpose of deciding
this case only that if Universal Underwriters had not filed
the SR-21 it would have had a defense under the principle
enunciated in Quin v. Hoffmann.

In Laughnan v. Griffiths (1955), 271 Wis. 247, 73 N. W.
(2d) 587, we analyzed the Wisconsin Safety Responsibility
Law (sec. 85.09 (5) to (16) (c), Stats.) to ascertain its
underlying objective in order to determine the legal effect

fp

a ee 591
PO

of the filing of an SR-21 by an automobile liability insur-
ance company. We therein stated the following conclusion
(p. 259):

“We confine our determination at this time to holding that
an automobile liability insurance company can make itself
liable on a policy issued by it where, after investigating the
facts, it, acting through a duly authorized agent or employee,
voluntarily files with the commissioner an SR-21 form ad-
mitting coverage as to the accident described in such SR-21
intending to be bound thereby, even though without the
filing of the SR-21 there might not be liability.”

By use of the words “intending to be bound thereby” we
did not have reference to any undisclosed subjective intention
of the company, but only that the company had filed the
SR-21 for the purpose of complying with the Safety Respon-
sibility Law.

We also held in the Laughnan Case that sec. 85.09 (11),
Stats., clearly recognizes that the SR-21 may constitute an
admission against interest as to the coverage of the policy
on the part of the insurance company which has filed the
same. However, we expressly left undecided the further issue
of whether the filing of an SR-21 does not constitute more
than an admission against interest. .Our later decisions in
Prisuda v. General Casualty Co. (1956), 272 Wis. 41, 74
N. W. (2d) 777, and Pulvermacher v. Sharp, ante, p. 371,
82 N. W. (2d) 163, while referring to a filed SR-21 as an
admission against interest, are not to be interpreted as a hold-
ing that such an SR-21 might not have greater effect than
a mere admission against interest.

Our analysis of the Safety Responsibility Law in the
Laughnan Case clearly demonstrated that the objective of
such act was to protect the persons damaged or injured
through the negligence of an operator of a motor vehicle.
This was accomplished by providing a penalty against such
operator and, if he were not the owner of the vehicle driven

by him, then also against such owner, in the event there was
in existence no policy of automobile liability insurance which
covered the operation of such vehicle at the time of the
accident, and no cash indemnity fund or other security is
deposited with the commissioner. Such penalty, for failure
to meet either of such two alternative requirements, con-
sisted of suspending both the offending operator’s driver’s
license and the registration of the vehicle operated by him.
If a policy of existing insurance is the alternative means
selected to comply with the law such fact has to be evidenced
by the filing of the SR-21.

Keeping in mind the objective of the law, if a policy of
existing automobile liability insurance is to be relied upon
as the source of compensating the person who has sustained
damage or injury, surely the legislature intended this to be
as effective for such purpose as the alternative method of
depositing security with the commissioner. However, as
borne out by our decision in the Pulvermacher Case, the
legislature, albeit possibly unintentionally, left one loophole in
accomplishing such result. This came about by not provid-
ing that such existing policy of insurance meet any higher
or more stringent requirements than specified by secs. 204.30
(3) and 204.34 (2), Stats. Under such statutes a policy
may contain valid exclusion clauses which will prevent re-
covery on it. However, for reasons hereinafter pointed out,
our decision in the Pulvermacher Case, that the filing of the
SR-21 should not bar the insurance company from raising
the defense of a policy exclusion clause, should be limited to
exclusion clauses which prohibit recovery upon the policy
by the named insured.

We deem it highly significant that the Safety Responsibil-
ity Law affords a sixty-day period following receipt by the
motor vehicle department of the accident report before the
driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration may be sus-
pended because of failure to either file a proper SR-21, or to

es 593

deposit security in the amount required by the commission.
It seems evident that one of the purposes of providing such
sixty-day period is so that, if there is an existing policy of
automobile liability insurance, the insurer may have ade-
quate opportunity to conduct an investigation to determine
whether the facts warrant filing an SR-21. We are there-
fore constrained to hold that, when a company has through
an authorized officer, employee, or agent filed an SR-21
with the commissioner for the purpose of complying with
the Safety Responsibility Law, the company cannot thereafter
deny liability upon its policy because of any act occurring, or
fact existing, as of the time of such filing, which it then
knew, or could have known through the exercise of due
diligence. In other words, the legal effect of filing an SR-21
under such circumstances is to conclusively certify that under
the facts then existing its policy insured both the named
owner and the named operator of the particular vehicle
described in the SR-21 as to which the same was filed.

In those situations where greater liability is imposed upon
the insurance company, which has filed’an SR-21, than it
originally contracted for when it issued its policy, the same
is one imposed by statute as a result of its voluntary act in
filing the SR-21. We have an illustration of a similarly
imposed statutory liability provided in another phase of the
instant appeal. Under the provisions of sec. 85.08 (9) (c),
Stats., a parent or guardian, who has signed an application
for an instruction permit of a child under eighteen years of
age, is made liable for the negligence or wilful conduct of
such minor in operating a motor vehicle upon the highways.

To permit Universal Underwriters to introduce evidence
at the trial of the within action, that Arden Leffel had no
legal permission from either his father or Ringle to operate
the insured vehicle, would be to repudiate the certification
contained in its SR-21. This it cannot do.

2, es
ee

The rationale of the within opinion on the effect of the
filing of an SR-21 requires that we reconsider the basis of
our decision in the Pulvermacher Case as to the reason ad-
vanced as to why the insurance company there was not
barred from asserting the defense of a policy exclusion
clause. We there held that the filing by the company of
the SR-21 did not bar its right to assert the exclusion
clause as a policy defense because there had not been an
intentional relinquishment of a known right. We are now
satisfied that an insurance company, which files an SR-21,
is barred from asserting an exclusion clause in its policy as
a defense, if, in order to do so, it must rely upon the occur-
rence of facts which it could have discovered by the exercise
of due diligence within the sixty-day period allotted by stat-
ute for the filing of the SR-21.

However, in the Pulvermacher Case the injured person,
who is the third-party beneficiary that the Safety Responsi-
bility Law was designed to protect, was the named insured
under the policy. The Safety Responsibility Law should not
be so construed that the filing of an SR-21 would give such
named insured the right to recover upon his own policy of
insurance when he had already expressly contracted in such
policy that there would be no coverage as to his own
damages. This is because the SR~21 is filed to protect such
named insured, as owner of the insured vehicle, against hav-
ing his vehicle registration suspended. In this respect it is
a filing for and in behalf of the insured and he should not be
permitted to use it as a weapon against the Insurance Com-
pany.

Universal Underwriters contends that in the instant case
it does have a valid defense based upon an exclusion clause
in the policy. Such clause provided that the policy does not
apply “to liability assumed by the insured under any contract

a ee 595

or agreement except a warranty of goods or products.” Be-
cause of this, it is argued that any liability of Henry Leffel
as an additional insured is based upon his voluntary assump-
tion of liability for Arden’s acts by signing Arden’s applica-
tion for an instruction permit.

