State: South Carolina
Volume: 421
Term: 2018-2018
Jurisdiction(s): South Carolina
Source: https://static.case.law/sc/421.pdf

Ye :
803 S.E.3d 911
The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Preston Ryan OATES, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-001404

Opinion No. 5502
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 7, 2017

Filed July 26, 2017
Rehearing Denied September 1, 2017

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HLL

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Colum-
bia, for Appellant,

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant At-
torney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia;
and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for Re-
spondent.

GEATHERS, J.:

Appellant Preston Ryan Oates seeks review of his convic-
tions for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime. Appellant also
challenges the denial of his motion for immunity from prosecu-
tion pursuant to the Protection of Persons and Property Act
(the Act)! Appellant argues the circuit court erred in denying
his motion for immunity because (1) there was evidence that
the victim, Carlos Olivera (Victim), was attempting to forcibly
remove Appellant from his occupied vehicle, and (2) the circuit
court’s finding that the conflict had resolved at the time of the
shooting was not supported by the evidence.

Appellant also challenges the circuit court’s refusal to direct
a verdict of acquittal on the ground that the State failed to
disprove self-defense, Finally, Appellant assigns error to the
circuit court’s decision to give a voluntary manslaughter in-
struction to the jury on the ground that there was no evidence
of sudden heat of passion. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 24, 2010, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Victim
and his family visited his brother, Nelson Olivera (Nelson),
and Nelson’s family at their home in the Edgefield neighbor-
hood near Bluffton. Although the Edgefield Homeowner's
Association (the HOA) had prohibited parking on the streets
in the subdivision, Victim parked his minivan on the street in

1, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015).

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front of the house of Nelson’s neighbor, Steve Varedi. While
Victim, Nelson, and their two families were visiting inside
Nelson’s house, Appellant, who had been hired by the HOA to
tow illegally parked vehicles, noticed Victim’s minivan and
placed an automotive disabling device, ie., a “boot,” on the
minivan’s left front wheel. By the time Appellant was proceed-
ing to hook up the minivan to the tow truck, Varedi had
notified Victim that Appellant was about to tow Victim’s
minivan.

Victim, Nelson, and Varedi approached Appellant to ask him
to refrain from towing the minivan because it was Christmas
Eve and Victim was going to leave at that moment. When
Appellant saw the three men approaching him, he felt intimi-
dated and went back into the cab of his truck, shut the door,
and locked it. Subsequently, Appellant rolled down the driver’s
side door window to speak with the men. According to Nelson,
he was pleading for Appellant to release the minivan.

However, Appellant told investigators that when the three
men approached him, they were running “a little abruptly”
and were “hooting” and “hollering.” He stated both Nelson
and Victim jumped up on the truck’s running board and
started talking to him through the window and Victim told
Varedi, “Go get my shotgun.” Appellant recounted Nelson
saying, “Take that off his vehicle,” to which Appellant re-
sponded, “Okay[,] let me call my office and see what they
[want to] do and we'll get a handle.... It’s not a problem, we
can work this out.”

Appellant then heard “a round being chambered” as well as
Victim stating, “You’re [going to] take this off right now and
Tm leaving,” to which Appellant responded, “[TJhat’s fine.”
Appellant further stated he stalled to regain his composure by
fumbling with his set of keys and dropping them twice and he
“kept kind of freaking out a little bit.” Nelson’s testimony was
consistent with these two statements. Nelson admitted that
Victim pulled a gun out of his pants, ratcheted the gun, and
stated, “Nobody’s going to take my car.” Nelson stated Appel-
lant “seemed very nervous, moving some keys and touching
some papers,” although he indicated this was already occur-
ring when Victim pulled out his gun.

Te °

Appellant indicated that as he was fumbling with his keys,
Nelson “grabbed” them along with the lock tool that releases
the boot and took them to the front of the minivan? According
to Appellant, while Victim was still “in the window,” he asked
Appellant if he had any paperwork on the minivan and stated
he did not want law enforcement to “come look” for him, This
dialogue frightened Appellant; he recounted, “[TJhat threw up
a major red flag because he wants to make sure there’s
nothing in my vehicle that will connect me to his car.” Appel-
lant then pulled out his ledger and showed it to Victim to
reassure him that Appellant had no paperwork on the minivan.
While he was showing Victim the ledger, Appellant opened his
glove box and pulled out his gun along with some papers on
top of it to hide it.

At this point, another neighbor, Reba Bryan, offered to call
911, but both Appellant and Nelson told her it was unneces-
sary. According to Appellant, he stated, “Don’t worry about it,
everything’s fine, go back inside, he’s got a gun, so every-
thing’s okay here” in an attempt to give her the message to
call 911 without alerting the other men to his message.
Appellant then heard Nelson yell out something in Spanish to
Victim. At that moment, Victim “look[ed] at [Appellant] and he
[stated], [O]kay you're [going to] come get this s**t off....
Come get this s**t off now.’” Appellant described the next
few moments in the following manner:

[Victim] unlocked the door of my truck and pulled the

handle and opened it, and as he opened it, he was stepping

down off of the running board ... so he was opening it with
his left hand.... As he stepped back, I saw him with his
right hand reach and grab the pistol that was ... kind of
stuffed in his belt in the front. Well, [with] my line of sight
and where he was, I didn’t [want to] just cross through the
cab, so as he opened it, just to play along like I was [going
to] exit the vehicle to unlock the boot, [because] he was
already in draw, in motion.... And ... as he was stepping

down[,] the door was open and he was starting to draw, I

came around and I rotated and actually ... I [exited] the

[cab] and as I was [exiting] the [cab], since I had a little bit

of [a] height advantage on him, as I [exited] out straight

2. Appellant stated the set of keys had no relationship with the boot.

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instead of toward him, I [exited] straight out my door
stepping off of the metal running boards ... and I was
[exiting] out, and I looked and my line of sight was through
him straight down to the ground. It’s now or never, He’s
already in motion and he’s in draw. Whether he’s drawing it
to intimidate me, to keep me to go do what he wants me to
do, or if he knew I didn’t have any information on his
vehicle and ... ah, bye, bye, Preston ... regardless, he was
in motion, he was in draw and I reacted. I know ... I
remember the very first shot. I caught him on the left
side....
And that made him rotate left. Well, I didn’t know if I
grazed his ... the edge of his arm, if I grazed him under his
... I don’t ... I didn’t see [the] impact. I just know that I
... right when I was able to lock my elbows and squeeze
the trigger ... I hit him on the left side. ... And so it may
have caused him to rotate.... so he turned towards the
yard .... And as he ... went that way, I remember seeing
this part of his shoulder right here.... He was still a threat
to me. You're a threat until you’re disarmed or you're
unconscious, I discharged again. I ... don’t know how many
times I pulled the trigger....
I remember two shots.... So as he’s turning, ... that
would be counter-clockwise, ... and his shoulder was here
... I... let go a second round ... [because] my line of
sight was clear, ... I still had a little bit of [a] height
advantage because I was ... still progressing down from
my elevated position.... And then when I stopped, I saw
the gun slide across the asphalt and stop ... andI ...
stopped and I landed on the ground at low ready and I froze
there.

Several witness accounts of the entire incident conflicted
with Appellant’s statement that Victim ordered him out of the
truck while he was drawing his pistol. According to Nelson,
after Victim first ratcheted his gun and stated, “Nobody’s
going to take my car,” Nelson told Victim to put his gun away,
Victim then placed the gun back into his waistband, and
Victim never pulled it back out. Nelson expressly stated there
was “no arguing, ... no fighting, ... no bad words” and
Victim never talked to, threatened, or “attemptfed] to do
anything to [Appellant].” Victim’s widow, Dhayan Olivera,
testified Victim was directing traffic that was partially blocked

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by his minivan and the tow truck when Appellant shot him.
Nelson’s wife, Claudia Olivera, gave similar testimony. The
testimony of Victim’s widow, Nelson’s wife, and Nelson’s
neighbors, as well as a video from Varedi’s home surveillance
camera, indicated Victim was walking or running away from
Appellant when Appellant began shooting him, Nelson’s wife
and Victim’s widow also testified Appellant continued shooting
Victim even after he fell onto the street.

Several of the eyewitnesses, including Appellant, immediate-
ly called 911 to report the incident. The paramedie who later
arrived on the scene detected no signs of life in Victim. Dr.
Ellen Riemer, a forensic pathologist, conducted an autopsy on
Victim and prepared a report revealing that Victim had been
shot six times. In her report and at trial, she described the
following gunshot wounds, not necessarily in the order in
which Victim sustained them: (1) to the right side of the
posterior neck; (2) to the right side of the abdomen; (8) to the
middle of the back; (4) to the left side of the back; (5) to the
posterior aspect of the right arm; and (6) to the left side of the
upper back. Dr. Riemer confirmed there was only one gunshot
wound that was not on the posterior aspect of Victim’s body.

Dr. Riemer’s report also noted she found no gunpowder
residue near any of Victim’s wounds. However, she testified
that rather than characterizing the wounds as “distant gun-
shot wounds,” she called them “indeterminate” because “even
if it’s at very close range, if there’s an intermediate object that
could absorb the stippling, ... it’s not deposited on the skin”
and she could not “say for certain, based on all the findings on
the body, ... if it was shot at a distant range.” Dr. Riemer
also testified she examined Victim’s clothing and saw “no
obvious signs of any type of soot on the clothing.”

Appellant was indicted for voluntary manslaughter and pos-
session of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.
Appellant filed a motion for immunity under the Act, and the
Honorable R. Markley Dennis, Jr. conducted a hearing on the
motion, which he later denied. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, which Judge Dennis denied after a hearing.
Appellant filed an appeal from these rulings; however, this
court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory.’

3, Our supreme court has held that the denial of a motion for immunity
from prosecution under the Act is not immediately appealable but may

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Subsequently, Appellant was indicted for murder, and the
solicitor dismissed the voluntary manslaughter indictment at
the beginning of the murder trial before the Honorable
Brooks P. Goldsmith. At the State’s request and over Appel-
lant’s objection, the circuit court instructed the jury on the
lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The jury
found Appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and posses-
sion of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The
circuit court sentenced Appellant to twenty-six years of im-
prisonment for voluntary manslaughter and five years of
imprisonment for the weapon possession conviction, to run
concurrently. The circuit court denied all of Appellant’s post-
trial motions, with the exception of his motion to reduce his
sentence. The circuit court reduced the sentence for voluntary
manslaughter to twenty-four years of imprisonment. This ap-
peal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in declining to
grant Appellant immunity from prosecution under the Act
when there was evidence that Victim attempted to forcibly
remove Appellant from his occupied vehicle?

2. Was the circuit court’s finding that the conflict had re-
solved at the time of the shooting supported by the
evidence?

8. Did the circuit court err in refusing to direct a verdict of
acquittal on the basis of self-defense? :

4, Was there evidence of sudden heat of passion to justify
the cireuit court's jury instruction on voluntary man-
slaughter?

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Immunity
Appellant argues the circuit court committed an error of law

in declining to find he was entitled to immunity under section
16-11-440(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015) because there

be raised on appeal only after the subsequent prosecution, conviction,
and sentencing. See State v, Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 181-85, 747 S.E.2d
677, 679-81 (2013).

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was evidence that Victim was attempting to forcibly remove
Appellant from his occupied vehicle. Appellant also argues the
cirevit court abused its discretion in declining to find Appel-
lant was entitled to immunity under section 16-11-440(C)
because the circuit court’s finding that the conflict had re-
solved at the time of the shooting was not supported by the
evidence. We disagree.

HM “A claim of immunity under the Act requires a
pretrial determination using a preponderance of the evidence
standard, which this court reviews under an abuse of discre-
tion standard of review.” State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 288, 290, 786
S.E.2d 182, 186 (2016) (quoting State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364,
370, 752 S.H.2d 268, 266 (2013)). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the [circuit] court’s ruling is based on an error of
law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without
evidentiary support.” Jd. “In other words, the abuse of discre-
tion standard of review does not allow this court to reweigh
the evidence or second-guess the [circuit] court’s assessment,
of witness credibility.” State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 316, 768
§.E.2d 232, 237-88 (Ct. App. 2014). Further, “the General
Assembly did not intend” to require the circuit court “to
accept the accused’s version of the underlying facts” in deter-
mining a motion for immunity under the Act. Curry, 406 S.C.
at 871, 752 S.E.2d at 266.

Section 16-11-440 provides, in pertinent part,

(A) A person is presumed to have a reasonable fear of

imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to himself or

another person when using deadly force that is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily injury to another
person if the person:
(1) against whom the deadly force is used is in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has un-
lawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle, or if he removes or is attempting to
remove another person against his will from the dawell-
ing, residence, or occupied vehicle; and
(2) who uses deadly force knows or has reason to believe
that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and fore-
ible act is occurring or has occurred.

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(C) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and
who is attacked in another place where he has a right to be,
including, but not limited to, his place of business, has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and
meet force with force, including deadly force, if he reason-
ably believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily
injury to himself or another person or to prevent the

commission of a violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60,
(emphases added).

Here, the circuit court reviewed (1) Appellant's December
24, 2010 videotaped interview with Sergeants John Adams and
Laurel Albertin of the Beaufort County Sheriff’s Office; (2) the
audio recording of Appellant’s December 27, 2010 interview
with Captain Robert Bromage of the Beaufort County Sher-
iff’s Office; (8) witness statements from Nelson, Nelson’s wife,
Victim’s widow, and Nelson’s neighbors (Varedi and Elizabeth
Reyes Sorto); (4) a video from Varedi’s home surveillance
camera showing a portion of the incident;‘ (6) the autopsy
report; (6) an audio recording of several 911 calls, including a
call from Appellant; and (7) a Supplemental Incident Report
authored by Angela Viens with the Sheriff's Office, which
included summaries of on-the-scene statements given by Nel-
son, Varedi, and Reba Bryan. The circuit court also heard
testimony from Investigator Viens and David Rice, a former
concealed weapons permit instructor.®

After considering all of the evidence before it, the circuit
court concluded section 16-11-440(A) did not apply to Appel-
lant’s case because “[t]he facts presented [did] not show that
at the time of the shooting[, Victim] was unlawfully or forcibly
entering, or had entered, [Appellant’s] vehicle. [Victim] was
walking away from [Appellant’s] tow truck at the time [Appel-
lant] got out of his vehicle and shot [Victim].” The circuit court
also concluded section 16-11-440(C) did not apply to Appel-
lant’s case because “his use of deadly force against [Victim]
was not necessary to prevent his own death or great bodily
injury[ ] or the commission of a violent crime.”

4. The quality of the video is poor.

3. In response to evidence that Victim had a concealed weapons permit,
the defense offered the testimony of Rice regarding the instruction he
gave his students on the permissible use of a concealed weapon.

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Subsection (A)

HM Appellant argues the circuit court committed an error
of law in failing to address the part of subsection (A) that
allows the presumption of having “a reasonable fear of immi-
nent peril or death or great bodily injury” when the person
against whom deadly force is used “removes or is attempting
to remove another person against his will from the dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle.” Appellant contends there was
evidence that Victim was either attempting to remove, or had
forcibly removed, Appellant from his truck at gunpoint.

However, the circuit court adequately addressed the lan-
guage highlighted by Appellant. In its order denying Appel-
lant’s motion for immunity, the circuit court addressed the last
phrase in subsection (A) in the “Facts” section of the order. In
the order’s recitation of the facts, the circuit court stated,
“{Appellant] alleges that [Victim] was forcing him from the car
at gunpoint. However, there are at least three other witnesses
to the incident who state that the argument between the two
men had subsided and that everyone present was calm at the
time [Appellant] shot [Victim].” ®

Admittedly, the cireuit court did not address the last phrase
in subsection (A) in its legal analysis. Nonetheless, because the
cireuit court addressed Victim’s alleged attempt to force Ap-
pellant from his truck in the fact section of the order and
implicitly found this version of the incident incredible, the
failure to address this precise question in the order's legal
analysis does not constitute reversible error. See State v.
Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 518, 683 8.H.2d 152, 156 (2006) (“Gener-
ally, appellate courts will not set aside convictions due to
insubstantial errors not affecting the result.”).

6. In the hearing on Appellant’s motion for reconsideration, the circuit
court commented on its review of Appellant's two interviews with law
enforcement, stating, “[T]here was much of his logic that ... I did not
believe. I don’t concur, I didn’t agree with it. I didn’t think that it was
logical.” The circuit court also stated, “In this particular case, I
believed the version of facts testified [to] by the other witnesses,
corroborated by scientific evidence of the gunshot wounds[, ajnd the
witnesses’ testimony of how it all happened, uh,—just simply it
doesn’t—it’s more consistent with the other witnesses than it is his
version.”

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Subsection (C)

In its order denying immunity, the circuit court applied
subsection (C) to the facts of the present case in the following
manner:

The Act is specific that a person attacked in a place in which

he has a right to be has no duty to retreat. The issue

presented in this case, however, is whether this statute
protects a person who shoots and kills another if the con-
frontation has ended and the victim is walking away. The

Act allows a person to stand his ground and meet force with

force if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent

death or great bodily injury or to prevent the commission of

a violent crime. In this case, while [Appellant] was in a place

that he was allowed to be, his use of deadly force against

[Victim] was not necessary to prevent his own death or

great bodily injury[] or the commission of a violent crime.

Assuming that there was an “attack” previously, there was

no such event at the time of the shooting. In short, there

was no force to be met, [Victim] was walking away from

[Appellant] when he was shot five times in the back and

once in the side. Other evidence presented supports the

[clourt’s finding that the argument had ended at the time

[Appellant] fired the fatal shots. The [court will not inter-

pret the language of the statute to mean that a person may

shoot and kill another when a perceived attack has ended.

Appellant argues the record does not support the circuit
court’s conclusion that the attack had ended and, therefore,
the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to find
Appellant was entitled to immunity under subsection (C).
Appellant asserts Victim intended to force Appellant to unlock
the boot on Victim’s minivan and Victim “had already made
his intentions clear by either brandishing or pointing a firearm
at Appellant.” Appellant also asserts he reasonably believed
deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily
injury.’ Appellant states,

7, Appellant does not argue that deadly force was necessary to prevent
the commission of a violent crime. See § 16-11-440(C) (granting a
person “who is attacked in another place where he has a right to be”
the right to “stand his ground and meet force with force, including
deadly force, if he reasonably believes it is necessary to ... prevent the
commission of a violent crime as defined in Section 16-1-60"),

a "

This is not a situation where [Victim] had given up on trying
to convince Appellant not to tow his minivan and was
walking back to his brother’s house to either call the police
or prepare to pay the tow fine. [Victim] was determined to
prevent his van from being towed and threatened Appellant
with a gun.

While these arguments are compelling, this court cannot
“veweigh the evidence or second-guess the [circuit] court’s
assessment of witness credibility.” Douglas, 411 S.C. at 316,
768 S.H.2d at 238. A review of the order denying immunity
indicates the circuit court was not convinced of the reasonable-
ness of Appellant’s asserted belief that deadly force was
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury. See id. at
820 n.7, 768 S.E.2d at 239 n.7 (“[Tyhe standard for evaluating
whether an accused had a reasonable belief that deadly force
was necessary to prevent great bodily harm to himself is
objective, rather than subjective.”), Even if the uncontroverted
facts show Victim was still intent on preventing his minivan
from being towed when he had his back turned to Appellant,
this is not necessarily inconsistent with the circuit court’s
perception that the aggression had abated at that precise
moment. Such a finding supports the circuit court’s conclusion
that it was unreasonable for Appellant to believe deadly force
was necessary at that particular point in time.

In sum, our deferential standard of review requires us to
affirm the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for
immunity from prosecution under the Act. See Jones, 416 S.C.
at 290, 786 S.E.2d at 136 (“A claim of immunity under the Act
requires a pretrial determination using a preponderance of the
evidence standard, which this court reviews under an abuse of
discretion standard of review.” (quoting Curry, 406 S.C. at
370, 752 S.H.2d at 266)); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371, 752 S.H.2d at
266 (holding the General Assembly did not intend to require
the circuit court “to accept the accused’s version of the
underlying facts” in determining a motion for immunity pursu-
ant to the Act); Douglas, 411 S.C. at 316, 768 S.H.2d at 238
(“(TJhe abuse of discretion standard of review does not allow
this court to reweigh the evidence or second-guess the [circuit]
court’s assessment of witness credibility.”).

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IL. Directed Verdict/Self-Defense

Appellant maintains the circuit court erred in declining to
direct a verdict of acquittal because the State failed to dis-
prove self-defense. We disagree.

Directed Verdict/Self-Defense Standard

HM “On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict,
this [clourt views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the State.” State v. Pearson, 415
S.C. 468, 470, 783 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2016) (quoting State v,
Butler, 407 8.C. 876, 881, 755 S.H.2d 457, 460 (2014)). “If the
[S]tate has presented ‘any direct evidence or any substantial
circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt
of the accused,’ this [clourt must affirm the [circuit] court’s
decision to submit the case to the jury.” State v. Hepburn, 406
S.C. 416, 429, 758 S.H.2d 402, 409 (2018) (quoting State v
Cherry, 861 S.C. 588, 593-94, 606 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004)). “The
case should be submitted to the jury if there is any substantial
evidence [that] reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the
accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly or logically
deduced.” State v. Robinson, 310 8.C. 585, 588, 426 S.E.2d 317,
819 (1992). An appellate court may reverse the circuit court
only if “there is no evidence to support” the circuit court’s
ruling. State v. Gaster, 849 S.C. 545, 555, 564 S.E.2d 87, 92
(2002),

HM Recently, there has been confusion among the bench
and bar regarding what standard the cireuit court should
apply to a directed verdict motion when self-defense has been
asserted. Butler, 407 S.C. at 383-85, 755 S.H.2d at 461-62
(Beatty, J., concurring). In State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499,
716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011), our supreme court held that the
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground of
self-defense. The court began its discussion with the following
language:

“A defendant is entitled to a directed verdict when the

[S]tate fails to produce evidence of the offense charged.” “If

there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence

reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the
appellate court must find the case was properly submitted
to the jury.” However, when a defendant claims self-de-
fense, the State is required to disprove the elements of self-

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defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We find the State did

not carry that burden.

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279,
292-98, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006)). Many have reasonably
understood this language as requiring the State to disprove
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt at the directed verdict
stage.

HE However, in Butler, the majority reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that when ruling on a directed verdict motion, the circuit
court “is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its
weight.” 407 S.C. at 881, 755 S.E.2d at 460 (quoting State v
Wiggins, 330 S.C. 588, 545, 500 S.H.2d 489, 498 (1998)); see id.
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the circuit court
should have required the State to disprove self-defense beyond
a reasonable doubt at the directed verdict stage). The majority
also expressed its disagreement with the defendant’s reliance
on Dickey “to support her contention that the [circuit] court
applied an incorrect standard at the directed verdict stage.”
Id. The court responded that it held in Dickey “the defendant
was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of self-defense
because the wncontroverted facts established self-defense as a
matter of law.” Id. (citing Dickey, 894 S.C. at 501, 716 S.H.2d
at 102).

Based on the foregoing, we interpret Butler to stand for the
proposition that our well-established directed verdict standard
is not altered by a defendant’s claim of self-defense.

Elements of Murder and Self-defense

HM“ ‘Murder’ is the killing of any person with malice
aforethought, either express or implied.” 8.C. Code Ann. § 16-
8-10 (2015). “ ‘Malice’ is the wrongful intent to injure another
and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing
wrong.” In ve Tracy B., 391 S.C, 51, 69, 704 S.E.2d 71, 80 (Ct.

8, Clearly, “[wJhen self-defense is properly submitted to the jury, the
defendant is entitled to a charge, if requested, that the State has the
burden of disproving self-defense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Burkhart, 350 S.C. 252, 261, 565 S.B.2d 298, 303 (2002)
(emphases added) (quoting State v. Addison, 343 S.C. 290, 294, 540
S.E.2d 449, 451 (2000), The charge should also inform the jury that the
State's burden “is carried by disproving any one of the four elements by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bixby, 388 S.C. 528, 554,
698 S.E.2d 572, 586 (2010).

; a

App. 2010) (quoting State v. Kelsey, 381 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.H.2d
68, 69 (1998)). “It is the doing of a wrongful act intentionally
and without just cause or excuse.” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Tate v. State, 351 S.C. 418, 426, 570 S.B.2d 522, 527
(2002)).
Malice can be inferred from conduct [that] is so reckless and
wanton as to indicate a depravity of mind and general
disregard for human life. In the context of murder, malice
does not require ill-will toward the individual injured, but
rather it signifies “a general malignant recklessness of the
lives and safety of others, or a condition of the mind [that]
shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief.”
Id. (emphases added) (citation omitted) (quoting State v.
Mouzon, 231 S.C. 655, 662, 99 S.H.2d 672, 675-76 (1957).

HE The elements of self-defense are:
First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on
the difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such
imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his
belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of
ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the
same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent
danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a
man of ordinary prudence, firmness and courage to strike
the fatal blow in order to save himself from serious bodily
harm or losing his own life. Fourth, the defendant had no
other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his
own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as
he did in this particular instance.

Douglas, 411 S.C. at 318, 768 S.E.2d at 238-89 (emphases

added) (quoting Curry, 406 S.C. at 871 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266

nA).

Application

HM At trial, the jurors viewed Appellant’s December 24,
2010 videotaped interview and the home surveillance video and
listened to the recordings of (1) Appellant’s December 27, 2010
interview; (2) his statements to Deputy Erick Hardy while

a ;

being transported to the Hilton Head substation of the Sher-
iff's Office; and (8) several 911 calls, including a call from
Appellant. The jurors also heard testimony from Nelson,
Nelson’s wife, Victim’s widow, Nelson’s neighbors, Dr. Riemer,
and those employees of the South Carolina Law Enforcement.
Division investigating the case.

Among these recordings and testimony was evidence from
which the jury could have inferred not only a degree of
recklessness that rises to the level of malice but also the
unreasonableness of Appellant’s stated belief that he was in
imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily
injury. See Douglas, 411 S.C. at 818, 768 S.H.2d at 238-39
(setting forth the elements of self-defense); In re Tracy B.,
391 S.C. at 69, 704 S.H.2d at 80 (“Malice can be inferred from
conduct [that] is so reckless and wanton as to indicate a
depravity of mind and general disregard for human life.”); id.
(“(Mlalice ... signifies ‘a general malignant recklessness of
the lives and safety of others, or a condition of the mind [that]
shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief’” (quoting Mouzon, 231 S.C. at 662, 99 S.E.2d at
675-76).

Several witness accounts of the entire incident omitted any
reference to an extended heated argument. According to
Nelson, when he and Victim first approached Appellant, Vic-
tim ratcheted his gun and stated, “Nobody’s going to take my
car,” but when Nelson told Victim to put his gun away, Victim
placed the gun back into his waistband and never pulled it
back out. Nelson expressly stated there was “no arguing, ...
no fighting, ... no bad words” and Victim never talked to,
threatened, or “attempt{ed] to do anything to [Appellant].”

When asked if she heard any of the conversation between
Victim and Appellant, Victim’s widow replied, “No. [Victim]

. used to talk very soft[ly].” She also testified Victim was
directing the traffic that was partially blocked by his minivan
and the tow truck when Appellant shot him, and Nelson’s wife
gave similar testimony. The testimony of Nelson, Nelson’s
wife, Nelson’s neighbors, Victim’s widow, and Dr. Riemer
established that most of the six shots fired by Appellant hit
Victim in his back. Based on all of this testimony, the jury

* |
could have concluded that Appellant’s belief that his life was in
danger was unreasonable.

Further, Dr. Riemer testified that an exit wound from
Victim’s chest was “shored,” indicating that Victim was
pressed against a hard object when the bullet exited his body.
This is consistent with the testimony of Nelson’s wife and
Victim’s widow that Appellant continued shooting Victim even
after he fell onto the street. The jury could have concluded
that Appellant’s recklessness rose to the level of malice.
Moreover, the jury could have inferred from the evidence that
Appellant could have avoided the danger by continuing to
cooperate with Victim and then driving away and calling 911
to report the incident?

While there was enough evidence of self-defense to warrant
a jury instruction, the evidence was conflicting. Given the
starkly contrasting versions of events provided by the wit-
nesses and by Appellant,” witness credibility was a critical
factor in this case as it was in Butler and State v. Richburg,
250 S.C. 451, 459, 158 S.H.2d 769, 772 (1968), In Richburg, our
supreme court held that the question of self-defense should be
submitted to the jury when the credibility of the witnesses is
in play:

Appellant contends ... that the [circuit court] should have

directed a verdict, as a matter of law, of not guilty in favor

of the defendant on the plea of self-defense. When the
evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable infer-
ence, questions of fact must be submitted to the jury. We
think jury issues were made by the whole of the evidence,

Among other considerations is the credibility of the wit-

nesses, including that of the appellant himself. When there

is reason to discredit a witness because of interest or
otherwise[,] the [circuit court] is not required to take the
case from the jury as a matter of law but may and should

2

While a person seeking immunity from prosecution under section 16-
11-440(C) may use deadly force to prevent the commission of a violent
crime, there is no comparable language in our case law discussing the
elements of self-defense. See, ¢.g,, Douglas, 411 S.C. at 318, 768 S.E.2d
at 238-39.

10, Although Appellant did not testify at trial, the jury viewed his
recorded interviews with police.

ma *
submit the issues, including credibility of the witnesses, to
the jury.

250 S.C. at 459, 158 S.H.2d at 772. The court added, “We do
not think the [circuit court] would have been justified in telling
the jury that reasonable men could not disagree as to the
truthfulness of appellant’s version of the killing.” Jd. at 459-
60, 158 S.H.2d at 772. Likewise, in Butler, our supreme court
noted that the defendant’s credibility problems distinguished
the nature of the evidence in her case from the uncontroverted
nature of the evidence in Dickey and concluded the credibility
issues had “to be resolved by the jury.” 407 S.C. at 882, 755
§.E.2d at 460 (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, the cireuit court properly declined
to direct a verdict of acquittal. Cf Dickey, 894 S.C. at 508, 716
§.H.2d at 108 (concluding “the wncontroverted facts estab-
lish[ed] as a matter of law that Petitioner had no other
probable means of avoiding the danger other than to act as he
did” (emphasis added)); State v. Long, 825 S.C. 59, 68, 480
§.E.2d 62, 68-64 (1997) (“While self-defense can be inferred
even from the State’s version of the evidence, the evidence of
self-defense is not conclusive. Whether [the] appellant actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
sustaining serious bodily injury and whether an ordinary
person would have entertained the same belief were questions
for the jury.”).

Ql. Jury Instruction

HM Appellant argues the circuit court erred in charging
the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary man-
slaughter because there was no evidence of the element of
“sudden heat of passion,” i.e., that Appellant was acting under
an uncontrollable impulse to do violence and was incapable of
cool reflection as a result of fear. Appellant maintains,
“{bJased on the facts of this case, Appellant either shot in self
defense or he acted with malice.” We disagree.

HE “Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of
a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal
provocation.” State v. Starnes, 888 8.C. 590, 596, 698 S.H.2d
604, 608 (2010). “To warrant the court eliminating the charge
of manslaughter, there must be no evidence whatsoever tend-

* Le

ing to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. If
there is any evidence from which it could be inferred the
lesser, rather than the greater, offense was committed, the

defendant is entitled to such charge.” Jd. (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).

HE “Whether a voluntary manslaughter charge is war-
ranted turns on the facts. If the facts disclose any basis for the
charge, the charge must be given.” Id. at 597, 698 S.E.2d at
608 (emphasis added).

[Flear resulting from an attack can constitute a basis for
voluntary manslaughter. Yet the presence of fear does not
end the inquiry regarding the propriety of a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. We have consistently held that
sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation is
defined as an act or event that “must be such as would
naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind
of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and
produce what, according to human experience, may be
called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.” While the
act or event “need not dethrone the reason entirely, or shut
out knowledge and volition,” it must cause a person to lose
control.

We reaffirm the principle that a person’s fear immediately
following an attack or threatening act may cause the person
to act in a sudden heat of passion. However, the mere fact
that a person is afraid is not sufficient, by itself, to entitle a
defendant to a voluntary manslaughter charge. Consistent
with our law on voluntary manslaughter, in order to consti-
tute “sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provoca-
tion,” the fear must be the result of sufficient legal provoca-
tion and cause the defendant to lose control and create an
uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Succinetly stated, to
warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge, the defendant’s
fear must manifest itself in an uncontrollable impulse to do
violence.

A person may act in a deliberate, controlled manner, not-
withstanding the fact that he is afraid or in fear. Converse-
ly, a person can be acting under an uncontrollable impulse
to do violence and be incapable of cool reflection as a result

a ;

of fear. The latter situation constitutes sudden heat of
passion, but the former does not.
Id, at 598-99, 698 S.E.2d at 609 (emphases added) (citations
omitted) (quoting State v. Pittman, 378 S.C. 527, 572, 647
§.H.2d 144, 167 (2007).

HM “In determining whether the act [that] caused death
was impelled by heat of passion or by malice, all the surround-
ing circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consid-
eration, including previous relations and conditions connected
with the tragedy, as well as those existing at the time of the
killing.” State v, Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 418, 706 S.H.2d 12, 15
(2011).

In Cook v. State, 415 S.C. 551, 555, 784 S.E.2d 665, 667
(2015), as in the present case, the defendant objected to the
State’s request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The
circuit court had relied on the following facts in determining
that a charge on voluntary manslaughter was supported by
the evidence: (1) the defendant was in fear, (2) he shot the
victim twice, and (8) he stated “before I knew it, I fired a
shot.” Id. at 557, 784 S.E.2d at 668. However, our supreme
court held that the defendant’s actions did not suggest he was
acting in the sudden heat of passion. Id. at 559, 784 S.H.2d at
669. The court explained, “We do not believe the fact that
Cook shot Victim twice or his statement ‘before I knew it, I
fired a shot’ is evidence that Cook’s fear manifested in an
uncontrollable impulse to do violence.” Id. at 558, 784 S.H.2d
at 668. The court also stated,

Here, Cook stated he tried to walk away from Victim, but

Victim kept cutting him off. The fact that Cook was trying

to walk away from the conflict does not suggest Cook was

incapable of cooling off. In addition, Bridges testified that

Cook and Victim were talking softly and that he could

hardly tell they were arguing. This too does not suggest

that Cook was acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do
violence as surely if one was so enraged to kill, one would
not be talking softly with the victim right before the act.

Further, at no point during Cook’s statement does he

indicate he lacked control over his actions. Accordingly, we

believe the facts of this case suggest Cook shot Victim
either with malice or in self-defense.

. a

Id. at 557, 784 S.H.2d at 668. The court also noted there was
no physical altercation involved. Jd. at 559, 784 S.H.2d at 669.

Likewise, our supreme court concluded there was no evi-
dence of sudden heat of passion in Starnes and, therefore,
upheld the circuit court’s refusal to charge the jury on volun-
tary manslaughter. 388 S.C. at 599-600, 698 S.H.2d at 609. The
defendant and the two victims, Bill and Jared, were engaged
in a drug purchase with a fourth individual, Jody, at the
defendant’s home when Jared “pulled a gun on” Jody. Id, at
595, 698 §.H.2d at 607. The defendant testified Jared’s action
“scared” him, and he went into his bedroom to retrieve his
gun, Id, at 595, 599, 698 S.E.2d at 607, 609, As the defendant
exited his bedroom, “Bill said ‘whoa’ and was pointing a gun at
him,” Id. at 595, 698 S.H.2d at 607. The defendant then shot
Bill and Jared, Id. On appeal, the court acknowledged the
evidence of the defendant’s fear but concluded there was no
evidence that the defendant was “out of control as a result of
his fear or was acting under an uncontrollable impulse to do
violence,” Id. at 599, 698 S.H.2d at 609. The court stated the
evidence showed that the defendant “deliberately and inten-
tionally shot Jared and Bill and that he either shot the men
with malice aforethought or in self-defense.” Id.

In the present case, however, the jury could have reason-
ably inferred from the evidence that when Appellant shot
Victim six times, he was acting under “an uncontrollable
impulse to do violence” even if the jury could have drawn an
equally reasonable inference that Appellant acted in a “delib-
erate, controlled manner.” Id. Admittedly, several witness
accounts of the entire incident are comparable to witness
accounts of the defendant and the victim “talking softly” in
Cook. 415 S.C. at 557, 784 S.E.2d at 668. Further, Appellant
told police that before he fired the fatal shots, he was in
“conservation mode.” When asked how many shots he fired,
Appellant initially stated he remembered two shots and then
compared his reaction during the incident to his reaction
during a prior incident: “But I don’t know when I ... I know
... I knew the first time on Hilton Head, I remember I
emptied it ... Well, that ... that was a panic fire ... the first
time. This time, I had a little bit more composure.” (emphasis
added). Appellant also explained to police that the numerous
shots fired at Victim were his attempt to disable Victim from

a "

killing Appellant and that he kept shooting until he saw
Victim’s gun slide across the road beneath him. The jury could
have reasonably inferred from all of this evidence that Appel-
lant was acting in a “deliberate, controlled manner.” Starnes,
888 S.C. at 599, 698 S.E.2d at 609.

However, unlike the lack of any evidence of sudden heat of
passion in Cook and Starnes, there is some evidence in the
present case from which the jury could have reasonably
inferred that Appellant was “incapable of cool reflection” and
was acting under an “uncontrollable impulse to do violence.”
Starnes, 388 S.C. at 598, 698 S.H.2d at 609 (“[S]udden heat of
passion upon sufficient legal provocation is defined as an act
or event that ‘must be such as would naturally disturb the
sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person
incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to
human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to
do violence.’ ” (quoting Pittman, 378 S.C. at 572, 647 S.H.2d at
167)). First, neither Cook nor Starnes involved six gunshots to
the same victim as does the present case. Further, one of
Nelson's neighbors, Elizabeth Sorto, was sitting in her family’s
car in their driveway after returning from a restaurant when
she heard “a lot of people outside yelling.” She testified she
saw “one of the guys” stepping onto the truck’s “side rail” and
“they were just getting very argumentative and just going
back and forth.” Her husband, Edwin Sorto, testified that as
he was going into his house to obtain some personal belong-
ings and returning to the car, he “could hear a dispute” and
when he was back in the car, he heard gunshots fired in “rapid
succession.”

Moreover, Nelson testified Appellant was very nervous even
before Victim ratcheted his gun. Appellant told Sergeants
Adams and Albertin that after he heard Victim’s gun ratchet,
he tried to buy some time by fumbling with his set of keys and
he “kept kind of freaking out a little bit.” (emphasis added).
He also stated that when Victim asked if Appellant had any
paperwork documenting Victim’s vehicle, “that’s when I got
really scared. That’s when you get that little pain, like right
below your sternum that kind of presses inward.” (emphasis
added). Appellant quoted Victim as stating that he did not
want law enforcement “to come look for” him. Appellant
understood this statement to mean that Victim wanted to
make sure there was nothing in the tow truck that would

* a

connect Appellant to Victim’s vehicle. He continued, “Yeah,
T’ve been in this business a long time[,] so now I’m really
nervous. I knew I had my Glock in the glove box. His friend

was on the way to retrieve a shotgun and I heard a pistol
ratchet already... .” (emphasis added).

Appellant also gave the following account of his reaction to
Victim ordering him to exit his truck:

I [exited] straight out my door stepping off of the metal

running boards ... and I looked and my line of sight was

through him straight down to the ground. It’s now or never.

He’s already in motion and he’s in draw. Whether he’s

drawing it to intimidate me, to keep me to go do what he

wants me to do, or if he knew I didn’t have any information
on his vehicle and ... Ah, bye, bye, Preston ... regardless,
he was in motion, he was in draw and I reacted."

(emphases added).

The jury could have reasonably inferred from all of this
evidence that when Appellant shot Victim six times, he was
“incapable of cool reflection” and was acting under an “uncon-
trollable impulse to do violence” such that there was sufficient
evidence of Appellant’s sudden heat of passion. See Starnes,
888 S.C. at 598, 698 S.H.2d at 609 (“{S]udden heat of passion
upon sufficient legal provocation is defined as an act or event
that ‘must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of
reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable
of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human
experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do
violence.’” (quoting Pittman, 878 S.C. at 572, 647 S.H.2d at
167).

Finally, in addition to the above-referenced evidence, Appel-
lant’s behavior and words immediately after the shooting were
relevant to his state of mind immediately before and during
the shooting.” Nelson testified that immediately after shooting

11, In requesting the voluntary manslaughter charge, the assistant solic-
itor distinguished the present case from Starnes by noting Appellant’s
numerous descriptions of the emotions he felt during the incident and
arguing that, collectively, all of these expressions showed heat of
passion, The circuit court relied on this argument in granting the
State’s request.

12. See State v. Martin, 94 S.C, 92, 94, 77 S.E, 721, 721 (1913) (“The
language and behavior of the defendant at the time of the shooting, or

a :

Victim, Appellant was “waving [his pistol] around and saying,
[‘whoever comes] near me, I [will] kill you, don’t move.[’]”
Nelson also testified that when he asked Appellant why he
killed Victim, Appellant “was just saying bad words” and “put
his gun ... on my forehead ... [aJnd he said, [You make
another step, I [will] kill you?’ Nelson’s neighbor, Steve
Varedi, recounted that immediately after Appellant shot Vic-
tim, Appellant “was waving the firearm around just erratically
at everyone, myself included.” Claudia Olivera gave a similar
account: “[Appellant] pointed the gun at me and at everyone,
and he pointed the gun to my husband’s head.” She testified
that when she tried to get near Victim’s body, Appellant told
her “[‘Jdon’t move or I'll shoot.[')”

The jury could have reasonably inferred from all of this
testimony that when Appellant shot Victim six times, he was
incapable of cool reflection and was acting under an uncontrol-
lable impulse to do violence. See Starnes, 888 S.C, at 598, 698

immediately afterwards, showing his attitude of aggression or of regret,
clearly tended to enlighten the jury on the issue as to whether the
shooting was done with malice, or in heat and passion, or in self-
defense.”); see also Ramsey v, State, 233 Ga. App. 810, 811, 505 S.E.2d
779, 781-82 (1998) (determining the admissibility of a defendant’s
after-the-fact admission to being under the influence of drugs at the
time of the alleged battery and highlighting the defendant's claim of
self-defense in holding, “the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence
tends to show the accused’s state of mind shortly before, during, or
shortly after the commission of the crimes”); cf, State v. Quick, 107 S.C.
435, 438, 93 S.E. 127, 128 (1917) (holding the defendant’s capture and
return of a frightened horse to its owner at the scene of a gunfire
exchange between the defendant and the victim was “part of the
transaction,” and the defendant’s remark concerning being shot by the
victim or his brother, which occurred “only a few minutes” after the
shooting as he was returning the horse, “was a part of the res gestae”);
State v. McDaniel, 68 S.C. 304, 310, 47 S.E. 384, 386 (1904) (stating
that in order to be admissible into evidence, “declarations must be
substantially contemporaneous with the litigated transaction, and be
the instructive, spontaneous utterances of the mind while under the
active, immediate influences of the transaction; the circumstances pre-
cluding the idea that the utterances are the result of reflection or design
to make false or self-serving declarations” (emphasis added)); id. (hold-
ing that the circumstances of time and place surrounding the defen-
dant’s shooting of the victim “do not alone necessarily prevent a
declaration from being part of the res gestae, but they are factors, with
other circumstances, in determining whether the declarations were the
spontaneous utterances of the mind under the immediate influence of the
transaction” (emphasis added)).

. a

S.E.2d at 609 (defining sudden heat of passion upon sufficient
legal provocation),

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s deci-
sion to give the jury a voluntary manslaughter instruction. See
id. at 596, 698 S.H.2d at 608 (“To warrant the court eliminat-
ing the charge of manslaughter, there must be no evidence
whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to
manslaughter, If there is any evidence from which it could be
inferred the lesser, rather than the greater, offense was
committed, the defendant is entitled to such charge.” (citation
omitted)).

CONCLUSION
We affirm the denial of Appellant's motion for immunity
from prosecution pursuant to the Protection of Persons and
Property Act, We also affirm Appellant’s convictions for volun-
tary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime.

AFFIRMED.

MCDONALD and HILL, JJ., concur.
a

808 S.H.2d 731
Stacey SELLERS, Claimant, Respondent,
ve
TECH SERVICE, INC., Employer, and Builders Mutual
Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants,

Appellate Case No, 2015-001676
Opinion No. 5508
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard May 8, 2017
Filed August 9, 2017

ee
i)

2
co)

Hii

Richard C. Detwiler and Jacqueline M. Pavlicek, of Callison,
Tighe & Robinson, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants.

Robert Fredrick Goings, of Goings Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

—
MCDONALD, J.:

In this appeal from the Appellate Panel of the South
Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commis-
sion), Appellant Tech Service, Inc. (Tech Service) + argues the
Commission erred in (1) finding Respondent Stacey Sellers
was a Tech Service employee, rather than an independent
contractor, at the time of his injury and (2) basing its determi-
nation on immaterial information. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural Background

On November 8, 2018, Sellers sustained injuries while per-
forming heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
construction at a single-family home in the Market Commons
subdivision in Myrtle Beach (City). Sellers fell from a thirty-
foot extension ladder while he was “trimming out” a house and
sustained injuries to his legs, back, and neck. He was subse-
quently hospitalized.

On November 9, Sellers notified Riverport Insurance Com-
pany (Riverport) of his accident. On November 20, Riverport’s
third-party claims administrator denied the claim because
Sellers had “knowingly and voluntarily” excluded himself from
its workers’ compensation insurance policy.2 That same day,
Sellers filed a Form 50 naming Tech Service of Myrtle Beach,
LLC (TSMB) as a party to his case and requesting a hearing.
On December 13, 2018, Sellers filed an amended Form 50
naming Tech Service as a party.>

At the March 25, 2014 hearing before the single commis-
sioner, Sellers testified he was a longtime employee of both
Tech Service and TSMB and was working in the course and
scope of this employment at the time of his accident. Sellers

1, Although the filings refer to both “Tech Services” and “Tech Ser-
vice,” owner Tracy Davis testified at his deposition that the business is
actually named “Tech Service, Inc,” We order that the case caption be
amended accordingly.

2. Riverport was later dismissed from this case by consent order.

3. Tech Service has six to eight employees, which it shares with TSMB.
Before an employee is sent to a particular jobsite, the employee is
informed whether the job is for Tech Service or TSMB so he or she can
record the time accordingly.

a

explained that his first cousin, Tracy Davis, is the owner of
Tech Service and a co-owner of TSMB.

In early 2013, Sellers complained to Davis about not receiv-
ing proper overtime pay and deductions from his paycheck.
According to Sellers, Davis occasionally avoided paying over-
time by separating the hours Sellers worked between Tech
Service and TSMB. Sellers testified Davis offered to make him
a “1099 employee” and help Sellers with his taxes when he
filed Sellers stated Davis gave him $1,250 in cash and in-
structed him to purchase his own workers’ compensation
insurance policy for “tax purposes only.” On February 21,
2018, Sellers purchased the Riverport policy but excluded
himself from it because he believed he was covered by Tech
Service’s policy.

In March 2018, Davis began paying Sellers without deduct-
ing for income taxes and reporting his wages using a Form
1099 rather than a Form W-2. Although Sellers performed
“side work” to make extra money both before and after the
March 2018 payment change, he denied signing an indepen-
dent contractor agreement or otherwise changing his employ-
ment relationship with Tech Service. Beginning March 4,
however, Sellers submitted weekly “Sellers Heating and Cool-
ing” invoices to Tech Service for payment as directed by
Davis.

To the contrary, Davis testified Sellers first approached him
in January 2018 about his desire to work for himself as a
subcontractor because he wanted to make more money. Davis
denied that Sellers ever complained about not receiving prop-
er overtime pay or deductions from his paycheck. However,
Davis had no documentation reflecting the purpose and nature
of his deductions from Sellers’s pay, Davis told Sellers he
could begin working as a subcontractor after he obtained a
workers’ compensation insurance policy and adamantly denied
giving Sellers cash to purchase the policy. Davis explained
that if he were going to give Sellers such funds, he would have
given him a check to document the expenditure for his own
business records, Davis learned about Sellers’s accident from

4, 1099 refers to an IRS Form 1099-MISC, which is used to report
payments made in the course of a trade or business to a person who is
not an employee or to an unincorporated business.

a

Tech Service supervisor Jacob Hamilton. Both Hamilton and
Davis told Sellers he could not file a claim under Tech
Service’s policy because recently audited documents reflected
Sellers was a subcontractor.

By order dated August 29, 2014, the single commissioner
determined Sellers was an employee of Tech Service at the
time of his injury pursuant to section 42-1-180 of the South
Carolina Code (2015) The single commissioner dismissed
TSMB. On July 17, 2015, the Commission affirmed and
adopted the single commissioner's order in its entirety.

Standard of Review

HMM The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) estab-
lishes the standard for our review of Commission decisions.
Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 §.C. 130, 185, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Under the APA, this court may reverse or modify the
decision of the Commission when the substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because “the decision is affect-
ed by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record.” Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second
Injury Fund, 889 S.C. 422, 427, 699 8.H.2d 687, 689-90 (2010);
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(d)-(e) (Supp. 2016). Because the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a jurisdic-
tional question, “the [clourt may take its own view of the
preponderance of the evidence.” Shatto v. McLeod Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 406 8.C. 470, 475, 758 8.H.2d 416, 419 (2018) (quoting
Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transp. Co.,
382 S.C. 295, 299, 676 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2009)). However, “this
broader scope of review does not require this [clourt to ignore
the findings of the Commission, which was in a superior
position to evaluate witness credibility.” Paschal v. Price, 392
S.C. 128, 138, 708 S.H.2d 771, 778 (2011).

5. In pertinent part, section 42-1-130 defines “employee” as a person
“engaged in an employment under any appointment, contract of hire,
or apprenticeship, expressed or implied, oral or written, including
aliens and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully em-
ployed, but excludes a person whose employment is both casual and not
in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of his
employer.” S.C. Code § 42-1-130 (2015).

a
Law and Analysis

I. Employment Test

HN We are presented with the question of whether
Sellers was, at the time of his injury, an employee of Tech
Service rather than an independent contractor.’ “No award
under the Workers’ Compensation Law is authorized unless
the employer-employee or master-servant relationship existed
at the time of the alleged injury for which [a] claim is made.”
McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C, 466, 469, 318
§.E.2d 38, 89 (Ct. App. 1984). “The burden of proving the
relationship of employer and employee is upon the claimant,
and this proof must be made by the greater weight of the
evidence.” Lewis v, L.B. Dynasty, 411 S.C. 637, 641, 770
§.H.2d 398, 895 (2015). “South Carolina’s policy is to resolve
jurisdictional doubts in favor of the inclusion of employers and
employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Spivey v.
D.G. Constr. Co., 821 S.C. 19, 21-22, 467 S.B.2d 117, 119 (Ct.
App. 1996).

HMMM “Under South Carolina law, the primary consider-
ation in determining whether an employer/employee relation-
ship exists is whether the alleged employer has the right to
control the employee in the performance of the work and the
manner in which it is done.” Paschal, 392 S.C. at 182, 708
§.E.2d at 773. “The test is not the actual control exercised, but
whether there exists the right and authority to control and
direct the particular work or undertaking.” Id. (quoting Kil-
gore Grp., Inc. v. 8.C. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 318 S.C. 65, 68, 487
§.E.2d 48, 49 (1998)). The four employment test factors re-
garding the right of control include: “(1) direct evidence of the
right or exercise of control; (2) furnishing of equipment; (8)
the method of payment; and (4) the right to fire.” Shatto, 406
S.C. at 476, 753 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting Wilkinson, 382 S.C. at
299, 676 S.H.2d at 702).

6, “An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own
methods, without being subject to the control of his employer except as
to the result of his work.” Chavis v. Watkins, 256 S.C. 30, 32, 180
S.E.2d 648, 649 (1971) (quoting Bates v. Legette, 239 S.C. 25, 34-35,
121 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1961).

—

In Wilkinson, the widow of a long-haul truck driver killed
while driving his tractor filed a workers’ compensation claim,
contending her husband was an employee of the trucking
company. 882 S.C. at 297-99, 676 S.E.2d at 701. Based on the
analytical framework approved in Dawkins v. Jordan, 341 8.C.
484, 584 S.E.2d 700 (2000), this court found Wilkinson was an
employee. Jd. at 299, 676 S.E.2d at 701-02. Our supreme court
reversed, holding Wilkinson was an independent contractor
because he had entered a contract to alter his status from
employee to independent contractor, carried the equivalent of
his own workers’ compensation policy, and owned and as-
sumed financial responsibility for all costs associated with his
tractor. Id, at 301-06, 676 S.E.2d at 703-06. Further, the court
overruled Dawkins, which instructed that the presence of “any
single factor is not merely indicative of, but, in practice,
virtually proof of, the employment relation.” Id, at 306-07, 676
8.E.2d at 706 (quoting Dawkins, 841 S.C. at 489, 584 S.H.2d at
708). Instead, the four factors “should be evaluated in an
evenhanded manner” consistent with pre-Dawkins case law.
Id, at 307, 676 S.E.2d at 706.

More recently in Shatto, a nurse anesthetist injured in a
hospital operating room fall sought workers’ compensation
benefits as a hospital employee. 406 S.C, at 478, 753 S.H.2d at
417, While the Commission determined every factor of the
employment test supported an employment relationship, this
court reversed and found an independent contractor relation-
ship. Id. However, the supreme court reversed, holding only
the “method of payment” factor weighed in favor of the
independent contractor finding. 406 S.C. at 477, 753 S.H.2d at
419-20. The court found “the other factors, especially evidence
of control and furnishing of equipment, compellingly support a
finding of an employment relationship.” Jd. at 477, 758 S.H.2d.
at 420,

A. Direct Evidence of the Right or Exercise of Control

Tech Service argues it did not control the details of Sellers’s
work at the time of his injury. Yet, regardless of whether or
not Tech Service exercised actual control over the details of
Sellers’s work, there is evidence in the record illustrating it
had the right to exercise such control.

a

“While evidence of actual control exerted by a
putative employer is evidence of an employment relationship,
the critical inquiry is ‘whether there exists the right and
authority to control and direct the particular work or under-
taking.’” Shatto, 406 S.C. at 477, 753 S.E.2d at 420 (quoting
Young v. Warr, 252 8.C, 179, 189, 165 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1969).
“The right to control does not require the dictation of the
thinking and manner of performing the work, It is enough if
the employer has the right to direct the person by whom the
services are to be performed, the time, place, degree, and
amount of said services.” Shatto, 406 S.C. at 477, 758 S.B.2d at
420 (quoting Nelson v. Yellow Cab Co., 848 S.C. 102, 110, 588
§.E.2d 276, 280 (Ct. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by
Wilkinson, 382 S.C. at 300 n.8, 676 S.E.2d at 702 n.8)).

Concerning this factor, the Commission found (1) Sellers
was instructed by either Davis or Hamilton on the work he
was to perform and his work was supervised; (2) Sellers
reported to work as he was instructed; (8) Sellers did not bid
for work on any projects he performed for Tech Service,
including the project on which he was working when injured;
(4) Tech Service did not inform the general contractor of the
project on which Sellers was injured that he was working as a
subcontractor or independent contractor; (5) Tech Service
directed Sellers to wear a Tech Service uniform, which he
wore each work day, including the date of his injury; (6)
Sellers carried Tech Service business cards and service con-
tracts, which he executed with customers as an agent of Tech
Service; and (7) Sellers had the authority to order, purchase,
and pick up supplies at Gateway Supply using Tech Service’s
account.

We recognize some of the documentary evidence contained
in the record, including Sellers’s workers’ compensation insur-
ance policy, the “Sellers Heating and Cooling” invoices, and
his Form 1099, supports Tech Service’s argument that this
was an independent contractor relationship. However, unlike
in Wilkinson, the record in this case is devoid of an indepen-
dent contractor agreement. See 382 S.C. at 300, 676 S.H.2d at
702 (“In evaluating the four factors, we are guided initially by
the parties’ independent contractor agreement.”). As such, we
must look to the parties’ conduct in making our determination.

a

See id. (“But more importantly, we are guided by the parties’
conduct, which mirrored the terms of the contract.”).

A review of the record reveals Sellers reported to work in
the manner in which he was instructed, whether it was to the
office or a job site. He worked alongside other Tech Service
employees and under supervisor Jacob Hamilton, who inspect-
ed and monitored the quality of Sellers’s work product. Sellers
never bid against any other subcontractors to perform HVAC
construction for Tech Service. Instead, Davis informed Sellers
of a particular job and “from that point he would let [Davis]
know when he got it done.” Hither Davis or Hamilton would
follow up with the customer to ensure their satisfaction with
the quality of Sellers’s work. If an issue arose on a project,
Hamilton sent either Sellers or an hourly employee to fix it.

In addition to HVAC construction, Sellers performed ser-
vice calls and sold service contracts to customers, signing as
an employee and agent of Tech Service. Sellers carried Tech
Service invoices with him to jobs and executed between twenty
and one hundred invoices for Tech Service after March 2013.
Despite Tech Service’s contention that it lacked control over
Sellers because he could refuse jobs and work on his own
schedule—as evidenced by gaps in his work for Tech Service
from March through November 2018—Davis’s right to control
the time, place, and amount of Sellers’s work weighs heavily in
favor of finding an employment relationship. See Shatio, 406
S.C. at 477, 753 S.E.2d at 420 (“It is enough if the employer
has the right to direct the person by whom the services are to
be performed, the time, place, degree, and amount of said
services.” (quoting Nelson, 343 §.C. at 110, 588 S.E.2d at 280,
overruled on other grounds by Wilkinson, 382 S.C. at 300 n.8,
676 S.H.2d at 702 n.3)).

B. Furnishing of Equipment

Tech Service contends Sellers furnished his own equipment.
at the time of his injury. Like the Commission, we disagree.

In deciding whether Tech Service furnished equipment to
Sellers, the Commission found (1) Sellers was not financially
capable of purchasing all of the tools pictured in the hearing
exhibits; (2) most of the tools were purchased by Tech Service
and provided to Sellers, including the ladder from which
Sellers fell on the date of his accident; (8) Sellers was able to
charge any supplies he needed on a Tech Service account; (4)

po
a

Sellers did not pay for any supplies out of pocket and did not
have his own supply account; and (5) the evidence was unclear
whether Sellers was provided a van by Tech Service.

Before March 2018, Sellers drove a Tech Service van.
Sellers was not responsible for the gasoline, maintenance,
insurance, or registration on the company van. In March 2018,
Sellers “purchased” a used Tech Service van from Davis;
however, there is some dispute as to whether Sellers ever paid
any money to actually purchase the van. LeGrande Todd,’ a
cousin of both Sellers and Davis, testified he loaned Sellers
$500 to buy the van. Alternatively, Sellers explained Tech
Service deducted $500 from his paychecks. Davis was unable
to recall whether Sellers paid with cash or a check and stated
he did not have a record of the sale. Nevertheless, Tech
Service was no longer responsible for the gasoline, mainte-
nance, insurance, or registration on the van. See Wilkinson,
382 S.C. at 301-06, 676 S.E.2d at 703-06 (explaining one of the
facts supporting a finding of an independent contractor rela-
tionship was the claimant’s ownership and assumption of
financial responsibility for his tractor); see also Shatto, 406
S.C. at 479, 753 8.E.2d at 421 (“When it is the employer who
furnishes the equipment, the inference of right of control is a
matter of common sense and business.” (quoting 3 Arthur
Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation
Law § 61.07[2] (2018))).

Sellers testified Tech Service supplied his ladder years ago
and that he moved it from his company van to his personal van
in March 2018. Although Sellers maintained Tech Service
supplied him with other tools as well, Davis claimed Sellers
accumulated the tools over the years and transferred them
from his company van to his personal van when he began
working as an independent contractor. After Sellers switched
vans, Davis “didn’t check behind him that strongly because he
was family and [Davis] was trying to help him.” ®

7. Todd has a close relationship with Davis and helped him start Tech
Service. Additionally, Todd willingly assisted Tech Service in producing
documents to aid in its defense of this case but failed to produce
documents Sellers requested by subpoena.

8. This testimony seems at odds with Davis’s stance that Tech Service
employees who performed “side work” were essentially stealing from
Tech Service.

a

Davis admitted Sellers always wore a Tech Service uniform,
including on the date of his accident. Additionally, Sellers
carried Tech Service business cards. Although Sellers also had
“Sellers Heating and Cooling” business cards, he claimed he
primarily gave these to other Tech Service employees as an
ongoing joke.

The fact that Sellers handwrote “Tech Service” on his tools,
including the ladder from which he fell, should not be afforded
controlling weight. The following evidence is of greater signifi-
cance: (1) Tech Service provided the tools to Sellers at some
point in time and (2) Tech Service either permitted Sellers to
move the tools from his company van to his personal van in
March 2018 or ignored the fact that he did so. Although the
record reflects Sellers paid for all costs associated with the
van after March 2018, it is unclear whether he actually pur-
chased the van or Tech Service provided it to him. Because
Davis testified he would have kept a record of providing funds
to Sellers for his purchase of a workers’ compensation insur-
ance policy, it seems likely Davis would (or should) have also
kept a record of selling the used van. Therefore, we find Tech
Service’s furnishing of equipment for Sellers to use while on
the job favors a finding of employment.

C. Method of Payment

Tech Service maintains the method in which it paid Sellers
at the time of his injury strongly favors an independent
contractor relationship. We disagree.

“When considering this prong, typically a court
looks to whether the claimant was paid by the job or by the
hour and how the claimant filed [his] taxes.” Lewis, 411 S.C. at
645, 770 S.E.2d at 397. “ ‘Payment on a time basis is a strong
indication of the status of employment,’ while [p]ayment on a
completed project basis is indicative of independent contractor
status,” Shatto, 406 S.C. at 480, 753 S.B.2d at 421 (quoting 3
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 61.06).

The Commission found Tech Service determined both the
method and amount Sellers was paid. Specifically, the Com-
mission found Sellers’s income from Tech Service after March
20138 was largely consistent with his income from prior years,
and the most significant change was that Tech Service planned

a

to report Sellers’s earnings using a Form 1099, The Commis-
sion explained, “We recognize that [Tech Service] attempted
to classify him [as an independent contractor] for tax purposes
under a Form 1099, instead of [an employee under] a Form
W-2, but the issuance of a Form 1099 does not necessarily
define an employment relationship.”

Tech Service paid Sellers on a weekly basis both before and
after March 2018. Before March 2018, Sellers received four-
teen dollars an hour and his wages were reported on a Form
W-2. However, the evidence is disputed as to how Sellers’s
wages were calculated. Sellers testified his hours were based
on a preset amount for completion of a specified job based on
the flat rate pricing book, in which hours worked would bear a
relationship to the type of job performed. According to Sellers,
Davis said, “I can do this by making you a 1099 employee, but
if you do it faster [than the predetermined amount of time],
it’s actually like you are making [twenty] bucks an hour
instead of [fourteen] bucks an hour,” Davis maintained Sell-
ers’s hours were based on the actual time he worked and that
he never paid his employees using the flat rate pricing book.
Likewise, Hamilton testified Tech Service employees were
paid hourly.

After March 2018, Sellers was paid on “Sellers Heating and
Cooling” invoices he was directed to submit to Davis, and his
wages were reported on a Form 1099,° Davis advised Sellers
the invoices were necessary for tax purposes and they needed
to “look like an invoice.” Sellers explained the invoices were
based on amounts set by Davis based on the amount of time
Davis determined it should take to complete a job. Sellers
testified that several weeks before his accident, Davis told
him, “We're probably going to have to go back to paying you
back by the hour like we were originally paying you.”

Here, there was no employment contract, and the testimoni-
al evidence does not clearly indicate the amount and method
by which Tech Service paid Sellers. Like the Commission, we
believe this suggests Sellers and Davis had a dispute regard-
ing how Sellers’s wages were being calculated. However, it is
clear that Sellers received the majority of his income from

9. From March through November 2013, Sellers submitted more than
one hundred forty invoices to Tech Service and six invoices to TSMB.

6

Tech Service both before and after March 2013. The only
other entities from which Sellers received minimal compensa~
tion were TSMB and Todd’s plumbing company. Although not
as strong as the “direct evidence of the right or exercise of
control” and “furnishing of equipment” factors, we find the
“method of payment” evidence further weighs in favor of
affirming the Commission’s finding of an employment relation-
ship between Sellers and Tech Service.

D. Right to Fire

Tech Service argues it did not have the right to terminate
Sellers without liability at the time of his injury. We disagree.

HM “(Jn any relationship there exists some right to ter-
minate the arrangement.” Lewis, 411 S.C. at 645, 770 S.H.2d
at 397. “This factor is often the most problematic, for a
putative employer generally has the ability to terminate both
employees and independent contractors.” Shatto, 406 S.C. at
481, 753 S.E.2d at 422. However, our supreme court has
previously recognized, “The power to fire, it is often said, is
the power to control. The absolute right to terminate the
relationship without liability is not consistent with the concept
of independent contract, under which the contractor should
have the legal right to complete the project.” Id. (quoting 3
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 61.08[1]). Essential-
ly, the court must “look to whether liability exists if the work
is prematurely interrupted.” Lewis, 411 S.C. at 646, 770
§.E.2d at 397,

The Commission determined Tech Service had the right to
terminate Sellers; however, the reasons for which Tech Ser-
vice could terminate this employment relationship are unclear.
Sellers testified Davis took a hard stance on employees who
moonlighted by doing “side work.” Yet, Sellers admitted to
performing “side work” both before and after March 2013.
Hamilton testified he suspected Sellers was doing “side work”
before March 2013. In fact, Todd testified he hired Sellers to
perform “sub work” before and after March 2013. Still, we
find evidence illustrating Davis and Hamilton supervised, in-
spected, and monitored the quality of Sellers’s work product
supports the finding that Tech Service had the right to

a

terminate its working relationship with Sellers without liabili-
ty.

Additionally, Sellers testified Davis had the right to termi-
nate his employment with Tech Service. Sellers explained that
if Davis were to terminate his employment, he would be
required to seek employment from another HVAC company.
In conjunction with the direct evidence of Tech Service’s
“right or exercise of control,” we believe the “right to fire”
factor further favors a finding of employment. Accordingly, we
affirm the Commission’s conclusion that the greater weight of
the evidence supports the finding of an employment relation-
ship between Sellers and Tech Service at the time of the
accident.

I. Immaterial Information

HM Tech Service contends the Commission relied heavily
upon information not relevant to the four factors of the
employment relationship inquiry in determining Sellers’s em-
ployment status. Specifically, Tech Service argues the Com-
mission’s decision was based on immaterial information re-
garding (1) Sellers’s lack of proper licensing at the time of his
accident; (2) Tech Service’s representations to the City re-
garding its use of subcontractors on the job where Sellers was
injured; and (8) Sellers’s authority to bind Tech Service to
contracts with third parties.

We acknowledge representations to the public and compli-
ance with governmental regulations are not dispositive in
weighing the employment test factors. See Shatto, 406 S.C. at
478-19, 753 S.E.2d at 420-21 (“The presence of governmental
regulations neither mandates nor forecloses a finding of an
independent contractor relationship.”); id. at 479, 758 S.H.2d
at 420-21 (“Regulatory compliance, by itself, is more properly
viewed in a neutral manner, one that does ‘not necessarily
support a conclusion of employment status.’ ” (quoting Wilkin-
son, 882 8.C. at 302, 676 S.E.2d at 703)). Nevertheless, the
record illustrates—and the Commission recognized—several
facts illustrating Tech Service held Sellers out as its employee.

In obtaining permits with the City for the job on which
Sellers was injured, Tech Service represented that no subcon-
tractors or independent contractors would be involved. City

a

employee Kristi Evans testified Tech Service was required to
list the names of any subcontractors or independent contrac-
tors who would perform work on projects for which it pulled
an HVAC permit. Even after March 2013, Tech Service listed
Sellers as an employee on its internal business records. Fur-
ther, Sellers is not licensed to do business individually and
lacks the HVAC contractor licensing required to conduct his
trade in South Carolina,

Finally, Sellers did not have his own separate supply ac-
count. He did, however, have access to a Tech Service supply
account at Gateway Supply. Numerous invoices show Sellers
purchased and signed for supplies on behalf of Tech Service;
these included not only those supplies needed to complete
Tech Service’s jobs but also items typically provided by an
employer to an employee, such as overalls and batteries.

We find the Commission properly applied the four factors of
the employment relationship inquiry. See Shatto, 406 S.C. at
476, 758 §.E.2d at 419 (explaining the four employment test
factors regarding the right of control). That its order refer-
ences additional facts not conclusive as to employment status
does not alter our determination that the Commission thor-
oughly analyzed the relevant facts and evaluated the employ-
ment test factors in an “evenhanded manner.” See Wilkinson,
882 S.C. at 800, 676 S.H.2d at 702; see id. at 307, 676 S.E.2d at
706 (“Consistent with pre-Dawkins’ case law, the common law
factors—right or exercise of control, method of payment,
furnishing of equipment and right to fire—should be evaluated
in an evenhanded manner in determining whether the ques-
tioned relationship is one of employment or independent con-
tractor.”),

Conclusion

The Commission’s order determining Sellers was a Tech
Service employee at the time of his injury is

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., concur.
De

a ‘

804 S.B.2d 801
The STATE, Respondent,
vy.

Trenton Malik BARNES, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-002771
Opinion No. 5509
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard April 17, 2017
Filed August 16, 2017

See also 2017 WL 3044752

x

_ ;

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Susan-
nah Rawl Cole, and Solicitor Daniel Edward Johnson, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

HILL, J:

After a joint trial, Trenton Barnes and Lorenzo Young were
convicted by a jury of murder, kidnapping, second-degree
burglary, and attempted armed robbery. We set forth the
relevant facts in State v. Young, Op. No. 5501, 420 8.C. 608,
808 S.E.2d 888, 2017 WL 3044752 (S.C. Ct. App. filed July 19,
2017) (Shearhouse Adv. Sh. No. 27 at 96-101). On appeal,
Barnes argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his motions
for severance; (2) admitting the testimony of two jailhouse
informants as statements against interest under Rule
804(b)(8), SCRE; and (8) allowing the State to improperly
impeach the testimony of his mother, Latoya Barnes. We
affirm,

L

HM Barnes first contends the trial court abused its dis-
eretion in denying his motion to sever his trial from Young’s.
Denial of a severance motion is an abuse of discretion if
unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law.
State v. Spears, 898 S.C. 466, 475, 718 S.H.2d 324, 328 (Ct.
App. 2011),

HM Codefendants in a murder case are not automatically
entitled to separate trials. State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 78, 502
§.E.2d 68, 75 (1998). They are entitled to a severance “only
when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compro-
mise a specific trial right of a codefendant or prevent the jury
from making a reliable judgment about a codefendant’s guilt.”
State v. Dennis, 387 S.C. 275, 282, 523 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1999).
See also Hughes v. State, 346 S.C. 554, 559, 552 S.H.2d 315,

; a

817 (2001); see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 584, 540,
118 S.Ct. 988, 122 L.Hd.2d 317 (1993) (“{I]t is well-settled that
defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they
may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.”). We
will only reverse the denial of a severance motion when it is
reasonably probable the defendant would have received a
more favorable outcome had he been tried separately. Hughes,
346 S.C. at 559, 552 S.H.2d at 317.

Barnes argues being tried with Young compromised his
right to effectively cross-examine Young’s girlfriend, Rolanda
Coleman. Barnes believes Coleman was a key witness whose
eredibility was central, as she identified him as the gunman in
the gray sweatshirt on the surveillance video, and also testi-
fied she had seen him with a gun on another occasion. Barnes
claims in a separate trial he would have been able to elicit that
Coleman and Young were codefendants in an unrelated pend-
ing burglary charge. Barnes believes this would have allowed
him to better portray to the jury that Coleman’s testimony
lacked credibility because she was seeking to protect Young,
with whom she shares two children.

The record reveals the trial court only prohibited Barnes
from telling the jury Young was charged in the pending
burglary case, presumably because to do so would have intro-
duced improper evidence of Young’s character and prior bad
acts, transgressing Rule 404, SCRE. Nothing stopped Barnes
from confronting Coleman about her bias in favor of Young
based on their relationship or her willingness to testify in
hopes of reducing her exposure to substantial prison time on
the burglary charge. In fact, these areas were explored during
her testimony. Being tried with Young did not hamper Barnes’
right to cross-examine Coleman effectively; consequently, no
prejudice accrued to him. Moreover, we do not believe exclu-
sion of this singular point of impeachment prevented the jury
from making a reliable judgment about Barnes’ guilt. See
Dennis, 337 S.C. at 282, 523 S.E.2d at 176, Coleman’s testimo-
ny was cumulative to other evidence, including Barnes’ letter
to his mother and his mother’s identification of him in the
video.

Barnes also claims the joint trial prevented him from cross-
examining Young about the statements he made to Alfred D.

a .
Wright and Michael Schaefer identifying “Trigg” and “Trap”
as his accomplices. Because Young did not take the stand,
Barnes maintains he could not confront Young and conse-
quently Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 1620,
20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), required Barnes be granted a separate
trial.

This is a closer issue. As we noted in Young, the State’s
decision to try Barnes and Young together was fraught with
risk. It also placed the trial court in difficult positions through-
out the almost three week trial. Yet, as we concluded in
Young’s appeal, the trial was fundamentally fair and we can
confidently say the jury was not prevented from making a
reliable judgment about Barnes’ guilt. As more fully explained
in Section II, infra, the evidence of Barnes’ guilt was over-
whelming. The probability Barnes would have fared better in a
separate trial is remote. Accordingly, even if the denial of
severance compromised Barnes’ right to confront Young, the
error was harmless. See State v. McDonald, 412 S.C. 188, 142,
771 S.H.2d 840, 844 (2015) (“In some cases the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the preju-
dicial effect of the codefendant’s admission is so insignificant
by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the improper use of the admission was harmless error.”
(quoting Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056,
81 L.Ed.2d 840 (1972))).

IL.

Hs Barnes next argues the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony of Wright and Schaefer under the hearsay
exception for statements against penal interest, Rule 804(b)(8),
SCRE. We agree.

HE s[n criminal cases, an appellate court reviews only
errors of law. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216,
220 (2006). The admission of evidence is within the discretion
of the trial court, and we may only check that discretion if it is
abused. State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.H.2d 240, 244
(2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the
trial court is controlled by an error of law or lacks evidentiary

; a

support. State v. Pagan, 869 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.H.2d 262, 265
(2006).

HE oOver Barnes’ objections, Wright testified in part:
Q: .... What did [Young] tell you about his case?
[WRIGHT]: That he was with two other individuals that he
ealled Trigg and Trap, and I later got their names from
somebody else, but not from him. He just gave me their
nicknames. He said they went to rob a club, but the club
was closed, so they went next door to a bakery where Trap
stayed outside as a look out and he and Trigg went in. A
woman resisted when they demanded for money and swung
a knife at them, and he shot her two times.
Q: And backing up just a little bit, you said he mentioned
that he did this with two other individuals?
A: Right,
Q; Did you learn who Trigg was?
A: I was told by someone else, not him, that Trigg was Troy
Stevenson and Trap was Trenton Barnes and they were
both brothers,

Schaefer later took the stand and provided the following:
Q: Just go ahead and tell the jury what Mr. Young told you.
[SCHAEFER]: Okay, he said him and two other people by
the name of Trap and Trigg went out to rob a nightclub in
the area, but it was closed. They saw the bakery was
opened. They took that as an opportunity to go in. The
woman was in there, He said she went for a knife and she
was struggling so [he] shot her twice. He fled the scene. He
said he was wearing a red hoodie and jeans.

Q: And you just mentioned Trap and Trigg. Did you know
who those individuals were?

[SCHAEFER]: No, it wasn’t until later on. I just knew
them by their nicknames

Q: And did you determine later who Trap and Trigg were?
A: Yeah.

Q: Who was Trap?

A: A 16-year-old kid named Troy. Yeah, Troy.

Q: A 16-year-old?

a *

A: Yes.

Q: Did you understand who Trigg was?

A: That’s Trenton, Trenton Stevens (sic).

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct.
2481, 129 L.Hd.2d 476 (1994), is the starting point for consid-
ering admissibility of statements against penal interest;

In our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(8) is

that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory

statements, even if they are made within a broader narra-
tive that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may

not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(8) that a

statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller

confession, and this is especially true when the statement

implicates someone else.
Our supreme court adopted the Williamson approach in State
v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 286, 24445, 528 8,E.2d 168, 172 (1999), We
interpret the rule allowing statements against penal interest
stringently. Fuller emphasized the “strict requirements” of
the rule. Id. at 245, 528 S.H.2d at 172, State v. Holmes
reaffirmed Fuller and stressed the rule is to be applied “very
narrowly to only those portions of a hearsay statement which
are plainly self-inculpatory.” 342 8.C. 118, 117, 586 S.H.2d 671,
678 (2000). See generally Weinstein’s Federal Evidence 804-64
(2d ed. 2017) (“[A] statement which shifts a greater share of
the blame to another person (self-serving) or which simply
adds the name of a partner in crime (neutral) should be
excluded even when closely connected to a statement that
assigns criminality to the declarant.”); McCormick on Evi-
dence 588 (7th ed. 2018) (“The result is that only the specific
parts of the narrative that inculpate qualify.”).

HE Rule 804(b)(8), SCRE, requires the trial judge to
view the disputed evidence in light of the surrounding cireum-
stances and discern whether each particular remark is plainly
self-inculpatory. This entails a searching examination of both
content and context. The portions of Wright and Schaefer’s
testimony that relate Young’s mention of “Trigg” and “Trap”
as his accomplices were not admissible as statements against
Young’s interest. To be sure, “a statement is not per se
inadmissible simply because the declarant names another per-
son.” Fuller, 887 S.C, at 245, 528 §.H.2d at 172. Nevertheless,

a

we have never found a statement in which a declarant impli-
cates—rather than merely names—another admissible under
Rule 804(b)(8). The rule only grants admission of statements
against the declarant’s penal interest. Statements that are
against the penal interest of an accomplice do not qualify for
the simple fact that the accomplice is not the declarant.

We find the trial court erred in admitting this testimony.
The portions of the testimony that did not plainly inculpate
Young were rank hearsay inadmissible against Barnes.

Hs However, the improper admission of hearsay is
harmless when it could not have reasonably affected the
result. State v. Brewer, 411 S.C. 401, 408-09, 768 S.E.2d 656,
660 (2015). “No definite rule of law governs this finding;
rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of the error
must be determined from its relationship to the entire case.”
State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 578, 386 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985).
Even if Wright and Schaefer’s testimony had been limited to
Young’s self-inculpatory statements, the State overwhelmingly
proved Barnes was one of the people who entered the kitchen
and shot at Victim.” This evidence includes, most compellingly,
Barnes’ letter to his mother confessing to the crime; his
mother’s identification of him as the person wearing the gray
sweatshirt in the surveillance video; and the timeline of
Barnes’ whereabouts on the night of the shooting. According-
ly, the error in admitting hearsay against Barnes through
Wright and Schaefer’s testimony was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v. Prioleau, 345 S.C. 404, 406-411,
548 S.H.2d 213, 214-16 (2001) (finding admission of hearsay
statement by possible accomplice was harmless in light of
victims’ photographic and in-court identification of their assail-
ant).

1, Although not an issue before us, it is unclear how Wright and
Schaefer's testimony concerning how they learned the identities of
“Trigg” and “Trap” complied with Rule 602, SCRE.

2. One of Barnes’ best defenses may have been that he was the lookout
standing outside the door of the kitchen and “merely present’? when the
crimes took place. Wright and Schaefer's testimony might have helped
advance this defense, as they both placed Barnes outside, implicating
Troy Stevenson as the man in the gray-hooded sweatshirt who went
inside.

a =
Tr.

Finally, Barnes claims error in the manner the
State was allowed to impeach the testimony of his mother,
Latoya Barnes, with a prior inconsistent statement she had
made to Investigator Matthew McCoy.

The State called Ms. Barnes as a witness on November 13,
2014, and questioned her about a recorded phone conversation.
with McCoy from August 2018. Ms. Barnes admitted the
communication occurred, but flatly denied she had stated
Barnes was the one in the surveillance video wearing the gray
sweatshirt. For good measure, the State had Ms. Barnes
reaffirm her denial at the end of her direct examination.

On November 17, the State called McCoy and, over Barnes’
objection, published the portion of the August 2018 conversa-
tion when Ms, Barnes states her familiarity with her “kid’s
build” and identifies Barnes as the one wearing the gray
sweatshirt in the video.

Rule 613(b), SCRE, states:

(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of

Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-

ment by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is

advised of the substance of the statement, the time and
place it was allegedly made, and the person to whom it was
made, and is given the opportunity to explain or deny the
statement. If a witness does not admit that he has made the
prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence of such
statement is admissible.
Barnes maintains the State should have been forced to play
the recorded conversation between Ms. Barnes and McCoy
during Ms. Barnes’ testimony. According to Barnes, this ap-
proach would have allowed Ms. Barnes the opportunity to
explain the inconsistency and given Barnes the opportunity to
cross examine her about it. Barnes claims these opportunities
vanished once Ms. Barnes was released by consent from her
subpoena at the conclusion of her testimony.

We see no error. Once the State confronted Ms. Barnes
with the substance of her previous statement, the time and
place it was made, and the person to whom it was made, and
she denied making it, the foundation required by Rule 613(b)

s a

was complete. See State v. Bixby, 888 S.C. 528, 551-52, 698
§.H.2d 572, 584-85 (2010) (finding State laid proper foundation
under Rule 613(b) for introduction of recorded conversation
after witness was excused because witness admitted having
conversation at issue but denied making the statements); State
v, McLeod, 362 8.C. 78, 81, 606 8.H.2d 215, 219 (Ct. App. 2004)
(stating that under Rule 618(b), extrinsic evidence of the
statement is not admissible unless witness is advised of the
substance of the statement, the time and place it was allegedly
made, and the person to whom it was made).

HE The rule does not require extrinsic evidence of the
prior statement be admitted immediately. It merely authorizes
the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the inconsistency. Be-
cause the impeaching evidence is “extrinsic,” the avenue of its
admissibility may not always run through the witness to be
impeached by it, for that witness may not be competent to
authenticate the extrinsic evidence. See McCormick on Evi-
dence 215-16 (‘7th ed, 2018) (equating “intrinsic evidence” with
cross-examination, as opposed to “[e]xtrinsic evidence of incon-
sistent statements, that is, the production of other witnesses’
testimony about the statements”),

In some instances—say, if the previous statement was to a
third party and unrecorded—it may, for many reasons, be
impossible to produce the proof while the denier remains on
the stand. One reason would be the principle that no two
bodies may occupy the same space at the same time. Counsel
may also have strategic reasons for delaying such proof, We
are not prepared to require a witness who has denied making
a prior inconsistent statement to remain glued to the stand
until thoroughly impeached, so a party can ask the witness to
“explain” her earlier denial. See e.g. Alewander v. Conveyors &
Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1231 (6th Cir. 1984) (no require-
ment that admission of prior inconsistent statement as sub-
stantive evidence per Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) occur while
witness on stand).

We also see no prejudice. The State read the statement to
the witness twice; we are unclear what difference playing the
recording of the statement to her would have made. While Ms.
Barnes was no longer under subpoena, we know of no reason
why Barnes could not have recalled his mother to the stand,

a °

voluntarily or not, after McCoy’s testimony. Nor have we been
apprised what Barnes would have asked his mother about the
inconsistency that he had not already had the opportunity to
pursue during her initial cross-examination.

Rule 618(b), SCRE, works in tandem with Rule 611(a),
SCRE, which arms the trial court with vast discretion in
controlling the mode and order of witness testimony. We find
the trial court properly handled this impeachment evidence.

Iv.
For the reasons set forth, we affirm Barnes’ convictions.

GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur,
|

804 S.E.2d 633
DIRECTV, INC. & SUBSIDIARIES, Appellant,
ve
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001509

Opinion No. Op. 5513

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard March 14, 2017
Filed August 30, 2017

Rehearing Denied January 11, 2018

(Ht

Es)

John C. yon Lehe, Jr. and Bryson M. Geer, both of Nelson
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Charleston, for Appel-
lant.

Nicole M. Wooten, William J. Condon, Jr., and Milton G.
Kimpson, all of the South Carolina Department of Revenue, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

WILLIAMS, J.:

In this appeal from the administrative law court (ALC),
DIRECTV, Ine. & Subsidiaries (DIRECTV) argue the ALC
erred in (1) applying an improper burden of proof, (2) holding
DIRECTV’s income-producing activities (IPA) consisted solely
of signal delivery into its customers’ homes, (8) finding DI-
RECTV failed to establish the portion of its IPA occurring in
South Carolina, and (4) finding the South Carolina Depart-
ment of Revenue (the DOR) properly imposed substantial
understatement penalties. We affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves the DOR’s denial of DIRECTV’s claims
for refunds of South Carolina corporate income and license fee
taxes for the tax years 2006 through 2008 and the assessment,
of South Carolina corporate income and license fee taxes,

TT

interest, and penalties for the tax years 2009 through 2011. To
properly determine DIRECTV’s IPAs, we find it instructive to
briefly detail DIRECTV’s business operations and its methods
for soliciting and securing customers and deriving its revenue.
DIRECTV’s Business Operations

DIRECTV—a California corporation with its headquarters
and principal place of business located in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia—provides access to direct-to-home digital television enter-
tainment via satellite to residential and commercial customers
across the United States in exchange for a subscription fee.
DIRECTV has four principal “value drivers” for its business:
development and acquisition of content; broadcast operations
and distribution; marketing and sales; and customer care.

DIRECTV targets customers through high-quality, national
advertisements designed to encourage existing and potential
customers to call a toll-free number, which directs customers
to DIRECTV’s customer service call centers, to place an order
for DIRECTV’s television services. The call centers—located
entirely outside of South Carolina and owned and operated by
DIRECTV and third parties—facilitate the installation of set-
top boxes and dishes in subscribers’ homes and businesses by
a third-party home service provider hired by DIRECTV.
DIRECTV delivers programming to a subscriber only after
the subscriber signs a customer agreement and installation of
DIRECTV’s equipment is completed. For a monthly subscrip-
tion fee, DIRECTV provides its subscribers access to original
and acquired television programming.

DIRECTV produces several types of original programming
and sporting events. Additionally, it acquires programming
from third-party providers such as movie studios, broadcast
television networks like NBC, local broadcast stations, and
providers of cable programming like HBO and ESPN’ DI-
RECTV receives third-party programming content through

1. Customers are required to lease the set-top boxes from DIRECTV, and
both parties agreed all income generated by South Carolina customers
leasing the set-top boxes and purchasing tangible personal property,
such as remote controls, should be included in the numerator of the
gross receipts ratio.

2. DIRECTV’s employees in California are responsible for the acquisi-
tion and negotiation of its third-party programming and for the devel-
opment of its original programming.

a «

satellite, fiber-optic cables, and over-the-air broadcasts. DI-
RECTV’s national broadcast centers in California and Colora-
do receive, process, collect, and transmit these signals to one
of eleven satellites in geo-stationary orbit above the earth,
which then sends a wide beam of energy covering the United
States. Programming from local broadcast television stations
is collected at unmanned, local collecting facilities maintained
by DIRECTV and located throughout the country in corre-
spondence with each of the 210 Nielsen assigned designated
market areas.’ Each of the local collecting facilities transmits
signals to one of DIRECTV’s six up-link facilities, located
throughout the country but not in South Carolina. The up-link
facilities transmit the content to one of the eleven geo-station-
ary satellites, which then transmits a narrow spot beam,
containing only the local programming, to the designated
market area from which it originated. DIRECTV’s subscribers
receive national and local programming from these signal
beams via mounted satellite dishes on or near their homes or
businesses. The signal then relays from the mounted satellite
dishes to the subscribers’ set-top boxes, which delivers the
signal onto the subscribers’ television sets.

Although DIRECTV established its four primary value
drivers through testimony, DIRECTV primarily derives its
revenue from “fees paid by its [approximately 20 million] cus-
tomers for rentals of set-top boxes and subscriptions to its
programming services.” According to DIRECTV, this includes
monthly fees from subscriptions to one or more video pro-
gramming packages; revenue from pay-per-view program-
ming; revenue from the sale or lease of DIRECTV’s equip-
ment; revenue from optional warranties on the leased set-top
boxes; and revenue from fees associated with DVR set-top
boxes, high-definition set-top boxes, and multiroom viewing
charges. Other than DIRECTV’s local collection facilities in
South Carolina, its equipment rental and sale to subscribers in
South Carolina, and the one or two employees located in
South Carolina during the tax periods at issue, nearly all of
DIRECTV’s assets, employees, and property involved in pro-
viding its services to subscribers were located outside of South
Carolina.

3. During the tax periods at issue, four local collection facilities were
located in South Carolina.

DIRECTV’s Income Tax Returns

For income tax purposes, corporations like DIRECTV ap-
portion net income to South Carolina using a fraction in which
the numerator is gross receipts from within South Carolina
during the taxable year and the denominator is gross total
receipts from everywhere during the taxable year. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-6-2290 (2014). For the 2006, 2007, and 2008
tax years, DIRECTV originally filed corporate income tax
returns in South Carolina in which it sourced 100% of its
subscription receipts and 100% of its rental receipts from
South Carolina subscribers to the numerator of the gross
receipts ratio, This corresponded to gross receipt ratios of
1,9539% for 2006; 2.0016% for 2007; and 2.0548% for 2008,
which DIRECTV used to apportion its net income to South
Carolina, In 2008, the DOR conducted a field audit on DI-
RECTV’s tax returns from 2006 through 2008. Following the
audit, the DOR did not make any adjustments to DIRECTV’s
tax returns, and thus, accepted DIRECTV’s original 2006
through 2008 corporate tax income returns as filed. However,
DIRECTV subsequently filed amended corporate income tax
returns for tax years 2006 through 2008, wherein DIRECTV’s
only change was the removal of 100% of the South Carolina
customer subscription receipts that was originally sourced to
the numerator of the gross receipts ratio.

As a result, the gross receipts ratio used to apportion
DIRECTV’s net income to South Carolina changed from the
original 1.9539% to an amended 0.0246% for 2006; from
2.0016% to an amended 0.0810% for 2007; and from 2,0543% to
an amended 0,1187% for 2008, DIRECTV attached the follow-
ing statement, explaining the change, to each of its three
amended returns:

The return is being amended to apportion sales receipts to

the state under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2295 which [sic]

sources sales of services under a pro-rate cost of perform-
ance method. The originally filed return incorrectly appor-
tioned satellite television subscription receipts to South

Carolina using market-based sourcing, rather than the cost

of performance sourcing that is prescribed by statute.

4, In its amended order, the ALC noted both parties originally erred in
referencing South Carolina’s apportionment statute but later agreed

Ss

As a result of the change in the amended returns, DI-
RECTV attempted to reduce its income tax and license fee
liability by $5,976,810 and sought a refund in the same
amount. The DOR conducted another field audit of DIRECTV,
and in its November 29, 2011 field audit report, the DOR
denied DIRECTV’s amended returns and refund request and
accepted DIRECTV’s original 2006 through 2008 tax returns
as filed. In its filed original corporate income tax returns for
tax years 2009 through 2011, DIRECTV used a method for
ealculating the gross receipt ratio similar to the one in its
amended 2006 through 2008 returns,® which resulted in gross
receipts ratios of 0.1437% for the 2009 tax year; 0.1570% for
the 2010 tax year; and 0.2962% for the 2011 tax year. Again,
the DOR conducted an audit on these returns, and in its
January 28, 2014 field audit report, the DOR assessed DI-
RECTV for income taxes and license fees for 2009 through
2011 that calculated the gross receipts ratio by attributing
100% of DIRECTV’s South Carolina subscription receipts to
the numerator of the ratio.

DOR Determination and ALC Hearing

On February 18, 2014, the DOR issued a department deter-
mination in which it found the gross receipts DIRECTV
generated from the sale of subscriptions were directly pro-
duced from activity occurring within South Carolina, namely
the delivery of the signal into South Carolina homes and
businesses and onto customers’ television sets. Accordingly,
the DOR determined the revenue from DIRECTV’s subscrip-
tion receipts should be sourced to South Carolina. Thereafter,
DIRECTV requested a contested case hearing of the DOR’s
determination before the ALC, seeking a determination of the

and clarified their positions to reflect “that South Carolina uses a
method of apportionment based on the proportion of income-producing
activity conducted within the State.”

5. While DIRECTV did not include any South Carolina subscription
receipts in the numerator of its gross receipts ratio in the amended
2006 through 2008 returns or on the original 2009 and 2010 returns, it
did change its method slightly for the original 2011 returns by sourcing
a percentage of its total subscription receipts to South Carolina based
on a ratio of its South Carolina payroll to its total payroll, which
ultimately resulted in approximately $22 million of its $410 million in
South Carolina subscription receipts (approximately 5%) being includ-
ed in the gross receipts ratio numerator.

TT

extent to which DIRECTV’s IPA occurred in South Carolina
and whether the DOR properly assessed substantial under-
statement penalties against DIRECTV for taxes owed for the
2009 through 2011 tax years.

Following a hearing, the ALC issued an amended final
order and decision on June 12, 2015. The ALC found (1)
DIRECTV’s IPA was the delivery of the signal into homes
and businesses and onto the television sets of its customers;
(2) the IPAs related to South Carolina customers occurred
entirely within South Carolina; and (8) 100% of DIRECTV’s
subscription receipts from South Carolina customers must be
sourced to the numerator of the gross receipts ratio. Addition-
ally, the ALC found DIRECTV liable for substantial under-
statement penalties. Furthermore, the ALC denied DI-
RECTV’s refund request for its amended 2006 through 2008
income tax returns and assessed DIRECTV $6,646,168 in tax
and license fees; $653,425 in interest; and $1,246,155.75 in
penalties relating to its 2009, 2010, and 2011 income tax
returns. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the ALC err in (1) holding DIRECTV’s IPAs consist
solely of the delivery of the signal into the homes of its
customers and finding that DIRECTV failed to establish
the portion of its IPAs that were conducted in South
Carolina, and (2) applying an improper burden of proof?

Il. Did the ALC err in finding the DOR properly imposed
substantial underpayment penalties?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs appellate
review of decisions from the ALC. Risher v. S.C. Dept of
Health & Envtl. Control, 398 8.C. 198, 208, 712 9.B.2d 428,
431 (2011).

The review of the [ALCYs order must be confined to the

record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the

judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the
decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or[ ] it
may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights

es

of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding,
conclusion, or decision is:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

( arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2016).

HM An appellate court should only reverse the ALC’s
order if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record
or contains an error of law. Original Blue Ribbon Tawi Corp.
v. S.C. Dept of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 604, 670 S.E.2d
674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Media Gen. Comme’ns, Inc.
v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 388 S.C. 188, 144, 694 8.H.2d 525, 528
(2010) (“A reviewing court may reverse the decision of the
ALC [when] it is in violation of a statutory provision or it is
affected by an error of law.”). “Substantial evidence is not a
mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed blindly from
one side, but is evidence [that], when considering the record as
a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the agency reached....” Leventis v. S.C. Dep’t of Health
& Envil. Control, 840 §.C. 118, 130, 530 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ct.
App. 2000) (quoting Welch Moving & Storage Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of S.C., 801 S.C. 259, 261, 391 S.H.2d 556, 557 (1990)).
However, “[qjuestions of statutory interpretation are ques-
tions of law, which [the appellate court is] free to decide
without any deference to the court below.” Centex Int'l, Inc. v.
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 139, 750 S.H.2d 65, 69
(2018) (first alteration in original) (quoting CFRE, LLC v.
Greenville City. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881
(2011)).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. DIRECTV’s IPAs and Burden of Proof
A. DIRECTV’s IPA

DIRECTV asserts the ALC erred as a matter of law by
misinterpreting sections 12-6-2290 and 12-6-2295(A)(5) of the

South Carolina Code. Further, DIRECTV argues the ALC
erred in holding its IPA was the delivery of the signal into the
homes and businesses of its customers and in finding DI-
RECTV failed to establish the portion of its IPAs that oc-
curred in South Carolina because the ALC’s findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

HM “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.H.2d 457, 459 (2007).
‘Whe[n] the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory
interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to
impose another meaning.” Media Gen. Comme’ns, Inc., 388
S.C. at 148, 694 S.H.2d at 580 (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341
S.C. 79, 85, 588 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). “Words must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or
forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation.”
Sloan, 371 S.C. at 499, 640 8.H.2d at 459.

HE However, a court will reject the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statute if the interpretation of the statute by
its plain, ordinary meaning leads to an absurd result that was
unintended by the legislature. Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C.
Dep't of Revenue, 415 8.C. 851, 355, 782 S.H.2d 590, 592
(2016). “If possible, the court will construe the statute so as to
escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect.”
Kiriakides v. United Artists Comme'ns, Inc., 812 S.C. 271,
275, 440 S.H.2d 364, 366 (1994). “In so doing, the [cJourt
should not concentrate on isolated phrases within the statute,
but rather, read the statute as a whole and in a manner
consonant and in harmony with its purpose.” Duke Energy
Corp., 415 S.C. at 355, 782 S.H.2d at 592; see also Etiwan
Fertilizer Co. v. S.C. Taw Comm'n, 217 S.C. 354, 860, 60
8.H.2d 682, 684 (1950) (“The prime object, of course, in the
construction of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent.”).

Corporate income tax in South Carolina “is imposed annual-
ly at the rate of five percent on the South Carolina taxable
income of every corporation ... transacting, conducting, or
doing business within this State or having income within this
State, regardless of whether these activities are carried on in

 °

intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce.” 8.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-6-580 (2014). In South Carolina, a corporation’s taxable
income “is computed using the Internal Revenue Code with
modifications as provided by South Carolina law, and this
amount is ‘subject to allocation and apportionment as provided
in Article 17 of this chapter.”” Media Gen. Comme’ns, Inc., 888
S.C. at 145, 694 8.H.2d at 528 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-
580 (2014)). “If a taxpayer is transacting or conducting busi-
ness partly within and partly without this State, the South
Carolina income tax is imposed upon a base which reasonably
represents the proportion of the trade or business carried on
within this State.” 9,C. Code Ann, § 12-6-2210(B) (2014); see
also Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc. v. S.C. Taw Comm'n, 293
S.C. 447, 449, 861 S.H.2d 846, 847 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The
purpose of the allocation statutes is to provide for imposition
of South Carolina income tax ‘upon a base which reasonably
represents the proportion of the trade or business carried on
within this State.’” (quoting Hertz Corp. v. 8.C. Tax Comm'n,
246 S.C. 92, 95, 142 S.H.2d 445, 446 (1965))). Our supreme
court has previously held that “the apportionment formula is a
reasonable basis for establishing the income tax of corpora-
tions [that] ... do business on a multistate level.” Hastman
Kodak Co. v. 8.C. Tas Comm'n, 808 S.C. 415, 419, 418 S.B.2d
542, 644 (1992).

In South Carolina, the nature of the taxpayer’s business in
the state determines the method of apportionment a taxpayer
must use. For tax years prior to 2007, the net income of a
service provider such as DIRECTV’ was apportioned “using a
fraction in which the numerator is gross receipts from within
this State during the taxable year and the denominator is total
gross receipts from everywhere during the taxable year.” 8.C.
Code Ann, § 12-6-2290 (1995) (amended Supp. 2007), For tax
years following 2006, section 12-6-2290 of the South Carolina
Code (2014) provides that “{flor purposes of this section, items
included in gross receipts are as provided in [slection 12-6-

6. In 2007, the General Assembly amended section 12-6-2290 by adding
a sentence to the end of the existing statute, which included a cross
reference to the new definition of ‘gross receipts” and took effect in the
2007 tax year. See Act No. 110, 2007 S.C. Acts 36-37.

7. The ALC identified DIRECTV as a service provider, and DIRECTV
does not dispute this finding.

aT

2295.” The relevant subsection in the instant case is subsection
12-6-2295(A)(5), which states:
(A) The terms “sales” as used in [s]ection 12-6-2280 and
“gross receipts” as used in [slection 12-6-2290 include, but
are not limited to, the following items if they have not been
separately allocated:

() receipts from services if the entire income-producing
activity is within this [s]tate. If the income-producing
activity is performed partly within and partly without this
[s]tate, sales are attributable to this [s]tate to the extent
the income-producing activity is performed within this
[sltate.

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2295 (2014).

HM sn the instant case, DIRECTV argues the ALC
committed an error of law because it misinterpreted section
12-6-2295(A)(5) when it looked to the location of DIRECTV’s
customers in determining DIRECTV’s IPA. Because this ar-
gument concerns statutory interpretation, it is a question of
law, which we may decide without any deference to the ALC.
See CFRE, LLC, 895 §.C. at 74, 716 S.H.2d at 881. As used in
section 12-6-2295(A)(5), the term “income-producing activity”
helps define gross receipts as used in section 12-6-2290, which
requires taxpayers like DIRECTV to apportion its corporate
income to South Carolina using a fraction wherein the numer-
ator is gross receipts from South Carolina during the taxable
year and the denominator is gross receipts from everywhere
during the taxable year. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-2290
(2014). When examining the apportionment statutes, “the stat-
utory policy is designed to apportion to South Carolina a
fraction of the taxpayer’s total income reasonably attributable
to its business activity in this State.” Duke Energy Corp., 415
S.C. at 356, 782 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting Hmerson Elec. Co. v,
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 395 S.C. 481, 485-86, 719 S.E.2d 650,
652 (2011).

HAs applied, section 12-6-2295(A)(5) defines gross re-
ceipts as “receipts from services if the entire income-produc-
ing activity is within this [s]tate. If the income-producing
activity is performed partly within and partly without this
[s]tate, sales are attributable to this [s]tate to the extent the

©

income-producing activity is performed within this [s]tate.”
Giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,
we find section 12-6-2295(A)(5) establishes that if a corporation
generates revenue or income from activity performed exclu-
sively within South Carolina, then its gross receipts must
include that income in the numerator of the gross receipts
ratio, However, if a corporation, acting on a multistate level,
derives its revenue from activities occurring both inside and
outside of South Carolina, then the revenue generated from its
services performed within South Carolina are its gross re-
ceipts from South Carolina, and thus, must be included in the
numerator of the gross receipts ratio. This interpretation
keeps the legislative purpose of the allocation statutes intact.
See Lockwood Greene, 298 S.C. at 449, 861 S.E.2d at 347.

Nevertheless, DIRECTV argues it presented substantial
evidence at the ALC hearing to show how it generates income,
DIRECTV’s expert economist, Dr. Brian J. Cody, identified
four primary value drivers—content development, marketing,
broadcast operations, and customer service—that influence
customers’ decisions in subscribing to DIRECTV’s services.
Dr. Cody explained these drivers are DIRECTV’s IPAs be-
cause DIRECTV engages in these activities to convert poten-
tial customers into subscribers and to create additional income
from existing subscribers. Basing his formula on the method-
ology found in Lockwood Greene, Dr. Cody determined the
percentage these IPAs occurred in South Carolina using a
payroll and assets method, calculating DIRECTV’s payroll
and assets in South Carolina relative to their total payroll and
assets everywhere else, as a proxy for approximating the
amount of DIRECTV’s total revenue occurring inside South
Carolina.

In Lockwood Greene, the taxpayer—an engineering firm
with offices, projects, and clients in numerous states, including
South Carolina—sought a refund of income tax based on the
argument that the then-apportionment statute required re-
ceipts to be apportioned based on where its customers were
located and payments were made, which is an “origin of
payment” view. 298 S.C. at 448, 861 S.E.2d at 347. The tax
commission argued for a “place of activity” view, which appor-
tions income based on the place where the services are
performed. Jd. The court of appeals noted that the taxpayer

a

provided services to its clients through highly trained engi-
neers and personnel and that clients paid the taxpayer for the
expertise and time of its employees. Jd. at 449, 361 S.E.2d at
347. The court determined that the business of engineering
firms, like the taxpayer, carried on in a state was reasonably
measured by services rendered by its personnel in that state,
which represented a “place of activity” test. Id. The court also
noted that the taxpayer’s argument regarding the tax commis-
sion’s inconsistent interpretation of the statute based on the
commission’s guidelines was unpersuasive because the taxpay-
er did not operate a similar business to those businesses in
which the tax commission focused on whether the services
were performed in South Carolina. Id. at 450, 861 S.H.2d at
348,

DIRECTV asserts the “place of activity” test is still applica-
ble, and thus, because the four primary value drivers repre-
senting its IPAs were accomplished through its employees, the
payroll and assets method would reasonably represent “the
proportion of gross receipts that should be sourced to South
Carolina.” ® Moreover, DIRECTV argues the ALC—in finding
that all of DIRECTV’s activities, outside of beaming the
satellite signals to its customers, were “preparatory” activities
and were “too attenuated to the production of income” to be
IPAs—misinterpreted and misapplied Mercury Motor Eu-
press, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 244 S.C. 184,
185 9.H.2d 756 (1964).2 DIRECTV argues the transactions

8, Dr, Cody’s method resulted in an average of 0.85% of DIRECTV’s
gross subscriber receipts being sourced to South Carolina over the tax
years at issue. Dr. Cody calculated the payroll formula by dividing
DIRECTV's South Carolina-based payroll of two employees by its total
payroll, which gave a weighted average of 0.07%. Dr. Cody then
repeated this method by dividing the value of DIRECTV’s South Car-
olina assets by its total assets, resulting in an average of 1.63% for the
tax period at issue, Dr, Cody then averaged these two figures to obiain
the 0.85% figure,

9. In Mercury Motor, the taxpayer, a multistate motor carrier, claimed
the statutory apportionment formula improperly apportioned 17% of its
income to South Carolina—representing 17% of its mileage in the
state—when the taxpayer only generated approximately 1% of its gross
revenue from delivery or picking up freight within South Carolina. 244
S.C. at 139, 135 S.B.2d at 758. Our supreme court stated the taxpayer
was “engaged in income producing activity actually done and per-
formed within” South Carolina, when the taxpayer's trucks traveled the

a °

listed by the supreme court in Mercury Motor are analogous
to DIRECTV’s activities of content development, marketing,
and broadcast operations in that both series of activities
contribute to the generation of gross receipts, and ultimately,
to net income to be apportioned.

HH sUpon our review of the record, substantial evidence
supports the ALC’s finding that DIRECTV’s IPA is the
delivery of signal to its customers nationwide, and accordingly,
the delivery of signal to South Carolina customers is repre-
sented by 100% of its South Carolina subscription receipts, Dr.
Glen W. Harrison, the DOR’s expert, determined the purchase
of DIRECTV’s services and the delivery of television services
in the customers’ homes or businesses was the activity that
“actually generate[d] income” for DIRECTV. We also find
DIRECTV’s reliance on Lockwood Greene for the develop-
ment of its proxy method is unfounded. While we acknowledge
that the court in Lockwood Greene utilized a “place of activity”
test based on the services provided by personnel in South
Carolina, the facts are distinguishable from the instant case.
Lockwood Greene involved an engineering firm that provided
its clients a service from which it derived its income by
offering the time and expertise of its highly trained engineers
and personnel. 293 S.C. at 448, 361 S.H.2d at 847. Here,
however, while DIRECTV has highly trained engineers and
personnel obtaining content and producing innovative technol-
ogy, DIRECTV’s customers are paying DIRECTV for the end
result of the personnel’s work—the delivery of the signal that
allows customers to enjoy the digital entertainment for which
they pay DIRECTV. The service DIRECTV provides is en-
tirely different from Lockwood Greene and DIRECTV’s

state’s highways. Id. at 141, 135 S.E.2d at 759. The court also listed a
series of transactions—solicitation of freight, hauling of freight, picking
up freight, delivering freight, and collecting charges—and stated each
transaction in the series contributed to the earning and net income of
the taxpayer, and “while each transaction is necessarily incidental to
the production of its income, the transaction which primarily earns the
income is the hauling of the freight.” Jd. The court found that the
taxpayer failed to meet its burden of showing the tax was unconstitu-
tional, arbitrary, and discriminatory because nothing indicated that its
trucks, while traveling 17% of the roads, failed to contribute to the
taxpayer's income or failed to earn less than 17% of the income. Jd. at
141, 135 S.E.2d at 760.

a

source of income does not derive from its engineers, but
rather from subscriptions to its programming packages.

Although we recognize that South Carolina law only re-
quires a reasonable approximation for apportionment, we find
Dr. Cody’s method is not a reasonable approximation of
DIRECTV’s business activity in South Carolina. See Coving-
ton Fabrics Corp. v. S.C. Taw Comm'n, 264 S.C. 59, 66, 212
S.E.2d 574, 577 (1975). Dr. Cody designed his payroll and
assets method to represent “the proportion of gross receipts
that should be sourced to South Carolina,” which would
generate a hypothetical figure of South Carolina subscription
receipts that would result from multiplying a payroll and
assets percentage for a given year by DIRECTV’s total
subscription revenue for that year. (emphasis added). Howev-
er, while DIRECTV asserts its IPA is its four primary value
drivers and the payroll and assets method is a reasonable
proxy for determining how much of its IPA should be appor-
tioned to South Carolina, we find that 0.85% of DIRECTV’s
total subscription revenue does not reasonably represent DI-
RECTV’s business activity in South Carolina. The payroll and
assets method cannot be a reasonable approximation of the
business activity conducted in South Carolina because DI-
RECTV’s personnel in South Carolina during the periods at
issue consisted of two employees, at most, and the only assets
that DIRECTV owned in South Carolina were the four local
collection facilities and the equipment purchased or leased by
its subscribers. Additionally, we find Dr. Harrison correctly
stated that the DOR appropriately soureed DIRECTV’s sub-
scription revenue from its South Carolina customers to the
numerator of the gross receipts ratio because it directly
represented DIRECTV’s business activity in South Carolina
and calculated DIRECTV’s activity in the state, Furthermore,
we agree with Dr. Harrison’s statement that the proxies or
approximations employed by DIRECTV were unnecessary in
measuring the value of DIRECTV’s services in South Carolina
because the subscription fee paid by DIRECTV’s subscribers
directly placed a value on DIRECTV’s services.

We note DIRECTV states its principal aim is to “package
and deliver high quality video entertainment” to subscribers,
and that it is not a media broadcaster, but “is a producer of
original content and a multichannel video programming dis-

Ss «

tributor, whose revenue is derived from fees paid by its
customers for rentals of set-top boxes and subscriptions to its
programming services.” Stated differently, the service DI-
RECTV provides to its approximately twenty million nation-
wide customers is the delivery of high quality television enter-
tainment. Its clients pay DIRECTV for the delivery of its
television programming packages and for the equipment to
process the signal DIRECTV sends to its customers. Thus, as
a service provider, DIRECTV’s IPA is the delivery of its
programming signal to its customers across the country and in
South Carolina,

In accordance with statutory language and policy, the fees
paid by South Carolina subscribers for the lease and purchase
of DIRECTV’s equipment and the delivery of the signal to the
subscribers represent the extent of the IPAs occurring in
South Carolina; reasonably represent DIRECTV’s business
activity in South Carolina; and are to be included in the
numerator of the gross receipts ratio as the South Carolina
gross receipts for DIRECTV. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-6-
2290, -2295(A)(5); see also Duke Energy Corp., 415 S.C. at 356,
782 S.H.2d at 592 (“{TJhe statutory policy [for the apportion-
ment statutes] is designed to apportion to South Carolina a
fraction of the taxpayer’s total income reasonably attributable
to its business activity in this State.” (quoting Hmerson Elec.
Co., 395 §.C. at 485-86, 719 S.H.2d at 652)); Hastman Kodak
Co., 808 S.C. at 419, 418 S.H.2d at 544 (“The fact that a very
small percentage of the leased assets are located in South
Carolina is accounted for in the numerator of the apportion-
ment formula in which Kodak’s payroll, property, and sales in
this state are computed. Therefore, the apportionment formula
reflects a ‘reasonable representation’ of Kodak’s business in
this state.”). Therefore, we agree with the ALC and find
DIRECTV should source 100% of its South Carolina subserib-
er receipts to the numerator of the gross receipts ratio.

Last, we find DIRECTV’s Merewry Motor argument unper-
suasive. The “preparatory” activities that DIRECTV engages
in for the production of its programming and marketing are
not an IPA for the purposes of section 12-6-2295(A)(5). We
note Dr. Cody testified these activities were conducted “in
anticipation” of customers signing up for DIRECTV’s services
and DIRECTV engages in these activities “in anticipation of

2

future profits.” Accordingly, these activities cannot be IPAs
because they do not produce income, but rather, are “income-
anticipatory” activities. DIRECTV’s primary income-produc-
img activity is the delivery of the signal to the customer
because this activity actually generates income for DIRECTV.
While the other activities occurring prior to the delivery of
signal are important for DIRECTV in that it can help lead to
income, section 12-6-2295(A)(5) requires activities that actually
produce income. Thus, we agree with the ALC and find that
these activities are “too attenuated” to be considered income-
producing for the purposes of section 12-6-2295(A)(5).

In conclusion, we affirm the ALC because its decision is not
affected by an error of law and is supported by substantial
evidence. See Media Gen. Comme’ns, Inc., 388 S.C. at 144, 694
S.E.2d at 528,

B. Burden of Proof

DIRECTV next argues the ALC erred by applying an
improper burden of proof because DIRECTV proved by a
preponderance of the evidence it was entitled to a refund for
tax years 2006 through 2008 and the DOR’s assessment for
the tax years 2009 through 2011 was incorrect. We disagree.

HE The standard of proof in an administrative hearing
of a contested case is by a preponderance of the evidence. See
§.C, Code Ann. § 1-23-600(A)(5) (Supp. 2016) (“Unless other-
wise provided by statute, the standard of proof in a contested
case is by a preponderance of the evidence.”). In general, the
party asserting the affirmative issue in an adjudicatory admin-
istrative proceeding has the burden of proof. See Leventis, 840
§,C. at 182-38, 580 S.H.2d at 651. “In reaching a decision in a
contested violation matter, the ALC serves as the sole finder
of fact in the de novo contested case proceeding.” S.C. Dep’t of
Revenue v. Sandalwood Soc. Club, 399 8.C. 267, 279, 781
§.E.2d 330, 887 (Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis omitted), “The
Rules of Procedure for the Administrative Law Judge Division
require that the AL[C] make independent findings of fact in
contested case hearings, and the [APA] clearly contemplates
that the AL[C] will make [its] own findings of fact in a
contested case hearing.” Reliance Ins. Co, v. Smith, 827 8.C.
528, 584, 489 S.H.2d 674, 677 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).

es °

When conflicting evidence on an issue exists, the appellate
court defers to the findings of the fact-finder in accordance
with the substantial evidence standard of review. Risher, 393
S.C. at 210, 712 S.H.2d at 435.

In the instant case, the ALC determined DIRECTV had the
burden of proof because it was challenging the DOR’s deter-
mination that it must source its South Carolina subscription
receipts from South Carolina customers to the numerator of
the gross receipts ratio. Thus, the ALC required DIRECTV
prove the DOR was incorrect for including DIRECTV’s sub-
scription receipts for its South Carolina customers in the
numerator of the gross receipts ratio and that a refund of the
2006 through 2008 tax years and reassessment of 2009
through 2011 tax years was proper. However, the ALC deter-
mined DIRECTV failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was not required to source all of its subscrip-
tion receipts from South Carolina customers to the numerator
of the gross receipts ratio.

DIRECTV, on the other hand, relies on this court’s findings
in a property tax case—Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 367
8.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1988)—for support that it satisfied its
burden of proof and is entitled to relief. In Cloyd, a county tax
assessor assessed taxes on eight properties, which were locat-
ed in a floodway and subject to strict restrictions on use
following the enactment of an ordinance, without making an
allowance for the ordinance’s effect on the fair market value of
the land. Jd. at 87, 8367 S.H.2d at 172. On appeal, the assessor
claimed his assessment carried a presumption of correctness,
which could not be set aside unless the landowners proved the
actual value of their property. Jd. at 88, 867 S.H.2d at 172~73.
The court of appeals determined that a contesting taxpayer,
who has the burden of proving the taxing authority’s valuation
incorrect, could overturn that presumption of correctness and
be entitled to relief if the taxpayer either proved the actual
value of the property or could show other evidence to indicate
the assessing authority’s valuation was incorrect. Jd, at 88-89,
367 S.E.2d at 173.

DIRECTV asserts Cloyd is applicable here because it has
been used in other tax cases unrelated to property tax,
Furthermore, based on the findings in Cloyd, DIRECTV

2 TTT

contends it is entitled to appropriate relief because it satisfied
its burden of proof by presenting detailed testimony and
substantial evidence that showed the DOR’s assessment was
incorrect and because the DOR did not present credible
evidence as to DIRECTV’s IPA,

HMM We find DIRECTV’s reliance on Cloyd is misguided.
While it has been used as the burden of proof in personal
income tax, sales tax, and accommodation tax cases before the
ALC, we note that none of these cases involved corporate
income tax, or more importantly, the apportionment of corpo-
rate income. Thus, because the facts of Cloyd are too far
removed from the facts of the instant case, the application of
the Cloyd burden of proof is inapplicable here. Furthermore,
even if we applied Cloyd, we find DIRECTV failed to satisfy
its burden of proof because it did not demonstrate an actual
value for its IPAs and did not present other evidence proving
the DOR incorrectly included 100% of DIRECTV’s subscrip-
tion receipts from South Carolina customers in the numerator
of the gross receipts ratio.

Hl As the fact-finder, the ALC was free to weigh evi-
dence and determine witness credibility in making its factual
findings. See MRI at Belfair, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Health &
Envtl. Control, 392 S.C. 314, 324, 709 S.B.2d 626, 681 (2011).
Both parties presented their own experts in economics and tax
policy to convey their opinions on where DIRECTV’s IPA
occurred. In light of the evidence presented, the ALC found
DIRECTV’s argument unpersuasive. In particular, the ALC
found Dr. Cody’s methods did not provide actual values for
DIRECTV’s services and his proxies did not provide a reason-
ably approximate value of DIRECTV’s IPAs in South Car-
olina. As previously mentioned, we agree with the ALC’s
assessment that DIRECTV’s payroll and assets proxy is not a
reasonable approximation of its IPA in South Carolina. More-
over, because the DOR presented evidence that conflicted with
DIRECTV’s evidence regarding the sourcing of the IPA, our
substantial evidence standard of review dictates that we defer
to the findings of the fact-finder. See Risher, 398 S.C. at 210,
712 S.H.2d at 435. Accordingly, the ALC properly determined
DIRECTV did not satisfy its burden based on the ALC’s
findings that “rental and sales receipts received from South

Ss °

Carolina customers are properly included in the numerator of
the gross receipts ratio.”

Additionally, DIRECTV argues the ALC ignored the sub-
stantial factual and economic evidence it presented. DIRECTV
points out the ALC held that “the delivery of the signal into
the homes and onto the television sets of DIRECTV’s custom-
ers” was DIRECTV’s IPA despite stating that it did not adopt
the DOR’s view that IPA of “businesses within the direct
broadcast services industry is completely limited to the deliv-
ery of a signal into the customer’s home and onto the custom-
er’s television.”

We find, however, that simply because the ALC did not
agree with the DOR’s apportionment method does not mean
DIRECTV satisfied its burden of proof. DIRECTV was still
required to prove that removing South Carolina subscription
receipts from the numerator reasonably represented its busi-
ness activity in South Carolina. See Lockwood Greene, 293
S.C. at 449, 361 S.H.2d at 347. Furthermore, we agree with
the ALC that the outcome of the DOR’s assessment—includ-
ing 100% of South Carolina subscription receipts in the num-
erator of the gross receipts ratio—is correct, but like the
ALC, we find this is not DIRECTV’s sole IPA in South
Carolina. Nevertheless, while other IPAs may have occurred
within the state, sourcing 100% of DIRECTV’s subscriptions
to the numerator of the gross receipts ratio best represents
DIRECTV’s activity within South Carolina.

Mindful of our standard of review and in light of the
evidence presented in the record, we affirm the ALC because
its findings were not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.” 8.C.
Code Ann, § 1-28-610(B)(e) (Supp. 2016). Thus, we find DI-
RECTV failed to meet its burden of proof and show why its
South Carolina subscription receipts should not be sourced to
the numerator of the gross receipts ratio.

I. Substantial Underpayment Penalties

Last, DIRECTV argues substantial evidence does not sup-
port the ALC’s finding that the DOR properly imposed sub-
stantial understatement penalties. We disagree. Section 12-54-
43(A) of the South Carolina Code (2014) applies civil penalties

TT

to every South Carolina tax law that requires a return unless
otherwise provided. Section 12-54-155(A)(1) of the South Car-
olina Code (2014) addresses substantial underpayments of
taxes and provides that “[i]f there is an underpayment attrib-
utable to ... a substantial understatement of tax for a taxable
period ..., there must be added to the tax an amount equal to
twenty-five percent of the amount of the underpayment.”
“[T]here is a substantial understatement of tax for a taxable
period if the amount of the understatement for the taxable
period exceeds the greater of ten percent of the tax required
to be shown on the return for the taxable period or five
thousand dollars.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-155(B)(1)(a) (2014).
As applied, the term “understatement” means “the excess of
the amount of the tax required to be shown on the return for
the taxable period over the amount of the tax imposed which is
shown on the return.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-155(B)(2)(a)
(2014),
The amount of the understatement ... must be reduced by
that portion of the understatement which is attributable to
the tax treatment of an item: (i) by the taxpayer if there is
or was substantial authority for that treatment, or (ii) with
respect to which the relevant facts affecting the item’s tax
treatment are adequately disclosed in the return or in a
statement attached to the return and there is a reasonable
basis for the tax treatment of the item by the taxpayer.

$.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-155(B)(2)(b). The statute further
adds that “[a] penalty must not be imposed pursuant to this
section with respect to a portion of an underpayment if it is
shown that there was a reasonable cause for the portion and
that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to the
portion.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-155(D)(1) (2014).

HMM The ALC found the DOR was correct in its under-
statement and interest calculations for the 2009 through 2011
tax years. It also found no substantial authority supported
DIRECTV’s treatment of its subscription receipts and DI-
RECTV’s basis for its tax treatment of the subscription
receipts was unreasonable. However, the ALC reduced the
understatement penalty to 25% of the original penalty because
DIRECTV acted with sufficient belief in bringing its claim
regarding the portion of the understated tax amounts,

Ss °

DIRECTV, however, asserts it presented substantial evi-
dence and testimony demonstrating its treatment of subscrip-
tion revenue was correct. DIRECTV also asserts it had sub-
stantial authority for its treatment of the subscription revenue
based on the holdings in Lockwood Greene and Mercwry
Motor. Finally, DIRECTV claims it demonstrated good faith
by attributing a portion of its subscription revenue to South
Carolina for the 2011 tax year. We affirm the ALC’s decision
to assess underpayment penalties.

As previously discussed, the record contains substantial
evidence demonstrating DIRECTV’s use of the payroll and
assets method was an unreasonable approximation of its IPA
in South Carolina and did not reasonably represent DI-
RECTV’s business activity in the state. See Duke Energy
Corp., 415 8.C. at 356, 782 8.E.2d at 592 (“[Tyhe statutory
policy [for the apportionment statutes] is designed to appor-
tion to South Carolina a fraction of the taxpayer’s total income
reasonably attributable to its business activity in this State.”
(quoting Emerson Elec. Co., 395 8.C. at 485-86, 719 S.E.2d at
652)); Covington Fabrics Corp., 264 S.C. at 66, 212 S.E.2d at
577 (explaining only a reasonable approximation is necessary
for apportionment purposes). Moreover, DIRECTV’s original
tax returns filed for the 2006 through 2008 tax years sourced.
all of its subscription receipts in South Carolina to the numer-
ator of the gross receipts ratio, but only after filing amended
returns did DIRECTV rely on the holdings of Lockwood
Greene and Merewry Motor, both of which were settled law by
2006. DIRECTV’s reliance on these cases is unfounded be-
cause—regardless of their holding—established law dictates
the purpose of the apportionment statutes is to apportion
corporate income upon a basis that reasonably represents the
corporation’s business activity in South Carolina. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-6-2210(B); Duke Energy Corp., 415 S.C. at
856, 782 S.E.2d at 592; Lockwood Greene, 293 S.C. at 449, 361
S.E.2d at 347. Because DIRECTV’s treatment of its income
tax did not reasonably represent its business activity in the
state, DIRECTV could not have relied on substantial authori-
ty for its treatment of the subscription receipts.

