State: Washington
Volume: 200
Term: 1939-1939
Jurisdiction(s): Washington
Source: https://static.case.law/wash/200.pdf

[No. 27295. En Banc. August 3, 1939.]

Gerorce Breck et al., Respondents, v. A. E. Dvz et al.,
Appellants.*

"Reported in 92 P. (2d) 1113.

a

Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann and
Smith & Matthews, for appellants.

Shank, Belt, Rode & Cook, for respondents.

Sremert, J.—This is an action to recover damages for
personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian from the
impact of an automobile while crossing a street inter-
section. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for plain-
tiffs, husband and wife. Motions for new trial and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict having been
denied, judgment on the verdict was entered, from
which defendants, also husband and wife, have ap-
pealed. The plaintiff wife will be referred to herein-
after as though she were the sole respondent, and the
defendant husband will be referred to as though he
were the sole appellant.

As grounds for reversal, it is contended (1) that
respondent failed to prove any negligence of appellant
constituting the proximate cause of the injuries; (2)
that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law; and (3) that the court erred in ad-
mitting testimony regarding statements made by un-
identified bystanders shortly after the accident. The
first two contentions relate to the sufficiency and con-
clusive effect of the evidence, and will be considered
together.

HI A challenge by a defendant to the sufficiency
of the evidence admits the truth of plaintiff’s evidence
and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn there-
from, and requires that the evidence be interpreted

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most strongly against the defendant. Weinman v.
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 175 Wash. 73, 26 P.
(2d) 395; Buttnick v. J. & M., Inc., 186 Wash. 658, 59 P.
(2d) 750; White v. Consolidated Freight Lines, 192
Wash. 146, 73 P. (2d) 358; Vercruysse v. Cascade
Laundry Co., 193 Wash. 184, 74 P. (2d) 920; Perren v.
Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P. (2d) 867; Gibson v. Spokane
United Railways, 197 Wash. 58, 84 P. (2d) 349.

The facts, as the jury reasonably might have found
them in support of its verdict, may be stated thus: The
accident occurred on a Saturday afternoon at about
three o’clock, in the intersection of Third avenue and
Union street, which is in the down-town district of
Seattle. Third avenue runs in a northerly and south-
erly direction; Union street runs in an easterly and
westerly direction. Above the center of the intersection
is suspended an automatic traffic signal light, which
operates on a sixty-five second cycle, as follows: The
light remains green for north and south traffic, and red
for east and west traffic, for twenty-eight and one-half
seconds; it then turns red in all directions for a period
of four seconds, during the last two seconds of which a
bell rings; the light then turns green for east and west
traffic, continuing red for north and south traffic, and so
remains for twenty-eight and one-half seconds; it then
turns red again in all directions for another period of
four seconds, during the last two seconds of which the
bell rings.

Appellant was driving south along Third avenue
toward Union street; abreast of him was another auto-
mobile proceeding in the same direction. The green
signal light was in his favor until he arrived at a point
about one hundred thirteen feet north of Union street.
At the same time, respondent and about fifteen or
twenty other people were standing on the sidewalk at
the southwest corner of the intersection waiting for the

signal light to flash green for east and west traffic.
When the light changed to green, there was no auto-
mobile traffic within the intersection, and the group of
pedestrians moved forward, inside the lines of the
cross-walk, toward the opposite side of the street. The
respondent was in the front rank of four people and
“slightly ahead of the other three. The light having
turned red for north and south traffic, the automobile
which was abreast of appellant came to a stop. Ap-
pellant, however, continued into and across the inter-
section at a speed of about twenty-five miles per hour,
and without sounding his horn.

Ordinance No. 64692 of the city of Seattle provides:

“On streets where traffic at intersections is controlled
by traffic control signals or by police officers, pedes-
trians shall not cross a roadway against a red or
‘STOP’ signal and shall not cross at any place except
in a marked or unmarked crosswalk. A pedestrian
crossing or starting across in any such crosswalk on a
green or ‘GO’ signal shall have the right-of-way over
all vehicles, including those making turns, until such
pedestrian has reached the opposite curb, and it shall be
unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to fail to yield
the right-of-way to any such pedestrian.”

Appellant’s car, passing rapidly across the immediate
line of travel of the front rank of pedestrians, brushed
the coat of one of them and in all probability would
have struck two of them had not others hastily pulled
them backward. Respondent, who had then reached
a point in the street about ten feet from the west curb,
was evidently not aware of appellant’s approach and
was proceeding forward, when suddenly she came in
violent contact with the right side of appellant’s car,
as a result of which she was thrown to the pavement
and severely injured.

The evidence most favorable to appellant was to the
effect that he entered the intersection while the green

, a
light was still in his favor, that he was then traveling
about ten or fifteen miles per hour, and that, at the
time of the impact, his speed had been reduced to about
five or six miles per hour; that he did not see respondent
until just immediately before the impact; and that
respondent came from the curb, without looking to the
_ right or left, and walked directly against the side of his
car.

Obviously, there was a direct conflict in the evidence
with reference both to the negligence of appellant and
its causative effect and to respondent’s contributory
negligence. The jury reasonably might have believed
and adopted either version.

The rule is that where, on a controverted ques-
tion of fact, there is evidence, or there are justifiable
inferences from evidence, upon which reasonable minds
might reach different conclusions, the question be-
comes one of fact for the jury, and not for the court,
to decide. Ahrens v. Anderson, 186 Wash. 182, 57 P.
(2d) 410; Boyd v. Cole, 189 Wash. 81, 63 P. (2d) 931;
Corbaley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688, 74 P. (2d)
993; Gibson v. Spokane United Railways, 197 Wash.
58, 84 P. (2d) 349; Shephard v. Smith, 198 Wash. 395,
88 P. (2d) 601.

HB Appellant strenuously contends that respondent
at no time looked to her left, else she would have seen
appellant’s automobile; that she took no precaution for
her own safety, but walked blindly into the side of his
car. From this, he concludes that she was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The jury well may have believed that respondent
did what an ordinarily prudent person would have done
under like or similar circumstances, that appellant’s
failure to stop his car on seeing the continued approach
of the pedestrians was negligence, and that such neg-

a
ligence was the sole proximate cause of the injuries to
respondent.

Respondent had the right, under the circumstances,
to assume that no automobile would enter the inter-
section against a traffic signal and contrary to law, or
would interfere with her lawful progress when the
signal was in her favor, and she was entitled to rely
upon such assumption until she knew, or, in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care should have known, the con-
trary. Church v. Shaffer, 162 Wash. 126, 297 Pac. 1097;
Woods v. Greenblatt, 163 Wash. 433, 1 P. (2d) 880;
Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 45 P. (2d) 619.

In support of his contention, appellant cites a number
of cases, of which the one most pertinent here is Estill
v. Berry, 193 Wash. 10, 74 P. (2d) 482. In that case, a
pedestrian, on a dark, blustery night in December, was
proceeding from the southwest corner of a street inter-
section toward the opposite curb. At a point about ten
or twelve feet out in the street, she suddenly came in
contact with the right side of an automobile which,
coming from the north, was passing in front of her, and
as a result of the impact she was thrown some distance
on the pavement. We held that the pedestrian was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

That case, however, is distinguishable from this in
several respects. In the former case, there were no
signal lights regulating the flow of traffic at the par-
ticular place. The driver of the automobile in that
case, after stopping at the arterial sign on the north
side of the intersection, was proceeding across in low
gear, at a slow rate of speed, and was not violating any
traffic ordinance. The lights of his car were shining
and were plainly visible. The pedestrian was shielding
the left side of her face with her arm as a protection
against the weather. Her collision with the car was
not due to the negligence of the driver, for he was not

" Pe
guilty of any negligence, but was solely the result of
her failure to take reasonable precaution under the
existing circumstances.

In the case at bar, there was sufficient evidence to
support the verdict, and in arriving at its verdict the
jury must have found that the appellant was guilty of
one or more acts of negligence, and that respondent,
obedient to the traffic signal and moving with the crowd,
was exercising reasonable care. These distinguishing
facts make the Estill case inapplicable here.

Appellant’s remaining contention relates to the ad-
mission of certain testimony. A patrolman of the city
of Seattle testified that, while he was walking north
along Third avenue toward Union street, on the par-
ticular afternoon, his attention was attracted by a
woman lying unconscious in the street; near her stood
an automobile, the driver of which had alighted. The
officer did not witness the accident, nor did he know
how, or just when, it occurred. Upon seeing the woman
in the street, he immediately went to where she lay
and, shortly thereafter, with the assistance of appellant,
lifted her into the car and accompanied her and appel-
lJant to a hospital.

In the course of his examination, he was asked by
respondent’s counsel whether he had heard anyone at
the scene of the accident make any statement as to how
it had happened. The witness replied that he had, but
he did not know who the persons making the statements
were. Appellant’s counsel objected to further testi-
mony relative to the subject, upon the ground, among
others, that the persons had not been identified. The
court overruled the objection upon the theory that the
statements were part of the res gestae, but restricted
the testimony to statements made in the presence and
hearing of the appellant. The witness then testified as
follows:

“Q. In the presence of Mr. Dye when you went out in
the street there tell us what it was. A. Some of these
people said he went through the red light. Q. That was
the substance of their remarks? A. Yes, sir. They
stepped right over there. The Court: What, if any-
thing, did he say? The witness: He did not say any-
thing.”

Appellant now contends that these statements of un-
identified persons were not properly a part of the res
gestae, and that the court erred in admitting such testi-
mony.

Hl This court has had frequent occasion in the past
to consider the so-called res gestae rule with respect to
the admission of testimony concerning statements made
by participants in a transaction or by other persons
present thereat. We have taken the pains to examine
the cases on the subject as listed in the Washington
Digest Annotated, topic “Evidence,” key numbers 118
to 128 inclusive; we make. this reference only because
the cases are too numerous to set forth by specific cita-
tion in this opinion.

A careful examination of those cases, read chrono-
logically and as a whole, will reveal that the rule as
adopted, declared, and followed by this court requires
that the statement or declaration concerning which
testimony is offered must, in order to make such evi-
dence admissible, possess at least the following essential
elements: (1) The statement or declaration made
must relate to the main event and must explain, eluci-
date, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it
must be a natural declaration or statement growing
out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past,
completed affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact, and
not the mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a
spontaneous or instinctive utterance of thought, domi-
nated or evoked by the transaction or occurrence itself,

° a

and not the product of premeditation, reflection, or
design; (5) while the declaration or statement need
not be coincident or contemporaneous with the occur-
rence of the event, it must be made at such time and
under such circumstances as will exclude the presump-
tion that it is the result of deliberation, and (6) it must
appear that the declaration or statement was made by
one who either participated in the transaction or wit-
nessed the act or fact concerning which the declaration
or statement was made.

HI For the purposes of this case, it may be conceded
that the evidence offered by the patrolman possessed
the essentials of the first five requirements above stated.
However, the sixth essential is lacking. It was not
shown, nor is there evidence from which it reasonably
can be inferred, that the persons who are purported to
have made the statements saw the appellant drive into
the intersection against the red light. It is purely a
matter of speculation whether they themselves ob-
served the condition of the signal light or were even in
the vicinity when appellant drove into the intersection.
For aught that the record discloses, they may have
been repeating merely what others had told them, or
perchance reconstructing the initial occurrence from
what they finally saw. The evidence was not admis-
sible as a part of the res gestae, in the absence of a
showing that the declarants either participated in the
transaction or witnessed the act, or fact, concerning
which the declarations or statements were made. The
term “res gestae” is not a mere shibboleth by an indis-
criminate use of which every unsworn statement made
during a particular transaction or occurrence is to be
admitted. It is a doctrine which recognizes that, under
certain circumstances, a declaration may be of such
spontaneous utterance that, metaphorically, it is an

a .

event speaking through the person, as distinguished
from a person merely narrating the details of an event.

HI Respondent contends, however, that the evi-
dence was admissible as proving an admission by appel-
lant. The rule is that, where a definite statement of a

matter of fact is made in the presence or hearing of a
party, so that he understands it, in regard to facts af-
fecting him or his rights, and the statement is of such
a nature as to call for a reply, and the party addressed
is possessed of knowledge concerning the matter re-
ferred to, and is not physically disabled from answer-
ing, the statement, in connection with a total or partial
failure to reply, is admissible in evidence as tending to
show a concession of the truth of the facts stated. Mc-
Cord v. Seattle Elec. Co., 46 Wash. 145, 89 Pac. 491, 13
L. R.A. (N.S.) 349; 16 Cyc. 956; 22 C. J. 321, § 356.

Conceding that the statement, in this instance, was
of a definite fact, and assuming that appellant heard
and understood it, and was also possessed of knowledge
concerning the matter referred to, nevertheless, in our
opinion, the statement was not, under the circumstances,
of such a nature as to call for a reply from appellant.
Neither the appellant nor the patrolman were concerned.
at that time with the matter of determining who was to
blame for the accident; a woman lay unconscious in
the street, and the emergency required that their im-
mediate attention be devoted to obtaining medical aid
for her as speedily as possible.

The Washington motor vehicle act, in force at the
time of the accident, requires that the operator of any
vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to
any person shall render to such person reasonable as-
sistance, including the carriage or arrangements for
carriage of the person to a physician or hospital, if it is
apparent that medical treatment is necessary or if such
carriage is requested by the injured person or on his

as
behalf. Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-134 [P. C.
§ 2696-756] (Laws of 1937, chapter 189, p. 918, § 134).
It was the legal, as well as the moral, duty of appellant
to render the required assistance, and he was not called
upon to enter into a verbal combat with every by-
stander, at the risk of having his silence construed
against him in a court of law. Were this not so, then”
every one involved in a traffic accident, no matter how
seriously he may have injured some one else, or how
blameless he himself may have been, would be com-
pelled to hazard a dispute with every one who assumed
to charge him with a wrong, or else be regarded as
having admitted that the fault was his. We are not
inclined to announce such a rule.

The judgment is reversed, with direction to grant a
new trial.

Brats, Rosrnson, Sumpson, Mintarp, and Geracuty,
JJ., concur.

Jzrrers, J.(dissenting)—I am unable to agree with
the majority opinion that the testimony of officer
Floyd I. Green, relative to statements made by a by-
stander that “he [appellant] went through the red
light,” was not admissible as part of the res gestae,
under the facts in this case, and I therefore dissent from
the majority opinion.

Officer Green was only a short distance from the ac-
cident at the time it happened, and came upon the
scene while respondent was still lying in the street,
where she had been struck by appellant’s car. Officer
Green, with the help of appellant, placed respondent
in the car, and at that time, in response to a question
asked by Green, the above statement was made, by a
bystander unknown to Green.

The majority opinion states that such testimony, to
be admissible, must possess the following elements:

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“(1) The statement or declaration made must relate
to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in
some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a
natural declaration or statement growing out of the
event, and not a mere narrative of a past, completed
affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact, and not the
mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a spon-
taneous or instinctive utterance of thought, dominated
or evoked by the transaction or occurrence itself, and
not the product of premeditation, reflection, or design;
(5) while the declaration or statement need not be co-
incident or contemporaneous with the occurrence of
the event, it must be made at such time and under such
circumstances as will exclude the presumption that it is
the result of deliberation; and (6) it must appear that
the declaration or statement was made by one who
either participated in the transaction or witnessed the
act or fact concerning which the declaration or state-
ment was made.”

The majority opinion concedes that the evidence of-
fered possessed the essentials of the first five require-
ments, but is lacking in the sixth essential.

I agree with the majority opinion as to the essential
elements set out in the first five requirements, and I
also agree that the rule assumes that any such state-
ment, to be admissible, must be made by one who saw or
participated in the accident.

The majority opinion states that it was not shown,
nor is there evidence from which it reasonably can be
inferred, that the person who is purported to have made
the statement saw appellant drive through the red
light. It is true there is no positive statement by
declarant that he witnessed the accident, other than
the statement, “He went through the red light,” but,
keeping in mind that all the essential elements set out
in the majority opinion were present, unless it be that
it does not appear that declarant saw appellant drive

‘ as

through the red light, I am forced to the conclusion
that at least it is a reasonable inference that declarant
saw the act that he described, and that the statement
was therefore properly submitted to the jury.

The following rule is announced in 3 Jones Com-
mentaries on Evidence (2d ed.), 2220, § 1209:

“It is true that the language in a few cases would
seem to deny, or cast doubt upon, the admissibility of
declarations, as part of the res gestae, of mere by-
standers who are non-actors. But, as we have stated,
the majority of cases clearly hold that declarations of
mere bystanders are admissible when properly meeting
the general requirements of the doctrine.” (Italics
mine.)

The theory on which statements of this character are
received is stated in Jones on Evidence, supra, at p.
2223, § 1210:

“The theory upon which res gestae declarations of
the type here under discussion are admitted in evidence
without the sanctity of an oath is that such declarations
derive their credibility from the stress of circumstances
under which they are made and not from the trust-
worthiness of the person making them. Accordingly,
it may be stated as a general rule which follows natur-
ally from the logic upon which such declarations are
admitted, that competency of the declarant as a witness
is nota prerequisite to admissibility.” .

See, also, 10 R. C. L. 980, § 162; Kenney v. State, 79
S. W. (Tex. Crim. App.) 817.

In the early case of Britton v. Washington Water
Power Co., 59 Wash. 440, 110 Pac. 20, 33 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 109, cited by textwriters on this subject, and re-'
ferred to in practically all of the subsequent decisions
by this court, one of respondent’s witnesses, upon direct
examination, stated that, when the boy was observed
riding upon the steps, the conductor pulled the bell
cord and started to open the door, when someone said,

2S s*

“The boy is off.” This statement was stricken, on
motion of the respondent. This court held the state-
ment should have been admitted, and that, in striking
the statement, the trial court committed prejudicial
error. In the cited case, it does not appear that the
witness knew who the person that made the statement
was, nor does it appear, other than from the statement
made by the bystander that “The boy is off,” that he
saw the act he described, but certainly it is a reasonable
inference that the declarant did see the act he described.
If we are to indulge in any presumptions in favor of
respondents’ testimony to support the verdict herein, it
surely is a reasonable inference to draw from the facts
that the declarant in the instant case saw appellant go
through the red light.

This court has had this question before it in Heg v.
Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 Pac. 51; Mathewson v.
Olmstead, 126 Wash. 269, 218 Pac. 226; Field v. North
Coast Transportation Co., 164 Wash. 123, 2 P. (2d) 672,
76 A. L. R. 1114; and Duvall v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel
Co., 191 Wash. 417, 71 P. (2d) 567, but in none of these
cases, so far as I have been able to determine, does it
appear that the declarant saw the accident, other than
as that fact may be inferred from the declarant’s state-
ment, as in the case at bar.

It seems to me the majority opinion, instead of ad-
mitting all reasonable inferences in favor of the testi-
mony in question, indulges in speculation to sustain the
contention that the sixth essential necessary to make
the testimony admissible is lacking.

I am therefore of the opinion that the statement
testified to by officer Green as having been made by a
bystander meets all the requirements of the res gestae
rule, and was properly admitted by the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion in regard to the other
questions raised.

16

I think the judgment of the trial court based upon
the verdict of the jury was right, and should be af-
firmed.

Buakg, C. J., and Main, J., concur with Jerrmrs, J.

[No, 27566. Department Two. August 3, 1939.]

CreecH Bros. Contractine Company, Appellant, v.
Paciric County, Respondent.*

Fred M. Bond, for appellant.
J. Burke Welsh, for respondent.

Geracuty, J—The plaintiff brought this action to
recover from the defendant, Pacific county, a balance
alleged to be due under the terms of a contract entered

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 292.

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into by the parties for the erection of a bridge and ap-
proaches. The cause-was tried to the court without a
jury. Findings of fact were made, in which the court
found that there was due the plaintiff a balance of
$903.06, for which sum a judgment was entered in its
favor. The plaintiff, not being satisfied with the amount
of the award, appealed. The contract, made by the
parties August 4, 1937, was on a standard printed form,
which provided that the contractor was to “do all work
and furnish all materials” required to complete a bridge
across Fall river, in Pacific county. But this general
provision was qualified by certain special provisions
made a part of the contract. Under these, the county
was to furnish all the materials necessary for the proj-
ect. The labor and necessary equipment for perform-
ing the work were to be supplied by the contractor.
The contract was let on the basis of unit prices. The
contractor’s proposal, attached to and made a part of
the contract, specified the several units, quantities, and
bid prices as follows:

Approxi- ‘Unit

mate Bid
“Stem of Work Quantity Unit Price Amount
Removing existing bridge
and trestle approaches Lump
and cleaning site AU wee eee Sum 340.00
Structure Excavation 200 Cu.Yds. $1.25 250.00
Trestle Lumber in place 44.621 M.B.M. 16.00 713.94
Truss Lumber in place 10.587 M.B.M. 40.00 423.48
Total Amount of Bid $1727.42”

After completion and acceptance of the bridge, a
controversy arose in respect to the balance due the cori-
tractor. It had been paid one estimate of $850.54. The
complaint alleged that there was due a balance of
$1,114.86, in which was included an item of $40.11 for
extras. In its answer, the county admitted the full per-

aT

formance of the contract and alleged that there was due
the contractor a balance of $850.11.

Apart from a dispute as to some small items con-
tained in the contractor’s bill for extras, the difference
between the parties arose out of conflicting views as
to the classification of the lumber used in the project.
It is to be seen from the proposal that the contractor
was to be paid at the rate of $16 a thousand, board
measure, for trestle lumber in place, and $40 a thousand
for truss lumber in place. It will also be noted that the
estimated quantity of trestle lumber was 44,621 feet,
and truss lumber 10,587 feet, or a total of 55,208 feet.

That the total amount of timber used in the structure
was 57,678 feet, is not disputed. Of this amount, some
8,500 feet was used for the flooring and stringers of the
bridge proper, that is, the span supported by trusses
across the stream between the piers. The appellant
contends that the lumber used for stringers and flooring
should be classified as truss lumber and its installation
paid for at the rate of $40 a thousand, while the respond-
ent urges that it should be classified as trestle lumber,
payable at the rate of $16 a thousand.

The special provisions of the contract provided:

“Trestle LUMBER:

“The unit contract price per M.B.M. for Trestle Lum-
ber shall be for the handling and placing only of all
lumber, nails, hardware and other parts necessary to
the erection of the trestle approaches and frame bent
piers for the Howe Truss Span as shown by the plans,
which price shall include all labor, supervision, tools,
equipment and all other expenses incidental to the erec-
tion of the same.

“Truss LUMBER:

“The unit contract price per M.B.M. for Truss Lum-
ber shall be for the handling, framing and placing only
of all lumber, bolts, rods, washers, plates, angle blocks,
nails and all other parts necessary to the erection of the
Howe Truss Span as indicated by the plans, which price

CCU

shall include all labor, supervision, tools, equipment and
all other expenses incidental to the erection of the
same.”

HEME The appellant, contending that these special
provisions were plain and unambiguous and called for
no construction, objected, at the trial below, to the
reception of evidence in explanation of their meaning.

It must be conceded that, standing alone, the pro-
visions would seem to require no construction, but they
are only a part of the contract. The plans and proposal
which appellant signed are also part of the contract.

While the appellant alleged in its complaint that the
trestle lumber in place amounted to 36,149 feet and the
truss lumber 21,529 feet, in its proposal the approxi-
mate quantities were stated at 44,621 feet of trestle and
10,587 feet of truss lumber. Since the quantities could
be estimated with reasonable certainty from the plans,
the amounts stated in the proposal strongly support the
respondent’s contention that the flooring and stringers
were not considered as “truss lumber in place.”

The trial court, being of the opinion that the contract
as a whole was ambiguous and uncertain as to the
matter at issue and required construction, permitted
respondent to introduce evidence in explanation of its
terms.

Mr. J. D. Henry, a civil engineer of long experience
and admitted qualification, testified that he had checked
the lumber in the trestle, and also the amount of lumber
in the floor, as a separate item. He “made a couple of
hundred feet more for truss lumber than the plans
show . . .” The decking and stringers on the truss
amounted to about 8,500 feet:

“The truss lumber exclusive of guard rail and the

wheel guard rail amounted to 9,828 feet, the guard rail
550 and the railing 550 or a total of 10,493 feet.”

oa

He testified that the decking, including stringers, was
a very low labor product which could be handled fast;
that any one bidding on the contract and examining the
plans would know that the decking and stringers on the
span were not included in the engineer’s estimate of
truss lumber; that his own figures, based on the plans,
indicated that the lumber in the decking and stringers
were not included as truss lumber.

Asked, as an expert, whether anyone could intelli-
gently bid on the contract without an examination of
the proposal and plans, he answered, “They could not
bid on the contract at all, they would not be permitted
unless they used the combined data”; that the con-
tractor’s proposal is always attached to the plan, and he
must submit the papers altogether. In his opinion,
under the contract as a whole, the decking and stringers
were to be considered as trestle lumber.

The court found that there had been used, in the
whole job, 57,678 feet; that, of this, 44,649 feet should
be considered as trestle lumber, and 13,029 feet as truss
lumber. The appellant’s bill for extras was reduced
from $40.11 to $32.31. Summarizing the whole con-
tract, including the contested items, the court found
that the appellant had earned $1,753.60; that, deducting
from this sum the $850.54 already paid, there remained
a balance of $903.06 due the appellant, for which judg-
ment was to be awarded, this being $211.80 less than the
amount claimed by the appellant.

The record sustains the court’s finding, and the judg-
ment should be affirmed.

Brakxg, C. J., Beats, Simpson, and Jerrers, JJ., con-
cur. :

2.

me

[No, 27474. Department Two. August 4, 1939.]

Pup Girarpi et al., Respondents, v. Unton Hicu
Scuoot District No. 1, Skacrt County, et al.,

Appellants.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 298.

Warren J. Gilbert and Karr & Gregory, for appel-
lants.

Henderson & McBee, for respondents.

Smurson, J.—Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
compensation for injuries to themselves, and, in ad-
dition, plaintiffs Girardi sought recovery for damage to
their automobile, sustained in the collision with a
school bus owned by defendant school district and
driven by defendant Ralph McMains, its employee.

Plaintiffs allege that the driver of defendants’ bus
was negligent in that he drove the bus on the left side
of the center of the street or highway on which it was
traveling; that the driver failed to keep his vehicle
under control and to watch, look, and observe where
he was going; that he did not yield to plaintiffs’ driver
the right of way; that, in making a left turn at the street
intersection where the accident occurred, he failed to
pass around the center of the intersection, but instead
made a left turn before reaching the center of the inter-
section, cut the corner, and ran into and against plain-
tiffs’ car as it was passing through the intersection on
its right side of the highway.

ee *

Defendants by answer denied the charges of neg-
ligence, and alleged that the driver of plaintiffs’ car
was guilty of contributory negligence in that he was
driving at an excessive rate of speed and failed to keep
a proper lookout for other vehicles on the highway, to
keep his car under control, and to exercise due care to
avoid the collision. The reply put in issue the allega-
tions contained in defendants’ answer.

Upon the issues thus presented, the case was tried
to a jury, resulting in verdicts favorable to plaintiffs.
After appropriate motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing ‘the verdict and for a new trial were made and
denied, defendants appealed.

Appellants urge errors on the part of the trial court
(a) in excluding evidence concerning the speed of re-
spondents’ car; (b) in precluding the cross-examination
of respondent driver relative to whether he had been
drinking intoxicating liquor before the collision; (¢) in
the giving of certain instructions and the refusal to
give other instructions proposed by appellants; (d) in
the denial of a motion for a new trial; and (e) in enter-
ing judgment on the verdicts.

The accident occurred September 10, 1937, on west
Division street, at or near its intersection with Wall
street, just west of the city limits of Mt. Vernon: West
Division street, running east and west, is paved with
concrete eighteen feet in width, with additional black
top paving on each side about four or five feet in width.
Wall street runs north and south and is paved to a
width of eighteen feet. A yellow strip is painted along
the center of west Division street.

From the intersection, an unobstructed view is had
of west Division street to a distance of about twelve
hundred feet to the west. The accident took place at
approximately nine o’clock a. m.; the day was clear,
and the pavement dry.

aT

The driver of the school bus was traveling in a west-
erly direction, and intended to make a left turn and go
south on Wall street. Respondents were traveling in
an easterly direction on west Division street. ,

Further evidence which the jury was justified in be-
lieving may be briefly stated as follows: As respond-
ents arrived at a point one hundred fifty feet from the
intersection, they were traveling about twenty-five
miles per hour, at which time the driver took his foot
from the gas pedal and did not thereafter accelerate his
speed. He looked ahead, saw appellants’ bus approach-
ing from the opposite direction on its right side of the
highway; that no signal of an intention to turn was
given by anyone in the bus, and, feeling secure in hav-
ing the right of way, proceeded to and across the inter-
section; that, when respondents were across the inter-
section, the driver of the bus turned immediately to his
left in front of respondents’ car, and came into collision
with the left front portion of the car. Respondents
were seriously injured by the collision. The injuries
to Mr. and Mrs. Girardi were permanent in nature.

The map of the intersection introduced in evidence,
and upon which the position of the cars after the col-
lision was indicated, shows they came together at a
point eighteen or twenty feet east of the east line of the
pavement on Wall street. The front wheels of the bus
were on respondents’ side of the paved portion of the
highway, and the left front end was within a short dis-
tance of the south side of the pavement on west Division
street. In short, the bus in an oblique position oc-
cupied all but about two feet of the pavement on re-
spondents’ side of the road. The relative position of the
cars just after the accident is not in serious dispute.

The evidence relating to speed and the giving of a
signal indicating that the bus was going to turn to the
left, was in conflict, but such evidence was entirely for

_ tc twCCidS

the determination of the jury, and it was justified in
finding that appellants’ driver was guilty of negligence.

HEM Appellants first complain of the court’s re-
fusal to allow a seventeen-year-old witness, who was
riding in the bus, to testify concerning the speed of
respondents’ car as it approached the intersection.
Upon direct examination, the witness testified that he
rode in cars frequently and had watched speedometers,
estimated the speed of the automobiles, and could tell
the jury how fast respondents’ car was traveling. Ap-
pellants offered to show that the witness would testify
that respondents’ car was traveling sixty miles per
hour. When he was asked questions touching his quali-
fications, he stated that he had never made any tests
of the speed of any cars coming toward him other than
a mere guess. Objection to this testimony was sus-
tained, though the court did allow the witness to testify
that the car was coming very fast.

Our attention is called to Tecklenburg v. Everett R.,
Light & Water Co., 59 Wash. 384, 109 Pac. 1036, 34
L.R. A. (N.S.) 784; Hiscock v. Phinney, 81 Wash. 117,
142 Pac. 461, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1044; Bennington v.
Northern Pac. R. Co., 118 Wash. 1, 192 Pac. 1073, and
other authorities which hold that a nonexpert witness
may testify as to the speed of moving objects. The
evidence was admissible. However, in view of the
fact that the witness was allowed to express his opin-
ion that the car was “coming fast,’ we are of the
opinion that the exclusion of his testimony in regard
to the precise rate of speed of respondents’ car does
not constitute prejudicial error and comes within the
holding of this court in Ives v. Silvernail, 157 Wash.
25, 288 Pac. 276, in which it is stated:

“While the witness might properly have been per-

mitted to testify, even though what he said would not
have been of very great probative value, it was not

aT

reversible error to reject the testimony. “The testi-
mony which he had already given amounted to sub-
stantially the same as if he had expressed an opinion
that the automobile was going between fifty and sixty
miles per hour, which was the offer of proof.”

Hi The evidence was cumulative, inasmuch as two
other witnesses testified the car was proceeding at an
excessive rate of speed and at approximately sixty
miles per hour. In such cases, it is largely within the
discretion of the trial court whether the evidence
should be admitted. In re West Marginal Way, 109
Wash. 116, 186 Pac. 644; Sound Timber Co. v. Danaher
Lumber Co., 112 Wash. 314, 192 Pac. 941.

HI The next error assigned relates to the restric-
tion of the cross-examination of respondent Philip
Girardi. A partially filled bottle of whiskey was found
in respondents’ car, and appellants’ counsel asked the
witness, “You had a bottle in the car, didn’t you?” The
court sustained an objection to the question, and stated
“Objection sustained. There is no allegation of that.”

Appellant contends that the cross - examination
should have been allowed in order to show that the
witness had consumed intoxicating liquor. It will be
observed, however, that appellants’ attorney did not
inquire as to whether respondent had consumed any
of the liquor that had been in the bottle, and when
asked by the court if he contended respondents were
intoxicated or had drunk from the bottle, counsel
answered in the negative. Counsel had a right to
question the witness relative to drinking or being in-
toxicated, but he did not pursue that line of examina-
tion.

The record discloses that, after this question was
raised, respondents testified very fully with respect
to the bottle of liquor, the reason for having it in the
car, and that neither of them had taken a drink. After

that testimony had been introduced, no questions were
asked on cross-examination concerning the drinking
or the matter of intoxication. The question concerning
the bottle was immaterial, and the court’s ruling was
correct.

HM Appellants assign as error the giving of instruc-
tion No. 13 for the reason that the court did not define
the terms “remote cause” and “mere condition.” Al-
though a definition of these terms would have been
helpful, in view of the fact that the court expressly
defined “negligence” and “proximate cause” and the
necessity of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the negligence of the party complained
against was the proximate cause of the resulting in-
juries, we are satisfied that the absence of an explana-
tory statement in the instruction with reference to
these terms does not constitute prejudicial error.

Hl Appellants urge error in the giving of instruc-
tion No. 15 in that it mistakenly informed the jury
that the right of way of respondents’ car was abso-
lute. The instruction was one of four which informed
the jury concerning the rights and duties of the liti-
gants while crossing and turning at an intersection.
Appellants also assert that instructions Nos. 13, 14,
and 16 were stated in the abstract and not specifically
applied to the parties litigant.

Instruction No. 13 included the statutory law defin-
ing the duty of the driver who intends to make a left
turn at an intersection. Instruction No. 14 contained
the rules laid down in Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash.
563, 289 Pac. 533.

Instruction No. 15 informed the jury that, if the de-
fendant McMains intended to make a left turn and
thereby placed the Girardi automobile upon his (Mc-
Mains’) right, it was the duty of the defendant Mc-
Mains to yield the right of way to plaintiffs Girardi,

eFC

and plaintiffs Girardi had the right to assume that the
defendant McMains would yield to them such right of
way until the driver of plaintiffs’ automobile knew, or
by the exercise of ordinary diligence should have
known, to the contrary. The jury was further in-
structed that, if the defendant McMains failed to yield
to plaintiffs Girardi the right of way under the circum-
stances outlined in the instruction, and that his failure
so to do was the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ damages
and injuries, their verdict should be for plaintiffs.

Instruction No. 16 stated:

“When two vehicles are approaching an intersection
from opposite directions and one intends to make a
left turn at the intersection, you are instructed that
the right-of-way given by statute to the car which in-
tends to proceed straight through the intersection is
not an absolute right but a relative one. Such right-of-
way does not relieve the driver of the car which in-
tends to proceed straight through the intersection from
the duty of driving in a reasonable, careful and lawful
manner but there is at all times the duty imposed
upon the driver of such car to drive his car in a reason-
able, careful and prudent manner under the existing
circumstances and to at all times exercise reasonable
care and caution to avoid colliding with a vehicle
about to make a left turn. If he does not do so, then
he is guilty of negligence.”

We cannot agree with appellants’ contention that, by
instruction No. 15, the jury was instructed that the
right-of-way of respondents’ car was absolute; and,
in any event, instruction No. 16 unequivocally informed
the jury that the right-of-way of the driver which in-
tends to proceed straight through the intersection is
not an absolute one.

Nor are we able to agree that the instructions were |
improper because they were stated in the abstract.
True, instruction No. 14 merely announced the general
rules applicable to drivers of automobiles at intersec-

CC‘

tions, but instructions Nos. 13, 15, and 16 specifically
applied the general principles contained in instruction
No. 14 to the parties plaintiff and defendant in this
“case. Although instruction No. 16 does not refer to
the parties by name or as plaintiffs and defendants,
the employment of the language “the car which in-
tends to proceed straight through the intersection” re-
ferred to the driver on the right, respondent Girardi.

The instructions considered together gave the proper
information to the jury concerning the rights, duties,
and obligations of the respective parties to this action.

HM Appellants also complain of the giving of in-
struction No. 27, which sets forth the life expectancy
in years of respondents Philip Girardi and Angelin
Girardi as of the time of the collision, and of the refusal
of the court to give appellants’ requested instruction
No. 23, relating to the life expectancy of respondents
Girardi, not only in years but as such life expectancy
was affected by other evidence and surrounding cir-
cumstances which were present. Instruction No. 26
properly instructed the jury to consider any extenuat-
ing facts or circumstances which might affect the life
expectancy, and hence the giving of instruction No.
27 and the refusal to give appellants’ proposed in-
struction No. 23 cannot be said to be error.

HI The refusal of the trial court to give appellants’
requested instruction No. 8 also was not error for the
reason that it was covered in substance by the instruc-
tions given.

Nor are we persuaded that the trial court abused.
his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Bragg, C. J., Main, Bears, and Grracuty, JJ., concur.

w
J

’ [No. 27405. Department Two. August 4, 1939.]

In the Matter of the Estate of Brrtua Bostap,
Deceased.

Tue State or Wasuineron, by Robt. F. Waldron, as
Supervisor of the State Inheritance Tax and
Escheat Division, Appellant, v. Frank S.
Boistab, as Executor, Respondent.+

Robt. F. Waldron, John M. Boyle, Jr., and Charles
Snyder, for appellant.

W. Grant Armstrong, for respondent.

‘Reported in 93 P. (2d) 726.

.

Sel’

Miniarp, J.—On February 7, 1938, Bertha Bolstad,
a resident of Lewis county, died testate. She left a
separate estate of the appraised value of $15,252.55.
After making allowable deductions, the net taxable
estate is $13,311.38. Under her will, that estate passed,
pursuant to the provisions of a trust agreement exe-
cuted by Mrs. Bolstad January 26, 1938, to her stepson,
Frank S. Bolstad, trustee, to manage this trust estate
for the benefit of the testatrix’s incompetent son,
Russell J. Bolstad.

Under the terms of the trust agreement, the trustee
may use the principal and income for the care and
maintenance of the cestui que trust. The trustee is
empowered to employ a designated married couple to
take care of the cestui que trust. As consideration for
that service, the trustee is required to provide from
the funds of the estate for the care and maintenance
of that couple during their life and for the payment
of their funeral expenses if they predecease the bene-
ficiary, Russell J. Bolstad. Certain real estate of the
value of $3,250 is to be used as a home for the bene-
ficiary and the two persons who are charged with the
duty of caring for Bolstad.

The trust agreement further provides that, upon the
death of Russell J. Bolstad, the trust shall cease, at
which time the above-described real property shall
be conveyed to the two people, or the surviving mem-
ber of that marital community, who cared for Bolstad
during his life; and the remainder of the estate is to
be divided between two residuary beneficiaries who
are within the class C classification of the inheritance
tax statute (Laws of 1935, chapter 180, p. 770, § 106;
Laws of 1939, chapter 202, p. 692, § 1; Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup)., § 11202 [P. C. § 7030-166]).

Russell J. Bolstad is thirty-eight years of age. Under
actuaries’ combined experience tables, it is probable

vl
that he will survive the two people who are caring for
him, but he is older than the residuary legatees, who,
probably, will survive him. Bolstad’s life estate, com-
puted as required by Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11205
(Laws of 1935, chapter 180, p. 782, § 112), is $8,271.27,
and the remainder to the class C beneficiaries is of the
value of $5,040.11.

The supervisor of the inheritance tax and escheat
division filed in the probate proceeding his finding of
the net value ($13,311.38) of the estate and petitioned
that, after the allowance of an exemption of ten thou-
sand dollars, the balance of the estate, in the amount
of $3,311.38, passing to remaindermen be adjudged
subject to an inheritance tax at the rate of ten per cent,
as the remaindermen are class C beneficiaries under
the inheritance tax statute.

Frank S. Bolstad, executor arid trustee of the estate
of Bertha Bolstad, deceased, filed objections to the
finding and petition of the supervisor upon the ground
that the entire estate passes to or for the benefit of
Russell J. Bolstad, who is a beneficiary in class A,
hence one per cent of the net estate in excess of ten
thousand dollars—this will amount to $33.11—is the
total tax due upon the estate. An order was entered
by the superior court sustaining the position of the
executor and trustee of the estate. The supervisor
appealed.

Hl The supervisor of the inheritance tax division
contends that, under In re Gochnour’s Estate, 192
Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027, and In re Hallstrom’s Estate,
198 Wash. 214, 88 P. (2d) 405, only ten thousand
dollars was exempt, and the remainder of the estate
was taxable under class C rates. The supervisor argues
that, if it were not for In re Gochnour’s Estate, supra,
and In re Hallstrom’s Estate, supra, it would be con-
tended that the value of the life estate to Russell J.

—E Sl’

Bolstad, in the amount of $8,271.27, falls within the
exemption applicable to class A and is therefore free
from taxation, but that the remainder, in the amount
of $5,040.11, passes to class C beneficiaries and is tax-
able at the rate of ten per cent, or the tax due would
be $504.01.

The pertinent provision of the statute (Laws of
1935, chapter 180, §106, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 11202) reads as follows:

“An inheritance tax shall be imposed on all estates
subject to this act and other inheritance tax acts of
the State of Washington, at the following rates:

“Class A. Any devise, bequest, legacy, gift or bene-
ficial interest to any property or income therefrom
which shall pass to or for the use or benefit of any
grandfather, grandmother, father, mother, husband,
wife, child or stepchild, or any lineal descendant of
the deceased is hereby denominated as class A. On
any amount passing to class A in excess of $10,000 up
to and including $25,000,1%; . . .

“Class C. Any inheritance, devise, bequest, legacy,
gift or beneficial interest to any property or income
therefrom which shall passto . . . anyperson ...
other than mentioned in class A and class B herein, is
hereby denominated class C.

“On any amount passing to class C up to and includ-
ing $10,000, 10%; . . . ” (Italics ours.)

In the Gochnour case, a wife left a net estate of less
than ten thousand dollars to her husband “ ‘with full
power to alienate the same for his use and benefit
during his natural life’ ” with remainder at his death
to her sister and nieces, who are within the B and C
classification of beneficiaries under the inheritance tax
statutes.

We held that, under the terms of the will, the hus-
band of the testatrix took a life estate with vested re-
mainder to the sister and nieces of the testatrix, not-
withstanding his absolute power of disposal during his

Le

_

life time. We were of the view that the statute is not
susceptible to the construction that the husband must
take a fee or acquire an absolute ownership of the
property devised in order to be entitled to the exemp-
tion of ten thousand dollars; that to so construe the
statute would defeat its express purpose as manifested
in the italicized portion quoted above, as the husband
would, to the extent of the amount of the tax claimed
on the remainder, be deprived of the “use and benefit”
of the property devised and consequently be denied
the full exemption allowed by the statute. In that case,
the life tenant was sixty-four years old. The worth
of his life interest in the estate computed in accord-
ance with the provisions of § 112, chapter 180, Laws
of 1935, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11205 was $3,053.86.
The present taxable value of the interest of the re-
maindermen under Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11205
was $6,315.14 unless the estate was exempt from taxa-
tion under Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11202.

All that we held in In re Gochnour’s Estate, supra,
and in In re Hallstrom’s Estate, supra, was that there
can be no impairment of the exemption of ten thou-
sand dollars to beneficiaries in class A of the inheri-
tance tax statute. This leaves in the case at bar a
taxable amount in the vested remainder in class C in
the amount of $3,311.38, which is taxable at the rate
of ten per cent; that is, the total:tax due is in the
amount of $331.14.

Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11202 (Laws of 1935,
chapter 180, §106) was amended by Laws of 1939,
chapter 202, p. 692, §1, under which amendment the
language “or for the use or benefit of” was deleted
from the 1935 inheritance tax statute.

By virtue of this amendment and § 13, chapter 202,
Laws of 1939, p. 712, which provides that chapter 202,
Laws of 1939, shall apply to all inheritance tax cases

—E 2 sl’

pending at the time this act takes effect, insists the
supervisor, the remainder of $5,040.11 to the class C
beneficiaries is taxable at the rate of ten per cent,
hence the tax due is $504.01. It is argued that the
decision in the Gochnour case and in the Hallstrom
case was grounded upon the words “or for the use or
benefit of” appearing in the statute; and that, as the
statute now effective does not contain those words, the
life estate must be computed under Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 11205, reading as follows:

“When the estate of a deceased person shall be sub-
ject to an inheritance tax, and there be an annuity,
life estate or an estate for a term of years given to
one or more persons and the remainder to another or
others, the entire estate shall be appraised as other
estates are required to be appraised by the laws of
this state. The value of the annuity, life or term
estate shall be determined according to the rules or
standards of mortality and of value commonly used
in actuaries’ combined experience tables on the basis
of four per centum annual interest, and the value of
the remainder shall be determined by deducting the
amount found to be the value of the annuity, life or
term estate from the whole estate. After the values
shall have been determined as provided in this sec-
tion, the tax shall be computed and collected in the
same manner that the tax on other estates is com-
puted and collected. The state insurance commis-
sioner is hereby directed to obtain and publish for the
use of courts and appraisers throughout the state tables
showing the average expectancy of life and values of
annuities and of life and term estates.”

Russell J. Bolstad was given the right to the use and
benefit of all of the property. Under the authorities,
he took a life estate, notwithstanding this right to in-
vade the whole principal. The 1939 amendment, which
deleted the words “or for the use or benefit of,” has
not so changed our inheritarice tax law as to require
the taking of a fee or the acquisition of absolute owner-

ee

ship of the property to bring a legatee or devisee within
the provisions of class A. (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 11202.) The amendment does not change the effect
of In re Gochnour’s Estate, supra, and In re Hallstrom’s
Estate, supra, as to the exemption in the case at bar.
The omission from the statute of the words quoted
above does not affect the beneficial interest of the son
in the whole estate or his right to the income from
the estate.

The only reasonable conclusion following an analysis
of the two -cases cited and Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§§ 11202 and 11205, is that one in class A of Rem. Rev.
Stat. (Sup.), § 11202, who takes a life estate with full
power to exhaust the entire estate for his use and
benefit during his natural life with the remainder at
his death to persons named by the decedent is entitled
to the exemption of ten thousand dollars, and the rate
of the inheritance tax on the value of the estate in
excess of ten thousand dollars would be governed by
the class or classes in which those who succeeded to
the remainder of the estate were under the inheritance
tax statute. (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11202.)

The cause is remanded, with direction to the trial
court to enter an order requiring payment of inheri-
tance tax of $331.14.

Brake, C. J., Jerrers, Smupson, and Grracuty, JJ.,
coneur.

[No. 27561. Department Two. August 4, 1939.]

Tue State or Wasuineton, Respondent, v. Fay E.
Woon, Appellant.t

Oscar A. Zabel, for appellant.
Ralph Smythe and Max Church, for respondent.

Miiarp, J—Defendant was charged by information
with commission of the crime of making a false entry
in a record of account. At that time, the defendant
was represented by his attorney. He entered a plea
of “guilty,” but, subsequently and prior to pronounce-
ment of sentence and entry of judgment, filed a peti-
tion for permission to change his plea of “guilty” to
one of “not guilty.” The petition was bottomed on
the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., §2111 [P. C. § 9164])
which provides that, at any time before judgment, the
court may permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn
and other plea or pleas substituted. The petition re-
cites that defendant is innocent of the charges against
him, that he did not appreciate the gravity of the
charge preferred against him and did not understand

*Reported in 93 P. (24) 294.

. a

what his rights were at the time he entered a plea of
guilty. In support of his petition the defendant filed
the following affidavit:

“That I am the defendant in the above entitled ac-
tion; that I was arrested on or about January 21, 1939,
and lodged in the city jail in Port Angeles, Washington;

“That the defendant does now, and at all times since
my arrest, has maintained his innocence of the charges
in the Information;

“That shortly after defendant’s arrest defendant was
extremely upset from the shock of being accused of
the charges and did not have full and clear possession
of his mental faculties, and his mental state was hazy
and befogged; that defendant was very much .con-
cerned about his wife’s mental and physical condition,
which was extremely bad prior to his arrest; that his
wife was under doctor’s care and that about Tuesday
of said week prior to defendant’s arrest the said wife
was to have undergone a major operation, and she was
at that time pronounced to be devoid of sufficient vital-
ity and strength, by the physician, to undergo a serious,
major, surgical operation; that the physician then
prescribed that she be given medicines and rest in
order that her constitution and strength could be im-
proved so as to develop sufficient natural resistance to
the shock and strain of a major operation; that defend-
ant, at the time of his arrest, knowing the gravity of
his wife’s condition, and being fearful of the effect that
the news of the defendant’s arrest would have upon his
wife in her predicament, became greatly confused and
distressed, all of which prevented the defendant from
realizing that he was being charged with being a crim-
inal at heart and in mind; that defendant was confined
to the jail until the Thursday following, on which day,
for the first time he was permitted to glance at the
charges made against him; that at said time, due to
his distressed mental state, the confusion, the wife’s
illness, and his state of mind was such that in fairness
to the defendant, affiant was in no mental condition
to give an intelligent answer to the charges.

“That the defendant protested to the counsel that he
was innocent of the charges; that under the above cir-

PS °

cumstances and a misunderstanding of his rights, his
plea of ‘guilty’ was entered; that at the time of the
entry of the plea of ‘guilty’ defendant was informed
by counsel that he could later withdraw his plea of
‘guilty’ and enter a plea of ‘not guilty.’

“That at the time of his plea the defendant did not
fully understand the charges preferred and his rights
under the law; that the defendant avers that he is inno-
cent of the charges set out in the information, and is
entitled to a jury trial in this connection;

“Affiant further states that he knowingly, made no
false entry in the record required by law to be kept
by the auditor of Clallam county, Washington.”

The prosecuting attorney’s affidavit, which was filed
at the time of the hearing of the application of the de-
fendant for permission to change his plea, reads as
follows:

“That the defendant, Fay E. Wood, was examined.
by the prosecuting attorney’s office January 14, 1939,
and subsequently on the 21st day of January, 1939; at
the time each examination was made the defendant
was not under arrest, and was admittedly not acting
under coercion, threats or inducement; that the infor-
mation obtained at each examination was substantially
the same;

“That after the second examination the defendant
was placed in custody and confined in the jail; that
from the time of his arrest on Saturday, January 21,
until he entered his plea on the following Thursday,
January 26, the prosecuting attorney’s office, the
sheriff’s office, and all other law enforcement offices
in the county were completely out of touch with the
defendant and had no conversations with him of any
kind; that the only person representing the state in
this matter, who saw the defendant from the time of
his arrest, was Mr. Bucsko, an inspector for the state
highway patrol, to whom the defendant made the same
statements he had made to the prosecuting attorney’s
office; that Mr. Bucsko saw the defendant but once
and that on January 21; that the said visit was only
for a few minutes;

° a
“That the said defendant was immediately repre-
sented by counsel; that the prosecuting attorney’s office
gave written copies of the statement and confession
of the defendant to the counsel for the defendant for
his examination, and the full statement of the defend-
ant was read by the counsel for the defendant; that
the defendant’s main complaint has been the matter
of his punishment and not the question of whether he
made a false entry or not; that the prosecuting at-
torney’s office in consideration of the defendant’s wife’s
illness, stipulated and agreed that the defendant could
be released on bond pending the entrance of the sen-
tence which was deferred solely for that reason;

“That some time subsequent to the 26th day of Jan-
uary, 1939, the defendant voluntarily came to affiant’s
office and told affiant he was satisfied that he had been
given a square deal and that he hoped for leniency;

“That the nature of the offenses committed by the
defendant were discussed by the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant at the time of the last examination,
and the said defendant was fully informed of the of-
fenses to be charged;

“That on the day the defendant was arraigned, the
information was first given personally to the defend-
ant and read by him and then after he had thoroughly
examined the same the defendant came into the court-
room and the information was reread to him by the
prosecuting attorney;

“That the defendant was at that time and at all times
from the time of his arrest represented by counsel.”

The former counsel of the defendant also filed the
following affidavit and notice of his withdrawal as
counsel:

“Comes now W. F. Phillips, original counsel for de-
fendant, and withdraws as such counsel, for the fol-
lowing reasons:

I

“Because I am not in accord with the action of with-
drawing the plea of guilty filed herein.

I,

“Because the defendant never challenged the facts
on which the charge against him is based, though he
did say ‘That he did not feel guilty; that he did not
feel like he was a criminal,’ which was entirely imma-
terial. The law condemns certain acts as criminal,
and it makes no difference whether a man who com-
mits acts prohibited by law as criminal feels like he
has violated the law or not.

I.

“Because the statement in the affidavit in support
of the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty ‘That at
the time of the entry of the plea of “guilty” defendant
was informed by counsel that he could later withdraw
his plea of “guilty” and enter a plea of “not guilty,”’
is untrue, as he was specifically told the withdrawal
of such plea was in the discretion of the court; that
he could withdraw it with the consent of the court.”

In answer to the affidavits of the prosecuting attor-
ney and defendant’s former counsel, the defendant
filed the following counter-affidavit:

“TI, Fay E. Woop, the defendant in the above entitled
action, being first duly sworn, on oath depose and
state: That in reply to the affidavit of Ralph Smythe,
prosecuting attorney for Clallam county, Washington,
defendant denies that the ‘main complaint has been
the matter of his punishment and not the question of
whether he made a false entry or not, and further
affiant avers and states that at all times he protested
his innocence of the charges and that he was influenced.
and coerced and threatened with more serious charges
if he did not plead guilty to the charge; that further
the defendant affirms all of his statements made in his
opening affidavit; affiant further admits that he went
to the prosecutor’s office, but denies that he told the
prosecutor ‘he was satisfied; that he had been given
a square deal and that he hoped for leniency.’ But
states that from the prosecutor’s standpoint the prose-
cutor may have been trying to give the defendant a
break, in so far as the prosecutor understood the matter,
but that affiant maintained his innocence of charges

° a

at all times and denied the accusations; affiant further
states that he was accused by the prosecutor, of being
guilty of blackmail against the former treasurer of
Clallam county, Walter A. Baar, and that the prose-
cutor threatened to charge him with this crime; that
the defendant, under all of the circumstances, was
induced and coerced as stated in this affidavit and his
opening affidavit in his distressed, beclouded and con-
fused mental condition to surrender his will so that
he was led into entering a plea of ‘guilty’ to the charge
against his real wishes and against his personal judg-
ment, all of which caused him to enter a plea of ‘guilty’
involuntarily and under a mistaken belief that he was
assisting his wife in her serious physical condition;
that under all of the circumstances defendant was at
a disadvantage in protecting his rights;

“That as stated by his previous counsel, affiant had
stated ‘that he did not feel guilty;’ affiant now real-
izes that feeling as he did, he should not have pleaded
guilty, and for that reason made application to the
court for the change of plea to ‘not guilty.’

“In answer to the statement by affidavit of defend-
ant’s former counsel, affiant states that as a layman,
he understood that the change of plea from ‘guilty’
to ‘not guilty’ could be made as a matter of right,
although he does not recall the exact words of his
former attorney.”

After argument thereon, the petition to withdraw
the plea of “guilty” and substitute a plea of “not
guilty” was denied by the court, which pronounced
sentence and entered judgment on defendant’s plea of
guilty. Defendant appealed.

HI Counsel for appellant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying permission to
appellant to substitute for his plea of “guilty” a plea
of “not guilty,” citing as sustaining authority State v.
McDowall, 197 Wash. 323, 85 P. (2d) 660. In the
ease cited, we held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for leave
to withdraw his plea of guilty to one of the counts

Se .
of the information and enter a plea of not guilty. We
stated that the section (Rem. Rev. Stat., §2111) of
the statute authorizing the court to permit, at any time
before judgment, the withdrawal of the plea of guilty
and the substitution of another plea, is permissive and
vests the court with authority, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, to permit a change of plea; and that,
as the matter of the withdrawal of a plea once entered
rests peculiarly within the discretion of the court, a
ruling made in the exercise of such discretion will not
be reversed except for manifest abuse. In support of
our holding that the appellant’s assignment of error
was without merit, we cited State v. Cimini, 53 Wash.
268, 101 Pac. 891.

In State v. Cimini, supra, we quoted with approval
the following language from People v. Miller, 114 Cal.
10, 45 Pac. 986, and we have not since departed from
the rule there enunciated:

“ ‘Before judgment, the court may, at any time, per-
mit this to be done (Pen. Code, § 1018), and the dis-
cretion thus vested is one to be liberally exercised.
The law seeks no unfair advantage of a defendant,
but is watchful to see that the proceedings under
which his life or liberty is at stake shall be fairly and
impartially conducted. It holds in contemplation his
natural distress, and is considerate in viewing the
motives which may influence him to take one or an-
other course. Therefore, it will permit a plea of guilty
to be withdrawn if it fairly appears that defendant was
in ignorance of his rights and of the consequences of
his act, or was unduly and improperly influenced either
by hope or fear in the making of it. But the mere
fact that a defendant, knowing his rights and the conse-
quences of his act, hoped or believed, or was led by
his counsel to hope or believe, that he would receive
a shorter sentence or a milder punishment by pleading
guilty than that which would fall to his lot after trial
and conviction by jury, presents no ground for the
exercise of this liberal discretion. . . . To hold that

* a
it did would be equivalent to saying that a defendant
might speculate upon the supposed clemency of a
judge, with a right to retract if, at any time before
sentence, he began to think that his expectation would
not be realized.’ ”

Did the appellant enter his plea of guilty without
hope or fear, without improper influence or promise,
with full knowledge of his legal and constitutional
rights and of the consequences of his act? If so, the
trial court’s ruling should be affirmed. The affidavits
in support of the application of the appellant are
quoted above, as are also the affidavit of counsel who
represented him at the time appellant entered his plea
of guilty, and affidavit of the prosecuting attorney. It
does not appear therefrom that appellant at any time
challenged the facts on which he was charged with
the crime of making a false entry in a record of ac-
count. He admitted that he did the thing which the
statute defines as a crime. The fact that he “did not
feel guilty,” or that he did not realize “that he was
being charged with being a criminal at heart and in
mind,” is not material, as it is not disputed that the
charge in the information is true. There is no showing
that he was subjected to coercion or duress to compel
him to enter a plea of guilty. Appellant’s counter-
affidavit, filed five days after hearing on his petition,
establishes the fact that he went to the office of the
prosecuting attorney.

We are satisfied that the trial court was convinced
that the plea of guilty was entered by the appellant
with full knowledge and understanding of its effect,
and with full and complete knowledge of the crime
with which he was charged; that he fully understood
his constitutional rights and entered the plea of guilty
in good faith and not through misapprehension or mis-
understanding.

a °

Appellant’s petition to withdraw his plea of guilty
and substitute therefor a plea of not guilty was ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

“Tt is wholly in the discretion of the court whether a
plea of any sort may be withdrawn. Permission may
always be granted, but unless an abuse of discretion
is shown, the refusal of permission to withdraw a plea
is not error.” 12 Cyc. 350.

There is no showing of abuse of discretion by the trial
court; therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

- Bragg, C. J., Gzracury, Suvpson, and Jzrrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27467. Department Two. August 5, 1939.]

Tue Starz or Wasuincron, Respondent, v. Henry
Doncxers, Appellant.

Frank E. Hammond, for appellant.

B. Gray Warner, Albert D. Rosellini, and H. I. Kyle,
for respondent.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 355.

° PS

Muxtarp, J—It is a crime under the statute (Rem.
Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-134 [P. C. § 2696-756], Laws
of 1937, chapter 189, p. 918, § 134) for the operator of
any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury
to a person to fail to stop and render aid to the injured
person after the accident. The defendant was found
guilty, by the verdict of a jury, of that crime. From
the judgment and sentence pronounced against him on
the verdict, the defendant appealed.

The only question presented by the appeal is whether
the evidence, which was wholly circumstantial, was-
sufficient to support the verdict.

We are satisfied that there was enough evidence,
which is summarized as follows, to carry the case to
the jury, whose province it was to say whether the case
so made was overcome by the evidence given in behalf
of the appellant:

On February 10, 1938, about 3:45 p. m., George
Sevilles was found unconscious lying approximately
six feet up the driveway of the home of a Mr. England,
on the north side of a concrete highway in King county
which runs west from Enumclaw to Auburn. About
one and one-half miles west of Enumclaw is the “Wish-
bone Inn.” About five or six hundred feet west of that
tavern there is an upgrade on the highway, at which
point the highway proceeds through a cut about twenty
feet high and eighty feet long. At right angles from
the highway at this point an upgrade driveway on
which George Sevilles was found leads to the home
of a Mr. England. A similar driveway leads to the
home of a Mr. Henniger, about three or four hundred
feet to the south of the highway.

No one was available as an eye-witness to the injury
of Mr. Sevilles. The victim, who never subsequent to
the injury became mentally normal, was, of course,
unable to testify; the physician, who examined Sevilles,

a .

testified that Sevilles had a ragged cut over the right
side of his forehead and over the right side of the eye
and a contusion and swelling of the back of his left
hand. There was, also,-a contusion and swelling be-
tween the heel and the knee in the back of his left leg.
The physician testified that the injuries sustained by
Sevilles could have been caused by an automobile.

On the date in question, Gladstone Toman and Henry
Belleck were engaged in the automobile wrecking busi-
ness at Enumclaw. Appellant, who resides outside of
Enumclaw, was acquainted with the two members of
that firm and occasionally visited their place of busi-
ness. On February 10th, one Campbell brought his
truck to Toman’s garage for repairs, but he became so
intoxicated during the day that Toman’s partner, Bel-
leck, arranged to drive Campbell home in the truck
some time prior to four p.m. In order that Belleck
might return to Enumclaw, Toman requested appel-
lant to take Toman’s 1936 Ford V-8 de luxe sedan and
follow the truck to Campbell’s home, which was at
Handy Corner, about four or five miles west of Enum-
claw on the highway leading to Auburn, and bring
Belleck back in the sedan. Mr. Toman testified that
appellant was not under the influence of liquor.

The truck proceeded west toward Auburn, and ap-
pellant in the Ford sedan followed it. Belleck testified
that he was not acquainted with Sevilles, but that, on
the way out in the truck, he passed a man walking on
the north side of the highway near the Wishbone Inn,
and as Belleck turned out to pass the man he saw two
automobiles following the truck, one of which was a
sedan operated by appellant. When the truck arrived
about a mile and a half beyond the Wishbone Inn,
Belleck stopped the truck to permit Weaver, who was
riding with him, to alight, and appellant then drove
around in front of the truck and waited for the truck

° PS

to proceed. The truck operated by Belleck and the
sedan operated by appellant then proceeded to Handy
Corner, where the operators stopped, went inside, had
a glass of wine, and remained there about fifteen
minutes. The appellant and Belleck then got into the
sedan and proceeded toward Enumclaw, Belleck oper-
ating the sedan. Belleck further testified that nothing
appeared unusual in the behavior of appellant, who
did not seem to be excited or nervous.

When Belleck and appellant arrived at the cut in
the road at the England driveway, people were con-
gregated around a man lying in the driveway. They
did not stop, but went on to Enumclaw, where they
arrived between four-thirty and five o’clock in the
afternoon. Appellant met his father in Enumclaw,
and these two got into their automobile and started
home over the Auburn highway. When appellant again
arrived at the England driveway, the body of Sevilles
was then in the highway patrol wagon on the way to
the hospital.

Appellant testified that at no time did his automobile
come into contact with the body of any person what-
soever.

Miss Dorothy Henniger, who was looking out of the
window of her home, which was approximately one
hundred and fifty feet from the highway, testified that
she saw Sevilles walking along the highway in ques-
tion, which man was later identified as Sevilles, and
that she watched him walking along the highway until
her vision was obstructed by a bank which hides some
of the highway. After this man disappeared behind the
bank, she saw a blue V-8 sedan, which she later iden-
tified as the car owned by Tornan, pass and enter the
cut; that, as it went through the cut, she saw something
which she described as a puff of smoke or dust go up
into the air while the car was in the cut. She then

a °

observed the car coming out through the cut. She
testified that she saw another car (this was the car
of a Mr. Steiner, who picked up the victim) drive up
and stop in the cut, whereupon she went out and found
Mr. Sevilles lying about six feet off of the highway.

Another witness testified that, on or about the time
that the accident happened, he was driving along the
highway, and that a car, similar to the one that 1t was
admitted that the appellant was driving that day, al-
most ran into him. The operator of the offending
automobile was wearing a blue blazer and a brown or
grey hat and resembled the appellant. There was
other testimony to the effect that the appellant was
wearing a blue blazer and a brown hat on the day of
the accident.

There was further testimony that the automobile
operated by appellant was taken to a garage at eight
o’clock the morning following the accident, and that
the right front fender had a large dent in it about
fifteen inches long on the crown of the fender and was
marked on the side. There was also a slight dent on
the right side of the grill of the car. The automobile
operated by appellant was followed by an automobile
operated by witness Steiner, who discovered the in-
jured man and picked him up. There is testimony that
the damage to the fender was result of an accident
prior to the one in which it is charged that appellant
was implicated.

| | True, the evidence is purely circumstantial;
however, to warrant a conviction thereon,

“. . . it is not essential that no inference or pre-
sumption shall be indulged in by the jury that does not
in their minds necessarily arise from the circumstances
proved. Although circumstantial or presumptive evi-
dence is allowed to prevail, even to the convicting of
an offender, still the circumstances must themselves be
proved and not presumed. While the evidence must

° a

lead to the conclusion so clearly and strongly, where
the evidence is purely circumstantial, as to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence,
still, it is not necessary that the evidence should pro-
duce absolute certainty in the minds of the jurors, or
that it should dissipate mere conjectures and specu-
lative doubts,—for metaphysical and demonstrative
certainty is not essential to proof by circumstances. It
is sufficient if the evidence produce moral certainty, to
the exclusion of every reasonable doubt.” 8 R.C. L.
226, 227.

Whether circumstantial evidence tending to connect
appellant with the crime excludes, to a moral certainty,
every other reasonable hypothesis than that of appel-
lant’s guilt, was a question for the jury, and not for the
court.

“The weight of the evidence, whether direct or cir-
cumstantial, is a matter for the jury. When the evi-
dence is of the latter kind, it is for the jury to say
whether it excludes every reasonable hypothesis con-
sistent with the innocence of the accused. That it may
not be so convincing to us, or may be hard to reconcile
in some of its aspects, or may appear in some of its
features to refute or negative guilt, or to cast doubt
thereon, will not justify the court in setting aside the
verdict of the jury.” Allen v. State, 26 Ariz. 317, 323,
225 Pac. 332.

Counsel for appellant argues that no evidence was
adduced that Sevilles was injured by any vehicle. The
testimony of the examining physician was that the in-
juries sustained by Sevilles could have been caused
by collision with an automobile. In addition, there is
proof that the automobile operated by appellant fol-
lowed Sevilles into the cut on the highway immediately
after Sevilles entered the cut. A cloud of dust went
up while the car and the victim were both in the cut.
That automobile drove out of that cut in the highway
and the pedestrian shortly thereafter was found about

51

six feet off the highway suffering from the injuries
above described.

No further review of the state’s evidence, the truth
of which the verdict reflects the jury accepted as true,
is necessary. Under the circumstances proved, the jury
was warranted in finding the appellant guilty as
charged.

The judgment is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Mazn, Geracuty, and Suvpson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27560, Department Two. August 5, 1939.]
PEopLes Park AND AMUSEMENT Association, Lyc.,

Appellant, v. FLorence ANROONEY, as Admini-
stratrix, et al., Respondents.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 362.
ee

Mark M. Litchman, for appellant.
A. A. Seijas and Ivan L. Hyland, for respondents.

Muttarp, J.—Under the terms of a written contract
executed June 10, 1933, plaintiff, a domestic non-profit
corporation, leased certain real estate (People’s Park,
Renton Junction, King county) to Fred Anrooney for
a period of ten years at a rental of seventy-five dollars
monthly, payable in advance on the tenth day of each
and every month during the period of the lease, and
received from the lessee at the time of the execution
of the lease one hundred and fifty dollars as the first
and last months’ rental. Under one of the provisions of
the contract, the lessee was permitted to terminate the
lease by giving a written notice to the lessor on or
before the tenth day of any month, in which event
the balance (seventy-five dollars) of the one hundred
and fifty dollars paid at the time of the execution of
the contract was to be applied in payment of the rental
for the ensuing thirty days. It was further agreed
that, if the lessee failed to pay the monthly rental of
seventy-five dollars on or before the tenth day of any
month, the lessor “may declare this lease forfeited,”
and the seventy-five dollars was to be applied in settle-
ment of any rent then due and the balance held as
liquidated damages for the lessee’s breach of the con-
tract.

_tC:C(‘éORR

The lessee accepted the buildings and grounds in
their then present condition and agreed to furnish
and pay for the water, light, and heat used by him.
The lessee was further obligated under the lease to keep
the buildings and grounds in a clean and sanitary con-
dition, to use the leased premises in a lawful manner,
and not permit any unlawful acts thereon. In the
event of damage, by fire or otherwise, to the dance
pavilion or other buildings covered by the lease in ex-
cess of ten per cent of the value of the buildings, the
lessee was required to restore such buildings to their
original condition at his own expense. If the lessee
failed to signify, within ten days after such damage,
his intention, by notice in writing to the lessor, to re-
build or restore the buildings, the lessor at its option
could declare the lease terminated. The lessor was
required to repair any buildings damaged by fire in
an amount less than ten per cent of the value of such
building; and the rental ceased during the time the
lessor was making the repairs. Subject to approval
of the lessor, the lessee was permitted to make altera-
tions and improvements at his own expense to the
dance pavilion. Any violation of the agreement ren-
dered the “lease null and void.”

For four years, the premises were maintained by the.
lessee as a park and dancing pavilion. Upon the death
of the lessee, the widow, Florence Anrooney, was ap-
pointed and qualified as administratrix of the estate of
her deceased husband. July 21, 1938, plaintiff gave
written notice to the administratrix (who had sublet
the premises to a tenant who was using the dancing
pavilion for a skating rink) and to all parties interested
in the estate, of cancellation of the lease between it
and Fred Anrooney on the grounds that more than two
months’ rental was past due; that, contrary to the terms
of the lease, the dancing pavilion was used for skating

eFC

rink purposes, and that the lessee had permitted animals
to pasture on the grounds. In addition to the three
foregoing reasons, the lessor advised in its notice of
cancellation of the lease that the lease was void because
it was indefinite as to time, in that the lessee can termi-
nate the contract at any time, and there was no con-
sideration for the lease for a longer period than a month
to month tenancy.

One week subsequent to its notice of cancellation of
the lease, the lessor brought this action, under the
declaratory judgment act (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§§ 784-1 to 784-17 [P. C. §§ 8108-21 to 8108-37], Laws
of 1935, chapter 113, p. 305, as amended by Laws of
1987, chapter 14, p. 39), to secure a judgment declaring
the lease invalid as a lease for a period of ten years;
and that, if the lease be held valid for the ten-year
period, it be declared cancelled by reason of the com-
mission by the lessee’s successors in interest of waste
and two and one-half months’ rental delinquency in
violation of the covenant requiring payment of the
stipulated rental monthly in advance.

The demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that
same did not allege facts entitling plaintiff to relief
under the declaratory judgment act was overruled. By
their answer, defendants admitted execution of the
lease and succession in interest to the rights of the
lessee, but denied any breach.of the lease.

The trial court found that the estate of the deceased
lessee owes to plaintiff lessor one and one-half months’
rental, which is an expense of administration in the
probate of the estate of the deceased lessee; that lessee
did not breach the lease by permitting skating in the
dance pavilion; that the lease did not contain a restric-
tive covenant respecting the pasturing of animals on
the grounds; and that no waste was committed on the
premises. The trial court concluded that the lease was

ee

a valid ten-year lease, and that promissory notes in
the amount of $112.50, given in payment of rental for
one and one-half months, are part of the expenses of
administration to be paid in the settlement of the estate
of the deceased lessee. Judgment accordingly was
entered. Plaintiff appealed.

Counsel for appellant contends that the lease is in-
valid for a ten-year period, as it is a unilateral contract
and lacks mutuality in that only the lessee may
terminate the lease at any time and that the lessor has
not the same privilege; and that there was a failure
of consideration for the lease. If, argues counsel for
appellant, the lease is valid, appellant is entitled to
maintain the action for declaratory judgment to estab-
lish right to forfeit the lease and repossess the premises
for default of the lessee in payment of rent and the
lessee’s commission of acts of waste—permitting
animals to pasture on the grounds, etc.

In support of the contention that the lease is a tenancy
at will, therefore cancellable at the will of the appel-
lant, counsel for appellant quotes as follows:

“An express agreement to pay rent will not neces-

sarily prevent a tenancy at will from being created.”
16R.C. L. 611.

Counsel for appellant further quotes the following
to sustain his position that the agreement in the case
at bar created nothing more than a tenancy at will:

““All leases for uncertain terms are prima facie,
leases at will; . . .’ . . . Where a lease for an
indefinite time expressly provided that the lessee may
terminate the agreement at any time . . . this has
been held to create a tenancy at will, though a statute
provided that no tenancy at will could be created
except by express contract. It is a well settled and
well known rule of law that a lease or estate which
is at the will of one of the parties is equally at the will

eFC

of the other party. One of them is no more or no
further bound than the other.” 16 R. C. L. 612.

Section 1, p. 39, Laws of 1937 (Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 784-1) of the declaratory judgment act pro-
vides that courts of record shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. Section 2, p.
305, Laws of 1935 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 784-2) of
the act, so far as pertinent to this action, reads as fol-
lows:

“A person interested undera . . . written con-
tract . . ., or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a . . . contract
may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . contract .
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal
relations thereunder.” .

HI The appellant was entitled to a declaratory
judgment as to the validity of the lease. It does not
follow, however, that the lessor may maintain an action
for a declaratory judgment to establish its right to
forfeit or cancel the lease and repossess the premises
for default of the lessee, and his successors in interest,
in payment of rent or for commission of waste on the
premises.

Hi The authorities uniformly hold that a lease for
a definite term which contains a provision for its termi-
nation before the expiration of the term fixed at the
option of either of the parties is not invalid, although
it gives the lessor or the lessee alone the right to
terminate the lease. The common law rule that an
estate at the will of one party is equally at the will of
the other is without application to a lease for a defined.
term, but which reserves to one of the parties an
option to terminate it prior to the expiration of the
term. 35 C. J. 1052; 16 R. C. L. 1113.

_ctC(‘sN

“Frequently the option is granted with the intention
of its being exercised at the end of a specified period
of tenancy, such as a month, quarter or a year and
when such intention is manifest, the option must be
exercised in relation thereto. The option may, how-
ever, authorize the termination of the lease at any time
irrespective of the rental periods. Thus, under a pro-
vision that either party may terminate the lease by
giving one month’s notice to the other, it has been
held that the required notice may be given at any time
so as to terminate the lease at the expiration of one
month therefrom, without regard to the stated periods
when the rent is payable.” 16 R. C. L. 1112.

The fact that a lease for a fixed period provides
for its termination before the expiration of such period
at the option of the lessor or the lessee alone will not
prevent it from creating a valid term for years. 35
C. J. 972.

In the contract in the case at bar, the lessee promised
to do something and pay certain money—which was
paid—in exchange for which the lessor promised to
lease the premises. The promise for a promise was
sufficient to obligate both parties. In re Tveekrem’s
Estate, 169 Wash. 468, 14 P. (2d) 3.

In consideration of the execution of the contract, the
lessee paid to the lessor one hundred and fifty dollars,
covering the first and last months’ rental under the
lease.

The lease is valid and its terms are clear. The right
of the lessor to terminate the lease on default of the
lessee in payment of rent has not been challenged. If
the lessee committed acts of waste and defaulted in
payment of rent, the lessor has a full and complete
remedy in an action in unlawful detainer. Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 812 [P. C. § 7970].

HA declaration will not be made as to the rights
of parties to a contract, where it appears that the con-

a

. troversy relates to acts which have already been com-
mitted and for the redress of which there exists an
action at law. The proceeding for a declaratory judg-
ment is not a substitute or alternative for the common
law or statutory actions existing when the declaratory
judgment act was adopted in this state. The act was
not designed to supplant other remedies well estab-
lished and working satisfactorily. Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank v. Billstein, 283 N. W. (Minn.) 138.

In Eiffel Realty & Inv. Co. v. Ohio Citizens Trust Co.,
55 Ohio App. 1, 8 N. E. (2d) 470, it was held that a
lessor is not entitled to maintain an action for a
declaratory judgment to establish right to forfeit lease
and repossess premises for default of lessee in payment
of rent and taxes, in view of availability of adequate
remedy in ejectment, the proceeding for a declaratory
judgment not being a substitute or alternative for com-
mon law or statutory actions existing at the time of
the adoption of the declaratory judgment act. In that
case, the lessor sought a judgment under the uniform
declaratory judgment act declaring the ninety-nine
year lease in question terminated because of the de-
fault of the lessee in payment of rent and taxes at the
time required by the lease; that the court declare that
the lessor had the right to reenter the premises, and
that the lessee be ordered to surrender possession of
the premises to the lessor. The trial court refused to
enter a declaratory judgment on the ground that the
lessor had full and complete remedies in either an
action in forcible entry and detainer or an action in
ejectment. The court of appeals, in its opinion af-
firming the judgment of the trial court, said, after re-
viewing the authorities on the question whether a per-
son having an adequate and complete remedy to
accomplish the desired end can disregard it and ask
for declaratory relief:

Cc t:C(‘iRR

“Tf the plaintiff in this action can require from the
courts a declaration such as it seeks, it is hard to con-
ceive of a party who, having a cause of action of any
kind, large or small, against another, might not ask a
court of record to enter a declaratory judgment de-
fining his rights. Thereby we would have parallel
remedies, in part at least, in every civil cause of action,
even though the older remedies are satisfactory and
their use well settled. This would also result in
multiplicity of actions, for, having secured such dec-
Jaration, further proceedings would be necessary, as
in the case at bar, to make the declaration of the court
effective. Section 12102-8, General Code. Such was
not the intent of the Legislature when the declaratory
judgments law was enacted and the provisions for
older remedies were not repealed.”

The purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to
declare rights rather than to execute them. It is not
within contemplation of the act that, in the construction
and interpretation of an instrument such as that now
before us, the court should make a declaration whether
the law is that the tenant is liable for waste and the
contract forfeited because of the breach of some im-
plied duty or whether the law is that the contract may
be forfeited for default in payment of rent required
under one of the covenants of the contract.

The judgment is affirmed.

Braxg, C. J., Sremert, Sumpson, and Geracuty, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27590. Department Two. August 5, 1939.]

JoserH D. Roserts, Respondent, v. Eart Mr.rKin, as
Auditor of King County, et al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 393.

B. Gray Warner, Wm. Hickman Moore, John Caugh-
lan, Oliver E. Henderson, Geo. F. Vanderveer, and John
Geisness, for appellants. ©

James M. Ballard and Philip Tindall, for respondent.

The Attorney General and John E. Belcher, Assis-
tant, amici curiae.

Geracuty, J—Clara Wheeler, Bernice Steele, Irene
Olson, and G. L. Baxter filed charges with Earl
Millikin, auditor of King county, demanding the recall

° a

and discharge of Joseph D. Roberts from the office of
senator of the state of Washington from the “35th leg-
islative district.” The charges, filed under Laws of
1918, chapter 146, p. 454 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5350 [P. C.
§ 2305] et seq.), specified two acts of alleged mal-
feasance and misfeasance committed by Senator Rob-
erts in respect of the duties and obligations of his office
during the 1939 session of the state legislature.

The first charge was that, being desirous of the pas-
sage of bill 46, then pending in the senate, but opposed
to the passage of pending Senate bill 47, he unlawfully
entered into a corrupt agreement with four of his col-
leagues, who were opposed to the passage of bill 46,
but favored the passage of bill 47, by the terms of
which he would cast his vote for bill 47, which he
opposed, and his four colleagues, parties to the agree-
ment, would vote for bill 46, to which they were
opposed; that

“. . . pursuant to said improper, unlawful and
corrupt understanding and agreement the said Joseph D.
Roberts did, on the ist day of February, 1939, vote in
support of and for the passage of said Senate bill 47;
that said vote and said support of Joseph D. Roberts
for said bill was solely in furtherance of said unlawful,
improper and corrupt understanding and agreement,
and was not based on a fair and impartial determina-
tion of the merits of said bill and proposition in ac-
cordance with his best and uninfluenced judgment.”

The second charge recited the pendency of bills 48
and 70 before the senate; that the governor of the state
desired the passage of bill 48; that Senator Roberts
was opposed to the passage of bill 48, but favored the
passage of bill 70, and was further desirous of secur-
ing assurance that, upon its passage, it would be signed
by the governor. It is charged that Senator Roberts
and the governor, for the sole purpose of carrying out
their respective wishes in the premises and preventing

a °

the fair and impartial consideration of the two bills in
accordance with the best and uninfluenced judgment
of the several parties, did

“. . . wilfully, knowingly, intentionally and un-
lawfully conspire together and mutually enter into an
improper, unlawful and corrupt understanding and
agreement whereby said Joseph D. Roberts agreed to
cast his vote in favor of the passage of Senate bill
No. 48, and whereby said Clarence D. Martin agreed to
use his influence to secure the passage of Senate bill
No. 70

and that Senator “Roberts, “solely in furtherance of said
unlawful, corrupt and improper understanding. and
agreement,” voted for the passage of Senate bill 48,
and that his vote was not based

“. . . ona fair and impartial determination of
the merits of said bill in accordance with his best and
uninfluenced judgment, but solely in consideration of
the promises and acts”

of the governor.
Laws of 1913, chapter 146, p. 455, § 3, provides that,

“Tf the acts complained of in the charge or [are] acts
of malfeasance or misfeasance while in office, or a vio-
lation of the oath of office, as specified in the Consti-
tution, the officer with whom the charge is filed shall
formulate a ballot synopsis of such charge of not to
exceed two hundred words, which shall set forth the
name of the person charged, the title of his office, and
a concise statement of the elements of the charge, and
shall notify the persons filing the charge of the exact
language of such ballot synopsis, and attach a copy
thereof to and file the same with the charge, and there-
after such charge shall be designated on all petitions,
ballots and other proceedings in relation thereto by
such synopsis.” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5352 [P. C. § 2307].

Following the filing of the charges with the auditor
of King county, the present action was instituted by
Senator Roberts, seeking a decree permanently enjoin-

" a

ing the auditor from preparing a ballot synopsis or tak-
ing any of the other steps required of him by statute
in the furtherance of the charges; and that the court
decree that the charges be declared not to constitute
misfeasance or malfeasance in office or a violation of
the oath of office of the plaintiff as a state officer. The
proponents of the charges, with Millikin, the county
auditor, were named as defendants.

The amended complaint alleged that the charges
filed against the plaintiff were false and untrue and
maliciously made for the purpose of injuring his good
name and reputation as a state officer and citizen of
the community; that Senate bills 46, 47, and 48, re-
ferred to in the charges, were known as the social
security “stop-gap” bills, and that it was well known
among the members of the legislature that, if these bills
were not passed, the Federal government would refuse
to pay the state “matching funds”; and that, without
such aid, the state program of social security would be
seriously handicapped, if not destroyed.

It is further alleged that the bills were of an emer-
gency character and their immediate passage was nec-
essary to insure the continued payment by the Fed-
eral government of matching funds; that Senate bill 70,
referred to in the second charge, provided for the ap-
propriation to keep the parks and playgrounds of the
state open to the general public and was for the general
welfare of the citizens of the state; that Senate bills
46, 47, and 48 passed the senate with substantial major-
ities; and that Senate bill 70 passed the senate without
a dissenting vote and, likewise, was passed by the
house of representatives without any dissenting votes.

It was denied that the plaintiff, or any other mem-
ber of either branch of the legislature, personally or
remotely, profited by the enactment of any of the bills
mentioned in the charges.

a °

It was alleged that there was not then, nor has there
ever existed in the state of Washington, a political sub-
division known as the “35th legislative district,” and
that the plaintiff was not an officer of the thirty-fifth
legislative district, as set forth in the charges. It was
also alleged that chapter 146, Laws of 1913, providing
the procedure for the recall of public officers, is un-
constitutional, in that it exceeds the authority granted
by the recall amendment to the state constitution. It
was finally alleged that the charges filed against the
plaintiff do not constitute legal grounds for his recall,
but that the county auditor, Millikin, was about to pre-
pare a ballot synopsis of the charges and to perform the
other acts required of him by chapter 146, Laws of 1913.

The defendant Millikin, appearing separately, moved
to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint on the
ground that the allegations contained in them were
irrelevant, immaterial, and redundant. A demurrer
was also interposed by him on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, and
that the amended complaint did not state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action. The other de-
fendants moved to quash plaintifi’s show cause order
and demurred to the complaint.

At the conclusion of the hearing upon the demurrers
and motions, the court granted the motion of defend-
ant Millikin to strike one paragraph of the amended
complaint, and denied all the rest of the motions inter-
posed by the parties. The demurrers were overruled,
and the defendants, electing to stand upon their
motions and demurrers, declined to plead further;
whereupon, judgment was entered permanently en-
joining the defendant Millikin, as auditor of King
county, from preparing the ballot synopsis to the recall
charges and from doing any other act with relation to

[|

° a

them. The defendants, other than Millikin, joined in
an appeal from the judgment; Millikin, as auditor, took
a separate appeal.

As the trial court filed no memorandum of opinion,
the grounds upon which its conclusion was based are
not disclosed by the record. The respondent states
that the issues involved on the appeal are:

“(1) May the superior court enjoin proceedings to
recall a public officer based upon charges which those
who filed the recall petition admit are false and mal-
icious?

“(2) May the superior court enjoin such proceed-
ings when the proponents of such recall admit that the
office is not described as provided by statute?

“(3) May the superior court enjoin recall proceed-
ings when the complaint for injunction recites that
the act is unconstitutional, and the demurrer admits it?

“(4) May the superior court enjoin such recall
proceedings where the proponents of such recall admit
that the charges do not constitute legal charges for
recall of plaintiff?”

HI it will be observed that the respondent relies
to some extent upon the admissions of the appellants’
demurrers to the complaint. The appellants attacked
the complaint by demurrers and by a motion to strike
irrelevant and immaterial allegations. The complaint
alleged that the charges were “false and untrue and
maliciously made for the purpose of injuring the good
name and reputation of the plaintiff rad

If the court is not authorized to inquire into the truth
of the charges or the motive of the parties filing them,
then, of course, these allegations of the complaint were
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues, and should
have been stricken.

In Cudihee v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 Pac. 367, it is
held that the truth of the charges upon which the offi-
cer is sought to be recalled is triable solely before the
people.

P "

“The people, speaking in the manner provided by
law, may discharge their public officers for any cause,
or without any cause, as their laws may provide. In-
deed, the people’s rights are as complete in that re-
spect as when they choose such officer. In other words,
as against the people, a public officer, their servant,
has no rights whatever, so far as his possession of the
office is concerned, which may not be ignored by the
people speaking in a lawful manner. While it seems
true that, under this constitutional provision, an officer
is to be removed for cause only; yet, the question being
purely a political one, unless expressly provided other-
wise by statute or constitution, it is manifest that the
tribunal before which the sufficiency of the cause is to
be tried is that of the people. It may be that the courts
have jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the
statement of the allegations made as cause for removal
if presented in a proper proceeding involving the ques-
tion of the calling of the election, but the trial of the
question of whether such cause actually exists, and as
to whether the officer shall be discharged, is to be had
before the tribunal of the people and decided by them
at the polls.”

Now, if the courts are without power to inquire into
the truth of the charges, they are, with much greater
reason, without power to inquire into the motive of
the persons filing the charges. The extent of the court’s
right to intervene in a recall proceeding is prescribed
in § 14 of the act, p. 461, which provides that the court
shall have original jurisdiction to compel the perform-
ance of any act required of any officer under the pro-
visions of the act,

“ in case such officer refuse to perform the
same, or to prevent the performance by any such officer
of any act in relation to the recall not in compliance
with the provisions of this act; . . .” Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 5363 [P. C. § 2318].

Under the act, the auditor’s function, in relation to
the charges, is to prepare a ballot synopsis if he finds

° ae

that they sufficiently charge malfeasance or misfeas-
ance or breach of official oath; or to refuse to prepare
the synopsis if he finds the charges insufficient. In
either case, the correctness of his determination is sub-
ject to review by the court. There is nothing in the
constitution or statute in anyway implying a right in
the auditor, or in the court, to inquire into the motive
of the proponents of the charges. Their motive, in so
far as it bears upon the issues, is, like the truth of the
charges, triable to the tribunal of the people at the
polls. Courts would be treading upon dangerous
ground if they should assume to make the exercise by
the citizens of rights granted by the constitution and
Jaws dependent upon considerations of motive. A bad
motive may inspire an act appearing on its face valid
and beneficial, while a bad and invalid act may be, and
sometimes is, done with good intent and the best of
motive.

HI The complaint alleged that chapter 146, Laws
of 1913, is unconstitutional, and the respondent argues
that the demurrers admit the truth of the allegation.
The allegation is not one of fact, but a conclusion of
law; so, too, the allegation in the complaint that the
charges are insufficient for the recall of the respondent.
Whether they are or not, is a question of law, not of
fact.

As we view it, there are three questions properly
before the court on this appeal:

(1) Whether the charges are fatally defective in
that they specify that the respondent is a senator from
the “35th legislative district,” instead of from the
“thirty-fifth senatorial district”; (2) whether the
charges state acts of malfeasance or misfeasance; and
(3) whether chapter 146, Laws of 1913, is constitu-
tional.

Hi The reapportionment act, adopted at the 1930

a °

general election, Laws of 1931, chapter 2, p. 31 (Rem.
Rev. Stat., § 8137-1 [P. C. § 3557-L]et seq.), provides
that the senate shall consist of forty-six members, one
of whom shall be elected from each of the forty-six
senatorial districts therein established. It is provided
that the house of representatives shall consist of ninety-
nine members, who shall be elected from the forty-six
representative districts outlined in the act. The
boundaries of the several senatorial and representative
districts are the same, and they bear the same numbers.
The boundaries of the thirty-fifth senatorial district
and the thirty-fifth representative district, in King
county, are the same; they are both defined as embrac-
ing “the following precincts in the city of Seattle, in
King county: 233 to 238, inclusive, and 244 to 280, in-
clusive.”

In practical effect, the plan of the act is to divide
the state into forty-six districts for legislative purposes,
each district electing one senator and one or more rep-
resentatives. These districts might be referred to with
propriety, if not with technical accuracy, as legislative
districts, and, indeed, they are commonly so re-
ferred to.

It is to be borne in mind that the filing of the charges
with the county auditor is the initial step in the recall
process. He is to prepare a ballot synopsis for print-
ing upon petitions, which thereafter are to be circu-
lated for the signatures of electors. The county auditor
could not be misled as to the district represented by
the respondent in the state senate, and it may be as-
sumed that, in the preparation of the ballot synopsis,
the reference to the district would be made with tech-
nical accuracy.

We think this objection without merit.

HI On the question of the sufficiency of the
charges, the case of Pybus v. Smith, 80 Wash. 65, 141

° Se

Pac, 203, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1145, L. R. A. 1915A, 285,
seems to us to be decisive. In that case, the charge, as
recited in the court’s opinion, was:

“Tt is alleged in the charge made against appellant,
in substance, after stating in some detail various
matters pending before the city council, that he speci-
ally desired certain action to be taken by the city coun-
cil in certain of these pending matters; that other
councilmen especially desired certain action to be
taken by the city council in certain others of these
pending matters; and:

“That said E. T. Pybus and said councilmen Zener,
Hines and Wilson, each well knowing said facts as
above alleged, and while in office as said councilmen,
on or about the 6th day of January, 1914, and for the
sole purpose of carrying out their respective wishes in
the premises and preventing said matters and appoint-
ments from being fairly and impartially determined by
said councilmen, solely on the merits thereof according
to the best and uninfluenced judgment of said several
councilmen, did wilfully, knowingly, intentionally and
unlawfully conspire together and mutually enter into
an improper, unlawful and corrupt understanding and
agreement to cast their several votes on said proposi-
tions as follows, to wit:

“‘R. T. Pybus agreed to cast his vote to reject the
appointment of N. Inscho as chief of police and in con-
sideration therefor, W. R. Wilson agreed to cast his
vote in support of and to adopt the said proposed Sun-
day closing ordinance.

“. T. Pybus further agreed to cast his vote to re-
ject the confirmation of F. M. Berry as city engineer
and in consideration therefor C. A. Hines agreed to cast
his vote in support of and for the adoption of said pro-
posed Sunday closing ordinance; all of said parties
agreed with each other that said several propositions
should be voted upon by them and each of them alike
and in the following manner, that is that they would
each vote to reject the appointment of N. Inscho as
chief of police, to reject the appointment of F. M. Berry
as city engineer, and to adopt and pass the Sunday clos-
ing ordinance, and to confirm the appointment of one

a "

W. W. Gideon (the father-in-law of said councilman
C. R. Zener) as chief of police if the mayor of said city
could be prevailed upon to appoint said Gideon to said
position.’ ”

In sustaining the sufficiency of the charge, the court
said:

“Whether this appellant could be convicted of a mis-
demeanor in our state upon the charge here made may
be regarded as somewhat doubtful. But we are, how-
ever, of the opinion that the facts here charged against
the appellant, if true, do constitute malfeasance in
office on his part, within the meaning of that word as
used in our constitutional and statutory recall provi-
sions, and form sufficient legal cause for submitting to
the voters of the city the question of his recall and dis-
charge from public office. The following authorities
lend some support to this view, though we do not cite
them as being directly in point: Minkler v. State ex
rel. Smithers, 14 Neb. 181, 15 N. W. 330; State ex rel.
Tilley v. Slover, 113 Mo. 202, 20 S. W. 788; Bradford v.
Territory ex rel. Woods, 2 Okl. 228, 37 Pac. 1061;
Mechem, Public Officers, § 458. In the text of 9 Cyc.
485, touching the illegality of contracts which tend to
interfere with the proper administration of govern-
ment, the learned editors say:

“<A people can have no higher public interest, except
the preservation of their liberties, than integrity in the
administration of their government in all its depart-
ments. It is therefore a principle of the common law
that it will not lend its aid to enforce a contract to do an
act which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by improper
and sinister influences, the integrity of our social or
political institutions. Public officers should act from
high consideration of public duty, and hence every
agreement whose tendency or object is to sully the
purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the
high trust is confided is condemned by the courts. The
officer may be an executive, administrative, legislative,
or judicial officer. The principle is the same in either
case.’ ””

° a

There is no material difference between that case
and the one before us; indeed, the proponents of the
present charges seem to have drafted them with the
Pybus case in mind. We think the charges sufficient.

Hl The respondent and the attorney general, who
has filed a brief as amicus curiae, contend that the
recall act, or at least those portions of it which provide
for a preliminary filing of charges with the county
auditor and the preparation of a ballot synopsis to be
printed upon the recall petitions, thereafter to be cir-
culated for signatures of the voters, is unconstitutional.
They argue that this is so because the constitution
provides that a public officer may be recalled on the
petition of a specified percentage of legal voters filed
with the proper officer, but makes no provision for the
filing of charges by one or more voters preliminary
to, and as a prerequisite for, the filing of the recall
petition.

The statute does not attempt to change the provi-
sions of the constitution in respect to the filing of peti-
tions for recall bearing the signatures of the requisite
number of voters. It was passed in response to a man-
date of the recall amendment to the constitution, Art. I,
§ 34, to the effect that

“The legislature shall pass the necessary laws to
carry out the provisions of section thirty-three (33)

of this article, and to facilitate its operation and effect
without delay: . . .”

The act has been in effect for twenty-six years. In
that period, at least fifteen cases arising under it have
been before this court. In two of these cases, Cudihee
v. Phelps, 76 Wash. 314, 136 Pac. 367, and State ex rel.
Lynch v. Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 Pac. 374, the con-
stitutionality of the statute as a whole was upheld.
The provision requiring the preliminary filing of the

a °

charges and the preparation of a ballot synopsis, is
challenged for the first time.

The rule that every intendment is to be indulged in
favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act, is
reinforced in the present instance by the fact that the
recall process outlined in the act has been, for a quarter
of a century, accepted as part of the permanent public
policy of the state. The constitution itself, other than
declaring the right to recall and prescribing the officer
with whom the recall petitions are to be filed and the
required number of signatures, does not outline the
procedure to be followed. The matter of procedure
was, in a large measure, and of necessity, left to the
discretion of the legislature. The express mandate
that the legislature should, without delay, pass the
necessary laws to carry out the provisions of the con-
stitution and facilitate its operation, implies that this
provision was not deemed self-executing, but required
legislation to make it operative.

The statutory procedure for making the right of re-
eall effective, follows closely the plan embodied in
another act of the 1913 legislature, chapter 138, p. 418
(Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5397 [P. C. § 2750] et seq.), regu-
lating the procedure for exercise of the right of direct
legislation by the people under the initiative and refer-
endum provisions of the constitution, also adopted at
the 1912 general election. (Art. Il, §1, 7th amend-
ment.)

Chapter 138, p. 418, §1, provides that, whenever
any legal voter or committee or organization of legal
voters shall desire to propose a measure for submis-
sion to the legislature, or to the people upon an initia-
tive petition, or desire to order by petition the referen-
dum of any act, bill, or law passed by the legislature,

“.. . he or they shall file in the office of the sec-
retary of state five printed or typewritten copies of

" SE

the proposed measure or of the act or part thereof
on which a referendum is desired, accompanied by
the name and postoffice address of the person, com-
mittee or organization proposing the same,

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5397 [P. C. § 2750].

It is also provided that, after filing, the secretary of
state shall forthwith transmit to the attorney general
a copy of the measure bearing’ the serial number. The
attorney general is required, within ten days after
receipt of the measure, to formulate and transmit to
the secretary of state a ballot title of not to exceed one
hundred words. The ballot title formulated by the
attorney general is to be the ballot title of the measure
unless changed on appeal to the courts.

Now, all this procedure is preliminary and ‘additional
to that prescribed in the constitution, as much so as
the procedure preliminary to the filing of the recall
petitions. If the recall provision is obnoxious to the
constitution, the like provision in the initiative and
referendum statute is unconstitutional. Initiative and
referendum proposals have been more numerous than
recall proceedings, many measures initiated have been
enacted, and laws passed by the legislature have been
successfully suspended.

HI Each of these measures for direct legislative
action by the people has been referred by the secre-
tary of state to the attorney general for preparation
of a ballot synopsis without, so far as we are advised,
a challenge from him as to the constitutionality of the
act. Certainly, if there could ever be a case where
long acquiescence in departmental construction of a
statute should be given weight, it is here.

But, independently of long acquiescence in the chal-
lenged provisions of the act, we are of the opinion that,
considered on its merits, the provision for the filing of
charges and the preparation of a ballot synopsis pre-

Cc tC

liminary to the circulation of the petition, is a reason-
able and proper one, wholly consistent with the con-
stitution, and designed and intended to facilitate the
right of recall. This requirement is in line with the
other provisions of the act intended to restrain corrupt
practices in the recall process. None of the regulatory
provisions of the act can be said, with reason, to unduly
hamper the right of recall.

Our conclusion is that the motion to strike should
have been granted and the demurrers sustained. The
judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the superior court for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the views expressed in this
opinion.

Brake, C. J., Mintarp, Suwpson, and Jzrrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27323. Department One. August 7, 1939.]

Swan Persson, Appellant, v. McKay Coat Company,
Respondent.*

*Reported in 92 P. (2d) 1108.

_ ae

W. C. Hinman, for appellant.
John Kelleher, for respondent.

Rosinson, J.—Upon the hearing of this appeal, the
respondent moved to strike the appellant’s statement
of facts, upon the ground that “it is made up of nothing
more than a rambling assertion of legal conclusions
and conjectures.” To some extent, the statement is
subject to criticism as to form, but, as it is duly and
regularly certified, and contains a clear and definite
statement of that portion of the evidence upon which
the case turns, the motion will be denied.

The plaintiff sought a judgment for fifteen thousand
dollars, on various allegations sounding in both tort
and contract, but, by the time the case went to the
jury, the trial judge had pared it down to an action
for the conversion of a donkey engine, valued at one
hundred fifty dollars, some iron pipe, valued at one
hundred dollars, a wooden water tank, valued at
twenty-five dollars, and a mine car, worth twenty-five
dollars; in all, three hundred dollars; and that was the
amount for which the jury returned a verdict.

The sole assignment of error is that the court subse-
quently granted the defendant, McKay Coal Company,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

On December 12, 1932, McKay Coal Company leased
to appellant, Persson, a tract of coal land. A royalty
of thirty-five cents per ton was to be paid on all coal
mined and sold. Persson put some personal property
on the land and started to mine coal. His report to
the Federal department of commerce shows that he
mined and sold 129 tons in 1933. He, however, paid
no royalties. In November, 1933, with the coal com-
pany’s consent, Persson sublet to LaFreniere and
Raynes. They quit in February, 1934. In June, 1934,
again with lessor’s consent, Persson assigned the lease
and sold the personal property to Baciu. Baciu did .

RE 2S’

not work the mine. In September, 1934, he offered
to sell the personal property to the coal company for
one hundred dollars. They did not want it, but
allowed it to remain on the land as his property. In
January, 1935, Baciu turned the property back to
Persson, but there is evidence on behalf of the coal
company that it was not informed of this, and there
is no evidence to the contrary.

On April 24th, Persson went to the property and
found Hutchinson, the treasurer and general manager
of the coal company, there. Persson testified, speaking
of Hutchinson:

“He told me I was trespassing on the property and
if I appeared there again he would have me arrested
and he would attach any property I might have for
the royalties.”

It was contended that these words, spoken under
the circumstances shown, constituted a conversion.

Hi Upon consideration of the matter after verdict,
the trial court concluded that there was no evidence
of conversion, and rightly. There is no evidence that
the coal company did anything in connection with the
property; none that it claimed any kind of dominion
over it. The property was merely on its land, having
been brought or left there by the appellant himself.
The coal company’s possession, if it can be called pos-
session, was entirely lawful, and could not have be-
come wrongful until a demand for it had been made
and refused, Hanson v, Ostrander R. & Timber Co.,
147 Wash. 104, 265 Pac. ‘159; that is, unless the circum-
stances showed that a demand would have been futile.
Lockit Cap Co. v. Globe Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290
Pac. 813. There is no evidence to indicate that.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Brags, C. J., Sremert, Mary, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27486, Department One. August 7, 1939.]

Cc. C. Bowman et al., Respondents, v. O. O. HarpGRovE,
Appellant.

Lindsay & Harper, for appellant.
Tucker & Tucker, for respondents.

Main, J.—This is a forcible entry and detainer ac-
tion. The trial was to the court without a jury, and
resulted in findings from which it was concluded that
the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief which they
sought. From the judgment entered directing the is-
suance of a writ of restitution, the defendant appealed.

October 14, 1937, the respondent C. C. Bowman
leased to the appellant, O. O. Hardgrove, for a period
of ten yéars, one hundred acres of agricultural land,
which was community property, and the lease was
not signed by Jennie S. Bowman, the wife of C. C.
Bowman. The appellant went into possession and re-

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 308.

Sl’

mained in possession for approximately a year, farm-
ing and generally improving the land. The respond-
ents resided on a tract of land which was adjacent to
that leased. It is not disputed that Mrs. Bowman
knew that the appellant was in possession.

On or about September 14, 1938, the respondents
gave notice to the appellant to quit and surrender
possession of the land covered by the lease, and there-
after the present action was instituted for the purpose
above stated. Upon the trial, Mrs. Bowman did not
testify, due to the fact that she was at the time dan-
gerously ill.

Hi The question is whether Mrs. Bowman con-
sented to the making of the lease, or subsequently
ratified it. There is no question but that she knew,
as stated, that the appellant was in possession and
farming and clearing the land, but the question is
whether she knew that the lease was made for a period
of ten years.

The controlling principle is stated in Hay v. Chehalis
Mill Co., 172 Wash. 102, 19 P. (2d) 397, where it is said:

“This court has definitely committed itself to the
doctrine that, where the wife has consented to the
conveyance, or contract to convey, or has subse-
quently ratified or sanctioned it, she may not there-
after disaffirm it. Konnerup v. Frandsen, 8 Wash. 551,
36 Pac. 493; O’Connor v. Jackson, 33 Wash. 219, 74
Pac. 372. On the other hand, where there has not
been joint action by the members of the community,
the act by one, in order to have any validity, must be
done or performed under such circumstances as that
the law will conclusively presume therefrom that there
has been acquiescence on the part of the other. Allen
v., Esgate, 131 Wash. 618, 230 Pac. 818.”

The appellant cites a number of cases in which it is
held that the wife was bound by a lease or a convey-
ance which she did not sign, either on the ground that
she had consented thereto or had ratified what her

a!

husband had done. On the other hand, the respondents
cite a number of cases where it is held that the wife
‘was not bound. Each case must depend very largely
upon its own facts, and, in this case, the question of
fact is, as already indicated, whether Mrs. Bowman
consented to the lease, or subsequently ratified it with
knowledge that it was for a period of ten years. The
trial court expressly found that she had neither con-
sented to, nor subsequently ratified, the lease.

After reading and considering the evidence as it ap-
pears in the record, we are of the opinion that the trial
court correctly found the facts. It would serve no
useful purpose to here review the evidence in detail.

The judgment will be affirmed.

Buaxz, C. J., Jerrers, and Rogrvson, JJ., concur.
Sternert, J., dissents.

[No. 27285. Department One. August 8, 1939.]

Harry A. Brop, Respondent, v. Genet HEaTING AND
Prumeinc Company, Appellant, C. A.
Dunnam Company, Respondent.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 313.

Emil N. Stenberg, for appellant.

Robert B. Abel, for respondent Brod.

Rickabaugh & Rickabaugh, for respondent C. A.
Dunham Company.

Roginson, J.—Harry A. Brod, a salesman of heating
and ventilating equipment for various manufacturers,
and on his own account, brought this action to recover
$555, the price of an electric motor. Being in doubt as
to the person from whom he was entitled to recover,
he joined several defendants, as permitted by subd. 2,
Rule II, Rules of Pleading, Procedure and Practice,

LFF

193 Wash. 40-a. These defendants were Gehri Heating
and Plumbing Company, a corporation (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Gehri), C. A. Dunham Company, a cor-
poration (hereinafter called Dunham), and E. M.
Tennant. Dunham’s home office and plant are in Chi-
cago. Tennant was the manager of its Seattle sales
office.

Gehri answered, denying that it had purchased the
motor. Dunham answered, also denying that it had
purchased the motor, but cross-complained against
Gehri for $863.93, with respect to goods alleged to have
been sold and delivered. Answering the Dunham
cross-complaint, Gehri set up that it had entered into
a written contract with Dunham on February 1, 1936,
to purchase a list of articles set out at the various
prices therein stipulated; that said articles had been
furnished, and that it had paid for the same, except
for the sum of $224.27. As the motor, for the price
of which the plaintiff sued, was one of the articles
listed in this contract, Gehri further pleaded that, if
the plaintiff recovered against it, then it should have
a recovery over against Dunham for $555, less $224.27,
or $330.73.

Replying to the Gehri answer to its cross-complaint,
Dunham denied that the alleged contract of February
1, 1936, purporting to have been executed by Tennant,
was its contract. It denied that Tennant had any
authority to enter into any contract on its behalf to
sell any material not manufactured or handled by it.
It further set up that no contract made by a salesman
on its behalf was valid until approved in writing by
the home office. It alleged that it did furnish to Gehri,
on various orders transmitted by Tennant, a list of
articles of the value of $1,947.25, and had received
payments amounting to $1,083.32, leaving a balance due
of $863.93. It further denied that Tennant had any

a *

authority to make collections on its behalf, or to re-
ceive payment for its goods when sold by him, and
alleged that, if any payments were made to Tennant
on account of goods sold by it to Gehri, they were made
to him without authority and could not rightly be
applied as a payment on its account.

It appears from the record that Gehri, late in 1935
or early in 1936, secured contracts to install heating
systems in three public buildings. In order to perform
these contracts, it had to purchase a great deal of equip-
ment. On February 1, 1936, it addressed a letter to
“C, A. Dunham Company, 1518 Exchange Building,
Seattle, Washington. Atten: Mr. E. M. Tennant,” as
follows:

“Dear Sir:

“Confirming the verbal award of all specialties as
specified for the Hoquiam, Montesano and Male Ward
P. W. A. Projects according to quotation submitted us
by you as listed below: [Here follows a list of articles
with prices attached to each, and, including the motor,
the whole amounting to upwards of six thousand dol-
lars.]”

There are also some general provisions concerning
discounts, not material to our inquiry. The letter is
signed by the Gehri company. At the bottom, left,
appears: “Accepted: By E. M. Tennant.”

Prior to February ist, Mr. Tennant had gotten a
price from Brod on the motor, which is listed in the
February Ist contract. Brod testified that, in case the
sale of the motor was made, he and Tennant were to
divide the resulting profits. After the instrument of
February 1st was executed, Tennant sent an order to
Brod’s principal for the motor and some other equip-
ment needed to fulfill the Gehri contract. This order
was on a Dunham letterhead. At the bottom, as on all
of the Dunham letterheads which we find among the
exhibits, was printed in small, but in readable, type:

a

“All contracts and agreements of this company are
made contingent upon strikes, accidents and other de-
lays beyond its control, and are only binding upon the
company when approved in writing by the home office.”

It was for that reason, Brod testified, that he insisted
that Gehri become personally responsible for the equip-
ment that he furnished. Concerning this, Brod testified
that, before he shipped the motor, he told Otto Gehri,
president of the company, that he would look to them
direct for payment, and that Gehri told him that he
would have to get authority from Tennant. Brod said
that he got such authority and telephoned Gehri, and
Gehri said: “O. K.” At another point, Brod testified,
squarely, that Gehri told him he would pay him for the
motor; that he then furnished it, and sent the invoice to
. Gehri. A copy of this invoice is in the record, dated

October 2, 1936. A witness named Carlson testified that
Otto Gehri told Brod, in his presence, in February, 1937,
that there was money coming from the job and he would
be responsible for payment for the motor.

Mr. Gehri testified that the motor was purchased
from Dunham, and not from Brod; that he did tell
Brod he would pay him direct if he got an order from
Dunham through Tennant; but that he never received
it, and that he paid Dunham for the motor when he com-
pleted payment of the February 1st contract, less
$224.27.

HI It is contended that, at the most, this evidence
shows but an agreement on Gehri’s part to answer for
the default of another, and therefore not enforcible,
because not in writing. This contention is evidently
based upon the testimony of Carlson that Gehri told
Brod, in 1937, that he would be “responsible” for pay-
ment for the motor. However, the finding of the court
is that Gehri made a direct, original promise to pay in
August, 1936, before the motor was delivered. The evi-

rc ttC“(éite

dence to this effect, though somewhat scanty, is, in our
opinion, sufficient to support the finding.

Was the February Ist contract a contract between
Gehri and Dunham or between Gehri and Tennant?
The contract is, in form, ambiguous; for, while Gehri’s
letter is addressed to Dunham, it is accepted by Ten-
nant—not specifically by Tennant on behalf of Dunham.

Hi It is abundantly clear from the record that
Tennant had no actual authority to make such a con-
tract for Dunham. Tennant did not treat it as a Dunham
contract. He did not send it to his principal for ap-
proval. He merely sent orders to it for those items in
the contract which it could supply, just as he sent the
order to Brod’s principal for the motor. Dunham’s evi-
dence is to the effect that it never even saw a copy of
the February Ist instrument until January, 1937, al-
though all of the goods it had furnished to Gehri had
been shipped, accepted, and installed long prior to that.

It is quite easy to understand why the instrument of
February Ist was not sent to Dunham by Tennant, for
about two-thirds of the articles, in value, listed therein,
were not Dunham’s goods, and the agency agreement
between Dunham and Tennant, which was introduced
in evidence by both parties to the action, provides,
among other things,

“It is distinctly agreed that the Second Party [Ten-
nant] will not sell directly or indirectly any article or
products other than those of the First Party [Dunham]
unless first approved in writing by the First Party.”

At another point in the Dunham-Tennant agency
agreement, we find this language:

“The Second Party has authority only as the repre-
sentative of the First Party to sell the First Party’s
products

It was also provided in the agency agreement that
Tennant could make no contract or agreement on behalf

-—vLvLFLFTFTFTFT

of Dunham without its consent in writing, and, as we
have heretofore stated, notice to that effect was carried.
on all Dunham’s letterheads, which letterheads Ten-
nant was required to use, and did use.

The agency.agreement further provided:

“Second Party shall not make collections for goods
sold on contracts made hereunder, but all collections
of accounts for money due First Party shall be made
by First Party and it shall have exclusive charge and
control of same, except in special cases wherein the
First Party authorizes in writing the collection of cer-
tain accounts.”

It is, therefore, clear that Tennant had no actual au-
thority to make any such contract for Dunham as the
alleged February 1st contract, and also that he had no
authority to make collections.

HAs between Gehri and Dunham, however, it is
the agent’s apparent authority which controls. Did
Dunham hold out Tennant as being authorized to make
such a contract? Appellant points out that “Dunham
C A Co Exch Bg EL iot-1894,” appears in the Seattle
telephone book, and that there is a similar listing in
the Seattle directory. He also introduced a photograph
of the entrance door to 1518 Exchange building, upon
which appeared, at the top, the following: “Percy S.
Laing Shipping Company, Inc., Steamship Agents,
Brokers & Fruit Forwarders;” below that, “Griffith
Transport Company,” and below that, “C. A. Dunham
Co.”

The maintenance of these listings and the presence
of the name on the office door were known to Dunham;
in fact, its contract with Tennant required them. This
is substantially the only evidence in the record relied
upon to show apparent authority in Tennant to make
the sort of contract alleged. The fact seems to be that,
in making the alleged contract, Otto Gehri, acting for

a «
his company, relied wholly upon Tennant’s statements
that he was Dunham’s agent, and assumed that, as such
agent, he had authority to make such a contract for his
principal. We quote from the cross-examination of
Otto Gehri, who, as president of Gehri, negotiated the
alleged contract:

“Q. You introduced Defendant’s Exhibit 2 which I
put in as an exhibit in your answer, and you claim is
the contract on which you are relying to hold C. A.
Dunham Company? A. Yes, sir. Q. How is that ac-
ceptance signed? A. By Mr. Tennant. Q. As manager,
or agent for C. A. Dunham Company? A. No, sir. Q.
You have no acceptance of any kind from C. A. Dun-
ham Company? A. This is addressed to C. A. Dunham
Company. Q. But you have no acceptance? A. No,
sir. Q. Only by Mr. Tennant individually? A. Whom
I considered their agent. Q. You stated you never
were in their office at Seattle? A. No, sir. Q. And
never saw their letterheads? A. Not that I recall. Q.
Then you are relying entirely upon Mr. Tennant’s au-
thority to represent C. A. Dunham Company by his
statement to you that he was manager? A. Yes, sir.”

Mr. Gehri’s testimony on his direct examination was
as follows:

“Q. Mr. Gehri, you had a conversation with Mr. Ten-
nant as to his relation with the C. A. Dunham Com-

pany? A. Yes. @. What did he say his relationships
were? A. He was a salaried employee.”

Subsequent acts of Gehri are inconsistent with the
claim that it thought that the February Ist contract
was Dunham’s. On July 15, 1936, Dunham, having
filled the orders sent in by Tennant, wrote Gehri a
rather sharp letter concerning the nonpayment of its
account. On July 25th, Gehri sent Dunham $1,083.36.
Dunham acknowledged it, and stated that $191.18 was
still due, and they would expect it by August 15th. On
September 18th, Dunham complained, by letter, of not

av
having received this amount. Answering that letter on
September 22nd, Gehri said, in part:

“Answering your letter of September 18th with refer-
ence to the $191.18 balance. This balance is on the
Hoquiam School job which we have completed and have
certificate of acceptance on and have made application
for full settlement which we expect in the very near
future and will remit in full at that time.”

On October 27th, Dunham wrote, complaining that it
had not received the $191.18, and on November 9th, that
it received neither the money nor an answer to its letter
of October 27th. Yet, Gehri now shows, in its evidence
in this case, that it paid Tennant $579 on July 6th, and
says that this was a payment to Dunham. If that is so,
it owed no balance of $191.18 all those months, and, in
fact, it had overpaid Dunham when it sent $1,083.36 on
July 25th.

When, finally, Gehri began claiming, late in 1936,
that it had such a contract, Dunham had a great deal of
difficulty in getting Gehri to furnish it a copy. Relative
to this, Mr. Gehri testified:

“Q. Why do you say you were reluctant to tell C. A.
Dunham Company what your contract was? They
wrote you after you had some trouble on stuff fur-
nished by Mr. Tennant and you wanted C. A. Dunham
Company to make it right, and they had to write several
times before you told them. A. I think if we had Mr.
Tennant here we could clear this thing up. Q. Why
didn’t you tell C. A. Dunham Company? A. Because
we realized that Mr. Tennant was going ‘South’ with
the money, and we wanted to close the jobs before
they filed a lien.”

There is a great deal in the record from which an
inference can be drawn that the claim of Gehri that the
February 1st contract was with Dunham was an after-
thought. However that may be, we are of the opinion
that there is not sufficient proof of holding out to hold

a *

Dunham—nothing more than its name on the office door
and in the directories, and whatever inference might
have been drawn from that by Gehri is weakened by
the fact that Otto Gehri testified that he knew that
Tennant was a mere salaried employee.

In any event, and even if Tennant had the right
to, and did, make the contract on the part of Dunham,
Gehri had no right to assume that Tennant was au-
thorized to receive the payments to become due there-
under. Such authority is not implied from the right to
sell, unless the agent is entrusted with possession of the
goods; which was not the case here.

In Petersen v. Pacific American Fisheries, 108 Wash.
63, 183 Pac. 79, 8 A. L. R. 198, this court quoted, with
approval, the following from 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law
(2d ed.), 1014:

“Where the principal has clothed the agent with
the indicia of authority to receive payment, as by en-
trusting him with the possession of the goods to be sold,
the purchaser is warranted in paying the price to the
agent at the time of sale. But when the agent has not
the possession of the goods, and no other indicia of au-
thority, and is only authorized to sell, the purchaser
pays the agent at his peril, and it devolves upon him to
show that the agent was authorized to receive pay-
ment’.”

See the elaborate note on the Petersen case in 8 A. L.
R. 203, entitled, “Authority of Agent to Receive Pay-
ment for Commodities Which He Is Authorized to Sell
or for Which He is to Find Market,” and the continua-
tion thereof in 105 A. L. R. 718.

In a later case, decided by this court (Woodworth v.
School Dist. No. 2, 92 Wash. 456, 159 Pac. 757), it is
said:

“The court was also requested to instruct the jury
that an agent employed to make sales, and selling on
credit, is not authorized to subsequently collect the

sv

price in the name of the principal, and payment to him
will not discharge the purchaser unless he can show
some authority in the agent other than that necessarily
implied in a mere power to make sales. This instruction
also should have been given in order that the jury
might be advised that, if they found that Jansson had
no apparent authority other than to make sales, pay-
ment to him would not discharge the debt.”

There is some contention made that Dunham
ratified the alleged contract by supplying the goods,
and that it is even now, in prosecuting its cross-com-
plaint, seeking to take the benefit thereof. But, as we
have heretofore pointed out, Dunham had no knowledge
of the existence of any such instrument until after the
goods had been forwarded in accordance with Ten-
nant’s orders, accepted by Gehri, and installed in the
buildings. It could not, by conduct, ratify an instru-
ment of which it had no knowledge.

Nor is Dunham now attempting to reap the benefit of
the contract. It disavowed the contract utterly when it
first received knowledge of it. In its cross-complaint, it
alleged that it furnished Gehri goods and merchandise
of the value of $1,947.25; that it had received $1,083.32
on the account; and that $863.93 was still due. The trial
court so found, and we think its findings are supported
by the evidence.

The judgments appealed from are affirmed.

Bruaxe, C. J., Matn, Jerrers, and Srervert, JJ.,
concur.

91

[No. 27485. Department One. August 8, 1939.]
Tue Srate or Wasurveron, on the Relation of Rosa
Johnson, Individually and as Guardian, Appellant,
v. Tue Crry or Darron et al., Respondents.*

John C. Hurspool, for appellant.

R. M. Sturdevant, for respondents.
*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 909.

‘ as

Rosrnson, J.—This case is submitted upon an agreed
statement of facts.