It would seem that such liability of Henry Leffel for
the acts of operation of his son, Arden, is one imposed by
statute ' rather than the result of a contract or agreement.
Lackey v. Olds & Stoller Inter-Exchange (1927), 80 Cal.
App. 687, 252 Pac. 672, and Marple v. American Automobile
Ins. Co. (1927), 82 Cal. App. 137, 255 Pac. 260. Further-
more, the omnibus coverage clause of Universal Under-
writers’ policy makes any person an additional insured
thereunder who uses the insured vehicle, “provided the actual
use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his
permission.” Henry Leffel had express permission from
Ringle to use the car, and such use, therefore, included the
right to permit someone else to operate it. Maurer v. Fesing
(1940), 233 Wis. 565, 571, 290 N. W. 191, and Schimke
v. Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1954) 266 Wis. 517, 521,
64 .N. W. (2d) 195.

However, even if there had been a violation of this par-
ticular exclusion clause by reason of Henry Leffel signing
Arden’s application for an instruction permit, this was a fact
which Universal Underwriters should have discovered by
the exercise of due diligence prior to the filing of the SR-21.
This precludes it from raising such issue now.

' Sec. 85.08 (9) (c), Stats., provides: Any negligence or wilful
misconduct of @ person under the age of eighteen years when oper-
ating a motor vehicle upon the highways shall be imputed to the
person who signed the application of such person for a permit or
license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable for such
operator for any damages caused by such negligent or wilful
misconduct.

5°;
ee

‘While we thus reach the conclusion that the learned trial
court properly denied the motion for summary judgment of
Universal Underwriters, we cannot affirm such denial with
respect to the other movant, Ringle. The complaint alleged
agency and joint enterprise between the Leffels and Ringle,
but the affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment aver no facts to sustain such allegations. On the
other hand, the facts stated in the affidavits in support of
the motion completely negative any relationship of agency or
joint enterprise. Therefore, the allegations of the complaint
on this issue are not to be considered in disposing of the
motion for summary judgment. See Laughnan v. Griffiths,
supra, at page 251. This requires that the order appealed
from, in so far as it denied the application for summary
judgment dismissing the complaint as to Ringle, must be
reversed.

By the Court—That part of the order denying summary
judgment as to the appellant Universal Underwriters is
affirmed ; and that part of the order denying summary judg-
ment as to the appellant Ringle is reversed, and cause re-
manded with directions to enter judgment dismissing the
complaint as to him. The respondents shall be entitled to
tax costs.

Faircuitp, J. (concurring). Quin v. Hoffmann
(1954), 265 Wis. 636, 62 N. W. (2d) 423, held that
permission given to an unlicensed driver is not “permission”
as used in the statutory omnibus coverage clause. In my
opinion that decision should be overruled. It was apparently
considered that sec. 204.30 (3), Stats., was not enacted for
the protection of persons injured but only for the benefit
of the additional assured. That was too narrow a view.
Ch. 349, Laws of 1955, effective July 8, 1955, changed the
tule of Quin v. Hoffmann but the instant case arose before

that date. On the basis of the foregoing, I agree that the
order as to Universal Underwriters should be affirmed. I
agree with reversal as to Ringle for the reason stated by the
majority.

Because the foregoing is a sufficient basis for the result,
T express no opinion as to the theory upon which the majority
opinion is based. With reference, however, to the discussion
of Pulvermacher v. Sharp, ante, p. 371, 82 N. W. (2d) 163,
set forth in the majority opinion, the following observation
is pertinent. Counsel in the Pulvermacher Case did not
attack the validity of the policy provision excluding from
coverage afforded to an additional. assured his liability to a
named assured. Such validity was evidently considered
established in Frye v. Theige (1948), 253 Wis. 596, 34
N. W. (2d) 793. Although the opinion in the Frye Case
sought to distinguish Schenke v. State Farm Mut. Automo-
bile Ins. Co. (1944), 246 Wis. 301, 16 N. W. (2d) 817,
the principle of the Schenke Case was in my opinion correct
and controlling. The court ought to return to it. The ex-
clusion of liability to a named assured causes an additional
assured to enjoy less protection than the policy gives the
named assured and violates sec. 204.30 (3), Stats.

Carcitt Coat Company, Respondent, vs. VALENTINE,
Appellant.

April J—May 7, 1957.

599

601

For the appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of
Johns, Roraff, Pappas & Flaherty of La Crosse.

For the respondent there was a brief by Hale, Skemp,
Hanson & Schnurrer, and oral argument by Joseph D. Beck-
er, all of La Crosse.

SrEInLE, J. The defendant contends that the written
phrase in the contract “to be financed,” clearly indicates an
intention that the plaintiff would accept the purchase price
in the form of deferred payments, and that since the times
for payment are not fixed, the contract is indefinite as to
payment, and hence is invalid under the rule of Buck v. Pond
(1905), 126 Wis. 382, 105 N. W. 909; Poole v. Tannis
(1908), 137 Wis. 363, 118 N. W. 188, 118 N. W. 864;
and Bast v. Sproll (1922), 176 Wis. 371, 187 N. W. 223.
It is the position of the plaintiff that the contract calls for
cash payment from the defendant upon the completion of the
installation of the furnace.

It was the view of the small claims court, as expressed in
its decision, and which was sustained by the circuit court,
that “the complaint, construed in the most favorable light to
the plaintiff, is sufficiently definite and certain to state a
cause of action. The court feels that the method of payment
can, from the face of said contract, be interpreted to mean
that an immediate cash payment be made in full, and that the
phrase ‘to be financed’ can be construed to refer to financing
by other persons.”

We are of the opinion that considered as a whole, the
language of the contract is reasonably or fairly susceptible
of different constructions, and that it is therefore ambiguous.
Where there is ambiguity in a contract, the sense in which
the words therein are used is a question of fact. Woodall v.
Democrat Printing Co. (1947), 250 Wis. 348, 27 N. W.
(2d) 437. It is the rule that in determining the meaning of
a writing which is ambiguous, it is proper to receive evidence
to ascertain the situation and surrounding circumstances in
order that the court may put itself in the place of the parties
and then ascertain their intention. Jones v. Holland Furnace
Co. (1925), 188 Wis. 394, 206 N. W. 57.

Tf the language of an instrument is ambiguous, the court
is not restricted to a consideration of the face of the instru-
ment in ascertaining the intent of the parties. Ludtke v.
Compound School Dist. (1944), 246 Wis. 235, 16 N. W.
(2d) 562.

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by de-
murrer, every reasonable intendment and presumption is to
be made in favor of the complaint, and the plaintiff is en-
titled to all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from
the facts pleaded. Conrad v. Evans (1955), 269 Wis. 387,
390, 69 N. W. (2d) 478.

The court properly overruled the demurrer. If at the trial
it is established that by the words “to be financed” it was
intended that the seller was to accept payments in instalments,
and that it was not to be paid in cash by the buyer when the
installation was completed, then the doctrine of the cases
relied on by the defendant as.above referred to, will apply.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.