Finally, subsection 12-54-155(D)(1) requires the taxpayer to
both act in good faith and have a reasonable cause for the
portion of an underpayment before the removal of the penalty.

aT

In the instant case, the ALC reduced DIRECTV’s penalty to
25% of the original amount because DIRECTV “acted with
sufficient belief in bringing its claim regarding the portion of
the understated tax amounts.” While the ALC found DI-
RECTV acted in good faith, the ALC did not, however, find a
reasonable cause for DIRECTV’s underpayment. Therefore,
in accordance with our standard of review, we affirm the
ALC’s amended order regarding substantial understatement
penalties.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find the ALC did not err by
finding DIRECTV’s IPA was the delivery of its signal into the
homes and businesses of its customers and DIRECTV must
source 100% of its subscription receipts from South Carolina
customers to the numerator of the gross receipts ratio. We
likewise affirm the ALC’s assessment of underpayment penal-
ties. Accordingly, the ALC’s decision is

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, J., and LEE, A.J., concur.
be

a

805 S.H.2d 568
Farid A. MANGAL, Respondent,

ve
STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000610

Opinion No. 27726
Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard December 14, 2016
Filed July 19, 2017
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled October 4, 2017

s |

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Alicia A. Olive, both of Columbia, for Petitioner.

John R. Ferguson, of Cox Ferguson & Wham, LLC, of
Laurens, and C. Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

Solicitor J. Strom Thurmond, Solicitor Barry J. Barnette
and Amie Clifford, all of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae Solici-
tors’ Association of South Carolina, Inc.

Suzanne B. Cole, of Spartanburg and Candice A. Lively, of
Chester, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Network of Chil-
dren’s Advocacy Centers and University of South Carolina
Children’s Law Center.

JUSTICE FEW:

Farid A. Mangal was convicted of criminal sexual conduct
with a minor, lewd act upon a child, and incest. After his
convictions were affirmed, Mangal filed this action for post-
conviction relief (PCR). He argues trial counsel was ineffective
for not objecting to improper bolstering testimony. The PCR
court refused to rule on the improper bolstering issue because
the court found Mangal did not raise it in his PCR application
or at the PCR hearing. The court of appeals reversed, finding
the improper bolstering issue was raised to the PCR court.
The court of appeals then proceeded to grant PCR on the
merits of the issue before it was considered by the PCR court.
We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the PCR court’s
order.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts surrounding Mangal’s sex crimes are set forth in
detail in the court of appeals’ opinion. Mangal v. State, 415
S.C. 310, 781 S.E.2d 732 (Ct. App. 2015). Focusing on those
facts relevant to the specific issues in this appeal, the victim—
Mangal’s nineteen-year-old daughter—testified Mangal had
been sexually assaulting her since she was ten years old. She
described where, when, and how it happened. On cross-exami-
nation, trial counsel questioned the victim about inconsisten-
cies in her testimony and suggested she had a motive to lie

a =
about the sexual abuse—to gain freedom from Mangal’s strict

parenting. Mangal testified in his defense and claimed the
victim and her mother fabricated the allegations.

Mangal’s improper bolstering claim is based on the testimo-
ny of the State’s witness Nancy Henderson, M.D., a pediatri-
cian the trial court qualified as an expert “in the examination,
diagnosis, and treatment of child sex abuse.” Dr. Henderson
testified she conducted a physical examination of the victim
and discovered her “hymen tissue looked very, very normal”
except for a “marked narrowing” at one spot. Dr. Henderson
concluded this was “a sign of some type of penetration.” She
then testified the victim had been “sexually abused,” and that
her opinion was “based on the history [the victim] shared with
me and based on my examination.” Trial counsel cross-exam-
ined Dr. Henderson in part by emphasizing her reliance on the
victim’s history—as opposed to the physical examination—in
forming her opinion that the hymen injury resulted from
sexual abuse.

The jury convicted Mangal of criminal sexual conduct with a
minor in the first degree, criminal sexual conduct with a minor
in the second degree (two counts), lewd act upon a child,’ and
incest, The trial court sentenced Mangal to thirty years in
prison, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions. State
v. Mangal, Op. No. 2009-UP-118, 2009 WL 9528881 (S.C. Ct.
App. filed March 4, 2009).

Mangal filed his PCR application without the assistance of
counsel.’ As required by section 17-27-50 of the South Carolina

1. Dr. Henderson explained the hymen “‘s a type of flexible tissue in the
adolescent population that partially covers the vaginal opening.”

2. This offense is now classified as criminal sexual conduct with a minor
in the third degree under subsection 16-3-655(C) of the South Carolina
Code (2015).

3. There is no provision of law for the appointment of counsel in a PCR
proceeding unless the application raises questions of law or fact which
the court determines require a hearing. See Rule 71.1(d), SCRCP (“If,
after the State has filed its return, the application presents questions of
law or fact which will require a hearing, the court shall promptly
appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is indigent.”); see also
Whitehead v. State, 310 S.C. 532, 535, 426 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1992)
(“Rule 71.1(d) mandates the appointment of counsel for indigent PCR

; a

Code (2014) and Rule 71.1(b) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, he made the application on the form pre-
scribed by this Court. See Form 5, SCRCP Appendix of
Forms. In the blank requiring the applicant to “State concise-
ly the grounds on which you base your allegation that you are
being held in custody unlawfully,” Mangal handwrote, (a)
“ineffective assistance of counsel trial,” (b) “prejudiceness,” (c)
“ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” In the blank
requiring the applicant to “State concisely and in the same
order the facts which support each of the grounds set out
[above],” Mangal handwrote (a) “failure to preserve direct
appeal issue,” (b) “failed to investigate documentary evidence
and witnesses,” and (c¢) “fail to make an additional object[ion]
to the sufficiency of the curative charge or moved for a
mistrial.” He also wrote “will amend pursuant to SCRCP, Rule
71.1” to include “new grounds upon appt. of PCR counsel,” in
apparent recognition that Rule 71.1(d) requires, “Counsel shall
insure that all available grounds for relief are included in the
application and shall amend the application if necessary.”

Mangal was subsequently appointed counsel, and later re-
tained a different attorney who represented him at the PCR
trial, but no written amendment to Mangal’s original applica-
tion was filed. Mangal’s counsel began the PCR hearing by
ealling witnesses, giving no indication to the PCR court he
intended to raise any issues not set forth in the original
application. During his presentation of evidence, PCR counsel
asked trial counsel why he did not object to “improper bolster-
ing” testimony given by Dr. Henderson, and the State briefly
cross-examined him on the same subject. However, PCR
counsel did not mention any intent to make an ineffective
assistance claim based on a failure to object to improper
bolstering testimony until the end of the hearing, At that
point, he argued trial counsel was ineffective in several re-
spects not mentioned in the original application, including for
not objecting to the alleged improper bolstering testimony of
Dr. Henderson,

The PCR court denied relief in a written order without
addressing the improper bolstering issue. Mangal made a

applicants whenever a PCR hearing is held to determine questions of
law or fact.”).

a ;

motion under Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure to alter or amend the judgment, arguing the PCR
court should have addressed the improper bolstering issue.
The PCR court denied the motion and held the improper
bolstering issue was “not presented to the court in the applica-
tion or in an amendment, and no testimonial evidence from the
applicant was presented in support of these allegations.”

Mangal filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of the denial of PCR, which we transferred to the court
of appeals pursuant to Rule 248(/) of the South Carolina
Appellate Court Rules. Mangal argued trial counsel was inef-
fective for not objecting to Dr. Henderson’s testimony and the
PCR court erred by not ruling on the issue. The court of
appeals agreed the PCR court erred in not ruling on the
improper bolstering issue. Mangal, 415 S.C. at 317-18, 781
S.H.2d at 785-86, The court of appeals then addressed the
merits of the issue, finding Dr. Henderson’s testimony was
improper bolstering and counsel was ineffective for not object-
ing to it. 415 S.C. at 319-20, 781 S.E.2d at 736-87. The court of
appeals remanded to the court of general sessions for a new
trial. 415 S.C, at 319-20, 781 S.E.2d at 787. The State filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari for review of the court of
appeals’ decision, which we granted.

Il. Standard of Review

HM SoOOur standard of review in PCR cases depends on the
specific issue before us. We defer to a PCR court’s findings of
fact and will uphold them if there is any evidence in the record
to support them. Seller v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.H.2d
525, 527 (2016) (citing Jordan v. State, 406 S.C. 448, 448, 752
S.E.2d 588, 540 (2018)). We do not defer to a POR court’s
rulings on questions of law.' “Questions of law are reviewed de
novo, and we will reverse the PCR court’s decision when it is
controlled by an error of law.” Selimer, 416 S.C. at 610, 787
S.E.2d at 527 (citing Jamison v. State, 410 8.C. 456, 465, 765

4, The court of appeals incorrectly stated ‘‘an appellate court ‘gives
great deference to the PCR court's ... conclusions of law,’” quoting
our own incorrect statement in Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 383, 629
S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006). Mangal, 415 S.C, at 316, 781 S.E.2d at 734, We
clarify that appellate courts review questions of law de novo, with no
deference to trial courts.

. a

§.E.2d 128, 127 (2014)). On review of a PCR court’s resolution
of procedural questions arising under the Post-Conviction
Procedure Act or the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,
we apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Winkler v.
State, 418 S.C. 643, 663, 795 S.H.2d 686, 697 (2016) (applying
an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's decision on
a motion for a continuance); Sweet v. State, 255 S.C. 298, 296,
178 S,E.2d 657, 658 (1971) (same).

Til. Presentation of the Improper Bolstering Issue

Hl We first address the court of appeals’ ruling that the
improper bolstering issue was presented to the PCR court,
and thus the PCR court erred in not ruling on it. We find the
PCR court acted within its discretion in refusing to address
the issue. First, the written application makes no mention of a
claim based on improper bolstering, and no amendment to the
written application was ever made. Second, PCR counsel
began the hearing without mentioning there would be any
additional claims for ineffective counsel beyond those listed in
the original application. Third, even when POR counsel ques-
tioned trial counsel on why he did not object to Dr.
Henderson’s testimony, he did not inform the PCR court he
would make a claim for ineffectiveness based on the failure to
make an objection.

Fourth, when PCR counsel did finally mention an ineffec-
tiveness claim based on the testimony of Dr. Henderson, he
did not make the claim with specificity. In what was essential-
ly a closing argument, PCR counsel argued for relief on
several unrelated grounds, and then stated,

We also brought up the issue of Dr. Henderson. I believe in

this case we have no case law specifically on allowing an

expert to say in her opinion abuse occurred. She wasn’t
asked that question. She gave that answer. It did not
receive an objection which we believe it should have. It was
improper vouching.
There was no further discussion of any claim for ineffective-
ness based on trial counsel not objecting to Dr. Henderson’s
testimony.

To the extent PCR counsel’s brief statement constitutes a

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we find a PCR

a "

judge would have difficulty recognizing it. The entire eviden-
tiary presentation at the PCR hearing regarding trial coun-
sel’s decision not to object to Dr. Henderson’s testimony
consisted of three points. First, the PCR court was informed
that the State asked Dr. Henderson, “Do you have an opinion
within a reasonable degree of medical certainty based on your
education, training, and experience, and based on your find-
ings on examination of the victim, whether those findings are
consistent with a penetrating injury?” Second, PCR counsel
immediately commented, “Which was an appropriate question
under our law, I would think.” Third, the PCR court was
informed Dr. Henderson stated she “believed [the victim] had
been abused.” ® Thus, the only evidentiary basis PCR counsel
presented to support the premise that Dr. Henderson’s testi-
mony was improper bolstering was the fact Dr. Henderson
gave her opinion—based in part on physical findings from an
objective medical examination—that the victim suffered a
penetrating injury resulting from sexual abuse.

In its opinion concluding Dr. Henderson’s testimony was
improper bolstering, the court of appeals relied on several
additional portions of Dr. Henderson’s testimony that were
not revealed to the PCR court at any point during the PCR
hearing. First, the court of appeals relied on the fact Dr.
Henderson testified she considered “the history that [Victim]
gave [her]” in reaching her opinion the victim had been
abused, 415 S.C. at 319, 781 S.H.2d at 736. However, the PCR
hearing transcript contains no mention of this testimony.
Second, most of the testimony the court of appeals relied on to
support its conclusion Dr. Henderson’s testimony was improp-
er bolstering was actually elicited by trial counsel on cross-
examination. There was no reference to any of that testimony
during the PCR hearing.

Finally with regard to the PCR court’s exercise of discretion
in refusing to address the improper bolstering issue, Mangal
filed a Rule 59(e) motion asking the PCR court to consider the

5. Mangal’s PCR counsel inaccurately quoted Dr. Henderson's testimo-
ny. She never used the word “believed.” Instead, she stated, “Based on
the history that she shared with me and based on my examination I felt
that it was consistent with a, that she had been abused.” She was then
asked, “Also opinion as to whether she was sexually abused, that
opinion is,” and she replied, “That she had been, yes, sir.”

; a

claim. The PCR court denied the motion, finding “no testimo-
nial evidence ... was presented in support of these allega-
tions.” We agree with the PCR court. The most generous
interpretation of the improper bolstering claim—as counsel
described it to the PCR court in closing argument and in the
Rule 59(e) motion °—limits the claim to the failure to object to
Dr. Henderson’s direct examination opinion testimony. That
testimony provides no support for the claim other than Dr.
Henderson considered the victim’s history—in addition to her
objective findings—in reaching her opinion that the penetrat-
ing injury resulted from sexual abuse. Notably, however, Dr.
Henderson did not repeat to the jury the victim’s history.

From a procedural standpoint, the court of appeals relied on
Stimpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 627 8.H.2d 701 (2006), which
it found “similar” to this case, to support its conclusion the
PCR court erred by not ruling on the improper bolstering
issue. Mangal, 415 §.C. at 317, 781 S.E.2d at 735. Simpson is
similar to this case in that the PCR court refused to rule on a
PCR claim “because Simpson did not specifically raise it in his
POR application.” 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.H.2d at 707. Also
similar to this case, Simpson filed a Rule 59(e) motion chal-
lenging the PCR court’s refusal to rule on the issue. 367 S.C.
at 600 n,8, 627 S.E.2d at 708 n.8. We held “Simpson should
have been permitted to amend his PCR application to conform
to the evidence presented.” 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 708.

However, there are significant dissimilarities between
Simpson and this case. First, Simpson was an appeal from a
three and one-half day PCR hearing, and PCR counsel’s
intention to pursue the disputed issue was made clear during
the PCR hearing. The issue concerned an alleged Brady’
violation involving a bag of money, which trial counsel testified
he learned of “two hours before testifying” at the PCR trial,’

6. Mangal’s current PCR appellate counsel did not represent him at the
PCR hearing or in filing the Rule 59(e) motion.

7. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct, 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),

8. In Simpson, we stated, ““Simpson’s defense counsel ... testified that
he learned about the bag of money only two hours before testifying.”
367 S.C, at 599, 627 S.E.2d at 707. We used the word “only” to
emphasize the merit of the Brady claim—that trial counsel was never
informed of exculpatory information. We did not mention it in relation

a ;

and the State knew about it in time to present a witness
“whom the State called for the specific purpose of addressing
the ... issue.” 867 S.C. at 599, 627 S.H.2d at 707. The PCR
court also left the record open in Simpson for the State to
submit additional evidence. 367 S.C. at 608, 627 S.H.2d at 712.
Here, on the other hand, the State had no notice Mangal
intended to pursue the claim until the end of the hearing, after
all the evidence had been presented. Though the State did
conduct a brief cross-examination of trial counsel on his deci-
sion not to object to Dr. Henderson’s testimony, the State had
little reason to suspect her testimony would form part of the
basis of a PCR claim yet to be made.

Second, the PCR court in Simpson made a specific finding
as to the merits of the Brady claim, stating “the contents of
the bag could have been exculpatory,” and “this evidence
should have been preserved and, thus, been subject to discov-
ery.” 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.H.2d at 707. We observed, “De-
spite this finding, the [PCR] court ruled that the issue about
the bag of money was not preserved for review because
Simpson did not specifically raise it in his PCR application.”
Id. Here, the PCR court made no such finding on the merits of
the improper bolstering issue.

Finally, we specifically relied in Simpson on Rule 15(b) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, under which—we
stated—“pleadings may be amended, even after judgment, to
conform to issues tried by express or implied consent but not
raised in the original pleadings.” 367 S.C. at 599, 627 S.E.2d at
708 (citing Rule 15(b), SCRCP). The focus of a Rule 15(b)
analysis is prejudice to the opposing party. See Harvey v.
Strickland, 850 S.C. 808, 318, 566 S.H.2d 529, 535 (2002)
(holding Rule 15(b) “[almendments to conform to the proof
should be liberally allowed when no prejudice to the opposing
party will result.”). We analyzed prejudice in Simpson, holding
“the State would not be prejudiced by such an amendment
given that the State cross-examined Simpson’s defense counsel
on the issue and was permitted to present its own witness ...
to contest the issue’s relevance.” Simpson, 367 S.C. at 599, 627

to the late indication of an intent to pursue the PCR claim. The
important fact here is that the applicant's intent to pursue the claim
was clear during the PCR hearing.

; a

§.E.2d at 708. The court of appeals did not mention any
prejudice analysis in this case before relying on Simpson to
find error in the PCR court’s refusal to allow an amendment.

IV. Excusing Procedural Default in PCR Proceedings

There have been rare cases in which we have excused PCR
applicants from procedural failures such as occurred in this
case. In Simmons v. State, 416 S.C. 584, 788 S.E.2d 220 (2016),
for example, the PCR applicant properly amended his applica-
tion to assert “a claim that the State violated his due process
rights by presenting false evidence to the jury” with its
presentation of DNA evidence. 416 S.C. at 589, 788 S.H.2d at
223. The PCR court granted relief on another issue, as a
result of which the applicant’s death sentence was vacated. 416
S.C. at 586, 788 S.H.2d at 222. The PCR court “summarily
denied the remaining claims, including Simmons’s challenge to
the DNA evidence, ‘as without merit.’” 416 S.C. at 591, 788
§.E.2d at 224, As to the summary denial of those claims,
“Simmons failed to file a Rule 59, SCRCP motion, as our
issue-preservation rules require.” Id.; see Marlar v. State, 875
S.C. 407, 410, 653 S.E.2d 266, 267 (2007) (holding that when a
PCR court fails to make specific findings as to an issue, a Rule
59(e) motion is necessary to preserve the issue for appeal). We
held that although the State was “technically correct” to argue
Simmons’ DNA claim was procedurally barred, “dismissing
the writ of certiorari would be fundamentally contrary to the
interests of justice.” Simmons, 416 8.C. at 591, 788 S.H.2d at
224, We remanded the case to the POR court for a new trial
on the DNA claim, 416 S.C. at 593-94, 788 S.E.2d at 225.

Our ruling in Simmons was based on the State’s presenta-
tion—though innocent—of false evidence underlying the
State’s analysis of DNA. 416 S.C. at 591, 788 S.H.2d at 224.
We relied on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United
States and this Court to support the need for the “extraordi-
nary action” we took under that circumstance to excuse the
procedural bar. 416 S.C. at 591-92, 788 S.H.2d at 224 (citing
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1178, 1177, 3
L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221 (1959) and Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39,
47-48, 631 8.E.2d 70, 75 (2006)).

a "

In most PCR cases, however, we have refused to excuse the
pleading and issue-preservation requirements that apply in all
civil cases. In Aice v. State, 805 S.C. 448, 409 S.H.2d 392
(1991), for example, we refused to relax procedural require-
ments simply “on the ground that his first ... PCR applica-
tion was insufficient due to ineffective PCR counsel.” 305 S.C.
at 448, 409 S.H.2d at 393. In Plyler v. State, 309 S.C. 408, 424
§.H.2d 477 (1992), the applicant attempted to raise on appeal
for the first time a burden-shifting claim based on trial
counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s malice charge.
809 S.C. at 409, 424 S.H.2d at 478. As to the merits of the
claim, we found “the malice charge ... is so diseased with
burden-shifting presumptions that it violates Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Hd.2d 39 (1979).”
Plyler, 309 S.C. at 410-11, 424 §.H.2d at 478. Nevertheless, we
affirmed the denial of PCR, stating, “Since this issue was
neither raised at the PCR hearing nor ruled upon by the PCR
court, it is procedurally barred.” 309 S.C. at 409, 424 S.H.2d at
478, In Marlar, we reversed the court of appeals for address-
ing an issue not specifically addressed in a PCR order when
the applicant did not make a motion to alter or amend
pursuant to Rule 59(e). 875 S.C. at 410, 658 8.H.2d at 267. We
stated, “Because respondent did not make a Rule 59(e) motion
..., the issues were not preserved for appellate review, and
the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the merits of the
issues....” Id.; see also Humbert v. State, 845 S.C. 332, 387,
548 §.H.2d 862, 865 (2001) (stating the failure to file a Rule
59(e) motion as to an issue not addressed by the PCR court
leaves the issue unpreserved).

We have often considered the tension between the rights at
stake in PCR proceedings and the application of traditional
procedural requirements for the presentation and preservation
of issues. See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 418 S.C. 505, 795 8.H.2d
29 (2016); Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.H.2d 758 (1999).
The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed
this tension in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 182 S.Ct. 1309,
182 L.Hd.2d 272 (2012). The issue in Martinez was “whether a
federal habeas court may excuse a procedural default of an
ineffective-assistance claim when the claim was not properly
presented in state court due to an attorney's errors in an
initial-review collateral proceeding.” 566 U.S. at 5, 182 S.Ct. at

: a

1318, 182 L.Ed.2d at 280. After Martinez was convicted in the
state court of Arizona of two counts of criminal sexual conduct
with a minor, the state appointed new counsel for the direct
appeal. 566 U.S. at 5-6, 182 S.Ct, at 1313-14, 182 L.Ed.2d at
280. While the direct appeal was pending, Martinez’s newly-
appointed counsel initiated a state PCR proceeding. 566 U.S.
at 6, 182 S.Ct. at 1814, 182 L.Ed.2d at 280. However, counsel
made no claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and
later filed a statement asserting there were “no colorable
claims at all.” 566 U.S. at 6, 182 8.Ct. at 1814, 182 L,Hd.2d at
280-81. The state court dismissed the PCR action, 566 U.S. at
6, 182 S.Ct. at 1814, 182 L.Hd.2d at 281.

Later, Martinez filed a second PCR action in state court
with new counsel, this time asserting trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance, 566 U.S. at 6-7, 182 S.Ct. at 1814, 182
L.Ed.2d at 281. The state court dismissed this PCR action,
finding Martinez was procedurally barred from pursuing inef-
fective assistance claims that should have been asserted in his
first PCR action, 566 U.S. at 7, 182 S.Ct. at 1814, 182 L.Hd.2d
at 281. Martinez subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court, again raising the ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims. Jd. The district court refused to address the claims
on the ground they were barred by procedural default in state
court, and “Martinez had not shown cause to excuse the
procedural default.” 566 U.S. at 7-8, 182 S.Ct. at 1815, 182
L,Ed.2d at 281. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 566 U.S. at 8, 182 S.Ct. at 1815, 182
L.Ed.2d at 282.

The Supreme Court held “a procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of
ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding
was ineffective.” 566 U.S. at 17, 182 S.Ct. at 1820, 182 L.Hd.2d
at 288. In doing so, the Court recognized the right to the
effective assistance of trial counsel is a “bedrock principle in
our justice system,” and acknowledged applicants “confined to
prison” and “unlearned in the law” often have difficulty com-
plying with procedural rules in a PCR case. 566 U.S. at 12, 182
S.Ct. at 1817, 182 L.Ed.2d at 284. The Court then stated,

Allowing a federal habeas court to hear a claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the

a °

absence of an attorney) caused a procedural default in an
initial-review collateral proceeding acknowledges, as an eq-
uitable matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding,
if undertaken without counsel or with ineffective counsel,
may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consider-
ation was given to a substantial claim.

566 U.S. at 14, 182 S.Ct. at 118, 182 L.Ed.2d at 285-86.

We first considered Martinez in Kelly v. State, 404 8.C. 365,
145 S.E.2d 877 (2018). We held Martinez “is limited to federal
habeas corpus review and is not applicable to state post-
conviction relief actions.” 404 S.C. at 365, 745 S.H.2d at 377.
We considered Martinez again in Robertson. Reaffirming Kel-
ly, we held “Martinez does not afford Petitioner a right to file
a successive PCR application by merely alleging ineffective
assistance of prior PCR counsel.” 418 S.C. at 516, 795 S.E.2d
at 84, In Robertson, however, we permitted the PCR applicant,
to pursue a successive application the PCR court found was
procedurally barred. 418 8.C. at 516, 795 8.B.2d at 34.

Hl The Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez reminds us
that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel is a “bedrock principle in our justice system.” Sim-
mons and Martinez counsel us that there are situations where
the interests of justice require PCR courts to be flexible with
procedural requirements before PCR applicants suffer proce-
dural default on substantial claims. Such flexibility is consis-
tent with the purpose and spirit of our Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.’ These considerations should guide PCR courts when
struggling to balance procedural requirements against the
importance of the issues at stake in PCR proceedings. We

9, See 4 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Adam N. Steinman,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1029 (4th ed, 2015) (“The federal rules
are designed to discourage battles over mere form and to sweep away
needless procedural controversies that either delay a trial on the merits
or deny a party his day in court because of technical deficiencies.”);
Maybank v. BB&T Corp., 416 S.C. 541, 565, 787 S.E.2d 498, 510 (2016)
(“In construing the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, our Court
looks for guidance to cases interpreting the federal rules.”); 3 Cyclope-
dia of Federal Procedure § 8.2 (3d ed., rev, 2017) (“The spirit of the
Rules is to settle controversies upon their merits rather than to dismiss
actions on technical grounds, to permit amendments liberally, and to
avoid, if possible, depriving a litigant of a chance to bring a case to
trial.”).

encourage trial courts in PCR cases to use the discretion we
grant them on procedural matters to find reasonable ways—
within the flexibility of our Rules—to reach the merits of
substantial issues.

Hl As we stated in Odom and repeated in Robertson,

“All applicants are entitled to a full and fair opportunity to

present claims in one PCR application.”

Robertson, 418 S.C. at 518, 795 8.E.2d at 33; Odom, 387 S.C.
at 261, 523 S.E.2d at 755.

V. The Procedural Default in This Case

Hl This is not an appropriate case in which to excuse
Mangal from his procedural default. As we explained, the PCR
court acted within its discretion to refuse to address any claim
based on Dr. Henderson’s direct examination testimony. In
addition to that testimony, however, the court of appeals relied
on Dr. Henderson’s cross-examination testimony to support its
conclusion of improper bolstering. This testimony does not
convince us to excuse the procedural default.

First, none of it was presented to the PCR court at the
hearing. In addition, the State makes a convincing argument
that trial counsel elicited this testimony intentionally pursuant
to a valid trial strategy. See Watson v. State, 870 S.C. 68, 72-
78, 634 S.H.2d 642, 644 (2006) (finding counsel’s performance
was not deficient in making the decision not to object to
“nadmissible” testimony because his strategy—that doing so
“might lead to the more damaging introduction” of other
evidence—was valid).

Trial counsel testified this was “not the first time I’ve been
with Dr. Henderson.” When asked if he expected Dr.
Henderson to give an opinion on whether the victim had been
sexually abused, trial counsel answered, “Not only did I expect
it, but if she had answered any other way I would have been
shocked, because Dr. Henderson's testimony is canned testi-
mony. And she'll testify the same way in every trial.” The
State argues trial counsel, knowing Dr. Henderson would give
an opinion the victim had been sexually abused, attempted to
undermine her opinion by demonstrating to the jury that Dr.
Henderson’s opinion was not based on the objective results of
her physical examination, but rather on the victim’s fabricated

statements. The State argues trial counsel then intentionally
invited Dr. Henderson to admit she based her opinion on the
truth of what the victim told her. According to the State, this
allowed trial counsel to impeach Dr. Henderson’s opinion with
the weaknesses he had previously shown in the victim’s credi-
bility. Otherwise, the State argues, trial counsel was left with
an expert opinion based only on objective physical findings—a
far more difficult opinion to impeach. We need not decide
whether this was a valid trial strategy.” We simply find this
evidence does not support the extraordinary action of excusing
Mangal’s procedural default.

VI. Conclusion
We REVERSE the court of appeals’ finding that the PCR

court erred in refusing to address the improper bolstering
issue, and REINSTATE the POR court’s order denying PCR.

KITTREDGE, J., concurs. BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, J., and
Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones concur in result only.

804 S.E.2d 850
In the MATTER OF Michael Mark MCADAMS, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000732
Opinion No. 27737

Supreme Court of South Carolina,

Heard June 15, 2017
Filed September 14, 2017

10. If we were to excuse the procedural default for failing to present this
claim to the PCR court, it would be necessary to remand to the PCR
court for a hearing because the PCR court was not given the opportuni-
ty to make factual findings as to the reasonableness of this strategy, and
if found not to be a reasonable strategy, whether the applicant suffered
prejudice. See Simmons, 416 S.C. at 593, 788 S.E.2d at 225 (‘We sit
today in an appellate capacity and making findings of fact de novo
would be contrary to this appellate setting.”),

102

ial

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex Davis,
Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia,
for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Michael Mark McAdams, of Myrtle Beach, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

Between September 2006 and July 2009, Respondent Mi-
chael Mark McAdams participated in a fraudulent investment
scheme along with co-defendants Robert Dane Freeman and
Charles Lowell Walker. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(ODC) brought formal disciplinary charges against McAdams
after he pled guilty to one count of wire fraud conspiracy as a
result of his participation in the scheme. Because McAdams
failed to file any response to the formal charges, all the

allegations contained therein are deemed admitted. Rule 24(a),
RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR. The sole matter before the Court is
determining the appropriate sanction. We accept the recom-
mendation from the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the
Commission) and order McAdams be disbarred and assessed
the costs of the proceedings in this matter.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

While a partner in a Myrtle Beach law firm, McAdams
joined with Freeman and Walker to create an entity known as
Global Holdings Group, LLC (GHG). McAdams and his co-
defendants purported to engage in international financial in-
vestments and solicited funds from wealthy individuals for
high-yield, unregulated transnational investment opportuni-
ties. McAdams used his status and position of confidence as an
attorney to identify and target wealthy individuals for solicita-
tion of investment opportunities, while also bolstering the
credibility of GHG. During the course of the enterprise,
McAdams became aware that the investments were fraudulent
and that the solicited funds were not being used as promised,
but he continued to use his position as an attorney to solicit
funds for GHG. Rather than engaging in any investment
transactions, McAdams and his co-defendants used the solic-
ited funds to pay for personal expenses and to make lulling
payments to previous investors in an effort to perpetuate the
fraud.

Eventually, a federal investigation ensued, and in 2014
McAdams was charged with three counts of wire fraud, one
count of wire fraud conspiracy, and one count of international
money laundering. McAdams subsequently pled guilty to the
one count of wire fraud conspiracy in exchange for dismissal of
the remaining charges. As conditions of the plea deal, Mc-
Adams agreed, inter alia, to further cooperate with the Fed-
eral Government in the prosecution of his co-defendants, and
to pay restitution totaling $3,327,494.11.

Following the criminal investigation and subsequent plea
agreement, ODC filed formal disciplinary charges against
McAdams in September 2016, and the Commission’s disciplin-

1. McAdams failed to appear at the proceeding before this Court despite
having been ordered to do so,

—

ary panel (the Panel) held a hearing the following February.
Based on McAdams’ role in the investment scheme and his
failure to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, the Panel
found him in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(RPC) contained in Rule 407, SCACR. The nature of the
violations are three-fold. First, after being notified that ODC
was conducting an investigation into allegations of misconduct
in 2009, McAdams failed to submit any written response, failed
to comply with a subpoena for documents, and failed to appear
to respond to questions under oath as directed. Based on this
failure to cooperate, McAdams was placed on interim suspen-
sion by this Court in April 2010. After learning of McAdams’
guilty plea, ODC began conducting a new investigation in July
2016, but McAdams again failed to submit any written re-
sponse. The Panel found this failure to cooperate was in
violation of Rule 8.1(b), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR. Second, the
Panel found the conduct giving rise to McAdams’ indictment.
and guilty plea was in violation of Rules 8.4(b), (d) & (e), RPC,
Rule 407, SCACR. Lastly, after this Court issued an order for
McAdams to reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protec-
tion for the services rendered by an attorney appointed to
protect McAdams’ former clients, the Panel found he has
failed to make any payments, in violation of Rule 8.4(e), RPC,
Rule 407, SCACR.

As a result of the aforementioned findings of misconduct,
the Panel determined McAdams is subject to discipline for
violating the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforce-
ment: Rule 7(a)(1) (violating the Rules of Professional Con-
duct); Rule 7(a)(8) (willfully violating an order of the Supreme
Court and willfully failing to appear, respond, or comply as
directed by disciplinary authorities); Rule 7(a)(4) (conviction of
a crime of moral turpitude); and Rule 7(a)(5) (engaging in
conduct tending to bring the legal profession into disrepute or
conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law). Rule 418,
SCACR,

DISCUSSION

HMMM Because McAdams has been found in default, the
factual allegations against him are deemed admitted and the
sole question remaining for the Court to determine is whether
to impose the Panel’s recommended sanction. See In re Jacob-
sen, 886 S.C. 598, 606, 690 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2010). Although we

ave not bound by the findings of the Panel, its recommenda-
tion is entitled to great weight. Id.

In this case, we accept the Panel’s findings and recommen-
dations in toto. While McAdams presented no mitigating
evidence, we agree with the Panel’s consideration of aggrava-
ting factors, namely McAdams’ lack of cooperation in the
disciplinary investigation, failure to answer the formal
charges, and failure to appear at the disciplinary hearing. See
In ve Tullis, 375 S.C. 190, 192, 652 S.E.2d 395, 395-96 (2007)
(explaining the Court gives substantial weight to an attorney’s
failure to answer charges or appear at a disciplinary hearing,
usually resulting in the most severe sanctions).

Given the nature and magnitude of McAdams’ misconduct,
his lack of participation in the disciplinary process, and ab-
sence of any mitigating factors, we find disbarment to be the
appropriate sanction, not retroactive to the date of interim
suspension. Further, we order that he pay the costs of the
investigation and prosecution of this matter totaling $683.10
and reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection in the
amount of $221.66, both within 30 days of the date of this
order,

Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, Me-
Adams shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing
that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and
shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the Prac-
tice of Law to the Clerk of Court.

DISBARRED.

BEATTY, C.J,, KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

804 S.E.2d 852
In the MATTER OF Jacob Leon PARROTT, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001451
Opinion No. 27736
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted August 25, 2017
Filed September 14, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex Davis,
Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia,
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

Jacob Leon Parrott, of Myrtle Beach, Pro Se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an
Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to
Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate
Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits
misconduct and consents to discipline ranging from a public
reprimand to a definite suspension not to exceed nine months,
Respondent requests the sanction be made retroactive to the
date of interim suspension,‘ but understands that if the Court
declines to apply the sanction retroactively, the validity or
enforceability of the Agreement is not affected. ODC does not
oppose the request.

1, Respondent was placed on interim suspension by order dated Decem-
ber 29, 2016, In re Parrott, 419 8,C. 1, 795 S.B,2d 457 (2016).

Respondent has agreed to pay the costs incurred by ODC
and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in the investigation
~ and prosecution of this matter, Respondent has also agreed, as
a condition of discipline, to enter into a two year monitoring
contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers and file annual re-
ports of his compliance with the contract with the Commission
on Lawyer Conduct.

We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the
practice of law in this state for nine months, not retroactive.
The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows.

Facts

In August 2016, respondent was arrested and charged with
voyeurism pursuant to 8.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-470(B) (2015)
after he used a cell phone to take a picture up a woman’s skirt
in a grocery store. He was 56 years old at the time. Respon-
dent failed to inform the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in
writing within fifteen days of the arrest. Respondent repre-
sents he reviewed the rule regarding self-reporting an arrest
and consulted with an attorney, but concluded he did not have
a duty to self-report.

In January 2017, the charge was remanded to the municipal
court contingent upon respondent pleading guilty to assault
and battery, third degree. The following month, respondent
pled guilty as agreed and was sentenced to pay a fine of $776.

By way of an affidavit in mitigation, respondent states he is
an alcoholic in active recovery and attends Alcoholics Anony-
mous (AA) five to seven times a week. Respondent states he
had been sober for approximately 235 days as of the date of
the affidavit—May 15, 2017. He also attends a follow-up care
program at Coastal Recovery Center where he is completing
their intensive outpatient treatment program. He has provided
a letter from the Center regarding his continued participation
in outpatient treatment and stating respondent appears to be
committed to “life-long recovery in abstinence based recovery
principles.”

Respondent explains that he progressed from being a social
drinker to an alcoholic in 2018 and began attending AA “off
and on” at that point, with some periods of sobriety, including
one twenty-month period. At the time, he was living in North-

ern Virginia and had the support of sober friends and an AA
sponsor. Respondent states he was “highly successful” while
working in the Northern Virginia/DC area where he “excelled”
in positions with Westlaw/Thomson Reuters. However, when
Thomson Reuters downsized, respondent lost his job. He took
and passed the Virginia bar examination and established a solo
practice in Northern Virginia, while maintaining his license to
practice law in South Carolina. However, in August 2015,
respondent moved from Virginia to Myrtle Beach to care for
his elderly mother. He took a job with a criminal defense firm,
but left their employ in January 2016. Respondent neglected
to participate in AA after he relocated and soon relapsed,
“culminating with binge drinking in the summer of 2016.” At
his family’s insistence, he scheduled himself to be checked in
to an inpatient treatment facility. However, on the day he was
scheduled to report to the treatment facility, he was charged
with the crime that is the basis of this disciplinary action.
Respondent was highly intoxicated at the time of the incident
and when he checked in to the treatment facility later that
day. He completed a twenty-eight day inpatient program
followed by two months of intensive outpatient treatment.
Respondent has submitted a letter from the treatment facility
regarding his participation in treatment while hospitalized.

Respondent notes that in nearly thirty-four years of practice
as an assistant solicitor and a private practitioner, no client or
any other party has lodged any type of complaint against him
relating to his work.

In 1997, this Court imposed a four month suspension on
respondent after he pled guilty to simple assault and battery
for pulling down a woman’s bathing suit while she was sun-
bathing at the beach in 1994. In re Parrott, 825 S.C. 162, 480
S.E.2d 722 (1997). The opinion notes respondent had been
involved in a similar incident in 1989, but was not prosecuted.
Respondent covered his face in both incidents and fled when
the women put up a struggle. He had no prior connections
with either woman. In mitigation, respondent offered the
testimony of a psychiatrist who testified respondent was suf-
fering from “an adjustment disorder with mixed emotions and
problems with conduct.” The psychiatrist opined a “psychosex-
ual development arrest” caused the assaults. It was also the
psychiatrist’s opinion respondent was “developmentally arrest-

ed at the adolescent stage and his acts showed the type of
sexually immature behavior normally associated with that
stage.” The psychiatrist believed respondent’s developmental
problems occurred because of family problems when respon-
dent was growing up, that the acts would not recur, and that
respondent was responding well to treatment and counseling.

Respondent acknowledges his prior disciplinary history, but
points out he had no further instances of such behavior since
the offense in 1994. He states that since that time, his career
and personal life have been rewarding, noting he “largely
raised” his three daughters on his own when they were
younger.

Law

Respondent admits that his criminal conduct reflects ad-
versely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and/or fitness as a
lawyer and that the criminal act involved moral turpitude in
violation of Rules 8,4(b) and (c) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (RPC), Rule 407, SCACR. Respondent further admits
his failure to notify the Commission on Lawyer Conduct of his
arrest constituted a violation of Rule 8.3(a), RPC, which
requires a lawyer arrested for or charged by way of indict-
ment, information or complaint with a serious crime to inform
the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in writing within fifteen
days of being arrested or charged. Rule 1.0(0), RPC, defines a
serious crime as including a crime which reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects.

Finally, respondent admits he is subject to discipline pursu-
ant to the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforce-
ment, Rule 418, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be a ground for
discipline for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of this
jurisdiction regarding professional conduct of lawyers); Rule
7(a)(4) (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to be
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude or serious crime); and
Rule 7(a)(5) (it shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to
engage in conduct tending to pollute the administration of
justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into
disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice
law).

Conclusion

We hereby suspend respondent from the practice of law in
this state for nine months from the date of this opinion.
Respondent shall pay the costs incurred by ODC and the
Commission on Lawyer Conduct in the investigation and
prosecution of this matter. Respondent shall also enter into a
two year monitoring contract with Lawyers Helping Lawyers
and file annual reports of his compliance with the contract
with the Commission on Lawyer Conduct.

Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent
shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he
has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR.

DEFINITE SUSPENSION.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and

JAMES, JJ., concur.
Le

804 S.E.2d 854
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC INTEREST FOUNDATION
and Edward D. Sloan, individually, and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, Petitioners,
ve
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

and John Y. Walsh, Deputy Secretary of Transportation

for Engineering, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001175

Opinion No. 27738

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard January 12, 2016
Filed September 14, 2017

+
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5

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James G. Carpenter and Jennifer J, Miller, both of Green-
ville, for Petitioners.

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr., of SC Department of Transporta-
tion, of Columbia, for Respondents.

CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY:

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward D.
Sloan,! individually and on behalf of all others similarly situat-
ed (“Petitioners”), filed this declaratory judgment action
against the South Carolina Department of Transportation
(“SCDOT”) and John V. Walsh, Deputy Secretary of Trans-

1. Sloan is a citizen, resident, taxpayer, and registered elector of South
Carolina.

portation for Engineering of SCDOT (“Respondents”). Peti-
tioners sought a declaration that SCDOT’s inspection of three
privately owned bridges violated sections 5 and 11 of article X
of the South Carolina Constitution,” which Petitioners assert
prohibit the expenditure of public funds for a private purpose.
The trial court granted Respondents’ motion for summary
judgment, finding: Petitioners lacked standing; the controver-
sy was moot and did not fall under any of the exceptions to the
mootness doctrine; and Respondents’ actions were not ultra
vires or unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed. S.C.
Pub. Interest Found. v, 8.C. Dep't of Transp., 412 S.C. 18, 770
S.E.2d 399 (Ct. App. 2015). This Court granted Petitioners’
request for a writ of certiorari. We reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Aiken City Councilman Reggie Ebner is a resident of
Woodside Plantation, a gated subdivision in the City of Aiken.
In September of 2010, Ebner emailed then-State Representa-
tive Tom Young asking for guidance on “who is responsible for
the design approval, construction inspection, safety require-
ments and final approval for bridges in the City of Aiken.” In
July of 2011, Young forwarded an email from his “constituent
Reggie Ebner” to Walsh at SCDOT. In the email, Ebner
requested SCDOT inspect three wooden bridges located with-
in Woodside Plantation, which he alleged had engineering and
construction flaws. Ebner signed the email “Reggie Ebner,
City of Aiken Councilman for District 4.” After receiving the
email, SCDOT conducted an inspection of the three bridges
and issued a report on its findings.’ SCDOT estimated the cost
of the inspection was $1,400.

Following the inspection, the Office of the Chief Internal
Auditor (“OCIA”) for the Commission on the Department of
Transportation investigated the propriety of Respondents’ ac-
tions. In a report to former Secretary of Transportation
Robert St. Onge, OCIA made several findings, including:

2, S.C. Const. art. X, §§ 5, 11,

3. SCDOT determined the bridges ‘“‘are in good condition with just some
minor problems,”

(1) The bridges are neither part of the State highway
system nor are they owned or maintained by the City of
Aiken;

(2) The request to inspect the bridges came from a city
councilman, not from the City of Aiken;

(8) Prior to the inspection, SCDOT personnel made a direct
inquiry to the City of Aiken and verified that the bridges

were private property;

(4) SCDOT’s employees warned Chief Engineer for Opera-
tions Clem Watson that it was against SCDOT’s policy
to inspect privately owned bridges;

(6) SCDOT had no obligation to inspect the bridges; and

(6) Walsh and Watson maintained their actions fell within a
“grey area” of the law.

Petitioners subsequently filed this declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that SCDOT’s inspection of the
privately owned bridges contravened the constitutional re-
quirement that the expenditure of public funds serve a public
purpose. After both parties moved for summary judgment, the
trial court concluded: Petitioners lacked standing; the issue
‘was moot; and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied.
Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to address the merits
of the issue and determined the inspection was not unconstitu-
tional because it did not solely benefit the homeowners in
Woodside Plantation, but was for the health, safety, and
welfare of the public at large. The trial court also found the
inspection was not ultra vires because “the inspection of the
bridges was legitimately within the City’s police power and the
decision by Walsh to assist it was well within the Depart-
ment’s enumerated powers to assist other governmental enti-
ties in areas of its expertise” under section 57-3-110 of the
South Carolina Code.*

The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding Petitioners did
not have standing and the action did not fall under any
exception to the mootness doctrine. S.C. Pub. Interest Found.,
412 &.C. at 24-28, 770 S.E.2d at 402-04, The Court of Appeals

4, See S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-110 (2006) (providing SCDOT may, upon
request, assist government authorities in supervising the construction of
roads and bridges under certain circumstances).

based its conclusion solely on its belief that SCDOT “conduct-
ed its own audit and concluded its own actions were improp-
er.” Id. at 24, 770 S.H.2d at 402. The Court of Appeals
declined to reach the issues of whether Respondents’ conduct
was ultra, vires or unconstitutional based on its disposition of
the justiciability issues. Jd. at 28, 770 S.E.2d at 404. This
Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

II. Standard of Review

HM When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, ap-
pellate courts apply the same standard that governs the trial
court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, which provides that summary
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clegg, 877 S.C.
648, 658, 661 S.H.2d 791, 796 (2008); Rule 56(c), SCRCP. This
Court reviews all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences
arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party below. Willis v. Wu, 362 S.C. 146, 151,
607 S.E.2d 63, 65 (2004).

If. Discussion

A. Whether Petitioners have standing to bring their
claim.

HM “A plaintiff must have standing to institute an action.”
Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. 581, 547, 590 8.E.2d 338,
347 (Ct. App. 2008). Standing is “[a] party’s right to make a
legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1625 (10th ed. 2014). We recognize
three types of standing: (1) standing conferred by statute; (2)
“constitutional standing”; and (8) public importance standing.
ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 380 S.C. 191, 195, 669 8.E.2d
837, 389 (2008). Petitioners assert they have constitutional
standing as taxpayers and public importance standing.

1. Constitutional Standing

A party has constitutional standing if he can show:
(1) he suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest,
which is conerete and particularized, and actual or imminent;

(2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
conduct; and (8) it is likely the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 402
S.C. 811, 817-18, 741 S.H.2d 515, 518 (2018). Here, Petitioners
are unable to show they suffered a concrete and particularized
injury distinct from that shared by other taxpayers; therefore,
we find Petitioners do not have constitutional standing. See
Freemanile v. Presion, 398 8.C. 186, 198, 728 S.H.2d 40, 44
(2012) (recognizing that a taxpayer’s injuries are “common to
all citizens and taxpayers ... [which thereby] defeats the
constitutional requirement of a concrete and particularized
injury”).
2. Public Importance Standing
HMM Unlike with constitutional standing, a party is not
required to show he has suffered a concrete or particularized
injury in order to obtain public importance standing. S.C. Pub.
Interest Found. v. S.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 408 S.C.
640, 645, 744 S.H.2d 521, 524 (2018). Nor must he “show he
has an interest greater than other potential plaintiffs.” Davis
v. Richland Cnty. Council, 872 S.C. 497, 500, 642 8.H.2d 740,
742 (2007). Requiring otherwise would undermine the purpose
of public importance standing, which is to “{a]llow[ ] interested
citizens a right of action in our judicial system when issues are
of significant public importance to ensure[] ... accountability
and the concomitant integrity of government action.” Sloan v.
Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. at 551, 590 S.H.2d at 349. However,
as this Court recognized:
An appropriate balance between the competing policy con-
cerns underlying the issue of standing must be realized.
Citizens must be afforded access to the judicial process to
address alleged injustices. On the other hand, standing
cannot be granted to every individual who has a grievance
against a public official. Otherwise, public officials would be
subject to numerous lawsuits at the expense of both judicial
economy and the freedom from frivolous lawsuits.
Sloan v, Sanford, 357 S.C. 481, 484, 598 S.H.2d 470, 472 (2004).
Thus, when deciding whether to confer public importance
standing, courts must take these competing policy concerns
into consideration, and must also determine whether the party
presents an issue of public importance and whether future
guidance on that issue is needed. ATC S., 880 S.C. at 198-99,

669 S.H.2d at 341. However, as this Court has acknowledged,
since many issues may be of public interest, or importance,>
“{t]he key ... is whether a resolution is needed for future
guidance.” Jd. at 199, 669 S.H.2d at 341; Carnival Corp. v.
Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass’n, 407 S.C. 67, 79-
80, 753 S.H.2d 846, 853 (2014) (“Whether [public importance
standing] applies in a particular case turns on whether resolu-
tion of the dispute is needed for future guidance.... [The
need for future guidance generally dictates when [public im-
portance standing] applies.”). Applying this test to the case at.
hand, we find Petitioners have established public importance
standing.

The issue of whether SCDOT may inspect bridges within
private, gated communities is one of public importance as it
involves both the conduct of a government entity and the
expenditure of public funds. See Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Green-
ville Cnty., 342 S.C. 515, 528, 587 S.E.2d 299, 303 (Ct. App.
2000) (recognizing that there is a “public interest involved i[n]
the prevention of the unlawful expenditure of money raised by
taxation”). A further indicator of the issue’s importance is
that, as even the dissent recognizes, a decision on the merits
of the issue may “have far-reaching ... consequences for the
safety of our citizens.” Additionally, future guidance is needed
since there is no judicial guidance addressing the issue and
there is evidence SCDOT will inspect this type of property in
the future. When asked during oral argument whether
SCDOT would inspect bridges located on private property
again, SCDOT replied “Yes, if we have the time.” Although a
close call, we find the policy concerns that we must balance in
determining whether to confer public importance standing
weigh in Petitioners’ favor given the factors already mentioned
and the issue involved implicates both statutory and constitu-
tional provisions. Accordingly, we hold Petitioners have public
importance standing, A contrary holding would essentially
render a law superfluous if we deem the conduct it prohibits
too insignificant to ensure the law is enforced.*

5. See ATC S., 380 S.C, at 199, 669 S.E.2d at 341 (“Of course zoning is a
matter of public importance, but the same may be said of most
legislative and executive actions.”’).

6. We note that this Court has granted Sloan public importance standing
in at least six other cases. See S.C. Pub. Interest Found. v. S.C. Transp.

B Whether the controversy falls within an exception to
the mootness doctrine.

Petitioners contend the Court of Appeals erred in conclud-
ing this matter is not justiciable because Respondents admit-
ted their conduct was wrongful. We agree.

HE «A justiciable controversy must be present before
any action can be maintained. Byrd v. Irmo High Sch., 321
S.C. 426, 430, 468 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1996). “A justiciable
controversy is a real and substantial controversy appropriate
for judicial determination, as opposed to a dispute or differ-
ence of a contingent, hypothetical or abstract character.”
Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 856 S.C. at 546, 590 S.B.2d at 346.

The Court of Appeals’ finding hinged on its understanding
that SCDOT “conducted its own audit and concluded its own
actions were improper.” S.C. Pub. Interest Found., 412 S.C. at
24, T70 S.H.2d at 402. In reality, OCIA, a division of the
Commission on the Department of Transportation, conducted
the audit. While it found that certain SCDOT employees
thought the inspection of the bridges was against SCDOT’s
policy, it stopped short of concluding SCDOT’s actions were
wrongful. Further, on appeal, Respondents admit that they
disagree with the findings in OCIA’s report. Instead, they
maintain their inspection of the bridges was lawful because
their actions served a public purpose and because they be-

Infrastructure Bank, 403 S.C, 640, 744 S.E.2d 521 (2013) (granting
Sloan public importance standing in order to consider whether the
statute that governs the composition of the South Carolina Transporta-
tion Infrastructure Bank’s Board of Directors is constitutional); Sloan v.
Dep’t of Transp., 379 S.C. 160, 666 S.E.2d 236 (2008) (finding Sloan
had public importance standing to challenge SCDOT’s alleged misuse
of a statutory emergency procurement provision); Sloan v. Hardee, 371
S.C. 495, 640 S.E.2d 457 (2007) (applying public importance standing
to decide whether certain SCDOT Commissioners were lawfully ap-
pointed); Sloan v. Wilkins, 362 S.C. 430, 608 S.E.2d 579 (2005) (deter-
mining Sloan was entitled to public importance standing to challenge
whether an act violated the one subject provision of the South Carolina
Constitution); Sloan v, S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 365 S.C. 299, 618 S.B.2d
876 (2005) (holding Sloan had public importance standing to dispute
the propriety of the procurement procedure SCDOT used to award
contracts for certain construction projects); Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C.
431, 593 S.B.2d 470 (2004) (conferring public importance standing to
determine whether the governor may hold a commission in the Air
Force Reserve).

lieved they were assisting a municipality. Accordingly, we
conclude the Court of Appeals erred in finding Respondents
admitted their conduct was improper.

Petitioners also contend the Court of Appeals erred in
determining the controversy did not fall within any of the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine. We agree.

“A case becomes moot when judgment, if ren-
dered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing
controversy.” Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670
8.E.2d 668, 667 (Ct. App. 2009). There are three exceptions to
mootness. “First, if the issue raised is capable of repetition but
generally will evade review, the appellate court can take
jurisdiction.” Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 380 8.C. at 535, 670
§.E.2d at 667. “Second, an appellate court may decide ques-
tions of imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule
for future conduct in matters of important public interest.”
Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 568, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001).
“Finally, if a decision by the trial court may affect future
events, or have collateral consequences for the parties, an
appeal from that decision is not moot, even though the appel-
late court cannot give effective relief in the present case.” Id.

HM We acknowledge that the controversy that gave rise
to this appeal is moot because SCDOT has already inspected
the bridges. Thus, any ruling from this Court will have no
practical effect on the controversy. Nevertheless, we conclude
this controversy should be addressed because it is one which is
capable of repetition yet will evade review.

HM When asserting the controversy falls under this ex-
ception, “{t]he party bringing the action need only show the
issue raised is capable of repetition and is not required to
prove there is a ‘reasonable expectation’ the issue will arise
again.” Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. at 554-55, 590
S.E.2d at 351. “However, the action must be one which will
truly evade review.” Sloan v. Friends of Hunley, Inc., 369
S.C. 20, 27, 680 S.H.2d 474, 478 (2006).

In Byrd v. Irmo High School, 321 S.C. 426, 482, 468 S.E.2d
861, 864 (1996), this Court determined short-term student
suspensions were capable of repetition, yet will evade review
because they “by their very nature, are completed long before

TT

an appellate court can review the issues they implicate.”
Applying Byrd to this case, we conclude the issue of whether
Respondents can inspect bridges inside private, gated commu-
nities is one that is capable of repetition, yet will generally
evade review. Respondents are capable of repeating their
actions in the future, especially since they maintain their
conduct was lawful. In fact, they said they would inspect
private bridges in the future. Moreover, this issue is one which
will typically become moot before it can be reviewed. Like
student suspensions, the inspection of roadways and bridges
can typically be completed long before a court can review the
propriety of the action. For example, here, the inspection took
only one day to complete. Accordingly, while we find the issue
giving rise to this appeal is moot, we find the controversy is
capable of repetition yet will generally evade review. In view
of our conclusions on the mootness and standing issues, we
could remand to the Court of Appeals to consider Petitioners’
remaining issues. However, in the interest of judicial economy,
we decline to do so and instead proceed with our review. See
Furtick v. S.C. Dep’t of Prob, Parole & Pardon Servs., 852
S.C. 594, 599, 576 S.H.2d 146, 149 (2008) (addressing the
merits of an issue in the interest of judicial economy even
though the respondent was entitled to review by the lower
court),

C. Whether SCDOT’s inspection was unlawful.

HMI Petitioners assert Respondents’ inspection of the pri-
vately owned bridges was unconstitutional because it contra-
vened the constitutional requirement that the expenditure of
public funds serve a public purpose.’ We agree.

7. Specifically, Petitioners raised, verbatim, the following issues in their
brief:

1. When the Department of Transportation expended public funds to
assist a private citizen in his dispute with the developer of a
private, gated community, did the courts below err in failing to
rule that the expenditure violated the South Carolina Constitution,
Article X, Sections 5 and 11?

When a private citizen in a dispute with the developer of a private,
gated community asked the Department of Transportation for
professional engineering assistance, did the courts below err in
ruling that the request for assistance came from a municipality?

x

Ss ©

Article X, section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution
provides: “Any tax which shall be levied shall distinctly state
the public purpose to which the proceeds of the tax shall be
applied.” S.C. Const. art. X, § 5. Thus, all taxes levied must be
used towards a public purpose. See Feldman & Co. v. City
Council of Charleston, 23 S.C. 57, 62 (1885) (“Hence it seems
to be universally conceded, even by those who are disposed to
enlarge the taxing power of the legislature to its greatest
extent, that a law authorizing taxation for any other tha[n] a
public purpose is void.”). “In deciding whether governmental
action satisfies a public purpose, we look to the object sought
to be accomplished.” Carll v. S.C. Jobs-Econ. Dev. Auth., 284
S.C. 488, 448, 327 S.E.2d 381, 334 (1985). “As a general rule a
public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity,
and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents, or at least
a substantial part thereof.” Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153,
162, 217 S.E.2d 48, 47 (1975) (emphasis added).

We find the inspection of the bridges did not serve a public
purpose. We do not doubt that the inspection was conducted to
assuage safety concerns. However, the owners of the bridges
were the beneficiaries of the inspection, not the public at
large, whose access to the bridges is limited to the authoriza-
tion provided by the homeowners. In short, it is not the
publie’s responsibility to pay the maintenance costs of bridges
located within a gated community that seeks to exclude the
public from enjoying the use of the bridges. Thus, because it
did not serve a public purpose, we find the inspection was
unconstitutional.

HMM Further, even if we did not find SCDOT’s actions
were unconstitutional, we would nevertheless find the inspec-
tion ultra vires because it was not performed upon the request
of a municipality as required under section 57-3-110(7) of the
South Carolina Code, which provides:

The Department of Transportation shall have the following

duties and powers:

instruct, assist, and cooperate with the agencies, depart-

ments, and bodies politic and legally constituted agencies of

the State in street, highway, traffic, and mass transit mat-
ters when requested to do so, and, if requested by such

TT

government authorities, supervise or furnish engineering
supervision for the construction and improvement of
roads and bridges, provided such duties do not impair the
attention to be given the highways in the state highway
system.
S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-110(7) (2006) (emphasis added). In
arguing otherwise, Respondents assert Ebner’s email estab-
lished “sufficient color of authority for the State Highway
Engineer to believe he was assisting a City under the statuto-
ry powers and duties conferred on the Department of Trans-
portation” under section 57-3-110(7). We disagree.

In the email Representative Young sent to Walsh at
SCDOT, Young identified Ebner as his constituent, not as a
councilman acting for the City of Aiken. Therefore, SCDOT
was on notice that the forwarded request was from a private
individual, not from the City of Aiken. Although Ebner signed
his email “Reggie Ebner, City of Aiken Councilman for Dis-
trict 4,” this alone is insufficient to serve as a request from the
entity. Our conclusion is also consistent with OCIA’s finding
that the request to inspect the bridges came from a city
councilman, not from the City of Aiken. Consequently, we find
Respondents were not acting pursuant to a request from the
City of Aiken.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, we find Respondents’ conduct was unconstitu-
tional and ultra vires. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is

REVERSED.

HEARN, J., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.
KITTREDGE, J., dissenting in a separate opinion in which
Acting Justice Costa M. Pleicones, concurs. Acting Justice
Costa M. Pleicones, dissenting in a separate opinion in which
KITTREDGE, J., concurs.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE:

I join Justice Pleicones in dissent. I write separately to
comment on the standing issue, but primarily to express my

fundamental disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the
merits.

Unquestionably, Petitioners (Sloan) may not be accorded
taxpayer standing under our jurisprudence, as set forth by
Justice Pleicones. See, ¢.9., Crews v. Beattie, 197 S.C. 82, 49,
14 §.H.2d 851, 357-58 (1941) (recognizing that the generalized
interest every taxpayer has in the operation of the govern-
ment is usually insufficient to confer standing). The public
importance exception to the normal standing requirements
presents a closer question, but again, I join Justice Pleicones
in finding Sloan lacks standing under this doctrine as well. To
accord Sloan standing in this case is tantamount to conferring
standing on every citizen in every case where improper gov-
ernmental activity is alleged. That has never been my under-
standing of the public importance exception, and it was not my
intent to allow the exception to swallow the rule when I
authored our opinion in ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston Cown-
ty, 880 S.C. 191, 669 S.E.2d 337 (2008). See id. at 199, 669
§.H.2d at 341 (“The key to the public importance analysis is
whether a resolution is needed for future guidance.”).

Even assuming Sloan has public interest standing, I re-
spectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclu-
sion. I believe today’s decision will have far-reaching negative
consequences for the safety of our citizens,’ in that the major-
ity unreasonably constrains the authority and discretion of
Respondent South Carolina Department of Transportation
(DOT) in the discharge of its constitutional and statutory duty
to build and maintain a safe roadway system for the use of
the public. See S.C. Const. art. XII, § 1 (authorizing the
General Assembly to establish agencies to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare and to set the limits within which
those agencies may operate); 8.C. Code Ann. § 57-8-110
(2006) (isting DOT’s powers and responsibilities); see also
Leonard v. Talbert, 222 8.C. 79, 83, 71 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1952)
(“Subject to constitutional limitations, the state has absolute
control of the highways, including streets, within its borders,
even though the fee is in the municipality. Such power of su-

8. The majority references my “far-reaching negative consequences”
statement as “[a] further indicator of the issue’s importance” justifying
Sloan’s public importance standing. Not so. My comment is addressed
to the impact of what I believe is the Court’s clearly erroneous decision
today on the merits,

pervision and control may be exercised directly by the legisla~
ture or may be delegated by it to subordinate or local govern-
mental agencies....” (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); of S.C. State Highway Dep't v.
Harbin, 226 8.C. 585, 597-98, 86 S.E.2d 466, 472 (1955)
(recognizing that “under its police power [the General Assem-
bly] has full authority in the interest of public safety” to
establish both the conditions under which a person may be
permitted to operate a motor vehicle and the grounds on
which that permit may be revoked),

The majority presents the issue in this case in a myopic and
misleading way, essentially asking whether public funds may
be spent for a private purpose. Framing the issue in that
manner leads to the self-evident conclusion, which is, of
course, that public funds may not be spent for a private
purpose. However, misstating the question presented to the
Court obscures the real issue and attributes to DOT a position
it does not assert, as DOT has never contended it may spend
“public funds for a private purpose.”

The bridges in Woodside Plantation in Aiken are not public
and they are not “in the state highway system,” ° but they are
located in a road system that is used by the public,” as are
numerous privately owned bridges and dams throughout the
state. When the public, including school buses, regularly trav-
els along a roadway that contains a privately constructed
bridge, I am confident the legislature has granted DOT the
legal authority to exercise its discretion to provide engineering
supervision when requested by the local government." See
S.C. Code Ann, § 57-8-110(7).

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority reads sec-
tion 57-8-110(7) in isolation, without appreciating the statute’s

9, S.C, Code Ann. § 57-3-110(7) (authorizing DOT to assist local govern-
ments so long as such assistance does not interfere with DOT's obli-
gations to the state highway system).

10. School buses regularly travel the roads within Woodside Plantation,
which in 2011 had approximately 4,000 residents (a population that is
expected to double to 8,000 residents),

11, The majority also finds fault with the request for assistance from a
member of the Aiken City Council. Councilman Reggie Ebner made the
request via email to then-Representative Tom Young. Councilman Eb-
ner signed the email “Reggie Ebner, City of Aiken Councilman for

placement within the South Carolina Code. In contrast, I
would approach the question of the legislature’s intent in
section 57-3-110(7) by examining the statute in its proper
context. See, e.g., Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., 406 8.C.
124, 128-29, 750 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2013) (noting that courts must
construe a statute’s words in context so as not to frustrate the
purpose of the statutory scheme in which they appear (cita-
tions omitted)).

I begin with section 57-3-120, which states, “Highway,
street, or road are general terms denoting a public way for
the purpose of vehicular travel, ... and the terms shall
include roadways, pedestrian facilities, bridges, ... and all
other facilities commonly considered component parts of high-
ways, streets, or roads.” S.C. Code Ann. § 57-3-120(1) (2006)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
Woodside Plantation’s roads and bridges are utilized by the
public, I believe those structures constitute “public way[s] for
the purpose of vehicular travel” so as to fall within the
legislature's definition of a highway, street, or road. Id.

As set forth in section 57-8-110, DOT’s “duties and powers”
are broad and include the ability to “lay out, build, and
maintain public highways and bridges, including the exclusive
authority to establish design criteria, construction specifica-
tions, and standards required to construct and maintain high-
ways and bridges.” Id. § 57-3-110(1). Then, subsection (7)
makes clear DOT’s authority is not limited to state highways,
giving DOT discretion to

instruct, assist, and cooperate with the ... bodies politic ...

of the State in street, highway, traffic, and mass transit

matters when requested to do so, and, if requested by such

government authorities, supervise or furnish engineering

supervision for the construction and improvement of roads

and bridges, provided such duties do not impair the atten-

tion to be given the highways in the state highway system.
Id. § 57-8-110(1).

I draw three conclusions, important for the resolution of this
case, from the language in section 57-3-110(7). First, because

District 4.” Representative Young forwarded the request to DOT and
referred to the councilman as a constituent. We are told the request
lacked “‘sufficient color of authority.’’ I respectfully disagree.

ST

DOT may only provide engineering support to local govern-
ments when doing so does not interfere with DOT’s obli-
gations to state highways, DOT’s primary responsibility is
clearly to the state highway system. See id. Second, by giving
DOT discretion to assist local governments, subsection (7)
necessarily authorizes DOT to provide assistance to local
governments for roads and bridges outside of the state high-
way system. See id. Third, although subsection (1) limits
DOT’s power to “lay out, build, and maintain” to “public
highways and bridges,” subsection (7) speaks only of “roads
and bridges” generally, indicating the restriction in subsection
(1) does not apply when DOT provides assistance under
subsection (7). Id. § 57-3-110(1), (7) (emphasis added); seg, e.g.,
State v. Sweat, 886 S.C. 389, 351, 688 8.H.2d 569, 575 (2010)
(“A statute should be so construed that no word ... shall be
rendered surplusage....” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). The legislature, in my judgment, thus struck
a balance between ensuring DOT focused on the state highway
system and giving DOT discretion to provide for the safety of
roads and bridges outside of that system.

I would therefore construe DOT’s authority to “instruct,
assist, and cooperate with” local governmental authorities “in
street, highway, traffic, and mass transit matters” as embrac-
ing the “furnish[ing] [of] engineering supervision for the con-
struction and improvement of roads and bridges.” $.C. Code
Ann. § 57-8-110(7). Therefore, provided a privately owned
bridge is part of “a public way for the purpose of vehicular
travel” such that a nexus exists between the bridge and the
road system utilized by the public, I would find the legislature
has authorized DOT to act within the broad parameters of
subsection (7). Id. §§ 57-3-110(7), -120(1).

In the instant case, DOT spent a de minimis amount of
time and money for a manifestly public purpose, the type of
conduct expressly permitted by section 57-8-110(7).” There-

12. One of the flaws in the report of the Office of the Chief Internal
Auditor is the implication that DOT acted unlawfully merely because
“[t]he bridges {in Woodside Plantation] are neither part of the State
highway system nor are they owned or maintained by the City of
Aiken.” As discussed above, the notion that DOT's authority and assis-
tance may never be offered beyond “the State highway system” is
contrary to section 57-3-110(7)’s express terms. Moreover, the City of

fore, in my view, the trial court’s decision granting DOT’s
motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. But a
majority of the Court believes otherwise, under the guise that
DOT spent “public funds for a private purpose.” We are thus
left with DOT no longer having either authority or discretion
to provide assistance to local governments on matters critical
to the safety of the traveling public. The result the Court
reaches today is contrary both to law and, most regrettably, to
DOT’s public safety goals, as defined by the legislature.

T dissent.

ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES:

I respectfully dissent because in my opinion, the trial judge
and the Court of Appeals were correct in finding Sloan lacked
standing to bring this action.

In my view, the trial judge properly determined there was
no evidence SCDOT has a pattern of, or intends to hereafter
provide, the inspection of private property in derogation of
state law. The majority correctly points out the public interest
exception was created to “ensure accountability and the con-
comitant integrity of government action,” and to provide “fu-
ture guidance.” See ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 380
S.C. 191, 199, 669 S.H.2d 337, 341 (2008); Sloan v. Greenville
Cnty., 856 S.C. 581, 551, 590 S.H.2d 338, 349 (Ct. App. 2003);
of Sloan v. Dep't of Transp., 365 S.C. 299, 308, 618 S.H.2d 876,
881 (2005) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (quoting Crews v. Beattie,
197 S.C. 82, 49, 14 S.H.2d 351, 358 (1941) (“[t]he mere fact that
the issue is one of public importance does not confer upon any
citizen or taxpayer the right to invoke per se a judicial
determination of the issue”)); Baird v. Charleston Cnty., 383

Aiken clearly has an interest in ensuring the safety and integrity of
privately owned bridges along public ways within its corporate limits.
See Vaughan v. Town of Lyman, 370 S.C. 436, 442, 635 S.E.2d 631, 634
(2006) (“Our Court has long recognized that a municipality has a duty
to maintain its streets. (citation omitted); Floyd v. Town of Lake City,
231 S.C. 516, 522, 99 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1957) (discussing a statute
allowing an individual to recover from a municipality for “damage[s]
[caused] by reason of a defect in any street, causeway, bridge[,] or
public way ... within the limits of any city or town” and noting a city's
“duty to maintain its streets and other public ways in reasonable repair
for the purpose of travel” (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).

S.C. 519, 580-31, 511 S.E.2d 69, 75 (1999). As demonstrated by
the investigation conducted by the Office of the Chief Internal
Auditor for the Commission on the Department of Transporta-
tion—which addressed issues this inspection posed, and con-
cluded, “Deviations from federal and state regulations must be
avoided”—SCDOT has established it maintains proper inter-
nal procedures for addressing and remaining accountable for
the decisions made within its discretion. Accordingly, in my
opinion, Sloan has not established he has standing by way of
the public interest exception.

For the same reason, in my opinion, Sloan also lacks
taxpayer standing. See Sloan, 356 S.C. at 549, 590 S.H.2d at
347 (citing Beaufort Cnty. v. Trask, 349 S.C. 522, 529, 568
S.E.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App.2002) (“For a plaintiff to have
taxpayer standing, the party must demonstrate some over-
riding public purpose or concern to confer standing to sue on
behalf of her fellow taxpayers” (emphasis supplied))); Crews,
197 S.C. at 49, 14 S.H.2d at 357-58 (“The general rule is that a
taxpayer may not maintain a suit to enjoin the action of State
officers when he has no special interest and his only standing
is the exceedingly small interest of a general taxpayer.”),

Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
a

805 S.E.2d 201
In the MATTER OF Heather Mary Boone
MCKEEVER, Respondent,
Appellate Case No. 2016-002464
Opinion No, 27739

Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Heard March 22, 2017
Filed September 20, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Barbara Ma-
rie Seymour, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia,
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Heather Mary Boone McKeever, of Lexington, Kentucky,
pro se.

PER CURIAM:

The numerous charges against Respondent Heather Mary
Boone McKeever in this disciplinary matter include the unau-
thorized practice of law, improper fee arrangements, false
statements before the court, and attempting to intimidate a
former client. Because McKeever failed to answer the formal

charges against her and failed to appear at her hearing before
the Commission on Lawyer Conduct, she is in default and the
charges against her are deemed admitted. The only matter
before the Court is determining the appropriate sanction for
McKeever’s misconduct. At the hearing before this Court,
McKeever offered no mitigating evidence or explanation for
her conduct. Because of her pattern of abusing the judicial
process, masking her misconduct, and, perhaps most trou-
bling, attempting to intimidate a former client through merit-
less lawsuits, we find it appropriate to permanently debar
McKeever in this state, order her to pay the costs of the
investigation and subsequent proceedings, and other sanctions
as will be described herein.

FACTS

The following facts are drawn from the formal charges
against McKeever, which are deemed admitted pursuant to
Rule 24(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
(RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate
Court Rules (SCACR).

McKeever is a licensed attorney in Kentucky who moved to
Charleston with her husband, Shane Haffey, in the midst of
the foreclosure of a $1,000,000.00 loan on their Kentucky
home. Upon arriving in Charleston, McKeever came into
contact with Betty McMichael, who owned two properties—
991 Governors Road where she resided, and 986 Governors
Road which she rented out. After learning that McMichael
faced foreclosure on both of these properties, McKeever of-
fered her legal representation, despite not being licensed to
practice law in South Carolina. McMichael initially declined
the offer, but she ultimately agreed to the arrangement after
repeated phone calls and visits from McKeever. In exchange
for McKeever’s legal services, McMichael allowed McKeever
and her family to live in the 986 Governors Road house rent-
free during the course of representation—an improper fee
arrangement because McKeever did not advise McMichael on
the scope of her legal representation or the basis for her fees.
Moreover, McKeever obtained a possessory interest in the
property that was the subject of the litigation—a conflict of
interest of which McKeever did not make McMichael aware.

Upon obtaining MeMichael’s consent to represent her in the
foreclosure actions, McKeever’s subterfuge began. Sometime

Zz *°

after McMichael accepted her legal representation, McKeever
induced her to issue a quitclaim deed granting title to 986
Governors Road to Bondson Holdings, a fictitious entity
owned by McKeever and Haffey. Moreover, after the judge
granted permission for McKeever to appear pro hac vice in
the 991 Governors Road foreclosure action in July 2011, she
took no steps to protect McMichael’s interest for the next year
while living rent-free in a house owned by McMichael in
exchange for her legal representation. Ultimately, a licensed
South Carolina attorney was forced to make an appearance on
behalf of McMichael in 2012 and the case was eventually
dismissed in 2018.

While representing McMichael in connection with the first
foreclosure action brought against 986 Governors Road,
McKeever again sought pro hac vice admission with a licensed
South Carolina attorney serving as local counsel. Without
consulting local counsel or McMichael, McKeever filed a docu-
ment entitled “Answer Class Action Complaint” under local
counsel’s name. In the document, she asserted thirty-nine
affirmative defenses, apparently in an effort to remove the
encumbrances on the property and secure clear title, which
McKeever and Haffey held after receiving the deed from
McMichael.! Additionally, in an attempt to delay and hinder
the foreclosure proceedings, McKeever falsely claimed that
McMichael resided at the property, levied allegations against
opposing counsel, and filed notices of depositions for numerous
named and unnamed individuals. When local counsel discover-
ed McKeever filed the answer under her name and without
her knowledge, she moved to be relieved as counsel. Eventual-
ly the mortgage holder voluntarily dismissed its action against
McMichael, and in November 2011 McKeever filed the quit-
claim deed to 986 Governors Road.’ McKeever took no further
legal action on McMichael’s behalf; however, she retained the
benefit of living at 986 Governors Road rent-free and holding
title to the property.

1, McKeever did not disclose this fact to local counsel or to any other
parties to the action.

2, It appears McKeever delayed filing the deed until after the foreclosure
action was dismissed to avoid any discovery of her interest in the
property and resulting conflicts of interest.

Tn late 2012, Bank of America acquired the entity which
held the note on 986 Governors Road and reinstituted foreclo-
sure proceedings on the property. Prior to filing, Bank of
America’s attorneys conducted a title search and discovered
the quitclaim deed granting title to Bondson Holdings. Bank
of America then filed its action naming both McMichael and
Bondson Holdings in its summons and complaint. McKeever
contacted South Carolina attorney Parker Barnes, Jr. and
requested he serve as local counsel for McMichael, falsely
representing that she was eligible to appear pro hac vice.
McKeever filed no answer, responsive pleadings, or any other
motions on behalf of McMichael aside from a motion for an
extension of time to file a response and objection to a transfer
to the Master in Equity. This Court issued a letter to the
Charleston County Clerk of Court advising that McKeever
was not licensed to practice law in South Carolina, nor had she
filed an application for pro hac vice admission in the matter?
Nevertheless, McKeever continued to file pleadings and mo-
tions on behalf of Bondson Holdings and Haffey. In these
various motions and pleadings, McKeever asserted frivolous or
meritless legal positions, made false statements, and threat-
ened civil action and criminal prosecution against Barnes,
opposing counsel, the presiding judge, and the clerk of court.

After McKeever’s repeated efforts to stall the foreclosure
process on 986 Governors Road failed, she attempted to
perpetuate the scheme to defraud McMichael and Bank of
America by filing two lawsuits against McMichael in Ken-
tucky. Despite Kentucky’s lack of jurisdiction over McMichael,
McKeever filed suit on behalf of Bondson Holdings seeking
$827,500.00 in damages, alleging conversion and disparage-
ment of title based on false accusations that McMichael en-
cumbered 986 Governors Road with the mortgage now held by
Bank of America and two other debts incurred after deeding
the property to Bondson Holdings. In the second Kentucky
action, McKeever brought suit on behalf of her purported law
firm, McKeever Law Offices, LLC, claiming $256,200.00 in
damages for McMichael’s failure to pay attorney’s fees. MeMi-

3. Although Barnes had earlier motioned to be relieved as local counsel
for McMichael, he resumed his representation to protect her legal
interests after learning of McKeever's misrepresentations.

chael was forced to hire local counsel in Kentucky to defend
against these actions, and Bondson Holdings’ claim was even-
tually dismissed with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The presiding judge further ordered Bondson Holdings
to pay McMichael $1,500.00 in attorney’s fees, but McMichael
agreed to forego payment of the award in response to threats
of an appeal by McKeever. McKeever’s actions in filing suit
against McMichael were intentionally designed to intimidate
and coerce her, and to perpetuate the scheme to defraud her
and obtain title to 986 Governors Road free of any encum-
brances.

In yet another attempt to delay the foreclosure proceedings
brought against 986 Governors Road, McKeever assisted Haf-
fey with the filing of a bankruptey petition in Kentucky for an
entity he owned called Sandlin Farms, falsely claiming the
entity owned an interest in 986 Governors Road. The bank-
ruptcy court dismissed the petition, finding Haffey engaged in
“an ongoing pattern of delay” and abused the bankruptcy
process.>

McKeever also engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
in two other instances when she appeared on behalf of another
homeowner facing foreclosure in Beaufort County in 2012 and
then appeared on behalf of her own adult daughter in January
2015 after the daughter was charged with speeding.’ Despite
the arresting officer repeatedly advising McKeever that she
was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, she filed a
motion to dismiss and made multiple appearances on behalf of
her daughter without applying for pro hac vice admission.

4, The final disposition of the claim filed by McKeever Law Offices, LLC
is not clear from the record.

5. McKeever signed and filed an appeal of this dismissal on behalf of
Haffey, That appeal is pending, with an order holding it in abeyance
pending the outcome of various appeals McKeever filed in litigation
related to the foreclosure on the $1,000,000.00 loan on the Kentucky
property.

6. While appearing on behalf of her daughter, McKeever also made
numerous false statements to the court, including asserting dismissal
was warranted because the State failed to appear at two earlier hear-
ings and representing that her daughter was entitled to the appointment
of a guardian ad litem, despite knowing her daughter had already
reached the age of majority.

In summary, since arriving in South Carolina in 2010,
McKeever has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and violated the rules of pro hac vice admission. She actively
solicited McMichael’s consent to represent her in foreclosure
proceedings despite not being licensed to practice in South
Carolina; prepared and filed a quit claim deed to 986 Gover-
nors Road; and represented Bondson Holdings and Haffey’s
interest in the 986 Governors Road foreclosure action without
seeking pro hac vice admission. Likewise, throughout these
various proceedings, McKeever was not eligible to appear pro
hac vice because she resided in South Carolina,” was regularly
engaged in the practice of law in the state, and was regularly
engaged in substantial business activities in South Carolina.
McKeever then used her confidential relationship with McMi-
chael to obtain title to McMichael’s property and resided in
the premises rent-free for years, all the while failing to
provide any meaningful representation or protect McMichael’s
legal interests. When the Office of Disciplinary Counsel initi-
ated its investigation of McKeever’s alleged misconduct by
serving her with a notice of investigation in May 2018, she
failed to submit a written response as required by Rule 19(b),
RLDB, failed to appear to answer questions under oath, failed
to produce subpoenaed documents, and made numerous false
statements to mislead disciplinary counsel.

ANALYSIS

HE The authority to discipline attorneys and the manner
in which the discipline is administered rests entirely with this
Court. In ve Tullis, 375 S.C. 190, 191, 652 S.H.2d 395, 395
(2007). We have repeatedly held that an attorney’s failure to
participate in a disciplinary proceeding is indicative of a
disinterest in the law and will be given substantial weight in
determining the appropriate sanction. In re Murph, 350 S.C.
1, 4, 564 S.H.2d 678, 675 (2002). An attorney who fails to
answer charges or appear to defend or explain her alleged
misconduct is subject to the harshest sanctions because the
disciplinary process is designed largely to protect the public
from indifferent or unscrupulous lawyers. Id.

7. At the time of McKeever’s infractions, the Appellate Court Rules
prohibited persons residing in South Carolina from obtaining pro hac
vice admission. That rule has since been amended to allow pro hac vice
admission to South Carolina residents. Rule 404, SCACR.

Hl As a result of her actions, we find McKeever violated
Rule 404(a)-(c), SCACR, and the following Rules of Profes-

sional Conduct: 1.1; 1.2; 1.8; 1.4; 1.5; 1.7; 1.8; 1.16; 3.1; 8.2:
8.4; 4.1; 5.5; and 8.4. Rule 407, SCACR.

In light of McKeever’s blatant disregard for this state’s
regulation of the legal profession, her abuse of the judicial
system, threatening and coercive behavior directed at McMi-
chael, and her lack of candor with various courts, we impose
the following sanctions and declare McKeever be: (1) perma-
nently debarred, prohibiting her from seeking any form of
admission to practice law (including pro hac vice admission) in
South Carolina, and prohibiting her from advertising or solicit-
ing legal services in the state; (2) ordered to pay McMichael
$1,500.00 for attorney’s fees related to the actions filed in
Kentucky; and (8) ordered to pay the costs of the disciplinary
investigation and formal proceedings. Moreover, pending the
outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding in which Haffey has
subjected the 986 Governors Road property, we reserve the
right to void any deed through which McKeever wrongfully
granted title to herself and Haffey in violation of our Rules of
Professional Conduct.

Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, McKeev-
er shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that
she has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR.

DEBARRED.

5 8.85

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

805 S.E.2d 577
In the MATTER OF Mozella NICHOLSON, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001781
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
September 21, 2017

ORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to
place respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule

17(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, and/or transfer respondent
to incapacity inactive status pursuant to Rule 28, RLDE, Rule
413, SCACR. The petition also seeks appointment of the
Receiver to protect the interests of respondent’s clients pursu-
ant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

IT IS ORDERED that respondent is transferred to incapac-
ity inactive status until further order of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lump-
kin, Esquire, Receiver, is hereby appointed to assume respon-
sibility for respondent’s client files, trust account(s), escrow
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office
accounts respondent may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take
action as required by Rule 81, RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR, to
protect the interests of respondent’s clients. Mr. Lumpkin
may make disbursements from respondent’s trust account(s),
escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law
office accounts respondent may maintain that are necessary to
effectuate this appointment.

This Order, when served on any bank or other financial
institution maintaining trust, escrow, and/or operating ac-
count(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction to prevent
respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and
shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial
institution that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Es-
quire, has been duly appointed by this Court.

Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United
States Postal Service, shall serve as notice that the Receiver,
Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by
this Court and has the authority to receive respondent’s mail
and the authority to direct that respondent’s mail be delivered
to Mr, Lumpkin’s office.

Mr. Lumpkin’s appointment shall be for a period of no
longer than nine months unless an extension of the period of
appointment is requested.

/s/ Donald W. Beatty, C.J.
Pe

805 S.E.2d 577
RE: EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC FILING PILOT
PROGRAM-COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
September 27, 2017

ORDER

Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the
South Carolina Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic
Filing (E-Filing) of documents in the Court of Common Pleas,
which was established by Order dated December 1, 2015, is
expanded to include Edgefield and McCormick Counties. Ef-
fective October 10, 2017, all filings in all common pleas cases
commenced or pending in Edgefield and McCormick Counties
must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney,
unless the type of case or the type of filing is excluded from
the Pilot Program. The counties currently designated for
mandatory E-Filing are as follows:

Aiken Allendale Anderson Bamberg
Barnwell Beaufort Cherokee Clarendon
Colleton Georgetown Greenville Hampton
Horry Jasper Lee Oconee
Pickens Spartanburg Sumter Williamsburg
Lexington Saluda

Edgefield and McCormick—Effective October 10, 2017

Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic
Filing Policies and Guidelines, which were adopted by the
Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the training materi-
als available on the E-Filing Portal page at http:/Avww.
sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether any specific filings
are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are
strongly encouraged to review, and to instruct their staff to
review, the training materials available on the E-Filing Portal
page.
/s/ Donald W. Beatty

Donald W. Beatty

Chief Justice of South Carolina

805 S.E.2d 578

John DOE 2, Appellant,
v.
THE CITADEL, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001505
Opinion No. 5504

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard May 9, 2017
Filed August 2, 2017
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled September 27, 2017
Certiorari Denied March 28, 2018

a
~)

5

William Mullins McLeod, Jr., and Jacqueline LaPan Edger-
ton, both of McLeod Law Group, LLC, of Charleston, for
Appellant.

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr., Randell Croft Stoney, Jr., and John
William Fletcher, all of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms,
LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.

WILLIAMS, J.:

In this civil matter, John Doe 2 (Doe) appeals the circuit
court’s grant of summary judgment to The Citadel, arguing
the court erred in dismissing his claims of negligence/gross
negligence and outrage. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is one of many lawsuits stemming from a child
sexual abuse scandal involving a summer camp at The Citadel,
The Military College of South Carolina (The Citadel), and
Louis “Skip” ReVille. On April 28, 2007, the father of a former

camper at The Citadel’s youth summer camp notified Mark
Brandenburg, The Citadel’s general counsel, that one of the
camp’s counselors had engaged in sexual misconduct at the
camp with his son five years earlier. The former camper’s
father told Brandenburg a counselor named Skip invited his
son into his dorm room, where the two watched pornography
together and masturbated. Brandenburg subsequently spoke
by telephone with the former camper, then nineteen years old,
who confirmed that Skip had invited him into his room,
showed him pornography, and convinced him to masturbate.
After reviewing camp records, Brandenburg was able to iden-
tify the counselor as ReVille, who worked at the camp for
three summers from 2001 to 2008,

On April 24, 2007, Brandenburg—along with Colonel Joseph
Trez, an executive assistant to John Rosa, The Citadel’s
president—met with ReVille, a Citadel graduate who had also
worked with college students as a part-time, temporary tutor
at The Citadel’s writing center from August 2006 to April
2007. During the meeting, ReVille emphatically denied the
former camper’s allegations. Brandenburg continued to inves-
tigate the allegations from April through July 2007, and by
May 2007, had informed President Rosa of the allegations. On
July 1, 2007, Brandenburg traveled to Texas to meet with the
former camper and his parents. At some point during that
summer, however, Brandenburg fell out of touch with the
former camper. Brandenburg then contacted potential wit-
nesses who may have been present during the commission of
ReVille’s alleged misconduct, but he failed to find one that
could corroborate the former camper’s accusations. The Cita-
del ended its investigation without reporting the complaint to
law enforcement.

In October 2011, ReVille was arrested after confessing to
abusing numerous boys while employed in various educational
and athletic positions in the Charleston area over the span of
nearly a decade. On June 18, 2012, ReVille pleaded guilty to
numerous charges involving the abuse of twenty-three boys in
Charleston, Berkeley, and Dorchester counties and was sen-
tenced to fifty years in prison.

1. Neither the former camper nor his family reported the incident to law
enforcement officials during this time.

|

ReVille met, Doe—a young male about to enter the seventh
grade—and his family in the summer of 2005, through Re-
Ville’s involvement with AAU basketball at Pinewood Prepara-
tory School (Pinewood Prep) in Summerville, South Carolina.
That summer, ReVille began “grooming” Doe and later abused
Doe at ReVille’s residence, and he continued to abuse Doe
throughout the 2005-2006 school year. At the time, ReVille
was a teacher at Pinewood Prep. Doe, however, neither at-
tended Pinewood Prep nor any summer camps or educational
programs at The Citadel. In the spring of 2006, ReVille was
terminated from his teaching position at Pinewood Prep and
accepted Doe’s parents’ offer to move into the mother-in-law
suite connected to their house. While living there from May
2006 to June 2007, and for a short period after moving out,
ReVille continuously abused Doe. ReVille’s sexual abuse of
Doe ended when Doe and his family moved to Georgia in the
summer of 2007.

Doe filed the instant action against The Citadel on March
19, 2012, alleging claims of negligence/gross negligence and
outrage. In his complaint, Doe claimed actions taken by The
Citadel created a risk that ReVille would be placed in posi-
tions to enable him to victimize young boys, and subsequently,
its failure to prevent this risk allowed ReVille to sexually
abuse him. Doe asserted The Citadel was in a unique position
to warn or prevent ReVille from sexually abusing young
victims like Doe because The Citadel knew of the reported
sexual abuse and it had a special relationship with ReVille.
The Citadel filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on
April 24, 2015.2 After conducting a hearing, the cireuit court
granted The Citadel’s motion on July 6, 2015.

In its order, the circuit court dismissed Doe’s negligence
claims because it found The Citadel did not owe Doe a duty of
care to prevent ReVille from sexually abusing Doe. Specifical-
ly, the court noted the majority of the abuse of Doe occurred
before the April 2007 allegations by the former camper.
Moreover, the cireuit court found it was “impossible to differ-
entiate the injury that [Doe] suffered after The Citadel argu-

2, The Citadel initially filed a motion for summary judgment in this and
related cases on March 6, 2014. On December 9, 2014, the circuit court
denied The Citadel’s motion.

ably should have stopped ReVille from abusing him from the
unquestionably devastating injury that [Doe] suffered from his
longstanding, ongoing abuse by ReVille.” Accordingly, the
court concluded Doe’s injuries arose before, and were not
proximately caused by, any breach of duty by The Citadel.

The court also dismissed the outrage claim as a matter of
law because it was barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act® (TCA) and alternatively found no evidence suggested
The Citadel directed any conduct toward Doe. This appeal
followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment
under the same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursu-
ant to Rule 56, SCRCP.” Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of S.C., Inc. 849 8.C. 856, 361, 563 S.H.2d 331, 383 (2002).
Summary judgment shall be granted when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that ... no genuine
issue [exists] as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c),
SCRCP. When determining whether triable issues of material
fact exist, the court must view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493-94, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860
(2002). When the preponderance of the evidence standard
applies, the nonmoving party is only required to submit a
mere scintilla of evidence to withstand a motion for summary
judgment. Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326,
330, 673 S.H.2d 801, 803 (2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Negligence/Gross Negligence

Doe first argues the circuit court erred in finding The
Citadel did not owe a duty to Doe. We disagree.

HN To prove negligence, the plaintiff must show “(1)
[the] defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) [the]
defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission;
(8) [the] defendant’s breach was the actual or proximate cause

3. S.C, Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 through -220 (2005 & Supp. 2016).

of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) [the] plaintiff suffered an
injury or damages.” Roe v. Bibby, 410 S.C. 287, 298, 768
S.H.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Doe v. Marion, 378
S.C. 390, 400, 645 S.E,2d 245, 250 (2007)). Negligence is a
mixed question of law and fact with the existence and scope of
a duty being questions of law and a breach of duty being a
question for the jury. Miller v. City of Camden, 317 S.C. 28,
81, 451 S.B.2d 401, 408 (Ct. App. 1994). “In a negligence
action, the court must determine, as a matter of law, whether
the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.” Faile v.
S.C. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 350 S.C. 315, 334, 566 S.E.2d
536, 545 (2002). Negligence is not actionable without a duty of
care. Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, 331 8.C. 79, 86,
502 S.H.2d 78, 81 (1998).

WM South Carolina law does not recognize a general duty
to warn a third party or potential victim of danger or to
control the conduct of another. Rogers v. S.C. Dep't of Parole
& Cmty. Corr., 320 S.C. 258, 255, 464 S.H.2d 830, 382 (1995).
However, this rule has five recognized exceptions: (1) when
the defendant has a special relationship to the victim; (2) when
the defendant has a special relationship to the injurer; (8)
when the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty; (4) when
the defendant intentionally or negligently creates the risk; and
(5) when a statute imposes a duty on the defendant. Faile, 350
S.C. at 334, 566 S.H.2d at 546.

Doe does not argue the existence of any special relationship
to qualify for the special relationship exceptions. Rather, Doe
asserts The Citadel is liable to Doe “for its own failure to act
with due care in voluntarily undertaking the duties to investi-
gate, arrest, and punish ReVille; for taking actions that negli-
gently created the risk that ReVille would sexually abuse
[Doe]; and for action[s] to conceal ReVille’s pedophilia in
violation of Title [X.”4 We address each argument in turn.

A. Voluntary Undertaking

Hl Doe first asserts The Citadel established a duty of care
to Doe when it voluntarily undertook the duty to investigate
claims of sexual abuse on its campus, turn offenders over to its

4, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C, §§ 1681-
1688 (2012).

own law enforcement entity, and arrest offenders. We dis-
agree,

Under South Carolina law, the Restatement of Torts estab-
lishes the recognition of a voluntarily assumed duty and
states,

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to

render services to another which he should recognize as

necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance
upon the undertaking.
Johnson v. Robert E. Lee Acad., Inc., 401 8.C. 500, 504-05,
737 S.H.2d 512, 514 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting ResrarmmEnr
(Seconp) or Torts § 323 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).

In the instant case, The Citadel’s general counsel, Branden-
burg, conducted an investigation into the former camper’s
allegations of sexual abuse by ReVille after the former camp-
er’s father called The Citadel on April 23, 2007. Under section
823 of the Restatement of Torts, however, this undertaking
cannot create a duty unless (1) Brandenburg’s failure to
exercise reasonable care actually increased the risk of harm to
Doe or (2) Doe suffered harm because he relied upon Bran-
denburg’s undertaking, See id. at 505, 787 S.H.2d at 514.

Upon our review of the record, we find no evidence supports
a showing that Brandenburg’s actions increased the risk of
harm to Doe. In fact, the record demonstrates that ReVille
was already abusing Doe—for nearly two years—when the
April 23, 2007 allegations were made. Thus, any failure of The
Citadel to exercise due care in its investigation regarding a
former camper could not have reasonably increased the risk of
harm to Doe when the harm was already occurring. Moreover,
the record indicates Brandenburg conducted his investigation
as the college’s general counsel to “find out what happened”
and determine possible avenues for settlement for the protec-
tion of The Citadel. It was not conducted as part of a criminal
investigation. See Goode v. St. Stephens United Methodist

Church, 329 S.C. 488, 444-45, 494 S.H.2d 827, 888 (Ct. App.
1997) (finding an owner of an apartment complex did not
undertake a duty to protect a social guest from a criminal
assault occurring at the complex when providing security to
the complex was taken for the protection of the tenants and
not the general public). Last, because Doe had no prior
relationship with The Citadel and no evidence indicates Doe
relied on Brandenburg’s investigation to prevent further
harm, The Citadel did not create a duty when it investigated
the April 28, 2007 allegations.

HI Nevertheless, Doe claims the evidence presented at
summary judgment® established The Citadel violated its own
policies ® from 1998 to 2005 by not investigating ReVille for
sexual abuse of children. Additionally, Doe argues The Cita-
del’s policies required action following the April 2007 allega-
tions and its failure to adhere to the policies demonstrated a
lack of due care.

We disagree with Doe’s contention that The Citadel’s devia-
tions from its own policies and procedures, both prior to and
following the April 23, 2007 allegations, demonstrate a lack of
due care and create a triable issue as to whether The Citadel
voluntarily assumed a duty to investigate and arrest ReVille
for sexual abuse of children. Indeed, we find the internal
policies created by The Citadel do not establish a voluntary
undertaking of a duty; rather, they can only serve as evidence
of the standard of care if the duty was established by law. See
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 8.C. 240, 247,
711 S.E.2d 908, 912 (2011) (“[I]f no duty has been established,

5. While Doe states facts in support of his argument, we note that some
of the facts cited are not supported by evidence in the record, In
particular, Doe asserts The Citadel was aware of ReVille’s pedophilia as
early as 1998, when he received services from the campus counseling
center, Moreover, Doe asserts that one of ReVille’s victims (Camper
Doe 6), a former camper and counselor, was fired by Jennifer Garrott,
the camp's deputy director, when he attempted to report ReVille’s
abuse to her in 2005. Because these facts do not appear in the record,
we do not consider them. See Rule 210(h), SCACR (‘[T]he appellate
court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on
Appeal.”),

6. The Citadel implemented new policies in 2001 for the supervision of
its camp and counselors after it learned of the sexual abuse of campers
by a former senior counselor.

evidence as to the standard of care is irrelevant. Only when
there is a duty would a standard of care need to be estab-
lished.”); id. at 248, 711 S.E.2d at 912 (holding Wal-Mart did
not voluntarily undertake a duty despite creating an internal
policy that its photo technician violated by destroying photo-
graphs depicting child abuse and not informing the store
manager or keeping them as evidence, and finding the policy
only served as evidence of the standard of care). Therefore,
any violation of an internal policy does not give rise to the
voluntary assumption of a duty and does not establish that
The Citadel owed a duty of care as a matter of law.

B. Negligent Creation of the Risk

Doe next asserts The Citadel is liable for negligently creat-
ing the risk that ReVille would sexually abuse Doe. We
disagree.

In Edwards v. Lexington County Sheriffs Department, our
supreme court imposed a duty of care on a county and its
sheriff's department because it found the entities created a
risk of injury to the appellant. 386 S.C. 285, 2938-94, 688 S.H.2d
125, 129-80 (2010). In that case, the appellant, a domestic
violence victim, sued the respondents, the county and depart-
ment, after she was attacked by her ex-boyfriend in a magis-
trate’s court bond revocation hearing in which no security was
provided. Id. at 287-88, 688 S.E.2d at 127. An employee of the
sheriff's department, who was aware of the ex-boyfriend’s
multiple bond violations and threats against the appellant,
requested to schedule the bond revocation hearing, where the
ex-boyfriend subsequently attacked the appellant. Jd. at 288,
688 S.E.2d at 127. Despite being aware of the appellant’s fear
of her ex-boyfriend, the respondents strongly encouraged the
appellant to be present at the bond revocation hearing. Id. at
298, 688 S.E.2d at 130. Our supreme court found the respon-
dents could not claim a lack of knowledge of the ex-boyfriend’s
violent tendencies towards the appellant because the respon-
dents were seeking to revoke his bond for his failing to obey a
no-contact order, which was issued in response to his violent
actions. Id. The court found the respondents “created a situa-
tion they knew or should have known posed a substantial risk
of injury to [the appellant],” and given their knowledge of the
ex-boyfriend’s demonstrated threats against the appellant, the

respondents owed the appellant a duty of care. Id. at 294, 688
§.E.2d at 130, Importantly, the court noted the respondents’
duty “is one of due care and whether [the respondents] acted
reasonably, negligently[,] or grossly negligently is not before
us.” Id.

In the instant case, Doe argues The Citadel’s duty to Doe is
based upon “The Citadel’s own affirmative actions that created
the circumstances for ReVille to sexually abuse [Doe],” and
The Citadel should have foreseen its negligent actions “would
probably cause injury to someone in the form of sexual abuse
by ReVille.” Doe again cites evidence of The Citadel’s policy
violations and alleged concealment of ReVille’s actions. How-
ever, we again find any purported violation of the policy does
not amount to the existence of a duty, but rather, focuses
more on the standards of due care establishing the extent and
nature of the duty, which would help a fact-finder determine
whether a duty was breached. See Madison ew rel. Bryant v.
Babcock Ctr, Inc. 871 8.C. 123, 185, 688 8.B.2d 650, 656
(2006) (rejecting defendants’ all or nothing approach with
regard to the existence of a duty and noting that argument
“confuses the existence of a duty with standards of care
establishing the extent and nature of the duty in a particular
case”). Unlike Edwards, Doe does not present any evidence
indicating The Citadel actively created a situation that in-
creased the risk of harm to Doe—such as placing ReVille and
Doe in the same room, encouraging the two to meet, or
placing Doe in ReVille’s custody. In fact, no evidence suggests
The Citadel was even aware of Doe’s very existence before the
commencement of this lawsuit because Doe had no affiliation
with The Citadel’s programs or camps.

Furthermore, the evidence does not demonstrate The Cita-
del was aware of ReVille’s pedophilia prior to the April 2007
allegations, despite Doe’s claims to the contrary. The record
does not support Doe’s assertions that The Citadel knew of
ReVille’s sexual misconduct while he was a counselor at the
camp. In particular, Doe asserts The Citadel should have
investigated and arrested ReVille when Garrott found ReVille
alone in his room with a camper in 2002, and again in 2003
when she discovered him in his room rubbing “Icy Hot” on a
junior counselor’s leg following a run. However, the record
does not indicate that any improper behavior was occurring at

the time when Garrott “caught” ReVille to warrant termi-
nation or an investigation. Garrott stated, at the time, she did
not think either incident amounted to a violation of the camp
policies. Instead, she viewed the incidents as “lapse[s] in
judgment.” Doe’s arguments again “confuse the existence of a
duty with standards of care establishing the extent and nature
of the duty in a particular case.” Madison ew rel. Bryant, 371
S.C. at 185, 688 S.H.2d at 656. Inasmuch as Doe failed to
prove the existence of a duty of care, any argument involving
the standards of care are not properly before this court. See
Bishop, 381 S.C. at 86, 502 8.H.2d at 81 (“An essential element.
in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal
duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Without a
duty, there is no actionable negligence.”).

In conclusion, while ReVille’s continued sexual abuse of Doe
was beyond despicable, we find that, as it relates to any failure
to respond after the April 2007 allegations, The Citadel’s
purported failure to intervene did not create a risk of harm to
Doe when Doe was already exposed to ReVille’s abuse. See,
¢.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489
US. 189, 201, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (“While
the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor
did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to
them.”); Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.8d 429, 439 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“[Alllowing continued exposure to an existing danger by
failing to intervene is not the equivalent of creating or increas-
ing the risk of that danger.”), cert. denied sub nom. John Doe
2 Rosa, — US. ——, 186 S.Ct. 811, 198 L.Ed.2d 715
(2016).

Cc. Title IX

HE Doe next argues the federal statute, Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, imposed a duty on The
Citadel not to conceal ReVille’s sexual abuse following the
April 2007 allegations.’ We disagree,

7. We do not find it necessary to address any of Doe’s arguments that
‘The Citadel’s alleged violations of Title IX demonstrate its failure to act
with due care because, as previously mentioned, these arguments
involve the standards of due care, which presuppose the existence of a
duty. See Edwards, 386 S.C, at 294, 688 S.E.2d at 130.

WA plaintiff will prove the first element of a negligence
claim—that the defendant owes him a statutorily-created duty
of care—if the plaintiff shows two things: “(1) that the essen-
tial purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of harm
the plaintiff has suffered; and (2) that he is a member of the
class of persons the statute is intended to protect.” Rayfield v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., 297 S.C. 95, 108, 374 S.H.2d 910, 914-15
(Ct. App. 1988). “Title IX prohibits discrimination occurring
under any educational program or activity.” Doe by Doe v.
Berkeley Cty. Sch. Dist., 989 F.Supp. 768, 770 (D.S.C. 1997).
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).

We find Doe’s claim fails because he is not a member of the
class of persons the statute intends to protect. Title IX intends
to protect participants and students of educational programs.
See, e.g., Dipippa v. Union Sch. Dist., 819 F.Supp.2d 485, 446
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (“Generally speaking, parents of a student
whose rights were violated do not have standing to assert
personal claims under Title IX, but do have standing to assert
claims on the student’s behalf.... On its face, the statutory
language of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., applies only to
students and participants in educational programs.” (citations
omitted)); Doe v. Oyster River Co-op. Sch. Dist., 992 F.Supp.
467, 481 (D.N.H. 1997) “Ordinarily, only participants of feder-
ally funded programs ... have standing to bring claims under
Title IX.”). In the instant case, both parties agree that Doe
never attended The Citadel or its summer camps. Because
Doe was never a student or participant in any educational
program at The Citadel, he is not a member of the class of
persons Title IX intends to protect. Thus, Doe failed to prove
The Citadel owed him a statutorily-created duty, and we
affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.

8. We do not address Doe’s essential purpose requirement argument
because we find the resolution of this issue is dispositive. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.B.2d.
591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address remaining
issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

Il, Outrage

HM Last, Doe asserts the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment to The Citadel on Doe’s outrage claim
because more than a scintilla of evidence exists to establish
that The Citadel’s conduct was outrageous and directed at
Doe. We disagree.

HE (Under South Carolina law, outrage claims are limit-
ed to a defendant’s egregious conduct toward a plaintiff.
Upchurch v. N.Y, Times Co., 314 8.C. 581, 586, 481 S.H.2d 558,
561 (1998). “It is not enough that the conduct is intentional
and outrageous, It must be directed at the plaintiff, or occur
in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.”
Id. (emphasis added).

In the instant case, while The Citadel’s failure to notify law
enforcement of ReVille’s alleged abuse in 2007 is highly la-
mentable, Doe did not present any evidence that The Citadel
directed any tortious conduct specifically toward him. Indeed,
The Citadel was unaware of Doe’s very existence prior to the
commencement of this lawsuit. Accordingly, we uphold the
circuit court’s finding on this issue.®

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment to The Citadel is

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, J., and LEE, A.J., concur.
a

9. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we decline to
address whether the circuit court erred in finding the TCA barred Doe's
outrage claim. See Futch, 335 S.C. at 613, 518 S.E.2d at 598 (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution
of a prior issue is dispositive).

ms a

805 S.E.2d 204
The STATE, Respondent,

v

Lance Leon MILES, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000308
Opinion No, 5511

Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
Heard June 7, 2017
Filed August 28, 2017
Rehearing Denied October 19, 2017

Fred
1
at

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Hitit

Appellate Defender John Harrison Strom, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Megan Harrigan Jameson, Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of Lexington, for Re-
spondent.

HILL, J.:

Lance L. Miles appeals his conviction for trafficking in
illegal drugs in violation of section 44-53-370(e)(8) of the South
Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). He argues the trial court erred
by: (1) instructing the jury, in reply to a question they posed
during deliberation, that the State did not have to prove Miles
knew the drugs were oxycodone; (2) denying his directed
verdict motion; and (8) admitting three statements he con-
tends were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
US. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We affirm.

L

While scanning parcels for illegal drugs at the Federal
Express office in West Columbia, agents from the Lexington
County Sheriff's Office became suspicious of a package. They
arranged for a controlled delivery to the listed address, which
was within an apartment complex. Surveilling the delivery,
they observed the delivery person ring the doorbell and leave
the package by the front door. A few moments later, an agent
noticed Miles exit a nearby apartment and begin walking
around the parking lot. The agent then saw a young female
emerge from the delivery address. She looked at the box, got
on her phone, quickly hung up and went back inside. Miles
then got on his phone while walking towards the box. Miles
picked up the box and started back to his apartment. Seeing
the agents advancing to intercept him, he tried to ditch the
box, The agents apprehended and handcuffed him,

Agent Edmonson immediately questioned Miles about the
contents of the box. Miles claimed he did not know what was
inside. Edmonson then asked if there were drugs inside the
box; Miles responded there probably were, but he did not
know what kind. At this point, Edmonson read Miles his
Miranda rights and asked Miles again whether there were
drugs in the box. Miles again responded the box could contain

a

drugs, but he did not know what kind. Upon obtaining a
search warrant and Miles’ consent, the agents opened the box
and discovered three hundred pills that a chemist later testi-
fied contained a total of nine grams of oxycodone. Edmonson
next asked Miles to write down everything he knew about the
box and the drugs. Edmonson then reread Miles his Miranda
rights, and Miles wrote a statement admitting he had been
paid one hundred dollars to pick up the box, someone named
“Mark” had called him to pick it up, and the “owner” was a
“Stacks” from Tennessee,

Edmonson then wrote out two questions. First, “Did you
know drugs are in the parcel ‘box’?” Miles wrote, “Yes.” The
second question and answer—related to Miles’ admission that
he had previously picked up packages for money—were re-
dacted and not presented to the jury.

Miles was indicted for trafficking in illegal drugs, in viola-
tion of section 44-53-870(e)(8). He did not testify at his trial
and moved unsuccessfully for directed verdict, arguing in part
there was insufficient evidence he knew the box contained
oxycodone. During the jury charge, the trial court gave the
following instruction:

Mr. Miles is charged with trafficking in illegal drugs and in

this case we are referring to [o]xycodone. The State must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant know-
ingly delivered, purchased, brought into this state, provided
financial assistance or otherwise aided, abetted, attempted
or conspired to sell, deliver, purchase, or bring into this
state and was knowingly in actual or constructive possession
or knowingly attempted to become in actual or constructive
possession] of the [o]xycodone. Possession may be either
;+. actual or constructive.

The trial court charged that the State bore the burden of
proving the amount of oxycodone was more than four grams.
The trial court further instructed that the State had to prove
criminal intent, which required a “conscious wrongdoing,” and
that intent may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
and other circumstances. After deliberating for some time, the
jury asked the following question: “Does the [S]tate have to
prove that the defendant knowingly brought into the state

four grams or more of [o]xycodone or just any amount of
illegal drugs in order to consider this trafficking?”
The trial court, over Miles’ objection, replied to the jury as
follows:
[The law in South Carolina is the State does not have to
prove that the Defendant knew that the drugs in the
package were [o]xycodone, just that he knew that the
package contained illegal drugs. However, the State does
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the illegal
drugs that were in the package were] more than four
grams of [o]xycodone.
The jury later returned with a verdict of guilty. Because Miles
had at least two prior drug convictions, he was sentenced to
the mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years, and or-
dered to pay a $100,000 fine.

IL.

Hs Miles’ primary argument on appeal is the trial
court’s supplemental charge misinformed the jury that the

State did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Miles knew the drug he possessed was oxycodone. We review
jury instructions to determine whether they, as a whole,
adequately communicate the law in light of the issues and
evidence presented at trial. State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 88, 90, 747
§.B.2d 444, 448 (2018).
Section 44-58-370(e)(8) provides in part:
Any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, cultivates,
delivers, purchases, or brings into this State, or who pro-
vides financial assistance or otherwise aids, abets, attempts,
or conspires to sell, manufacture, cultivate, deliver, pur-
chase, or bring into this State, or who is knowingly in actual
or constructive possession or who knowingly attempts to
become in actual or constructive possession of: ... four
grams or more of any morphine, opium, salt, isomer, or salt
of an isomer thereof, including heroin, as described in
Section 44-58-190 or 44-58-210, or four grams or more of
any mixture containing any of these substances, is guilty of
a felony which is known as “trafficking in illegal drugs”... .
(emphases added).
Miles contends the term “knowingly” as used in subsection
(e) applies to each element of the trafficking offense, including

the specific type of drugs listed in (e)(8). The issue of whether
trafficking requires proof that the defendant not only know-
ingly intended to “sell[], manufacture[ ], cultivate[] ...” or
“posses[ ]” illegal drugs, but also had knowledge of the precise
identity of the illegal drug being trafficked, has, surprisingly,
never been addressed by our appellate courts.

Hl We are mindful that “statutory interpretation begins
(and often ends) with the text of the statute in question.
Absent an ambiguity, there is nothing for a court to construe,
that is, a court should not look beyond the statutory text to
discern its meaning.” Smith v. Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 555-56,
799 S.H.2d 479, 488 (2017) (citations omitted).

Courts grapple often with that tricky adverb “knowingly.”
In United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 585, 588 (4th Cir. 2006),
the court construed a federal statute that punished “[a] person
who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce ... with
intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2000 & Supp.
2003)). Rejecting the argument that the government was
required to prove the defendant knew the person transported
was a minor, Judge Wilkinson noted:

[Clonstruction of the statute demonstrates that it does not

require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s

minority. It is clear from the grammatical structure of

§ 2428(a) that the adverb “knowingly” modifies the verb

“transports.” Adverbs generally modify verbs, and the

thought that they would typically modify the infinite hereaf-

ters of statutory sentences would cause grammarians to
recoil. We see nothing on the face of this statute to suggest
that the modifying force of “knowingly” extends beyond the
verb to other components of the offense.

Id. at 539.

The United States Supreme Court has not been so gun-shy
about the adverb.! They ordinarily read a “statute that intro-
duces the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as
applying that word to each element.” Flores-Figueroa v. Unit-

1. We suspect the bar for causing grammarians to recoil is low.

ed States, 556 U.S. 646, 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853
(2009). They have also found “the word ‘knowingly’ applies not
just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those
verbs.” McFadden v. United States, — U.S. ——, 185 8.Ct.
2298, 2304, 192 L.Hd.2d 260 (2015).

But the Court has not gone so far as to hold that a criminal
statute that opens with “knowingly” invariably requires each
element be proven by that level of intent. It is commonplace
that “different elements of the same offense can require
different mental states.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 609, 114 S.Ct. 1798, 128 L.Hd.2d 608 (1994). Even in
Flores-Figueroa, the Court acknowledged that “knowingly”
does not always modify every element, particularly where the
statutory sentences at issue “involve special contexts or ...
background circumstances that call for such a reading.” 556
U.S. at 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886. The Court emphasized that “the
inquiry into a sentence’s meaning is a contextual one.” Id.; see
also Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Herte Corp., 782 F.2d 381,
885 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Fundamental to any task of interpretation
is the principle that text must yield to context.”) (Friendly, J.).

HM «(Our duty is to determine legislative intent, and the
text of the statute is often the best evidence of that intent.
Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 583 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000).
Yet the text “must be construed in context and in light of the
intended purpose of the statute in a manner which harmonizes
with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose.”
Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 192, 712
S.E.2d 416, 425 (2011) (citation and internal quotations omit-
ted).

I We find that by using “knowingly” in subsection (e),
the Legislature did not intend to require the State to prove a
defendant knew the specific type of illegal drug he was
trafficking. Section 44-58-370 is concerned with criminalizing
numerous forms of conduct involving illegal drugs. Thus,
subsection (c) decrees “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance,”
subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. $.C. Code Ann.
§ 44-58-870(c) (Supp. 2016). Our supreme court has held the
language now codified in subsection (c) requires the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he

possessed a “controlled substance.” State v. Atiardo, 263 S.C.
546, 549, 211 S.H.2d 868, 869 (1975). Subsection (d) then sets
forth the penalties for possession based on the type of con-
trolled substance. S.C, Code Ann. § 44-53-870(d) (Supp. 2016),

This brings us to trafficking, subsection (e). Tellingly, our
supreme court has explained “[iJt is the amount of [the
controlled substance], rather than the criminal act, which
triggers the trafficking statute, and distinguishes trafficking
from distribution and simple possession.” State v. Raffaldt, 318
S.C. 110, 117, 456 S.H.2d 390, 394 (1995). While the court in
Raffaldt was not confronted with the mental state required for
a trafficking conviction, that issue was addressed in State v.
Taylor, 323 S.C. 162, 166, 473 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1996).
In Taylor, the defendant was charged with trafficking more
than ten grams of crank, in violation of section 44-53-375(C) of
the South Carolina Code (Supp. 1995), which contains lan-
guage nearly identical to section 44-53-370(e), including place-
ment of the adverb “knowingly.” Taylor argued the language
required the trial court to charge the jury that “they could not
find [her] guilty of trafficking in crank unless she knew there
were ten grams or more.” Taylor, 328 8.C. at 167, 478 S.H.2d
at 819. Relying on Raffaldt, we disagreed. Id.

Raffaldt and Taylor illuminate the “special context” re-
vealed by viewing section 44-53-3870 as a whole. Because
section 44-58-370(c) only requires knowledge that the sub-
stance is “controlled,” and because Raffaldt and Taylor tell us
the only difference between the elements of distribution and
simple possession and the elements of trafficking is the
amount of the controlled substance involved, there is no
reason to suspect the Legislature meant to require knowledge
of the specific type of controlled substance in trafficking
prosecutions. Miles’ interpretation depends upon isolating
“knowingly” in subsection (e) and extending its modifying
reach not only to “possession,” but to the specific type of
drugs listed. Magnifying individual words of a statute and
insisting they be interpreted concretely can lead to strange
results. One could, for example, myopically diagram subsection
(e)(8) and conclude it criminalizes the possession of more than
four grams of table salt, or even the conduct of the delivery
person in this case. Further, were we to adopt Miles’ version
of subsection (e), the State would have to convince the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant not only knew the
drugs were oxycodone, but also knew that oxycodone is a
“morphine, opium, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof,
including heroin, as described in Section 44-58-190 or 44-58-
210, or ... any mixture containing any of these substances.”
We doubt the Legislature, in passing the drug trafficking
laws, meant to create a scenario where a defendant is culpable
only if armed with a proficiency in chemistry on par with a
pharmacist or Walter White? That is why considering the
words in their surrounding environment is essential, especially
here where the statute runs to nearly five-thousand words and
represents the Legislature’s will in the massive field of drug
interdiction. Given this background, “[ilf ever we are justified
in reading a statute, not narrowly as through a keyhole, but in
the broad light of the evils it aimed at and the good it hoped
for, it is here.” United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
587, 557, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 448 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).*

HI When a statute can be read in its ordinary sense,
courts have no right to engineer an extraordinary one. That
the Legislature titled the offense defined by subsection (e)(3)
as “trafficking in illegal drugs” affirms our conclusion that a
defendant need not know the precise identity of the controlled
substance to be guilty. See Univ. of S.C. v. Elliott, 248 S.C.
218, 221, 149 S.H.2d 488, 434 (1966) (“[I]t is proper to consider
the title or caption of an act in aid of construction to show the
intent of the legislature.”). This sense becomes inescapable
when we consider subsection (e)(8)’s reference to sections 44-
58-190 and 44-58-210 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016),
which set forth Schedules I and II governing classification of
controlled substances. While we can interpret statutes by
bringing in rules of grammar, logic, and other tools, we must
be careful not to construe common sense out.

Courts in many other states share our conclusion that
proving the defendant knew the specific type of drug is not
required in trafficking and other controlled substance of-

2. Breaking Bad (AMC 2008-13).

3. Our emphasis on context and structure bears on the threshold deci-
sion of whether the statute is ambiguous, and is not meant to dilute the
rule of lenity, as we later discuss.

fenses. See, eg., State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.38d 455,
461 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005); People v. Bolden, 62 Ill.App.8d
1009, 20 Ill.Dec. 79, 879 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1978); Com. v
Rodriguez, 415 Mass, 447, 614 N.B.2d 649, 658 (1998); State v.
Ali, 775 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Edwards, 257 N.J.Super. 1, 607 A.2d 1812, 1818 (App.Div.
1992); State v. Engen, 164 Or.App. 591, 993 P.2d 161, 170
(1999); State v. Sartin, 200 Wis.2d 47, 546 N.W.2d 449, 455
(1996).

HE We cannot leave this issue without discussing the
important canon of statutory construction that penal statutes
are to be strictly construed. This rule of lenity applies when a
criminal statute is ambiguous, and requires any doubt about a
statute’s scope be resolved in the defendant’s favor. Berry v.
State, 381 S.C. 630, 633, 675 S.E.2d 425, 426 (2009). But the
rule of lenity is not a device to create ambiguity, nor should a
court invoke it before considering the words of the statute in
context. State v. Dawkins, 352 S.C. 162, 166-67, 573 S.H.2d
788, 785 (2002); State v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J.,
164 S.C. 318, 162 S.E. 334, 338 (1981) (“The rule that a penal
statute must be strictly construed does not prevent the courts
from calling to their aid all the other rules of construction and
giving each its appropriate scope, and is not violated by giving
the words of the statute a reasonable meaning according to
the sense in which they were intended, and disregarding ...
even the demands of exact grammatical propriety.” (citation
and internal quotations omitted)); see also United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)
(court should rely on lenity only if, “(alfter ‘seiz[ing] every
thing from which aid can be derived,’” it is “left with an
ambiguous statute” (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 US. (2
Cranch) 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.))).

HN One of the foundations of the rule of lenity is the
concept of fair notice—the idea that those trying to walk the
straight and narrow are entitled to know where the line is
drawn between innocent conduct and illegality. McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816
(1931) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given
to the world in language that the common world will under-
stand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.

To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be
clear.”). The line for conduct involving contraband is not
merely clear but fluorescent. At least since State v. Freeland,
106 S.C. 220, 91 S.E. 8 (1916), we have required a defendant to
know or be willfully ignorant that he was dealing with contra-
band drugs to satisfy criminal intent. This removes innocent
activity, inadvertence or accident from the law’s grasp. At any
rate, we need not apply the rule of lenity here, as context has
convinced us section 44-58-370(e)(8) does not require proof of
knowledge of the specific identity of the controlled substance.
Carter v. United States, 580 U.S. 255, 269, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147
L.Ed.2d 208 (2000) (courts are required “to read into a statute
only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful
conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct’ ”).

Another foundation of the rule of lenity is the separation of
powers. Our Constitution commits the task of defining crimi-
nal offenses solely to the Legislative Branch. Bass, 404 U.S. at
847-48, 92 S.Ct. 515; United States v. Wiliberger, 18 US. 6
Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). If the Legislature believes
our interpretation expands or is otherwise contrary to the
scope it intended section 44-58-870(e)(8) and its harsh penalty
scheme to have, it can amend the statute.

The trial judge’s instructions—including his initial charge
that criminal intent consists of “conscious wrongdoing”—con-
veyed the pertinent legal standards to the jury. He further
correctly charged that the State still bore the burden of
proving the drug quantity and identity.

UI.

HM Miles next argues he was entitled to a directed ver-
dict because the State presented insufficient evidence that he
knowingly trafficked oxycodone. As we have held, the State
needed only to prove Miles knew the item was a controlled
substance. Because there was evidence Miles possessed the
box, the jury was free to infer he knew what was in it. As the
assistant solicitor pointed out, the evidence was literally lying
at Miles’ feet. See State v. Gore, 318 S.C. 157, 163, 456 S.E.2d
419, 422 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Possession gives rise to an inference
of the possessor’s knowledge of the character of the sub-
stance.”). Of course, Miles also admitted he knew the box

contained drugs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the State, these circumstances go far beyond mere
suspicion. There was ample direct and substantial cireumstan-
tial evidence from which Miles’ guilt could be fairly and
logically deduced. Rule 19, SCRCrimP; State v. Odems, 395
S.C. 582, 586, 720 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2011).

Iv.