In 1923, the council of the city of Dayton passed an
ordinance providing for the paving of one of its streets
on the special assessment plan. The ordinance created
a local improvement district and authorized the issu-
ance of local improvement bonds to the contractor in
payment of the cost of the improvement. Notice was
given of hearing on the assessment roll, and thereafter
the assessment roll, no objections having been filed, was
approved and confirmed by the city council. The im-
provement was completed and local improvement fund
bonds issued to the contractor in payment of the cost
of the improvement. The bonds were in denominations
of five hundred dollars each, except that the first bond
was for $630.65, and were numbered consecutively from
1 to 32, They were in usual form and contained on
their face the declaration required by the Laws of 1911,
chapter 98, p. 474, § 52, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9405 [P. C.
§ 1040].

Relator is the owner and holder of bonds Nos. 28 and
29, and, as guardian of the estate of Estel Mortimer, a
minor, is the holder of bond No. 27. Bonds Nos. 1 to
26, inclusive, have been paid. All assessments on prop-
erty in the local improvement district have been paid,
except those hereinafter mentioned. There is not a suf-
ficient amount in the local improvement fund to pay
the bonds remaining unpaid, the only money in the
fund being the sum of sixty dollars.

The deficiency arises because the assessments against
certain lots and parcels of land were not paid. Two
lots were assessed at $266.22 and $65.16, respectively.
These assessments were not paid, nor were the general
taxes, and the general tax liens were foreclosed and the
property struck off to the county. Three lots were as-
sessed at $78.50, $120.00, and $1,198.80, respectively.

A —*

These assessments were not paid, and the assessment
liens were foreclosed and the property struck off to the
city.

The lot assessed for $1,198.80 is on a steep hillside.
It appears from the agreed statement that the value of
this lot, at the time the assessment was made, was fifty
dollars, and that the benefits received from the im-
provement did not exceed eighty-five dollars, and that
the present value of the lot is one hundred and thirty-
five dollars. The assessment, together with the interest
that has accrued, now amounts to $2,341.33.

If all of the assessments, with interest, had been paid,
there would have been funds sufficient to pay all of the
bonds. Relator brought this action for a writ of man-
date requiring respondents to reassess the property in
the local improvement district to provide funds for the
payment of the bonds held by her. From a judgment
denying the application for writ of mandate, relator ap-
peals.

Appellant contends that, under the provisions of the
local improvement statute (Laws of 1911, chapter 98,
p. 441, as amended), the property is subject to reassess-
ment to provide funds for the payment of the bonds
held by her, and she relies particularly upon the fol-
lowing language contained in § 42, p. 468 (Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 9395 [P. C. § 1030]):

“ . Whenever, on account of any mistake, in-
advertence or other cause, the amount assessed shall
not be sufficient to pay the cost and expense of the im-
provement made and enjoyed by the owners of the
property in the assessment district where the same is
made, the council of such city or town is authorized and
directed to make reassessments on all the property in
said assessment district to pay for such improvement;

HI In the case of State ex rel. Larson v. Vancouver,
160 Wash. 655, 295 Pac. 947, the court pointed out that

ae

this section must be construed with reference to the
other sections of the act, and particularly § 23, p. 455
(Rem. Rev. Stat., $9375 [P. C. §1011]), which pro-
vides:

“Whenever any assessment-roll for local improve-
ments shall have been confirmed by the council or other
legislative body of such city or town as herein pro-
vided, the regularity, validity and correctness of the
proceedings relating to such improvement, and to the
assessment therefor, including the action of the council
upon such assessment-roll and the confirmation thereof,
shall be conclusive in all things upon all parties, and
cannot in any manner be contested or questioned in
any proceeding whatsoever by any person not filing
written objections to such roll in the manner and within
the time provided in this act, and not appealing from
the action of the council in confirming such assess-
ment-roll in the manner and within the time in this act
provided. No proceeding of any kind shall be com-
menced or prosecuted for the purpose of defeating or
contesting any such assessment, or the sale of any prop-
erty to pay such assessment, or any certificate of de-
linquency issued therefor, or the foreclosure of any
lien issued therefor: Provided, that this section shall
not be construed as prohibiting the bringing of injunc-
tion proceedings to prevent the sale of any real estate
upon the grounds (1) that the property about to be
sold does not appear upon the assessment-roll, or (2)
that said assessment has been paid.”

The court held, overruling Loveless v. Chehalis, 133
Wash. 33, 233 Pac. 301, that the confirmation of the
assessment roll was conclusive upon the contractor as
well as the property owners, saying:

“Thus, the legislature recognized the necessity for
certainty in these matters, and provided very definitely
that, after due confirmation, the amount and sufficiency
of the assessment could no longer be questioned, except
in the event of invalidity, or the like, as we shall later
see.”

CC i

Later, in the opinion, the court said, at page 661:

“These last two sections of the statute [§§ 9395 and
9396], when read in connection with the preceding
sections, rather clearly indicate the legislative intent
that the assessment-roll, as confirmed, shall be final
and binding upon all parties, save only in cases where
the assessment may be held to be invalid, or there is
some error or mistake which renders the assessment
uncollectible or insufficient from the beginning. The
clause, ‘whenever on account of mistake, inadvertence
or other cause, the amount assessed shall not be suf-
ficient to pay the cost and expense of the improvement,’
relates necessarily to the causes therein before enu-
merated, or some cause of like nature, and cannot be
held to relate to subsequent defaults of the property
owners which are not to be anticipated. .

“Here was an assessment never held invalid, suf-
ficient in amount to pay the cost and expense of the
improvement if property owners paid as the ordinance
required, which was duly confirmed, and became bind-
ing upon the property owners and the contractor alike;
and his successor in interest, the respondent, since the
bonds are payable only out of a special fund and are
non-negotiable, is likewise bound.” (Italics ours.)

Appellant’s counsel, in an attempt to distinguish the
instant case from the Larson case says, in his brief:

“Tf the assessment in the Larson case was sufficient
to pay the cost of the improvement, then that state-
ment cannot be applied to the present case where the
assessment was insufficient to pay such cost, and this
is the distinction between the two quoted paragraphs,
and a distinction which the trial court ignored. There
seems to have been no question in the Larson case but
that the assessment was sufficient at the beginning, the
action to compel a reassessment was brought on that
theory and that the insufficiency arose from subsequent
conditions. Here the insufficiency existed from the
moment the assessment was levied.

“It is true the language used by the court in the last
quotation in saying, ‘if the property owners paid as the
ordinance required’ tends to confuse the matter.”

The words, “if property owners paid as the ordinance
required,” do not tend to confuse the matter; on the
contrary, they make it plain that, when the court said,
“Here was anassessment . . . sufficient in amount
to pay the cost and expense of the improvement,” it
meant an assessment, equal in amount, at the time
made, to the cost of the improvement. That is, if an
improvement costs ten thousand dollars, and ten thou-
sand dollars is assessed when the improvement is made,
then the amount assessed is “sufficient,” within the
meaning of § 9395, even though it turns out that a
lesser amount is ultimately realized, due to the failure
of property owners to pay.

In the case at bar, the improvement was made sixteen
years ago, and the amount assessed, was, as in the
Larson case, sufficient to pay the cost of the improve-
ment; but, due to the failure of some of the property
owners to pay their assessments, the fund proved in-
sufficient to pay the bonds.

It is a matter of common knowledge that hundreds
of improvement districts throughout the state have
failed to pay out for the same reason, and that many of
them overlap. The consequences of holding in this
case that the city council may be required by mandate
to make a reassessment to make up the deficiency, upon
the ground that the amount assessed was not sufficient
within the meaning of § 9395, would be staggering. It
would constitute a precedent for a reassessment of
thousands upon thousands of pieces of property which
have been dealt with for years upon the understanding
that they were free and clear of all assessments. In the
larger cities, where there has been much overlapping,
there would doubtless be reassessments for more than
one improvement. :

The appellant misinterprets the opinion in the
Larson case, as well as the statute itself. The statute

Cc Ci

does not provide for reassessment when the assessment
as made was sufficient to pay the cost, but a deficiency
resulted due to the failure of some of the property
owners to pay.

Hi Appellant also contends that the assessment as
to the side hill lot was void, and that the assessment,
considered as a whole, was, therefore, “insufficient”
from the beginning. It is said to be void because the
lot was assessed at $1,198.80, whereas the benefit it
received was not more than eighty-five dollars. Ap-
pellant cites Horton Inv. Co. v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 556,
162 Pac. 989; Towers v. Tacoma, 151 Wash. 577, 276
Pac. 888; and In re Sixth Avenue, 155 Wash. 459, 284
Pac. 738, in which cases it was held that assessments for
local improvements must be made according to the
benefits received by each property. But all of these
are cases wherein the owner of a specific piece of prop-
erty was appealing from the order confirming the as-
sessment thereon.

It is too late in this case to question the assessments
made on specific pieces of property. Had the owner of
the side hill lot filed objections upon that ground, and
they had been disallowed, and he had then appealed
from the order confirming the assessment roll, doubt~-
less that rule would have been applied. But he did not
do so; and, by the terms of § 23, chapter 98, Laws of 1911
(Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9375), the assessment became “con-
clusive in all things upon all parties,” including, as is
held in State ex rel. Larson v. Vancouver, the con-
tractor and his successor in interest (in this case, the
appellant relator), since the bonds are non-negotiable
and payable out of a special fund.

The appellant further contends that the method
of assessment employed in this instance must be held
to be unlawful and invalid because it took no account

Le

a!!!

of the principle that an assessment on a particular piece
of property should be strictly proportionate to the
benefits received. The plan of the assessment is set
out in the agreed statement of facts, as follows:

“(13) ‘That the method of determining the amount
of assessment against each lot or parcel of land for such
local improvement district, was as follows: The total
cost of improvement was apportioned one-half to the
property lying on each side of the center line of Sixth
Street. The number of square feet was then deter-
mined and the assessment was made against it in pro-
portion to the total number of square feet on that side
of the street to the center of each block, respectively,
and apportioned according to the zoning method upon
the ratio fixed by statute, to-wit: Rem. Revised Stat-
ute of Washington, Section No. 9365.”

But the fact that both the front foot and zone methods
of assessment sometimes result in gross inequalities
does not make such methods of assessment ipso facto
void, where, as under our statutes, the procedure af-
fords to each individual property owner his day in
court and the right to file written objections and to
appeal in case they are overruled. In speaking of the
front foot method in Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Mich. 431, 8
N. W. 52, a case decided as early as 1881, in which it
was contended that an assessment according to front-
age was not an assessment in proportion to benefits
received and, therefore, in violation of constitutional
principles, Judge Cooley, an authority of the very first
rank on American constitutional law, in stating the
opinion of the court, said:

“We might fill pages with the names of cases decided
in other states which have sustained assessments for
improving streets, though the apportionment of the
cost was made on the same basis as the one before us.
If anything can be regarded as settled in municipal law
in this country, the power of the legislature to permit
such assessments and to direct an apportionment of the

cost by frontage, should by this time be considered as
no longer open to controversy. Writers on constitu-
tional law, on municipal law, and on the law of taxation
have collected the cases, and have recognized the
principle as settled.”

The principle must be regarded as settled in this
state. We quote from Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash.
589, 124 Pac. 121:

“The method of distributing the cost, whether by
front foot or by area or by a zone system, will not
ipso facto invalidate the assessment.”

This statement is quoted with approval in Lindstrom
v. McMillan, 98 Wash. 608, 168 Pac. 463, and again
approved in the per curiam opinion in In re Roeder
Avenue, 159 Wash. 32, 292 Pac. 113.

In considering this matter, we have had the benefit
and advantage of a most useful memorandum opinion
prepared by the trial judge and made a part of the
record in the cause. We agree with his conclusion that
there are no facts or circumstances in this case which
differentiate it from the case of State ex rel. Larson v.
Vancouver, 160 Wash. 655, 295 Pac. 947.

The judgment denying the application for the writ
and dismissing the action is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Mary, Srervert, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

100

[No. 27340. Department One. August 10, 1939.]

Auice M. Drstey, Respondent, v. Wini1am F. Perers
et al., Appellants.

Wortme Marriuews, Respondent, v. WILLIAM F, PETERS
et al., Appellants.

Herpert D. Green, Respondent, v. Witt1am F. Perers
et al., Appellants.?

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 720.

Edge & Keith, H. E. Sarette, and Norman DePender,

for appellants.
H. Earl Davis and C. A. Orndorff, for respondents.

Jzrrers, J——This appeal is from an order granting
a new trial in each of three actions, consolidated for
the purpose of trial, after a verdict in favor of the de-
fendants in each action. .

The suits were instituted by plaintiffs, Alice M.
Dibley, Worthie Matthews, and Herbert D. Green,
against defendants William F. Peters and Ethel Peters,
his wife, to recover damages for injuries claimed to
have been sustained by plaintiffs as the result of an
automobile accident. Plaintiffs in each case claimed
the accident was caused by the negligence of defend-
ant Ethel Peters in the operation of an automobile
driven by her.

Defendants filed an answer to the complaint in each
ease, wherein they denied any negligence on their
part, and alleged affirmatively that plaintiffs and the
driver of the car in which they were riding were
guilty of contributory negligence, and further alleged
that plaintiffs and one Garland D. Connor, the driver

of the car in which plaintiffs were riding, at the time
of the accident were engaged in a common enterprise
or joint venture.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants
in each case.

Plaintiffs interposed a motion for new trial on all
the statutory grounds. The motion was granted on the
sole ground of the misconduct of juror W. E. Cassidy.

Plaintiffs filed six affidavits in support of their
motion, and defendants filed ten controverting af-
fidavits. We shall attempt to summarize these af-
fidavits' as briefly as possible, first taking up the
affidavits filed by plaintiffs.

D. R. Cork states in his affidavit that he had known
W. E. Cassidy for fifteen years, and that he (Cassidy)
had been following carnivals and had been operating
carnival games of chance, giving blankets and other
merchandise as prizes; that, on January 19, 1938, the
same day the jury in the instant action was released,
after having returned its verdict, affiant met Cassidy
on the street in Spokane and had a conversation with
him, in which Cassidy stated that he had just been
released from the Peters case, that he had done good
work for the Peters and saved them a bunch of money
for his work on the jury, and that he was going to get
in touch with Peters, asking affiant if he knew where
Peters lived; that a couple of days later, affiant again
met Cassidy on the street and had another conversa-
tion with him, in which he stated that, while he was
sitting as a juror in the Peters case, he had been in-
formed that both cars involved in the accident had
liability and property damage insurance, that the com-
pany covering the car in which plaintiffs were riding
had made settlement for injuries to some of the oc-
cupants of the Peters car, and that that was proof the
Peters were not to blame.

a “

The affidavit of Andrew James Duncan, who was a
juror in this case, states that, during the time the case
was being tried and before it had been submitted to
the jury, Cassidy, on several occasions, tried to discuss
the facts of the case with affiant, and that, on one oc-
casion, Cassidy stated to affiant that he had talked to
the prosecutor in regard to the case and had been in-
formed by the prosecutor that there was five thousand
dollars insurance on each car, and that the issue in the
action was overinsurance; that affiant informed Cas-
sidy that, under the instructions of the court, they
were not to discuss the case until it had been submitted
to them by the court, but that Cassidy still attempted
to discuss the case with affiant; that, before the case
was submitted to the jury, affiant observed Cassidy
talking to other jurors, and affiant knew, from what
he heard, that they were discussing the case and the
facts with reference to insurance, Cassidy claiming to
know there was insurance involved in the case; that,
when the jury retired to the jury room to consider
their verdict, Cassidy immediately announced that the
only way attorney Davis, for plaintiffs, would get his
money was through the insurance company, providing
he won this case, but that he (Cassidy) had sympathy
for the Peters and would not vote against them; that
there was some discussion as to whether or not Mrs.
Peters was intoxicated, but Cassidy stated that, so far
as he was concerned, that did not enter into it, and
refused to discuss the facts of the case with affiant or
the other jurors, but from the start took the attitude
that, regardless of the facts, he was for the Peters;
that, when the question of negligence on the part of
Mrs. Peters was discussed, Cassidy took the position
and stated that it appeared that plaintiff Green was
making enough money to take care of himself, and that

Peters should not be stuck for damages, when plain-
tiffs did not need the money.

The affidavit of H. Earl Davis, one of the attorneys
for plaintiffs, relates that, immediately after the re-
turn of the verdict in the instant case, he had a talk
with juror Cassidy, in which Cassidy stated that he
controlled the jury and was responsible for the verdict
in favor of Peters, and further stated that, after he had
looked the case over, he felt “that there was only one
cow to milk, and that the only cow that had any milk
was the Peters;” that Cassidy stated to affiant, in his
office, on or about February 15, 1938, that he (Cassidy)
had known Lester Edge for a long time, that he had
known there was insurance on both cars and felt the
lawsuit was between the insurance companies; that
he had learned from authoritative sources, between the
time the jury was selected and the time the case was
submitted to the jury, that the company carrying the
insurance on the car in which plaintiffs were riding
had made a settlement with Betty Hurst, one of the
occupants of the Peters car, and that to him that was
an admission of liability on the part of Connor; that
Cassidy further stated to affiant that he knew and had
found out that there was three thousand dollars in-
surance on the Peters car, and that there had been an
offer made to plaintiffs to settle for three thousand
dollars; that affiant tried to find out from Cassidy the
source of his information, but Cassidy only made
answer that “jurors are not so dumb, they have a way
of finding out things;” that, at the conclusion of the
case, the jury was polled, and jurors Andrew John
Duncan and Effie Pringle dissented from the verdict.

The affidavit of Paul K. Cooney, an employee in the
office of H. Earl Davis, states that, on February 15,
1938, he called juror Cassidy on the telephone, and that
subsequently Cassidy came into the office, and in a

conversation with affiant, Cassidy stated, in substance,
that, after the jury was selected and before the case
was submitted to them, he (Cassidy) learned from
sources which convinced him of the truth of the state-
ments, that there was insurance on both cars involved
in the accident, and that Betty Hurst, one of the wit-
nesses for defendants and one of the occupants of de-
fendants’ car, had been paid some figure, which he
learned to be around seven hundred dollars; that Cas-
sidy would not reveal the source of his information.

The affidavit of Herbert D. Green, one of the plain-
tiffs herein, states that he was around the halls and in
the men’s rest room during the various recesses and
on more than one occasion observed juror Cassidy
talking to defendants Peters and wife, and also to
Betty Hurst, one of the witnesses for defendants; that,
following the afternoon recess on January 14th, affiant
observed Cassidy talking to defendant Peters for some
time; that, at one time during the trial, in the men’s
rest room, affiant heard Cassidy and one other juror
talking, and that one of them said this was an insur-
ance case.

Grace J. Green, wife of plaintiff Herbert D. Green,
in her affidavit states that she was present in court
during the time the instant case was being tried; that,
on several occasions following recess, when the jury
was being returned to the jury box, affiant observed
juror Cassidy wink at defendant Peters in such a man-
ner as to be noticeable to affiant sitting in the court
room; that affiant noticed this to occur following the
noon recess on Monday, January 17th.

Defendants’ affidavits show substantially as follows:

William F. Peters, one of the defendants, in his af-
fidavit states that at no time during the trial did he
contact any member of the jury; that at no time were
any winks or glances exchanged between affiant and

any of the jurors; that affiant has no personal acquain-
tance with any of the jurors trying the case.

Betty Hurst states in her affidavit that at no time
during the trial did she have a conversation with juror
Cassidy, nor did she observe Mr. and Mrs. Peters, or
either of them, in conversation with Cassidy.

W. E. Cassidy states in his affidavit that he has read
the affidavits presented by plaintiffs in reference to
him; that he denies that he winked at defendant Peters
or that he made any overture or friendly gesture to-
wards anyone connected with the case; that he has
known D. R. Cork for many years, that he met Mr.
Cork on the street about January 19th, and talked to
him, and that during the conversation some inquiry
was made as to the case in which affiant was a juror,
and affiant stated he was on the Peters case; that af-
fiant made no reference to having saved any money
for anyone or that he expected any reward for his jury
service; that affiant did feel friendly toward the Peters
family, due to his observation of them in court, and
that, purely as a friendly gesture, he exchanged friendly
greetings with Mr. Peters in the hall; that, after affiant
had been discharged from jury duty, he learned that
some offer of settlement had been made and that there
was insurance involved, but that he had no information
on this subject until after the case was over, except
that he surmised that, because Connor was making no
claim herein, his claim had been taken care of; that
affiant has known both Earl Davis and Lester Edge,
and has known for some time that they represent in-
surance companies; that affiant did not state to attorney
Earl Davis that affiant, during the trial, knew the facts
set out in the affidavit of Earl Davis; that affiant denies
that he made any improper attempt to discuss the facts
in the case with juror Duncan, denies that he told
Duncan he had talked to the prosecutor about the case,

and denies that he talked to the other jurors about the
merits of the case, prior to the commencement of their
deliberations.

Jurors N. P. Nicholson, E. R. Swick, Linda Brady,
and Amelia Law, and defendant Ethel Peters, in their
affidavits state, in substance, that they did not hear
juror Cassidy, either in or out of the jury room, state
that he knew both parties to the action had insurance,
and that he (Cassidy) wanted to decide in favor of the
Peters because plaintiffs’ insurance company had set-
tled with Betty Hurst. It further appears from the af-
fidavit of Nicholson that at no time did he see Cassidy
wink at Mr. or Mrs. Peters, nor did he see Cassidy in
conversation with Mr. or Mrs. Peters, or Betty Hurst.

Lester P. Edge, one of the attorneys for defendants,
in his affidavit states that, on the day following the
discharge of the jury in the Peters case, juror Cassidy
called at his office and chatted with him about the
case; that Cassidy at no time made any suggestion

’ that he expected any compensation for his services as
a juror; that, during this conversation, affiant told
Cassidy that plaintiffs had been offered a substantial
settlement, and that a settlement had been made with
Betty Hurst.

The affidavit of Harvey E. Sarette is to the effect that
he is associated with Lester P. Edge; that he was
present during much of the conversation between Mr.
Edge and juror Cassidy; that Mr. Edge’s affidavit is
affiant’s version of what was said at that time.

After a hearing on the motion for new trial, the court
took the matter under advisement. Briefs were sub-
mitted by respective counsel, and the trial court, after
a full consideration of the matter, granted the motion,
on the ground of misconduct of juror Cassidy, and
filed a memorandum opinion wherein he stated:

“The granting of a new trial is largely a matter of
discretion with the trial judge. In all my experience
as a trial court I have never granted a new trial on the
ground of misconduct of the jury. However, in this
action I am convinced that under the law the bias,
prejudice and misconduct of the juror Cassidy has been
established by the record. I feel compelled to hold that
the plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial and the motion
will be granted.”

The order was duly entered, and this appeal fol-
lowed.

The record herein shows only one motion for new
trial and one order granting the motion, and that is in
the Worthie Matthews case. However, in view of the
consolidation of the three cases, we have assumed the
order entered in the Matthews case was intended to
apply to all three cases.

Appellants claim the court erred in considering the
affidavits of respondents in support of their motion for
new trial, and in granting a new trial.

The question presented is whether or not the trial
court abused its discretion in granting respondents a
new trial because of misconduct of juror Cassidy.

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 348 [P. C. § 8512], provides:

“A juror may be examined by either party as a wit-
ness, if he be otherwise competent. If he be not so
examined, he shall not communicate any private
knowledge or information that he may have of the
matter in controversy to his fellow jurors, nor be
governed by the same in giving his verdict.”

Hi Trial courts have wide discretion in granting
or refusing new trials, and the exercise of this discre-
tion in granting a new trial will not be interfered with,
except in situations where pure questions of law are
involved, and this court will not interfere with the
ruling of the trial court upon such a motion, unless it
can be said from the record that the court abused its

discretion. Danielson v. Carstens Packing Co., 115
Wash. 516, 197 Pac. 617; Leach v. Erickson, 161 Wash.
473, 297 Pac. 738; Norland v. Peterson, 169 Wash. 380,
13 P. (2d) 483; Hanna v. Bodler, 173 Wash. 460, 23 P.
(2d) 396; Corbaley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688,
74 P. (2d) 993. Ordinarily, a much stronger showing
of an abuse of discretion is required to set aside an
order granting a new trial, than one denying a new
trial. McKay v. General Acc. etc. Corp., 163 Wash.
92, 299 Pac. 987; Mathisen v. Norton, 187 Wash. 240,
60 P. (2d) 1. .

HB While it is undoubtedly the rule that affidavits
of jurors cannot be received to impeach their verdict
as to those matters which inhere in the verdict, except
as showing that the verdict was reached by chance or
lot, and that exception is statutory (Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Seattle Electric Co., 75 Wash. 430, 134 Pac.
1097), yet we have consistently held, since the de-
cision in State v. Parker, 25 Wash. 405, 65 Pac. 776,
that it is competent to show the facts in relation to the
misconduct of a juror, but not to show the effect of
such misconduct on other jurors, the latter question
being one for the court to determine. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Seattle Electric Co., supra; Lyberg v.
Holz, 145 Wash. 316, 259 Pac. 1087; Hamilton v. Snyder,
182 Wash. 688, 48 P. (2d) 245; Mathisen v. Norton,
supra.

We have, in certain cases, used language implying
that affidavits of jurors should be considered in so far
as they state the facts showing misconduct, but not
as showing the effect of such misconduct on the verdict,
the latter being for the court to determine from the
facts. This application of the rule seems to us to meet
every purpose of public policy. It prevents the jury
from divulging what consideration entered into its
deliberations or controlled its action, thus impeaching

its own verdict, but it does not close what is often the
only avenue to a showing of actual facts constituting
misconduct. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Seattle Electric
Co., supra.

We have not been able to find in our own decisions
any attempt to definitely specify what things do and
what do not inhere in the verdict. In Keller v. Dodds,
277 N. W. (Iowa) 467, we find, in a quotation from
Wright v. Illinois & M. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, the fol-
lowing statement in regard to this matter:

“That affidavits of jurors may be received for the
purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter oc-
curring during the trial or in the jury room, which
does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that
a juror was improperly approached by a party, his
agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed
as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and
in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was deter-
mined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of
chance or other artifice or improper manner; but that
such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received
to show any matter which does essentially inhere in
the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to
the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of
the court; the statements of the witnesses or the plead-
ings in the case; that he was unduly influenced by the
statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mistaken
in his calculations or judgment, or other matter resting
alone in the juror’s breast’.”

HH Appellants cite authorities from other jurisdic-
tions to support their contention that the affidavits of
respondents were improperly received and considered.
by the court herein, contending that the verdict cannot
be impeached by evidence of statements after trial;
that prejudice of jurors may not be shown by affidavit
of respondents’ attorney; that the verdict cannot be
impeached by evidence of others as to statements of a
juror after his discharge; that affidavits as to what was

said in the jury room are incompetent to impeach the
verdict.

Regardless of the rule announced in other jurisdic-
tions, we are satisfied that the contentions of appellants
above set forth cannot be sustained under the statute
or by the decisions of this court.

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399 [P. C. § 8225], provides in part
as follows:

“The former verdict or other decision may be vacated
and a new trial granted, on the motion of the party ag-
grieved, for any of the following causes materially af-
fecting the substantial rights of such party:

“1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse
of discretion, by which such party was prevented from
having a fair trial;

“2. Misconduct of prevailing party or jury . . .”

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 401 [P. C. § 8227], provides:

“The motion for a new trial shall state the grounds
or causes for which a new trial is asked, and if made
for any of the causes mentioned in the first, second, .
third, or fourth subdivision of section 399, the facts
upon which it is based may be shown by affidavit.”

We are of the opinion that, under § 401, supra, and
the decisions of. this court, the trial court may receive
and consider the affidavit of any person, otherwise
competent to make an affidavit, in support of or against
a motion for new trial, in so far as such affidavit shows
facts in relation to the misconduct of a juror, but may
not consider such affidavit as to those things which
inhere in the verdict. We are also of the opinion that,
where such affidavits are based upon statements
claimed to have been made by a juror, the evidence
does not become incompetent because the statements
of such juror were made after he had been discharged
from further consideration of the case. In the cases
of Alexson v. Pierce County, 186 Wash. 188, 57 P. (2d)

318, and Mathisen v. Norton, supra, we recognized the
competency of evidence consisting of statements made
by jurors after their discharge, and in the Alexson
case, supra, we recognized the right of the trial court
to receive and consider an affidavit made by the at-
torney for plaintiffs, showing statements made to him
by a juror after she had been discharged. In Hamilton
v. Snyder, supra, we held the motion for new trial was
properly denied by the trial court, but we accepted
without question the right to show by affidavits acts
of misconduct in the jury room.

We are therefore of the opinion that the trial court,
in the instant case, was justified in receiving and con-
sidering the affidavits of respondents, in so far as they
set out facts purporting to show misconduct of the
juror Cassidy, either in or out of the jury room, which
occurred during the trial of the case, and which did
not inhere in the verdict.

Hi Appellants cite authorities from this state and
other jurisdictions to sustain their contention that the
facts purporting to show misconduct of juror Cassidy,
as set forth in respondents’ affidavits, were not sufficient
to authorize the trial court in granting a new trial. We
do not think the cases cited from this state support ap-
pellants’ contention that the trial court erred in grant-
ing the motion for new trial in the instant case, but
do support the well recognized rule, so often announced
by this court, that, where there is a controverted ques-
tion of fact presented to the trial court for its con-
sideration, and the court either grants or denies a
motion for new trial, such action by the trial court will
not be disturbed by this court, unless we are satisfied
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
We refer to some of the cases cited, as illustrating
what we have just said.

In the cases of Lander v. Shannon, 148 Wash. 93, 268

Pae. 145, and Lloyd v. Mowery, 158 Wash. 341, 290 Pac.
710, where the jury, during its deliberations, considered
indemnity insurance, the trial court denied a motion
for new trial, and we affirmed the decision of the lower
court. But in those cases, there was conflict in the
evidence, as shown by the affidavits, and the trial court,
in the exercise of its discretion, determined that the
verdict had not been successfully impeached.

In Stockdale v. Renton, 122 Wash. 172, 210 Pac. 360,
the motion was based upon an affidavit stating that
one of the jurors was seen in conversation with the
principal witness for the defendant, and that this same
juror, when the verdict was returned, rushed to the
plaintiff and shook hands with her, and congratulated
her upon her success. The court stated:

“These acts, if unexplained, would tend strongly to
impeach the impartiality of the particular juror, but
we find a sufficient explanation in a counter affidavit.”

The trial court having found, on a disputed question
of fact, that the motion for new trial should not be
granted, we refused to disturb that finding.

Appellants cite the case of State v. McChesney, 114
Wash. 113, 194 Pac. 551, to sustain their contention
that misconduct of a juror will not be considered as
ground for a new trial, where the juror denies the mis-
conduct. We do not think it was the intention of this
court in the cited case to lay down a general rule that,
where a juror is by affidavits charged with misconduct .
and by his affidavit denies such misconduct, there is
no question of discretion left to the trial court, but the
question becomes purely one of law. We think what
was said in the cited case was meant to apply to the
facts as presented by the affidavits filed in that case.
Where the court is given a wide discretion in passing
upon controverted facts, we must look to the evidence
in each particular case and the entire record as pre-

sented to us, and upon the situation thus presented
determine whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion.

Our conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since
the holding in the McChesney case, in the cases of
Alexson v. Pierce County, and Mathisen v. Norton,
supra, where the juror accused of misconduct denied
such misconduct, we held that an issue of fact was
presented. It might also be noted that the writer of the
opinion in the McChesney case signed the majority
opinion in the Mathisen case.

The right to trial by jury includes the right to an
unbiased and unprejudiced jury, and a trial by a jury
one or more of whose members is biased or prejudiced,
is not a constitutional trial. Alexson v. Pierce County,
supra. In the order granting the new trial in the
instant case, we find the following statement:

“It appearing to the court from all of the records
and files herein, including the affidavits submitted by
the respective parties, that under the law the bias,
prejudice and misconduct of the juror W. E. Cassidy,
being juror number 8 on the trial of said cause, has been.
established, and by reason thereof the plaintift did not
have a fair and constitutional trial

While we appreciate the issues are more limited
where a motion for new trial is granted upon one spe-
cific ground than they are where the order is a general
one, still we think, even though the order is based
upon one ground, upon conflicting affidavits as to the
misconduct of a jury or jurors, that a question of fact
is presented for the determination of the trial court,
and that its action will not be disturbed by this court,
unless we are convinced that the trial court abused
its discretion. The trial judge in the instant case,
who has had many years of trial experience, was con-
vineed, as shown by his memorandum opinion filed

herein, that respondents did not have a fair trial be-
cause of the bias, prejudice, and misconduct of one
of the jurors.

While it is true that, in the instant case, the evidence
of misconduct, as shown by respondents’ affidavits, was
controverted, yet it will be noticed that juror Cassidy,
in his affidavit, only partially denied the facts set out
in the Cork affidavit, and his denial of the Duncan
affidavit is only to the effect that he did not make
any improper attempts to discuss the facts with juror
Duncan, to deny that he told Duncan he had talked
with the prosecutor about the case, and to deny he
had talked to other jurors about the case.

After a consideration of this record, we are unable
to say that the court abused its discretion in finding and
determinizig that the juror Cassidy was biased and
prejudiced and guilty of misconduct, and that, by rea-
son thereof, respondents did not have a fair and con-
stitutional trial.

The record shows that juror Cassidy made an inde-
pendent investigation, during the trial, of certain facts
pertaining to the case, either through the prosecutor
or elsewhere, and, based upon such investigation, he
determined that the car in which respondents were
riding was covered by insurance, and that the company
carrying the insurance on the Connor car had settled
with Betty Hurst, an occupant of appellants’ car, and
concluded from this fact that the Peters were not to
blame. There were also acts shown indicating a
friendly relation between juror Cassidy and the Peters.
While this fact in itself might not indicate or show
misconduct, it was a fact to be considered by the court.

While we appreciate that this matter is here on a
specific order, still it must be assumed the trial court
observed these jurors and their actions in the court
room, at least, and was therefore to some extent able

116

to pass upon the credibility of the jurors Duncan and
Cassidy, and to determine what the probable effect on
the jury was of juror Cassidy’s misconduct, as shown
by the affidavits. We think the acts herein last above
set out did not inhere in the verdict, but, as was said
in Mathisen v. Norton, supra, rendered the verdict
wholly abortive.

The order granting the new trial in the consolidated
cases is affirmed.

Buaxe, C. J., Maryn, STEINERT, and Rospinson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27526. Department One. August 10, 1939.]

In the Matter of the Estate of Rosr T. Jackson,
Deceased.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 349.

117

Burkey & Burkey and Scott, Langhorne & McGavick,
for appellants.

Guy E. Kelly and Herbert P. Jones, for respondents.

May, J.—This is an appeal from a portion of the
decree of distribution entered in the estate of Rose T.
Jackson, deceased, who died testate May 6, 1932. By
her will, she devised and bequeathed the residue of
her estate, one-third to Anton J. Nilsen, one-third to
the Puyallup, Washington, Home for Ladies of the
Grand Army of the Republic, and one-third to Fenton
Jackson. Nilsen was named as executor.

The estate consisted of real and personal property.
In the inventory filed, there was listed a note of
Nilsen’s due the estate, in the sum of $3,750. Sometime
after Nilsen was appointed executor and qualified, he
assigned all his interest in the estate, including his fees,
to one O. M. Knudsen, to whom Nilsen was indebted
in the sum of $2,500. September 15, 1938, the court
fixed the executor’s fees at $2,500.

Thereafter, and on December 2, 1938, the court en-
tered a final decree of distribution, in which it was
ordered that Nilsen’s fees, as well as his one-third in-
terest in the residue of the estate, should be applied
upon his indebtedness thereto, as represented by the
note for $3,750. September 20th, Nilsen executed and
delivered to Knudsen a new assignment in writing,
covering the fees as fixed and allowed by the court.
From the decree as entered, Nilsen and Knudsen ap-
peal.

The principal question is whether the court had the
right to provide that Nilsen’s fees as executor should
be applied upon the indebtedness which he owed the
estate.

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1467 [P. C. § 9923], provides that
the naming of a person as executor in a will or the
appointment of a person as administrator

“, . . shall not operate as a discharge from any
just claim which the testator or intestate had against
the executor or administrator, but the claim shall be
included in the inventory and the executor and ad-
ministrator shall be liable to the same extent as he
would have been had he not been appointed executor
or administrator.”

HM Where the executor or administrator of an
estate is its debtor, the amount of his indebtedness is
to be retained out of his distributive share as heir,
devisee or legatee, in like manner and to the same
extent as though he were any other person entitled
to distribution. 8 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, § 1138.

The right of retainer is sometimes referred to as a
set-off, but this is technically incorrect, because, as
pointed out in In re Smith’s Estate, 179 Wash. 417,
38 P. (2d) 244, there is a difference between retainer
and set-off. The appellants recognize the right of re-
tainer, as to the personal estate subject to distribution,

as against a debt due the decedent from a distributee,
but contend that that rule does not apply to the real
property. The trial court, in its decree, provided: .

“That said executor is hereby directed to set off the
fee of $2,500 allowed to him and any legacy which he
may have from the estate against his note in the sum
of $3,750, plus interest, and said fee and legacy are
hereby distributed to the other heirs of the estate.”

In the case of Boyer v. Robinson, 26 Wash. 117, 66
Pac. 119, it was held that a debt due from a devisee
can be retained from his portion of the real estate
by the executor and applied on the indebtedness of
the devisee to the estate. This was on the theory that,
since an heir or devisee owes the estate more than
the value of his share and does not pay his debts, he
has no interest in the property of the estate, because
the property would not descend until his debt was
satisfied.

In Stanley v. United States Nat. Bank, 110 Ore. 648,
224 Pac. 835, it was said:

“Indebtedness of a legatee or distributee constitutes
assets of the estate, which it is the duty of the executor
or administrator to collect for the benefit of creditors,
legatees and distributees. To the extent of his indebt-
edness withheld from the estate by the legatee or dis-
tributee, the distributive share or legacy of the debtor,
is regarded as having been paid, and his claim upon
the estate satisfied pro tanto, and where the amount
of the indebtedness of the distributee or legatee ex-
ceeds the value of the legacy or distributive share, it
extinguishes his title to the property of the estate in
the hands of the executor or administrator available
for distribution: Streety v. McCurdy, 104 Ala. 493
(16 South. 686); Webb v. Fuller, 85 Me. 443 (27 Atl.
346, 22 L. R. A. 177); Fiscus v. Moore, 121 Ind. 547
(23 N. E. 362, 7 L. R. A. 235); Holmes v. McPheeters,
149 Ind. 587 (49 N. E. 452); In re Lietman, 149 Mo. 112
(50 S. W. 307, 73 Am. St. Rep. 374); Armour v. Kendall,

15 R. I. 193 (2 Atl. 311); Oxsheer v. Nave, 90 Tex. 568
(40 S. W. 7, 37 L. R. A. 98); New v. New, 127 Ind.
576 (27 N. E. 154).”

The appéllants seek, first, to distinguish the case of
Boyer v. Robinson, supra, and then take the position
that, if it cannot be distinguished, then it should be
set aside, because it is claimed it is not based upon
sound reason and is out of harmony with the weight
of authority. We think the decision should not be
departed from, because it is equitable and just in its
operation. The right of retainer is based upon the
equitable principle that no one should be permitted
to share in the distribution of a fund until he has dis-
charged his obligation to contribute to the fund. If
the personal representative is indebted to the estate
and is also entitled to a distributive share therein, he
is required to satisfy the indebtedness, as far as pos-
sible, out of the portion coming to him. 3 Alexander,
Commentaries on Wills, § 1496; Case Note Annotation,
1A. L. R. 1031; Webb v. Fuller, 85 Me. 443, 27 Atl.
346, 22 L. R. A. 177.

HI It is the general rule that the assignee of a
legacy or distributive share, whether with or without
notice of his assignor’s indebtedness to the estate, takes
subject to the existing equities, and is in no better con-
dition than his assignor would have been had the as-
signment not been made. Romig v. Erdman, 5 Whart.
(Pa.) 112, 34 Am. Dec. 533; Loverett v. Veatch, 268
Ky. 797, 105 S. W. (2d) 1052, 110 A. L. R. 1378; Case
Note, 75 A. L. R. 886.

HE We now come to the question of whether the
rule, as applied to bequests and devises with reference
to retainer, should be applied to fees earned as exec-
utor. It will be admitted that the executor’s fees bear
a little different relation to the estate than does the

distributive share of the estate to a legatee or devisee.
As pointed out, the rule of retainer is equitable in its
nature and based upon the principle that one should
not be permitted to share in the distribution of a fund
until he has discharged his obligation to contribute to
that fund. If the fees of the executor are not applied
upon his indebtedness to the estate, then they will go
to Knudsen under the assignment. It would seem to
be inequitable to take these fees out of the estate, while
Nilsen is indebted to it in a greater sum than the
amount thereof, and give them to a third person. In
our opinion, the trial court correctly ruled upon this
question.

It will be admitted that the case of Lester v. Toole,
20 Ga. App. 381, 93 S. E. 55, holds to the contrary, but
we are not disposed to adopt the holding in that case.

HI Upon the trial, the appellants sought to prove
the insolvency of Nilsen, but the testimony was re-
jected. The ruling was correct, because the right of
retainer between executors and legatees exists inde-
pendent of insolvency. Chase Nat. Bank v. Sayles,
30 F. (2d) 178.

HI Also, upon the trial, the appellants sought to
prove by Nilsen that he was not indebted upon the
note, and this testimony was properly rejected. In
Rem. Rev. Stat., §1211 [P. C. § 7722], it is provided
that, where the adverse party sues or defends as
having derived right or title through or from any
deceased person, then a party in interest shall not be
admitted to testify in his own behalf as to any trans-
action had by him with, or any statement made to
him, or in his presence, by the deceased person.

The respondents in this case, Puyallup, Washington,
Home for Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic
and Fenton Jackson, derive title through or from the
deceased. Nilsen was a party in interest, and, under

122

the statute, his testimony was rightly rejected. In re
Miller’s Estate, 129 Wash. 211, 224 Pac. 607.
The decree will be affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Jerrers, Ropryson, and Srervert, JJ.,
concur.

(No. 27318. Department One. August 11, 1939.]

J. L. Oativy, Appellant, v. Otiver M. Pacx et al.,
Respondents.t

John Salisbury, for appellant.

Robert R. Pence, for respondents.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 289,
De

Rosinson, J.—In this case, the plaintiff alleged that
defendants tore out the plumbing fixtures in his build-
ing without his knowledge or consent, and sought to
recover the rental value of the building during a period
of three months, in the sum of one hundred and fifty
dollars. The defendants filed a cross-complaint, alleg-
ing that plaintiff and defendants entered into an agree-
ment whereby defendants were to remove the old
plumbing fixtures and install new fixtures in the build-
ing, which was being remodeled by plaintiff, and that,
after the fixtures were removed and before the new
fixtures were installed, plaintiff changed his mind and
directed defendants to reinstall the old fixtures, and
that defendants did so, and that the value of the labor
and materials was $122.60. Defendants sought to re-
cover this amount and foreclose a lien for labor and
materials filed by them. Thereupon, plaintiff filed a
supplemental complaint, alleging that an ordinance of
the city of Spokane required defendants to obtain a
permit to reinstall the fixtures, and that defendants
reinstalled the fixtures without obtaining such per-
mit. The trial court found that the parties entered
into the agreement claimed by defendants; that the
value of the work and materials was $122.60, and en-
tered judgment for this amount and a decree foreclos-
ing the lien. Plaintiff appeals.

The evidence amply supports the findings of the
court that the parties entered into the agreement
claimed by respondents, and no contention is here
made to the contrary. .

HE Appellant contends that the court committed
error in refusing to require respondents to elect upon
which of their defenses and causes of action they would
proceed. There is no merit in this contention. The
answer set forth but one affirmative defense, and one

cross-action. The defense was that the fixtures were
removed and reinstalled under agreement with the
appellant, and the cause of action was for the recov-
ery of the value of the labor and materials and to fore-
close the lien.

Appellant contends that the court committed error
in admitting in evidence the notice of claim of lien.
The basis of this contention is that the claim did not
set forth the various items of labor and materials fur-
nished. The notice of claim, however, appears to com-
ply in all respects with the requirements of the pres-
ent statute, and was, therefore, sufficient.

HM Appellant’s next contention is that there can be
no recovery on the cross-action because respondents
did not obtain a permit from the city for the reinstalla-
tion of the fixtures. A copy of the ordinance was not
introduced in evidence, but we will assume that it re-
quired respondents to obtain a permit before proceed-
ing with the work. It does not necessarily follow that
respondents cannot recover the value of the labor and
materials furnished because they did not obtain a per-
mit to do the work. The respondent company held a
master plumber’s license authorizing it to engage in the
plumbing business. The contract to do the work was
not necessarily illegal because performed in an illegal
manner. Armour & Co. v. Jesmer, 76 Wash. 475, 136
Pac. 689; Fox v. Rogers, 171 Mass. 546, 50 N. E. 1041;
Keith Furnace Co. v. Mac Vicar, 280 N. W. (Iowa) 496;
Spurgeon v. Imperial Elevator Co., 99 Mont. 432, 43 P.

. (2d) 891. See, also, Yakima Lodge No. 53, K. of P. v.

Schneider, 173 Wash. 639, 24 P. (2d) 103.

In Keith Furnace Co. v. Mac Vicar, 280 N. W. (Iowa)
496, it was held that failure to obtain a permit for the
installation of an oil burning system, as required by
ordinance, did not preclude the seller from recovering
its price. Our own case of Armour & Co. v. Jesmer,

supra, is cited in the Mac Vicar case, and also in Spur-
geon v. Imperial Elevator Co.

In Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112, we
held that a plumber, not licensed as required by ordi-
nance, could not recover compensation for services
rendered; but that is not the question involved in this
case.

The cases cited by appellant, Oilure Mfg. Co. v. Pid-
duck-Ross Co., 38 Wash. 137, 80 Pac. 276, Lewer v. Cor-
nelius, 72 Wash. 124, 129 Pac. 911, and Wright v. Corbin,
190 Wash. 260, 67 P. (2d) 868, are clearly not in point.
In each of them, the illegality entered either into the
consideration or the promise. That is not the case here.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Buaxg, C. J., STemERT, Jerrers, and Mary, JJ., con-
cur.

[No, 27421. Department One. August 11, 1939.]

Aura M. Compron, Appellant, v. Ricuarp BarTELson
Evans, as Administrator, et al., Respondents.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 341.

J. W. Greenough and Graves, Kizer & Graves, for
‘appellant.

R. E. Lowe and Clare E. Turner, for respondents.

Rosrnson, J.—Plaintiff brought this action to recover
damages for personal injuries received when an auto-
mobile in which she was riding and which was being
driven by Mrs. Blanche Evans left the highway and
overturned. Mrs. Evans was killed in the accident.
The suit was brought against her surviving husband,
James H. Evans, as executor of her will and as sur-
viving member of the community. Subsequent to the
commencement of the suit, Mr. Evans died, and his
executors and administrator de bonis non with the
will annexed of the estate of Mrs. Evans were sub-
stituted as parties defendant.

The complaint alleged that plaintiff was employed
as a servant and housekeeper by the Evans family and
was entitled to transportation in the family automobile
when the family shifted its place of residence; and
that, while the family was traveling from a summer
home maintained at Lake Christina, British Columbia,
to the home maintained at Evans, Washington, Mrs.
Evans drove the car at an excessive speed, causing it
to leave the highway and overturn. Plaintiff alleges
that she waives the tort and elects to sue on the con-
tract. A demurrer to the complaint, based on the
ground that the cause of action did not survive the

death of Mr. and Mrs. Evans, was sustained by the
court, and plaintiff appeals.

Hi Appellant concedes that, at common law, a
cause of action for injuries to the person, not based
on contract and not affecting property of any kind,
did not survive the death of the wrongdoer. Hambly
v. Trott, 1 Cowp. 371, 2 Eng. Rul. Cas. 1. It is said by
Sir Frederick Pollock, an eminent English writer on
the law of torts, that the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona is one of some antiquity, but its origin
is obscure and post-classical. Pollock, The Law of
Torts (11th ed.), 61. The same writer, in criticizing
the rule, says:

“It is better that the residuary legatee should be to
some extent cut short than that the person wronged
should be deprived of redress.” Id., p. 62.

The rule has been severely criticized in a compara-
tively recent issue of The Harvard Law Review, Vol.
48, p. 1008; and in the case of Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 885,
49 L. R. A, (N.S.) 897, the court, by way of introduc-
tion to a number of severely critical quotations from
text writers and judicial opinions, said:

“The maxim, ‘Actio personalis moritur cum persona,
is by no means a favorite with the courts. It has no
champion at this date [1914], nor has any judge or
law writer risen to defend it for 200 years past.”

It has recently been held by the supreme court of
Florida, in Waller v. First Sav. & Trust Co., 103 Fla.
1025, 138 So. 780, that the rule, at least in so far as it
related to rights of action against defendants, did not
become a part of the common law of Florida, because
contrary to the customs, institutions, and general pol-
icy of the state; and the rule, as it affects the asserted
rights of deceased plaintiffs, has been repudiated in
Nebraska in Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St.

R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N. W. 537, for substantially
the same reasons.

It was, perhaps, open to this court, in its earliest
eases touching the matter, to refuse to follow the an-
cient rule in whole or in part, upon the ground that
it was “incompatible with the institutions and condi-
tions of society in this state.” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 143
[P. C. § 8252]. It held, however, that the rule, as it
existed in England at the date of the Declaration of
Independence, became a part of the common law of
the state. Our legislature has from time to time
passed statutes dealing with certain phases of the
matter; and if further changes are necessary and de-
sirable, they must be made by that department of the
state government. The existing law in this jurisdic-
tion is stated in the following excerpt from the opinion
in Jonas v. Taylor, 166 Wash. 302, 6 P. (2d) 615:

“The rule is that a pending action for unliquidated
damages founded on the tort of a defendant, dies with
the death of the defendant. State ex rel. Baeder v.
Blake, 107 Wash. 294, 181 Pac. 685; Bortle v. Osborne,
155 Wash. 585, 285 Pac. 425. Not simply that the ac-
tion cannot be prosecuted against the heirs and legal
representatives of the deceased, but that the action

18.

HI The trial court held that the instant action is
founded on tort. The appellant contends that it is
founded upon contract, and that it is therefore main-
tainable under Laws of 1917, chapter 156, p. 685, § 148,
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1518 [P. C. § 9886], which section
reads as follows:

“Actions for the recovery of any property or for the
possession thereof, and all actions founded upon con-
tracts, may be maintained by and against executors
and administrators in all cases in which the same might
have been maintained by and against their respective
testators or intestates.” (Italics ours.)

As an approach.to the solution of the matter, we
first examine the allegations of the complaint. Para-
graph 1 alleges that the plaintiff entered into an oral
contract of employment with the marital community
consisting of James H. Evans and his wife. Paragraph
2 alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff was to act as
cook, housekeeper, and general household servant;
such service to be rendered at the Evans’ community
residence in Stevens county, and at their summer home
at Lake Christina, in British Columbia. Paragraph 3
is as follows:

“By the terms of said contract the community prom-
ised to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $30 per month
during the term of her employment. And the com-
munity further agreed and was obligated to perform
and it was understood by both parties that it would
perform the following terms, said terms being integral
parts of the contract between the community and
plaintiff either by express agreement or by necessary
and natural implication, and said terms were fully
recognized, performed and relied and acted upon as
an integral part of said contract by both parties thereto
at all times from its creation until its breach described
in paragraph 5 and following paragraphs hereof; to
furnish to plaintiff board and room at Evans, Washing-
ton, or at Lake Christina, B. C., or at either or both
of said places or at any other place where plaintiff’s
contract of employment required her to be; to furnish
to plaintiff safe and adequate transportation from and
between points where she was required by the com-
munity to render her services under the terms of her
contract with it, and particularly from and between
the community’s homes at Evans, Washington, and
Lake Christina, B. C.; and to exercise due and reason-
able skill and care in the provision of board, room, and
transportation as above stated during each and all of
the times and occasions plaintiff should be engaged in
the discharge of her duties under her contract with the
community.”

Paragraph 4 alleges that plaintiff fully performed
and executed the contract until it was breached, as
described in succeeding paragraphs. Paragraph 5 al-
leges, in substance, that the community breached the
contract by not exercising due and reasonable skill in
transporting her from the summer residence to the
Stevens county residence, but that Mrs. Evans, in
transporting her between the two places,

“. . . negligently, carelessly, and recklessly drove
and controlled said car so that it left the road, plunged
over an embankment and injured plaintiff as stated
in paragraph 7 hereof. The acts and omissions of the
community and of Mrs. Evans as the agent of the com-
munity which proximately caused the accident above
described and plaintiff’s injuries were:

“(a) The selection by the community of a driver
known to the community to be or who the community
reasonably should have known to be incompetent and
unqualified to operate the automobile used by the com-
munity to transport plaintiff as the community agreed
in its contract with plaintiff.

“(b) The operation of said automobile by the com-
munity’s agent at an unreasonable, excessive, danger-
ous and unlawful speed while transporting plaintiff.

“(c) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to keep it under a rea-
sonable degree of control while transporting plaintiff.

“(d) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to maintain a reason-
able lookout to observe road conditions ahead.

“(e) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to drive it at a suffi-
ciently slow speed when approaching and traveling
on a descending grade to enable the agent to operate
the automobile with a reasonable degree of safety for
plaintiff occupying it.

“(£) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to drive it at a suffi-
ciently slow speed when approaching and traveling
on a curve in the road to enable the agent to operate

the automobile with a reasonable degree of safety for
plaintiff occupying it.

“(g) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to drive it at a suffi-
ciently slow speed to provide a reasonable degree of
safety for plaintiff occupying it when approaching and
traveling through a cut made by the road going down
a grade in and through a hill in such manner that that
portion of the road ahead of the descending automobile
and around a curve was not visible to the operator of
the automobile.

“(h) The failure and neglect of the community’s
agent operating the automobile to drive the automo-
bile on the operator’s right side of the road.”

Paragraph 6 alleges that the contract was in full
force and effect at the times mentioned in paragraph 5.
Paragraphs 7 to 12, inclusive, describe plaintiff’s in-
juries and set up her claims for damages. Paragraph
13 sets up the fact of administration, and that plain-
tiff’s claim has been filed and rejected. Paragraph 14
reads as follows:

“Plaintiff has elected to waive any and all causes of
action in tort unconnected with contract she may have
had by virtue of the facts hereinabove alleged and
she solely asserts and stands upon her cause of action
under and by virtue of the contract above alleged.”

Reduced to its lowest terms, the complaint alleges
that there was a contract wherein the community em-
ployed the plaintiff as a house servant for an indefinite
period. Since the community lived, alternately, in
different residences, it was a subsidiary term of the
contract that the community would transport the
plaintiff when the community moved from one resi-
dence to the other. It is not alleged that the commu-
nity expressly agreed to transport her safely. If that
became a part of the contract, we take it that it became
so by a process of implication; that is to say, since the
community agreed to transport the plaintiff, and the

law imposes upon one who, by private contract, trans-
ports another a duty to use due care in so doing, then,
by implication of law, the obligation to use due care
is read into the contract.

A recent case, which should be read in its entirety,
McClure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 69 P. (2d) 573, states
the formula which should be used in determining
whether an action is in contract or in tort, as follows:

“Whether an action is in contract or in tort should
be determined in the first place from the pleadings,
and by an examination and consideration of the essen-
tial allegations of the complaint rather than the form
adopted by the pleader, what the pleader calls it, the
understanding of counsel or of the trial court, and the
question must be determined by reference to the com-
plaint as a whole, and not by particular words or alle-
gations considered apart from the context. 1C. J.S.
1100, Actions, § 46. We think a good test to be used in
determining whether a pleading sets up a case in con-
tract or in tort may be stated as follows. When an act
complained of is a breach of specific terms of the con-
tract, without any reference to the legal duties imposed
by law upon the relationship created thereby, the action
is in contract, but where there is a contract for services
which places the parties in such a relation to each other
that, in attempting to perform the promised service,
a duty imposed by law as a result of the contractual
relationship between the parties is violated through an
act which incidentally prevents the performance of the
contract, then the gravamen of the action is a breach
of the legal duty, and not of the contract itself, and in
such case allegations of the latter are considered mere
inducement, showing the relationship which furnishes
the right of action for the tort, but not the basis of
recovery for it, and in such cases the remedy is an
action ex delicto.” (Italics, in part, ours.)

See, also, Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140

So. 893, and cases cited therein; Pecos & N. T. R. Co.
v. Amarillo St. R. Co., 171 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1103,

1105; Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 Pac. 524, 70 A.
L. R. 106.

Clearly, under the rule as stated by the Arizona
court and in the cases just cited, the complaint in the
instant case states an action in tort. It states a con-
tract for services which placed the parties in such
relation to each other that, in attempting to perform
the services, Mrs. Evans violated a duty imposed upon
her by law by reason of her contractual relationship
with the plaintiff, by an act which incidentally pre-
vented her performance of the contract.

Let us suppose that the facts pleaded were that, pur-
suant to the contract, Mrs. Evans had started to trans-
port the plaintiff from the one residence to the other,
and that, midway in the journey, she refused to trans-
port her farther. The weather was cold and inclement,
and plaintiff was compelled to complete the journey
on foot. Due to the consequent exposure, the plaintiff
suffered a severe and costly illness. Let us further
suppose that, after Mrs. Evans’ death and the appoint-
ment of Mr. Evans, as executor, followed by his death,
the plaintiff brought such an action as this to recover
for that damage—would it lie, under Code § 1518?
Without expressly so deciding, we think that it might
be entertained, upon the theory that the damage suf-
fered was occasioned by the breach of the contract to
furnish transportation, as distinguished from a breach
of the duty imposed by law to exercise due care. To
put the matter in another way, the gist of the plaintiff’s
complaint in the supposed case would be: The de-
fendant did not transport me; that is, she breached
the contract. The gist of the complaint in the instant
case is: The defendant did not exercise due care in
transporting me; that is, she violated a duty imposed
by law.

The case of Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev.

247, 134 Pac. 753, 136 Pac. 705, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1,
upon which appellant relies, among others, is plainly
a contract case. Forrester had a railroad ticket en-
titling him to be transported from Ogden to San Fran-
cisco. The railroad company ejected him from the
train at a remote siding in Nevada. Due to the conse-
quent exposure, he became ill and died. The adminis-
trator of his estate sued under a statute exactly like
our §1518. The court held that it was an action
founded on a contract, which might have been main-
tained by his intestate in his lifetime. And so it was;
for the damages sought flowed directly from the breach
of the written contract of carriage. But, in the instant
case, the injuries for which recovery is sought were
allegedly caused by one or more of the eight violations
of duty so elaborately pleaded in paragraph 5 of the
complaint.

We find, in our own reports, a case in which the
plaintiff might have set out all the facts and alleged
that he elected to waive the tort and prosecute the
action in contract, just as the appellant has done in
this case. Instead of doing so, he, in effect, made his
election in advance by attempting to state an action
in contract only, making no mention whatever of negli-
gence. He alleged that he was employed as a bridge
carpenter; that, at the time he was employed, it was
agreed that, if injured, he would be furnished adequate
and efficient hospital facilities, medical attendance,
and care; and that, while so employed, he fell from a
bridge and injured his foot. He was placed in the com-
pany hospital. The company doctor diagnosed his
injury as a sprain, and in about six or seven weeks
discharged him from the hospital as cured. It subse-
quently developed that the bones of his foot had been
broken. The action was so tardily commenced that,
if it were held to be an action in tort, it was barred by

the statute of limitations; but maintainable, if held to
be an action upon a contract. The court said, in part:

“The appellant says that it was an action upon a con-
tract to furnish hospital facilities and medical atten-
dance, and the respondent says that it is one in tort,
based upon the failure of the doctor to properly diag-
nose and treat the injured foot. To determine whether
an action is one upon contract or in tort, attention will
be given to the substance of the action rather than to
the form and the. nature of the right the violation of
which creates the right of action. School District No.
18 v. Twin Falls State Bank & Trust Co., 52 Ida. 200,
12 P. (2d) 774; Bates v. Bates Machinery Co., 230 Ill.
619, 82 N. E. 911, 12 Ann. Cas. 175; Union Tool Co. v.
Farmers’, etc., Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424,
28 A. L. R. 1417.

“.. , In the complaint, it is said that the appel-
lant did not receive adequate and efficient hospital
service and medical attendance and care,

ae in that prompt and efficient attention and
examination was not given and made to ascertain and
determine the extent of the injuries that the plaintiff
had sustained and from which he was suffering. . . .

“The evidence offered is to the same effect.

“We come then to the question of what is the nature
of the right the violation of which creates the right of
action. The failure of the doctor to make a proper
diagnosis and give the right treatment was a breach
‘of his duty as a physician, founded upon. his legal obli-
gations as such, without reference to the contract.
The action, being one for this breach of duty, sounded
in tort and not in contract. Nelson v. Harrington,
72 Wis. 591, 40 N. W. 228, 1 L. R. A. 719, 7 Am. St.
900; Mueller v. Winston Bros. Co., 165 Wash. 130, 4
P. (2d) 854. The substance of the action, as shown
by the complaint and by the evidence, was the failure
of the doctor to properly diagnose and treat.

“While negligence is not specifically mentioned in
the complaint or the evidence, the facts alleged in the
complaint and supported by the testimony show that
the gist thereof was the malpractice of the physician,
which is negligence and not a breach of the contract

of employment. [Citing cases.]” (Italics ours.) Mc-
Donald v. Camas Prairie R. Co., 180 Wash. 555, 38 P.
(2d) 515.

In this case, the substance of the action is the elabo-
rately alleged negligence of Mrs. Evans, the breach of
her legal duty to use due care in performing the con-
tract with plaintiff, a duty which (leaving the host
and guest statute out of consideration) existed inde-
pendent of contract.

What is really sought in this case is to induce the
court to read into the contract, as a term thereof, the
general legal obligation to use due care, and then,
having thus made it a term of the contract, to hold
that the contract was breached by the alleged failure
to use due care, as set out in paragraph 5 of the com-
plaint. As was recently said in Noble v. Martin, 191
Wash. 39, 70 P. (2d) 1064:

“Tt has not been the policy of this court to imply a
contract where the gravamen of the action is a negli-
gent or tortious act, as may be seen from a discussion

of the matter in Northern Grain & Warehouse Co. v.
Holst, 95 Wash. 312, 163 Pac. 775.”

Other illustrations might have been cited, such as
Grussemeyer v. Harper, 187 Wash. 508, 60 P. (2d).702.
In a number of jurisdictions, the action in that case
would have been held to be in contract, upon the
theory that one who takes the oath as a corporate di-
rector impliedly agrees to use care in the manage-
ment of the corporate affairs, and that, in committing
acts of negligence, he breaches that agreement. But
this court held that negligence is the gist of such an
action. See, also, O’Toole v. Empire Motors, Inc., 181
Wash. 130, 42 P. (2d) 10, and Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash.
329, 123 Pac. 450, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1033, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 251, in which the court quotes, with approval,

a statement from the decision of the supreme court
of the United States in Hill v. United States, 149 U.S.
593, 37 L. Ed. 862, 13 S. Ct. 1011, to the effect that the
settled distinction between contract and tort cannot
be evaded by framing a claim as upon an implied
contract.

In the Holst case, supra, the court said, among other
things:

“Whatever may be the relation of public officials to
the government they serve, in seeking to enforce lia-
bility against them because of their dereliction of duty,
such liability is not based upon breach of an express
or implied contract, but arises, if at all, out of the tort
embraced within the neglect or failure giving rise to
the injury complained of, just as an action by a pas-
senger against a common carrier for injuries, in a sense
grows out of the breach of an implied contract to safely
carry, yet the gravamen of such action, when pleaded,
is the negligent act which is the proximate cause of
the injury.”

Substantially the same illustration was used in the
Riddoch case:

“The contention that this is an action on contract
and not in tort cannot be sustained. . . . The same
elements are present in every case of injury to a pas-
senger on a railroad or street car. The duty to carry
safely is assumed by contract, but the action is in tort.”

In our opinion, this action is founded on tort. The
effect of adopting the appellant’s theory would be to
compel the lower court to entertain an action which
the law says is dead. Jonas v. Taylor, 166 Wash. 302,
6 P. (2d) 615. In the consideration of other cases, we
have not felt at liberty to disregard the distinction
between actions founded on tort and those founded in
contract in order to save alleged causes of action from
the devastating operation of limitation statutes. We
would not be justified in disregarding that distinction

138

in this case in order to avoid the operation of other
existing rules of law because the opinions of many
eminent legal authorities have been cited to the effect
that such rules are unwise and improvident. Even if
these opinions are sound, they are not material in the
present inquiry, since the court is bound to apply the
Jaw as it exists.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Stemvert, Jerrers, and Mar, JJ.,
concur.

[INo. 27259. Department One. August 12, 1939.]

Roy Younc, Appellant, v. Taz DrpartMEnT or LABOR
anp Inpustrizs, Respondent.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 337.

Moe & Hunter and Vanderveer & Bassett, for ap-
pellant.

The Attorney Gerieral and J. A. Kavaney, Assistant,
for respondent.

Sretvert, JA claim for compensation under the
workmen’s compensation act was filed by an injured
employee and was denied by the supervisor of the de-
partment of labor and industries. On a rehearing by
the joint board of the department, the order of the
supervisor was affirmed. An appeal to the superior
court resulted in a confirmation of the order of the
joint board. The injured claimant thereupon appealed
to this court, and hereinafter will be referred to as
appellant.

The only question involved on the appeal is whether
or not, at the time of his injury, appellant was in the
course of his employment within the meaning of the
workmen’s compensation act.

The facts which give rise to that question are as
follows: From August, 1935, to January 6, 1987, ap-
pellant was employed as a common laborer on the
Grand Coulee Dam project. During the first four
months of his employment, he assisted in the hauling
of material to various parts of the construction; during
the last four weeks of his work, he was a member of
a clean-up crew, whose duties were to collect and re-
move all left-over material, debris, and rubbish from
various parts of the dam, as directed by the foreman.
Prior to January 2, 1937, C. R. Durham was foreman
of the crew. Thereafter, and on the day of appellant’s
injury, Paul Waller was in charge.

The portion of the dam located near midstream was
designated “block 40.” On the face of the block there

was an opening about eight feet square, and from this
opening a ladder or stairway twelve feet in length led
. toa gallery, which was about five feet wide, extending
through the dam. Approximately twenty-five feet
from the entrance to the gallery, a transverse gallery
ran crosswise of the block. Some distance within this
second gallery, there was a vertical shaft, three feet
square, extending a distance of fifty feet down to the
next lower level of the dam. A wooden cap had been
constructed for the purpose of covering the aperture.
This cover was easily removable to permit use of the
bore of the shaft.
. Upon two occasions, about three months before the
date of the accident, appellant, while under the super-
vision of the foreman Durham, had worked with the
crew cleaning up material left in the galleries. For
the greater part of the time, however, and particularly
while working under the supervision of foreman
Waller, appellant’s duties were confined to clean-up
work outside the galleries.

Appellant’s hours of labor were from eight a. m. to
twelve noon, and from one p. m. to four p.m. He
was paid at the rate of sixty cents per hour. During
the noon period, for which the men received no pay,
they were not under supervision unless called upon
by their foreman to do some special or extra work.
The workmen customarily brought their lunches,
which they ate on the premises at whatever places they
desired; on account of the distances to their homes,
it would have been impracticable to do otherwise.

Appellant had at one time asked his first foreman,
Mr. Durham, for an increase in pay, and was told
that he did not “know enough yet,” and that he would
have to “learn his way around a little better” before
he could be paid more. By this, the foreman stated at
the trial that he meant that the appellant would have

to know more about the premises and how better to
handle himself.

On January 6, 1937, appellant ate his lunch, as usual,
near the place where he had been working, and at
about 12:30 p. m. concluded that he would visit the
interior of block 40. Inasmuch as the succeeding
events touched the crux of the case, we quote his own
testimony:

“Q. What prompted you to go down that direction?
A. What made me go that way? Q. Yes, what caused
- you to decide to go down there? A. Well, I had heard
all the boys speaking of block 40 and I asked one of
the boys that worked down there to come and go with
me and he says, ‘No, there is nothing down there, that
I care to see. I have been down there lots of times
and this fire feels pretty good. I think I will stay
here.” So I walked down that way and in the mean-
time I saw some boards that had to be thrown out and
we had to throw all the boards— Q. (Interposing)
just a minute before going into that, what was your
reason in your own mind for wanting to go down there
to look around? A. You mean why did I start down
that way? Well, I started down for the toilet. Q.
When you went in block 40, what prompted you to
go inside? A. I saw some material they had thrown
out—you mean what caused me to go there? Q. Yes.
A. Isaw some boards and some rubbish and she bolts
and different things that had to come out. Q. Was
there any other reason that you felt for wanting to
look around in there? A. The big reason was, the
main reason, that I wanted to get acquainted with what
had already taken place and help myself so that I could
learn construction; learn how the dam was built. I
helped haul over lots of this material that went in
there. Some of it was the cooling pipes, and I would
like to see how far the cooling pipes were put apart
and how high up—look it over. I helped haul over
some of those large gallies and I wanted to see what
they looked like. Q. Let me ask you this question.
Did you go in there just purely for the purpose of
amusement? A. No, because lunch hour was the

only time I had any time of my own in order to famili-
arize myself, get myself acquainted with the job and
the construction. Q. What was your object in getting
yourself acquainted with the job and the manner in
which the project was being constructed in that vicin-
ity? A. Well, so as to make myself more valuable
to the company, so that if the opportunity ever come
that I could hold a better position and get more salary.
That is what we was after—we are all up here for
what salary—what money we can get. I was told
one time by Mr. Durham, the foreman, the sooner I
was more valuable to the company I would get more
money.”

It is not contended upon the appeal that appellant
went into the interior of the block for any purpose
other than to inspect the premises and to familiarize
himself with the character of the construction.

Appellant descended from the outside of the dam
through the opening in its face, proceeded along the
gallery, and turned to the right at the transverse gal-
lery, through which he pursued his way until suddenly
he fell down the shaft, as a result of which he was
severely injured. There was not sufficient light in the
gallery to enable appellant to see the shaft. Appar-
ently, also, the cover of the shaft had been moved,
wholly or partially, from its accustomed place. There
were no warning signs, nor, so far as appellant was
concerned, had any instructions been given forbidding
the men to go into the galleries.

With this factual situation before us, we consider
the law upon the subject.

HM Rem. Rev. Stat, § 7675 [P. C. § 3470], pro-
vides:

“Workman means every person in this state, who
is engaged in the employment of any employer coming
under this act whether by way of manual labor or

otherwise, in the course of his employment:
(Italics ours.)

The statute does not define the phrase “in the course
of his employment,” and we therefore look to the cases
for the meaning ascribed to it.

As stated in 71 C. J. 658, § 404, a definition, widely
adopted, is that

“An injury to an employee arises in the course of
his employment when it occurs within the period of
his employment, at a place where he may reasonably
be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of
his employment or engaged in doing something inci-
dental to it.”

Numerous cases adopting that definition, or others
closely similar thereto, are cited in the footnotes to
the text.

The test adopted by this court for determining
whether an employee is, at a given time, in the course
of his employment, is whether the employee was, at
the time, engaged in the performance of the duties
required of him by his contract of employment, or by
specific direction of his employer; or, as sometimes
stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the
furtherance of the employer’s interest. McGrail v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 190 Wash. 272,
67 P. (2d) 851, and cases’ therein cited.

HI The peculiarity of the case before us is that the
accident happened during the noon hour, while appel-
lant, though not at work, nor under the supervision of
his employer, nor receiving pay for that period, was,
nevertheless, on his employer’s premises, and was en-
gaged at the time of his injury in a personal explora-
tion of a locality which he had not been forbidden to
enter.

We have no cases from this jurisdiction presenting
that exact situation, but there are several which bear
a more or less close analogy.

In Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Department of Labor

& Industries, 157 Wash. 96, 288 Pac. 655, a logger, who
was required to live at the camp of his employer, made
a trip to a distant town on Sunday for recreational
purposes. He was given free transportation for the
trip on the company’s gasoline speeder. The workman
was not on regular duty nor under the supervision of
his employer at the time, nor was he receiving com-
pensation from his employer for that day; his time
on the particular occasion was his own. During the
course of the trip, and while riding on the speeder,
he was injured. In denying him recovery, we held that
an employee injured at a time when he is doing some-
thing solely for his own benefit or accommodation, and
not while engaged in or furthering his employer’s busi-
ness, is not injured “in the course of his employment.”

In Carroll v. Western Union Tel. Co., 170 Wash. 600,
17 P. (2d) 49, a messenger boy owning a motorcycle
was employed by a telegraph company and was paid
for his services, including the use of his machine, a
specified amount per hour. The boy kept the motor-
cycle in repair at his own expense. One afternoon,
with the consent of his employer, he visited a store to
purchase some accessories for his motorcycle. While
returning to the office, he ran into and injured a pedes-
trian. Suit was brought by the injured person against
the telegraph company. We affirmed a judgment
denying recovery, on the ground that the messenger
was not at the time of the accident in the course of
his employment, but was acting solely for his personal
and private purposes.

In Hill v. Department of Labor & Industries, 173
Wash. 575, 24 P. (2d) 95, it appears that a street car
operator had stopped his car near a post office for the
purpose of depositing a letter in the mail box in front
of the building. While crossing the street, he was
struck by an automobile. We held that the operator

ee *

was not, at the time of his injury, in the course of his
employment. The opinion, however, recognized the
distinction between that case and those cases wherein
persons within the protection of the act temporarily
left the places of their employment for the purpose of
performing some act of necessity or convenience, such
as procuring water or food.

Consulting the cases from other jurisdictions, we
find many instances in which employees have been
injured during meal hours when they were not actu-
ally at work. The general rule in such cases is that
the injury is compensable if the employee was, at the
time, doing something incidental to the duties for
which he was engaged, but is not compensable if the
injury resulted from an independent act of the em-
ployee having no connection with his work or his meal.

“In accordance with the general rule that injuries
to an employee while he is doing something not strictly
within his obligatory duty but which is incidental
thereto may be compensable, harm which befalls an
employee may be compensable when it occurs to him
during the lunch period or other meal period. How-
ever, harm sustained during a meal period may not
be compensable as arising out of and in the course
of employment when the harm results from an inde-
pendent act of the employee having no connection
with his work or his meal, or from the independent
act of a third person, or when the harm is sustained
by reason of the employee’s placing himself in a more
dangerous position than was required of him during
the meal period, or where sufficient evidence that harm
sustained during the meal period was an accident

arising out of and in the course of the employment is
lacking.” 71 C. J. 739, § 456.

Many cases from various jurisdictions are cited in
the footnotes to the text.

The theory of the cases is that a period of rest, re-
freshment, or other temporary cessation from work, is

not of itself sufficient to break the continuity of
employment, but that the independent act of the em-
ployee, which has no relation to the employer’s inter-
est, serves to break the so-called nexus and to put the
employee without the course of his employment.

In this case, it is manifest that appellant’s venture
had no connection whatever with his meal. He was not
seeking a place where he might eat, nor was he return-
ing to work from a place where he had eaten. He had
finished his lunch without any mishap and had entered
upon a wholly separate and distinct undertaking.
When he began his exploration of the interior of the
dam, he was not under the supervision or control of his
employer, but was on his own time. He was not then
engaged in the performance of any of his obligatory
duties or anything incident to them. He was not per-
forming a task in furtherance of his employer’s work
or interest, but was engaged in a voluntary exploration
of his own conception. We are satisfied that appellant
was not in the course of his employment, within the
meaning of the workmen’s compensation act.

The situation was nowise altered by the fact that the
alleged purpose of appellant’s venture was to acquaint
himself with the intricacies of the project and, by thus
increasing his value to his employer, ultimately to ob-
tain an increase of wages for himself. The course of
his employment required him only to do certain things,
at certain times, at specified places, under the super-
vision of his foreman. It did not require him, nor was
he expected, to abandon his routine of work, visit
places unfamiliar to him, and expose himself to pos-
sible dangers, merely that he might thereby fit him-
self for a different course of employment. What in-
formation he may have expected to gain was solely for
his own benefit and in no way contributed to the value
of the work which he was engaged to perform. He was

147

not fulfilling any duty required of him by his contract,
nor was he furthering the interest of his employer. He
was engaged in an independent act having no connec-
tion with his work.

The judgment is affirmed.

Braxg, C. J., Mary, Rosrson, and Sumeson, JJ., con-

cur.

[No. 27438. Department One. August 12, 1939.]

Tue Loneview Company et al., Appellants, v. H. D.
Rewner, as Treasurer of Cowlitz County, et al.,
Respondents.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 389.

Donworth, Paul & Donworth and Joseph T. Woods,
for appellants.

Shirley R. Marsh and H. Jerard Imus, for re-
spondents.

Jerrers, J—This is an appeal by plaintiffs, The
Longview Company, a corporation, and The Long Bell
Lumber Company, a corporation, from a judgment of
dismissal, entered after a demurrer to plaintiffs’
second amended complaint had been sustained and
after a refusal on the part of plaintiffs to further plead.

The material facts, as shown by the second amended
complaint, are as follows: Pursuant to Laws of 1917,
chapter 180, p. 517, and acts amendatory thereof, there
was organized and created diking improvement district
No. 4 of Cowlitz county, Washington. An order estab-
lishing the district was entered November 5, 1917.
Certain assessments for the purpose of retiring obliga-
tions incurred by the district for the construction and
maintenance of a dike therein, were levied against the
property in the district, and particularly against cer-
tain property of plaintiffs, who were then, and are now,
the owners of approximately seventy-five per cent of
the property. March 25, 1925, an order was entered by
the county commissioners of Cowlitz county, consoli-
dating district No. 4 and diking improvement districts
Nos. 6, 7, and 8, in a district known as consolidated dik-

RE 2 —s(*

ing and improvement district No. 1 of Cowlitz county.
The area of, and the improvements in, such consoli-
dated district are materially different from the area of,
and the improvements in, the districts therein con-
solidated, and the assessments levied on account of the
construction and maintenance of the improvements in
such consolidated district are materially different in
amount and apportionment from assessments which
were levied against the districts consolidated.

Plaintiffs have paid in full all of the assessments
levied against the property which they own in the dis-
trict, and the obligations of district No. 4 have been
fully paid and retired, and there is now in the hands of
defendants a surplus in the sum of $15,675.44. Plain-
tiffs allege that, on account of the assessments which
they have paid in said district, they are entitled, re-
spectively, to receive from such surplus, as their pro
rata share, the sums of $10,972.41 and $1,019.30, for
which demand has been made upon defendants, but
payment has been refused; that the defendants have
caused the surplus accruing in diking district No. 4 to
be transferred to the maintenance fund of the consoli-
dated district, and plaintifis are informed and believe
that defendants intend to exhaust such surplus by
crediting the maintenance assessments of the consoli-
dated district levied against each lot in district No. 4,
until the credit equals the pro rata share of such sur-
plus based upon the amount which each lot or parcel
paid upon assessments of district No. 4.

Defendants interposed a demurrer to this complaint,
which was sustained, and, plaintiffs refusing to further
plead, a judgment of dismissal was entered on Decem-
ber 10, 1938, and this appeal followed.

Appellants contend the court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that no

cause of action was stated therein and in dismissing
the action.

Diking improvement district No. 4 will hereinafter
be referred to as the district, and consolidated diking
and improvement district No. 1 as the consolidated
district.

The question presented is whether or not the owner
of property in a diking improvement district, upon
which all assessments have been paid, is entitled to a
pro rata refund of the surplus money in the redemp-
tion fund of such district, all obligations of the district
having been paid and retired, where such district has
been consolidated with other districts into a diking im-
provement district under the provisions of Rem. Rev.
Stat., §4449 [P. C. § 1945-100] et seg. (Laws 1923,
chapter 46, p. 131, § 14; Laws 1917, chapter 130, p. 517,
§ 1), the area, improvements, and assessments of the
consolidated district being materially different from
the area, improvements and assessments of the districts
consolidated.

In considering this question, we must, in this case,
accept as true the facts well pleaded in the complaint.

Appellants contend that to permit such a transfer of
funds would be in violation of Art. I, §§3 and 16, of
the state constitution, and the fourteenth amendment
to the Federal constitution. They also contend that
there is no statutory authority. for such transfer. On
the other hand, respondents contend such a transfer is
authorized by Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 4439 and 4439-1.
They also contend that the assessments have been paid
voluntarily and cannot be recovered back.

HI Rem. Rev. Stat., §4449 [P. C. § 1945-100],
authorizes the consolidation of diking improvement
districts, whenever it shall appear to the board of
county commissioners that such consolidation “will re-
sult in economy of the maintenance of such districts.”

Tc Cie

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4453 [P. C. § 1945-104], defines the
rights and powers of consolidated districts as follows:

“From the time of the entry of the order of con-
solidation, such consolidated district and its board of
supervisors shall have all the rights and powers of,
and be subject to all laws applicable to a district estab-
lished under the provisions of this chapter, and the
several districts included in the consolidated district
shall thereby be dissolved without any further pro-
ceedings. Notwithstanding such consolidation and dis-
solution, none of the outstanding bonds, warrants or
other indebtedness of any district included in the con-
solidated district shall be affected thereby; and all
lands liable to be assessed to pay any of such bonds,
warrants or other indebtedness shall remain liable to
the same extent as if such consolidation had not been
made; and any and all assessments theretofore levied
or made against any such lands shall be and remain un-
impaired, and shall be collected in the same manner as
if no such consolidation had been made. The board of
supervisors of the consolidated district shall have all
the powers possessed at the time of the consolidation
by the boards of supervisors of the several districts in-
cluded in the consolidation to levy, assess and cause to
be collected any and all assessments or charges against
any of the lands within the several districts that may
be necessary or required to provide for the payment
of all the bonds, warrants and other indebtedness
thereof. Until such assessments shall have been col-
lected and all indebtedness of the district paid, separate
funds shall be maintained for each district as were
maintained prior to the consolidation.” (Italics ours.)

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4439, is § 33, chapter 130, Laws of
1917, p. 544, and in so far as its reference to funds is
concerned, is the same as Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4439-1
[P. C. § 1945-86]. These sections provide for the estab-
lishment of construction, redemption, and mainte-
nance funds in the county treasury of any county in
which a diking improvement district is established,
and further provide that into the redemption fund shall

be paid all proceeds derived from assessments levied
to pay cost of construction, and also all moneys, if any,
remaining in the construction fund after the payment
of all warrants drawn against it. It is further pro-
vided that, after the payment of interest and principal
of all outstanding bonds and warrants, including tem-
porary warrants, any balance thereafter remaining in
the redemption fund shall be paid into the maintenance
fund. Sections 4439 and 4439-1 are the only sections of
the statute which refer to or authorize a transfer of
funds of a diking improvement district, whether it be
an original district or a consolidated district.

Respondents contend that these sections, when read.
in connection with § 4454 [P. C. § 1945-105] (Laws
1917, chapter 130, p. 519, § 6), authorize the transfer
of any balance remaining in the redemption fund of
district No. 4, to the maintenance fund of the consoli-
dated district.

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4454, supra, provides that, when-
ever two or more districts have been consolidated, all
the provisions of law applicable to such districts prior
to the consolidation shall apply to the consolidated
district.

Section 4453, supra, provides that, upon consolida-
tion, the several districts included in such consolida-
tion shall be dissolved without further proceedings.
However, this section further provides that none of the
outstanding bonds, warrants, or other indebtedness of
any district included in such consolidation shall be
affected thereby. And it is also provided that, until
-all indebtedness of the districts has been paid, separate
funds shall be maintained for each district, as were
maintained prior to consolidation.

We think it is apparent, from §§ 4453 and 4454,
supra, and from our decision in Thurston County v.
Clausen, 118 Wash. 653, 204 Pac. 787, that the con-

solidated district may go forward from the point
where the original districts left off. It is authorized
to establish its construction, redemption, and main-
tenance funds, and to levy assessments against the
property within the consolidated district, as may be
necessary, and such as are permitted by statute, to
meet the cost of construction and maintenance of the
consolidated district. But it is also apparent, from
§ 4453, supra, that, in so far as the funds derived from
assessments levied for the purpose of liquidating the
obligations of the districts consolidated are concerned,
such funds are not to become a part of the funds of the
consolidated district, but are kept separate and apart
therefrom, and in our opinion, become a trust fund for
the purpose of liquidating the particular obligations
for which the levies were made. It is apparent the con-
solidated district, as such, assumes no outstanding obli-
gations of the districts in the consolidation, but the
land in each district continues to be subject to assess-
ment for its obligations incurred prior to consolidation,
until such obligations are all paid.

It appearing herein, then, that all the obligations of
district No. 4 have been liquidated, and that the district
has been dissolved, and it further appearing that there
is a balance in the redemption fund of such district,
may the supervisor of the consolidated district au-
thorize a transfer of such balance to the maintenance
fund of the consolidated district?

We think, under the statutes, the, consolidated dis-
trict is a new entity, formed for the purpose of effecting
a more economical operation of the districts included
in the consolidation. Necessarily, the levies to be made
to carry out this purpose must be determined by the
board of supervisors of the new district, and such levies
must be based upon the benefits to be received by all
the land in such consolidated district. It is alleged in

the instant case that the assessments levied on account
of construction and maintenance by the consolidated
district are materially different in amount and appor-
tionment from assessments which were levied against
the lands in district No. 4.

We do not think §§ 4439 and 4439-1 were intended to
authorize, or that they do authorize, a transfer of any
balance remaining in the redemption fund of district
No. 4, to the maintenance fund of consolidated dis-
trict No. 1, but that such sections, when construed in
connection with the other sections of the act relative to
diking improvement districts, whether they be original
districts or consolidated districts, only authorize a
transfer of funds remaining in the redemption fund of
a district, after all its obligations have been paid, to
the maintenance fund of the particular district for
which the assessments were levied. The statutes un-
doubtedly also contemplate a use for such funds, before
any transfer can be made to the maintenance fund.
In the instant case, district No. 4 having been dissolved
and all its obligations having been paid, in so far as
such district is concerned, there could be no further
use for such funds for any purpose.

It seems to us that to place the interpretation upon
these statutes contended for by respondents would be
to say that funds received from assessments levied for
a particular purpose by a district can be transferred to
the maintenance fund of another district, to be used by
the latter district for an entirely different purpose than
that for which the funds were obtained. While we
have serious doubts as to the right of the legislature to
provide for a transfer such as contended for by re-
spondents herein, in view of our conclusion that the
statutes do not authorize such a transfer, we are not
called upon and do not, in the instant case, determine
whether or not such a provision would be a violation

of the constitutional right of a property owner who had
paid assessments in a district included in a consoli-
dation.

We are of the opinion that the funds remaining in
the redemption fund of district No. 4 constitute a trust
fund for the benefit of the property owners of district
No. 4 who have paid their assessments, and that a court
of equity, in the absence of some statutory provision
therefor, has jurisdiction to require a pro rata distribu-
tion of such funds to such property owners. 19 C. J.
761, § 300; Snowden v. Thompson, 115 Ark. 587, 171
S. W. 919; Grooms v. Board of Directors etc., 167 Tenn.
589, 72S. W. (2d) 772. See, also, 5 McQuillin, Munici-
pal Corporations (2d ed.), 914, § 2312; Paving District
No. 5 v. Fernandez, 142 Ark. 21, 217 S. W. 795.

Hi Respondents contend that the assessments
herein, having been voluntarily paid, cannot be recov-
ered back, and cite the case of Pacific Finance Corp. v.
Spokane County, 170 Wash. 101, 15 P. (2d) 652, and
eases therein cited, to sustain this proposition. We
think the cited cases are authority only for the rule
that void taxes voluntarily paid cannot be recovered
back, and are not authority for the contention made
herein. In the instant case, appellants are not seeking
to recover funds illegally exacted, but are seeking to
have money refunded which has been paid in excess of
the amount actually needed for discharging the obliga-
tions for which the assessments were imposed. This
we think they have a right to do. Thibault v. Mc-
Haney, 127 Ark. 1, 192 S. W. 183.

This action involves only the balance remaining
in the redemption fund of district No. 4. However,
in appellants’ brief there is some intimation that, in
arriving at the amounts which they claim as their pro
rata share of the refund, the balance remaining in the
maintenance fund of district No. 4 was included. In

156

order that there be no misunderstanding, we hold that
appellants are entitled to a refund of $10,972.41 and
$1,019.30, respectively, or so much of such amounts as
shall be determined to be their pro rata share of the
balance remaining in the redemption fund of district
No. 4, based upon the assessments paid by appellants
for construction purposes.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Buake, C. J., Sremvert, Rosryson, and Mar, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27415. Department One. August 12, 1939.]

F. A. Kennett, Respondent, v. Franx A. Feperict et al.,
Appellants.+

*Reported in 93 P, (2d) 333.

157

Ballinger, Hutson & Boldt, for appellants.
Vanderveer & Bassett, for respondent.

Sremert, J.—Plaintiff brought suit to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries alleged to have been sus-
tained by him as the result of slipping on the floor of a
cafeteria owned and operated by defendants. Trial
by jury eventuated in a verdict in defendants’ favor.

The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial
specifically on the grounds that certain instructions,
although correct in law, were repetitious; that another
instruction, though correct, was without the issues; and
that still another was misleading. From the order thus
disposing of the case, defendants have appealed.

Appellants make two contentions on the appeal:
(1) That, in any event, the evidence was insufficient
to support a verdict for respondent, and (2) that there
was no prejudicial error attendant upon the giving of
the particular instructions. Respondent, having a dif-
ferent theory of the law applicable to the case, presents
an additional question under which he contends that
the controlling instructions were incorrect, constituting
prejudicial error.

We will consider first the matter of the alleged in-
sufficiency of the evidence.

Respondent’s testimony, summarized and stated in
narrative form, was as follows: For several years
prior to 1937, Frank A. Federici, who will be referred
to as if he were the sole appellant, operated a cafeteria
lunchroom in the business section of Seattle. The food
was customarily served to patrons from glass-parti-
tioned counters arranged along one side of the room.
On the opposite side was a row of booths, to which the
patrons, after being served, carried their trays for the
purpose of eating their meals. A center aisle about six
feet in width extended the length of the room, at the
rear of which was a water dispensary with glasses for
use by the patrons. The floor of the room was smooth
and had a polished surface.

At about noon, April 10, 1937, respondent met his
friend of many years, W. H. Woolridge, at the entrance
of the cafeteria, and the two men went inside to have
lunch together. After selecting their food at the ser-
vice counter, they carried their trays across the aisle

and deposited them on a table in one of the booths.
Respondent then started toward the rear of the room
to get a glass of water. He had taken but a few steps
when his right foot slipped on a greasy spot, which he
had not previously observed. He at once tried to stop,
but his left foot also slipped, whereupon he quickly
caught hold of a post, and thus saved himself from
falling. In doing so, he experienced a stinging sensa-
tion in the right groin. However, he continued his
course toward the rear, procured a glass of water, re-
turned to the booth, and sat down. As he did so, he
was again seized with a severe pain. On his return to
the booth, a woman employee was mopping the floor
at the place where, in slipping, he had left several skid
marks. Respondent’s conversation with the woman is
reported in a single paragraph of his testimony, as
follows:

“I said something about there being grease on the
floor and ‘I came near taking a nasty spill.’ And she
said something to the effect that some customer had
spilled it and she hadn’t had time yet to clean it up.”

Respondent had been in the lunchroom about five
minutes when the accident happened, and during that
time nothing had been spilled on the floor.

After eating his lunch, respondent left the place with
his friend and subsequently went home alone in a
street car. He made no complaint or report of the acci-
dent to the appellant.

After the pain in respondent’s right side had sub-
sided, a soreness developed, and a few months later it
was found, upon examination by a physician, that re-
spondent had a small hernia. In the following Janu-
ary, which was nine months subsequent to the accident,
respondent, without any previous notice to appellant,
filed suit to recover damages for the injuries alleged
to have been sustained.

Respondent’s testimony concerning the occurrence,
including the statement made by the woman employee,
was corroborated by the testimony of his companion
Woolridge.

Appellant’s evidence was confined to the testimony
of himself and that of the former woman employee.
Appellant testified that he had operated the cafeteria
about ten years; that he had twenty-four employees,
of whom twelve were on duty during the noon hour;
that four of these served the patrons at the counter and
one or two girls attended to removing the dishes and
food left on the tables or dropped on the floor; that
between four hundred and five hundred people usually
ate in the cafeteria during the daily noon period, from
eleven o’clock a. m. to two o’clock p. m.; that the place
was swept and mopped regularly three times a day,
once in the-forenoon and twice in the afternoon and
evening; that he knew nothing about the accident and
had not heard of it until the summons and complaint
were served upon him.

The other witness called by appellant was the woman
designated by respondent as the person who had
mopped the floor after he had slipped thereon. At the
time of the trial, she was no longer in the employ of
appellant. She testified that she had seen respondent
in the cafeteria on a number of occasions, but was not
acquainted with him. On both direct and cross-exami-
nation, she stated repeatedly that she had no recollec-
tion whatever of the accident and could not recall that
she had ever had any conversation with respondent.
She testified that the floor was swept regularly three
times a day, and that sweeping and cleaning were
among her duties while she was on shift; that she, as
well as the other employees, had frequent occasion to
remove particles of food dropped by customers, and

that, according to the rule of the house, it was done as
quickly as possible.

HEM Appeliant’s first assignment of error relates
to the statement made by the former waitress while
mopping the floor. No issue is raised against the com-
petency of the declaration, as evidence, but the argu-
ment challenges the sufficiency of such evidence alone
to support the burden cast upon respondent of showing
appellant’s knowledge of the substance on the floor.

Appellant proceeds upon the rule, well established
in this state, that evidence of verbal declarations of
the adverse party, where there are no corroborating
facts or circumstances, is not sufficient to sustain a ver-
dict of a jury upon a vital issue. Ludberg v. Barg-
hoorn, 73 Wash. 476, 131 Pac. 1165; Jones v. Harris, 122
Wash. 69, 210 Pac. 22; Low v. Colby, 137 Wash. 476,
243 Pac. 18, 247 Pac. 475; Commercial Importing Co. v.
Wear, 180 Wash. 669, 41 P. (2d) 777.

In each of those cases, however, the alleged declarant
denied that he had made the statement attributed to
him. In this case, the woman declarant did not deny
making the statement. She merely testified that she
had no recollection whatever concerning it or the
transaction with which it was connected.

Evidence of the admission of a material fact by an
adverse party or by his agent acting within the scope
of his authority, if undenied when full opportunity
for denial is afforded, constitutes substantial evidence
of such fact.

In the case of Wiard v. Market Operating Corp., 178
Wash. 265, 34 P. (2d) 875, it appeared that the plain-
tiff, a woman, had slipped on a greasy spot on the floor
of a restaurant, thereby sustaining severe injuries.
At the trial of the case, the plaintiff testified that, im-
mediately following the accident, the lady in charge of

|

the restaurant made certain verbal admissions show-
ing actual notice to her of the condition of the floor.
Upon that phase of the case, we pointed out certain dis-
tinguishing features between it and other cases and
said:

“Furthermore, the persons to whom the admissions
were attributed in the Ludberg and Jones cases took
the stand and denied making them. Here Miss Malloy
took the stand, but did not deny making the statements
attributed to her by appellant. Under the circum-
stances disclosed by this record, we think the evidence
of her statements, undenied as they were, constitutes
substantial proof of constructive notice to respondent
of the presence of the spot of grease on the floor. We
know of no more convincing proof of a fact than evi-
dence of its admission, when the person to whom the
admission is attributed, having the opportunity, fails
to deny it.”

Upon the authority of the Wiard case, we conclude
that the alleged statement by the woman employee, un-
denied by her, taken in connection with the other facts
and circumstances shown by the evidence, was suf-
ficient to take the case to the jury, under proper in-
structions by the court.

Appellant next assigns as error the granting of a new
trial. His contention is that the instructions, upon
which the motion was granted, were not repetitious;
and that, even if they were, no prejudicial error arose
therefrom. We shall not discuss that assignment, be-
cause we have come to the conclusion that certain of
the instructions prejudicially placed a burden of proof
upon respondent inconsistent with the law applicable
to the situation as developed upon the trial.

The question we are now about to discuss goes to
the heart of the case, was the basis of respondent’s
motion for a new trial below, was fully argued in the
briefs on appeal, and necessarily requires a decision

for the guidance of the trial court upon further pro-
ceedings.

In three separate instructions, phrased in different
terms, the court informed the jury that, in order to
return a verdict for respondent, it must find, among
other things, that respondent had proven by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that appellant, or his employee,
had knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the
presence of the greasy substance on the floor for such
a length of time prior to the accident as would have
enabled appellant, by the exercise of reasonable care,
to remove such substance before respondent slipped
on it. By those instructions, there was placed upon
respondent the burden of showing that, even if appel-
lant had actual knowledge of the presence of the sub-
stance on the floor, such knowledge must nevertheless
have been for a sufficient length of time to have en-
abled appellant to remove it. The vice of these in-
structions lay, not in the statement of the rules of law
by which appellant’s negligence or exculpation from
negligence was ultimately to be determined by the
jury, but in the statement concerning the burden of
proof on those respective questions.

HM The law in this state with reference to the lia-
bility of storekeepers or restaurateurs for injuries sus-
tained by their patrons through defective condition of
the premises is now quite definitely settled. A store-
keeper is required to maintain his storeroom in such a
condition as a reasonably prudent and careful store-
keeper would deem sufficient to protect customers from
danger while exercising ordinary care for their own
safety. Stone v. Smith-Premier Typewriter Co., 48
Wash. 204, 93 Pac. 209; Watson v. Zimmerman, 175
Wash. 410, 27 P. (2d) 707; Tyler v. Woolworth Co., 181
Wash. 125, 41 P. (2d) 1093; Engdahl v. Owl Drug Co.,
183 Wash. 100, 48 P. (2d) 232; Shumaker v. Charada

Inv. Co., 183 Wash. 521, 49 P. (2d) 44; Barnes v. J.C.
Penney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. (2d) 311; Knopp v.
Kemp & Hebert, 193 Wash. 160, 74 P. (2d) 924.

As a corollary to that rule, it has been established in
this jurisdiction that, where negligence is predicated
upon the failure to keep the premises in repair or ina
reasonably safe condition, it must be shown that the
defective condition has either been brought to the |
notice of the defendant or has existed for such time as
would have afforded him sufficient opportunity, in the
exercise of ordinary care, to have made a proper in-
spection of the premises and to have removed the
danger. Wiard v. Market Operating Corp., 178 Wash.
265, 34 P. (2d) 875; Riley v. Pacific Outfitting Co., 185
Wash. 497, 55 P. (2d) 1058.

It will be observed that the customer or patron is
not under a double duty in the matter of proof, but
only under an alternative duty. He may show actual
knowledge on the part of the storekeeper or he may
establish constructive knowledge by showing that suffi-
cient time has elapsed for the storekeeper, by the exer-
cise of reasonable care, to have remedied the defect.
But the party complaining is not required to establish
both alternatives.

Hi ‘When the customer or patron has shown actual
knowledge, he has made a prima facie case of liability.
If the storekeeper would then exculpate himself, he
must show that, despite his knowledge, he has not had
sufficient time, by the exercise of reasonable care, to
correct the defective condition. In the first instance,
the customer has the burden of proof, but in the matter
of exculpation the storekeeper has the burden. The
burden of each, respectively, is to prove his contention
by a preponderance of the evidence in the case.

Hi Respondent’s evidence, tending to show exist-
ence of the grease spot on the floor and actual knowl-

edge thereof by the employee acting within the scope of
her authority, made a prima facie case of negligence,
and the burden of establishing exculpation was upon
appellant.

At the same time, however, respondent offered evi-
dence, through the alleged statement of the employee,
upon which appellant could rely as tending to prove
that he had not had sufficient time, by the exercise of
reasonable care, to put the floor in proper condition.
But it could not be said, as a matter of law, that such
evidence of exculpation was conclusive. It became a
question for the jury to determine upon all of the evi-
dence and under proper instructions whether or not
exculpation had been established by a preponderance
of the evidence.

Hl By the court’s instructions, however, the jury
was told that respondent was required to carry not only
his own burden with respect to actual knowledge, but
that of appellant as well. To that extent, the court
erred upon the vital issue in the case, and, manifestly,
such error was prejudicial. Since the verdict was un-
favorable to respondent, he is entitled to a new trial
upon proper instructions.

The other errors complained of by respondent in the
matter of instructions will in all probability not occur
upon another trial, and hence it is unnecessary to dis-
cuss them.

For the reasons above given, the order granting a
new trial is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Maz, Rosinson, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27463. Department One. August 14, 1939.]

Wave H. Dzan et al., Respondents, v. Raupu E.
Wooorurr et al., Appellants.*

Ward & Ward and Clark & Grady, for appellants.
McEwen & Brooks, for respondents.

Buakz, C. J—This is an action by the vendees under
a contract for the sale of real estate for abatement of a
part of the purchase price because of the destruction
*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 357.

by fire of buildings on the premises during the life of
the contract. The action is brought upon the theory
that the contract contained a forfeiture clause; and
that, under the rule of Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649,
233 Pac. 29, the loss occasioned by the destruction of
the buildings must fall on the vendors. The defend-
ants, on the other hand, contend that the contract did
not contain a forfeiture clause; that, therefore, under
the rule of Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490,
135 Pac. 240, and First Nat. Bank v. Mapson, 181 Wash.
196, 42 P. (2d) 782, the vendees obtained an equitable
title; that, since the basis of the rule of Ashford v.
Reese is that loss follows title, the loss in this instance
must fall on the vendees. The vendors also claim that
the fire was the result of negligence on the part of the
vendees. The court entered a decree in accord with
the contentions of the plaintiffs. Defendants, the
vendors, appeal.

The appeal, with one exception, raises only questions
of fact. Indeed, in finality, the question to be deter-
mined turns upon the credibility of the appellant
Woodruff and the respondent Dean. For counsel are
agreed that, under the rules of the above-cited cases,
if there was a forfeiture clause in the contract, the loss
must fall on the vendors unless the fire was the result
of the vendees’ negligence; and if there was no for-
feiture clause, the loss must fall on the vendees.

The question of negligence may be summarily dis-
posed of. While the court made no findings of fact,
its decree, by necessary implication, presupposes that
the vendees were free from negligence. Without dis-
cussion, we may say that we think the evidence on that
issue would warrant no other conclusion.

To determine whether the parties agreed to a for-
feiture in the event of default on the part of the ven-
dees, requires a somewhat detailed statement of the

transaction. Although there were two writings signed
by the parties in connection with the transaction, we
are satisfied that the contract essentially rested in
parol. For, as we shall see later, one of the writings
was obviously incomplete and the other was merely
an escrow agreement.

The subject of the contract was a 120-acre tract,
upon which there was a considerable stand of timber,
a dwelling, and ranch buildings. The appellants had
purchased it some years before from one Wang on a
contract upon which there was still five hundred dol-
lars due. Appellants and respondents consummated
their deal on July 14, 1936. The terms of their contract
with respect to payment and an escrow arrangement,
subsequently effected, were reduced to writing. The
agreed purchase price was $2,300, $250 of which was
payable in cash. The balance was represented by four
notes: One for $250, payable October 20, 1936; one for
$700, payable May 1, 1937; one for $500, payable
August 1, 1937; and one for $600, payable February 1,
1938. This writing referred to three instruments to be
placed in escrow: (1) A deed, (2) special use permit
for forest service, (3) assignment of shares in a water
association; and recited that these instruments were
“to be returned in case of default.” The contemplated
escrow agreement was executed July 23, 1936. The
deed, put in escrow, was one executed by Wang and
wife with the name of the grantee to be filled in. If re-
spondents made the payments specified, the deed was
to be delivered to them. In case they failed to make
the payments, the deed and other papers were to be
delivered to appellants. While, by the terms of the
escrow agreement, it would appear that the notes were
also delivered to the escrow holder, they were in fact
delivered to appellants at that time. The escrow
agreement contained the following:

“That Ralph E. Woodruff, or his representatives,
shall have the right to cancel this agreement for non-
payment should payment not be made as herein speci-
fied, provided however, they shall give Wade H. Dean
and Effie M. Dean thirty days notice, with copy to
escrow holder, of their intention to cancel for nonful-
fillment of this contract. And in the event that the
delinquency is not taken care of within said thirty
days, the said escrow holder shall on demand deliver
all of said papers to Ralph E. Woodruff, or his repre-
sentatives.”

No controversy arose until about the time the $700
note became due. That note was not paid on its due’
date, May 1, 1937. Whether this was the result of in-
ability of respondents to pay it then or the controversy
which arose over who should bear the loss occasioned
by the fire, is not clear.

The parties do not agree as to the date of the fire.
Respondents say it occurred May 3rd or 4th. Appel-
lants fix the date as June 2nd or 3rd. In any event,
the $700 note was not paid until after the fire. In the
meantime, respondents were insisting upon some abate-
ment in the purchase price, which appellants refused
to consider. Respgndents paid the $500 due August 1,
1937, though still insisting that they were entitled to
some adjustment on the purchase price. Before the
last note, for $600, became due, respondents com-
menced this action.

HM The cause came on for trial on May 10, 1938.
As we read the record, the respondents rested their
theory of a forfeiture clause solely upon the above-
quoted provision of the escrow agreement. That that
provision is not such as would permit the vendor upon
default of the vendee to cancel the contract, retake the
land, and retain payments made by the vendee, we
think is apparent. And, by implication, at least, coun-
sel for respondents concede that it is not.

For, while the court had the cause under advisement,
respondents filed a petition to reopen the case for the
purpose of taking additional testimony. The petition
was granted, and additional evidence was presented.
The additional evidence consisted of the testimony of
the respondents, the appellant Woodruff, the escrow
holder, and two letters. Only one of the letters has any
significance. It was from appellant husband to the
escrow holder giving notice of intention to cancel the
contract. The testimony of the escrow holder is quite
noncommittal, but its purport is to the effect that
Woodruff was asserting his right to cancel the contract
and withdraw the deed and other papers.

It is the testimony of respondent Dean and appellant
Woodruff given on this second hearing that led us to
say, in the beginning, that, in final analysis, the issue
as to whether or not the parties agreed to a forfeiture
must turn upon their credibility as witnesses. For both
Dean and Woodruff grasped, with singular adeptness,
the legal consequence of the presence of such a stipu-
lation on the one side and its absence on the other.
Dean on the one hand testified that he wanted to con-
summate the transaction by taking a deed and giving
back a mortgage, but that Woodruff insisted on retain-
ing title and the right to cancel upon default and retain
payments received. In other words, Dean’s testimony
brings the case within the rule of Ashford v. Reese,
supra. Woodruff, on the other hand, testified just as
directly and positively that no forfeiture was contem-
plated or agreed to; that he retained the legal title
simply to secure the purchase price. In other words,
under his testimony, the equitable title passed to Dean
when the contract was entered into.

Hi There are inferences and probabilities to be
gleaned from the record in support of both versions.
It will serve no useful purpose to weigh them here.

It is impossible for us upon this record to form an in-
dependent judgment as to where the truth lies. Ina
situation such as this, so much depends, in ascertaining
the truth, upon the comparative candor and disingenu-
ousness of the witnesses while they are on the stand
that only the trial judge, who sees and hears them, can
draw an accurate conclusion. There is no tangible evi-
dence in this record which would justify us in arriving
at a different conclusion than that reached by the trial
judge on this issue.

HB Appellant assigns as error the admission of the
testimony relating to the forfeiture feature of the con-
tract. Objection to the testimony was based on the
theory that the writing of July 14th, coupled with the
escrow agreement of July 23rd, constituted a complete,
unambiguous, written contract, which could not be
supplemented by parol evidence. The objection, we
think, is without merit. The writing of July 14th does
not purport to cover the entire agreement between the
parties. It does not even contain a description of the
land except as “120 acres known as the Wang place.”
Nor can the escrow agreement be construed as the con-
tract of sale. Naturally, there were recitals in it em-
bodying certain features of the contract theretofore
consummated by the parties. But these were simply
incident to the main purpose of the escrow agreement.
They were incorporated to enlighten the escrow holder
in carrying out the obligations he assumed as such.

The judgment is affirmed.

. JEFFERS, STEINERT, Marn, and Rosrnson, JJ., concur.

172

[No. 27460. Department One. August 14, 1939.]

Witt1am E. Werr, Appellant, v. ScHoon Disrricr
No, 201, Kurcxrrat County, et al., Respondents.+

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 308.

Snively & Bounds and Owen Clarke, for appellant.

Edgar H. Canfield and Ralph S. Barber, for respond-
ents.

Sremert, J—Plaintiff brought suit to recover the
amount of a year’s salary stipulated in a contract under
which he had been employed as principal of a school
district. Defendant resisted the action on the ground
that the contract had been procured by plaintiff
through fraud. Trial of the issues by the court without
a jury resulted in a written decision in favor of de-
fendants and a judgment dismissing the action. Plain-
tiff has appealed.

On June 4, 1937, appellant, William E. Weir, accom-
panied by his wife, went to Glenwood, Washington, for
the purpose of applying for the position of principal of
public schools of the respondent school district. There
they became acquainted with the three respondent
school directors and during the course of the day had
several conversations with them relative to the posi-
tion. Mr. Weir’s qualifications appeared to be fully
satisfactory to the directors. The matter of salary was,
concededly, an important topic in the discussion.

According to Mr. Weir’s testimony regarding the
negotiations on that occasion, it was then and there
orally agreed that the directors would employ him for
the succeeding school year beginning August 30th at
an aggregate salary of eighteen hundred dollars, which
amount the directors themselves proposed. No con-
tract forms being then available, Weir was advised that
the necessary papers would be mailed to him at an
early date for signature. Mrs. Weir testified to the
same effect.

According to the testimony of the directors, they
were at that time doubtful whether the district was
financially able to pay as much as eighteen hundred

ddllars, but were willing to authorize the execution of
a contract providing for that amount of compensation
for Weir’s services if the school budget, which had not
yet been approved, should be the same as that for the
preceding year. They further testified that, at the con-
ference, Weir agreed to call upon Mrs. Sue Morehead,
county superintendent of schools, at Goldendale, which
was about thirty-five miles distant, and ascertain from
her the financial condition of the school district and the
status of its budget for the ensuing year, and report the
results to them. Mr. and Mrs. Weir both denied that
any such agreement, or any conversation evidencing
such understanding, was had, and it does not appear
from the record before us that Mr. Weir ever went to
Goldendale for that purpose.

On June 19th, no contract forms having been re-
ceived by Weir, he made a second trip to Glenwood.
According to his testimony regarding the events of that
occasion, he spent the greater part of the day inter-
viewing the directors with reference to the contract.
In the evening, he met two of them at the schoolhouse,
at which time the contract was signed by him and the
two directors, in the presence of the county superin-
tendent and one Harold Henry, without any objection
whatever to any of its terms, including the salary pro-
vision of eighteen hundred dollars. Later in the same
evening, the third director signed the contract in the
presence of Henry and, likewise, without any objection.
Henry corroborated the account thus given by Weir.

The evidence of respondents regarding the circum-
stances incident to the execution of the contract was of
a different hue. The two directors testified that, at the
meeting on the evening of June 19th, and prior to the
execution of the contract, Weir told them that he had
consulted the county superintendent and was advised
by her that the school budget had been approved and

that the district would be able to pay him eighteen
hundred dollars. They further testified that they had

- signed the contract relying wholly upon Weir’s repre-
sentations regarding his conference with the county
superintendent, and that no one other than Weir and
themselves was present when the contract was signed.
One of the directors admitted, however, that, just as
they finished signing the contract, the county superin-
tendent came into the room and then told them that
they could not pay eighteen hundred dollars. The
third director, who was not present at the meeting but
who signed the contract later in the evening, testified
that, although at the time of affixing his signature
thereto he expressed the view that the district did not
have sufficient funds to pay the stipulated salary, he
had nevertheless executed the agreement, relying upon
the same representations made by Weir.

Mrs. Morehead, the county superintendent, was
called by respondents as a witness at the trial, and her
testimony was as follows: At no time prior to June
19th had Weir discussed with her the financial condi-
tion of the school district. On that day, however, while
attending a picnic in Glenwood, she had met Weir, who
informed her at that time that the school district was
about to hire him as principal at a salary of eighteen
hundred dollars. Knowing the financial condition of
the district, she advised him that it would be impossible
to pay that amount. Weir then volunteered to get the
board of directors together that evening at a stated
hour, in order that she and all parties immediately con-
cerned might discuss the entire matter. At the ap-
pointed time, she attended the meeting, but upon her
arrival the contract had already been signed. She
thereupon again informed Weir that there would not
be sufficient money to pay him the stipulated amount.
Moreover, she had repeatedly told the directors that

they would not have enough funds in the coming year
to pay a principal so large a salary. Mrs. Morehead’s
testimony was corroborated, in part, by her husband,
who was also present at the picnic.

Upon rebuttal, Weir denied the misrepresentations
attributed to him, and his testimony was corroborated
by that previously given by the witness Henry. Weir
also denied that he had agreed to arrange a meeting at
which Mrs. Morehead was to be present.

From this point, the evidence is not in conflict. About
July 23rd, Weir moved to Glenwood and during the
next six weeks occupied himself in preparing for the
opening of school. In the meantime, other teachers had
been employed as assistants to him. School opened on
August 30th, and Weir promptly began his work as
principal. At about that time, the directors received
a copy of the final budget, from which it appeared that
they could not pay Weir eighteen hundred dollars.
Accordingly, on September 7, they asked Weir to enter
into a modification agreement providing for a reduced
compensation of thirteen hundred fifty dollars for the
year. Weir declined to do so. After several unsatis-
factory conferences, protracted over a period of about
ten days, the board of directors on September 17th
served written notice on Weir terminating his services
on September 20th.

Weir thereafter endeavored to obtain a teaching po-
sition elsewhere, but, owing to the lateness of the
season, was unable to secure one.

In the record, there appear two forms of school dis-
trict budgets which respondents introduced as exhibits.
These forms contain instructions for their preparation.
The general procedure prescribed in the instructions
is as follows: Prior to April 1st of each year, the
county superintendent should furnish the local school
board with preliminary estimates of the various re-

ceipts of the school district and information for the
following year. The school board should then set up
a tentative budget, to be thoroughly discussed with the
county superintendent. After a public hearing has
been had, a preliminary budget should be transmitted
to the county superintendent by April 25th, and a pre-
liminary review made by the county reviewing com-
mittee before May ist, and a tentative total set. Early
in July, the county superintendent should send to the
school board three copies of the regular budget blank,
showing definite estimates of receipts and other neces-
sary information. Two copies of the final budget
should be filed with the county superintendent and
one with the clerk.of the board not later than August
ist. During August, the budget should receive a final
review by the county reviewing committee. Four
copies of the budget, if then approved, should be filled
out, of which one is to be filed with the clerk of the
district, one with the county auditor, and two with the
county superintendent, who is required to forward one
of them to the superintendent of public instruction.

Appellant advances four contentions upon his ap-
peal.

HI The first is that he did not make the represen-
tations attributed to him. It is apparent, however, that
the situation upon which this contention is founded
presented merely an issue of fact whereon the trial
court was required to weigh the evidence and adjudge
the credibility of the witnesses. The court having
found against appellant on conflicting evidence from
which different conclusions reasonably might have
been drawn, we are not permitted nor inclined to dis-
turb the finding.

Appellant further contends that, even if it be con-
ceded that such representations were made by him,
they could not be held to be fraudulent, because they

were in fact true. There is some basis for this con-
tention, because, according to the discussion in the
briefs, supported to some extent by the record, the
imadequacy of the budget as finally determined was,
in part, attributable to the fact that the patrons of
the school district were demanding that five teachers
be employed for the ensuing term instead of four, as
had been the case in the preceding year. That was a
factor which necessarily would affect the financial
situation according to whether or not the board should
ultimately accede to public demands. However, the
evidence upon that issue, as contained in the narra-
tive statement of facts, is too barren of detail to enable
us to draw therefrom any satisfactory conclusion. We,
therefore, pass that question.

Hi Appellant’s next contention is that the alleged
misrepresentations were immaterial, in that they
necessarily related to future or contingent events, and
were, therefore, merely expressions of opinion. We
do not agree with appellant. The representations com-
plained of related to positive statements of fact, upon
which the directors claim to have relied when they
signed the contract. Those statements, as found by
the court, were that appellant had interviewed the
county superintendent, and that she had told him
that the budget was sufficient to pay him a salary of
eighteen hundred dollars. If such statements were
made, they concerned facts which it is claimed induced
the execution of the contract.

Hi Appellant’s final contention is that respondents
are estopped from claiming reliance on the alleged mis-
representations. We believe that this contention is
well founded.

We are aware that the tendency of the modern deci-
sions is to restrict rather than to extend the rule re-
quiring diligence on the part of the injured party and

similar rules such as caveat emptor. 26 C. J. 1144, § 59.
This court has frequently noted this trend of decision
and has aligned itself with that policy. Wooddy v.
Benton Water Co., 54 Wash. 124, 102 Pac. 1054, 132
Am. St. 1102; O’Daniel v. Streeby, 77 Wash. 414, 137
Pace. 1025, L. R. A. 1915F, 634; Duffy v. Blake, 80 Wash.
643, 141 Pac. 1149; Bliss v. Clebanck, 136 Wash. 32,
238 Pac. 979.

But in these later cases, it is to be noted that there
was a false assertion of an existing fact, usually with
reference to property, the truth of which fact was
peculiarly within the knowledge or means of knowl-
edge of the declarant; or the property was at a distance
and the opportunity of ascertaining the true fact was
not readily at hand; or the misrepresentation was made
for the purpose of preventing an investigation and
ascertainment of the true fact; or the declarant knew
that the other party did not intend to make a personal
investigation, but relied solely on the truth of the fact
communicated by the declarant. Stewart v. Larkin,
74 Wash. 681, 134 Pac. 186, L. R. A. 1916B, 1069.

The case before us does not fit into that mold. The
school directors were, themselves, ‘the persons who
tentatively were to determine and express the needs
and abilities of the school district; they were fully ad-
vised and were presumed to know the procedure by
which they could determine the exact extent of their
prospective obligations; they knew that the amount of
money to be used for teachers’ salaries would be vitally
affected by the number of teachers to be employed;
they, of course, were aware that the very keystone of
the educational arch was the principal of schools, and
that it would require a certain amount of money to
procure the services of one who was properly qualified
for the place; the directors held positions of trust,
which, if accepted by them, demanded a reasonable

devotion to the discharge of the duties thereto an-
nexed; by their own testimony, they knew that the
matter of salaries depended upon the condition of the
budget, and that the approval of the budget in its
finality lay with the county superintendent and the
reviewing board; and they were told repeatedly by
the county superintendent that they would not have
enough money to pay Weir so large a salary.

Under such circumstances, the directors were not
justified in relying, if they did rely, upon the alleged
statements of Weir, when they themselves had more
intimate knowledge and direct authoritative informa-
tion as to the true condition of the budget and the
consequent extent of their financial ability.

[| Another reason why respondents should be
estopped from asserting reliance upon the statements
of appellant is that, assuming that they had been mis-

“led, they failed to take appropriate action after the

contract had been executed and at a time when they
knew that the district would be embarrassed by its
performance.

One who seeks to avoid a contract, which he has been
induced to enter into by fraudulent representations of
another touching the subject matter of the contract,
must act with reasonable promptness on discovering
the fraud, or the right to rescission will be waived.
Blake v. Merritt, 101 Wash. 56, 171 Pac. 1013; Kellner
v. Rowe, 137 Wash. 418, 242 Pac. 353; Stubbe v. Stangler,
157 Wash. 283, 288 Pac. 916; Depositors Bond Co. v.
Christensen, 185 Wash. 161, 53 P. (2d) 312.

Hardly had the contract been’ signed when Mrs.
Morehead, the superintendent, appeared at the meet-
ing and announced that the board was unable to pay
the amount specified. Thus the directors were ad-
vised that any representation to the contrary by Weir
was false. Yet they did nothing to repudiate the con-

tract. Instead, they permitted appellant for over two
months to busy himself in preparation for the school
term, and, finally, to enter upon his duties when school
opened on August 30th.

Had the directors acted with reasonable promptness,
appellant might have secured another position and
thus obviated loss to himself and embarrassment to the
school district. When the board ultimately dismissed
him on September 17th, it was too late for appellant
to secure another appointment. Since the directors
had the opportunity and were under the duty to speak
promptly, their failure to do so must cast upon the
school district the burden of the loss entailed.

The judgment is reversed. .

Brags, C. J., Mary, Rosryson, and Jerrers, JJ.,
coneur.

[No. 27420. Department One. August 14, 1939.]

C. E. Gray et al., Respondents, v. C. A. Harris & Son,
Inc., Appellant.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 385.

182

John Spiller, for appellant.

J. Harold Anderson (Robert D. Hamlin, of counsel),
for respondents.

JEFFERS, J.—This is an appeal by defendant, C. A.
Harris & Son, Inc., a corporation, from a judgment
rendered by the superior court for Chelan county, on
August 16, 1938, in favor of plaintiffs, C. E. Gray and
Viola Gray, his wife.