603

Knuta, Appellant, vs. Fmeriry & Casuatty Company oF
New York, Respondent.

April 9—May 7, 1957.

605

For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by
Paul Pike Pullen of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief by Bendinger, Hayes
& Kluwin, and oral argument by Bernard J. Hankin, all of
Milwaukee.

Wincert, J. Weare of opinion that the complaint states
a cause of action against the Surety Company.

Section 10 of the three-party contract provides that Fidel-
ity guarantees, covenants, and agrees with the city that
Donlen will well and truly perform the contract; “and that
the said party or parties of the second part [Fidelity] will
well and truly pay on demand to the said city of Milwaukee
any and all damages, and sums of money, which the said
party of the first part [Donlen] shall be liable to pay to the
said city under this contract or any clause or agreement
therein; and shall promptly make payment to each and every
person or party entitled thereto of all the claims for work or
labor performed and material furnished for or in or about
this contract.” (Italics ours.)

In the absence of anything to the contrary in the contract,
we construe the italicized clause as a promise by Fidelity to
pay directly any claim against Donlen for “work or labor
performed and material furnished for or in or about this
contract,” if Donlen shall fail to pay the same. It is thus a
contract for the benefit of the third persons who furnish
work, labor, or materials to Donlen “for or in or about” the
contract, and as such is enforceable in an action at law by a
third-party beneficiary who brings himself within its terms.

oS ems

Concrete Steel Co. v. Illinois Surety Co. 163 Wis. 41, 43, 46,
157 N. W. 543; Theodore J. Molzahn & Sons v. Maryland
Casualiy Co. 214 Wis. 603, 605, 254 N. W. 101. It is within
the city’s powers, and proper and commendable, to contract
for a performance bond broad enough in terms to protect
suppliers of services and materials whose claims are not lien-
able. R. Connor Co. v. Aetna Indemnity Co. 136 Wis. 13,
17, 115 N. W. 811; Builders L. & S. Co. v. Chicago B. & S.
Co, 167 Wis. 167, 172, 166 N. W. 320.

Fidelity argues that the only purpose of section 10 of the
contract is to protect the city, and that it should not be con-
strued as a contract for the benefit of third-party suppliers
of services or materials for the contract. We think, however,
that the express words of section 10, that the defendant shall
“promptly make payment to each and every person or party
entitled thereto of all the claims for work or labor performed
and material furnished” are too clear to admit of any such
construction. Ozaukee Sand & Gravel Co. v. Milwaukee, 243
Wis. 38, 9 N. W. (2d) 99, relied on by Fidelity, involved
only the interpretation of the very different language of sec.
289.53 (4), Stats. 1939, and held that a contract to supply
gravel unrelated to a specific construction project was not a
contract “for a public improvement” within the meaning of
that statute. The case is no authority for denying the quoted
words of section 10 their plain meaning as a promise for the
benefit of third persons.

It remains to consider whether plaintiff brings himself
within the class of persons to whose benefit the quoted prom-
ise extends. Does one who performs the service of hauling
and delivering the sand and gravel which the principal con-
tractor has contracted to furnish to the city have a claim “for
work or labor performed and material furnished for or in or
about this contract?’ We think he does,

In our view the transportation of sand and gravel to the
buyer is “work . . . performed for or in or about” the con-

a a 607
Pe

tract to furnish the material; to wit, the work of hauling.
“Work” must mean something other than “labor,” other-
wise the expression “work or labor” is mere tautology.
Other things being equal, a construction which gives effect
to every word of the contract should be preferred to one
which results in surplusage. Dore v. Glenn Rock Mineral
Spring Co. 147 Wis. 158, 161, 132 N. W. 906. That the
legislature uses “work” as a much broader term than “labor”
in a somewhat comparable context is illustrated by a com-
parison of sec. 289.01 (2) (a), Stats., giving a lien to a
principal contractor “who performs any work,” etc., and sec.
289.02 (1), providing different lien protection for every per-
son other than a contractor “who furnishes labor.”

While Fidelity is a surety, it is a paid surety, and hence
its obligation is not to receive the strict construction to
which gratuitous sureties are entitled, but on the contrary
has the essential features of an insurance contract and is
subject to the rules of construction applicable to such con-
tracts. Building Contractors’ L. M. L. Ins. Co. v. Southern
S. Co. 185 Wis. 83, 87, 200 N. W. 770.

In sustaining Fidelity’s demurrer, the circuit court relied
on a number of decisions holding that a surety’s obligation
under a performance bond on a public improvement executed
pursuant to the requirement of sec. 289.16 (1), Stats. (for-
merly sec. 3327a), and in substantially the statutory lan-
guage, is limited to payment of such claims as are described
in that statute. Wisconsin Brick Co. v. National Surety Co.
164 Wis. 585, 160 N. W. 1044; Webb v. Freng, 181 Wis.
39, 194 N. W. 155; Southern Surety Co. v. Metropolitan
S. Comm. 187 Wis. 206, 201 N. W. 980, 204 N. W. 476.
Those cases were decided prior to the extensive amendment
of sec. 289.16 (1) by chs. 83 and 316, Laws of 1933, and
were based on the proposition that the bond, being given
pursuant to statutory mandate, was to be construed as cover-
ing only claims of the kind mentioned in the statute; and the

8
PE

coverage of the statute was in turn limited to claims of the
sort that would be lienable under the Mechanic’s Lien Law
in the case of a private construction project, since the pur-
pose of sec. 289.16 was to extend to contractors, laborers,
and materialmen on a public work protection comparable to
that given by the Mechanic’s Lien Law on private construc-
tion.

Under the rationale of those cases claims of many kinds
for services or commodities furnished to public contractors
were held to be “nonlienable” and not recoverable from the
contractor’s bondsman. To the cases cited may be added
White v. United States F. & G. Co. 216 Wis. 173, 256
N. W. 694, where a trucker who hauled materials on a
county construction job was held not entitled to a “lien”
under sec. 289.16, Stats. 1929, and hence not entitled to re-
covery under the bond required by that statute. Other com-
parable cases are reviewed in Osgood Co. v. Peterson
Construction Co, 231 Wis. 541, 545, 286 N. W. 54.

We do not think that that line of cases is controlling of
the present one. Here the bond is not given pursuant to the
requirement of sec. 289.16 (1), Stats., which applies only
when the contract “pertains to or is for or in or about any
public improvement or public work of whatsoever kind.”
The contract now before us is not directly related to any
public improvement or public work, but merely calls for the
sale and delivery of commodities not earmarked for use on
any particular project. Hence it is not a contract for a
“public improvement or public work.” Ozaukee Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Milwaukee, 243 Wis. 38, 9 N. W. (2d) 99;
Standard Oil Co. v. Clintonville, 240 Wis. 411, 414, 3 N. W.
(2d) 701. Therefore sec, 289.16 (1) is not applicable.