HMI Miles contends the series of three statements he gave
to law enforcement should have been suppressed because the
agents engaged in the “question-first” manipulation of Mi-
rvanda forbidden by Missowri v. Seibert, 542 US. 600, 124
8.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Hd.2d 648 (2004), and State v. Navy, 886 S.C,
294, 688 S.E.2d 888 (2010). He asserts Agent Edmonson’s
immediate questioning of him upon arrest was a custodial
interrogation triggering Miranda. At trial, the State conceded
as much and agreed not to present evidence of Miles’ first two
statements. But, during a later bench conference, Miles
agreed to their admissibility, which is unsurprising as this
strategy allowed Miles to get his theory of the case—that he
didn’t know what kind of drugs were in the package—before
the jury without having to take the stand. See State v. Bryant,
872 S.C. 805, 642 S.H.2d 582 (2007) (stating an issue conceded
at trial cannot be argued on appeal).

The issue of whether admission of Miles’ third, written
statement violated Seibert and Navy is unpreserved. Miles did
not raise these cases or the “question-first” principle to the
trial court. See State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 488, 446, 710 S.E.2d 55,
59 (2011) (“For an admissibility error to be preserved, the
objection must include a specific ground ‘if the specific ground
was not apparent from the context.’” (quoting Rule 108(a)(1),
SCRE)); In ve Michael H., 360 S.C. 540, 546, 602 S.E.2d 729,
782 (2004) (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must
be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court. In other words,
the trial court must be given an opportunity to resolve the
issue before it is presented to the appellate court.” (citation
omitted)).

Hl Even if the issue was preserved, any error in admit-
ting the redacted written statement was harmless. The
statement was cumulative and could not have reasonably

contributed to the verdict. It did not contradict Miles’ earlier
statements that he did not know the type of drugs in the
box, and added he was paid one-hundred dollars to retrieve
it. See State v. Martucci, 380 8.C. 232, 261, 669 S.E.2d 598,
614 (Ct. App. 2008) (“The admission of improper evidence is
harmless where the evidence is merely cumulative to other
evidence.”), We cannot imagine the vague references to oth-
ers involved packed any punch with the jury.

v.

The trial court did not err in its supplemental instruction to
the jury that the State was only required to prove Miles
knowingly trafficked in a controlled substance. There was
sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury, and even if
the Miranda issue was preserved, we find no prejudice. Miles’
conviction is therefore

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
a

805 8.B.2d 585

The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Robert Lee MOORE, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001669
Opinion No. 5512

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard January 18, 2017
Filed August 80, 2017
Rehearing Denied November 2, 2017

8
Be

a
s

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Colum-
bia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant At-
torney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia; and
Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.:

Robert Lee Moore appeals his conviction for attempted
murder, arguing the trial court erred when it (1) denied his
motion to suppress evidence from a limited warrantless search
identifying him as the owner of a cell phone found at the crime
scene and (2) denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to a subsequent search warrant Moore contends was
based on a conclusory affidavit, Although the panel majority
affirms the circuit court’s denial of Moore’s motion to suppress
the identification information obtained from the warrantless

search of the cell phone, Chief Judge Lockemy, Judge Kondu-
ros, and I differ in our analyses of this Fourth Amendment.
challenge. The majority also affirms the circuit court’s denial
of Moore’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant
to the search warrant, as we find the supporting affidavit was
sufficient to establish probable cause.

Facts and Procedural History

On the afternoon of February 25, 2018, Travis Hall (Victim)
was found shot in the head in a Taco Bell parking lot. When
police arrived at the scene, Victim was draped out of the
driver’s side door of his vehicle, and three cell phones were
found in the car. The phone at issue here was an AT&T
ZTE331 model flip phone (the flip phone) discovered “almost
up under” the driver’s side seat. The other two phones were
iPhones belonging to the Victim. In addition to the three
phones, money and drugs were found inside the vehicle.

Police photographed and collected the phones, took them to
the Sheriff's Office, and gave them to Detective Lindsay
McGraw. Detective McGraw performed limited forensic exami-
nations to determine who owned each of the phones. Specifi-
cally, he pulled the flip phone’s subscriber identity module
card (SIM card) from the phone and obtained the telephone
number associated with the phone. Detective McGraw provid-
ed the phone number to Investigator Tom Clark, who ran it
through a database and determined the flip phone belonged to
Moore. Investigator Clark then applied for a search warrant
to examine the stored data on the phone. After obtaining the
search warrant, Detective McGraw performed a full forensic
examination of the flip phone during which he recovered
stored contacts, images, call logs, and text messages.

Before trial, Moore moved to suppress any and all informa-
tion derived from the search of his phone, citing Riley v.
California, — U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct, 2478, 189 L.Hd.2d 4380
(2014). Moore further argued the search warrant affidavit
submitted to support the flip phone warrant application was
conclusory and did not support the finding of probable cause
necessary for issuance of the search warrant. The trial court
denied the motion to suppress the flip phone evidence, ruling
the phone was abandoned property.

At trial, the State’s evidence established Victim was at his
mother’s home prior to the shooting and received several
phone calls from the same number. Records from the flip
phone revealed five calls were made to Victim’s phone between
1:08 p.m. and 2:06 p.m. on the day of the shooting.

After the shooting, witnesses observed a white Chrysler 300
rapidly fleeing the area. One witness who was on foot stated
the car drove against the flow of traffic and had to slam on its
brakes to avoid hitting her. Police later used surveillance
footage to identify the vehicle at a gas station near the Taco
Bell. The video showed that after the vehicle parked at the gas
station, two men exited and threw a bag in the trash before
entering the gas station. The two men were identified as Tevin
Thomas and Moore. Inside, Moore bought potato chips and
cigarettes, and was required to give his birthdate for the
cigarette purchase. This footage showed Thomas wearing dark
clothing and Moore wearing a red jacket. Other cameras at a
Cracker Barrel and an automotive business recorded the
vehicle after it left the gas station. The vehicle was eventually
located in a neighborhood not far from the automotive busi-
ness.

Thomas testified that he and Moore had planned to rob
Victim during a drug deal. According to Thomas, Moore was
given a revolver by a third man who did not go with them to
the Taco Bell. Moore and Thomas rode to the Taco Bell in
Moore’s Chrysler. Once they arrived, Victim parked next to
their car and Moore exited his car and got into Victim’s car.
Thomas stated he saw Moore pull the gun on Victim; a
struggle then ensued and Thomas heard a gunshot. Thomas
testified that he got out of Moore’s car and tried to intervene
when he saw the struggle, but the doors on Victim’s car were
locked. When Thomas later asked whether Moore shot Victim,
Moore responded, “yeah, I seen blood coming out of his head.”

A fingerprint expert testified Thomas left ten fingerprints
on the exterior of the passenger side of Victim’s car. None of
Moore’s fingerprints were found on Victim’s car; however,
both Thomas’s and Moore’s fingerprints were found on the
white Chrysler 300.

Moore called eyewitness Chris Barnes, who testified he was
at the Taco Bell, heard a shot, then saw a man emerge from

a =

the passenger side of Victim’s car and jump into another car.
He described the man as wearing a dark colored sweatshirt
and a dark colored toboggan. Barnes was shown the gas
station surveillance video with Moore wearing a red jacket,
but Barnes insisted the man he “locked eyes with” at the Taco
Bell was not wearing red.

The jury found Moore guilty of attempted murder, and the
circuit court sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment.

Standard of Review

HME “On appeals from a motion to suppress based on
Fourth Amendment grounds, the appellate court] ... reviews
questions of law de novo.” State v. Bash, 419 S.C. 263, 268, 797
§.H.2d 721, 723-24 (2017). As to a circuit court’s findings of
fact, we must affirm “if there is any evidence to support” the
factual findings and “may reverse only for clear error.” State
v. Brown, 401 8.C. 82, 87, 736 8.H.2d 263, 265 (2012).

Law and Analysis

I. Warrantless Search of the Flip Phone

Moore argues the initial warrantless search of the flip phone
violated the Fourth Amendment, and no exception to the
warrant requirement applied to justify the search. Additional-
ly, Moore disputes the circuit court’s conclusion that he aban-
doned his phone. I disagree that the initial, limited search to
determine ownership of the flip phone violated the Fourth
Amendment.

HM The Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution demands that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. South Carolina’s constitution also recog-
nizes the right of the people to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See S.C, Const. art. I, § 10 (containing
language nearly identical to that of the Fourth Amendment).
But not every search implicates the Fourth Amendment. “The
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114
L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). “[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs
when the government violates a subjective expectation of

privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 38, 121 S.Ct. 2088, 150 L.Hd.2d 94 (2001).
However, “a Fourth Amendment search does not occur ...
unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is]
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable’” Id.
(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct.
1809, 90 L.Hd.2d 210 (1986)). In cases claiming an unreason-
able search and seizure, the burden is on the defendant to
prove not only that the search of an item was illegal, but also
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item
searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S, 98, 104-05, 100
S.Ct, 2556, 65 L.Hd.2d 688 (1980) (holding petitioner did not
make a sufficient showing that his legitimate or reasonable
expectations of privacy were violated by a search of his female
companion’s purse).

Particularly illustrative here is a recent case from the
Georgia Court of Appeals, State v. Hill, 888 Ga.App. 57, 789
§.E.2d 317 (2016). In Hill, a police officer discovered a cell
phone in the back seat of a taxi. Id, at 818, The taxi’s driver
told police that a man had fled his taxi without paying the
fare. Id. The police officer turned on the phone but could not
access any information because the phone was protected by a
passcode. Id. However, the officer was able to use an emer-
gency call feature on the phone to get in touch with a 911
dispatcher, who then provided the officer with the phone’s
number as well as the owner’s name and date of birth. Id.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found no Fourth Amendment
violation because the defendant had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his name, date of birth, or phone number. Id. To
support its determination, the Georgia court cited the litany of
state and federal cases that have concluded “a person lacks a
legitimate expectation of privacy in identifying information
such as name, address, or telephone number that is used to
facilitate the routing of communications by methods such as
physical mail, e-mail, landline telephone, or cellular tele-
phone.” Id. at 319. The court explained there was a “core
distinction” between the content of a communication and the
information necessary to get the communication from one
point to another. Jd. at 319 (citing United States v. Carpenter,
819 F.8d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2016); see also United States v.

Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (address-
ing historical cell-site location information and holding an
individual can claim “no legitimate expectation of privacy” in
information he voluntarily provided to a third party). Although
the content of the communication is private, the information
related to its transmission is not. Hill at 319; Graham at 428,

The Hill court further recognized that “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.” Id, (quoting Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 785, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Hd.2d 220 (1979)); see
also Graham at 428 (recognizing “the vast majority of federal
district court judges” who have reached the same result),
Therefore, the defendant’s cellular phone number did not fall
within the category of private information protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Hill at 320. The police in Hill did not—
and could not due to the presence of a passcode—access the
files contained on the phone.» ? Id.

Likewise in Graham, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
considered information voluntarily provided to cell phone pro-
viders, albeit in a different, and perhaps more intrusive,
context. In discussing its reasoning for finding a defendant
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in historical cell-site
location information, the court noted:

Moreover, outside the context of phone records, we have

held that third-party information relating to the sending and

routing of electronic communications does not receive

Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Bynum,

604 F.8d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010). In Bynum, we explained

that it “would not be objectively reasonable” for a defendant

to expect privacy in his phone and Internet subscriber
records, including “his name, email address, telephone num-

ber, and physical address.” Id.

Graham at 432,

Like the Hill phone, Moore's flip phone was found at a

erime scene and was examined by police before they obtained

1, It is unclear whether Moore’s phone was passcode-protected, al-
though when an officer was asked to review Detective McGraw’s report
to see whether the report indicated the phone was passcode-protected,
the officer stated, “I don’t see that it was.”

2, Because the court found no Fourth Amendment violation, it did not
reach the issue of abandonment, Hill at 321.

a warrant solely to obtain the telephone number and owner-
ship identification. In the present case, police removed the
phone’s SIM card and processed it for the limited purpose of
obtaining the telephone number. I recognize that even small
manipulations of personal property have been held to be
Fourth Amendment searches. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
821, 324-25, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (holding a
search occurred when a police officer briefly moved stereo
equipment inside a defendant’s apartment in order to record
the equipment’s serial numbers). However, under the facts of
this case, law enforcement’s limited search of the SIM card to
obtain the phone number did not constitute an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment because Moore had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the number itself.

Of significance here is the fact that police obtained a
warrant before performing further analysis to examine the
phone’s contents. In Riley, the United States Supreme Court
explained that the immense amount of personal information
stored in modern cell phones makes cell phone searches
inherently different from other searches conducted incident to
a lawful arrest. 184 S.Ct. at 2482. The Court wrote:

The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated
consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one
place many distinct types of information ... that reveal
much more in combination than any isolated record. Second,
a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of informa-
tion to convey far more than previously possible.... Third,
the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier...

Finally, there is an element of pervasiveness that character-
izes cell phones but not physical records. Prior to the digital
age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive
personal information with them as they went about their
day. Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone,
with all that it contains, who is the exception. ...
Id. at 2489-90. The Supreme Court ultimately held “that a
warrant is generally required before such a search, even when
a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.” Id. at 2493. The
Court explained:

a

Modern cell phones are not just another technological con-
venience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they
hold for many Americans “the privacies of life[.]” The fact
that technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not make the information any
less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.
Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accord-
ingly simple—get a warrant,
Id, at 2494-95,

Unlike Riley, this case does not involve the warrantless
search of a cell phone’s stored contents. Accordingly, Riley’s
concerns about modern cell phones operating as personal
“minicomputers” are not implicated when, as here, police
obtained a warrant before examining the flip phone’s stored
contents, Id. at 2489; see also Hill, 789 S.H.2d at 320 (“Al-
though a law enforcement officer cannot access data stored
within a cellular phone without a warrant or an exception to
the warrant requirement ... courts have held that the officer
can take other action with a cellular phone lawfully in his or
her possession to determine the phone’s owner.” (internal
citation omitted)).*

I recognize our learned dissenting colleague’s admonition in
State v. Brown that “the lack of any exigency justifying a
warrantless search and the ease with which law enforcement
could have obtained a warrant demonstrates further the need
to comply with the warrant requirement.” 414 S.C. 14, 80, 776
§.E.2d 917, 926 (Ct. App. 2015) (Konduros, J., dissenting), cert.
granted (S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated August 8, 2017). I also
acknowledge that the best policy in cases where Fourth
Amendment concerns might be implicated is to obtain a
warrant before conducting a search. See Riley, 134 S.Ct. at
2498 (“Recent technological advances ... have ... made the
process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.”); State v.
Cardwell, 414 8.C. 416, 778 8.B.2d 488 (Ct, App. 2015), cert.
granted (June 16, 2016) (stating a warrant is a necessary and
“relatively simple step” when seeking to conduct a full search
of files on a computer). Yet, I agree with the Brown majority

3, Because I would find no Fourth Amendment violation, I have not
addressed the issue of abandonment.

Y

that in Riley, “the Court did not require law enforcement
officers to obtain a warrant to search every cell phone that
falls into their possession[,]” in every situation. 414 S.C. 14, 23,
776 S.E.2d 917, 921-22. “[T]he Fourth Amendment is not
triggered unless a person has an actual and reasonable expec-
tation of privacy or unless the government commits a com-
mon-law trespass for the purpose of obtaining information.”
State v. Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 527, 765 S.H.2d 564, 568
(2014) (citation omitted).

HM As an additional sustaining ground, I find the inevit-
able discovery doctrine applies to the question of ownership of
the flip phone. See State v. Spears, 393 S.C. 466, 482, 718
S.E.2d 824, 832 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The inevitable discovery
doctrine, one exception to the exclusionary rule, states that if
the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means, the information is
admissible despite the fact it was illegally obtained.” (citing
Nia v. Williams, 467 U.S. 481, 444, 104 8.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d
377 (1984))), Detective McGraw testified he was asked to
perform a forensic examination of all three phones found at
the scene of the shooting. The undisputed evidence established
five phone calls were made from the flip phone to one of
Victim’s phones shortly before the shooting occurred. There-
fore, even without the use of the SIM card, Moore’s telephone
number would have been discovered through the examination
of Victim’s phones—in which Moore certainly had no reason-
able expectation of privacy. See Niw, 467 U.S. at 449-50, 104
S.Ct, 2501 (holding the inevitable discovery doctrine applied
when searchers were approaching the location of a victim's
body and would have discovered it without information ob-
tained from the defendant’s unlawful interrogation).

Il. Validity of Search Warrant

Next, Moore argues the warrant to search the contents of
the flip phone was impermissibly issued as the conclusory
affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant did not establish the
necessary probable cause. The panel majority disagrees.

Hs A search warrant may issue only upon a finding of
probable cause. State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 50, 625 8.H.2d

216, 221 (2006). The duty of the reviewing court is to ensure
that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis upon which
to conclude that probable cause existed. Id. at 50, 625 S.E.2d
at 221. “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” State v. Spears, 393 8.C. 466, 488,
718 S.H.2d 824, 388 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Dunbar,
361 S.C. 240, 253, 608 S.H.2d 615, 622 (Ct. App. 2004), “A
reviewing court should give great deference to a magistrate’s
determination of probable cause.” State v. Weston, 329 S.C.
287, 290, 494 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1997). “Suppression is appropri-
ate in only a few situations, including when an affidavit is ‘so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Jd, at 298, 494 S,H.2d
at 804 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928, 104
S.Ct. 8405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)).

Here, the affidavit submitted with the search warrant re-
quest stated:

On 2/25/2018 at approx. 14:18 Hrs. Deputies with the Spar-
tanburg County Sheriff's Office responded to 760 Warren H.
Abernathy Hwy. In reference to a shooting. Upon arrival
they found the Victim, Travis Hall had been shot. Hall was
transported to SRMC. Through further investigation and
the processing of the Victim’s vehicle an AT&T ZTE model
Z381 cell phone serial number # 22213371843 was found
inside the victim’s vehicle. Through further investigation it
was found the phone number assigned to the phone is (864)
494-2573, Through further investigation it was found this
phone did not belong to the Victim. Through further investi-
gation it was found this phone belonged to Robert Lee
Moore. This search warrant is needed for the furtherance of
this investigation to obtain information from the phone that
can either implicate, or clear Robert Lee Moore from any
involvement in this incident.

This affidavit provided ample probable cause for the magis-
trate to issue the warrant. The affidavit explained why police
believed the phone’s contents would reveal evidence about the
shooting and Moore’s possible involvement; namely, because
police discovered his phone in Victim’s vehicle at the scene of

the shooting. Contra State v. Smith, 801 8.C. 871, 378, 392
§.H.2d 182, 188 (1990) (finding an affidavit defective on its face
when it set forth no facts as to why police believed a defen-
dant committed a robbery and omitted the fact that some of
the information in the affidavit was provided by an informant).
As the affidavit provided the magistrate with a substantial
basis to find probable cause existed to support the search and,
thus, issue the warrant, the circuit court properly denied
Moore’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
in a separate opinion. KONDUROS, J., dissenting in a
separate opinion.

LOCKEMY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:

HM I agree with the dissent’s Fourth Amendment analy-
sis and would find Moore’s constitutional rights were violated
when officers searched his cell phone without a warrant.
However, I would find the information used during trial—the
identity of the owner of the cell phone—would have been
inevitably discovered because officers obtained a valid search
warrant prior to performing a full forensic search. Therefore,
I concur in part and dissent in part.

As each of my colleagues recognize, the Fourth Amendment
ensures “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures... .” U.S. Cost. amend. IV. Furthermore, as the lead
opinion notes, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amend-
ment is ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1948, 164 L.Hd.2d 650 (2006). “In the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley
v. California, — U.S. —, 184 8.Ct. 2478, 2482, 189 L.Hd.2d
430 (2014).

The lead opinion indicates the officer’s actions in removing
the SIM card and processing the information contained there-
in was not a search under the Fourth Amendment because
Moore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the infor-
mation recovered. I disagree that the Fourth Amendment

analysis should focus on the information searched, and instead

should focus on what information could have been searched.

The SIM card contained more than simply the cell phone’s

number, and police could have accessed that information dur-

ing their search. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Riley,
a cell phone search would typically expose to the govern-
ment far more than the most exhaustive search of a house:
A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive
records previously found in the home, it also contains a
broad array of private information never found in a home in
any form—uniless the phone is.

Id. at 2491.

I would find Moore had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the data contained on his cell phone, and any intrusion into
that data constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, I disagree with the State that Moore’s reason-
able expectation of privacy was abandoned as the facts do not
support such a finding in this case. See State v. Dupree, 319
S.C. 454, 457, 462 S.H.2d 279, 281 (1995) (“In the law of search
and seizure, ... the question is whether the defendant has, in
discarding the property, relinquished his reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy so that its seizure is reasonable within the
limits of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting City of St. Paul v.
Vaughn, 306 Minn. 387, 287 N.W.2d 365, 870-71 (1975))); State
v. Brown, 414 8.C, 14, 28, 776 8.E.2d 917, 922 (Ct. App. 2015),
cert. granted, (S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated August 8, 2017)
(“Whether such an expectation of privacy has been aban-
doned ’is determined on the basis of the objective facts
available to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the
owner’s subjective intent.” (quoting United States v. Tugwell,
125 F.8d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997))).

Because Moore had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the data contained on his cell phone and he did not abandon
that expectation, I would find the State violated the Fourth
Amendment by performing a warrantless search of that infor-
mation. I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion
because I believe the State would have inevitably discovered
the same information using the valid warrant it later secured
to continue its search of the phone. See Nix v. Williams, 467
US. 481, 447, 104 S.Ct, 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (“If the

a ,

us a

government can prove that the evidence would have been
obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted
regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no
rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to
ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings.”).

I recognize police included information gleaned from the
warrantless search in their warrant affidavit. In State v.
Spears, this court faced a similar issue regarding illegally
obtained information used in a warrant. 893 S.C. 466, 718
§.H.2d 324 (Ot. App. 2011). The court excised the offending
information from the warrant affidavit, and analyzed the re-
maining portions of the affidavit to determine if probable
cause still existed to support the magistrate’s decision to issue
the warrant. Id, at 488, 718 8.H.2d at 333,

Here, I would find any information about the owner of the
phone should be removed from the warrant affidavit and the
remaining language should be considered under our test for
probable cause. The affidavit would thus read:

On 2/25/2018 at approx. 14:18 Hrs, Deputies with the Spar-

tanburg County Sheriff’s Office responded to 7680 Warren

H. Abernathy Hwy. In reference to a shooting. Upon arrival

they found the Victim, Travis Hall had been shot. Hall was

transported to SRMC. Through further investigation and
the processing of the Victim’s vehicle an AT&T ZTE Model

2331 cell phone serial number [Redacted] was found inside

the Victim’s vehicle. This search warrant is needed for the

furtherance of this investigation to obtain information from
the phone that can either implicate, or clear any individual
from any involvement in this incident,

I agree with the lead opinion that this warrant affidavit
would support a finding of probable cause. See State v. Dun-
bar, 861 S.C. 240, 258, 608 S.E.2d 615, 622 (Ct. App. 2004)
(“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.”). Accordingly, I would find the
evidence would have been inevitably found pursuant to the
valid search warrant, regardless of the initially unlawful
search,

Finally, I wish to echo the sentiments expressed in the lead
opinion and the dissent cautioning officers about the practice
of searching cell phones without warrants. Chief Justice Rob-
erts stated well the importance with which courts must protect
individual’s rights to the “privacies of life” that are contained
on cell phones. Riley, 184 S.Ct. at 2495. “The fact that
technology now allows an individual to carry such information
in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of
the protection for which the Founders fought.” Id. There were
no cell phones at Valley Forge. The principle of fighting and
dying to make sure a soldier of the king is not allowed to kick
in a citizen’s door, however, is not very different than keeping
a person’s utmost personal information safe from unreason-
able government intrusion. In the context of a search incident
to an arrest, the Supreme Court created a bright line rule—
“get a warrant.” Id. While this case does not warrant the
ereation of such a rule in cases outside the search incident to
an arrest exception, officers should tread lightly around digital
information, and consider the implications of failing to obtain a
warrant before searching an individual’s cell phone.

KONDUROS, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand
Moore’s case for a new trial. I conclude Officer McGraw’s
warrantless examination of the SIM card constituted a search
that violated Moore’s Fourth Amendment rights. As Officer
McGraw explained in his testimony, the contents one can find
on a SIM card include the stored phone number, call logs, a
contact list, and “things of that nature.” In this case, Officer
McGraw testified he recovered the cell phone number, thirty-
four contact entries, and three text messages. The minute
Officer McGraw removed the SIM card, he had access to
digital information in which our courts have recognized an
expectation of privacy. See Riley v. California, — US. —,
134 S.Ct. 2478, 189 L.Ed.2d 480 (2014) (explaining society is
willing to recognize an expectation of privacy in the digital
contents of one’s cell phone as reasonable). Therefore, I would
conclude the warrantless search of Moore’s cell phone violated
his Fourth Amendment rights and no exception to the warrant

requirement applies to the facts of this case. Katz v. United
States, 889 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)
(indicating searches without a warrant are per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment unless some exception
applies).

The lead opinion cites to two cases—one from the Georgia
Court of Appeals and one from the Fourth Cirevit Court of
Appeals—both of which are distinguishable from the facts in
this case. In State v. Hill, the police used a locked cell phone
to call 911 and obtain the owner’s phone number, name, and
date of birth, 338 Ga.App. 57, 789 S.E.2d 317, 318 (2016). Such
limited identifying information is not all Officer McGraw had
access to in Moore’s SIM card. The 911 dispatcher in Georgia
did not provide the police with the owner’s contact list, text
messages, or call logs. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United
States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en bane),
addressed an individual’s expectation of privacy in historical
cell-site location information. Again, this is distinguishable
from the information available on a SIM card.

Additionally, I respectfully disagree with both of my learned
colleagues that this warrantless search of Moore’s cell phone
ean be cured through inevitable discovery. The holding in
Riley “is not that the information on a cell phone is immune
from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required
before such a search, even when a. cell phone is seized incident
to arrest.” 184 §.Ct. at 2493 (emphasis added). As I noted in
my dissent in State v. Brown, 414 8.C. 14, 32, 776 S.H.2d 917,
927 (Ct. App. 2015) (Konduros, J., dissenting), cert. granted
(S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated August 8, 2017), I believe this
language from Riley indicates an officer must obtain a war-
rant prior to searching a cell phone absent an applicable
exception, even when one’s expectation of privacy is diminish-
ed. Allowing officers to search the digital content of a cell
phone prior to obtaining a warrant, yet cure such an invasion
by arguing they could have inevitably obtained the informa-
tion, circumvents the spirit of the warrant requirement. In
keeping with my previous dissent and adhering to what I

4, I agree with Chief Judge Lockemy that the facts of this case do not
support a finding Moore abandoned his expectation of privacy in the
contents of the cell phone.

believe is the Court’s holding in Riley, I would find the search
of the digital contents of Moore’s cell phone violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment and the case should be re-
versed and remanded.*

805 S.E.2d 212

Lisa MCKAUGHAN, Individually and as the
Personal Representative of the Estate
of William Farr, Appellant,
ve
UPSTATE LUNG AND CRITICAL CARE SPECIALISTS,
P.C. and Sau-Yin Wan, M.D., Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001828
Opinion No, 5515

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard February 15, 2017

Filed September 14, 2017
Rehearing Denied October 19, 2017

5, Because my resolution of Moore’s issue regarding the warrantless
search of the cell phone would be dispositive, I decline to address his
second issue on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc,, 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S,E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appel-
late court need not address remaining issue when disposition of prior
issue is dispositive).

2
a
By

Jordan Christopher Calloway, of McGowan Hood & Felder,
LLC, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Davidson & Lindemann, PA, of
Columbia; and Ashby W. Davis and David Lee Williford, II,
both of Davis, Snyder, Williford & Lehn, P.A., of Greenville,
for Respondents.

LOCKEMY, C.J.:

In this medical malpractice action, Lisa McKaughan, indi-
vidually and as personal representative of the estate of her
father, William Farr, alleges the circuit court erred by direct-
ing a verdict in favor of Critical Care Specialists and Dr. Sau-
Yin Wan (collectively Respondents). McKaughan also alleges
the circuit court improperly excluded the testimony of her
expert as unreliable. We reverse.

FACTS

On January 11, 2010, Dr. Sau-Yin Wan, a pulmonologist,
examined William Farr, a lifelong smoker with complaints of
trouble breathing. During Dr. Wan’s examination, she ordered
a chest x-ray. Dr. Wan interpreted the x-ray herself and
determined Mr. Farr suffered from hyperinflation, meaning
there was too much air in Mr. Farr’s lungs. Dr. Wan specifi-
cally looked for nodules in the lungs, which would signal
cancer, but did not find any. Dr. Wan diagnosed Farr with
dyspnea, COPD, nondependent tobacco use disorder, and hy-
poxemia. None of these diagnoses indicated the presence of
cancer. Dr. Wan recommended Farr stop smoking and in-
structed him to return to the clinic in six months in order to
determine if he stopped smoking. Mr. Farr did not return for
his follow-up appointment.

Following his initial consultation with Dr. Wan, Farr had
continuing trouble breathing. McKaughan scheduled an ap-
pointment for her father to see Dr. Ronald Littlefield on
October 6, 2010. On October 7, 2010, Dr. Littlefield ordered an
x-ray of Farr’s chest. The x-ray showed a large mass in Farr’s
right lung. Dr. Littlefield referred Farr to the Lung and
Chest Medical Associates for further evaluation.

Eventually, doctors diagnosed Farr with a nine-centimeter
primary lung cancer in his right lung. Doctors removed Farr’s
cancer in December 2010, and he began chemotherapy and
radiation after the surgery.

Farr subsequently developed a tumor in his left lung in
August 2011. Doctors biopsied the tumor and found it was
cancerous in April 2012. Doctors diagnosed him with stage
four lung cancer, with a three to six month prognosis. Farr
died on June 19, 2012. His death certificate lists metastatic
lung cancer as the cause of death.

McKaughan filed a lawsuit on May 80, 2018 against Respon-
dents alleging medical malpractice in their care of her father.
She alleged Respondents caused her father’s death by failing
to diagnose his lung cancer during the January 2010 appoint-
ment. The case proceeded to trial on July 27-29, 2015. After
McKaughan presented her case, Respondents requested the
trial court direct a verdict in their favor. Respondents alleged
McKaughan failed to present sufficient evidence of a breach of
a standard of care or that any breach caused Fary’s death.
The trial court denied Respondents’ motion on the standard of
care issue, but granted their motion because it did not believe
McKaughan presented sufficient evidence of causation. The
trial court found McKaughan failed to present evidence of how
the cancer metastasized from the right lung to the left lung,
meaning the jury would have to speculate as to the method of
metastasis. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a directed
verdict motion, this court will reverse if no evidence supports
the trial court’s decision or the ruling is controlled by an error
of law.” Burnett v. Family Kingdom, Inc., 387 S.C. 188, 188,
691 S.E.2d 170, 178 (Ct. App. 2010). “When reviewing the trial
court’s decision on a motion for directed verdict, this court
must employ the same standard as the trial court by viewing
the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. “The trial court must
deny a directed verdict motion where the evidence yields more
than one inference or its inference is in doubt.” Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

A medical malpractice plaintiff must prove, by a
‘p! P
preponderance of the evidence:

(1) The presence of a doctor-patient relationship between
the parties;

(2) Recognized and generally accepted standards, practices
and procedures which are exercised by competent physi-
cians in the same branch of medicine under similar cireum-
stances;

(8) The medical or health professional’s negligence, deviat-
ing from generally accepted standards, practices, and proce-
dures;
(4 Such negligence being the proximate cause of the plain-
tiffs injury; and
(6) An injury to the plaintiff.
Jamison v. Hilton, 413 S.C. 188, 140-41, 775 S.H.2d 58, 62 (Ct.
App. 2015) (quoting Browwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence
Hosps., 409 S.C. 514, 521, 763 S.E.2d 200, 208 (2014).

HM “When one relies solely upon the opinion of medical
experts to establish a causal connection between the alleged
negligence and the injury, the experts must, with reasonable
certainty, state that in their professional opinion, the injuries
complained of most probably resulted from the defendant’s
negligence.” Id. at 141, 775 S.H.2d at 62 (quoting Hoard ew rel.
Hoard v. Roper Hosp., 887 S.C. 589, 546, 694 S.H.2d 1, 5
(2010)). “The reason for this rule is the highly technical nature
of malpractice litigation.” Hillis v. Oliver, 323 S.C. 121, 125, 478
8.H.2d 798, 795 (1996). “When expert testimony is the only
evidence of proximate cause relied upon, the testimony must
provide a significant causal link between the alleged negli-
gence and the plaintiff's injuries, rather than a tenuous and
hypothetical connection.” Hilton, 418 S.C. at 141, 775 S.H.2d
at 62 (quoting Hoard, 887 S.C. at 546-47, 694 S.E.2d at 5).
“Only on the rarest occasion should the trial court determine
the issue of proximate cause as a matter of law.” Burnett, 387
S.C, at 191, 691 S.H.2d at 175,

Dr. Barry Singer, an expert in medical oncology and hema-
tology, examined Farr’s medical records and testified those
records indicate the right lung tumor was a stage 2B lung
cancer with no metastases. Singer testified the right lung
cancer was a bronchoalveolar type adenocarcinoma. According
to Singer, adenocarcinoma means a tumor that develops in the
glands. Specifically, Singer stated the cancer was adenocarci-
noma with papillary features,

Singer’s review of the pathology report compiled after
Farr’s 2010 surgery indicated the right lung cancer was
9x8.5x5 centimeters. Singer described the tumor as “quite
large.” Singer testified the tumor was likely two to three
centimeters in size in January 2010.

Singer testified the larger a tumor is, the more likely it is to
have spread. According to Singer, “as cancer grows, cells
break off all the time. The body’s immune system is able to
generally prevent them taking hold and growing [what] we call
a metastasis, but the more surface area, the more area cells
[have] to break off.” Singer asserted the prognosis for a larger
tumor is no different from a small tumor “until the actual
metastasis occurred. When a recurrence occurs, then the
patient, in lung cancer, generally is going to die.” Singer
testified his recommended treatment for Farr’s cancer would
not have included chemotherapy and radiation had it been
discovered in January 2010 instead of October 2010. Singer
testified it was his opinion that, more likely than not, had
Farr’s cancer been diagnosed in January 2010, Farr would
have survived the cancer.

Singer stated he believed Farr’s cancer metastasized from
the right lung to the left lung. Singer noted the tumor cells
that were removed from Farr’s right lung were within one
millimeter of the resection, meaning “there’s a great risk that
cells may have been left after the surgery.” Singer opined
these close margins were the reason for Farr’s chemotherapy
and radiation following surgery, to ensure any cells that were
left were destroyed.

Singer explained the tumor on Farr’s left lung was also an
adenocarcinoma, but with primarily lepidie and acinar pat-
terns. According to Singer, “as an adenocarcinoma, knowing
they can have a multitude of variance in terms of appearance,
that it’s, to me, it would, 95 percent of the time be the same
cancer” as the right lung. Singer stated the tumors contain the
same cells, but different types of cells were predominate.
Singer testified he would expect to see a metastasis in primary
lung cancer within one-and-a-half to two years.

Singer did not find the difference between the papillary
primary cancer in the right lung and the lepidie and acinar
patterns in the left lung extraordinary. Singer testified that
cancers are not uniform and “metastases in primaries don’t
often have the exact same histology.” Singer further opined,
“(The primary] may be predominance of one type and then
metastasis [sic] because that’s the most aggressive form of the
tumor versus the primary.” Singer testified, to a reasonable

degree of medical certainty, Farr’s cancer spread from his
vight lung to his left lung.

On cross-examination, Singer acknowledged the surgeons
checked the margins around the tumor for signs of cancer
cells and did not find any. The surgeons also looked at the
lung itself for further signs of cancer, but did not discover any.
Singer acknowledged that lymph nodes taken during the
surgery tested negative for cancer cells, and there did not
appear to be any vascular involvement. Singer also recognized
Farr continued to smoke following his surgery. Finally, Singer
acknowledged that if Farr did not die of the right lung cancer,
and the right lung cancer did not spread to the left, but the
left cancer was in fact a new cancer, Respondents would not
be responsible for his death.

On redirect, Singer testified he has seen several thousand
patients with lung cancer during his career. Singer stated a
patient can have a metastasis with negative margins and no
lymph node involvement, According to Singer, surgical resec-
tion does not remove every cancer cell from a patient, and
“even in patients with pathologic Stage, Stage 1 lung cancer,
where every node is negative and every margin is negative, 30
percent die because they have metastatic disease that turns up
within a year or two.” Singer testified, in his opinion, it is
more likely than not that Farr was part of the 30 percent who
die without lymph node involvement.

At the close of McKaughan’s case, Respondents moved for a
directed verdict, arguing she had not introduced any evidence
of how the cancer metastasized from the right lung to the left.
Respondents argued McKaughan’s failure to prove a method
of metastasis constituted a failure to prove causation.

McKaughan argued she does not have to prove the mecha-
nism of spread, only that the tumor did in fact spread.
McKanughan noted, “A lot of times, in a cancer spread, Your
Honor, there is no evidence” of how the cancer spread.

The trial court detailed its belief that McKaughan had the
responsibility to prove how the cancer got from one lung to
the other. The trial court stated, “I’m just not convinced that
it’s enough for a doctor to come in and look at the end result
and say okay, this cancer’s the same as the other cancer, it
met—it metastasized and not say well, how did it—that hap-

pen.” McKaughan again asserted, “How something happens is
not our burden.” Respondents again asserted McKaughan
must prove the method by which the cancer metastasized in
order to prove causation.

The trial court found McKaughan had not presented suffi-
cient evidence to prove how the cancer metastasized from one
lung to the other. The trial court then granted Respondents’
motion for directed verdict, reasoning that allowing the jury to
deliver a verdict in this case would require them to “engage in
improper speculation in [determining] how this cancer got
from one side to the other.”

Wl We find the trial court imposed too high a burden on
McKaughan to prove how the cancer spread from one lung to
the other. In this highly technical field, where there may not
be clear markers indicating by what method a cancer spreads,
it was an error of law to direct a verdict in favor of Respon-
dents because Dr. Singer did not definitively indicate by what
method the cancer metastasized. See Hilton, 418 S.C. at 141,
775 S.H.2d at 62 (“When expert testimony is the only evidence
of proximate cause relied upon, the testimony must provide a
significant causal link between the alleged negligence and the
plaintiff's injuries, rather than a tenuous and hypothetical
connection.” (quoting Hoard, 387 S.C. at 546-47, 694 8.H.2d at
5)). If a plaintiff presents an expert who testifies, to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty, and with supporting scientific
evidence, that the plaintiff's cancer is a metastasis, the plain-
tiff has met its burden to overcome a directed verdict.

Under this standard, we believe Singer presented sufficient
evidence for the jury to determine that Farr’s cancer metasta-
sized from his right lung to his left lung. Burnett, 387 S.C, at
188, 691 S.H.2d at 178 (“The trial court must deny a directed
verdict motion where the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt.”). Singer’s testimony
indicates his professional opinion that the cancer in Farr’s
right lung metastasized to his left lung, even though the
margins surrounding the tumor and the lymph nodes were
negative for cancer cells. Singer noted cancer cells were found
within one millimeter of the edge of the lung resection follow-
ing the 2010 surgery. According to Singer, these close margins
indicated “there’s a great risk that cells may have been left

after the surgery.” Further, Singer testified surgical resec-
tions do not remove all cancer cells, and 30% of patients with
negative margins and no lymph node involvement subsequent-
ly have a recurrence of cancer. Based on his experience,
Singer testified he was 95% sure the adenocarcinoma in Farr’s
left lung was the same adenocarcinoma from Farr’s right lung,
based in part on when the second tumor appeared. We believe
Singer’s testimony alone provided a basis by which the jury
could have found the cancer metastasized from the right lung
to the left lung. This evidence was sufficient to overcome
Respondent’s motion for a directed verdict.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is

REVERSED.
HUFF and THOMAS, J.J., coneur.

805 S.E.2d 216
CHARLESTON COUNTY ASSESSOR, Appellant,
ve
UNIVERSITY VENTURES, LLC, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001106
Opinion No. 5516
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard January 25, 2017
Filed September 14, 2017
Rehearing Denied October 19, 2017

1, Because we reverse the trial court's order granting Respondents’
motion for a directed verdict, we decline to address McKaughan’s
arguments regarding expert testimony that was excluded as unreliable.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C, 598, 613,
518 S,.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review
remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive
of the appeal),

Prag
ad

Rey
a
ay

Bernard H. Ferrara, Jr., Joseph Dawson, III, Austin Adams
Bruner, and Johanna Serrano Gardner, all of North Charles-
ton, for Appellant.

Morris Arthur Ellison and William Thomas Dawson, III,
both of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, of Charles-
ton, for Respondent.

KONDUROS, J::

In this tax reassessment case, the Charleston County Asses-
sor (the Assessor) appeals the administrative law court (ALC)
finding the assessed value for 2011 of property owned by
University Ventures LLC was incorrect. The Assessor con-
tends the ALC erred in determining (1) the reassessment
cycle at issue began in 2005 and (2) the property should be
valued as a vacant lot. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
PROCESS FOR ASSESSMENT OF REAL PROPERTY

This case involves the procedure for tax assessment of
property in South Carolina. We provide an overview of the law
governing tax assessment prior to discussing the facts.

The South Carolina Constitution directs the General Assem-
bly to create the method by which property in South Carolina
should be taxed. See S.C. Const. art. X, § 6. (“The General
Assembly shall establish, through the enactment of general
law ... the method of assessment of real property within the
State that shall apply to each political subdivision within the
State.”); Simkins v. City of Spartanburg, 269 S.C. 248, 247,
237 S.H.2d 69, 71 (1977) (“[Alssessment means the value
placed upon property for the purpose of taxation by officials
appointed for that purpose.”). Accordingly, the General As-
sembly has established the process through which property is
to be assessed through statutory scheme. “All property must.
be assessed uniformly and equitably throughout the State.”
8.C. Code Ann. § 12-48-210(A) (2014).

Additionally, the legislature has dictated that reassessment '
happen once every five years. See S.C. Code Ann, § 12-43-
217A) (2014) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
once every fifth year each county or the State shall appraise
and equalize those properties under its jurisdiction,”). It has
also provided: “Property valuation must be complete at the
end of December of the fourth year.,., In the fifth year, the
county or State shall implement the program and assess all
property on the newly appraised values.” Jd. Additionally,
“{nJo reassessment program may be implemented in a county
unless all real property in the county, including real property
classified as manufacturing property, is reassessed in the
same year.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-210(B) (2014). Section 12-
43-217(B) allows the implementation of the five-year-reassess-
ment program to be postponed one year. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-43-217(B) (“A county by ordinance may postpone for not
more than one property tax year the implementation of re-
vised values resulting from the equalization program provided
pursuant to subsection (A).”).

The amount the value of real property can be increased for
each five-year reassessment is limited to 15%. See S.C. Const.
art. X, § 6 (“Each political subdivision shall value real proper-
ty by a method in which the value of each parcel of real

1, Reassessment is defined as “[a]n official revaluation of property, often.
repeated periodically, for the levying of a tax.” Assessment, Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed, 2014).

property, adjusted for improvements and losses, does not
increase more than fifteen percent every five years unless ...
an assessable transfer of interest! occurs.”); 8.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-37-3140(B) (2014) (“Any increase in the fair market value
of real property attributable to the periodic countywide ap-
praisal and equalization program implemented pursuant to
[slection 12-43-217 is limited to fifteen percent within a five-
year period to the otherwise applicable fair market value. This
limit must be calculated on the land and improvements as a
whole.”).
However, this limit does not apply to the fair market value
of additions or improvements" to real property in the year
those additions or improvements are first subject to proper-
ty tax, nor do[es it] apply to the fair market value of real
property when an assessable transfer of interest occurred in
the year that the transfer value is first subject to tax.
§ 12-87-3140(B). A new structure cannot “be listed or assessed
for property tax until it is completed and fit for the use for
which it is intended,” which is shown “by the issuance of the
certificate of occupancy or the structure actually is occupied if
no certificate is issued.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-87-670 (2014).

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 5, 2006, University Ventures purchased va-
cant land located in North Charleston for $1,253,224. In April
of 2008, University Ventures received a building permit and
began construction on the land of a 115-room Hampton Inn
and Suites, with the construction cost estimated at $7,952,998.
The hotel was completed, and a certificate of occupancy was
issued on April 22, 2009, The Assessor issued a 2010 tax
assessment for the property with a value of $8,180,000, which
University Ventures did not challenge.

2. ‘Assessable transfer of interest’ means a transfer of an existing
interest in real property that subjects the real property to appraisal.”
S.C, Code Ann, § 12-37-130(4) (2014).

3. “‘‘Additions’ or ‘improvements’ mean an increase in the value of an
existing parcel of real property because of: (a) new construction; (b)
reconstruction; (c) major additions to the boundaries of the property or
a structure on the property; (d) remodeling; or (e) renovation and
epaehitation, including installation.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-3130(1)
(2014).

TT

The Assessor conducted a reassessment with a uniform date
of value of December 31, 2008. On May 21, 2009, Charleston
County Council adopted an ordinance ‘ providing for the post-
ponement of the implementation of the 2010 revised values
resulting from the next county-wide equalization program
until 20115

The Assessor sent a notice of reassessment dated June 30,
2011, to University Ventures, stating the property’s fair mar-
ket value for the 2011 Reassessment was $9,630,000 based on
a date of value of December 31, 2008, but was limited by the
15% cap on increases in value at $9,407,000.° In September
2011, University Ventures objected to the valuation for the
property. The Assessor reviewed the valuation and made no
adjustment.

University Ventures applied for review by the Charleston
County Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board). Following a
conference, the Board determined because the hotel was in-
complete at the end of 2008, the property should be assessed
as vacant land and valued it at $628,439.

The Assessor filed a request for a contested case hearing
with the ALC. At the hearing, Walter L. Ziegler, Sr., who was
employed by and performed appraisals for the Assessor’s
Office, testified the property was valued at $404,000 for both
the 2008 and 2009 tax bills. He provided that once the hotel

4, That ordinance stated:

The implementation of revised values from the 2010 county-wide
appraisal and equalization program are hereby directed to be post-
poned for one property year. The postponement directed applies to all
revised values.... In accordance with Act No. 93 of 1999, the
postponement directed by this Ordinance shall not affect the schedule
of the appraisal and equalization program required pursuant to ...
[slection 12-43-217.

Charleston County Ord. # 1586, The pertinent portion of Act No, 93

amended section 12-43-217 of the South Carolina Code to provide for

the postponement of the implementation of the revised valuations for

reassessment and equalization by not more than one year, Act No. 93

§ 12(B), 1999 S.C. Acts 316,

5. The Assessor refers to the reassessment that was implemented in 2011
as the 2010 Reassessment. We will call it the 2011 Reassessment to
avoid confusion with the yearly assessment for 2010.

6. $9,407,000 is a 15% increase from the previously assessed value of
$8,180,000.

was finished in 2009, the Assessor sent University Ventures an
assessment dated May 14, 2010, valuing the property at
$8,180,000. He testified the tax bill was for hotel, land, and
improvements, which were valued at $8,180,000. He further
testified that for the county-wide reassessment issued in 2011,
the Assessor valued the property at $9,630,000 but the in-
crease was limited to $9,407,000 because of the 15% cap. On
cross-examination, Ziegler indicated the last general five-year
reassessment done for the county was based on values as of
December 81, 2003. He stated he was unsure in what year that
reassessment was supposed to have taken place but he knew it
was delayed one year. He also noted that assessment was
actually implemented in 2005. He further explained reassess-
ment was to be performed every five years according to state
statute. However, he testified the next reassessment was
supposed to be completed in 2010. He provided it was sup-
posed to be implemented in 2010 and it was delayed until 2011.
He recapped that implementation for the reassessments was
delayed for 2004 until 2005 and for 2010 until 2011.

Both sides presented real estate appraisal experts who
testified as to the value of the property. The Assessor’s expert
provided a value of the property on December 31, 2008, based
on the hypothetical assumption the hotel was complete at that
time, He valued it at $8,861,350 for tax assessment purposes.
He believed the hotel was 65% to 70% complete on December
81, 2008, but he did not examine the property until 2014. He
testified the value of the land alone on December 31, 2008, was
$990,000, Alternatively, University Ventures’ expert testified
the value of the land alone on December 31, 2008, was
$784,000, He indicated the hotel was 65% complete on Decem-
ber 81, 2008. He placed the hypothetical value of the hotel on
December 31, 2008, if it had been complete, at $8,450,000. He
testified the actual value of the hotel on that date was
$3,959,400. He provided he had never heard of a building
being taxed on its value as a partially complete building; he
believed property could only be taxed on the value of the land
until the building was completed.

Following the hearing, the ALC determined the Assessor
had misapplied section 12-43-217 of the South Carolina Code
and because the improvements—the hotel—were not complet-
ed at the time of the valuation date, the property was appro-

priately valued as vacant land, The ALC found the preponder-
ance of the evidence supported University Ventures’ position
the reassessment cycle at issue was comprised of the years
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. The ALC determined the
Assessor implemented the reassessment using the wrong
years—2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010. The ALC calculated
the value for the land value to be $860,587 by averaging the
experts’ values of the unimproved land. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a tax assessment case reaches the ALC “as a
request for judicial review of [a] County Board of Assessment
Appeals decision upholding [an] [a]ssessor’s valuation,” the
proceeding in front of the ALC is a de novo hearing. Smith v.
Newberry Cty. Assessor, 350 S.C. 572, 577, 567 S.H.2d 501, 504
(Ct. App. 2002); see also Reliance Ins. Co, v. Smith, 327 S.C.
528, 534, 489 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[Allthough a
case involving a property tax assessment reaches the AL[C] in
the posture of an appeal, the AL[C] is not sitting in an
appellate capacity and is not restricted to a review of the
decision below. Instead, the proceeding before the AL[C] is in
the nature of a de novo hearing.”).

HMMM “In reaching a decision in a contested violation mat-
ter, the ALC serves as the sole finder of fact in the de novo
contested case proceeding.” S.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Sandal-
wood Soc. Club, 899 S.C. 267, 279, 731 S.H.2d 330, 837 (Ct.
App. 2012). “The Rules of Procedure for the Administrative
Law Judge Division require that the AL[C] make independent.
findings of fact in contested case hearings, and the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act clearly contemplates that the AL[{C]
will make [its] own findings of fact in a contested case
hearing.” Reliance Ins. Co., 827 S.C. at 584, 489 S.H.2d at 677
(citation omitted). When the evidence conflicts on “an issue,
the [cJourt’s substantial evidence standard of review defers to
the findings of the fact-finder.” Risher v. S.C. Dep’t of Health
& Envil. Control, 398 S.C, 198, 210, 712 S.E.2d 428, 485 (2011).

The review of the [ALC]’s order must be confined to the

record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the

judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the
decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it

SS ©

may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights

of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding,

conclusion, or decision is:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(©) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of

discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann, § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2016).

HMM “The decision of the [ALC] should not be overturned
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled
by some error of law.” Original Blue Ribbon Tawi Corp. v.
S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600, 604, 670 S.E.2d 674,
676 (Ct. App. 2008). “A reviewing court may reverse or modify
an administrative decision if the findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence.” Risher, 393 S.C. at 210,
712 S.E.2d at 484. “Substantial evidence is ‘evidence which,
considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency
reached.” Se. Res. Recovery, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Health &
Envil. Control, 358 S.C. 402, 407, 595 S.E.2d 468, 470 (2004)
(quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C, 130, 185, 276 S.H.2d 304, 306
(1981)). “Substantial evidence ... is more than a mere scintilla
of evidence.” Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp., 380 8.C. at
605, 670 S.H.2d at 676,

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Years in Reassessment Cycle

I The Assessor argues the ALC misconstrued South
Carolina law and the Charleston County ordinance postponing
reassessment when it found the reassessment cycle at issue in
the case ended in 2009 instead of 2010. We disagree.

HE “Questions of statutory interpretation are questions
of law, which this [clourt is free to decide without any defer-
ence to the tribunal below.” Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't
of Revenue, 415 S.C. 351, 855, 782 S.H.2d 590, 592 (2016). “The

TT

cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Centew Int'l, Inc. v.
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 182, 189, 750 S$.H.2d 65, 69
(2013) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 8.C. 495, 498, 640 8.H.2d
457, 459 (2007)). “The language of a tax statute must be given
its plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of an ambiguity
therein.” Duke Energy Corp., 415 S.C. at 355, 782 §.E.2d at
592; see also Lockwood Greene Eng’rs, Inc. v. S.C. Tax
Comm'n, 298 8.C. 447, 449, 861 8.B.2d 346, 347 (Ct. App. 1987)
(“A statutory provision should be given a reasonable and
practical construction consistent with the purpose and policy
expressed in the statute.”). “[W]e must follow the plain and
unambiguous language in a statute and have ‘no right to
impose another meaning.’” Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397
§.C. 582, 585-36, 725 8.H.2d 698, 695 (2012) (quoting Hodges v.
Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 583 S.H.2d 578, 581 (2000)). “When a
statute’s terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there
is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply
the statute according to its literal meaning.” Centew Int'l, Inc.,
406 S.C. at 189, 750 S.H.2d at 69 (quoting Sloan, 871 S.C. at
498, 640 S.E.2d at 459). “However, ‘the statute must be read
as a whole and sections which are part of the same general
statutory law must be construed together and each one given
effect.’” CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67,
74, T16 S.H.2d 877, 881 (2011) (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth.
v. Jasper Cty., 368 S.C. 388, 398, 629 S.H.2d 624, 629 (2006)).

The legislature has ordered that reassessment happen once
every five years: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
once every fifth year each county or the State shall appraise
and equalize those properties under its jurisdiction.” S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-43-217(A) (2014). The legislature has also
mandated: “Property valuation must be complete at the end of
December of the fourth year.... In the fifth year, the county
or State shall implement the program and assess all property
on the newly appraised values.” Jd. Further, a reassessment
program cannot “be implemented in a county unless all real
property in the county ... is reassessed in the same year.”
8.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-210(B) (2014). A county can postpone
the implementation of the five-year-reassessment program for
one year. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-217(B) (2014) (“A county
by ordinance may postpone for not more than one property

tax year the implementation of revised values resulting from
the equalization program provided pursuant to subsection
(A).”).

The Assessor contends a reassessment cycle must be viewed
prospectively. Therefore, in this case, because the reassess-
ment was to be implemented in 2010 (implementation post-
poned to 2011), the fifth year of the cycle was 2010, and the
new cycle would encompass 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015.
University Ventures maintains the five-year cycle actually
ended in 2009 based on looking back at previous cycles and
counting forward, making the cycle at issue in this case 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.”

The only evidence in the record about when the five-year
eycle began was provided by Ziegler. He testified the previous
cycle ended in 2004. This end date is supported by agreement
of the Assessor in this court’s opinion for LMP Properties. See
LMP Props., Inc., 403 8.C. at 197, 743 8.E.2d at 89 (providing
that at a contested case hearing before the ALC at which the
Assessor sought review of the Board’s decision, “the parties[,
including the Assessor,] agreed that the date for valuing the
properties was December 31, 2003, because 2004 was the year
of the countywide reassessment”). Additionally, although not
binding on us, the ALC has recognized in several cases in
which the Assessor was a party that 1999 was a reassessment,
year, although the Assessor ultimately delayed the implemen-
tation by two years to 2001. See Northbridge Assocs. LLC v.
Charleston Cty. Assessor, 038-ALJ-17-0148-CC (filed Mar. 30,
2004); Charleston Cty. Assessor v. Bennett, 02-ALJ-17-0268-

7. We note the parties agreed the date of value for the property was
December 31, 2008, However, the Assessor's rationale for why that date
is proper is flawed. It maintains 2009 is the fourth year of the cycle and
tax values can be determined at any time before December 31 of the
fourth year, “Ordinarily, ‘[t]he pertinent date to determine the value of
property for a given tax year is December 31st of the preceding year.’ ”’
Charleston Cty. Assessor v. LMP Props., Inc., 403 S.C, 194, 199, 743
S.E.2d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 2013) (alteration by court) (quoting Lindsey v.
S.C. Tax Comm'n, 302 S.C. 274, 275 n.1, 395 S.E.2d 184, 185 nt
(1990)). However, section 12-43-217(A) clearly states valuation “must
be complete at the end of” the fourth year of the reassessment cycle.
University Ventures’ position—that the fourth year of the cycle was
2008—is correct as further discussed infra. The Assessor's attempt to
make the 2008 valuation date conform to its reassessment cycle argu-
ment is strained and unpersuasive.

CC, n.1 (filed Apr. 29, 2003); Charleston Cty. Assessor v. Pack
Rat Investments, 02-ALJ-17-0120-CC, n.8 (filed Apr. 29, 2008).
The fact that 1999 was a reassessment year supports Ziegler’s
testimony that 2004 was the end of the subsequent reassess-
ment cycle.

The Assessor’s repeated pattern of delaying the implemen-
tation year for reassessment has resulted in confusion and
inconsistency because it has created a six-year cycle. However,
the statute is clear the delay only applies to the implementa-
tion; any delay should have no impact on the five-year reas-
sessment cycle. The confusion over which value to use for the
hotel seems to have arisen in part from the Assessor delaying
the 1999 reassessment to 2001, instead of 2000.

The Assessor caused the problem by confusing the permis-
sible one-year delay in implementation with an impermissible
delay in starting the clock running on the five-year cycle. The
only evidence in the record supports the ALC’s determination
the Assessor incorrectly calculated the five-year reassessment
period and the relevant period actually ended in 2009, The
evidence further supports the ALC’s finding the Assessor’s
reasoning for its actions unconvincing. Therefore, we affirm
these findings.

Il. Value of Property for 2011 Tax Reassessment
HI The Assessor contends the ALC erred in valuing the
property as a vacant lot for the purposes of the 2011 Reassess-
ment. We agree.
“All property must be valued for taxation at its true value in
money....” S.C, Code Ann. § 12-37-9380 (2014). True value
is the price which the property would bring following rea-
sonable exposure to the market, where both the seller and
the buyer are willing, are not acting under compulsion, and
are reasonably well informed of the uses and purposes for
which it is adapted and for which it is capable of being used.
Id.
The fair market value is determined at the later of:
(a) the base year®! ...;

8. “For purposes of determining a ‘base year’ fair market value pursuant
to this section, the fair market value of real property is its appraised

es *

(b) December thirty-first of the year in which an assessable

transfer of interest has occurred;

(c) as determined on appeal; or

(d) as it may be adjusted as determined in a countywide

reassessment program conducted pursuant to [slection 12-

43-217, but limited to [a 15% increase].

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-87-3140(A)(1) (2014). “[Tyhe fair market
value of subsequent improvements and additions to the prop-
erty” must be added to this value. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-87-
8140(A)(2) (2014). A new structure cannot “be listed or as-
sessed for property tax until it is completed and fit for the use
for which it is intended,” which is shown “by the issuance of
the certificate of occupancy or the structure actually is occu-
pied if no certificate is issued.” 8.C. Code Ann. § 12-87-670
(2014).

“Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law,
which this [clourt is free to decide without any deference to
the tribunal below.” Duke Energy Corp., 415 S.C. at 855, 782
§.B.2d at 592. “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Centex Int'l, Inc., 406 S.C. at 189, 750 S.H.2d at 69 (quoting
Sloan, 871 S.C. at 498, 640 S.E.2d at 459). “The language of a
tax statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning in
the absence of an ambiguity therein.” Duke Energy Corp., 415
S.C. at 855, 782 S.H.2d at 592; see also Lockwood Greene
Eng’rs, Inc., 293 S.C. at 449, 361 S.H.2d at 347 (“A statutory
provision should be given a reasonable and practical construc-
tion consistent with the purpose and policy expressed in the
statute.”). “However, regardless of how plain the ordinary
meaning of the words in a statute, courts will reject that
meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly
absurd that it could not have been intended by the General
Assembly.” Duke Energy Corp., 415 S.C. at 855, 782 S.H.2d at
592. “If possible, the [cJourt will construe a statute so as to
escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect.” Id.
“Tn so doing, the [c]ourt should not concentrate on isolated
phrases within the statute, but rather, read the statute as a
whole and in a manner consonant and in harmony with its

value applicable for property tax year 2007.” S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-
3140(C) (2014).

purpose.” Id.; see also CFRE, LLC, 395 &.C. at 74, 716 8.H.2d
at 881 (“However, ‘the statute must be read as a whole and
sections which are part of the same general statutory law
must be construed together and each one given effect.’”
(quoting S.C. State Ports Auth., 368 S.C. at 398, 629 S.H.2d at
629)).

“(T]he Assessor is required to prove the correct-
ness of the valuation he is seeking; the Assessor is not
required ... to prove the incorrectness of the Board’s deci-
sion.” Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C. 528, 584, 489 S.H.2d
674, 677 (Ct. App. 1997). “A taxpayer contesting an assess-
ment has the burden of showing that the valuation of the
taxing authority is incorrect.” Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 88,
867 S.B.2d 171, 173 (Ct. App. 1988). “Ordinarily, this will be
done by proving the actual value of the property. The taxpay-
er may, however, show by other evidence that the assessing
authority’s valuation is incorrect. If he does so, the presump-
tion of correctness is then removed and the taxpayer is
entitled to appropriate relief.” Id. at 88-89, 867 S.H.2d at 178
(citation omitted).

Because the 2010 Assessment was the first time the com-
pleted hotel was assessed at the value of a completed build-
ing—a value University Ventures did not challenge— the 2010
Assessment value would be the proper value to use from that
time until the next reassessment. Because the value set when
the hotel was complete was more current than the value of
what was actually in existence on December 31, 2008—when
valuation for county-wide reassessment was performed—there
is no reason to change the value during the implementation of
reassessment. See § 12-37-3140(A)(1) (providing a property’s
fair market value is the value applicable at the later of certain
events). Nothing changed in the time since the hotel was first
appraised until the 2011 Reassessment—no Assessable Trans-
fers of Interest or additional improvements occurred.

The hotel could not be valued as an incomplete hotel be-
cause of the statutory requirement that a new structure
cannot “be listed or assessed for property tax until it is
completed and fit for the use for which it is intended.” 8.C.
Code Ann. § 12-37-670(A). Whether it is complete and fit for
use is demonstrated “by the issuance of the certificate of

occupancy,” which did not occur until 2009. S.C. Code Ann,
§ 12-87-670(B). A hypothetical value of what the hotel would
have been worth on December 31, 2008, if it was completed is
not the proper value to use for the 2011 Reassessment. It
would produce an absurd result for the property to be valued
as if a finished hotel were on it when that was not the case. It
also would be absurd for the property to be assessed as a
completed hotel one year, revert to vacant land for the reas-
sessment year, and then return to the value at which it was
originally assessed for the following year’s assessment, as the
ALC determined should happen.

The value of the completed hotel was calculated at a date
after the date of valuation for reassessment. Because its
valuation had already been updated and was the most current,
it did not need to be reassessed. If reassessed values had gone
into effect the year before they did, the value of the completed
hotel would have been what was assessed and not changed the
following years. The purpose of reassessment is for property
values to be up to date but also all evaluated at the same time.
However, the statute specifically provides that if a property
has improvements or additions, which by definition includes
new construction, those improvements are eligible to be as-
sessed once completed. Because the hotel was completed after
valuation was finished for other properties in Charleston
County, the initial finished value is the correct value to use.
Therefore, the ALC erred in valuing the property as vacant
land for the 2011 reassessment. Accordingly, that determina-
tion is reversed and instead the property should be valued at
$8.18 million as it was when it was first completed and
assessed.?

CONCLUSION

The ALC correctly determined Charleston had delayed its
reassessment by more than the one year allowed by the

9. The Assessor further maintains the ALC erred when it placed only a
land value on the property for the 2011 Reassessment because the
property assessment for the previous year included the completed hotel
and University Ventures did not appeal that assessment. Based on our
decision of the other issues on appeal, we need not address this issue.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.B.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review
remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive
of the appeal).

Legislature. However, the ALC erred in setting the value of
the property as vacant land and instead the property should
be valued at $8.18 million as it was when it was first completed
and assessed. Accordingly, the ALC’s decision is

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

LOCKEMY, C.J, and MCDONALD, J., coneur.

806 S.H.2d 82

The PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA; The Trustees of The Protestant Epis-
eopal Church in South Carolina, a South Carolina Corporate
Body; All Saints Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc.; Christ St.
Paul’s Episcopal Church; Christ the King, Waccamaw; Church
of The Cross, Ine. and Church of the Cross Declaration of
Trust; Church of The Holy Comforter; Church of the Redeem-
er; Holy Trinity Episcopal Church; Saint Luke’s Church, Hil-
ton Head; St. Matthews Church; St. Andrews Church-Mt, Pleas-
ant Land Trust; St. Bartholomews Episcopal Church; St.
David’s Church; St. James’ Church, James Island, 8.C.; St.
John’s Episcopal Church of Florence, 8.C.; St. Matthias Episco-
pal Church, Inc, St. Paul’s Episcopal Church of Bennettsville,
Inc,; St. Paul’s Episcopal Church of Conway; The Church of St.
Luke and St. Paul, Radcliffeboro; The Church of Our Saviour
of the Diocese of South Carolina; The Church of the Epiphany
(Episcopal); The Church of the Good Shepherd, Charleston, SC;
The Church of The Holy Cross; The Church of The Resurrec-
tion, Surfside; The Protestant Episcopal Church of The Parish
of Saint Philip, in Charleston, in the State of South Carolina;
The Protestant Episcopal Church, The Parish of Saint Michael,
in Charleston, in the State of South Carolina and St. Michael’s
Church Declaration of Trust; The Vestry and Church Wardens
of St. Jude’s Church of Walterboro; The Vestry and Church
Wardens of The Episcopal Church of The Parish of Prince
George Winyah; The Vestry and Church Wardens of The
Church of The Parish of St. Helena and The Parish Church of
St. Helena Trust; The Vestry and Church Wardens of The
Parish of St. Matthew; The Vestry and Wardens of St. Paul’s
Church, Summerville; Trinity Church of Myrtle Beach; Trinity
Episcopal Church; Trinity Episcopal Church, Pinopolis; Vestry
and Church Wardens of the Episcopal Church of The Parish of
Christ Church; Vestry and Church Wardens of The Episcopal
Church of the Parish of St. John’s, Charleston County, The
Vestries and Churchwardens of The Parish of St. Andrews,
Respondents,

212

The EPISCOPAL CHURCH (a/k/a The Protestant Episcopal
Church in the United States of America) and The Episcopal
Church in South Carolina, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000622
Opinion No. 27731
Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard September 28, 2015
Filed August 2, 2017
Rehearing Denied November 17, 2017

213

Lt

Allan R. Holmes, Sr. and Timothy O. Lewis, both of Gibbs &
Holmes, of Charleston, David Booth Beers and Mary E.
Kostel, both of Goodwin Procter, LLP, of Washington, DC,
Blake A. Hewitt and John S. Nichols, both of Bluestein
Nichols Thompson & Delgado, of Columbia, Thomas S. Tisdale
and Jason §. Smith, both of Hellman Yates & Tisdale, of
Charleston and R. Walker Humphrey, II, of Waters & Kraus,
of Dallas, Texas, for Appellants.

C. Alan Runyan and Andrew S. Platte, both of Speights &
Runyan, of Beaufort, Henrietta U. Golding and Amanda Bai-
Jey, both of McNair Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, C. Mitchell

Brown, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Columbia,
Charles H. Williams, of Williams & Williams, of Orangeburg,
David Cox, of Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, of
Charleston, Thomas C. Davis, of Harvey & Battey, of Beau-
fort, Harry Easterling, Jr., of Bennettsville, G. Mark Phillips,
of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Charleston, W.
Foster Gaillard and Henry Grimball, both of Womble, Carlyle,
Sandridge & Rice, of Charleston, Keith McCarty, of McCarty
Law Firm, of Charleston, William A. Scott, of Pedersen &
Scott, of Charleston, Mark Evans, of Charleston, David B.
Marvel and David L. DeVane, both of Prenner Marvel, of
Charleston, John Furman Wall, ITI, of Mt. Pleasant, Allan P.
Sloan, ITI and Joseph C. Wilson, IV, both of Pierce, Herns,
Sloan & Wilson, of Charleston, C. Pierce Campbell, of Turner,
Padget, Graham & Laney, of Florence, Robert R. Horger, of
Horger, Barnwell & Reid, of Orangeburg, Saunders M.
Bridges, of Aiken Bridges Elliott Tyler & Saleeby, of Flor-
ence, Lawrence B. Orr, of Orr Elmore & Ervin, of Florence,
Francis M. Mack, of St. Matthews, Robert S. Shelton, of The
Bellamy Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, William A. Bryan, of
Bryan & Haar, of Surfside Beach, Harry Oxner, of Oxner &
Stacy, of Georgetown, Susan MacDonald and Jim Lehman,
both of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Myrtle
Beach, Brandt Shelbourne, of Shelbourne Law Firm, of Sum-
merville, Stephen S. McKenzie, of Coffey, Chandler & Kent, of
Manning, John B. Williams, of Williams & Hulst, of Moncks
Corner, George J. Kefalos and Oana D. Johnson, both of
George J. Kefalos, P.A., of Charleston, Stephen Spitz, of
Charleston and Thornwell F. Sowell, III and Bess J. Durant,
both of Sowell Gray Stepp & Lafitte, LLC, of Columbia, for
Respondents.

ACTING JUSTICE PLEICONES:

This is an appeal from a circuit court order holding that the
Appellants have no legal or equitable interests in certain real
and personal property located in South Carolina, and enjoining
the Appellants from utilizing certain disputed service marks
and names. In this lead opinion I explain why I would reverse
the entire order.

The Respondents are the Protestant Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of South Carolina (Disassociated Diocese); the
Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Church in South Car-
olina (Trustees); and thirty-six individual parishes that have
aligned themselves with the Disassociated Diocese (Parishes).
The Appellants are The Episcopal Church a/k/a The Protes-
tant Episcopal Church in the United States of America (TEC)
and The Episcopal Church in South Carolina, the diocese that
remains affiliated with the TEC (Associated Diocese).

After a lengthy bench trial, and based upon the application
of “neutral principles of law,” the circuit court found in favor
of the Respondents on both the property and the service mark
causes of action. Since the main purposes of this suit were
requests for declaratory judgments and injunctive relief, I find
that it sounds in equity.’ Doe v. S.C. Med. Mal. Liab. Joint
Underwriting Ass’n, 347 8.C. 642, 557 S.E.2d 670 (2001). The
Court is therefore free to take its own view of the facts. Id.

As noted above, much of the trial judge’s decision making in
this case was controlled by her interpretation of the “neutral
principles of law” approach to deciding ecclesiastical disputes.
See Pearson v. Church of God, 825 S.C. 45, 478 S.H.2d 849
(1996) (adopting this approach). Specifically, she was guided
by her reading of this Court’s decision in All Saints Parish
Waccamaw v. The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Dio-

1, Acting Justice Toal maintains that because the declarations made in
this case will determine the rightful ownership of property, the main
purpose of this suit is legal. I, however, look not to the first paragraph
of the complaint, but rather to the prayer for relief, which seeks a
declaration (1) which of the competing entities is the true diocese, (2)
that respondents’ legal title to property trumps appellants’ equitable
claims, and (3) for other injunctive relief related to trade names, The
main purpose is to enjoin appellants from “interfering” with the re-
spondents in “church matters” and thus this suit sounds in equity.
Compare, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 349 S.C. 336, 563 S.B.2d 320 (2002).
To the extent the issues turn on property rights, the results turn on the
validity and existence of certain trusts, matters which also sound in
equity. E.g., Settlemeyer v. McCluney, 359 S.C. 317, 596 S.B.2d 514 (Ct.
App. 2004). Were Acting Justice Toal correct, and were the Court to
find the main purpose of this suit were legal, then the Court would be
compelled to reverse and remand for a new trial given the number of
erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge
and raised to us on appeal. I note none of the opinions that would
uphold the trial court's order in whole or in part address these issues.

cese of South Carolina, 385 8.C. 428, 685 8.E.2d 163 (2009)
(All Saints). In the trial judge’s view, the admissibility of
evidence and the resolution of the property disputes at issue
here were properly adjudicated solely on the basis of state
corporate, property, and trust law, and she was required to
ignore the ecclesiastical setting in which these disputes arose.
This error of law led, in turn, to a distorted view of the issues
in this case.

Before discussing the merits of the appeal, I briefly review
a simplified history of TEC, and the church’s history in South
Carolina. I next address, and would reverse, the circuit court’s
finding that TEC is a congregational rather than a hierarchi-
cal church. I then address misperceptions of the “neutral
principles of law” approach resulting in large part from the
trial court’s reading of All Saints, which I would now overrule
in part? I conclude that the present property and church
governance disputes are not appropriate for resolution in the
civil courts and would reverse the order to the extent it
purports to resolve these questions. Finally, I find the trial
court erred in holding that the Respondents’ state-registered
trademarks prevail over TEC’s federally-protected trade-
marks, and therefore would also reverse that portion of the
order.

HISTORY

The Episcopal Church has a long history in South Carolina.
See All Saints, supra. In 1789, four years after its formation,
the Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina (South
Carolina Diocese) and six other dioceses came together to
form the national church (TEC). The South Carolina Diocese
was voluntarily associated with TEC since that date, save for a
five-year hiatus surrounding the Civil War. In 1841, Article 1
was added to the South Carolina Diocese’s Constitution. This
article, titled, “Of acceding to the constitutions and canons of
the general convention,” provided “The [South Carolina Dio-

2. Acting Justice Toal misreads my opinion as retitling property owned
by All Saints Waccamaw, ousting its vestry, and rewriting its charter. It
is unclear to me how Acting Justice Toal derives that conclusion as that
congregation is not a party to this suit.

cese] accedes to, recognizes and adopts the general constitu-
tion and canons of [TEC] and acknowledges their authority
accordingly.” Similar language in which the Diocese acceded to
TEC remained in the Diocese’s governing documents until
2010. Further, for more than 200 years, a parish had to agree
to conform to TEC’s Constitution and Canons as well as those
of the Diocese in order to become and remain a member of the
South Carolina Diocese. Finally, the Trustee Corporation,
which purports to be represented in this suit by the respon-
dent Trustees, was chartered as a non-profit corporation in
1880 and again in 1902.

In 1923, after requesting permission from TEC to divide the
state into two Dioceses, TEC’s General Convention agreed to
the division and the state was divided into the Upper and
Lower Dioceses of South Carolina. The Lower Diocese was
incorporated in 1978, with this corporate purpose: “[T]o con-
tinue an Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons
of [TEC}.” Both the Disassociated Diocese and the Associated
Diocese claim to be the successor to the Lower Diocese.

Overly simplified, the issue in this case is whether respon-
dent Disassociated Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes or
appellant Associated Diocese and its parishes “own” the real,
personal, and intellectual property that the Appellants allege
was held in trust for the benefit of TEC in 2009,

I, TEC Organization

In All Saints, the Court reiterated its previous definitions of
a congregational and a hierarchical church structure: “A con-
gregational church is an independent organization, governed
solely within itself..., while a hierarchical [or ecclesiastical]
church may be defined as one organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common
ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.” All Saints, 885 S.C.
at 448, 685 S.H.2d at 171 fn. 9 (quoting Seldon v. Singletary,
284 S.C. 148, 149, 326 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1985)).

TEC is an unincorporated association comprised of subunits
known as dioceses. Hach diocese is, in turn, comprised of
congregations known as parishes or missions. Every three

years, TEC sponsors a General Convention to which each
diocese’s standing committee sends a specified number of
clerical and lay representatives to conduct TEC’s business,
including electing and confirming * new bishops.

The evidence in the record demonstrates TEC’s organiza-
tion is three-tiered, with the General Convention at the top,
approximately one hundred dioceses created along geographi-
cal lines in the middle, and the individual parishes and mis-
sions affiliated with a particular diocese forming in the bottom
tier. TEC is led by a Presiding Bishop, and each diocese is
traditionally led by a bishop. The record establishes that the
ultimate authority in TEC rests with the General Convention,
and that the written sources of authority include TEC’s Con-
stitution and Canons, the Book of Common Prayer, and the
Holy Bible. As noted above, until 2010, the Lower Diocese
explicitly acceded to TEC’s authority, and accession to both
the Diocese and TEC was required of all parishes and mis-
sions. Further, until 2010, the Trustees’ corporate bylaws
stated it would carry out its duties under the authority of
TEC’s Constitution and Canons.

I find, based upon the evidence in this record, that TEC is a
hierarchical church, and would therefore overrule the trial
court’s finding that it is, instead, a congregational church. Doe,
supra. In reaching this decision, I join numerous other juris-
dictions that have concluded that TEC is a hierarchical
church. See, eg., Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.8d 699 (4th Cir.
2002); In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal4th 467, 87
Cal.Rptr.3d 275, 198 P.38d 66 (2009); Parish of the Advent v.
Protestamt Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, 426 Mass.
268, 688 N.E.2d 923 (1997); Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest
Tewas, 422 S.W.8d 594 (TX 2014); Falls Church v. Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States, 285 Va. 651, 740
§.E.2d 580 (2018). I turn next to a discussion of All Saints.

I. All Saints

As noted above, the trial judge’s conduct of the trial and her
rulings were governed, in large part, by her understanding of

3. Although a diocese (s)elects its own bishop, the bishop is not the
ecclesiastical authority for the diocese until, inter alia, a majority of the
standing committees for the remaining dioceses confirm his (s)election.

All Saints. As explained below, I would now overrule All
Saints to the extent it holds that TEC’s Dennis Canon and the
Lower Diocese’s own version of that Canon were ineffective in
ereating a trust over the property at issue here, and to the
extent the opinion distorts the correct understanding of the
neutral principles of law approach to resolving issues arising
from a church schism. In so doing, I focus especially on the
effects of corporate actions taken by ecclesiastical institutions.

In All Sainis, the dispute was between the Lower Diocese
and a congregation which sought to disaffiliate from the
Diocese. The legal questions were which faction of the splin-
tered Episcopal congregation owned the parish property, and
which faction controlled the parish’s vestry. All Saints decided
the property issue by holding that TEC’s 1979 “Dennis Can-
on” was ineffective in creating a trust over real and personal
property titled in the name of the All Saints Parish. Further,
in deciding the “legitimate vestry” issue, the Court indicated
that the “neutral principles of law” approach required that in
order for a civil court to determine whether a church-related
dispute could be adjudicated in that forum, the court must
look only at state corporate and property law, ignoring the
ecclesiastical context entirely. If the civil court could deter-
mine the dispute applying state law, then the case could be
resolved by it. Thus, All Saints undertook to analyze the
disagreement in that case by treating the “All Saints Corpora-
tion” as independent of the “Ail Saints Parish.” I find this
analysis to be a distortion of the neutral principles approach.
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775
(1979).

In All Saints, the Court correctly explained “neutral princi-
ples of law” this way:
A clear recitation of the neutral principles of law approach
as adopted by this Court was enunciated in Pearson v.
Church of God. In Pearson, we articulated the rule that
South Carolina civil courts must follow when adjudicating
church dispute cases. We reaffirm and more fully explain
this rule here. The Pearson rule provides:
(1) Courts may not engage in resolving disputes as to
religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or
administration; (2) courts cannot avoid adjudicating rights

Ts

growing out of civil law; (8) in resolving such civil law
disputes, courts must accept as final and binding the
decision of the highest religious judicatories as to reli-
gious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, and ad-
ministration.

325 S.C. at 52-58, 478 S.H.2d at 853,

The Pearson rule establishes that where a civil court can
completely resolve a church dispute on neutral principles of
law, the First Amendment commands it to do so. Nonethe-
less, where a civil court is presented an issue which is a
question of religious law or doctrine masquerading as a
dispute over church property or corporate control, it must
defer to the decisions of the proper church judicatories in so
far as it concerns religious or doctrinal issues. See Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709, 96 S.Ct. 2372
(finding that the controversy before the Court “essentially
involve[d] not a church property dispute, but a religious
dispute the resolution of which ... is for ecclesiastical and
not civil tribunals.”).

All Saints, at 444-45, 685 S.E.2d at 172.

Properly applied, the “neutral principles” approach requires
that the civil court’s initial inquiry be a “holistic” one. The
court must first determine whether the property/corporate
dispute will require the court to decide issues of religious law,
principle, doctrine, discipline, custom, or administration—in
other words, is the property/corporate dispute actually ecclesi-
astical in nature. If the dispute is “a question of religious law
or doctrine masquerading as a dispute over church property
or corporate control,” then the Constitution of the United
States requires the civil court defer to the decision of the
appropriate ecclesiastical authority. All Saints, supra. As ex-
plained below, this is the approach I expressly adopt and
apply to decide the merits of the present dispute in § III,
infra.’ Before proceeding to that analysis, however, I reexam-
ine the legal analysis applied in All Saints and the conclusions
drawn there.

4, Acting Justice Toal contends I ‘skip’ this step entirely: I respectfully
refer the reader to the penultimate sentence in the first paragraph
under this section.

SS ©

In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Jones v. Wolf, supra.
Like the present case, Jones was a property dispute arising
from a schism in a hierarchical church. The Jones Court
acknowledged the ability of civil courts to resolve most church-
based property disputes using deeds, state statutes, the local
church charters, and the national church’s constitution. The
Court explicitly stated, however, that:

‘Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provi-

sions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to

church property in the event of a particular contingency, or
what religious body will determine the ownership in the

event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a

religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the

ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with
the desires of the members.

The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to “inhibit”

the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral

provisions of state law governing the manner in which
churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.

Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a

church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time

before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so
desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will
retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or
the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust
in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitu-
tion of the general church can be made to recite an express
trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden
involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil
courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by
the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cogniza-
ble form.

Jones at 608-4, 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

In 1979, TEC, acting through the General Convention,
responded to Jones by enacting the so-called Dennis Canon.
This Canon provides:

All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of

any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this

Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish,

Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this
trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority
of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing
over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission
or Congregation remains part of, and subject to this Church
and its Constitution and Canons,

The Dennis Canon (Canon 1.7.4) is followed by Canon 1.7.5,
which provides:

The several Dioceses may, at their election, further confirm

the trust declared under the foregoing Section 4 by appro-

priate action, but no such action shall be necessary for the

existence and validity of the trust.

In 1987, the Lower Diocese of South Carolina adopted a
version of the Dennis Canon as part of its own constitution, as
did many of the Parishes.’ Recall that accession to TEC’s
Canons, which included the Dennis Canon, and to the Lower
Diocese’s Constitution, which from 1987 forward included a
diocesan version, were conditions of a parish or mission’s
membership in the Lower Diocese. Recall also that until the
2010 Diocesan Convention, Article 1 of the Diocesan Constitu-
tion provided: “The Church in the Diocese of South Carolina
accedes to and adopts the Constitution and Canons of [TEC]
and acknowledges this authority accordingly.”

In All Saints, this Court first addressed the validity of the
Trusts created by the Dennis Canon and Diocesan Constitu-
tion as applied to property belonging to the All Saints Parish
at the time the Parish sought to disaffiliate from the Episcopal
Church. In resolving the issue of the effect of THC’s adoption
of the Dennis Canon in 1979, and the Lower Diocese’s incorpo-
ration of the Canon into its own constitution in 1987, the Court
reviewed the history of the All Saints Parish, extensively
reporting and resolving title issues from 1745 until 1908. On
the merits, the All Saints opinion simply holds:

5. The diocesan version of the Dennis Canon states: “All real and
personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission, or
Congregation is held in trust for [TEC] and the [Lower Diocese]. The
existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and
Authority of the Parish, Mission, or Congregation existing over such
property so long as the particular Parish, Mission, or Congregation
remains a part of, and subject to, [TEC] and the [Lower Diocese].”

SS C“(t;wC:tsSC‘(‘C‘C
Furthermore, we hold that neither the 2000 Notice [record-
ed by the Diocese in the county courthouse reflecting the
trust created by the Diocese and that created by the Dennis
Canon] nor the Dennis Canon has any legal effect on title to
the All Saints congregation’s property. A trust “may be
created by either declaration of trust or by transfer of
property....” Dreher v. Dreher, 870 S.C. 75, 80, 684 S.E.2d
646, 648 (2006). It is an axiomatic principle of law that a
person or entity must hold title to property in order to
declare that it is held in trust for the benefit of another or
transfer legal title to one person for the benefit of another.
The Diocese did not, at the time it recorded the 2000 Notice,
have any interest in the congregation’s property. Therefore,
the recordation of the 2000 Notice could not have created a
trust over the property.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that title to the
property at issue is held by All Saints Parish, Waccamaw,
Inc., the Dennis Canons [sic] had no legal effect on the title
to the congregation’s property, and the 2000 Notice should
be removed from the Georgetown County records,

All Sainis at 449, 685 S.H.2d at 174.

I would now overrule All Saints to the extent it held the
Dennis Canon and the 1987 amendment to the Lower Dio-
cese’s Constitution were ineffective in creating trusts over
property held by or for the benefit of any parish, mission, or
congregation in the Lower Diocese. The result in All Saints
was obtained without considering the religious documents and
texts, including the Diocesan Constitution, which formed the
foundation of the relationships between All Saints Parish, the
Lower Diocese, and TEC, and by ignoring the premise of
Jones that a hierarchical church could direct the disposition of
property in case of a schism with a minimal burden. Specifical-
ly, All Saints failed to acknowledge that, as a matter of church
governance and administration, All Saints Parish had agreed
to be bound by the “trust terms” found in the Dennis Canon
and the Diocesan Constitution through its voluntary promises
of allegiance, upon which the hierarchical church is founded,
and by its conduct in remaining affiliated with TEC after 1979,
and with the Lower Diocese after 1987. All Saints’ failure to
consider the entirety of these ecclesiastical relationships, the
governing documents, and the parties’ conduct, as well as the

TT
assurances given by the Jones’ majority that a hierarchical
church could direct the ownership of property in the case of a
schism, led to a violation of the command of Pearson that a
court look at the entirety of the dispute, including the hierar-
chal church’s constitution, canons, and rules, before determin-
ing whether the dispute can be resolved purely by the applica-
tion of state law.

Further, I find that All Saints fell into error when it
created an artificial division between All Saints’ authority as a
parish to withdraw from TEC and the Lower Diocese, and All
Saints parish’s corporate authority to withdraw by amending
its bylaws and articles of incorporation in compliance with
South Carolina law. The All Saints decision focused only on
the parish corporation’s compliance with the provisions of the
South Carolina Non-Profit Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-31-100,
et seq. (2006 and Supp. 2016). The opinion concluded that the
corporate formalities had been properly executed and thus the
parish had effectively withdrawn from TEC, The flaw in this
section of the All Saints decision is that it relies on a false
dichotomy between parish as ecclesiastical unit and parish as a
corporate entity,’ and fails to acknowledge the dispositive
statute in the Non-Profit Act.

6. I find persuasive this passage from Justice Lehrmann’s dissent in
Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 617-18 (TX
2014):

When deciding whether a matter invokes constitutional protection, I
believe that we should err on the side of caution, upholding constitu-
tional mandates when in doubt.

‘The Court divides the questions of Good Shepherd parish’s authority
to withdraw from TEC and Good Shepherd corporation's authority to
withdraw by amending its bylaws and articles of incorporation.... In
my view, however, the two inquiries are inextricably linked. The
Court goes on to conclude that, because the parish at issue was
incorporated and because there was no specific TEC or diocesan
restriction on the corporation’s authority to amend its bylaws and
articles of incorporation, the validity of Good Shepherd's withdrawal
by amendment of those documents was not an ecclesiastical ques-
tion.... I am unconvinced that the incorporated status of the parish
removes the issue from the realm of church polity. If [the Bishop’s]
determination that the parish could not withdraw from TEC is a
binding ecclesiastical decision, it does not cease to be so because of
the corporate form taken by the parish. Such a determination permits
civil courts to conduct an end-run around the First Amendment’s
prohibition against inquiry into and resolution of religious issues by

Ss ~

The omitted statute, § 38-31-180 (2006) ” provides:

§ 33-31-180. Religious corporations; Constitutional protec-
tions.

If religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious
corporation is inconsistent with the provisions of this chap-
ter on the same subject, the religious doctrine controls to
the extent required by the Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution of South Carolina, or both.

Once effect is given to § 38-81-180, and the disaffiliated
parish’s actions in All Saints are viewed through the proper
constitutional lens, it is patent that the civil courts of South
Carolina were obligated to accept the ecclesiastical decision

effectively allowing the lower church entity's unilateral decision to
trump the higher entity's authority over matters of church polity.
Notably, the Court recognizes that “what happens to the relationship
between a local congregation that is part of a hierarchical religious
organization and the higher organization when members of the local
congregation vote to disassociate is an ecclesiastical matter over
which civil courts generally do not have a jurisdiction.” Id. at 607
(citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-
14, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976)). “But what happens to the
property is not,” the Court continues, “unless the congregation's
affairs have been ordered so that ecclesiastical decisions effectively
determine the property issue.” Id. It follows that [the Bishop’s]
determination regarding the parish’s authority (or, more accurately,
lack of authority) to withdraw from TEC is a binding ecclesiastical
decision, irrespective of the corporate form taken by the parish. In
turn, since Good Shepherd did not validly withdraw from TEC, Good
Shepherd remained a constituent thereof and consequently remained
subject to TEC’s and the Diocese’s Constitutions and Canons.

‘There appears to be no dispute that, as a TEC parish, Good Shepherd
could not pick and choose those portions of the governing documents
by which it wished to be bound, And the Dennis Cannon [sic] and its
diocesan counterpart expressly state that the church property is held
in trust for TEC and the Diocese. Thus, if Good Shepherd had no
authority to withdraw, it had no authority to revoke its adherence to
the Canons or to revoke the trust placed on the property by virtue
thereof. Moreover, the Canons condition Good Shepherd’s authority
over the church property on its “remain{ing] a part of, and subject to,
this Church and its Constitutions and Canons.” By purporting to
withdraw from TEC, then, Good Shepherd took the very action that
would strip it of its rights in the property. Good Shepherd may not
avoid the consequences of its actions—consequences to which it had
freely agreed—simply by voting to no longer be subject to those
consequences.

7. This statute was the foundation of the trial court's order in All Saints.

that the so-called “minority vestry” were the All Saints par-
ish’s true officers. Had the All Saints Court analyzed the issue
under all the relevant authorities, it would have been clear
that the Court could not adjudicate the corporate legitimacy
claim, as the question which group was the “true vestry” was a
matter of religious law and doctrine, and both the Constitution
and § 33-31-180 required that the Court accede to THC’s and
the Lower Diocese’s determination of the “true vestry.” See
Pearson, supra.

Here, the trial court sought to faithfully apply the flawed
analytical framework created by All Saints. In so doing, she
unwittingly violated the constitutional precepts that underlie
the “neutral principles of law” approach to the resolution of
church disputes.

I now turn to the facts of this case in order to determine
whether the trial court properly determined that the present
property/corporate dispute was cognizable in the civil court.

I. Application

Hl While Ali Saints deemed the reason(s) for the disaffili-
ated parish’s corporate actions irrelevant to the dispute, I find
that the underlying reasons for the schism here are relevant
to the determination whether this dispute is, at its core, one
grounded in “religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, cus-
tom, or administration” and thus not cognizable in civil court.
See Pearson, 825 8.C. at 58, 478 S.H.2d at 851-2. Although the
trial judge understandably sustained respondents’ objections
to much of the evidence offered to explain the Disassociated
Diocese’s decision to leave TEC in light of All Saints, I find
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support my finding
that doctrinal issues were the trigger. Doe, supra. A brief
overview of that evidence follows.

In 2006, the Lower Diocese of South Carolina convened to
select a new bishop and the Diocesan Convention elected
Mark Lawrence. There was evidence that Bishop Lawrence
was understood to be disenchanted with TEC’s direction.’ His

8, Prior to 2006, TEC’s General Convention confirmed the selection of
the first openly homosexual bishop in TEC, Bishop Lawrence testified
the Disaffiliated Diocese had become “uncomfortable with the trajecto-
ry of the general convention of the Episcopal Church.” In referring to

2006 election did not garner the support of a majority of
TEC’s other dioceses, however, a requirement for a bishop's
election to be valid. In 2009, Bishop Lawrence was ordained as
Bishop of the Lower Diocese following his reassurances to the
other dioceses he would make the requisite vows of conformity
to TEC’s Canons and Constitution. The record reflects that
Bishop Lawrence did make these vows.

The record demonstrates that Bishop Lawrence and others
in the Lower Diocese determined to leave TEC and to take
with them the property of those parishes in the Lower Diocese
that were intending to disaffiliate. For example, a former
president of the Lower Diocese’s Standing Committee testified
that the Diocese’s bank accounts were moved to “friendly
bankers” out of fear that the accounts might be frozen if
Bishop Lawrence were to be disciplined by TEC. This witness
testified he received a call in 2009 from another priest in the
Lower Diocese who expressed concern that Bishop Lawrence
was “not moving quickly enough to take the [Lower Diocese]
out of [TEC],” and reminded the witness that they had elected
Lawrence “to take us out of [TEC].”

Following this Court’s opinion in All Saints, which held that
the All Saints Parish was not bound by TEC’s Dennis Canon
or by the Diocesan Constitution’s version of the Canon, and
that a parish could disaffiliate from the Diocese simply by
amending its corporate documents, Bishop Lawrence and his
supporters undertook certain actions? Among other things,

the Presiding Bishop of TEC, Katharine Jefforts Schori, Bishop Law-
rence testified she had gone “contrary to the historic teachings of the
church and the Holy Scriptures” and admitted this involved “the
sexuality issue.”

9, Acting Justice Toal ignores the evidence in the record, and concludes
that in creating and disseminating these deeds and in purporting to
alter the Lower Diocese’s governance documents, “Bishop Lawrence
{was] clearly acting on the [TEC’s] behalf..." This astounding conclu-
sion is supported by the equally stunning assertion that “[TEC] was
fully aware of what Bishop Lawrence's intentions were when he was
made a bishop....” The evidence reflects, in fact, that TEC was
(rightfully) concerned about the Bishop’s intentions and that his 2006
election not receive the consent necessary from the diocesan standing
committee for years, and then only after his written assurances (1) that
he would make the requisite vows of conformity to TEC’s Canons and

2
the Diocesan Convention began the process of amending the
Lower Diocese’s governing documents, and began providing
Parishes with quitclaim deeds purporting to disclaim any
interest of the Diocesé in each Parish’s property. Parishes,
however, were asked to delay recording these deeds until 2011
because, as a witness for respondents testified, there was fear
TEC would discipline Bishop Lawrence if the quitclaim deeds
were recorded and his actions became public.

Following the All Saints decision, certain leaders in the
Lower Diocese, among the Trustees, and within the leadership
of various parishes in the Diocese undertook to sever the
relationship between themselves and TEC through corporate
amendments. On October 19, 2010, Bishop Lawrence executed
Nonprofit Corporation Articles of Amendment which purport-
ed to amend the language concerning the purpose of the
Lower Diocese set forth in its 1978 incorporation. The amend-
ment purportedly altered the purpose from “to continue the
operation of an Episcopal Diocese under the constitutions and
canons of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America” to “to continue operation under the Consti-
tution and Canons of The Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of South Carolina.” Other corporate actions were
taken during this period which purported to alter the gover-
nance structure of the Diocese, and many of the Parishes
undertook similar corporate alterations. During 2010, the
Trustees met to amend their corporate bylaws, which stated
the corporation would carry out its duties under the authority
of TEC’s Constitution and Canons, to remove these refer-
ences.

On December 5, 2012, Bishop Lawrence was informed that
TEC’s Presiding Bishop accepted his renunciation of orders,
and shortly thereafter, a letter confirmed the action.” On

Constitution and (2) that “[his] intention is to remain in the Episcopal
Church, period.”

10. The letter stated in pertinent part: “In accordance with Title III,
Canon 12, Section 7 of the Constitution and Canons of [TEC] and with
the advice and consent of the Advisory Committee to the Presiding
Bishops, I have accepted the renunciation of ordained ministry of this
church made in writing on November 17th, 2012, by the Right Rever-
end Mark Joseph Lawrence, Bishop of South Carolina.” Bishop Law-
rence contends he never made such a renunciation, November 17,

January 4, 2018, the Respondents filed this suit for a declara-
tory judgment seeking a declaration that respondent Disasso-
ciated Diocese was the true Diocese in the lower part of South
Carolina, that all property at issue belonged to that faction,
and for injunctive relief against the Appellants. On January
26, 2018, Charles vonRosenberg was elected and ordained as
the Bishop of appellant Associated Diocese.

The finding that TEC is hierarchal requires that I defer to
its highest ecclesiastical body. Pearson, supra. TEC’s accep-
tance of Bishop Lawrence’s renunciation of orders and the
subsequent ordination of Bishop vonRosenberg are decisions
that the civil court “must accept as final and binding....”
Pearson, 825 S.C. at 52-58, 478 S.H.2d at 858. Because TEC
has recognized the Associated Diocese to be the true Lower
Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop vonRosenburg as its
head, a civil court cannot inject itself into this church gover-
nance dispute and reevaluate that decision applying state law
principles because this is a question of church polity, adminis-
tration, and governance, matters into which civil courts may
not intrude. The circuit court erred in allowing itself to
become entangled in the questions of which competing claim-
ant was the true successor of the Lower Diocese.

HE Further, the civil courts in South Carolina cannot
decide disputes which are governed by church polity and
governance concerning property ownership. For the reasons
given above, I have determined that the real and personal
property disputes sought to be adjudicated in this civil lawsuit
are “question[s] of religious law or doctrine masquerading as a
dispute over church property [and] corporate control... .” See
All Saints at 445, 685 S.H.2d at 172. I find, therefore, the
Court “must defer to the decision of the proper church
judicatories....” Id. “What happens to the relationship be-
tween a local congregation that is part of a hierarchical
religious organization when members of the local congregation
vote to disassociate is an ecclesiastical matter over which civil
courts generally do not have a jurisdiction.” Serbian E. Ortho-
dow Diocese v. Mitlivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49
L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). Here, the church governing documents

2012, is the date the Disassociated Diocese held a Special Convention
affirming the Diocese’s disaffiliation from TEC.

establish that as of 2010, the Lower Diocese had agreed since
at least 1822 to be part of TEC and to be bound by its
Constitution and Canons. These documents make clear that
since at least 1979, and explicitly since 1987, the Lower
Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes accepted that the
property in dispute in this case was held in trust for TEC, and
was controlled by the Diocese, the Trustees, and the Parishes
only so long as they remained part of TEC. Here, both TEC
and Lower Diocese had in place provisions governing the
disposition of property in the event of a disaffiliation as
contemplated by Jones. I believe the Court is “[constitutional-
ly] bound to give effect to the result indicated” by TEC and
the Lower Diocese, especially since both entities enacted these
provisions “before the dispute erupt[ed].” Jones, supra at 606,
99 S.Ct, 3020, I would therefore reverse the circuit court’s
decision to the extent it declined to give effect to the Dennis
Canon and its diocesan counterpart, and to the extent it held
that the Disassociated Diocese, the Trustees, and parishes
controlled or owned the disputed real and personal property."

IV. Service Marks

Hl The trial court upheld the Respondents’ claim that
state trademarks it began filing in 2010 were being infringed
upon by the Appellants in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-
1160 (Supp. 2016) and §§ 16-17-810 and 820 (2016), leading to
confusion, It therefore enjoined the Appellants from “using,

11. As Acting Justice Toal acknowledges, the determination that this
dispute is ecclesiastical is tantamount to recognizing the validity of the
trusts, By denying the ecclesiastical nature of this dispute, Chief Justice
Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and Acting Justice Toal free themselves from
First Amendment constraints and, among other things, impose a re-
quirement that each local church must specifically accede to the Dennis
Canon before it can be bound, Such a requirement entangles the civil
court in church matters, for TEC’s Canons specifically provide that “no
such action shall be necessary for the existence and validity of the
trust.” Canon 1.7.5, and the Diocesan Constitution expressly provided
for accession to, adoption of, and acknowledgment of the authority of
TEC’s Constitution and Canons. Jones requires only that “a religious
organization ... ensurfing] that a [church property] dispute ... will be
resolved in accord with the desires of the members, .,.” indicate those
desires in “some legally cognizable form...” Jones does not require
that these “cognizable forms” be create a way that satisfies the
specific legal requirements in each jurisdiction where the church prop-
erty is located.

Ss ©

assuming, or adopting” certain “names, styles, emblems, or
marks” claimed by the Respondents. I agree with the Appel-
Jants that in light of the evidence of the confusion created by
the Respondents’ use of the term ‘episcopal,’ with TEC’s
federally-registered trademarks, which include “The Episcopal
Church” and “The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United
States of America,” state law dictates that the Appellants
right to these marks is superior, and that therefore the
Respondents’ state marks must be cancelled. See S.C, Code
Ann. § 89-15-1145(8)(£) (Supp. 2016). I would therefore reverse
the injunctive relief granted by trial court.

CONCLUSION

I would overrule All Saints to the extent it held the Dennis
Canon and the diocesan equivalent did not create effective
trusts in South Carolina, and to the extent that it holds that
corporate actions taken by Episcopal dioceses, parishes, mis-
sions, and related corporations can be reviewed without refer-
ence to TEC’s Constitution, Canons, and other authorities, and
without reference to § 33-31-180. Further, the question of
which diocese is “legitimate” is a question of church gover-
nance and not a matter to be resolved in the civil courts of
South Carolina, I would therefore reverse the circuit court’s
order to the extent it rejected the efficacy of the Dennis
Canon and the Diocesan Constitution, and to the extent it
declined to accept TEC’s recognition of the Associated Diocese
as the true Lower Diocese of South Carolina. In addition, I
would reverse the injunction granted to respondents on their
service mark claim.

Finally, while all individuals are guaranteed the freedom to
disassociate from a religious body, here the question of the
disposition of ecclesiastical property following the disaffiliation
from the TEC by the Disassociated Diocese, the Trustees, and
the Parishes, is a question of church governance, which is
protected from civil court interference by the First Amend-
ment.

For the reasons given above, I would reverse the circuit
court’s order and also join Justice Hearn’s opinion.

HEARN, J., concurring in a separate opinion. BEATTY,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate
opinion. KITTREDGE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part in a separate opinion. Acting Justice Jean H. Toal
dissenting in a separate opinion.

JUSTICE HEARN:

I concur fully with Acting Justice Pleicones’s thorough and
well-reasoned lead opinion, but write separately because of the
magnitude of this case and its far-reaching effects not only on
the Episcopal Church (“the National Church”) but also all
other hierarchical religious organizations.”

The primary issue before the Court is which of two compet-
ing dioceses is the true Episcopal diocese in the lower half of
South Carolina and thus has the right to control the property
at issue which consists of thirty-six parish churches and Camp
Saint Christopher on Seabrook Island. Because the National
Church has ordained Charles vonRosenberg and recognizes
him as the Bishop in the Lower Diocese, this Court, under
long-settled principles, must defer to that decision. Conse-
quently, I would find the actions of the breakaway bishop,
Mark Lawrence, and his followers in leaving the National
Church and attempting to take its property with them, are
ineffective. Additionally, consistent with the majority of state
court decisions which have considered this issue, under neutral
principles of law, the Dennis Canon ® controls and imposes an
express trust on the property in favor of the National Church.
Therefore, I concur with the lead opinion and would confirm
title to the property at issue in the National Church and
reverse."

12, I emphasize that our holding does not, as the dissent claims, affect
ail trusts in South Carolina; rather, our holding is limited to ecclesiasti-
cal decisions protected by the First Amendment, as will be explained
herein.

13. Acanon is “[a] law, rule, or ordinance in general, and of the church
in particular. An ecclesiastical law or statute.” Black’s Law Dictionary
206 (6th ed. 1990).

14, At the outset, I find the trial was permeated by errors which
necessarily dictated the outcome. The threshold issue in resolving this
dispute was an analysis of the structure of the National Church—

SS

As the lead opinion thoroughly explains, there can be but
one conclusion based on the record before us and the over-
whelming consensus of our sister jurisdictions, and that is the
National Church is hierarchical in nature.® With that in mind,
I turn to the claims raised by the respective parties.

ANALYSIS
I, ECCLESIASTICAL DEFERENCE

I believe it is clear this dispute arises out of doctrinal
differences between the National Church and the Breakaway
Diocese. I therefore find that we are required in this instance
to exercise restraint and defer to the highest ecclesiastical
body of this hierarchical church. Though the Breakaway Dio-
cese has attempted to frame this as a matter of simple
corporate law fit for resolution in civil court, we are bound by

whether it is hierarchical or congregational—and the nature of the
relationship between the thirty-six parishes and the National Church.
After repeatedly stating on the record that the church’s structure was
“rrelevant,” and refusing to admit evidence on this issue, insisting that
South Carolina was not a “hierarchical state,” the trial court found in
its order that the National Church “‘is not organized in a fashion that its
governance controls the Dioceses or the parish churches, Authority
flows from the bottom, the parish churches, up.” Additionally, although
there can be no question that the individual parishes have been affiliat-
ed with the National Church for decades, the trial court found in its
order that “[nJone of the Plaintiff parish churches have ever been
members of [the National Church].”

The significance of this error in refusing to recognize the National
Church’s hierarchical design and the historical relationship of the
individual parishes to the National Church cannot be overstated. By
mischaracterizing the structure of the National Church and the nature
of the relationship between it and the individual parishes, the trial court
employed an erroneous framework in resolving this dispute.

15, See, e.g., Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 716 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Our
examination of this record, and our study of the organization and
operation of the Episcopal Church, compels the determination that the
court was correct in both its analysis and in its conclusion: The
Episcopal Church is hierarchical.”); Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts
v. Devine, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 722, 797 N.E,2d 916, 921 (2003) (“Based on
our review of the record we conclude ... that the Episcopal Church is
hierarchical.”); Episcopal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 11 N.Y.3d
340, 870 N.Y,S.2d 814, 899 N.E,2d 920, 921 (2008) (‘The National
Church has a hierarchical form of governance, Its governing body, the
General Convention, adopted—and periodically amends—a constitution
and canons that manifest its doctrinal law.”).

Lr
the Constitution and our own precedent from interjecting
ourselves into religious matters masquerading as disputes
over property or corporate control. See Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese for U.S. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
709-10, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); All Saints
Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of South Carolina, 885 S.C. 428, 445, 685 S.H.2d 163,
172 (2009).

The use of the word “masquerade” by the United States
Supreme Court in Milivojevich is particularly germane here.
Whether used as a noun (“a disguise or false outward show”)
or as a verb (to “have or put on a deceptive appearance”),!” the
word aptly describes the actions of Bishop Lawrence and the
Breakaway Diocese. Despite the vows and written assurances
made by Bishop Lawrence concerning his loyalty to the Na-
tional Church, within a few short years of his ordination, the
masquerade began.'* Bishop Lawrence and his followers pro-
vided parishes with quitclaim deeds designed to disclaim any
interest of the Diocese in each parish’s property. In further-
ance of a pretense of loyalty, these quitclaim deeds were not
made public; rather, parishes were asked to delay their re-
cording. Bishop Lawrence’s group also quietly changed the
Diocese’s bank accounts, seeking out “friendly bankers” who
would provide assurances that the accounts would not be
frozen when litigation commenced. Importantly, the fuse
which ignited this powder keg was without question the diver-
gent views on the doctrines and teachings of the National
Church,

Although the trial court barred the National Church from
introducing evidence as to the reason for the Breakaway
Diocese’s actions, it is clear from the record that doctrinal
issues concerning marriage and the role of women were the

16, Te American Herrrace Dictionary 770 (2d College ed. 1982),
17, Id.

18. Although the dissent takes issue with my recitation of Bishop Law-
rence’s role in this rift, the facts contained herein are undisputed in the
record and many are based upon direct admissions from Lawrence
himself. Moreover, I find these facts highly relevant—if not essential—
in addressing Bishop Lawrence's alleged breach of fiduciary duties
owed to the National Church, as discussed infra.

Ss

trigger. A witness for the dissociated parishes testified that it
was “a doctrinal issue” which prompted St. Andrew’s in Mt.
Pleasant to leave the National Church. Another parish witness
stated that the National Church “seemed to be moving away
from the Christ teaching [sic] that marriage is between a man
and a woman.” Other parish witnesses testified they were
leaving the National Church because of the way it was treat-
ing Bishop Lawrence, obviously referring to the National
Church’s discipline of Bishop Lawrence as a result of his
actions in leading the Breakaway Diocese out of the National
Church. Bishop Lawrence testified the Breakaway Diocese
had become “uncomfortable with the trajectory of the general
convention of the Episcopal Church.” In referring to the then-
Presiding Bishop of the National Church, Katharine Jefforts
Schori, Bishop Lawrence testified she had gone “contrary to
the historic teachings of the church and the Holy Scriptures”
and admitted this involved “the sexuality issue.”

Given this background, I find this case is factually distin-
guishable from our holding in All Saints and more analogous
to the dispute in Milivojevich where the Supreme Court found
the issues were inextricably tied to “a matter of internal
church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical
affairs.” 426 U.S. at 721, 96 S.Ct. 2872, Furthermore, our
holding is not wholly contradictory to All Saints; rather it is
grounded in one of the very principles that case reaffirmed.
885 S.C. at 445, 685 S.H.2d at 172 (finding that if a question of
religious law or doctrine is masquerading as a dispute over
property or corporate control, the court must defer to the
ecclesiastical body).

In essence, resolving this dispute would require us to decide
which faction is the “true” Episcopal Church. Because the
National Church has recognized the remaining diocese to be
the true Lower Diocese of South Carolina with Bishop vonRo-
senburg at its head, we cannot inject ourselves into this
dispute in such a manner as to overrule that determination.
See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721, 96 S.Ct. 2372. This Court
has repeatedly acknowledged its constitutional mandate to
refrain from wading into matters of internal organization, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom or law. All Saints, 385 S.C. at 445,
685 S.E.2d at 172; Pearson v. Church of God, 325 8.C. 45, 49-
50, 478 S.H.2d 849, 851-52 (1996). This decision is unquestion-

ably a matter of church polity and governance, matters into
which civil courts should not intrude. On this basis alone, I
would reverse the decision of the trial court.

With the guarantees of the First Amendment in mind, the
National Church purposely and consciously decided to struc-
ture its organization in the manner espoused in its constitution
and canons. Dating back to the early 19th century, churches
were built, congregations grew, and members attended ser-
vices, all with voluntary acceptance of the National Church’s
governing framework. In fact, Title II, Canon 6.1 of the
National Church’s constitution and canons states, “No Church
or Chapel shall be consecrated until the Bishop shall have
been sufficiently satisfied that the building and the ground on
which it is erected are secured for ownership and use by a
Parish, Mission, Congregation, or Institution affiliated with
this Church and subject to its Constitution and Canons.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, by these very terms, houses of
worship cannot be members of the “Episcopal Church” unless
they are subject to the National Church’s governing authority.

The National Church’s constitution and canons are as much
a part of its identity as a religious organization as the scrip-
tures themselves. As a Court, we can no more decide what it
means to be part of the “Episcopal Church” than we can
dictate how the National Church chooses to worship. The
inextricable link between the National Church’s religious
structure and the dispute before the Court is supported by
abundant evidence. Accordingly, I find the current litigation
before the Court is, at its heart, controlled by matters of
religious doctrine, and therefore I would defer resolution to
the ecclesiastical authorities of the National Church.

Nevertheless, in light of the Breakaway Diocese’s insistence
that the case is ripe for resolution in this Court, I continue to
address equally compelling grounds to support the lead opin-
ion’s holding.

II. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES

Even were we to wade into this dispute and resolve it solely
on neutral principles as the dissent insists, I would still find
the trial court erred in holding the Dennis Canon ineffective
and in giving effect to Bishop Lawrence’s attempts to change

the corporate charter and form. More importantly, I believe
the writings, conduct, and relationship between the parties all
evince the necessary intent to create a legally cognizable
express trust, enforceable in favor of the National Church.

Tn considering the application of neutral principles, I turn to
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775
(1979), and the response of the National Church and the
Lower Diocese to its holding. In Jones, the four dissenting
Justices would have gone even further than the majority to
hold that a rule of compulsory deference was necessary in
order to protect the free exercise rights of those who had
formed a religious association. The majority’s response to that
criticism resulted in this passage which is critical to our
resolution today:

At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can

ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the

hierarchical church will retain the church property. They

can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a

right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church.

Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can

be made to recite an express trust in favor of the

denominational church. The burden involved in taking
such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be
bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties,
provided it is in some legally cognizable form.

Id, at 606, 99 S.Ct. 8020 (emphasis added).

Two months after the decision in Jones, and in obvious
response to the invitation contained therein, the National
Church adopted the Dennis Canon, which recites an express
trust in favor of the denominational church. That same year,
the National Church also adopted a companion canon which
stated, “The several Dioceses may, at their election, further
confirm the trust declared under the [Dennis Canon] by
appropriate action but no such action shall be necessary for
the existence and validity of the trust.” (Emphasis added.)
Significantly, in 1987 the Lower Diocese did exactly that—
confirming its acknowledgement of the trust by adopting its
own mirror image of the Dennis Canon.” The dissent fails to

19. That canon stated, “All real and personal property held by or for the
benefit of any Parish, Mission, or Congregation is held in trust for the

Se
mention the Diocesan canon or analyze its importance in its
opinion, perhaps for the same reason it does not discuss the

hierarchical nature of the National Church and why that is
critical to the resolution of the case before us.

There is no question that South Carolina adheres to neutral
principles in resolving church property disputes. See Pearson,
supra; All Saints, supra. However, that does not mean we are
“not a hierarchical state,” as the trial court repeatedly stated.
Adherence to neutral principles does not require us to ignore
the clear language of the United States Supreme Court in
Jones as to how hierarchical churches like the National
Church may protect their property, nor the actions of the
Plaintiffs before us. In fact, the proper application of neutral
principles entails a holistic analysis of deeds, corporate char-
ters, and the constitution and governing documents of the
general church. In 1841, the delegates to the Diocesan Con-
vention of South Carolina voted unanimously to accede to the
National Church’s constitution and canons. When the Diocese
of South Carolina wished to divide into two dioceses, permis-
sion was sought from the National Church to do so and was
granted. When the Lower Diocese was incorporated in 1978,
its stated corporate purpose was “to continue an Episcopal
Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of America.” Represen-
tatives from the Diocese were present at the General Conven-
tion in 1979 when the Dennis Canon was adopted. In 1987, the
Diocese adopted its own language reaffirming the trust im-
posed by the Dennis Canon. Accordingly, Respondents acted
consistently both before and after the enactment of the Dennis
Canon by the General Convention as though the National
Church held a trust interest in the property at issue, going so
far as to expressly acknowledge the existence of the trust in
their own Diocesan canon.

Episcopal Church and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of South Carolina. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way
limit the power and Authority of the Parish, Mission, or Congregation
existing over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission,
or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to, the Episcopal
Church and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South
Carolina.” (Emphasis added.)

SS  °

The highest courts in many other jurisdictions have conclud-
ed that the Dennis Canon applies to defeat claims of owner-
ship and control over church property by disassociated parish-
es, “even in cases in which record title to the property has
been held in the name of the parish since before enactment of
the provision.” Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Connecti-
cut v. Gauss, 302 Conn. 408, 28 A.8d 302, 321 (2011); In re
Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal.4th 467, 87 Cal.Rptr.8d 275,
198 P.8d 66, 84 (2009); Bishop & Diocese of Colorado v. Mote,
716 P.2d 85, 108-09 (Colo. 1986); Rector, Wardens, Vestrymen
of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese
of Georgia, Inc., 290 Ga. 95, 718 S.E.2d 287, 254 (2011); Daniel
v. Wray, 158 N.C.App. 161, 580 S.H.2d 711, 719 (2008); Hpisco-
pal Diocese of Rochester v. Harnish, 11 N.Y.8d 340, 870
N.Y.S.2d 814, 899 N.E.2d 920, 925 (2008) (“We conclude that
the Dennis Canons clearly establish an express trust in favor
of the Rochester Diocese and the National Church.”); In ve
Church of St. James the Less, 585 Pa, 428, 888 A.2d 795, 810
(2005); Falls Church v. Protestant Episcopal Church in US.,
285 Va. 651, 740 S.E.2d 580, 540 (2018) (“In the present case,
we need look no further than the Dennis Canon to find
sufficient evidence of the necessary fiduciary relationship. As a
number of courts in other states have noted, the Dennis Canon
‘merely codified in explicit terms a trust relationship that has
been implicit in the relationship between local parishes and
dioceses since the founding of [the National Church] in
1789,’ ”). Unlike the dissent, none of these jurisdictions based
the validity of the Dennis Canon on the formal execution of
trust documents following its enactment.

In my view, the language in Jones that “[a]t any time before
the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire,
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the
church property” by reciting an express trust in favor of the
denominational faction has clearly been met here. As noted by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of Connecticut, Jones v. Wolf “not only gave general
churches explicit permission to create an express trust in
favor of the local church but stated that civil courts would be
bownd by such a provision.” 28 A.8d at 325 (emphasis in
original). The dissent ignores the United States Supreme
Court’s admonition that the “burden” on national churches in

TT

taking steps to impose an express trust over church property
“will be minimal.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020
(emphasis added). There is no question but that the National
Church more than met this minimal burden in enacting the
Dennis Canon, and under Jones, this Court is bound to
recognize the trust it created. The Dennis Canon, the Dioce-
san Canon, and the mandate found in the National Church’s
canons declaring that affiliated parishes are bound by its
governing laws satisfy the legally cognizable form and the
intent to create a trust which Acting Justice Toal claims are
absent. See Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v.
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 352 Or. 668, 291 P.8d 711, 720
(2012) (explaining “the neutral principles approach does not
free the courts from examining and potentially giving legal
effect to church documents”).

To suggest that to comply with the blueprint laid out by the
United States Supreme Court, the National Church would be
required to obtain a separate trust instrument from each of
the thirty-six parishes would impose a constitutionally imper-
missible burden on the National Church and violate the First
Amendment. As it stands now, the trial court’s order shows no
regard for the self-governance of the National Church and
instead attempts to wrongfully supplant enforceable religious
canons. Thus, I join the lead opinion in departing from All
Saints to the extent it held that the Dennis Canon and
subsequent acquiescence by individual parishes were insuffi-
cient to establish a trust in favor of the National Church.”

20. I fear the approach urged by the dissent would ultimately lead to
confusion, voluminous litigation, and uncertainty for religious organiza-
tions. Of what importance is it that a religious body be hierarchical in
nature, if any individual church can choose to disassociate from the
higher body and take all property with it? For decades, religious
organizations have structured their affairs to comply with the roadmap
drawn out in Jones where the Supreme Court expressly annunciated a
minimal burden for them to ensure a continuing body. If we were to
ignore this, it logically follows that any hierarchical church would
struggle to maintain itself. At any doctrinal difference, an individual
parish could decide it disagrees with the teachings of the national body,
break away and proclaim itself the “true” church. In a hierarchical
church, the individual parishes look to the head of the church to
provide guidance and steer the course of worship, not the other way
around. Were we to adopt the dissent’s approach, the tail would be
wagging the dog.

Ss

I agree with Justice Kittredge’s dissent in recognizing the
unique nature of trusts as applied to religious organizations,
but I cannot embrace his conclusion that the trust imposed by
the Dennis Canon is revocable at any time—a finding unsup-
ported by any authority. To give credence to the terms of the
Dennis Canon only to conclude that it is revocable at the
whims of the parishes surely renders this a trust in name only.
I find compelling the language used by the majority in Jones
v. Wolf that “the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the
faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church
property.” 443 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added). If
we conclude the trust is merely revocable, then certainly the
parties cannot ensure the National Church retains the proper-
ty, and Jones v. Wolj’s clear effort to prevent property dis-
putes in the wake of church schisms is rendered meaningless.

Justice Kittredge also posits that the provisions of the
South Carolina trust code which unquestionably render the
trust irrevocable are not enforceable here because, he ar-
gues, the National Church’s entire case is based on the
derogation of our trust code. At the outset, I find this to be
a mischaracterization of the National Church’s position be-
cause it did not contend strictly that the trust imposed by
the Dennis Canon was wholly independent from South Car-
olina law; to the contrary, the National Church repeatedly
argued for the existence of an express trust, created pursu-
ant to our established trust law. Furthermore, I find this
reasoning inconsistent with Justice Kittredge’s subsequent
claim that Respondents withdrew their accession to the Den-
nis Canon “in accordance with state law.” What we cannot do
is pick and choose which state laws to apply in order to
justify a desired result. Thus, I would not be so selective in
adhering to one law addressing the manner in which Respon-
dents may revoke the trust, while at the same time disre-
garding the very statute that controls whether the trust,
once created, is revocable.

Respectfully, I disagree with my colleague and would apply
the appropriate statute which resolves the issue: South Car-
olina Code Section 62-7-602(a) (Supp. 2016) (common law
default rule of irrevocability applies to trusts created before
the effective date of the statute [January 1, 2006]). When
faced with a similar schism in the Presbyterian Church, the

TT
Supreme Court of Oregon—also applying the Uniform Trust
Code and adhering to neutral principles—found the express
trust in favor of the denominational church was irrevocable
because it was created before Oregon’s adoption of the UTC.
See Hope Presbyterian Church, 291 P.38d at 726-27. I would
follow the approach taken by Oregon and look to our statutory
code, which provides this simple answer to any question of
revocability: the trust is irrevocable because it was created
prior to the implementation of the SCTC. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 62-7-602(a).

With regard to the dissent’s proposition that eight of the
dissociated parishes formerly affiliated with the National
Church were nevertheless free to ignore the provisions of the
Dennis Canon, I believe this issue is not properly before the
Court because, from my review of the record, the argument
was not raised by Respondents at the trial court level, nor was
it argued on appeal before this Court. To base its opinion on
such reasoning now signifies the dissent’s departure from this
Court’s longstanding adherence to issue preservation rules.
See I’on, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526
§.E.2d 716, 728 (2000),

Justice Kittredge suggests that I am ignoring Rule 220(e)
by insisting that the Court should not reach this issue of the
seven or eight churches. I am aware of the language in
subsection (c) which provides that the “appellate court may
affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any
ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal.” (Emphasis
added.) However, case law from this Court which interprets
the Rule provides guidance on when this provision should be
utilized. In I’on this Court streamlined the procedure for the
use of additional sustaining grounds, and held only that the
basis for a respondent's additional sustaining grounds “must
appear in the record on appeal.” 838 S.C. at 420, 526 S.H.2d at
723. Here, Acting Justice Toal purports to satisfy that princi-
ple by plucking this argument concerning the seven or eight
churches, not from anything mentioned by Respondents in the
pleadings, the record, or the brief, but rather from the post-
trial motion filed by the National Church. In doing so, she

21, There is a discrepancy as to the precise number of parishes alleged
to fall within the scope of this argument.