In their first amended complaint, plaintiffs set up
three purported causes of action. The trial court al-
lowed plaintiffs recovery, against the corporate de-

fendant only, on their first cause of action and in part
on their second cause of action, but denied plaintiffs
recovery on part of their second cause of action and
on their third cause of action. Plaintiffs did not appeal
from that part of the judgment adverse to their con-
tentions.

The undisputed facts may be stated as follows: Prior
to June 3, 1936, A. O. Arneson and wife were the
owners of the southeast quarter of the southeast quar-
ter of section 26, township 27 north, range 20, E. W. M.
On the date last mentioned, Arneson and wife con-
veyed this property to plaintiffs, the deed expressly
conveying to plaintiffs the right of redemption from
sheriff’s sale in cause No. 12307 in the superior court
for Chelan county, wherein L. A. Pietz, as receiver of
First National Bank of Hayti, was plaintiff, and Arne-
son and wife were defendants. The defendant cor-
poration became the purchaser of the property at
sheriff’s sale in cause No. 12307, on February 29, 1936,
and on June 22, 1936, plaintiffs redeemed the property
in question by paying to the sheriff of Chelan county
the amount of the purchase price paid by defendant
corporation for such property at the execution sale,
together with interest up to the time of redemption
and the costs of redemption.

While there is some dispute in the testimony as to
the amount of timber cut from the land in question
and as to the value thereof, the trial court saw the
witnesses and apparently accepted the testimony of
Earl Moon, a scaler for defendant corporation, as a
basis for its decree that, between the date when de-
fendant purchased the property and the date of the
redemption by plaintiffs, defendant cut from the land
121,000 board feet of timber, and we think the court
was justified in its finding. We are also of the opinion
that the court was justified in its conclusion that this

timber was reasonably worth the sum of $363. There
is also some dispute as to the amount of timber hauled
over the land in question between the date of redemp-
tion by plaintiffs and the commencement of this suit
and as to the damage caused by such hauling, but again
we think there is ample testimony to justify the find-
ing of the trial court that not less than 600,000 board
feet was hauled by defendant across the land.

It appears from the testimony of plaintiff Gray that
the road across the land in question, over which de-
fendant hauled its logs, was built by defendant cor-
poration some eight or ten years ago; that the road
washed out and was rebuilt by the United States forest
service. The evidence relative to the damage to the
property resulting from defendant’s hauling, as shown
by the testimony of Martin Petersen and Ragna Peter-
sen, witnesses for plaintiffs, and by the testimony of
plaintiff Gray, is based upon the reasonable value of
the use of the road; in other words, as testified by
plaintiff, for the privilege of using the road.

The trial court granted plaintiffs judgment on their
first cause of action, for timber cut and removed by
defendant, in the sum of $363, and on their second
cause of action for one hundred dollars. Defendant
corporation has appealed.

Appellant contends the court erred in granting judg-
ment to respondents in any sum on their first cause of
action, and also claims the court erred in granting
judgment to respondents in the further sum of one
hundred dollars as damages to the property, as the
result of hauling timber over the land by appellant.

As to the first cause of action, the question pre-
sented is whether or not respondents are entitled to
recover against appellant for the value of timber cut
and removed by appellant from the land in question be-
tween the time it purchased such property at execution

sale and the time of redemption by respondents, where
respondents redeemed without demanding an account-
ing, as provided in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 600 [P. C. § 7915].

Appellant contends that respondents’ first cause of
action is one in conversion, and that the conversion
was complete at the time the timber was cut; that the
title to the trees cut passed to appellant at that time;
and that, in the absence of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 600,
such action as might have accrued was a personal one
for damages in favor of the judgment debtor, Arneson,
only, and that solely by virtue of § 600, supra, does
any right accrue in favor of respondents. We are un-
able to agree with appellant in its contentions.

Rem. Rev. Stat., §595 [P. C. § 7910], provides in
part:

“The judgment debtor or his successor in interest,
or any redemptioner, may redeem the property at any
time within one year after the sale, on paying the
amount of the bid, with interest thereon at the rate of
eight per cent per annum to the time of redemption,
together with the amount of any assessment or taxes
which the purchaser or his successor in interest may
have paid thereon after purchase, and like interest on
such amount;

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 600, in so far as material, pro-
vides:

“The purchaser, from the time of the sale until the
redemption, and the redemptioner from the time of his
redemption until another redemption, except as here-
inafter provided, is entitled to receive from the tenant
in possession the rents of the property sold, or the
value of the use and occupation thereof. But when
any rents or profits have been received by.such per-
son or persons thus entitled thereto, from the property
thus sold, preceding the redemption thereof from him,
the amount of such rents and profits, over and above
the expenses paid for operating, caring for, protecting
and insuring the property, shall be a credit upon the
redemption money to be paid; and if the redemptioner

or other person entitled to make such redemption,
before the expiration of the time allowed for such re-
demption, files with the sheriff a demand in writing
for a written and verified statement of the amounts
of such rents and profits thus received, and expenses
paid and incurred, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five (5) days after such sworn statement is
given by such person thus receiving such rents and
profits, or by his agent, to the person making such
demand, or to the sheriff. It shall be the duty of the
sheriff to serve a copy of such demand upon the per-
son receiving such rents and profits, his agent or his
attorney, if such service can be made in the county
where the property is situate. If such person shall, for
a period of ten days after such demand has been given
to the sheriff, fail or refuse to give such statement,
such redemptioner or other person entitled to redeem
from such sale, making such demand, may bring an
action, within sixty days after making such demand,
but not later, in any court of competent jurisdiction,
to compel an accounting and disclosure of such rents,
profits and expenses, and until fifteen days from and
after the final determination of such action the right
of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or
other person making such demand who shall be en-
titled to redeem.

In the first place, we are of the opinion that
the legal title to real estate does not pass to one pur-
chasing at an execution sale until the period of re-
demption has expired and a sheriff’s deed issued.
Cogswell v. Brown, 102 Wash. 625, 173 Pac. 623.

This being true, the appellant herein had no right,
during the redemption period, to denude the land of
its merchantable timber. We are also of the opinion
that the only rights given by the statute to such a
purchaser are to protect, care for, and, in a proper
case, operate the property, during the period of re-
demption; and if he has received any rents or profits
from the property during such period, and there is a
redemption, he must, in an appropriate action, account

to the redemptioner for such rents and profits, over
and above the cost of operating, caring for, and pro-
tecting the property.

HI We are further of the opinion that the deed of
June 3, 1936, from Arneson and wife to respondents,
even without reference to the right to redeem, would
have carried with it the right to redeem, but when in
addition we have the conveyance of such right ex-
pressed in the deed, and also a written assignment of
Arneson and wife to respondents of any and all rights
of the Arnesons to redeem, certainly there can be no
question as to respondents’ right to redeem, provided,
of course, they have complied with the statute.

We think there can be no question but that respond-
ents had a right to redeem, under § 595, supra, by
paying the amounts prescribed by such statute, regard-
less of whether or not they had, prior thereto, made a
demand upon appellant for a sworn statement of the
rents, profits and expenditures made by appellant.
State ex rel. Bryant v. Starwich, 131 Wash. 101, 229
Pac. 12.

HM Having, then, made redemption under § 595,
supra, and having paid to the sheriff, for appellant,
the amount it paid for the property at the execution
sale, can respondents, after the expiration of the period
of redemption, bring an action against appellant for
the reasonable value of the timber cut and removed
from such premises? We think they can.

Respondents, having redeemed under § 595, supra,
as they had a right to do, and not having made a de-
mand for an accounting, are not, in our opinion, bound
by the provision of § 600, supra, relative to the time
within which an action may be brought after a demand.
for an accounting has been made and refused, but
were entitled to bring this action, which we think, in
so far as the first cause of action is concerned, is based

upon the equitable ground that appellant, having re-
ceived from respondents all it paid for the property at
the execution sale, should not, in good conscience, be
permitted to keep the money and also the timber which
it had unlawfully cut and removed from the property
during the redemption period.

Appellant cites the following cases to support its
contentions: Cogswell v. Brown, supra; State ex rel.
Bryant v. Starwich, supra; and First Nat. Bank v.
Kahle, 143 Wash. 336, 255 Pac. 374.

In the Brown case, supra, there was a demand by
the redemptioner for an accounting, and after such
demand, an action was brought to redeem and for an
accounting. We think the situation presented in the
cited case is different from that presented in the instant
case, and that what was said in the cited case relative
to the time an action could be brought is not controlling
herein.

In the Starwich case, supra, the question was whether
or not the purchaser at the execution sale could com-
pel the redemptioner to pay the expenses incurred by
the purchaser for operating, caring for, and protecting
the property, as a condition precedent to redemption.
The court held that redemption could be had under
§ 595, supra, by paying the amounts therein specified.

In the First Nat. Bank case, supra, appellants did
not comply with the provisions of either §595 or
§ 600, supra, but brought an action for redemption and
demanded an accounting. In the cited case, there is
no question of the property being stripped of that
which made it valuable, nor was redemption made
prior to bringing the action.

HM Appellant contends that the trial court should
in no event have allowed more than nominal damages
to respondents on their second cause of action.

There is no question but that appellant was a tres-

passer upon respondents’ land, after redemption. The
testimony shows that it hauled over this land at least
600,000 board: feet of timber, after respondents had
redeemed, and before this action was begun, without
respondents’ permission, and without any right so to
do. However, the testimony also shows that the haul-
ing was upon an old road that had been there for some
ten years, and that the only damage was such as might
result from the use of this private road. The only testi-
mony bearing upon the damage to the land from such
hauling seems to be based upon the claimed reason-
able value per thousand feet for hauling timber over
this road. We are of the opinion that there is no testi-
mony herein which would justify a judgment against
appellant on the second cause of action in the sum of
one hundred dollars, but a technical trespass having
been proven, we think respondents are entitled to
nominal damages in the sum of one dollar, on their
second cause of action.

The judgment is affirmed as to the first cause of ac-
tion, and modified as to the second cause of action to
the extent of allowing a recovery in favor of respond-
ents for nominal damages in the sum of one dollar.
Respondents will recover their costs herein.

Buake, C. J., Stemert, Mar, and Rostnson, JJ.,
concur,

190

{No. 27496. Department One. August 15, 1939.]

James P, Kinney et al., Appellants, v. Taz NortHEern
Lire Insurance Company, Respondent.*

Wright & Wright (Ambrose C. Grady, of counsel),
for appellants.

Preston, Thorgrimson & Turner, for respondent.

Main, J—This action is based upon an insurance
policy. The defendant denied liability and pleaded two

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 360.

affirmative defenses. One was that the policy had
never been delivered; and the other, that the insured
committed suicide and thereby voided any recovery
upon the policy. The cause was tried to the court and
a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the defendant.
From the judgment entered upon the verdict, the
plaintiffs appeal.

The respondent, The Northern Life Insurance Com-
pany, is a corporation organized under the laws of this
state, and is engaged in the business of writing life
insurance, with its principal office in the city of Se-
attle. The appellants, James P. Kinney and Mar-
garet L. Kinney, his wife, are the parents of Philip T.
Kinney, the insured.

September 9, 1937, Philip T. Kinney signed an ap-
plication for insurance upon his life and named as
beneficiaries his father and mother. In the applica-
tion, the premium was stated as being $7.55 per month.
When the application was received at the office of the
company, it was discovered that the agent who took
the application had made a mistake in the amount of
the premium, and, instead of it being $7.55, it was
$8.00, per month. The policy was written calling for
a premium of $8.00 per month, and attached to the
policy was the amended application.

At the time the insured signed the application, he
paid the agent $7.55, as being the premium for the
first month. September 17th of the year above men-
tioned, the policy was handed to the agent to deliver
to the insured, upon condition that he pay the addi-
tional amount of the premium and sign the amended
application. The agent attempted to contact the in-
sured the afternoon of that day, but was unable to
do so, although he had a conversation with him over
the telephone; the insured stating that he would pay

the additional premium and sign the amended appli-
cation, and the agent was to call upon him the next
morning for that purpose. Later in the evening of the
same day, the insured met his death by reason of a
gunshot wound. Whether accidental or intentional, is
not material upon this appeal.

In submitting the case to the jury, they were told,
in effect, by instruction No. 9, that there could be no
recovery if neither the application was signed nor the
policy delivered to the insured prior to his death. The
question presented upon this appeal is whether that
was a correct instruction.

HI The appellants contend that the words “either
actually or constructively” should have been embodied
in instruction No. 9, and that the failure to so embody
them renders the instruction incorrect. In connection
with this, it is stated that the court failed to recognize
the fact that there could be a constructive delivery
of a policy of insurance without actual delivery of the
same. The court, in instruction No. 7, definitely in-
structed the jury upon the matter of constructive de-
livery, to which instruction no complaint appears to
be made. It would seem to follow that the court did
not fail to recognize that there could be a constructive
delivery.

HI The next question is whether the conversation
had by the agent and the insured over the telephone
operated as an acceptance of the policy by the insured,
and, by reason of that fact, there was a constructive
delivery. If the agent had the authority to waive the
condition fixed by the company, that he should collect
the additional premium and have the amended appli-
cation signed before the policy was delivered, it may
be that that conversation would result in a construc-
tive delivery. There is no evidence from which the

jury could find that the agent had the authority to
waive the conditions mentioned.

It is the intention of the parties, not the manual
possession of the policy, which determines whether
there has been a delivery thereof. There must be an
intention to part with control of the instrument and
place it in the power of the insured or some person
acting for him. The matter of delivery is largely one
of intent. Frye v. Prudential Ins. Co., 157 Wash. 88,
288 Pac. 262; Harlow v. North American Accident Ins.
Co., 162 Wash. 423, 298 Pac. 724.

In the first of the cases cited, a policy was placed in
the mail by the insurance company at its principal
place of business, which was in an eastern state, ad-
dressed to one of its agents, with instructions to collect
the premium and deliver the policy to the insured. It
is recognized in that opinion that there can be a condi-
tional delivery, and that a constructive delivery may
become absolute. The policy was received by the
agent and was not delivered to the insured, due to the
negligence or fault of the agent. It was there held
that the insurance company would not be permitted
to invoke the condition that the policy was not to be
delivered to the insured until after the premium was
paid, because the failure to deliver was due to the
fault of the agent.

In the second case cited, it was held that, due to the
facts of that particular case, the insurance company
had waived the matter of conditional delivery, and,
for this reason, judgment went against it. Neither of
the cases mentioned supports the claim here that there
had been a constructive delivery of the policy which
had become absolute prior to the death of the insured,
because the respondent had not done anything which
would destroy its right to rest upon the fact that the

[|

delivery was conditional. It will be noted that, in the
instruction complained of, the jury were told that, if
the insured did not sign the amended application, then
there could be no recovery.

In the case of Long v. New York Life Ins. Co., 106
Wash. 458, 180 Pac. 479, there was an amended appli-
cation, and the policy was mailed to an agent with. in-
structions to have the amended application signed
before the delivery of the policy. Prior to delivery,
the insured died, and it was held that there was no
delivery of the policy and no agreement upon the
terms thereof. That case sustains the portion of the
instruction which states that, if the amended applica-
tion was not signed, there could be no recovery. We
find no error in the giving of the instruction in ques-
tion.

The judgment will be affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Jerrers, Ropinson, and Sremvert, JJ.,
concur. :

195

(No, 27541. Department One. August 15, 1939.]

Cuar.ezs F’. Ernst, as Director of the State Department
of Social Security, Respondent, v. Guarantss Mrui-
work, Lvc., et al, Respondents, Unttep STaTES
or America, Appellant, King County
et al., Respondents.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 404,

J. Charles Dennis, Gerald Shucklin, and Thomas R.
Winter, for appellant.

Mawer & Wigle, for respondents Guarantee Mill-
work, Inc., et al.

Kellogg, Walters & Pedersen, B. Gray Warner,
Lloyd W. Shorett, and Edward E, Henry, for respond-
ents King County et al.

Jurrers, J—This is an appeal by the United States
from an order of the superior court for King county,
establishing priorities, ordering distribution, discharg-
ing receiver, and exonerating his bond, made and en-
tered November 4, 1938, wherein the receiver was
directed to pay the subrogation claim of J. B. Warrack
for 1937 personal property taxes paid by him, the claim
of King county for 1938 personal property taxes due
and unpaid, and the labor claim of Mary Warrack,
prior to the claim of the United States for social se-
curity and income taxes. The controversy is one be-
tween the United States, King county, J. B. Warrack,

and Mary Warrack, as to priority of payment out of
the assets of an insolvent corporation.

No bill of exceptions or statement of facts having’
been certified to this court, we are limited, in our
consideration of the questions raised, to the findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and order signed by the
trial court.

The findings of the trial court may be summarized
as follows: On October 14, 1938, the matter came on
for hearing before the court on the final report, petition
for order determining priorities and for distribution,
and petition for discharge, and, evidence having been
introduced and considered, the court made the follow-
ing findings of fact:

There remains in the hands of the receiver, for
distribution, the sum of approximately $750.55, but
there are not sufficient funds with which to pay a
dividend in any amount to general creditors. With
reference to claims heretofore filed as and/or approved
by the superior court as preferred, the following facts
appear:

That, on or about May 4, 1937, the county assessor
of King county made a regular and valid assessment
against the personal property of defendant corpora-
tion then on its operating premises, for the 1937 per-
sonal property taxes, in the sum of $245.58, including
interest and penalties; that such assessment was not
segregated with reference to property encumbered or
free of encumbrances, and on July 25, 1938, in order
to protect his interest in that part of the tangible per-
sonal property which he held under chattel mortgage,
and which he had duly foreclosed and bought in at
sale, J. B. Warrack paid to King county the sum of
$245.58; that, on April 12, 1938, the county assessor
of King county made a regular and valid assessment
against the personal property of defendant corpora-

tion for 1938 personal property taxes, in the sum of
$205.64, which remains due and unpaid; that no dis-
traint was made by King county for either the 1937
or 1938 taxes; that, on October 11, 1938, J. B. Warrack
filed herein a petition for order of priority of King
county personal property taxes, and for subrogation
of that portion of the 1937 personal property taxes
paid by him; :

That the portion of defendant’s personal property
covered by chattel mortgage held by J. B. Warrack
was sold and bid in by Warrack for ten thousand dol-
lars; that the unencumbered tangible personal prop-
erty was sold for $1,508.01; that the sale price at the
foreclosure sale and the price received by the receiver
for the unencumbered property is a fair measurement
of the value of all the property; that the claim of King
county for 1938 taxes covers that portion of the un-
paid personal property taxes represented by the ratio
which the fund received from the sale by the receiver
of the unencumbered property covered by the assess-
‘ment ($1,518.01) bears to the total value of the tan-
gible personal property received by him covered by
the assessment ($11,518.01); that, based on this ratio,
King county is entitled to 13.17% of $205.64, or $27.08;
that J. B. Warrack is entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of King county, based upon his payment of the
total of 1937 personal property tax, to the extent of
13.17% of $245.58, or $32.45, which sum would have
been payable to King county under its assessment lien
from funds in the receiver’s possession, if the same had
not been satisfied by J. B. Warrack;

That Mary Warrack duly filed with the receiver her
claim for wages due her from defendant corporation,
in the sum of three hundred dollars; that no lien was
filed therefor; that the receiver was appointed within
ninety days after claimant ceased to perform such

labor; that the claimant duly qualified for preference
under Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 1149 and 1153 [P. C. §§ 9737,
9741], and asserted priority under those statutes;
That, on or about July 12, 1938, Thor W. Hendrick-
sen, acting collector of internal revenue for the district
of Washington, on behalf of the United States, filed
proofs of claim covering social security taxes assessed
against defendant corporation for the years 1936 and
1937, and the first quarter of 1938, and additional in-
come tax for the year ending December 31, 1937, the
social security tax being $2,223.53, plus penalty of
$422.35, and interest $71.54, and the income tax $13.38;
that no notice of tax liens were ever filed with the
auditor of King county or the clerk of the United
States district court prior to the appointment of the
receiver herein, or at all; that the state did not appear
at the hearing and asserted no claim to priority.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the court concluded
that the claim of King county to the extent of $32.34
for personal property taxes for the year 1937 is a valid
and specific lien under Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11265
[P. C. § 6882-104] (Laws of 1935, p. 75, § 7), against
the funds in the hands of the receiver for distribu-
tion, and J. B. Warrack, having paid the 1937 taxes,
is entitled to subrogation and should be by the receiver
reimbursed in the amount of $32.34, prior to the pay-
ment of any other claim; that the claim of King county,
to the extent of $27.08, for personal property taxes for
the year 1938, is a valid and specific lien against the
funds in the hands of the receiver for distribution
and should be second in priority; that the claim of
Mary Warrack for wages, in the sum of three hundred
dollars, is a valid and specific lien under Rem. Rev.
Stat., §§ 1149 and 1153, against the funds in the hands
of the receiver for distribution and should be third
in. priority of payment; that the claim of the United

States for income and social security taxes is junior
in priority to the claim of King county, J. B. Warrack,
and Mary Warrack, and that, after payment by the
receiver of the three claims last above mentioned, the
receiver shall disburse and pay over to the United
States the remainder of the funds in his hands for dis-
tribution. An order was made and entered on No-
vember 4, 1938, in accordance with the conclusions,
and this appeal followed.

HI Respondents have moved to affirm the final
order upon the record, because of the failure of appel-
lant to include in its brief any statement of the ques-
tion involved and any assignment of error. While we
do not approve the style used by appellant in the prepa-
ration of its brief, we think it is apparent from appel-
lant’s analysis of the issue that its claim is based upon
the provisions of U. S, Rev. Stat., §§ 3466 and 3467 (31
U.S. C. A. §§ 191, 192), and that the only error
claimed, or which could be claimed, is that the order
is not supported by the findings. The motion will be
denied.

Appellant contends that, under U. S. Rev. Stat.,
§§ 3466 and 3467 (31 U.S. C. A., §§ 191 and 192), it is
entitled to have its claim for social security and income
taxes paid by the receiver, from funds in his hands,
prior to the claims of respondents. Section 3466, supra,
provides in part:

“Whenever any person indebted to the United States
is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased
debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators,
is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the de-
ceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first
satisfied.”

Section 3467 provides:

“Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other
person, who pays any debt due by the person or estate
from whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies

and pays the debts due to the United States from such
person or estate, shall become answerable in his own
person and estate for the debts so due to the United
States, or for so much thereof as may remain due and
unpaid.”

On the other hand, respondents King county and
J. B. Warrack contend that, under Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 11265, a specific lien was created on certain
personal property of Guarantee Millwork, Inc., prior
to the appointment of the receiver; that this property
came into the hands of the receiver impressed with
such lien, and was sold under order of court; and that
they are entitled to have their claims based upon such ©
lien satisfied from the proceeds of such sale in the
hands of the receiver, prior to appellant’s claim. Sec-
tion 11265, supra, provides in part:

“The taxes assessed upon each item of personal prop-
erty assessed shall be a lien upon such personal prop-
erty from and after the date upon which the same is
listed with and valued by the county assessor, and no
sale or transfer of such personal property shall in any
way affect the lien for such taxes upon such property.”

Hs This being an action of equitable cognizance,
and no statement of facts or bill of exceptions having
been brought to this court, the rule is that the decree
of the trial court is entitled to every presumption
necessary to sustain it, in the absence of an affirmative
showing in the finding itself that the facts necessary
to sustain it did not exist. State ex rel. Northeast
Transp. Co. v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 262, 77 P.
(2d) 1012, 82 P. (2d) 111.

HB We think it clear that, under § 11265, supra,
the county is given a specific lien on the personal prop-
erty assessed, from and after the date such property
is listed with and valued by the county assessor, and
that no distraint of such property is necessary to per-

fect such lien. Fowler v. Snohomish County, 149
Wash. 530, 271 Pac. 587. We are also of the opinion
that, under Rem. Comp. Stat., § 11272, which was not
as specific as Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11265, this
court recognized that the statute gave a specific lien
on the personal property assessed, and that distraint
was not necessary to perfect the lien, except where
it was attempted to impress the lien upon property
other than that upon which the assessment was made.
Goodsell v. Spokane County, 135 Wash. 669, 238 Pac.
612. In Minshull v. Douglas County, 133 Wash. 650,
234 Pac. 661, after referring to the statute and several
of our cases, including Wilberg v. Yakima County,
132 Wash. 219, 231 Pac. 931, 41 A. L. R. 184, we made
this statement:

“Under the various statutes and under our own de-
cisions, it is manifest that the personal property tax is
a specific lien against the specific property assessed;
that the assessed personal property may be followed
into the hands of a transferee and the assessed taxes
collected.” (Italics ours.)

Hl Section 3466, supra, relied upon by appellant,
is purely a priority statute, and no lien is created by it.
United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253, 67 L. Ed.
638, 43 S. Ct. 295; Bramwell v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co,, 269 U. S. 483, 70 L. Ed. 368, 46 S. Ct.
176. Whatever rights the appellant has under this
statute did not attach until the receiver was appointed.
United States v. Oklahoma, supra; Spokane County v.
United States, 279 U.S. 80, 73 L. Ed. 621, 49 S. Ct. 321.

Appellant cites many cases from the supreme court
of the United States to sustain its claim to priority.
We have examined these cases, and find none of them
that holds that the United States is entitled, under
§ 3466, supra, to priority over a claimant having a
specific lien on property taken over by a receiver. In

fact, we do not understand that appellant contends it
would be entitled to priority herein if respondents
hhad such a lien, but appellant contends respondents
have no such lien, because they did not actually cause
the property assessed to be distrained.

Appellant relies, to a very considerable extent, on
two cases from this jurisdiction, namely, Spokane
County v. United States, supra, and In re Dickson’s
Estate, 197 Wash. 145, 84 P. (2d) 661. We do not
think the case of Spokane County v. United States is
authority for appellant’s contention, for the reason
that in the cited case the question of a specific lien was
not in issue. This is evident from the case itself, and
also from the following statement made by the court
in New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 77 L. Ed. 754,
53 S. Ct. 323:

“The tax held to have been subordinated in the
Spokane County suit was not a perfected lien upon the
property of the insolvent at the date of the receiver-
ship. 279 U.S. 80, 93, 94. The question was reserved
whether a different conclusion would have been neces-
sary if such a lien had been proved.”

Neither do we think the case of In re Dickson’s
Estate, supra, purports to deal with priorities as be-
tween the United States, under § 3466, supra, and a
claimant having a specific lien, but deals only with
priorities as between general creditors.

HI We are therefore of the opinion that respondent
King county obtained a specific lien upon the personal
property of Guarantee Millwork, Inc., for the years
1937 and 1938, prior to the appointment of the receiver;
that the specific property assessed came into the hands
of the receiver and was sold by him under order of
court; that the specific lien followed the proceeds of
the sale and attached thereto; and that the claims of
King county and J. B. Warrack should be paid by the

receiver from such proceeds, before the claim of ap-
pellant.

Hi Respondent Mary Warrack claims a specific
lien for labor, under Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 1149 and 1153,
and the court found that she had duly qualified for
preference and priorities asserted under such statutes.
Appellant contends that the claim filed by Mary War-
rack is not a labor lien claim, but at most, is a preferred
salary claim to the extent of one hundred dollars.
However, we are, at the outset, met with the rule that,
no statement of facts being here, there is no evidence
before us from which we can determine what kind
of work respondent may have done for the corpora-
tion, or upon what facts the court based its finding
that respondent had qualified for preference, other
than as may appear from the claim filed. Even
though it may appear from the claim that respondent
was an officer of the defendant corporation, if facts
were presented to the court showing that she per-
formed services for the corporation outside of those
required of her as an officer, she would be entitled to
a preferred claim for such services. Cavanaugh v.
Art Hardware & Mfg. Co., 124 Wash. 243, 214 Pac. 152.

We are therefore of the opinion that we must pre-
sume there was evidence from which the trial court
determined respondent performed labor of such a
nature as to bring her within the purview of § 1149,
supra, which provides in part as follows:

“Every person performing labor for any person,
company or corporation, in the operation of any rail-
way, canal or transportation company, or any water,
mining or manufacturing company, sawmill, lumber
or timber company, shall have a prior lien on the
franchise, earnings, and on all the real and personal
property of said person, company or corporation, which
is used in the operation of its business, to the extent
of the moneys due him from such person, company or

corporation, operating said franchise or business, for
labor performed within six months next preceding the
filing of his claim therefor . . . ; and no mortgage,
deed of trust or conveyance shall defeat or take prece-
dence over said lien.”

Section 1153 provides:

“Whenever a receiver or assignee is appointed for
any person, company or corporation, the court shall
require such receiver or assignee to pay all claims for
which a lien could be filed under this chapter, before
the payment of any other debts or claims, other than
operating expenses.”

Under the sections last above mentioned, a right is
given to subject certain specific property to the pay-
ment of specific wage claims. These sections, in our
opinion, give to one performing certain labor a spe-
cific lien on certain property. In the absence of
insolvency, in order to perfect the lien, the claimant
must file notice of his claim in the auditor’s office, and
serve a copy on the employer, as provided in Rem.
Rev. Stat., § 1150 [P. C. § 9738]. However, when the
employer becomes insolvent within ninety days from
the time claimant ceased employment, no notice is
necessary, but the lien automatically matures. Olsen
v. Smith, 84 Wash. 228, 146 Pac. 572. See, also,
Brown v. Wilcox Lumber & Logging Co., 118 Wash.
336, 203 Pac. 949.

Based upon the findings of the trial court and the
statutes referred to, we conclude that respondent Mary
Warrack had a specific lien on the property of the in-
solvent corporation, and that such lien entitled her to
priority over any claim of priority asserted by ap-
pellant under U. S. Rev. Stat., § 3466.

The judgment is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Mary, Rosrnson, and Sreivert, JJ.,
concur.

.

[No, 27448. Department One. August 16, 1939.]

Tue Srarz or Wasutneron, Appellant, v. Dramonp
Tank Transport, Inc., Respondent.t

B. Gray Warner and Laurance A. Peters, for appel-
lant.

Preston, Thorgrimson & Turner, for respondent.

Main, J.—The defendant was charged in justice
court with operating a garbage truck without a permit
from the department of public service, and was there
convicted, from which conviction it appealed to the
superior court. In the latter court, the action was dis-
missed, from which the state gave oral notice of appeal
from the oral decision of the trial court announced at
the conclusion of the trial. No formal written order
or judgment was entered.

HI 4¢ the threshold, we are met with the ques-
tion of jurisdiction. In Codd v. Von Der Ahe, 92 Wash.
529, 159 Pac. 686, there was an attempt to appeal from
the oral decision of the trial court; and it was there
said:

‘Reported m 93 P. (2d) 313.

“We cannot entertain an appeal, as, from a final
judgment, from an oral order which was never ex-
pressed in a formal written judgment.”

That case is controlling. The case of Robertson v.
Shine, 50 Wash. 433, 97 Pac. 497, is to the same effect.

The question is not whether an oral notice of appeal
can be given at the proper time, but whether there is
any judgment or order from which an appeal can be
taken.

Hl This being a question of jurisdiction, the court
will raise it of its own motion, even though neither of
the parties is asking for such a ruling. It is well-settled
that the parties cannot stipulate jurisdiction in this
court.

There being no formal written order or judgment
from which an appeal could be taken, the law requires
the dismissal of this appeal, and it is so ordered.

Brakg, C. J., Sremvert, Roprnson, and Jerrsrs, JJ.,
concur.

208

{No. 27490. Department Two. August 16, 1939.]

H. O. Potann, Respondent, v. Tas Crry or SEATTLE,
Appellant.t

A. C. Van Soelen and John A. Logan, for appellant.

Bailey, Heussy & Clarke and Paul Lemargie, for
respondent.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 379.

Smupson, J.—Plaintiff instituted this action to re-
cover compensation for personal injuries sustained by
him when he was struck by a Seattle street car. The
charges of negligence on the part of the motorman
who was in charge of the operation of the street car
at the time of the injury, are that he was operating
the car without watching for traffic in the front thereof
and at a dangerous and excessive rate of speed, in
excess of thirty-five miles per hour; that the front
lights of the street car were out; that he failed and
neglected to apply the brakes or to sound any warning
when he saw or should have seen plaintiff in front of
the car; and further that he neglected to operate the
street car carefully and prudently, or to accord the
users of the crosswalks their rights. Defendant denied
the charges of negligence and, by way of affirmative
defense, alleged that plaintiff’s damages, if any, were
caused and contributed to by his own carelessness and
negligence.

The case was tried to a jury, and resulted in a ver-
dict in favor of plaintiff.

At the close of plaintifi’s case, defendant moved for
a nonsuit. A motion for a directed verdict was also
made at the proper time. After a verdict had been
returned, defendant moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and, without waiving that motion,
in the event it were denied moved for a new trial. The
motions were denied, and judgment was entered in
favor of plaintiff. The city appeals.

The facts most favorable to plaintiff may be sum-
marized as follows: Appellant owns and operates a
double track street railway system, a part of which
runs in a northerly and southerly direction along the
west shore of Lake Union. Westlake avenue proper is
physically separated from, but is immediately adjacent
to, the area occupied by the street car tracks. The

paved area of the street is double the width of the
usual pavement with a dirt strip in between, and there
is a curb three inches high along the easterly boun-
dary of the pavement. East of this curb is an unpaved
area along the lake, in which is located a double track
for street cars. This area is not open for vehicular
travel, and the rails, ties, and ballast of the track are
open and uncovered as on the ordinary railway track.
Northbound cars travel on the easterly track, and
southbound cars travel on the westerly track.

At the place where the accident occurred, Newton
street intersects Westlake avenue, but does not extend
over or across the street car tracks. At this point in
the track area, two loading and unloading platforms
have been constructed parallel to the tracks, each six
feet wide and sixty feet long. One platform is located
between the curb at the new pavement edge and the
west rail of the westerly track; the other is east of the
easterly track. There is a crosswalk at both ends
across the tracks connecting the two platforms. There
is also a wood guardrail along the curb separating the
paved street from the west platform, with an entrance
at the north end thereof. Eighteen feet north of the
northerly end of the platform is a sixteen-foot cross-
walk utilized for vehicular traffic from the east side
of Westlake avenue. Approximately 150 feet easterly
of the northbound tracks is the shore of Lake Union,
upon which lake are constructed numerous house-
boats. On the southwest corner of Westlake avenue
and Newton street is constructed a gasoline service
station.

Between five and six o’clock in the afternoon of
February 10, 1938, respondent alighted from a taxicab
opposite the houseboats and walked across the tracks
in an easterly direction to a houseboat occupied by
Mr. Kelly. Respondent remained at this friend’s house

until about ten o’clock, at which time he crossed the
track to the gasoline station. After remaining at the
station for a short time, he thought he saw some
friends approaching along Westlake avenue in an auto-
mobile and who crossed the street car tracks and
stopped at a point between the easterly tracks and
Lake Union. Respondent crossed Westlake avenue to
its easterly side and stopped at the railing which sepa-
rated the highway from the street car tracks. At this
point, he looked to the right and left, but stated he
did not see any street car. He then proceeded to walk
in an easterly direction on the pedestrian crossing.
His vision and hearing were very good. Respondent
testified that the evening was clear, the visibility very
good, and he could see along the track a distance of
180 feet. After taking three or four steps east of the
guard rail, he was hit by a southbound street car.

There was evidence to the effect that the street car
was going at a speed of forty-five miles per hour, that
no bell was rung or brake applied before respondent
was struck. There was an absence of evidence on
the part of respondent’s witnesses concerning the
headlights on the street car just prior to or at the time
of the impact. None of them noticed whether or not
a headlight was burning. Witness Frye was standing
on the east side of the street car track at the time of
the accident. When asked about the lights on the front
of the car, he said:

“T don’t know, I couldn’t say either one, I don’t know
which is right, it is just one of those things, I don’t re-
member whether it was dark or light, because in a posi-

tion like that, when you are looking at somebody about
to get hit, you don’t know whether there are lights.”

Later, on cross-examination, he gave the following
testimony:

“Now, Mr. Frye, not the headlight on the street car,
but was the street car otherwise lighted? A. Yes, it
was. Q. And how fully lighted was it, just describe to
the jury what lights the street car had? A. Well, I
don’t know, just like any other street car would be at
night, just looked lighted was all. Q. Fully lighted?
A. I don’t know, just looked lighted. I don’t know
whether any lights were missing, just looked lighted to
me.”

Witness Evans was in an automobile waiting for re-
spondent and didn’t see the street car until it struck
respondent, and when asked about the lights, said:
“Well, if there was a light on it I never saw it.” When
cross-examined, he said the inside lights on the car
were burning. .

Witness Gilbertson was standing at the front of the
automobile waiting for respondent. She gave the fol-
lowing testimony on direct examination:

“Q. And when you saw the street car, it was approxi-
mately at the automobile crossing? A. You know,
when you look at something and you glance at some-
thing out of your right eye causes you to know that
something was coming—well, I saw it. I didn’t see it
further to the right of me, and I just saw it out of the
corner of my eyes in that quick glance. . . . Q. Now,
did you notice the front end of the street car, Mrs. Gil-
bertson? A. Oh, I seen it like I say. I saw it a little
to my right before I was even with it. I wouldn’t know
how many feet out there. I saw it a little to my right
like that as I kind of half turned and glanced back at
him again. Q. Did you notice whether or not the light
was burning? A. I didn’t notice any light. If there
was one burning, I didn’t see it.”

The passengers getting on the car at Seventy-third
avenue and Greenwood, Sixty-second avenue and
Phinney, Fifty-ninth avenue and Phinney, and Forty-
third avenue and Fremont, all testified that the head-
light was burning when they boarded the car, and one
passenger testified that the light above the car door

was burning at the time of the accident. The motor-
man was certain that all the lights on the car were
burning, including the headlight. All witnesses who
examined the headlight after the accident were agreed
that the outer glass was broken, and the motorman
explained that its condition was caused by hitting
respondent.

HH For the purposes of this case, we will assume
without deciding the negligence of the motorman in
operating the street car. In approaching the question
of respondent’s contributory negligence, we have in
mind that:

“The questions of negligence and contributory negli-
gence, where the evidence is conflicting, is always a
question for the jury, has been held in so many cases

that it is unnecessary to cite them.” Crowe v.
O’Rourke, 146 Wash. 74, 262 Pac. 136.

” “Tt has long been the rule of this court that, before a
court will be justified in taking from the jury the ques-
tion of contributory negligence, the acts done must be
so palpably negligent that there can be no two opinions
concerning them.” Walters v. Seattle, 97 Wash. 657,
167 Pac. 124.

Was there sufficient competent evidence to
show that the headlight on the street car was not burn-
ing as it approached the crosswalk upon which re-
spondent was injured?

The evidence that it was not burning, at the most,
was of a negative character. Only one of the witnesses
noticed the car at a point closer to the crosswalk than
fifteen feet, and that witness, Ada Gilbertson, had but
a fleeting glance at it, and said: “I just saw it out of
the corner of my eyes in that quick glance.”

The failure to notice the street car and to ascertain
whether its lights were burning was natural, because
the witnesses either lived in the vicinity and did not
take particular notice of passing cars, or were friends

of respondent and were interested only in watching
him cross the track to the waiting automobile.

“Where the attention of those testifying to a negative
was not attracted to the occurrence which they say
they did not see or hear, and where their situation was
not such that they probably would have observed it,
their testimony is not inconsistent with that of credible
witnesses who were in a situation favorable for ob-
servation, and who testify affirmatively and positively
to the occurrence. There is then no conflict.” Chicago
& N.W. R. Co. v. Andrews, 130 Fed. 65.

Cases of like import are: Anspach v. Philadelphia
& R. R. Co., 225 Pa. 528, 74 Atl. 373, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.)
382; Zotter v. Lehigh Valley Co., 280 Pa. 14, 124 Atl.
284; Crystal v. Baltimore & B. A. Electric R. Co., 150
Md. 256, 132 Atl. 629; Twining v. Lehigh & N. E. R.
Co., 310 Pa. 429, 165 Atl. 489; Cooper v. Southern R.
Co., 153 Va. 93, 149 S. E. 444; Pere Marquette R. Co. v.
Anderson, 29 F. (2d) 479; Globe Indemnity Co. v.
Stenger, 82 Colo. 47, 256 Pac. 658; Handy v. New
Orleans Public Service, 10 La. App. 72, 120 So. 271.

In Crystal v. Baltimore & B. A. Electric R. Co., supra,
the court had before it a case where there was evidence
that the automobile driver looked but did not see the
approaching headlights of the street car. In that case,
the driver of the automobile testified that he heard no
bell or other signal given of the approach of the street
car, and that neither the driver nor his helper saw the
car or any light before the accident, but that the light
was out after the accident.

In that case, the court said:

“Testimony must have more than a speculative value
before it can be regarded as of testimonial sufficiency
to establish a material fact. And this principle is par-
ticularly applicable in the present connection because,
in the driver’s signed statement, he said, consistently
with all the other testimony on the record, that, while
lying on the ground after the collision, he noticed that

215°

all the car lights were out, but that he did ‘not know if
they were out at time of collision, or if collision caused
trolley to fly off’ The evidence of negligence must be
affirmative and there can be no presumption that the
lights were not burning on the electric car.”

The fleeting view of the car as it approached re-
spondent brings this case within the rule announced in
Dunsmoor v. North Coast Transp. Co., 154 Wash. 229,
281 Pac. 995, in which this court stated:

“The trial court sustained the motion for a nonsuit
on the ground that there was no evidence of negligence
on the part of the driver of the stage. With this con-
clusion we are constrained to agree. The only evidence
that pointed to negligence on the part of the driver
were estimates made by the appellant’s witnesses as
to the speed of the stage. But these were made under
conditions that leave them of no probative value.
Davis, who was in the better position to judge of the
speed of the stage, says that he did not see the stage
until after it passed him, just immediately prior to the
collision. His view of it, at best, could have been
nothing more than a fleeting glance. The driver of the
car, with which the stage collided was somewhat more
emphatic. She says the stage was traveling at a speed
of fifty miles per hour. But, as she further testifies that
she did not see the stage until after she turned her car
into its path, when it was no more than a hundred feet
away, coming head-on towards her, it is plain that she
could make no very accurate estimate of its rate of
speed. She was herself traveling towards the stage at
approximately thirty miles per hour, and, estimating
the speed of the stage at the legal limit, the vehicles
would come together in less than a second from the
time she first saw the stage. Aside from the fact that
she was observing the stage from a position in which it
was the most difficult to judge accurately of its speed,
she must have been alarmed at the situation in which
she had placed herself, and must have been giving some
attention to the management of her own car. These
conditions would put further difficulties in the way of
an accurate judgment. Like the trial court, we cannot

think her estimate has any better foundation than a
mere guess.

“It was incumbent upon the appellant, in order to
recover against the respondent, to show that its driver
was guilty of negligence. This she must show by sub-
stantial evidence—a scintilla of evidence will not
do—and, in our opinion, the evidence here is not of that
substantial character on which a jury is permitted to
found a verdict.”

The case just cited has been followed in Hansen v.
Continental Casualty Co., 156 Wash. 691, 287 Pac. 894;
Cartwright v. Boyce, 167 Wash. 175, 8 P. (2d) 968;
Haydon v. Bay City Fuel Co., 167 Wash. 212, 9 P. (2d)
98; Femling v. Star Pub. Co., 195 Wash. 395, 81 P. (2d)
293.

In Hansen v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, it was
said:

“We have adopted the fair and reasonable rule of
requiring substantial evidence, not merely a scintilla
of evidence, to satisfy the requirement of a preponder-
ance of the evidence. And while, under a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, all evidence
and fair inferences from the evidence must be con-
sidered in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is directed, we are nevertheless sat-
isfied that there is no substantial evidence in this case
to show that any authorized agent of the appellant had
any notice of the accident in question until after the
policy had been issued.”

In considering the evidence in the instant case, we
must find that there was no substantial evidence upon
which the jury could have found that the street car
had lights which were not burning. There is no pre-
sumption that the lights were not burning. Crystal v.
Baltimore & B. A. Electric R. Co., supra.

In view of the definite testimony that the headlight
was burning, the evidence relative to its burning some
time before the accident, together with the admitted

fact that it was out immediately after the car struck
respondent and the outer glass was broken, we con-
clude that the headlight must have been burning be-
fore the impact as the street car approached the cross-
walk upon which respondent was walking.

HE We come now to the problem of whether re-
spondent was guilty of contributory negligence in
crossing the car tracks as he did. He testified that,
when he reached the guard rail near the track, he
looked right and then left before starting to walk
across the tracks and, as stated hereinbefore, he testi-
fied that he did not see an approaching street car.

The tracks, streets, and the other physical conditions
surrounding the place where the accident occurred in
this case and the actions of respondent are almost iden-
tical with those reported in Simmons v. Seattle, 154
Wash. 66, 280 Pac. 931. In that case, as in this, the
injured person testified that she looked for an ap-
proaching car, but did not see it, and, further, that she
heard no warning signal of its approach and that the
car was traveling at an excessive rate of speed. The
court stated:

“But this was not sufficient to excuse her. The situ-
ation is not materially different from the situation
presented in the case of McClelland v. Pacific North-
west Traction Co., 138 Wash. 527, 244 Pac. 710, where
we held that the facts did not justify a recovery on the
part of the injured plantiff. In that case, we said:

“The claim of error is that the court erroneously
took the case from the jury. It seems to us that appel-
lant’s own testimony conclusively shows that she was
attempting to walk across the tracks in front of the
oncoming interurban car of respondent while fully
conscious of, and for the most part actually continually
seeing, the approach of the car, during the entire time
of its approach over a distance of at least 250 feet. Her
view, manifestly, was unobstructed. Her approach
from the curb to the track was not in the slightest de-

gree interfered with by any passing vehicles or other
traffic of any kind. Conceding, for present purposes,
that respondent’s motorman was negligent in the opera-
tion of the car, in so far as its speed is concerned,
though we regard that as very doubtful, we are never-
theless of the opinion that her own testimony conclu-
sively shows that she was herself negligent in such
degree that her negligence became the predominating
proximate cause of her being injured. She was a pedes-
trian there, not the driver of a vehicle, and hence, at
least in some considerable measure, had larger oppor-
tunity for protecting herself than the driver of a vehicle
would have, in that she would have more thorough con-
trol over her own movements. The following of our
decisions touching the question of contributory negli-
gence of pedestrians in somewhat similar situations,
we think, strongly support our conclusions here
reached: [Citing cases].’”

The excessive speed of an oncoming car does not
relieve one who is crossing the track from the duty of
exercising ordinary care for his own safety and to as-
certain whether or not a car is approaching before
attempting to cross. Fluhart v. Seattle Electric Co.,
65 Wash. 291, 118 Pac. 51; Beach v. Pacific Northwest
Traction Co., 185 Wash. 290, 237 Pac. 737.

In Fluhart v. Seattle Electric Co., supra, the injured
person testified that he looked both ways before start-
ing to cross a street railway track, but could not see
the approaching car. In passing upon the question of
his contributory negligence, this court stated:

“There was neither necessity nor excuse for stepping
in front of the car even though it was approaching at an
unlawful speed. Negligence on the part of appellant
did not relieve respondent from the duty of exercising
care and avoiding contributory negligence on his
part.

. Evidence of physical facts making it cer-
tain a pedestrian must have seen, or could have seen
an approaching car had he looked, renders unavailing
his unsupported statement that he did look but could

not see. Oral statements, although undisputed, must
yield to undisputed physical facts and conditions with
which they are irreconcilable. From the physical facts
and respondent’s evidence it is apparent he recklessly,
carelessly, and negligently walked too near the ap-
proaching car, and that in so doing he was guilty of
contributory negligence.”

The following statement of Judge Chadwick in re-
ferring to a plaintiff injured while crossing in front
of a street car in Slipper v. Seattle Electric Co., 71
Wash. 279, 128 Pac. 233, is especially pertinent to the
facts testified to and the physical situation present in
the case at bar:

“He should have been to some extent at least, mind-
ful of his own safety. The cable makes quite a noise
and the car makes an even greater noise. The track

_ itself was a sign and warning of danger; it was under
his eye and must have been seen if he was looking in
the direction in which he was going .

: He might continue in motion; he might
close his eyes; but his ears were open and, though
slightly deaf, there is no evidence tending to show that
he could not hear ordinary sounds and conversation.”

In the following cases, this court has held that a per-
son walking in front of a street car or automobile is
guilty of contributory negligence even though he tes-
tifies that he looked and did not see an object which
plainly could have been seen. Even if he did not see
the object, he is held to that same degree of care if it
is shown that the object was present and could have
been seen by looking. Helliesen v. Seattle Electric Co.,
56 Wash. 278, 105 Pac. 458; Herrett v. Puget Sound
T., L. & P. Co., 103 Wash. 101, 173 Pac. 1024; Silver-
stein v. Adams, 134 Wash. 430, 235 Pac. 784; Campbell
v. Spokane United Railways Co., 174 Wash. 347, 24 P.
(2d) 1068.

It is clearly apparent in this case that, when re-
spondent started across the street car tracks, the street

car was some distance to his left, in plain sight and
lighted on the inside, its headlight was burning, it was
making considerable noise as it approached the cross-
walk, and that respondent was guilty of contributory
negligence, as a matter of law, when he attempted to
cross in front of the moving car.

The judgment is reversed, with instruction to dismiss
the action.

Brats, Geracuty, and Rosrnson, JJ., concur.
Brake, C. J. (dissenting)—Upon the facts disclosed

by the record, I think the question of contributory
negligence was for the jury. I therefore dissent.

(No. 27395. Department One. August 17, 1939.]
In the Matter of the Estate of Witt1am J. LaMBELL,
Deceased.

Apert LAMBELL, Individually and as Executor, Appel-
lant, v. Tue State or Wasuincron, by William H.
Pemberton, as Supervisor of the State Inheri-
tance Tax and Escheat Division, et al.,
Respondents.+

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 352,

221

Oliver Hulback and Fred’k R. Burch, for appellant.

Robert F. Waldron, John M. Boyle, Jr., and Charles
Snyder, for respondent state of Washington.

Sweeney & Haugland and B. H. Camperson, for re-
spondents Lambell et al.

Rosinson, J.—William J. Lambell, a resident of
Seattle, Washington, died at the age of seventy-one
years, leaving a will executed on the day of his death.
By paragraph two of the will, he devised all of his
real estate to his brother, Albert Lambell. Paragraph
three of the will is as follows:

“Provided there is sufficient cash and bonds on hand
after the payment of funeral expenses, expenses of last
sickness and of administration, I direct that 60%
thereof be given to, and I hereby bequeath it to, my

brother, Albert Lambell; and if the remainder of such
cash and bonds be sufficient to allow $100. to each of
the following persons, and $50. per person to certain
other three, then I direct that such division and ap-
portionment be made, and I hereby bequeath it to
them respectively: To Albert Lambell, 60%; to Lillian
Lambell, $100.; to Mrs. A. E. Lambell, $100.; to Arthur
Baker, $100.; to Ellen Baker, wife of Arthur Baker,
$100.; to Ernest Atherton, Jr., $100.; to Wilber Etherton,
$100.; to Bryce Etherton, $100.; to Alberta Lasky, $100.
(this last bequest to Alberta Lasky to be delivered to
her father A. EK. Lambell to be by him used for her
purpose or given to her in installments as he may see
fit) ; to Herbert Arthur Baker, $50.; to Walter Bareham
Baker, $50.; to Lloyd George Baker, $50. Provipep,
that should there not be sufficient cash and bonds to
make the foregoing division in full, then and in that
event each shall take a proportionate reduction; and
provided further, that should there be any remainder
after the specific bequests have been paid in full, then
each of the said legatees shall take thereof in pro rata
parts in the same manner in which they would have
received the pro rata deficiency.”

The supervisor of the inheritance tax and escheat
division construed the will to mean that sixty per cent
of the cash and bonds was given to the brother, Albert
Lambell, a class B beneficiary under the provisions of
the inheritance tax act, and the remaining forty per
cent to the other legatees mentioned in paragraph three,
class C beneficiaries under the provisions of the act,

_and imposed a tax accordingly. The brother, Albert
Lambell, filed exceptions to the findings of the super-
visor, claiming that, under paragraph three of the will,
he was entitled to sixty per cent of the cash and bonds,
and, in addition, sixty per cent of the remaining forty
per cent. The class C beneficiaries filed a petition in
opposition to the claim of the brother, Albert Lambell.
After a hearing, the court overruled the exceptions of
the brother, Albert Lambell, and entered an order

affirming the findings of the supervisor. The brother,
Albert Lambell, as a legatee and as executor of the will,
appeals.

| Respondent state of Washington moves that the
appeal be dismissed on the ground that the amount in
controversy is less than two hundred dollars. The
amount of the tax actually in dispute is $112.29. How-
ever, the action, which began as a proceeding to fix the
amount of the inheritance taxes, became converted
into one for a construction of a will, in which, the ap-
praised value of the estate being $10,921.22, the dis-
position of sums greatly exceeding two hundred dollars
was in controversy. The motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied.

HI Respondent legatees move that the appeal by
Albert Lambell, as executor, be dismissed, for the
reason that the executor is not an aggrieved party.
As all interested parties wére before the court, there
was no occasion for the executor to take either side
in the controversy. The motion to dismiss the appeal
by the executor, as such, is granted.

We have read paragraph three of the will many
times, and not always with the same result. We have
finally come to the conclusion that it was the intention
of the testator to give Albert Lambell sixty per cent
of the cash and bonds, and no more. We think that,
where the testator used the words “To Albert Lambell,
60%,” he was repeating the bequest already made to
his brother of sixty per cent of the cash and bonds, and
did not intend to give him, in addition to the sixty per
cent of the cash and bonds, sixty per cent of the re-
maining forty per cent. The testator says:

“Provided there is sufficient cash and bonds on hand
after the payment of funeral expenses, expenses of
last sickness and of administration, I direct that 60%
thereof be given to, and I hereby bequeath it to, my
brother, Albert Lambell; :

There can be no question but that, by this language,
the testator intended that Albert should receive sixty
per cent of the cash and bonds after the payment of
funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness, etc.

“.. . and ifthe remainder of such cash and bonds
be sufficient to allow $100. to each of the following
persons, and $50. per person to certain other three, then
I direct that such division and apportionment be made,
and I) hereby bequeath it to them respectively:

The word “remainder,” without much doubt, refers
to the remainder of the cash and bonds after deducting
the sixty per cent bequeathed to Albert. None of the
parties contends otherwise. Then, the remaining forty
per cent is to be divided into shares of $100 and $50
and bequeathed “to the following named persons,” re-
spectively: .

“. . . To Albert Lambell, 60%; to Lillian Lam-
bell, $100; to Mrs. A. E. Lambell, $100.; to Arthur
Baker, $100.; to Ellen Baker, wife of Arthur Baker,
$100.; to Ernest Atherton, Jr., $100.; to Wilber Etherton,
$100.; to Bryce Etherton, $100.; to Alberta Lasky, $100.
(this last bequest to Alberta Lasky to be delivered
to her father A. E. Lambell to be by him used for her
purpose or given to her in installments as he may see
fit); to Herbert Arthur Baker, $50.; to Walter Bareham
Baker, $50.; to Lloyd George Baker, $50.”

“To Albert Lambell, 60%.” Sixty per cent of what?
The testator does not say sixty per cent of the forty
per cent. The testator had already directed that that
forty per cent be divided and apportioned into shares
of $100 and $50, and, as so divided, given to the “fol-
lowing persons.” Albert Lambell is not given any of
the shares. The amounts written after the names of
the other legatees indicate that they are to receive
shares of $100 and $50. Albert Lambell not being
given any of the $100 and $50 shares into which the

whole of the forty per cent is to be divided, to what
can the words “To Albert Lambell, 60%” apply?

“Provided, that should there not be sufficient cash
and bonds to make the foregoing division in full, then
and in that event each shall take a proportionate re-
duction;” .

“Foregoing division,” it would seem, must refer to

the division of the remainder into shares of $100 and
$50. “Each,” in the clause “each shall take a propor-
tionate reduction,” must refer to each of the persons
who take the $100 and $50 shares into which the forty
per cent remainder is to be divided. As none of these
shares is bequeathed to the brother, Albert Lambell,
there is no provision that he shall share in any reduc-
tion.
*“. . . and provided further, that should there be
any remainder after the specific bequests have been
paid in full, then each of the said legatees shall take
thereof in pro rata parts in the same manner in which
they would have received the pro rata deficiency.”

We think that this part of paragraph three sustains
the contention that it was not the intention of the
testator that Albert should share in the forty per cent
remainder. It would seem impossible for him to share
in any “pro rata deficiency,” since, if appellant’s con-
struction be correct, he would receive a straight 60%.
The remainder of the forty per cent is to be given to the
legatees who would have shared in a pro rata deficiency,
had there been a deficiency. Albert Lambell is not
such a legatee.

Hit is said in appellant’s brief:

“Albert Lambell is testator’s nearest blood relation
named in the will and by the evident intent, made the
‘object of his bounty,’ and as such should be favored
in the construction of this will.”

a

But it would seem that the construction made by
the lower court still leaves Albert Lambell the ob-
ject of the testator’s bounty; for, under that construc-
tion, Albert Lambell receives $6,105.61, while the
testator’s nephews and nieces each receive $381.68,
and his cousins, each $165.84. In any event, if there
be any force in the appellant’s contention in this re-
gard, it is at least offset by the rule that, where con-
struction is necessary, the law favors that construction
which conforms most nearly to the general laws of
inheritance. In re Shumway’s Estate, 194 Mich. 245,
160 N. W. 595; Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, 210 Ind.
509, 1.N. E. (2d) 585, 4.N. BE. (2d) 202, 108 A. L. R. 530;
Ellsworth College v. Carleton, 178 Iowa 845, 160 N. W.
222; 28 R. C. L., Wills, 229, § 190.

The deceased left no issue, nor wife, nor father or
mother. Lillian Lambell, a niece, is, presumably, the
daughter of a deceased brother, and the three Etherton
nephews are, evidently, the sons of a deceased sister.
Under our general statutes of descent and distribution,
if the testator had died intestate, Lillian Lambell
would have been entitled to the same amount as Albert
Lambell, and the Ethertons would, by representation,
have been entitled, in the aggregate, to an equal
amount. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1341 [P. C. § 9847], subd.
3, and § 1364 [P. C. § 9861], subd. 3.

The order appealed from is affirmed. The respond-
ents will recover costs against Albert Lambell.

Buaxr, C. J., Jerrers, Stermvert, and Mary, JJ.,
concur.

227

[No. 27503. Department Two. August 17, 1939.]

Tue State or WasHIncron, Respondent, v. FRanK
Bairp, Appellant.*

"Reported in 93 P. (2d) 409.

Robertson & Smith, for appellant.

John D. Evans, Ralph Wilkinson, and C. C. Quacken-
bush, for respondent.

Brake, C. J—Mark P. Miller Milling Company owns
a warehouse at Seabury Siding in Whitman county. On
May 19th or 20th it was discovered that the warehouse
had been broken into and 136 sacks of Federation
wheat had been stolen. None of the company’s agents
or employees had been at the warehouse for a period
of eight or ten days.

On May 26th, defendant was taken into custody and
subsequently charged by information with the crime
of burglary in the second degree, as for breaking into
the warehouse with the intent to commit larceny. By
another information, he was charged with the crime
of grand larceny, as for stealing and carrying away
the 136 sacks of Federation wheat. The two causes
were consolidated for trial before the same jury, which
acquitted defendant of the burglary charge and con-
victed him upon the charge of grand larceny. De-
fendant interposed motions for new trial and in arrest
of judgment, which were denied. From judgment and
sentence entered upon the verdict in the grand larceny
case, he appeals.

The evidence upon which the state endeavors to

sustain the verdict is wholly circumstantial. In order
to apprehend the full force and effect of the state’s
evidence, it is necessary to keep in mind the relative
location of five places: (1) Seabury Siding; (2) the
town of Fairfield; (3) the town of Spangle; (4) what
is known as the Duncan grade; and (5) the defendant’s
residence. Seabury Siding is located in the north-
eastern part of Whitman county, about five miles from
the Spokane county line. Fairfield is located in the
southeastern part of Spokane county, about eight miles
from the Whitman county line. Spangle is located in
south central Spokane county, about twelve miles from
the Whitman county line. In relation to Seabury
Siding, Spangle is situated some twenty-one or twenty-
two miles to the northwest. Duncan grade is about
five miles northeast of Spangle. The appellant lives
three or four miles to the northwest of Spangle.

In the morning of May 18th, the appellant and one
Metcalf drove into the barnyard of Howard Lindstrom,
who lives three miles east of Fairfield. Standing in an
open shed was a one and a half ton truck belonging to
Lindstrom. It was a dual tread vehicle, equipped with
four diamond tread Goodyear tires on the rear wheels.
The tires on the right duals were more worn than those
on the left. The truck had no muffler. Upon the truck
were eight sacks of peas.

In the course of conversation with appellant, Lind-
strom disclosed that his wife had been ill and that she
was not at home. About noon, Lindstrom called on a
neighbor, Herman Hanson, where he met the appellant
and Metcalf again. During the course of conversation
there, Lindstrom disclosed that he was going to attend
a lodge meeting at Spokane that night.

Lindstrom left home about eight o’clock that even-
ing. At about 8:45, a neighbor of Lindstrom’s saw the
latter’s truck being driven away.

During the early morning hours of May 19th, a
truck, apparently without a muffler, heavily loaded,
was traced on a devious course between Seabury Siding
and Spangle. The evidence to this effect was adduced
by witnesses who lived at intervals of four to six miles
along the way. None of them saw the truck. All of
them were awakened by its noise and testified that it
was going in a northerly or westerly direction. After
daybreak, two witnesses living within a mile of the
Duncan grade were awakened by a truck, apparently
without a muffler, coming from the south at a high
rate of speed. One testified that a smaller car followed
the truck. The other testified that, about three-quarters
of an hour later, he saw a car coming from the north
(the Duncan grade) and going very fast toward
Spangle.

During the day of May 19th, Lindstrom’s truck was
found near the foot of the Duncan grade. On the
Duncan grade there were imprints of diamond tread
dual tires. On the dirt ramp at the north end of the
warehouse at Seabury Siding were found the imprints
of dual diamond tread tires of such a character as to
indicate that the tires on the right were more worn
than those on the left. After an examination of the
tires on Lindstrom’s truck and of imprints made by
them, a deputy sheriff testified that the imprints dis-
covered at the warehouse were made by the tires of
the Lindstrom truck.

On May 26th, forty-nine sacks of Federation wheat
were found in the granary on Baird’s place. Baird at
that time insisted that it was Albit wheat. There was
also found in the granary a sack with the initials
“H. L.” At the trial, Lindstrom positively identified
this sack as one of the eight containing peas which
were on the truck at the time it was stolen. A sack
containing Federation wheat marked “Nat Harris”

was also found in Baird’s granary. Nat Harris was
intermittently employed to sweep out the warehouse
at Seabury Siding and was permitted to take the
sweepings. He had taken sacks to the warehouse and
left some there. It appears that it is sometimes neces-
sary to resack grain at the warehouse. In such in-
stances, any empty sacks which may be found in the
warehouse are used.

Hi Appellant at appropriate times challenged the
sufficiency of this evidence to sustain a verdict of
guilty. We are of the opinion that the facts we have
narrated were sufficient to justify the jury in conclud-
ing: That appellant stole Lindstrom’s truck on the
evening of May 18th; that he drove to the warehouse
at Seabury Siding and stole the 136 sacks of Federation
wheat which were discovered to be missing on May
19th or 20th; that he drove the loaded truck to his home
northwest of Spangle, unloaded, and then drove the
empty truck down the Duncan grade, where he aban-
doned it.

But, says appellant, the evidence with respect
to the Lindstrom truck was all inadmissible, because
it tended to prove a separate and distinct crime with
which he was in fact charged in the superior court of
Spokane county. His position is that, without the evi-
dence relating to the theft of the Lindstrom truck, the
case made by the state is insufficient to sustain a verdict
of conviction for larceny of the wheat.

Conceding this position is sound, we are of the view
that all the evidence relating to the larceny of the
Lindstrom truck was admissible. While it is the gen-
eral rule that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible
in a prosecution of a criminal offense, there are several
well recognized exceptions to it. One is that, when
the crime charged and another crime are so inter-
related as to make evidence relating to the other rele-

vant and material on the trial of the crime charged, the
evidence is not to be excluded because it tends to prove
a separate offense. State v. Gottfreedson, 24 Wash.
398, 64 Pac. 523; State v. Dana, 59 Wash. 30, 109 Pac.
191; State v. Leroy, 61 Wash. 405, 112 Pac. 635; State
v. Conroy, 82 Wash. 417, 144 Pac. 538; State v. Kelly,
187 Wash. 301, 60 P. (2d) 50. In the third case cited
the court said:

“The case was tried on circumstantial evidence, and
the purpose of this testimony was to fix the where-
abouts of the appellant about the time the Plemmons
house was entered. In short, its purpose was to show
that the appellant was in the vicinity and had the op-
portunity to commit the crime charged. The matter
of the burglary, the key, the knives and the wedge,
tended to identify and locate him. If the appellant left
a trail of crime behind him, the misfortune is his, and
that fact cannot defeat the right of the state to connect
him with the crime charged by proofs of all relevant
circumstances. . . . Testimony otherwise relevant
does not become incompetent because it may tend
incidentally to show that the accused has committed
another crime.”

Also, evidence is competent to show a defendant’s
connection with an instrumentality used in the com-
mission of the offense charged, even though it also
tends to prove that the instrumentality was stolen by
defendant at some other time and place. 1 Wharton’s
Criminal Evidence (11th ed.), 490, § 345; State v.
O’Donnell, 195 Wash. 471, 81 P. (2d) 509.

HI Appellant assigns as error the admission of
certain evidence. As we have seen, the court per-
mitted a deputy sheriff to testify that the tire imprints
on the ramp of the warehouse were, in his opinion,
made by the tires of the Lindstrom truck. That evi-
dence of the character here challenged is competent
and material is generally recognized. 5 Am. Jur. 859;
22 C. J. 597, 598; State v. Burke, 124 Wash. 632, 215

Pac. 31; State v. Simmons, 172 Wash. 438, 20 P. (2d)
844.

Hi In giving his testimony, the deputy sheriff re-
ferred to a photograph which he had taken of the tire
imprints on the ramp of the warehouse. Appellant
makes some point of the fact that this photograph did
not go to the jury. But appellant cannot complain,
because it was upon his objection that it was not ad-
mitted in evidence.

Hi Appellant assigns error upon the admission in
evidence of certain empty sacks, sacks of wheat, sacks
of pea meal, and a sample of wheat taken from his
granary by the officers. We gather that the ground of
objection is that they were not sufficiently identified
as coming from the warehouse at Seabury Siding, or
as belonging to Lindstrom, to justify their admission
in evidence. They were not positively identified and
consequently carried little probative value. But we
think they were admissible in view of the testimony
of the witnesses who testified concerning them. The
same may be said of wheat samples from the lots of
grain in the warehouse from which the 136 sacks were
stolen.

Hi The appellant further contends that there is
such an inconsistency between the verdict of acquittal
on the burglary charge and the verdict of conviction
on the grand larceny charge that the latter cannot
stand. We do not think this contention is sound in
fact or law. Under the evidence, the larceny of the
wheat does not necessarily presuppose a breaking into
the warehouse by appellant. No agent or employee of
the owner had been at the warehouse for eight or ten
days prior to May 19th. The jury might, under the
circumstances, have considered that the breaking was
done by someone other than appellant; that he had
made an unobstructed entry. In law, there is no in-

consistency in verdicts of acquittal and conviction upon
charges of crimes composed of different elements, but
arising out of the same state of facts. McDaniel v.
Commonwealth, 165 Va. 709, 181 S. E. 534; People v.
Haupt, 247 N. Y. 369, 160 N. E. 643; State v. Brundige,
114 Kan. 849, 220 Pac. 1039; United States v. Capone,
93 F. (2d) 840; Freeman v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 13;
People v. Cordish, 110 Cal. App. 486, 294 Pac. 456.

Under the foregoing authorities, there was, in law,
no inconsistency in the verdicts.

Judgment affirmed.

Bears, Mar, Suvpson, and Jzrrers, JJ., concur.

[No. 27271. Department One. August 17, 1939.]

Mrs. Witt1am Cook, as Administratrix, Respondent,
v. Joun W. Rarrerty et al., Appellants.

Drxon Murpnry, Respondent, v. Joun W. RarrEerRTy
et al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 376.

235

Newman H. Clark and Leo J. Brand, for appellants.

McMicken, Rupp & Schweppe, Bernard Reiter, and
Frank M. Preston, for respondents.

Rosrson, J.—The collision out of which these actions
arose occurred on the Pacific highway between Tacoma
and Olympia, about a mile and a half south of the
entrance to Fort Lewis. Dixon Murphy, plaintiff in
one of the suits, was driving his father’s car south
toward Olympia. Mrs. Wilma Whitner, one of the de-
fendants, was driving her father’s car north toward
Seattle. There are two parallel strips of pavement,
each eighteen feet wide, with a four foot gravel or
dirt strip between them. The pavement was covered

with a thin coating of ice, and the Whitner car skidded
from the east strip of pavement across the dirt or
gravel strip to the west side of the west strip of pave-
ment in front of the oncoming Murphy car, turning
completely around two and a half times before the
collision occurred. Miss Cora Cook, a passenger in the
car that was being driven by Dixon Murphy, received
injuries from which she died two months later. The
gasoline tank of the Whitner car was punctured and
the car was enveloped in flames, but its occupants
were not seriously injured.

Mrs. Cook, administratrix of the estate of Cora Cook,
deceased, brought suit against Mrs. Whitner and her
parents, the Raffertys, who owned the car which she
was driving, to recover damages for Miss Cook’s alleged
wrongful death. Dixon Murphy also brought suit
against the same defendants to recover damages for
personal injuries received by him and damages to his
father’s car. Mrs. Whitner counterclaimed against
Murphy, and the Raffertys also counterclaimed against
him for damages to their car. The two suits were tried
together before the court, sitting without a jury. The
court entered findings, conclusions, and judgment for
the plaintiffs in each suit, and dismissed the counter-
claims against Murphy. The causes were consolidated
on appeal.

Appellants contend that the skidding of the Whitner’
car was not due to any negligence on the part of Mrs.
Whitner; and that the driver of the Murphy car was
negligent in the operation of the car, and that his neg-
ligence was the sole, proximate cause of the collision.

HI While it is true that the mere skidding of a car
is not necessarily evidence of negligence (Wilson v.
Congdon, 179 Wash. 400, 37 P. (2d) 892), it is a cir-
cumstance which may be taken into consideration in
connection with all of the facts and circumstances of

the case in determining whether or not the driver of
the car was guilty of negligence.

While Mrs. Whitner and Mrs. Doris Bates, who was
a passenger with her in the car, testified that Mrs.
Whitner was driving at only twenty-five miles an hour,
the court was not bound to accept their testimony. The
fact that the car turned completely around two and a
half times on a straight highway that was practically
level, the grade being but 0.122 per cent, a drop of a
little more than one foot in a thousand feet, and crossed
a four foot dirt or gravel strip and passed over to the
extreme west side of the west eighteen foot pavement,
indicates that the driver of the car was at fault, and we
think that, under all the facts and circumstances, the
court was justified in so finding. It had been snowing,
but was not snowing at the time of the accident. There
was snow on either side of the highway and on the dirt
strip between the two pavements. Mrs. Whitner
testified that she was not aware of the ice on the pave-
ment until the car began to skid, but other witnesses,
called by the defendants themselves, testified that there
was ice on the highway for some distance south of that
point. :

Although mere skidding is not necessarily evidence
of negligence, where a car traveling on a. highway such
as this skids from one of the strips of pavement across
a four foot dirt or gravel strip onto the other strip of
pavement, the burden is on the driver of that car to
show that he was not negligent. Weaver v. Windust,
195 Wash. 240, 80 P. (2d) 766. That burden has not
been met in this case. The trial judge, in orally giving
his opinion, said:

“I am satisfied that the icy condition of the pavement
existed for a sufficient space and for a sufficient distance
to put anyone on warning that they were driving on a
dangerous surface. The Bowers testified that they
noticed it the moment they came down into that part

of the road, where it is divided. Mrs. Whitner testified
that she didn’t notice it, but Mrs. Bates admitted that
she did; so there was a quarter to a half a mile, I am
satisfied, of icy pavement, which should have put Mrs.
Whitner upon warning that the surface was such that
she must proceed with extreme care.

“Now, she proceeds apparently with what she con-
sidered due care, but at a rate which caused the car
not merely to skid, but to go into a double if not a
triple circular skid, where it executed I gather two
and_a half complete circles, and ended up clear over
on the west strip after having crossed this dirt or gravel
strip between the two strips of paving.

“Tt seems to me that, while a skidding case cannot
be considered a case of res ipsa loquitur, it seems to
me that in connection with the warning of the icy sur-
face, that fact that the car did go into an icy skid, of
that duration and of that many revolutions, is sufficient
evidence to outweigh the effect of the testimony of the
defense witnesses.”

We think that these views of the trial court are sup-
ported by the evidence.

Hs The driver of the Murphy car testified that he
was driving at between thirty and thirty-five miles an
hour; that he saw the Whitner car when it commenced
to spin; and that it was approximately two hundred
feet from him at that time. He further testified that
he immediately applied his brakes, and that the Whitner
car covered more of the two hundred feet than he did.
We do not think that the evidence shows that the driver
of the Murphy car was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence or negligence that proximately caused the ac-
cident.

Hi Appellants contend that the parents of Mrs.
Whitner are not liable. The evidence shows that Mrs.
Whitner was an adult daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Raf-
ferty; that her husband died in 1933; and that, since
then, she has resided with her parents as a member of

their household. She paid for her room and board,
but the evidence shows that she was treated as a mem-
ber of the family, and that her parents permitted her
to use the car freely and on many occasions. Under
these circumstances, we think that the parents were
liable under the “family purpose doctrine,” which has
been the settled law of this state since the decision in
Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020, 50
L.R. A. (N.S.) 59, in 1913. The reasons why the court
has so steadily adhered to the doctrine have recently
peen restated in Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85
P. (2d) 1041.

HB Appellants also contend that the parents of Miss
Cook were not dependent upon her for support; and
that, therefore, there can be no recovery by them. The
evidence shows that Miss Cook was a daughter of a
deceased sister of Mrs. Cook. She was adopted by
the Cooks when she was ten years of age, shortly
after the death of her mother, and was twenty-one
years of age at the time of the accident. She had at-
tended the College of Puget Sound and the University
of Washington, and, after leaving the University, had
attended a business college. Mr. and Mrs. Cook and
a sister of Mrs. Cook who resided in the East paid the
expenses of her tuition. At the time of the accident,
she was earning between seventy-five and ninety dol-
Jars a month as a stenographer. She lived with her
parents, and, although she did not pay any regular
amount for room and board, she contributed to the
expenses of the household.

Mr. Cook was an invalid, and had been unable to
work for ten or twelve years. Mrs. Cook was unem-
ployed. A sister of Mrs. Cook, who resided in the East,
for several years had been sending her money, ap-
proximately seventy dollars a month, for her support.
It appears that these payments were entirely voluntary,

and that they were reduced somewhat after Miss Cook
obtained permanent employment.

Under the facts, we think it is reasonable to suppose
that, had Miss Cook lived, she would have continued
to contribute to the support of the family and con-
tinued to care for her parents, and to conclude that
Mr. and Mrs. Cook suffered a pecuniary loss by reason
of her death. It is established in this state that parents
of an adult son need not be wholly dependent upon
him for support in order to recover damages for his
wrongful death. Partial dependency is sufficient.
Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 48 P. (2d) 949. The
rule as to an adult daughter must be the same.

Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 183, 183-1, and 194 [P. C. §§ 8259,
8260, 8275], being remedial in their nature, are liber-
ally construed. We think that there was a showing of
need, on the one hand, and a financial recognition of
it, on the other, within the spirit and meaning of such
decisions as Bortle v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 Wash.
552, 111 Pac. 788, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 731, and Grant v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 Pac. 842,
and that the rather modest allowance of one thousand
dollars should be sustained.

The judgments appealed from are affirmed.

Buaxe, C. J., Srumvert, Jerrers, and Main, JJ.,
concur.

241

[No. 27300. Department Two. August 18, 1939.]

Wit1am Caianan, Respondent and Cross-appellant,
v. DeWirr Jonss et al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 326.

D. Elwood Caples, for appellants.

Wilkinson & Langsdorf, for respondent and cross-
appellant.

Brats, J.—The defendants in this action, DeWitt
Jones and Eugene G. Cushing, at all times herein men-
tioned were attorneys at law and copartners, engaged
in the general practice under the firm name of Cushing
& Jones, in the city of Vancouver, Washington. Since
January 1, 1935, Mr. Cushing has been the regularly
elected, qualified, and acting prosecuting attorney for
Clark county, and Mr. Jones has been his regularly
appointed deputy.

The plaintiff herein, William Callahan, for some time
prior to May 1936, lived in a trailer, which was stand-
ing on property owned by a railroad company, in the
city of Vancouver. In the late spring of 1936, he went
to eastern Washington on a visit, returning to Van-
couver early in the following September. On his re-
turn, Mr. Callahan discovered that one George O. Baird
had moved the trailer to another location in the city
of Vancouver, whereupon Messrs. Callahan and Baird
called at the office of defendants, where they discussed
with Mr. Jones the matter of the removal of the trailer
and the personal property therein located, some of
which was missing. A few days later, Mr. Callahan
again called at defendants’ office, stating to Mr. Jones
that he had left in the trailer, secreted under a mattress,
stock certificates which he owned, representing one
hundred forty-seven shares of the capital stock of
Stone & Webster, Inc., of New York City, and that he
had discovered that the stock certificates had been
stolen. The defendants then made an investigation of

the matter, with the result that George O. Baird was
apprehended in the city of San Francisco and returned
in custody to Clark county, where he was charged
with the crime of grand larceny, based upon the theft
of Mr. Callahan’s stock. Baird pleaded guilty, and
December 15, 1936, was sentenced to the penitentiary.

At the time Mr. Callahan called defendants’ atten-
tion to the theft of his stock, some conversation was
had relative to the recovery thereof, Mr. Callahan re-
questing defendants to notify Stone & Webster, Inc., of
the fact that the stock had been lost or stolen, for the
purpose of preventing transfer of ownership on the
corporate records. Mr. Callahan then paid defendants
five dollars as a retainer for legal services to be ren-
dered, and the corporation was advised, by letter dated
September 12, 1936, written by Mr. Jones, and signed
by him as “Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Clark
County, Washington,” of the fact that the stock was
missing.

Defendants, in the course of their investigation, dis-
covered that Baird had forged Callahan’s signature to
a purported assignment on the stolen certificates and
disposed of them through a Vancouver bank. After the
termination of Baird’s prosecution, and as the result
of negotiations between defendants and the bank, de-
fendants, acting on behalf of Callahan, persuaded the
bank which had received the certificates from Baird
to make good Callahan’s loss by turning over to de-
fendants an equal number of shares of Stone & Webster
stock, which the bank had purchased November 24th,
and which was then of the market value of $4,850. A
controversy then arose between Callahan and defend-
ants, the latter claiming the right to charge Callahan
a fee in a sum equaling twenty-five per cent of the
value of the property recovered for Callahan. De-
fendants made this claim under an oral contract with

Callahan, which contract the trial court found defend-
ants made with Callahan at the time they were re-
tained by Callahan to recover the shares of stock.
Callahan refused to pay defendants any fee whatso-
ever, denying the existence of any contract and con-
tending that, under Laws of 1887-8, chapter 103, p.
189, §1 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4138) [P. C. § 1792], infra,
defendants were by law prohibited from making any
charge against plaintiff.

Defendants held the stock certificates under a claim
of attorney’s lien, and during the month of April, 1937,
plaintiff instituted this action in replevin, seeking to
obtain possession of the stock and damages for its de-
tention. Defendants answered the complaint and cross-
complained, claiming their attorney’s lien, and asking
to have the same reduced to judgment.

The action came on regularly for trial before the
court, sitting without a jury, with the result that the
court found that an oral contract had been made be-
tween plaintiff and defendants to the effect that de-
fendants should represent plaintiff as his attorneys in
an attempt to recover the stolen stock certificates, or
their value, and that defendants should receive for
their services an amount equal to twenty-five per cent
of the value of any recovery which they might make.
The court further found that defendants had rendered
services to plaintiff, as claimed by defendants, but
concluded that, under the statute above referred to,
and as a matter of public policy, defendants were not
entitled to recover on their contract, and that plaintiff
was entitled to recover possession of his stock, free and
clear from any claim on the part of defendants. From
a judgment entered in accordance with the findings of
fact and conclusions of law, defendants have appealed.
Plaintiff has cross-appealed from the judgment because
of the refusal of the trial court to award him damages

on account of the decrease in value of the stock while in
defendants’ possession.

Error is assigned upon the entry of the judgment in
respondent’s favor, appellants contending that the
judgment does not conform with the evidence and the
facts found, and is contrary to law. Cross-appellant
contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him
damages, as above stated.

Laws of 1887-8, chapter 103, p. 189, §1 (Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 4138), above referred to, reads as follows:

“No prosecuting attorney shall receive any fee or
reward from any person on behalf of any prosecution
for any of his official services, except as provided in
this act, nor shall he be engaged as attorney or counsel
for a party in any civil action, [or for] a party to any
criminal proceedings depending upon the same facts as
such criminal proceedings.” .

The word “act” in the third line of the section should
undoubtedly read chapter, as printed in Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 4138. :

The same statute appears in Rem. & Bal. Ann. Codes
& Statutes of Washington as § 3969, accompanied by
the following note: “The word ‘criminal’ in the last
line should read ‘civil’,” and the word civil is included
in brackets following the word criminal. This reading
of the section has been continued in subsequent codes.
Whether the notation last referred to is correct, is un-
important, in so far as this action is concerned. :

Findings Nos. 7 and 8 made by the trial court read
as follows:

“VII. That plaintiff, at the time of retaining de-
fendants’ services, agreed to pay and defendants agreed
to accept for services to be performed by them, a sum
equivalent to 25% of the amount, if any, recovered for
plaintiff, and that such sum based on the value of the
stock recovered for plaintiff at the time of such re-
covery was and is the sum of $1212.75, and that neither

said amount, or any portion thereof, has been paid to
defendants, and that defendants claim an attorneys’
lien upon said stock certificates for the payment
thereof.

“VII. That the contract of employment entered
into between plaintiff and defendants, as recited in the
preceding paragraph, was and is in contravention of
public policy and in violation of the provisions of
§ 4138 of Remington’s Revised Statutes of the State
of Washington, and, therefore, void and of no force
and effect.”

It appears that, December 4, 1936, respondent exe-
cuted a power of attorney to appellants, authorizing
them to represent him in all legal proceedings inci-
dental to the recovery of respondent’s stock. The
power of attorney was signed several days before the
criminal prosecution, which appellant Cushing had
instituted by information against Baird, was termi-
nated by the latter’s plea of guilty and the imposition
of sentence. It clearly appears from the testimony of
appellant Jones that the contract which appellants
entered into with respondent was made prior to the
institution of the criminal proceeding against Baird.

HM Acticle 11, §5, of the constitution of this state,
reads as follows:

“The legislature, by general and uniform laws, shall
provide for the election in the several counties of
boards of county commissioners, sheriffs, county clerks,
treasurers, prosecuting attorneys, and other county,
township, or precinct and district officers, as public
convenience may require, and shall prescribe their
duties and fix their term of office. It shall regulate
the compensation of all such officers, in proportion to
their duties, and for that purpose may classify the
counties by population. And it shall provide for the
strict accountability of such officers for all fees which
may be collected by them, and for all public moneys
which may be paid to them, or officially come into their
possession,”

The legislature has prescribed the duties of prose-
cuting attorneys (Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 4130, 4131, 4132,
4133, 4136, 4137 and 4138 [P. C. §§ 1788, 1789, 1790, 1791,
1795, 2155, 1792]), and by Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 4200-5a, Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 4201 and 4203, it has fixed
their compensation. By § 4138, supra, the legislature
has limited the activities of prosecuting attorneys in
connection with the general practice of law. This
provision of the statute was first enacted in 1858, p.
13, § 8, of the laws of that year reading as follows:

“The prosecuting attorney shall receive no fee or
reward from or on behalf of any prosecution for any
of his official services, nor shall he be engaged as
counsel for either party in any civil action depending
upon the same facts as a criminal prosecution.”

The statute was reenacted by Laws of 1877, p. 248,
§ 13; Code of 1881, § 2164; Laws of 1883, p. 74, § 17;
Laws of 1886, p. 62, § 12; and in its present form, Laws
of 1887-8, p. 189, § 1.

The right of the legislature to regulate the activities
of a public officer outside of his official duties was up-
held by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, In re
Shelley, 332 Penn. 358, 2 Atl. (2d) 809, and we find
no reason for questioning the validity of § 4138, supra.

HI The legislature has chosen to restrict the field
of activities of lawyers who accept office as prosecut-
ing attorneys. Whether or not practice by prosecuting
attorneys has been unduly restricted, is a legislative,
not a judicial, question. In the case at bar, appellants
were diligent and conscientious in all that they did,
both in prosecuting Baird and in recovering for re-
spondent his property. It does not appear that they
violated any principle of ethics, but the trial court
held that a declared legislative public policy, as em-
bodied in the statute above referred to, prohibited ap-
pellants from representing respondent as his attor-

neys in the particular matter which is the subject of
this action. We are convinced, as was the trial court,
that appellants at all times acted in entire good faith,
and that no prejudice to anyone resulted from what
they did. The trial court, at the close of the case,
orally announced that he ruled in favor of appellants,
but later, on reconsideration and after reargument,
decided in favor of respondent.

The general rule in regard to the participation by a
prosecuting attorney in civil practice has been well
stated as follows:

“He [the prosecuting attorney] is not prohibited, in
the absence of statute, from representing private liti-
gants where he owes no duty to the state.” 18 C. J.
1308, § 32.

“A contract made by a public officer is against public
policy and void, if it interferes with the unbiased dis-
charge of his duty to the public in the exercise of his
office, or if it places him in a position inconsistent with
his duty to the public, or even if it has a tendency to
induce him to violate such duty and the question of
the validity of such a contract does not depend on the
circumstances whether it can be shown that the public
has actually suffered any detriment or loss.” 22 R.C. L.
460, § 121.

In 2 Thornton, Attorneys at Law, 1113-4, § 705, we
find the following:

“The duties of a prosecuting attorney are usually
prescribed by statute, and may be increased or dimin-
ished as the legislature may see fit, and in some in-
stances certain duties are imposed by the constitu-
tion; but the prosecutor cannot be compelled to per-
form acts other than those so provided for. The prose-
cutor represents the people, and his right to do so, as
expressed in the constitution or statute, cannot be re-
stricted or superseded excepting in the manner pro-
vided for by law. He is vested with a personal dis-’
cretion as a minister of justice, and it is his duty to
act impartially. He must guard the interests of public

a .

justice in behalf of all concerned, and he must not
become entangled with private grievances which will
prevent him from properly performing his official
duties. A prosecuting officer is invested with a broad
discretion, subject to a certain judicial control, and
he will not be excused for the nonperformance of his
official duties because of local sentiment or popular
clamor.”

A legal officer of the state, representing the state
or a county, is a law enforcing officer, interested only
in seeing that justice is done, the laws enforced, and
persons guilty of violation of law punished. The prin-
ciple embodied in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4138, has received
the particular attention of different legislatures of the
territory and state of Washington, and is an important
portion of our law governing public officers.

It is easy to understand the evils guarded against
by this statute. While, in the case at bar, it clearly
appears that appellants discharged their official duties
with unbiased minds, it might happen that a holding
that the contract here in question is valid and enfor-
cible might at some future time precipitate difficul-
ties and open the door to the evils which the statute
was designed to prevent. If prosecuting attorneys may
enter into such contracts as this, the intent of the stat-
ute that such officers shall receive no fee or reward
on behalf of any prosecution can be evaded, the possi-
bilities of such evasions of the statute being obvious.

The legislative intent to entirely separate the official
duties of prosecuting attorneys from any private gain
clearly appears, and this legislative policy is so clearly
in the public interest that the statute should not be
restricted by judicial interpretation, but should be so
construed as to accomplish to the full its beneficent
purpose.

The principle was long ago laid down that no man
can serve two masters. It is not consistent with the

public interest that a prosecuting officer may receive
personal gain as the result either of the conviction or
acquittal of one charged with infraction of the law, or
in connection with the filing of any charge. Neither
should the power of the state be used to discover facts
or evidence which might result in private profit to
the official vested by law with authority to use such
power. The very appearance of evil in connection
with the administration of public office must be
avoided.

The following decisions follow the principle here in-

volved: In the case of Cheney v. Unroe, 166 Ind. 550,
77 N. E. 1041, 117 Am. St. 391, it appeared that the
plaintiff held a temporary appointment as superintend-
ent, to see that certain contractors who were construct-
ing a road faithfully performed their contract. The
plaintiff was to receive from the county a dollar and
a half a day, and, during the period of his employment,
also contracted to work for the contractors at the same
wage paid other workmen. The court held that the
contract with the contractors was illegal and void, and
that, quoting from Waymire v. Powell, 105 Ind. 328,
4. E. 886,
“Tt is of no consequence that no injury, or that an
actual benefit, has resulted from such employment.
The law will not permit public servants to place them-
selves in a situation where they may be tempted to
lo wrong, and this it accomplishes by holding all such
employment, whether made directly or indirectly,
utterly void.” .
In the case of People ex rel. Davis v. Thomas, 33
Barbour 287, the supreme court of New York, holding
that the power of appointment vested in three justices
could not be by them exercised by the appointment
of one of their own number, said:

“These three justices are the depositaries of a public
trust, and it is a principle of universal application, as

well as of public decency, that neither of them should
be permitted to discharge it for his own benefit or to
promote his private interest.”

In the case of Spence v. Harvey, 22 Cal, 337, 83 Am.
Dec. 69, the supreme court of California held that a
contract of lease, entered into by the plaintiff in ex-
pectation of receiving an appointment as postmaster,
was void as against public policy. The plaintiff re-
ceived the appointment as postmaster, and established
the postoffice on the premises which had been leased to
him, but thereafter he was evicted, as he contended,
by collusion and fraud on the part of his lessors. The
court observed that the office of postmaster is a public
one, and that in the discharge of his duties, the plain-
tiff was bound to consider the best interests of the
public, and that any contract in connection with his
official duties which inured to his private gain inter-
fered with the discharge of his duties as a public
officer,.and that such contract was void, regardless of
whether or not it could be shown that the public suf-
fered any detriment.

In the case of People ex rel. Hutchison v. Hickman,
294 Ill. 471, 128 N. E. 484, the supreme court of Illinois,
considering a statute of that state very similar to our
own, held that the prosecuting attorney was not en-
titled to receive a fee for services rendered to the
widow of a man who had been killed by one Mings,
in collecting for the widow damages from Mings. The
prosecuting attorney contended that his employment
in the civil action commenced after Mings’ conviction,
but the court held against him upon this point, and
concerning his right to accept the employment, said:

“It was evidently the purpose of the legislature in
enacting said provision to prevent any influence upon
the discharge of the duties of the State’s attorney by
reason of personal interest on his part, through em-
ployment of individuals interested in the prosecution

of a criminal charge, to prosecute a civil action de-
pending on the same facts upon which such prosecu-
tion may rest. . . .

“A State’s attorney who has been given to under-
stand that he will be employed to prosecute a civil case
after the conclusion of the criminal case may be in-
fluenced by improper motives of self-interest to secure
a conviction of a citizen charged with crime or to pre-
vent such conviction. Such a holding would likewise
open the door for criminal prosecutions in aid of civil
actions. We are of the opinion that it was the purpose
and intent of the legislature that a State’s attorney
should not at any time be interested or employed in a
civil case which it might reasonably be presumed
would grow out of and depend upon the facts upon
which the criminal prosecution depends.”

Appellants rely upon two Iowa cases, the first, Belli-
son v. Apland & Co., 115 Iowa 599, 89 N. W. 22. In
that case, the court construed an Iowa statute forbid-
ding county attorneys to accept employment

“ein any action or proceeding pending or
arising in his county, based upon substantially the
same facts upon which a prosecution or proceeding
has been commenced or prosecuted by him in the name
of the county or state.’”

The Iowa statute is even broader than that in force
in this state, as private practice is forbidden in con-
nection with facts even substantially the same as those
involved in a criminal proceeding. The prosecuting
attorney represented the plaintiff in an action for
damages alleged to have been occasioned by reason
of the failure of the plaintiff’s husband to provide for
her, it being alleged that this failure resulted from
the sales of liquor by the defendant to the plaintiff’s
husband. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was re-
versed on appeal, because of erroneous instructions
given by the trial court, but the court also considered
the question of whether or not the county attorney,

under the Iowa statute, was entitled to represent the
plaintiff. The court held that, under the evidence, it
appeared that the suit was not based upon even sub-
stantially the same facts upon which an indictment
had been returned by a grand jury. If the civil action
was not based upon even substantially the same facts
as the criminal prosecution, the law officer of the state
was certainly not prohibited by the statute from repre-
senting a party to the litigation.

The second Iowa case cited by appellant is that of
Snyder v. Tribune Co., 161 Iowa 671, 143 N. W. 519,
an action against a newspaper for libel, instituted by
a resident of another county. The county attorney of
the county of the plaintifi’s residence appeared as
counsel for the defendant. The court held that the
statute of Iowa above referred to did not apply, as it
forbade the participation of county attorneys in pri-
vate litigation only in the county in which he had been
elected to serve as county attorney.

The statute of this state above referred to is couched
in general terms, and embodies a sound principle of
law. The operation of the statute should not be limited
by judicial construction. The law embodies an im-
portant principle of public policy, and should be con-
strued so as to accomplish its purpose.

This court has held, in Delbridge v. Beach, 66 Wash.
416, 119 Pac. 856, that a contract for legal services,
which is against public policy, is void and unenforcible.
The case cited is nowise in point here upon the facts,
but has some bearing upon the situation presented by
the question of public policy.

The case of Beck v. Boucher, 114 Wash. 574, 195 Pac.
996, is relied upon by both parties herein. It appeared.
that an attorney solicited employment and procured
an agreement for contingent compensation for legal
services to be rendered. It was held that, while the

original contract was solicited by the attorney, con-
trary to the code of legal ethics of this state, and con-
trary to Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2370 [P. C. § 8763], a second
contract had been entered into between the parties,
under which the litigation had been prosecuted to a
successful conclusion. It was held that the attorney
was entitled to compensation. In the course of the
opinion, it was noted that, while an attorney may be
disciplined for soliciting business, the contract which
the parties entered into was not against public policy,
but entirely consistent therewith. While, in soliciting
the employment, the attorney was guilty of wrongful
conduct, the client, for a considerable period of time,
availed herself of his services and entered into a second
contract, by the terms of which the attorney agreed
to accept a lesser amount of compensation than that
fixed by the first contract. The attorney performed
valuable services under this second contract, and this
court rightly held that the client was estopped from
refusing to pay for valuable services which she had
accepted over a long period of time, having full knowl-
edge from all the circumstances.

HM Appellants contend that, assuming that their
contract was void as in violation of Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 4138, supra, nevertheless the trial court should have
allowed them a recovery on the basis of a quantum
meruit for the value of the professional services which
they rendered to respondent. In this connection, ap-
pellants cite the opinion of the supreme court of New
Mexico, in the case of Baca v. Padilla, 26 N. M. 223,
190 Pac. 730, 11 A. L. R. 1188, in which it was held
that a contract for legal services entered into between
an attorney and a private party, under the terms of
which the attorney, for a contingent fee, was to act
as private prosecutor in a criminal case, was void as
against the policy of the law, the court, however, hold-

ing, in an action by the attorney, that the contract was
neither malum in se nor malum prohibitum, and that
a recovery should be allowed on the basis of a quantum
meruit. It does not appear that any statute similar
to § 4138 was in force in New Mexico, and the attorney
who was allowed to recover was not holding a state
or county office.
In2R.C. L. 1046, § 128, is found the following:

“There is an obvious distinction bearing upon the
right of an attorney to recover upon a quantum meruit
for services rendered pursuant to an illegal contract,
between a case where the contract is illegal because
the services agreed to be rendered in performance
thereof are illegal, and a case where the contract is
illegal only because of some improper provision relating
to the mode of compensation, or an illegal stipulation
against the right of the client to compromise the claim
without the consent of the attorney. It is apparent, in
the first case, that every objection to permitting a re-
covery upon an express contract applies with equal
force to a recovery upon a quantum meruit. And this is
true even when the services are not intrinsically illegal,
but are improper and contrary to public policy because
of the circumstances under which they are rendered.”

In the case of Carter v. Bradley County Road Imp.
Dist., 155 Ark. 288, 246 S. W. 9, an action by a state
highway engineer, based upon services rendered in
connection with a contract for the construction of a
public road, the supreme court of Arkansas held there
could be no recovery upon a quantum meruit, as the
contract pursuant to which the services were rendered
was prohibited by law.

The supreme court of Georgia, in the case of Sapp
v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S. E. 62, 85 A. L. R. 1361,
held that

“An express agreement denounced by law cannot
be made legal and binding as an implied contract, by

merely praying for a recovery on quantum meruit of
a portion of the amount expressly agreed upon.”

Tn our opinion, these cases lay down the correct rule,
and we decline to follow some authorities in which the
contrary doctrine was approved.

Hi Respondent in the court below sought damages
on account of the decrease in value of the stock while
the same was held by appellants in their possession.
The trial court failed to grant respondent any recovery
upon this phase of the case, and respondent cross-
appealed from the judgment, in so far as it failed to
grant him any relief by way of damages.

Examination of the record convinces us that respond-
ent was entitled to no relief by way of damages, for
the reason that appellants urged him to sell the stock,
which respondent refused to do, choosing to hold the
same, believing that it would increase in value.

We are convinced that the contract relied upon by
appellants, and which the trial court correctly found
was entered into between the parties, was void as in
contravention of § 4138, and as against an eminently
sound and repeatedly expressed legislative policy, and
that the trial court properly held that the contract
could not be made the basis of any recovery on the
part of appellants against respondent, either on the
contract or by way of quantum meruit.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, both upon
appellants’ appeal and respondent’s cross-appeal. As
both parties appealed from the judgment, neither party
will recover costs in this court.

Brakes, C. J., Mmiarp, Jerrers, and Grracuty, JJ.,
concur.

257

[No. 27520. Department Two. August 18, 1939.]

Harry S. Bowen et al., Appellants, v. Harry ODLAND
et al., Respondents.’

Kellogg, Walters & Pedersen, for appellants.

Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, for
respondents.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 366.

Beats, J.—Plaintiffs, Harry S. and Bessie Bowen,
sued Henry and Alice Odland for damages on account
of injuries suffered by Mrs. Bowen as the result of a
collision between plaintiffs’ automobile, driven by Mrs.
Bowen, and defendants’ automobile, driven by Mrs.
Odland. In their complaint, plaintiffs demanded judg-
ment for fifty thousand dollars on account of Mrs.
Bowen’s injuries, and over $2,200 on account of dam-
ages to their automobile and other incidental items.
Defendants cross-complained for damages to their
automobile in the sum of $225.

The action was tried to a jury, which returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants, but without award-
ing them any damages. From a judgment entered upon
the verdict, plaintiffs have appealed, assigning error
upon the giving of certain instructions; upon the re-
fusal of the trial court to grant their motion for a new
trial; and upon the entry of judgment upon the verdict.

The accident occurred September 22, 1937, at the
intersection of Harvard avenue north and east Pros-
pect street, in the city of Seattle. Mrs. Bowen was
driving north on Harvard avenue north, and Mrs.
Odland was driving east on east Prospect street. The
Bowen car was on Mrs. Odland’s right.

As the result of the accident, Mrs. Bowen was very
seriously injured, and at the trial testified that she
had no recollection whatever of the accident. Mrs.
Odland testified that, about three o’clock in the after-
noon, the pavement being dry, she was driving uphill
on east Prospect street, approaching the intersection
with Harvard avenue north, the car being in inter-
mediate gear; that she approached the intersection at
a speed not exceeding fifteen miles per hour; that she
saw the Bowen car approaching, going very fast, and
she tried to stop, but was unable to avoid striking the
other car. She testified that, in her best judgment,

the other car was fifty to one hundred feet away when
she first saw it, but it is evident from her testimony
that her estimate of this distance was little more than
a guess.

No witness testified concerning the relative posi-
tion of the cars in or near the intersection prior to the
collision. Several witnesses heard the crash; one wit-
ness saw the Bowen car immediately thereafter as it
proceeded across the street and overturned; and sev-
eral witnesses testified as to what occurred immediately
after the accident. Several witnesses testified that,
after the accident, Mrs. Odland said that she did not
see the Bowen car prior to the impact. It appears that
the Bowen car was struck on the left side, back of the
center.

Appellants assign error upon two paragraphs of in-
struction No. 11, as given by the trial court. By in-
struction No. 10, the jury were told that it was the
duty of the operator of any vehicle, on approaching
street intersections, to look out for and give right of
way to vehicles on the right simultaneously approach-
ing a given point within the intersection, whether such
vehicle first entered the intersection or not. Appel-
lants argued to the trial court that this instruction
covered the situation completely and adequately.

Instruction No. 11, which embodies the principles
of law approved by this court in the case of Martin v.
Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533, was divided
into four numbered paragraphs. By the first, the jury
were told that all rights of way are relative, and that
the duty to avoid collisions at street intersections rests
upon both drivers. By the second paragraph, the jury
were told that the primary duty of avoiding such col-
lisions rests upon the driver on the left, which duty
he must perform with reasonable regard to the main-
tenance of a fair margin of safety at all times. The

third and fourth paragraphs of the instruction, of
which appellants complain, read as follows:

“(3) If two cars collide within the intersection, then
they were simultaneously approaching a given point
within the intersection, within the meaning of the stat-
ute, unless—

“(4) The driver on the left assumes and meets the
burden of producing evidence which will carry to the
jury the question of fact as to whether or not the
favored driver on the right so wrongfully, negligently,
or unlawfully operated his car as would deceive a rea-
sonably prudent driver on the left and warrant him
in going forward upon the assumption that he had the
right to proceed.”

Appellants argue that these portions of the instruc-
tion were not within the issues of the case, could
readily have confused the jury, and were highly prej-
udicial to appellants.

In the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, it
appeared that the disfavored driver, on approaching
the intersection, reduced his speed to three or four
miles an hour, and looked to his right down the inter-
secting street. He saw two automobiles approaching at
a considerable distance. Believing that he had ample
time to cross the street ahead of the cars which he
saw, and which enjoyed the right of way, he proceeded
to cross the street, but was struck by one of the ap-
proaching cars. There was evidence to the effect that
the car on the right was exceeding the speed limit,
and the jury might have found that it continued at
an excessive rate of speed up to the instant of the col-,
lision. This court held that instructions similar to in-
struction No. 11 given by the trial court in the case
at bar, embodied the principles of law applicable to

_ the evidence before the jury. In the case cited, the
jury might have found that the car which enjoyed the
right of way was as far from the intersection as 190

feet when the disfavored driver started to cross, and
that that car was moving at a speed far in excess of
the lawful rate, and that its speed was not diminished
prior to the collision.

In the case at bar, Mrs. Odland testified, in answer
to a question as to what happened:

“I just saw it [the Bowen car], and then in a flash
it was on me, it was coming very fast, and it was just
all over, and it went on across the street and hit the
post, or whatever it did hit, and continued on and
turned over.”

She testified that, when she first saw the Bowen car,
she tried to stop. Asked as to the speed of the Bowen
car, she answered: “I would have to guess. I know it
was going fast.” Immediately her counsel said to the
witness: “The question is, could you have any judg-
ment on it? Do you have a judgment as to what speed
it was traveling?” and she answered: “Around forty
miles, is that what you mean? I don’t think I under-
stood you, Mr. McKelvy.” Answering another question -
by her counsel as to where the Bowen car was when
she first saw it, she said: “To the best of my judg-
ment it was back about fifty to one hundred feet.”

The view across the southwest corner of the inter-
section was somewhat obstructed by brush, and the
Odland car, in approaching the intersection, was pro-
ceeding up a thirteen per cent grade, while Harvard
avenue was practically level. The situation was mani-
festly one which required the exercise of care on the
part of both drivers, and particularly upon the one
occupying the disfavored position.

In the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra, it clearly
appeared that the disfavored driver saw the car ap-
proaching from his right at a considerable distance,
and had an opportunity to, and did, estimate the sit-
uation and determine whether or not he could cross in

safety. It seems probable that he could have done so,
had the approaching car not been proceeding at an
excessive rate of speed. The fourth paragraph of in-
struction No. 11, above quoted, presupposes a state of
facts at least approximately similar to the situation
presented in the Hadenfeldt case. In the case at bar,
the only testimony concerning the situation just prior
to the accident was that given by Mrs. Odland, who
said that she just saw the Bowen car, “and then in a
flash it was on me.” She tried to stop her car, but
did not succeed in doing so in time to avoid the col-
lision.

Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-88 [P. C. § 2696-846]
(Laws of 1937, chapter 189, p. 899, § 88), reads as fol-
lows:

“Tt shall be the duty of every operator of any ve-
hicle on approaching public highway intersections to
look out for and give right of way to vehicles on their
right, simultaneously approaching a given point with-
in the intersection, and whether such vehicle first
enter and reach the intersection or not: Provided, This
section shall not apply to operators on arterial public
highways.”

This is the basic law governing vehicles at street
intersections, and it was recognized by this court in
the Hadenfeldt case. Paragraph 4 of instruction No.
11 recognizes a proper exception to or limitation on
the basic rule, but an instruction stating this exception
should only be given in cases where the facts warrant
it. The exception presupposes a situation in which the
disfavored driver has an opportunity to observe the
situation and is misled or deceived by the actions of
the favored driver. From Mrs. Odland’s evidence, it
is impossible to conclude that she was in any manner
deceived. As soon as she saw the Bowen car, she knew
that she could not safely attempt to cross in front of
it, as she testified that she attempted to stop.

The rule of the Hadenfeldt case should not be ex-
tended to any such situation as is presented in the case
at bar. The instruction referred to was outside of the
issues in the case, and was confusing, in that it intro-
duced a rule of law inapplicable to the facts, but which
the jury may well have attempted to apply to the
case before them.

In the case at bar, there is no evidence upon which
to base the theory that Mrs. Odland was in any man-
ner deceived by what she saw. At no time after she
saw the Bowen car was she warranted in going for-
ward upon the assumption that she had the right to
proceed. From Mrs. Odland’s testimony, it appears
that, when she first saw the Bowen car, her reaction
was to attempt to stop, and this she attempted to do.

In the case of Roed v. Washington Laundry Co., 160
Wash. 166, 294 Pac. 1023, this court held that, even
though the disfavored driver looked to the right be-
fore entering an intersection, the case fell within the
second principle referred to in the Hadenfeldt case,
and without the fourth, and that the trial court prop-
erly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff having been guilty of such negligence as pre-
cluded any recovery on his part.

In the case of Palmer Inv. Corp. v. Seattle, 161 Wash.
460, 297 Pac. 783, the court, speaking through Judge
Tolman, reversed a judgment entered upon the verdict
of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the court
had improperly instructed the jury and permitted the
jury to place upon the operator of the defendant’s car
the whole duty of avoiding the collision. The Haden-
feldt case was referred to and followed.

In Martin v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 162
Wash. 150, 297 Pac. 1098, this court affirmed a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that, under the
facts, paragraph 4 of the Hadenfeldt rule properly ap-

plied to the situation. It appeared that the disfavored
driver, on approaching the intersection, looked to his
right and saw a car approaching, but thinking that
he had a reasonable margin of safety, attempted to
cross ahead of the car. It was held that a question of
fact for the jury was presented.

In the case of Rhodes v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 54, 299
Pac. 976, this court reversed a judgment entered upon
the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, holding
that the driver of the disfavored car had violated two
rules of the road, and that, as matter of law, it should
be held that his negligence substantially contributed
to the accident. The driver of the car on the left testi-
fied that, on approaching the intersection, he looked
to his right and saw nothing, but after a glance to his
left, he continued across the street, and that, just as

‘ he was entering the intersection, he saw a car coming
from his right; that, when he saw this car, he applied
his brakes, and attempted to stop. Asked whether or
not he was struck before he stopped, he answered: “I
couldn’t say as to that, it was—all happened so quick.”
The court referred to the fourth of the Hadenfeldt
rules and held that the driver of the disfavored car
had not met the burden thereby placed upon him, and
that, as matter of law, it should so be held.

In the case of Vance v. McCleary, 168 Wash. 296, 11
P. (2d) 823, the judgment of the superior court in
favor of the defendants, entered notwithstanding the
verdict of the jury in plaintifi’s favor, was affirmed.
This court, citing the second paragraph of the Haden-
feldt rules, to the effect that the primary duty of avoid-
ing such accidents rests upon the driver on the left,
held that the plaintiff was not deceived by the defend-
ants’ course of driving.

In the case of Sather v. Blodgett, 169 Wash. 25, 13
P. (2d) 60, this court affirmed a judgment of the su-

perior court dismissing an action on defendant’s mo-
tion at the close of plaintifi’s case, which involved an
automobile collision. The plaintiff’s car was traveling
north, and the defendant south, on the same street.
Plaintiff attempted to make a left-hand turn into an
intersecting street. Each car was traveling upgrade,
the apex of the hill being at the street intersection
above referred to. The plaintiff testified that he en-
tered the intersection and turned at a lawful rate of
speed, after giving the proper signal for a left-hand
turn. Because of the hill, neither driver could see the
other car for any considerable distance back of the
intersecting street. Plaintiff turned to his left, placing
the other car on his right, and testified that he saw the
defendant’s car fifty or sixty feet back from the corner,
and that the next thing he knew, the defendant’s car
struck plaintiff’s car on the side. Plaintiff testified
that, if the defendant’s car had not been proceeding
at a rate of speed greater than twenty-five miles an
hour, and had entered the intersection at no more than
fifteen miles per hour, plaintiff would have had time
to clear the intersection before the collision. Plaintiff
introduced no evidence whatever concerning the speed
of the defendant’s car, nor that he knew at what speed
defendant’s car was traveling. This court called par-
ticular attention to the fact that it did not appear from
plaintiff's testimony that he was deceived by the opera-
tions of defendant’s car to any degree whatsoever. It
was held that, since’ neither car was on an arterial
highway, the case was governed by the rule in the
Hadenfeldt case, and that since the plaintiff

«

. produced no evidence to indicate that re-
spondent [defendant] ‘so wrongfully, negligently, or
unlawfully operated his car as would deceive a rea-
sonably prudent driver’ in his (appellant’s) position,
there was no question to go to the jury.”

The case is important here, as this court, in its opin-
ion, stressed the fact that the plaintiff was nowise de-
ceived by the acts of the defendant.

In the case of Hoenig v. Kohl, 182 Wash. 245, 46 P.
(2d) 728, we affirmed a judgment of the superior court
entered in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the
verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, in an action
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile colli-
sion. The superior court had ruled in defendant’s
favor, upon the ground that plaintiff’s negligence had
materially contributed to the accident. Plaintiff was
driving west, and defendant’s car was proceeding
south, both cars approaching the intersection where
the accident occurred. The defendant’s car had the
right of way; neither street was an arterial highway.
The plaintiff testified that, because of the injuries
which he received in the accident, his memory had
been affected, and he had no recollection of the acci-
dent, or of the events which immediately preceded it.
A guest who was riding with him testified concerning
the collision. From the testimony of this witness, it
appeared that plaintiff’s car approached the intersec-
tion at a lawful rate of speed; that plaintiff looked to
his right, and at that time the defendant’s car was not
more than half a block distant; that both cars con-
tinued through the intersection, and collided therein.
This court, holding that, under the evidence, it should
be held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent,
said: .

“Having in mind the rule laid down in Martin v.
Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533, and the cases
which follow it, there is here no room for reasonable
minds to differ. If the appellant looked, as it is said
he did, then he saw, or was charged with the duty of
seeing, the approaching car, and was bound in law
to know that its rights in the intersection were superior
to his own. Being the disfavored driver, it was incum-

bent upon him to yield the right of way unless the
situation was such as to clearly indicate that he could
cross with a fair margin of safety. In the light of the
quoted testimony, no reasonable mind can believe that
the appellant exercised that care which the law re-
_quired of him. The burden was upon the appellant
to produce evidence of facts which would justify him
in proceeding into the intersection. This, he did not
do, and upon the uncontradicted testimony, reasonable
minds must agree that the appellant was guilty of
contributory negligence in driving into the intersection
under the conditions shown.”

Two cases cited by respondents in connection with
this phase of the case at bar, are not in point.

We hold that that portion of instruction No. 11 stat-
ing the rule embodied in the fourth paragraph of the
principles laid down in the Hadenjeldt case, to which
appellants excepted, had no application to the facts
as shown by the testimony in the case at bar, and
should not have been given. Under the statute, the
primary duty of avoiding a collision rests upon the
driver on the left. The rule laid down by the fourth
paragraph of the instruction above quoted is an ex-
ception to the general rule and should be applied only
in special cases, when rendered appropriate by the
evidence. The principle embodied in this paragraph
applies in cases in which testimony has been intro-
duced to the effect that the disfavored driver had an
opportunity to observe and estimate the situation and
actually did so, and further was deceived by some con-
duct of the other driver which led the disfavored driver
to believe that he could proceed within a reasonable
margin of safety, and that he was therefore warranted
in going forward.

We have considered only the question of the pro-
priety of the instruction referred to in view of the
evidence. The record discloses a proper case for sub-
mission to a jury.

268

The views hereinabove expressed render it unneces-
sary to discuss appellants’ other assignments of error.

Because of error in instructing the jury, as above
stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, with
instructions to the trial court to grant a new trial.

Bragg, C. J., Mar, Sumpson, and Grracuty, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27538. Department One. August 18, 1939.]
A. F. Coox et al., Respondents, v. ALBERT COMMELLINI
et al., Respondents, ALBERT’S APARTMENTS,
Inc., Appellant.*

Joseph A. Albi and G. E. Lovell, for appellant.
Dillard & Powell, for respondents Cook et al.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 441.

Main, J.—The plaintiffs, A. F. Cook and Mary E.
Cook, his wife, brought this action to foreclose a labor
and materialmen’s lien upon property owned by the
defendant Ambassador Building Corporation. There
were other parties made defendant, including the Inde-
pendent Lumber & Fuel Company, a corporation, and
the receiver of the Ambassador Building Corporation.
Subsequently, the Albert’s Apartments, Inc., inter-
vened.

After his appointment, the receiver caused ten thou-
sand dollars in insurance to be placed upon the build-
ing on the property, which, as he thought, was for the
benefit of general creditors. Thereafter, and before
the case came to trial, the buildings which were cov-
ered by the insurance burned.

The Albert’s Apartments, Inc., amended its com-
plaint in intervention and asked that it be given an
equitable lien on the ten thousand dollars insurance.
It had a mortgage upon the property in the sum of
approximately ten thousand dollars. As the result of
the trial, the court decreed that the Albert’s Apart-
ments should have a first and prior lien by reason of
its mortgage; that the lien claimants should be second
in priority, and the second mortgage lien of the Inde-
pendent Lumber & Fuel Company should rank third.
From that part of the decree which denied the Albert’s
Apartments an equitable lien upon the insurance
money, it appealed. It did not appeal from any other
part of the decree, and there was no other party that
appealed.

Upon the appeal (Cook v. Commellini, 196 Wash.
125, 82 P. (2d) 143), that portion of the decree which
denied the Albert’s Apartments an equitable lien upon
the insurance money was reversed and the cause re- ~
manded. When the case came on again for hearing
in the superior court, that court construed the reversal

by this court as opening up and vacating the entire
decree entered at the conclusion of the first trial. Dur-
ing the time that the case was pending here upon
_appeal, the Albert’s Apartments, Inc., caused the
property to be sold upon that portion of the decree
which directed a foreclosure of its mortgage, and at
the sale it was purchased by that corporation. In the
decree entered as the result of the second hearing,
that sale was set aside and vacated, and the Albert’s
Apartments again appeal.

The question upon this appeal is whether the trial
court erred in construing the reversal upon the former
appeal as vacating the entire decree instead of only
that portion which had been appealed from. To state
it otherwise, the question is whether, when a decree
contains a number of independent provisions and the
losing party appeals from one of them and the decree
is reversed, it will open up the entire decree, includ-
ing those parts which were not appealed from.

HEME In Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1719 [P. C. § 7293], it is
provided that the appellant, in his notice of appeal,
shall designate with reasonable certainty from what
judgment or orders, whether one or more, the appeal
is taken, “. . . and if from part of any judgment
or order, from what particular part.”

In § 1720 [P. C. § 7294], it is stated that any party
who does not join in the appeal, as therein provided,
“, . . shall not derive any benefit from the appeal
unless from the necessity of the case.”

In the case of Stewart v. Larkin, 74 Wash. 681, 134
Pac. 186, L. R. A. 1916B, 1069, it was said that, under
the statute, “It is permissible to appeal from a part
of the judgment only.”

It is a well-established rule that, on appeal from only
a part of a judgment or decree, the court may not re-
view rulings which do not affect the part appealed

from, except where the part appealed from is so inter-
woven and connected with the remainder, or is so de-
pendent thereon, that an appeal from a part involves
a consideration of the whole, and is really an appeal
from the whole. 9 Bancroft’s Code Practice and Rem-
edies, § 7264.

In the case of Shreeder v. Davis, 43 Wash. 129, 86
Pac. 198, it was said:

“But while the question seems never to have been
discussed by this court, the uniform practice of the
court since its organization has been to treat judg-
ments against two or more persons for the purposes

of an appeal as a several judgment rather than as an
entirety.”

In the case now before us, as already indicated, the
different portions of the judgment were not interwoven
or dependent upon each other. Each was separate and
distinct. One had to do with the foreclosure of a mort-
gage which was established as a first lien; another had
to do with the foreclosure of a labor and materialmen’s
lien; and a third had to do with the rights of the second
mortgagee. In passing, it may be said that there are
some other portions of the decree which do not appear
to be at all material at this time.

In the case of Littell v. Miller, 8 Wash. 566, 36 Pac.
492, it was held that an appeal from a decree of fore-
closure of a mechanic’s lien which results in a reversal
of the decree on account of the invalidity of the lien
would not affect the personal judgment obtained
against the contractor in the foreclosure proceeding
when he had not joined in the appeal. It was there
said that:

“The statute under which the appeal was taken con-
tains an express provision to the effect that a party
not joining in an appeal shall derive no benefit there-
from except from the necessities of the case.”

There is no substantial distinction between that case
and the one now before us, and each rests upon the
same controlling principle.

Cases such as Benney v. Clein, 15 Wash. 581, 46 Pac.
1037, and Singly v. Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066,
63 Am. St. 896, which hold that, where a party to the
action purchases property sold on execution while an
appeal from the judgment is pending and the judgment
is subsequently reversed, it vacates and sets aside the
sale, have no application to the present case; the rea-
son being that, in this case, the portion of the decree
which directed the foreclosure of the Albert’s Apart-
ments, Inc., was never appealed from, and, conse-
quently, was never vacated or set aside by this court.

It is true that the opinion upon the former appeal
concluded with the statement: “The judgment is re-
versed.” That language must be construed in the light
of what was then before the court for determination.
In the body of the opinion, it was recognized, though
not expressly stated, that the appeal was only from
that portion of the decree which denied the equitable
lien upon the insurance money to Albert’s Apartments,
Inc. The fact is, the court had no jurisdiction upon
that appeal to make any order with reference to those
portions of the decree from which no appeal had been
taken. The portions of the decree not appealed from
became res judicata, and the mortgage, having been
foreclosed and the sale made in pursuance of that de-
cree, was legal and binding, and the court was without
power to set it aside.

Something has been said about the equitable con-
siderations in this case; but the parties who are claim-
ing that there are such considerations had a right to
protect themselves either by bidding at the sale or
by redeeming. Assuming that there are equitable
considerations, as claimed, these would not permit the

273

court to vacate any portion of the decree not appealed
from.

The decree which was entered upon the second hear-
ing and which is before us at this time is reversed,
and the cause remanded.

Bragg, C. J., Srervert, Roprvson, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

(No. 27584. Department Two. August 21, 1939.]

Joun H. Erurepce, Respondent, v. Diamonp Drini
Conrractine Company, Appellant.t

Dillard & Powell, for appellant.
Brown & Weller, for respondent.