Since the obligation now in suit was not required by sec.
289.16 (1), Stats., there is no reason to construe it as limited
in coverage to the statutory requirement. Moreover, it is
broader in terms than sec. 289.16 (1), which requires that

| ee 609

the bond be conditioned on payment of all claims “for labor
performed, and materials furnished for or in or about or
under such contract, to be used or conswmed im making such
public improvement or performing such public work.” By
section 10 of the contract in suit, the surety agrees to make
payment to each person entitled thereto “of all the claims
for work or labor performed and material furnished for or
in or about this contract,” without limitation to use or con-
sumption in making a public improvement or performing a
public work. Even in the case of a bond given pursuant to
sec. 289.16 (1), if its terms are substantially broader than
the statute requires, it will be construed to cover claims not
“fienable” under the statute. Building Contractors’ L. M. L.
Ins. Co. v. Southern S, Co. 185 Wis. 83, 86, 200 N. W. 770;
Hunter Machinery Co. v. Southern Surety Co. 193 Wis. 218,
222, 214 N. W. 613.

The provision of section 16 of the present contract, that
the contract is made expressly subject to the provisions of
ch. 261, Laws of 1882, and laws amendatory and supple-
mental thereto, is immaterial to the construction of sec-
tion 10. The statute thus referred to, now sec. 26.11,
Milwaukee city charter (1934 ed.), provides that any person
furnishing “supplies or materials” for the use of a contractor
in the performance of any contract made with the board of
public works of the city of Milwaukee, in the name of the city,
or that shall do any labor for such contractor in the perform-
ance of such contract, shall have a lien, enforceable according
to a prescribed procedure. This statute requires no bond, and
the contract is not made with the board of public works, but
instead with the central board of purchases. See Worden-
Allen Co. v. Milwaukee, 171 Wis. 124, 176 N. W. 877.

By the Court——The order sustaining the demurrer of the
defendant Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York and
the judgment dismissing the complaint as to said defendant
are reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer.

0 ee
Ld

Hrrpar, Appellant, vs. Jounson, Defendant: Frogtity &
CasuaLty Company or New York, Respondent.
Wavuxesua Brock Company, Inc., Appellant, vs. Joun-
son, Defendant: Fineriry & CasuaLty CoMPANY OF

New York, Respondent. [Two cases.]

April 9—May 7, 1957.

ee
Le]

For the appellants there was a brief and oral argument by
A. L. Tilton of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief by Bendinger, Hayes

& Kluwin, and oral argument by Bernard J. Hankin, all of
Milwaukee.

Wincert, J. These are companion cases to Knuth v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., ante, p. 603, 83 N. W. (2d) 126,
and are governed by the decision in that case. The four cases
were heard together in the circuit court, and in each case
the court sustained the demurrer of the Fidelity & Casualty
Company of New York to the complaint and entered judg-
ment dismissing the complaint as to that company. The ap-
peals were argued together and the parties have stipulated
that they involve the same questions of law.

Each case involves a contract by a dealer in sand and
gravel to furnish those commodities to the city of Milwaukee,
to which contract the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New
York was a party, and by section 10 of which Fidelity guar-
anteed performance of the contract by the dealer, and also
agreed to “promptly make payment to each and every person
or party entitled thereto ofall the claims for work or labor

a | 611

performed and material furnished for or in or about this
contract.” In all material respects the contract is the same
as that in the Knuth Case. Each of the plaintiffs asserts an
unpaid claim against the principal contractor (the dealer)
and seeks recovery thereof from Fidelity by virtue of the
quoted provision of section 10.

In the Hribar Case, plaintiff’s claim is for trucking serv-
ices furnished to the principal contractor, while in the Wau-
kesha Block Co. Cases the plaintiff claims the price of gravel
sold by it to the principal contractor. While the complaints
are not clear on the point, the parties and the court appear
to have assumed that Hribar’s trucking services were related
to and in aid of performance of the principal contractor’s obli-
gation to the city under the contract, and that the gravel
sold by Waukesha Block Company to the principal contractor
went to the city under the contract. For present purposes we
accept that interpretation. Thus viewed, the Hribar Case is
on all fours with Knuth v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., while the
Waukesha Block Co. Cases differ only in the fact that instead
of furnishing trucking services to the principal contractor,
the plaintiff furnished gravel.

We consider that the claim of Waukesha Block Company
for the price of gravel sold to the principal contractor to en-
able him to perform his contract stands on the same footing
as the claims of Knuth and Hribar for services in transport-
ing the gravel. Section 10 of the contract in suit obligates
Fidelity to “make payment to each and every person or party
entitled thereto of all the claims for work or labor performed
and material furnished for or in or about this contract.”
No distinction is discernible between gravel sold by Wauke-
sha Block Company which was “material furnished for” the
contract, and the trucking services of Knuth and Hribar,
which were “work .. . performed . . . for” the contract.

By the Court.—In each case the order-.sustaining the de-
murrer of the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York and

the judgment dismissing the complaint as to said defendant
are reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

Burcine, Respondent, vs. Burtine, Appellant.

April 9—May 7, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by
D. Sutherland of Fond du Lac.

es

For the respondent there was a brief by Lehner & Lehner
of Princeton, and oral argument by Philip Lehner, Sr.

FarrcHixp, J. At common law, and in early years under
the code, a plaintiff had the absolute right to discontinue an
action before or after issue joined and without leave of court.
Berischy v. McLeod, 32 Wis. 205, 210. Later decisions,
however, recognize certain qualifications upon plaintiff's
right to discontinue. Leave to discontinue may be denied,
in the discretion of the court, if the rights of defendant, third
parties, or the public will be substantially prejudiced by
discontinuance. State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis.
226, 233, 82 N. W. 158; School District v. Clifeorn, 133
Wis. 465, 467, 112 N. W. 1099; Anderson v. Horlick’s
Malted Milk Co. 137 Wis. 569, 572, 119 N. W. 342; Guin-
ther v. Milwaukee, 217 Wis. 334, 258 N. W. 865. Ina
divorce action it has been held that plaintiff husband was
not entitled to an unconditional discontinuance, but the court
had discretion to require him to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred in defense of the action as a condition. Schulz v.
Schulz, 128 Wis. 28, 31, 107 N. W. 302.

Because plaintiff’s right to discontinue is not absolute, and
it is the duty of the court to exercise discretion, we consider
that a plaintiff's motion for dismissal should be heard upon
notice. There was no notice to defendant in the case before
us, and the order of dismissal must therefore be reversed.
We conclude that plaintiff's motion for dismissal will still
be before the circuit court, to be heard upon notice: Defend-
ant will thus have an opportunity to present her position to
the circuit court. She has asserted here that she is prejudiced
by the dismissal because (1) her motion that plaintiff be ad-
judicated in contempt has not been decided, (2) she has had
no opportunity to refute charges made against her in con-
nection with plaintiff's motion for a blood test, and (3) she

a ee 615
Cd

has not been awarded costs. We leave the merits of these
assertions to the circuit court.