SS C“(Ct;wsts‘(C;‘(SSC
ignores this language from I’On which I view as critical to an
appellate court’s decision as to whether or not to exercise the
discretion afforded by the Rule to affirm on this basis: “Of
course, a respondent may abandon an additional sustaining
ground under the present rules—just as a respondent could
under the former rules—by failing to raise it in the appellate
brief.” Id. This is precisely what I believe occurred here, and
while I agree that this Court may affirm on any ground
contained in the record on appeal, as provided by Rule 220(c),
I believe this is surely one of those instances where it “would
be unfair or unwise to resolve a case on a ground never
mentioned by the respondent,” given the dearth of evidence on
this issue in this voluminous record. See Jean Hoefer Toal et
al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 62 (2d ed. 2002).
Quite simply, too many discrepancies exist to resolve the issue
on this record, the most glaring being the actual number of
entities to be affected—by the National Church’s count the
number is seven while Acting Justice Toal asserts it is eight.
Accordingly, it is not the case, as Justice Kittredge posits, that
I am ignoring the language in Rule 220(c), but rather that 1
would honor the language in J’On and elect not to reach this
issue where it was never raised by Respondents and doing so
injects an alarming degree of uncertainty into this case,

Moreover, I fear the dissent mischaracterizes the National
Church’s argument regarding the twenty-nine parishes with
documentation reaffirming their allegiance to the National
Church. In my view, the National Church is correct in its
assertion that even without these individual reaffirmations
made post-Dennis Canon, the relationships between the Na-
tional Church and the parishes reveal that an express trust
exists, created as the majority envisioned in Jones v. Wolf.
That the National Church could locate twenty-nine reaffirma-
tions made after the enactment of the Dennis Canon simply
serves to point out the magnitude of the trial court’s inexplica-
ble error in finding no express trust was ever created by any
of the parishes. However, the creation of a trust was never
contingent upon the presence of these documents. Likewise,
the dissent fails to give any effect to the trust imposed by the
Diocesan canon. If the Dennis Canon has no effect on these
seven parishes because it was unilateral, the same cannot be
said about the Diocesan canon, which unequivocally bound its

affiliated parishes. Even without the Dennis Canon, the hier-
archical structure of the National Church results in the Dioce-
san canon binding all affiliated parishes, including the seven in
question.

Lastly, even accepting arguendo the dissent’s assertion
there was no writing to create an express trust binding the
remaining seven parishes, I would find South Carolina’s doc-
trine of constructive trusts would operate to impose a trust in
favor of the National Church. A constructive trust arises
“whenever the circumstances under which property was ac-
quired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the
one holding the legal title.” Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 529,
854 S.H.2d 559, 561 (1987). The impetus to impose a construc-
tive trust “results from fraud, bad faith, abuse of confidence,
or violation of a fiduciary duty which gives rise to an obli-
gation in equity to make restitution.” Id. Importantly, in
construing whether a constructive trust exists, this Court acts
as the finder of fact in accordance with its own view of the
evidence. Jd. at 530, 354 S.H.2d at 561. For decades, if not
longer, these parishes very clearly held themselves out as
being affiliated with the National Church, agreed to be bound
by its constitution and canons, attracted new members based
on their affiliation with the Episcopal faith, participated in
church governance, and in all other ways acted consistently
with the National Church’s structure. As mentioned earlier,
parishes must agree to be bound by the National Church's
constitution and canons before their buildings can be consec-
rated as churches of the Episcopal faith. In light of the
evidence presented by both parties, I believe equity requires
that a constructive trust be imposed, lest this Court condone
the seven parishes camouflaging themselves as loyal adherents
to the National Church without objection for nearly 30 years
after the Dennis Canon was adopted, only to pivot and pro-
claim that relationship never existed when it no longer suited
them. This is precisely the type of bad faith which constructive
trusts were designed to reconcile.”

22, Justice Kittredge conscientiously questions the propriety of declaring
the National Church the rightful holder of the parish property and
depriving the disassociated parishioners of the churches where they
once worshipped. 1 answer his question with another equally compel-
ling question: May we deprive the remaining constituents of the Nation-

Ss °°

In sum, regardless of the effects, if any, of the absence of
reaffirmations given by the seven parishes in response to the
Dennis Canon, the record is rife with evidence that the
National Church and Respondents structured their relation-
ship in such a manner that Respondents were to act as
trustees on behalf of the National Church. This Court must
give effect to this trust under the neutral principles approach,
The dissent’s suggestion that there were no written docu-
ments evincing a trust executed by Respondents is not sup-
ported by the record. Even beyond its clear accession to the
Dennis Canon by its actions in remaining affiliated with the
National Church upon its enactment, the Lower Diocese indis-
putably manifested its acknowledgement that all parish prop-
erty was held in trust for the National Church through its
adoption of its Diocesan version of the Dennis Canon in 1987.
Through the hierarchical structure of the organization, the
adoption of the Diocesan canon was binding upon all of its
parish affiliates. Only by ignoring the hierarchical framework
of the National Church could one believe the parishes were
not bound by this Diocesan canon.

Lastly I note, even if this Court resolved the matter solely
under state corporate law, Bishop Lawrence disregarded cor-
porate form and governance and therefore his actions were
ineffectual.” In 1978 the nonprofit corporation was chartered,

al Church of this same property when, for decades, they attended
services, donated funds, and invested time and labor into their respec-
tive parishes, all the while acting with the knowledge that the property
was held in trust for the National Church in accordance with the
organization’s widely-known religious canons? The dissenting justices
attempt to answer these questions looking narrowly at state property
law, but it comes at the expense of the First Amendment freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution. Justice Kittredge perceives an inequity
in requiring the breakaway constituents to leave their property behind,
but as a Court we must be equally mindful of the past and present
parishioners who devoted their time and talents to the individual
parishes and relied on the fact that they were indivisible parts of the
National Church.

23. Interestingly, a recent decision from a California appellate court
affirmed title to disputed property in the National Church following a
similar series of events in the Diocese of San Joaquin, where, as a
parish rector, Lawrence joined an attempt to lead the diocese out of the
National Church prior to his election as bishop in South Carolina. See
Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 246 Cal.App.4th 254, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d

establishing the governance of the diocese. This is significant
for two reasons.

First, the articles of incorporation expressly proclaimed the
purpose of incorporation was “to continue the operation of an
Episcopal Diocese under the Constitution and Canons of The
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of Amer-
ica,” Under a plain reading of the articles, the stated purpose
incorporates by reference its alignment with the National
Church, thereby subordinating the Diocese to the constitution
and canons of the National Church. This stated intent to align
and subordinate to the National Church is further supported
by the Legislature’s expressed intention to allow religious
doctrine to control over corporate form. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 83-81-180 (2006) (“If religious doctrine governing the affairs
of a religious corporation is inconsistent with the provisions of
this chapter on the same subject, the religious doctrine con-
trols to the extent required by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of South Carolina, or both.”). As
such, the nonprofit corporation and those acting on its behalf
are subject to all oaths and canons of the National Church.
The exception for religious governance is critical here; while
the trial judge found, and Justice Kittredge agrees, that
Bishop Lawrence and the Breakaway Diocese made legally
effective changes to the nonprofit corporation, that result can
be reached only by disregarding section 33-31-180 and relying
on the default provisions of the nonprofit code. However,
because the National Church has promulgated its own set of
rules concerning corporate governance, including changes to
the bylaws, section 33-31-180 requires that those rules trump
the default provisions of the nonprofit corporate code, Thus,
the actions of Bishop Lawrence and the Breakaway Diocese—
which indisputably did not comply with the National Church’s
governing rules—must be deemed ineffective.“

51 (2016). In that case, the court resolved the dispute based on state
corporate principles, finding the attempts to amend the diocese’s arti-
cles of incorporation and transfer property were ineffective. Id. at 65~
67,

24, I must part company with Acting Justice Toal in her dogged effort to
impose South Carolina civil law at any cost, which in my view runs
roughshod over the National Church’s religious autonomy and indeed,
elevates the concept of neutral principles to heights heretofore un-

Second, as the director of a nonprofit organization, the
bishop owes a fiduciary duty of care, loyalty, and good faith to
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South
Carolina, See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-300 (2006); see also
Menezes v. WL Ross & Co., LLC, 408 S.C. 522, 581, 744 S.H.2d
178, 183 (2018) (“The duty of loyalty requires corporate offi-
cers and directors act in the best interest of the corporation
and prioritize the corporation’s interest above their own.”). It
is troubling that the dissent would base its holding on the
application of corporate law, yet at the same time inexplicably
fail to consider Bishop Lawrence’s derogation of his fiduciary
duties. Bishop Lawrence’s actions in this matter undermined
the very organization he was charged (and swore an oath) to
serve, thereby ignoring his prescribed fiduciary duties.> This
is evidenced by his issuance and delivery of quitclaim deeds *
to disassociated parishes and instruction to those parishes not.
to immediately record the deeds; seeking out “friendly bank-
ers” to discreetly handle church assets; and executing a formal
residential lease of the diocesan property to himself in his
individual capacity. Bishop Lawrence’s subterfuge took place

known. My own view of the appropriate application of neutral princi-
ples would honor the constitutional mandate to not disturb matters of
religious governance in order to maintain religious institutions’ inde-
pendence from state intrusions, a principle repeatedly described by the
United States Supreme Court as radiating ‘‘a spirit of freedom for
religious organizations, an independence from secular control or ma-
nipulation—in short, [the] power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School v. E.E.0.C., 565 U.S, 171, 185-86, 132 S.Ct, 694, 181 L.Ed.2d
650 (2012) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97
L.Ed, 120 (1952)).

25. In fact, when questions arose surrounding Bishop Lawrence's loyal-
ty to the National Church and jeopardizing his potential ordination, he
expressly represented to the National Church his intention to abide by
its doctrines and teachings. In a letter dated March 7, 2007, Bishop
Lawrence wrote, “I will heartily make the vows conforming to the
doctrine, discipline and worship of the Episcopal Church, as well as the
trustworthiness of the holy scriptures. So to put it as clearly as I can,
my intention is to remain in the Episcopal Church, period.”

26. Indeed, if Bishop Lawrence himself believed the National Church
held no interest in the property of the various parishes, there would
have been no reason for him to issue quitclaim deeds.

ST

over the course of several years, all the while keeping his
actions secret from the National Church to which he had
vowed his loyalty. Further, the act of amending the corporate
form was not in the interest of the corporation because it was
contrary to the constitution and canons of the National
Church. Based upon both the articles of incorporation and the
fiduciary duty owed to the nonprofit corporation, Bishop Law-
rence acted outside his scope and authority in direct violation
of his oath, the canons, and corporate governance. Therefore,
any attempts by Bishop Lawrence to unilaterally alter the
Lower Diocese’s relationship with the National Church cannot
be given any effect.

CONCLUSION

Based on our doctrine of deference to ecclesiastical authori-
ty, the Appellants represent the true Lower Diocese of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina and are there-
fore entitled to all property, including Camp Saint Christopher
and the emblems, seals, and trademarks associated with the
National Church. This holding is based on the National
Church’s recognition of Charles vonRosenberg as its Bishop
and the express trust imposed on Respondents’ property by
the Dennis Canon, as well as on state corporate law princi-
ples.

CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY:

Given the divergent opinions, I am compelled to write
separately because I believe my position is that of a centrist
between the members of the Court. While I agree The Episco-
pal Church (“TEC”) is hierarchical, I disagree with the analy-

27. To clarify the dissent’s summary of this case’s resolution, I join
Acting Justice Pleicones and Chief Justice Beatty in reversing the trial
court as to the twenty-nine parishes that documented their reaffirma-
tion to the National Church, but Chief Justice Beatty joins Acting
Justice Toal and Justice Kittredge with respect to the remaining seven
parishes. Four justices agree that the Dennis Canon created an enforce-
able trust as envisioned in Jones, but Justice Kittredge departs from the
majority and would find that the trust was revoked at the time of the
schism. Moreover, though Acting Justice Pleicones and I believe ecclesi-
astical deference is required in this case, both of our opinions find that
all thirty-six parishes acceded to the Dennis Canon such that a legally
cognizable trust was created in favor of the National Church.

SS «:

sis and much of the result reached by the majority. Instead,
applying neutral principles of law, I would find those parishes
that did not expressly accede to the Dennis Canon should
retain ownership of the disputed real and personal property.
Consequently, I coneur in part and dissent in part.

As evident by all of the well-written opinions, this case
evokes strong views from each member of this Court. I cannot
deny that each opinion is impassioned and persuasive. Al-
though I appreciate the merits of each view, I do not believe
that emotion or religious doctrine should control purely legal
analysis. Rather, distilled to its simplest form, this case in-
volves a property dispute. Thus, irrespective of the doctrinal
context in which the case arose, this legal issue is our sole
concern.

In resolving this issue, I am guided by the neutral principles
of law approach enunciated in All Saints and Jones and aptly
discussed by former Chief Justice Toal. See All Saints Parish
Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
South Carolina, 385 S.C. 428, 444, 685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (2009)
(applying neutral principles of law in disputes arising between
a congregation and its denomination over title to church
property and between the congregation’s members over corpo-
rate control; stating, “the neutral principles of law approach
permits the application of property, corporate, and other
forms of law to church disputes”); Jones v. Wolf, 448 U.S. 595,
603-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (holding that a
state is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of
law approach as a means of adjudicating church disputes;
recognizing that “(t]he primary advantages of the neutral-
principles approach are that it is completely secular in opera-
tion, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of
religious organizations and polity”).

Based on the neutral principles of law approach, I believe
our analysis requires a discussion of the following sequential
questions: (1) what is the legal efficacy of the Dennis Canon?;
(2) does accession to the Dennis Canon equate to a creation of
a legally cognizable trust?; and (8) what is the import of a
decision not to accede to the Dennis Canon?

28, 1 express no opinion concerning the rights to the service marks as I
believe this determination should remain with the federal court.

The answer to each of these questions is not dependent on
the doctrinal validity of the Dennis Canon or a determination
that TEC is hierarchical. In fact, I look no further than our
state’s property and trust laws to determine whether the
purported trust created by the Dennis Canon comports with
the requirements of either an express or constructive trust.

Although this writing arguably complies with the statute of
frauds, like Justice Toal, I would find that, standing alone, it is
not sufficient to transfer title of property or create an express
or constructive trust under South Carolina law. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 62-7-402(a)(2) (2015) (“To be valid, a trust of real
property, created by transfer in trust or by declaration of
trust, must be proved by some writing signed by the party
creating the trust. A transfer in trust of personal property
does not require written evidence, but must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence, pursuant to Section 62-7-407.”). Sig-
nificantly, in the instant case, the party attempting to create
the trust was not the settlor. Instead, TEC was merely the
drafter of the Dennis Canon as it had no interest in the
property intended to comprise the corpus of the trust. Admit-
tedly, there is no requirement that the drafter of a trust
agreement be the settlor; however, in the absence of this
status, TEC was nothing more than a demanding scrivener.

Further, in my view, the Dennis Canon, by itself, does not
have the force and effect to transfer ownership of property as
it is not the “legally cognizable form” required by Jones. See
Jones, 443 US. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (recognizing that courts
must give effect to churches’ intent when deeds and trust
documents executed by the general church “provided [the
documents] are embodied in some legally cognizable form”).
While the Dennis Canon may use the term “trust,” this word
alone does not unequivocally convey an intention to transfer
ownership of property to the national church or create an
express or constructive trust, See Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525,
580, 354 §.E.2d 559, 561 (1987) (“In order to establish a
constructive trust, the evidence must be clear, definite, and
unequivocal.”),

Yet, TEC argues that the parishes’ accession to the Dennis
Canon created the trust. Assuming that each parish acceded in

Ss ©

writing, I would agree. In my view, the Dennis Canon had no
effect until acceded to in writing by the individual parishes.

Thus, in contrast to the majority, I would find the parishes
that did not expressly accede to the Dennis Canon cannot be
divested of their property. Because there was no writing
purporting to create a trust and they took no other legal
action to transfer ownership of their property, I believe these
parishes merely promised allegiance to the hierarchical nation-
al church. Without more, this promise cannot deprive them of
their ownership rights in their property. However, I agree
with the majority as to the disposition of the remaining
parishes because their express accession to the Dennis Canon
was sufficient to create an irrevocable trust.”

In conclusion, I readily acknowledge the controversy sur-
rounding this case and the ramifications of the Court’s deci-
sion. Even so, my decision cannot be driven by personal
beliefs or a desired result. Strictly applying neutral principles
of law, which I believe this property dispute mandates, I
would affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the
circuit court.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE:

Because I believe the proper application of “neutral princi-
ples of law,” as enunciated in Jones v. Wolf,’ demands that all
thirty-six local parishes retain ownership and control of their
property, I would affirm the trial court in result."

29, Additionally, I would find “The Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal
Church” in the Diocese of South Carolina should retain title to Camp
Si. Christopher as my decision in no way alters the clear language of
the 1951 deed conveying ownership of this property. The conveyance of
Camp St. Christopher was for the explicit purpose of furthering “the
welfare of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of South Carolina.” In my
view, the disassociated diocese can make no claim to being the succes-
sor to the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Car-
olina.

30. 443 U.S, 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979).
31, I join Justice Toal’s opinion, save for Part II.C.1’s conclusion that no

trusts were created as to the twenty-eight churches that acceded to the
1979 Dennis Canon.

This Court may—indeed, must—resolve this property dis-
pute on the basis of civil law, without regard to religious
doctrine or practice.” I first address the twenty-eight local
churehes that acceded in writing to the 1979 Dennis Canon.
Justice Toal presents a scholarly analysis of South Carolina
trust law. I take no exception to her presentation of general
trust-law principles, and I join Justice Toal in result. However,
for reasons I explain below, it seems to me that Jones v. Wolf
creates some uncertainty as to what “neutral principles of law”
means in the context of a church property dispute. As a result,
I am not persuaded that a court may, within constitutional
boundaries, simply apply general state trust law to decide this
ease. As best as I can interpret and apply Jones v. Wolf, it is
my view that a trust was created as to the property of the
local churches that acceded to the 1979 Dennis Canon. In what
appears to be a pure application of neutral principles of law,
Justice Toal would hold that accession to the 1979 Dennis
Canon “was not a legally binding action to impose a trust
under South Carolina law.” While I agree the national church
could not unilaterally declare a trust over the property of the
local churches, I would join Chief Justice Beatty and hold that
the local churches’ accession to the 1979 Dennis Canon was
sufficient to create a trust in favor of the national church. See
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775
(1979) (noting that courts must give effect to churches’ intent
when churches structure property arrangements “in some
legally cognizable form”).

I focus my comments on express trusts in light of First and
Fourteenth Amendment considerations, for that is the basis on
which the national church seeks to acquire control over the
property of the local churches. I do not depart from Justice
Toal’s position lightly, for she faithfully interprets South Car-

32. By framing the issue before the Court as being which diocese is the
“true” diocese of the national church, the lead opinion and concur-
rence preordain the result, for that is a question this Court clearly lacks
authority to answer. See id. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (“[T]he First Amend-
ment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on
the basis of religious doctrine and practice.”). Moreover, quoting from
a case cited by Justice Hearn, “recognizing the Episcopal Church as
hierarchical does not resolve a property dispute such as the one here.”
Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner, 246 Cal.App.4th 254, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d
51, 63 (2016).

olina’s trust law as it applies to typical property disputes.
Were the Court in the instant case permitted to apply the law
of express trusts as we ordinarily would, the suggestion that
any of the thirty-six local churches created a trust in favor of
the national church would be laughable. Yet I find Jones v.
Wolf teaches that a court must treat religious organizations
differently in accordance with constitutional limitations and
considerations. The burden the law imposes on a religious
organization in creating a trust is reduced.

Tn resolving church property disputes, we learn from Jones
v. Wolf that “neutral principles of law” is a bit of a misnomer,
for it is not really “neutral” after all. If it were, why would the
Supreme Court have taken pains to mandate that the burden
imposed on a religious organization be “minimal”? See id. at
606, 99 S.Ct. 3020. And why would the Supreme Court have
specified ways churches could establish an express trust,
without indicating concern for whether those methods were
valid under any state’s existing trust law? See id. at 608, 99
S.Ct. 3020. I believe where there is a dispute involving a local
church’s property rights vis a vis a national religious society
and an affiliated local religious body, constitutional consider-
ations require courts to analyze and resolve the property
dispute through the framework of a “minimal burden” on the
national religious organization. See id. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020.

Two passages from Jones v. Wolf lead me to this conclusion.
First, the Court in Jones v. Wolf spoke forcefully about the
many advantages of the neutral principles of law approach:

The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach

are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet

flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organ-
ization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objec-
tive, well-established concepts of trust and property law
familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the
neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of
private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering pri-
vate rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the
parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and
trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to
happen to church property in the event of a particular

2 ee
contingency, or what religious body will determine the
ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy.

Id. at 603, 99 S.Ct, 8020 (emphasis added).

If this were the sum total of what Jones v. Wolf said about
neutral principles, I would without hesitation join Justice Toal
in full. But the Jones v. Wolf Court went further. Specifically,
the majority in Jones v. Wolf addressed the dissent, which
preferred a rule of compulsory deference.” In declining to
mandate a rule of compulsory deference, the Court rejected
the dissent’s argument that the neutral-principles method
would frustrate the free-exercise rights of the members of a
religious organization. The Court explained:

The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to “inhibit”
the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral
provisions of state law governing the manner in which
churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.
Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a
church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time
before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so
desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will
retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or
the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust
in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitu-
tion of the general church can be made to recite an express
trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden
involved in taking such steps will be minimal, And the civil
courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by
the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cogniza-
ble form.

Id, at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added). It is this passage in
particular that causes me to part company with Justice Toal’s
adherence to the normal rules of the road concerning the
creation of express trusts.

33. In my view, Justices Pleicones and Hearn cast their votes based on
the rule of compulsory deference that was rejected in Jones v. Wolf. See
id. at 604-05, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (noting the dissent in that case “would
insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a dispute arises
over the ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the
authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself” (internal
quotation marks omitted)),

SS

As I interpret the above passages, Jones v. Wolf imposes a
minimal burden on a national religious institution in the
creation of what courts must recognize as an express trust
over the property of an affiliated local church. Thus, while
general principles of law mark the starting point in resolving a
church property dispute, the harder question is determining
where to draw the finish line—just how much of the general
law must a religious organization follow?

Here, as Justice Toal forcefully points out, the national
church turns the law of express trusts on its head, as no local
church (as “settlor”) took steps to create a trust, but merely
responded to (“acceded” to) changes to church governance
documents proposed by the national church. Nonetheless,
given the Supreme Court’s imprimatur concerning the mini-
mal burden that may be imposed on a religious organization, I
conclude that a trust was created in favor of the national
church over the property of the twenty-eight local churches
that acceded in writing to the 1979 Dennis Canon,

The next question is whether these twenty-eight churches
were irrevocably bound by the 1979 Dennis Canon. The na-
tional church accepted the invitation of Jones v. Wolf and
created the equivalent of an express trust with a minimal
burden. If the national church had followed state law as
described by Justice Toal and actually created an express
trust in the normal course, the national church would have a
strong argument on the issue of revocability. But the national
church cannot escape the method and manner in which it
chose to create a trust, that is, by placing the trust provision
in a church governance document that is inherently amenda-
ble.

Justice Hearn invokes what she calls the “common law
default rule of irrevocability” to argue that the local churches
were eternally bound by the 1979 Dennis Canon. However,
this “default rule” is a presumption that is susceptible of
evidence of a contrary intent. In my judgment, as explained
below, the circumstances here overcome the presumption of
irrevocability.

“If the meaning of the trust instrument is uncertain or
ambiguous as to whether the settlor intended to reserve a
power of revocation, evidence of the circumstances under

which the trust was created is admissible to determine its
interpretation.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 380 emt. b
(1959). Among the factors that could indicate a settlor intend-
ed to reserve a right of revocation are the character of the
trust property, the relationship between the settlor and the
beneficiary, and the reasons that induced the settlor to create
the trust. H.g., id. §§ 880 emt. ¢, 332 emt. a (1959). I believe
these factors militate in favor of the trust’s revocability.* The
disputed property includes land and buildings to which the
local churches have long held title, in some cases for centuries.
And the impetus to create the trust came not from the settlors
(the local churches), but the beneficiary (the national church).
Furthermore, I would not myopically invoke the common law
presumption of irrevocability where, as here, the national
organization seeking to impose the trust placed the trust
language in a document that is by its very nature subject to
amendment. As the legislature observed in a comment to the
South Carolina Trust Code, “An unrestricted power to amend
may also include the power to revoke a trust.” S.C. Code Ann.
§ 62-7-602 reporter's cmt. (Supp. 2016).

In my view the circumstances described above—a trust
provision drafted by a beneficiary and placed in an amendable
church governance document—combine to overcome the com-
mon law presumption of irrevocability. As a result, I would
hold as a matter of South Carolina law that under these facts
the local churches were not forever bound by the trust provi-
sion, and they retained the authority to withdraw their acces-
sion to it. That is precisely what they did—through proper

34, Inote that there is significantly less justification for adhering to the
common law presumption of irrevocability where, as in this case, it is
not consistent with the rationale behind the presumption—“[t]he theory
.., that most trusts are created by way of gift and a completed gift may
not be rescinded by the donor merely by reason of a change of mind.”
Mary F, Radford, George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The
Law of Trusts and Trustees § 998, at 235 (3d ed. 2006). Here, the trust
was clearly not intended to effectuate a gift to the beneficiary (the
national church); rather, the trust was drafted by the national church
(the beneficiary) to benefit the national church. In addition, the settlors
(the local churches) retained ownership of and continued to exercise
exclusive control over the property,

35, Ireject any argument that the national church would be required to
consent to any amendment of the trust provision, for the national

action, by those with proper authority, the Diocese and local
churches withdrew their accession to the 1979 Dennis Canon
in accordance with state law prior to the filing of this litiga-
tion.** Therefore, I would affirm the trial court in result and
hold that those churches that had previously agreed to the
1979 Dennis Canon are no longer bound by it.”

I turn now to the eight churches that never acceded to the
1979 Dennis Canon. Today, this Court allows (by a three-to-

church would never consent and the result would be a de facto
irrevocable trust. Chief Justice Beatty accurately describes the national
church as “nothing more than a demanding scrivener.” Allowing the
national church to invoke the “minimal burden” approach of Jones v.
Wolf in the creation of a trust is not a license to completely turn our
back to neutral principles of law. If it is determined that a settlor
retains the right to revoke a trust and the manner of revocation is not
specified, the trust may be revoked “ ‘in any manner which shows a
clear and definite purpose on the part of the settlor of the trust to revoke
the same.’” Peoples Nat’l Bank of Greenville v. Peden, 229 S.C. 167,
171, 92 S.B.2d 163, 165 (1956) (emphasis added) (quoting Broga v.
Rome Tr. Co., 151 Misc. 641, 272 N.Y.S. 101, 106 (Sup. Ct. 1934); see
also S.C, Code Ann. § 62-7-602 reporter's cmt. (‘Where the right to
revoke [is] reserved and no particular mode [is] specified, any mode
sufficiently showing an intention to revoke [is] effective.”),

36. There is no question that Bishop Lawrence and the local churches
had the legal authority at the time to take the actions they did. Justice
Hearn’s reliance on Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner is misplaced. In
that case the attempted transfers of diocesan property by Bishop
Schofield were ineffective because they “occurred after Schofield had
been removed as bishop of the Diocese.” Diocese of San Joaquin, 202
Cal.Rptr.3d at 59. Not only that, but the entity to which Bishop
Schofield attempted to transfer the property did not exist because he
lacked authority under California law to change the diocese’s corporate
name, Jd. at 65-67. Conversely, notwithstanding the unrelenting vilifi-
cation of Bishop Lawrence, it is manifest that Bishop Lawrence was
duly ordained, appointed, and authorized to act at the time the property
transfers and corporate amendments occurred, and they were conduct-
ed in accordance with South Carolina law.

37. Despite Justice Hearn’s claim to the contrary, reaching this conclu-
sion does not require me to ignore the Nonprofit Corporation Act's
exception for religious organizations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-31-180
(2006). Section 33-31-180 grants supremacy to a religious corporation’s
governing documents only “to the extent required by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of South Carolina.” Jd. Therein
lies the nub of this dispute, as “[t]he exact scope of constitutional
[imitations is less than clear and is subject to debate.” Id, § 33-31-180
official cmt. (2006). Justice Hearn and I simply disagree as to what the
Constitution requires.

ST

two vote with Chief Justice Beatty casting the deciding vote)
the eight churches that were never subject to the 1979 Dennis
Canon to keep their property. That is remarkable, for by a
single vote the rule of law is preserved and property owner-
ship is protected.

Prior to today’s opinion, the national church’s focus in this
property dispute has been whether the 1979 Dennis Canon
imposed an express trust on the property of the local
churches. The national church throughout this litigation has
relied on the 1979 Dennis Canon and the law of ewpress trusts
to support its claim of ownership over the church property of
the thirty-six local parishes in question. But it is undisputed
that eight of the local parishes were never subject to the 1979
Dennis Canon. Yet two members of this Court would go
further and transfer to the national church ownership of the
property of the eight churches that never agreed to the
Dennis Canon. That is stunning. The effort by two members of
this Court to strip the property from these eight churches
confirms Justice Toal’s observation concerning their motiva-
tion to “reach[ ] a desired result in this case.”

I first address the concurrence’s view that the Court may
not even consider the status of the eight non-acceding
churches on issue preservation grounds. The answer to this
assertion is simple: “The appellate court may affirm any
ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any ground(s) ap-
pearing in the Record on Appeal.” Rule 220(c), SCACR (em-
phasis added). The local churches, as winners at trial and
respondents on appeal, were not required to play “what if we
lose” in their briefs or during oral argument.

Moreover, as Justice Toal points out, the national church
itself brought up the non-acceding churches. The national
church acknowledged to this Court that only some of the
thirty-six local churches involved in this litigation “made ex-
press promises in their governing documents to comply with
the [nJational [cJhurch’s rules” after the national church
adopted the 1979 Dennis Canon. That obviously makes an

38. The national church acknowledged in its brief that “29 of the 36
parishes made express promises in their governing documents to com-
ply with the [nlational [clhurch’s rules after those rules had been
amended to include the Dennis Canon in 1979,” Brief of Appellants at

issue out of the churches that did not make such promises.
Although the concurrence may feign surprise at a majority of
this Court addressing the status of the eight non-acceding
churches, the national church surely cannot.

As to the merits of the national church’s claim to the
property of the eight non-acceding churches, in my judgment
the dissent on this issue (Justices Pleicones and Hearn) mis-
reads the Supreme Court’s observation in Jones v. Wolf that
complying with state property and trust laws would not im-
pose an undue free-exercise burden on religious organizations
as a command that states completely ignore their existing
laws to placate hierarchical national churches, Properly ap-
plied to the non-acceding churches, there is no neutral princi-
ple of law that supports the conclusion Justices Pleicones and
Hearn desire. As Chief Justice Beatty and Justice Toal note in
their respective opinions, the framework set forth in Jones v
Wolf makes clear that, because of well-established South
Carolina law, an express trust cannot be imposed on the
property of those eight churches that never adopted the
Dennis Canon. See 8.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(2) (Supp.

38. The same point was repeated by the national church's counsel
during oral argument.

39. I do not address constructive trusts, because that issue is not
preserved for our review. The national church has relied exclusively on
the law of express trusts throughout this litigation. The national church
mentioned the term constructive trust just once in its fifty-one-page
brief and not at all in its twenty-five-page reply brief. The sole reference
to a constructive trust was a conclusory statement that “South Car-
olina’s Trust Code and common law of constructive trusts” require the
Court to enforce the Dennis Canon against all thirty-six parishes,
Accordingly, the law of constructive trusts cannot serve as a basis to
reverse the trial court. See, e.g., Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence
Hosps., 409 S.C, 514, 520 n.4, 763 S,E.2d 200, 203 n.4 (2014) (refusing
to consider an argument in the appellant’s brief that was “conclusory”
and “not supported by any authority”); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314
S.C, 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting a claim is deemed
abandoned when the appellant fails to support it with arguments or
citations to authority); of, 1’On, LLC. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C.
406, 421-22, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (stating that although an
appellate court may affirm a decision on any ground appearing in the
record, “[aln appellate court may not, of course, reverse for any reason
appearing in the record”). I add that the phrase “constructive trust”
was never mentioned in the approximately hour-long oral argument
before this Court. In any event, Justice Toal correctly explains why the
law of constructive trusts provides no lifeline to the national church.

2016) (stating that express trusts in real property “must be
proved by some writing signed by the party creating the
trust”); see also Beckham v. Short, 298 S.C. 348, 349, 380
§.E.2d 826, 827 (1989) (noting that under the then-applicable
statute, “trusts in lands not manifested and proved by some
writing signed by the party declaring the trust are utterly void
and of no effect” (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).

Nonetheless, the national church, with two members of this
Court in support, desires the property of these eight churches
by virtue of a “trust” the churches never acceded to. In short,
these eight churches have never agreed to anything in a
“legally cognizable form” indicating the slightest intention of
transferring ownership of their property. Yet if Justices Plei-
cones and Hearn had their way, these eight local churches
would lose their property today. Under this approach, the
1979 Dennis Canon was unnecessary, for the national church
would control the property of all local churches simply because
the national church “said so.” Perhaps this explains the wis-
dom of the Jones v. Wolf majority in rejecting the rule of
compulsory deference that Justices Pleicones and Hearn in-
voke today.

By a single vote, these eight local churches retain ownership
of their property. The message is clear for churches in South
Carolina that are affiliated in any manner with a national
organization and have never lifted a finger to transfer control
or ownership of their property—if you think your property
ownership is secure, think again.

I dissent in part (concerning the twenty-eight churches) and
concur in part (concerning the eight non-acceding churches).

ACTING JUSTICE TOAL:

This is a very difficult dispute in which the trial court was
asked by the plaintiffs to declare the status of title to church
property. Just as the litigants in this matter are in disagree-
ment about the legal issues raised in this case, so too our
Court is sharply divided in our opinions about this matter.
These divisions are the result of sincerely held views about the
law, but we are united in our deep respect for each other’s
views and the sincerity which informs our opinions. The

various writings are powerfully written and deeply researched.
I am regretful that I cannot join my colleagues in the majori-
ty whose legal ability I respect so highly. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent.’ With regard to the question of who owns
the disputed real and personal property, I would hold that the
plaintiffs are the title owners in fee simple absolute to this
property under South Carolina law and would affirm the
decision of the trial court. With regard to the question of
whether the defendants infringed on the plaintiffs’ service
marks, I would narrowly affirm the trial court under state law
and defer to the federal court to answer any issues in this
matter in which federal copyright and trademark law may be
applicable.

InTRODUCTION

The main points upon which I depart from my brothers and
sister in the majority are as follows:

(D I would rely on over three hundred years of settled trust
and property law in South Carolina to declare title to these
disputed properties in the plaintiffs’ favor, as I believe the
effect of the majority’s decision is to strip a title owner of its
property and give it to an organization with which the
property owner has no affiliation, relying on documents and
practices that do not create a trust under South Carolina
law.

(2) The lead opinion and concurrence” (unsuccessfully)
attempt to strip eight parishes of their titled property,

40. As there are five writings covering different aspects of this case, I
refer to “the majority” when discussing the collective decisions of Chief
Justice Beatty, Justice Hearn, and Acting Justice Pleicones.

41. I likewise concur in the result reached by Justice Kittredge in his
dissent. Justice Kittredge believes that in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S, 595, 99
S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
dictated a national church need not strictly adhere to a state’s neutral
trust law to establish a cognizable property interest in its constituents’
holdings. I cannot agree that complying with ordinary trust law re-
quirements is overly burdensome, or that enforcing such requirements
would violate the holding in Jones. However, Justice Kittredge nonethe-
less takes a reasoned approach to the applicability of our state’s trust
law in this instance. I therefore concur in the result he reaches.

42. For sake of clarity, I refer to Acting Justice Pleicones’s opinion as
the lead opinion and Justice Heam's opinion as the concurrence. I refer

despite the fact that these parishes have never agreed to or

signed any document purporting to affect their ownership

interests,

(8) I believe the lead opinion is not consistent with the

provisions of South Carolina statutory law regarding the

organization and management of non-profit and charitable
corporations,

(4) I believe the lead opinion uses an equitable standard of

review in this action which is not consistent with the plead-

ings in this matter, and thus, misstates the question before
this Court,

(6) In my view, the lead opinion is contrary to settled First

Amendment precedents from the United States Supreme

Court.

(6) Although the lead opinion specifically relies on and

upholds our prior precedents—most importantly All Saints

Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the

Diocese of South Carolina, 385 8.C. 428, 685 S.E.2d 163

(2009)—essentially the effect of its holding is to reverse the

result in All Saints,

In my view, the result stemming from the majority’s various
decisions is a distinct departure from well-established South
Carolina law and legal precedents, a departure which appears
to be driven by a sole purpose: reaching a desired result in
this case. However, the Court’s decision here affects law
governing ail trusts and titles as well as the operation of all
non-profit and charitable corporations in this State. Thus, the
effects of the majority's decision are sure to be pervasive, and
for this reason, I feel compelled to write separately.

I. Paris anv Posture or rar Dispute

The plaintiffs in this case are: (1) thirty-six individual
church parishes, incorporated under South Carolina law and
located in southeast South Carolina (the plaintiff parishes); (2)
the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South
Carolina, a South Carolina corporation (the disassociated dio-
cese); and (3) the Trustees of the Protestant Episcopal Church
in South Carolina, a South Carolina corporation (the trustee

to Chief Justice Beatty's opinion as the Chief Justice’s partial concur-
rence, I refer to Justice Kittredge’s dissent as the Kittredge dissent.

SS

corporation). It is undisputed that the individual plaintiff-
parish corporations hold title in fee simple absolute to their
parish’s real and personal property. It is also undisputed that
the disassociated diocese is the title holder of its service
marks, seals, and emblems; and that the trustee corporation
holds title in fee simple absolute to Camp St. Christopher.

The defendants in this case are: (1) the National Episcopal
Church, a voluntary unincorporated association (the national
church); and (2) the Episcopal Church of South Carolina, a
South Carolina corporation affiliated with the national church
(the associated diocese). As to the relationship between the
plaintiffs and defendants, the disassociated diocese was once a
member of the national church, and the plaintiff parishes were
and are affiliated with the now-disassociated diocese. The
associated diocese is comprised of the parishioners and
churches who chose to continue their association with the
national church when the disassociated diocese disaffiliated
from that organization.

Prior to the Revolutionary War, the South Carolina Com-
mons House of Assembly created colonial parishes as part of
the Church Act, granting the parishes both civil and ecclesias-
tical powers over the land and people. These colonial parishes
were part of the Church of England, under the authority of
the Bishop of London. However, the Church of England did
not pay for the services provided to parishioners, nor did it
pay for the properties used by the churches located within the
parishes. Rather, the various colonial churches were locally
funded, and the properties associated with them were titled in
the local churches’ names.

In 1778, the first state constitution disestablished the
Church of England as the state church and empowered exist-
ing parishes to petition the legislature for incorporation. The
local churches previously under the aegis of the Church of
England disassociated from that Church, and many sought to
be legislatively incorporated.

Later, in 1785, the disassociated diocese formed as an
unincorporated association of former Anglican churches. In
1786, the twelve churches that then comprised the disassociat-

ed diocese adopted the first diocesan constitution.* In this
constitution, the churches—some of which predated the forma-
tion of the diocese by more than 100 years—reaffirmed that
they wished to remain independent from the Church of Eng-
land in ecclesiastical and civil matters. Three years later, in
1789, the disassociated diocese and six other states’ dioceses
founded and voluntarily associated with the national church
under terms dictated by the dioceses.

Except for a five year hiatus during the Civil War," the
disassociated diocese continued its voluntary association with
the national church until October 2012. Throughout the histo-
ry of the disassociated diocese’s voluntary association with
the national church, the plaintiff parishes likewise voluntarily
associated with the disassociated diocese, and therefore, were
only affiliated with the national church through their mem-
bership in the diocese. Both before and after the association,
the plaintiff parishes and their parishioners worshipped on
property titled in the individual parishes’ names, which the
parishes owned in fee simple. Moreover, for as long as the
disassociated diocese was affiliated with the national church,
the national church and its dioceses, including the disassociat-
ed diocese, implemented various changes in their respective
constitutions and canons, which are the governing documents
for the organizations.

In 1978, the disassociated diocese incorporated, becoming a
non-profit corporation. Initially, the diocese’s corporate pur-
pose was “to continue the operation of an Hpiscopal Diocese

43. These churches included St. Philip’s Church, Charleston; St. Mi-
chael’s Church, Charleston; Prince Frederick, Plantersville; St. James’
Church, Goose Creek; St. Thomas’ Church, Berkeley County; St. Bar-
tholomew’s Church, Jacksonboro; Prince William's Church, Beaufort
County; St. Andrew’s Church, Mt. Pleasant; the Church of the Parish of
St. Helena, Beaufort; the Episcopal Church of the Parish of Prince
George Winyah, Georgetown; St. John’s Parish, Colleton County; and
the Episcopal Church of Christ Church Parish, Mt. Pleasant. Some of
these churches are parties to this action,

44, Thus, these plaintiff parishes did not transfer title to their properties
to the disassociated diocese.

45, These states included New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina.

46. Title to the properties owned by the disassociated diocese and its
churches did not change hands either before or after the Civil War.

Ss ©

under the Constitution and Canons of [the national church].”
Similarly, the trustee corporation’s initial bylaws stated that it
would carry out its duties under the authority of the national
church’s constitution and canons. Likewise, many of the indi-
vidual plaintiff parishes had similar provisions in their govern-
ing documents.

In 1979, the national church enacted the so-called “Dennis
Canon,” which reads:

All real and personal property held by or for the benefit of

any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this

Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish,

Mission or Congregation is located. The existence of this

trust, however, shall in no way limit the power and authority

of the Parish, Mission or Congregation otherwise existing
over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission
or Congregation remains a part of, and subject to this

Church and its Constitution and Canons.

In 1987, the disassociated diocese adopted its own version of
the Dennis Canon.*" The defendants contend that twenty-eight
of the plaintiff parishes “acceded,” in some form or another,
either to the local or national version of the Dennis Canon,*
Right of the plaintiff parishes never acceded to either Dennis
Canon.” In all cases, however, the defendants concede that no
formal trust documents were ever executed by the plaintiff
parishes, the disassociated diocese, or the trustee corporation

47. That version of the Dennis Canon states: ‘“‘All real and personal
property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission, or Congrega-
tion is held in trust for [the national church] and the [disassociated
diocese]. The existence of this trust, however, shall in no way limit the
power and authority of the Parish, Mission, or Congregation existing
over such property so long as the particular Parish, Mission, or Congre-
gation remains a part of, and subject to, [the national church] and the
[disassociated diocese].” (Emphasis added).

48, Some of these “accessions” occurred before the 1979 proclamation
of the Dennis Canon by the national church. Some occurred before
1987 when the now-disassociated diocese adopted its own version of
the Dennis Canon, Some occurred after both actions.

49, The defendants do not reference any documentation of accession
(and I have found none in the record) for the following plaintiff
parishes: Christ the King, Waccamaw; St. Matthews Church, Darling-
ton; St, Andrews Church-Mt, Pleasant Land Trust; St. Paul’s Episcopal
Church of Conway; The Episcopal Church of the Parish of Prince
George Winyah, Georgetown; the Parish of St. Andrew, Mt. Pleasant;

in favor of the national church specifying the title holder as
the settlor or creator of the trust and the national church as
the cestwi que trust or holder of the beneficial title of the
trust. Instead, the defendants maintain that the Dennis Canon
and other specific actions of the plaintiffs in amending their
governing documents throughout their history (including be-
fore the existence of the Dennis Canon) “imposed” a trust in
favor of the defendants,

In 2009, with the General Convention’s approval, Bishop
Lawrence became the ecclesiastical head of the now-disassoci-
ated diocese. Shortly thereafter, a doctrinal dispute concern-
ing marriage and the priesthood developed between the na-
tional church and the disassociated diocese, resulting in what
was described as a “cold war” between the entities.

As a result, the disassociated diocese, the trustee corpora-
tion, and the plaintiff parishes began to make significant
changes to their corporate organizational structures and gov-
erning documents, in accordance with the civil laws by which
the disassociated diocese and the national church structured
its affairs in South Carolina. For example, in March 2010, the
trustee corporation amended its bylaws to remove all refer-
ences and accessions to the national church’s constitution and
canons. Similarly, in October 2010 and February 2011, the
disassociated diocese amended its constitution and canons to
remove its accession to the Dennis Canon and other canons of
the national church, and to adopt a new corporate purpose: “to
continue operation under the Constitution and Canons of [the
disassociated diocese].” While these changes were being made,
Bishop Lawrence was the duly-elected (by the national
church) corporate officer empowered with the authority to
undertake these actions in South Carolina under state law.

St. John’s Episcopal Church of Florence; and St. Matthias Episcopal
Church, Summerton. The defendants contend that St. Matthias and St.
John’s in effect “acceded” to the Dennis Canon because each was
deeded some real property by the now-disassociated diocese that con-
tained language tantamount to accession. However, neither of these
churches ever directly acceded 1o the local or national version of the
Dennis Canon, and the disassociated diocese disclaimed any interest in
these churches’ real property by quitclaim.

50. To the extent Justice Hearn’s concurrence focuses on the alleged
nefarious motives and actions of Bishop Lawrence and other parish

During the same time period, the disassociated diocese
issued a series of quitclaim deeds to the plaintiff parishes,
disclaiming any interest it might have in the plaintiff parishes’
properties. Further, the disassociated diocese applied to South
Carolina’s Secretary of State to register five “service marks”™;
three similar names for the disassociated diocese, and two
pictures of the diocesan seal.” All of the amendments and
registrations were accomplished through publicly-recorded le-
gal documents. Additionally, at some point during this time,
the national church had actual knowledge of these changes,
but chose not to revoke Bishop Lawrence’s authority within
the church.

In September 2012, the national church’s disciplinary board
found that Bishop Lawrence had abandoned the national
church, and recommended disciplinary action against him. On
October 17, 2012, upon discovering the disciplinary board’s
recommendation to sanction Bishop Lawrence, the disassociat-
ed diocese ended its association with the national church. The
disassociated diocese’s standing committee then amended its
corporate bylaws to add provisions prohibiting anyone from
challenging the authority of the board of directors or removing
any member of the board, including Bishop Lawrence, except
by the process provided in the diocesan bylaws.

Thereafter, loyalists within the disassociated diocese who
remained committed to the teachings of the national church
called a meeting.” At this meeting, the defendants discussed

officers and members of the disassociated diocese, as will be explained,
infra, it is my opinion that such examination and recitation is inappro-
priate. Because I believe this dispute should be resolved on neutral
principles of law, reliance on this ecclesiastical and doctrinal back-
ground is improper to resolving this dispute,

51. Service marks are similar to trademarks, but whereas trademarks
identify and distinguish a person’s or business's goods, service marks
identify and distinguish a person’s or business’s services. Compare S.C.
Code Ann, § 39-5-1105(7) (1976) (defining “service mark”), with S.C.
Code Ann. § 39-5-1105(9) (1976) (defining “trademark”).

52. In 2011, several of the plaintiff parishes also registered service
marks,

53, The defendants called the meeting by emailing clergy from the
disassociated diocese and inviting them to a clergy day purportedly

replacing the disassociated diocese with a newly-created dio-
cese—the associated diocese—and placing Bishop Charles
vonRosenberg at its helm.

On November 17, 2012, the disassociated diocese held a
Special Convention, at which the plaintiff parishes and their
clergy overwhelmingly voted to affirm the diocese’s disaffilia-
tion from the national church, as well as voting to remove the
diocese’s accession to the national church’s constitution. On
January 26, 2018, following the national church’s acceptance of
Bishop Lawrence’s renunciation of orders, the associated
diocese was created and subsequently voted to reverse most of
the changes made to the disassociated diocese’s constitution
and canons. That same date, Bishop vonRosenberg was offi-
cially installed as the national church’s bishop to the associat-
ed diocese.

After the plaintiffs withdrew from the national church, the
defendants claimed ownership over all of the property held by
the plaintiffs, arguing the plaintiffs only held such property in
trust for the benefit of the national church and its associated
diocese, and that the associated diocese was entitled to control
and govern the assets belonging to the plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs acceded to the Dennis Canon.

IL. Raat anp Personal PROPERTY

The question here is ultimately simple: what entities—the
plaintiffs or the defendants—own the real and personal prop-
erty at issue? I fundamentally disagree with how the lead
opinion and concurrence answer that question, as we are not
asked to determine the “legitimacy” of either diocese, nor are
we permitted to do so by the United States Constitution or
South Carolina law.

A, Standard of Review

First, I strongly disagree with the lead opinion’s statement
of the standard of review. The lead opinion contends that

sponsored by the disassociated diocese. This is just one of several
instances in which the plaintiffs claim the defendants improperly used
the disassociated diocese’s registered name and seal without permis-
sion.

54, Bishop Lawrence contends that he never renounced his orders.

because the plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief, this is an
equitable matter. As a result, the lead opinion finds the Court
is free to take its own view of the facts.

However, by the terms of their complaint, the plaintiffs seek
a declaratory judgment as to the rightful ownership, under
South Carolina law, of the real, personal, and intellectual
property of the disassociated diocese, the plaintiff parishes,
and the trustee corporation.® The plaintiffs’ request for in-
junctive relief is clearly confined to the defendants’ use of the
plaintiffs’ names, seals, and emblems—which, as I explain
further, infra, is ultimately a question of federal law.

“A suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equita-
ble; rather, it is determined by the nature of the underlying
issue.” Sloan v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 388 S.C. 152, 157, 694
S.E.2d 532, 584 (2010). Rather than looking to the relief
sought, appellate courts must look to the “main purpose” of
the underlying issue to determine whether the action is at law
or in equity. Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 16, 690 S.H.2d
771, T73 (2010); Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 856 S.C. 581, 544,
590 S.E.2d 838, 345 (Ct. App. 2008).

Here, the central issue of this dispute (as succinctly put by
the lead opinion) is the determination of title to real property.
Therefore, the action is one at law. See Query v. Burgess, 371
S.C. 407, 410, 639 S.H.2d 455, 456 (Ct. App. 2006) (“Where, as
here, the main purpose of the [declaratory judgment action]
concerns the determination of title to real property, it is an
action at law.”); see also Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 60, 367

55. Specifically, the opening paragraph of the plaintiffs’ second amend-
ed complaint states:
Plaintiffs, by and through their respective undersigned counsel, bring
this action against the Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment
pursuant to §§ 15-53-10 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws
(1976) that they are the sole owners of their respective real and
personal property in which the Defendants, The Episcopal Church
(“TEC”) has no legal, beneficial or equitable interest. The Plaintiffs
(except for St. Andrew’s Church, Mt. Pleasant) also seek a declaratory
judgment that the Defendants and those under their control have
improperly used and may not continue to use any of the names,
styles, seals and emblems of any of the Plaintiffs or any imitations or
substantially similar names, styles, seals and emblems and that the
Court enter injunctions prohibiting the Defendants and those under
their control from such uses pursuant to §§ 39-15-1105 et seq. and
§§ 16-17-310 and 320 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976).

S.H.2d 156, 157 (1988) (“The determination of title to real
property is a legal issue.”). In an action at law tried without a
jury, this Court will not disturb the trial court’s findings of
fact unless there is no evidence to reasonably support them.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 405 §.C, 584, 598, 748 S.H.2d
781, 785 (2018). “However, an appellate court may make its
own determination on questions of law and need not defer to
the trial court’s rulings in this regard.” Id.

It is abundantly clear from the pleadings that the main
purpose of this declaratory judgment action is the determina-
tion of title to real property. Thus, under South Carolina’s
jurisprudence, this is an action at law, and we must defer to
the trial court’s factual findings unless wholly unsupported by
the evidence,

B. First Amendment Jurisprudence

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see
also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 808, 60 S.Ct. 900,
84 L.Ed. 1218 (1940) (stating the Establishment Clause applies
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment). Undeni-
ably, “the First Amendment severely cireumscribes the role
that civil courts may play in resolving church property dis-
putes.” Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem't Presbyterian Church, 893 U.S. 440, 449, 89
§.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). More specifically, “the First
Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church prop-
erty disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.”
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 8020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775
(1979); Serbian E. Orthodouw Diocese for the U.S. & Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10, 96 S.Ct, 2872, 49 L.Ed.2d
151 (1976); Presbyterian Church, 398 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct, 601
(discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (18 Wall.) 679, 728-29, 20
L.Ed. 666 (1871)); accord Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist
Church, 406 S.C. 156, 160, 750 S.B.2d 605, 607 (2018) (quoting
Kedroff' v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct.
148, 97 L.Ed, 120 (1952)). In other words, civil courts may not
inquire into matters touching on “ ‘theological controversy,
church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity

of the members of a church to the standard of morals required
of them.’” Serbian E. Orthodow, 426 U.S. at 718-14, 96 S.Ct.
2872 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S, (18 Wall.) at 788).

However, “not every civil court decision as to property
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protect-
ed by the First Amendment.” Presbyterian Church, 398 U.S.
at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601; see also Jones, 448 U.S. at 605, 99 S.Ct.
3020 (rejecting the suggestion that the First Amendment
requires states to adopt a compulsory rule of deference to
religious authorities in resolving church property disputes
when the dispute does not involve a doctrinal controversy).
Instead, “a [s]tate may adopt any one of various approaches
for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no
consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and
liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.” Jones, 448 U.S. at
602, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis in original) (citing Md. & Va,
Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 896 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct, 499, 24 L.Hd.2d 582 (1970)
(per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring).

Thus far, the Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned two
constitutionally permissible approaches for resolving church
disputes: the deference approach and the neutral principles of
law approach. See All Saints, 885 S.C. at 442, 685 S.H.2d at
171. Under the deference approach, “whenever the questions
of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law
have been decided by the highest of [the] church judicatories
to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must,
accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.”
Watson, 80 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 727; see also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Emp’t Op-
portunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 185-86, 182 S.Ct. 694, 181
L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), The deference approach used to be the
only approach taken by courts to resolve church disputes, All
Saints, 885 S.C. at 448, 685 S.E.2d at 171. However, as First
Amendment jurisprudence developed, criticism of a pure def-
erence approach arose because the approach “is rigid in its
application and does not give efficacy to the neutral, civil legal
documents and principles with which religious congregations
and denominations often organize their affairs.” See, ¢.9., id. at
444, 685 S.E.2d at 171.

TT

As an alternative, in Jones v. Wolf, the United States
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned the neutral principles of
law approach to resolving church disputes. 443 U.S. at 608, 99
S.Ct. 3020 (holding a state is constitutionally entitled to adopt
the neutral principles of law approach as a means of adjudicat-
ing church disputes); accord Presbyterian Church, 393 US. at
449, 89 S.Ct. 601 (“[T]here are neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be
applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is
awarded.”).

Under the neutral principles methodology, ownership of

disputed property is determined by applying generally ap-

plicable law and legal principles. That application will usual-
ly include considering evidence such as deeds to the proper-
ties, terms of the local church charter (including articles of
incorporation and [bylaws], if any), and relevant provisions
of governing documents of the general church,
Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tew., 422 8.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex.
2014). In Jones, the Supreme Court explained:
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach
are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet
flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organ-
ization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objec-
tive, well-established concepts of trust and property law
familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the
neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of
private-law systems in general—flexibility in ordering pri-
vate rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the
parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust
provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen
to church property in the event of a particular contingency,
or what religious body will determine the ownership in the
event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a
religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with
the desires of the members.
443 U.S. at 608-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020. At the most basic level, the
neutral principles approach embodies notions of fairness, as
churches—like other private and public entities—can avail

SS ©

themselves of the protections of our state and local laws, and
therefore, should be on an equal playing field when disputes
arise under those laws. As far back as 1871 in Watson—which
was the architect of the deference approach as we know it—
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged this basic
principle of fairness:

Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude

as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable

purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are
equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of
their members subject to its restraints. Conscious as we
may be of the excited feeling engendered by this controver-
sy, ... we enter upon its consideration with the satisfaction
of knowing that the principles on which we are to decide so
much of it as is proper for our decision, are those applicable
alike to all of its class, and that our duty is the simple one of
applying those principles to the facts before us.

80 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 714.

In Pearson v. Church of God, this Court first adopted the
neutral principles approach. 325 §.C. 45, 478 S.H.2d 849 (1996).
There, the Court articulated three general principles to assist
the courts when resolving civil disputes involving a church. Id.
at 52-53, 478 S.E.2d at 853. First, “courts may not engage in
resolving disputes as to religious law, principle, doctrine,
discipline, custom, or administration.” Id. at 52, 478 S.H.2d at
858. Second, “courts cannot avoid adjudicating rights growing
out of civil law,” such as disputes determined by contract or
property law. Id. at 52 & n.8, 478 S.H.2d at 853 & n.3. Third,
“in resolving such civil law disputes, courts must accept as
final and binding the decisions of the highest religious judica-
tories as to religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, cus-
tom, and administration.” Id. at 52-58, 478 S.H.2d at 858; see
also Jones, 448 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 8020; Serbian E. Ortho-
dow, 426 U.S. at 724-25, 96 S.Ct. 2872.

Prior to Pearson, this Court issued decisions resolving
property matters using a purely deferential approach.” How-

56. Here, the plaintiffs utilized local deed recordation systems and
organized as corporations under state law.

57. See, e.g., Seldon v. Singletary, 284 S.C. 148, 326 S.E.2d 147 (1985)
(deferring to hierarchical authority of the church in case involving

ever, following Pearson’s pronouncements, South Carolina
evolved into a State that exclusively applies a neutral princi-
ples approach to matters involving secular church disputes—
and not just property disputes. See, eg., All Saints, 885 S.C.
at 442, 685 S.H.2d at 170 (applying neutral principles of law in
disputes arising between a congregation and its denomination
over title to church property and between the congregation’s
members over corporate control); Pearson, 325 8.C. at 45, 478
§.E.2d at 849 (applying neutral principles of law in a contrac-
tual pension dispute); see also Banks, 406 S.C. at 156, 750
S.E.2d at 605 (effectively applying neutral principles of tort
law to a dispute between church trustees and the church
pastor when deciding that the trustees’ claims of negligence,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
could be litigated in a civil court).

Under the current analysis, a court must first determine if
the dispute is ecclesiastical or secular.* If the dispute is
secular in nature, we have—until now—applied the neutral
principles approach, See id. If the dispute is ecclesiastical in
nature, we have applied the deference approach. See Knotts v.
Williams, 319 S.C, 478, 478, 462 S.H.2d 288, 291 (1995) (find-
ing in a dispute about the ecclesiastical leadership of a church
that “the courts’ function is solely limited to interpreting the
final action of the church”); accord Pearson, 825 S.C. at 52,
478 8.E.2d at 858 (stating “courts may not engage in resolving
disputes as to religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline,
custom, or administration”),

Only after deciding that the dispute is ecclesiastical should a
court consider whether the church is hierarchical or congrega-
tional,” and then defer to the decision of the highest authority
in that body to resolve the dispute. See Pearson, 325 S.C. at 58
n4, 478 S.H.2d at 858 n4 (“In religious organizations of a
hierarchical nature, courts would interpret the final actions of

ownership and control of church property); Adickes v. Adkins, 264 8.C.
394, 215 §.B.2d 442 (1975) (same); Bramilett v. Young, 229 S.C, 519, 93
S.E,2d 873 (1956) (same).

58, The lead opinion agrees this is the correct starting-point in the
analysis.

59. See generally Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 369 n.1, 90 S.Ct. 499
(Brennan, J., concurring) (defining hierarchical and congregational
organizations),

the highest ecclesiastical tribunal or body. In religious organi-
zations of a congregational nature, courts would interpret the
final actions of the majority of congregations.”).” Thus, ordi-
narily, if a dispute is deemed to be a secular civil dispute, the
question of whether a church is hierarchical or congregational
does not even factor into the analysis. See All Saints, 885 S.C.
at 444, 685 8.E.2d at 172 (“Church disputes that are resolved
under the neutral principles of law approach do not turn on
the single question of whether a church is congregational or
hierarchical. Rather, the neutral principles of law approach
permits the application of property, corporate, and other
forms of law to church disputes.”).

Although the lead opinion states that it relies on this well-
established framework, the lead opinion does not actually
apply it. In fact, in both of their analyses, the lead opinion and
the concurrence do not first consider the nature of the cause
of action, instead skipping straight to making a factual pro-
nouncement that the national church is hierarchical." In so
doing, both opinions persist in committing a fundamental

60. The lead opinion criticizes All Saints, claiming it stands for the
proposition that “the ‘neutral principles of law’ approach require[s]
that in order for a civil court to determine whether a church-related
dispute could be adjudicated in that forum, the court must look only at
state corporate and property law, ignoring the ecclesiastical context
entirely,” This is a gross misstatement of the legal framework created
by Pearson and perpetuated by the All Saints decision, in that both
opinions clearly state that South Carolina still uses deference when
appropriate—just not with respect to secular civil matters.

61. As stated previously, I believe the lead opinion’s exercise in fact-
finding is wholly inappropriate under the proper “any evidence” stan-
dard of review, conveniently cast aside by the lead opinion to benefit its
analysis. Under the correct standard of review, we are required to
uphold the trial court’s finding that the structure of the national church.
is ambiguous due to displaying aspects of both a hierarchical and
congregational organization, In cases “where the identity of the govern-
ing body or bodies that exercise general authority within a church is a
matter of substantial controversy,” the United States Supreme Court
has declared that “civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious
law and usage that would be essential to the resolution of the controver-
sy.” Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 369-70 & n.4, 90 S.Ct. 499 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that even when courts employ the
deference approach and attempt to enforce the decision made by the
highest ecclesiastical authority in a church, those courts “would have to
find another ground for decision, perhaps the application of general
property law, when identification of the relevant church governing body

analytical error: failing to first assess the nature of the dispute
itself. By applying the framework in reverse order and declar-
ing the church hierarchical as an initial matter, it is the lead
opinion and concurrence themselves that imbue this dispute
with ecclesiastical qualities, because the finding carries with it
the implication that all decisions with respect to this dispute
over property ownership flow from this leadership structure.
Thus, the lead opinion and concurrence essentially gut the
neutral principles approach so carefully developed since Pear-
son. Under their formulations, there will never be a civil law
suit involving a church that can be resolved without reference
to ecclesiastical doctrine, law, custom, or administration. In
my view, the two opinions overrule Pearson and its progeny in
all but name.”

In my opinion, the framework—properly applied—yields but
one logical result. Because this is a dispute over title to

is impossible without immersion in doctrinal issues or extensive inquiry
into church polity” (emphasis added)); see also Jones, 443 U.S, at 605,
99 S.Ct. 3020 (stating that the deference approach is inappropriate
when the locus of control is ambiguous (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox,
426 U.S. at 723, 96 S.Ct. 2372)). Here, the record supports the trial
court's finding that the national church’s leadership structure is ambig-
uous. I contend this ambiguity provides an additional basis on which
this Court should look to neutral principles of property law to resolve
this dispute. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 605, 99 S.Ct. 3020; of. Serbian E.
Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 714, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (“[I]t is easy to see that if the
civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the
doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and
fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and
must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would
become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the
ecclesiastical decree would be determined in civil court.”’).

62. I note that until today, our precedents have conformed with the
overwhelming majority of state courts (not to mention the United States
Supreme Court) that would apply a neutral principles approach to this
title dispute. See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (upholding
the neutral principles approach in a property dispute); Md, & Va.
Eldership, 396 U.S. at 367, 90 S.Ct. 499; Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal
Church, 383 Il.Dec. 634, 14 N.E.3d 1245, 1258 (2014); Masterson, 422
$.W.3d at 602 n.6 (collecting state cases). Notably, the lead opinion
does not cite any cases to support its novel analysis, and instead
primarily supports its departure from well-settled law using the non-
prevailing analysis contained in the dissent to a Texas state court case
which resolved a church property dispute using the neutral principles
approach. See Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 614 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting).

property, we should apply neutral principles of South Carolina
property and trust law.

C. Application

As noted previously, the lead opinion and concurrence de-
clare this property dispute is ecclesiastical in nature based on
their factual finding that the national church is a hierarchical
institution. In doing so, they rely on directives from the
national church unilaterally creating trusts in the plaintiffs’
properties, claiming these purported trust documents satisfy
the requirements of Jones. This result is the exact opposite
that I’ would reach in applying Jones’s neutral-principles
approach.

Jones was a property dispute arising from a schism in a
hierarchical church, in which the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the ability of civil courts to resolve most church-based
property disputes using deeds, state statutes, the local church
charters, and the national church’s constitution. There, the
Supreme Court explained:

Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provi-

sions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to

chureh property in the event of a particular contingency, or
what religious body will determine the ownership in the

event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a

religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the

ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with

the desires of the members.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020. I agree with the lead
opinion that Jones offers religious institutions the ability to
order their affairs and structure their property ownership
through “appropriate” (i.e, secular) channels. However, the
Jead opinion and I diverge at the point in its analysis where it
fails to recognize Jones’s mandate that any such undertaking
must occur in a legally binding manner:

The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to “inhibit”

the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral

provisions of state law governing the manner in which
churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods.

Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a

church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time

before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so

desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will

retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or
the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust
in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitu-
tion of the general church can be made to recite an express
trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden
involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil
courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by
the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cogni-
zable form.

Jones, 448 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (emphasis added). The

lead opinion and concurrence not only misinterpret this pas-

sage from Jones, but ultimately dispense with it.

First, the lead opinion and concurrence extrapolate a re-
quirement that any state law affecting a church’s property
rights may only be accomplished with minimal burdens on the
national religious body. More accurately, the Jones Court was
merely stating that only minimal efforts would be required on
the part of national church organizations to bring their owner-
ship interests within the ambit of state law and ultimately, to
avoid litigation over property ownership in the event of a
doctrinal dispute or schism. Jones did not, as the lead opinion
suggests, create a requirement that states amend their prop-
erty laws so as to only minimally burden national religious
organizations as they are attempting to structure their affairs
with respect to property ownership in their member dioceses.
Further, contrary to the lead opinion’s implication, South
Carolina law does not place undue burdens on religious bodies
seeking to create trusts in this State. Our general trust law is
similar to that of every other jurisdiction in this country, and
therefore, it requires only minimal effort to comply with South
Carolina trust law.

Next, the lead opinion and concurrence dismiss completely
the requirements that trust documents—which “ensure ...
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the
church property’—must be adopted before the dispute begins
and be “embodied in some legally cognizable form” in order
to be enforceable under state law. To me, however, this
language is the defining language of the Jones opinion with

respect to this suit, and why the plaintiffs necessarily must
prevail.

The lead opinion finds that not only is accession to the
Dennis Canon not required, but that the defendants were not
required to take any further action under South Carolina law
to ensure the validity of these “trusts.” Remember that eight
parishes neither acceded to the Dennis Canon nor took any
other legal action with respect to their property outside of
membership in the national church. Thus, the lead opinion
finds trusts existed with respect to all of the plaintiff parishes
merely because these parishes were members in a voluntary
organization where that organization has unilaterally claimed
ownership in their property.

By giving credence to this standard built only on “the
national church said so,” the lead opinion effectively ignores
Jones altogether. Jones explicitly suggests state courts use
“well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar
to lawyers and judges” to resolve these disputes, “thereby
promis[ing] to free civil courts completely from entanglement
in questions of religious doctrine, policy, and practice.” 443
US. at 608-04, 99 S.Ct. 3020, In fact, in Jones, the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case to Georgia to deter-
mine the property’s ownership by applying Georgia’s long-
established property law. Id. at 609-10, 99 S.Ct. 8020. Yet, in
direct contravention of Jones’s directive to use state principles
of property and trust law ingrained in the collective knowledge
of our bench and bar to resolve church property disputes, the
lead opinion instead does exactly what Jones warns against
and dives headfirst into religious matters.

Under South Carolina law, there are only two ways to
create a trust: either expressly or constructively. As will be
explained, infra, it is my opinion that the defendants accom-
plished neither in this case.

1. Express Trusts

The South Carolina Trust Code™ provides that an express
trust may be created by either the “transfer of property to
another person as trustee,” or by a “written declaration signed
by the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable

63. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-7-101 to -1106 (2009 & Supp. 2016).

Sr

property as trustee.” 8.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(1); see also
All Saints, 385 8.C. at 449, 685 S.H.2d at 174. However, it is
axiomatic that the trust is created only if, inter alia, the
settlor indicates an intention to create the trust. S.C. Code
Ann. § 62-7-402(a)(2); State v. Parris, 863 8.C. 477, 482, 611
§.E.2d 501, 508 (2005). Moreover, to satisfy the statute of
frauds, “a trust of real property ... must be proved by some
writing signed by the party creating the trust.” S.C. Code
Ann. § 62-7-401(a)(2); Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227,
231-82, 420 8.H.2d 877, 879 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Beckham v.
Short, 298 S.C. 348, 349, 380 S.E.2d 826, 827 (1989). Proof of
express trusts must be made by clear and convincing evidence.
Price v. Brown, 4 S.C. 144 (1873); of S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-
407 (stating that the burden of persuasion for oral trusts is
clear and convincing evidence).

In examining the efficacy of the Dennis Canon, I would find
that it does not satisfy the requirements for creating an
express trust under South Carolina law. First, there was no
transfer of title. In fact, the defendants stipulated at trial that
the property in dispute is (and has always been) titled in the
plaintiff parishes’ names. Thus, in order to create an express
trust, the plaintiff parishes—as the title-holders—must have
made a written, signed statement of intent to transfer their
property into a trust for the benefit of the national church. Cf
Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943)
(examining the document creating a purported trust in order
to ascertain which church faction was the beneficiary of the
trust). However, the Dennis Canon is merely the national
church’s statement of interest in the plaintiff parishes’ proper-
ties. “It is an axiomatic principle of law that a person or entity
must hold title to property in order to declare that it is held in
trust for the benefit of another or transfer legal title to one
person for the benefit of another.” All Saints, 385 S.C. at 449,
685 S.E.2d at 174. Thus, I believe the only conclusion this
Court could reach under South Carolina law is that the Dennis
Canon is not a basis for asserting legal title to the plaintiffs’
properties, nor does it create an express trust over the those
properties, Jd. (holding that the Dennis Canon does not create
an express trust pursuant to South Carolina property law); ef.
Jones, 448 US. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (stating that civil courts
must give effect to deeds and trust documents executed by the
general church “provided [the documents are] embodied in
some legally cognizable form” (emphasis added))."4

With respect to the writing requirement, the defendants
argue that twenty-eight of the thirty-six plaintiff parishes
“made express promises in their governing documents to
comply with the [nJational [cJhurch’s rules after those rules
had been amended to include the Dennis Canon in 1979,” and
that “[t]hese writings fulfilled the writing and signature re-
quirements of South Carolina’s Trust Code.” © I would reject
this argument for two reasons.

First, the twenty-eight parishes that made this alleged
express promise at most merely acceded to the national
church’s constitution and canons. However, their accession did
not include a transfer of title in a form recognized under South
Carolina law. Moreover, like the two prior disassociations—
from the Church of England during the Revolutionary War,
and from the national church during the Civil War—the
plaintiffs associated and disassociated with the national church
on their own terms, and at no point made a title transfer
recognizable under South Carolina law. Thus, it is my opinion
that the parishes’ accession to the national church’s rules does
not constitute clear and convincing evidence that they intend-
ed to place their property in trust (either revocable or irrevo-
cable) for the national church. See Price, 4 S.C. at 144
(requiring clear and convincing evidence of intent to place
property in beneficial use for another).

64, For this reason, I believe the lead opinion errs in reexamining our
holding in Ail Saints. I am just as firmly convinced now—as the Court
was in 2009—that the Dennis Canon did not create an express trust
under South Carolina law and that All Saints was correctly decided. To
the extent the lead opinion contends that it is not seeking to overrule
the result of All Saints, its analysis of the issue does not comport with
this assertion.

65. A majority of the Court agrees with my analysis up to this point,
finding we must apply neutral principles of South Carolina property
law to resolve this dispute. However, on this argument, Chief Justice
Beatty and I part ways. He agrees with the defendants’ argument,
finding ‘the Dennis Canon had no effect until acceded to in writing by
the [twenty-eight] individual parishes.” I explain, infra, why I respect-
fully disagree with him. Essentially, I do not believe mere accession
meets the requirements of South Carolina law for the creation of a
trust.

66. I note that the defendants ask that we resolve this title issue by
deciding whether the parties complied with the rules set forth in their

2. Constructive Trusts

Likewise, I would find that constructive trusts did not arise
with respect to the property at issue.

“A constructive trust will arise whenever the circumstances
under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it
should be retained by the one holding the legal title.” Lollis v.
Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 529, 854 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1987); see also
Carolina Park Assocs. L.L.C. v. Marino, 400 S.C. 1, 6, 782
S.H.2d 876, 879 (2012). “A constructive trust results from
fraud, bad faith, abuse of confidence, or violation of a fiduciary
duty which gives rise to an obligation in equity to make
restitution.” Lollis, 291 S.C. at 529, 354 $.H.2d at 561; Gordon
v. Busbee, 397 S.C. 119, 141, 723 S.H.2d 822, 884 (Ct. App.
2011). “In order to establish a constructive trust, the evidence
must be clear, definite, and unequivocal.” Lollis, 291 S.C. at
530, 354 S.H.2d at 561.

respective constitutions and canons—such as the Dennis Canon. While
we can decide that the Dennis Canon (and other governing documents)
are not legally binding trust documents because they do not comport
with the secular formalities required by South Carolina law to impose a
trust on the settlor’s property, it would be completely improper under
settled First Amendment jurisprudence for this Court to resolve this
real property title issue by delving into the ecclesiastical doctrine of the
national church. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S, at 449, 89 S.Ct.
601 (“States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure
relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil
courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”’).
The concurrence suggests the Court does not have enough information
to determine, applying long-standing state property principles, the
statuses of the titles of the various properties, and that at best, a
remand would be required to allow the parties to litigate the issue.
However, this flies in the face of basic appellate principles. Cf, Odom v.
State, 337 S.C. 256, 261, 523 S,E.2d 753, 755 (1999) (holding succes-
sive PCR applications are disfavored because they allow the applicant
more than one bite at the apple). Here, each plaintiff painstakingly
entered into evidence information about their individual titles. In re-
sponse, the defendants did not attempt to refute or distinguish any of
the individual plaintiff's title information, but instead proceeded entire-
ly on ecclesiastical theory, i.e., that they owned all of the disputed
properties, without exception, because “the national church said so.” In
my view, the plaintiffs clearly established each of their titles under our
state’s property, trust, and corporate law, and the defendants failed to
grapple with the implications of those neutral principles of state law, to
their detriment.

es ~

According to the testimony adduced at trial, the plaintiffs
obtained their properties through (1) grants from current or
prior parishioners; or (2) purchase with their own funds, and
not funds from the national church. The defendants made no
effort to demonstrate that the parishioner grants were intend-
ed to be grants to the national church or the local diocese
affiliated with the national church. In fact, the deed granting
Camp St. Christopher to the trustee corporation expressly
names the trustee corporation as beneficiary due to its “good
works.” Therefore, I would find no “clear, definite, and un-
equivocal” evidence of fraud on the part of the plaintiffs in
acquiring title to the properties.

The defendants argue Bishop Lawrence and the disassociat-
ed diocese acted deceptively and contrary to the national
church’s interests in issuing the quitclaim deeds, and that
their amendment of the disassociated diocese’s corporate char-
ter was wlira vires. In the defendant’s view, this provides
evidence of fraud sufficient to make constructive trust appro-
priate in this situation. I disagree.

Essentially, the defendants ask that we determine the plain-
tiffs lacked the canonical authority to issue the quitclaim deeds
and amend their corporate charters. However, the Supreme
Court has expressly forbidden courts from making such deter-
minations. See Md. & Va. Eldership, 896 U.S. at 370, 90 S.Ct.
499 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that even in applying
the deference approach, “civil courts do not inquire whether
the relevant church governing body has power under religious
law to control the property in question. Such a determination,
unlike the identification of the governing body, frequently
necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and
usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the
allocation of power within a church so as to decide where
religious law places control over the use of church property
would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner
as civil determination of religious doctrine.”).

Rather, we may only determine whether the plaintiffs had
legal authority and followed the appropriate steps under South
Carolina’s corporate law to issue the quitclaim deeds and
amend their corporate charters. I would find the plaintiffs had
the legal authority and complied with the legal requirements

rT
to effectuate those changes, and the defendants do not argue
otherwise to this Court. Remember, the national church never
revoked Bishop Lawrence’s authority over the disassociated
diocese while the diocese was issuing the quitclaim deeds or
amending its diocesan constitution, canons, and corporate
purpose.” Indeed, the purported acceptance of Bishop Law-
rence’s renunciation of orders occurred after the amendments
to the various constitutions and deeds were executed and
publicly recorded. To me, this constitutes overwhelming evi-
dence of the national church’s acquiescence to the changes in
the plaintiffs’ corporate forms, constitutions, and bylaws.

Further, all actions by Bishop Lawrence were undertaken
using the correct legal channels and proper corporate formali-
ties under South Carolina law. Not only was Bishop Lawrence
clearly acting on the national church’s behalf at the time, but
the record shows that the national church was fully aware of
what Bishop Lawrence’s intentions were when he was made a
bishop and that he was executing these deeds by the authority
vested in him by the national church. Thus, whether or not
trusts were created—which I contend they were not—the
eurrent status of the property is that it has been deeded back
to the plaintiff parishes. That these various corporate amend-

67. Likewise, the national church did not assert the plaintiff parishes
lacked the authority to de-accede.

68. This is in stark contrast to the facts underlying the recent California
case cited favorably by the concurrence. In Diocese of San Joaquin v.
Gunner, 246 Cal.App.4th 254, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 (2016), the California
Court of Appeals applied neutral principles of state corporate law and
held the attempts to amend the breakaway diocese’s articles of incorpo-
ration and transfer the property away from the national church were
ineffective. However, importantly, in that case, the bishop of the break-
away diocese had already been deposed by the national church one
month before attempting to amend the diocesan articles of incorpo-
ration under state law, and two months before attempting to transfer
the disputed property titles to the new corporation formed by the
breakaway diocese. This, of course, was not the case here, as Bishop
Lawrence retained his full secular and religious authority over the
disassociated diocese until well after all of the amendments were
adopted and quitclaim deeds were issued. Thus, in my view, the
analysis in Gunner supports my position, not the concurrence’s. See,
eg., id. at 63, 64 (including section titles to the court’s opinion stating
“Deference to the [national cJhurch does not resolve the dispute’ and
“The property was not held in trust for the [national church”).

—CtsSSCSC‘(‘(iéi
ments and deeds are embodied in a “legally cognizable form”
is irrefutable.

The lead opinion utterly fails to account for the national
church’s subsequent action of quitclaiming the deeds back to
the plaintiff parishes. Even though the lead opinion and
concurrence declare this dispute “ecclesiastical,” the fact re-
mains that Bishop Lawrence—acting with the full authority of
the national church—legally transferred the deeds to the
plaintiffs, and the deeds continue to be held by the plaintiffs.
No level of deference to the national church at this point can
change this. Thus, it remains unclear what legal basis the lead
opinion is using to declare the national church the rightful
owner of the plaintiffs’ property.

While I would decline to impose a constructive trust on the
plaintiffs’ properties, I would additionally find that the proper-
ty at issue is now titled in the plaintiffs’ names by its bishop’s
actions,

D. Conclusion as to Title of Plaintiff Parishes’ Property

By applying neutral principles of South Carolina’s long-
standing property law, I would find that the national church
has no “legally cognizable” interest in the plaintiff parishes’
properties. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020; Md. &
Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 367-68, 90 S.Ct. 499 (dismissing the
appeal for want of a federal question after the state court
resolved a church property dispute by examining the deeds to
the properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trusts,
and the relevant provisions in the church’s constitution perti-
nent to the ownership and control of church property, and
found that nothing in those documents gave rise to a trust in
favor of the general church). Despite the lead opinion’s and
concurrence’s statements to the contrary, this is not an in-
stance where a “property right follows as an incident from
decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues.”
See Kedroff, 844 U.S. at 120-21, 78 S.Ct. 143. Rather, the
properties at issue here are titled in the plaintiff parishes’
names (and some have been for over two hundred years), and
the majority is permitting the defendants to cireumvent South
Carolina law in authorizing this title-takeover, albeit not
agreeing on the rationale for doing so.

Let us not forget the defendants stipulated that the real
property at issue is titled in the plaintiff parishes’ names, and
that the plaintiff parishes “are not members of the [national
church.” (emphasis added). Aside from the fact that a majori-
ty of the parishes acceded to the Dennis Canon in some form
or another—which I would find was not a legally binding
action to impose a trust under South Carolina law—eight
parishes never acceded in any form to either the national
church’s Dennis Canon or the diocesan version of the Dennis
Canon created by the now-disassociated diocese.” Under the
lead opinion’s formulation, these parishes, like all of the other
plaintiff parishes, must surrender their lawful titles to the
national church for the mere fact that the national church is a
religious organization. This is extremely troubling, The lead
opinion offers no explanation or legal basis (and I know of
none) that allows for an organization—religious or otherwise—
to strip an individual, business, or charitable organization of
title ownership because that organization unilaterally declares
ownership in such property. However, the ramifications do not

69, The concurrence takes Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and
me to task for giving any credence to the fact that eight of the thirty-six
plaintiff parishes did not accede to the Dennis Canon whatsoever. I first
point out the national church contended in both its motion to reconsid-
er and its brief to this Court that twenty-eight of the thirty-six plaintiff
parishes “made express promises in their governing documents to
comply with the [n]ational [cJhurch’s rules after those rules had been
amended to include the Dennis Canon in 1979,” and that “[t]hese
writings fulfilled the writing and signature requirements of South
Carolina’s Trust Code.” (emphasis in original), While the argument only
addresses the twenty-eight churches that allegedly acceded, it raises a
direct question about the other eight churches, implying that they are
somehow different from the twenty-eight who “made express prom-
ises.” Second, and perhaps more importantly, the concurrence incor-
rectly construes our holding in J’On L.L.C. v, Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338
S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000), with regards to issue preservation as it
relates to additional sustaining grounds. A prevailing party need never
raise an additional sustaining ground below, nor secure a ruling on it,
in order for the issue to be preserved for appellate review. See Rule
220(c), SCACR (providing appellate courts may affirm the judgment of
a lower court based on any ground appearing in the record). Undoubt-
edly, it is more prudent to raise an additional sustaining ground in the
appellate brief, as it draws the appellate court's attention to the matter
and encourages it to exercise its discretion to address the issue. Howev-
er, explicitly raising the issue is not a prerequisite for the court to
affirm the decision of the lower court on an alternative ground, See
Rule 220(c), SCACR.

Ss

end there. The rationale underlying the lead opinion would
place many heretofore validly-titled properties in legal limbo.
If I were a member of a governing body of a religiously-
affiliated hospital, for example, I would be gravely concerned,
as the lead opinion declares today that different rules apply to
religious organizations with respect to corporate organization
and property ownership in this State.

In my opinion, because it would dispense with the ancient
formalities of property and trust law and the prior esteem
with which courts in this state afforded such formalities, the
lead opinion’s rationale would dramatically alter our property
law as we know it, Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s
decision that the defendants do not have an interest in the
plaintiff parishes’ real properties.

E, Camp St. Christopher

In some respects, the title to Camp St. Christopher pres-
ents the Court with a more straightforward analysis, in that
the Dennis Canon, by its own terms, does not apply. Specifi-
cally, the Dennis Canon states, inter alia, “ All real and
personal property held by or for the benefit of any Parish,
Mission or Congregation is held in trust for this Church and
the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or Congre-
gation is located.” (emphasis added). It is undisputed the
trustee corporation holds title in fee simple to Camp St.
Christopher, and that it does so for the benefit of the disasso-
ciated diocese, rather than any individual parish, mission, or
congregation. Because the trustees did not accede to the
Dennis Canon, there is no basis in South Carolina trust law
for the national church to claim an ownership interest in Camp
St. Christopher. Moreover, although the trustee corporation’s
initial bylaws stated that it would carry out its duties under
the authority of the national church’s constitution and canons,
the trustees later took steps, using appropriate corporate
formalities, to amend the bylaws and remove all references to
the national church before the national church revoked Bishop
Lawrence’s authority. Accordingly, similar to the other plain-
tiff parishes’, I would declare title to Camp St, Christopher in
the trustee corporation, held for the benefit of the disassociat-
ed diocese, just as the original deed conveyed the property.

Se
TIL. Inreccectuan Property

Next, the plaintiffs assert their service marks are validly
registered under state law and that they own the right to use
the seals and symbols registered with the state. As a result,
the plaintiffs claim the defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’ marks
amounts to service mark infringement. The defendants take
the position that the plaintiffs’ service marks are too similar to
the defendants’ federally-registered service marks, and that
because the defendants registered their marks with the Unit-
ed States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the Lanham
Act” expressly preempts state law with respect to the validity
of the plaintiffs’ marks,

I would narrowly affirm the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiffs’ service marks are validly registered under state law.
However, because there is already a pending federal case
involving the applicability of the Lanham Act to these exact.
marks, I would defer to the federal courts regarding the
applicability of federal copyright law.

A, Standard of Review

“Actions for injunctive relief are equitable in nature.” Gros-
shuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 4, 628 S.H.2d 883, 834 (2005).
“In an action in equity tried by a judge alone, the appellate
court may find facts in accordance with its view of the
preponderance of the evidence.” Goldman v. RBC, Inc., 369
S.C. 462, 465, 632 S.H.2d 850, 851 (2006). “However, this broad
scope of review does not require an appellate court to disre-
gard the findings below or ignore the fact that the trial judge
is in the better position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses.” Pinckney v. Warren, 344 8.C. 882, 387, 544 S.H.2d
620, 623 (2001). Moreover, appellants are not relieved of their
burden of convincing an appellate court that the trial court
committed an error in its findings. Id. at 887-88, 544 8.H.2d at
628.

B. Merits
Pursuant to federal law,

70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006),

Any registration issued under the [Lanham Act] ... and
owned by a party to an action shall be admissible as
evidence and shall be prima facie evidence of the validity
of the registered mark and of the registration of the
mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of
the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark
im commerce on or in connection with the goods or ser-
vices specified in the registration subject to any conditions
or limitations stated therein.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (emphasis added). Moreover,
The ownership by a person of a valid registration under [the
Lanham Act] ... shall be a complete bar to an action
against that person, with respect to that mark, that—
(A) is brought by another person under the common law
or a statute of a State; and
(B)@) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment; or
(i) asserts any claim of actual or likely damage or harm
to the distinctiveness or reputation of a mark, label, or
form of advertisement.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(@)(6).™
“In the absence of an express congressional command, state
law is preempted if the law actually conflicts with federal law,

71. South Carolina law provides:

‘The secretary shall cancel from the register, in whole or in part: ...
(3) a registration concerning which a court of competent jurisdiction
finds that the: ... (f) registered mark is so similar, as to be likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive, to a mark registered by
another person in the [USPTO] before the date of the filing of the
application for the registration by the registrant under this article, and
not abandoned; however, if the registrant proves that the registrant is
the owner of a concurrent registration mark in the [USPTO] covering
an area including this State, the registration under this article may
not be canceled for that area of the State...

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-1145(3)(f) (Supp. 2016) (emphasis added).

Similarly,
A mark by which the goods or services of an applicant for registration
may be distinguished from the goods or services of others may not be
registered if the mark: ... (5) consists of a mark which: ... (b) when
used on or in connection with the goods or services of the applicant is
primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of
them....

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-1110(A)(5)(b) (Supp. 2016).

or if federal law so thoroughly occupies the legislative field as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress has left no
room for the states to supplement it.” City of Cayce v. Norfolk
8. Ry. Co., 391 S.C. 395, 401, 706 S.H.2d 6, 8 (2011), Under the
Lanham Act, the USPTO must refuse to grant a subsequent
mark if the “dominant element” of the subsequent mark is
already registered in a previous mark. In re Chatam Intl Inc,
880 F.3d 1840, 1341-45 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, there are
two “key considerations” in determining the dominant element
of the previously-registered mark: (1) the similarities between
the names of the previous and subsequent trademarks, and (2)
the similarities between the previously and subsequently
trademarked goods. Id. at 1841-42.

C. Conclusion as to Service Marks

I would find the trial court failed to address the effect, if
any, of the Lanham Act on the plaintiffs’ claims for service
mark infringement. However, because there is a pending
federal case filed by Bishop vonRosenberg addressing the
same issue, I would decline to address the effect of federal law
on the parties’ service marks. Thus, I would narrowly affirm
the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs’ marks are
validly registered under South Carolina law, and would leave
the application of the Lanham Act to the pending federal case.

ConcLusion

The lead opinion in this case is nothing less than judicial
sanction of the confiscation of church property masquerading
as an attempt to promulgate a new deference rule for deter-
mining title in this matter. With no discussion of why the
neutral principles of law approach to resolving church title
determinations should be abandoned by the State of South
Carolina, the lead opinion advocates overruling a framework
that has heretofore taken the courts out of ecclesiastical
controversies, instead encouraging the Court to devolve to the
civil court the authority to undo centuries of well-settled
church titles by judicial fiat. Such an opinion, had it obtained
the support of a majority of this Court, would have been a
crushing blow to centuries of carefully crafted and well-
reasoned South Carolina law.

Aside from the fact that I do not believe there were ever
any legal trusts created with respect to the property at issue,
the simple fact is that the national church, for whatever
reason, never acted to take away Bishop Lawrence’s legal
authority to act for it and the disassociated diocese. Under the
authority granted to him by the national church, Bishop
Lawrence legally transferred the plaintiffs’ property back to
them. Thus, to the extent the lead opinion relies on deference
to confiscate the plaintiffs’ property, that concept cannot over-
come the essential problem that the national church itself
deeded the property back to the plaintiffs.

Further, many of the plaintiff parishes established their
corporate existence under South Carolina corporate law or by
legislative charter years before the Dennis Cannon was
adopted. Additionally, after Jones, all of the plaintiff parishes
and the disassociated diocese made sure that they were orga-
nized as corporations under South Carolina law. None of these
church corporations renounced or limited their ability to
amend their charters and bylaws after initial adoption. With a
stroke of a pen, the majority vitiates South Carolina’s charita-
ble corporation law and invalidates all of the plaintiffs’ duly
adopted corporate documents.

Because I cannot find any legal basis to support the majori-
ty’s decision in this case, I would affirm the decision of the
trial court. I respectfully dissent.”

72. As I stated at the outset, this is unfortunately a difficult case leading
us to five different, strongly-held opinions. Because we all write sepa-
rately, my summary of my understanding of the Court's holdings is as
follows. A majority of the Court—consisting of Chief Justice Beatty,
Justice Kittredge, and me—agree that Pearson and All Saints (and their
progeny) remain good law in this state, and that in secular church
disputes, our state courts should apply neutral principles of law to
resolve the case. As it relates to this particular case, the same majority
would find this is a secular church dispute, and the Court must
therefore apply longstanding trust law to resolve the questions before
us. I would find the parties’ actions did not comply with the formalities
required to create a trust in this state. In short, I believe the parties did
not embody their intentions to create a trust in favor of the defendants
in a “legally cognizable form.” Justice Kittredge would find the parties
created a revocable trust in favor of the national church, but the
plaintiffs later took steps to revoke their accession to the trust. There-
fore, both Justice Kittredge and I would declare all of the disputed titles
in favor of the individual plaintiffs, with no trust formed in favor of the
defendants. However, we are in the minority, because a different

fe

805 S.E.2d 763
In the MATTER OF Lisabeth Kirk ROGERS, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001159
Opinion No. 27740

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted September 14, 2017
Filed October 4, 2017

majority of the Court—consisting of Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Hearn,
and Acting Justice Pleicones—would reverse the trial court and transfer
title of all but eight of the plaintiffs’ properties to the defendants. While
Justice Hearn and Acting Justice Pleicones would do so because they
believe this is an ecclesiastical dispute and the Court must therefore
defer to the national church’s decision on the matter, Chief Justice
Beatty would do so because he believes all but eight of the plaintiffs
acceded to the Dennis Canon in a manner recognizable under South
Carolina’s trust law. Thus, the result reached on title is: 1) with regard
to the eight church organizations which did not accede to the Dennis
Canon, Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and I would hold that
title remains in the eight plaintiff church organizations; 2) with regard
to the twenty-eight church organizations which acceded to the Dennis
Canon, a majority consisting of Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Hearn, and
Acting Justice Pleicones would hold that a trust in favor of the national
church is imposed on the property and therefore, title is in the national
church; and 3) with regard to Camp St. Christopher, Chief Justice
Beatty, Justice Hearn, and Acting Justice Pleicones would hold title is
in the trustee corporation for the benefit of the associated diocese,
whereas Justice Kittredge and I would hold that the trustee corporation
holds title for the benefit of the disassociated diocese.

As to the second issue on appeal, involving the plaintiffs’ claims for
service mark infringement, Chief Justice Beatty, Justice Kittredge, and I
would find the marks are validly registered under state law, but leave
the ultimate resolution of the parties’ conflicting claims to the pending
federal case,

293

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph P.
Turner, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia, for
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Lisabeth Kirk Rogers, of Seneca, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel and Respondent have entered into an Agreement
for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of
the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) con-
tained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits mis-
conduct and consents to the imposition of a public reprimand
or a suspension not to exceed one year. We accept the
Agreement and issue a public reprimand. The facts, as set
forth in the Agreement, are as follows.

Facts and Law

Respondent was employed by Oconee Medical Center
(OMC) as General Counsel. A patient at OMC had no family
or friends to care for her, so Respondent volunteered to act as
her guardian and conservator. Respondent did not discuss the
possible conflicts of interest that could arise out of her ap-
pointment with the patient and did not get the patient to
waive these conflicts.

Respondent billed the patient for her time as conservator;
the patient’s bills totaled $8,687. The patient’s home needed
repairs, and Respondent hired her son to do cleaning and
repair work on the home for $10 per hour. Respondent paid

—

her son a total of $700. Respondent’s son had a history of drug
abuse, but Respondent believed him to be sober at that time.
Respondent gave her son permission to stay in the home while
he was working as he did most of the work at night after his
day job. At some point, Respondent’s son moved into the
patient’s home. Respondent was not aware of her son’s move
into the home, but she acknowledges she would have known if
she had inspected the utility bills she was paying on the
patient’s behalf.

Respondent admits she did not properly monitor the work
her son was performing at the patient’s house. She states she
had meningitis and was required to be hospitalized both in and
out of state over a three month period during the time her son
was working on the house. When Respondent returned to
work, she discovered the patient’s home had been vandalized
by her son and/or his friends. She also discovered her son had
forged the patient’s name to the patient’s car title and sold the
patient’s car, Additionally, her son had sold some of the
patient’s possessions. Respondent promptly reported the mat-
ter to the police,

Respondent was arrested and charged with Failing to Re-
port Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult by the Seneca Police
Department. She was accepted into pretrial intervention pro-
gram (PTI), and her charge was expunged. Respondent made
full restitution, including all fees she collected, and apologized
to the patient, She also performed 48 hours of community
service and attended a class required of all PTI participants. !

Respondent admits her conduct violated Rule 1.7 (lawyer
shall not represent client if representation involves concurrent
conflict of interest; concurrent conflict of interest exists if
there is significant risk that representation of client will be
materially limited by lawyer’s personal interest) and Rule 8.4
(it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the Rules
of Professional Conduct or do so through the acts of another;
it is professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct

1, By order dated March 22, 2016, Respondent was placed on interim
suspension based on this criminal charge, With the filing of this
opinion, this interim suspension has been dissolved, See Rule 2(n),
RLDE (defining an interim suspension as a “temporary suspension
from the practice of law pending a final determination in any proceed-
ing under these rules.”’).

—z «

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct contained in Rule 407, SCACR.
Respondent admits these violations constitute grounds for
discipline under Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for discipline
for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct) and Rule
7(a)(5) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to engage in
conduct tending to pollute administration of justice or bring
legal profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating unfit-
ness to practice law), RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR.

Conclusion

We find Respondent's misconduct warrants a public repri-
mand. Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and publicly
reprimand Respondent for her misconduct.

PUBLIC REPRIMAND.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., coneur.

805 S.H.2d 764
In the MATTER OF Darryl D. SMALLS, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001219
Opinion No. 27741
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted September 14, 2017
Filed October 4, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia, for
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Darryl D. Smalls, of Columbia, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel (ODC) and Respondent have entered into an
Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to
Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
(RLDE) contained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate
Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits
misconduct and consents to the imposition of a definite sus-
pension for no less than nine (9) months and no more than
three (3) years. Respondent requests that any suspension be
made retroactive to October 10, 2016, the date of his interim
suspension. We accept the Agreement and impose a definite
suspension of eighteen (18) months from the practice of law.
We grant Respondent’s request to make his suspension retro-
active to the date of his interim suspension.

Facts and Law

Pattern of Failure to Pay Court Reporters

On May 5, 2009, Respondent received a transcript for a
deposition and an invoice for $107.75 from Southern Reporting
(Southern). Southern sent several notices to Respondent that
payment was due and called Respondent in an attempt to
collect, but could not reach him. On December 2, 2009, South-
ern filed a complaint with ODC. After notice of the complaint,
Respondent paid the invoice on January 19, 2010.

Graber Reporting Service (Graber) issued invoices for tran-
seripts to Respondent in October 2009 for $180.35, in July
2010 for $483.65, and in August 2010 for $821.59. After re-

— «

peated attempts to collect these invoices, Graber filed a com-
plaint with ODC in February 2012. After notice of the com-
plaint, Respondent paid the invoices on March 12, 2012.

On January 25, 2012, Respondent received a transcript of a
deposition and an invoice for $183.25 from Ray Swartz &
Associates (Swartz). Swartz sent Respondent several letters
asking for payment of the invoice. On October 24, 2012, Swartz
filed a complaint with ODC. After notice of the complaint,
Respondent paid the invoice on November 27, 2012. Respon-
dent’s failure to pay Swartz followed his receipt of a letter of
caution in April 2012 for the same misconduct.

Graber issued invoices for transcripts to the Respondent in
May 2018 for $526.05 and in July 2018 for $819.75. After
repeated attempts to collect these invoices, Graber filed a
second complaint with ODC on April 17, 2014. After notice of
the complaint, Respondent paid the invoices on July 7, 2014.
Respondent’s failure to pay Graber followed his receipt of a
letter of caution in April 2012 for the same misconduct.

On December 10, 2014, Respondent received a transcript of
a deposition and an invoice for $78.50 from Creel Court
Reporting (Creel). After repeated phone messages and several
collection letters, Creel could not collect payment and filed a
complaint with ODC on January 7, 2016. Respondent has yet
to pay these invoices. Respondent’s failure to pay Creel fol-
lowed his receipt of a letter of caution in April 2012 and a
confidential admonition in October 2014 for the same miscon-
duct.

Respondent admits his pattern and practice of failing to
timely pay for court reporting services violates Rule 4.4 (in
representing a client, lawyer must have respect for rights of
third persons) and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct to
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) found in
Rule 407, SCACR.

Pattern of Failure to Respond to Disciplinary Inquiries

On December 14, 2009, Respondent was notified of the
complaint from Southern and given fifteen (15) days to submit
a written response. On January 7, 2010, ODC sent a certified
letter to Respondent reminding him of his obligation to re-
spond. On February 2, 2010, Respondent submitted his writ-

ten response, thirty-five (85) days late. ODC dismissed the
complaint after Respondent paid the invoice.!

On February 23, 2012, Respondent was notified of the first
Graber complaint and given fifteen (15) days to submit a
response. On March 19, 2012, ODC received the Respondent’s
timely written response. On April 17, 2012, ODC concluded the
first Graber complaint with a letter of caution citing Rule 4.4
and Rule 8.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCAOR, after Respondent
paid the invoices.

On November 8, 2012, Respondent was notified of the
Swartz complaint and given fifteen (15) days to submit a
written response. On November 27, 2012, ODC received Re-
spondent’s timely written response. On April 12, 2018, ODC
issued a notice to appear to Respondent pursuant to Rule 19,
RLDB, Rule 413, SCACR, requiring his appearance on April
380, 2018, Respondent did not appear. On May 80, 2018, ODC
issued a notice to appear which rescheduled Respondent’s
appearance to July 9, 2018. Respondent appeared and re-
sponded to questions. On October 29, 2014, the Commission on
Lawyer Conduct (Commission) accepted an Agreement for
Discipline by Consent and concluded the Swartz complaint
(along with the second Graber complaint and two client com-
plaints) with a confidential admonition, with conditions, citing
Rule 4.4, Rule 8.1(a) (a lawyer shall not fail to respond to a
lawful demand for information in connection with a disciplin-
ary matter), and Rule 8.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

On April 22, 2014, Respondent was notified of the second
Graber complaint and given fifteen (15) days to submit a
written response. On May 15, 2014, ODC sent a certified letter
to Respondent reminding him of his obligation to respond. On
May 28, 2014, ODC issued a notice to appear to Respondent
requiring his appearance on July 2, 2014. Respondent did not

1, Rule 20, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, prohibits the use of the allegations
in a dismissed complaint for any purpose unless it is re-opened by the
Commission on Lawyer Conduct. Rule 20 allows a dismissed complaint
to be re-opened by an Investigative Panel upon a finding that an
additional complaint has been filed against the same lawyer involving
allegations which are related or similar to the dismissed complaint, On
March 4, 2016, Disciplinary counsel moved to re-open Southern's
dismissed complaint. Respondent did not file a return or otherwise
oppose the motion. The Investigative Panel granted the motion, and
Southern’s complaint was re-opened.

— «

appear. On July 10, 2014, ODC notified Respondent of its
intention to file a petition for his interim suspension for failing
to respond. On July 11, 2014, Respondent submitted his
written response, sixty-five (65) days late. On October 29,
2014, the Commission accepted an Agreement for Discipline
by Consent and concluded the second Graber complaint (along
with the Swartz complaint and two client complaints) with a
confidential admonition, with conditions, citing Rule 4.4, Rule
8.1(a), and Rule 8.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

On January 20, 2016, ODC sent Respondent a copy of the
Creel complaint and a notice of investigation, giving him
fifteen (15) days to submit a written response. Respondent did
not submit a response. On January 20, 2016, ODC issued a
notice to appear and subpoena to Respondent, requiring his
appearance on March 4, 2016. Respondent did not appear.

Respondent admits his failure to timely respond and other-
wise cooperate in disciplinary investigations violates Rule
8.1(a), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

Failure to Comply with Finally Accepted Agreement
for Discipline by Consent

In the Agreement for Discipline by Consent that concluded
the Swartz complaint, the second Graber complaint, and two
client complaints, Respondent agreed to certain conditions.
Those conditions included paying the investigation costs by
November 29, 2014, completing the Legal Ethics and Practice
Program (LEAPP) Ethics School and Law Office Manage-
ment School by October 29, 2015, and maintaining $1,000 in
his operating account to cover costs incurred on behalf of
clients, including court reporting invoices.

The Commission sent letters reminding Respondent of his
obligations on November 17, 2014, January 7, 2015, April 29,
2015, April 30, 2015, August 26, 2015, and January 8, 2016.
Respondent did not complete the required LEAPP sessions,
which were available to him in February 2015, September
2015, and February 2016. Furthermore, Respondent did not
pay the investigation costs.

Respondent admits his misconduct violated the following
Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR: Rule
a)(1) (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct), Rule
'%(a)(8) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to knowing-

ly fail to respond to demand from disciplinary counsel), Rule
7(a)(5) (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to engage in
conduct tending to pollute administration of justice or bring
legal profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating unfit-
ness to practice law), and Rule 7(a)(9) (it shall be ground for
discipline for lawyer to willfully fail to comply with terms of
finally accepted agreement for discipline by consent).
Conclusion

We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and
impose on Respondent a retroactive definite suspension from
the practice of law for eighteen (18) months, retroactive to the
date of his interim suspension.

Prior to filing any petition for reinstatement, Respondent
shall complete the LEAPP Program in its entirety, including
Ethics School, Trust Account School, Advertising School, and
Law Office Management School.

Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of the date of
this order, Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the
investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the
Commission.

Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, Respondent.
shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he
has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR.

DEFINITE SUSPENSION.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

806 S.E.2d 125
In the MATTER OF Alvin R,. LUNDGREN, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-000097
Opinion No. 27742
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard August 16, 2017
Filed October 18, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex Davis
Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia,
for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Alvin R. Lundgren, of Veyo, Utah, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel (ODC) filed formal charges against Respondent
alleging he committed misconduct by violating the rules gov-
erning pro hac vice admission and serving improper subpoena
and discovery requests. Respondent is not licensed to practice
law in South Carolina. Because Respondent failed to file any

1, Respondent has been admitted to the practice of law in Missouri,
California, Utah, and Kansas. The Missouri Supreme Court indefinitely
suspended Respondent from the practice of law in Missouri in 2000 for
the unauthorized practice of law. Thereafter, the court reinstated Re-
spondent’s license to practice law; however, his Missouri license is
currently inactive. In 2014, Respondent resigned from the California
State Bar. On July 11, 2013, Respondent was disbarred by the District

response to the formal charges, all the allegations contained
therein are deemed admitted. Rule 24(a), RLDE, Rule 413,
SCACR. Neither ODC nor Respondent filed exceptions to the
recommendation and the matter is now before the Court for
consideration. The sole issue before the Court is determining
the appropriate sanction. We accept the recommendation from
the Commission on Lawyer Conduct, and we find it appropri-
ate to permanently debar Respondent in this state, order him
to pay the costs of the investigation and subsequent proceed-
ings, and order him to comply with other sanctions as will be
described herein.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the formal charges
against Respondent and are deemed admitted pursuant to
Rule 24(a), RLDH, Rule 413, SCACR.

Respondent lives with his wife (Wife) in Utah, where he was
licensed to practice law.” Wife previously lived in South Car-
olina with her first husband (Ex-Husband). Wife was divorced
from Ex-Husband in 1998, Thereafter, Ex-Husband filed a
defamation action against Wife in South Carolina, In February
2009, Respondent submitted an application for pro hac vice
admission to the South Carolina Supreme Court Office of Bar
Admissions in an effort to represent Wife in the defamation
action. Respondent’s local counsel filed the required applica-
tion and a motion with the cireuit court to allow Respondent to
appear pro hac vice. However, Respondent filed various plead-
ings, motions, responses to motions, proposed orders, and
letters to judges without the signature of his local counsel as
required by Rule 404(f), SCACR.’ Ultimately, the parties
mutually agreed to dismiss their claims.

Court of Morgan County in Utah for misappropriation of client funds.
Following Respondent’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the
disbarment, In May 2017, Respondent was disbarred by the Kansas
Supreme Court.

2, See note 1.

3. Rule 404, SCACR, has been amended since 2010, The citation here
refers to the version of the rule in place at the time of Respondent's
conduct. See Rule 404(f) (2010) (“The South Carolina attorney of record
shall at all times be prepared to go forward with the case; sign all

In 2011, Wife sought to modify the Final Order and Decree
of Divorce by amending certain language regarding Ex-Hus-
band’s retirement funds, In October 2012, Respondent submit-
ted an application for pro hac vice admission to the South
Carolina Supreme Court Office of Bar Admissions to repre-
sent Wife in the divorce action. Respondent failed to file his
application or a motion to appear pro hae vice with the family
court prior to making an appearance as required by Rule
404(c), SCACR.! In August of 2018, the family court issued a
final order resolving the modification.

In December 2014, approximately a year and a half after
the divorce action concluded, Respondent issued a subpoena to
Ex-Husband’s former employer, under the caption of the
divorce action. In addition to issuing a subpoena in a dismissed
case, Respondent improperly: (1) issued the subpoena without
stipulation of the parties or court order upon written applica-
tion, as required by Rule 25, SCRFC; (2) issued the subpoena
to an out-of-state entity; (8) falsely stated in the subpoena that
an action was pending in family court; (4) falsely certified in
the subpoena that it was issued in compliance with Rule 45,
SCRCP; and (5) failed to set forth in the subpoena the text
required by Rule 45(c) and (d), SCRCP. Respondent then
served a document entitled “Plaintiff's Request for Answers to
Interrogatories, Admissions and Request for Production of
Documents” on Ex-Husband and his counsel, again citing the
divorce action. In addition to serving a discovery request in a
dismissed case, Respondent improperly: (1) issued the discoy-
ery request without stipulation of the parties or court order
upon written application, as required by Rule 25, SCRFC; (2)
had direct contact with Ex-Husband, whom Respondent knew
to be represented by counsel; (8) falsely stated in the discov-
ery request that an action was pending in family court; and (4)
falsely stated in the discovery request that it was issued in

papers subsequently filed; and attend all subsequent proceedings in the
matter,....””).

4, Rule 404, SCACR, has been amended since 2012. The citation here
refers to the version of the rule in place at the time of Respondent's
conduct, See Rule 404(c) (2012) (“An attorney desiring to appear pro
hac vice shall file with the tribunal in which the matter is pending,
prior to mys an appearance, an Application for Admission Pro Hac
Vice....

compliance with Rules 38, 34, and 36, SCRCP, and Rules 34
and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In issuing the
subpoena and discovery request, Respondent’s conduct violat-
ed the South Carolina Family Court Rules, the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 3.4(d), 4.1, 4.2, 4.4(a), and
8.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.

ODC filed formal charges on August 22, 2016. Respondent
did not file an answer and was held in default by panel order
dated November 3, 2016. The Hearing Panel convened and
filed its Panel Report on December 9, 2016. Respondent was
given notice of the proceeding but did not appear. After
considering the aforementioned misconduct, the Hearing Pan-
el determined Respondent is subject to discipline for violating
the following Rules of Lawyer Discipline: Rule 7(a)(1) (violat-
ing the Rules of Professional Conduct or any other rules of
this jurisdiction regarding professional conduct of lawyers)
and Rule 7(a)(5) (engaging in conduct tending to pollute the
administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal
profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfit-
ness to practice law). Rule 413, SCACR. The Hearing Panel
found Respondent violated Rule 404, SCACR, the South Car-
olina Rules of Civil Procedure, and the South Carolina Rules
of Family Court and was therefore subject to discipline pursu-
ant to Rule 7(a)(1) of Rule 418, SCACR.

DISCUSSION

Hl Since Respondent failed to answer the formal charges,
he is deemed to have admitted the allegations in the charges.
Rule 24(a), RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR. Further, since he failed
to appear for the panel hearing, Respondent is deemed to
have admitted the factual allegations and to have conceded the
merits of any recommendations considered at the panel hear-
ing. Rule 24(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

Pursuant to Rule 8(b), RLDHE, Rule 418, SCACR, the
Commission on Lawyer Conduct has jurisdiction over all
allegations that a lawyer has committed misconduct. “Lawyer”
is defined as “a lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction if the
lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this
jurisdiction.” Rule 2(q), RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR. According-
ly, even though he is not admitted to practice law in South

Carolina, Respondent is subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina and the Commission on
Lawyer Conduct pursuant to Rule 8.5(a) of the South Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.

Hl The authority to discipline lawyers and the manner in
which the discipline is imposed is a matter within the Court’s
discretion. In re Van Son, 408 S.C. 170, 174, 742 S.H.2d 660,
662 (2018). The sole question remaining for the Court is
whether to impose the Hearing Panel’s recommended sanc-
tion. Id. (“When the respondent is in default the Court need
only determine the appropriate sanction.”).

Although not admitted to practice law in South Carolina,
Respondent nevertheless engaged in the practice of law in this
state. We agree with the Hearing Panel’s consideration of
aggravating factors, namely Respondent’s lack of cooperation
in the disciplinary investigation, failure to answer the formal
charges, failure to appear at the disciplinary hearing, and
prior disciplinary history. In ve Hall, 333 S.C. 247, 251, 509
8.H.2d 266, 268 (1998) (“An attorney’s failure to answer
charges or appear to defend or explain alleged misconduct.
indicates an obvious disinterest in the practice of law. Such an
attorney is likely to face the most severe sanctions because a
central purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the
public from unscrupulous and indifferent lawyers.”); In ve
Jacobsen, 886 9.C, 598, 607, 690 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2010) (recog-
nizing disciplinary history is an appropriate consideration in
imposing sanctions). Respondent presented no mitigating evi-
dence,

Given the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, his lack of
participation in the disciplinary process, and absence of any
mitigating factors, we adopt the sanctions recommended by
the Hearing Panel and find it appropriate to permanently
debar Respondent, prohibiting him from seeking any form of
admission to practice law (including pro hac vice admission) in
South Carolina and prohibiting him from advertising or solicit-
ing legal services in the state. Further, we order that within
thirty (80) days of the date of this opinion, he pay the costs of
the investigation and prosecution of this matter and reimburse
the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection in the amount of
$758.95.

Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, Respon-
dent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing
that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 418, SCACR.

DEBARRED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW, and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

806 S.E.2d 708
The STATE, Respondent,
v
Shawn Lee WYATT, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No, 2016-001303
Opinion No, 27743

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 14, 2017
Filed October 25, 2017

&
S
-)

vs __

Appellate Defender John Harrison Strom, of Columbia, for
Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney
General William M. Blitch Jr., both of Columbia, and Solicitor
Randy E. Newman Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW:

Shawn Lee Wyatt appeals his convictions for attempting to
furnish contraband to a prisoner and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana. He argues the
trial court erred by not suppressing two eyewitness identifica-
tions. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to suppress the
primary identification. We find, however, the police identifica-
tion procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, and thus the
trial court should have addressed the suppression question
only under the first prong of Neil v. Biggers.! As to the other
identification, we find no error. We affirm Wyatt’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 5:45 a.m. on July 12, 2013, Kershaw
Correctional Institute Officer Joe Schnettler was at his post in
a watch tower when he observed a man run from the woods to
the fence surrounding the prison. Schnettler watched the man
throw eight packages over the fence, and then run back into
the woods. During the incident—which lasted no more than
thirty seconds—Schnettler radioed other prison officers and
announced each time the man threw another package over the
fence. Schnettler estimated his distance from the man to be
eighty or ninety yards. After the incident, Schnettler de-
scribed the suspect as a “white man” wearing “long jean
shorts and a dark shirt.”

1, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed. 2d 401 (1972).

A few minutes later, Kershaw Correctional Institute Officer
Brenda Lippe was driving to work when she passed a man
walking away from the prison on Highway 601.7 When Lippe
arrived at work, she heard about the incident at the fence, and
told the correctional officer in charge of contraband, Corporal
Christopher Hunt, she had seen a man walking away from the
prison on Highway 601. She described him as “a light skinned
black gentleman with a nice neat haircut, black shirt and ...
charcoal-colored shorts.”

The correctional officers informed the Lancaster County
Sheriff's Office that there was a “black male wearing a black
shirt and jean shorts” walking on Highway 601 who may have
been involved with a contraband incident at the prison. At
approximately 6:00 a.m., Deputy Charles Kirkley saw Wyatt
walking along Highway 601. Kirkley stopped Wyatt and asked
for his identification, Kirkley then informed Hunt he found the
suspect.

Hunt and Schnettler left the prison and drove to the side of
the road where Kirkley was holding Wyatt. Schnettler asked
Kirkley to let Wyatt out of the car so he could see Wyatt
standing up. After looking at him, Schnettler said, “Yeah,
that’s the guy I saw.” When asked at trial “what about the
appearance of that man enabled you to say that,” Schnettler
testified it was the “clothing he was wearing and how light the
skin was on his legs.” Schnettler stated, “The skin color of his
legs looked different” because his calves were “shiny.”

Kirkley put Wyatt back in the patrol car and drove to the
prison so Lippe could identify him. When they arrived, Kirk-
ley, Hunt, and Wyatt got out of the car and stood next to it.
Lippe—who was in a watch tower forty or fifty yards away—
positively identified Wyatt as the man she had seen walking
on Highway 601 a few minutes earlier.

The contents of the packages thrown over the fence were
tested and determined to be powder cocaine, cocaine base,’
and marijuana. Based on the identifications made by Schnett-
ler and Lippe, the State charged Wyatt with attempting to

2. Kershaw Correctional Institution is located on Highway 601.

3, See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110(9) (Supp. 2016) (‘Cocaine base is
commonly referred to as ‘rock’ or ‘crack cocaine.’ ”).

furnish contraband to a prisoner, possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine
base, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.

Prior to trial, Wyatt moved to suppress the identifications.
The State argued against suppression under both prongs of
Biggers. However, the trial court analyzed only the second
prong, and found the “procedures used in this arrest did not
create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
The court denied Wyatt’s motion to suppress. The jury con-
victed Wyatt of all charges, and the trial court sentenced him
to ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed Wyatt’s
conviction in an unpublished opinion. State v. Wyatt, Op. No.
2016-UP-162, 2016 WL 1366982 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Apr. 6,
2016). We granted Wyatt’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

Il. Identification Evidence

WE When a defendant challenges the admissibility of a
witness’s identification, trial courts employ a two-pronged
inquiry to determine whether due process requires suppres-
sion. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-200, 93 S.Ct. at 881-82, 34 L.Ed.
2d at 410-11; State v. Liverman, 398 S.C. 180, 188, 727 8.E.2d
422, 426 (2012). First, the court must determine whether the
identification resulted from “unnecessarily suggestive” police
identification procedures. Biggers, 409 U.S, at 198-99, 93 S.Ct.
at 381-82, 34 L.Ed. 2d at 410-11; Liverman, 398 S.C. at 138,
727 S.E.2d at 426. The Supreme Court of the United States
has repeatedly emphasized “that due process concerns arise
only when law enforcement officers use an identification pro-
cedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New
Hampshire, 565 U.S, 228, 238-89, 182 8.Ct. 716, 724, 181 L.Ed.
2d 694, 707 (2012) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 482 U.S. 98,
107, 109, 97 S.Ct, 2248, 2249, 2250, 68 L.Ed. 2d 140, 149, 151
(1977), and Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L.Ed.
2d at 411); see also Liverman, 898 S.C. at 188, 727 S.H.2d at
426 (describing the trial court’s task under the first prong as
determining “whether the identification resulted from unnec-
essary and unduly suggestive police procedures”). If the court
finds the police procedures were not suggestive, or that sug-
gestive procedures were necessary under the circumstances,
the inquiry ends there and the court need not consider the
second prong. See United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 984

(7th Cir. 2018) (citing Perry for the proposition that “courts
will only consider the second prong if a challenged procedure
does not pass muster under the first”); State v. Dukes, 404
S.C. 558, 557-58, 745 S.H.2d 137, 189 (Ct. App. 2018) (same).

Hl If, however, the court determines the procedures were
both suggestive and unnecessary, the court must then deter-
mine “whether the out-of-court identification was nevertheless
so reliable that no substantial likelihood of misidentification
existed.” Liverman, 398 S.C. at 188, 727 S.H.2d at 426 (citing
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 84 L.Ed. 2d at
411).

As the Supreme Court stated in Perry, “Only when [the]
evidence ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission violates
fundamental conceptions of justice, have we imposed a con-
straint [on admissibility] tied to the Due Process Clause.” 565
U.S. at 287, 182 S.Ct. at 728, 181 L.Ed. 2d at 706 (quoting
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668,
674, 107 L.Ed. 2d 708, 720 (1990)).

Wyatt argues the trial court erred by not suppressing
Schnettler’s and Lippe’s identifications because the proce-
dures used were unnecessarily suggestive and created a sub-
stantial likelihood of misidentification. We address each identi-
fication separately.

A. Schnettler’s Identification

Schnettler’s identification of Wyatt occurred during a single
person showup procedure, which is where police present a
single suspect to an eyewitness for possible identification. The
showup procedure here took place near the prison property
approximately fifteen minutes after the crime was committed.

1. Suggestiveness

HI Wyatt argues the State conceded the first prong of
Biggers during the suppression hearing. The State counters
that it conceded single person showup procedures are sugges-
tive, but never conceded the procedure was unnecessary under
the circumstances. During his argument against Wyatt’s mo-
tion to suppress, the solicitor stated, “Your Honor, I concede
that the showup procedure is suggestive, I think it’s inherently

suggestive, that doesn’t mean that it’s automatically a cause
for suppression.” The solicitor continued,

I think one thing you have to think about in this case is

these are not civilian witnesses who are called upon to

identify somebody who might be a suspect in the crime.

These are trained law enforcement officers who as Officer

Schnettler said are taught, number one, to observe and

record information mentally and then to report the informa-

tion so that correct procedures can be undertaken to resolve
the situation that has occurred.

We read the State’s concession that the procedures were
“inherently suggestive” not to concede its position under the
first prong of Biggers, but rather to frame its argument on the
question of necessity. The ensuing argument that the wit-
nesses were “trained law enforcement officers” who have a
duty “to report the information so that correct procedures can
be undertaken to resolve the sitwation that has occurred” is an
argument about the necessity of the procedures. Therefore,
although the State conceded the police procedures were sug-
gestive—and we agree—the analysis under the first prong is
not complete without considering the necessity of the proce-
dures.

2, Necessity

Hl In Perry, the Supreme Court illustrated the necessity
requirement by discussing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87
S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1199 (1967). The Perry Court ex-
plained that in Stovall the police performed a showup proce-
dure by bringing the defendant to the witness’s hospital room.
565 U.S. at 237-38, 132 S.Ct. at 724, 181 L.Ed. 2d at 706. “The
witness was the only person who could identify or exonerate
the defendant; the witness could not leave her hospital room;
and it was uncertain whether she would live to identify the
defendant in more neutral circumstances.” 565 U.S. at 288, 182
S.Ct. at 724, 181 L.Ed. 2d at 706. The Perry Court explained
its analysis from Stovaill, “Although the police-arranged show-
up was undeniably suggestive, the Court held that no due
process violation occurred. Crucial to the Court’s decision was
the procedure’s necessity... .” Id.*

4. Other courts have denied suppression under the first prong of Biggers
because the circumstances of the case rendered suggestive police proce-

In Gibbs v. State, 403 S.C. 484, 744 S.E.2d 170 (2018), we
explained other situations in which the circumstances may
make suggestive police identification procedures necessary:

where it occurs shortly after the alleged crime, near the

scene of the crime, as the witness’ memory is still fresh, and
the suspect has not had time to alter his looks or dispose of
evidence, and the showup may expedite the release of
innocent suspects, and enable the police to determine
whether to continue searching.
408 S.C. at 494, 744 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting State v. Mansfield,
348 S.C. 66, 78, 588 S.H.2d 257, 268 (Ct. App. 2000)).

We find the showup procedure used for Schnettler’s identifi-
eation was necessary under the circumstances. First, Kirkley
found Wyatt walking on Highway 601 near the prison approxi-
mately fifteen minutes after Schnettler had seen someone
throw contraband over the fence. The black shirt and dark
jean shorts Wyatt was wearing matched the description Kirk-
ley received from the correctional officers. Because Schnettler
had not been able to observe the suspect’s facial features, but
rather had described him primarily in terms of the clothes he
was wearing that left his distinctive calves exposed, the best
opportunity for Schnettler to say whether the suspect was the
man he saw was right then, before the suspect could change
his appearance. By conducting the showup procedure immedi-
ately, Kirkley was able to quickly determine whether Wyatt
was the person who threw the contraband into the prison, or
whether Wyatt should be released because he was innocent
and the sheriff's office needed to continue its search before

dures necessary, See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 499 F.3d 703, 707-
08 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding ‘the showup, while suggestive, was [not]
unduly so” because “there was a good reason for the failure to resort to
a less suggestive alternative’); State v. Addai, 778 N.W.2d 555, 565
(N.D, 2010) (‘The ‘unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive’ prong is
separated into two inquiries: ‘(1) whether the identification is sugges-
tive, and (2) whether there is a good reason for not using a less
suggestive procedure.’””); 778 N.W.2d at 566 (“Showup identifications
conducted close in time and proximity to the crime may be necessary to
ensure the correct person has been apprehended, the perpetrator is not
still at Jarge, and an innocent person is not being held.””); see also State
v. Dubose, 285 Wis.2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (2005) (following
Stovall and holding “an out-of-court showup is inherently suggestive
and will not be admissible unless, based on the totality of the circum-
stances, the procedure was necessary”).

other suspects could leave the area. See Hawkins, 499 F.3d at
707-08 (discussing showup identifications conducted “close in
time and proximity to the scene of a crime” and stating “[s]uch
identifications both protect innocent individuals from unneces-
sary arrest and help authorities determine whether they must
continue to search for the actual perpetrator”); United States
v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Police officers
need not limit themselves to station house line-ups when an
opportunity for a quick, on-the-scene identification arises,
Such identifications are essential to free innocent suspects and
to inform the police if further investigation is necessary.”).