Mirarp, J.—Plaintiff entered into a contract with
defendant, under which the latter was obligated to drill
a test well on plaintiff’s property, the drilling to pro-
ceed at the option of the plaintiff so long as financed
by him in accordance with the contract. On or about
five months after commencement of the work under
the contract, the parties entered into a supplemental

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 324.

agreement. Three months later, defendant advised the
plaintiff of suspension of drilling operations “under the
provision of our agreement.” Within less than a
month after receipt of that notice, plaintiff brought an
action against defendant for recovery of the amount
paid by plaintiff to the defendant under the original
contract. Trial to the court without a jury resulted
in findings of fact and judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the amount claimed by him in his complaint. The
defendant appealed.

Appellant contended that the trial court erred in
holding that the words “five consecutive days of drill-
ing,” contained in the second agreement between the
parties meant actual turning of the drill at the bottom
of the hole. Appellant insisted that the words quoted
meant no more than that appellant should diligently
prosecute drilling operations, and that it was justified
in its discontinuance of the work when appellant was
unable to make progress at the rate provided in the
contract.

We held (Ethredge v. Diamond Drill Contracting
Co., 196 Wash. 483, 83 P. (2d) 364) that the second
agreement was supplementary to the first agreement
and that the two must be read together as one con-
tract; that the trial court was in error in excluding, on
objection of appellant, parol evidence, offered by the
respondent, of the parties signing the contracts or their
agents to throw light upon the actual meaning of the
parties, as a contract containing the words “five con-
secutive days of drilling” was, in that respect, ambig-
uous, as it might mean either actual drilling or dili-
gent prosecution of drilling operations. We said:

“It is the opinion of the majority that the contract
is ambiguous, and that the trial court should have ad-
mitted the evidence offered by respondent as to what
was said by the interested parties at the time of the

signing of this agreement. If the language of the con-
tract is not plain, statements by the parties who signed
the same, or their agents, subject to the rules of evi-
dence, should be admitted to throw light upon the
actual meaning of the contract.

“The judgment appealed from is accordingly vacated,
and the cause remanded, with instructions to the trial
court to hear such competent, relevant, and material
evidence as may be offered by either party as to what
was said and done at the time the agreement of March
20th was executed by the parties. The superior court
will then again render judgment determining the
issues presented.”

That is to say, the judgment was reversed, and the
cause was remanded to the trial court with direction
to hear such competent, relevant, and material evi-
dence as might be offered by the respondent or appel-
lant as to what was said and done at the time the
second agreement was executed by respondent and
appellant.

Pending the additional hearing, the trial court on
appellant’s motion therefor granted to appellant per-
mission to amend its answer to the effect that the words
“days of drilling” as customarily used in the business
of drilling mean days devoted by a drilling crew to the
general drilling operations and are not limited to actual
drilling at the bottom of the hole.

Only three persons were present during the negotia-
tion and signing of the contract in question: The re-
spondent and his attorney on the one side and appel-
Jant’s" secretary, who represented his company. The
testimony of those three witnesses as to their discus-
sion respecting the meaning of the words “of drilling”
that were inserted in the second agreement just prior
to the execution of that agreement, is in conflict. Re-
spondent and his attorney testified that the parties
agreed that the contract meant that the five consecu-
tive days’ work was to be drilling on the bottom of

the hole, and that the words “of drilling” were added
to show such meaning. Appellant’s secretary testified
that the added words were to show that the five days
were to be expended in work in the hole and should
not include time of shutdowns necessary to connect
up the water supply or for other reasons.

On this additional hearing, three witnesses were per-
mitted to testify in support of the allegations of appel-
lant’s amended answer. After hearing this additional
testimony, the trial court again decided the case on
the same ground given on the first trial and entered
judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant in the
same amount that was awarded in the former hearing.
Defendant appealed.

HI In remanding the cause to the trial court, it
was the duty of the trial court to comply with the
mandate of this court. Such mandate must be strictly
followed and carried into effect according to its true
intent and meaning, as determined by the directions
given by this court. Proceedings contrary to the man-
date must be treated as null and void. Gudmundson
v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 160 Wash. 489, 295
Pac. 167; 3 Am. Jur. 730, § 1234.

The trial court in following the direction of this
court was limited to hearing

“. . . such competent, relevant, and material evi-
dence as may be offered by either party as to what was
said and done at the time the agreement of March
20th was executed by the parties.”

Clearly, the only evidence that was admissible on
this additional hearing to throw light upon the actual
meaning of the contract was as to what was said and
done by the interested parties at the time of the sign-
ing of the agreement in question. Evidence of the
intent of the parties drawn from custom or usage given
by persons who were not present when the terms of

the contract were discussed was patently inadmissible
on this additional hearing, which was limited as stated
above.

We cannot say that the evidence preponderates
against the trial court’s findings. The trial court heard
the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the wit-
ness stand and was in a more advantageous position
than we to determine the question whether the intent
of the parties in making the second contract was as
represented by respondent or was as testified by ap-
pellant’s secretary.

The judgment is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Sremvert, Geracury, and Srumpson, JJ.,

concur.

[No. 27627. Department Two. August 21, 1939.]

Tue Stare or WasHINGTON, on the Relation of North-
west Airlines, Inc., Plaintiff, v. J. W. Hoover, as
Acting Director of the Department of Labor
and Industries, Respondent.+

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 346.

Karr & Gregory, for relator.

The Attorney General and Browder Brown, Assistant,
for respondent.

Brats, J.—Relator filed in this court an original pro-
ceeding in mandamus, asking that a writ issue requir-
ing the acting director of the department of labor and
industries to recognize certain employees of relator as
within the scope of the workmen’s compensation act of
this state, and to establish a rate schedule fixing a basis
of contribution for relator.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., relator herein, is a corpora-
tion, engaged in the business of transportation by air,
having its principal place of business in St. Paul, Min-
nesota. It carries passengers, express, baggage and the
United States mails in interstate commerce, and is also
engaged in intrastate transportation within the state of
Washington. Exclusive of its clerical and office staffs,
relator employs between seventy-five and one hundred
persons within the state of Washington, most of whom
are members of ground crews; and in addition to the
employees mentioned, relator employs approximately
twenty-five pilots and co-pilots and three stewardesses,
all of whom are stationed either in Seattle or Spokane,
and all of whom, to some extent at least, are engaged
in interstate commerce. .

Relator filed its application for an alternative writ,
and in support thereof filed the affidavit of one of its
counsel, setting forth in some detail the facts herein-
above generally stated, and also that relator had by
letter requested that the department of labor and in-
dustries of Washington take steps to bring relator’s em-

ployees under the act, and that the department had
refused to do so. Copies of the letters which passed
between the relator and the department are attached
to relator’s application for the writ, and from this cor-
respondence it appears that the department refused to
recognize, as within the scope of the statute, airplane
pilots and instructors, while as to certain of relator’s
maintenance personnel, the department stated that it
would make an investigation for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether or not these employees should be rec-
ognized as within the protection of the act.

An alternative writ of mandate having been issued,
the department appeared by the attorney general and
demurred to relator’s petition and to the alternative
writ, upon the ground that the same failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute any cause of action, or any sufii-
cient grounds for the granting of the relief demanded.
The matter, having come on regularly before the court,
was argued and submitted upon relator’s application
and the demurrer thereto.

Relator’s argument has been directed almost entirely
to the question of whether or not its employees who are
actually engaged in flying should be included within
the act, and as it appears from relator’s petition that
the department proposed to make some investigation
concerning the status of other of relator’s employees,
with the view of determining whether or not such em-
ployees come under the act, we shall consider relator’s
application for a writ of mandate as limited to such of
its employees as are actually engaged in navigation of
the air. Any questions which may arise in the future
as to the status of other employees of relator will be
left open for future determination.

By Laws of 1911, chapter 74, p. 345 (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 7673 [P. C. § 3468] et seq.), an act relating to com-
pensation of injured workmen, the legislature declared

the common law system governing the remedy of work-
men against employers for injuries received in hazar-
dous work to be inconsistent with modern industrial
conditions, and established a new plan for the compen-
sation of persons injured in hazardous industry. As,
in 1911, transportation by air was a novelty, and as a
practical proposition had not reached the commercial
stage, the act did not refer to travel by air. That occu-
pation was not referred to in the act, and persons so
engaged were not included within its operation. The
act was amended several times without reference being
made to persons engaged in transportation by air, but
Laws of 1923, chapter 136, p. 373 (Rem. Comp. Stat.,
§ 7676), amended it in certain particulars, and under
the title “Industries,” a new class, number 34-5, was
added, bringing airplane pilots and instructors under
the act, their industrial insurance rate, per cent of pay-
roll, being fixed at ten per cent, and the medical aid
rate at three cents per day.

While between 1923 and 1937 the act was several
times amended, and changes made in the classifications
of industries as shown in the rate schedule, the rate of
contribution as to class 34-5 being changed, between
1927 and 1937 no change was made in § 7674, in which
were listed the extrahazardous employments, which
section contained no specific reference to persons en-
gaged in air navigation. By laws of 1937, chapter 211,
p. 1028 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7674 [P. C. § 3469]),
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7674, was amended, and among
the extrahazardous occupations named were included
“teaming, truck driving and motor delivery, including
drivers and helpers, in connection with any occupation
except agriculture.”

By Laws of 1937, chapter 89, p. 345 (Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 7676 [P. C. § 3471]), relating to industrial in-
surance and medical aid rates, the classifications were

again amended, class 34-5, supra, was omitted, and for
the first time there was included class 34-3, “Airplane
(manufacturing) .”

By Laws of 1939, chapter 41, p. 119, §1, Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 7674, was again amended, the words herein-
above quoted from Laws of 1937, chapter 211, being
again included in the act as amended.

HJ The business of manufacturing airplanes has
been, by the legislative enactment above referred to,
included within the scope of the act. Relator vigor-
ously argues that its airplanes are used in motor de-
livery, and that its employees engaged in driving the
planes and in assisting in their operation while in the
air are brought within the act by the portion of chap-
ter 211, Laws of 1937, above quoted.

It is argued that, by dropping the classification “air-
plane pilots and instructors” from the rate schedule,
and adding motor delivery to the extrahazardous em-
ployments, the 1937 legislature intended to bring under
the act all workmen engaged in the operation of an
air transportation system, instead of including airplane
pilots and instructors only. The 1937 legislature, as
above stated, added a classification bringing the in-
dustry of manufacturing airplanes within the act.

Consideration of the statute now in force, in the light
of the changes which have been made in the law in
respect to the question under consideration, convinces
us that it was the intent of the legislature to bring the
business of airplane manufacturing under the act, but
not to include within the scope thereof airplane pilots
or instructors or other employees of air transportation
companies engaged in actual flying. We cannot agree
with relator in its contention that motor delivery, as
used in the statute above quoted, includes airplanes.
In construing a statute, all pertinent portions thereof
should be considered, as well as the history of the

legislation. We cannot give the act the broad and
inclusive construction for which relator contends.

Relator relies upon the opinion of the supreme court
of Oklahoma, in the case of Ft. Smith Aircraft Co. v.
State Industrial Ins. Commission, 151 Okla. 67, 1 P.
(2d) 682. It appeared that the duties of the injured
workman included repairing and cleaning airplanes,
and required him to fly occasionally and to instruct
student flyers. The workman was injured while fly-
ing, in the course of a lesson to a student flyer. The
court held that the workman was both a mechanic
and an instructor in flying, and was engaged in extra-
hazardous employment within the scope of the work-
men’s compensation act. We are concerned here with
employees whose duties are exclusively confined to
flight operations. The case cited is not in point.

The view which we take of the statute renders un-
necessary any discussion of the fact that relator’s em-
ployees are engaged in interstate commerce.

We hold that persons in relator’s employ as pilots,
co-pilots, and stewardesses, are not within the protec-
tion of the workmen’s compensation act. As to other
employees of relator, not actually engaged in flying,
we express no opinion, it appearing that the depart-
ment is conducting an investigation concerning the
applicability of the statute to some of these employees.
Questions concerning them are left open for future
determination.

Writ denied.

Buaxe, C. J., Mary, Smuvpson, and Jsrrers, JJ.,
concur.

283

[No. 27528. Department One, August 21, 1939.]

O. B. Forni et al., Appellants, v. Auto MEcuantcs’
Untow Locat No. 297 of THE INTERNATIONAL Asso-
CIATION or Macurnists et al., Respondents.*

Burkey & Burkey, for appellants.
L. B. Sulgrove and John Geisness, for respondents.

Main, J.—This action was brought seeking injunc-
tive relief. At the time the complaint was filed, a
temporary restraining order was issued, and also a
show cause order. Upon the return day of the show
cause order, a hearing was had, the result of which
was the denial of a temporary injunction. Subse-

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 422.

quently, the case came on for trial upon the merits,
and the court refused a permanent injunction. From
the judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.

The respondent Auto Mechanics’ Union Local 297
will be referred to as the union, and C. E. Rowley, who
is the business representative of the union, will be
referred to as the business agent. The appellants, O. B.
Fornili and Emma Fornili, his wife, for a number of
years, owned and operated a business in the city of
Tacoma for the sale of used cars, gas, oil, and gasoline,
and, in connection therewith, they conducted an auto-
mobile repair shop. They owned the building in which
the business was conducted. The repair shop, while
located under the same roof, was in a different room
from that devoted to the remainder of the business.
For a number of years, they had employed several men
in the shop.

In 1936, the place was picketed by the union, and,
as a result thereof, the parties entered into a written
agreement for one year to employ none but union
mechanics. This agreement was succeeded by a sim-
ilar one, entered into early in the year 1937, which,
by its terms, expired June 16, 1938.

In February of that year, the appellants say that
they leased the repair shop to one Manuel A. Becker.
The respondents dispute this, and claim that Becker
was, in truth and in fact, an employee of the appellants,
and the pretended lease was simply a subterfuge to
avoid the terms of the contract. In considering the
case, we will accept the view of the respondents as
to the nature of the relation between Becker and the
appellants.

During the time that the contract was in force, there
was more or less difficulty between the appellants and
the union, due, as it appears, largely over hours. Be-

fore June 16th, and from time to time during the life
of the contract, there was picketing. After the con-
tract expired, there was no picketing until the 30th of
September following.

From the time that Becker went into the shop, the
appellants, in addition to him, had only one employee,
who worked generally in the salesroom, and was what
might be referred to as a “handy man.” Neither
Becker nor the other employee belonged to the union.
So far as the record shows, they were satisfied with
their wages, hours, and working conditions. No dis-
pute had arisen between either one of them and the
appellants.

The business agent testified that, when they re-
sumed September 30th, the same conditions existed as
existed when they were picketing the place prior to
the expiration of the contract. But we cannot accept
this as a correct view of the situation. The contract
was not in existence when the picketing was resumed,
and the situation stood at that time as if there had
been no previous contract. We will make no further
reference to the picketing during the life of the con-
tract, because that matter is wholly immaterial at this
time. At no time did either of the parties ask to have
the contract renewed, and there were no negotiations:
between them with reference to a renewal.

In the case of Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks’
Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372, it was held that,
where there was no controversy between an employer
and the employees, a third party could not picket the
business for the purpose of coercing the managers of
the stores into inducing or persuading their employees
to become members of the union, for the reason, as
there stated, there did not exist a labor dispute. In
that case, it was said:

“The vital, controlling question at issue here is plain
and easy of solution. It in no way pertains to the re-
lations between the appellant, a merchant, and its
employees. For aught that appears, they are content
and satisfied, among themselves. On the contrary,
this is a lawsuit between appellant and a third party—
a labor union that does not include in its membership
any employee of the appellant. What right have the
respondents to insist or demand, at the threat or cost
of the destruction of appellant’s business, or at all, that
appellant ask, urge or coerce, directly or indirectly,
its employees, who are at liberty to do as they please,
to join respondents’ organization? Of course, there is
nothing unlawful in hiring clerks or salesmen who are
not members of a local organization such as the re-
spondent; and any attempt, like that in this case, to
deny or cripple one’s right to do so is an unwarranted
attempt by individuals or persons to unreasonably
interfere with the freedom of the liberty and property
right of contract.

“The conduct of respondents, in conjunction with
that of appellant, cannot be termed a labor dispute.
It is an unwarranted attempt on the part of respond-
ents to compel appellant, against its right of choice,
to become active in the cause of respondents, with the
result that, upon the failure of that attempt, respond-
ents purposely commenced and continued picketing,
to appellant’s damage in the large sum of $2,200 in less
than four months’ time, with the avowed intention of
continuing the same to manifest, irreparable injury
and damage to the appellant.”

That case, in the case of Adams v. Building Service
Employees International Union, Local No. 6, 197 Wash.
242, 84 P. (2d) 1021, was cited with approval.

The holding in the case of Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw
Mill Workers Union, 189 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066,
is not applicable to the facts in the case now before us.
That case involved the picketing of a logging camp,
and is not an authority which supports the judgment
in this case.

In Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash.
396, 63 P. (2d) 397, it was said:

“The right to earn a livelihood and to continue in
employment unmolested by unwarranted activities of
third persons is entitled to protection in equity. Truax
v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 283. A correlative principle is that the em-
ployer has the right freely to maintain relations of em-
ployment with whomsoever he desires, and no one has
the right purposely to disrupt or interfere with those
relations by the intentional resort to such measures
as will obviously, and in the ordinary course of events,
inflict irreparable injury upon the employer. Hitch-
man Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 S.
Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461. Both of the
cases just cited are authority for the further rule that
it is immaterial whether the employment be for a term
or at will.”

The rule of the Safeway Stores case, as already indi-
cated, is controlling here. In this case, there was no
controversy or dispute between the appellants, the em-
ployers, and the employees. The picketing was resumed.
bya third party. Itis not clear from the record whether
the purpose of the picketing was to coerce the appel-
lants into having their employees become union men,
or whether its purpose was to punish them for failing
to live up to the terms of their contract while it was
in effect. In either event, the picketing was not law-
ful. The business agent testified, referring to the ap-
pellant O. B. Fornili, that “we had a fight on with him.”
The witness further testified that he heard the secretary
of the union state to a third party that they were going
to do to Fornili “what had been done to Stoner,” re-
ferring to the Stoner Motor Company, which had been
previously picketed and had been compelled to quit
business on account of labor difficulties.

HH At the conclusion of the hearing on the merits
in this case, the appellants were entitled to a permanent

injunction. It is said, however, that there was no
probability of picketing being resumed, and, for this
reason, a permanent injunction was properly refused.
In this connection, the business agent testified:

“In this case the pickets have not been placed back
since they were taken off under the original order of
the Court. I do not know what the organization
[union] may do with reference to it, nor is anyone able
to tell until the organization takes a vote on it.”

The facts in this case are entirely different from what
they were in Commercial Bindery & Printing Co. v.
Tacoma Typographical Union No. 170, 85 Wash. 234, 147
Pac. 1143. The record here is not sufficient to establish
that there was no probability that picketing would be
resumed if injunctive relief was denied.

The judgment will be reversed, and the cause re-
manded with direction to the superior court to enter a
judgment permanently enjoining the respondents from
picketing the place of business of the appellants.

JEFFERS, RoBINSON, and Stemvert, JJ., concur.

Brakg, C. J. (dissenting)—In view of the principle
that the rule of a case does not become stare decisis un-
til followed in subsequent decisions (14 Am. Jur. 295,
§ 82; McDonald v. Davey, 22 Wash. 366, 60 Pac. 1116;
State ex rel. Bloedel-Donovan Lumber Mills v. Savidge,
144 Wash. 302, 258 Pac. 1), I think the law laid down
in Safeway Stores should be reexamined in the light
of recent decisions of the supreme court of the United
States and courts of last resort in other states, con-
struing the Norris-LaGuardia act and acts patterned
after it. For Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7, p. 10
(Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 7612-1 to 7612-14 [P. C.
§§ 3467-21 to 3467-34]) is identical in terms and pur-
pose with that act, and the Safeway Stores case is com-
pletely out of harmony with the construction placed

upon that act by the supreme court of the United States
and the construction placed upon similar acts by courts
of other states. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 82 L. Ed. 1012, 58 S. Ct. 703;
Schuster v. International Ass’n of Machinists, etc., 293
Tl. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50; Local Union No, 26, etc.
v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. B. (2d) 624, 108 A. L. R.
1111; Wallace Co. v. International Ass’n of Mechanics,
etc., 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, Local No, 5, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W.
270, 872, affirmed 301 U. S. 468, 81 L. Ed. 1229, 57S. Ct.
857.

In those decisions, provisions identical or similar to
§$ 4(e) and 13(c), chapter 7, Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess.,
pp. 12, 17 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-4 [P. C.
§ 3467-24] subd. (e) and § 7612-13 [P. C. § 3467-33],
subd. (c)), have been accepted for what they say in
plain and unambiguous terms:

“Sec. 4. No court of the State of Washington shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute or prohibit
any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from
doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the follow-
ing acts: .

“(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by adver-
tising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method
not involving fraud or violence; . .

“Sec. 13. When used in this act, and for the purpose
of thisact— . .

“(c) The term dabor dispute’ includes any contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of per-
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the peguimate relation of employer and employee.”

In other words, it is held in those cases that a labor
union, by its members and sympathizers, may maintain
a picket line to coerce an employer to operate a
“closed shop,” even though there be no controversy
between him and his employees. The only limitation
upon the right is that it shall be exercised without
“fraud or violence.” There is nothing in the record in
the instant case that savors in the remotest degree of
“fraud or violence.” The threat of the union members
that they would put appellant out of business and the
statement that they had put other employers who had
refused to comply with their demands out of business,
are nothing more than “seller’s talk,” designed to im-
press the employer with the power of the picket line
to create a public opinion against him for operating

in “open shop.”

In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
supra, the court said:

“Petitioners have written respondent letters threat-
ening boycott and ruination of its business and notices
that by means of announcements, meetings and adver-
tising the petitioners will circulate statements that
respondent is unfair to colored people and to the colored
race and, contrary to fact, that respondent does not
employ colored persons; .

“The Act does not concern itself with the background
or the motives of the dispute. The desire for fair and
equitable conditions of employment on the part of per-
sons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal
of discriminations against them by reason of their race
or religious beliefs is quite as important to those con-
cerned as fairness and equity in terms and conditions
of employment can be to trade or craft unions or any
form of labor organization or association. Race dis-
crimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed
more unfair and less excusable than discrimination
against workers on the ground of union affiliation.
There is no justification in the apparent purposes or
the express terms of the Act for limiting its definition

of labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by ex~-
cluding those which arise with respect to discrimina-
tion in terms and conditions of employment based upon.
differences of race or color. . .

“The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that
it was the purpose of the Congress further to extend
the prohibitions of the Clayton Act respecting the
exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts and to obviate
the results of the judicial construction of that Act. It
was intended that peaceful and orderly dissemination
of information by those defined as persons interested in
a labor dispute concerning ‘terms and conditions of em-
ployment’ in an industry or a plant or a place of busi-
ness should be lawful; that, short of fraud, breach of
the peace, violence, or conduct otherwise unlawful,
those having a direct or indirect interest in such terms
and conditions of employment should be at liberty to
advertise and disseminate facts and information with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, and
peacefully to persuade others to concur in their views
respecting an employer’s practices. The District Court
erred in not complying with the provisions of the Act.”

In Schuster v. International Ass’n of Machinists, etc.,
supra, the court said:

“While plaintiff complains about the presence of the
pickets that alternated in front of his place of business,
his real complaint unquestionably is against the public-
ity given by the signs carried by them proclaiming the
truth as to the unfairness of his attitude toward organ-
ized labor. He persists in his refusal to deal with a
labor union and yet he resents as an infringement of
his rights the disclosure by that union to the public,
including members of labor unions and their sympa-
thizers, of his antagonism to organized labor. His
position that, notwithstanding his antagonism to the
union, the law must silence the voice of organized labor
lest he may suffer any ill consequences as a result of
his attitude, is untenable. It is, of course, his right
and privilege to refuse to deal with the union and to
operate a nonunion shop, but, in our opinion, it is just
as much the right and privilege of the union, when he

9
|

so refuses, to publish the fact that it regards him as
unfair to it. What inalienable right has an employer
who is unfair in the eyes of organized labor to the favor
of the continued patronage of its members and friends?
“It has been repeatedly held that where an employer
refuses to employ union labor, labor organizations
may freely publish in their own official organs and
other newspapers, in pamphlets or circulars, or by
means of the radio, the fact that such employer is un-
fair to organized labor. Then, why is it not just as
lawful for a labor union to make publication of the
employer’s unfairness by signs carried peaceably by a
member or members of the interested union in the
vicinity of the place of business of the employer?”

But, apart from the right to picket established by
our Norris-LaGuardia act, the injunction which the
court here directs to issue, will infringe rights guaran-
teed to respondent by the fourteenth amendment to the
constitution of the United States. For to accord
workers in labor disputes the right of “peaceful picket-
ing” and “peaceable persuasion” is but to uphold them
in their right to assemble and publicize their griev-
ances. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion, 307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, Case No. 651, October
Term 1938, decided June 5, 1939. While the right of
patrolling or picketing was only incidentally involved
in that case, the court held that the right to assemble
and speak cannot be circumscribed by a municipal ordi-
nance prohibiting public gatherings without a permit
first obtained from a designated official. In that case,
Mr. Justice Stone said:

“It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by
this Court, without a dissenting voice, that freedom of
speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are
rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, with-
out regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. .

“Both courts below found, and the evidence supports
the findings, that the purpose of respondents, other

than the Civil Liberties Union, in holding meetings in
Jersey City, was to organize labor unions in various
industries in order to secure to workers the benefits of
collective bargaining with respect to betterment of
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment. . . . True, the findings refer to
the suppression by petitioners of exhibits, one of which
turns out to be a handbill advising workers they have
the legal right, under the Wagner Act, to choose their
own labor union to represent them in collective
bargaining. But the injunction, which the Court now
rightly sustains, is not restricted to the protection of
the right, said to pertain to United States citizenship,
to disseminate information about the Wagner Act. On
the contrary it extends and applies in the broadest
terms to interferences with respondents in holding any
lawful meeting and disseminating any lawful informa-
tion by circular, leaflet, handbill and placard. If, as
my brethren think, respondents are entitled to main-
tain in this suit only the rights secured to them by the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment—here the right to disseminate informa-
tion about the National Labor Relations Act—it is
plain that the decree is too broad. Instead of enjoining,
as it does, interferences with all meetings for all pur-
poses and the lawful dissemination of all information,
it should have confined its restraint to interferences
with the dissemination of information about the
National Labor Relations Act, through meetings or
otherwise. The court below rightly omitted any such
limitation from the decree, evidently because, as it
declared, petitioners’ acts infringed the due process
clause, which guarantees to all persons freedom of
speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose.

: It is enough that petitioners have prevented
respondents from holding meetings and disseminating
information whether for the organization of labor
unions or for any other lawful purpose.”

And Mr. Justice Roberts said:

“. . . What has been said demonstrates that, in
the light of the facts found, privileges and immunities
of the individual respondents as citizens of the United

States, were infringed by the petitioners, by virtue of
their official positions, under color of ordinances of
Jersey City, unless, as petitioners contend, the city’s
ownership of streets and parks is as absolute as one’s
ownership of his home, with consequent power alto-
gether to-exclude citizens from the use thereof, or
unless, though the city holds the streets in trust for
public use, the absolute denial of their use to the re-
spondents is a valid exercise of the police power.

“. . . Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, im-
munities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”

Even in broader terms, in the case of Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666, did
that court deny a municipality the right to prohibit
the use of the streets for the peaceable dissemination
of propaganda. Speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, the court there said:

“We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face.
Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its
character is such that it strikes at the very foundation
of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license
and censorship. The struggle for the freedom of the
press was primarily directed against the power of the
licensor. It was against that power that John Milton
directed his assault by his ‘Appeal for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing.’ And the liberty of the press be-
came initially a right to publish ‘without a license what
formerly could be published only with one.’ While
this freedom from previous restraint upon publication
cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of
liberty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading
purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.
See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713-716; Grosjean v. American

Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245, 246. Legislation of the
type of the ordinance in question would restore the
system of license and censorship in its baldest form.

“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers
and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets
and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons
in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas
Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion. What we have had recent occasion to
say with respect to the vital importance of protecting
this essential liberty from every sort of infringement
need not be repeated. Near v. Minnesota, supra;
Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra; De Jonge v.
Oregon [299 U. S. 353, 81 L. Ed. 278, 57 S. Ct. 255],
supra.” :

Of course, an injunction infringing rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment has no greater sanctity
than a city ordinance which contravenes such rights.
A court has no more right to impinge upon the privi-
leges and immunities guaranteed to citizens than has
a city council.

I dissent.

296

[No. 27378. En Banc. August 24, 1939.]

Emma Louise Coie, Respondent, v. Taz DeparTMENT
or Lasor anp InpustRies, Defendant, E. C.
Miiter Cepar Lumser Company,
Appellant.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 413.

De
Ln

L. B. Donley, for appellant.

The Attorney General, J. A. Kavaney and T. H. Little,
Assistants, for defendant.

John Geisness and Newton C. McCoy, for respondent.

Stemerr, J—A claim for widow’s pension under the
workmen’s compensation act was rejected by the super-
visor and by the joint board of the department of labor
and industries. On appeal by the claimant to the su-
perior court, where the cause was reviewed by the
court solely on the departmental record, the order of
the department was reversed, and the claim was re-
manded to the joint board for further proceedings.
The employer of the deceased workman has appealed.

The brief of the respondent widow opens with a
motion to dismiss the appeal, upon two grounds.

HI The first ground is that appellant employer, a
corporation, has no right of appeal, because it did not
apply for a rehearing before the joint board according
to the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., §7697 [P. C.
§ 3488].

The employer was not aggrieved by the order of the
supervisor; hence, there was no occasion for it to apply
to the joint board for a rehearing. Likewise, the em-
ployer was not aggrieved by the final order of the joint
board; hence, there was no occasion for it to appeal
to the superior court. The widow was the aggrieved

party in both instances, and she alone had occasion to
apply for a rehearing and to appeal. These steps she
took. The statute contemplates but one rehearing be-
fore the joint board, and when that has been had and a
final order has been entered by the board, the matter
is closed so far as the department is concerned.
Albrecht v. Department of Labor & Industries, 192
Wash. 520, 74 P. (2d) 22.

HI The second ground of the motion is that the
employer did not become a party to the record because
it did not petition to intervene. The employer par-
ticipated in the hearings before the joint board and in
the hearing before the court. It was an interested and
active party, and was aggrieved by the judgment of the
superior court. It, therefore, had the right to appeal to
this court. Hoff v. Department of Labor & Industries,
198 Wash. 257, 88 P. (2d) 419. The motion is denied.

On the merits of the case, the sole question is whether
or not the respondent has, by a clear preponderance of
the evidence, overcome the presumption in favor of the
correctness of the decision of the department.

Hi Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7697, provides that, in all
court proceedings under or pursuant to the workmen’s
compensation act, the decision of the department shall
be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall
be on the party attacking the decision. Zankich v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash. 25, 63
P. (2d) 427; Russell v. Department of Labor & In-
dustries, 194 Wash. 565, 78 P. (2d) 960; Cooper v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 195 Wash. 315, 80
P. (2d) 830; Langford v. Department of Labor & In-
dustries, 195 Wash. 412, 81 P. (2d) 277; Schrawm v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 197 Wash. 336,
85 P. (2d) 262.

HI The facts, so far as they are undisputed, are
these: On December 16, 1934, John Cole, an employee

of appellant, being engaged in extrahazardous employ-
ment, within the meaning of the workmen’s compensa-
tion act, fell from a ladder a distance of about twelve
feet onto and across the side of a fuel bin and severely
injured his right arm in the region of the axilla, or
armpit. At the time of the accident, Cole appeared to
be a normal, healthy man. Following the accident, his
arm became swollen and discolored, and varicosities
developed around the shoulder and across a portion of
the chest, indicating that, due to the injury to the
axillary vein, nature had attempted to establish a
return flow of the blood through the superficial veins.

From the time of the accident until about the
middle of February, 1935, Cole worked only part time.
The department thereupon allowed him compensation
for time loss to the extent of twenty-three days, and
later, in March, awarded him compensation for perma-
nent partial disability to the extent of five degrees.
The swelling was then gradually decreasing.

On April 26, 1935, Cole reported to his physician
that he had tried to work, but could not do so on ac-
count of the pain. The swelling in the upper right
arm had not then wholly disappeared.

Some time in May or June of that year, Cole de-
veloped what was described as a brassy cough. From
May until October, and during such times as appel-
lant’s mill was in operation, Cole continued to work,
but with some interruptions; his general health, how-
ever, progressively declined.

In October, Cole noticed a pulsating tumor in the
upper part of his chest. His physician diagnosed it as
an aneurism of the aorta, and ordered him to cease
work entirely. On November 9th, Cole entered a
hospital, and the following day the aneurism burst,
resulting in the death of the patient.

Cole’s widow filed a claim for pension January 27,

1936, and on April 17th, pursuant to an order of court,
the body was exhumed, and a post-mortem examina-
tion was made by three physicians, of whom one was
appointed by the department, one by the widow, and
the third selected by the two appointees. At the con-
clusion of the autopsy, the commission of specialists
made written findings of the discovery of a ruptured
aneurism of the first part of the arch of the aorta and
numerous sclerotic plaques extending down to the
bifurcation of the abdominal aorta. They reported,
as their anatomical diagnosis, rupture of an aortic
aneurism, arteriosclerosis of the arteries, fibrosis and
calcification and partial occlusion of the coronary
arteries, and almost complete obliteration of the sub-
clavian and right axillary vein. Relative to the cause
of death, it was the opinion of the three specialists, as
expressed in their report, that the aneurism preexisted
the injury of December 16, 1934, that it was due solely
to disease unrelated to trauma, and that the injury
neither contributed to nor aggravated the preexisting
condition.

Upon the rehearing before the joint board, consider-
able evidence was taken, corisisting principally of the
testimony of physicians, and the case is, therefore,
peculiar in that the determination of the factual issue
rests primarily upon the testimony of medical experts.

All of the physicians were in accord to the following
extent: (1) That the death of the workman was
caused by the bursting of the aneurism; (2) that the
primary cause of aneurism is arteriosclerosis; and
(3) that the facts disclosed by the autopsy were suffi-
cient of themselves to account for the aneurism. The
issue of fact comprehended in the legal question sub-
mitted to us is, therefore, narrowed to the single ques-
tion whether or not the injury of December 16, 1934,
was a causative factor in the formation or the aggra-

vation of the aneurism, resulting in the workman’s
death.

The attending physician, called as a witness by re-
spondent, testified that he “believed“ that there was
a causal connection between the injury and the rup-
tured aneurism. Amplifying his statement, he said:

“Well, whether or not there was an aneurism there
at the time of the injury is impossible for me to state.
He had no indication of anything, so far as I knew,
up until that time; but having an aneurism at that
time, it would be my opinion that his death was
hastened by the injury that he sustained to the aneu-
rism.”

He further testified that, as a medical matter, he
would assume that Mr. Cole had a weakened arterial
wall at the time of the injury; that a severe jar “might”
temporarily increase the blood pressure and, as a re-
sult, further weaken the arterial condition; and that
the “probable” effect of the jarring injury which he
sustained on December 16, 1934, would be to further
tend to weaken the arterial wall.

On cross-examination, the witness reiterated his
statement that “there probably was some weakened.
condition there prior to that [the injury].” He con-
ceded, however, that he had never taken the blood
pressure of the workman and knew,nothing about it.
He further admitted that, in his practice, he had never
known of an injury in the region of the arm or shoulder
which, in his opinion, caused, contributed to, or aggra-
vated an aneurism of the aorta.

Respondent’s other physician witness, testifying in
response to a hypothetical question, stated that, in his
opinion, the accident would have had no effect upon.
a normally elastic aorta, but that a blow of sufficient
intensity to cause damage to the axillary structures
“might” cause damage to the arch of the aorta, par-

ticularly if it was not entirely normal in elasticity or
size.

The substance of the testimony of these two wit-
nesses included (1) an assumption of a prior weakened
condition of the arterial wall, and (2) a conclusion
that the jar consequent upon the injury “might” have
accentuated the weakened condition and thus probably
hastened the workman’s death. The evidence was, at
best, conjectural and speculative.

The appellant called, as witnesses, the three physi-
cians who had performed the autopsy, and their testi-
mony, in our opinion, more than balanced that of re-
spondent’s witnesses. To set forth the testimony of
each in detail would largely be repetition. A summary
of it will suffice.

They testified that, while aneurism might be caused
by trauma, the blow would have to be directly in the
region where the aneurism formed and would have to
be of such terrific force as to break the bones; that,
in this instance, the post-mortem showed no evidence
of traumatic aneurism; that the blocking or oblitera-
tion of the axillary veins or the veins in the region
of the shoulder would have no effect on the aorta;
that the most common cause of aneurism of the aorta,
almost to the exclusion of anything else, was disease,
not injury; that Mr. Cole’s arteries, particularly the
aorta, were sclerotic to a marked and unusual degree;
that the evidence of an existing disease was sufficient
of itself to fully account for the aneurism; and that
for anyone, even a medical witness, to say when an
aneurism began, with reference to a date on which
an injury occurred, without physical examinations
and diagnoses being made both before and after such
injury, would be purely speculative. From their
knowledge upon the subject and from the examina-
tion made by them, it was their unqualified opinion

that the aneurism was the natural result of the ad-
vanced arteriosclerosis found in the aorta, and that
the injury was neither a primary nor a proximate
cause of the aneurism or of its fatal result.

It is not sufficient that a claimant show a mere possi-
bility that the accident and its accompanying injury
caused or contributed to the death of the injured per-
son. The burden is on the claimant to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the injury was a
proximate or a contributing cause of death. Kavaja
v. Department of Labor & Industries, 126 Wash. 284,
218 Pac. 196; Tomovich v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 126 Wash. 287, 218 Pac. 197; Cooper v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 195 Wash. 315, 80
P. (2d) 830.

Our reading of the record convinces us that the pre-
ponderance of the evidence supports the findings and
decision of the department. In any event, we cannot
say, nor do we think that any court can say, that the
evidence preponderates against the decision.

The judgment is reversed, with direction to the trial
court to affirm the decision of the department.

Smmpson, Ropinson, and Jerrers, JJ., concur.

Mitarp, J. (concurring) —The majority of the
members of this court did not subscribe to the theory
of the opinion in State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196
Wash. 308, 82 P. (2d) 865; two judges concurred in
the result; three judges dissented. Subsequently, a
majority of this court held in Hoff v. Department of
Labor & Industries, 198 Wash. 257, 88 P. (2d) 419,
that an employer had an unqualified right to appeal
to this court in this class of cases. There must be
finality some time. I concur in the opinion of Judge
Steinert on the merits. The question of the employer’s
right of appeal is not now an open one.

Matin, J. (dissenting)—Considering, along with the
expert testimony, the fact that John Cole was a strong,
healthy man, capable of doing hard work at the time
of his injury, and the history of his condition from
that time until the time of his death, I am of the view
that the superior court correctly decided this case.

I therefore dissent.

Beats, J. (dissenting)—-The question of the right of
an employer to prosecute an appeal to the superior
and supreme courts from an award in favor of his in-
jured workman is one of great importance and diffi-
culty. In the case at bar, as stated in the majority
opinion, the claim of respondent Emma Louise Cole,
the widow of the deceased workman, was denied by
the supervisor and by the joint board. On appeal to
the superior court by the claimant, the departmental
order was reversed, and the claim remanded to the
department for further proceedings. The employer
has prosecuted to this court an appeal from the judg-
ment of the superior court. No appeal from that judg-
ment by the department is before us.

Laws of 1911, chapter 74, p. 345 (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 7673 [P. C. § 3468]), the workmen’s compensation
act, in § 1, p. 345, by way of a preamble, states the pur-
pose of the act, and provides that the state of Wash-
ington, in the exercise of its police and sovereign power,

“., . declares that all phases of the premises are
withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and
certain relief for workmen, injured in extrahazardous
work, and their families and dependents is hereby pro-
vided regardless of questions of fault and to the ex-
clusion of. every other remedy, proceeding or com-
pensation, except as otherwise provided in this act;
and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of
action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction
of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby
abolished, except as in this act provided.”

The act as originally passed, and as amended, pro-
vides for appeals on the part of employers to the courts
from departmental’ decisions; § 7697 [P. C. § 3488]
being general, other sections being specific. The sec-
tion referred to provides in part, referring to orders,
decisions or awards by the department, that “any
claimant, employer or other person aggrieved by any
such order, decision or award must, before he appeals
to the courts,” etc. I have come to the conclusion that
an employer is not aggrieved by a ruling of the depart-
ment or a judgment of the superior court making an
award to his injured employee, save in so far as that
award may unjustly affect his cost experience and con-
sequently increase the amounts which he is required
to pay into the fund by way of premiums. Save as
to that phase of the matter, the particular employer
of the workman injured is no more aggrieved by an
award in favor of the workman than is every other
employer of labor in the same group with the employer
in question, all of whom contribute to the particular
fund, by way of premiums or assessments, sums suffi-
cient to pay the employees of that group who are in-
jured in the course of their employment.

In the case of Mud Bay Logging Co. v. Department
of Labor & Industries, 189 Wash. 285, 64 P. (2d) 1054,
and on rehearing, 193 Wash. 275, 75 P. (2d) 579, there
was before this court an appeal by an employer, pre-
senting a state of facts as follows: A workman in
the employ of Mud Bay Logging Company was in-
jured. The department allowed the workman com-
pensation, and the department paid him the sum of
$1,225, then charging four thousand dollars against
the employer’s cost experience. The employer sought
relief before the joint board on account of the charge
against its cost experience. The board accorded a
hearing, but refused to grant any relief. The employer

then appealed to the superior court, which granted the
employer relief, finding that the order making the
charge against the employer’s cost experience was
erroneously entered and directing that the charge be
canceled. From that judgment, the department ap-
pealed to this court. The judgment of the superior
court was affirmed, this court holding that the em-
ployer had, under the law, the right to appeal to the
superior court from the order of the joint board, above
referred, to.

It has many times been held that an opinion of an
appellate court is controlling authority only upon the
question actually decided, and manifestly, in the case
referred to, there was no question of an appeal by an
employer from an award to an injured workman, as
the workman had received his money. The only ques-
tion presented and decided was the right of the em-
ployer to contest, on appeal, the charge against his cost
experience, which charge would tend to increase the
payments which he would be required to make into
the accident fund. The case was correctly decided;
as, in so far as an improper award to a workman in-
creased the amounts which the employer of that work-
man would be required to pay, over the amount he
would have been required to pay had the award not
been made, that particular employer was aggrieved
by the order of the department. While the language
of the opinion of this court on the rehearing of the
case cited is very broad, and indicates that an employer
generally has the right of appeal, the opinion is con-
trolling authority only for the proposition that an em-
ployer may be “aggrieved” by an award by the depart-
ment in favor of his injured workman, within the in-
tent of § 7697, only in so far as the award may affect
his cost experience and increase the contributions
which he must make to the fund.

The opinion refers to the previous cases of Brewer
v. Department of Labor & Industries, 143 Wash. 49,
254 Pac. 831, and Seattle Can Co. v. Department of
Labor & Industries, 147 Wash. 303, 265 Pac. 739, as
cases in which appeals by employers from department
orders were not questioned. In the earlier of these
cases, the workman appealed to this court from a judg-
ment of the superior court sustaining the denial by the
department of compensation for injuries, and this court
affirmed the judgment appealed from, holding that the
claimant was not an employee. The employer had
intervened before the superior court, and had also
appealed to this court from the judgment therein ren-
dered. Concerning this phase of the ease, we said:

“We have not considered the question whether the
Hobi Logging Company, not having appealed within
the time fixed by statute from a decision of the depart-
ment of labor and industries, had a right thereafter
to intervene in the superior court and become a party
to the action, for the reason that the case is here upon
its merits by Brewer’s appeal. Upon the ruling of the
trial court jn permitting the intervention we express
no opinion.

It seems to me clear that an employer may appeal
from a ruling of the department, to the effect that an
injured workman was or was not an employee, was
or was not engaged in extrahazardous labor, or was or
was not injured in the course of his employment.
There was no question in the case concerning the right
of the employer to appeal from an award in favor of
an injured workman, as no award was ever made.

An employer may appeal to the courts from any
ruling of the department on the matter of whether
the workmen’s compensation act applies in any par-
ticular situation. There are, of course, other specific
provisions in the act giving an employer the right to
appeal in the instances therein referred to, but in re-

gard to an award in favor of a workman, it seems to
me that, under the act, the employer may appeal to
the courts only as to questions which affect him par-
ticularly, and not as to the propriety of the award in
the particular case, when that award affects him no
differently, save in degree, than it affects other em-
ployers in the same class group.

In the second of the-cases last cited, it appeared that
three employees of the Seattle Can Company had con-
tracted benzol poisoning. Claims based upon this
poisoning were rejected by the department. The em-
ployer appealed to the superior court from the de-
partmental ruling, and the personal representative of
one of the employees, who had died as the result of
the poisoning, also appealed. The superior court re-
versed the action of the department and remanded the
cases for classification and award. The department
appealed to this court from the judgment of the su-
perior court, and the judgment was here affirmed.
There was, then, no question of an appeal by the em-
ployer from an award made by the department. In
my opinion, these cases throw no light on the ques-
tion of the right of an employer to appeal from an
award made by the department to an injured work-
man.

In the case of Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Industries, 157 Wash. 96, 288 Pac. 655,
an employer appealed from an order of the depart-
ment rejecting the claim of a workman, the employer
contending that the workman was within the protec-
tion of the industrial insurance law, and that his rem-
edy was limited to the relief afforded by that statute.
The department had ruled that the workman was
without the protection of the law, and evidently the
injured man was anxious to accept that ruling and
sue the employer for damages. It was properly held

that the courts had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
by the employer from the departmental ruling, as the
employer was aggrieved thereby and had the right to
present to the courts the question of whether or not
the workman was within the scope of the act.

In the case of State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 191
Wash. 534, 71 P. (2d) 545, this court held that an em-

_ ployer, adversely affected by an order of the super-
visor, could, under Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 7697 and 10837
[P. C. §§ 3488, 4-79], apply for a rehearing before the
joint board. The matter was presented to this court
on an original application by the workman for a writ
of mandate requiring the state auditor to issue war-
rants in favor of the workman in a sum which he
alleged had been awarded to him by an order of the
supervisor. The application for the writ was by this
court denied, upon the ground that the matter was
still pending before the department.

In the later case of State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger,
196 Wash. 308, 82 P. (2d) 865, another application by
the same injured workman for a writ of mandate re-
quiring the supervisor to transmit vouchers to the
state auditor in payment of an award, it appeared that
the supervisor had made an award in favor of the
workman, which award had been sustained by the
joint board. The employer then appealed to the su-
perior court, whereupon the supervisor refused, on
demand of the workman, to pay the amount awarded
by the department, contending that the employer’s
appeal to the superior court ousted the department of
jurisdiction. On the foregoing state of facts, this court
held that, under Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7697, the appeal
by the employer did not operate as a stay. It was
held that the application should be granted, and the
writ was accordingly issued. In the course of the
opinion, this court said:

“In the absence of a bond superseding the order of
which the employer complains in the case at bar—in
view of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7697, granting the right of
appeal by denying the right to supersede the order—
relator may enforce payment by writ of mandamus.

“The appeal granted to the employer does not, under
the plain language of the statute, operate as a stay;
therefore, the compensation awarded by the joint
board should be paid without regard to the question
Phether the appeal of the employer may be success-
“To hold that compensation such as that awarded
to the relator can be stayed pending judicial review
on appeal by the employer from the order making the
award, would nullify the very purpose of the compen-
sation act to furnish certain, expeditious, and adequate
relief to the injured workman.”

Under the statute, the case was properly decided.
On his appeal, the employer could still present to the
court any question concerning the charge which the
department could make against his cost experience.
That was the only matter in connection with the award
in which the employer could be aggrieved. Certainly,
if the payment of an award to an injured workman, as
held in the case last cited, cannot be stayed pending an
appeal by the employer, such an appeal in many cases
is a vain and useless gesture. In case of a continuing
payment, such as a widow’s pension, an appeal by the
employer, if successful on the merits, would result in
stopping the payments, but it seems unreasonable that
the law should be so construed as to permit an appeal
to defeat some awards and not others.

In the case of Albrecht v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 192 Wash. 520, 74 P. (2d) 22, the depart-
ment granted a claim for a widow’s pension. The em-
ployer then petitioned the joint board for a rehearing,
which the board granted. After the hearing had been

held, the joint board entered an order sustaining its
previous ruling, to the effect that the pension be paid.
From this last order, the employer appealed to the
superior court. It was held that there was no statutory
provision authorizing

“oe, an appeal to the joint board after it has
made its final order upon an appeal from the supervisor;
when the joint board hears an appeal on the question
presented and makes a final order on the merits of the
case, that case is closed;”
and the order of the superior court dismissing the em-
ployer’s appeal was affirmed. It was apparently as-
sumed that the employer had the right of appeal from
the departmental order awarding the widow’s pension
—as, in my opinion, he did—in order to contest, if he
desired, any charge against his cost experience based
upon the award of the pension. The only question,
however, determined by the decision was that the em-
ployer had not proceeded correctly in endeavoring to
prosecute an appeal to the superior court from the order
of the joint board.

In the recent case of Hoff v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 198 Wash. 257, 88 P. (2d) 419, it ap-
peared that the department denied an application on
the part of an injured workman for the reopening of
his claim on the ground that his condition had become
aggravated since the claim had been closed. The
workman appealed to the superior court, with the re-
sult that judgment was entered reversing the order of
the department. The department and the employer
took separate appeals to this court from the judgment
of the superior court. On motion of the-workman, the
appeal of the department was dismissed, and the cause
proceeded on the appeal of the employer. The respond-
ent moved to dismiss this appeal, on the ground that
the employer had not formally intervened in the cause

below, and for that reason was not a party to the
record. In discussing this motion, this court stated
that, by certain of its recent decisions, it had been
held that an employer had a right of appeal to the
courts in industrial insurance cases, citing several au-
thorities. Assuming that the employer had a right of
appeal, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.

In addition to the cases above referred to, the court,
in support of the proposition that we have held that an
employer may appeal, cited the cases of State ex rel.
Winningham v. Olinger, 190 Wash. 697, 70 P. (2d) 317,
and State ex rel. Hills v. Olinger, 193 Wash. 365, 75 P.
(2d) 926. In the first of these two cases, this court
reversed a judgment of the superior court directing
that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the supervisor
to approve a contract with a hospital association, hold-
ing that, before an appeal could be prosecuted to the
superior court from any departmental action, resort
must first be had to the joint board. The contract
which was the subject matter of the action was one for
medical aid. In my opinion, the case has nothing to
do with the question of the right of an employer to ap-
peal from the department to the courts in an attempt
to review, on the merits, an award to an injured work-
man.

In the other of the two cases last referred to, which
was an original application to this court for a writ of
mandate, it appeared that the relator, in the course of
his employment, suffered an injury for which he pre-
sented a claim, which was allowed and later closed.
Thereafter, the claim was opened, and the claimant
allowed an additional amount. Subsequently, the
workman asked that his claim be reopened, on the
ground that his injury had become aggravated. This
application was denied, and an appeal was taken to the
joint board, which ordered a hearing upon the matter

of aggravation. The joint board reversed the action of
the supervisor, and directed that an additional amount
be allowed, whereupon the employer requested that a
further hearing be had, which request the department
granted. The workman then instituted the proceeding
by way of an application for a writ of mandate to re-
quire the supervisor to transmit to the state auditor a
voucher in favor of the workman. This court assumed,
without deciding, that the employer had no right to
petition the department for a rehearing, but held that
the department nevertheless had the right to grant a
rehearing on its own motion. This court held that the
matter was still pending before the department; that
the claim had not been finally disposed of by the joint
board; and that the relator was not entitled to the
relief which he sought before this court. This case has
no bearing upon the question of the right of an em-
ployer to appeal to the courts from an award in favor
of a workman.

In the case of Hoff v. Department of Labor & In-
dustries, supra, this court entertained and decided in
favor of the employer an appeal from a judgment of
the superior court entered in favor of the injured
workman. It seems to me that this is the only one of
our cases which is directly in point upon the matter
of the right of an employer to prosecute such an appeal
and obtain relief by way of the reversal of the award
in favor of the workman. As I understand the other
cases cited in the Hoff case, no one of them, in so far
as the question therein actually decided was concerned,
is direct authority for the proposition that an employer
may prosecute such an appeal, and contest the award
on the merits.

Undoubtedly, our decisions contain language which
is thoroughly consistent with the theory that an em-
ployer may appeal to the courts and contest, on the

merits, an award by the department in favor of his
injured employee. After careful consideration, how-
ever, I am convinced that an employer is not, within
the purview of § 7697, a person aggrieved by an order
of the department awarding compensation to his in-
jured employee, in so far as the actual award is con-
cerned, and that, on appeal to the courts from such
an award by the department, the employer can contest
only the charge against his cost experience, which fol-
lows as the result of the award made. In so far as the
award itself is concerned, the employer is no more
aggrieved, and in fact, if his payroll be small, he may
be much less aggrieved, than other employers in the
same group. Any question as to whether or not the
injured workman is within the scope and protection
of the act, and his remedy limited thereby, presents
an entirely different situation.

The allowance to an employer of a general appeal on
the merits, which would bring before the courts the
basic question of the propriety of the award, appears
wholly inconsistent with the rule laid down in the
recent case of State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196 Wash.
308, 82 P. (2d) 865, where we held that an appeal by
an employer from an award by the department in
favor of his injured employee did not operate as a
stay to delay the payment of compensation awarded
by the department to the injured workman, and that
such compensation must be paid pending the appeal,
and without regard to the outcome thereof. Under
the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7676, Laws of
1937, chapter 89, p. 345, § 1), the employer clearly has
a right to appeal to the courts from any departmental
determination as to his cost experience, and this right
is nowise enlarged by holding that the employer may
review that question on appeal under the right granted
by § 7697; and careful study of this section convinces

me that an employer is not aggrieved by such award
within the scope thereof, but is aggrieved within the
intent thereof if, because of the award, an unjust and
unwarranted addition to his cost experience is made
by the department.

In my opinion, the different provisions of the statute
concerning rehearings of decisions of the supervisor
before the joint board, and providing for appeals to
the superior court, are indefinite and ambiguous, and
in construing these provisions, the entire statute, its
clearly expressed purpose, and its orderly adminis-
tration must be considered. Certainly, if an employer
can appeal to the superior court from a departmental
order awarding compensation to his injured workman,
and contest before the courts the award on its merits,
the matter of compensation to injured workmen is
nowise removed from private controversy.

In my opinion, this court, in the case of Hoff v.
Department of Labor & Industries, swpra, should have’
considered only the question of whether or not the
award to the workman should or should not be made
the basis of a charge against the employer’s cost ex-
perience. Section 7697 provides that “appeal shall lie
from judgment of the superior court as in other civil
cases,” and appeals in other civil cases may be taken
only by parties aggrieved by the judgment of the su-
perior court. The jurisdiction of the superior court on
appeals from the department is statutory, and, in my
opinion, the only logical rule is that the employer is
not aggrieved by any judgment in favor of the work-
man which the superior court may grant, save in so
far as this judgment may affect his cost experience.
The interest of the employer does not become, as to
matters affecting an award to a workman under the
act, essentially different in nature from his interest
in the matter while the claim is pending before the de-

partment. Doubtless, the employer may and should
cooperate with the department, both in departmental
and judicial proceedings, but as the employer remains
at all times a private party, and as, under the act, the
matter of payment to an injured workman by way of
an award on account of injuries received by the work-
man has been removed from private controversy, the
employer at no stage of the proceedings becomes a
person aggrieved, within the meaning of the act, by
the making of an award.

Any controversy between a workman on the one
hand and the department on the other is not, in es-
sence, a private controversy, as the department is an
agency of the state, provided for by statute to ac-
complish certain statutory purposes. The same is true
as to any controversy between the employer on the
one hand and the department on the other, concerning
questions of law, but when the department, pursuant
“to its statutory authority, has made an award in favor
of a workman, to allow the workman’s employer to
appeal from that award to the superior court and
contest the same on the merits, presents a matter
which, it seems to me, is purely one of private con-
troversy. A workman may appeal from the depart-
ment’s denial of any award, or from the granting of
what he considers inadequate relief, and the employer
may appeal from a ruling of the department in favor
of a workman, and present any question which may
affect his cost experience; but to allow the employer
to appeal from the award in favor of the workman,
carries on what is no more than a private controversy
between the workman and his employer.

If, after the making of an award by the depart-
ment, the employer elects to appeal to the courts from
the departmental ruling and challenge the award for
the reason that the injured workman was not an em-

ployee, or that he was not engaged in extrahazardous
employment, or that he was not injured in the course
of his employment, or that, for any other reason, the
workman was not within the protection of the act, or
possibly for some other reason exclusive of the merits
of the award itself (as admittedly the employer has
the right to do), the employer, nevertheless, on appeal
may obtain relief from the courts, as on appeal from
the award itself, as above stated, only as to the matter
of any charge against his cost experience, and may not
obtain a review of the award itself on the merits.

As to whether or not an employer could appeal from
an award and present on such appeal the contention
that the award made was purely arbitrary and caprici-
ous and without foundation either in fact or in law,
I express no opinion. No such question is presented
in the case at bar.

As above stated, I am of the opinion that the same
rule should apply to appeals from the superior court
as applies to appeals from the department.

In the case at bar, in my opinion, the only question
which the employer may urge upon his appeal to this
court is whether or not the award which the judg-
ment of the superior court provides shall be made
should be charged against the employer’s cost ex-
perience.

I agree with the majority opinion in holding that the
preponderance of the evidence supports the findings
and decision of the department, but, in my opinion,
the relief granted by this court should be limited to a
direction that the cost experience of appellant be not
increased by the amount which respondent will receive.

Geracuty, J. (dissenting)—On the merits, I am of
the opinion that the judgment of the trial court was
correct and should be affirmed.

318

I am further of the view, for the reasons stated by
Judge Beals, that, in any event, the judgment entered
in pursuance of the majority opinion should be limited
in its effect to the cost experience rating of the ap-
pellant corporation.

I therefore dissent.

Buaxg, C. J., concurs with Grracuty, J.

[No. 27481. Department Two. August 25, 1939.]

In the Matter of the Estate of A. E. Larson, Deceased.
Surrtey D. Parker, as Administrator, Appellant, v.
R. M. Harpy et al., Respondents, Nat U. Brown
et al., Respondents and Cross-appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 431.

319

Isham N. Smith, Richards, Conklin & Delle, and
I. J. Bounds, for appellant.

Cheney & Hutcheson, for respondents Hardy et al.
and respondents and cross-appellants Brown et al.

Padden & Moriarty, for respondents Stolle et al.

Mrxarp, J—On the ground that the defendants
evolved and executed a plan (option and sale of eighty-
five thousand shares of Sunshine Mining Company
stock) by which they devastated the Larson estate and
unjustly enriched themselves, Shirley D. Parker, as
administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of the
estate of A. E. Larson, deceased, brought this action
to recover in excess of two million dollars against the
former corporate executor (Yakima First National
Bank) of the estate and against the executor’s officers
and employees and against other defendants.

One of the affirmative defenses was that the plain-
tiff is concluded by the court’s orders authorizing
option and sale of the shares of stock and the decree
approving the executor’s final account.

Two defendants, who were allowed as attorneys for
the former executor a fee of twenty-five thousand dol-
lars, all of which was paid except twenty-five hundred
dollars when decree was entered approving the final
account of the executor, by cross-complaint sought
award of that balance and of an additional fee in the
amount of twenty-five hundred dollars for professional
services rendered by them to the estate subsequent to
discharge of the executor—a total recovery of five
thousand dollars.

The trial court expressed the view that Mrs. Larson,
the only person really in interest, may not maintain
this action, as the original sale of fifteen thousand
shares of Sunshine stock and the option given on
seventy thousand shares of that stock were at the be-
hest and with the consent of Mrs. Larson; that, at the
time of the entry of the decree approving the executor’s
final account, Mrs. Larson was then possessed of all the
information regarding the administration of the res
of this estate that she ever obtained subsequently, and
that the release of the executor at that time effectually

released it and its attorneys and all other joint tort-
feasors. The trial court was of the further opinion
that the cross-complainants were entitled to a recovery
of only the balance due under their contract with the
executor. Judgment dismissing the complaint and
awarding recovery of twenty-five hundred dollars to
the cross-complainants was entered. Plaintiff ap-
pealed. Cross-complainants cross-appealed.

In 1920, A. E. Larson, Alexander Miller, J. B. Cox,
and N. P. Hull (at his death succeeded on the board of
directors of the Sunshine Mining Company by his son,
Carroll Hull) became interested in the Sunshine silver
mine in Idaho. A. E. Larson, who was president, and
Alexander Miller, who was vice-president and treas-
urer, of the mining company, were also vice-presidents
and directors of the Yakima First National Bank, of
Yakima, Washington.

In the early part of 1934, Grande, Stolle & Company,
of Seattle, agent of Seligman & Co., an investment
brokerage firm of New York, endeavored to obtain a
listing of the Sunshine Mining Company stock upon the
curb exchange for unlisted trading. Later, in the
spring of that year, an effort was made by Stolle to
obtain general listing, as under the securities exchange
act the stock could not be admitted for unlisted trad-
ing. In the spring of 1934, the stock was worth about
six dollars a share on the Spokane market, which was
the only market available for the stock at that time.
By the middle of June, the stock had fallen to $5.40 a
share. In submitting his financial statement to the
bank as a basis for loans, which he subsequently made
in 1934, Larson placed the value of his stock at one
dollar a share.

Sometime in May, 1934, while Mr. Larson was con-
fined to the hospital, a meeting of the board of directors

a

_ of the Sunshine Mining Company, at which meeting
Miller, Cox, I. H. Dills, and Hull were present, a reso-
lution was passed directing Mr. Dills to ascertain from
Seligman & Co. the details and expense of listing the
Sunshine Mining Company’s stock upon the curb ex-
change. During that spring, Mr. Miller was of the
opinion that the stock was selling at a price in excess of
its value, and he therefore sold off his stock in small
quantities as rapidly as it could be absorbed by the
Spokane market. All of the directors, with the excep-
tion of Larson, desired the stock to be listed on the
curb exchange and agreed they would override Larson’s
objections to listing the stock.

On June 7, 1934, A. E. Larson died. By his will, he
made special bequests of approximately five hundred
thousand dollars, among which was one of five thou-
sand dollars to R. M. Hardy, president of the Yakima
First National Bank, in appreciation of the honesty of
the latter in business dealings. The most valuable
and highest income-producing property of the Larson
marital community was 210,974 shares of stock in the
Sunshine Mining Company, a domestic corporation, -
which owns valuable silver mines in Idaho. Larson
nominated the Yakima First National Bank as executor
of his estate. Mr. Larson was buried June 11, 1934.

During the interim between the dates of Larson’s
death and burial, Mr. Miller, who was eighty years of
age and succeeded to the presidency on the death of
Mr. Larson, endeavored to find some one who could
be elected to the board of directors and take over the
presidency of the mining company. On June 11, 1934,
two days prior to the probate of the will on June 13,
1934, R. M. Hardy consented to act as president of the
Sunshine Mining Company. On that date, in order to
qualify him, Mr. Miller transferred one thousand
shares of the stock of that company to Mr. Hardy.

That evening, the board of directors of the Sunshine
Mining Company elected Mr. Hardy to membership on
the board. At that meeting, Charles Samuels, the
general superintendent of the mine, and Mr. Doucette,
the foreman of the mine, were present. They in-
formed the members of the board of directors, who
were discussing the question of listing the stock upon
the curb exchange, that, in order to obtain a listing
of the stock, it would be necessary to have an engineer’s
report. They further advised that some care would
have to be exercised in the selection of the engineer,
as a good engineer would not pass the mine for listing.
Mr. Miller appointed a committee consisting of the
secretary of the company, the attorney for the com-
pany, I. H. Dills, and R. M. Hardy to investigate the
listing.

On June 13th, the Yakima First National Bank
qualified as executor and the will was admitted to
probate. On the same date, the residuary legatee and
surviving widow filed a petition for family allowance,
alleging that the value of the estate was approximately
one and one-half million dollars.

On the 27th day of June, 1934, the board of directors
of the Sunshine Mining Company adopted a resolution
authorizing the filing of an application for listing of
the stock. Seligman & Co. agreed to undertake the
listing and pay all expenses upon condition that the
four major stockholders—the Larson estate, Alexander
Miller, Mrs. N. P. Hull, and J. B. Cox—would agree to
sell ten thousand shares each, grant options upon suf-
ficient of the remainder of their shares of the stock to
represent approximately a total of forty per cent of
their holdings, and agree that they would not sell
more than a limited quantity of stock; and that Stolle
Company, who represented Seligman & Co., should
obtain a minimum of two hundred thousand shares

under a contract and option. The executor bank re-
tained the firm of Rigg, Brown & Halverson as its at-
torneys.

During the period of the first negotiation, Mrs. Lar-
son and her son, Shirley D. Parker, were absent in
California. When they returned to this state, about
July 4, 1934, R. M. Hardy explained all of the transac-
tion respecting the agreement for listing of the stock
to Shirley Parker, who was acting as the agent of his
mother. At her request, Shirley Parker was placed
on the pay roll of the bank as executor, at a salary of
one thousand dollars monthly, to assist in the adminis-
tration of the estate. Shirley Parker, Mrs. Larson’s
son by a prior marriage, was a practicing lawyer, and
some of his years as an attorney-at-law were with one
of his present counsel, I. N. Smith.

Upon the return of Mrs. Larson and her son to this
state, the latter consulted with a reputable lawyer of
Yakima respecting the exercise by Mrs. Larson of her
right to administer the community estate. He later
informed that lawyer he would permit the bank to
continue if satisfactory fee arrangements could be made
with the executor’s attorneys. At a conference be-
tween Parker and the attorneys of the executor bank,
the listing of the stock was discussed, and the parties
agreed upon an attorney’s fee of twenty-five thousand
dollars. Parker insisted that the estate be closed
* within one year, as he desired to avoid long drawn
out proceedings with resultant expense. The attorneys
advised Parker that, if the listing arrangements were
consummated, the options taken and the stock sold at
the option price, the estate could be closed within a
year except for the final clearance from the state and
Federal governments, which would probably require
a little more time. .

It clearly appears from the evidence that Hardy in-

formed Parker respecting the options, the requirement
of a favorable engineer’s report, and that Seligman
would exercise the options if the report was favorable.
It is also clear that Parker was given all the informa-
tion that Mr. Stolle gave to Mr. Hardy and the other
directors.

On July 26, 1934, the attorneys for the executor
bank prepared a petition, which was presented to the
court commissioner, for authority to sell ten thousand
shares of stock upon installment paying basis at
$5.825 a share, and to option seventy thousand shares
of the stock at $6.90 a share. Mr. Parker read the
option form and discussed at some length the matter
with the attorneys. Mr. Parker testified that Mr.
Hardy told him that he believed that, if the listing
program succeeded, the market under the guidance of
Seligman would increase the price of the remainder
of the Sunshine stock in the Larson estate in an amount
in excess of the worth of all of the stock at that time.
Mr. Parker testified that he read the petition requesting
the authorization and he believed that it would result
in benefit to the estate. Others testified in favor of
granting the petition, and no one appeared in opposi-
tion to it.

The petition states that it is necessary that some part
of the personal property of the estate be sold to pay
the specific bequests provided in the will and that the
petitioner believes that the offer of Grande, Stolle &
Company is the best offer that could be received for a
portion of the stock. The superior court commis-
sioner of Yakima county signed the order authorizing
the sale and delivered the original petition and the
signed order to the attorneys for the executor. The
petition and order were not filed until February 27,
1935, which was subsequent to the date of the exercise
of the options for seventy thousand shares of stock.

On July 31, 1934, on request of Mr. Parker, a second
petition was presented to the court commissioner for
authority to sell fifteen thousand shares of the Sunshine
stock at $5.825 a share for cash. An order was made
authorizing the sale of fifteen thousand shares at $5.825
ashare. After this order, which canceled the order of
July 26, 1934, as to the sale of ten thousand shares and
ratified the order authorizing the optioning of seventy
thousand shares, was signed by the court commissioner,
it, together with the petition therefor, were given to
the attorneys for the executor bank and by them placed
in their safe. On August 13, 1934, the stock was listed
on the curb exchange of New York.

Parker possessed this information. He continuously
watched the trust ledger kept by the bank executor,
and he saw the sales of the stock being made at $6.90
a share when the market price was increasing to ten,
eleven, and twelve dollars a share.

About August 15, 1934, an attempt by diamond
drilling to intersect the vein in the mine on the twenty-
three hundred foot level was successful, and good ore
was found. That vein was seven and one-half feet
wide, and the company’s assay disclosed forty ounces
of silver to the ton. A statement was sent to the stock-
holders of the Sunshine Mining Company, in which
the listing of the stock on the curb exchange was an-
nounced and a statement was made of the result of the
diamond drilling. A copy of this report was also
released to the press. In the latter part of August or
the first week of September, 1934, a copy was person-
ally delivered to Mr. Parker and to Mr. Hardy.

About this time, at the instance of Mr. Parker, it
was decided to request an extension of time to No-
vember 23, 1934, in which to file an inventory and ap-
praisal of the estate. On October 25, 1934, an order,
which recites appearance of the executor by its at-

torneys and that Rose B. Larson appeared by her duly
authorized agent, Shirley D. Parker, was entered by
the court authorizing the extension.

The first mining stock of the Larson estate under
option was sold about September 1, 1934. About De-
cember 5, 1934, is the last date of the exercise of the
option to purchase the stock. In August, 1934, Parker,
who was acquainted with the market price of that
mining stock on ‘the Spokane market and the New
York curb exchange, went to Los Angeles and then
to New York. On August 23, 1934, he telegraphed Mr.
Hardy expression of appreciation for the letter and en-
closures received from Mr. Hardy, and asked Hardy
for the status of the options and for further develop-
ments or news. Hardy telegraphed Parker that no
further options had been taken up, and that the drilling
disclosed good ore in the mine on the twenty-three
hundred foot level.

The next day, Parker departed for New York and so
advised Hardy. While in New York, he visited Mr.
Seligman, who gave to him a copy of the printed ap-
plication to list the Sunshine stock. Parker was in-
formed by Seligman, in answer to his request for the
opinion of the latter as to the height the price of the
stock would rise, that the price would go as high as
fifteen dollars a share at the then price of silver. There
is testimony to the effect that Parker informed Selig-
man that the Larson estate owned about two hundred
thousand shares of this mining stock, on a portion of
which options had been given and some of the shares
sold, and Seligman’s advice was sought respecting the
question whether more stock should be sold.

There is no doubt that, either in August or in No-
vember, 1934, Parker received full and complete in-
formation concerning the mine and the value of the
stock. While he was assisting in administration of the

estate, he inspected the trust ledger, which was in
custody of the corporate executor, and saw the entries
therein covering deposits, disbursements, etc., during
1934 and 1935. In that ledger is a copy of the petition
for probate of the last will of A. E. Larson, with which
is the inventory and appraisement of the estate. The
mining stock was appraised at $6.90 a share, with the
exception of fifteen thousand shares, which were sold
at $5.825 a share, all information as to which is entered
in the trust ledger, which Parker testified he read.
The record was before Parker and shows that the cor-
porate executor received the money upon the exercise
of the options between September 1, 1934, and De-
cember 5, 1934, and that record, which Parker read,
shows the deposits of the trust funds and the date of
each deposit.

After December 5, 1934, Mr. Parker and his mother
were absent from this state. As his mother’s agent,
he wrote to a firm of reputable attorneys in Yakima,
which he retained to advise him as to the statutory
requirements for publication, in order that the estate
might be closed at the earliest possible moment after
February, 1935. This firm of attorneys examined the
court records on file and checked the inheritance tax
reports, ete. Parker knew that, while the Sunshine
stock of the estate was appraised at $5.825 and $6.90
a share, that stock was then selling for twice that
amount.

On November 10, 1934, a complete report on diamond
drilling in the mine was mailed to all of the stock-
holders of the mining company, released to the press,
and a copy given to Mr. Parker at that time. This,
doubtless, was the report for which Parker was wait-
ing when he appeared in court October 5, 1934, as the
duly authorized agent of his mother, Mrs. Rose B.
Larson, and testified in support of his petition for an

pe

extension of time to November 23, 1934, in which to
file an inventory and appraisal of the estate. On
February 2, 1935, and on February 13, 1935, Mr. Parker
became conversant with the engineer’s report of de-
velopments since the report of July, 1934, of that
engineer.

On or about this time, Mr. Parker requested that
the estate be closed. The attorneys for the executor
commenced preparation of the final account. On dis-
covering that the petitions and orders for the sale and
option of the stock had not been filed of record, those
attorneys immediately had them filed. On April 23,
1935, the bank, as executor, filed its final report and
petition praying distribution of the estate and discharge
of the executor. The petition was set for hearing on
May 24, 1935. Mr. Parker, acting for his mother, re-
tained a firm of attorneys to represent the beneficiaries
upon the hearing of the final account. Parker and
Mr. I. N. Smith (one of the attorneys for the appel-
lant) had a copy of the final account. The attorneys
retained by Mr. Parker obtained three continuances,
the last continuance setting the hearing on the final
account on June 25, 1935, for Mr. Parker’s convenience
and because of the illness of Mr. Smith.

On May 1, 1935, the court entered an order granting
the petition for preliminary partial distribution to Mrs.
Larson of fifteen thousand shares of Sunshine stock.
That petition recited that the inventory showed a total
of 210,974 shares of Sunshine stock as property of the
Larson marital community, of which stock eighty-five
thousand shares had been sold, leaving 125,974 shares
in the estate. ,

In May or June, 1935, it was decided that, instead
of finally closing the estate, the bank would resign as
executor and Shirley D. Parker would be appointed
administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, and

all the estate would be distributed to Mrs. Larson
except enough to pay the unpaid bequests, in the
amount of approximately ninety-five thousand dollars,
and any future or additional inheritance taxes that
might be due. Prior to the consummation of that plan,
one of the attorneys retained by Parker, one of present
counsel for appellant, Shirley D. Parker, and one of
the attorneys for the executor bank had a conference
respecting the execution by Mrs. Larson of a bond to
save the bank harmless from any unpaid obligations
and giving a general release to the bank. Parker in-
quired whether the release would discharge the bank
from undiscovered fraud. He was assured that it
would not; that the release was not intended to cover
undiscovered fraud.

There is testimony that one of the reasons the bank
desired the release was that the record showed sales
of Sunshine stock at $6.90 a share, when that was less
than the market price of the stock, with which situa-
tion all the parties were familiar, and the bank wanted
the release from any possible liability on any such
transaction. Mr. Parker’s testimony was to the effect
that he was informed that, if a release were not signed,
the bank would demand fifty thousand dollars execu-
tor’s fees and one hundred thousand dollars as at-
torney’s fees.

Prior to the hearing upon the final account, one of
the attorneys retained by Mr. Parker made a thorough
examination of the records at the court house and, of
course, informed himself respecting the petitions and
orders authorizing sale and option of the stock. In his
discussion with Mr. Parker and one of present counsel
for appellant of the question of the validity of those
transactions, one of Mr. Parker’s attorneys advised
them that any objections they had to the sales and
options should be made at the hearing upon the final

account. At that time, Parker and one of his present
counsel were complaining of fraud by the bank and
its president in the matter of the sale of the stock at
less than the market price.

On June 25, 1935, the resignation of the bank as the
executor of the estate was accepted and an order was
entered approving the account of the executor, fixing
executor’s fees and attorney’s fees, partially distribu-
ting the estate, and appointing Shirley D. Parker as
administrator de bonis non with the-will annexed. The
petition of his attorney for appointment of appellant as
administrator de bonis non with the will annexed
recites:

“That Yakima First National Bank, a corporation,
named as executor in said will, duly qualified as such
and from the time of its appointment and qualification
has duly administered said estate. That said executor
has filed in this court an account of all its acts in re-
lation to the administration of said estate and has
tendered its resignation as such executor to this court,
asking that its account be approved and that all of said
estate be distributed except 15,000 shares of stock of
Sunshine Mining Company, a corporation. Said execu-
tor has further asked that it be discharged from further
responsibility under said trust and that its sureties be
discharged from further liability on its bond.”

The order approving the final account and making
the appointment requested recites that there has been
no final audit as to inheritance tax, that there may be
further liability, that there were unpaid bequests ap-
proximating ninety-five thousand dollars, and recites:

“That by reason of the non-payment of said two be-
quests and the possible liability of said estate for
further inheritance taxes and estate taxes, it is not
deemed advisable to close said estate at this time, but
that the court deems it advisable that a partial distribu-
tion of said estate be had and that the court finds that
15,000 shares of the capital stock of the Sunshine

Mining Company, a corporation, will be fully sufficient
and ample, if sold, to pay said bequests and any further
claims against said estate for inheritance taxes or
estate taxes, and additional costs of administration, if
any.”

The order also recites that all the property of the
estate was inventoried and appraised, that Rose B.
Larson, widow of the deceased, is the only heir, and
then proceeds to distribute the property as follows:

An undivided one-half interest in certain real prop-
erty subject to a life estate to Rose B. Larson, and then
adjudges,

“. , . that all the remainder of said estate, real,
personal and mixed, wherever situate and being, or
to which the said deceased was at his death in any way
entitled, and all equitable and legal rights which he
held or may hereafter acquire, whether described in
the inventory and appraisement herein or any of these
proceedings or not, except 15,000 shares of the capital
stock of the Sunshine Mining Company, a corporation,
be and the same is hereby distributed to Rose B. Lar-
son, widow of said deceased, of legal age;

The fees of the bank were fixed at fifteen thousand
dollars and the fees of the bank’s attorneys were fixed
at twenty-five thousand dollars, of which amount
twenty-two thousand, five hundred dollars had been
paid, and it was further adjudged and decreed:

“OrpERED, ApJUDGED AND DecreEp that the said ac-
count and supplemental account of Yakima First Na-
tional Bank as executor to the date hereof be and the
same is hereby fully approved and confirmed, and all
payments made by said bank are hereby ratified and
approved; and

“Tr FurtHer APPEARING TO THE Court that at the
conclusion of said hearing on said account, said Yakima
First National Bank submitted its resignation as execu-
tor herein, and the said Rose B. Larson submitted a
verified petition asking for the appointment of

Shirley D. Parker, her son, as administrator de bonis
non with the will annexed.”

The resignation of the bank was accepted, Parker
was found to be a proper ‘person for appointment as
administrator de bonis non upon his qualifying there-
for, and in conclusion it was

“ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DecrEED that on the filing
by said Yakima First National Bank of a receipt from
the said Rose B. Larson showing delivery to her of all
the personal property now in the hands of said bank
belonging to said estate, with the exception of 15,000
shares of the capital stock of Sunshine Mining Com-
pany, a corporation, and a receipt showing delivery to
the said Shirley D. Parker, as administrator de bonis
non with the will annexed, of the said 15,000 shares
of the capital stock of the Sunshine Mining Company,
said bank shall be entitled to an order exonerating its
bond as executor herein and exonerating it from any
further liability of any kind, character or description
as executor of said estate.”

Thereafter, a distribution of the Larson estate was
made as directed in the order of June 25, 1935. On
July 6, 1935, the court entered its final order accepting
the resignation of the executor and discharging it
and its bondsmen from liability.

The bond and release signed by Rose B. Larson was
signed in the presence of only her son, who took that
instrument to her. He testified that he had a general
conversation with her when she signed the release to
the effect that she was releasing the bank for all books
of account, and she read the release before she signed
it. The bond and release signed by Mrs. Larson when
same was presented to her for that purpose by her son,
at which time none of the rest was present, reads, so
far as material, as follows:

“Whereas, It is the desire of both parties hereto to

distribute all the property thereof in the hands of said
bank, except 15,000 shares of the capital stock of Sun-

shine Mining Company, to the undersigned, and to
permit the bank to resign its trust;

“WHEREAS, no final audit of the Federal estate tax
return and the state inheritance tax return has been
made and there may be a liability of said estate for ad-
ditional estate and inheritance taxes;

“Now Tuererorr, if the above bounden principal
shall pay all additional Federal estate taxes and state
inheritance taxes and all other claims of like kind,
character and description that may be made against
the said bank as executor, this obligation shall be void;
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. And the
above bounden principal further hereby released the
said bank and its officers, and agents from all claim of
any kind, character or description that may now exist
or may hereafter arise by reason of said bank’s acting
as executor of said estate or in the conduct of the busi-
ness of said estate during such time as said bank was
executor. Provided that this release shall not operate
to release the said bank and its officers from accounting
for the property and assets of said estate and distrib-
uting the same in the manner provided by law, nor
relieve the attorneys for said executor and said estate
from their duty of handling all matters in connection
with inheritance taxes and estate taxes, or any litiga-
tion that may arise therefrom, without further expense
to said estate, other than the balance due on the fee
allowed by court, for their services.”

The ten days in which to commence proceedings for
revision of the accounts of the court commissioner ex-
pired July 5, 1935. The final order discharging the
executor and exonerating the bond was filed July .6,
1935, after all the receipts and other orders had been
filed showing the delivery of all the personal property
in the hands of the bank, with the exception of fifteen
thousand shares of the mining stock, to Rose B. Larson,
and showing delivery to Shirley D. Parker, as adminis-
trator de bonis non of fifteen thousand shares of Sun-
shine Mining Company stock.

This action was commenced by the filing of sum-

mons and complaint June 23, 1936. Notice of appeal
from the judgment effective November 22, 1938, was
filed December 10, 1938, and the cause heard in this
court June 12, 1939. In addition to briefs and citations
covering six hundred and ninety-six pages, the record
consists of four hundred pages of transcript, twenty-
one hundred and forty pages of testimony, and many
exhibits; however, our disposition of the appeal obviates
necessity of discussion of all of the questions presented.
by appellant’s twenty-two assignments of error.

HI The orders of July 26 and July 31, 1934, au-
thorizing option and sale of the Sunshine Stock, were
entered by the probate court pursuant to statutory au-
thority (Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 1493 to 1591), therefore
were valid. The statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1493 [P.
C. § 9975]) provides that the court may order a sale of
any personal property of the estate for any reason
which may, to the court, seem right and proper, upon
such terms or conditions as the court may prescribe.
The grant of an option to buy is within the terms of a
power to sell, where reasonably necessary to effect a
sale at an advantage. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
2186, § 741.

|| The orders authorizing the option and sale of
the stock and the receipt and disbursement of the
proceeds of the sale of the stock were ratified and ap-
proved by the decree of June 25, 1935, which approved
the final account of the executor and made complete
and final distribution of the estate, with the exception
of certain property which was reserved for use in pay-
ment of certain bequests and unpaid taxes. Hearing
was had upon proper statutory notice. All parties
interested appeared in court by counsel and obtained
three continuances. They carefully examined the ac-
count, discussed the subject of sales of the stock and
the price received for the stock. A full and complete.

hearing was had in court, where all were given op-
portunity to voice any objection any desired to make.
Mr. Parker was advised by his counsel that the hearing
on the final account was the time and the place to com-
plain, but he registered no complaint. There was no
appeal from the decree of final distribution, therefore,
the decree is res adjudicata. Laack v. Hawkins, 155
Wash. 308, 284 Pac. 89.

“The order in probate upon the statutory published
notice approving the executor’s final account and the
decree of distribution is final and res adjudicata of
all matters covered by that order and all questions
that should have been raised at the hearing upon the
final account and petition for distribution. .

“The entire history of the mortgage transactions
which constituted a refund of a prior mortgage debt
created by Bostock in his lifetime appears in the
interim report of November 4, 1931, a copy of which
was sent to appellants’ attorneys. While the mortgages
were not originally authorized by the court, the mort-
gages were ratified by its order approving the interim
report.” Bostock v. Brown, 198 Wash. 288, 88 P. (2d)
445,

In reversing a judgment of the superior court setting
aside a court commissioner’s order in a probate matter,
which order was not taken before the superior court
for revision nor was an appeal taken therefrom, we
said in In re Rabie’s Estate, 199 Wash. 207, 90 P.
(2d) 1011:

“The order of March 31st, eliminating the eight
thousand dollars from the inventory, being neither
taken before the superior court for revision nor ap-
pealed from, became a final adjudication, and it is not
before us for review. We express no opinion as to
whether the commissioner was in error when he en-
tered the order of March 31st which struck the eight
thousand dollars from the inventory.

“Whether the court commissioner had the right to
vacate the order bringing the entire eight thousand

dollars into the inventory with the consent and: ap-
proval of all the interested parties, is not of controlling
importance. It may be said, in passing, that, the order
having been consented to and approved, those now
objecting to it are not in a position to complain. [Citing
cases.] The reason is that the parties, in effect, having
invited the court commissioner to enter the order,
will not be permitted to complain thereof, even though
its entry was erroneous. [Citing cases.]”

Our examination of the record discloses that none
of the respondents purchased or received, directly
or indirectly, any shares of Sunshine stock of the
Larson estate. The record is clear that, so far as any
information which would throw light on the orders
of July 26 and July 31, 1934, is concerned, nothing was
concealed from Mr. Parker, who was the agent and
attorney for his mother. If we assumed that the only
testimony in the record was that which sustained the
allegations in the complaint as to the two orders and
the final decree, a case would be presented of intrinsic
fraud; hence, insufficient to sustain a cause of action.
Bostock v. Brown, 198 Wash. 288, 88 P. (2d) 445.

Hs. Larson, acting with full knowledge of the
facts of the case, not under the influence of misrepre-
sentation or other wrongful conduct on the part of
respondents, and represented by her son, an attorney,
executed the release quoted above. She is now
estopped by that release to allege that the conduct of
the executor was a breach of trust. 4 Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees, 2708, § 941.

At the time the release was executed, Mrs. Larson
was represented by four lawyers, one of whom was
her son, Shirley D. Parker. All of those lawyers
were fully advised as to all of the facts. The subject
of prosecution of the action which is now before us,
was discussed by those lawyers; and at that time, Mr.
Parker was advised that the questions he now raises,

if not raised prior to execution of the release and the
entry of’ the decree approving the final account, would
be barred by the release and the decree.

None of the respondents conversed with Mrs. Larson
respecting the release. Her son, appellant adminis-
trator, took the release to his mother, whom he ad-
vised that she was releasing the bank. Mrs. Larson
read the release and signed it. There is no evidence
that she did anything under duress, and there is not,
as there surely cannot be, any claim that Mr. Parker
did anything under duress. Our research fails to elicit
any evidence that Mrs. Larson, who never testified,
did not know everything that it is claimed was con-
cealed from Shirley Parker. There is a complete
failure of proof of an essential element to establish
the charge of fraud; that is, that the facts were con-
cealed from Mrs. Larson.

HI The assignment that the court erred in not con-
struing clause seventeen of the Larson will as pro-
hibiting the grant of the options, and that the orders
of July 26 and July 31, 1934, were violative of that
clause, is without substantial merit. The clause pro-
vides that the executor shall have three years, if neces-
sary, to liquidate enough property to pay all of the
bequests of the testator. All that is meant by the
clause is that the executor is given in excess of the
statutory six-months period and prevents a legatee
from successfully claiming interest because of failure
of payment of a legacy prior to three years.

Any claim that the orders were erroneous because
of clause seventeen of the will may not be urged at this
time. The question of the propriety, necessity, or
reason for the sale of the stock was completely ad-
judicated by the entry of the order and became final
upon the expiration of the time to appeal or revise,
as we stated in an earlier portion of this opinion.

| Counsel for appellant assign as error the award.
to Brown and Halverson, attorneys for the executor,
of twenty-five hundred dollars, balance of attorney’s
fee reserved by decree entered June 25, 1935. Those
two attorneys cross-appealed from the judgment which
limits their recovery to twenty-five hundred dollars.

A few days prior to the resignation of the bank as
executor of the Larson estate, Mr. Brown, one of the
executor’s counsel, discussed with appellant Parker
and Mr. Smith, one of appellant’s attorneys, the ques-
tion of the validity of Mr. Larson’s bequest of forty
thousand dollars for the improvement of Painted Rocks
Park in Yakima county. The resignation of the ex-
ecutor, the execution of bond and release by Mrs.
Larson, the petition and appointment of appellant as
administrator, and the final hearing, were all parts
or steps of one transaction or proceeding in which all
of the parties appeared. With knowledge of the provi-
sions of the will and acquaintance with the question
as to the validity of the Painted Rocks Park bequest—
one of the bequests to secure payment of which fifteen
thousand shares of Sunshine stock were transferred
to appellant administrator—a decree was entered
awarding the attorneys of executor bank a fee of
twenty-five thousand dollars, all of which, with the
exception of twenty-five hundred dollars, was paid
by the estate to the attorneys. That the fee of twenty-
five thousand dollars was allowed for all services of
the attorneys to the estate to the date of decree of
June 25, 1935, and for services to be rendered in the
future in connection with inheritance taxes solely, is
clear from an inspection of the bond and release exe-
cuted by Mrs. Larson. So far as pertinent, that in-
strument reads as follows:

“Provided that the release shall not operateto . . .
relieve the attorneys for said executor of said estate

from their duties in handling all matters in connec-
tion with inheritance taxes and estate taxes or any
litigation that may arise therefrom, without further
expense to said estate, other than the balance due on
the fee allowed by the court, for their services.”

All that was required of the executor’s attorneys,
to be entitled to the twenty-five hundred dollars re-
served from their fee of twenty-five thousand dollars,
was to handle the inheritance tax question and any
litigation arising therefrom; this they did. It follows
that those attorneys are entitled to that amount
awarded by the judgment in this action.

Cross-appellants insist that they are entitled to an
additional fee of not less than twenty-five hundred
dollars for services rendered to the estate after the
bank resigned as executor. Appellant retained those
attorneys a few days subsequent to entry of decree
of June 25, 1935, approving final account of executor,
appointing present administrator, etc., to institute an
action to set aside the Painted Rocks Park bequest.
Those two lawyers were successful and thereby in-
creased the residuary estate of the appellant’s mother
in the amount of forty thousand dollars, less Federal
and state inheritance taxes of a little more than two
thousand dollars. :

Counsel for appellant concede that a reasonable fee
should be paid for the “good work” performed, if the
estate is liable therefor, but argue that the attorneys
knew, prior to the resignation of the executor and the
discharge of the executor’s attorneys, that the bequest
was invalid, and it was part of the duty of those at-
torneys “then to protect the estate by attempting to
void the legacy.”

Patently, the attorneys are entitled to compensation
for the services they rendered to the estate which re-
tained them to render special legal services which they

efficiently performed. They were retained by appel-
lant, to whose attention the question of the validity
of the bequest was brought prior to his appointment
as administrator and before the discharge of cross-
appellants as attorneys for the executor, and with full
knowledge of all the facts those attorneys were re-
lieved from duty of handling any matter in connection
with the estate in the future except the matter of
taxes. They did not conceal from the appellant, prior
to his appointment as administrator, the fact that they
questioned the validity of the bequest. Every duty
that devolved upon them prior to the final settlement,
the resignation of the executor, and their discharge
as attorneys of the executor, was performed by cross-
appellants. The fee they ask is reasonable for the very
considerable service rendered to the estate since June
25, 1935. .

The judgment is affirmed on the appeal. The judg-
ment is reversed on the cross-appeal, and remanded
with direction to the trial court to enter judgment in
favor of cross-appellants for the additional fee of
twenty-five hundred dollars, or a total award of five
thousand dollars.

Bragg, C. J., GeracHty, Ropinson, and Sumeson, JJ.
concur.

342

(No, 27469. Department Two. August 29, 1939.]

D. G. CottyEr, Respondent, v. J. L. Eapert, Defendant,
Jerry Vanpos, Appellant.t

Newton & Newton and Wm. A. Johnson, for appel-
lant.

Cooper & Cooper, for respondent.

Brats, J—In his amended complaint upon which
the action was tried, plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ants J. L. Egbert and Jerry Vandos were copartners,
doing business in the city of Everett under the trade
name of Everett Petroleum Distributing Company;
that, October 1, 1937, plaintiff delivered to defendant
Egbert his check for eight hundred dollars, the pro-
ceeds thereof to be used for the purpose of buying a
truck for plaintiff; that Egbert, without plaintifi’s
knowledge or consent, deposited the check to the credit
of the partnership composed of himself and Vandos;
and that the partnership used the money in payment

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 399.

of partnership debts; that plaintiff demanded of the
defendants that they repay the amount which he had
delivered to Egbert, but that they refused to do so.

The complaint then set forth a second cause of ac-
tion, with which we are not concerned, and a third
cause of action, repeating the allegations as to the
partnership and further alleging that the partnership
employed one Art M. Hagen and became indebted to
Hagen, for labor performed by him, in the sum of
$81.24, which account Hagen had assigned to plaintiff.
Judgment was demanded for the amounts due.

Defendant Jerry Vandos, for himself and Everett Pe-
troleum Distributing Company, answered the amended
complaint, denying the material allegations of the first
cause of action and alleging that any transaction be-
tween plaintiff and the defendant J. L. Egbert was a
personal loan from plaintiff to Egbert, and that neither
Vandos nor the company benefited thereby. Answer-
ing the third cause of action, the material allegations
thereof were denied.

The action was tried to the court, sitting without a
jury, and resulted in findings of fact and conclusions
of law in plaintiff’s favor and against defendant Jerry
Vandos and the partnership (the defendant Egbert
not having appeared in the action and apparently not
having been served with process), followed by a judg-
ment against defendant Vandos and the partnership,
from which defendant Vandos has appealed.

Error is assigned upon the ruling of the trial court
denying appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence interposed at the close of respondent’s case;
upon the finding of the trial court that Egbert and ap-
pellant were partners, and upon several other findings
in connection with the relationship of appellant and
Egbert; upon the finding of the trial court that re-
spondent’s assignor, Art Hagen, performed labor for

defendants at their request; upon the entry of con-
clusions of law in respondent’s favor; and upon the
refusal of the trial court to make certain findings of
fact and conclusions of law proposed by appellant.
Error is also assigned upon the denial of appellant’s
motion for a new trial, and upon the entry of judg-
ment against him.

The question turns upon the liability of appellant
as a partner or associate of defendant Egbert, the trial
court having found that Egbert and Vandos were
partners, and that, for this reason, appellant Vandos
and the partnership were liable to respondent.

It appears that, prior to January 1, 1937, the Sunset
Oil Company was acting as a distributor of petroleum
products in the city of Everett. Soon after the date
mentioned, the company discontinued its operations as
distributor, and this branch of the business was taken
over by individuals. Defendant J. L. Egbert had been
in the company’s employ for about five years, and soon
after January 1, 1937, the company and Egbert entered
into a contract whereby Egbert was to act as dis-
tributor of the products sold by the company for the
territory in and around Everett. According to the
rules of the company, none of its distributors could
be a member of any partnership, and Egbert stated
to the company’s manager that he had no partner.

During the month of December, 1936, there was
filed in the office of the clerk of Snohomish county a
certificate of assumed name, stating that William
Hickey and J. L. Egbert were doing business under
the assumed name and style of Everett Petroleum Dis-
tributing Company. Late in January following, an-
other certificate was filed, stating that J. L. Egbert
was engaged in business under the name and style as
above stated.

The business was thereafter conducted under the

trade name referred to, and under the contract with
the oil company, until February, 1938, Egbert, being
in need of money, made some arrangements with ap-
pellant, whereby the latter turned over to Egbert five
thousand dollars, Egbert satisfying the oil company
that he had this amount of money, which he stated
he had received from relatives in Oregon. It is ad-
mitted that, under the agreement between Egbert and
appellant, checks on the bank account, which was kept
in the name of Everett Petroleum Distributing Com-
pany, had to be signed by both Egbert and appellant,
the notice to the bank in which the account was kept,
bearing the signatures of both men, being in evidence,
the card bearing the notice, “both signatures required
on all checks.” .

Appellant denies that he was a partner of Egbert.
He contends that he simply advanced five thousand
dollars to Egbert, of which about three thousand dol-
lars had been returned to him, appellant contending
that it was agreed between Egbert and himself that
he should sign all checks on the company account,
simply as a measure of protection against wrongful
diversion of funds by Egbert. Appellant was in the
fuel business and purchased oil and gas from Egbert,
testifying that he gave Egbert credit for such supplies
upon his loan to Egbert, appellant also testifying that
he was to receive interest upon the amount loaned, at
the rate of six per cent per annum. Appellant also
testified that the day after he turned over the five
thousand dollars to Egbert, the latter returned fifteen
hundred dollars to him. He also talked rather vaguely
about a bond which Egbert gave him, but the nature
of this bond was not explained.

The evidence clearly discloses that, October 1, 1937,
respondent delivered his check for eight hundred
dollars to Egbert; that Egbert endorsed this check,

which was also endorsed by Everett Petroleum Dis-
tributing Company; that the check was deposited to
the credit of the latter company and the amount thereof
checked out by Egbert and appellant in payment of
company expenses. Respondent and appellant both
testified at the trial, but Egbert did not testify, having
left the jurisdiction of the court.

HI Apparently it was some time before it occurred
to respondent that he had been defrauded, and after
he -was aware of this fact, respondent several times
stated that he made no claim against appellant. The
trial court held that respondent’s statements that
he made no claim against appellant were competent
evidence and entitled to consideration, but were not
conclusive as against respondent, and were simply en-
titled to be considered with the other evidence before
the court. The trial court’s position on this phase of
the case was clearly correct, appellant contending,
of course, that the trial court did not give sufficient
weight to this portion of the evidence.

HH The evidence as to the actual business rela-
tionship existing between appellant and Egbert is not
altogether clear. The company for whom Egbert was
acting as distributor forbade him to have a partner.
Appellant admits that he turned over to Egbert five
thousand dollars and that he took quite an active part
in the distributing business, admitting that he signed
all checks. The trial court criticized the testimony
both of appellant and of respondent, as not entirely
frank, and commented upon the fact that, while ap-
pellant testified concerning a bond which Egbert exe-
cuted in his favor, no such document, nor any other
paper signed by Egbert bearing upon the relationship
between Egbert and appellant, was introduced in evi-
dence. The court also commented upon the fact that

appellant failed to produce the books of account, which
the court observed were under appellant’s control.

As we said in the recent case of Barovic v. Constanti,
183 Wash. 60, 48 P. (2d) 257, the question of fact as
to whether or not a partnership existed in a particular
case must be determined by the facts shown in that
case, “and, for the most part, the facts are to be
gleaned rather from the acts and conduct of the par-
ties than from the spoken word.”

In 2 Rowley, Modern’ Law of Partnership, 1230,
§ 880, it is stated that:

“Partnership, like every other fact, must be proved
by competent evidence, and it can not be shown by
mere supposition. It may, however, be shown not
only by an actual written contract, but by parol, by
the acts of the parties, their admissions—in fact, by
the circumstances of the case.”

This doctrine was recognized by this court in the
eases of Richardton Roller Mills v. Miller, 99 Wash. °
654, 170 Pac. 357, and Cruickshank v. Lich, 158 Wash.
523, 291 Pac. 485.

The trial court was of the opinion that appellant
was a silent partner, and of course it is admitted that
appellant’s name was never openly used in connec-
tion with the business. Appellant was not a silent
partner in the sense that he had no voice in the firm’s
business. His right to sign all checks indicates a con-
siderable measure of control, whatever was the exact
nature of the agreement between appellant and Egbert.

Appellant testified that, before Egbert departed, he
had collected on accounts owned by the Sunset Oil
Company over $1,100; that there were NSF checks out-
standing amounting to $1,148.88; and that the physical
assets of the business amounted to less than two hun-
dred dollars. Appellant had possession of such docu-
ments as existed, bearing upon the relationship be-

tween himself and Egbert. He also had possession of
the books and accounts of the business. Yet, as noted
by the trial court, appellant produced at the trial none
of these records, and his testimony is vague and un-
satisfactory and, to some extent, contradictory. Sev-
eral of his own witnesses gave testimony which indi-
cates that some business relationship other than cred-
itor and debtor existed between appellant and Egbert.
One of appellant’s-witnesses, Arthur O. Thiry, testi-
fied that, during the month of February, appellant
told the witness that he (appellant) was part owner
of the business.

Many authorities are cited in the briefs, but few are
particularly helpful, as this is peculiarly a fact case,
depending upon the evidence. In the case of Potter
v. Scheffsky, 139 Wash. 238, 246 Pac. 576, the appellant,
who was seeking to foreclose a chattel mortgage, con-
tended that the trial court had erred in finding that
the relationship between the parties was a partnership

* and not that of creditor and debtor. This court held
that, while the evidence was conflicting, it supported
the finding of the trial court that a partnership ex-
isted. As the case cited was between the persons
whom the court found to be partners, a higher degree
of proof was required to establish the partnership
than is required in the case at bar, in which the fact
of partnership was sought to be proven by a creditor.
Cruickshank v. Lich, supra. Beyond question, the pro-
ceeds of respondent’s check went into the bank account
of the distributing company and was paid out for its
benefit.

In 47 C. J. 901, $385, the rule is laid down as fol-
lows:

“In order to charge an undisclosed or dormant part-
ner with an obligation of the firm, it is necessary that
such obligation be contracted on the credit of the firm

and be within the scope of the partnership business,
or that the proceeds of the obligation be used in the
business or for the benefit of the firm.”

Tn the case at bar, respondent’s eight hundred dol-
lars was used for the benefit of the firm.

Appellant argues that a partnership is not obligated
to pay the individual debts of a partner; and that,
before the partnership can be held liable to a third
party, it must appear that the obligation was incurred
as a partnership debt; and that, even though the con-
tract of the individual partner resulted in a benefit to
the partnership, the liability to repay still rests upon
the individual partner who incurred it, and not upon
the partnership. Authorities which lay down this
rule are cited by appellant.

It is true that a partnership may not be liable for
the debt of an individual partner, even though the in-
curring of the obligation inured to the benefit of the
partnership, but the rule should not be applied in such
a situation as is here presented. Appellant was taking
an active interest in the business, in which, according
to his own story, he had a considerable investment.
He exercised his right to sign all checks on the com-
pany’s account. This indicates his interest in the funds
deposited to the company’s credit, and respondent’s
check for eight hundred dollars was so deposited. A
deposit of $1,080.03, made to the company’s credit
October 2, 1937, which included respondent’s eight
hundred dollar check, was the largest deposit the
company made between September 17, 1937, and
March 9, 1938, and in such a business as the parties
were conducting, the deposit of an eight hundred dol-
lar check was evidently rather outstanding.

In the case of Marsh v. Keating, 1 Bing. (N. C.) 199,
131 Eng. Rep. 1094, it appeared that a partner obtained
money by means of forged documents, and the House

of Lords held that the partnership was liable for money
received through such acts, stating (p. 1102):

“Tt must be admitted that they were so far imposed

upon by the acts of their partner, as to be ignorant
that the sum above mentioned was the produce of the
Plaintiff’s stock; but it is equally clear that the De-
fendants might have discovered the payment of the
money and the source from which it was derived, if
they had used the ordinary diligence of men of busi-
ness. :
“If they had not the actual knowledge, they had all
the means of knowledge; and there is no principle of
law upon which they can succeed in protecting them-
selves from responsibility, in a case wherein, if actual
knowledge was necessary, they might have acquired
it by using the ordinary diligence which their calling
requires.”

The acquiescence by one partner in a direct financial
benefit to the partnership is strong evidence of an
intention by the acquiescing partner to recognize, as a
partnership debt, any obligation which follows the
benefit received. In the case at bar, the evidence con-
cerning the direct benefit accruing to the company is
clear. It profited by the transaction to the extent of
eight hundred dollars. The trial court, in its “supple-
mental ruling,” stated that the partnership received
all the benefits of the check, and that the proceeds
thereof were actually paid out upon the signatures of
Egbert and appellant; that appellant acquired all of
the assets of the partnership by paying all of the
claims, except that of respondent.

Respondent relies upon the case of In re Ketchum,
1 Fed. 815. The opinion is long, and contains language
which is in point here.

This court, in the case of Constanti v. Barovic, 199
Wash. 117, 90 P. (2d) 724, considered the partner-
ship relation in an action in which the plaintiff con-
tended that such a relation existed, this court holding,

contrary to the judgment of the superior court, that the
parties were partners. It appeared that one of the
parties advanced money, which was to be returned
to him before the proceeds of the business could be
divided, this court holding that such a state of facts
nowise detracted from the force of the partnership
contract, and that the liquidation of this partner’s
initial investment in the undertaking was not a con-
dition precedent to the establishment of the partner-
ship relation. It was held that the question of whether
or not a partnership exists “depends upon the intent
of the parties as manifested by their conduct, state-
ments, and written contracts.” In the course of the
opinion, this court quoted from the case of Nicholson
v. Kilbury, 83 Wash. 196, 145 Pac. 189, the following
language:

“There is no arbitrary rule by which it may be
determined whether a partnership relation existed in
a given instance or not. The existence of a partnership
depends upon the intention of the parties. That in-
tention must be ascertained from all of the facts and
circumstances and the actions and conduct of the
parties. While a contract of partnership, either ex-
pressed or implied, is essential to the creation of the
partnership relation, it is not necessary that the con-
tract be established by direct evidence. The exis-
tence of the partnership may be implied from circum-
stances, and this is especially true where, as here, the
evidence touching the inception of the business and the
conduct of the parties throughout its operation, not
only tends to show a joint or common venture but is
in the main inconsistent with any other theory’.”

Appellant relies upon the opinion of this court in
the case of Lansdown v. Huff, 103 Wash. 277, 174 Pac.
21, in which an order of the superior court granting a
new trial, after the verdict of a jury in favor of the
plaintiff, in an action on a contract, was affirmed. This
court held that an instruction which the trial court

gave to the jury was erroneous, in that it was so worded
that the jury might have concluded that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover if he or his assignors believed,
or had a reasonable right to believe, that the defendant
was a partner. Concerning that question, this court
said:

“We do not think this is the law. No matter how
reasonable appellant’s belief may have been, if no
partnership in fact existed, and Huff had no knowledge
that he was being held out as a partner, and did not
hold himself out to be such, there could be no liability.”

The case is not here in point.

Appellant also relies upon the case of Lowenstein v.
Whitelaw, 178 Wash. 428, 34 P. (2d) 1108, in which
the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant as a partner
of one Rothstein. This court, after noting the rule that
“one is liable to third persons as a partner only when
a partnership actually exists, or when, by his conduct,
he is estopped from denying it,” and the further rule
that the burden of proving the existence of a partner-
ship, or facts in law amounting to an estoppel, rests
upon the person asserting it, affirmed the ruling of the
trial court in favor of the defendant, saying that the
evidence fell far short of proving the partnership, and
there was no proof of any fact which would constitute
estoppel. The case is not in point.

Respondent testified that appellant told him that he
(appellant) wanted four thousand dollars for his inter-
est in the business, and also testified to a conversation
between appellant, the attorney for the Sunset Oil
Company, and himself, in which, according to respond-
ent, the attorney said to appellant, referring to the
business here in question: “You are a partner and
have a perfect right to go down and look at the plant,”
to which appellant answered, “Maybe I am.” Appel-
lant denied that any such conversation had been had,

and that he had offered to sell, and the attorney who
it was alleged made the statement to appellant was not
called as a witness. There were other contradictions
in the evidence.

This case depends upon the facts, and is one in which
the judgment of the trial court, who heard and saw the
witnesses, carries especial weight. The trial court
made a positive finding that appellant and Egbert were
copartners, doing business as a partnership, “with J. L.
Egbert, as the active managing partner and Jerry
Vandos, as the silent partner.” Appellant strenuously
attacks this finding, but we are convinced that this
court should not hold that the trial court erred in
making it.

The court did not err in denying appellant’s challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of re-
spondent’s case, and the other findings find ample
support in the evidence.

We conclude that it was properly held that respond-
ent was entitled to judgment against appellant upon
both the first and third causes of action set forth in
respondent’s amended complaint, and the judgment ap-
pealed from is accordingly affirmed.

Brakz, C. J., Geracuty, Mary, and Srmpson, JJ.,
concur.
Le

354

(No. 27512. Department Two. August 29, 1939.]

Harry Anperson, Appellant, v. Kine County et al.,
Respondents.t

Hare, Turner & Maurier, for appellant.

B. Gray Warner and F. M. Reischling, for respond-
ents.

Mutarp, J.—This action was brought by a bidder to
recover partial payment made by him at a tax sale for
real property, and to recover amount of profit he would
have made through sale of the property to a third
person if the county had not destroyed the improve-
ment on the land prior to the tax sale. The appeal is
prosecuted by the plaintiff as from a judgment of dis-
missal, rendered upon the plaintifi’s refusal to plead

*Reported in 93 P, (2d) 284.

further after a demurrer was sustained to his com-
plaint.

The complaint, the allegations of fact therein being
admitted by the demurrer to be true, is summarized
as follows:

Lots 1 and 2, block 1, Glen Park Addition to the city
of Seattle, were improved with “a residential building
of substantial value.” From 1926 to 1936 inclusive,
King county assessed that land and improvement sepa-
rately and levied a tax on the aggregate value of the
land and improvement as provided by law. The as-
sessed value for the year 1926 was $846 for the land
and $440 for the improvement, an aggregate assessed
value of $1,280 for the two lots and improvement
thereon. There was some variation in the assessed
valuations from year to year subsequently, but in none
of the years 1926 to 1935 was the assessed valuation of
the building less than twenty-eight per cent of the
aggregate, and the average assessed value of the im-
provement for the ten-year period was in excess of
thirty-one per cent of the aggregate assessed value of
the property.

On August 2, 1937, the taxes for the years 1926 and
1929 being unpaid, the county foreclosed its tax lien
and acquired title to the property. On or about
October 15, 1937, appellant applied to the property
agent of King county to purchase the property in ques-
tion at public auction. In that application, which was
approved October 18, 1937, by the board of commis-
sioners of King county, appellant agreed to bid $665
for the property. He made a payment of ten dollars
to apply on the purchase price of the property to cover
the cost of publication of notice of the sale, which
amount was to be credited against the purchase price
of the property if appellant was the successful bidder

at the auction sale. The application to purchase the
property reads as follows:

“No. 3358
“APPLICATION For SALE AND RECEIPT For EARNEST
Money
“Seattle, Washington, Oct. 15, 1937
“RecerveD from Harry ANpERsoN hereinafter called
the purchaser, Ten and No/100 beet e eee eee Dollars,
to apply on the purchase price of the following de-
scribed property of King county:

Section Township Range Bid
Description or Lot or Block

Guren Park App. Si¥jof1&2 1 $665.00
Prius Apv. Costs .

“It is agreed that said property will be advertised
for sale at public auction as provided by law and pur-
chaser hereby bids therefor the sum of not less, than
$665.00, subject to outstanding Assessments, if any.

“It is further agreed that if purchaser shall be the
highest bidder at such auction sale, then within 30
days after such sale said purchaser shall pay to the
County Treasurer of King County the difference be-
tween the sum herein receipted for and the amount
of said purchaser’s highest bid at such sale, and there-
upon a deed to said property shall be issued to said
purchaser. Should purchaser fail to make full pay-
ment within 30 days as above provided the sum of
money herein receipted for shall be forfeited as liqui-
dated damages to King County. In case purchaser
shall not be the highest bidder at such sale his deposit
shall be refunded to him.

“If property is bought on contract 20 % or THE PuR-
cHase Price Must se DEPosITED WITH THE CoUNTY
‘TREASURER ON DATE or SALE.

“It is further agreed that in the event the Board of
County Commissioners fails to approve the terms of
this agreement and order said property advertised for
sale as above provided, purchaser’s deposit shall be
refunded to him without further liability.

“Executed in quadruplicate this 15th day of October,
1937.
“Joun P, ANGEL
Property Agent for King County
“Harry ANDERSON
Purchaser.”

Appellant and the officers and agents of King county
knew that the real property was improved with a
dwelling house at the time appellant made the applica-
tion to buy the property. [The property is described
in the application as the south half of lots 1 and 2, sans
any statement as to improvement.] Statutory publica-
tion of notice of sale was made by the county, and No-
vember 13, 1937, was designated as the date of the
auction when the property would be offered for sale.
Subsequent to October 15, 1937 [date of appellant’s
application to purchase the property], and November
18, 1937 [date of sale of the property], the building on
the property in question was destroyed by employees
of King county. Neither at the time of the sale of the
property or previous thereto was notice given by King
county to Anderson of the destruction of the house.

On November 13, 1937, appellant’s bid of $665 for
the property was accepted by the county treasurer, to
whom appellant paid an additional sum of forty dollars
on the purchase price. At the time of the sale, appel-
lant believed that the building was still on the premises,
and it was not until subsequent to acceptance of his
bid and payment of the additional sum of forty dollars
that he learned of the destruction of the house. All
proceedings of the county and its officers and agents
relating to the tax foreclosure, sale, and resale were
regular and in accordance with law.

After execution and approval of appellant’s applica-
tion of October 15, 1937, to purchase the property, and
prior to the acceptance of appellant’s bid at the auction

sale of November 13, 1937, appellant entered into an
agreement with a third person to sell the property to
that third person at the price of seventeen hundred
dollars, contingent on appellant’s acquisition of title
to the property. Because of the removal of the house
from the property, appellant cannot now require his
purchaser to proceed with the sale. Because the county
is unable to deliver the property with the improvement
thereon, appellant refused to proceed further or to pay
the balance of his bid. .

Appellant alleges that he has sustained damage, for
which he prays recovery, in the amount of $1,035,
representing loss of profit under contemplated resale
of the property and fifty dollars representing payment
to the county on the application to purchase and pay-
ment at the time of the acceptance of his bid on Novem-
ber 13, 1937.

The statute governing the resale of tax title prop-
erty by counties reads as follows:

“Real property hereafter or heretofore acquired by
the several counties of the State of Washington for
taxes shall be subject to sale by order of the board of
county commissioners of the several counties of this
state at any time after the counties shall have received
a deed therefor, when in the judgment of the board of
county commissioners they deem it for the best inter-
ests of the county to sell the same. When the board
of county commissioners desires to sell any property so
acquired, it may, if deemed advantageous to the county,
combine any or all of the several lots and tracts of
land so to be sold in one or more units, and it shall then
enter an order on its records fixing the unit or units
in which the property shall be sold and the minimum
price for each of such units, and directing the county
treasurer to sell such property in the unit or units and
at not less than the price or prices so fixed by said
poard: Provided, That the said order shall be subject
to the approval of the county treasurer if several lots
or tracts of land are combined in one unit. It shall be

the duty of the county treasurer upon receipt of such
order to publish once a week for three consecutive
weeks a notice of the sale of such property in a news-
paper printed and published in the county where the
land is situated: Provided, That in counties where
there is no newspaper published, the treasurer of such
county shall cause such notice to be published in some
newspaper in the state of general circulation in such
county having no resident newspaper, and the property
to be sold shall be set forth and described in said notice,
and the minimum price fixed in said order, together
with the time and place and terms of sale, which said
sale shall be made at the front door of the county court-
” house in the county in which the land is situated be-
tween the hours of 9 o’clock a. m. and 4 o’clock p. m.,
and all sales so made shall be to the highest and best
bidder at such sale, and sales to be made under the
provisions of this act may be adjourned from day to day
by the county treasurer by public announcement made
by the treasurer at the time and place designated in
the notice of such sale, or at the time and place to
which said sale may be adjourned. The person making
the bid shall state whether he will pay cash for the
amount of his bid or accept a real estate contract of
purchase in accordance with the provisions hereinafter
contained. The person making the highest bid shall
become the purchaser of said property. If the highest
bidder is a contract bidder the purchaser shall be re-
quired to pay twenty per cent of the total purchase
price at the time of said sale and shall enter into a
contract with the county as vendor and the purchaser
as vendee which shall obligate and require the pur-
chaser to pay the balance of said purchase price in ten
equal annual installments commencing November 1st
and each year following the date of said sale, and shall
require said purchaser to pay six per cent interest on
all deferred payments, interest to be paid at the time .
the annual installment is due; and may contain a pro-
vision authorizing the purchaser to make payment in
full at any time of any balance due on the total pur-
chase price plus accrued interest on such balance.
Said contract shall contain a provision requiring the
purchaser to pay before delinquency all subsequent

‘taxes and assessments that may be levied or assessed
against said property subsequent to the date of said
contract, and shall contain a provision that time is of
the essence of the contract and that in event of a failure
of the vendee to make payments at the time and in
the manner required and to keep and perform the
covenants and conditions therein required of him that
the said contract may be forfeited and terminated at
the election of the vendor, and that in event of said
election all sums theretofore paid by the vendee shall
be forfeited as liquidated damages for failure to com-
ply with the provisions of said contract; and shall re-
quire the vendor to execute and deliver to the vendee
a deed of conveyance covering said property upon the
payment in full of the purchase price, plus accrued.
interest.” Laws of 1937, chapter 68, p. 233, § 1, Rem.
Rey. Stat. (Sup.), § 11294 [P. C. § 6882-133].

HI Counsel for appellant concede that, in the
absence of a statute providing for repayment of the
purchase price, the rule of caveat emptor precludes
recovery from the county by the purchaser at a tax
sale of the purchase price where the title fails because
of any defect in the proceeding leading up to the sale,
or failure of title passing to the grantee by the deed.
Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193, 277 Pac.
839. However, counsel for appellant argue, if the
county, before acceptance of appellant’s application
for resale of the property, had destroyed the house
thereon and noted on the public records the changed
condition in the property, the rule would be applicable;
but if such change occurred with no public record
thereof and the county proceeded as if the property
were in the same condition as when application was
made to purchase, the rule of caveat emptor may not
avail as a defense in an action to recover the purchase
price or damages sustained as alleged in the case at
bar. That is, appellant bid on tax title property which
was sold November 13, 1937, pursuant to the statute

(Laws of 1937, chapter 68, p. 233, § 1, Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 11294), but that property, which appellant
knew was improved with a dwelling house thereon
prior to the sale, was not improved property at the
time he made his bid, which was accepted; therefore,
having accepted (with knowledge that the property
was improved) his application of October 15, 1937, to
purchase the property with the improvement thereon,
the county must respond in damages for breach of its
statutory duty to deliver what it had undertaken to
sell.

Our holding in Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash.
193, 277 Pac. 839, that the purchaser at resale from the
county, who acquired no title as a result of the sale
being void, could not recover the purchase price from
the county, is in accord with the general rule that,
unless aided by express statutory authority, the holder
of an invalid tax title is not entitled to recover back
his money against the county or state from whom the
purchase was made. See, also, Hilton v. DeLong, 188
Wash. 162, 61 P. (2d) 1290.

The rule apparently is absolute that, where a statute
provides for the reimbursement of purchasers at in-
valid tax sales, there can be no recovery under cir-
cumstances not within the terms of the statute. 61
C. J. 1467-1468, § 2076. In discussing the question
whether the rule denying recovery should apply where
property is not subject to the tax for which it is sold,
the editor of the annotation commencing at page 829
of Vol. 77 A. L. R., observes that “no decision has been
found which rests upon such a distinction.”

In Parrott v. Abernathy, 58 S. D. 603, 237 N. W. 900,
77 A. L. R. 818, it was held that, where land had been
invalidly attached to a school district so that the school
tax thereon was invalid notwithstanding the regularity
of the tax proceeding, although the premises had been

bid in by the county treasurer for the county with
knowledge that the validity of the school tax was
challenged and in litigation, an innocent purchaser of
the certificate was not entitled to recover from the
county the amount of the school tax. The rule of
caveat emptor, said the court, applied even though the
invalidity of the tax was not disclosed by the tax pro-
ceeding; especially as a statute existed permitting tax
purchasers to be reimbursed in certain cases and the
statute made no provision for such a case as that be-
fore the court. The court said:

“Tt should be kept in mind that the rules which
apply to actions to recover back money paid by one
person to another do not apply, to their full extent, to
actions to recover back from a county, town, or other
municipality money in payment of taxes illegally or
irregularly assessed or levied. There are certain con-
siderations of public policy which must necessarily be
taken into consideration. Ifa party could recover back
from the public whenever there was some illegal or
irregular action on the part of public officers in the as-
sessment or levy of the tax, merely because he was
ignorant of such illegality or irregularity at the time he
paid the tax, the public finances would be thrown into
chaos, and frequently municipalities would be reduced

ee

to utter bankruptcy’.

In Minnesota, under a statute which states the in-
stances in which a purchaser may obtain a refund of
the purchase money, where a sale is invalid because
lands previously bid in by the state were included, the
purchaser was held not entitled to a refund, because
that fact did not constitute one of the instances specified
by the statute. Wellcome Co. v. Marshall County, 174
Minn. 431, 219 N. W. 545. .