The notice of appeal included the “failure” of the circuit
court to act on two maiters. In a proper case, upon proper
application for exercise of the superintending control of this
court over others, an appropriate writ may be issued com-
pelling a circuit court to dispose of a pending matter. Ap-
peals are taken from orders or judgments. An “appeal” from
inaction accomplishes nothing, and only the order of dis-
missal is before us on this appeal.

By the Court—Order reversed, cause remanded for fur-
ther proceedings upon plaintiff's motion to dismiss.

Marteson and another, Appellants, vs. Jounson and
another, Respondents.*

April 10—May 7, 1957.

* Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on June 26, 1957.

For the appellants there were briefs by Frank L. Morrow
of Eau Claire for the Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,

r es 617

and by Doar & Knowles of New Richmond for Vera Matte-
son, and oral argument by Mr. Morrow and Mr. Warren P.
Knowles LI.

For the respondents there was a brief by William A. Cam-
evon and Howard W. Cameron of Rice Lake, and oral argu-
ment by William A. Cameron.

Martin, C. J. Coverage A under Insuring Agreement I
of the policy in question reads:

“To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be-
cause of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death
at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of the automobile.”

The definition of “insured” under Insuring Agreement III
provides:

“With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability
and for property-damage liability the unqualified word
‘insured’ includes the named insured and also includes any
person while using the automobile and any person or organ-
ization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the
actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or
spouse or with their permission. . .

Under Exclusions it is provided:

“This policy does not apply: . . .

“(e) under coverage A, to any obligation for which the
insured or any company as his insurer may be held liable
under any workmen’s compensation law, or to bodily injury
to or death of any person who is a named insured;

“(£) under coverage A, to liability to any employee with
respect to injury to or death of another employee of the same
employer injured in the course of such employment in an
accident arising out of the maintenance or use of the auto-
mobile in the business of such employer; . . .”

Co

Appellants contend that exclusion clause (f) is void as not
permitted by sec. 204.30 (3), Stats., and is therefore re-
pugnant to it.

In holding the clause valid, the trial court relied almost
entirely upon Schneider v. Depies (1954), 266 Wis. 43, 62
N. W. (2d) 431. A careful comparison of the exclusion
clause in that case and the one in the instant case discloses
that they differ in a very material way. In the Depies Case
the exclusion applied to any employee with respect to injury
to another employee; in this case the exclusion applies to
liability to any employee with respect to injury to another
employee. If exclusion clause (f) read, “to liability of any
employee, etc.,” the clause would be substantially the same
as that held valid in the Depies Case and would exclude from
coverage the liability of the driver with permission, Johnson,
with respect to the injury to his coemployee Matteson. As
the language stands, however, it has no application to the
situation here because liability to the plaintiff- Matteson is
with respect to Matteson’s injury, not with respect to the
injury of another employee.

Although the rule is that courts should construe all pro-
visions of a contract, if possible, to give effect to all, there
is another rule that doubtful provisions should be construed
against the party preparing the contract, and this should be
particularly true of exclusions in an insurance policy.

We must hold that the language of exclusion clause (f)
does not exclude liability to Vera Matteson with respect to
her own injury nor does it exclude any liability of Richard
Johnson with respect to Matteson’s injury. The result is
that the driver with permission is covered by the policy while
under exclusion clause (e) the named insured is not; but, as
stated in Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines (1954), 268
Wis. 233, 67 N. W. (2d) 297, where a similar result was
reached, sec. 204.30 (3), Stats., is not violated if a policy

a ee 619

gives to an additional insured more Protection than it af-
fords the named insured.

While it has no bearing on the decision on the merits, it
is to be noted that the same attorneys appear for Richard
Johnson and General Casualty Company and that a very sub-
stantial conflict of interest exists as between these two parties
on this appeal. True, Johnson’s interests coincided with those
of the plaintiffs in this situation, but Johnson had no con-
trol or authority over plaintiffs’ attorneys and they owed no
duty to him. To condone such a practice is dangerous, and
the trial court should not have permitted it. The point upon
which this case is decided was not raised by counsel on either
side. If it had been noted by respondents’ attorneys, what
would their duties have been? To whom were their loyalties
owed? It might well be that had Johnson been répresented
by counsel solely concerned with his interests, the difference
between the exclusion clause in the Depies Case and that in
the instant case would have been called to the attention of
the court.

By the Court—Judgment reversed, and cause remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Bese, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Larson and another,
Defendants and Appellants.

Harper, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Larson and another,
Defendants and Appellants: Beur, Impleaded Defend-
ant and Respondent.

Nerpa#1, Plaintiff, vs. Harper and others, Defendants and
Respondents: Larson and another, Defendants and Ap-
pellants.

April 10—May 7, 1957.

Ld

For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Hannan,
Johnson & Goldschmidt, attorneys, and Herbert L. Wible
of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr.
Wible.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by Gaynor
& Hughes of Plymouth, attorneys, and James W. Lane of
Milwaukee of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. James R.
Hughes and Mr. Lane.

For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Hold-

en & Schlosser of Sheboygan, and oral argument by Wayne
W. Schlosser.

Broaproor, J. Larson left his home in Milwaukee to
attend a dance at Schmit’s pavilion south of the intersection
of State Trunk Highway 141 and County Trunk Highway
Q. His wife sat in the front seat of the car with him and
two nieces and a nephew, all adults, occupied the rear seat
of the car. Larson described the area around the pavilion
by stating that at the south line of Highway Q and proceed-
ing in a southerly direction the first building is a garage
with a gasoline pump in front of it. South of the garage is
a small empty lot. The Schmit house is located south of the
empty lot, then comes the tavern, then the dance hall, and
then a number of motel cottages. Larson testified that he
drove north on State Trunk Highway 141, a three-lane
highway, from Milwaukee. About 800 feet south of the in-
tersection with Highway Q there is the crest of a hill. After
crossing the crest of the hill, and about 200 feet below it, he
turned left into the center lane after giving a left-turn signal

+: es
Lt

with his hand and arm. His car was not equipped with di-
rectional signals. He was looking for a parking place in
front of one of the buildings on the west side of the highway.
He selected a parking spot next to the gasoline pump in front
of the garage and turned to his left without further signal.
He testified that he looked in his rear-vision mirror just
before making the turn but did not see the lights of the
tractor-trailer unit until it was opposite his left rear wheel.
The collision between the right front of the tractor and the
left front of the automobile occurred immediately.

Behr had driven the tractor-trailer unit to Chicago and
was on his return trip to Plymouth. His cousin was his
helper on the trip and rode in the cab with him. He was
traveling north on State Trunk Highway 141. His testi-
mony is that as he came over the crest of the hill he saw the
Larson automobile parked or stopped on the east side of
the highway with the left wheels on the concrete and the
right wheels on the shoulder. Another car was proceeding
ahead of him in a northerly direction and it passed the Lar-
son car. He testified that he signaled with his lights, blew
his horn, and turned to his left into the center lane and
proceeded north. As he approached the Larson car it turned
suddenly to the left. He again blew his horn, flashed his
lights, set his brakes, and swung to his left to avoid the
collision. The Larson car was spun around and after the
collision it faced in a northwesterly direction. The tractor-
trailer stopped a short distance north of the intersection, the
tractor facing in a northwesterly direction. Following the
collision the trailer jackknifed and struck the cab with such
force that Behr was thrown from the cab and the tractor
wheels ran over him, inflicting serious injuries.