Second, the vague description the correctional officers gave
Kirkley of a “black male wearing a black shirt and jean
shorts”—without Schnettler’s identification—raises serious
questions as to whether Kirkley had probable cause to arrest
Wyatt. See State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 49, 625 S.H.2d 216,
220 (2006) (“Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists
when the circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowl-
edge are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that
a crime has been committed by the person being arrested.”),
While Kirkley had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain
Wyatt based on Wyatt’s close proximity to the prison and the
descriptions from Schnettler and Lippe, we doubt this was
sufficient to establish probable cause. At oral argument, a
justice of the Court asked Wyatt's counsel, “If Deputy Kirkley
had picked up Wyatt on the side of the road with the two
descriptions he had from Schnettler and Lippe ... but did not
conduct the showup ... would he have had probable cause to
make an arrest.” Counsel answered, “Probable cause—likely
not at the time he stopped him....” See Dubose, 699 N.W.2d
at 504 (stating “[a] showup [is] necessary ... [if] the police
lacked probable cause to make an arrest” without it).

Finally, we question whether there were other procedures
Kirkley could have used that would have been less suggestive.
The characteristics Schnettler described observing in the sus-
pect were not features that could have been presented in a
typical photographic lineup. Schnettler testified he was unable
to observe the typical attributes used to make identifications
in lineups—things like hairstyle, hair color, and facial features.
“I was not looking at facial features,” he stated, “I was looking
at what he was doing, so I can’t do facial features.” Instead,

Schnettler focused his observation on attributes he could
observe from eighty or ninety yards away—the “clothing he
was wearing and how light the skin was on his legs.” Under
these circumstances, a photograph lineup would require police
to present Schnettler with photographs of other people with
similar characteristics as Wyati—wearing black shirts, jean
shorts, with their calves visible. Such a lineup would be
unworkable.

Wl “(Whhat triggers due process concerns is police use of
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure... .” Per-
ry, 565 U.S. at 282 n.1, 182 S.Ct. at 721 n.1, 181 L.Ed. 2d at
708 n.1, The procedure used for Schnettler’s identification was
suggestive, but the suggestive procedure was necessary under
the circumstances of this case. Under the first prong of
Biggers, therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion
to suppress.

B. Lippe’s Identification

We begin our review of the trial court’s analysis as to Lippe
by observing that her identification was of little consequence
to the outcome of the trial. She did not witness the crime, and
her testimony proved only a fact already established conclu-
sively: that Wyatt was walking away from the prison on
Highway 601 just before 6:00 a.m. See Liverman, 398 S.C. at
141, 727 S.H.2d at 427 (discussing factors to be considered
when deciding if an error was harmless, including “the impor-
tance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case” and
“whether the testimony was cumulative”), In addition, there is
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that
“no substantial likelihood of misidentification existed” under
the second prong of Biggers. See 398 S.C. at 188, 727 S,E.2d at
426 (listing five factors a court should consider in determining
the reliability of an identification under the second prong: (1)
“the witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator at the time
of the crime,” (2) “the witness's degree of attention,” (3) “the
accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the perpetrator,”
(4) “the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation,” and (5) “the length of time between the crime
and the confrontation”).

Ill, Conclusion

The trial court was correct not to suppress Schnettler’s
identification. However, the court should have considered the
necessity of the police procedures under the first prong of
Biggers instead of going straight to the second prong. We find
the procedure used for Schnettler’s identification was neces-
sary under the first prong.

We affirm the decision not to suppress Lippe’s identifica-
tion. Wyatt’s convictions are AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE and JAMES, JJ., concur.
HEARN, J., concurring in a separate opinion,

JUSTICE HEARN:

I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I
write separately because I believe certiorari was improvident-
ly granted. From my reading of the solicitor’s colloquy with
the trial judge, the State acknowledged the procedure was
inherently suggestive and then moved immediately to discuss
the second prong of Biggers. Therefore, I believe the trial
judge properly understood the State to have conceded the
procedure was umecessarily suggestive and couched her rul-
ing in terms of whether a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification existed. Thus, I would dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted.

806 S.E.2d 713
Anthony Neil BRIGGS, Respondent,
v
STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner.
Appellate Case No. 2014-000693
Opinion No. 27745
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted June 15, 2017
Filed October 25, 2017

&
ot
co)

gS
*

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Alicia A. Olive, both of Columbia.

Jeremy Adam Thompson, Law Office of Jeremy A. Thomp-
son, LLC, of Columbia.

JUSTICE FEW:

This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) action. The PCR court
granted relief and ordered a new trial. We affirm.

I. Procedural History

The State indicted Briggs for criminal sexual conduct with a
minor in the first degree and lewd act upon a child,! and called
the case to trial on August 28, 2010. The victim testified
Briggs touched her “private” with his “private” and with his

1, See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(A) (2015) (defining criminal sexual
conduct with a minor in the first degree); § 16-3-655(C) (defining
criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the third degree, formerly
mown as lewd act upon a child)

mouth, and the jury watched video of two forensic interviews
in which the victim explained what happened. Using a special
interrogatory verdict form, the jury found Briggs performed
“anal intercourse,” “cunnilingus,” and “other intrusion” on the
victim. The trial court sentenced Briggs to life in prison. The
court of appeals affirmed. State v. Briggs, Op. No. 2012-UP-
328, 2012 WL 10842051 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 30, 2012).

Briggs then filed this action for PCR. He claimed, among
other things, his trial counsel was ineffective in permitting the
forensic interviewer to give opinion testimony that she be-
lieved the victim’s accusations to be true. The PCR court
granted relief, vacated the convictions, and remanded to the
court of general sessions for a new trial. We granted the
State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR
court’s ruling?

Il. Deficient Performance

Briggs’ primary claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
relates to the testimony of Michele Arroyo-Staggs, who con-
ducted the two forensic interviews of the victim. At trial, the
State called Arroyo-Staggs to testify about those interviews,
and moved to qualify her as an expert witness in child abuse
assessment.

The PCR court found trial counsel—Max B. Singleton of
Spartanburg—was deficient in three respects as to the testi-
mony of Arroyo-Staggs. First, Singleton failed to object to the
qualification of Arroyo-Staggs as an expert witness. Second,
Singleton did not object to her direct examination testimony
that improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim. Third,
Singleton intentionally elicited additional improper bolstering
testimony from Arroyo-Staggs on cross-examination in which
she explained the reasons she believed the victim’s accusations
against Briggs. The PCR court found Singleton’s performance
did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness by
which we judge the performance of counsel under the first
prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Williams v, State, 363 S.C.
841, 348, 611 S.H.2d 232, 238 (2005) (stating the first prong of

2. We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215,
SCACR.

the Strickland test requires the applicant to prove “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80
L.Ed.2d at 698)).

A. Improper Bolstering Testimony

We begin with the PCR court’s second finding, that Single-
ton was deficient for not objecting when Arroyo-Staggs gave
improper bolstering testimony on direct examination. The
PCR court focused on four points in Arroyo-Staggs’ testimony.
First, Arroyo-Staggs explained to the jury that before the
interviews, she stressed to the victim the importance of telling
the truth. Second, Arroyo-Staggs testified to her opinion the
victim had not been coached. Third, Arroyo-Staggs told the
jury “my role is to always find out ... whether or not the
child is able to know the difference between a truth and a lie.”
On this point, the solicitor asked, “Do you make an assessment
to determine whether or not the child understands truth and
lie before you do [the interview],” and she replied, “That’s
correct.” Fourth, when the solicitor asked Arroyo-Staggs to
“describe for the jury what a forensic interview is,” Arroyo-
Staggs answered, “A forensic interview is an assessment that
is conducted ... for the purpose of finding out if something
happened or didn’t happen.” Similarly, when asked how she
“assess[es] a child’s competency to do a forensic interview,”
Arroyo-Staggs testified, “I base a lot of it on my experience
and my knowledge and my training in reference to the devel-
opmental stages to figure out what has occurred.”

Hl In recent years, we have decided many cases on the
question of the permissible limits of a forensic interviewer's
testimony in the context of the prohibition against improper
bolstering. See, eg., State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 776
8.E.2d 76 (2015); State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 771 S.E.2d 836
(2015); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C, 840, 787 S.H.2d 490 (2018);
State v. Whitner, 399 S.C, 547, 782 8.E.2d 861 (2012); State v.
Jennings, 394 S.C, 478, 716 S.E.2d 91 (2011). Under the
holdings of those cases, the PCR court was correct to conclude
Singleton should have objected to at least three of the catego-
ries of testimony listed. The State argues, however, the stan-
dards made clear in those cases were not so clear when Briggs
was tried in 2010. Thus, the State argues, Singleton’s failure to

a ws

object was reasonable under the circumstances that existed at
the time. This is a forceful argument, as we may not judge the
reasonableness of counsel’s performance by standards that
developed later. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 §.Ct. at
2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694 (“A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the cireum-
stances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”).

As to the PCR court’s first point, the State is correct. In
2015 in Anderson, we held, “There is to be no testimony”
before the jury from a forensic interviewer about instructing
the victim on “the importance of telling the truth” because this
testimony “necessarily conveys to the jury that the interview-
er and law enforcement believe the victim and that their
beliefs led to the defendant’s arrest, these charges, and this
trial, thus impermissibly bolstering the minor's credibility.”
418 S.C. at 221, 776 S.E.2d at 80. In State v. Douglas, 380 S.C.
499, 671 S.E.2d 606 (2009), however, we held that a forensic
interviewer's explanation to the jury about the importance of
telling the truth was not improper bolstering, 380 8.C. at 504,
671 S.H.2d at 609. The witness in Douglas told the jury “we
talk a lot about telling the truth and telling a lie and we make
an agreement with each other that I will tell her the truth and
that she will tell me the truth, if we get past that, if the child
agrees to do that, we go on.” 880 S.C. at 501, 504, 671 S.H.2d
at 607, 609. We disagreed this was “vouching for Victim’s
veracity” and held, “There is no evidence whatsoever [the
forensic interviewer] believed the Victim to be telling the
truth.” 380 S.C. at 504, 671 S.H.2d at 609. On this point,
therefore, Singleton’s decision not to object was reasonable
under the circumstances that existed at the time,

Our decision in Douglas makes clear, however, that a foren-
sic interviewer may not be permitted to give testimony that
improperly bolsters the credibility of the victim. We decided
Douglas on appeal from a ruling by the court of appeals that
recognized improper bolstering testimony is inadmissible. See
State v. Douglas, 867 S.C. 498, 520, 626 S.H.2d 59, 71 (Ct. App.
2006) (“The only reasonable inference the jury could have
drawn from Herod’s testimony is that she believed the victim
told the truth.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 380 8.C, 499, 671

ma a

S.E.2d 606. Our decision was not to disagree with the principle
that improper bolstering testimony is inadmissible, but simply
to disagree that the specific testimony at issue in that case
was improper bolstering.

We also made the inadmissibility of improper bolstering
clear in Smith v. State, 386 8.C. 562, 689 S.H.2d 629 (2010)—
six months before Briggs’ trial. In Smith, we found trial
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to testimony by a
forensic interviewer that improperly bolstered the victim’s
eredibility. 886 S.C. at 569-70, 689 S.H.2d at 683. We ex-
plained, “The forensic interviewer ... testified without objec-
tion that she found the Victim’s statement ‘believable’ and
stated the Victim had no reason ‘not to be truthful.’” 386 8.C.
at 564, 689 S.E.2d at 631. We held “the forensic interviewer’s
... opinion testimony improperly bolstered the Victim’s credi-
bility,” 886 S.C. at 569, 689 S.E.2d at 633,° and granted a new
trial, 386 S.C. at 570, 689 S.E.2d at 638. We stated “we can
discern no defensible basis for trial counsel’s failure to chal-
lenge the forensic interviewer's objectionable testimony.” 386
S.C. at 568, 689 S.E.2d at 633.

HE Smith demonstrates the central point of the prohibi-
tion against improper bolstering: a witness may not give an
opinion for the purpose of conveying to the jury—directly or
indirectly—that she believes the victim. The forensic inter-
viewer's testimony in Smith that she found the victim's testi-
mony “believable” directly conveyed her opinion as to the
victim’s credibility. Our holding that trial counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to object to the testimony made it clear that
when a forensic interviewer gives testimony that directly
reveals her opinion on the victim’s credibility, it is improper
bolstering. However, we also found counsel ineffective for
failing to object when the interviewer testified “the victim had
no reason not to be truthful.” This testimony indirectly con-
veyed her opinion on the victim’s credibility. Therefore, Smith
stands for the principle that there is “no defensible basis for
trial counsel's failure to challenge” the testimony of a forensic

3. We also held counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible hearsay
quoted by the forensic interviewer corroborating the victim’s testimony
was deficient performance. 386 S.C. at 568, 689 S.E.2d at 633. The
“opinion” testimony, however, was the testimony the victim was “be-
lievable” and “had no reason not to be truthful.”

a es

interviewer given for the purpose of revealing—directly or
indirectly—the witness’s opinion as to the credibility of the

Even before Smith, however, the law was already clear that
no witness may give an opinion as to whether the victim is
telling the truth. In State v. Dawkins, 297 S.C. 386, 377 S.H.2d
298 (1989), the defendant made a pretrial motion “to prevent
any testimony by one witness as to their opinion about the
credibility of another witness.” 297 S.C. at 398, 377 S.H.2d at.
802. The trial judge agreed to the premise of the motion,
stating he “didn’t know of any provision that allows one
witness to give their opinion relative to the credibility of
another opinion by another witness.” Jd. During the trial, the
solicitor asked the victim’s treating psychiatrist, “Based on
your examination and your observations of [the victim], are
you of the impression that her symptoms are genuine?” Id.
We found the question improper. 297 S.C. at 394, 877 S.H.2d
at 302.

HM After Dawkins in 1989, certainly after Douglas in 2009
and Smith in 2010, reasonably competent trial counsel should
know to object—absent a valid trial strategy—when a forensic
interviewer gives testimony that indicates the witness believes
the victim, but does not serve some other valid purpose. When
the testimony directly conveys the witness’s opinion that the
victim is telling the truth, it is obviously improper bolstering.
The question we have struggled with is whether the testimony
at issue indirectly conveys that. In 2009 in Douglas we held
testimony the forensic interviewer instructed the victim to tell
the truth was fine, 380 S.C. at 504, 671 S.E.2d at 609; in 2015
in Anderson we held it is impermissible, 418 S.C. at 221, 776
§.E.2d at 80. Our inability to be clear as to this first point of
testimony renders reasonable Singleton’s failure to object to
it, because we may not judge counsel’s performance on stan-
dards that developed later.

Hl The question to which we now turn is whether Arroyo-
Staggs’ testimony on the other three points constituted im-
proper bolstering in 2010 when Briggs was tried.

Arroyo-Staggs’ testimony that the victim had not been
eoached—the second point as to which the PCR court ruled
Singleton should have objected—is similar to the “no reason

not to be truthful” testimony we found improper in Smith.
After a series of questions about the general nature of coach-
ing in which Arroyo-Staggs defined it as “when the child is
being coerced to think about the [accusation] from somebody
else’s viewpoint,” the State asked,

Q: When you were talking about coaching earlier and cer-
tain indications of a child having been coached, did you
pick up on any of those during your interview with the
victim?

A: I would say that in the first interview I really tried to
assess that, as well as the second interview, and I did not
find any evidence.

This testimony was arguably offered for the purpose of
conveying the witness’s opinion about the credibility of the
victim, and thus could be improper bolstering. This is a point,
however, as to which we will be very careful. Under certain
circumstances, it may be proper for the State to ask an expert
about coaching. For example, if defense counsel accused the
child’s mother or father in opening statement or on cross-
examination of coaching the child to make an accusation they
knew to be untrue, such a line of questioning to an expert
could be admissible.

One can even envision a scenario in which coaching is
implied, or otherwise becomes an issue without such a direct
accusation, Under any of those circumstances, where the
testimony is offered to address coaching as a disputed issue, it
may be reasonable for counsel to decide not to object. But see
Stone v. State, 419 S.C. 370, 386, 798 S.E.2d 561, 570 (2017)
(stating “trial counsel should have objected to those compo-
nents of the ... testimony as to which counsel felt he had a
reasonably persuasive argument for exclusion”).

In this case, Singleton testified his approach to the trial was
not based on the victim having been coached, but on the
opposite set of circumstances. In particular, when asked at the
PCR trial, “Going into the [general sessions] trial, what was
your strategy,” Singleton testified his strategy was “to say
that it didn’t happen, because nobody, her mother, her grand-
mother, nobody believed the child, that it happened.” In his
opening statement, Singleton told the jury “the father didn’t
report it for over a month,” even when “he knew ... the child

was going ... back to live with [Briggs].” As to the mother,
Singleton told the jury, “It’s not that she didn’t believe [the
victim] for a day or two. She didn’t believe her for over a
year.” Thus, rather than painting a picture of a child coached
by her parents to make a false accusation, Singleton painted a
picture of a child who stood by her accusation despite the fact
her parents did not support her.

Contrary to this strategy, however, Singleton also told the
jury in his opening statement that the child’s mother was
telling “anybody that would listen” that “the father of the child
was putting all of this in her head.” Thus, Singleton made the
question of whether someone coached the child to make a false
accusation an issue in the case. Although Arroyo-Staggs’
opinion that the victim had not been coached arguably provid-
ed an indirect indication to the jury that she believed the
victim, the State has a good argument that it offered the
opinion to respond to Singleton’s statement in opening that
made coaching an issue, not for the purpose of bolstering.
Under these circumstances, we do not believe Arroyo-Staggs’
testimony that the child had not been coached was improper
bolstering, and we decline to hold that Singleton’s failure to
object to it was deficient performance.

Hl We find, however, Arroyo-Staggs’ testimony that her
“role” was to determine whether the child knows the differ-
ence between the truth and a lie—the PCR court’s third
point—and that her “purpose” was “finding out if something
happened” or “to figure out what has occurred”—the fourth
point—clearly conveyed to the jury that she believed the
victim. As we will explain, Singleton’s failure to object to this
testimony was deficient performance.

Hl We have recognized that a forensic interviewer may
serve dual purposes in child sex abuse cases. First, they serve
an evidentiary purpose. As we explained in Kromah, a forensic
interviewer is “a person specially trained to talk to children,”
her “job ... is ... to collect facts,” and her “purpose is to
prepare for trial.” 401 S.C. at 357, 787 S.H.2d at 499. In this
regard, as we explained in Anderson, “The sole purpose of her
jury testimony is to lay the foundation for the introduction of
the videotape, and the questioning must be limited to that
subject.” 413 S.C. at 220-21, 776 S.E.2d at 80. Thus, the

evidentiary purpose of a forensic interviewer is to use her
skills in interviewing a child to enable the child to speak, so
the jury—not the forensic interviewer—may determine “if
something happened.”

We have also recognized that forensic interviewers serve an
investigatory purpose. In Kromah, we stated, “Forensic inter-
viewers might be useful as a tool to aid law enforcement
officers in their initial investigative process.” 401 S.C. at 357
u.5, 787 S.E.2d at 499 n.5. In Anderson, we recognized that
one “purpose of [a forensic] interview is to allow law enforce-
ment to determine whether a criminal investigation is war-
ranted.” 418 S.C, at 221, 776 8.H.2d at 80. In both Kromah
and Anderson, however, we specifically held that this investi-
gatory purpose should not be discussed in the forensic inter-
viewer's testimony before the jury. Kromah, 401 S.C. at 357-
58 n.5, 737 S.H.2d at 499 n.5; Anderson, 418 S.C. at 221, 776
§.E.2d at 80.

In this explanation in Anderson and Kromah of the dual
purposes of forensic interviewers, we did not create new
standards by which to assess the admissibility of evidence, nor
to judge the performance of counsel. Rather, we simply ap-
plied to specific factual situations the longstanding rule of law
that no one may invade the province of the jury. We observed
long ago it is “axiomatic” that “the credibility of the testimony
of these witnesses is for the jury,” State v. Wright, 269 S.C.
414, 417, 287 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1977), and recently “we have
confronted instances where the State has ... sought to have
the forensic interviewer, improperly imbued with the imprima-
tur of an expert witness, invade the province of the jury by
vouching for the credibility of the alleged victim,” Whitner,
399 S.C, at 559, 782 S.H.2d at 867.

In this case, by informing the jury she conducted the
forensic interviews for the purpose of finding out whether the
sexual abuse happened, Arroyo-Staggs went far beyond her
role as a person who collects facts for the jury to use in the
jury’s determination of whether the victim was telling the
truth. Arroyo-Staggs invaded the province of the jury and
testified she had already made that determination. This testi-
mony directly conveyed to the jury that she believed the
victim.

Similarly, her testimony that she made the determination
the child understood the difference between a truth and a lie
before she conducted the interviews is not part of her eviden-
tiary role. Arroyo-Stagegs’ testimony not only revealed to the
jury that she believed the child knew the difference, but she
also indirectly revealed she believed the subsequent disclosure
in the interview was the truth.* There was no purpose for this
testimony except to bolster the victim’s credibility, and thus it
was improper.

Finally, if Singleton decided not to object to Arroyo-Staggs’
direct testimony based on a valid trial strategy, we would find
his performance reasonable despite the inadmissibility of the
evidence. See Watson v. State, 370 S.C. 68, 72-78, 634 8.H.2d
642, 644 (2006) (finding counsel’s performance was not defi-
cient in making the decision not to object to “inadmissible”
testimony because his strategy—that doing so “might lead to
the more damaging introduction” of other evidence—was val-
id). That is not a concern in this case because Singleton’s
strategy of showing nobody believed the victim, and thus the
abuse did not happen, could not have been advanced by
allowing Arroyo-Staggs to testify she believed her. In addition,
Singleton testified he had no strategy to support his failure to
object to Arroyo-Staggs’ testimony, and he did not even
consider objecting. If Singleton did not consider objecting, he
could not have decided not to object as a matter of strategy.

We agree, therefore, that Singleton should have objected
when Arroyo-Staggs gave improper bolstering testimony dur-
ing her direct examination. We find the PCR court correctly
concluded Singleton’s performance in failing to object to Ar-
royo-Staggs’ testimony on these two points was deficient
under the first prong of Strickland.

4. Arroyo-Staggs’ testimony that her role was to make the determination
of whether the child knew the difference between the truth and a lie is
different from the testimony the majority in Douglas found not to be
improper bolstering. See 380 S.C. at 504, 671 S.E.2d at 609 (finding a
forensic interviewer's explanation to the jury about the importance of
telling the truth, and seeking an agreement with the child to tell the
truth, was not improper bolstering). In Douglas, the witness acted as
instructor, but Arroyo-Staggs testified she acted as decision-maker. Any
witness who tells the jury she has decided questions of fact invades the
province of the jury.

B. Cross-Examination

Wl The PCR court’s third finding of deficiency was that
Singleton elicited improper bolstering testimony from Arroyo-
Staggs on cross-examination. Singleton asked,

Q: I guess what I’m trying to ask is if she can’t pinpoint the
time, not, you know, a specific date or—but around a
holiday or a birthday or something like that, I guess, I
mean, how can you assess if she’s telling—I mean, how
can you as an expert determine if she’s telling the truth
if she can’t tell you exactly around about the time when it
happened, around some specific event or holiday?

A: I can definitely assess it, which I have I believe accurate-
ly and appropriately, again, basing it on age appropriate-
ness, information she’s provided. And I don’t even recall
in the interviews if I asked specifically what date that
that occurred. So it can be that I didn’t ask.

Q: Right. But it doesn’t concern you that when you ask a
child how many times it happened and they say one and
then they go all the way up to a thousand times, that
doesn’t concern you?

A: No, sir, it does not concern me, not in this particular
case.

Q: Why does it not concern you?

A: Well, as I said before, based on her age and based on the
information that she was able to give me, what I deduct-
ed was a disclosure based on the appropriateness of
the—what I saw, what I heard, her statements, behavior
and affect—were all appropriate for her age.

Singleton’s cross-examination question “how can you as an
expert determine if she’s telling the truth”—particularly the
open-ended quality of the question—was sure to solicit an
answer that directly bolstered the victim’s credibility. Arroyo-
Staggs’ answer met expectations, and placed squarely before
the jury her opinion that the victim was telling the truth. That
question and those that followed violated a fundamental princi-
ple of cross-examination. See Francis L. Wellman, TE Arr or
Cross-ExAMINATION 79-80 (1903) (instructing that “no question
should be put to an expert which is in any way so broad as to
give the expert an opportunity to expatiate upon his own

a a

views, and thus afford him an opportunity in his answer to
give his reasons, in his own way, for his opinions, which
counsel calling him as an expert might not otherwise have
fully brought out in his examination”).

We can discern no defensible purpose for Singleton’s cross-
examination questions. Singleton did not provide any. As we
explained earlier, Singleton testified his strategy was “to say
that it didn’t happen, because nobody, her mother, her grand-
mother, nobody believed the child, that it happened.” Single-
ton’s deficiency in these cross-examination questions was that
despite this strategy, he made sure the jury knew at least one
person believed the child—the expert. In the series of ques-
tions and answers quoted above, from which Singleton appears
to have gained nothing for Briggs, he permitted a highly-
educated, articulate, certified expert witness to provide the
jury something that significantly undermined his strategy—an
expert who believed the victim.

The PCR court found Singleton “compounded Arroyo-
Staggs’ prejudicial testimony on direct examination by re-
peatedly asking her [on cross], as an expert and in her
professional opinion, whether or not she felt the victim was
truthful.” The PCR court found Singleton permitted Arroyo-
Staggs to convey to the jury that she “independently reviewed
the [victim’s] disclosure and found it to be truthful.” The PCR.
court also found, quoting Jennings, 394 S.C. at 480, 716 S.E.2d
at 94, “[t]here is no other way to interpret [Arroyo-Staggs’
testimony] than to mean [she] believed the child ] [was] being
truthful.” We find the PCR court correctly concluded Single-
ton was deficient under the first prong of Strickland in cross-
examining Arroyo-Staggs because he elicited from her and
presented to the jury her direct statement that she believed
the victim’s accusations when nobody else did.

C. Expert Qualifications

Hl We disagree, however, with the PCR court’s finding
that Singleton was deficient in not objecting to Arroyo-Staggs

5, See William H, Fortune, Richard H. Underwood, and Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Mopern Litigation anp Proressiona Responsraruity Hanp-
BooK 428 (Aspen Publishers 2001) (‘‘As most students of trial advocacy
know, Francis Wellman authored the text on cross-examination, Tue Art
or Cross-Examination, widely regarded as the classic American book on
the subject.” (emphasis in original)).

se a

being qualified as an expert. Our analysis begins with Doug-
las, in which we addressed whether the trial court should have
allowed a witness to be qualified as an expert in forensic
interviewing. On appeal from a ruling by the court of appeals
that qualifying a forensic interviewer as an expert was not
error, we affirmed, but said only that it was “unnecessary” on
the facts of that case. 880 S.C. at 501, 671 S.H.2d at 608. We
did not say it was error,’ and specifically recognized “there
may be a case in which qualification of an expert in this field is
proper.” 380 S.C. at 503 n.2, 671 S.H.2d at 608 n2. In
subsequent cases, we have permitted a forensic interviewer to
be qualified in related areas such as “child abuse assessment,”
the field in which the State offered Arroyo-Staggs as an
expert. In Anderson, for example, while we held we do not
recognize expertise in the narrow field of “forensic interview-
ing,” 418 S.C. at 219, 776 S.E.2d at 79 (emphasis added), we
held that a forensic interviewer may be qualified as an expert
in child abuse assessment to “testify to the behavioral charac-
teristics of sex abuse victims,” 418 S.C. at 218, 776 S.E.2d at
79. Writing in partial dissent in Anderson, then Chief Justice
Toal—joined by Justice Kittredge—stated “forensic interview-
ers have a legitimate role to play in these cases, ... may be
qualified as experts in child abuse assessment[, and] may
testify ... as experts regarding matters in their expertise,
such as delayed disclosure.” 418 S.C. at 222, 776 S.H.2d at 81
(Toal, C.J., dissenting in part),”

Since Anderson, the court of appeals has on at least two
occasions affirmed a trial court’s qualification of a forensic

6. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Pleicones interpreted the majority
opinion as finding error in the qualification of the witness as an expert.
380 S.C. at 505, 671 S.E.2d at 609-10 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).

7. In State v. Baker, 390 S.C. 56, 700 S.B.2d 440 (Ct. App. 2010), rev’d on
other grounds, 411 S.C. 583, 769 S.B.2d 860 (2015), the court of appeals
reviewed a trial court’s decision to qualify a witness “‘as an expert in
forensic interviewing.” 390 S.C, at 67, 700 S.E.2d at 445, The court of
appeals did not find error, but assuming error for the purposes of the
argument, found “Baker suffered no prejudice.” Id. On certiorari from
the court of appeals’ decision, then Chief Justice Toal—joined by Justice
Kittredge—wrote in dissent she would find no error in the trial court’s
decision. See 411 S.C. at 592, 769 S.E.2d at 865 (Toal, C.J., dissenting)
(“I would find that the trial court did not err qualifying [the witness] as
an expert in forensic interviewing.”).

interviewer as an expert to testify as to the behavior of child
sex abuse victims. See State v. Barrett, 416 S.C. 124, 180, 785
§.E.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2016), cert. granted (Mar. 24, 2017)
(finding “no error” in qualifying a forensic interviewer as an
expert to testify “regarding general behavioral characteristics”
of child sex abuse victims); State v. White, 416 S.C. 185, 188,
784 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ct. App. 2016) (finding “the trial court
acted within its discretion” when it qualified “the forensic
interviewer as an expert in the dynamics of child abuse”).

In light of this history of permitting forensic interviewers to
testify as experts, we simply cannot say it was unreasonable
for Singleton to not object to the qualification of Arroyo-
Staggs as an expert in child abuse assessment in the August.
2010 trial.

TI. Prejudice

Hs To satisfy the second prong of Strickland—the
prejudice prong—Briggs must demonstrate a “reasonable
probability” the result of the trial would have been different if
Singleton had not committed the errors we discussed above.
Rutland »v. State, 415 8.C. 570, 577, 785 S.H.2d 350, 358 (2016).
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to under-
mine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Jd. On this point,
the evidence is conflicting. On one hand, there was no physical
evidence any sexual abuse occurred, and thus the victim’s
credibility was very important. Singleton testified the case
“turned on the credibility of the little girl,” and he told his
client “it would come down to whether they believed her or
not.” In addition, as we explained in Kromah, the “impermissi-
ble harm” from improper bolstering “is compounded” when
the witness “is qualified as an expert.” 401 S.C. at 358, 737
§.E.2d at 4998

On the other hand, the State presented additional evidence
that Briggs sexually assaulted the victim. For example, in a
lengthy interview with law enforcement after he waived his
right to remain silent, as one detective testified, Briggs did not

8. Contra Douglas, 380 S.C. at 503, 671 S.E.2d at 609 (finding the
contention “the jury was likely to give [the forensic interviewer's]
testimony undue weight simply because of her qualification as an
expert” to be “untenable”,

strongly deny he abused the victim. In fact, the detective
testified, when asked whether he was going to say he didn’t
sexually assault the victim, Briggs responded, “Well, I’m not
going to deny it to you because you know better.” Briggs told
another detective he was “sick and he needed help.” Briggs
also made a series of strange statements in recorded phone
calls from the jail that the State effectively argued were
incriminating. Finally, two of Briggs’ fellow prisoners testified
he made incriminating statements. One testified Briggs told
him “he pulled the girl off the bed. And he used to ride her on
his lap playing horsey with her. And he said that one time he
ejaculated. She asked what it was, and he told her it was
snot.” The other testified he overheard Briggs saying “he
rubbed his penis in between [the victim’s] legs, butt area, and
until he ejaculated” and “basically he had the case beat
because he didn’t penetrate her.”

While all of this evidence could indicate the jury was certain
to find Briggs guilty—regardless of Arroyo-Staggs’ improper
bolstering—our decision is governed by the standard of re-
view. We defer to a PCR court’s findings of fact, and we will
uphold them if there is evidence in the record to support them.
Seller v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016)
(citing Jordan v. State, 406 9.C. 448, 448, 752 S.E.2d 588, 540
(2018)). The PCR court found the case “came down to the
victim’s believability and credibility.” The PCR court found
the most damaging testimony to Briggs—that of the “two
jailhouse informants”—was not reliable because their “credi-
bility is highly suspect.” Finally, the PCR court found “there
is a reasonable probability that the result of the Applicant's
trial would have been different” if Singleton had not allowed
Arroyo-Staggs to improperly bolster the victim. Giving to the
factual findings by the PCR court the deference we are
required by law to give, we affirm the court’s finding that
Briggs proved prejudice, satisfying the second prong Strick-
land.

IV. Conclusion

Briggs’s trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to, and
eliciting, testimony from the forensic interviewer which im-
properly bolstered the credibility of the victim, We AFFIRM

the PCR court’s finding that this deficiency prejudiced Briggs
and REMAND to the court of general sessions for a new trial.

KITTREDGE, HEARN and JAMES, JJ., concur.
BEATTY, C.J., concurring in result only.

806 8.E.2d 728

In the MATTER OF James H. HARRISON, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002217
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
October 25, 2017

ORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place
Respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b) of
the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) con-
tained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). Respondent consents to being placed on

interim suspension.

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent’s license to practice law
in this state is suspended until further order of this Court.

Respondent is hereby enjoined from taking any action re-
garding any trust, escrow, operating, and any other law office
account(s) Respondent may maintain at any bank or other
financial institution, including, but not limited to, making any
withdrawal or transfer, or writing any check or other instru-

ment on the account(s).

Within fifteen (15) days of this order, Respondent shall
serve and file the affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE, Rule
418, SCACR. Should Respondent fail to timely file the re-
quired affidavit, Respondent may be held in civil and/or crimi-
nal contempt of this Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE,

Rule 418, SCACR.

/s/ Donald W. Beatty, C. J.
FOR THE COURT

ST

RE: EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC FILING PILOT
PROGRAM-COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439
Supreme Court of South Carolina.

October 30, 2017

ORDER

Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the
South Carolina Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic
Filing (E-Filing) of documents in the Court of Common Pleas,
which was established by Order dated December 1, 2015, is
expanded to include Richland County. Effective November 14,
2017, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or
pending in Richland County must be E-Filed if the party is
represented by an attorney, unless the type of case or the
type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program. The counties
currently designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:

Aiken Allendale Anderson Bamberg
Bamwell Beaufort Cherokee Clarendon
Colleton Edgefield Georgetown Greenville
Hampton Homry Jasper Lee
Lexington McCormick Oconee Pickens
Saluda Spartanburg Sumter Williamsburg

Richland—Effective November 14, 2017

Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic
Filing Policies and Guidelines, which were adopted by the
Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the training materi-
als available on the H-Filing Portal page at http:/Awww.
sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether any specific filings
are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are
strongly encouraged to review, and to instruct their staff to
review, the training materials available on the E-Filing Portal
page.

/s/ Donald W. Beatty
Donald W. Beatty
Chief Justice of South Carolina

806 S.B.2d 724
The STATE, Appellant,

ve
Marvin Reginald BROWN, Respondent.

Appellate Case No, 2014-002129
Opinion No, 5506
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard April 18, 2017
Filed August 2, 2017
Rehearing Denied December 5, 2017

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Deputy Attor-
ney General Donald J. Zelenka, both of Columbia; and Solici-
tor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

KONDUROS, J.:

In this criminal case, the State appeals the circuit court’s
decision finding the statement of the victim inadmissible as a
dying declaration exception to hearsay. The State argues the
cireuit court erred in (1) finding the statement inadmissible as
hearsay, (2) making conclusions regarding the medical rec-
ords, and (8) finding the victim was planning to seek revenge.
We affirm,

FACTS

Davon Goodwin, a nineteen-year-old man, sustained a gun-
shot wound to his abdomen on April 26, 2011. Emergency
medical services transported Goodwin to the hospital, and the
medical records indicate he arrived at the hospital “alert” and
“spitting up or coughing up bright red blood” with a severe

abdominal wound requiring immediate surgery. Goodwin was
intubated and doctors performed emergency surgery to repair
his abdominal wounds. Doctors performed another surgery the
next day, April 27, which included the placement of drains and
tubes. The medical records indicate Goodwin was extubated on
the morning of April 28,

On April 29, Detective Jerome Fleming with the City of
Charleston Police Department, went to the hospital to inter-
view Goodwin in the intensive care unit. Goodwin identified
Marvin Reginald Brown from a six-pack photographic line-up
as the person who shot him. On the same day Goodwin made
the identification to Detective Fleming, Goodwin was moved
out of the intensive care unit “to the floor.” Medical records
reveal “the decision was made that he was ready for transfer
to the floor;” “[hJe is up and out of bed-to-chair and [physical
therapy] has been consulted to work with ambulation;” “[hlis
abdominal incision is closed and the skin is closed with staples
and is clean, dry, and intact;” and “{hJe has been tolerating
tube feeds through [the tube] without any difficulty.”

The medical records also indicate Goodwin continued to
have pain and was not interested in physical therapy. For
example, the “[Physical] Therapy Charting Report” of April
30—the day after Goodwin gave the identifying statement to
Fleming—indicates his “[a]lverage pain over the last 24 hours”
was “8/10,” his goal was “not [to] do [physical therapy],” and.
his response to the treatment was noted as “fatigued” with
impairments of “decreased endurance, pain, limited mobility.”
On the other hand, the same physical therapy record that day
states: “Patient is alert and oriented to name, place[,] and
date;” he “[t]olerates 5 to 15 minutes of an uninterrupted
exercise bout;” his physical therapy prognosis is “good;” and
the long term outcome “as discussed with patient and/or
family” includes a notation that Goodwin “will be able to
return to work/school full time” and “will be independent with
all self care including driving.”

While still in the hospital, on the morning of May 4,
Goodwin was found to be unresponsive. Efforts to revive
Goodwin failed, and he was pronounced dead. The medical
records include notations that a pulmonary embolism was the
suspected cause of Goodwin’s death and his death was a

“{sludden, unexpected, unexplained death.” However, the Fo-
rensic Autopsy Final Report established the cause of death as
“{elomplications of a single penetrating gunshot wound to
abdomen.” Brown was indicted for murder, armed robbery,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent
erime. Before trial, Brown moved to exclude Goodwin’s identi-
fying statement to Detective Fleming as hearsay and a viola-
tion of the Confrontation Clause.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Fleming described
Goodwin as “very weak” and “unable to really raise his hands
or arms ... and speak loudly.” Detective Fleming answered
affirmatively when asked whether Goodwin “was able to com-
municate,” “was lucid and alert,” and “was able to correct you
if you misheard something he said.” Detective Fleming also
testified he had to encourage Goodwin to identify the person
who shot him, explaining “[i]t is common knowledge, as far as
a lot of victims ... they don’t want to be identified as being an
individual that assisted police.” Detective Fleming noted:

My comments to him [were] that he’s the victim here of this

shooting, and very fortunate at that time to say that—to be

alive. And ... there was no one out there really to come

forward to say that they witnessed this shooting, and he was

the only guy that could say—we could say establish who the

perpetrator of the crime was and bring him to justice.
Goodwin’s family members also testified at the hearing. Good-
win’s grandfather testified Goodwin told him he would not be
able to ride with him in the car, an activity they had enjoyed
together: “I was sitting there holding his hand, and we were
talking about the times we had, and the subject came up about.
us riding around.... And he said he wouldn’t be able to ride
with me, and that my other grandson ... would have his
seat.” Goodwin’s grandfather also testified Goodwin told him
“he wasn’t going to make it.” However, Goodwin’s grandfather
could not remember with specificity at what point during
Goodwin’s hospitalization these conversations occurred. Of
Goodwin’s demeanor after surgery, Goodwin’s father testified
Goodwin was

[a]lmost like a—a child just happy to see his parents,

because ... he know([s] I’m dad, I’m going take care of him,

you know. You know, more like, for example, like if your
child got in a fight at school or beat up with a gang and be

happy to see their parents when they see them, because

they [are] scared.

Goodwin's father also testified his son “was in a deep stare,
and always want[ed] you to hold his hand.”

Goodwin's sister testified Goodwin cried while in the hospi-
tal, although she had never seen him ery before, and Goodwin
“seemed tired, and he was ready to go home.”! Goodwin’s
brother testified Goodwin told him “everything will be all
right,” and “the boy shot him.” Regarding the person who shot
Goodwin, Goodwin’s brother said: “I know who he is.”

At a subsequent hearing, the circuit court verbally ruled
Goodwin’s statement was not a statement made under the
belief of impending death, noting Goodwin had been extubated
at the time of the statement; his sister testified “he just
seemed tired and ready to go home;” and Goodwin was
“ambulatory,” “screened for a physical therapy session,” and
“everyone thought he was getting better.” The trial court
further stated this case “was different than the situation in
[McHoney*], which was the case that was most helpful.”

The circuit court thereafter issued a written order finding
Goodwin's statement was inadmissible as hearsay. Specifically,
the circuit court found the medical records indicated Goodwin
“was improving and was not in imminent danger of death” at
the time he gave the identifying statement. The order refer-
enced several points in the medical record, including Goodwin
was “extubated on the 28th,” “ ‘adequate on the floor, trans-
ferred out of [the intensive care unit], was making strides with
physical therapy, and ambulating in the hall’”; “[h]e received
a physical therapy consult on April 29th, and began physical
therapy on April 30th”; “[oJn that day, he tolerated 5-15
minutes of uninterrupted exercise”; and his “May 4th death
was listed as sudden and unexpected,” The court also found

1, At the suppression hearing, the State advised the circuit court that
Goodwin's family sent a note interpreting this statement as follows:
I received a note from the family. Take this how you will, your
Honor, But their interpretation of his statement, I’m ready to go
home was, I’m ready to pass. I'm ready to pass on to Heaven, And
they wanted to make sure I conveyed that to you. That was their
interpretation of him saying that.

2. State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 544 S.E.2d 30 (2001).

a ss

“neither the medical records nor the other evidence in the
case demonstrates that the victim was aware of his imminent
death when identifying the photograph of the defendant from
the six-pack lineup.” Additionally, the order stated: “[E]vi-
dence presented at the pref trial hearing suggested that the
victim was planning on seeking revenge against his assailant.
This is inconsistent with both an awareness of imminent death
as well as one who has given up all hope of survival.” This
appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMM “In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review
errors of law only.” State v. Baccus, 867 8,C, 41, 48, 625
§.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Thus, an appellate court “is bound by
the [circuit] court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous.” Jd. “The determination by the [circuit] court of
the preliminary facts, on which the competency of a dying
declaration depends, will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless
clearly incorrect and prejudicial.’” State v. Bethea, 241 S.C.
16, 28, 126 S.H.2d 846, 849-50 (1962) (quoting State v. Smalls,
87 S.C. 550, 551, 70 S.E. 300, 301 (1911)). “Affirmance is
required when ... the conclusion of the [circuit court] is a
reasonable inference from the evidence.” Id. at 24, 126 S.H.2d
at 850. “The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the [circuit court], whose decision will not
be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” State v.
Winkler, 888 S.C. 574, 588, 698 S.B.2d 596, 601 (2010) (quoting
State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.H.2d 240, 244 (2001)),
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the
[circuit] court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled
by an error of law.” Id. (quoting State v. Pittman, 873 S.C.
527, 577, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007). “An abuse of discretion
oceurs when the [circuit] court’s ruling is based on an error of
law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without
evidentiary support.” State v. Hawes, 411 S.C, 188, 191, 767
§.E.2d 707, 708 (2015) (quoting State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16,
782 S.H.2d 880, 884 (2012)).

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Belief of Imminent Death

HI The State argues the circuit court erred in finding
Goodwin’s statement identifying Brown is inadmissible hear-

say, asserting the record contains evidence Goodwin believed
his death was imminent, citing his grandfather’s and sister’s
testimonies, Goodwin’s demeanor, and his medical condition.
The State also argues the circuit court erred in relying on
Goodwin’s improvement when he later died from his injuries
and the amount of time a declarant lives after giving the
statement is immaterial. We disagree.

HM “In a prosecution for homicide ..., a statement
made by a declarant while believing that the declarant’s death
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what
the declarant believed to be impending death” is not excluded
by the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. Rule 804(b)(2), SCRE. Imminent is defined as “[nJear
at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than
touching; impending; on the point of happening; threatening;
menacing; perilous.” Imminent, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th
ed. 1979). “[D]ying declarations are competent evidence, for or
against the accused, upon preliminary proof of certain condi-
tions.” Bethea, 241 S.C. at 21, 126 S.E.2d at 848.

The rules in regard to such testimony are well settled: Ist.

That death must be imminent at the time the declarations in

question are made. 2nd. That the declarant must be so fully

aware of this as to be without any hope of life. * * * And
8rd. That the ‘subject of the charge’ must be the death of
the declarant, and the circumstances of the death must be
the subject of the declarations.
Id, at 21, 126 S.H.2d at 848-849 (quoting State v. Johnson, 26
S.C. 152, 153, 1 S.E. 510, 510 (1887).

HM “A declarant does not have to express, in direct
terms, his awareness of his condition for his statement to be
admissible as a dying declaration. The necessary state of mind
can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the declaration.” McHoney, 344 S.C. at 98, 544 S.H.2d at 33.
“Furthermore, the length of time the declarant lives after
making the dying declaration is immaterial. The focus is on
the declarant’s state of mind when the statement is made, not
on the eventual outcome of the declarant’s injuries.” Id. at 93,
544 §.H.2d at 34.

A belief in imminent death is an extreme and powerful
belief, as noted in State v. Davis, 188 S.C. 582, 187 S.E. 189

= *

(1927). In Davis, the victim told his doctor: “‘I don’t believe I
am going to make it.’” Id. at 588, 187 S.E. at 140. However,
the doctor “encouraged him to think that he would recover—
with what success is not shown.” Jd, The supreme court found
the victim’s statement should not have been admitted, finding
that while the victim “was uneasy and anxious about his
condition, [the victim] had not given up all hope of life, and in
this respect the test was not met.” Id.

Here, evidence supports the circuit court’s finding Good-
win’s statement was not made while he believed his death was
imminent. The circuit court’s order noted specific facts in the
medical record “that he was improving and was not in immi-
nent danger of death at the time the statements were made.”
The order referenced portions of the medical record that
provide Goodwin underwent surgery, was extubated, was
transferred out of intensive care on the day of the statement,
was able to begin physical therapy, and that his death was not
expected. The court indicated recognition of Goodwin’s “seri-
ous condition” at the time he identified Brown but relied on
evidence in the medical record he was improving. The circuit
court also found “neither the medical records nor the other
evidence in the case demonstrates that the victim was aware
of his imminent death” when he made the identifying state-
ment,

The medical records support the circuit court’s finding
Goodwin was improving on the date Goodwin gave the identi-
fying statement to Detective Fleming. Physician notes from
that evening state “[hle is up and out of bed-to-chair and PT
has been consulted to work with ambulation.” The medical
records establish Goodwin successfully underwent two surger-
ies and was extubated prior to the statement. The “Case
History” set forth in the autopsy report indicates “[tJ]he pa-
tient improved and had begun ambulation and physical thera-
py,” after the second surgery, although an exact date is not
given,

In Bethea, the victim identified the person who shot her to
the responding sheriff and told the sheriff she was going to
die. 241 S.C. at 22, 126 S.H.2d at 849, The victim also
identified the person who shot her to a nurse at the hospital

Ms a

and told the nurse she was going to die. Jd. at 22-28, 126
§.E.2d at 849. Later, the victim told the nurse “ ‘that if she
died,” she did not want the person who shot her to come to
the funeral. Jd. at 28, 126 S.H.2d at 849. The victim’s doctor
testified “her course was progressively downward.” Id. at 22,
126 S.H.2d at 849. The supreme court affirmed the circuit
court’s decision admitting the statements made by the sheriff
and the nurse. Jd. at 24, 126 8.H.2d at 850.

In the present case, however, Goodwin gave the statement
identifying Brown after he had undergone two surgeries, been
extubated, and was able to breathe on his own. On the same
day Goodwin identified Brown, he was moved out of the
intensive care unit and began to ambulate, Goodwin did not
identify the assailant spontaneously but in response to ques-
tioning when Detective Fleming encouraged Goodwin to iden-
tify the person who shot him. Additionally, Goodwin was
reluctant to name the perpetrator, which suggests a fear of
reprisal, something inconsistent with a belief of impending
death,

The case at bar is also in contrast to the facts in McHoney
wherein the victim sustained a severe cut across her neck and
seven stab wounds to her abdomen. 344 S.C. at 89-90, 544
S.E.2d at 82, After the attack, the victim was conscious but
could not speak, and identified her attacker by nodding to
indicate letters of her attacker’s name as a nurse recited the
alphabet. Id. at 90, 544 S.H.2d at 32. Even though the nurse
sought to reassure the victim she would be alright, the victim
“shook her head no.” Jd. The victim lost consciousness before
being transported to another trauma center and never re-
gained consciousness before dying two weeks later. Id. The
supreme court found the circuit court “properly admitted the
victim’s identification of ‘SP’ as her killer under Rule 804(b)(2),
SCRE.” Id. at 94, 544 8.H.2d at 34,

Recognizing the challenge of discerning the state of mind of
the declarant, we find the record contains evidence to support
the circuit court’s finding Goodwin’s statement to Detective
Fleming was inadmissible hearsay as it did not meet the dying
declaration exception.

a “

IL. Findings as to Goodwin’s Revenge

HM The State also argues the circuit court erred in
finding Goodwin was planning to seek revenge against his
attacker, asserting no evidence was offered at the pretrial
hearing to establish such intent. We agree.

The circuit court’s written order stated:

Furthermore, evidence presented at the pref Jtrial hearing
suggested that the victim was planning on seeking revenge
against his assailant. This is inconsistent with both an
awareness of imminent death as well as one who has given
up all hope of survival. Ex. A at 464.

“Ex, A at 464” appears to be a flowsheet of chaplain services
indicating that a chaplain visited with the family of the victim
on the day he was admitted to the hospital and again after
Goodwin died. Brown’s argument that Goodwin’s lack of chap-
lain visits supports a finding of intended revenge is strained at
best. Additionally, testimony Goodwin knew who shot him and
feared his assailant does not support such a conclusion.

No evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that
Goodwin planned to seek revenge against Brown, and the
evidence Brown identified in his brief is not evidence Goodwin
was planning to seek revenge. Therefore, we find the conelu-
sion of the circuit court as to revenge was erroneous. Howev-
er, this error did not prejudice the State.

“The determination by the trial court of the preliminary
facts, on which the competency of a dying declaration depends,
will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless clearly incorrect and
prejudicial” ” Bethea, 241 S.C. at 28, 126 S.H.2d at 849-50
(quoting Smails, 87 8.C. at 551, 70 S.E. at 801). “To warrant
reversal, an error must result in prejudice to the appealing
party.” State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16-17, 782 S.E.2d 880, 884
(2012).

Whether an error is harmless depends on the circumstances
of the particular case. No definite rule of law governs this
finding; rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of
the error must be determined from its relationship to the
entire case. Error is harmless when it “could not reasonably
have affected the result of the trial.”

us a
State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 578, 386 S.H.2d 150, 151 (1985)

(quoting State v. Key, 256 S.C. 90, 93, 180 S.E.2d 888, 890
(1971)).

We find the circuit court did not rely solely on evidence of
revenge to support a finding of hearsay but relied on other
evidence, including the medical records. Notably, the finding
of revenge appears in the written order, but the court did not
rely on the finding of revenge in its verbal ruling. Moreover,
the finding of revenge in the written order is an additional
reason given by the circuit court for finding Goodwin was not
aware of his imminent death when he made the statement,
The circuit court found “neither the medical records nor the
other evidence in the case demonstrates that the victim was
aware of his imminent death when identifying the photo-
graph....” The court supported its ruling by first stating: “on
April 29th, the victim’s medical condition was improving.” The
court next stated: “Furthermore, evidence presented at the
pre[ trial hearing suggested that the victim was planning on
seeking revenge against his assailant.” Thus, the finding of
revenge is in addition to a finding of an improved medical
condition as set forth in the medical records. As such, we do
not find this error prejudiced the State and affirm the admis-
sion of the identifying statement.*

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the cireuit
court excluding the identifying statement as hearsay is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, J., and LEE, A.J., concur.
be

3. Based on our findings regarding hearsay, we decline to address
Brown’s assertion the identifying statement was inadmissible as a
violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution
and the South Carolina Constitution as an additional sustaining ground.
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding the appellate court need not
address remaining issues when the previous issue is dispositive).

806 S.E.2d 731

Dallas Paul BESSINGER, Claimant,
v
R-N-M BUILDERS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Employer, and
FirstComp, a division of Markel, Inc., Carrier,

Of whom the South Carolina Uninsured Employers’
Fund is the Appellant/Respondent,

And FirstComp, a division of Markel, Inc.,
is the Respondent/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002092
Opinion No, 5521

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard February 7, 2017
Filed October 25, 2017

351

Amy V. Cofield, of Cofield Law Firm, of Lexington, for
Appellant/Respondent.

Richard Daniel Addison and Lee E. Dixon, both of Hedrick
Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, of Columbia, for Respon-
dent/Appellant.

THOMAS, J.:

This is a cross-appeal from a final decision and order of the
Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission
holding the South Carolina Uninsured Employers’ Fund
(UEF) responsible for Dallas Bessinger’s benefits. The Appel-
late Panel found the workers’ compensation policy between
J&L Construction, LLC (J&L) and FirstComp, a division of
Markel, Inc., (FirstComp) was procured by fraud and void ab
initio. This case involves an unusual procedural posture where
a Single Commissioner found the policy void ab initio, the
Appellate Panel vacated the decision of the Single Commis-
sioner and remanded for a “hearing de novo,” a Single Com-
missioner once again found the policy void ab initio, and the
Appellate Panel affirmed that finding in full. UEF argues (1)
the Single Commissioner erred by reconsidering evidence
submitted in the first hearing without ensuring a proper
foundation was laid in the second hearing; (2) the Single
Commissioner erred in denying UEF’s motion to exclude
several depositions during the second hearing; and (8) the
Appellate Panel erred in finding a workers’ compensation
policy can be void ab initio when statute requires a party to
eancel a workers’ compensation policy in accordance with the
statutory framework. FirstComp appeals the Appellate Panel’s
initial remand arguing it exceeded and failed to comply with
its statutory and regulatory authority. We affirm.

FACTS

Dallas Bessinger was employed by J&L, which was operat-
ed by Emory Wilkie and John Loughery, to perform certain
roofing work. On January 4, 2012, Bessinger fell from a roof
sustaining injuries to his left hip, right arm, ribs, and back.
Bessinger immediately went to the hospital. While Bessinger
was at the hospital, Wilkie and Loughery proceeded to Mid-
lands Insurance Center in Lexington to meet with a workers’
compensation representative, TaLisa Miller. Wilkie represent-
ed to Miller that J&L had no knowledge of a prior injury or
pending litigation resulting from its work. Miller then accept-~
ed a cash payment of the premium and issued a policy from

Ss ©

FirstComp backdated to 12:01 a.m. on January 4, 2012. Bes-
singer attempted to file a workers’ compensation claim with
Miller the following Monday, and Miller immediately informed
FirstComp of the potential fraud. FirstComp then informed
J&L, Wilkie, and Loughery it was rescinding the policy due to
fraud. Bessinger filed his Form 50 on April 19, 2012, alleging
injuries to his left hip, right arm, ribs, and back. FirstComp
and UEF each denied coverage.

The parties appeared before the Single Commissioner on
July 18, 2012 (First Hearing), and the Single Commissioner
adopted the Commission’s file as part of the record after none
of the participating parties objected. Bessinger testified he
was working on a house in Orangeburg on January 4, 2012.
Bessinger claimed he was rolling felt on the roof when “the
felt came from under [him]” and he fell approximately three
stories.

Following Bessinger’s testimony, the Single Commissioner
asked FirstComp if they had any witnesses to present other
than the depositions submitted. FirstComp stated they had no
other evidence to put forth, UEF did not object to the
admission of the depositions.

The Single Commissioner filed a decision and order on
December 18, 2012, finding that due to Wilkie and Loughery’s
fraudulent activity the policy was void ab initio. With respect.
to UEF’s argument the issue was controlled by section 38-75-
780, the Single Commissioner found it did not alter the right
of a party to rescind a contract induced by fraud. Therefore,
the Single Commissioner held that the policy between Fir-
stComp and J&L was void and UEF was liable for benefits
under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).

UEF appealed the order to the Appellate Panel and again
raised the argument that section 38-75-7380 contemplates this
factual situation. UEF claimed the Single Commissioner erred
in finding the policy was void ab initio due to fraud. In
response, FirstComp argued there is a difference between
eancellation of a policy, which section 38-75-7830 contemplates,
and rescission of a policy.

1, S.C, Code Ann. § 38-75-730 (2015).

The Appellate Panel issued its decision and order (Remand
Order) on April 17, 2014, vacating the Single Commissioner's
decision and finding “good grounds have been shown for the
Commission to reconsider the evidence, receive further evi-
dence, and rehear the parties or their representatives pursu-
ant to [section 42-17-50 of the South Carolina Code (2015).]”
The Appellate Panel ordered the Single Commissioner to hold
a “hearing de novo.” The Appellate Panel did not give any
further reasoning.

The Single Commissioner held the hearing de novo (Second
Hearing) on August 21, 2014. FirstComp questioned the pro-
priety of the Remand Order because the Appellate Panel did
not give any specific instructions or reasoning in the order.
UEF argued there is nothing in workers’ compensation law
allowing a policy to be void ab initio and section 38-75-7380 is
the only controlling law. UEF then contended the Remand
Order wiped the slate totally clean regarding evidence submit-
ted during the First Order. UEF argued there were issues
regarding notice for the depositions and they were inadmissi-
ble during the Second Hearing. UEF claimed anything the
Single Commissioner considered during the First Hearing was
improper to consider during the Second Hearing absent inde-
pendent foundation laid for the readmission of the evidence,

The Single Commissioner issued its decision and order on
March 31, 2015. In the order, the Single Commissioner noted
the Appellate Panel remanded the case with instruction to
reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, and rehear
the parties or their representatives. The Single Commissioner
found the Appellate Panel did not invalidate or exclude any
evidence which was part of the record. Therefore, the Single
Commissioner stated the Second Hearing was based on the
evidence presented during the First Hearing and any new
evidence the parties wished to offer. The Single Commissioner
then found all of the elements for fraud were met and the
policy was procured by fraud and void ab initio. Additionally,
the Single Commissioner held section 38-75-7830 contemplated
cancellation of an insurance policy while the present case
concerned rescission due to fraud. Finally, the Single Commis-
sioner dismissed FirstComp from the case and ordered UEF
to provide benefits to Bessinger,

ee

Following the Single Commissioner’s decision and order,
UEF again appealed to the Appellate Panel, and FirstComp
filed a cross-appeal. UEF argued the Single Commissioner
erred by considering evidence the parties submitted during
the First Hearing without a proper foundation during the
Second Hearing. UEF argued the depositions were inadmissi-
ble during the Second Hearing because notice was deficient.
UEF reiterated its contention that a workers’ compensation
policy cannot be void ab initio and section 38-75-7830 should
control this case.

FirstComp argued this case revolved around the difference
between rescission of a policy and cancellation of a policy.
FirstComp argued the policy was procured by fraud and it
was entitled to rescind the policy rather than cancel the policy
pursuant to section 88-75-7830. FirstComp argued the Single
Commissioner correctly followed the instructions of the Appel-
late Panel by reconsidering evidence that had already been
submitted. However, FirstComp argued the Remand Order
was improper because the Appellate Panel did not state any
supporting facts or law.

The Appellate Panel filed its decision and order on Septem-
ber 5, 2015, and adopted the findings, conclusions, and orders
of the Single Commissioner verbatim. Therefore, the Appel-
late Panel found the policy void ab initio, dismissed FirstComp
from the case, and ordered UEF to provide Bessinger benefits
under the Act, This cross-appeal followed.

UEF’S ISSUES ON APPEAL

1, Whether the Single Commissioner erred during the Sec-
ond Hearing by considering evidence submitted during
the First Hearing when FirstComp failed to lay a proper
foundation for the evidence?

2. Whether the Single Commissioner erred in denying
UEF’s motion to exclude multiple inadmissible deposi-
tions?

8. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in finding a workers’
compensation policy can be “void ab initio” or “rescinded”

when South Carolina law requires a party to cancel such

a policy pursuant to statute?

FIRSTCOMP’S ISSUE ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Appellate Panel erred in vacating the first
order of the Single Commissioner and remanding for the
Second Hearing?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HMMM The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act®
governs the standard of judicial review in workers’ compensa-
tion cases. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 8.C. 180, 185, 276 S.H.2d
804, 306 (1981). When reviewing an appeal from the Appellate
Panel, “this [clourt may not substitute its judgment for that of
the [Appellate Panel] as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact, but may reverse where the decision is
affected by an error of law.” Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 8.C.
618, 617, 571 S.B.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 2002). “Statutory inter-
pretation is a question of law.” Hopper v. Terry Hunt Constr.,
378 S.C. 475, 479, 646 S.E.2d 162, 165 (Ct. App. 2007). “This
court is free to decide matters of law with no particular
deference to the fact finder.” Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393
S.C. 77, 82, 710 S.H.2d 454, 456 (Ct. App. 2011). “But whether
the facts of a case were correctly applied to a statute is a
question of fact, subject to the substantial evidence standard.”
Hopper, 373 S.C. at 479-80, 646 S.H.2d at 165. “When the
purpose of the underlying dispute is to determine whether
coverage exists under an insurance policy, the action is one at
law.” Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 385 S.C. 187, 191, 684
S.E.2d 541, 543 (2009).

UEF’S APPEAL

1. Consideration of Evidence From the First Hearing

I UEF contends the Remand Order required the Single
Commissioner to conduct the Second Hearing as if the First
Hearing never happened. UEF argues the Single Commission-
er erred during the Second Hearing by considering evidence
from the First Hearing. We disagree.

We find UEF misconstrues the nature of the Remand Order
by focusing too narrowly on the phrase “hearing de novo.”
Although the Appellate Panel did remand for a hearing de

2. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 through -400 (2005 & Supp. 2017).

novo, a complete reading of the Remand Order shows the
purpose of the Second Hearing was to “reconsider the evi-
dence, receive further evidence, and rehear the parties or
their representatives.” The instruction to “reconsider the evi-
dence” demonstrates the Appellate Panel intended for the
Single Commissioner to reconsider any evidence submitted
during the First Hearing. Furthermore, this result is contem-
plated by the various attendant statutes and regulations.
Section 42-17-50 of the South Carolina Code (2015) permits
reconsideration of evidence, receipt of additional evidence, and
the rehearing of parties or their representatives. Also, Regula-
tion 67-707 * allows a Single Commissioner to take additional
evidence. Therefore, we find the Single Commissioner did not
err during the Second Hearing by considering evidence sub-
mitted during the First Hearing.

2. Admissibility of Depositions

Hl UEF argues the Single Commissioner wrongfully ad-
mitted several depositions during the Second Hearing. UEF
asserts the deposition of TaLisa Miller was wrongfully admit-
ted because there was no evidence it received proper notice of
the deposition. UEF argues the depositions of John Loughery
and Emory Wilkie were inadmissible because UEF did not
receive notice of the depositions and was not present when
they were conducted. UEF claims it is irrelevant whether the
evidence was admissible in the First Hearing. We disagree.

UEF did not object to the admission of the depositions
during the First Hearing or during its first appeal to the
Appellate Panel. Indeed, UEF raised no argument regarding
admission of the depositions until the Second Hearing. Be-
cause, as discussed above, the Appellate Panel ordered the
Single Commissioner to reconsider the evidence from the
First Hearing and UEF failed to object to the depositions
during the First Hearing, UEF waived any ability to object
during the Second Hearing. Thus, the Single Commissioner
properly considered the depositions during the Second Hear-
ing.

3. S.C, Code Ann. Regs. 67-707 (2012).

3. Section 38-75-730

UEF asserts a workers’ compensation policy must be can-
celled according to section 38-75-7380 for the cancellation to be
effective and can never be void ab initio. UEF argues section
88-75-7830 contemplates the factual posture of the instant case
and is the only method for cancelling the policy. UEF argues
Bessinger cannot be denied benefits due to the fraudulent
actions of employers. Because Bessinger is a third-party bene-
ficiary of the contract, UEF asserts fraudulent actions by the
employers cannot defeat his entitlement to benefits under the
policy. UEF argues the language of the policy must be
construed against the issuer and the policy does not allow for
the type of relief sought by FirstComp. UEF also claims any
fraudulent conduct by Bessinger’s employers cannot void the
policy because FirstComp was negligent when it issued the
policy. We disagree.

WM “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hodges
v. Rainey, 341 §.C. 79, 85, 583 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). “Under
the plain meaning rule, it is not the court’s place to change the
meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.” Id. “Where the
statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion are not needed and the court has no right to impose
another meaning.” Id. “The goal of statutory construction is to
harmonize conflicting statutes whenever possible and to pre-
vent an interpretation that would lead to a result that is
plainly absurd.” Id. at 91, 588 S.E.2d at 584. “What a legisla-
ture says in the text of a statute is considered the best
evidence of the legislative intent or will.” Miller Constr. Co. v.
PC Constr, of Greenwood, Inc., 418 8.C. 186, 204, 791 S.H.2d
821, 381 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting State v. Hlwell, 408 S.C. 606,
612, 748 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2018).

In pertinent part, section 38-75-730(a)(2) reads “[nJo insur-
ance policy or renewal thereof may be canceled by the insurer
prior to the expiration of the term stated in the policy, except
for ... [a] material misrepresentation of fact which, if known
to the company, would have caused the company not to issue
the policy[.]”

Ss ©

Our supreme court has recognized the difference between
rescission and cancellation of a contract. See Gov't Emp. Ins.
Co. v. Chavis, 254 §.C. 507, 516, 176 S.B.2d 131, 185 (1970)
(“(Clancellation refers to the termination of the policy prior to
the end of the policy period, and termination refers to the
expiration of policy by the lapse of the policy period. Rescis-
sion is not merely a termination of contractual obligation but
is abrogation or undoing of it from the beginning, which seeks
to create a situation the same as if no contract ever had
existed.”). In Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc., this Court
stated:

A contract may be rescinded for unilateral mistake only

when the mistake has been induced by fraud, deceit, misrep-

resentation, concealment, or imposition of the party opposed
to the rescission, without negligence on the part of the party
claiming rescission, or when the mistake is accompanied by
very strong and extraordinary circumstances which would
make it a great wrong to enforce the agreement,
298 S.C. 191, 199, 359 S.E.2d 291, 297 (Ct. App. 1987), over-
ruled on other grownds by Ward v. Dick Dyer & Assoc., Inc.,
304 S.C, 152, 403 S.H.2d 810 (1991).

UEF points to the North Carolina case Ovendine v. TWL,
Inc, and urges this court to follow the statement found therein
that “a workers’ compensation insurance contract will ...
never be void ab initio, but must be cancelled in a manner
prescribed by [the statute at issue].” 184 N.C.App. 162, 645
8.E.2d 864, 866 (2007). Although Ouendine provides guidance
and our courts give weight to decisions of North Carolina
courts interpreting that state’s workers’ compensation stat-
utes, we find Owendine distinguishable from this case. The
policy at issue in Owendine was in existence for several
months before the injury. Id. at 865, Also, the insurance
carrier attempted to cancel the policy for “underwriting rea-
sons” prior to the date of the injury. Id, Following the injury,
there was a dispute as to coverage and the North Carolina
Workers’ Compensation Commission ultimately held the carri-
er responsible for coverage. Id. On appeal, the carrier argued
the employer made material misrepresentations, the content
of which were not disclosed in the court’s opinion, in the
application for insurance which should prevent recovery under
applicable law. Jd. The North Carolina Court of Appeals

disagreed, finding a statute which specifically prohibited can-
cellation of certain workers’ compensation policies controlled.
Id. at 866. The court ultimately held a North Carolina work-
ers’ compensation policy can never be void ab initio but must
be cancelled in the manner prescribed by the controlling
statute. Id.

Although Owendine provides guidance, we find Star Insur-
ance Company v. Neighbors, 122 Nev. 778, 188 P.8d 507 (2006)
more persuasive. As in this case, the policy at issue in Neigh-
bors was not in existence at the time the injured employee fell
off a roof. Id. at 509. The day after the incident, the employer
requested the carrier reinstate its workers’ compensation in-
surance, which had lapsed a few months prior. Jd. The insurer
required the payment of an unpaid premium and a letter from
the employer verifying that no losses had occurred during the
cancellation period. Jd. The employer fraudulently stated
there had been no loss, fully aware of the injury to the
employee. Id. After the employee submitted a claim for work-
ers’ compensation benefits, the insurer denied the claim, re-
turned the premium, and rescinded the policy based on the
misrepresentation. Jd. The issue in Neighbors was the inter-
pretation of a statute similar to the one in Owendine and the
case at bar.' Jd. In analyzing the statute, the court noted that
while it afforded an insurer the right to void a policy based on
misrepresentations, it also protected the employee by requir-
ing the insurer “to provide compensation to claimants arising
before the cancelation of the policy.” Id. at 510. The court
noted the apparent contradiction, stating the statute did “not
clearly apply to retroactive insurance which, by definition, did
not exist at the time of the injury.” Id. The court reasoned:

Certainly, an obligation to provide compensation under the

statute is normally stimulated by an accident, the obligation

normally arises under pre-existing coverage, and the term

“cancellation” normally presumes the discontinuation of a

4, “No statement in an employer's application for a policy of industrial
insurance voids the policy as between the insurer and employer unless
the statement is false and would have materially affected the acceptance
of the risk if known by the insurer, but in no case does the invalidation
of a policy as between the insurer and employer affect the insurer’s
obligation to provide compensation to claimants arising before the
cancellation of the policy.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616B,033(2) (2012).

pre-existing policy. Further, an anomalous situation occurs
where the employer fraudulently seeks to create the “obli-
gation to provide compensation” after the fact. Thus, when
the employer has fraudulently procured retroactive or back-
dated insurance for the explicit purpose of obtaining cover-
age for a pre-existing loss, a latent ambiguity arises in
connection with the scope of [the statute].
Id. When examining the purpose of the statute, the court
found, among other purposes, “the measure prohibits the
practice of ’post-accident’ underwriting, i.e., claim avoidance
under a pre-existing policy, based upon an act of fraud that is
totally unrelated to the subsequent claim or otherwise.” Id. at
510-11. The court then stated:
This is not a case of post-accident underwriting with regard
to an existing policy.... [Insurer] is not attempting to avoid
coverage it had placed before an accident based upon mis-
conduct that is in no way related to the claim in question. In
this instance, [the employer] obtained the policy by fraud to
get coverage for this particular claim.
Id, at 511. Following this conclusion, the Neighbors court cited
other jurisdictions that reached similar conclusions. See id.
(“If A applies for fire insurance upon a building and fraudu-
lently represents that he has had no fire losses, the policy may
be voidable and subject to cancellation by the insurer upon
discovery that the insured had had losses under circumstances
making the new risk undesirable. But if he applies for insur-
ance knowing that the building has already been destroyed by
fire, conceals the fact of the prior loss and secures a policy
antedated to cover the time of the loss, the policy is void and
no liability ever attaches.” (quoting Matlock v. Hollis, 153
Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119, 124 (1941))). Following the reasoning
in Matlock, the Neighbors court ultimately held that when
“the ‘obligation to provide compensation’ under [the] statute is
itself procured by post-accident fraud, [the statute] does not
operate to retroactively impose coverage.” 138 P.3d at 512.
This rationale has been followed by other jurisdictions. See
Century Indem. Co. v. Jameson, 383 Mass. 503, 181 N.E.2d
167 (1956); Hunt v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 158 Colo. 584, 387
P.2d 405 (1968); Maise v. Delaney, 81 8.D, 306, 184 N.W.2d
770 (1965). Indeed, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law
recognizes this general principle stating:

The only situation in which the insurance would be defeated
for all purposes by act of the employer is that in which the
insurance is absolutely void ab initio, rather than voidable;
this would occur if the employer attempted to insure against
an accident that had already occurred, by pre-dating the
insurance and fraudulently concealing the known existence
of an accident within the period so covered.

14 Lex K. Larson & Thomas A. Robinson, Larson’s Workers’

Compensation Law, § 150,02[4] (2016).

HI Based on standard statutory construction principles,
we find section 38-75-730 does not restrict a party’s ability to
rescind an insurance contract under the circumstances of this
case, Our case law has long recognized the distinction between
rescission and cancellation of a contract. See Boddie Noell
Props., Inc. v. 42 Magnolia P’ship, 352 S.C, 487, 442-44, 574
§.E.2d 726, 728-29 (2002) (recognizing the distinction between
rescission and cancellation of a contract); First Equity Inv.
Corp. v. United Serv. Corp. of Anderson, 299 S.C. 491, 498,
386 S.H.2d 245, 249 (1989) (affirming the distinction between
rescission and cancellation of a contract by explaining a party
cannot simultaneously seek rescission damages and other rem-
edies that essentially affirm the existence of a contract);
Chawis, 254 S.C. at 516, 176 S.H.2d at 135 (“[Clancellation
refers to the termination of the policy prior to the end of the
policy period, and termination refers to the expiration of policy
by the lapse of the policy period. Rescission is not merely a
termination of contractual obligation but is abrogation or
undoing of it from the beginning, which seeks to create a
situation the same as if no contract ever had existed.”).
Despite this distinction, our legislature used only the term
“cancellation” and “canceled” in section 88-75-7380, If the legis-
lature wanted to proseribe the circumstances under which a
party to an insurance contract could rescind such a contract, it
could have done so. However, because the legislature did not
include the term “rescission” in any part of section 88-75-7380,
we find our common law precedents regarding rescission of a
contract remain. See Smith v. Tiffamy, 419 S.C. 548, 556, 799
S,E.2d 479, 488 (2017) (explaining the legislature’s use of
“differing terms” is deliberate and the words mean what they
say). Thus, by its plain language, section 38-75-7830 applies
when a party wishes to cancel a policy already in existence at

Ss °°

the time of a loss and not when a party seeks to rescind a
policy procured by fraud to cover a pre-existing loss.

Insurance by its very nature is meant to protect against the
unknown or the possibility of a loss. An insurance company
issues a policy and assumes such a risk or possibility of loss.
That was indeed what happened in Oxendine. However, in
Neighbors and this case, the insurance company was not
assuming any risk or possibility of loss. Instead, the employer
attempted to gain coverage for a known loss that had already
occurred. Contrary to UEF’s assertions, we find section 38-75-
730 does not contemplate such a scenario. Section 38-75-7830
does not apply under the limited circumstances of this case,
and the Appellate Panel properly found it did not bar Fir-
stComp from rescinding the policy.

Finally, with regard to UEF’s claims that FirstComp was
negligent and, thus, could not prevail on a rescission claim,
UEF offered no evidence other than unsupported assertions
to show FirstComp’s actions were negligent or in any way
outside the realm of normal business practices. Thus, URF
failed to show the Appellate Panel’s findings on this issue are
unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm
the decision and order of the Appellate Panel finding a party
may seek rescission of a workers’ compensation policy when it
was procured by fraud to cover a pre-existing loss.
FIRSTCOMP’S APPEAL

FirstComp argues the Appellate Panel erred by vacating
the initial order of the Single Commissioner because the
Remand Order was facially invalid and did not comply with
the requirements of the Act and other applicable law. Because
the Remand Order was not a final judgment, FirstComp was
required to continue in the litigation and could appeal only
after final judgment. The ultimate result reached by the
Appellate Panel was beneficial to FirstComp and identical to
the position the parties were in prior to the remand. Because
we affirm the Appellate Panel’s final decision and order on the
merits, the propriety of the Remand Order is merely aca-
demic. Therefore, FirstComp’s appeal is moot. See Mathis v.
S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 260 S.C. 344, 346, 195 S.E.2d 718,
715 (1978) (“A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered,
will have no practical legal effect upon existing controversy.

This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for
[a] reviewing [cJourt to grant effectual relief.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final decision and
order of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission.

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur.
Es

—  *«

807 S.H.2d 198
The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Deangelo MITCHELL, Defendant,
and
AA Ace Bail by Frances and Palmetto Surety
Corp., as Surety, Petitioners.
Appellate Case No. 2016-000980
Opinion No. 27747
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard April 12, 2017
Filed November 8, 2017

BO

8
oy

367

Robert T. Williams, Sr. and Benjamin Allen Stitely, both of
Williams, Stitely & Brink, PC, of Lexington, for Petitioners.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and V. Henry Gun-
ter, Jr., both of Columbia, and Solicitor Scarlett A. Wilson, of
Charleston, for Respondent.

— a
JUSTICE JAMES:

This appeal arises from an order estreating a surety bond
and remitting one-half of the bond forfeiture. The court of
appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Mitchell,
2016 WL 640522, Op. No. 2016-UP-070 (S.C. Ct. App. filed
Feb. 17, 2016). We affirm the court of appeals’ holding that the
bond estreatment was proper and that the amount of forfei-
ture remitted was not arbitrary or capricious. We hold that
the circuit. court may consider the willfulness of a bondsper-
son’s actions, in addition to the willfulness of a defendant’s
actions, when determining whether, and to what extent, to
remit a bond forfeiture.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Deangelo Mitchell was arrested for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine and was released on a $25,000 surety bond.
Subsequently, Mitchell was arrested for trafficking in cocaine,
distribution of cocaine, and involuntary manslaughter; bond
was set at $400,000. Mitchell’s bonds were then consolidated
for all his pending charges and the circuit court set a $150,000
surety bond. Bond conditions included a standard good behav-
ior condition, plus house arrest and electronic monitoring. AA
Ace Bail by Frances and Palmetto Surety Corporation (collec-
tively, Bond Company) executed the $150,000 surety bond and
Mitchell was released.

Thereafter, the State moved to revoke Mitchell’s bond on
the basis that Mitchell blatantly disregarded the house arrest
and electronic monitoring provisions of his bond and thus,
violated the “good behavior” requirement of the bond con-
tract.t Mitchell appeared at the revocation hearing and testi-
fied that he was never informed of the conditions of his bond

1. The parties have concentrated their arguments upon Mitchell’s re-
peated electronic monitoring violations as being violations of the “good
behavior” condition of his bond. Arguably, a good behavior violation is
committed only when the defendant has committed another crime
while out on bond. Even if repeated violations of the electronic moni-
toring provisions are not “good behavior” violations, the bond covering
Mitchell (and most other defendants) clearly includes a provision that
the defendant shall comply with all conditions of bond; since this bond.
included a provision that Mitchell would comply with all conditions of
bond, and since house arrest and electronic monitoring were conditions
of bond, the result is the same.

and that he was never informed he was violating a condition of
his bond.

Mitchell’s bondsperson, Frances Jenkins, testified at the
revocation hearing that she has been a bondsperson for almost,
twenty years. She testified she was aware electronic monitor-
ing was a condition of Mitchell’s bond. Jenkins admitted the
monitoring company contacted her two to three times to
inform her that Mitchell was violating the electronic monitor-
ing conditions; she testified that she in turn contacted Mitchell
and told him to “tighten up.” Concerning her responsibilities
as a bondsperson, Jenkins initially testified, “I write appear-
ance bonds, not behavior bonds.” Later during her testimony,
she conceded that her responsibilities as a bondsperson in-
elude helping to enforce bond conditions other than the defen-
dant’s appearance in court.

James Robinson, the owner of the monitoring company,
testified at the revocation hearing that his office contacted
Mitchell and Jenkins on several occasions regarding the elec-
tronic monitoring violations, and that after continuing viola-
tions, his office notified Jenkins she needed to arrest Mitchell
because “it was very obvious” that he was staying out all
night. Robinson testified “it got to where there was just no
compliance” and that Mitchell committed daily house arrest
and electronic monitoring violations. Robinson testified he
advised Jenkins that it appeared Mitchell was “out there doing
drug transactions.” Robinson testified that Jenkins refused to
pick Mitchell up and responded, “well, that’s how he makes a
living.” Jenkins denied telling Robinson that she knew Mitch-
ell made money dealing drugs.

The circuit court found Mitchell’s claims of ignorance as to
the conditions of his bond were not credible and revoked the
bond for repeated violations of the terms and conditions of the
bond. Mitchell was placed in custody until he pled guilty and
was sentenced to a term of incarceration.

On August 8, 2012, the State filed a Notice of Forfeited
Recognizance seeking estreatment of the bond posted by Bond
Company. The circuit court held two hearings on the motion,
and on July 9, 2014, the circuit court issued its order estreat-
ing $75,000 of the $150,000 bond.

In its order, the circuit court first noted that pursuant to Hx
parte Polk, 354 S.C. 8, 579 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2003), the
purpose of the bond “was to assure not only Mr. Mitchell's
appearance, but also his good behavior while out on bond,”
noting the additional conditions of the bond order imposing
house arrest and electronic monitoring. Second, the court
found Mitchell’s violations, “as well as Ms. Jenkins’ admitted
failure to fulfill her obligations as the bondsperson and take
appropriate action to address them, were clearly willful.”
Finally, the court found that the State incurred expenses in
addressing this matter and that the State was prejudiced
because this case, in addition to other cases brought to the
court’s attention, resulted in the issuance of a moratorium on
the use of electronic monitoring in the circuit. The court of
appeals affirmed both the circuit court’s decision to estreat the
bond and the amount estreated. Mitchell, Op. No. 2016-UP-
070.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HE “An appellate court reviews the circuit court’s ruling
on the forfeiture or remission of a bail bond for abuse of
discretion.” State v. McClinton, 369 S.C. 167, 170, 681 S.H.2d
895, 896 (2006).

An abuse of discretion oceurs when the circuit court’s ruling

is based upon an error of law, such as application of the

wrong legal principle; or, when based upon factual conclu-
sions, the ruling is without evidentiary support; or, when the
circuit court is vested with discretion, but the ruling reveals
no discretion was exercised; or when the ruling does not fall

within the range of permissible decisions applicable in a

particular case, such that it may be deemed arbitrary and

capricious.
Id.

DISCUSSION

Bond Company contends estreatment was improper because
the sole purpose of a surety is to insure the defendant's
appearance for court, not the defendant’s behavior. Bond
Company concedes that a bond may be estreated for a viola-
tion of a bond condition but argues that once the defendant is

surrendered to the State, the entire amount of estreatment.
must be remitted, as long as the State has suffered no
prejudice. Bond Company further contends that even if es-
treatment were proper, the amount remitted was arbitrary
and capricious because Mitchell appeared for court, the State
ineurred no costs from locating or prosecuting Mitchell, and
the State otherwise suffered no prejudice. We disagree.”

HM An appearance recognizance bond:

must be conditioned on the person charged personally ap-
pearing before the court specified to answer the charge or
indictment and to do and receive what is enjoined by the
court, and not to leave the State, and be of good behavior
toward all the citizens of the State, or especially toward a
person or persons specified by the court.

§.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-20(A) (2014). Upon breach of a condi-
tion of the recognizance, the recognizance is forfeited and the
liability of the surety to pay the amount of the penalty
becomes fixed, “unless relieved or exonerated by action of the
court.” Pride v. Anders, 266 S.C. 888, 340, 228 $.H.2d 184, 185
(1976) (citing State v. Edens, 88 S.C. 302, 70 8.E. 609 (1911)).

The procedure for estreatment of bonds in the instant case
is controlled by South Carolina Code § 17-15-170 (2014), See
State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 554, 206 S.H.2d 822, 828
(1974). The circuit court followed the requisite procedure,
Section 17-15-170 provides that whenever the recognizance is
forfeited by noncompliance with its conditions, the State shall
immediately notify any party bound in the forfeited recogni-
zance to appear and show cause “why judgment should not be
confirmed against him.” At the show cause hearing, if the
person so bound “does not give a reason for not performing
the condition of the recognizance as the court considers suffi-

2. Bond company also contends that any estreatment must be condition-
al upon the surrender of the defendant to the State under S.C. Code
Ann, § 38-53-70 (2015) and that they are relieved of liability because
Mitchell appeared in court. We hold this issue is not preserved for this
Court’s review, Even if the issue was preserved, section 38-53-70 is
inapplicable to this case because it only applies to an estreatment being
paid in installments resulting from a defendant's failure to appear in
court, Here, Mitchell appeared for court and estreatment was ordered
based upon Mitchell's violation of the good behavior condition and
upon the willful noncompliance of Mitchell and Jenkins.

—

cient, then the judgment on the recognizance is confirmed.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-170.

Hl Thereafter, a second hearing may be held to determine
the amount, if any, to be remitted. Holloway, 262 S.C. at 555,
206 S.H.2d at 828. The court may “remit the whole or any part
of the forfeiture as may be deemed reasonable” upon affidavit
sufficiently stating the forfeiture resulted “from ignorance or
unavoidable impediment and not from wilful default.” S.C.
Code Ann. § 17-15-180 (2014).

The circuit court is vested with discretionary power
to determine whether a bond forfeiture should be remitted,
and if so, to what extent. State v. Workman, 274 S.C. 341, 348,
263 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1980). But see United States v. Parr, 560
F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Neither frustration nor its
kinsman vindictiveness should be of weight in tipping the
scales by which the elements of the court’s discretion is
weighed.”). “[I]n determining whether any remission of the
judgment is warranted, the trial court is not limited to consid-
ering only the actual cost to the State.” Hu parte Polk, 354
S.C. at 12-18, 579 S.H.2d at 331. “[T]he following factors, at
the least, should be considered in determining whether, and to
what extent, the bond should be remitted: (1) the purpose of
the bond; (2) the nature and wilfulness of the default; (8) any
prejudice or additional expense resulting to the State.” Id. at
18, 579 S.E.2d at 831 (emphasis added).

HN We respectfully reject Bond Company’s argument
that a surety is relieved of all liability upon the surrender of a
defendant to the State. The obligation of a surety is not to the
State to produce the defendant, but is rather “an obligation to
answer, to the extent of the penalty, for the default of the
defendants, as principals.” Pride, 266 S.C. at 841, 223 S.H.2d
at 186. The surrender of a defendant after default does not
entitle a surety to a remission of the forfeiture “as a matter of
right.” Holloway, 262 8.C. at 555-56, 206 S.H.2d at 824,

Hl Although this Court most frequently addresses condi-
tions of a bond breached by a defendant’s failure to appear, a
professional bondsperson “is certainly aware that an appear-
ance bond carries conditions beyond the defendant’s appear-
ance in court.” State v. Boatwright, 310 S.C. 281, 288, 428

S.E.2d 189, 141 (1992). “The bond may also be estreated if the
defendant breaches terms or conditions of the bond other than
appearance.” Id. at 286, 423 S,E.2d at 142 (Toal, J., dissent-
ing).

HMM Here, despite Bond Company’s procurement of Mitch-
ell’s appearance in court, the record supports the circuit
court’s finding that Mitchell committed daily violations of the
house arrest and electronic monitoring conditions of his bond.
Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in estreating Mitchell’s bond for repeated noncom-
pliance with a condition of bond.

WE We further conclude that the three factors enumerat-
ed in Polk, swpra, are not the exclusive considerations of the
circuit court in determining whether to remit a bond forfeiture
and, if so, to what extent the forfeiture should be remitted.
Indeed, in Polk, the court of appeals correctly noted that the
circuit court may consider other relevant factors. We hold that
in the bond estreatment setting, it is proper for a circuit court
to consider the bondsperson’s willful failure to monitor the
defendant’s compliance with conditions of bond in determining
whether justice requires the enforcement of a forfeiture order.

Here, the circuit court properly considered the bondsper-
son’s willful failure to fulfill her obligations as the bonds-
person, in addition to the Polk factors. The circuit court
deliberately analyzed each relevant factor pertinent to the
circumstances of this case, including: (1) Mitchell’s willful
daily violations of the condition of house arrest and (2) the
bondsperson’s total failure to supervise Mitchell and do her
part to remedy his noncompliance. Though some circuit
judges might have remitted more, and though some might
have remitted less, the circuit court weighed the relevant
factors and set forth clear factual findings. In adherence to
our standard of review, we hold the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering estreatment and in remit-
ting $75,000 of the amount forfeited.

CONCLUSION

We hold that in an estreatment proceeding, the circuit court
may consider evidence of a bondsperson’s willful failure to

fulfill their obligations as the bondsperson, in addition to the
factors expressed in Polk, in determining whether, and to
what extent, a bond forfeiture should be remitted. We hold the
circuit court acted within its discretion in determining the
amount of the bond forfeiture to be remitted. The court of
appeals’ decision is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, 0.J., KITTREDGE, J., and Acting Justices
James E. Moore and William P. Keesley, concur.

807 S.E.2d 197
Jacquelin S, BENNETT, Genevieve S. Felder, and Kathleen S.
Turner, individually, as Co-Trustees and Beneficiaries of the
Marital Trust and the Qualified Terminable Interest Trust
created by the Thomas Stevenson Will, and Jacquelin S. Ben-
nett, and Kathleen S, Turner, as Co-Personal Representatives
on behalf of the Estate of Jacquelin K. Stevenson, Respondents,
ve
T. Heyward CARTER Jr., Evans, Carter, Kunes & Bennett, P.A,,
Douglas Capital Management, Inc., Dixon Hughes f/k/a Pratt-
Thomas Gumb & Co., P.A., and Lynne L, Kerrison, Defendants,

Of Whom Dixon Hughes f/k/a Pratt-Thomas Gumb &
Co., and Lynne L. Kerrison are the Petitioners.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000065
Opinion No. 27748

Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Heard May 24, 2017
Filed November 8, 2017

M. Dawes Cooke Jr., of Barnwell Whaley Patterson &
Helms, LLC, of Charleston, and Frederick K. Sharpless, of
Greensboro, both for Petitioners.

Keith M. Babcock, A. Camden Lewis, James Mixon Griffin,

and Ariail Elizabeth King, all of Lewis Babcock & Griffin,
LLP, of Columbia, for Respondents.

JUSTICE JAMES:

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals’ deci-
sion reversing in part a circuit court order which granted
Petitioners summary judgment on Respondents’ individual
cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty. Bennett v. Carter, Op. No, 2015-UP-491, 2015 WL
5968253 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 14, 2015). The sole issue
before the Court is whether this cause of action survives
summary judgment. We affirm as modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jacquelin Stevenson (Mother) was the sole lifetime benefi-
ciary of two trusts created by the will of her husband, who
died in 1988. The residual beneficiaries of the two trusts were
her sons, Thomas Stevenson III and Daniel Stevenson II
(collectively, the Stevenson brothers), and her daughters, Re-
spondents.

The Stevenson brothers were also co-trustees of the two
trusts from 1999 to 2006. Respondents allege that while the
Stevenson brothers were co-trustees, they violated their fidu-
ciary duties by unlawfully taking money from the trusts.

1, The factual recitations herein are in the light most favorable to
Respondents, as this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment.
‘These findings are not binding on the fact-finder on remand.

Respondents claim the Stevenson brothers stole approximate-
ly five million dollars from the two trusts.

In 1997, Lynne Kerrison and her accounting firm Dixon
Hughes (collectively, Petitioners) began preparing the income
tax returns of Mother and the two subject trusts. Mother’s
personal bookkeeper, Pat Neapolitan, provided Kerrison with
the information needed to complete Mother’s tax returns and
those of the trusts. In 2001, while preparing Mother’s tax
returns, Kerrison noticed the records reflected loans to one of
the Stevenson brothers and had concerns about the propriety
of the transactions. She contacted Mother’s attorney, Heyward
Carter Jr., and informed him of the transactions. In October
of 2001, Kerrison, Carter, and the Stevenson brothers met to
discuss the suspect transactions. At this meeting, the Steven-
son brothers were advised about the impropriety of these
transactions, and they were advised to tell Respondents about
their actions. Neither Carter nor Kerrison had any discussions
with Respondents about Mother’s finances or the finances of
the trusts. The Stevenson brothers did not tell Respondents
about the transactions until a meeting in 2006.

After the meeting in 2001, the Stevenson brothers continued
to withdraw money from the trusts. Neapolitan died, and at
some point in 2008, Petitioners began performing the book-
keeping for Mother and the trusts, Petitioners had possession
of the trust checkbooks and would write checks from the
trusts to the Stevenson brothers. The Stevenson brothers held
sole check-signing authority.

To obtain checks from the trusts, the Stevenson brothers
would request a withdrawal at Petitioners’ office, and Petition-
ers’ employees would then write the checks as requested.
Petitioners knew the Stevenson brothers continued to with-
draw money from the trusts after the October 2001 meeting,
Petitioners were aware some of the checks written for the
Stevenson brothers were to the Stevenson brothers’ compa-
nies, and Petitioners were aware one of Petitioners’ partners
was personally investing in one of those businesses, as well as
sitting on its board.

In 2006, Respondent Kathleen S. Turner (Turner) attended
a meeting with Kerrison, Carter, and the Stevenson brothers.
At this meeting, Turner learned for the first time that the

Stevenson brothers had withdrawn money from the two trusts
over a five year period, Mother passed away in 2007. In 2008,
Respondents brought suit against the Stevenson brothers,
resulting in a settlement with Thomas Stevenson and a judg-
ment against Daniel Stevenson. In 2009, Respondents filed the
present action against Petitioners for professional negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty.

The circuit court granted Petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the three-year statute of limita-
tions had expired on all causes of action. The circuit court also
ruled Respondents had not presented sufficient evidence to
withstand summary judgment on their claim for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The court of appeals
reversed in an unpublished decision, holding there was a
question of fact as to when the statute began to run on the
cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty, and holding Respondents presented sufficient evidence
in support of that claim to withstand summary judgment.
Bennett v. Carter, Op. No. 2015-UP-491, 2015 WL 5968253
(S.C. Ct. App. filed Oct. 14, 2015). Petitioners do not challenge
the statute of limitations holding; therefore, the only issues
before the Court are (1) whether the court of appeals erred in
holding Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to allow the
aiding and abetting claim to survive summary judgment, and
(2) whether the aiding and abetting claim abated upon Moth-
er’s death in 2007.

DISCUSSION

HE OWe review the granting of summary judgment under
the same standard applied by the trial court under Rule 56(c)
of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Quail Hill,
LLC ». Cty. of Richland, 387 S.C. 228, 285, 692 S.H.2d 499, 505
(2010). The trial court shall grant summary judgment if “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 56(¢), SCROP. “In determining whether any triable issue
of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can
reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Quail Hill, LLC, 387
S.C. at 285, 692 S.H.2d at 505 (quoting Pye v. Estate of Fox,
369 S.C. 555, 568, 633 S.H.2d 505, 509 (2006). “However, it is
not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not
reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine.” Town of
Hollywood v. Floyd, 403 8.C. 466, 477, 744 9.E.2d 161, 166
(2018). When the trial court grants summary judgment on a
question of law, we review the ruling de novo. See Town of
Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662
§.E.2d 40, 41 (2008).

HMMM The elements for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty are (1) a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the
plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowing participation in the
breach; and (8) damages. Future Grp. II v. Nationsbank, 824
S.C. 89, 99, 478 S.H.2d 45, 50 (1996). “The gravamen of the
claim is the defendant’s knowing participation in the fiducia-
ry’s breach.” Id.

A. There is Sufficient Evidence to Allow the Aiding and
Abetting Claim to Survive Summary Judgment.

HE In finding Respondents presented sufficient evidence
to withstand summary judgment, the court of appeals wrote,
“In addition to taking no further action regarding [the Steven-
son brothers’] activities, Kerrison’s firm actually had posses-
sion of the trust checkbooks and wrote the checks for [the
Stevenson brothers’] withdrawals of funds from the trusts.”
Bennett v. Carter, Op. No. 2015-UP-491. We agree Respon-
dents presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably
conclude Petitioners knowingly participated in the Stevenson
brothers’ breach through Petitioners’ possession of the trust
checkbooks and writing checks to the Stevenson brothers?
However, to the extent the “in addition to taking no further
action” language employed by the court of appeals can be
interpreted to hold that Petitioners’ non-disclosure is evidence
of Petitioners’ knowing participation, we modify the court of
appeals’ opinion.

Petitioners contend the “in addition to” language employed
by the court of appeals allows Respondents to pursue their

2, We take no position as to whether other facts, if proven, would also
support a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

aiding and abetting claim on the theory Petitioners should
have disclosed the Stevenson brothers’ withdrawals to Respon-
dents, or at least to Turner. Petitioners argue such disclosure
is prohibited by 26 U.S.C. § 7216 (2000) and S.C. Code Ann,
§ 40-2-190 (Supp. 2004).? Respondents argue the “related tax-
payer” exception in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7216-2(b)(1)-(2) (2001) 4
allowed Petitioners to make the disclosure to Respondents.
We agree with Petitioners.

Petitioners were prohibited by 26 U.S.C. § 7216 from dis-
closing the Stevenson brothers’ withdrawals to Respondents
because this statute prohibits any person who is engaged in
the business of preparing tax returns—here, Petitioners—
from disclosing to a third party any information furnished for,
or in connection with, the preparation of any such return and
imposes criminal sanctions for a violation of this prohibition.
Respondents contend the “related taxpayer” exception set
forth in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7216-2(b)(1)-(2)* allowed for disclo-
sure to Turner, as Petitioners also prepared her individual tax
returns. We disagree. The exception does not apply, as the
exception is triggered only when the tax preparer is engaged
in “preparing a tax return of a second taxpayer” and when the

3. Petitioners cite section 40-2-190(A) of the South Carolina Code for the
proposition that their disclosure of the withdrawals to Respondents was
prohibited. Respondents contend Petitioners failed to cite this statute in
their arguments before the trial court and the court of appeals, and,
therefore, Petitioners are unable to now rely on this statute as authority.
We first note the effective date of current section 40-2-190(A) was July
22, 2004—several years after the allegedly improper withdrawals began
but more than a year before they ended. It appears the text of current
section 40-2-190(A) did not exist elsewhere in the South Carolina Code
prior to July 22, 2004; at the least, Petitioners have not cited to any
similar statutory language existing prior to this date, and we have been
unable to find any such language. Whatever the case, we find the
applicable federal authority as discussed herein is sufficient to support
our conclusions.

4. Parties cite to ihe “related taxpayer” exception as 26 C.F.R.
§ 301.7216-2(e)(1)-(2); however, during the time period in which the
alleged aiding and abetting occurred, the “related taxpayer” exception
was located in subsection (b)(1)-(2). The “related taxpayer” exception
was not moved to subsection (e)(1)-(2) until the 2008 version of the
Code of Federal Regulations, See 26 C.F.R, § 301.7216-2(e)(1)-(2)
(2008). Nevertheless, the language is substantially the same.

5. See note 4,

=

subject information was used in preparing the second taxpay-
er’s returns. 26 C.F.R. § 801.7216-2(b)(1)-(2). While Turner
may have been a “second taxpayer,” there is no evidence any
information pertaining to the illicit withdrawals was used “in
preparing” her personal returns,

Hl Respondents also claim Petitioners should have dis-
closed the withdrawals to Turner because she was designated
as Mother’s attorney-in-fact under Mother’s 2001 power of
attorney. Respondents correctly state that the holder of a
power of attorney steps into the shoes of the grantor and is
basically the alter ego of the grantor. See Muller v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 28 Kan.App.2d 186, 12 P.8d 899, 904 (2000) (citing 3
Am. Jur. 2d, Agency § 28). However, since Kerrison notified
Carter, Mother's personal attorney, of the withdrawals, that
was sufficient to notify Mother. See Crystal Ice Co. of Colum-
bia, Inc. v. First Colonial Corp., 278 8.C. 806, 809, 257 8.E.2d
496, 497 (1979) (“It is well established that a principal is
affected with constructive knowledge of all material facts of
which his agent receives notice while acting within the scope
of his authority.”). Mother was Carter’s client and was compe-
tent at the time Kerrison informed Carter about the with-
drawals. While Kerrison could have disclosed any information
to Turner that was disclosed to Mother through Carter, the
power of attorney did not create a separate and independent
obligation on the part of Petitioners to disclose the withdraw-
als to Turner in her capacity as Mother’s attorney-in-fact. The
fact that disclosure to Turner as attorney-in-fact would have
resulted in her being individually aware of the withdrawals is
of no import.

B. The Aiding and Abetting Claim Survives Mother’s
Death.

HM Petitioners contend they are entitled to summary
judgment on the ground that Respondents’ claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty abated on the death of
Mother because the claim rests on a theory of fraud and
deceit.’ We disagree.

6. Petitioners asserted this ground in their original motion, but it was
not ruled upon by the trial judge. Petitioners asserted it as an additional
sustaining ground before the court of appeals and then again in their

— «

Section 15-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides
“{elauses of action for and in respect to ... any and all
injuries to the person or to personal property shall survive
both to and against the personal or real representative ... of
a deceased person ... any law or rule to the contrary notwith-
standing.” However, South Carolina recognizes several excep-
tions to the survivability of a claim, including an exception for
fraud. See Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C.
256, 15 S.E.2d 117 (1941),

Petitioners first argue Respondents’ claim for aiding and
abetting does not survive Mother’s death because the essence
of the claim is that Petitioners fraudulently failed to disclose
to Respondents the Stevenson brothers’ fraud and deceit. This
argument is unavailing, as we have determined Petitioners had
no obligation to disclose the Stevenson brothers’ withdrawals
to Respondents. Nondisclosure to Respondents—fraudulent or
otherwise—is not part of Respondents’ aiding and abetting
claim.

Second, Petitioners argue the aiding and abetting claim
does not survive Mother’s death because the claim is based on
the Stevenson brothers’ fraudulent conduct against Mother,
the sole lifetime beneficiary of the trusts. That argument is
likewise unavailing. While the Stevenson brothers’ alleged
fraud and deceit committed against Mother will be in evidence,
Respondents’ claim for aiding and abetting is based on the
Stevenson brothers’ fraud and deceit committed against Re-
spondents. The issues framed to this Court have been with
regard to Respondents’ individual claims as beneficiaries, not
their claims as co-trustees or co-personal representatives of
Mother's estate. Within the context of abatement, the fact that
Mother may have been a victim of the Stevenson brothers’
fraud and deceit does not impact the viability of Respondents’
individual claims. Their individual claims do not derive from
damage sustained by Mother during her lifetime, but rather
from damage they must prove they individually sustained as
residual beneficiaries.

petition for rehearing, but it was not ruled upon by the court of appeals.
They have raised the issue again before this Court.

a
CONCLUSION

The decision of the court of appeals reversing the grant of
summary judgment to Petitioners is affirmed as modified.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting
Justice Clifton Newman, concur.

807 S.E.2d 208
The STATE, Respondent,

v.
Andrew T. LOOPER, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001493
Opinion No. 27746

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 15, 2017
Filed November 8, 2017

Ped
Oo
oO

38

6

J. Falkner Wilkes and Steve W. Sumner, both of Greenville,
for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jennifer Ellis Roberts, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE KITTREDGE:

Petitioner Andrew T. Looper challenges the court of ap-
peals’ dismissal of his appeal from an interlocutory circuit
court order. We affirm as modified, and in doing so clarify our
rules regarding appealability.

L

Petitioner was charged with driving under the influence
(DUD) after being pulled over by a Greenville County Sheriff's
Deputy for speeding. At a pretrial hearing before a magis-
trate, Petitioner moved to suppress evidence of field sobriety
tests and breath analysis, arguing they were the fruits of an
unconstitutionally prolonged traffic stop. The magistrate
granted Petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence and
dismissed the DUI charge.

a en

The State appealed to the circuit court.’ The circuit court
held the magistrate erred in granting Petitioner’s motion and
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Thereafter, Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals,
which analogized the circuit court’s order to an interlocutory
order denying a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Looper,
412 S.C. 363, 366, 772 S.H.2d 516, 517 (Ct. App. 2015). The
court of appeals therefore dismissed the appeal, finding Peti-
tioner was not “aggrieved” in a legal sense because he had not
been convicted and sentenced. Id. at 365-66, 772 8.E.2d at 517.

We issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’
decision.

I.

Petitioner now argues the court of appeals erred by con-
cluding that, because he had not been convicted below, he was
not aggrieved and not entitled to appeal the circuit court’s
decision. We disagree, and we take this opportunity to clarify
our appealability jurisprudence.

A.

HM In South Carolina, the State may immediately appeal
an interlocutory order “granting the suppression of evidence
which significantly impairs the prosecution of a criminal case.”
State v. McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 168, 387 S.H.2d 208, 209
(1985); see S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-380(2)(a) (2017) (giving the
Court appellate jurisdiction to review an intermediate order
that “in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken or discontinues the
action”). In contrast, typically “a criminal defendant may not
appeal ‘except from the final sentence imposed by the court.’”
State v. Gregorie, 339 S.C. 2, 8, 528 S.H.2d 77, 78 (2000)
(quoting State v. Timmons, 68 S.C. 258, 259, 47 8.B, 140, 141
(1904); see also State v. Miller, 289 S.C, 426, 426, 346 S.H.2d
705, 705 (1986) (“In South Carolina, a criminal defendant may
not appeal until sentence has been imposed.”),

1, An appeal from a magistrate’s court is to “the circuit court of the
county where the judgment was rendered.” Rule 18(a), SCRMC.

me a

Hl In Gregorie, we held that once an appeal has been
taken to the circuit court and “that court renders its final
judgment, the right to further appellate review is controlled
by statute: Any aggrieved party may appeal the circuit court’s
final judgment.” 339 S.C. at 4, 528 S.H.2d at 78; see S.C. Code
Ann, § 18-1-30 (2014) (“Any party aggrieved may appeal in
the cases prescribed in this title.”); id. § 18-9-10 (2014) (pro-
viding for appeals to this Court or the court of appeals in
cases that are appealed pursuant to section 14-3-330).

HB “(Alm aggrieved party is one who is injured in a
legal sense or has suffered an injury to person or property.’”
State v. Rearick, 417 S.C. 391, 398 n.9, 790 S.E.2d 192, 196 n.9
(2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Cow, 828 S.C.
871, 878, 492 S.E.2d 899, 400 (Ct. App. 1997)), cert. denied, —
US. —, 187 §.Ct. 1582, 197 L.Hd.2d 712 (2017). “A final
judgment disposes of the whole subject matter of the action or
terminates the particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
to be done but to enforce by execution what has been deter-
mined.” Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. S.C. Dep’t of
Health & Envtl. Control, 387 S.C. 265, 267, 692 S.B.2d 894,
895 (2010).

B.

Hl Relying on Gregorie, Petitioner contends that once the
appellate process was properly begun by the State, it could be
continued by any party that received an adverse decision from
the reviewing court. Therefore, because the circuit court ruled
against him, Petitioner argues he was entitled to an immediate
appeal.

While the result in Gregorie is correct, the language in the
opinion can be parsed in a manner that is at odds with our
well-established appealability rules. That language, which Pe-
titioner understandably focuses on, suggests that the test for
appealability is “whether the party bringing the appeal is
aggrieved.” Gregorie, 339 S.C. at 4, 528 S.E.2d at 78. We
acknowledge that this language may be read to suggest that
being aggrieved is the only requirement to appeal from a
circuit court’s order. However, understood in context, we do
not view Gregorie as a departure from the general require-
ments for appealability: being aggrieved by a final judgment.

This is so because Gregorie had been convicted and sentenced,
and under the facts and procedural posture of that case, any
retrial was barred by double jeopardy as a matter of law,
rendering the order of the circuit court effectively a final
judgment by which Gregorie was unquestionably aggrieved.
See id. at 3-4, 528 S.H.2d at 78. Thus, the twin pillars of
appealability, aggrieved and a final judgment, were present.

Here, in contrast, as the court of appeals noted, Petitioner
has not been convicted and sentenced. See Looper, 412 S.C. at
865, 772 S.H.2d at 517. We, of course, take no exception to the
notion that Petitioner was adversely impacted by the circuit
court’s order remanding the case for trial, but he was not
aggrieved in a legal sense. Cf Shields v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 808 8.C. 469, 470, 402 S.H.2d 482, 483 (1991) (“Avoid-
ance of trial is not a ‘substantial right’ entitling a party to
immediate appeal of an interlocutory order.”). Moreover, be-
cause the circuit court’s order did not purport to determine
Petitioner’s guilt or impose any sentence on him, it was not a
final judgment. Cf State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 182-83, 187,
747 S.E.2d 677, 679-80, 682 (2013) (construing the denial of an
immunity request pursuant to the Protection of Persons and
Property Act and dismissing an appeal on the basis that “an
order denying a request for immunity is not a final order in
the case” and recognizing that “[t]his Court has held that,
generally, a criminal defendant may not appeal until sentence
is imposed” (emphasis removed)).

Hl Relying on selected language in Gregorie, Petitioner
additionally advances section 18-1-30 of the South Carolina
Code as a standalone basis in support of his purported right to
appeal the circuit court’s order” Section 18-1-80 provides,
“Any party aggrieved may appeal in the cases prescribed in
this title.” S.C. Code Ann. § 18-1-30. However, this statute
cannot be construed in isolation to permit an appeal as a
matter of right on the sole basis of being aggrieved. Indeed,
this is self-evident from the statute’s reference to “the cases
prescribed in this title.” Id. Elsewhere in title 18, section 18-1-

2, See Gregorie, 339 S.C. at 4, 528 S.E.2d at 78 (“Once th[e] [circuit]
court renders its final judgment, the right to further appellate review is
controlled by statute: Any aggrieved party may appeal the circuit
court's final judgment.”’),

10 expressly references “the mode [of reviewing a judgment or
order] prescribed for particular matters in Titles 14, 15, and
17 [of the South Carolina Code].” Id. § 18-1-10 (2014), And
section 18-9-10 specifically refers to appeals brought pursuant
to section 14-83-3830. Jd. § 18-9-10, Naturally, then, courts
frequently turn to section 14-3-330 in analyzing whether an
interlocutory order may be appealed.’ See, eg., Brown v
County of Berkeley, 366 8.C. 354, 361-62, 622 S.B.2d 588, 587—
88 (2005) (reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss and
finding it not immediately appealable).

Whether based on statute or case law, the overarch-
ing point remains—absent the presence of an exception to the
final judgment rule, appealability is determined by a final
judgment and an aggrieved party. See also Rule 201, SCACR
(“Appeal may be taken, as provided by law, from any final
judgment, appealable order[,] or decision.... Only a party
aggrieved by an order, judgment, sentence[,] or decision may
appeal.”). As noted, in the criminal context, a judgment is final
when sentence is imposed. See, eg., Gregorie, 889 S.C. at 4,
528 S.E.2d at 78. As Petitioner has not been convicted and
sentenced, there has been no final judgment, and as no
exception to the requirement of a final judgment is applicable
under the facts of this case, Petitioner’s appeal is premature
and must be dismissed.

Im.

Hs To the extent Gregorie may be read to imply that any
party aggrieved by an order of the circuit court is entitled to
appeal, it is hereby modified. We reiterate that a party may
appeal from a decision not amounting to a final judgment only
where provided by statute. See Hx parte Wilson, 367 S.C. 7,
18, 625 S.H.2d 205, 208 (2005) (“Absent some specialized
statute, the immediate appealability of an interlocutory or
intermediate order depends on whether the order falls within
[section] 14-8-880.”). We therefore affirm as modified the court
of appeals’ dismissal of Petitioner’s appeal.*

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur
Le

3, Petitioner makes no argument that section 14-3-330 authorizes his
appeal from the order of the circuit court.

4, If Petitioner is convicted and sentenced in the magistrate’s court, he
may then challenge on appeal the circuit court’s reversal of the magis-
trate’s order suppressing evidence and dismissing the charge.

807 S.E.2d 696
In the MATTER OF Ray A. LORD, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001218
Opinion No. 27751
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted October 26, 2017
Filed November 15, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia, for
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

J. Steedley Bogan, Bogan Law Firm, of Columbia for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel and Respondent have entered into an Agreement
for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of
the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) con-
tained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits mis-
conduct and consents to the imposition of a confidential admo-
nition or public reprimand. We accept the Agreement and
issue a public reprimand. The facts, as set forth in the
Agreement, are as follows.

Direct Solicitation Letters

To market his legal services, Respondent sent direct mail
solicitation letters to potential clients who received traffic
tickets. A recipient of one of the letters filed a complaint with
the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. In response to the
complaint in this matter, Respondent acknowledged the fol-
lowing violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in his
solicitation letters:

1, Respondent used the tagline “attorneys at law” on his law
firm letterhead. The tagline was misleading because Re-
spondent is a solo practitioner.

2. Respondent claimed that he has “28 years experience |
both as a lawyer and former law enforcement officer” in
his solicitation materials. Respondent acknowledges the
claim was misleading because he has only been a lawyer
and former law enforcement officer for sixteen years.
Respondent’s intention was to relay that he has twenty-
eight years total experience as a law enforcement officer
and as a lawyer combined.

8. Respondent used the telephone number (844) FIXTICK-
ET. Use of the phoneword is the equivalent of a nick-
name, tradename, or moniker and is likely to create
unjustified expectations or an implication that he can
achieve results by unethical means. Furthermore, the
phoneword is a moniker that implies an ability to obtain a
certain result,

4, Respondent stated in his solicitation letters that he
learned about the recipient’s traffic ticket from “court
records.” Respondent’s identification of the source of his
information was not sufficiently specific.

Website

Respondent’s solicitation letter specifically referred the re-
cipient to the website of Respondent’s law firm. On his web-
site, he claimed he has “unique insight into the South Carolina
traffic laws that many other lawyers simply do not have.”
Respondent admits this claim cannot be factually substantiat-
ed.

Online Lawyer Profile

The solicitation letter specifically referred the recipient to
Respondent's profile on www.avvo.com (“AVVO”), a legal mar-
keting website. AVVO creates profiles for attorneys without
their consent, knowledge, or participation, then invites them to
“claim” their profiles and participate in a variety of AVVO
marketing activities, including “ratings,” peer endorsements,
client testimonials, and online contact with prospective clients.
Respondent claimed his AVVO profile and used the website to
market his legal services. Accordingly, Respondent is respon-
sible for its content and is ethically required to ensure his
profile complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct. In

=i «

connection with a prior disciplinary investigation in 2012,
which is described below, Respondent agreed to add a disclo-
sure regarding endorsements, testimonials, and reports of
past results to his AVVO profile. This disclosure was required
to be “clear and conspicuous.” However, at the time Respon-
dent added his disclosure in 2012, “clear and conspicuous”
disclosures were not specifically defined. In July 2014, specific
requirements for clear and conspicuous disclosures were add-
ed to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent admits
he did not revise his 2012 disclosure to conform with the new
standards.

Response to Negative Review
In 2012, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) investigat-
ed an anonymous complaint alleging Respondent improperly
responded to a negative review by a client on AVVO. The
negative review, which included the client’s first name, stated:
[Respondent] works very closely with the Columbia area
police departments, and knows many people in this system
personally. After asking numerous times to retrieve a patrol
ear surveillance video due to overzealous police officers
throwing me to the asphalt in handcuffs. (sic) He denied the
video being of any help and ignored my requests. He in fact
told me it was best to apologize to the officers even though I
was not violent towards them in any way and did very little
in reducing my violation and fine. What a waste of time and
money. I honestly believe he was working with the officers,
(his recent co-workers) the whole time.
Respondent’s response, which was publicly accessible, stated
the following:
Here is the other side of the story. This client was charged
with offenses that could have resulted in over a year in
prison. I was able to negotiate with the prosecutor no jail
time and no probation and a dismissal of the most serious
charge and this was simply the best result possible. Of
course, I try very hard to get all charges dismissed, but that.
is simply not realistic for some cases and I tell all clients
that I cannot and do not guarantee any specific result. It’s
funny how this client had no complaint with me 6 months
ago when he was facing prison time and he left the court-
room a free man only having to pay a simple fine and now 6
months later is complaining. You can (sic) make everybody

happy. The vast majority (over 95%) of my clients are very
satisfied with my representation, but some people, no mat-
ter what you do, are always going to find something to nit-
pick on. The fact that the video was never provided means
nothing as it was not required for a conviction and the client
could have easily have been convicted by the testimony of
the 4 cops who were there and if we had gone to trial and
lost, he would have been sitting in prison right now instead
of being free. I never ignored my client’s requests. The facts
differ greatly from my former client’s recollection and the
recollection of several witnesses who were at the scene. This
is just an ungrateful former client who now wants to “blame
his lawyer” because of what “he” did. This is typical of a
very young person who has a lot of growing up to do. To my
former client: Do me a favor. The next time you are
arrested, call a public defender and see what happens and
after you sit in jail for 8 months they might get around to
sending you a form letter. Good luck.

In April 2018, an Investigative Panel issued a confidential
admonition to Respondent because the response disclosed
information related to the representation of the client and
negatively characterized public defenders.

In reviewing Respondent’s AVVO profile in connection with
the investigation of the current complaint, ODC discovered
Respondent had not removed the offending post after receiv-
ing the admonition. Respondent never removed the offending
post after receiving the admonition, which he admits he should
have done.

Rules of Professional Conduct

Respondent admits his conduct violated the following Rules
of Professional Conduct contained in Rule 407, SCACR: Rule
1.6 (a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client without client’s informed consent);
Rule 7.1 (a lawyer shall not make false, misleading or decep-
tive communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's ser-
vices); Rule 7.1(a) (a communication violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct if it contains a material misrepresenta-
tion of fact or omits a fact necessary to make a statement not
materially misleading); Rule 7.1(b) (a communication violates
the Rules of Professional Conduct if it is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve or

implies the lawyer can achieve results by unethical means);
Rule 7.1(¢) (a communication violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct if it compares the lawyer’s services with other law-
yers’ services, unless the comparison can be factually substan-
tiated); Rule 7.1(d) (a communication violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct if it contains a testimonial or endorse-
ment and does not clearly and conspicuously state that any
result the endorsed lawyer or law firm may achieve on behalf
of one client in one matter does not necessarily indicate
similar results can be obtained for other clients); Rule 7.1(e) (a
communication violates the Rules of Professional Conduct if it
contains a nickname, moniker, or trade name that implies an
ability to obtain results in a matter); Rule 7.2() (any disclo-
sures or disclaimers regarding communications sent for adver-
tising purposes must be of sufficient size to be clearly legible
and prominently placed so as to be conspicuous to the viewer;
if the advertising statement is made on a website or online
profile, the disclaimer must appear on the same page as the
statement requiring the disclosure or disclaimer); Rule 7.3(g)
(any written communication prompted by a specific occurrence
involving or affecting the intended recipient of the communica-
tion or a family member shall disclose how the lawyer ob-
tained the information prompting the communication); Rule
7,.5(a) (lawyer shall not use a firm name that is false or
misleading); and Rule 7.5(d) (lawyers may state or imply that
they practice in a partnership only when that is the fact).

Respondent also admits his conduct violated the Lawyer’s
Oath, Rule 402(h)(3), SCACR (a lawyer will maintain the
dignity of the legal system).

Respondent admits these violations constitute grounds for
discipline under Rule 7(a), RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR (it is a
ground for discipline for a lawyer to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct),

Conclusion

We find Respondent’s misconduct warrants a public repri-
mand. Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and publicly
reprimand Respondent for his misconduct.

PUBLIC REPRIMAND.

BEATTY, C.J, KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

807 S.E.2d 699
In the MATTER OF Henry H. TAYLOR, Respondent,

Appellate Case No. 2017-001913
Opinion No. 27750

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted November 2, 2017
Filed November 15, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and William C.
Campbell, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia,
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

J. Steedley Bogan, Bogan Law Firm, of Columbia for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel and Respondent have entered into an Agreement,
for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of
the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) con-
tained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits mis-
conduct and consents to the imposition of a confidential admo-
nition or public reprimand. We accept the Agreement and
issue a public reprimand. The facts, as set forth in the
Agreement, are as follows.

Facts and Law

Police Chief (Chief) worked a motor vehicle accident with
significant injuries and developed a relationship with the
victim’s family (Family). Chief suggested the Family contact
Respondent for representation. Respondent maintains there
was never any initial agreement between himself, Chief, or
any third party for the payment of a referral fee. Respondent
learned of the Family’s potential case through the brother
(Brother) of his long-standing business partner (Partner).
Respondent told Brother he could not approach the Family
directly. He believes Brother conveyed this information to
Chief, who then recommended Respondent to the Family.
After obtaining a favorable settlement for the Family, Respon-
dent charged Family a fee below the prevailing rate. After the
ease, Partner approached Respondent, asking him to pay
Brother and Chief for the referral. Respondent wrote two
checks, one for $48,500 and one for $20,000, from his personal
account. He initially characterized the checks as loans to
Partner, although now he admits the payments were for
Chiefs efforts in putting him in contact with the Family.

Respondent admits his conduct violated Rule 5.4 (except
under limited circumstances, a lawyer or law firm shall not
share legal fees with a nonlawyer) and Rule 8.4(e) (it is
professional misconduct to engage in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Profession-
al Conduct contained in Rule 407, SCACR.

Respondent admits these violations constitute grounds for
discipline under Rule 7(a), RLDE, Rule 418, SCAOR (it is a
ground for discipline for a lawyer to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct).

Conclusion

We find Respondent’s misconduct warrants a public repri-
mand. Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and publicly
reprimand Respondent for his misconduct.

Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation
and prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission
on Lawyer Conduct within thirty (80) days of the date of this
order. Furthermore, Lawyer shall complete the Legal Ethics
and Practice Program Ethics School within six (6) months of
the date of this order.

PUBLIC REPRIMAND.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and

JAMES, JJ., concur.

807 S.H.2d 701
RE: SUSPENSION OF ELECTRONIC FILING
IN RICHLAND COUNTY
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
November 16, 2017

ORDER

By Order dated October 30, 2017, the Pilot Program for the
Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of documents in the Court of
Common Pleas was expanded to include Richland County
effective November 14, 2017.

Unforeseen technical issues have made E-Filing in Richland
County problematic for a number of court personnel, and
issues with system response times have resulted in long delays
for attorneys attempting to E-File documents. Based on these
issues, the October 30, 2017 Order expanding E-Filing to
Richland County is rescinded. Upon entry of this Order, E-
Filing is suspended in Richland County, and documents shall
be filed in the Traditional manner in Richland County until
further notice.

—i «

The Richland County Clerk of Court shall promptly process
all H-Filings that remain pending. Any H-Filings that cannot
be processed through the E-Filing System shall be printed
and entered manually by the Clerk of Court.

This Order shall not affect the validity of any E-Filed
document processed before or after the entry of this Order.
Furthermore, in the event a document that was served via a
Notice of Electronic Filing cannot be accessed in the E-Filing
System, that document should be viewed by accessing the
Public Index online at http://www.sccourts.org/caseSearch/,

Finally, the declaration of a Limited Technical Failure of
the H-Filing System in Richland County on November 15,
2017, may have adversely affected the ability of lawyers to
comply with deadlines in court proceedings. Accordingly, I
find it appropriate to declare the day of Wednesday, Novem-
ber 15, 2017, a “holiday” in Richland County for the purpose of
Rule 6 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This
holiday declaration shall only apply to documents and cases
that are within the scope of those required to be E-Filed
under the South Carolina Electronic Policies and Guidelines.
/s/ Donald W. Beatty

Donald W. Beatty

Chief Justice of South Carolina

808 S.E.2d 378
The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Gerald BARRETT, Jr., Petitioner.
Appellate Case No, 2016-001306
Opinion No. 27752

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 15, 2017

Filed November 22, 2017

a

Appellant Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Peti-
tioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant At-
torney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, and
Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, all for Respon-
dent,

PER CURIAM:

We granted Gerald Barrett’s petition for a writ of certiorari
to review the court of appeals’ decision in State v. Barrett, 416
S.C. 124, 785 S.E.2d 887 (Ct. App. 2016). We now dismiss the
writ as improvidently granted.