In Levy Bros. v. Board of Commissioners, 101 Okla.
241, 225 Pac. 387, it was held that money paid by a
(purchaser at a tax sale for taxable real property regu-
larly assessed can not be recovered merely for the

reason that the property was listed as improved, when,
as a matter of fact, it was vacant. In the course of the
opinion, the court said that the purchasers paid too
much,

“

. . but all sources of information were open to
them as well as to the county officials. They failed to
avail themselves of such sources. oe

“The county is not a warrantor of the accuracy of an
assessment list as to value, nor does it guarantee cor-
rect action on the part of its officers. Cooley on Taxa-
tion (8rd Ed.) page 1493. The purchasers of this cer-
tificate were under no obligation to buy . . . They
were volunteers investing their money in such securi-
ties as they believed would return them 18 per cent.
per annum, orataxdeed. . . . There is nothing in
the agreed statement to show that the error was made
by any county officer, but even in that event plaintiffs
could not recover. :

“There are no decisions, so far as our investigation
goes, that present an exact parallel. A near approach
is the case of Lindsey v. Boone County, 92 Iowa, 86.
This was a suit by a purchaser of tax sale certificate
because of an alleged erroneous description of property
in that the lot was apparently listed under a question-
able ownership and the description was doubtful. The
certificate purchaser paid subsequent taxes on the real
property and also delinquent personal taxes of the
owner, which were a lien on the realty under the Iowa
statute. Iowa has statutes similar in effect to ours, but
the court held plaintiffs could not recover. In conclud-
ing the court said:

“<The conclusion reached in this case is not a hard
one. It results from the application of well-established
rules of law. A purchaser at tax sale must beware.
The description of the premises is open to his inspec-
tion, and he buys just such as the county offers to give.
If it is not sufficient to carry the title, he need not buy.
So, with reference to the subsequent taxes, he has the
right to pay them, but is not compelled to do so. If he
does, the payment is voluntary, and no action will lie
to recover them back. The subsequent taxes were not

paid through a mistake, nor was there any fraud in the
transaction’.”

The property was not listed as improved. The ap-
plication, upon which appellant relies, describes the
property as the south half of lots 1 and 2 of block 1,
Glen Park Addition. The fact that the appellant knew,
and the fact that the county officials knew, that a house
was on the lots at the time appellant made application
to purchase the property pursuant to the statute, are
not determinative factors. While the records would
not have disclosed that the house had been removed,
appellant is not entitled, because of his prior knowl-
edge of a house having been on the property October
15, 1937, to a position other than that which would
obtain in the case of other purchasers.

When, on October 15, 1937, appellant agreed to bid
on the property at the sale to be held approximately
one month later, he did not thereby acquire a right
different than that of any other bidder who appeared
for the first time when the property was offered at
auction. If such bidder failed to inspect the land at
the time and discover the absence of a house which he
understood, or knew, was formerly on the land, he
could not successfully maintain an action to recover
the purchase price or the down payment made by him.
If he had inspected the land at that time, he would
have learned that it was not improved. The appellant
did not, by his application of October 15, 1937, purchase,
nor did he obtain an option to purchase, the land prior
to the removal of the house therefrom. The tax sale of
November 13, 1937, created a contract between the
county and the appellant. The terms of that contract
will be found in the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 11294) governing tax sales.

The doctrine of caveat emptor applies with full force
to a tax sale like that in the case at bar. We are not

aware of any rule or statute which required the county
to maintain the land in question in the same condition
it was when the county acquired it, nor has our atten-
tion been directed to any statute requiring the county
to maintain the land in the same condition from the
date of the application for its purchase until the date
of the sale. The deposit of ten dollars at the time the
application was made assured the county of payment
of the cost of advertising the property for sale. No
option was thereby acquired by appellant to purchase
the property. No duty was incumbent on the county to
continue the building on the land for the benefit of the
successful bidder.
The judgment is affirmed.

Buaxg, C. J., Sumpson, Rosinson, and Grracuty, JJ.,

concur.

[No. 27454. Department One. August 30, 1939.]

Eprru ExizaperH McPuerson, Respondent, v.
JAMES FranKLIN McPuHErson,
Appellant.t

De
*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 428.

Burton J. Onstine and Carl L. Shuff, for appellant.
Geo. W. Young, for respondent.

Jzrrers, J—The plaintiff in this action, Edith Eliza-
beth McPherson, instituted a suit for divorce against
the defendant, James Franklin McPherson, on the
ground of nonsupport. Defendant filed an answer and
cross-complaint, wherein he asked that plaintiff’s com-
plaint be dismissed and that he be granted a decree of
divorce. Plaintiff replied to the affirmative matter set
up in the cross-complaint of defendant, and thereafter
the matter came on for trial before the court on the
issues raised by the pleadings. On July 14, 1938, the
trial court entered an interlocutory decree in favor of
plaintiff and therein settled the property rights of the
parties, awarded the custody of the minor daughter to
plaintiff, and denied defendant’s prayer for divorce.
Motion for new trial was made by defendant and
denied on September 15, 1938. Defendant appealed
from the interlocutory order entered July 14, 1938.

We are met, at the threshold of our consideration of
this case, by a motion of Seattle First National Bank,
operating through its Spokane & Eastern branch, for an
order substituting and admitting it as a party respond-
ent in the case, in the place of Edith Elizabeth Mc-
Pherson, now deceased. The affidavit supporting this
motion shows that respondent, Edith Elizabeth Mc-
Pherson, died testate in Spokane, on May 15, 1939; that
the last will and testament of deceased, which nomi-
nated Seattle First National Bank, Spokane & Eastern
branch, as executor thereof, was duly proved and ad-
mitted to probate in Spokane county, and that the
bank above named was regularly appointed as executor
of the estate of the deceased, May 22, 1939; that the
executor has qualified and is now acting in such
capacity.

Appellant, James Franklin McPherson, has also ap-
peared herein, and by motion asks that this action be
abated and dismissed in this court and the lower court,
for the reason that, respondent having died on May 15,
1939, and this being a divorce action, the action has
abated and the interlocutory decree, in its entirety,
became a nullity upon the death of respondent. Ap-
pellant also objects to any substitution of the executor
of respondent, except for the sole and only purpose of
determining and passing upon his motion to abate and
dismiss this action.

The question to be determined is: Does an inter-
locutory order of divorce, which makes an award of
property, fail, abate, and become a nullity for all pur-
poses upon the death of a party respondent, occurring
subsequent to its entry and prior to the entry of a final
decree, and while an appeal from such interlocutory
decree is pending in this court?

The executor contends that, as between the parties,
the interlocutory decree is final and conclusive, sub-
ject to appellant’s right to have reviewed the fairness
of the division of the property and those matters per-
taining thereto. The executor admits that the question
of whether or not there were grounds for divorce can-
not now be examined into by this court, as that issue
falls from the appeal by reason of the death of respond-
ent, but contends that the action, in so far as it affects
the property rights of the parties, did not abate upon
the death of respondent.

For brevity’s sake, we will hereinafter refer to the
executor of respondent’s estate as respondent.

In connection with and supporting the motion are
copies of certain public records which, in our opinion,
establish the death of respondent, and we are there-
fore of the opinion this fact is properly before us for
our consideration.

We are unable to agree with respondent’s conten-
tions. In support of its contentions, respondent cites
Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 988 [P. C. § 7507], and Rem.
Rev. Stat., §996 [P. C. § 7512]. Section 988, supra,
as amended by Laws of 1933, p. 432, $1, after some
general provisions relative to the interlocutory decree,
provides:

“ such order, however, as to the custody,
management and division of property shall be final and
conclusive upon the parties subject only to the right
of appeal; but in no case shall such interlocutory order
be considered or construed to have the effect of dis-
solving the marriage of the parties to the action, or of
granting a divorce, until final judgment is entered:

Section 996, supra, provides:

“Tn all instances where the superior court shall grant
a divorce, it shall be for cause distinctly stated in the
complaint, and proved, and found by the court, and the
court shall state the facts found upon which the decree
is rendered; and when either party shall signify a
desire to appeal from any of the orders of the court, in
the disposition of the property or of the children, the
court shall certify the evidence adduced on the trial,
and the supreme court shall be possessed of the whole
case as fully as the superior court was, and may reverse,
modify, or affirm said judgment, according to the real
merits of the case.”

It is the general rule, concurred in by respondent,
that an action for divorce proper, being purely a per-
sonal action based upon the personal relationship and
status of marriage, terminates with the death of either
spouse, not only because of its personal character, but
because the marriage is ipso facto dissolved by death.
But, contends respondent, where, as in the instant case,
the interlocutory decree settled the property rights of
the parties, the action does not abate in so far as the
property rights are concerned, but such decree may be

reviewed by this court, to the extent that it involves
such rights.

There is much authority from other jurisdictions to
sustain this contention of respondent, but we are of the
opinion that, under our decisions, the interlocutory
decree, in its entirety, abates and becomes a nullity
upon the death of one of the parties, whether before
or after the interlocutory decree is entered. We stated
in Dwyer v. Nolan, 40 Wash. 459, 82 Pac. 746, 111 Am.
St. 919,1 L. R.A. (N.S.) 551:

“Tt will not be gainsaid that an action for divorce
is a purely personal action. Nothing is sought to be
affected but the marital status of the husband and wife.
The distribution of property in such an action is in-
cidental, and it is clearly incontestable that, wpon the
death of either party, whether before or after the de-
cree, the subject of the controversy is eliminated. If
the death of the plaintiff in this case had occurred
before judgment, it will not be urged that there could
have been a substitution of his executors to represent
him in the prosecution of the case. Such a proposition,
for manifest reasons, would not be entertained by a
court for a moment. What additional authority or
power did they have to represent him in the same case
when he died after judgment? Manifestly none. They
cannot stipulate with reference to the decree. They
cannot consent to setting aside the judgment. There
is no conceivable particular in which they represent
the deceased or the heirs with reference to the sub-
ject-matter of the action,'in the slightest degree. The
very nature of the action renders this impossible.”
(Italics ours.)

See, also, Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90 Pac.
588, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 103.

In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 63 Wash. 126, 114 Pac.
915, the defendant was awarded a decree of divorce
and directed to make certain payments to the plaintiff,
and the decree also awarded plaintiff certain property
as her separate property. Plaintiff appealed from the

decree, except as to the part awarding her a life in-
surance policy, Defendant moved to dismiss the ap-
peal, on the ground that an appeal would not lie from
that part of a decree in a divorce proceeding granting
a divorce, where the decree as a whole not only granted
a divorce, but partitioned the property of the spouses.
After referring to Rem. & Bal. Code, § 989, the court
stated:

“Tt is plain that, by this section of the statute, power
to partition the property between the parties exists
only where the divorce is granted. In other words, the
power to partition the property is ancillary to the power
to grant the divorce, and can be exercised only after
the principal power is exercised. It is plain, also, that
if the appeal is entertained in the present case, it may
finally result in a decree partitioning the community
property of the parties between them, and denying
them a divorce. Whether a court has jurisdiction in
a suit between husband and wife to partition between
them their community property to be held thereafter
as separate property, we need not here determine, but
we are clear that it was not the purpose of the statute
to permit such a partition in a suit for a divorce where
the main purpose of the suit fails.” (Italics ours.)

We cite this case only for the purpose of showing that
this court has long recognized the rule that, where the
main purpose of a divorce action fails, any property
settlement made therein, being only ancillary to and
dependent upon the main purpose, also fails.

In re Martin’s Estate, 127 Wash. 44, 219 Pac. 838, the
trial court, basing its conclusions upon Rem. Comp.
Stat., §988, and upon the interlocutory decree of
divorce rendered in favor of Dr. Martin, held that,
while the interlocutory decree was not final as a decree
of divorce, it was so as a disposition of the property
rights of the parties. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 988, in so far
as it provided for the finality of the decree, as to the

management, custody and disposal of the property,
was the same as Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 988. In the
cited case, the court stated:

“But notwithstanding the support which the word-
ing of this section of the statute seems to lend to the
court’s conclusion, we can not think the conclusion
voices the legislative intent. It is our opinion that the
entire order is interlocutory; that, if the interlocutory
decree is subsequently made final, all of its provisions
then become so; but if, by mutual agreement of the
parties to the proceeding, by the death of one of the
parties, or for any other cause, the divorce is not made
final, the interlocutory decree in its entirety becomes
a nullity. It is the general rule, and this court has held
[see Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90 Pac. 588, 11
L. R. A. (N. S.) 103], construing our prior statute
which did not provide for an interlocutory decree, that
the power to dispose of the property of the husband
and wife in a divorce proceeding was a mere incident
of the power to grant a divorce, and we think the same
rule prevails under the present statute. Being an
incident, there can be no disposition of the property
of married persons in a divorce action unless the action
reaches the stage of an absolute decree.” (Italics
ours.)

It is apparent in the instant case that the action can
never reach the stage of an absolute decree.

In addition to the statutes hereinbefore mentioned,
respondent very largely relies upon the case of Master-
son v. Ogden, 78 Wash. 644, 139 Pac. 654, Ann. Cas.
1914D, 885. In the cited case, an action for divorce
was brought by plaintiff, Cora Masterson, against her
husband, James Masterson. Mr. Masterson was much
older than his wife at the time of their marriage, and
had accumulated considerable property. Some time
after the marriage, the sons of Masterson by a former
marriage induced their father to deed his property to
them, upon the promise made by the boys that they

would make certain provisions relative to his care.
Cora Masterson made parties to the divorce proceed-
ings the two sons of her husband, and also a step-
daughter, to whom a mortgage had been given by
defendant. An interlocutory decree of divorce was
thereafter entered, in which the court held that the
property was transferred by James Masterson to his
sons for the purpose of cheating and defrauding the
plaintiff, and certain awards were made to plaintiff and
made a lien on the real property conveyed to the sons.
An appeal from the decree was taken and perfected,
and thereafter James Masterson died. The executor
of the deceased appeared and interposed a motion to
abate and dismiss the action. This court considered
the matter, for the purpose, as we read the case, of
determining the rights of the third parties. We do not
think the cited case is controlling here.

It appearing from the record herein that respondent,
Edith Elizabeth McPherson, has died since the entry
of the interlocutory decree, and prior to the entry of
the final decree, we are of the opinion that the subject
matter of the controversy abated, and that the inter-
locutory decree in its entirety automatically became
a nullity, as of the date of respondent’s death. We
think it needless to further argue the matter as to the
finality of the interlocutory decree, in so far as it af-
fected a division of the property, in view of what was
said In re Martin’s Estate, supra. We do not believe
§ 996, supra, was intended to, or that it does, empower
this court to reverse, modify, or affirm an interlocutory
decree of divorce, after the death of one of the parties
to such decree, except where the rights of third parties
were involved in the decree itself, and then only for the
purpose of adjudicating the rights of such third persons.

Being, then, of the opinion that this action has abated,
and that the interlocutory decree in its entirety became

a nullity, as of the date of respondent’s death, there is,
in our opinion, nothing before us to consider, except a
proper disposal of this appeal, and for this purpose
only, we have admitted a substitution of the executor
of respondent’s estate for respondent.

The motion of appellant to dismiss the appeal will be
granted, for the reasons herein assigned. We think, in
view of the situation presented, each party should pay
his own costs herein, both on the appeal proper and in
connection with the motions herein presented.

Srervert, Mary, and Rosinson, JJ., concur.

Buakz, C. J. (dissenting)—The statute, Rem. Rev.
Stat. (Sup.), § 988 [P. C. § 7507] (Laws of 1933, p. 432,
§1), makes the interlocutory order “final and con-
elusive upon the parties” in so far as it affects “the
custody, management and division of property.” An
interlocutory order is, in this respect, a final decree
and was so held to be in Masterson v. Ogden, 78 Wash.
644, 139 Pac. 654, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 885.

I dissent.

374

[No. 27591. Department Two. August 31, 1939.]

Luoyp R. Bosixe, Respondent, v. Francis B. Wricut
et al., Appellants.t

Clark & Grady, for appellants.
Stephen E. Chaffee, for respondent.

Smupson, J.—This action was instituted to collect an
amount alleged to be due plaintiff for the agreed value
of apple peelings and cores sold and delivered to de-
fendants.

The complaint alleges that, September 24, 1937, plain-
tiff and defendants entered into a contract whereby
plaintiff agreed to sell to defendants and defendants
agreed to purchase apple peelings and cores which
plaintiff had secured from the Valley Evaporating
Company’s plant at Prosser, Washington, at the price
of two dollars per ton in the event that the apple peel-

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 321.

ings were not furnished for the entire season, and with
the additional agreement that, in the event the peel-
ings were furnished for the season, the price would
be $2.50 per ton; and that plaintiff complied with the
agreement and delivered to defendants 771,614 pounds
of peelings and cores.

It was further alleged that, on the first day of No-
vember, 1937, defendants refused to comply there-
after with the contract between plaintiff and defend-
ants and refused to accept peelings from plaintiff; that
plaintiff was compelled to haul and dump them, to his
damage in the sum of $120; and that the only amount
paid by defendants upon the contract was $166.18.
The defendants answered, denying the allegations of
the complaint, and then set up a defense which, in
effect, alleged that the Yakima Fruit Products Com-
pany had entered into a written contract with the
Valley Evaporating Company under which the Yakima
Fruit Company was to receive the skins and cores from
the evaporating company’s plant at Prosser free of
charge; that the Yakima Fruit Products Company
orally assigned to defendants its right to take and re-
ceive the skins and cores from the Prosser plant; that
defendants contemplated hauling the same from Pros-
ser to their winery plant at Grandview, Washington;
and that defendants were not informed by the Yakima
Fruit Products Company that it was to receive the
skins and cores from the Prosser plant without any
charge being made therefor.

‘The answer further alleged that, September 24, 1937,
plaintiff represented to defendants that he had a con-
tract with the Valley Evaporating Company for the
purchase from it of apple skins and cores from its Pros-
ser plant for which the Yakima Fruit Products Com-
pany had contracted, and plaintiff offered to sell and
deliver the same to defendants at Grandview at two

dollars per ton, including hauling charges; that the
offer was made to the manager of defendants’ Grand-
view plant, and, relying upon these representations,
the manager of the Grandview plant accepted the offer
subject to the approval of defendants; that the defend-
ants’ undertaking to pay plaintiff for deliveries of apple
peelings at Grandview was conditioned upon plaintifi’s
having the contract which he represented he had with
the Valley Evaporating Company; that plaintiff in fact
did not have the contract represented with the evapo-
rating company, but merely had an arrangement with
that company to the effect he would haul away and
dump any cores and peelings which the company
wanted hauled away, and that for this service he was
to be compensated at the rate of fifty cents per ton;
that the defendants believed and relied upon the repre-
sentations of plaintiff and would not have entered into
any contract with plaintiff if they had known his
representations were false; and that, therefore, de-
fendants should be obligated to pay plaintiff only the
reasonable value, cost, and expense of hauling the peel-
ings from Prosser to Grandview, that is, $191.40 less
$166.18 already paid, leaving a balance of $25.22.

The case was tried to the court, sitting without a
jury, and at its termination findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and judgment were entered in favor of
plaintiff.

Error is assigned in respect to the finding that ap-
pellants had contracted unconditionally to purchase
waste apple peelings from respondent.

The evidence disclosed that respondent lives at
Grandview and owns a truck, which he uses for general
hauling. Appellants operate a winery at Grandview,
and in the process of making wine use apple peelings
and cores, which are the by-products of apple dehy-
drating plants.

Respondent in testifying, among other things, stated
that he had a contract with the Valley Evaporating
Company to take the peelings and cores from its plant
for an indefinite period of time; that he was to have
them in consideration of keeping the bins, in which
the peelings and cores were deposited, cleaned out
each day; that, September 24, 1937, he saw Mr. Hafey,
the foreman in charge of appellants’ winery, and of-
fered to sell to the winery the apple peelings and cores
at a price of $2.50 per ton; that he was told by Mr.
Hafey that he (Hafey) could not make a contract with-
out the approval of appellant (Mr. Wright).

Respondent further testified that he unloaded some
of the apple peelings and cores on September 24th and
25th, and was told by Mr. Hafey that he had contacted
Mr. Wright and that the winery would take the apple
peelings and cores at a price of two dollars per ton,
subject to a raise of fifty cents per ton provided re-
spondent would deliver the apple peelings and cores
for the entire season.

Respondent also testified that he talked to Mr. Wright
over the telephone and was told that the agreement
made with Mr. Hafey was approved and, in talking
about the contract, Mr. Wright said “That’s fine,” and
he would see me later. His testimony was that he saw
Mr. Wright the last week in October and was informed
that he, Wright, had traded for the peelings and that
he would not take any more peelings from respondent,
and that thereafter respondent was compelled to and
did dump the balance of the peelings and cores he
secured from the Valley Evaporating Company’s plant
at a cost to him of $120.

Appellants denied respondent’s contention that he
had title to or the right to the peelings and cores. Mr.
Wright testified that he told respondent that he wanted.
to see his contract with the Valley Evaporating Com-

pany for the peelings at their Prosser plant, and that
appellants’ contract with respondent for peelings from
‘the Prosser plant was expressly contingent upon re-
spondent’s having the right to and owning those peel-
ings, and if respondent did not possess such ownership
the contract would not have been made by appellants.
Mr. Wright also denied having a telephone conversa-
tion with respondent.

It is clear that respondent’s evidence, if believed by
the trial court, established not only respondent’s right
to the peelings at the Prosser plant, but also proved
the contract to sell such peelings to appellants as al-
leged by respondent, and that respondent complied
with its terms. It is equally true that Mr. Wright’s
evidence and the testimony of other witnesses was in
sharp conflict with that of respondent. We think it is
significant that, notwithstanding the fact that appel-
Jants contended they were the assignee of the Yakima
company which had the right to the peelings of the
Prosser plant, they did not assert their rights as such
assignee, nor did they communicate directly with the
Valley Evaporating Company until respondent had
made deliveries of apple peelings to appellants in sub-
stantial quantities.

Hl In such cases, we will not disturb the findings
of the trial court upon conflicting evidence unless the
evidence preponderates against the findings of the
trial court. Peterson v. Ogle, 110 Wash. 610, 188 Pac.
768; Yarnall v. Knickerbocker Co., 120 Wash. 205, 206
Pac, 936; O’Reilly v. Miller, 148 Wash. 277, 268 Pac.
869; Rockwell v. Peyran, 172 Wash. 434, 20 P. (2d)
841; Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Olsen, 174 Wash. 200,
24 P. (2d) 613; Anthony v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 178 Wash. 506, 35 P. (2d) 54; Automatic
Canteen Co. of Washington v. Automatic Canteen Co.

of America, 182 Wash. 133, 45 P. (2d) 41; Kelly v.
Bank, 188 Wash. 614, 62 P. (2d) 1359. .

The trial court was in a better position than this
court to weigh the evidence of the several witnesses
who appeared and testified, and in such cases we will
not disturb the court’s findings when a case hinges on
the credibility and capacity of the witnesses. Kuhn v.
Lewis, 153 Wash. 457, 279 Pac. 597; In re Larsen’s
Estate, 191 Wash. 257, 71 P. (2d) 47; Dowell, Ine. v.
United Pac. Casualty Ins. Co., 191 Wash. 666, 72 P.
(2d) 296; Bostwick v. Washington Motor Coach Co.,
194 Wash. 178, 77 P. (2d) 790.

A reading of the statement of facts discloses that
there was substantial evidence to support the conclu-
sions of the trial court, and that the preponderance
of the evidence was not clearly against them, and justi-
fied the court’s conclusion.

Hl Appellants urge error in the admission of the
record of the telephone company of a telephone con-
versation. The divisional manager of the telephone
company was allowed to identify a slip of paper, which
was admitted in evidence, upon which was a notation
made by one of the telephone operators to the effect
that, September 28, 1937, Mr. Hafey had called Mr.
Wright on the telephone in Yakima. This evidence
was introduced to corroborate the testimony of re-
spondent that he had talked to Mr. Wright by tele-
phone from the winery office September 28, 1937. Ap-
pellants contend that the divisional manager, not hav-
ing seen the notation made on the slip, was incompe-
tent to identify the written instrument.

The slip of paper was part of the records of the tele-
phone company, and as such was entitled to be ad-
mitted in evidence. Cascade Lumber Co. v. Aetna In-
demnity Co., 56 Wash. 503, 106 Pac. 158; Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Huetter, 68 Wash. 442, 123 Pac. 607;

380

Atkin v. Long Lake Lumber Co., 159 Wash. 27, 292
Pac. 104. : ;

The other assignments of error having been con-
sidered, and finding no error in the record, the judg-
ment is therefore affirmed.

Biakg, C. J., StemvertT, Geracury, and Mruiarp, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27551. Department Two. August 31, 1939.]

Aorran Detsman et al., Appellants, v. ALBERT BERTOTTI,
Respondent.*

‘Reported in 93 P. (2d) 371.

Le

Kahin, Carmody, Schramm & Kellogg, for appellants.

Houghton, Cluck & Coughlin and Emil P. Schubat,
for respondent.

Brats, J.—East Seventy-seventh street in the city of
Seattle runs east and west and is crossed at right
angles by Fifteenth avenue northeast. East of the
intersection, Seventy-seventh street slopes down at a
5.82 per cent grade, and north of the intersection Fif-
teenth avenue slopes down at a grade of less than one-
half of one per cent. Each street is paved, the paved
portion of Fifteenth avenue being forty-two feet in
width, that of Seventy-seventh street being twenty-
five feet wide. Each street has concrete sidewalks, the
parking strip on Fifteenth avenue between the street
curb and the edge of the sidewalk being five and one-
half feet wide, Along Fifteenth avenue, northerly
from the sidewalk on Seventy-seventh street, stands a
thick, high hedge, about twelve feet back from the east
line of the pavement, which obstructs the view of
Fifteenth avenue as one approaches that street from
the east along Seventy-seventh street. There is a small
gap in this hedge, through which an automobile driver,
approaching Fifteenth avenue from the east on Sev-
enty-seventh street, can obtain a very restricted
glimpse across a small portion of Fifteenth avenue,
some distance to the north of the intersection.

Plaintiff Adrian Delsman (who will be referred to
as though he were the sole party plaintiff) resides in

the neighborhood, and owns a garage which opens upon
an alley paralleling Fifteenth avenue, which alley
intersects Seventy-seventh street some distance to the
east of the intersection.

Early on the morning of April 5, 1938, plaintiff, driv-
ing his Chevrolet automobile, left his garage and pro-
ceeded south along the alley to Seventy-seventh street.
He turned west upon that street and proceeded slowly
upgrade in a westerly direction for about a block and a
half, when he approached the intersection of Seventy-
seventh street and Fifteenth avenue. As he ap-
proached the intersection, he passed a “Slow” sign and
stopped his car. He had looked through the break in
the hedge, and through that gap saw no approaching
traffic on Fifteenth avenue. He testified that he
stopped at a point where he could see in front of the
hedge, and that, when he stopped, he could see to his
right along Fifteenth avenue about two hundred feet;
that, seeing no traffic approaching, he put his car into
low gear and started across Fifteenth avenue, looking
to his left, and as he looked to his left he shifted into
intermediate gear; that, after satisfying himself that no
traffic was approaching from the left, he again looked
to his right, seeing an approaching truck; that, realiz-
ing his danger, he shifted into high gear, stepped on
the gas, and endeavored to avoid a collision, swinging
his car a little to his left; that notwithstanding his
efforts to escape, the truck struck the rear right wheel
of his car. As a result of the collision, Delsman suffered
severe injuries, including a skull fracture, and later
brought suit against Albert Bertotti, the owner of the
truck with which plaintiff’s car collided.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s
driver was negligent, in that he was driving at a speed
in excess of thirty-five miles per hour; that the
driver failed to keep sufficient lookout or give notice of

his approach; and that the driver failed to avail him-
self of an opportunity afforded him to avoid the col-
lision, by applying his brakes or turning his truck.
The defendant denied all negligence on the part of his
employee and pleaded contributory negligence on the
part of plaintiff, who, by his reply, denied any negli-
gence on his part.

The action was called for trial before a jury, and,
at the close of plaintiff’s case, the defendant challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence and moved to dismiss
upon the ground that it appeared from plaintiff’s own
evidence that plaintiff had been guilty of negligence
which materially and proximately contributed to the
accident. The court sustained the challenge and dis-
missed the action with prejudice. From the judgment
of dismissal, plaintiff has appealed, assigning error
upon the exclusion of certain testimony upon defend-
ant’s objection; upon the ruling of the trial court sus-
taining defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence; and upon the entry of judgment of dismissal.

It does not appear that, on the morning of the acci-
dent, the visibility was poor or that driving was in any
way difficult. Appellant, of course, was the disfavored
driver, and on approaching the intersection, it was his
duty, pursuant to Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-88
[P. C. § 2696-846] (Laws of 1937, chapter 189, p. 899,
§ 88), to look out for and give right of way to any vehicle
approaching from his right. Respondent’s truck was
approaching the intersection from appellant’s right,
and of course was clearly within the range of vision
of any person looking north along Fifteenth avenue.
According to the testimony of certain of appellant’s
witnesses, respondent’s truck was proceeding at a
speed of from thirty-eight to forty-five miles per hour,
and neither slowed down nor varied its course prior
to striking appellant’s car.

For the purposes of this appeal, it may be assumed.
that respondent’s driver was proceeding at an unlaw-
ful rate of speed, the question to be determined being
whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that, as
matter of law, appellant was also negligent, and that
his negligence in a material degree proximately con-
tributed to the accident. Appellant strenuously con-
tends that the evidence which he produced made a
case for the jury, and that the trial court erred in de-
termining the issue as matter of law.

Appellant testified that, after his glance through the
break in the hedge, which disclosed no traffic on Fif-
teenth avenue, he stopped his car with its front about
even with the east line of the sidewalk on Fifteenth
avenue, and that, from his position when he stopped
his car, he could see north along Fifteenth avenue a
distance of about two hundred feet. Of course, appel-
lant’s view along Fifteenth avenue was to some extent
restricted by the hedge. He did not have the benefit
of observation from a point where he could see the
entire width of the street. He stated positively that
he did not see the truck, and that, if he had seen it, he
would not have attempted to cross the intersection
ahead of it. He looked to his left, as traffic from that
direction would be the first traffic he would meet, and,
seeing no vehicle approaching from that direction,
proceeded to cross the intersection in low gear. When
he again looked to his right, he saw the truck approach-
ing rapidly. Appellant was just shifting into high gear
when he saw the truck, and he continued shifting and
stepped on the gas, in an attempt to avoid a collision.

When appellant first saw the truck, it was about
seventy-five feet distant. Appellant stated that, in his
opinion, after he first saw the truck, his car proceeded
about its own length, or possibly a little more, before
the collision. Appellant was familiar with the inter-

section, having often driven across it from the east,
and knew the position of the “Slow” sign and of the
hedge, and that the hedge obscured the view from the
east along Fifteenth avenue.

Manifestly, the intersection presented a dangerous
condition, and one which required care and attention
on the part of a driver approaching from the east. No
such driver could safely rely upon the glimpse of
Fifteenth avenue which he might obtain through the
gap in the hedge, such a glance being too restricted to
enable such a driver to form any opinion of value as to
whether or not traffic was approaching from the north
along Fifteenth avenue.

Appellant relied upon his observation north along
Fifteenth avenue from the position which he occupied
when he stopped his car. He was then, in the front
seat of his car, as he showed by marking a map of the
intersection, which is in evidence, a little to the east of
the east line of the hedge, extended south. He testified
definitely that, from this point, his view north was
restricted to approximately two hundred feet, his
vision, of course, not being straight down the avenue,
but limited to an angle by the southerly end of the
hedge. From a complete stop at this point, appellant
started his car, went into low gear, proceeded to cross
the intersection, and, as he testified, did not see the
approaching truck until it was within seventy-five feet
of his car. Appellant testified, on cross-examination,
that, if he had, from the easterly curb line, looked to
his right and seen the approaching truck, he could
have stopped his car in the easterly half of the inter-
section. He also testified that, if he had looked to the
right when from his position in the driver’s seat he was
approximately even with the sidewalk on Fifteenth
avenue, he would have had a practically unlimited
vision north on Fifteenth avenue.

P|

One of appellant’s witnesses, Mr. Pinkerton Day,
who was standing on the northwest corner of the inter-
section waiting for a street car, and saw both the truck
and appellant’s car, testified that, as the front of ap-
pellant’s car crossed the east line of Fifteenth avenue,
the front of respondent’s truck was approximately
forty-eight or fifty feet north of the north curb line of
Seventy-seventh street. This witness stated that he
had seen the truck as far up Fifteenth avenue as
Eightieth street.

HI The trial court did not err in ruling that, as
matter of law, appellant was guilty of contributory
negligence which barred his recovery in this action.
The northeast corner of the intersection was ob-
structed. Under the law, appellant was required to
look out for, and yield the right of way to, a vehicle
approaching from his right. The observation which a
driver in appellant’s position is required to make is
observation from a point at which he can see, and de-
cide when he can proceed within a reasonable margin
of safety, not from a point back from the intersecting
street, from which his view is seriously obstructed.
Appellant, at a point approximately twelve feet east of
the east curb line of Fifteenth avenue, undertook to
start his car from a dead stop and proceed across that
highway, without looking north along that street from
the east curb line on Fifteenth avenue, from which
point he would have had a clear view of approaching
traffic, and would, of course, have seen respondent’s
truck approaching from his right.

Appellant.argues that, under the rules laid down in
the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289
Pac. 533, he was deceived by the fact that the truck
was moving at an excessive rate of speed. Appellant
relies upon the Hadenfeldt case, contending that the
facts in the two cases are practically identical. In the

case cited, the opinion calls attention to the fact that
the disfavored driver looked to his right from the curb
line of the intersecting street and saw approaching the
car with which he subsequently collided. Under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, this court held that
whether or not the disfavored driver had acted in a
reasonably prudent manner, in consideration of all the
evidence, was for the jury to determine. The question
to be determined involved a car which the disfavored
driver saw, not a car which he did not see, and the dis-
favored driver looked to his right from a point from
which he could see all approaching traffic. The last
of the.four elements of the rule laid down in the Haden-
feldt case does not apply here, as appellant testified
that he did not see respondent’s truck until it was too
late for him to stop to avoid the collision, and that, if
he had seen the truck from the east margin of Fifteenth
avenue, as he must have seen it, had he looked, he
would not have attempted to cross the intersection
ahead of it.

A somewhat similar situation was presented in the
recent case of Bowen v. Odland, ante p. 257, 93 P. (2d)
366, in which we held that the last portion of the
rule of the Hadenfeldt case was not applicable to the
situation there presented. Several of our cases were
there discussed, and further consideration of these
cases is unnecessary.

Appellant cites the case of Martin v. Westinghouse
etc. Co., 162 Wash. 150, 297 Pac. 1098, and several other
cases. In the case last referred to, it was evident that
the disfavored driver, as he entered the intersection,
looked to his right and saw approaching the car with
which he subsequently collided. The plaintiff was of
the opinion that he had time to cross ahead of the
approaching car, and this court held that it could not
be determined as a matter of law that there was not a

reasonable margin of safety in plaintiff’s favor, be-
cause if the car had not been exceeding the speed limit,
probably such margin of safety would have been suf-
ficient. Upon such a state of facts, the question of
whether or not the plaintiff driver failed to act as a
reasonably prudent man in his situation would have
acted, was for the jury.

In the case of Thompson v. Fiorito, 167 Wash. 495,
9 P. (2d) 789, 12 P. (2d) 1119, the disfavored driver,
on approaching an intersection, looked to his right and
saw an approaching truck over two hundred feet away.
After some further observation, he continued along the
intersection, and his car was struck by the truck. This
court held that the plaintiff had the right to assume
that the truck would not exceed the legal speed limit,
and that the question of whether or not the plaintiff
was justified in attempting to cross ahead of the truck
was for the jury.

Appellant also cites the case of Eggert v. Schumacher,
173 Wash. 119, 22 P. (2d) 52, in which this court
affirmed an order of the superior court granting a new
trial after sustaining defendant’s motion for a nonsuit.
It appeared that the pavement was icy and slippery;
that the disfavored driver stopped his car and looked
in both directions, seeing no approaching traffic. He
then started slowly across the intersection and was
struck by the defendant’s car approaching from the
right. The driver occupying the favored position set
his brakes, but his car slid for some distance, striking
the car driven by the plaintiff. The trial court, after
granting defendant’s motion for a nonsuit, changed its
mind, and held that, in consideration of the slippery
condition of the highway and other matters, a jury
question was presented, in which view this court con-
curred. The case is not controlling here.

Appellant also cites the case of Gibson v. Spokane

United Railways, 197 Wash. 58, 84 P. (2d) 349, in
which this court affirmed a judgment rendered in favor
of the plaintiff in an action based upon an automobile
collision in a street intersection. It appeared that the
plaintiff, the disfavored driver, looked to his right as
he entered the intersection and saw no approaching
traffic within his range of vision, which was limited to
one hundred seventy-five feet, or less, by dust raised
by passing cars. There was testimony to the effect that
the plaintiff’s car had practically cleared the intersec-
tion when the defendant’s vehicle swerved to its right
and struck the plaintifi’s car. The case is nowise in
point here.

Appellant relies upon the case of Davis v. Riegel,
182 Wash. 1, 44 P. (2d) 771, which involved a collision
between an automobile and a pedestrian. The trial
court held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, and granted judgment
for defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the jury
in favor of plaintiff. This court held that the trial
court had erred in ruling in defendant’s favor as matter
of law. In the course of the opinion, this court said:

“Assuming that she [plaintiff] did not look to the
south, and that, if she had looked, she could have seen
the automobile, she is charged with notice of what she
would have seen, had she looked. The situation would
be the same as though she had looked and seen the
automobile. Silverstein v. Adams, 134 Wash. 430, 235
Pac. 784. It is immaterial whether she looked or not,
if, as a reasonably prudent person, she would have been
justified in trying to cross had she looked before start-
ing. Morris v. Seattle, Renton & Southern Ry. Co.,
66 Wash. 691, 120 Pac. 534.”

Appellant, in his brief, quotes the last portion of the
foregoing quotation, but the case is not at all in point
here, as, if this appellant had looked and seen the ap-

proaching truck, he certainly, as a reasonably prudent
person, would not have been justified in trying to cross
the street ahead of it. He himself said that, had he seen
the truck in time, he would have stopped.

Appellant argues that the principle of the Hadenfeldt
case should be extended to cover the facts in the case

.at bar, contending that appellant looked to his right
and saw no approaching traffic from that direction
which would constitute a danger to him if the approach-
ing car was proceeding within the speed limit fixed by
law. We are not inclined to extend the exception re-
ferred to in the case of Martin v. Hadenfeldt to such a
situation as is here presented.

The burden to avoid colliding with a car approaching
from his right rests heavily upon the disfavored driver.
A clear and unambiguous statute imposes this burden,
and the ingrafting of exceptions upon this sound and
wholesome rule of the road would tend only to con-
fusion and lead drivers occupying the disfavored posi-
tion under the statute to think that they might some-
how escape the burden imposed upon them by law and
throw the blame for avoidable accidents upon another.
Speed is of much less importance than safety, and,
under modern traffic conditions, safety, to a great ex-
tent, depends upon careful and prudent observation
both of natural physical conditions and of other ve-
hicles using the highway, as well as of pedestrians. We
are in accord with the rules laid down in the Haden-
feldt case, but are not inclined to extend the exception
therein provided for.

In the case at bar, appellant relied upon a somewhat
restricted view of Fifteenth avenue to his right. A per-
fectly clear and unobstructed view was available to
him after his car advanced only a few feet from where
he took the observation upon which he relied. In fail-
ing to again look to his right, he was negligent. He did

not bear the burden which rested upon him as the dis-
favored driver, and the trial court properly so held.

HM Appellant next argues that, conceding that ap-
pellant was guilty of contributory negligence, under
the doctrine of last clear chance the court should have
denied the challenge to the evidence and submitted
that question to the jury, upon the theory that, under
the first situation of the doctrine of last clear chance, as
stated in Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541, 228 Pac.
302, a jury question was presented. Whether or not
any situation calling for the application of the doctrine
of last clear chance is applicable in a given case, is a
question of law to be determined by the court. Hart-
ley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407, 165 Pac. 106; Burlie v.
Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684; Rossier v.
Payne, 125 Wash. 155, 215 Pac. 366. In the case at bar,
we find no basis in the record for a holding that any
element of the doctrine of last clear chance should be
applied.

| Finally, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in sustaining respondent’s objection to a portion
of the testimony of appellant’s witness Robert S.
Taylor, an engineer who testified as an expert concern-
ing the length of time it takes to stop cars going at
different rates of speed, dividing the matter of making
such stops into two factors, one of which is referred to
as the “braking distance,” and the other as “reaction
time,” which is explained as the time which elapses
between the instant when the driver first sees some-
thing which causes him to wish to stop and the instant
when he has succeeded in applying his brakes.

Testimony as to the average time of mental reaction
is of doubtful value. In any event, the witness testi-
fied as to what, in his opinion, is usually considered as
a fair reaction time. Assuming that this testimony was
admissible, the fact that the court sustained objections

392

to further questions concerning the same matter can-
not be held to constitute reversible error, as the testi-
mony rejected would be merely cumulative, and its
admission or rejection largely within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge. Sound Timber Co. v. Dana-
her Lumber Co., 112 Wash. 314, 192 Pac. 941; Girardi
v. Union High School Dist. No. 1, ante p. 21, 93 P.
(2d) 298.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment ap-
pealed from is affirmed.

Sremvert, Grracuty, and Simpson, JJ., concur.

Brake, C. J., (dissenting)—I dissent. Upon the facts,
as stated in the opinion, I think the question of con-
tributory negligence was for the jury.

[No. 27519. Department Two. September 1, 1939.]

Great Nortuern Rariway Company, Respondent, v.
Tue State or Wasuincton, Appellant.t

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 694.

393

The Attorney General and John E. Belcher, Assistant,
for appellant.

Thomas Balmer, Edwin C. Matthias, and Anthony
Kane, for respondent.

Mitzarp, J.—Section 78, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
p. 749, imposes a tax on each distributor of one-fourth
of one cent for each gallon of fuel oil “sold, distributed,
withdrawn or used by him.” Section 1 (amendatory

of § 78, chapter 180, Laws of 1935), chapter 116, Laws
of 1937, p. 459 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.) § 8370-78 [P.
C. § 7030-138]) imposes a tax on each distributor of
one-fourth of one cent for each gallon of fuel oil “sold,
distributed, or withdrawn by him.” The only change
in the 1935 statute by the 1937 enactment was to dis-
continue the tax on use. Subdivision (c), § 79, chap-
ter 180, Laws of 1935, p. 750, defines the term “dis-
tributor” and divides distributors into three classes, for
purpose of taxation under the act, as follows:

“The word ‘distributor’ shall mean and include
[1] every person who refines, manufactures, produces
or compounds fuel oil and/or diesel oil and sells, dis-
tributes, or in any manner uses the same in this state;
also [2] any person who imports any fuel oil and/or
diesel oil into this state and stores, withdraws, sells,
distributes, or in any manner uses the same in this
state whether in the original package or container in
which it is imported or otherwise; also [3] any person
who having acquired in this state in the original pack-
age or container fuel oil and/or diesel oil, shall dis-
tribute or sell the same, whether in such original
package or container in which the same was imported
or otherwise, or in any manner uses the same;

Subdvision (c), §79, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
was amended by subd. (b), $2, chapter 116, Laws of
1937, p. 459 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8370-79 [P. C.
§ 7030-139]). It added the word “withdraws” after the
word “sells” in the first class of distributors named in
the definition and omits the phrase “or in any manner
uses.” No change:was made in the second and third
classes of distributors named in the definition.

Section 1, chapter 186, Laws of 1939, p. 581, imposes
a tax on each distributor of one-fourth of one cent for
each gallon of fuel oil “withdrawn, sold, distributed or
in any manner used by such distributor.” This amend-
ment restores the tax on use discontinued by § 1, chap-

ter 116, Laws of 1937, which amended § 78, chapter
180, Laws of 1935.

Subdivision (a), §2, chapter 186, Laws of 1939,
p. 581, amendatory of subd. (b) § 2, chapter 116, Laws
of 1937, and subd. (c), § 79, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
defines the term “distributor” and divides distributors
into three classes, for purpose of taxation under the act,
as follows:

“ Distributor’ shall mean and include [1] every per-
son, firm, association or corporation who refines, manu-
factures or compounds liquid or liquefiable petroleum

. products, and withdraws, sells, distributes, or in any
manner uses the same in this state; also [2] any person,
firm, association or corporation who acquires the same
within the state from any person refining it within or
importing it into the state on which the tax of one-
quarter (44) cent per gallon has not been paid; or
[8] any person, firm, association or corporation who
imports the same into this state and withdraws, sells,
distributes or in any manner uses the same in this
state.”

The 1939 enactment restores the phrase “or in any
manner uses” to the first class of distributors named in
the definition in the 1935 act and omitted from the
1937 amendatory statute. The second class of distribu-
tors named in the definition in the 1935 and 1937 stat-
utes is made the third class in the 1939 enactment,
which omits the word “stores” and the clause “whether
in the original package or container in which it is im-
ported or otherwise.” By the 1939 statutory definition
of the second class of distributors, a third classification
(not so restricted as the third class of distributors
named in the definition in the 1935 and 1937 statutes) is
made. This group of distributors comprises those who
acquire fuel oil within this state from any person re-
fining fuel oil within or importing it into the state if
the tax on such fuel oil has not prior thereto been paid.

The penalty provisions of chapter 58, Laws of 1933,
p. 298, were adopted (doubtless to compel those en-
gaged in selling, withdrawing, distributing, and using
fuel oil to take out a distributor’s license and pay the
tax imposed by Title XI, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
p. 749, chapter 116, Laws of 1937, p. 459, Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.) § 8370-78 [P. C. § 7030-138] et seg.) as a part
(§ 81, chapter 180, Laws of 1935, p. 751; § 4, chapter
116, Laws of 1937, p. 461, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 8370-81 [P. C. § 7030-141]) of the 1935 and 1937
statutes.

Section 8, chapter 58, Laws of 1933, p. 306 (Rem. Rev.
Stat. (Sup.), § 8327-8 [P. C. § 7068-78]), provides that
a fuel oil tax shall be paid monthly; that, if a person
acts as a distributor “without first securing the license
required by section 3,” he shall pay a penalty amount-
ing to one hundred per cent of the tax. If the sworn
monthly statement required by §7 of the act, p. 306
(Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8327-7 [P. C. § 7068-77]),
is not filed by the distributor, a penalty amounting to
ten per cent is added to the tax due. If the tax is not
paid by the distributor by five p. m. on the fifteenth
day of the next month after the tax becomes due, the
distributor is subject to another penalty of ten per cent.
All of the penalties are cumulative, and “no action
taken pursuant to this section shall relieve in any wise
any person from the penal provisions of this act.”

Section 9 of chapter 58, Laws of 1933, p. 307 (Rem.
Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8327-9 [P. C. § '7068-79]), provides
that, if any distributor is delinquent in the payment of
his excise tax under the act, notice of the amount of
such delinquency shall be given by the director of
licenses “to all persons having in their possession or
under their control any credits or other personal prop-
erty belonging to such distributor,” and such persons
so notified shall withhold the payment of such credits,

etc., to the taxpayer to protect the state in the collec-
tion of the tax. Such taxes, penalties, and interest con-
stitute a lien in favor of the state upon all franchises,
property, and rights to property, whether real or per-
sonal (whether such property is employed by such per-
son in the prosecution of his business or otherwise)
from the date the taxes are due and payable until paid.
If the distributor is in default for more than ten days,
the director is authorized to issue a warrant to the sher-
iff of any county of the state commanding the sheriff
to levy upon and sell the goods and chattels of such
distributor, without exemption, found within his juris-
diction, for the payment of the amount of the delin-
quency, with the added penalties, etc., and to proceed
with the sale “with like effect and in the same manner
as prescribed by law in respect to executions issued
against goods and chattels upon judgment by a court
of record.”

In addition to the foregoing self-executing provisions
undoubtedly designed to compel obedience without
resort to the courts, §§ 19 and 22 of chapter 58, Laws
of 1933, pp. 323, 326 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 8327-
19, 8327-22 [P. C. §§ 7068-89, 7068-92]), provide that
any person, firm, association or corporation “or any offi-
cer or agent thereof failing to pay the tax as herein pro-
vided, or violating any of the other provisions of this
act,” shall be punishable by a fine of from five hundred
to five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term
not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment. The state highway patrolmen are author-
ized to arrest “on view, without writ, rule, order or
process, any person known to have violated any of the
provisions of this act.”

Prior to the enactment of the fuel oil tax statute,
plaintiff used fuel oil for the generation of steam in its
locomotives in the operation of its railroad as a common.

carrier of commerce in the state of Washington and
adjacent states. On December 20, 1929, plaintiff
entered into the first contract pertinent to the case at
bar for the purchase of California fuel oil from the
Associated Oil Company. The contract recites the pur-
pose was to obtain a dependable supply of fuel oil for
the operation of plaintiffs trains west of Whitefish,
Montana.

The contract of December 20, 1929, was for

“oy the period beginning on January 1, 1931,
and ending on December 31, 1933, deliveries to be made
in fairly equal monthly installments, all the fuel oil
up to and not exceeding a total during each year of
2,300,000 bulk barrels of 42 U. S. gallons each, re-
quired by Buyer during said period for current fuel oil
purposes in the operation of its lines of railway west
of Whitefish, Montana; provided that Buyer shall pur-
chase hereunder not less than 1,800,000 bulk barrels of
fuel oil during each year of said period.”

A similar provision is in the contract executed
August 16, 1935. By supplemental agreement of Sep-
tember 14, 1931, the term of the contract of December
20, 1929, was extended to December 31, 1935. The fuel
oil involved in the case at bar, between May 1, 1935, to
December 31, 1935, was sold and delivered under the
terms and conditions of the contract of December 20,
1929. A new contract, in all particulars important to
this case the same as the preceding contract, was exe-
cuted August 16, 1935, for the period January 1 to
December 31, 1936. That contract was continued in
force for the period ending December 31, 1938, by letter
contract of June 10, 1936. The fuel oil involved in this
case from and after January 1, 1936, was sold and de-
livered to plaintiff under the terms of the contract of
August 16, 1935.

The pertinent provisions of the contract executed
December 20, 1929, are as follows:

“Buyer agrees to give Seller at least thirty (30) days’
written notice of any deliveries of oil required here-
under. Said oil shall be delivered into the tanks of
Buyer at Everett, Washington, where Buyer shall
furnish suitable wharf and docking facilities and pipe
lines and tanks for receiving said oil promptly, and
shall furnish berth where Seller’s vessels drawing not
more than thirty (30) feet may navigate to, lie at, and
depart from, safely at all stages of the tide. Said oil
is to be delivered at Seller’s risk as far as ship’s rail
only, in tank ship lots of from Sixty Thousand (60,000)
to One Hundred Thousand (100,000) barrels, at Seller’s
option . . .

“All pipe lines from said tank or tanks to the vessel
shall be full when pumping begins and the lines shall
have no open connections other than to the tank or
tanks to which the oil is being delivered during time of
unloading or between opening and closing gauges. Not-
withstanding Seller’s agreement to deliver said oil into
Buyer’s tanks, it is agreed that any loss of oil from
Buyer’s pipe lines between the ship’s rail and the
Buyer’s tanks, or from the Buyer’s tanks, due to burst-
ing, breaking or leaking of such pipe line or hose or
tanks or connections, or failure to close and keep closed
all connections other than to the tank or tanks to which
the oil is being delivered, shall be borne by Buyer.
In case of any such loss the quantity thereof shall be
determined by measurements of ship’s tanks, and
Buyer shall pay Seller for such quantity as though
same had been delivered into the tanks. . . .

“Quality of oil delivered hereunder shall be deter-
mined by test of running line sample secured from
vessel’s discharge line continuously during the dis-
charge of cargo. . . .

“Buyer is obligated to receive the oil upon vessel’s
readiness to discharge at minimum rate of Twenty-five
Hundred (2500) barrels per hour, provided the vessel
is able to pump at that rate. In the event of failure of
Buyer so to do, the Buyer shall pay the Seller demur-
rage on the vessel AT THE RATE of Fifty Dollars
($50.00) per hour, In the event of Buyer’s failure to
receive the oil as stipulated above due to breakdown of
Buyer’s plant or machinery or due to fire or other cause

beyond Buyer’s control, the rate of demurrage shall be
Twenty-five Dollars ($25.00) per hour.

“Buyer agrees to pay seller at office of Seller in San
Francisco, California, located at 79 Montgomery Street,
in current moneys of United States of America for each
bulk barrel of 2 U.S. gallons of oil delivered here-
under,

The provisions of the contract of August 16, 1935,
material to this case, read as follows:

“Buyer shall give Seller at least thirty (30) days’
written notice of any deliveries required hereunder.

“Said oil shall be delivered into Buyer’s tanks
at Everett, Washington, in tank ship lots of from
Sixty Thousand (60,000) to One Hundred Thousand
(100,000) barrels, at Seller’s option. . .

“Buyer shall furnish safe berth for discharging, and
shall receive delivery from said vessel, at the said
point of destination, or as near thereto as said vessel
may, at any stage of the tide, proceed to, lie at, dis-
charge, and depart from, always safely afloat, when
draft does not exceed 30 feet. Buyer shall furnish
berth at said point free of all charges.

“In receiving deliveries Buyer shall render ‘all neces-
sary assistance and shall provide adequate facilities
and equipment to receive oil at the rate of not less than
3,000 barrels per running hour at port of discharge.
Steam for making deliveries shall be furnished by
Seller’s vessel, but if port regulations or other causes
beyond Seller’s control prohibit or prevent mainte-
nance of fires under its boilers, Buyer, at its expense,
shall furnish shore steam at a pressure of not less than
100 pounds per square inch at vessel’s pumps. If
delivery is not received within the aforementioned
period, and if said vessel, unless prohibited or pre-
vented as aforesaid, has maintained an average pres-
sure of 65 pounds on the shore line at the point nearest
the vessel’s discharge connection, it shall be conclusive
evidence that the vessel’s facilities were capable of
making delivery within said specified period, and that
the facilities and equipment provided by Buyer were
insufficient to receive delivery within said specified
period. .

A *

“Seller’s title to, and responsibility and risk for, said
oil shall cease when and as same passes ship’s rail at
point of discharging. Buyer shall be responsible for all
of said oil lost through leakage, breakage, or defect in
discharge hose, shore lines, tanks or connections. In
case of any such loss the quantity thereof shall be de-
termined by measurements of ship’s tanks and Buyer
shall pay Seller for such quantity as though same had
been delivered into the tanks. . .

“All pipe lines from said tank or tanks to the vessel
shall be full when pumping begins and the lines shall
have no open connections other than to the tank or
tanks to which the oil is being delivered during time
of unloading or between opening and. closing gauges.
Notwithstanding Seller’s agreement to deliver said oil
into Buyer’s tanks, it is agreed that any loss of oil from
Buyer’s pipe lines between the ship’s rail and the
Buyer’s tanks, or from the Buyer’s tanks, due to burst-
ing, breaking or leaking of such pipe line or hose or
tanks or connections, or failure to close and keep closed
all connections other than to the tank or tanks to which
the oil is being delivered, shall be borne by Buyer.
In case of any such loss the quantity thereof shall be
determined by measurements of ship’s tanks, and
Buyer shall pay Seller for such quantity as though
same had been delivered into the tanks.

“The quality of oil delivered hereunder shall be de-
termined by test of composite sample secured from dis-
charge line during the discharge of cargo.

To insure that all of the oil remaining in
the discharge line from previous delivery is displaced,
the first sample shall be taken one-half hour after the
vessel commences to discharge.

“Payments hereunder shall be made in lawful money
of the United States of America. Buyer shall pay
Seller at Seller’s office in San Francisco, California, for
each bulk barrel of oil delivered.

The negotiations culminating in the execution of the
foregoing fuel oil contracts were conducted in Minne-
sota between representatives of the oil company and
plaintiff. The contracts were prepared by attorneys

of the respective companies in Minnesota and Cali-
fornia and were executed and delivered in the state of
California and the state of Minnesota. Each month, in
payment for oil delivered during the preceding month,
plaintifi’s treasurer, in St. Paul, Minnesota, transmits
a check to the oil company’s offices at San Francisco,
California.

Plaintiff maintains at a point on its main line of rail-
road, adjacent to Puget sound, known as Mile Post 31,
at Everett, Washington, three stationary tanks, which
are at a slight elevation above high tide and have a
capacity of 165,000 barrels. A pipe line, which has an
additional storage capacity of six thousand gallons, ex-
tends from the storage tanks to and along a timber
wharf projecting into Puget sound.

The fuel oil delivered to plaintiff under the above-
described contracts was loaded by the oil company into
tank ships owned (or chartered) and operated by the
oil company and transported by the oil company in
those tank ships by way of the Pacific ocean, the strait
_ of Juan de Fuca and Puget sound, to and alongside

plaintiff's wharf at Mile Post 31, on Puget sound, in
Everett, Washington. When the tank ships arrived at
Mile Post 31, delivery of the oil to the plaintiff was by
the oil company through a short discharge hose sup-
plied by the oil company, which hose was connected to
and extended from the deck outlet of the ship’s tanks,
over the ship’s rail, to the end of plaintiff’s pipe line on
plaintiffs wharf. The valves at the deck outlet and at
the end of plaintiff’s pipe line were then opened and the
oil was pumped from the hold of the tank ship through
the discharge hose into plaintiff’s pipe line and storage
tanks. The ship, as required by the contracts between
plaintiff and the oil company, at all times supplied the
power to run the pumps.

On completion of delivery of the oil, the valve at the

wharf end of plaintiff’s pipe line was closed and the dis-
charge hose back-pumped by the ship in order to re-
move all oil from the discharge hose. The contracts
provide that all pipe lines from the storage tanks to the
vessel are to be full, when pumping begins. Under the
method employed by the oil company and the plaintiff
in delivery and storage of the fuel oil, the pipe line, to
the full extent of its capacity of six thousand gallons,
was used for the storage of oil from the delivery of one
ship-load until the delivery of the next ship-load.
Plaintiff did not have anything whatever to do with the
operation of the tank ships or with the delivery of the
oil, and did not come into possession or control of the
oil until it passed the ship’s rail into plaintifi’s pipe
line. After its receipt in plaintiffs storage tanks and
pipe line at Mile Post 31, at Everett, Washington, the
fuel oil purchased by plaintiff from the oil company
under the contracts in question was withdrawn and
used by plaintiff in the operation of its trains.

In June, 1935, the plaintiff was granted a license
authorizing it to engage in business as a distributor of
fuel oil under the provisions of chapter 180, Laws of
1935. July 1, 1936, the license was renewed for one
year, expiring June 30, 1937. On June 17, 1937, the
license was again renewed to expire June 30, 1938.
Subsequently, counsel for plaintiff surrendered the li-
cense to the director of licenses.

Plaintiff punctually made, without protest, required
monthly payments of distributor’s fuel oil tax aggre-
gating $206,789.70 on 82,715,887 gallons of oil sold and
delivered to it under the contracts in question for the
period May 1, 1935, to March 31, 1937. Remittances for
the taxes, amounting to $17,517.42 on 7,006,970 gallons
of fuel oil, were made, under written protest, for the
months of April and May, 1937. The director of li-
censes agreed to permit plaintiff, and not enforce penal

provisions of the fuel oil statute, to defer future pay-
ments of the distributor’s fuel oil tax until disposition
of appeal in State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land, 194 Wash. 591, 78 P. (2d) 1090, which raised the
question whether a railroad company under facts like
those in the case at bar was subject to the distributor’s
fuel oil tax as an importer. We reversed the judgment
and held that the railroad company did not import the
oil, therefore was not subject to the tax.

Promptly thereafter, on the ground that, although
not made under written protest, the payments were in-
voluntarily made as the moneys were paid to the state
under duress, business compulsion, and coercion aris-
ing out of the penalty provisions of Title XI, chapter
180, Laws of 1935, chapter 116, Laws of 1937, and chap-
ter 58, Laws of 1933, plaintiff instituted its first cause of
action to recover against the state fuel oil taxes paid
for the period from May 1, 1935, to March 31, 1937.
In its second cause of action, plaintiff seeks to recover
payments made under written protest of fuel oil taxes
for the months of April and May, 1937.

The state answered, defending its right to retain fuel
oil taxes paid by plaintiff from May 1, 1935, to May 31,
1937, and by cross-complaint sought recovery of taxes
alleged to have accrued between June 1, 1937, and
September 30, 1938, payment of which was withheld
pending disposition of appeal in State v. Fidelity & De-
posit Co. of Maryland, supra.

Trial of the cause to the court, sitting without a jury,
resulted in findings of fact and conclusions of law in
favor of the plaintiff. Judgment awarding recovery to
plaintiff on its two causes of action and dismissing the
cross-complaint was entered. Defendant appealed.

Counsel for appellant contend that respondent was
the importer of the fuel oil in question, that respondent
stored the oil in this state and thereafter withdrew it

from storage and used it in this state; therefore, re-
spondent is subject to taxation as a distributor under
that subdivision of § 79, chapter 180, Laws of 1935, and
that subdivision of § 2, chapter 116, Laws of 1937, de-
fining a distributor as any person who imports any fuel
oil into this state and stores, withdraws, or in any man-
ner uses the same in this state, whether in the original
package or container in which it is imported or other-
wise. In the event that we do not agree that respond-
ent was the importer of the oil, counsel for appellant in-
sist that respondent is subject to the tax as a “distribu-
tor” under the third subdivision of § 79, chapter 180,
Laws of 1935, and the second subdivision of § 2, chap-
ter 116, Laws of 1937, which defines and classifies as a
distributor any person who acquires the oil in this state
in the original package or container and thereafter
stored, distributed, or used the oil in this state.

Counsel for respondent insist on appeal, as they
argued in the trial of the action—with which position
the trial court was in accord—that the facts surround-
ing the purchase by, delivery to, and use of fuel oil by
the Northern Pacific Railway Company in State v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 194 Wash. 591, 78
P. (2d) 1090, were the same in every material respect
as the facts surrounding the purchase by, delivery to,
and use of fuel oil by respondent in the case at bar;
therefore, any question as to the liability of respondent
for the tax as a fuel oil distributor under chapter 180,
Laws of 1935, and chapter 116, Laws of 1937, is fore-
closed by our opinion in the case cited.

HE The facts in State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.
of Maryland, supra, are, substantially, the same as the
facts in the case at bar. In that case, counsel for ap-
pellant railway company argued as follows:

“The definition of ‘distributor,’ in § 79, is in three
parts, viz:

“(a) Every person who refines, manufactures, pro-
duces, or compounds fuel oil and sells, distributes or in
any manner uses the same in this state.

“(b) Also any person who imports any fuel oil into
this state and stores, withdraws, sells, distributes or in
any manner uses the same in this state whether in the
original package or container in which it is imported or
otherwise.

“(¢) Also any person who having acquired in this
state in the original package or container fuel oil, shall
distribute or sell the same, whether in such original
package or container in which the same was imported
or otherwise, or in any manner uses the same.

“Obviously, neither (a) nor (c) apply here. (a)
means one who refines and sells or uses in the same
state. (c) applies to the acquisition in the state of oil
in the original package or container; for instance, a
tank car, and sale or use in the state. The oil in ques-
tion was not acquired in this state in the original con-
tainer.

“The portion of the definition of a distributor on
which the state must rely and on which the trial court
must have based its opinion is (b), applying to one who
‘imports and stores, withdraws, sells, distributes or in
any manner uses . . . in this state’”

The original package doctrine advanced by counsel
for the state in the case at bar was not urged by counsel
for the state in the case cited. It is plain that the
parties (the state and the railway company) were of
the view that the answer to the question whether the
railway company was an importer of fuel oil would be
determinative of the question whether the railway
company was subject to the tax as a distributor.

We held that, under the fuel oil tax statutes defining
three classes of distributors, one of which is (b) per-
sons who import fuel oil into the state and store, sell,
withdraw, or use the same, a railroad company is not
subject to the tax as an importer where its contract
with the oil company required the oil company to bring

a large quantity of fuel oil into the state and deliver it
into the railroad company’s tanks at Tacoma, the fuel
oil to be at all times subject to the risk of the oil com-
pany until the act of importation was wholly per-
formed, when the oil was then sold and payment made
for same. ,

The only question presented in that case was
whether the railroad company imported the fuel oil.
This is clear from a reading of the opinion, the perti-
nent language of which is as follows:

“It appears upon analysis of § 79 of the act, p. 750,
Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8370-79 [P. C. § 7030-139],
that three classes of distributors are taxed, namely:
(a) persons who refine, manufacture, produce, or com-
pound fuel oil and sell, distribute it, or in any manner
use the same within the state; (b) persons who import
any fuel oil into the state, and store, sell, withdraw,
distribute, or in any manner use the same within the
state; (c) persons who, having acquired fuel oil in
original packages or containers, distribute or sell the
same, whether in the original package or container or
otherwise, or in any manner use the same.

“Tt is obvious that, under the facts pleaded, proved,
and found, the railway company cannot be included
under (a) or (c), nor can it be included under (b),
unless, in addition to storing and using the oil, it im-
ported it into the state. The question is, therefore,
reduced to this: Did the railway company import the
oil?

“. . . the oil in question was brought into the state
by the oil company and was there sold to the railway
company, just as the contract contemplated. We,
therefore, hold that the oil company, and not the rail-
way company, imported the oil. Accordingly, the rail-
way company does not fall within any of the classes
of persons which the statute makes subject to the tax;
for, although it stored and used it, it did not import
and store, etc.”

Chapter 186, Laws of 1939, p. 581 (cited and quoted
above), amendatory of chapter 180, Laws of 1935, and

chapter 116, Laws of 1937, reflects acceptance by the
legislature of State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
land, 194 Wash. 591, 78 P. (2d) 1090, as determinative
of the question whether, under facts (which are sub-
stantially the same as in the case at bar) of that case,
the purchaser of the fuel oil is an importer, and also
the question whether such purchaser was a distributor,
as having acquired the oil in this state in the original
package or container. .
Hl In its petition for rehearing, which was denied,
the state contended, for the first time, that the Northern
Pacific Railway Company was a distributor under the
third subdivision of § 79, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
as the railway company acquired the oil in this state
in the original package or container. Under our deci-
sion (State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 194
Wash. 591, 78 P. (2d) 1090) which was expressly con-
fined to the only question (which we answered in the
negative) raised by the parties, Did the Northern
Pacific Railway Company import the oil? the ques-
tion presented in the case at bar whether respondent
is an importer of fuel oil is foreclosed and must be
answered in the negative. However, the denial of the
petition for a rehearing challenging, for the first time,
our attention to the original package doctrine, did not
foreclose the question whether, under the third sub-
division of § 79, chapter 180, Laws of 1935, one who
acquires fuel oil in this state in the original package
or container, etc., is subject to the tax as a distributor.
Hl In support of the position that respondent ac-
quired fuel oil in the original package or container and
distributed and used the same in this state, therefore is
subject to the fuel oil tax as a distributor, counsel for
the state cite West Virginia & Maryland Gas Co. v.
Towers, 134 Md. 137, 106 Atl. 265, in which the Mary-
land court of appeals held that an article imported is

not protected, by the provisions of the United States
constitution relating to interstate commerce, from the
interference of state laws when the original package
has been sold by the importer or broken up by him
or has otherwise become mixed with the common mass
of property in the state. The court stated that the
term “original package,” as used in cases involving
interstate commerce, may apply to articles incapable,
by reason of their physical properties, of assuming the
form of a package, therefore the term “original pack-

" age” means the form or physical condition of the ar-
ticle in which it is transported in its interstate move-
ment, hence natural gas transported from one state to
another state in pipe lines may fall within the term.
The original package of gas is broken when the first
gas is taken out of the pipe lines and sold in the state
in which delivery is made, and the gas thereafter
ceases to be an article of interstate commerce. Pat-
ently, that case is not in point.

Neither is Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S.
444, 64 L. Ed. 654, 40 S. Ct. 355, apposite. That case
involved the validity of a statute of New Mexico which
defined “distributors” of gasoline as those who sell it
from tank cars, receiving tanks or stations, or in or
from tanks, barrels, or packages not purchased from a
licensed distributor, etc., and imposed a gallonage tax
on all gasoline sold or used by such distributors. The
United States supreme court held that the imposition
was a privilege tax; and, as applied to parties who
brought gasoline from without and sold it within the
state, the act was invalid, as a burden on interstate
commerce, in so far as it related to their business of
selling in tank car lots and in barrels and packages,
as originally imported from other states; but, if sepa-
rable, the statute was valid in its application to sales

made from such original packages in retail quantities
to suit purchasers.

Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 79 L. Ed.
838, 55 S. Ct. 358, is not in point, as will clearly appear
from examination of the opinion. The United States
supreme court held in that case that, if goods carried
from one state reach their destination in another state
and are held in the second state in original packages
for sale, the latter state has power to tax those goods
without discrimination, as it does other property with-
in its jurisdiction; that a state tax on distributors of
gasoline of so much per gallon sold is not repugnant
to the commerce clause of the United States constitu-

_ tion as applied to a case where the vendor, under local
contracts for sale of gasoline in tank cars—original
packages—to be delivered to the purchasers locally on
their rail sidings, was at liberty to take it from local
or outside sources and chose to consign it to the pur-
chasers from another state.

Burke v. Bass, 123 Neb. 297, 242 N. W. 606, is not an
apt authority. The supreme court of Nebraska held
in that case that motor vehicle fuel unloaded from a
tank car into the shipper’s storage tank lost its inter-
state character and may be subjected to an excise tax
upon its use and distribution. That is a different ques-
tion than the one presented in the case at bar.

In Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. South Portland, 121
Me. 128, 115 Atl. 900, 26 A. L. R. 965, the Petroleum Cor-
poration imported oil into the United States in tank
steamers from Mexico and pumped that oil into receiv-
ing tanks belonging to the Petroleum Corporation at
South Portland, Maine, for distribution by the owner
(Petroleum Corporation) of the tanks. The oil was
withdrawn by the Petroleum Corporation from its stor-
age tanks and sold to buyers in South Portland, Maine,
and other portions of New England. The Petroleum

Corporation contested a tax imposed by the city of

South Portland upon the oil in the storage tanks, on the

ground that the tax was upon imports, therefore ille-

gal as in violation of Art. I, § 10, clause 2, of the United

States constitution. The city’s position, which was sus-

tained by the supreme court of Maine, was that the oil

in the storage tanks had lost its character as an import,

because it had been separated from the original recep-

tacle in which it was shipped and was therefore sub-~
ject to local taxation. The court said:

“It may be regarded as settled then that imported
goods lose their character as imports when either of
two changes has taken place; first, when they have
passed from the control of the importer as by sale, or
second, when they have been separated from the origi-
nal receptacle in which they were shipped. In the case
at bar there is no claim that the oil had passed from the
control of the importer. The plaintiff company still
owned the property.

“The next consideration logically is, whether that
original package has been broken, within the purview
of the established rule, so that the contents have be-
come a part of the general mass of property.

“Tn our opinion it has. When the steamer reached
Portland the oil was pumped from the steamer tank,
the receptacle in which it had been imported, into four
tanks located on shore. The original package was
thereby broken. The contents were separated from the
container and we can detect no real difference between
removing the contents from the container and the con-
tainer from the contents. If the importation had been
dry goods in cases, the removal of the cases inclosing
the goods would have the same effect as the removal
of the goods from the cases. In either case the original
unit of importation has been destroyed by separation,
and that we understand to be the test. Can it be said
that the oil is in its original package when it has been
removed from its original container and distributed
among and deposited in four different containers on the
shore? Neither in fact nor in law is the original pack-
age preserved; on the contrary, for it have been substi-

tuted four new and different packages. Suppose a large
tierce of liquor was imported and, after the vessel
reached port, the liquor was pumped from the tierce
into kegs or jugs on the wharf. Could it be success-
fully contended that these kegs and jugs constituted
original unbroken packages?

“Or suppose in the case at bar, instead of pumping
the oil from the steamer tank to the shore tanks the
transfer were made by workmen with buckets. Would
the same claim be made? Neither the method of trans-
fer of the contents nor the nature of the new recep-
tacles is of importance. The vital fact is the separation
itself. The fallacy in the plaintiff’s contention perhaps
lies in the fact that because the oil is in the same form
when in the shore tanks as in the steamer’s tank, there-
fore the importation remains unchanged. The oil is
indeed in the same form, and necessarily so; but the
same is true of other imported goods after they have
been removed from the receptacle in which they were
imported. That, however, is not the test. The test is
whether the integrity of the entire package, that is the
imported commodity and the receptacle in which it was
imported, has been preserved.”

In Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 15 F. (2d)
208, it was held that oil brought from Mexico into Gal-
veston, Texas, in tank steamers, and from Galveston
distributed under a prior contract to a railroad com-
pany at Galveston and to interstate buyers out of Gal-
veston, retained its character as import not subject to
local taxation, though some small quantities were sold
locally when pumped into tanks from the steamers in
which the oil was shipped. The court said, repudiating
the court’s construction of the import clause in Mezi-
can Petroleum Co. v. South Portland, supra:

“The plaintiff contends, too, that, conceding that the
defendant was the importer, the goods were not in the
original package in which imported, and therefore had
become part of the general mass of property in the
state. It is a matter of hornbrook knowledge that the
original package statement of Justice Marshall was an

illustration, rather than a formula, and that its appli-
cation is evidentiary, and not substantive, and I can-
not give my assent to the view, expressed in the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Maine in Mexican Petro-
leum Co. v. Portland, 121 Me. 128, 115 A. 900, 26 A. L. R.
965, that the tanker which brought the oil from Mexico
is the original package in the sense of the constitutional
construction, whether it is physically so or not. I am
therefore of the opinion that the oil, when pumped into
the tanks, still retained its state as an import, and would
only lose it when, and if, it was maintained in tanks
for the purpose of general and indiscriminate sale.

“After all, it is the facts in the case which make the
law, and not the law which makes the facts, and the
facts here show direct importation, with the provision
for sale already made, and the pumping in the tanks

- a mere step in effecting that purpose. It would be a
strained construction to hold that this oil, collected as
it was, and distributed as it was, was not an import,
within the meaning of the Constitution, and I am con-
tent to hold that it was.

“Some stress has been laid upon the fact that a few
thousand out of the many million barrels of oil pumped.
in was sold for local use. The law, like other things,
goes on common sense, and if these small spot sales,
mainly matters of accommodation as they were, were
to be given the effect of changing the character of this
oil, it would be a case of the law being made de mini-
mis, and not according to reason.”

All that the authorities, upon which the state relies,
hold is that, when the importer so acts upon the thing
imported that it becomes incorporated into a mass of
property in the jurisdiction in which it is brought, the
thing imported loses its distinctive character as an
import and becomes subject to the taxing power of the
state into which the article was brought; if, however,
while the thing imported remains the property of the
importer and is retained in his warehouse, in his tank
car, in his tank steamer, or in his warehouse, in the

original form or package in which it was imported, a
tax upon it would be clearly a duty on imports.

Inasmuch as respondent never received the oil in
the original package (respondent had nothing to do
with the oil until after it was withdrawn from the
original package (a tank steamer) and deposited in
entirely different containers which were respondent’s
storage facilities), respondent is not within the third
class of distributors defined in the statute. Respondent
did not acquire “in this state in the original package
or container fuel oil.”

As respondent is not subject to the fuel oil tax as a
distributor under any of the provisions of chapter 180,
Laws of 1935, and chapter 116, Laws of 1937, it follows
that appellant is not entitled to recovery on its cross- ©
complaint, and that respondent is entitled to refund of
fuel oil taxes paid by it under protest for the months
of April and May, 1937.

HEME The next question is whether, having paid to
the appellant without protest fuel oil taxes for the
period May 1, 1935, to March 31, 1937, respondent is
entitled to recovery of those payments as having been
made under duress, coercion, and business compulsion.

Counsel for appellant contend that the payments for
fuel oil taxes of which respondent complains in its first
cause of action were made without protest; therefore,
those are voluntary payments and are not recoverable
in view of the statute (chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p.
201, Rem. Rev. Stat., §11315-1 [P. C. § 6882-189]
et seq.) which requires, as a condition precedent to
the maintenance of an action to recover taxes claimed
to be illegal, excessive or void, that such taxes be paid
under protest.

Chapter 58, Laws of 1933, is made a part of the fuel
oil tax statutes (chapter 180, Laws of 1935, and chap-
ter 116, Laws of 1937) and provides, as recited in the

earlier part of this opinion, a method under which
fuel oil taxes are made collectible by summary process
and thereby compel obedience by the taxpayer with-
out the taxpayer having his day in court. The evi-
dence amply sustains the finding of the trial court that,
because of summary nature of the fuel oil tax statutes
and the necessity of compliance therewith in order to
avoid interruptions in the operation of its railroad and
in the use and management of its property which
would result from respondent’s failure to comply with
those statutes, respondent qualified as a distributor of
fuel oil and paid the taxes, recovery of which is now
sought by respondent.

The penalty provision of the fuel oil tax statutes
was designed to accomplish this purpose, and in the
case at bar the objective for which it was designed
was achieved. That is, the taxes which appellant
claims accrued between May 1, 1935, and May 31, 1937,
were paid by respondent under duress, coercion, and
business compulsion imposed by the summary and
self-executing provisions of the fuel oil statutes.

Chapter 62, Laws of 1931, was intended, a reading
of that statute clearly shows, to apply exclusively to
ad valorem taxes. The pertinent section (§ 185, p.
830, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8370-185 [P. C. § 7030-
245]) of the administrative provision of the revenue
act (Title XVIII), chapter 180, Laws of 1935) reads.
as follows:

“The provisions of this title shall not apply with re-
spect to the administration of the taxes imposed under
titles XV and XVI, herein, but shall apply with re-
spect to the taxes imposed under all other titles of
this act, in such manner and to such extent as is indi-
cated in the last section of each of such titles.”

The last section (§ 81, chapter 180, Laws of 1935) of
Title XI of the fuel oil tax statute does not make any

of the sections of the general administrative provision
applicable to fuel oil taxes, but in lieu thereof provides
that chapter 58, Laws of 1933 (except certain sections)
shall have full force and application to Title XI as
fully as if the words “fuel oil” appeared therein. These
same provisions, with some immaterial changes, are
carried into the amendatory statute (chapter 116,
Laws of 1937). Chapter 58, Laws of 1933, does not
contain any specific provision which requires pay-
ment under protest in order to obtain a refund of a
tax illegally exacted, nor is there present in chapter
58, Laws of 1933, any provision similar to § 198 of the
general administrative provision of chapter 180, Laws
of 1935, p. 837 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 8370-198
[P. C. § 7030-258]), requiring payment, as a condition
precedent to court action, that all taxes, penalties and
interest imposed under the provisions of the act shall
be paid in full prior to the institution in any court of
an action to contest such tax, penalties or interest.
The failure, counsel for appellant contend, to institute
an action to enjoin collection of the tax, bars respond-
ent’s right to recover the taxes paid under duress,
coercion, and business compulsion between May 1,
1935, and May 31, 1937.

If the general administrative provisions of chapter
180, Laws of 1935, are applicable to the fuel oil tax
imposed under Title XI, chapter 180, Laws of 1935,
then payment under protest is not required, nor is
respondent given the right to bring injunction pro-
ceedings.

It would not be reasonable to hold that it was the
intention of the legislature to classify actions for re-
covery of fuel oil and gasoline taxes with actions for
recovery of ad valorem taxes by requiring payment
of all such taxes under protest and to waive protest
as to all other excise taxes.

Statutes should be construed as a whole. The in-
tention of the legislature may not be shown by taking
one section or sentence of a statute. If we are mindful
of that rule, we plainly see, in reading all of chapter
62, Laws of 1931, that the legislature intended that
statute to apply solely to ad valorem taxes.

Section 1 of that statute, p. 201, provides that no in-
junction shall be granted to restrain the collection of
any tax except in two cases. The second exception is
“where the property upon which the tax is imposed is
exempt from taxation.” (Italics ours.) An excise tax
is not imposed upon property, but is a charge made for
a privilege enjoyed. Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford,
183 Wash. 317, 49 P. (2d) 14. Section 1 would have no
meaning if chapter 62, Laws of 1931, were meant to
apply to excise taxes. We held in State v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 194 Wash. 591, 78 P. (2d)
1090, that the fuel oil tax imposed by Title XI, chapter
180, Laws of 1935, is an excise tax imposed upon per-
sons with respect to the privilege of distributing fuel
oil.

Section 2, chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 201, provides
that, in all cases of the levy of taxes for public revenues
which are deemed unlawful or excessive by the person,
firm or corporation whose property is taxed, or from
whom such tax is demanded or enforced, such person
may pay such tax under written protest, and there-
upon the person so paying may bring an action in the
superior court against the state, county, or municipality
by whose officers the same was collected to recover
such tax or any portion thereof so paid under protest.
Attention is again directed to the fact that it is only
the person whose property is taxed that is permitted
to pay the tax under protest and recover a refund.
The property of a person paying the fuel oil tax is

[|

not taxed; that tax is an excise tax. The omission by
the legislature of any reference to “licenses,” or any
term which would clearly include the fuel oil tax,
evinces the intention of the legislature that chapter
62, Laws of 1931, should not apply to an excise tax.

Section 3 of chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 202, pro-
vides for a judgment for recovery of taxes paid under
protest and the payment of that judgment. In that
section, it is patent that the legislature did not intend
to include excise taxes, such as the fuel oil tax, because,
after the provision for a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff when it is determined that the taxes unlawfully
collected, is the provision that:

“In case the action is against a county and the judg-
ment shall become final, the amount of such judgment,
including legal interest and costs where allowed, shall
be paid out of the treasury of such county by the
county treasurer upon warrants drawn by the county
auditor against a fund in said treasury hereby created
to be known and designated as the county tax refund
fund. Such warrants shall be so issued upon the filing
with the county auditor and the county treasurer of
duly authenticated copies of such judgment, and shall
be paid by the county treasurer out of any moneys on
hand in said fund. If no funds are available in such
county tax refund fund for the payment of such war-
rants, then such warrants shall bear interest in such
cases and shall be callable under such conditions as
are provided by law for county warrants, and such
interest, if any, shall also be paid out of said fund.”

The only provision made for payment of a judgment
is in the event the action is against a county. The fuel
oil tax is payable to the treasurer of the state of Wash- ©
ington (§ 8, chapter 58, Laws of 1933; § 81, chapter
180, Laws of 1935; § 4, chapter 116, Laws of 1937). No
action would lie against a county for a refund of the
fuel oil tax. If there had been any intention to apply
chapter 62, Laws of 1931, to excise taxes, which are

payable to the state, surely there would have been
included in the act a provision for payment of judg-
ments obtained against the state.

Section 4 of chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 202, pro-
vides for the levying of taxes for the county tax refund
fund by the proper county officers upon all of the tax-
able property within the county and upon all of the
taxable property of each taxing district within the
county. Clearly, the legislature did not contemplate
anything other than ad valorem taxes and did not have
in mind excise taxes which are payable only to the
state of Washington.

Section 5, chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 203, provides
that the venue of actions for the recovery of taxes
paid under protest shall be the superior court of the
county wherein the tax was collected. The proviso
to this section is to the effect that, where the property
against which the tax is levied consists of the operat-
ing property of a railroad company, etc., the venue
may be made in the superior court of any one of the
counties in which such tax is paid.

Section 6, chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 204, limits
the time in which actions may be instituted to recover
taxes.

Section 7, chapter 62, Laws of 1931, p. 204, pro-
vides, “Except as permitted by this act, no action shall
ever be brought attacking the validity of any tax, or
any portion of any tax.” This applies only to those
taxes (ad valorem taxes) contemplated by the legis-
lature in enactment of chapter 62, Laws of 1931.

There is a general rule that a tax paid voluntarily
cannot be recovered back after the statute levying the
tax has been declared unconstitutional; however, that
rule is subject to the qualification that, if the tax has
been paid under duress, coercion, or business compul-
sion, then it may be recovered back as an involuntary

Se

payment. It is not essential that express protest be
made at the time of payment, as that is only one class
of evidence that the payment was made under coercion.

The trial court found (the evidence does not pre-
ponderate against that finding) that respondent quali-
fied as a distributor of fuel oil and paid the taxes, the
validity of which respondent now challenges, because
of the summary nature of the fuel oil tax statutes and
the necessity of compliance therewith in order to avoid
interruption of the operation of its railroad and in the
use and management of its property which would re-
sult from respondent’s failure to comply with those
statutes.

A tax so paid is paid under duress or business com-
pulsion and is therefore involuntary. Non-compliance
with the law may be made so disadvantageous as ef-
fectively to induce compliance, even though the law
leaves compliance or non-compliance voluntary. In
declaring the agriculture adjustment act unconstitu-
tional, the United States supreme court held in United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477, 56 S. Ct.
312, that the effect of the act was to exert coercion by
economic pressure, making acceptance of its provisions
in fact involuntary. The coercive purpose and effect
of the penal provision of the fuel oil tax statutes was
amply sufficient to break down the resistance of a tax-
payer who was not certain whether he was a distrib-
utor. There was a yielding to compulsion precisely
the same as if the respondent did so to avoid jail sen-
tences and fines imposed on its officers and employees
and to prevent interruptions in the operation and in
the use and management of its property. The United
States court of appeals for the District of Columbia in
Thompson v. Deal, 92 F. (2d) 478, 484, aptly said:

“Whatever may have been the old rule as to the
characteristics of duress and coercion, a more liberal

view prevails, and ought to prevail, today—a change
of view point which has arisen as the government has
extended its control over the domestic concerns of the
citizen. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has ex-
pressed this better view as follows: ‘The old rule that
there could be duress only where there was a threat of
loss of life, limb, or liberty has been so changed that
duress may sometimes be implied when a payment is
made or an act performed to prevent great property
loss or heavy penalties y7yhen there seems no adequate
remedy except to submit to an unjust or illegal demand
and then seek redress in the courts.’

“We are not unmindful of the rule that ordinarily
when money has been voluntarily paid with full knowl-
edge of the facts it can not be recovered on the ground
the payment was made under a misapprehension of
the legal rights and obligations of the person paying.
But we think this rule has no present relevancy for, as
Mr. Justice Clifford said in United States v. Ellsworth,
101 U. S. 170, 174, 25 L. Ed. 862, in a very clear case
of what many courts would have called a voluntary
payment made under misapprehension of legal rights:
‘Call it mistake of law or mistake of fact, the prin-
ciples of equity forbid the United States to withhold
the same from the rightful owner.’”

In Union Bag & Paper Corp. v. State, 160 Wash. 538,
295 Pac. 748, 74 A. L. R. 1295, the plaintiff sought re-
covery from the state of corporation filing, and other,
fees paid for the right to transact business in this state.
The complaint alleged that the statutes under which
the fees were exacted were violative of plaintifi’s
rights under the constitution of the United States. The
state’s demurrer to the complaint was overruled and
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. In affirm-
ing that judgment, we used the following language
and reviewed certain authorities which make that
opinion applicable to the facts in the case at bar:

“The argument of counsel for the state, as we under-

stand them, proceeds upon the theory that, since
plaintiff’s complaint, especially in its first and second

vv
causes of action, fails to allege that the power corpora-'
tion expressly protested to the secretary of state against
the payment of the filing and license fees exacted by
him as prescribed by the statutes, the plaintiff is pre-
cluded from recovery as prayed for. We may concede
that there are decisions which would sustain this con-
tention, if this were a question of the payment of an
illegal tax exaction, involving nothing more in its con-
sequence than the collection of the tax as a mere civil
liability against the corporation or its property, and
did not otherwise impair or embarrass the business of
the corporation. Our decisions in Tozer v. Skagit
County, 34 Wash. 147, 75 Pac. 638, Drum v. University
Place Water Dist., 154 Wash. 700, 281 Pac. 731, and
perhaps in some other cases, lend support to this con-
tention, applicable to such a tax exaction.

“However, it seems to us that express protest, at
the time of payment, is but one class of evidence of
the payment being made under coercion. Here, we
have other very convincing evidence of coercion. Had
the payments of the statutory prescribed filing and
license fees not been made by the power corporation
at about the time they were paid, the business rights
of that corporation within this state would have been,
by the express terms of the statutes above noticed,
seriously threatened in the particulars above noticed.
We are of the opinion that the allegations of the plain-
tiff’s complaint, admitted by the demurrer as true,
show that the payments of the exacted filing and license
fees were made under such coercion as to render the
state liable to return the amounts so paid, though it
does not appear that they were paid under express
protest.

“In the text of 26 R. C. L., p. 457, we read:

“<‘The modern tendency is toward greater liberality
in recognizing the implied duress under which pay-
ment of a tax is almost always made, and even when
no seizure of the taxpayer’s goods is imminent, if he
is put at a serious disadvantage in the assertion of his
legal rights in defending proceedings brought to col-
lect the tax, justice may require that he should be at
liberty to avoid this disadvantage by paying promptly

and bringing suit on his own side. He is entitled to
assert his supposed right on reasonably equal terms.
When payment of an illegal tax is made in order to
avoid a penalty or disability which may be imposed
upon the taxpayer without giving him his day in court,
such payment will be considered involuntary,’

“And further, on page 459:

“Tf payment of an illegal tax is made under duress,
it need not be paid under protest to entitle the tax-
payer to recover it back, if he makes it clear that his
payment is involuntary, and a protest in such a case
is important only as evidence that the payment was
the effect of the duress,’

“In the text of 4 Dillon on Municipal Corporations
(5th ed.), § 1620, it is said:

“‘The coercion or duress which will render a pay-
ment of taxes involuntary must in general consist of
some actual or threatened exercise of power possessed,
or assumed to be possessed, by the party exacting or
receiving the payment, over the person or property of
another, from which the latter has no other means or
reasonable means of immediate relief except by mak-
ing payment.’

“Tn the text of 3 Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.), § 1297,
it is said:

“Tndependent of statute, a payment is not compul-
sory merely because made under protest. On the other
hand, if paid under compulsion, no protest is necessary.
However, in case of doubt, protest may be taken into
account in determining the question of duress’

“In Cox v. Welcher, 68 Mich. 263, Justice Campbell,
speaking for the court, made this general observation:

“Where payments are involuntary, and made under
legal duress, there has never been any rule requiring
a specific protest. The attempt to compel payment
where there is no legal burden is regarded as a legal
injury, and payment made to avoid the seizure and
sale of property to pay the wrongful claim can be re-
covered back as an extorted sum for which there was
no consideration.’

“It is true that the payment by the power corpora-
tion of the exacted filing and license fees here in ques-
tion, was not directly to avoid the unlawful seizure

and sale of any of the power corporation’s property;
but the payments were made to avoid the above noticed
statutory threatened interference with its lawful busi-
ness in this state. Among other decisions lending
strong support to our present view of the power corpo-
ration’s rights here drawn in question, we note: City
of Chicago v. Sperbeck, 69 Ill. App. 562; American Dist.
Telegraph Co. v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 578,
211 N. Y. Supp. 262; 243 N. Y. 565, 154 N. E. 607; New-
berry v. City of Detroit, 184 Mich. 188, 150 N. W. 838;
Swift Co. v. United States, 111 U. S. 22; Atchison, T.
& S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280.

“Our own decision in Olympia Brewing Co. v. State,
102 Wash. 494, 173 Pac. 430, is in harmony with, and
in principle strongly supports, our present view.
While there seems to have been a formal protest against
the payment of the license fee there exacted of and paid
by the brewing company, we said:

“The fact that the fees were paid with or without
protest is of no moment if their payment was made
under compulsion, and it cannot be gainsaid that pay-
ments made to prevent the sacrifice of large capital
investments are not voluntarily made but are made
as the result of compulsion.’ ”

The judgment awarding recovery to respondent on
its first and second causes of action and denying re-
covery to appellant on its cross-complaint is affirmed.

Suvpson, Geracuty, and Rosrnson, JJ., concur.

Brake, C. J. (dissenting)—Respondent brought this
action for a refund of excise taxes paid as a “distrib-
utor” of fuel oil under the provisions of chapter 180,
Laws of 1935. It set up two causes of action: One
for the recovery of $206,790, with interest, for taxes
paid pursuant to the act, without protest; the other for
$17,517, with interest, for taxes paid under protest.
The appellant cross-complained for $129,000 for taxes
due and accruing under the act subsequent to May,
1938. The lower court entered judgment in favor of

| *

the respondent on both causes of action and denied
recovery to the state on its cross-complaint.

The judgment was based on the holding of this court
in State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 194
Wash. 591, 78 P. (2d) 1090. I do not think, however,
that that case is authority for holding that respondent
is not a “distributor” under the third definition con-
tained in Laws of 1935, chapter 180, § 79. While in
that case it was broadly stated that the Northern Pa-
cific Railway Company did not come under any of the
definitions contained in § 79, the question presented
and decided was whether the railway company came
within the second definition as one who “imports any
fuel oil,” ete.

I think that respondent clearly comes within the
third definition of the term “distributor” as defined in
§ 79. That provides:

“The word ‘distributor’ shall mean and include

+ any person who having acquired in this state in
the original package or container fuel oil and/or diesel
oil, shall distribute or sell the same, whether in such
original package or container in which the same was
imported or otherwise, or in any manner uses the
same; . . .” (Italics mine.)

And I am warranted in saying that the respondent
thought so, too, until this court handed down its de-
cision in State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
supra. For, on June 4, 1935, respondent, pursuant to
§ 81 (incorporating as a part of the title chapter 58,
Laws of 1933, § 2), applied to the director of licenses
for a license as a “distributor” of fuel oil. This license
was voluntarily renewed by respondent on July 1,
1936, and again on June 17, 1937.

T dissent.

A
S&S
a

[No. 27202. En Banc. September 2, 1939.]

O. J. Buewpz, Respondent, v. Hzarst Pustications, INc.,
at al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 733.

Tanner & Garvin, for appellants.
Stevenson & Gershon, for respondent.

Smurson, J—Plaintiff brought this action to recover
damages from defendants for publishing an article in
the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, a newspaper owned by
defendant Hearst Publications, Inc., and of which news-
paper defendant Oliver S. Morris was city editor at
the time that article was published.

The material allegations of the amended complaint
upon which the case was tried may be stated as fol-
lows: Sunday, July 19, 1936, the defendant corpora-
tion, in writing, maliciously published in each edition
of its newspaper a libelous and scandalous story about
and concerning the plaintiff, which story appeared in
a prominent position, under large headlines, upon the
first page of the newspaper. The offending article
reads:

“Broken Neck Kits Crry Prisoner

“Injury Discovered After Man Spent Day in Cell

“Charles Adolph Dettz, middle-aged machinist, who
lay all day in a padded cell at the city jail with a broken
neck before attendants discovered his condition to be
serious, died yesterday at King County Hospital.

“Dettz was found in the street at Westlake Ave. N.
and Prospect St. at 5:30 a. m. Thursday, the coroner’s
preliminary report showed. He was taken to police
headquarters and examined by Dr. Sol Levinson of
City Hospital, who said he talked and walked normally,
and who diagnosed his case as plain drunkenness.

“In the afternoon Dr. O. J. Blende, another City Hos-
pital physician, examined Dettz and diagnosed his
condition as ‘alcoholic paralysis’ and ordered him re-
moved to King County Hospital.

“Dettz lived at 1526 Belmont Ave.

“County Autopsy Surgeon Gale E. Wilson, after a
post-mortem examination, said that Dettz’ neck had

been fractured several hours before he was taken to
jail.”

It is further alleged that the story is false and un-
true, in the following particulars: That Dettz (whose
true name is Deetz), did not lie all day in a padded
cell at the city jail with a broken neck before atten-
dants discovered his condition to be serious; that
plaintiff did not diagnose Deetz’ condition as “alcoholic
paralysis;” that county autopsy surgeon Gale E. Wilson
did not, after a post-mortem examination, state that
Deetz’ neck had been fractured several hours before
he was taken to jail; that Deetz never, at any time,
had suffered or sustained a broken neck; and that he
did not die as a result of such injury.

It is also alleged that, as the proximate result of this
publication, plaintiff’s good reputation as a practicing
physician and surgeon in Seattle and the state of
Washington has been, and for a long time to come will
continue to be, greatly injured and impaired; and in
such professional capacity he has been brought into
public hatred, contempt, ridicule, and professional dis-
repute, thereby suffering damages in the sum of
twenty-five thousand dollars.

The defendants answered separately, setting up cer-
tain defenses, the statements of which are not neces-
sary to this decision.

The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict returned
in favor of plaintiff in the sum of ten thousand dollars.
Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and, without waiving that motion, they moved ©
for a new trial. The court ordered that a new trial
would be granted unless plaintiff consented to a reduc-
tion of the verdict to five thousand dollars. Plaintiff
consented to the reduction, and judgment was entered
against defendants in the sum of five thousand dollars,
from which judgment they have presented this appeal.

At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendants challenged
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish a cause
of action against them. The motion was denied.

The determination of the merit of this assignment
necessitates an inquiry into whether the published
article is libelous per se.

We find it necessary to mention only one assignment
of error, inasmuch as the disposition of it is decisive
of this case, namely, that the court erred in denying
defendants’ motions for a directed verdict and for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict.

I The fact that the complaint alleged that the
article complained of in this case was published ma-
liciously did not add to the essentials of the complaint.
Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 Pac. 774,
Ann. Cas. 1917B, 442.

HM Whether a writing is libelous per se is a ques-
tion for the court to decide as a matter of law, after
considering the article in its entirety, unless the writ-
ing is ambiguous, in which event the truth of the in-
nuendo will be submitted to the jury.

“We have stated the answer to be that any publica-
tion which falsely charges a person with the commis-
sion of a crime or comes with[in] § 2424, Rem. Comp.
Stat. [P. C. § 8953], is libelous per se, and the deter-
mination of whether a given article is libelous per se
is one for the court to make, and in doing that the
article should be read as an entirety and considered
in its natural and obvious sense and not extended by
the conclusions of the pleader, and the defamatory
matter must be certain and apparent from the words
themselves.” Graham v. Star Pub. Co., 133 Wash.
387, 233 Pac. 625.

Cases of like import are Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash.
155, 45 Pac. 747; Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass’n,
55 Wash. 331, 104 Pac. 769, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1021;
Velikanje v. Millichamp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876;

Roane v. Columbian Pub. Co., 126 Wash. 416, 218 Pac.
213.

Libel is defined by our criminal statute, Rem.
Rey. Stat., § 2424 [P. C. § 8953], in force when the
libelous article was published:

“Every malicious publication by writing, printing,
picture, effigy, sign or otherwise than by mere speech,
which shall tend:

“(1) To expose any living person to hatred, con-
tempt, ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the
benefit of public confidence or social intercourse; or

“(3) To injure any person, corporation or associa-
tion of persons in his or their business or occupation,
shall be libel. . . .”

In Wilson v. Sun Pub. Co., supra, this court approved
the following definition of libel that is actionable per se:

“Unfortunately, the law of libel has been obscured
by a mass of technicalities and subtle refinements.
When language is used concerning a person or his
affairs which, from its nature, necessarily must, or
presumably will, as its natural and proximate conse-
quence, occasion him pecuniary loss, its publication
prima facie constitutes a cause of action, and prima
facie constitutes a wrong, without any allegation or
evidence of damage other than that which is implied
or presumed from the fact of publication; that this is
all that is meant by the term “actionable per se.”
. . .? Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Co., 35 Minn. 251, 28
N. W. 708.”

Among the cases in which we have had occasion to
consider the question of whether a certain writing
was libelous per se are the following: Denney v.
Northwestern Credit Ass’n, supra; Velikanje v. Milli-
champ, supra; General Market Co. v. Post-Intelligencer
Co., 96 Wash. 575, 165 Pac. 482; Magee v. Cohn, 187
Wash. 157, 59 P. (2d) 1131.

In the much cited case of Denney v. Northwestern

Credit Ass’n, supra, plaintiff alleged that, because of
a report by the credit association, he had been refused
credit and injured in his feeling and reputation. In
Velikanje v. Millichamp, supra, the statement claimed
to be libelous charged the plaintiff with having pre-
sented forged receipts in order to collect money on
them. The published article complained of in General
Market Co. v. Post-Intelligencer Co., supra, was to
the effect that plaintiff, which owned a food market,
had tons of food unfit for consumption. In Magee v.
Cohn, supra, the alleged libelous statement charged
the plaintiff, an attorney, with certain errors in the
account set forth in the final report in the probate of
an estate. In all of these cases, the court held that
the published articles were not libelous per se. In
each of the above cases the article was more far-
reaching in implications than the one under considera-
tion.

The cases cited and relied upon by respondent that
the published article is libelous per se have been ex-
amined, but we do not deem them to be controlling
here. In addition, we have made an independent
search of the cases in which this court has held cer-
tain published articles to be libelous per se, and we
find the present article is materially dissimilar in its
general tenor and implications from the articles and
documents under consideration in those cases.

It is evident from a consideration of the whole ar-
ticle and its nature and character that the most that
can be said is that the respondent made an incomplete
diagnosis, in that he did not discover that Deetz was
suffering from a fracture dislocation of the neck spine,
or, in lay language, a broken neck. There is no inti-
mation that a discovery of the neck ailment before
his admission to the hospital would have saved his
life. The article was commendatory of respondent’s

action in that he was the one individual who recognized
that the prisoner was in a serious condition and took
the necessary steps to have him removed to a hospital
where he might receive additional medical care. The
Janguage contained in the writing was not equivocal,
and the article was not libelous per se.

HI Assuming that the article did charge the re-
spondent with having made a wrong diagnosis, still it
would not be libelous per se. A physician is only re- -
quired to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of
his profession and is not liable for mistakes if he uses
the methods recognized and approved by those reason-
ably skilled in the profession.

It is clear that to charge a physician merely with the
mismanagement, or the making, of a wrong diagnosis
in a particular case, is not, of itself, actionable. Such
a charge implies nothing more, at the most, than igno-
rance or unskillfulness in that case, and does not ma-
terially affect his reputation as respects his general
competency to practice his profession.

To charge a professional man with negligence or
unskillfulness in the management or treatment of an
individual case, is no more than to impute to him the
mistakes and errors incident to fallible human nature.
The most eminent and skillful physician or surgeon
may mistake the symptoms of a particular case with-
out detracting from his general professional skill or
learning. To say of him, therefore, that he was mis-
taken in that case would not be calculated to impair
the confidence of the community in his general pro-
fessional competency.

This rule does not apply, of course, to those cases
in which the charge of gross misconduct is such as to
imply the unfitness of a physician in his profession.
36 C. J. 1187, § 83; Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed.),
171, § 188; 179, §146; Jones v. Diver, 22 Ind. 184;

Gauvreau v. Superior Pub. Co., 62 Wis. 403, 22 N. W.
126; Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 35 Minn. 251, 28 N. W.
708; Twiggar v. Ossining Printing & Pub. Co., 161 App.
Div. 718, 146 N. Y. Supp. 529.

HH Since the alleged defamatory publication is not
actionable per se and the complaint is barren of any
allegation of special damages, there remained no ques-
tion of fact for the jury as to whether the recitals in
the published article were true, and thus there can be
no recovery. Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass’n,
supra; Wood v. Star Pub. Co., 90 Wash. 85, 155 Pac.
400; and Magee v. Cohn, supra.

The judgment is reversed, with instruction to dis-
miss the action.

Sremvert and Rozinson, JJ., concur.

JEFFERS, Brats, and Greracuty, JJ., concur in the
result,

Many, J. (dissenting)—In my opinion, the published
article, a copy of which is set out in the majority opin-
ion, was libelous per se, and for this reason I dissent.

Brake, C. J., concurs with Mar, J.

INo, 27441. Department Two. September 5, 1939.]

E. T. Harrison, Respondent, v. ConsoLipatep HoLpine
Company, Appellant.*

Rigg, Brown & Halverson and Paul M. Goode, for
appellant.

S. F. McAnally and Velikanje & Velikanje, for re-
spondent.

Brats, J.—During the month of November, 1930,
American Machinery & Electric Company, a corpora-
tion’ engaged in business in the state of Washington,
having an office in the city of Tacoma, entered into an
agreement with Independent Bakery, Inc., a corpora-

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 729.

tion engaged in business in the city of Yakima, to in-
stall a freight elevator in a building which the bakery
was constructing. The elevator was installed, and
March 23, 1931, pursuant to the construction contract
above referred to, the two corporations entered into a
conditional sales contract, whereby the machinery
company agreed to sell the elevator to the bakery for
$2,200, to be paid in installments, according to the
terms of the written contract, which contract was filed
for record in the office of the auditor of Yakima county,
March 27, 1931. Some payments were made on ac-
count of the purchase price, and February 16, 1932,
there was a balance due on the contract in the sum of
$1,790.

October 15, 1931, the machinery company, for value,
sold and assigned the conditional sales contract to E. T.
Harrison, who at all times thereafter, up to and includ-
ing the date of the entry of judgment in this action, re-
mained the owner thereof.

February 11, 1931, an action was instituted before
the superior court for Yakima county against the bak-
ery, seeking foreclosure of a mortgage or some other
lien against the bakery’s property which contained the
elevator. Decree of foreclosure was entered, and April
30, 1932, the property was sold by the sheriff to Con-
solidated Holding Company, a corporation, which re-
ceived a deed to the premises May 10, 1933, the holding
company having ever since been the owner of the
premises.

February 3, 1937, E. T. Harrison, as assignee of the
vendor in the conditional sales contract above referred
to, instituted this action against Consolidated Holding
Company, a corporation, Independent Bakery, Inc., a
corporation, and another corporation which, it was al-
leged, had some interest in the premises, plaintiff
alleging facts as above set forth; that the balance above

referred to was due on the contract of conditional sale;
that the holding company had taken title to the build-
ing subject to plaintifi’s interest in the elevator and
had refused to permit plaintiff to remove the elevator;
plaintiff praying for a decree establishing his title to
the elevator, its accessories and equipment, barring de-
fendants from any claim to or interest in the property,
and restraining the holding company from interfering
with plaintiff in removing the elevator from the
premises.

The record before us shows no pleading on the part
of any defendant save the holding company, which
answered, denying many of the material allegations of
plaintifi’s complaint, admitting its ownership of the
building containing the elevator, and that it had re-
fused to permit plaintiff to remove the same. For a
first affirmative defense, the answering defendant
alleged its corporate existence; that it purchased the
property April 30, 1932; that the elevator was then in
the building, permanently attached thereto and to the
real estate upon which the building was located; that
the elevator was a fixture within the building and could
not be removed therefrom. For a second defense, the
defendant alleged that, at all times since its purchase
of the property, defendant asserted its rights of owner-
ship in and to the elevator and building, openly and ad-
versely to all claims, including the claim of the plain-
tiff; that the defendant paid all taxes against the build-
ing and the elevator therein contained; that the de-
fendant acquired ownership of the elevator by adverse
possession; and that plaintiff’s action had not been com-
menced within the time limited by law. For a third
defense, defendant specifically pleaded that plaintiff’s
action was barred by the statute of limitations and, for
a fourth defense, pleaded that plaintiff and his assignor

had been guilty of such laches as precluded their asser-
tion of any right in or to the elevator.

The affirmative defenses having been denied by a
reply, the action came on regularly for trial before the
court, sitting without a jury. The court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law in plaintiff’s favor,
and from a decree declaring plaintiff to be the owner of
the elevator, its accessories and equipment, and barring
the defendants from asserting any right, title, or in-
terest thereto, and restraining them from interfering
with plaintiff in removing the elevator, its accessories
and equipment from the premises, the defendant Con-
solidated Holding Company has appealed.

Appellant assigns error upon the ruling of the court
to the effect that the six-year statute of limitations ap-
plied, rather than the three-year statute; upon the re-
fusal of the trial court to enter judgment in appellant’s
favor, or to grant appellant’s motion for a new trial;
and upon the entry of judgment in favor of respondent.

The case is before us upon the findings of fact and
conclusions of law only, the record containing no state-
ment of facts or bill of exceptions.

In its reply brief, appellant has moved to strike from
the records and files a supplemental transcript, which
appellant assumes was filed herein on behalf of re-
spondent. As no such supplemental transcript appears
in the record, we cannot discuss or rule upon this
motion.

In addition to finding facts as hereinabove stated, the
trial court found that appellant was, and at all times
since April 30, 1932, had been, the owner of the land
and building in which the elevator was located, find-
ings Nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12 reading as follows:

“(9) That the conditional sales contract as afore-
mentioned between plaintiff’s assignor and Indepen-
dent Bakery Inc. was duly forfeited under the terms of
said contract, but that said contract was never assumed

by the defendant, Consolidated Holding Company.
That said Consolidated Holding Company did not at
any time make any payments thereon and has at all
times since said date, to-wit, the 30th day of April,
1932, had said elevator in its exclusive physical posses-
sion and the said Consolidated Holding Company has
at all times since the installation of said elevator paid
all taxes thereon.

“(10) That on or about the 28th day of September,
1932, the defendant Consolidated Holding Company re-
fused to surrender possession of said elevator described.
herein to said plaintiff. That said defendant, Consoli-
dated Holding Company, refused to surrender said ele-
vator. That at all times since the 30th day of April,
1932, the Consolidated Holding Company has been in
physical possession of said elevator, and has continu-
ally used the same.

“(11) That the elevator can be removed without
material damage to the building.

“(12) That the action was timely instituted within
the six-year statute of limitation.”

Respondent contends, and the trial court agreed with
him, that the action is governed by that portion of the
statute of limitations, Rem. Rev. Stat. §157 [P. C.
§ 8162], which provides that “an action upon a contract
in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of
a written agreement,” is barred unless commenced
within six years. As above set forth, the trial court
made an express finding to the effect that this action
was timely instituted within the period of the statute
just quoted. This so-called finding is merely a con-
clusion of law.

Appellant contends that the action falls within Rem.
Rev. Stat., § 159 [P. C. § 8166], subd. 2, which reads
as follows:

“An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal
property, including an action for the specific recovery
thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights
of another not hereinafter enumerated.”

From the findings as made by the trial court, it ap-
pears that appellant purchased the property at sher-
iff’s sale April 30, 1932, and received a sherifi’s deed
May 10, 1933; that appellant took possession of the
premises April 30, 1932, and at all times since that date
has had the elevator in question in its exclusive physi-
cal possession, and has continuously used the same.
The trial court also specifically found that, on or about
September 28, 1932, appellant refused to surrender
possession of the elevator to respondent, supra.

In his amended complaint, respondent alleged his
ownership of the elevator, the contract of conditional
sale between respondent’s assignor and the bakery,
pleading the contract with particularity; that, on or
about April 30, 1932, through court proceedings, appel-
lant became the owner, or reputed owner, of the build-
ing, taking title to the building subject to respondent’s
interest in the elevator; and that appellant has refused
to permit respondent to remove the elevator and ac-
cessories from the building, claiming some right, title,
or interest therein. Respondent did not allege that any
contractual relation ever existed between respondent
and appellant, and the trial court expressly found that
the contract was forfeited; that the same was never
assumed by appellant; and that appellant never made
any payments thereon. The bakery was named as a
party defendant to the action, but it does not appear
that process was ever served upon that defendant, and
the judgment does not recite that the bakery was ever
served with summons, or that it appeared in the action.

HE Appeliant, by its answer to the amended com-
plaint, tendered the issue that respondent’s action was
barred by the statute of limitations, this defense being
denied by respondent in his reply. Respondent’s ac-
tion was to recover specific property and, in effect, to
quiet its title to the elevator. By way of incidental

relief, respondent sought to bar the defendants in the
action from asserting any right, title, or interest
thereto, and to restrain appellant from interfering with
respondent in the removal of the elevator from the
building. As against appellant, the action was not one
founded upon, or arising out of, a written instrument.
While respondent’s ownership of the elevator was es-
sential to the establishment of his cause of action, the
length of time during which respondent had owned the
elevator under a written instrument, or otherwise, was
immaterial.

The trial court found that the contract of conditional
sale had been forfeited. The elevator was respondent’s
property, and in the absence of the establishment of
some affirmative defense by appellant, respondent,
within an indefinite period, could maintain an action
for recovery of possession of its property.

Appellant interposed the defense that the action had
not been commenced within the time limited by law,
and the trial court specially found, as above stated, that
appellant, on or about September 28, 1932, refused to
surrender possession of the elevator to respondent.

As above noted, appellant, in its answer, by its
second affirmative defense, pleaded that it had acquired
ownership of the elevator by adverse possession. There
is no finding covering this claim on the part of appel-
lant, the findings being silent as to whether appellant
ever asserted any claim to the elevator prior to the time
it filed its answer, the findings going no further than
to show that appellant, since April 30, 1932, has been
in physical possession of the elevator and has continu-
ally used it.

The trial court erred in concluding that the six-year
statute of limitations controlled the rights of the parties
to this appeal, as, in so far as the controversy between
them was concerned, respondent’s rights were not

ee *

based upon a contract in writing, or any liability ex-
press or implied arising out of a written agreement.

Respondent is entitled to prevail, unless appellant’s
plea of the statute of limitations, based upon Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 159, subd. 2, is well taken. It is not necessary
upon this appeal to determine whether this section of
the statute of limitations may be invoked merely as a
defense to respondent’s action, or whether appellant
must prove its title by adverse possession, or other-
wise, in accordance with its plea. The findings before
us do not form sufficient basis upon which to determine
this question, particularly in so far as appellant’s claim
of title by adverse possession to the elevator is con-
cerned.

Hl inany event, as the trial court decided the case
upon the wrong theory, the judgment appealed from
should be reversed, and the cause remanded for fur-
ther consideration by the trial court.

This procedure finds support in several of our prior
decisions. In the case of McNeff v. Capistran, 120
Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 41, this court referred to Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 1737 [P. C. § 7322], relative to the appellate
powers of this court, saying:

“This court is empowered on an appeal to affirm, re-
verse, or modify the judgment appealed from, or direct
the proper judgment to be entered, or direct a new
trial, or direct the further proceedings to be had. As
the evidence is insufficient on which to base an order
for a proper judgment, there is no recourse other than
to remand the cause for further hearing.”

In the case of State v. Starr, 185 Wash. 18, 52 P. (2d)
897, this court held that the respondent had miscon-
ceived the nature of its cause of action; that the real
issue had not been presented to the court; and that the
case should be retried upon the correct theory.

In the case at bar, it is not necessary to direct that

442,

a new trial be granted, but it is ordered that the judg-
ment appealed from be reversed, and the cause re-
manded with directions to the trial court to make find-
ings upon the question of appellant’s defense under the
three-year statute of limitations. The trial court may
reopen the case and take such further evidence as may
be offered and tend to throw any light upon this phase
of the litigation. Appellant will recover its costs in
this court.

Buiakg, C. J., Geracuty, Suvpson, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No, 27608. Department One. September 6, 1939.]

Tueopore R. BasKert et al., Respondents, v. Tue Crry
oF SEATTLE, Appellant.*

A.C. Van Soelen and C. C. McCullough, for appellant.
Kennett & Benton, for respondents.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 769.

a “

Srerert, J.—This cause is presented to us solely on
respondents’ motion to strike the statement of facts,
dismiss the appeal, and affirm the judgment. The
matter was argued on a regular motion day and there-
after was assigned for opinion, with leave to respective
counsel to file additional briefs on the question. Since
that time, supplemental briefs have been submitted by
both parties.

The original action was brought by respondents
herein, husband and wife, to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained by the husband. Upon the
trial, the jury returned a verdict in respondents’ favor.
Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and,
in the alternative, motion for new trial having been
denied, the court entered judgment on the verdict,
whereupon the city, appellant herein, gave notice of
appeal.

Within the time allowed by law, appellant served
and filed its proposed statement of facts, which pur-
ported to include only such matters and proceedings as
related to alleged misconduct of a juror upon the trial
of the cause. Appellant, however, failed to serve or
file with the proposed statement of facts any statement
of the points upon which it intended to rely on appeal,
as required by Rule IX (2), Rules of the Supreme Court
(Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), Vol. 1, p. 56, 193 Wash. 10-a).
Respondents served no counter statement. The court
signed the certificate attached to the proposed state-
ment and subsequently signed an amended certificate,
to each of which certificates more specific reference
will be made later. Shortly after the statement of facts
had been certified by the trial court, respondents coun-
tered by filing in this court the motion now under con-
sideration.

The motion is based upon two grounds: (1) That
appellant failed to serve or file a statement of the points

‘

upon which it intended to rely ori appeal, as required
by Rule IX (2), Rules of the Supreme Court; and (2)
that it does not appear either from the certificate or
from the amended certificate of the trial court that the
statement of facts contains all the material facts,
matters, and proceedings occurring in the cause and
upon the motion for new trial, and not already made a
part of the record. If either of these grounds be found
sufficient, it will necessitate granting the motion to the
extent hereinafter indicated.

Since we base our decision upon the second ground
as applied to this particular situation, we shall not dis-
cuss the first, but we wish hereby to remind the bar of
the existence of Rule IX (2), the advisability of its ob-
servance, and the difficulties attendant upon failure to
comply with it.

In considering the second ground of the motion, the
certificates made by the trial court must be scrutinized.

That part of the original certificate which is material
to our present inquiry reads as follows:

“I Certiry, that the record as hereinbefore set out,
namely: ‘Transcription of the examination of the
juror, G. Ortin, on the voir dire; true copies of affi-
davits as served and filed on behalf of defendant on
Motion for a New Trial; true copies of counter-affidavits
as served and filed on behalf of plaintiffs; transcription
of excerpts of the proceedings on hearings on the
Motion for New Trial as interposed by the defendant
as of January 28, 1939, February 11, 1939, and Febru-
ary 17, 1939,—is a true and correct record of only such
portions of the trial proceedings and of only such por-
tions of the record and of the hearings on Motion for
New Trial, which, by way of a Statement of Facts, are
necessary and proper for the presentation of the par-
ticular question herein involved to the Supreme Court
of this state,

“Anp the same are hereby made a part of the record
herein.” (Italics ours.)

P| °
In the amended certificate, that part of the original

certificate which is above italicized was amended to
read as follows:

“ . are necessary and material for the presen-
tation of the claim of error on the part of the Trial
Court in denying the motion for a new trial upon the
ground of bias or misconduct of the juror Orlin; and this
certificate is limited to that question and to that ques-
tion alone; and the same are hereby made a part of the
record herein.”

The amended certificate contains also the following
additional recitals:

“T Do Furtuer Certiry that the foregoing Statement
of Facts does not include the complete record and all of
the proceedings and evidence in the cause; and

“T Do Furruer Cerriry that the appellant did not
serve or file with its Proposed Statement of Facts a
statement of the points upon which it intended to rely
on appeal—as required by subdivision 2 of Rule IX of
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, and
that the appellant has not at any time served or filed
such a statement, and that respondents were therefore
not advised so as to be able to intelligently propose
amendments in accordance with the provisions of Rem-
ington’s Revised Statutes, Section 389.”

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 391 [P. C. § 7819], which relates to
certificates to bills of exceptions and statements of
facts, provides:

“The judge shall certify that the matters and pro-
ceedings embodied in the bill or statement, as the case
may be, are matters and proceedings occurring in the
cause and that the same are thereby made a part of the
record therein; and, when such is the fact, he shall
further certify that the same contains all the material
facts, matters and proceedings heretofore occurring in
the cause and not already a part of the record therein,
or (as the case may be) such thereof as the parties have
agreed, to be all that are material therein.

(Italics ours.)

. a

HI From a reading of the two certificates, it will be
observed that, in one of them, it is recited that the
matters therein particularly referred to are necessary
and proper for the presentation to the supreme court of
the particular question involved; and that, in the other,
it is stated that the same matters are necessary and
material for the presentation of the claim of error on
the part of the trial court in denying the motion for
new trial based on a specified ground.

However, in neither certificate is it expressly stated
or necessarily implied that the matters therein referred
to contain all the material facts, matters, and proceed-
ings pertaining to the particular question involved
upon the appeal. The certificates go no further than to
say that such matters as are contained in the statement
of facts are necessary and material for such purpose.
That is not sufficient. Where an appeal or other pro-
ceeding for review is taken upon a limited question, as
provided in Rule IX (2), Rules of the Supreme Court,
193 Wash. 10-a, it must appear that the statement con-
tains all the facts, matters, and proceedings material to
the particular question, theretofore occurring in the
cause and not already made a part of the record therein,
or (as the case may be) such thereof as the parties
have agreed to be all that are material therein.

We have interpreted the statute and expressed in-
sistence upon it so many times that it hardly seems
necessary to repeat our admonition. Merely for em-
phasis, we cite a number of our decisions and quote
from a few of them. Kirby v. Collins, 6 Wash. 297,
32 Pac. 1060; State ex rel. Miller v. Seattle, 45 Wash.
691, 89 Pac. 152; Taylor v. Andres, 83 Wash. 684, 145
Pac. 991; Deller v. Long, 96 Wash. 372, 165 Pac. 98;
Mauseth v. Slayden, 104 Wash. 512, 177 Pac. 319; King
v. Manson, 165 Wash. 90, 4 P. (2d) 885; Gilmore v.
Red Top Cab Co., 171 Wash. 346, 17 P. (2d) 886; In re

Jordan’s Estate, 171 Wash. 624, 18 P. (2d) 855; Sim-
mons v. Department of Labor & Industries, 175 Wash.
290, 27 P. (2d) 567; State ex rel. Northeast Transporta-
tion Co. v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 262, 77 P. (2d)
1012, 82 P. (2d) 111.