Prior to the accident a county traffic policeman was travel-
ing south in the west lane of the highway. He testified that
he saw the Larson car either stopped or proceeding very
slowly on the east side of the highway and that he saw a car

a | 625
Ld

pass the Larson car and proceed north. He saw the tractor-
trailer unit flash its lights and turn into the center lane and
saw the Larson car turn abruptly in front of the tractor-
trailer unit.

The appellants had requested two additional questions to
be included in the special verdict with respect to the negli-
gence of Behr. The first one was whether Behr was negli-
gent with respect to keeping a proper lookout and the second
to inquire with respect to his negligence in passing Larson’s
automobile under the conditions then existing. In connection
with the passing question they also requested an instruction
based on sec. 85.16 (6), Stats. 1951, which read as follows:

“Tt shall be unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to
overtake and pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same
direction at any steam, gas, or electric railway grade crossing
or at an intersection of highways unless permitted to do so
by a traffic officer or upon  ighways which are properly
marked by traffic lanes; . .

The appellants contend that the court erred in failing to
include those questions in the special verdict and to give the
requested instruction. It is first contended that it was neces-
sary to submit the questions because they had pleaded such
negligence by Behr. The mere fact that issues are raised by
the pleadings does not mean that they must be included in the
special verdict. In a recent opinion, Bell v. Duesing, ante,
pp. 47, 53, 80 N. W. (2d) 821, this court said:

“In drafting a special verdict the trial court must first
consider the issues raised by the pleadings. He should then
eliminate from the issues so raised those that are determined
by the evidence on the trial by admissions, by uncontradicted
proof, or by failure of proof. Only those remaining should
go to the jury.”

The appellants next contend that upon cross-examination
Behr testified he was probably engaged in conversation with
his cousin prior to the accident and that just before the col-

26 es
es

lision his cousin said “Look out.” It is contended from these
admissions the jury might draw inferences that Behr was
not looking. Drivers are not prohibited from conversing
with other persons in a vehicle and the fact that they are do-
ing so would not justify a legitimate inference that they were
not looking ahead and seeing everything to be seen in front
of the vehicle. With a collision inevitable, as here, the fact.
that the passenger in a vehicle shouts “Look out” would not
justify such an inference. It was a natural exclamation under
the circumstances. Behr had testified that he had the Larson
car under observation at all times after he came over the
crest of the hill. His description of the movement of the
Larson automobile was corroborated by the testimony of
the traffic officer. From a careful reading of the record we
would have been unable to permit an affirmative answer
to the lookout question to stand had it been submitted.

The appellants contend that Behr violated the provisions
of sec. 85.16 (6), Stats. 1951, which are quoted above, by
arguing that the collision occurred within or at the intersec-
tion. It is true that the word “at” often is defined as “near.”
However, the statute was a penal statute, the penalty appear-
ing in sec. 85.91. This requires a strict construction of the
word “at” and without evidence that the collision occurred
within the intersection no violation was shown. Neither ve-
hicle reached the intersection prior to the collision and Lar-
son’s automobile did not reach the intersection either before
or after the collision. As this was admittedly a three-lane
highway, it is probable that passing within the intersection
was permissible under the rules stated in Topham v. Casey,
262 Wis. 580, 55 N. W. (2d) 892. It is unnecessary, how-
ever, to determine that question. The appellants injected into
the record some evidence that the highway up to a point
some 10 or 15 feet south of the intersection was zoned for
no passing in either direction. When such testimony was
first offered there was an objection to it on the ground that

a ae 627
Po

it was not material to the issues in the case since it had not
been pleaded that Behr was negligent in attempting to pass
in a no-passitig zone. The trial court admitted the testimony
over the objection, although the objection was valid and
should have been sustained. Later other evidence to the same
effect came in without objection but it is still not an issue
in the case and the testimony is immaterial.

It is further contended that the medical proof was insuf-
ficient to establish whether a chest complication suffered by
Behr was due to an embolism or to pneumonia. From the
first X rays taken it was difficult to determine the cause of
the chest condition. However, after the doctor had treated
the patient throughout, it was his opinion that his disability
was caused by a blood clot from a damaged pelvic vein going
to the lung to form a pulmonary embolism. The only error
we find was when the court permitted the plaintiff Behr, over
objection, to testify that a piece of bone got into the blood
stream and that formed a blood clot that got into his lung.
This was clearly improper testimony but cannot be said to
be prejudicial in view of the medical testimony.

It is further contended that the plaintiff Behr did not
establish his loss of wages by proof to the required degree
of certainty. We can find no error in that regard. There
was testimony which the jury was at liberty to believe that
would justify the award of damages for that item. No pas-
sion or prejudice is evident and in fact the award for pain
and suffering was conservative to say the least, and cer-
tainly the award for permanent injuries was well supported
by the evidence.

The appellants finally contend that the instruction given
by the trial court as to Larson’s duty to observe the head-
lights of the truck was unwarranted and prejudicial. We do
not so find, but the instruction under the circumstances could
not be held to be prejudicial because if Larson had not been
found causally negligent as to lookout the result would have

been the same, since no negligence was found on the part of
Behr. The verdict is supported by competent testimony and
the verdict supports the judgments appealed from.

By the Court—The judgment in each case is affirmed.

Suzrt, Respondent, vs. Susrr, Appellant.
April 10—May 7, 1957.

a be 629
Le

For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by
Oscar Rademacher of Medford.

0
Lr :

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by
Francis R. Parks of Rice Lake.

Brown, J. The appeal challenges the merits of the trial
court’s findings both in respect to its denial of a divorce to
the husband and in its award of custody. These findings
are:

“7, That neither of the parties hereto sustained their bur-
den of proof as to the allegations which would have entitled
either of them to a divorce and that it is not fit and proper
for a divorce to be granted either of the parties. That neither
of the parties hereto are fit and proper persons to have the
care, custody, and control of the minor children. That Mrs.
Ben Walker of Rice Lake, Wisconsin, the maternal grand-
mother of the children of the parties, is a fit and proper
person to have the care and custody of the children. That
Mrs. Ben Walker is a resident of the state of Wisconsin
and willing to receive and properly care for such children,
and that the granting of their custody to her will promote
the welfare of the children.”

Findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed on ap-
peal unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear
preponderance of the evidence. Gordon v. Gordon (1955),
270 Wis. 332, 339, 71 N. W. (2d) 386. The weight of the
evidence and the credibility thereof were matters entirely
within the province of the court as the trier of the facts. Id.,
page 340.