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

HEARN, Acting Chief Justice, FEW and JAMES, JJ., and
Acting Justices Arthur Eugene Morehead, III, and Jan B.
Bromell Holmes, concur.

808 S.H.2d 378

In the MATTER OF Bennett Joseph
SCHILLER, III, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001645
Opinion No, 27753

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted October 24, 2017
Filed November 22, 2017

405

po

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julie K.
Martino, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia, for
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Thomas A, Pendarvis, of Pendarvis Law Offices, PC, of
Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement
for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of
the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) con-
tained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits mis-
conduct and consents to a public reprimand. We accept the
Agreement and issue a public reprimand. The facts, as set
forth in the Agreement, are as follows.

Facts
Co-counsel was retained by Client, a North Carolina resi-
dent, to represent him with regards to a motor vehicle acci-
dent that oceurred in North Carolina. Co-counsel subsequently
associated respondent on the case. Neither co-counsel nor
respondent was admitted to practice law in North Carolina.

Client signed two fee agreements. The first agreement was
a fee agreement stating the attorneys’ fee was 38% of any
recovery and that if there was no recovery, Client would be
responsible for “all actual expenses.” The agreement did not
specify whether the attorneys’ fee would be calculated before
or after litigation and other expenses were deducted. Although
respondent asserted he and his co-counsel explained to Client

how funds would be distributed under the agreement, respon-
dent admits that the failure to document in writing whether
litigation and other expenses are to be deducted before or
after a contingent fee is calculated is a violation of Rule 1.5(c)
of the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct.*

After recovering the policy limit of $30,000 from the at-fault
driver’s insurance carrier, respondent and co-counsel pursued
recovery under Client’s underinsured motorist (UIM) policy.
That carrier tendered $220,000 to respondent and co-counsel,
which represented the policy limit of $250,000 minus a set-off
of $30,000 based on the payment by the at-fault driver’s
carrier.

Client refused to accept the funds due to a disagreement
over the disbursement statement, specifically, the disburse-
ment of attorneys’ fees. Client informed respondent and co-
counsel he was terminating the “fee contract,” as he believed
the fees were unreasonable and he did not understand there
were other fee agreement options. Client also stated he did
not understand from the fee agreement that respondent and
co-counsel could place a lien on the insurance proceeds for the
amount of the attorneys’ fees owed.

Thereafter, respondent sent letters to Client’s UIM carrier
informing the carrier that he and co-counsel had a lien on the
$220,000 for their one-third contingency fee. In one of the
letters, respondent directed the carrier not to discuss the
matter with Client or Client’s brother without the consent of
respondent or co-counsel.

Subsequently, Client left a voice message with the carrier
notifying the carrier that he had terminated respondent and
co-counsel. Client also sent a letter to respondent and co-
counsel asking them to notify the carrier that they were no
longer representing Client.

The carrier sent a letter to respondent informing him Client
had notified the carrier that he had discharged respondent
and co-counsel. The carrier requested respondent contact
Client about the outstanding claim. Three weeks later, and

1, Pursuant to Rule 8.5(b)(2) of the South Carolina Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, because the predominant effect of the
conduct at issue was in North Carolina, the North Carolina Revised.
Rules of Professional Conduct apply.

over a month after Client requested such action, respondent
and co-counsel notified the carrier they were no longer repre-
senting Client and returned the insurance proceeds to the
carrier.

Client alleged respondent and co-counsel failed to withdraw
as counsel after he terminated the fee agreement and that
they failed to inform the UIM carrier they were no longer
representing Client after he requested they do so. Respondent
admits his failure to withdraw from representation after multi-
ple communications from Client requesting respondent and co-
counsel cease representation violated Rule 1.16(a)(8) of the
North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct.

Finally, Client alleged respondent and co-counsel forged
Client’s signature on a document entitled “Settlement Agree-
ment and Covenant Not to Enforce Judgment-North Car-
olina.” Client stated he had never seen the document but it
had a signature purporting to be his that was witnessed by
respondent and notarized by respondent’s paralegal.

Respondent and co-counsel explained they discussed with
Client the possibility of pursuing the at-fault driver’s personal
assets but Client understood the only way to secure payment
more quickly was to accept the limits of the driver’s insurance
policy by way of a covenant not to execute and accept the
limits of the UIM coverage on a policy release. Respondent
and co-counsel stated Client understood the difficulty of recov-
ering from the driver’s personal assets and therefore agreed
to accept the insurance limits. Respondent and co-counsel
stated they explained the settlement agreement and disburse-
ment from the driver’s carrier to Client and asked him to
come to the office and sign the covenant not to execute and
the check issued by the carrier. According to respondent and
co-counsel, Client directed them to sign the items for him and
send him the check.’ Respondent signed the covenant not to
execute, witnessed it himself, and had his paralegal notarize it.
The document stated the person signing was affirming he had
carefully read the document, understood its contents, and was
signing it as his own free act. The cover letter respondent sent,

2. Respondent provided documents to support his position that Client
gave him permission to sign Client’s name, but the documents are not
contemporaneous with the signing and notarizing of the documents.

to Client along with the check did not reference the covenant
not to execute or indicate a copy was enclosed.

Respondent admits the covenant not to execute was falsely
witnessed and notarized and that he did not provide a copy to
Client. Respondent states the document was not relied on by
the at-fault driver’s insurance carrier because Client refused
to sign the settlement agreement.

Respondent admits his actions with regard to the covenant
not to execute were improper and in violation of the following
North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule
4.1 (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person); Rule 5.8(b) (a lawyer
with supervisory authority over a nonlawyer shall make efforts
to ensure the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer); Rule 5.3(c)(1) (a lawyer
is responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer who commits a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct when the lawyer
orders or ratifies such conduct); and Rule 8.4(d) (it is profes-
sional misconduct to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice).

Law

Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the
above provisions of the North Carolina Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct. He also admits the violations constitute
grounds for discipline under Rule 7(a)(2) of the South Carolina,
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 418,
SCACR.

Conclusion

We find respondent’s misconduct warrants a public repri-
mand. Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and publicly
reprimand respondent for his misconduct. In addition, as set
forth in the Agreement, respondent shall (1) complete the
Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and a
notary public class within one year of being disciplined; (2)
require all notary publics in his office to attend a notary public
class within the same time period, to maintain records of
attendance, and to sign a statement that they have read and
will abide by the South Carolina Notary Public Reference
Manual; and (8) pay the costs incurred in the investigation of

Ss

this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct
within thirty days of the date of this opinion.
PUBLIC REPRIMAND.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur,

808 §.E.2d 880
RE: EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC FILING PILOT
PROGRAM-COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
November 28, 2017

AMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the
South Carolina Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic
Filing (B-Filing) of documents in the Court of Common Pleas,
which was established by Order dated December 1, 2015, is
expanded to include Kershaw County. Effective December 5,
2017, all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or
pending in Kershaw County must be E-Filed if the party is
represented by an attorney, unless the type of case or the
type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program. The counties
currently designated for mandatory H-Filing are as follows:

Aiken Allendale Anderson Bamberg
Barnwell Beaufort Cherokee Clarendon
Colleton Edgefield Georgetown Greenville
Hampton Horry Jasper Lee
Lexington McCormick Oconee Pickens
Saluda Spartanburg Sumter Williamsburg

Kershaw—Effective December 5, 2017

Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic
Filing Policies and Guidelines, which were adopted by the
Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the training materi-
als available on the E-Filing Portal page at http:/Avww.

sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether any specific filings
are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.
Attorneys who have cases pending in Pilot Counties are
strongly encouraged to review, and to instruct their staff to
review, the training materials available on the H-Filing Portal
page.
/s/ Donald W. Beatty

Donald W. Beatty

Chief Justice of South Carolina

807 S.E.2d 701
The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Sandy Lynn WESTMORELAND, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002636
Opinion No. Op. 5498

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard April 12, 2017
Filed July 12, 2017
Rehearing Denied December 14, 2017

|
.
a
yt

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Colum-
bia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney
General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Caro-
line M. Scrantom, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Barry Joe
Barnette, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

THOMAS, J.:

Appellant Sandy Lynn Westmoreland appeals his convic-
tions for murder and hit and run involving a death. He argues
the trial court erred by allowing the coroner to testify as a lay
witness that the cause of the victim’s death was a homicide

and instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a
defense. We affirm Appellant’s conviction for hit and run and
reverse his murder conviction.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A grand jury indicted Appellant in October 2012 for murder
and hit and run involving a death. The indictments alleged
Appellant purposefully hit Michael Daniels (Victim) with his
vehicle and failed to remain at the scene to give information or
render aid, The murder indictment claimed Victim died due to
his injuries. The solicitor called Appellant’s case to trial in
December 2014,

Travis Haney testified he was a security guard at Mary
Black Hospital and was on duty on March 14, 2012. Haney
testified he was walking down a hallway when Victim “stum-
bled” out of a room erying and with a bloody nose. Haney
asserted Appellant was inside the room. Haney testified he
contacted the sheriff's office per hospital policy. According to
Haney, Victim did not want to press charges against Appellant
but wanted to gather his things and leave. Haney asserted he
and a deputy walked Appellant to his automobile following his
discharge from the hospital and watched him drive away
alone.

Deputy Jeffery Valentine testified he responded to a report
of Appellant assaulting Victim inside the hospital. Valentine’s
testimony was consistent with Haney’s testimony. Additional-
ly, Valentine testified that when he and Haney escorted
Appellant to his vehicle after the initial altercation, Appellant
noticed Victim had forcibly entered Appellant’s vehicle and
absconded with some of Victim’s possessions. Valentine
claimed Appellant became “pretty upset” when Valentine de-
clined to charge Victim with breaking into the vehicle. The
following morning, someone discovered Victim dead in the
bushes in the hospital parking lot.

The trial court qualified Dr. John Wren as an expert in
pathology. Wren testified Victim died almost immediately due
to a “vehicle versus pedestrian encounter.” Wren asserted
Victim was standing and facing away from the vehicle at the
time of the collision.

Jason Bryant testified he was a sergeant and supervisor in
the violent crime division and he went to Appellant’s house

shortly after the incident to question him. According to
Bryant, during his initial conversation with Appellant, Appel-
lant claimed he left the hospital without incident and hit a deer
on his way home from the hospital. However, Bryant testified
that, after he discussed “discrepancies” with Appellant, he
admitted he hit Victim with his vehicle when leaving the
hospital. Appellant explained to Bryant he did not “drive well
at night” and attempted to pull the vehicle over to allow
Victim to get inside when he accidently hit him with the
vehicle. According to Bryant, Appellant claimed he stopped
and checked on Victim but, after realizing Victim was not
breathing, became scared and left the scene.

Michael Duncan testified he was a trooper for the highway
patrol and was a member of the Multidisciplinary Accident
Investigation Team (MAIT). He asserted the MAIT’s primary
job was reconstructing traffic incidents, and the trial court
qualified Duncan as an expert in “accident reconstruction.”
Duncan claimed he responded to the scene of Victim’s death
and performed an investigation. Duncan asserted he found
“tire tracks going off into the grass at a sharp angle” and
there were no “skid marks” leading to where the tire tracks
entered the grass. Duncan concluded the vehicle did not
attempt to stop based on his observation that there were
“acceleration marks in the grass” beyond where Victim’s body
was found. He contended the vehicle did not decelerate at the
point of impact or after; “[i]Jt was one continuous motion.”
Duncan estimated the vehicle’s speed at a range of twenty-
nine and thirty-seven miles per hour. Duncan also surmised
there was “severe steering input” to maneuver this vehicle
into the grass to strike Victim. He explained this meant the
vehicle “did not just drift off the road” and it was more akin to
taking a right hand turn into the grass.

Rusty Clevenger testified he was the coroner for Spartan-
burg County. Following some preliminary testimony regarding
his experience, the State offered Clevenger as an “expert in
determining the manner of death.” Appellant objected to
admitting Clevenger as an expert based on his qualifications.
After a short colloquy between the trial court and counsel, the
State withdrew its attempt to admit Clevenger as an expert.
However, Clevenger proceeded to testify his responsibilities as
coroner included determining any deceased’s manner of death.

He explained any death presents five options when deciding
the manner of death: natural, accident, homicide, suicide, and
undetermined. Clevenger also explained the process of deter-
mining the manner of death included considering the patholo-
gist report and the findings of investigators and law enforce-
ment. Clevenger testified a homicide was “the intentional act
of you taking the life of another.” In a situation when one
person takes the life of another person, he admitted he cannot
always determine whether the act was intentional. Clevenger
then asserted he “ruled this case a homicide.” Appellant
objected and claimed Clevenger gave improper opinion testi-
mony. The trial court responded, “I think coroners are re-
quired to give rulings on death by law” and “{hle’s stating
what his ruling is. I'll overrule the, the objection.”

Following the State’s case, Appellant testified he was in-
volved in a romantic relationship with Victim for approximate-
ly eighteen years. Appellant claimed he and Victim went to the
hospital on the day in question because he was experiencing
stomach pains and bleeding. Appellant claimed his argument
with Victim in the hospital room began because Victim spent
their last $20 purchasing what he thought was a crack rock
but turned out to be a piece of soap. He asserted his walking
cane hit Victim’s nose by accident during the argument.
Appellant contended he was “high” when the hospital dis-
charged him due to all of the medication he had taken.
Appellant testified he was driving away from the hospital
when he “saw a glimpse of [Victim] way off the road.” Appel-
lant claimed he “jerked the car to pull over and pick him up”
and he “felt a bump.” Appellant admitted he realized what
happened so he “turned around and came back” to check on
Victim but realized he was dead. Appellant claimed he did not
seek help for Victim because he was already dead and he “just
flipped out.” Appellant asserted it was an accident,

After both parties rested, they discussed a potential jury
charge regarding voluntary or involuntary intoxication with
the trial court. Appellant objected to a charge on voluntary
intoxication because he was taking prescribed medication.
Following the discussion, the trial court indicated it would give
Appellant time to research case law supporting his argument.
and would issue its ruling later. Subsequent to closing argu-
ments, the trial court reopened the discussion on intoxication.

Appellant maintained his position that a charge on voluntary

intoxication would be improper because everything Appellant

took was prescribed. The following colloquy then took place:
THE COURT: Well, I mentioned to all of you the possibility
of me charging the jury that they will have to make a
finding of fact—

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: And that will be fine.

THE COURT: —as to whether or not this was a voluntary

or involuntary intoxication, if any at all.

Appellant’s Counsel]: And that would be fair, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because there was evidence there was [no

intoxication] according to the doctor.

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And so if there, if there was no—if they find

that there was no intoxication, it wouldn’t be a factor in

their determination.

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If they find that it was voluntarily done, then

it’s not a defense. If they find that it was involuntarily done,

then it would serve as a mitigating factor or a defense to

the—to a statute requiring general intent.

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: Specific intent.

THE COURT: Specific Intent.

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: Yes, sir, and that would be—we

would have no real objection to that. No real objection to

that.

THE COURT: So, you would agree to me charging in that

fashion?

‘Appellant’s Counsel]: I would,

During the jury instructions, the trial court issued jury
instructions consistent with the above-quoted colloquy. Follow-
ing the jury instructions, Appellant again stated he had no
objection. The jury returned guilty verdicts for murder and hit
and run. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty years’
imprisonment for murder and twenty-five years’ imprisonment
for hit and run. The trial court ordered the sentences to run
concurrent. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1, Did the trial court err by allowing Clevenger to testify
as a lay witness that he determined the cause of death
was a homicide, which he defined as an intentional act?

2. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury on volun-
tary intoxication when there was evidence showing Ap-
pellant received medication in the hospital for medical
purposes?

CLEVENGER’S TESTIMONY

Appellant argues the trial court erred by allowing Cleven-
ger to testify he determined the manner of death was a
homicide because it was impermissible opinion testimony by a
lay witness. Specifically, Appellant argues Clevenger was not
qualified as an expert and his opinion that Victim’s death was
a homicide “embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by the
jury.” Appellant asserts this error was “extraordinarily preju-
dicial” because he presented an accident defense during trial.

The State argues the trial court did not commit any error
by admitting Clevenger’s testimony. Specifically, the State
argues the testimony was proper because a statute required
Clevenger to report the manner of death. The State asserts
Clevenger “exemplified the personal knowledge necessary to
report that the manner of death was ruled homicide” due to
“his statutorily defined role.” However, the State acknowl-
edged Clevenger’s “testimony assisted the factfinder in win-
nowing out whether [Victim] died as a result of accident,
recklessness, or by the intentional act of another.” Despite this
acknowledgment, the State claims any error was harmless in
light of the other evidence of guilt and it did not contribute to
the verdict.

A. Merits

HE «We find the trial court abused its discretion by
committing an error of law when it admitted Clevenger’s
testimony because it was improper opinion testimony by a lay
witness in violation of Rule 701(a), SCRE. “The admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s sound
discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling
admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a ‘manifest

abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.”
State v. Commander, 396 8.C. 254, 262-68, 721 S.H.2d 418, 417
(2011) (quoting State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 682 S.B.2d
845, 847-48 (2006)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or
are controlled by an error of law.” State v. Pagan, 369 S.C.
201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006).

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’[s]

testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to

those opinions or inferences which (a) are rationally based
on the perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’[s] testimony or the determi-
nation of a fact in issue, and (c) do not require special
knowledge, skill, experience or training.
Rule 701. “Expert testimony differs from lay testimony in that
an expert witness is permitted to state an opinion based on
facts not within his firsthand knowledge....” Watson v. Ford
Motor Co., 389 S.C. 484, 445-46, 699 S.H.2d 169, 175 (2010).
“On the other hand, a lay witness may only testify as to
matters within his personal knowledge and may not offer
opinion testimony which requires special knowledge, skill,
experience, or training.” Id. at 446, 699 S.H.2d at 175; see also
State v. Douglas, 380 S.C. 499, 502, 671 S.E.2d 606, 608 (2009)
(“Lay witnesses are permitted to offer testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences if the opinions or inferences are
rationally based on the witness’[s] perception, and will aid the
jury in understanding testimony, and do not require special
knowledge.”). “Testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
State v. Fripp, 396 S.C. 484, 489, 721 S.B.2d 465, 467 (Ct. App.
2012) (quoting Rule 704, SCRE).

We find the trial court abused its discretion by committing
an error of law when it admitted Clevenger’s testimony re-
garding the cause of Victim’s death because it constituted
improper opinion testimony from a lay witness. Clevenger’s
opinion as to Victim’s cause of death was not based on his
perceptions. See Rule 701(a) (requiring opinion testimony from
a lay witness be limited to opinions based on the witness’s
perceptions). Clevenger testified his determination of Victim’s
cause of death was based on the findings of the pathologist

“ a

and the investigation of law enforcement. Thus, Clevenger’s
opinion regarding the cause of Victim’s death was not based
on his perceptions or observations but instead was based on
his review of the perceptions of others. As a result, his
testimony as a lay witness was improper opinion testimony
under Rule 701(a).' See Douglas, 380 8.C. at 502-03, 671
S.H.2d at 608 (finding the trial court was not required to
qualify the witness as an expert because she testified only to
her personal observations and experiences); Small v. Pioneer
Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 468, 494 $,B.2d 835, 845 (Ct.
App. 1997) (finding a lay witness could offer his opinion as to
what caused a machine to malfunction because his opinion was
based “upon his observations and perceptions as the [daily]
operator” of the machine).

With regard to the State’s claim the trial court properly
admitted Clevenger’s testimony because a statute requires the
coroner to issue a ruling on cause and manner of death, such a
statutory requirement does not necessarily render the coro-
ner’s ruling admissible during trial. Clevenger’s testimony as
to his ruling on cause and manner of death must still comport
with the rules of evidence to be admissible. See Bartlett v.
State, 998 So.2d 157, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining
“the mere fact that [a statute] required the investigator(s) to
determine whether ‘there is probable cause that the force that
was used was unlawful’ does not automatically bootstrap this
information into admissible evidence”).

HI Additionally, we disagree with the State’s argument
that the trial court properly admitted Clevenger’s testimony
because “homicide” was a term of art and was not a comment
on the criminality of Victim’s death. In Commander, our
supreme court found the trial court correctly admitted testi-
mony from the medical examiner, who was qualified as an
expert witness, asserting the victim’s death was a homicide.
896 S.C. at 267-70, 721 S.H.2d at 420-21. The court explained,
under the circumstances of that case, “homicide” meant only

1, Because we find Clevenger’s testimony violated Rule 701(a) and the
trial court erred by admitting it, we need not address whether his
testimony also violated Rule 701(b) or Rule 701(c). See Futch v. McAl-
lister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591,
598 (1999) (explaining an appellate court need not address remaining
issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

—i «

that the victim died “by the act, procurement, or omission of
another” and did not comment on the criminality of the death.
Id. at 265, 721 8,H.2d at 419. However, the court expressly
recognized “that, in certain circumstances, expert medical
testimony of this type has the potential to invade the province
of the jury.” Id. at 268, 721 S.H.2d at 420. As a result, our
supreme court adopted the rule allowing a properly qualified
expert to testify regarding cause and manner of death “so long
as the expert does not opine on the criminal defendant’s state
of mind or guilt or testify on matters of law in such a way that
the jury is not permitted to reach its own conclusion concern-
ing the criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. at 269, 721
S.E.2d at 421,

Here, we find Clevenger’s lay testimony that Victim’s death
was a homicide, which he defined as an intentional act, was an
opinion on Appellant’s state of mind and, thus, his guilt under
the circumstances of this case. As discussed more fully below,
with regard to Appellant’s murder indictment, the main issue
during trial was whether Appellant intentionally or accidental-
ly hit Victim with his vehicle, There was no dispute that
Appellant’s actions led to Victim’s death. Thus, Clevenger’s
testimony that Appellant acted intentionally was an opinion on
Appellant’s state of mind and guilt. Accordingly, we find
Clevenger’s testimony violated our supreme court’s rule pro-
nounced in Commander.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discre-
tion by committing an error of law when it admitted Cleven-
ger’s opinion testimony that Victim’s death was a homicide
because his testimony violated Rule 701(a).

B. Harmless Error

Hse find the trial court’s error was not harmless as
to Appellant’s murder conviction because Clevenger’s testimo-
ny went to the trial’s main issue regarding murder and went
to the heart of Appellant’s defense. However, the error was
harmless as to Appellant’s conviction for hit and run because it
could not reasonably have affected the result of that convic-
tion.

“Generally, appellate courts will not set aside convictions

due to insubstantial errors not affecting the result.” State v.

—

Pagan, 369 8.C, 201, 212, 631 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2006). Where
“guilt has been conclusively proven by competent evidence
such that no other rational conclusion can be reached,” an
insubstantial error that does not affect the result of the trial
is considered harmless. Jd. A harmless error analysis is
contextual and specific to the circumstances of the case: “No
definite rule of law governs [a finding of harmless error];
rather the materiality and prejudicial character of the error
must be determined from its relationship to the entire case.

Error is harmless when it could not reasonably have affect-

ed the result of the trial.” State v. Reeves, 301 S.C. 191, 1938~

94, 891 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1990).

State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 447-48, 710 S.E.2d 55, 60 (2011).
“An officer’s improper opinion which goes to the heart of the
case is not harmless.” State v. Ellis, 345 S.C. 175, 178, 547
§.E.2d 490, 491 (2001).

“Murder’ is the killing of any person with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied.” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10
(2015). South Carolina requires the driver of any vehicle
involved in an incident resulting in injury or death to give his
name, address, and vehicle registration number to the other
driver. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1230 (2006). Section 56-5-1230
also requires a driver involved in an incident to render aid to
any person injured due to the incident including “making
arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician.”
Id. Additionally, statute mandates a driver involved in an
incident resulting in death or injury to a person shall return to
and remain at the scene until he has fulfilled all requirements
of section 56-5-1280. 8.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1210(A) (2006). A
driver who fails to comply with section 56-5-1210(A) is guilty
of a felony and “must be imprisoned not less than one year nor
more than twenty-five years” when death results. S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-5-1210(A)(8) (2006).

In this case, the trial court’s error was not harmless
with regard to Appellant’s murder conviction because the
error could reasonably have affected the result of the murder
conviction by commenting on the main issue to be decided by
the jury and discrediting Appellant’s main defense. The main
issue during the trial was whether Appellant intentionally or
accidentally hit Victim with his vehicle. Appellant testified he

i ©

was aware his vehicle hit Victim at the time of the incident.
However, Appellant claimed the incident was an accident and
he did not intentionally hit Victim. The State asserted Appel-
lant intentionally hit Victim and offered physical evidence of
the scene and other evidence tending to show Appellant had a
motive to hurt Victim. Thus, the main issue for the jury to
decide regarding the murder indictment was whether the
incident was the result of an intentional act or an accident.
Such a determination likely would have been the deciding
factor when assessing whether Appellant acted with malice
aforethought, which was an essential element of murder.
Clevenger’s testimony went directly to the heart of this issue.

Clevenger testified his professional responsibilities included
determining a deceased’s manner of death. He explained any
death presents five options: natural, accident, homicide, sui-
cide, and undetermined. Clevenger defined the homicide op-
tion as “the intentional act of you taking the life of another.”
He then explained he “ruled this case a homicide.” Through
this testimony, Clevenger offered his opinion that this case
involved a homicide, which he defined as an intentional act.
Also, one of the other potential manners of death was accident,
and he expressly ruled out that option by testifying the case
was a homicide. Additionally, in its brief, the State admitted
Clevenger’s “testimony assisted the factfinder in winnowing
out whether [Victim] died as a result of accident, recklessness,
or by the intentional act of another.” Thus, his testimony went
directly to the main issue during trial and the heart of
Appellant’s defense that the incident was an accident. See
State v. Huckabee, 419 S.C. 414, 480, 798 S.H.2d 584, 592-98
(Ct. App. 2017) (finding improper testimony was not harmless,
in part, because it went to the heart of the appellant’s de-
fense), petition for cert. filed.

Although the remaining evidence tending to show Appellant
intentionally hit Victim was compelling, including the physical
and motive evidence, we find Clevenger’s testimony could have
reasonably impacted the result of the murder conviction and,
thus, was not harmless. See Hillis, 845 S.C. at 178, 547 S.B.2d
at 491 (explaining improper testimony that went to the heart
of the case was not harmless). Accordingly, we reverse Appel-
lant’s murder conviction.

a

HH However, the trial court’s error was harmless with
regard to Appellant’s conviction for hit and run. Clevenger’s
testimony was not direct evidence tending to show Appellant’s
guilt or innocence for hit and run. Also, his testimony was not
an opinion on the main issue for the jury to decide regarding
hit and run. Clevenger’s testimony was an opinion on Appel-
lant’s intent and state of mind shortly before and at the time
Appellant hit Victim with his vehicle. As noted above, this was
the main issue for the murder conviction. However, whether
Appellant intentionally or accidentally hit Victim was mostly
irrelevant when deciding whether Appellant was guilty of hit
and run. The relevant inquiries for hit and run were whether
Appellant was aware he was involved in an incident involving a
vehicle and did he fail to comply with section 56-5-1210(A).
The hit and run statutes seek to examine a driver's actions
and intent following a vehicle incident. Clevenger’s testimony
offered no opinion as to Appellant’s actions or intent following
the incident in this case.

Furthermore, Appellant admitted he realized he hit Victim
and stopped to check on him. He also admitted leaving the
scene without ever contacting police, rendering aid to Victim,
or providing the information required by section 56-5-1210(A)
and section 56-5-1230. He claimed he failed to seek help for
Victim because he “just flipped out” and Victim was already
dead. Thus, Appellant’s admissions provided overwhelming
evidence of guilt for hit and run. Because Clevenger’s testimo-
ny was mostly irrelevant with regard to the hit and run
conviction and Appellant’s testimony provided overwhelming
evidence of guilt, Clevenger’s testimony could not reasonably
have impacted the result of the conviction for hit and run.
Therefore, we affirm this conviction.

Accordingly, the trial court erred by admitting Clevenger’s
testimony because it constituted improper opinion testimony
from a lay witness in violation of Rule 701(a). We reverse
Appellant's murder conviction because the error was not
harmless for that conviction. However, the error was harmless
as to Appellant’s conviction for hit and run, and we affirm that
conviction,

VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION CHARGE

HM Appellant argues the trial court erred by instructing

the jury on voluntary intoxication because the evidence was

i  «

undisputed the hospital heavily medicated him for medical
purposes. Appellant claims he did not waive his objection to a
voluntary intoxication charge by merely consenting to a “less
damaging” instruction. The State argues this issue is unpre-
served because Appellant conceded any objection to the trial
court’s proposed jury instructions regarding intoxication.

HMM “It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review.”
Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 380 S.C, 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 781, 738
(1998). “An issue conceded in a lower court may not be argued
on appeal.” TNS Mills, Inc. v. 8.C. Dep't of Revenue, 381 8.C.
611, 617, 503 S.H.2d 471, 474 (1998). We decline to address this
issue because Appellant conceded any objection to the jury
instructions. Although Appellant initially objected when the
State requested an instruction on voluntary intoxication, the
trial court later proposed jury instructions related to intoxi-
cation. After the trial court explained its proposed instructions
on intoxication, Appellant stated, “we would have no real
objection to that. No real objection to that.” Subsequently, the
trial court instructed the jury consistent with its proposal to
the parties, and following the instructions, Appellant expressly
denied having any objection. Based on these circumstances,
Appellant conceded any objection he may have had to the jury
instructions on intoxication. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s
jury instructions.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court erred by
admitting Clevenger’s testimony because it was improper
opinion testimony from a lay witness in violation of Rule
701(a). We affirm Appellant’s conviction for hit and run be-
cause the trial court’s error was harmless as to that conviction.
However, we reverse Appellant’s murder conviction because
the error was not harmless and could have contributed to the
verdict. Additionally, we find Appellant conceded his argument
regarding the jury instructions to the trial court.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur.

807 S.E.2d 206
The STATE, Respondent,
v.

Derek Vander COLLIER, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000184
Opinion No. 5518
Court of Appeals of South Carolina,
Heard April 12, 2017
Filed October 4, 2017
Rehearing Denied December 7, 2017

John Lafitte Warren, III, of Simmons Law Firm, LLC, and
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, both of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant At-
torney General William Frederick Schumacher, IV, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway,
all for Respondent.

LOCKEMY, C.J.:

Derek Vander Collier appeals his conviction for second-
degree burglary, arguing the trial court improperly limited his
closing argument, erred in allowing the State to play record-
ings of two police interviews, and should not have allowed a
witness to identify him in front of the jury. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 20 and 21, 2018, the Jamaican Motor Inn in
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, was closed to visitors because

the room doors were being repainted. Justin Kirkman, one of
the subcontractors hired for this task, stayed in the penthouse
on the fifth floor of the motel during the night to check the
doors at thirty-minute intervals and close them when the paint
dried.

During the early morning hours on November 21, while
Kirkman was in the penthouse between rounds, he heard a
suspicious sound coming from another floor. Kirkman took the
motel elevator to the third floor, where he noticed the light in
one of the rooms was on even though he had turned off all the
room lights. Kirkman went to that room and saw a man
attempting to remove a television from the wall of the room.

According to Kirkman, when he confronted the stranger,
the man drew what appeared to be a semiautomatic handgun
and fled the room to the first floor of the motel. Despite the
brevity of the encounter, Kirkman observed the man face-to-
face at a close distance for ten to fifteen seconds. Further-
more, the light in the motel room was on during the confronta-
tion, and although the man wore a hooded sweatshirt, the hood
was down during their encounter.

Kirkman followed the man to the parking lot and saw him
drive away in a four-door sedan from the late 1990s or early
2000s. Kirkman saw no other occupants inside the car but
noticed a television in the back seat. Kirkman chased the car
in an unsuccessful attempt to get the license tag number.
After returning to the third floor and noticing one of the
rooms was missing a television, Kirkman called the police.

About a week after the incident, Kirkman went to the police
station to meet with an artist, who prepared a computer
sketch of the suspect based on his description. Later, Kirkman
viewed a photo lineup. After viewing the lineup, Kirkman
narrowed his selection to two photos. Although he was “lean-
ing towards” one of the two, he could not make a positive
identification because of the poor quality of the images and his
reluctance to implicate the wrong person. However, Kirkman
also told the police he was certain he would recognize the
suspect in person.

On January 29, 2014, Brian Truex, who was then a violent
crimes detective with the Myrtle Beach Police Department,
recognized Collier on the street. Truex attempted to contact

—i =

Collier because he recognized Collier was facing numerous
burglary charges. Initially, Collier attempted to evade arrest
by giving Truex a false name, but the police confirmed his
identity, arrested him, and transported him to the Myrtle
Beach Police Department for an interview.

Truex conducted Collier’s first police interview, which began
five to ten minutes after his arrest. Before receiving M%-
vanda+ warnings, Collier informed Truex he had smoked
crack cocaine a short time earlier’; however, he did not
appear to be under the influence of any drugs and was eager
to proceed with the interview. Collier had only a tenth-grade
education, but he was articulate and able to answer Truex’s
questions in an appropriate manner, providing specific and
incriminating details about the burglaries for which he was
being investigated. During the interview, Collier admitted to
burglarizing various area hotels but claimed he did this to help
his mother, who he claimed was having financial problems.
Collier also revealed his method for removing televisions from
hotel rooms and acknowledged he had been at the Jamaican
multiple times, an admission supported by specific information
that Collier provided about the hotel and surrounding land-
marks,

Carol Ann Allen, a property crimes detective with the
Myrtle Beach Police Department, conducted the second and
third interviews of Collier on January 30 and 31, 2014. Collier
discussed the November 21 incident at the Jamaican during
the third interview, which took place at his request. Although
Collier denied pulling a gun on Kirkman, he indicated he was
the individual whom Kirkman encountered.

On April 24, 2014, Collier was indicted on one count of
second-degree burglary and one count of possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The State
called the case to trial on December 8, 2014.

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966).

2. According to Collier, he “had smoked like four to five minutes before
they arrested [him]’'; however, Truex testified Collier “stated he had
smoked crack approximately forty-five minutes prior to the interview.”

_—

After a jury was selected, the trial court held Jackson v.
Denno * hearings to determine the admissibility of recordings
of the first and third interviews. Over Collier’s objections, the
trial court ruled the recordings of both interviews admissible
with appropriate redactions.

Based on assurances from the State that it would not ask
Kirkman to identify Collier in front of the jury, the trial court
did not hold a Neil v. Biggers‘ hearing. However, during the
State’s case-in-chief, Kirkman, the first witness to testify, was
asked if the person he saw attempting to dismount a television
from a hotel room wall was “in the courtroom.” Because a Neil
v. Biggers hearing had not taken place, the trial court declared
a mistrial,

A different jury was selected, and the State called the case
to trial the next day. The court held an in camera Neil v.
Biggers hearing and ruled, over Collier’s objection, Kirkman
could make an in-court identification of Collier in front of the
Jury.

Among the concerns expressed by the defense to Kirkman’s
in-court identification of Collier was Kirkman’s presence in the
courtroom during the Jackson v. Denno hearing the previous
day, during which audio recordings of Collier’s interviews
were played.® The defense, however, did not question Kirkman
or any other witness about what Kirkman saw or heard during

3. See Jackson v, Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d
908 (1964) (stating a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the
“constitutional right ... to object to the use of [a] confession and to
have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of
voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of
the confession”),

4, See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S, 188, 198-99, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401
(1972) (requiring the trial court to determine whether an out-of-court
eyewitness identification of a criminal defendant is admissible based on
(1) whether the identification resulted from unnecessary and unduly
suggestive procedures and (2) if so, “whether under the ‘totality of
circumstances’ the identification was reliable” notwithstanding the
suggestive identification procedures).

5, The defense made no contemporaneous objection to Kirkman’s pres-
ence in the courtroom during the Jackson v. Denno hearing because
that hearing took place during the first trial, when the State mistakenly
informed the trial court it would not ask Kirkman to make an in-court
identification.

the Jackson v. Denno hearing or whether his presence in the
courtroom during the hearing affected his ability to make an
impartial in-court identification.>

During the State’s case-in-chief, Kirkman revealed on direct
examination he was currently on probation for burglary and
non-aggravated charges from Colorado. On cross-examination,
defense counsel pointed out possible inconsistencies between
what Kirkman claimed he told the police about the car that he
saw leaving the Jamaican and the description of the vehicle in
the police report. The State then requested to play a tape of
Kirkman’s statement to the police as a prior consistent state-
ment. The defense objected, asserting “[i]t would just be
bolstering testimony by the State” but indicated it would
agree to playing the recording of “those specific questions.”

The trial court noted Kirkman was asked specific questions
about what he told the police and informed counsel it would
grant the State’s request if the defense intended to argue to
the jury that Kirkman had an improper motive to fabricate his
testimony and was “lying to save himself from going back to
jail.” Defense counsel conferred with Collier and advised the
court Collier would not make this argument. Based on this
assurance, the trial court denied the State’s request.

Recognizing a “continuing objection by the Defense,” the
trial court allowed Kirkman to identify the artist’s sketch
made according to his description. Kirkman also identified
Collier in front of the jury. The trial court also allowed the
State to publish recordings of the first and third interviews to
the jury.

The defense rested without presenting a case-in-chief, and
the trial proceeded to closing arguments. When presenting its
closing argument, the State pointed out Kirkman was still on
probation and argued, “If [Kirkman] were to be convicted of
lying to the police or lying to the [c]ourt, he could go to jail, he
could go to prison. He has a lot of incentive to tell the

6. The State noted Kirkman was in the courtroom for only a few minutes
and the limited part of the recording that he heard did not include any
admissions by Collier. The State also reminded the trial court that (1)
there was no sequestration order in effect when the Jackson v. Denno
hearing took place and (2) Kirkman was prompily removed from the
courtroom when a sequestration order was issued,

—

truth.... [Kirkman] has no motivation to lie. [Kirkman] is a
reliable witness.” The defense did not object to these remarks,
However, during closing argument by the defense, counsel
asserted, “You tell me who has got motivation. Justin Kirkman
has motivation, already convicted felon[,] already on proba-
tion.” The State objected, and the jury exited the courtroom.

The State moved to reopen the case and play the recording
of Kirkman’s statements to the police, arguing it was entitled
to this relief because defense counsel’s closing remarks about
Kirkman’s motivation violated the defense’s prior representa-
tion that it would neither argue recent fabrication on Kirk-
man’s part nor suggest Kirkman gave false testimony to avoid
incarceration. In response, defense counsel noted (1) he ad-
vised the trial court he would be attacking Kirkman’s general
credibility as a witness and (2) the State’s closing argument
included discussion of Kirkman’s believability and reliability.

The trial court denied the State’s motion to reopen the case.
However, observing the defense did not make a timely objec-
tion to the remarks at issue in the State’s closing argument,
the trial court refused to allow the defense to argue Kirkman
was “lying on the stand to save himself from going to jail
because he’s a convicted felon.” The trial court emphasized its
ruling was limited to allegations that Kirkman had an improp-
er motive to testify untruthfully and specifically ruled the
defense could attack Kirkman’s credibility in other ways,
including references to Kirkman’s status as a convicted felon.
Although the trial court prohibited the defense from suggest-
ing Kirkman had an improper motive to give false testimony,
it did not instruct the jury to ignore the remarks defense
counsel had already made that Kirkman, as a convicted felon,
had motivation to lie.

When defense counsel resumed his closing argument, he
included several points that called Kirkman’s credibility into
question, including (1) Kirkman’s prior record, (2) Kirkman’s
inability to make a positive identification of Collier until his in-
court identification at trial, and (8) the possibility that Kirk-
man misidentified the person whom he saw attempting to
remove a television from the Jamaican.

The jury found Collier guilty on the charge of second-
degree burglary but acquitted him on the weapons charge.

The trial court sentenced Collier to thirteen years’ imprison-
ment with credit for time served. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court improperly limit Collier’s closing
argument by prohibiting him from responding to the State’s
alleged bolstering of its key witness?

Il. Did the trial court err in allowing the jury to hear
recordings of Collier's first and third police interviews?

III. Did the trial court err in allowing Kirkman’s in-court
identification of Collier?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “The conduct of a criminal trial is left largely to the
sound discretion of the trial judge, who will not be reversed in
the absence of a prejudicial abuse of discretion.” State v,
Bryant, 372 S.C. 305, 312, 642 S.H.2d 582, 586 (2007). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is
unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law.”
Id, This broad discretion applies to rulings regarding closing
arguments. See State v. Patterson, 824 S.C. 5, 17, 482 S.H.2d
760, 766 (1997) (“[A] trial judge is vested with broad discretion
in dealing with the range of propriety of closing argument,
and ordinarily his rulings on such matters will not be dis-
turbed.... The appellant has the burden of showing that any
alleged error in argument deprived him of a fair trial.”).

“In determining whether a confession was given
‘voluntarily,’ [the appellate court] must consider the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s giving the con-
fession.” State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 566, 647 S.E.2d 144,
164 (2007). However, “[t}he trial court’s factual conclusions as
to the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed on
appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 186, 551 S.E.2d 240,
252 (2001).

Hl “IA trial] court’s decision to allow the in-court identifi-
cation of an accused will not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion or prejudicial legal error.” State v. Simmons, 384
S.C. 145, 166, 682 S.E.2d 19, 80 (Ct. App. 2009),

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Limitations on Collier’s Closing Argument

Hl Collier first argues the trial court improperly limited
his closing argument when it prohibited him from responding
to remarks in the State’s closing argument that allegedly
bolstered Kirkman’s credibility. Collier maintains the trial
court allowed the State to argue during its closing that
Kirkman “ha[d] no motivation to lie” but unfairly deprived him
of the right to dispute this assertion during his own closing
argument. However, Collier’s objection on appeal is not direct-
ed at the bolstering itself; rather, he contends the State’s
alleged bolstering of Kirkman’s credibility and reference to his
motivation not to lie opened the door and invited a response
from the defense. We find no reversible error.

Hs (Under the “invited response” doctrine, also referred
to as the “invited reply” doctrine, “[o]nce the defendant opens
the door, the solicitor’s invited response is appropriate so long
as it does not unfairly prejudice the defendant.” Ellenburg v.
State, 867 S.C. 66, 69, 625 S.H.2d 224, 226 (2006); see also
Vaughn v. State, 362 8.C. 163, 169-70, 607 S.H.2d 72, 75 (2004)
(“Once a defendant opens the door, the relevant question in
determining if a defendant’s rights were violated is whether
the solicitor’s comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ”
(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648, 94 S.Ct.
1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974))). “[TJhe idea of an invited re-
sponse is not to excuse improper comments, but to determine
their effect on the trial as a whole.” Jd. at 169, 607 S.E.2d at
1.

The doctrine has generally been applied upon a finding
“that although a solicitor’s closing argument was inappropri-
ate, it was responsive to statements or arguments made by the
defense, and thus did not deny the defendant due process.”
Tappeiner v. State, 416 S.C, 289, 251, 785 S.E.2d 471, 477
(2016). Nevertheless, we have found no binding authority
prohibiting the use of the doctrine to justify an allegedly
improper closing remark by a criminal defendant,

HHI In the present case, however, the remarks in the
State’s closing argument that prompted the defense to assert

—i «

Kirkman had an improper motive to fabricate his testimony
did not constitute bolstering. To the contrary, the State’s
closing remarks were confined to the record and did not
evidence any personal vouching of Kirkman’s credibility. See
State v. Shuler, 844 9.C. 604, 630, 545 $,E.2d 805, 818 (2001)
(“Improper vouching occurs when the prosecution places the
government’s prestige behind a witness by making explicit
personal assurances of a, witness’ veracity, or where a prosecu-
tor implicitly vouches for a witness’ veracity by indicating
information not presented to the jury supports the testimo-
ny.”).

We further hold Collier had the burden to make a contem-
poraneous objection to any improper remarks in the State’s
closing argument instead of reneging on his earlier promise
not to argue Kirkman fabricated his story to avoid a probation
violation, See U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18, 105 S.Ct. 1088, 84
L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (advocating restraint in invoking the invited
response doctrine and stating “the prosecutor at the close of
defense summation should have objected to the defense coun-
sel’s improper statements with a request that the court give a
timely warning and curative instruction to the jury”).

Furthermore, to the extent the remarks at issue invited a
response from the defense, we hold the trial court gave the
defense adequate leeway to attack Kirkman’s credibility in its
closing argument. The court did not prohibit the defense from
questioning Kirkman’s observation of the suspect or from
pointing out inconsistencies between Kirkman’s testimony and
police accounts of the incident in its summation. Moreover,
although the defense was not permitted to assert that Kirk-
man testified falsely to avoid criminal penalties, the trial court
expressly allowed the defense to address Kirkman’s status as
a convicted felon and the implication of his criminal record on
his general credibility as a witness. In view of these consider-
ations, we hold the restrictions imposed by the trial court on
Collier’s closing argument were not an abuse of discretion.

HM Finally, we note that before the trial court ruled on
the State’s motion to reopen, defense counsel had already
argued to the jury that Kirkman, as a convicted felon on
probation, had motivation to lie about what had happened. The
trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard this remark

a

or order it stricken from the record. Furthermore, after the
trial court prohibited the defense from discussing improper
motive in its closing argument, the defense never proffered
additional remarks that it would have made but for this ruling.
Given these circumstances, we hold Collier has not provided
sufficient evidence to prove he was prejudiced by the trial
court’s ruling. See State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 169, 478
§.E.2d 260, 268 (1996) (“The burden of proof is on Appellant to
show prejudice.”); State v. Reeves, 301 S.C. 191, 194, 391
S.E.2d 241, 248 (1990) (“Error is harmless when it could not
reasonably have affected the results of the trial.”); State v.
White, 371 S.C. 489, 447, 689 8.E.2d 160, 164 (Ct. App. 2006)
(“(Olur appellate courts have consistently held that trial court
should only be reversed when an error is prejudicial and not
harmless.”).

Il. Admission of Collier’s First and Third Interviews

WM Collier argues the jury should not have heard the
recording of his first police interview because the interview
took place shortly after he smoked crack cocaine. Collier
points out that Truex, who conducted this interview, acknowl-
edged during his testimony that crack cocaine can impair a
user’s decisions. Collier contends the highly addictive and
intoxicating effects of the drug were likely to have induced
him to do almost anything to avoid incarceration even if the
primary effects of the drug had worn off. In opposing the
admission of his third police interview, Collier argues (1) he
requested this interview because of concerns about admissions
he made during the first interview and (2) law enforcement
made promises of leniency during this interview that overbore
his will. The trial court rejected Collier’s arguments that his
statements during these interviews were not made voluntarily.
We find no abuse of discretion.

Truex testified Collier did not appear to be under the
influence of any drugs and refused his offer to postpone the
first interview. In the audio recording of this interview submit-
ted as an exhibit in this appeal, Collier appears relaxed and
forthcoming with details, and we detected no signs of over-
reaching on the part of law enforcement in eliciting informa-
tion from Collier. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s deci-

sion to allow the jury to hear the recording of the first

Collier also asserts the tape of his third interview should
have been suppressed because “had Appellant not [made] his
first statement under the influence of drugs, he would not
have given a subsequent statement.”’ In essence, Collier
argues because his first statement was involuntary due to his
intoxication, his third statement must also be involuntary.
Because we find his first interview was voluntary, we find the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the state-
ments in the third interview were also voluntary.

We also reject Collier’s argument that his cooperation with
law enforcement and admissions during the third interview
were a desperate attempt to appease the police in order to
avoid incarceration; to the contrary, the detectives who inter-
viewed him only assured him that telling the truth would not
hurt his situation. See State v. Rochester, 801 S.C. 196, 200,
891 S.H.2d 244, 246-47 (1990) (“A statement induced by a
promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the
inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.”).

If. In-Court Identification

HM Finally, Collier argues the trial court should not have
allowed Kirkman to identify him before the jury because the
pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. Col-
lier points out (1) he was the only person in the photo lineup
who, like the suspect, wore a hooded sweatshirt; (2) Kirkman
had only limited time to view the suspect; (8) Kirkman was
able to eliminate only four of the six individuals depicted in
the lineup, made no firm identification, and admitted he could
not be one hundred percent sure the photograph he selected
was indeed the person he encountered at the Jamaican; and
(4) Kirkman himself expressed concern that he may have been
unduly influenced by the fact that Collier was the only subject
in the photo lineup who was wearing a hooded sweatshirt.
Collier further contends (1) there were no indicators that
Kirkman’s out-of-court identification was so reliable that there
could be no substantial likelihood of misidentification and (2)

7. Collier does not assert any other basis for finding the third interview
was involuntary.

a

the problems resulting from the pretrial identification proce-
dure were exacerbated by Kirkman’s presence in the court-
room during the Jackson v. Denno hearing. We affirm the
admission of the in-court identification.

Hs “A criminal defendant may be deprived of due
process of law by an identification procedure which is unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identi-
fication.” State v. Traylor, 360 8.C. 74, 81, 600 S.H.2d 528, 526
(2004), “An in-court identification of an accused is inadmissible
if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure created a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id.
However, “[a]n identification may be reliable under the totali-
ty of circumstances even when a suggestive procedure has
been used.” State v. Simmons, 884 8.C. 145, 166, 682 S.H.2d
19, 30 (Ct. App. 2009). In determining whether an identifica-
tion is reliable, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect at the time of
the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (8) the accura-
ey of any prior descriptions by the witness of the suspect, (4)
the witness’s level of certainty at the confrontation, and (5) the
amount of time between the crime and confrontation. Id. at
166-67, 682 S.H.2d at 30.

To support his position that the photo lineup was unduly
suggestive, Collier argues he was the only person depicted in
the lineup who, like the person Kirkman confronted, wore a
hooded sweatshirt. Collier points out Kirkman himself was
reluctant to make a positive identification and even admitted
he worried he “was associating ... since the gentleman in the
photo had a hoodie on, that [he] was just associating those two
together...,.” Although Kirkman’s hesitation was probative of
the reliability of his out-of-court identification, it does not
necessarily follow that the lineup was tainted by suggestive
police tactics. Cf State v. Turner, 878 S.C. 121, 127-28, 644
§.H.2d 698, 697 (2007) (finding a photo lineup “not unduly
suggestive ... [d]espite the variation in the background col-
ors” because the defendant “d[id] not stand out in comparison
with the other individuals in the lineup”); State v. Stewart, 275
S.C, 447, 449-51, 272 S.E.2d 628, 629-30 (1980) (rejecting all
challenges by the appellant to the pretrial identification proce-
dures used by the police even though, among other complaints,

—_i «

the appellant was the only person placed in a physical lineup
who had a beard).

Furthermore, regardless of any alleged flaws in the photo
lineup, the trial court gave adequate consideration to the
requisite factors in deciding to admit Kirkman’s in-court iden-
tification of Collier. Although more than one year passed
between the incident and Collier's trial, Kirkman testified he
viewed the suspect face-to-face and in good lighting for ten to
fifteen seconds. There was no evidence of any distractions that
would have compromised Kirkman’s degree of attention,
Shortly after the incident, Kirkman assisted law enforcement
in preparing a sketch that was provided to this court and
resembles the picture from the photo lineup that he tentative-
ly selected. Finally, Kirkman maintained since the time he met
with the police that he “would a hundred percent recognize
him in[ Jperson.” Moreover, during the Neil v. Biggers hear-
ing, Kirkman testified he was sure Collier was the person he
confronted at the Jamaican “{t]he second [he] saw [Collier’s]
face when [Kirkman] was in the courtroom” and his recogni-
tion of Collier was based on this prior encounter. This evi-
dence is sufficient to support a finding that Kirkman’s in-court.
identification was reliable even if the pretrial identification
procedure was suggestive.

We further affirm the trial court’s decision to admit Kirk-
man’s in-court identification of Collier even though Kirkman
was in the courtroom during the Jackson v. Denno hearing.

HM “Where identification is concerned, the general rule is
that a trial court must hold an in camera hearing when the
State offers a witness whose testimony identifies the defen-
dant as the person who committed the crime, and the defen-
dant challenges the in-court identification as being tainted by
a previous, illegal identification or confrontation.” State v.
Ramsey, 345 8.C. 607, 618, 550 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). The
purpose of the hearing is “to determine whether, under the
circumstances of [the] case, [the witness’s] identification of
[the defendant is] so tainted as to require its suppression at
trial.” State v. Simmons, 308 S.C. 80, 88, 417 S.E.2d 92, 93-94
(1992). “In such [a] hearing, the testimony should be taken
and all factual questions determined including those involving
the [defendant’s] constitutional rights pertinent to the admissi-

e a
bility of the proffered evidence.” State v. Cash, 257 S.C. 249,
258, 185 S.H.2d 525, 527 (1971).

Here, an in camera Neil v. Biggers hearing took place,
during which the defense expressed concern about Kirkman’s
presence in the courtroom during the Jackson v. Denno
hearing. However, defense counsel conceded he “d[idn’t] know
how much that played into [Kirkman’s] identification all of a
sudden a year later when it never happened before.” More-
over, there was no evidence to support a finding that Kirk-
man’s in-court identification of Collier resulted from anything
Kirkman saw or heard during the Jackson v. Denno hearing.
To the contrary, Kirkman testified at the Neil v. Biggers
hearing “[tJhe second” he saw Collier’s face in the courtroom
he was “one hundred percent” sure Collier was the person he
observed attempting to remove a television from the Jamaican
and his immediate recognition of Collier was based on his
observation of Collier that night. Considering this testimony
and the absence of any other indicia of undue influence, we
hold Kirkman’s in-court identification of Collier was not “so
tainted as to require its suppression at trial.” Stmmons, 308
S.C. at 88, 417 S.E.2d at 94.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

807 S.E.2d 710
The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Earnest Stewart DAISE, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002394
Opinion No. 5520

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard March 9, 2017

Filed October 25, 2017
Rehearing Denied December 14, 2017

as

19
x
+

g
a

Allen Mattison Bogan and Phillips Lancaster McWilliams,
both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Colum-
bia; and Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy At-
torney General, John W. MelIntosh, and Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, of Columbia; and
Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for Respon-
dent.

MCDONALD, J.:

Earnest Daise appeals his convictions for murder, assault
and battery with intent to kill, possession with intent to

distribute marijuana, and trafficking in cocaine. Daise argues
the circuit court erred in (1) allowing a witness to offer
hearsay violative of the Confrontation Clause, (2) permitting a
witness to comment on the credibility of another witness, (8)
admitting testimony that a victim feared Daise, (4) failing to
require the State to produce materials that allegedly amount
to a “handbook” on circumventing a Batson challenge, (5)
admitting a photograph of Daise in a custodial pose, and (6)
admitting two photographs in which a child victim’s birthday
cake is visible. Finally, Daise argues the circuit court’s cumu-
lative errors denied him a fair trial. We affirm the convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Jeanine Mullen was the mother of four children, Child 1,
Child 2, John Doe 1 (four years old), and John Doe 2 (two
years old). Jeanine was involved in a romantic relationship
with Daise—the father of John Doe 2—at the time of the
murders.

On the morning of November 15, 2009, Daise left Jeanine’s
Beaufort County home in her white van. Video surveillance
showed Daise with the van at a gas station between 11:45 a.m.
and 12:18 p.m. Jeanine’s attempts to reach Daise to have him
return the van, which she needed to prepare for John Doe 1’s
fourth birthday party, were unsuccessful. Phone records es-
tablished that between 11:39 a.m. and 3:52 p.m. on November
15, Jeanine called Daise eighteen times. Although most of the
calls went to voicemail, the 3:52 p.m. call lasted twenty-eight
seconds. Around dusk,’ Daise was seen with the van at Eddie’s
Disco, where he was overheard telling someone on the phone,
“Who the f*** you think you talking to?”

Sometime between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Jeanine’s father,
Frank Mullen, arrived at Jeanine’s home to drop off the two
older children. The group noticed Jeanine’s white van parked
in the driveway—the doors were open and it appeared “ran-
sacked.” Inside the home, Frank found John Doe 1’s body in
the kitchen and Jeanine’s body in her bedroom.’ Although

1, The court took judicial notice that the sun set that day at 5:22 p.m.,
with twilight ending at 5:48 p.m.

2. John Doe 1 died from a gunshot wound to the head. Likewise, Jeanine
died from a gunshot wound to the head, but she had an additional

us a

John Doe 2 was still alive, he had also been shot and was lying
near Jeanine, The only item missing from the home was a .38
pistol.

Around 2:00 a.m. on the morning of November 16, police
apprehended Daise at the home of his friend, Jay Simmons.
Daise had his own bedroom in the home, and a search of that
bedroom revealed half a pound of marijuana, an electronic
scale, ammunition commonly associated with an AK-47, a set
of keys that fit the doors and ignition of Jeanine’s white van,
twenty-six grams of crack cocaine, and Daise’s cell phone.
Police also documented a red smear on the door into the
bedroom, noted what appeared to be “fresh” blood on the
front-left pocket of Daise’s blue jeans, and photographed a cut
on Daise’s right hand. During his initial interview, Daise
denied being at Jeanine’s home or driving her van.

At trial, the State introduced phone records showing Daise
made nine calls to Simmons between 6:00 p.m. and 6:18 p.m.
Simmons initially testified that sometime after 6:00 p.m., he
picked up Daise on the side of the road and gave him a ride.’
Simmons sent Daise a text message at 6:04 p.m. that he was
“on the way.” On cross-examination, Simmons admitted to
sending the text but insisted he never picked up Daise.
Simmons claimed police threatened to charge him as an
accessory if he did not say he picked up Daise.

A trace evidence expert testified she found gunshot residue
on the blue jeans Daise was wearing when he was appre-
hended. On cross-examination, she admitted she only found
one single particle of gunshot residue on each leg of the jeans
and acknowledged gunshot residue can remain on unwashed
clothing for many months. She also testified there was no
gunshot residue on Daise’s sweatshirt.

gunshot wound on her left thigh. The State’s pathologist opined Jea-
nine’s head wound was caused by a gun being placed directly against
her head,

3. Another set of keys, which unlocked the back door to Jeanine’s home,
and a purse were found in the passenger seat of the van.

4, A police officer testified that the location where Simmons indicated
he picked up Daise was 1.6 miles from the crime scene,

a w

A DNA expert testified the red smear on the door in
Simmons’s home was comprised of Daise’s blood. Testing
revealed blood from both Daise and Jeanine on the blue jeans.

The jury found Daise guilty of two counts of murder, one
count of assault and battery with intent to kill, one count of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and one count
of trafficking cocaine between ten and twenty-eight grams.
Daise received sentences of life without parole on the murder
charges and consecutive sentences totaling seventy years’
imprisonment on the remaining charges.

Il, EMT Testimony

Daise argues the circuit court erred when it allowed emer-
gency medical technicians (EMTs) to testify about twenty-
eight-month-old John Doe 2’s responses to questioning regard-
ing who caused his injuries.

Before trial, the State indicated it planned to introduce
evidence that John Doe 2 told EMTs “Daddy” hurt him.
Relying on Michigan v. Bryant,’ the State argued the evi-
dence was nontestimonial in nature and, therefore, did not
violate Daise’s right to confront his accuser. The circuit court
agreed the statement was nontestimonial and allowed the
State to introduce it.

At trial, EMT Scott Sampson testified that when he entered
Jeanine’s home, he found two individuals who appeared to be
deceased. He also found John Doe 2, who was breathing,
whimpering, and crying but only responsive to “painful stimu-
li.” Sampson disrobed John Doe 2 to locate his injuries and
turned him over to Paramedic Shayna Orsen.

Orsen testified she arrived on the scene with EMT Crew
Chief Paramedic Danny Tinnel, who remained in the ambu-
lance. Orsen further testified John Doe 2 was “unresponsive”
and “unconscious” when he was given to her. After placing
him on the stretcher, Orsen and Tinnel assessed John Doe 2
for signs of trauma and found one bullet wound to his chest
and another behind his ear. Tinnel administered an TV (normal
saline fluid drip) while Orsen treated the chest wound.

5, 562 U.S, 344, 377-78, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (holding
the admission of victim’s statements in response to police questioning
not violative of the Confrontation Clause because their primary purpose
was to assist police officers during an ongoing emergency).

On the way to the hospital, John Doe 2 became responsive.
Tinnel immediately began questioning him regarding “person,
place, time, and event,” which Tinnel explained they do “with
just about every patient.” Specifically, Tinnel asked John Doe
2 for his name and it “sounded like” he responded “Dub” or
“Doug.” ® Tinnel then asked John Doe 2 several more ques-
tions, including “how it happened” and “who hurt him.” John
Doe 2 responded “Daddy” hurt him but was unable to respond
to any additional questions including “what his daddy’s name
was.”

A. Hearsay

Hl Daise argues the circuit court erred in allowing the
challenged testimony because it constitutes inadmissible hear-
say.”

Hl “It is well-settled that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review.”
Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 389 8.C. 406, 412, 529 S.H.2d
548, 546 (2000). “Error preservation requirements are intend-
ed ‘to enable the lower court to rule properly after it has
considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments.’” Id. (quot-
ing ’On v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 388 S.C. 406, 422, 526
§.H.2d 716, 724 (2000)). “In order to preserve for review an
alleged error in admitting evidence an objection should be
sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of
the alleged error so it can be reasonably understood by the
trial judge.” State v. Prioleau, 345 S.C. 404, 411, 548 S.E.2d
218, 216 (2001).

Hl Our review of the record reveals that at no time during
the trial proceedings did Daise make a hearsay objection to
the challenged testimony. See State v. Hoffman, 312 S.C. 386,

6. John Doe 2’s grandmother and his older half-brother testified John
Doe 2's nicknames included “Dub,” “Little Dub,” and “J-Dub.”

7. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted” and is inadmissible unless it falls
within one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. Rules
801(c) & 802, SCRE.

a a

398, 440 S.H.2d 869, 878 (1994) (“A contemporaneous objection
is required to properly preserve an error for appellate re-
view.”). His only objection to John Doe 2’s statement that
“Daddy” hurt him was to “renew our Crawford objection,”
which Daise initially made at a pretrial hearing. See Rule
108(a)(1), SCRE (stating a party must state “the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context”). On appeal, Daise first argued the chal-
lenged testimony was inadmissible under the medical diagno-
sis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule.? See State v.
Freiburger, 366 §.C. 125, 184, 620 S.H.2d 787, 741 (2005)
(explaining an argument advanced on appeal but not raised
and ruled on below is not preserved). In his reply brief, Daise
set forth additional arguments that the challenged testimony
was inadmissible under the present sense impression” and
excited utterance 4 exceptions to the hearsay rule. However,
“an argument made in a reply brief cannot present an issue to
the appellate court if it was not addressed in the initial brief.”
Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557
S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, we find the hear-
say arguments unpreserved for our review.

B. Confrontation Clause

Daise further argues that even if the challenged testimony
is not hearsay, it violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront his accuser.

8. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d
177 (2004) (holding out-of-court testimonial statements by witnesses are
inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause unless
the witnesses are unavailable and defendants had prior opportunity to
cross-examine them).

9, Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment
“are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness.” Rule 803(4), SCRE.

10. Rule 803(1), SCRE, defines a ‘present sense impression” as “[a]
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter.”

11. An excited utterance is ‘[a] statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
caused by the event or condition.” Rule 803(2), SCRE.

Paramedic Tinnel testified that in response to questioning,
John Doe 2 stated “Daddy” hurt him. Tinnel explained he
began questioning John Doe 2 immediately after he became
responsive in order to “keep him awake and talking,” “find out
if he had any other injuries,” and “determine his level of
responsiveness.” Just as he does with other patients, Tinnel
questioned John Doe 2 regarding “person, place, time, and
event.” Tinnel clarified “[tJhe purpose we were going after was
to determine his level of consciousness and to determine his
cognitive thought process, especially with the possibility of a
gunshot wound to the head.”

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution demands that “fin all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, the United States Supreme
Court held “the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right
and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 380 U.S. 400, 408, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 18 L.Hd.2d 923
(1965).2

The Supreme Court again addressed the Confrontation
Clause in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct.
1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Crawford was convicted of
assaulting a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife. Id. at 38,
124 S.Ct. 1854. At trial, the State introduced the wife’s tape-
recorded statement describing the stabbing to the police,
despite the fact Crawford had no opportunity to cross-examine
her. Id. The Court reversed Crawford’s conviction and held
the admission of a testimonial hearsay statement against an
accused violates the Confrontation Clause if: (1) the declarant
is unavailable to testify at trial, and (2) the aceused has had no
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. at 54, 124
§.Ct. 1354, Thus, the Confrontation Clause may operate to
render otherwise admissible hearsay evidence inadmissible if

12, In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

= «

it is testimonial in nature. See id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1854,
Although the Court declined to comprehensively define “testi-
monial,” it did declare that the “core class of ‘testimonial’
statements” includes: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent”; (2) “ ‘extrajudicial statements ... con-
tained in formalized testimonial materials’”; (8) statements
made under circumstances leading an objective witness to
reasonably believe they would be available for use at a later
trial; and (4) “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations.” Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1854 (quoting
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d
848 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).

In Dawis v. Washington, decided jointly with Hammon v.
Indiana, the Supreme Court addressed the Confrontation
Clause in the context of two domestic violence cases. 547 U.S.
818, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), Announcing what
has come to be known as the “primary purpose” test, the
Court explained “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made
in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose ... is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,”
however, statements “are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to estab-
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. The Court found the
Davis victim’s identification of her abuser in response to initial
questioning from a 911 emergency operator was nontestimoni-
al. Id. at 826-29, 126 S.Ct. 2266, In Hammon, however, the
Court held that when police responded to a domestic distur-
bance, found the couple at home, and took a statement from
the wife about the husband’s abuse while the husband was in
another room, wife’s statements were testimonial. Id. at 829-
84, 126 S.Ct. 2266,

In Michigan v. Bryant, police officers responding to a radio
dispatch found a man lying in a gas station parking lot with a
gunshot wound to his abdomen. 562 U.S. at 849, 181 8.Ct. 1143
(2011). Before the victim was removed from the scene, the
police officers asked “what had happened, who had shot him,
and where the shooting had occurred.” Id. (quoting People v.

“ a
Bryant, 483 Mich. 182, 143, 768 N.W.2d 65, 71 (2009)). At trial,
the officers were permitted to testify that the victim, who was
now deceased, told them Bryant shot him as well as when and
where the shooting occurred. Jd. The Supreme Court held the
victim’s statement to police was nontestimonial because the
officers’ “primary purpose was simply to address what they
perceived to be an ongoing emergency, and the circumstances
lacked any formality that would have alerted [the victim] to or
focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his
statements.” Jd. at 877, 181 S.Ct. 1148. “[Tyhe relevant inquiry
is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals
involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from
the individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances
in which the encounter occurred.” Jd. at 360, 181 S.Ct. 1148,
“(T]he statements and actions of both the declarant and
interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation.” Jd. at 367, 181 S.Ct. 1148. The
Court carefully added that “giv[ing] controlling weight to the
‘intentions of the police’” would be “a misreading of our
opinion,” instructing lower courts to consider “all of the rele-
vant circumstances” in determining whether statements are
testimonial. Id. at 369, 131 S.Ct. 1148. “ ‘The identity of an
interrogator, and the content and tenor of his questions,’ can
illuminate the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation.”” Id.
(citations omitted).

More recently, the Supreme Court again addressed the
Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Clark, — U.S. —~, 185
S.Ct. 2178, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015). Clark was convicted of
felonious assault, child endangerment, and domestic violence
arising from his physical abuse of his girlfriend’s three-year-
old son and eighteen-month-old daughter. Id. at 2177-78. The
three-year-old’s preschool teachers observed visible injuries to
his eye, face, and chest. Id. at 2178. When the lead teacher
asked, “[w]ho did this” and “[wJhat happened to you,” the
child responded “Dee, Dee.” Id. The Court held the child’s
statement was not testimonial (even though it required his
teachers to report the abuse) because “a statement cannot fall
within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary purpose
was testimonial.” Id. at 2180-81. “Where no such primary
purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern

of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause.” Id. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 359, 131
S.Ct. 1148). In addressing “whether statements to persons
other than law enforcement officers are subject to the Con-
frontation Clause,” the Supreme Court “decline[d] to adopt a
categorical rule” but noted “such statements are much less
likely to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement.
officers.” Id. at 2181. The Court identified several cireum-
stances contributing to its determination, including the fact
that the questions and answers “were primarily aimed at
identifying and ending the threat” and protecting the child-
victim, the conversation between the child and his teachers
was “informal and spontaneous,” the declarant was three
years old at the time of his statement, and the teachers were
not “principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting
criminal behavior.” Id. at 2181-82. See also State v. Ladner,
873 S.C. 108, 118-15, 644 S.H.2d 684, 689-90 (2007) (state-
ments made by two-and-a-half year old girl to her caretakers
immediately after the discovery of her injury were nontestimo-
nial and, thus, not admitted in violation of Crawford).

Hl We find John Doe 2’s statement in response to the
EMT questioning was nontestimonial. The statement occurred
in an ambulance on the way to the hospital during an ongoing
medical emergency—facts that distinguish this case from
Crawford ’s formal police interrogations at the station. See 541
US. at 38-40, 124 S.Ct. 1854 (explaining that following his
arrest, Crawford and his wife were both interrogated twice).
Nor are the circumstances in this case akin to the police
interrogation and battery affidavit in Hammon, where officers
knew the identity of the attacker and questioned the victim
only after they had safeguarded her from potential harm. 547
US, at 829-34, 126 8.Ct. 2266,

The conversation between Paramedic Tinnel and John Doe
2 is closer to that of a victim’s identification of his or her
abuser in response to initial questioning from a 911 emergency
operator or a teacher. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-29, 126 8.Ct.
2266; Clark, 185 S.Ct. at 2178. Tinnel explained “[t]he purpose
we were going after was to determine [John Doe 2’s] level of
consciousness and to determine his cognitive thought process,
especially with the possibility of a gunshot wound to the head.”
As the Supreme Court held in Bryant, we find the “primary

purpose” of the questioning in this case—what is your name,
how did this happen, who did this to you, and who is your
daddy—was “simply to address what they perceived to be an
ongoing emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formali-
ty that would have alerted [the victim] to or focused him on
the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements.” 562
US. at 877, 181 S.Ct. 1148. Tinnel’s objective was to keep
John Doe 2 “awake and talking,” “find out if he had any other
injuries,” and “determine his level of responsiveness” during
an ongoing medical emergency.

The Supreme Court’s holding in Clark further supports the
circuit court’s conclusion and our opinion that the introduction
of the challenged testimony here did not violate the Confron-
tation Clause. See Clark, 185 S.Ct. at 2181 (“The teachers
asked [the child-victim] about his injuries immediately upon
discovering them, in the informal setting of a preschool lunch-
room and classroom, and they did so precisely as any con-
cerned citizen would talk to a child who might be the victim of
abuse.”). Likewise, the conversation in the ambulance was
spontaneous because Tinnel began questioning John Doe 2
immediately after he became responsive, as he testified he
does “with just about every patient.”

John Doe 2’s very young age further reinforces our conclu-
sion that the challenged testimony was not testimonial. See id.
at 2182 (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if
ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool stu-
dents understand the details of our criminal justice sys-
tem.... [and research shows] young children ‘have little
understanding of prosecution.’”), No twenty-eight-month-old
child in John Doe 2’s position would intend for his statement
to substitute for trial testimony. Certainly, this child, who
possibly witnessed his mother and brother shot to death and,
at the very least, was left alone in a room with his dead
mother and severe injuries of his own, was not making a
statement for future prosecutorial use as he became respon-
sive in the ambulance. As Clark explains, “a young child in
these circumstances would simply want the abuse to end,
would want to protect other victims, or would have no discer-
nible purpose at all.” Id. at 2182. Similarly, the circuit court
cogently addressed John Doe 2’s very young age in determin-
ing the statement was nontestimonial.

Finally, although the Supreme Court has declined to adopt a
categorical rule that statements to individuals who are not law
enforcement officers fall outside the testimonial scope of the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, the fact that John
Doe 2 was speaking to an EMT during an ongoing medical
emergency remains highly relevant to our determination. Af-
ter a thorough review of the record before us, we find the
admission of the challenged statement did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's ad-
mission of John Doe 2’s responses to the EMTs caring for him
in the ambulance.

Ill. Sgt. Fraser’s Testimony

Hl Daise argues the circuit court erred in allowing Staff
Sergeant Jeremiah Fraser to impermissibly comment on the
credibility of Jay Simmons’s conflicting statements to police,
Daise contends he is entitled to a new trial because witness
credibility is a matter within the exclusive province of the
jury, and one witness is not allowed to testify as to the
truthfulness of another.

Simmons gave conflicting testimony regarding Daise’s activ-
ities and demeanor on the date of the shootings. Simmons’s
trial testimony was consistently conflicting; he also provided
conflicting accounts to law enforcement during the investiga-
tion. Specifically, on direct examination, Simmons denied talk-
ing with Daise on the evening of the murders. Simmons
testified he picked up Daise approximately a mile from the
erime scene after sending him the “on the way” text, dropped
him off near the tracks on Poppy Hill Road, and was back
home before his girlfriend arrived at 7:00 p.m. Simmons stated
Daise “seemed alright” when he picked him up and he denied
previously telling Sergeant Fraser that Daise acted like he
had been robbed and was stressed out. On cross-examination,
Simmons testified he told police he picked up Daise from the
side of the road near the crime scene only after law enforce-
ment threatened to charge him with accessory after the fact.
Simmons then stated he gave Daise a “ride to the store”
before subsequently testifying he never picked up Daise at all.
Simmons acknowledged texting Daise that he was “on the
way” but stated he was unable to find Daise.

Hl Thereafter, the State called Fraser to explain why
police questioned Simmons on both November 15 and Novem-
ber 18, 2009:

Q: [When you talked to Jay Simmons [on November 18,

2009], had he been talked to already by other officers?

A: Yes, he had.

Q: And was the story that he gave those officers credible?

A: No, it was not.

Q: Did you have information that led you to believe that
those stories were not credible?
A: Yes, we did.

Q: Is that why you wanted to interview him again?

A: Yes, sir, that’s correct.
Fraser explained Daise gave law enforcement one story before
he was confronted with his cell phone and the “on the way”
text but provided an alternative version of events after the
confrontation.

The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported

by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject

to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evi-

dence of truthful character is admissible only after the

character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked

by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
Rule 608(a), SCRE. “Our courts have previously held that
‘(t]he assessment of witness credibility is within the exclusive
province of the jury,’ and that witnesses generally are ‘not
allowed to testify whether another witness is telling the
truth!” State v. Kromah, 401 8.C. 340, 358, 737 8.B.2d 490,
499-500 (2018) (quoting State v. McKerley, 397 S.C. 461, 464,
725 §.E.2d 189, 141 (Ct. App. 2012) (alteration in original)).
Moreover, “{ilt is improper for the solicitor to cross-examine a
witness in such a manner as to force him to attack the veracity
of another witness. This error is reversible if the accused is
unfairly prejudiced thereby.” State v. Bryant, 816 8.C. 216,
221, 447 S.H.2d 852, 855 (1994) (quoting State v. Sapps, 295
S.C. 484, 486, 369 S.H.2d 145, 145-46 (1988)).

Considering the record as a whole, we find Fraser’s testimo-
ny regarding the credibility of Simmons’s conflicting state-
ments constituted improper witness pitting. However, because
Simmons gave inconsistent statements throughout his own
trial testimony, he effectively impeached his own credibility.
See Thrift v. State, 302 S.C. 585, 587, 397 S.E.2d 528, 525
(1990) (“[IImproper ‘pitting’ constitutes reversible error only if
the accused was unfairly prejudiced.”); State v. Hariott, 210
S.C. 290, 298, 42 S.H.2d 385, 388 (1947) (“[Aln accused cannot
avail himself of error as a ground for reversal where the error
has not been prejudicial to him.”), Although a witness is
generally not allowed to testify as to the truthfulness of
another witness, Fraser’s assertion that Simmons’s November
15 statement was not credible because it was inconsistent with
his November 18 statement was merely cumulative to Sim-
mons’s own inconsistent testimony. See State v. Blackburn,
271 S.C. 824, 829, 247 S.H.2d 334, 837 (1978) (“Under settled
principles, the admission of improper evidence is harmless
where it is merely cumulative to other evidence.”). Fraser
never stated Simmons’s trial testimony was not credible—only
that he did not find Simmons’s initial police statement credible
given that Simmons initially denied owning a cell phone, which
was demonstrably false. Thus, Daise was not prejudiced by
Fraser’s testimony.

IV. Fear Testimony

Daise challenges the testimony of Jeanine’s coworker and
friend, Alleen Porter, arguing the circuit court erred in admit-
ting her testimony that Jeanine feared Daise.

At trial, the State proffered Porter’s testimony. During the
proffer, Porter testified Jeanine “was terrified of [Daise]’ and
wanted to leave him. Due to their volatile relationships, Porter
and Jeanine formed a safety plan. Porter explained that she
and Jeanine communicated at certain times throughout the
night and on weekends to make sure each was okay. Porter
also testified that she overheard arguments between Jeanine
and Daise. On a specific instance, Porter overheard Daise tell
Jeanine, “I'll kill you and your mother fing kids.” The circuit
court concluded Porter’s testimony was admissible but ex-
plained she could not testify about why Jeanine feared Daise.

Rule 803(8), SCRE, provides that a statement ‘of the declar-

ant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or

physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,

mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a

statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remem-

bered or believed’ is not excluded by the hearsay rule.
State v. Hughes, 419 S.C. 149, 155, 796 S.H.2d 174, 178 (Ct.
App. 2017). “Our supreme court has held that ‘while the
present state of the declarant’s mind is admissible as an
exception to hearsay, the reason for the declarant’s state of
mind is not.’” Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 334 S.C. 71, 76, 512
8.E.2d 507, 509 (1999)). “The court cautioned that ‘if the
reservation in the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must
be understood to narrowly limit those admissible statements
to declarations of condition—I’m scared”—and not belief-
“Tm scared because [someone] threatened me.”’” Id. at 155—
56, 796 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting Garcia, 334 S.C. at 76, 512
§.E.2d at 509).

In this case, the circuit court erred in admitting some of
Porter’s testimony; however, such admission did not cause
Daise prejudice. See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 288, 625
§.E.2d 641, 646 (2006) (“The improper admission of hearsay is
reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice.”).

HMMM At trial, Porter testified Jeanine “was terrified of
him” and wanted to leave him. Porter also testified about
overhearing Daise threaten to kill Jeanine and her children.
We find these statements were inadmissible because they not
only revealed Jeanine’s fearful state of mind, they described
the reason for it. See Garcia, 384 S.C. at 76, 512 S.H.2d at 509
(“[W]hile the present state of the declarant’s mind is admissi-
ble as an exception to hearsay, the reason for the declarant’s
state of mind is not.”), Porter's statement closely emulates the
testimony ruled inadmissible in Garcia. See id. at 74-76, 512
§.E.2d at 508-09 (holding a witness’s testimony was improper-
ly admitted under Rule 808 stating, “[w]hile their testimony
presents circumstantial evidence of the decedent’s fear of
appellant and concern for her safety, the testimony improperly
reveals the reason for her state of mind (ie., that appellant
had kicked and threatened to kill her)”), Nevertheless, this
testimony was cumulative to Frank’s testimony that his

daughter feared Daise and planned to end the relationship,
which was presented without objection. Accordingly, we find
any inadmissible testimony was cumulative such that Daise
cannot demonstrate prejudice. See Weston, 867 S.C. at 288-89,
625 S,H.2d at 646 (finding even if witnesses’ testimony con-
cerning victim’s fear of the defendant was inadmissible, there
was no prejudicial error because it was cumulative to other
witnesses’ testimony admitted without objection); see also
Hughes, 419 S.C, at 156-57, 796 8.H.2d at 179 (explaining that
although the circuit court erred in admitting some of the
testimony, the appellant could not demonstrate the necessary
resulting prejudice).

Additionally, any error in admitting Porter’s testimony was
harmless due to the other overwhelming evidence of Daise’s
guilt. See State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 110 n.7, 771 S.H.2d
836, 340 n.7 (2015) (stating an error in admitting certain
testimony could be deemed harmless because of the existence
of overwhelming evidence of guilt); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C.
572, 578, 386 S.H.2d 150, 151 (1985) (finding the erroneous
admission of hearsay testimony harmless in light of the other
“abundant evidence” of defendant’s guilt). Phone records re-
vealed that between 11:39 a.m. and 3:52 p.m. on November 15,
2009, Jeanine called Daise eighteen times. Child 1 testified
Daise drove the white van away from Jeanine’s home on the
morning of November 15. Video surveillance shows Daise had
the van at a gas station shortly before noon, and he was seen
driving the van near Eddie’s Disco around dusk. Frank, Child
1, and Child 2 arrived back at Jeanine’s around 7:00 p.m.,
where they saw the “ransacked” van in the driveway. Inside
the home, Frank discovered Jeanine, John Doe 1, and John
Doe 2. Contrary to Daise’s claim that he was not in the vicinity
of the residence on the evening of the incident, Simmons
testified he picked up Daise about a mile from Jeanine’s and
dropped him off near the tracks on Poppy Hill Road. Further,
when Daise was arrested, gunshot residue and traces of
Jeanine’s blood were found on his jeans. Thus, we find the
State presented overwhelming evidence of guilt such that any
error in the admission of the “fear” statements was harmless.

V. Batson Materials

Hl Daise argues the circuit court erred in refusing to
require the State to produce certain prosecutorial training

materials regarding jury selection. Daise asserts African-
American jurors are struck disproportionately in Beaufort
County, and the court’s failure to require disclosure of the
State’s Batson “handbook” prevented him from making a
viable Batson challenge.

Before trial, Daise subpoenaed the records custodian of the
South Carolina Commission on Prosecution Coordination (the
Commission) to provide “[aJll documents regarding jury selec-
tion, including but not limited to training documents, training
agendas, manuals, policy statements or ... advisements, cor-
respondence with current or former prosecutors and circuit
court judges.” Daise stated two capital lawyers who had
reviewed some of the materials suggested they were a “hand-
book on how to get around Batson.” Daise also noted the
circuit court had received expert testimony from a statistician
who indicated that in Beaufort County, African-American
males were struck at a rate four and a half times higher than
Caueasian males."

The circuit court reviewed the Commission materials in
camera and ruled they did not “include any abusive instruc-
tions or teaching materials, nor use of improper technique.”
The court also found the materials were “generally protected
as work-product, as they were created and disseminated in a
limited fashion with the purpose of assisting the State’s prepa-
rations for trial.” We agree. See, e.g., Tobaccoville USA, Ine. v.
McMaster, 887 S.C. 287, 294, 692 S.E.2d 526, 580 (2010)
(“(Alttorney work product doctrine protects from discovery
documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, unless a
substantial need can be shown by the requesting party.”);
State v. Myers, 859 S.C. 40, 49, 596 S.H.2d 488, 498 (2004)
(noting Rule 5, SCRCrimP, exempts from discovery work
product and internal prosecution documents which contain no
impeachment or exculpatory evidence); Rule 5(a)(2),
SCRCrimP (“Except as provided in [prior subsections], this
rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,

13. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986).

14. This testimony does not appear in the record. However, the circuit
judge noted she heard cases in Beaufort County every week and she had
never been concerned with the racial makeup of the county’s juries.

a “

memoranda, or other internal prosecution documents made by
the attorney for the prosecution or other prosecution agents in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of the
case....”),

HH Similarly, our review of the approximately 1000 pages
of Commission materials sealed for appellate review revealed
nothing encouraging prosecutors to strike jurors for imper-
missible reasons—race-based or otherwise. The documents
include outlines, slideshows, and handouts from various lec-
tures and training sessions. Many discuss the Batson frame-
work, and some do provide general advice on how to evaluate
jurors. However, nothing in the submitted documents suggests
an intent to help prosecutors racially discriminate. In fact, the
materials contain statements such as “the critical question is
whether or not a juror can give both the State and the
defendant a fair trial” and the repeated caution: “DO NOT
RELY ON STEREOTYPES & PREJUDICE.”

A trial court’s rulings in matters relating to discovery

generally will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a

clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs

when the trial court’s order is controlled by an error of law
or when there is no evidentiary support for the trial court’s
factual conclusions.
Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 416 S.C. 517, 587,
787 S.E.2d 485, 495 (2016) (citation omitted). We find no error
in the circuit court's in camera review and quashing of the
subpoena to the Commission.
VI. Daise’s Photograph

HI Daise argues the circuit court erred in admitting a
photograph of him in a custodial pose (State’s Exhibit 49)
because it was unfairly prejudicial and implied he had a
criminal record.

State’s Exhibit 49 depicts Daise standing in profile in front
of two bookshelves filled with books, framed pictures, and
office supplies. Daise is wearing a white tank top and blue

15. A large number of the materials are duplicative.

16, The State noted the photo was taken at a police substation that is
actually ‘‘a house that they use after hours.”

jeans. His hands are together near his beltline, and handcuffs
or other restraint devices are not visible because the State
digitally removed them.

The State asserted it sought to admit State’s Exhibit 49 to
show how Daise was dressed when he was apprehended. Daise
stated he was willing to stipulate to the chain of custody for
his jeans. The State responded there was no chain of custody
issue and explained, “This is an issue of what he was wearing
at the time law enforcement got there. That’s the only photo-
graph we have of him in the jeans.” Daise countered that
even with the digital removal of the handcuffs, the photo
depicted him in a custodial position and, thus, was substantial-
ly more prejudicial to him than probative to the State’s case.
In admitting the photo, the circuit court found the photo was
not unfairly prejudicial and noted the State had an interest in
trying its case and showing what Daise “came out in.”

WM “For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant.”
State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 126, 606 S.H,2d 508, 513 (Ct. App.
2004). “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Rule 401,
SCRE. “Evidence is admissible if logically relevant’ to estab-
lish a material fact or element of the crime; it need not be
‘necessary’ to the State’s case in order to be admitted.” Sweat,
362 S.C. at 127, 606 S.H.2d at 513. “Although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury....” Rule 403, SCRE. “If
judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403
analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.”
State v. Green, 412 8.C. 65, 79, 770 S.E.2d 424, 482 (Ct. App.
2015) (quoting State v. Lyles, 379 S.C. 328, 389, 665 8.E.2d
201, 207 (Ct. App. 2008)).

HE We find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the photograph.

17, Simmons’s girlfriend testified State’s Exhibit 49 reflected how Daise
was dressed when police apprehended him at Simmons’s home on the
night of November 15.

The introduction of a ‘mug-shot’ of a defendant is reversible
error unless: (1) the [S]tate has a demonstrable need to
introduce the photograph, (2) the photograph shown to the
jury does not suggest the defendant has a criminal record,
and (3) the photograph is not introduced in such a way as to
draw attention to its origin or implication,
Id. at 79, 770 S.E.2d at 432 (quoting State v. Traylor, 360 8.C.
74, 84, 600 S.E.2d 528, 528 (2004) (alteration in original)), In
State v. Stephens, a defendant argued the admission of a
photographic lineup was unduly prejudicial as it suggested he
had a prior criminal history. 398 S.C. 314, 319-22, 728 8.H.2d
68, 71-73 (Ct. App. 2012), This court found the argument
unpersuasive as the images in the lineup showed each subject
wearing street clothes with their “head[s] and neck[s] against
a blank background and [bearing] no identifying marks as to
date, location, agency, or purpose of the photograph.” Id. at
822, 728 S.H.2d at 72. State’s Exhibit 49 was less suggestive
than the photograph in Stephens because it showed Daise in
street clothes, lacked identifying marks, and was not part of a
lineup. The only parts of the photograph suggesting a custodi-
al pose are Daise’s profile view and the location of his hands in
a position consistent with those of a person who is handcuffed
from the front. However, neither of these elements suggest
Daise had a prior criminal history. See State v. Denson, 269
S.C. 407, 418, 237 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1977) (holding the introduc-
tion of a photograph taken from a lineup did not imply the
defendant had a criminal record; because there was testimony
about the defendant’s arrest, it was “much more likely the
jury assumed the picture was taken by the police when the
[defendant] was arrested”).
VII. Birthday Cake Photographs
HE Daise argues the trial court erred in admitting photo-
graphs showing a birthday cake because they were unneces-
sary and aroused the jury’s sympathies and prejudices by
reminding them that John Doe 1 died on his fourth birthday.
The record contains two photographs (State’s Exhibits 5
and 6) depicting the birthday cake inside a white box on a
couch in Jeanine’s living room, Neither the cake nor the box
contain discernible writing. The State argued the photographs
were relevant to show there were no signs of a forced entry or

burglary in the living room. The circuit court agreed, finding
the photographs were probative and not “prejudicial in any
way.”

State’s Exhibits 5 and 6 are relevant because they show the
undisturbed interior of Jeanine’s home, supporting the unlike-
liness of a home invasion by strangers. See Rule 401, SCRE
(stating evidence is relevant if it tends to “make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence”). Specifically, Investigator Jody Hiers testified
there were no signs that anything had been broken or stolen
in the living room, and she used one of the photographs to
note the presence of a stereo and TV. Investigator Hiers
further described how other areas of the home showed no
signs of a forced entry or burglary. See State v. Elders, 386
S.C. 474, 488, 688 S.E.2d 857, 862 (Ct. App. 2010) “Ordinarily,
it is not an abuse of discretion to admit photographs that
corroborate testimony.”).

As to the danger of unfair prejudice, we agree with the
circuit court that State’s Exhibits 5 and 6 merely showed the
family was “going to a party” and were not offered to “elicit
any sympathy.” Notably, the cake was inside an unmarked box
and no other hallmarks of a child’s birthday party were visible
except a possible birthday present beneath the box. We find
such photographs were not “calculated to arouse the sympathy
or prejudice of the jury,” and, thus, were properly admitted.
State v. Brazell, 325 S.C. 65, 78, 480 S.H.2d 64, 72 (1997).

VIO. Cumulative Error

Daise argues the cumulative effect of the circuit court’s
errors warrants a new trial.

HE “The cumulative error doctrine provides relief to a
party when a combination of errors, insignificant by them-
selves, has the effect of preventing the party from receiving a
fair trial, and the cumulative effect of the errors affects the
outcome of the trial.” State v. Beekman, 405 S.C. 225, 237, 746
§.E.2d 483, 490 (Ct. App. 2013). “An appellant must demon-
strate more than error in order to qualify for reversal pursu-
ant to the cumulative error doctrine; rather, he must show the
errors adversely affected his right to a fair trial to qualify for

reversal on this ground.” Jd. Given our analysis above, any
errors by the circuit court were not prejudicial and did not
combine to affect Daise’s right to a fair trial. Simmons’s own
contradictory testimony mitigated any error caused by “pit-
ting,” and Porter’s “fear” testimony was cumulative to other
testimony admitted without objection. Thus, any error here is
insufficient to warrant invocation of the cumulative error
doctrine, See id. at 238, 746 S.H.2d at 490 (stating our courts
do not apply the “plain error” rule and refusing to allow a
defendant to argue that the cumulative effect of several unpre-
served matters deprived him of a fair trial).

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, Daise’s convictions are
AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., concur.

807 S.B.2d 7238
Kathleen LOLLIS and Linda Campbell, Appellants/Respondents,
v

Lisa DUTTON, Dennis Dutton, and Kelsey
Dutton, Respondents/Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001861
Opinion No. 5522

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted September 7, 2017
Filed November 1, 2017

Ss

2
Ss
o

~

a
i

a

Matthew P. Turner, of Laurens, for Appellants/Respon-
dents,

John R. Ferguson, of Cox Ferguson & Wham, LLO, of
Laurens, for Respondents/Appellants.

GEATHERS, J.:

Appellants/Respondents, Kathleen Lollis and Linda Camp-
bell, and Respondents/Appellants, Lisa Dutton, Dennis Dut-
ton, and Kelsey Dutton (collectively, the Duttons), have filed
eross-appeals from the circuit court’s order in this declaratory
judgment action. Appellants/Respondents argue the circuit
court erred by concluding (1) Kathleen Lollis (Mother),
through her late son, Frank Lollis (Frank), entered into
binding contracts with Lisa Dutton and Dennis Dutton to sell
two tracts of land and (2) Lisa Dutton (Lisa) overpaid Appel-
lants/Respondents by $850.96. The Duttons argue the circuit
court erred by declining to award them attorney's fees and
costs. We affirm the circuit court’s conclusions that the disput-
ed contracts were binding and Lisa overpaid Appellants/Re-
spondents.! Further, we vacate the denial of attorney’s fees
and costs and remand this issue to the circuit court.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 20, 2011, Lisa entered into a contract of sale for
a mobile home and the tract of land on which it was located,
Tract A2 on Cemetery Road, ie. 1082 Cemetery Road, in
Ware Shoals.” The contract named Mother as the seller and
Lisa as the purchaser and required Lisa to pay a purchase
price of $58,650, plus 5 percent annual interest, in monthly
installments of $400. The contract also required Lisa to pay
county property taxes and Mother to transfer Tract A2 to
Lisa when Lisa paid “the purchase price plus all accrued

1, We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215,
SCACR.

2, Lisa had already moved into the mobile home in July 2011 and had
begun making payments on the property on August 3, 2011.

interest” in full. However, the contract provided, “If [Lisa]
does not make payments within thirty (80) days of the due
date, [Mother] shall have the right to immediately retake
possession of the subject property and all payments made by
[Lisa] under [the contract of sale] shall be forfeited.” The
contract was amended on January 4, 2012, to correct the
identifying information for the mobile home.

Frank, who lived with and took care of Mother, signed
Mother’s name to the contract and its amendment.? John
Scurry, Jr., an attorney who handled Frank’s real estate
transactions, prepared the contract of sale for Tract A2 and
signed his name as a witness. Attorney Scurry testified he saw
Frank sign Mother’s name and he thought he recalled Frank
showing him a power of attorney naming Frank as Mother's
attorney-in-fact. Lisa testified Frank had told her previously
that he had a power of attorney for Mother. At trial, Mother
denied that Frank had a power of attorney for her.

Lisa had known Frank for nineteen years and did a lot of
real estate business with him and his family. She testified all
of the locations where she had lived for the previous ten years
were related to the Lollis family and every time she purchased
property that was titled in Mother’s name, Lisa dealt with
Frank and Attorney Scurry. She typically signed documents
related to their real estate transactions at Attorney Scurry’s
office or at his house, and she “never had an issue until” she
tried to obtain a deed for Tract A2. Lisa also testified that
when she arrived to sign the contract of sale for Tract A2, the
contract already had a signature for Mother.

Attorney Scurry testified that Frank did a lot of his busi-
ness in cash and always carried a lot of cash. Frank typically
bought property in other individuals’ names and signed their
names to documents, including not only Mother but also Roger
Davenport, a former employee. In his January 6, 2014 affida-
vit, Attorney Scurry stated,

3. Frank had previously commissioned a survey for a larger parcel on
Cemetery Road for the purpose of dividing it into Tract A and Tract A2.
‘The survey was completed on October 18, 2011 and recorded on
November 21, 2011. The survey refers to “Tracts Al and A2,” but all
other references in the record are to Tract A and Tract A2.

Frank did a lot of real estate transactions, but he explained
that because of his ‘checkered past[,] he generally put the
property in other [individuals’] names. Most of his property
[was] put in [Mother’s name]. It is my opinion that [Mother]
knew that Frank titled property in her name.

Barry Adams, who had worked for Frank, testified that
Frank “was kind of picky about signing anything. He wouldn’t
sign anything unless he had a lawyer notary public [sic]
present and [made] sure the right person was there to sign.”
But Adams admitted Frank “didn’t put anything in his name.”
Adams also testified Frank told him he was planning to let
Lisa keep the mobile home but also tell her to move it off of
Tract A2:

[H]e ... told me ... that the paperwork was all screwed

up.... [W]e couldn’t find the data plate on the mobile home

that [Lisa] lives in and he had other papers with the serial
number. The title had been lost. He said that he wanted to
give [Lisa] that mobile home but he wanted her to move it
somewhere else and get it off of [Mother’s] property be-

cause he was tired of fooling with it. That it was just a

hassle and he wanted it gone and wanted them gone,

When asked why Frank included the land in the contract of
sale, Adams stated, “I don’t know anything about that. He just
said that she was trying to talk him into letting her get that
land and it belonged to [Mother]. And he couldn’t do that or
something like that, something to that effect.”

According to Frank’s sister, Appellant/Respondent Linda
Campbell (Sister), Frank was slowly dying from cancer as
early as 2011. As Frank became increasingly ill, Attorney
Scurry prepared a written power of attorney for Mother
naming Sister as her attorney-in-fact. Sister’s power of attor-
ney for Mother was executed on November 23, 2011. Attorney
Scurry explained, “[I]t was sort of agreed that [Sister] was
going to kind of take over.”

In December 2012, Frank orally agreed to sell Tract A on
Cemetery Road to Lisa’s husband, Respondent/Appellant Den-
nis Dutton (Dennis),‘ rather than to another individual who
was interested in the property, if Dennis could “pay [it] off

4. Lisa and Dennis were separated at the time.

quickly.” Therefore, on December 17, 2012, Dennis entered
into a written contract to purchase Tract A and the mobile
home on this tract. The contract named Mother and Frank as
the sellers and Dennis as the purchaser. The contract required
Dennis to pay county property taxes and a purchase price of
$27,700 in monthly installments of $300, but it did not require
the payment of interest on the purchase price. The contract
also required Mother and Frank to transfer Tract A to Dennis
when the purchase price was paid in full. However, the
contract provided, “If [Dennis] does not make payments with-
in thirty days [ ] of the due date[, Mother and Frank] have the
right to immediately retake possession of the subject proper-
ties.”

Frank and Lisa drafted this contract at the county library.
Lisa explained that Frank asked her to draft the contract
using previous contracts drafted by Attorney Scurry as temp-
lates. Lisa testified they then “went back to the house,” and
Frank and Dennis signed the contract there. Lisa further
testified she and her daughter, Respondent/Appellant Kelsey
Dutton (Kelsey), witnessed Frank and Dennis signing the
contract. According to Lisa, Frank then took the contract to
Mother to obtain her signature. Heather Fields, the Town
Clerk for the Town of Ware Shoals, testified Lisa and Frank
brought the contract to Fields that same day for her to
notarize. Fields stated that Frank and Lisa signed the con-
tract in Fields’ presence before she notarized it.

As Frank was approaching death, Lisa called Attorney
Scurry to ask “what was going to happen about her payments
and all” and “if Frank had contacted [him] about a deed.”
When Attorney Scurry told Lisa that Frank had not contacted.
him, Lisa informed Attorney Scurry she was going to visit
Frank at the hospice house in Greenwood. According to Sister,
Frank went into hospice care the last week of his life, and he
died on April 28, 2018. Sister testified she and Mother
“couldn’t see any peace from [Frank] dying on his deathbed
for [Lisa] calling him on the phone taking [chemotherapy].”

A few days after Frank died, Lisa approached Sister about
making a payment on Tract A2 and the mobile home. Sister
testified she did not know what Lisa was talking about at the
time and she asked Lisa to give her time as she had “just

buried [Frank].”* Sister also testified she later received a
letter from Lisa’s attorney indicating Lisa had completed
paying the amount she owed for Tract A2 and the mobile
home and asking for a deed to the property and the release of
a lien on the mobile home.’

On September 11, 2018, Mother and Sister filed an amended
complaint against the Duttons seeking (1) temporary and
permanent injunctions prohibiting the Duttons from occupying
or using Tract A and Tract A2; (2) a judgment declaring
Mother to be the sole owner of Tract A and Tract A2 and
determining the ownership of the mobile homes, including a
declaration that Sister is the sole owner of the mobile home on
Tract A2; (8) an order quieting title to Tract A and Tract A2;
(4) damages for trespass, fraud/misrepresentation, civil con-
spiracy, slander of title, conversion, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and (4) attorney's fees and costs.’ The
Duttons answered and counterclaimed seeking (1) specific
performance of the contracts of sale for Tracts A and A2; (2)
damages for abuse of process, slander of title, civil conspiracy,
fraud/negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Statute
of Elizabeth; and (8) attorney’s fees and costs,

After a bench trial, the circuit court issued an order con-
cluding Frank was “acting as the authorized agent for [Mother
and Sister] in his dealings with [the Duttons].” The circuit
court addressed Mother’s and Sister’s declaratory judgment
cause of action by finding the Duttons had valid and enforce-
able rights under the contracts of sale. The circuit court
dismissed Mother’s and Sister’s other causes of action. Fur-
ther, the circuit court granted the Duttons’ request for specific
performance of the contracts and dismissed their other causes
of action. The circuit court also ruled that attorney’s fees were
“denied to [Mother, Sister and the Duttons].” Mother and
Sister filed a “Motion to Reconsider, Alter, or Amend Pursu-

3. Lisa denied that Sister asked her for time.

6. The lien was in Sister's name even though Sister testified she had no
idea how she obtained it. Lisa testified she did not sign the back of the
Certificate of Title granting a lien to Sister but rather Lisa’s name was
forged,

7. The original complaint is not in the record, and the parties have not
indicated when the original complaint was filed and served,

—_i «

ant to Rule 59(e),” and the Duttons filed a “Motion to Alter or
Amend and Motion for Attorney Fees” with an accompanying
“Attorney Fee Affidavit” and “Affidavit of Costs.” The circuit
court summarily denied all post-trial motions. This appeal
followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1, Was Frank acting as an agent for Mother when he entered
into the contracts with Lisa and Dennis?
2. Did the cireuit court err by concluding Lisa overpaid
Mother by $850.96?
8. Did the circuit court err by summarily denying the Duttons’
request for attorney’s fees and costs?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HB “This [clourt reviews all questions of law de novo.”
Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 302, 688 S.E.2d 808, 807 (Ct.
App. 2009); see also Clardy v. Bodolosky, 388 S.C, 418, 425,
679 S.H.2d 527, 580 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Questions of law may be
decided with no particular deference to the trial court.” (quot-
ing S.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. M & T Enters. of Mt. Pleasant,
LLC, 879 S.C. 645, 654, 667 S.E.2d 7, 12 (Ct. App. 2008))).
“Review of the [circuit] court’s factual findings, however,
depends on ... whether the underlying action is an action at
law or an action in equity.” Fesmire, 885 S.C. at 302, 683
8.E.2d at 807 (citing Townes Assocs. Ltd. v. City of Greenville,
266 S.C, 81, 85-86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1976)). Further,
“fw]hen a suit involves both legal and equitable issues, each
cause of action retains its own identity as legal or equitable for
purposes of the applicable standard of review on appeal.”
Holly Woods Ass’n of Residence Owners v. Hiller, 892 S.C.
172, 180, 708 S.E.2d 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2011).

HE so[n an action at law, the circuit court’s factual find-
ings “will not be disturbed upon appeal unless found to be
without evidence [that] reasonably supports the [circuit
court’s] findings.” Townes, 266 S.C. at 86, 221 S.H.2d at 775.
“On appeal from an action in equity, [the appellate court] may
find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of
the evidence.” Walker v. Brooks, 414 S.C. 348, 847, 778 S.H.2d

477, 479 (2015). “However, this broad scope of review does not
require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore
the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position to
assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Laughon v. O’Braitis,
360 S.C. 520, 524-25, 602 S8.H.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004).
Further, “this broad scope does not relieve the appellant of
[the] burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”
Ballard v. Roberson, 399 S.C. 588, 593, 733 S.E.2d 107, 109
(2012); accord Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 887-88, 544
8.E.2d 620, 628 (2001).

Wl “To determine whether an action is legal or equitable,
this [clourt must look to the action’s main purpose as reflected
by the nature of the pleadings, evidence, and character of the
relief sought.” Fesmire, 385 S.C. at 308, 688 S.E.2d at 807; see
also Alford v. Martin, 176 S.C. 207, 212, 180 S.H. 18, 15 (1985)
(“The character of an action is determined by the complaint in
its main purpose and broad outlines and not ... by allegations
that are merely incidental.”). Here, we examine only those
causes of action that the circuit court addressed, ie., the
Amended Complaint’s declaratory judgment cause of action
and the Duttons’ counterclaim for breach of contract.

“Declaratory judgments are neither legal nor equita-
ble.” Bundy v. Shirley, 412 S.C. 292, 301, 772 S.H.2d 163, 168
(2015). “The standard of review for a declaratory judgment
action is, therefore, determined by the nature of the underly-
ing issue.” Jd. In their declaratory judgment cause of action,
Mother and Sister sought a judgment declaring the Duttons to
have no legal or equitable interest in Tract A or Tract A2;
Mother sought a judgment declaring her to be the sole owner
of Tracts A and A2; and Sister sought a judgment declaring
her to be the sole owner of the mobile home on Tract A2.
Hence, the issue underlying Mother’s and Sister’s declaratory
judgment cause of action is in the nature of a quiet title claim.

Hl “Typically, an action to remove a cloud on and quiet
title to land is one in equity.” Estate of Tenney v. S.C. Dep't of
Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C, 100, 105, 712 S.E.2d 395,
897 (2011); see also Holly Woods, 392 S.C. at 180-81, 708
§.H.2d at 792 (“[AJn action to quiet title to property is an
action in equity.” (quoting Jones v. Leagan, 384 8.C. 1, 10, 681
§.H.2d 6, 11 (Ct. App. 2009))). “However, ‘when the defen-

dant’s answer raises an issue of paramount title to land, such
as would, if established, defeat the plaintiff's action, the issue
of title is legal.” Estate of Tenney, 398 8.C. at 105, 712 S.B.2d
at 397 (quoting Dargan v. Tankersley, 380 S.C. 480, 488, 671
8.E.2d 78, 74 (2008)). Here, the Duttons’ answer did not
precisely assert a paramount title to Tracts A and A2. In fact,
they conceded Mother held legal title to these tracts. Rather,
they asserted they held equitable title to the tracts and sought
specific performance as a remedy for Mother's alleged breach
of the contracts to sell the tracts.

Further, our appellate courts have traditionally viewed the
main purpose of a cause of action seeking specific performance
as the pursuit of equitable relief and thus have found such a
claim to be equitable in nature. See Ingram v. Kasey’s Assocs.,
340 S.C. 98, 105, 581 S.H.2d 287, 290-91 (2000) (applying the
equitable standard of review to the findings of fact in a specific
performance action); Lowcountry Open Land Trust v.
Charleston S. Univ., 376 8.C. 399, 406, 656 S.E.2d 775, 779
(Ct. App. 2008) (holding that an action for specific perform-
ance lies in equity).®

Based on the foregoing, we view the two causes of action
addressed by the circuit court in the instant case as equitable
in nature. Therefore, this court may review the circuit court’s
factual findings in accordance with its own view of the prepon-
derance of the evidence. Walker, 414 S.C. at 347, 778 S.H.2d at
479 (“On appeal from an action in equity, [the appellate court]
may find facts in accordance with its view of the preponder-
ance of the evidence.”). Nonetheless, we defer to the circuit

8. In Fesmire, this court noted the supreme court's application of the
legal standard of review to the factual findings in a specific perform-
ance action in McGill y. Moore, 381 S.C, 179, 672 S.E.2d 571 (2009).
385 S.C. at 304, 683 S,E.2d at 807-08. We distinguished Fesmire from
McGill by explaining that the very existence of a contract with the
specific terms asserted by the Fesmires was disputed, whereas in
McGill, the existence of the contracts was undisputed and the court was
required to interpret the contracts’ written provisions before determin-
ing the suitability of specific performance as a remedy. Id. at 304, 683
S.E.2d at 807, The McGill court concluded the purpose of the action
before it was to construe a contract and such an action was an action at
law. McGill, 381 S.C. at 185, 672 S.E.2d at 574. Here, as in Fesmire,
very existence of the contracts was disputed because Mother alleged
that her signatures were forged. Therefore, we find the instant action to
be distinguishable from McGill.

court’s determinations of witness credibility. See Laughon, 360
S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.H.2d at 111 (“However, this broad scope
of review does not require this court to disregard the findings
at trial or ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a
better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see
also Ballard, 899 S.C. at 598, 788 S.H.2d at 109 (“[TJhis broad
scope does not relieve the appellant of his burden to show that
the trial court erred in its findings.”).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I, Agency

Mother and Sister argue the circuit court erred by conelud-
ing Mother entered into contracts with Dennis and Lisa for
the sale of Tracts A and A2 and ordering specific performance
of the contracts because Frank was not an agent for Mother.
We disagree.

HR “Agency is a question of fact.” Gathers v. Harris
Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 226, 317 8.E.2d 748,
752 (Ct. App. 1984). “[TJhe relationship of agency need not
depend upon express appointment and acceptance thereof.
Rather, an agency relationship may be, and frequently is,
implied or inferred from the words and conduct of the parties
and the circumstances of the particular case.” Nationwide
Mut. Ins, Co. v. Prioleau, 859 S.C. 238, 242, 597 S.H.2d 165,
168 (Ct, App. 2004),

The law creates the relationship of principal and agent if the

parties, in the conduct of their affairs, actually place them-

selves in such position as requires the relationship to be
inferred by the courts, and if, from the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case, it appears that there was at
least an implied intention to create it, the relation may be
held to exist, notwithstanding a denial by the alleged princi-
pal, and whether or not the parties understood it to be an
agency.

Id. (quoting Crystal Ice Co. of Columbia v. First Colonial

Corp., 278 8.C. 806, 309, 257 S.H.2d 496, 497 (1979).

HM In other words, agency “may be proved circumstan-
tially by the conduct of the purported agent exhibiting a
pretense of authority with the knowledge of the alleged princi-

pal.” Town of Kingstree v. Chapman, 405 S.C. 282, 315, 747
8.B.2d 494, 511 (Ct. App. 2018) (quoting R & G Constr., Inc. v.
Lowcountry Reg’l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 484, 540 S.H.2d
118, 118 (Ct. App. 2000); see also 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion
§ 111 (2017) (“When an owner expressly or impliedly assents
to or ratifies a disposition of certain property, there can be no
recovery for conversion as there was no unauthorized conduct
regarding property of the owner.”).

HE Further, “the doctrine of apparent authority pro-
vides that the principal is bound by the acts of his agent when
he has placed the agent in such a position that persons of
ordinary prudence, reasonably knowledgeable with business
usages and customs, are led to believe the agent has certain
authority and they in turn deal with the agent based on that
assumption.” Spence v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 126, 628 S.H.2d
869, 879 (2006) (emphasis added).

A principal may be held liable to a third person in a civil

lawsuit for the fraud, deceit, concealment, misrepresenta-

tion, negligence, and other omissions of duty of his agent

[that] occur in the scope of the agent’s employment, even

when the principal did not authorize, participate in, or know

of such misconduct or even when the principal forbade or
disapproved of the act in question. This rule “is founded
upon public policy and convenience, for in no other way
could there be any safety to third persons in their dealings,
either directly with the principal, or indirectly with him
through the instrumentality of agents. In every such case[,]
the principal holds out his agent as competent and fit to be
trusted, and thereby, in effect, he warrants his fidelity and
good conduct in all matters within the scope of the agen-
ey.... Seeing that some one must be [the] loser by the
deceit, it is more reasonable that he who employs and
confides in the deceiver should be the loser than a strang-
en.

Id. at 126-27, 628 S.H.2d at 879-80 (emphases added) (citation

omitted) (quoting West v. Serv. Life & Health Ins. Co., 220

8.C. 198, 202, 66 S.H.2d 816, 817 (1951)).

HMM Here, Attorney Scurry testified Mother was “fully
aware that Frank was buying and selling property in her
name” and was “transacting business in her name.” Attorney

_—

Scurry also testified that Frank “bought and sold a lot of
property in [Mother’s] name.” Further, Lisa testified Mother
was present when Lisa made some of her payments to Frank,
Mother never objected, and Mother even retrieved the receipt
book for Frank on a few occasions. Dennis and his daughter,
Kelsey Dutton, gave similar testimony, and Dennis stated he
believed Frank was acting on Mother’s behalf. Dennis testified
he made one of his payments on Tract A to Frank at Mother’s
house and Mother was present but did not object. Likewise,
Larry Colson, a friend of Kelsey, delivered one of the Duttons’
payments, a $700 check, to Frank at the Lollises’ home in
December 2012. Colson told Frank that Dennis sent him to
make a mobile home payment, and Mother was present at that
time.

Moreover, there was some evidence that Frank had a power
of attorney for Mother until she named Sister as her attorney-
in-fact on November 28, 2011, and Sister’s power of attorney
post-dated the contract of sale for Tract A2. But even if Frank
never had a written power of attorney, Lisa testified (1) Frank
told her he had a power of attorney for Mother; (2) Lisa
relied on Frank’s representation; and (8) she would not have
entered into the contract of sale for Tract A2 and made
payments on the property had she known Mother was not
going to acknowledge her payments. Likewise, Dennis testi-
fied (1) he believed Frank was acting on Mother's behalf; (2)
he relied on the course of dealing that Frank had established
with him in previous transactions for property titled in Moth-
er’s name; and (8) if he had known that Mother was not going
to honor the contract of sale for Tract A, he would not have
entered into the contract and made payments on the property.

In sum, Mother’s knowledge that Frank was buying and
selling property in her name and her tacit acceptance of this
practice placed Frank “in such a position that” Lisa and
Dennis were “led to believe” Frank had the authority to act on
Mother's behalf “and they in turn [dealt] with [Frank] based
on that assumption.” Spence, 368 S.C. at 126, 628 8.H.2d at
879; see also Chapman, 405 S.C. 282, 315, 747 S.H.2d 494, 511
(“(Algency may be proved circumstantially by the conduct of
the purported agent exhibiting a pretense of authority with
the knowledge of the alleged principal.” (quoting R & G
Constr. Inc., 348 S.C. at 434, 540 S.E.2d at 118)).

Based on the foregoing, the preponderance of the evidence
shows an agency relationship between Mother and Frank as
well as his apparent authority to sell Tracts A and A2 to
Dennis and Lisa. Therefore, Frank’s actions were binding on
Mother.

IL. Overpayment

Mother and Sister maintain the circuit court erred by
concluding Lisa overpaid the sum of $850.96 and by ordering
Mother and Sister to refund that amount to the Duttons.
Specifically, Mother and Sister assign error to the circuit
court’s finding that the Duttons were more credible than
Mother and Sister. We disagree.

Initially, we note Mother and Sister cite no authority for
their argument. Therefore, this court may deem this argument
abandoned. See Bryson v. Bryson, 878 S.C. 502, 510, 662
§.E.2d 611, 615 (Ct. App. 2008) (“An issue is deemed aban-
doned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is
raised in a brief but not supported by authority.”), In any
event, we find no error in the circuit court’s finding that Lisa
overpaid $850.96 to Mother and Sister.

Hs E'ven when this court’s scope of review is broad-
ened in equity cases, “[t]he credibility of testimony is a matter
for the finder of fact to judge.” S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Forrester, 282 8.C. 512, 516, 320 8.H.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 1984);
see Laughon, 360 S.C. at 524-25, 602 S.H.2d at 111 (holding
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of review “does
not require this court to disregard the findings at trial or
ignore the fact that the [circuit court] was in a better position
to assess the credibility of the witnesses”). In a bench trial,
the judge, as the finder of fact, may believe all, some, or none
of the testimony, even when it is not contradicted, Cf Ross v.
Paddy, 340 S.C. 428, 484, 582 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2000)
(“Even where the evidence is uncontradicted, the jury may
believe all, some, or none of the testimony. ...”). “Because the
appellate court lacks the opportunity for direct observation of
the witnesses, it should accord great deference to [circuit]
court findings where matters of credibility are involved.”
Forrester, 282 8.C. at 516, 320 8.B.2d at 42.

_

HM Here, the circuit court relied on its assessment of the
comparative credibility of the parties to find that the Duttons
fulfilled their obligations under the disputed contracts and
Lisa overpaid Mother and Sister by $850.96. We conclude
Mother and Sister have failed to carry their burden of con-
vincing this court that it should not defer to the cireuit court's
assessment. See Ballard, 399 S.C. at 593, 733 S.H.2d at 109
(stating the equitable standard of review “does not relieve the
appellant of his burden to show that the trial court erred in its
findings”). At trial, Lisa testified she made all of the payments
required by the contract of sale for Tract A2, plus an extra
$850.96, and she presented several canceled checks and cash
receipts showing her monthly payments. Mother and Sister
presented a handwriting expert in an attempt to cast doubt on
the authenticity of this evidence. However, the circuit court
had concerns with the specimen signatures Mother and Sister
provided to their expert. Given our examination of the record,
including Mother's repudiation of one of her own specimen
signatures,’ we share those concerns. See Fletcher v. Med.
Univ. of S.C., 890 S.C. 458, 463, 702 S.H.2d 372, 874 (Ct. App.
2010) (“The probative value of expert testimony stands or falls
upon an evidentiary showing of the facts upon which the
opinion is, or must logically be, predicated.” (quoting Ward v.
Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 568, 851 S.B.2d 867, 876 (Ct. App.
1986))).

Further, because Mother and Sister challenged Lisa’s finan-
cial ability to pay for Tract A2, Lisa recited the sources of her
income, which included proceeds from the sale of previously-
owned real estate; a lump sum Social Security Disability
payment; monthly disability payments; savings from monthly
Social Security payments to her daughter Kelsey over the
course of nine years; and gifts from relatives. Lisa also
indicated Dennis received approximately $700 per month in
Supplemental Security Income benefits and approximately
$50,000 per year buying and selling items on craigslist. Den-
nis’s testimony corroborated this, except to clarify that the
$50,000 “wasn’t all profit.” Dennis also testified he paid all that
was due under the contract of sale for Tract A, and he

9. One of Mother's specimen signatures was on her purported driver's
license. At trial, Mother refused to verify the authenticity of this signa-
ture,

presented cash receipts showing his payments and a Certifi-
cate of Title to the mobile home showing Frank’s release of his
lien on the mobile home. The circuit court took judicial notice
that the date on the last receipt and the date on the lien
release were the same, February 8, 2013.

Several other witnesses corroborated Lisa’s and Dennis’s
testimony concerning their payments as well as Frank’s pref-
erence for doing business in cash. One of these witnesses,
Heather Fields, a notary public, testified she saw Frank sign
two cash receipts. The circuit court found Fields to be a
credible, neutral witness, and our examination of the record
confirms this assessment. In contrast, Sister refused to ac-
knowledge receiving any payments on Tract A2 until confront-
ed with her own endorsement of a $700 check written by Lisa.

Based on the foregoing, we find nothing untoward in the
circuit court's assessment of witness credibility. Therefore, we
conclude the circuit court appropriately relied on Lisa’s credi-
bility to find she overpaid the sum of $850.96 to Mother and
Sister. In accordance with longstanding precedent, we accord
great deference to the circuit court’s assessment. See Forres-
ter, 282 S.C. at 516, 320 S.H.2d at 42 (“Because the appellate
court lacks the opportunity for direct observation of the
witnesses, it should accord great deference to [circuit] court
findings where matters of credibility are involved.”).

Ill. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

The Duttons argue the circuit court erred in declining to
award them attorney’s fees and costs. On the other hand,
Mother and Sister maintain the grounds for the Duttons’
request for attorney’s fees and costs are not preserved for
review because the Duttons did not present these grounds to
the circuit court.

HM As to one of these grounds, section 15-37-10 of the
South Carolina Code (2005), we agree with Mother and

10. Section 15-37-10 provides for the recovery of certain costs and
disbursements in a civil action “to be inserted in the judgment against
the losing party.” However, the statute also provides that in equity
cases, an award of costs and disbursements is within the court's
discretion: “In cases in chancery[,] the same rule as to costs shall
prevail unless otherwise ordered by the court.”

Sister. The Duttons did not argue to the circuit court that they
were entitled to costs and disbursements under section 15-37-
10. Therefore, the Duttons failed to preserve this ground for
review. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 880 S.C. 71, 76, 497 8.H.2d
731, 733 (1998) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and
ruled upon by the [circuit court] to be preserved for appellate
review.”).

The other three grounds for the Duttons’ request for attor-
ney’s fees and costs were set forth in their post-trial motion
for attorney's fees: (1) section 15-36-10, part of the Frivolous
Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA)," which provides in
part that a party “shall” be sanctioned for a frivolous claim or
defense if the court finds the party failed to comply with one
of three listed conditions and sanctions may include the pre-
vailing party’s reasonable attorney's fees and costs; (2) Rule
87(¢), SCRCP, which allows a party to apply for the reason-
able expenses, including attorney’s fees, in proving a matter
when the opposing party fails to admit the truth of the matter
as requested under Rule 36, SCRCP; and (8) section 15-53-100
of the South Carolina Code (2005), part of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA),” which states, “In any
proceeding under [the UDJA,] the court may make such
award of costs as may seem equitable and just.”

HH The Duttons initially requested attorney’s fees and
costs in their Answer and Counterclaim and again during
Lisa’s testimony. While they did not specifically cite the above
three grounds until they filed their post-trial motion, this
motion sufficiently preserved these grounds for review. See
Rule 54(d), SCRCP (“A motion for costs, supported by an
affidavit that the costs are correct and were necessarily in-
curred in the action, may be filed by the prevailing party
within 10 days of the receipt of written notice of the entry of
final judgment.”); Rutland v. Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond
& Garner (Law Firm), 871 8.C. 91, 96, 687 S.E.2d 316, 319
(Ct. App. 2006) (“[BJecause [the circuit court] retains jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend a

11. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10, -100 (Supp. 2016).
12. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (2005).

judgment within ten days of its issuance, a motion for sanc-
tions [under the FCPSA] would be timely if filed within ten
days of judgment.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Pit-
man v. Republic Leasing Co., 351 8.C. 429, 481, 570 S.E.2d
187, 189 (Ct. App. 2002))); Sessions v. Withers, 827 S.C. 409,
415, 488 S.H.2d 888, 891 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[E]xpenses should
be imposed under Rule 37(c) ‘only after the requesting party
actually proves the ... truth of the matter that was addressed
in the request for admission.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 7
Moore’s Federal Practice § 37.72 at 87-181 (8d ed.))).

HM As to the merits, the circuit court’s summary order
denying all post-trial motions did not specifically address the
above three grounds or the standards set forth in the corre-
sponding statute or rule. We acknowledge that findings of fact,
and conclusions of law are generally not required for decisions
on motions. See Rule 52(a), SCRCP (“Findings of fact and
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions
under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided
in Rule 41(b).” ® (emphasis added); Woodson v. DLI Props.,
LLC, 406 8.C, 517, 527, 753 8.H.2d 428, 433 (2014) (citing Rule
52, SCRCP, for the proposition that findings of facts and
conclusions of law on motions are not required for appellate
review). However, the circuit court’s order indicates it did not
exercise any discretion to evaluate the Duttons’ request for
fees and costs under Rule 37(c), SCRCP or the UDJA. See
Samples v. Mitchell, 829 8.C, 105, 112, 495 S.E.2d 218, 216
(Ct. App. 1997) (“A failure to exercise discretion amounts to an
abuse of that discretion.”); see also Fontaine v. Peitz, 291 S.C.
536, 588, 354 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1987) (“When the [circuit court]
is vested with discretion, but [its] ruling reveals no discretion
was, in fact, exercised, an error of law has occurred.”); John-
son v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 304, 372 S.H.2d 107, 115 (Ct.
App. 1988) (“A decision lacking a discernible reason is arbi-
trary and constitutes an abuse of discretion.”). In fact, Rule
37(c) requires the circuit court to exercise its discretion in a
specific manner:

If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or

the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 86, and if

13. Rule 41(b), SCRCP, concerns the involuntary dismissal of an action
or cause of action.

the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, he
may apply to the court for an order requiring the other
party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in mak-
ing that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The
court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2)
the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(8) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to
believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was
other good reason for the failure to admit.

(emphases added).