In State ex rel. Miller v. Seattle, supra, the ques-
tion is presented and answered in the following quo-
tation from the opinion:

“The certificate to the statement of facts recites:
‘I hereby certify that the matters and proceedings
embodied therein are matters and proceedings occur-
ring in said cause and the same are made a part of the
record therein.’ It is neither certified that the state-
ment before us contains all the material matters and
proceedings occurring in the cause which are not
already a part of the record, nor that it contains such
thereof as the parties have agreed to be all that are
material therein. The statute makes it the duty of
the trial judge to so certify when such are the facts,
Bal. Code, § 5060 (P. C. § 677). In the absence of such
a certificate it must, therefore, be presumed that the
statement does not include all the material facts, and
we are thus advised that all the material facts which
were before the trial court and which controlled its
action are not before us. Under such circumstances,
we cannot properly review the findings of facts, and
the findings as made by the court, therefore, become
the established facts in the case.”

In Taylor v. Andres, supra, it was said:

“Where it does not appear in the certificate to the
statement of facts that the statement contains all the
material facts not already a part of the record neces-
sary to the consideration of the case, the statement
upon motion will be stricken. In the absence of such
a certificate, it is presumed that the statement does
not include all the material facts. [Citing cases.]”

In Deller v. Long, supra, the certificate recited that
the statement of facts contained all the material facts,

. PS

matters, and proceedings occurring in plaintiffs case
only. We said:

“The record does not purport to contain all of the
evidence produced upon the trial, nor does it appear
from the certificate that such portion of the record
as is brought here contains all of the material facts,
matters and proceedings occurring at the trial and not
already a part of the record, nor that it contains such
thereof as the parties have agreed to be all that are
material. Under such a certificate, it must be pre-
sumed that the statement does not include all of the
material facts.”

In Mauseth v. Slayden, supra, the contention was
made by appellant that, since he had filed all that part
of the record which he deemed material as a statement
of facts, and that, since no objection had been filed
thereto, the proposed statement should “be deemed
agreed to.” In declining to place that construction
upon certain sections of the statute, the court said:

“A reading of these two sections makes it clear be-
yond the peradventure of a doubt that, whether the
statement is impliedly agreed to under § 389, or is
agreed to in writing, or by stipulation in open court,
it is essential that the trial judge certify that the record
contains all the material facts, matters and proceedings
before this court will consider any claim of error predi-
cated thereon. For, ‘even though the appeal be pre-
sented upon agreed statement of facts, it is necessary
that it be properly certified by the trial court.”

In Gilmore v. Red Top Cab Co., supra, the certificate
recited that the statement of facts contained substan-
tially all the material facts, matters, and proceedings
occurring in the cause. We held that the word “sub-
stantially” was not sufficient compliance with the
statute, and said:

“The statement of facts must be stricken. The state-
ment of facts, while certified to contain the matters
and proceedings occurring in the trial and making the

same a part of the record, is not certified to contain
‘all the material facts, matters and proceedings hereto-
fore occurring in the cause,’ etc. It will be presumed,
in the absence of such a certificate, that the statement
of facts does not include all the material facts, and we
will not examine the statement of facts to ascertain
whether it does in fact contain all the material facts
and proceedings necessary to the consideration of the
points involved.”

In Simmons v. Department of Labor & Industries,
supra, appears the following statement decisive of the
question there presented:

“We have repeatedly held that we will not in any
case say that the judgment of the trial court is wrong
upon questions of fact unless we have before us all
the evidence upon which that court passed judgment,
and that this fact must affirmatively appear from the
record. The presumption is that the court acted upon
sufficient evidence. [Citing cases.]”

These cases effectually dispose of the question under
consideration here. The statement of facts must be
stricken; in the absence of such statement, we cannot
consider the particular question raised on the appeal,
and the motion to dismiss the appeal therefore will
have to be granted. It is so ordered.

Matn, Rosivson, and Jerrzrs, JJ., concur.

Brakes, C. J. (dissenting)—The jury returned a ten
to two verdict for twenty thousand dollars. The juror
Orlin was one of the ten. On his voir dire examina-
tion, he was asked: “Mr. Orlin, have you or any mem-
ber of your immediate family ever had occasion to file
a claim against the city?” to which he answered “No.”
It is admitted that he had filed a claim against the city
on November 22, 1938, for $1,005 on account of injuries
alleged to have been sustained as the result of negli-
gence of the city.

a

The statement of facts consists solely of Orlin’s voir
dire examination and affidavits in support of and
against the motion for new trial and colloquy between
the respective counsel and the court. It really is a
bill of exceptions. See Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Walker, 123 Wash. 203, 212 Pac. 277. Upon the record
thus made, there is only one possible question that
appellant can raise on the appeal: The misconduct
of the juror Orlin in falsely answering questions on
his voir dire examination.

It seems to me that the trial judge has definitely and
adequately certified that all evidence “necessary and
material for the presentation of the claim of error on
the part of the trial court in denying the motion for
a new trial upon the ground of bias or misconduct
of the juror Orlin” is contained in the statement of
facts.

Upon this condition of the record, the applicable
rule is that:

“A statement of facts should not be stricken or dis-
regarded because it does not contain all the facts and
proceedings, if it contains sufficient to represent the
only error relied upon for reversal.” (Italics mine.)
Syllabus 2, Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, supra.

The statement and certificate considered by the court
in that case are strikingly analogous to the statement
and certificate in the instant case. In any event, the
statement of facts should be returned and the trial
judge given an opportunity to insert the word “all”
in his certificate. Littlejohn v. Miller, 5 Wash. 399,
31 Pac. 758. For, as I understand it, no contention is
made that the statement of facts does not contain all
the facts material to the question of juror Orlin’s mis-
conduct.

I dissent.

451

[No. 27562. Department Two. September 8, 1939.]

Marron Dirrmar, Respondent, v. CHARLES H. FRYE,
Appellant.

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 709.

Eggerman & Rosling, Walser S. Greathouse, and
Joseph J. Lanza, for appellant.

Todd, Holman & Sprague, William M. Allen, and
Lowell P. Mickelwait, for respondent.

Mitxarp, J——Emma Frye and Augusta Frye were
sisters. Charles H. Frye, president of Frye & Com-
pany corporation, and Frank F. Frye, an employee of
that corporation after sale of his interest therein to
Charles H. Frye, were brothers. Emma Frye, who
died in February, 1934, was the wife of Charles H.
Frye. Augusta Frye, who died October 20, 1937, was
the wife of Frank F. Frye, who died in November,
1935.

Emma Frye signed, as maker, a promissory note
dated October 31, 1930, in the amount of forty thou-
sand dollars, payable ninety days after notice of de-
mand for payment to the order of Augusta Frye. On
February 11, 1931, the following endorsement was
written by Charles H. Frye on the back of the note:

“As of Feby 11th 1931 .
“Chas. H. Frye.”

After the death in 1934 of Emma Frye (maker of
the note), demand for payment was made by Augusta
Frye upon Charles H. Frye, as executor of his deceased
wife’s estate. A claim in that estate was duly filed
and allowed. In October, 1936, the note was unpaid,
whereupon the attorneys representing Augusta Frye,
who was then alive, wrote the following letter to the
attorneys representing Charles H. Frye:

“Eggerman & Rosling October 9, 1936
1824 Exchange Building,

Seattle, Washington.

Attention: Mr. Greathouse.

Gentlemen:

“You are familiar with the fact that our client
Augusta Frye is the owner and holder of a certain

promissory note dated October 31, 1930, in the princi-
pal amount of $40,000, with interest, and that as Ex-
ecutrix of the Estate of Frank F. Frye, deceased, she
is likewise the owner and holder of a promissory note
of the same date for $60,000, with interest. Both of
the above notes were signed by Emma Frye as maker,
were endorsed by Charles H. Frye, personally, and
were payable ninety days after notice of demand for
payment. Although claims based upon these notes
have been filed in the probate proceedings of the Estate
of Emma Frye, deceased, and were recently allowed,
the notes remain unpaid.

“In order to avoid any contention by Mr. Frye that
after October 31, 1936, the Statute of Limitations will
serve as a bar to his individual liability as a endorser
on these notes, we request that you cause the enclosed
forms of acknowledgment of debt to be signed by Mr.
Frye and returned to us.

“In the event that these acknowledgments of debt
are not executed and returned to us by October 20,
1936, it will then be necessary for us to institute actions
against Mr. Frye, individually, to enforce collection on
these notes. Yours very truly,

Topp, Houman & SPRAGUE.”

One of the attorneys representing Augusta Frye
testified that, shortly after the foregoing letter was
written, he had a conversation by telephone with one
of the attorneys representing Charles H. Frye respect-
ing the consequences that would ensue if Mr. Frye
refused to sign the requested letter of acknowledg-
ment; that Mr. Frye’s counsel was informed action
would be brought, as stated in the letter, in the event
of Mr. Frye’s failure to sign the acknowledgment; that,
if Mr. Frye signed and returned the requested letter
of acknowledgment, “we will not bring suit for a
while.”

The opposing attorney admitted that a telephone
conversation was had concerning the letter, but he
could not recall any conversation like that remem-

bered by Mrs. Frye’s attorney. Both attorneys testi-
fied, however, that, subsequent to the telephone con-
versation and prior to October 21, 1936, Mr. Frye’s at-
torney was granted permission to examine the note
which he conceded was endorsed by Charles H. Frye.
On or about October 21, 1936, the requested letter of
acknowledgment, signed by Mr. Frye, was delivered
to Mrs. Frye’s attorneys. That letter, in which Mr.
Frye wrote the amount of interest paid on the note,
reads as follows:

“Mrs, Augusta Frye October 21, 1936
c/o Todd, Holman & Sprague

1006 Hoge Building

Seattle, Washington

Dear Madam:

“You are the owner and holder of a certain promis-
sory note signed by Emma Frye as maker, dated Octo-
ber 31, 1930, for the principal sum of $40,000, and pay-
able ninety days after notice of demand for payment.

“For value received I endorsed the above promissory
note. You have requested my acknowledgment of my
liability as endorser of this note in order to avoid the
bar of the Statute of Limitations.

“Please be advised that I hereby acknowledge my
personal liability as endorser of said note and agree to
pay the same.

“There is now due and owing on said note the prin-
cipal sum of $40,000, together with interest thereon at
the rate of 6% per annum from November 1, 1933, less
the sum of $4,154.40 paid upon accrued interest since
January 27, 1936. Very truly yours,

Cuares H. FRYE
Individually.”

The next step to enforce the liability of Charles H.
Frye as an endorser was service upon him May 14,
1937, of summons and complaint, which were not filed,
in action by Augusta Frye against Charles H. Frye to
recover upon the note in question. Nothing further
was done until April, 1938, when summons and com-

plaint in this action by Seattle First National Bank,
as executor of the estate of Augusta Frye, deceased
(Mrs. Frye died October 30, 1937), to recover upon
the note against Charles H. Frye, were filed. The
affirmative defenses were that no consideration passed
to Charles H. Frye for his endorsement, which was
placed on the note subsequent to its execution and
delivery, and absence of consideration for the letter
of October 21, 1936, in which defendant Frye acknowl-
edged his personal liability as endorser and agreed to
pay the note. Upon the grounds that “it was either
incompetent or not material,” or that the defendant
was estopped by his letter of October 21, 1936, from
urging such defense, the trial court excluded evidence
of lack of consideration for the endorsement and di-
rected a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. From the
judgment entered on that verdict, the defendant ap-
pealed.

Subsequent to the appeal, a decree was entered dis-
tributing, and respondent executed an assignment
transferring, the judgment to Marion Dittmar. Pur-
suant to stipulation and motion of the appellant and
the respondent, we have entered an order substituting
Marion Dittmar herein as respondent in place of the
Seattle-First National Bank.

Appellant contends that he should have been per-
mitted to show that his indorsement upon the note
subsequent to its execution and delivery was without
consideration, hence not binding; that, as the endorse-
ment was invalid, his letter of October 21, 1936, ac-
knowledging personal liability as endorser of the note
and promising to pay same, was, also, without binding
effect in the absence of a new and independent con-
sideration; and that “it is no consideration to delay
bringing action on an endorsement that is ineffectual,
in any event.”

The trial court refused appellant’s offer to prove by
his own testimony and by entries in the books kept for
appellant and his deceased wife that appellant did not
receive anything for his endorsement, that all of the
money received from Augusta Frye in this transaction
was placed to the credit of Emma Frye, and that none
of the borrowed money was ever received by appellant.
Appellant was not permitted to testify that Frank F.
Frye, acting for Augusta Frye, took the note February
11, 1931, after execution and delivery of same by Emma
Frye October 31, 1930, to the office of appellant, who,
on request of Frank F. Frye, signed the note at that
time. The court also rejected appellant’s offer to show
by his own testimony the relations between the parties,
that the loans were not made to each other on a com-
mercial basis, but were made as one member to an-
other member of the family at a low rate of interest
and

“. . . that the borrowing of this money was
made at the behest of Emma Frye, who had always
been on close and intimate terms with her brother-in-
law and sister up to that time, and who was concerned
about Mr. Frank Frye’s health and who asked Mr.
Charles Frye to see if some arrangement could not be
made to handle this money, and that Emma Frye indi- .
vidually agreed to the handling of the money and gave
her note to Augusta Frye and executed a mortgage to
secure the indebtedness; that Mr. Charles H. Frye re-
ceived nothing for his endorsement on the note, the en-
dorsement being made at the request of Frank Frye
acting for Augusta Frye just previous to a trip that
Mr. Frye made on business back east, and at a time sub-
sequent to the original delivery of the note; that Frank
Frye brought the note in and asked Mr. Charles H.
Frye to endorse it, which he did, writing on there ‘As
of February 11, 1931’; that the transaction was through-
out primarily for the accommodation of Augusta Frye
under the circumstances I have stated.”

| | A person whose signature appears upon a
promissory note is presumed to have become a party
to the note for value. Such person has the burden of
establishing lack of consideration, even if he signed
the note after its execution and delivery.

“Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie
to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and
every person whose signature appears thereon to have
become a party thereto for value.” Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 3415 [P. C. § 4095].

“Absence or failure of consideration is matter of de-
fense as against any person not a holder in due course;
and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro
tanto, whether the failure is an ascertained and liqui-
dated amount or otherwise.” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 3419
[P. C. § 4099].

In State Bank of Clarkston v. Morrison, 85 Wash.
182, 147 Pac. 875, the defendant appellant endorsed the
note in controversy subsequent to its execution and
delivery. In holding that the fact that the defendant
endorsed the note imports value to support his endorse-
ment and that the burden of overcoming the presump-
tion of consideration was upon the defendant, we said:

“It was conceded at the trial that the appellant had
endorsed this note. . . .

“It is plain, under this statute [Ch. 149 L. 1899, § 24],
that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that
the endorsement was for value. The fact that the ap-
pellant endorsed the note imports value and consid-
eration under the statute. The burden, therefore, was
upon the appellant to show that the endorsement was
without consideration moving either to him or to the
makers of the note.”

See, also, Gleason v. Brown, 129 Wash. 196, 224 Pac.
930, reading as follows:

“The defense of the lack of consideration must be
affirmatively pleaded and the burden of proof is upon
the one asserting failure of consideration. State Bank

. a

of Clarkston v. Morrison, 85 Wash. 182, 147 Pac. 875;
Scott v. Bourn, 13 Wash. 471, 43 Pac. 372; McKenzie v.
Oregon Imp. Co., 5 Wash. 409, 31 Pac. 748; Baker-Boyer
Nat. Bank v. Hughson, 5 Wash. 100, 31 Pac. 423...

“In the case of Poncin v. Furth, 15 Wash. 201, 46
Pac. 241, we said:

“We are cited to no authority which supports the
contention that the rules of evidence are changed when
a suit is brought upon negotiable paper against the
legal representative of a deceased person and that “the
death of the maker . . . wipes out the presump-
tions and rules of evidence which control such paper
among living persons.” ’”

Particularly pertinent is the following from the opin-
ion in Greenwood v. Lamson, 106 Vt. 37, 168 Atl. 915,
917:

“Tt is a settled and well-recognized rule that a party
who signs a note after its execution, delivery, and ac-
ceptance is not liable to the payee when there was no
new or additional consideration for such signing, either
in the form (1) of some advantage to some of the sign-
ers, or (2) of some disadvantage to the payee, or (3) of
an agreement, at the time of the original execution and
delivery, that the note would be so signed. Persia
Sav. Bank v. Wilson, 214 Iowa, 993, 243 N. W. 581; King
v. Wise (Tex. Com. App.), 282 S. W.570. The defend-
ants, by their answer, invoke this rule of law, but they
have introduced no evidence to sustain the allegation.
They contend that the burden was upon the plaintiff
to establish a new consideration. But the argument
misconceives the express provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. By section 24 of the Act (G. L. 2894)
the note is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
a valuable consideration, and every person whose sig-
nature appears thereon to have become a party there-
to for value, and section 28 of the Act (G. L. 2898) pro-
vides that absence or failure of consideration is matter
of defense as against any person not a holder in due
course. These provisions of the Act expressly cast
upon the party asserting absence or failure of consid-
eration the burden of establishing the issue by plead-

ings and proof. Harponola Company v. Wilson, 96 Vt.
427, 433, 120 Atl. 895; Alexander v. Chevalier, 98 Vt.
230, 233, 126 Atl. 498; Niles v. Rexford (decided, Octo-
ber Term, 1933), 105 Vt. 492, 168 Atl. 714. See Browne
v. Fine, 104 Vt. 221, 228, 158 Atl. 669. Sections 24 and
28 (G. L. 2894 and 2898) do not make any distinction
between signers before delivery and signers after de-
livery. We read them as they are written, and hold
that the rule as to burden of proof of the issue of ab-
sence or failure of consideration applies with equal
force to a person who signs the note after its delivery.”

See, also, Loveland v. Sigel-Campion Live Stock Co.,
TT Colo. 22, 234 Pac. 168; Thomas v. Hoebel, 46 Idaho
744, 271 Pac. 931; Conner v. Henry, 205 Iowa 95, 215
N. W. 506; Nolte v. Nolte, 211 Iowa 1289, 235 N. W. 483;
Sangster v. Bricker, 66 Ind. App. 409, 118 N. E. 383.

After the introduction of the note in evidence, the
burden rested upon appellant to rebut the presumption
that his endorsement was made for a valuable con-
sideration. State Bank of Clarkston v. Morrison, supra;
Gleason v. Brown, supra.

“In the first place ‘every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable
consideration; and every person whose signature ap-
pears thereon to have become a party thereto for value,’
though when evidence is introduced tending to show
that no consideration was given some courts hold that
the ultimate burden of establishing its existence is
upon the holder. The great weight of authority under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, however, places this
burden on the defendant.” Williston on Contracts
(Rev. ed.), 370, 371, § 108.

HI The burden upon the appellant of showing that
his endorsement was without consideration was not
sustained by his testimony and other evidence offered
by him that he received no money or thing of value
for his signature on the back of the note. The pre-
sumption of consideration extends to any fact which,

under the situation and circumstances of the parties,
might reasonably supply a consideration. The pre-
sumption cannot be overthrown except by proof of
facts warranting the inference of no consideration of
any kind. If at the time the loan was made it was the
understanding—that situation not only reasonably
may have existed but very probably did exist—that the
additional signature of appellant would be obtained,
and if it was placed on the note February 11, 1931, by
appellant pursuant to the original agreement, that
signing related back to the inception of the original
contract of October 31, 1930, and no new consideration
was necessary.

“The general rule undoubtedly is that one who signs
a note after it has been executed and delivered, and
after the entire consideration has passed between the
original parties thereto, incurs, in the absence of a
new consideration, no liability, but if it was the under-
standing at the time the payee parted with his money
that the additional signature would be obtained, and
if it was affixed pursuant to the original agreement,
such signing relates back to the inception of the original
contract and no new consideration is necessary.” Be-
drosian v. Der Manouelian, 48 R. I. 40, 134 Atl. 851.

If the evidence excluded by the court had been
admitted, it, together with evidence that was admitted,
would only show the fact that appellant did not
receive anything for his endorsement. This clearly
would be insufficient to sustain the burden imposed
upon appellant of showing there was no consideration
to support his endorsement, as there was no attempt
to negative other kinds of consideration, one of which
is suggested above.

In other words, the offers of proof do not negative
the possibility that Emma Frye, when she made the
note October 31, 1930, promised the payee to obtain
Charles H. Frye’s signature, and that he signed pur-

suant to such promise when Frank F. Frye, in accord-
ance with the prior agreement, presented the note to
appellant with request for endorsement. It follows
that the error, if any, in rejecting appellant’s offers
of proof was not prejudicial.

Drake v. Seck, 116 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 67, was an
action to recover on promissory notes against the ad-
ministratrix of the estate of the deceased maker of
the notes. The trial court directed a verdict for the
plaintiff. In affirming the judgment, on appeal of de-
fendant, the supreme court of Kansas said, respecting
the defense of want of consideration:

“A second defense was want of consideration. The
administratrix testified, over objection, as follows:

““That upon being appointed administratrix she
took possession of the property and papers of her de-
ceased husband; that as such administratrix she was
familiar with the assets of her said husband’s estate
at the time of his death; that she took possession of
deceased’s bank book and bank account, and exam-
ined his accounts and his business, and that she did
not find where he had received any money or con-
sideration, or any evidence of his having received any
consideration for the notes sued on; that she knew no
consideration was received by her husband for said
notes; that she was in a position at the time that she
would have known if her husband had received any
consideration for the notes sued on, and that she didn’t
know of her husband receiving any consideration
therefor,’

“The witness also offered to testify that she knew
the source from which the property coming to her
possession as administratrix was derived, and none of
it which deceased owned subsequent to the date of
the note came as consideration for execution of the
notes. The offer was refused. What probative force
did the testimony offered and admitted have?

“The statement that the administratrix was in a
position to know and knew there was no consideration
for the notes, was mere opinion and conclusion of the

witness. It arbitrarily leaped over facts warranting
the conclusion, and dictated to the jury what it should
find. When the court was called on to determine
whether there was any evidence to go to the jury, it
was obliged to disregard the statement, because it
would have been obliged to set aside a verdict based
on the statement. The evidence therefore reduced to
this: The administratrix, being in possession of dece-
dent’s books, papers, and property, discovered nothing
for which the notes might have been given. But there
were the notes, importing a consideration (R. S. 16-
107), deemed prima facie to have been executed for a
valuable consideration (R. S. 52-301), and containing
the maker’s written declaration that they were given
for value received.

“Want of consideration is not a mere purden-shifter,
but is an affirmative defense (R. S. 16-108), which
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence
in order to defeat recovery. (Fuller v. Scott, 8 Kan.
25.) The presumption of consideration is not a pre-
sumption of law; it is a presumption of fact. It extends
to any fact which, under the situation and circum-
stances of the parties, might reasonably supply a con-
sideration, and it cannot be overthrown except by
proof of facts warranting the inference of no considera-
tion of any kind. Consideration may arise in various
ways, and proof of absence of one kind does not neces-
sarily disprove presence of another kind. The fact
that the deceased had no property which might have
been purchased by the notes was no proof he did not
receive cash. The fact that his bank books showed
no deposit of money, and that his accounts showed no
payment of debts contemporaneously with execution
of the notes, was no proof that the notes were not
given in renewal of other maturing notes. The notes
may have been given to discharge the maker’s obli-
gation as surety, or indorser for another, in which
event his books, papers and estate would not reveal
consideration moving to him. There was testimony
that the notes were in fact given to take the place of
other notes of the decedent which were surrendered
to him. Ignoring the testimony, such a transaction

was embraced within the presumption, and the evi-
dence offered and introduced was wholly insufficient
to affect weight of the presumption.”

To the same effect is American Nat. Bank v. Wool-
ard, 342 Ill. 148, 173 N. E. 787, which was an action on
a promissory note. The court held that defendant’s
testimony regarding lack of consideration based upon
information defendant obtained in conversation with
deceased president of payee corporation was inadmiss-
ible; that, in absence of evidence on which jury could
reasonably find in favor of party holding affirmative
of issue, verdict should be directed; and that presump-
tion of consideration for note cannot be overthrown
except by proof of facts warranting inference of no
consideration of any kind. The court said:

“In the absence of evidence on which a jury could
in the eye of the law reasonably find in favor of the
party holding the affirmative of an issue, a motion to
direct a verdict against the party so holding the affirma-
tive should be allowed. Evidence sufficient to defeat
such a motion must be evidence upon which the jury
could, without acting unreasonably in the eye of the
law, decide in favor of the party so having the affirma-
tive. (Offutt v. Columbian Exposition, 175 Ill. 472.)
The issue presented by the present case is therefore
whether, upon the evidence relied upon by plaintiffs
in error, a jury could, without acting unreasonably in
the eye of the law, decide in their favor.

“In dealing with this issue it is essential to keep in
mind that ‘value,’ as employed in the section of the
Negotiable Instruments law, which prescribes that
every person whose signature appears upon a negoti-
able instrument is deemed prima facie to have become
a party thereto for value, is any consideration suffi-
cient to support a simple contract, and that even an
antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for money
or not, constitutes value where an instrument is taken
either in satisfaction therefor or as security therefor,
and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable
on demand or at a future time. .

“In Drake v. Seck, 116 Kan. 717, 229 Pac. 67, where
in a proceeding to recover on certain promissory notes
a directed verdict for plaintiff was upheld, the court
aptly said: ‘The statement that the administratrix
was in a position to know, and knew there was no
consideration for the notes was mere opinion and con-
clusion of the witness. It arbitrarily leaped over facts
warranting the conclusion and dictated to the jury
what it should find. . . . The presumption of con-
sideration is not a presumption of law—it is a presump-
tion of fact. It extends to any fact which under the
situation and circumstances of the parties might rea-
sonably supply a consideration, and it cannot be over-
thrown except by proof of facts warranting the in-
ference of no consideration of any kind. Consideration
may arise in various ways, and proof of absence of
one kind does not necessarily disprove presence of
another kind’ This language is fairly applicable to
the present record. Granting that plaintiffs in error
made a sufficient showing that they received no money,
no facts are disclosed warranting the inference of no
consideration of other kinds equally lawful and equally
adequate. To find that plaintiffs in error by proving
absence of one possible kind of consideration have
thereby proved that there was no consideration would
obviously be to act unreasonably in the eye of the law.
The motion of defendant in error for a directed ver-
dict should have been allowed, and the judgment of
the Appellate Court was proper.”

Appellant was not competent, under Rem. Rev.
Stat., §1211 [P. C. § 7722], to testify regarding the
transactions with Augusta Frye, who was not alive at
the time of the trial of this action.

. “. . , in an action . . . where the adverse
party sues or defends as . . . legal representative
of any deceased person, . . . thena party in inter-

est or to the record, shall not be admitted to testify in
his own behalf as to any transaction had by him with,
or any statement made to him, or in his presence, by
any such deceased . . . person...” Rem
Rev. Stat., § 1211.

“Death has sealed the lips of one of the parties and

the statute imposes the same silence upon the other. -

The prohibition of the statute is absolute and uncondi-
tional. It admits of no qualification or exception, and
it is not the province of this court to add to it or take
from it. We are satisfied, therefore, that the court be-
low correctly ruled that the appellant was not compe-
tent to testify to any transaction had with or state-
ment made by the deceased, regardless of the testi-
mony that may have been given by other witnesses.”
O’Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493, 93 Pac. 1078.

See, also, Jones v. Peabody, 182 Wash. 148, 45 P.
(2d) 915, 100 A. L. R. 64; Ulbright v. Hageman, 181
Wash. 706, 44 P. (2d) 196.

All that remains of the offers of proof are the books
of Emma Frye and the appellant, which show that
the money advanced by Augusta Frye on the note
was received by Emma Frye and not by appellant; and
that the books record the obligation as that of Emma
Frye solely. There would be the evidence by appel-
lant’s secretary that Frank F. Frye brought the note
to Charles H. Frye, who, at request of Frank F. Frye,
signed the note February 11, 1931. This secretary of
appellant would also have testified respecting the book
entries above described.

As stated earlier in this opinion, the appellant’s offers
of proof and the evidence introduced on the issue of
consideration were insufficient to affect weight of the
statutory (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 3415) presumption that
appellant was a party to the note for value. If a new
trial were had, either with or without a jury, on the
evidence admitted and the excluded evidence offered

by appellant, it would be the duty of the trial court to-

sustain motion by respondent for a directed verdict or
judgment in respondent’s favor, appellant having failed
to sustain his defense of no consideration.

HM Counsel for Augusta Frye advised appellant

by letter of October 9, 1936, that his failure to accede,
by October 20, 1936, to her demand that he acknowl-
edge in writing his personal liability as an endorser of
the note of which his wife was maker, would result in
institution of action against him individually to enforce
collection on the note. The letter of acknowledgment
dated October 21, 1936, prepared by Augusta Frye’s
attorneys, was signed and delivered by Mr. Frye to
Augusta Frye’s attorneys.

It is clear that he signed that letter in contemplation
of forbearance on the part of the payee of the note.
His acknowledgment of his liability and his promise to
pay the note constituted a request that the payee for-
bear to sue. In reliance upon his letter, there was actual
forbearance for a substantial period of time. More than
six months elapsed before Augusta Frye served com-
plaint on appellant. Not until nearly eleven months
thereafter, or seventeen months after appellant signed
the letter of acknowledgment, was the action com-
menced to enforce collection on the note. The letter
of October 21, 1936, was an independent contract sup-
ported by a valid consideration—forbearance to prose-
cute a claim on which Augusta Frye had a right to sue.

“It is enough if it is to be inferred from the cir-
cumstances that there was an implied request for for-
pearance for a time and that such forbearance was
in fact extended in compliance with the request.”
McDonald Bros. Co. v. Koltes, 155 Minn. 24, 192 N. W.

See, also, Galena Nat. Bank v. Ripley, 55 Wash. 615,
104 Pac. 807, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 993.

The judgment is affirmed.

Buakz, C. J., Roprnson, Geracuty, and Srupson, JJ.,
concur.

467

[No. 27564. Department Two. September 8, 1939.]

Marton Drrrmar, Respondent, v. Frye & CoMPANY,
Appellant.t

Eggerman & Rosling, Walser S. Greathouse, and
Joseph J. Lanza, for appellant.

Todd, Holman & Sprague, William M. Allen, and
Lowell P. Mickelwait, for respondent.

Mirarp, J—In action by Seattle-First National
Bank, as executor of the estate of Augusta Frye, de-
ceased, against Charles H. Frye, to recover on promis-
sory note in the principal amount of forty thousand
dollars, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 717.

December 17, 1938. On the same date, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff in action by Seattle-
First National Bank, as administrator de bonis non
with will annexed of the estate of Frank F. Frye, de-
ceased, against Charles H. Frye, to recover on promis-
sory note in the principal amount of sixty thousand
dollars.

On April 21, 1938, while the two actions above-
described were pending against Charles H. Frye, a
writ of garnishment was issued to and served upon
the garnishee defendant Frye & Company in each of
the two causes. By answer of its treasurer in each
cause May 9, 1938, the garnishee defendant admitted
that it “was at the time of service of said writ of gar-
nishment and is now and at all times since said service
has been indebted to Charles H. Frye in the sum of
$126,841.05,” less an offset of $3,169.85 indebtedness of
Charles H. Frye to Frye & Company. Plaintiff's mo-
tion for judgment on the answer of the garnishee de-
fendant on the ground that it appeared therefrom that
Frye & Company was indebted to Charles H. Frye in
the net amount of $123,671.20, was denied. Over plain-
tiff’s objection, the garnishee defendant by its presi-
dent (Charles H. Frye) was permitted to amend its
answers to allege that the indebtedness of Frye & Com-
pany to Charles H. Frye was not matured, thereby pre-
senting an issue of fact on question of maturity of the
obligation.

The proceedings on the two writs were consolidated,
and the trial of the causes as one action resulted in
findings of fact summarized as follows:

That, in January, 1934, Frye & Company was in-
debted in large amounts to various banks, and that
Charles H. Frye was endorser on the notes evidenc-
ing such indebtedness. On January 19, 1934, Charles H.
Frye mortgaged certain timber lands in Lincoln county,

Oregon, which were his separate property, to the cred-
itor banks as security for the indebtedness of Frye &
Company. On January 12, 1938, the timber lands
were sold. The net proceeds of $191,588.32 of that sale
were distributed to the three remaining creditor banks
as follows: National Bank of Commerce of Seattle,
$63,894.36; Seattle-First National Bank, $64,747.27;
Bank of California, $62,946.69.

On January 12, 1938, the National Bank of Com-
merce and the Bank of California applied the amounts
aggregating $126,841.05, distributed to them as above
stated, upon the indebtedness owed to them by Frye &
Company upon the note representing which indebted-
ness Charles H. Frye was endorser. On the same date,
Frye & Company entered on its books a credit of
$126,841.05 in favor of Charles H. Frye, representing
the amounts applied by the two banks upon the in-
debtedness mentioned. By reason of the application
of the proceeds of the sale upon the indebtedness of
Frye & Company to the two banks mentioned, there
arose on January 12, 1938, in favor of Charles H. Frye,
an indebtedness of $126,841.05 from Frye & Company,
which indebtedness was then due, payable, and ma-
tured, as against which Frye & Company is entitled to
a set-off of $3,169.85 on account of indebtedness of
Charles H. Frye to it in that sum.

In consonance with the foregoing findings, judgment
was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Frye & Company
appealed. Since the appeal, the judgment in the con-
solidated causes has been assigned to Marion Dittmar,
who, pursuant to motion and stipulation of the parties
interested, has been substituted as respondent in place
of the Seattle-First National Bank.

Unless the evidence preponderates against the find-
ing that the indebtedness owing by Frye & Company
to Charles H. Frye was a matured obligation at the time

the writs of garnishment were served, the judgment
must be affirmed. The only issue presented is whether
the indebtedness of appellant to Charles H. Frye was
a matured or a deferred obligation at the time the
writs of garnishment were served upon it.

In December, 1932, Frye & Company and Charles H.
Frye were heavily indebted to a number of banks. A
bankers’ committee representing the Seattle and Port-
Jand banks to which Frye & Company were indebted
decided to accept demand notes in lieu of the then exist-
ing notes of Frye & Company, and one of the conditions
or terms for liquidation of the indebtedness on which
appellant relies to establish its contention that, at the
time of the service of the writs of garnishment, its
indebtedness to Charles H. Frye was not a matured
obligation, is as follows:

“That Frye & Company will not permit its president,
or any other officer or employee, to draw funds or
obtain funds on their personal account in excess of their
stipulated monthly wage or salary.”

In January, 1934, thirteen months subsequent to the
agreement of December, 1932, Frye & Company was
still indebted in large amounts to a number of banks.
Charles H. Frye was secondarily liable as endorser on
the notes evidencing that indebtedness. The banks
insisted upon further security for the indebtedness.
Seattle-First National Bank was selected to act as
trustee for itself and the other creditor banks under
the mortgages given as additional security. Pursuant
to that arrangement, Charles H. Frye executed, Janu-
ary 19, 1934, an agreement under which he pledged
certain corporate securities and other property to the
trustee bank.

At that time, Charles H. Frye mortgaged to the
Seattle-First National Bank, Lincoln county, Oregon,
timber lands owned by him as his separate property.

That mortgage recited that it was one of a number of
mortgages executed by Charles H. Frye in considera-
tion of an extension of time of payment of the indebted-
ness due the banks, and that the trustee was author-
ized to apply the proceeds received from sale of the
property on the indebtedness listed.

In November, 1935, in order that the sale of the prop-
erty might be facilitated, Mr. Frye conveyed the timber
lands to the Bank of California, as trustee, under an
arrangement with the other banks. Under that agree-
ment, it was provided that the net proceeds of the sale
of the timber lands would be applied pro rata upon
the respective obligations of the creditor banks. On
January 12, 1938, the bank sold the property. The
net proceeds of the sale amounted to $191,588.32, which
were distributed to the three remaining creditor banks
on a pro rata basis, as recited in the early part of this
opinion. Two of the banks applied the amounts dis-
tributed them upon the indebtedness owed them by
Frye & Company, the aggregate of the amounts sO ap-
plied being $126,841.05.

The bockkeeper of Frye & Company, under instruc-
tions from its treasurer, made an entry of credit to
Charles H. Frye of $126,841.05, representing the amount
owed Mr. Frye by reason of the application of the sale
proceeds by two of the creditor banks. By that entry,
there was established an open account in favor of
Mr. Frye. In the accounts of Frye & Company, an
entry was also made reducing the bank indebtedness
by the same amount that was credited to Charles H.
Frye. That was the state of the account when the
writs of garnishment were served on appellant April
21, 1938.

HI Patently, an indebtedness from Frye & Com-
pany to Charles H. Frye, who was secondarily liable as

endorser for the indebtedness of Frye & Company to
the banks, arose immediately upon the application of
the proceeds of the sale of his Oregon timber lands on
the indebtedness of Frye & Company to the creditor
banks. 9 Am. Jur. 208, § 455; Holland v. Tjosevig, 109
Wash. 142, 186 Pac. 317. The implied obligation of the
primary debtor (appellant) to reimburse the endorser
(Charles H. Frye) accrued and became due and pay-
able when the payment ‘was made, regardless of
whether it was a partial payment or a complete dis-
charge of the debt. Seattle v. Walker, 87 Wash. 609,
152 Pac. 330; 37 C. J. 860.

“An implied contract to indemnify one who pays
the debt of another arises at the time the suretyship
is made. :

“But a cause of action against the principal does
not arise until the promissor makes payment.

“It is not necessary to pay the entire debt; an in-
demnity may be enforced upon part payment to the
extent of the amount paid, and if the debt is paid by
installments, action may be brought for each install-
ment as it is paid.” Stearns Law of Suretyship (4th
ed.), § 280.

Hl There is nothing in the agreement of December,
1932, upon which appellant relies, which postponed or
extended the maturity of the obligation of Frye &
Company to Charles H. Frye; that obligation was due
and payable on and after January 12, 1938. The pro-
vision of the agreement of December, 1932, relates to
advances and was not intended to prevent Frye & Com-
pany from meeting its corporate obligations accruing
subsequent to the date of that agreement. The pro-
vision was intended to prevent overdrafts on the part
of the officers in anticipation of future salaries. The
officers were not permitted, under the agreement of
December, 1932, to obtain funds on their personal ac-

count in excess of their monthly wage or salary.
Clearly, that provision is inapplicable to the indebted-
ness arising out of the sale of the property pledged
more than one year later by Charles H. Frye under
specific agreements.

The agreement of December, 1932, containing the
provision upon which appellant relies, did not con-
template the deposit of any collateral, and none was
deposited under it. That arrangement between the
banks and appellant was unnecessary after the collat-
eral was given in 1934; and it is clear that thereafter
the parties treated the letter of December, 1932, as of
no effect. Mr. Frye was permitted to overdraw on his
current account amounts in excess of five thousand
dollars over and above his salary; at the time the writs
were served, the overdraft was $3,169.85, which was
increased to $4,561.00 at the time of trial.

The mortgage and sale of the timber lands consti-
tuted a transaction to which the agreement of De-
cember, 1932, did not apply. The letter of 1932 con-
tains nothing to prevent Frye & Company from paying
Charles H. Frye, whose claim arises out of the sale of
his timber lands for the account of Frye & Company.
There was no agreement postponing the maturity of
indebtedness of Frye & Company to Charles H. Frye.

The trial court believed, as do we, that the original
answer of the treasurer of appellant, that Frye & Com-
pany at the time of the service of the writs was in-
debted to Charles H. Frye in the amount stated, was
true, and that the subsequent testimony of Mr. Frye
and appellant’s treasurer, concerning an understanding
to defer payment, was untrue. The defense of im-
maturity of the obligation was, we are convinced, an
afterthought, born when appellant was confronted with
a judgment requiring payment by appellant of the
money into court.

474

The evidence overwhelmingly preponderates in sup-
port of the findings; therefore, the judgment should be,
and it is, affirmed.

Bake, C. J., Gzracuty, Sumpson, and Rosiyson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27554. Department One. September 13, 1939.]

Unitep Unton Brewine Company, Appellant, v. Dave
Beck et al., Respondents.?

Henry Clay Agnew, for appellant.
Vanderveer & Bassett and Clarence J. Coleman, for
respondents.

"Reported in 93 P. (2d) 772.

Stervert, J—This was an action to recover damages
for loss of business’ sustained by plaintiff through the
alleged wrongful and malicious acts of the defendants,
and to obtain a permanent injunction restraining de-
fendants from directly or indirectly interfering with
the marketing of plaintifi’s beer and, specifically, from
directly or secondarily boycotting such product. By
stipulation of the parties at the end of the trial, plain-
tiff’s prayer for damages was withdrawn and certain
of the defendants were dismissed from the action.

At the conclusion of the hearing by the court, a
decree was entered, to which the remaining defendants
consented, permanently enjoining them

“

. from employing any threats or intimidations
as a means of deterring any merchant from supplying
any of plaintiff’s customers with commodities or prod-
ucts used or useful in the conduct of their business,”

but in all other respects denying plaintiff’s prayer for
relief.

Deeming itself aggrieved by the inadequacy of the
order, in that it did not grant the full relief sought,
plaintiff has appealed.

The respective contentions of the parties can best
be indicated by a resume of the pleadings.

The complaint presents the situation substantially as
follows: Appellant is a corporation organized and
qualified under the laws of the state of Washington
and is engaged in the business of manufacturing beer,
known as Old Empire Beer, and wholesaling it through-
out the various counties of this state. Its employees
are all members of the International Union of United
Brewery, Flour, Cereal and Soft Drink Workers of
America, which, for brevity, we shall refer to as
Brewery Workers Union. There never has been any
dispute between appellant and any of its employees

over wages, hours, conditions of employment, or any
other matter.

Respondent Dave Beck is an international organizer
for International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Stablemen and Helpers, hereinafter referred to
as the Teamsters Union. The other respondents are
local unions under charter from either the parent
Teamsters Union or the Culinary Workers and Bar-
tenders Union, which latter is hereinafter referred to
as Culinary Workers Union. As such international
organizer, Beck exercises complete domination and
control over each of the respondent local unions.

During the year preceding December, 1938, respond-
ent Beck, solely for the malicious purpose of destroy-
ing appellant’s business, directed the respondent local
unions in a systematic effort designed to prevent the
marketing and distributing of appellant’s product.
Pursuant to such directions, the respondent locals of
the Teamsters Union have refused to deliver products
of any kind to any place of business in this state which
buys, sells, or possesses appellant’s beer, and the re-
spondent locals of the Culinary Workers Union have
refused to furnish any bartenders or any employees
to any restaurant or tavern that buys, sells, or pos-
sesses such beer. Furthermore, the respondent local
unions have picketed every retail business in this state
which handles appellant’s product; the pi¢kets bear
signs stating that such picketed premises are unfair
to organized labor, although, in fact, no labor dispute |
exists or has existed at any of such places.

A group of defendants, who by the stipulation were
dismissed from the action, are engaged in the business
of wholesaling merchandise to restaurants, taverns,
and other retail businesses handling beer. Pursuant
to respondent Beck’s directions, these defendants have
refused, and still refuse, to sell or deliver any product

or furnish any service to such places of business as
buy, sell, or possess beer manufactured by appellant.
As a consequence, appellant’s customers engaged in
the retail business are prevented from obtaining de-
sired merchandise and services.

This conduct of respondents has substantially de-
creased the sale of appellant’s beer in this state, and
if allowed to continue will cause appellant irreparable
damage.

The foregoing constitutes the material allegations of
appellant’s complaint.

In their answers, respondents deny all the allega-
tions of the complaint except that appellant’s em-
ployees are members of the Brewery Workers Union.
By way of an affirmative defense, respondents present
their side of the controversy as follows: Appellant was
organized as a corporation by the Brewery Workers
Union, and all its stock is closely held by that organiza-
tion. Both the Brewery Workers Union and the Team-
sters Union were organized pursuant to charters issued
by the American Federation of Labor, which we will
hereinafter refer to as A. F. of L.

In 1933, a controversy arose between the two unions,
as to which had jurisdiction over drivers employed on
brewery trucks. Pursuant to the constitution and laws
of A. F. of L., that controversy was submitted to the
general executive council of the federation for deci-
sion. The council decided that jurisdiction over the
drivers belonged to the Teamsters Union and not to
the Brewery Workers Union. Thereupon, the Brewery
Workers Union appealed consecutively to the conven-
tions of A. F. of L. held in the years 1934, 1935, and
1936, and at each of those conventions the decision of
the general executive council was, after full hearing,
sustained. Nevertheless, the Brewery Workers Union
and the appellant herein, acting in open defiance of

the decisions of A. F. of L., have continued to man all
brewery trucks with members of the Brewery Workers
Union, and the members of that union have boycotted
the products of all breweries in this state which em-
ployed members of the Teamsters Union, as a conse-
quence of which the respondent local unions have, in
turn, refused, and now refuse, to haul-any product of
appellant or to patronize or render any service to any
retailer of appellant’s products.

Appellant, though contending that respondents’ af-
firmative defense is immaterial to the issues here in-
volved, nevertheless comes forward by way of reply
and, after admitting that a majority of its stock is owned
by members of the Brewery Workers Union, gives its
version of the preexisting controversy between the
two unions as follows:

Shortly after its organization in 1887, the Brewery
Workers Union, which comprised all employees of the
brewing industry including beer truck drivers, was
granted a certificate of affiliation by A. F. of L. No
Teamsters Union or any union of drivers was granted
a certificate of affiliation until twelve years later. One
of the objects of A. F. of L., as provided by its constitu-
tion, is the establishment of trade unions based upon
a strict recognition of the autonomy of each trade and
the promotion and advancement of such bodies. The
constitution further provides that no charter shall be
granted by A. F. of L. to any national, international,
trade, or federal labor union without a positive and
clear definition of the trade jurisdiction claimed by the
applicant, and that no charter shall be granted such
applicant if the jurisdiction claimed trespasses on the
jurisdiction of any existing affiliated union, unless such
affiliate gives its written consent thereto. The A. F.
of L. has no authority or control over the jurisdiction

of the Brewery Workers Union, nor can it transfer
such jurisdiction to another.

The brewing and delivery of beer throughout the
United States, except in the state of Washington and
to some extent in the state of Oregon, are now con-
ducted by the Brewery Workers Union.

In 1934, a proposition that the Teamsters Union be

~ given jurisdiction over certain drivers was submitted
to a referendum vote of the members of the Brewery

‘ Workers Union, and the result of that vote was 170 in
favor of such proposal and 14,161 against it.

There are in the United States approximately twelve
thousand members of the Brewery Workers Union who
are engaged as beer truck drivers. For many years,
the Brewery Workers Union has issued charters
throughout the principal cities of the United States to
local unions composed of members who are either ex-
clusively beer truck drivers or else handle, in part,
deliveries of all brewery products; these locals and
their members participate in the sick benefits and in-
surance features provided by their parent union.

In spite of these general conditions pertaining to
jurisdiction, respondents Beck and the Teamsters
Union have by illegal boycotts seized control of all
breweries in the state of Washington except that of
appellant and are engaged not only in the delivery,
but also in the brewing and bottling, of beer.

The pleadings, as we have summarized them, present
the background which gave rise to this controversy
and reveal the existence of a protracted struggle be-
tween two powerful international unions for the right
to exercise jurisdiction over a particular type of em-
ployment.

The evidence introduced upon the trial, as it appears
from a narrative statement of facts, is not in dispute.

Appellant called as witnesses seventeen tavern oper-

ators, a hotel keeper, a bartender, the secretary of the
Brewery Workers local union, and two of its own em-
ployees, a salesman and a truck driver.

The testimony of the various tavern keepers, though
differing circumstantially, evidenced the same type of
conduct and purpose on the part of respondents. For
brevity, we quote from but one of them, as illustrative
of the general tenor. Leo Delorme’s testimony, taken
verbatim from the statement of facts, was as follows:

“I own and operate a tavern in Yakima County,
Washington, situated just outside the city limits of
Yakima. About the 3rd day of December, 1938, I
started selling Old Empire Beer which I purchased
from the plaintiff. Mr. Dick Howard, an official of
the Bartenders’ Union Local 624, told me that unless
I stopped selling this beer he would forbid my em-
ployees, who were members of his union, to work and
would picket the place. I told him I had bought the
beer and would sell it, so my employees left and my
place has been picketed since and is now being pick-
eted. The pickets carry a sandwich sign upon which
is printed ‘Delorme’s Tavern unfair to organized labor.’
Mr. McCoy of the Teamsters’ Union told me that any
teamster who delivered to my tavern while I had Old
Empire Beer would be subject to a $250 fine by the
Teamsters’ Union. Immediately upon my putting in
the beer I was unable to get delivery of other com-
modities which I sell at my tavern.”

Other tavern keepers testified that, upon their dis-
continuing the sale of appellant’s beer, respondents’
opposition ceased.

The hotel keeper testified as follows:

“T operate the Green Hotel in Hoquiam, Washington.
I put in Old Empire beer about November, 1937. Since
that time, I have not been able to get deliveries of
anything to the hotel.”

The ice man testified as follows:

“IT am in the ice business. I buy my ice at the Blue
Ribbon in Bellingham and make my living selling it.

I take my own truck. About August 12, 1938, Mr.
White and an officer of the Teamsters Union told me
that unless I stopped delivering ice to the Marine
Tavern in Bellingham that they would see that I lost
my other customers so I stopped making deliveries.”

The bartender testified:

“T am employed as a bartender at the Commercial
Tavern in Everett. After the owner put in Old Empire
Beer for sale the place was immediately picketed by
the Culinary Workers’ Union of Everett. Mr. Good-
rich, the business agent of the union, came in and took
the union card out of the house. Prior to that time the
employees were all union but they were called out.
All the employees were satisfied and there was no dis-
pute other than the sale of the beer.”

The truck driver testified:

“T am a driver for the United Union Brewing Com-
pany. Iama member of the Brewery Workers’ Union.
I was returning through Everett from Bellingham with
a load of beer. Goodrich of the Culinary Workers’
Union told me to get the truck out of town. A little
later on near Sultan, Washington, my truck was shot
up by a group of men including Anthony Harn and
Goodrich of the Culinary Workers.

. CROSS-EXAMINATION.

“T procured a warrant for their arrest but they have

never been apprehended.”

The salesman testified:

“T am employed as a salesman for the United Union
Brewing Company. In February, 1938, we had been
making it a point to be present in taverns because
our beer drivers had been followed from place to place
by squads of men in cars. In this month Mr. Reese
and myself stopped at Andy’s Tavern in Seattle while
our driver came in with some beer. He was followed
by two car loads of men. All of them wore teamsters’
buttons. They followed him inside the tavern. Billy
Vitro was one of the men. I was knocked down by
one of the men. Vitro said we would have to get the

beer out of there and our driver refused. The driver’s
helper was thrown to the floor and beaten over the
head with a flash light and knocked unconscious. There
were two criss-cross wounds across his head which had
to be sewed up. Our driver had a gun and finally
drove them out, holding one car load until the police
came. The men were tried in police court at the
time and convicted and given six months but appealed
and Mr. Warner has refused to proceed with the case.

“We had at one time about sixty accounts in Tacoma
until the Teamsters put in the rule about delivery of
aul other products. We lost all the accounts but about

ee.”

The secretary testified:

“I am the secretary of the Brewery Workers’ Local,
having jurisdiction in the territory of Walla, Walla.
All the employees of the United Union Brewing Com-
pany are members of this local, including the beer
drivers. All of the employees are satisfied with their
wages, hours and conditions of employment and there
is no labor dispute.

Cross-EXAMINATION

“The stock in the plaintiff corporation is owned by
the International Brewery Workers’ Union; ‘This
brewery in Walla Walla as well as one in Tacoma
formerly belonged to the Northwest Brewing Com-
pany, which was .a corporation controlled by Pete
Maranoff. The Brewery Workers’ International Union
had loaned this company money and when the com-
pany became insolvent, foreclosed a mortgage against
the Tacoma Brewery and the Walla Walla Brewery and
bought them at Sheriff’s sale. The plaintiff corpora-
tion was then organized to operate them. The only
brewery that operates is the one at Walla Walla. Iam
familiar with the fact that in 1933 the executive board
of the American Federation of Labor awarded juris-
diction of beer drivers to the Teamsters’ Union and
that this ruling was approved by a majority vote of
the convention of the American Federation of Labor
in 1933. Defendants’ Exhibit 9 is the Minute Book of
the American Federation of Labor showing such rul-
ing. The Brewery Workers’ Union has refused to

recognize the ruling. In 1934 this court restrained
our Local Union in Cause No. 267047 from picketing
Hemrich Brewing Company or from distributing litera-
ture stating that Hemrich’s beer was unfair. Defend-
ants’ Exhibit 10 contains the original restraining order.
I do not know whether or not any more literature was
distributed after the restraining order. We do regard
beer delivered by the Teamsters’ Union as being un-
fair and refuse to patronize it. The C. I. O. has voted
beer unfair that is manufactured by the Teamsters
and not by the Brewery Workers. I know that many
taverns sell our beer in order to get the patronage of
members of the C. I. 0.”

At the conclusion of appellant’s evidence, and after
respondents’ challenge to its sufficiency and their mo-
tion to dismiss appellant’s application for a restraining
order had been denied, respondents called but one
witness, who testified as follows:

“Tam an attorney and am also an officer of the Pacific
Northwest Brewery Association. On January 17, 1934,
we tendered Mr, Craine and other officers of the Brew-
ery Workers’ Union, a contract whereby the Brewery
Workers were granted jurisdiction of all workers in
our breweries except beer drivers and gave them ten
days to sign the agreement and to concede the juris-
diction of the beer drivers to the Teamsters. They
refused to sign the agreement within ten days. We
then awarded the work to the unions organized by the
Teamsters. After this literature was distributed de-
claring our beer unfair. This was done by the Brewery
Workers’ Union. Recently several Unions affiliated
with the C. I. O. have passed resolutions not to
patronize beer manufactured by our breweries and
have sent copies of these resolutions to various brew-
eries.

CROsS-EXAMINATION
. “I do not know from my own knowledge whether
or not the action of the C. I. O. was solicited by the
Brewery Workers. I know of no literature against
any of our beer distributed by the Brewery Workers
after October, 1937. Eastern beer such as Pabst,

Hamm’s and Budweiser, is manufactured by breweries
in which the brewery drivers are affiliated with the
Brewery Workers’ Union. This condition is true all
over the United States except in the state of Wash-
ington, the city of Cleveland, Ohio, and I believe to
some extent in Chicago. There was a period of about
ten months when the Teamsters kept the eastern beer
out of the state of Washington. It was immediately
after the memorandum decision of Judge Cushman, as
shown by plaintifi’s exhibit 4 for identification, that
the eastern beer was allowed in the state of Washing-
ton again. I do not believe the decision had anything
to do with it. I know that after the decision of the
American Federation of Labor Convention of 1933
awarding jurisdiction to the Teamsters Union of beer
drivers that under the supervision of Mr. Green, Presi-
dent of the American Federation of Labor, a vote was
taken of the members of the Brewery Workers’ Union
as to their desire on the change of affiliation and the
result of the vote was approximately fourteen thou-
sand against the change of affiliation to one hundred
seventy in favor of changing. I do not believe that
the election was fairly conducted, as it was apparent
that the members of the Brewery Workers’ Union were
influenced by their officers.”

We now proceed to the questions which are sug-
gested and argued upon the appeal.

Respondents take the position squarely that the only
question involved is whether the Brewery Workers
Union or the Teamsters Union has jurisdiction over
brewery truck drivers. By “jurisdiction” in this in-
stance is meant the right to accept such drivers as
members and to represent them in the negotiation of
employment contracts and the settlement of disputes
with their employers. Respondents assert that, as
members of the Teamsters Union, an affiliate of A. F.
of L., they have the right to enforce obedience to pa-
rental authority by withholding their labor and patron-
age from all beer taverns that patronize appellant’s

brewery. Appellant insists that the orders of A. F.
of L. through its executive council and in convention,
awarding such jurisdiction to the Teamsters Union,
are void because in violation of the constitution of the
federation.

We will not undertake to decide, in this case, whether
such orders were valid or invalid. There are two rea-
sons for the position we take: (1) Neither the A. F.
of L., nor the international body of Brewery Workers
Union nor any local union of that body, nor the inter-
national body of Teamsters Union, is a party to this
controversy, and, so far as this case is concerned, any
question regarding the validity of the orders referred
to is a collateral matter; and (2) in any event, a deci-
sion of that question is unnecessary in the determina-
tion of the real issue involved in this case. Whatever
may be the background of this controversy and what-
ever strife between two rival labor organizations may
yet lurk therein, the immediate question before us is
whether the appellant, a private corporation organized
and doing business under the laws of this state, may
appeal to the courts for the protection of its property
rights.

We clearly recognize the fact that the stockholders
of the appellant corporation are members of one of the
two rival labor organizations. We are also aware that
one of these labor organizations at one time loaned
money to the former owner of appellant’s brewery for
the evident purpose of enabling its members to secure
exclusive employment therein adverse to the interests
of the other labor organization, Neither of these con-
‘siderations is material in this case. The mortgage
securing the loan was foreclosed, and the brewery
was bought at execution sale by the mortgagee. The
appellant was organized to take over and operate the
brewery which had been subject to the mortgage.

Although its stock is owned’by members of the Brew-
ery Workers Union, appellant stands exactly in the
same position as any other corporation with respect
to the right to acquire property and conduct business,
so long as it complies with the laws of this state.

In our opinion, this appeal presents, for ultimate
determination, two issues, or, more properly perhaps,
one issue which may be considered from two ap-
proaches.

Hl The first question is whether or not respond-
ents may lawfully use the methods which they have
employed, in order to compel appellant to hire, as
truck drivers, only those who are members of the
“Teamsters Union, or to compel appellant’s employees
to join that union.

The workers employed by appellant. have selected
their own bargaining agency, as they had the right
to do. The “labor disputes” act of this state, Laws of
1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7, p. 10 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 7612-1 [P. C. § 3467-21] et seg.), in announcing the
public policy of this state, recognizes that the indi-
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable
terms and conditions of employment,

“. . . wherefore, though he should be free to de-
cline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that
he have full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of his own choosing,
to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employ-
ment, and that he shall be free from interference, re-
straint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protections; . . .” Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses.,
chapter 7, p. 10, §2 (Rem. Rey. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2
[P. C. § 3467- 221).

It is to be borne in mind that no member of the

Teamsters Union has ever been employed by appel-

" lant; and, further, that there is no dispute whatever
upon any subject between appellant and its own em-
ployees.

In Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks’ Union, 184 Wash.
322, 51 P. (2d) 372, the officers and members of a
local union picketed plaintiff’s places of business for
the purpose of compelling plaintiff's employees to join
the union. No dispute existed between plaintiff and
its employees, and none of its employees were mem-
bers of the union. In directing that a decree be entered
permanently enjoining defendants from picketing any
of plaintiffs places of business, we said:

“The vital, controlling question at issue here is plain
and easy of solution. It in no way pertains to the rela-
tions between the appellant, a merchant, and its em-
ployees. For aught that appears, they are content and
satisfied, among themselves. On the contrary, this is
a lawsuit between appellant and a third party—a labor
union that does not include in its membership any
employee of the appellant. What right have the re-
spondents to insist or demand, at the threat or cost
of the destruction of appellant’s business, or at all, that
appellant ask, urge or coerce, directly or indirectly,
its employees, who are at liberty to do as they please,
to join respondents’ organization? Of course, there is
nothing unlawful in hiring clerks or salesmen who
are not members of a local organization such as the re-
spondent; and any attempt, like that in this case, to
deny or cripple one’s right to do so is an unwarranted
attempt by individuals or persons to unreasonably
interfere with the freedom of the liberty and property
right of contract.

“The conduct of respondents, in conjunction with
that of appellant, cannot be termed a labor dispute. It
is an unwarranted attempt on the part of respondents
to compel appellant, against its right of choice, to be-
come active in the cause of respondents, with the result
that, upon the failure of that attempt, respondents

Se

purposely commenced and continued picketing, to
appellant’s damage in the large sum of $2,200 in less
than four months’ time, with the avowed intention of
continuing the same, to manifest, irreparable injury
and damage to the appellant.”

A similar state of facts was involved in Adams v.
Building Service Employees etc. Union, 197 Wash.
242, 84 P. (2d) 1021. In upholding the injunctive fea-
ture of the decree, we said:

“An adjustment to the satisfaction of appellants of
their controversy with respondent might result in
shorter hours and increased pay for respondent’s em-
ployees; however, none of those employees is a member
of appellant union, and there was no controversy be-
tween respondent and his employees. The purpose
of the picketing was to compel respondent’s employees,
who were unwilling to join Local No. 6 unless respond-
ent also signed the agreement demanded by appellants,
to become members of the picketing union; that is,
respondent was to be compelled at the cost of the de-
struction of his business to coerce his employees, who
are at liberty to do as they please, to join appellants’
organization.”

In Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash.
396, 63 P. (2d) 397, this same character of controversy
was before this court as a result of the concerted
action of certain breweries and the members of the
Teamsters Union to compel members of the Brewery
Workers Union to join the rival union. In upholding
the contempt action taken by the trial court following
its decree of injunction, we said:

“The action of the owners was contrary to the public
policy announced in the very legislative act on which
all of the defendants formerly relied and on which the -
appellant even now relies. But the case goes deeper
than that. It is a case where it has been made to ap-
pear that one set of employees, through threats of
strikes and boycotts, is seeking to compel a group of
employers to discharge another set of employees whose

relations with their employers have been in all re-
spects harmonious. This is unwarranted. No one has
a right to coerce an employer, by threats of violence
or of activities which will inevitably lead to great
financial loss, in order to compel the discharge of an
employee.

“The right to ¢ earn a livelihood and to continue in
employment unmolested by unwarranted activities of
third persons is entitled to protection in equity. Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, Ann.
Cas. 1917B, 283. A correlative principle is that the
employer has the right freely to maintain relations of
employment with whomsoever he desires, and no one
has the right purposely to disrupt or interfere with
those relations by the intentional resort to such mea-
sures as will obviously, and in the ordinary course of
events, inflict irreparable injury upon the employer.
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v, Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,
38 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461.”

In the very recent case of Fornili v. Auto Mechanics’
Union etc., ante p. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422, the same ques-
tion, arising under slightly different factual circum-
stances, was presented.’ The cases from which we
have quoted above were cited with approval and the
same conclusion reached. We said:

“Tt is not clear from the record whether the purpose
of the picketing was to coerce the appellants [employ-
ers] into having their employees become union men,
or whether its purpose was to punish them for failing
to live up to the terms of their contract while it was

in effect. In either event, the picketing was not
_ lawful.” .

In the case at bar, the purpose of respondents in
committing the acts complained of was to compel ap-
pellant to substitute for its present employees other
employees, or to compel appellant’s employees to be-
come members of the Teamsters Union. The purpose
was unlawful. To accomplish that purpose, resort was
had to acts destructive of appellant’s business. Those

acts were likewise unlawful and the proper remedy
was by injunction.

HI The second, and principal, question is whether
or not, in any event, appellant is entitled to the relief
sought, on the theory that the actions of respondents
constituted a secondary boycott.

While the term “secondary boycott” is of somewhat
vague signification and has no precise and exclusive

“denotation, the courts, both Federal and state, are
agreed that any combination will be held to be a sec-
ondary boycott if its purpose and effect are to coerce
customers or patrons, through fear of loss or bodily
harm, to withhold or withdraw their business rela-
tions from the employer who is under attack.

“The substance of the matters here complained of
is an interference with complainant’s interstate trade,
intended to have coercive effect upon complainant, and
produced by what is commonly known as a ‘secondary
boycott,’ that is, a combination not merely to refrain
from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by
peaceful means persuade complainant’s customers to
refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to exercise coercive
pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective,
in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patron-
age from complainant through fear of loss or damage
to themselves should they deal with it.” Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172,
65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196.

“A secondary boycott may be defined as a combina-
tion to cause a loss to one person by coercing others
against their will to withdraw from him their bene-
ficial business intercourse, by threats that unless those
others do so, the combination will cause similar loss
to them, or by the use of means as the infliction of
bodily harm on them or such intimidation as will put
them in fear of. bodily harm.” Smythe Neon Sign Co.
v. Local Union No. 405 etc., 284 N. W. (Iowa) 126.

“The law recognizes what may be called two species
of boycotts. One a primary boycott that is applied

directly and alone to the offending person, by with-
drawing from him all business relations on the part of
the organization that initiated the boycott, and the
other a secondary boycott that becomes effective when
the members of the organization refuse to have any
business relations with persons dealing with the of-
fender until he has yielded to the demands of the or-
ganization.” Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Board
of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224 S. W. 451, 21
A. L. R. 531.

“The method adopted in this case presents a clear
case of attempted boycotting, both primary and sec-
ondary. The purpose of a secondary boycott is to
bring to bear a duress upon the customers of the per-
son under attack, by threatening them directly or in-
directly with a boycott, if they persist in trading with
such person.” Ellis v. Journeymen Barbers’ Inter-
national Union, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111, 32
A. L. R. 756.

See, also, 32 C. J. 167, § 233.

While there are some decisions to the contrary, no-
tably in California and Montana, the weight of authority
is that a conspiracy, combination or continuance of
acts, formed or designed to injure a person’s business
by coercing his customers, or prospective customers,
into withholding or withdrawing their patronage from
him by acts or threats of injury to the customer’s busi-
ness if he fails to comply with the demands of the
conspirators or combatants, constitutes a secondary
boycott and will be restrained by a court of equity.
32 C. J. 168, §§ 235(b), 236(bb); 172, § 244(bb). In
addition to the cases cited in the footnotes to the fore-
going text, see, also, Armstrong Cork & Insulation Co.
v. Walsh, 276 Mass. 263, 177 N. E. 2; Yankee Network,
Inc. v. Gibbs, 3 N. E. (2d) (Mass.) 228; Newark Morn-
ing Ledger Co. v. Suburban Newsdealers’ Ass’n (N. J.
Ch.), 9 N. J. Misc. 373, 154 Atl. 534; Mitnick v. Furni-
ture Workers Union, etc., 124 N. J. Eq. 147, 200 Atl.

553; Commercial House & Window Cleaning Co. v.
Awerkin, 138 Misc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797; George F.
Stuhmer & Co. v. Korman, 241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 788; Chapman v. Doe, 7 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 470;
Bomes v. Providence Local No. 223 etc., 51 R. I. 499,
155 Atl. 581.

Many cases from the Federal courts have condemned
the secondary boycott as being in violation of the
anti-trust laws and have upheld the power of the courts
to restrain such activities. Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 62 L. Ed. 260, 38 S. Ct.
65, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct.
172, 65 L. Ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196; Bedford Cut Stone °
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U. S. 37,
71 L. Ed. 916, 47 S. Ct. 522, 54 A. L. R. 791; Local 167
of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v.
United States, 291 U. S. 298, 54 S. Ct. 396, 78 L. Ed.-
804; Waitresses’ Union, Local 249 v. Benish Restaurant
Co. (C. C. A.), 6 F. (2d) 568; International Organiza-
tion, ete. v. Red Jacket C. C. & C. Co. (C. C. A.), 18
F. (2d) 839; Aeolian Co. v. Fischer (C. C. A.), 40 F.
(2d) 189; Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co. (C.
C.A.), 87 F. (2d) 583; Columbus Heating & Ventilating
Co. v. Pittsburgh Building Trades Council (D. C.
Penn.), 17 F. (2d) 806; Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers (D.C. Penn.), 35 F. (2d) 203;
United States Gypsum Co. v. Heslop (D. C. Iowa), 39
F, (2d) 228.

This court has previously recognized the bases upon
which injunctive relief against secondary boycott is
rested. In Jensen v. Cooks’ & Waiters’ Union, 39
Wash. 531, 81 Pac. 1069, although it did not, strictly
speaking, involve a case of secondary boycott, we
said:

“Men cannot lawfully jointly congregate about the
entrance of one’s place of business, and there, either
by persuasion, coercion, or force, prevent his patrons
and the public at large from entering his place of
business or dealing with him. To destroy his business
in this manner is just as reprehensible as it is to
physically destroy his property.. Either is a violation
of a natural right, the right to own, and peaceably
enjoy, property.”

See, also, Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International
Typographical Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358, 32
A. L. R. 767.

A person’s business constitutes a property right and,
if lawful, is entitled to protection from any unlawful
interference. Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks’ Union,
184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372; Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312, 66 L. Ed. 254, 42 S. Ct. 144, 27 A. L. R. 375;
Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union
etc., 21 N. E. (2d) (Hl.) 308, 32 C. J. 168, § 235(b).

We have in this case the following elements: (a)
Property rights involved; (b) unlawful interference
with such rights by acts constituting a secondary boy-
cott and involving (c) intimidation, threats, and vio-
lence; and, as a result, (d) the owner of such prop-
erty rights being threatened with great and irrepa-
rable injury.

Appellant is entitled to a decree enjoining respond-
ents from actively interfering with the marketing of
appellant’s beer; from picketing, or threatening to
picket, any of appellant’s customers or prospective
customers because such customer, present or pro-
spective, handles or attempts to handle beer manufac-
tured by appellant; and from interfering in any way
with the delivery of other products or commodities to
any of such customers or prospective customers be-
cause they handle or attempt to handle such beer.

The cause is remanded to the superior court for
modification of the decree as herein indicated.

Matn, Rosinson, and Jerrers, JJ., concur.

Braxg, C. J. (dissenting)—I dissent not only for the
reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in the case of
Fornili v. Auto Mechanics’ Union etc., ante p. 283, 93
P. (2d) 422, but also for the following reasons:

Applying the alter ego doctrine, the appellant is in
reality the instrumentality of the Brewery Workers’
Union. That union and respondent International
Brotherhood of Teamsters are both affiliates of the
American Federation of Labor. For several years, these
two unions have been engaged in a dispute over the
jurisdiction of drivers of vehicles employed in the
brewery business. The instant law suit arises out of
that controversy. The controversy has several times
been submitted to bodies of the American Federation
of Labor having jurisdiction of such matters, and each
time there has been a decision confirming the juris-
diction of the Teamsters Union over the drivers.

Under such facts as these, it is universally held that
the courts will not take jurisdiction of the controversy.
In 4 Am. Jur. 466, the applicable rule is stated as
follows:

“Tt is well established that courts will not interfere
with the internal affairs of voluntary associations, ex-
cept in such cases as fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, it is held that mandamus will not lie to
regulate the affairs of unincorporated societies or asso-
ciations, at least not in the absence of a permissive
statute. Nor will an injunction be granted where the
association is proceeding in accordance with its rules
and within the scope of its jurisdiction. The decisions
of the tribunals of an association with respect to its
internal affairs will, in the absence of mistake, fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness, be accepted by the courts
as conclusive. Moreover, it is held that the courts will

not undertake to inquire into the regularity of the pro-
cedure adopted and pursued by such tribunals in reach-
ing their conclusions.” (Italics mine.)

Moreover, this court has recognized and applied the
rule. Kelly v. Grand Circle etc. Woodcraft, 40 Wash.
691, 82 Pac. 1007; Stivers v. Blethen, 124 Wash. 473,
215 Pac. 7. In the former case, the court said:

“Tn cases of this kind ‘courts never interfere, except
to ascertain whether or not the proceeding was pur-
suant to the rules and laws of the society, whether or
not the proceeding was in good faith, and whether or
not there was anything in the proceeding in violation
of the laws of the land’ Connelly v. Masonic Mut.

Benefit Ass’n, 58 Conn. 552, 18 Am. St. 296, 9 L. R. A.
428.”

Applying this rule, the action should be remanded
to the superior court with directions to dismiss.

{No. 27458. En Banc. September 14, 1939.]

Tue State or WasHincton, Respondent, v. K. W. Berry
. et al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 93 P. (2d) 782.

a
tH

C. D. Cunningham, for appellant Berry.

W. H. Abel, for appellant Smith.

Wallace G. Mills, for appellant Reddick.

Ralph L. J. Armstrong, for appellant McAloon.

Smith Troy, J. W. Graham, Leonard E. Top, and
John S. Lynch, Jr., for respondent.

Muxtarp, J.—The defendants Berry and three others
were charged, as follows, by two counts in an informa-
tion filed in the superior court for Thurston county,
with the crimes of kidnaping in the first degree and of
assault in the first degree:

“They, the said K. W. Berry, William McAloon,
James Reddick and Robert Smith, in the county of
Thurston, State of Washington, on or about the 19th
day of August A. D., 1938, did wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, seize, confine and inveigle another, to-wit,
one Irving Baker, with intent to cause the said Irving
Baker without authority of law to be secretly confined
and imprisoned, and that said act or acts as heretofore
in this paragraph outlined was wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously committed by all of said defendants as
aforesaid, jointly and by each of said defendants as
aforesaid, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously aiding,
encouraging, assisting, counseling and abetting each
other in the unlawful commission of said crime.

IL

“They . . . did wilfully, unlawfully and felo-
niously, with intent to commit a felony upon the per-
son of another, to-wit, one Irving Baker, did assault
the said Irving Baker with deadly weapons, which said

_ deadly weapons were then and there held and used by
the said K. W. Berry, with such force and in a manner
likely to produce the death of the said Irving Baker,

and that said act or acts as heretofore in this paragraph
outlined was wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously com-
mitted by all of said defendants as aforesaid, jointly
and by each of said defendants as aforesaid, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously aiding, encouraging, assist-
ing, counseling and abetting each other, and particu-
larly the said K. W. Berry in the unlawful commission
of said crime.”

While all of the defendants pleaded not guilty, each
admitted that he was a participant in the acts consti-
tuting the crimes which all were charged with com-
mitting. In justification of his role in this drama of
atrocity, Berry alleged that his wife was raped by the
complaining witness, and that he, Berry, was lured by
the officers of the law into the commission of the crimes
charged. Reddick sought to be absolved on the ground
that he acted under compulsion. Alcoholism, which
rendered him incapable of realizing what he was doing,
was advanced by McAloon as excusatory of the part
he played. Smith asked exculpation on the theory that
he thought the course pursued by him and the other
defendants was lawful.

Trial to a jury resulted in verdicts finding the four
defendants guilty of kidnaping in the first degree,
Berry, Reddick and McAloon guilty of assault in the
first degree, and Smith guilty of assault in the second
degree. By special verdict, the jury withheld the
death penalty for the crime of kidnaping in the first
degree. Judgment was entered that the four defend-
ants shall be imprisoned for life on the kidnaping con-
viction, that Berry, Reddick and McAloon be im-
prisoned not more than twenty years on the first de-
gree assault conviction, and that Smith be imprisoned
not more than ten years on the second degree assault
conviction; the sentences of each defendant to run con-
secutively. The defendants appealed.

The facts established by the verdict are summarized.

Appellant Berry, age fifty years, was a practicing
physician and surgeon of the city of Olympia at the
time he was placed under arrest for the crimes charged.
He was twenty-three years older than his wife, whose
fidelity to him he doubted. On July 2, 1938, a house
party was held at Mud Bay, near Olympia, in a house
or cabin the rental of which was paid by Berry. The
idea of the house party originated with Dr. and Mrs.
Berry and another married couple. The Fourth of
July was on Monday, and it was the intention of those
who participated in that party to spend the week-end
at the camp and return to Olympia in the afternoon
or evening of Monday, July 4th. In addition to appel-
lant Berry and wife and complaining witness Baker,
three other men and four other women attended the
party.

A few minutes before midnight, July 3rd, appellant
returned to Olympia for a twenty-four hour tour of
duty at St. Peter’s hospital, pursuant to a rule that
required him, as one of those on the hospital staff on
Sundays and holidays, to serve from midnight, July
8rd, to midnight, July 4th. He had an understanding
with his wife that she would return to Olympia Mon-
day morning, July 4th, to prepare breakfast for him,
and he would then return her in his automobile to the
house party at Mud Bay. ,

Mrs. Berry did not return to Olympia and prepare
breakfast for Dr. Berry, who, about noon, July 4th,
went to the camp to ascertain the reason his wife
breached the breakfast agreement. No explanation
satisfactory to him was forthcoming, whereupon the
enraged husband departed from the camp, returned to
his home in Olympia, left a note informing his wife of
his intention to separate from her, and then automo-
biled to Tacoma, where he remained all night.

Dr. Berry returned to Olympia the morning of July
5th. He resumed his efforts, which included whipping
Mrs. Berry July 7, 1938, to compel his wife to explain
her disregard of her promise to return to Olympia July
4th and prepare his breakfast. Berry, who was suspi-
cious that his wife was guilty of infidelity, persisted in
his attempts to wring from her an admission of guilt
and obtain the name of her paramour. She denied
repeatedly until as late as July 20, 1938, any sexual
relations by force or consent. On July 25, 1938, Berry
again brutally whipped his wife and terrorized her into
fabrication of the story that she was raped by Baker
about six a. m., July 4, 1938, in the front seat of Baker’s
automobile.

Early in August, 1938, some discussion was had by
Dr. Berry, Mrs. Berry, and her parents, with the prose-
cuting attorney for Thurston county respecting the
filing of an information charging Irving Baker with
the crime of rape. The prosecuting attorney informed
those present that, while he advised against the sub-
jection of Mrs. Berry and her family to such an ordeal.
if Mrs. Berry would sign a complaint charging Mr.
Baker with the crime of rape, a warrant for the arrest
of Mr. Baker would issue and he would be placed on
trial. Appellant Berry then agreed, on suggestion of
his wife, to a substitute plan, which contemplated a
meeting at which the prosecuting attorney, other of-
ficers, appellant Berry, Mrs. Berry, and Mr. Baker
would be present. Mr. Baker would be confronted by
Mrs. Berry, who would accuse him of having raped.
her, and Baker would be required to depart from
Olympia.

On or about this time, Dr. Berry solicited the assis-
tance of William McAloon, age fifty-five years, a former
law enforcement officer of Grays Harbor county, Robert
Smith, age thirty-three years, a farm hand of Grays

Harbor county, and James Reddick, age twenty-eight
years, a taxicab operator in Olympia, in punishing
Baker. On August 19, 1938, Berry again interviewed
the three men just named and induced them to assist
him in committing the proposed acts, as to the nature
of which he informed each of them.

Prior to August 19th, Berry obtained from the office
of a justice of the peace in Grays Harbor county a
blank warrant for arrest, on the representation that
he intended to play a joke on a recently wedded couple.
On August 19th, he assisted McAloon to redeem a
revolver from a party who held same as security for
payment of an indebtedness. This revolver was used
in commission of the crimes of which appellants were
convicted. By misrepresentation, Berry obtained a set
of license plates which were placed on his automobile
August 19th just prior to the kidnaping and were used
to prevent identification of Berry’s automobile.

Berry brought Smith and McAloon from Grays
Harbor county the evening of August 19th to Olympia,
where Smith was stationed in a position enabling him
to watch the business place of Baker, a retired Coast
Guard officer thirty-seven years old, who was engaged
in the automobile business. Smith was supplied with
an officer’s star, and McAloon was in possession of the
revolver redeemed by Berry. After Berry learned that
Baker had departed from his place of business for his
home, the four appellants drove in Berry’s Buick sedan
to the corner of Seventeenth and Columbia streets, in
Olympia, where Berry got out of his automobile.
About one block distant, on east Eighteenth: street,
Baker resided with his family (his wife, a son twelve
years old, and a daughter six years old), who had
moved from Seattle to Olympia about one month prior
to this date. The post of Berry was where he could
not be observed, but at that point he had a full view

of what his co-conspirators were accomplishing at and
in the Baker hore, and was at a place from which he
could escape if his accomplices failed in their purpose
and were apprehended..

About ten minutes past ten p. m., either McAloon
or Smith knocked at the door of the Baker home. Mrs.
Baker opened the door, turned on the porch light and
called her husband to the door. Smith handed to
Mr. Baker the fictitious “warrant for arrest” prepared
by Berry, charging Baker with raping “Elizabeth
Berry,” and said “I have a warrant for your arrest.”
Smith then grasped Baker by the shoulders and stated
“We are going to take you with us.” McAloon placed
the muzzle of the revolver mentioned above against
Baker’s back and said “I am an officer of the law, you
come with me.”

By aid of the counterfeit warrant and the menacing
revolver, Baker was, against his will, forced from his
home and out of the presence of his wife and two small
children into the night, where in front of his home he
was roughly pushed into the back seat of Berry’s Buick
sedan, which, with motor running and Reddick at the
wheel, was there waiting in readiness for the conspira-
tors to make a quick escape. The automobile was
rapidly driven to the appointed place of meeting with
Berry, who got into the front seat of the automobile
alongside operator Reddick. Immediately, Berry
turned around, leaned over the seat, and struck Baker,
who was held in the back seat by Smith and McAloon,
in the face with his fists. .

The automobile proceeded north to the corner of
Legion way and Capitol way, thence turned to the
right and proceeded east on the new Pacific highway
to a point five miles east of Olympia; thence to the left
off the main highway north about one-fourth of a mile
on an old county road, through a thickly wooded and

uninhabited area; thence to the right a short distance,
up a small incline east on an old abandoned lane thickly
overgrown with brush and thickly wooded on both
sides, to a point where a passerby could not have seen
the conduct of appellants, who bound Baker’s hands
and feet and dragged their victim to a place a few
feet distant from the automobile. From time to time
while on the way to this destination, Berry, Smith,
and McAloon struck the defenseless Baker about the
head and face with a heavy flash light, with the re-
volver, and with their fists, causing their victim to lose
consciousness during a part of the trip.

After Baker was dragged from the automobile,
Berry, by assistance of the rays of a flash light held by
Reddick upon the securely bound and helpless victim,
subjected Baker for more than one hour to brutal
treatment. Not content with repeatedly striking Baker
in the face with his fists, Berry kicked his victim in the
groin and other parts of the body, and mercilessly
whipped Baker on the bare back, using the buckle end
of a belt in accomplishing this particular part of his
program of brutality. Then Berry went to his automo-
bile and obtained a surgeon’s knife and rubber gloves
used by surgeons when performing operations. He
returned to his victim and announced to his accom-
plices his purpose to mutilate and emasculate Baker.
Through forcible intervention of appellant Smith—
doubtless, this act influenced the jury in finding Smith
guilty of a lower degree of assault than the others—
Berry was prevented, in part, from achieving his
avowed purpose. .

Berry cut away the front portion of Baker’s trousers,
exposing the latter’s private parts. Using a pair of
pliers held in one hand, Berry, holding Baker’s testicles
in the other hand, struck them forcibly several times
with the pliers. Berry then employing the same pliers,

tore off Baker’s foreskin. Baker was bound, defense-
less, helpless; yet Smith, desiring to continue in his
role of accomplice to the conclusion of the program,
held Baker upon the ground. McAloon with his pistol
stood guard, acting as a lookout so that none might
prevent the appellants from torturing Baker.

Appellants abruptly discontinued their activity and
burned the fictitious warrant of arrest. Whether they
ceased because they were tired or alarmed, is not dis-
closed. Berry used adhesive tape from his kit to tape
Baker’s eyes and mouth closed. The knots by which
Baker was already bound were strengthened. The
appellants left Baker beaten, bleeding, and semi-
conscious, feet and hands bound, in this out-of-the-way
place to suffer from exposure and lack of medical at-
tention. Baker finally removed his bonds, obtained
aid, and was returned to his family, who immediately
had him removed to a hospital.

During all of the time that he was torturing Baker,
Berry endeavored to force Baker to admit that the
latter raped Berry’s wife; but each time he was asked
to make such an admission, Baker positively denied
that he ever had sexual relations with Mrs. Berry.

About midnight, Berry was arrested in a restaurant
in Olympia. He first denied any knowledge of the
whereabouts of Baker, but later admitted the facts.
About twelve-thirty a. m., Berry was taken by the
officers to locate the scene of the assault, in an effort
to render assistance to the injured man, but Berry mis-
directed the officers and laughingly expressed his glee
at the inability of the officers to find Baker. All of the
appellants were quickly apprehended, and each con-
fessed his part in the crimes of which they were con-
victed, as recited above.

Each appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
first count of the information charging the crime of

kidnaping in the first degree. It is argued that the
words “with intent to extort or obtain money or re-
ward for his release or disposition,” are applicable to
the first as well as to the second method of kidnaping
set out in the statute; therefore, the absence from count
one of any allegation as to the purpose for which the
complaining witness was confined or imprisoned is
fatal.

The information charges that the appellants “did
. . . seize, confine andinveigle . . . Irving Baker,
without authority of law, to be secretly confined and
imprisoned.” ;

At the common law, kidnaping, which was classi-
fied as a misdemeanor, was defined as

“ . the forcible abduction or stealing away of a
man, woman, or child from their own country and
sending them into another.” 4 Blackstone’s Com., 219.

The essence of the crime at the common law was
unlawful detention or imprisonment,—an “aggravated
species of false imprisonment.” 35 C. J. 903, §1; 8 R.
C. L. 296, §319. It is probable that the elements of
ransom or reward were not considered, for the reason
that kidnaping was not perpetrated for financial gain,
but primarily as a matter of expediency.

Most of the states of the United States have, in recent
years, enacted statutes defining kidnaping. Generally,
the common law feature of unlawful imprisonment
has been retained, and there has been added a new pro-
vision relating to ransom or reward, usually stated—
as in our statute—in an alternative form. Both under
the common law and the statutes, the unlawful re-
straint and secret confining appear to be the essence
of the crime, regardless of the purposes of such re- .
straint.

“The dominating element of the offense of kidnaping,
like the statutory felony of assault with intent to

murder, is the intent with which the acts enumerated.
in the statute are done, to wit: ‘With the intent to
cause him to be secretly confined or imprisoned against
his will, or to be sent out of the state against his will,’
and the adverb ‘secretly’ qualifies each of the verbs
‘confined’ and ‘imprisoned,’ clearly indicating a legis-
lative purpose to denounce as a felony any surrepti-
tious restraint of one person by another in such sort
as to deprive the subject of the crime ‘of the friendly
assistance of the law to relieve himself from captivity,’
1 Russ. Cr. 961; Smith v. State, 63 Wis. 453, 23 N. W.
879.” Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 32, 123 So. 231, 68
A. L. R. 712.

The foregoing view is in harmony with the common
Jaw, though based upon a statute similar in form to
the first provision of our kidnaping statute. (Laws of
1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 6, p. 8, §1; Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 2410-1 [P. C. § 8941-1].)

In People v. Hope, 257 N. Y. 147, 177 N. E. 402,
the defendants entered the car of another person and,
at the point of a gun, ordered the owner of the car to
drive from New York to Long Island. The defendants
were captured en route. Section 1250 of the Penal
Law of New York reads as follows:

“‘Kidnaping defined. A person who wilfully: 1.
Seizes, confines, inveigles, or kidnaps another, with
intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be
secretly confined or imprisoned within this state, or to
be sent out of the state, or to be sold as a slave, or in
any way held to service or kept or detained, against
his will; . . . Is guilty of kidnaping.’”

That statute, like our statute, indicates alternative
methods of kidnaping, any one of which constitutes
kidnaping. In the course of its opinion, the court of
appeals of New York said:

“In the case at bar the willful and unlawful seizure
and confinement was established by direct evidence.
The jury has found upon sufficient evidence that such

seizure and confinement was unlawful, willful and
with the intent to secretly confine, imprison and detain
McCarthy against his will, within the State. It has not
found, nor would it have been justified in finding, that
the seizure and detention was with the intent to hold
to serve. Such a finding was not necessary to sustain
a conviction.

“The statute must be given a reasonable construction
in order to promote the efficient enforcement of the
criminal law, to prevent crime and to promote the ends
of justice. The object of the statute and of the com-
mon law on the subject was the same, to secure the
personal liberty of citizens and to secure to them the
assistance of the law necessary to release them from
unlawful restraint. (Smith v. State [63 Wis. 453],
supra; People v. Camp [139 N. Y. 87], supra.)

“The statute defining kidnapping in Minnesota is al-
most identical with section 1250 of the Penal Law. In
the case of State v. Newman (127 Minn. 445) the court
held that the willful and unlawful seizing of a person
with the intent to cause him to be secretly confined
or imprisoned within the State constituted the crime
of kidnapping. We are satisfied that such is the proper
construction of the statute, and that it is unnecessary
to prove an intent ‘to hold to serve’ as contended by
the appellant. It was sufficient to charge and prove
that the defendant willfully and unlawfully seized
McCarthy, against his will, and confined and kidnapped
him with intent to cause him to be secretly confined,
detained or imprisoned within this State. All of those
elements were established to the satisfaction of the
jury. The intent was evidenced by the fact that he was
secretly seized in the night time by the use of a gun
and actually imprisoned, confined and restrained in the
automobile. :

“McCarthy was secretly seized in the night under
circumstances calculated to terrify him. His captors
had guns which they threatened to use to kill him with
if he moved. They forced him to take the rear seat in
the car. They apparently intended to take him in the
car to Long Island as Klemmer was told to drive there.
They had complete control of his person; he was con-

fined and imprisoned in the car. That was not a mere
assault or imprisonment. He was secretly confined
and imprisoned because his captors were concealing
their purpose from the public by compelling Klemmer
and McCarthy to appear to be willing participants in
the automobile ride, when in fact they were compelled
upon the threat of death to act as they did.

“The confinement and detention in the automobile
for a short time, coupled with the intent, brings the
.case within the purview of the statute. (State v. Leuth
[128 Iowa 189], supra.)

“Tt seems clear that under the common understand-
ing of the term ‘kidnapping’ the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged and the facts bring the case with-
in the spirit and intent of the statute.”

In State v. Autheman, 47 Idaho 328, 274 Pac. 805,
62 A. L. R. 195, it was held that one who boards an-
other’s automobile and forces such other to drive him
to such places as he desires, kidnaps such other within
a statute defining kidnaping as the seizure of another
with intent to cause him, without authority of law, to
be held in service, or kept or detained against his will.

In State v. Harmon, 175 Wash. 94, 26 P. (2d) 614,
three masked men forced their way into the home of
a banker and, menacing the banker, his wife, and two
children, with revolvers, compelled that family to
accompany the kidnapers to a house eight miles from
the banker’s home. The wife and children were kept
under guard, while the banker was compelled to return
with his captors to town, where the kidnapers con-
templated robbing a bank. The plan to rob the bank
was abandoned, and the banker and his family were
left at the house eight miles from their home. One of
the miscreants was apprehended three days later and
convicted, under the statute of 1909 (Laws of 1909,
chapter 249, p. 935, § 158; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2410), of
the crime of kidnaping, in that the defendant wilfully
seized, confined or inveigled another with intent to

cause him without authority of law to be secretly con-
fined or imprisoned. We affirmed the judgment.

See, also, Epperson v. State, 211 Ind. 237, 6 N. E. (2d)
538, in which defendants’ conviction of the crime of
kidnaping was sustained. In that case, the accused,
under pretense of being good faith passengers, decoyed
taxicab driver to place where he was forced to drive
on at point of gun, and one of those passengers took
over the wheel and drove taxicab driver to a cornfield,
where he was robbed, bound, and left.

HI True, the common law may be of assistance in
the construction or interpretation of a statute, if such
statute needs to be construed or interpreted. However,
where the offense as defined by the statute is plainly
stated and there is no ambiguity, the court will not
resort to the history of the law or the common law defi-
nitions to determine the intent of the legislature. 35
C. J. 903.

| Our statutes relating to the crime of kidnaping
have never been ambiguous. The old law (Laws of
1909, chapter 249, p. 935, § 158; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2410)
reads as follows:

“Every person who shall willfully—

“(1) Seize, confine or inveigle another with intent
to cause him without authority of law to be secretly
confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service,
or with intent to extort or obtain money or reward for
his return, release, or disposition, or to lead; take, en-
tice away, or detain, a child under the age of sixteen
years with intent to conceal him from his parent, guar-
dian or other person having lawful care or control of
him, or to steal any article upon his person; or

“(2) Abduct, entice, or by force or fraud unlaw-
fully take or carry away another to or from a place
without the state, and shall afterwards send, bring or
keep such person, or cause him to be kept or secreted
within this state;

“Shall be guilty of kidnaping, and punished by im-

prisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than
ten years.”

Throughout the act, the conjunction “or,” the correl-
ative of “either,” is used, which clearly expresses the

- legislative intent that, if any person shall either do the
first act specified or the second or the third, ete., he
shall be guilty of kidnaping. Plainly, it is not essential
that all of the elements enumerated must be present
in any given case to constitute the crime of kidnaping
under this statute. We agree with counsel for the state
that there are five separate elements, any one of which
constitutes the crime:

First degree kidnaping— (1) Unlawful imprison-
ment, (2) holding to service, and (3) holding for
money or reward. Second degree kidnaping—(4) En-
ticing and concealing a child, and (5) removing from
the state and thereafter secreting him within the state.
That is, under the 1909 statute, doing either one or an-
other of three acts (in addition to kidnaping a child)
brought the author within the kidnaping statute.

Laws of 1909, chapter 249, p. 935, § 158; Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 2410:

(1) Every person who shall wilfully seize, confine
or inveigle another with intent to cause him without
authority of law to be secretly confined or imprisoned,

(2) Or in any way held to service,

(3) Or with intent to extort money or reward for
his return, etc.

Surely, under that statute, the acts of appellants con-
stituted kidnaping. The change in the amendatory
statute is slight, in wording, the effect being to create
two ways in place of three by which kidnaping can be
accomplished, and to increase the penalty. It would not
be a reasonable deduction that the legislature intended
to weaken the kidnaping statute. It would hardly be
contended that, under the 1909 statute, reward or ran-

som was a necessary element of the crime. State v.
Harmon, 175 Wash. 94, 26 P. (2d) 614.

That the methods are alternative, is clear. The last
provision does not qualify the other two preceding pro-
visions. The 1933 statute is identical down to and in-
eluding the word “imprisoned,” following which are
the words, “or in any way held to service with the
intent to extort or obtain money or reward for his
release or disposition.”

That portion of the amendatory statute pertinent to
the question before us reads as follows:

“Every person who shall wilfully,

“(1) Seize, confine or inveigle another with intent
to cause him without authority of law to be secretly
confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service -
with the intent to extort or obtain money or reward
for his release or disposition, shall be guilty of kid-
naping in the first degree, . . .” Laws of 1933, Ex.
Ses., chapter 6, p. 8, §1; Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 2410-1. (Italics ours.)

To interpret the statute in harmony with the conten-
tion of the appellants, would require a change in the
grammatical construction of the two provisions of the
statute. As the statute is written, there is nothing to
indicate that the ransom or reward portion is referable
to the first provision (unlawful confinement or impris-
onment) of the statute. No comma appears after the
word “service.” If a comma were at that point, the
* position of appellants would be more tenable than the
words “with intent to extort or obtain money or re-
ward” were referable to both of the preceding provi-
sions. It will be observed that there is no break in the
continuity of the second provision, which is complete
in itself, as is the first provision. See State v. Wall,
189 La. 653, 180 So. 476; State v. Tiffany, 44 Wash. 602,
87 Pac. 932.

According to the argument of appellants, to “seize,

confine or inveigle another with intent to cause him
without authority of law to be secretly confined or im-
prisoned,” within this state without “intent to extort
or obtain money or reward for his release or disposi-
tion,” would not constitute the offense of kidnaping;
while it is second degree kidnaping to unlawfully take
another “to or from a place without the state,” and
afterward “keep such person, or cause him to be kept
or secreted within the state without the intent to ex-
tort or obtain money or reward for his release or dis-
position, . . .” Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 6,
§ 1, subd. (2). Such construction of the statute would
be contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legis-
_ lature to strengthen, not weaken, the kidnaping statute.

In State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P. (2d) 553, ap-
pellant contended that the language “to extort or ob-
tain money or reward” related to both methods in
which the crime of first degree kidnaping may be com-
mitted. The state’s position in that case was the same
as the position of the state in the case at bar. We
refused to determine which was the correct view of the
statute (Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 6; Rem. Rev.
Stat. (Sup.), § 2410-1). We held, however, that a “re-
ward” need not be a thing of pecuniary value. In af-
firming the conviction of the defendant, a fugitive from
justice who forced a cab driver to drive an automobile
in an attempted escape, of the crimé of kidnaping in
the first degree, we stressed the necessity of giving the
statute a reasonable construction in order to promote
the efficient enforcement of the law and, in the course
of our opinion in that case, said:

“From this statute, it will be noticed that the crime
of kidnaping in the first degree may be committed
either by seizing, confining, or inveigling another with
intent to cause him without authority of law to be
‘secretly confined or imprisoned,’ or with seizing, con-

fining, or inveigling another to be ‘held to service.’ Fol-
lowing this is the statement, with intent to extort or
obtain ‘money or reward’ for the release or disposition
of the subject of the kidnaping. The appellant con-
strues the statute as meaning that the language, to
extort or obtain ‘money or reward,’ relates to both
methods in which the crime may be committed. The
state says that the correct construction is that the words
‘money or reward’ do not relate to the first method of
committing the crime, that of secretly confining or
imprisoning the victim, but only refer to the second
method, or that of being ‘held to service.’

“It will not be necessary here to determine whether
the appellant or the state has the correct view of the
statute. Without so deciding, it will be assumed that
the construction contended for by the appellant is the
correct one. The question, then, is reduced to whether
Jones’ forced driving of the appellant was such a bene-
fit to the latter as comes within the meaning of the
word ‘reward.’ Jones was confined in the automobile
by the acts of the appellant, within the meaning of the
statute. People v. Hope, 257 N. Y. 147, 177 N. E. 402;
Doss v. State, 220 Ala. 30, 123 So. 231, 68 A. L. R. 712.

“The legislature, by using after the word ‘money’ the
words ‘or reward,’ undoubtedly intended that the word
‘reward’ was not used to mean the same thing as money
or a thing in itself of pecuniary value. The statute
should be given a reasonable construction in order to
aid in the efficient enforcement of the law and promote
the ends of justice. . .

“In Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 80 L. Ed.
522, 56 S. Ct. 395, an officer was unlawfully ‘seized and
carried out of the state to prevent his making an arrest.
The Federal kidnaping act, as amended, used the words
‘ransom or reward or otherwise.’ The word ‘other-
wise’ had not been in the act amended. Speaking with
reference to the words ‘for ransom or reward,’ it was
said:

“The original Act (1932) required that the trans-
ported person should be held “for ransom or reward.”
It did not undertake to define the words and nothing
indicates an intent to limit their meaning to benefits

De

of pecuniary value. Generally, reward implies some-
thing given in return for good or evil done or received.’

“Later in the opinion, it was said:

“ Folding an officer to prevent the captor’s arrest is
something done with the expectation of benefit to the
transgressor. So also is kidnaping with purpose to se-
cure money. These benefits, while not the same, are
similar in their general nature and the desire to secure
either of them may lead to kidnaping. If the word
reward, as commonly understood, is not itself broad
enough to include benefits expected to follow the pre-
vention of an arrest, they fall within the broad term,
“otherwise.” ’

“Tt is true that, in the concluding sentence, the court
says that, if the word ‘reward,’ as correctly understood,
is not broad enough to include benefits expected to
follow the prevention of an arrest, they fall within
the broad term ‘otherwise.’ Notwithstanding this last
statement, the argument in the opinion is to the effect
that the word ‘reward’ is broad enough to include
within its meaning a benefit that will accrue to the
transgressor by kidnaping an officer of the law to pre-
vent him from making an arrest. If a benefit of that
kind is included within the word ‘reward,’ it neces-
sarily follows that the benefit which the appellant in
this case would receive by forcing Jones to assist him
in his flight as a fugitive from justice would likewise
be within the meaning of that term.”

When the state showed that the victim was forcibly
and without authority of law removed from his home
and transported to another place, wilfully and secretly
confined and imprisoned, the crime of first degree kid-
naping under our statute was established.

If we assume, as appellants insist, that the
“reward” portion is referable to the first provision of
the statute—that is, that a “reward” must be involved
to constitute kidnaping—evidence concerning mutila-
tion was received without objection and exhibited the
reason for the kidnaping; which in a legal sense, under
our holding in State v. Andre, supra, involved a re-

ward incidentally thereto. In the case cited, we said
that the word “reward” was not used to mean the
same thing as money or a thing in itself of pecuniary
value.

While appellants were not charged with holding the

. Victim to service for “reward,” if, as appellants insist,
the “reward” clause applies to the first provision of
the kidnaping statute, and a reward was in fact shown
without objection on the part of appellants, the judg-
ment may not be reversed—the rights of the appellants
were not prejudiced—upon the theory that a reward
was not alleged.

A criminal kidnaps an officer—or a taxicab operator,
as in the case of State v. Andre, supra,—to avoid arrest.
The reason for avoiding arrest is to escape the mental
and physical punishment of confinement in a prison.
The reward is escape from the mental agony and physi-
cal restrictions of the prison, an emotional as well as a
physical satisfaction. The processes of the body are
not more real than the processes of the mind. The
satisfaction of a mental or emotional condition may be
as great—probably greater under some conditions—as
a financial or physical satisfaction. It would probably
be embraced within the meaning of the word “reward.”

Assuming that Dr. Berry believed that his wife had
been raped—such belief would be, of course, immate-
rial and would not be a defense of-the crimes he com-
mitted—his reaction would be a desire for revenge.
To satisfy that alleged emotional upheaval, Berry tor-
tured the man presumed to have violated Berry’s wife.
His reward was the satisfaction of his desire for re-
venge. No logical distinction can be made between
the satisfaction of a desire to execute vengeance, and
the mental satisfaction of escape from fear of arrest.

‘To some extent, the same thing is true of McAloon,
Reddick and Smith. Those three members of the tor-

ture group did not possess personal knowledge as to
the guilt or innocence of the prosecuting witness, but
they believed Berry’s story. By reason of their friend-
ship for Berry, they accepted the vicarious duty of
assisting Berry in satisfying his desire for revenge,
as if each of the three had himself suffered the injury.
Their reward lay in the fact of an accomplished ven-
geance on behalf of a friend and the presumably
strengthened bonds of friendship. “Rewards” of this
character are in principle no different than the reward
of escape from the fear of prison or the reward of the
physical satisfaction of sadistic desires.

We cannot agreé with the argument on behalf of
appellants to the effect that, no matter what felonious
purpose the criminal may have in mind, the crime of
kidnaping is absent unless he is seeking a ransom. The -
essence of the crime of kidnaping is the unlawful secret
imprisonment; and what was the motive of Berry and
his three friends in commission of the crime, is com-
paratively unimportant.

An excellent discussion, by a member of the edi-
torial board of the University of Washington Law
School, of our kidnaping statute is published in Vol.
XIV, No. 1, pp. 56-57, of the Washington Law Review
and State Bar Journal. A particularly pertinent para-
graph of that article reads as follows:

“In construing the statute it must be kept in mind
that, before its enactment, confinement within the state
was sufficient to constitute the offense; that the statute
was designed to broaden the application of the existing
laws, and that, if the ransom clause were appended to
both methods of committing the crime, the confinement
within the state would not constitute kidnaping unless
the intent to obtain money or reward were present. It
is difficult to believe that such an interpretation would
be reasonable under the circumstances, for the opera-
tion of the law would be restricted to those cases in
which the transgressor had the intent to obtain money

or reward. It is submitted, therefore, that the reward
clause applies to the second method of committing the
offense, viz., holding to service, and that secret con-
finement within the state is sufficient to constitute the
first method of committing the offense.”

Hl To sustain his claimed defense of entrapment,
Berry offered to prove that he tried, without success,
to persuade the prosecuting attorney to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the complaining witness; that the
prosecuting attorney and other officers advised him to
obtain assistance and to take the “complaining witness
out and beat him up;” that the chief of the highway
patrol, to whom Berry exhibited the fictitious warrant,
later used by appellants, advised that, “when he took
the complaining witness out, he should burn the war-
rant and emasculate him;” that, on the assurance that,
if prosecuted at all, he would be prosecuted only for
the crime of assault in the third degree, he, with the
assistance of his three friends, committed the offenses
of which he was convicted. The rejection of that offer
is assigned as error.

Even if Berry had testified in harmony with his offer
of proof, and if we concede the truth of the statements,
the alleged facts do not bring Berry within the entrap-
ment rule for two reasons. First, no offer was made
indicating that any officer of the law originated the
idea of kidnaping or the idea of first degree assault,
the crimes which appellant was charged with commit-
ting. While not pertinent to this inquiry, the testi-
mony of Berry that, as early as July 7th, he started
out with a gun to kill Baker, is interesting, as it tends
to prove that the idea of violence in some form had
its origin in the mind of Berry. Another reason why
the facts alleged do not bring appellant within the en-
trapment rule is that the basic idea of the doctrine is
that the acts done by officers of the law to induce its

violation must be done for the purpose of arrest and
the prosecution of the violator. As stated in Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 77 L. Ed. 413, 53 S. Ct.
210, 86 A. L. R. 249,

“A different question is presented when the criminal
design originates with the officials of the Government,
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce -
its commission in order that they may prosecute.”

There is no offer to prove that the officers made the
suggestions credited to them for the purpose of prose-
cuting Berry. If they were made at all but were not
made for that purpose, such officials would merely be
accessories before the fact, and, so far as appellant is
concerned, the participation of those officials as acces-
sories would not be a defense. The rule on entrap-
ment is stated as follows in 15 Am. Jur., 25, § 336:

“As a general rule, if the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused
is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him therefor, no conviction may be
had, though the criminality of the act is not affected
by any question of consent. In some jurisdictions,
however, initiative on the part of the perpetrator of
an act is not essential to charge him with criminal
responsibility. A person who commits a crime at the
suggestion or instigation of another is just as guilty
as if the design had originated with him, and it is not
material in this respect that the suggestion was made
by a police officer.”

See, also, 1 Wharton’s Crim. Law (12th ed.), 599,
§ 406; 18 A. L. R. 146; 66 A. L. R. 478; 86 A. L. R. 263.

The proof offered by Dr. Berry would not constitute
a defense to him either as entrapment or as instigation,
inducement, or solicitation; and the officers in question,
if we concede the truth of the allegations that the of-
ficers made the statements ascribed to them, would

merely have been, under the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 2260 [P. C. § 8695]; Laws of 1909, chapter 249, p. 892,
§ 8) reading as follows, principals along with Berry:

“Every person concerned in the commission of a
felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, whether
he directly commits the act constituting the offense,
or aids or abets in its commission, and whether present
or absent; and every person who directly or indirectly
counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or
otherwise procures another to commit a felony, gross
misdemeanor or misdemeanor, is a principal, and shall
be proceeded against and punished as such. The fact
that the person aided, abetted, counseled, encouraged,
hired, commanded, induced or procured, could not or
did not entertain a criminal intent, shall not be a de-
fense to any person aiding, abetting, counseling, en-
fouraging, hiring, commanding, inducing or procuring

‘im.

HM The court charged the jury that the essential
elements of the crime of kidnaping, all of which the
state was required to prove to the satisfaction of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, were that, on August
19, 1938,

“ . . the defendants did wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously seize, confine and/or inveigle Irving Baker,
by force and threats with intent to cause the said Irving
Baker without authority of law to be secretly confined
or imprisoned, or to be held to'service with intent to
extort a reward for the release or disposition of the
said Irving Baker.”

The court further instructed the jury that kidnaping
may be committed in either of two ways: First, by
causing a person to be seized and confined or impris-
oned, without authority of law; second, by causing him
to be seized without authority of law to be held to
service with intent to extort money or reward for
his release,

In view of what we said above respecting the crea-

tion, by 1933 amendment of the 1909 statute, of two
methods, in lieu of three, by which kidnaping may be
accomplished, and our discussion of State v. Andre,
195 Wash. 221, 80 P. (2d) 553, which sustains our
holding that “reward” need not be a thing of pecuniary
value but may include the satisfaction of a mental or
emotional condition, we see no substantial merit in
the argument of the appellants that the instructions
are prejudicially erroneous, as there is not present in
the information any mention of reward or money, nor
does the information charge that appellants held Baker
to service with intent to extort a reward for his release.

The instructions of which appellants complain may
not be made a basis for reversal of the judgment. The
instructions are in no sense prejudicial to appellants.
They are favorable to appellants and unfavorable to
the state, in that the jury could easily have gained the
idea that the state must prove the act to have been
committed for ransom or reward, in order to hold ap-
pellants liable for the crime of kidnaping.

“A defendant can not complain of errors which are
favorable to himself i

“Applying the rule heretofore stated, defendant
cannot complain of error in instructions if the error
operates in his favor. A familiar application of this
principle occurs when the instructions given impose
on the state a greater burden than the law requires
for the purpose of sustaining a conviction, as where
the instructions impose on the state a too high degree
of proof, or require the jury to find the existence of
elements which are not essential ingredients of the
offense.” 17 C. J. 358, § 3723, 17 C. J. 359-360, § 3729.

The same reasoning is applicable to the four instruc-
tions (7, 9, 12 and 24) of which appellants complain.

HI Counsel for appellants challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain the charge of assault in the
first degree, insisting that the only felony that appel-

Jants- could have intended to commit upon the person
of the complaining witness, under the facts and cir-
‘cumstances of the case, was that of maiming him; and
that there is no proof that the complaining witness
‘was maimed, no evidence being presented even tend-
ing to show that the physical vigor of the complaining
witness was seriously diminished or that his person
was seriously disfigured by appellants’ assault upon
him.

“Every person who, with intent to kill a human
being, or to commit a felony upon the person or prop-
erty of the one assaulted, or .

“(1) Shall assault another with a firearm or any
deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to
produce death . .

. shall be guilty of assault in the first de-
gree, - . .” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2413 [P. C. § 8758].

The appellants entered into a conspiracy to commit
two felonies, in the commission of which each con-
spirator is chargeable with the act of each member
‘of the conspiracy. The stated purpose of Berry was
to emasculate, as well as to otherwise maltreat, the
prosecuting witness. His intention, it is clear, was
to kill Baker following that operation. We may dis-
regard all intentions of Berry other than his intention
to maim Baker, which offense is a felony and was com-
mitted by Berry with the pliers as recited above. So
far as the law is concerned, each of the appellant co-
conspirators inflicted the wounds on Baker and enter-
tained the same intent as Dr. Berry, who committed,
as he announced he intended to commit, a felony
(mayhem) on the person of Baker. Mayhem is de-
fined as follows:

“Every person who, with intent to commit a felony,

or to injure, disfigure or disable another, shall willfully
inflict upon him an injury which—

“(1) Seriously disfigures his person by any muti-
lation thereof; or

“(2) Destroys or displaces any member or organ
of his body; or

“(3) Seriously diminishes his physical vigor by the
injury of any member or organ;

“Shall be guilty of maiming and be punished by im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than
ten years, and the willful infliction of the injury shall
be prima facie evidence of the intent.” Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 2407 [P. C. § 8992]. (Italics ours.)

“To constitute maiming it is immaterial by what
means or instrument or in what manner the injury
was inflicted.” Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2408 [P. C. § 8993].

Hs The argument for reversal on the first-degree
assault conviction is not sound. The complaining wit-
ness was permanently injured; however, his recovery
from the injuries inflicted by appellants does not oper-
ate to save the offenders from conviction of assault in
the first degree in view of § 157 of the 1909 “Maiming”
statute, p. 934, which reads as follows:

“Whenever upon a trial for maiming another person
it shall appear that the injury inflicted will not result
in any permanent disfiguration of appearance, diminu-
tion of vigor, or other permanent injury, no conviction
for maiming shall be had, but the defendant may be
convicted of assault in any degree.” Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 2409 [P. C. § 8994].

Our investigation does not disclose that the other
questions raised by appellants are of substantial merit.

The judgment is affirmed as to each appellant.

Buaxg, C. J., Suvpson, and Jzrrers, JJ., concur.

Beats, J. (concurring)—That portion of § 1, chapter
6, Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., p. 8 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 2410-1), defining the crime of kidnaping in the first
degree, is grammatically correct, and is not ambiguous.
It does not require the addition of a comma after the

words “or in any way held to service,” in order to make
the language conform to the rules of grammar, or to
remove any ambiguity in the language used. The addi-
tion of a comma at the place indicated would change
the meaning of the statute, and, in view of the severity
of the sentence which the law provides shall follow a
conviction of the crime of kidnaping in the first degree,
establish what it is argued would be a more reasonable
statute.

The historic crime of kidnaping as established under
the old Jaws of England had little or nothing to do with
the desire to obtain money or reward for the release
of the person kidnaped. The acts which constitute this
crime were clearly stated in the former law of this
state (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2410), quoted in the majority
opinion.

The crime stated in the first clause of the section last
referred to is an heinous one, and one that may be per-
petrated in connection with the exercise of the greatest
cruelty, and is a crime deserving of condign punish-
ment. If the court should construe the act of 1933 in
accordance with the contention of appellants, the forci-
ble sequestration within this state of a person over
sixteen years of age, possibly for a long time, and under
circumstances of great cruelty, would not constitute
the crime of kidnaping, and it is possible that such a
dastardly act might constitute no crime at all, or a mis-
demeanor merely.

The second clause of section 1 of the act of 1933, p. 9,
establishes the crime of kidnaping in the second de-
gree, and includes therein the unlawful taking by force
or fraud of a person to or from a place without the
state, and the bringing, keeping, or secreting of such
person within the state, without the intent to extort or
obtain money or reward for his release or disposition.

To me it is inconceivable that the legislature, while

making such acts as those last mentioned an offense
for which a severe penalty shall be imposed, intended
to depart from the ancient rule and permit one, with
impunity, to kidnap and confine within this state a per-
son residing therein.

While it is true that acts can be imagined which
might constitute, under the statute, kidnaping in the

* first degree, which acts might not apparently deserve
the severe penalty provided by the statute for convic-
tion of that crime, that, in my opinion, is a legislative
problem with which the courts are little concerned. In
construing criminal statutes, it is the duty of the courts
to so construe them, if possible, as not to allow acts
which are manifestly most serious crimes against so-
ciety to go unpunished.

Under the act of 1909, the seizing, confining, or in-
veigling of a person, with intent to cause him, without
authority of law, to be in any way held to service, was
made kidnaping, as was the same act, committed with
intent to extort or obtain money or reward for the per-
son’s return, release or disposition. Each was a manner
in which the crime might be committed. By the stat>
ute of 1933, these two different methods of committing
the crime of kidnaping were combined, and while it
may be argued that a better law than the 1933 act
might be enacted, that fact alone does not make the
statute bad or require that words and language which
are unambiguous be construed otherwise than in ac-
cordance with their plain meaning.

I am convinced that it should not be held that the
words “with intent to extort or obtain money or re-
sward for his release or disposition,” as contained in § 1
of the act’ now in ‘force, are a part of the first portion
of the section ending with the word “imprisoned.” In
my opinion, they are a part of the second phase of the
crime, defined as holding to service.

I concur in the opinion of the majority holding that
the record before us supports the conviction of appel-
lants of the crime of kidnaping in the first degree, as
defined by the statute now in force.

I cannot agree with the majority in holding that an
emotional reaction or satisfaction may constitute a re-
ward, within the meaning of the statute. The case of
State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P. (2d) 553, referred
to in the majority opinion, was correctly decided, as the
defendant procured, by kidnaping the prosecuting wit-
ness, a direct financial reward, the absolute equivalent
of money, namely, transportation in a taxicab from the
place where the defendant was to the place to which
he desired to go. In my opinion, the opportunity to
inflict torture upon the prosecuting witness in the case
at bar, and the satisfaction which appellants may have
derived from the infliction of such torture, does not
constitute a reward, within the meaning of the statute.

Iam in accord with the majority opinion in holding
that appellants Berry, McAloon, and Reddick were
properly convicted of the crime of assault in the first
degree, and appellant Smith of the crime of assault
in the second degree.

With the exception noted, I concur in the majority
opinion.

Sremert, J. (dissenting in part)—I am unable to
concur with the majority in holding that the informa-
tion was sufficient to charge appellants with the crime
of kidnaping in the first degree, within the meaning of
Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 2410-1. I am of the opinion
that the phrase “with the intent to extort or obtain
money or reward for his release or disposition” modi-
fies all the preceding language of the section and not,
as the majority holds, merely the clause “or in any way
held to service”; further, I believe that, when the legis-

lature adopted the kidnaping act of 1933, it did so with
the avowed purpose of making an entire revision of
the former law upon the subject by classifying the
crime of kidnaping into degrees, dependent upon the
presence or absence of intent to extort a ransom for the
release of the victim, and fixing different penalties
therefor.

A comparison between the former law and the pres-
ent law is of interest.

The act of 1909, Laws of 1909, chapter 249, p. 935,
§ 158, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2410, reads as follows:

“Every person who shall willfully—

“(1) Seize, confine or inveigle another with intent
to cause him without authority of law to be secretly
confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service,
or with intent to extort or obtain money or reward for
his return, release, or disposition, or to lead, take, en-
tice away, or detain, a child under the age of sixteen
years with intent to conceal him from his parent, guar-
dian or other person having lawful care or control of
him, or to steal any article upon his person; or

“(2) Abduct, entice, or by force or fraud unlawfully
take or carry away another to or from a place without
the state, and shall afterwards send, bring or keep such
person, or cause him,to be kept or secreted within this
state;

“Shall be guilty of kidnaping, and punished by im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than
ten years.”

The act of 1933, Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 6,
p. 8 (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 2410-1), is entitled:

“An Act relating to the crime of kidnaping and the
punishment therefor, and repealing section 158, chap-
ter 249, Session Laws, 1909 (section 2410, Remington’s
Revised Statutes of Washington), and declaring that
this act shall take effect immediately.” (Italics mine.)

Section 1 of the act, p. 8, provides:

“Every person who shall wilfully,

“(1) Seize, confine or inveigle another with intent
to cause him without authority of law to be secretly
confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service
with the intent to extort or obtain money or reward for
his release or disposition, shall be guilty of kidnaping
in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment in the state pen-
itentiary for life as the jury shall determine; and in
every trial for kidnaping in the first degree, the jury
shall, if it find the defendant guilty, also find a special
verdict as to whether or not the death penalty shall be
inflicted; and if such special verdict is in the affirma-
tive, the penalty shall be death, otherwise, it shall be
as herein provided. All executions in accordance here-
with shall take place at the state penitentiary under the
direction of and pursuant to arrangements made by the
superintendent thereof: Provided, the time when such
execution shall take place shall be set by the trial judge
at the time of imposing sentence and as a part thereof.

“(2) Lead, take, entice away or detain a child under
the age of sixteen years with intent to conceal him
from his parent, parents, guardian or other lawful per-
son having care, custody or control over him, or with
intent to steal any article from his person, but without
the intent to extort or obtain money or reward for his
return, or shall abduct, entice, or by force or fraud un-
lawfully take or carry away another to or from a place
without the state, and shall afterwards send, bring or
keep such person, or cause him to be kept or secreted
within the state without the intent to extort or obtain
money or reward for his release or disposition, shall be
guilty of kidnaping in the second degree and shall be
punished as in the case of a felony . . .” (Italics
mine.)

The act of 1909 defined four types of unlawful con-
duct as constituting kidnaping, only one of which con-
templated extortion as an essential element. All four,
however, were of equal gravity in the eyes of the law,

and the penalty for each was the same, imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years.

The sensational abduction of the Lindbergh baby on
March 1, 1932, and the wave of similar crimes follow-
ing in its wake, the motives of which were the extor-
tion of ransom, prompted the Federal government and
many of the states to revise their criminal statutes in
an effort to prevent the recurrence of atrocities involv-
ing the lives and health of innocent persons.

It seems plain to me that the intention of the legis-
lature, in enacting the 1933 law, was to divide the crime
of kidnaping into two degrees: (1) where the offense
was committed with intent to extort a ransom, for
which the penalty was life imprisonment or death, and
(2) where the offense was committed without such in-
tent, in which event the penalty was that ordinarily
‘fixed for a felony. The reasons for such classification
are, of course, obvious. The legislature recognized that
ransom was the usual motive, without which the crime
would seldom be committed; and, further, that, in such
instances, if the ransom was not forthcoming, the vic-
tim in the hands of the criminal would likely be killed
or suffered to die from want of care, as experience had
amply shown.

Such an interpretation appears to follow both from
the manner in which the statute was enacted and from
its content. If our present law is to be given the inter-
pretation placed upon it by the majority opinion here-
in, then it was wholly unnecessary for our legislature
to do more than to increase the penalty for violation of
the 1909 law from a minimum term of ten years, to life
imprisonment or death. The former law covered every
other angle and phase of the present law.

The legislature, however, did not amend the 1909
Jaw, as the majority intimates; it expressly repealed

it, so that none of its provisions thereafter remained in
force. Having abrogated the old law, the legislature
enacted an entirely new one.

An analysis of the language and arrangement of the
1933 act confirms me in the view that I have taken.
The interpretation of the majority renders the present
law illogical and unreasonable in several particulars.