The trial was protracted and the record is voluminous.
We have examined it all. The parties were married in 1946
when the girl was nineteen and the man about twenty-four.
They came from farm families. When they had been mar-
ried a few years they bought a 40-acre farm near Rice Lake
in joint tenancy with money Mr. Subrt inherited from his
parents. They paid $2,600 in cash and gave a mortgage of
$2,500 for the balance. They worked the farm together when
Mr. Subrt was at home, and he also worked a nine-hour
day in a mill in near-by Rice Lake. While he was so em-

a Ce 631
Td

ployed Mrs. Subrt did a man’s work in the cattle barn and in
the fields, trading her labor on other farms when necessary
to get additional labor on her own. By industry and thrift
they paid the mortgage in two and one-half years and at the
time of the trial had accumulated approximately $750 in a
joint bank account, $700 in cash kept in the house, eight
head of dairy cattle, some farm machinery, and two auto-
mobiles. The parties have two children, boys, who at the
date of the trial, in March and June, 1956, were ten and
eight years old. They are healthy, well-cared for, and attend
school. Mrs. Subrt had been born and raised a Roman
Catholic. Her husband described himself a free-thinker
which, he said was a person who did not believe in a personal
God or in the immortality of the soul but whose religion was
“Do unto others as they do unto you.” (Sic.)

In January, 1956, Mrs. Subrt took a few personal be-
longings, $700 in cash, an automobile, and the two children
and went to live with her mother in Rice Lake. She com-
menced this action the same day. She charges her husband
with parsimony so extreme that it impairs the well-being of
herself and the children and with interference in the practice
of the religion in which she was raised and in which she
wishes to raise the children. He accuses her of misconduct
with other men and with neglecting her duties as wife and
mother by frequenting taverns when he is away at work.

A recitation of the evidence material to the controversial
findings, as already quoted, would benefit no one. It is
obvious from these findings that the trial court either dis-
believed the testimony upon which the husband relied or did
not draw from it the inferences which the husband thought
should be drawn, It is that court’s function to determine
the probative effect of the evidence. This record does not
permit us to say that offenses by the wife of sufficient gravity
are established with such certainty that the refusal of the trial
court to grant the husband a divorce is reversible error.

6.

It is unnecessary to comment on the evidence in support
of Mrs, Subrt’s complaint, for she has not appealed from
the judgment or otherwise attacked the findings.

The custody issue is more complex. In the absence of an
appeal by Mrs. Subrt we need consider it only from the
standpoint of her husband. In the first place, he submits
that, in divorce, jurisdiction to determine custody of children
is limited by statute to those cases in which the divorce is
granted. When the present judgment was rendered, June 26,
1956, the applicable statute read:

“247.24 JUDGMENT; CARE AND CUSTODY, ETC., OF MINOR
cHILpREN. In rendering a judgment of nullity of marriage
or for divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from
bed and board, the court may make such further provisions
therein as it shall deem just and proper concerning the care,
custody, maintenance, and education of the minor children
of the parties, and give the care and custody of the children
of such marriage to one of the parties to the action, or may,
if the interest of any such child shall demand it, and if the
court shall find that neither of the parents is a fit and proper
person to have the care and custody of any such child, give
the care and custody of such child to any fit and proper
person, who is a resident of this state and willing to receive
and properly care for such child, or to any institution in-
corporated for such purposes and willing and authorized to
receive and care for such child, having due regard to the age
and sex of such child... .”

Our decision in Dovi v. Dovi (1944), 245 Wis. 50, 13
N. W. (2d) 585, is not in accord with appellant’s contention.
There we held that a court of equity in which action for
divorce is pending has the inherent jurisdiction to protect
the interest of the child of the parties whether the divorce is
granted or not, and jurisdiction to determine custody in
accordance with the child’s interest is neither dependent upon
statute, nor limited by it. The Dovi divorce action was
brought in the circuit court while the instant action is in
county court but that is immaterial here because ch. 154,

a | 633
Lt

Laws of 1927, with certain exceptions not involved at present,
made the county court of Barron county “a court of general
jurisdiction, with the same power and jurisdiction as have
been heretofore, are now, or may hereafter be conferred by
the constitution or statutes of this state upon the circuit
courts of the state.” (Wis. Anno. (1950), p. 1623, sec.
1(3).) Therefore we conclude that the trial court had juris-
diction to determine the custody of the two children and only
its discretion in making the order of custody is in question
now.

In custody cases it is impossible to fix rules which are in-
flexible. Each case must be considered in the light of all the
facts and circumstances that appear in the record. The
welfare of the child is the paramount and controlling con-
sideration in determining the custody of a minor child. In
reviewing custody cases this court relies heavily upon the
determination of the trial court and, except in the very few
cases where there is a clear abuse of discretion, the court’s
order should prevail. These fundamental principles have
been stated often and recently, as in Dodge v. Dodge (1955),
268 Wis. 441, 67 N. W. (2d) 878, and reiterated in State
ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler (1955), 270 Wis. 469, 71 N. W.
(2d) 376. The latter case also recognizes the obvious fact
that the prospective home surroundings of the children, the
character of those who would associate with them, and their
opportunities for education and moral training are matters
proper to be considered by the court.

In the case at bar the trial court does not indicate the
evidence on which it relied in finding that Mr. Subrt is an
unfit person to have custody of his children. There is evi-
dence in the record, however, that would support the finding.
Mrs. Subrt testified that the children are afraid of their
father and hated to see him come home; that his parsimony
deprived them of sufficient food and clothing; that much
of the clothing they did have was from her mother. With

3

consent of counsel the court took the children into chambers
and talked privately with them. This consent implies consent
that the court may consider whatever was revealed there.
We do not know what the court learned from the children
nor what part, if any, of Mrs. Subrt’s testimony it believed.
It only tells us that the children bore no ill will toward either
parent and that since they had lived with their grandmother
they were attending church regularly and were very happy
about it. But it is in evidence without contradiction that
Mr. Subrt had no plans at all for the children’s moral educa-
tion. For their physical welfare his plan was to hire some
respectable woman who would keep house for him and them.
These are very young boys, needing love and security. There
is a complete absence of evidence of any care or any affection
that he ever bestowed on either of them or any interest
he has in them other than to keep them from their mother.
Relying heavily, as we must, upon the determination of the
trial court, we consider that the record supports the court’s
finding regarding the fitness of the father to be granted their
custody. Concerning the grandmother to whom custody is
awarded, no attack is made upon her personal fitness but it
is submitted that her home is unfit because of the unfitness
of their mother who will reside there, too. All the testimony
shows that Mrs. Subrt gave the children good care in her
own home. The offenses with which her husband charged
her (which the trial court did no# find she committed) at any
rate did not occur in the children’s presence. The court
could reasonably believe that Mrs. Subrt’s behavior in her
mother’s home would not be harmful to her sons. If later
developments show the hope to be vain, suitable modifications
may be made in the order for custody. Certainly, the situa-
tion is far from ideal but under all the circumstances we
conclude that the trial court’s determination of the custody
question, as well as its disposition of the merits of divorce,
was within a permissible exercise of its discretion.

|| ee 635
Po

Discretionary, too, is the allowance by the trial court of
attorney fees and suit money to the plaintiff, and the amount
of support money to be paid by the defendant while custody
of his children is intrusted to their grandmother. We find
no abuse.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.