Further, the FCPSA, specifically section 15-36-10(C)(1),
makes mandatory the circuit court's determination of whether
a claim or defense was frivolous:

At the conclusion of a trial and after a verdict for or a
verdict against damages has been rendered or a case has
been dismissed by a directed verdict, summary judgment, or
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, upon motion of the
prevailing party, the court shall proceed to determine if the
claim or defense was frivolous,

(emphasis added). Section 15-86-10(C)(1) also sets forth specif-
ic standards for determining frivolity:

An attorney, party, or pro se litigant shall be sanctioned for
a frivolous claim or defense if the court finds the attorney,
party, or pro se litigant failed to comply with one of the
following conditions: (a) a reasonable attorney in the same
circumstances would believe that under the facts, his claim
or defense was clearly not warranted under existing law and
that a good faith or reasonable argument did not exist for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (b) a
reasonable attorney in the same circumstances would be-
lieve that his procurement, initiation, continuation, or de-
fense of the civil suit was intended merely to harass or
injure the other party; or (c) a reasonable attorney in the
same circumstances would believe that the case or defense
was frivolous as not reasonably founded in fact or was
interposed merely for delay, or was merely brought for a
purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of

proposed parties, or adjudication of the claim or defense
upon which the proceedings are based.

(emphases added). Nothing in the order denying the parties’
post-trial motions indicates the circuit court made such a
determination,

Based on the foregoing, we remand to the circuit court for
consideration of the above three grounds for attorney’s fees
and costs and for the required analyses of the underlying
specific facts.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court on the merits of
Mother's and Sister’s appeal, vacate the denial of attorney’s
fees and costs, and remand to the circuit court for an order
consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND RE-
MANDED.

SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

808 S.E.2d 807
Jane DOE, Petitioner,
v.

STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001726
Opinion No. 27728
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard March 23, 2016
Refiled November 17, 2017
Rehearing Granted November 17, 2017

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Bakari T. Sellers and Alexandra Marie Benevento, both of
Strom Law Firm, L.L.C., of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Solicitor General
Robert D, Cook, Deputy Solicitor General J. Emory Smith,
Jr., and Assistant Attorney General Brendan Jackson Mc-
Donald, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Richele K. Taylor and Thomas A. Limehouse, of the Office
of the Governor, both of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae Gover-
nor Henry D. McMaster.

David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood and Barry J. Bar-
nette, of Spartanburg, both for Amicus Curiae Solicitors’
Association of South Carolina, Inc.

Meliah Bowers Jefferson, of Greenville, for Amicus Curiae
South Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexu-
al Assault.

Kevin A. Hall and M. Malissa Burnette, both of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Equality Coalition, Inc.

Leslie Ragsdale Fisk, of Greenwood, Tamika Devlin Can-

non, of Greenville, and J. Edwin McDonnell, of Spartanburg,
all for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Legal Services,

Lindsey Danielle Jacobs and Patricia Standaert Ravenhorst,
both of Greenville; and Sarah Anne Ford, of Columbia, all for
Amicus Curiae South Carolina Victims Assistance Network.

Alice Witherspoon Parham Casey, of Columbia, for Amicus
Curiae Women’s Rights and Empowerment Network.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the Respondent’s petition for
rehearing, the Court grants the petition for rehearing, dis-
penses with further briefing, and substitutes the attached
opinions for the opinions previously filed in this matter.

/s/ Donald W. Beatty, C.J.

/s/_ John W, Kittredge, J.

/s/ Kaye G. Hearn, J.

/s/ John Cannon Few, J.

/s/ Costa M. Pleicones, A.J.
CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY:

The Court granted Jane Doe’s petition for original jurisdic-
tion to consider whether the definition of “household member”
in South Carolina Code section 16-25-10(8) of the Domestic
Violence Reform Act and section 20-4-20(b) of the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act + (collectively “the Acts”) is uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Claus-
es of the Fourteenth Amendment” to the United States

1, The Acts define “household member” as:

(a) a spouse;

(b) a former spouse;

(c) persons who have a child in common; or

(@) a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited.
S.C. Code Ann, § 16-25-10(3) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added); id. § 20-
4-20(b) (2014) (defining “household member” identical to section 16-
25-10(3), but designating provisions with lowercase Roman numerals
rather than letters).

2. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see

Constitution, Specifically, Doe contends the provisions are
unconstitutional because neither affords protection from do-
mestic abuse for unmarried, same-sex individuals who are
cohabiting or formerly have cohabited. In order to remain
within the confines of our jurisdiction and preserve the validity
of the Acts, we declare sections 16-25-10(8) and 20-4-20(b)
unconstitutional as applied to Doe.

I, Factual / Procedural History

This case arises out of an alleged domestic dispute between
a former same-sex couple. Doe claims that she and her ex-
fiancé cohabited between 2010 and 2015. Following the dissolu-
tion of the relationship, Doe moved out of the shared residence
and relocated to Columbia.

On August 6, 2015, Doe contacted police to report that she
was assaulted by her ex-fiancé the day before as she was
leaving a Columbia hotel. On August 10, 2015, law enforce-
ment was summoned to Doe’s workplace after someone called
regarding a disturbance in the parking lot. When the officers
arrived, Doe claimed that her ex-fiancé and another individual
followed her from her apartment to work. While no physical
confrontation took place, Doe claimed that she felt threatened
by her ex-fiancé’s actions. Law enforcement filed incident
reports for both events, the first was identified as “simple
assault” and the second was identified as “assault-intimi-
dation.”

On August 12, 2015, Doe sought an Order of Protection *
from the Richland County Family Court. The family court
judge summarily denied Doe’s request, citing a lack of juris-

S.C. Const. art, I, § 3 (‘The privileges and immunities of citizens of this
State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be
abridged, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.”).

3, An “Order of Protection” is defined as “‘an order of protection issued.
to protect the petitioner or minor household members from the abuse
of another household member where the respondent has received
notice of the proceedings and has had an opportunity to be heard.” S.C.
Code Ann. § 20-4-20(f) (2014),

diction pursuant to section 20-4-20(b), which defines “house-
hold member” in the Protection from Domestie Abuse Act.

HM Doe filed an action for declaratory judgment in this
Court’s original jurisdiction on August 14, 2015. Doe sought
for this Court to declare unconstitutional the statutory defini-
tion of “household member” because it “leaves unmarried,
same-sex victims of abuse without the benefit of the same
remedy afforded to their heterosexual counterparts.” This
Court granted Doe’s petition for original jurisdiction by order
dated November 5, 2015.5

4, Subsequently, Doe sought a Restraining Order in a Richland County
magistrate’s court. On August 13, 2015, a magistrate court judge
granted Doe a Temporary Restraining Order that was converted to a
Restraining Order on December 17, 2015.

5. The author of the dissenting opinion concludes there is no controver-
sy for which the Court should exercise its original jurisdiction. For
several reasons, we disagree with this conclusion. Initially, in granting
Doe's petition for original jurisdiction, we found the case satisfied the
requirements of our appellate court rules. See Rule 245(a), SCACR
(authorizing Supreme Court to entertain matters in its original jurisdic-
tion “[i]f the public interest is involved, or if special grounds of
emergency or other good reasons exist”), Further, this Court has
exercised its authority to grant a petition for original jurisdiction where
a legitimate constitutional issue has been raised. See, e.g., Am. Petro-
leum Inst. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 S.C. 572, 677 S.E.2d 16 (2009)
(accepting matter in original jurisdiction to address Petitioners’ claim
that Act at issue violated the “one subject” provision of the South
Carolina Constitution), holding modified by S.C. Pub. Interest v. Lucas,
416 S.C. 269, 786 S.E.2d 124 (2016); Tucker v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 314 S.C, 131, 442 S.E.2d 171 (1994) (exercising original
jurisdiction to determine whether the statute at issue violated the South
Carolina Constitution); Thompson v. S.C. Comm’n on Alcohol & Drug
Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 467, 229 S.E.2d 718, 719 (1976) (exercising
original jurisdiction and holding that provisions of the Uniform Alcohol
and Intoxication Treatment Act violated the Equal Protection clauses of
the federal and state constitutions; noting that the “questions involved
are of such wide concern, both to law enforcement personnel and to the
public, that the court should determine the issues in this declaratory
judgment action”).

Finally, any claim that “there is no controversy” before the Court is
without merit. While the parties may agree that Doe should be protect-
ed under the Acts, the parties disagree as to whether the definition of
“household member” is constitutional and the appropriate remedy.
Additionally, even if the dissent’s position were meritorious, it would
not eliminate the existence of a controversy. See 1A C.J.S, Actions § 16,
at 259 (2016) (defining “controversy” and stating, “In a limited sense, it

II. Discussion

A. Arguments

In essence, Doe maintains the South Carolina General As-
sembly intentionally excluded her from consideration for an
Order of Protection in family court “because of her sexual
orientation.” As a result, Doe claims she was denied a remedy
that is readily accessible to similarly situated opposite-sex
couples. Doe explains that by purposefully defining “household
member” as “a male and female who are cohabiting or former-
ly have cohabited” rather than in the disjunctive “male or
female,” the General Assembly enacted a statutory definition
that violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Specifically, Doe asserts she has been arbitrarily and capri-
ciously deprived of the right to protect her life as she cannot
obtain an Order of Protection in family court. Further, Doe
contends she is being denied the same protection afforded to
opposite-sex, cohabiting couples even though there is no ra-
tional reason to justify this disparate treatment.

Although Doe acknowledges that an abuser in a same-sex
relationship could be charged with criminal assault and bat-
tery and that she could obtain a Restraining Order in magis-
trate’s court, she claims that these remedies are not commen-
surate with the heightened penalties and protections afforded
by the Acts. In particular, Doe points to the provisions of the
Domestic Violence Reform Act that authorize enhanced penal-
ties for convicted abusers who commit additional acts of
violence, restrictions on a convicted abuser’s ability to carry a
firearm, additional penalties for violations of protection orders,
and more stringent expungement requirements.

To remedy the disparate treatment and avoid the invalida-
tion of the Acts in their entirety, Doe advocates for this Court
to: (1) construe the word “and” in sections 16-25-10(8)(d) and
20-4-20(b)(iv) to mean “or”; and (2) declare the definition of
“household member” to include any person, male or female,

may be defined as an allegation of fact on one side which is denied by
the other side, but the element of dispute is not essential to constitute a
justiciable controversy, as such a controversy may exist even if all of the
facts and the law are admitted by all the parties” (footnotes omitted).

who is currently cohabiting with someone or who has formerly
eohabited with someone.

In response, the State contends that any constitutional
analysis could be avoided if the Court: (1) construes the
phrase “male and female” as proposed by Doe; or (2) sever
those words from the definition so that it reads only “cohabit-
ing or formerly have cohabited.” The State asserts that such a
construction would be consistent with and effectuate the legis-
lative purpose of the Acts, which is to protect against violence
between members of the same household.

Alternatively, if the Court strikes down the Acts based on a
constitutional violation, the State submits the Court could
delay implementing its decision to allow the General Assembly
time to amend the statutes consistent with this Court’s ruling.
Ultimately, given the importance of the domestic violence
statutes, the State implores this Court not to invalidate the
Acts in their entirety based solely on the literal import of the
word “and.”

B. Constitutional Analysis

1, Legislative History °

Hl An overview of the legislative history of the Acts,
particularly the term “household member,” is instructive. In
1984, the General Assembly enacted the Criminal Domestic
Violence Act and the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act. Act

6. The author of the dissenting opinion takes issue with our reference to
“legislative history.” Interestingly, the dissent contends it is “improp-
er,” yet relies on the 1994 and 2005 versions of the Acts to declare that
“Tilt is in fact perfectly reasonable to construe the Acts to protect
unmarried, same-sex couples,” Further, the dissent claims it “is not
truly legislative history” because it does not “focus on some event,
document, or statement separate from the amendment itself through
which the Court could explain how the legislative history reflects the
legislative intent.” While the term “legislative history” encompasses the
use of the items identified by the dissent, and is generally relied on if
the text of the statute is ambiguous, it is not so limited in application
and may include, as we did, the historical evolution of the statute at
issue, See 73 Am. Jur, 2d Statutes § 97, at 336 (2012) (“In determining
legislative intent, the court may review the earlier versions of the law.
Therefore, in the construction of a statute, reference may be made to
earlier statutes on the subject which are regarded as in pari materia
with the later statute.”).

No. 484, 1984 S.C. Acts 2029. Notably, both Acts are contained
within Act No. 484; however, the definition of “household
member” is different in each Act.’ Over the course of the next
thirty-one years, the General Assembly amended the Acts four
times, the most extensive in 2015.

In 1994, the General Assembly amended sections 16-25-10
and 20-4-20 to delete “family or” preceding “household mem-
ber,” add “persons who have a child in common,” and add/sub-
stitute “a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly
hawe cohabited” for “and persons cohabitating or formerly
cohabitating.” Act No. 519, 1994 S.C. Acts 5926, 5926-27;
5929:'

In 2008, the General Assembly deleted “parents and chil-
dren, persons related by consanguinity or affinity within the
second degree” from sections 16-25-10 and 20-4-20. Act No. 92,
2008 8.C, Acts 1588, 1541; 1550.°

7, In 1984, section 16-25-10 stated: “As used in this article, ‘family or
household member’ means spouses, former spouses, parents and chil-
dren, persons related by consanguinity or affinity within the second
oeeehy and persons cohabitating or formerly cohabitating.” (Emphasis
added.

In 1984, section 20-4-20(b) stated: “ ‘Family or household member’
means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, and persons
related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.”

8. In 1994, section 16-25-10 was amended to read: “As used in this
article, ‘household member’ means spouses, former spouses, parents
and children, persons related by consanguinity or affinity within the
second degree, persons who have a child in common, and a male and
female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited.” (Emphasis
added.

In 1994, section 20-4-20(b) read: “ ‘Household member’ means
spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons related by
consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, persons who have a
child in common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly
have cohabited.” (Emphasis added.)

9. In 2003, section 16-25-10 was amended to read: “As used in this
article, ‘household member’ means spouses, former spouses, persons
who have a child in common, and a male and female who are cohabiting
or formerly have cohabited.” (Emphasis added.)

In 2003, section 20-4-20(b) was amended to read: “ ‘Household
member’ means spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in
common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have
cohabited.” (Emphasis added.)

In 2005, the General Assembly retained the 2003 definition
of “household member” in sections 16-25-10 and 20-4-20(b), but
separately identified each qualifying household member with
numbers in section 16-25-10 and lowercase Roman numerals in
section 20-4-20(b). Act No. 166, 2005 S.C. Acts 1884, 1836;
1842.

In 2015, the General Assembly extensively amended the
Criminal Domestic Violence Act to provide for the “Domestic
Violence Reform Act.” Act No. 58, 2015 S.C. Acts 225 (effec-
tive June 4, 2015). While the new Act retained the definition of
“household member,” it provided for, inter alia, enhanced
penalties for one convicted of subsequent offenses of domestic
violence, the offense of domestic violence of a high and aggra-
vated nature, and the prohibition of possession of a firearm for
one convicted of domestic violence.”

Although a review of the statutory evolution is not disposi-
tive of the instant case, it is conclusive evidence the General
Assembly purposefully included the phrase “male and female”
within the definition of “household member” in 1994 and has
retained that definition.

2. Presumption of Constitutionality

HE (With this background in mind, we must presume the
Acts are constitutional “unless [their] repugnance to the con-
stitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Joytime
Distribs. & Anwusement Co. v. State, 338 8.C. 634, 640, 528
§.H.2d 647, 650 (1999). This general presumption of validity
can be overcome only by a clear showing the act violates some
provision of the constitution. Id. Accordingly, our scope of
review is limited in cases involving a constitutional challenge
to a statute “because all statutes are presumed constitutional
and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid.”

10, See, e.g, S.C. Code Ann, § 16-25-20 (Supp. 2017) (providing: (1)
enhanced penalties for one convicted of subsequent domestic violence
offenses; (2) degrees of domestic violence offenses; and (3) penalties for
a violation of an order of protection); id. § 16-25-30 (prohibiting
possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of domestic
violence or domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature); id.
§ 16-25-65 (outlining offense of domestic violence of a high and aggra-
vated nature).

Hendria v. Taylor, 358 S.C. 542, 550, 579 §.H.2d 320, 324
(2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

8. Facial versus “As-Applied” Challenge

Hl Cognizant of the presumption of constitutionality, we
must first determine the type of constitutional challenge posed
by Doe, In her brief and the allegations in the declaratory
judgment pleadings, it appears that Doe claims the statutes
ave facially invalid and invalid “as applied” to her. However,
as will be discussed, we find that Doe can only utilize an “as-
applied” challenge.

Hl “The line between facial and as-applied relief is [a]
fluid one, and many constitutional challenges may occupy an
intermediate position on the spectrum between purely as-
applied relief and complete facial invalidation.” 16 C.J.8. Con-
stitutional Law § 158, at 147 (2015). Further, “the distinction
between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined
that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control
the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a consti-
tutional challenge.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
558 U.S. 310, 331, 180 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010).
Rather, “[tJhe distinction is both instructive and necessary, for
it goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court,
not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Id.

HM “A facial challenge is an attack on a statute itself as
opposed to a particular application.” State v. Legg, 416 S.C. 9,
18, 785 S.H.2d 369, 371 (2016) (citing City of Los Angeles,
Calif. v. Patel, — U.S. —, 185 8.Ct. 2448, 192 L.Ed.2d 485
(2015)). Consequently, in analyzing a facial challenge to the
constitutional validity of a statute, a court “considers only the
text of the measure itself and not its application to the
particular circumstances of an individual.” 16 C.J.S. Constitu-
tional Law § 168, at 161 (2015).

One asserting a facial challenge claims that the law
is “invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid appli-
cation.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 94 S.Ct. 1209,
89 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). This type of challenge is “the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which

a ne

the [statute] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481
US. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Thus,
“{ulnless the statute is unconstitutional in all its applications,
an as-applied challenge must be used to attack its constitution-
ality.” Travelscape, L.L.C. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 391 8.C.
89, 109 n.11, 705 S.H.2d 28, 39 n.11 (2011) (quoting Williams v.
Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 958 (11th Cir. 2001)); Renne v. Geary,
501 U.S, 812, 323-24, 111 S.Ct, 2331, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991)
(recognizing that a facial challenge should generally not be
entertained when an “as-applied” challenge could resolve the
case).

In an “as-applied” challenge, the party challenging
the constitutionality of the statute claims that the “application
of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted,
or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional.”
Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S.
1011, 1011, 118 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Hd.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., dissenting), denying cert. to
962 F.2d 1866 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “finding a statute or
regulation unconstitutional as applied to a specific party does
not affect the facial validity of that provision.” T'ravelscape,
391 S.C. at 109, 705 S.E.2d at 39; see Sec’y of State of Md. v.
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965, 104 8.Ct. 2839, 81
L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (discussing “as-applied” challenges and
stating, “despite some possibly impermissible application, the
remainder of the statute covers a whole range of easily
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Instead, “(t]he
practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional ‘as ap-
plied’ is to prevent its future application in a similar context,
but not to render it utterly inoperative.” Ada, 506 U.S. at
1011, 113 S.Ct. 633.

Here, Doe contends that by failing to include unmarried
same-sex couples within the definition of “household member,”
the statutes are not only facially invalid, but invalid “as
applied” because they excluded her from consideration for an
Order of Protection in family court based on her sexual
orientation. We conclude that Doe has failed to establish that
the statutes are facially unconstitutional.

sn a

In prefacing our analysis, we note that Doe has not
launched a wholesale attack on the Acts or the definition of
“household member” nor does she advocate for invalidation of
the statutory provisions in their entirety. Rather, she merely
seeks to be included with those eligible to receive an Order of
Protection. While this fact is not dispositive of a facial chal-
lenge, as we must necessarily focus on the text of the statutes,
it is significant given our judicial preference to remedy any
constitutional infirmity in the least restrictive way possible.

Turning to the text of the definition of “household member,”
we find that it is facially valid because it does not overtly
discriminate based on sexual orientation. Though not an all-
inclusive list, the statutes would be valid as to same-sex
married couples, opposite-sex married couples, and unmarried
opposite-sex couples who live together or have lived together.
Because there are numerous valid applications of the defini-
tion of “household member,” it is not “invalid in toto.” Conse-
quently, Doe must use an “as-applied” challenge to present
her claim that she was intentionally excluded as a qualifying
“household member” for an Order of Protection in family
court. Thus, the question becomes whether the statutory
definition of “household member” as applied denied Doe equal
protection of the laws.

4, Equal Protection

HE The Equal Protection Clauses of our federal and
state constitutions declare that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;
S.C. Const. art. I, § 8. Equal protection “requires that all
persons be treated alike under like circumstances and condi-
tions, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.”
GTE Sprint Comme’ns Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 8.C.,
288 S.C. 174, 181, 341 S.H.2d 126, 129 (1986) (quoting Marley
v, Kirby, 271 §.C. 122, 128-24, 245 §.H.2d 604, 605 (1978)).
“The sine qua non of an equal protection claim is a showing
that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment.”
Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 354, 461 S.H.2d
388, 391 (1995).

HE “Courts generally analyze equal protection chal-
lenges under one of three standards: (1) rational basis; (2)

intermediate scrutiny; or, (8) strict scrutiny.” Denene, Inc. v.
City of Charleston, 359 S.C. 85, 91, 596 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2004).
“Tf the classification does not implicate a suspect class or
abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used.”
Id. “Under the rational basis test, the requirements of equal
protection are satisfied when: (1) the classification bears a
reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be
affected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under
similar circumstances and conditions; and; (8) the classification
rests on some reasonable basis.” Id. “Those attacking the
validity of legislation under the rational basis test of the Equal
Protection Clause have the burden to negate every conceivable
basis which might support it.” Botter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,
393 S.C. 123, 128, 712 S.H.2d 401, 403-04 (2011) (citations
omitted).

Turning to the facts of the instant case, Doe has met her
burden of showing that similarly situated persons received
disparate treatment. Doe suggests that this case should be
subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny as a result of
“gender classification”; however, she seems to concede that
the appropriate standard is the rational basis test. While there
is some limited authority to support the application of interme-
diate scrutiny, we need not make that determination because
the definition of “household member” as applied to Doe cannot
even satisfy the rational basis test.

HI Defining “household member” to include “a male and
female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited,” yet
exclude (1) a male and male and (2) a female and female who
are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited,” fails this low level
of scrutiny. Specifically, we conclude the definition: (1) bears
no relation to the legislative purpose of the Acts; (2) treats
same-sex couples who live together or have lived together
differently than all other couples; and (8) lacks a rational
reason to justify this disparate treatment.

Based on our interpretation of the Acts, the overall legisla-
tive purpose is to protect victims from domestic violence that
occurs within the home and between members of the home,
See Moore v. Moore, 376 S.C. 467, 476, 657 S.E.2d 748, 748
(2008) (“The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act was enacted
to deal with the problem of abuse between family members.

The effect of the Act was to bring the parties before a judge
as quickly as possible to prevent further violence.” (quoting 17
S.C. Jur. Criminal Domestic Violence, § 14 (Supp. 2007)).

Statistics, as identified by the State, reveal that “women are
far more at risk from domestic violence at the hands of men
than vice versa.” Thus, the State maintains the General As-
sembly defined “household member” as “a male and female
who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited” to address the
primary problem of domestic violence within opposite-sex cou-
ples.

Without question, the statistics relied on by the State are
accurate. However, a victim of domestic violence is not de-
fined by gender, as the word is non-gender specific.”

Moreover, although the Acts may have been originally
enacted to address traditional findings of domestic violence,
new research shows that individuals within same-sex couples
experience a similar degree of domestic violence as those in
opposite-sex couples. See Christina Samons, Same-Sex Domes-
tic Violence: The Need for Affirmative Legal Protections at
All Levels of Government, 22 8. Cal. Rev. L. & Soe. Just. 417,
430-35 (2018) (recognizing recent reform to criminal and fami-
ly laws for domestic violence involving same-sex couples at the
federal level and identifying need for similar reform at state
level); Leonard D. Pertnoy, Same Violence, Same Seu, Differ-
ent Standard: An Examination of Same-Sea Domestic Vio-
lence and the Use of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman’s
Syndrome in Same-Sea Domestic Violence Cases, 24 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 544 (2012) (discussing similarities of domestic
violence in same-sex versus opposite-sex couples; recognizing
disparity in remedies afforded by the courts to victims of
domestic violence in same-sex versus opposite-sex couples).

Because the Acts are intended to provide protection for all
victims of domestic violence, the definition of “household mem-
ber,” which eliminates Doe’s relationship as a “qualifying
relationship” for an Order of Protection, bears no relation to
furthering the legislative purpose of Acts.

11. Cf. S.C. Const. art. I, § 24 (outlining Victims’ Bill of Rights and
providing that it is intended to “preserve and protect victims’ rights to
justice and due process regardless of race, sex, age, religion, or eco-
nomic status”).

a on

Additionally, the definition of “household member” treats
unmarried, same-sex couples who live together or have lived
together differently than all other couples. As we interpret the
definition of “household member” a person, who fits within one
of the following relationships, would be eligible for an Order of
Protection: (1) a same-sex married or formerly married cou-
ple;! (2) a same-sex couple, either married or unmarried, who
have a child in common; (8) an opposite-sex married or
formerly married couple; (4) an opposite-sex couple, either
married or unmarried, who have a child in common; and (5) an
unmarried opposite-sex couple who is living together or who
has lived together.

Thus, while Doe and her ex-fiancé were similarly situated to
other unmarried or formerly married couples, particularly
unmarried opposite-sex couples who live together, Doe was
precluded from seeking an Order of Protection based on the
definition of “household member.” We find there is no reason-
able basis, and the State has offered none, to support a
definition that results in disparate treatment of same-sex
couples who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited."

12, Judicial declarations have eliminated, for the most part, disparate
treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. See Obergefell v.
Hodges, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (holding
that states’ ban on same-sex marriages violated the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses).

13. Sections 16-25-10(3)(c) and 20-4-20(b)(iii) identify a “household
member” as including “persons who have a child in common.” Thus,
arguably an unmarried, same-sex couple who has a child in common
would constitute a “qualifying relationship” for an Order of Protection.
See, eg, VL. v. B.L., — U.S. ——, 136 S.Ct. 1017, 194 L.Ed.2d 92
(2016) (holding the Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant
full faith and credit to a Georgia decree of adoption, which was
between an unmarried, same-sex couple who had three children in
common but did not reside together).

14, We need not reach Doe’s Due Process challenge as the Equal
Protection issue is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of George-
town, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (recognizing that an
appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the
disposition of an independent issue is dispositive); Sangamo Weston,
Ine. v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143, 414 S.E.2d 127 (1992) (conclud-
ing that appellate courts will not issue advisory opinions that are purely
academic and do not affect the outcome of the case).

Because it is clear that the definition of “household mem-
ber” violates the Equal Protection clauses of our state and
federal constitutions, we must declare it unconstitutional. See
Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State, 338 S.C. 634,
640, 528 S.H.2d 647, 650 (1999) (“A legislative enactment will
be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears
so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it
violates a provision of the constitution.”).*

5. Remedy

HM Having concluded that the definition of “household
member” is unconstitutional as applied to Doe, we must next
determine the appropriate remedy.

Clearly, in the context of the statutory scheme of the Acts,
this Court cannot construe and effectively amend the statutes
to change the plain language of “and” to “or” as proposed by
the State. See Shelley Constr. Co. v. Sea Garden Homes, Inc.,
287 S.C. 24, 28, 886 8.H.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1985) (“We are
not at liberty, under the guise of construction, to alter the
plain language of the statute by adding words which the
Legislature saw fit not to include.”); of State v. Leopard, 349
S.C. 467, 478, 568 S.H.2d 842, 845 (Ct. App. 2002) (declining to
alter statutory definition of “household member” in section 16-
25-10; stating, “[ilf it is desirable public policy to limit the
class to those physically residing in the household, that public
policy must emanate from the legislature”).

Also, even though the Acts include severability clauses,"
there is no reason to employ them as we have found the
sections containing the definition of “household member” are

15. In contrast, the dissent finds “the only” reasonable interpretation is
that “Doe is covered” because ‘‘an order of protection is available when
domestic violence is committed upon members of unmarried, same-sex
couples of both genders~male and female,” Notably, the author of the
dissenting opinion is the sole proponent of this interpretation, which
not only lacks supporting authority but is based on a forced construc-
tion of the statutory language.

16. Act No. 58, 2015 Acts 225, 265-66 (providing a severability clause in
2015 Domestic Violence Reform Act); Act No. 166, 2005 Acts 1834,
1846 (providing a severability clause in 2005 Act amending Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act, which includes definition of “household
member” in section 20-4-20).

not facially invalid. Rather, the constitutional infirmity is
based on their application to Doe, i.e., not including unmarried
same-sex couples in the definition of “household member.”
Thus, severance cannot rectify the under-inclusive nature of
the definition.

Further, even if we were to attempt to remedy the constitu-
tional infirmity through severance, we find severance of the
entire phrase “a male and female who are cohabiting or
formerly have cohabited” to be unavailing since the constitu-
tional infirmity would remain. Protection afforded by the Acts
would still be elusive to Doe and would no longer be available
to opposite-sex couples who are cohabiting or formerly have
cohabited. Yet, it would be available to unmarried persons
such as former spouses (same-sex or not) and persons (same-
sex or not) with a child in common. Absent an “as-applied”
analysis, the “household member” definitional sections must
be struck down. As a result, the Acts would be rendered
useless. Such a drastic measure is neither necessary nor
desired. See Thayer v. S.C. Taw Comm’n, 807 8.C. 6, 18, 413
§.H.2d 810, 814-15 (1992) (“The test for severability is whether
the constitutional portion of the statute remains complete in
itself, wholly independent of that which is rejected, and is of
such a character as that it may fairly be presumed that the
Legislature would have passed it independent of that which is
in conflict with the Constitution.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). Accordingly, we reject any suggestion
to sever the Acts as it is inconsistent with our rules of
statutory construction and would contravene the intent of the
General Assembly.

Finally, we decline to invalidate the Acts in their entirety.
Such a decision would result in grave consequences for victims
of domestic violence. To leave these victims unprotected for
any length of time would be a great disservice to the citizens
of South Carolina,

III. Conclusion
In order to address the important issue presented in this
ease and remain within the confines of the Court’s jurisdiction,
we declare sections 16-25-10(8) and 20-4-20(b) unconstitutional
as applied to Doe. Therefore, the family court may not utilize
these statutory provisions to prevent Doe or those in similar

same-sex relationships from seeking an Order of Protection.
Cf. Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 8830 N.W.2d 335, 354
(lowa 2018) (concluding that presumption of parentage stat-
ute, which expressly referred to a mother, father, and hus-
band, violated equal protection as applied to a married lesbian
couple to whom a child was born to one of the spouses during
the couple’s marriage; identifying appropriate remedy by stat-
ing, “Accordingly, instead of striking section 144.182) from
the [lowa] Code, we will preserve it as to married opposite-sex
couples and require the [Iowa Department of Public Health]
to apply the statute to married lesbian couples”).

Declared Unconstitutional As Applied.

KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. Acting Justice
Costa M. Pleicones, concurring in result only. FEW, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part in a separate opinion.

JUSTICE FEW:

Jane Doe, the State, and all members of this Court agree to
this central point: if the Acts exclude unmarried, same-sex
couples from the protections they provide all other citizens,
they are obviously unconstitutional. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“No state shall ... deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws.”); S.C. Const. art. I, § 3 (“nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”);
Sunset Cay, LLC v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 428, 598
S.E.2d 462, 469 (2004) (“To satisfy the equal protection clause,
a classification must ... rest on some rational basis.”).

For two reasons, I would not declare the Acts unconstitu-
tional. First, Doe and the State agree the Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act protects Doe, and thus, there is no
controversy before this Court. Second, Doe and the State are
correct: ambiguity in both Acts—particularly in the definition
of household member—requires this Court to construe the
Acts to provide Doe the same protections they provide all
citizens, and thus, the Acts are not unconstitutional.

I. There is no Controversy before the Court

Our courts will not address the merits of any case unless it
presents a justiciable controversy. Byrd v. Irmo High Sch.,

321 S.C. 426, 430-31, 468 8.H.2d 861, 864 (1996). In Byrd, we
stated, “Before any action can be maintained, there must exist
a justiciable controversy,” and, “This Court will not [decide]

. academic questions or make an adjudication where there
remains no actual controversy.” Id.; see also Peoples Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Res. Planning Corp., 358 S.C. 460, 477, 596
§.E.2d 51, 60 (2004) (“A threshold inquiry for any court is a
determination of justiciability, ie., whether the litigation pres-
ents an active case or controversy.”). Doe and the State agree
the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act protects Doe, and
therefore, there is no controversy.

Jane Doe filed an action in the family court seeking an
order of protection from a threat of domestic violence pursu-
ant to section 20-4-40 of the Protection from Domestic Abuse
Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-4-40(a) (2014). By its terms, the Act
applies to “any household members in need of protection.” Id.
By filing the action seeking the protection of the Act, Doe
necessarily took the position that the definition of “household
member” includes unmarried, same-sex couples, and thus in-
cludes her. Doe argues to this Court that the definition should
be interpreted to include her.” Her alternative argument—
that the Act is unconstitutional—is based on the family court
ruling she chose not to appeal. Rather than appeal, she filed
this action naming the State as the only defendant.

The State, however, agrees with the position Doe took in
family court—the definition of household member includes
unmarried, same-sex couples, and thus includes Doe. In its
Answer, the State contends that any “constitutional problem
associated with the definitions at issue ... may be addressed
through interpretation to encompass unmarried, same-sex cou-
ples.” In its return to Doe’s petition for original jurisdiction,
the State wrote, “There is ... no evidence that the Legisla-
ture intentionally discriminated against same-sex couples.” At
oral argument before this Court, the State disagreed with the
statement “it is clear it is the legislative intent to exclude
homosexual couples.” Also at oral argument, the State was

17. As the majority explains, “Doe advocates for this Court to: (1)
construe the word ‘and’ .,. to mean ‘or’; and (2) declare the definition
of ‘household member’ to include any person, male or female...”

18. A justice of the Court stated, “Following the legislative history of this
statute, it is clear it is the legislative intent to exclude homosexual

asked—referring to the Protection from Domestic Abuse
Act—“You're saying the statute covers Jane Doe?” to which
the State responded, “Yes.” In making these statements, the
State asks this Court to interpret the definition of “household
member” to include Doe and partners in other non-marital
same-sex domestic relationships.

If Doe had appealed the family court’s ruling that the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act did not apply to her, she
would have presented a justiciable controversy to this Court.
Doe chose not to appeal, and she filed this action. When the
State agreed with Doe that the Act should be interpreted to
protect her, it eliminated any controversy. The majority over-
looks this important detail. When both sides agree, there is no
controversy.

Il. The Acts are not Unconstitutional
In Joytime Distributors & Amusement Co. v. State, 338
S.C. 684, 528 S.H.2d 647 (1999), this Court repeated the
longstanding rule of law that we will not construe an act of the
General Assembly to be unconstitutional unless there was no
choice but to do so,
This Court has a very limited scope of review in cases
involving a constitutional challenge to a statute. All statutes
are presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be con-
strued so as to render them valid. A legislative act will not
be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the
constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. A
legislative enactment will be declared unconstitutional only
when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt that it violates a provision of the constitu-
tion.
888 S.C. at 640, 528 S.H.2d at 650; see In re Stephen W., 409
S.C. 78, 76, 761 S.H.2d 281, 232 (2014) (same); S.C. Pub.
Interest Found. v. 8.C. Transp. Infrastructure Bank, 403 8.C.
640, 645, 744 S.H.2d 521, 528 (2018) (same); Clarke v. S.C. Pub.
Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 485, 181 8.B, 481, 484 (1985) (same);
see also Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist, v. State, 410 S.C. 619, 628,
767 S.H.2d 157, 161 (2014) (reciting the principle that “we will

couples, Otherwise, they would not have changed the word ‘person’ to
‘male and female.’ The State responded, “I respectfully disagree.”

not find a statute unconstitutional unless ‘its repugnance to
the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”).

Under Joytime Distributors, we are constrained to inter-
pret the Acts to include unmarried, same-sex couples unless
the Acts “so clearly” exclude them “as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt.” In other words, if the statutory text of the
definition of “household member” in the Acts is clear, and if
that text so clearly excludes unmarried, same-sex couples as to
leave no reasonable doubt they are excluded, then the Court is
correct to find the Acts unconstitutional. That text, however, is
not clear.

We originally decided this case on July 26, 2017. Doe v.
State, Op. No, 27728 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 26, 2017)
(Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 28 at 55). In this substituted opinion
the Court has reversed itself in two important respects." The
first—now finding the Acts unconstitutional “as applied,” but
previously finding the applicable subsections of the Acts un-
constitutional on their face—is a significant reversal, but not
important to my analysis. The second—reversing itself from a
finding that the Acts are clear and unambiguous” to an
analysis based on the premise that the applicable subsections
of the Acts are not clear™—demonstrates my analysis is
correct. This fundamental change in the Court’s reasoning
should require an explanation as to how the majority can
ignore the presumption of constitutional validity we said was
the law in Joytime Distributors. The majority recites the
words, “This general presumption of validity can be overcome
only by a clear showing the act violates some provision of the

19. Chief Justice Beatty, who was not the author of the original majority
opinion, has not been inconsistent, but from the outset has advanced
the argument that is now the position of the Court. See Doe, Op. No.
27728 (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 28 at 62) (Beatty, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

20. In the original decision, the majority stated, “We disagree with
Justice Few that the language at issue is ambiguous,” and, “The plain
language is clear...” Doe, Op. No. 27728 (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 28
at 59 n.6),

21, As I will explain, the majority’s finding of unconstitutional legislative
intent is based on what it contends is an analysis of legislative history,
which is an analysis our law does not permit when the text of the
statute is clear and unambiguous.

constitution.” But the requisite “clear showing” simply cannot
be made based on an argument that the Acts ambiguously set
forth the definition that violates the constitution.

The Court’s new analysis pays no attention to the text of the
Acts. Rather, the majority’s analysis is driven by the actions
the General Assembly took in 1994, and is based solely on
what the majority calls “legislative history.” This approach is
improper because we have repeatedly declared we will not
look beyond the text of the statute itself, and thus will not
consider other indicators of legislative intent such as “history,”
unless the text of the statute is ambiguous.” See, e.g., Smith v.
Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 555, 799 8.B.2d 479, 483 (2017) (“If a
statute is clear and explicit in its language, then there is no
need to resort to statutory interpretation or legislative intent
to determine its meaning.” (quoting Timmons v. S.C. Tricen-
tennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 401, 175 S.H.2d 805, 817
(1970))); 419 S.C. at 556, 799 S.E.2d at 483 (“Absent an
ambiguity, there is nothing for a court to construe, that is, a
court should not look beyond the statutory text to discern its
meaning.”).

By turning directly to legislative history to support its
analysis without any reference to the text of the definitions,
the majority has necessarily conceded the text is not clear, but
ambiguous. This concession should have brought the majori-
ty’s analysis back to the presumption of constitutionality, and
the Court’s duty to try to find a way to construe the Acts as
constitutional. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist., 410 S.C. at 628, 767
§.E.2d at 161; Stephen W., 409 S.C. at 76, 761 S.H.2d at 232;
S.C. Pub. Interest Found., 408 S.C. at 645, 744 8.H.2d at 528;
Joytime Distributors, 888 8.C. at 640, 528 S.H.2d at 650;
Clarke, 177 S.C. at 485, 181 S.E. at 484. If it is reasonable to
do so, we should construe the Acts to protect unmarried,
same-sex couples, and find the Acts constitutional. See Town

22, The majority’s approach is improper for a second reason—this is not
truly legislative history. The majority has merely looked at the amend-
ments to the definition of “household member,” and drawn inferences
from those amendments to conclude what the General Assembly intend-
ed. That is called “guesswork,” not the consideration of history. A
proper legislative history analysis would focus on some event, docu-
ment, or statement separate from the amendment itself through which
the Court could explain how the legislative history reflects the legisla-
tive intent.

of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C, 382, 342, 718 S.E.2d 278,
288 (2011) (“Any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in
favor of a just, equitable, and beneficial operation of the law.”).

It is in fact perfectly reasonable to construe the Acts to
protect unmarried, same-sex couples. In 1994, “household
member” was defined in terms of pairs or groups of people,
“spouses, former spouses, parents and children, persons relat-
ed ....” See supra note 8. In that context, the Acts logically
applied when domestic violence occurred between the members
of a defined pair or group. In 2005, however, the definitions
were amended so that the primary subsections of each defini-
tion are now framed in terms of individual people: “a spouse;
... a former spouse.” See Act No. 166, 2005 S.C. Acts 1834,
18836." Under this current structure, the Acts apply when
domestic violence is committed upon the members of the
defined group.

The Protection from Domestic Abuse Act follows this struc-
ture. The Act “created an action known as a Petition for an
Order of Protection’ in cases of abuse to a household mem-
ber.” § 20-4-40 (emphasis added). The “petition for relief must
allege the existence of abuse to a household member.” § 20-4-
40(b) (emphasis added). Under the current version of the
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, therefore, the Act oper-
ates to protect citizens from abuse “to” a person listed in the
definition of “household member.” Reading the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act under this structure, Doe and other
partners in unmarried, same-sex relationships are protected.

To understand this point, consider the operation of the Acts
regarding individuals included in the first and second subsec-
tions of the definition—“a spouse” and “a former spouse.” A
person may seek an order of protection under the Protection
from Domestic Abuse Act “in cases of abuse to a household

23. The majority incorrectly states ‘‘the General Assembly retained the
2003 definition of ‘household member’” with the 2005 amendments.
Rather, the 2005 amendments contain a substantive change that is
important to my analysis. Before 2005, the household member was
defined in terms of groups—between whom domestic violence might be
committed. After the 2005 amendments, household member is defined
in terms of individuals—upon whom domestic violence might be com-
mitted. The majority overlooks this substantive change in labelling my
analysis “forced.”

member.” If we apply that provision using the first subsection
of the definition, an order of protection is available “in cases of
abuse to [a spouse].” If we apply that provision using the
second subsection of the definition, an order of protection is
available “in cases of abuse to [a former spouse].”

Now consider the operation of the Acts regarding individu-
als included in the fourth subsection—“a male and female who
are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited”’—the subsection
the majority finds unconstitutional. An order of protection is
available “in cases of abuse to [a male ...],” or “in cases of
abuse to [a female ...].” In fact, an order of protection is
available “in cases of abuse to [a male and a female].” In other
words, an order of protection is available when domestic
violence is committed upon members of unmarried, same-sex
couples of both genders—male and female. Doe is covered.

The interpretation I have just explained is not only a
reasonable interpretation, it is the only reasonable interpreta-
tion. The majority’s interpretation that the General Assembly
intended to exclude same-sex couples is based on the premise
that the subsection applies only when “a male and female” are
cohabiting together. This interpretation works only if the Acts
are construed to apply when domestic violence occurs between
members of a defined pair or group. That construction was
eliminated, however, with the 2005 amendments. As discussed
above, the Acts now apply when abuse is committed upon the
members of the defined group. Thus, the majority’s interpre-
tation leads to an absurd result. The General Assembly clearly
did not intend the Acts to apply “in cases of abuse to [a male
and female].” Under such a reading the Acts would apply only
when there are two victims.

The presence of the word “and” instead of “or” in the fourth
subsection of the definition of household member may be
troubling, but it does not require the conclusion the General
Assembly intentionally excluded unmarried, same-sex couples
from the Acts. Rather, it merely demonstrates the ambiguity
in the definition. It is more reasonable to resolve that ambigui-
ty in favor of constitutionality by including Doe and other
members of unmarried, same-sex couples than it is to resolve
it in favor of finding a malicious motive behind the 1994
amendments.

I respectfully believe Doe and other members of unmarried,
same-sex couples are covered by the Acts and the Acts are
therefore constitutional.

809 S.E.2d 58
Daniel B. DORN, in his capacity as the Parent and Natural
guardian of E.D., R.D., and Y.D., Petitioner,
ve
Paul S. COHEN and Susan Cohen, Individually and in their
capacity as the Co-Conservators of the person of Abbie Tene
Dorn, a protected person and ward, and in their capacity as Co-
Trustees of the Abbie Dorn Special Needs Trust, Respondents.

Paul S. Cohen, M.D. and Susan Cohen, Respondents,
v
E.D., R.D., and Y.D., The Living Issue of Abbie Ilene Dorn,
and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services, Respondents below,

Of whom E.D., R.D., and Y.D., The Living Issue
of Abbie Ilene Dorn are the Petitioners,
and.
the South Carolina Department of Health
and Human Services is a Respondent.

In re: The Abbie Dorn Special Needs Trust.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002393
Opinion No. 27757

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted November 29, 2017
Filed December 20, 2017

518

John A. Massalon and Christy Ford Allen, both of Wills
Massalon & Allen, LLC, and Daniel 8. Slotchiver, of Slotchiv-
er & Slotchiver, LLP, all of Charleston, for Petitioners.

John Kachmarsky, of Law Office of John Kachmarsky, of
Charleston; Virginia Lee Moore, of Moore Johnson & Saraniti
Law Firm, PA, of Surfside Beach; Bret Harlan Davis and
Reese Rodman Boyd, III, of Davis & Boyd, LLC, of Myrtle
Beach; Lynette Rogers Hedgepath, of The Hedgepath Law
Firm, PA, of Conway; and Shealy Boland Reibold, of Colum-
bia, all for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to review the court of
appeals’ decision in Dorn v. Cohen, 418 S.C. 126, 791 S.E.2d
813 (Ct. App. 2016). We grant the petition, dispense with

further briefing, and affirm the court of appeals’ decision as
modified.

Petitioner Daniel Dorn filed a petition in the probate court
to remove respondents Paul and Susan Cohen as the co-
trustees of a Trust established for the care of Dorn’s ex-wife,
Abbie Dorn, and further sought a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent the Cohens from spending Trust money for
any purpose other than Abbie’s medical care. The Cohens
subsequently filed a petition to affirm legal fees paid by the
Trust and to reform the terms of the Trust.

Following a hearing, the probate court denied Dorn’s re-
quest for a TRO and consolidated both petitions, requiring the
Cohens to amend their petition to name Dorn, Abbie’s minor
children, and the South Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services as parties. The probate court appointed a
guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the children, and ap-
pointed both a GAL and an attorney to represent Abbie.

The petitions were tried together, and on the final day of
trial, petitioner Dorn challenged Abbie’s status as a party,
arguing Abbie was not named in his petition and should not be
allowed to present witnesses. The probate court found that,
while Abbie was not named as a party, she was an indispens-
able party to both actions because the actions sought changes
to her Trust, and the purpose of appointing Abbie a GAL and
counsel was to represent her interests in the matter.

The probate court subsequently issued an order adding
Abbie as a party to both petitions pursuant to Rule 19, South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner appealed, and
the circuit court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory.

The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of
the appeal as interlocutory pursuant to 8.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-
830 (2017). Relying on Morrow v. Fundamental Long-Term
Care Holdings, LLC, 412 S.C. 584, 778 S.H.2d 144 (2015), the
court of appeals found the appealability of the probate court’s
order was determined by section 14-38-8830, which governs
appeals from the trial court. The court of appeals applied
Morrow and Neeltec Enters., Inc. v. Long, 897 8.C. 568, 725
§.E.2d 926 (2012), in finding the probate court’s order did not
affect petitioners’ substantial rights under section 14-3-330(2).

I We find the court of appeals erred in applying section
14-3-330 in determining whether the probate court order was
immediately appealable. Appeals from the probate court are
governed by section 62-1-308 of the Probate Code, which
provides the following, in pertinent part:

Except as provided in subsection (1), appeals from the

probate court must be to the circuit court and are governed

by the following rules:

(a) A person interested in a final order, sentence, or decree
of a probate court may appeal to the circuit court in the
same county, subject to the provisions of Section 62-1-303.

S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-308(a) (Supp. 2017); see Eu parte
Wilson, 367 S.C. 7, 625 S.E.2d 205 (2005) (“Absent some
specialized statute, the immediate appealability of an interloc-
utory or intermediate order depends on whether the order
falls within § 148-830.” (emphasis added)).

I Because the probate court’s order adding a party to
the action was not a final order, the order was not immediate-
ly appealable pursuant to section 62-1-308. See Fulmer v.
Cain, 880 S.C. 466, 670 S.H.2d 652 (2008) (holding only final
orders from the probate court are appealable under section
62-1-308).

Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals’ analysis, and
affirm the dismissal of the appeal by the circuit court on the
grounds set forth above.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

809 S.E.2d 54
In the MATTER OF James L, BELL, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001908
Opinion No. 27755
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Submitted December 1, 2017
Filed December 20, 2017

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sabrina C.
Todd, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia, for
Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

James L. Bell, of Charleston, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplin-
ary Counsel (ODC) and Respondent have entered into an
Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to
Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
(RLDE) contained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina Appellate
Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits
misconduct and consents to the imposition of a definite sus-
pension for no more than nine (9) months. Respondent re-
quests that any suspension be made retroactive to November
18, 2016, the date of his interim suspension. We accept the
Agreement and impose a definite suspension of nine (9)
months from the practice of law. We grant Respondent's
request to make his suspension retroactive to the date of his
interim suspension.

Facts and Law

Respondent was hired to negotiate the purchase of an oil rig
in Oklahoma by NTB Management Planning and Control,
LTD (NTSB), an Israeli company. The fee agreement between
Respondent and NTB provided for a retainer of $21,000 plus
hourly fees; however, Respondent never received the retainer.
Instead, NTB advised Respondent that insurance proceeds
due to NTB would be wired to his account to be disbursed for
expenses related to the purchase of the oil rig as instructed. A
wire of $48,600 from Liberty Company Insurance Brokers
(Liberty) soon arrived in Respondent’s trust account at Wells
Fargo Bank (WF Trust Account), which prior to the wire had
a balance of $2.48. NTB’s USA director, Roland Nelson, asked
Respondent to give him cash from these funds to pay NTB’s
expenses. Pursuant to Nelson’s instructions, Respondent paid
two of NTB’s third-party vendors. He withdrew cash in the
amount of $6,600 to purchase a cashier’s check made payable
to the first vendor. He deposited the cashier’s check into an
account which Nelson identified as the vendor's account. On
the same day, Respondent withdrew $8,000 in cash from his
WF trust account. After Respondent gave Nelson $500 of this
amount for his hotel bill, Respondent deposited the remaining
$7,500 into his trust account at Bank of America (BOA Trust
Account) and then transferred the funds to the second ven-
dor’s account. Respondent then paid himself a total of $8,500
in fees by way of two online transfers from his WF Trust
Account, one to his operating account and another to his
personal joint checking account.

During an angry telephone call, Nelson claimed one or both
of NTB’s third-party vendors had not been paid and threat-
ened to cut Respondent’s throat. Desiring to terminate his
relationship with NTB, Respondent decided to withdraw the
balance from his WF Trust Account. Respondent forgot to
account for the transfers he made for his fees equal to $8,500,
so he believed the balance in the WF trust account was higher
than it actually was. He signed a cash withdrawal slip for
$33,987.48 to purchase a cashier's check made payable to his
firm and deposited the check into his BOA Trust Account.
Once these transactions were processed, Respondent's WF
Trust Account was overdrawn by $8,485.

—i ©

Although NTB is a legitimate company, the purchase of the
oil rig was a fraudulent transaction. The wire from Liberty
into Respondent’s WF Trust Account was initiated by an email
scam perpetrated on NTB. When Wells Fargo contacted
Respondent about the overdraft and the fraudulent wire,
Respondent agreed to return $38,987.43 to his WF Trust
Account and authorized the return of the account balance
equal to $25,467.48 to Liberty. He elected to retain the $8,500
in fees he paid to himself, claiming he failed to understand
from his conversation with Wells Fargo that the funds be-
longed to Liberty. He admits he did not ask enough questions
to learn what actually happened.

Respondent only responded to the notice of investigation
and a request for additional information from ODC after
receiving reminder letters. Respondent initially explained the
overdraft to ODC by claiming he accidentally transposed
numbers while in a hurry, the error was caught immediately,
and the funds were promptly returned to the account. Howev-
er, the bank statement from his WF Trust Account revealed
this was not the case.

Respondent admits his conduct violated Rule (2)(c) (cash
withdrawals from client trust accounts are prohibited) and
Rule 6 (no item shall be drawn on a trust account made
payable to cash) of the Financial Recordkeeping Rules found
in Rule 417, SCACR. Furthermore, he admits his conduct
violated Rule 8.1(b) (a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary
matter shall not fail to respond to a lawful demand for
information from a disciplinary authority) and Rule 8.4(e) (it is
professional misconduct to engage in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Profession-
al Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.

Conclusion

We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and
suspend Respondent from the practice of law for nine (9)
months, retroactive to November 18, 2016, the date of his
interim suspension.

Prior to filing any petition for reinstatement, Respondent
shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program
(LEAPP) Ethics School as provided by Rule 38, RLDE, Rule

a

418, SCACR. Additionally, Respondent shall complete the
LEAPP Trust Account School and Law Office Management
School within one year of being reinstated to the practice of
law.

Within thirty (80) days of the date of this order, Respondent.
shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer
Conduet.

Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, Respondent
shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he
has complied with Rule 80, RLDE, Rule 418, SCACR.

DEFINITE SUSPENSION,

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., concur.

809 S.E.2d 56
In the MATTER OF Michael Frank JOHNSON, Respondent.
Appellate Case No, 2017-001154
Opinion No. 27756
Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Submitted November 30, 2017
Filed December 20, 2017 i

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Sabrina C.
Todd, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of Colum-
bia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

Michael Frank Johnson, of Taylors, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent and the
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an
Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to
Rule 21 of the Rules for Respondent Disciplinary Enforce-
ment (RLDE) contained in Rule 418 of the South Carolina
Appellate Court Rules (SCACR), In the Agreement, Respon-
dent admits misconduct and consents to disbarment. He re-
quests his disbarment be imposed retroactively to April 1,
2014, the date of his interim suspension. In the Matter of
Johnson, 407 S.C. 510, 756 S.E.2d 897 (2014). We accept the
Agreement and disbar Respondent from the practice of law in
this state, retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. In
addition, we impose certain conditions on readmission as de-
scribed in this opinion. The facts, as set forth in the Agree-
ment, are as follows.

Matter A

A check issued by Respondent on his trust account was
presented against insufficient funds, Respondent initially re-
ported he had made a bookkeeping mistake and immediately
deposited the funds necessary to correct the problem. Respon-
dent later stated he had accidentally paid himself excess fees
in one case by failing to take into account a properly issued
check he issued months earlier in another matter that had not
yet cleared. Respondent returned the excess fees to the
account, Respondent admits he was not maintaining a receipt
and disbursement journal or client ledgers, and as a result, he
failed to properly safe keep $125 in filing fees he was holding
for Client A. He was also not reconciling his account and not
retaining his trust account bank statements. During the inves-
tigation, Respondent created and submitted to ODC ledgers

for the two clients believed to be involved in the insufficient
funds report, but those ledgers were not accurate. Because
Respondent did not maintain records of the purposes of his
transactions, the bank records alone do not provide a complete
picture of Respondent’s handling of the funds entrusted to his
care. During the 22 months he had a trust account with Wells
Fargo Bank, Respondent made 16 cash withdrawals totaling
$12,398.66. He also made cash deposits without noting the
name of the clients on his deposit slips and issued checks to
himself and to third parties without identifying the client
whose funds were being disbursed. Respondent issued checks
for filing fees from his trust account for some clients for whom
no deposit into the trust account could be identified.

Matter B

Respondent represented Client B on a personal injury
matter for $17,900. He immediately paid $5,000 to Client B
and told him he may receive additional proceeds after all
medical bills were paid. Rather than pay Client B’s medical
bills, Respondent converted the remaining proceeds for his
personal use and stopped taking Client B’s calls. When Client
B filed a complaint, Respondent wrote ODC and Client B,
denying any misconduct and explaining he was negotiating
Client B’s medical bills. By the dates of these letters, Respon-
dent had already removed most of the proceeds from his trust
account. In his response to a request for additional documen-
tation, Respondent admitted he had been dishonest with ODC
about his handling of client funds. He admitted that he had
taken money from his trust account in Client B’s case and in
other cases to pay personal bills. Respondent also admitted he
provided false information to ODC during the investigation of
Matter A. Respondent’s admitted misconduct resulted in his
interim suspension. Shortly before being suspended, Respon-
dent transferred $287.01 to his trust account and paid this
amount to Client B. Client B filed a claim with the Lawyers’
Fund for Client Protection (Fund), and the Fund awarded him
$9,151.54, making allowance for a legal fee to Respondent.

Matter C

After Respondent was placed in interim suspension, the
South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense complained

that he had been paid flat fees in the amount of $900 on 24
cases that had to be reassigned to new counsel as a result of
his interim suspension. Respondent has not returned any of
these fees to the Commission on Indigent Defense.

Violations of Rules of Professional Conduct

Respondent admits that by his conduct, he has violated the
following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
407, SCACR: Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall keep client reasonably
informed about status of matter), Rule 1.15(a) (awyer shall
hold funds of client in connection with representation in an
account separate from lawyer’s funds and complete account
records shall be kept by lawyer; Respondent shall comply with
Rule 417, SCACR), Rule 1.15(d) (a lawyer who receives funds
in which a client or third person has an interest shall promptly
notify the client or third person), Rule 8.1(a) (a lawyer shall
not knowingly make a false statement of material fact in
connection with a disciplinary matter), Rule 8.4(d) (it is profes-
sional misconduct to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and Rule 8.4(e) (it is
professional misconduct to engage in conduct that is prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice). Additionally, Respondent
admits by failing to keep adequate financial records and by
withdrawing funds from his trust account in cash, he failed to
obey the financial recordkeeping rules of Rule 417, SCACR.

Finally, Respondent admits he has violated the following
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413,
SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (it shall be a ground for discipline for
Respondent to violate Rules of Professional Conduct) and Rule
7(a)(5) Gt shall be a ground for discipline to engage in conduct
that brings the legal profession into disrepute or conduct
demonstrating an unfitness to practice law).

Conclusion
We accept the Agreement and disbar Respondent from the
practice of law in this state. This sanction shall be retroactive
to April 1, 2014, the date of Respondent’s interim suspension.
Within thirty (80) days of the date of this order, Respondent
shall enter into an agreement with ODC to pay the costs
ineurred by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in
the investigation of this matter, to repay the Fund for the

disbursements it made to Client B, and to repay all fees paid
by the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense for
the 24 cases which were reassigned as a result of Respon-
dent’s interim suspension.

Prior to readmission, Respondent shall complete the Legal
Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School, Trust Account
School, Advertising School, and Law Office Management
School. Further, prior to readmission, Respondent shall hire a
forensic accountant to review his trust account records. Re-
spondent shall pay restitution to any clients or third parties to
whom the accountant determines Respondent failed to make
proper disbursements.

Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, Respon-
dent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing
that he has complied with Rule 30 of Rule 413, SCACR, and
shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the Prac-
tice of Law to the Clerk of Court.

DISBARRED,

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and

JAMES, JJ., concur.
a

809 S.H.2d 59

Lori Dandridge STONEY, Respondent,
v.
Richard S.W. STONEY Sr., Petitioner,

and
Theodore D. Stoney Jr., Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002076
Opinion No, 27758
Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Submitted November 29, 2017
Filed December 20, 2017

Charles H. Williams, of Williams & Williams, of Orange-
burg, Donald Bruce Clark, of Charleston, and James B. Rich-
ardson Jr., of Columbia, for Petitioners.

J. Michael Taylor, of Taylor/Potterfield, of Columbia, and
Peter George Currence, of McDougall, Self, Currence &
McLeod, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners each seek a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the court of appeals in Stoney v. Stoney, 417 S.C.
345, 790 8.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 2016). In Stoney, the court of
appeals directed the family court judge to conduct a new trial
after holding the judge abused his discretion or otherwise
erred in regards to multiple issues. Finding error in the
standard of review applied by the court of appeals, we grant
the petitions, dispense with further briefing, reverse the court
of appeals, and remand the case to the court of appeals to
decide the appeal applying the appropriate standard of de

novo review articulated in Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 709
§.E.2d 650 (2011),

In Lewis, this Court extensively analyzed the applicable
standard of review in family court matters and reaffirmed that
it is de novo. We noted that, while the term “abuse of
discretion” has often been used in this context, it is a “misno-
mer” in light of the fact that de novo review is prescribed by
article V, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution. See S.C.
Const. art. V, § 5 (stating in equity cases, the Supreme Court
“shall review the findings of fact as well as the law, except in
cases where the facts are settled by a jury and the verdict not
set aside”).

We observed that de novo review allows an appellate court
to make its own findings of fact; however, this standard does
not abrogate two long-standing principles still recognized by
our courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial judge
is in a superior position to assess witness credibility, and (2)
an appellant has the burden of showing the appellate court
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding
of the trial judge.

In the current appeal, the court of appeals cited Lewis, but
it veered from a complete application of this benchmark. The
court of appeals repeatedly referenced an “abuse of discre-
tion” standard throughout its findings, which culminated in a
reversal and remand for a new trial on numerous issues. As
recognized by the parties, once the court of appeals found
error in one aspect of the family court judge’s ruling, it
impacted other components, creating a “domino effect.”

Although appellate courts have been citing Lewis for the
appropriate standard of review in family court matters since
its publication in 2011, there appears to be lingering confusion
over the actual implementation of this standard. This is evi-
denced by the fact that in some decisions the courts have cited
Lewis while also simultaneously referencing cases citing an
abuse of discretion standard.’ In addition, some attorneys

1. See, e.g, McKinney v. Pedery, 413 S.C. 475, 776 S.E.2d 566 (2015);
Crossland v. Crossland, 408 8.C. 443, 759 S.B.2d 419 (2014); Wilburn v.
Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 743 S.E.2d 734 (2013); Woods v. Woods, 418
S.C, 100, 790 S.E.2d 906 (Ct. App. 2016); Ricigliano v. Ricigliano, 413
S.C, 319, 775 S.E.2d 701 (Ct. App. 2015); Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411

continue to cite an abuse of discretion standard in their briefs
to this Court. This trend is troubling in light of the fact that
application of the correct standard of review is often crucial in
an appeal. See Dorman v. Dep't of Health & Envil. Control,
350 S.C. 159, 565 S.H.2d 119 (Ct. App. 2002) (highlighting the
critical importance of a court’s standard for review). For these
reasons, we reiterate that the proper standard of review in
family court matters is de novo, rather than an abuse of
discretion, and encourage our courts to avoid conflating these
terms in appeals from the family court.

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals
and remand this case for consideration of the issues on appeal
applying the de novo standard.

REVERSED AND REMANDED,

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and
JAMES, JJ., coneur.

808 S.H.2d 821
The STATE, Respondent,
ve
Stanley Lamar WRAPP, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000909

Opinion No. 5510
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard May 4, 2017

Filed August 16, 2017

Rehearing Denied January 18, 2018

S.C, 481, 769 S.E,2d 442 (Ct. App. 2015); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 403 8.C.
228, 742 8.E.2d 677 (Ct. App. 2013); Lewis v. Lewis, 400 8.C. 354, 734
$.B,2d 322 (Ct. App. 2012); Sheila R. v. David R, 396 S.C. 41, 719
S.E.2d 682 (Ct. App. 2011); Moeller v. Moeller, 394 S.C. 365, 714 S.B.2d
898 (Ct. App. 2011); Reed v. Pieper, 393 S.C. 424, 713 S.B.2d 309 (Ct.
App. 2011).

:
es
19

a ss
Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assis-
tant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin, of Co-
lumbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood,
for Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.:

Stanley Lamar Wrapp appeals his convictions for possession.
with intent to distribute (PWID) cocaine base and driving
under suspension (DUS), arguing the cireuit court failed to
make the required findings that he had proper notice of his
trial date and that his absence was voluntary before trying
him in absentia. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Facts and Procedural History

On October 17, 2018, Greenwood County Drug Enforcement
(GCDE) officers initiated a traffic stop and arrested Wrapp
for driving with a suspended license, When Wrapp was
searched incident to the arrest, the officers found crack co-
caine in his pocket. A subsequent search of Wrapp’s vehicle
uncovered more crack, a set of digital scales, and a razor knife
like those commonly used to cut crack cocaine. Wrapp was
charged with DUS and trafficking in crack cocaine.

On October 18, 2018, Wrapp signed bond paperwork show-
ing his court date was December 6, 2013, and providing “[ilf
no disposition is made during that term, the defendant shall
appear and remain throughout each succeeding term of court
until final disposition is made of his case.” The paperwork also
stated, “I understand and have been informed that I have a
right and obligation to be present at trial and should I fail to
attend the court, the trial will proceed in my absence.”

On July 14, 2014, Wrapp’s case was called for trial before
the Honorable William P. Keesley. Wrapp’s trial counsel asked
for a continuance, in part, so he could have more time to

m4 a

investigate an issue regarding a confidential informant (the
CI). Judge Keesley granted the continuance.

On Monday, September 29, 2014, Wrapp’s case was re-called
for trial before the Honorable Thomas A. Russo. After jury
selection, trial counsel moved for a continuance because
Wrapp was not present. Trial counsel stated, “I don’t have
personal knowledge of why he isn’t here, I don’t know if ...
his absence is voluntary or involuntary.” In response, the
State asserted that following the July 2014 continuance, the
solicitor told Wrapp “that his case would be called for trial the
next time we could get to it.” The State also contended that
during this conversation the solicitor told Wrapp he would not
make any deals after the week of July 14. Finally, the State
asserted it was contacted three weeks prior to trial by a
private attorney whom Wrapp had asked to represent him.
Subsequently, this attorney “declined to get involved due to
the fact that [the case] was up for trial.” Upon inquiry, trial
counsel responded that he did not know whether this attorney
had informed Wrapp of his upcoming trial date.

The circuit court noted a bench warrant had been issued for
Wrapp, and trial counsel confirmed that the public defender’s
office had an investigator looking for him. In response, the
circuit court stated,

[T]he difficult thing is you led off with this observation that.

is we don’t know whether his absence here today is a

voluntary or not voluntary absence. I don’t know what his

situation is or why he’s not here. But it does appear that he
was noticed to be here. For whatever reason[,] he’s not
here. I don’t really have a valid reason. I don’t see any

purpose that would be served in continuing the case.... [I]f

he makes himself unavailable, that’s—I just don’t know that

you can make yourself unavailable and then use that as a

basis for getting a continuance granted.... So I’m going to

respectfully deny the motion for a continuance. I hope your
investigator finds him this afternoon or this evening and
then he can show up and be of assistance to you. But we're
going to go ahead and proceed whether he’s present or not.
Trial counsel asked for a delay until Wednesday, October 1,

but the circuit court declined, stating it would begin Wrapp’s
trial at 9:30 am. on Tuesday, September 30. Trial counsel

objected, stating, “For the record.... I don’t feel like Mr.
Wrapp has been adequately noticed and we object to going to
trial.” The circuit court responded, “Alright. Well, we'll start
back at 9:30 in the morning.”

The trial took place on September 30, 2014, and the jury
convicted Wrapp of DUS and possession with intent to distrib-
ute cocaine base. Wrapp was sentenced to twenty years’
imprisonment on the PWID charge and sixty days’ imprison-
ment for DUS. These sentences were sealed and later read to
Wrapp in court on March 30, 2015.

Standard of Review

HM “In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review
errors of law only.” State v. Ravenell, 887 S.C. 449, 454, 692
S.E.2d 554, 557 (Ct. App. 2010). “An appellate court is bound
by the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous.” Id.

Law and Analysis

HM “The trial court’s denial of a motion for a continu-
ance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
diseretion.” Id. at 455, 692 S.E.2d at 557. “It is well estab-
lished that, although the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused to be
present at every stage of his trial, this right may be waived,
and a defendant may be tried in his absence.” Jd. “A trial
judge must determine a criminal defendant voluntarily waived
his right to be present at trial in order to try the defendant in
his absence.” Jd. at 455, 692 S.H.2d at 557-58. “The judge
must make findings of fact on the record that the defendant
(1) received notice of his right to be present and (2) was
warned he would be tried in his absence should he fail to
attend.” Id. at 456, 692 S,E.2d at 558.

Rule 16, SCRCrimP, also outlines the required process:
Except in cases wherein capital punishment is a permissible
sentence, a person indicted for misdemeanors and/or felo-
nies may voluntarily waive his right to be present and may
be tried in his absence upon a finding by the court that such
person has received notice of his right to be present and
that a warning was given that the trial would proceed in his
absence upon a failure to attend the court.

WE We hold the circuit court erred in trying Wrapp in
absentia without making specific findings that Wrapp (1)
received notice of his right to present, and necessarily, of the
term of court for which he needed to be present, and (2) was
warned he would be tried im absentia if he failed to attend.
Initially, we are not persuaded by the State’s argument that
this issue is unpreserved. Although trial counsel did not
specifically object to the circuit court’s failure to make these
factual findings, he moved for a continuance and objected to
the trial proceeding due to the lack of adequate notice to
Wrapp. Cf Ravenell, 887 S.C. at 456-57, 692 S.H.2d at 558
(addressing the merits when trial counsel moved for a continu-
ance but did not specifically object to a trial in absentia and
never asserted that his client failed to receive adequate notice
or warnings).

In determining the trial would proceed in Wrapp’s absence,
the circuit court stated, “I don’t know what his situation is or
why he’s not here. But it does appear that he was noticed to
be here, For whatever reason he’s not here. I don’t really have
a valid reason. I don’t see any purpose that would be served in
continuing the case....” Even if we were to construe this as a
finding that Wrapp received notice of his right to be present,
there was no finding that Wrapp was informed he could be
tried in absentia.' Thus, Wrapp cannot be said to have volun-
tarily waived his right to be present at trial. See State v. Ritch,
292 S.C. 75, 76, 354 S.H.2d 909, 909 (1987) (finding error and
reversing when a trial court failed to make required findings
that an appellant received notice of his right to be present at
trial and a warning that he would be tried in his absence
should he fail to attend).

In addition to the circuit court’s failure to make the requi-
site factual findings, the record is devoid of any fact indicating
Wrapp had actual notice of the term of court in which his trial
would oceur. See Ravenell, 887 S.C. at 456, 692 S.H.2d at 558
(“{Nlotice of the term of court in which a defendant will be
tried is sufficient notice to enable the defendant to make an
effective waiver of his right to be present at his trial.”); see

1. We acknowledge Wrapp was provided the “in absentia’ notice on his
bond form. But the circuit court made no such finding and acknowl-
edged that it had no information as to whether Wrapp’s absence was
voluntary.

also Ellis v. State, 267 S.C. 257, 261, 227 S.H.2d 304, 306
(1976) (stating a defendant will not know the day and time of
trial until shortly before trial begins). Neither the solicitor’s
July 2014 statement to Wrapp that he would be tried “the next
time [the State] got to it” nor the language in the bond form
notified Wrapp of the term of court in which he would be
tried. Further, neither party presented any direct evidence—
such as a subpoena or a statement from trial counsel—
indicating Wrapp had notice of the term of court in which his
case would be tried. In fact, the parties were unclear as to that
circuit’s normal procedure for noticing defendants. See City of
Aiken v, Koontz, 368 S.C. 542, 547, 629 S.E.2d 686, 689 (Ct.
App. 2006) (“If the record ... does not include evidence to
support a finding that the defendant was afforded notice of his
trial, the resulting conviction in absentia cannot stand.”). It
seems logical that for one to voluntarily fail to attend trial or
otherwise waive his trial appearance, one must actually know
when the trial is to occur,

The State urges us to find any error in this process was
harmless, However, we need not undertake a harmless error
analysis when, as here, the trial court erred in failing to make
the requisite findings and the record is devoid of facts allowing
us to discern whether Wrapp had notice of the term of court.
See State v. Jackson, 290 S.C. 485, 486-87, 851 S.H.2d 167, 167
(1986) (remanding for a new trial because there was no
evidence in the record that the defendant was given notice of
his trial and neither defendant nor his counsel were present at
trial); State v. Simmons, 279 S.C, 165, 166-67, 303 S.H.2d 857,
858-59 (1983) (remanding for a new trial because the record
was devoid of facts showing defendants had notice of their
trial); see also Ritch, 292 8.C. 75, 854 S.E.2d 909; State v,
Fleming, 287 S.C. 268, 885 S.E.2d 814 (1985), Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED,

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., concur.

ST

808 S.E.2d 521
KIAWAH RESORT ASSOCIATES, L.P., a Delaware
Limited Partnership, and Kiawah Development.
Partners II, Inc., Appellants/Respondents,
v.
KIAWAH ISLAND COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., a South

Carolina Not-for-Profit Corporation, Respondent,

and

Kiawah Property Owners Group, Inc. and Inlet
Cove Club Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Respondents/Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001146
Opinion No. 5517
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard March 8, 2017
Filed September 27, 2017
Rehearing Denied January 4, 2018

iB

Ellis R. Lesemann and Michelle A. Matthews, both of
Lesemann & Associates, of Charleston, for Appellants/Respon-
dents.

Allison Carter Jett, of Weissman, P.C., of Atlanta, GA, for
Respondent.

Amy E. Armstrong and Jessie A. White, both of the South
Carolina Environmental Law Project, of Pawleys Island, for
Respondents/Appellants.

LOCKEMY, C.J:

In these cross-appeals Kiawah Resort Associates, L.P.
(KRA) and Kiawah Development Partners II LLC (KDP II)
(collectively Appellants) appeal from the Master-in-Equity’s
order declining to reform a deed given to Kiawah Island
Community Association (KICA). Appellants assert the master
erred by refusing to consider KICA’s subsequent conduct as
evidence of mutual mistake and finding there was no evidence
KICA did not intend to accept 4.62 acres of oceanfront proper-
ty as common area. Kiawah Property Owners Group, Inc,
(KPOG) and Inlet Cove Club Homeowners Association (IC-
CHA) assert the master properly declined to reform the deed,
but appeal the master’s order finding KPOG and ICCHA did
not have standing to participate in the action between Appel-
Jants and KICA. We affirm,

FACTS

KRA is the developer of a substantial area on Kiawah
Island. On September 26, 1994, KRA entered into a Develop-
ment Agreement with the Town of Kiawah Island. As part of
that agreement, KRA agreed to convey certain property to
KICA as common property. Those lands included “a strip of
scenic dunes and high land owned primarily by the Property
Owner ... which extends along the Kiawah Island beachfront
for approximately 10 miles as generally depicted on Exhibit
16.2.” KRA agreed to convey by quit claim deed that property
to KICA on or before January 1, 1996. KRA also agreed to
convey property known as “Captain Sam’s Spit” to KICA by
January 1, 2008, “provided, however, that [KRA] may convey
the eastern half of the spit to Charleston County Park &
Recreation Commission prior to January 1, 2008.”

TT

On that same day, KRA entered into an Agreement for
Conveyance with KICA. The stated purpose of the agreement
was “to evidence its agreement to the conveyance of such
properties in accordance with the terms and provisions of the
Development Agreement.” In consideration of the sum of
$5.00, KRA agreed to convey, and KICA agreed to accept
several tracts of land. Specifically, parcel 8, entitled “Approxi-
mately 10 Miles of Beachfront Property pursuant to Para-
graph 16(b) of the Development Agreement” included a full
legal description with specific metes and bounds. On Decem-
ber 29, 1995, KRA issued KICA a quit claim deed using the
same legal description found in the Agreement for Convey-
ance,

Subsequently, KRA determined the property it conveyed in
the 1995 deed included a 4.62-acre tract not contemplated in
the Development Agreement. On March 1, 2013, KRA filed its
complaint requesting the court reform the deed based on a
mutual mistake and issue a declaratory judgment that the
inclusion of this additional tract was “unintentional, in error,
and a mistake, and contrary to the intent of the parties to the
two Development Agreements of which KICA was a named
third party beneficiary.” After a trial, the master found KRA
failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a mutual
mistake and denied KRA’s requests for a declaratory judg-
ment and reformation of the deed. This appeal followed.
KRA’s APPEAL

KRA asserts the master erred by denying its request for
reformation of the 1995 deed based upon the intent expressed
in the 1994 Development Agreement and KICA’s subsequent
conduct. KRA alleges all of the evidence presented during
trial evidences a mutual mistake by KICA and KRA in
deeding an additional 4.62 acre tract to KICA.

a) Consideration of Subsequent Conduct

KRA presented evidence of subsequent conduct by KICA
that could support their claim for reformation. In its final
order the master gave little weight to that evidence and
stated, “given the lack of any evidence of KICA Board’s
discussion of the Beachfront Strip prior to the execution of the
Beachfront Deed, that the best evidence of KICA’s intent

during the relevant period of 1994 and 1995 is its President’s
execution of the Agreement for [C]onveyance” (emphasis add-
ed). KRA alleges the master improperly relied upon this
court’s decision in Penza v. Pendleton Station, LLC for the
proposition that a court cannot look to parole evidence if a
deed is unambiguous on its face. 404 S.C. 198, 748 S.H.2d 850
(Ct. App. 2018),

To the extent the master found Penza to preclude its
consideration of parole evidence if it found the deed was
unambiguous, the master erred. The plaintiff in Penza appeal-
ed the master’s order finding a mortgage was intended to
cover two tracts rather than one. Jd. at 201, 748 S.H.2d at 851.
Penza asserted the master erred in granting summary judg-
ment because there was an issue of fact as to whether the
mortgage was intended to encumber both tracts; alternatively
Penza argued the master’s order reformed the deed without a
showing of mutual mistake. Jd. This court found the mortgage
to be ambiguous, and that a genuine issue of material fact
precluded summary judgment. Jd. at 205, 748 S.H.2d at 853.
This court then found an analysis of Penza’s reformation
argument was unnecessary. Id. at 205, 743 S.H.2d at 858-54,

Furthermore, our supreme court’s decision in Sims v. Tyler
indicates subsequent conduct is proper evidence in a reforma-
tion dispute. 276 S.C. 640, 281 S.E.2d 229 (1981). The Sims
purchased two lots in a subdivision in 1969 from James Perry.
Id. at 641, 281 S.E.2d at 229. Perry executed a deed in favor of
the Sims and they recorded it. Jd. The Sims built a house on
one lot and built a doghouse and garden on the other. Id. at
641, 281 S.H.2d at 230. Several years later, Perry purportedly
sold one of the lots to the Tylers. Jd. at 642, 281 S.H.2d at 280.
The Tylers asked the Sims to remove the doghouse so they
could build a fence. Jd. The Sims complied, then brought suit
for trespass. Jd. The trial court found the Sims’ deed should
be reformed and the Tylers should have possession of the lot,
based on a mutual mistake between the Sims and Perry. Id.
The Sims court reversed, finding “There is no evidence to
support respondents’ contention that the Sims did not intend
to purchase this lot. The purchase price, the payment of taxes
since its purchase, the construction of the doghouse and the
planting of the garden are clear and convincing evidence the
Sims intended to purchase” both lots. Id.

TT

Because the Penza court specifically declined to address the
reformation argument before it, the master erred in applying
the summary judgment analysis in this case.’ Additionally,
applying Sims, we believe the master erred to the extent it
failed to consider KICA’s subsequent acts in determining
whether to reform the deed. Therefore, we will consider those
facts in the reformation analysis.

b) Reformation of Deed

HE “Before equity will reform an instrument, it must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence not simply that there
was a mistake on the part of one of the parties, but that there
was a mutual mistake.” Timms v. Timms, 290 S.C. 188, 187,
848 S.H,2d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1986). “A mutual mistake is one
whereby both parties intended a certain thing but because of a
mistake in drafting did not get what they intended.” Id.

HMM ‘In an appeal from an action in equity, tried by a
judge alone, we may find facts in accordance with our own
view of the preponderance of the evidence.” U.S. Bank Tr.
Nati Ass’n v. Bell, 885 S.C. 864, 378, 684 8.E.2d 199, 204 (Ct.
App. 2009). “However, this broad scope of review does not
require an appellate court to disregard the findings below or
ignore the fact that the trial judge is in a better position to
assess the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quoting Pinckney
v. Warren, 844 S.C. 382, 887, 544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001)).
“Moreover, the appellant is not relieved of his burden of
convincing the appellate court the trial judge committed error
in his findings.” Id. (quoting Pinckney, 344 8.C, at 387-88, 544
S.E.2d at 628).

1. KRA’s Argument

Though the facts and procedural posture of this case are
complex, the issue is simple: Did KRA and KICA intend for
the ten-mile beachfront parcel to begin at the eastern bound-
ary of Tract 18, as KRA claims, or the eastern boundary of the
Employee Tract, where the deed begins?

1, KICA asserts the master properly declined to reform the deed because
it was unambiguous pursuant to Penza. For the foregoing reasons, we
disagree.

es «

During trial, KRA presented the testimony of three KICA
board members to establish KICA’s intent. Leonard Long, a
partner in KRA and the secretary of KICA in 1995, testified
as to his understanding about the property lines. Long testi-
fied, as secretary of KICA, that he understood the beachfront
strip would terminate at Tract 18, not the Employee Tract.
Long testified the property description in the Agreement for
Conveyance and the deed were identical, but he alleged they
were both incorrect. According to Long, there was no plat of
the island at the time, and, regarding a property description
for the ten-mile strip, KRA “knew it was going to be loosey-
goosey, but we thought we could do it.” Long asserted it
would have been cost and time prohibitive to survey the
beachfront property before deeding it to KICA.

Long also testified about other instances where property
descriptions were mistakenly drafted. Long testified that dune
fields, which were supposed to have been deeded to KICA,
were mistakenly not conveyed. Long also recalled that one
deed mistakenly conveyed to KICA a tract in the center of the
island. These improper conveyances were remedied with cor-
rective deeds. According to KRA, these confirmatory quit
claim deeds established a course of conduct for the correction
of incorrect conveyances between KRA and KICA.

Patrick McKinney, another KRA partner and KICA board
member, also testified. McKinney confirmed the board was
comprised of four KRA members and three homeowners.
According to McKinney, the board was “one man one vote” at
that time. McKinney also testified KICA was a South Carolina
nonprofit corporation,

Testifying in his capacity as a partner in KRA and member
of KICA’s board, McKinney stated he believed that the beach-
front strip would begin at the eastern boundary of Tract 13,
not the Employee Tract. More pointedly, McKinney testified
that neither KRA nor KICA intended the additional 4.62 acres
be conveyed to KICA.

On cross-examination, McKinney testified he could not re-
call the KICA board discussing the terms of the Agreement
for Conveyance. McKinney believed he had discussions with
the homeowner members of the board, but could not recall if
they occurred during board meetings. McKinney also could

a

not remember if the KICA board ever took any official action
regarding the Agreement for Conveyance or the quit claim
deed itself.

The last KRA partner and KICA board member to testify
was Townsend Clarkson, Clarkson was CFO for KRA and the
president of KICA. In this capacity, Clarkson signed the
Agreement for Conveyance on behalf of KICA. According to
Clarkson, it was KICA’s intent that the beachfront property
begin at Tract 18 and continue for ten miles. Clarkson also
testified that KRA has paid the property taxes on the 4.62
acres.

Clarkson recalled a conversation he had with Craig Weaver,
the 2012 chairman of KICA’s board. According to Clarkson,
Weaver “recognized that ... this property should not have
been transferred; that it was a mistake; and that their attor-
ney ... at that time had told them that they—the covenants
required them to go to a vote.” KRA asserted a memorandum
drafted by Weaver, entitled “Talking Points for KDP,” evi-
denced the KICA board’s understanding that the additional
4.62 acres was conveyed by mistake.

Clarkson acknowledged on cross-examination that he too
could not recall whether there was a formal vote of the KICA
board to accept the Agreement for Conveyance.

KRA also presented maps, some created by KICA, showing
common areas under KICA control that do not include the
additional 4.62 acres. KRA relied upon Exhibit 16.2, attached
to the Development Agreement, as evidence of its intent to
convey only the ten-mile stretch of beachfront property begin-
ning at Tract 18. While it is not clear that the map begins at
Tract 18, it is clear that the 4.62 acre additional lot, which is
physically disconnected from the beachfront property, is not
shaded in the same way the beachfront property is. KRA also
presented maps it created that show the additional 4.62 acres
was developable property owned by KRA. According to zoning
maps maintained by the Town, the additional 4.62 acres is
zoned R-3 commercial while the beachfront property is zoned
as a park. Finally, maps published by KICA on its website do
not show the additional 4.62 acres as common area owned by
the association, though there was no evidence presented to
establish when those maps were created. KRA asserted these

a «

graphical depictions demonstrate KICA had no intent to re-
ceive the additional property and has not acted as if it did
receive that property.

KRA also avows that KICA has not taken any actions to
demonstrate ownership of the 4.62 acres since 1995. Clarkson
testified that, during his time on the KICA board between
1995 and 2001, KICA did nothing to exercise any control or
ownership over the 4.62 additional acres. Mark Pemar, a KRA.
employee tasked with long-range planning for Kiawah Island,
agreed with Clarkson that there were no signs KICA had used
the additional property.

2. IKKICA’s Argument

KICA asserts KRA failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence that the deed contradicts the terms of an antecedent
agreement between KICA and KRA. KICA asserts the
“Agreement for Conveyance obligated KRA to convey and
KICA to accept a deed in precisely the same form as the
Beachfront Deed.”

KICA further asserts the testimony from Long, Clarkson,
and McKinney “cannot be considered competent testimony”
because a majority of the homeowner representatives had to
approve the transaction with KRA pursuant to the South
Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Act defines a conflict
of interest transaction as “a transaction with the corporation
in which a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect
interest.” S.C. Code Ann. § 83-31-831(a) (2006). According to
the official comment to section 38-31-831, the subsection ap-
plies to a transaction if a director “is a general partner in a
partnership or a director, officer or trustee of another entity
that has an interest in the transaction.” S.C, Code Ann. § 33-
81-831 cmt. 1 (2006). To have a quorum to vote on a conflict of
interest transaction, “a majority of the directors on the board
who have no direct or indirect interest in the transaction”
must vote to authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction. S.C.
Code Ann. § 33-31-831(e) (2006). KICA argues there is no
evidence the board ever took a vote of the three homeowner
members of the board to approve the transaction, therefore,
the testimony from the KRA members of the KICA board is
not sufficient to express KICA’s intent. KICA’s argument thus
appears to be that it could not have an intent because the

disinterested homeowner members never voted to express an
intent.

KICA presented testimony from two of its members that
they actively use and enjoy the 4.62-acre property. Wendy
Kulick, a resident of Kiawah Island since 1989, testified she
walked on the beach in the area of the 4.62-acre property and
generally enjoyed the property. She testified if the master
were to find the property is not common property, she be-
lieved she would need explicit permission from the property
owner to walk in that area. However, Kulick acknowledged
that there was a 99-year lease that will allow her to cross the
property, regardless of who owns it.

Dr. Peter Mugglestone, who also owns property on Kiawah
Island, testified that he runs most mornings and cuts through
the 4.62 acres. Dr. Mugglestone also testified that he often
walks in the afternoon and used the property to get to the
boardwalk. Dr. Mugglestone stated he takes pictures of the
wildlife on the 4.62 acre property and enjoys the property in
its unaltered state.

Regarding the memo from the 2012 board chair, KICA
asserts it simply demonstrated KICA’s understanding that
KRA did not intend to convey the 4.62 acres to KICA. KICA
notes “[t]he Taking Points for [Kiawah Development Partners
(KDP) ] document does not say that the 2011 KICA Board had
determined that the 1995 KICA Board had not intended to
receive” the additional 4.62 acres. Rather, the memo states,
“Based on the examination of the record of documents avail-
able to KICA, the board is satisfied that the transfer of the
property to KICA was not intended by the original parties to
the [Development] [A]greement, which included [KRA] and
the Town of Kiawah Island,” and that “KICA does not desire
to benefit from this unintended transfer of property.”

Finally, KICA asserts whatever the intentions of the KRA
and the Town of Kiawah Island when they signed the 1994
Development Agreement, those intentions cannot be implied
to KICA because it was not a party to that agreement. KICA
states there is no evidence its representatives ever saw the
Development Agreement, and an agreement between KRA
and the Town of Kiawah Island cannot be demonstrative of its
intent.

3. The Master’s Orders

The master issued its final order on June 4, 2014. The
master found the Agreement for Conveyance was the only
document related to the additional 4.62 acres that was signed
by KICA. The master also found the legal descriptions in the
Agreement for Conveyance and the quit claim deed were
identical.

The master detailed the graphical evidence and testimony
presented by KRA. The master also analyzed whether the 4.62
acres was developable, as there was testimony that KRA
intended only to convey non-developable property to KICA.

The master stated, “The court finds that whatever evidence
exists of KRA’s intent not to convey the Beachfront Strip to
KICA is only relevant to the extent the court finds the deed
and Agreement for Conveyance to be ambiguous.” The master
determined the deed and the Agreement were unambiguous,
and KRA’s claims must fail. However, the master continued to
analyze the evidence as if the deed were ambiguous. The
master again noted the Agreement for Conveyance was the
only written agreement between KRA and KICA, and the
deed mirrored that agreement. Because the two property
descriptions were identical, there was no mistake between the
agreement and the drafting of the deed.

The master also found that KRA did intend to convey the
4.62 acres as part of the ten-mile strip of property. The master
then found the 4.62-acre property was not developable; there-
fore, the conveyance of the additional property was consistent
with the purpose of the 1994 Development Agreement, which
was to convey non-developable property to KICA to hold as
common area,

Finally, the master found KICA’s position as a third-party
beneficiary of the 1994 agreement did nothing to answer the
question of KICA’s intent. The master also noted it could find
“no guiding legal authority to authorize, much less require,
that it weigh or examine the intent of anyone who is not an
immediate party to the instrument, or at least in privity
thereto when determining intent for the purposes of proving
mutual mistake in the context of reformation.” Accordingly,
the master denied KRA’s request that it reform the deed.

KRA filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment
and the master issued an order denying the motion to alter or

amend on May 4, 2015. In that order, the master found his
earlier discussion of the developability of the 4.62 acres “does
not impact the [cJourt’s ultimate conclusion that [KRA] did not
meet [its] burden on [its] claim for reformation.” The master
also found the 1994 agreement was inapplicable to the deter-
mination of KICA’s intent, and any discussion of the Develop-
ment Agreement or Exhibit 16.2, “while perhaps demonstra-
tive of KRA’s intent, does nothing to bolster any inference
that it is a reflection of KICA’s intent.” The master noted that
the potentially gratuitous nature of the transfer also does not
change the analysis of the reformation claim. The master
again noted its belief that the unambiguous nature of the
Agreement for Conveyance and the deed militated against
reforming the deed.

For the first time in the order denying KRA’s motion to
alter or amend, the master detailed the testimony by the KRA
directors that were also KICA board members. The master
found the KRA directors engaged in a “conflict of interest
transaction” as defined in the South Carolina Non-Profit Cor-
poration Act. Under the Act, a non-profit corporation may
transact business with an interested director, but the transac-
tion must be approved by a majority of the disinterested
directors. The master found there was no evidence of any
meeting by the KICA board to discuss the property transfer,
and no evidence was presented about the homeowner KICA
board members or their understanding of the agreement.
After considering the application of the Act to these facts, the
master found there was not clear and convincing evidence of a
mutual mistake, and again refused to reform the deed.

Finally, the master found KPOG and ICCHA did not show
that they asserted any discrete claims that were separately
derived from their membership in KICA. The master stated,
“It is KICA who has the sole right and authority to prosecute
or defend [its] rights.” The master then found KPOG and
ICCHA did not demonstrate they had separate standing from
their capacity as KICA members and should be dismissed
from the case.

4, Analysis

Hl While KRA did present some evidence to support their
assertion that KICA shared a mutual mistake regarding what

property it intended to receive, we find KRA failed to carry its
high burden to reform the deed. See Timms, 290 S.C. at 187,
848 §.H.2d at 889 (“Before equity will reform an instrument, it
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence not simply
that there was a mistake on the part of one of the parties, but
that there was a mutual mistake.”). The only written agree-
ment between KICA and KRA provides that KRA will convey,
and KICA will accept, the ten-mile strip of property beginning
at the Employee Tract, including the 4.62 acres. We acknowl-
edge the 1994 Development Agreement evidences that KRA
intended to convey the ten-mile strip of beachfront property
beginning at Tract 18; however, KICA was not a party to that
agreement and KICA’s intent cannot be inferred from its
terms.

Admittedly, there was some evidence to support KRA’s
argument that KICA did not take actions consistent with
owning the disputed property. KICA’s maps do not indicate it
owns the disputed property and the memo from KICA’s
former board chairman suggests the property was mistakenly
conveyed. However, there is no evidence in the record that
KICA intended to receive anything other than what KRA
conveyed. The language in the deed and the executed Agree-
ment for Conveyance are identical, and no witness can pro-
duce evidence that KICA’s board considered the matter in any
way. At its core, this case is the result of KRA’s failure to
have the property properly surveyed and the consequential
results of that failure.

KPOG and ICCHA’S APPEAL

A party must be permitted to intervene, as of right, in an
action when the party claims an “interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and
he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties.” Rule 24(a)(2), SCRCP. If a party
is not permitted to intervene as of right, the trial court may
permit it to intervene “when an applicant’s claim or defense
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.”
Rule 24(b)(2), SCRCP.

HMM “The decision to grant or deny a motion to join an
action pursuant to Rule 19, SCRCP, or intervene in an action

pursuant to Rule 24, SCRCP, lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Hu parte Gov't Emp.’s Ins. Co. v. Goethe,
878 S.C, 182, 135, 644 S.H.2d 699, 701 (2007). “This [cJourt will
not disturb the lower court’s decision on appeal unless a
manifest abuse of discretion is found resulting in an error of
law.” Id. (quoting Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 869 S.C. 483,
438, 683 S.E.2d 148, 146 (2006)). “Moreover, the error of law
must be so opposed to the lower court’s sound discretion as to
amount to a deprivation of the legal rights of the party.” Id.
(quoting Jeter, 369 S.C. at 488, 688 S.E.2d at 146).

HM “Generally, the rules of intervention should be lib-
erally construed where judicial economy will be promoted by
declaring the rights of all affected parties.” Id. at 188, 644
S.E.2d at 702. “Accordingly, the [clourt should consider the
practical implications of a decision denying or allowing inter-
vention.” Id. “However, a party must have standing to inter-
vene in an action pursuant to Rule 24, SCRCP.” Id. “A party
has standing if the party has a personal stake in the subject
matter of a lawsuit and is a ‘real party in interest.” Id, “A
real party in interest ... is one who has a real, actual,
material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action, as distinguished from one who has only a nominal,
formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the action.”
Id. (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C, 454, 458, 441 S.H.2d
325, 827 (1994).

HM “Ii is well settled that an issue cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and
ruled upon by the [master] to be preserved.” Pye v. Estate of
Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 683 8.E.2d 505, 510 (2006).

HMM The issue KPOG and ICCHA raise in their appeal of
the master’s order is not preserved for this court’s review. In
the early stages of the litigation, KPOG and ICCHA peti-
tioned to intervene, either as a matter of right or with the
master’s permission. See Rule 24, SCRCP. The master found
KPOG and ICCHA raised distinct interests in the disposition
of the 4,62-acre property because of their proximity to the
tract, The master also found KPOG and ICCHA’s interests
would not be adequately protected by KICA’s defense because
KICA did not take a position on its intent or whether there
was a mutual mistake while KPOG and ICCHA asserted there

Ss

was evidence KICA intended to accept the additional land.
Accordingly, the master allowed KPOG and ICCHA to inter-
vene pursuant to Rule 24(a), SCRCP, and Rule 24(b), SCRCP.

Following the master’s final order, KRA filed a motion to
alter or amend that order and a motion for relief from the
order granting intervention. KPOG and ICCHA filed a re-
sponse to KRA’s motion. In its order on the motion to alter or
amend the final order, the master declined to amend any
substantive portions of the order pertaining to the reforma-
tion; however, the master did decide that KPOG and ICCHA
did not have standing and should not be allowed to intervene.
The master found “neither intervening entity has asserted any
discrete claims that are separately derived from their mem-
bership in KICA.” KPOG and ICCHA immediately filed an
appeal from the master’s order, without filing a motion for
reconsideration.

On appeal, KPOG and ICCHA assert the master confused.
and misapplied the legal standards for standing and interven-
tion, which lead to a ruling wholly inconsistent with its previ-
ous ruling. This argument was never raised to the master.
Therefore, we decline to address it.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
De

808 S.E.2d 626
Robert J. BURKE, Respondent,
ve
REPUBLIC PARKING SYSTEM, INC., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000269
Opinion No. 5519
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard June 6, 2017
Filed October 25, 2017
Rehearing Denied January 11, 2018

rd
13

es

Roopal S. Ruparelia and Sarah Patrick Spruill, both of
Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Clayton B. McCullough and Jamie A. Khan, both of MeCul-
lough Khan, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent.

THOMAS, J.:

Appellant Republic Parking System, Inc. (Republic) filed
this appeal following a jury verdict in favor of Respondent
Robert J, Burke. Republic claims the trial court erred by
denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) and a new trial based on many arguments including
that the trial court erred by excluding its expert witness, We
agree the trial court erred by excluding Republic’s expert
witness and reverse for a new trial; thus, we decline to
address Republie’s remaining arguments.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In his complaint, Burke alleged he was a customer in the
George Street parking lot (the Lot) in Charleston at approxi-
mately 7:00 p.m. in January 2018. Burke claimed he parked his
car and attempted to exit the Lot on foot when he tripped and
fell on a “raised curb” inside the Lot. Burke asserted the curb
“was virtually hidden” due to “extremely low and poor lighting
conditions.” Burke named as defendants Republic, Indigo Re-
alty Company, LLC (Indigo), and the City of Charleston (the
City). Burke alleged Indigo owned the Lot and leased it to the
City who then contracted with Republic to operate the Lot,
Burke claimed Republic operated and managed the Lot and
was responsible for keeping it free of hazardous conditions,
maintenance, and repairs.

Burke settled with Indigo and the City the week before
trial. During a motion in limine on the morning the trial
began, Burke moved to exclude Republic’s expert witness, Dr.
Todd Shuman. Burke admitted the City named Shuman as an
expert during discovery but claimed only the City named him.
Burke asserted that fact was a consideration in his decision to
settle with the City.’ Republic claimed it did not name Shuman

1. During oral argument, Burke continued to assert he “may’’ not have
settled with the City had he known Republic would call Shuman as an
expert. However, Burke refused to state definitively that he would not
have settled, and he acknowledged other strong motivations to settle

in its discovery responses because the City had named him
and did not settle with Burke until the week prior to trial.
Republic claimed, however, that it did name Shuman in its
pre-trial brief served the Friday before trial. Also, Republic
asserted it had a fee sharing agreement with the City for
compensating Shuman. Republic pointed out Burke would not
be prejudiced or surprised by Shuman’s testimony because he
had been aware of Shuman and had taken his deposition,

The trial court inquired whether Republic ever supplement-
ed its interrogatories, and Republic admitted it had not. The
trial court then excluded Shuman because Republic failed to
file a supplemental interrogatory. The trial court explained it
was excluding Shuman because Republic answered interroga-
tories and did not identify an expert witness. The trial court
noted “[alll [Republic] had to do was to send [Burke] a letter.”
When Republic attempted to restate it listed Shuman as a
witness in its pre-trial brief, the trial court incorrectly stated
the pre-trial brief listed him as a fact witness.

Subsequently, Republic proffered Shuman’s deposition in
which he testified he reviewed records related to Burke’s
medical care following the incident in this case, Shuman
asserted there were “several reasons” Burke could have fallen
and his recovery was “greatly influenced” by his preexisting
medical conditions. Specifically, Shuman noted Burke’s preex-
isting conditions that could have caused his fall in the Lot
included diabetes, “significant swelling” in his feet, and a prior
stroke. Shuman also claimed “the extent of [Burke’s] injuries
may not be as great as were initially stated” by Burke’s
physician. Testifying specifically about Burke’s records, Shu-
man claimed some of the records indicated Burke’s knee
injury was a chronic problem in existence prior to his fall in
the Lot, The jury returned a verdict in Burke’s favor, and the
trial court denied Republie’s post-trial motion for JNOV or a
new trial. This appeal followed.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Shu-
man’s testimony based on Republic’s failure to timely identify
Shuman as an expert witness?

with the City, including the South Carolina Tort Claims Act's cap on
recovery against a government entity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter
within the trial court’s sound discretion, and an appellate court
may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence
upon a showing of a ‘manifest abuse of discretion accompanied
by probable prejudice.” State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254,
262-63, 721 8.H.2d 418, 417 (2011) (quoting State v. Douglas,
869 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.H.2d 845, 847-48 (2006)). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either
lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law.”
State v. Pagan, 369 8.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006),
Determining whether prejudice exists “depends on the cireum-
stances” and “the materiality and prejudicial character of the
error must be determined from its relationship to the entire
case.” State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 172, 508 S.E.2d 870, 876
(1998) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 386 S.E.2d
150, 151 (1985)). Prejudice in this context means “there is a
reasonable probability the jury’s verdict was influenced by the
wrongly admitted or excluded evidence.” Vaught v. A.O. Har-
dee & Sons, Inc., 366 S.C. 475, 480, 623 S.E.2d 378, 375 (2005).

EXCLUSION OF SHUMAN’S TESTIMONY

Hl Republic argues the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding Shuman because it failed to properly weigh the
appropriate factors for determining a sanction when a party
fails to timely disclose a witness. We agree.

HMMM Deciding the appropriate sanction for late disclosure
of an expert witness lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Barnette v. Adams Bros. Logging, Inc., 355 S.C.
588, 592, 586 S.H.2d 572, 574 (2008). “The rule is designed to
promote decisions on the merits after a full and fair hearing,
and the sanction of exclusion of a witness should never be
lightly invoked.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. H&S Oil Co., 268 S.C.
407, 411, 211 S.H.2d 228, 225 (1975)). A trial court “is required
to consider and evaluate” certain factors before excluding a
witness: “(1) the type of witness involved; (2) the content of
the evidence emanating from the proffered witness; (8) the
nature of the failure or neglect or refusal to furnish the
witness’[s] name; (4) the degree of surprise to the other party,
including the prior knowledge of the name of the witness; and

es «

(5) the prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. at 592, 586 S.E.2d
at 574-75.

In Barnette, our supreme court found the trial court abused
its discretion by excluding an expert witness because the trial
court “made no specific finding of prejudice to the [opposing
party], other than finding the late disclosure would necessitate
further discovery” and there was no violation of a pre-trial
order. Id. at 598, 586 S.E.2d at 575, See Jenkins v. Few, 391
§.C. 209, 219-20, 705 S.H.2d 457, 462 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting an
expert witness after considering the relevant factors). In
Jumper, this court reversed the family court’s decision to
exclude a witness. Jumper v. Hawkins, 348 S.C. 142, 152, 558
§.E.2d 911, 916 (Ct. App. 2001). This court found the family
court “erred by focusing solely on the [pre-trial scheduling]
order in making its decision” and failing to consider all of the
relevant factors. Id. at 151-52, 558 8.H.2d at 916.

In Bryson, this court found the special referee was within
its discretion to exclude a witness when the party attempting
to call the witness did not notify the opposing party until the
morning of trial. Bryson v. Bryson, 878 S.C. 502, 508, 662
§.E.2d 611, 618 (Ct. App, 2008). The court carefully examined
the record and found the special referee “properly considered
the Jumper factors” when making its decision. Id. This court
also examined each of the factors and noted the opposing
party would suffer “significant surprise and prejudice” be-
cause it would be unable to prepare for examining the witness
and would have no opportunity to depose the witness. Id. at
509, 662 S.H.2d at 614. The Bryson court concluded, “[Wle
find the special referee properly considered all factors set
forth in Jwmper when deciding to exclude [the witness], and
therefore, the exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.” Id.

Additionally, in Arthur, the trial court excluded multiple
witnesses because the appellant failed to identify them within
the deadline imposed by a scheduling order. Arthur v. Seaton
Dental Clinic, 368 S.C. 326, 338, 628 S.H.2d 894, 900 (Ct. App.
2006). Although the trial court failed to specifically enunciate
the Jumper factors when making its ruling, this court found
the trial court “did not exclude the witnesses solely on the
ground of [the appellant’s] failure to comply with the time

limits of the scheduling order. Instead, the [trial court] made
the appropriate inquiry and considered the requisite factors.”
Id, at 841, 628 S.H.2d at 902. Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion because it based its decision on a consider-
ation of the Jwmper factors, rather than the initial finding that
notice of the witnesses was untimely. Id.

Hl Accordingly, based on our review of the case law, a
trial court has discretion to decide the sanction for a party
providing untimely notice of a witness but may exclude the
witness from testifying only after considering each of the
Jumper factors. A party’s failure to provide timely notice of a
witness triggers the trial court’s obligation to then consider
the factors. Thus, when a trial court excludes a witness for the
sole reason that the party attempting to call the witness failed
to provide timely notice under the rules of discovery, the trial
court commits an error of law, which is an abuse of discretion.

In this case, the trial court abused its discretion because it
excluded Shuman on the sole basis that Republic failed to
provide timely notice of its intent to call him as an expert
witness. After thoroughly reviewing the discussion between
the trial court and the parties, we find the trial court based its
ruling on the single finding that Republic did not serve a
supplemental interrogatory. During the motion in limine, the
trial court inquired whether Republic ever supplemented its
interrogatories, and Republic admitted it had not. The trial
court responded, “Very well, I am going to grant [Burke’s]
motion [to exclude Shuman]. He’s not going to testify.” The
trial court further stated, “I am banking on the fact that you
have answered interrogatories and today you've still not iden-
tified an expert witness.” The trial court noted “[a]ll [Repub-
lic] had to do was to send them a letter.” When Republic
attempted to argue it listed Shuman as a witness in its pre-
trial brief, the trial court stated the pre-trial brief listed him
as a fact witness.”

Despite Republic’s attempt to argue the Jumper factors
including that Burke would not be surprised or prejudiced, the
trial court made clear it was excluding Shuman simply because
Republic failed to provide timely notice. The trial court failed

2. The pre-trial brief listed Shuman as an expert witness.

to consider the Jwmper factors, and as discussed above, such a
failure is an abuse of discretion under our case law. Thus, the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding Shuman when it
based its decision only on Republic’s failure to timely name
Shuman as a witness and failed to consider the Jumper
factors.

WM Furthermore, we find the trial court’s error preju-
diced Republic. See State v. Cope, 885 S.C. 274, 287, 684
S.E.2d 177, 184 (Ct. App. 2009) (“To warrant reversal, any
error by the trial court in admitting or excluding expert
testimony must result in prejudice.”), Shuman was Republic's
only expert witness to contradict Burke’s expert, and his
testimony would have impacted the causation and damages
elements of Burke’s claims. Shuman’s testimony went to
whether Burke’s fall was caused by the Lot’s conditions or a
preexisting medical condition. In his deposition, Shuman testi-
fied there were “several reasons” Burke could have fallen such
as diabetes, significant swelling in his feet, the long car ride
preceding the fall, and other preexisting medical conditions.
Shuman noted Burke had at least one other fall prior to his
fall in the Lot. Shuman also asserted Burke’s ability to recover
was “greatly influenced” by his preexisting conditions. By
excluding Shuman’s testimony, the jury was not permitted to
hear and consider all relevant evidence relating to causation
and damages, and there is a reasonable probability the jury’s
verdict was influenced by the trial court’s decision. See
Vaught, 366 S.C. at 484-85, 623 S.H.2d at 378 (finding there
was “a reasonable probability the jury’s verdict was influenced
by the excluded evidence because the jury was not permitted
to hear and consider all relevant evidence relating to dam-
ages”). Thus, Shuman’s testimony was vital to Republic's
causation and damages arguments, and the trial court’s exclu-
sion of it prejudiced Republic. Accordingly, because the trial
court abused its discretion by excluding Shuman’s testimony
and that error was prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a
new trial? See id. at 485, 623 S.H.2d at 378 (reversing and

3. Because our decision to grant a new trial based on the trial court’s
abuse of discretion is dispositive of Republic’s remaining arguments, we
decline to rule on them. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C, 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (explaining an

es
remanding for a new trial after finding the trial court commit-
ted reversible error by excluding certain evidence).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF, J., concur.
| |

808 S.E.2d 824

Wadette COTHRAN and Chris Cothran, Respondents,
vy.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY and Robert Tucker, Defendants,

Of which State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000177
Opinion No. 5524
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard September 8, 2017
Filed November 22, 2017 |
Rehearing Denied January 18, 2018

appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of a
prior issue is dispositive).

iol
Ss
1

564

Charles R. Norris and Robert W. Whelan, of Nelson Mullins
Riley & Scarborough LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.

Charles Logan Rollins, II, of The Hawkins Law Firm, of
Spartanburg, for Respondents.

THOMAS, J.:

Appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany (State Farm) appeals the circuit court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment to Respondents Wadette and Chris Cothran.
The Cothrans brought this action against State Farm alleging
breach of an insurance contract and breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. State Farm argues the circuit court

es

erred by granting summary judgment in the Cothrans’ favor
because our supreme court’s precedent was controlling and by
holding public policy prohibited insurers offering personal
injury protection (PIP) benefits from reducing those benefits
by the amount an insured receives from a workers’ compensa-
tion policy. We reverse.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Cothrans filed this action in April 2015, alleging bad
faith refusal to pay insurance benefits and breach of contract.
In August 2015, the parties entered a stipulation of facts.
Wadette Cothran was injured in a motor vehicle accident and
incurred medical expenses in excess of $5,000. Wadette’s
employer’s workers’ compensation carrier paid her medical
expenses in full, Wadette was also covered by her automobile
policy issued by State Farm (the Policy), which provided PIP
coverage with a limit of $5,000. State Farm paid $991 to the
Cothrans for a portion of Wadette’s lost wages but denied
payment of the remaining PIP coverage because a provision
(Excess Provision) in the Policy provided its PIP coverage was
excess to any benefits the policyholder recovered under work-
ers’ compensation law. The Cothrans claimed the Excess
Provision violated section 38-77-144 of the South Carolina
Code (2015)! and they should recover the PIP benefits in
addition to the workers’ compensation benefits. Both parties
moved for summary judgment and agreed there were no
material facts in dispute. The sole matter before the circuit
court was whether the Excess Provision violated section 38-77-
144.

The Policy in its entirety is included in the record on appeal
and was presented to the circuit court. The Excess Provision
stated, “Any [PIP] Coverage provided by [the Policy] applies
as excess over any benefits recovered under any workers’
compensation law or any other similar law.”

State Farm argued our supreme court essentially decided

1. See § 38-77-144 (“There is no [PIP] coverage mandated under the
automobile insurance laws of this State... If an insurer sells no-fault
insurance coverage which provides [PIP], medical payment coverage,
or economic loss coverage, the coverage shall not be assigned or
subrogated and is not subject to a setoff.”),

this issue in Richardson” by finding section 88-77-144’s prohi-
bition against setoffs applied only to a possible setoff for a
tortfeasor’s liability. It claimed it was entitled to summary
judgment because section 88-77-144 did not apply to the
situation in this case. Alternatively, the Cothrans argued the
plain meaning of section 38-77-144 did not allow a setoff of
PIP benefits. They also argued Richardson did not address
this situation and was only meant to prevent a liability carrier
from receiving a windfall. Finally, the Cothrans asserted
allowing a setoff of PIP benefits under these circumstances
would violate public policy because a workers’ compensation
carrier would be prevented from claiming an equitable interest
in the PIP benefits.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Cothrans. The circuit court found the Excess Provision consti-
tuted a setoff under South Carolina law. The court then found
the Excess Provision violated the plain meaning of section 38-
77-144. With regard to Richardson, the circuit court deter-
mined it “addresse[d] only stacking of coverage,” rather than
a setoff provision, Further, the circuit court found if State
Farm’s argument was correct “there would be no bar to the
PIP carrier alleging a setoff based on payments made by the
health insurance carrier, the liability insurance carrier, or, for
that matter, the injured party’s Aunt Ethel and Uncle Fred
who broke their piggy bank to pay for her hospital bill.” The
circuit court believed an interpretation permitting such a
finding would lead to an “absurd result.” Finally, the circuit
court declared public policy would not allow a setoff under
these circumstances because it would prevent the workers’
compensation carrier from claiming an equitable interest in
the PIP benefits. Subsequently, the circuit court denied State
Farm’s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the circuit court err by finding section 38-77-144

invalidates the Excess Provision?

2. Did the circuit court err by finding public policy prohibits

a setoff of PIP benefits because it prevents workers’

2. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. v, Richardson, 313 8.C. 58, 437 S.B.2d
43 (1993).

compensation carriers from asserting an equitable lien
against PIP benefits?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM The circuit court should grant a motion for summary
judgment when the evidence shows “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(¢), SCRCP. An
appellate court “reviews the grant of a summary judgment
motion under the same standard as the [circuit] court.” Mont-
gomery v. CSX Transp., Inc., 376 S.C. 87, 47, 656 S.E.2d 20,
25 (2008). “When the purpose of the underlying dispute is to
determine if coverage exists under an insurance policy, the
action is one at law.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rhoden, 398
S.C, 393, 898, 728 S.E.2d 477, 479 (2012), “[W]hen an appeal
involves stipulated or undisputed facts, an appellate court is
free to review whether the [circuit] court properly applied the
law to those facts.” Jd. at 398, 728 S.H.2d at 480 (quoting In re
Estate of Boynton, 355 S.C. 299, 301, 584 S.H.2d 154, 155 (Ct.
App. 2008).

SECTION 38-77-144

State Farm argues the circuit court erred by granting
summary judgment in the Cothrans’ favor because our su-
preme court’s ruling on section 88-77-144 in Richardson was
controlling. Specifically, State Farm argues Richardson held
section 38-77-144’s prohibition against a setoff applied only to
prevent a tortfeasor from receiving a setoff against an in-
sured’s PIP benefits, State Farm claims the circuit court erred
by substituting its interpretation of legislative intent for our
supreme court's interpretation. Also, State Farm asserts it
was entitled to limit its liability by including the Excess
Provision in the Policy.

The Cothrans argue the circuit court properly granted
summary judgment in their favor based on the plain meaning
rule because the text of section 88-77-144 is clear. The Coth-
rans claim “any policy provision that constitutes a [setoff] [of
PIP benefits] must be invalid.” The Cothrans contend Rich-
ardson does not apply to this case and addressed only whether
an insurance policy may prohibit stacking of coverages.

a.

HM We find the circuit court erred by finding section 38-
77-144 invalidated the Excess Provision because the setoff
prohibition in section 38-77-144 applies only to prevent tortfea-
sors from reducing their liability by the amount of PIP
benefits recovered by a claimant. “An insurance policy is a
contract between the insured and the insurance company, and
the policy’s terms are to be construed according to the law of
contracts.” Williams v. Gov't Emps. Ins, Co. (GEICO), 409
S.C. 586, 594, 762 S.H.2d 705, 709 (2014). “As a general rule,
insurers have the right to limit their liability and to impose
conditions on their obligations provided they are not in contra-
vention of public policy or some statutory inhibition.” Id. at
598, 762 S.H.2d at 712. Although not absolute, parties to an
insurance contract “are generally permitted to contract as
they see fit.” Id. However, “[s]tatutes governing an insurance
contract are part of the contract as a matter of law, and to the
extent a policy provision conflicts with an applicable statute,
the provision is invalid.” Id. “There is no [PIP] coverage
mandated under the automobile insurance laws of this
State.... If an insurer sells no-fault insurance coverage which
provides [PIP], medical payment coverage, or economic loss
coverage, the coverage shall not be assigned or subrogated
and is not subject to a setoff.” §.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-144
(2015).

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, In

construing statutory language, the statute must be read as a

whole, and sections which are a part of the same general

statutory law must be construed together and each one
given effect. Unless there is something in the statute requir-
ing a different interpretation, the words used in a statute
must be given their ordinary meaning. When a statute’s
terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no
room for statutory construction and a court must apply the
statute according to its literal meaning.

Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 397 8.C, 551, 556-57, 725

§.E.2d 704, 706-07 (2012) (citations omitted).

In Richardson, our supreme court considered the meaning
of a “setoff” as used in section 88-77-1447 318 S.C, at 60-61,

3. At the time our supreme court decided Richardson, section 38-77-144
was numbered section 38-77-145. However, the wording of the current

487 §.E.2d at 45. The insureds incurred medical expenses
following a motor vehicle accident, and they filed a claim for
PIP benefits under two policies with the same insurer. Id. at
59, 437 8.H.2d at 44. The insurer paid the PIP benefits for one
policy but denied payment on the other policy based on a
policy provision that prevented the insureds from stacking
their policies’ PIP benefits, Jd. The insureds brought a declar-
atory judgment action claiming the insurer’s refusal to pay
both policies’ PIP benefits amounted to a setoff in violation of
section 38-77-14, Id. The insurer argued the disputed provi-
sion was an “anti-stacking” provision, rather than a setoff as
that term is used in section 88-77-144, Id. at 60, 487 S.H,2d at
44. Our supreme court analyzed the legislative history of
section 38-77-144 and agreed with the insurer, Jd. at 60, 487
§.H.2d at 45. The court noted the statute, prior to 1989,
“allowed a tortfeasor to reduce his liability to a claimant by
the amount of PIP benefits received by the claimant.” Id.
(citing S.C. Code Ann. § 88-77-290(f) (1989)). The court ex-
plained the legislature changed automobile insurance law in
1989, repealed the tortfeasor’s statutory setoff, and “expressly
provided that PIP coverage was not subject to a [setoff].” Id.

Considering this legislative history, the Richardson court
found the legislature “intended for the [setoff] prohibition in
[section 38-77-144] to refer to the statute allowing reduction of
a tortfeasor’s liability[,] which was repealed” in 1989, Id. Thus,
our supreme court found the setoff in section 38-77-144 “is the
tortfeasor’s reduction in liability formerly allowed” by statute.
Id. The court concluded the legislature “intended the [setoff]
prohibition of section 88-77-14[4] to apply only to the tortfea-
sor.” Id. at 61, 487 S.H.2d at 45 (emphasis added). Thus,
although Richardson involved an anti-stacking provision, its
holding was not limited or restricted only to stacking related
provisions.

Additionally, this court has relied on Richardson to find
section 88-77-144 “prevented [a] tortfeasor from profiting in
the case where the injured party received PIP benefits.”

section 38-77-144 is identical to the statute at the time of Richardson
except for changing “must” to “shall” in one instance. Compare § 38-
77-144 (noting PIP coverage “shall” not be assigned), with S.C. Code
Ann. § 38-77-145 (Supp. 1992) (noting PIP coverage “must” not be
assigned),

Mount v. Sea Pines Co., 387 S.C. 855, 358, 523 S.E.2d 464, 465
(Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). “By enacting section 38-77-14[4],
the legislature attempted to insure that the tortfeasor paid the
full amount of damages suffered by the injured party.” Id.
Based on these findings, the Mount court determined the
setoff prohibition in section 38-77-144 did not apply to prevent
a tortfeasor from reducing a jury award in the plaintiff's favor
by the amount the tortfeasor paid prior to trial toward the
plaintiffs medical expenses. Id. Although the setoff at issue in
Mount did not involve PIP benefits, the Mount court’s inter-
pretation and application of Richardson in a situation other
than one involving an anti-stacking provision is instructive.

Further, the Fourth Circuit has considered whether the
setoff prohibition in section 38-77-144 prohibits an insurer
from reducing the amount of underinsured motorist (UIM)
benefits by the amount of PIP benefits. Rowszie v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 556 F.3d 165, 166 (4th Cir. 2009). In Rowzie, the plaintiff
was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured
motorist, and she received PIP benefits from her insurer. Id.
The plaintiff also sought to recover UIM benefits from her
insurer, but the insurer, based on express language in the
policy, reduced the UIM award by the amount of PIP benefits
it paid the plaintiff. Jd. The plaintiff claimed the setoff prohibi-
tion in section 38-77-144 prohibited the insurer from reducing
UIM benefits based on the amount it paid in PIP benefits. Id.
The Rowzie court relied on Richardson to determine the
setoff prohibition in section 38-77-144 applied “‘only to the
tortfeasor,’ and not to serve as a general prohibition against
all reductions of automotive insurance based on upon
PIP/MedPay coverage.” Id. at 168. The court emphasized “the
specific finding in Richardson that the [setoff] prohibition
applies ‘only to the tortfeasor.” Id. at 169. Subsequently, the
court declared, “As the court in Richardson made clear, the
South Carolina legislature drafted [section] 88-77-144 with the
intention that the setoff prohibition would ‘apply only to the
tortfeasor.’ ” Id.

Thus, despite the language of section $8-77-144 appearing to
prohibit any setoff of PIP benefits, our supreme court de-
clared the legislative intent of that section was to prohibit
tortfeasors from reducing their liability by the amount of PIP
benefits. See Richardson, 318 S.C. at 61, 4837 S.H.2d at 45

(finding the legislature “intended the [setoff] prohibition of
section 88-77-14[4] to apply only to the tortfeasor” (emphasis
added)). As discussed above, this court and the Fourth Cireuit
have followed Richardson’s holding.

In this case, the cireuit court erred by finding section 38-77-
144 prohibited the parties from contracting to setoff PIP
benefits by the amount the Cothrans received under workers’
compensation Jaw. As discussed above, the setoff prohibition in
section 38-77-144 applies only to prevent tortfeasors from
reducing their liability by the amount a claimant receives in
PIP benefits. Section 88-77-144 does not prohibit an insured
and insurer from contracting to reduce PIP benefits by the
amount the insured receives under workers’ compensation law.
Because the Excess Provision allows a setoff only for what the
insured receives under workers’ compensation law and does
not involve any setoff for tortfeasor liability, section 38-77-144
does not prohibit or invalidate the Excess Provision. There-
fore, the parties were entitled to include the Excess Provision
in the Policy. See Williams, 409 S.C. at 598, 762 S.H.2d at 712
(noting parties to an insurance contract “are generally permit-
ted to contract as they see fit”).

Hl With regard to the Cothrans’ argument that State
Farm’s interpretation of section 38-77-144 would lead to an
absurd result because it would allow an insurer to essentially
reduce PIP benefits by any payment an insured received, we
believe the concern is overstated. South Carolina courts refuse
to enforce insurance policy exclusions that render the cover-
age “virtually meaningless.” See Isle of Palms Pest Control
Co. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 319 8.C. 12, 19, 459 S.E.2d 318, 321
(Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to interpret an exclusion in a way
that “would render the policy virtually meaningless, because it
would exclude coverage for ... the very risk contemplated by
the parties”); see also Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 407
S.C. 565, 580, 757 S.E.2d 399, 407 (2014) (explaining courts
may use the doctrine of reasonable expectations to interpret a
policy if the terms “are ambiguous or conflicting, or if the
policy contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print
takes away that which has been given by the large print”);
S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 398 S.C. 604,
615, 730 S.E.2d 862, 867 (2012) (noting “the literal interpreta-
tion of policy language will be rejected whe[n] its application

would lead to unreasonable results and the definitions as
written would be so narrow as to make coverage merely
‘illusory’ ”); B.L.G. Enters., Ine. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 884 8.C.
529, 587 n.5, 514 S.H.2d 827, 331 n.5 (1999) (recognizing an
“jllusory” exclusion is unenforceable). Thus, if a policy con-
tained a PIP exclusion so broad as to render PIP benefits
unobtainable, virtually meaningless, or illusory, an insured
would be able to dispute the exclusion without having to rely
on section 38-77-144,

Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred by invalidating
the Excess Provision based on section 38-77-144 because the
setoff prohibition in that section only prohibits tortfeasors
from reducing their liability to a claimant by the amount of
PIP benefits the claimant receives, Because section 38-77-144
does not prohibit the type of exclusion contained in the Excess
Provision, the parties were free to contract as they wished.
We reverse the circuit court’s holding on this issue.

PUBLIC POLICY

State Farm argues the circuit court erred by invalidating
the Excess Provision based on public policy. First, State Farm
claims the issue of public policy was not before the circuit
court and it erred by considering the issue. Second, State
Farm contends PIP coverage is not required and our case law
expressly disclaims any public policy regarding such coverage.