According to the majority view, it is a crime to seize,
confine, or inveigle another with intent to cause him to
be secretly confined or imprisoned, but it is not a crime
to seize, confine, or inveigle another with intent to
“hold him to service” unless there be an intent to ex-
tort or obtain money or reward for his release or dis-
position. Could the legislature possibly have meant
that subjecting one to service, after he had been seized,
confined, or inveigled, was a lesser offense than merely
seizing, confining or inveigling him without such sub-
jection to service? I do not think so, for, obviously, to
hold one to service is to add to the flagrancy of the
wrong.

According to the interpretation of the majority, it is
kidnaping in the first degree, punishable by life im-
prisonment or death, if an adult or a person over six-
teen years of age be seized, confined, or inveigled for
the purpose of secret confinement or imprisonment,
while if the same act be perpetrated upon a child under
the age of sixteen years, it is only kidnaping in the sec-
ond degree, punishable as a felony, unless it be done
with intent to extort money for his return. Did the
legislature contemplate that result? I do not think so,
for the reason that the necessity of preventing abduc-
tion is greater, if anything, in the case of helpless chil-
dren than in the case of adults; moreover, the law was
enacted to arrest a crime wave which had involved
principally the kidnaping of infants.

According to the interpretation of the majority, if a

person be seized, confined, or inveigled, and held in
confinement or imprisonment within this state, it is
kidnaping in the first degree; but if the person be taken
beyond the jurisdiction of this state, and subsequently
returned and kept or secreted within the state, it is only
kidnaping in the second degree, unless it be done with
intent to extort or obtain money for his release or dis-
position. Did the legislature mean that it was a less
offense to transport the victim beyond the state line
and then return him, than it was to retain him continu-
ously within the state? I do not think so, for taking a
person without the state makes the capture of the crimi-
nal more difficult and exposes the captive to greater
hazards.

The interpretation of the majority is illogical for
another reason. As the statute is now made to read,
the crime of kidnaping in the second degree includes
within it all the elements of kidnaping in the first de-
gree. In other words, the graver crime is the lesser
offense.

The effect of the prevailing opinion, in my judgment,
exceeds all rational purposes of the act. Two illustra-
tions will suffice, though many more could be sug-
gested.

Suppose that a merchant discovers that a rock has
been thrown through his store window. He sees a boy
in the vicinity who, he thinks, is the miscreant. He
takes the boy into custody and, without authority of
law, confines him in the basement of his store, not for
the purpose of compelling the boy to pay for the darn-
age done, nor with the intent of obtaining money for
the boy’s release, but simply to satisfy his own resent-
ment. As the statute is now construed by the majority,
the merchant is guilty of kidnaping in the first degree,
subject to life imprisonment or hanging.

Again, suppose that a man invites another to his
office, or to his home, and during the course of some
dispute, or through sheer malice, turns the key in the
lock and refuses to let his visitor depart or to commu-
nicate with relatives or friends. No demand for ran-
som is made or intended, yet, according to the major-
ity opinion, such person is guilty of kidnaping in the
first degree and may be imprisoned for life or hung.

True, indeed, a prosecuting attorney may hesitate
to file an information in either of the illustrative cases,
but what about the victim who proffers the complaint?
Is he to be told that, although he has been kidnaped
within the meaning of the graver provision of the
statute, the penalty is too great to be imposed under
such circumstances or that it is the province of the
prosecutor to determine whether a criminal shall stand
trial for a crime the elements of which he is charged
with committing?

I will concede that, under my interpretation of the
statute, one might seize, confine, or inveigle another
and cause him to be secretly confined without being
guilty of the crime of kidnaping at all. But the answer
to that is threefold. (1) If such should be the case,
it is the fault of the statute; (2) aside from the cases
mentioned in subd. 2 in the 1933 statute, there would
rarely be a case of kidnaping without intent to ex-
tort money or reward; and (3) if there were such a
case, it would, in practically every instance, be at-
tended with an act of maiming (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2407
[P. C. § 8992]), assault (Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 2413 to
2415 [P. C. §§ 8758 to 8760]), or coercion (Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 2614 [P. C. § 8827]), and punishable under the
statutes just cited. In the case at bar, appellants would
not be immune to punishment, for their acts involved
(1) conspiracy (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2382 [P. C. § 8783]),
(2) unlawful assembly (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2550 [P. C.

§ 9080]), (3) burglary (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2578 [P. C.
§8771]), (4) personation of an officer (Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 2616 [P. C. § 8868]), (5) false arrest (Rem.
Rev. Stat., § 2611 [P. C. § 8824]), (6) coercion (Rem.
Rev. Stat., § 2614), (7) assault (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§§ 2413 to 2415), and (8) maiming (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 2407).

To say the least, the statute in its present form is

ambiguous as to whether or not intent to extort money
or reward is a necessary element of the crime of kid-
naping in the first degree. If there be an ambiguity,
then, under every rule of criminal procedure, that
interpretation must be adopted which is the more
favorable to the accused.
" There is yet another phase of the majority opinion
with which I do not agree. The opinion holds that the
desire for revenge or the satisfaction of any emotional
upheaval constitutes a reward within the meaning of
the statute. If that be the legal definition of “reward”
as applied to the statute, then any emotion capable of
satisfaction, or sought to be satisfied, is sufficient. It
may be vengeance, hatred, anger, malevolence, dislike,
contempt, disapprobation, even curiosity as to how the
victim will react under the circumstances, or it may be
the prompting of mere mischief. In short, it is any-
thing from which the perpetrator may gain any kind
of momentary emotional satisfaction.

However, what the majority seems to have over-
looked is the very statute on which it relies, for by the
terms of the act the “reward” must be for the “release
or disposition” of the victim, not for some abstract, va-
grant, or even malicious emotion experienced or in-
dulged by the malefactor. In my opinion, this is a
strained construction which even the civil law would
not countenanee, much less the criminal law of this
state. .

I think that the judgment should be reversed on
count one of the information and affirmed on count
two.

Geracuty, Main, and Rosrnson, JJ., concur with
Srerert, J.

[No. 27545. Department Two. September 25, 1939.]

Cuartes Carson, Appellant, v. Tas DEPARTMENT OF
Lazor anp Inpustries, Respondent.

W. H. Sibbald, for appellant.

The Attorney General and J. A. Kavaney, Assistant,
for respondent.

Geracuty, J—This appeal is from a judgment of
the superior court sustaining the decision of the joint
board of the department of labor and industries ap-
proving the action of the supervisor of the department

*Reported in 94 P, (2d) 191.

in refusing to reopen a claim for payment of additional
compensation on account of aggravation.

Claimant, on December 27, 1932, was struck in the
lower abdomen by a piece of timber which “kicked
back” from the saw he was operating. He was thrown
to the floor from a platform on which he was standing,
and sustained the injuries for which he claimed com-
pensation. March 6, 1933, the department made an
order closing the claim, with payment of time lost to
March Ist.

The claimant did not appeal from this order, but,
December 2, 1933, filed an application for the reopening
of his claim, alleging that, subsequent to its final clos-
ing, there had developed a deep pain in the lower left
portion of his abdomen and extending into his hip,
back, and down the left leg. Upon the filing of this
application, the department caused the claimant to be
examined by its medical examiner, who reported that
he was unable to find any evidence of aggravation sub-
sequent to the former examination of March 1, 1933,
and expressed the opinion that, were it not for the
preexisting osteo-arthritis and focal infection, time lost
would not have been over four weeks, and there would
be no permanent partial disability. Upon this report,
the supervisor denied the application for the reopening
of the claim.

A rehearing before the joint board was granted on
the claimant’s petition. Preceding the rehearing, the
department caused him to be examined by a commis-
sion of three doctors, who confirmed the prior report
of the medical examiner to the effect that the claim-
ant’s condition was not due to the injury he had sus-
tained, but, rather, to “hypertrophic arthritis and
other foci of infection.” Upon this report and other
evidence offered at the hearing, the joint board, Octo-
ber 15, 1934, made an order finding:

“After careful review and consideration of the entire
records, facts and testimony in the matter, the joint
board concludes that the claimant had proven no ob-
jective or definite aggravation of disability. That med-
ical examination and testimony proves conclusively
that the claimant has suffered no aggravation of dis-
ability due to the injury; the joint board concludes
that aggravation, if any, is due not to the claimant’s
injury but to a pre-existing disease for: which the de-
partment is not responsible. That therefore the super-
visor’s refusal to reopen the claim on the grounds of
aggravation of disability was correct and is hereby
sustained.”

Upon claimant’s appeal from the ruling of the joint
board to the superior court, the issue was submitted
to a jury, which returned a verdict finding claimant’s
total disability attributable to his injury. The court,
however, March 11, 1935, granted the department’s
motion for a judgment of dismissal notwithstanding
the verdict, upon the ground that there was nothing
in the record warranting a reversal of the departmental
decision refusing to reopen the claim.

The claimant did not appeal from this judgment, but,
February 27, 1936, again made application for the re-
opening of his case by the department on the ground
of aggravation, alleging that “the back injury has be-
come greatly aggravated.” The department caused the
claimant to be again examined by the same commission
of three doctors who had before examined him. They
reaffirmed their previous finding that his condition was
due solely to preexisting osteo-arthritis along the spinal
column. Upon refusal of the department to reopen the
claim, an application for rehearing before the joint

_ board was made.

At the hearing which followed before the joint board,
the claimant was not allowed to introduce evidence in
respect to the effect of the preexisting arthritic con-

dition, for the stated reason that there had previously
been a decision on that issue adverse to the claimant.
Claimant thereupon offered to prove that his condition
was one growing out of the injury without limiting
himself “in any way to the arthritic condition which
doctors have testified existed.” Upon the rejection of
this offer of proof, the hearing ended, and the board
made an order sustaining the supervisor’s denial of
the claim for aggravation.

On appeal, the superior court overruled the joint
board and remanded the claim, with direction to grant
an unrestricted and full hearing.

A full hearing was had before the joint board in
compliance with the court’s decision, and, at its con-
clusion, the action of the supervisor was sustained.
On appeal to the superior court from this decision, the
court not only adjudged that the superior court judg-
ment entered March 11, 1935, sustaining the decision
of the joint board, concluded the claimant on the exis-
tence of aggravation of his arthritic condition, but went
further and decided the case on the merits, sustaining
the finding of the joint board. The present appeal
followed.

HI It scems hardly necessary to cite cases in sup-
port of the principle applicable to a judgment on the
merits not appealed from. That such a judgment pre-
cludes the later raising of issues settled thereby is be-
yond question. That the issue raised in the present
appeal presents nothing new or different from that
involved in the first appeal is clearly manifest, for the
issue there was whether or not the arthritic condition
was in any degree attributable to the accident, and
that is the specific issue presented on this appeal. .

In DePre v. Pacifie Coast Forge Co., 151 Wash. 430,
276 Pac. 89, a case before the court on.a second appeal,
we said, with respect to the first appeal:

“The principal question there before us was whether
the facts relegated the respondent to relief under the
workmen’s compensation act, and our decision was that
they did not. The decision, under our repeated hold-
ings, became the law of the case, and we would not
now inquire into the question were we convinced that
our first holding was erroneous.”

The trial court correctly held the claimant estopped
by the judgment of March 11, 1935. The court further
held that, on the merits, the claimant had failed to
overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to
the decision of the joint board.

In view of the fact that the judgment must, in any
event, be affirmed on the first ground stated by the
court, it is unnecessary to discuss the facts further than
to say that a careful reading of the departmental rec-
ord satisfies us that the trial court’s conclusion on the
issue was correct.

The judgment is affirmed.

Brake, C. J., Mruarp, Suvpson, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27153. Department One. September 26, 1939.]

CommerctaL Waterway District No. 1 or Kine
County et al., Respondents, v. Kine County
et al., Appellants.*

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 491.

Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann, Egger-
man & Rosling, B. Gray Warner, and William Hickman
Moore, for appellants.

Shorett, Shorett & Taylor and Evans, McLaren &
Littell, for respondents.

Rosivson, J.—The purpose of this action was to pre-
vent the sale by King county of a tract of land abutting
on the Duwamish waterway. The action was begun
on August 11, 1937. On August 16, 1937, the land
was sold at public auction to the Hemrich Brewing
Company, a corporation. Subsequently, it was per-
mitted to intervene in the action, and the cause pro-
ceeded as one to cancel and annul the deed. That
relief was granted bya judgment and decree entered

on April 12, 1938. The Hemrich Brewing Company
has appealed, and, although we find no notice of appeal
by King county in the record, it is joined with the
brewing company in the briefs, and all parties appear
to recognize it as an appellant.

Approximately five-sixths of the tract included in _
the deed is part of a larger tract acquired by King
county for a dock site in 1912 and 1913. On November
8, 1910, there was submitted to the voters of King
county, and approved by them, a proposition for the
issuance by King county of bonds in the principal
amount of $1,750,000, to aid in a comprehensive
harbor development project. The resolution of the
county commissioners submitting the proposition to
the vote of the people was incorporated in the notice
of election and recited, among other things:

“Wuerreas, it has long been and is essential to the
future growth, development and prosperity of King
county that its one harbor. be made into a great and a
cheap harbor, lest the commerce of the north Pacific
Ocean, of Alaska, and of the Orient, be attracted to
ports of other states or to British Columbia by reason
of the development of harbors at such other parts now
under way at expenditures many times greater than
that herein proposed, and for the creation of such a
harbor the county possesses natural advantages un-
surpassed; and

“Wuereas, the enterprise of artificial extension of
present harbor facilities toward the end aforesaid has
heretofore proceeded in parts and sections to the dis-
advantage of the whole; and

“Wuergas, the project known as the Lake Washing-
ton Canal, though but a part of the harbor improve-
ment, has heretofore received aid from the govern-
ment of the United States to an extent exceeding
$600,000 in money, and the last Congress appropriated
the sum of $2,275,000 for the locks of said canal upon
the continuing contract system, this county has pro-
cured and deeded to the government a considerable

part of the right of way for the same at an expense
of upwards of $240,000, the state has granted several
hundred thousand dollars in value of lands, tide, shore
and upland, and has appropriated $250,000 in money
in aid of the same, thereby recognizing the national,
state and county benefit to be derived therefrom,
and it will require further aid only to the extent of
the sum of $75,000 which will pay for the excavation
of the channel of said canal; and

“Wuereas, the improvement of the south end of the
harbor has now proceeded so far as the formation of
commercial waterway district Number One for the
straightening, widening and deepening of the channel
of the Duwamish river at an estimated cost of $1,-
500,000, of which $600,000 is properly a county expen-
diture to be contributed by the county in considera-
tion of the benefit to the county from the improve-
ment, and the remainder of the cost will be contributed
by the Commercial Waterway District Number One
in recognition of the local benefit; and :

“WueEreas, the uplands and shore lands adjacent to
said lakes and waters are, for the most part, in every
respect suitable, convenient and inviting for manufac-
turing sites and other industrial uses, if only said lakes
and waters were accessible by sea-going ships; but
until said lakes and waters are so accessible, are of
comparatively small value and are unattractive and
unprofitable for such uses; and .

“Wereas, the topography of said ‘city of Seattle
fronting on Elliott bay is so hilly that there is but a
narrow strip of land at or near the level of water
transportation and all the water front on said bay,
except a few street ends owned by said city, is pri-
vately owned and privately controlled, some of it by
industrial concerns, but most of it by railroad and
steamship lines, and said waterfront and the adjacent
lands are much congested by business interests; and

“WuerEas, said Duwamish river, straightened and
deepened, as aforesaid, and said canal when con-
structed, will each serve the purpose of a great public
highway into the interior of said county, whereby the

transportation and commercial facilities of said county
will be largely augmented and manufacturing and busi-
ness industries stimulated and developed,

“Wuereas, the acquisition of sites for public wharves
and docks and of other rights and interests necessary
and proper to be acquired, for the purpose of better
and fuller enjoyment of the benefits of- said public
improvement by the people of King county, will rea-
sonably cost $350,000; and :

“WHEREAS, it is the intention of this resolution that
King county shall bear its proper share of the cost of
said improvement and of its several parts, and at the
same time not in any way interfere with the progress
of the commercial waterways aforesaid, but, on the
contrary, leaving the said canal and commercial water-
way districts free to proceed with their work under
the law of their creation and thereby raise and ex-
pend the sums necessary to pay for the local benefits
to each; and . .

“Wurreas, said board is proposing and intending, if
authorized and empowered so to do, to have King
county, by and through said board, contract indebted-
ness for the object and purpose of the public improve-
ment aforesaid, and in aid and furtherance and com-
pletion of the same to the amount of $1,750,000 to be
expended under the directions of and subject to the
approval of said board, as follows: that is to say:

“$750,000 thereof in excavating the channel of said
Lake Washington canal; $600,000 thereof in acquiring
rights of way for, and in dredging along the same a
straightened, widened and deepened channel for said
Duwamish river along the line laid out by said Com-
mercial Waterway District number one; $350,000
thereof in acquisition for public uses of sites for
wharves and docks, and of other rights and interests
necessary or proper to be acquired in aid and further-
ance of said improvement, or of securing the drainage
or commercial public facilities and benefits to be de--
rived therefrom; and $50,000 in turning Cedar river
into Lake Washington along lines to be adopted by said
proposed Commercial Waterway District Number Two,
subject to the approval of this board; and

The bond issue, which was proposed by the resolu-
tion and authorized by a vote of the people, was vali-
dated by an emergency act promptly passed at the
next session of the legislature. This act (Laws of
1911, chapter 3, p. 3, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9666 [P. C.
§ 5850] et seq.) reads, in part, as follows:

“Section 1. That whenever the board of county com-
missioners of any county of the first class of this state
shall deem it for the interest of the county to engage
in or to aid the United States of America, the State of
Washington, or any adjoining county or any city of
this state, or any of them, in construction, enlargement,
improvement, modification, repair or operation of any
harbor, canal, waterway, river channel, slip, dock,
wharf, or other public improvement, or any of the
same, for the purposes of commerce, navigation, sani-
tation and drainage, or any thereof, or to acquire, or
operate wharf sites, dock sites, or other properties,
rights or interests, or any thereof, necessary or proper
to be acquired or operated for public enjoyment of
any such public improvement, and to incur indebted-
ness to meet the cost thereof and expenses connected
therewith, and’ issue bonds of the county for the pay-
ment of such indebtedness, or any thereof, such county
is hereby authorized and empowered, by and through
its county commissioners, to engage in or aid in any
such public work or works, operation or acquisition,
as aforesaid, and to incur indebtedness for such pur-
pose or purposes to an amount, which, together with
the then existing indebtedness of such county, shall
not exceed five per centum of the taxable value of the
taxable property in said county, as shown by the last
previous assessment roll thereof for state and county
purposes, and to issue the negotiable bonds of the
county for all or any of such indebtedness and for the
payment thereof, . . .” (Italics above and else-
where in this opinion are supplied.)

Section 2, p. 4 (Rem. Rev. Stat., §9667 [P. C.
§ 5851]), declared that every purpose mentioned in §]
was a county purpose.

aT

Section 3, p. 5 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9668 [P. C.
§ 5852]), provided that, in case the question of incur-
ring such indebtedness or issuing any such bonds had
been submitted to the voters of a first class county
within one year prior to the day the act became effec-
tive and sufficient votes had been cast in the affirma-
tive and all proceedings had as prescribed in §1,
then they were validated and confirmed, and the
county authorized to proceed to incur the indebted-
ness, issue the bonds, and engage in the construction,
acquisition, or operation of the public works intended
and contemplated.

Notwithstanding this legislative action, the validity
of the bonds was seriously challenged in a taxpayer's
suit. The opinion rendered on the appeal of that ac-
tion (Blaine v. Hamilton, 64 Wash. 353, 116 Pac. 1076,
35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 577) is very pertinent to our present
inquiry. After quoting portions of the commissioners’
resolution, the court said, in part:

“The resolution was incorporated in the notice of
election, and recites, that it is essential to the future
growth, development, and prosperity of the county
that its one harbor be made into a great and cheap
harbor, to the end that it may retain and develop its
natural commercial advantages; that the former policy
of improving the harbor in parts had not proven ad-
vantageous; that the present harbor facilities are in-
adequate; that the expansion of the harbor can be best
accomplished by means of a canal connecting Lakes
Union and Washington with the bay, straightening,
widening, and deepening the channel of the Duwamish
river, and turning the waters of Cedar river into Lake
Washington; and that the three matters are so natu-
rally and necessarily related that they are, in fact, a
single project consisting of interdependent parts.
The resolution further recites that the acquisition of
sites for public wharves and docks is essential to the
improvement as an entirety. The question was sub-
mitted to the people as a single proposition calling for

a vote, ‘King County Harbor Bond Issue—Yes,’ and
‘King County Harbor Bond Issue—No.’

“The appellants’ first and principal contention is
that several separate, distinct, and independent enter-
prises were submitted to the people as a unit, compel-
ling them to approve or reject the bond issue as an
entirety, and that the election is therefore invalid.
The argument is that such a submission permits a
meritorious and popular measure to carry or to be
borne down by an undesirable one, and that the people
were not given an opportunity to exercise a full, free,
and intelligent assent as the general law contemplates
and requires.”

After discussing a number of its decisions, the court
stated this general conclusion:

“We are, therefore, committed to the view that dis-
tinct, unrelated, and independent objects or purposes
must be separately submitted by the ballot.”

But, continuing, the court said:

“Counsel for the appellants, in his oral argument,
stated that the true test of whether a proposition is
single is, will it stand alone. This, we think, is but
one of the tests of singleness, and might often be no
test at all. The true criterion is, are the several parts
of the project so related that united they form in fact

but one rounded whole. . . . The item for wharves
and docks is strongly condemned as bearing no rela-
tion to the other parts. . . . Experience has shown

the wisdom of the public retaining control of such
matters. The larger harbor would be incomplete if
the public failed to provide aids for its utilization.
Wharves and docks are but adjuncts to the harbor.
They are but connecting links between the highways
of the land and the highways of the sea. They are
to sea commerce what a bridge which spans the stream.
is to land commerce.”

The court sustained the bond issue as against the
objection that it covered several unrelated purposes,
saying:

De

“Guided by the principles which we have stated,
we are constrained to hold that, while the proposition
is divided into four parts, taken together they form
but one rounded project—the creation of a great
harbor, by utilizing, developing, and uniting the waters
which nature has so bounteously provided.”

Thus, it appears that the bond issue would have been
held wholly invalid if the court had not found that the
$350,000, included therein, to be expended “in the
acquisition for public uses of sites for wharves and
docks,” was an expenditure of the same nature as
the $750,000, included therein, for excavating the Lake
Washington canal, and the $600,000, included therein,
for acquiring the right of way for the straightening
and deepening of the Duwamish river, and the $50,000,
included therein, for the diversion of the Cedar river
into Lake Washington.

After the bond issue had been validated by chapter
3, Laws of 1911, and its legality approved by the court
in the case of Blaine v. Hamilton, the county brought
an action to condemn a site for a dock in the Duwamish
waterway. The court held, in State ex rel. Wauconda
Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 660, 124 Pac. 127,
Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1076, that the county did not have
the right. of eminent domain for that purpose, sug-
gesting that “it is presumed that the legislature in-
tended that the necessary property should be ac-
quired by contract.” That case was decided on June 5,
1912. We quote the following from the journal of the
proceedings of the county commissioners of June 26th:

“The following proposition for the purchase of
Union Trust Company island as a dock site was sub-
mitted by the Union Trust Company, and, on motion,
same was accepted, and it was ordered that said island,
less exceptions as noted, be purchased and paid for
out of the ‘Dock and Dock Sites Fund,’ at $63,500.
Messrs. Hamilton and Rutherford voting ‘Aye;’ Mc-
Kenzie voting ‘No.’”

In September, 1912, the county took a warranty deed
to the property, subject only'to the rights of the com-
missioners of the waterway district, under an action
which they were then prosecuting to condemn the
right of way necessary to straighten and deepen the
Duwamish river, in which action benefits were to be
assessed and a small portion of the western side of
the island was to be taken.

This property, as the name by which it was desig-
nated indicates, was an island. It was a long, slightly
crescent-shaped piece of land lying in the Duwamish
river. We estimate, from other distances shown on
the maps in the record, that it was between 1700 and
1800 feet in length, and between 275 and 300 feet in
width at its widest point. Being an island, it was, of
course, not usable as a dock site in its then condition.

The waterway district’s plans were fully matured
at the time the county purchased the island. In fact,
they were matured at the time the bond issue was pro-
posed, as is definitely shown by the resolution of the
county commissioners. The waterway district, at the
time this property was purchased, was, as the deed
recites, already condemning its right of way. The
straightened waterway was to run lengthwise along
the west side of the island, and the old'river bed on
the east side of the island, cutting it off from the rail-
roads and east Marginal way, was to be abandoned.
This would permit access to the island by building a
causeway from Marginal way across the abandoned
river bed.

But more than that was required in order to make
the property a desirable dock site. If a dock should
be constructed parallel with the river, there would not
be more than 1800 feet of berthing space, and ships
lying along the river would be an obstacle to the navi-
gation of the channel, and especially so when being

loaded from scows swung alongside. There is oral evi-
dence that the plan was to extend waterways or slips
inland, angling slightly to the south. This would per-
mit railroad spurs to be run along the side of the slips
and for vessels to lie alongside, completely out of the
navigable channel. It would also multiply the berth-
ing space. The island property, because it was only
approximately 300 feet wide, would not afford slips
long enough to berth large ocean-going ships. The
acquisition of the old channel of the river to the east-
ward of the island was necessary in order to convert
the island into a suitable dock site. If that were joined
to the island itself, this would permit slips of at least
700 feet in width. At least four such slips could then
be built, wide enough to accommodate vessels on both
sides, giving 5600 feet of berthing space.

That this was the plan which everybody having any
connection with the Duwamish river improvement had.
in mind, is amply shown by oral evidence in the rec-
ord, and that evidence receives confirmation from the
fact that the county commissioners afterwards ac-
quired the abandoned river bed and excavated and
built such a slip at the north end of the property.

There were two ways in which the county might get
title to those portions of the abandoned river bed which
it needed to make a practical dock site out of the Union
Trust Company island. Section 8 of chapter 11, Laws
of 1911, p. 21 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9732 [P. C. § 1374]),
provided that such abandoned beds “are hereby given
and granted and vested in the respective commercial
waterway districts now existing, or hereafter to be
formed,” and the commissioners of the waterway dis-
tricts were given the right to sell such beds and shores
upon such notice and proceedings as the law provided
that boards of county commissioners should be gov-

erned by in the disposition of real estate belonging to
the counties:

“Provided, however, That the commissioners of such
commercial waterway district may, in their discretion,
exchange such abandoned beds and shores, for other
property needed in the straightening, deepening or wid-
ening of such rivers, watercourses or streams, and which
exchange may be made upon such terms and conditions

and in such areas as, in the discretion of such commis- .

sioners, they may deem advisable and for the best in-
terests of such commercial waterway district without
any notice or other formality or proceedings what-
ever.”

If the sale method was adopted, the waterway com-
missioners would be required to publish notice for
four weeks of intention to sell, hold a hearing at which
any taxpayer would have the right to be heard, and,
after making a finding that such sale was advisable,
publish notice for four weeks that the property would
be sold at public auction on a day and at a place cer-
tain. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 4007 [P. C. $1710] et seg. At
an auction sale, the county, of course, would be subject
to the competition of any and all bidders; but, if the
county had some property which the waterway dis-
trict needed in order to straighten and deepen the river,
then the waterway commissioners could exchange the
abandoned river bed for that property at their discre-
tion and “without any notice or other formality or
proceedings whatever.”

On January 9, 1913, the county commissioners passed
a resolution, reciting, in part, as follows:

“Wauerrras, the county of King still has a possible
claim or interest in and to the use of all those portions
of the streets, avenues, alleys, public roads, highways,
and other public places within the limits of the right of
way of Commercial Waterway District No. 1 of King
county, state of Washington, and

“WHEREAS, said Commercial Waterway District has

a possible claim or interest in and to all that portion of
the present bed or channel and shores of the Duwamish
river lying east of the east margin of the right of way
of said Commercial Waterway and extending from the
point where said eastern margin intersects the right
bank of the Duwamish river immediately above Union
Trust Company Island, to a point where said eastern
margin of said right of way intersects the right bank
of the Duwamish river immediately below said Union
Trust Company Island; and

“Wuereas, both King county and said Commercial
Waterway District desire to co-operate with each other
in the commercial development of King county; and

“Wuereas, King county has acquired and is now the
owner of a large portion of said Union Trust Company
Island for dock purposes, and desires to develop the
same unhindered by any possible claim on the part of
said district in and to the said described portions of the
bed and shores of the Duwamish river, the sume being
contiguous to said public dock property; and

“Wuerras, the present right of King county in and
to the use of said portions of roads, streets, etc., above
described is a doubtful claim and one which the county
does not wish to insist upon for the reason that to do
so would impede the development of said Commercial
Waterway; and

“WHEREAS, it is considered by this board and by the
Board of Commissioners of said Commercial Waterway
District to be to the mutual advantage of said district
and said county, that an exchange be made by said
King county and by said Commercial Waterway Dis-
trict each to the other of their respective interests in
said portions of said public roads and said described
portion of said river bed;

“Now, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Board of
Commissioners of King county that an exchange be
made by said King county with said Commercial
Waterway District whereby said King county will for-
ever grant to said Commercial Waterway District No. 1,
the right and privilege to extend its waterway through
and over all of said described portions of the public
roads, etc., and other public places within the limits of

the right of way of said Commercial Waterway Dis-
trict, in exchange for a quit claim deed by said Com-
mercial Waterway District and its commissioners of
all their interest in and to the said described portion
of said channel beds and shores of the Duwamish river;
and 2

On the previous day, the waterway district had
passed its resolution dealing with the matter, which
reads, in part, as follows:

“Wurrzas the County Commissioners of King county,
state of Washington, have offered to execute and de-
liver a quit claim deed to this district of all the county’s
right, title and interest in and to the public roads,
streets, avenues, alleys and other public places within
the limits of the right of way of this district for the pur-
pose of being used in the construction and maintenance
of said Commercial Waterway, in exchange for a quit
claim deed from said district, and its Commissioners of
all that portion of the present channel or bed of the
Duwamish river described as follows:

“All the following portion of the present bed or chan-
nel of the Duwamish River to-wit: lying East of the
East margin of said right of way and extending from
the point where said eastern margin intersects the right
bank of the Duwamish River immediately above Union
Trust Company Island, to a point where said eastern
margin of said right of way intersects the right bank
of the Duwamish River immediately below said Union
Trust Company Island; and

“WueEreas, this board deems it advisable and expe-
dient to secure such conveyance from King county of
its interest in said portions of public roads, streets, etc.
said portions being needed in the construction and
maintenance of the Commercial Waterway in said dis-
trict; and

“WHEREAS, said King county expects to develop Union
Trust Company Island and adjoining portions of the
bed, channel and shores of the Duwamish river as a
public dock which when so developed will be of great
benefit and advantage to said Commercial Waterway
and to the entire district; and

“WueEreas, this board deems it advisable and for the
best interests of the Commercial Waterway District
that said exchange be made;

On January 9, 1913, the waterway district gave a
quitclaim deed to the county for that portion of the
river bed described in the resolutions. Later, on May
8, 1914, and on July 22, 1919, it gave additional deeds
called “correction” deeds, although the description of
the original deed corresponds with the descriptions
in the two resolutions. None of these deeds contains
any limitation on the use of the property. In the first
deed, the consideration is recited as one dollar, and, in
the other two, one dollar and other valuable consid-
erations.

Having acquired the abandoned river bed to the
eastward of Union Trust Company island, the county
proceeded to improve the whole property by filling in
the old river bed, bulkheading the tract, and filling it
up to grade. In doing so, it expended $40,000 of the
money voted by the people for “acquisition for public
uses of sites for wharves and docks.” These expendi-
tures were made in 1914 and 1915. In making them,
the county excavated a slip at the northerly tip of the
island and across the abandoned river bed east of it,
and in September, 1917, let a contract for the erection
of a dock or wharf along its southern edge, at a cost
of $31,853.94. In February, 1918, it added forty feet to
the length of the dock at a contract price of $11,800.
All of these sums were paid out of the money voted by
the people for the acquisition of wharves and docks for
public uses; that is, out of the $350,000, voted on No-
vember 8, 1910, for that purpose, $147,153.94 was éx-
pended in the acquisition and development of the site
within the first eight years.

In the deed which the lower court canceled and
annulled, the county of King purported to convey to

the Hemrich Brewing Company a strip of land approxi-
mately nine hundred by three hundred feet, running
across -the dock site from the Duwamish waterway to
east Marginal way, the northern edge of which is about
two hundred feet south of, and parallel to, the north-
ern edge of the wharf constructed in 1917 and 1918.
For convenience, this property will hereinafter be re-
ferred to as the Hemrich tract. If the original plan
of development had been, or should be, continued, by
working from north to south, the next transverse slip
would fall partly, if not wholly, within its boundaries.

The property included in the deed is made up of four
parts. At the southwest corner of the tract next to
the waterway is a small, wedge-shaped piece of the old
river bed; then there is a strip of what was formerly:
the old Union Trust Company island, about three hun-
dred feet in width; then a portion of abandoned river
bed, approximately four hundred feet in width; then,
extending to Marginal way, a piece of upland, approxi-
mately one hundred and fifty feet in width, acquired
by the county in 1933. The court held that the county
had no power to sell those portions of the tract which
were formerly a part of the Union Trust Company
island or of the old river bed, on the ground that they
were part of a dock site held in trust by the county for
public uses.

The respondents say that there is but one question
presented by this appeal, and state it as follows:

“In 1912 the board of King county commissioners
acquired a tract of land now fronting on the Duwamish
waterway for public dock site purposes. A part of the
tract consisted of Union Trust Company island and was
purchased and paid for out of the ‘public dock site’ por-
tion of a harbor bond issue. The balance of the tract
consisted of an area of abandoned river bed contiguous
to said island, which was conveyed to the county by
commercial waterway district for public dock site pur-

Po

poses. The deeds themselves did not contain any
clause purporting to restrict the use which the county
might make of the property.

“The county improved the entire tract by filling and
bulkheading, and constructed a public dock and wharf
on a portion thereof, all being paid for by warrants on
the said ‘public dock site’ fund.

“Does the county have authority to sell a portion of
the original tract which as yet has never been actually
used as a public dock or wharf? The lower court’s an-
swer was ‘No.’”

The appellants break up the matter into a number
of subsidiary questions, of which, we think, only the
following requires special attention:

“Even though the property might have been ac-
quired by the county in its governmental capacity, did
not the county have the right to sell it where it appears
that it was never appropriated or used for the purpose
intended and that it is no longer necessary for that
purpose?”

Before an attempt can be made to answer these ques-
tions, and particularly the second, a further statement
of facts is necessary. The appellants point out that,
although a public dock was built on the dock site, it
was never publicly operated; and further, that some
portions of the dock site have been deeded away; and
still further, that other portions, including those cov-
ered by the Hemrich deed, have been leased for indus-
trial uses for long terms. In April, 1916, the county
conveyed a tract of land, formerly a part of the aban-
doned. river bed, to Samuel S. Loeb. No part of this
tract is east of, or touches, the old Union Trust Com-
pany island, and, for that and other reasons, we are not
clear whether it has ever been a part of the dock site;
nor is it necessary to determine that question in this
action. In 1919, the county conveyed a small portion
of the abandoned river bed, which was a part of the
dock site, to grantees, in exchange for lands which it

needed in order to get access from Marginal way to cer-
tain lands which it owned on the river. An alley was
condemned across the site, immediately south of, and
adjoining, the Hemrich tract, and a street along a part
of its extreme eastern edge.

A tract south of the Hemrich tract was leased to
Seattle Warehouse Company in 1922, for a period of
thirty years, to be used only for warehouse purposes.
A warehouse, costing $85,000, was built upon it, and
the tract has been re-leased to another warehouse com-
pany, presumably a successor to the first, for a period
of thirty years from 1930. South of that, a large saw-
mill and burner have been operated from time to time
since 1925.

The Hemrich tract itself has been under lease for
commercial purposes for many years. It was leased
in 1917, with other property to the north of it, in-
cluding that part of the property on which the wharf
stands, for a period of thirty-five years, to be used
only for commercial, manufacturing, and industrial
purposes. Subsequently, in 1918, it was included in
another overlapping lease covering even more prop-
erty towards the north. Subsequently, the dock prop-
erty was stricken from the lease, and the 1918 lease
modified by a supplemental lease which provided that
the dock property, that is, the existing dock, should
be, and remain, “for public enjoyment and use as a
public wharf or dock.” Various leases and sub-leases
followed, which it would be unprofitable to detail. It
will suffice to say that, by 1933, or shortly thereafter,
they came into the possession of the Hemrich Brewing
Company. It has buildings upon the property of a
value of $252,000, all of which were erected while the
property was held under lease. No part of the tract it
occupies and which was deeded to it on August 13,
1937, was ever used as a public dock.

On these facts, the appellants claim an estoppel
against the respondents, and further contend that, even
if the dock site was acquired by the county in its
governmental capacity, it now has the right to dispose
of it, because, it is said, time has demonstrated that
it is not needed for the purpose for which it was ac-
quired.

HI We are of the opinion that the trial court was
correct in holding that both that portion of the old
Union Trust Company island and that portion of the
abandoned river bed included in the Hemrich tract
were acquired by the county in its governmental ca-
pacity. It seems to us that this is an inevitable con-
clusion, from the facts which we have already stated.
By their resolution of July 26, 1910, the then county
commissioners requested the voters to provide funds
to enable the county to cooperate with the United
States government, the state of Washington, and Com-
mercial Waterway District No. 1, in enlarging and im-
proving Seattle harbor, “. . . lest the commerce of
the North Pacific Ocean, of Alaska, and of the Orient
be attracted to ports of other states or to British Co-
lumbia, . . .” The resolution spoke of the project
as of “national, state and county benefit.” It asked
for authority to raise and contribute $750,000 toward
the excavation of Lake Washington canal and $600,000
to assist the waterway district in acquiring right of
way for straightening the Duwamish river and in
dredging it in order that ocean-going vessels might
have access to Lakes Washington and Union and might
penetrate deeply into the flat lands south of the city.
Speaking of the then existing harbor, Elliott Bay, the
resolution said:

“. . , and all the waterfront on said bay, except

a few street ends owned by said city, is privately
owned and privately controlled, some of it by indi-

vidual concerns, but most of it by railroad and steam-
ship lines. ..

It was to prevent such a condition on the new water-
front that the county commissioners asked the voters
to authorize the borrowing of $350,000 to be expended

“oy in acquisition for public uses of sites for
wharves and docks and of other rights and interests
necessary or proper to be acquired in aid and fur-
therance of said improvement.”

At no place in the long resolution, which was in-
corporated in the notice of election, is there the slight-
est intimation that the county proposed to acquire or
operate a dock in a proprietary capacity. The money
was asked for to further the general purposes of the
harbor project by acquiring and preserving for the
public, dock sites, places where docks might be built
when necessary upon the new waters to be opened
up by the proposed Lake Washington canal and the
Duwamish waterway.

It is clear that, had the purpose of the expenditure
of the $350,000 requested of the voters been to acquire
a county proprietary interest, the whole bond issue
would have been invalidated in Blaine v. Hamilton,
64 Wash. 353, 116 Pac. 1076, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577.
It was validated because the court held that the pro-
posed expenditure for dock sites was of the same na-
ture as that to be made for excavating the canal,
creating the waterway, and diverting the Cedar river,
that is, “the creation of a great harbor.”

Having persuaded the voters to supply the fund by
these representations, the county proceeded to de-
vote it to the purposes indicated. The Union Trust
Company island was purchased for a dock site, as is
indicated by the facts that (1) it was paid for out of
the dock site fund in September, 1912; (2) by the
recitals in the resolution of the county commissioners

of January 13, ‘1913; and (3) by the acquisition of
the necessary river bed and the later improvement
of the whole as a dock site by bulkheading, filling,
grading, and then by excavating a slip and construct-
ing a dock across the property. All such improvements
were paid for out of the fund voted by the people
to acquire dock sites for the further development of
the one rounded project, a great harbor.

Hi In view of these facts, we think it unnecessary
to discuss the appellants’ contention that the property
was never dedicated or appropriated as a dock site.
We will not assume that the county commissioners
misused the funds voted for governmental purposes to
acquire a proprietary interest, nor will we conclude
that they could defeat the public interest by merely
failing to publish a map showing the property with
the legend “dock site” printed upon it. The intent to
devote the Union Trust Company island, and that
much of the abandoned river bed which was necessary
to its practical development as a dock site, to that
purpose, is abundantly shown, and that is all that is
necessary to constitute a dedication.’ Seattle v. Hill,
23 Wash. 92, 62 Pac. 446.

We are not impressed with the argument that
the respondents are estopped from contesting the at-
tempted sale and transfer in fee. It is difficult to see
how public inaction could confer a power to sell; and
in any event, if the county acquired the property in
trust for the public, the fact that it may have breached
the trust on former occasions or in certain particulars,
if it actually did so, would not debar the public from
objecting to further and additional breaches.

Tn this connection, it is urged that the respondents
stood by and permitted the county to make long leases
for industrial purposes. But it may be that this was
not a breach of the trust. The appellants seem to

assume, in this branch of their argument, that, if a
trust existed, its primary obligation was that the county
should at once establish a public dock. We find
nothing in the resolution initiating the bond issue war-
ranting such an assumption.

The representation to the voters was that the county
desired authorization to cooperate with the Federal
government, the state government, and the waterway
district in enlarging the Seattle harbor by construct-
ing the Lake Washington canal and the Duwamish
waterway. It was pointed out that the waterfront of
the then existing harbor had, with the exception of
a few street ends, passed into private control, “most
of it,” said the resolution, into the control of the rail-
road and steamship lines. Authorization was asked to
borrow and expend $350,000, “in acquisition for public
uses of sites for wharves and docks.” It will be noted
that the money was not asked for, nor supplied, for
the purpose of building and operating wharves and
docks. The idea held out to the voters was that the
$350,000 was to be used to acquire dock sites in order
that the new waterfront to be opened should not, like
the old, pass almost wholly into private hands. Ob-
viously, the representation to the voters was that the
$350,000 was to be used to acquire the fee of some of
the new waterfront and hold it for the future pub-’
lic use.

It would be unreasonable to suppose that anyone
connected with the development of the larger harbor
was so visionary as to contemplate that a great new
system of docks would be needed the moment the
canal and the waterway would be completed. The
idea was to insure that the waterfront would not all
be in the hands of railroad and steamship companies
when the development should come. It may well be,
then, though we do not here so decide, that it was

not a breach of the public trust for the county to grant
leases on the property and thus secure a temporary
income while waiting for the public need to develop.
Inland Waterways Co. v. Louisville, 227 Ky. 376, 13
S. W. (2d) 283.

Hit is also urged that the appellants are estopped
because they made no objection to the conveyance of
a certain portion of the abandoned river bed to one
Loeb. But, as we have hereinbefore indicated, it is
by no means clear from the record that the trust at-
tached to that particular tract. Nor are we able to
say that the county’s exchange of a small part of the
abandoned river bed with the Seattle Warehouse Com-
pany in order to get access to the waterway at some
point undisclosed in the record constituted a breach
of trust. , :

Finally, in that division of their brief relating to
estoppel, the appellants cite but one case, Jardine v.
Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 248 Pac. 225, 48 A. L. R. 509.
We find nothing in that opinion supporting the ap-
pellants’ theory of estoppel. The case merely holds
that a taxpayer may not enjoin a city from using prop-
erty as a hospital which was purchased from the pro-
ceeds of a bond issue voted to acquire a waterworks
system. Neither estoppel nor the outright sale of
property appears to have been involved in that action.

Both parties have cited a great number of author-
ities upon the principal question involved in this ap-
peal. Many of the cases cited by ‘appellants involve
the disposition of property purchased from general
funds, and others are cases, like the Jardine case, where
the property was merely devoted to other public uses.
In our opinion, the strongest case cited on appellants’
behalf is that of Dix v. Port of Port Orford, 131 Ore.
157, 282 Pac. 109. This case involves the outright sale
of a dock site and wharf purchased with the proceeds

of bonds issued to acquire such property. The right
to sell was upheld. The case is, therefore, prima facie
pertinent as to both questions under discussion.

The port of Port Orford was organized as a municipal
corporation under Oregon law in 1919; its primary
object and purpose, as described in the enabling act,
being to promote “maritime shipping and commercial
interest of such corporation.” From the proceeds of
a bond issue authorized by the vote of the people, the
port commissioners purchased a dock site and erected
and operated a wharf. At the time, Port Orford was
comparatively isolated. With the coming of good
roads, trucks invaded the transportation field to such
an extent that the resources of the port were not suf-
ficient to cover maintenance and operating expenses.
The port commissioners contracted to sell the prop-
erty to a logging company for a sum sufficient to dis-
charge the port’s outstanding bonds. In a suit by a
taxpayer to enjoin the sale, the court said:

“As a general rule the power of a municipality to
convey property is equal to its power to acquire it. At
common law a municipal corporation, unless restrained
by its charter, could dispose of property in the same
manner as private individuals: 19 R. C. L. 772. In
the instant case, we do not think that the property ac-
quired through purchase was dedicated to a public
use. True, it inured to the benefit of the public, but
the port was engaged in this commercial enterprise
for profit as a toll was charged any shipper who used
the wharf or docking facilities. It was not open to
indiscriminate use by the public. In the maintenance
and operation of this property the port was acting in
a proprietary capacity: Esberg Cigar Co. v. Port, 34
Or. 282 (55 P. 961, 48 L. R. A. 445). It held title to
property which had been acquired for strictly cor-
porate uses: City National Bank v. Kiowa, 104 Okl.
161, (230 P. 894, 39 A. L. R. 206 (note)). It is not a
case of holding title to property in trust where there
has been a dedication to a public use. It is not anal-

ogous to streets or to public highways. Due to changed
conditions the board of commissioners in the exercise
of their discretion determined that this property was
no longer adapted to the purpose for which it was
originally intended and that the best interests of the
taxpayer would be subserved by disposing of the
same,”

If the property in the case at bar had been acquired
in a proprietary capacity, as the Port Orford property
was, the county commissioners could, no doubt, dispose
of it upon a showing that it was no longer needed.

Hi It is contended, however, that they may do so
even though it was acquired and held in a govern-
mental capacity. This contention is-embodied in the
question submitted to the court by the appellants:

“Even though the property might have been acquired
by the county in its governmental capacity, did not the
county have the right to sell it where it appears that
it was never appropriated or used for the purpose in-
tended and that it is no longer necessary for that
purpose?”

The question is based upon unwarranted assump-
tions. The property was appropriated, and has at all
times been used, for the purpose intended; and that it
is no longer necessary for that purpose, is not proven,
nor is it susceptible of proof. This is because the pur-
pose intended was not, as appellants assume, to estab-
lish and operate a public county dock, but to proctre
dock sites on the new waters to be opened up by the
Lake Washington canal and the Duwamish waterway
and preserve them for the public until the growth of
Seattle and its harbor should require docks at such
locations. The fact that that need has not yet ap-
peared, does not authorize the county commissioners
to pass the property back into private ownership by
disposing of the fee title. That Seattle harbor has
reached the zenith of its maritime development, is not

susceptible of proof. The need for docks on these
waters may arise in the future. The intention of the
voters that not all of the new waterfront should pass
into private hands, but that the fee title to some of it
should be acquired and held in trust for the public,
cannot be defeated by the county commissioners upon
the theory that there is no present and immediate
need.

Hl There are several minor contentions to be dis-
posed of. The appellants complain that the trial court
erred, there being no limitation in the deeds, in ad-
mitting oral testimony to the general effect that the
waterway district conveyed the abandoned river bed.
to the county, upon the understanding that it was to
be used to round out the dock site. We will not expand
this already over-long opinion to discuss this assign-
ment, since, even if the admission of that testimony
constituted error, it was in no way prejudicial, in view
of the fact that there is an abundance of other evidence
in the record which sustains that conclusion.

HM It is also assigned as error that the court per-
mitted the respondents to reopen their case to offer evi-
dence that the Lindbergs were taxpayers, a matter
which they had overlooked until after both sides had
rested. We are unable to perceive any merit in this
assignment.

It is further assigned as error that the evidence sub-
mitted on that issue was insufficient. We have exam-
ined the questioned evidence and reject this assign-
ment also.

The judgment and decree appealed from is affirmed.

Braxg, C. J., Mary, Sremvert, and Jerrers, JJ., con-
eur.

[No. 27558. En Banc. September 27, 1939.]

Tue City or Yakrma, Respondent, v. Jay GorHaM,
Appellant.

Vanderveer & Bassett and Houghton, Cluck &
Coughlin, for appellant.

Harry L. Olson, for respondent.

Brakes, C. J.—The defendant was charged with, and
convicted of, the violation of section one of ordinance
B-301 of the city of Yakima, which provides:

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person to walk back
and forth, loiter or remain upon the streets, alleys or
sidewalks in front of any business house or industrial
plant in the city of Yakima, Washington, or at or in
close proximity to the rear or side entrances of such
place of business or walk around such place of busi-
ness or industrial plant for the purpose of persuading
or intimidating any person from entering said place of
business for the purpose of transacting business there-

“Reported in 94 P. (2d) 180.

in; provided however, that this section shall not apply
to employees who have been employed three months
or more at said place of business, and who have been
so employed within sixty days of the period in which
the acts herein referred to shall be done.”

The facts out of which the charge arose are as fol-
lows: The Lindeman Power Equipment Company is
engaged in retailing and manufacturing farm machin-
ery and equipment. Its place of business is located on
south Third street between La Salle and Rainier ave-
nues, in the city of Yakima:

Prior to June 9, 1936, the company had in its employ
some eleven men belonging to Machinists’ Local No.
1531—a union affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor. On or about that day, “Mr. Lindeman made
the rule that no member of the Union could work for
him and discharged the two he was familiar with as
being members, . . .” ‘The others went out on
strike. The company was put on the unfair list by the
Yakima Central Labor Council and the Washington
State Federation of Labor. Subsequently, the National
Labor Relations Board, through the Regional Board,
took jurisdiction of the controversy and ruled in favor
of the discharged and striking employees. In the mean-
time, on April 28, 1938, the city of Yakima adopted
ordinance No. B-301.

On September 7, 1938, appellant was arrested while
patrolling on the sidewalk in front of the premises of
the Lindeman company. He accosted no one. He cre-
ated no disturbance. He simply had slung over his
shoulders a “sandwich sign,” which bore the inscrip-
tion:

“LINDEMAN
Power & Equipment Co.
UNFAIR
to
ORGANIZED
Lazor”

Appellant was a meniber of Machinists’ Local No.
1531, but had never been in the employ of the Linde-
man company.

Hi From this brief summary of the facts, it is ap-
parent that the question for determination on the
appeal is whether the city of Yakima may, under its
police power, prohibit “peaceful picketing” and “peace-
able persuasion” by workers during the course of labor
disputes. For there is no doubt that appellant, in pick-
eting the Lindeman place of business, was violating
the ordinance.

We think the question must be answered in the neg-
ative, for the reason that, in terms and purposes, the
ordinance conflicts with the public policy of this state
as declared by the legislature in Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses.,
chapter 7, p. 10, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §§ 7612-1 to
7612-15 [P. C. $§ 3467-21 to 3467-35], inclusive. That
act has been characterized as the state “Norris-La
Guardia act,” inasmuch as it is identical in terms with
the act of Congress known by that appellation. 29
U.S.C. A. (Sup.), § 101 et seq.

It is elementary that the police power of municipali-
ties derives from the state, and can be exercised only
in conformity with general laws and the public policy
of the state, as declared by the legislature. Const. Art.
XI, § 11; Seattle Electric Co. v. Seattle, 78 Wash. 203,
138 Pac. 892; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court,
67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 78, L. R. A.
1915C, 287. In the latter case, the court said:

“Where the state, . . . asserted its jurisdiction
over a given subject-matter, . . . the municipal
charter or ordinance must give way.”

Now, in § 2 of our Norris-LaGuardia act, p. 10,
the legislature declared the public policy of this state
in the following terms:

“Wuerreas, Under prevailing economic conditions, de-
veloped with the aid of governmental authority for
owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual
unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should
be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his
own. choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of
his employment, and that he shall be free from inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor,
or their agents, in the designation of such representa-
tives or in self-organization or in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protections; therefore, the following defi-
nitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts of the State of Washington are
hereby enacted.” Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-2
[P. C. § 3467-22].

Section 4 (e), p. 12, provides:

“No court of the State of Washington shall have jur-
isdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction in any case involving or grow-
ing out of any labor dispute or prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute (as
these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: . .

“Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not in-
volving fraud or violence; . ” (Italics ours.)
Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-4 [P. C. § 3467-24].

Section 13, p. 17, provides:

“When used in this act, and for the purpose of this
act—

“(e) “The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any contro-

versy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of per-

sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.” (Ital-
ics ours.) Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7612-13 [P. C.
§ 3467-33].

If the foregoing legislative declarations of the public
policy of the state be valid, it would hardly seem that
the invalidity of ordinance No. B-301 is debatable.
For it would be difficult to find two enactments of
legislative bodies so directly opposite in purpose and
terms as these.

And, as we understand respondent’s position, it seeks
to sustain the validity of the ordinance on the theory
of the invalidity of the act of the legislature. This,
respondent endeavors to establish by an argument
based on a line of decisions in which this court has
held picketing, peaceful or otherwise, to be unlawful.
Jensen v. Cooks’ & Waiters’ Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81
Pac. 1069, 4L. R. A. (N. S.) 302; St.Germain v. Bakery
& Confectionery Workers’ Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166
Pac. 665, L. R. A. 1917F, 824; Baasch v. Cooks Union,
Local No. 33, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843; Danz v.
American Federation of Musicians, 183 Wash. 186,
233 Pac. 630.

All these cases antedate the enactment of Laws of
1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7. Therefore, they cannot, in
the light of that act, be considered as authority upon
the problem which now confronts us. And, in passing,
it is to be noted that, prior to the passage of that act,
the court had recognized the right of “peaceful picket-
ing” under certain conditions. Adams v. Local No.
400 of Cooks etc., 124 Wash. 564, 215 Pac. 19; Sterling
Chain Theaters v. Central Labor Council, 155 Wash.
217, 283 Pac. 1081. In the former case, it was said:

“The supreme court of the United States, in the
case of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central

Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 66 L. Ed. 189, has elabo-
rately discussed this subject of injunction in indus-
trial disputes. It speaks with clearness of the rights
and obligations of the contesting parties in such con-
troversies, and, as a general guide, announces the fol-
lowing rule:

“ach case must turn on its own circumstances.
It is a case for the flexible remedial power of a court
of equity, which may try one mode of restraint, and
if it fails or proves to be too drastic, may change it.’”

Since the passage of our Norris-La Guardia act, this
court has sustained the right of peaceful picketing
under circumstances essentially no different than
those in the case at bar. Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw
Mill Workers Union, 189 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) 1066.
The court there said:

“As stated in the opinion of this court in the case of
Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396,
63 P. (2d) 397, working men have ‘the right to cease
work, or to strike, or in the lawful way to call a strike
and persuade others to join them.’ The right of labor
unions to convey to the public at large and persons
specially interested information to the effect that a
certain business or plant has been by labor unions
declared unfair has been several times upheld.”

It is true that, in that case, the picketing occurred
in the woods at a logging camp, and in this it occurred
on a city street. But we can conceive no difference
in the fundamental right by reason of that difference
in fact. Whether the right be exercised on a country
road or a city street, it is necessarily qualified by the
right of the traveling public. Of course, the right
cannot be exercised in a manner to interfere with or
obstruct traffic. .

That brings us to the consideration of a case upon
which respondent places much reliance: Tacoma v.
Roe, 190 Wash. 444, 68 P. (2d) 1028. We, however,
can find no analogy between that case and this in

law or in fact. The ordinance under consideration in
that case was definitely an ordinance designed to con-
trol traffic. Neither in terms nor purpose was it de-
signed to prohibit picketing. Nor was the defendant
in that case engaged in picketing.

Respondent also puts much reliance upon the cases
of Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks’ Union, 184 Wash.
322, 51 P. (2d) 372; and Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397. But, as
we read those cases, they are not decisive of the ques-
tion raised here. True, the Safeway Stores case di-
rectly involved picketing, but the decision hinged upon
the holding that no labor dispute existed in contem-
plation of the act. In the Blanchard case, the question
of picketing was only remotely involved—if at all. In
final analysis, that case simply holds that the power
of the courts to grant injunctions derives from the
constitution and cannot be circumscribed by legisla-
tive enactment. We find nothing in either of those
cases which conflicts with a holding on the record of
this case that “peaceful picketing” is lawful, and that
ordinance No. B-301 is invalid because it conflicts
with the public policy of the state, as declared by the
legislature in Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7.

This conclusion is in harmony with what seems to
be the unanimous opinion of courts dealing with the
subject of peaceful picketing in the light of the Norris-
LaGuardia act and acts identical with, or patterned
after, it. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery
Co., 303 U. S. 552, 82 L, Ed. 1012, 58 S. Ct. 703; Fenske
Bros. v. Upholsterers’ International Union, 358 Ill. 239,
193 N. BE. 112, 97 A. L. R. 1318; Schuster v. International
Ass’n of Machinists, etc., 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E.
(2d) 50; Local Union No. 26 etc. v. Kokomo, 211 Ind.
72,5 .N. E. (2d) 624, 108 A. L. R. 1111; Geo. B. Wallace
Co. v. International Ass’n of Mechanics, etc., 155 Ore.

652, 63 P. (2d) 1090; American Furniture Co. v. I. B.
of T. C. & H. of A., Chauffeurs etc., 222 Wis. 338, 268
N. W. 250, 106 A. L. R. 335; Senn v. Tile Layers Pro-
tective Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270, 872 (af-
firmed 301 U. S. 468, 81 L. Ed. 1229, 57 S. Ct. 857).

The Indiana case, Local Union No. 26 etc. v. Kokomo,
supra, is peculiarly pertinent because it is indistin-
guishable in its facts from the case at bar. There, as
here, pending a labor dispute, the city of Kokomo
passed an ordinance prohibiting picketing. The court
said:

“Since the legislature, by Chapter 12, Acts 1933, has
spoken in no uncertain terms upon the question of
labor disputes, the city of Kokomo possesses no power
to adopt an ordinance contrary to the legislative ex-
pression upon that subject, or contrary to the general
policy of the state.

“Part of the ordinance in question is irreconcilable
and inconsistent with Chapter 12, Acts 1933, and under
the foregoing authorities, and many others, cannot be
sustained upon the ground that it is a valid exercise
of police power. .

“The act of picketing i is a means of ‘compulsion and
coercion,’ but if it is exercised in a legal manner and
without fraud or violence, it is lawful under the stat-
ute, yet it is the clear intention of the ordinance to
prevent such acts. The overt act of assembling and
congregating for concerted action in a peaceable,
lawful manner is made punishable by the ordinance.
The ordinance is repugnant to the declared purpose
and object of the statute.”

In so far as ordinance No. B-301 conflicts with the
public policy of the state as declared by the legis-
lature in Laws of 1933, Ex. Ses., chapter 7, Rem. Rev.
Stat. (Sup.), §§ 7612-1 to 7612-15, it is invalid.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
with directions to dismiss.

Miiarp, Geracuty, Jerrers, Simpson, Bras, and
Rosrnson, JJ., concur. “+

Marn, J. (dissenting)—I recognize that the statute
expressly gives the right of “patrolling,” and declares
the public policy of the state. The statute, however,
does not cover the matter of the time, place, or manner
of patrolling. To give the right to patrol is one thing,
and to regulate the manner and the time and place
where it may be done is something else. I do not
believe that the legislature intended that the word
should be given a meaning so broad as to deprive a
city or town of the right to regulate the use of its
streets and sidewalks, or to deprive a business house
of the right to protect its business if the picketing
was destroying it, even though there was nothing that
could be said to amount to either fraud or violence. It
is a well-known fact that businesses of a certain type
can effectually be ruined by picketing in close prox-
imity tothe entrance of the business house, and in such
numbers as to practically destroy the business.

It is probably correct to say that, in the ordinance,
there are one or more provisions which cannot be
sustained; but it is not necessary, in view of the theory
upon which the majority opinion is written, to go into
these at this time.

. For the reasons indicated, I dissent.

Srernert, J. (dissenting)—For the reasons given by
Judge Main and, further, upon the ground that the
opinion .is inconsistent with our holdings in Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks’ Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P.
(2d) 372, and cases following it, concerning the limita-
tions upon the right to picket, I dissent.

573

[No. 27322. En Banc. September 28, 1939.]
Frances L. Keiuer, Respondent, v. Tan Crry oF
Szartie, Appellant.

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 184.

Brake, C. J., Mary, and Mrutarp, JJ., dissent.

A. C. Van Soelen and C. V. Hoard, for appellant.
Hare, Turner & Maurier, for respondent.

Rosinson, J—Mrs. Keller, as plaintiff, recovered a
jury verdict against the city of Seattle with respect
to injuries alleged to have been suffered by reason
of the negligent operation of a municipal street car.
On appeal, the city contends that the trial court erred
in denying its challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, in denying its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and in giving instruction No. 14.
It prays, in the alternative, that the cause be dismissed
or a new trial ordered.

Mrs. Keller received her injuries on September 14,
1937. On the following September 30th; she filed her

statutory claim against the city, describing the occur-
rence, in part, as follows:

“Claimant was seated on left front seat of said car
of the seats running crosswise thereof. The said car
stopped at said intersection, and while the car was so
stopped, claimant rose from her seat and proceeded
toward the front end of said car for the purpose of
getting off at the next intersection, to-wit: Broadway
and James street. While claimant was so proceeding,
the operator of said street car carelessly and negli-
gently started said car with a sudden, violent and
unusual jerk,.causing claimant to lose her balance and
throwing her with great force and violence against
the seat on the right side of said car, and the passen-
gers sitting thereon, and against the floor, causing the
injuries and damage hereinafter set forth.”

In the complaint, personally verified by her, under
oath, on January 19, 1938, Mrs. Keller alleged:

“Plaintiff was seated on the left front seat which
was placed crosswise of said car. At the time, there
were other passengers on the car, some of whom were
standing. The said car stopped at said intersection,
and while the car was so stopped, plaintiff rose from
her seat and proceeded toward the front end of said
car for the purpose of getting off at the next inter-
section, to-wit: Broadway and James street. While
plaintiff was so proceeding, the operator of said street
car carelessly and negligently started said car with a
sudden violent and unusual jerk, causing plaintiff to
lose her balance and throwing her with great force
and violence against the seat on the right side of said
ear, and the passengers sitting thereon, and against
the floor, causing the injuries and damage hereinafter
set forth.”

On April 21, 1938, Mrs. Keller, in giving a deposi-
tion under oath, testified several times, very definitely,
that she arose from her seat while the car was stopped
at the intersection of Broadway and Cherry streets to
allow passengers to alight, and that she had gotten

to her feet with the idea of getting off at the next
street and was standing when the car started with a
jerk which caused her to fall.

“Q. Will you describe in your own words just how
it happened? A. I wanted to get off at James street.
I had to get up to get off the car; and just as I got up
and took a step, why,—a couple of steps, perhaps, the
car jerked and threw me. Q. Was the car stopped
when you got up? A. When I got up? Q. Yes. A.
Yes. Q. It was stopped at Broadway and Cherry—
A. Yes, somebody got off. Q. And you were stand-
ing when it started? A. Yes, I got up— Q. You
were standing when it started? . . . Q. Was it
jerking more than cars usually do when they start
up? A. Well, it jerked, yes. Q. Was it worse than
they usually jerk when they start up? Was this worse
than the usual jerk when they start up? A. Yes, it
was quite a jerk. Q. Well, that does not answer the
question. I asked you, was it worse than usual, the
jerk, when cars start up? A. Well, it must have been
to throw me, to give me such a hard blow, throw me
so far. Q. Did you notice it at the time? A. Yes, I
noticed it at the time, that it was hard, because it
hurt me. Is that what you mean? Q. Well, I want
you to describe it just as well as you can. A. Well, it
just threw me. It all happened in a minute. Q. You
see that this jerk is very important both from your
standpoint and mine too, and I wanted you to describe
it as fully as you could. A. Well, I just got up and
took a few steps, and it gave a big jerk. It must have
been a terrible jerk to knock me down and throw me
so hard.”

This testimony, it will be noted, is entirely consistent
with the claim Mrs. Keller filed with the city, and also
with her complaint in this action.

At the trial, Mrs. Breen, a frequent passenger on
that line, was the first witness called. She was stand-
ing in the aisle, holding to the back of the third, left,
transverse seat. She testified, very positively, that
there was a jerk when the car started, after allowing

passengers to alight at Cherry street. This jerk threw
her backward. At that time, Mrs. Keller was still
seated. After the car had started, plaintiff, Mrs. Keller,
arose to get off, and there was another jerk, as if the
brakes had been applied suddenly, swinging Mrs.
Breen forward. This was the jerk which caused Mrs.
Keller to fall.

Mrs. Belarde, a sister of Mrs. Breen, was the next
witness called. She also testified that the car had
stopped and was again under way when the jerk oc-
curred which caused Mrs. Keller to fall.

The plaintiff, on being called after these two wit-
nesses had testified, abandoned the story she had told
in her claim to the city, and in her complaint, and in
her deposition of April 21st, to the effect that she fell
when the car jerked in starting up after the Cherry
street stop, and testified as Mrs. Breen and Mrs.
Belarde had done, saying, in part:

“The car stopped at Cherry street to let off people—
someone, and then after it started I got up and started
toward the forward end of the car and then it gave a
lurch, a very strong lurch, and threw me with great
force up against the seat and the people on the right
hand side of the car.”

In connection with this shifting of ground on
the part of the plaintiff, two contentions are made:
First, that there is a variance between the claim filed
with the city and the case made in court, in that Mrs.
Keller alleged, in her claim, that she was injured by
a starting jerk after a stop at an intersection, while
her evidence showed a stopping or decelerating jerk
after the car was on its way. There is no merit in
this contention, since the claim gave sufficient notice
of the time, place, and general nature of the alleged
accident. Wagner v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 275, 146 Pac.
621, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 720. Second, that Mrs. Keller’s

Dnt

conduct, in so readily shaping her testimony to make
it conform to that given by Mrs. Breen and Mrs.
Belarde, after having three times sworn, under oath,
that she fell because the car jerked in starting, after
discharging passengers at Cherry street, shows that
she is wholly unworthy of credit. Obviously, that cir-
cumstance affected her credibility. But credibility is
a matter for the exclusive consideration of the jury.
In our present inquiry, we are not only required to
treat the testimony given by Mrs. Keller, or on her
behalf, as true, but we must also give her the benefit of
every favorable inference which can be drawn from it.

HAs the plaintiff herself said, in giving her testi-
mony, “There are more or less jerks on any car.” The
question presented by the two assignments of error
relating to the merits is: Was there evidence that the
alleged jerk was so unusual and violent that reason-
able men might, in the absence of any explanation of
its cause, infer that it was brought about by some
negligent act or omission?

The evidence relied upon to show negligence is
found wholly in the testimony given by Mrs. Breen,
Mrs. Belarde and the plaintiff. In her direct examina-
tion, the plaintiff characterized the alleged jerk as
“a very strong lurch.” In her cross-examination, she
testified as follows:

“Q. How did it jerk; as if the brakes had been sud-
denly applied? A. I could not say, it just came like
that and I could not say what kind of a jerk it was.
It was a very violent jerk. It threw me to my knees.
Q. It did not swerve from left to right, did it? A.
I could not say that. Q. You could not say; you
did not know what kind of a jerk it was? A. It was
a very violent jerk. It threw me forward.”

Mrs. Breen, on direct examination, testified as
follows:

“Q. How would you describe this particular jerk
when Mrs. Keller fell? A. Well, it was very forceful
or violent; that is about the best I could say.”

She further testified that she might have fallen her-
self if she had not been holding to a seat. On cross-
examination, she said that the car did not sway, and
continuing:

“Q. You say it swung you around. Did it throw
you forward or backward? A. It did not throw me
clear around because I braced myself, but it did swing
me forward. Q. It swung you forward as if he put
on the brakes suddenly; is that right? A. That is
the impression I had of it.”

Mrs. Breen also testified that the operator of the
car was a more “jerking” driver than any other on
that line.

Mrs. Belarde testified to the same effect, and, as to
the jerk in question, she said that it was the most
severe that she had ever experienced while riding in
a street car. She further testified:

“Q. Did you feel the jerk? A. Yes, I did. Q.
What happened when you felt the jerk? A. Well,
I was thrown forward and my hat knocked to the
back of my head. Q. How far forward? A. Well,
far enough that I bumped my knees and I hit my hat
on the person in front of me. Q. You bumped your
knees, I presume on the back of the seat in front of
you? A. Yes.”

Upon cross-examination, she further testified:

“Q. Was anybody else thrown forward in the seat?
A. Idid not notice. I was busy, I did not notice. My
hat was thrown forward. . - Q. Were your
knees bruised? A. I could not say they were bruised,
but they did get a sharp bump.”

The appellant, in urging that no case was made for
the jury, relies upon the opinion in Wade v. North
Coast Transportation Co., 165 Wash. 418, 5 P. (2d)

985, cases cited in that opinion, and other cases of a
similar nature. In that case, a suitcase fell from a
parcel rack near the top of a bus, when the vehicle
was turning a corner, and injured a little girl. Wit-
nesses testified that the bus was going “quite fast;”
that there was a sudden “lurch and jerk;” that the bus
“Jurched;” and that passengers standing in the aisle

_ were thrown over against people sitting in the seats.
One witness testified:

“*Q. Did you feel the manner in which he was
turning into that street? Did you notice it? A. It
was impossible for me to stay in the seat; I was not
thrown out of the seat. Q. What did it do to you?
A. Oh, just sort of—I sort of left the seat.’ ”

It will be noted that the testimony of this witness
was somewhat indefinite. The court sustained the
action of the lower court in granting a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

We will not review the great number of other cases
which appellant cites. The case of Endicott v. Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Co., 318 Pa. 12, 177 Atl. 17, is
fairly typical, and is, at least, as favorable to the ap-
pellant as any other it has cited. We quote from that
decision:

“Testifying in her own behalf, plaintiff stated that
she boarded defendant’s trolley car, carrying an um-
brella and a small bag containing groceries; that there
were no empty seats; that after the car started another
passenger offered her a place at the front end of the
long bench that [ran] lengthwise of.the car’ on the
right-hand side; that she ‘took hold of the iron bar’
in front of the seat and ‘sat down right away, and the
car gave a terrible, terrific jolt? and stopped ‘very
suddenly,’ and she fell to the platform, suffering the
injuries for which she sought recovery. She testified
further that as she fell she saw men in front of her
‘twirling around on the straps,” and ‘people on the
seats pushing forward against the others.’ Another

witness stated that there was a ‘sudden and violent
stop,’ a ‘jerk, sudden, very sudden,’ that the passengers
who were seated ‘jostled up against each other,’ and
that he ‘whirled around’ on the strap to which he was
holding. This was the whole of plaintiff’s case.

“Accepting as true plaintifi’s evidence as to how the
accident happened, we are required to determine
whether it is sufficient to show that the car was oper-
ated in a negligent manner. In a long line of deci-
sions, recently reviewed by us in Smith v. Pgh. Rys.
Co., 314 Pa. 541, this court and the Superior Court
have held that statements that a street car ‘started
violently,’ ‘started with a violent jerk,’ ‘started with
a sudden, unusual, extraordinary jerk, ‘stopped with
a jerk, ‘came to a hard stop,’ ‘started up all of a sud-
den, with an awful jerk, and stopped all of a sudden,’
and the like, are not of themselves sufficient to show
negligent operation of the car, but that there must be
evidence inherently establishing that the occurrence
was of an unusual and extraordinary character, or
evidence of its effect on other passengers sufficient
to show this. .

“The fact that several passengers who were stand-
ing ‘whirled around’ or ‘twirled around’ on the straps
cannot be said to be sufficient to show an extraordinary
jolt or jerk of the car. A happening of this kind is
such a commonplace that it seldom attracts atten-
tion. Likewise, the testimony that the passengers on
the side seats (and it is clear that those are the ones
referred to) ‘pushed forward’ or ‘jostled up’ against
each other does not show that the stop was of an un-
usual or extraordinary nature.”

We agree with the appellant that the cases sustain
its contention as to the testimony given by the plain-
tiff herself, and by Mrs. Breen, but we do not hold
that view as to the testimony given by Mrs. Belarde.
It is to be remembered that the car had stopped at
the intersection where jerks might be expected to
occur in stopping and starting, and was proceeding
on its way when this jerk or jolt happened In our

opinion, reasonable men might well believe from Mrs.
Belarde’s testimony that this jerk was something more
than the ordinary jolt or jerk incident to transporta-
tion, especially since it occurred when the car was
traveling between intersections; and that, in the ab-
sence of any explanation on the part of appellant, it
laid the foundation for a logical inference that its
servant did not exercise that high degree of care which
the law imposes upon carriers of passengers; or, to
put the matter more briefly, that there was sufficient
evidence, in the words of the Endicott case, “of its
effect on other passengers” (Mrs. Belarde), to warrant
such an inference. °

Defendant made no attempt to explain the accident,
but such defense as it attempted was wholly directed
toward showing that it did not happen. Mrs. Keller
had alleged that she fell at about 4:45 p. m., and her
testimony, and that of her witnesses, was to the effect
that the incident occurred either a few minutes before,
or a few minutes after, five o’clock. Defendant offered
evidence to the effect that none of its employees had
reported the accident, as required by its strictly en-
forced rules requiring reports of all accidents in or
about their cars, and supplemented this by calling the
five motormen who operated the five cars which went
over the line, outward bound, between 4:45 and 5:17.
Each of them testified that, to the best of his knowl-
edge, no such accident happened on his car.

HM Appellant contends that the court erred in
giving instruction No. 14, which reads as follows:

“If you find that the plaintiff was a passenger on
defendant’s street car, and that she was injured by
virtue of the manner in which the defendant operated
the car, then I instruct you that there is a presump-
tion that plaintifi’s injury was caused by negligence
of the defendant, and the burden of proof is then on
the defendant to show that it was not negligent.”

Immediately after the jury retired, counsel for the
city read this instruction to the court, and, excepting
to it, said:

“I think that is entirely too broad, because the bur-
den is on the plaintiff to establish actual negligence
on the part of the defendant before she can recover.

“Under this instruction if she was injured by rea-
son of an ordinary jerk or ordinary going around the
curve by the car, no matter if it was operated in the
most careful manner possible, it would then transfer
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant,
and I do not think that is the law.”

The instruction was clearly erroneous, for the rea-
sons stated in the exception. Respondent insists that
the instruction is correct, on the ground that it is an
exact paraphrase of an instruction approved in Fire-
baugh v. Seattle Electric Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 Pac.
995, 111 Am. St. 990,2L. R. A. (N. S.) 836. But, ina
later case in which a plaintiff seeking to recover with
respect to injuries directly caused by the jerking of
a cable car relied upon the Firebaugh case and the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as the respondent does
here, the court said:

“The accidents in Firebaugh v. Seattle Elec. Co.,
40 Wash. 658, 82 Pac. 995, 111 Am. St. 990,2 LR. A.
(N. S.) 836; Williams v. Spokane Falls & Northern
R. Co., 39 Wash. 77, 80 Pac. 1100, and Anderson v.
McCarthy Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398, 95 Pac. 325,
16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, were of such a character as,
in the light of ordinary experience, were explainable
from the standpoint of the plaintiff by the presump-
tion of negligence only. Each and all of them were
unusual, not to be ordinarily anticipated, and incon-
sistent with the idea of careful operation. No such
showing is made in this case, the undisputed evidence
being that jerks of a cable car are of ordinary occur-
rence, consistent with careful operation, and that they
frequently happen without any act of negligence upon

the part of the carrier.” De Yoe v. Seattle Electric
Co., 53 Wash. 588, 102 Pac. 446, 104 Pac. 647, 1133.

In this case, the undisputed evidence is that jerks
of an electric car are of ordinary occurrence, consis-
tent with careful operation, and that they frequently
happen without any act of negligence on the part of
the carrier.

Respondent says, in her brief, that:

“The rule is stated in 10 C. J. 1030, § 1429, as follows:

“ ‘Sudden Jerks or Sudden or Premature Starts. As
to injuries resulting from the sudden movement of a
train or car, causing a jerk or jolt, the burden of prov-
ing which is on plaintiff it has been held that the fact
of the jerk or jolt itself, when proved as being un-
usual or extraordinary in its nature, is prima facie
evidence of negligence, the burden then being on de-
fendant to show freedom from negligence on its part;
and it is not necessary for plaintiff to go further and
to show that the jerk or jolt was not in the course of
the ordinary operation of the road; but the presump-
tion of negligence becomes conclusive unless it is
shown that the jerking or jolting of the car was un-
avoidable in the exercise of the highest degree of care.

”” (Italics ours.) .

But the obvious answer to that is that the instruction
complained of did not restrict the matter to a jerk
and jolt, “unusual or extraordinary in its nature.”
The jury was instructed that there was a presump-
tion of negligence if the plaintiff was injured “by
virtue of the manner in which the defendant operated
the car.” That included all operating jerks and jolts.

Most of the cases cited by respondent contain lan-
guage similar to that approved and quoted in the
Firebaugh case from Elliott on Railroads:

“Tt is, therefore, too broad a statement of the rule
to say that, in all cases, a presumption of negligence
on the part of the carrier arises from the mere happen-
ing of the accident or anihjury to a passenger regard-

less of the circumstances and nature of the accident.
The true rule would seem to be that when the injury
and circumstances attending it are so unusual and
of such a nature that it could not well have happened
without the company being negligent, or when it is
caused by something connected with the equipment
or operation of the road, over which the company had
entire control, without contributory negligence on the
part of the passenger, a presumption of negligence on
the part of the company usually arises from proof of
such facts, in the absence of anything to the contrary,
and the burden is then cast upon the company to show
that its negligence did not cause the injury.’ ”

But this accident was not of such a nature that “ ‘it
could not well have happened without the company
being negligent.” It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that a motorman, while operating his car be-
tween stops, is often confronted with dangers which
require the sudden setting of brakes, such as a jay-
walking pedestrian, a child running into the street
after a ball, an automobile or truck going in the same
direction suddenly pulling over into the middle of the
street or suddenly veering so close to the track as to
make a collision probable.

This action was wholly based upon the theory that
the respondent plaintiff was injured by the careless
manner in which the car was operated. The original
allegation of negligence was:

“«

. . the operator of said street car carelessly and
negligently started said car with a sudden, violent
and unusual jerk,

When it appeared from the evidence that the plain-
tiff did not fall when the car started, but when it de-
celerated between street intersections, she asked and
obtained leave to amend by adding the words “and
operated” after the word “started.” They were inter-
lined in the complaint and initialed by the trial judge.

The question which the case presented to the jury
was: Was the car “operated” in a careless and negli-
gent manner? The plaintiff, of course, had the burden
of proving that it was. The members of the jury were,
however, instructed that, if they found that plaintiff
“was injured by virtue of the manner in which the
defendant operated the car,” the burden was on the
defendant to show that it was not negligent, and so,
the jury was authorized to find for the plaintiff with-
out proof that the car was negligently operated; for
it is entirely possible that the plaintiff may have
fallen on account of an ordinary operating jerk. In
other words, under the instruction complained of, the
jury was authorized to presume that the car was negli-
gently operated because the defendant did not prove
that it was not.

Hl While strenuously insisting that the giving of
instruction No, 14 did not constitute error, the re-
spondent insists that, if it did, the error was harmless,
since the jury was told, in instruction No. 9, that the
defendant would not be liable for ordinary jerks and
jolts; and further, because it was stated generally, in
other instructions given, that the plaintiff must prove
negligence. We have frequently held that the giving
of a technically erroneous instruction does not consti-
tute prejudicial error, when, upon considering the
instructions as a whole, it can be fairly said that the
error was cured by some other instruction. But all
holdings of that kind depend upon the particular cir-
cumstances presented. Here, the result of the action
wholly depended upon the question as to whether or
not the motorman operated the car in a negligent
manner. The evidence tending to prove that he did
was not very convincing and, indeed, was barely suf-
ficient to carry the case to the jury.

a ™

HI It was contended throughout the case that the
rule of res ipsa loquitur applied. The respondent con-
cedes that the instruction complained of is a res ipsa
loquitur instruction. Her brief contains a subdivision
in defense of it, headed: “B. The Instruction on Res
Ipsa Loquitur Was Properly Given.” In a supple-
mental memorandum filed since the argument En
Bane, that contention is still stoutly maintained. Be-
ing of the opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applied and having procured the court to so instruct,
it is but reasonable to suppose that respondent’s coun-
sel urged that theory in his argument to the jury. The
‘doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is, obviously, directly
contrary to the rule that a plaintiff is required to
prove negligence. It dispenses with such proof on
his part and throws the burden upon the defendant
to disprove negligence.

Upon these considerations, we think that we must
‘dispose of the case as a similar case was disposed of
in Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Fotheringham, 17 Colo.
App. 410, 68 Pac. 978. In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that she was thrown and injured by sudden
jerking of a railroad car. The trial court instructed
the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Upon ap-
peal, the reviewing court said,—the first sentence re-
ferring to the res ipsa loquitur instructions:

“They authorized the jury to presume negligence
from the fact of the accident. It is true that the court
elsewhere gave an instruction that the burden was
upon the plaintiff to prove the negligence of the de-
fendant; but it could not undo the mischief it had
occasioned, by merely contradicting itself. It did not
belong to the jury to say in which of the court’s irrecon-
cilable declarations it was right, and in which it was
wrong; nor is it possible for us to know which they
followed.

“The judgment must be reversed.”

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
trial court is ordered to grant the defendant’s motion
for a new trial. ,

BEaLs, JEFFERS, STEINERT, SIMPSON, and GERAGHTY,
JJ., concur.

Mam, J. (dissenting)—I agree that instruction No.
14 does not contain a correct expression of the law,
and I am in accord with the law as stated in the ma-
jority opinion. There remains, however, the question
of whether, even though instruction No. 14 was erro-
neous, it was prejudicial. In view of the evidence
that was introduced and the giving of instruction
No. 9, wherein the jury were definitely told that there
was no liability for injuries caused by ordinary jolts
or jerks, I am unable to see how the jury could have
been misled by instruction No. 14. It is my view that
the instruction, even though erroneous, was not preju-
dicial.

I think the judgment should be affirmed.

Bragg, C. J., and Mzutarp, J., concur with Many, J.

589

[No. 27462. En Bane. September 28, 1939.]

Mary Lamps, a Minor, by Annie Lampe, her Guardian
ad Litem, et al., Appellants, v. A. J. TYRELL
et al., Respondents.*

S. A. Gagliardi, for appellants.

Robert E. Evans and Hayden, Metzger & Blair, for
respondents.

Jzrrrers, J.—This action was brought by Mary
Lampe, by her guardian ad litem, Annie Lampe; Anton
Lampe and Annie Lampe, husband and wife; Elsie

*Reported in 94 P, (2d) 193.

Hauge, by her guardian ad litem, Jennie Hauge; Andy
Hauge and Jennie Hauge, husband and wife; Mildred
Walentiny, by her guardian ad litem, Theresa Walen-
tiny; Mathias Walentiny and Theresa Walentiny, hus-
band and wife; against A. J. Tyrell and Joe Tyrell,
to recover for injuries claimed to have been sustained
by Mary Lampe, Elsie Hauge, and Mildred Walentiny,
as the result of a collision between a car in which they
were riding and a parked car, the car in which plain-
tiffs were riding being driven by defendant Joe Tyrell
and owned by his father, A. J. Tyrell.

A demurrer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint, inter-
posed by defendant A. J. Tyrell, having been sustained,
and plaintiffs having elected to stand on their amended
complaint, the cause proceeded to trial against Joe
Tyrell alone. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the court
granted a motion for nonsuit made by defendant Joe
Tyrell and thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal
on the merits as to both defendants. A motion for
new trial was timely made and denied, and this appeal
followed. °

Appellants contend the court erred (1) in sustaining
the demurrer of respondent A. J. Tyrell and dismissing
him from the case; (2) in granting a nonsuit at the
conclusion of appellants’ evidence; and (3) in denying
the motion for new trial, and entering a judgment of
dismissal.

The facts in this case, in so far as material to a
decision of what we deem the vital questions in the
case, may be stated as follows: On May 10, 1934,
twenty-one girls from the senior class of St. Leo’s
high school, in Tacoma, together with two chaperons,
went out to Lake Killarney to spend the week-end.
Among these girls were appellants Mary Lampe, Elsie
Hauge, and Mildred Walentiny, who at that time were
about seventeen years of age. The next day, shortly

before supper time, Dale Forkenbrock and Mark
Lowell drove out to the girls’ camp in Dale’s Austin
car. These boys had supper at the camp, and sometime
thereafter, respondent Joe Tyrell, driving his father’s
car, and accompanied by John Rhea, Phil Bartinetti,
and Glen Collins, drove into the camp. These boys
were all high school boys, and about the same age
as the girls, some of whom they knew and some of
whom they did not know.

These young folks did the things young people
usually do at picnics, but eventually it was suggested
by someone that they have a wiener and marshmallow
roast. This suggestion led to an inspection of the sup-
plies, and it was found there were not enough wieners
and marshmallows for the crowd. It was suggested
that someone would have to go into Tacoma to get
some wieners and marshmallows.

During this conversation, the crowd was scattered
around, some of them being on the lake, some of them
in the cabin, where the conversation, or at least part
of it, seems to have taken place, and some outside.
During the conversation, someone suggested that they
take up a collection to get the wieners and marsh-
mallows, and apparently this was done, but none of
the appellants knew who took up the collection, who
contributed, other than that they thought most of the
girls who had some change contributed, how much
was contributed, or who got the money. It does, how-
ever, appear that John Rhea had the money at the time
the six young people started for Tacoma. All of
these appellants testified that the collection was taken
up for the sole purpose of getting the wieners and
marshmallows, and it does not appear from the testi-
mony of any of the appellants, or any other witness
except Phil Bartinetti, that anything was said about

any part of this money being used to pay the expense
of transportation to Tacoma and back.

About this time, someone suggested that Dale
Forkenbrock take his car and go after the supplies,
but it appears that Dale’s car, being an Austin, was
small, and as he had apparently already been into Ta-
coma once that afternoon, he did not want to go. Joe
Tyrell then said he would take his car and go, but
that he did not want to go alone, and would not go
unless some of the girls went along for company.
None of the appellants seemed to know just how it
happened that they were the ones who finally went,
except that it appears that some of the girls were en-
gaged in other activities, some of them had work to do
around the camp, and it was suggested that appellants
go with Joe for company, so they went. It does not
appear that Joe Tyrell at any time talked personally
to any of the appellants about the trip, or that at any
time it was discussed with them as to what was to
be done after they got to Tacoma, or that appellants
were to take any part in purchasing the supplies.

Nothing appears in the testimony to indicate that
anyone other than respondent was to have any control,
either directly or indirectly, in the operation of the
car. It does not appear from the testimony that re-
spondent expressly invited any one of these appel-
Jants to accompany him, but it does appear from all
the testimony that respondent said he would take his
car and go, if some of them would go with him for
company, and so eventually appellants went.

As an example of the testimony of appellants, Mil-
dred Walentiny testified that Joe offered to go, but
did not want to go alone; that some of the boys offered
to go, and “we went with him because he did not
want to go alone—we went along for company.” Ap-
pellant Elsie Hauge testified that Joe Tyrell said he

would go, but would not go alone; that he wanted
someone to go with him for company; that nobody
designated them to go, but that the girls went because
Joe wanted some of them to go for company, and that
was the reason’they went. Appellant’ Mary Lampe
did not know who asked her to go, did not remember
seeing the collection taken up, and did not remember
who did any of the talking or what was said, except
that they were going to take up.a collection. She did
not remember whether she contributed or not.

Phil Bartinetti testified that he went because Joe
asked him to go, and that was the only reason he went.
During his examination, on three different occasions
he testified the collection was taken up for the pur-
pose of getting wieners and marshmallows and for no
other purpose, but finally, in answer to a question by
Mr. Gagliardi, he testified that they were to use some
of the money to buy gas and oil. On cross-examina-
tion by Mr. Evans, he admitted that, during the con-
versation, he had heard no one say anything about
buying gas and oil, but that, after the collection was
taken, and just before they got in the car, John and
Joe said they were to buy gas and oil with some of
the money. He further testified that no gas or oil
was purchased, and, on being further interrogated by
Mr. Evans as to whether he had stated in Mr. Evans’
office that nothing had been said at any time about
gas and oil, the witness said he did not remember.
On being further questioned by Mr. Evans as to
whether or not a short time before, in the hall, the
witness had said he had lied to Mr. Evans in his office,
the witness said he did not remember, but, referring
to that occasion, further testified: “I might have
made a lot of lies.”

Dale Forkenbrock testified that Joe said-he would
take his car and go in, and Rhea and Bartinetti were

going with him; that they asked if anybody else wanted
to go along, and it was finally decided three of the
girls would go; that they did not ask any definite
girl—they just asked who would like to go along, and
these girls said they would be the ones that would
like to go. In answer to a question by Mr. Gagliardi,
“Who said that?” the witness replied, “The boys asked
the girls who would like to go along.”

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in
ruling that appellants had failed to prove a joint ad-
venture, and in taking the case away from the jury
and deciding, as a matter of law, that the appellants
were not entitled to recover.

Appellants seem to argue that, unless it appears
that the relationship was that of host and guest, or
licensor and licensee, the relationship of the parties
should have been submitted to the jury, and thus to
argue, inferentially at least, that possibly there could
have been, under the testimony in this case, some re-
lationship other than that of joint adventurer, host
and guest, or licensor and licensee. We think, under
the testimony, the status of the parties hereto was
either that of joint adventurer, host and guest, or
licensor and licensee. Counsel for appellants does
not suggest what other relationship could have ex~-
isted. Certainly, they were not passengers for hire;
neither were they trespassers. However, later on in
his brief, counsel for appellants flatly contends the
facts proven bring this case squarely within the defi-
nition of joint adventurer.

The trial court held the status of the parties was
not that of joint adventurer, but was that of either host
and guest or licensor and licensee, and, there being
no evidence that the accident was intentional on the
part of respondent, there could be no recovery herein.

HJ The question of whether or not the relation-

ship of joint adventurer has been established is not
always an easy one to determine. There are many
decisions from this court on this question, and in some
of the cases it was held that the relationship had been
established; in others not. The facts in some of these
cases are such as not to be easily distinguished. How-
ever, we believe that the relationship of joint adven-
turer is fundamentally based upon certain principles,
and that the court has endeavored to apply those prin-
ciples to the facts in the different cases.

In the following cases, we held the testimony suffi-
cient to take the case to the jury on the question of
joint adventure: Masterson v. Leonard, 116 Wash.
551, 200 Pac. 320; Hurley v. Spokane, 126 Wash. 213,
217 Pac. 1004; Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.,
133 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635; O’Brien v. Woldson, 149
Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304, 62 A. L. R. 436; Lloyd v.
Mowery, 158 Wash. 341, 290 Pac. 710; White v. Stanley,
169 Wash. 342, 13 P. (2d) 457; Bates v. Tirk, 177 Wash.
286, 31 P. (2d) 525; Forman v. Shields, 183 Wash. 333,
48 P. (2d) 599; Potter v. Jaurez, 189 Wash. 476, 66
P. (2d) 290; Duvall v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 191
Wash. 417, 71 P. (2d) 567; DeNune v. Tibbitts, 192
Wash. 279, 73 P. (2d) 521; and in the following cases,
we held the testimony was not sufficient to estab-
lish such relationship: State ex rel. Ratliffe v. Su-
perior Court, 108 Wash. 443, 184 Pac. 348; Rosenstrom
v. North Bend Stage Line, 154 Wash. 57, 280 Pac. 932;
Sanderson v. Hartford Eastern R. Co., 159 Wash. 472,
294 Pac. 241; Colvin v. Simonson, 170 Wash. 341, 16
P. (2d) 839; Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484,
18 P. (2d) 48; Pickering v. Stearns, 182 Wash. 234,
46 P. (2d) 394; Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86, 77
P. (2d) 382.

The first case to which we desire to refer is that of
State ex rel. Ratliffe v. Superior Court, supra, as this

case is cited in many cases and seems to have been
the pioneer in this state in announcing the principles
underlying this relationship. In the cited case we
stated:

“The courts and authorities have not yet laid down
any very certain definition of a joint adventure, nor
have they established any very fixed or certain boun-
daries thereof, but generally they have been content
to determine whether the given or conceded facts ina
particular case constitute the relationship of joint ad-
venturers or copartners. Generally speaking, the
authorities seem to hold that a joint adventure very
closely resembles a copartnership, and that the rules
of law governing the latter are generally applicable
to the former. It is conceded that a joint adventure
creates a close and even fiduciary relationship be-
tween the parties, and that whether an instrument
establishes the relationship of landlord and tenant or
joint adventurers or copartners is to be ascertained
from ‘the contract.” (Italics ours.)

In Hurley v. Spokane, supra, it does not appear that
there was any agreement between the parties, but it
does appear that the occupants of the car were brother
and sister, using the car of their father for a common
purpose at the time of the accident. The decision
seems to have been based upon the rule announced
in 20 R. C. L. 149, which is to the effect that, if two or
more persons unite in the joint prosecution of a com-
mon purpose, under such circumstances that each has
authority, express or implied, to act for all in respect
to the control of the means or agencies émployed to
execute such common purpose, the negligence of one
in the management thereof will be imputed to the
others.

In Masterson v. Leonard, supra, where it appears
that two boys were riding a bicycle, owned by the
father of one of them, delivering papers on a route be-
longing to one boy, the other boy going along for the

purpose of learning the route so that he could substi-
tute for the boy who owned the route, we held there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the ques-
tion of joint adventure, saying:

“We are of the opinion, in view of the ownership
of the bicycle, the general possession of and control
over it by Frank, the acquiescing by him in the tem-
porary control over it by Edward for the purpose of
conveying them both on this hazardous journey,
which we think was their common enterprise or ad-
venture, that the trial court did not err in telling the
jury, in effect, that whatever negligence Edward was
guilty of, in carrying out this their joint enterprise
or adventure, was attributable to Frank and became,
in law, his negligence.”

No reference is made in this opinion to any con-
tractual relation.

In Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., supra, there
was evidence of an agreement by the parties to enter
into an undertaking in which the parties had a common
interest, and to which they were all to contribute.

In O’Brien v. Woldson, supra, the testimony shows
the parties left Spokane on a pleasure trip to Portland
and Seattle. Mrs. Woldson was to furnish the automo-
bile, and Mrs. O’Brien was to pay for the gasoline. In
this case, we stated:

“For present purposes it is sufficiently accurate to
say that the relations of joint adventurers as between
themselves are governed practically by the same rules
that govern partners.”

Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Line, supra, is
cited by counsel for each of the parties hereto, and is
referred to in practically all of the cases subsequently
decided by this court on this question. In the cited
case, respondent and one Baffaro were students at
Renton high school and members of the football team.
On the day of the accident, the members of the foot-

\

ball team were excused at three o’clock, in order that
they might engage in football practice. When respond-
ent and Baffaro went to their lockers, each discovered
he had left the key to his locker at home. Baffaro
had driven a car to school, which was parked on the
grounds. When Baffaro discovered his key was at
home, he stated that he was going after it, and that
he would take respondent along and drive him to his
home so he could get his key. It was while on this
mission that the accident happened. This court held
the parties were not engaged in a joint adventure, and
in the course of the opinion stated:

“The relation, as a legal concept cognizable by the
courts, must have its origin in contract.

“There must be an agreement to enter into an under-
taking in the objects or purposes of which the parties
to the agreement have a community of interest and
a common purpose in its performance. Necessarily,
the agreement presupposes that each of the parties has
an equal right to a voice in the manner of its perform-
ance, and an equal right of control over the agencies
used in its performance. One or more of the parties
may, of course, intrust performance to another or
others, but this involves only the law of agency.”

In Lloyd v. Mowery, supra, the evidence is to the
effect that there was an agreement to engage in a joint
adventure, and that, for the purpose of carrying out
the common purpose, one of the parties was to fur-
nish the car and the others were to contribute to the
expenses of the trip. The Rosenstrom case is not re-
ferred to, and the decision is based upon the rule an-
nounced in O’Brien v. Woldson, supra.

The testimony in White v. Stanley, supra, is to the
effect that the parties were going on a fishing trip,
and the night before talked the matter over. While
there was no express agreement as to just what each
one was to contribute towards the expedition, it ap-

pears that Stanley furnished the car and White con-
tributed to the expenses of the trip. In the cited case,
we referred to Masterson v. Leonard, and Hurley v.
Spokane, supra, and apparently upon the authority of
those two cases, stated:

“Many times, an express or implied agreement to
share the expense is one of the elements constituting
a joint adventure, but it is not always a necessary ele-
ment.”

We stated, in Sanderson v. Hartford Eastern R. Co.,
supra:

“The evidence before us fails to disclose the elements
of a ‘joint adventure, or any facts which constituted
Samuel Sanderson in law respondent’s agent for the
purpose of driving Samuel’s automobile. In the sug-
gestion made by respondent’s son that respondent ride
home in the son’s car, and in the acceptance of this
invitation by respondent, it is clear that respondent
entered upon this journey as a mere invitee, and not
as a joint adventurer.”

In Colvin v. Simonson, supra, where it appears that,
at the time of the accident, the father of respondent,
as was the usual practice, was taking respondent’s
brother to school, and was then to take respondent on
to her work, we stated:

“In our opinion, the record is lacking in evidence
upon which to predicate a finding that there was a
relationship of joint adventurers between respondent
and her father. Mere evidence that a passenger is in
the habit of making certain trips at regular intervals
is, in itself, insufficient upon which to predicate the
existence of a joint venture.”

In the case of Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, supra, the
facts are that appellants Kielsmeier were the owners
of an automobile, and on the day of the accident, Mrs.
Kielsmeier, together with respondent Dorothy Eu-
banks, a minor, her mother, and a Mrs. Harter, made a

trip to the city of Yakima to do some shopping and to
attend a luncheon to be given by a mutual friend.
Sometime prior to the day of the accident, Mrs. Eu-
banks and Mrs. Harter had discussed the expected trip
to Yakima and had probably agreed that between them
they would pay for the gas and oil used on the trip.
About the time they started on the trip, either Mrs.
Eubanks or Mrs. Harter suggested that they drive up
to a gas station and procure gas and oil. The offer was
declined by Mr. Kielsmeier, who was present at that
time. The ladies did their shopping and attended the
luncheon, and on the return trip the accident occurred,
resulting in injuries to Mrs. Eubanks and her daughter
Dorothy. In the cited case, we stated:

“There is nothing in this evidence, in our opinion,
from which any reasonable conclusion or inference can
be drawn that there was a joint adventure between the
parties . . . The preliminary arrangement be-
tween Mrs. Eubanks and Mrs. Harter, relative to pay-
ing for the gasoline and oil on the Yakima trip, if it
is to be considered seriously at all, was never com-
municated to the appellants. In any event, there was
never a consummation of the prospective arrangement

“But even if the gasoline and oil had been purchased
by the lady companions, that of itself would not have
established a joint adventure . . . The purchase
by a companion of a trifling amount of gasoline, in the
absence of any agreement by the parties to share the
expenses of a trip, does not ipso facto convert the
amenities of a friendly host into the obligations of a
joint adventurer. -To hold otherwise would compel
every host to dilute his hospitality and season it with
the flavor of a bargain. :

“The parties may have made the trip to Yakima each
having a like purpose in mind, but that fact alone does
not constitute a joint adventure. A host and guest
may, and often do, have a common objective, in point
of time or place, yet their relationship as such is not
thereby necessarily changed. . . . We have held

that a joint adventure, as a legal concept, must have
its origin in contract, that the agreement presupposes
that each of the parties has an equal right to a voice
in the manner of its performance and an equal right
of control over the agencies used in its performance.

“The respondents did not testify, or by slightest
suggestion assume to say, that there was any agree-
ment of any kind whatever whereby the parties were
to share the expenses or to exercise joint control over
the automobile. .

“The respondents were guests, not joint adven-
turers.” (Italics ours.)

In Bates v. Tirk, supra, the testimony shows that
one Royer Bogenreif was a friend of the Bates family,
and had on frequent occasions been out riding, in the
Bates family car, with various members of the family,
and on such occasions usually did the driving. On
the day of the accident, there was to be a football
game at the school grounds, and in the forenoon,
Bogenreif went to the Bates home, with the intention
of taking respondent, Dorothy Bates, and her sister
to the football game, provided they were allowed to
use the Bates car. Permission was given by respond-
ent’s father to use the car, and it seems to have been
understood that Bogenreif was to do the driving.
Borgenreif replenished the car with gasoline, pur-
chased by himself, and the three young people went
to the football game. It was on the return trip home
that the accident in which respondent was injured
happened. We held the undertaking was a joint ad-
venture. :

We held, in Pickering v. Stearns, supra, that, at the
time of the accident, the parties were not engaged in
a joint adventure, and therein stated:

“We find in the record nothing which supports re-
spondent’s contention that she bore the relation of
joint adventurer. She was not a student at the junior

college, nor does it appear that she made any contribu-
tion to the expense of the journey. We are of the
opinion that John Oldfield and Ed Stearns were joint
adventurers, but respondent was an invited guest of
the joint adventure, and bore the relation of guest to
both Oldfield and Stearns.”

It does not appear that respondent had been invited
to make the trip by Ed Stearns, the driver of the car,
but had been invited by John Oldfield, who contrib-
uted five gallons of gasoline towards the expense of
the journey.

In Forman v. Shields, supra, Gordon Shields had
obtained permission of his father (appellant) to use
the family car to take a group of boys on a class picnic
to Lake Samish. Among these boys was respondent,
William Forman. The night before the picnic, the
boys decorated the car, each contributing a small
amount towards the decorations. It was also agreed
that respondent and two of the other boys should each
buy a gallon of gas for the trip. No gas was ever pur-
chased by these boys, and respondent’s explanation
of his failure so to do was that settlement was to have
been made after the picnic. We held the facts suffi-
cient to take the case to the jury on the question of
joint adventure.

In Potter v. Jaurez, supra, the testimony shows that
respondent desired to make the trip from Seattle to
Rockport and return, and pursuant to such desire, she
talked the matter over with appellant Mrs. Jaurez, and
it was agreed appellants would take respondent to
Rockport, and that respondent would pay her share of
the expenses. We stated that the jury could hardly
do otherwise than find that a complete understanding
was then arrived at by the two ladies, to the effect
that the respondent should pay her share of the ex-
penses.

In Duvall v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., supra, we
stated that all the elements of joint adventure, as
enumerated in the Rosenstrom case, supra, sufficiently
appeared to make the question one for the jury. While
it appears that all the ladies who were riding in the
car at the time of the accident were going to Tacoma
for the purpose of putting on some lodge work, it does
not appear that there was any agreement or under-
standing that the ladies, other than the owner of the
car, would in any way contribute to, or share in, the
expense of the trip, nor is there anything in the testi-
mony to indicate that the ladies, other than the owner
of the car, were to have a voice in the manner of
operation or control of the automobile.

In the case of Syverson v. Berg, supra, the sole ques-
tion was whether the trial court, as a matter of law,
should have held that respondent Mrs. Syverson was
an invited guest, under Laws of 1933, chapter 18, p.
145. Respondent’s minor daughter and appellant,
Rodney Berg, had been friends for some time, and
about a year prior to the accident, appellant had in-
vited respondent’s daughter to accompany him on an
automobile trip to Pullman, to attend a dance. As the
trip involved an overnight absence, respondent would
not allow her daughter to go. At the time of the
trip in question, appellant again invited respondent’s
daughter to accompany him to Pullman, to attend a
military ball. The mother again refused to allow the
daughter to go, and at first refused to accompany the
young people as chaperon, but about a week prior to
the ball, respondent relented and granted permission
to the young people to make the trip, respondent to
go along as chaperon, her only purpose being to make
the trip possible for her daughter and appellant. The
opinion states:

“This was a purely social automobile trip. It was
not taken in expectation of material gain. To hold
that a mother acting as a chaperon to her daughter
for the sake of propriety is not within the status of
an invited guest—there is no evidence or claim of any
monetary consideration either accruing or promised
to the appellant as a result of this trip—would so
misinterpret the statute as to divest it of force and
defeat the clearly declared intention of the legislature
to deny recovery, as against the owner or operator of
the automobile, to a guest or licensee where no business
advantage or material consideration accrued to the
host in the transportation resulting in the injury.

“This is not a case of an agreement to share expenses
and where, by reason of such an agreement, a ma-
terial benefit is conferred upon the driver.” (Italics
ours.)

Since the decision in the Ratliffe case, supra, to
which reference is made in the Rosenstrom case, this
court has recognized the rule that the relationship of
joint adventurer must have its origin in contract.
Appellants recognize this rule, but say that “at no time
has it been held that it was a contract clothed with
all the definitions and necessities of a contract.”

While it may be that, in some of the cases, such as
Hurley v. Spokane, and Duvall v. Pioneer Sand &
Gravel Co., supra, there does not seem to be much
in the testimony upon which to base any contractual
relation, still we are of the opinion it has not been
the intention of this court to depart from the rule
announced in the Rosenstrom case, and we again affirm
the rule there announced, and now state that the rela-
tionship of joint adventurer must be founded on con-
tract, and that, before such relationship can be estab- ~
lished, it must appear from the testimony that there
was an agreement between the parties to enter into
an undertaking, in the objects or purposes of which

the parties to the agreement have a community of
interest.

Such an agreement presupposes that each of the
parties has an equal right to a voice in the manner of
its performance and an equal right of control over
the agencies used in its performance. We cannot be-
lieve that this status can be established by mere loose
statements, with no thought of any contractual obli-
gation, or that it can be formed by the mere purchas-
ing of some item, such as gas or oil, there having been
no previous agreement or understanding so to do.
Neither do we believe that a common purpose is suf-
ficient in itself to form this relationship, there having
been no previous agreement to carry out the common
purpose. The relationship of joint adventurer is a
serious matter, and it should not be held that the par-
ties thereto have assumed the liabilities attached to
such an undertaking, without some definite indication
of their intention so to do.

If this relationship is to find any basis in contract,
then certainly there must be present some of the ele-
ments of a contract before it can be contended such a
relationship has been established. It is so obvious as
to be almost inescapable that there must be an agree-
ment in order that at least two elements necessary
to this relationship be established, or implied there-
from. We know, as a practical proposition, that, when
several parties are riding in a car, regardless of what
their purpose may be, the owner of the car usually
drives and controls the car. Apparently, the courts
have recognized this fact; hence, the only theory on
which one not such a driver or operator may be said
to have an equal voice in the manner of its perform-
ance and an equal right of control over the car, is that
each is engaged in the performance of the plans which
all have agreed upon, and which are as personal to

" a

one as to the other. Surely, before it can be said that
parties other than the owner of a car have an equal
voice in its operation and control, there must be some
contribution on their part to the enterprise, which will
be of mutual benefit to the owner of the car, as well
as to themselves, and which will constitute a consider-
ation for their right to an equal voice in the manner of
performance and an equal right of control over the
car.

Viewing the testimony in the instant case with the
rule in mind just announced, we are clearly of the
opinion that appellants and respondent were not joint
adventurers. There was no agreement, either express
or implied, between appellants and respondent, shown
by the testimony; neither does it appear that appel-
lants contributed anything to the trip from which re-
spondent would have benefited, other than the pleasure
of their company. It does not appear that it was neces-
sary for appellants to go, as John Rhea had the money
with which to buy the wieners and marshmallows, and
it further appears from the testimony of appellants
that they went along as company, and for that reason
only.

HI Was the relation of appellants and respondent
that of host and guest, or licensor and licensee?

Laws of 1933, chapter 18, p. 145, §1, provides:

“No person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle as an invited guest or licensee with-
out payment for such transportation shall have a cause
of action for damages against such owner or operator
for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident, unless
such accident shall have been intentional on the part
of said owner or operator.”

There is no claim here, nor does the testimony show,
that the accident in which appellants were injured
was intentional on the part of respondent.

We think, under a fair interpretation of the testi-
mony in this case, appellants were respondent’s guests.
It is claimed the testimony does not show that appel-
lants were invited guests. It is true it does not appear
that respondent specifically asked each one of the ap-
pellants to go into Tacoma with him, but we think
an invitation may be given impliedly as well as ex-
pressly. Respondent stated that he would take his
car and go in after the supplies, but would not go
unless some of the girls went along for company, and
so, as testified by them, they went along for company;
in other words, these appellants accepted the implied
invitation of respondent, extended to any of the girls
that might desire to go along. We believe appellants
were invited guests of respondent, under our decisions
in Eubanks v. Kielsmeier and Syverson v. Berg, supra.
See 4 Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law and Prac-
tice, 79, § 2292.

In view of the conclusion reached by us on the ques-
tion considered, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the
other errors assigned by appellants.

We are therefore of the opinion the court did not
err in granting respondent’s motion for nonsuit at the
conclusion of appellants’ evidence and entering a judg-
ment of dismissal.

The judgment is affirmed.

ALL Concur.

608

INo. 27472. Department One. September 29, 1939.]
ALice Warner, a Minor, by E. C. Warner, her Guardian
ad Litem, Respondent, E. C. Warner, Indi-
vidually, Cross-appellant, v. GorDon J.
Keesier et al., Appellants.t

*Reported in 94 P, (2d) 175.

609

Ballinger, Clark, Mathewson & Force, for appel-
lants.

Ballinger, Hutson & Boldt, for respondent and cross-
appellant.

Jerrers, J.—This action was brought by Alice War-
ner, a minor, by her guardian ad litem, E. C. Warner,
and E. C. Warner, individually, against Gordon J.
Keebler and Dorothy Keebler, his wife, to recover
damages for personal injuries received by plaintiffs,
and also for damages to the automobile of E. C. War-
ner, as the result of a collision between a car driven
by plaintiff E. C. Warner, in which his daughter Alice
was riding, and a truck driven by defendant Gordon J.

as

Keebler, in which his wife Dorothy was riding. The
accident occurred at the intersection of south One
Hundred Twentieth street and Roseburg avenue south,
in King county, Washington.

The cause was tried to the court without a jury.
The court entered findings, conclusions, and judgment
in favor of plaintiff Alice Warner against defendants,
and denied plaintiff E. C. Warner, individually, any
recovery. The court also denied defendants recovery
on their cross-complaint for personal injuries received
and damage to their truck.

Motions for judgment notwithstanding the oral de-
cision of the court, or in the alternative for new trial,
were timely made by defendants and by plaintiff
E. C. Warner, individually, and denied.

Defendants have appealed from the judgment en-
tered, and plaintiff E. C. Warner, individually, has
appealed from that part of the judgment denying
him relief.

Roseburg avenue south and south One Hundred
Twentieth street are gravel surfaced public highways
in King county, Washington, neither street being an
arterial highway. Roseburg avenue runs in a general
northerly and southerly direction, and One Hundred
Twentieth street runs in an easterly and westerly
direction.

Just prior to the accident, as appears by the testi-
mony of appellant Gordon Keebler, he was proceeding
north on Roseburg avenue at about eighteen miles per
hour in his Ford truck. For about one hundred feet
south of the intersection, the road was rough, and
he slowed down to about fifteen miles per hour. At
all times, he was-driving on his right-hand side of the
road. He did not look to the right for approaching
traffic on One Hundred Twentieth street, and did not
see the Warner car until just as he came into the

intersection, at which time he thought the Warner
car was about one hundred feet east of the intersection.
Appellant testified that he could not tell the speed of
respondent’s car, and, to use his own words, “I was
giving the man the benefit of the doubt of a prudent
speed.” He further testified that he did not stop,
although he could have stopped in ten or twelve feet,
but kept right on into the intersection, thinking, as
he said, that it was more or less safe to drive across
the intersection. He was almost through the inter-
section when his truck was struck just back of the
cab by the Warner car and was carried across the inter-
section to the north and west, and turned partly
around.

On direct examination, Dorothy Keebler was asked
the question: “Will you just explain in your own
words how the accident happened?” to which she
replied:

“There isn’t really much we can explain, except
that we were approaching the intersection and we saw
the lights of this car approaching, and the next thing
the accident was over with. That is about the only
way I can describe it. We were approaching the inter-
section and saw the lights and were halfway across
the street when the accident was over with.”

This witness further testified that she thought the
Warner car was seventy-five to one hundred feet away
when they first saw it.

Respondent E. C. Warner testified that, just prior
to the collision, he was proceeding west on One Hun-
dred Twentieth street at about thirty to thirty-five
miles per hour; that his daughter Alice, a minor of
thirteen years, was riding with him; that he first saw
appellants’ truck when he was about sixty-five feet
east of the intersection; that, when he saw appellants’
truck, he slowed down, and that the Keebler truck

slowed down, or, as it looked to him, had come to a
stop; that, by this time, he had reached the intersec-
tion, and thinking appellants’ truck had slowed down
or stopped to let him pass, he then turned his attention
to the front, stepped on the gas, released his brakes,
and all of a sudden appellants’ truck was before him
and it was too late to avoid the collision.

The traveled portion of One Hundred Twentieth
street was about twenty-one feet wide where. it en-
tered the intersection, and about twenty-four feet wide
including the part outside the traveled portion. Ap-
pellant Gordon Keebler further testified that, at the
time he was struck, there was about ten or twelve
feet back of his truck which was available for Warner
to use, but that Warner did not vary his course, but
came straight on until he struck appellants’ truck.

The trial court found that, by reason of the com-
bined and concurring negligence of respondent E. C.
Warner and appellants, and as a proximate result
thereof, the automobile of respondent E. C. Warner
and the truck of appellants came into collision within
the intersection, and by reason thereof, the injuries
and damages to the various parties were incurred.

The trial court further found that the negligence of
Gordon Keebler consisted of the following: Failing
to keep a proper lookout for the approach of the War-
ner automobile, and failing to yield to the Warner
automobile the right of way in and through the inter-
section, when the latter was on the right of appellants’
truck and simultaneously approaching a given point
within the intersection.

Appellants’ assignments of error will be hereinafter
referred to as they are discussed.

HI This case having been tried to the court, we
are bound to accept the findings as verities, unless
from the record it appears that they are contrary to

the clear preponderance of the evidence. Pietro Paint
Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 147 Wash. 158, 265 Pac. 155.

Appellants contend the court erred in denying them
recovery against respondent E. C. Warner, and in hold-
ing that appellant Gordon Keebler was negligent, and
that such negligence was one of the proximate causes
of the accident.

Hi It is apparent from the fact that the car col-
lided in the intersection and the further fact that it
does not appear that respondent’s car was being so
wrongfully and unlawfully operated as to deceive ap-
pellants, that the cars were simultaneously approach-
ing a given point in the intersection. Martin v. Haden-
feldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533. This being true, it
follows that appellant Gordon Keebler was the dis-
favored driver. Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-88
[P. C. § 2696-846], provides:

“Tt shall be the duty of every operator of any ve-
hicle on approaching public highway intersections to
look out for and give right of way to vehicles on their
right, simultaneously approaching a given point within
the intersection, and whether such vehicle first enter
and reach the intersection or not: Provided, This
section shall not apply to operators on arterial public
highways.” Laws of 1937, chapter 189, p. 899, § 88.

While all rights of way are relative, the primary
duty of avoiding accidents rests upon the driver on
the left, which duty he must perform with reasonable
regard to the maintenance of a fair margin of safety
at all times. Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra.

In Roed v. Washington Laundry Co., 160 Wash. 166,
294 Pac. 1023, the plaintiff was driving his car north
on Roed road, and on approaching the intersection
with the Sunnydale road, he looked and saw the laun-
dry truck approaching at a distance of about one
hundred seventy-five feet. Plaintiff was driving at

about sixteen miles per hour. He speeded up his car
a little, but was struck by the laundry truck at a point
a few feet north of the center of the intersection.
Plaintiff was the driver on the left, and we held that
he was guilty of such negligence as to preclude a
recovery, and that the case fell within the second para-
graph of the principles announced in the Hadenfeldt
case, and without the fourth.

In Strouse v. Smith, 166 Wash. 643, 8 P. (2d) 411,
the driver of the car on the left testified that he did
not look to the right for approaching cars until the
front end of his car came into the intersection. In
commenting on the testimony in the cited case, we
stated:

“Respondent’s testimony conclusively establishes
the fact that, except for his contributory negligence
in failing to comply with the statute above referred to,
the injury would not have occurred. He did not, when
approaching the public highway intersection, look out
for and give right of way to the vehicle on his right.
- He does not claim to have looked to the right until the
front end of his car came into the intersection. That
he did not then comply with the statute requiring
drivers to look out for vehicles on their right, is clear
from his testimony that he did not see any vehicles
when he looked to the right as his car entered the
intersection. The mandate of the statute is not com-
plied with by a mere perfunctory turn of the head.
When the law requires a driver to look, it places upon
that individual the duty of seeing and observing. Mr.
Christoe, who was riding with respondent, looked to
the right as the car entered the intersection, and saw
the truck fifty or sixty feet away.”

HI In the instant case, there was no traffic on the
highways in question, and no reason which would
require appellants to proceed through the intersection
with undue haste. It does not appear from the testi-
mony that respondent Warner was operating his car

unlawfully, and, as we read the testimony, there was
nothing in the manner of the operation of the Warner
car which should have, or did, deceive appellants. We
think the fault undoubtedly lies in the fact that appel-
lant Gordon Keebler did not take the time to look
and determine, as he was required to do, the speed of
the Warner car, or its distance from the intersection.
In other words, as shown by his testimony, appellant
took a chance that he had time to cross the intersec-
tion ahead of the Warner car. Appellant, in our
opinion, did not use reasonable care, under the exist-
ing conditions, to maintain a reasonable margin of
safety. See Vance v. McCleary, 168 Wash. 296, 11 P.
(2d) 823; McAllister v. Anderson, 169 Wash. 14, 13
P. (2d) 36; Sather v. Blodgett, 169 Wash. 25, 13 P.
(2d) 60.

We are of the opinion the trial court was right in
holding that appellant Gordon Keebler was negligent;
that such negligence was one of the proximate causes
of the accident; and that, because of such negligence,
appellants were not entitled to recover herein.

| The truck was the property of the community
composed of appellants Gordon Keebler and Dorothy,
his wife, and at the time of the accident was being
used for the benefit of the community. Under the
situation here presented, the negligence of Gordon
Keebler would defeat any recovery on the part of
appellant Dorothy Keebler. Ostheller v. Spokane &
Inland Empire R. Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac. 630.

Appellants cite Saad v. Langworthy, 153 Wash. 598,
280 Pac. 74; Martin v. Hadenfeldt, supra; Butzke v.
Hendrickson, 172 Wash. 302, 20 P. (2d) 7. The rule
announced in the fourth paragraph of the principles
laid down in the Hadenfeldt case is not applicable
herein, nor are the other cases cited applicable on the
facts.

" a

|| Appellants further contend that, even though
it be assumed that appellants were negligent, the
doctrine of last clear chance would apply. In Left-
ridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541, 228 Pac. 302, we stated:

“Thus we have two different situations to which the
last clear chance rule applies. In the one, the plain-
tiff’s negligence may continue up to the time of the
injury if the defendant actually sees the peril; in the
second, the plaintifi’s negligence must have terminated
if the defendant did not actually see the peril, but by
the exercise of reasonable care should have seen it.”

If either branch of the last clear chance rule is ap-
plicable herein, it must be the first part, for the negli-
gence of appellants occurred just prior to, and con-
tinued up to, the time of the accident. We do not
think, under the facts in this case, the rule is appli-
cable. There is no testimony which indicates that re-
spondent E. C. Warner actually saw the peril of ap-
pellants until it was too late to avoid the collision.

HI We shall next discuss the contention made by
cross-appellant, before taking up appellants’ further
assignments of error relative to the judgment in favor
of respondent Alice Warner.

The court found that the cars of cross-appellant and
appellants were simultaneously approaching the inter-
section, and we are in accord with that finding. This
would place cross-appellant in the position of the
favored driver. The court, however, found and con-
eluded that cross-appellant was negligent in failing
to see and appreciate the approach of appellants’ truck
in time to avoid a collision. We have examined the
testimony carefully, and are unable to agree with the
trial court that the testimony herein will support a
finding of negligence on the part of cross-appellant.
It does not appear from the testimony that cross-
appellant was traveling at an unlawful rate of speed,

or that he was in any manner violating the rules of
the road. The undisputed testimony is to the effect
that, when he saw appellants’ truck, cross-appellant
slowed down, and that he thought appellants had
slowed down or stopped to let him pass; that, by this
time, he had reached the intersection; that he then
looked ahead, released his brakes, and proceeded into
the intersection; and that he did not realize that ap-
pellants’ truck had not stopped until it was right in
front of him and it was too late to avoid the collision.
This testimony of cross-appellant was not, in our
opinion, met or overcome by appellants.