FaircHitp, J. (dissenting in part). I agree with the
affirmance of the judgment except on the matter of custody.
Much of the testimony which tended to cast an unfavorable
light upon the husband and wife must have been disbelieved
by the trial court or else considered to have been explained
away or else thought to establish facts not sufficiently serious
to be grounds for divorce. Upon that state of the record we
cannot determine whether there was a sufficient basis for
the findings of the trial court that the husband is unfit to
have custody nor that it is for the best interest of the children
that they be with the grandmother. In my opinion the part
of the judgment relating to custody and payment of support
money should be reversed, and the cause remanded for addi-
tional findings upon the subject of custody.

I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice STEINLE joins in
this dissent.

CurriE, J. (dissenting). I concur in the dissenting
opinion filed by Mr. Justice Farrcw 1p in so far as the issue
of custody is concerned. However, I also dissent on the issue
of whether the court committed error in denying the defend-
ant husband a divorce on his counterclaim. This is because
Iam of the opinion that the finding of fact by the trial court
to the effect that the defendant husband had failed to prove
a case of cruel and inhuman treatment against the wife is
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the
evidence.

Wm. H. Hememann Creamertss, Inc., Appellant, vs.
Vitiace or Kewaskum and another, Respondents.

April 10—May 7, 1957.

For the appellant there was a brief by Marth & Marth of
West Bend, and oral argument by William J. Marth.

For the respondents there was a brief by O'Meara &
O’Meara of West Bend, and K. Wm. Haebig of Kewaskum,
and oral argument by Stephen M. O’Meara.

Curriz, J. The sole ground of attack voiced in the
plaintiff's complaint against the validity of the special assess-
ment is that the plaintiff received no benefit therefrom. The
plaintiff alleges that it received no benefit because the
sewerage-service charges comprising the same were for the
period of October 1, 1954, to September 30, 1955, and
the new sewage-treatment plant was not put into operation
until October 1, 1955.

a ee 639

Sub. (1) of sec. 66.076, Stats., provides that, in addition
to other methods whereby a village may finance improve-
ments to a sewage system, including a treatment plant, is
that of imposing “sewerage-service charges.” Sub. (4) of
such section further provides that the governing body of the
municipality may establish such charges either to pay the
whole or any part of the costs of such an improvement, or to
pay all or part of the principal and interest of any indebted-
ness incurred for the same. Sub. (5) permits the imposing
of classified charges taking into consideration the volume of
water passing into the sewage system, the character of the
sewage or waste discharged, and the use made of the sewage
system including the disposal plant. Sub. (7) requires that
such charges be collected and taxed, and be a lien upon
the property served, in the same manner that water rates
are under the provisions of sec. 66.069 (1) or sec. 66.071
(1) (e). Sub, (9) makes the public service commission the
proper agency to pass upon any complaint that the service
charges are unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory.

During the year embraced by the attacked assessment all
of the industrial wastes of the plaintiff were discharged by
it into the village sewage system. No greater or additional
sewage service, in so far as ridding plaintiff’s plant of its
industrial wastes is concerned, was furnished to the plain-
tiff after the completion of the new treatment plant on
October 1, 1955. The only change effected by such new
plant is that now the plaintiff's sewage is adequately treated
before being discharged into the river, while before it was
not because of the inadequacy of the prior treatment plant.

The plaintiff's brief cites a number of decisions of this
court to the effect that a special assessment, which is not
based upon benefits received by the assessed property, is un-
constitutional and void. The reason why a special assess-
ment in excess of benefits is unconstitutional was stated by

0
|

the United States supreme court in Norwood v. Baker
(1898), 172 U. S. 269, 279, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed.
443, as follows:

“In our judgment, the exaction from the owner of private
property of the cost of a public improvement in substantial
excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to the extent
of such excess, a taking, under the guise of taxation, of
private property for public use without compensation.”

We fail to see how such principle has any application to the
instant case. We are not here concerned with the amount
of the questioned assessment because the legislature has con-
stituted the public service commission as the exclusive tri-
bunal to pass on that issue. Our only jurisdiction is to
determine its legality, and, under the sole issue raised by the
plaintiff's complaint, we must uphold its validity if plain-
tiffs property benefited from the improvement.

While the plaintiff's property had not benefited from the
improvement during the year in which the questioned sewer-
age-service charges were imposed, there can be no question
but what it did benefit immediately upon the new treatment
plant being placed in operation on October 1, 1955. For one
thing, it was relieved thereby from the necessity of con-
structing separate treatment facilities -which otherwise would
have been required of it by the committee on water pollu-
tion and the state department of public health.

The case, therefore, seems to boil down to the narrow issue
of whether present benefit is an essential prerequisite, or may
future benefit be sufficient to sustain the assessment.

In Dickson v. Racine (1886), 65 Wis. 306, 27 N. W.
58, the court had before it a special assessment for the con-
struction of a street. Witnesses had testified that the mere
opening of the street, without the construction of a bridge
across the river at the end of the street, would confer no
benefit upon plaintiff's lots abutting on the street. The reason

a | 641

for the opening of the street was to make an approach to a
bridge, the construction of which was contemplated by the
defendant city in the near future, and the court found it was
almost a public necessity to have a bridge there. It was there
held that the jury might consider the enhancement in value
of plaintiff's lots due to this future construction of the
bridge in determining the amount of benefits to be assessed
against such lots.

We deem Dickson v. Racine, supra, to be authority for
the principle that future benefits may be considered in
sustaining the validity of a special assessment. However, in-
asmuch as the construction of the bridge had not been author-
ized at the time the special assessment was levied, such
case in this respect is contra to the weight of authority as
evidenced by an annotation in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669.
This is because benefits arising from improvements which
depend upon contingent future action of public authorities
should not be considered in assessing benefits. However,
in the instant case no such contingency is present because
the improvement had been authorized by the village board
and the contract let prior to the time the sewerage-service
charges were imposed.

The author of the annotation in 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 669,
lays down the test that the benefits necessary to sustain a
special assessment “must be substantial, certain, and capable
of being realized within a reasonable time.” Likewise, 14
McQuillin, Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), pp. 125-127, sec. 38.33,
states, “The fact that property will receive no present
benefit in the sense of actual use of the improvement will not
defeat the assessment if benefits are sure to be realized in a
reasonable time in the future.”

It is our considered judgment that the instant assessment
meets the test laid down by the foregoing authorities because
the benefit of the improvement to the plaintiff's property

2s
ee

. was sure to be realized within a reasonable time in the future
from the time when the questioned sewerage-service charges
were imposed.

By the Court—Judgment affirmed.