Hl The Cothrans argue the circuit court correctly found
public policy prohibits a setoff of PIP benefits by the amount
of workers’ compensation benefits received. The Cothrans
claim the “public policy at issue ... is the right of the
employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier to reim-
bursement for the expenses it accrues as a result of a work-
related injury.” Specifically, the Cothrans argue public policy
prohibits a setoff of PIP benefits because a workers’ compen-
sation carrier may have an equitable interest in the PIP
benefits.

HMMM Here, the circuit court erred by finding public
policy prohibits a policy exclusion that reduces the amount of
PIP benefits by the amount the insured receives under work-
ers’ compensation law. “Whether a particular provision in an
insurance policy violates the public policy of the state is a

question of law that is reviewed [de novo] by an appellate
court.” Williams, 409 8.C. at 599, 762 S.H.2d at 712. “It is
axiomatic that freedom of contract is subordinate to public
policy, and agreements that are contrary to public policy are
void.” Rhoden, 398 S.C. at 398, 728 S.H.2d at 480 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (brackets removed). However, “[w]e
cannot read into an insurance contract, under the guise of
public policy, provisions which are not required by law and
which the parties thereto clearly and plainly have failed to
include.” Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 318 8.C. 236, 289, 487
S.E.2d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting Barkley
»v. Int'l Mut. Ins. Co., 227 S.C. 38, 45, 86 S.E.2d 602, 605
(1955).
Public policy considerations include not only what is ex-
pressed in state law, such as the constitution and statutes,
and decisions of the courts, but also a determination wheth-
er the agreement is capable of producing harm such that its
enforcement would be contrary to the public interest or
manifestly injurious to the public welfare.

Williams, 409 S.C. at 599, 762 S.H.2d at 712, “South Car-
olina does not require any PIP coverage under its automobile
insurance laws and has no public policy regarding such cover-
age.” Smith, 318 S.C. at 289, 437 S.H.2d at 144,

Public policy in this state does not prohibit a reduction of
PIP benefits by the amount an insured receives in workers’
compensation benefits. Our legislature has determined PIP
coverage in this state is voluntary. See § 38-77-144 (stating
“[t]here is no [PIP] coverage mandated under the automobile
insurance laws of this State”). Because the legislature has
deemed PIP coverage voluntary and not required for the
public good, there is no prohibition on the parties’ ability to
limit the recovery of PIP benefits to certain situations. Thus,
there is no public policy prohibition on the parties’ ability to
contract for a reduction in PIP benefits when the insured
receives benefits from another source, e.g., under workers’
compensation law. Furthermore, this type of exclusion, which
reduces PIP benefits in only a very limited circumstance, does
not produce harm “such that its enforcement would be con-
trary to the public interest or manifestly injurious to the
public welfare.” See Williams, 409 S.C. at 599, 762 S.E.2d at
712 (“Public policy considerations include ... a determination

whether the agreement is capable of producing harm such that
its enforcement would be contrary to the public interest or
manifestly injurious to the public welfare.”).

With regard to the circuit court’s specific finding that public
policy prohibits the type of policy exclusion at issue in this
case because it prevents the workers’ compensation carrier
from obtaining a lien on the PIP benefits, we disagree. As
noted above, our legislature declared PIP coverage is not
required. See § 88-77-144 (“There is no [PIP] coverage man-
dated under the automobile insurance laws of this [s]tate.”).
Because PIP coverage is voluntary, public policy does not
require payment of PIP benefits so that a workers’ compensa-
tion carrier may obtain a lien against those benefits. If our
public policy was such that payment of PIP benefits was
needed or desired for the benefit of workers’ compensation
carriers, the legislature could have mandated that PIP cover-
age be included with all automobile policies. Also, we find
nothing in the relevant statutes to indicate the legislature
intended to favor workers’ compensation carriers at the ex-
pense of automobile insurance carriers. Accordingly, we re-
verse the circuit court on this issue and find public policy does
not prohibit a policy exclusion that reduces PIP benefits by
the amount the insured recovers under workers’ compensation
law.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s grant
of summary judgment in the Cothrans’ favor because neither
section 38-77-144 nor public policy prohibits the type of exclu-
sion contained in the Excess Provision. Thus, the parties were
free to include it in the Policy.

REVERSED.'

WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

4, We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215,
SCACR.

808 S.B.2d 831
COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant,
v.
Stephen H. WALL and Maria P. Snyder Wall, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001795
Opinion No. 5525
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard October 10, 2017
Filed December 6, 2017

~~
_ . ee

F. Ward Borden, of Jones Simpson & Newton, PA, of
Bluffton, for Appellant.

Drew A. Laughlin, of Laughlin & Bowen, PC, of Hilton
Head Island, for Respondents.

GEATHERS, J.:

Appellant Community Services Associates, Inc. (CSA) seeks
review of an order of the Master-in-Equity denying CSA’s
request to permanently enjoin Respondents, Stephen H. Wall
and Maria P. Snyder Wall (collectively, the Walls), from
renting out the first floor of their single-family residence while
simultaneously occupying the upstairs guest suite. CSA argues
the master erred by (1) finding the Walls’ residence had only
one kitchen; (2) concluding the Walls’ rental activity did not
violate CSA’s restrictive covenants; and (8) declining to consid-
er a letter written by Respondent Maria P. Snyder Wall (Mrs.
Wall) and published in a local newspaper after the merits
hearing. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 1, 1970, the Sea Pines Plantation Company
adopted the current restrictive covenants that apply to resi-
dential and common areas within Sea Pines Plantation, a gated
community on Hilton Head Island (the Covenants). Part I of
the Covenants applies to all “Class ‘A’ Residential Areas” and
includes, inter alia, the following restrictions:

5, All lots in said Residential Areas shall be used for
residential purposes exclusively. No structure, except as
hereinafter provided[,] shall be erected, altered, placed or
permitted to remain on any lot other than one (1) detached
single family dwelling not to exceed two (2) stories in height
and one small one-story accessory building [that] may in-
clude a detached private garage and/or servant’s quarters,
provided the use of such dwelling or accessory building does
not overerowd the site and provided further[] that such
building is not used for any activity normally conducted as a
business. Such accessory building may not be constructed
prior to the construction of the main building.

6. A guest suite or like facility without a kitchen may be
included as part of the main dwelling or accessory building,
but such suite may not be rented or leased except as part of
the entire premises[,] including the main dwelling, and
provided, however, that such guest suite would not result in
over-crowding the site.

(emphasis added). Parts II through V, respectively, apply to
only those areas designated as “Beach Residential,” “Golf
Fairway Residential,” etc. The Sea Pines Plantation Company
enforced the Covenants until CSA, a property owners’ associa-
tion, succeeded to the Covenants’ enforcement.

In 1998, the Walls purchased their residence at 48 Planters
Wood Drive in Sea Pines Plantation. According to Respondent
Stephen H. Wall (Mr. Wall), the residence has one kitchen on
the north side of the first floor. The second story of the
residence consists of a guest suite that is accessible only by an
outside staircase.

In 2012, the Walls began renting out a room in their
residence through Airbnb, an online rental broker. The Walls’
listing with Airbnb was titled “Hilton Head Organic B&B, Sea
Pines” and indicated that the room accommodated three indi-

viduals. The Walls also cooked breakfast for their renters.
After CSA expressed concern about the Walls’ rental activity,
the Walls changed their listing with Airbnb to the “Whole
House” category and began renting out the entire first floor
while living in the second-story guest suite themselves. They
also dropped the title “Hilton Head Organic B&B, Sea Pines”
and stopped cooking breakfast for their renters.

On September 25, 2014, CSA filed a Verified Complaint
against the Walls, seeking temporary and permanent injunc-
tions against the Walls’ alleged operation of “a bed and
breakfast” in their residence and the rental of merely part of
the residence rather than the entire residence. In its com-
plaint, CSA asserted that the Covenants, specifically para-
graphs five and six of Part I, authorize the short-term rental
of an entire residence but not part of a residence,

The Walls filed a Verified Answer asserting they advertised
on airbnb.com in the “Whole House” category and that they
remained in the guest suite when their whole house was
rented. However, the Walls denied CSA’s allegation that they
were operating a bed and breakfast in their residence. The
master conducted a hearing on CSA’s temporary injunction
request on April 7, 2015, which was continued to April 21,
2015. On this later date, the master received evidence on
CSA’s requests for temporary and permanent injunctions.

On May 7, 2015, the master issued an order denying CSA’s
requests for injunctive relief and dismissing the Verified Com-
plaint. CSA filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and
the master conducted a hearing on the motion on June 28,
2015. Subsequently, CSA requested the master to consider a
letter to the editor of The Island Packet, a local newspaper,
written by Mrs. Wall concerning the benefits of Airbnb versus
a new hotel on the island. The master declined to consider the
letter. On August 10, 2015, the master issued an order denying
CSA’s motion to alter or amend. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the master err by finding the Walls’ residence had only
one kitchen?
2. Did the master misinterpret paragraphs five and six of Part
I of the Covenants?

3. Was the letter written by Mrs. Wall and published in The
Island Packet relevant to the issues in the case?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This [c]ourt reviews all questions of law de novo.” Fesmire
v. Digh, 885 S.C. 296, 802, 688 S.B.2d 808, 807 (Ct. App. 2009);
see also Clardy v. Bodolosky, 383 S.C. 418, 425, 679 S.E.2d
527, 530 (Ct. App. 2009) (“A legal question in an equity case
receives review as in law.” (quoting Sloan v. Greenville Cty.,
356 S.C. 581, 546, 590 S.H.2d 388, 346 (Ct. App. 2008))); id.
(“Questions of law may be decided with no particular defer-
ence to the trial court.” (quoting S.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. M &
T Enters. of Mt. Pleasant, LLC, 879 S.C. 645, 654, 667 S.H.2d
7, 12 (Ct. App. 2008))). “Review of the trial court’s factual
findings, however, depends on ... whether the underlying
action is an action at law or an action in equity.” Fesmire, 885
S.C. at 302, 683 S8.H.2d at 807 (citing Townes Assocs. Ltd. v.
City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 85-86, 221 §.E.2d 773, 775-76
(1976)).

HM “An action to enforce restrictive covenants by injunc-
tion is in equity.” S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClel-
lanville, 345 S.C. 617, 622, 550 S.H.2d 299, 302 (2001). “On
appeal from an action in equity, [the appellate court] may find
facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the
evidence.” Walker v. Brooks, 414 S.C. 848, 347, 778 S.E.2d 477,
479 (2015). “However, this broad scope of review does not
require this court to disregard the findings at trial or ignore
the fact that the trial judge was in a better position to assess
the credibility of the witnesses.” Laughon v. O’Braitis, 360
S.C. 520, 524-25, 602 S.H.2d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2004). Further,
“this broad scope does not relieve the appellant of [the]
burden to show that the trial court erred in its findings.”
Ballard v, Roberson, 399 S.C. 588, 593, 783 S.H.2d 107, 109
(2012); accord Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 882, 387-88, 544
§.E.2d 620, 628 (2001).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Number of Kitchens

HI CSA argues the master erred by finding the Walls’
residence had only one kitchen because the evidence shows

the Walls have a kitchen in the upstairs guest suite. We
disagree.

Mr. Wall testified he and Mrs. Wall kept an induction plate,
a toaster oven, and a mini-refrigerator in the guest suite and
they occasionally prepared food for themselves with these
appliances. Mr. Wall also stated he and Mrs. Wall washed
their dishes in the guest suite. CSA argues this evidence
shows the Walls had a kitchen in the guest suite because
“{tJhe usual and customary meaning of ‘kitchen’ is ‘a room or
area where food is prepared and cooked.’” However, even
CSA’s chosen definition of kitchen necessarily implies that the
room is dedicated exclusively to preparing and cooking food,
and there is no evidence showing that the Walls’ guest suite
has a room dedicated exclusively to this purpose. We agree
with the master that the Walls’ use of certain “dormitory-style
portable appliances to store and prepare foods on the second
floor does not create a kitchen, as the term is commonly used.”
Therefore, we affirm the master’s finding that the Walls’
residence had only one kitchen and this kitchen is located on
the first floor.

Il. Violation of Covenants

CSA also argues the master erred by concluding the Walls’
activity of renting out the first floor of their residence while
simultaneously occupying the upstairs guest suite did not
violate the Covenants. CSA asserts the master misinterpreted
paragraphs five and six of Part I of the Covenants because
these two provisions, read together, require a residence to be
rented in its entirety. We disagree.

HE“ ‘Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature,’ so
that the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the parties as determined from the
whole document.” Taylor v. Lindsey, 382 S.C. 1, 4, 498 S.E.2d
862, 863-64 (1998) (quoting Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown,
287 S.C. 1, 6, 386 S.H.2d 15, 18 (1985)). “When the language of
a contract is clear, explicit, and unambiguous, the language of
the contract alone determines the contract’s force and effect
and the court must construe it according to its plain, ordinary,
and popular meaning.” Moser v. Gosnell, 384 8.C. 425, 480, 513
§.H.2d 128, 125 (Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, when “the lan-

PS rrrt‘“(té(:S*étCS
guage imposing restrictions upon the use of property is unam-
biguous, the restrictions will be enforced according to their
obvious meaning.” Shipyard Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Mangiar-
acina, 307 S.C. 299, 808, 414 S.H.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1992).

HM “A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the
contract are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpre-
tation.” McClellanville, 345 S.C. at 628, 550 S.H.2d at 302.
When such an ambiguity exists, all doubts are to be “resolved
in favor of free use of the property.” Hardy v. Aiken, 369 8.C.
160, 166, 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006). Thus, “a restriction on the
use of the property must be created in express terms or by
plain and unmistakable implication.” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 §.C, 152, 157, 263 S.H.2d
378, 380 (1980)).

“The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the

other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by

construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its
terms[”] even to accomplish what it may be thought the
parties would have desired had a situation which later
developed been foreseen by them at the time when the
restriction was written.
Taylor, 382 S.C. at 4, 498 S.H.2d at 864 (emphasis added)
(quoting Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216 S.C. 255, 262, 57
S.E.2d 420, 424 (1950).

Here, the parties agreed the only provisions in the Cove-
nants that bear on the Walls’ rental activity are paragraphs
five and six of Part I, which state, .

5, All lots in said Residential Areas shall be used for
residential purposes exclusively. No structure, except as
hereinafter provided[,] shall be erected, altered, placed or
permitted to remain on any lot other than one (1) detached
single family dwelling not to exceed two (2) stories in height
and one small one-story accessory building [that] may in-
clude a detached private garage and/or servant’s quarters,
provided the use of such dwelling or accessory building does
not overcrowd the site and provided further[] that such
building is not used for any activity normally conducted as a
business. Such accessory building may not be constructed
prior to the construction of the main building.

6. A guest suite or like facility without a kitchen may be
included as part of the main dwelling or accessory building,

TT

but such suite may not be rented or leased except as part of

the entire premises[,] including the main dwelling, and

provided, however, that such guest suite would not result in
over-crowding the site,
(emphases added).

Hl The express terms of paragraph six require a resi-
dence with a guest suite to be rented in its entirety when the
guest suite is rented out. However, paragraphs five and six do
not, by their express terms or by plain and unmistakable
implication, require a residence with a guest suite to be rented
in its entirety in every circumstance, See Hardy, 369 S.C. at
166, 681 S.H.2d at 542 (“[A] restriction on the use of the
property must be created in express terms or by plain and
unmistakable implication, and all such restrictions are to be
strictly construed, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free
use of property.” (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton, 274
S.C. at 157, 268 S.H.2d at 380)). Therefore, this court may not
interpret paragraphs five and six to include such a require-
ment even if it could be reasonably implied. In other words, it
is not enough for the implication to be reasonable—it must be
unmistakable. See Taylor, 882 S.C. at 4, 498 S.H.2d at 864
(“The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the
other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by
construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its
terms|’] even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties
would have desired had a situation which later developed been
foreseen by them at the time when the restriction was writ-
ten.” (emphases added) (quoting Forest Land Co., 216 S.C, at
262, 57 S.E.2d at 424)),

Ht best, paragraphs five and six are capable of two
reasonable interpretations: (1) a residence with a guest suite
must be rented in its entirety in every circumstance or (2) the
owners of a single family dwelling with a guest suite may stay
in the guest suite themselves while renting out the remaining
space. See McClellanville, 845 8.C. at 628, 550 S.H.2d at 302
(“A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.”).
Because the latter interpretation “least restricts the use of the
property,” we must adopt this interpretation. See Taylor, 382
S.C. at 4, 498 S.H.2d at 864 (“[When] the language of the

es ©

restrictions is equally capable of two or more different con-
structions that construction will be adopted which least re-
stricts the use of the property.”).

Additionally, the evidence shows the Walls complied with all
of the express terms of paragraphs five and six. It is undisput-
ed that short-term rentals do not violate the requirement that
all lots shall be used for residential purposes. It is also
undisputed that the Walls had only their two-story dwelling on
the site and did not rent out their guest suite. While the
presence of a kitchen in the guest suite, which is prohibited by
paragraph six, was disputed, the master properly resolved this
issue in favor of the Walls. See supra Part I. Finally, Brett
Martin, CSA’s president, admitted he was not aware of CSA
receiving any complaints that the Walls’ use of their home was
overcrowding the site, as is prohibited by paragraph six of
Part I of the Covenants,

Based on the foregoing, the master properly concluded the
Walls’ rental activity did not violate the Covenants,

III. Post-hearing Evidence

HE Finally, CSA maintains the master erred by de-
clining to consider a letter written by Mrs. Wall after the
merits hearing and published in The Island Packet on August
2, 2015, CSA contends the master had discretion under Rules
52(b) and 59(a), SCRCP, to take additional evidence and the
letter was relevant to whether the Walls actually believed
their activities violated the Covenants. We disagree.

Initially, this issue is not preserved for review because CSA
did not cite Rules 52 and 59 in its request for the master to
consider Mrs, Wall’s letter. See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First
Carolina Corp. of S.C., 872 S.C. 295, 801, 641 S.E.2d 908, 907
(2007) (“It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.”
(quoting Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.H.2d
781, 738 (1998))).

In any event, the master properly declined to consider Mrs.
Wall’s letter because it was not relevant to the issues in the
case. The language cited by CSA refers to Airbnb and states,
“As a community, we should explore the benefits that this
sustainable business model brings. We should have a town

TT

meeting and engage in healthy dialogue.” In his letter request-
ing the master to consider this language, counsel states,
We believe this letter demonstrates [Mrs.] Wall’s actual
view of the ‘sustainable business model’ as she described
it—calling it ‘a far better solution than a new hotel.’ She
also calls for a town meeting to ‘engage in healthy dia-
logue’—an apparent admission that this business model does
not comport with the current covenants and restrictions.
In response, the master stated, “Thank you for the message,
however, I’m not going to consider matters outside the origi-
nal record. Also, [CSA’s] interpretation of ‘healthy dialogue’
seems a stretch.” We agree with the master that the highlight-
ed language is not an admission that the Walls’ activities with
Airbnb violated the Covenants. Therefore, even if the master
was under the mistaken impression that he could not accept
additional evidence, his alternative ground for excluding the
letter, its lack of relevance, was valid. See Rule 402, SCRE
(“Evidence [that] is not relevant is not admissible.”); Rule 401,
SCRE (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”).

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the master’s order.
AFFIRMED.

SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

809 S.E.2d 60
Willie JORDAN, Appellant,
ve.

Jane DOE, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-002354
Opinion No. 5526
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Heard June 21, 2017
Filed December 18, 2017

Pamela R. Mullis, of Mullis Law Firm, PA, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Helen F. Hiser and Andrew Luther Richardson, Jr., both of
McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of Columbia, for Respon-
dent.

LOCKEMY, C.J.:

In this action pursuant to the uninsured motorist statute,
Willie Jordan appeals the circuit court’s order granting sum-

mary judgment to Jane Doe as a result of Jordan’s failure to
comply with section 88-77-170(8) of the South Carolina Code
(2015). We reverse.

FACTS

On March 18, 2014, Willie Jordan filed a Jane Doe action
claiming he was struck by an unknown driver and suffered
injuries as a result of that accident. Jordan claimed he left his
job at Owen Steel at 2:30 p.m. on April 1, 2011, to pick up a
friend at a local store. Jordan parked his truck and, while
walking to the store, made a phone call on his cell phone.
Jordan claims a woman in a gray van then backed into him,
driving him to the pavement. Jordan stated the woman got out.
of her van, saw him under the rear bumper, and yelled, “Them
damn telephones will get you killed.” According to Jordan, the
van then left the parking lot quickly’

Jordan claimed he got up and asked other people in the
parking lot which way the van went. Jordan then got back in
his truck and drove around the area for approximately 20
minutes looking for the van, but could not find it. After his
search, Jordan returned to the scene of the accident.

Jordan went to one of the businesses in the shopping center
to ask the owner if there was video of the driver. The store
clerk indicated she had seen the driver and she frequented the
store. The clerk also told Jordan the store’s surveillance
equipment captured an image of the driver. Jordan saw the
picture but did not ask for a copy of the video. Jordan did not
ask the clerk if she knew the identity of the driver.

The next morning, Jordan woke up in pain and went to the
emergency room for treatment. A nurse told Jordan he was
going to call the police to report the accident. A police report
prepared after speaking with Jordan indicates

Mr. Jordan stated the only reason he called law enforce-

ment is because on today when visiting the hospital, hospital

employees told him to do so. Mr. Jordan did not want law

enforcement to be involved. Mr. Jordan stated that he did

not want to prosecute, Mr. Jordan stated that he did not

1. While not essential to this court's holding, these facts illustrate the
modern societal paradox of the immovable force of advancing personal
electronic communications meeting the unstoppable object of 3000
pounds of steel and plastic.

a se

know if it was intentional or unintentional.... Mr. Jordan
stated there was a video camera at the incident location.

The police report also indicated officers spoke with the
manager of the store the driver frequented. Officers took a
picture of the driver from the store’s video camera “for
investigative purposes.” An additional narrative attached to
the police report indicates “Mr. Jordan will prosecute.”

Jane Doe filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging
Jordan failed to comply with section 38-77-170 of the South
Carolina Code, and Doe was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. During the motion hearing Doe asserted Jordan was
negligent in failing to determine who the driver was and failed
to produce an affidavit by an accident witness until four years
after the accident. After the hearing, the circuit court issued
an order granting Doe’s motion for summary judgment and
finding Jordan was negligent in failing to ascertain the identi-
ty of the driver. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

HM “When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
appellate courts apply the same standard applied by the
[circuit] court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP.” Knight v.
Austin, 396 S.C. 518, 521, 722 S.B.2d 802, 804 (2012) (quoting
Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769
(2011)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the plead-
ings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery on file show there is
no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 521-22, 722 S.H.2d at
804. “The evidence and all reasonable inferences must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Id, at 522, 722 S.E.2d at 804 (quoting Fleming v. Rose, 350
S.C. 488, 493-94, 567 S.H.2d 857, 860 (2002)). “[IIn cases
applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof,
the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere
scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for sum-
mary judgment.” Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co., 381 8.C.
826, 330, 678 S.H.2d 801, 808 (2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Hl Jordan argues the circuit court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment because he presented a scintilla of evidence

that he was not negligent in failing to determine the identity
of Jane Doe. We agree.

An injured insured may recover for injuries caused by an
unidentified driver based on an uninsured motorist policy if
the insured complies with the requirements of section 38-77-
170 of the South Carolina Code (2015). That section indicates:

If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes

bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown,

there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured
motorist provision, unless:

(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the
accident to some appropriate police authority within a rea-
sonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occur-
rence;

(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact
with the unknown vehicle, or the accident must have been
witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of
the insured vehicle; provided however, the witness must
sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the
accident contained in the affidavit;

(8) the insured was not negligent in failing to determine
the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other
vehicle at the time of the accident.

“An insured cannot recover uninsured motorist coverage un-
less the three conditions under [section] 38-77-170 are met.”
Miller v. Doe, 312 8.C, 444, 446, 441 S.H.2d 319, 320 (1994).

The circuit court found Jordan failed to satisfy the third
requirement to recover under the uninsured motorist policy.
The circuit court found,

[Jordan] was aware of the existence of video tapes and
security footage from the location of the accident yet he did
not act to recover that evidence—or even choose to view the
evidence, [Jordan] failed to follow up with the store manag-
er to determine the identity of the driver. Police were
dispatched the following day when [Jordan] presented to the
hospital but [Jordan] shut down their investigation into the
matter by instructing them not to pursue charges.

Due care required [Jordan] to actually seek out the footage

from the store in order to ascertain the identity of the

driver. [Jordan] failed to do so. Simply informing police

officers one day later that there may be footage is not
sufficient to meet the high burden of the statute. Additional-
ly, instructing those same officers not to pursue the case
negates any benefit that could be obtained from their inves-
tigation. [Jordan’s] own actions resulted in a failure to
obtain the identity of the vehicle and/or driver. These

actions constitute negligence pursuant to [section] 38-77-

170(8).

Accordingly, the circuit court granted Doe’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.

We find Jordan presented sufficient evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, to create a question of fact
with regard to his negligence in failing to determine the
identity of the unknown driver at the time of the accident.
Knight, 396 S.C. at 521-22, 722 8.B.2d at 804 (“Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, affi-
davits, and discovery on file show there is no genuine issue of
material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a
matter of law.”); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-170(8). Immediately
following the accident, Jordan asked the multiple witnesses to
the accident which way the offending driver went. Jordan then
attempted to locate the vehicle that hit him for twenty min-
utes. Finally, he found a merchant with video of the driver?
These facts satisfy the scintilla standard, and a jury should
determine whether Jordan’s actions rose to the level of negli-
gence in failing to determine the identity of the driver at the
time of the accident.

Doe argues Jordan effectively stopped any police investiga-
tion of the incident by telling officers he did not want to
prosecute. Doe also argues Jordan should have questioned the
store clerk about the driver’s identity, questioned the wit-
nesses about whether they knew the driver, and asked the
witnesses whether they saw a license plate number. The
statute does not require the victim of an accident to do

2. It is also noteworthy Jordan reported the incident to police and
notified officers a video of the driver existed, though we focus our
analysis on Jordan's actions at the scene of the accident. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 38-77-170(3) (requiring an insured seeking to collect under the in-
sured’s uninsured motorist coverage to not be “negligent in failing to
determine the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other
vehicle at the time of the accident”).

everything necessary to secure the identity of the driver.
Instead, the statute requires the victim not be negligent in
failing to determine the driver’s identity at the time of the
accident,

Doe asserts this case is controlled by our supreme court’s
holding in Hart v. Doe, 261 8.C, 116, 198 8.E.2d 526 (1973). In
Hart, the plaintiff was injured when another vehicle failed to
yield the right of way at an intersection. Jd. at 118-119, 198
§.H.2d at 527, At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, based in part upon the plaintiff's
negligence in failing to ascertain the identity of the unidenti-
fied driver, which the trial court granted. Id.

The supreme court affirmed. The Hart court noted

Plaintiff was painfully injured, sustaining a compressed

fracture of her second lumbar vertebra and as a result she

testified that she was unable to move immediately following
the accident, but her testimony as to various post accident
facts reflects that she remained in full possession of her
mental faculties. She remained in her car for some twenty

or thirty minutes until removed by an ambulance.... Im-

mediately following the wreck, she directed one of the

children to go for their father and the other to go notify

Highway Patrol and get an ambulance.

Id. at 121, 198 S.H.2d at 528. The court also found the driver
of the other vehicle parked near the accident site and stayed
with the wrecked car until the ambulance left the scene with
the plaintiff. Id. at 121, 198 S.H.2d at 528-29, The unidentified
driver also spoke with the plaintiff and told her he was from
Texas, Jd, at 122, 198 S.H.2d at 529.

The Hart court found “we have the plaintiff in full posses-
sion of her faculties, who spent some twenty to thirty minutes
in the company of the man from Texas ... who, as she
contends, ran into her and forced her into a field.... Yet, she
made no effort to ascertain the identity of the man from
Texas.” Id. The court found “the only inference from the
testimony is that [Hart] exercised no care whatever in” identi-
fying the driver. Id.

Hart is easily distinguishable. Jordan did not have the
opportunity to speak with the driver that hit him, and he took

a me

affirmative steps to determine who the driver was. While
Jordan may have been able to do more to determine the
identity of the driver, we believe there was some evidence to
satisfy the statutory requirement that he not be negligent in
failing to identify the driver. Thus, we find the circuit court
erred in granting Doe summary judgment.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is

REVERSED.

HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
Es

809 S.E.2d 409

In the MATTER OF William Ashley JORDAN, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2012-212593
Opinion No. 27734

Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Heard March 2, 2016
Filed August 30, 2017
Rehearing Denied February 15, 2018

1g
pre}

ea

—

Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Barbara Ma-
rie Seymour, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, both of Columbia,
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

A. Camden Lewis and Ariail Elizabeth King, both of Lewis
Babcock L.L.P., of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This attorney disciplinary matter arises out of two separate
sets of formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel against William Ashley Jordan. Disciplinary Counsel
filed the first set of formal charges with the Commission on
Lawyer Conduct on January 7, 2011. The first charges allege
primarily that Mr. Jordan did not properly manage funds
owed to clients or co-counsel or keep adequate records of
those funds between 1999 and 2005. As to those charges, a
hearing panel of the Commission recommended to this Court
that Mr. Jordan receive a public reprimand, and Mr. Jordan
agrees a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction.

In October 2012, while the panel’s recommendation for the
first set of charges was pending before this Court, Disciplin-
ary Counsel received a new complaint alleging Mr. Jordan
committed more serious misconduct between 2009 and 2012.
The crux of the new complaint was—in seven different cases—
Mr. Jordan entered into a fee-sharing arrangement with an-
other attorney, did not disclose the arrangement to the client,
collected a fee for the case, and deposited the entire fee in his
law firm’s accounts instead of paying co-counsel’s share of the
fee. After considering the second set of charges, the panel
recommended to this Court that Mr. Jordan be disbarred.

Disciplinary Counsel requested we stay our decision on the
first set of charges pending an investigation of the second set.
Because we granted the stay, we have not previously ad-
dressed the first set of charges. Therefore, although the
sanction we ultimately impose is based on the misconduct in
the second set of charges, we have necessarily included in this
opinion the details of the misconduct in the first set of
charges.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Disciplinary Counsel filed the first set of formal charges on
January 7, 2011. On March 1, 2011, Mr. Jordan filed his
response to the charges, and on March 17, 2011, he filed a
corrected response. On December 5, 2011, Mr. Jordan ap-

peared before the hearing panel for a full evidentiary hearing
on the first set of charges.’ On July 12, 2012, the hearing panel
issued its report recommending a public reprimand based on
the following misconduct.

In the Client A case, the panel found Mr. Jordan paid
himself more attorney’s fees than he was entitled to receive
pursuant to his fee-sharing arrangement with two attorneys,
improperly negotiated a check for attorney’s fees from his
trust account to his firm account before the funds had been
collected by his bank, failed to pay his co-counsel’s shares of
the fee from a settlement installment for approximately two
years, and—after finally paying his co-counsel—disbursed
$49,338.32 more from his trust account than he received on
behalf of the client. The panel found this conduct violated Rule
1.15, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, and Rule 417, SCACR. The
panel also found Mr. Jordan failed to supervise a nonlawyer
assistant in violation of Rule 5.8, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR.
Although Disciplinary Counsel charged Mr. Jordan with vio-
lating Rule 8.4(d), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, the panel found
Mr. Jordan did not engage in dishonest or fraudulent conduct.

In the Client B case, the panel found Mr. Jordan—while
holding funds in trust for a deceased client—failed to ensure
his associate opened an estate for the disbursement of the
funds. Mr. Jordan transferred the funds through several trust
accounts over the course of four years but could not produce
an accounting of the transfers. Mr. Jordan’s bookkeeper “mis-
takenly transferred” some of the client’s funds to cover a
shortage of funds held in trust for another client, and Mr.
Jordan could not account for the remaining funds at the time
his law firm dissolved. After improperly holding the funds for
over six years, Mr. Jordan restored the funds to his trust
account and paid the funds to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client
Protection. The panel found Mr. Jordan violated Rules 1.1, 1.3,
1.15, and 5.1, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, and Rule 417, SCACR.
The panel also found Mr. Jordan failed to properly supervise
his bookkeeper in violation of Rule 5.8, RPC.

In the Client C case, the panel found Mr. Jordan paid
himself more attorney’s fees than he was entitled to receive

1. These dates are important in our consideration of the second set of
charges.

pursuant to his fee-sharing arrangement with co-counsel,
transferred funds held in trust for his client but failed to
account for $382.21 of those funds, and disbursed more funds
to the client than he deposited in the trust account. Mr.
Jordan’s bookkeeper covered the overpayment using another
client’s funds. The panel found Mr. Jordan violated Rules 1.1
and 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR.

In the Client D case, the panel found Mr. Jordan and his co-
counsel agreed to reduce their fee from forty percent to
approximately thirty-six percent for settling the case. After
receiving the settlement money, Mr. Jordan issued a check for
the full attorney’s fee to his firm, despite his agreement to
split the fees evenly with co-counsel. Mr. Jordan later over-
paid his co-counsel by paying her half of a forty-percent fee,
rather than the agreed-upon thirty-six percent fee. Mr. Jordan
transferred funds from Client E’s account ledger in his trust
account to make up for the overpayment. The panel found Mr.
Jordan violated Rules 1.3 and 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417,
SCACR. The panel also found Mr. Jordan failed to properly
supervise a nonlawyer assistant in violation of Rule 5.8, RPC.

In the Client E case, the panel found Mr. Jordan agreed to
share fees equally with his co-counsel. After settling the case,
Mr. Jordan deposited his half of the $18,000 attorney’s fee in
his trust account and used the money to cover his overpay-
ment in the Client D case. Mr. Jordan then paid co-counsel’s
share of the fee to himself because he believed co-counsel
owed him money in another case. He subsequently paid him-
self a one-half share of the fee a third time—which resulted in
Mr. Jordan receiving 150% of the total attorney’s fee—but he
could not identify the source of the funds. The panel found Mr.
Jordan violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR.

In the Client F case, the panel found Mr. Jordan settled
claims on behalf of two clients for $15,000 each and deposited
the settlement funds in his law firm’s trust account. After
making several disbursements, Mr, Jordan held $7,800 in trust
for the clients to pay medical expenses or liens. Mr. Jordan
transferred the funds through several trust accounts but failed
to accurately record the transfers. Five years later, during
Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation, Mr. Jordan discovered he
owed no liens or bills on behalf of the clients. However, Mr.

Jordan could no longer account for the funds ih his trust
account and paid the clients from his personal funds. The
panel found Mr. Jordan violated Rules 1.3 and 1.15, RPC, and
Rule 417, SCACR.

In the Client G case, the panel found Mr. Jordan received
$81,000 on behalf of his client and deposited the funds into his
trust account pending the outcome of the client’s case. Less
than two weeks later—while the case was still pending—Mr.
Jordan wrote the client a trust account check for $31,000,
received a loan from the client for the same amount, deposited
the funds into a personal account, and wrote a check for
$22,000 of the funds to his law firm’s operating account. Hight
months later, Mr. Jordan repaid his client without paying
interest. Mr. Jordan did not reduce the terms of the loan to
writing, did not advise the client to seek advice from indepen-
dent counsel, accepted the loan without disclosing his conflict
of interest, and did not obtain the client’s consent to the
conflict. The panel found Mr. Jordan’s “acceptance of a loan
from funds obtained on behalf of a client in a legal matter
without payment of interest, terms of repayment, written note
or other guaranty of repayment, or contingency for failure to
pay was not fair or reasonable to the client.” Therefore, the
panel found Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.8(a), RPC, Rule 407,
SCACR.

In the Client H case, the panel found Mr. Jordan received
$55,200 in funds to be held in trust on a client’s behalf and—at
her instruction—disbursed the funds to pay the client’s obli-
gations. Mr. Jordan’s records identified $51,755.28 disbursed
on the client’s behalf. In March 2008, Mr. Jordan issued a
check for $6,105.10 to a mortgage company. According to the
panel, Mr. Jordan’s records “do not identify the purpose of
this check or the client on whose behalf it was paid,” but Mr.
Jordan believes he wrote the check on behalf of Client H.
Therefore, Mr. Jordan paid on Client H’s behalf $2,660.38
more than he received, The panel found Mr. Jordan violated
Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR.

In the Client I case, the panel found that in May 2008, Mr.
Jordan deposited settlement funds into a client trust account
and improperly used the funds to pay attorney’s fees and costs
to his law firm before his bank collected the funds, in violation

of Rule 1.15(f), RPC. Between May 2008 and February 2004,
Mr. Jordan made a series of payments to the client while he
negotiated a lien held by a workers’ compensation carrier. In
July 2005—before Mr. Jordan settled the lien—he dissolved
his law firm without an accurate accounting of the funds held
in trust for the client and claims he left the funds in a trust
account under the control of his former partner. Mr. Jordan
ultimately paid the client with his personal funds after learn-
ing from the former partner’s bookkeeper “that no funds
remained in trust for his clients.” The panel found Mr. Jordan
violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR. The panel
also found Mr. Jordan failed to supervise a nonlawyer assis-
tant in violation of Rule 5.8, RPC.

In the Client J case, the panel found Mr, Jordan collected a
class action settlement in three installments. When he trans-
ferred the first settlement installment from one trust account
into a second trust account, he failed to account for $10,000 of
the settlement funds. He also erroneously paid himself an
additional $10,000 for partial reimbursement of costs, Six
years after receiving the final settlement installment, approxi-
mately $12,000 of the settlement remained unclaimed, but Mr.
Jordan could not locate the funds, The panel found Mr. Jordan
violated Rules 1.1, 1.8, 1.5, and 1.15, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR,
and Rule 417, SCACR. The panel also found Mr. Jordan failed
to supervise a nonlawyer assistant in violation of Rule 5.3,
RPC.

In the Client K case, the panel found Mr. Jordan trans-
ferred approximately $42,000 held in trust for a client through
several trust accounts. Mr, Jordan then dissolved his law firm
without an accurate accounting of the Client K funds remain-
ing in the firm’s trust account. When he requested the trust
balance from his former partner’s bookkeeper, he “was in-
formed by [the] bookkeeper that there were no funds remain-
ing in the [Client K] matter.” He paid the client using earned
fees from another client’s case and funds from a check he
received from an associate. The panel found Mr, Jordan
violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR.

In the Client L case, the panel found Mr. Jordan disbursed
settlement funds to and on behalf of the client, including a
$2,600 check to pay a doctor bill. According to the panel

report, the payee never negotiated the check, and Mr. Jordan
did not discover the outstanding check until approximately
four years after the settlement “when his accountant identified
it as unpaid.” However, he was unable to locate the funds in
his trust accounts. The panel found Mr. Jordan violated Rules
1.8 and 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR. The panel also
found Mr. Jordan failed to supervise a nonlawyer assistant in
violation of Rule 5.8, RPC.

In the Client M case, the panel found Mr. Jordan—after
paying fees and expenses—consolidated into a single trust
account funds held in trust for the estate of his client. In doing
so, he included almost $18,000 more in the account than he
actually held in trust for the estate. After disbursing the
correct amount of funds to the estate, he could not identify
who was entitled to the additional $18,000 remaining in the
trust account. Although Mr. Jordan denied committing any
misconduct in this case, the panel found clear and convincing
evidence that Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule
417, SCACR.

In the Client N case, the panel found Mr. Jordan deposited
a settlement check into a trust account, improperly disbursed
the settlement funds before his bank collected the check, and
paid himself the full fee and reimbursement of his expenses
despite his agreement to share the fee equally with co-counsel.
Mr. Jordan paid his co-counsel six months later after co-
counsel brought the issue to his attention. The panel found
Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.15, RPC.

In the Client O case, the panel found Mr. Jordan improperly
disbursed settlement funds to himself before his bank collect-
ed the funds, paid himself fees on portions of a settlement he
had not yet collected, did not maintain separate client ledgers
for two clients, and treated the clients’ settlements as one fund
from which he could collect his fees. The panel found Mr.
Jordan violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR.

As to the first set of formal charges, Mr. Jordan contested
the allegation that he violated Rule 8.4(d), RPC, an allegation
that he violated Rule 8.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR, one of
the allegations that he violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and one of the
allegations that he violated Rule 417, SCACR. He admitted
the remaining violations. The panel made a factual finding that

Mr. Jordan did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive in
violation of Rule 8.4(d), RPC. The panel explained “no evi-
dence was offered by [Disciplinary Counsel] that would estab-
lish or suggest that [Mr. Jordan] was dishonest in handling
[his] trust account at any time” and stated, “While there was a
pattern of accounting errors made by [Mr. Jordan], none
amounted to dishonest or fraudulent conduct.” However, the
panel found by clear and convincing evidence Mr. Jordan
violated Rule 1.15, RPC, and Rule 417, SCACR, in the case in
which he denied violating those rules. The panel did not
address the allegation that Mr. Jordan violated Rule 8.4(e),
RPC,

In its report, the panel considered several mitigating fac-
tors, including Mr. Jordan’s chemical dependency. According
to a physician who testified at the December 5, 2011 hearing,
Mr. Jordan was addicted to prescription drugs from 1997 to
2004, and his addiction caused memory loss and other serious
side effects. Mr. Jordan blamed the addiction for causing his
failure to account for client funds and keep accurate records.
The panel considered several other mitigating factors, includ-
ing Mr. Jordan’s personal and emotional problems, his cooper-
ation in disciplinary proceedings, his timely good faith effort to
make restitution or rectify the consequences of his miscon-
duct, and the remoteness in time of his offenses. The panel
also considered several aggravating factors—including multi-
ple disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, and prior
offenses *—-and recommended Mr. Jordan be publicly repri-
manded.

On October 9, 2012—while the panel’s initial reeommenda-
tion was pending before this Court—Disciplinary Counsel
received a complaint from an attorney who referred several

2. Mr, Jordan has received two letters of caution for misconduct in other
situations. In 2001, he received a letter of caution for misplacing client
records in violation of Rules 1,3 and 1.15, RPC. In 2007, he received a
letter of caution for refusing to pay for mediation services. The panel
considered “the fact that [Mr. Jordan] has been cautioned before for
concerns about Rule 1.15” as an aggravating factor in its panel report
as to the first set of charges. See Rule 2(r), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR
(‘The fact that a letter of caution has been issued shall not be consid-
ered in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer unless
the caution or warning contained in the letter of caution is relevant to
the misconduct alleged in the proceedings.”).

cases to Mr. Jordan between 2009 and 2012. This Court stayed
the first set of charges pending an investigation into the new
complaint. On May 8, 2015, Disciplinary Counsel informed the
Commission the parties agreed to waive the filing of the
second set of charges and submit stipulations of fact and
proposed amended panel reports without an evidentiary hear-
ing. On June 3, 2015, the Commission accepted the waiver of a
hearing but directed Disciplinary Counsel to file formal
charges, and on June 4, 2015, Disciplinary Counsel filed a
second set of formal charges. On September 8, 2015, the panel
issued an addendum to its original report, in which it found
the stipulated facts constituted an admission by Mr. Jordan of
misconduct in seven cases.

In each of the seven cases, the attorney referred a client to
Mr. Jordan, the two attorneys agreed to evenly split Mr.
Jordan's fee from the client’s claim, Mr. Jordan did not inform
the client of the fee-sharing arrangement or obtain the client’s
consent to the arrangement, and in at least six of the cases,
Mr. Jordan did not promptly pay his co-counsel’s share of the
fee. The hearing panel did not address the propriety of Mr.
Jordan’s agreement to evenly split the fee Mr. Jordan earned
from each of the cases, other than noting its general finding
that the

division of the fee was not based on the proportion of the
work done by each lawyer, but rather based on an under-
standing that both lawyers would be accountable for the
representation and that [the referring attorney] ... and his
staff would be generally available to [Mr, Jordan] if he
required assistance.

To place the second set of charges in context, it is important
to note the timing of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct in relation to
the proceedings for the first set of charges, Disciplinary
Counsel filed the first set of charges on January 7, 2011, and
Mr. Jordan filed his responses to those charges in March 2011.
Mr. Jordan appeared at a full hearing on the first set of
charges on December 5, 2011, We describe each of the cases in
the second set of charges below.

In the Client P case, Mr. Jordan entered into a forty-
percent fee agreement with a client on May 5, 2009, and
agreed to pay the referring attorney half the fee. In Septem-

ber 2010, Mr. Jordan settled the claim for $100,000 and
presented to the client a settlement disbursement statement
showing $40,000 in fees and $5,792.48 in costs payable to Mr.
Jordan. The second set of charges and stipulations of fact
stated Mr. Jordan claimed he paid the referring attorney’s
share of the fee, but he could not produce any document or
record to support his assertion and failed to maintain records
of the settlement check, deposit of settlement funds, or can-
celed disbursement checks. However, in an August 2015 filing,
Mr. Jordan submitted documents to the panel showing he paid
the referring attorney’s fee and reimbursement of costs in
January 2011—four months after the payment was due and
contemporaneous with the filing of the first set of formal
charges.

In the Client Q case, Mr. Jordan settled a case in the fall of
2010 for $52,500. He issued the client a settlement disburse-
ment statement showing $21,000 in fees and $8,852.24 in costs
payable to Mr. Jordan and $758 in costs payable to the
referring attorney. The addendum and stipulations of fact
stated Mr. Jordan claimed he paid the referring attorney’s
share of the fee but could not produce documents proving his
assertion. The record shows Mr. Jordan did not pay the
referring attorney’s share of the fee until March 2011.

In the Client R case, Mr. Jordan settled the client’s case in
January 2011 but did not hold the referring attorney's share of
the fee separately. Mr. Jordan also did not promptly deliver
the share to the attorney or notify him of the settlement.
Instead, according to the addendum, he “deposited two trust
account checks into his operating account” for the entire
amount of the fee and costs. In June 2011, the referring
attorney sent Mr. Jordan a list of referred cases and asked
Mr. Jordan about the status of the cases. The list incorrectly
showed the Client R case as pending, and Mr. Jordan in-
formed the attorney the listed status was correct—despite
settling the case several months prior. Approximately a week
later, Mr, Jordan sent the attorney a list of referred cases that
incorrectly showed the Client R case as “Filed/Litigating.” In
December 2011, the attorney sent Mr. Jordan another list of
eases—which still listed the Client R case as pending—and
Mr. Jordan again incorrectly confirmed the Client R case was
still pending. Mr. Jordan incorrectly confirmed the case was

still pending a fourth time in January 2012. During a tele-
phone conversation in September 2012, Mr. Jordan again
incorrectly informed the referring attorney the case was still
pending. After the attorney’s assistant checked the court
docket and learned the case settled in January 2011, Mr.
Jordan “issued operating account checks to [the referring
attorney] for one half of the fee and reimbursement of costs.”
Mr. Jordan “had to deposit funds into his operating account
from an equity line of credit” to cover the checks. Mr. Jordan
claimed he incorrectly stated the status of the case because he
confused it with a similar case. Mr. Jordan also claimed he did
not pay the referring attorney his share of the fees and costs
because the case did not appear on Mr. Jordan’s “master list
of cases with associated counsel.” However, Mr. Jordan could
not produce the alleged master list to Disciplinary Counsel.

In the Client S case, Mr. Jordan settled the case in May
2011 for $80,000. On four occasions—the two June 2011 lists,
the December 2011 list, and the January 2012 list described in
the Client R case—Mr. Jordan misrepresented to the refer-
ring attorney the status of the Client S case as pending or
“Filed/Litigating.” He paid the referring attorney's share of
the fee in September 2012 after the attorney contacted him by
telephone and informed him the court’s online docket showed
the Client S case had been resolved.

In the Client T case, Mr. Jordan settled the case in October
2011 and deposited the settlement check into his trust account.
On October 81, 2011, he “deposited trust account checks into
his operating account” for the entire fee and costs. Mr. Jordan
did not hold the referring attorney’s share of the fee in trust
and did not inform the attorney he settled the case. On
December 27, 2011, when the attorney sent Mr. Jordan the list
of cases described in the Client R and Client S cases and
asked about their status, Mr. Jordan misrepresented that the
Client T case was still pending. Disciplinary Counsel discover-
ed Mr. Jordan’s failure to pay the referring attorney’s share of
the fee during this disciplinary investigation. At the time the
panel issued the addendum—September 8, 2015—Mr. Jordan
still had not paid the referring attorney’s share of the fee
because he claimed he “believe[d] that [the attorney] owe[d]
him $20,000.00 in connection with” another case.

In the Client U case, the parties stipulated similar events
occurred as in the Client T case. On December 14, 2011, Mr.
Jordan deposited a settlement check into his trust account,
then “deposited trust account checks into his operating ac-
count” for the entire fee and costs. He incorrectly confirmed
the status of the Client U case on the referring attorney’s
December 27, 2011 list, which showed the case was pending.
In January 2012, Mr. Jordan again misrepresented that the
case was pending. At the time of the addendum, Mr. Jordan
still had not paid the referring attorney’s share of the fee for
the same reason he asserted in the Client T case.

In the Client V case, the client suffered a back injury in a
workplace accident and retained an attorney to represent him
in a workers’ compensation claim. After resolving the workers’
compensation claim, the attorney referred the client’s third-
party claim to Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan also represented the
client’s wife on a claim for loss of consortium. The client
signed a fee agreement and gave Mr. Jordan power of attor-
ney, but his wife did not. In September 2012, Mr. Jordan
settled the case for $500,000 and signed a settlement agree-
ment on behalf of both clients without showing the agreement
to either. Because Mr. Jordan did not show them the agree-
ment prior to signing it, the agreement contained a false
statement that the clients had read the agreement. On Sep-
tember 18, 2012, Mr. Jordan “deposited the settlement pro-
ceeds into his trust account,” then improperly “transferred
$200,000 from his trust account to his operating account as
attorney’s fees” before his bank had collected the funds. The
referring attorney was entitled to one half of the fee, but Mr.
Jordan did not hold his share of the fee in trust and instead
deposited the entire $200,000 fee into his law firm’s operating
account. The clients disputed the amount of the fee calculated
by Mr. Jordan and asserted Mr. Jordan had agreed the
attorney’s fee “would be calculated as forty percent of the net
proceeds after repayment of $100,000.00 in subrogation to the
workers’ compensation carrier.” On September 25, 2012, Mr.
Jordan transferred $100,000 back into his client trust account.
He paid $80,000—the referring attorney’s share according to
the fee amount asserted by the client—to the referring attor-
ney and added $40,000 to the client’s net recovery. Mr. Jordan

“fully disbursed” the settlement proceeds from his trust ac-
count on October 26, 2012.

Contrary to its findings regarding the first set of charges,
the hearing panel found the stipulated facts in the second set
of charges support a finding that Mr. Jordan violated Rule
8.4(d), RPC, by “engagling] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”

The panel reconsidered its findings of aggravating and
mitigating factors in its original report. First, the panel ex-
plained it no longer considered the remoteness in time of the
events as a mitigating factor because Mr. Jordan’s “practices
of not paying earned fees to co-counsel and not maintaining
adequate financial records continued at least from September
2010 ... through September 2012”—after the January 2011
first set of charges and even after the December 2011 hearing.
Second, the panel found Mr. Jordan made “false statements”
and committed “other deceptive practices during the discipline
process,” and the panel considered those as aggravating fac-
tors. According to the addendum, Mr. Jordan testified at the
2011 hearing that he resolved his accounting issues and made
a “significant effort” to operate his law firm in accordance with
the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, the panel found
Mr. Jordan “was actively engaging in the very same profes-
sional misconduct at the time he was answering the first
Formal Charges and appearing before this Panel at the disci-
plinary hearing.”

Finally, the panel rejected a “lack of a dishonest or selfish
motive” as a mitigating factor. The panel stated, “Because the
instances of converting co-counsel’s earned fees to his own use
continued long after [Mr. Jordan] purportedly addressed his
staffing and accounting issues, resolved his family problems,
and successfully overcame his debilitating mental disorder and
addiction, we can only attribute his ongoing misconduct to
selfish and dishonest motives.” The panel recommended Mr.
Jordan be disbarred.

IL Analysis
HE This Court is not bound by the panel’s recommenda-

tion and may make its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law. In re Davidson, 409 S.C, 321, 827, 762 S.H.2d 556, 559

(2014). However, “the findings and conclusions of the Panel
are entitled much respect and consideration.” 409 8.C. at 328,
762 S.H.2d at 559. “A disciplinary violation must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.” In re Samaha, 399 S.C. 2, 10,
781 S.E.2d 277, 281 (2012) (quoting In re Greene, 871 S.C. 207,
216, 638 S.E.2d 677, 682 (2006)).

We accept the findings in the hearing panel report as to the
first set of charges, Mr. Jordan’s stipulation of the facts
alleged in the second set of charges, and the findings in the
addendum to the hearing panel report as to the second set of
charges. Mr. Jordan’s stipulations and the panel's findings
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Jordan
violated numerous provisions of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, including Rules 1.1, 1.8, 1.5(e), 5.1, and 5.8, and the
financial recordkeeping requirements and client trust account
safeguards of Rule 417, SCACR. We specifically discuss Mr.
Jordan’s violations of the following additional Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.

A. Rule 1.5(c), RPC

HM Rule 1.5(c) establishes requirements for contingent fee
agreements and disbursement of money received in contingent
fee cases. The hearing panel found that in six cases from the
second set of charges, Mr. Jordan “did not disclose the fee
division between [himself] and [the referring attorney] as
required by Rule 1.5(¢),” and Mr. Jordan admitted the viola-
tion. We accept Mr. Jordan’s admission that he violated Rule
1.5(¢).

B. Rule 1.5(e), RPC

Rule 1.5(e)(1) states, “A division of a fee between lawyers
who are not in the same firm may be made only if ... the
division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation.” Rule 1.5(e)(2) allows lawyers to divide a fee
only if “the client agrees to the arrangement, including the
share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is con-
firmed in writing.” We accept Mr. Jordan’s admission that he
violated Rule 1.5(e).

i. Rule 1.5(e)(2)—Written Confirmation

Hl Mr. Jordan entered into fee-sharing arrangements in
seven cases described in the second set of charges without
obtaining his clients’ written confirmation of their agreement
to the fee division. Therefore, Mr. Jordan violated Rule.
1.5(e)@).

ii. Rule 1.5(e)(1)—Division of Work or Responsibility

The record reflects that as far as Mr. Jordan knew, the
referring attorney performed no work on any of the cases.
From Mr. Jordan’s perspective, therefore, an even division of
the fee was not “in proportion to the services performed by
each lawyer.” The hearing panel found Mr. Jordan split the
fee “based on an understanding that both lawyers would be
accountable for the representation and that [the referring .
attorney] and his staff would be generally available to [Mr.
Jordan] if he required assistance.” Because the hearing panel’s
finding does not satisfy the requirement that “each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation,” we dis-
agree. The comments to Rule 1.5 explain,

Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial

and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the

lawyers were associated in a partnership. A lawyer who
assumes joint responsibility should be available to both the
client and the other fee-sharing lawyer as needed through-
out the representation and should remain knowledgeable
about the progress of the legal matter.

Rule 1.5, emt. 7, RPC.

Mr. Jordan did not keep the referring attorney updated on
the progress of the cases. If anything, the record indicates Mr.
Jordan concealed the progress of the cases from the referring
attorney—for as long as twenty months in one case. Mr.
Jordan could not have considered the referring attorney to
have assumed joint responsibility for the case after he inten-
tionally kept the lawyer unaware for twenty months that their
case had settled. When Mr. Jordan then shared the fee with
him on an even division, he did so in violation of Rule 1.5(e)(1).
See also In re Hart, 361 S.C. 392, 395, 605 S.E.2d 582, 584
(2004) (“Respondent acknowledges ... a written agreement
with the client in which both attorneys acknowledged full

responsibility for the matter was required.”). Therefore, Mr.
Jordan violated Rule 1.5(e)(1).

C. Rule 1.8(a), RPC
Rule 1.8(a)(1) provides,
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a

client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, secu-
rity or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are
fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that
can be reasonably understood by the client;

HM Mr. Jordan admitted he accepted a loan from a client
without complying with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a)(1). Mr.
Jordan committed three separate violations. First, the transac-
tion was not fair or reasonable to his client because Mr.
Jordan did not agree to pay any interest or otherwise promise
to compensate his client for the time value of the client’s
money. While it is also true that Mr. Jordan did not actually
pay any interest upon repayment of the principal, the violation
was complete at the time he took the loan because his failure
to promise to pay interest gave him the benefit of the client’s
money without any obligation to pay for that benefit. Second,
the transaction was not fair or reasonable to his client because
Mr. Jordan admitted he “did not provide for any timetable for
repayment,” and thus, he gave the client no contractual right
to demand repayment. Third, Mr. Jordan admitted in his
response that he did not transmit the terms of the loan to the
client in writing.

As to Rule 1.8(a)(2), Mr. Jordan admitted he did not advise
the client to seek the advice of independent counsel prior to
making the loan. Mr. Jordan also violated Rule 1.8(a)(8)
because he accepted the loan from his client without obtaining
her written informed consent to the essential terms of the
transaction or to his conflict of interest.

D. Rule 1.15(a), RPC

WH Rule 1.15(a) requires lawyers to hold property belong-
ing to other people in trust:

A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representa-
tion separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall
be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where
the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent,
of the client or third person.

. Complete records of such account funds and other
property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved
for a period of six years after termination of the representa-
tion, A lawyer shall comply with Rule 417, SCACR (Finan-
cial Recordkeeping).

Hl We accept Mr. Jordan’s admission that he violated
Rule 1.15(a). First, he failed to hold money belonging to co-
counsel separate from his own funds. In these instances, Mr.
Jordan paid fees belonging to co-counsel pursuant to fee-
sharing agreements into his own account instead of paying the
fees directly to co-counsel from his trust account. A lawyer
holding funds owed to his co-counsel pursuant to a fee-sharing
agreement is subject to the requirements of Rule 1.15 as to
those funds. See Hamilton v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 180 S.W.8d 470,
473 (Ky. 2005) (finding a lawyer who took clients from his
former law firm and agreed to pay the former firm a portion
of any settlement he obtained for those clients violated Ken-
tucky’s Rule 1.15—which is similar to our Rule 1.15—‘by
failing to promptly notify a third party claimant[—his former
law firm—Jof the receipt of settlement proceeds in which the
third party had an interest; failing to promptly deliver to that
third party funds that it was entitled to receive; and failing to
keep the funds in a separate bank account”); see also ANN.
Mops. Ruuus or Pro’, Conpbucr r. 1.15 annot. (Am. Bar Ass’n
2015) (Conversion and Misappropriation) (“A court may apply
Rule 1.15 ... to a lawyer who misuses money that belongs to
a law firm.”),

Second, Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.15(a) by overpaying
himself or his co-counsel using client funds. In the Client A
case, Mr. Jordan settled the case and overpaid himself by
$666.67. In the Client C case, Mr. Jordan settled the case and
paid himself a forty-percent fee despite agreeing to a one-
third fee. He then transferred the funds held in trust for the
client—minus $382.21—into a certificate of deposit account but
could not locate the additional $382.21 he failed to transfer.

Because he overpaid himself and lost a portion of the funds, he
failed to hold the client’s money in trust as required by Rule
1.15(a).

As noted above, in the Client E case, Mr. Jordan agreed to
evenly share the fee with another attorney, used his half of the
fee to cover a shortage in another client’s account ledger, paid
himself co-counsel’s share of the fee, then paid himself half the
fee again. This overpayment to himself came out of client
funds in violation of Rule 1.15(a). In the Client J class action
case, Mr. Jordan deposited a settlement installment into a
trust account. He then transferred the settlement install-
ment—minus approximately $10,000—into a different trust
account. Mr. Jordan could not account for the missing $10,000.
Mr. Jordan later erroneously paid himself $10,000 more than
he was entitled to receive for reimbursement of expenses.
Therefore, he did not properly hold his clients’ funds separate
from his own. In the same case, Mr. Jordan also could not
locate approximately $12,000 that had not been claimed and
therefore should have remained in a trust account.

The third way Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.15(a) is he failed
to maintain adequate records of money held in trust for clients
and co-counsel. In three cases, Mr. Jordan transferred funds
held in trust for a client through several trust accounts but did
not keep records of the transfers. In two cases, Mr. Jordan
overdrew a client’s trust account ledger when he paid his co-
counsel because he had already paid himself the full fee, did
not keep a record of the payment to himself, and therefore
claims he did not realize he had already paid himself the full
fee when he paid his co-counsel, Additionally, in two cases, Mr.
Jordan claims he left funds in trust for his clients when he
dissolved his law firm. However, when he asked his former
partner to disburse the funds he claimed were still in a trust
account, his former partner informed him there were no funds
held in trust for those clients.

Despite his agreement to stipulate to the facts alleged and
waive an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Jordan portrays his Rule
1.15(a) violations as simple mistakes by arguing he did not
realize he had already paid himself his share of the fee. We
find Mr. Jordan violated the rule in each of the instances
described above, and none of the violations were merely

technical. The recordkeeping provision of Rule 1.15(a) protects
lawyers who obey the rule because they always have detailed
records to show how client funds and the funds of others were
maintained and distributed. The recordkeeping provision also
prevents lawyers who disobey the rule from claiming they
made a simple mistake. In Mr. Jordan’s case, he admitted
violating the recordkeeping provision of Rule 1.15 in several
cases in the first set of formal charges. At the same time he
claimed to the hearing panel he was making a “serious effort”
to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct, he not only
continued to commingle client and co-counsel funds with his
own in violation of Rule 1.15(a), he also continued to conceal
that misconduct by failing to keep adequate records. These
violations were not simple mistakes—they were intentional.’

E. Rule 1.15(d), RPC

HE When a lawyer receives funds in which a client or third
person has an interest, the lawyer “shall promptly notify the
client or third person.” Rule 1.15(d), RPC. Additionally, the
lawyer must “promptly deliver to the client or third person
any funds or other property that the client or third person is
entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property.” Id. As we noted in our analysis of Rule 1.15(a), a
“third person” under this rule includes co-counsel.

In four cases described in the first set of formal charges—
the Client A, D, E, and N cases—Mr. Jordan agreed to share
a fee with co-counsel but did not promptly notify co-counsel or
promptly deliver co-counsel’s share of the fee. The amount of

3, Rule 1.15 does not include an element of intent. See Attorney Griev-
ance Comm’ v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 842 A.2d 42, 49 (2004) (applying
a rule similar to our Rule 1.15 and stating, “This Court has explained
on numerous occasions that with regard to Rule 1.15 ‘an unintentional
violation of this rule ... is still a violation of the attorney's affirmative
duties imposed by the rule’ ”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 1143, 1154
(1999))); In re Mayeux, 762 So.2d 1072, 1075 (La. 2000) (applying a
rule similar to our Rule 1.15 and stating, “The lawyer's mistake, good
faith, or lack of conscious wrongdoing does not negate an infraction of
the rule, but bears only on the penalty to be imposed.” (citation
omitted)). Thus, our finding that Mr, Jordan acted intentionally is not
necessary to find he violated Rule 1.15, but does factor into whether he

time between settlement and payment to co-counsel in these
cases ranged from six months to two and a half years.

Mr. Jordan also failed to comply with Rule 1.15(d) in at least
six cases described in the second set of charges. In those
cases, Mr. Jordan and the referring attorney agreed to evenly
share the fee Mr. Jordan received when he resolved the case.
When Mr. Jordan settled each case, he collected the fee but
did not notify the referring attorney he had received the fee.
He also misrepresented to the referring attorney that several
of the cases were still pending months after settling the cases,
thereby concealing from the referring attorney that he was
holding funds in which he knew the referring attorney claimed
an interest. Moreover, Mr. Jordan did not promptly deliver
the referring attorney’s share of the fee in those six cases, and
in two cases, Mr. Jordan still has not delivered the referring
attorney’s share. Because Mr. Jordan did not promptly notify
his co-counsel or promptly deliver co-counsel’s funds, he violat-
ed Rule 1.15(d).

F, Rule 1.15, RPC

HMM Rule 1.15((1) prohibits lawyers from disbursing trust
account funds “unless the funds to be disbursed have been
deposited in the account and are collected funds.” The com-
ments to Rule 1.15 explain the “requirement in Rule 1.15(£)(1)
that funds be deposited and collected in the lawyer’s trust
account prior to disbursement is fundamental to proper trust
accounting.” Rule 1.15, emt. 5, RPC. To comply with Rule
1.15(()(1), a lawyer must wait until a check deposited in a trust
account has cleared the bank before disbursing the funds from
the check. Rule 1.15(f)(2) provides exceptions to the Rule
1,15(f)(1) requirements. See, ¢.g., Rule 1.15(f)(2)Gii), RPC (pro-
viding an exception for a “properly endorsed government
check”); Rule 1.15(f)(2)(iv), RPC (providing an exception for
checks from insurance companies that do not exceed $50,000).

Mr. Jordan violated Rule 1.15(f)(1) in six cases—four cases
described in the first set of formal charges and two cases
described in the second set of charges. In each of those cases,
Mr. Jordan received settlement checks and deposited the
checks in a trust account. On the day of the initial deposit or
the day after the deposit, Mr. Jordan wrote checks for the
funds from the trust account to his law firm’s accounts—

violated Rule 8.4(d) and our decision regarding the appropriate sanc-
tion.

before his bank collected the money. The Rule 1.15(f)(2)
exceptions do not apply to any of these cases. Therefore, Mr,
Jordan’s disbursement of funds in each of the six cases
violated Rule 1.15(£)(1). See Rule 1.15, emt. 8, RPC (“A law-
yer’s disbursement of funds from a trust account in reliance on
deposits that are not yet collected funds in any circumstances
other than Subsections (i) through (vi) of Rule 1.15(f)(2) may
be grounds for a finding of professional misconduct.”).

G. Rule 84(d), RPC

HM Rule 8.4(d) states, “It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”

When the panel reevaluated its recommendation after con-
sidering the second set of charges, it found Mr. Jordan had
“dishonest and selfish motives” and engaged in “deceit and
misrepresentation in the disciplinary investigation” in violation
of Rule 8.4(d). The panel placed particular reliance on the
timing of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct—many of his acts of mis-
conduct in the second set of charges occurred after Disciplin-
ary Counsel filed the first set of formal charges on January 7,
2011, and some of the misconduct occurred even after the
December 5, 2011 hearing on the first set of charges. The
panel found, “Because the instances of converting co-counsel’s
earned fees to his own use continued long after [Mr. Jordan]
purportedly addressed his staffing and accounting issues, re-
solved his family problems, and successfully overcame a debili-
tating mental disorder and addiction, we can only attribute his
ongoing misconduct to selfish and dishonest motives.” For
example, in May 2011—approximately four months after the
first set of charges—Mr. Jordan settled the Client 8 case, did
not hold his co-counsel’s share of the fee in trust or inform co-
counsel of the settlement, and deposited the entire fee into his
operating account. In June 2011, December 2011, and January
2012, Mr. Jordan informed his co-counsel that two cases were
still pending, despite settling the cases months earlier. Simi-
larly, the majority of the misconduct in the three other cases
occurred after Disciplinary Counsel filed the first set of formal
charges covering the same misconduct.

The panel found Mr. Jordan engaged in “false statements
and other deceptive practices during the discipline process,”

such as misrepresenting that he had resolved the “bookkeep-
ing” issues that he blamed at the December 2011 hearing for
his failure to maintain adequate records of his trust accounts.
The timing supports the panel’s conclusion. Mr. Jordan was
engaging in misconduct at the same time he asserted to the
panel he had fixed the issues he blamed for identical miscon-
duct in the first set of charges. In his March 2011 response to
the first set of charges, Mr. Jordan asserted he “demonstrated
he can ethically run a law practice for the last half a decade
and he has put in place the appropriate safeguards to ensure
that this issue never recreates itself.” Contrary to that asser-
tion, Mr. Jordan committed much of the misconduct in the
second set of charges within several months of his response,
and he lied to his co-counsel about the status of two cases
within weeks of appearing at the hearing. The panel respond-
ed in the following manner to Mr. Jordan’s claim that he had
“turn[ed] his practice into a model of how to practice law in an
appropriate way”:

Yet, less than two months before the hearing, [Mr. Jordan]

had misappropriated [the referring attorney’s] earned fees

of $2,500.00 in the [Client T] matter.... Just about a week
after the hearing, [Mr. Jordan] misappropriated [the refer-

ving attorney’s] earned fees of $1,800.00 in the [Client U]

matter. And, on January 10, 2012, [Mr. Jordan] was assur-

ing [the referring attorney] that these cases were still
pending.

Mr. Jordan also claimed he discontinued his practice of
disbursing attorney's fees and costs before his bank collected
the funds—in violation of Rule 1.15(f)—by asserting at the
December 2011 hearing, “That’s no longer the practice we do
at all.” The panel again rejected Mr. Jordan’s claim and
stated, “To the contrary, ... that is exactly what [Mr. Jordan]
continues to do, In May 2011, he paid himself over $84,000.00
in attorney's fees and costs in the [Client S] matter the day
after deposit. In September 2012, he paid himself $200,000.00
in attorney’s fees in the [Client V] matter the day after
deposit.”

Mr. Jordan has demonstrated he is a highly intelligent
individual who has successfully represented many clients dur-
ing his career. Throughout these proceedings, he has claimed
he made honest mistakes regarding the distribution of money

and never intended to take his co-counsels’ money. Given the
timing of his misconduct in relation to these disciplinary
proceedings, however, we cannot accept Mr. Jordan’s claim. It
is difficult to believe a lawyer of Mr. Jordan’s intelligence and
experience who has been formally charged with taking money
owed to co-counsel could be so careless as to settle a case and
not check to see if any co-counsel was entitled to a portion of
the fee or verify whether he had settled the case before telling
eo-counsel the case was still pending. As the panel noted, “it
defies logic that he would be so careless given the serious
nature of the disciplinary proceedings against him at the
time.” We find this misconduct was not careless—it was
intentional,

Thus, we agree with the hearing panel and find Mr. Jordan
committed professional misconduct on multiple occasions by
“engagling] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
[and] misrepresentation” in violation of Rule 8.4(d).

Ill. Sanction

HM Mr. Jordan argues his misconduct was unintentional
and the panel’s original recommendation of a public reprimand
is the appropriate sanction. He admits failing to keep required
records, but he contends this lack of records caused him to
make innocent mistakes when he misrepresented the status of
his cases to co-counsel. Additionally, Mr. Jordan argues this
case arose from a civil dispute with the referring attorney over
fees and is therefore inappropriate for a disciplinary proceed-
ing. In support of that argument, Mr. Jordan cites twenty-
seven cases over the last three years in which this Court has
disbarred a lawyer. In those twenty-seven cases, Mr. Jordan
contends, no lawyer has been disbarred for a fee dispute with
another lawyer or for failing to obtain a client’s consent to a
fee-sharing arrangement. Finally, Mr. Jordan argues his per-
sonal problems—particularly a battle with lymphoma—amiti-
gate the severity of his misconduct. Accordingly, Mr. Jordan
argues the appropriate sanction is a public reprimand.

We acknowledge much of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct, such as
that described in the first set of formal charges, warrants only
a public reprimand. However, considering his pattern of mis-
conduct as a whole—including the timing of the allegations—

we agree with the panel that Mr. Jordan’s misconduct was the
product of “selfish and dishonest motives” rather than “a
series of simple oversights and accounting errors.” Thus, a
public reprimand is inadequate and a more severe sanction is
warranted.

First, in its report on the first set of charges, the panel
considered “the fact that [Mr. Jordan] has been cautioned
before for concerns about Rule 1,15” as an aggravating factor.
In its report on the second set of charges, the panel found “a
continuation of this pattern of misconduct during the time
period leading up to—and continuing for some time after—the
disciplinary hearing held on December 5, 2011.” For example,
Mr. Jordan’s repeated failure to keep required records—
particularly as to the second set of charges—allowed him to
deny intentional misconduct throughout Disciplinary Counsel’s
investigation into both the first set of charges and the second
set of charges. The hearing panel noted Mr. Jordan’s claim
“that his misconduct was ‘simply a failure to keep adequate
records’ and ‘at worst negligent,’” Like the hearing panel, we
are unpersuaded by Mr. Jordan’s argument that his lack of
records caused him to make innocent mistakes.

Second, we have considered Mr. Jordan’s arguments that
this is a civil fee dispute and no lawyer has been disbarred for
failing to disclose a fee-sharing arrangement to a client. Mr.
Jordan and his co-counsel do have a civil dispute over some of
their fee-sharing arrangements, but within that dispute arose
allegations—and now findings—of professional misconduct.
We are not imposing—and the panel is not recommending—a
sanction on Mr. Jordan solely for his civil fee dispute or his
failure to obtain his clients’ consent to fee-sharing arrange-
ments, Rather, the sanction is based on a pattern of intention-
al misconduct over many years, including multiple instances of
Mr. Jordan deliberately using shoddy recordkeeping to cover
up his attempts to steal fees from his co-counsel.

Third, we are highly sensitive to Mr. Jordan’s personal
problems, including his prescription drug addiction, his family
issues, and his assertion that his struggle with lymphoma
caused him to make careless mistakes. As to the prescription
drug issues, Mr. Jordan explained he was addicted to benzo-
diazepines from 1997 through 2004. Although he overcame his

addiction in 2004, he argues such an addiction can have long-
term cognitive effects, including memory loss. As to his health
issues, Mr. Jordan filed affidavits prior to oral argument from
two doctors explaining he may have been suffering from
symptoms of lymphoma as early as March or April 2011. In
one of the affidavits, a doctor stated, “Lymphoma can affect a
patient’s ability to complete normal activities of daily living
and it was clearly impacting his ability to function.” Mr.
Jordan cites Standard 9.3 of the American Bar Association’s
Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to sup-
port his argument that this Court must consider his mitigating
factors. Standard 9,82 does include mental disability and
chemical dependency as factors that may be considered in
mitigation. However, the timing of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct in
the second set of charges undermines his arguments. That
misconduct began around September 2010 when Mr. Jordan
accepted a fee and failed to pay co-counsel’s share in the
Client P case. Standard 9.82(i) provides the factors serve as
mitigation “when ... the respondent’s recovery from the
chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a
meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation;
and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence
of that misconduct is unlikely.” ANN, STANDARDS For IMPosING
Lawyer Sanctions 9,82() (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015) (emphasis
added). Mr. Jordan engaged in a pattern of misconduct prior
to the earliest possible beginning of his cancer symptoms and
well after he overcame his prescription drug problems, and he
continued that pattern for several years. In fact, Mr. Jordan
stipulated his “medical conditions arose after the conduct set
forth in [the second set of charges] and [he] does not assert
that those conditions had any causative effect on that con-
duct.” Therefore, his personal problems and health problems
do not mitigate the need for a severe sanction.

Finally, the timing of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct cannot be
reconciled with his assertion that the misconduct was acciden-
tal. As we noted in our analysis of Rule 8.4(d), RPC, Mr.
Jordan is a highly intelligent person, It makes no sense that a
person of Mr. Jordan’s intelligence and experience could “acci-
dentally” fail to pay his co-counsel, then—while under investi-
gation by Disciplinary Counsel for doing so—continue to acci-
dentally do the same thing. As the panel noted in its report on

the second set of charges, “Even if we were to give [Mr.
Jordan] the benefit of the doubt and attribute his repeated
misrepresentations to [the referring attorney] to inadvertence
or poor recollection, it defies logic that he would be so careless
given the serious nature of the disciplinary proceedings pend-
ing against him at the time.” Standing alone, the failure to pay
co-counsel in the first set of charges would not support a
finding of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The
second set of charges, however, in which Mr. Jordan commit-
ted the misconduct at the same point in time he was claiming
the previous conduct was accidental and he had taken steps in
the management of his firm to prevent it, leave no room for
any finding other than intentional misconduct. As we have
stated, much of Mr. Jordan’s misconduct does not warrant
more than a public reprimand. We agree with the panel,
however, that Mr. Jordan’s conduct in the second set of
charges was “selfish and dishonest” and therefore violated the
Rule 8.4(d) prohibition against “conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”

“This Court has recognized that ‘the primary purpose of
disbarment ... is the removal of an unfit person from the
profession for the protection of the courts and the public, not
punishment of the offending attorney.’ ” Davidson, 409 8.C. at
828, 762 S.H.2d at 559 (quoting In re Pennington, 898 S.C.
300, 304, 713 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2011). We find the deliberate
misconduct Mr. Jordan repeatedly committed over a long
period of time places him squarely into the category of people
for which disbarment is appropriate.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Jordan is DISBARRED. Within fifteen (15) days of the
date of this opinion, Mr. Jordan shall file an affidavit with the
Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 80 of
Rule 418, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of
Admission to the Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court.

DISBARRED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ.,
concur. Acting Justice Pleicones not participating.

a

809 S.E.2d 423

The STATE, Respondent,
v
Luzenski Allen COTTRELL, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000731
Opinion No. 27754

Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard May 24, 2017
Filed December 20, 2017
Rehearing Denied February 16, 2018

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628

Keir M. Weyble and Sheri L. Johnson, both of Cornell Law
School, of Ithaca, New York, and Robert M, Dudek, of Colum-
bia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka and Assistant Attorney
General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia, and Solicitor
Jimmy A. Richardson, of Conway, for Respondent.

JUSTICE HEARN:

Appellant Luzenski Allen Cottrell was convicted and sen-
tenced to death by an Horry County jury for the 2002 murder
of Myrtle Beach police officer Joe McGarry. On appeal, Cott-
rell now raises five issues, all of which involve rulings largely
addressed to the trial judge’s discretion. Finding no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge, we affirm his conviction and
sentence,

FACTS

Shortly after midnight on December 29, 2002, McGarry and
fellow police officer Mike Guthinger entered a Dunkin Donuts
in the city of Myrtle Beach. Both officers were in uniform and
on duty, completing a traffic stop a short time earlier before
deciding to get coffee. Upon entering Dunkin Donuts, McGar-
ry immediately recognized Cottrell, who was ordering coffee

i  «

at the register with two companions, Diane Lawson and Fred
Haleomb. McGarry was familiar with Cottrell, having had
several previous encounters with him, including arresting
Cottrell for possession with intent to distribute marijuana
earlier that year. More significantly, Lt. Amy Prock of the
Myrtle Beach Police Department had recently notified McGar-
ry that Cottrell had been identified as a possible suspect! in
the shooting death of Rick Hartman, whose body had been
found in a rural part of Horry County roughly a month earlier.

Upon recognizing Cottrell, McGarry informed Guthinger
that Cottrell was identified as a suspect in a shooting and that
he was possibly carrying a gun, Rather than proceed in line to
get coffee, McGarry and Guthinger exited the Dunkin Donuts
and approached Cottrell on the sidewalk as he stepped out the
door. McGarry asked Cottrell whether he remembered him,
and then inquired as to whether he had taken care of the
previous charges for which McGarry had arrested him. Cott-
rell indicated they were all taken care of. At that point,
McGarry asked Cottrell for his identification and informed
him he was going to run an NCIC check to see if Cottrell had
any outstanding warrants.

While waiting for a response from the dispatcher after
calling in Cottrell’s information, McGarry indicated to Cottrell
that he was going to perform a pat-down for weapons. Cottrell
told McGarry “no” before turning and walking away toward
another vehicle driven by Donnie Morgan, who was part of
Cottrell’s group but unknown to the officers at the time.
Cottrell’s right hand was somewhere near the front of his
waistband as he turned and walked away” McGarry then
immediately began yelling for Cottrell to stop and show his

1, Halcomb was also identified as a suspect in Hartman's death, but he
‘was not immediately recognizable to the officers.

2. Cottrell was wearing an oversized, baggy jersey, which Guthinger
testified made it impossible for him to see whether he had a concealed
handgun underneath, though he also stated that such oversized clothing
was often worn for the purposes of concealing illegal weapons. Though
there was no eye witness testimony to confirm it, the State’s theory was
that at some point while waiting for the NCIC to come back, McGarry
caught a glimpse or saw the imprint of a concealed handgun on
Cottrell’s person, thereby causing McGarry's rapid change in demeanor
and his instructions to Cottrell to keep his hands visible.

a

hands. When Cottrell did not comply, McGarry unholstered
his weapon and again commanded Cottrell to show his hands.
With Cottrell’s back still turned to him, McGarry reholstered
his weapon and rushed towards Cottrell from behind, strug-
gling to grab Cottrell’s right hand which was near the front of
his waistband, while McGarry’s left hand was somewhere on
Cottrell’s upper back or shoulder, attempting to gain control
of him,

The pair stumbled and separated as they slid toward the
rear of the Morgan vehicle. As they regained their balance
and squared up, Cottrell raised a .45 caliber handgun and fired
a shot, striking McGarry in the face from eight to twelve
inches away. The shot incapacitated McGarry, who fell back-
wards and struck his head on the pavement.’

Immediately upon seeing Cottrell shoot McGarry, Guthing-
er drew his weapon and fired several shots at Cottrell, striking
him in the leg as Cottrell sought cover behind Morgan’s car.
Guthinger and Cottrell continued to exchange gunfire, and
numerous vehicles and nearby buildings were struck by bul-
lets. At some point during the shootout, Cottrell told Guthing-
er he was surrendering, prompting Guthinger to leave his
protected position to place him under arrest. However, as he
approached, Cottrell reloaded his firearm and resumed shoot-
ing at Guthinger, who retreated to cover and called for
backup.

3. Guthinger testified he witnessed Cottrell raise his gun and shoot
McGarry, and that the sound of the first shot was simultaneous with the
muzzle blast he saw from the gun’s muzzle. Guthinger then heard a
second shot but did not see a muzzle flash. Experts confirmed that
McGarry's weapon fired a shot, and Lawson, who witnessed the events
from the passenger seat in Halcomb’s vehicle, testified that McGarry’s
weapon discharged while he was falling backwards after being shot by
Cottrell.

4, There was some dispute as to when Cottrell was shot. The defense
produced an expert who testified that Cottrell was shot from the front,
attempting to convince the jury that McGarry fired the first shot and
struck Cottrell. Guthinger testified that he shot Cottrell, and that
Cottrell was moving without any signs of injury immediately after
shooting McGarry, and only after Guthinger fired at him did Cottrell
begin hopping or limping on one leg. In a statement to police following
the shooting, Cottrell stated he believed it was Guthinger who shot him,
not McGarry. Lawson also confirmed that it was Cottrell who fired the
first shot, while McGarry then fired as he was falling to the ground.

Cottrell fled the scene and responding officers engaged in a
high speed chase through Myrtle Beach until his getaway
vehicle was brought to a halt using stop sticks to disable the
tires, and he was placed under arrest. Police recovered the .45
caliber weapon that was forensically matched to the bullet
which killed McGarry, along with another loaded .357 revolver
in the backseat. Officers attempted to perform CPR on
McGarry, but he passed away in the Dunkin Donuts parking
lot.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cottrell was first tried for the murder of McGarry in 2005.
At that trial, the jury found him guilty of murder, assault with
intent to kill, resisting arrest, and grand larceny. Cottrell
appealed the murder conviction, and this Court reversed,
finding the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter in addition to murder.
State v. Cottrell, 876 S.C. 260, 265, 657 S.E.2d 451, 454 (2008)
(hereinafter referred to as Cottrell I). The other convictions
remained, but Cottrell was granted a new trial on the murder
charge.

Weeks prior to the scheduled start of Cottrell’s second trial
in March 2012, the solicitors representing the State had
separate conversations with Cottrell’s appointed attorneys, at
which time each accused co-counsel of misconduct and ques-
tioned their ability to adequately represent Cottrell in light of
their difficulty working together. The solicitors made the trial
judge aware of these allegations, and he conducted discussions
in chambers with the appointed attorneys, who both confirmed
they had indeed made the allegations brought to light by the
State. Both attorneys also indicated they felt their inability to
work together jeopardized Cottrell’s defense.

In a pre-trial hearing, the trial judge expressed his concerns
over the allegations made by Cottrell’s attorneys, questioning
whether it was possible for them to effectively represent
Cottrell. Cottrell’s attorneys stated they could put their differ-
ences aside and work together so the case could proceed, but
acknowledged they would defer to the trial judge’s decision.
One of the attorneys admitted that the allegations were proba-
bly sufficient to solidify post-conviction relief if the case went

forward. The trial judge then gave Cottrell an opportunity to
discuss the matter with his attorneys, After their discussion,
Cottrell reiterated he felt confident in his attorneys’ ability to
represent him, but that he would defer to the trial judge’s
decision. Ultimately, due to his concerns for Cottrell’s repre-
sentation and the ability of the attorneys to overcome their
problems just two weeks before trial, the trial judge decided
to relieve both attorneys. After appointing new defense coun-
sel,® the trial judge afforded Cottrell more than two years
before rescheduling the trial so that his new attorneys would
have adequate time to prepare.

Cottrell was eventually tried and found guilty of murder,
and the case proceeded to sentencing. During the sentencing
phase, the jury heard evidence of Cottrell’s prior bad acts,
including a prior conviction for the murder of Jonathan Love
in Marion County, as well as testimony surrounding Hart-
man’s murder, which the State asserted Cottrell was responsi-
ble for although the case had not yet been tried.®

After deliberating for approximately two hours over Cott-
rell’s sentence, the jury sent a note to the trial judge indicat-
ing there were eleven jurors for the death penalty and one for
life, asking, “What is the next step?” The trial judge did not
disclose to the parties what the split was at that time, instead
reading a redacted version without the numerical count, and
informing them that he would instruct the jury to continue
deliberations. Because the jury had only been deliberating for
two hours, the trial judge concluded it was too early to give an
Allen’ charge, The jury continued its deliberations and ulti-
mately returned with a unanimous recommendation that Cott-
rell be sentenced to death.’ Cottrell now raises five issues in
his appeal to this Court.

5. There is no dispute over replacement counsel’s qualifications to
represent Cottrell.

6. After Cottrell’s second trial and conviction for the murder of McGar-
ry, the State decided not to further pursue charges against Cottrell for
the Hartman murder,

7. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528
(1896),

8. The jury found three aggravating circumstances present to warrant
the imposition of the death penalty: (1) a prior murder conviction; (2)

= ©

ISSUES PRESENTED

I. Did the trial judge’s removal of Cottrell’s appointed attor-
neys violate his right to counsel and due process under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

II. Was Cottrell’s right to a fair and reliable sentencing
determination violated as a result of the qualification and
seating of two jurors whose expressed views prevented or
substantially impaired their ability to consider constitutionally
relevant mitigating evidence?

III. Did the trial judge err in excluding the testimony of
Detective Nathan Johnson on the grounds that the risk of
prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value?

IV. Did the trial judge err by refusing to instruct the jury not
to infer malice exclusively from the use of a deadly weapon?
V. Did the trial judge err by refusing to disclose the contents
of a jury note to Cottrell’s defense counsel during sentencing
deliberations?

ANALYSIS

I, REMOVAL OF ATTORNEYS

Hl Cottrell contends that the removal of his appointed
counsel without any factual findings on the record was an
unnecessary termination of his existing attorney-client rela-
tionship and a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. On the
other hand, the State asserts the removal of Cottrell’s counsel
was an appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial judge.
Given the trial judge’s discretionary authority and his duty to
ensure the integrity of the judicial process and safeguard
Cottrell’s right to effective counsel, we find the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in removing Cottrell’s attorneys and
appointing new counsel.

Hs An accused has the right to assistance of counsel.
U.S. Const, amend. VI. However, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is “circumscribed by the trial court’s obligation to
safeguard the integrity of the proceedings and ensure trials

the killing of a police officer in the line of duty; and (3) conduct that
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place.
See 8.C, Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (2015).

—

are conducted according to the ethical standards of the profes-
sion.” State v. Sanders, 841 S.C. 386, 389, 584 S.H.2d 696, 697
(2000). Thus, a motion to relieve counsel is left to the discre-
tion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Justus, 392 S.C. 416, 418, 709
§.E.2d 668, 670 (2011). In determining whether to remove a
defendant’s attorneys, a court must balance a defendant’s
right to choose his own counsel “against the need to maintain
the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility.”
Sanders, 341 S.C. at 390, 534 S.H.2d at 698. The Fourth
Circuit has explained that a trial judge must be allowed
“substantial latitude” and broad discretion in disqualifying a
defendant’s chosen lawyer so the trial judge may “rule without
fear that it is setting itself up for reversal on appeal.” U.S. v.
Howard, 115 F.3d 1151, 1155 (4th Cir. 1997).

Cottrell characterizes the trial judge’s removal of his coun-
sel as arbitrary and unsupported by any basis in the record,
citing to United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147—
48, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), for the proposition
that the removal of his attorneys was a structural error under
the Sixth Amendment. We disagree.

While Cottrell is correct in asserting that the erroneous
deprivation of a defendant’s counsel of choice is a structural
error in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the key qualifying
language in that statement of law requires that the removal of
defendant’s chosen counsel be erroneous. In Gonzales-Lopez,
the United States Supreme Court noted that the right to
counsel of choice is not absolute and is subject to several
limitations, but because the government conceded that the
district court erroneously deprived respondent of his counsel
of choice and without proper justification, the broad discretion
normally afforded to trial judges was not applicable. Id. at 152,
126 S.Ct. 2557. Importantly though, the Gonzalez-Lopez court
made clear that its holding did not cast any doubt or place any
qualifications upon its prior holdings that “limit the right to
counsel of choice and recognize the authority of trial courts to
establish criteria for admitting lawyers to argue before them.”
Id. at 151, 126 S.Ct. 2557. Reaffirming its earlier holdings, the
Court further noted this right to counsel of choice does not
extend to defendants represented by appointed counsel. Id.
The Court also reiterated the wide latitude that must be

= ©

afforded to trial courts in balancing the right to counsel of
choice with the needs of fairness, and its “interest in ensuring
that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards
of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all
who observe them.” Jd. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557,

In this case, we believe the trial judge acted properly and in
accordance with his broad discretionary authority in removing
Cottrell’s appointed attorneys. We agree with Cottrell’s argu-
ment that his relationship with appointed attorneys, once
established, should be afforded the same level of deference as
that which is afforded to clients with retained counsel; howev-
er, that does not overcome the strong language from Gon-
zales-Lopez, Sanders, and the long line of other authorities
delineating the wide latitude a trial judge possesses in balanc-
ing the right to counsel of choice with safeguarding the
integrity of the judicial process. Here, the record reflects the
trial judge removed Cottrell’s attorneys to ensure Cottrell
received a fair trial with adequate representation and to
maintain the integrity of the judicial process. And, unlike
Gonaales-Lopez, the State does not concede that the trial
judge erroneously removed counsel—precluding a finding that
the removal of Cottrell’s attorneys was necessarily a structur-
al error and instead requiring the Court to apply an abuse of
discretion standard.

As Cottrell points out, Sanders grants the trial judge discre-
tion in removing counsel, but he contends there must first be
an evidentiary hearing with findings of fact before the judge
ean make such a decision. Indeed, this Court explained in
Sanders that “as a procedural safeguard, an evidentiary hear-
ing is appropriate to determine whether there is evidence to
support counsel’s removal.” 341 S.C. 886, 391, 5384 S.E.2d 696,
698. In Sanders, the trial judge removed one of the defen-
dant’s attorneys after the State indicated the attorney would
be called as a witness to testify about her interactions with
another State witness. Rather than holding a hearing to
determine whether the attorney was a “necessary witness” to
disqualify her under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
trial judge merely relied on the State’s assertion and removed
the attorney.

a

In Cottrell’s case, these concerns are mitigated because in
addition to the in camera discussions, the trial judge did in
fact hold a hearing to allow Cottrell and his attorneys to be
heard on the matter. We acknowledge it is somewhat proble-
matie that the record does not indicate with specificity what
the allegations of misconduct and disagreement actually entail,
but the attorneys’ confirmation that the accusations were
made and the absence of any rebuttal weighs in favor of
affirming the trial judge’s decision. Moreover, once one of
Cottrell’s attorneys admitted on the record that he believed
Cottrell would likely prevail on PCR based on these allega-
tions, we find the trial judge had little choice but to remove
the attorneys to preserve the integrity of the trial in accor-
dance with Gonzales-Lopez and Sanders. The right to counsel
is not so absolute that it requires a trial judge to preside over
a trial, exhausting the time of attorneys, jurors, and judicial
staff despite an admission by a defendant’s attorney that the
integrity of the verdict is in doubt due to conduct falling below
the accepted standards of the legal profession.

Based on the above analysis, we find the trial judge acted
within the limits of his discretionary powers and did not
violate Cottrell’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by remov-
ing his appointed attorneys and replacing them with new
counsel. Had the attorneys denied the allegations or objected
to the trial judge’s remedy of removal, more complete findings
of fact may have been appropriate, but the limited findings in
the record are bolstered by the attorneys’ acquiescence to the
trial judge’s ruling. Though deference is afforded to a defen-
dant’s attorney-client relationship once established, that rela-
tionship is limited by a trial judge’s obligation to safeguard the
integrity of the judicial process, as the trial judge did here.
Thus, we find no error in the trial judge’s removal and
replacement of Cottrell’s appointed attorneys.

I. JUROR QUALIFICATION

Hl Cottrell next argues the trial court erred in qualifying
Jurors 148 and 450 after they made statements during the
jury selection process indicating they would not consider
evidence of a defendant’s background in determining whether
to impose the death penalty. After reviewing the record and

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the entirety of each juror’s voir dire, we affirm the trial
judge’s decision to qualify the jurors.

HM s(Determinations of whether a juror is qualified are
left to the sole discretion of the trial judge who has the
opportunity to see and hear the jurors. State v. Dickerson, 395
S.C. 101, 115, 716 S.E.2d 895, 903 (2011). In reviewing the trial
judge’s qualification of jurors, the juror’s responses must be
examined in light of the entire voir dire, and the trial judge’s
decision will not be reversed unless it is wholly unsupported
by the evidence. Id. “The ultimate consideration is that the
juror be unbiased, impartial, and able to carry out the law as
explained to him.” State v. Sapp, 366 S.C. 288, 291, 621 S.E.2d
883, 887 (2005).

A full review of the voir dire process shows that neither of
the jurors in question was “mitigation-impaired,” and both
identified themselves as “Type C” jurors, meaning they would
not always vote for life or always vote for death. The jurors
further stated they would wait until all evidence was present-
ed before determining the appropriate sentence based on
aggravating and mitigating evidence.’ Both jurors expressed a
willingness to follow the trial judge’s instructions regarding
the law, and both indicated they would not automatically
impose the death penalty. See Dickerson, 395 8.C. at 116, 716
S.E.2d at 903 (“The circuit judge was more persuaded by the
juror’s consistent affirmation he would follow the law and wait
to hear all of the evidence than by his apparent confusion over
the State’s burden, and we believe his ultimate determination
of [the juror’s] qualification to serve is supported by the

9. For example, Juror 450 explained to defense counsel, “Again, I think
that everything is based on individual acts, and so overall to say that the
death penalty is for everybody, I just don’t think that's how it should
be.” Keeping in mind that the jurors had not yet been given any
instructions on the law, we read the colloquies with Cottrell’s attorneys
asking whether the jurors would consider a defendant's background
when determining the appropriate sentence and their responses of “no”
to signify the jurors’ intent to treat all defendants fairly and equally, and
base their decision upon the facts of the case. To laypersons, the notion
of equal treatment for all under the law is a touchstone of our justice
system, and until a juror is fully informed that he may determine the
appropriate sentence based on the unique backgrounds or characteris-
tics of the defendant, it is not surprising that a juror would state that he
intends to treat all defendants equally, regardless of their background,

[ a

record.”). During the sentencing phase of Cottrell’s trial, th
trial judge repeatedly instructed the jurors that they would be
required to consider any mitigating circumstance of any na-
ture whatsoever, and explained what mitigating evidence could
entail.

Based on the deference appellate courts afford to trial
judges in matters of jury selection, and looking at the entirety
of the voir dire process, along with the clear instructions given
by the trial judge, we affirm the trial judge’s qualification of
Jurors 450 and 148.

Ill. TESTIMONY OF NATHAN JOHNSON

Cottrell asserts the trial judge violated his due process
rights, the Confrontation Clause, and his Fourth Amendment.
right against unreasonable seizures by excluding the testimo-
ny of Detective Nathan Johnson. We disagree.

A. Background

Horry County Detective Nathan Johnson began investigat-
ing the murder of Rick Hartman after his body was found in
November 2002. Johnson identified Cottrell as a possible
suspect in the murder and notified the Myrtle Beach Police
Department to inform its officers that Cottrell was a suspect
and requested any additional information about him. MBPD
Lt. Prock relayed this message to McGarry, knowing that he
was personally familiar with Cottrell after arresting him for
PWID earlier that year. McGarry had no contact or conversa-
tions with Johnson, instead only hearing from Prock that
Cottrell was a possible suspect in a shooting death.

In a pre-trial hearing, the State proffered testimony from
Johnson, Prock, and Guthinger in an effort to establish that
McGarry had reasonably articulable suspicion to conduct a
Terry stop during his encounter with Cottrell as a matter of
law. Much of Johnson’s pre-trial testimony was dedicated to
the facts he relied on in identifying Cottrell as a “suspect” in
Hartman’s murder, including Hartman’s escort business, his
relationship with Cottrell, and the circumstances surrounding
his homicide. Lastly, Johnson explained that the entirety of his

10. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

interactions with members of MBPD was to inform them there
had been a homicide, a shooting was involved, and that he was
looking at a couple of suspects, one of them being Cottrell.

At trial, the State called upon Prock to testify that she
relayed Johnson’s request to McGarry. In response to Prock’s
testimony, Cottrell sought to call Johnson to testify regarding
the information he knew about Cottrell’s involvement in the
Hartman murder, arguing that Johnson did not have reason-
able suspicion to identify Cottrell as a “suspect,” making
McGarry’s Terry stop an unlawful seizure. The trial judge
excluded Johnson’s testimony on the basis that particular
information about the Hartman murder investigation was not
relevant, and even if it were, its prejudicial effect and potential
to mislead or confuse the jury substantially outweighed its
probative value. However, the trial judge left the door open
for Cottrell to call any witness he wished, including Johnson,
to contradict or impeach anything that Prock testified to
regarding the information that was passed to McGarry. After
Prock testified, Cottrell did not call Johnson to contradict or
impeach any of her statements.

Cottrell now argues the trial judge’s ruling violated his
constitutional right to present a defense, and his due process
and Fourth Amendment rights. According to Cottrell, the
lawfulness of McGarry’s actions and Cottrell’s level of culpa-
bility are dependent on whether Johnson possessed reasonable
suspicion himself. Thus, Cottrell argues that the jury should
have determined, as a matter of fact, whether Johnson pos-
sessed reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.

B. Discussion

HEM The right to present a complete defense is violated
by the exclusion of defense evidence pursuant to a state rule
of evidence only in rare circumstances. Nevada v. Jackson,
569 U.S. 505, 183 S.Ct, 1990, 1992, 186 L.Ed.2d 62 (2013). The
right to present a defense is not without limits, and the right
does not allow criminal defendants to present any evidence
regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence. See
U.S. v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996). Trial
judges are afforded wide latitude in determining whether
evidence is admissible. State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 624, 703

S.E.2d 226, 229 (2010). “To warrant reversal based on the
admission or exclusion of evidence, the appellant must prove
both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice, ie.,
that there is a reasonable probability the jury’s verdict was
influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof.”
Fields v. Regional Medical Center Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19,
26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005),

HM “The trial judge is given broad discretion in ruling
on questions concerning the relevancy of evidence, and his
decision will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of
discretion,” State v. Aleksey, 848 S.C. 20, 35, 588 8.H.2d 248,
256 (2000). Even where evidence is relevant, it may still be
excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighs its probative value. Id.; Rule 408, SCRE. The decision
whether to admit evidence under this rule is again left to the
sound discretion of the trial judge, and the decision will only
be set aside in extraordinary circumstances where the discre-
tion has been plainly abused. United States v. Simpson, 910
F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990).

We reject Cottrell’s broad assertions that his constitutional
rights were violated by the exclusion of Johnson’s testimony.
Unquestionably, his right to present a defense and the con-
frontation clause are still subject to the rules of evidence, and
Cottrell does not challenge the constitutionality of those rules.
See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98
L.Hd.2d 798 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered
right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or
otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”). On
the various grounds which Cottrell challenges the exclusion of
Johnson’s testimony—though we find no error in the trial
judge’s ruling—Cottrell must still establish prejudice, and we
find none here. See State v. Jenkins, 412 S.C. 648, 651, 778
§.E.2d 906, 909 (2015).

HM From an evidentiary standpoint, we find no error in
the trial judge’s assessment that the risk of prejudice or
confusion substantially outweighed the probative value, if any,
of Johnson’s testimony because McGarry’s reasonable suspi-
cion to conduct a Terry stop was not solely dependent on
Johnson's request, It is well-established that reasonable suspi-
cion is judged according to the complete facts and circum-

stances known to the officer at the time the seizure is made.
See US. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66
L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In this case, McGarry had knowledge
beyond that which Johnson possessed, including the specifics
of Cottrell’s prior arrest, his connection to the drug trade, an
allegation that Cottrell had held a woman hostage over an
unpaid debt, and an outstanding charge in New York for
attempted murder. Furthermore, the observations McGarry
made on the night of his murder were unique to him, and
Johnson had no knowledge as to what McGarry witnessed,
such as whether Cottrell was illegally carrying a concealed
weapon or the movement of Cottrell’s hand toward his waist-
band, that spurred him to seize Cottrell. Lastly, for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we find the seizure did
not occur at the moment McGarry began interacting with
Cottrell, nor when McGarry informed him that he would like
to perform a pat-down for weapons; rather, the seizure oc-
eurred only when McGarry placed his hands on Cottrell in an
effort to restrict his movement, and at that time, witnesses
corroborated that Cottrell’s right hand was located near his
waist band—an indicator to an experienced officer like MeGar-
ry that Cottrell may have been reaching for a weapon. See
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547,
118 L.Hd.2d 690 (1991) (finding a suspect was not seized when
he did not submit to a police officer’s authority after receiving
orders to stop, and the seizure only occurred once the officer
tackled the suspect). Because Johnson’s identification of Cott-
rell as a suspect was not the sole piece of information known
to McGarry, it reduces the probative value of Johnson’s testi-
mony. On the other hand, the trial judge found Johnson’s
testimony about the Hartman murder would have necessarily
led to a “trial within a trial” that would not only confuse the
issues and mislead the jury, but would cause substantial
prejudice to Cottrell by exposing the jury to a litany of other
erimes and bad acts which the parties had earlier agreed to
keep unknown to the jury. Thus, we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the trial judge’s conclusion that the risk of confusion
and prejudicial effects of Johnson’s testimony substantially
outweighed its probative value.

HM Additionally, based on the evidence presented, we find
Cottrell was not entitled to a jury charge on reasonable

se a

suspicion, but rather, the focus for the jury in determining the
lawfulness of the stop was the reasonableness of the manner
in which McGarry acted. While the lawfulness of an arrest is
within the province of the jury’s deliberation, our manslaugh-
ter jurisprudence does not dictate that the existence of reason-
able suspicion is necessarily a component for the jury to
consider—the inquiry may be limited to analyzing the manner
in which the officer acted, and whether he used a proportion-
ate amount of force. This point is illustrated by the fact that
both parties asked the trial judge to rule on the lawfulness of
McGarry’s Terry stop as a matter of law in pre-trial hearings.
While the trial judge declined to rule at that time, preferring
to see how the issue would develop at trial and what evidence
the parties would offer, his reason for excluding Johnson’s
testimony is clarified by his post-trial order, where the trial
judge found McGarry possessed reasonable suspicion as a
matter of law. We are confident that after hearing Johnson's
testimony, the trial judge was able to determine that Johnson
himself possessed a reasonable suspicion, and therefore, his
testimony was properly excluded to prevent it from unduly
prejudicing or confusing the jury, instead allowing the jury to
limit its inquiry to the reasonableness of the manner in which
McGarry acted.

HM In summary, we find Cottrell’s argument that the
trial judge violated his rights to present a defense and to
confront a witness are without merit. “A defendant’s right to
present a defense is not absolute: criminal defendants do not
have a right to present evidence that the district court, in its
discretion, deems irrelevant or immaterial.” United States v.
Prince-Oyibo, 320 F.8d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2008). The trial
judge stated appropriate reasons to exclude Johnson’s testi-
mony based on Rules 401 and 403, SCRE, and because
Cottrell has not shown an abuse of discretion, we affirm the
trial judge’s evidentiary ruling."

11, Additionally, we find it difficult to discern what prejudice Cottrell
suffered from the exclusion of Johnson’s testimony and do not see a
reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict was influenced by the
exclusion of Johnson's testimony. Not only does Johnson’s testimony
further support finding McGarry possessed reasonable suspicion and
affirm the lawfulness of his actions, its admission would have also led
to the introduction of evidence that Cottrell acted with malice when he

— ©
IV. JURY INSTRUCTION ON MALICE

HM During the jury charge conference, Cottrell requested
that the trial judge charge the jury not to infer malice from
the use of a deadly weapon, in accordance with Cottrell’s
reading of State v. Belcher, 885 S.C. 597, 685 S.H.2d 802
(2009). The trial judge agreed to remove any instruction
permitting the jury to infer malice from the use of a deadly
weapon, but he refused to issue an express instruction that the
jury could not infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon,
noting that the jury has the right to make inferences from the
evidence if it chooses to do so.

Cottrell argues that his due process rights were violated by
the trial judge’s refusal to affirmatively instruct the jury not
to infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon because it
allowed the prosecution to shirk its burden of proof during
closing arguments by telling the jury to infer malice from
Cottrell’s gun, We disagree.

HE «A trial court is required to charge the current and
correct law in South Carolina. State v. Brandt, 393 8.C. 526,
549, 718 S.H.2d 591, 608 (2011). An appellate court will only
reverse a trial court’s decision regarding a jury charge if there
is an abuse of discretion. State v. Pittman, 878 S.C. 527, 570,
647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007). This Court’s landmark decision in
State v. Belcher departed from the then-common practice of
charging the jury that it may imply malice from the use of a
deadly weapon, even where the defendant presents evidence
that he used the weapon in self-defense, 385 S.C. 597, 685
S.E.2d 802 (2009). Belcher created a new standard whereby
jurors could no longer be charged to infer malice from the use
of a deadly weapon where evidence is presented that would
reduce, mitigate, excuse, or justify the homicide. Id. at 600,
685 §.H.2d at 804. In an instructive footnote, the Court
clarified that its opinion was narrowly tailored to apply to the
jury charge only, but did not “restrict the State from arguing
to the jury for a finding of malice from the use of a deadly
weapon, nor restrict a defendant from arguing the absence of
malice or the presence of reasonable doubt in this regard.” Id.
at 612, n. 9, 685 S.H.2d at 810, n. 9.

killed McGarry, negating the existence of legal provocation or self-
defense.

i Pe

Here, the trial judge fully complied with Belcher and did not
charge the jurors that they could infer malice from Cottrell’s
use of the weapon. He instructed only that malice could be
inferred from conduct showing a total disregard for human
life. Accordingly, we find the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion because his jury instructions complied with Belcher,
and the additional charge requested by Cottrell was not
supported by any authority. Furthermore, contrary to Cott-
rell’s assertion that his case is similar to Belcher where it was
entirely conceivable that the only evidence of malice was the
defendant’s use of a handgun, there is ample evidence in the
record here that would allow the jury to infer malice based on
Cottrell’s conduct showing a total disregard for human life,
including his indiscriminate shooting that struck several vehi-
cles and a restaurant across the street, thereby endangering
members of the public. Thus, we affirm the trial judge’s
instructions.

V. CONTENTS OF THE JURY NOTE

HM Lastly, Cottrell argues the trial judge’s refusal to
inform defense counsel of the contents of the jury note indicat-
ing the jury's numerical division during sentencing delibera-
tions violated his right to assistance of counsel, a fair jury
trial, and a non-arbitrary verdict. We disagree.

HM Section 16-3-20(C) states that the trial judge must
impose a life sentence if a capital sentencing jury cannot reach
a recommendation after a reasonable deliberation. The deter-
mination of whether a jury has engaged in a “reasonable
deliberation” is a matter committed to the trial judge’s discre-
tion. Tucker v. Catoe, 846 8.C. 488, 489, 552 S.H.2d 712, 715
(2001). In Tucker, the jury deliberated late into the night and
resumed the next day; that afternoon, the foreman sent a note
to the judge stating that the jury was unable to reach a
verdict at that time and asking for a recharge on the juror’s
responsibilities. 7d. at 491, 552 S.H.2d at 716. The judge then
issued an Allen charge, which this Court found was unconsti-
tutionally coercive under the totality of the circumstances,
specifically finding the charge impermissible because it singled
out the lone juror in the minority. Tucker, 346 S.C, at 498, 552
§.E.2d at 717. Additionally, the Court was critical of the
judge’s treatment of notes he received from the jury. The

a ws
judge did not disclose the contents of the first note, which
stated the jury was deadlocked at 10-2 in favor the death
penalty, but simply told the parties the jury wished to rehear
testimony. Jd. at 495, 552 S.H.2d at 718. The jury sent a
second note the following day informing the judge it was
divided 11-1 and that it was “hopelessly deadlocked” and not
likely to ever get a unanimous verdict. Jd. Emphasizing that it
was relying on a “combination of withholding pertinent infor-
mation from the parties, thereby depriving them of the facts
necessary to make informed decisions; failing to instruct the
jury to omit from its future communication any reference to
the nature of its division; and giving an unconstitutionally
coercive Allen charge, with its emphasis on a collective result,”
the Court granted the defendant a new sentencing proceeding.
Id.

Unlike in Tucker, the note sent by the jury in Cottrell’s case
did not state that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The note
simply indicated what the jurors’ vote was and inquired as to
the next step, The trial judge acted within his discretion and
determined that the jury had not yet reached a deadlock after
“reasonable deliberation” because it had only been deliberat-
ing for two hours at that point. Without a deadlock, the trial
judge found it was not appropriate to give an Allen charge,
instead simply telling the jury to continue with its delibera-
tions. Furthermore, the trial judge followed the Court’s in-
structions in Tucker and advised the jury not to notify him of
its specific vote counts in future notes. The trial judge notified
the parties of the contents of the jury’s note, withholding only
the numerical split.

Cottrell cites to United States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 525
(ist Cir. 1991), and State v. Tremblay, 820 A.2d 571, 575~76
(Me. 2003) to demonstrate that the trial judge violated Cott-
rell’s rights by not disclosing the numerical split. In both
cases, the courts found the respective trial judges should have
disclosed knowledge of numerical splits to the parties because
it deprived them of an opportunity to be adequately heard
before the trial judges responded to the juries’ inquiries.
However, in both Maraj and Tremblay, the courts found the
failure to disclose the numerical split was harmless error and
the defendants suffered no prejudice. See Maraj, 947 F.2d at
526 (holding whether the failure to disclose the numerical split

was viewed under the more strict standard for constitutional
violations or under less stringent standard applicable to most
trial errors, the error was harmless); Tremblay, 820 A.2d at
577 (explaining that because the note indicated the jury
“reached a relative standstill in deliberations and needed
further instructions on how to proceed,” and was not “substan-
tive inquiry into fact or law” the court’s limited disclosure of
the contents made the defendant less susceptible to prejudice).

HM Accepting Cottrell’s argument that the trial judge
should have disclosed the numerical split, we agree with the
State that the decision is subject to a harmless error analysis.
Because the trial judge concluded the jury had not yet
reached a deadlock such that he needed to give an Allen
charge, even if Cottrell had been notified of the numerical
split, there was nothing further for him to do at the time to
protect his rights. See Maraj, 947 F.2d at 526 (“Moreover, had
the full note been contemporaneously disclosed, there was
nothing more that defense counsel could appropriately have
done to protect their clients’ rights. On this record, we fail to
see any realistic possibility that the partial nondisclosure
prejudiced the defense, contributed even fractionally to the
convictions, influenced the jury en route to the verdicts,
swayed the trial’s outcome, or adversely affected the appel-
lants’ substantial rights.”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial
judge’s ruling.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

HM Pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 16-3-25(C)
(2015), this Court must review the proportionality of Cottrell’s
death sentence. From our review of the record, we find the
sentence was not imposed as a result of passion, prejudice, or
any other arbitrary factor. The evidence clearly supports the
jury’s finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. See 8.C.
Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C). Lastly, the death penalty has been
imposed in similar cases where the aggravating circumstances
involved the death of a police officer. See Sapp, 366 S.C. at
294, 621 S.H.2d at 888; Aleksey, 848 S.C. at 36, 588 S.H.2d at
256.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court committed no
reversible error and Cottrell’s conviction and sentence for the
murder of Officer McGarry are AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE and JAMES, JJ., concur.
FEW, J., concurring in result only in a separate opinion,

JUSTICE FEW:

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I disagree,
however, with two points in the majority’s analysis.

I. Removal of Attorneys

First, I disagree that a trial court has “discretion” to
remove trial counsel over the defendant’s objection as an
exercise of the court’s duty to ensure the defendant receives a
fair trial. This Court has never before recognized such discre-
tion, nor has any court of which I am aware, In each case cited
by the majority to support its holding, the trial court made a
specific factual finding that the attorney was legally disquali-
fied due to a conflict of interest or a likelihood the attorney
would be a witness at trial. The trial court’s failure to make
such specific findings in this case is the error we address in
this appeal,” and clearly distinguishes each of those cases
from this one. The majority has taken those cases far out of
their proper context, and the cases do not support the majori-
ty’s holding.

For example, the majority states “the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is ‘cireumscribed by the trial court’s obligation
to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings and ensure trials
are conducted according to the ethical standards of the profes-
sion,’” quoting State v. Sanders, 341 S.C. 386, 389, 584 S.E.2d
696, 697 (2000). Sanders, however, involved an allegation the
attorney would be called as a “necessary witness” in the trial,

12, Cottrell’s own statement of the issue before us is, “The trial court's
removal of the lawyers appointed to represent [Cottrell], over the
objection of both [Cottrell] and his lawyers, and in the absence of any
findings justifying this interference with an established attorney-client
relationship, violated [Cottrell’s] rights to counsel and due process
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments...” Appellant's Br. 10
(emphasis added).

8 Pe

and thus was legally disqualified pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the
South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Jd.; see Rule
3.7, RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (providing, “A lawyer shall not
act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be
a necessary witness....”). In Sanders, we actually reversed
the trial court’s decision to remove counsel even though the
trial court’s ruling was based on a finding of legal disqualifica-
tion. 341 S.C, at 390, 534 S.H.2d at 698. Sanders does not
support the existence of “discretion” to remove an attorney
without any finding of a legal basis for disqualification.

Sanders relied on United States v. Howard, 115 F.8d 1151
(4th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Williams, 81 F.8d 1821
(4th Cir. 1996), In Williams, the district court disqualified
counsel based on its finding counsel had a conflict of interest.
81 F.3d at 1828, Williams then offered to supply auxiliary
counsel to cross-examine the witness whose testimony provid-
ed the primary basis for counsel’s conflict, but the district
court elected not to permit the arrangement. Jd. Later,
Williams claimed the witness would not testify because she
would assert a privilege, and thus the potential conflict was
not a concern. Id. The district court rejected the argument
and permitted the government to call the witness. Jd. Thus,
when the Fourth Circuit stated “disqualification of Williams’s
counsel was well within the district court’s discretion,” 81 F.3d
at 1825, the appellate court was referring to the trial court’s
discretion to reject the arrangement proposed to eliminate the
conflict, not discretion to remove counsel when no disqualify-
ing reason existed.

In Howard, which the majority in this case quotes directly,
the district court made two separate factual findings to sup-
port its conclusion counsel was legally disqualified—counsel
had a conflict of interest and counsel was likely to be a
necessary witness. 115 F.3d at 1155. However, the defendant
attempted to waive the conflict and argued counsel would not
be required to testify. Id. Reviewing the district court’s deci-
sion not to permit the waiver and not to accept the argument
counsel would not testify, the Fourth Cireuit stated the “right
to be represented by an attorney of his own choosing ... is
circumscribed by ... the obligation of trial courts to safeguard
the integrity of the proceedings before them,” and “a trial
court ’must have sufficiently broad discretion to rule without

fear that it is setting itself up for reversal on appeal’ if it
disqualifies a defendant’s chosen lawyer.” Id. (quoting
Williams, 81 F.8d at 1824), Therefore, the “discretion” re-
ferred to by the Fourth Circuit is not the discretion to do what
the trial court did here, but only that “district courts ‘must be
allowed substantial latitude’ in rejecting waivers of this sort.”
Id.

The majority also relies on State v. Justus, 392 S.C. 416, 709
§.E.2d 668 (2011). In Justus, the “the solicitor filed a motion
entitled ‘Motion to Have the Court Determine Whether De-
fense Counsel has an Actual Conflict of Interest.’ ” 392 S.C. at
417, 709 S.E.2d at 669. The motion was based on the solicitor’s
contention that defense counsel represented the State’s lead
investigator, who was a potential witness in the case. 392 S.C.
at 417-18, 709 S.E.2d at 669. At a hearing on the motion, the
defense attorney testified she represented the investigator
only for a limited purpose, which had been completed, and she
was no longer representing him. 392 S.C. at 418, 709 S.E.2d at
669. The resolution of the motion, therefore, turned on the
factual question of whether the defense attorney continued to
represent the investigator, and thus whether or not a conflict
of interest would arise if he testified. We stated,

We acknowledge that it is a close question whether [coun-

sel]’s representation of [the investigator] was ongoing or

had concluded. Moreover, it is fairly debatable whether [the
witness]’s potential testimony presented an actual conflict of
interest. However, given the conflicting evidence before the
trial court, and giving deference to its findings of fact, we
find no abuse of discretion in the disqualification of [coun-
sel].

392 S.C. at 419, 709 S,E.2d at 670.

The “discretion” to which we referred in Justus was discre-
tion to make the factual finding necessary to determine if a
potential conflict of interest existed, not to simply remove
counsel with no finding of legal disqualification, As it did with
Sanders and Howard, the majority has taken Justus out of
context, and Justus does not support the majority’s holding.

Based on Sanders, Howard, and Justus, the majority treats
the trial court’s ruling to dismiss counsel as one “largely
addressed to the trial judge’s discretion,” and states “we

believe the trial judge acted ... in accordance with his broad
discretionary authority in removing Cottrell’s appointed attor-
neys.” I strongly disagree with the majority’s characterization
of the trial court’s authority. In my opinion, a trial court may
not terminate the attorney-client relationship between a crimi-
nal defendant and his counsel over the defendant’s objection
without first making specific findings that a valid basis for
disqualification exists. See generally United States v. Gonza-
lez-Lopez, 648 U.S. 140, 147-48, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 165 L.Ed.
2d 409, 419 (2006) (“The right to select counsel of one’s choice
... has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitution-
al [Sixth Amendment's] guarantee. ... Deprivation of the
right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously prevent-
ed from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless
of the quality of the representation he received. To argue
otherwise is to confuse the right to counsel of choice—which is
the right to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative
effectiveness—with the right to effective counsel—which im-
poses a baseline requirement of competence on whatever
lawyer is chosen or appointed.”); Faretta v. California, 422
US. 806, 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d 562, 572-73
(1975) (“The right to defend is given directly to the accused;
for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails.... To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his
considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.”).

That does not mean the trial court’s error requires a new
trial. First, I would remand this case to the trial court and
require the court to make findings as to whether a valid basis
for disqualification exists. Even without a remand, however, I
would not reverse the trial court and order a new trial. I

13. It makes no difference that counsel was appointed. See Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 n.5, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1622 n.5, 75 L.Ed. 2d 610,
627 n.5 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“But the considerations that
may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant’s right to choose his
own counsel ... should not preclude recognition of an indigent defen-
dant’s interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney
with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence...
[An indigent defendant has an important interest in a relationship that
he might develop with his appointed attorney.”); see also Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L.Ed. 2d 333,
344 (1980) (stating, in a different context, “we see no basis for drawing
a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny
equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers”).

would instead affirm on the narrow basis that the facts in this
record do not require a new trial.

As then Solicitor Hembree stated at the hearing the trial
court conducted to address this question, this was an “extreme
situation.” Prior to the hearing, both Solicitor Hembree and
then deputy solicitor Richardson submitted memoranda to the
trial court in which they described separate conversations
each had with Cottrell’s first and second chair attorneys.
Solicitor Hembree’s memo documents the statement of first
chair counsel that “in her career practicing law she had never
worked with any lawyer more dishonest or unethical than
[second chair]” and “she could not wait to get this case
concluded just to get away from him.” Deputy Richardson’s
memo documents the statement of second chair that first chair
“was lazy, not easily motivated, and drank too much.” Deputy
Richardson’s memo states second chair “said that he had to
take the lead on getting started for this trial because [first
chair] would never request discovery, look into getting ex-
perts, and investigate the details of the shooting or possibili-
ties of misconduct” by officer MeGarry."*

The trial court met privately with each defense attorney
before the hearing. At the hearing, the trial court stated he
was able to verify “the memoranda which were provided to me
are correct” that both defense attorneys had accused the other
of “what I consider to be serious misconduct.” The court
explained that “each of defense counsel believed that the
allegations were correct” and “both counsel told me that in
their opinion ... [Cottrell’s] defense was being jeopardized.”
While I believe the trial court erred by not making specific
findings, the court explained, “I have been very careful not to
go into the specifies ..., but there have been allegations
involving dishonesty, unethical conduct, personal problems

14, See State v. Cottrell, 376 S.C. 260, 265, 657 S.E,2d 451, 454 (2008)
(finding the evidence presented at Cottrell’s first trial supported the
“reasonable inference ... that [officer McGarry] reacted in an imper-
missibly aggressive manner, physically assaulting and then shooting
[Cottrell] when he exercised his constitutional right to walk away” and
“evidence in this case presented a jury question whether the arrest was
lawful but effectuated through the victim’s unnecessary use of vio-
lence”).

that should be addressed, all sorts of things that I believe ...
would be of grave concern.”

In a written order, the trial court stated first chair “made
serious allegations of dishonesty and unethical conduct against
her co-counsel,” and second chair “challenged [first chair’s]
competence, work ethic, and personal life.” The court stated,
“Each acknowledged having made the statements against co-
counsel and that they believed the statements to be true.”

In conclusion, the trial court should have made specific
findings on the record, and given that it did not do so, this
Court should remand with a requirement that those findings
be made now. However, I acknowledge the trial court was in a
very difficult position. In ten years as a trial judge in which I
presided over hundreds of criminal trials and numerous capital
cases, I never faced an “extreme situation” like this. I am not
sure how I would have handled it if I had. Reading this record
convinces me that a dilemma of this magnitude will almost
never arise. While I steadfastly disagree with the majority’s
characterization of the trial court’s power to resolve this
problem as one of “wide latitude” or “considerable discretion,”
I do believe that on these unique facts the failure of the trial
court to make specific findings that would form the basis for a
legal disqualification does not warrant a new trial.

IL. Contents of the Jury Note

That it is error for a trial court to refuse to inform defense
counsel of the contents of a note from the jury should require
no explanation. In my view, a trial court has no authority to
refuse to inform trial counsel of any information regarding the
conduct of a trial. If this Court takes seriously the duty of
counsel to provide effective assistance under the Sixth Amend-
ment, then we must also recognize the elementary principle
that counsel must have available the information necessary to
fulfill that duty. The idea that a trial court may unilaterally
decide not to provide such information to trial counsel in any
proceeding—particularly the sentencing phase of a capital
trial—is absurd.

As to whether this obvious error requires reversal, Cottrell
has not articulated any action trial counsel could have taken if
the information was disclosed that would have changed the

Se os
way the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing or al-

tered its outcome. I agree, therefore, with the majority’s
conclusion the error was harmless.