While we appreciate rights of way are relative, and
the duty rests upon both drivers to avoid accidents
at intersections, we think, under the testimony herein,
cross-appellant used that care required of a driver
in his position. There is no intimation in the record,
as we read it, that the court did not believe the testi-
mony of cross-appellant, but apparently concluded
from the facts that cross-appellant was negligent. Ap-
pellants did not attempt to meet this testimony, other
than by showing the force of the impact and claiming
therefrom that cross-appellant must have been going
at an unlawful rate of speed. The scene of the acci-
dent being outside an incorporated city, and neither
highway being an arterial, cross-appellant was law-
fully entitled to drive thirty-five miles per hour.

It is our opinion that cross-appellant did all that
he was required to do. After looking and seeing
appellants’ truck, and watching it up to the time he
came to the intersection, and determining in his own
mind that it had stopped or slowed up to let him
pass, he had a right to assume, as the favored driver,
that appellants had accorded him the right of way,
and proceed. Breithaupt v. Martin, 153 Wash. 192,
279 Pac. 568; Sather v. Blodgett, supra.

While the trial court denied cross-appellant recovery,
he found that his car had been damaged in the sum
of five hundred dollars, and that he had been dam-
aged to the extent of two hundred fifty dollars for
personal injuries received. The testimony supports
this finding.

Hit is next contended that the court erred in
holding that respondent Alice Warner was entitled to
damages in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars. The
trial court saw this young lady and had an oppor-
tunity of observing the effect of the injuries which
she claimed to have received, and to some extent de-
termine as to whether or not they would be permanent
and would disfigure her. Doctor North testified that
Alice Warner’s nose was broken, that, as a result of
the break, the nose was flatter than usual, and that
there was a hypersensitive area on the left side of the
nose and face; that, in his opinion, the condition was
permanent; that this condition caused a twitching of
the face at times, and that her breathing was not as
free as it should be. Doctor W. C. Kintner’s testi-
mony was to the effect that he examined and treated ~
Alice Warner for her injuries, except the broken nose;
that, in addition to the broken nose, she had two lacer-
ated fingers on her left hand and a lacerated hip
wound; that, because of loss of tissue on the middle
finger, a scar formed, which impaired the use of this
finger—in other words, as stated by the doctor, there
was a thirty-five degree loss of flexation; that this
condition would be permanent, unless possibly re-
moved by an operation. It also appears that respond-
ent suffered considerable pain and from shock. While
it appears that Miss Warner had suffered a broken
nose once before, it also appears that no disfigure-
ment resulted from the first break, and it does not

appear that the second break was in the same place as
the former one.

Considering all the facts herein, we are not pre-
pared to say that the trial court was not justified in
awarding to respondent Alice Warner the sum of fif-
teen hundred dollars damages for the injuries re-
ceived.

It is further contended by appellants that respond-
ent and Alice Warner cannot recover herein against
appellants, for the reason that the negligence of her
father is imputed to her, upon the theory that re-
spondents were, at the time of the accidents, engaged
in a joint enterprise. The trial court found that re-
spondent Alice Warner was not guilty of contributory
negligence, and the evidence supports this finding. In
view of the fact that we have held that E. C. Warner
was not negligent, it becomes unnecessary to discuss
the other questions raised by appellants. Clearly, we
think respondent Alice Warner was entitled to recover
against appellants.

The judgment is affirmed on appellants’ appeal and
reversed on cross-appeal of E. C. Warner, with direc-
tions to the trial court to set the judgment aside, in so
far as cross-appellant is concerned, and enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law in cross-appellant’s
favor, and judgment in favor of cross-appellant and
against appellants in the sum of seven hundred fifty
dollars.

Braxe, C. J., Mary, Sterert, and Rosryson, JJ.,
concur.

620

[No. 27308. En Banc. October 7, 1939.]

Berryu I. Lunpay, Appellant, v. Taz DEPARTMENT OF
Lazor AND InpustRies, Respondent.t

"Reported in 94 P. (2d) 744.

[|

Vanderveer & Bassett, for appellant.

The Attorney General and J. A. Kavaney, Assistant,
for respondent.

Bragg, C. J.—This is an appeal from a judgment dis-
missing an appeal from an order of the joint board of
the department of labor and industries denying a pen-
sion claimed by appellant under the industrial insur-
ance act.

For some time prior to February 21, 1935, appellant’s
deceased husband had been in the employ of Benjamin
Franklin Thrift Stores, Inc., as a grocery clerk. He
was, however, assigned to duty on the delivery truck
on an average of two days a week. On the day men-
tioned, when alighting from the truck, after making
deliveries, he sustained an injury. Subsequently, he
submitted to an operation which was designed to cor-
rect the condition brought about by the injury. Post-
operation nephritis developed, from which he died
some months later.

The department denied appellant’s claim for pension
on two grounds: (1) That her husband, at the time of
injury, was not a workman in contemplation of the
industrial insurance act; (2) that the injury was not
the cause of death. As the latter point is not especially
stressed, we shall discuss it first.

Hl That the back condition, brought about by the
injury, could be corrected only by operative procedure,
is not disputed. Whether deceased had nephritis at the
time of the injury, is not certain. He did have marked
symptoms of it at the time of the operation. A week
or ten days subsequent to the operation, nephritis de-
veloped to an unusual extent.

The department offered no medical evidence. From
the testimony of two physicians who testified for claim-
ant, we think it is clear that, if deceased did have
nephritis at the time he was injured, the condition was
so seriously aggravated by the injury and the subse-
quent operation as to result in death.

That operative procedure intervened and may have
been the immediate cause of the condition from which
death finally resulted, is immaterial. Right to compen-
sation under the industrial insurance act persists as
though the original injury were the immediate cause
of death. See Ross v. Erickson Const. Co., 89 Wash.
634, 155 Pac. 153; Carmichael v. Kirkpatrick, 185 Wash.
609, 56 P. (2d) 686.

The principal question presented is whether,
at the time he was injured, appellant’s husband was a
workman in contemplation of the industrial insurance
act. This question arises from the manner in which
the meat department was conducted in the particular
store in which appellant’s husband was employed. The
Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores, Inc., operated a num-
ber of complete food markets in Seattle and other
places in the state. These markets handled groceries,
fruit and vegetables, and meats. A free delivery ser-
vice was maintained.

Of course, as a grocery clerk, appellant’s husband
was not a workman in contemplation of the industrial
insurance act. For the grocery business is not classi-
fied as extrahazardous. But the meat business, where
power machinery is used, is so classified. And this
classification includes trucks by which deliveries of
meat are made. The fact that the truck carried both
meat and groceries on the trip, at the end of which
appellant’s husband was injured, is not in dispute. So
there can be no doubt that he was engaged in extra-
hazardous work in contemplation of the act.

| The department contends, however, that it does
not follow that his widow is entitled to a pension, be-
cause his employer, the Benjamin Franklin Thrift
Stores, Inc., was not engaged in an extrahazardous
business. This contention is based on the fact that the
latter had leased the space occupied by the meat mar-
ket and had sold, on conditional bill of sale, the market
fixtures and equipment to one Jared. We think this
contention is without validity.

In considering the effect of the lease and bill of sale
upon appellant’s rights under the industrial insurance
act, we must keep in mind the declared public policy
of the act—particularly as manifested by Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 7685 [P. C. § 3479], which provides:

“No employer or workman shall exempt himself
from the burden or waive the benefits of this act by
any contract, agreement, rule or regulation, and any
such contract, agreement, rule or regulation shall be
pro tanto void.”

The lease in question contains a stipulation which,
we think, brings the Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores,
Inc., within the purview of the act as an employer in an
extrahazardous business. For it was stipulated that
all deliveries of meat should be made by the lessor in
its trucks. Jared paid the lessor thirty dollars a month
for this service. So that, to the extent it was engaged
in the business of delivering meat, the Benjamin Frank-
lin Thrift Stores, Inc., was an employer in an extra-
hazardous business. And the deceased husband was,
therefore, a part-time employee in an extrahazardous
occupation. While engaged in the performance of such
extrahazardous duties, he was a workman in contem-
plation of the act. Denny v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 172 Wash. 631, 21 P. (2d) 275; Morris v. De-
partment of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 423, 38 P.
(2d) 395.

: | In any event, an employee may, in contempla-
tion of workmen’s compensation acts, sustain the rela-
tionship of employee to two employers, a general em-
ployer who pays his wages and a special employer to
whom he may be loaned and for whom he may be per-
forming services. When such an employee is injured
in the course of extrahazardous employment, he is a
workman in contemplation of the workmen’s compen-
sation act, upon the theory that he is an employee of
either one or both of the employers. Umsted v. Sco-
field Engineering Const. Co., 203 Cal. 224, 263 Pac. 799;
New York Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commis-
sion, 126 Cal. App. 37, 14 P. (2d) 160; Atherholt v.
William Stoddart Co., 286 Pa. 278, 133 Atl. 504; De
Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N. Y. 273, 116 N. E. 992;
Wright v. Cane Run Petroleum Co., 262 Ky. 251, 90
S. W. (2d) 36. In the latter case, the doctrine is stated:

“In such case, the employer who directs his servant
to work for another is regarded in law as the general
employer, and the one for whom he works as a special
employer, and the relation of employer and employee,
in the circumstances, exists between both of them and
the employee, himself. If the employee is under the
exclusive control of the special employer in the per-
formance of work which is a part of his business, he is,
for the time being, his employee; yet, at the one and
the same time, he is the employee of the general em-
ployer, as well as the employee of the special employer.
And he may, under the common law of master and
servant, look to the former for his wages and to the
latter for damages for negligent injuries; so under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act he

“‘may so far as its provisions are applicable, look to
the one or the other, or to both, for compensation for
injuries due to occupational hazards.’ ”

Her husband having sustained injuries, in the course
of extrahazardous employment, which caused his death,

appellant is entitled to claim the benefits afforded by
the industrial insurance act.
Judgment reversed.

Mary, Beats, Mr.tarp, Geracuty, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

Smueson, J. (dissenting)—As I view it, the conclu-
sion that the department has jurisdiction over this
claim is untenable.

In order to present my position, I deem it necessary
to state the following additional facts: There were
two pieces of mechanical equipment situated in and
used within the meat market operated by power-driven
machinery, to-wit, a refrigerator and a meat grinder.
Appellant’s husband testified that inside of the store
he had nothing to do with the meat market, but was
subject to call to assist the driver of the truck in de-
livering groceries from the Benjamin Franklin Thrift
Stores, Inc., grocery store and meat from the market
situated therein. Appellant’s husband went on such
deliveries “roughly twice a week” as a driver’s assis-
tant, and there were usually three deliveries on each
of those days, and, as stated by the majority, he had
been delivering meat just prior to the time of the
accident.

During the month of May, 1930, one A. L. Jared en-
tered into a partnership with the Benjamin Franklin
Thrift Stores, Inc., in respect to the meat market situ-
ated in the grocery store located at Nineteenth avenue
and east Aloha street, in the city of Seattle. Under
that arrangement, Jared was paid a salary of two hun-
dred dollars per month by the Thrift Stores, Inc., until
August, 1933. It then appeared that the existing ar-
rangement for the operation of the meat market was
not economically feasible, and in lieu of taking a re-”
duction in salary Jared and Benjamin Franklin Thrift

Stores, Inc., entered into a lease agreement whereby
the latter leased the market to Jared. The lease pro-
vided for a term commencing August 1, 1933, and end-
ing June 13, 1936, and provided for the payment by the
lessee of forty dollars rental each month.

Paragraphs 3, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, and 25, respectively, of
the lease recite:

“(3) The lessee shall install his own store fixtures
and lighting fixtures at his own expense, provided,
however, that they shall be of such material and work-
manship as to harmonize with fixtures installed in such
store building by the lessor. Said lessee shall also
furnish at his own expense such signs, etc., as may
seem necessary provided, however, that such signs and
other advertising shall be subject to the approval of
the lessor.” 5

“(6) The lessor shall be absolutely free and lessee
agrees to save lessor harmless from any and all liabil-
ity that may arise from injury or damage to persons
or property occurring on the premises hereby demised,
or that may be caused by the neglect of the lessee, his
representatives, assigns, successors, or employees.”

“(8) The lessee shall conduct his business on the
premises as a department of the lessor under the name
of Benjamin Franklin Thrift Market. The lessee, how-
ever, shall not use the name of the lessor or the credit
of the lessor in connection with lessee’s business or
affairs, and said lessee hereby agrees and convenants
that he will purchase only in his own name and at his
own expense and on his own and sole credit all mer-
chandise, material, and the like used in his said
business, and will likewise make payment therefor
promptly when due. The lessee shall not contract any
pills in the name of the lessor, or involve the lessor in
any expense or liability whatsoever.”

“(9) The lessee agrees to keep the said meat market
to be operated on the premises hereby demised, open
for business at all times during the business hours of
the lessor throughout the entire period of this lease
and lessee shall supply at his own expense a sufficient

number of efficient sales people and others to properly
conduct the business of said meat market. Should
lessee or his employees desire to use said premises dur-
ing other than regular business hours of lessor, permis-
sion therefor shall first be obtained from lessor.”

“(15) Lessee agrees to pay for all power and refrig-
eration used on the premises hereby demised and fur-
ther agrees to furnish lessor with such refrigeration
as lessor may require, for which lessor agrees to allow
lessee a credit of $3.50 per month on the rental hereby
reserved.”

“(16) Lessor agrees to allow lessee the use of lessor’s
delivery service, the lessee hereby agrees to use the
same and to pay therefor to the lessor the sum of thirty
dollars per month in addition to the rental hereby re-
served, it being understood that this delivery service
shall consist of one car making three trips per day and
it being further understood that if additional delivery
service be furnished lessee will increase the payment
to be made for said delivery service proportionately.”

“(25) It is understood and agreed that this lease
shall be conditioned of that certain contract of condi-
tional sale entered into between the parties hereto on
the 29th day of August, 1933, wherein and whereby
the lessee herein agrees to purchase certain fixtures
from the lessor herein for use in connection with the
premises hereby demised, and it is agreed that in the
event of any default on the part of the lessee herein in
connection with the conditional sales contract, then
and in that event the lessor herein may at its option
cancel and terminate this lease in the same manner as
for any other forfeiture herein provided for.”

From the foregoing provisions of the lease, it is ap-
parent that the lessee was to conduct his business under
the name of Benjamin Franklin Thrift Market, but in
connection with his business he was not permitted to
use the name or credit of the lessor; that the lessee
was to employ the necessary personnel to operate the
meat market save in regard to delivery service, and
was to purchase the fixtures to be used in the meat

market; that the lessee was to pay for his own refrig-
eration used on the premises, but agreed to furnish the
lessor with such refrigeration as proved requisite to
its need, and the lessor agreed to allow the lessee a
credit of $3.50 per month on his rental for that service;
and by paragraph 16 of the lease the lessor agreed to
allow the lessee the use of the lessor’s delivery service,
and the lessee agreed to use the same, and pay there-
for a minimum of thirty dollars per month in addition
to the rental.

The lessee, Jared, continued to operate under the
lease until July 21, 1935. The injury was sustained
February 21, 1935.

It is admitted that the lessee, Jared, never paid ap-
pellant’s husband his wages or any part thereof dur-
ing the term of his lease, and his entire salary was paid
to him by the Benjamin Franklin Thrift Stores, Inc.

With the foregoing facts in mind, I now turn to a
consideration of the applicable law.

Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7676 [P. C. § 3471], class
43, providing basic premium rates for the accident fund
and the medical aid fund, recites in part:

“Meat, fish, and poultry markets (with power ma-
chinery), (includes drivers and helpers) . . .” Laws
of 1937, chapter 89, p. 345, § 1.

Grocery stores are not classified under the act as
being extrahazardous in character.

It may be observed, however, that Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 7674 [P. C. § 3469], reads in part:

“There is a hazard in all employment, but certain
employments have come to be, and to be recognized as
being inherently constantly dangerous. This act is
intended to apply to all such inherently hazardous
works and occupations, and it is the purpose to embrace
all of them, which are within the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the state, in the following enumeration, and
they are intended to be embraced within the term

‘extrahazardous’ wherever used in this act, to-wit:

“Factories, mills and workshops where machinery
isused; . . . transfer, drayage and hauling; . . .”
Laws of 1937, chapter 211, p. 1028, § 1.

While transfer, drayage, and hauling are declared to
be extrahazardous in nature and under the act (Rem.
Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7674), still since the grocery and
meat business are so closely related to each other in
this particular case and the groceries and meats were
frequently delivered together as an accommodation to
the customer, the grocery store was not really engag-
ing in the business of transfer, drayage, or hauling
within the contemplation of the act, and thus was not
under the act because of its delivery service. Edwards
v. Department of Labor & Industries, 146 Wash. 266,
262 Pac. 973; Dingman v. Department of Labor & In-
dustries, 157 Wash. 336, 288 Pac. 921; Carsten v. De-
partment of Labor & Industries, 172 Wash. 51, 19 P.
(2d) 133; Dalmasso v. Department of Labor & Indus-
tries, 181 Wash. 294, 43 P. (2d) 32; Jannak v. Depart-
ment of Labor & Industries, 181 Wash. 396, 43 P. (2d)
34; Johnson v. Department of Labor & Industries, 182
Wash. 351, 47 P. (2d) 6.

Moreover, it does not follow that, because drivers
and helpers employed in meat markets are under the
act by its express terms, that drivers and helpers em-
ployed by grocery stores in making delivery therefrom
are also under the act.

The making of delivery of groceries and, in addition,
of meats, by an employee of the grocery store, from
the meat market situated in the same store operating
under a lease from the lessor grocery, does not, to my
mind, bring such an employee of the grocery store
under the act, even though such an employee of a meat
market would be under the act.

There then remains the question as to whether this

lease was intended as a device envisaged either by the
proprietor of the meat market, the lessee, or the em-
ployees, engaged in making deliveries of meats or both,
which is prohibited by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7685 [P. C.
§ 3479]. I am unable to acquiesce in the conclusion of
the majority that appellant’s husband occupied a dual
employment status, that is, that he had both a general
and special employer. He was employed solely and
exclusively by the grocery store. The evidence does
not disclose that his services were loaned to the opera-
tor of the meat business, but simply that he was at
times ordered to assist the driver of the Thrift Store
truck in making deliveries. He was never subject to
any orders or directions of the meat store operator.

It does not appear that the covenant in the lease
relating to delivery service was made with the inten-
tion of violating Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7685, even though
the lessee is thereby enabled to escape the burdens he
would otherwise have to assume under the act. We
are, then, confronted with the question of whether a
meat market whose drivers and helpers are admittedly
under the act, may entrust to an independent concern,
a grocery store, whose drivers and helpers are not
under the act, the delivery of its meats.

While, under Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7685, an employer
whose employees are under the act may not contract
with his employees to exempt himself from the bur-
dens of the act, still that statute does not preclude him
from entering into a contract with another firm for
the conduct of a certain phase of his business even
though the employees of such other firm would not be
under the act, while if employees of the original em-
ployer performed the same work, they would be cov-
ered by the act.

As a practical matter, the real reason that prompted
the legislature to place drivers and helpers of meat

markets under the act was that such drivers and help-
ers usually also worked in the meat market and around.
and with power-driven machinery therein. Otherwise,
the legislature would have placed all drivers and their
helpers of all forms of business under the act. Since
the reason for the inclusion of meat market employee
drivers and helpers does not obtain under the facts
here, inasmuch as the appellant’s husband was exclu-
sively a grocery store employee and did not work at
all in the meat market, he was not a workman engaged
in extrahazardous employment. The legislature did
not intend to extend the act to cover such an employee.
Thus, the covenant in the lease relating to deliveries is
not inhibited by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7685.

The result of the majority opinion will be to bring
within the act every employee of allied enterprises
whose employees are not classified under the act as
engaged in extrahazardous work, who handle any prod-
uct, however small, of a business whose employees are
expressly covered by the act.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

Sremert and Rosinson, JJ., concur with Suvpson, J.

[No. 27716. Department One. October 7, 1939.]
Tue State or Wasurncron, on the Relation of G. W.
Hamilton, Attorney General, Plaintiff, v. Tar
SUPERIOR CourT For CowLitz County,
Respondent.

The Attorney General and L. C. Brodbeck, Assistant,
for relator.

John F, McCarthy and Edgar P. Reid, for respondent.

Mituarv, J—By her deed of September 21, 1938,
Mary Downing conveyed to the state of Washington
a right of way for highway purposes across her land
in Cowlitz county, and she received the stipulated
consideration of six hundred dollars for that convey-
ance.

In March, 1939, Mrs. Downing instituted an action
in the superior court for Cowlitz county against the
state of Washington to obtain a decree canceling the
above-described deed, on the ground that she was
induced by the fraudulent representations of an official
of the state highway department to execute that in-

*Reported in 94 P. (24) 505.

strument. She further prayed that she be adjudged
the owner of the strip of land in question and that de-
fendant be required to accept her tender of the sum
of six hundred dollars, the amount received by plain-
tiff from defendant as consideration for the challenged
conveyance.

On the ground that the action is against the state
of Washington and is one in equity to cancel a written
instrument for fraud, hence a proceeding in personam
and not within the purview of the proviso of the stat-
ute (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 886 [P. C. § 6260]) fixing the
venue of actions against the state as the superior court
for Thurston county, the state of Washington filed in
this court its petition for a writ of prohibition restrain-
ing the superior court for Cowlitz county from pro-
ceeding further in that action. In response to an alter-
native writ, respondent filed herein a demurrer to
relator’s petition, thereby raising for determination the
sole question whether an action against the state to
cancel a deed for fraud and revest title in plaintiff
grantor is an action “to determine or quiet title to any
real property” within the meaning of the proviso of
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 886.

We agree with counsel for the state that an action
may not be maintained against the state without its
consent; and that, when the state does consent, it may
determine in what forum it may be sued.

HI The constitution (Art. II, § 26, state constitu-
tion) provides that “the legislature shall direct by law
in what manner and in what courts suits may be
brought against the state.”

Pursuant to the foregoing constitutional provision,
the legislature fixed the venue of actions against the
state as follows:

“Any person or corporation having any claim against
the state of Washington shall have a right of action

@

against the state in the superior court of Thurston
county. . . . Provided, that actions for the enforce-
ment of foreclosure of any lien upon, or to determine
or quiet title to, any real property in which the state
of Washington is a necessary or proper party defend-
ant may be commenced and prosecuted to judgment
against the state in the superior court of the county
in which such real property is situated, . . .” Laws
of 1927, chapter 216, p. 331, § 1; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 886
[P. C. § 6260].

It will be noted that the statute provides that an
action to determine or quiet title to any real property
in which the state of Washington is a necessary or
proper party defendant is a local action and may be
brought in the county where-the land is situated. By
enactment (Laws of 1854, p. 133, § 13; Laws of 1860,
p. 7, § 15; Laws of 1869, p. 12, § 48; Laws of 1877, p.
11, § 48; Code 1881, §47; 2 H. C., §158; Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 204 [P. C. § 8541]) prior to statute (Laws of
1927, chapter 216, §1; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 886) fixing
venue of actions against the state, the legislature pro-
vided that actions for the recovery of, for the posses-
sion of, or for the determination of all questions affect-
ing the title to, real property shall be commenced in
the county in which the subject of the action, or some
part thereof, is situated.

Under the provisions of the cited statutes (Rem.
Rev. Stat., §§ 886, 204), an action, whether against
the state or other party defendant, to determine the
title to real property is a local action. In Ryckman
v. Johnson, 190 Wash. 294, 67 P. (2d) 927, we held
that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
of real estate is within the statutory (Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§ 204) classification of causes “for the determination
of all questions affecting the title.”

No useful purpose would be served by reviewing
the conflicting authorities on the question of venue

of an action to cancel a deed conveying land. By
statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 886, 204) and by decision
(Ryckman v. Johnson, supra), we are committed to
the rule that where, as in the case at bar, an action
is brought to cancel a deed on the ground of fraud
and to revest title to the land covered by that deed
in plaintiff, that action is one to determine the title
to real property, as the subject of that action involves,
the object of that action is directed toward, the land
and the title thereto. See 67 C. J. 62; Eckhardt v.
Bankers’ Trust Co., 218 Iowa 983, 249 N. W. 244, 252
N. W. 373; 9 Am. Jur. 395.

The reason for the rule is stated as follows in
Ryckman v. Johnson, 190 Wash. 294, 67 P. (2d) 927:

“Appellants cite and rely upon certain of our deci-
sions which hold that actions wherein it is sought to
establish and enforce a trust, or where the court in
the exercise of its equity powers acts to compel par-
ties before it to do a particular thing, or where, in
the defendant’s answer, title to real property is brought
into issue only incidentally, are transitory, inasmuch
as the decree acts only in personam. The principles
enunciated in those cases are well settled, in this state
at least, but they do not meet this case, because, as
already stated, the subject of the action involves, and
the object of the action is directed toward, the land
and the title thereto.

“Tt is the policy of our law that all transactions
affecting the title to real estate shall be matters of
record in the county where such real estate is situ-
ated, so that any one concerned therewith may be in-
formed as to the condition of its title by an examina-
tion of the public records in such county” Seymour
v. LaFurgey, 47 Wash. 450, 92 Pac. 267.”

The writ is denied.

Brake, C. J., Mam, Rosinson, and Sumeson, JJ.,
concur.

636

[No. 27494. Department Two. October 10, 1939.]

Frances A. Eastersrooxs, Respondent, v. ALBERT
ABRAHAMS et al., Appellants.+

Eggerman & Rosling, Walser S. Greathouse, and
Evert Arnold, for appellants.

John J. Kennett and Fred C. Campbell, for respond-
ent.

Geracuty, J—The plaintiff sued upon a restitution
bond for recovery of damages sustained by reason of
wrongful eviction from premises occupied by her
under lease. After trial to the court, a judgment was

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 486.

rendered in her favor against the defendants, principal
and surety on the restitution bond. The defendants
appeal.

The judgment awarded the respondent four hundred
dollars for direct loss suffered by the eviction, two
hundred fifty dollars for attorneys’ fee incurred in
defending the unlawful detainer action, and one hun-
dred fifty dollars as an attorneys’ fee in the present
action on the bond.

The appellants assign error upon the allowance of
both items of attorneys’ fees, as well as upon the
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment
in respect of the amount awarded for direct damages
resulting from the eviction.

Upon institution of the unlawful detainer action,
Abrahams, plaintiff in that action, appellant here,
caused to be issued a writ of restitution, which was
quashed on the application of the defendant in that
action, respondent here. The complaint was amended
and an alias writ issued, under which the respondent
was evicted from the premises. At the subsequent
trial on the merits, the court dismissed the action with
costs to the respondent.

Hi The appellants contend that there is no war-
rant in law for the allowance by the court of attorneys’
fees, either in the unlawful detainer action or in the
present action on the bond, other than the fees pro-
vided in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 481 [P. C. § 7462], as costs,
and cite, in support of their position, Enbody v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co., 147 Wash. 237, 265
Pac. 734. The respondent, on the other hand, relies
in support of the judgment upon Corman v. Sander-
son, 72 Wash. 627, 131 Pac. 198. Other than these two
cases, which are in seeming conflict, our attention is
not called to any direct holding by this court upon
the question. .

The rule stated in State ex rel. Maltbie v. Will, 54
Wash. 453, 103 Pac. 479, 104 Pac. 797, that the statute

“. . . fixes the attorney’s fees that may be allowed
toa successful litigant as costs in civil actions, and
no additional fees for their prosecution should be
allowed without statutory authority,”

has been repeatedly reaffirmed. The allowance of
fees in suits upon injunction and garnishment pro-
ceedings in certain cases is an exception to this rule,
to which reference will hereafter be made. The stat-
ute governing attachments specifically provides for the
allowance of such fees as damage in actions upon at-
tachment bonds. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 654 [P. C. § 7386].

In the Enbody case, as in this, there had been a
wrongful ouster in a detainer action. In a suit for
damages upon the restitution bond, the trial court
awarded the plaintiff an attorney’s fee, as an item of
damage, for successfully defending the action. In
stating the ground upon which this allowance was
made, that court, in its memorandum opinion, said:

“The original suit was wrongfully brought and the
plaintiffs herein were compelled to defend against it,
which they did successfully. The bonding company
well knew the plaintiffs would be compelled to employ
an attorney if they resisted the suit. They are entitled
to recover reasonable attorneys fees paid therefor be-
fore the commencement of this action, as part of the
damages sustained, for this was an expense directly
necessitated by Mrs. Stewart’s unlawful action. A
bond was given to indemnify loss sustained by such
action, if wrongful. The plaintiffs allege that in de-
fending the detainer suit they were compelled to and
did employ an attorney at an expense of $100.00. $10.00
attorneys fee was taxed in that suit, so he should re-
cover as damages on this account $90.00.”

Passing upon the allowance of attorney’s fees below,
this court said:

“Nor were the respondents entitled to recover for
the attorney’s fees expended in the defense of the first
cause of action. The statute (Rem. Comp. Stat., § 481)
{[P. C. § 7462] allows, in all cases, to the prevailing
party certain specified sums called attorney’s fees to
be taxed as costs, and in certain other instances it pro-
vides specially for the recovery of attorney’s fees ex-
pended in a former action to be recovered in another
(see Rem. Comp. Stat., § 654) [P. C. § 7386]. But the
general rule, in the absence of statute, is not to allow
such a recovery. Lovell v. House of the Good Shep-
herd, 14 Wash. 211, 44 Pac. 253; State ex rel. Maltbie v.
Will, 54 Wash. 453, 103 Pac. 479, 104 Pac. 797; Gabriel-
son v. Gorin, 92 Wash. 408, 159 Pac. 387. An exception
is made in the instance where the damages sought are
for the wrongful issuance of an injunction, but this is
so hedged about with limitations as to make the rule
inapplicable to other situations. More than this, the
rule is one that the court does not desire to extend.”

In Corman v. Sanderson, supra, relied on by the re-
spondent, the court affirmed a judgment of the supe-
rior court which included an item of one hundred dol-
lars for attorneys’ fees in successfully defending an
unlawful detainer action. In the course of the opinion,
it is said:

“The evidence shows, and the court found, that the
respondent had paid $225 advance rent, and that she
was damaged $50 on account of the removal and $100
for attorneys’ fees in successfully defending the unlaw-
ful detainer action. These were proper items to be
allowed.”

It seems to have been assumed by the parties that,
if the defendant in the unlawful detainer action had
made a valid agreement for reasonable attorneys’ fees,
such fees were allowable. In the respondent’s brief in
that case, it is said:

“Tt is not urged but that respondent is entitled to re-
cover attorney fees if she had obligated herself to pay
attorney’s fees.”

In announcing its decision in the present case, the
trial court said that it considered the allowance of fees
as being ruled by Corman v. Sanderson rather than by
the Enbody case, characterizing the latter case as being
so obscure that the court was not persuaded it over-
ruled Corman v. Sanderson. Unlike the Corman case,
the right to the allowance of fees was challenged both
in the trial court and here in the Enbody case; and,
while this court did not, in terms, overrule the earlier
case, it did so by implication in the language we have
quoted.

Attorney’s fees are sometimes allowed in garnish-
ment proceedings without express statutory authority,
on the supposed analogy between that proceeding and
injunctions and attachments. This analogy is referred
to in James v. Cannell, 135 Wash. 80, 237 Pac. 8, where
the court refers to the reason given for the allowance
of attorneys’ fees in actions on injunction bonds in 2
High, Injunctions (3d ed.), 1685, and continues:

“If attorney’s fees may be collected as a part of the
damages for the wrongful issuance of an injunction or
attachment, there is no reason that we can see why
they should not also be recoverable in the wrongful
levy of a writ of garnishment.”

The court also said that, without statutory authoriza-
tion, attorneys’ fees in actions on bonds in attachment
cases would be allowable as part of the damages.

The position of the respondent seems to be that, since
attorneys’ fees are allowed in actions on garnishment
bonds by reason of their analogy to injunction bonds,
and would be allowable in actions on attachment bonds,
even if the statute did not so provide, the analogy
should be carried one step further to include actions
on restitution bonds. This, the Enbody case said, in
effect, the court did not desire to do. The Enbody case,
later in time than Corman v. Sanderson, states the cor-

rect rule, and we deem it controlling here on the allow-
ance of attorneys’ fees as an element of damages in the
unlawful detainer action.

HE What we have already said applies, with stronger
reason, to the allowance of an attorneys’ fee for prose-
cuting the present action on the bond. The court al-
lowed the fee on the authority of cases where fees had
been allowed in attachment and garnishment cases.
“We have been cited to no cases where an attorney’s
fee has been allowed for prosecuting a suit on a restitu-
tion bond. As we have already seen, the court is com-
mitted against extending the doctrine of analogy to
include unlawful detainer actions.

The court allowed the respondent four hun-
dred dollars as damages for the wrongful eviction. We
cannot, upon the record, say that the court was not
warranted in making this allowance. The respondent
had purchased the furniture in a small hotel from the
appellant Abrahams for two thousand five hundred
dollars, paying in cash and property twelve hundred
dollars and giving a mortgage on the property, payable
in monthly installments, to secure the balance of the
purchase price. At the time of the purchase, the ap-
pellant held the premises under a lease, which, by its
terms, expired before the institution of the unlawful
detainer action. At the expiration of the lease, the
premises were occupied on the basis of a month to
month tenancy. Whether the respondent was a ten-
ant of Abrahams’s or a tenant of the owner, was a prin-
cipal issue in the case. The trial court decided that
she was not a tenant of Abrahams’s, and that his evic-
tion of her was wrongful.

While respondent was in default on the mortgage
and her financial condition may have been precarious,
she had an equity in the business which was destroyed
by the ouster. The extent to which she was damaged

||

642

was a question of fact to be decided by the trial court
upon the evidence. The evidence does not prepon-
derate against its finding.

The cause is remanded to the superior court, with
direction to modify the judgment by eliminating there-
from the two items of attorneys’ fees which we have
discussed. As so modified, the judgment will be af-
firmed.

Braxe, C. J., Brats, Smvpson, and Rosinson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27574. Department One. October 11, 1939.]
Date H. Isom, Appellant, v. Otympra Or. & Woop
Propucts Company, Respondent.t

George F. Yantis, for appellant.
Thos. L, O’Leary, for respondent.

Smupson, J.—Plaintiff instituted this action to re-
cover compensation for personal injuries which he had
sustained on account of the explosion of gasoline oc-

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 482.

curring during the time it was being supplied to his
boat by defendant’s marine service station.

October 29, 1937, plaintiff brought his cabin cruiser
to the marine gasoline service station operated by de-
fendant for the purpose of securing gasoline. The
gasoline was supplied to the cruiser from a tank on
the service float, or station, through a flexible hose.
The hose was handed to plaintiff by one of defend-
ant’s employees, and plaintiff then proceeded to open
a valve attached to the end of the hose so that the
gasoline could flow into the tanks aboard his boat. An
outside tank was filled first. Plaintiff then closed the
valve on the end of the hose and went inside the cabin
where an inner tank was located. He inserted the
hose nozzle into the tank, pressed the valve handle
to start the flow of gasoline, and shortly thereafter the
boat was afire. The explosion and fire was caused
by the escaping gas fumes coming into contact with
a fire burning in the small stove located in the boat
cabin.

Plaintiff was seriously burned. His complaint charged
the defendant with negligence in the manner in which
the gasoline was furnished to him and the failure of
defendant to provide proper equipment, and properly
instructed employees, for the delivery of gasoline. De-
fendant, in its answer, denied the charge of negligence,
and alleged that the injury was caused by the contribu-
tory negligence of plaintiff. The action was tried to
a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.
The court granted defendant’s motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the action.
Plaintiff has appealed.

Respondent moves to dismiss the appeal, basing its
motion upon the ground that the appeal was not taken
within thirty days after the date of the entry of the

judgment, as provided by Rule V, Rules of the Supreme
Court, 193 Wash. 4-a, in effect August 1, 1938.

Appellant resists the motion to dismiss the appeal .
upon the ground that his attorney was misled con-
cerning the date of the filing of the judgment in the
office of the county clerk.

The judgment bears date January 25, 1939, and was
filed the same day in the clerk’s office. Notice of ap-
peal was served on counsel for the respondent Febru-
ary 28, 1939, and was filed in the clerk’s office March
1, 1939.

On the date the notice of appeal was filed, the at-
torney for appellant filed an affidavit in the office of
the clerk of the superior court which contained the
following language relative to the notice of appeal:

“ . . that on or about the 25th day of January,
1939, defendant's counsel herein served on affiant a
proposed order granting defendant’s motions for judg-
ment for defendant, n. o. v., and for a new trial, and
a proposed copy of judgment for defendant, all in the
above entitled case; That the said order bore date
before signing as of January 30, 1939; That the said
proposed judgment contained a blank as to the day in
the month of January, 1939, for signature; That copies
thereof were left with affiant who endorsed his o. k.
as to form on the said proposed order and judgment;
That the said order was so dated apparently on the
assumption that it would be presented on the succeed-
ing Motion Day which was January 30, 1939, but
having been o. ked. as to form by opposing counsel,
was actually presented for signature, the date changed
and the order and judgment filed on and as of Janu-
ary 25, 1939; That plaintiff had difficulty in providing
money for his appeal bond; That counsel for plaintiff,
not knowing of the change in date or the filing of the
order and judgment and relying on the copy served
on him at his office and the date thereon as of January
30, 1939, delayed serving and filing notice of appeal
until the 28th day of February, 1939, assuming that
said date was the twenty-ninth (29th) day after entry

of judgment; That he then learned for the first time
of the change in date of the said instruments; That
the said change in date was not made for the purpose
of misleading affiant but the circumstances were such
that affiant was misled to the great prejudice of his
client; That affiant believes that an order should be
made herein permitting the filing of the said notice
of appeal and bond as of February 23, 1939 to preserve
his rights on appeal.”

Counsel for respondent then made and filed an affi-
davit setting out facts relative to the dates on the
order and judgment similar to those contained in the
affidavit made by the attorney for appellant.

A hearing was had by the trial court upon the ques-
tion presented in the affidavits. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the court made the following order:

‘Ir Is Orperep That plaintiff's notice of appeal
herein, together with his cash bond in the sum of Two
Hundred ($200.00) Dollars be received as of Febru-
ary 23, 1939, to all of which defendant excepts and
his exceptions are hereby allowed.”

|| The order of the trial court was of no force or
effect. Trial courts have no jurisdiction other than
to do those things necessary or specifically provided
by statute for making the appeal effective. Kawabe
v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 97 Wash. 257, 166 Pac.
617; Van Horne v. Van Horne, 194 Wash. 606, 78 P.
(2d) 1082. :

In Hibbard & Co. v. Morton, 184 Wash. 569, 52 P.
(2d) 313, this court quoted with approval the follow-
ing language from Stark v. Jenkins, 1 Wash. Terr. 421:

“‘At the expiration of the time limited the cause
of action, transit in rem judicatam, and no consent of
parties nor willingness of judges can recall a contro-

versy thus wisely, by limitation of our law, passed
into the realm of ended suits.’ ”

646

There is no provision of our statutes which author-
izes a trial court to, by order, change the date of the
filing of notice of appeal or the bond on appeal.

There was, as disclosed by the affidavits, no intent
on the part of counsel for respondent to in any way
mislead appellant’s attorney concerning the date of
the filing of the judgment.

The judgment was presented to the trial judge in
the usual manner and filed in the clerk’s office in the
ordinary course of business. Its filing date was notice
to appellant and his attorney. The notice of appeal
was given more than thirty days after the time for
appeal began to run. It, therefore, conferred no
appellate jurisdiction upon this court.

The appeal is dismissed.

Brake, C. J., Mary, Miutarp, and Rosinson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27707. Department One. October 11, 1939.]
James Otson, Respondent, v. A. G. SCHAEFER
et al., Appellants.t

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 480.

Wallace G. Mills, for appellants.
J. W. Graham, for respondent.

Muxarp, J.—Plaintiff purchased an automobile on
conditional sales contract in December, 1937, from
A. G. Schaefer, The purchase price of the automobile
was $530.56, of which the vendee paid $180 at the time
of the execution of the sales contract and obligated
himself to pay thereafter sixteen monthly installments
of $21.91 each, commencing March 2, 1938. Two
monthly installments were paid by the vendee. Sub-
sequent installments were never paid by the vendee.

On June 13, 1938, a representative of the vendor was
permitted by the vendee to take the automobile from
Shelton, where the vendee resided, to the vendor’s
place of business in Olympia, under an agreement that
the possession of the automobile would be retained by
the vendor for fifteen days, within which period the
vendee would be given an opportunity to pay the de-
linquent installments and regain possession of the au-
tomobile. If the defendant failed within the period
stipulated to pay the delinquent installments, all inter-
est of the vendee in the automobile would be forfeited.
Six days prior to the expiration of the stipulated period
for redemption of the automobile, the vendee called
at the vendor’s place of business with a friend, who
stated that he was willing to pay the delinquent install-
ments for the vendee in consideration of the assign-
ment to him of the vendee’s interest in the conditional
sales contract. Prior to that date, the vendor sold the
automobile to a third party. The vendor refused to
substitute any other automobile or to refund the pay-
ments made under the conditional sales contract.
Thereupon, the vendee brought this action against the

vendor to recover, for the wrongful conversion of his
automobile, the amount of $223.82, paid by him under
the contract.

The cause was tried to the court, which found that
plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount paid by
him under the conditional sales contract. Judgment
was entered accordingly. The vendor appealed.

Hl 0n the ground that it was prematurely taken,
the respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal. The
record contains a transcript of the minutes of the clerk
of the superior court for Thurston county bearing date
May 1, 1939, reciting that, referring to this action,

“This matter before the court upon defendant’s mo-
tion in arrest of judgment, presented by defendants’
counsel Wallace G. Mills, Plaintiff represented in court
by his counsel, J. W. Graham. The court heard argu-
ment of counsel on his motion, and being duly advised,
motion was denied. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment, as presented by Mr. Graham,
signed and entered. Upon judgment being signed by
the court, Mr. Mills gave oral notice of appeal. John M.
Wilson, Judge.”

It appears, however, that, while the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment, prepared and pre-
sented by counsel for the respondent, were signed by
the trial court May 1, 1939, they were not “entered”
on that date. The findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the judgment, all of which were signed by the trial
court May 1, 1939, were received by the clerk of the
superior court by mail from respondent’s counsel May
8, 1939, and were filed and entered on that date; those
papers were never in the possession of the clerk prior
to May 8, 1939.

Rule V, Rules of the Supreme Court, 193 Wash. 4-a,
provides that, in civil actions, an appeal from any final
judgment must be taken within thirty days after the

date of the entry of such final judgment. Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 1719 [P. C. § 7293], provides:

“A party desiring to appeal to the supreme court
under the provisions of this title may, by himself or
his attorney, give notice in open court or before the
judge, if the judgment or order appealed from is ren-
dered or made at chambers, at the time when such
judgment or order is rendered as made, that he appeals
from such judgment or order to the supreme court, and
thereupon the court or judge shall direct the clerk to
make an entry of such notice in the journal of the
court. If the appeal be not taken at the time when the
judgment or order appealed from is rendered or made,
then the party desiring to appeal may, by himself or
his attorney, within the time prescribed in section 1718,
serve written notice on the prevailing party or his at-
torney that he appeals from such judgment or order
to the supreme court, .

In Quareles v. Seattle, 26 Wash. 226, 66 Pac. 389, we
held that, when a judgment is signed by the court it
is rendered, and when it is filed by the clerk it becomes
effective as a judgment. We said:

“There is a clear distinction between the making or
rendering of a judgment and its entry. The judgment
is made or rendered when the court announces it or
signs the judgment, as is the common practice, and re-
turns the signed judgment to counsel. It is entered
when it is placed of record by the clerk.”

The judgment was “rendered or made” on May 1,
1939, when the court signed that judgment and re-
turned same to counsel for respondent. At that time,
counsel for appellant “gave oral notice of appeal.”
Clearly, counsel was appealing from the judgment that
the court had signed and that notice was given at the
proper time.

“The evident purpose of the statute is that, when the

judgment is signed, and when all parties are presumed
to be present in court, an oral notice then given shall

be binding upon them. The judgment must be signed,
before it can be filed, and the purpose of the statute
would be defeated if it were to be held that the judg-
ment must also be filed with the clerk of the court,
and that thereafter the appealing party must return to
the court room and give oral notice of an appeal. In
all likelihood, his adversary would by that time have
departed and thus oral notice would be no notice in
fact, and the prevailing party in every action would
be compelled to examine the clerk’s minutes and to
take notice of the minute entry made by the clerk in
his absence.” Johnson v. California-Wash. Timber Co.,
159 Wash. 214, 292 Pac. 418.

The fact that, after the judgment was rendered, at
which time oral notice of appeal was given, counsel
for respondent did not file same immediately with the
clerk, does not render ineffective appellant’s notice of
appeal. In Johnson v. California-Wash. Timber Co.,
159 Wash. 214, 292 Pac. 418, the appellant gave oral
notice of appeal at the time the judgment was signed
in open court. The findings and conclusions were
immediately filed with the clerk. While the judgment
was likewise tendered to the clerk for filing, same was
not actually filed and entered by the clerk until five
days later, because of the failure on the part of the
respondent to then pay the judgment fees. We held
that the oral notice of appeal given at the time the
findings and judgment were signed, but before the
judgment was filed with the clerk, was not premature.
This is in harmony with Quareles v. Seattle, 26 Wash.
226, 66 Pac. 389.

The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

The argument of appellants’ counsel for reversal of
the judgment is based on a number of grounds. It is
unnecessary, however, to discuss all of them in view
of our disposition of the appeal.

HI Recovery is sought by respondent for the con-
version of his automobile. He alleged that he was

damaged in the amount of $223.82, the aggregate of
his payments under the conditional sales contract.

The measure of damages for the wrongful conver-
sion by conditional sales vendor is the value of the
property at the time of the conversion less the balance
of the unpaid purchase price. Richardson v. Great
Western Motors, 109 Wash. 324, 187 Pac. 333.

In Laws v. Commercial Credit Co., 166 Wash. 507,
7 P. (2d) 606, one of the causes of action was to re-
cover for the conversion of an automobile held under
a conditional sales contract. The purchaser introduced.
testimony of payments in excess of one thousand dol-
lars under the contract, but he failed to offer any
evidence as to the value of the car at the time of the
conversion. We held that, as there was no evidence
as to what the automobile was worth at the time of
the conversion, there was a failure of proof as to the
purchaser’s damages.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
with direction to the trial court to dismiss the action.

Brake, C. J., Maryn, Rosson, and Srmpson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27131. Department One. October 11, 1989.]

In the Matter of the Estate of Pau Nociesere,
: Deceased.

Tue State or Wasuincton, by Robt. F. Waldron, as
Supervisor of the State Inheritance Tax and
Escheat Division, Appellant, v. O. S.
Haucen, as Executor, Respondent.*

‘Reported in 94 P, (2d) 488.

Robt. F. Waldron, John M. Boyle, Jr., and Charles
Snyder, for appellant.

Palmer, Askren & Brethorst and B. E. Lutterman,
for respondent.

Rosrnson, J.—Paul Nogleberg died testate in De-
cember, 1930. His estate was appraised at $42,601.76.
In November, 1931, a decree of partial distribution was
entered without notice to the inheritance tax authori-
ties. It is stipulated that the appraised value of the
property so distributed was $4,955.75. In October,
1932, the executor made a report to the inheritance tax
and escheat division of the state tax commission show-
ing the inheritance taxes to be $789.62. The supervisor
replied: “The tax is as shown in the report, plus any
accrued interest.”

Shortly thereafter, the executor wrote the supervi-
sor to the effect that, due to the weakness of the real
estate market, he was not able to raise funds to pay the
tax, saying: “I shall mail you at this time $150.00 on
account.”

The supervisor acknowledged the receipt of that.
amount on October 30, 1932, adding:

“Said check has been remitted to the State Treasurer
as a partial payment of inheritance tax due the State of
Washington in the above entitled estate.

“Tt is agreeable to this Division that partial payment
of said tax be made from time to time but your atten-
tion is called to the fact that interest is steadily accru-
ing and that the larger payments you make will result
in less interest to be paid.”

Nothing further had been paid at the time the legis-
lature enacted chapter 180, Laws of 1935. Section 124
of that act, p. 791, reads as follows:

“The provisions of the title, except section 115, shall
apply to all cases pending in the inheritance tax and
escheat division and to all cases pending in any of the
courts of this state, whether on appeal or otherwise, at
the time this act takes effect, whether the death of the
decedent occurred prior to the passage of this act or
subsequent thereto: Provided, however, That the in-
heritance tax now due before the passage of this act
may be paid under the law effective immediately be-
fore the passage of this act if paid within ten months
from the time this law becomes effective: Provided, fur-
ther, That if a portion of the inheritance tax is paid in
any estate now pending within the ten months as
herein provided, then the increased rates under this
title shall apply only upon the proportionate part of
such estate remaining unpaid.” Rem. Rev. Stat.
(Sup.), § 11211le [P. C. § 7030-184].

No payment was made during the ten months’ grace
period, and, shortly after its expiration, the supervisor,
holding the matter to be “pending,” within the mean-
ing of the foregoing provision of the statute, made a
finding showing a tax due of $3,004.42, and interest in
the sum of $851.26, or a total of $3,855.68. In June,
1937, the supervisor filed amended findings fixing the
total amount of $3,845.11. To these findings, excep-
tions were filed by the executor, and, upon a hearing

of the matter, an order was entered, which reads, in
part, as follows:

“. . . and the Court being fully advised in the
facts and premises, does here and now

“Oper, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the inheritance
tax due in the above-entitled estate is, as originally
reported by the executor and accepted and agreed upon.
by the Supervisor, the sum of $789.62. That the execu-
tor has made a payment on account of said tax in the
sum of $150.00, and that the inheritance tax now due
herein is the sum of $639.62, plus interest on $789.62
from the 21st day of December, 1930, to the 19th day
of October, 1932, at the rate of eight per cent per an-
num, and interest on $639.62 from the 19th day of Oc-
tober, 1932, at the rate of eight per cent per annum
until payment.”

Hi The first question presented by the appeal is:
Is this a “pending” case, within the meaning of § 124,
chapter 180, Laws of 1935? In support of the trial
court’s holding that it was not a pending case, the
respondent cites In re Turner’s Estate, 191 Wash. 145,
70 P. (2d) 1059, as conclusive. But it is clear that, in
that case, the amount of the tax was fixed by a formal
judicial decree entered with notice. A receipt was is-
sued showing payment of the inheritance taxes. The
estate was distributed, and the executrix discharged
from her trust. The tax liability, as such, was wholly
discharged by the acceptance of a bond liability in lieu
thereof, in the manner permitted by the then existing
statute. In the instant case, at the time the hearing
was held, the bulk of the estate was still in the hands
of an actively functioning executor. There had been
no payment of tax, except a small sum on account. The
amount of the tax had not been fixed by judicial decree.

It is contended, however, that the amount of the tax
was fixed by an agreement between the executor and.
the supervisor in October, 1932. This amounts to a
contention that the supervisor had the power to adju-

dicate the amount of taxes due and irrevocably fix the
amount as between the state and the estate by entering
into a contract with the executor. We do not think
the supervisor had, or has, such power. He has lim-
‘ited powers to compromise in doubtful cases, but even’
then, the compromise settlement must be approved
by the superior court having jurisdiction of the estate.
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 11215 [P. C. § 7066].

Furthermore, it does not appear to us that the super-
visor and the executor purported to make such a con-
tract. No more is shown other than that their minds
met upon the amount of taxes payable, if paid under
the then existing law. The respondent executor could
have paid under that law had he chosen to do so. He
not only delayed for several years until chapter 180,
Laws of 1935, was enacted, but after its enactment he
failed to take advantage of the proviso of § 124:

“Provided, however, That the inheritance tax now
due before the passage of this act may be paid under
the law effective immediately before the passage of this
act if paid within ten months from the time this law
becomes effective.”

Meanwhile, the interest on whatever tax was due
was, of course, accumulating day by day throughout
the entire period. It seems clear to us that this matter
was in no sense closed in October, 1932, or at any other
time, but that it has, at all times since the death of
Nogleberg, been pending, within the meaning of the
1935 statute, and that the rates therein provided must
be applied. In re Elvigen’s Estate, 191 Wash. 614, 71
P. (2d) 672; In re Smith’s Estate, 194 Wash. 215, 77 P.
(2d) 780.

HH The second question presented is: Did the trial
court correctly hold that the one hundred and fifty
dollars paid in October, 1932, should be applied on the
tax instead of being first credited to interest and then

to principal? Ordinarily, interest is not regarded as

part of a tax. Henry v. McKay, 164 Wash. 526, 3 P.

(2d) 145, 77 A. L. R. 1025. Since the executor wrote

that he was unable to pay the tax in full, but enclosed

* one hundred and fifty dollars “on account,” and the
supervisor replied: “Said check has been remitted to
the State Treasurer as a partial payment of inheritance
tax due the State of Washington,” we think it suffi-
ciently appears that the parties agreed on its applica-
tion to the payment of the tax, as distinguished from
interest. The respondent executor is entitled to have it
so applied.

Hi The third question presented is with regard to
the computation of interest. The appellant contends
that interest must be paid from the date of death on
the amount of tax found due by application of the new
rates provided in the 1935 statute. The respondent
executor says that, since it is clear that he owed but
$789.62, up to the time the 1935 statute became effec-
tive, this would be charging interest upon a liability
which had no existence. But the liability did have
existence. The retroactive provisions of the statute
established the greater liability as of the date of death.
We see no escape from the application of that part of
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 11210 [P. C. § 7061], which reads
as follows:

_ “All taxes imposed by this act shall take effect and
accrue upon the death of the decedent or donor. If
such tax is not paid within fifteen months from the ac-
cruing thereof, interest shall be charged and collected
at the rate of ‘eight per centum per annum.

(Italics ours.)

Finally, it is contended that the increased rates
of the 1935 statute cannot possibly be applied to that
portion of the property which was distributed-by a par-
tial decree of distribution in 1931, citing Succession of

Stauffer, 119 La. 66, 43 So. 928, which holds that the
property of an estate vests in the distributees upon dis-
tribution, and that the imposition of new or increased
inheritance taxes thereafter would constitute an un-
lawful infringement of vested rights. But whatever
the law may be in Louisiana, we have consistently
held that the property does not vest in the distributees
until the inheritance tax is paid.

In In re Fotheringham’s Estate, 183 Wash. 579, 49 P.
(2d) 480, and again in In re Smith’s Estate, 194 Wash.
215, 77 P. (2d) 780, we quoted, with approval, the fol-
lowing excerpt from United States v. Perkins, 163
U.S. 625, 41 L. Ed. 287, 16S. Ct. 1073:

“Certainly, if it be true that the right of testamen-
tary disposition is purely statutory, the State has a
right to require a contribution to the public treasury
before the bequest shall take effect. Thus the tax is
not upon the property, in the ordinary sense of the
term, but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not
until it has yielded its contribution to the State that
it becomes the property of the legatee.’” (Italics ours.)

Applying that principle in In re Smith’s Estate,
supra, it was held that the increased rates imposed by
chapter 180, Laws of 1935, were applicable and collec-
tible, even though the entire estate had been distributed
by a lawful decree before chapter 180 was enacted.

The order appealed from is set aside, and the lower
court is directed to enter a new order in harmony with .
this opinion.

Bragg, C. J., Srenvert, Mar, and Jerrers, JJ., con-
cur.

659

[No. 27672. Department One. October 11, 1939.]

Consouipatep Freicut Lives, Inc., et al., Appellants,
v. Toe DepaRTMENT or PusLic SERVICE et al.,
Respondents.1

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 484,

James A. Brown and Lloyd E. Gandy, for appellants.

The Attorney General and Don Cary Smith, Assis-
tant (Joseph Starin, of counsel), for respondent De-
partment of Public Service.

Randall & Danskin, for respondent Davenport Hotel,
Ine.

Maun, J.—This is an appeal from a judgment of the
superior court affirming an order of the state depart-
ment of public service.

All of the appellants are now, and at all times in this
action mentioned were, common carriers of freight in
this state, authorized by the department of public ser-
vice to haul freight by motor vehicle. The Davenport
hotel is the principal hotel in the city of Spokane. In
the course of its business, it had a large amount of
freight and baggage moving to and from its place of
business, both intrastate and interstate. Each of the
appellants was serving the hotel in the capacity of pick-
ing up freight or baggage at its place of business and
delivering it anywhere in this state or in the regular
channels of interstate commerce, and each was deliv-
ering freight to the hotel which had its origin both in
intrastate and interstate commerce.

In August, 1937, a strike of its laundry workers was
called at the Davenport hotel, and a picket line was
thrown around the hotel. After this was done, the local
manager of the Teamsters’ Union served notice on
each of the appellants to the effect that they would not
be allowed to make deliveries or pickups of freight or
baggage at the hotel. All the operators of the appel-
lJants’ motor trucks were members of the Teamsters’
Union. The local manager told the appellants that, if
they permitted the trucks to go through the picket
line, or discharged any of their employees for refusal
to go through, he would call a strike of all of the em-

ployees of the appellants who belonged to the Team-
sters’ Union. After this, the trucks of the appellants
did not go through the picket line, though other trucks
constantly did. At the picket line, there was no vio-
lence or disturbance of any kind, and no one passing
through the line was molested in any way. The only
reason that the appellants refused to send their trucks
through the line was that the local managing agent of
the Teamsters’ Union told them that, if they did, he
would call a strike of the members of the union.

This condition obtained for some time and until the
hotel filed a complaint with the department on October
15, 1938. On the same day, the department set the
matter for hearing for October 28, 1938. Three or four
days prior to the hearing, the local managing agent
told the appellants that they could send their trucks
through the picket line. Sometime prior to this, the
local agent had released the ban so far as interstate
commerce was concerned. A hearing was had before
the department, and resulted in an order suspending
the permit, under which each one of the appellants
operated, for a period of thirty days, but provided that
such suspension should not become operative during
the continued compliance by the appellants with the
provision of the law and of the order. From this order,
the appellants took the case to the superior court for
review. After a hearing there, the order of the depart-
ment was affirmed, and it is from this order that the
appeal was prosecuted.

Upon the appeal, two questions are presented: First,
whether the action had become moot; and second,
whether the tariff published by the appellants, ap-
proved by the department, and in effect during the
time the appellants refused to go through the picket

line, exempted them from serving the hotel, under the
circumstances.

HI If the question has become moot, it is solely by
reason of the fact that, a few days before the hearing
in the department, the managing agent of the Team-
sters’ Union permitted the trucks to cross the picket
line. This action on the part of the manager of the
union fell far short of making the question on the
merits moot. Baasch v. Cooks Union, Local No. 33, 99
Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843; Fornili v. Auto Mechanics’
Union Local No. 297, ante p. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422.

Hl Upon the merits, if the appellants were exempt
from crossing the picket line, it is by reason of a pro-
vision in the tariff under which they were operating.
This provision is as follows:

“Impractical Operation: Nothing in this tariff shall
be construed as making it binding on carriers to pick
up and/or deliver freight at locations from and to
which it is impracticable to operate trucks on account
of conditions of highways, roads, streets or alleys, or
because of riots or strikes, or when loading or unload-
ing facilities are inadequate.”

If the appellants were excused by this provision,
they must rely solely upon the contention that, under
the statement in the tariff, it was impractical to oper-
ate the trucks because of the strike. “Impractical,”
as used in this tariff, clearly refers to the conditions
at the picket line, and, as already pointed out, the con-
ditions there were not such as to make it impractical
for the trucks to pass through.

Hs The question then arises whether the appellants
were excused by reason of the law. They being com-
mon carriers, it was their duty, under the facts and
circumstances of this case, to send their trucks through
the picket line. 13 C. J. S. 407; I Moore on Carriers (2d
ed.), 124; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Burlington, C. R.

663

& N. R. Co., 34 Fed. 481; Burgess Bros. Co. v. Stewart,
112 Misc. 347, 184 N. Y. Supp. 199.
The judgment will be affirmed.

Buaxg, C. J., Mrtarp, Roprwson, and Suupson, JJ.,
concur.

{No. 27690. Department One. October 13, 1939.]

Tur State or WasHINGTON, on the Relation of The De-
partment of Public Service, Appellant, v. NortTHERN
Paciric Raruway Company et al., Respondents.*

*Reported in 94 P, (2d) 502.

The Attorney General and Don Cary Smith, Assis-
tant (Will M. Derig and Raymond W. Clifford, of coun-
sel), for appellant.

Robert S. Macfarlane, Dean H. Eastman, E. C.
Matthias, A. J. Clynch, Hayden, Merritt, Summers &
Bucey (Roy F. Shields, of counsel), Green & Burnett,
A. N. Whitlock, and Thos. H. Maguire, for respondents.

Main, J—The state department of public service
brought this action seeking injunctive relief, and also
a writ of mandamus. The defendants were a number
of railroad corporations doing business in this state.
The injunctive relief was sought for the purpose of
preventing the defendants from putting into effect a
tariff schedule covering the matter of the movement
of logs in carload lots, and for a writ of mandamus to
compel them to adopt a tariff which had the approval
of the department.

At the time the action was instituted, a temporary
restraining order was issued.- At the conclusion of a
hearing on the merits, the court denied the injunctive
relief and also denied a writ of mandamus. From this
judgment, the department appealed.

The judgment from which the appeal was taken
was signed and entered May 25, 1939. The notice of
appeal was served upon the respondents June 19,

1939, and filed June 20, 1939. It thus appears that
the notice of appeal was not served or filed for more
than twenty days after the entry of the judgment.
After the notice of appeal had been given, the appel-
lant filed a petition in this court asking for a super-
sedeas and stay. A few days after this petition was
served and filed, the respondents moved to dismiss the
appeal because not timely taken.

‘The action was instituted under the provisions of
chapter 117, Laws of 1911, p. 538. Section 93 of that
act, p. 605, under the heading, “Summary Proceed-
ings,” defines the power and duties of the commission
by which the act was then to be administered. The
section also specifies what the final judgment may
contain, and provides for an appeal

“

to the supreme court from such final judg-
ment in the same manner and with the same effect as
appeals from judgments of the superior court in actions
to review orders of the commission. All provisions
of this act relating to the time of appeal, the manner
of perfecting the same, the filing of briefs, hearings
and supersedeas, shall apply to appeals to the supreme
court under the provisions of this section.” Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 10442 [P. C. § 5620].

Section 88, p. 598, sets forth the requirements re-
lating to an appeal to this court in this language:

“The commission [the department of public ser-
vice], any public service company or any complainant
may, within twenty days after the entry of judgment
in the superior court in any action of review, prose-
cute an appeal to the supreme court of the state of
Washington. . . . Such appeal shall be taken by
giving a notice of appeal in open court at the time
of the rendition of judgment, or by the service and
filing of a notice of appeal within twenty days from
and after the entry of the judgment.” Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 10430 [P. C. § 5615].

It will be noted that here is a provision for an ap-
peal within twenty days after the entry of the judg-
ment, and, as above appears, this appeal was not taken
until the twenty-fifth day.

In support of its position that the appeal was taken
within time, the appellant makes three principal con-
tentions: (a) That the twenty-day provision of the
statute is permissive, and not mandatory; (b) that the
twenty-day provision has been superseded by a rule
of this court fixing the time to take appeals in civil
actions at thirty days; and (c) that, in any event, it -
had a right to have the judgment reviewed in this
court, even though the act was held to be mandatory
and the twenty-day provision not set aside by the
rule of court mentioned. These contentions will be
considered in the order stated.

HE it will be admitted that, when the word
“may” is used in a statute, it may be used in the sense
of being permissive, or in the sense of being manda-
tory. Whether it is the latter, of course, depends upon
the intention of the legislature, to be collected from
the terms of the act.

It will be noted that, in the excerpt quoted from
§ 93, it is provided that all provisions of this act relat-
ing to “time of appeal,” the manner of perfecting the
same, shall apply to appeals to this court. In § 88,
it is stated that an appeal may be taken within twenty
days after the entry of the judgment, and this is
followed, at the conclusion of the section, by the state-
ment that such appeal “shall” be taken by giving a
notice of appeal in open court at the time of the ren-
dition of the judgment or by service and filing of a
notice of appeal “within twenty days from and after
the entry of the judgment.”

At the time this statute was enacted, the time for
appeal in civil actions was ninety days after the entry

of the judgment, and the appellant, had there been no
provision shortening the time, would, doubtless, have
come under that provision. If the twenty-day pro-
vision is permissive, there was no purpose whatever
in fixing that time in the statute, as, under the ninety-
day statute, the appellant could have appealed imme-
diately after the entry of the judgment, or at any time
within the period of ninety days. It is clear that the
legislature must have intended that appeals must be
taken within twenty days, under the act.

| In support of its second contention, the appel-
lant says that, when the court promulgated the rule
reducing the time for taking appeals in civil actions
and proceedings from ninety days to thirty days (140
Wash. xlii, which became effective January 14, 1927),
it thereby abrogated and set aside the twenty-day
provision for appeal provided for in the statute above
mentioned.

It will be admitted that the public service commis-
sion law, of which the two sections of the statute that
are here for consideration are a part, is a general law,
but the provision with reference to the time of taking
appeal is special. There are cases where a special
law may be repealed by one which is general, and this
again depends upon the intention. In In re West
Barton Street Sewer, 163 Wash. 645, 1 P. (2d) 858,
it was held that an appeal must be dismissed when
not taken within the fifteen days after the date of
the entry of the judgment appealed from. In that
case, the statute contained a proviso “that such appeal
must be filed within fifteen days after the date of
entry of the judgment” of the superior court. It was
there said, referring to the statute:

“This is a special statute, and appeals under it must
be taken, as under any special statute, in conformity

with its provisions. The general rule on appeals (Rule
of Practice X, par. 1, 159 Wash. lxiv, Rem. 1927 Sup.,
§§ 308-10, par. 1), which simply modified the previous
statutory general rule by shortening the time for ap-
peals from final judgments from ninety to thirty days,
has no application to appeals under the special statute
invoked in this case or under any other special statute
orrule. It is elementary that a general statute or rule,
though subsequently enacted or promulgated, does
not affect a special statute or rule. Meade v. French,
4 Wash. 11, 29 Pac. 833; State ex rel. Sherman v.
Benson, 111 Wash. 124, 189 Pac. 1000.”

It is sought to distinguish that case on the theory
that the legislative enactment there used the term
“must,” while the one we are now considering used
the term “may.” But this is not a distinction, because,
as above indicated, the word “may,” in the statute
now under consideration, must be construed to mean
“onus.”

It is further sought to distinguish the case on the
ground that the court referred to the statute under
which the appeal was taken as a special one. This
reference, undoubtedly, referred to the sections of the
statute which were before the court and which were
being considered, and that was the section covering
the matter of the time in which to take an appeal.
We see no distinction between that case and the one
now before us.

Hl The contention that a right of appeal or review
in this court exists even though the statute is manda-
tory and has not been repealed by the rule promul-
gated by this court, is based upon the provisions of
§ 4, Art. IV of the constitution of this state. That sec-
tion provides that:

“The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction
in habeas corpus and quo warranto and mandamus
as to all state officers,

Clearly, there is nothing in the section which author-
izes a review of a judgment of the superior court in
a case where this court has no jurisdiction by reason
of the failure to timely give notice of appeal.

The cases of North Bend Stage Line v. Department
of Public Works, 170 Wash. 217, 16 P. (2d) 206, and
Kitsap County Transportation Co. v. Department of
Public Works, 170 Wash. 396, 16 P. (2d) 828, upon
which the appellant relies as supporting its conten-
tion, are entirely different. In each of those cases,
the court had jurisdiction under a law passed by the
legislature which was held to be unconstitutional. The
court, notwithstanding this fact, retained jurisdiction
by certiorari under its discretionary power. The dif-
ference between those two cases and the one now
before us is that, there, the court had jurisdiction, and,
in this case, it never has acquired jurisdiction.

Our attention has been called to the rule of law
which provides that statutes and rules of practice
are to be liberally construed. In addition to this, it
may be said that this court, at the present time and
for many years past, has been reluctant to dismiss
appeals. Notwithstanding this, there are cases which
present a situation where there is no other alterna-
tive, and the present case is one.

The law requires that this appeal be dismissed, and
it is so ordered.

Buake, C. J., Mruiarp, Roginson, and Sumeson, JJ.,
concur.

[No. 27743. Department One. October 13, 1939.]

Tur Strate or Wasuineron, on the Relation of
Thomas H. Davis, Plaintiff, v. Tur Superior Court
For Kine County, Chester A. Batchelor,

Judge, Respondent.*

James G. Mulroy and Charles A. Cave, for relator.
Ralph A. Horr, for respondent.

Mittarp, J—This is an original petition to this court
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court
for King county from entering an order requiring the
relator to pay to the plaintiff forty dollars monthly
during the pendency of his appeal in an action en-
titled Blanche E. Davis v. Thomas H. Davis, and to
also prevent that court from entering an order requir-
ing the relator to pay to Blanche E. Davis three hun-

‘Reported in 94 P. (2d) 478.

dred dollars for suit money to enable her to resist the
relator’s appeal in the action just described.

The facts, as disclosed by the petition and the re-
turn thereto of the superior court, are as follows:

An action was commenced by Blanche E. Davis in
the superior court for King county to obtain a divorce
from Thomas H. Davis. In his answer and cross-
complaint, Thomas H. Davis alleged that, without
knowledge of the fact that the plaintiff was then the
wife of another, he consented to marry her; and that,
on or about October 3, 1938, a marriage ceremony
purporting to unite Blanche E. Davis and Thomas H.
Davis as husband and wife was performed in this state.
He prayed that the purported marriage be annulled.
Through their respective attorneys, the plaintiff and
defendant stipulated in open court that a decree of
annulment should be entered. Judgment was entered
pursuant to findings and conclusions of the court
that, by reason of the purported marriage, the plaintiff
had sustained damages in the amount of two thousand
dollars, and that that marriage should be annulled.

Defendant immediately gave notice of appeal from
that portion of the judgment awarding recovery in
the amount of two thousand dollars to the plaintiff
and filed the required cost and supersedeas bond to
perfect the appeal and to stay further proceedings
upon the judgment.

On July 29, 1939, plaintiff filed a motion which came
on for hearing August 4, 1939, before respondent su-
perior court for an order requiring defendant to con-
tinue to pay to plaintiff support money of forty dol-
lars monthly until disposition of his appeal; and that
the defendant be also required to pay to the plaintiff
three hundred dollars to enable her to resist in this
court the appeal of the defendant. Respondent su-
perior court announced its intention to grant the

motion, whereupon relator filed his petition, as above
stated, in this court for a writ of prohibition to restrain
respondent from entering such order.

The statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 984 [P. C. § 7503])
provides that any person who has been a resident of
this state for one year may file his or her complaint
for a divorce or a decree of nullity of marriage in the
superior court of the county where he or she may re-
side, and like proceedings shall be had thereon as in
civil cases. The statute (Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
§ 988 [P. C. § 7507], Laws of 1933, p. 432, §1) further
provides that, pending the action for the divorce, the
court may make, and by attachment enforce, such
orders for the disposition of the property and chil-
dren of the parties as may be deemed right and proper,
and such orders relative to the expenses of such ac-
tion as will insure to the wife an efficient prepara-
tion of her case and a fair and impartial trial thereof.
If the court determines that either party or both is
entitled to a divorce, an interlocutory order must be
entered accordingly. That order shall also make all
necessary provisions as to alimony, custody, support
and education of the children, etc.

| It is clear that the statute presupposes the
existence of the marital relation as a condition to the
right of the court to award alimony and attorney’s
fees to the wife. The existence of the marital relation
is a condition precedent to the power of the court to
grant to the wife alimony and attorney’s fees. Dolby
v. Dolby, 93 Wash. 350, 160 Pac. 950; Haakenson v.
Coldiron, 190 Wash. 627, 70 P. (2d) 294.

In the action to annul their marriage, the parties
stipulated the entry of a decree of annulment, doubt-
less on the ground that the marriage was void because,
at the time of her purported marriage to the defend-

ant (relator in this proceeding), the plaintiff was then
the wife of another.

The right to attorney’s fees or alimony is predicated
upon the duty of the husband to the wife springing
from the contract or status of marriage. As marriage
is the essential foundation of allowances and alimony,
the existence of a marriage between the parties must
be adinitted, or shown, before an order properly can
be made for an allowance of temporary alimony or
suit money.

Where the existence of the marriage is not admitted
or established—in the action of Blanche E. Davis
against the relator, the invalidity of the marriage of
plaintiff and defendant was admitted and the inter-
locutory order established the nonexistence of a mar-
riage between them—in an action for annulment, no
assistance will be granted to the wife from the means
of the husband. Therry v. Therry, 117 Fla. 453, 158
So. 120; Morgan v. Morgan, 148 Ga. 625, 97 S. E. 675,
4A.L. R. 925; 19 C. J. 212; 6 Bancroft’s Code Practice,
6646, § 4904.

The existence of the marital relation is a condition
precedent to the power of the court to grant alimony,
counsel fees, or suit money to the wife. Where the
existence of the marriage is not admitted or estab-
lished, or where it is admitted that the complainant
had living an undivorced husband at the time of her
purported second marriage, the court is without
power to grant alimony, counsel fees, or suit money
to the woman.

The writ is granted.

Brake, C. J., Mary, Rosrnson, and Smupson, JJ.,
concur.
fe

[No, 27476. En Bane. October 16, 1939.]

Cumvrronw M. Miuuzr, Appellant, v. Taz DEPARTMENT OF
Lazor anp Inpustrizs, Respondent.*

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 764.

V. D. Bradeson, for appellant.

The Attorney General and J. A. Kavaney, Assistant,
for respondent.

Srermert, J.—This is a proceeding under the work-
men’s compensation act. The judgment of the superior
court affirmed an order of the joint board of the de-
partment of labor and industries closing the claim
of an injured workman with an allowance for time
loss and an award for permanent partial disability.
The workman, deeming himself aggrieved by the order
and judgment, has appealed to this court.

The questions to be determined on the appeal are
(1) whether appellant’s condition should have been
classified as a total disability, either permanent or else
temporary, rather than as a permanent partial dis-
ability, and (2) whether or not the amount of the
award was proper and just. .

The facts material to the consideration of these ques-
tions are as follows: Appellant, Clinton M. Miller,
was a longshoreman, twenty-six years of age, strongly
built and weighing about one hundred seventy-eight
pounds. He had been doing heavy manual work for
about nine years. In April, 1937, while helping to
load some heavy bales of pulp at a Tacoma dock, he ©
experienced what he termed a “twinge” in the lower
part of his back. He continued his work, however,
for six days and then quit for a period of nine days
for treatment. Resuming his employment, he worked
regularly at the dock until, on August 4th, while help-
ing to lift a drum of oil weighing about five hundred
pounds, he suffered a severe sprain of the lumbosacral
joint. On account of the pain, appellant was unable
to work for about a month. Between September 3rd
and December 10th he worked intermittently about
ten days. From December 10th until the following’

April he did not work at all, and during that entire
period was under the care of a physician, who, with
the consent of the department, prescribed a sacroiliac
belt and administered a course of intravenous injec-
tions.

On March 24, 1938, at the direction of the depart-
ment, appellant was examined by another physician,
who later reported that appellant had no disability
resulting from the injury of August 4, 1937, and that
he should be requested to go back to work, with no
permanent partial disability rating. On April 4, 1938,
the supervisor of the department entered an order
closing the claim with payment for time loss to April
1st, but with no allowance for permanent partial dis-
ability. Thereupon, appellant filed an application for,
and was granted, a rehearing before the joint board.

The joint board then referred the matter to a com-
mission of medical specialists for examination of, and
report concerning, appellant. On May 31, 1938, the
commission made a report of its findings to the effect
that there was a definite tenderness at the lumbosacral
joint and that the X-ray films showed a congenital
absence: of the neural arch of the first sacral segment,
and further reciting, as its conclusions, the following:

“Tt is our opinion that (1) The claimant’s condition
is not fixed; (2) That his disability—in part at least
is due to the injury of which he complains; (3) The
claimant is not able to carry on a gainful occupation;
(4) Treatment by surgical operation is indicated. We
believe that a well planned and efficiently executed
fusion operation including the 5th lumbar and upper
two sacral segments is definitely indicated in this case.”

On June 1, 1938, the rehearing before the joint board
began. The report of the specialists was offered in
evidence and the testimony of appellant and his wit-

. hesses, including his attending physician, was taken.

The physician testified that appellant was suffering
from a lumbosracro-iliac ailment; that his condition
had not materially improved; that further medical
treatment would be of no value; and that the only
thing that possibly could do appellant any good would
be a surgical operation, but that even an operation
offered only a fifty-fifty chance of improvement. The
physician was not asked whether appellant’s disability
was total or partial. The rehearing was then ad-
journed to a later date for the taking of testimony
offered by the department.

In the interim, that is, on July 8, 1938, the depart-
ment informed appellant, who was then in Portland,
Oregon, that the evidence in the case indicated the
advisability of having a fusion operation upon his
spine and authorized appellant to have it performed
by a certain orthopedic specialist in that city. Appel-
lant promptly notified the department that he rejected
the proposal, and further requested that his case be
closed with a lump sum settlement.

The department thereupon again referred the matter
to the commission of specialists for further examina-
tion of appellant and for report as to whether appel-
lJant’s condition was of traumatic origin and the result
of the injury complained of and, if so, whether his
condition was fixed and, if fixed, the extent of perma-
nent partial disability due to the injury, to be ex-
pressed in terms of percentage as compared to a maxi-
mum of the maximum award for unspecified disability
amounting to eighty degrees; or, if his condition was
not fixed, whether further treatment was indicated
and, if so, the treatment recommended; and also as to
whether appellant was able to carry on a gainful oc-
cupation. On July 26, 1938, the commission made its
report, which, after confirming its former report, con-
cluded as follows:

0 i
ee

“We are of the opinion that he has an extensive
permanent disability, partly due to a congenital weak-
ness as formerly described, and partly due to his in-
jury to this already weakened structure, which has
resulted in a chronic strain at the lumbosacral area
and the formation of localized traumatic arthritis.

“It is our opinion further that he should be awarded
a PPD [permanent partial disability] of 40 degrees
as a result of the injuries he received in April and in
August of 1937.”

The rehearing was resumed September 9, 1938, at
which time the testimony of the three specialists and
the physician who first recommended that appellant’s
claim be closed was taken. The three specialists testi-
fied that, in their opinion, an operation would greatly
improve appellant’s condition, although such result
could not be predicted with certainty; that the fusion
should be successful if the operation was properly
performed; that appellant’s present infirmity was pro-
duced by a combination of the injury and a congenital
weakness of his back; that such infirmity then consti-
tuted a permanent partial disability; and that, in their
opinion, appellant should have a rating of forty degrees
(which is equivalent to one-half of the maximum)
permanent partial disability.

Only one of the three specialists testified directly
upon the question whether appellant was able to en-
gage in a gainful occupation. With reference to that
matter, the witness testified that appellant was not
totally disabled and that, while he would not be able
to do heavy manual lifting, he “could go ahead and
do light work.”

Each of the three specialists was questioned as to
how he arrived at the figure of forty degrees for per-
manent partial disability. One of them stated that
they had taken into consideration the congenital
anomaly which caused a weakened condition of ap-

pellant’s back and that they thought they were deal-
ing fairly with him in classifying him in such a way
as to give him fifty per cent of the highest amount
allowable for a permanent partial disability not spe-
cifically described in the statute. The second specialist
testified that the award was made for appellant’s con-
dition as it then existed, which was a sprain super-
imposed on a congenitally weak back; he further
testified that the basis of the award was the loss of
function. The third specialist concluded that appel-
lant was not totally disabled and that, in justice both
to the state and appellant, forty degrees was a proper
figure.

The fourth medical witness, who had examined ap-
pellant on March 24, 1938, testified that the workman
had a congenitally weak back; that, in the opinion of
the witness, the pain suffered by appellant came from
the use of his back during hard labor rather than
from injury; that, when the witness made the examina-
tion, he thought that appellant was able to work, but
that appellant should not follow hard manual labor.

Later, at a continued hearing, appellant called, in
rebuttal, a physician witness, who testified that appel-
lant had a small congenital defect but that it did not
materially contribute to the ailment; that appellant’s
condition was due to chronic lumbosacral strain which
might be remedied either by complete rest or by a
fusion operation, although there was no assurance
that the latter would be successful; and that appellant
could not in his condition perform hard manual labor,
but that there were many types of sedentary work
in which he could engage. ,

At the conclusion of the rehearing, the joint board
made a summary of the proceedings, from which it
concluded that appellant’s permanent partial disability
due to injury did not exceed forty degrees, and that

the permanent partial disability, if any, in excess of
forty degrees was not due to injury but to congenital
defects. Basing its findings on this summary, the joint
board entered an order directing the supervisor of the
department to reopen the claim, to award the appel-
lant additional time loss compensation, together with
forty degrees permanent partial disability, and to close
the claim on that basis. The order of the joint board
was affirmed by the trial court.

We now take up the questions involved upon the
appeal.

HE Appellant contends, first, that his condition was
not fixed, and that, therefore, he could not be given
a rating of permanent partial disability.

The rule in this state undoubtedly is that, before
an allowance can be made for a permanent partial dis-
ability, the condition of the injured workman must
have reached a fixed state. Ray v. Department of
Labor & Industries, 177 Wash. 687, 33 P. (2d) 375;
Lackey v. Department of Labor & Industries, 179
Wash. 594, 38 P. (2d) 345; Elliott v. Department of
Labor & Industries, 187 Wash. 656, 61 P. (2d) 291,
188 Wash. 703, 62 P. (2d) 1343.

Appellant’s contention is based upon the first report
of the specialists, in which they found that his condi-
tion was not fixed; and upon the statement in their
second report that, in their opinion, the claimant’s
condition was the same as that expressed in their
former report.

The record discloses that the first report was made
on the assumption that an operation would be per-
formed, from which the doctors concluded that ap-
pellant’s condition was not fixed, because, in their
opinion, surgical treatment would either rectify or
materially improve his condition; while the second
report was made upon the assurance that no operation

would be had and upon the doctors’ belief and decision
that the condition was permanent. Moreover, regard-
less of any prior reports, there is ample evidence to
support the finding of the department that appellant’s
condition had become fixed, because, without an opera-
tion, no improvement could be expected. Appellant’s
condition having become fixed, it was necessary for
the department to determine whether the disability
was total or partial. Upon that question, the evidence
abundantly supports the finding that the fixed condi-
tion was one of permanent partial disability. We,
therefore, conclude that the classification made by the
department should be affirmed.

HI The second question is whether, for the dis-
ability as classified by the department, the amount of
the award was proper and just.

Compensation for permanent partial disability is
prescribed by Rem. Rev. Stat., §7679 [P. C. § 3472]
(f). That section sets up a schedule of amounts al-
lowable for specifically described disabilities, and then
proceeds:

“Compensation for any other permanent partial dis-
ability shall be in the proportion which the extent of
such other disability shall bear to that above speci-
fied, which most closely resembles and approximates
in degree of disability such other disability, but not

in any case to exceed the sum of two thousand four
hundred dollars ($2,400.00)

The disability shown in this case is not one of those
mentioned in the schedule, and, hence, the amount of
allowable compensation must be estimated by a proper
application of the statutory provision just quoted.

In determining the correct amount of compensation,
it becomes necessary to decide whether appellant’s
existing disability is to be considered as integral or
whether it is to be regarded as divisible and, thus,

attributable in part to trauma and in part to a pre-
existing congenital defect. The findings of the joint
board seem to indicate that in awarding appellant com-
pensation for permanent partial disability of forty de-
grees, the board limited the allowance to disability
due to trauma only, and did not include so much of
the disability as may have been due to the congenital
anomaly. If that was the intention of the department,
we are of the opinion that it erred.

We have held in an unbroken line of decisions that,
if an injury, within the statutory meaning, lights up
or makes active a latent or quiescent infirmity or
weakened physical condition occasioned by disease,
then the resulting disability is to be attributed to the
injury, and not to the preexisting physical condition.
Ray v. Department of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash.
687, 33 P. (2d) 375; Brittain v. Department of Labor
& Industries, 178 Wash. 499, 35 P. (2d) 49; McGuire
v. Department of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash. 645,
38 P. (2d) 266; Rikstad v. Department of Labor &
Industries, 180 Wash. 591, 41 P. (2d) 391; Johnson v.
Department of Labor & Industries, 184 Wash. 567, 52
P. (2d) 310; Pulver v. Department of Labor & Indus-
tries, 185 Wash. 664, 56 P. (2d) 701; Matson v. De-
partment of Labor & Industries, 198 Wash. 507, 88
P. (2d) 825.

If this be true with respect to a weakened physical
condition resulting from disease, it must likewise be
true with respect to a similar infirmity resulting from
some structural weakness of the body. As we have
many times stated, the provisions of the workmen’s
compensation act are not limited in their benefits to
such persons only as approximate physical perfection,
for few, if any, workmen are completely free from
latent infirmities originating either in disease or in
some congenital abnormality. It is a fundamental prin-

ciple which most, if not all, courts accept, that, if the
accident or injury complained of is the proximate
cause of the disability for which compensation is
sought, the previous physical condition of the work-
man is immaterial and recovery may be had for the
full disability independent of any preexisting or con-
genital weakness; the theory upon which that prin-
ciple is founded is that the workman’s prior physical
condition is not deemed the cause of the injury, but
merely a condition upon which the real cause oper-
ated. Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539,
97 Atl. 1020; Studebaker Corp. v. Jones, 104 Ind. App.
270, 10 N. E. (2d) 747; Doane v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 163 So. (La. App.) 717; Wilkins v. Ben’s Home
Oil Co., 166 Minn. 41, 207 N. W. 183; Dymak v. Haskins
Bros. & Co., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N. W. 860; Vallee v.
Spaulding Fibre Co., 89 N. H. 285, 197 Atl. 697; Gorman ©

' v. Miner-Edgar Chemical Corp., 16 N. J. Mise. 170,
198 Atl. 404; Cole v. State Highway Department, 190
S. C. 142, 2S. BE. (2d) 490.

Applying this principle to the instant case, we are
of the opinion that the accident or injury was the
proximate cause of appellant’s ultimate disability, and
that his prior congenital weakness was but a condi-
tion upon which the injury became operative. The
evidence discloses that appellant for many years had
been undergoing arduous manual labor and, prior to
the accident, was not suffering from the congenital
defect.

In our consideration and determination of this par-
ticular question, we have not overlooked Rem. Rev.
Stat., § 7679 [P. C. § 3472] (g), which provides, in
part, as follows:

“Should a workman receive an injury to a member

or part of his body already from whatever cause per-
manently partially disabled, resulting in the amputa-

tion thereof or in an aggravation or increase in such
permanent partial disability but not resulting in the
permanent total disability of such workman, his com-
pensation for such permanent partial disability shall
be adjudged with regard to the previous disability of
the injured member or part and the degree or extent
of the aggravation or increase of disability thereof.”

In Elliott v. Department of Labor & Industries, 187
Wash. 656, 61 P. (2d) 291, modified and clarified in
188 Wash. 703, 62 P. (2d) 1343, we seem to have given
that section a construction which would authorize
the department to determine, in the exercise of its
judgment or discretion, to what extent the disability
was due to a prior congenital weakness of the work-
man’s back and to what extent it was due to the in-
jury.

We have reconsidered the holding in the Elliott
case and are now of the opinion that its interpretation
of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7679 (g), respecting the authority
of the department, was incorrect. We are of the view
that Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7679 (g), is applicable only
to cases in which the workman already is, in fact,
permanently partially disabled within the meaning
of the workmen’s compensation act, but that it does not
apply when the preexisting weakened or congenital
condition, independent of the subsequent injury, has
not, in any way, incapacitated the workman or has
not, of itself, constituted a disability. For the reasons
given upon the question under consideration, we con-
clude that the department should have awarded ap-
pellant compensation for his entire disability, to the
extent that it was found to exist, without regard to
the congenital defect.

Hl In its brief, the department takes the position
that appellant is virtually seeking a pension; and that,
since he refused to submit to the operation, he should
not be permitted to recover. Reliance is placed on

Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7688 [P. C. § 3481], which provides,
in part, as follows:

“. . . if any injured workman shall persist in un-
sanitary or injurious practices, which tend to imperil
or retard his recovery, or shall refuse to submit to such
medical or surgical treatment as is reasonably essential
to his recovery, the commission may reduce or sus-
pend the compensation of such workman. ”

That provision of the statute has reference only to
a reduction or suspension of monthly payments which
are being made to an injured workman during the
period of recuperation from an injury. It does not
apply to a lump sum settlement for a permanent par-
tial disability which has been determined by the de-
partment after the condition of the workman has
become fixed. For these reasons, it becomes unneces-
sary to discuss further the question suggested by the
department.

Having now passed on all the questions presented
upon the appeal, we approach the matter of a proper
disposition of the case. 7

Upon the record before us, we are unable to find or
declare the extent, or degree, of appellant’s permanent
partial disability, for neither the evidence nor the
findings of the board afford any certainty upon the
subject. The evidence merely indicates that the spe-
cialists composing the commission were of the opinion
that, in attributing fifty per cent of the disability to
the injury, a liberal allowance to appellant was made.
The findings of the department were to the effect that
the disability due to the injury did not exceed forty
degrees; and that, if there were any disability in ex-
cess of that degree, it was due to congenital defect.
But neither the evidence nor the findings established
or determined the extent of the entire disability re-
gardless of the congenital defect. To fix the amount

of the allowance to be made to appellant, it is neces-
sary, first, to determine the extent or degree of his
entire permanent partial disability.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
with direction to the trial court to refer the matter
to the joint board for further hearing, consideration,
and final determination, in accordance with the views
herein expressed.

ALL CONCUR.

[No. 27579, Department Two, October 16, 1939.]

In the Matter of the Estate of Cuar.zs I. WELcu,
Deceased.

_ Curistine T. Wencu, Appellant, v. D. P. Weicu, as
Administrator, et al., Respondents.*

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 758.

Jack McWalter, for appellant.
A. J. Balliet and Richard B. Ward, for respondents.

Jerrers, J—This is an appeal by Christine T. Welch,
widow of Charles I. Welch, deceased, from an order
made in the estate of the deceased, entered by the
superior court for King county, denying the petition
of Christine T, Welch for an award in lieu of home-
stead. The facts in the case were stipulated, as pro-
vided by Rule X, Rules of the Supreme Court, 193
Wash. 1l-a, and so far as material may be stated
as follows:

Charles I. Welch died intestate in Seattle, Washing-
ton, on July 2, 1938, and appellant, Christine T. Welch,
is the widow of the deceased, having married Charles I.
Welch on July 2, 1938, some four hours prior to his
death, after a six months correspondence courtship.
Deceased left surviving him his widow (this appel-
lant) and four children, one of them, Ernest Welch,
being a minor eighteen years of age, who is subnormal
and has an intelligence quotient of fifty-five, or a little
more than fifty per cent of normal.

Decedent left an estate consisting of real and per-
sonal property, which has been appraised by appraisers
regularly appointed by the court, at $6,945.07. Appel-
lant duly and regularly petitioned the court to have
certain real and personal property of the estate set
aside to her in lieu of homestead, which property is
worth the sum of three thousand dollars. The time
for filing creditor’s claims against the estate has ex-
pired, and there are sufficient assets on hand, over
and above the allowance petitioned for by appellant,
to permit the payment of funeral expenses, expenses
of last sickness, and expenses of administration. No
homestead in the property of deceased has been
claimed in the manner provided by law, but decedent,

Charles I. Welch, received an award in lieu of home-
stead from the estate of a former spouse.

Due notice of the hearing of the petition of appel-
lant was given in the manner provided by law, and
the only minor child, Ernest Welch, was duly repre-
sented at the hearing by his duly appointed guardian
ad litem, Richard B. Ward.

Based upon the above facts, the court, on March 24,
1939, entered an order denying appellant’s petition,
for the reason, as expressed orally by the court, that,
under the facts, it would be inequitable to permit ap-
pellant to secure an award in lieu of homestead; first,
because appellant had been married to deceased only
four hours at the time of his death, and second, be-
cause an award in lieu of homestead to appellant would
diminish the distributive share of the minor heir,
Ernest Welch, who is subnormal, and who is a person
likely to become a public charge.

‘On the basis of the facts herein set out and the order
of the court, the parties agree that the questions in-
volved in this appeal are:

(1) Does the fact that the decedent and appellant
were married only four hours prior to the death of
Charles I. Welch bar appellant from securing an award
in lieu of homestead?

(2) Does the fact that the interest of the minor in-
competent heir, Ernest Welch, would be diminished
by the granting of an award to appellant bar appellant
from securing such an award?

(3) Does the fact that decedent had, prior to the
time of his marriage with appellant, secured an award
in lieu of homestead in the course of the probate of
the estate of a former wife bar appellant from secur-
ing the award asked for herein?

Appellant assigns as error the order of the trial
court denying her petition for an award in lieu of

homestead, and bases her claim upon Rem. Rev. Stat.,
§§ 1473 and 1474 [P. C. §$§ 9893, 9894].

Unless the trial court was right in denying appel-
lant’s petition on what is termed equitable grounds,
it is apparent from the stipulated facts that appellant
is eligible to receive an award in lieu of homestead,
under the provisions of § 1473, supra. It is also ap-
parent that she does not come within the exception
of § 1474, supra, which provides that an award

“oy shall not be taken from separate property
of the deceased, which is otherwise disposed of by
will, where there is no minor child living as the issue
or adopted child of the surviving spouse and the de-
ceased.”

HM We think the court erred in denying appel-
lant’s petition because of the short duration of the
marriage and the further fact that such an award
would diminish the distributive share of the minor.

We have consistently held that award statutes,
such as §§ 1473 and 1474, supra, give an absolute right,
which is not subject to collateral conditions and should
not be influenced by the countervailing equities; that
such statutes are not, strictly speaking, homestead and
exemption laws, although, like general laws exempt-
ing homesteads and certain personal property, they
rest in a sound public policy and are calculated to
prevent dependency.

In re Lavenberg’s Estate, 104 Wash. 515, 177 Pac.
328, where a nonresident widow was claiming prop-
erty in lieu of homestead, we stated:

“A judicial duty imposed by the legislature compels
the setting apart of the property, and against the order
of the court nothing will avail unless it be the volun-
tary renunciation of the widow. . . . ‘It is an abso-
lute right that the statute gives unqualified by collateral

conditions.’ Griesemer v. Boyer, supra [13 Wash.
171, 43 Pac. 17].”

In re Johnson’s Estate, 114 Wash. 61, 194 Pac. 834.

In re Schiffner’s Estate, 174 Wash. 134, 24 P. (2d)
434, in referring to an award in lieu of homestead
based on $§ 1473 and 1474, supra, we stated:

“These allowances against the estate are created

by law, and are preferred just as other debts are pre-
ferred, and not subject to any collateral conditions.

“Cases from this court and others and the texts as
to the countervailing equities of appellants on the one
hand and respondent on the other, are of no influence,
in view of our positive statutory law and consistent
construction thereof.” (Italics ours.)

See, also, In re Chisholm’s Estate, 159 Wash. 674,
294 Pac. 973, 76 A. L. R. 279.

Respondent relies upon, and asks us to adopt the
reasoning applied in, In re Tyler’s Estate, 140 Wash.
679, 250 Pac. 456, 51 A. L. R. 1088, wherein it appears
that appellant murdered his wife, and thereafter, when
her estate was being probated, petitioned the court
to set aside to him certain property of the wife’s estate
in lieu of homestead. It was contended in the cited
case. that the court had no alternative, under the stat-
ute, but to make the award. This court therein stated:

“It is so offensive .to good conscience, repugnant to
justice and revolting to the mind of every right think-
ing person, that one should come into court with
bloody hands and receive, as it were, a reward for his
iniquity, that we cannot conceive that the legislature,
composed of persons of good sense and integrity, should
ever have intended, in enacting the statute and its
amendment, that such consummation could be accom-
plished. It must be true that such a state of facts as
appear in this case was not in the mind of the legis-
lature at the time the statutes were passed.”

Since the decision in the Tyler case, the legislature
has amended § 1473, supra, and by such amendment
denied to a surviving spouse, who has feloniously killed

the deceased spouse, the right to have property
awarded to him or her, as provided in the section.

Without further discussion of the cited case, we
think neither the facts nor the reasons assigned for
the decision applicable to the instant case.

HI This leaves the third question to be disposed
of, and we are of the opinion it must be answered in
the negative. Section 1473, supra, provides in part:

“Tf it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of
the court that no homestead has been claimed in the
manner provided by law, either prior or subsequent
to the death of the person whose estate is being ad-
ministered . ”
the court, upon a showing made that the provisions
of the statute have been complied with, shall make
the award in lieu of homestead.

It is again apparent from the stipulated facts that
no homestead has been claimed in any property be-
longing to the estate of Charles I. Welch, either prior
or subsequent to his death. We think appellant clearly
is entitled to an award in lieu of homestead, regard-
less of the fact that her deceased husband had been
allowed such an award from the estate of a former
wife.

We have held that an award in lieu of homestead
was not strictly a homestead or exemption law. In
re Lavenberg’s Estate, supra; Greer v. Robinson, 149
Wash. 659, 272 Pac. 28.

We cannot agree with respondents that to allow this
appellant an award in lieu of homestead would, in
effect, allow the pyramiding of homesteads.

As we have herein stated, no homestead had been
claimed in decedent’s estate, either prior or subse-
quent to his death, and appellant is therefore, as a
matter of right under the statutes, entitled to the
award claimed.

- The judgment is reversed, with instructions to the
trial court to award to appellant, in lieu of homestead,
the property set out in her petition and in the stipu-
lated facts.

Braxz, C. J., Beats, Sremert, and Grracuty, JJ.;
concur.

[No. 27636. Department Two. October 17, 1939.]

Ciara Voer, Appellant, v. Wartrney Curtis et al.,
Respondents.*

|
Poe, Falknor, Emory & Howe, for appellant.
Jeffrey Heiman, for respondents.

Brats, J.—Plaintiff sued the defendants, asking for
judgment in a considerable sum on account of an al-
leged appropriation of plaintifi’s property by defend-
ants. By their answer, defendants denied the material
allegations of plaintiff's complaint and pleaded an af-
firmative defense, which plaintiff denied by reply. The

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 761.

action was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict
in plaintiffs favor in the sum of $3,550.

Defendants moved for a new trial, basing their
motion upon all the statutory grounds. In support of
their motion, as based upon misconduct of the jury,
defendants submitted the affidavits of several jurors.

It appears from the record that the case was sub-
mitted to the jury at one o’clock in the afternoon,
and that the jury considered its verdict until approxi-
mately half after eleven o’clock that evening, prior
to which time the vote of the jury had been eight in
favor of the plaintiff and four in favor of the defend-
ants. Shortly before eleven-thirty o’clock, the vote
changed to nine for the plaintiff and three for the de-
fendants. Not long after the vote last mentioned, the
court called in the jury to ascertain the prospects of
a verdict being returned. In response to the court’s
question, the foreman stated that during the afternoon
the vote had stood eight to four in favor of plaintiff,
but that on the last ballot it had stood nine to three.
The court then told the jury that an additional fifteen
minutes would be allowed them for deliberation, and
the jury again retired. A few minutes after the ex-
piration of the fifteen minute period suggested by the
court, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff,
a poll of the jury disclosing that ten jurors had voted
in favor of this verdict. On the poll, each juror stated
that the verdict was the verdict of the jury, ten of
them stating that the verdict was their verdict, the
other two that it was not their verdict.

The trial court denied defendants’ motion for a new
trial upon all grounds urged save that of misconduct
of the jury, and signed an order granting the new trial
solely on that ground. From this order, plaintiff has
appealed, assigning error upon the entry of the order.

‘From the affidavits of the jurors filed by the respec-

tive parties in connection with respondents’ motion for
a new trial, it appears that, on the last ballot of the
jury prior to eleven-thirty o’clock, three of the jurors,
Gus L. Hensel, Howard B. Stephens, and Mayme C.
Schram, voted in favor of a verdict for the defendants,
with the result that the vote stood nine to three in
favor of appellant; that it was suggested that one of
these three jurors change his vote and vote in favor
of appellant, which change would result in a verdict;
and that the three jurors agreed among themselves
that one of them would so change his vote. It does
not appear that all or any of these jurors had become
convinced that a verdict in favor of appellant should
be returned upon the facts and the law, but they did
agree that one of them would vote in appellant’s favor.

From the affidavits, it further appears that, in ac-
cordance with this agreement, the three jurors, using
an ordinary deck of playing cards, cut the cards to
determine which juror should vote in appellant’s favor;
that juror Stephens “lost,” and in accordance with the
fall of the cards, on the next ballot changed his vote
from “for the defendants” to “for the plaintiff;” that,
as the result of the change of juror Stephens’ vote, ten
jurors voted in favor of appellant, and a verdict was
returned in her favor in the amount above indicated.

Juror Schram filed her affidavit stating these facts.
Another juror, Lillie M. Keltner, who had voted in
appellant’s favor prior to the change, made affidavit
to practically the same facts, as being within her
knowledge. Two other jurors made affidavit to the
effect that cards were cut by the three jurors referred
to in juror Schram’s affidavit, and other jurors filed
affidavits, some of them to the effect that, in the opinion
of affiants, no action on the part of jurors Schram,
Stephens, and Hensel improperly influenced or af-

fected the verdict. Some of these affidavits were filed
by respondents and others by appellant.

Careful reading of the affidavits clearly convinces
us that the three jurors did, as stated in juror Schram’s
affidavit, agree that one of them would change his
vote from in favor of respondents to in favor of appel-
lant, and that cards were cut to determine which juror
would make the change.

_ Appellant argues that, when the three jurors agreed
that one of them would change his vote, a verdict in
appellant’s favor became assured, and that the subse-
quent use of cards to determine which juror would
change his vote was an immaterial circumstance and
did not justify the trial court in granting respondents’
motion for a new trial upon the ground of misconduct
of the jury.

HI Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), §399 [P. C. § 8225],
states the grounds for granting a new trial, providing
that the verdict may be vacated and a new trial
granted on motion of the party aggrieved for any one
of eight enumerated causes affecting the substantial
rights of the moving party. Paragraph 2 of the sec-
tion, defining one of the causes for the granting of a
new trial, reads as follows:

“Misconduct of prevailing party or jury; and when-
ever any one or more of the jurors shall have been
induced to assent to any general or special verdict
to a finding on any question or questions submitted
to the jury by the court, other and different from his
own conclusions, and arrived at by a resort to the de-
termination of chance or lot, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavits of one or more of the jurors.”
Laws of 1933, p. 481, § 1.

From the record, it appears beyond question that
juror Stephens was induced, by “a resort to deter-
mination of chance or lot,” to assent to a verdict against
which he had voted for many hours.

The trial judge filed a memorandum opinion, which
is in the record, from which it appears that the court
was convinced that the three jurors named had been
guilty of misconduct of such a nature as to warrant
the court in granting a new trial. With this view of
the situation, we are in hearty accord.

Appellant cites Rem. Rev. Stat., § 359 [P. C. § 8525],
which reads as follows:

“When the verdict is returned into court either party
may poll the jury, and if ten of the jurors answer that
it is the verdict said verdict shall stand. In case ten
of the jurors do not answer in the affirmative the jury
shall be returned to the jury-room for further delibera-
tion;”
relying upon that portion of the section which provides
that “if ten of the jurors answer . . . said verdict
shall stand.” This section refers to the matter of
polling the jury and the receipt of the verdict. The
effect to be given to the section in case a juror should
endeavor to impeach his own answer to the poll need
not here be considered, as juror Stephens neither made
affidavit as to what happened nor made any statement
whatsoever in connection with the proceedings lead-
ing up to the granting of the new trial. The section
cannot be construed to mean that the verdict may not
be subsequently set aside, as provided by § 399, supra.

Appellant also argues that, because juror Stephens,
who it is alleged changed his vote pursuant to the fall
of the cards, filed no affidavit stating his recollection
of the events, the other affidavits filed do not justify
the order appealed from. It is not necessary to draw
any inference one way or another from the fact that
no affidavit on the part of juror Stephens was filed.
The picture is complete without any statement from
him.

Appellant cites the opinion of this court in the case

of State v. Millroy, 103 Wash. 193, 174 Pac. 10. The
defendant was convicted of a crime and moved for a
new trial, the trial court denying the motion and
entering judgment and sentence. In the course of
the opinion, this court used the following language:

“Tt is next argued that the court erred in receiving
the verdict of the jury. When the verdict was re-
turned, the jury was polled. In answer to a question
asked of each of the jurors whether the verdict was
their verdict, one of the jurors answered: ‘Either
that, or a hung jury. When admonished by the court
that she should answer directly ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ the juror,
in answer to the question: ‘Is this your verdict and
the verdict of the jury?’ said ‘Yes’ The verdict was
thereupon received. The answer of the juror to the
question of the court was conclusive, and the juror
cannot now be heard to say that she did not agree to
the verdict.”

It appears that the juror referred to in the opinion,
when admonished by the court that she should answer
the question directly, stated that the verdict was her
verdict and the verdict of the jury. In view of her
positive answer, her preliminary remark was un-
important. It was properly held that her answer was
conclusive upon her, and that she could not thereafter
impeach her solemn statement made upon the poll of
the jury.

In the case cited, it was also contended that a new
trial should have been granted because of misconduct
of the jury, in that one of the jurors, while considering
the verdict, had cast a lot to determine which way
she should vote. It does not appear that any other
juror knew of this action at the time, or that the juror
changed her opinion or her vote as the result of what
she had done, or that the verdict to which she as-
sented was in fact not her verdict. Referring to this
phase of the case, this court said:

“Whatever the fact may be, it is plain that the ver-
dict of a jury cannot be impeached in this way. After
a juror has returned a verdict, he cannot be heard to
impeach the verdict because some trifling cireum-
stance like this may have controlled his vote.”

The case is not controlling here. If verdicts could
be overturned by subsequent statements on the part
of a juror who, after stating on the poll that the ver-
dict was his, later sought to explain some of the mental
processes by which he reached his conclusion, there
would be little stability in verdicts. It did not appear
that the juror had agreed with anyone else that her
vote would be controlled by the casting of a lot, and
certainly her idle and foolish act could nowise con-
trol her own mind in finally reaching a conclusion
concerning the issues upon which she was to pass.

The statute here in question is clear and definite,
and lays down a very salutary rule. The affidavits

. filed, in which several of the jurors stated events which
happened in the jury room during the jury’s delibera-
tions, clearly show that, as the result of an agreement
between three jurors, one of the three changed his
vote as the result of the chance fall of a card. The
court in its memorandum opinion properly character-
ized such proceedings, saying that jurors who show
such a lack of appreciation of their duties and responsi-
bilities are not fitted for the task.

The trial court was well within its sound discre-
tion in granting respondents’ motion for a new trial,
and the order appealed from is affirmed.

Bragg, C. J., Srervert, Geracuty, and Jurrers, JJ.,
concur.

699

[No. 27837. Department One. October 18, 1939.]

Tue Srate or Wasuincton, Respondent, v. Chayron D.
Currig, Appellant.*

Clayton D. Currie, pro se.
B. Gray Warner and John A. Burns, for respondent.

Rosinson, J.—This is a case wherein a defendant,
convicted in a criminal action, has attempted to per-
sonally conduct his appeal. As has heretofore occurred
in such instances, but little attention has been paid to
the rules of procedure, and our immediate concern is

*Reported in 94 P. (2d) 754.
bt

as to whether or not we have Jurisdiction to consider
the matter on its merits.

It appears from the record in this case that the ap;
pellant was convicted by a jury at a trial held in King
county, the Honorable Calvin S. Hall presiding, on
March 31, 1938, upon the charge of having taken an
automobile without permission of the owner. Motions
for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were over-
ruled on April 9, 1938.

On June 2nd, an additional information was filed
against appellant as an habitual criminal. That matter
came on for hearing before the Honorable James 'T.
Lawler, sitting with a jury, and a verdict sustaining
the charge was returned on July 22, 1938. On Sep-
tember 24, 1938, Judge Lawler denied a motion for
new trial, and entered judgment. A notice of appeal
was thereupon given in open court. That date, Sep-
tember 24, 1938, is the pivotal date in this matter, for,
under our rules of procedure in criminal cases, an
appeal is not effectual for any purpose unless. certain
steps are taken within specified periods after the date
on which the notice of appeal is given.

After the notice of appeal had been given, the ap-
pellant acted as his own attorney. The record from
this point on is very confusing. A great number of
affidavits and letters appear in our files, purporting
to show the difficulties the appellant encountered in
the preparation of his appeal. They are, for the most
part, ex parte statements of the appellant. They have,
of themselves, given us a distinct impression that the
principal, if not the sole, cause for the deficiencies in
the record is that, in attempting to conduct his own
appeal, the appellant assumed an undertaking which
was far beyond his capacity and understanding. How-
ever that may be, the record definitely shows, among
other things: (1) That, although the appeal: was

taken on September 24, 1938, no certified copy of a
statement of facts or bill of exceptions was filed in
this court until January 31, 1939; (2) that the tran-
script of record on appeal was not filed in this court
until January 31, 1939; and (3) that, although the
appellant’s time for filing his opening brief in this
court was extended to January 3, 1939, by order of
the chief justice, it was not, in fact, filed until Feb-
ruary 14, 1939.

HI By subd. 3 of Rule XII of Rules of the Supreme
Court, as set out in 193 Washington Reports, page 15-a,
it is provided:

“3. No appeal in a criminal cause shall be effectual
for any purpose unless the appellant shall, within
sixty days after giving notice of appeal as herein-
before provided, have filed or caused to be filed with
the clerk of the supreme court the following:

“(a) A statement of facts or bill of exceptions
served on the respondent and certified by the judge
of the superior court according to the procedure, so
near as may be, in civil causes;

“(b) A transcript of record certified by the clerk
of the superior court, pursuant to the procedure, so
near as may be, in civil causes; .

“(d) Appellant’s opening brief, prepared i in accord-
ance with the rules of the supreme court, with proof
of service thereof on the respondent.

“Except as herein otherwise provided, the giving of
the notice of appeal and the filing in the supreme court
of a certified statement of facts, certified transcript of
record, abstract of record, and appellant’s opening
brief, shall be jurisdictional.

“In any case where the proposed statement of facts
or bill of exceptions has been filed with the clerk of
the superior court within sixty days after giving notice
of appeal as hereinbefore provided, but the appellant,
through no fault of his own, is unable to have the
same certified in time to file the same with the clerk
of the supreme court within the time herein specified,
the time for such certification may, upon good cause

shown, be extended by the chief justice of the supreme
court, or, in his absence, any other judge thereof; and
if such extension be granted, said chief justice of the
supreme court or judge thereof shall, in the same
order, fix the time for filing the appellant's opening
brief and abstract of record.”

It is apparent from the facts hereinbefore set out
that appellant’s transcript of record was filed in this
court more than two months too late, his statement
of facts, giving full force to the extension granted,
twenty-eight days too late, and his opening brief,
again giving full force to the extension granted, more
than forty days too late.

Many criminal appeals have been dismissed in
this court for failure to comply with Rule XVII [super-
seded by Rule XII]. Usually, such dismissals are
granted on motion, many of them unresisted, and, in
such instances, no opinion is written. See, however,
State v. Marcy, 189 Wash. 493, 65 P. (2d) 1271, where
the appellant was late in filing his statement of facts,
and the motion to dismiss was passed to the merits.

In the recent Departmental opinion in State v. West,
197 Wash. 595, 86 P. (2d) 192, it was strongly sug-
gested that, in an exceptional case, the court might
have the power to disregard the requirements of Rule
XVII. It is insisted that this is such a case, in that,
if the rule is enforced, a man who has been sentenced
to life imprisonment will be denied a review in this
court simply because he has not complied with certain
technical rules. We have given further consideration
to the content and history of Rule XVII, and, for the
reasons hereinafter set out, have become convinced
that the suggestion made in the West case is unsound.

The state legislature, in its extraordinary session of
1925, passed an act (chapter 118, p. 187, Rem. Rev.

Stat., § 18-1 [P. C. § 8676-1] et seq.) entitled as fol-
lows: :

“An Act to promote the speedy determination of
litigation on the merits and authorizing the Supreme
Court to make rules relating to pleading, procedure
and practice in the courts of this state.”

By §1 of the act, p. 187 (Rem. Rev. Stat. § 13-1
[P. C. § 8676-1]), the supreme court was given power
to prescribe by rule the pleading, practice, and pro-
cedure to be used in all suits, actions, appeals, and
proceedings in the courts of whatever nature.

Section 2, p. 187, provided:

“When and as the rules of courts herein authorized
shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith
shall be and become of no further force or effect.”
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 13-2 [P. C. § 8676-2].

In the final sentence of §1 of the act, the legisla-
ture prescribed the policy which the court should
follow in exercising the power therein conferred:

“In prescribing such rules the Supreme Court shall
have regard to the simplification of the system of
pleading, practice and procedure in said courts to
promote the speedy determination of litigation on the
merits.”

At the same session, the legislature passed an act
(chapter 45, p. 38, Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10959-1 [P. C.
§ 3426-1] et seg.) providing for the creation of the
judicial council, a body to be made up of the chief
justice and one other judge of the supreme court,

_ two superior court judges, a prosecuting attorney, two
lawyers in private practice, the chairman of the
judicial committee of the senate, and the chairman of
the judicial committee of the house. The general
duties of the council were prescribed as follows: To
continuously survey and study the operation of the
judicial department of the state; to receive and con-

sider suggestions from judges, public officers, members
of the bar, and citizens as to remedies for faults in
the administration of justice; to devise ways of expe-
diting judicial business; and to submit from time to
time to the courts or the judges such suggestions as
it may deem advisable for changes in rules and pro-
cedure.

During the year 1930, The Superior Court Judges’
‘Association of the state of Washington addressed a
detailed communication to the judicial council point-
ing out the evils of delay in criminal appeals. This
communication appears at page 5 of the third report
of the judicial council issued in January, 1931. We
quote from it briefly:

“In our opinion there is no other judicial reform
to which the bench could address itself that would
command a greater measure of public approbation or
would offer greater possibilities of improving the ad-
ministration of justice in this state. If law abiding
citizens are to be given the protection to which they
are entitled and if the dignity and prestige of the state
are to be upheld, our system of criminal procedure
must be overhauled so that the innocent will be ex-
onerated, and the guilty punished, with a greater
degree of promptness than is now required.”

The communication was accompanied by a proposed
modification of the rules which need not be here de-
tailed. It will be sufficient to say that the judges
proposed that the time for taking appeals in criminal
eases be reduced to five days, and that the time for
filing appellant’s brief be limited to sixty days after
the taking of his appeal.

The council at once addressed itself to the matter
and, after making some changes in the tentative draft,
submitted the proposed rules and the recommendation
of the superior court judges to the bar of the state in
the form shown in appendix “B” to its third report.

The reason for this submission is shown in that report
at page 6, as follows:

“The Council in tentatively submitting a separate
set of rules for expediting criminal appeals does so in
recognition of the fact that the public has a vital in-
terest in the speedy disposition of cases involving of-
fenses against the public itself, and that, therefore,
criminal appeals should be expedited so far as can
be possibly done without jeopardizing the rights of
the defendant. The Council recognizes that there is
an accepted difference between civil and criminal ap-
peals, in that with respect to civil matters the public
owes no duty except to furnish litigants a fair tribunal
in which, according to some reasonable system of pro-
cedure, they can obtain justice, but in criminal cases
where the offense is against the public itself and the
public is therefore vitally interested, the state has the
right to set up a much more rigid and expeditious
system of procedure so that delay may not, in the
event of new trials, result in the weakening of mem-
ories or the loss of witnesses.”

The matter was thoroughly discussed in the meet-
ings of various local bar associations and at the meet-
ing of the state bar. A referendum showed that the
majority of the members of the bar were favorable
to the proposed changes. Profiting by the many sug-
gestions received and from a consideration of rules
obtaining in other jurisdictions, the council, in June,
1934, adopted a final draft of the proposed rules and
recommended their adoption by the supreme court.
After due consideration, they were adopted by this
court in November, 1934, to become effective on March
1, 1935. They appear as an amendment to Rule X,
and as Rule XVII, Rules of Pleading, Procedure and
Practice, in 178 Wash. xxxvii. Some slight additions
were made as of May 1, 1938. In the latest codifica-
tion of the rules, reported in 193 Washington Reports,

P|

the existing rules governing appeals in criminal cases
are consolidated as Rule XII, page 14-a.

It may well be doubted whether there is any other
statute or rule in force in this state which received,
before its enactment, a more thorough and a more
expert study than the rule under discussion. In sub-
stantially its present form, it received thorough con-
sideration for a considerable time by the superior court
judges of the state; for, in submitting the matter to
the judicial council in 1930, they accompanied it with
a careful statistical study. The judicial council had
the matter under advisement and consideration for
four full years, in the course of which it was sub-
mitted to the members of the bar of the state and
their individual and collective opinions taken by per-
sonal contact and referendum vote. In 1934, the rules
were thoroughly considered by the then members of
this court, and they were again considered and some
minor additions made in 1938.

The fact is that our state has been both cautious and
conservative in adopting rules to expedite criminal
appeals. A number of our sister states began earlier
and went further. Our rule did not become effective
until 1935, and is designed to get the record into the
appellate court within sixty-five days after judgment.
According to a report of a research worker in the
bureau of public administration of the University of
California, published in 24 California Law Review,
September, 1936, and republished in the Legal Peri-
odical Digest of the Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
for that year, page 2563, a set of rules was already in
force in California, which had produced, among others,
the following result:

“In the one thousand two hundred and thirty-five

appeals from judgment filed in the appellate courts
from 1929 to 1935, the average time consumed between

a "

the pronouncement of judgment by the superior court
and the filing of the reporter’s transcript in the court
of appeals was forty-four days.”

Finally, although the matters with which we are
dealing are embraced in what we call a rule, it is that
kind of a rule which has all the force of a statute,
since it was promulgated at the direct command of the
legislature “to promote the speedy determination of
litigation.” It is true that the court has the power
to change and rewrite the rule, but that is a very
different thing from excepting a particular individual
from its operation or excusing its violation in a par-
ticular instance. That, the court has no power to do.

At his request, the appellant was granted leave to
file a supplemental brief. This was received on Oc-
tober 3rd, while this opinion was in course of prepara-
tion. The brief is wholly devoted to constitutional
questions, thought by appellant to inhere in the
merits, and contains nothing bearing upon that phase
of the matter which we have herein discussed.

The appeal must be dismissed. It is so ordered.

Brake, C. J., Mar, Sremvert, and Jerrers, JJ.,
concur.

708

[No. 27568. Department Two. September 8, 1939.]

Marton Dirrmar, Respondent, v. Cartes H. Frye, Appellant?

Eggerman & Rosling, Walser S. Greathouse, and Joseph J.
Lanza, for appellant.

Todd, Holman & Sprague, William M. Allen, and Lowell P.
Mickelwait, for respondent.

Muttarp, J——Emma Frye signed, as maker, a promissory note
dated October 31, 1930, in the amount of sixty thousand dollars,
payable ninety days after notice of demand for payment to the
order of Frank F. Frye. On February 11, 1931, her husband,
Charles H. Frye, placed his endorsement on the back of that note.
On October 9, 1936, the note was unpaid, whereupon counsel for
executrix of the estate of Frank F. Frye, deceased, demanded of
Charles H. Frye written acknowledgment that he endorsed the note
for value, to which demand Mr. Frye acceded October 21, 1936.

On April 5, 1938, the Seattle-First National Bank, as adminis-
trator de bonis non with will annexed of the estate of Frank F.
Frye, deceased, instituted this action to recover against Charles H.
Frye on his endorsement. The affirmative defenses were that no
consideration passed to Charles H. Frye for his endorsement and
absence of consideration for letter of October 21, 1936, in which
Frye acknowledged his personal liability as endorser and agreed
to pay the note. The trial court excluded certain evidence of lack
of consideration for the endorsement and directed a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff. From the judgment entered on that verdict,
the defendant appealed.

Since the appeal, the judgment has been assigned to Marion
Dittmar who, pursuant to motion and stipulation of the parties in-
terested, has been substituted herein as respondent in place of the
Seattle-First National Bank.

The facts (with exception of the amount of the note and name
of the payee) in the case at’ bar and the questions meriting con-
sideration on this appeal are identical with those in Dittmar v.
Frye, ante p. 451, 93 P. (2d) 709. That decision controls this case
entirely.

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Braxs, C. J., GERaGHTy, Sumpson, and Rosinson, JJ., concur.

‘Reported in 93 P. (2a) 716.

eet